THE CHASM AHEAD

AURELIO PECCEI An overview of a world in crisis—why the growing gap between the United States and Europe is a tragedy and what can be done now to stave off disaster

„ The Jiasin Ah

"Only the cooperation of all advanced peoples—East and West—can maintain the world system in a general direction of civilized development. T h i s , " the author writes, " i s what this book is about." The Chasm Ahead is a brilliant and informed analysis of the menacing technological gap that now

separates the United

States

and

Europe—with what may eventually be dire consequences. Aurelio Peccei speaks not to the expert, who is already well aware this gap exists, but to the modern, open-minded general reader who desires a better understanding of the problems of our time. Mr. Peccei first examines the state of affairs as technology increasingly separates America and Europe, using "technology" to mean the organized

application

and

utilization

of

knowledge to make products, services, and techniques available

in the market and to

society in general. Next, he presents in perspective the situation and ills of the entire world system, East-West, North-South. Lastly, the book

outlines a new approach, to

macroproblems of our technological

the

age—a

courageous departure from current thinking (Continued

on back flap)

The Chasm Ahead

AURELIO

PECCEI

The Chasm Ahead

THE M A C M I L L A N C O M P A N Y COLLIER-MACMILLAN LTD., LONDON

Copyright © 1969 by Aurelio Peccei A l l rights reserved.

N o part of this book may be reproduced or

transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the Publisher. Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 69-11395 First Printing The Macmillan Company Collier-Macmillan Canada Ltd., Toronto, Ontario Printed in the United States of America

T o Paola, Roberto and Riccardo, and Kiko, Jocie and Jean, and to their children and all their young friends

Contents

Acknowledgments

xi

Introduction

xiii

PART ONE

The Cleavage Across the Atlantic

i

Chapter 1

I

The Technological Gap

Aftermath of the Technological

Revolution

The Dispute about the Gap

I 6

Difficulty of Sizing up the Issue

10

The Gap in Computers

15

From Nuclear Energy to

Aerospace

and Telecommunications

18

The Greater United States Effort in Research and Development

24

Comparative Size and Productivity

26

Brain Training—and

29

Draining

Facing the Gap Chapter 2

The Meaning of the G a p

33 37

A Historical Parallel

37

The American Forward Stance

41

The Pessimistic View of Europe

55

A Metaphor for Our Times

62 vii

CONTENTS Consequences Chapter 3

of the Gap

68

Principles for an Atlantic Strategy

A New Approach The Principles

Is Required

73 73

of Priority and Interdependence

77

The Role of the United States

80

The Role of Europe

89

The Principle

96

of Leadership

PART TWO

The World in Convulsion Chapter 4

103

Between Explosion and Convergence

103

The New Divisive Forces

103

Which Way the Soviet Union?

118

The Emergence

135

Chapter 5

of "One

World"

A Tidal W a v e of Global Problems

Urban Problems—Not

the Largest

159

The Dramatic Race Between Population The Unmet Demand The Necessity The Immense

for Economic

of Building Challenge

The Progressive

Global Dimensions

and Food

176

World

193

of Our Ecosystem

to Our Thinking

164

Development

a Second

of Education

Degradation

159

197 203 211

PART THREE

The Great Change of Direction

219

CONTENTS Chapter 6

"Project 1 9 6 9 "

The New Approach: Recapitulating

219

First Step

the Premises

219 236

Four Basic Principles

241

The Preparatory

Phase

248

The Institutional

Framework

254

Chapter 7

T h e Political Implications

An Act of Political

Will

The Role of the Atlantic Reflections

Index

261 261

Community

on the Longer Term

268 273

283

ix

Acknowledgments

Writing this book has been an enjoyable challenge.

I hope it

has been shared, though I am afraid with a far smaller degree of pleasure, by those who helped me to put it together, because not being a professional in this trade—as the reader will soon detect — I involuntarily imposed on them a greater burden than was necessary.

I wish to thank all of them very heartily for their

endurance and patience. I am indebted first of all to Mario Rossi, who a couple of years ago insisted that I should put on paper, in this form, some of the ideas and reactions derived from my long intercourse, as an industrialist and consulting manager and a man with deep human sympathy, with all kinds of people in many parts of the world. If there is any good in these pages, the reader too should remember him, because he had faith in these ideas and helped me in formulating some of them in parts of the book.

He also

consistently advised me on writing for the American public and revised my texts. I wish to express here my gratitude to three girls who with unperturbed grace withstood the ordeal of working with me at odd and unpredictable hours.

They are Mary Kennedy, who

assisted me in New Y o r k , and Elena Battistoni and Anna Maria Pignocchi, my loyal, admirable and efficient Rome secretaries.

I

wish also very much to thank Peter Glendening, who put his fine mind to reviewing and brushing up my English here and there, changing expressions without changing meaning. With Paolo Rogers I often brood about many of the hurdles xi

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS and pitfalls which we, Europeans and Americans, find in our march forward, and the absolute necessity of reaching a basic and workable understanding on where we want to go and how we may get there.

W e share fundamental views on the necessity and

modes of this cooperation, and I am glad to acknowledge here the fine contribution he has given to me, and others, in the search for ever new ways and means to unite the Atlantic nations toward common g o a l s — w h i c h is one of the leitmotivs of these pages. Finally, I owe very much to my colleagues and collaborators on countless projects and ventures in so many countries.

Time

and again, with Paolo Balbo, Carlo Castaldi, Ercolano Chiari, Riccardo

Chivino,

Piero

Cordignano,

Sandro

Fe

d'Ostiani,

Luciano Gallino, Luigi Malvasio, Paolo Mancinelli,

Umberto

Montalenti,

Portalis,

Elserino

Piol,

Jean-Jacques

Rousseau

Oberdan Sallustro, Celestino Segni, Emanuele

Tosco,

among

many others, I have discussed how to meet and solve a great variety of modern man's problems—problems of development in general, problems of social values and societal innovation, problems of management, problems of technological research

and

transfer, problems of production and productivity, problems of transport, of organization, of efficiency, problems of culture, education and training.

I wish to state that in these pages there is a

reflection of the integrity, fervor and competence with which all these gentlemen have contributed toward imagining, creating and operating new forms and structures of that cooperation among peoples and across boundaries which is the background of this book. A . P.

xii

Introduction

Last August, when I was finishing this book, Czechoslovakia was abruptly overpowered by her Warsaw Pact allies—an inexplicable, sudden emergency symbolic of the disorders and potential threats of our age.

Since then, much water, as they say, has

passed under the bridges in all parts of the world.

Most of it was

turbid, as were the events it carried. Other Soviet postures seemed to set the clock back some fifteen years and evoked the dark specters of confrontation.

Later,

yet another major monetary crisis erupted with a run on the French franc, saved only by stopgap measures, amidst unusual controversies.

Both developments reveal how fragile the foun-

dations of the present international structure are.

Meanwhile the

adverse flow of events was leaving nothing untouched.

The

human condition and human reason continued to suffer, and practically everything that happened sharpened the sense of concern with which these pages had been written. Not only were we confronted with planetary malaise and turmoil, but we had to recognize that this nation is divided and uncertain, as are the other Atlantic nations and the whole West. The traditional principles of authority are questioned, existing institutions do not keep pace with modern life, the body politic is sick and the party system under challenge, new generations openly contest the views and deeds of the older ones. reforms are needed—urgently.

Profound

But the spirit and fire of reform

have not yet found a bard or hero.

And on both sides of the

Atlantic, clamor for renewal is coming mainly from uncreative xiii

INTRODUCTION minorities, leadership is wanting, and no inspiring elite is surging to the forefront. The fact is that the onrush of change has become so drastic that people are utterly confused as to what the situation actually is, what may eventuate from it, what they want instead, and what needs to be done.

A n d while the very essence of human society

is being transformed, the economic and technological glamour of its achievements conceals from our sight that these unceasing waves of change attack the very roots of our individual and collective life.

W e thus fail to perceive the danger element in-

herent in uncontrolled growth.

Phenomenal increases, rapidly ap-

proaching critical maxima along exponential curves, are happening in population, pollution, energy release, speed, automation and

other

key

areas

revolutionized

by

technology.

In

the

changed dynamics of these interacting factors lie the reasons why mankind is confronted with such an unprecedented complex of explosive problems.

But we do not yet seem ready to realize

that the time has come to plan and act on a scale and in ways capable of matching the new thrust and threat of events. Considering the situation in these broad and essential terms, we must recognize that very little is being done to redress it and set human fortunes on a sound and reasonable course.

Even

during the intense, soul-searching political debates of 1968, no indication emerged that any of what I call the macroproblems of our age are being seriously tackled in either the United States or Europe.

I mean that nothing has been said or done which goes

to the heart of the great questions besetting man and society, on which our common future depends; and that very bleak situations will undoubtedly meet us during the next decades, unless a supreme effort is made now to get out of the present global impasse. Something novel and important, however, has emerged lately from the mass of the people, holding out the promise of new hope. xiv

T w o developments stand out and, albeit not yet implying

INTRODUCTION a determination to engage the future positively, reflect a widespread desire to break away from the p a s t — a s in fact they concern things now incompatible with survival and the modes and needs of the technological age. One is the slow, angry defeat of the once triumphant, sharp logic of w a r — a l l but sealed in Vietnam.

It is not that the ways

of war are now foreclosed, although, to all practical ends, its o b j e c t i v e — v i c t o r y — i s ; it is that everywhere people are now convinced that its costs are unacceptable, its risks monstrous.

If

hereafter war can no longer be ranked as an alternative, men will be forced to find new coherence in peace.

This is a total reversal

of past situations, opening up unlimited perspectives, and bound to generate new trends in their thinking, new approaches to the world's problems. The other positive development is the growing refusal of people at large to be brainwashed and led by false pretenses, ideological jugglery, doctored evidence and prospects, a less-than-candid presentation of issues.

Participation in the decision p r o c e s s — s o

widely requested nowadays—presumes

access to, and use of,

knowledge and information, even before the sharing of responsibility.

That is why, in the face of a better informed and dis-

criminating public opinion at home and abroad, no party or government can now hope to get scot-free past a credibility gap.

In

this respect, 1968 is probably the turning point, particularly in the Communist camp, but also with us. The imperatives and opportunities of our time, however, will stay hidden if we do not painstakingly seek for them.

This

search has to be based on a much deeper understanding of the fundamental conditions and problems of our time.

It demands

stature, vision and commitment, it presupposes willingness to innovate and capacity to organize and control innovation, and it requires willpower to lead, and then patience to wait for consensus.

Over the next few years only the peoples of North

America and Europe, acting together, can supply the impetus for xv

INTRODUCTION this great change of direction; and then only the cooperation of all advanced p e o p l e s — E a s t and W e s t — c a n maintain the world system in a general direction of civilized development.

This is

what this book is about. T h e Atlantic nations cannot separate in this grave predicament.

Jointly, they must produce the ideas and resources and

make the sacrifices to organize the new course; and they must rally the other developed nations in this unprecedented human enterprise.

Here are the two Great K e y s to the future I mention

in my presentation.

But time is essential.

A n d for the moment

— E u r o p e a n s ought to a g r e e — t h e only decision and power center actually in a condition to trigger off the movement is the United States. This unique and decisive responsibility has to be shouldered by the new Administration in Washington.

The two Great Keys to

the future lie, for a reasonable time, reasonably within its reach. This is why I consider it an inescapable duty of one and all to support it in this task, whatever one's opinions and leanings before its inauguration. A . P. Rome, November

xvi

1968

The Chasm Ahead

P A R T

ONE

The Cleavage Across the Atlantic

CHAPTER

Aftermath

i. THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP

of the Technological

Revolution

THE TIME HAS COME to examine the dangerous turn of events in this latter part of the 1960% to try to make projections into the future of the present disquieting situations, and to determine what we must do to retain control of our destiny in a time of precipitous change. I am prompted to write this book by the conviction one gets traveling far and wide in the world and observing the growing confusion and complexity of the problems and expectations of our age.

This conviction is that mankind is galloping in the

direction of assured and possibly total disaster.

It follows that a

radical change of azimuth and saner control over its course are both imperative and urgent.

A s man himself has embarked on

this reckless course, it is possible for him to correct it.

The

correction, however, will have to be radical, and the hour is already rather late. I am not a pessimist.

But I see the threat and challenge

components looming so much larger in the diagram of forces that dominate the future that I feel priority attention needs to be given to them—urgently. I

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC With this as my broad frame of reference, I will in Part I of this book examine the Western world, using vector of c h a n g e — a s the focal element. trate on the Chasm

Ahead,

technology—the

I propose to concen-

the split that is rapidly

widening

among the Atlantic nations, and which threatens to divide them into two segments—American society and European

society—

divergent, and evolving in different ways. In Part II, I will attempt to present in perspective the entire world system, as I see i t — a t the crossroads. serious.

Its condition is

Tensions are growing, conflicting tendencies clash.

On

the one hand, its outdated and inefficient sociopolitical organization is patently incapable of coping with the new pattern of forces which have emerged in the modern age, and which tend to disrupt the

system

outright.

On

the other

hand,

weaker factors are working in the opposite

equally

new

but

direction—toward

shaping a universal conception of the human family, and a planetization of our interests—and thus tend instead to transform and coalesce the system.

Still dominant, however, are the un-

controlled and convulsive situations we witness exploding from time to time, and which may eventually get out of hand and play havoc with mankind and civilization.

These are threats and

challenges of a novel kind, which need to be faced squarely.

To

do this we must take an active forward posture, based on a deeper understanding of our peculiar epoch and leading to new forms of long-range coordinated action on a world scale. nally, I will also examine some of the Macroproblems

Fi-

of our

time, this new category of very large problems of a complex nature, demographic, societal, political, or ecological, or of a composite character, which incisively affect the life of most of the world's peoples, and require a global attack. M y intention in this review, first of the state of Atlantic affairs, and then of the situations and ills of our old planet, is to try to give a true, even if cursory, picture of human society's present predicament.

2

A n d from this analysis I will, in Part III, go on to

THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP outline a New Approach

to the world and its problems, which

I submit it is now imperative to adopt if we are going responsibly to prepare ourselves for tomorrow's world.

This N e w A p p r o a c h

entails a courageous departure from current thinking and policies, and the adoption instead of the forward posture I have mentioned.

It means applying all our knowledge and capacity

actively to shape the future.

Because of its traumatic novelty

and extreme complexity, I think it ought to start with a broad feasibility s t u d y — P r o j e c t 1969—to

be undertaken by the most

advanced countries, using objective and scientific methods. M y conviction is that the inevitable outcome of this hard, comprehensive and compassionate new look at man and society in our tempestuous age will be that a Great Change

of

Direc-

tion in our course is both imperative and urgent, to head it off from very probable catastrophe in the coming decades. N o w , to start our discussion, we may recognize that, in a world full of cracks and gaps widened by the torrential flow of change, the cleavage between the United States and Europe is surely not the widest.

But it is the one that may have the most far-reaching

consequences. What may be called the Atlantic

platform

is the world's most

important geopolitical area and the home of the most advanced civilization.

M o r e than one hundred n a t i o n s — b i g and small, old

and n e w — a r e grouped around that platform or look to it for aid, progress, and leadership.

Should the present cleavage continue

to widen and b e c o m e — a s many signs i n d i c a t e — a chasm irretrievably sundering this platform, there is great doubt whether the world will enter the golden age men expect as a result of our technological progress.

Indeed, it seems that the entire human

society might be heading for an era of disorder and crisis. Ironically, this cleavage in the middle of the Atlantic is being brought about by one of the most extraordinary events of worldwide consequence in man's history, an event the Western peoples themselves have unleashed but no longer seem able to c o n t r o l — II

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC the technological revolution.

It is a revolution so sweepingly

new that we are patently unable to understand all its implications.

It is also so radical that, although the Atlantic peoples are

still its major protagonists, they are becoming at the same time the unwilling and largely unwitting agents of many negative developments in its side effects. Carried along as we are in the maelstrom of this revolution, it is difficult to assess its wider effects.

M a n y have attempted this

by searching analysis or comprehensive interpretation.

One such

is M . Pierre Piganiol, a scientist of humanistic spirit, who in a recent book (Maitriser le Progres,

1 9 6 8 ) discusses the impact of

what he calls the scientific revolution on governments and international relations, on education, art and languages, on environment, and on man, as well as on industrial enterprises and the economy. M y general objection is that, save this and a few other exceptions, in examining this pervasive transformation of our society, we seem unable to get rid of our slant toward things e c o n o m i c — what Bertram M . Gross calls our "economic Philistinism."

For

instance, this is the original sin of two very recent and otherwise certainly

commendable

papers

prepared

by

Dr.

Richard

H.

K a u f m a n and Dr. Jean-Pierre Poullier as background material for the Conference on Strategies for Atlantic Technological D e velopment sponsored by the Atlantic Institute and the Committee for the Atlantic Economic Cooperation ( C A E C ) . ference itself, which in M a y

A n d the con-

1968 brought together in R o m e

seventy chief executives of leading corporations and banks on both sides of the Atlantic, was under the spell cast on our thoughts by the indicators and dialectics of economy. In my own view, it is misleading to judge the impact of technological disparities from this angle only.

Their consequences

do not affect only economic activities, they overflow to all other fields, and interact with the entire texture of society.

I cannot

agree more with the trend of thinking pointing in this direction. 4

THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP Commenting on the impact of the space programs on American society, Professor Gross notes that even in "the President's major policy documents, particularly the Economic Budget Message,

Report

and the

we find practically no information whatsoever

on 'social structures.'

W e find that the major indicators deal not

with how good but how much, not with the quality of our lives but rather with the quantity of goods and dollars" (Preface by Bertram M . Gross to Social Bauer, page xiii).

Indicators,

edited by R a y m o n d A .

This may justify many lesser sinners.

How-

ever, "the new interests in information on direct and indirect benefits (and disbenefits) to different groups or beneficiaries"—he a(jds—"is

already leading to a search for better social indicators"

(Ibid., page x i v ) , and he quotes the new Budgeting System

Planning-Programming-

( P P B S ) , being introduced by certain govern-

ment agencies in this country, as an example. It is precisely by taking stock of all the phenomena affecting modern society that we ought to assess the revolution under way, and try to understand where it is leading us.

T h e task is made

somewhat easier, because certain of its unwanted consequences, far from lurking in some distant time, ghosts of the future, are already apparent now and seem destined to grow to intolerable proportions during our lifetime.

One of the most relevant nega-

tive elements, and one which I will use to unfold my thesis, was first perceived a few years ago and is o f t e n — i f somewhat superficially—called

the technological

gap between the United States

and Europe. A s stated, my argument is that, if we do not succeed in stopping this gap from widening, there will be fatal consequences, not only for the whole gamut of relationships between these two great communities, but also for their individual futures and the future of all mankind.

II

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC The Dispute

about

the

Gap

Before attempting to substantiate this thesis, however, I should make it clear that, in the broad sense used here, technology means the organized application and utilization of knowledge to make products, services, processes, and techniques available on the market and to society in general. is very great.

Its impact on modern life

Suffice it, for the moment, to recall that it has been

estimated that technological progress made a 52 percent contribution to the United States' economic growth during the thirtyyear period 1 9 2 7 - 1 9 5 7 .

T o speak of the gap with this wide

connotation is to assume that there actually exists a significant difference in technological performance between the two sides of the Atlantic, a capacity of American society to innovate and progress which cannot be matched by Europe.

A s this may be

considered a bold assumption, two major pertinent questions may be anticipated.

Is there, in fact, a technological gap between the

United States and Europe?

A n d if it does exist, what is its real

meaning? Actually, the existence of a technological gap and its consequences have been an issue of debate between Americans and Europeans during the last few years.

Many Americans, espe-

cially those in official circles, have until recently denied that the two continents were moving so far apart technologically as to create this new problem across the Atlantic.

This

American

refusal to admit the g a p — w h i c h in the minds of many Europeans was e v i d e n t — h a s been a point of contention at the countless meetings and conferences devoted to the subject in the last few years. A s merely one example of this debate, I recall that the existence or importance of the gap was belittled by many American participants at the Symposium on Technology and World Trade, held in November 1966 at Gaithersburg, Maryland, on the occasion of the dedication of the huge new laboratories of the N a tional Bureau of Standards. 6

Y e t these ultramodern, impressive

THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP facilities, dependent upon a federal agency, were there for all to see

They were a monumental demonstration of what the United

States can do and actually is doing in the field of applied research to stimulate the growth and competitive edge of A m e r i c a n technology and economy.

T h e stage was properly set on that occa-

sion to show how powerful America promotes ever more research and innovation, recognizing that they lie at the heart of the process by which America has grown and renewed itself—and outstripped all others, including slower-moving Europe. The participants in the symposium knew this effort could not be duplicated by any nation, not even by all the European countries acting

together,

should

that

continent

become

united.

When the then Assistant Secretary of Commerce J. Herbert Holloman said

that

"we

believe

that

technology,

appropriately

understood, morally and ethically applied, is the best hope for a peaceful, prosperous society," they knew also that he was opening a door whose keys are indeed in the hands of the United States.

A n d they were left wondering whether Europe, let alone

the lesser countries, could ever obtain these keys, or if the United States was willing to use them to give others equal access to the paths of technological prosperity and so make the world's gaps less blatant. The impression of hopelessness was increased, however, when the then Secretary of Commerce John T . Connor added:

"We

need to change our approach to the fact that there are differing levels of technology in various fields among the nations of the world.

Our thoughts and actions should not be directed toward

compensating for these differences artificially.

Rather we should

try to assure that each nation has access to the particular technology most appropriate to its own goals as defined by that nation."

Foreigners in the audience were now convinced that the

United States not only was setting its course toward private exclusive technological frontiers but would also be lost from sight by

all the others much sooner than they had previously feared. And yet the gap was denied or decried.

For myself, I admired II

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC these two forthright and outspoken gentlemen.

T h e y were voic-

ing current United States thinking—that those crying at the gap were alarmists of a sort, because although it was true that the United States was setting the pace, the gap, if any, could be offset by Europe and others if they were really determined to catch up with America. This tune was played time and again by most American officials.

It was not merely an official posture.

T h e y were really

unconvinced that the two halves of the Atlantic were becoming progressively separated by a widening gap, and that the gap was to be a permanent feature of the Atlantic landscape.

Y o u can-

not expect, they said, the same level of technology between firms in industry, or industries in one country, or between countries. Indeed, they pointed out, disparities within the United States may even exceed those between the United States and Europe, and technological leads and lags are natural and fluctuate from time to time. M a n y Europeans, standing on the low side of the gap, perceived its dangers better and sooner.

They admitted that in

fundamental science Europe probably equaled America.

But, as

Professor Jerome B. Wiesner said, "Science is the quest for more or less abstract knowledge, whereas technology is the application of organized knowledge to help solve problems in our society." These Europeans argued that, as the central challenge is not so much gaining new knowledge as learning how to use it effectively, and that, as A m e r i c a is unexcelled in the capacity to swiftly bring techno-scientific progress to the marketplace and into our daily lives, the gap is inevitable.

If it was undeniable that Europe was

ahead in some sectors, they pointed out that the United States lead was very great precisely in the areas that the French call porteurs d'avenir, the key science-based industries and techniques on which the future hinges: computer technology, jet aircraft, satellite communications, microcircuitry, rocket and space science, automated machine tools. 8

A n d they maintained that the

THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP United States lead was even greater when one also considered the capacity to handle giant technical programs by systems analysis and other advanced methods, which in the American experience have already proven themselves in military applications.

In con-

clusion, the technological scales have become irrevocably tilted, according to these Europeans, and the lopsidedness across the Atlantic was not only here to stay but to grow continuously. The issue remained controversial, however.

T h e rather sterile

discussion went on from seminar to conference to roundtable, while the chanceries added their voices to the general confusion. The turning point for a more objective view of the problem was reached, I believe, at the Conference on Transatlantic T e c h nological

Imbalance

France, in M a y

and

Collaboration,

held

at

Deauville,

1967, with the sponsorship of the Scientific-

Technological Committee of the North Atlantic Assembly and the Foreign Policy Research Institute of the University of Pennsylvania.

Opinions still varied according to differences in the

definitions of the words technological conflicting judgments.

and gap, as well as to

But as the conference progressed, the

referents became clearer and a consensus was reached which included the majority of participants. The conclusion at D e a u v i l l e — w h i c h in my view is still a mild expression of a stark p h e n o m e n o n — w a s that although in a number of specific industries and in certain areas of pure science Europe enjoys parity and even superiority, the number of such sectors is relatively small, and there exists an over-all in favor of America.

imbalance

I quote from the conference's final report:

The United States was seen to have a decided edge, not only in the overall conditions, asserted to result in technological growth, hut in the specific results themselves, especially in the critical industries of aerospace, electronics and computers. lng

resources, it was agreed that such a gap existed. a

Thus, defin-

"gap" as an uneven distribution of technologically relevant There was also

sentiment that, even in the local circumstances where now the

II

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC gap was not pronounced, the future was threatening because of the large-scale impetus to technology w h i c h the A m e r i c a n s were able to stimulate in their society.

A similar conclusion had already been reached in a report prepared by an outstanding American executive and a recognized authority on this matter, Dr. Antonie T . Knoppers, who had been requested by the Atlantic Institute to assess the situation.

He

had no hesitation in saying, " T h e leadership in technology held by the United States over Western Europe is even greater than is generally thought in Europe, and is increasing.

T h e long and

short range consequences to E u r o p e — a n d thus to the Atlantic economic relationship—are dangerous if the trend is permitted to continue." A t the present reading, it is no longer disputed among knowledgeable people that a new concern has entered our l i v e s — t h e serious technological gap dividing A m e r i c a from Europe.

It is

also generally conceded that, although in certain industries the United States' technological superiority goes back a century and in other industries the technological lead has changed

hands

many times in the last decades, the over-all gap in its present form is a relatively

recent

phenomenon.

It was in the

1950's

that Europe started lagging dangerously behind. T o d a y , the same Europe that until World W a r II was a healthy contender for technoscientific primacy, running neck and neck with the United States toward progress, or at least trailing behind her at a visible distance, no longer belongs in the same heat.

A yawning gap

between them has set i n — p e r h a p s for good.

Difficulty

of Sizing

up the

Issue

What the experts know, however, has not permeated public awareness in this country.

One can in fact perceive that public

opinion is largely unaware of yet another issue of concern, while 10

THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP those in many influential circles, though recognizing the gap, are still somewhat unimpressed by its presence or meaning.

This is

understandable for a number of reasons. Significant quantitative scarce.

information

about the gap

is

very

It cannot be measured either directly or by its impact,

for instance, on economic growth, export performance, or the balance of payments.

There is no absolute evidence how it is

actually growing or at what pace. described.

Neither can it be precisely

It appears to be a polyphenomenon of a complex

nature, encompassing practically the entire front of human enterprise and activities, which in turn have such different manifestations on the two sides of the Atlantic.

While its measurements

are uncertain, its dynamics, more important than its actual dimensions at any given moment, are likewise elusive. A s the technological gap escapes definition by clear-cut formulae, roundabout ways have been used in the attempt to express what it is meant to represent.

