The Evidence for God: Religious Knowledge Reexamined

T H E EVIDENCE FOR GOD eligious Knowledge Reexamined PAUL K. M O S E R

AMBRIDGE

THE EVIDENCE FOR

GOD

If God exists, where can w e find adequate evidence for God's existence? In this book, Paul K. Moser offers a new perspective on the evidence for God that centers on a morally robust version of theism that is cognitively resilient. The resulting evidence for God is not speculative, abstract, or casual. Rather, it is morally and existentially challenging to humans, as they themselves responsively and willingly become evidence of God's reality in receiving and reflecting God's moral character for others. Moser calls this "personifying evidence of G o d , " because it requires the evidence to be personified in an intentional agent - such as a human - and thereby to be inherent evidence of an intentional agent. Contrasting this approach with skepticism, scientific naturalism, fideism, and natural theology, Moser also grapples with the potential problems of divine hiddenness, religious diversity, and vast evil. Paul K. Moser is professor and chair of the philosophy department at Loyola University Chicago. Editor of Jesus and Philosophy and the journal American Philosophical Quarterly, he is author of The Elusive God: Reorienting Religious Epistemology, Philosophy After Objectivity, and Knowledge and Evidence, as well as co-editor of Divine Hiddenness and The Rationality of Theism.

The Evidence for God Religious Knowledge

Reexamined

PAUL K. MOSER Loyola University Chicago

§|§ C A M B R I D G E ^0

UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo, Delhi, Dubai, Tokyo Cambridge University Press 32 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10013-2473, USA www.cambridge.org Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521736282 © Paul K. Moser 2010 This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press. First published 2010 Printed in the United States of America A catalog record for this publication is available from the British Library. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication data

Moser, Paul K., 1957The evidence for God : religious knowledge reexamined / Paul K. Moser. p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 978-0-521-51656-3 (hardback) 1 . God-Proof. 2. God (Christianity) 3. Knowledge, Theory of (Religion) I. Title. BT103.M67 2009 2ii'.3-dc22 2009037197 ISBN ISBN

978-0-521-51656-3 Hardback 978-0-521-73628-2 Paperback

Cambridge University Press has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLS for external or third-party Internet Web sites referred to in this publication and does not guarantee that any content on such Web sites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

For Anna and hauta

Among the mature wedo speak wisdom, but not the vrisdom of this age. 1 Corinthians 2:6

Contents

Preface Introduction 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 1.

Nontheistic Naturalism 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

2.

Science and Purpose Purposive Explanation Ontological Naturalism Methodological Naturalism A Dilemma for Scientism Theism beyond Scientism

Fideism and Faith 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

3.

A Wilderness Parable Beyond Taste The Title " G o d " Bias in Inquiry Divine Evidence Overview

Faith Philosophy and Faith Christian Faith Faith in Action Whither Fideism? Argument-Indifferent Fideism

Natural Theology and God 1. A Living G o d vii

viii

CONTENTS

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 4.

Personifying Evidence of God 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

5.

Whither Natural Theology? Natural Theology after Darwin From Call to Kerygma Valuing Theistic Belief Summary Argument

Skeptical Doubts Inquirers under Scrutiny From Scrutiny to Rescue Arguing for God Volitional and Filial Knowledge Good N e w s Gift as Power

Diversity, Evil, and Defeat 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Religious Diversity and Logical Exclusion Redemptive Exclusivism Exclusivism toward God Inclusive Christian Exclusivism Evil as Defeater Conclusion

References Index

The question of whether G o d exists is enduringly with us, whether w e like it or not; so, w e might as w e l l deal with it straight up. This book approaches the question of whether G o d exists from a n e w perspective, in which humans themselves are put under moral question, before G o d ' s authority, in raising the question of whether G o d exists. The result is a n e w perspective on the evidence for G o d , including a morally robust version of theism that is cognitively resilient, even against skepticism. The resulting evidence for G o d is not speculative, abstract, or casual but is, instead, morally and existentially challenging to humans. This evidence becomes salient to inquirers as they themselves responsively and willingly become evidence of G o d ' s reality in receiving and reflecting G o d ' s moral character for others. The book calls this personifying evidence of God, because it requires the evidence to be personified in an intentional agent, such as a purposive h u m a n , and thereby to be evidence inherently of an intentional agent. The book contrasts its approach with skepticism, scientific naturalism, fideism, and natural theology, and it faces directly the potential problems for theism raised b y divine hiddenness, religious diversity, and vast evil. In the end, a morally challenging version of theism emerges as cognitively tenable. The book d r a w s from revised parts of some of m y recent essays in the philosophy of religion: "Farewell to ix

x

PREFACE

Philosophical Naturalism” (with David Yandell), in William Lane Craig and J. P. Moreland, eds., Naturalism: A Critical Analysis (London: Routledge, 2000); “Religious Exclusivism,” in Chad Meister, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Religious Diversity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010); “Sin and Salvation,” in Charles Taliaferro and Chad Meister, eds., The Cambridge Companion to Christian Philosophical Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); and “Faith in God,” in Michael Austin and Doug Geivett, eds., Christian Virtue (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2010). Many people have been helpful with comments, suggestions, questions, and discussions, including Linda Moser, Tom Carson, Arnold vander Nat, David Yandell, Chad Meister, Gregory Wolcott (who gave special help with the index), Mark McCreary, Bryan Kibbe, Meghan Sullivan, Keith Yandell, Paul Knitter, Paul Copan, William Abraham, Jason Baehr, John Bishop, Jay Wood, Tedla Gebreyesus, Paul Mueller, Tom Wren, J.D. Trout, Andrew Cutrofello, Alvin Plantinga, Randy Newman, and the students in my philosophy graduate seminars at Loyola University Chicago. I thank them for their kind and significant help. I also thank the audiences at various presentations of some of the book’s material, including at Loyola University Chicago, Princeton Seminary, Baylor University, Loyola Marymount University, Wheaton College, Bethel College (Indiana), and some recent meetings of the Evangelical Philosophical Society in Chicago and Providence. In addition, I thank Samuel Attoh, the Associate Provost for Research at Loyola University Chicago, for important assistance. Finally, Andy Beck, Beatrice Rehl, and James Dunn have been very helpful at Cambridge University Press, and Ken Karpinski at Aptara and Linda H. Smith have been very helpful in the production process. Paul K. Moser Chicago, Illinois

Introduction

“Many questions are answered wrongly, not because the evidence is contradictory or inadequate, but because the mind through its fundamental dispositions and presuppositions is out of focus with the only kind of evidence which is really available.” – H.H. Farmer 1927, p. 5.

The question of whether God exists is at least as old as the hills, and the human race, too, but old age in this case has not yielded undisputed wisdom or even broad clarity. In fact, although obviously of first importance, the question of whether God exists has suffered from a certain widespread human bias regarding the manner in which we should approach it. The bias obscures how human inquirers themselves are arguably put under question, before God’s authority, in raising the question of whether God exists. This book uncovers this bias, challenges it, and offers an alternative, more defensible approach to the question of whether God exists. The result is a new perspective on the evidence for God. Upon asking aright the question of whether God exists, the book contends, we find a morally robust version of theism that is cognitively resilient. We also then find that the evidence for God is not speculative, abstract, or casual, after all, but is, instead, morally and existentially challenging to us humans. This evidence thus extends beyond the 1

2

THE EVIDENCE FOR GOD

argumentative domain of philosophers and theologians, and engages people from all w a l k s of life at the levels of w h o they are and w h o they should be. The evidence in question, w e shall see, has a distinctive character: this evidence becomes salient to inquirers as they, themselves, responsively and willingly become evidence of God's reality, in willingly receiving and reflecting G o d ' s powerful moral character - specifically divine, unselfish love for others, even one's enemies. We shall call this personifying evidence of God, because it requires the evidence to be personified in an intentional agent, such as a purposive human, and thereby to be evidence inherently of an intentional agent. Such evidence, in keeping with its divine source, is inherently for the sake of others and, ideally, it is realized intentionally b y humans for others. Philosophers, among m a n y others, have neglected to look in this quarter for evidence of G o d , but this book offers the needed correction and thereby gives n e w foundations to belief in G o d . Personifying h u m a n evidence of G o d , although w i d e l y neglected, w o u l d fit well with the reality of a G o d w h o aims not simply to inform humans but primarily to d r a w them noncoercively into taking on, or personifying, G o d ' s perfect moral character, in fellowship with G o d . Part of this divine aim w o u l d be to h a v e humans become bearers of G o d ' s moral character in a w a y that brings G o d ' s distinctive, if elusive, presence near to others. This book presents the case for such morally challenging personifying evidence of G o d . In doing so, it attends to the role of h u m a n resistance to such evidence in obscuring the reality of not only this evidence but also G o d himself.

1. A W I L D E R N E S S P A R A B L E

A reality-based parable will give us needed focus, and save us from u n d u e abstractness, in our inquiry about G o d ' s existence. During summertime hiking, w e h a v e become lost in the expansive wilderness area of Hells C a n y o n between

INTRODUCTION

3

western Idaho and northeastern Oregon. North America's deepest river gorge, Hells C a n y o n drops about 8,000 feet below Idaho's Seven Devils Mountains, and is carved by the w i l d Snake River. The C a n y o n is ten miles w i d e , and is happily free of cars, trucks, and even roads - and therefore McDonald's drive-throughs. It is notorious for being inaccessible by any easy means. Unfortunately, w e h a v e ended u p deep in this river gorge, without a helpful exit m a p or any other worthwhile plan of departure. We are n o w confronted with m a n y difficulties, including the following: seemingly endless miles of seemingly directionless foot trails, dangerous western rattlesnakes, roaming mountain lions (a.k.a. cougars), howling coyotes, unpredictable temperatures, meager supplies, d y i n g cell phone batteries, increasing hunger, and no satellite navigation system. However, w e happen upon a dilapidated, abandoned shack hailing from the short-lived gold miners of the 1860s. The shack contains, not a double-quad-core computer with broadband internet access, but instead some rusty pots and pans and a barely functional amateur (ham) radio left behind recently b y distracted employees of the U S Forest Service. The radio's battery still w o r k s but probably not for long. A s a result, our predicament in Hells C a n y o n seems bleak indeed, but perhaps is not without some hope. How, then, might w e survive? Obviously, w e need a w a y out of Hells C a n y o n , sooner rather than later. In particular, w e need instructions and even an instructor to help us to get out, given that w e lack the resources, including a trustworthy plan, to make our w a y out on our own. We need a personal agent w h o is an intentional instructor, b e y o n d mere instructions, because w e need someone w h o (a) will intentionally and reliably identify our particular location n o w relative to a path that leads to our rescue, and (b) will supply further resources w e will need along the path to our safety, including corrections, reminders, and perhaps even encouraging w o r d s to sustain us. A s a result, w e should not assume that our problem is

4

THE EVIDENCE FOR GOD

simply cognitive; in our journey to safety, w e shall need some ongoing aid beyond k n o w n information. A particularly noteworthy need concerns our deepest motives and related attitudes. If w e are to be guided trustworthily but noncoercively along the path to safety, w e will need to be ready and willing to be so guided. A s a result, w e m a y need some motivational and attitudinal transformation, and even moral transformation. We shall be particularly aware of this kind of need in subsequent discussion, once w e turn directly to k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s reality. E v e n so, w e need at least someone w h o can identify a trustworthy path from where w e are n o w to eventual safety, in contrast with all of the dead ends facing us in the vast wilderness. A mere m a p or set of instructions will fail us, if only because w e do not k n o w our actual location on the m a p or in the instructions, and, in any case, w e shall need ongoing intentional and corrective guidance along the path to safety. In short, the path w e need calls for a path finder and a path sustainer for us. The first step for us is sincerely to acknowledge our need in our predicament. C a n w e k n o w i n g l y make contact with an intentional rescuer w h o will locate us and then help us to reach safety? If so, as w e shall see, w e w o u l d do well to ask what purposes the rescuer has in helping us to reach safety. Perhaps the rescuer's purposes are more profound and morally better than ours. The ham radio, at any rate, seems to be our only m e d i u m of hope, although it definitely has seen better days. Still, might it put us in touch with someone w h o will intentionally help us out of our lost state? If w e fail in this connection, w e will perish, given our breathtakingly austere wilderness surroundings. Our predicament in the river gorge is life or death, rescue or destruction. Our either-or situation is urgent and obvious; as a result, w e should o w n it, and deal with it. Is there life b e y o n d Hells Canyon? Particularly, is there life accessible by us b e y o n d Hells Canyon? The latter question n o w amounts to this: is there an intentional rescuer available

INTRODUCTION

5

to us b e y o n d Hells Canyon? Or, in other w o r d s , are w e all u p a river gorge without a rescuer? Being nothing if not orderly thinkers, w e call an emergency strategy meeting to sort out our main options for handling the dire predicament before us. Option 1: Despairing We can just give u p n o w in abject despair, yielding to hopelessness and its resulting destruction of us all. Our being lost will then become final, and our hope will disappear altogether as w e ourselves disappear. On this option, w e will yield to Hells C a n y o n as our wilderness grave, and give u p on finding a w a y out to safety. Our conviction will be just this: " w e can't get there from here." We then will not bother even to pursue the question of whether there is an intentional rescuer available to us beyond Hells Canyon. On this option, w e are practical atheists about a rescuer, and w e succumb to the d o w n w a r d pull of fatal despair. Still, w e will h a v e to face the question of whether, given our available evidence, our despairing is premature and at least initially ill-advised. We cannot responsibly ignore this life-or-death question. Option 2: Passively Waiting We can just sit back in the dilapidated miners' shack and wait, largely in doubt, for any possible (if supposedly improbable) rescuer to find us. Our casual waiting must m a k e d o without a television and a computer, of course, but w e might play tic-tac-toe or some other trivial pencil-andpaper game while w e remain practically skeptical about the intervention of a rescuer. On this option, w e are practical agnostics about a rescuer, and w e might even take some pride in our disciplined refraining from actively seeking a rescuer. Our pride might be accompanied b y a self-indulgent d e m a n d that w e be spoon-fed b y any rescuer, without our

6

THE EVIDENCE FOR GOD

taking an active and cooperative cognitive or practical role in our rescue. In any case, w e will have to face the question of whether our available evidence, in conjunction with our best interest, supports our passively waiting. We might find that passively waiting w o u l d be irresponsible of us. Option 3: Leaping We can throw caution to the wilderness w i n d , and leap onto a foot path, even in the absence of evidence in favor of success (that is, eventual safety) in taking that path. We might conveniently pick a familiar path, one that is well-trodden, w i d e l y a p p r o v e d of, and historically dignified in the eyes of our peer group or doxastic community. Indeed, our taking this path could amount to an embraced "form of life" or a virtual social institution among our lost peers, including those w h o h a v e j u m p e d onto it before us. Of course, w e w o u l d not presume to recommend this path as supported by conclusive evidence or even significant evidence of its success, but w e do not therefore shrink back. Instead, w e gladly leap onto this path, in keeping with the familiar practices of our wilderness forebears and contemporaries. On this option, w e are practical fideists about a rescuer, because w e proceed as if conclusive evidence is not available or even needed in support of either a rescuer or our adopted plan for being found by a rescuer. Eventually, w e will have to face the natural question of whether our leaping amounts to anything more than wishful thinking on our part. A definite problem, in any case, is that m a n y of the available paths lead to dead ends (where we, too, are dead) rather than to safety. A s a result, w e should not take this option blithely. Option 4: Discerning Evidence We can tighten our belts, given our impending food shortage, and take a hard look at our available evidence for a w a y out of our dangerous wilderness predicament. This option

7

INTRODUCTION

seeks an alternative to (1) despairing, (2) passively waiting, and (3) leaping, at least as an initial strategy. It takes two significantly different forms. What appears to be an old directional m a p leading from somewhere to somewhere else emerges from a pile of clutter near the h a m radio. The origin and destination points on the m a p are far from obvious, but they seem not to involve a McDonald's restaurant or even a Starbuck's. Purpose-neutral discerning or characterizing of the apparent m a p w o u l d be free of identifying any purposes, or intentions, involving the m a p . It w o u l d identify, however, various nonpurposive features of the m a p , including geometric properties (such as shapes), constituent parts (such as opposing corners), and sensory features (such as textures). The natural sciences, unlike the social sciences and the humanities, typically settle for purpose-neutral discerning of available evidence. Such discerning can be v e r y helpful as far as it goes, but it seems not to be exhaustive in all cases. It seems not a l w a y s to offer full coverage of the actual evidence w e h a v e , particularly in connection with functional social artifacts, such as radios, telephones, computers, and M P 3 players. In any case, w e will need to ask h o w this very restrictive approach comports with our actual available evidence of the w o r l d around us and within us. We w o u l d suffer harm, of course, b y omitting crucial evidence of a rescuer. A.

PURPOSE-NEUTRAL

DISCERNING

OF

EVIDENCE.

We sometimes can discern available evidence in terms of relevant purposes indicated in the evidence. For instance, regarding our apparent directional m a p , w e can try to discern the cartographer's purpose in sketching the m a p as it actually is rather than as it w o u l d be as a result of a different purpose. Such discerning w o u l d be "telic" (from the Greek w o r d , telos, for " p u r p o s e " ) in virtue of seeking a goal or (in Aristotelian language) a "final c a u s e " in the relevant evidence. Accordingly, B. T E L I C

D I S C E R N I N G OF EVIDENCE.

8

THE EVIDENCE FOR G O D

w e might explore the m a p in terms of a directional purpose: that is, the cartographer's aim to direct readers from Point A (say, the miners' shack in Hells Canyon) to Point B (say, Baker City, OR, on the Old Oregon Trail). We therefore can imagine that the main purpose of the cartographer and her m a p is to lead lost people to safety. It m a y be difficult for us sometimes to confirm the reality of a purpose indicated b y evidence, but in telic discerning w e w o u l d be attentive to this prospect, and w e w o u l d be willing to explore any evidence for the purpose in question. In doing so, w e w o u l d m o v e b e y o n d the immediate concerns of the natural sciences, but this w o u l d not necessarily be a cognitive deficiency at all. In fact, our available evidence could call for our attending to purposive considerations for the sake of accurate comprehensive treatment of our evidence. The propriety of telic discerning therefore cannot be excluded as a matter of logical or cognitive principle. It remains as a logically and cognitively live option, and this will surprise no one w h o is not in the grips of a supposed monopoly by the natural sciences. Telic discerning of evidence takes t w o main forms: direct and indirect. Direct telic discerning identifies certain evidence as inherently and directly purposive and thus immediately indicative of a personal agent. In contrast, indirect telic discerning identifies certain evidence as extrinsically and indirectly purposive and thus inferentially indicative of a personal agent. M u c h of so-called "natural theology" offers (whether accurately or inaccurately) indirect telic discerning of certain evidence, characteristically by inference to the divine reality of (a) a purposive designer of nature, (b) an intentional first cause of observed contingent events, (c) a personal ground of moral values, or (d) a purposive basis of reflective consciousness. Questions of accuracy aside, such natural theology seeks rationally to identify divine reality indirectly, inferentially, and discursively, and thus uses distinctive premises to infer a conclusion in a natural-theological argument of one form or another. It

INTRODUCTION

9

does not offer, however, evidence as inherently purposive in the w a y that direct telic discerning does. The direct form of telic discerning finds purposive reality indicated directly in some evidence. For instance, it identifies intentional communication in some evidence without an intermediary, particularly such communication as an invitation, a call, a c o m m a n d , or a challenge. If h u m a n conscience could be a means of such communication, at least under some circumstances, then direct telic discerning could look in conscience for noninferential evidence of intentional communication, even from G o d . We shall consider this prospect in Chapter 4, in connection with a position called volitional theism. It promises to underwrite some important theological k n o w l e d g e without the u n d u l y abstract and suspect b a g g a g e that burdens much natural theology. We can use the presence of the ham radio in the miners' shack to illustrate the distinction between purpose-neutral discerning and telic discerning. Hoping against hope that a needed rescuer is accessible, w e turn on the radio and scan some easily located regional frequencies. Surprisingly, w e v a g u e l y detect an apparent voice that evidently is calling to us while breaking u p in crackling static. Purpose-neutral discerning w o u l d attend to various physical features of this intriguing radio transmission: its v o l u m e , its temporal length, its auditory sharpness, and so on. Such features, of course, are important and even physically measurable, but they do not include w h a t a person intends to communicate in a radio transmission. They are, after all, purpose-neutral, and therefore do not include or entail purposes. Telic discerning, in contrast with purpose-neutral discerning, w o u l d consider any evidence of an intended communication via the h a m radio. A s a result, it w o u l d attend to the radio in the light of w h a t (primarily) it w a s intended to convey: intentional communication among purposive agents. Indeed, the v e r y notion of a h a m radio (functionally characterized) involves the idea of such purposive communication. Accordingly, if w e dispense with the notion of purpose

to

THE EVIDENCE FOR G O D

(as even possibly represented in evidence), w e put the v e r y notion of a h a m radio at risk. Typical goal-oriented explanation in the social sciences, in the humanities, and in nonacademic contexts will then disappear as well. A s a result, our cognitive and practical lives will suffer drastically, in being limited to nonpurposive explanations, say from the natural sciences. This lesson applies likewise to our predicament in Hells Canyon. Our inanimate surroundings, although beautiful and highly structured in m a n y w a y s (and u g l y and seemingly chaotic in other w a y s ) , will not b y themselves guide us to safety, given that w e need intentional guidance. The corresponding purpose-neutral discerning of our evidence will evidently share that inadequacy. Telic discerning inquires about the reality of purposes or intentions, and therefore exceeds not only inquiry about inanimate physical objects, circumstances, processes, or events, but also inquiry about abstract entities, such as properties, sets, or propositions. Telic discerning includes inquiry about goal-directed, intentional actions, and not just inanimate things or happenings. Clearly, w e cannot plausibly assume at the start of inquiry that reality is devoid of purposes and intentional actions. Nothing in logic or in the notion of reality or even in science precludes the reality of either purposes or intentional actions. Of course, one might fervently embrace an austere ontology that, in keeping with an extreme, eliminative version of materialism, excludes the reality of purposes, but any such ontology w o u l d be logically optional, and not logically required. In addition, any such ontology w o u l d invite assessment of its accuracy on the basis of the actual evidence available to us. In the absence of such assessment, it w o u l d risk becoming a dogmatic ideology that seems as cognitively arbitrary as any other such ideology. The evidence available to us in e v e r y d a y human-toh u m a n interactions certainly appears to support the reality of purposes and of resulting intentional actions. Frequently, it seems, humans set goals, identify means to achieve those

INTRODUCTION

11

goals, and then enact their preferred means to their goals, sometimes predictably achieving their goals. They even d o this, apparently, in a socially coordinated w a y at times, whereby they share goals and means to those goals and thus act cooperatively to arrive at the same destination. Accordingly, some people, including careful philosophers, sometimes show u p at a common meeting at the same time and place - no small accomplishment in the larger, causally elaborate scheme of things. In cases of e v e r y d a y social coordination, acknowledgment of h u m a n purposes explains an important part of w h a t w e experience, and it does so in a w a y that conforms to our available evidence. Accordingly, the social sciences, including social psychology and sociology, flourish in their acknowledging h u m a n purposes that can be socially shared and coordinated. We, in fact, h a v e no equally accurate alternative explanation of much h u m a n behavior and experience; accordingly, our overall evidence appears positively to favor intentional or purposive explanation in m a n y cases. A s a result, w e m a y reasonably proceed with such explanation w h e n accurate treatment of our overall evidence calls for it. This will take us b e y o n d explanation in the natural sciences but will yield cognitive gain nonetheless. Returning to our Hells C a n y o n predicament, w e should attend carefully to the surprising voice-like transmission from the h a m radio. Exactly how are w e to d o this? That is the big question. Some people in our lost group might insist on purpose-neutral discerning, but that perspective w o u l d foreclose a significant prospect: namely, that w e can identify in our evidence a rescuer w h o intends to communicate with us in order to lead us to safety. That is n o w a life-or-death prospect for us, and w e therefore should avoid foreclosing it, unless, of course, w e must yield to compelling evidence in favor of foreclosing it. A s a result, w e resolve to allow for telic discerning, at least in principle, given that intentional considerations v e r y w e l l m a y be present in our radio evidence.

12

THE EVIDENCE FOR G O D

In our bleak situation, w e k n o w w h a t we w a n t - namely, to be rescued from the wilderness gorge. Another question, however, seems relevant: w h a t should w e expect of a rescuer? This suggests another question: what w o u l d the rescuer (if there is one) w a n t from us? Perhaps the rescuer in question w o u l d want us fully to appropriate the rescue and thereby to be fully freed b y it, and not just to believe that the rescue is available or to go along half-heartedly. The rescuer, as suggested previously, might also be interested in our moral well-being, b e y o n d our fleeting pleasures, and might even take the initiative in the rescue process and include some needed moral challenges for us. In that case, our wilderness gorge w o u l d be used b y the rescuer as the school ground for our intended moral transformation. Perhaps, in addition, the rescuer in question w o u l d w a n t us to "shut u p " and to listen for the needed guidance and expectations, for our o w n genuine good. To the same end, the rescuer might send a capable representative into the gorge to identify with us and to aid our transformation and rescue. In any case, w e shall carefully explore such w i d e l y neglected matters in subsequent chapters. This book extends the wilderness parable to introduce w h a t is arguably the common h u m a n predicament in our planetary wilderness canyon, where w e all face the prospect of ultimate physical death and social breakdown. From the perspective of our species overall, our food and water supplies are threateningly low, with little hope of being adequately replenished. On m a n y fronts, our relationships with one another are unravelling, and h a v e resulted in selfish factions and fights. The factions and fights often involve race, religion, nationality, or economic class, but they sometimes cut across familiar divides. Selfishness transcends common categories, a l w a y s , of course, for the sake of selfishness. We h a v e become willing even to sacrifice the minimal wellbeing of others for our o w n selfish ends. A s a result, economic injustices abound among us, wherever a sizeable

INTRODUCTION

13

group resides. Accordingly, genuine community has broken d o w n on various fronts, and, in the absence of a rescuer, w e shall all soon perish, whether rich or poor. Our planetary wilderness canyon continues to suffer various grave troubles, as d o w e , as our lives clearly show. Evidently, successful scanning for a rescuer is our only hope. Will w e connect with a rescuer? Will w e survive? Will our rescue come in stages rather than all at once, and will it call for our moral transformation? Will only some of us survive? Some of us, in any case, give u p hope, and turn to convenient diversions from our unfortunate predicament. (The list of such diversions seems endless.) Others lack the energy for diversions, and end u p as the despairing lost ones among us. A n y daily n e w s p a p e r will confirm our difficult predicament, with depressing w a r stories, troubling cases of personal and corporate greed, striking revelations of political and religious corruption, and v e r y sad obituaries as the disappointing culmination of h u m a n troubles. Our well-founded access to the reality of a perfectly loving G o d arguably w o u l d be analogous to our access to an actual wilderness rescuer via frequencies on a ham radio. In particular, w e w o u l d need somehow to "tune i n " to (or to "appropriate") the reality, and the corresponding available evidence, of G o d . After all, G o d w o u l d be an invisible personal Spirit w h o has definite character traits and purposes that are perfectly authoritative and loving and thus morally superior to ours. We w o u l d need, accordingly, to point ourselves, rather like a radio antenna, in the right direction to receive, at least clearly, any divine intervention aimed at noncoercively transforming and rescuing us. The right direction, relative to a perfectly loving G o d , w o u l d not automatically match the self-chosen directions of our o w n lives, and w e should not expect G o d to adopt our selfish w a y s . Being perfectly loving, G o d w o u l d h a v e a character and related purposes significantly different from our o w n , given our selfish and other imperfect w a y s . G o d ' s direction

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THE EVIDENCE FOR GOD

therefore w o u l d differ notably from our o w n self-chosen directions, even if w e suffer from grave delusions of being acceptable to G o d on our o w n imperfect terms. A s people lost in the wilderness canyon, w e should not expect ourselves to have any control or authority over which radio frequency a potential rescuer uses. If w e stubbornly insist on such authority, w e m a y completely overlook the frequency actually occupied by a potential rescuer. We therefore should ask this simple question: who is entitled to choose the potential rescuer's frequency for communication - the lost people or the potential rescuer? In addition, are w e willing to be rescued, or found, on the terms of the rescuer rather than on our favored terms? Once w e ask such questions, w e should see that the lost people have no decisive authority of their o w n to d e m a n d exactly h o w the potential rescuer is revealed or proceeds. Their expectations of the potential rescuer, at least for practical purposes, should conform to the character and purposes of the potential rescuer, and not vice versa. Likewise, w e should not expect a perfectly loving G o d to appear on our convenient terms (say, on the nightly news) if this w o u l d be at odds with G o d ' s perfectly loving character and purposes. For good reason, including for our o w n good, G o d might not want to be heard in the popular n e w s media or in the money-driven broadcasts of m a n y televangelists. A media-packaged, domesticated G o d w o u l d arguably be an imposter at best, given the unmatched demands of worthiness of worship. Our crucial initial question becomes not so much whether G o d exists as w h a t the character and purposes of a perfectly authoritative and loving G o d w o u l d be, if G o d exists. In addition, w e should explicitly ask the following question, in keeping with our previous observations: w h a t kind of evidence and k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s reality w o u l d a perfectly loving G o d offer to humans, particularly humans needing transformation toward G o d ' s moral character? The most direct answer is that G o d w o u l d offer the kind of evidence and k n o w l e d g e that represents and advances G o d ' s kind of

INTRODUCTION

15

unselfish love among humans. The crucial next question is whether w e are sincerely willing to conform to G o d ' s terms for our rescue, b y w a y of evidence, k n o w l e d g e , and expectations. A r e w e willing to be rescued on G o d ' s terms, even if those terms call for our moral transformation toward G o d ' s character of perfect, unselfish love? In other w o r d s , are w e ourselves willing to become, in volitional interaction with G o d , evidence of G o d ' s reality, thereby reflecting G o d ' s reality for others? The latter question reorients inquiry about G o d ' s existence b y bringing it into line with self-reflective existential questions about w h o w e are and w h o w e should be, in the presence of G o d ' s reality. It includes the key notion of our becoming personifying evidence of G o d , in order to highlight the cooperative role humans h a v e in appropriating evidence of G o d ' s reality. (Chapter 4 returns to this notion.) We will use the wilderness parable to examine, without needless abstraction, the main approaches to k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s existence. Those approaches are analogous to the options noted previously. More specifically, they are: nontheistic naturalism, including atheistic and agnostic naturalism (combining either Option 1: Despairing or Option 2: Passively Waiting, with Option 4a: Purpose-Neutral Discerning of Evidence), fideism (analogous to Option 3: Leaping), natural theology (combining Option 4b: Telic Discerning of Evidence, with its indirect variation), and volitional theism (combining Option 4b: Telic Discerning of Evidence, with its direct variation). Let's think of conclusive evidence as the kind of evidence needed for satisfaction of the justification condition for knowledge. A t least for all actual cognitive and practical purposes, nontheistic naturalism gives u p on (the reality of) conclusive evidence of G o d ' s existence, and offers a naturalistic limit on reasonable explanation and belief that excludes irreducible purposes or intentions. Fideism disowns any requirement of conclusive evidence of G o d ' s existence but tries, nonetheless, to sustain belief that G o d

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THE EVIDENCE FOR G O D

exists, sometimes on moral grounds or on grounds of social propriety in one's social context. Natural theology, in contrast, holds out for conclusive evidence of G o d ' s existence but makes its case on the basis of inferential evidence and corresponding arguments available to natural cognitive sources. Without depending on any argument of natural theology, volitional theism acknowledges evidence of purposive divine intervention in the w o r l d , but does not characterize (all) such evidence in terms of inferential evidence or arguments. It acknowledges, more specifically, that a perfectly loving G o d w o u l d seek noncoercively to transform the wills of w a y w a r d humans, and thereby to have humans themselves become personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality, in willingly receiving and reflecting G o d ' s powerful moral character for others and thus bringing G o d ' s presence near to others. Additional positions and variations are possible, of course, but they are b e y o n d our direct concern. (On the fine points regarding conclusive evidence and k n o w l e d g e in general, see Moser 1989.) In asking about G o d ' s existence, w e should clarify at the start the general kind of matter w e are considering. Otherwise, w e could end u p hunting the snark, and therefore m a y find nothing at all. 2. B E Y O N D T A S T E

We must ask, sooner or later, h o w a question about G o d ' s existence relates to actual reality, particularly regarding whether reality includes G o d . Clearly, reality surpasses h u m a n opinions at least in the natural sciences, and, as a result, w e sometimes h a v e scientific discoveries that d o not reduce to h u m a n opinions or inventions. For instance, our best science in molecular chemistry reveals molecular processes that preceded the existence of humans and therefore cannot be reduced to h u m a n opinions or inventions. The existence of atoms in covalent bonds, in particular, did not wait for the inventive p o w e r s or even the

INTRODUCTION

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messy emergence of h u m a n beings, h o w e v e r important w e h u m a n s m a y be in other respects. Instead, our best chemistry discovers such antecedently existing molecular realities and seeks to explain them with illuminating chemical theories. A n y current textbook on molecular chemistry supplies the fascinating evidence, with the help of abundant charts, graphs, and illustrations. Does reality in theology surpass h u m a n opinions and inventions, as it does in chemistry and the other natural sciences? More directly, is there anything independent of us humans in the domain of theology to be discovered rather than merely invented b y us? In particular, is there a human-independent divine rescuer? Theological realists answer yes, whereas theological antirealists answer no. Theological agnostics collectively shrug their shoulders, and settle for d i s a v o w i n g any genuine k n o w l e d g e , pro or con, regarding existence in the theological domain. Such agnostics therefore are k n o w n b y the fruits of their familiar refrain: " w e don't know." Let's postpone n o w the beguiling higherorder question whether they know that they lack knowledge in this area. That question w o u l d take us far afield in epistemology, and w e w o u l d then have trouble finding our w a y back to the wilderness predicament. Some theological antirealists, going b e y o n d agnosticism, recruit support for their antirealism from the widespread h u m a n disagreement about matters theological. It m a y seem that for any t w o people brought together, w e find at least two or three opposing theological positions. Of course, the reality of the situation is not quite so fractured, but it is nonetheless fractured deeply and widely, if not irredeemably. The natural sciences appear to sing happily, even proudly, in unison by comparison with the cacophony of theology. Notoriously, philosophy is likewise fractured deeply and widely, but w e need not belabor this obvious point for current purposes. We are not pursuing the sociology of theology or philosophy, because w e are concerned with a larger rescue operation.

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THE EVIDENCE FOR GOD

Although the natural sciences h a v e enjoyed more agreement (and more federal grant money) than the field of theology, w e need to be cautious about the actual take-home lessons of this undeniable difference. Widespread h u m a n disagreement about a topic, such as the topic of G o d ' s existence, does not entail or otherwise support antirealism about that topic. Clearly, there can be a determinate fact of the matter in an area, including theology, despite widespread h u m a n disagreement regarding that area. For instance, the considerable disagreement among educated humans regarding (the causes and effects of) global climate change in recent decades does not entail that there is no fact of the matter regarding (the causes and effects of) such climate change. After all, there is a fact of the matter, and it merits h u m a n pursuit, given our vulnerable environmental predicament. Climate change, in any case, is not at the mercy of h u m a n opinion, and much of reality undeniably follows suit. A fact of the matter, although stubbornly real, can be elusive (that is, very difficult to identify) and therefore can prompt extensive and even persistent h u m a n disagreement. A contrary suggestion that allows such disagreement to preclude the reality of facts gives h u m a n disagreement too much reality-making power. Reality in general does not depend on h u m a n agreement; in fact, it can withstand, without any real difficulty, extensive and persistent h u m a n disagreement. The same holds for h u m a n knowledge: it can be genuine even in the face of widespread human disagreement. Such disagreement in an area does not, by itself, undermine justified or evidence-based true belief (of the kind suitable to knowledge) in that area. Disagreement can arise as a result of various factors that d o not challenge the reality of truth, k n o w l e d g e , or even evidence in the area of disagreement. Going to an extreme, some people suggest that the central claims of religion and theology are purely subjective in being just a matter of personal taste, with no factual

INTRODUCTION

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significance whatever b e y o n d such taste. Analogously, I claim that vanilla ice cream is the best, but m y daughter claims that chocolate ice cream is the best. Still, w e respect each other's tastes, without insisting that one of us is right and the other w r o n g about the taste of ice cream. Fights over correctness about taste, accordingly, v e r y rarely erupt inside or outside ice cream shops. (School cafeteria food fights are, of course, another messy matter altogether, stemming from ulterior student schemes and conflicts of various sorts.) Perhaps theology belongs just in ice cream shops, in virtue of being just a matter of taste, without any further factual significance. Perhaps indeed, but the story regarding theology is definitely more complicated than our identifying the best taste of ice cream. One important but very sad consideration is that people do sometimes fight and even kill each other over theology, including over relatively minor doctrinal points of theology (see Juergensmeyer 2003, for a sample of the troubling details). For instance, violent disputes over the theologically proper m o d e of baptism as an initiation rite h a v e left some unfortunate people murdered b y drowning, even in the n a m e of a holy and gracious G o d . At this point, theology and the taste of ice cream diverge, and theology fares far worse, and far more dangerous. In this respect, theology m a y be a serious social hazard, more dangerous than anything offered in an ice cream shop. Theology, one might suggest, could be a matter of personal taste in t w o w a y s . First, the content of a theological claim, with regard to what the claim is about, could be just a person's taste involving personal likes and dislikes. When I claim, for example, that vanilla ice cream is the best, I might be saying simply that I like the taste of vanilla ice cream more than the alternative flavors (chocolate, pomegranate, peanut butter, banana, grapefruit, green tea, and so on). The previous statement m a y be true regarding m y claim about ice cream, but an analogous claim for theology does not represent anything near the norm for theological statements. Typically, one's affirmation that G o d exists, for instance, is not

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THE EVIDENCE FOR GOD

offered as just a remark about one's taste. Instead, it ordinarily aims to acknowledge that a unique creative agent (that is, God) is real, even real b e y o n d (and prior to) any h u m a n taste. In offering G o d as creator, theists typically propose that G o d exists prior to the emergence of humans and their tastes, and that this G o d has unmatched causal powers. Accordingly, some theology appears not to be reducible in its affirmed content to claims of taste involving h u m a n likes and dislikes. This appears to be an empirical fact. A second approach to theology as taste-based proposes that the ultimate support for theological statements reduces to personal taste, and nothing more. E v e n if one talks about a G o d w h o s e existence is independent of humans, according to this approach, one will have to settle for support or evidence for such talk that amounts to just personal taste involving one's likes and dislikes. This w o u l d be a bad cognitive situation indeed for theology, because its support w o u l d then be highly subjective. Its support w o u l d be akin to m y subjective, taste-based support for claiming that vanilla ice cream is best. Such a subjectivist approach, however, might not capture the true story about theology in general. Perhaps some evidential support in theology actually takes us beyond mere personal likes and dislikes after all. This book aims to identify what kind of cognitive support is actually enjoyed b y some theology, beyond h u m a n likes and dislikes. In particular, it introduces a distinctive kind of evidence appropriate for the reality of a G o d worthy of worship. M a n y sane, educated, and generally trustworthy people claim not only that G o d exists, but also that they h a v e genuine knowledge, including justified true belief, that G o d exists. Because claims are typically cheap and easy, h o w ever, the claim to k n o w that G o d exists prompts the following response, usually sooner rather than later: how do they know? This common four-word question, although irksome at times, is perfectly intelligible and even valuable as far as it goes. It seeks an explanation of h o w the belief that

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G o d exists exceeds mere belief or opinion, and achieves the status of genuine knowledge. In particular, this question typically seeks an explanation of how, if at all, the belief that G o d exists is grounded, justified, reasonable, or evidence-based regarding affirmation of its truth. A plausible goal behind our four-word question, at least for m a n y inquirers, is to acquire truth in a manner that includes an adequate, well-grounded, or trustworthy indication of true belief. These truth-seeking inquirers aim not only to avoid false belief and lucky guesswork, but also to minimize the risk of error in their beliefs (at least in a w a y befitting to acquiring truth while avoiding falsehoods). We should aim for the same, as people w h o seek to acquire truth (and to avoid error) but w h o are faced sometimes with facts and other realities at odds with our opinions, even our confident and long-held opinions. In seeking truth about G o d ' s existence, in particular, w e therefore should seek truth based on adequate evidence for G o d ' s reality. Such evidence, if available, w o u l d indicate (perhaps fallibly) that it is true that G o d exists, or in other w o r d s , that G o d is real rather than fictional. Harking back to our wilderness parable, w e ideally w o u l d find some genuine cognitive support or evidence for any claim to the reality of a rescuer; likewise for any claim to the reality of G o d . This w o u l d save us from relying just on g u e s s w o r k or wishful thinking in our inquiry. In treating any question about G o d ' s existence, w e should begin with some clarity regarding w h a t (or w h o m ) w e are asking about: in this case, God's existence. A r e w e asking about a morally indefinite but strikingly powerful creator? M a n y academic writers on theism, "mere theism," deism, atheism, and agnosticism inquire about the existence of such a creator, whatever the creator's moral character may be. (For one of m a n y troublesome examples in circulation, see Dennett 2006, p p . 240-6.) The creator in question, as far as such inquiry is concerned, m a y turn out to be an evil tyrant or at least a morally indifferent slouch. This kind of inquiry, h o w e v e r earnest and rigorous in its search for a creator,

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THE EVIDENCE FOR G O D

m a y rest on a misleading bias regarding G o d ' s character. In any case, such inquiry w o u l d be significantly different from inquiry about the existence of a G o d w h o is worthy of worship and thus morally perfect, including perfectly loving toward all persons, even enemies. Let's begin to clarify the latter kind of inquiry, g i v e n that it refuses to lower the bar for being G o d and thus for questions about G o d ' s existence. 3. T H E T I T L E " G O D "

A s suggested previously, w e should approach the question about human k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s existence b y asking specifically what, or (better) w h o s e , conceivable existence w e are considering. More directly, w h a t exactly do w e mean by the tiny but important term " G o d " ? Our response will determine, at least in part, the actual value of our question and its suitable means of answer. Clearly, if the question of h u m a n k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s existence lacks value and thus does not matter, then w e should change the subject to something else, advisedly to something worthwhile. M a n y people, however, contend that this question actually has unsurpassed, life-or-death importance, given what they mean by the term " G o d . " In this case, at least, one's meaning of a term matters significantly and thus deserves careful attention. Philosophical and theological questions about G o d often suffer from a seriously v a g u e conception of G o d , resulting typically from undue abstractness in the assumed idea of G o d . Perhaps some people use theological abstractness to divert attention from a potential divine moral challenge to w a y w a r d humans; at least, w e should keep this possibility in mind. In keeping with a prominent traditional usage, w e can fruitfully use the term " G o d " as a most exalted title rather than as a proper name. This allows us to talk intelligibly about whether G o d exists, even if G o d does not actually exist and even if w e d i s a v o w k n o w l e d g e that G o d exists. A title, such as "the Queen of Chicago," can be perfectly intelligible

INTRODUCTION

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even if it has no actual titleholder. (For the record, Chicago has no city queen, but the meaningfulness of the previous title is not thereby threatened; that title is not gibberish, after all.) Semantic meaning, in this and other cases, does not require naming. A s a result, our use of " G o d " as a title saves us from unfair dismissal of agnostics and atheists b y a naming fiat. Nothing is gained, in any case, b y trying to name one's genuine critics out of business. That quick strategy w o u l d be too easy, given that it could be used b y anyone at will, even b y one's critic. Two could play that unhelpful game. The title " G o d , " on the proposed usage, signifies (that is, connotes) a being w o r t h y of w o r s h i p , even if such a being fails to exist and therefore even if the title fails to refer to an actual thing. Worthiness of worship is, of course, maximally morally demanding. It requires inherent (or selfcontained) moral perfection, including perfect moral righteousness, and such perfection in an agent demands, in turn, a perfectly loving character, including perfect love toward one's enemies. (See L u k e 6:27-36 and Matthew 5:38-48 for a distinctive and influential notion of G o d , originating in J e w ish soil and enduring in Christian thought, that explicitly includes divine love of enemies.) A n agent's selfish failure to love w o u l d block that agent from having a morally perfect character, h o w e v e r powerful and knowledgeable that selfish agent m a y be. In addition, the required unselfish love w o u l d be purportedly redemptive rather than merely sentimental or romantic, because it w o u l d actively seek the well-being of all persons. Talk m a y be cheap and easy, but the kind of love in question w o u l d not be, at all. Let's say that a being is w o r t h y of worship if and only if that being, having inherent moral perfection, merits worship as unqualified adoration, love, trust, and obedience. Of course, h u m a n s can w o r s h i p a morally defective powerful being, perhaps out of h u m a n fear of harmful threatening power, but the being in question w o u l d not be worthy of worship. People, to their o w n detriment, often worship

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false gods, despite the unworthiness and unreliability of those gods. The results of such misguided worship do not include lasting h u m a n satisfaction, whatever else they include. Indeed, such worship is typically a recipe for frustration and other trouble. It follows that worship can be dangerous, and w e therefore should not take worship lightly. What w e w o r s h i p m a y be, in the end, a matter of life or death for us, even if w e fail to recognize this. G i v e n the exalted moral standard for worthiness of worship, w e readily can exclude most claimants to the preeminent title " G o d " on the ground of moral deficiency. Moral defects bar a candidate from the status of being G o d , automatically and decisively. (The list of failed candidates seems almost endless, and therefore w e n o w m a y postpone an actual list. Readers can easily supply their o w n lists, for their o w n anticounterfeit purposes.) People sometimes casually use the term " G o d " in w a y s contrary to worthiness of worship, but this empirical fact does not challenge the value of the current morally demanding usage. Part of the value of the current usage is that it allows us to engage some central theological concerns of traditional monotheism (particularly of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) without arbitrarily dismissing atheists and agnostics by a naming fiat. Clearly, people cannot name or postulate G o d into existence via refusing to imagine that G o d does not exist. Likewise, people cannot define or postulate G o d out of existence, as if a mere h u m a n definition could block the actual existence of G o d . The topic of G o d ' s existence is more resilient than such quick ploys suggest. We can have an intelligible title, such as " G o d , " but have no ground whatever for acknowledging the reality of an actual holder of that title. A s a result, w e arguably need some indication of the reality of an agent worthy of worship to avoid mere wishful thinking in h u m a n belief that G o d exists. In particular, w e arguably need evidence of the reality of perfect love in a morally impeccable agent toward all agents, given that worthiness of worship includes perfect

INTRODUCTION

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love toward all agents. The required p o w e r of perfect love in an agent includes the agent's intention to bring about unselfishly w h a t is good, and only w h a t is g o o d , ultimately for all affected persons, even those w h o are the agent's enemies. Perfect love thus underwrites the amazing and rare phenomenon called enemy-love, and hence does not settle for love just for one's friends, colleagues, or helpful associates. This accounts for its v e r y rare occurrence among humans, including religious and educated humans. A n agent's genuine, morally righteous love aims to culminate in beneficial intentional actions toward others, a n d thus it must be rooted in one's intentions to love in action. Because intentions to love, w h e n real, operate at the v e r y heart of an agent, particularly at the heart of an agent's motivation, perfect unselfish love w o u l d reside ultimately in an agent's motivational center, or " h e a r t " (kardia, in ancient Greek). This position is assumed in the J e w i s h scriptures in Deuteronomy 6:4-6, for example, and in the Christian N e w Testament in M a r k 1 2 : 2 9 - 3 0 , for example. We humans, it is arguable, cannot create this rare p o w e r of unselfish love ourselves, but G o d , as perfectly loving, w o u l d seek noncoercively to introduce, proliferate, and sustain this unselfish p o w e r among all humans, at their motivational centers (see, for instance, 1 John 4:7-9, 19). H u m a n s therefore w o u l d depend on G o d for this unusual power, even if some h u m a n s mistakenly w o u l d take credit for it themselves. Such mistaken self-credit, w e shall see, is a common source of one's failing to apprehend salient evidence of G o d ' s existence. Ideally, by divine hope, all capable agents willingly w o u l d receive divine love from G o d and then manifest it from the heart toward all agents, even (perhaps with difficulty) toward their worst enemies and harshest critics. Mere human agents, as suggested previously, w o u l d manifest such love in a manner dependent on G o d , but G o d w o u l d do so inherently, as a matter of inherent but still praiseworthy moral character. This consideration suggests a distinctive kind of theology: kardiatheology, as theology

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aimed primarily at one's motivational heart, including one's will, rather than just at one's mind or one's emotions. Such theology accommodates Henry Sidgwick's astute observation, in keeping with Jesus's Sermon on the M o u n t / P l a i n , that "inwardness, Tightness of heart or spirit, is the special and pre-eminent characteristic of Christian g o o d n e s s " (1902, p. 1 1 4 ) . Divine self-revelation or self-manifestation to humans, it is arguable, w o u l d fit with kardiatheology in aiming noncoercively to realize divine perfect love in h u m a n hearts rather than just to expand human reflection or information. A G o d worthy of worship w o u l d not be in the business of just expanding our databases or simply giving us an informational plan of rescue from our troubles. Divine selfrevelation and its corresponding evidence therefore w o u l d seek to transform humans motivationally, and not just intellectually, toward perfect love and its required volitional cooperation with G o d . In this respect, a G o d worthy of worship w o u l d have important practical interests regarding human intentions and actions, beyond merely theoretical interests regarding human judgments and beliefs. This w i d e l y neglected consideration, w e shall see, underwrites a distinctive account of the evidence for G o d . It also fits well with the prospect that a perfectly loving G o d w o u l d w a n t humans to become living, personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality, in willingly receiving and reflecting G o d ' s profound moral character for others. (Chapters 2 and 4 return to the cognitive significance of kardiatheology and personifying evidence of God.) Let's consider the plausible v i e w that divine selfrevelation to humans w o u l d include a manifestation and an offering of divine perfect love to humans for their o w n good. Given this view, w e inquirers about G o d ' s existence should identify, at least in general, what an actual indication of such a manifestation and an offering w o u l d look like. Perhaps the indication in question will be subtle, elusive, and puzzling in order (a) to avoid intimidating, coercing, or indulging

INTRODUCTION

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humans and (b) to offer a profound existential, motivational challenge to w a y w a r d humans. G o d therefore w o u l d h a v e definite purposes in offering evidence of divine reality to humans, and these purposes w o u l d guide the kind of evidence offered and the w a y it is to be received. We m a y call this purposively available evidence of divine reality, because it w o u l d be offered in accordance with definite divine purposes for humans. Returning to the wilderness parable, w e need to consider whether the needed rescuer has a special moral agenda of transformation for lost h u m a n s , for their o w n good. Our time in the wilderness m a y thus be more purposive and adventurous than w e initially supposed. G o d could be profoundly at w o r k in one's wilderness troubles even if one fails to acknowledge or appreciate this.

4. B I A S I N I N Q U I R Y

A s previously noted, a widespread bias in h u m a n expectations of G o d is that G o d w o u l d be revealed to humans as a morally indefinite creator, in a w a y that sets aside or postpones moral issues regarding humans relative to G o d . In asking about a morally indefinite creator, however, inquirers might miss out on available salient evidence of an ethically robust G o d w h o is no morally indefinite creator but w h o is inherently morally righteous and challenging, particularly toward w a y w a r d humans. Inquirers might miss out on such evidence because they are looking for G o d in all the w r o n g places, especially in the supposedly morally indefinite places. The bias invites this largely ignored issue: are w e h u m a n s in a position on our o w n to answer the question of whether G o d exists, without our being morally challenged b y G o d , if G o d exists? Once w e raise this issue, w e can plausibly allow our list of potential cognitive options to be expanded. Perhaps the true G o d , being morally perfect, is, in fact, intentionally elusive and even obscure regarding the ethically casual issue of whether there is a morally indefinite

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THE EVIDENCE FOR GOD

creator. One of G o d ' s aims with divine elusiveness w o u l d be to highlight a more urgent question for humans: namely, who exactly is (worthy of being) in charge here as the proper moral authority over the universe, including over all humans? A related urgent question in need of focus m a y be: exactly how is G o d in charge over this deeply morally troubled universe? A morally definite, perfectly loving G o d could use such questions to prompt us to ask seriously: to whom are w e humans as responsible agents ultimately morally accountable, even with regard to h o w w e inquire about G o d ? Will w e let G o d be truly G o d (and thus morally robust, challenging, and authoritative) even in the area of h u m a n inquiry about G o d ' s reality? If so, w e w o u l d allow G o d (at least in principle) to take the initiative in seeking humans, on G o d ' s terms, even before humans seek G o d . We harmfully jump the gun, philosophically speaking, w h e n we pursue the question of G o d ' s existence as if G o d is morally indefinite and thus not intentionally elusive toward any human pursuit of a morally indefinite creator. Indeed, our jumping the gun in this manner may involve a kind of cognitive idolatry whereby w e use cognitive standards that displace G o d ' s cognitive and moral supremacy, including G o d ' s authority over the actual manner of divine self-manifestation and corresponding evidence for humans. Such idolatry inevitably w o u l d be harmful to inquirers by distancing them from needed suitable k n o w l e d g e and evidence of the true G o d . Once again, w e need to consider allowing G o d to be G o d , and thus authoritative and morally challenging, even in the cognitive domain. Jesus m a y h a v e had a challenge to cognitive idolatry in mind with this otherwise puzzling prayer of gratitude for divine hiding: At that time Jesus said, "I thank you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because you have hidden these things from the wise and the intelligent, and have revealed them to infants; yes, Father, for such w a s your gracious will. All things have been

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handed over to me by my Father; and no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and anyone to w h o m the Son chooses to reveal him." (Matt. 1 1 : 2 5 - 7 , NRSV, italics added; cf. Luke 1 0 : 2 1 - 2 , 1 Cor. 2:4-14. Subsequent translations from the Greek N e w Testament are my own unless otherwise noted.) Jesus portrays his divine Father as hiding divine w a y s and means from people w h o are pridefully " w i s e and intelligent" in their o w n eyes, if only because they are not suitably ready to receive G o d ' s message. He suggests that G o d is intentionally elusive, even to the point of hiding, relative to people w h o oppose G o d ' s authority and morally righteous w a y s . This suggestion agrees with a longstanding teaching of the prophetic tradition in the Hebrew scriptures, including Isaiah 45:15: "Truly you are a G o d w h o hides himself, O G o d of Israel, the S a v i o r " (NRSV). G o d , then, m a y be more challenging than m a n y h u m a n s have supposed. If w e take Jesus and the Hebrew prophetic tradition seriously, w e should expect G o d to be morally righteous, perfectly loving, and thus (for redemptive purposes) at times elusive toward w a y w a r d humans. G o d then w o u l d be anything but a morally indefinite creator. People, however, are sometimes not ready and willing to receive G o d ' s selfmanifestation aright, with d u e honor, gratitude, and submission. Accordingly, G o d w o u l d offer needed challenges of various sorts to humans, and some divine hiding w o u l d offer one such challenge (see Rom. 1 : 1 8 - 2 3 , John 1 2 : 3 9 - 4 1 ; cf. Moser 2008, Chapter 2). In this regard, w e should expect G o d to be a m o v i n g target, and not an object for casual or convenient h u m a n inspection, speculation, or entertainment. G o d ' s morally profound character and aims w o u l d preclude G o d ' s joining in h u m a n intellectual games that ignore or short-change serious h u m a n moral needs. We must be wary, then, of morally neutralizing or otherwise domesticating G o d in our inquiry about G o d ' s existence. Accordingly, for our o w n g o o d , w e should steer clear of the aforementioned bias in our inquiry.

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A perfectly loving G o d w o u l d h a v e morally definite purposes toward humans, including the purposes to invite and to encourage able-minded humans to enter into cooperative fellowship with G o d and thereby to become loving as G o d is loving, even toward resolute enemies. A s suggested, therefore, G o d w o u l d make evidence of divine reality purposively available to humans, that is, available in a w a y that serves G o d ' s perfectly loving redemptive aims for humans. These aims w o u l d include a call from G o d to humans to yield to and obey G o d as authoritative Lord, and this call w o u l d seek, noncoercively, to engage humans at a level of motivational depth, rather than at a superficial level. This G o d therefore w o u l d contrast sharply with the relatively aloof creator postulated by deism or b y morally indefinite theism. H u m a n inquiry about G o d should be prepared to follow suit, in agreement with its potential subject of inquiry. A s a result, it should be open to a divine expectation that humans themselves become, in cooperative interaction with G o d , personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality, in willingly receiving and reflecting G o d ' s powerful moral character for others. We shall clarify this neglected but crucial lesson.

5. D I V I N E E V I D E N C E

On reflection, w e should expect a perfectly loving G o d to offer any divine self-manifestation and accompanying evidence to humans as a matter of divine cognitive grace rather than h u m a n meritorious earning or even h u m a n l y controllable evidence. In other w o r d s , divine self-manifestation and its corresponding evidence w o u l d come to humans as a h u m a n l y unearned gift, if they come at all, and humans w o u l d not be in charge or in control of h o w or w h e n the gracious gift is offered to them. Being anchored in such a gracious gift, h u m a n k n o w l e d g e and evidence of a perfectly loving G o d w o u l d differ importantly from the kinds of human k n o w l e d g e and evidence that h a v e humanly controllable objects, such as lab specimens, kitchen appliances, or patio furniture pieces.

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The divine gracious gift in question, in its invitational call to humans, could and w o u l d m a k e noncoercive demands on humans for the sake of reconciling humans to G o d . Indeed, w e should be open to G o d as the one w h o initiates the process of h u m a n k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s reality via p u r p o sive divine self-revelation that includes such an invitational call to humans. In that case, w e w o u l d be open also to the need for h u m a n responsiveness to G o d ' s call to humans. Part of this responsiveness, w e shall see, w o u l d include h u m a n willingness to become living, personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality, in willingly receiving and reflecting G o d ' s moral character for others. G i v e n divine moral perfection, a willingly obedient h u m a n response to divine demands to receive and to practice divine love w o u l d be the suitable w a y for a h u m a n to receive the divine gift on offer. Accordingly, w e should expect the availability of some evidence of divine reality to be sensitive to the will of its intended h u m a n recipients. Inquiry about divine reality w o u l d m o v e then to a n e w level, beyond mere reflection and inference, to h u m a n obedience and disobedience, particularly toward our becoming personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality. What once seemed to be a merely intellectual inquiry w o u l d become morally and existentially loaded for us inquirers about G o d . A key question for us is: who is inquiring about the existence of G o d ? More specifically, what kind of person is inquiring about divine reality, a person willing to yield to (and thus reflect) a perfectly loving G o d or a person unwilling to yield (and thus reflect)? A perfectly loving G o d , accordingly, w o u l d turn the tables on h u m a n inquirers b y asking about their own status, particularly their o w n moral position, before G o d . In particular, are they willing to become personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality and thus to receive and to reflect G o d ' s moral character for others, thereby bringing G o d ' s presence near to others? In any case, inquiry about divine reality w o u l d no longer be a casual, morally indefinite matter akin to a spectator sport. It w o u l d become morally loaded and h u m a n l y humbling if approached aright. Inquirers

3

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THE EVIDENCE FOR G O D

about G o d ' s existence, even inquirers among philosophers and theologians, typically overlook this important cognitive consideration about a G o d worthy of worship. We shall begin to reorient inquiry about G o d ' s existence b y asking with due seriousness the following questions. What if G o d w o u l d be perfectly loving even in offering to humans any divine self-manifestation and corresponding evidence of divine reality? What w o u l d available evidence of G o d ' s existence then be like? H o w w o u l d it call us inquirers to account before G o d , and h o w w o u l d it bear on w h a t w e , ourselves, are reflecting in w h o w e are? H o w might one's lacking evidence of divine reality then concern primarily one's o w n moral character and attitudes toward G o d rather than the actual availability of such evidence? Philosophers and theologians have not given adequate attention to such important questions, but w e shall begin to correct this deficiency. In doing so, w e shall allow for a fair hearing of a case for reasonable, well-grounded belief that a perfectly loving but elusive G o d actually exists. A s explanatory disciplines, philosophy and theology routinely introduce and explore " w h a t if?" questions for the sake of entertaining explanatory hypotheses. Accordingly, w e d o well to extend the previous list of questions a bit to identify some areas in need of explanation regarding h u m a n k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s existence. What if w e humans, in our moral imperfection and our resistance to unselfish love, are typically not ready and willing to receive G o d on God's morally challenging terms? What if h u m a n pride, including our desired self-sufficiency, obscures our apprehending (a) w h o G o d truly is, (b) the reality of G o d ' s authoritative call to us, and (c) the lasting good that G o d wants for us? What if divinely desired h u m a n k n o w l e d g e of G o d is not a spectator sport at all, but rather calls for willingly obedient h u m a n knowledge of G o d as authoritative Lord (rather than as a morally indefinite creator)? In that case, such knowledge w o u l d d e m a n d h u m a n volitional yielding to G o d as Lord, at least to some extent.