Sometimes, to describe it, re-

course is made to its supposed effects on productivity, output per unit, competitive ability, rate of growth, or capacity to innovate. Other times its purported causes are taken as meaningful indications of what it is all about.

For instance, the gap is linked to

the size of companies and markets or to research and development ( R and D ) investments.

It is related to the differences of

attitudes and values in the American and European societies or the institutions that bind together a whole continent on the one side and fragment another continent on the other.

It is traced

back to education, government postures, entrepreneurship, managerial capacities, and union policies that vary so much in old Europe from young America. Not only are the concepts rather too confused for the general public to understand them; even the definitions are controversial. Many people reject the very term technological nomer.

gap as a mis-

T h e gap, it is maintained, cannot be rightly termed tech-

nological when Europe offers excellent examples of high and II

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC advanced technology, quite comparable to America's.

Much

more appropriate, the argument goes, is to call the phenomenon a managerial gap, an educational gap, or an innovation gap, because it is germane to the capacity, actual or potential, to conduct man's affairs in ways adaptable to the modern world.

Some

say that in actual fact the technology differences between Europe and the United States are more in the nature of lags than of gaps. Others quote a quip: T h e gap is not proven, in any case it is not technological, and as Europe still does not exist, the talk is about nonentities—the only real thing in the picture is the United States. N o wonder then that the American public has not yet grasped what actually is this laceration occurring in the body of Western society.

Understandably, in Europe people are more aware of

the existence of w h a t — l a c k i n g a better definition—we may still go on referring to as the technological

gap.

T h e press, the radio

and T V tell them that the secret lies in the capacity to innovate and translate scientific and technical knowledge into products and processes, in which the United States is far more advanced than Europe.

Capital is more plentiful and freely available and

bolder in accepting risks; the educational system produces better scientific and engineering skills in greater number; management is sharper; the domestic market is much larger and in many ways three, five, or ten years ahead of the European markets; a small number of giant firms are better placed to undertake the risks of R and D investment and of innovation than a large number of small

firms.

T h e y know also that of determining importance

have been the United States defense outlays, of a magnitude that—fortunately, they b e l i e v e — i s without parallel in Europe. They are, however, afraid that the technological effort spurred by defense requirements, which has already stimulated a number of breakthroughs in electronic circuitry, telecommunications, propellants, exotic metals, instruments, and an incredible profusion 12

II

THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP

of gadgetry for the conquest of space, etc., will have increasing effects on everyday life in the future. All these impressions have already ingrained themselves in the European public's mind.

They exist alongside the image of the

United States as the spearhead of human progress (only here and there challenged

by

the

Russians).

This

mythologizing

of

United States technology has probably gone so far beyond reasonable marks that its breathtaking advance is given the credit or blame for much of the revolutionary transformation taking place in everything important in society: values and habits, economic growth and potential for destruction, expansions of industry and decline of traditional

activities,

new

jobs

or

unemployment,

newer communications media and lesser capacity of understanding one another.

T h e United States image is not only one of

standard-bearer of this great upheaval of change, but also one of the only nation capable of absorbing and utilizing its impact and deriving ever new strength from it. Now, if such is public awareness of the gap in Europe, and assuming that the gap really exists, at least to the extent indicated by the consensus at Deauville, it is important to awaken the same consciousness in the American public.

T h e issue ought to be

clearly stated for it to judge. How can outlines of this divisive phenomenon, I asked myself, be conveyed in terms convincing, not to the expert, who no longer needs to be convinced, but to a select public, the readers of this book, who might then convey the message to wider circles?

I am writing this book in faith that the reader is a culti-

vated individual, modern and open-minded, somewhat puzzled and concerned by what happens in the world, and therefore desirous of better understanding the problems of our time.

It is

this person I wish to communicate with. A t the same time, I do not want this book to become a treatise, °r worse, limited to gapology. manager, not a scholar.

It is written by an industrial

It does not set out to present a full

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC demonstration of the g a p — w h i c h , I am sure, eventually can be g i v e n — w i t h tables, diagrams, and detailed specifications. risome topic would thus also become boring.

A wor-

This work intends

to be one of synthesis, bringing forward some ideas about the extremely serious world situation, and suggesting possible avenues for the future.

I would like to be in communion with the

reader and assess with him in broad historical terms what is happening before our eyes in the Atlantic region, and from there move on into the wider and wilder world. M y contribution toward understanding the technological gap and its possible aftermath is not based on the introduction of original or novel data either.

It is rather directed at drawing the

proper inferences from existing elements.

T o explain this central

phenomenon of our time without academic presentation and citation, therefore, I have decided that it might be useful to give the reader a brief cross-section of the news, facts, data, and comments on this topic, which the ordinary citizen daily receives from the press, radio, and television, or occasionally from technical magazines and reports. F r o m the avalanche of information daily pouring on the public, the portion which deals with this subject is uncoordinated, and most of it goes unnoticed.

It comes from the most disparate

sources, and it is sometimes couched in rather confusing, abstruse terms.

T o extract the gist of it and to build a true and

meaningful scenario of

the transatlantic

technological

imbal-

ances, I have asked my friend Mario Rossi, Special Correspondent of The Christian

Science

Monitor

at the United Nations, to

assist me in following the phenomenon for one y e a r — r o u g h l y the year 1 9 6 7 — a s it emerged from the ordinary mass communication media. In his N e w Y o r k observatory, Mario Rossi was ideally situated to collect the source materials, statistical data, and basic findings that support and supplement my opening argument.

In the fol-

lowing pages I shall be making use of this evidence and documentation. 14

THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP II

The Gap in

Computers

First, it is important to realize that the gap that matters is not made up solely of statistical elements.

Let me repeat that I do

not intend to give demonstrations in a mathematical sense.

The

technological gap between the United States and Europe is a subjective as well as an objective phenomenon, something that we can calculate in certain aspects and just feel in others. matter of knowledge but also of intuition.

It is a

When we travel from

southern Italy to southern C a l i f o r n i a — o r , for that matter, to southern E n g l a n d — w e need no production figures or income scales to tell the difference between styles of life. A n y understanding of the problems posed by the technological gap must therefore begin with the fundamental recognition that we are dealing not only with quantitative but also, and especially, with qualitative factors. T o bring this thinking sharply into focus, let us take the crucial case of computers.

A b o u t 40,000 computers are already in

operation in the United States as opposed to about 10,000 in all of Western Europe.

It is reliably estimated that by 1970 there

will be about 50,000 computers in the United States and by 1 9 7 5 , 80,000 and only about 20,000 in Western Europe.

As

we

proceed with these comparisons, the fact is to be borne in mind that the population of Western Europe is more than half again as large as that of the United States: about 355 million as opposed to 206 million. The United States has thus a commanding lead in the new field of electronic data processing which is probably the most pervasive development, affecting more industries in more ways than any other.

It is acknowledged that computers are the star pro-

tagonists of the technological revolution under way. But statistics alone do not reflect the full picture.

There is

another aspect which appears to be more significant: In Europe the computer is being used for limited specialized applications in industry, government, and universities.

It cannot be otherwise,

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC considering that in 1965 the computer-per-man ratio was 386 computers

for

every

million

nonagricultural

workers

in

the

United States, compared to only 125 computers for every million nonagricultural workers in Switzerland, 95 in Sweden, 67 in West Germany, 60 in France, and 48 in the United Kingdom. When I visit the United States, I often clip from the newspapers those articles in which reference is made to computers. T h e following are headlines from some:

COMPUTERS ASSIST A BROOKLYN BIRTH:

2

ELEC-

TRONIC SYSTEMS USED TO A I D C A R E OF PATIENTS IN $ 2 5 - M I L L I O N HOSPITAL C O M P U T E R TESTED AS WEATHER A I D C O M P U T E R S GUIDE PUPIL INTEGRATION: EVANSTON, I I I . , IS REDRAWING ITS SCHOOL BOUNDARIES TO END RACIAL IMBALANCE C O M P U T E R TICKET TESTED BY L . I . R . R . :

ENCODED

CARDS A R E C A L L E D POSSIBLE IN THE FUTURE U . S . COMPUTERS H E L P THWART VIETCONG C O M P U T E R " T U N E S " A R T C E N T E R CEILING C O M P U T E R ORDERS PARTS FOR AN AIRLINE COMPUTER

CHESS W O N

BY

STANFORD:

MACHINE

TAKES ON RUSSIANS A F T E R BEATING CARNEGIE QUICK, C O M P U T E M E A N I C E T A P E S T R Y COMPUTER

TO

AID

L.I.

COMMUNITIES:

STONY

BROOK FACILITY TO A I D SCHOOLS AND HOSPITALS U . S . URGED TO U S E C O M P U T E R IN LANGUAGE STUDY 6TH GRADE TAKING C O M P U T E R COURSE

16

II

THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP 15

POLICE

DEPARTMENTS

TO

LINK

WITH

F.B.I.

COMPUTER SYSTEM COMPUTER N O W A W A L L STREET GUARD COMPUTER JUMPS TO SKI CONCLUSIONS COMPUTERS

TO A I D LEGAL

RESEARCH:

COUNTER

W I L L O F F E R L A W Y E R S C O M P L E T E FILES OF CASES COMPUTER

HOOKUP

TO H O M E

FORESEEN:

MOUTH PROFESSOR HOLDS T H A T BY

1990

DART-

MILLIONS

W I L L SHARE U S E OF DEVICES

If we took the time to examine each of the stories in depth, we would be forced to recognize a whole range of very

serious,

concrete applications of computers throughout the United States. But the last quotation alone is enough to underline my contention that computers are fast becoming a built-in feature of A m e r ican life. Computers are not simple gadgetry, the kind of gimmickry that Americans are so often accused of spawning. man's mental environment. thinking

capacity

and

open

They up

enhance new

and

vistas

T h e y alter multiply

and

his

heretofore

undreamed-of opportunities for the solution of the increasingly complex problems of an industrial society.

T h e computer revo-

lution is altering the fabric of society in the United States to an extent unparalleled in Europe.

Computer technology and ap-

plications require a sophisticated approach at all levels, from producers to customers.

Suffice it to mention that computers

have brought about a new and revolutionary art of management in the conduct of both business and public affairs, which leads to the more efficient use of materials and personnel, faster results and better products, and greater profits. Is it not unreasonable to assume that, if the United States is in a

class by itself when it comes to sheer numbers of computers, it

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC might also be in a class by itself when it comes to all these other factors?

Through computers we accomplish a spectrum of quali-

tative changes that are at the core of the technological gap between America and Europe.

F r o m a technical point of view,

computers do not exist in a vacuum.

On the contrary, they

reflect and dramatize technological changes brought about by the explosion of science-based industries. Electronic components are a case in point. tightly linked with computers.

This is a sector

Here, where industries are in

some cases only five years old and rarely more than ten, fantastic prospects are opening up through the development of such advanced technology as minute integrated circuits.

Here again,

American companies ( T e x a s Instruments, Fairchild, M o t o r o l a ) account for 90 percent of the European market and are practically the sole depositories, through their international subsidiaries, of know-how in this breakthrough development sector. T h e electronics industry in general is, fittingly, one with a builtin feedback, and the country that already holds such a lead seems destined to maintain it.

T o quote my friend Christopher Lay ton,

"to bridge that gap would be for Europe about as easy as boarding a moving express train."

From Nuclear and

Energy

to

Aerospace

Telecommunications

In other frontier industries that are bound to determine the course of the future, one witnesses the emergence and widening of gaps.

Such is the case of the nuclear industry in spite of

Europe's earlier start.

I shall not concern myself with military

applications, where it is common knowledge that the United States holds an overwhelming position. However, even in peaceful applications, by a concentration of effort the United States has easily succeeded in outclassing Europe, which was paralyzed 18

THE T E C H N O L O G I C A L GAP

by an inane proliferation of national approaches and even nationalistic feuds. Today, as it happens, the total installed nuclear power in Europe, some 6,000 M W , may be greater than that in the United States, about 200 M W .

But when one looks beyond the surface

figures, United States dominance is clear, buttressed as it is by the fact that the market for enriched uranium fuel, a major factor in nuclear power, is controlled by her.

A n d 32,000 M W power

stations are now on order in this country.

Furthermore, U.S.-

made nuclear reactors—by General Electric and Westinghouse— have begun to sweep world markets. This seeming inability to meet the nuclear power challenge fills Europe with gloom, and especially the British have found it galling, since they had a head start in design and cost efficiency. Now, despite the fact that British and German laboratories seem to be ahead, so far, in the next generation prototypes—the fastbreeder reactor, which is considered to be the reactor for the eighties—the story may repeat itself.

A n d before that deadline

arrives, uncoordinated, ineffectual policies may already have produced the sterilization of the initial European lead built up through research in the past years. The same story of the dramatic decline of great European industries can be recited for the aircraft industry.

The record

here is one of bold initiatives, gambles, fiascos, and again, of selfdefeating feuds.

In a book to be published shortly (Europe's

Advanced Technology:

A Program for Integration),

Layton tells the whole story in detail.

Christopher

Suffice it to mention the

failure of the European attempt to produce a variable geometry aircraft and the airbus.

This failure has probably decreed the

final dominance of United States aircraft in world markets.

The

Americans have taken the initiative in the construction of the "jumbo jet" with the Boeing 747, and have a strong time lead in the airbus category with the Lockheed L 1 0 1 1 and the McDonnell Douglas D C 10.

These airplanes are due to go into operation in 19

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC 1970,

and

will

again

revolutionize

civilian

air

transport.

Europe's only entry so far is the Rolls R o y c e engines powering the L i 0 1 1 .

But, indeed, the airbus case illustrates the limits and

failures of production by European-style coalition: two or more governments, two or more managements and two or more production lines trying to simulate the unified industrial process contracted out to a single c o m p a n y — w h i c h , moreover, has at its disposal a very large domestic market. T h e Americans, meanwhile, have not only been developing individual aircraft but perfecting the concept of "fleet standardization," with its rational planning, and cost saving.

And

these are some of the reasons why, one by one, civilian airlines and military air forces are, with a few exceptions, United States material.

adopting

Only in the race for supersonic aircraft

does Europe seem in a position to win eventually, if the AngloFrench Concord

maintains its present decisive lead and proves

itself operationally satisfactory. Space is just another typical example of the gap in effectiveness between the two sides of the Atlantic.

Certainly, there is

also a huge gap in scale: around four billion dollars spent annually in the United States during the past years (more than Europe's entire civilian R and D effort in all industries) compared with slightly more than 200 million dollars on Europe's space programs, national and international. In the more significative terms of manpower, N A S A has some 500,000 employees, as against 20,000 in government and international space research centers in the whole of Western Europe. This overwhelming ratio may probably be reduced in the future. For one thing, many voices in this country are criticizing such expenditure as lavish, and somebody has gone so far as to compare it to the R o m a n Empire devoting so much of its revenue to the Circus.

On the other hand, Europe seems about to revise its

programs, and the Causse Report, prepared on behalf of the minister-level European Space Conference, suggests an annual 20

II

THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP

investment of 400 billion dollars in 1970, nearly equally distributed between multilateral and national efforts.

But, even on

these optimistic assumptions, the ratio would still be 8 or to 1. The time-lag is also great: the first American Explorer

10 was

flown in 1957 under the tremendous push given by the Russian achievements, and approximately 500 further satellites have been flown since by the United States, against eleven by Europe, the first in 1964.

But what matters most is that the organization

behind is so different.

Against the American concentration of

effort, there are presently three main multinational space organizations in Europe: the European Space Research Organization ( E S R O , grouping ten nations) for scientific satellites and sounding rockets, the European Launcher Development Organization ( E L D O , six nations) for the development of launchers, and the European Conference on Satellite Communications ( C E T S , eighteen nations)

aiming at a program

of

application

satellites.

Then there are t e a separate national programs and a number of bilateral combinations such as the Franco-German

association

for the development of the communications satellite

Symphonie,

and a number of instances of cooperation between single nations and N A S A . Aerospace has become one of the largest United States manufacturing employers, with a 1.2 million payroll, including percent of the nation's scientific and engineering talent.

20 Co-

operation among government agencies, space-oriented industries, universities and a wide circle of knowledgeable professionals is easy and rapid, facilitated by a permanent turnover of persons among these groups.

T h e decision-making machine is well oiled

and quick to operate, even if not all taxpayers are happy about the amount of the allocations.

In Europe, on the contrary, the

dissemination of information is difficult and slow.

Sometimes it

seems as if communications on space and the universe was better at

the time when Kepler and Galileo used to compare their results

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC and thoughts by writing letters to each other in Latin between Prague and Florence. Europe has not fully understood that space is not a vague competition for "pie in the s k y , " a race for prestige by reaching for the stars.

Space research is part and parcel of the new sci-

entific revolution and has started a new era of discovery, comparable to the one which followed the first use of the telescope. A n d it has some very real, immediate results, not to mention spin-off effects on industry as a whole.

Application satellites,

such as communications, meteorology, navigation and earth resource survey satellites, are bound to play a fundamental role in the future of mankind. But, except for its participation in a fifty-odd nation venture, the International Telecommunications Satellite Consortium

(In-

t e l s a t ) — i n which the United States, having developed the basic know-how, has more than half the s t o c k — E u r o p e has still to take a step in this area, nor has it any practical plans for developments in the immediate future.

In 1964 it started a program

to set up its own communications satellite network, but has failed so far to come up with a concerted plan which could harmonize the existing and operating Intelsat global system with a European regional system capable of satisfying, on an economic basis, the additional local requirements. T o conclude, it may be appropriate to recall a remark made one day by M a r k Twain and quoted by Ernst Stuhlinger.

A

riverboat pilot was complaining bitterly about the new steamboats which, as he said, made a real misery out of boating, and M a r k Twain answered: "I see what you mean, brother, but don't pity yourself.

When it's steamboat time, you better steam!"

Communications at large are one of the main avenues of the technological revolution.

T h e new communications theory

is

developing systems which include satellites and computers connected by telephone, telegraph, and microwaves.

Y e t if we scale

down from the spectacular hardware and technology of satellite 22

II

THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP

communication to the more down-to-earth telephone system, the gap in both quantity and quality still exists. Half the growth of calls in the next ten years will be for data transmission from computer to computer.

In the United States it

is already possible to get through central computers by using telephone lines.

Sharing the time of such central computers,

people will in the near future gather all kinds of information and answers concerning law, medicine, science, technology, and business.

Europe is still way behind.

In 1966 it had only one

telephone for every six people, compared with one for two in the United States, and the quality of European telephone lines is rarely up to American standards.

In spite of the fast rate of

growth in the number of telephones installed in Europe, there is still little indication that its telephone networks are prepared for the revolution in telecommunications that is already under way in the United States. The Bell Telephone Company experimental laboratories are known throughout the world as the very model of the most advanced and progressive kind of commercial research laboratory — w i t h the transistor as only one of its many contributions to modern technology.

Though Europe spends more on telephone

research and development than the United States, its efforts are dispersed in national approaches with quite insufficient, if not inefficient, results. Organization

for

( O E C D ) Report

It has been pointed out in the exhaustive Economic

Cooperation

on the United

and

States Science

Development Policy

that the

several high-level telecommunications industries in Europe, put together, deal with a network smaller than the 70 or 80 percent of the total United States telephone system manufactured and operated by one single company, A T & T . It is in such a complex of interlocking factors that the technology gap lies.

Individually considered, these factors are evi-

dence of the fact that the United States has a dominant lead over Western Europe in most crucial areas of applied science and

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC marketable technology.

In combination, they exert such a for-

mative influence on the societies of America and Europe that, even if the gap is not yet irrefutably proven, they portend a phenomenon that will widen as time passes.

The Greater Research

United

and

States Effort

in

Development

Competition by innovation is rapidly taking the place of competition by productivity.

Investment of capital and talent in R

and D is at the base of the innovative process and constitutes one of the necessary driving forces of future growth.

It may be

argued that R and D expenditures are simply inputs, and provide no measure of output, that is, of actual results.

However, there

are enough cases to prove that the R and D effort is concomitant with over-all growth. According to the latest data available, R and D expenditures in the United States—one-third of the world t o t a l — w e r e 24 billion dollars (3.5 percent of the gross national product [ G N P ] )

in

1967 as against about 7 billion dollars ( 1 . 3 percent of the G N P ) in Western Europe.

T h e resources annually deployed by the

United States are ten times greater than those of Great Britain, fifteen times those of Germany and France.

Her R and D ex-

penditures are expected to reach 53 billion dollars at current prices in 1980, when in all Western Europe they will probably be nearing only 20 billion dollars.

In the number of people em-

ployed on research and development, which probably provides a more significant indication of the real effort devoted to this activity, the United States dominance is again undeniable: about one and one-quarter million people, as opposed to about one-half million in Europe. A t present the United States government pays nearly threefourths of the national R and D bill.

Such Washington backing

amounts to nearly one-seventh of the federal budget.

By the end

of the century, according to some projections, the federal gov24

THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP ernment may be paying as much as four-fifths of the nation's R and D costs.

A n d as science policy and its management acquire

greater importance as instruments of achieving national objectives, this centralization of its funding, the intelligent use of a new tool invented to give it more leverage, and practically nonexistent in Europe—the federal R and D c o n t r a c t — a n d its coordination with government purchasing, plus the American capacity of managing highly complex research projects, are proof of the United States' greater efficiency, and cannot but help to solidify its overall techno-scientific superiority over Europe. Moreover, this well-designed and massive United States R and D effort has been selective, aiming at developing

particularly

some science-intensive and future-oriented activities, such as aircraft, electronics, instrumentation, nuclear energy and telecommunications, in which the United States has by now acquired a commanding lead.

A n d early dividends have started coming in,

since these are the industries which have been experiencing the greatest export expansion. The advantages accruing from this policy are also shown by the United States technological balance of payments, namely the net flow of money for patents, royalties, licenses, and technological know-how at large she sells to other nations and buys from them.

It is far from being a perfect instrument of analysis, but,

in the absence of a better one, it is an indicator of value.

The

trend of the technological balance of the United States with Western Europe shows a growing surplus in favor of the United States, which more than doubled the receipts from 1958 million dollars) to 1965 ( 4 5 4 million dollars).

(132

It is pertinent to

indicate that these same years mark the turning point in the R and D

effort in the

United

States,

with

total

expenditures

doubling from roughly ten billion dollars in 1958 to more than twenty billion dollars in 1965.

Thus, as was pointed out in the

° E C D report, "if the R and D effort is not enough to explain this expansion, it certainly contributes and explains some aspects." II

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC T h e R and D investment can thus be considered one of those determinant factors that have brought about the technological gap between Europe and America.

Even if its rate of growth per

year is expected to decline, the American lead over Europe is more likely to lengthen than to shorten in the light of the longterm fruition of the investments made in the past.

T o quote a

great tragedian, Europe cannot expect to "sleep out this great gap"

Comparative

Size and

Productivity

Since optimal dimensions vary from industry to industry, from sector to sector, size in industry is a controversial factor.

Never-

theless, the fact remains that in such major industrial sectors as automobiles, electronics, rubber, steel, oil, and chemicals the largest firms are American, and the gap between them and their European competitors is considerable. the American

domestic

T h e far greater size of

market accounts partly for this dis-

parity. According to O E C D data the largest American firm in electronics has a turnover three times that of the leading European firm.

T h e latter is surpassed by two other American

firms.

In

the automobile industry, the ratio is nearly 10 to i ; in rubber and steel it is more than 2 to i .

In chemicals the gap between the

first three American firms combined and the first three foreign firms is about 1.4 to 1, and this is the sector where foreign industry is nearest in size to American industry. T h e oligopolistic structure of American industry is favorable to innovation.

Large American firms are better placed than their

European counterparts to undertake risks. the latter trail behind.

But also profit-wise

In same-industry comparisons, consid-

erable disparities are found between profit performances in the United States and those in the rest of the world.

In electronics

the ratio between the net profit of the leading American company 26

THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP and that of the leading foreign company is 3.2 to 1; in automobiles it is more than 20 to 1; in chemicals 2 to 1; in steel 11 to 1; in tires 4 to 1. It is correctly pointed out by another O E C D report that these differences in profits are far more important than differences in the volume of sales or turnover.

They are an indicator of the

great productivity achieved by firms in the United States.

In

1966 Britain's National Economic Development Office calculated that the United States productivity was far greater than Europe's.

T h e number of men required to produce the same

output as one man in the United States was, for example 2.3 for Britain in steel, 3.4 for Britain and 2.6 for Germany in chemicals, 4.2 and 3.8 respectively for Britain and Germany in electrical machinery, and so on. This means that, besides advantages of scale, American industry enjoys a productivity edge over European competition.

Very

different opinions can be gleaned as to the main factors contributing to this difference in performance.

One thing, however, seems

to me certain, namely that, just as for the furtherance of innovation, cost performance, profit growth, etc., productivity too depends very much on the quality

and drive of

Knoppers always underscores superior industrial and management concepts as the deciding factor.

management. management A n d one field

where America excels, certainly, is managerial capacity.

Hence,

the tendency to speak of the managerial gap. A s to the productivity gap itself, it has been speculated that several elements and trends should lead to its narrowing in the future.

I wish this were true.

However, contrary to this anticipa-

tion, I would cite the conclusions of the American

economist

Richard N. Cooper in his exhaustive study of this specific issue in Automation

and Technological

Change.

A rough estimate of the pace of reduction in the productivity gap can be made by assuming that the difference between the con-

II

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC tinuing high productivity increases in Europe and a plausible rate for the United States is one percent a year.

If the productivity

level in the United States is now two and one half times the European level, it would take 23 years for the European level to reach half the United States level, and nearly a century to close the productivity gap entirely.

Of course the question of size, as a factor of technological progress is not in itself decisive.

T h e argument has been brought

forward that in the United States the small innovating industry committed to science-oriented sectors has often played a role greater than that of the large corporations.

Xerox,

Polaroid,

Varian, Hewlett-Packard, and other electronic components industries are well-known cases.

This is true, but small, pace-set-

ting firms thrive better when they live among a population of giants, and when the market offers them unlimited opportunities to grow, as in the United States.

A n d , on the other hand, the

size factor may be decisive where the "minimum threshold" is so high that only very large concerns can possibly reach it. This is the case with nuclear industry and satellite technology.

communication

A s to the latter, Freeman and Harlow esti-

mated that it would cost 80 to n o million dollars to develop a commercial satellite over five years.

This amount does not in-

clude the almost extravagant costs of basic backup research and the ancillary costs of vectors, launchings, reserve units, etc.

In

nuclear and aircraft industries the case is all the more evident, considering that, for instance, Britain's fast breeder reactor prototype and development program may cost more than 400 million dollars, and the rate for a supersonic aircraft is at least three times as much.

Layton's correct conclusions, again, are that

large companies and considerable government financial assistance are both needed for their development.

It is not surprising,

therefore, that in some future-creative sectors America's big battalions tend to win. 28

THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP The statement in a memorandum of the C o m m o n

Market

Commission is not, therefore, mistaken, although it may be only partially correct: "It is the widespread feeling that European companies are not big enough at present either to take full advantage of the C o m m o n Market, or to compete with powerful outside concerns—particularly American companies—which are able to set themselves within the Community itself and because of their greater financial and technical resources built up in a vast home market, can easily outweigh those European

com-

panies which do try to adapt themselves to the scale of competition appropriate to the C o m m o n M a r k e t . "

Brain Training—and

Draining

Modern industrial society is so complex and integrated that everything interacts with everything else.

T h e vehicle for change

is technology, and probably the main factor influencing technology is education.

From all that has been said in the previous

pages, it clearly follows that the relative availability of qualified personnel, both at the scientific level and at the professional and technical levels, is the key element in the technological disparities between the United States and Europe. We will examine, first, the great mobility, most of it one-way, of human elements between the two sides of the Atlantic, and then, how the brainpower, which constitutes the natural endowment of the two societies, is upgraded, educated, and trained by each. It is understandable that a good deal of public attention is directed toward what is commonly known as the brain drain, which depletes

Europe—and

other areas t o o — a n d

enriches America with high-value brainpower.

generally

Layton is right

when he writes that the brain drain "reflects and exaggerates the shift of the center of gravity of technological power" to the United States. II

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC What the brain drain usually refers to is, of course, the movement of

scientists

and technicians

trained specialists of many States.

in particular—and

kinds in g e n e r a l — t o

But the issue is really more complicated.

the

highly United

For one thing,

the "brains" of the world of science and technology always tend to concentrate in a few centers within the more developed countries.

This has been so since the first astrologers, medicine men,

and metal workers congregated in the cities of

Mesopotamia.

But even though the problem is not confined to the drain of scientists and technicians into the United States today, it is only proper to focus attention on the current situation there, because it clearly defines the nature of the problem. According to a study by the National Science

Foundation,

43,500 scientists and engineers emigrated to the United States during the thirteen years from 1949 to 1 9 6 1 . average of about 3,350 a year.

This represents an

A n d although the total does not

include the many other related specialists—from doctors to lab technicians—yet even these thousands represent a loss to the native countries and a gain to the United States that is equivalent to the training provided by several large universities.

Seventy

percent of the 43,500 who immigrated into the United States came from countries with a relatively high standard of education — C a n a d a and West European countries. In 1966 two official reports in Britain caused considerable concern when they revealed the seriousness of the problem: 37 percent of the physicists w h o received doctorates between 1958 and 1963, for instance, were working a b r o a d — m a i n l y in the United States.

Already in 1963 the R o y a l Society had issued a

report showing about 7 percent of the recipients of doctorates in science and engineering were emigrating and settling permanently in the United States.

Again in 1966 Britain's Action Committee

for European Aerospace reported that the United

Kingdom's

whole aerospace program was in danger of collapsing due to American "pirating" of brains: Some 500 designers and 30

100

II

THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP

stress engineers were recruited during a single year to work in the United States. The flow of European scientists to the United States averages 2,000 annually. than 2,700.

T h e peak year was 1966, when there were more

A l m o s t half of them came from Great Britain, while

the Common Market countries provided only a relatively small proportion of the total.

What is peculiar is that physical and life

sciences are the greatest single field of interest (45 percent of the total) for brains drained to the United States.

Of the forty

scientists living in this country who were awarded the Nobel Prize for physics or chemistry between 1907 and 1961

fifteen

were foreign-born. A s a side issue we may note that the outlook is even gloomier for developing countries, because with the new immigration legislation, the former quota system ceased to exist in July 1968 and the technical and intellectual qualities of the immigrants will henceforth be among the criteria of selection, and therefore, the brain drain will be relatively bigger. The importance of the problem, however, cannot be judged from statistics alone.

It is in the less measurable sphere of qual-

ity that the brain drain makes its ultimate impact. those who migrate

are motivated,

Generally,

enterprising people.

The

Royal Society recognized this when it stated: " W e regard as much more serious the economic consequences of the loss to this country of the leadership and the creative contribution to science and technology which these emigrants would have made in their working lives." Here we may turn to the most pertinent study, that of R a y mond Poignant, a leading French authority on education, undertaken for the Institute of University Studies of the European Community.

Its results, made public in 1965, indicate that, in

all the relevant areas, the nations of Western Europe lag behind the United States in the production of trained personnel in general, and scientific technological personnel in particular.

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC According to this study and O E C D data, in 1964 the United States spent 6.18 percent of its G N P on education, as compared with an average of about 4 percent of the main European countries.

School enrollment as a percentage of the total population

in the age bracket between five and twenty-four years was 77 in the United States, 65.3 in France, 60.5 in the United Kingdom and 56.3 in Germany. This is reflected in the higher proportion of high-level manpower in the United States, accounting for 17 percent of total labor force as compared to n

percent in the United Kingdom,

and 10 percent in the C o m m o n Market countries.

In his paper,

K a u f m a n notes that over 40 percent of the university-age population in the United States are in colleges or universities, compared with 10 percent in Britain, 15 percent in France, and 7 percent in Germany and Italy; that about 20 percent of the university-age population in the United States earn degrees, compared

with

only about 4 percent in the European C o m m o n Market; and that there are over 2,000 institutions of higher learning in the United States, compared with 40 in France and 48 in Germany. Still, we might overlook these figures if the European nations were making some advances.

Instead, the Poignant study showed

that the European Economic Community nations were not changing their secondary education setups fast enough to achieve any substantial increase in their relatively small percentage of collegeage population receiving higher education.

Behind these

figures,

of course, lies still another issue: the social inequality when it comes to educational opportunities within the European nations. Put simply, working-class children are not getting their share of higher education, and it seems fair to say that Europe is thus wasting the brainpower,

not to say the lives and future, of

many of these children. Europe has lost many opportunities to narrow the gap between the potential of education and the advancement of science and technology. 32

T o be sure, many responsible Americans have seri-

THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP ous reservations about the close relationships that have developed between the new scientific establishment and the educational establishment in this country, and debate continues about the details and general configuration of these relationships.

But

the fact remains that there has been a definite link between the progress of science and technology in the United States and the increasingly prominent role that the educational has played in this area.

establishment

Wherever we look in the United States

from the introduction of the "new math" in the lower grades to the establishment of the Harvard University Program on T e c h nology and S o c i e t y — w e see that United States educational institutions are in the vanguard of those w h o wish to come to grips with science and technology in modern society. Comparisons with the European educational

establishment—

whether by statistics or actual instances—are especially difficult, because so many factors are involved that we are in danger of comparing unlikes.

But whether we use figures or whether we

use more intuitive readings of the situation, we must conclude that the relative position of most Western European countries, in terms of making the best use of their brainpower, will more than likely be worse by 1970 than in 1940.

A s I have tried to sug-

gest, it is in the area of the less tangible factors—summed up as preparation for the modern w o r l d — t h a t the true gap lies.

Facing

the

Gap

Whatever the shortcomings and incompleteness of this panoramic review of the causes and symptoms of technological and related disparities between the United States and Europe, the picture we have formed is unfortunately clear enough.

I believe

that at this stage little doubt remains even in the layman's mind about the presence, in our Atlantic platform, of an ugly crack that has started to drive us apart. T o move from this preliminary conclusion and consider the II

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC second basic question relative to the m e a n i n g and c o n s e q u e n c e s of the g a p , w e must start by realizing that this is far f r o m being a minor issue.

Its dimensions, its d y n a m i c s , and its nature c a u s e

the technological g a p to be o n e of the m a j o r p r o b l e m s c o n f r o n t ing the A t l a n t i c c o m m u n i t y of nations. T o drive h o m e this c o n c e p t finally, without repeating myself, I q u o t e at some length the very v a l u a b l e a n d w e l l - b a l a n c e d opinion w h i c h e m e r g e d f r o m the previously m e n t i o n e d D e a u v i l l e C o n f e r ence.

O t h e r and m o r e detailed d o c u m e n t s h a v e a p p e a r e d since,

w h i c h support its c o n c l u s i o n s , but the D e a u v i l l e consensus report is incisive and m e m o r a b l e as a c o u r a g e o u s statement.

It is an

expression of statesmanship, b e c a u s e it c o m p e l s serious reflection; and let us h o p e it will lead to action.

It says:

Large scale European-Atlantic differences in values, mobility, institutional structures, size, and rigidity were seen to account for the discrepancies.

Values or attitudes which might foster be-

haviour leading to technological growth were found to be relatively weak in Europe.

Whether the issue under discussion was

the attitudes toward accepting innovation and change, or working to increase the profit of a firm, or moving to turn pure science into applied technology, the values of Europeans were deemed to be less supportive to technology than those of Americans. Mobility was another common theme. . . .

Some stressed the

relatively greater capacity of Americans for geographic mobility, while others stressed the relative ease with which

Americans

enjoyed occupational mobility between universities, research institutes and the industrial sector . . . the relative dynamism of American society was underlined as a major cause of technological superiority deemed to be dependent on the free exchange of individuals and information throughout the society.

Special at-

tention was paid to the link between the generator of science, the university, and the applicator of science, industry.

T h e link was

seen to be highly productive in the United States and relatively weak in Europe. 34

THE TECHNOLOGICAL GAP Related to the differences in mobility, are the differences in institutional structures. Communications

between institutions

or

within institutions were deemed to be better in the United States than in Europe.

In the new pragmatic political environment of

the United States, government is allowed and even encouraged to play a major role in developing the U.S. technological

base.

Government aids industry by subsidizing research in the early non-profit stage.

Industry profits f r o m spin-offs from govern-

ment initiated projects.

Mutual benefits accrue from the struc-

tural relations: which industry, government, and the university have evolved with each other.

T h e relative absence of structural

barriers against trade and the relative ease with which the different economic, political, and intellectual institutions can communicate with each other and adapt to changes in the needs of one or the other partner, all these assets of the dynamic environment were considered by many to be at the root of

technological

disparities. For others, size was counted as a major asset in favor of the United States.

Size of firm, to allow for capital formation, and

size of production facility, to allow for small unit cost, were said to work in the favor of the United States. was judged as an especially

T h e size of market

important and, perhaps,

critical

factor. . . . Mention was made of the relative rigidity of European factors of production.

T h e flexibility and adaptability which characterizes

social and economic institutions in the United States was deemed as a useful asset of a technologically receptive society.

Unpre-

dictable demands of a rapidly developing technology are most readily met in a society which is flexible and willing to evolve new forms tions.

of

person-to-person,

institution-to-institution

rela-

The relatively larger sector of American society which

has been educated on the college and university level, contributes to that flexibility and mobility which enhances employment opportunities.

The factors that were viewed at Deauville as the most serious were the disparities of

values, mobility,

structure,

size,

and II

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC rigidity.

We should not fail to understand their importance as

factors perpetuating and widening the cleavage that now divides the Western society.

Their influence is great, because they are

related to each other in an interacting system in which the multiplying effect of the American assets makes the potential of the United States look enormous compared with that of Europe, in a period in which the latter seems to be caught up in a vicious circle of desultory performances which in turn stifle the will to try harder. Having thus half-assumed

and then, at least,

half-demon-

strated the existence of the gap, I could, if a remark in a lighter vein be permitted in such a serious context, supply a final demonstratio per absurdum dox.

by quoting what I call the Casimir para-

In the words of Dr. H. B. G . Casimir, the highly respected

Dutch scientist and research director: "If America really wants to do something about the gap, start introducing a different currency

in each of the fifty states, and

impose

other

serious

boundaries among all the states. Y o u have enough Italian, Greek, and German and Dutch people to create four, five, or six official languages in the various regions.

If you made a state with an

official Italian language, be sure to incorporate minorities with another language or two. full effect.

Otherwise it won't work or create the

It would also help to have several of these states

drive on the right side of the road and others keep to the left. It would be a nice project in operational research to work this out in such a way that you would get the maximum number of collisions.

If this experiment were done, and we then, ten or fifteen

years from now, compared your A m e r i c a with Europe, we may well have bridged the gap, whatever it is!" This witty aphorism helps us to realize the truth of the existence of a disturbing and baffling gap right in the heart of the Atlantic community.

In the face of this grim finding, we are

definitely prompted to inquire further: What is its true meaning, and what are its short- and long-range consequences on the A t lantic system itself? 36

CHAPTER 2. THE MEANING OF THE GAP

A Historical I

Parallel

HAVE RECOGNIZED,

at the outset, that on our planet there are

larger gaps than the technological gap between the United States and Europe.

Most people, indeed, are aware of the extreme

differences from the focal viewpoint of economic development and living standards between certain parts of the world—namely, between the developed and the underdeveloped nations.

These two

categories, and the gulf between them, are self-evident.

Little

doubt exists that this major issue ranges the "have" and "havenot" nations against each other and divides the world into two irreconcilable camps, as we will see later. Y e t few people pause to ask themselves how this dramatic differentiation between a minority of rich and a majority of poor nations of the world has come about.

Why, in other words, has

the first group so progressed that it includes most affluent countries, while the second has fallen back so seriously that it contains literally starving and destitute peoples? Historical analogy and comparison are always difficult and sometimes misleading.

They may yield general principles, how-

ever, and in our case a quick glance at the past may offer interesting food for thought. Science and technology have deeply influenced the civilization and shaped the history of man throughout the centuries, and it is worthwhile to begin by considering what part they have played in bringing about this gap in development standards and potential. In the history of mankind it is possible to see long phases of slow evolution, broken by periods of intense change which can be compared to the mutations in the life of the species.

When a 37

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC community became stronger through the discovery of new technical methods or weapons, it invariably conquered or repressed more backward neighboring communities or races.

Each

of

these stages of man's advancement, often separated one from another by thousands of years, necessarily brought about a corresponding change in the social order. When the new order became stable and spread to other peoples, a new great step in the human ascent was accomplished. Sir Julian Huxley has pointed out that, since man took life across the threshold from the biological to the social phase of evolution, there have been five dominant types of human organization, which he calls psychosocial

systems.

These five major

successive stages of civilization are those of food gathering; the tribal organization of man the hunter; the settled life in villages dedicated to growing crops and domesticating animals; the organized city leading to powerful nations and empires; and finally the stage of organized inquiry and of science, industry, and structured economic systems.

This is the phase in which we live, and

in which the present and new

radical

differentiation

among

countries has taken place. Another Englishman,

Arnold Toynbee,

the celebrated

his-

torian, said (Playboy, April 1 9 6 7 ) that until about 300 years ago, the West was just an ordinary part of the world, just one section of the civilized world like any other, not more advanced in any way, not less advanced.

But about

three centuries back, we in the West began to pull away.

We

became preponderant in power because we stole a march on the rest of the world in technology.

In fact, the living standard and development level of the French or German peasantry of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were not much better than those of the Egyptian fellahin and Chinese farmers of the same period.

T h e real parting of the

ways between the developed and what we euphemistically also 38

THE MEANING OF THE GAP indicate as the developing nations may be traced back to the great change brought about by the widespread use of new technologies, which started in England about two centuries ago, and then spread to what are now the other advanced or industrial countries.

Later this change came to be known as the industrial

revolution,

which some people prefer to call the first industrial

revolution.

T h e overwhelming factor that marked its advent was

the invention of powerful machines capable of multiplying man's capacity for work. The world is still laboring in the aftermath of this great change. T h e consequences of this relatively recent technologyengendered transformation are incalculable.

Observe, for in-

stance, how behindhand are the countries that went untouched by the industrial miracle—the underdeveloped countries.

A s the

others moved ahead, they remained in every aspect much the same as they were yesteryear—in social structure, political system, economic standards, and above all, in the capacity to adopt the modern ways leading to progress.

T h e y are in permanent

need of aid from the advanced countries, but so far no measure or form of aid has been found capable of putting them, or a majority of them, also on the move.

T h e first half of this century

has shown that the world is unstable specifically because this gap is widening.

O n the one side the rich want to stay rich and can

become richer and more powerful.

Meanwhile, on the other side

the poor are condemned to grow relatively poorer, and thus become restless and rebellious.

A s a consequence, we may say that

a point has been reached where any constructive dialogue between the two categories of nations is nearly impossible. I recognize that social and political conditions are to a very great extent responsible for underdevelopment being so widespread, particularly in A s i a and A f r i c a , and that among these factors foreign domination and heen paramount.

exploitation—colonialism—has

But taking technology as the principal deter-

minant of accelerating change, this is just a confirmation of the 39

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC axiom that where s o c i e t y — f o r one reason or another, such as subservience to a foreign colonial p o w e r — h a s been unable to board the express train of technology, it has been doomed to fall behind. I also admit that to assume technology as the focal element in history is of course a simplification of complex phenomena.

But

to simulate reality in our minds or words or models, we are bound to make an interpretation and synthesis of it, and no synthesis can do equal justice to all factors.

In substance, the

fact I wish to note here is that it was a technological vector that sparked off the first industrial revolution, which in turn produced this immense wedge now sharply dividing the world into two p a r t s — t h e developed and the underdeveloped. This much is generally accepted as history.

A n d yet, while

we are still unable to cope with the imbalances that followed the first industrial revolution, an even more disconcerting technological gap is appearing, this time right in the midst of the more advanced nations, tearing A m e r i c a apart from Europe.

This

new revolutionary transformation, whose consequences are beyond our imagination, is carried on the swift wings of the even more prodigious machines of the cybernetic age, because this time they

have

the power

of

multiplying

immeasurably

the

capacity not of human muscle but of the human brain. This upheaval has timidly been called the second revolution.

But it is more than that.

industrial

W a v e after wave of new

and newer technology unceasingly batters human society

and

creates in its most advanced parts (which are ready to absorb this technological input) what already has all the features of a new mutation.

America is already in the throes of this meta-

morphic change, while Europe is still resistant to it. When we consider that the transformation brought about by the

first

industrial

revolution

was

a process

that

developed

through two centuries, and that the current mutation is instead happening in a matter of two decades, we begin to realize that 40

THE MEANING OF THE GAP what we are about to witness is a quantum change telescoped in time.

It affects only one part of the Atlantic system, but for that

very reason it may well rock it entirely.

In fact the lesson of

history we have just recited teaches us that this crossing to a new level of social or psychosocial organization by only one people is bound to have shattering and lasting consequences in its relationships with the others. If we, Americans and Europeans alike, become convinced that this is the appalling reality unfolding in front of our eyes, then we must rapidly devise new attitudes and strategies, while there is still time to cope with this unprecedented situation, before the quantitative and qualitative gaps between our societies lead to a difference in kind and to a reciprocal estrangement.

If we feel

that the Atlantic gap is the beginning of an emergency as great as I will attempt to show, then we will have to call upon all our energies and treasure to meet it, and try

to forestall

it in

time. T o this end, we must start by quickly making an effort to understand the real nature of this change of situation.

Then we

shall need new concepts, lexicon, and imagery to depict it to our minds, and new wills, approaches, and institutions to guide our action.

Finally and fundamentally, what is necessary is a sub-

stantial change in how we manage the sum of things in the A t lantic system.

The American

Forward

Stance

The realization that a major historical event is happening while we watch, and that we are largely unprepared to cope with it, makes one wonder what the United States' attitude and awareness are with respect to the change in the offing in our societies. Plainly the most significant reaction or nonreaction, about any l s sue,

is that of the most powerful and influential section of the

community.

In ascertaining it, I have again enlisted the help of 41

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC my colleague, Mario Rossi, whose study supplies more elements on which to base my second argument on the differential in outlook and qualitative changes forced upon American and European societies by the technological revolution.

Thus, in discuss-

ing this point, I shall be making use of his observations about the attitude in this country. W e have all been long accustomed to the fact that America leads the world when it comes to the size of G N P ,

business,

budget, output, consumption, and so on.

T h e United States is

always ahead where figures are concerned.

But it is not a matter

merely of a series of figures to reveal a gap.

A solid statistical

basis, of course, is necessary for an argument—provided basis is not distorted.

this

" W e now live in an e r a " — q u i p s Bertram

M . G r o s s — " i n which it is scarcely worthwhile to lie without statistics."

That is why I started, in the preceding chapter, by

furnishing a fair selection of what I consider objective data. In the case in point, it is not the figures that are alarming, but what they portend.

It is not so much the gap, but its widening,

and not even this trend, but its meaning, that ought to concern us.

T h e money spent on R and D , the disparity in the technologi-

cal balance of payments, the difference in the numbers of graduates in science and technology—these concern us insofar as they are pointers to the future. T h e seeds of the future are planted now.

When we consider

the disparity between the two continents, statistics should worry us as we read that an estimated 40 percent of the sales of United States industry in 1970 will concern products not available today on the market.

Or, for instance, when the European economic

correspondent to the Christian

Science

Monitor

writes (Decem-

ber 20, 1 9 6 6 ) that "if present trends continue, 80 percent of products made in Europe will be made by American firms, and 90 percent of the profits made and distributed from their sale will be distributed to shareholders in the United States." owe their impact to their implications. 42

Such figures

Behind them lies a pat-

THE MEANING OF THE GAP tern of significance, a texture of implications.

A n d the gap,

although solidly based on quantitative measures, emerges as a question of quality, a matter of life style, of over-all outlook and attitudes. Nothing can indicate what the gap means better than the postures on the two shores of the Atlantic toward this phenomenon, and generally with respect to the pace of change that transforms our lives.

T o exemplify the situation emerging in the United

States, her unique forward stance, we will consider two aspects: her immediate, farsighted acceptance of the machines that symbolize and shape the modern a g e — c o m p u t e r s ; and her organized effort in preparing the coming generations for this difficult new age—education. About computers, the basic statistics are not in dispute—the United States is far and away the leader and promises to hold her superiority for quite a time.

Even if Europeans can ride "piggy-

back" on United States experience and make certain gains in their manufacture and application, it seems unlikely that the United States will lose its lead, because most foreign computer manufacturers are now tackling jobs that the United States solved three to five years before.

A n d even if we draw Japan into the

picture and consider that she is moving quickly ahead in the manufacture of many sorts of computers, we must realize that most of these are of the smaller types. The size of a computer is crucial.

What we may call a large

computer is not just a machine that does more work than smaller computers, it does more and different things and implies a transformation from the grass roots of the entire organization's concept and operation.

T h e software becomes dominant, and in the

case of large computer systems, it acquires such dimensions and complexities that it is worth more than the hardware itself.

An

enterprise's software reflects and embodies its technological and organizational capabilities.

In this respect, it may be likened to

education with men: it is an intellectual amplifier of essential 43

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC importance.

A n d both in man and machines, the amplification is

all the greater if applied to high-potential systems. N o w , in the manufacture and application of giant computers, the United States holds an unchallenged position.

American

firms are making them adaptable to so many jobs and uses that foreign firms can hardly hope to compete with them.

Even when

we read that in Europe they are going to produce large computers, the American experience and lead cannot be matched, not to mention the fact that the rights to many of the crucial components will continue to be controlled by United States firms. But where America's lead is greatest is in the endorsement it has given to the epoch-making innovation

computers

imply.

Computer systems and technology are here to stay as one of man's most trusted, indispensable companions.

T h e y are in-

extricably involved with the whole complex of the modern way of life, and bring about profound changes in society.

W h a t links

computers more and more closely to people is the new concept of data processing.

A c c o r d i n g to this rapidly developing concept,

the computer is no longer in rooms separate from the users, but is on the desks, at the work stations, in the department stores, at the tellers' windows.

It is connected with a typewriter, a project

engineer's pen, a cash register, or an accounting machine. multitude of computer peripherals—the

terminals—brings

This the

computer in touch with everybody, in most of the daily tasks, during our work, study, and relations with others. service will become personalized.

Says Gen. David

"Future

may

generations of Americans

careers during their lifetimes.

Computer Sarnoff:

pursue two or three

T h e home computer will aid in

developing career mobility by providing continuing self-instruction." (Saturday Review,

July 23, 1 9 6 6 ) .

T h e Americans have grasped the necessity and potential of this change far ahead of Europeans.

T h e real point is that this coun-

try, as we have already seen, has accepted computers as part of modern life and is moving ahead on all fronts to make use of 44

THE MEANING OF THE GAP as a utility, as the salt of efficiency, in every possible way

By

n o m e a n s

are

Americans convinced that this coming

computer age will necessarily make a wonderful future.

But

even when we balance the enthusiasm of the proponents of computers with the misgivings of their detractors, the fact remains that computers have entered the fabric of American life to an extent unknown in Europe. It is at this point that the real meaning of the gap begins to be exposed.

Nowhere is this more a p p a r e n t — a n d finally, more sig-

nificant—whan when we examine the way the educational establishments of the United States have accepted the

computer.

More and more colleges and universities are offering special courses in computer science and related disciplines; and graduate students—whether they are in archaeology or political s c i e n c e — are beginning to make use of the computer for their work.

Any

university in the future that does not teach its students to use computers is in danger of becoming a second-class institution. In a full study of this phenomenon, called " T h e Computer as a Tutor," in Life magazine, it was mentioned that there are about one thousand projects on computerized learning installed at all educational levels across the United States.

( T h e same article

reminds us that between 1964 and 1966 alone, there were 120 corporate arrangements made in the United States between electronics companies and publishing firms, many of the publishing firms being acquired for their interests in textbooks and educational publishing.) Likewise with American industry.

M u c h of its success has

been due to its pragmatic approach to serving the customer better, and to its keenness to develop improved models embodying new designs and techniques and higher standards.

It has, in

other words, hinged on a mental attitude, on the urge to get out and never stop promoting more sales and uses. a

case in point.

T h e computer is

Never has it just been a matter of making

computers and pushing them onto the market.

A s the story of 45

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC the largest manufacturer shows, an even greater amount of money and thought has been invested in marketing, in building up service facilities, in studying customer needs, in supplying him with software consultation, and helping him to organize his business around the new equipment, in leasing, renting, or selling him system-wide hardware-software packages, and in training and maintaining staffs to solve his problems and support him in the full use of computer systems.

It is this attitude that accounts for

the

the

phenomenal

spread

of

computer

in

United

States

society. Similarly, the practical American mind has shown its readiness for opportunity and change in the face of another extraordinary modern phenomenon called the information explosion.

More

than a million technical articles on science and engineering alone are published in sixty world languages every year.

A s often,

seen from a different angle, the image may be reversed:

the

recipient of this formidable onrush of data and news may call it, with M c L u h a n , an information implosion.

In any case, this

cornucopia of information makes one d i z z y — i t is almost antiinformation. other.

Its legions of facts and discoveries obscure each

In the United States, scientists, managers, and business-

men spend an estimated 1.5 billion dollars a year only in trying to locate answers that have already been found and written up somewhere.

T h e solution to this information overload

forth, as one could expect, from the United States.

came

A n d here

again, the computer supplies the key to the new systems being developed for the storage and quick retrieval of all sorts of data and information. Since rapid and dependable information has become the cornerstone of the modern technological society, John Diebold, one of the most imaginative yet solidly based computer apostles, predicted the dawn of a new age. 1966) he wrote:

46

In Foreign

Affairs

(October

THE MEANING OF THE GAP Today one can no longer think of just the computer.

One must

think in the more comprehensive terms of information

tech-

nology or information systems.

This fact is brought

home

dramatically by a review of costs.

Ten years ago, the computer

or central processor represented some 75 percent of the total cost of an automatic data-processing system.

T h e so-called periph-

eral equipment—input/output devices, outside storage and communications links—accounted changing radically and by completely reversed.

for some

25 percent.

This

is

1972 the cost relationships will be

The computer is emerging from its glassed-

in throne room and, as it becomes increasingly accessible to those needing its services, the links between it and society proliferate both in number and in complexity.