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The k n o w l e d g e of G o d in question w o u l d require that w e be willing to become personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality, in virtue of our willingly receiving and reflecting G o d ' s moral character for others. We thus should consider an important distinction between spectator k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s reality (that does not challenge a h u m a n will to yield to G o d or to become evidence of G o d ' s reality) and authoritative, invitational k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s reality (that invites a person to cooperate with G o d ' s will and thereby to become personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality, including evidence of G o d as an intentional agent). The latter kind of knowledge, although w i d e l y neglected by philosophers and theologians, is critically important to our inquiry. What w o u l d become of evidence of G o d ' s reality if w e found that spectator k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s reality is unavailable to humans? C o u l d there still be salient evidence and k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s reality available to humans? There definitely could be, as long as the relevant evidence and k n o w l e d g e w o u l d fit with G o d ' s distinctive character and purposes. The evidence in question w o u l d be purposively available to humans, in keeping with G o d ' s perfectly loving, morally challenging purposes for humans. Its being apprehended by humans w o u l d be sensitive then to the attitudes, including volitional attitudes, of humans toward G o d ' s character and purposes. One such attitude, w e shall see, concerns whether humans are willing to become personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality, in response to a divine call. In keeping with the cognitive importance of such audience receptivity, Jesus speaks of the need for " e y e s to see and ears to hear" regarding the evidence of divine intervention, including through himself (see M a r k 4:22-3). Some people assume that G o d w o u l d h a v e a magic cognitive bullet in divine self-revelation w h e r e b y G o d guarantees that the divinely offered evidence of G o d ' s existence will actually be willingly received b y humans. Sometimes this dubious assumption is clothed in talk of "divine sovereignty," but this approach, in any case, involves a

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serious mistake. Analogously, a sincere person's telling the truth to others does not guarantee that the truth thereby told is actually willingly received b y the intended audience. Intended recipients of evidence can fail to be willing recipients o w i n g to their unreceptive, resistant w a y s . In particular, it can be painful for people to acknowledge a humbling truth about themselves, and therefore they might opt not to accept this truth. Clearly, unselfish love (exemplified in an invitation to unselfish morally good fellowship) offered to a person need not be received or valued by that person. Accordingly, unreceptive humans w o u l d be able to block any supposed magic cognitive bullet on G o d ' s part. We h a v e suggested a cognitively important question of this form: " i n connection with giving evidence to humans via divine self-manifestation, w h a t if G o d wanted valuable feature X ? " A s responsible inquirers about G o d ' s existence, w e should attend to various questions of this form, given that such questions can reliably guide and even correct h u m a n expectations about any divine evidence. Our questions about the evidence for G o d ' s existence then w o u l d be sensitive to w h a t X involves in our question - that is, to w h a t G o d w o u l d w a n t to bring about in offering the relevant evidence to humans. Our questions w o u l d include, for instance, a question of this sort: if G o d desired to use divine self-manifestation noncoercively to challenge h u m a n selfishness and pride, including self-righteousness, and to transform humans toward unselfish, morally righteous love whereby they become personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality, then w h a t w o u l d the relevant evidence of divine reality look like, at least in general? Philosophy of religion, theology, and general h u m a n inquiry about G o d h a v e suffered from a lack of attention to such a question. A correct answer to this question, however, w o u l d be invaluable for sincere people inquiring about evidence and k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s existence. A perfectly loving G o d w o u l d seek noncoercively to h a v e others willingly receive and then manifest G o d ' s perfect

INTRODUCTION

35

love at the level of their motivational center, or heart, for the sake of building and sustaining G o d ' s kingdom c o m m u nity. Divine perfect love w o u l d be inherently communitybuilding in that way, w h a t e v e r else it includes. This w o u l d involve the aforementioned kind of kardiatheology aimed at the h u m a n heart, rather than just a theology of the m i n d or the emotions, and it w o u l d include h u m a n s ' willingly becoming personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality in response to a divine call. Accordingly, certain kinds of controllable or morally neutral evidence expected or d e m a n d e d by m a n y humans w o u l d not fit at all with what a perfectly loving G o d seeks. Divine massive fireworks displays in the sky overhead, for instance, w o u l d not d o the desired job, h o w ever entertaining they m a y be for some humans. A s a result, w e should not expect G o d to offer such relatively superficial displays, despite some familiar h u m a n desires and demands to the contrary. Instead, w e should expect something morally more profound and more challenging. Perfect love, after all, w o u l d be anything but morally superficial or casual, especially relative to w a y w a r d h u m a n tendencies. A perfectly loving G o d w o u l d desire and noncoercively promote that all people, both individually and collectively, willingly receive divine love and thereby worship G o d and live in loving fellowship with G o d (and with each other) from their heart, for their o w n good. The desired fellowship w o u l d include noncoerced h u m a n volitional (that is, willbased) cooperation with G o d , particularly cooperation with G o d ' s advancement of unselfish love toward all people, even toward G o d ' s enemies. To that end, G o d w o u l d want people to be cooperatively related to G o d on perfectly loving terms that exclude selfishness and pride and advance unselfish love toward all agents. Being related to G o d on G o d ' s terms w o u l d include people in a morally transformative d i v i n e - h u m a n relationship that increasingly replaces h u m a n selfishness and pride with h u m a n reception and promotion of divine morally righteous love. It w o u l d also include their becoming personifying

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evidence of G o d ' s reality wherein they willingly receive and reflect G o d ' s powerful moral character for others. These people w o u l d be individually in an I-Thou relationship and collectively in a w e - T h o u relationship with G o d - that is, in the second person toward G o d , as Thou. They thereby w o u l d receive divine love and, on that basis, they w o u l d adore, love, trust, and obey G o d directly, and, ideally, wholeheartedly. Evidence of divine reality, anchored in divine cognitive grace, w o u l d conform to such distinctive divine purposes and thus w o u l d be purposively available to humans. It therefore w o u l d not be just a matter of speculation or entertainment for spectators. The transformative relationship in question w o u l d include an initiating and sustaining divine call via h u m a n conscience: specifically, a divine call a w a y from h u m a n selfishness and pride, including self-righteousness, and toward h u m a n cooperation in (receiving and manifesting) divine perfect love and its morally righteous requirements. This follows from the fact that divine perfect love w o u l d be invitational in that it w o u l d invite people into volitional fellowship with G o d and thereby with others w h o h a v e similar aims. This invitational call w o u l d be directed at h u m a n conscience for the sake of motivational and existential personal depth, and it thereby w o u l d invite one to be sincerely disclosed, or revealed, before G o d for the sake of honest transformation. In particular, it w o u l d seek free disclosure of w h o one truly is morally and w h o one morally ought to be b y the exalted standard of a perfect loving G o d . G o d thus w o u l d seek a relationship of h u m a n transformation toward G o d ' s perfect love, in d i v i n e - h u m a n volitional fellowship. Being purposively available, evidence of divine reality for humans w o u l d emerge from and fit with the same divine desire for h u m a n transformation in d i v i n e - h u m a n cooperation. A key result of such transformation w o u l d be humans w h o become personifying evidence of divine reality, including evidence of G o d as an intentional agent.

INTRODUCTION

37

The divine evidence in question, indicating divine invitational agape, w o u l d itself be invitational because it includes a call to humans to enter into volitional fellowship with G o d . This evidence w o u l d also be authoritative in virtue of indicating an authoritative call to humans from an authoritative G o d . The divine authority thereby indicated w o u l d include G o d ' s being inherently worthy of h u m a n love, trust, and obedience, given G o d ' s inherent morally perfect character and intentional agency. The relevant evidence w o u l d contrast with any kind of spectator evidence that makes no d e m a n d or call on the direction of a h u m a n will or life, such as either observational evidence from design or order in nature or theoretical evidence concerning the need for a first cause of experienced contingent events. Let's a c k n o w l e d g e , then, a conceptual distinction between authoritative invitational evidence and spectator evidence. We shall see h o w this distinction bears importantly on various approaches to h u m a n k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s existence. G i v e n the anticipated role of invitational evidence, w e shall confront three important questions about G o d ' s existence. First, if G o d ' s existence is elusive, w h y should w e suppose that G o d exists at all? Second, if G o d actually exists, w h y is G o d elusive, particularly if G o d seeks to communicate with people for their o w n good? Third, w h a t are the implications of divine elusiveness for s u p p o s e d k n o w l e d g e and evidence of G o d ' s reality? This book approaches these questions on the basis of a n e w account of k n o w l e d g e and evidence of divine reality that challenges the main competing approaches to G o d ' s existence, including those of nontheistic naturalism, fideism, and natural theology. This book recommends an analogue of Aristotle's w i s e advice, in his Nicomachean Ethics, to look for precision in each class of things just so far as the nature of the subject matter admits. The analogue is this: w e should let our understanding of evidence, and thus of k n o w l e d g e , regarding a subject matter (in particular, G o d ) be guided b y the nature of

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the subject matter and the actual corresponding features of our evidence regarding that subject matter. Accordingly, w e should not be guided b y some dubious antecedent cognitive standard, such as a standard that requires either h u m a n control of relevant evidence or the absence of a moral challenge to inquirers. In following the suggested analogue, w e will characterize evidence regarding a subject matter (including G o d ' s existence) in a manner true to the nature of the subject matter in question and to the reality of our corresponding actual evidence concerning that subject matter. This will save us from wishful thinking and other forms of bias in connection with our topic. Evidence of G o d ' s reality is, by definition for this book's purposes, evidence that a morally perfect intentional agent worthy of worship actually exists. Whether such evidence is available to humans remains to be seen. Where, in any case, might w e find such evidence? In nature? In history? In philosophical arguments? In ourselves? Somewhere else? Famously and confidently, Bertrand Russell anticipated his response if he were to meet G o d after his death: " G o d , y o u g a v e us insufficient evidence." This simple question arises: insufficient for what? Russell might have considered a bit of cognitive modesty in the presence of an authoritatively and morally perfect G o d . In that case, Russell instead w o u l d have asked: " G o d , what morally impeccable purposes of yours led to your being subtle and elusive in the evidence of your reality available to h u m a n s ? " It is disappointing that Russell s h o w e d no awareness of such an important question for a reasonable truth-seeker regarding divine reality. Perhaps w e h a v e a sign here that Russell had his o w n questionable agenda, even an ax to grind, in treating questions about G o d ' s existence. I suspect that w e do. In contrast with Russell, w e will entertain the following question neglected b y m a n y skeptics: if a perfectly loving G o d w o u l d choose to give h u m a n s evidence of G o d ' s reality, w h a t parameters or distinctive features for the evidence w o u l d G o d observe? A plausible answer is that G o d w o u l d

INTRODUCTION

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impart the relevant evidence in a manner that is morallycommendable as w e l l as morally beneficial for receptive humans. Specifically, G o d w o u l d seek to benefit h u m a n wills and not just h u m a n thoughts or emotions, given the key role of wills in morally relevant motivation, decision making, and action. In this regard, the pertinent evidence w o u l d be volitionally and thus morally significant. In effect, it w o u l d aim to h a v e humans themselves become personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality, in willingly receiving and reflecting G o d ' s moral character, including divine intentional agency, for the sake of others. This book contends that, in neglecting this consideration, the positions of nontheistic naturalism, fideism, and natural theology face serious problems. In general, then, the book recruits some neglected but important ideas from philosophical theology to illuminate religious epistemology in a w a y that highlights its moral and existential significance for all inquirers about G o d . The book develops analogues of the previous wilderness parable to elucidate a distinctive volitional, purposeoriented approach to evidence of divine reality, in contrast with the aforementioned competing approaches. The reality of the frequencies activating the h a m radio found in the miners' shack does not depend, of course, on our tuning in to those frequencies. The radio frequencies are real and actually available to people even if all of us are fast asleep at our radios. We, in fact, are bombarded with radio w a v e s at all hours, even w h e n w e are altogether u n a w a r e of them. Similarly, the available evidence of the reality of the radio w a v e s is independent of our tuning in to them. In general, our not actually having (received) evidence does not entail that it is not available to us. Of course, our failure to turn on the ham radio can leave us with no received evidence of the reality of the radio transmissions in our area. Still, the distinctive available evidence of h a m radio activity can be acquired by all w h o seek it in the right way, with the help of a radio. That evidence is definitely available to us, and it m a y be crucial to our being rescued from our wilderness predicament.

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THE EVIDENCE FOR GOD

Developing the wilderness parable, the book contends that w e should expect evidence and k n o w l e d g e of divine reality to be purposively available to humans - that is, available only in a manner suitable to divine purposes in self-revelation. In addition, it contends that these divine purposes w o u l d include the noncoerced transformation of h u m a n wills toward G o d ' s will, for the sake of h u m a n moral improvement as well as h u m a n fellowship with G o d . This lesson generates a major shift in our understanding of h u m a n k n o w l e d g e and evidence of divine reality, because it demands that inquirers become sensitive to the character and purposes of an authoritative, perfectly loving G o d in a manner that challenges and reorients h u m a n wills. Indeed, it demands that h u m a n inquirers themselves become personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality, in willingly receiving and reflecting G o d ' s moral character for others and thus bringing G o d ' s presence near to others. 6.

OVERVIEW

A s suggested previously, this book contrasts and assesses four important competing approaches to religious knowledge: nontheistic naturalism (as in the recent w o r k s of, for instance, Daniel Dennett, Richard D a w k i n s , and E.O. Wilson), fideism (as suggested, for example, in some influential writings of Soren Kierkegaard, LudwigWittgenstein, Karl Barth, Rudolf Bultmann, and certain advocates of Reformed epistemology), natural theology (as represented, for instance, in first cause, design, and fine tuning arguments for G o d ' s existence), and volitional theism (as hinted at by Blaise Pascal and developed at length in Moser 2008). Each of the four competing approaches receives its o w n expository and evaluative chapter, and the concluding chapter attends to some potential defeaters, particularly in religious diversity and in evil, against the book's volitional theism. Chapter 1 , "Nontheistic Naturalism," gives a fair hearing and a firm challenge to some influential versions of

INTRODUCTION

41

nontheistic naturalism about h u m a n k n o w l e d g e . The naturalism in question recommends agnosticism, if not atheism, regarding divine reality on the basis of a d e m a n d for a certain kind of supporting evidence. The evidence d e m a n d e d is naturalistic in virtue of being continuous, or of a piece, with the natural sciences, at least in terms of underlying methodological support. Chapter 1 elucidates this notion of "naturalistic," and gives attention to a familiar argument from the explanatory success of naturalism in the sciences. The familiar argument in question, particularly as represented b y Dennett in various w o r k s , concludes that all cognitively good explanations are naturalistic (roughly, continuous with the natural sciences) and thus ultimately nonintentional or nonpurposive in terms of w h a t they acknowledge as real. This monopolistic inference, according to Chapter 1 , fails to convince, and even lacks support from the natural sciences themselves. Chapter 1 also discusses h o w evidence from religious experience bears on naturalism, particularly with regard to the h u m a n variability of such evidence. The chapter contends that one person's lack of salient experiential evidence of divine reality cannot plausibly be generalized to the universal conclusion that everyone lacks such evidence. This leads to a firm challenge for m a n y religious skeptics. According to Chapter 2, "Fideism and Faith," fideism, as represented by Kierkegaard, Barth, and Bultmann, is driven by a twofold attempt to exempt religious beliefs from a need for supporting evidence and thereby to sidestep skeptical worries about religious beliefs. A n underlying assumption, at least b y Kierkegaard, is that the commitments of religion involve a kind of faith v e r y different from inquiry in philosophy and the sciences. E v e n if this is correct, however, Chapter 2 contends that traditional monotheism, as represented in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, includes truthclaims about reality and therefore must distinguish these claims from claims that are evidently false and from claims that lack any indication of their being true.

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The neglect b y fideism of needed religious cognitive support, according to Chapter 2, leaves religious commitment open to a problem of cognitive arbitrariness and thus cognitive irrationality. The chapter examines some attempts of fideism to avoid this problem, but concludes that the problem stubbornly persists for fideism. The chapter also considers a version of fideism suggested b y a recent approach to the "proper basicality" of religious belief in so-called "Reformed epistemology." The chapter recommends against any confusion of evidence for a belief and an argument for a belief. Even if a religious belief can be "properly basic," and thus not in need of a supporting argument, it does not follow that such a belief needs no supporting evidence. In addition, according to Chapter 2, w e w o u l d d o well to avoid a kind of fideism about argument support that divorces rational belief from potential support from an argument. Chapter 3, " N a t u r a l Theology and G o d , " examines a nonpurposive approach to evidence for religious belief found in much natural theology, including in some first cause, design, fine tuning, and ontological arguments for G o d ' s existence. The chapter contends that this approach is too objectivist, because it relies on a spectator approach to evidence that disregards important volitional tendencies of inquirers in the appropriation of any relevant divine evidence. The chapter clarifies the significant distinction between spectator evidence and a kind of authoritative evidence that includes a volitional challenge to inquirers. Chapter 3 contends that w e should expect evidence offered to humans by a G o d worthy of worship to be authoritative evidence rather than spectator evidence. If this is so, w e can identify a critical deficiency in the familiar approaches to evidence for religious belief in traditional and contemporary natural theology. The chapter argues, in this connection, that standard natural theology fails to accommodate a key feature of a perfectly loving G o d : divine elusiveness stemming from perfectly loving divine purposes to transform inquirers morally and volitionally. Such natural

INTRODUCTION

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theology also neglects the significance of personifying evidence of divine reality wherein a human, as an intentional agent, becomes evidence of G o d ' s existence in virtue of willingly receiving and reflecting G o d ' s moral character for others. In addition, the chapter identifies some salient benefits of the fact that reasonable religious belief does not depend on natural theology. According to the volitional theism of Chapter 4, "Personifying Evidence of G o d , " w e need to ask w h a t kind of divine self-manifestation and self-revealing evidence w e should expect of a perfectly loving G o d w o r t h y of w o r s h i p . Part of the answer, as suggested previously, is that such a G o d w o u l d aim to influence not just h u m a n thoughts or emotions but also h u m a n wills, particularly regarding h u m a n desires and aversions, likes and dislikes, and loves and hates. Pascal w a s right in this connection, specifically in suggesting that G o d w o u l d self-hide and self-reveal for this important willoriented, morally relevant end. (The same idea is suggested by John 12:20-41.) A central divine purpose w o u l d be h u m a n transformation of a morally significant kind, whereby humans noncoercively become willing to love and to forgive as G o d loves and forgives, even their enemies, and thereby themselves become personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality. The needed volitional transformation w o u l d include attunement, or cooperation, of a h u m a n will with G o d ' s moral will, for the purpose of removing h u m a n selfishness and its destructive consequences as a means to building genuine community under divine moral authority. The volitional theism of Chapter 4 is doubly volitional: in acknowledging that evidence of G o d ' s reality among humans manifests G o d ' s will, and in characterizing such evidence as being suitably appropriated via the yielding of a h u m a n will to G o d ' s will, for the sake of one's becoming personifying evidence of G o d . Chapter 4 contends that the needed volitional attunement of a h u m a n will with G o d ' s will includes a kind of

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direct h u m a n k n o w l e d g e of divine reality that goes beyond mere prepositional k n o w l e d g e that G o d exists. This direct k n o w l e d g e involves h u m a n experiential acquaintance with distinctive, morally relevant volitional p o w e r inherent to G o d ' s character. A salient feature of this divine p o w e r is a genuine offer of forgiveness to offenders against G o d , even enemies, without the condoning of wrongdoing. Chapter 4 explains that the morally transforming effects of one's willingly receiving such an offer can increase one's evidence of divine reality. The chapter's approach to evidence and k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s existence thus contrasts sharply with the naturalist, fideist, and natural theological approaches examined in Chapters 1 - 3 . It illustrates that inquirers themselves m a y be under scrutiny and even moral challenge in their inquiry about G o d , for the sake of their becoming personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality. Chapter 5, "Diversity, Evil, and Defeat," attends to some influential proposed defeaters of evidence of divine reality, including alleged defeaters both from the disunity - and even inconsistency - among religious explanations offered b y the w o r l d ' s various religions and from the extensive evil in the world. One important lesson concerns the need to acknowledge h u m a n cognitive limits, particularly limits on w h a t w e humans are in a position to explain regarding any divine purposes in allowing various kinds of evil and religious disagreement. According to Chapter 5, given such limits, w e humans should not expect to be able to offer a comprehensive account of either the religious disagreement or the extensive evil in the w o r l d , even if some religious disagreement and some evil can be seen to serve a divine purpose. One important result of the chapter is our increased - if still limited - understanding of the significance of elusiveness in evidence of divine reality available to humans. Overall, then, this book invites us to inquire about G o d ' s existence in a n e w w a y that involves us morally and existentially as inquirers. We might think of ourselves as being

INTRODUCTION

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under inquiry in our inquiry about G o d ' s existence. In doing so, w e shall experience a major shift in epistemological questions about G o d , given that they then become questions that involve us as responsible agents, too. We n o w can see that the scope of this book differs from that of its predecessor, The Elusive God. Whereas the latter booked focused on the basis and details of volitional theism, the present book develops volitional theism against a background that includes critical assessment of prominent competing positions.

1

Nontheistic Naturalism

"I think that sometimes, out of the corner of an eye, 'at the moment which is not of action or inaction', one can glimpse the true scientific vision; austere, tragic, alienated, and very beautiful. A world that isn't for anything; a world that is just there." -Jerry Fodor 1998, p. 169. M a n y philosophers, among others, h a v e appealed to the sciences as a basis for challenging either the truth or the rationality of belief that G o d exists. We shall explore whether this common strategy actually succeeds in its challenge. Jerry Fodor elaborates on "the true scientific v i s i o n " in connection with biology, as follows: " A l l that happens is this: microscopic variations cause macroscopic effects, as an indirect consequence of which sometimes the variants proliferate and sometimes they don't. That's all there is; there's a lot of 'because' out there, but there isn't any 'for'" (1998, p. 168). "The true scientific v i s i o n " therefore denies that there is a purposive G o d or a purposive Mother Nature, or a purposive anything else, for that matter. If w e return to the wilderness parable of the Introduction, w e w o u l d identify "the true scientific vision" as entailing that a purposive rescuer is not part of the true scenario at all, for better or worse. M a n y w o u l d dare to suggest that this is, indeed, for the w o r s e w h e n one is lost deep in a wilderness canyon.

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E v e n so, "the true scientific v i s i o n " merits our attention now. Historically, according to Fodor, " . . . G o d w a s d e a d a century or so before D a r w i n turned u p But D a r w i n made it crystal clear that the natural order couldn't care less. It w a s n ' t G o d that D a r w i n killed, it w a s Mother N a t u r e " (1998, p. 186). Accordingly, "the true scientific vision," b y Fodor's lights, makes do without G o d and Mother Nature; indeed, it proceeds without any supernatural or natural purposive "for." It leaves behind purpose of any kind for the sake of uniformly nonpurposive causal explanation of the world. A m o n g twentieth-century philosophers, Bertrand Russell boldly offers such an austere scientific vision in his famous essay, " A Free M a n ' s Worship" (1903), and m a n y philosophers of a materialist persuasion follow suit (see the relevant essays by W.V. Quine, Daniel Dennett, and Paul Churchland in Moser and Trout 1995, or the essays in Parts II, III, and V of Lycan 1999; Chapter 3 returns to the significance of D a r w i n i s m for natural theology). If "the true scientific v i s i o n " sets the standard for all of reality, and thus for all genuine k n o w l e d g e of reality (as m a n y philosophers hold), w e have a straightforward challenge to the truth of theism and to any k n o w l e d g e that theism is true. If "the true scientific v i s i o n " also sets the standard for rational belief about reality, it will raise a definite challenge to rational belief that G o d exists. Specifically, if there are no purposes, then there is no purposive G o d and hence no G o d (as worthy of worship) at all. In that case, there will be no genuine k n o w l e d g e that G o d exists, even if m a n y people (for whatever reasons) mistakenly believe that G o d exists. Rational belief that G o d exists will also face serious trouble in the final analysis. This chapter explores and undermines the challenge of "the true scientific v i s i o n " to belief that G o d exists. It does so in connection with certain disputed questions about the reality of purposes and of purposive - that is, intentional explanations.

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1. S C I E N C E A N D PURPOSE

One can argue plausibly that the natural sciences do, indeed, leave behind explanatory talk of purposes and acknowledge only nonpurposive causes and explanations. If w e consider explanations in physics, for example, w e find only nonpurposive explanations of various sorts. Some such explanations are nonprobabilistic (say, in Newtonian kinematics), and others are probabilistic (say, in quantum statistical mechanics), but all such explanations are free of reference to purposes and thus to purposive agents. The same holds for chemistry, geology, and biochemistry, among other natural sciences. We find no explanations in these quarters of this form: " A n agent purports, aims, or intends to bring about X . " That form of purposive, or intentional, explanation w o u l d take us to the domain of the social sciences or the domain of commonsense explanation, b e y o n d the domain of the natural sciences proper. Someone might propose biology as an exception in the natural sciences that involves genuine purpose, given its use of some important language ("selection," "function") that seems purposive. Such biological language as "selection" and "function," however, is not intended in its strict use to signify actual purposes, goals, or intentions at w o r k in biological explanation. A n y appearance to the contrary is nothing more than a mere "manner of speaking," that is, rough shorthand for strict talk of something nonpurposive. Mother Nature is, in fact, no intentional Mother at all in the official explanations offered by biology. More generally, a key assumption of the natural sciences, if only methodologically, is that those sciences are explaining not the actions of purposive agents but, instead, events and processes (rather than intentional actions) resulting from nonpurposive causes, at least proximally if not distally or ultimately. (On the conditions for intentional actions in general, see Mele and Moser 1994; cf. Moser 1993, Chapter 5.)

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One might a d d that the natural sciences seek only nonpurposive causes and explanations given the adopted purposes of the natural sciences, that is, as a result of w h a t these sciences aim to accomplish. This, however, w o u l d raise t w o immediate questions. First, d o the natural sciences seek only nonpurposive causes and explanation just as a unified methodological strategy and thus merely as a practical expedient for natural scientific explanation? Or are the natural sciences instead committed to a theory of w h a t exists (an ontology) that, in virtue of being "natural," excludes irreducible intentional actions and purposive agents? M a n y (but not all) scientists will answer no to the latter question and yes to the former on the ground that the natural sciences do not, by themselves, exclude the existence of G o d and all other purposive agents. The natural sciences, according to these scientists, are logically compatible with the existence of G o d and other purposive agents, although these sciences, by practical or methodological expedient, d o not rely on explanations that refer to G o d or to any other irreducible purposive agent. If the natural sciences were actually committed to an ontology that excludes purposive agents altogether (and thus G o d , too), w e could properly d e m a n d adequate evidence to justify this bold exclusion. Such a d e m a n d , of course, w o u l d yield a difficult task for the natural sciences, or at least a task not yet fulfilled on the basis of the needed evidence. The dominant testimony of scientists themselves supports this unsurprising observation. E v e n so, m a n y writers uncritically assume the bold exclusion in question. The second immediate question concerns the aforementioned talk of the adopted purposes of the natural sciences, or of w h a t the natural sciences seek. Such talk seems irredeemably intentional, goal-directed, and purposive, and therefore at odds with an attempt to rid the natural sciences of anything purposive in their explanations. If w e attribute specific purposes to the natural sciences in connection with

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their explanatory aims, then w e cannot consistently portray the natural sciences as being completely free of all purposes. A s a result, it m a y seem that the relevant talk of purposes will have to be shorthand for something nonpurposive, if the natural sciences are to be free of purposes. It is difficult to identify the needed replacement (longhand) language, because purposes seem not to have any close cousins that can readily stand in as nonpurposive substitutes. Specifically, w e have no obvious nonpurposive replacements that function (if only in our explanations) in the w a y s purposes do, particularly in setting goals for inquiry. Even so, any claim that talk of purposes is just shorthand will readily invite the question of w h a t this shorthand is actually shorthand for, and the answer will need to steer clear of purposive scientific explainers. This need remains to be met, and an appropriate strategy for success (nonpurposively understood, of course) is less than clear. If w e were to drop talk of purposes altogether, w e w o u l d need (in the scenario at hand) a means of limiting the scope of the natural sciences to nonpurposive phenomena without involving talk of the " p u r p o s e s " or " a i m s " of the natural sciences. This w o u l d seem to take us back to a disputable ontological claim that excludes G o d and all other irreducible purposive agents from the domain of what is real. In that case, however, w e evidently m o v e from the frying pan to the fire. It is, after all, no small task to exclude irreducible purposive agents from the domain of w h a t is real. Clearly, it is not a lesson of the sciences, explicitly or implicitly, that this exclusion has been accomplished. In fact, the needed supporting evidence for such an exclusion seems not to be forthcoming, after all. One might try to avoid both the frying pan and the fire by distinguishing between the purposes of natural scientists and the features of natural scientific explanations. The general idea is just this: natural scientific explanations are characteristically free of purposive language and commitments, given the aim of natural scientists qua natural scientists to

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avoid purposive language and commitments in their natural scientific explanations. This idea m a y seem promising, at least until w e ask h o w the scope of natural scientific explanations is related to the (evidently intentional) conduct of natural scientists themselves. After all, natural scientists, among m a n y others, do seem to aim for g o o d explanations of various phenomena. In addition, given the evident intentional phenomena involved in humans (intentionally) explaining certain phenomena and in other seemingly purposive human activity, w e seem to be left with an irreducible dualism in kinds of explanation: purposive explanations and nonpurposive explanations. This dualism suggests that the natural sciences fail to supply the true scientific vision, even if they supply an important part of the true vision. The reality of the remaining part(s) of the vision, including the social sciences where intentional explanation flourishes, will challenge any alleged explanatory monopoly by nonpurposive natural science. If "the true scientific v i s i o n " feels like a liberating epiphany to some theorists (Fodor calls it " v e r y beautiful," whereas Russell calls it "alien and inhuman"), the social sciences appear to throw cold water on the (nonintentional) party, even without apologies. Psychology and sociology, for instance, are u p to their necks - even u p to their very minds in purposive language and explanations. If w e take a w a y desires, intentions, and decisions, w e thereby undermine intentional explanation and take a w a y the social sciences as w e k n o w them, including psychology and sociology. Suddenly, our domain of explanation w o u l d become very limited, and the resulting limitation w o u l d seem arbitrary at best. Psychology without intentional action collapses into physiology and neurology (and perhaps related natural sciences); likewise for sociology. Intentional explanation then loses its footing, and in that case, psychology and sociology will have to forgo their distinctive m o d e of explanation via intentions and desires. If this w e r e to take place,

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w e might say that the social sciences (as w e l l as e v e r y d a y explanations) h a v e been sacrificed to the natural sciences, even though the exact " p u r p o s e " of the sacrifice is unclear or at least not compelling. Perhaps an excessive standard of ontological or methodological "simplicity" is at w o r k , a standard that ultimately runs roughshod over actual data needing explanation. In any case, the main casualty will then be intentional explanation, including the explanatory role of irreducible intentional agents. We therefore should briefly explore the significance of intentional - that is, purposive explanation.

2. PURPOSIVE EXPLANATION

Let's think of an explanatory strategy as just a m o d e of explanation - that is, a m o d e of answering certain explanation-seeking questions that typically include certain why-questions, how-questions, or what-questions. A welldefined explanatory strategy, like any well-defined "strategy," must include certain specified ends and certain necessary conditions for appropriately achieving those ends. The phenomena selected as needing explanation m a y be description-dependent (say, certain parts of language) or description-independent (say, certain features of the world independent of humans). Neither option challenges the relevance of the aforementioned ingredients of a well-defined explanatory strategy. Whatever explanatory goals and necessary conditions are adopted, a theorist must accept a semantically significant (or an interpreted) vocabulary - a conceptual apparatus - for formulating those goals and necessary conditions. This conceptual apparatus also plays a crucial role in formulating acceptable explanatory hypotheses in accordance with an explanatory strategy. A conceptual apparatus yields a domain of discourse pertinent to an explanatory strategy. It consists of an acceptable vocabulary that can underwrite standards for the kinds of vocabulary pertinent to an explanatory strategy. Lacking

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such a conceptual apparatus, an explanatory strategy could proceed with virtually any vocabulary, h o w e v e r arbitrary, disparate, and disjoint. It could explain, for example, the same phenomena b y employing vocabulary from quantum theory, ancient Babylonian theology, Freudian psychology, and v o o d o o i s m - perhaps even all in one convoluted explanation with unmatched disunity. Well-defined explanatory strategies, however, seek a kind of explanatory unity that disallows such an "anything g o e s " convoluted approach to explanation. (On unification as a fundamental goal of scientific explanation, see Friedman 1974 and Kitcher 1 9 8 1 , 1 9 8 9 . ) The general explanatory strategy in the natural sciences for example, physics, chemistry, geology, and biology is relatively well defined, although not algorithmic. It includes, at any given time, a conceptual apparatus and a set of necessary conditions that exclude an "anything g o e s " approach to explanation. It excludes, for example, naturalscientific explanation of physical phenomena b y voodooism and ancient Babylonian theology, and this explains w h y scientific publications such as Science and Scientific American are free of v o o d o o i s m and ancient Babylonian theology. Such publications, in addition, w o u l d not regard this omission as an explanatory deficiency at all. A n explanatory strategy is individuated, or singled out, b y its conceptual apparatus and necessary conditions. Accordingly, if w e make sufficient changes in its conceptual apparatus or necessary conditions, w e thereby change the explanatory strategy. The natural sciences, on this approach to individuation, represent one general explanatory strategy, whereas intentional, or p u r p o s i v e , explanation represents another. (We shall continue to use talk of "intentional" explanation and talk of " p u r p o s i v e " explanation interchangeably.) The intentional vocabulary of purposive explanation - with its talk of beliefs, desires, intentions, purposes, and goals - is significantly different from the vocabulary of the natural sciences. G i v e n their general explanatory strategy, the natural sciences will not settle for explanation

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in such purposive vocabulary. This is part of w h a t makes them natural sciences (rather than, say, social sciences), and this holds true even if natural scientific explanation does not enjoy strict causal laws (throughout), but settles instead for statistical laws (in at least some areas). Events needing explanation can be identified, of course, in w a y s neutral between differing explanatory strategies, sometimes with just the neutral demonstratives " t h i s " and "that." Such neutral identifications typically are rather uninformative, but they can still be helpful in a quest for explanation. They can enable us to speak intelligibly of t w o different explanatory strategies bearing, at least potentially, on the same phenomena - for example, phenomena described by a psychologist in purposive terms as " m y intentionally calling m y Cavalier King Charles spaniel." In particular, w e can speak topic-neutrally of certain events occurring at a certain time that are explainable, at least in principle, by both a natural-scientific strategy and an intentional strategy. We need not assume that the competing explanations are equally good or correct in such a case. C a n a natural-scientific explanatory strategy and an intentional explanatory strategy, if they are truly independent of each other, individually fully explain the same phenomena? If, following Donald Davidson (1963), w e take intentional explanation to include a causal component (say, because mental events, such as decisions, sometimes have a causal role in explanation), then w e must confront an apparent problem. J a e g w o n K i m contends that " t w o or more complete and independent [causal] explanations of the same event or phenomenon cannot coexist" (1989, p. 89). K i m ' s "simple argument for explanatory exclusion for causal explanations" runs as follows: Suppose that [causes] C and C* are invoked as each giving a complete explanation of [an event] E. Consider the two questions: (1) Would E have occurred if C had not occurred? and (2) Would E have occurred if C* had not occurred? If the answer is

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a " y e s " to both questions, this is a classic case of overdetermination, and . . . w e can treat this case as one in which either explanation taken alone is incomplete, or else exempt all overdeterminative cases from the requirement of explanatory exclusion. If the answer is a " n o " to at least one of the questions, say the first, that must be because if C had not occurred, C* would not have either. And this means t h a t . . . the two explanations are not independent explanations of E (1989, p. 92). A s a first response, w e should hesitate to treat cases of causal overdetermination automatically as cases of incompleteness in the individual explanations (for relevant discussion, see Marras 1998). The relation between the t w o kinds of cases is more complicated than this. Let E be some event or set of events described topicneutrally - for example, "this event occurring right now." For instance, w e might let E represent the events described topic-neutrally that a psychologist w o u l d describe in purposive language as " m y intentionally calling m y barking spaniel." Let C be an intention-based causal explainer of E from an intentional strategy - an explanation in terms of m y beliefs, desires, and intentions, including m y aim to bring m y barking spaniel from outside into the house, in order to give m y stressed neighbors some needed relief. Further, let C* be a physical causal explainer of E from a natural-scientific strategy - say, an explainer in neurophysiological terms that does not appeal to m y beliefs, desires, or intentions. Let's suppose also that w e h a v e no definitional or nomological (law-based) reduction between C's being an explainer of E and C*'s being an explainer of E. In this respect, w e h a v e independent explainers. The issue at hand is whether these t w o explainers, if complete, are possible at the same time. If w e accept both an intentional strategy and a naturalscientific strategy to explain E, w e should answer yes to K i m ' s questions (1) and (2). We then h a v e , from the standpoint of the t w o accepted strategies, a case of causal and explanatory overdetermination. K i m (1989, p. 91) evidently

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holds that any explanation that w o u l d fail to mention either of the t w o causes in such a case of overdetermination w o u l d fail to give the complete causal picture, and therefore w o u l d be an incomplete explanation. Accordingly, Kim suggests that neither the intentional strategy nor the natural-scientific strategy w o u l d offer a complete explanation in such a case. K i m ' s approach to explanation apparently allows us to maintain both an intentional explanatory strategy and a natural-scientific explanatory strategy toward certain events (if neutrally described). The price paid in such cases is that neither strategy will be complete in K i m ' s preferred sense of "complete." This, however, is a small price, if it is a price at all. The lack of completeness for each accepted strategy will only be relative to the applicability of a different explanatory strategy accepted by us. Such relative lack of completeness takes nothing a w a y from an individual explanatory strategy considered from its o w n standpoint and its o w n correctness. Rather, it indicates simply that different explanatory strategies are accepted by us and are applicable to the same phenomena needing explanation. This is no theoretical defect for an explanatory strategy. It is simply an indication that a theorist can use different accepted explanatory strategies for the same phenomena (described topic-neutrally). K i m ' s concern is this: " T w o explanations of one event create a certain epistemic tension, a tension that is dissipated only when w e h a v e an account of h o w they, or the two causes they indicate, are related to each other" (1989, p. 92). Our two explanatory strategies for E relate to each other as follows: they differ by w a y of conceptual apparatus, wielding irreducibly different vocabularies, and therefore they are conceptually independent of each other. In addition, they are not complete for us in K i m ' s sense of "complete," because they both are accepted by us and apply to the same phenomena described topic-neutrally. That is, they answer explanation-seeking questions about the same phenomena described topic-neutrally. On m y construal of K i m ' s standards for avoiding epistemic tension, these considerations

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save us from explanatory exclusion by removing the epistemic tension. These considerations, furthermore, do not block the possibility of our establishing empirical correlations between events as intentionally described and events as (purely) physically described. K i m applies his standards for explanatory exclusion in a v e r y different manner. For example, he writes: The explanatory exclusion principle provides a simple explanation of w h y the two theories [of "vernacular psychology" and "neuroscience"]... compete against each other and w h y their peaceful coexistence is an illusion. For vernacular psychology and neuroscience each claim to provide explanations for the same domain of phenomena, and because of the failure of reduction in either domain, the purported explanations must be considered independent. Hence, by the exclusion principle, one of them has to go (1989, p. 1 0 1 ) . K i m adds, b y w a y of a proposed reconciliation, that the w a y to save vernacular psychology is to focus only on its normative role in evaluating actions, and to stop regarding it as a competitor to neuroscience that generates law-based causal explanations and predictions (1989, p. 106). This proposal, however, seems to rob intentional explanation in psychology of its genuine explanatory value and to relegate it to a domain of evaluation without explanation. Some theorists offer an analogous proposal for religion and natural science: specifically, let religion be a matter of ethics but not of factual reality, and let the sciences handle factual reality (see, for instance, G o u l d 1999; for misgivings, see Dennett 2006, p. 30, and D a w k i n s 2006, p p . 55-8). K i m ' s position on explanatory exclusion is less than compelling at best. His argument just quoted is invalid b y his o w n standards. Explanatory independence is not sufficient, but is only necessary, for explanatory exclusion. Explanatory completeness, on K i m ' s account, is also necessary for explanatory exclusion, but his argument neglects this decisive consideration. Kim, moreover, has provided no reason

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to assume that vernacular psychology and neuroscience are complete in the relevant sense. M a n y of us accept vernacular psychology and neuroscience as explanatory strategies for the same phenomena, neutrally described. We therefore plausibly can, and w o u l d , answer yes to K i m ' s aforementioned questions (1) and (2) concerning causal overdetermination. We plausibly can deny, then, that vernacular p s y chology and neuroscience are complete in the relevant sense proposed by Kim. A denial of completeness for vernacular psychology and neuroscience gains plausibility once w e acknowledge a certain kind of relativity in the "completeness" of an explanation. Neither vernacular psychology nor neuroscience is complete in the relevant sense, if w e accept an explanatory strategy relative to which each of those explanatory approaches leaves some explanation-seeking questions unanswered. Vernacular psychology raises certain explanation-seeking questions (for example, concerning beliefs, desires, and intentions) that are not raised or answered at all by neuroscience. More to the point, neuroscience does not offer any explanations in the language of beliefs, desires, and intentions. N o one should be inclined to deny this empirical fact. Clearly, neuroscience raises certain explanation-seeking questions (for example, concerning neuronal/synaptic functioning and other neurophysiological factors) that are not treated by vernacular psychology. For better or worse, vernacular psychology does not operate in the language of neuroscience, and this is an unsurprising empirical fact. If, for example, w e seek an explanation in neuroscientific terms of the neuronal/synaptic functioning in m y brain while I intentionally call m y spaniel into the house, vernacular psychology will not serve our purpose at all. We then will need to look elsewhere. Still, it does not follow that vernacular psychology has to do only with " n o r m a t i v e " considerations in "evaluating actions," and not with factual reality. Such an inference clearly w o u l d be invalid.

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A s for K i m ' s proposed reconciliation, w e should hesitate to relinquish vernacular psychology as a basis for predictions and causal explanations. Perhaps, at bottom, Kim fears a kind of causal dualism in which both mental causes and physical causes are (acknowledged as) genuine. Even so, there is nothing inherently w r o n g with causal dualism, and such dualism is, in fact, cognitively reasonable if it earns its keep b y its unmatched explanatory p o w e r relative to the w h o l e range of our experience and evidence. In particular, m a n y (if not all) of us have found considerable success in using vernacular psychology to predict various occurrences and to g i v e causal explanations of various phenomena. Let's consider a specific case involving the following events needing explanation. (a) A t 9:00 A . M . every M o n d a y between September 1 and December 1 , at least a dozen university graduate students and I converge on R o o m 334 of C r o w n Center of Loyola University Chicago. (b) The students carry with them copies of some recent books on the philosophy of religion, the psychology of religion, and epistemology. (c) From 9:00-11:30 A . M . , the students and I utter sentences employing vocabulary from the philosophy of religion, epistemology, vernacular psychology, and neuroscience. (d) A t 1 1 : 3 0 A . M . , the students and I depart from Room 334 of C r o w n Center. We can describe these events in terms that are more obviously topic-neutral; this w o u l d not affect the point at issue. A s it happens, w e are able to explain and to predict such events as (a)-(d) only by relying on an intentional, or purposive, explanatory strategy. Neither neuroscience nor natural science in general is u p to the job, and one can give only a questionable promissory note that this inadequacy will change in the future. In particular, I n o w must rely on an explanation in terms of the beliefs, desires, decisions, and

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intentions of m y students and myself. M y students desire (and intend) to earn a university graduate degree, and I desire (and intend) to help b y providing some of the academic means. M y students and I believe that by meeting at the specified time to discuss the psychology and epistemology of religious belief, w e can contribute to their fulfilling the degree requirements. So far, then, the relevant explanatory factors are highly intentional, and have little, if anything, to d o with neuroscience or natural science. M y students and I h a v e decided (that is, h a v e settled on the plan) that w e will contribute to fulfilling their degree requirements by, among other things, meeting at the specified time to discuss the psychology and epistemology of religious belief. We have not made any conflicting decisions that override or otherwise challenge the former decision. A s a result of such factors, according to an intentional explanation in terms of the beliefs, desires, decisions, and intentions of m y students, events (a)-(d) occur. Without such an intentional explanation, w e w o u l d be at a loss to account for events (a)-(d), and abstract worries about a threat from causal dualism should not be allowed to obscure this fact. Our intentional explanation of events (a)-(d) attributes causal efficacy to such familiar intentional phenomena as believing, desiring, deciding, and intending. It appeals to such causally relevant phenomena to explain and even to predict the occurrence of certain ordinary events represented by (a)-(d). Such causal intentional phenomena n o w play an indispensable role for us in explaining and predicting the events in question. We have no replacement explainers at hand, or even a sketch of replacement explainers. This is a fact partly about us as agents w h o formulate explanations, of course, but it is nonetheless a fact of the matter, at least so far as w e know. We h a v e no reason to suggest that physicalists (or naturalists) and intentionalists should a l w a y s agree in their explanations and predictions. Rather, the point is that intentional explanation and prediction sometimes are our only

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available means of explaining and predicting certain occurrences. It is v e r y doubtful, as just suggested, that anyone could explain or predict the events represented by (a)-(d) solely on the basis of contemporary natural science, including neuroscience. K i m ' s proposal for reconciliation therefore w o u l d h a v e us relinquish our best available explanation and predictive basis of the events in question. This is a proposal with an obvious explanatory loss and no corresponding benefit. Accordingly, w e should decline this proposal. (For additional support for the genuine explanatory value of intentional psychology, see Horgan and Woodward 1985.) Suppose that w e accept that neuroscience can (at least in principle) explain the events represented by (a)-(d), if described topic-neutrally, and that its explanations are altogether nonintentional. In that case, neither neuroscience nor vernacular psychology w o u l d be complete for us in K i m ' s sense of "complete." This consideration, however, takes nothing a w a y from the explanatory value of either strategy. It simply indicates that w e accept different explanatory strategies applicable to a certain set of phenomena needing explanation. M y suggested approach to explanatory completeness, as noted previously, acknowledges a certain kind of relativity to the explanatory strategies accepted by a theorist or group of theorists. A theorist w h o rejects intentional explanatory strategies might accept only a natural-scientific explanatory strategy, and no alternative explanatory strategy. Such an eliminative naturalist w o u l d h a v e a difficult time explaining m a n y macro-aspects of our daily lives, including what appear to be our intentional actions aimed at certain goals. For instance, explaining the aforementioned events (a)-(d) under the descriptions offered w o u l d become a serious problem. In addition, in such eliminative naturalism, theology in general w o u l d go b y the board as something without a genuine grip on reality. E v e n so, the natural-scientific strategy w o u l d be complete, at least in principle, for the eliminative

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naturalist w h o accepts no alternative explanatory strategy. K i m ' s alternative understanding of explanatory completeness seems not to acknowledge such relativity, but in this regard it is obscure on the exact conditions for completeness. If w e relinquish intentional explanation altogether, three options remain for the social sciences, given their acknowledgment of intentional actions (for supporters of each option, see Moser and Trout 1995). First, one might try to reduce the social sciences to the natural sciences b y showing that explanations in the social sciences are ultimately (that is, in what they genuinely contribute) just explanations in the natural sciences. This option is n o w w i d e l y acknowledged as hopeless, although a few wishful philosophers and scientists have tried to keep the pipe dream alive. At least, no one has s h o w n h o w intentional explanation (say, in sociology or in psychology) can be adequately captured by nonintentional explanation (say, in biology or in chemistry). In particular, no one has s h o w n h o w familiar explanatory talk of intentions (or of intentional, purposive agents) reduces, without semantic loss, to talk of something nonintentional. On the second option, a theorist proposes that w e simply eliminate intentional explanations as irretrievably false, without bothering to seek a reduction to nonintentional explanations. This option is highly controversial, however, because no one has shown that intentional explanations and therefore the corresponding social sciences are irretrievably false (in their acknowledging intentional actions or intentional agents). Indeed, barring a fear of causal dualism, one must w o n d e r w h a t w o u l d motivate one to " w a n t " to eliminate intentional explanations. In any case, even eliminative naturalists seem to h a v e their (intentional) wants, given their desired and promoted strategies for explanation. The third option proposes that w e continue to use intentional explanations w h e n convenient but acknowledge that they are just a useful manner of speaking that is, strictly speaking, false. Such pragmatism about intentional explanation

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(which is at least suggested b y K i m ' s proposed reconciliation) m a y seem helpful at first glance, but it faces two serious problems. A s suggested previously, one problem is that no one has offered a defensible case that intentional explanations and the corresponding social sciences are, strictly speaking, false. In addition, such a case does not seem to be available to us, given the evident reality of purposive phenomena. The other problem is that w e inquirers naturally w a n t to explain why intentional explanations are actually useful, w h e n they are useful. A r e they useful, at least in part, because they portray something real - namely, intentional agents, attitudes, and actions? A n affirmative answer is arguably a live option in the social sciences and in everyd a y intentional explanation. In any case, w e d o well to separate two variations on naturalism that bear on intentional explanation: ontological naturalism and methodological naturalism. Let's briefly explore these t w o variations.

3. O N T O L O G I C A L

NATURALISM

Ontological naturalism comes in m a n y different forms, but the variations share the following thesis that m a y be called core ontological naturalism: every real entity consists of, or at least o w e s its existence to, the objects a c k n o w l e d g e d by w h a t w o u l d be the completed empirical sciences. We m a y think of the latter objects as the objects of a natural ontology. Ontological naturalism is a general position about what actually exists, and therefore is a metaphysical view. It is directly neither an epistemological v i e w about h o w w e know something nor a semantic v i e w about the meaning of terms. Instead, it directly concerns h o w things actually are, and therefore is, properly speaking, ontological. (I use the terms "ontological" and "metaphysical" interchangeably.) Ontological naturalists typically (but not a l w a y s ) endorse some kind of materialism, or physicalism, about real things. In that endorsement, they hold that the completed empirical

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sciences will support materialism. One influential understanding of "material" (or "physical") is that something is material (or physical) if and only if it is extended in space. G i v e n this understanding, strict materialism is the v i e w that everything that actually exists is extended in space, and therefore nothing nonspatial exists. Loose materialism, in contrast, is the v i e w that all particular things that exist are extended in space, but this v i e w allows for the existence of nonspatial universals (which are not particular things, strictly speaking), such as abstract properties and mathematical sets. Still, strict materialism and loose materialism (even taken individually) entail that G o d , characterized as a nonspatial spirit w h o is not a universal, does not exist. The aforementioned general portrayals of strict and loose materialism seem straightforward, but the relevant notion of spatial extension evidently depends on the v e r y notion of "material" that is in need of clarification. In other w o r d s , the notion of spatial extension seems to involve the notion of physical, or material, space. If that is so, conceptual circularity will threaten the suggested characterization of materialism. We cannot truly clarify our talk of "material" with more talk of "material." Something else is needed. (We are, as suggested, using the terms "material" and " p h y s i c a l " interchangeably.) The problem at hand is that the notion of spatial extension is actually the notion of something's being extended in physical space, or being physically extended. We can coherently conceive that something (say, a personal spirit) has temporal extension, in virtue of extending over time, even though that thing is not extended at all in physical space. In other w o r d s , w e face no self-contradiction in holding that something is temporally extended but is not a physical thing. The proposed characterization of materialism needs revision, then, to talk of physical space or physical extension. In that case, however, a problem of conceptual circularity threatens. E v e n if there is no strict circularity here, the notion of being extended in physical space seems too close,

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semantically, to the notion of being material to offer genuine illumination. Minimally, w e need some clarification of the talk of spatial extension, if such talk is to clarify our understanding of w h a t is material. We n o w can leave that project, however, as h o m e w o r k for materialists. A second prominent construal of "material," in keeping with the ultimate base acknowledged b y naturalism, invokes the empirical sciences as a source of clarification. The general idea is that the language of the (hypothetically completed) empirical sciences determines what it is to be material, or physical. On this view, a predicate such as "is an electron" signifies a physical item if a n d only if the empirical sciences, in their hypothetically completed form, rely on that predicate in their descriptive and explanatory formulations. This strategy m a y seem promising at the start for naturalists, because it lets the empirical sciences themselves ultimately clarify w h a t it is to be physical. Three difficulties are noteworthy. First, the empirical sciences currently lack an exhaustive list of truths about the physical w o r l d and therefore are definitely incomplete. In addition, it is not clear that they will ever have such an exhaustive list, given the tremendous complexity of the physical world. Such incompleteness allows for there being predicates that the empirical sciences do not rely on, but that nonetheless pick out something real in the physical world. It is questionable, then, whether the empirical sciences have a monopoly on predicates signifying real physical items. Second, the empirical sciences use mathematical and logical predicates that evidently d o not signify physical items at all. For example, the predicate "is a member of a (mathematical) set" does not signify a physical item, according to standard mathematical interpretations. Third, invoking "the empirical sciences" raises the problem of specifying exactly w h e n something is an "empirical" science. Such specifying w o u l d be no small task, given (a) the actuality of such theoretical empirical sciences as cosmology and particle physics that rely on highly theoretical entities, and (b) the inclusion

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of the social sciences, including their intentional vocabulary and explanations, in the empirical sciences. In any case, it w o u l d not help n o w to portray an empirical science as a discipline that investigates, in a special way, only the material, or physical, w o r l d , because w e are seeking an elucidation of the relevant notion of being material (or physical). The exact conditions for w h a t it is to be material, or physical, resist easy specification, and the same holds for the category of being empirical. Is social psychology, for example, an empirical science? Social psychologists, as previously suggested, often use intentional vocabulary (for example, talk of beliefs, desires, intentions, fears, and hopes) that does not obviously signify (just) material things. A s a result, w e w o u l d need clarification of the sense in which social psychology is "materialist," if it is an empirical science in the relevant sense. In general, ontological naturalists w h o base their materialism on the empirical sciences w o u l d d o well to characterize what it is to be an empirical science without relying on talk of what is material or physical. This w o u l d save them from a clear threat of conceptual circularity. (For other difficulties in giving an adequate characterization of materialism, see Crane and Mellor 1990, and their follow-up contribution in Moser and Trout" 1995, p p . 85-9.) Ontological naturalists w h o are materialists oppose various forms of ontological pluralism, including ontological dualism - the v i e w that there are two irreducible kinds of things that actually exist. A v e r y influential kind of ontological substance dualism, stemming from Rene Descartes, affirms that there are mental substances (particularly, thinking and willing individuals) as well as physical substances (particularly, material substances), and that mental substances d o not depend for their existence on physical substances. Proponents of such Cartesian dualism must specify, among other things, the sense in which mental substances do not depend for their existence on physical substances. They typically allow for relations of causal dependence between mental substances and material substances, but

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they deny that mental substances are part of the ontological realm of material substances. According to Cartesians, a mental substance is different in ontological kind from a material substance. If there is a coherently conceivable ontological distinction between minds and material bodies, then materialism, understood as entailing m i n d - b o d y identity, is not conceptually, or analytically, true - that is, true just in virtue of the meanings of the terms " m i n d " and "material body." A n inference from a coherently conceivable ontological distinction between minds and material bodies to an actual ontological distinction between minds and material bodies in reality creates trouble. The latter actual distinction entails that actual minds are not material bodies. Such an actual ontological distinction goes beyond a distinction between kinds, concepts, or definitions; it entails a difference between actual particular things. The inference in question w o u l d need to accommodate this fact. E v e n if it is not conceptually (or otherwise necessarily) true that minds and material bodies are identical, according to m a n y philosophers, it m a y still be contingently true (and thus possibly false) that minds are material bodies. According to these philosophers, an identity relation between m i n d s and material bodies m a y hold as an actual matter of fact even if it does not obtain as a matter of kind, concept, definition, or necessity. Other philosophers deny that the notion of contingent identity is coherent, and accept an inference from the coherent conceivability of an ontological m i n d - b o d y distinction to an ontologically real distinction between minds and bodies. We need not endorse either position here. According to most contemporary materialists, the coherent conceivability of the falsity of materialism does not challenge the actual contingent truth of materialism about minds. The contingent truth of such materialism, according to most contemporary materialists, is truth enough. Ontological naturalists w h o are materialists reject Cartesian ontological dualism, particularly its implication that a

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h u m a n mind consists of a nonphysical substance different in kind from material bodies. They also reject the Cartesian v i e w that some mental properties are actually exemplified by certain nonphysical things - that is, things not extended in physical space. Materialists are uniformly monistic in their v i e w s that all actually existing individuals are material, and that the only things that exemplify mental (or psychological) properties are material things. These t w o fundamental materialist v i e w s , according to most contemporary materialists, are contingently true and justifiable empirically not a priori. These materialists acknowledge that the evidence for these t w o v i e w s must come from factors dependent on h u m a n experience. They hold, accordingly, that neither reason nor definition alone can produce the needed evidence. We should contrast the following t w o contrary options about the relation between ontological naturalism and materialism: (a) ontological naturalism is logically neutral regarding materialism and therefore is logically compatible with ontological dualism, and (b) ontological naturalism logically entails materialism and therefore is logically incompatible with ontological dualism. G i v e n option (a), a defense of materialism on the basis of ontological naturalism should appeal to supporting evidence beyond naturalism, and that evidence presumably w o u l d be independent empirical evidence. G i v e n option (b), an appeal to ontological naturalism in defense of materialism w o u l d need to be an appeal to something irreducible to materialism, because materialism w o u l d then be a logical prerequisite of ontological naturalism. A n appeal to materialism to support materialism w o u l d convince no one. Many, if not most, contemporary ontological naturalists prefer option (a) over option (b). W. V. Quine has opposed option (b) as follows: . . . nowadays the overwhelming purposes of the science game are technology and understanding The science game is not committed to the physical, whatever that means Even

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telepathy and clairvoyance are scientific options, however moribund. It would take some extraordinary evidence to enliven them, but, if that were to happen, then empiricism itself - the crowning n o r m . . . of naturalized epistemology would go by the board. For remember that that norm, and naturalized epistemology itself, are integral to science, and science is fallible and corrigible (1990, pp. 20-1). Quine suggests that naturalism anchored in science is not logically committed to physicalism (or materialism) or even to empiricism. Quine's use of "science" here is definitely not restricted to empirical science in the u s u a l sense, because it allows that empiricism could " g o b y the b o a r d " in science as the result of our discovering extraordinary evidence of parapsychological phenomena. He does not regard such potential extraordinary evidence as entailing our moving either outside of science or against science. Instead, he finds such potential evidence compatible with science as a fallible (or error-capable) pursuit of h u m a n understanding on the basis of evidence. Naturalists of Quine's persuasion endorse fallibilism about science (owing to its error-capability) with good reason, given the enormous shifts in the scientific understanding of reality that h a v e occurred early and late in the history of science. A commitment to absolute space as the basis for material reality led m a n y theorists, at least in earlier times, to oppose theories of space-time relativity. Likewise, an a priori commitment about the materialist or the empiricist nature of science could bring naturalists directly into conflict with the best contemporary science h u m a n s h a v e to offer if science develops in certain novel nonmaterialist directions. A s just noted, accordingly, Quine's o w n a v o w e d constraints on the ontology of the sciences permit (under certain extraordinary conditions) the acknowledgment of parapsychological processes as being scientific, and Quine's constraints on scientific methodology permit (again, under certain extraordinary conditions) the rejection of empiricism. The sciences, as portrayed b y Quine, permit (under certain

7

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extraordinary conditions) even nonempirical methodologies to ground belief in nonphysical things or processes. Quine, then, is no monolithic ideologue for empiricism or materialism. It is n o w unclear h o w the nonempirical methods employed in traditional metaphysics, including the metaphysics of G o d , can be ruled out b y Quine's liberal naturalism, as long as those nonempirical methods are fallible and yield h u m a n understanding. If the sciences are the fallible pursuit of h u m a n understanding, and there is no requirement that the objects of such understanding fall within the range of empirical experience, then there is no requirement that the scientific pursuit of h u m a n understanding must be fully delimited by empiricism. The scientific pursuit can then include even fallible theology that advances human understanding. This will come as an o d d result, at best, for many naturalists. Even so, it is a (seldom noted) result of Quine's liberal naturalism as just summarized. Perhaps theology does not yield technology, but the same is true of much w i d e l y accepted empirical science. It is arguable, however, that some theology yields fallible human understanding and, in that respect, is akin to the sciences. The o d d result for naturalists of Quine's persuasion stems from their reliance, particularly in opposing traditional metaphysics, on their portrayal of science as pretty much any "fallible and corrigible" pursuit of understanding. Specifically, they offer no reason to think that science, as merely a fallible pursuit of understanding, must exclude fallible metaphysics, even the fallible metaphysics of G o d . Contrary to Quine's liberal naturalism, then, m a n y philosophers anchor naturalism in empirical science rather than just in the fallible and corrigible pursuit of understanding. This is in keeping with the fact that naturalists typically limit good scientific explanation to empirically oriented explanation, and thereby intend to exclude theology from science. Without digressing to the complex task of supplying a precise account of "empirically oriented" explanation, let's

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construe "empirical science" broadly to encompass any scientific discipline housed in a typical college of natural or social sciences. Accordingly, astronomy is in, and astrology out; psychology is in, and parapsychology out. Anthropology is in, but philosophy and theology are out, given their customary place in the humanities or the arts, as a result of their being insufficiently empirical to be empirical sciences. Our criterion is rough, of course, but it enables us to take some definite steps. Ontological naturalism comes in eliminative, reductive, and nonreductive forms, as follows: (i) Eliminative ontological naturalism: e v e r y real entity is included in the ontology of the hypothetically completed empirical sciences, and any language independent of those sciences is eliminable from discourse without any cognitive loss. (ii) Noneliminative reductive ontological naturalism: every real entity either is included in the ontology of the hypothetically completed empirical sciences or is reducible to something included in that ontology. (iii) Noneliminative nonreductive ontological naturalism: every real entity either (a) is included in the ontology of the hypothetically completed empirical sciences, (b) is reducible to something included in that ontology, or (c) supervenes, without reduction, on entities that fall under (a) or (b). The relevant talk of supervenience in (iii) has received many technical analyses from philosophers (see, for instance, the essays in Savellos and Yalcm 1995), but the key idea in the present context is that some features of the w o r l d are nonreductively based on certain objects of the empirical sciences. Perhaps the fluidity of water is supervenient in this manner, and perhaps mental events are, too. If w e bracket discussion of abstract entities, such as mathematical sets, proponents of (i) h a v e included W.V. Quine (1957), Paul Churchland (1979), and Daniel Dennett (1987). J.J.C. Smart (1963)

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and E.O. Wilson (1987), among others, h a v e represented (ii). Donald Davidson (1970) and D a v i d Papineau (1993), among m a n y others, h a v e supported variations on (iii). Some philosophers favor naturalism for some domains, but hold certain v i e w s that are incompatible with positions (i)-(iii). They offer, as one example, a version of naturalism that acknowledges the existence of nonphysical abstract objects (for instance, abstract propositions or mathematical sets) that neither consist of nor are grounded, whether b y reduction or b y supervenience, in the objects of an ontology of empirical science. E v e n so, they hold that all "particular" (as opposed to "abstract") things consist of or at least are grounded in the objects of empirical science, and this underwrites their endorsement of naturalism for some domains. Ontological naturalism invites a straightforward question: w h y should w e hold that empirical science has a monopoly on the ontological basis for real things or even for real " p a r t i c u l a r " things? Clearly, there is no logically or conceptually necessary connection between empirical science and the ontological basis for real things. We can coherently imagine the reality of many things (including such objects as mathematical sets and abstract propositions) that h a v e no apparent ontological basis in the objects of empirical science. A s a result, naturalism calls for an answer to the previous question about a monopoly, and that answer should offer a necessary or at least a universal connection between empirical science and the ontological basis for real things. The answer will need to speak to the following issue in particular: given the remarkable diversity of the kinds of real objects, including the real objects experienced by humans, w h y should w e suppose that empirical science offers the exclusive ontological basis for those objects? Empirical science w o u l d appear, at least at first glance, to offer a rather narrow basis for the wide-ranging set of real things. If ontological naturalism is true, then G o d does not exist, because G o d (if G o d existed as a nonphysical spirit) w o u l d

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not consist of or be grounded in the objects of empirical science. If traditional monotheism is true, G o d is an individual personal agent (and not an abstract object) w h o s e existence does not depend on the objects of empirical science. According to such monotheism, the objects of empirical science resulted from divine creation. A s a result, if such monotheism is true, there is at least one real thing that does consist of or depend on the objects of empirical science, and hence ontological naturalism is false. If someone k n o w s that ontological naturalism is true, then that person has the basis for k n o w l e d g e that traditional monotheism is false. This basis involves the fact that such naturalism logically entails that traditional monotheism is false. After careful attention to the available pertinent evidence, however, I a m u n a w a r e of anyone's having such a basis, and therefore I find ontological naturalism to be doubtful at best. In any case, a proponent of ontological naturalism must provide adequate cognitive support for such naturalism, and this task is demanding b y any standard. The immediate question is this: what kind of actual evidence excludes G o d ' s existence in the manner suggested? In particular, what kind of actual evidence from empirical science thus excludes G o d ' s existence? It is very difficult to identify candidates for such evidence, even after careful investigation. Might G o d not hide from the domain of scientific evidence and even be elusive toward humans for various g o o d purposes? Might G o d not w a n t to make it clear that G o d is not a scientific object or any kind of h u m a n l y controllable or conveniently predictable object? We can think of various good purposes that could underlie such divine elusiveness (as w e shall see in Chapters 3 and 4), and it w o u l d be presumptuous at best to suppose that our scientific evidence precludes such purposes or otherwise excludes G o d ' s existence. Some philosophers steer clear of ontological naturalism, as a result, and look to a methodological variation on naturalism. Let's briefly consider that variation.