The quick

absorption

of

innovation

in American

life—of

which computer technology offers a most pertinent e x a m p l e — i s made possible by America's unmatched ability to organize in an expeditious and simple way large teams of specialists and technicians working together with an understanding of the total process.

It is therein, above all, that the superiority of the United

States firms resides—not in some secret knowledge. Thanks to computers, unprecedented

opportunities of both

new dimensions and scope are now being offered to this extraordinary American capacity.

System-wide conceptions are now

made possible even in the case of very large systems, and the definable boundaries of what may be considered a system are continuously expanding. experimentation

and

Moreover, thanks to computer-based

technology,

the application

of

scientific

methods is being made possible to improve the organization and decision-making processes in complex systems of men and machines, in which highly trained personnel interact in a dynamic loop with extremely

sophisticated

equipment.

computers are in fact more than technology.

In this sense,

A n d it is no longer

enough for people to be receptive to the new technology.

New 47

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC attitudes at all levels and a new type of open and integrated organization are needed. A s mentioned, American management has been quick to understand these new opportunities, whereas in Europe centralization and cult of tradition prevail.

rigidity,

T o o often in Euro-

pean firms, there is a tight-lipped, clannish isolationism within different sections—an unwillingness to break across the boundaries of accounting, engineering, sales, and so forth.

Certainly,

for Europeans, there are too few exchanges across the boundaries within an industry or between different industries—not to mention across national boundaries. But this is what the new computer technology is all about: a galaxy of new and newer modes by which to keep the flow of modern society's complex activities swift, and of new and newer techniques by which the systems approach may be applied rationally to study and resolve large, intricate problems involving human beings, boundaries between people, and interfaces.

man-machine

It is only by recognizing the revolutionary nature of

this change in how to organize human enterprise that we can understand the impact of computers on all aspects of our lives, and by realizing how the attitude toward this change differs on the two sides of the Atlantic that we may see where the real dynamism of the gap lies. T o those who m a y — e r r o n e o u s l y — h o l d that this is merely a difference in degree, one may offer Norbert Wiener's favorite retort, that the difference between a medicative dose of strichnine and a lethal dose is also only one of degree.

A n d what charac-

terizes our epoch is the order of magnitude of the changes in the consequences.

T o explain what it means, I can do no better than

quote Edmund C . Berkeley, editor of Computers

and

Automa-

tion: It is like the statement that regarded solely as a f o r m of transportation, m o d e r n automobiles and aeroplanes are no different

48

THE MEANING OF THE GAP from walking. . . . The reason the statement is false is it ignores the order of magnitude of the change between the three modes of transportation: we can walk at speeds of around 4 miles per hour, while modern jet planes travel at around 400 miles per hour.

Thus a jet plane is around two orders of magnitude faster

than an unaided human transportation, while modern computers are around six orders of magnitude faster than hand computation.

It is common knowledge that a change by a single order of

magnitude may produce fundamentally new effects in most fields of technology; thus the change by six orders of magnitude in computing has produced

many

fundamentally

new effects.

We have thus examined how this country is constantly on the alert

for

any

opportunities

opened

up

by

techno-scientific

progress, and quick to seize them—although, as Gertrude Stein said, it is the oldest country, because it was the first to enter the twentieth century.

A similar forward outlook characterizes the

attitude not only of its educational establishment but also of its government and business complex toward education—the kind of education that is required in an age so oriented toward science and technology. This attitude has deep roots in American tradition and practise. It is not merely that the present total amount spent throughout the nation on education runs to about 50 billion d o l l a r s — f a r more than the total G N P of many nations.

Nor is it merely that

a greater percentage of Negroes go on to college in the United States than the total percentage of young people in most lands. And it is not because here colleges and universities get a large proportion of the government funds for scientific research—close °n 2 billion dollars a year.

Nor again is it because of the ease

with which individual Americans move back and forth from one world to the o t h e r — a s ,

for instance,

at Stanford

University

where there are said to have been five staff members who became multimillionaires by participating in commercial developments in 49

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC the area.

The American attitude toward education lies, again, in

its conception of modern life and its requirements. Therefore it is not just in the difference between the numbers of graduate scientists, engineers and administrators that the true educational gap is to be seen.

The educational gap has far

greater dimensions, and it has an inbuilt dynamism.

Indeed, a

solid case can be made for the claim that education supports the very underpinnings of the technological gap of the future.

Now,

by education we must understand something far more than classrooms filled with young people from ages five to twenty-five.

We

must use the word in its widest sense—extending from the teaching of literacy to craft and technical training, from the formation of organizational and community leaders to programs of orientation in the modern world. T o the extent that the human factor is the motor for any forward drive, education is coming to rate top priority increasingly.

I know of no better statement of this fresh viewpoint than

in the remarks made by Dr. Philip Hauser, director of the Population Research and Training Center of the University of Chicago: "It is becoming recognized that the most important single type of investment for achieving economic development is investment in human resources.

Investment in education and skills

may provide a greater return than any other input. . . .

Invest-

ment in human resources is essentially investment in the improved quality of a population as it may be achieved through increased education and training." It is a long lead that the United States has here over Europe. America, in fact, has been quick waking up also to the role that education is to play in the future.

For all their defects and

limitations, its education systems are trying the best ways to prepare young people for the modern world.

This can be seen

not only in the rapid integration of the computer in the curricula and school activities, but also in how the new science and technology are embraced. 50

From the earliest grades there is exposure

THE MEANING OF THE GAP to the newest materials—whether teaching machines, audiovisual aids, or new textbooks.

A n d throughout the schools there is a

more solid preparation in the new advances in science and technology.

Some of the best minds in the various disciplines have

totally rethought their curricula—the

"new

math," the

"new

biology," and the "new physics." This type of education has consequences on all the student population, not only the top. tical terms.

Consider what it means in prac-

T h e new advanced science-based industry and gov-

ernment make greater demands at every l e v e l — n o t only upon theoretical scientists, but upon engineers, technicians, and skilled craftsmen.

K e y importance in our new world is possessed by

scores of white and blue collar " B " level experts.

T h e new

disciplines, or rather the new ways of teaching, are absorbed not only by the men who fill the top positions in the technical and scientific field, or will become executives in business and public administration, but also by those who will operate at low or middle levels in the corporations, the factories, the government, and the professions. This is, of course, to the advantage of the whole economy and society, progress.

and

not

only

to

the

activities

at

the

frontiers

of

It contributes to the creation of an integrated society,

where no major gaps exist between production and services, between the various branches of industry and the R and D elite, and between public administration

and the university.

Here

the

fruits of scientific discovery and technological application meet with an average productivity level, organizational rationality, and production efficiency, all of which contribute to the nation's economic, commercial, military, and political success. I have acknowledged that the American educational system is far from perfect, even on its own terms.

Recent events have

thrown some crude light on certain of its shortcomings.

And

certainly it can be said that the United States is sometimes too quick to embrace the n e w — w h e t h e r it be language labs or teach51

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC ing machines or educational T V — a n d often she adopts things before the "kinks" are out of them, or even before she knows exactly why they are to be adopted.

A s United States Commis-

sioner of Education Harold H o w e remarked:

" W e now have

some machines that can talk but have nothing to say." But surely the physical and intellectual investment, the amplitude of all sorts of facilities, their quality and their spread to reach possibly all young men and women, the standard of curricula and tuition and the adherence to contemporary realities of the American educational system are an example that Europe admires—and is far from being able to duplicate.

A n d they

have made possible some extraordinary achievements that cannot be matched anywhere else.

Around certain large educational

institutions—which

aspects

in some

may

be

likened

cloisters of medieval times—centers of unexcelled

to

the

intellectual

and scientific vigor mixed with creative capacity have sprung up. Stanford, in fact, provides an interesting case study of the point I am attempting to make.

In its immediate area, for in-

stance, there are several firms started by people f r o m Stanford, whose sales now amount to several billions of dollars.

Mean-

while, attached to the university is the Stanford Research Institute, said to have a net worth of some twelve billion dollars—of which some eight billion dollars was earned by surplus income on its operations, while the other four billion dollars was contributed by industry and business in order to make the research services possible and available. A n d Stanford is not an exception. country

is the Massachusetts

A t the other end of the

Institute of Technology,

where

about 55 percent of the operating budget and 95 percent of the research budget come from federal government funds. of

advanced-technology

matrix. nomic 52

firms

has

spun

off

from

A bevy the

MIT

Route 128 has become a synonym for scientific-ecoundertakings,

think

tanks,

sophisticated

labs,

Ph.D.'s

THE MEANING OF THE GAP entrepreneurship.

Their business is thriving and not only with

government contracts. Both M I T and Stanford may be extreme cases, but they are not alone.

They seem to represent a growing trend in the United

States, and a symbol of her faith and stance in the conquest of the future.

Another very interesting example of this attitude,

involving the application of computer-based technologies in a setting of higher education, is a venturesome, nonmilitary, nonprofit frontier undertaking having the primary purpose of institutionalizing systematic and comprehensive studies of the longrange future. This is the Institute for the Future ( I F F ) , whose incorporation in early 1968 was made possible by the spade work of two highly reputed organizations of long standing: the Rand Corporation, for many years in the forefront of applying to intricate defense problems the formal and systematic techniques of analysis which are largely called systems analysis, and the N a tional Industrial Conference Board, which possesses unique experience in economic analysis and forecasts.

Then a number of

foundations joined hands in furthering the creation of I F F , and finally Wesleyan University offered substantial support and offcampus facilities to make it operational. I F F objectives and p r o g r a m — " t o discern and cope with today's major societal problems, to avoid the creation of more complex ones tomorrow, and to open up important new alternatives in the shaping of the nation's f u t u r e " — a n d the roster of firstclass intellects who agreed to share in the new venture risks are a credit to the society which has been able to express them.

This

is another feat Europe would not be able to duplicate—even were the funding available. The collaboration among the universities, foundations, business, and government that these examples indicate—and

that

strengthen the United States' dominant position over E u r o p e — i s therefore something of far greater importance than all those impressive sums and percentages which cause the United States 53

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC always to win the numbers game.

Behind it, there is the willing-

ness to cross the old boundaries between the academy and the marketplace, between the ivory tower and the White House. There is also the recognition that modern science and technology are going to be a great part of our future.

Y e s , the

United States is aware of it, and seldom halted by doubt.

She

may not always solve the problems, but likes to face them.

The

men who used the first bows and arrows changed traditional energy and work patterns.

Nowadays, why not take a positive

view, and recognize that cybernation is going to free more and more people from manual labor and allow them to use their minds more, and have more leisure?

Surely, this will cause new

problems: what to do with all this free time, how to occupy the mind?

But these problems might be considered the new fron-

tiers, and no doubt it will be found out how the new science and technology that contributed toward creating them will also become the means to work toward their solution. prepared to undertake all these tasks.

People must be

A n d investments in edu-

cation will pay b a c k — h a n d s o m e l y . This is America's spirit—which is lacking in Europe.

In the

revolutionary periods of history the crux of the question has always been whether people, or elites,

were willing to face the

challenge, the dangers and constrictions—not only to reap the benefits—inherent in the new complex.

Looking in perspective

at the breathtaking contemporary revolution—if only through the foci of computers and education, as we h a v e — o n e will perceive that America is willing and set to ride the waves of the future. She does not even perceive that Europe is struggling behind, clearly in trouble and unable for the moment to follow the same course. This is the forward, ho! stance of the happy warrior. Admittedly, it entails some risks.

Considering the total picture—and

some admonishing signs—one may feel that the United States has been too cocksure of herself so far, and too busy forging ahead, to be embarrassed by doubt, or meditate about the measure and 54

THE MEANING OF THE GAP meaning of all the gaps around her.

One may even wonder if a

full awareness is not lacking in the United States of the problems and consequences of her rather indiscriminate commitment to technology—and of her navigating alone. The need for thorough reappraisal permeates the air in this country, no less than elsewhere. this book.

I refer to it in many parts of

But, for the moment, the point I want to make is that

the United States has stood up to the challenges of modern science and technology prior to all other nations, and incontestably better.

V i e w e d from the United States, this is the spirit, the

forward drive, that is wanting in Europe.

A n d in itself this

disparity explains why the gap exists, widens, and is so important.

The Pessimistic

View of

Europe

However, this conclusion gives only a partial answer to the question of our inquiry.

T h e full and deeper meaning of the

technological imbalance can hardly be appraised by looking at it only from the United States' vantage point, any more than we of the developed Northern nations are in the best position to see how desperate is the condition of the underdeveloped n a t i o n s — let alone how immense is the effort required to overcome that condition.

T h e sated and the rich are hardly able to understand

the hungry and the poor, the leader to take into his view the stragglers. T o get the whole picture objectively, the gap must be considered from both sides.

F r o m the European point of view, not

only is its span judged more unbridgeable than it may look from the United States, but also the problem of regaining control of the gap becomes less manageable every year.

T h e material terms of

this problem are further complicated by political and psychological factors—and increasing differences in value systems—which tmpinge on reality and intensify the impact of the gap. Let us rapidly glance at the European side of the coin.

I do 55

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC not wish to recount here in detail the very long and very wellknown list of tremendous political and institutional drawbacks of Europe at this turn of history. sary.

However, a few words are neces-

H o w can that continent overcome, in the extremely short

time events allow us, the handicaps of its fragmentation into some twenty sovereign

states and their differences in language, legisla-

tion, policy, and custom?

Its hard core is represented by the

European Economic Community ( E E C ) , 1 which is also called the European C o m m o n Market, established by the Treaty R o m e in 1957.

of

T h e formal customs union among its six mem-

bers (France, Western Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and L u x e m b u r g ) was completed—according to schedule — i n July 1968, although many strings are still attached to this tariff abolition, and many nontariff obstacles have to be got rid of really to weld the six national markets into one.

L e t us admit

that the import restrictions adopted by France at the very start of the union have only episodic v a l u e — t h o u g h

they are a bad

precedent other members may invoke t o m o r r o w — a n d let us also suppose that the current phase of the Community is one of true consolidation

following

this

important

step.

Yet

agreement

among the member states is still necessary to implement each subsequent advance along the road of economic integration, the principles of which have been applied in the United States for more than a century, including a really free movement of capital and workers, the freedom of establishment and unified basic economic and social legislation.

Let us imagine finally that all these

truly innovatory steps are firmly taken in Europe and that this stage of economic integration is reached—probably in the early seventies.

Then, further measures will still be required to align

A c t u a l l y , starting July 1 9 6 7 , the e x e c u t i v e s ( C o u n c i l o f M i n i s t e r s and C o m m i s s i o n ) o f the E E C and the t w o o t h e r c o m m u n i t i e s — t h e E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y f o r C o a l and Steel ( E C C S ) a n d that f o r A t o m i c E n e r g y ( E U R A T O M ) w e r e unified, thus g r o u p i n g the three institutions in w h a t is n o w c o l l e c t i v e l y c a l l e d the E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t i e s . H e r e w e still n a m e it, as m a n y d o , the E E C , a f t e r the m o s t significative o f the three institutions.

56

THE MEANING OF THE GAP the national economic policies of its members, and eventually merge them into a single European p o l i c y — a d o p t e d by rule of majority (whose finality is achievement), not unanimity

(whose

end is stalemate). A s we see, there is a long way to go, no doubt interspersed with roadblocks and pitfalls, especially if along it the Community expands to take the United Kingdom and other countries into its fold.

Many of these obstacles are of a political nature, but by no

means all of them are of the Gaullist brand, or in practice depend exclusively on free internal European conditions.

A n d they are

so conspicuous that it is difficult to imagine how the Community could undertake all these measures to achieve economic integration without, at the same time, adopting an advanced degree of political union.

B u t — e v e n if a point of no return has

finally

been reached—the political unity of Europe is not yet in sight, either within the Community or the still more difficult larger unification involving also the other regional grouping, namely the European Free Trade Association ( E F T A ) .

N o w it is hardly

possible that, during this critical period of transition

toward

unity, effective measures capable of containing the gap can be applied at a true European level.

T h e European nations' un-

coordinated procedures, policies, and programs cannot provide a satisfactory answer to the need for modernizing that continent's institutions,

educational

establishments,

and

techno-structure.

Nor can the European administrations, agencies, and corporations, constrained as they are within their limited dimensions, write off the growing costs or buy the leadtime that are intrinsic to a sustained pace of technological advance.

Finally, lacking a

well-organized

and

continental-scale

information

organization

base, they cannot fully adopt the more sophisticated

systems

analysis procedures and management technologies, which

are

now necessary to quickly and rationally define goals and decide policies. With these handicaps, Europe's pace is no match for A m e r 57

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC ica's technology stride. them.

Vain attempts have been made to offset

Thus, in the absence of a truly European framework or

scope, and short of supranational authorities or institutions empowered to launch European of parallel

programs or projects, the avenues

national policies and bilateral and multinational ac-

cords were tried.

These half-measures seemed to offer some

hope as a short-term solution.

However, as we have seen, they

proved to be a desultory and lengthy detour, and nearly all these endeavors were soon falling apart at the seams, because multinational compromise rigged decisions, management was interfered with by politics, and conflicting national programs continued to be developed at cross-purposes with the European design. These and a thousand other ills were demonstrated by the negative experience of intra-European

cooperation in aircraft

construction, space programs, and nuclear energy.

T h e picture

became even more complicated in recent times when the smaller nations of the Community insisted on the application of the socalled clause of the "equitable return," by which each member nation should profit in each cooperative program in proportion to its contribution.

A l o n g this way, unified Europe is but a mirage,

and its construction a maddeningly complicated jigsaw

puzzle

where practically no piece fits with another. I have always held that Europe's technological progress will depend very much on the attitude of its industrial community, and that, through the initiative of the leading industries, the goal of pulling Europe together in order to overcome the technological gap may lose the look of a dream and take on feasible contours. A t such a stage it might even be built into an idee-force.

Among

the great issues vitally touching Europe, that of coaching it to make the most of the newest computer and information technologies seems to me a primary one, and one in which, instead of expecting slow-to-come government action, industry could stand up and take the lead.

With these views, I suggested in 1967 to

some of the most prominent European industries of the sector 58

THE MEANING OF THE GAP that, jointly and responsibly, they ought to prepare the blueprint of an over-all plan to computerize the continent, covering all aspects from hardware to software, R and D , communications, education, and training. This industry-sponsored plan to modernize Europe in the central and paramount field of information automation was to be the starting move of a farsighted, public-minded contribution to the progress of European society, made by its most strongly organized sector—which by the way only too often criticizes government inaction.

However, it never came into being because no

company felt it could mix with its competitors, not even in recommending to their respective governments and the E E C

and

E F T A authorities the policies and actions necessary to push Europe into the computer a g e — w h i c h would eventually be in the interest of industry itself.

A greater sense and effort of leader-

ship, I am afraid, is required of old Europe's strong industrial groups to keep the continent—and their position within i t — i n the high ranking of yesterday. The lack of cohesion and drive of the European

corporate

community is probably, but no doubt only partially, due to the great difficulty of any of its members to structure its own philosophy, policy, and organization in a truly European way.

L a c k of

a unified corporate law, of common patent laws, standards regulations, and a European capital market, the persistence of buy national

policies,

parochial-minded

customers,

protectionist

unions, and of a generalized bias toward national allegiance are among the handicaps they face if they want to Europeanize themselves.

There are only three such "rare birds," as Christopher

Layton calls them, as multibased European companies, formed by the combination of two companies of different nationalities: two of old standing ( R o y a l Dutch Shell and Unilever) and a newly created one (the A g f a - G e v a e r t combine).

"It is a telling

reflection on all of us in E u r o p e " — s a i d Harold Wilson in his speech of November 1967, when he launched the still ripening 59

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC idea of European technological c o o p e r a t i o n — " t h a t apart from a handful of established organizations such as Shell, Unilever, and Philips, the only companies which transcend Europe's national frontiers on an integrated basis are the American-owned corporations in Europe." While Europe is incapable of defining a set of common policies, including a European policy for science and technology and a "buy E u r o p e a n " policy; while its industry has not been able to find European vocations and dimensions, but remains a German, French, or Italian industry possessing bases in, and exporting to, the other countries of the area; and while the merger spree is no more than inbreeding among companies of the same nationality; ironically United States firms have found the road open to become the major beneficiary of all this talk about unifying Europe, and as a start, of the leveling of the internal customs tariffs in the two European regional groupings. A l l these factors add to the sense of frustration that dominates the European scene, accompanied by a largely unjustified resentment against the United States.

N o wonder, therefore, that the

technological gap is viewed through black-tinted glasses from the other side of the Atlantic. Nothing perhaps can better help in the understanding of E u rope's mood, its contradictions and fears, its introversions, its viscosity with respect to change, its skepticism and propensity not to rush things, than The American

Challenge,

the recent best-

seller by Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber, one of the best European journalists.

He undoubtedly wrote it as a sort of bugle call

to awaken Europe and startle it out of its legal and political labyrinths.

A glimpse of its contents may be caught from the

following excerpts. A b o u t some crumbling structures in Europe (page x i i i ) :

Starting with a rather matter-of-fact examination of

American

investment in Europe, we find an economic system that is in a state of collapse 1 .

60

It is our own.

W e see a foreign challenger

THE MEANING OF THE GAP breaking down the political and psychological framework of our societies.

W e are witnessing the prelude to our own historical

bankruptcy. A b o u t the impasse in w h i c h E u r o p e a n s find themselves

(page

150): Thus France and the other countries of Western Europe are going off simultaneously in three directions, but making no progress, unable to decide between the road of narrow nationalism, which is no longer passable, the road of cooperation, which goes nowhere, and the road of federation, which is blocked.

How

can we escape this impasse? T h e i r loss of spirit ( p a g e

181):

European societies manifest this sense of impotence in several ways: by loss of their creative drive; by the feeling of no longer being in the running, of having dropped out of the race for scientific and sociological developments that determine our form of civilization; and by the conviction that they have been outpaced and are no longer able to compete in the areas that count for human progress. A n d their loss of r a n k ( p a g e

191):

The day this drive weakens to the point that Europeans let "somebody bigger" do their work for them, the spirit of our civilization will have broken, as did that of the A r a b and Indian civilizations centuries ago.

W e would be tainted by the knowl-

edge of our own failure.

Without suffering from poverty, we

would nevertheless soon submit to a fatalism and depression that would end in impotence and abdication. D o these o v e r t o n e s carry the point too far? P r o b a b l y . L e t m e , however, end this o v e r v i e w of E u r o p e ' s idiosyncrasy vis-a-vis gap and all that, by quoting f r o m o n e of the excellent

the Time 61

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC essays ( T i m e m a g a z i n e , J a n u a r y

13, 1 9 6 7 ) .

It is a salty and

u n d r a m a t i c s u m m i n g - u p of d a y - t o - d a y facts, w h i c h s h o w s h o w they m a y strike the man-in-the-street in that continent, and set the tune of his j u d g m e n t : Everywhere about him, the European sees American products and processes.

When

a Frankfurt businessman rises in the

morning, he may well reach for a Gillette razor blade, Colgate toothpaste, and hair lotion that comes in a bottle made by an Owens-Illinois subsidiary.

A f t e r he downs his Maxwell instant

coffee with Libby condensed milk, his wife, trim in her Lycra stretch bra, kisses him goodbye, leaving only a trace of Revlon lipstick.

In his Ford Taunus, or G . M . Opel, fueled with Esso

gasoline, he drives to an office equipped with Remington typewriters, I T T telex machines and I B M computers.

While his wife

runs a Hoover vacuum cleaner, a Singer sewing machine and a Sunbeam iron, he confers with his American advertising agency and stops at a branch of First National City Bank of York.

New

If he sneezes in the wintry damp, he pulls out a Kleenex.

If his boss needles him, he calms down with a Miltown.

Relax-

ing in the evening, he puffs an R.J. Reynolds Reyno menthol cigarette, listens to R C A , Columbia or Capitol records.

A t bed-

time, he fastens his door with a lock made by B K S , a Y a l e & T o w n e subsidiary that is the continent's largest lock producer.

A Metaphor

for Our

Times

T h e picture o n e gets f r o m this brief glance at E u r o p e is certainly not e n c o u r a g i n g , but it illustrates the contrast b e t w e e n the t w o sides of the A t l a n t i c .

M e l a n c h o l y though it m a y seem, it

sums u p the attitudes and j u d g m e n t s prevailing on the E u r o p e a n side, w h e r e A m e r i c a is v i e w e d as c r o s s i n g — p e r h a p s not a l w a y s w i s e l y — a new threshold of t e c h n o l o g i c a l a d v a n c e that sunders all its c o n t a c t s with the rest of the w o r l d , including E u r o p e . W h i l e A m e r i c a blazes a t r a i l — i f y o u wish, rather h e c t i c a l l y —

62

THE MEANING OF THE GAP Europe meanders.

This dissimilarity compounds the social and

psychological consequences of the technological revolution over the two sides of the Atlantic community and implies the emergence of two different types of society and political outlooks. Moreover, other factors, which do not exist in America, operate in the evolution of European society and contribute to molding i t s profile—again, differently from America.

A m o n g such

factors are the far greater direct participation of the state in the production of goods and services, which in the United States would be considered socialistic,

a greater dose of planning at

national level, special ties with former colonies, intense trade and cultural relationships with many other developing countries, the mutual attraction of the two halves of Europe (West and E a s t ) , plus the increasing economic cooperation with the Soviet Union. Technology acts as a booster on the force of these factors, accentuating—at least for the time being—instead of softening the basic differences between the two continents. N o wonder, therefore, that many people, and not only in Europe, have started asking themselves whether the gap engendered by the technological revolution only means that Europe is lagging five, ten, or fifteen years behind the United States, or whether in effect it is not a much deeper phenomenon. apprehension.

I fully share this

T o use a French expression, un ecart de

civilisa-

tion ( " a civilization g a p " ) is splitting the once compact Western world.

A n d to consider the West as a homogeneous system

begins to sound like indulging in wishful thinking. Now, to sum up the meaning, as I see it, of this cleavage across the Atlantic, I shall resort to a metaphor.

A few years

ago C . P. Snow warned us of the major split between the two cultures—a

scientific-technological

culture

and

a

humanist-

aesthetic c u l t u r e — w h i c h were in danger of losing mutual contact.

Thus cultural imbalance exists bother in human society

considered as a whole and between its different geographical segments.

Thus in today's America the scientific innovative thrust 63

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC is a far more powerful factor of transformation than it is in Europe, where the cultural heritage has deeper roots, is more pervasive. However, not only the nature and the kinetics of the technoscientific component itself but also its cumulative effects differ so fundamentally between the two great Western communities, as we have seen, that I should like to propose a figurative representation of the gap. the IBM age. the G M

age.

The gap, in effect, is between the GM age and

Europe is living at the peak of the industrial a g e — America,

meanwhile,

is already crossing

the

threshold into a sui generis type of post-industrial a g e — t h e I B M age. This metaphor means that on the European side of the Atlantic the civilization of the internal combustion engine and the manufacturing plant still reigns with all its predominant features; the engine and the motor, hydro and fossil conventional energy sources, great factory layouts, the importance of the production process and of the assembly line, the need to increase output, to transport merchandise, to satisfy mass demand of goods and services, to provide good communications facilities.

It is sym-

bolized by the dominance of hardware, and of man over machine.

It is the G M age, incidentally, that the United States

pioneered

and

extended

the

furthest.

But

already,

on

the

American side, most of these features are but the background and infrastructure for another kind of civilization.

It is systems-

and software-oriented.

In it machine and process technology

assume

to intellectual

roles

ancillary

technology;

electronics,

cybernation, communications, and data processing become paramount; and the giant steel and motor car plants and refineries are obedient to the mute command of microcircuits. Compared to the G M age, the I B M age moves at even greater speeds and through larger distances, needing instant information.

It tends to be more flexible and more reliable where sheer

efficiency of operations is concerned. 64

It leads, on the one hand,

THE MEANING OF THE GAP to centralization, and on the other, to proliferation.

Its power is

weird and silent, and though less apparent than that of the workshop, its dominance may be all the deeper for being subliminal. The machine is already a system, it chases man from ever more jobs, exacts from him greater training and education, and one day will be symbiotic and gain parity status with him. Thus the whole structure of production, the chain of command, family and community life, the role and horizon of the individual, are again revolutionized.

T h e vector has been tech-

nology, but the resulting gap is not, finally, technological.

It is

involved with the ways men think and look at the world; it is intellectual, psychological, and societal.

Literally, two different

systems of language are used, because the values, attitudes, and concerns of the people in the G M age and the I B M age, respectively, are different.

One need not agree completely with Mar-

shall M c L u h a n on his speculations about modern media, but to borrow his imagery, we might say that the G M age is mechanical, linear, and sequential, while the I B M age is electronic and simultaneous.

Julian Huxley says (Playboy, January 1967, page 9 4 ) ,

that when there is the emergence of a new pyschosocial system "man radically changes his ideas about his place, his role and his job in n a t u r e — h o w

to utilize natural resources, how

to

organize his societies, how to understand and pursue his destiny." This is what we are now witnessing in America. Not all segments of the United States, of course, have entered into this new age.

N o one knows better or is more ready to

admit than the Americans themselves that many people in their society, alas, have not even kept up with the G M age and its benefits, let along begun to share in the I B M age.

But at the

levels where decisions are made and power is exerted to mold and steer society—the educational, industrial (and in the vanguard among industries, General Motors itself!), and governmental establishments—the United States is committed to the 65

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC I B M age.

It willingly accepts its breathtaking technology and

potential—and apparently also its p r o b l e m s — a n d so moves into the future. There can be little consolation in saying that the United States is merely the first to embrace the I B M age, because

nobody

knows if and when the next in line will arrive at the same threshold.

T o transmit that age to the rest of the world is prob-

ably an equation without solution, at least for a couple of generations. ture. The

A t best, it promises to be an extraordinarily baffling venT h e reason here is significant. GM

mechanical-electrical-chemical

moved and transplanted relatively

technology

can

be

easily: Y o u can introduce the

engine and motor, mechanical and electrical transmission, the whole automobile culture; you can train people to produce, service, and maintain most machines, you can teach people how to build dams, lay highways, erect plants.

This has been, and is

being done, in fact, throughout much of the world.

T h e results

are unrewarding, and an immense endeavor is yet required to overcome

refractory

and

unprepared

situations,

in

order

to

spread what is generally called industrialization to the less-developed countries.

I have already touched upon this subject and

will briefly return to it later.

A l l the same, we can say that with

luck it can be done, or at least that we have substantially learned the technique for doing it. But with the I B M culture, the problem is different.

It is not

only that where society is not as organized as in the United States, or where psychological—are

antagonistic

factors—social,

behavioral

and

relevant, the introduction of the computer

and information system technologies may prove unrewarding, or cause serious disequilibrium or even rejection; it is that in some kinds of society the objective situation and the standard of values make it nearly impossible to convince men that they must learn much and work little, and it is more difficult to teach them how to acquire the techniques and select the information consistent 66

THE MEANING OF THE GAP with a system leading them to work even less, although more efficiently. I often wonder what shattering traumas the more traditional or metaphysic cultures will suffer from concentrated exposure to the culture of the new

technologies.

Will they

be smashed

smithereens—and what will then fill the vacuum? societies survive the shock? tors?

to

C a n these

What curse will haunt the desecra-

Beyond that, it is still an open question if, even in the

United States, people may be convinced to live permanently with the I B M culture, depend almost completely on ghostly machines and their superhuman decisions—and still retain the identity that we, and they, have so far considered characteristic of man.

And

what civil and moral virtues will eventually be generated

by

these new types of humans, wherever they may be, whose most intense communion will not be with G o d or other people but with their strange machines lying in an aseptic, constant climate, using artificial languages, and resolving more problems than man can formulate? If this last is a question posed even in the highly organized United States society, solid and vital in collective discipline as it is, anchored to basic principles from which it knows how to derive ever new strength, it becomes an overwhelmingly difficult problem with other peoples lacking the same cult of efficiency. One of the most interesting essays on the problems emerging in the United States is " A m e r i c a in the Technetronic A g e " by Professor Zbigniew Brzezinski (Encounter, January 1 9 6 8 ) .

I can-

not agree more with him when he says: The approaching transformation will come more rapidly and will have deeper consequences for the way and even perhaps for the meaning of human life than anything experienced by the generations that preceded us.

America is already beginning to experi-

ence changes and in the course of so doing it is becoming a "technetronic"

society:

a

society

that

is

shaped

culturally,

67

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC psychologically, socially and economically by the impact of technology and electronics, particularly computers and communications. The industrial process no longer is the principal determinant of social change, altering the mores, the social structure, and the values of society.

The metaphor ends with more question marks than it started with.

But it has probably helped us to understand the kind of

drama being played on the Atlantic stage, of which we are unconsciously playwrights and protagonists.

With this reading of

history, the essence of the script is that, quite literally, the United States and Europe during our lifetime are becoming ages apart. What are the consequences?

Consequences

of the

Gap

We have just seen that the effects of the technological revolution are radical and cumulative.

T h e changes generated touch

the very roots of the society of man.

Where society naturally

tends to absorb innovation, as in the United States, it causes a quantum jump, a societal mutation.

Europe is not yet affected

by this mutation because it is being subjected to the technological shock with a lag of a few years compared to the United States, and because it possesses an ancient investment in humanistic, historical culture and values, which make the texture of its society intrinsically more resistant to innovation.

A difference in degree

between the United States and Europe is thus rapidly becoming a difference in kind. W e have also apprehended that what we are considering in the already embattled Atlantic community is, therefore, not a gap between

two

substantially

homogeneous

continents

and

sub-

systems, a passing phenomenon, or one whose consequences may perhaps be felt only many years from now.

It is a metamorpho-

sis profoundly changing hitherto familiar features, and it is not, 68

THE MEANING OF THE GAP as we have noted, a ghost of the future.

Under the impact of the

technological revolution, the distance and differences between the United States and Europe are already human

activity

now marked in every

or potential—technological,

educational,

eco-

nomic, financial, industrial, organizational, managerial, and military.

They are already perceivable in the philosophy and style of

life, outlook, attitude, motivation, interests, and purpose of their respective peoples.

If the American and European societies still

belong to the same ideological system, in practice they

already

give different interpretations to the fundamental values they have in common. A s I have suggested from the outset, the conclusion to be drawn is that the technological disparities bisecting the Atlantic community, telescoped as they are into a very short span of time and reacted upon in such different ways in the United States and Europe, have caused the fracture in the Atlantic platform to acquire dramatic proportions.

If the causes persist, the histori-

cal course of these two main bodies of the Western world will no longer be parallel, but will separate and diverge. There is no wisdom in concealing the fact that in our part of the world two different societies are rapidly emerging and progressively becoming estranged from each other.

Unless we adopt

a drastically new approach and radical measures to face up to this situation, in all likelihood the present gap will grow to be an immeasurable chasm, the Chasm

Ahead,

tearing apart the old

and the new seats of Western civilization in such a manner that the separation will be without remedy.

Constructive dialogue

between the two banks of the chasm would then become as difficult as it is now between the advanced West and the underdeveloped peoples of the world. A n d as technology is becoming more and more inseparable from politics and the general conduct of human affairs, this impending fracture will also signify a grave political dislocation in the entire Atlantic system.

I may quote again from Brzezinski's 6q

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC essay: " T h i s change is separating the United States from the rest of the world, prompting a further fragmentation among an increasingly differentiated mankind, and imposing upon Americans a special obligation to ease the pains of the resulting confrontation."

However, the situation is even much more serious than

these words may indicate. Before going any further, and discussing the issues in front of us and the principles to organize adequate solutions, I would like the r e a d e r — n a y , all people on both sides of what has been the Ocean of our h o p e — t o pause and consider both the present reality and its possible projection and consequences.

Let me repeat

that the direct and second-order consequences of a permanent Atlantic fracture would be incalculable.

W e are living at a

moment in history when man, by his scientific and technological prowess, has shrunk the world, for all practical purposes, to dimensions comparable to those of a city-state in ancient or medieval times or a national state a few decades ago.

B y the

same stroke, he has aggravated the problems of humanity ever more crowding this world to unheard of gigantic proportions. W e have, therefore, reached a point when we cannot get away from considering the world as a unity, "the little room in God's house where man spends all the day." What can the future of mankind be in this shrunken world if the highly civilized, rich, and powerful Atlantic peoples become divided for good, and incapable of understanding each other, and if the Atlantic platform on which they live and which is the only staging area where a new start can be mounted to reinstate stability and development in the less favored regions of the world, turns itself out of order and becomes unusable?

In such a world

what will be the destiny of the Atlantic peoples themselves? Each of us can give his own answer to these questions.

I have

already given mine and will only add that, in my opinion, no constructive world design is possible that is not the pursuit of an unreal stalemate, or die-hard defense of precarious privileges and

70

THE MEANING OF THE GAP strident imbalances, unless the Atlantic peoples set an example to all other peoples and are themselves united in peaceful alliance, partnership, community, commonwealth, or other form of mutual trust and cooperation.

Only by acting in close concert can they

influence other peoples and nations, the strong and the less strong, those who are friendly and in due time those w h o are not, and bring all of them sooner or later to their side with a fair chance to participate in, and benefit from, a cooperative effort toward resolving the world's problems. But if the Atlantic peoples become even more divided than they are now, if the fracture between them reaches a final point of no return, we may be assured that they c a n n o t — a n y of them, not even glorious and all-powerful A m e r i c a — e x p e c t to progress and pursue their own goals in a world marked by disarray, chaos, and no doubt, militant intolerance.

Divided, they cannot hope in

the long run to survive, peacefully or otherwise, because the rest of the world will not forget or forgive that they have forfeited their unique role in a moment of universal need. That is why I think that Atlantic is the First Great Key to the

unity and compactness,

in fact,

future.

71

CHAPTER 3. PRINCIPLES FOR AN A T L A N T I C S T R A T E G Y

A New Approach

Is

Required

WE HAVE SEEN what is the real meaning of today's gap, and we have discussed the incredible disruptive potential of the gap if its trend is allowed to continue.

Our analysis has followed an es-

calation course, because it started from a controversial issue of who is more advanced in technological progress, then went on to consider the impact that superiority in this field may have on society, and ended by concluding that we are in danger of a societal schism right in the middle of the Atlantic system of nations. I do not believe that, in reaching these conclusions, I have overstated the implications and consequences of this situation, which if now in the forefront, were practically unknown, and left us unconcerned a few years back.

Should the reader, however,

be still doubtful, he has but to think of the tremendous pace of technological progress which in the short span of a few years has changed the order of magnitude of many phenomena affecting our lives. lievable.

T h e speed of development in our time is hardly beOne of our greatest scientists, the late J. Robert Op-

penheimer, marveling at it, said that "one thing that is new is the prevalence of newness, the changing scale of change itself, so that the world alters as we walk in it." Now, if this assessment of the present plight of the Atlantic world is not altogether off the mark, it is logical to move one step further and inquire about the possible ways and means to put this situation straight again.

In the first instance, is it within our 73

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC reach to stop Atlantic disintegration?

If so, how can the solidity

of the Atlantic platform be reconstructed and the solidarity of its peoples be reestablished, even in altogether new forms, which may be better adapted to the changing times? This is too complex a matter involving so many variables and irrational elements, and blurred by spurious information and contrasting interests, to afford simple and immediate answers.

A

positive response to these questions, and to many other intricate issues which have paramount importance for our future, depends, anyhow, on the right approach to them. A s we are now about to enter and explore the unknown territory where solutions lie, I want to state that we must pay more attention to how we chart our way into this new territory, rather than stumble on a good solution or two. all my reasoning that it is immensely mine the intellectual

and organizational

rectly to set objectives, lem or

processes

define strategies,

on them, than concentrate

It is a cardinal point in

more important

to

by which

reach decisions

detercor-

and act

on the solution of any individual

prob-

problems.

This represents an entirely new approach with respect to our present compartmented vision of what needs doing. this is one of the guidelines to the New Approach

Better said,

which I think is

indispensable if we are going to organize a balanced and stable solution to the complex of problems confronting us. As

these

problems

become

bigger,

more

intricate,

more

numerous and more interlocked, the question of method in attacking them becomes essential, lest we get lost in their dangerous maze, and formulate wrongly the questions that matter, or address ourselves to solve the wrong problems.

The New A p -

proach will exact from us an unusual effort that will be conceptual and philosophical before it is political and operational, and it will demand greater expertise than the more intuitive, rule-ofthumb

and

experience-based

sought heretofore. 74

ways

by

which

solutions

were

PRINCIPLES TTOR AN ATLANTIC STRATEGY It also involves a much broader understanding

than currently

exists of the revolutionary changes occurring in the world and the new relationships between man, society and environment at this turning point of history.

It likewise requires that the issues we

are interested in resolving be placed in a much broader

context

where not only their inherent sequential cause-and-effect relations, but also the major interactions with all other relevant issues may be identified and considered. The necessity for this N e w Approach to all the great and vital problems of our time is reinforced by the easy realization that our present and old approach is so fraught with nearly incredible contradictions and topsy-turviness that it cannot lead to any stable solution.

I will later touch upon these incongruities, but

let me now give a few examples here. W e serve and praise the national when the supranational or global is our challenge; we employ limited means to pursue unlimited objectives; we adopt sectoral outlooks to approach interpenetrating and tangling phenomena; we look near and act shortterm, while we need to see far and plan long-term; we have profusion of knowledge but do not know how to use it; we are committed to the hard sciences, while we are off-balance due to neglect of the social and moral sciences; we trust more in our destructive might than in our capacity to organize peace and development; we support old-fashioned concepts and attempt to use them to straitjacket sweepingly new realities.

With these

totally misleading optics and practice, it is a miracle if we have not yet led the Atlantic compact, or the world spaceship, totally astray. This is a most serious matter.

A s more than once in recent

years mankind has already lost its way in the quagmire, when only last-minute warnings stopped it on the brink of disaster, I would say that, at this stage, the odds are even on which way it w iH

go.

T h e stakes are of course very high, and one can either

wager one's lot that, collectively, humans

are a

mischievous 75

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC species eventually dominated by a suicide complex, or still speculate that they are the rational and spiritual creatures we used to claim.

Time will soon tell.

T h e rationale of the N e w A p p r o a c h to the contemporary world and the attendant considerations made in this book on the myriad problems confronting us echo a growing concern creeping among the most alert of our peoples,

and point inexorably

to the

need for a radical change in the direction along which human affairs are conducted: the Great Change my central theme.

of Direction,

which is

This change is necessary in world as well

a s — a s part of the w h o l e — i n Atlantic affairs.

Its adoption de-

mands a thorough and responsible debate on the objectives and a drastically new strategy for mankind and civilization, or more accurately, the adoption of a forceful and coherent

strategy

where there now is no strategy at a l l — b u t only conflicting tactics and improvisation based on expediency. However, it would be beyond the scope and possibility of this book to undertake a detailed discussion of all the questions it raises or offer an organic answer to all of them.

O n the one hand,

far greater knowledge, research, and wisdom than I can muster would be required, and probably much more time than the reader can spare.

On the other hand, as this book unfolds, it will ap-

pear that its purpose is to put into real perspective some of the great problems I have mentioned—of which, indeed, the first is the technological g a p — t o show that they will become more and more interlocking and difficult to resolve as time passes.

And

that their compounded complexity and increased menace compel the

abandonment

of

the

present

irrational,

muddled,

petty-

minded, outdated, and potentially destructive conduct of human affairs, and the adoption of this new integrated, future-oriented approach. Therefore, in discussing the delicate and worrying situations emerging in the Atlantic sphere at a time of impending general 76

PRINCIPLES TTOR AN ATLANTIC STRATEGY crisis, rather than suggest specific solutions, I will now indicate some of the basic principles which, in my view, should inspire our strategy in facing them.

The Principles

of Priority

and

Interdependence

T h e questions stemming from the Atlantic gap must be examined with this broad approach before we can reach valid conclusions about the way in which we should respond to them. It must, however, be borne in mind that, while beyond any shade of doubt a change of policies is required eventually to redress the situation, entailing a great number of separate and joint actions by the Atlantic countries, no such thing is possible unless public opinion supports it.

T h e intellectual and academic

communities, and the governmental, corporate, and union decision centers on both sides of the ocean must be convinced that we are face to face with the hard reality I have been describing, and should, therefore, be ready to endorse this change of course. I shall not rest until this urgent message is fully communicated: Americans and Europeans alike must abandon the irresponsible complacency that has until now characterized

their

judgment of their own economic strength, their capacity to govern themselves, and even the present and future shape of their mutual relationships, because the day they realize that the gap between them has become a chasm, and a threat to all, may be just one day too late to invoke the Atlantic spirit and solidarity. When the present is already critical and the future

looks

bleaker, as are our present straits, recourse has to be had to both the techniques of crisis management and creative

planning—

provided, however, that the former by no means displaces the latter.

It is in keeping with this severe rule that I will now

mention, as part and parcel of a suggested forward strategy for the Atlantic nations, three guiding principles that in my view 77

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC reconcile the needs of immediate action with the exigencies of policy planning.

They are built around the simple and often

heralded, but seldom applied, concepts of priority, dence,

and

interdepen-

leadership.

T o start with, it is necessary on both sides of the Atlantic to undertake

in earnest the difficult, even painful,

ing and redefining priorities.

task of

recogniz-

N o great statesmanship is required

to discern that, at the present international juncture, not even the combined wealth, power, and capacity of all the Western nations, were they compactly united in total commitment, are enough to cope with the increasing mass of their own present domestic and Atlantic problems, plus those inescapably thrown in their lap by a troubled and expectant world, plus the equally important necessity of preparing a more stable tomorrow at home and internationally.

This inadequacy is made still more blatant because for

the moment there is no such thing as a bloc of the Atlantic nations.

Under the present circumstances, therefore, as a start,

the question of priorities has to be taken up separately, for the United States, on the one hand, and—assuming the European nations are able to piece their views together—for a united Europe, on the other. In the face of this stark reality, it is clear as daylight that the United States ought not to get involved in this whole congeries of problems, and should think twice before tackling even major ones when they are only sectorally important for this country or the world; and that Europe ought to be even more cautious in its aims, and avoid trying to be a carbon copy of the United States. O n each side of the Atlantic, political fortitude and vision are now required to determine a scale of goals and priorities consisttent with their respective interests, commitments, and resources, deployed against the background of a world context, and considered over long as well as short periods; and then to make a set of coherent choices accordingly.

Instead of tinkering ineffectually,

as both America and Europe now do in their different ways, with 7«

PRINCIPLES TTOR AN ATLANTIC STRATEGY too many scattered problems or objectives—more often than not uncoordinated or at cross-purposes with one another—and instead of announcing more and more programs that patently can never materialize, each of them should firmly get on with the business of identifying a set of feasible goals, and reordering a comprehensive plan of priorities, and then set forth, and carry out, the projects and policies that are both feasible and of the highest priority.

A t the same time, each should abandon, post-

pone, or phase programs and commitments that are marginal with respect to the over-all objectives, or have lesser immediate or deferred importance according to this strategy. These concepts are elementary, the constant guidelines of successful individuals and corporations.

Y e t they are consistently

ignored by our national policy makers.

Their adoption would

automatically lead the Western nations to give serious consideration and recognition to the second, and likewise fundamental, principle, based on the plain reality that in this era neither government nor industry nor any single nation, not even a whole continent, can go it alone without sacrificing optimum opportunities and even jeopardizing minimal plans.

Under the present

international circumstances, this principle could, in the beginning, be most usefully employed within the Atlantic sphere. In fact, effective Atlantic

interdependence

is now more than ever a

primary necessity for all our nations. It is as simple as that.

Y e t even this principle is ignored, to

the extent of acting contrary to historical trends.

In this time of

internecine debate and dissent, it is worth remembering that the record of the nations touched by the waves of the Atlantic has for more than two centuries been one of cross-fertilizing interdependence at peace and in war.

Through their exchange of goods,

techniques, and ideas, the flow of capital and aid, and the migration of hands and brains, in defense of liberty and ways of life, and in shaping a great civilization and a common destiny, the allimportant Atlantic platform has been welded together, and in its 79

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC area the most advanced system of human organization recorded in history has been created. What must now be resisted is the gap per se, the reversal of this natural course, the nonrecognition of interdependence as an indispensable basis for our lives.

Our governments and our peo-

ples should be brought to recognize that the chasm ahead and the consequent derailment of the Atlantic system, right at the moment when Atlantic strength is a prerequisite, would be a historical catastrophe.

The Role of the United

States

O n these two c o u n t s — o f priorities to be fixed, and interdependence to be enacted—criticism is easier and probably more pertinent at the present reading in the case of the United States. It is so, because this nation not only possesses the proper institutions to establish a coherent over-all policy but has developed superior forecasting, systems analysis, planning, and managerial capabilities, tools with which it can guide itself efficiently. In the last few years this criticism has been forthcoming in abundance from many quarters.

It interests all of us because it

is directed at correcting some of the forces and tendencies that, by inadvertence, oversight, or contrary interest, work against the maintenance of a healthy Atlantic system by pushing the United States too far ahead of Europe in some sectors and too far away from it in others. suffered by some

It also brings to the surface the neglect important

aspects or sectors of

American

society. T h e over-all impression one gathers at present is that the national purposes of this, the greatest nation of all times, are far from clear, or at least that no strategic design has been conceived to fulfill them.

This is a striking fact, particularly at a time when

the condition of world affairs demands precisely these t h i n g s — namely, over-all objectives, and strategies to achieve t h e m — b u t on a much greater scale. So

PRINCIPLES TTOR AN ATLANTIC STRATEGY I quote some random specimens.

For instance, in this coun-

try, there has long been a cry for more attention to social values. John Kenneth Galbraith's The Affluent

Society

is already a clas-

sic, with its indictment of the American economic order based on a persistent imbalance between overproduction of wares for private consumption and underproduction of public services. reverse trend is manifesting itself.

Some

A noteworthy study is un-

der way by Syracuse University's Newhouse

Communication

Center under the sponsorship of the American A c a d e m y of Political and Social Sciences.

It deals, in Bertram M . Gross' words,

with "such vital subjects as the reduction of poverty, freedom from discrimination, social and political participation, civil liberties and the administration of justice, art and culture, employment and leisure, learning and education, health and well-being, the production of knowledge, the natural environment, the urban environment, and the mass media." However, signs of the existing grave confusion in, or lack of, leadership in the definition of basic priorities for the whole of American society are abundant.

They may be gathered from the

Report of the National

Commission

Advisory

of March 1967, called the Kerner Report.

on Civil

Disorders

Its memorable con-

clusion is that "our nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and unequal."

T h e commissioners

said that "only a commitment to national action on an unprecedented scale can shape a future compatible with the historic ideals of American society."

This request calls for a change of

priorities and long-term plans—hitting on the head both the nail of this very problem and more largely the present practice of inconsistent half-strategies.

Even columnist Joseph A l s o p (In-

ternational Herald

March 20, 1968) commented with

Tribune,

anguish that the report "is nothing more nor less than an official portrait

of

the

American-dream-turning-into-nightmare,"

and

"furthermore, for all its strong, even emotional, language, the riot commission's report timidly understates the true horror of that problem." 81

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC This grave problem, smack in the center of United States cities, is a cause of consternation, not only for America and her friends and admirers, but also for those who, though not friendly, have enough salt in their head to understand that, if the United States is locked with her domestic problems, the chances of redressing the alarming situations that prevail throughout the world will become very dim indeed.

A n d by the side, it provides proof

that yesterday's improvidence spells trouble for today, and that the world is such an interlocking system that a domestic problem here may have international repercussions everywhere. T a k e another example: the military-industrial complex.

In

this case, again, lack of an early enough definition of national strategic priorities has had exponential consequences.

General

Eisenhower's historic and incisive warning in his last presidential speech of January 1961 brought up an issue which has been amply debated since.

"This conjunction of an immense military

establishment and a large arms industry is new in the American experience.

T h e total influence—economic, political, even spir-

itual—is felt in every city, in every state house, every office of federal government.

W e recognize the imperative need for this

development.

Y e t we must not fail to comprehend its grave

implications.

Our toil, resources, and livelihood are all in-

volved: so is the very structure of our society." Obviously, a multibillion-dollar effort concentrated in one single direction has an unbalancing effect, even for the strongest economy and nation.

I was impressed by some comments on

this, among others those made by Seymour Melman in his Our Depleted

Society.

It is not for a foreigner, not even for the

staunchest friend and admirer of this country, to add his own comment and interpretation.

But I cannot refrain from brood-

ing over the universal significance of some passages.

Let me cite

two:

W e can try to visualize the present power of the U.S. strategic nuclear stockpile in another w a y .

82

Suppose a

Hiroshima-size

PRINCIPLES TTOR AN ATLANTIC STRATEGY bomb had been exploded every day of every year for the last 1,965 years, or since the birth of Christ.

T h e combined force of

all of these explosions would be just over 14,000 megatons; this is only 7 0 % of the destructive capability now encased in the U.S. longrange bombers and missiles alone [page 14]. On the assumption of 9 0 % attrition of aircraft and 7 5 % attrition of strategic missiles, the resulting overkill factor would be about 220 times on the main USSR.

population-industrial

centers

of

the

If the assumption of attrition were relaxed to 5 0 % , then

the overkill rate on Soviet industrial-population centers would be more than 1,000 times [page 18].

I do not know if these figures and the rationale they imply are correct.

One could, however, allow them a very wide margin of

error without changing the picture they convey.

On the other

hand, I fully realize that this is the shield under which Western Europe and many other peoples also have progressed and prospered.

A n d moreover, that this frightening investment of wealth

and talent for destruction is the mirror image and replica of a similar, though more secretive, mad effort in the Soviet U n i o n — w h i c h does not justify either of them on human and moral grounds. But what is important for our matter-of-fact reasoning is the assessment of this effort in the more general framework of national (and Atlantic, international)

interests: a security effort

which, according to Ralph E. L a p p , the outspoken physicist and author, has cost this country in the postwar years an investment of one trillion dollars and the emergence of what he calls the "weapon culture" and "weapon e g o " 1968).

( T h e Weapon

Culture,

Clearly, an effort of this magnitude cannot be conjured

up without a strong impact on the allocation of national resources, both material and intellectual—and

society's

general

outlook on man and life. In other words, is this the best way to attain the purported goals?