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4. M E T H O D O L O G I C A L

NATURALISM

Going b e y o n d the immediate concern of an ontology of w h a t is real, the term "naturalism" picks out a range of v i e w s about the nature of legitimate inquiry that are logically independent of ontological naturalism. These v i e w s share the following position, which w e m a y call core methodological naturalism: every cognitively legitimate (or rational) method of acquiring or revising beliefs consists of or is grounded in the hypothetically completed methods of the empirical sciences (that is, in " n a t u r a l " methods). This is not ontological naturalism, because claims about the cognitively legitimate methods of acquiring or revising beliefs are not the same as claims about what actually exists. In agreement with most naturalists, w e m a y understand talk of the "methods of the empirical sciences" broadly, to encompass the kinds of "lay scientific" observation and belief formation that underlie ordinary perceptual beliefs. Methodological naturalism offers a kind of variety analogous to that of ontological naturalism. We thus may distinguish: (iv) Eliminative methodological naturalism: all terms, including empirically disputed terms (for example, normative and intentional terms), e m p l o y e d in cognitively legitimate methods of acquiring or revising beliefs are replaceable, without cognitive loss, by terms employed in the hypothetically completed methods of the empirical sciences, (v) Noneliminative reductive methodological naturalism: all terms, including empirically disputed terms, employed in cognitively legitimate methods of acquiring or revising beliefs either are replaceable, without cognitive loss, b y terms e m p l o y e d in the hypothetically completed methods of the empirical sciences or are reducible (by, for example, either definition or entailment) to terms e m p l o y e d in those methods.

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(vi) Noneliminative reductive-and-nonreductive methodological naturalism: all terms, including empirically disputed terms, e m p l o y e d in cognitively legitimate methods of acquiring or revising beliefs either (a) are replaceable, without cognitive loss, by terms e m p l o y e d in the hypothetically completed methods of the empirical sciences, (b) are reducible to terms employed in those methods, or (c) are neither replaceable nor reducible in the manner of (a) or (b) but instead h a v e referents that supervene u p o n those of the terms employed in the hypothetically completed methods of the empirical sciences. W.V. Quine suggested (iv) in his early w o r k , and Donald Davidson suggested a version of (vi). Perhaps a reductionist such as J J . C . Smart or E.O. Wilson w o u l d endorse (v). The talk of "empirically d i s p u t e d " terms in (iv)-(vi) connotes terms deemed by some to be insufficiently empirical to figure in the empirical sciences. Normative terms (say, from ethics) and mentalistic terms (say, from psychology) are familiar instances of empirically disputed terms. In (iv)-(vi), the notion of "cognitive" m a y be taken in the broadest sense, to include k n o w l e d g e proper (however analyzed in detail), justified belief, and even evidence for a belief. In other w o r d s , methodological naturalists claim that the hypothetically completed methods of the empirical sciences define or otherwise ground the only sorts of inquiry that yield knowledge, justified belief, or even evidence for a belief. Contrary to m a n y textbooks on science, w e lack a simple recipe to characterize precisely the methods of the empirical sciences. The actual sciences are methodologically complex by any standard, and their methods d o not reduce to recipes. Perhaps the best w e can do is to refer to the methods e m p l o y e d in our best physics, chemistry, astronomy, geology, biology, anthropology, psychology, sociology, and so on. The debate will turn, quite naturally, to w h a t exactly is included in " a n d so o n " or in our " b e s t " empirical sciences.

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This will lead quickly to complex topics in the philosophy of science, but w e need not digress. Our main point is that an accurate understanding of the methods of the sciences is no simple matter. We m a y acknowledge that the methods of the empirical sciences, h o w e v e r fallible and whatever specifically they include, are designed to achieve truth rather than falsehood. We also m a y recognize that the methods of the empirical sciences seek various cognitive virtues, such as fruitful explanation and predictive success, at least in some areas. Even faced with the concerns of skeptics about acquiring truth, w e should acknowledge that the methods in question are intended to achieve truth, regardless of whether they actually succeed. The turbulent history of the empirical sciences illustrates conclusively that they d o not a l w a y s succeed. That limitation, however, does not preclude intended truth in the methods of the empirical sciences. Characteristically, scientific methods are intended to achieve truth, even w h e n they fail. We m a y assume, accordingly, that a scientific method is cognitively relevant at least in that it aims for true (rather than false) results on the basis of supporting evidence. Some people evidently hold that the methods of the sciences h a v e a monopoly in this area, but this view, w e shall see, faces a serious problem b y its o w n standard, given that it is not, itself, a scientifically justified view. We turn n o w to a troublesome dilemma for naturalism.

5.

A

D I L E M M A

FOR

SCIENTISM

Our dilemma will bear on positions (i)-(vi), given that it bears on the aforementioned core statements of naturalism satisfied b y those positions, namely: Core ontological naturalism: every real entity either consists of or at least owes its existence to the objects acknowledged by the hypothetically completed empirical sciences (that is, the objects of a natural ontology).

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Core methodological naturalism: every cognitively legitimate method of acquiring or revising beliefs consists of or is grounded in the hypothetically completed methods of the empirical sciences (that is, in natural methods). These are core statements of ontological and methodological naturalism, and they offer the empirical sciences as the criterion for metaphysical and cognitive genuineness. They entail ontological and methodological monism in that they acknowledge the empirical sciences as the single standard for genuine metaphysics and cognition. These core positions therefore promise us remarkable explanatory unity in metaphysics and cognition. Still, w e must ask: is their promise trustworthy? For brevity, let's call the conjunction of these two positions Core Scientism, while allowing for talk of both its distinctive ontological component and its distinctive methodological component. Core Scientism is not itself a thesis offered b y any empirical science. In particular, neither its ontological component nor its methodological component is a thesis, directly or indirectly, of an empirical science or a group of empirical sciences. Neither component is endorsed or implied b y the empirical scientific w o r k of physics, chemistry, astronomy, geology, biology, anthropology, psychology, sociology, or any other natural or social empirical science or any group thereof. A s a result, no research fundable by the National Science Foundation, for instance, offers Core Scientism as a scientific thesis. In contrast, the National E n d o w m e n t for the Humanities w o u l d be open to funding certain w o r k centered on Core Scientism, perhaps as part of a project in philosophy, particularly in philosophical metaphysics or epistemology. Core Scientism proposes a universality of scope for the empirical sciences (see its talk of " e v e r y real entity" and " e v e r y cognitively legitimate method") that the sciences themselves consistently avoid. Individual sciences are typically distinguished b y the particular ranges of empirical

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data they seek to explain: biological data for biology, anthropological data for anthropology, and so on. Similarly, empirical science as a whole is typically distinguished b y its attempt to explain all relevant empirical data and, accordingly, by the range of all relevant empirical data. G i v e n this typical constraint on empirical science, w e should be surprised indeed if the empirical sciences had anything to say about whether entities outside the domain of the empirical sciences (say, in the domain of theology) are nonexistent. A t any rate, w e should be suspicious in that case. S w e e p i n g principles about the nature of cognitively legitimate inquiry in general, particularly principles involving entities allegedly outside the domain of the empirical sciences, are not the possession or the product of the empirical sciences themselves. Instead, such principles emerge from philosophy or from some product of philosophy, perhaps even misguided philosophy. Accordingly, Core Scientism is a philosophical thesis, and is not the kind of scientific thesis characteristic of the empirical sciences. The empirical sciences flourish, have flourished, and will flourish without commitment to Core Scientism or to any such philosophical principle. Clearly, furthermore, opposition to Core Scientism is not opposition either to science (regarded as a group of significant cognitive disciplines) or to genuine scientific contributions. Proponents of Core Scientism will remind us that their scientism invokes not the current empirical sciences but rather the hypothetically completed empirical sciences. Accordingly, they m a y be undisturbed by the absence of Core Scientism from the theses of the current empirical sciences. Still, the problem at hand persists for Core Scientism, because w e have no reason to hold that Core Scientism is among the claims or the implications of the hypothetically completed empirical sciences. A general problem is that specific predictions about w h a t the completed sciences will include are notoriously risky and arguably unreliable (even though this robust fact has not hindered stubborn forecasters of science).

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The often turbulent, sometimes revolutionary history of the sciences offers no firm basis for reasonable confidence in such speculative predictions, especially w h e n a sweeping philosophical claim is involved. In addition, nothing in the current empirical sciences makes it likely that the completed sciences w o u l d include Core Scientism as a thesis or a n implication. The monopolistic hopes of some naturalists for the sciences, therefore, are hard to anchor in reality. The problem with Core Scientism stems from its distinctive monopolistic claims. Like m a n y philosophical claims, it makes claims about every real entity and every cognitively legitimate method for acquiring or revising beliefs. The empirical sciences, as actually practiced, are not monopolistic, nor do w e h a v e any reason to think that they should or will become so. Neither individually nor collectively do they offer scientific claims about every real entity or every cognitively legitimate method for belief formation. A d v o cates of an empirical science monopoly w o u l d do well to attend to this empirical fact. The empirical sciences rightly limit their scientific claims to their proprietary domains, even if w a y w a r d scientists sometimes overextend themselves, and depart from empirical science proper, with claims about every real entity or every cognitively legitimate method. (The latter claims tend to sell trendy books, even though they fail as science.) Support for this observation comes from the fact that the empirical sciences, individually and collectively, are logically and cognitively neutral on such matters as the existence of G o d and the veracity of certain kinds of religious experience. Accordingly, each such science logically and cognitively permits the existence of G o d and the veracity of certain kinds of religious experience. We h a v e no reason, moreover, to suppose that the hypothetically completed empirical sciences should or will differ from the actual empirical sciences in this respect. Naturalists, at any rate, h a v e not s h o w n otherwise; nor has anyone else. This comes as no surprise, however, once w e recognize that the G o d of traditional monotheism

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does not qualify or function as an object of empirical science. A c c o r d i n g l y w e d o w e l l not to assume, without needed argument, that the objects of empirical science exhaust the objects of reality in general. A n analogous point holds for the methods of empirical science: w e should not assume uncritically that they exhaust the methods of cognitively legitimate belief formation in general. Proponents of Core Scientism might grant that it is not, itself, a claim of the empirical sciences, but they still could propose that Core Scientism is cognitively justified by the empirical sciences. (A " c l a i m " of the empirical sciences is, let us say, a claim logically entailed by the empirical sciences, whereas a claim justified b y the sciences need not be thus logically entailed.) This m o v e w o u l d lead to a focus on the principles of cognitive justification appropriate to the empirical sciences. Specifically, what principles of cognitive justification allegedly combine with the (hypothetically completed) empirical sciences to justify Core Scientism? More relevantly, are any such principles of justification required, logically or cognitively, by the (hypothetically completed) empirical sciences themselves? N o such principles of justification seem logically required, because the (hypothetically completed) empirical sciences logically permit that Core Scientism is not justified. Whether such principles of justification are cognitively required depends on the cognitive principles justified by the (hypothetically completed) empirical sciences, and the latter matter clearly remains unsettled. We have, at any rate, no salient evidence for thinking that the (hypothetically completed) empirical sciences will include or justify cognitive principles that justify Core Scientism. The burden for delivering such evidence is squarely on naturalists, and it remains to be discharged. Minimally, the empirical sciences rely on abductive cognitive principles that certify inferences to a best available explanation of pertinent phenomena. The empirical sciences, after all, are in the business of best explanation regarding empirical phenomena in various domains (physics,

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chemistry, astronomy, geology, biology, and so on). E v e n so, their domains of pertinent phenomena to be explained are not, individually or collectively, monopolistic in the manner required by a straightforward abductive justification for Core Scientism. For example, those domains of empirical phenomena d o not preclude, individually or collectively, every kind of religious experience suitable to abductively justified belief that G o d exists; nor do they otherwise exclude (grounded belief in) the reality of G o d . A s a result, the abductive cognitive principles accompanying the empirical sciences will fall short of justifying Core Scientism, given the latter's dubious monopolistic assumptions. More generally, any domain of evidence outside the scope of the (hypothetically completed) empirical sciences will raise potential problems for the abductive justification of Core Scientism, given its dubious monopolistic a s s u m p tions. In particular, a G o d w h o is outside the domain of the empirical sciences could s u p p l y a kind of experiential evidence that does not fall under the category of the empirical sciences, perhaps because the evidence supplied by G o d is too elusive to be scientific in any typical sense of "scientific." The sciences d o not preclude this coherent option; nor should w e as theorists regarding the sciences and the reality of G o d . (Chapters 3 and 4 explore this option further.) B y w a y of reply, some philosophers may propose that Core Scientism is constitutive of the hypothetically completed empirical sciences properly understood. The proposal, more specifically, suggests that the proper understanding of "empirical science" involves Core Scientism as a definitive ingredient. This w o u l d amount to an attempted vindication of Core Scientism by semantical, or definitional, fiat. The relevant claim w o u l d be that it is just part of the proper understanding of w h a t "empirical science" means that Core Scientism is correct. Mere definition then would do all of the h e a v y lifting here. The proposed solution is too arbitrary to be satisfactory. It offers nothing to block opponents of Core Scientism from

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making an analogous m o v e , whereby a position contrary to Core Scientism becomes part of the proper understanding of "empirical science" as a definitive ingredient. For example, one might as w e l l build a theistic design hypothesis into the "proper understanding" of what "empirical science" means. (I do not recommend this, of course, but the logical point holds.) Two, then, can p l a y the unconvincing game of semantical fiat in this connection. Of course, one might object that a theistic design hypothesis is insufficiently empirical to figure in the proper understanding of "empirical science." In that case, an opponent of Core Scientism might direct a similar objection to the ontological and methodological components of Core Scientism. If the proper understanding of "empirical science" rests on semantical fiat alone, Core Scientism will run afoul of various available contrary proper understandings of "empirical science." In other w o r d s , Core Scientism w o u l d need a different line of defense if arbitrariness is to be avoided. Naturalists sympathetic to either pragmatism or some kind of antirealism about truth may try to rescue Core Scientism b y rejecting any characterization of scientific and philosophical understanding as "truth-seeking." Pragmatists insist that the purpose of inquiry is to produce (theoretically) "useful" beliefs rather than to uncover truths. In addition, antirealists typically claim that the purpose of inquiry is to produce consensus of a certain sort regarding various claims or at least to pursue any of a number of other nonalethic goals (that is, goals other than truth). (Pragmatism and antirealism face decisive self-referential problems, but w e need not digress here; for the problems, see Moser 1993, Chapter 1 , and Alston 1997.) The relevant problem with pragmatism and antirealism emerges from their assumptions about " t h e " purpose of inquiry. We h a v e no reason to suppose that there is such a singular, specific thing as " t h e " purpose of inquiry or that truth is irrelevant as a goal of inquiry, particularly in the sciences. Even if inquiry has nonalethic goals of the sort favored b y pragmatists and

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antirealists, it can (and often does) still have truth as a central goal, particularly in the sciences. Like theorists engaged in the empirical sciences, w e are concerned with legitimate inquiry in those cases where inquiry is directed to the discovery of truth (and the avoidance of falsehood). The fact that some standards (whether naturalist or otherwise) w o u l d govern inquiry with goals other than truth is no surprise, but it has no bearing on the dispute over naturalism offered as a v i e w about the nature of legitimate truth-seeking inquiry. It may be " u s e f u l " (assuming that this term avoids undesired alethic implications - no small task, actually) for some purposes not to posit nonphysical objects or not to employ nonscientific methods. Still, even if this were useful relative to those purposes, this fact w o u l d be irrelevant to the current dispute over Core Scientism as defined previously. Therefore, w e need not concern ourselves further with pragmatist or antirealist defenses of Core Scientism. We n o w can raise a troublesome dilemma for Core Scientism. Either Core Scientism is not, itself, a thesis included in or even justified b y the (hypothetically completed) empirical sciences, or its justification depends on a special commitment to the "proper understanding" of "empirical science." In the first case, Core Scientism is self-defeating; that is, it fails b y its o w n standard. In the second case, Core Scientism is philosophically harmless, because it rests just on definitional fiat rather than on a significant independent reality. In either case, however, Core Scientism is philosophically ineffectual, and is no real threat to an ontological commitment to G o d ' s existence. The self-defeat of Core Scientism w o u l d result from its failing to be included in or even justified b y its o w n proposed single standard for methodological and ontological integrity - the (hypothetically completed) empirical sciences. By its o w n standard, in that case, Core Scientism w o u l d suffer defeat. If, however, Core Scientism is to be rescued via semantical (or definitional) fiat, as a desideratum

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for the proper understanding of "empirical science," it becomes harmlessly stipulative, with no firm basis in reality beyond stipulative definition, such as in the reality characterized by empirical science. In that case, Core Scientism loses its ontological and cognitive bite b y its o w n standard, because it becomes divorced from the ontological and cognitive successes of the actual empirical sciences. G i v e n this dilemma, Core Scientism becomes philosophically innocuous on its o w n standard, because it then has no significant reality behind it. A s a result, a commitment to G o d ' s existence is not thereby threatened. In the end, w e do well to let Core Scientism collapse of its o w n weight, because it takes nothing of significance d o w n with it. Science, in particular, will flourish without it.

6.

THEISM

BEYOND

SCIENTISM

Scientism aside, w e have found no reason to regard the empirical sciences as a threat to belief that G o d exists or to the claim that it is reasonable (for some people) to believe that G o d exists. Of course, by "empirical science," w e mean empirical science that is not monopolistic regarding ontology or cognitive method, and this includes our best actual empirical science. If everything real, k n o w n , or knowable is scientific or otherwise natural, but G o d is not part of what is scientific or natural, then G o d will be excluded from the domain of w h a t is real, k n o w n , or knowable. Rudolf Bultmann (1966, p. 274) has commented, however, that "philosophy leaves fundamentally free the possibility of a w o r d spoken to [humans] from b e y o n d , " where "from b e y o n d " means "from G o d . " A t least, philosophy apart from Core Scientism leaves this possibility free. The same is true of empirical science, although it is a common but implausible mistake among naturalists to conflate empirical science and Core Scientism. Actual empirical science, in any case, leaves free the possibility of a w o r d spoken to us from b e y o n d , and this empirical fact, on reflection, should come as no surprise.

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Clearly, the history of empirical science exhibits remarkable explanatory success, along with its m a n y failures in truth seeking and explanation. The history of physics, astronomy, biology, and chemistry supplies abundant examples on both fronts. This history of science is mixed indeed, but the paths of explanatory success are clear and convincing. Can any intellectually capable person (at least b e y o n d dogmatic skeptics) suggest with a straight face that our best sciences offer no explanatory success at all? This seems doubtful at best. E v e n so, the history of explanatory success in empirical science does not recommend Core Scientism in any way. In particular, this success does not underwrite a monopoly for a natural ontology of science, as if it called for a sweeping philosophical position in materialist metaphysics. A s a result, the explanatory success in empirical science does not undermine, or otherwise challenge, belief that G o d exists. A t a m i n i m u m , w e h a v e no reason to think that if G o d exists, G o d must or even w o u l d be available to ordinary scientific investigation. In particular, if G o d , being w o r t h y of worship, is inherently purposive, then G o d m a y h a v e certain purposes that call for divine elusiveness relative to scientific investigation and (at times) to scientific investigators themselves. In particular, G o d ' s elusiveness m a y yield a kind of variability in religious experiences among humans, and in corresponding evidence, that undermines any s w e e p ing claiming that scientific evidence or methodology has a monopoly regarding evidence or knowledge. In that case, the absence of religious experience from scientific evidence w o u l d not recommend skepticism about G o d ' s existence for all people, particularly for those people w h o h a v e suitable religious experience and corresponding religious evidence. A s a matter of empirical fact, the evidence in empirical science does not attend, in any serious way, to religious experience that is sensitive to the volitional tendencies of h u m a n persons. In particular, such religious experience is sensitive to h u m a n s ' willingness to receive and to reflect

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G o d ' s moral character for others and thereby to become personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality, including evidence of G o d ' s intentional agency and moral character. Perhaps such religious experience is either insufficiently empirical, in a scientific sense, or too elusive to attract serious attention from empirical science. (Chapters 3 and 4 return to this important but w i d e l y neglected theme.) Recall Fodor's aforementioned "true scientific v i s i o n " according to which "there's a lot of 'because' out there [in the w o r l d ] , but there isn't any 'for'" (1998, p. 168). Theorists can effectively pursue Fodor's "true scientific v i s i o n " to see h o w far it can be pushed as a comprehensive explanation, as long as this pursuit avoids an implausible assumption of an ontological monopoly for the objects of empirical science. The latter assumption w o u l d exclude agents themselves and their intentional actions from the ontological picture, and thereby w o u l d preclude the very role of agents (intentionally) pursuing Fodor's true scientific vision. We then w o u l d be unable consistently to recommend the intentional pursuit of Fodor's "true scientific v i s i o n " or even natural scientific explanations. In the absence of a monopolistic ontological assumption for the actual w o r l d , Fodor's "true scientific v i s i o n " (regardless of its dubious truth) can illuminate the nature of an imagined w o r l d without intentional agents and intentional actions. There will be, of course, no intentional agents in that w o r l d for w h o m the vision is illuminating, but from outside that imagined world, an intentional agent can apprehend the strangeness of the vision of an altogether nonintentional world. The actual w o r l d , thick with intentional agents and actions, is definitely not that w o r l d , and this should come as no ontological or cognitive embarrassment for us. Indeed, if w e are in a predicament akin to the wilderness parable of the Introduction, w e should value not only intentional agents lost in the wilderness canyon, but also any prospective intentional agent w h o can serve as our needed rescuer.

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It w o u l d be u n w i s e indeed (and dangerous, too) to value otherwise. A big question remains: if the claim that G o d exists neither is part of empirical science nor is justified by empirical science, w h a t is its actual status relative to empirical science? More specifically, w h a t kind of rational support, if any, does this claim enjoy? Is its support compatible with the kind(s) of rational support found in empirical science? If so, is there room for peaceful coexistence, after all, between science and religious commitment that acknowledges G o d ' s existence? We shall see that there is, but first w e need to consider a position that, in the philosophical tradition of Immanuel Kant, tries to leave room for such religious commitment b y abandoning hope of its having any (decisive) cognitively rational support - that is, the kind of rational support fitting for genuine knowledge. Science m a y enjoy such rational support, but, according to the fideist position to be explored in C h a p ter 2, religious commitment must earn its keep in some other, noncognitive way. We shall see that such a fideist requirement faces serious trouble, quite aside from the actual cognitive status of theistic belief. Fideism, w e shall see, will not deliver a successful alternative to scientism.

2

Fideism and Faith

" T h e certainty in the religious life is b o u n d u p w i t h the autonomy of that life, its uniqueness and its independence of other k n o w l e d g e . Our natural m o d e s of rational certainty are but points of attachment, or under-agents for the certainty of faith; they are not germs of it, and they are not tests of i t . . . . Our ultimate authority, then, w h i c h justifies e v e r y other authority in its degree and measure, is the Creator of the N e w H u m a n i t y as such."

- P.T. Forsyth 1913, p p . 135-6. In the wilderness parable of this book's Introduction, some people lost in the wilderness gorge named "Hells C a n y o n " disown any need of a well-grounded, or trustworthy, indication of either a rescuer or a plan to reach safety. Nonetheless, they are committed to a rescuer w h o will bring them to safety. Perhaps their commitment is motivated by what seems either prudent or morally advisable to them. In any case, their belief in a rescuer is not accompanied by acknowledgment of a need for well-grounded, or trustworthy, evidence to support their belief. This position is akin to fideism about theistic belief, the v i e w that belief in G o d does not depend for its acceptability on well-grounded, or trustworthy, supporting evidence. We shall use " w e l l - g r o u n d e d " and "trustworthy" to signify something's meriting, or being worthy of, trust or reliance, either as a (possibly fallible) basis for a truth-affirming 88

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commitment or as a (possibly fallible) supported truthaffirming commitment, such as a supported belief. Such trustworthiness for a belief is not objective reliability relative to h o w the w o r l d actually is, but is, instead, relative to a person's available truth indicators, or evidence. It requires, accordingly, not the truth of a supported belief, but rather the worthiness of a belief's being held on the basis of its supporting truth indicator, or evidence. E v e n if some false beliefs enjoy this kind of trustworthiness, g i v e n their supporting evidence, not all beliefs d o , even all true beliefs. The support for m a n y beliefs, even m a n y true beliefs, fails to yield trustworthiness, and therefore recommends due suspicion rather than commitment toward the relevant beliefs as true. Theistic fideism might seem to try to achieve its desired theological benefits b y simple theft instead of honest toil. A leap without trustworthy evidence, in other w o r d s , seems too easy, if not outright arbitrary and dangerous. Even so, some religious theorists hold that humans must approach G o d only by faith, and that faith in G o d involves - or at least m a y involve without deficiency - a leap without trustworthy supporting evidence. Some fideism appears to be a (severe) reaction to a cognitive standard similar to the methodological naturalism presented and challenged in Chapter 1. If faith in G o d does not need support from trustworthy evidence at all, then it will not be troubled b y cognitive demands similar to those associated either with methodological naturalism or with the sciences themselves. Perhaps, in that case, neither methodological naturalism nor the sciences themselves will pose a threat to faith in G o d . Fideism, in any case, evidently makes faith in G o d a cognitively different kind of entity from k n o w l e d g e in the sciences, and some religious theorists d e e m this a n important source of safety (that is, freedom from challenge) for theistic belief. According to J e w i s h and Christian theism, G o d authoritatively invites and highly values h u m a n faith in God. What

9

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THE E V I D E N C E F O R G O D

exactly, however, is such faith? What, in addition, is its primary value? Is it a virtue of some sort, perhaps even a moral virtue? H o w , furthermore, is h u m a n faith in G o d related to h u m a n k n o w l e d g e and evidence, and h o w does it contrast with so-called h u m a n " w o r k s " ? This chapter explores such questions, in order to put theistic fideism and h u m a n theistic faith in an illuminating theological, cognitive, and moral context. More specifically, it will identify some serious deficiencies of fideism, while suggesting that h u m a n faith in G o d need not be similarly deficient. Accordingly, w e should not confuse h u m a n faith in G o d with fideism about human faith in G o d . Fideism, at its core, is a controversial v i e w about the relation between h u m a n faith in G o d and evidence of G o d ' s existence; it denies that the acceptability, even the cognitive acceptability, of such faith requires such trustworthy evidence.

1.

FAITH

The term "fideism" comes from the Latin w o r d for faith, "fides," and w e can illuminate fideism by attending to some of the important features of h u m a n faith in G o d . According to the Hebrew Bible, G o d ' s valuing of h u m a n faith became apparent in v e r y early times, even before the origin of national Israel and Judaism. In particular, Genesis 15:5-6 states: " H e [God] brought him [Abram] outside and said, 'Look toward heaven and count the stars, if y o u are able to count them.' Then he said to him, 'So shall y o u r descendants be.' A n d he believed the L O R D ; and the L O R D reckoned it to him as righteousness" (NRSV). The Hebrew w o r d translated " b e l i e v e d " derives from the same root as that of our English w o r d " A m e n . " Accordingly, w e might offer this paraphrase: " A b r a m 'amen-ed' the Lord, and the Lord counted it for him as a right relationship with the L o r d . " The w o r d "trust" is among the best in the English language for the " a m e n - i n g " relationship in question. Various translations of the Hebrew Bible (for example, the N E B ,

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R E B , N A B , and N J B translations) use language that helpfully captures the object of A b r a m ' s faith: " A b r a m put his faith in the LORD...." We m a y treat "faith in G o d , " "trust in G o d , " and "belief in G o d " as interchangeable phrases in such a context. The kind of faith ascribed to A b r a m in Genesis 1 5 is no mere intellectual or psychological matter. It involves the central purpose a n d direction of A b r a m ' s life relative to G o d ' s redemptive promise and call to him. The best language for such faith is "entrusting oneself to G o d . " Accordingly, w e should consider this paraphrase: " A b r a m entrusted himself to the L o r d , a n d the Lord counted this self-entrusting b y A b r a m as a right relationship of A b r a m with Himself." The relevant self-entrusting, as exhibited in Genesis 1 5 - 2 5 , required A b r a m ' s living obediently into an ongoing and future-directed relationship with G o d as the authoritative promise-giver and promise-keeper, and therefore his faith w a s itself d y n a m i c and ongoing (or diachronic) rather than static (or synchronic). This self-entrusting exceeded intellectual assent, given that it w a s life-involving, and not just mind-involving or just action-involving. In particular, A b r a m w a s entrusting himself to G o d , for the present and for the future, relative to G o d ' s unique promise to bless all the families of the earth through him (that is, Abram), even though it w a s unclear to him exactly how this promise w o u l d eventually be realized (see Gen. 1 2 : 2 - 3 , i3'-i6; for similar notions of entrusting oneself to G o d , see Ps. 3 1 : 5 , L u k e 2 3 : 4 6 , 1 Pet. 2:23, 4:19). According to Genesis 1 5 , G o d calls Abram into a selfentrusting relationship, and then responds to A b r a m ' s entrusting himself to G o d by crediting this entrusting commitment to G o d (and G o d ' s promises) as righteousness that is, as a right relationship with G o d . In other w o r d s , G o d thereby offers a means to exercise mercy rather than condemnation t o w a r d rebellious and w a y w a r d humans, without condoning either their rebellion, including their s u p p o s e d self-righteousness, or any other wrongdoing of

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humans toward G o d . G o d therefore seeks, in the Genesis narrative as well as in other key biblical narratives, the redemption of humans via the h u m a n response of faith, or self-entrustment, toward G o d and G o d ' s promise. (Section 3 of this chapter returns to this important lesson.) According to various biblical writers, the temporal order in the divine process of crediting righteousness to h u m a n s via faith, or entrusting oneself, is crucial and irreversible. Mercifully, G o d moves first, both with a redemptive promise for the needed good of humans and with a corresponding authoritative invitation to humans to entrust themselves wholeheartedly to G o d . Specifically, G o d calls A b r a m into a needed relationship before A b r a m calls G o d (see Gen. 1 2 : 1 - 3 ) . We therefore might say, in this connection, that "in this is love, not that w e loved G o d , but that he loved u s — We love, because he first loved u s " (1 John 4:10, 19). G o d ' s promise and corresponding invitation to humans manifest divine love, as various biblical writers have noted (see, for instance, Hos. 1 1 : 1 - 9 , Rom. 5 : 1 - 1 1 , 9:25-33, Heb. 5 : 1 - 1 0 , 6:13-20). According to these writers, w e are called by G o d to put our faith in, or entrust ourselves to, the G o d w h o first loved us. This distinctive theme of divine grace, or unearned gift, appropriated through faith as self-entrustment, emerges in the Hebrew Bible and in the Christian N e w Testament. (Sections 3 and 4 of this chapter clarify this theme.)

2.

PHILOSOPHY

A N D

FAITH

The topic of faith in G o d has attracted extensive controversy throughout the history of philosophy, at least from Socrates to the present. One important lesson of this ongoing controv e r s y is that the notion of faith "in G o d " is not reducible to the idea of faith "that G o d exists." If faith that G o d exists is just belief that G o d exists, it is merely a psychological attitude toward a judgment or a proposition. That is, it is simply de dicto, related to a prepositional dictum: namely, to the statement that G o d exists. In contrast, faith in God

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is best understood as having a de re component (specifically, involving a relation to something agent-like) that is irreducible to a judgment or a proposition. In particular, faith in G o d relates one to God, and not just to a judgment or a proposition about G o d . Some writers, under the influence of Soren Kierkegaard, w o u l d say that h u m a n faith in G o d involves a distinctive " I - T h o u " relationship between a h u m a n and G o d that is not reducible to de dicto belief that G o d exists. What exactly such an I-Thou relationship consists in has been a topic of controversy in the philosophy of religion. Clearly, given its de re component, this is not faith regarding merely historical or propositional information of any sort. (For relevant discussion, see Farmer 1942, Chapter 2, Brunner 1964, Moser 2008, Chapter 3. For an influential discussion of the I-Thou relationship influenced b y Kierkegaard 1992 [1846], see Buber 1958 [1923].) Writing under the p s e u d o n y m "Johannes C l i m a c u s " in Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Kierkegaard emphasizes the importance of the "inwardness of faith." He proposes that such inwardness "cannot be expressed more definitely than this: it is the absurd, adhered to firmly with the passion of the infinite" (1992 [1846], vol. 1 , p. 2 1 4 ; subsequent page references to Kierkegaard are to this volume). He adds that the relevant inwardness, in contrast to "objective faith" as " a s u m of tenets," includes " . . . placing [a person] decisively, more decisively than any j u d g e can place the accused, between time [namely, h u m a n finitude] and eternity [namely, G o d ] in time, between h e a v e n and hell in the time of salvation" (p. 2 1 5 ) . A s a result, according to Kierkegaard's Climacus, " . . . an objective k n o w l e d g e about the truth or the truths of Christianity is precisely untruth. To k n o w a creed b y rote is paganism, because Christianity is i n w a r d n e s s " (p. 224). Faith in G o d , Kierkegaard's Climacus maintains, involves a commitment to mystery (in the presence of G o d in h u m a n inwardness) that does not go a w a y or yield to explanation, nonparadoxical description, or philosophical resolution (cf. p p . 2 1 3 - 1 4 ) .

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H u m a n philosophical speculation about G o d and G o d ' s purposes, according to Climacus, "is a temptation, the most precarious of all" temptations (p. 214). The speculative philosopher w h o seeks an explanation of G o d ' s w a y s , he claims, is not the prodigal son w h o comes home to his waiting divine Father. In contrast, the speculative philosopher is "the naughty child w h o refuses to stay where existing humans belong, in the children's nursery and the education room of existence where one becomes adult only through inwardness in existing, but w h o instead wants to enter G o d ' s council, continually screaming that, from the point of v i e w of the eternal, the divine, the theocentric, there is no p a r a d o x " (p 214). A s a result, the speculative philosopher refuses to acknowledge G o d as God (cf. p. 156). Kierkegaard's Climacus makes his antispeculative point in connection with divine forgiveness of human sins. He proposes that "the simple w i s e person," even after reflection on G o d ' s forgiveness of h u m a n sins, w o u l d say: "I still cannot comprehend the divine mercy that can forgive sins; the more intensely I believe it, the less I a m able to understand it" (p. 228). On this basis, Climacus concludes that " . . . probability does not seem to increase as the inwardness of faith is augmented, rather the opposite" (p. 228; cf. p. 2 1 1 ) . This fits with his suggestion that Christian faith " . . . is not a matter of k n o w i n g " objectively (p. 2 1 5 ) . Climacus's underlying assumption is that "if I am to apprehend G o d objectively, I do not have faith; but because I cannot d o this, I must h a v e faith" (p. 204). In addition, Climacus holds that in faith "the individual existing h u m a n being has to feel himself a sinner," and such feeling is subjective (as "the deepest pain") rather than objective (p. 224). Faith in G o d , according to Kierkegaard's Climacus, does not require comprehending G o d or G o d ' s mysterious w a y s . If "comprehending" means "fully understanding," this position of Climacus's is compelling, or at least worthy of serious consideration. We should not expect cognitively limited humans to be able to comprehend G o d or G o d ' s

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purposes in the sense of "being able fully to explain G o d or G o d ' s p u r p o s e s . " E v e n so, w e should be careful about the implications of this position for well-grounded faith in G o d , particularly in connection with Climacus's following remark: "Faith [in G o d ] h a s . . . t w o tasks: to watch for and at every moment to make the discovery of improbability, the paradox, in order then to hold it fast with the passion of i n w a r d n e s s " (p. 233). This remark yields a dubious message, because it suggests that the inwardness of faith is antithetical, or at least inversely proportional, to reasonable or wellgrounded belief as evidence-based, probably true belief. A t times, Kierkegaard as Climacus suggests that his talk of the " a b s u r d " and the " p a r a d o x , " with regard to the inwardness of faith, is just talk of an eternal, "infinite" G o d entering temporal, finite h u m a n history, particularly in the divine incarnation in Jesus as a h u m a n with historical existence. He writes: "The eternal truth has come into existence in time. That is the paradox What, then, is the absurd? The absurd is that the eternal truth has come into existence in time, that G o d has come into [such] existence, has been born, has g r o w n u p , etc., has come into existence exactly as an individual h u m a n b e i n g . . . . " (pp. 2 0 9 - 1 0 ; cf. p p . 2 1 3 , 2 1 7 ) . If this is all Kierkegaard means, his talk of " p a r a d o x , " "absurdity," and "contradiction" is potentially v e r y misleading, because it suggests m u c h more than this w h e n taken at face value. The Christian proclamation of divine incarnation in Jesus is surprising and mysterious indeed, but it is not, strictly speaking, absurd or contradictory. A n y suggestion to the contrary should deliver a careful demonstration of the alleged contradiction in this proclamation, but it is at best doubtful that this requirement can be met. Kierkegaard's Climacus portrays the claim of divine incarnation in Jesus as " . . . c o n t a i n i n g ] the contradiction that something that can become historical only in direct opposition to all h u m a n understanding has become historical," and he adds that "this contradiction is the absurd, w h i c h can only be

9

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THE EVIDENCE FOR GOD

b e l i e v e d " (p. 2 1 1 ) . In the methodology of Climacus, " . . . the point is . . . to do a w a y w i t h . . . reliabilities, demonstrations from effects, and the whole mob of pawnbrokers and guarantors, in order to get the absurd clear - so that one can believe if one w i l l " (p. 2 1 2 ) . We do not find here, then, an invitation to well-grounded, evidence-based faith in G o d . On the contrary, w e find resistance to such an invitation. Climacus's talk of contradiction as "direct opposition to all h u m a n understanding" is evidently to be taken at face v a l u e , as involving a conflict with w h a t w e humans can understand. Even so, Kierkegaard's Climacus has not s h o w n that Christian faith, including commitment to divine incarnation in a h u m a n , harbors a literal contradiction. He evidently assumes that G o d as eternal cannot enter temporal existence but nonetheless has actually done so. Specifically, he speaks of the "dialectical contradiction" as " . . . the historical that has been able to become historical only against its n a t u r e . . . " (p. 578). Still, Kierkegaard's Climacus has not s h o w n that, according to Christian faith, G o d as eternal cannot enter temporal existence or that this is against G o d ' s nature; accordingly, he has not s h o w n that a contradiction is present. The Christian v i e w that G o d has entered temporal existence in Jesus is surprising and mysterious by any ordinary standard, but its original proponents, as represented in the N e w Testament, seem not to have offered it as contradictory. More to the point, w e have no good reason to offer it as literally contradictory, particularly if divine eternality is logically compatible with historical divine incarnation. Accordingly, the suggestion of Kierkegaard's Climacus to the contrary fails to convince. If Christian faith presents us with a literal contradiction, then it presents us with something that cannot be literally true. A literal contradiction is not only false, but also necessarily false. So far as w e know, the earliest proponents of the Christian proclamation of divine incarnation in Jesus did not offer their proclamation as necessarily false. On the contrary, they evidently w e r e offering a message they

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claimed to be true, that is, a proclamation of divine incarnation that, they claimed, actually occurred. A s a result, a literal contradiction w o u l d pose a serious problem for their message; in particular, it w o u l d undermine the prospect, and thus the actuality, of their proclamation's being true. Accordingly, Climacus's talk of "contradiction" seems foreign to the cause of the earliest proponents of the Christian proclamation of divine incarnation in Jesus. The same holds for Kierkegaard's talk of the incarnation as " a sign of contradiction" in his later w o r k , Practice in Christianity (1848), which he regarded as his " m o s t perfect and truest" writing. Kierkegaard himself evidently held the v i e w of contradiction represented in Concluding Unscientific Postscript and Practice in Christianity, at least during the time of those works, despite his use of p s e u d o n y m s . Kierkegaard's understanding of faith in G o d , as represented by Climacus, appears to sacrifice not only the (possible) truth of the message of G o d ' s intervention in h u m a n affairs, but also the general accessibility of that message throughout history. In particular, his understanding of the "inwardness of faith" in G o d evidently blocks people w h o existed before the incarnation in Jesus from having faith in G o d as the h u m a n means of receiving divine grace. This, of course, is an excessively n a r r o w approach to faith in G o d . A b r a h a m (aka A b r a m ) , for instance, should be a candidate for faith in G o d , in keeping with Genesis 1 5 and Romans 4, even if (quite naturally, given his historical location) he did not believe in the divine incarnation in Jesus or in any contradiction, or absurdity, regarding G o d ' s intervention in Jesus. (For relevant discussion, see K a s e m a n n 1 9 7 1 , Chapter 4.) A b r a h a m ' s not believing in a contradiction about divine incarnation, in other w o r d s , should not disqualify him from having faith in G o d . Faith in G o d , as suggested previously, is plausibly regarded as a h u m a n response of entrustment of oneself, n o w and into the future, to G o d and G o d ' s promises, and not as an acceptance of a contradiction or an absurdity.

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A s illustrated b y the case of A b r a m in Genesis 1 5 , faith in G o d can h a v e (at least in principle) a cognitive basis in the h u m a n experience of G o d ' s intervening in h u m a n lives with redemptive actions and thereby calling people to trust and obey G o d . In fact, faith in G o d should be grounded in trustworthy supporting evidence of that distinctive kind in order to avoid becoming just wishful thinking, misleading dogmatism, distorting bias, or some other kind of cognitively arbitrary commitment. Cognitive arbitrariness is harmful in this connection because it leaves faith as unguided by a trustworthy indication of w h a t is true and therefore as a prime candidate for a species of distorting bias or misleading dogmatism. Fideism about faith in G o d , w e shall see, suffers from the deficiency of failing to protect against this serious problem. Ideally, h u m a n faith in G o d is cognitively grounded in humanly experienced evidence of its divine personal object: namely, the G o d w h o authoritatively calls humans before they call G o d . (On the relevant cognitive basis as purposively available authoritative evidence, see Chapters 3 and 4 and Moser 2008.) Faith in G o d therefore should not be characterized as an inward embracing of contradiction or absurdity, because that approach to faith undermines the important need for supporting evidence of the truth of any proposition accepted in faith. Kierkegaard's portrait of faith as contradictory or absurd, accordingly, is misleading and harmful if taken at face value. Even so, Kierkegaard is correct about the independence of human faith in G o d from philosophical speculation or theoretical speculation in general. If such faith is a h u m a n response of self-entrustment to an experienced divine intervention, such as a divine call, then it does not depend for its existence on philosophical speculation or any other kind of speculation. In addition, Kierkegaard w a s right to contrast genuine faith in G o d with rote m e m o r y of tenets and with empty ritual in practices, but he went to an implausible and dangerous extreme in welcoming contradiction in faith.

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Kierkegaard's Climacus suggests that Socrates manifested and recommended a kind of "existential i n w a r d n e s s " analogous to faith, given his focus on h u m a n existence and w h a t it means for humans to exist (pp. 204-7). E v e n if he did manifest this (and it m a y be impossible to verify), w e should hesitate to compare Socrates favorably to Jesus regarding the latter's emphasis on faith in G o d . The difference between them is, in the end, vast and irreducible, and the key difference stems from the distinctive role of G o d in the theology of Jesus. Jesus, as the self-avowed authoritative Son of his divine Father (see Mark 1 2 : 1 - 1 2 , Matt. 1 1 : 2 5 - 7 , Luke 1 0 : 2 1 - 2 ) , commands people to h a v e faith as obedient and loving entrustment of themselves to his Father (see Mark 1 1 : 2 2 ) , on the basis of G o d ' s purportedly redemptive intervention in h u m a n lives. Such entrustment of oneself m o v e s o u t w a r d obediently in self-giving love, by divine c o m m a n d , t o w a r d G o d and thereby toward others. It transcends mere discussion and mere passionate subjectivity in order to personify, and thereby to represent, the value of a life of faithful obedience under divine authority. The intended result is h u m a n personification and reflection of G o d ' s moral character for others, in the manner exemplified and c o m m a n d e d by Jesus (see Matt. 5 : 1 4 - 1 6 ) . Accordingly, the apostle Paul speaks of "faith [or trust, in G o d and Jesus] w o r k i n g through love (agape)" (Gal. 5:6). Such outgoing faith in G o d is a consistent focus of Jesus as the representative of his divine Father, and it is absent from Socrates as represented by Plato (and from Kierkegaard writing as Climacus in the Concluding Unscientific Postscript). In this respect, the difference between Jesus and Socrates regarding h u m a n faith in G o d is more substantial than any similarity. Kierkegaard has captured an important dimension of faith in G o d in his emphasis on h u m a n decision, or resolution, regarding G o d ' s call (pp. 1 1 6 , 1 2 9 - 3 0 , 2 2 1 - 2 ) . A s Climacus, he remarks that "the speculative t h i n k e r . . . believes only to a certain degree - he puts his hand to the p l o w a n d

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looks around in order to find something to k n o w " (p. 230). The self-entrustment central to faith in G o d requires a definite commitment to G o d , and this commitment demands a h u m a n decision to yield oneself to G o d , n o w and into the future, relative to G o d ' s authoritative will and promises. In this respect, faith in G o d is a kind of self-giving obedience, even morally virtuous obedience because it is morally excellent in at least one respect, as w e shall see. It therefore is a mistake to oppose faith in G o d to h u m a n obedience, although such faith is irreducible to individual obedient actions apart from self-entrustment to G o d . E v e n so, the required decision and commitment need not be cognitively arbitrary or otherwise unreasonable. They can rest on salient evidence supplied by divine intervention in h u m a n experience. In the w a k e of Kierkegaard, m a n y writers h a v e latched on to his language of a " l e a p " of faith, and have suggested that faith in G o d cannot h a v e supporting evidence. Rudolf Bultmann is a clear proponent of this view. In explaining John's Gospel on the topics of h u m a n faith and divine revelation, he writes: " . . . the man called to have faith can ask for no credentials, no legitimation, no 'testimony' (marturia) to the validity of the w o r d of the revelation The paradox is that the w o r d of Jesus does not find its substantiation by a b a c k w a r d movement from the attesting w o r d to the thing attested , but finds it only in a faith-prompted acceptance of the w o r d " (1955, p. 68). Bultmann's fideism becomes explicit as follows: " E v e r y authentication of the Word [of God] is rejected; it is itself 'witness', and there is no other witness beside the Word which man acting under his o w n control could first test and find correct, so that he could then decide to believe" (1969, p. 304). Bultmann, like Kierkegaard, thus divorces faith from any supporting evidence that could serve to test the veracity of a faithcommitment. Karl Barth has also echoed Kierkegaard in fideist remarks about faith in G o d . He writes: "The Gospel of salvation can only be believed in; it is a matter for faith only. It demands

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choice To him that is not sufficiently mature to accept a contradiction and to rest in it, it becomes a scandal to him that is unable to escape the necessity of contradiction, it becomes a matter for faith" (1933, p. 39). In addition, according to Barth, "the G o s p e l does not e x p o u n d or recomm e n d itself. It does not negotiate or plead, threaten, or make promises" (1933, p. 38-9). Here, again, w e find no place for evidence in support of the veracity of a faith-commitment. The emphasis on h u m a n choice, or decision, displaces any role for supporting evidence. This theme from Kierkegaard, echoed in Bultmann, Barth, and m a n y others, leaves us with fideism about faith in G o d . A s a result, w e should w o n d e r h o w one is to handle questions, even for oneself, about the veracity of a faith-commitment. Of course, a person can m a k e a faith-commitment in the absence of supporting evidence. For instance, one can m a k e a faith-commitment that Black Beauty will w i n at the racetrack, even though one has no supporting evidence for his commitment to this particular horse. E v e n so, it w o u l d be odd indeed if a faith-commitment could not be supported by, or recommended on the basis of, evidence for the veracity of the commitment. Kierkegaard, Bultmann, and Barth, h o w ever, h a v e suggested that there is an incompatibility between faith in G o d and supporting evidence. Their suggestion evidently stems from their v i e w that the nature of faith in G o d is inherently paradoxical, contradictory, or absurd. The latter view, however, is anything but obvious, and w e do well to rernain suspicious of it, particularly in the absence of compelling support. The v i e w emerges from Kierkegaard's needlessly extreme v i e w of G o d as being "infinite" in a manner that makes a divine historical incarnation a "contradiction." Kierkegaard, Bultmann, and Barth should h a v e found due warning of their mistake in the fact that none of the biblical writers calls people to embrace a contradiction or anything else that is necessarily false. Contrary to Kierkegaard, Bultmann, and Barth, w e h a v e characterized h u m a n faith in G o d as h u m a n self-entrustment to G o d , n o w and into the future, in response to h u m a n

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experience of G o d ' s redemptive intervention in h u m a n lives. Such faith as entrustment of oneself to G o d is arguably a needed motivational anchor for h u m a n faithful actions toward G o d and others, in obedience to G o d . It includes one's general receptive volitional commitment to receive any manifested and offered divine p o w e r of redemptive unselfish love as a gracious gift and thereby to obey G o d in w h a t G o d commands and promises. In such faith, accordingly, one will commit oneself to personify and to reflect G o d ' s distinctive moral character, including divine unselfish love, for others. On this personally interactive basis, one can, oneself, become personifying evidence of divine reality and thus reflect G o d ' s moral character for others. A faith-commitment of oneself to G o d can be firmly in place even if one occasionally disobeys G o d and thereby, on occasion, violates one's general self-commitment to G o d . Such a volitional self-commitment, w h e n actually carried out by a person in action, includes that person's submitting his or her will to G o d ' s authoritative will in a particular case of action, just as Jesus did in Gethsemane (see Mark 1 4 : 3 2 8) and A b r a m did in the context of Genesis 1 5 . This kind of faith-commitment is arguably morally virtuous because it includes human reception of divine moral excellence, particularly divine unselfish love. In contrast, mere belief that G o d exists can be altogether selfish, and therefore need not be virtuous at all in that respect (see James. 2:19). A s a result, w e should not confuse such belief with genuine faith in G o d . Faith in G o d includes, at its core, one's obediently receiving, and volitionally committing oneself to, G o d and w h a t G o d graciously offers for the sake of both reconciled fellowship with G o d and h u m a n reflection of G o d ' s moral character. A life of faith in G o d therefore is inherently a life that obediently receives, and volitionally entrusts oneself to, G o d and G o d ' s authoritative call to reconciled d i v i n e - h u m a n fellowship. The obedient receptivity of faith in G o d toward G o d ' s call leads to the kind of h u m a n transformation that enables a h u m a n to become suited to d i v i n e - h u m a n fellowship and to

FIDEISM A N D FAITH

reflect G o d ' s moral character. In short, such obedient receptivity enables one to become personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality as one receives G o d ' s moral character and lives obediently into the future. Faith in G o d is therefore forwardlooking, given divine plans and promises for the future. It is, accordingly, akin to hope in G o d , as is indicated in some of Paul's letters (see Rom. 4 : 1 7 - 1 8 , 2 Cor. 1 : 9 - 1 0 ; cf. Ridderbos 1975, p p . 248-52). It w o u l d be misleading at best to contrast h u m a n faith in G o d with h u m a n obedience to G o d ' s call to reconciled d i v i n e - h u m a n fellowship. Such faith is inherently an obedient response of volitional self-commitment to receive and to follow agreeably an authoritative divine call that offers lasting forgiveness and reconciled fellowship. Faith in G o d , accordingly, is a means to reconciled fellowship with G o d for the sake of receiving and reflecting G o d ' s moral character for others. A b r a h a m , the biblical exemplar of faith in G o d , is thus called a "friend" of G o d , given the role of fellowship with G o d in his faith in G o d (see 2 Chron. 20:7, Isa. 41:8, James. 2:23). He also entrusted himself to G o d , as his obedient response to G o d ' s authoritative call. The friendship in question therefore preserves G o d ' s unique authority and thus is not reducible to a friendship among equals. The receptive feature of faith in G o d , toward an experienced divine call, arguably excludes a characterization of such faith in terms of pure imagination or wishful thinking, and points instead to a kind of experiential cognitive s u p port. This lesson, if secured, counts directly against fideism, because the lesson portrays faith in G o d as being responsive to a kind of intervention in h u m a n experience that can, and arguably sometimes does, qualify as trustworthy evidence. Exactly w h a t such evidence is evidence of will be, of course, a matter of dispute among philosophers, as pretty m u c h everything else is. E v e n so, w e h a v e a basis for contrasting faith in G o d with unconstrained fantasy or g u e s s w o r k , and for finding a trustworthy ground for faith in G o d in the thing(s) to which such faith is a response. This consideration

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merits our attention as a warning against conflating faith in G o d with mere belief that G o d exists. In addition, it counts against any kind of fideism (familiar from Kierkegaard, Bultmann, and Barth) that portrays faith in G o d as irreconcilable with supporting evidence. We will explore this important consideration in connection with a distinctively Christian understanding of faith in G o d .

3.

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FAITH

We can turn to Paul's letters in the N e w Testament for a distinctively Christian nonfideist approach to faith in G o d . Paul uses talk of obedience (of a special kind) and talk of belief/faith interchangeably in some important contexts that can illuminate our understanding of faith in G o d (see, for instance, Rom. 1 0 : 1 6 - 1 7 ; cf. Rom. 1 : 5 , 6 : 1 6 , 1 6 : 2 6 , Gal. 5:5-7). Likewise, as the authoritative model for Paul, Jesus acknowledged a necessary role for h u m a n obedience to G o d ' s will in order for humans to enter G o d ' s kingdom (see Matt. 7 : 2 1 , 1 6 : 2 4 - 6 , 1 9 : 1 6 - 2 2 , 2 1 : 2 8 - 3 2 ; cf. Matt. 6:24-9). addition, Jesus commanded that his followers have faith in G o d and in the G o o d N e w s of divine redemption via himself (see, for instance, M a r k i : i 5 , 5:36, 1 1 : 2 2 ; cf. John 1 4 : 1 ) . A positive response therefore w o u l d be obedience of a definite sort. The "obedience of faith" mentioned by Paul (in Rom. 1:5, 16:26) is deep-seated attitudinal obedience. It includes one's obediently receiving, and volitionally committing and yielding oneself to, G o d as perfectly authoritative and g o o d , for the sake of living into and reflecting G o d ' s redemptive offer of n e w life, including volitional fellowship with G o d . We m a y call such faith in G o d obedience of the heart, in keeping with Paul's illuminating remark that " w i t h the heart one believes unto righteousness" (Rom. 10:10). This obedience of the heart includes, at its core, one's entrusting oneself to G o d , n o w and into the future, as one's authoritative source of life. Accordingly, the obedience of faith is no mere intellectual assent to a statement or even mere belief that G o d m

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exists. It is not simply de dicto, because it has an irreducible de re component, given that it is faith in G o d . (For one of m a n y failures to appreciate this feature of Paul's understanding of faith in G o d , see Buber 1 9 5 1 , p p . 97-8; for more accurate approaches, see Kasemann 1 9 7 1 , Chapter 4, Ridderbos 1 9 7 5 , Chapter 4, and Segal 1990, Chapter 4.) A s suggested, one's heart-based obedience of faith can be, for various reasons, imperfectly represented in one's corresponding actions. In other w o r d s , w e can entrust ourselves to G o d in faith but still make occasional moral mistakes, including serious moral mistakes. Indeed, a selfcommitment to G o d as authoritative Lord could genuinely accompany such moral failings and enable those failings to be seen for w h a t they are: moral failings before G o d . In addition, a perfectly loving G o d , such as the G o d represented b y Jesus in his Sermon on the Mount (see Matt. 5:38-48), w o u l d seek to attract and to transform the v e r y center of h u m a n motivation, that is, the motivational " h e a r t " (kardia) of a person. This consideration lends support to the distinctive kind of theology mentioned in the Introduction: kardiatheology, as theology aimed primarily at a person's motivational heart, including the person's will, rather than just at a person's mind or a person's emotions. Such kardiatheology seeks to bear on h u m a n attitudes, including faith as obedient selfentrustment from the heart, that are motivationally more significant than mere beliefs, thoughts, and emotions. Christian faith in G o d , in keeping with the teaching of Jesus and Paul, should be understood in terms of kardiatheology. In particular, it should be understood as a willing, obedient entrustment of oneself to G o d that involves one's motivational heart and that therefore is inherently actionoriented. This understanding stands in clear contrast w i t h intellectualist approaches that portray faith as only belief that something is the case, and with subjectivist approaches that fail to make faith in G o d action-oriented. In addition, if w e regard a moral virtue as a motivating moral excellence of a person, w e m a y understand kardiatheology as promoting

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moral virtues of the heart, anchored in fellowship with G o d , the ultimate source and sustainer of h u m a n moral virtues. Faith in G o d is significant among those moral virtues, and, in the perspective offered here, it can also be cognitively virtuous given that it enables a person to receive some otherwise unavailable evidence of divine activity. The latter point fits with (one fruitful reading of) the Augustinian thesis that " I have faith [in G o d ] in order to understand." (Chapter 4 returns to this cognitive theme; see also Dickie 1954.) M a n y theologians have disregarded the important idea of faith in G o d as including a general volitional commitment to receive and to follow G o d and G o d ' s authoritative call to fellowship. They therefore have neglected the status of h u m a n faith in G o d as a distinctive kind of obedience of the h u m a n heart to G o d ' s call and will. The importance of kardiatheology has been obscured accordingly, as has the importance of humans, themselves, becoming personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality in receiving and reflecting G o d ' s moral character for others. Some Christian theologians fear that, given such an approach, faith w o u l d be confused with human " w o r k s " that are not only unnecessary for but also incompatible with any grace-based divine redemption of humans. The heart-based "obedience of faith" is not w h a t Paul calls " w o r k s " in contrast with faith. Instead, Paul thinks of " w o r k s , " at least in Romans 4:4 and Romans 9:30-3, as what one does to obligate G o d or to earn (or to merit) a certain status from G o d . In contrast with an ordinary use of the term " w o r k s , " the w o r d is a technical theological term in Paul's remarks in Romans 4 and 9. It signifies a contrast with the divine redemptive grace (charis= gift) that is to be received by faith, or self-entrustment, toward G o d , the giftgiver of salvation. Paul highlights the role of grace in a w a y that makes grace inseparable from the grace-giver, given his v i e w that the needed p o w e r of redemption for h u m a n s is from G o d and is not a h u m a n product or a h u m a n l y controllable possession (see 1 Cor. 1 : 1 8 - 2 9 , Cor. 1 : 8 - 1 0 ; cf. K a s e m a n n 1 9 7 1 , p. 82). 2

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In keeping with faith in G o d as obedient entrustment of one's heart to G o d , Paul says the following about identity markers for G o d ' s redeemed people: " F o r neither circumcision counts for anything nor uncircumcision, but keeping the commandments of G o d " (1 Cor. 7:19, RSV, italics added). In Paul's understanding, G o d ' s commandments include not only the divine love commands issued b y Jesus (Mark 1 2 : 2 8 - 3 1 ; cf. Gal. 5:14), but primarily the gospel of Jesus Christ itself, in virtue of its authoritatively calling people to "the obedience of faith" in G o d and Jesus (see Rom. 16:26; cf. Matt. 28:18-20). Accordingly, after presenting the G o o d N e w s of divine grace as gift-righteousness through Jesus (Rom. 3 : 2 1 - 6 ) , Paul speaks of "obedience which leads to righteousness" (Rom. 6:16, RSV). He characterizes this obedience as one's being "obedient from the heart," and he suggests that it underlies one's " h a v i n g been set free from s i n " (Rom. 6 : 1 7 - 1 8 , RSV). These remarks cohere with Paul's talk of the "obedience of faith" (Rom. 1 : 5 , 16:26), which is best understood in terms of one's general volitional entrustment of oneself, at the level of one's heart, to G o d and G o d ' s call to n e w life as one obediently receives the transformative gift of reconciled fellowship w i t h G o d . Contrary to some theistic predestinarians, Paul acknowledges an indispensable human role in the (human reception of) divine redemption of humans. This role includes human receptivity of faith in G o d ; more specifically, it includes the h u m a n obedient reception of, and volitional commitment to, the G o o d N e w s gift of divine righteousness exemplified in Jesus. In this connection, Kierkegaard w a s right to stress the role of h u m a n decision or commitment in faith in G o d . Paul avoids extreme divine sovereignty that forecloses a crucial role for h u m a n volitional response (on which see Meadors 2006), and states why A b r a h a m and m a n y other h u m a n s are reckoned with divine righteousness. Specifically, their faith, as their response of entrustment of themselves to G o d , is reckoned to them as divine righteousness (see R o m . 4 : 1 6 23). If Paul w e r e an advocate of extreme divine sovereignty,

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he w o u l d h a v e mentioned only G o d ' s predestinarian role, but clearly he does not do so. Following Jesus, he therefore can, and does, offer a robust conception of universal divine love for humans, even for h u m a n enemies of G o d . The h u m a n rejection of faith in G o d , according to Paul, will exclude some humans from life with G o d (see Rom. 1 1 : 2 0 ; for a similar theme outside Paul, see Heb. 1 1 : 6 ) . The divine redemptive gift offered without coercion falls short of its salvific goal in the absence of being voluntarily received by h u m a n faith, or self-entrustment, toward G o d . When, however, this gift is received b y h u m a n faith, and divine righteousness (including right relationship with God) is thereby credited to a h u m a n , w e h a v e an actual divine gift of righteous reconciliation of humans to G o d . A s a result, salvation by divine grace through faith does not rest on an acknowledged fiction. Instead, Paul portrays such salvation as resting on a divine unearned gift of reconciliation appropriated by h u m a n faith (see Rom. 5 : 1 - 1 1 ) . G o d ' s righteousness includes divine p o w e r to enable such grace-based reconciliation and salvation (see Kasemann 1 9 6 1 , Way 1 9 9 1 , Chapter 4). Following a common reading of Ephesians 2:8, one might think of faith in G o d , itself, as a divine gift, but in that case there w o u l d still be a crucial role for h u m a n volitional response in willingly receiving this gift. In any case, Paul, in the w a k e of Jesus, thinks of h u m a n faith in G o d as the h u m a n means of receiving the unearned gift of divine redemptive grace and new, reconciled life (see Rom. 4.16). He also thinks of such faith as something that humans willingly can reject by adopting resolute distrust in G o d (apistia, Rom. 4:20). A b r a h a m , according to Paul, did not fail in that w a y relative to G o d and G o d ' s redemptive promise, despite A b r a h a m ' s occasional acts of disobedience. In Paul's grace-based theology, "that is w h y his faith in G o d w a s 'reckoned to him as righteousness'" (Rom. 4:22, RSV, italics added; cf. Gal. 3 : 6 9). Such faith resists any motive for h u m a n boasting, earning, or self-credit before G o d , because it is just the h u m a n

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means, for J e w s as well as Gentiles, to receive the gracious gift of redemption promised b y G o d , including the gift of d i v i n e - h u m a n fellowship via G o d ' s Spirit (see Rom. 3 : 2 9 30,5:2, Gal. 3:14). Paul therefore reports that G o d ' s crediting of righteousness to humans " d e p e n d s on faith" in G o d , "in order that the promise [of redemption] m a y rest on grace," that is, on the grace-giver (Rom. 4:16, R S V ) . Paul links h u m a n faith in G o d to h u m a n reception of G o d ' s Spirit, which, according to Paul, is reception of the Spirit of the risen Jesus (see Rom. 8:9). More specifically, he thinks of h u m a n faith in G o d , in terms of obedience of the heart, as the means of receiving G o d ' s empowering Spirit whereby divine l o v e c o m m a n d s can actually be obeyed by a h u m a n in virtue of the p o w e r of divine love in one's receptive heart (see R o m . 5:5, Gal. 3 : 2 - 5 , 1 4 , 5:5-7,22). This e m p o w e r i n g Spirit, according to Paul, leads a willing human noncoercively to love as G o d loves by "killing the d e e d s " antithetical to divine love (Rom. 8:13). Of course, Paul does not confuse killing evil deeds and killing people w h o perform evil deeds. Instead, Paul echoes the command issued b y Jesus to follow his divine Father in loving people w h o do evil deeds, even one's evil enemies (see Rom. 1 2 : 1 9 - 2 1 , Matt. 5:43-8). Paul thinks of h u m a n l y received divine love, via selfentrustment to G o d , as e m p o w e r i n g the h u m a n fulfillment of (the main purpose of) G o d ' s law w h e n such love is lived out toward G o d and others (see Rom. 1 3 : 8 - 1 0 , Gal. 5:15; cf. 2 Cor. 3:5-8, Gal. 6:2, Matt. 5 : 1 7 , 2 0 - 2 ) . G o d ' s offering, as a gracious powerful gift, w h a t the divine love commands require of humans underwrites Paul's G o o d N e w s of G o d ' s inviting humans into G o d ' s kingdom, via the crucified and risen Jesus. This G o o d N e w s , according to Paul, is "the p o w e r of G o d for salvation to everyone w h o has faith [in G o d ] " (Rom. 1 : 1 6 , RSV; cf. 1 Cor. 4:20). In this perspective, such faith is a crucial means to transfer needed p o w e r to humans from G o d , and this power, being divine, transcends all merely h u m a n sources and possessions. According to Paul, this is

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the saving p o w e r of G o d ' s Spirit, the Spirit received only as a God-given gift via the h u m a n self-entrustment of faith, and not by h u m a n earning. This self-entrustment approach to faith, in making faith a response to an experienced intervention rather than a blind leap, reveals that fideism about Christian faith is misguided in divorcing faith from a trustw o r t h y basis. Let's briefly explore this lesson further.

4.

FAITH IN

ACTION

H u m a n faith in G o d , as characterized b y Paul, includes an affirmative h u m a n response of self-entrustment to G o d ' s redemptive call. This fits with Paul's remark that " . . . faith [in G o d ] comes from w h a t is h e a r d " (Rom. 1 0 : 1 7 , RSV; cf. Gal. 3:2). This is faith in G o d as a receptive response of volitional commitment to G o d ' s call heard by a person. It includes the person's willing reliance, grounded in experienced evidence of the call, on the G o d w h o m humans need to overcome their destructive selfishness and impending death with lastingly good life. Accordingly, this is not faith as g u e s s w o r k or as a leap without evidence, as if faith in G o d were automatically defective from a cognitive point of view. Faith in G o d can be at least as cognitively good, well-founded, and trustworthy as one's trusting in one's best friend, and therefore need not be a cognitive embarrassment or shortcoming at all. (Chapter 4 returns to this important cognitive point.) Our entrusting ourselves to G o d includes our willingly counting on G o d as our authoritative Lord, in response to G o d ' s redemptive intervention in our lives. This, of course, is no mere intellectual affirmation or ungrounded leap in the dark. Christian faith offers the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus as the focal divine intervention and the focus of the preached G o o d N e w s of G o d ' s salvation for humans. A s Paul expresses this: " . . . G o d w a s in Christ reconciling the w o r l d to h i m s e l f . . . " (2 Cor. 5:19). Faith in G o d , accordingly, is for the sake of reconciliation in fellowship with G o d

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through Jesus. In counting on G o d as authoritative Lord, I manifest m y having committed myself to G o d volitionally as my G o d and my Lord. I therefore commit, obediently, to put G o d ' s will over m y o w n will in m y life, even with regard to m y impending death. This fits with the w a y Jesus p r a y e d to G o d in Gethsemane u p o n his impending redemptive death by crucifixion: " N o t w h a t I will, but w h a t You w i l l " (Mark 14:36). According to Paul, in entrusting myself to G o d , I commit m y selfish w a y s to d y i n g and even to death in order to live by G o d ' s unselfish loving w a y s , in fellowship with G o d . In short, I resolve to die to m y selfishness in order to live to G o d and G o d ' s w a y s of perfect love. I thereby share, and cooperate in realizing, G o d ' s purposes for m e in his calling me to faith in G o d . Paul understands the h u m a n reception of divine grace via such a commitment of faith in terms of " d y i n g and rising with Christ" (see Rom. 6 : 1 - 1 4 , Phil. 3 : 9 1 1 ; for the same general lesson offered b y Jesus himself, see Mark 8:34-6; cf. Byrnes 2003, G o r m a n 2009). This process of d y i n g and rising entails a commitment to reject selfishness, specifically any selfishness that involves exalting m y will above G o d ' s will of perfect unselfish love. The relevant trust, or faith, thus includes m y obediently entrusting myself to G o d as G o d , in response to G o d ' s authoritative call that makes a claim on me and m y w h o l e life, n o w and for the future. This call is, accordingly, a call to wholehearted entrustment of oneself to G o d , n o w and for the future. Nothing in one's life is to be excluded from G o d ' s authoritative call to faith as such self-entrustment. In selfishness (the antithesis of loving others), I fail to honor G o d as authoritative Lord, because I put myself and m y o w n w a y s above the superior w a y s of a perfectly loving G o d . I w o u l d not necessarily be selfish, however, in putting G o d ' s w a y s first in order to bring good to myself. Doing something good for myself is not automatically selfish on m y part. Self-interestedness and selfishness are clearly not one and the same thing, and, of the t w o , only selfishness

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inevitably conflicts with the will of a perfectly loving G o d . We can avoid some confusion here if w e replace familiar religious talk of "selflessness" with talk of "unselfishness." Selfishness threatens if I seek to fulfill m y desires in w a y s that k n o w i n g l y bring harm to others. The divine call to h u m a n faith in G o d , in contrast, is a call to die to h u m a n selfishness in order to live to (and thus for) the G o d w h o seeks to e m p o w e r unselfish love and to overcome death for humans. This action-oriented call is a far cry from any fideist call to embrace a contradiction in passionate subjectivity. The suggestion of Paul and various other early Christians that, in faith in G o d , I must die to m y selfish w a y s to live to G o d m a y seem to rest on an u n d u l y harsh understanding of w h a t such faith requires. E v e n so, the suggestion gains some support from an empirically verifiable feature of the human condition: namely, deep-seated human selfishness, the antithesis to the unselfish love, including the love of enemies, characteristic of a morally perfect G o d . Obviously, selfishness is the immoral toxin inside us that leads us to hoard the wealth and other resources desperately needed by other people. We definitely need a powerful remedy, or antitoxin, and w e gain nothing of significance by ignoring this urgent problem. Facing the problem of h u m a n selfishness with honesty w o u l d enable us to apprehend our genuine need of the divine p o w e r of perfect unselfish love. In addition, it thereby w o u l d encourage us to become sincerely open to any available evidence of divine reality and of any reconciliation offered by G o d . More to the point, it w o u l d prompt us to be attentive to any divine call for us to become, through transformation in self-entrustment to G o d , personifying evidence of divine reality. If w e could free ourselves of selfishness on our o w n , b y our o w n controllable power, w e w o u l d doubtless find much less selfishness around us and even within us, given its self-destructive effects. E v e n so, w e cannot plausibly be encouraging about our taking care of the problem of h u m a n selfishness on our o w n , because w e typically protect our

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o w n selfishness out of selfish fear of personal loss. Obviously, our persistent selfishness makes us morally defective (and arguably w o r t h y of judgment) b y the divine standard of unselfish perfect love. It therefore disqualifies us from being morally equivalent to G o d and even from deserving, meriting, or being o w e d redemption b y G o d . Nonetheless, w e humans have a lingering tendency to " p l a y G o d " in assuming supreme authority in some areas of our lives. This tendency has harmful cognitive as well as moral consequences, because it obstructs our ability to receive available evidence of divine reality that is intended to challenge our moral deficiencies. We humans can become inclined to ignore, if not to suppress, needed evidence of G o d ' s authoritative call in h u m a n conscience that challenges us in our selfish tendencies opposed to G o d . A s Paul suggests, in our self-indulgent immorality, w e can consistently " s u p p r e s s " w h a t G o d offers to us b y w a y of corrective challenges (see Rom. 1 : 1 8 ) . We evidently have the God-given freedom to suppress challenges in conscience, and w e often exercise that freedom, even to our o w n cognitive and moral detriment. The relevant empirical evidence arguably is o v e r w h e l m i n g in favor of the latter point. In addition, it does not encourage hope for humans aiming to free themselves from their tendencies to selfishness. A p o w e r b e y o n d h u m a n p o w e r s evidently is needed. We humans tend to consider ourselves to be authoritative lords over our lives, particularly in areas w e deem crucial to our o w n well-being. A n especially revealing area concerns h o w w e treat our enemies w h o clearly threaten our o w n (perceived) well-being. In some cases, w e ignore them, but in other cases, w e seek to destroy them, at times with h e a v y artillery and toxic chemicals or at least with great harm to their reputations. We very rarely, if ever, offer our enemies unselfish forgiving love, the kind of merciful enemylove found in the perfectly loving G o d acknowledged b y Jesus's Sermon on the Mount (see Matt. 5:43-8; cf. L u k e 6:2736). Such enemy-love, however, is a crucial feature of w h a t

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enables the Jewish-Christian G o d to be inherently morally perfect and w o r t h y of w o r s h i p , and thereby to satisfy the maximally honorific title " G o d . " Not just any maximally powerful being, of course, will qualify as titleholder of the morally demanding title " G o d . " The title requires inherent moral perfection, and such perfection demands a perfectly loving character, even toward enemies. Once w e acknowledge this, w e readily can exclude as imposters a long list of proposed candidates for the titleholder, and then can focus carefully on the v e r y small list (of one) worthy of the wholehearted self-entrustment appropriate to faith in G o d . In the end, the perfectly loving G o d represented b y Jesus is the only remaining serious candidate, once w e acknowledge the crucial role of enemy-love. This claim m a y seem implausibly bold and exclusive at first glance, but w e simply have no other candidate w h o offers enemy-love as a standard for all concerned. The evidence from the history of religion is, if surprising, clear on this front. We, of course, might divorce the title " G o d " from the standard of enemy-love, but that w o u l d be a m o v e of ad hoc moral diminution of the category of being G o d . We humans are inclined to suppose that the risk of living by unselfish love (especially toward our enemies) is too great for us, because it is too threatening to our o w n perceived well-being. We thereby often choose contrary to the unselfish w a y s of a perfectly loving G o d , given our presumption that w e k n o w better and given our selfish fear of personal loss. (On fear as an impediment to faith, see M a r k 4:40-1, 5:36.) Accordingly, w e play (false) G o d in the arena of ethical conduct, and w e proceed with destructive actions against our enemies w h o seem to threaten our well-being. In contrast to such selfish fear and destructive actions, faith in the true G o d w o u l d be inherently the volitional commitment to let God be God in our lives. Such faith w o u l d include the heart-based commitment to refuse to play (false) G o d regarding the true G o d ' s w a y s of perfect love, including enemy-love. If w e w o u l d h a v e such faith in G o d , w e w o u l d

FIDEISM A N D FAITH

"5

decisively renounce selfishness as ultimately counterproductive and destructive, even toward enemies. Obviously, w e and our relationships with other people w o u l d become v e r y different in that case. Faith in G o d then w o u l d m a k e a striking difference in action as well as in passion. The urgent question is whether w e are sincerely willing to undergo the needed change. We must face a cognitive obstacle to h u m a n faith in G o d , given that w e humans sometimes play (false) G o d regarding w h a t is to count as needed adequate evidence of G o d ' s existence. Boldly, w e presume to be in a position to say, on our o w n authority, w h a t kind of evidence G o d must supply regarding G o d ' s existence. We thereby reason in a questionable way, familiar from Bertrand Russell (1970), N.R. Hanson ( 1 9 7 1 ) , and m a n y other philosophers, that neglects the fact that any evidence of G o d ' s existence w o u l d be purposively available to us in a manner that suits the authoritative purposes of a morally perfect G o d . In general, the questionable reasoning runs as follows. If G o d actually exists, G o d w o u l d certainly be revealed in a w a y readily noticed by all concerned. For instance, G o d w o u l d be revealed with considerable signs easily acknowle d g e d b y all relevant observers. G o d , however, is definitely not revealed in that way. Therefore, according to m a n y casual observers, G o d does not actually exist. A s a result, Russell stated as follows his response if he w e r e to meet G o d after his death: " G o d , y o u g a v e us insufficient evidence." Using the previous line of reasoning, w e intentionally exalt ourselves as cognitive judge, jury, and executioner over G o d , and our boldly appointed cognitive standard consigns G o d to the hapless category of the nonexistent. Our dubious presumption is that G o d must be revealed on our preferred cognitive terms, as if our o w n boldly appointed terms w e r e cognitively above reproach. This amounts to a kind of cognitive idolatry w h e r e b y w e replace G o d ' s cognitive authority with our own. In particular, w e set u p our preferred cognitive standards in w a y s that block

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or undermine "reasonable" acknowledgment of G o d ' s reality. A t the same time, w e ignore the fact that any evidence of G o d ' s existence w o u l d be purposively available to humans in keeping with God's perfectly loving (and thus sometimes subtle and elusive) character and purposes. Cognitive idolatry typically stems from cognitive pride wherein w e play (false) G o d in the cognitive domain, to our o w n harm. One's epistemology matters, then, because it can interfere with one's reception of important available evidence of G p d ' s existence. Obviously, w e humans are imposters in playing G o d , in any domain, because w e fail decisively to be worthy of worship. In particular, w e lack the kind of powerful divine moral perfection that delivers not only an opportunity for lasting life in the face of our impending death, but also an offer of unselfish love and reconciliation in the presence of our destructive selfishness. Divine p o w e r therefore contrasts sharply with familiar h u m a n power, especially in supplying w h a t humans desperately need in their dire predicament. We should allow, accordingly, for cognitive grace whereby G o d freely gives us purposively available evidence of divine reality on G o d ' s perfectly loving terms, without either our trivializing G o d ' s morally profound character or our earning evidence or k n o w l e d g e of G o d . A perfectly loving G o d w o u l d call us to die to our playing G o d in order to live obediently and lastingly in fellowship with G o d as our Lord. Our playing G o d wreaks havoc, wherever p l a y e d , because w e are at most a w e a k and pathetic counterfeit in place of the morally perfect and powerful true article. In the presence of our impending physical death, a perfectly loving G o d w o u l d call us to the realization that our playing G o d , including in the cognitive domain, will lead ultimately to the grave, with no h a p p y ending. This G o d w o u l d also call us to yield our selfish wills to G o d ' s unselfish w a y s rather than to h a v e our selfish wills extinguished altogether, given their destructive tendencies. Offering purposively available evidence of divine reality, G o d w o u l d call

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us to fold n o w (that is, to repent) and to welcome (that is, to trust) divine redeeming p o w e r in a n e w Spirit-led m o d e of living and dying. According to the Christian G o o d N e w s , the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus perfectly m o d e l this n e w m o d e of existence, receptively and obediently under the divine authority that, in perfect redemptive love, is for our good. Faith in G o d , as self-entrustment n o w a n d for the future, is the h u m a n means of receiving and appropriating this n e w m o d e of life under G o d , in fellowship w i t h G o d . Moral considerations surround and permeate faith in G o d , taking it beyond merely intellectual considerations. In h u m a n selfishness antithetical to divine love, w e fear not getting something w e want (perhaps an opportunity or a relationship), even at the expense of harming others, perhaps by blocking them from things they need. One motive at w o r k is self-indulgent fear, which typically underwrites greed, covetousness, bias, and various other evils. Such fear haunts our natural behavioral tendencies, and l o o m s large over much of h u m a n history, including national w a r s , racial and ethnic conflicts, and religious violence. M o r e specifically, such fear can capture and enslave us at the expense of flourishing and loving h u m a n relationships, and it is a l w a y s contrary to the life-giving w a y s of a perfectly l o v i n g G o d . Faith in G o d is a needed antidote, because such faith, as h u m a n entrustment to G o d , is the avenue of receiving the perfect divine love that casts out selfish fear and offers reconciled fellowship instead (see 1 John 4:18). Ordinary k n o w l e d g e of information will not free us from our selfishness or our impending death, because h u m a n s need volitional, purpose-directed power to m o v e b e y o n d selfishness and death. Clearly, contrary to Plato, w e can k n o w w h a t is good but fail to conform to it in our desires, intentions, and actions. Selfishness is inherently a matter of the will, and therefore cognitive enlightenment b y itself will not solve the h u m a n problem of selfishness. A l t h o u g h m a n y philosophers and religious thinkers h a v e overlooked this important lesson, w e should acknowledge it as w e l l

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as the h u m a n need of corrective p o w e r b e y o n d intellectual illumination. Bearing on the wilderness parable in the Introduction, h u m a n faith in G o d offers a place of rescue and safe refuge from our selfishness where w e are set free of selfish fear even in the face of death. This is a place of d i v i n e - h u m a n interpersonal fellowship where humans are volitionally related and reconciled, via entrusting themselves, to a personal agent w h o first calls them into reconciled fellowship and'new life. This call comes with the distinctive power of divine unselfish love. Such divine love can bring good to us, even in our suffering and dying, in w a y s that make selfishness undesirable, ineffectual, and even repulsive. In our suffering and dying, w e often have a clear opportunity to see that the lasting p o w e r of the salvation, or rescue, w e humans need does not come from us but must come instead from G o d (see 2 Cor. 4:7, 12:9). According to the Christian Good N e w s , G o d ' s authoritative p o w e r of unselfish lasting love, particularly as exemplified in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, shows us (perhaps even without fully explaining) that w e do not need selfishness to receive what is vitally good for us, and that even physical death can be overcome in resurrection by G o d . This is a central part of the Christian G o o d N e w s of powerful divine redemption by grace through faith in G o d and in Jesus as G o d ' s unique mediator. In the interest of full disclosure, w e humans should ask whether w e are morally and cognitively fit or positioned to recognize on our o w n a personal p o w e r of perfect love that can liberate us from our selfishness if w e are willing. We m a y be too far into the wilderness darkness of destructive selfishness to see on our o w n what w e truly need to see and to do. This w o u l d recommend cognitive pessimism about our own resources relative to a perfectly loving G o d , but it w o u l d not be unqualified pessimism about all available resources. Fortunately, w e ourselves arguably do not exhaust the available resources in this area.

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Perhaps the needed divine resources are p u r p o s i v e l y available to us if w e are suitably willing, in a manner that fits with divine redemptive purposes for us as people needing volitional transformation, in reconciled fellowship and life with G o d (see Moser 2008 for details). A t least w e n o w face this urgent question: are w e h u m a n s willing to hear, and then to obey in the self-entrustment of faith, a call to everdeepening fellowship and life with a G o d w h o manifests and commands love toward others, even toward enemies? This life-or-death question raises the existential question of whether w e are willing to be addressed b y a G o d w h o offers n e w life on G o d ' s terms of unselfish love. This question takes us well beyond philosophy proper, into a self-defining decision each reflective h u m a n must make, h o w e v e r the details of one's philosophy are w o r k e d out.

5.

W H I T H E R

FIDEISM?

The previous sketch of distinctively Christian faith in G o d serves an important purpose in an evaluation of fideism. Specifically, it gives us a concrete standard for measuring the adequacy of fideism as an approach to faith in God. We shall see that fideism not only falls short of the standard outlined but also conflicts with it. A s a result, Christian faith in G o d calls for an alternative to fideism. The same antifideist lesson is true, as w e shall see, of any other approach to faith in G o d that calls for faith that can be trustworthily, or wellgroundedly, commended as true rather than false or illusory. A perfectly loving G o d , in virtue of genuine unselfish love toward others, w o u l d be outgoing in intentional actions for the good of others. In addition, for the sake of genuine unselfish love toward others, such a G o d w o u l d encourage and even c o m m a n d others to be likewise outgoing in intentional actions for the good of others. A s a result, such a G o d w o u l d expect h u m a n faith in G o d to be lived out in unselfish love toward others, and not in hate toward others. Accordingly, as noted previously, Paul identifies Christian

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faith in G o d as "faith [in G o d ] w o r k i n g through l o v e " (Gal. 5:6). In addition, as also suggested previously, Paul portrays Christian faith in G o d as a grounded h u m a n response of self-entrustment to a divine call to a n e w life of unselfish love (see Rom. 1 0 : 1 7 ) . This call, according to Paul, is an integral part of the Christian G o o d N e w s of G o d ' s redemptive plan via the crucified and risen Jesus, and it is offered as a cognitive ground for Christian faith in G o d . Faith in G o d could not be trustworthily commended as a correct human response to be obediently lived out for the good of others if it rested just on an acknowledged contradiction or on some other kind of ungrounded commitment. The latter two options (of acknowledged contradiction and ungrounded commitment) will undermine the crucial role of a divine call, or anything else, as a trustworthinessconferring ground for a correct human response of faith in G o d . More specifically, those options divorce such faith from a trustworthy grounding in a divine call to n e w h u m a n life with G o d , or in anything else. In doing so, they cut off faith in G o d from both what gives it trustworthy significance in a human life and a trustworthiness-conferring cognitive ground for its being correct. The result is a kind of faith that is either necessarily false (if it is contradictory) or cognitively arbitrary (if it is lacking in a cognitive ground). H u m a n s cannot trustworthily adopt or live out, in intentional actions aimed at manifesting unselfish love, contradictory or ungrounded faith in G o d . Indeed, such faith cannot be, even in principle, trustworthily commended (for adoption or practice) as correct if it is either contradictory or ungrounded. Instead, such faith will be trustworthily commended as correct only if it is cognitively commendable, because the faith in question commits one to the reality of G o d . A s a result, questions about reality in contrast with unreality or illusion, in the case of G o d , emerge automatically. Accordingly, from a cognitive point of view, such faith calls for a (possibly fallible) truth indicator to serve as a trustworthiness-conferring ground.

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Faith in G o d will be cognitively commendable only if it has an available basis for commendation that is neither contradictory nor cognitively arbitrary. Fideist faith that is not thus commendable relative to available truth indicators w i l l lack needed support relative to our evidential perspective on reality and thus will float free of our trustworthy indicators of w h a t is real, or actually the case, rather than illusory. A s a result, fideist faith will be cognitively deficient, relative to our (possibly fallible) trustworthy evidential indicators of reality, in a manner that blocks its being trustworthily commendable as correct. If h u m a n faith in G o d has no truth indicator to serve as a trustworthiness-conferring ground, it will lack a trustworthy place in h u m a n thought and life. Indeed, it w i l l then be an untrustworthy postulate that fails to earn its keep for w h a t it actually is in a h u m a n life: namely, a definite claim on reality, particularly regarding the reality of G o d . Fideism makes faith in G o d just such a postulate in need of a trustworthiness-conferring basis regarding its being correct. In separating such faith from a trustworthiness-conferring basis that offers a (possibly fallible) well-grounded truth indicator, fideism has faith make d o without a trustworthy basis for its supposedly being correct, or for its commendation as correct. It thereby makes faith untrustworthy and thus, arguably, dispensable, at least relative to our trustworthy truth indicators. In the end, fideism leads to the dispensability of faith in G o d , at least from the standpoint of w h a t has a trustworthy basis or w h a t is trustworthily commendable as correct. Fideists cannot salvage their fideism by requiring/us^ some evidential support for faith in G o d but not enough to m a k e such faith more reasonable, or trustworthy, than its denial. That position w o u l d leave faith in G o d , at best, as a position on which people should withhold judgment (that is, neither affirm nor deny) from a cognitive point of v i e w that d e m a n d s trustworthiness. If faith in G o d is at best a position on which w e should withhold judgment from the standpoint

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of trustworthiness, then w e should withhold judgment on it, all things considered. A position that makes a claim about reality (such as a claim that G o d exists) but is not supported b y trustworthy evidence (and thus is, itself, not trustworthy) should not be accepted as true. A s noted previously, the trustworthiness in question is not objective reliability relative to h o w the w o r l d actually is; instead, it is relative to a person's available truth indicators, or evidence. One might accept, of course, that an untrustworthy position is prudently or morally beneficial w h e n adopted, but that w o u l d be a m o v e to a domain of practical value other than either correctness in the position or trustworthiness regarding correctness in the position. For practical, noncognitive reasons, such as prudential or moral reasons, one might recommend faith in G o d , but that recommendation w o u l d fall short of a recommendation of either the correctness or the trustworthiness regarding correctness (in the content) of faith in G o d . It w o u l d be more accurate, therefore, to offer noncognitive reasons as recommending that one act as if one had faith in G o d , without recommending either the actual trustworthiness or the actual correctness of (the content of) such faith. We should distinguish, accordingly, between (a) trustworthiness regarding the evident truth of the content of belief or faith and (b) advisability (say, for practical or moral reasons) of one's adopting a belief or faithcommitment. This content-act distinction undermines pragmatist and Kantian variations on fideism, so long as a faithcommitment makes a claim on reality, such as the reality of G o d . (In particular, this distinction challenges the kind of Kantian fideism developed in Bishop 2007.) Under pressure, a fideist might retreat to a nonrealist conception of faith in G o d that avoids any commitment to the reality of G o d . That, however, w o u l d be a m o v e of troublesome desperation. Faith in G o d , as suggested previously, is de re in a manner that contrasts such faith with a mere noncognitive use of language that is free of concerns about reality as opposed to illusion. If there is no G o d , then there

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is no genuine de re faith in God, e v e n if there is belief that G o d exists. Fideists, accordingly, can m o v e to a nonrealist conception of faith in G o d only if they change the subject a w a y from genuine faith in G o d that concerns reality as opposed to illusion. A s usual, a m o v e to nonrealism, in keeping with the case of nonrealism about truth itself, sacrifices w h a t w a s originally at issue: the real existence of something. (For problems w i t h such nonrealism in general, see Moser 1993, Chapter 1.) Such nonrealism simply relinquishes genuine faith in God. It also sacrifices the role of G o d as a needed source of real p o w e r for human transformation and redemption. (The same problem faces any version of Kantian fideism that portrays G o d as a moral postulate.) In steering clear of nonrealism and its problems, fideists will be faced with a commitment to the reality of G o d that requires, from a cognitive point of view, a trustworthy truth indicator that can s u p p l y a basis for trustworthy commendation concerning the reality, rather than the illusion, of G o d . A s suggested previously, the latter requirement leads to the demise of fideism, because it leads to a required trustworthiness-conferring ground for faith in G o d . S u m ming u p , then, w e can see that fideism faces a dilemma of misplaced nonrealism or untrustworthy cognitive arbitrariness regarding its implication for faith in G o d . A central motivation for fideism, in the end, is just fear of the potentially corrosive effects of cognitive standards on religious belief. Kant, at least, famously offered a noncognitive approach to theistic belief that sought to escape a perceived threat from scientific or "theoretical" k n o w l e d g e of reality. His general strategy w a s to deny k n o w l e d g e in order to m a k e room for faith in G o d . More specifically, he sought to fold theistic belief into the d o m a i n of morality (by making commitment to G o d a postulate needed by moral rationality), and then to offer morality as a function of h u m a n practical rationality understood as a kind of consistency in h u m a n willing and believing. In thus moralizing faith in G o d , Kant's strategy decisively isolated theistic belief from

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the domain of science in particular and cognition in general, and this noncognitivist lesson w a s not lost on subsequent Christian theology in large sectors of the Protestant tradition. (For relevant discussion, see Thielicke 1990, Chapters 1 0 - 1 1 ; cf. Wainwright 2005, Chapter 1.) A fideist fear of cognitive standards for theistic belief is misplaced, however, w h e n it is generalized to concern all (plausible) cognitive standards. Indeed, the unfortunate result is akin to throwing out the baby with the (dirty) bath water. The fideist mistake, in the w a k e of Kant and Kierkegaard, is to approach some troublesome cognitive standards as if they were representative of cognitive standards in general. For instance, the Core Scientism challenged in Chapter 1 is, indeed, a troublesome cognitive standard, given that it is at odds with any cognitive standard not grounded in the empirical sciences. In particular, Core Scientism is at odds with any such cognitive standard independent of the sciences that approves of faith in G o d . The crucial problem is that Core Scientism fails to meet its o w n cognitive standard that requires a grounding in the empirical sciences. G i v e n this self-referential failing, Core Scientism is, at best, a cognitive standard worthy of our rejection. E v e n so, cognitive standards in general are not a threat to well-founded faith in G o d , regardless of any general fears behind fideism. We therefore should be suspicious of any general fideist attempt to set aside the primary importance of cognitive standards for faith in G o d , including any Kantian attempt to relegate faith in G o d to the domain of (the needed postulates of) practical or moral rationality (including the Kantian fideist attempt in Bishop 2007). The task of identifying adequate cognitive standards for h u m a n belief, including faith in G o d , is difficult by any standard. The task is remarkably complex, and it stubbornly resists any quick and easy solution. (See Moser 1989, 1993 for some indications of the significant complexity in this domain.) E v e n so, this task merits our careful attention, even

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in connection with cognitive standards for h u m a n faith in G o d . The motivation is straightforward: for h u m a n faith in G o d to be trustworthy in h u m a n life, it must be supported b y a trustworthy truth indicator, and this requires a basis for trustworthy commendation of h u m a n faith in G o d . The truth indicator in question will confer trustworthiness, and therefore will s u p p l y a well-founded cognitive grounding for faith in G o d . A s a result, fideism about faith in G o d will be misplaced, because a trustworthiness-conferring ground for faith in G o d will then be available. In the end, fideism leaves faith in G o d as something less than a trustworthy source for finding a needed rescuer in the Introduction's wilderness parable. In doing so, fideism arguably hinders trustworthy pursuit of the question of whether h u m a n faith in G o d contributes to the satisfaction of the deepest h u m a n needs, including h u m a n cognitive needs. (Chapter 4 returns to the latter topic.)

6.

ARGUMENT-INDIFFERENT

FIDEISM

Traditional fideism rejects a requirement of trustworthy support for religious beliefs, or at least minimizes the significance of such support in some way, perhaps by allowing moral or prudential reasons to h a v e decisive significance. In any case, one might reject traditional fideism about evidence but, following A l v i n Plantinga, endorse argumentindifferent fideism: the v i e w that belief in G o d can be perfectly rational even if there is no cogent argument w h a t e v e r for the existence of G o d (see Plantinga 1983, p. 65). M a n y proponents of so-called "reformed epistemology" support such argument-indifferent fideism, but w e shall see that this fideist position is untenable. By "cogent argument," Plantinga means "rationally convincing argument," which is not s y n o n y m o u s with "logically sound a r g u m e n t . " The premises of a logically sound argument, although true, need not be rationally convincing at all. In addition, w e should

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not confuse the idea of a cogent argument and the idea of evidence. Evidence, say from sensory experience, need not be an argument at all. Plantinga's position rests on an account of epistemic warrant - that is, of that "quality or quantity enough of which, together with truth and belief, is sufficient for k n o w l e d g e " (1993, p. v ) . He proposes that a belief has epistemic w a r rant only if it has been produced and sustained b y cognitive faculties that (a) are functioning properly in an appropriate environment, (b) are aimed at the production of true beliefs, and (c) h a v e a high objective probability of producing true beliefs under the appropriate conditions of belief formation. Plantinga explains his notion of the "proper function" of our cognitive faculties in terms of a "design p l a n " governing those faculties. Proper function of our cognitive faculties is function in accordance with the design plan for those faculties, and this design plan specifies the w a y those faculties function aright. Plantinga suggests that his talk of a design plan, as a specification of every aspect of h o w a thing will function w h e n it functions properly, does not entail that humans w e r e designed by G o d . He explains: " H u m a n beings are constructed according to a certain design plan. This terminology does not commit us to supposing that h u m a n beings have been literally designed - by G o d , for example. Here I use 'design' the w a y Daniel D e n n e t t . . . does in speaking of a given organism as possessing a certain design, and of evolution as producing optimal design " (1993, p. 1 3 ) . There is, however, a significant difference neglected by Plantinga between saying that humans are "constructed according to a certain design p l a n " and saying that they "possess a certain design." Contrary to a suggestion of neutrality, Plantinga evidently builds into his ideas of proper function and design plan (and thus also into his idea of epistemic warrant) an implicit reference to an intentional designer. Dennett's idea of the design of a thing (for instance, in Dennet 1987) is arguably not

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irreducibly normative or purposive, but Plantinga's notions of a design plan and of proper function are. Plantinga proposes that a design plan specifies h o w a thing ought to function. In addition, specification of h o w a thing ought to function is independent of h o w things of that sort actually do function for the most part. Indeed, it could happen that nothing of a certain kind actually functions as it ought to function in accordance with its design plan. Plantinga holds that proper function is determined b y h o w a thing functions normally, but he emphasizes that this is not a descriptive or statistical sense of " n o r m a l . " A s a result, any desire for compatibility with an evolutionary account of design, such as Dennett's, will ultimately fail. Plantinga speaks of proper function as follows: "[I]t is of first importance to see that this condition - that of one's cognitive equipment functioning properly - is not the same thing as one's cognitive equipment functioning normally, not, at any rate, if w e take the term 'normally' in a broadly statistical sense. E v e n if one of m y systems functions in a w a y far from the statistical norm, it might still be functioning properly. (Alternatively, what w e must see is that there is a distinction between a normative and a statistical sense of 'normal'.)" (1993, p. 9). Plantinga understands "proper function" in such a w a y that it is possible that no h u m a n actually functions in accordance with a particular aspect of the design plan for humans. A s a result, this is not a merely descriptive or statistical understanding of "proper function." G i v e n that Plantinga's standards for proper and improper function do not stem from a generalization from actual behavior, they must find their source elsewhere. Plantinga mentions evolution and G o d as possible alternative sources (1993, p. 2 1 ) , and he claims not to rule out evolution b y definitional fiat. A s noted previously, however, Plantinga requires that "proper function" be understood in relation to a normative sense of " n o r m a l , " but Darwinian evolution yields only descriptive statistical norms and

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therefore cannot deliver a genuinely normative sense of " n o r m a l . " Darwinian evolution does not yield norms to distinguish proper from improper functions as understood b y Plantinga, because it produces only organisms that actually function in accordance with mutation and natural selection. Plantinga's talk of the proper function of our cognitive faculties evidently makes sense only if w e assume that there is some definite set of cognitive standards provided by a (consistent) designer's intentions. Without that assumption, w e are faced with the relativity of w h e n a cognitive function is proper in the context of a w i d e range of different, and even conflicting, standards. Accordingly, Plantinga's epistemology fares better in a supernaturalist ontology than in a naturalist ontology. Indeed, it is hard to make definite normative sense of his talk of the proper function of our cognitive faculties without the assumption that there is a definite set of standards for proper cognitive function provided b y a (consistent) designer's intentions for our cognitive faculties. We therefore should hesitate to adopt Plantinga's talk of the proper function of our cognitive faculties unless w e are agreeable to a supernaturalist ontology. Many theorists will doubt that w e should follow Plantinga in talking about the proper function of our cognitive faculties in a normative sense that presupposes a supernatural designer. Even if Plantinga's theism is true, w e h a v e no reason to suppose that intentional standards for proper function set by humans cannot serve h u m a n epistemological purposes. Such standards arising from humans m a y v a r y across h u m a n groups, owing to v a r y i n g standards of propriety, but this will not preclude effective epistemological assessment. Variance in epistemological standards is a fact of contemporary epistemological life, and it m a y entail a kind of variance in epistemological concepts, at least at a level of specificity. (On the latter topic, see Moser 1993.) If w e bracket the design plan of a single G o d (or some such supernatural agent), w e shall be hard put to ignore variability in relevant epistemological standards. In that case, a kind of conventionalism and relativism about epistemological

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standards will merit serious consideration. Plantinga, however, does not give d u e consideration to the possibility that w e h u m a n s are the sources of the standards for distinguishing proper and improper cognitive function, relative to our preferred cognitive goals. Conventionalism aside, Plantinga's theism includes the following t w o propositions (2000, p. 438): (1) The w o r l d w a s created b y G o d , an almighty, allk n o w i n g and perfectly g o o d personal being (the sort of being w h o holds beliefs, has aims and intentions, and can act to accomplish these aims). :jf., (2) H u m a n beings require salvation, and G o d has prov i d e d a unique w a y of salvation through the incarnation, life, sacrificial death, and resurrection of his divine son, Jesus Christ. Regarding the possibility and the necessity of arguments for (2), Plantinga claims: My aim is to show how it can be that Christians can be justified, rational (both internally and externally), and warranted in holding full-blooded Christian belief.... Justification [taken deontologically, in terms of non-violation of intellectual obligations] and internal rationality [as proper function of one's cognitive processes given one's actual, possibly grossly misleading experiences] are easy e n o u g h . . . . External rationality and warrant are harder. The only w a y I can see to argue that Christian belief has these virtues [namely, external rationality and warrant] is to argue that Christian belief is, indeed, true. I don't propose to offer such an argument. That is because I don't know of an argument for Christian belief that seems very likely to convince one who doesn't already accept its conclusion. That is nothing against Christian belief, however, and indeed I shall argue that if Christian beliefs are true, then the standard and most satisfactory w a y to hold them will not be as the conclusions of argument (2000, pp. 200-1). Plantinga refrains from arguing that Christian belief is true, on this ground: " I don't k n o w of an argument for Christian belief that seems v e r y likely to convince one w h o doesn't

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already accept its conclusion." A s a result, b y Plantinga's lights, a worthwhile argument for Christian belief must seem very likely to convince one w h o does not already accept its conclusion. We n o w are on very thin ice, however, quite aside from the unclear talk of an argument's seeming " v e r y likely" to convince. Regarding w h o m is to be convinced, does Plantinga mean everyone w h o does not already accept the conclusion of a proposed argument for Christian belief? If so, w h y should w e accept that dubious requirement? It amounts to the following standard: (a) It is worthwhile or proper to argue that Christian belief is true only if one's argument seems v e r y likely to convince everyone w h o does not already accept its conclusion. M a n y perfectly worthwhile and proper arguments fail to seem v e r y likely to convince everyone w h o does not already accept their conclusions. A s a result, (a) is too demanding. For instance, Plantinga's influential free-will argument against the logical problem of evil for theism is perfectly worthwhile and proper (see Plantinga 1977), but it fails to seem likely to convince everyone w h o does not already accept its conclusion. Some people w h o do not already accept its conclusion are just too stubborn, whimsical, or outright confused to be (likely to be) convinced b y the argument. This fact reflects badly on the w a y w a r d people in question, and not at all on the free-will argument in question. This argument is beyond reproach relative to its a v o w e d l y limited goal of showing consistency, despite its failure to convince all people. Perhaps Plantinga meant not (a) but rather the following: (b) It is worthwhile or proper to argue that Christian belief is true only if one's argument seems v e r y likely to convince at least one person w h o does not already accept its conclusion.

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The problem is that (b) is too w e a k to yield Plantinga's desired result. It is a sad but true comment on our species that any argument, or at least any minimally nonpreposterous argument, seems v e r y likely to convince at least one person w h o does not already accept its conclusion. M a n y people are terribly and shamelessly gullible in the face of arguments (see any television talk show audience for examples). A s a result, w e will be able to find, in fairly short order, at least one person w h o is very likely to be convinced b y an argument for Christian belief but w h o does not already accept it conclusion. Accordingly, (b) will not support Plantinga's v i e w that his arguing for the truth of Christian belief is not worthwhile or proper. It seems ill-advised to base the supposed inappropriateness or lack of success of an argument for the truth of Christian belief on the argument's shortcoming in its apparent likelihood to convince certain people. In fact, Plantinga's line of argument disarms itself. His (implicit) argument for not arguing for the truth of Christian belief does not seem very likely at all to convince one w h o does not already accept its conclusion. By his o w n standard, then, Plantinga should relinquish his suggested argument against the appropriateness or success of argument for Christian belief. What, if anything, w o u l d underwrite Plantinga's misgiving about argument for Christian belief? One might offer a diagnosis in keeping with Plantinga's evident liking for things Calvinist. The Calvinist problem here, as pretty much everywhere, is sin, that is, depraving and corrupting sin. (Chapter 4 returns to the cognitive significance of h u m a n sin.) According to Plantinga's Calvinism (mercifully free of explicit foreordained lasting condemnation of certain people), " w e h u m a n beings, apart from G o d ' s special and gracious activity, are sunk in s i n ; . . . [as a result,] without some special activity on the part of the Lord, w e w o u l d n ' t b e l i e v e " (2000, p. 269; cf. p. 303). We are sunk deeply in sin, according to this story, so deeply that our coming to h a v e Christian beliefs must come " b y w a y of the w o r k of the H o l y Spirit,

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w h o gets us to accept, causes us to believe, these great truths of the g o s p e l " (2000, p. 245, italics added; cf. p. 260). Plantinga notes that G o d ' s causing us to do something rules out our doing it freely (2000, p. 462). It follows, on his view, that no one freely comes to- have Christian beliefs. So far, this is v e r y Calvinist, even with intimations of G o d ' s selective irresistible grace in regeneration of the " f a v o r e d " (2000, p. 254). Plantinga looks for scriptural support in Jesus's remark (John 6:44) that " n o one can come to me unless the Father w h o sent me d r a w s h i m " (2000, p. 269). The proposed diagnosis will not survive scrutiny. One difficulty is that John's Gospel resists a Calvinist reading of divinely selected and caused regeneration. The notion of " d r a w i n g " people in John's Gospel suggests both universality of d r a w i n g and human freedom to reject or to embrace the drawing. Accordingly, Jesus remarks that " w h e n I am lifted u p from the earth, I will d r a w all (pantas) [people] to myself" (John 12:32). Famously, John's Gospel (3:16) teaches that G o d so loved the w h o l e world (ton kosmon) that he g a v e his unique Son, so that anyone w h o trusts in him will have everlasting life. Taken as a whole, John's Gospel does not portray G o d as causing some people but not others to believe. Instead, this Gospel assumes a typical free h u m a n response of receiving or rejecting G o d ' s gracious salvation intended for all people (see John 1 : 1 1 - 1 3 , 3 : 1 9 - 2 1 ) . According to John's Gospel, in seeking genuine love from humans and thus respecting h u m a n freedom, G o d did not cause Jesus to obey (see John 1 0 : 1 7 - 1 8 ) ; likewise, G o d does not cause the " f a v o r e d " to believe or to be faithful. In John's Gospel and in the N e w Testament generally, G o d graciously gives h u m a n s the freedom to receive or reject G o d ' s salvation (see Meadors 2006). Otherwise, in regenerating just some favored people in moral and spiritual bondage, G o d w o u l d show a kind of selective love incompatible with genuine love of all people, including enemies. A s a result, G o d w o u l d lack moral perfection and thus worthiness of w o r s h i p , and w o u l d be inconsistent in

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commanding humans to love all of their enemies. A s w o r t h y of worship, G o d , of course, w o u l d be at least as loving as humans. In sincerely offering the gift of faith and salvation to all (and not just the favored), G o d w o u l d w a n t none to perish but everyone to come to repentance (see 2 Pet. 3:9; cf. Rev. 3:20). This divine w a n t w o u l d be free of harmful deceit; otherwise, its source w o u l d not be w o r t h y of w o r s h i p . A s it happens, the necessary role of h u m a n freedom in loving G o d has a tragic result: it results in the gracious divine want and invitation being unsatisfied in the case of some humans. The inherent risk of rejection is thus realized, tragically, b y some h u m a n s in the actual w o r l d . We w o u l d h a v e a kind of harmful deceit (or at least a pathetic notion of want) if G o d (i) reported his wanting the salvation of all people, (ii) could cause all people to have saving faith, but (iii) failed to cause all people to h a v e saving faith. Neither G o d nor anyone else, however, can cause a person to love others in the manner essential to saving faith. True love is inherently resistible, for the sake of maintaining the genuine agency of the people loved. Calvinism, h o w e v e r well-meaning and cleanly systematic, thus distorts and underestimates the universal genuine love found in a G o d worthy of worship. Calvinism aside, and contrary to Plantinga, the crucial role of G o d ' s Spirit in h u m a n faith and regeneration does not make argument for Christian truths superfluous or otherwise unnecessary. In the Christian story of divine revelation, G o d ' s Spirit can and sometimes does use arguments as p a t h w a y s to (or components of) free h u m a n reception of faith in G o d and h u m a n regeneration b y G o d . One's freely coming to G o d via the w o r k of G o d ' s Spirit can, and arguably sometimes does, include one's coming by w a y of argument. Here is a quick sketch of a relevant argument to be refined and defended in Chapter 4: 1. M y h u m a n life will be dominated b y unselfish love toward all other people only if m y selfish h u m a n fears are subdued at least for the most part.

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2. M y selfish h u m a n fears are subdued at least for the most part only if a perfectly loving G o d pours out (in response to m y free reception) divine unselfish love in m y heart. 3. M y h u m a n life is indeed dominated b y unselfish love toward all other people. 4. Therefore, a perfectly loving G o d exists. This rough sketch of an argument for G o d ' s existence d r a w s from such N e w Testament passages as Romans 5:5 and 1 John 3:14, 4 : 1 2 - 1 3 , 1 8 . (As suggested, Chapter 4 adds some important details to this quick sketch.) G o d ' s Spirit w o u l d not be required to use any argument, of course, but could use a good argument without reproach. I, for one, find rational support for theism in such an argument as 1 - 4 (when properly amplified), and m a n y Christians testify to G o d ' s Spirit's using arguments on occasion for Christian belief. Of course, the argument 1 - 4 does not support the distinctive details of a Christian theology, but it can offer a theistic basis for a Christian theology, and it can be extended with further argument (as in Chapter 4) to lend support to central Christian beliefs. Plantinga's reluctance to propose arguments for Christian belief is puzzling at best. He claims, anticlimactically, that in asking about the truth of Christian belief, " w e pass b e y o n d the competence of philosophy" (2000, p. 499). What, h o w ever, is the supposed problem with Christian belief from the standpoint of philosophy and argument? E v e n if (as Plantinga holds) Christian faith in G o d is a gift that must be sealed u p o n one's heart by G o d ' s Spirit, and w e suffer profoundly from sin, h o w do such truths make Christian belief " b e y o n d the competence of philosophy"? This is far from clear in Plantinga's reformed epistemology. Our tendency not to follow G o d ' s unselfish w a y s on our o w n does not challenge the value of philosophy in itself for theology. Likewise, bad reasoners do not make reasoning itself hopeless, improper, or worthless. The

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performance of philosophers, h o w e v e r m i s g u i d e d at times, leaves unscathed the competence of philosophy as a rational truth-seeking and error-avoiding discipline. Philosophy done properly (unlike that, say, in Corinth in Paul's d a y ; see 1 Cor. 1:19-29) is arguably a proper and w o r t h w h i l e means to our freely discerning and welcoming the inviting and d r a w i n g righteous love of G o d ' s Spirit for all people, even for argumentative philosophers. It is not just a sophisticated tool for pollution control (as Plantinga 2000, p. 499 suggests). Christians, after all, do claim to speak w i s d o m (sophia) among the mature children of G o d (see 1 Cor. 2:6), even if not w i s d o m of this world, and the w i s d o m from G o d can sustain valid inferential patterns in arguments. Plantinga notes often that Christian belief is not typically formed on the basis of arguments. That seems virtually undeniable and even true. E v e n so, philosophers, including Christian philosophers, h a v e at least epistemological, ontological, and ethical w o r k to d o in philosophy, and this w o r k depends on arguments of various sorts. (Otherwise, they w o u l d not h a v e a place for such philosophical w o r k s as Plantinga's Warranted Christian Belief.) Plantinga proposes that G o d ' s Spirit enables believers to apprehend the glory and the beauty of the gospel in a manner that restores (to an important extent) the operation of the sensus divinitatis. This apprehension is not a premise in an argument, but is, instead, an occasion of one's forming the belief that the gospel is from G o d and true. Plantinga apparently suggests at one point that this apprehension is (on the m o d e l of perception) part of one's (nonpropositional) evidence for the gospel truths in that it is part of w h a t makes those truths evident for one (2000, p p . 305-6). He evidently backs off this suggestion, however, in his official m o o d (2000, p. 326); as a result, evidentialist hopes are not encouraged b y Plantinga. M y o w n evidentialism, as developed in this book, is m o d erate evidentialism, implying that justified belief in G o d must rest on (perhaps fallible) evidence, but not necessarily

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prepositional evidence, that indicates the reality of G o d . (Unfortunately, however, "evidentialism" seems to be a dirty w o r d in Plantinga's vocabulary.) Determinate nonpropositional experience, for instance, can supply relevant evidence in connection with theism. (The idea of nonpropositional evidence in general is developed in Moser 1989.) More specifically, various N e w Testament writers promise morally transforming evidence to genuine seekers after G o d , and because this promised evidence is a definite indicator of the reality of a perfectly loving G o d , it manifests G o d ' s perfectly loving character. That is, this evidence includes and exhibits G o d ' s profound unselfish love (agape), even for G o d ' s enemies. Accordingly, Paul remarks that hope in G o d does not disappoint us (cognitively or otherwise) "because G o d ' s love has been poured out in our hearts" by G o d ' s Spirit (Rom. 5:5; cf. 2 Cor. 5 : 1 6 - 1 7 ; see also 1 John 4 : 1 2 - 1 3 , 1 6 , 1 9 ) . The presence of G o d ' s morally transforming love, it is arguable, can serve as a nonpropositional cognitive foundation for h u m a n knowledge of G o d ' s reality (see, for instance, Col. 2:2, 1 Cor. 8:2-3, Eph. 3 : 1 7 - 1 9 . ) In that capacity, it is real nonpropositional evidence of G o d ' s reality and presence. Such morally transforming love from G o d can produce (noncoercively) a loving character in willing people, despite their obstruction at times. This transformation happens to one, in part, and thus is neither purely self-made nor simply the byproduct of a self-help strategy. This w i d e l y neglected supernatural evidence and sign w o u l d be available at G o d ' s appointed time to anyone w h o is receptive toward G o d with due moral seriousness. Such an approach can illuminate these otherwise puzzling remarks: "We know that w e h a v e passed from death to life because w e love one another Whoever does not love does not k n o w G o d , for G o d is l o v e " (1 John 3 : 1 4 , 4:8, N R S V ) . This approach confirms that one's theistic belief need not be based on an argument or a proposition, even though it (cognitively) should be based on supporting evidence.

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G i v e n the suggested approach to nonpropositional evidence, humans w o u l d need to learn h o w to apprehend, and to be apprehended by, G o d ' s unselfish love, not just truths about G o d ' s love. Neither G o d nor G o d ' s love, of course, is a proposition or an argument, and neither is reducible to a purely intellectual entity. The (personifying) evidence of G o d ' s reality offered b y character-transformation toward unselfish love in willing people goes much deeper than the comparatively superficial evidence proposed in, for example, visions, ecstatic experiences, and fancy philosophical arguments. We consistently could dismiss any such proposed evidence as illusory or inconclusive, given certain alterations in our beliefs. In contrast, genuine character transformation toward G o d ' s unselfish love does not admit of convenient dismissal, because it bears directly on w h o one really is, or has become, including the morally relevant kind of person one actually is, or has become. Such transformation, in any case, cuts too deeply against our natural selfish tendencies to qualify as just a self-help ploy. A s a result, it arguably offers a kind of firm nonpropositional evidence that resists quick dismissal and offers a basis for theistic belief. (Chapter 4 returns to this topic in connection with personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality; see also Moser 2008.) Plantinga's epistemology must answer this question: w h e n exactly does an experience that occasions a belief yield warrant for that belief, and w h e n not? Obviously, not all experiences that occasion a belief yield warrant for that belief; an experience can prompt an unwarranted belief under certain circumstances. Plantinga's answer, as suggested previously, invokes a feature of the cognitive faculty that yields the belief in question. According to Plantinga, that faculty must function properly in a hospitable cognitive environment according to G o d ' s design plan that is directed at truth. This v i e w leads Plantinga to argue that agnosticism and naturalism about h u m a n origins lead to the destruction of k n o w l e d g e (2000, p p . 222-40). N o w , given

i 8 3

THE EVIDENCE FOR G O D

the role Plantinga assigns to cognitive faculties and G o d ' s design plan in warrant, his conclusion is not a far reach. Let's suppose, however, that one dissents from that role assigned b y Plantinga. What considerations can Plantinga then offer, given his argument-indifferent fideism? Assuming agnosticism for the sake of argument, Plantinga claims that " . . . because I n o w d o not believe that m y cognitive faculties are r e l i a b l e . . . , I also realize t h a t . . . beliefs produced b y m y faculties are no more likely to be true than false" (2000, p. 238). This inference, however, is too quick. One might h a v e an undefeated truth indicator (say, an auditory experience of the RoiTan cigar song, in the absence of conflicting experiences or beliefs) for a perceptual belief (that the RoiTan cigar song is being sung), even if one lacks actual reliability and even supposed reliability in one's cognitive faculty of hearing. The undefeated evidence for a belief need not derive from the general reliability of the faculty producing that belief. General unreliability in a belief-producing faculty, such as an auditory faculty, is perfectly compatible with one's having an impeccable, or undefeated, truth indicator (or evidence) in a particular case of belief formation, such as an auditory belief. A generally unreliable microphone, for instance, can deliver crystal-clear, faultless singing in some cases, as seasoned singers will testify. It follows, then, that undefeated truth indicators (for example, even from nonpropositional experience) can justify a belief without general reliability in the faculty yielding the belief. In addition, defeaters of evidence are not generated by mere beliefs (in the w a y suggested by Plantinga 2000, p. 485). Mere belief, even if aimed at truth, can be epistemically and alethically bankrupt and hence incapable of defeating evidence. These considerations about evidence and defeat should raise doubts about Plantinga's v i e w that agnosticism and naturalism about h u m a n origins lead to the destruction of human knowledge.