Has their priority been duly assessed?

In any case, what

is the cost-effectiveness of this investment for the United States (or for that matter, for the Soviet U n i o n ) , and how does it stand 83

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC in total-value comparison, including social values, with other alternative investments?

Would its revision provoke, as one

feels, a major change in politics and allocations?

It is not up to

me, or for this book, to answer these questions, but I know that it is misleading to conjecture that the grave distortions caused by this overwhelming commitment in one field, necessarily to the detriment of others, may after all be easily cured.

A t this scale,

these distortions go beyond the economy's limit of elasticity, and their redressing will cause painful crises over a very long time. Hoping that the reader will accept the objective spirit in which these remarks are made, and bear patience, I wish to refer to two highly authoritative comments which place the problem of priorities in a global perspective, the appropriate framework for the leading nation of the Atlantic community and the world. Walter Lippmann has, for some years, conducted an inspiring and most educative campaign to show that the United States cannot fill a superrole in world affairs.

T i m e and again he has

entered the arena in his masterful way, warning the American and also his uncommonly vast European public that there is a very definite and already transgressed limit to the commitments the United States can make and fulfill in the world. must be made, priorities defined.

Choices

A m o n g his innumerable arti-

cles, I remember reading in Newsweek

( A u g u s t I, 1 9 6 6 ) that

"the United States, for all its wealth and military power and for all of the ideological pretensions . . .

is quite unable to be the

world's policeman and to conduct a global crusade for its way of life and its favorite doctrines."

A g a i n in the spring of 1968, he

was decrying (International Herald

Tribune,

March 25,

1968)

the thesis that the United States has fallen heir to the role Britain played in the nineteenth century.

The thesis—not h i s — i s that

this nation "is now the guardian of the peace, the promoter of law and order, the defender against aggression, and the protector of the weak.

Since Britain has had to relinquish this global

mission, the United States in its power and its wealth and righ84

PRINCIPLES TTOR AN ATLANTIC STRATEGY teousness has been appointed to take over the glory and the burden."

Lippmann says that the times have changed and the

United States cannot fulfill that r o l e — a n d more so, I would add, if, of all strange things, she chooses to act alone. James Reston has been even more pointed.

Speaking of the

disorder of our age, he wrote that "there is a vast and defective sense of scale in the policies of the northern industrial countries," and in column after column in The New York edly raised the question of priority. in the International

Herald Tribune,

Times he repeat-

For example (as reprinted August 7, 1 9 6 7 ) :

The unsolved problem, obvious for a very long time, which the people intuitively understand or seem to understand, is the problem of priority. It is true that the United States can spend more money on the cities and on Vietnam this year than last year, but it is not true that it can deal effectively with the war in Vietnam, the problem of the cities, the flight to the moon, the health, education and welfare of all the people, the new class war between the rich nations and the poor nations, pork-barrel appropriations for all states and cities, veterans' aid, foreign aid, debt, education and the balance of payments—all these things at the same time. Alas, the question of priority is still very muddled, as developments in 1967 and 1968 show, with the financial and manpower resources of this nation overstretched, and its immense capacity to tackle large problems severely tested by the proliferating tentacles of too many issues attacked at the same time. Even the immense power of the United States should not be overestimated.

A f t e r all, the possibility of putting it to good use

is limited, unless it is redirected and redeployed.

A substantial

change of direction in its utilization at home and abroad would multiply manifoldly

its usefulness to all practical purposes.

The

issue is blurred chiefly because, in our minds, the strategy of security has completely overshadowed what may be called the 55

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC strategy of development.

For example, it is commonly held that

a situation of unipolarity exists now because the time of two superpowers is gone, and the United States has emerged as the only real global power, having greatly outpaced and outclassed the Soviet Union in techno-scientific, economic, and potential, and creative capacity.

military

But this conception connotes a

yardstick of power, which measures nearly exclusively negative values of deterrence and retaliation. What people want, besides security, are, however, constructive policies, positive steps toward a better living standard, a more wholesome quality of

life.

To

attain these other

objectives,

the formidable United States security-oriented potential is of little u s e — f o r the simple reason that it was conceived to suit a different set of requirements and priorities. Not only does the whole question of domestic and international priorities need a thorough reassessment, the principle of Atlantic interdependence must be reaffirmed and redefined right in this country.

Willy-nilly, it has undertaken a fearsome com-

plex of worldwide obligations and commitments; and even if henceforth it uses restraint, they will remain a formidable lot. Furthermore, let me repeat, many high-priority problems nowadays surpass the capacity of any nation, even the United States, and demand strategies and policies that she cannot conceive and execute alone. It now behooves the great and generous American people to come to the mature recognition that they cannot, of course, shirk global responsibilities and their relative burdens, but that the only way of facing them without courting disaster is to arrange all these demands, domestic and foreign, in a coordinated over-all plan, however imperfect it may be initially.

They have to accept,

at the same time, that the United States cannot decide the choices or conduct large-scale action without the support and participation of others, starting with Europe. 86

A n d in this respect, that

PRINCIPLES FOR AN ATLANTIC STRATEGY even if a unified European stand is so hard to crystallize, this is the right direction in which this country should move. This change of direction will probably mean for the United States a slowing down in the advance in R and D investment in some sectors, while boosting it in others, accepting second place in some advanced technology or strategic in a word, more on a policy of

fields,

transatlantic

and

relying,

specialization,

mutuality of interests and joint planning ahead, than going it alone.

A s I said, it may be a difficult choice to make, and it may

entail some risks.

But it will open wider horizons to this nation,

and offer it a greater range of options for the future.

A n d , not

least, it will establish with Europe that indispensable d i a l o g u e — real and creative, not only perfunctory, as n o w — o n objectives and strategies concerning the great world issues: East-West relations,

international

socioeconomic

development,

quences of the technological revolution, etc.

the

conse-

Even a joint effort

to control and contain the causes of the gap will be a first, invaluable dividend. If what has been said so far makes sense, and if the United States will adopt the principles of priorities and interdependence, I have no doubt that she would change the focus of her policy back from the Pacific again to the Atlantic.

A s things a r e — e v e n

assuming that the greatest challenges facing the West for the rest of the century are those of restraining China and maneuvering her peacefully

into the international c o m m u n i t y — t h e timing and

strategy have been wrong, with the United States engaged in these issues now and practically alone.

N o t only does the locus

of

her vital interests lie in the Atlantic-European area, but also, how much better it is for the United States to wait a few years, and prepare to deal with the Chinese issues from a much stronger position.

However, such a position can be built only around a

strongly fastened and united Atlantic platform.

The

obvious

strategy is to give priority to the Atlantic platform and seek interdependence with Europe first, and then move jointly on to

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC do the things that the United States alone can never hope to accomplish with respect to global problems—such as attracting the Soviet Union as a partner in the study of plans to stabilize and develop the great land areas in A s i a and elsewhere (rather than rejecting her as a natural or potential e n e m y ) , and engaging her potential to cooperate in realizing constructive

long-term

policies of worldwide scope (instead of dissipating, on both sides, enormous resources in the vain pursuit of overkill supremacy). T h e opposite policies, now being followed, have thrown the Atlantic camp into disarray.

If the present trend continues, it

seems inevitable that the more the United States gets singlehandedly and inextricably involved in the Far East, the greater the attraction Western Europe will feel toward Eastern Europe and the Urals.

Or the greater the doubts will become whether it is

a paying proposition for it to resist the lures and threats that the Soviet Union may be tempted to make with a view to dividing and controlling it.

Already this quite negative polarization of

American and European interests away from the Atlantic core, though fortunately still partial, is at the root of a good deal of disharmony and estrangement between them.

Should the United

States be entangled in Southeast Asia for a long time to come, the harm done to the Atlantic relationship could become irreparable. There is little doubt that, in such a case, Europe would practically turn its back on the Atlantic, and that the bridges to the East which President Johnson has advocated would actually be built by Europe alone.

They would carry considerable mercan-

tile, cultural, even ideological traffic—albeit little of American origin. Tracing back what we have said so far, we see how the different issues—from technology to V i e t n a m — a r e in fact interlocked, and how the problems of technological disparity between the United States and Europe cannot be resolved, any more than many other problems, except by a long-term over-all strategy jointly conceived and jointly undertaken by the Atlantic nations. 88

PRINCIPLES FOR AN ATLANTIC STRATEGY This joint strategy does not necessarily have to follow the official formation of an Atlantic community of sorts; indeed, it may precede it and help in eventually giving life to it.

T h e first task is

to impress on public opinion and political circles that, short of this combination of priority and interdependence policies between America and Europe, most of the measures otherwise devised to reduce the technological gap, or solve the other grave problems they have in common, though temporarily or sectorally promising, would be but palliatives; and the Atlantic and world situation would continue to worsen. Finally, if the perspective of an impending and inevitable A t lantic community is created in people's minds, not only will the problem of the gap look less abrasive to European pride, and lose some of the ugly thorns it now has for all, but many new undreamed-of channels will spontaneously open for the free circulation of technology

within

this promised,

unified

community

area.

The Role of

Europe

The need to assert the principles of priority and Atlantic interdependence is quite as pressing for Europe.

However,

one

should not lose sight that Europe's primum vivere requirement is rightly to exist as Europe. dilemma: to be or not to be.

Like Hamlet, Europe faces the In this respect, hope is pegged

mainly to the preservation, strengthening, and expansion of the J957

Treaty of Rome, by which the six signatories sought to end

their historical hostilities and rivalries, and established an unprecedented partnership among sovereign states—the E E C . We have seen that much pessimism prevails nowadays about the future of what is usually called the Community.

I have also

mentioned that, despite all misgivings and delays, a point of no return in its evolution has now been reached.

A n d lamentable

though the present state of European affairs is, there is reason to «9

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC hope that the goal, the actual economic and political unity of the continent, is after all not as remote as it may appear.

There is a

steady march forward in the implementation of the Treaty of R o m e , sometimes slowed down or sidetracked, but never really halted. T h e catalyst of Europe's unification cannot be other than the Community.

Though its current membership is still only six,

and some of its postures are self-centered and inward-looking, it represents a nucleus capable of eventually attracting all other European nations. munity

that

There is no alternative to it.

embodies

the

ideal

of

It is the C o m -

economic

integration,

conducive to the ultimate goal of political unity, and it is the Community that may have in the European Continent a function similar to what one would imagine for the Atlantic community in the wider world. Of course, there is no basis to presume that the process of giving birth to a continent by amalgamation and conviction, not conquest and dictatorship, is an easy one.

Whatever the desire

and rationale of more effective progress, one should not forget how deeply Europe is implicated in history and how its unification is contrary to age-old traditions, memories, feuds, interests, and taboos deeply set in its fabric and psyche. Therefore, to achieve a stronger C o m m u n i t y — t h i s prerequisite of unification in E u r o p e — t h e obvious strategy is to rally all elements, the active, dormant, lukewarm, or still unconvinced ones in the Community itself and in all the other Atlantic nations, including the United States, and induce them to support this Community-centered process as the only method now available of building Europe. Everyone must be prepared to pay a price, even a high price, for this first step toward one Europe to be made. "Europeists"

must accept that Europe

T h e orthodox

will consolidate

itself

somewhat erratically, a la carte, rather than assume at once the majestic and harmonious shape conceived by its early political 90

PRINCIPLES TTOR AN ATLANTIC STRATEGY designers.

T h e advocates of the quick entry of the United King-

dom must be patient while that momentous event is postponed for a few years more.

In the meantime, they should aim at

consolidating the present Community of Six and its external ties with the U K and the other E F T A countries.

A n d the " A t l a n -

ticists" of the two shores must absorb and placate the sprinkling of anti-Americanism occurring in Europe as an inevitable byproduct of this belabored process, and obtain forbearance and restraint in the United States in the face of it. However, even if their high hopes and spirits are maintained against the difficult hurdles still to come, there is no way out for Europeans but to recognize the principles of priority and Atlantic interdependence.

Europe's inferior potential dramatically

derscores this imperative.

un-

It is principally in this sense that I

said that Europe should reject all temptations to become carbon copy of the United States.

a

Instead of being hypnotized

by the United States' successes in applied science and advanced technology and trying to ape and duplicate them without a critical assessment of their consistence with a set of over-all European objectives, Europe must first define these objectives. It is again a question, also in the case of Europe, of starting with the right approach.

Once Europe has decided what are the

goals and priorities that best respond to its genius and needs, then it can launch programs that are feasible with its human and material resources.

Against this, the objection may be raised that

if a rational study of national objectives and priorities is so difficult in Washington, the magnitude of this difficulty will be much greater in Europe, where, besides at least equally muddled issues, in the absence of unified institutions, there is still a great measure of nationalistic tug-of-war between Paris, R o m e , Bonn, London, etc.

But this is really still more reason for considering the defini-

tion of priorities itself as a high-priority question. A s to the selection of European priorities, 1 would, for example, suggest that information technology, and its applications 91

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC — a sector where very little coordinated effort is made, but good results

could

easily

be

obtained—are

more

important

than

nucleonics, a sector where the excellent qualitative results obtained

do

lavished.

not,

however,

compensate

the

effort and

money

I would also suggest that a sustained aerospace effort

is justified at this stage only when directed towards developing directly

usable

civilian

applications.

Preferential

attention

should be given to the conservation and development of Europe's cities, most of which have been in the past high expressions of erstwhile technology, but now must be enabled to absorb the technology of modern times rather than be crushed by it, and remain one of the great patrimonies of mankind.

I would en-

large this concept to that of safeguarding the "quality of Europe," a continent of high and ancient civilization, dense population, and a unique heritage of historical, artistic, and sacred monuments.

This objective should probably take

over new ventures in oceanography,

and certainly

precedence should be

strenuously upheld against, for instance, the temptation of competing in advanced weaponry R and D with the United States or the Soviet Union.

But these are only personal opinions.

With his usual expertise, Christopher Layton in the not yet published book I have already mentioned discusses the chances of having a European science and technology policy before the existence of Europe itself: "So long as Britain and other West European countries are. outside the European Communities, a certain degree of improvisation will continue to prevail. same progress can be made."

A l l the

A n d he outlines a tentative institu-

tional framework for Europe with a Directorate of Science and Technology, a Science Foundation, a Technology Fund, and several Management Agencies.

In my own view, much essential

work can also be done well before these or other formal European institutions are established. Pierre Piganiol too outlines the basis of a unified science policy for Europe, and considers the prime need to be the creation of a 92

PRINCIPLES TTOR AN ATLANTIC STRATEGY European Science Foundation, whose initial task would be to take stock of existing facilities, means and programs, and provide cross-references to the situation in the United States and the Soviet Union.

But he insists that (ibid.,

page 2 9 9 ) :

Europe must primarily shape its philosophy of the future and recognize its specific needs; recognize its promising inventions at the blueprint stage, and foresee their implications . . . and not stand by until a rash of envy leads to a desire to possess things Americans have enjoyed for more than a decade. Although I do not share all the views held by these two friends of mine, they, and a growing number of dedicated Europeans, point out the right direction.

A n d it is this growing willingness

to unite in the face of the gap that may produce the embryo of a science policy even before Europe is born.

If this prediction is

fulfilled, and also an industrial policy that would be designed to foster the development of truly European corporations is eventually adopted,

great headway

objectives we have indicated.

will be made

toward

all

the

These will be two momentous

breakthroughs, because they will cause tens of thousands of government and corporate decision-makers not only in Europe, but also in the United States, to redirect their minds and activities toward longer-term, wider-horizon, future-oriented g o a l s — w h i c h means that they will inevitably work for, and not against, further European unity and Atlantic cooperation.

T h e outcome will be a

new renaissance, and a galvanization of energies throughout the old Continent. In the process, Europe will find that it cannot alone accomplish all its immense tasks and objectives.

For this reason, those

who want to build the new Europe should always aim at making it not an autarchic continent, but an outward and forward looking "Europe plus," as it is sometimes called, projected onto the Atlantic platform of cooperation and mutual fulfillment.

In Eu93

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC rope's case the principle of interdependence has become quite imperative at this stage, when European industry is deeply infiltrated by American investment or is dependent upon American patents and production, distribution, and managerial know-how. Whatever beliefs its leaders may hold about Europe's

goals,

they have no alternative for their attainment but long-range crossfertilization and ties with America. However, a weightier reason will become apparent for Europe to combine with the United States.

It is that the outside world,

although mesmerized by American might and bewitching technology, expects from Europe something that Europe in self-interest cannot refuse and has the capacity to conceive, something which it has the vocation to offer, but not the power to produce alone: how to organize

peace.

The United States is not considered, by and large, to be engaged on this path.

Pax Americana,

whatever it may be, and

despite its merits, sounds more a catchword than a convincing way of spreading peace across the planet.

In world public opin-

ion, the United States and the Soviet Union have been too busy watching each other and responding to mutual threat by arming to the teeth and dragging others in their wake, and in particular the United States has considered herself too powerful to be interested in making the supreme effort necessary to create the conditions, and undertake the organization, of a stable peace situation over the world.

Conversely, the credibility of Europe, in my

opinion, is not by and large questioned in this respect—notwithstanding some militarist regurgitation, here and there.

There-

fore, a united and respected Europe may bring into the Atlantic community this invaluable new component.

A n d this role of

Europe will be a determinant in the definition of its own and Atlantic objectives. Europeans must not shirk facing these realities and new responsibilities for another, overriding reason.

T h e sooner they

realize that closer complementation with the United States is in94

PRINCIPLES TTOR AN ATLANTIC STRATEGY escapable, the sooner they will discover that in the quid pro quo game with the Americans

they

still hold unexploited

cards.

A f t e r all, in advanced societies—and I would say this particularly of modern American society—people are becoming more sophisticated and strive for a higher quality of life.

In its inter-

play with America, Europe is especially capable of making original contributions toward this end. tion—aesthetic,

ethic,

spiritual,

Traits of its multiple civilizaphilosophical,

and

generally

humanistic—will blend with the present triumphant techno-scientific mainstream, pouring out mainly from its great fountainhead in America. In conclusion, if the perspective of a continuum of EuropeanAmerican cooperation

and interdependence,

leading to

some

form of stricter union of the two sides of the Atlantic, gains acceptability, then, as I have already said, many serious problems — f r o m the brain drain to the balance of payments—will look less serious even before being diluted in a wider area when the Atlantic institutions are in place; and at any rate, their inconvenience will become much more bearable. In this perspective of an Atlantic community, federation, or commonwealth, whatever this closer European-American nexus will eventually come to be in the next decades, asymmetry across the Atlantic and the disparities among its component peoples will not matter very m u c h — i n technological achievements, in productivity, techno-structure, institutions, and even ways of life. Indeed, considerable degrees of diversification among them may be considered a healthy feature of the mass society we are going to have, as they will enrich it with multiple experiences and foster the research of alternative solutions.

Thus they will permit it to

grow more versatile and creative, and offer a more interesting spectrum of opportunities to its people, and enhance the intercourse and mobility of their talent, entrepreneurship and capital all over the Atlantic area. Only by purposeful research, study, and implementation of the 95

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC tenets of priority and interdependence, coordinately by America and Europe, can the technological gap and its consequences be overcome.

This is indeed the strategy that will automatically, I

would

naturally,

say

stop

the

two

continents

from

drifting

apart. With this approach and this change of direction in the conduct of their own affairs, Europeans and Americans will then be able to devote much more attention to the outside world, from which the future threats and challenges I have already mentioned will come.

The Principle

of

Leadership

These observations bring us to the third principle beside those of priority and interdependence: that of leadership.

If only this

principle were understood, both the United States and Europe would promptly set aside their other differences and devote more energy to bridging the technological and other gaps that hinder the exercise of leadership. T o understand the full import of the consequences of the A t lantic split in the years to come, we must envisage the Atlantic platform as the very middle of the great stage rocked by the forces of the contemporary world.

F o r the Atlantic platform is

indeed the epicenter of movement in today's world system.

In

other epochs the center was in the heartlands of Asia or the Mediterranean, and from there, by foot, horse, or sail, trade and crafts moved and invasions started, and by word of mouth and by script, the will of the powerful and the faith and ideas of the sage irradiated, and in time, conquered the known world. In our own era, when time and distance no longer cushion the impact of change, what happens in the world largely depends on events occurring, decisions taken, or signals called in the central Atlantic area.

Trade and traffic, technology and information,

currencies and values, arms and fashion, hope and 96

delusion,

PRINCIPLES TTOR AN ATLANTIC STRATEGY boom and slump: A l l in great measure originate from, head toward, or are controlled by, the Atlantic nations.

A s a conse-

quence, the fate of the whole world hinges to a great extent on the policy and action of the Atlantic nations.

In turn, the United

States and Europe are no longer in a position to isolate themselves from either friend or foe.

It is these new situations that

have altogether changed their relationship with the rest of the world, and have thrown at them an extremely demanding burden of leadership. In a world system characterized by uncontrolled growth and imbalance, the Atlantic nations not only ought to realize that they cannot possibly discharge these new heavy responsibilities if they are not united, but they must be well and quickly that they cannot renounce

convinced

this role of leadership even if they wish

to do so. There are three principal circumstances in my opinion that oblige them to accept this role.

First, there is the one already

mentioned, namely that their own interests are basically affected by what happens in the outside world.

Therefore, they cannot

possibly sit back aloof, but are forced to step forward and take a good hand in controlling and directing what happens elsewhere on our planet.

Second, the peoples and nations of the world who

are friendly to them are, at the same time, weak in the contemporary world.

T h e need for help of these less advanced friendly

nations will probably grow, not diminish, as their economies and institutions become more complex and interpenetrated with the stronger and more sophisticated ones.

Third, if the Atlantic

nations demonstrate that they possess true qualities of world leadership in this difficult time, they can progressively win over the nations that are less friendly, and eventually even those presently openly antagonistic. N o w , what are the indications that the Atlantic peoples will be able to understand and resolve the problems they have to f a c e — and actually exert leadership? 97

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC Again, I have no assured answer.

But this book, I hope, may

serve to clarify some of the issues, and contribute to building up the resolve to meet them.

A s the reader proceeds to Parts II

and III, he will see that the nature and proportions of the problems that are thrown at the Atlantic nations and the world are discussed at some length, and the general framework required to reach valid solutions outlined.

Here now are a few introductory

remarks to show some of the lights and shadows of the task ahead. Since World W a r II the advanced nations have found ways of largely governing the politicoeconomic stability and growth of their own individual systems. They have achieved this by means of

complex

mechanisms

and

policies,

conceived

empirically

rather than doctrinally, which combine market automatism with government planning and control—plus a modicum of international solidarity when need is matched by goodwill.

Because of

the imperatives created by the onrush of technology, their governments and corporations have grown in stature—both in dimensions and functions—their spheres of action overlapping with each other.

Government and business have joined together, with

the participation sometimes of the academia and the unions, in developing new forms of organization and management of such elements as the economy, market, demand, output, wages, prices, R and D , and up to a certain point higher education.

This has

been accomplished by means of an interweaving of corporate and state decision centers, executive agencies, planning boards, think tanks and their operative dependencies. ernmental-productive-financial-scientific less represents what is now

This new form of govestablishment

being called

a modern

more

or

nation's

"techno-structure." Here is the secret of power and efficiency of the advanced nations and the fundamental and cumulative difference between them and the countries below the takeoff point.

These mecha-

nisms and procedures and the entire techno-structural 98

buildup

PRINCIPLES TTOR AN ATLANTIC STRATEGY are continuously

evolving

to

adjust to

changing

conditions.

Until recendy we were proud of our techno-structure, even if we somehow resented that what was once called the "invisible hand" regulating our marketplace and economy was now superseded by a more exacting power which took hold of most reins in the nation and society.

However, we had the certainty that nothing

better had ever been conceived. N o w , our advanced nations are in the grip of a crisis whose origin and consequences are deeper than those of an economic recession, though a recession may be one of the forms in which it will manifest itself.

Consequently, we are assailed by a new kind

of doubt and are inclined to question whether our techniques and our mechanisms and our entire art of governing ourselves can actually keep pace with the high-speed and bewildering transformations happening in our modern industrial societies.

A symp-

tom of some malfunctioning in our system as it operates at increased pressure is the technological gap itself.

It is similar to

what happens with complex mechanisms, when a minor flaw, tolerable in itself, may provoke major disarrangements, necessitating a complex revision and overhaul of the entire system. Other signs also indicate that our mechanism does not function well and is far from being under firm control.

I have already

indicated some malfunctioning of a social and political nature. There are examples also in fields related to the economy: the difficult negotiations of the Kennedy Round to liberalize trade, and the subsequent wave of protectionism that threatened and partially succeeded in offsetting the results obtained in the round; the difficulty of reaching and now implementing the R i o

de

Janeiro agreement, aimed at increasing international liquidity by means of new reserve instruments; the unsuccessful defense of the British pound, and its devaluation; the chronic difficulties of the United States balance of payments, then the run on gold and its uncertain final outcome; the historic step of the United States away from international liberalism as represented by her 99

THE CLEAVAGE ACROSS THE ATLANTIC imposition of curbs on capital exports, and the other proposed measures,

which

were

once

the

necessities

of

the

economies, not the prerogative of the greatest world

weaker power—

the list could continue and invade other fields. Even if, for a moment, we escape the air of crisis hanging over the strong nations of the world, the need for leadership remains dominant.

It is appropriate to quote here a statement, which

invites reflection, made by Hasan Ozbekhan, the noted mathematician and economist, in a recent paper for the Massachusetts Institute of Technology: " W h e n our situation is viewed in its current immediacy, its most striking aspect is complexity.

When we

try to imagine it in terms of the future what strikes us most are the uncertainties

it unfolds in the mind.

T h u s we stand, perhaps

more conscious and knowing than ever before, in the grip of present worldwide complexities and future uncertainties trying to define those modes of action that will best order the one and reduce the other." If this is the predicament of the advanced Western nations, the reader may well imagine, then, what under these prevailing conditions is the situation of the other nations and peoples of the world s y s t e m — h o w fragile and defenseless today, and how hopeless tomorrow.

Never forget that they are the great majority,

and that—leaving aside for one moment the communist countries — t h e y gravitate in one way or another toward the Atlantic platform, even though they belong to geopolitical areas and probably also sociopolitical systems different from ours.

Their develop-

ment record during the 1950^ and the 1960's is not altogether negative, but it is by no means encouraging either.

A n d we must

not delude ourselves that this passably acceptable past experience is likely to repeat itself in the 1970's.

In the years to come their

condition and the over-all condition of the world will be substantially worse, the struggle for life harsher, the expectations of people higher, the impact of technology even more brutal, and IOO

PRINCIPLES TTOR AN ATLANTIC STRATEGY the capacity of these nations to move ahead far below requirements. These nations will need and request a great deal more permanent or long-haul economic aid and technical assistance, which can be offered only by the industrialized world.

They will also

require as well some kind of long-term planning support and guidance to set their course in the right direction.

Only the

Atlantic nations as a bloc can give them this combination of leadership and aid, and they ought to remain ready to provide it.

Should they fail, several of the needy nations, which are

already in danger of breaking down now, will drift toward chaos and anarchy, thus further disrupting

the entire

international

system. Where, then, do we stand? so are the Atlantic nations.