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Although w e should grant that Christian belief is not a l w a y s formed on the basis of an argument, one m u s t still explain the grounds on which Christian belief is to be recommended as true. Otherwise, one will be left with recommendation fideism - that is, fideism about recommending a belief, or (equivalently) w h a t I have called "argument-indifferent fideism." Plantinga suggests that traditional theists lack reason to doubt that our cognitive faculties are designed to produce true beliefs. If, however, one doubts that our cognitive faculties yield truth, then, according to Plantinga, " y o u can't quell that doubt by producing an argument about G o d and his veracity, or indeed, any argument at all; for the argument, of course, will be under as m u c h suspicion as its source. Here no argument will help y o u ; here salvation will h a v e to be b y grace, not b y w o r k s " (1993, p. 237). According to Plantinga, traditional theists remain unscathed here because they are not inclined to doubt the reliability of our cognitive faculties. Regardless of w h a t traditional theists are actually inclined to doubt, one must ask whether, and if so how, they can justify, or trustworthily commend, the assumption that their cognitive faculties have been designed b y G o d to be reliable. E v e n if salvation here is b y grace rather than by w o r k s , m a n y people seeking redemption w o u l d like to justify, in some definite and trustworthy way, that the divine redeeming grace proclaimed b y Plantinga is genuine rather than spurious or illusory. One does not have to be a friend of skepticism in general to h a v e this common aspiration. Instead, one might simply aim to "test the spirits to see whether they are from G o d , because m a n y false prophets h a v e gone out into the w o r l d " (1 John 4:1). M a n y false prophets indeed have gone out and, therefore, any responsible inquirer will seek a discriminating standard. Various and sundry (incompatible) philosophical a n d religious positions lay claim to authority on h u m a n s , and w e need some w a y to distinguish the w h e a t from the tares, even

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if the t w o are allowed to g r o w together for a while. Plantinga has given us no reason to receive as genuine, rather than illusory, the divine epistemological grace he proclaims. H e has left unanswered w h a t exactly can trustworthily comm e n d his message of alleged divine grace, including cognitive grace, to the multitudes. Personal intuitions about warrant and proper function seem to figure prominently in his account, but, notoriously, such intuitions v a r y among philosophers, even among contemporary epistemologists. The real problem is Plantinga's view, amounting to argument-indifferent fideism, that belief in G o d can be perfectly rational even if there is no cogent argument whatever for the existence of G o d (1983, p. 65). A s acknowledged previously, an individual believer need not base her theistic belief on an argument (given a role for nonpropositional supporting evidence), but one still could formulate an argument that identifies the needed trustworthy truth indicator and the w a y it supports belief in G o d (see the previous argument 1 - 4 and the refined argument in Chapter 4). More generally, w h e n e v e r there is a trustworthy truth indicator for a belief, one can construct, in principle, an argument that identifies the truth indicator as support and represents the justificatory relation that enables the truth indicator to confer justification on the belief in question. If one cannot construct, in principle, such an argument, then something is suspect or missing in the alleged case of rational belief. Argument-indifferent fideism suffers from the problem this chapter identified for fideism in general: it robs theism of a needed cognitive basis for trustworthy commendation as true. It thus treats the predicament of the wilderness parable in the Introduction as though an adopted path in Hells C a n y o n need not be trustworthily commended as accurate or safe. This approach smacks of a kind of cognitive arbitrariness in the area of commendation, because it manifests argument indifference in this area where m a n y find a genuine cognitive need for trustworthy argument. Chapter 4

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recruits some considerations about best explanation in evidence to show that w e can actually do much better than fideism of any stripe. We must continue our search for a trustworthy evidential basis for theistic belief. If w e cannot find such a basis, w e should opt for agnosticism (or perhaps even atheism) rather than for fideism. If our evidence for theistic belief is ultimately untrustworthy, then agnosticism will serve at least to make us face the music about this fact. Fideism, w e h a v e seen, mutes this music in a w a y that obscures the need of faith in G o d for trustworthy support and commendation. We turn n o w to the question of whether natural theology can satisfy this important need. We shall see that natural theology faces a major problem of its o w n in this connection: namely, the problem of divine elusiveness.

3

Natural Theology and God

"Intellectual acuteness cannot discover the things of God, and the man who assumes that it can, will only be misled." - John Oman 1928, p. 71. The astonishing G o d acknowledged b y J e w s and Christians is not static but is dynamic, interactive, and elusive in selfrevelation. In particular, this G o d reveals himself to some people at times but also hides himself from some people at times. A s a result, this G o d is cognitively elusive; that is, the available evidence for this G o d ' s reality typically escapes h u m a n control, even regarding its reproducibility. In addition, the claim that this G o d exists is not obviously true or even beyond reasonable, or well-grounded, doubt (in any familiar sense) for all capable mature inquirers. Let's think of the G o d in question as "the living G o d " in virtue of this G o d ' s being personally interactive with some agents, and cognitively nimble and dynamic rather than cognitively inflexible or static. We should not confuse this G o d , then, with an immutable Platonic form or any other kind of abstract entity or nonpersonal principle. This G o d , more specifically, is reportedly elusive for good reasons that is, for reasonable divine purposes that fit with G o d ' s unique character of being w o r t h y of worship and thus being morally perfect. Accordingly, w e should expect any evidence of G o d ' s existence for humans to be purposively 142

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available to humans - that is, available to h u m a n s in a w a y that conforms to G o d ' s character and perfectly good purposes for them. If one of G o d ' s main purposes is to elicit noncoerced h u m a n faith or trust in God, then G o d m a y seek to be, himself, the conclusive (objective) cognitive ground for h u m a n commitment to G o d ' s reality. That w o u l d be to unify the ultimate ground and the object of the desired h u m a n faith, in a manner that preserves G o d ' s cognitive centrality. In that case, G o d w o u l d reveal G o d ' s presence directly to willing humans, for the sake of their becoming personifying revelatory evidence of G o d . Part of G o d ' s cognitive aim w o u l d be to h a v e willing humans become agents w h o receive and reflect G o d ' s moral character and thereby bring G o d ' s presence (rather than just theological information) near for others. The general idea is suggested in Paul's Corinthian correspondence, where he suggests that, through willing h u m a n s themselves, G o d disseminates knowledge of G o d to others, and that the Corinthians themselves are epistles, or letters, that establish the authenticity of Paul's divine G o o d N e w s message (see 2 Cor. 2:14, 3:1-6; cf. 2 Cor. 4:2). This chapter identifies some significant consequences of such personifying evidence and divine elusiveness for natural theology in particular and for theistic epistemology and philosophy in general.

1.

A LIVING

GOD

If the living G o d of Jewish and Christian theism actually exists, then this G o d is worthy of worship. That is, this G o d w o u l d merit worship b y all created persons w h o are capable of worshipping G o d . In addition, an agent w o u l d merit w o r s h i p only if that agent is morally perfect - that is, morally good and altogether free of any moral defect. Of course, people can worship all manner of things, even to their o w n detriment, but an agent truly w o r t h y of w o r ship must be above reproach or defect of any moral kind.

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G o d therefore must be perfectly loving toward all persons, including resolute enemies of G o d , even while hating evil attitudes and actions. If an agent failed to be perfectly loving toward other persons, then that agent w o u l d suffer a moral deficiency, and thus w o u l d fail to qualify for the maximally honorific title " G o d . " Failing to love even one enemy, including a particularly cruel and repulsive enemy, w o u l d entail moral imperfection and therefore disqualify one from being G o d . The requirement of being perfectly loving toward all persons sets a demanding moral standard for G o d , in keeping with Jesus's Sermon on the Mount (see Matt. 5:43-8; cf. L u k e 6:27-36). In particular, it requires that G o d seek not only w h a t is good but also w h a t is best, all things considered, for all persons and thus w h a t is morally best for them. If an agent aimed just for something less than w h a t is best for a person, then that agent w o u l d be able to seek, alternatively, something even better for that person. A s a result, that agent w o u l d not be perfectly loving toward that person. Being perfectly loving toward others, then, is intentionally active in virtue of seeking what is best, all things considered, for others, even for others w h o are one's enemies. Accordingly, such seeking aims for a certain kind of moral transformation in those persons w h o suffer moral deficiencies, such as selfishness and pride, and this transformation w o u l d include a m o v e a w a y from moral defects and toward what is morally best for them. In seeking moral transformation of humans, from spiritual death to n e w life, G o d w o u l d seek cooperative fellowship with them that includes their obeying G o d , because such fellowship w o u l d be morally best for them. Cooperative h u m a n fellowship with G o d w o u l d enhance the moral depth and well-being of humans, o w i n g to the purifying influence of G o d ' s morally perfect character. More specifically, G o d w o u l d seek to empower, without coercion, a moral transformation a w a y from h u m a n selfishness and toward h u m a n unselfish love for all people, for the sake of

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w h a t is morally best for humans. Such empowerment w o u l d ideally supply, among other things, morally good motives in h u m a n interaction with all people. It therefore w o u l d deliver needed moral correction and strength to humans. In addition, it w o u l d enable humans to receive and to reflect G o d ' s powerful moral character for others, thereby becoming personifying revelatory evidence of G o d ' s reality. In this w a y , h u m a n s w o u l d bring G o d ' s presence near for others. In seeking to e m p o w e r h u m a n s without coercion, G o d w o u l d aim to interact with humans via calling them into the needed fellowship and transformation. This divine call w o u l d include an invitation to d r a w humans internally (as w e l l as behaviorally) a w a y from selfishness, and toward G o d ' s w a y of moral life in unselfish love. It w o u l d be a call on our lives, not just on our thoughts, and it w o u l d be a call for us to live agreeably with God, w h e r e b y w e share and reflect G o d ' s perfect moral character and thus become personifying evidence of G o d (cf. 1 Thess. 5 : 9 - 1 0 , 2 Pet. 1:4). We therefore should expect this call to emerge, not superficially but deeply, particularly via conscience, where humans can be changed and motivated profoundly, including morally. G o d , after all, w o u l d aim to engage humans profoundly rather than superficially, for their o w n good. The aim w o u l d be for humans to be willingly m o v e d and transformed b y merciful divine love, for the sake of realizing and manifesting such unselfish love in and toward all persons. Accordingly, willing h u m a n s w o u l d become reflections, and hence evidence, of the moral character of G o d . The importance of a divine call or invitation fits well with some of the parables told b y Jesus, including the parables of the great feast (see Matt. 2 2 : 2 - 1 4 , L u k e 1 4 : 1 6 - 2 4 ) , and w e find such a call at the v e r y start of Jesus's ministry, in his baptism and in his inaugural preaching of the G o o d N e w s regarding G o d ' s intervention in h u m a n history (see M a r k 1 : 1 1 , 1 4 - 1 5 ) . In addition, Jesus and his turbulent life, themselves, are offered b y various N e w Testament writers as part of G o d ' s redemptive call to humans. The apostle Paul,

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accordingly, refers to Christians as those w h o were " c a l l e d " b y G o d "into fellowship" (1 Cor. 1:9; cf. 1 Cor. 1:2, 26, 7 : 1 7 24, Rom. 1 : 6 - 7 , Eph. 1 : 1 8 - 1 9 ) . More generally, first-century Christians came to be referred to as the people "called o u t " (from bondage and death into n e w life) b y G o d - that is, as the ekklesia (or the church; see 1 Thess. 1 : 1 , Matt. 16:18). Emil Brunner puts the main point as follows: "To answer to the creative loving call of G o d with responsive love; this is the destiny for which m a n w a s created, and this call is the foundation of his being The [divine] call reaches us as the assurance which bestows u p o n us fellowship with G o d , and as the claim which calls us as G o d ' s possession to obedience [to G o d ] " (1962, p p . 328-9). In a similar vein, Ernst K a s e m a n n proposes: "That G o d has spoken to us, and does not cease to speak to us, is our only salvation; that w e allow this Word to be spoken to us and dare to live by it is our sanctification and justification" ( 1 9 7 1 , p. 93). Unfortunately, the central role of the divine call to humans has largely disappeared in contemporary theology and philosop h y of religion, to the detriment of accurately characterizing h u m a n experience of G o d . Divine gracious love w o u l d include a call, or an invitation, to humans that can be ignored only at the expense of distorting a key intended aim of such love: d i v i n e - h u m a n fellowship and n e w h u m a n life that include human obedience to G o d for the good of humans. A n urgent question, then, is whether humans are actually willing to be addressed b y G o d for this purpose. The focus here is not so much on a gift as on the divine gift-giver and the call of this personal agent to humans. A s K a s e m a n n remarks: " . . . every gift of G o d which has ceased to be seen as the presence of the Giver and has therefore lost its character as personal address [to h u m a n s ] , is grace misused and w o r k i n g to our destruction" ( 1 9 6 1 , p. 1 7 5 ) . Due attention to this insight w o u l d transform religious epistemology as well as theology. We shall identify some of the important results, including their connection with natural theology.

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A divine call to, and interaction with, h u m a n s w o u l d a i m for our transformation as conformation to G o d ' s moral character, which, according to the Christian message, is i m a g e d perfectly by Jesus. In particular, the aim w o u l d be to redirect our wills, without coercion, rather than just our m i n d s , thoughts, or emotions. Blaise Pascal w a s right on this important matter of divine self-revelation. A s he puts it: " G o d wishes to m o v e the w i l l . . . . Perfect clarity w o u l d help the mind and harm the will. H u m b l e their p r i d e " (Pensees, sec. 234, Krailsheimer edition). By insisting on the goals of one's o w n will, in conflict with G o d ' s will, one embraces pride a n d thus rejects a humble attitude toward G o d ' s will, even if one refuses to acknowledge the reality of G o d ' s will. A perfectly loving G o d w o u l d aim to challenge and transform any s u c h prideful will, for the sake of bringing it into the morally better state of cooperation with G o d ' s will of unselfish l o v e toward all persons. G o d ' s intended deflation of h u m a n pride w o u l d w o r k on a number of troubled h u m a n fronts, including the cognitive front. Paul's Corinthian correspondence takes u p the cognitive front, among others, in stating that " . . . in the w i s d o m of G o d , the w o r l d did not k n o w G o d through [its] w i s dom " (1 Cor. 1 : 2 1 , RSV). One must wonder, of course, h o w such a v i e w bears on so-called "natural theology," a n d w e will investigate this matter. The divine motive, according to Paul, is to " s h a m e " those w h o are wise, in the know, or otherwise strong by h u m a n standards, " s o that no h u m a n being might boast in the presence of G o d " (1 Cor. 1:29, RSV). Such divine deflation aims to unmask the w e a k n e s s of h u m a n authority and strength before G o d , and to s h o w that these h u m a n resources cannot give life in the face of death. We might think of this deflation as divine pollution control, or as an anticounterfeit program, including in the cognitive domain. A life-defining example of resistance to a prideful h u m a n will emerges from Jesus in Gethsemane. Despite h a v i n g acknowledged a divine call to offer u p his life to G o d in

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redemptive crucifixion for others, Jesus struggles in Gethsemane with the challenge of his impending torturous death. In particular, he prays to G o d that, if it w e r e possible, his crucifixion w o u l d be avoided. Mark's Gospel reports his prayer as " A b b a , Father, for y o u all things are possible; remove this cup from me; yet, not w h a t I w a n t , but w h a t y o u w a n t " (Mark 14:36, N R S V ) . Accordingly, Jesus submits his will to G o d ' s perfect will, in faithful obedience to G o d . This kind of "Gethsemane struggle" w o u l d effectively serve G o d ' s redemptive purpose to bring h u m a n wills into cooperation with G o d ' s life-giving will. Such cooperation w o u l d manifest h u m a n life as a God-given gift to be guided b y divine p o w e r rather than a humanly o w n e d possession to be guided just b y h u m a n power. Indeed, G o d ' s call to h u m a n s w o u l d include a call to enter into such a Gethsemane struggle at every opportunity, for the sake of ongoing h u m a n transformation toward G o d ' s will. The living G o d thereby w o u l d meet h u m a n s w h e r e they actually live: that is, in real settings m a d e for volitional struggle against h u m a n selfishness and pride. If some humans w o u l d agreeably receive G o d ' s self-revealing call in these settings, then G o d , as perfectly loving toward h u m a n s , w o u l d noncoercively extend such a call to them, at least at fitting times w h e n they are ready. We n o w can begin to m a k e some sense of the kind of revelatory evidence of divine reality available to humans. In particular, w e n o w can appreciate that divine self-revelation to humans w o u l d involve a divine call that includes a h u m a n experience of divine volitional confrontation. Accordingly, K a s e m a n n has remarked that " . . . G o d ' s p o w e r [in G o d ' s " W o r d " ] . . . speaks to us in love and judgment so that we experience the pressure of its will..." (1961, p p . 1 7 6 - 7 , italics added). More specifically, the p o w e r of G o d ' s call w o u l d include an I-Thou confrontation of h u m a n and divine personal wills that is inherently de re rather than merely p r e p o sitional, or merely de dicto. H.H. Farmer says of such a confrontation that "it is a relationship wherein the activity of

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one self-conscious, self-directing will is conditioned by that of another in such w i s e that each remains free" (1942, p. 26). The " p r e s s u r e " of G o d ' s will, then, w o u l d not be coercion of humans, but it w o u l d , nonetheless, be purposively available to h u m a n experience on G o d ' s terms, which involve volitional pressure. Such volitional p o w e r offered to us w o u l d be an opportunity for us to manifest G o d ' s p o w e r or, alternatively, to try to exclude G o d from his universe. We might think of all of h u m a n life as such a p o w e r transaction, from G o d for us or, alternatively, from us against G o d . A direct authoritative call from G o d to humans w o u l d seek to find acknowledgment and agreeable reception in h u m a n conscience, where people can experience deep conviction and m o v e toward cooperation with G o d ' s will and conformation to G o d ' s moral character. H u m a n yielding to such a call w o u l d enable G o d ' s presence to emerge noncoercively with increasing salience in a h u m a n life, and it w o u l d advance h u m a n transformation a w a y from selfishness and toward G o d ' s perfectly unselfish will. Accordingly, G o d w o u l d aim to use such d i v i n e - h u m a n volitional confrontation to bring about not only h u m a n volitional k n o w l e d g e of G o d and of G o d ' s presence but also h u m a n redemption, in fellowship and n e w life with G o d . H u m a n s themselves thereby w o u l d become living, personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality, o w i n g to their receiving and manifesting G o d ' s characteristic moral power, the same p o w e r that guided Jesus to demonstrate G o d ' s self-giving agape in Gethsemane and, even more vividly, on Calvary. The direct acquaintance of a h u m a n with G o d , in an I Thou volitional confrontation, w o u l d be different in kind from an argument, because such acquaintance does not require an inference of any sort. In addition, it w o u l d be irreducible to de dicto truths, given its ineliminable de re component, which is describable as "volitional pressure." E v e n so, h u m a n l y experienced acquaintance with G o d ' s call could serve as conclusive evidence of G o d ' s existence for a person, in the absence of defeaters that undermine

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such evidence. We could illustrate this with a case in which such experiential acquaintance with an evident divine call is best explained, relative to all available evidence, b y the proposition that G o d has actually intervened in that person's experience. Evidence is conclusive, let's say, if and only if it is sufficient to satisfy the justification condition for k n o w l e d g e , in a manner free of ultimate defeat. (Chapter 4 returns to the details of such an approach.) A longstanding myth in philosophy of religion, shrouded in dense intellectualist fog, is that epistemically justified belief that G o d exists must be based on a sound argument for G o d ' s existence. Sometimes this myth is coupled with the more widespread dark myth that evidence must consist of an argument. Of course, a proposition for which one argues must rest on an argument, but w e should not confuse either evidence or propositions supported by evidence with propositions for which one argues. Any truth indicator for a proposition qualifies as evidence, even if defeasible, for a proposition, and even nonjudgment and nonargument experiences can and d o qualify as such evidence. It is just an intellectualist and rationalist myth to assume otherwise, and much of traditional empiricism rightly challenges that myth. (See Moser 1989 for detailed opposition to that myth.) We need to avoid, in any case, a bias against evidence of divine reality that comes from the volitional pressure of a transcendent call and the resulting transformation of a willing human recipient w h o thereby becomes personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality. The divine call in question and its resulting nonargument evidence of G o d ' s reality are not volitionally static but instead are subject to variations regarding the presence of G o d ' s purposive good will. In particular, G o d can retract a divine intervention or call from a person w h e n doing so serves G o d ' s perfect will. In doing so, G o d w o u l d withhold from some humans the volitional pressure characteristic of such a call. This could be a case in which, to use Paul's language, G o d " g a v e them u p , " or "delivered them,"

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to their o w n self-destructive w a y s for corrective judgment (Rom. 1:24, 26, 28). This vital trait of the G o d of A b r a h a m , Isaac, Jacob, and Jesus entails a living G o d w h o is intentionally active in purportedly corrective love, including judgment, toward humans. Unlike static evidence, this p u r p o sive activity can include the w i t h d r a w a l of G o d ' s presence from a h u m a n , including the w i t h d r a w a l of occurrent evidence of divine reality. In particular, such activity can be sensitive to the direction of a h u m a n will relative to G o d ' s character and purposes. In keeping with the option of divine w i t h d r a w a l , Isaiah 45:15 announces: "Truly, y o u are a G o d w h o hides himself, 0 G o d of Israel, the Savior." Unlike static idols, G o d is purposive, and evidence of divine reality follows suit, as Isaiah 4 6 : 1 1 suggests: " I h a v e spoken, and I will bring it to pass; 1 h a v e purposed, and I will do it" (NRSV). The message of purposeful divine hiding and seeking is reiterated in m a n y of the N e w Testament writings, including in the teaching of Jesus and of Paul (see, for instance, Matt. 1 1 1 2 5 - 7 / / L u k e 1 0 : 2 1 - 2 , 1 Cor. 2:7-10). This message implies that the presence and the corresponding occurrent evidence of G o d ' s call to h u m a n s are divinely retractable given, for instance, willful h u m a n resistance to G o d . A s a result, such evidence is experientially and thus personally variable in w a y s that allow for divine elusiveness and even hiddenness at times regarding divine purposes and divine existence. Natural theology, w e shall see, fails to accommodate such distinctive personally interactive evidence of G o d ' s existence. Our talk of divine hiddenness, as suggested in Chapter 2, will signify a case in which G o d ' s existence is not beyond reasonable doubt for a reasonable person.

2.

W H I T H E R

NATURAL

THEOLOGY?

The arguments of natural theology for G o d ' s existence, in a priori and a posteriori forms, h a v e been highly, if surprisingly, influential in m a n y quarters and eras. They include

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various ontological, contingency, cosmological, teleological, moral, and psychological arguments, among others, and the accompanying detail and sophistication can be Ptolemaic in spirit as w e l l as breathtaking. Characterized generally, these arguments seek to establish, or at least confirm, G o d ' s existence on the basis of natural sources of h u m a n k n o w l e d g e , without an appeal to any special revelation from G o d . Lacking that exclusion of special revelation, they arguably w o u l d qualify as arguments of supernatural theology rather than natural theology. In any case, to establish the existence of God, properly speaking, the arguments need to establish the existence of a personal agent who is worthy of worship and is thus morally perfect and hence perfectly loving toward all persons. This, of course, is a tall order, and none of the arguments of natural theology enjoys widespread support as having actually filled this particular order. In effect, the history of natural theology has been the history of attempting to secure k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s reality without acknowledging evidence of G o d ' s authoritative call to humans. We should address the reasons w h y this misleading but w i d e l y influential attempt has failed, does fail, and will fail. In general, the familiar a posteriori arguments confirm at most the existence of causes just adequate (and not b e y o n d just adequate) to yield their favored properties: perceived order or fine-tuning in nature, observed causal chains of contingent events, moral duties binding on humans, h u m a n self-reflective consciousness, and so on. The inferred justadequate causes, however, clearly fall short of establishing or confirming the real moral character of a personal agent w o r t h y of w o r s h i p , w h o has perfect love toward enemies. Some natural theologians candidly h a v e admitted as much, but they h a v e then retreated, for various reasons, to arguments for something inferior to G o d as a personal agent w o r t h y of worship. Even so, if the d e m a n d e d conclusion is to yield a personal G o d w o r t h y of w o r s h i p , w h o seeks fellowship with humans on divine terms, then the familiar

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a posteriori arguments fail to deliver, either individually or collectively. Consider, b y w a y of example, Aquinas's cosmological argument (in the Summa Theologica, I, q.2, a.3) that first identifies an order of efficient causation in the sensory w o r l d , then observes that nothing is either the efficient cause of itself or part of an infinite causal chain, and finally concludes that it is necessary to acknowledge " a first efficient cause, which everyone gives the name of God." Just for the sake of argument, w e n o w can grant Aquinas's inference that there is a first efficient cause, despite the endless flurry of philosophical controversy raised by this inference. A decisive problem is this: the inference gives us, at most, a first cause just adequate (and not b e y o n d just adequate) for the observed causal chains in the sensory world. Clearly, however, this first cause falls far short of a living personal G o d w o r t h y of worship w h o seeks fellowship with receptive humans. We h a v e no good reason, for instance, to ascribe moral perfection to the inferred first cause. In addition, it is doubtful that w e h a v e good grounds to ascribe fellowship-seeking personal agency to this just-adequate first cause. At least it is not obvious that such personal agency is required to accommodate the pertinent sensory data regarding causal chains. Those data offer no definite indication at all, de re or otherwise, of a personal agent, let alone a personal agent worthy of worship. It is just special pleading for Aquinas to refer to " a first efficient cause, which everyone gives the name of God." (A similarly dubious reference to G o d occurs in the corresponding argument in A q u i n a s ' s earlier Summa Contra Gentiles.) Certainly, skeptics will balk at that reference to G o d , and w e should too, given the exalted demands of morally perfect personal agency for satisfying the title " G o d . " If the conclusion of an argument does not include the existence of a morally perfect intentional agent, then that argument does not establish or e v e n confirm that God exists, whatever else it establishes or confirms. M u c h natural theology runs afoul of

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this simple fact, even w h e n inductive inference is acknowledged as justifiable. We should acknowledge an equally serious, but typically overlooked, problem for natural theology that stems from the elusiveness of the J e w i s h and Christian G o d . Consider Aquinas's evidence consisting of efficient causation in the sensory world. That empirical evidence is static in a w a y that occurrent evidence of the presence and the reality of the Jewish and Christian G o d is not. In particular, Aquinas's evidence involving efficient causation is not variable relative to the volitional tendencies of h u m a n agents toward G o d and G o d ' s will. A s a result, A q u i n a s ' s evidence in question fails to accommodate the personally interactive character of G o d ' s self-revelation that emerges from G o d ' s intermittent hiding and seeking relative to humans and their volitional tendencies. In other w o r d s , G o d ' s self-revelation, given its transformative redemptive aim for humans, should be expected to be personally interactive, variable, and intermittent in w a y s that mere efficient causation in the sensory w o r l d is not. A s a result, Aquinas's proposed evidence in the cosmological argument is not suited to the cognitively nimble and personally dynamic G o d of J e w i s h and Christian theism. Similar problems confront other familiar natural theological arguments that rely on sensory observation, including Aquinas's teleological arguments in the Summa Theologica (I, q.2, a.3) and in the Summa Contra Gentiles (I, Chapter 1 3 , Section 35). A g a i n , the just-adequate cause in question (say, of certain complex structures in nature) does not deliver the morally perfect Jewish and Christian G o d w h o is a personal agent w o r t h y of worship. A s a result, Aquinas had no adequate ground in natural theology for ascribing the title " G o d " to his alleged designer. Likewise, more recent variations on A q u i n a s ' s teleological argument, h o w e v e r elaborate, cannot escape this problem while remaining within natural theology and stopping short of special supernatural revelation. Grounded ascription of the exalted title " G o d "

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to an agent requires evidence of a morally perfect personal agent w h o calls receptive humans to fellowship with himself. In addition, a n y attempt to extend natural theology to include a h u m a n l y experienced divine call (perhaps in a robust argument from moral obligation) will m o v e b e y o n d natural theology proper to supernatural theology. Teleological arguments cannot avoid the aforementioned problem of divine elusiveness that challenges A q u i n a s ' s cosmological argument. A q u i n a s ' s evidence, consisting of certain complex structures in nature, is static in a w a y that occurrent evidence of the presence and the reality of the J e w i s h a n d Christian G o d is not. Specifically, A q u i n a s ' s evidence from complex structures in nature is not personally variable relative to the wills of h u m a n agents toward G o d ' s will. A s a result, Aquinas's evidence does not fit with G o d ' s personally interactive hiding and seeking relative to humans for the sake of their transformation. G o d ' s selfrevelation, aiming at transforming humans morally, w o u l d be personally variable and interactive in w a y s that mere complex structures in nature are not. This means that the evidence offered in A q u i n a s ' s teleological argument does not line u p with the personally and cognitively dynamic J e w i s h a n d Christian G o d w h o seeks h u m a n transformation toward G o d ' s moral character. Ontological arguments m a y appear, at first blush, to offer the needed hope for natural theology. They m o v e a priori from a concept of a perfect being to the actual existence of such a being, on the ground that without the actual existence of its represented object such a concept w o u l d not genuinely be that of a truly perfect being. The lack of existence in the represented object allegedly robs the concept of genuinely being a concept of a perfect object. A s a result, an ontological argument m a y seem to fill the tall order at hand. Perhaps, in particular, such an argument underwrites the existence of a being worthy of worship rather than a being just adequate to yield some empirical, moral, or psychological feature of the w o r l d . Some doubts, however, arise immediately.

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We need to distinguish between (a) an existence-affirming concept of a perfect being and (b) an existence-guaranteeing concept of a perfect being. A n existence-affirming concept of a perfect being includes (if only b y implication) either correct or incorrect affirmation of the existence of that being; the concept does not, b y itself, guarantee the existence of that being. One could h a v e the concept even though the conceptualized perfect being does not exist; analogously, a conceptualized perfect unicorn need not exist. In contrast, an existence-guaranteeing concept of a perfect being w o u l d logically exclude incorrect affirmation of the existence of that being (at least in any w o r l d where the concept exists), in virtue of guaranteeing the existence of that being. A concept of a perfect being can, and typically does, affirm (if only b y implication) the existence of that being, but this affirming m a y be erroneous and, in that case, the concept is misleading in w h a t it affirms (if only b y implication). S u p p o s e , as is typically the case, that an ontological argument includes an existence-affirming concept of a perfect being. We then must ask whether its (implied) affirmation of the existence of the perfect being is correct rather than incorrect. More specifically, w e must ask whether reality is such that it actually includes the perfect being in question. Perhaps reality does not include a perfect being, despite the concept's (implied) affirmation to the contrary. In other w o r d s , an existence-affirming concept of a perfect being will not, b y itself, settle the issue of whether G o d actually exists. We cannot find here, then, a logically conclusive m o v e from a concept of a perfect object to its existence, even if the existence of a perfect object is affirmed. A n existence-guaranteeing concept m a y seem able to save the day, but w e should have some real doubts on reflection. Suppose, as is usually the case, that an ontological argument includes an alleged existence-guaranteeing concept of a perfect being, on the ground that if the concept's represented object fails to exist, then the concept is not genuinely that of a •perfect object. We then need to ask whether w e actually h a v e

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a genuine concept of a perfect being that guarantees the existence of a perfect being. More specifically, w e m u s t inquire whether, necessarily, given the concept, reality is such that it includes a perfect being. We need to ask, in this connection, whether the concept in question is actually existenceaffirming but not existence-guaranteeing regarding a perfect being. We readily can grant that the concept is existenceaffirming, but this, of course, leaves open the question of whether a perfect being actually exists. Clearly, it w o u l d be question b e g g i n g s i m p l y to assume that the concept's affirmation of the existence of a perfect being is correct just b y virtue of the affirmation. We m a y have a concept that is incorrect in its affirmation of the existence of a perfect being, even if that affirmation is essential to the concept. In that case, one might say, w e h a v e a concept of a perfect being without a corresponding real object. A similar concept-object disconnect threatens a n y alleged existence-guaranteeing concept of a perfect being. We therefore m a y not h a v e the alleged existence-guaranteeing concept after all. It is not automatic that w e actually h a v e a concept of a perfect divine being that guarantees, b e y o n d simply affirming, the existence of that being. It n o w w o u l d be question begging, furthermore, to construe the use of the w o r d "of" in the phrase "concept of a perfect b e i n g " as de re, as though it actually denotes a perfect being. (Perhaps Anselm fell prey to that serious mistake, g i v e n a certain Platonic v i e w of meaning as naming; for relevant discussion, see McGill 1967.) In any case, an alleged existence-guaranteeing concept of a perfect being, by itself, therefore w i l l not settle the issue of whether G o d exists. Reality, including the reality of a perfect divine being, is not guaranteed b y a concept in the manner suggested. Ontological arguments d o not fare w e l l against the aforementioned problem arising from divine elusiveness that challenges A q u i n a s ' s cosmological and teleological arguments. The evidence consisting of the content of a concept of G o d , as offered in ontological arguments, is static in a

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w a y that the personally interactive occurrent evidence of the presence and the reality of the J e w i s h and Christian G o d is not. In particular, the evidence consisting of the content of a concept of G o d is not personally variable relative to the wills of h u m a n s toward G o d and G o d ' s will. A s a result, the evidence offered in ontological arguments fails to fit with the personally interactive divine self-revelation that involves G o d ' s intermittent hiding and seeking relative to humans. G o d ' s self-revelation w o u l d aim at the transformation of h u m a n s toward G o d ' s moral character, and therefore w o u l d be personally variable and interactive in w a y s that the content of a concept of G o d is not. This means that the evidence offered in ontological arguments is at odds with the personally and cognitively dynamic G o d of J e w i s h and Christian theism. In the end, then, ontological arguments do not save the d a y for natural theology. The aforementioned arguments of natural theology share a debilitating flaw. They offer no evidence whatever of a divine call to humans that includes h u m a n de re confrontation (via volitional pressure) with a living perfect will, and, accordingly, they offer no evidence of human de re confrontation with a living personal G o d w h o is worthy of worship and seeks fellowship with humans. Even ontological arguments fail on this score, and this w o u l d be so even if (contrary to w h a t is the case) there w e r e a nonquestionbegging inference from a concept of a perfect agent to a perfect agent worthy of worship. The relevant d i v i n e - h u m a n volitional confrontation involves an authoritative divine call for a human to commit to undergo moral transformation by w a y of response to a divine offer of fellowship. The arguments of natural theology, in contrast, lack evidence of an authoritative divine call for a h u m a n to commit to undergo such a transformation toward G o d ' s perfect will. A s a result, whatever the arguments of natural theology actually confirm, they d o not yield conclusive evidence of a volitionally interactive personal G o d w h o is w o r t h y of worship and seeks fellowship with humans.

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Omitting evidence of a volitionally interactive personal G o d , the arguments of natural theology instead offer volitionally static evidence that, with regard to its content, is independent of authoritative evidence of a divine personal call to a human. The arguments therefore offer, at best, evidence for mere spectators. In particular, the volitionally static evidence of natural theology is insensitive to the direction of a h u m a n will relative to G o d and G o d ' s will. M o r e specifically, such evidence does not increase or decrease relative to the orientation of a h u m a n will toward G o d ' s perfect will. A s a result, the evidence of natural theology does not provide for the kind of personally dynamic evidential variability, noted previously, that is central to some divine hiding from some humans. In particular, it neglects the personally variable but characteristic divine activity in which G o d intentionally hides and seeks in interaction w i t h humans for the sake of divine redemptive purposes. Such hiding and seeking intend to challenge and transform h u m a n s toward G o d ' s perfect will and thereby to lead humans in fellowship and n e w life with G o d as Lord. The evidence offered b y natural theology, in contrast, is volitionally casual a n d ineffectual relative to G o d ' s morally perfect authoritative will. The decisive failure of natural theology is just this: conclusive evidence for a personal G o d w h o , in virtue of being worthy of worship and thus perfectly loving, calls and hides from people at different times must involve an evident divine call in its content. Otherwise, an undermining defeater will emerge from the absence of such a call, given this true (and, I submit, justified) conditional: if there is a perfectly loving G o d , then this G o d w o u l d call receptive people at opportune times into d i v i n e - h u m a n fellowship and n e w life with G o d for their o w n good. Natural theology, being d e v o i d of such evidence of a divine call, thus falls short of conclusive evidence of G o d ' s existence. If, h o w ever, one has conclusive evidence of a divine call to h u m a n s , then the arguments of natural theology will be epistemically

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unnecessary, even if some people find those arguments to be helpful in various nonepistemic w a y s , such as psychological or aesthetic w a y s . A s a result, the kind of philosophy-totheology sequence familiar from Aquinas and other natural theologians ultimately fails. A perfectly loving G o d w o u l d h a v e no cognitive need of this sequence, because such a G o d w o u l d seek to be, himself, the (objective) cognitive ground of human belief in G o d ' s reality, thus unifying the object and the (objective) cognitive ground of h u m a n faith in G o d . We should expect a perfectly loving G o d , as suggested previously, to call willing humans to become personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality for the sake of bringing G o d ' s presence near for others. Natural theology offers no evidence to accommodate such a call that w o u l d be characteristic of G o d , and it therefore is irrelevant at best and misleading at worst. A divine call to us to become, ourselves, revelatory evidence of G o d is morally loaded in its d e m a n d , but the arguments of natural theology are not morally loaded at all in this respect. A s a result, they fail to point to a personal G o d worthy of worship. According to the Christian message, G o d ' s moral character is imaged perfectly in the evidence representing w h o Jesus Christ is as an intentional agent with definite demands and goals from G o d himself. In this message, G o d did not send humans just additional information or more l a w s or arguments. Instead, G o d sent revelatory personifying evidence in Jesus, and in the followers of Jesus w h o are being conformed to his self-giving moral image. John's Gospel therefore portrays Jesus as saying that people will k n o w his disciples by the intentional agape they manifest in themselves for one another, after the pattern of Jesus's agape (13:35). (A related cognitive role for agape is found in 1 John 4 : 7 - 1 6 and in Paul's undisputed letters, for instance in Romans 5:3-8 and 1 Corinthians 2 : 1 - 1 3 ; - G o r m a n 2001, Chapter 8, 2009, Chapter 2, Moser 2008, Chapter 3.) Some philosophers and theologians seek to recruit the apostle Paul as an advocate of natural theology given his c r

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remarks in Romans 1 : 1 9 - 2 0 . Attention to the details of his remarks, however, discloses that he does not propose that nature alone reveals divine reality. Rather, he explicitly claims that " G o d has manifested" divine reality to people (see R o m . 1 : 1 9 ) , even if through nature (which is not to be confused with a claim about "through nature alone"). Paul could have claimed that nature by itself manifests G o d ' s reality, but he definitely does not. We also can benefit from a simple distinction between G o d ' s being revealed "through nature" and G o d ' s being revealed "in nature by itself." A s Hendrikus Berkhof observes, " N a t u r e in itself does not reveal G o d . H e reveals Himself in history through his w o r d s and d e e d s " (1968, p. 52). A simple analogy illustrates the point: w h e n I call m y mother on the phone, the phone is not evidence of m y existence for m y mother; m y voice, however, could s u p p l y such evidence for her. In other w o r d s , m y existence is not revealed in the phone b y itself, but it can be revealed through the phone as I speak to her. G i v e n an intention to redeem us, a perfectly loving G o d w o u l d have a definite purpose different from our casually knowing, via spectator evidence, that G o d exists - namely, the purpose of bringing humans into lasting reconciliation with G o d , in loving and obedient fellowship with G o d . We therefore should expect G o d to offer purposively available evidence of G o d ' s reality that advances this redemptive purpose. It is doubtful that the spectator evidence of natural theology serves such a purpose, because such evidence does not engage us with a challenge to our w a y w a r d tendencies that need redemption. What about people altogether unreceptive to G o d ' s call? Might the arguments of natural theology serve such people? The answer depends, of course, on w h a t it is to serve such people. We h a v e seen good reasons to doubt that the arguments of natural theology deliver adequate evidence of a personal G o d w o r t h y of w o r s h i p , even if they deliver evidence of the reality of some lesser causal powers. Such evidence of lesser causal p o w e r s can figure, of course, in

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combinations with other kinds of evidence, and even benefit a person in that relatively modest connection. Even so, w e should not lose sight of the kind of evidence needed for conclusive belief in a personal G o d worthy of worship. Such evidence w o u l d include a divine call to receptive persons, and w o u l d be sensitive, in terms of its depth and salience, to one's willingness to obey G o d ' s call toward h u m a n moral transformation in a Gethsemane struggle. Natural theology leaves us altogether empty-handed on this life-or-death front. Accordingly, it is cognitively beside the point, if the point is (the redemptive purpose of) a personal G o d worthy of worship. Some philosophers will seek refuge in the claim that some arguments of natural theology are at least "confirmatory" of theism even if they fail to supply conclusive evidence of G o d ' s existence. The general idea is that some of the arguments in question raise the probability of theism to some extent even if they d o not settle the question of whether theism is true. Two obstacles merit comment. First, the arguments of natural theology will not be confirmatory of theism if they do not confirm to some extent that a personal agent worthy of worship exists. We have seen some reason to doubt that the relevant confirmation concerns a personal agent worthy of w o r s h i p , even if there is some confirmation that a lesser being exists. Second, the proposed standard for evidence being "confirmatory" must avoid being question begging regarding the alleged significant role of a personal agent worthy of w o r s h i p , but this, as suggested, is no small task. (For elaboration on a version of the latter problem, in connection with fine-tuning arguments, see C o l y v a n , Garfield, and Priest 2005.) M y case against natural theology relies on an understanding of the title " G o d " in terms of a personal agent worthy of worship. Someone might w o n d e r whether this case itself is a variation on natural theology Actually, it is not because it does not offer, on the basis of natural sources of k n o w l e d g e , an inference to the existence of a supernatural being. M y

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case relies on a notion of G o d , as a personal agent w o r t h y of w o r s h i p , but this notion does not figure in an a r g u m e n t for G o d ' s existence from natural sources of information. A s a result, w e do not need to rely on natural theology to challenge natural theology.

3.

NATURAL

THEOLOGY

AFTER

D A R W I N

We should ask h o w natural theology, particularly its teleological argument, fares in the w a k e of Charles D a r w i n . In 1 8 7 2 , D a r w i n turned the discipline of biology upside d o w n , with the publication of The Origin of Species. The disciplines of philosophy and theology, a m o n g m a n y others, likewise h a v e not been quite the same since. D a r w i n combined random variation (or mutation) and natural selection (or, more accurately, natural destruction) to explain h o w biological life, including h u m a n biological life, has d e v e l o p e d since its origin. The origin of species, he contended, can be explained in terms of the twofold mechanism of mutation and natural selection. This mechanism is natural in that it belongs to the domain of physical space-time and physical causal relations. A s suggested in Chapter 1 , the fallout of D a r w i n i s m for philosophy and theology is far-reaching b y any standard if it includes Fodor's "true scientific v i s i o n " of reality. What h a p pens in Darwin's aftermath to the s u p p o s e d role of purpose in h u m a n life? What happens, in other w o r d s , to the a s s u m e d distinctiveness of intentional h u m a n life? What h a p p e n s , in addition, to the presumed role of God in purposefully originating and sustaining h u m a n life? The general a n s w e r on all fronts is: v e r y much happens. A n y m o v e toward a more specific answer, however, attracts controversy on v a r i o u s fronts. Two reactions to D a r w i n are noteworthy. The first reaction proposes that D a r w i n demolished h u m a n p u r p o s e , h u m a n distinctiveness, and G o d ' s place in creation, at least as m a n y people h a v e thought of these phenomena. Richard D a w k i n s

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(1987) and Daniel Dennett (1995) suggest this reaction, with considerable rhetorical and polemical flourish. The second reaction, supported b y various proponents of "intelligent design," aims to restore an intelligent nonnatural designer to biology on the basis of an argument from apparent design in nature. The latter reaction, in its contemporary form, looks for scientific support mainly to the kind of evidence presented in Michael Behe's Darwin's Black Box (1996), but it falls within the broad tradition of A q u i n a s ' s aforementioned teleological argument for an intelligent designer. The contemporary case for an intelligent designer, however, aims to come from the demands of adequate empirical scientific explanation, and not from a special philosophy or an antecedent theology. Proponents of this approach insist that their case for an intelligent designer is empirical and scientific. Accordingly, they aim to challenge naturalism (on which, see Chapter 1) on empirical scientific grounds. Behe suggests that cells contain "irreducibly complex" systems that "cannot be explained by Darwinian evolution" (1998, p. 252). By "irreducible complexity," he means a "single system which is composed of several interacting parts that contribute to the basic function [of the system], and where the removal of any one of the parts causes the system to effectively cease functioning" (1998, p. 247). Proponents of intelligent design often cite the mammalian eye as an example of an irreducibly complex organ that requires an intelligent designer and that therefore cannot be explained just b y a series of natural causes. If Darwinian natural selection must operate on a specifiable biological function, then, according to Behe, an irreducibly complex organ w o u l d h a v e to arise and to be selected as a unit rather than piecemeal, because the parts individually lack the key function. Behe invokes blood clotting, protein transport, and photosynthesis, among other biochemical phenomena, to contend that D a r w i n i s m is b a d science w h e n its twofold mechanism of natural selection and mutation is offered to account for all of the diversity of biological life. G o o d biological

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science, according to Behe, must acknowledge an intelligent designer that is irreducible to the w o r l d of natural phenomena. He adds: " T h e conclusion of intelligent design flows naturally from the data itself - not from sacred books or sectarian beliefs. Inferring that biochemical systems w e r e designed b y an intelligent agent is a h u m d r u m process that requires no n e w principles of logic or science" (1998, p. 254). This, of course, appears to be a rhetorical strategy on Behe's part, because an inference to an intelligent designer is anything but h u m d r u m . It is actually highly controversial and subject to serious objections. Behe, to his credit, does not share A q u i n a s ' s aforementioned special pleading by referring to the cause of apparent design in nature as that " w h i c h everyone gives the name of G o d . " In particular, regarding the moral character or the theological status of an allegedly needed designer, according to Behe, any such nonscientific topic is beyond the scope of the purportedly scientific program called "intelligent design." Accordingly, Behe m a y choose to disregard one of the aforementioned criticisms of Aquinas's natural theological arguments: that is, they fail to confirm the existence of a personal G o d w o r t h y of worship. E v e n so, the charge is true, and perhaps even admittedly true, of Behe's design inference that it fails to confirm the existence of a personal G o d worthy of worship. In particular, w e find no basis in cells for inferring the existence of a morally perfect intentional agent. This consideration will reduce, if not eliminate, the significance of Behe's design inference for natural theology regarding a G o d worthy of w o r s h i p . We must w o n d e r how, if at all, Behe can substantiate his claim that irreducible complexity in cells "requires" an explanation via an intelligent designer. His case assumes that an object featuring irreducible complexity will not be so simple that it can be explained b y chance combinations in nature, even over a vast amount of time. The substantive debate will focus, of course, on whether any biological pattern, h o w e v e r complex, actually requires acknowledgment

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of an intelligent designer beyond a natural cause. We have noted Behe's talk of irreducibly complex systems that "cannot be explained by Darwinian evolution" (1998, p. 252, italics added). This, of course, is strong modal language for someone claiming to d o probabilistic, empirical science. Surprisingly, it is rather common language for Behe and other contemporary proponents of intelligent design. In similar language, Behe alleges that " . . . the fundamental mechanisms of life cannot be ascribed to natural selection, and therefore were d e s i g n e d " (1998, p. 256, italics added). We should note well the absence of the qualifier "probably," and therefore w o n d e r whether Behe has m o v e d beyond empirical science proper. The basis of the strong language in question is the questionable assumption that irreducible complexity somehow eliminates chance and demands an intelligent designer. The troublesome issue, however, concerns how strongly chance is eliminated, if it is actually eliminated at all. Is it eliminated at most to a certain degree of probability less than (empirical) certainty? If so, Behe's strong modal language is misleading at best. Darwinian biologists, in any case, need not (and rarely do) appeal to pure chance alone in biological explanation; they readily can make use of a w i d e range of scientific laws in such explanations. E v e n so, Behe goes well b e y o n d our scientific and empirical evidence in assuming that chance and natural, unintelligent causes cannot yield or account for the biological complexity in question. This modal assumption outstrips our scientific and empirical evidence in a manner that makes it «onscientific. Its modal lang u a g e takes us b e y o n d the empirical domain to the domain of modal philosophy independent of science. A s suggested, Behe offers intelligent design as part of an empirical scientific research program. Accordingly, w e should expect him to offer intelligent causes not as required or necessary explainers, but just as the best available explainers of certain biological phenomena. His strong modal talk suggests that a Darwinian biologist w h o does not countenance

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intelligent design in, for instance, the function of h u m a n cells is necessarily irrational. The only w a y to assess such a bold suggestion is to consider the actual explanatory resources of Darwinian biology. Kenneth Miller has offered a serious challenge to Behe's hypothesis of irreducible complexity in biology. He explains: The crux of [Behe's] design theory is the idea that by themselves, the individual parts or structures of a complex organ are useless. The evolutionist says no, that's not true. Those individual parts can indeed be useful, and it's by working on those "imperfect and simple" structures that natural selection eventually produces complex organs. In the case of the eye, biologists have realized that any ability, no matter how slight, to sense light would have had adaptive value. Bacteria and algae, after all, manage to swim to and from the light with nothing more than an eyespot - a lensless, nerveless cluster of pigments and proteins.... The existence of so many working "pseudo-eyes" and "semi-eyes" in nature convinced natural scientists that Darwin's imagined intermediates between primitive light-sensing systems and complex eyes were feasible and real (1999, pp. 135-6). Accordingly, Behe underestimates the biological significance of less advanced functions antecedent to the function of a d e v e l o p e d system d e e m e d "irreducibly complex." Miller d r a w s from recent cell biology, including recently published experimental studies, to disarm Behe's contention that Darwinian evolution cannot account for biochemical systems called "irreducibly complex." Miller's case is straightforward and compelling, given that it is anchored in salient evidence from biochemistry and biology. Darwinism, in Miller's h a n d s , is much more resilient than certain proponents of intelligent design w o u l d h a v e us believe. At a minimum, the aforementioned strong modal l a n g u a g e of Behe is n o w definitely out of place. In addition, it is doubtful that biology calls for Behe's design inference after all. A s a result, natural theology will not find a straightforward foothold in this quarter.

THE EVIDENCE FOR GOD

Miller has not settled for deflating the anti-Darwinian cases of scientific creationists and intelligent-design theorists, but has offered a compatibility thesis that can be used to redirect natural theology. In this connection, he has opposed an "absolute materialism" that implies that full predictability and ultimate explanation are, or at least will be, available for the material w o r l d . Physics leads the w a y here, and evolutionary biology follows suit. Miller explains: Quantum physics tells us that absolute knowledge, complete understanding, a total grasp of universal reality, will never be ours. Not only have our hopes been dashed for ultimate theoretical knowledge of the behavior of a single subatomic particle, but it turns out that in many respects life is organized in such a w a y that its behavior is inherently unpredictable, too. It's not just a pair of colliding electrons that defy prediction. The mutations and genetic interactions that drive evolution are also unpredictable, even in principle.... Life surely is explicable in terms of the laws of physics and chemistry,... but the catch is that those laws themselves deny us an ultimate knowledge of what causes what, and what will happen next (1999, pp. 208-9). Because w e are unable to link causes and effects for something as fundamental as electron emission, w e lack the kind of k n o w l e d g e needed for absolute materialism. Cognitive modesty, therefore, is recommended b y the sciences themselves, contrary to absolute materialism. Miller has found theoretical room to explain w h y there is no incompatibility between Darwinism and the monotheism of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. His case rests on the following observation: "the breaks in causality at the atomic level m a k e it fundamentally impossible to exclude the idea that what w e have really caught a glimpse of might indeed reflect the mind of G o d " (1999, p. 214). This is not natural theology in any traditional garb, but it is the suggestion that the uncertainty featured b y quantum reality blocks our having the kind of complete understanding of nature that w o u l d preclude G o d ' s involvement therein. A s Miller notes, "the indeterminate nature of quantum events w o u l d allow

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a clever and subtle G o d to influence events in w a y s that are profound, but scientifically undetectable to u s " (1999, p. 241). Miller is not looking for the basis of an argument for G o d ' s existence, but he does claim to h a v e identified an important component of science that precludes the conclusive rejection of theism on scientific grounds. His case aims to underwrite not G o d ' s existence, but rather the logical compatibility of theism and contemporary science. This suggests a modest brand of compatibilist natural theology, free of an empirical argument for G o d ' s existence. (For a similarly modest approach to natural theology, see Allen 1989.) Miller proposes that G o d m a y h a v e used quantum physics and Darwinian evolution as the tools to enable h u m a n freedom. He remarks: . . . if there is a God, consider what a master stroke quantum indeterminacy was. To create an orderly material world that didn't require constant intervention, the Creator had to make things obey defined laws. But if those laws were to run all the w a y down to the building blocks of matter, they would also have denied free will (1999, p. 251). Free will is thus a live option, given our best science. In addition, the indeterminism of physical reality w o u l d allow G o d to influence the development of physical events in w a y s u n k n o w n to us. Miller therefore agrees with Ian Barbour: "Natural laws and chance m a y equally be instruments of G o d ' s intentions. There can be purpose without an exact predetermined p l a n " (1999, p. 238). Miller's compatibility thesis is attractive, if only as a result of its modesty, but a problem arises with his unqualified talk of evolution as blind, random, and undirected and of nature as a self-sufficient system (see Miller 1999, p p . 1 3 7 , 1 9 6 , 244, 266). If quantum events do, indeed, " a l l o w a clever and subtle G o d to influence events in w a y s that are profound but scientifically undetectable to u s , " and w e acknowledge the reality of such a G o d , then w e should refrain from claiming that the natural w o r l d is blind, random, or undirected. It m a y be unpredictable to us, but (so far as w e k n o w ) it

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m a y be directed as well, at least at some points. G i v e n a scientifically undetectable, elusive G o d allowed by quantum physics, Miller should back off his recurring portrayal of nature and evolution as blind and undirected. A s far as our best science goes, nature and evolution m a y be influenced b y a scientifically undetectable, elusive G o d . That is, G o d m a y v e r y well influence the complexity-increasing march of evolution, but nonetheless be highly elusive and even hidden at times. Evolution m a y b e unguided at some points but divinely guided at other, key points. Our best science allows as much, even on Miller's general account of physics and evolution. G i v e n Miller's compatibility thesis, one might offer a modest but constructive approach to natural theology. This approach w o u l d seek to illuminate the logical compatibility between empirical science and theology, but w o u l d refrain from arguments for G o d ' s existence on the basis of empirical science (and other natural sources of information). A key motivation for this compatibilist approach w o u l d be that w e should not expect G o d to be an object of empirical science or expect the evidence for G o d ' s existence to fall within empirical science. Instead, w e should expect the evidence for G o d ' s existence to be much more elusive than the evidence within empirical science, given what w o u l d be G o d ' s elusive redemptive purposes for humans. (Chapter 4 returns to the purposes of an elusive God.) Compatibilist natural theology, then, is no threat to the methods or the conclusions of the empirical sciences. In addition, it resists any use of the empirical sciences to underwrite theology or philosophical metaphysics. In the light of the v e r y troubled history of natural theology, these are important virtues indeed.

4.

FROM CALL

TO

K E R Y G M A

G i v e n this chapter's argument against natural theology, w e are well-advised to look outside natural science for any evidence of G o d ' s existence. In particular, given w h a t w o u l d

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be G o d ' s redemptive purposes for humans, w e should be attentive to experiences that convey a divine call to fellowship and n e w life with G o d . Philosophy can and should help with this life-giving project. It can make such contributions as (a) a phenomenology regarding h u m a n experiences of a divine call, (b) an elucidation of the h u m a n conditions for noticing and receiving a divine call, and (c) an account of h o w evidence of a divine call can be conclusive and thus resistant to skeptical challenges. It is, however, v e r y rare to find such contributions in the philosophy of religion or even in philosophical theology. In neglecting the potential divine call to humans, philosophy of religion has neglected the vital cognitive role of the G o o d N e w s that G o d has reached out in Jesus to confront humans directly and personally in their distressed and dying condition, for the sake of d i v i n e - h u m a n fellowship and n e w h u m a n life. The cognitive foundations of this Christian G o o d N e w s lie in h u m a n experience of G o d ' s intervening personal Spirit (as explained in Moser 2008). This fits with the apostle Paul's following epistemological observations: . . . hope [in God] does not disappoint us, because God's love (agape) has been poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit that has been given to us (Rom. 5:5, NRSV). N o w we have received, not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit who is from God, so that w e may know the things freely given to us by God (1 Cor. 2:12, NASB). Paul's epistemology is thus pneumatic (or Spirit-oriented), owing to its crucial role for a personal divine Spirit w h o cannot be reduced to any psychological faculty or process or even to Calvin's sensus divinitatis. Paul's epistemology therefore is foreign to secular epistemology and to much philosophy of religion and philosophical theology. It is also an incarnational epistemology, given its vital cognitive role for G o d ' s Spirit dwelling in humans, in such a w a y that they become a temple of G o d ' s Spirit (see 1 Cor. 6:19) and thereby become

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personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality. We m a y think of incarnational epistemology as requiring that h u m a n inquirers themselves become evidence of G o d ' s reality in virtue of volitional acquaintance with G o d that enables humans to become agents w h o receive and reflect G o d ' s moral character and G o d ' s presence for others. In this approach, characteristic evidence of G o d ' s reality is increasingly available and salient to me as I, myself, am increasingly willing to become such evidence - that is, evidence of G o d ' s reality. Indeed, according to Paul, it is part of the G o o d N e w s that followers of Jesus are privileged to reflect the very glory (and thus the reality) of G o d as perfectly imaged in Jesus (see 2 Cor. 3:18, 4:6; cf. Ridderbos 1975, p p . 68-78, 2 2 3 - 3 0 , G o r m a n 2009, Chapter 3). The epistemology on offer is grace-based, in that firsthand k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s reality is a direct powerful gift of G o d ' s grace that cannot be separated from the gift-giver. The cognitive grace in question supplies a powerful cognitive gift and a personal ground that replace any d e m a n d for intellectual earning, controlling, or dominating with a freely given powerful presence of G o d ' s inviting and transforming Spirit, w h o seeks cooperative fellowship with humans. This cognitive, irreducibly personal gift and ground must be appropriated by humans in Gethsemane struggles, given the human condition of selfishness and pride, but it is not shrouded in philosophical sophistication of the sort accompanying natural theology. Accordingly, w e are not dealing with the G o d of the philosophers or of natural theology. The cognitive grace in question does not depend on philosophical sophistication. In offering unselfish fellowship and new life with G o d , the gift under consideration is directly challenging toward selfish and prideful h u m a n w a y s that resist G o d , including toward h u m a n cognitive idolatry, but it does not get b o g g e d d o w n in its o w n intellectual complications. It can be an object of careful philosophical assessment, of course, but it carries a simple assurance from G o d ' s personal Spirit in

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search of d i v i n e - h u m a n fellowship and n e w h u m a n life. The gift therefore acknowledges G o d himself as the (objective) cognitive ground of justified belief that G o d is real as well as the object of h u m a n faith in G o d . The underlying divine aim is twofold: that h u m a n faith h a v e its (objective) cognitive and motivational ground not in h u m a n w i s d o m but rather in the personal p o w e r of G o d himself (see 1 Cor. 2:4-5), d that this ground provide w h a t humans desperately need: fellowship and n e w life in G o d ' s presence. The cognitive grace in question is therefore intended to be redemptive, or salvific, for humans. The apostle Paul announces: " W h e n w e cry, 'Abba! Father!,' it is the Spirit himself bearing witness with our spirit that w e are children of G o d " (Rom. 8 : 1 5 - 1 6 , RSV; cf. 2 Cor. 1:22, Eph. 1 : 1 3 - 1 4 ) . We see here the often-overlooked role of simple filial prayer in receiving needed divine assurance, including evidence of G o d , directly from G o d himself. A s a result, even y o u n g children can enter G o d ' s kingd o m with well-grounded conviction, courtesy of the cognitive grace of G o d ' s intervening Spirit. For this, even sophisticated philosophers should be grateful, because w e cannot supply evidence on our o w n that silences skeptics before G o d ; only G o d can do that, and he does deliver at the opportune time for willing people. G o d ' s call to humans therefore should be kept front and center in philosophy of religion, h o w e v e r unpopular the results. Unlike the incarnational epistemology under development, natural theology obscures the desperate h u m a n need for (a) the cognitive grace of G o d ' s personal redemptive call to humans and (b) h u m a n turning, in repentance, to receive and obey that life-giving transformative call to fellowship and n e w life. This obscuring arises from the focus of natural theology on merely de dicto arguments rather than on an experienced divine call de re to humans. When philosop h y of religion m o v e s from a focus on such arguments to attend to the divine personal call for fellowship and n e w life, w e will see attention to a distinctive kind of evidence a n

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for G o d ' s reality. We then will attend to a distinctive kind of intervening volitional pressure that indicates G o d ' s reality and presence. Traditional natural theology suffers from exclusive attention to what the Introduction called spectator evidence - that is, the kind of volitionally neutral evidence that does not offer a powerful volitional challenge to inquirers to yield to G o d and thereby to become personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality. It neglects authoritative evidence of G o d ' s reality that invites a h u m a n to cooperate with G o d ' s will and thereby to become personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality, including evidence of G o d as an intentional agent of perfect love. G i v e n the prospect of such authoritative evidence, w e should acknowledge that one's resolute commitment to remain volitionally neutral toward G o d ' s existence can block one from appropriating available evidence of G o d ' s existence. A s the Introduction noted, traditional natural theology seeks rationally to identify divine reality indirectly, inferentially, and discursively, and it uses distinctive premises to infer a conclusion in a natural-theological argument of one kind or another. It does not offer, however, evidence as inherently purposive, in the w a y that direct telic discerning does (as characterized in the Introduction). In connection with the Introduction's wilderness parable, w e might think of traditional natural theology as overlooking the directness of a rescuer's intentional call to us in the h a m radio transmission. In any case, natural theology does devote its focus to inference in an argument, and not to h u m a n acquaintance with a divine call, or divine volitional pressure. G i v e n a central role for a divine personal call to humans, philosophy of religion, itself, will become existence- and life-involving for humans, and even kerygmatic. It will then stand in sharp contrast to traditional natural theology. The n e w s of a personal redemptive call to humans from a perfectly loving G o d is a l w a y s G o o d N e w s w o r t h y of a k e r y g m a

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(a G o o d N e w s proclamation), even if the n e w s is difficult and reorienting at times. Part of the G o o d N e w s for philosop h y of religion, including natural theology, is this: w e h a v e no end run around G o d ' s challenging personal call to us, as though (with shades of Jonah, the w a y w a r d prophet) w e could approach G o d ' s reality without being morally challenged b y G o d ' s perfect will. This w o u l d be in keeping with G o d ' s perfect redemptive love for us, and it w o u l d promise to make us new, in w h o w e are and in h o w w e live and think. We d o well to consider conducting our philosophy accordingly, and thereby to bring philosophy and ourselves to the life of the living personal G o d . We philosophers w o u l d then be in our proper place relative to G o d , as faithful and indebted recipients, servants, and ambassadors of the G o o d N e w s of the G o d w h o personally and authoritatively calls us to fellowship and n e w life with himself. If w e h a v e ears to hear this call, w e can become revelatory personifying evidence of G o d in virtue of our receiving and reflecting G o d ' s moral character for others. (Chapter 4 develops the cognitive side of this story of G o o d N e w s , and s h o w s that it has distinctive but genuine foundations.)

5.

VALUING

THEISTIC

BELIEF

We have seen that divine elusiveness and hiddenness d o not sit well with the main arguments of natural theology. In invoking such elusiveness and hiddenness, however, w e must face the charge that these phenomena indicate that theistic belief is not actually significant in the end. In other w o r d s , G o d , being elusive and even hidden at times, w o u l d appear not to be seriously interested in having humans believe that G o d exists. A s the following discussion indicates, some theorists will offer this consideration as importantly true regarding G o d ' s purposes, and others will offer it instead as a dubious implication that challenges this chapter's line of objection to natural theology. This means that

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w e need to clarify this matter. (Chapter 5 returns to the general topic in connection with a potential defeater for theism in general.) According to Robert M c K i m , the fundamental feature of divine hiddenness is "the fact that G o d ' s existence and nature are not o b v i o u s " (2001, p. 5; page numbers in this section refer to this book). Perhaps, however, the key feature is that G o d ' s existence is not beyond reasonable doubt for at least some humans. In any case, M c K i m adds t h a t " . . . G o d ' s existence and nature w o u l d be clearer if there w e r e in the w o r l d clear and obvious signs of G o d ' s presence, as w o u l d be the case if virtue w e r e a l w a y s rewarded, vice a l w a y s punished, and if various signs and w o n d e r s w e r e constantly available" (p. 6). He imagines the following possible "signs and w o n d e r s " that allegedly w o u l d make G o d ' s existence clear or at least clearer: the morning sky overhead w o u l d a l w a y s be lit up with a verse from the Psalms; a person's prayers to G o d w o u l d a l w a y s be followed with help of a clear sort; and future astronomical discoveries w o u l d be announced to us in advance. It is unclear, however, that such signs w o u l d be clear indicators of G o d ' s reality for all people; at least some people w o u l d not regard them as obvious signs of G o d ' s existence. The latter people w o u l d consider, and perhaps embrace, alternative explanations free of theology, and this suggests that w h a t is "clear" in perceived indicators of reality varies significantly among people. M c K i m proposes that "if G o d exists, G o d is hidden to a considerable degree from all h u m a n beings at all times" (p. 10). He offers a number of supporting arguments but then weakens his thesis as follows: " . . . w e h a v e reason to conclude that, if G o d exists, G o d is hidden to a considerable extent from almost all h u m a n beings at almost all times" (p. 1 2 ) . The thesis concerning "almost all h u m a n beings at almost all times" looks like a statistical empirical claim, the support of which w o u l d require salient statistical empirical evidence, but M c K i m has not supplied such evidence. In addition, it is unclear h o w he readily might gather such

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evidence. One obvious problem is that he w o u l d need statistical empirical evidence that bears on "almost all times," and this w o u l d not be easily forthcoming. One of M c K i m ' s arguments for the thesis that " G o d is hidden to a considerable degree from all human beings at all times" runs as follows. . . . it may be that the explanation of w h y some people find that God is hidden is that those people have the wrong attitudes or the wrong beliefs or have gone wrong in some other way. T h i s . . . might be thought of as a matter of failing to seek the truth with enough of their energies, being proud instead of humble, refusing to countenance the possibility that God might exist, being utterly unwilling to think or live or respond in ways in which one thinks one ought to think or live or respond if God were to exist, or something else. Insofar as the explanation [of divine hiddenness] is to be found in an area such as this, one has reason to concede that God is always hidden from everyone to some extent (p. 1 1 ) . A s indicated, M c K i m began with talk of G o d ' s being simply " h i d d e n , " and he suggests that this is to be understood in terms of "the fact that G o d ' s existence and nature are not obvious." Such talk has shifted, however, to talk of God's being "hidden to a considerable d e g r e e " and "hidden to some extent" (pp. 1 0 , 1 1 ) . We, of course, have an absolute use of the term "obvio u s , " wherein something either is obvious or is not. A direct analogue to this is our absolute use of " u n i q u e " : something either is unique or is not. Evidently, M c K i m initially uses " h i d d e n " in an absolute manner on the basis of an absolute use of " o b v i o u s , " but then shifts to a nonabsolute use that allows for degrees of hiddenness. His nonabsolute use evidently rests on a notion of degrees of obviousness that has not been clarified. Discussion becomes m u r k y here owing to lack of clarity in a standard for measuring degrees of obviousness and thus of hiddenness. We sometimes talk rather casually of something's being somewhat obvious, just as w e sometimes talk very loosely of something's being

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rather unique. This offends some linguistic purists, but the real concern is that such talk, in the present context, calls for a standard of measuring (at least in principle) degrees of obviousness. In the absence of such a standard, our nonabsolute use of " o b v i o u s " will be unclear, and M c K i m ' s use is, in fact, left unclear. What exactly does M c K i m mean in saying that " G o d is a l w a y s hidden from everyone to some extent" (p. 1 1 ) ? If w e use M c K i m ' s talk of w h a t is " o b v i o u s " to supply clarification, w e might have the claim that: (1) God's reality is always not obvious to some extent for everyone. In M c K i m ' s language, (1) seems to be s y n o n y m o u s with: (2) God's reality is always not clear to some extent for everyone. One might understand (2) as the innocuous claim that G o d ' s reality is never fully revealed to any human. M c K i m , however, does not understand (2) in that innocent manner; nor does he settle for a solely psychological lesson from (2). He aims to get cognitive, or epistemic, mileage from (2). M c K i m proposes that "to say that G o d is h i d d e n . . . is to say that religious ambiguity extends to the existence of G o d " (p. 2 1 ) . He clarifies his talk of religious ambiguity as follows: " o u r lives are ambiguous in that they may reasonably be interpreted in entirely secular terms or in religious terms, but also in that they m a y reasonably be interpreted using the concepts of various religious traditions" (p. 22). G i v e n the use of "reasonably" here, M c K i m has m o v e d beyond any psychological notion of hiddenness or clarity to an epistemically or cognitively loaded notion. The notion of divine hiddenness n o w carries a notion of reasonableness. We m a y presume that epistemic, or cognitive, reasonableness of some sort is relevant, because the concern is with the truth of

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theistic claims, and not the practical utility of holding theistic beliefs. (Chapter 2 introduced the latter distinction in its challenge to fideism.) M c K i m does not use d i v i n e hiddenness to recommend against any particular religious belief, but instead seems to grant the reasonableness, at least for some people, of the positions of the main w o r l d religions. He explains: I do not feel that I am in a position to judge what it is like to be a member of a tradition, or to possess a viewpoint, of which I have no personal experience, or to consider all of the relevant evidence at once, or even seriatim. As far as I know, there are numerous positions that may reasonably be held on religious matters, including the positions that go with being a member of any of the main world religions (p. 203). E v e n so, M c K i m adds: " A n implication of m y position is that most martyrs w h o have d i e d for their faith h a v e been misled, [ f o r ] . . . they h a v e died in the n a m e of certainty about their beliefs" (p. 204). He therefore has a recommendation, on the basis of divine hiddenness, for how religious beliefs should be held: he proposes that they should be held tentatively, without subjective certainty. It seems incorrect to say that most martyrs have died "in the name of certainty about their beliefs." Instead, they evidently h a v e died in the n a m e of the supposed G o d regarding w h o m they held subjectively firm, nontentative beliefs. There is, of course, a significant difference here. What a martyr dies for, relative to the m a r t y r ' s intentions, is the supposed G o d being served, not the psychological or cognitive status of the m a r t y r ' s beliefs. E v e n w h e n subjectively certain beliefs are in place, they and their psychological or cognitive status are not the intended object of one's commitment. Accordingly, the latter factors, taken individually or as a pair, are not w h a t martyrs die "in the name of." In fact, it is a category mistake (that is, a confusion of categories) to suggest otherwise.

i8o

THE EVIDENCE FOR GOD

It is altogether unclear h o w M c K i m could substantiate his claim that most martyrs w h o have died for their faith should not have held their religious beliefs with subjective certainty. A s noted, he has already conceded the following: " I do not feel that I am in a position to judge w h a t it is like to be a member of a tradition, or to possess a viewpoint, of which I h a v e no personal experience, or to consider all of the relevant evidence at once, or even seriatim." If, as he admits, he cannot consider all of the relevant evidence at once, or even seriatim, then he is in no position to recommend that most martyrs w h o h a v e died for their faith should not h a v e held their religious beliefs with subjective certainty. By his o w n acknowledgment, M c K i m does not h a v e an adequate vantage point on their evidence. By his o w n admission, for all he knows, their relevant evidence called for subjectively firm belief that resulted in martyrdom for the supposed G o d they followed. Divine hiddenness does not challenge this consideration at all, given that such hiddenness does not preclude salient evidence of G o d at some times for some people. We must make judgments of epistemic, or cognitive, reasonableness carefully, given the different specific standards of reasonableness in circulation. Obviously, competent people of integrity disagree about such reasonableness. In suggesting that most martyrs h a v e been misled owing to the cognitive mistake of subjective certainty, or nontentativeness, in their beliefs, M c K i m proposes that most martyrs h a v e been unreasonable. This proposal, as suggested, has not been substantiated b y M c K i m ; nor can it be, given his o w n aforementioned standard for reasonableness. A s suggested, m a n y relevantly competent people of considerable integrity disagree about the specific conditions for reasonableness. M c K i m ' s position regarding reasonableness, which recommends tentativeness in religious belief, relies on such disagreement as a basis for recommending tolerance toward the reasonableness of alternative religious beliefs. For the sake of consistency, his tolerance should be

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extended to the case of martyrs and the reasonableness of their beliefs. M a r t y r d o m aside, M c K i m uses divine hiddenness to try to minimize the importance of theistic belief in general. H e claims: "If theistic b e l i e f . . . w e r e v e r y important, each person, surely, w o u l d have an equal shot at i t . . . . There is the fact of religious ambiguity, [which] suggests that theistic belief is not important" (p. 1 2 2 ) . M c K i m therefore suggests that, given divine hiddenness, G o d regards theistic belief as "not important." This suggestion, however, is doubtful at best. A perfectly loving G o d could regard theistic belief as genuinely important but value other things as more important. For example, G o d could value letting h u m a n selfish opposition to G o d ' s unselfish w a y s mature into its destructive futility, so that its futility could be readily seen b y all honest observers, even if this entails some obscurity about G o d ' s reality, at least at times. (This, in fact, is what the apostle Paul suggests in R o m a n s 8 : 2 0 - 2 1 , as Chapter 4 explains in undermining potential challenges to theistic belief from evil and divine elusiveness and hiddenness.) This prospect for divine purposes challenges a n y suggestion from divine hiddenness that theistic belief is "not important." G o d could w o r k for good, redemptive purposes in people w h o lack theistic belief - even for the good of the people w h o lack such belief (as Chapter 5 explains). It does not follow, however, that theistic belief is not important. Theistic belief can still be important to G o d ' s redemptive w o r k , particularly to bringing into focus for h u m a n s the source of G o d ' s redemptive w o r k in humans: that is, G o d . Accordingly, even if theistic belief is not a necessary condition of G o d ' s redemptive w o r k , it still can function as an important contribution to this w o r k among humans. This chapter has invoked divine elusiveness and hiddenness to challenge traditional natural theology, but it has not offered any support for the suggestion that theistic belief is not important. On the contrary, it supports the v i e w that theistic belief can be v e r y important in one's becoming

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personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality by one's intentionally receiving and reflecting G o d ' s moral character for others. The basis of this chapter's challenge for the arguments of natural theology has come from the inadequacy of static or impersonal evidence for a G o d worthy of worship. The following chapter elaborates on the key idea of personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality, and explains h o w such evidence fits with a G o d w o r t h y of worship.

6.

S U M M A R Y

A R G U M E N T

In sum, this chapter has offered the following straightforw a r d argument against traditional natural theology, in order to highlight the kind of evidence w e should expect of a perfectly loving G o d . 1. By definition, a being w h o merits the maximally honorific title " G o d " w o u l d be worthy of worship, and thus w o u l d be morally perfect and hence perfectly loving toward all humans, even toward all h u m a n enemies of G o d , in such a w a y that G o d w o u l d seek the best, all things considered, for all humans. 2. By definition, it w o u l d be best, all things considered, for morally imperfect humans if they w o u l d agreeably receive a noncoercive self-revealing call from G o d that (a) directly and authoritatively invites them to enter into worship of G o d , including fellowship with G o d and volitional cooperation with G o d ' s perfect will, but (b) could be elusive and even hidden at times for divine purposes of a moral challenge to humans. 3. Hence, if some morally imperfect humans w o u l d agreeably receive the divine self-revealing call, noted in 2, then G o d w o u l d noncoercively extend such a call to them, at least at some times. 4. B y definition, a direct authoritative call from G o d to a h u m a n requires a de re agent-to-agent acquaintance of the h u m a n with G o d ' s call that is irreducible to de

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dicto truths (and, furthermore, need not coerce any . particular de dicto interpretation of this acquaintance experience). 5. Hence, if G o d extends a self-revealing call to some humans at some times, G o d w o u l d offer those humans at those times agent-to-agent acquaintance with G o d ' s call that is irreducible to de dicto truths. 6. By definition, the h u m a n l y experienced acquaintance with G o d ' s call, noted in 4, is not an argument, but in the absence of defeaters can nonetheless be conclusive evidence of G o d ' s existence for a person. 7. B y its nature, the conclusive evidence noted in 6, regarding G o d ' s call, is not volitionally static, but is, as divinely retractable given human volitional resistance, experientially and thus personally interactive and variable in a manner that a l l o w s for divine elusiveness and even hiddenness at times regarding divine existence (in keeping with w h a t some of the Hebrew prophets, including Jesus, require of conclusive divine evidence). 8. The arguments of traditional purely de dicto natural theology, whether a priori or a posteriori (for instance, ontological, first cause, design, and moral arguments), offer volitionally static evidence that (a) is not only independent of a divine call in its content (nature, for instance, offers no call of its o w n ) but also insensitive to the direction of a h u m a n will relative to G o d ' s will, and, thus, (b) does not allow for the kind of variability, noted in 7, that is central to elusiveness and hiddenness regarding divine existence. 9. B y definition, any conclusive evidence suitable to a G o d w h o calls and hides from people at different times (see the G o d of J e w i s h and Christian theism) must not be volitionally static, but must allow for the kind of variability, noted in 7, that is central to elusiveness and hiddenness regarding divine existence, and must involve an evident divine call in its content; otherwise,

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a defeater will emerge from the absence of such a call, given that a perfectly loving G o d w o u l d call receptive people at some times. Hence, the evidence offered b y the arguments of traditional purely de ditto natural theology does not qualify as conclusive evidence of the G o d of J e w i s h and Christian theism, w h o calls h u m a n s but is elusive and even hidden at times.

4

Personifying Evidence of God

" . . . the ultimate decisions are not made in the sphere of language, where they are at most expressed; they are made at the point where we fall into arrogance or despair; or where we hear the call to obedience and true humanity - at the point, that is, where we make decisions of will." - Ernst Kasemann 1967, p. 35. The wilderness parable of this book's Introduction offered a specific predicament as a context for our inquiry about G o d ' s existence. Our predicament in the parable highlights our need to find a w a y out of a dangerous wilderness setting in Hells C a n y o n . It raises the question of whether an intentional rescuer for us is at hand. It also gives us an opportunity to reflect on our o w n resources or the lack thereof in the dangerous, life-threatening setting. We should d o the same, of course, for our real-life setting. Some people doubt that anyone among us gets out alive in the end, whereas others propose that a rescuer for us is, in fact, available. If G o d is & real rescuer, h o w does one come to k n o w that this rescuer is real? In particular, w h a t kind of evidence is available to us? We h a v e not found much tenable encouragement about the reality of an intentional rescuer in the previous chapters. On the contrary, fideism and natural theology h a v e generated some difficult problems that call into question their being commendably trustworthy avenues to k n o w l e d g e 185

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of G o d ' s reality. In that regard, they h a v e failed to deliver the needed rescuer in a trustworthy manner. The same holds for nontheistic naturalism, because this position seeks to free humans from commitment to a supernatural rescuer. We h a v e found this position to be lacking at best, h o w ever, because it undermines itself by its o w n ontological and cognitive standard. A s a result, w e are not yet out of the wilderness, and the question of an intentional rescuer remains open. This chapter aims to show the w a y out, with the aid of a needed but w i d e l y neglected notion of personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality.

1.

SKEPTICAL

DOUBTS

H u m a n inquirers have long been vulnerable to skeptical questions about their cognitive fitness, especially regarding the prospect of h u m a n knowledge of G o d . Skeptics persistently have raised general questions about the trustworthiness of human beliefs and of such h u m a n cognitive, belief-producing sources as perception, memory, and introspection. Do these sources yield true rather than false beliefs, at least characteristically or (more modestly) in some cases? Skeptics have considerable skill in generating doubts with such a question. We naturally seek trustworthy evidence that our cognitive sources (characteristically) yield true rather than false beliefs. In doing so, w e aim to avoid circular reasoning in which a source under question regarding its being trustworthy is treated as if it w e r e not thus under question. We ask, accordingly, what noncircular or nonquestion-begging reason w e h a v e to regard our cognitive sources as trustworthy for acquiring truth and avoiding error. A s a result, w e might seek to confirm the trustworthiness of one cognitive source (say, auditory perception) without relying on another cognitive source (say, visual perception), because w e have raised the same question concerning trustworthiness about the latter source as about the former. Ideally, w e aim to avoid

PERSONIFYING EVIDENCE OF GOD

circularity in answering our question about the trustworthiness of our cognitive sources. Permitted circularity w o u l d make the task too easy because it w o u l d make it arbitrary. In asking about all of our cognitive sources, regarding their trustworthiness, w e cannot rely on those sources themselves to deliver nonquestion-begging or noncircular evidence of their trustworthiness. Otherwise, an arbitrary circularity w o u l d threaten. In addition, w e evidently cannot assume a position independent of all of our o w n cognitive sources to obtain a noncircular test of their trustworthiness. It seems that w e do not h a v e a vantage point outside our cognitive sources from which w e can assess their trustworthiness. This appears to be the h u m a n cognitive predicament, and no one has yet s h o w n h o w w e can escape it. This, too, is a straightforward consideration favoring the conclusion that w e should take skepticism quite seriously, if only to clarify the nature of our actual cognitive sources. Famously, in his Meditations, Descartes suggested that the existence of a trustworthy G o d can underwrite the trustworthiness of some of our cognitive sources. The suggestion is that if G o d is trustworthy, then G o d w o u l d not allow for w i d e s p r e a d untrustworthiness in our cognitive sources. Such a suggestion calls for considerable argument, but an immediate problem arises. It seems that our reasonable acknowledgment of a trustworthy G o d , w h o insures trustworthiness in our cognitive sources, will rely on (the trustworthiness of) a cognitive source in question. That is, such a cognitive source as perception, memory, or introspection evidently will play a role (as trustworthy) in our coming to k n o w that a trustworthy G o d exists. In that case, a kind of circularity will threaten and arguably undermine Descartes's suggestion. This is at least a potential problem that demands attention, and w e do not h a v e an easy answer. Questions under dispute in a philosophical context cannot attract nonquestion-begging answers from the mere presumption of the correctness of a disputed answer. If w e allow such question begging in general, w e can support any

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disputed position w e prefer. We then m a y simply beg the key question in any dispute regarding the preferred position. G i v e n that strategy, argument becomes superfluous in the w a y circular argument is typically pointless. Questionbegging strategies promote an undesirable arbitrariness in philosophical debate, and are rationally inconclusive relative to the questions under dispute. Hence, w e have good reason to steer clear of question-begging strategies. Of course, questions about the trustworthiness of our cognitive sources should be coherent. For instance, w e should not d e m a n d nonquestion-begging evidence indicating the trustworthiness of vision while w e call into question and therefore refuse, in principle, any available evidence indicating the trustworthiness of cognitive sources. That w o u l d be to d e m a n d that w e stand somewhere to assess trustworthiness while w e are not allowed to stand anywhere. Such a demand w o u l d undermine itself owing to a kind of incoherence - that is, w h a t w e m a y call demand incoherence. One can coherently question the trustworthiness of all evidence available to us, and some skeptics do just this. In that case, however, one cannot coherently demand that w e supply nonquestion-begging evidence indicating the trustworthiness of our cognitive sources or even of a single cognitive source. If all available evidence (including that from our cognitive sources) is under question by skeptics, then no evidence will be nonquestion-begging (relative to the skeptics). A s a result, a d e m a n d for nonquestion-begging evidence cannot coherently include unrestricted questioning of all available evidence. A n y d e m a n d , then, that w e establish the trustworthiness of our cognitive sources must allow that some evidence not be under question regarding trustworthiness. Otherwise, a kind of incoherence threatens: demand incoherence. Arguably, w e actually h a v e a firm place to stand in answering skeptical questions about evidence and reasonable belief. That is, w e m a y stand on our semantic, concept-forming intentions that give meaning to our terms.

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Consider the term "epistemic reason," which signifies the kind of reason appropriate to cognitively grounded belief and to knowledge. M a n y philosophers of different outlooks share the general notion of an epistemic reason as a (possibly fallible) truth indicator for a proposition. A n epistemic reason for a belief indicates, perhaps fallibly and with only a degree of probability, that the belief is true. Our meaning-forming intentions (to use terms in a certain w a y ) give semantic content to our talk of an "epistemic reason for a belief." A s intentional agents, w e have an active semantic role in this connection, and w e can benefit in epistemology from acknowledgment of this fact. Suppose that w e form the settled semantic intention to use "truth indicator" and "epistemic reason" as follows: a visual experience, for example, of an apparent book in a situation with no accessible opposing evidence is a (fallible) truth indicator and thus an epistemic reason for a visual belief that an actual book exists. This semantic intention, given its meaning-conferring role for us, could serve as a directly accessible semantic truth maker for our ascribing an epistemic reason, in such a case, to a visual belief that an actual book exists. It then w o u l d be part of what we mean by "epistemic reason" that such ascribing captures an epistemic reason for a visual belief that an actual book exists. Our semantic intentions concerning "epistemic reasons" therefore m a y serve as ultimate, even if revisable, truth makers for ascriptions of an epistemic reason. What about skeptics w h o raise doubts about the trustworthiness and reasonableness of beliefs produced by our Cognitive sources such as perception, memory, and introspection? They might object that our semantic intentions can be mistaken - say in virtue of failing to capture languageindependent justification or evidence. We can sidestep such an objection, however, because reality (the objective world) does not settle h o w in particular w e must seek truth. For better or worse, it does not settle which specific variant (or specific concept) of justification, evidence, or k n o w l e d g e

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is binding on a truth seeker. Even so, a person seeking to acquire truth and to avoid error should accommodate any necessary conditions for truth acquisition (for instance, logical consistency in a belief) and for trustworthy, wellgrounded belief. In the end, skeptics cannot convincingly hold nonskeptics to a specific concept or strategy of truth acquisition and error avoidance that recommends skepticism. In particular, skeptics cannot cogently mandate an epistemic concept or strategy for us that undermines the aforementioned kind of epistemic reason (for instance, for visual beliefs) grounded in semantic intentions regarding "epistemic reason." One noteworthy problem for skeptics is that the aforementioned kind of epistemic reason is, so far as w e can tell, at least as effective for trustworthy truth acquisition and error avoidance as anything skeptics, themselves, offer. In addition, skeptics h a v e no stable foothold to propose that such a semantically grounded epistemic reason is untrustworthy as a fallible truth indicator. Skeptics cannot plausibly charge us with question begging (or circular reasoning) here. It is part of what we mean b y "epistemic reason" that the kind of ascription in question, in the kind of experiential context in question, captures an epistemic reason for a visual belief that an actual book exists. A s a result, w e n o w may shift the burden of argument to the skeptic, and w e m a y call this "the skeptic's burden." We h a v e produced, after all, a skeptic-resistant truth indicator grounded in cognitively significant semantic intentions. We also have challenged inquirers - particularly skeptics - to steer clear of d e m a n d incoherence. The skeptic's burden is now properly the skeptic's. Until this burden is met, w e m a y endorse with a clear conscience, under the specified conditions where there is no opposing truth indicator, the cognitive reasonableness of some of the beliefs delivered by our cognitive sources. We also m a y endorse, again under the specified conditions, the cognitive reasonableness of belief in the trustworthiness of some of

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our cognitive sources. It follows that an argument for the reasonableness of theism will not automatically be undermined b y general skeptical worries about the trustworthiness of sense perception or of our cognitive sources. Of course, whether such an argument w i l l be u n d e r m i n e d in other w a y s remains to be seen. (For a more d e v e l o p e d case against skepticism, see Moser 1989, 2008, Chapter 1 and A p p e n d i x ; see also section 4 of this chapter.)

2.

INQUIRERS

U N D E R

SCRUTINY

In the Introduction's wilderness parable, although w e canyon wanderers h a v e a ham radio, it is unsettled whether w e h a v e a real intentional rescuer at hand. Some people will contend that the situtation is likewise for our real-life setting. One point seems noncontroversial: to acquire evidence of intervening ham radios and their distinctive transmissions, w e need to turn on a suitable radio scanner, raise its antenna, and then adjust the scanner to receive the appropriate frequency. In other w o r d s , w e must tune in to the desired frequency, and this requires some decision making and focusing on our part. People w h o fail to tune in will lack a certain kind of evidence that is available to them and is actually possessed by some other people w h o are suitably attuned. Obviously, radio w a v e s can carry good n e w s - even n e w s of a needed rescue operation - but if w e fail to tune in, w e shall fail to receive or to appropriate such news. The transmitted good n e w s can be readily available to us but not actually received, appropriated, or even acknowledged b y us. In that case, the good n e w s m a y seem absent and even hidden from us. Similarly, the source of the alleged good n e w s m a y s e e m elusive at best and even nonexistent. What, then, is the general condition of h u m a n s as inquirers about G o d ' s reality with regard to a needed intentional rescuer? Are humans cognitively or otherwise fit for the task of finding or receiving evidence of G o d ' s

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reality? The Introduction offered the term " G o d " as a maximally honorific title signifying worthiness of worship and thus moral perfection. We humans, of course, cannot plausibly lay claim to our having satisfied such an exalted title. On the contrary, humans arguably are experts at a kind of selfishness that is antithetical to G o d ' s moral character of unselfish love. We m a y call such selfishness and its accompanying pride " s i n , " for short, if only because there is no better w o r d at hand. We should acknowledge that w e can be experts at such sin even if w e d o not know that w e h a v e this expertise and even if w e do not like to talk about it. In addition, it does not follow that w e can immediately offer an adequate portrayal of the kind of sin in question. One can be an expert regarding deception, for instance, even if one cannot offer an adequate portrayal of deception. The relevant distinction concerns an expert in the realization of sin in contrast with an expert in the characterization of sin. Realization expertise does not entail characterization expertise. One's assessing a claim to realization expertise in sin requires one's having a characterization of sin, but such assessing w o u l d go beyond mere realization expertise. G i v e n our current interest in assessing, w e need to begin with a characterization of sin. This will shed light on the condition, including the fitness, of h u m a n inquirers about the reality of G o d with regard to a needed rescuer. In particular, it will illuminate whether humans are cognitively or otherwise well suited to receive or to appropriate evidence of G o d ' s reality. Perhaps w e humans possess some features that are resistant to or otherwise at odds with our receiving evidence of G o d ' s existence. Famously, Reinhold Niebuhr (1965, p. 16; see also his 1 9 4 1 , 1 9 4 9 ) suggests that the Christian v i e w of sin is empirically verifiable. One relevant consideration, however, is that Christians h a v e held m a n y different v i e w s of sin, and therefore any talk of the Christian v i e w of sin is questionable from the start. Augustine, for instance, suggested a v i e w of "original s i n " implying that one's being in a state of sin

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is s o m e h o w inherited from one's original ancestors, A d a m and Eve. H e writes: Properly speaking, human nature means the blameless nature with which man was originally created. But w e also use it in speaking of the nature with which w e are born mortal, ignorant, and subject to the flesh, which is really the penalty of sin. In this sense the apostle says: "We also were by nature children of wrath even as others" (Eph. 2:3). As w e are born from the first pair [namely, A d a m and Eve] to a mortal life of ignorance and toil because they sinned and fell into a state of error, misery, and death, so it most justly pleased the most high G o d . . . to manifest from the beginning, from man's origin, his [God's] justice in exacting punishment, and in human history his mercy in remitting punishment (Augustine 395, Book III, xix, 54 - xx, 55). Augustine thus regards h u m a n sin after the fall of A d a m and E v e as, at least in part, an inherited defective state that is part of the divine penalty for the sin of A d a m and Eve. According to Augustine, then, w e h u m a n successors to A d a m and E v e inherit our state of sin without initially choosing or willing it (for details see M a n n 2001, Cherbonnier 1 9 5 5 , Chapters 8-9). Niebuhr offers a v i e w of original sin contrary to A u g u s tine's. He holds, along with Augustine, t h a t " . . . the corruption of evil is at the heart of the h u m a n personality," but he also holds, against Augustine, that original sin " . . . is a corruption which has a universal dominion over all men, though it is not b y nature but in freedom that men s i n . . . " (1949, p. 1 2 2 ) . This v i e w denies Augustine's position that original sin in the w a k e of A d a m and E v e is an inherited defective state prior to one's free decisions. Niebuhr's v i e w evidently finds support in the following statement of the apostle Paul: " . . . sin came into the w o r l d through one man and death through sin, and so death spread to all men because all men sinned" (Rom. 5 : 1 2 , RSV, italics added). Paul does not say that sin and death spread just because A d a m and E v e sinned; instead, he points to the significant fact that

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"all men sinned." Paul's v i e w is more attentive to individual h u m a n accountability than is Augustine's, and it thus accommodates the moral truism that a child should not be held accountable or punished (especially b y a perfectly loving God) for the sins of his or her parents. One morally important consideration is that the child lacks the ability to prevent the parents from committing their sins or from handing a corrupt nature d o w n to their child. Of course, w e should avoid any simplistic v i e w that characterizes sin as just morally w a y w a r d actions that violate rules or regulations. This simplistic v i e w depersonalizes the objects of sin as rules or regulations. In contrast, according to some important strands of J e w i s h and Christian theism, sin is inherently personal in its subject and its object. For instance, Emil Brunner proposes the following: " . . . sin is a change in m a n ' s relation to God: it is the break in communion with G o d , [owing] to distrust and defiance M a n wants to be on a level with G o d , and in so doing to become independent of [ G o d ] " (1952, p. 92; cf. Brunner 1939, p p . 1 2 9 - 3 2 ) . A b r a ham Heschel likewise offers an inherently personal characterization of sin: "To the [Jewish] prophets, sin is not an ultimate, irreducible, or independent condition, but rather a disturbance in the relationship between G o d and man; it i s . . . a condition that can be surmounted b y man's return and G o d ' s forgiveness" (1962, p. 229). Similarly, the apostle Paul identifies h u m a n sin with one's resisting the honoring of G o d as G o d , including one's preferring to exclude G o d from one's k n o w l e d g e (see Rom. 1 : 2 1 , 28). The irreducibly personalist v i e w of Paul, Brunner, and Heschel captures a central theme of m a n y of the Jewish and Christian biblical writers: h u m a n sin is ultimately sin against God, even if it is so in virtue of h u m a n sin against G o d ' s commands and even if one denies that G o d exists. According to the most plausible J e w i s h and Christian theology, h u m a n sin against G o d involves more than h u m a n actions as external behavior against G o d . It includes h u m a n psychological attitudes against G o d as well as habits against

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G o d . In particular, according to such theology, h u m a n sin is anchored not in external behavior against rules, but rather in a morally responsible h u m a n will against G o d - specifically a h u m a n will against, or at least out of cooperation with, G o d ' s perfectly loving will. A s a result, any genuine solution to h u m a n sin (as offered b y a p r o g r a m of d i v i n e - h u m a n salvation) must be corrective s o m e h o w of not just external h u m a n behavior but h u m a n wills as well. More specifically, if h u m a n sin includes resistance to h u m a n volitional communion or fellowship with G o d , then d i v i n e - h u m a n salvation must s o m e h o w s u p p l y or e m p o w e r h u m a n volitional fellowship with G o d . Perhaps at its core d i v i n e - h u m a n salvation is d i v i n e h u m a n fellowship, including h u m a n volitional cooperation with G o d . Such a v i e w is suggested b y the following remark attributed to Jesus in John 17:3: "This is everlasting life: that they k n o w y o u , the only true G o d , and the one w h o m y o u sent, Jesus Christ." The relevant " k n o w i n g " of G o d is, of course, not mere propositional k n o w l e d g e that G o d exists (which even resolute enemies of G o d can have). Instead, the k n o w i n g in question includes volitional agreement and even fellowship with G o d (as explained in w h a t follows, and in detail in Moser 2008). We thus need to consider a kind of k n o w l e d g e of G o d that is suitably salvific (that is, salvation oriented), or redemptive, for h u m a n s and can provide the needed powerful but noncoercive rescue from human selfishness and destruction. Let's turn to the nature of this robustly cognitive salvific solution to the h u m a n predicament.

3.

F R O M SCRUTINY

TO

RESCUE

A s the Introduction suggested, an intentional rescuer w h o emerges in the wilderness parable m a y h a v e a distinctive pedagogical aim toward the people to be rescued. Specifically, the relevant p e d a g o g y could go b e y o n d informational concerns to counter w h a t the previous section w o u l d

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h a v e us call " h u m a n sin toward G o d . " If such sin is volitional (even in part), the antidote will need to be similarly volitional in involving the h u m a n will, and not just h u m a n beliefs and emotions. The corresponding salvific, or redemptive, knowledge will follow suit, as this section explains. We can benefit n o w from clarification of what w o u l d be h u m a n appropriation of the salvific gift on offer according to Jewish and Christian theism. This clarification illuminates what w o u l d be the pedagogical expectations of a perfectly loving G o d toward w a y w a r d humans, and it saves us from unhelpful abstractness in our talk of religious knowledge. At the heart of the Jewish and Christian G o o d N e w s of divine salvation of humans, w e find an important (but philosophically neglected) theme that exceeds divine forgiveness for h u m a n sin. It involves, in keeping with prophecies in the Hebrew scriptures from Jeremiah, Ezekiel, and Joel, one's being made new in spirit by God's Spirit as one dies to one's selfish life and entrusts oneself to G o d ' s Christ-shaped life of self-giving righteous love. G o d ' s Spirit, according to this G o o d N e w s , intervenes in a willing person's spirit (or motivational center) to e m p o w e r that person to love as G o d loves, in volitional cooperation with G o d . The Jewish and Christian salvation on offer is thus Spirit-oriented and spirit-oriented. Accordingly, one must die to selfish w a y s , including selfish autonomy, in order to live to G o d by the p o w e r of G o d ' s Spirit. The p o w e r in question involves the kind of noncoercive volitional pressure identified in Chapter 2. In Paul's distinctively Christian message, w e humans must be "crucified with Christ" (Gal. 2:19-20; cf. Col. 3:1-4), in dying to the anti-God selfish w a y s of the w o r l d and of ourselves, in order to live instead to G o d . Only then can w e be free to love as G o d loves, unselfishly and with forgiveness toward enemies. According to Paul's message, only G o d ' s Spirit w o r k i n g powerfully within us can motivate the sea change from h u m a n selfishness to unselfish love,

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even toward enemies. This change resembles a heart transplant, but it occurs at the level of one's spirit or motivational center. It alters the core of the nagging h u m a n problem of sinful selfishness, even if some residue persists, and it offers an opportunity for a lasting life of d i v i n e - h u m a n fellowship and salvation in place of alienation and final death. Accordingly, as Chapter 2 suggested, w e should expect a perfectly loving G o d to advance kardiatheology - that is, a theology aimed primarily at the h u m a n heart and not just h u m a n thoughts or feelings. (For discussion of the relevant notion of spirit, see Moser 1999 and Wiebe 2004; on the pertinent notion of heart, see Meadors 2006.) According to Paul's Christian G o o d N e w s , the gift of divine perfect love manifested in Jesus includes an offer of dual resurrection to humans. The duality includes willing humans being raised spiritually to n e w life now with G o d and their being raised bodily later, after the model of Jesus's bodily resurrection. Paul has spiritual, but not bodily, resurrection in m i n d w h e n he writes: "We w e r e buried therefore with [Christ] b y baptism into death, so that as Christ w a s raised from the dead by the glory of the Father, w e too might w a l k in newness of l i f e . . . . So y o u also must consider yourselves d e a d to sin but alive to G o d in Christ Jesus [Y]ield yourselves to G o d as [people] w h o h a v e been brought from death to life" (Rom. 6:4, 1 1 , 1 3 , RSV; cf. Col. 2:12). Accordingly, Paul supposes that followers of Jesus will " w a l k in newness of life" now toward G o d , " a s Christ w a s raised from the d e a d " (cf. 2 Cor. 5:17). H e assumes that they are already alive from the dead, as a literal translation of Romans 6:13 says. Paul holds that bodily resurrection for humans awaits a future time (1 Cor. 1 5 : 2 2 - 4 ) ; as a result, he must h a v e spiritual resurrection in mind in the previous remarks (see also G o r m a n 2001, p p . 46-7, 2009, p p . 74-7, Byrnes 2003, p p . 2 1 4 - 1 8 ) . Paul credits the source of h u m a n spiritual resurrection to the divine Spirit of the crucified Jesus sent b y G o d to receptive h u m a n s , "into [their] hearts, crying 'Abba!

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Father!" (Gal. 4:6; cf. Rom. 8:9, 1 Cor. 15:45). Similarly, in John's Gospel, Jesus as G o d ' s atoning sacrifice is identified directly with the one w h o gives G o d ' s Spirit to receptive people now (John 1 : 2 9 - 3 3 , 2 0 : 2 1 - 3 ; cf. Mark 1:8). The divine intended salvation of humans via Jesus therefore includes the divine empowering means of realizing this salvation in receptive humans: the sending of G o d ' s Spirit through Jesus to e m p o w e r receptive people to live a n e w now in fellowship with G o d and with each other in lasting unselfish love. Accordingly, Paul announces: "If anyone is in Christ, [that person is a] n e w creation" (2 Cor. 5:17; cf. Gal. 6:15). Here w e find, in such new creation, the divinely offered salvific antidote to h u m a n sin. Paul's G o o d N e w s " n e w creation" proclamation is J e w i s h as well as Christian. It echoes the remarkable prophecy of Ezekiel 36:26-7: " A new heart I will give y o u and a new spirit I will put within you; and I will take out of your flesh the heart of stone and give you a heart of flesh. A n d I will put m y spirit within you and cause you to w a l k in m y statutes and be careful to observe m y ordinances" (RSV; cf. Ezek. 37:14, Jer. 32:39-40). In keeping with this promise, Paul proclaims the cross and the resurrection of Jesus as the salvific avenue for G o d to impart G o d ' s Spirit to all receptive people, including Gentiles as well as J e w s (see Rom. 1 0 : 1 1 - 2 1 ) . This fits with the aforementioned kardiatheology aimed primarily at the h u m a n heart, and not just thoughts or feelings. (Chapter 5 takes u p the issue of h o w a perfectly loving G o d could w o r k outside the beliefs of any particular religion, given the obvious fact of religious diversity among humans.) A n e w h u m a n volitional center depends on the direct, firsthand reception and ongoing availability of G o d ' s e m p o w e r i n g Spirit by a receptive h u m a n agent. Such a n e w volitional center is at the heart of spiritual resurrection as understood by Paul and John (cf. John 3 : 1 - 1 2 ) . Such spiritual resurrection w o u l d h a v e straightforward cognitive as w e l l as salvific importance (as emphasized in Dickie 1954). In particular, it w o u l d yield experiential acquaintance with

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powerful evidence of G o d ' s intervening Spirit at w o r k in one's motivational center, leading one a w a y from selfishness and toward unselfish love, in volitional cooperation with G o d . Such experiential evidence indicates w h a t Paul calls a " n e w creation" in a person and what John calls " a person's being born from a b o v e . " (On the topic of n e w creation and conversion in Paul, L u k e , and John, see Gaventa 1986, Segal 1990, Chapters 4-5, Hubbard 2002, and Thompson 2001, Chapter 4.) A s noted previously, Paul states: " . . . hope [in G o d ] does not disappoint, because the love of G o d has been poured out in our hearts through the Holy Spirit given to u s " (Rom. 5:5; cf. 2 Cor. 1:22, 5:5). Through G o d ' s Spirit given to us, as w e willingly yield to G o d ' s authoritative call in conscience to volitional cooperation, our innermost personal center (that is, our heart) w o u l d welcome G o d ' s powerful self-revelation of perfect love and thereby begin to be changed from being selfish to manifesting G o d ' s imparted unselfish love, even if imperfectly. This w o u l d be an agent-to-agent salvific p o w e r transaction that m o v e s willing humans noncoercively from h u m a n selfish fear (the root of sin) to shared divine unselfish love (the root of salvation), and from spiritual death to n e w spiritual life. It w o u l d occur at the innermost personal center of a h u m a n life, where the problem of sinful selfishness and pride arises and endures, but it w o u l d not automatically remove all h u m a n selfishness and pride at once. This personal p o w e r transaction w o u l d yield, nonetheless, a n e w default motivational center in a manner that no merely intellectual or emotional process could. Paul's Spirit-focused approach to redemption bears directly on the reality and the relevance of purposively available evidence of divine reality. In this approach, h u m a n faith and hope in G o d (to fulfill divine promises, including the promise of salvation) can find a conclusive cognitive anchor in our evident experience of willingly receiving G o d ' s Spirit. In such receiving, G o d ' s love begins to change our hearts toward the distinctive character of divine unselfish love.

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Paul expresses a related theme in referring to the G o d w h o " h a s put his seal u p o n us and given us his Spirit in our hearts as a guarantee" (2 Cor. 1:22, RSV; see also 2 Cor. 5:5; cf. Eph. 1 : 1 3 ) . According to Paul, the Spirit given to receptive h u m a n hearts guarantees, as an evidential, cognitive d o w n payment, that G o d will complete the salvific w o r k of transformation b e g u n in those hearts. Such h u m a n volitional transformation toward divine love can be salient evidence of G o d ' s reality and intervention in a receptive h u m a n life.

4.

A R G U I N G

FOR

GOD

We can introduce a definition and an argument to elucidate the cognitive significance of divine merciful love. We begin with a definition of "the transformative gift" as: one's being authoritatively convicted in conscience and forgiven by X of sin and thereby being authoritatively called into volitional fellowship with X in perfect love and into rightful worship toward X as worthy of worship and, on that basis, transformed by X from default tendencies to selfishness and despair to a new volitional center with a default position of unselfish love, including forgiveness, toward all people and of hope in the triumph of good over evil by X. G i v e n this definition, and refining an argument from C h a p ter 2, w e can offer the following argument for the reality of an authoritative perfectly loving God: 1. Necessarily, if a h u m a n person is offered and receives the transformative gift, then this is the result of the authoritative p o w e r of a divine X of thoroughgoing forgiveness, fellowship in perfect love, worthiness of w o r s h i p , and triumphant hope (namely, G o d ) . 2. I h a v e been offered, and have willingly received, the transformative gift. 3. Therefore, G o d exists.

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The transformative gift in question can be offered to a person but rejected or ignored by that person. Accordingly, this gift's being offered does not guarantee its being received for w h a t it is intended to be: namely, a redemptive gift that seeks to trump h u m a n selfishness with divine love for the sake of h u m a n transformation b y G o d . If G o d inherently is perfectly loving, then G o d inherently is personal as an intentional agent with definite purposes. Accordingly, purposively available conclusive evidence and k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s reality as God w o u l d include evidence and k n o w l e d g e of G o d as personal and perfectly loving as an intentional agent. (Chapter 3 explained h o w traditional natural theology has missed this important lesson, to its o w n demise.) We cannot separate G o d ' s reality from G o d ' s perfectly loving personal character that defines G o d ' s reality. Likewise, w e cannot separate conclusive evidence and k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s reality from conclusive evidence and k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s perfectly loving personal character. M y direct, firsthand k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s reality and character w o u l d include m y being acquainted with (at least) God's personal and perfectly loving will. This will w o u l d seek to lead me noncoercively, via volitional pressure, toward volitional cooperation with G o d in unselfish love while convicting me of any wrongful obstacle to such leading. In other w o r d s , m y imperfect personal will w o u l d be challenged via m y acquaintance with a perfect personal will that seeks to lead me from selfishness to unselfish love in d i v i n e h u m a n fellowship. M y conscience w o u l d be a focal place for receiving this person-to-person volitional challenge and pressure in such a w a y that I come to " k n o w together" with G o d m y actual moral status before G o d . It w o u l d include intended conviction of m y moral w a y w a r d n e s s and noncoercive n u d g i n g of m y will toward d i v i n e - h u m a n cooperation in perfect love. When w e are acquainted with perfect unselfish love, w e are acquainted with G o d ' s inherent personal character and thus with the reality of G o d . This is so even if w e do not

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k n o w that w e are acquainted with divine reality in this case or in any other case. A t least this v i e w deserves serious consideration now. In k n o w i n g perfect unselfish love b y acquaintance, w e k n o w G o d ' s reality b y acquaintance, even if our understanding of what (or, better, whom) w e then k n o w is mistaken or otherwise deficient. In addition, w h e n acquainted with such love, w e face a person-defining and life-guiding choice: w e can either welcome and support our transformation or turn away, directly or indirectly, in rejection or indifference. Faced with such a choice, w e h a v e a decisive cognitive opportunity, and w e arguably are accountable before G o d for h o w w e handle it. Through acquaintance with perfect unselfish love, w e experience w h a t is being offered in the transformative gift. Perhaps w e have experienced only v a g u e glimmers of the gift, but these are enough to invite us to welcome and to support the gift rather than to turn a w a y in either rejection or indifference. According to this approach, the unselfish love intruding via volitional pressure in our troubled lives is G o d ' s noncoercive attempt to rescue us by leading us from despair to hope and from spiritual death to n e w life. A person, however, could be offered such an invitation from G o d and not even k n o w it, given obscuring confusions and corrupted motivational attitudes in that person. In any case, some cognitive and volitional pollution control m a y be needed among humans faced with divine intervention. Three h u m a n impediments to acknowledging divine intervention from a perfectly loving G o d are noteworthy. First, w e often look for G o d ' s reality in the w r o n g places, if w e care to look at all. Philosophers typically look in areas involving abstruse, esoteric arguments that h a v e nothing directly to do with G o d ' s inherent character of perfect authoritative love. For example, seemingly endless disputes about probabilities involving apparent design in biology or cosmology or about the need for an inaugural cause behind any parade of contingent causes and effects illustrate the point abundantly and decisively. One's antecedent

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commitments about G o d tend to color one's understanding of h o w the relevant probabilities or causal requirements g o , and this consideration leaves the disputes marked b y question begging and hence notoriously unresolved, at best. In any case, it is not clear that the empirical phenomena in question call for a personal agent w o r t h y of w o r s h i p . (See Chapter 3 for some serious shortcomings in natural theology on that front.) It therefore is unclear what, if anything, one actually gains from such disputes, beyond digging in deeper with one's antecedent commitments. Fortunately, w e need not go there to get to G o d ' s reality. Instead, a perfectly loving G o d w o u l d come to willing humans in G o d ' s unique irreducibly authoritative and personal way. Second, m a n y people unreflectively think of perfect unselfish love as just another natural h u m a n capacity, akin to vision, speech, and taste. Accordingly, they uncritically think that humans h a v e the p o w e r of perfect unselfish love on their o w n , without a morally superior p o w e r b e y o n d themselves. The rough idea, then, is that m a n y h u m a n s are naturally loving toward other people, and that therefore w e have no basis here for introducing a G o d worthy of worship. This is presumptuous at best, and also implausible on any careful reflection that attends to actual human tendencies. We obviously are hard put to come u p with a h u m a n community that exemplifies perfect love on its o w n , and this is very telling of the actual h u m a n condition. Left to our o w n resources and motives, w e evidently are too conflicted motivationally and too selfishly fearful of personal loss to generate and sustain perfect unselfish love in relationships. We therefore apparently need a morally superior p o w e r b e y o n d us. In any case, w e should not take self-credit in any situation in which self-credit is not due, including the situation of perfect unselfish love. If such unselfish love w e r e under our o w n p o w e r via self-help or peer-help among h u m a n s , w e w o u l d be much more effective and much less violent at conflict resolution, peace making, and community building. Our general record on these fronts obviously leaves a lot to

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be desired, to put the matter v e r y charitably, and it suggests that perfect unselfish love is not ours to deliver. The genuine offer and the h u m a n reception of the transformative gift, according to premise 1 , require a divine source that has the p o w e r of thoroughgoing forgiveness and transformation of willing humans to a n e w volitional center of default unselfish love and forgiveness toward all people. Indeed, it is part of the concept of the transformative gift, as characterized, that the source of this gift (when this gift is real) is a powerful divine authority of thoroughgoing forgiveness w h o is w o r t h y of worship. In the concept at hand, the transformation integral to this gift is the change of a person's motivational center to a default position of unselfish love and forgiveness for all people. This change involves a reported experienced reality that is prominent in Jewish and Christian theism, as outlined in the previous section: namely, the divine impartation of G o d ' s Spirit to humans w h e r e b y divine p o w e r is m a d e available to them at their motivational center in a default manner. A s a result, the change in question is not offered as just a product of human self-help or peer-help. Instead, it involves a distinctive p o w e r from beyond the domain of h u m a n power. Third, m a n y people think that conclusive evidence and k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s reality, if they are available at all, could be acquired b y us without our receiving an authoritative challenge to participate in the kind of perfect unselfish love characteristic of G o d . We humans naturally prefer to keep G o d ' s authoritative perfectly loving reality at arm's length, in order to block this reality from challenging our o w n selfish plans. A perfectly loving G o d , however, w o u l d offer selfish humans an authoritative challenge to have divine unselfish love e m p o w e r and guide their lives thoroughly, including in their interactions with dangerous enemies and morally perverse people. We therefore should consider the distinction from the Introduction between spectator evidence and k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s reality, which d o not challenge a h u m a n will to yield to G o d , and authoritative, invitational

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evidence and k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s reality, w h i c h invite a h u m a n will to cooperate with G o d ' s will and thereby to become personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality. A s inquirers about G o d ' s reality, w e do well to be open to such authoritative evidence and k n o w l e d g e , given the perfectly loving moral character of a G o d w o r t h y of worship. In keeping with authoritative direct, firsthand evidence of divine reality, as opposed to spectator evidence, premise 2 is irreducibly first-person and self-involving. It rests on undefeated authoritative evidence of divine reality that is inherently and directly firsthand and purposively available. Specifically, the evidence involves m y evident willing reception of an authoritative call in conscience to volitional fellowship with an intentional agent worthy of w o r s h i p . It also includes for me an evident n e w volitional center with a default position of unselfish love and forgiveness for all people. Of course, w e should not confuse the direct, firsthand evidence in question with an argument of any kind. Arguments, as noted previously, d o not h a v e a monopoly on evidence, even if evidence can be characterized and relied u p o n in an argument. Skeptics doubtless will question premise 2, if only because the first premise seems more secure. In the face of their challenge, however, I could plausibly argue for the cognitive well-groundedness, or trustworthiness, of premise 2 on the basis of its central role in an undefeated best-available explanation of the w h o l e range of m y experience and m y other evidence. This role includes this premise's figuring in a best-available answer to the following explanationseeking question: w h y is m y experience regarding the supposed provisions of the transformative gift (including m y evident change from default selfishness to a n e w volitional center with a default position of unselfish love toward all people) as it actually is now, rather than the opposite or at least v e r y different? On the basis of m y experiential evidence, the central role of premise 2 in answering such an explanation-seeking question can figure in its being well

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grounded for me and for anyone else w h o has similar evidence. If w e failed to acknowledge the reality of causation, our explanatory resources w o u l d suffer considerably; an analogous point holds for the reality of G o d , although the crucial evidence is volitionally sensitive and beyond our control. (See Moser 1989 for details on explanation and its role in justification and knowledge.) M y experiential evidence will be conclusive if it is unaccompanied b y defeaters, which can arise directly or indirectly. A direct defeater of initial evidence for a statement consists of additional evidence (not to be confused with mere beliefs) that significantly challenges the support of the initial evidence for the statement in question. Consider, for instance, m y initial visual evidence indicating that there is a bent stick submerged halfway in a tub of water. The support that this evidence initially offers can be defeated b y m y additional visual evidence indicating, from a broader visual perspective, that m y initial visual evidence fails, w h e n supplemented with m y broader evidence, to indicate that there is a bent stick in the tub of water. In contrast, an indirect defeater of evidence consists of evidence that significantly challenges the truth (claim) indicated b y that evidence. For instance, m y visual evidence indicating that there is a vase before me can be defeated by m y broader visual and tactile evidence indicating that only a holographic image of a vase is before me. Such defeaters illustrate that evidence can be defeated, and is thus defeasible, in two w a y s by additional evidence (but not by mere beliefs, which can be altogether lacking in supporting evidence). The kind of explanation-oriented well-groundedness, or trustworthiness, underlying premise 2 is rightly more demanding than a mere "consistency relation" with evidence (as proposed, for example, b y Cottingham 2005, p. 24). It also avoids worries about a cognitively naive realism that face a less demanding principle of credulity (as proposed, for example, by Swinburne 1979 and Davis 1989). In line with a so-called " c o m m o n s e n s e " approach to evidence

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and k n o w l e d g e , the latter principle of credulity assumes that reality is probably the w a y things appear to us to be, if there is no reason to question this. Our best science, however, can present subtle evidence independent of (some) commonsense beliefs (say, evidence in particle physics, regarding the constituents of physical objects) that challenges a commonsense belief resting on a principle of credulity. (See Wiebe 2004, p p . 1 4 2 - 4 , for some confirmation.) In contrast, m y proposed explanation-oriented approach makes wellgroundedness more stringent, given its required role in a best-available explanation relative to the w h o l e range of one's experience and evidence. A s a result, skeptics cannot plausibly accuse me of just preaching to the choir or to people of " c o m m o n sense," a practice that improperly w o u l d disregard skeptics. Cognitive support for premise 2 could be diachronic rather than just synchronic, because G o d could manifest his worship-worthy personal reality over time in the transformative gift as a person willingly receives that gift increasingly deeply. To the extent that w e are unwilling to undergo such reception of the transformative gift over time, w e w o u l d block from ourselves significant evidence of G o d ' s existence as w e obstruct evidence of G o d ' s desired intervention in our experience over time. Philosophers often look only for synchronic evidence of G o d ' s existence and thereby neglect the significant evidence of divine reality involved in ongoing h u m a n reception of the transformative gift. We, however, should look carefully for such diachronic evidence, given the ongoing purposes of noncoercive redemptive transformation that a perfectly loving G o d w o u l d have regarding willing humans (see Schweizer 1 9 7 1 , p. 50). Of course, not all people share m y evident experience underlying premise 2. That claim seems obviously true, but it yields no objection to premise 2, because that premise does not entail that all people h a v e the experience in question. In addition, cognitive support for a claim, including for premise 2, can v a r y among people, owing to variation

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in experiences and corresponding evidence. Accordingly, some people k n o w some things that are not k n o w n at all b y others, and this should come as no surprise. Of course, a critic might allege that the explanation offered b y premise 2 for m y experience is not only false but ultimately ungrounded. In that case, the critic will o w e us a falsifier of premise 2 and an undefeated defeater of m y evidence for premise 2. So far as I can tell, it will not be easy for the critic to deliver either of these. A t a minimum, the critic has some careful w o r k to do. Of course, I could h a v e a defeater supplied by m y experience (such as an indication of a hallucination or a dream), but the fact that I actually do not h a v e one is cognitively significant and should not be disregarded. This chapter and the following chapter contend that the needed falsifier or defeater is not as readily available as m a n y religious skeptics h a v e supposed (see Wiebe 2004 for additional support in this area). In addition, given m y appeal for antiskeptical purposes to an undefeated best-available explanation of the whole range of m y experience and other evidence, the scope for potential defeaters is broad indeed and is not implausibly restricted to w h a t fits with commonsense or naive realism. Accordingly, I have not narrowly stacked the evidential deck against skeptics. E v e n so, w e cannot plausibly excuse skeptics from their considerable evidential and explanatory burden now. We should not offer the conclusion of the argument 1 3, that G o d exists, as a conceptually necessary truth - that is, as a truth the denial of which is not coherently imaginable. We coherently can imagine that G o d does not exist, but, as this section has argued, it is true that G o d exists and there is purposively available conclusive evidence that G o d exists. Clearly, the p o w e r of our imagination, with regard to w h a t it can coherently present, outstrips w h a t is real and w h a t is conclusively supportable for us. A s a result, w e w o u l d risk implausible special pleading in suggesting that G o d ' s existence is conceptually necessary (unless, for

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some reason, w e introduced a merely technical notion of conceptual necessity independent of what w e can coherently imagine). In any case, it is enough for purposes of sound argument that the steps of argument 1 - 3 are true and their inference is valid. G i v e n the previous considerations, I find no compelling reason to deny that the argument is sound or, for a suitably positioned person, rationally cogent. H u m a n reception of the divine transformative gift can come in v a r y i n g levels or degrees, owing to v a r y i n g depths of being led into noncoercive volitional cooperation or fell o w s h i p with G o d . A t any level, however, one's undergoing the required transformation that brings a n e w default motivational center will entail one's becoming personifying evidence of divine reality, wherein one willingly receives and reflects G o d ' s moral character of unselfish love and thus G o d ' s distinctive kind of moral agency for others. In other w o r d s , one's receiving a n e w default motivational center supplies a basic, or foundational, threshold for one's becoming personifying evidence of G o d . Such life-giving, and self-giving, evidence, rather than that of natural theology, is characteristic of a G o d of perfect love. In accordance with its divine source, this personifying evidence is inherently for the sake of others. It is therefore inherently morally significant, in being motivated b y divine unselfish love.

5. V O L I T I O N A L A N D F I L I A L K N O W L E D G E

The volitional change identified in the previous section m a y n o w be seen as crucial to a distinctive kind of volitional and filial k n o w l e d g e of divine reality: that is, k n o w l e d g e wherein one comes to k n o w G o d as one's authoritative loving Father in virtue of the willingly received impartation of G o d ' s Spirit to one at one's motivational center. The relevant filial relation is, accordingly, a volitional and spiritual filial relation, o w i n g to the central roles of a human's receptive will and G o d ' s e m p o w e r i n g Spirit at w o r k in n e w h u m a n life.