T h e world is at a crossroads, and

T h e revolution of our time is gaining

momentum, and the signs indicate that during the next decade it will gather speed and force.

It is up to the Atlantic peoples, and

only to them, to unite and take the lead in an unprecedented movement to face the future.

Their leadership in thinking, in

devising new approaches, and in action is indispensable for the world to solve its problems.

For the first time in the history of

man, many of the major problems have become truly global and represent a challenge and a threat to the whole of humanity.

IOI

P A R T

T W O

The World in Convulsion

C H A P T E R A N D

4.

B E T W E E N

E X P L O S I O N

C O N V E R G E N C E

The New Divisive

Forces

IT IS HARD to develop a comprehensive view, free from prejudice, of the present state of the world system at large, and of how it behaves under the impact of the technological revolution.

But

this overview is essential, for the world's clinical condition and the system's interplaying forces in the late sixties are totally different from those we passably well recognized during the fifties, and which still mold our frame of reference.

T h e size and

complexity of the problems have greatly increased since, and other impressive problems have emerged, some of a truly global character.

A n d we may rest assured that the seventies will be

different and more difficult than the sixties—much more so than the sixties with respect to the fifties. In the review we are going to make of the present world situation, we may start by repeating the truism that rapid transition is the dominant feature not only in the Atlantic community but also the world at large, and that invariably the determinant factor is

103

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION technological acceleration.

A s what we call the world system is

in fact a conglomeration of systems and subsystems now actively interconnected, it is only natural that the more kinetic among them impose their dynamics on the others; and that, in this continuous interplay, the most advanced human societies' style of life and set of values infiltrate and powerfully influence the others. The result is a great dislocation of existing situations at an unprecedented scale and rapidity.

T h e entire world system is

continuously modified by the pressure of powerful forces and undercurrents that upset previous equilibria, widen the gaps and create new ones, spread wild expectations and profound u n r e s t — in sum, lay down the conditions for the most violent explosions in human history.

A t the same time, these same forces do away

with distances, equalize information, and create a new awareness that there exist problems and threats in common, and that, for good or bad, isolation in our crowded planet is going to disapp e a r — i n a sense, they progressively frame a greater unity encompassing the entire world. A s a consequence, spurred on by modern technology,

the

world system has arrived by quick leaps at a great bifurcation, whose alternative paths lead respectively toward a generalized state of Balkanization—with the exception of some entrenched a r e a s — o r toward the welding and rewelding together, by painful and difficult processes, of national and continental areas into greater unities bound together by common interests of survival and development. In this chapter, we will cast a panoramic glance at the international geopolitical configuration in this period of revolutionary and even metamorphic change. ripped by explosive forces.

W e will see that our planet is

Then, we will bring specifically into

focus the dynamic situation of one of its great areas—second only in importance to that of the A t l a n t i c — w h e r e urgent action of a new kind is needed.

This area is none less than that of

the other superpower, the Soviet Union, whose key position and 104

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE attitude require

very

special

consideration,

if some

effective

measure of control over world developments in the coming decades is to be gained.

Finally, we will glance at some of the

factors which, however contrastedly, tend to coalesce the world into one integrated and composite system.

A n d in the following

chapter, we will review the new category of towering problems which invest the world system as a whole, and which we have therefore called the macroproblems of our age. A s I have noted, so far, the divisive forces and trends have had the upper hand.

T h e resulting scars are ostensibly shown by the

political map of the world, but the process itself has been so swift that our conventional schematizations have not been able to keep pace with the galloping reality.

A n d since a great part of our

current political thinking is still molded by emotions and postures dating from the period following the last Western civil

war—

World War I I — t h e s e schematizations must be traced back to the late forties.

That was a time when many of the hopes for which

tens of millions of men gave their lives or substance were shown to be in vain.

Far from laying the foundations of a more stable,

well-ordered, and progressive world community, that terrible test undergone by humanity not only failed to prevent the emergence of the cold war, but also gave rise to seething tensions between the industrial and the underdeveloped countries, and between the so-called capitalist and the socialist countries. The last war may, therefore, account for the rough polarization of the mass of mankind into separate camps.

T h e general-

ized use of the new terms East and West, and North and

South,

to convey these now familiar meanings had a queer ambivalence: on the one hand it gave the uneasy feeling that apartheid

had

become a worldwide fatality, and on the other, it yielded a sense of the inescapable oneness of the world in its diversity.

When a

historical atlas of the twentieth century comes to be published, the world map at the threshold of the sixties may indeed be presented as indicated in Figure I.

East is opposed to West, and 105

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION only when they are confronted with the less developed South, are they lumped together as North. " W e " were of course the first world, also identified as the West.

However it actually included all the countries defined by

the United Nations as industrially developed, some twenty of them.

T h e term West became a synonym for technically and

economically advanced nations, which have integrated market economies, steady per-capita growth rates, institutions and attitudes that permit technological and social innovations, and relatively democratic forms of government.

T h e principal nucleus

comprised the communities established in the privileged zones on both sides of the North Atlantic and possessed of a homogeneous cultural basis, which has its roots in Greek philosophy, R o m a n law, the Christian ethical-religious inspiration, and languages of Latin and Anglo-Saxon derivation.

Besides the Atlantic nations,

Japan, Australia, N e w Zealand, a n d — t h o u g h we could hardly invite her if she did not undergo a change of soul and p o l i c y — South A f r i c a formed part of the industrial group and were often considered linked with the West. This first group of Western and Westernized nations presently has a population approaching 670 million inhabitants, about 20 percent of the world total, with a gross product exceeding (in 1 9 6 7 ) 1,500 billion dollars (65 percent of the world total), of which 57 percent are accounted for by the United States alone. Nearly all these nations are affluent or enjoy general well-being. Suffice it to note that they possess 87 percent of the gold used as monetary reserve, for whatever that may presently mean, and 70 percent of the other reserves; nearly 90 percent of the automobiles, telephones, and T V sets; and that they generate 73 percent of world exports. " T h e y " were the East, and in this second world camp were huddled together the nations under socialist

regimes.

Their

cohesive element was supposed to be ideology, but this proved to be an ephemeral judgment. 106

Moreover, these nations were char-

Fig. I The world at the threshold of the 1960's: Consequences of the Second World War and of the cold war.

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION acterized by public ownership of the means of production, central planning, bureaucratism, inelastic industrial structures, and controlling authoritarian governments.

Presently their population is

estimated largely to exceed 1.1 billion inhabitants, more than twothirds of which live in China, but their annual gross product to reach only about 550 billion dollars, of which approximately 54 percent is due to the Soviet U n i o n — h e n c e representing, in total, 24 percent of the world product and 37 percent of that of the first group.

Following a period of greater economic expansion than in

the West, their development entered a phase of stagnation, giving rise to serious doubts, even among their own peoples, as to the capacity of their economic system to satisfy that diversified demand for nonprimary consumer goods of better quality, which is the concomitant of higher stages of development. Lastly there were "the others," the South, identified with underdevelopment, nations that were collectively called the Third World, a kaleidoscope of peoples, in gross persons multiplying at a very high rate.

figures

1.6 billion

They presently include

about a hundred large and small countries, old and new, with the most varied conditions imaginable, ranging from the traditional community to nations passing through the difficult period of economic puberty.

In this case, the force of cohesion was detected

in their common status of underdevelopment, cementing their solidarity in the face of the advanced countries—which proved to be another misjudgment exploded by subsequent events.

The

Southern countries' gross product was and still is very low, today little more than 240 billion dollars a year, that is scarcely

11

percent of the world total, and is continuously eroded by inflationary processes. Such was the schematic four-square—but in fact, tripartite— geopolitical conceptualization of the world made some ten years ago.

It helped us recognize the deep divisions resulting from the

Second World War, gaps sharper and more poignant than those existing in previous historical periods. 108

W e knew that East and

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE West were pitted against each other, as if they were preparing for total confrontation, probing and prodding each other in Berlin, then here and there inside the boundaries of some European countries, in the Middle East, in Cuba. brinkmanship were born then.

T h e art and folly of

We also became accustomed to

the thought that, while we were wealthy and growing, the nations of the South were unable, despite the

financial

and technical

assistance given by us (generously, we thought), to resolve their dramatic and immense human, social, economic, and political problems.

Their plight dampened our spirit, and we knew that it

resulted in the world being extremely unstable. We learned this lesson so well that it remained engraved on our minds. But the winds of change in our times have quickly upset this picture of seemingly lasting validity.

Further wide

cracks have opened in a planet already so profoundly divided. Today's picture is that of a fractured world, riven by still more centrifugal forces.

A n d while we should prepare for the yet

newer situations looming for the seventies, our conceptions and policies are still pegged to the schemes we conceived during the fifties. Let us take a look at the new gaps that have appeared in the world map.

T h e West is embattled.

It is divided by a gap

which is much more than technological. on the verge of a major cleavage.

A s we have seen, it is

Other minor cracks cut across

Europe, where the E E C and E F T A represent different poles of attraction.

They even appear in the body of existing nations, in

Belgium, Germany, and Crete, and divide in two what is called South Tyrol by Germans and A l t o Adige by Italians, cause problems in Quebec, and of course, between Negroes and whites of this country. The East is certainly not in better shape.

Fractures in its once

monolithic complex began much earlier.

It all started when

what was called the communist bloc appeared to be less compact than was previously thought.

Then it became obvious that its log

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION pace of development had become less buoyant.

Eventually it

was evident to one and all that its whole economic organization was uncompetitive abroad and unresponsive to growing demands at home.

A new yearning was manifesting itself, particularly in

Eastern Europe, to get away from the stale dogmatic formulae of official propaganda, to express opinions and debate without fear, and to search for the truth in a freer and more civil way. Yugoslavia pulled out and tried to find her own autonomous course to socialism.

A few years later Hungary was in revolt,

and lately Romania has decided to try an independent national policy.

T h e last crisis so far, and to all signs a far-reaching one,

is that of the summer of 1968 in Czechoslovakia.

But there

are signs of a generalized malaise spreading over the Eastern European countries, sweeping through the cracking fabric of their inadequate economies.

Peoples are now convinced that their

present form of central planning must be drastically changed. There, too, youth is more categoric in spearheading an extension of the movement for change also in the political sphere.

Under

its impact the once unquestioned rigid disciplines and ideological orthodoxy are already, or are likely to be, giving way. But the most dramatic development has been the ideological schism between the Soviet Union and China. have kept us hoping and wondering.

Its different phases

The suspense is now over,

because this historic gap has apparently reached the point of no return.

In my understanding, the rift became inevitable and

acquired permanence when it had become plain to both parties that henceforth the U S S R was obliged to retain all its resources and devote them to foster her own development, thereby becoming unable to allocate any significant portion of them for economic assistance to C h i n a — j u s t at the time when the latter had most need of it.

O n the Soviet part, this was an imperative

necessity, breeding irreversible postures.

T h e conflict of per-

sonalities only aggravated the conflict of interests.

A s a matter

of fact, it soon turned out that the points of contrast—also in no

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE doctrine—were now far greater than the points of convergence. The oceanic yet inscrutable turmoil that is the ensuing cultural revolution in China has but sealed the division between the two great contenders for the leadership of the socialist camp.

I be-

lieve that another iron c u r t a i n — o n e that will prevent any pacific intercourse—has descended along the A m u r

river banks

and

across the Central Asian highlands, and that it will remain deep into the seventies as one of the dramatic features of our world. Behind it the laborious and cunning, and now proud, Chinese people will toil and build that immense nation's might and a new form of civilization through the continuance of the cultural revolution or by other means that we may not comprehend. will create their own techno-structure,

totally

They

different from

ours, and elaborate a Chinese way to resolve the problems of mankind and fulfill its aspirations. Then, one day, they will propose to the world their terms and pattern of collective organization, based on their own conceptions—as an alternative to ours. perhaps a decade or so.

A l l this will require some time,

This is the respite we will have to

put our house in order, to expand our platform, to decide how to face the threats and challenges of the f u t u r e — a n d Chinese competition in organizing the world.

But the reprieve will be no

longer. The time it gives us is the reason why this great division sundering the communist bloc in two may be a very fortunate happening—that is, if we are intelligent, resourceful and determined enough to seize this momentous opportunity to engage its more amenable members in a joint effort to shape a common future for all our peoples.

Our stand toward the Soviet Union,

and her response, have thus become vitally important.

Should

either we or she fail this occasion, the mammoth division that has now appeared across the world surface, isolating what will soon be a billion people from the rest of mankind, can only beget calamities of proportionate magnitude. ill

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION Before speaking of the Soviet Union, however, let us turn our eyes to the S o u t h — t h e other great mass of men and women in turmoil, cut off as they are from progress and prosperity. there was a Third World, it is now fractured.

If ever

A t times, it

achieves unity again, but only in a perfunctory approval of negative postures. But more often than not, this negativity is so patently vain and the revendications so bombastic, that they become self-defeating rather than reestablish solidarity.

T a k e , for instance, Algerian

President Boumedienne's declarations when he inaugurated the conference in Algiers of the eighty-seven less developed countries in 1967 in preparation for the grand assize on trade and development held that March in N e w Delhi:

"Whatever contribution

the industrialized nations may offer us must only be considered a mere restitution of a small part of the debt they have contracted towards us by their hateful exploitation." Senegal echoed:

"The

deterioration

T h e delegate from

of our trade is but the

plundering of the raw-material-producing countries by countries selling manufactured goods."

T o which the Liberian representa-

tive added: " T h e elimination of the inequality between rich and poor is the key problem of our time, inasmuch as it will decide the problem of war or peace." W e who have the privilege of living in the most advanced regions must, however, understand the motivations and emotions of these persons and try to perceive the elements of truth in their utterances.

We ought above all to do our b e s t — w h i c h is much

more than what we are doing now, as we will soon s e e — t o meet the needs of their peoples in a compassionate, enlightened, and modern way.

But they also, on their part, ought to recognize

that it is not with such oratorical tirades and nationalistic postures, nor through wrong educational, industrial, agricultural, and trade development policies, that they will succeed in improving the lot of their peoples. T h e reasons the South is so divided and spiraling IT2

toward

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE greater confusion, however, derive in great part from conditions that are either natural or bequeathed to the present by the past generations, both autochthonous and of conquistadores.

These

nations' lot is poor, difficult to improve because of irrational frontiers, arbitrarily traced by nineteenth-century European cartographers, because of racial and tribal strifes, because their economic system was organized in a way to suit the interests of the colonial powers, because they have by and large

unprepared

governments and few or no modern elites, because a new domineering type of culture, so different from theirs, sways the world with revolutionary force, and because this technological hurricane easily plays havoc with their weak structures.

Out of des-

peration or impotence they turn one against the other, like crabs in the basket, or are made to do so as proxies of foreign wills. In the process more cracks and gaps open among them and within them, and become wider. The examples are many.

India and Pakistan have been at war

and the ceasefire had to be arranged by the intervention of the Soviet Union and the United States.

T h e northern Sudanese of

mixed A r a b stock, and Muslims, use an exceedingly strong hand to subjugate the partly Christian and largely Negro southern population.

Somalia is in permanent tension with her neighbors.

In

Indonesia mass massacres marked the change of regime when the pro-Chinese were ousted by a military takeover in 1965.

The

statehood of Nigeria, the largest African country, is in question because of open warfare between different tribes, and the tragedy that followed the Biafran secession casts a shadow

reaching

deeply over the advanced nations, which permitted it, if they did not stir it.

The immense and probably equally useless tragedy

that is the war in Vietnam will certainly leave that country torn and lacerated.

Korea has been likewise the battleground

of

greater powers, and is now a historical freak, partitioned and unstable.

T h e C o n g o for the last ten years has been in and out

of a civil war fanned by tribal hatred, alien interests, and the 3

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION banditry of mercenaries. family

of

nations,

In what the Arabs themselves call their

mutual

mistrust,

divisions

in

antagonistic

camps, and all-out hostilities are more frequent than concord and peaceful cooperation.

The powder keg of the Middle East ex-

ploded again in 1967, and after the lightning victory of Israel, the conflict has only subsided; it is simmering while the parties flex and strengthen their military muscles for another bout, which may be decisive for t h e m — a n d for others, too. Whatever our judgment on the whys and wherefores of this cracking process affecting the structure of the Third World, this is an anticlimax after the halcyon days of Bandung in 1955 and the hopes prevailing throughout the 1950's.

The marginal consola-

tion the industrial and wealthy nations may draw from this state of disorder, and the desperation and plight of nearly half the world's population, is that, in this case also, they have some respite.

It gives them a chance of reculer pour mieux sauter, the

time to engineer a really constructive global strategy, and it also offers them a wider set of options regarding the nations and regions in which to start, soon and in earnest, a major undertaking to stop that part of the world from spinning off toward irremediable chaos.

But woe betide them, if they let these years

and months pass by without preparing to fulfill these historic responsibilities. Finally, we have to put on record what perhaps has been the major new event in the evolution of the less developed world: the emergence of Latin America and its separation from the other countries. including

Actually, Latin America never belonged to the group the

Afro-Asian

countries,

except

in the

statistical

categorization of the less developed nations to distinguish them from the developed ones. Nearly all Latin America has been independent for 140 years, whereas in most of A f r i c a , noncommunist Asia, and the Middle East, independence is more or less recent.

It has decades of

experience with various forms of self-government, or at least 114

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE local government.

Moreover, a deeply held popular allegiance

exists to the concept of government by the people, even if, in this period, its practice has been somewhat obscured.

In the Latin

American region, a great deal of illiteracy coexists with great literacy.

T h e cadres are made up of reasonably well-trained and

responsible people; it will be a miracle if A f r i c a , for example, manages to have a comparable elite

two decades from now.

Development in Latin America is far from being even, but the existing contrasts are symptoms of ferments and vitality not to be found in Asia and A f r i c a . Also, reasons of an economic nature make final the cleavages among the less developed countries.

These include their recip-

rocal competition to find outlets on the organized markets of the North, particularly for their mineral ores and tropical and subtropical produce, the trade preferences acquired by the eighteen African countries associated with the E E C , the preferential attention given by United States aid to countries in the Far East and India, and the United States hemispheric policies toward Latin America.

However, the roots of the economic dissension among

the weaker nations almost invariably lie in the rivalries, policies or nonpolicies, and selfishness of the advanced and yet unreformed nations of the North. These, in brief, are the changes

that have

geopolitical world map in some ten years.

overtaken

T h e bombardment by

technology continues to revolutionize extant situations. widening in the Atlantic system.

the

A gap is

East and West are more dan-

gerously, if not further, apart, and remain on a twenty-four-hour vigil against the reciprocal threat of sudden destruction. than once during East-West

tensions last-minute hopes

More have

rested with the Moscow-Washington "hot line." This is too tiny a thread indeed.

T h e spiritual and material gap between the North

and the South has become immense.

T h e South is splintered.

In the great reshuffle under way, groups of nations are dismembered from others and promptly set off in opposite direc115

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION tions.

Incomprehensions grow, political and psychological dif-

ferences become irreconcilable, intolerance has its great days, economic levels continue to diverge, expectations rise, and not being met, lead to exasperation.

In the meantime the revolution-

engendering technology that we nurture goes on milling new and greater changes. T h e entire world system has, therefore, entered a kinetic, explosive phase.

Our historical atlas would represent its large

masses, in these late sixties, more or less as indicated in Figure 2 — t h e world, a microcosm subject to centrifugal forces similar to those that act on the stellar system in the expanding universe. But our political thinking and conventional wisdom have not followed suit.

T h e point I wish to stress is that our minds are

still dominated by facts and ideas originating in the immediate postwar era.

T h e schemes that guide our action are

passe.

Whether we like it or not, our capacity to update our concepts and approaches to this world exploding before our eyes will very shortly be put to the test. T o be sure, though events are picking up speed, we still have some over-all respite, as we have seen.

In the historical per-

spective this is certainly a very little time-space, yet it is enough from a generation's point of view to work for world stability. There is, though, one exception. is very short on all counts.

In that case, time, in my view,

This is nothing other than the case of

the Soviet Union, which provides the testing ground for our capacity of understanding the new world condition, and of exerting leadership.

This largest country of the world in surface area,

the one which has the longest land boundaries with the largest number of countries, and whose shores touch more seas than any other's, the third biggest by population, this pivotal country is, more than any other, at the crossroads.

Moreover, her unique

and central position, her bulky mass and internal tensions can make of the Soviet Union the final element of subversion and 116

Fig. 2 The world at the close of the 1960's: The explosive phase of human society.

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION convulsion during the next decade: out of hand, she may hurl herself at, and play havoc with, the entire world system.

On the

contrary, by concert and joint effort, these tensions may be controlled, and her immense potential became a most precious element of world stability and progress. The Soviet Union, therefore, deserves a special discourse.

I

will consider the dynamics and perspectives of her situation using as focalizers the modernization of her domestic economy economic cooperation with the West.

and

This is not only because

these are the waters where I swim better.

If we place ourselves

in the U S S R ' s shoes, other factors are exceedingly

important,

including of course such often discussed security questions as nuclear parity with the United States, the balance of power between the N A T O and Warsaw Pact alliances, German reunification, denuclearization of Central Europe, and now the emergence of China as a nuclear power.

So are also such political and

ideological questions as the attraction of Eastern Europe toward Western Europe, international solidarity with communist parties elsewhere, the leadership of the world communist movement, the upholding of true Marxist-Leninist doctrine against

deviation-

isms, whatever all this means,

dialectical

acrobatics.

But

the

and the

fundamental

and

attendant decisive

question

is

whether or not the Soviet techno-structure and economy will satisfy her people's expectations and maintain the Soviet Union as a superpower during the seventies and the eighties.

Which

Way the Soviet

Union?

Portentous developments have occurred in the Soviet Union since the death of Stalin in 1953.

T h e still fluid situation and

trends, although less arcane than China's, are rather difficult to comprehend. However, the major difficulty in forecasting future developments lies not in understanding Soviet alchemy but rather in estimating the effect of attitudes that are even more difficult to 118

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE rationalize—our own.

So far, they have been myopic and fitful.

Since the problem of our posture and policies vis-a-vis the U S S R goes to the very heart of the matter, this is the problem I wish to raise.

It is a leading topic for our Kremlinologists and political

scientists by and large, as demonstrated by the papers or studies on i t — s o m e of them first-rate—pouring forth every few weeks. But the hardest knot for anybody to untie in the already knotty complex of the Soviet situation is the foreign component represented by the longer-range Western attitudes. The changes under way in the U S S R and those potential and contingent on our action demand a radical reshaping of

At-

lantic strategy to make it consistent with the realities of the modern world, and thereby capable of influencing a corresponding realignment by the Soviet Union.

T h e present Soviet predica-

ment affords a historic and unprecedented chance for the Atlantic nations to take the lead in establishing East-West relations on an entirely new f o o t i n g — n o t only to bury the battle ax and smoke the pipe of peace, but to work shoulder to shoulder to meet together the impending world crises. We may start by recognizing that the Soviet economy is easily the world's second, with her formidable natural resources only partially known and less exploited.

In September 1967 I had the

opportunity of making an extensive visit to the Siberian branch of the Academy of Sciences of the U S S R at Akademgorodok near Novosibirsk and then a tour of part of Siberia.

O n that occasion

I had visible and statistical proof of that region's abundance in untapped reserves of pure water, wood, mineral ore, and s p a c e — the largest sparsely inhabited promised land, just adjoining the most populous nation of the earth.

On the other hand, on all my

trips to Russia I invariably noticed that the present relative affluence of the Soviet c o n s u m e r — t h e result of the unsung sacrifice of previous

generations—though

still

unsatisfactory

by

Western

standards, was creating ever new expectations in her citizenry and problems for her leaders. This contrast between effort and resources on the one hand, 119

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION and benefits for the individual on the other, between what is available today and what is wanted, not only in mere wares, for tomorrow, is heightened by an enticing Westerly breeze which blows across the Soviet structures, and appeals especially youth and the intelligentsia.

to

This, in my opinion, is the most

remarkable characteristic of the present psychological moment in the Soviet Union. It is not only that the time for promises has passed.

It is not

only that belief has eroded in the U S S R of surpassing and overtaking the economic achievements of the capitalist

countries.

The very problem of managing the Soviet e c o n o m y — w h i c h is the pivotal issue—has not been resolved.

Continually criticized in

the Soviet press are its i l l s — f r o m the clogs in production and distribution to the mediocre or bad quality of what you buy, and to the recent lower indices of growth and investment, from the incurably low productivity to unemployment creeping in the face of the swollen administration payrolls. A t the beginning of this century a Russian historian said that progress in his homeland was barred by the enormous weight of the Czarist administration. has not greatly changed.

Sixty years thereafter the situation Spurred on by the galling and costly

setbacks in agriculture, the Soviet leaders now declare that an allout industrial effort is essential for the Soviet Union's future. But the giant bureaucratic machine has yet to prove that it can undertake it. Few Westerners have really penetrated into the life of a large Soviet organization, be it a ministry or the Gosbank, a factory or the Gosplan.

But whoever has dealt at length with any of them

has been struck by the quality of their experts, on the one hand, and on the other, their compartmented horizon, the interminable and hardly conclusive collective meetings, the crisscrossing responsibilities, the overhanging atmosphere of red tape, the slow decisions, the amount of paper work they ask of you and the little of it they do, which shows the evident low mechanization grade 120

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE of the apparatus.

These shortcomings appear in greater crudity

when you have the chance to know their organization a little deeper. The country's enormous administrative mechanism, far greater than anything we know in the West, has to do with a few hundred thousand typewriters (against some twenty million in the United States), perhaps fewer than ten thousand copying and duplicating machines, plus untold quantities of abacuses, which of course are found everywhere.

The computer is glamorized but very little

used, except for scientific or military purposes.

M y guess again

is that there are not more than a couple of thousand in operation.

Moreover, in keeping with the Soviet

build-the-country

tradition, attention is centered on the hardware aspects, and more so on the central units than on the peripheral equipment and terminals; software is just a Cinderella.

T h e system's rationali-

zation and streamlining to make full use of modern data processing techniques are still remote objectives.

Until new organiza-

tion and management philosophies are adopted, the preparation of computer software will remain a Sisyphean effort. Soviet society, so refined in many scientific fields and theoretical thought and so advanced in diffusing culture, has its other side of the coin in a still rough and clumsy capacity to apply this intellectual bounty to the practical problems of daily life. capacity to deliver, trait.

The

in which America excels, is not a Russian

If the United States-Europe gap is managerial, then there

is a much bigger Europe-Soviet gap of this kind.

T h e Soviets

have many technocrats, some of them very good, but they are still functionaries, not yet executives and managers in the Western sense.

Under these conditions, their

planning-production-

distribution-servicing investment produces low yields, which are no match for ours.

We may say that, on the whole, Soviet

society is only in an early G M age and has still to make a concentrated and well-directed effort to put its immense potential to use in order to participate in the benefits of that age. 121

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION The

Soviet Government

is fully aware

that the phase

of

spartan life and herculean efforts to build, then reconstruct, and expand a heavy industry base is over, and that new intelligence and sophistication are required in the present transition phase toward a consumer, technology-oriented society.