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The present section characterizes the n e w volitional center and the impartation of G o d ' s Spirit for a person in terms of the direct, firsthand reception and continuing availability of the morally perfect p o w e r of G o d ' s Spirit b y a willingly receptive person. This approach sidesteps metaphysical intricacies that are not essential to present explanatory purposes. It also enables us to avoid both a moralistic approach that characterizes a n e w motivational center just in terms of actual moral actions or episodes and a mystical approach that proposes that G o d ' s Spirit literally inhabits a human spirit. (For relevant discussion, see Brondos 2006, Chapter 6.) We must distinguish t w o kinds of knowledge: (i) propositional k n o w l e d g e that G o d exists, and (ii) filial k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s reality as one's humbly standing in a childlike, volitionally submissive relationship to G o d as perfectly authoritative and loving Lord and Father. (We should avoid confusion of one's being childlike and one's being childzs/z.) Filial k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s reality requires propositional knowledge that G o d exists, but it exceeds such propositional knowledge. One could know, on the basis of conclusive evidence, that G o d exists, but fail altogether to submit volitionally to G o d as Lord. Filial knowledge of G o d ' s reality, in contrast, includes one's being reconciled to G o d , at least to some extent, through volitional submission to G o d as Lord and Father, on the basis of conclusive authoritative evidence that is purposively available. It requires our entrusting ourselves as obedient children to G o d in grateful love, thereby becoming transformed in who we are and in how we exist and act, not just in w h a t w e believe or feel. We m a y think of this as h u m a n filial attunement to G o d relative to G o d ' s morally perfect will. This, of course, goes significantly beyond merely historical k n o w l e d g e of theologically interpreted events (on the latter kind of k n o w l e d g e , see Bourke 1964, Perrin 1976, Chapter 5, and Allison 2009). A s perfectly loving, G o d w o u l d not be satisfied b y our merely k n o w i n g that G o d exists. Such mere propositional

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k n o w l e d g e falls far short of w h a t G o d w o u l d value by w a y of the divine redemption of humans: namely, that all people, in response to purposively available authoritative evidence of divine reality, freely yield to G o d ' s call to receive transformation by G o d from selfishness to unselfish love toward all people. (For J e w i s h and Christian suggestions of this ideal, see, for example, Deuteronomy 6:5, 1 0 : 1 2 - 1 3 , Leviticus 1 9 : 1 8 , Mark 1 2 : 2 8 - 3 1 ; for some historical background, see Furnish 1972, Klassen 1984, and Meier 2009.) A s perfectly loving, G o d w o u l d aim to h a v e all people freely come, in volitional cooperation with G o d , to be morally perfect as G o d is morally perfect. G i v e n this aim, G o d w o u l d have no reason to offer spectator evidence of divine reality to humans. In contrast, authoritative evidence that includes a divine call to h u m a n transformation w o u l d serve God's redemptive purpose for humans. We can elucidate filial k n o w l e d g e of G o d by attending more carefully to the kind of h u m a n transformation it demands, and, in this connection, w e can benefit from some helpful suggestions in Paul's letters. According to Paul, the Spirit of G o d is also the Spirit of Jesus, w h o g a v e his life as G o d ' s Son in order to manifest and to offer his Father's powerful unselfish love for humans and thereby to offer d i v i n e h u m a n reconciliation. Accordingly, the Spirit of G o d is the Spirit of adoption of humans into G o d ' s family of children w h o acknowledge G o d as " A b b a , Father" (see Rom. 8:9,15), and this adoption includes one's being led by the unselfish p o w e r of G o d ' s Spirit (see Rom. 8:14). This approach to G o d ' s Spirit, portrayed as leading humans to become God's unselfish children, fits well with the importance of filial k n o w l e d g e of divine reality. B y w a y of contrast, worldly p o w e r s of h u m a n selfishness go in the opposite direction of one's being led b y the unselfish p o w e r of G o d ' s Spirit. In expecting evidence of G o d ' s reality to fit with w o r l d l y p o w ers, including w o r l d l y religious p o w e r s incompatible with unselfish love, people blind themselves from apprehending G o d ' s reality.

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According to Paul, G o d ' s intervening Spirit reveals G o d ' s reality and our relationship with G o d ; thus: " . . . w e have r e c e i v e d . . . the Spirit from G o d , in order that w e m a y k n o w the things freely given to us by G o d " (1 Cor. 2:12, italics added; cf. 1 Cor. 12:7-8, where Paul speaks of the "manifestation" of G o d ' s Spirit). The Spirit of G o d , as G o d ' s o w n divine agent of salvific intervention and communication, w o u l d automatically k n o w the things of G o d , including divine intentions and other attitudes. A s a result, the Spirit of G o d could authoritatively reveal G o d ' s reality and G o d ' s w a y s to humans. Paul therefore concludes that w e are given the Spirit of G o d in order that w e m a y k n o w G o d ' s reality and G o d ' s w a y s of self-giving love. He arguably has a kind of volitional and filial knowledge in mind, because h u m a n reception of G o d ' s Spirit requires human willingness to be adopted into G o d ' s family of obedient children, in cooperative fellowship with G o d . By giving G o d ' s o w n empowering Spirit to receptive humans, as a resident default but noncoercive guide and motivator, G o d extends volitional and filial knowledge of G o d ' s reality to humans. More specifically, G o d ' s intervening Spirit confirms to a receptive individual's spirit, via conscience, that he or she is a child of G o d , called into filial fellowship - including volitional cooperation - with G o d as perfectly authoritative and loving Father (see Rom. 8 : 1 5 - 1 6 , Gal. 4:6-7,1 Cor. 1:9; cf. 1 John 4:13). The role of conscience is crucial because it involves the spiritual heart of a person and, accordingly, is a place of profound conviction under certain conditions. Of course, G o d could use various means, including other people, to introduce noncoercive "volitional press u r e " in one's conscience and thereby lead a person toward a certain attitude or action. E v e n so, one's conscience w o u l d have a crucial role in the divine leading. Filial fellowship, including volitional cooperation, with G o d involves both noncoercive perfectly authoritative and loving ownership of a child on G o d ' s part and willingly being owned by G o d on the child's part. Accordingly, Paul states

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that followers of Jesus under G o d as Father are not their o w n but " h a v e been bought with a price" and thus belong to G o d (1 Cor. 6:19-20; cf. Rom. 14:7-9). Paul w o u l d say that the urgent question for a h u m a n is not so much " W h o a m I ? " as "Whose a m I ? " John's Gospel follows suit: "The one w h o is of [that is, belongs to] G o d hears the w o r d s of G o d ; on account of this, y o u do not hear them, because y o u are not of [that is, do not belong to] G o d " (8:47). A key motivational question therefore arises, and takes on cognitive significance: by whose power a m I living? A m I living by the lasting noncoercive p o w e r of G o d ' s Spirit of unselfish love, or instead by m y o w n short-lived, largely selfish power? The presence of one's selfishness can be a litmus test for one's being motivated by dying h u m a n p o w e r antithetical to the lasting unselfish p o w e r of a perfectly loving G o d . In Paul's message, obedient h u m a n reception of G o d ' s Spirit is no merely subjective matter. It yields one's becoming, b y w a y of a default motive, unselfishly loving to some discernible degree as G o d is unselfishly loving, even toward enemies. It bears observable fruits of the intervening Spirit of a perfectly loving G o d , such as love, joy, peace, patience, kindness, goodness, faithfulness, humility, and self-control (see Gal. 5:22-3). These fruits are not merely subjective phenomena but are, instead, discernible b y anyone suitably attentive to them. A s the powerful overflow of divine love in a receptive h u m a n life, they emerge in h u m a n lives in w a y s that are identifiable and testable, even if one needs willing "eyes to see and ears to hear" them. The fruits of G o d ' s Spirit arise and function in a larger context of a willing life under transformation as a salvific gift from G o d to be received via experientially grounded self-entrustment to G o d (see Gal. 3:2, 14). Accordingly, they figure directly in one's becoming personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality in one's willingly receiving and reflecting G o d ' s powerful moral character for others. Jesus himself announced the h u m a n need to test competing people and their positions: " B e w a r e of false prophets,

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w h o come to y o u in sheep's clothing but i n w a r d l y are ravenous w o l v e s . You will k n o w them b y their fruits E v e r y sound tree bears good fruit, but the b a d tree bears evil fruit. A sound tree cannot bear evil fruit, nor can a b a d tree bear good fruit" (Matt. 7 : 1 5 - 1 8 ) . Similarly, one can k n o w the authenticity of G o d ' s intervening Spirit by means of the fruits d e m a n d e d and yielded by the Spirit in one's o w n life. A s noted previously, this Spirit noncoercively demands and empowers one, in fellowship with G o d , to become loving (at least to a certain degree) as G o d is unselfishly loving, even toward enemies. In keeping with G o d ' s perfectly loving character, this is the primary fruit of G o d ' s intervening Spirit in a receptive person (see 1 Cor. 1 3 : 1 - 1 3 ; cf. Eph. 3 : 1 7 - 1 9 , Col. 2:2,3:14). G o d ' s intervening Spirit, then, comes with salient evidence observable by any suitably attentive person, and such evidence enables one to exclude imposters and even to become personifying evidence of God. This consideration bears directly on a test for the reality of divine salvation from sin and the falsity of the m a n y dangerous counterfeits in circulation. We have suggested that the kind of h u m a n transformation sought by a perfectly loving G o d w o u l d bear on the kind of evidence of divine reality w e should expect. Let's use the ancient Greek term agape to refer to the divine morally righteous unselfish love that noncoercively seeks w h a t is good, even w h a t is best all things considered, for all people involved. (Obviously, w e should not confuse agape with much of w h a t is ordinarily represented as " l o v e , " particularly the fluffy stuff of romance novels, popular love songs, and television soap operas.) Let's distinguish between (a) an agape-enhancing occasion in which a h u m a n is willingly agape-receiving a n d / o r agape-advancing toward G o d and other agents, in virtue of the value of agape, and (b) an agape-resisting occasion in which a h u m a n is willingly agapeneglecting a n d / o r agape-opposing toward G o d and other agents.

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G o d ' s desired transformation of humans w o u l d include a change from agape-resisting occasions to agape-enhancing occasions for humans, in d i v i n e - h u m a n fellowship. In other w o r d s , G o d w o u l d w a n t to e m p o w e r humans, without coercion, to transform any occasion fully, including the involved h u m a n agents themselves, from agape-resisting to agape-enhancing. Such noncoercive e m p o w e r i n g of what w e m a y call "agape transformation" w o u l d aim for cooperative d i v i n e - h u m a n fellowship, and w o u l d include a manifestation, if temporary and incomplete, of G o d ' s morally perfect character, even in the willing recipients of G o d ' s agape. This divine manifestation, in keeping with G o d ' s perfectly loving character, w o u l d seek to offer divine love to a w i d e r audience or to a particular audience more deeply. In doing so, G o d w o u l d seek to have humans themselves become personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality, in virtue of their willingly receiving and reflecting G o d ' s distinctive moral character for others. Agape-enhancing occasions are agape-enlightening in that they bring agape regarding G o d and other agents into h u m a n attention (at least for the willing humans involved) as valuable - that is, at least as w o r t h y of being received a n d / o r advanced. In contrast, agape-resisting occasions are agapedimming in that they obscure or reduce the value of agape regarding G o d and others for the relevant humans. If G o d ' s character is inherently a character of (morally righteous) agape, as some of the Hebrew prophets (including Jesus) and the N e w Testament writers suggest, then agape-resisting tendencies among humans could obscure the value of G o d ' s presence for those humans. In doing so, those tendencies also could obscure the reality of G o d ' s presence, because in neglecting the value of divine love, w e easily could fail to look for it at all. H o w w e treat agape toward people could be equivalent to h o w w e treat G o d : with acceptance, indifference, or rejection. To the extent that w e take self-credit for unselfish love toward people, w e obscure its real source

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and the evidence for that source. We also then fail to give credit where credit is due: to G o d . A s a result, our attitudinal treatment of agape in our lives can be cognitively significant in addition to being morally significant. The question of evidence for G o d ' s existence should become for us humans the question of h o w w e respond, at the volitional level of a decision, to the powerful gift of agape to us and others. In this connection, philosophy can remove obstacles and clear a path for something ultimately nonphilosophical, because that "thing" is uncontrollable and more profound and powerfully transformative than any philosophy. It involves something irreducibly person-toperson - specifically, an I-Thou acquaintance of a person with the living G o d . A t this sacred place, humans will be in the presence of the personal G o d of powerful holy love, and they will be called to a fitting, self-entrusting response. Accordingly, their role as intentional responsible agents will be as important as their role as knowers. In highlighting personifying evidence of G o d , this book's epistemology of religious k n o w l e d g e aims to capture this important consideration.

6.

GOOD NEWS

GIFT AS

POWER

The d i v i n e - h u m a n volitional fellowship central to human redemption w o u l d be lasting fellowship, and not just a temporary fix. This consideration agrees with the talk of everlasting life in John 17:3. However, some people doubt that divine perfect love, as a redemptive antidote to h u m a n sin, w o u l d actually yield everlasting life for willing recipients of such love. For instance, Timothy Jackson has raised such a doubt, on the ground that "to h a v e love is not to h a v e all good things [including everlasting life], but it is to have the best thing" (1999, p. 170). Evidently, Jackson assumes that having love, even if temporary, is "the best thing." Let's consider the prospect that the "best thing" w o u l d be for willing humans to have divine love everlastingly, and not

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just for the short term. Accordingly, if G o d is perfectly loving and thus wants the best for humans, G o d w o u l d give them the opportunity to h a v e divine love everlastingly. Failing to give this v i e w due consideration, Jackson claims that " l o v e can endure even without faith in one's o w n resurrection" (1999, p. 168). The immediate issue, however, is whether a perfectly loving G o d ' s wanting the best for humans w o u l d include G o d ' s giving them the opportunity to h a v e a life of divine love everlastingly, rather than just for the short term. The answer is definitely yes. Indeed, Jackson himself unknowingly offers the needed support as follows: " L o v e is concerned with preserving and enhancing all good things, to the greatest extent possible— " (1999, p. 2 1 8 , italics added). Accordingly, a perfectly loving G o d w o u l d offer willing h u m a n s the opportunity to receive a life of divine love everlastingly, in lasting fellowship with G o d . The d i v i n e - h u m a n fellowship central to h u m a n redemption w o u l d follow suit. The divine redemption of humans from sin w o u l d rest on divine authority, anchored in divine perfect love, and not on morally questionable h u m a n preferences. We can find some indications of such authority in the earliest reports about Jesus, w h o stood in contrast with his J e w i s h contemporaries w h o dared to speak for G o d (Matt. 7:28-9). Such authority w a s v e r y different from that of secular authorities w h o , according to Jesus, "lord it o v e r " others (Mark 1 0 : 4 2 5). The apostle Paul referred to this authority from G o d and Jesus as "the authority in the g o s p e l " (1 Cor. 9:18), and he understood "the g o s p e l " as "the power of G o d for salvation" (Rom. 1 : 1 6 , italics added). According to Paul, if the gospel of divine G o o d N e w s is an authoritative gift, it is a p o w e r gift (as emphasized in Kasemann 1 9 6 1 ) . Let's clarify this p o w e r authority and see h o w it contributes to the divine redemption of humans. We shall see that the kind of redemption in question harks back to the need of an intentional (and thus personal) rescuer in the Introduction's wilderness parable. Strikingly, Jesus manifested a kind of powerful authority that led to his being w o r s h i p p e d as the divine personal

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means of h u m a n salvation b y his earliest followers, including even such an educated Jewish monotheist as the apostle Paul (see Phil. 2 : 5 - 1 1 , 1 Cor. 1:2, Gal. 4 : 4 - 5 , 1 Thess. 5:8, Rom. 3:24; cf. Hurtado 2003 and Bauckham 2008). Jesus began his ministry as the preacher of the G o o d N e w s about God's arriving kingdom, under clear influence from the book of Isaiah (cf. M a r k 1 : 1 - 1 5 ) , but he became, v e r y soon after his death, an object offocus in the preaching of the G o o d N e w s by his earliest, J e w i s h disciples. In short, the preacher became part of the preached; the proclaimer became part of the proclaimed, as Bultmann (1955, Vol. 1 , p. 33) and m a n y other N e w Testament scholars have noted. In the path of C.H. D o d d (1936), Eugene Lemcio has identified a common k e r y g m a , or proclamation, regarding the G o o d N e w s of redemption in nineteen of the twenty-seven books of the N e w Testament. He has isolated this k e r y g m a in all of the main representatives and traditions of the N e w Testament, and he sums u p the unifying k e r y g m a as follows: "It declares the G o o d N e w s of G o d ' s sending [Jesus] or raising Jesus from the dead. By responding obediently to G o d , one receives the benefits stemming from this salvific event" (1991, p. 127). We therefore m a y speak of the G o o d N e w s k e r y g m a of redemption, b e y o n d any multiplicity of kerygmas (for further support for such unity of message, see Hunter 1943, Wenham 1993). In one of the earliest statements of the G o o d N e w s proclamation in the N e w Testament, Paul writes: For I delivered to you of first importance what I have received: that Christ died for our sins according to the Scriptures, that he was buried, that he was raised on the third day according to the Scriptures, and that he appeared to Peter, and then to the twelve. After that, he appeared to more than five hundred brothers at the same time, most of whom remain until now, but some have fallen asleep. Then he appeared to James, then to all the apostles, and last of all he appeared also to me, as to one untimely born If Christ has not been raised, our preaching is futile and your faith is futile too. We are also then found to

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be false witnesses about God, because w e have testified about God that he raised Christ from the d e a d . . . . If Christ has not been raised, your faith is futile; you are still in your s i n s . . . . If w e have hope in Christ only for this life, w e are to be pitied more than all men. But Christ has been raised from the dead, the firstfruits of those who have fallen asleep (1 Cor. 15:3-8, 14-15,17,19-20). The G o o d N e w s of redemption, according to Paul, includes the twofold fact that "Christ died for our sins" and w a s raised from the dead. Indeed, Paul regards the G o o d N e w s as "false" and "futile" in the absence of the resurrection of Jesus, because he links the resurrection of Jesus to divine forgiveness of h u m a n sins in such a w a y that if there is no divine resurrection in vindication of Jesus, " y o u are still in y o u r sins." A central theme of the Pauline G o o d N e w s of redemption is that h u m a n sins are forgiven, or pardoned, b y G o d , and humans are thereby offered reconciliation with G o d , in connection with the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. If atonement is d i v i n e - h u m a n reconciliation that effectively deals with h u m a n sin as resistance to divine unselfish love and fellowship, then the heart of the controversy about the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, at least b y Paul's lights, is a debate about atonement. E v e n so, some important questions remain. For instance, exactly h o w d o the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus figure in (intended) d i v i n e - h u m a n atonement? In addition, h o w is such atonement to be appropriated b y humans for redemption from sin? According to Matthew's Gospel (26:28), Jesus announced at the Last Supper that he will die "for the forgiveness of sins." In Matthew's account, the atoning sacrifice of Jesus as G o d ' s sinless offering for sinful humans is at the center of G o d ' s effort for h u m a n redemption. John's Gospel (1:36) and Paul's undisputed letters (see 1 Cor. 5:7, 2 Cor. 5:21, Rom. 3:24-6) agree with this lesson about redemption. The unique role assigned to Jesus in d i v i n e - h u m a n redemption clearly sets him apart from every other k n o w n seminal religious

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leader, including Moses, Confucius, Krishna, G a u t a m a the B u d d h a , and M u h a m m a d . A s portrayed b y Matthew, John, and Paul, Jesus uniquely offered himself as G o d ' s atoning sacrifice to G o d for h u m a n redemption from sin. Jesus therefore emerges at the center of the G o o d N e w s proclamation of G o d ' s intended redemption of humans. In other w o r d s , he becomes part of w h a t is proclaimed in the Christian G o o d N e w s , and thus he does not remain as just a proclaimer of the G o o d N e w s . The R o m a n crucifixion of Jesus m a y seem to leave him as ultimately a failure, even as one " c u r s e d " before G o d (see Gal. 3 : 1 3 , Deut. 21:23). Nonetheless, at least Paul, Matthew, and John proclaim the crucified and risen Jesus as the central mediating figure in G o d ' s atoning sacrifice and turnaround victory for the redemption of humans. Out of the apparent defeat of Jesus on the cross, according to the G o o d N e w s , G o d brought a unique manifestation and offering of divine love and forgiveness toward humans, including G o d ' s enemies, while setting aside any h u m a n means of triumphant p o w e r (see 1 Cor. 1 : 2 3 - 9 ) . The cross of Jesus therefore carries a w o r d of divine judgment, as noted by Kasemann (1967, p. 40): "The cross shows that the true G o d alone is the creator w h o w o r k s from nothing, w h o continually d r a w s creation out of chaos and w h o has hence constantly manifested himself since the beginning of the w o r l d as the raiser of the dead. The cross also shows us that from the aspect of the question of salvation, true man is a l w a y s the sinner w h o is fundamentally unable to help himself, w h o cannot b y his o w n action bridge the endless distance to G o d , and w h o is hence a member of the lost, chaotic, futile w o r l d , which at best waits for the resurrection of the d e a d . " The crucifixion of Jesus, accordingly, is proclaimed as a central part of G o d ' s intended powerful reversal of the dark h u m a n tragedy of alienation from G o d for the sake of h u m a n redemption b y G o d . It serves, in short, as a powerful divine invitation to humans bent on lesser, ultimately failing powers.

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The intended divine reversal aims at d i v i n e - h u m a n reconciliation b y means of a powerful manifestation of G o d ' s unselfishly loving moral character. This manifestation is exemplified in Jesus, G o d ' s innocent victim (of h u m a n sin) w h o offers forgiveness and fellowship instead of condemnation to guilty humans. We m a y call this the divine manifestoffering approach to atonement or redemption, in keeping with Romans 3 : 2 1 - 6 (which uses talk of "manifestation" repeatedly). What is being m a d e manifest is G o d ' s powerful moral character of righteous and forgiving love, and w h a t is being offered, in keeping with that character, is lasting d i v i n e - h u m a n fellowship as a powerful divine gift for the sake of h u m a n redemption. This divine gift for h u m a n s is anchored in both (a) the unique love offered and manifested v i a G o d ' s powerful atoning sacrifice in Jesus, the innocent victim of humans, and (b) G o d ' s powerful resurrection of Jesus as Lord and as Giver of G o d ' s Spirit. This gift, accordingly, is inextricably linked to its life-giving gift Giver. In an important sense, the gift of salvation is G o d himself. The manifestation of G o d ' s self-giving character in Jesus reveals the kind of G o d w h o is thereby offering forgiveness and lasting fellowship to humans for the sake of their redemption. The death of Jesus does not bring about d i v i n e - h u m a n reconciliation b y itself, but it aims to provide G o d ' s means of redemption of humans v i a divine manifestation and offering. To realize d i v i n e - h u m a n reconciliation, humans must receive the manifest offering of forgiveness and fellowship via grounded faith, or self-entrustment, toward the G o d w h o extends the manifest offering. Atonement will then become more than an offer to humans; it will become actual redemption of humans by G o d . (For some prominent alternatives to the manifest-offering approach to atonement, see A u l e n 1 9 6 1 , Berkhof 1986, p p . 3 0 4 - 1 2 ; cf. O'Collins 1995, pp. 197-201.) According to Paul's message (1 Thess. 5:10), Jesus as divinely appointed Lord and G i v e r of G o d ' s Spirit came from G o d to identify with us h u m a n s in our weakness and

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trouble, while he represented his divine Father in righteous and merciful love. Jesus therefore aims as G o d ' s salvific mediator to represent, and to serve as a personal bridge between, G o d and humans b y seeking to reconcile humans to his Father. Accordingly, he manifests and offers the divine gift of fellowship anchored in merciful, forgiving love as the p o w e r of G o d ' s o w n intervening Spirit. Jesus's obedient death on the cross, commanded of him b y G o d (see Rom. 3 : 2 5 , 1 Cor. 5:7, Phil. 2:8; cf. Mark 14:23-4, John 1 8 : 1 1 ) , aims to manifest h o w far he and his Father will go - even to gruesome death - to offer redemption, including divine forgiveness and fellowship, to humans. B y divine assignment, then, Jesus gives humans all he has, from his Father's self-giving love, to manifest that G o d mercifully and righteously loves humans to the fullest extent and to offer humans redemption as the gracious gift of unearned forgiveness, fellowship, and membership in G o d ' s everlasting family via reception of G o d ' s o w n Spirit (see, for instance, Rom. 5:8, John 3 : 1 6 17). This is the heart of the G o o d N e w s of redemption that emerges from Jesus and his immediate followers, and it differs strikingly from the various redemptive plans on offer elsewhere. (Chapter 5 returns to the latter consideration in connection with the topics of religious diversity and exclusivism.) The G o o d N e w s in question proclaims the cross of the obedient Jesus as the place where selfish human rebellion against G o d is mercifully judged and forgiven b y G o d . This does not mean that G o d punished Jesus, a reportedly innocent man w h o obeyed G o d in willingly going from Gethsemane to Calvary. N o N e w Testament writer teaches that G o d punished Jesus, although some later, less careful theologians h a v e suggested a contrary view. According to the G o o d N e w s , G o d sent Jesus into the rebellious w o r l d to identify with w a y w a r d humans in w a y s that manifest and offer divine love to them, even to the extent of undergoing, willingly and obediently, gruesome suffering and death at h u m a n hands. In this identification b y Jesus with

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w a y w a r d humans, G o d w o u l d deem his obedient suffering and death as adequate for dealing justly, under divine righteousness, with selfish h u m a n rebellion against G o d and G o d ' s unselfish love. Accordingly, Jesus p a y s the price on behalf of humans for righteous divine reconciliation of sinners, and thereby, in manifesting and offering divine forgiveness, removes any need for selfish fear, condemnation, anxiety, shame, guilt, and punishment among humans in relation to G o d (see Rom. 8:1). G o d employs the cross of Jesus independently of characteristic h u m a n p o w e r s , and thereby manifests that salvation comes from God's p o w e r rather than h u m a n power. A central lesson of Paul's Epistle to the Romans, in keeping with Jesus's parables in Matthew 2 0 : 1 - 1 5 and Luke 18: 9 - 1 4 , is that divine righteous grace trumps "justice as ordinarily understood." It is therefore a serious (but common) mistake to treat G o d ' s salvific atonement of humans via Jesus as an episode where "justice as ordinarily understood" is satisfied. On this ordinary understanding of justice, Jesus w o u l d h a v e to undergo punishment (by G o d ) for every sin ever committed, because justice is retaliatory, requiring " a n eye for an e y e " (see E x o d . 2 1 : 2 3 - 4 , Lev. 24:19-20, Matt. 5:384 1 ) . Divine righteous grace, according to Jesus and Paul, cannot be understood b y the standard of such justice, despite the demands of some people to the contrary. Instead, G o d ' s righteousness, or justice, must be understood in terms of divine grace that manifests and offers mercy, even to enemies of G o d , including religiously devout enemies. The Pauline G o o d N e w s identifies the ultimate motive for the crucifixion of Jesus as (the manifestation of) his Father's righteous love for humans. Unlike m a n y later theologians, Paul definitively links G o d ' s righteousness, or justice, with G o d ' s powerful self-giving love: " G o d manifests his o w n love (agape) for us in that while w e were yet sinners, Christ died for u s . . . . Since w e h a v e n o w been justified b y his blood, h o w much more shall w e be saved b y him from the wrath [of G o d ] . . . . [W]hile w e w e r e enemies [of G o d ] , w e

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w e r e reconciled to G o d through the death of his Son " (Rom. 5:8-10). G o d , according to Paul, takes the initiative and the crucial means through Jesus in offering a p o w erful gracious gift of d i v i n e - h u m a n reconciliation for the sake of h u m a n redemption. This offer, as suggested, manifests G o d ' s forgiving love as well as G o d ' s righteousness. Accordingly, Paul takes the sacrificial death of Jesus to manifest divine forgiving love and righteousness. Indeed, he seems to think of divine gracious love as powerful righteous love (see K a s e m a n n 1 9 6 1 , Way 1 9 9 1 , Chapter 4, Martyn 1997, Chapter 9). Mere forgiveness of humans by G o d w o u l d fail to counter adequately the w r o n g d o i n g that called for divine forgiveness - namely, h u m a n neglect and dismissal of divine gracious authority (on the latter topic, see Rom. 1 : 2 1 , 28; cf. Meadors 2006). In exposing and judging the basis of h u m a n wrongdoing, G o d upholds perfect moral integrity in the divine redemption of humans, without condoning evil. Through the loving self-sacrifice of Jesus, according to the G o o d N e w s , God meets the standard of morally perfect love for us humans, w h e n w e could not, w o u l d not, and did not. G o d then offers this gracious powerful gift of divinely prov i d e d righteousness to us, as G o d ' s Passover lamb for us (see 1 Cor. 5:7), to be received by self-entrustment to Jesus and G o d as salvific gift givers. Otherwise, our prospects for meeting the standard of divine perfect love and thus for salvation w o u l d be bleak indeed. (On gift righteousness from G o d , in contrast to h u m a n righteousness via the law, as central to Paul's thought, see Philippians 3:9, Romans 3 : 2 1 - 6 , 1 0 : 3 - 4 , and Galatians 3 : 1 1 - 1 2 ; cf. Way 1 9 9 1 , Chapter 4, Westerholm 2004.) Jesus's main motivation for undergoing the cross w a s his unselfishly loving obedience to his divine Father on our behalf for the sake of d i v i n e - h u m a n reconciliation. Jesus expresses the crucial role of obedience to his Father in Gethsemane: " N o t w h a t I will, but w h a t You w i l l " (Mark 1 4 : 3 5 6; cf. Mark 1 4 : 2 2 - 5 , John 12:27-8). Likewise, Paul v i v i d l y

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identifies the central role of Jesus' s obedience in this connection: "Christ Jesus, w h o , being in the form of G o d , did not consider equality with G o d something to be grasped, but he emptied himself, taking the form of a servant, being m a d e in h u m a n likeness. Being found in appearance as a man, he humbled himself and became obedient to death, even death on a cross" (Phil. 2:6-8, italics added; cf. R o m . 5 : 1 8 - 1 9 ) . The acknowledged obedience of Jesus in his death is obedience to the redemptive mission of his divine Father, w h o g a v e Jesus his salvific commission of suffering and death for the sake of reconciling humans to G o d (see Rom. 8:3-4; cf. John 1 8 : 1 1 ) . Jesus obeyed in Gethsemane in order to manifest and to offer divine merciful reconciliation to humans. A s a result, Jesus emerges as G o d ' s salvific Passover lamb on our behalf (1 Cor. 5:7; cf. John 1:29), that is, as G o d ' s atoning sacrifice as manifest offering for us (Rom. 3:25), because he w a s perfectly obedient and thus fully righteous in the eyes of his divine Father. G o d ' s standard of righteousness is therefore met by G o d on our behalf, by w a y of a powerful personal gift for us. The gift, in other w o r d s , is in the divine gift giver, and humans h a v e no basis for claiming to having earned this gift. It is, accordingly, a powerful gift that excludes boasting in h u m a n p o w e r or achievement. That is, it rightly deflates h u m a n pride as a source of h u m a n alienation from G o d . (On such pride, see Niebuhr 1 9 4 1 , Chapter 7.) The G o o d N e w s redemptive mission of Jesus included not only his death but also his resurrection by G o d . The aforementioned divine manifest-offering approach to redemption captures this fact by acknowledging the divine gracious offering of lasting d i v i n e - h u m a n fellowship under Jesus as Lord. Such divinely offered fellowship and redemption require that Jesus be alive to be Lord lastingly on behalf of humans. This illuminates Paul's comments that Jesus " w a s raised for our justification" and that " w e shall be s a v e d by his life" (Rom 4:25, 5:10), once w e acknowledge that

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justification and salvation (from h u m a n alienation and final death) are, like forgiveness, divine powerful gifts for the sake of lasting d i v i n e - h u m a n fellowship under Jesus as Lord (see 1 Thess. 5:10). The resurrection of Jesus from death is part of G o d ' s approval and even exaltation of G o d ' s obedient Son, the atoning sacrifice from G o d for humans (see Phil. 2 : 9 - 1 1 ) . Accordingly, the resurrection of Jesus gets some of its significance from the cross, where Jesus gave full obedience to his Father in order to supply a manifest offering of d i v i n e - h u m a n reconciliation, including divine forgiveness, to humans. In his life-surrendering obedience, Jesus manifested his authoritative Father's worthiness of complete trust and obedience, even w h e n death ensues. In other w o r d s , through his full obedience, Jesus confirmed the preeminent authority of his Father for the sake of forgiving and redeeming humans. His divine Father, in turn, vindicated and exalted Jesus, likewise for the sake of forgiving and redeeming humans. Both Jesus and his divine Father, then, play a crucial role in the divine manifest offering aimed at the atoning redemption of humans. The cognitive basis for accepting the resurrection of Jesus is no mere empirical or historical matter, contrary to the suggestion of some Christian writers. A s Emil Brunner has remarked: [A] faith whose authority is merely history has no worth. The real Easter faith does not come from the fact that one believes the report of the apostle without doubting; rather, it comes from the fact that one is reconciled to God through Jesus Christ. This reconciliation is not a mere belief but a rebirth, a new life. Through this reconciliation, godlessness and anxiety are rooted out, and one becomes a new [person]. From this reconciliation through Jesus Christ, faith in his resurrection from the dead arises of itself.... [Y]ou believe in the resurrection... because the resurrected One himself encounters you in a living w a y as he who unites you with God, as the living Mediator (1961, pp. 92-3).

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Accordingly, Brunner identifies a w a y to escape merely theoretical historical assessment regarding the resurrection of Jesus, even given this resurrection as occurring at a particular time. The escape comes from G o d ' s evident authoritative intervention in the lives of willing people with a call to d i v i n e h u m a n reconciliation. This intervention is not just a matter of imparting theoretical information, as if our problem were mainly the lack of information. Instead, w h e n willingly received, the divine intervention makes the receptive person volitionally and spiritually n e w b y the unique p o w e r of G o d ' s intervening Spirit, as suggested b y Paul and John (see 2 Cor. 5:17, Gal. 6:15, John 3:5-8). Clearly, this transformative divine intervention cannot be reduced to a body-tob o d y encounter with the risen Jesus. The needed newness in life, as suggested previously, resides ultimately in one's n e w volitional center, e m p o w e r e d by G o d ' s Spirit. One thereby becomes free to participate in volitional fellowship with G o d (and G o d ' s reconciled people) and in G o d ' s self-giving and forgiving love, even toward enemies. (For further discussion of the cognitive basis for accepting the resurrection of Jesus, see Brunner 1952, p p . 363-78, Schweizer 1 9 7 1 , p p . 4 9 - 5 1 , Moser 2008, Chapter 3.) According to the G o o d N e w s , w e should think of Jesus, w h o died to sinful, disobedient options and w a s raised to life by G o d , as an empowering life model, including cognitive model, for us, and not a mere substitute for us. Clearly, Jesus offered himself as a life model (see, for example, Luke 9:23-4, 1 4 : 2 7 - 3 3 ) , and Paul likewise offered Jesus as a life model, even for our ongoing suffering and d y i n g (see Phil. 2 : 5 - 1 3 , 3 : 7 - 1 1 , 2 Cor. 4 : 7 - 1 5 , R o m . 8:17; cf. G o r m a n 2001, 2009, Byrnes 2003). In obediently humbling himself, even to a place of suffering and death, Jesus aimed to manifest w h a t a perfectly forgiving, self-giving G o d is really like and w h a t we, too, should be like as children of such a G o d w h o willingly receive and reflect G o d ' s moral character for others. Jesus, accordingly, aimed to manifest and to offer w h a t it is to be a h u m a n person fully in the image of G o d , that is, a

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h u m a n person under the p o w e r of G o d ' s Spirit, serving in the k i n g d o m of G o d . To the extent that Jesus is actually our e m p o w e r i n g life model, w e can be persons e m p o w e r e d to receive filial k n o w l e d g e of G o d as our perfectly loving Father. In this capacity w e can become personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality and, accordingly, agents w h o willingly receive and reflect G o d ' s reality for others. We m a y regard human " d y i n g and rising" with Christ, as G o d ' s obedient child, as the substance of our becoming personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality. It w o u l d be a mistake, therefore, to leave d y i n g (to all anti-God w a y s ) out of the n e w life, including the n e w means of evidence, characteristic of divine redemption. The G o o d N e w s calls humans to receive divine redemption as a powerfully re-creative gift, because humans are unable on their o w n to uphold fellowship with G o d , owing to their inability on their o w n to love as G o d loves. G o d ' s intervening Spirit is offered as the personal p o w e r enabling willing people to enter into the redemption and fellowship provided b y G o d through Jesus. This is an integral, if widely neglected, part of the G o o d N e w s , and it w a s anticipated in section 4 of this chapter by the idea of a n e w volitional center with a default position of unselfish love. We n o w can credit the n e w volitional center to the direct, firsthand reception and ongoing availability of G o d ' s e m p o w e r i n g Spirit by a willingly receptive h u m a n agent. The cognitive relevance of such newness involving spiritual resurrection is straightforward. It yields experiential acquaintance with powerful evidence of G o d ' s intervening Spirit at w o r k in one's motivational center, leading one a w a y from selfishness and toward self-giving love, in fellowship with G o d . Such evidence indicates w h a t Paul calls a " n e w creation" in a person (2 Cor. 5:17), and it amounts to the basis of w h a t w e have called personifying evidence of divine reality in a willing human. Such evidence is central to the n e w manner of k n o w i n g suggested by Paul in connection with the n e w creation in a redeemed person (see 2 Cor. 5:16; cf. Martyn *997' PP- 8 9 - 1 1 0 ) .

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The "well-foundedness" of a receptive h u m a n response to the G o o d N e w s of redemption is ultimately anchored in willing volitional acquaintance and fellowship with G o d ' s authoritative intervening Spirit. The ultimate anchor is not in theoretical hypotheses or arguments, and it w o u l d be a conceptual confusion to suggest otherwise. Each person, however, must himself or herself face the authoritative call of G o d ' s Spirit to forgiveness and reconciliation. One cannot h a v e the volitional encounter by proxy, because responsible h u m a n s need, and h a v e , direct accountability before the redemptive G o d w o r t h y of worship. Critics might w o n d e r whether proponents of every religion could offer the kind of epistemological account at h a n d . The answer is clear: only if the religions in question offer a perfectly loving G o d w h o has intervened noncoercively to redeem people by divine grace rather than by h u m a n earning. Not all religions, of course, offer this kind of redemption; in fact, m a n y explicitly reject it, as Chapter 5 illustrates. (That claim is, as it happens, a verifiable empirical point, a n d it undermines any naive thesis of the redemptive unity of religions.) If some religions do offer the kind of perfectly loving G o d in question, then w e m a y be talking about the same G o d under different names. Of course, w e then w o u l d " n e e d to look carefully to see if that is actually the case. The theological epistemology of this book clearly (and properly) excludes an "anything g o e s " approach to theological evidence, but it allows (again, properly) for G o d ' s intervening in and redeeming the lives of people from various ethnic, racial, intellectual, and religious traditions. In fact, w e readily should expect the latter from a perfectly loving G o d w o r t h y of w o r s h i p . (Chapter 5 elaborates on this important theme in connection with the vast diversity of actual religions.) Finally, w e all n o w face a life-or-death question that brings us more existential focus than any abstract argument w o u l d . Specifically, are w e sincerely attending to the divine call v i a conscience and experienced agape in a w a y that w e l c o m e s the address from the G o d of A b r a h a m , Isaac, Jacob, and

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Jesus, where w e can become part of G o d ' s n e w creation? The analogous question in the Introduction's wilderness parable is clear: are w e willing to be led out of Hells C a n y o n by an intentional rescuer w h o seeks to transform us noncoercively from selfishness and pride to unselfish love? If w e are willing, the crucial evidence for G o d can be clarified and deepened in such a w a y that w e , ourselves, become personifying evidence of G o d as n e w l y re-created children of the living G o d w h o willingly receive and reflect G o d ' s moral character. The best explanation of our n e w lives then will be that G o d has indeed visited us redemptively, and that is evidence enough. We turn n o w to the bearing of this lesson on the reality of devastating evil and vast religious diversity in the w o r l d .

5

Diversity, Evil, and Defeat

"If we hold that living religion arises at the point where ultimate reality manifests itself to the human spirit, then obviously our understanding of religion will necessarily be determined by the view we take of that ultimate reality and of the relationship with the human spirit into which it enters." - H.H. Farmer 1954, pp. 26-7. The wilderness parable in the Introduction prompted a question about the availability of an intentional rescuer for the people lost in Hells Canyon. If the rescuer has a distinctive pedagogical aim for the lost people - specifically, for their being morally transformed in the rescue effort then the rescue strategy on offer m a y be subtle and elusive rather than explicit and straightforward. In that case, the rescue process m a y be rather messy, given the need for the lost people to be challenged morally and changed in various w a y s . A s a result, w e should not expect a simple recipe for the rescue, as if the rescue process w e r e akin to baking a simple cake. The rescuer m a y allow parts of Hells C a n y o n to be overg r o w n with thickets of thorns to highlight both the lost people's need for a rescuer and the inadequacy of their o w n strategies for a rescue. In other w o r d s , the rescuer m a y allow the surrounding conditions to deteriorate, even

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toward futility, in order to reveal that the p o w e r of the lost people is not genuinely life giving, whereas the p o w e r of the rescuer is. This lesson is evidently hard-won - if w o n at all by humans, given a deep-seated tendency to seek self-credit and self-sufficiency. A s a result, an analogy of easily baking a cake will not serve at all. A complex rescue of stubbornly resistant lost people is more to the point, b y w a y of analogy. Accordingly, a morally purposive rescuer m a y allow both for a diversity of rescue plans in circulation and for some suffering among the lost people. These complications m a y appear to challenge the reality of a rescuer, but the rescuer w o u l d w a n t the lost people to look more closely and more seriously at their available options, for purposes of needed transformation in the rescue. We therefore do so in this concluding chapter. We shall see that neither the extensive religious diversity nor the extensive evil in this w o r l d undermines grounded belief in an intentional rescuer worthy of worship.

1. R E L I G I O U S D I V E R S I T Y A N D L O G I C A L E X C L U S I O N

It is no easy task to specify clearly w h e n something is a religion (and w h e n something is not), and w h e n w e h a v e one religion rather than t w o or more religions. Familiar candidates for a religion include, of course, the following: Judaism, Christianity, Islam, Buddhism, Hinduism, Confucianism, Sikhism, Taoism, Shinto, and Bahaism. Some of these religions are theistic, in virtue of acknowledging the existence of a divine agent; others are not. Sometimes w e call a system of claims of a particular kind a religion, and sometimes w e call a h u m a n commitment of a particular kind a religious commitment. Accordingly, the term "religion" is slippery at best. In general, w e might say that a commitment is religious for a person if and only if the commitment is intrinsic (that is, not merely instrumental toward something else) and is intended to be life defining (that is, intended to be

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'

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constitutive of living) for that person. This is a broad, latitudinarian approach to something's being a religious commitment. It m a y allow even some intrinsic commitments of sports fans to their favorite sports to count as religious, at least in a "fanatical" sense. This is no defect for current purposes - specifically for our asking: can all religions get along? This question is intolerably v a g u e until w e specify w h a t getting along consists in. Perhaps advocates of various religions can "get a l o n g " even if religions themselves, in being contrary, cannot. We need to examine both (a) the sense in which religions can be exclusive and excluded and (b) the sense in which advocates of religions can also be exclusive and excluded. We shall see that some versions of religious exclusivism are undeniably true, and that at least one version is undeniably false. A s a result, " e x c l u s i v i s m " should not be regarded as a dirty w o r d in itself. It actually captures something important about the w a y religions are distinctive. Religions, even in their theistic forms, manifest remarkable diversity and even logical conflict in their religious statements, at least across different religions. Some religions affirm that G o d exists, but others deny that G o d exists. Some religions affirm that only one G o d exists, but others affirm that m a n y gods exist, and still others claim that no G o d exists. E v e n across versions of monotheism, diversity and conflict in positions are obvious and enduring. For instance, some versions of monotheism teach that G o d loves all people, including even resolute enemies of G o d ; other versions of monotheism firmly deny this. In addition, some versions of monotheism teach that humans must earn or merit their approval before G o d ; other versions strongly deny this, and affirm instead that G o d approves of people by w a y of a gracious (humanly unearned) divine gift. This is just a small sample of the extensive diversity and conflict in positions across religions. Clearly, no complete thematic unity across religions is available, h o w e v e r much some people might hope (and

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incorrectly allege) otherwise. Taken together, the claims of the various religions are logically inconsistent: they cannot all be true. (It is almost incredible that anyone w o u l d suggest otherwise after even a quick review of the religions in question.) A n y available unity of religions therefore will be, at best, partial - that is, incomplete. Even if, for example, J u d a i s m and Hinduism in their most prominent forms agree on some religious v i e w s , they disagree on monotheism. In particular, the exclusive monotheism of classical J u d a i s m is denied, at least by implication, by the prominent versions of Hinduism. A s a result, w e should not expect both J u d a i s m and Hinduism to be true; they are logically contrary religious positions, at least regarding some central religious claims. The same holds among many, if not all, other mainline religious positions. Accordingly, some mainline religious positions logically exclude some other mainline religious positions. This v i e w is logical religious exclusivism regarding logically contrary religious positions, and its truth cannot be denied with any plausibility. In addition, it is puzzling w h y anyone should w a n t to deny its truth. We shall see that some other kinds of theistic religious exclusivism also merit our acceptance. The Introduction offered the term " G o d " as a most exalted title rather than as a name. The aim w a s to allow us to talk intelligibly about whether G o d exists, even if G o d does not actually exist and even if w e d i s a v o w k n o w l e d g e that G o d exists. The Introduction also proposed that the title " G o d " signifies worthiness of worship, and that a being is worthy of worship if and only if that being, having inherent moral perfection, merits worship as unqualified adoration, love, trust, and obedience. G i v e n this exalted moral standard for worthiness of w o r s h i p , w e can exclude, as noted previously, most of the familiar candidates for the preeminent title " G o d " on the ground of moral deficiency. Moral defects bar a candidate from the status of being G o d , without an opportunity for appeal. For example, a failure to be perfectly loving toward other personal agents will exclude a

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candidatefromworthiness of w o r s h i p a n d thus from being

1

God. The Introduction offered an approach to inquiry about G o d that fits with the d e m a n d of worthiness of worship. A G o d w o r t h y of w o r s h i p w o u l d desire that all capable agents willingly receive divine love and then manifest it from their hearts toward all agents (including toward their enemies), thereby reflecting G o d ' s moral character for others. This consideration led the Introduction to propose kardiatheology, that is, theology aimed primarily at one's motivational heart - including one's will - and not just one's mind or emotions. A self-revelation to h u m a n s from a G o d worthy of worship w o u l d accommodate kardiatheology b y aiming noncoercively to realize divine perfect love in h u m a n hearts, and not just to e x p a n d h u m a n information or emotion. Accordingly, in self-revelation, G o d w o u l d aim to transform humans motivationally toward perfect love, and not just intellectually or emotionally. This consideration, as already noted, supports a distinctive account of the purposively available evidence of G o d ' s reality, and it bears on debates about religious inclusivism and exclusivism. The key point is that G o d w o u l d seek to h a v e h u m a n s , as intentional agents, personify (and thus themselves become) evidence of divine reality in order to reflect G o d ' s moral character for others. The Introduction raised the following w i d e l y ignored issue: are w e h u m a n s in a position on our o w n to answer the question of whether G o d exists, without our being morally challenged b y G o d , if G o d exists? We h a v e no reason to suppose that w e are. We therefore should be open to kardiatheology and its implications for needed h u m a n transformation b y divine intervention. Religious inquiry, in that case, will be no merely intellectual matter for humans. Instead, it will involve us as intentional agents w h o are morally accountable as inquirers before a G o d w h o seeks volitional cooperation, and thus obedience, from humans.

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2.

REDEMPTIVE

EXCLUSIVISM

For the sake of manageable focus, let's continue to limit our talk of religion to theistic religions - that is, religions that acknowledge the existence of a divine agent. M a n y advocates of the traditional monotheism of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam use the term " G o d " as a title connoting a unique agent w o r t h y of worship. Other proponents of such monotheism claim that their use of the title " G o d " connotes a unique agent w o r t h y of w o r s h i p , but they set the standard for worthiness of worship too low for genuine moral perfection. For instance, some advocates of monotheism acknowledge a G o d w h o arguably lacks moral perfection (at least by the most compelling standard of such perfection) in virtue of G o d ' s hating evil people. Psalms 5:5 and 1 1 : 5 , for example, claim that G o d " h a t e s " w i c k e d people, and not just w i c k e d thoughts, desires, intentions, or actions. The v i e w of a G o d w h o hates some people conflicts explicitly with the portrait of G o d offered b y Jesus's Sermon on the Mount, in Matthew 5:43-8 (cf. L u k e 6:27-36, John 3 : 1 6 - 1 7 ) . In fact, Jesus is arguably correcting a misguided v i e w of G o d offered by some of the Hebrew scriptures, perhaps including Psalms 5 and 1 1 . Consider, for instance, Matthew 5:43-5: " Y o u h a v e heard that it w a s s a i d . . . 'hate y o u r enemy', but I say to y o u , 'love your e n e m i e s . . . , in order that you m a y be children of your Father in H e a v e n ' . " We have no w a y to reconcile this clear and distinctive portrait of a perfectly loving G o d offered b y Jesus with the hate-based image sketched in Psalms 5 and 1 1 . They are, in fact, logically incompatible. A s a result, w e h a v e to choose between the two, and carefully reflective theists will side with Jesus and his portrait. (For an attempted moral defense of hating evil people, see H a m p t o n and M u r p h y 1988; for criticism, see Moser 2008, Chapter 3.) Jesus identifies G o d ' s love of even enemies of G o d as central to divine moral perfection, and this approach to moral perfection is preeminently commendable in virtue

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of excluding divine hate of people. Such hate w o u l d be destructive and condemning of people in a w a y incompatible with perfect moral goodness and thus w i t h worthiness of worship. We m a y plausibly hold, then, that there is significant religious diversity and even conflict within the teachings of the J e w i s h and Christian scriptures. In addition, w e m a y conclude that a " G o d " w h o hates some people lacks moral perfection and therefore is not w o r t h y of worship. J e w i s h and Christian monotheism, accordingly, comes in sharply conflicting variations relative to the moral characters those variations ascribe to G o d . G i v e n the morally preeminent standard of worthiness of w o r s h i p , w e are w e l l advised to rank the competing variations on monotheism b y means of the required standard of moral perfection. B y that standard, of course, the perfectly loving G o d a c k n o w l e d g e d by Jesus w o u l d , if real, morally trump the psalmist's G o d w h o hates some people. In any case, the G o d of Jesus is a viable candidate for the morally preeminent title " G o d " that signifies worthiness of w o r s h i p , but the psalmist's G o d is definitely not. The psalmist's G o d is morally too much like us morally defective humans to be worthy of worship. Our hate toward other people, according to Jesus, conflicts with G o d ' s morally perfect character, and thus does not reflect G o d at all. A t best, it reflects a false, counterfeit G o d . Monotheism seems initially more credible than polytheism, because w e are hard put to come u p with even one case of an intentional agent w h o is morally perfect and w o r t h y of worship. The various and s u n d r y gods of the polytheist pantheon are too m u c h like us morally imperfect beings regarding their moral failings. In particular, these gods share the fate of the hate-motivated G o d of Psalms 5:5 and 1 1 : 5 in falling short of moral perfection and, thus, worthiness of worship. Polytheists m a y find it convenient, if not self-supporting, to relax the standard for being divine, but they then risk divorcing being divine from being w o r t h y of w o r s h i p . In that case, the category of being divine w o u l d

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lose its moral preeminence. This is a serious problem for the prominent versions of polytheism in circulation, and, as just suggested, some variations on monotheism also suffer from this problem. Logical religious exclusivism, as suggested previously, is compelling, given the actual logically contrary claims made b y various religions. It yields the platitude that the claims of some religions logically exclude some claims of some other religions. That is, necessarily, if the claims of the former religions are true, then some claims of the latter religions are false. If this w e r e the only species of religious exclusivism in circulation, w e should all be avid religious exclusivists. Dissenters w o u l d be guilty of obvious logical confusions, and could be offered some straightforward logical corrections. Matters, however, are not so simple in the domain of religions and religious theorists. Some people h a v e proposed redemptive religious exclusivism: the v i e w that some religions are redemptively exclusive, that is, exclusive regarding the redemption, or salvation, of humans by G o d . Redemptive religious exclusivism offers two central variations: strategic redemptive exclusivism and personal redemptive exclusivism. We need to clarify this distinction in order to clarify redemptive religious exclusivism. We shall see that some important truth resides in this area of exclusivism. Strategic redemptive exclusivism states that some strategies or programs for religious redemption exclude some other such strategies or programs. Consider a J e w i s h Christian strategy that characterizes redemption as originating solely from divine grace (that is, a h u m a n l y unearned divine free gift) through h u m a n faith. Such a strategy excludes any religious strategy that characterizes redemption as originating from the h u m a n earning, or meriting, of salvation from G o d via a righteousness of one's o w n - say, from one's obeying a law. Redemption originating solely from divine grace, at least in the Pauline Christian strategy (see R o m 4:4), logically excludes redemption originating

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from h u m a n earning or meriting, in terms of one's o w n righteousness. (See Philippians 3:5-9 and Romans 9:32 for Paul's clear suggestion that as a zealous Pharisee he had previously advocated the latter kind of redemption originating from h u m a n earning, but that he has renounced this position for the sake of divine grace; cf. Fee 1995, p p . 305-37.) If the divine redemption offered to h u m a n s originates solely in a h u m a n l y unearned free gift from G o d (that is, in divine grace), then it does not originate in any h u m a n ' s o w n righteousness, including one's righteousness from obeying a law. Accordingly, the redemptive strategy promoted b y the Christian religion of the apostle Paul excludes the earlier redemptive strategy offered b y the Pharisaic religion of Saul of Tarsus. Of course, this does not suggest that all versions of J u d a i s m agree with the Pharisaism of Saul of Tarsus; clearly, the J u d a i s m of Jesus, for instance, did not agree with the Pharisaism of Saul. (On the relation between the two, see Furnish 1968, Bruce 1977, and Wenham 1995.) Strategic redemptive exclusivism is a specification of logical religious exclusivism, regarding strategies for religious redemption. Such redemptive exclusivism is undeniably true, given the logical conflict between at least the Pharisaic redemptive strategy of Saul of Tarsus and the later Christian redemptive strategy of the apostle Paul. We could illustrate this kind of logical conflict across the redemptive strategies of various religions, but w e need not d o so here. A n y sustainable philosophy (or history or sociology) of religion will embrace strategic redemptive exclusivism, given the conflicting programs of redemption across various religions. Personal redemptive exclusivism states that given certain religions, some people are excluded from divine redemption or salvation. We need to distinguish between the following t w o positions: Conditional personal exclusivism: If certain religions are correct in what they state or at least imply, then some people are excluded from divine redemption,

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and Actual personal exclusivism: Religion X is correct in stating or at least implying that some people are excluded from divine redemption. Conditional personal exclusivism is clearly true, because it is clear that some religions deny universalism about salvation. That is, they deny that all people will be redeemed by G o d . This is a straightforward empirical fact about some religions, quite aside from whether all people actually will be redeemed b y G o d . Consider the Reformed Protestant predestinarian v i e w of either John Calvin's 1 5 3 6 Institutes of the Christian Religion or the 1647 Westminster Confession of Faith. (We can bracket n o w any theological differences between the two.) Following the later Augustine, Calvin endorsed the following predestinarian exclusivist position: By predestination w e mean the eternal decree of God, by which he determined with himself whatever he wished to happen with regard to every man. All are not created on equal terms, but some are preordained to eternal life, others to eternal damnation; and, accordingly, as each has been created for one or other of these ends, w e say that he has been predestinated to life or to death (1536, Book 3, Chapter 2 1 , Section 5). The Westminster Confession of Faith, influenced b y some central themes of Calvin's theology, offers an equivalent predestinarian exclusivist view, at least regarding humans: By the decree of God, for the manifestation of his glory, some men and angels are predestinated unto everlasting life, and others foreordained to everlasting death. These angels and men, thus predestinated and foreordained, are particularly and unchangeably designed; and their number is so certain and definite that it cannot be either increased or diminished.... The rest of mankind [beyond those foreordained to everlasting life], God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, whereby he extendeth or withholdeth mercy as he pleaseth, for the glory of his sovereign power over his

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creatures, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonor and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice (Chapter 3; see Schaff 1919b). A straightforward implication of the second sentence just quoted is that G o d ' s foreordaining activity m a k e s some people "particularly and unchangeably d e s i g n e d " for "everlasting death." Calvin's corresponding idea is that G o d "determined with himself whatever he [that is, G o d ] wished to h a p p e n " to each person, including each person excluded from salvation forever. The Reformed exclusivist v i e w implies that, in divine sovereignty, G o d foreordains, or predestines, some people to everlasting damnation (or condemnation) rather than redemption (or salvation). In particular, it implies that this divine decision to exclude some people is ultimately God's o w n will and is therefore not determined b y h u m a n wills. In Calvin's influential approach to the matter, w h a t G o d wishes to happen to people w h o are not redeemed does, in fact, happen to them. That is, they are excluded by God from redemption forever, and this is ultimately b y divine intent. Bracketing the highly questionable moral character of a G o d w h o w o u l d proceed in this w a y toward people, w e cannot plausibly deny that hypothetical personal exclusivism follows from some influential religious v i e w s . Such exclusivism, w e shall see, also follows from some religious v i e w s that oppose predestinarian C a l v i n i s m and attribute the cause of redemptive exclusion to h u m a n s , themselves, w h o resist salvation. 3.

EXCLUSIVISM

TOWARD

GOD

For any version of actual personal exclusivism (as characterized previously), w e helpfully can raise the following crucial question: on what basis, or in virtue of what, are some people (allegedly) excluded from divine redemption forever? One exclusivist Christian view, in keeping with the previous Reformed predestinarian view, implies that some

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people are excluded from divine redemption in virtue of G o d ' s o w n decisively condemning sovereign will, and that G o d ' s will in this connection is not determined at all b y h u m a n wills. On this view, God is causally responsible for the permanent exclusion of some humans, given that G o d intentionally wills their permanent exclusion. Another exclusivist Christian v i e w avoids a predestinarian view. It implies that if an adult person of normal intelligence fails to believe a redemptive Christian message about w h a t G o d has accomplished via Jesus Christ, then that person is thereby excluded from salvation. This v i e w has been embraced by m a n y Christians w h o hold that a person's lacking a specific belief about salvation (or at least about God) excludes that person from salvation. We shall see that both of the exclusivist v i e w s , the predestinarian and doxastic v i e w s , are actually implausible, because they exclude a G o d w o r t h y of worship. A s suggested previously, w e are using the term " G o d " as a preeminent title with definite semantic content, requiring worthiness of worship and thus moral perfection in G o d . We therefore should ask h o w our notion of G o d bears on actual personal exclusivism. The predestinarian variation implies that G o d chooses to exclude some people permanently from redemption on the basis of G o d ' s o w n sovereign condemning will, and that this divine choice is not determined at all by any h u m a n will, such as a h u m a n will opposing G o d or redemption. According to this predestinarian view, G o d foreordains some people to be condemned and not to be redeemed b y G o d , and this sovereign divine action causes the actual permanent exclusion of these people from redemption. Some predestinarians invoke a careless and dubious reading of Chapter 9 of Paul's Epistle to the Romans for support, but Chapter 1 1 of Romans explicitly states that the unredeemed people in question are excluded on the basis of their o w n distrust or unbelief toward G o d (see Rom. 1 1 : 2 0 ) . Paul could h a v e said that these people are excluded just

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b y G o d ' s o w n sovereign will, but he does not, of course; instead, he invokes their distrust or unbelief t o w a r d G o d . Paul does not teach, then, that a sovereign divine choice causes some people to be excluded from salvation. O n the contrary, Paul writes concerning G o d : " B u t of Israel he says, 'AH d a y long I [God] h a v e held out m y hands to a disobedient and contrary p e o p l e ' " (Rom. 1 0 : 2 1 , RSV, citing Isa. 6 5 : 1 - 2 ) . The holding out of divine hands suggests a genuine divine invitation, rather than divine predestinarian exclusion or condemnation. Paul therefore contradicts a n y thesis of divine predestinarian exclusion. (See M e a d o r s 2006, Chapters 8-10, on divine judgment in Paul's Epistle to the Romans, particularly on its nonpredestinarian role.) A s noted previously, a G o d w o r t h y of w o r s h i p must be morally perfect; in other w o r d s , worthiness of w o r s h i p excludes moral deficiency. One w h o is morally defective in some w a y lacks the moral character needed for worthiness of adoration and complete trust. A s a result, such a being lacks worthiness of worship. One w h o fails to be perfectly loving toward all people (when one could be so) is morally deficient, at least regarding one's failure to love others perfectly. In addition, if one condemns another person (even one other person) to destruction as the constitutive result of one's o w n will, then one fails to be perfectly l o v i n g toward the person condemned. Accordingly, one fails to be w o r t h y of worship. The relevant talk of "the constitutive result of one's o w n w i l l " is intended to suggest full intended causal responsibility (that is, an intended constitutive role) in one's o w n will, with regard to the permanent exclusion of certain people from divine redemption. One's perfect love toward a person rules out, b y definition, one's condemning that person to destruction as the constitutive result of one's o w n will. Accordingly, if one permanently excludes a person from redemption as the constitutive result of one's o w n will, then one fails to be perfectly loving and likewise fails to be w o r t h y of w o r s h i p . It w o u l d distort the idea of being "perfectly l o v i n g " b e y o n d

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recognition to suggest that such excluding is actually perfectly loving. A s a result, if one excludes a person from redemption as the constitutive result of one's o w n will, then one fails to be G o d . The " G o d " of the aforementioned predestinarian position is not the true G o d w o r t h y of worship, because that position actually excludes the true G o d b y excluding divine perfect love toward all h u m a n persons. A n influential representative of the aforementioned doxastic exclusivist v i e w is the Christian Athanasian Creed (ca. 500). The relevant statements of the Athanasian Creed are these: 1. Whosoever will be saved, before all things it is necessary that he hold the catholic faith; 2. Which faith, except every one do keep w h o l e and undefiled, without doubt he shall perish everlastingly. 3. A n d the catholic faith is this: that w e worship one G o d in trinity, and trinity in u n i t y ; . . . 4. This is the catholic faith which, except a m a n believe faithfully, he can not be saved (see Schaff 1 9 1 9 a ) . The doxastic redemptive exclusivism of the Athanasian Creed is straightforward. If a person does not actually believe the Christian trinitarian faith, according to this Creed, that person "can not be s a v e d . " Specifically, the required belief in question is irreducibly propositional, because it is belief, or faith, "that w e worship one G o d in trinity, and trinity in unity." It follows that pre-Christian Semitic, Jewish, and Muslim monotheists (including even A b r a h a m , Isaac, Jacob, Moses, and D a v i d ) , and, for that matter, all others w h o are not Christian trinitarians, are excluded from salvation. They all lack the required trinitarian belief about G o d , specifically the belief or faith that " w e worship one G o d in trinity, and trinity in unity." Augustine and Thomas A q u i n a s , among m a n y other Christians, seem committed to such doxastic exclusivism, at least regarding people w h o h a v e lived since the time of the inception of the trinitarian faith. , ,,. .

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Clearly, the exclusivism of the Athanasian C r e e d conflicts with the character of a perfectly loving G o d . A s Ernst K a s e m a n n observes: "The choice of the patriarch [Abraham in Romans 4] as example and prototype w o u l d b e absurd if w e w e r e meant to confine the possibility of experiencing the divine righteousness to the period post Christum crucifixum" ( 1 9 7 1 , p. 86). Consider, in addition, a simple case in w h i c h an adolescent child from an isolated island in the South Pacific has not heard of the trinitarian "catholic faith" a n d will not hear of it during her life on earth. The A t h a n a s i a n Creed evidently implies that this child's mere failure to believe is sufficient for morally acceptable permanent exclusion b y a perfectly loving G o d . This is definitely a mistaken position. Suppose that the child fails to believe the "catholic faith" only because she has not heard of it. Suppose also that she eagerly w o u l d believe it if she heard of it (although, as it happens, she will not be presented w i t h it in her life on Earth). In other w o r d s , the child is disposed to believe the "catholic faith" (because she eagerly w o u l d believe it if she heard of it), but she does not actually believe it, and will not actually believe it during her earthly life. S u p p o s e also that the child's will is sincerely open to G o d ' s w i l l , and that therefore she is willing to receive and even obey any wellgrounded redemptive message from G o d . G o d , of course, is not obligated to redeem the child (or any other morally defective person) on the basis of what she (or any other mere human) has earned from God. E v e n so, G o d ' s morally perfect character must uphold the highest moral standards, including the standard of unselfish merciful love (agape) in connection with h u m a n redemption. A s a result, if G o d condemned the girl to everlasting death solely as a result of her failing to believe the "catholic faith," w e rightly could question the moral perfection and thus the divinity of G o d ' s character. We w o u l d need to ask w h a t " m o r a l perfection" actually means under such circumstances, because it seems clear that a condemning G o d in this case could d o much better from the standpoint of moral perfection.

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Divine moral perfection, as suggested previously, entails morally perfect love, and such love seeks w h a t is morally best for any person. It therefore includes an offer of forgiveness for the sake of reconciling estranged people to G o d . Of course, an offer of forgiveness and reconciliation need not actually be received or even seriously considered b y a person. In addition, divine coercion of a person w o u l d not be a genuine option, because it w o u l d undermine the needed h u m a n agency in genuine d i v i n e - h u m a n reconciliation. If human agency is removed, there will be no h u m a n agent w h o responsibly can enter into reconciliation with God. G o d ' s condemning the girl to everlasting death w o u l d not include seeking w h a t is morally best for her, because G o d w o u l d have a morally better alternative at hand. That is, at some point G o d could remove the girl's doxastic deficiency (say, with suitable evidence for belief) and thereby enable her to enter into explicit fellowship with G o d . This alternative w o u l d obviously be morally better for the girl than for her to undergo condemnation to everlasting death solely for a doxastic deficiency. A G o d of perfect love w o u l d not allow such a morally insignificant deficiency to preclude the girl's ultimately entering into explicit fellowship and n e w life with G o d . The doxastic version of personal exclusivism fails to accommodate this point about G o d ' s perfectly loving character and therefore offers a morally deficient G o d . That version of exclusivism, accordingly, excludes the G o d w o r t h y of worship. M a n y exclusivists of a Calvinist or Reformed persuasion will reply that G o d is " s o v e r e i g n " and therefore has a right to exclude w h o m e v e r he wishes. That reply, however, neglects divine worthiness of worship as central to G o d ' s character. Specifically, G o d ' s will is not morally permitted to violate the moral perfection inherent to worthiness of worship. (God, of course, w o u l d not be able to make divine actions morally permissible just b y an act of will; morality is more robust than that.) A n agent's violating the moral perfection

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inherent to worthiness of worship w o u l d exclude that agent automatically from the category of being divine. Accordingly, given a perfectly loving G o d , one's being excluded from salvation is not the result of one's failure to pass a mere informational test. A perfectly loving G o d a l w a y s w o u l d seek w h a t is morally best for one, including the provision of needed information at the opportune time. Conversely, salvation (or redemption) is not anchored in one's passing a mere informational test. Various gnostic and intellectualist approaches to redemption imply otherwise, but they neglect the inherent morally perfect character and redemptive concerns of a G o d w o r t h y of worship. Morally perfect divine concerns w o u l d approach redemption (or salvation) relative to a person's will and moral character, and w o u l d steer clear of any mere informational test. That is, they w o u l d fit with the kardiatheology mentioned previously, and therefore w o u l d seek to h a v e humans, themselves, become personifying evidence of G o d ' s reality in willingly receiving and reflecting G o d ' s moral character for others. A mere informational test is too demanding from the standpoint of divine moral perfection, because one can fail an informational test o w i n g just to an easily correctable cognitive inadequacy (even while one's will is genuinely open to conformity to G o d ' s will and moral character). In such a case, one w o u l d not be a lost cause at all relative to divine redemption of humans. On the contrary, one w o u l d be an excellent candidate - that is, " g o o d soil" for redemption, in the language of M a r k 4:20. A mere informational test is also too w e a k , because one can pass the test b y having the correct belief (say, belief that the "catholic faith," in the previous Athanasian sense, is true) but hold this belief solely out of selfishness and hate, even with one's will resolutely opposed to G o d ' s will and moral character. Doxastic versions of exclusivism run afoul of these considerations and therefore end u p excluding a G o d w o r t h y of worship. We h a v e good reason, then, to set aside such versions of exclusivism.

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4. I N C L U S I V E C H R I S T I A N

EXCLUSIVISM

Doxastic Christian exclusivism fails to accommodate an inclusive Christian version of exclusivism regarding the unique redemptive role of Jesus as G o d ' s atoning Son. The relevant inclusive Christian version of exclusivism affirms that Jesus is G o d ' s unique mediator for h u m a n redemption and that, therefore, the divine redemption of humans depends uniquely on Jesus. The key question concerns w h a t the language " d e p e n d s uniquely o n " means in this context. It w o u l d be a serious mistake, given divine moral perfection, to affirm that a person must believe or trust in this earthly life that Jesus is Lord to be a candidate for redemption by G o d . The previous discussion of the isolated girl illustrates this point adequately. Accordingly, the relevant sense of " d e p e n d s uniquely on J e s u s " must not require that one believe in this earthly life that Jesus is Lord. Nonetheless, one could consistently hold that a candidate for divine redemption must ultimately believe that Jesus is Lord, even if after death, upon one's acquiring adequate evidence regarding G o d ' s plan of redemption. (The apostle Paul m a y h a v e had the latter v i e w in mind in Philippians 2 : 9 - 1 1 ; at least, the present v i e w is compatible with his position.) According to the inclusive Christian exclusivism under development, divine salvation of humans is inherently christological, being mediated uniquely b y Jesus Christ. (See Chapter 4 on the relevant idea of mediation, or atonement). E v e n so, such salvation can be christological de re without being de dicto in a human's earthly life. G i v e n this inclusive Christian exclusivism, the ultimate offer of d i v i n e - h u m a n reconciliation includes Jesus as atoning mediator, in reality, but it does not follow that ultimate recipients of the offer must assent to or even conceive of such christological mediation in this earthly life. A s a result, w e should contrast the inclusive Christian exclusivism under development with the aforementioned doxastic exclusivism represented in the Athanasian Creed. Like traditional Christian belief,

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this inclusive Christian exclusivism excludes as false any account or doctrine of redemption that omits Jesus as the unique divinely appointed mediator for h u m a n redemption. Unlike doxastic Christian exclusivism, however, it allows for (that is, in principle includes) h u m a n candidates for redemption w h o do not and will not acknowledge Jesus as Lord in their earthly lives. We briefly shall consider both of these features, the exclusive feature and the inclusive feature. The exclusive side of the present v i e w fits with the traditional Christian view, suggested b y various writers of the N e w Testament documents, that Jesus is G o d ' s unique revealer and mediator for redemption. For instance, Matthew's Gospel states: At that time Jesus declared, T thank you, Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because you have hidden these things from the wise and understanding, and revealed them to babes. Yes, Father, for this was your gracious will. All things have been delivered to me by my Father; and no one knows the Son except the Father, and no one knows the Father except the Son and any one to whom the Son chooses to reveal him' (Matt. 1 1 : 2 5 - 7 , RSV; see also Luke 1 0 : 2 1 - 2 , John 5:22-3,17:25-6; cf. O'Collins 1995, pp. 1 2 3 - 4 , 1 3 3 - 4 ) . Accordingly, Jesus refers to himself as "the S o n " of G o d , and identifies himself as the only one w h o can reveal G o d (perfectly?) to humans. Going b e y o n d talk of k n o w l e d g e of G o d , some writings in the N e w Testament characterize Jesus as the unique atoning mediator between G o d and humans. For instance: " . . . there is one G o d , and there is one mediator between G o d and men, the man Christ Jesus, w h o g a v e himself as a ransom for all " (1 Tim. 2:5-6, RSV). In addition: " . . . by the name of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, w h o m y o u crucified, [but] w h o m G o d raised from the d e a d , b y him this man is standing before y o u well [T]here is salvation in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven given among men by which

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w e must be s a v e d " (Acts 4 : 1 0 , 1 2 , R S V ) . The N e w Testament, then, includes claims implying that Jesus is exclusively the (perfect?) revealer and mediator for G o d . We cannot establish the independent correctness of this demanding exclusivist position here, but w e can identify h o w this position can be inclusive in an important manner. The inclusive side of the Christian exclusivism under development finds support in the following story of judgment told by Jesus: When the Son of man comes in his glory, and all the angels with him, then he will sit on his glorious throne. Before him will be gathered all the nations, and he will separate them one from another as a shepherd separates the sheep from the goats, and he will place the sheep at his right hand, but the goats at the left. Then the King will say to those at his right hand, 'Come, O blessed of m y Father, inherit the kingdom prepared for you from the foundation of the world; for I was hungry and you gave me food, I was thirsty and you gave me drink, I was a stranger and you welcomed me, I was naked and you clothed me, I was sick and you visited me, I was in prison and you came to me.' Then the righteous will answer him, 'Lord, when did w e see thee hungry and feed thee, or thirsty and give thee drink? And when did w e see thee a stranger and welcome thee, or naked and clothe thee? And when did w e see thee sick or in prison and visit thee?' And the King will answer them, 'Truly, I say to you, as you did it to one of the least of these my brethren, you did it to me.' Then he will say to those at his left hand, 'Depart from me, you cursed, into the eternal fire prepared for the devil and his angels; for I was hungry and you gave me no food, I was thirsty and you gave me no drink, I was a stranger and you did not welcome me, naked and you did not clothe me, sick and in prison and you did not visit me.' Then they also will answer, 'Lord, when did w e see thee hungry or thirsty or a stranger or naked or sick or in prison, and did not minister to thee?' Then he will answer them, 'Truly, I say to you, as you did it not to one of the least of these, you did it not to me.' And they will go away into eternal punishment, but the righteous into eternal life (Matt. 25:31-45, RSV).

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The surprise experienced b y "the righteous," coupled with the King's focus on their caring behavior toward others, suggests something other than a doxastic standard for approval b y G o d . This fits with the remark of Jesus in Matthew 7:21: " N o t everyone w h o says to me, 'Lord, Lord', will enter the k i n g d o m of heaven, but only the one w h o does the will of m y Father w h o is in h e a v e n . " A s Jesus illustrated in the previous story of judgment, one can do the will of G o d without explicit doxastic commitment to G o d . This consideration speaks against excluding the isolated girl, in the aforementioned hypothetical case, from redemption b y G o d . It therefore speaks against doxastic exclusivism. There is an exclusivist nondoxastic criterion at w o r k in Matthew's judgment story from Jesus: namely, the h u m a n manifestation of divine unselfish love toward others. Such a manifestation arguably requires one's yielding, and being conformed, to the divine unselfish love manifested in one's o w n life, but it does not follow that one must believe during this earthly life that G o d exists. One could yield volitionally to G o d ' s unselfish love and thereby to G o d de re, without any corresponding acknowledgment de dicto and thus without one's k n o w i n g (or believing) that one is yielding to G o d or even k n o w i n g (or believing) that G o d exists. This consideration accounts for the element of surprise in Matthew's previous judgment story from Jesus. We should acknowledge a corresponding de re approach to rejection of G o d , in keeping with Matthew's judgment story from Jesus. One can resist or otherwise neglect conformity to the unselfish love presented to one and thereby resist or otherwise neglect de re the purported redemptive activity of G o d in one's life. This w o u l d amount to resisting or neglecting God, especially on the Christian v i e w that " l o v e {agape) is from G o d " (1 John 4:7) or that " G o d is l o v e " (1 John 4:16). In fact, one's resisting or neglecting unselfish love could h a v e dire cognitive results regarding one's knowing divine reality. A s one N e w Testament writer states: "The

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one w h o does not love does not k n o w G o d , because G o d is l o v e " (1 John 4:8). (For an attempt to m a k e good cognitive sense of this distinctive position, see Moser 2008.) If " H e l l " (not to be confused with Hells Canyon) is simply final exclusion from a life of fellowship with the G o d w h o graciously gives life, then Hell should be understood as ultimately se//-exclusion from such a life with G o d (see K v a n v i g 1993). Such self-exclusion can be de re in the sense just indicated, and it need not be de dicto in terms of a belief that one is rejecting G o d or even belief that G o d exists (or does not exist). A s a result, one can be living in Hell or moving toward Hell without even k n o w i n g this de dicto. Accordingly, h o w one responds to unselfish love can be important indeed relative to one's ultimate destiny. H o w one responds to such love can amount to h o w one responds to G o d , if only de re. Variation in beliefs among humans regarding divine redemptive activity raises various difficult questions about evidence and k n o w l e d g e of G o d ' s reality. For instance, w h y do some people (avowedly) h a v e evidence regarding G o d ' s redemptive activity and believe (or trust) in G o d on that basis, whereas others (avowedly) lack the needed evidence and thus refrain from trust in G o d ? Perhaps some people are not ready to receive the needed evidence aright, on G o d ' s terms of unselfish love. In that case, G o d could have a good reason for withholding pertinent evidence of divine reality from some people. If anything is clear, however, it is clear that w e have no simple answer to the previous question. That is, w e h a v e no theodicy or comprehensive explanation of G o d ' s w a y s regarding the elusiveness of divine evidence. In addition, given the limited place of humans, cognitively and otherwise, in the grand scheme of things, w e should not expect ourselves to h a v e one. It is arguable (following Moser 2008) that divine redemptive purposes account for the w a y s divine evidence is given and not given among humans. It does not follow, however, that w e can a l w a y s specify the exact divine purposes at

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w o r k among humans. Just as w e h a v e no comprehensive exact theodicy regarding evil (and should not expect to h a v e one in our cognitively limited situation), so also w e h a v e no comprehensive exact account of divine elusiveness and variation in divine self-revelation. E v e n so, our lacking any such comprehensive account does not undermine our h a v i n g conclusive evidence of divine reality. One still can h a v e evidence of divine reality based on experience of divine intervention in the absence of undefeated defeaters (as outlined in Chapter 4). Such evidence does not require a theodicy of us, given our limited cognitive resources regarding G o d ' s particular purposes. E v e n in the absence of de dicto h u m a n acknowledgment that there is divine intervention and evidence, G o d effectively can advance judgment and redemption of humans (where G o d ' s judgment is characteristically aimed at redemption). A s a result, in connection with divine judgment and redemption of humans, w e are well a d v i s e d to consider h u m a n attitudes more profound than mere belief and then to understand redemptively relevant faith toward G o d accordingly. This w o u l d be in keeping with the redemptive purposes of a G o d truly w o r t h y of worship. In addition, this w o u l d fit with the kardiatheology introduced previously, according to which G o d primarily w o u l d seek transformation of a h u m a n ' s motivational center and not just intellectual or emotional improvement. In doing so, G o d w o u l d seek to h a v e h u m a n s themselves become personifying evidence of divine reality wherein they willingly receive and reflect G o d ' s moral character for others. According to kardiatheology, h u m a n belief that G o d exists is not a litmus test (or necessary condition) for G o d ' s redemptive w o r k in humans. Inclusive Christian exclusivism accommodates this lesson, and points us to an elusive but profound G o d of perfect love and of kardiatheology, w h o can w o r k de re in h u m a n s despite the absence of h u m a n belief that G o d exists. In keeping with this lesson, the diversity of religious positions in circulation is no defeater of the

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evidence for this book's version of volitional theism. Neither the evidence nor the reality of G o d ' s redemptive w o r k de re is undermined b y the w o r l d ' s striking diversity of religious v i e w s . On the contrary, G o d can use such diversity to challenge and transform misplaced h u m a n attitudes for the sake of h u m a n redemption. Beliefs can and do matter, of course, but they are ill-suited to challenge the reality or the evidence of the redemptive p o w e r of a perfectly loving G o d . We see this p o w e r distinctively in humans w h o , themselves, are becoming personifying evidence for G o d in willingly receiving and reflecting G o d ' s moral character for others.

5.

EVIL AS

DEFEATER

M a n y people will object that, even given the experiential evidence for G o d in question, the world's unexplained evil provides an undefeated defeater of any such evidence. This objection travels far and w i d e , and it has taken in m a n y confident advocates. Careful reflection, however, suggests that the matter is actually more complicated. One's having conclusive (undefeated) purposively available evidence of God's reality is not the same as one's having a comprehensive explanation of God's purposes (say, in allowing evil). We need to distinguish between: (a) When I seek G o d with due volitional openness to authoritative divine reality, I will find, at the opportune time, G o d ' s self-revelation on the basis of conclusive purposively available evidence, and (b) When I seek G o d with due volitional openness to authoritative divine reality, I will find a comprehensive explanation of w h y G o d acts as G o d does, including in permitting evil.

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M a n y people w r o n g l y assume that option (b) w o u l d automatically come with option (a). The matter is actually more complex than that false assumption suggests. The promise of (a) regarding G o d ' s self-revelation at the opportune time does not depend for its correctness or justification on one's understanding all of G o d ' s purposes, even regarding the permitting of evil. A s a result, it does not yield a theodicy that fully explains and justifies G o d ' s purposes in allowing evil. Accordingly, (a) does not entail (b). The promise of (a) regarding G o d ' s self-revelation, if satisfied, entails one's acquiring conclusive evidence of G o d ' s reality at the opportune time, not one's acquiring a comprehensive explanation of G o d ' s purposes, including G o d ' s purposes in allowing evil. It w o u l d be logically invalid to infer that, given the kind of theism at hand and our cognitive limitations, " . . . w e simply are in the dark about the g o o d s that G o d will know, and the conditions of their realization" (Rowe 2006, p. 90; cf. Schellenberg 2007, p p . 300-3). Such an inference aims to underwrite skepticism about G o d ' s existence on the basis of unexplained evil in the world. G i v e n the clear and definite ingredients of (the notion of) divine perfect love, however, our limited explanatory darkness regarding some divine purposes in allowing evil cannot plausibly be generalized in that skeptical manner. On that dubious kind of generalization, one could not ever k n o w that an agent is truly morally good w h e n one lacked a comprehensive understanding of the agent's purposes, including the agent's purposes in allowing evil. That implication is obviously excessive, and it seriously challenges the skeptical inference in question. In demanding that humans seek G o d , G o d aims to uphold the supreme value and authority of divine self-revelation, thereby saving it from devaluation b y naturally selfish humans. Accordingly, G o d aims to h a v e h u m a n s supremely and wholeheartedly value divine perfect love, and to be personally transformed b y it, in fellowship with G o d , not just to think

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about it or to formulate arguments about it. E v e n so, h u m a n seeking of G o d , even w h e n accompanied b y one's finding G o d with conclusive evidence, w o u l d not yield a theodicy, because it w o u l d fall short of the cognitive resources for a comprehensive explanation and justification of G o d ' s purposes in allowing evil. We h a v e no reason to look for a skeptical defeater in the fact that a person w h o has experienced G o d can lack understanding of the specific intentions motivating G o d ' s actions at times, including in permitting evil. This should be no surprise, given the significant differences - cognitive and otherwise - that exist between G o d and humans. The closing chapters of the book of Job illustrate that one's lacking a comprehensive explanation and justification of G o d ' s purposes in allowing evil does not challenge one's having conclusive evidence of G o d ' s perfectly loving reality (cf. Ford 2007, Chapters 3 - 4 , Schneider 2004). H u m a n s should not be cognitively timid, then, about lacking a theodicy regarding G o d ' s permitting evil. In addition, people w h o hope to find G o d should not delay their search on the ground that they lack a theodicy that fully explains and justifies G o d ' s intentions in allowing evil. A s suggested, one's finding God, with conclusive evidence of divine reality, is not necessarily finding a theodicy; nor is this necessarily finding a full explanation and justification of G o d ' s purposes in occasional hiding from some people. The plausible v i e w that humans lack a theodicy must not be conjoined with the implausible v i e w that G o d is b e y o n d having moral obligations to humans. Marilyn McCord A d a m s has offered the latter v i e w in connection with "the problem of horrendous e v i l s " - that is, the problem of "evils the participation in (the doing or suffering of) which constitutes prima facie reason to doubt whether the participant's life could (given their inclusion in it) have positive meaning for h i m / h e r on the w h o l e " (2006, p. 32). Rape and torture are p a r a d i g m cases, and A d a m s claims that "traditional freewill approaches - with their m o v e to shift responsibility

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a n d / o r blame for evil a w a y from G o d and onto personal creatures - are stalemated b y horrendous evil." Her ground for this claim is this: " H u m a n radical vulnerability to horrors cannot have its origin in misused created freedom, because even if one accepted the story of A d a m ' s fall as historical (which I d o not) - the w a y it is told, humans w e r e radically vulnerable to horrors from the beginning, even in E d e n " (p. 36). Two considerations challenge A d a m s ' s portrait of the problem of evil at the start. First, "traditional free-will approaches," including the version in Plantinga 1977 (which is the most rigorously developed free-will approach to date), are not offered as a theodicy intended to explain or justify divine permission of evil, including horrendous evil. They are offered instead as a consistency argument against the charge of J.L. Mackie (1955) and others that theism is inconsistent with acknowledgement of the w o r l d ' s evil. Second, if vulnerability is susceptibility, then a modal confusion threatens the portrait, given the distinction between h u m a n vulnerability to horrors and actual h u m a n (experienced) horrors. It is, of course, logically possible that humans are vulnerable to horrors but d o not actually experience those horrors (say, because the horrors are not actualized in their lives). A s a result, the main problem of horrendous evil is not in h u m a n vulnerability to horrors, but is rather in human experience of actual horrors. If one insists that human vulnerability to horrors itself is evil, then, despite A d a m s ' s suggestion to the contrary (2006, p. 49), it is unclear that one can consistently say that the creation of this w o r l d w a s good before the h u m a n fall (since, by hypothesis, A d a m w a s vulnerable to evil before the fall). In any case, w e have no reason to suppose that h u m a n vulnerability as susceptibility to evil is, itself, evil. According to m a n y theologians and philosophers of religion, divine perfect love must allow for the real possibility of h u m a n rebellion against G o d if it is to allow for

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genuine h u m a n agency in relation to divine reality. Otherw i s e , h u m a n wills w o u l d be restricted in a w a y that blocks a kind of free agency needed for robust love in genuinely interactive relationship with G o d . Even so, G o d ' s allowing for h u m a n rebellion and for horrifying h u m a n suffering does not underwrite A d a m s ' s talk (which sounds explicitly Calvinist) of "the horrors that G o d has perpetrated on u s " or of Jesus as " a perpetrator of horrors" (2006, p p . 4 1 , 7 1 ; cf. p. 274). G o d ' s allowing for human susceptibility to horrors is one thing, and it is arguably required b y robust freely given love in d i v i n e - h u m a n genuinely interactive relationships. G o d ' s perpetrating horrors on humans w o u l d definitely be something else, and it w o u l d at least suggest that G o d causes evil and thus falls short of moral perfection and worthiness of worship. In that case, w e w o u l d have a counterfeit G o d w h o fails to satisfy the preeminent title " G o d . " Horrors, w e should recall, are genuine evils, and moral perfection does not allow one (even God) to d o evil that good m a y come. We do well, in this connection, not to risk lowering the bar for being G o d in a manner that removes worthiness of worship. A d a m s offers Jesus Christ as the G o d - m a n w h o can defeat horrendous evils. More specifically, Jesus participates in horrendous evils in such a w a y that he turns horrors into "occasions of personal intimacy with G o d " for humans. A d a m s denies that h u m a n p o w e r s are adequate to defeat horrors and restore a person after participation in horrors. Divine power, she contends, is needed. One big question, of course, is this: h o w does the process of defeat go? Part of the answer offered is: Christ is the One in Whom God's friendliness towards the human race is integrated. Christ is the One Who shares our human n a t u r e . . . . It is within the framework of His human personality that God especially befriends the whole human race, not least by sharing both our vulnerability to and our actual participation in horrors. Christ befriends us in a more intimate

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w a y through His Divine nature, through psychological-sense personal omnipresence and functional collaboration: I-not-Ibut Christ. "What a friend w e have in Jesus!" (2006, pp. 167-8). The key assumption is that the participation of Jesus as the G o d - M a n in h u m a n horrors can defeat the p o w e r of those horrors to rob a life of positive meaning. The corresponding proposal is that the offered friendship with G o d (and all this eventually involves, including bodily resurrection) can make h u m a n life worthwhile, horrors notwithstanding. A d a m s does not offer a theodicy, "because G o d has no obligations to creatures and hence no need to justify Divine actions to u s . " The ultimate ground offered for this striking claim is this: "Personal though G o d is, the metaphysical size g a p is too big for G o d to be d r a w n d o w n into the network of rights and obligations that bind together merely h u m a n b e i n g s " (2006, p. 43). A d a m s ' s G o d emerges, then, as a G o d b e y o n d moral obligation toward humans, even though it is altogether unclear w h y w e should think that "the metaphysical size g a p " (is that a p o w e r gap?) between G o d and h u m a n entails a relevant difference concerning moral obligations. A t this point, w e lose any moral grip on w h a t A d a m s means by the preeminent title " G o d . " The best w a y to understand the idea of the G o d and Father of Jesus is, in keeping with the Sermon on the Mount, as the one G o d worthy of w o r s h i p in virtue of moral perfection, the same perfection required of followers of Jesus in virtue of required enemylove (see Matt. 5:43-8; cf. L u k e 6:27-36). If G o d is not morally obligated to love his enemies (as the followers of Jesus are commanded in the Sermon on the Mount), then this G o d is not the G o d and Father of Jesus. In addition, this proposed G o d is not morally perfect and thus is not worthy of worship. In short, this G o d is not the worship-worthy G o d characterized b y Jesus in the Sermon on the Mount. In offering a G o d b e y o n d moral obligation toward humans, A d a m s offers a G o d u n w o r t h y of the title " G o d , " which,

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properly understood, connotes worthiness; Of w o r s h i p a n d thus moral perfection. If " G o d " is b e y o n d moral obligation toward humans, then it is unclear w h y one should bother with a treatment of evil that proposes the defeat of horrors by the " G o d - M a n . " We then m a y acknowledge that G o d (if G o d exists) is b e y o n d moral obligation toward us and be done with the w h o l e matter. At least, the whole effort loses its moral relevance given the dubious assumption in question. Consider h o w this result bears on A d a m s ' s universalist thesis regarding salvation of humans: "For G o d to succeed, G o d has to defeat horrors for everyone To be good to us, G o d will h a v e to establish and fit us all for wholesome s o c i e t y . . . . " (2006, p. 230). A natural reading of this thesis finds a moral duty of G o d toward humans lurking in the background, particularly if the thesis concerns the moral success or the moral goodness of G o d toward humans. Even so, the thesis is misguided. Part of G o d ' s being " g o o d to u s " includes G o d ' s not depersonalizing us by robbing us of our volitional agency. Predestinarian theology does not w e a r well at all in this connection. Some people, including Thomas N a g e l (1997), do not w a n t to live in a universe governed by G o d , and they h a v e this striking want resolutely, even after very careful consideration. G o d w o u l d not be good at all in suppressing their personal agency in this regard; in fact, G o d w o u l d then be a depersonalizing tyrant. If w e hold, however, that G o d has no moral obligations toward humans, then w e will be open to holding that G o d need not respect either h u m a n agency or robust, freedom-based love among and toward humans. We then risk obscuring the vast difference between a morally perfect G o d worthy of worship and a depersonalizing tyrant (a difference obscured, dangerously, by various predestinarian theologians). That w o u l d be a horror indeed. We all need a straightforward concept of G o d (such as that outlined in the Introduction) that clearly defeats that horror. Otherwise, an account of horror defeat will seem to be a parlor game

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at best or, at worst, our alleged horror defeater w i l l be the worst horror of all. " G o d " as such horror is definitely horror without defeat or end. The apostle Paul plausibly suggests that this w o r l d has been subjected to frustration and futility b y G o d , in divine hope that people will enter into "the glorious freedom of the children of G o d " (Rom. 8:20-1). This is an affirmation of G o d ' s using life's troubles - without causing evil - for a deeper good. Even so, this G o d , in honoring "glorious freed o m , " does not rob people of their volitional agency. Otherwise, there w o u l d be no genuine agents to enjoy the " g l o rious freedom" uniting the children of G o d . There w o u l d be only G o d ' s dominating will, to the exclusion of all other wills. In that case, the J e w i s h and Christian stories of the divine redemption of humans w o u l d be a charade at best. Of course, w e still lack an account of w h y G o d ' s subjecting creation to futility or defeating horrors is, at times and places, so humanly painful - even crushing from an earthly point of view. If the closing chapters of the book of Job are on the right track, w e should not hold our collective breath while waiting for the illuminating account. We m a y not be u p to adequately comprehending such an account, given our considerable cognitive limitations, or at least G o d m a y have no good purpose served b y offering an account to us now. E v e n so, w e can take some comfort in the fact that our having conclusive evidence of G o d ' s existence does not require our having any such account, and, in this horror-drenched w o r l d , w e should take all the good, well-grounded comfort w e can get. We must acknowledge that G o d does not a l w a y s d r a w near as a comforting "friend" in our times of trouble. In fact, G o d often seems hidden from some people at such times (in that G o d ' s existence is not b e y o n d reasonable doubt for them), and this fact of hiddenness emerges as a cognitive variation on the problem of evil. E v e n so, it w o u l d be question begging to portray such hiddenness as falsifying or undermining w i d e s p r e a d religious experience of G o d ' s

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reality. Divine hiding facing some people at some times, or even some people at all past and present times, does not entail divine hiding relative to all people at all times. More specifically, there is no defensible w a y to generalize from actual cases of divine hiddenness for some people to encompass all people with regard to the alleged lack of adequate evidence of divine reality. A generalized argument for atheism or agnosticism, then, does not emerge from divine hiddenness (for details, see Moser 2008, Chapter 1 ) . A n y such argument w o u l d require specific premises independent of divine hiddenness, but it is altogether unclear w h a t such premises w o u l d be in a cogent argument. In sum, then, it is doubtful that divine hiddenness in particular or evil in general will yield a successful defeater to this book's volitional theism.

6.

CONCLUSION

H a v i n g begun with the wilderness parable involving people in need of a rescuer, w e find ourselves n o w similarly in need of a rescuer. Even so, w e cannot point to an obvious rescuer or to a rescuer w e can control. Our rescuer is elusive and even hidden at times, but, on reflection, this should come as no surprise. If our rescuer is worthy of worship and thus seeks what is morally best for us, w e should expect challenges from divine elusiveness and hiddenness aimed at our transformation toward G o d ' s moral character. More specifically, w e should expect G o d to encourage our becoming, ourselves, personifying evidence of G o d , in our willingly receiving and reflecting G o d ' s moral character for others. In particular, w e should expect to be under challenge b y G o d for our o w n good, to learn to love as G o d loves. A s a result, our having evidence of G o d w o u l d be no spectator sport. Instead, it w o u l d be akin to a purportedly transformative rescue operation, in which w e are the (sometimes resistant) people being rescued, or at least intended to be rescued, largely from our o w n destructively selfish w a y s .

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The w o r l d around and within us actually looks, at times, as if it is the kind of place where w e humans are to learn h u m b l y to love unselfishly as G o d loves, in volitional cooperation with G o d . It certainly is not the kind of place where w e are to receive maximal pleasure, maximal pain, or maximal understanding of our surroundings or even ourselves. G i v e n this book's volitional theism, if w e become properly attuned to purposively available evidence of G o d ' s reality, including G o d ' s authoritative self-giving love, then G o d ' s reality will become, at the opportune time, adequately indicated for us b y undefeated authoritative evidence. We w o u l d do well, then, to seek and to appropriate the purposively available evidence of G o d ' s reality, h o w e v e r morally challenging the process. G i v e n volitional theism, the extent to which w e k n o w G o d , including G o d ' s reality, depends on the extent to which w e are sincerely willing to cooperate with G o d in a p r o g r a m of divine redemption of humans. A s a result, it becomes obvious w h y w e humans (whether theists, atheists, or agnostics) have difficulty in knowing G o d . The difficulty stems from our resisting cooperation in G o d ' s redemptive program of reconciliation. Accordingly, it is naive, if not arrogant, for us humans to approach the question of whether G o d exists as if w e w e r e naturally in an appropriate moral and cognitive position to handle it aright. Careful reflection on the redemptive purposes inherent to a perfectly loving G o d recommends an approach less presumptuous. We are, after all, inquiring about a v e r y special kind of agent with distinctive redemptive purposes in virtue of being perfectly loving, and not a household object or a laboratory specimen. Perhaps w e humans h a v e deep-seated difficulty with a gracious G o d w h o evades our o w n sophisticated cognitive nets in order to demonstrate that our o w n p o w e r s are not life giving apart from G o d . Stubbornly, w e seem to insist on our o w n inferior terms for redemption, and w e thereby end u p with cheap counterfeits of the genuine life-giving article.

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We should expect G o d to care about h o w w e handle evidence of G o d ' s existence. In particular, G o d ' s aim is for humans to become, in the image of G o d ' s moral character, more loving in handling this elusive and h u m a n l y uncontrollable evidence. In other w o r d s , humans are, themselves, to become personifying evidence of G o d in willingly receiving and reflecting G o d ' s moral character for others. Indeed, as w e increasingly become personifying evidence of G o d , our evidence of G o d becomes more salient, if only because w e ourselves are more salient evidence of G o d . In our inquiry about G o d , then, w e are put under challenge b y G o d to become the evidence of G o d w e claim to seek. Contrary to a typical philosophical attitude, k n o w l e d g e of G o d is not spectator entertainment, casual speculation, or an opportunity for self-credit, but is instead part of a process of G o d ' s thorough make-over of a person. It is, from our side of the process, an active self-commitment to a morally transforming personal relationship of volitional cooperation rather than to a mere subjective state or disposition. We come to k n o w G o d only as G o d becomes our God, the Lord of our lives, rather than just an object of our entertainment, speculation, or manipulation. G o d refuses, for our o w n good, to become an idol of h u m a n proportions. Instead, G o d seeks to remove all of our idols, ideally by our cooperating in removing them. The G o d worthy of worship is anything but cognitively " s a f e " or controllable. We cannot control either G o d or G o d ' s hiding on occasion, and w e should formulate our understanding of k n o w l e d g e of G o d accordingly. The G o d worthy of worship leaves us empty-handed w h e n w e insist on seeking with our self-made tools, including familiar philosophical arguments or religious spiritualities. We are, after all, neither G o d nor G o d ' s advisers, but w e can become, at our best, G o d ' s obedient children. A s a result, w e should not be surprised at all that w e lack our o w n devices to explain all of G o d ' s occasional hiding or G o d ' s permitting evil.

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G i v e n our considerable cognitive limitations, w e should expect G o d not to be fully comprehensible to us. Accordingly, Karl Rahner suggests that humans m a y (and should) willingly "fall into the abyss of G o d ' s incomprehensibility" (1983, p. 1 6 1 ) . We should not confuse this abyss, however, with an empty abyss, a chaotic abyss, or an abyss lacking evidence of divine reality. Instead, the abyss is the mystery of perfect divine love that outstrips h u m a n understanding, even w h e n the giver of such love offers purposively available evidence of divine reality to humans. A s Rahner comments, the mystery is "encompassed by the reality of G o d w h o is for u s " (1983, p. 1 6 1 ) . Contrary to fideism, w e should a d d the following: encompassed, too, by purposively available authoritative evidence of the divine agent w h o is for us, in redemptive love. The suggested "falling into the a b y s s " is volitionally active in that it includes one's willingly yielding, on the basis of purposively available evidence, to the divine p o w e r of self-giving love that is available even beyond the limits of human power, including the p o w e r of h u m a n comprehension. Accordingly, this falling includes a willing, volitional and obedient surrender to the authoritative G o d w h o can show u p , with an authoritative call to d i v i n e - h u m a n fellowship, even in the midst of human puzzlement, darkness, suffering, and death. E v e n given divine mysteries, our habitual refusal to love unselfishly as G o d loves prevents us from seeing the h u m a n l y available things of G o d . A s 1 John 4:3 states: " W h o ever does not love does not k n o w G o d , because G o d is l o v e . " Still, m a n y people will ask: w h y does G o d not become more obvious to us? The question, w e n o w can see, suffers from a misplaced emphasis and therefore should be redirected, as follows: w h y d o we fail to apprehend G o d ' s perfectly loving reality? Instead of uncritically embracing Russell's charge, " G o d , y o u g a v e us insufficient evidence," w e should question ourselves, including our moral and cognitive standing before G o d .

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G o d ' s turnaround question to us includes this query: w h y do y o u humans refuse to receive G o d ' s love and thereby learn to love as G o d loves? In addition: w h y d o y o u humans refuse to become, yourselves, personifying evidence of divine reality, in willing reception of and conformation to G o d ' s moral character of unselfish love? Challenged thus, w e are invited to undertake a cognitive and moral adventure of learning to love as G o d loves, in volitional fellowship with G o d , even through personal suffering, frustration, perplexity, and physical death. Our wilderness parable then will give w a y to the reality of a genuine rescue operation for us in our weakness, from death to n e w life with G o d , come w h a t may. The ever-present question, for better or worse, is just this: are w e sincerely willing to yield in cooperation with the needed self-giving Rescuer? Each of us is called to answer, n o w and in the future. Diversions aside, this life-giving challenge is at the v e r y heart of the evidence for G o d , and it invites us, even in our weakness, to become the evidence for G o d . A t this point, philosophy gives w a y to personal decision regarding not only the evidence one seeks but also the chosen direction of one's life. We all do well, then, to give careful attention to the profound demands of our becoming the evidence for G o d .

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Wenham, David. 1993. "Unity and Diversity in the N e w Testament." In George Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament, 2d ed., 684-720. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. 1995- Paul: Follower of Jesus or Founder of Christianity? Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. Westerholm, Stephen. 2004. Perspectives Old and New on Paul. Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans. Wiebe, Phillip. 2004. God and Other Spirits. N e w York: Oxford University Press. Wilson, E.O. 1987. Consilience: The Unity of Knowledge. N e w York: Knopf.

Index

A b r a m (or Abraham), 90-92, 97, 98, 1 0 2 - 1 0 3 , 1 0 7 , 1 0 8 , 1 5 1 , 229, 244-245 A d a m s , Marilyn McCord, 256-260 agape, 3 7 , 1 3 6 , 1 4 9 , 1 6 0 , 2 1 4 - 2 1 6 , 229, 245, 251 agape-transformation, 2 1 5 Allen, Diogenes, 169 Allison, Dale, 2 1 0 Alston, William P., 82 Anselm, 157 Aquinas, Thomas, 1 5 3 - 1 5 5 , 1 5 7 , 1 6 0 , 1 6 4 - 1 6 5 , 244 Aristotle, 37 Athanasian Creed, 244-245, 248 atonement, 198, 2 1 9 - 2 2 1 , 223, 248. See also reconciliation divine manifest-offering approach, 2 2 1 , 225, 226 attitudinal obedience, 104 Augustine, 1 0 6 , 1 9 2 - 1 9 4 , 240, 244 Aulen, Gustaf, 221 authoritative divine call. See God, as authoritative Barbour, Ian, 169 Barth, Karl, 4 0 - 4 1 , 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 , 104 Bauckham, Richard, 2 1 8 Behe, Michael, 1 6 4 - 1 6 7 Berkhof, Hendrikus, 1 6 1 , 221 bias, 1, 22, 27, 29, 38, 9 8 , 1 1 7 , 1 5 0 Bishop, John, 1 2 2 , 1 2 4 Bourke, Myles, 2 1 0

Brondos, David A., 2 1 0 Bruce, F.F., 239 Brunner, Emil, 9 3 , 1 4 6 , 1 9 4 , 226, 227 Buber, Martin, 9 3 , 1 0 5 Bultmann, Rudolf, 40-41, 84,100, 1 0 1 , 1 0 4 , 218 Byrnes, Michael, 197 Calvin, John, 1 7 1 , 240, 241 Calvinism, 1 3 1 - 1 3 3 , 241, 246, 258. See also predestination sensus divinitatis, 1 7 1 Cherbonnier, Edmond La B., 193 Churchland, Paul, 47, 7 1 cognitive standard, 28, 38, 8 9 , 1 1 5 , 123-124,128,186 Colyvan, Mark, 162 conceptual apparatus, 5 2 - 5 3 , 56 Confucius, 220 conscience, 9, 3 6 , 1 1 3 , 1 4 5 , 1 4 9 , 1 9 9 , 200-201, 205, 2 1 2 , 229 Cottingham, John, 206 Crane, Tim, 66 creationism (or creation science). See evolution, creationism Darwin, Charles, 4 7 , 1 6 3 - 1 6 4 , 1 6 7 Darwinism, 47, 1 2 7 - 1 2 8 , 1 6 3 - 1 7 0 . See also evolution David, 244 Davidson, Donald, 24, 54, 72, 75 Davis, Caroline Franks, 206 Dawkins, Richard, 40, 5 7 , 1 6 3

275

276

INDEX

deism, 2 1 , 30 demand incoherence. See skepticism, demand incoherence of Dennett, Daniel, 2 1 , 40-41, 47,57, 71,126-127, Descartes, Rene, 6 6 , 1 8 7 Cartesianism, 66-68 Dickie, Edgar, 106 discernment purpose-neutral, 6-7, 9-11,15 telic, 7 - 1 1 , 1 5 telic direct, 8 - 9 , 1 7 4 telic indirect, 8 divine hiddenness. See G o d , as elusive divine love commands, 1 0 7 , 1 0 9 Dodd, C.H., 218 dualism, 66. See also Descartes, Ren6 ontological, 66-68 empiricism, 6 9 - 7 0 , 1 5 0 enemy-love (or love of enemies), 2, 22-23, 5< 3°/ 35' 4 3 / 1 0 8 - 1 0 9 , 112-114,119,132,136,144,152, 1 8 2 , 1 9 6 , 2 1 3 - 2 1 4 , 220, 227, 235-236, 259 epistemic reason, 1 8 9 , 1 9 0 . See also truth indicator epistemic warrant, 126 evidence authoritative, 37, 42, 9 8 , 1 5 9 , 1 7 4 , 204-205, 2 1 0 - 2 1 1 , 263, 265 conclusive, 6 , 1 5 - 1 6 , 1 4 9 - 1 5 0 , 1 5 8 , 1 5 9 , 1 6 2 , 1 7 1 , 1 8 3 - 1 8 4 , 201, 204, 206, 208, 2 1 0 , 253, 255-256, 261 diachronic, 9 1 , 207 invitational, 37, 205 personifying, 2 , 1 5 - 1 6 , 26, 3 0 - 3 1 , 33-36, 38, 40, 43-44, 86, 102-103,106,112,137,143,145, 149-150,160,172,174-175,182, 186, 205, 209, 2 1 3 - 2 1 6 , 228, 230, 247, 253-254, 262, 264, 266 purposively available, 8, 27, 30, 33, 36, 40, 9 8 , 1 1 5 - 1 1 6 , 1 1 9 , 1 4 3 ,

1 4 9 , 1 6 1 , 1 7 4 , 1 9 9 , 201, 205, 208, 2 1 0 - 2 1 1 , 235, 254, 263, 265 spectator, 37, 4 2 , 1 5 9 , 1 6 1 , 1 7 4 , 204-205, 2 1 1 synchronic, 9 1 , 207 evidentialism, 1 3 5 - 1 3 6 evil, 2 1 , 40, 4 4 , 1 0 9 , 1 1 7 , 1 3 0 , 1 4 4 , 1 8 1 , 1 9 3 , 200, 214, 224, 230, 232, 236, 253, 257, 261, 264 as possible defeater to theism, 254-262 theodicy, 252-253, 255, 256-257, 259 evolution, 1 2 6 - 1 2 8 , 1 6 4 , 1 6 6 - 1 7 0 creationism, 168 intelligent design (or intelligent designer), 164-168 mutation (or random variation), 128,163-164 natural selection, 1 2 8 , 1 6 3 - 1 6 4 , 166-167 explanatory strategy, 52-54, 56, 58-59, 61

2

Farmer, Herbert H., 1, 9 3 , 1 4 8 , 231 Fee, Gordon, 239 fideism, 6 , 1 5 , 37, 39-42, 44, 87, 88, 1 4 1 , 1 7 9 , 1 8 5 , 265 argument-indifferent, 1 2 5 - 1 4 1 . See also Plantinga, Alvin Kantian, 1 2 2 - 1 2 4 . See also Kant, Immanuel filial knowledge. See knowledge, filial Fodor, Jerry, 46-47, 5 1 , 86, 163 Ford, David R, 256 Forsyth, P.T., 88 free will, 1 3 0 , 1 6 9 , 256-257 Friedman, Michael, 53 Furnish, Victor Paul, 2 1 1 , 239 Garfield, Jay, 162 Gautama the Buddha, 220 Gaventa, Beverly, 199

INDEX

God as authoritative, 1 , 1 4 , 28, 30, 32, 37-38, 40, 89, 9 1 , 9 8 , 1 0 0 , 102-106,110-111, 113, 115, 118,149,152,175,182, 199-200, 204, 209-210, 2 1 2 , 2 1 7 , 229, 263 as creator, 2 1 , 27-30, 32, 73,88, 129,169 as elusive (or divine hiddenness), 2, 27-29, 32, 37, 38, 42, 44, 73, 8 5 , 1 1 6 , 1 4 1 - 1 4 3 , 1 5 1 , i54-!55> 1 5 7 , 1 5 9 , 1 7 0 , 1 7 5 - 1 8 4 , 252-253, 262, 264 as personal Spirit, 1 3 , 1 7 1 - 1 7 2 as unselfish, 2 , 1 5 , 25, 34-35, 1 0 2 , 1 1 1 - 1 1 4 , 1 1 8 - 1 1 9 , *34/ 136-137,145,147,149,181, 192,196,199, 201-202, 204, 209, 2 1 1 , 2 1 3 - 2 1 4 , 2 1 9 , 2 2 1 , 223, 245, 2 5 1 , 263, 265-266 as worthy of worship, 14, 20-24, 2 6 , 3 2 , 38, 42-43, 4 7 , 8 5 , 1 1 4 , 116,132-133,142-143,152-155, 1 5 8 - 1 6 2 , 1 6 5 , 1 8 2 , 1 9 2 , 200, 203-205, 207, 229, 232, 234-237, 242-244, 246-247, 253, 258-260, 262, 264 G o o d N e w s proclamation. See kerygma Gorman, Michael, 1 1 1 , 1 6 0 , 197 Gould, Stephen Jay, 57 grace, 9 2 , 9 7 , 1 0 6 , 1 0 8 , 1 1 1 , 1 1 8 , 1 3 2 , 1 3 9 - 1 4 0 , 1 7 2 , 223, 229, 238-239 cognitive grace, 30, 3 6 , 1 1 6 , 1 4 0 , 172-173 Hampton, Jean, 236 Hanson, N.R., 1 1 5 Heschel, Abraham, 194 Horgan, Terence, 61 Hubbard, Moyer, 199 Hunter, A . M . , 218 Hurtado, Larry, 218

477

idolatry, 264 cognitive idolatry, 2 8 , 1 1 5 - 1 1 6 , 172 incarnational epistemology. See Paul, incarnational epistemology intelligent design. See evolution, intelligent design Isaac, 1 5 1 , 229, 244 Jackson, Timothy, 2 1 6 - 2 1 7 Jacob, 1 5 1 , 229, 244 Jesus, 28-29, 33' 9 9 - 1 0 0 , 1 0 5 , 107-iog, 111,114,118,120,132, 145,147,151,160,171,183,195, 1 9 7 - 1 9 8 , 2 1 1 , 2 1 3 , 2 1 5 , 220-228, 230, 236-237, 239, 242, 2 5 0 - 2 5 1 , 258-259 as authoritative, 2 1 7 as God's atoning sacrifice, 198, 2 1 9 , 2 2 1 , 223, 225-226, 248-250 as innocent victim, 221 as life-model, 227-228 as Mediator, 226, 248-250 as obedient, 9 9 , 1 0 2 , 1 0 4 , 1 1 1 , 1 1 7 , 1 3 2 , 1 4 8 , 222-228 as Passover Lamb, 224-225 as perfect image of God's glory, 172 as preacher, 2 1 8 Gethsemane (or Gethsemane struggle), 1 0 2 , 1 1 1 , 1 4 7 - 1 4 9 , 1 6 2 , 1 7 2 , 222, 224-225 incarnation, 9 5 - 9 7 , 1 0 1 , 129 Last Supper, 219 parables, 1 4 5 , 223 resurrection, 1 1 0 , 1 1 7 - 1 1 8 , 1 2 9 , 197-198, 2 1 8 - 2 2 1 , 225-227 Sermon on the Mount/Plain, 26, 1 0 5 , 1 1 3 , 1 4 4 , 236, 259 Jonah, 175 Juergensmeyer, Mark, 19 Kant, Immanuel, 8 7 , 1 2 3 - 1 2 4 . See also fideism, Kantian

28 7

INDEX

kardiatheology, 25-26, 3 5 , 1 0 5 - 1 0 6 , 1 9 7 - 1 9 8 , 235, 247, 253 Kasemann, Ernst, 9 7 , 1 0 5 - 1 0 6 , 1 0 8 , 1 4 6 , 1 4 8 , 1 8 5 , 2 1 7 , 220, 224, 245 kerygma, 174, 2 1 8 Kierkegaard, Soren, 40-41, 9 3 - 1 0 1 , 104,107,124 Kim, Jaegwon, 54-63 Kitcher, Philip, 53 Klassen, William, 2 1 1 knowledge authoritative, 33 filial (or volitional), 209-212, 228 spectator, 33 Krishna, 220 Kvanvig, Jonathan L., 252 Lemcio, Eugene, 2 1 8 Lycan, William, 47 Mackie, J.L., 257 Mann, William E., 193 Marras, Ausonio, 55 Martyn, J . Louis, 224, 228 materialism, 10, 47, 63-70, 85,168. See also physicalism loose, 64 strict, 64 McGill, Arthur C , 157 McKim, Robert, 1 7 6 - 1 8 1 Meadors, Edward, 1 0 7 , 1 3 2 , 1 9 7 , 224, 243 Meier, John, 2 1 1 Mele, Alfred, 48 Mellor, D.H., 66 Miller, Kenneth, 1 6 7 - 1 7 0 Moses, 220, 244 Muhammad, 220 Murphy, Jeffrie, 236 mysticism, 2 1 0 Nagel, Thomas, 260 natural theology, 8, 9 , 1 5 - 1 6 , 37, 39-40, 42, 44, 4 7 , 1 4 1 , 1 4 2 , 1 8 5 , 201, 203, 209

cosmological argument, 1 5 2 - 1 5 3 , • 155-157 ontological argument, 4 2 , 1 5 2 , 153-158 teleological argument, 1 5 2 , 154-155/157/163-164 naturalism, 4 1 , 44, 6 0 - 8 7 , 3 7 i 3 8 / 164,186 eliminative methodological, 74 eliminative ontological, 71 methodological, 63, 74-75, 77, 89 noneliminative nonreductive ontological, 7 1 noneliminative reductive methodological, 74 noneliminative reductive ontological, 7 1 noneliminative reductive-and-nonreductive methodological, 75 nontheistic, 1 5 , 37, 39-41 ontological, 63, 66-68, 7 1 - 7 4 , 76-77,128 Niebuhr, Reinhold, 1 9 2 - 1 9 3 , 225 I

-

O'Collins, Gerald, 2 2 1 , 249 obedience. See Jesus, as obedient; Paul, and "obedience of faith" Oman, John, 142 overdetermination, 55, 58 paganism, 93 Papineau, David, 72 Pascal, Blaise, 40, 4 3 , 1 4 7 Paul (apostle), 9 9 , 1 0 3 - 1 1 2 , 1 1 9 - 1 2 0 , 136,145,147,150-151,160-161, 171-173,193-194,196-200, 2 1 1 - 2 1 3 , 2 1 7 - 2 1 8 , 227, 239, 242-243, 248, 261 " n e w creation" proclamation, 198-199, 228 and "obedience of faith", 1 0 4 - 1 1 0 and Good N e w s of redemption, 218-226 and the Spirit of G o d , 2 1 1 - 2 1 3

279

INDEX

incarnational epistemology, 171-173 pneumatic epistemology, 1 7 1 Perrin, Norman, 2 1 0 personifying evidence of God. See evidence, personifying Peter (apostle), 2 1 8 physicalism, 60, 63, 69. See also materialism Plantinga, Alvin, 1 3 5 - 1 3 8 , 1 4 0 , 257. See also fideism, argument-indifferent Plato, 9 9 , 1 1 7 pneumatic epistemology. See Paul, pneumatic epistemology predestination (or predestinarianism), 1 0 7 - 1 0 8 , 240-244, 260. See also Calvin, John, Calvinism Priest, Graham, 162 Quine, W.V., 47, 68-72, 75 Rahner, Karl, 265 reconciliation, 3 1 , 1 0 2 - 1 0 3 , 1 0 7 - 1 0 8 , 1 1 0 , 1 1 2 , 1 1 7 - 1 1 9 , 1 6 1 , 210, 2 1 1 , 219, 2 2 1 - 2 2 7 , 9 r 4 6 , 263 redemption. See atonement; Paul, and Good news of redemption; reconciliation; salvation Reformed epistemology, 40, 4 2 , 1 2 5 , 2

2

2

134-135 proper basicality, 42 religious commitment, 232-233 religious diversity (or disagreement or variability), 40, 44, 8 5 , 1 9 8 , 222, 230, 232-233, 237 religious exclusivism, 235-254 actual personal redemptive, 240-248 conditional personal redemptive, 239, 240 doxastic actual redemptive, 244-248 inclusive Christian, 248-254

logical, 234, 238-239 personal redemptive, 238-341 predestinarian personal redemptive, 244 strategic redemptive, 238-239 religious inclusivism, 235 repentance, 1 3 3 , 1 7 3 resurrection, See also Jesus,

resurrection, 118,197,217,220 » bodily, 197, 259 spiritual, 1 9 7 - 1 9 8 Ridderbos, Herman, 1 0 3 , 105 R o w e , William L., 255 Russell, Bertrand, 38, 47, 5 1 , 1 1 5 , 265 salvation, 9 3 , 1 0 0 , 1 0 6 , 1 0 8 - 1 1 0 , 1 1 8 , 129,132-133,139,146,173, 195-200, 2 1 2 - 2 1 4 , 2 1 6 - 2 1 8 , 220-226, 238-239, 2 4 1 - 2 4 2 , 244, 247-249, 260 universa lism, 240, 260 Savellos, E . E . , 7 1 Schaff, Philip, 244 Schellenberg, J.L., 255 Schneider, John R., 256 scientific explanation, 4 9 - 5 1 , 53-54, 70, 86,164 nonpurposive, 10, 47-49, 5 1 purposive (or intentional), 1 1 , 47, 5 1 - 5 4 , 57, 60, 62-63 scientism, 7 6 - 8 7 , 1 2 4 dilemma for, 83-84 Segal, Alan E , 1 0 5 , 1 9 9 self-interestedness (as opposed to selfishness), 1 1 1 - 1 1 2 selfishness, dying to, 1 1 0 - 1 1 9 , 1 9 6 , 199, 2 1 3 Sidgwick, Henry, 26 sin, 9 4 , 1 0 7 , 1 3 1 , 1 3 4 , 1 9 2 - 1 9 8 , 200, 214, 2 1 6 - 2 1 9 , 2 2 1 , 223 as resistance to G o d ' s will, 1 9 5 , 219 Christian view of, 1 9 2 original sin, 1 9 2 - 1 9 3

28o

INDEX

skepticism (or skeptics), 5 , 3 8 , 4 1 , 76, 8 5 , 1 3 9 , 1 5 3 , 1 7 1 , 1 7 3 , 1 8 6 - 1 9 1 , 205, 207-208, 2 5 5 256 agnosticism, 5 , 1 5 , 1 7 , 2 1 , 23-24, 4 1 , 1 3 7 - 1 3 8 , 1 4 1 , 262-263 atheism, 5 , 1 5 , 2 1 , 23-24, 4 1 , 1 4 1 , 262-263 demand incoherence of, 188 Smart, J.J.C., 7 1 , 75 Socrates, 92, 99 subjectivism, 2 0 , 1 0 5 , 1 1 2 suffering, 1 1 8 , 222, 225, 227, 232, 256, 258, 265-266 supervenience, 7 1 - 7 2 , 75 Swinburne, Richard, 206 theodicy. See evil, theodicy theological antirealism, 1 7 - 1 8 theological realism, 1 7 Thielicke, Helmut, 124 Thompson, Marianne Meye, 199 transformation, Sec also agape, agape-transformation attitudinal, 4 moral, 4 , 1 2 - 1 5 , 7< 35~36, 40, 42-44,102,112,136-137, 144-145, 147-149,155,158, 162, 2 3 1 - 2 3 2 , 262, 264 motivational, 4, 26, 36, 235, 253 volitional, 4 2 - 4 3 , 1 0 7 , 1 1 9 , 1 5 0 , 200, 2 1 0 - 2 1 1 transformative gift, 200-202, 204-205, 207, 209 Trout, J.D., 47, 62, 66 2

truth indicator, 8 9 , 1 2 0 - 1 2 3 , 1 2 5 , 138,140,150,189,190. See also epistemic reason universalism. See salvation, universalism volitional attitude, 33 volitional attunement, 43 volitional commitment, 1 0 2 - 1 0 4 , 106-107, / 4 volitional confrontation, 1 4 8 - 1 4 9 , 158 volitional cooperation, 3 5 , 1 8 2 , 1 9 5 - 1 9 6 , 1 9 9 , 201, 209, 2 1 1 - 2 1 2 , 235, 263-264 volitional fellowship (or communion), 3 6 - 3 7 , 1 0 4 , 1 1 8 , 195, 200, 209, 216, 227, 229, 266 volitional interaction, 1 5 volitional theism, 9 , 1 5 - 1 6 , 40, 43, 45, 254, 262-263 volitional transformation. See transformation, volitional volitional yielding, 3 2 , 1 0 4 1 1 0

x l

Wainwright, William, 124 Way, David, 108, 224 Wenham, David, 218, 239 Westerholm, Stephen, 224 Wiebe, Phillip, 197, 207-208 Wilson, E.O., 40, 72, 75 Wittgenstein, L u d w i g , 40 Woodward, James, 61 Yalcin, U.D., 7 1

If God exists, where can we find adequate evidence for God's existence? In this book, Paul K. Moser offers a new perspective on the evidence for God that centers on a morally robust version of theism that is cognitively resilient. The resulting evidence for God is not speculative, abstract, or casual. Rather, it is morally and existentially challenging to humans, as they themselves responsively and willingly become evidence of God's reality in receiving and reflecting God's moral character for others. Moser calls this "personifying evidence of God," because it requires the evidence to be personified in an intentional agent - such as a human - and thereby to be inherent evidence of an intentional agent. Contrasting this approach with skepticism, scientific naturalism, fideism, and natural theology, Moser also grapples with the potential problems of divine hiddenness, religious diversity, and vast evil. PAUL K. MOSER is professor and chair of the philosophy department at Loyola University Chicago. Editor of Jesus and Philosophy and the j o u r -

nal American Philosophical Quarterly, he is author of The Elusive God: Reorienting Religious Epistemology, Philosophy After Objectivity, and Knowledge and Evidence, as well as co-editor of Divine Hiddenness and The Rationality of Theism.

i

Cover image; Rembrandt Harmensz van Rijn. The Return of the Prodigal Son, 1668-69. Oil on canvas, Hermitage, St. Petersburg, Russia. Photo: Scala / Art Resource, NY Cover design by Holly Johnson

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