T h e customer

is going to be more informed and discriminating, economic processes have to be swifter, and the internal market must intercommunicate with the more advanced ones of Western Europe and America.

They also realize that in this new phase of inten-

sive and diversified growth there will be the risk of a spillover of ideas and problems from economics into politics.

A t the same

time, they understand that the Soviet economy and power are now in danger of losing momentum and rank in the international competition. These cumulative reasons have forced the Soviet leaders to undertake an agonizing reappraisal of their industrial economy and techno-structure, which has led to the adoption of a new course for the economy.

This new policy is based on planning

decentralization, greater initiative and independence given to the enterprises, introduction of the profit motive and other incentives to increase productivity, and the use of the enterprises' performance as a yardstick for a better allocation of the brought into the economic cycle.

resources

These reforms were introduced

in some industries at the beginning of 1966 and were to be generalized during 1968. One used to be skeptical about the willingness of the Soviet hierarchy to risk a colossal domino effect by modifying some of the bases on which their industry had been constructed. Further contacts, however, have shown that this effort is seriously being made.

A t a week-long symposium organized in February 1968

in R o m e by Dr. Guido Carli, the governor of the Bank of Italy, to discuss with key Soviet economic leaders planning management of the enterprises with the new reform in the U S S R , compared to the West, the Italian participants developed a high 122

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE regard for the knowledgeability and quality of their Russian counterparts.

They also discovered that in many aspects, from the

methods

of

calculating

depreciation,

interest

on

debt,

and

remuneration on capital, to cost accounting, destination of earnings, and formation of the balance sheet, the differences between the two systems are much less than their similarities. A t that meeting I came to the conclusion that presently the central elites of the Soviet administration are revising and restructuring their thinking in two fundamental areas: first, they wish to make their procedures for price formation more flexible and adaptive to market requirements, and second, they see that decentralize-and-control coordination and the information feedback cycle in their planning must be more agile and efficient. The next step in the sequence, if they have their way, will be to start the adoption of Western managerial techniques and methods at enterprise l e v e l — p r o d u c t planning, mean time between failures, value engineering, market research, standard costs, profit centers, etc. The T h r e e - Y e a r Plan ( 1 9 6 8 - 1 9 7 0 ) approved in 1967 responds at least partially to these needs and directives.

It also embodies

new concepts about the necessity for international division of labor and the potential value of Western markets to the Soviet economy. voluntaristic

Its objectives seem more coherent and realistic, nonas they say in Moscow, than before.

T h e current

Plan, therefore, represents an important departure from the plans of the last thirty years and is more in line with the earliest Soviet tradition, which is at the root of modern planning. We must not make a mistake in judging what all this means. There is no doubt that the second world power is really at a crossroads, as I have already said.

T h e economic reform and its

over-all manifestation, the current Plan, represent a crucial turnmg point.

They provide a new though rather late chance for the

Soviet system to prove its validity.

T h e future of the U S S R

hangs now on her capacity to modernize her industry successfully 123

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION and substantially to increase the system's over-all productivity. The outcome, however, is uncertain.

It will affect not only the

life of the Russian people but also the outlook of that nation on all matters, including defense and security and relationships with other peoples. T h e Atlantic nations cannot face this entirely new situation with the mentality, rules, and policy approach that were used in the past periods of rollback, confrontation, or mere coexistence theories.

T h e matter is not only that of fundamentally changing

our relations with the second world power, which since World War II have dominated political thinking in a way to cause immense resources to go down the drain of military buildups all over the world, and to create the immanent risk of nuclear conflagration; but also of making this change so deep and robust as to turn the erstwhile enemy into a companion and ally in a design of worldwide scope, if we decide that the time has come to think about the future of our planet. We must, therefore, analyze the opportunities and

danger-

laden perspectives of the Soviet situation with the utmost care and a most open mind.

The present Soviet situation is in such a

state of flux and charged with such great variables—including our posture toward i t — t h a t the most disparate may eventuate.

developments

Let us consider only two of these possibilities,

which are opposed and extreme, but whose seeds are already embedded in Soviet society.

Their contrast reflects in a way the

pendular movement of Russian history, in which open society and closed society cycles follow each other.

From their analysis,

my argument, I believe, will emerge reinforced. According to one theory, it is plausible that the present Soviet leadership—the Party and the G o v e r n m e n t — w i l l be able and determined to go all the way with the new course, accepting the risks of failure.

I think, however, that they will do so only

provided they can somehow hedge against these risks both internally and externally. 124

Domestically, the dividends of this line of

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE action, in terms of a higher standard of living, will not be felt immediately or in the short run, but I believe that the Soviet people may be persuaded of the necessity of enduring still more sacrifice with patience, because the benefits of this new effort will, this time, be indubitable.

However, I do not see how this con-

viction may be generated, and even the success of the plan guaranteed, if the Soviet Union is not openly and officially assured of long-term cooperation of unprecedented character and magnitude from the other great industrial nations. In effect, as the new economic course picks up momentum, it will, in all likelihood, become clear that the present reforms are not enough.

When the liberalization process of the economy is

really in its stride, the idea that the nation's priorities must be realigned to give higher priority to market requirements will be self-propulsive.

A t the same time, the need to use Western tech-

niques will increase as they are applied, and ever greater markets will have to be sought as outlets for the growing production, and as a source of capital.

A l l this means that the nation's leaders

will face the recurrent dilemma of either turning back, or adopting more drastic reforms; and, if they choose to pursue the plan, that a great part of the indispensable support can only be available if it comes from the industrialized West. Moreover, once the movement picks up momentum, its effects will transcend the economic field.

T h e necessity to promote ever

new economic measures to meet mounting demands for change, and to manage the economy with flexibility, will require the Soviet establishment to be more pragmatic, less dogmatic.

The

perfunctory ritual of self-criticism will not be enough, because political debate and criticism will acquire new dimensions, and involve the participation of new groups and tendencies among the once passive citizenry. may

T h e social and psychological

impacts

then make inevitable a partial democratization and even

parliamentarization of the system, and promote an alliance of the 125

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION political class with the intelligentsia, the latter being called upon to play a greater role in the conduct of national affairs. Strong, responsible support from the active elites in the country, from the young, and also from the mass of the people, will be necessary to absorb, without an uncontrollable social crisis, the production and distribution slowdowns and flaws which will inevitably accompany the application of such drastic structural and operational reforms.

But, having opted for a diversified, inte-

grated economy, not even Soviet Russia can hope to do it alone, especially in time of trouble.

There are enough examples of

strong countries in the West requiring the mobilization of their sister nations'

resources

to bail

them

out from

far

smaller

changeovers and economic troubles than those which are in store for the Soviet nation, to cause its leaders to meditate that there can be no greater assurance, in these periods of difficulty, than firm international solidarity. W e thus come back to the necessity of the bulwark of vast East-West cooperation.

Admittedly, this new course will have to

be articulated in a series of operating and stand-by agreements loyally and openly negotiated on both sides.

But I firmly believe

that only an entirely new, long-range, and imaginative Western policy of economic cooperation with the Soviet Union can bring about, by direct and mediate effects, this profound transformation of her e c o n o m y — a n d finally, society. T h e other extreme alternative we may envisage is that the more reactionary elements, the apparatchiks

and hawks of the

Soviet system, perhaps with the support of the military-scientific c o m p l e x — t h e Soviet replica of the one we mentioned in the case of the United States—will manage to arrest or cripple the present economic reform, and block innovation in order to perpetuate the present status quo, or to bring back pre-reform, and rigidly centralized, authoritarian economic and political systems.

If this

occurs, the vicious circle of low standards of living-low productivity will be perpetuated. 126

With the spur of increasing demands

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE from the population, the situation may one day become untenable.

T h e disruptive forces still present in Soviet society would

then emerge.

A clash of nationalities is imaginable.

T h e effort to control events by a drastic return to Stalinist methods would inevitably result in a worsening of the domestic and international situation, without solving the problem gether.

alto-

T h e consequence might be a progressive disorganization

of the country, with the possible breakup of Soviet society into forms we cannot anticipate.

T h e possible pulling out from the

world scene of a country of the size and rank of the Soviet Union would create a very dangerous power vacuum.

Such an occur-

rence would spell suffering and grave risk, which would not be confined to the U S S R .

N o r can explosive developments be ruled

out, including a Bonapartist coup, the reappearance of ruthless leaders, their resort to establishing a military, and belligerent, alliance with C h i n a — a n d hence aggressive policies abroad. Should this be the retrogressive outcome of the present Soviet effort to find a way of getting out of obsolete economic philosophies, the international prospective at best will be one of bare coexistence in the shade of an umbrella of ominous weapons, and interspersed with recurrent crises of the Middle East or Vietnam type.

But the Soviet rulers may be tempted to seek other roads

to prestige.

A n d as there are no limits to human miscalculation

or folly when the light of reason disappears, the ultimate worst may happen, pitting East against West in World War III, each side decided to checkmate the other even at the risk of mutual incineration. Other alternatives may be imagined, but these two are sufficient to underline the magnitude and quality of the challenge facing both the Russians themselves and the Atlantic community.

T o meet it, the usual formulae of detente,

and even entente are clearly insufficient.

rapprochement,

In M a y 1966 President

Johnson proposed yet another formula, that of peaceful

engage-

ment, to be achieved by a greater liberalization of East-West 127

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION trade: " A f t e r years of careful s t u d y " — h e s a i d — " t h e time has now come for us to act, and act we should and act we must. With these steps, we can help gradually to create a community of interest, a community of trust and a community of effort. will the tide of human hope rise again."

Thus

But act we did not.

A n d the steps proposed are many leagues from being enough. East-West redressment and cooperation is not a case that can be treated solely or mainly them.

by trade measures,

any amount

of

N o r can we delude ourselves that solutions may be found,

by magic, by playing in a different way the old deck of cards, with worn political and military figurations, we have now used for twenty years.

The idea must be gotten into our heads that the

metal of the problem is much harder than will yield to this kind of attack. If both the Soviet and the Atlantic societies are incapable of generating new creative ideas, including their role in a rapidly changing world, and of acting in concert on radically new situations, this means that neither of them can rise to the new challenges.

But the fault of the West will be the greater.

I am

convinced that the initiative must come from the stronger, the freer, the less dogmatic and more imaginative of the two.

To

take the initiative on the great issues of the future would be a token of the genius of the West, and a prerogative of leadership the Atlantic nations should not relinquish. The call in this case is definitely for a i 8 o ° change in our strategy towards the Soviet Union.

We must become convinced

that, in the world situation East and West are both moving in at roaring s p e e d — a n d quite apart from their conflicting ideologies and different political institutions, which, however, on both sides require much refurbishing and updating—there is no more room between them for technological battles, cold war, potential confrontation, mutual hostility, reciprocal harassment, and similar antagonistic postures.

T h e altogether new era which is shaping

up generates a formidable crop of problems that must be faced 128

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE together by jointly prospecting and planning the future, as we will discuss later on.

T h e time has therefore come for us to decide,

and to demonstrate to the Soviets that we want not to weaken but indeed to strengthen them, and make them our companions and world a l l y — o f course on certain conditions.

These must be

reasonable conditions and, again, ought to be dictated by an objective study, and consideration of our planet's situation during the next decades. I had better hasten to remark that I am fully aware of the deep political pathos and sensitivity which still dominate the issue of our relations with the Soviet Union in the United States, and to a lesser degree also in E u r o p e — a n d , to be sure, reciprocally, in the U S S R with regard to the Atlantic countries and

Alanticism.

But if we place this crucial issue in the world context,

and

consider, as we must, a time-bracket of say ten to twenty years, there is no alternative but to face firmly the reality that solidarity Second

of the Atlantic

Great Key to the

community

and the Soviet

the

bloc is the

future.

T h e opinion is gaining ground that a new course in our dealings with the Soviets must be f o u n d — a n d not only by consular, commercial flight, cultural, and marginal, faltering (though essential)

armament

restraining

agreements.

In Blueprint

for

Peace (page 2 3 ) Richard N. Gardner reports the work and conclusions of an exceptional conference held at the White House in 1965 on international cooperation (with which I will deal later) and the Soviet Union touches the practical note of studying together the great issues we have in common. If we really want to implement the bold concept of the International Cooperation Year, then let us propose to the Soviet Union that our best qualified citizens meet with theirs to explore each of the thirty subjects discussed at the White House Conference—or other subjects of their choice. These meetings could be of the same character as the famous "Pugwash" conferences—scientists, scholars, and professional men of both countries would 129

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION participate in their individual capacities without committing their respective governments. If a series of meetings of this kind were held, it could not fail to have a salutary effect on the SovietAmerican relations. It would help identify areas of common interest to both sides and mobilize forces in the Soviet Union and the United States for broader and deeper cooperation. A departure in this sense is also made by Zbigniew Brzezinski, a most authoritative and articulate scholar specializing in EastWest relations.

In a notable recent essay (Foreign Affairs,

Jan-

uary 1 9 6 8 ) dealing with Europe's partition and the need for EastWest reconciliation, Brzezinski suggests that we should "take a step toward a larger community of the developed nations. . . . a task requiring the often conflicting virtues of perseverance and imagination."

His proposal, as he rightly contends, is compati-

ble with historical trends and the more immediate requirements of political reality. The long-range goal of the United States in regard to East-West relations is to transform the present hostility, of which Europe's partition is both the cause and the symptom, into an increasingly stable East-West cooperation designed to end that partition. This means deliberately promoting new patterns of relations and, in so doing, gradually eliminating those factors that prevent stability. This also means moving from the rigidity of two blocs facing each other across the Elbe to a solution that should eventually involve an interlocking structure based on four entities: America and Russia as the peripheral participants, and Western Europe and Eastern Europe as the two halves of the inner core (in time, perhaps, becoming still more closely linked). Each would enjoy differing degrees of internal homogeneity and each would engage others in varied patterns of relations, with differing degrees of intimacy and intensity. 130

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE I entirely endorse the pattern of East-West cooperation implied and directly suggested by Professor Brzezinski and all the attendant measures and attitudes that he indicates as conducive to its materialization or as resultant from it.

T h e possibility of

having this proposal considered as a practical g o a l — " a range goal serves as a b e a c o n " — f o r our public opinion

longand

policy-makers is so appealing that any comment tending to make its intellectual acceptance more hazardous seems out of place. Nevertheless, I would like to point out two aspects which partly corroborate or complement what he says and also make more sharply evident the need to march in the general direction he points o u t — b u t with solutions of more sweeping nature. The first is a matter of timing.

I sense that things are moving

too fast to allow a leisurely change of direction, mentality, and structures.

T h e article implies that, because it is so drastic, the

change may be fully implemented only at the end of the rather long period of the next twenty years.

But we have seen how the

world scene has rapidly changed in the last ten years, and we know that changes are getting faster, perhaps justifying the Latin saying that motus in fine velocior.

Should the successive stages

necessary for restructuring the East and West systems and their reciprocal relations in the way suggested require all the time from here to the distant future of the late eighties—when the world will have gone through successive new waves of fantastic transformation beyond our present imagination—this entire plan, I fear, will get lost on the way.

A g a i n our speed in facing the

change of reality will be some orders of magnitude lower than that of the change itself, and the consequences will again be incalculable. A second observation, which is actually intended to support this plan, is that it should swiftly be transferred from the sphere of political philosophy and speculation—which I think the author rightly considers as its starting b a s e — t o the practical ground of deeds and deals appealing to both pragmatic politicians and cor131

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION porate decision centers.

It is necessary, as suggested, but not

enough, to support the Soviet Union's association with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade ( G A T T ) and the International Monetary Fund ( I M F ) , and her entering into preferential agreements with the E E C , with the participation of its Eastern counterpart, (CMEA)

the

Council

for

Mutual

Economic

Assistance

or C o m e c o n as it is usually called, or to favor the

creation of a special East-West economic

assembly,

and

the

negotiation of other similar multilateral intergovernmental agreements.

Nor is it enough to study the practical measures to enact

these policies.

What is equally necessary is to mobilize the entire

techno-structure of the West and put its weight behind the plan. A n enormous and capillary effort of research and exploration has to be made, and quickly, to devise jointly with, or in advance of, the Soviets, the operative instrumentality of this change of direction, as I see it. T h e technical assistance agreements that are the main instrument of the present cooperation between Western European firms and Soviet and Eastern European organizations must be complemented by new forms of joint production agreements on much bolder and more secure bases than the timid examples being formalized in the case of Yugoslavia.

N o t enough in themselves,

these forms must lead to the creation of a new diversified range of practical instruments, including joint-stock companies or the equivalent thereof, and institutes permitting direct investment of the West in the U S S R or some other institutionalized participation of Western capital, and the enactment of all sorts of agreements facilitating the commercial and

financial

access of the

Soviets to the Atlantic markets. On the one hand, the Soviet Union must open its markets, from the erstwhile Iron Curtain to Vladivostok, to Western initiative, in new forms which are not yet defined, and increasingly base its development on trade and economic exchange with the West.

It

must disclose and discuss its plans in forms intelligible to the 132

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE West and adopt all along the line the practice of cooperation, so that cooperation will in effect be made possible.

On the other

hand, Europe and the United States must be ready to accept more Soviet goods on their markets in competition with their own and invent new ways of doing so; and teach the Soviets Western marketing

and

distribution

techniques,

which

the

Soviets

at

present totally ignore; and be ready also to finance on a short and long-term basis the export of their own goods, services, and knowhow to the East, until the trade balance achieves some equilibrium. What is finally necessary is not only to ship American equipment to the huge motorcar plant on the V o l g a which Fiat is helping the Russians to erect, or to lift outdated embargoes on the sale to the U S S R of materials which in effect have no strategic value.

It is also necessary that a similar liberal attitude be

adopted with regard to the Soviet-Olivetti deal for an office equipment factory, and the other score or so similar European technical assistance contracts with the Soviet, including those concerning computers.

By

the way, strategic concepts

have

themselves to be very much updated in the light of a plan of this kind.

This new course would also mean envisaging a peaceful

eastward offensive on the part of the best United States corporations alongside

European

ones—from

IBM

to Ford,

from

Chase to R C A , from General Electric to K o d a k , from Standard Oil to Monsanto.

T h e Soviet Union is in need of all of them.

Short of their support, she will not succeed in developing her resources and economy at the pace required. Whatever the wisdom and foresight of the Soviet leaders or the Atlantic political strategists, if there is not this large-scale engagement of the entire Western techno-structure to back an allout economic development of the Soviet Union, the latter will remain a weak and unpredictable partner in a world where the Atlantic community will henceforth need strong and good company. 133

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION I am not so naive as to overlook that this radical change of direction would more easily be accepted in Europe than in the United States—and, probably, the U S S R itself.

But I believe, to

start with, that this country cannot dodge any longer taking a hard, long-term view and deciding what are its objectives with respect to the Soviet Union (in conjunction with E u r o p e ) for the next ten to twelve years; and I believe also that, when it decides that it is ready to talk business in this way, the Soviets will follow suit.

They cannot reject an opening of this kind, if properly put

forward. I am also aware that, initially, the Soviets will probably benefit more than we will by any long-term plan of economic cooperation.

In due course, however, the benefits will surely balance

out, lest the spirit of cooperation be defeated.

A n d in the end, a

strategy of economic cooperation, leading to interdependence and a mutuality of interests, and supported by a common search and stand for the solution of overhanging world problems, is bound to pay dividends to one and all in terms of world stability and progress, largely compensating and offsetting any other disadvantage that may be incurred along the road. should not fear.

In any case, we

T h e stronger and more diversified economies of

the Atlantic nations are enough of a guarantee that their position will never be seriously impaired, while the infinite cultural, scientific, technical and economic ramifications of interests, and enterprise, and personal ties, stemming from such broad-based cooperation, will be the best conceivable hedge against the potential but fearsome dangers of a fallback to cold war or confrontation. Here again, in conclusion, I would like to place before the reader the questions that spring from our analysis.

If the per-

spective of Soviet evolution suggests, as real possibilities, the two extreme alternatives we have examined, and if the tempo of that evolution is fairly quick, ought we not to be prepared to face this situation? 134

If it is not wrong to infer that potentially there are

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE great opportunities, and far greater threats, for the Atlantic community and the whole world arising out of Soviet evolution, and that the Western nations have the possibility decisively to influence such evolution, can we maintain a passive attitude toward it?

A n d if in the light of this recognition, we are prompted

to act, should we not act with all our energy and resources and intelligence, and actually try, as President Johnson proposed, to make "the tide of human hopes rise again"? I have given my answer, and maintain that here we have, to a very great extent rightly in our hands, the second great key to the future—and that we should use it wisely and promptly.

The Emergence

of "One

World"

Time and again we hear that our condition and the future are disquieting, because of the ambivalence

of technology.

Accord-

ing to this view, we should register the outburst of modern technology on one side of the ledger in as much as it is the main agent, direct or remote, of the eruption of uncontrollable cracks in mankind's sociopolitical organization, and the new revolutionary element that has brought to a critical point the relationship of human society with its biophysical environment; and to record it on the other side as well, as technology provides new, unheardof ways and means to engineer unexpected solutions for some old problems and m o s t — t h o u g h not a l l — o f the new ones generated by its advent. However, this is only a dialectical short cut, for technology is but the tool and reflection of its master, man, who may direct it either way.

T h e ambivalence, ambiguity and

deemed to be linked to technology are man's.

unpredictability

Whether the sum

total of its effects will eventually be disruptive beyond repair, or fruitful beyond hope, depends essentially on him. way,

Put another

if by selfishness and improvidence in exploiting technology

man the discoverer and doer has created extreme instability in his 135

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION society and has also upset important natural equilibria, now it is up to man the philosopher and organizer to assert his preeminence again, and henceforth harmonize his technological progress with the rest of his activities and goals.

Villain or savior, per-

verter or healer—technology will just play the role man assigns to it.

But one thing is not possible: that man may himself go on

playing with the tremendous force of technology. longer remain an apprentice sorcerer.

He can no

He has to master his

technology. What he must realize is that his function has changed.

As

Julian Huxley said, "His role, whether he wants it or not, is to be a leader of the evolutionary process on earth and his job is to guide and direct it in the general direction of

improvement.

This new human function must be accepted at least to insure that none of the fundamental natural cycles that condition man's life on this planet are damaged beyond repair, and that his society does not play brinkmanship with self-destruction. Speaking of the growth complex of our society, Dr. Erich Jantsch in his very good paper that I will mention later, rightly points out that the "absolute level attained by this uncontrolled growth implies a high inertia of the dynamic system and reduced flexibility

for change.

It also dawns on us now that there is no

inherent cybernetics in the system, no self-regulating automatism of macroprocesses; the cybernetic element in the evolution of our planet is man himself and his capacity for actively shaping the future." Here is another guideline of the New Approach to our large problems, and a stern condition to be met.

N o w that he has

created forces and cycles which compete and interfere with those of nature itself, but which possess no in-built regulating mechanism, man—to

avoid economic,

ecological

debacle,

cybernetic

or regulating element

social, political,

and guide his destiny—has

demographic himself

of all man-influenced

or

to be the processes.

T h e yet to be properly explored moral and philosophical im136

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE plications of this new condition of man, with respect not only to his individual but also to his collective future, are sweeping. They will probably affect some of our deep-rooted beliefs and basic values.

But this is an inescapable consequence of our

technological progress. A s a matter of fact, what most distinguishes our present predicament from those that mankind faced before is the extraordinary proliferation, and the rapid widening, of gaps in all fields, dimensions and regions, just when greater consistency and closer unity are prescribed for our progress and survival.

Coupled with

this dynamic degradation of our whole system, is the parallel development of military technologies of destruction and debasement which, in the words of Robert S. M c N a m a r a , have "now circumscribed us all with a conceivable horizon of horror that could dwarf any catastrophe that has befallen man in his more than a million years on earth."

But what is at the root of the

disorders and malaise of our age, and may accelerate our race to perdition, is the greatest gap of all, which exists in our minds and in our hearts—the gap between the new realities we go on creating and our understanding of them, and between what ought to be the general direction of our effort and the wrong direction in which we apply it instead. These observations are related to what we have already said, touching upon two of the other interrelated guidelines on which to base the N e w Approach. cept of the necessity

One may be built around the con-

of understanding

far better

relations between man, society, and environment revolutionary

transformation.

the

changed

in this period of

T h e other is descending from the

interference of all questions one with the other, and hence the necessity that each problem or family of problems a wider context—which text.

for the larger problems

be analyzed in is a world

con-

A l l of them point out the world's oneness, its being the

veritable base unit for our reasoning about our condition and the future.

This again is a cardinal point.

I propose to consider 137

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION this theme, making a few remarks and variations around

it,

particularly with regard to the aspects concerning physical dimensions and human institutions. T o grasp more clearly the uniqueness of our epoch and the need for approaching its problems anew, let me briefly consider two of the paramount factors in the dynamics of any physical, economic, or intellectual system, and which also characterize what I have now been calling the modern world system. are: speed and size.

They

A third one, the more important the more

complex the system, as in our case, is the number and type of the relevant interacting variables. T h e novelty of the present world situation lies in the absolute values attained by these factors, whose combination overheating and instability in the total system.

produces

A s mentioned,

during the last couple of decades real order-of-magnitude jumps in these values have occurred.

T h e result is that some parts of

the system or subsystems are already operating at or beyond the limits of safety.

Nonetheless, we are more absorbed in still in-

creasing velocities and dimensions than mindful of the fact that each factor is the other's multiplier, and that there are thresholds that cannot be crossed without shaking and possibly rocking the entire system. The thresholds we trespass are, first of all, those of speed.

1

mean the speed at which man propels himself on earth and in space (e.g., supersonic transport), and the speeds and volumes at which his organs are subject to stress inputs (e.g.,

radiations,

news, vibrations, sonic b o o m s ) , no less than the speed of the machines which expand his capacities (e.g., to nanoseconds in computer systems).

from microseconds

Just a flash about these

latter values: a nanosecond is a billionth of a second.

A s Die-

bold has observed, a nanosecond has the same relationship to a second as a second has to thirty years. T h e same is true of the change of scale in s i z e — a s when in graphs we have to change from the arithmetic to the logarithmic 138

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE scale.

T h e giantism affecting our society can become

mon-

strously dangerous unless it is controlled and directed to useful ends.

Man's wisdom is the deciding factor, but till now it has

been sparingly used.

A growth complex characterizes the indus-

trial society; the cult of growth is so practiced that growth itself has become a goal.

Since this trend to bigness is uncontrolled, it

creates disequilibria and hence instability in the system. of the problems harassing the modern world

Many

are caused

by

swollen disparities (e.g., in development level), oversized dimensions (e.g.,

overpopulation), magnitude of threat (e.g.,

nuclear

annihilation), and number of concomitant issues and variables (e.g., the complexity of urban life). Our speed in moving about increases more quickly than our capacity or effort to organize life accordingly. airports.

But where will speed lead us?

Buckminster Fuller (Architectural

Consider the jams at Professor

Richard

Design, February 1 9 6 7 ) com-

pares the rate at which chemical elements were discovered in past centuries with the development and application of science to technology and its effects on society, and relates these achievements to the speeds at which man was successively able to go around the world, from the wooden sailing ship to the orbiting satellite.

" W e have at least three accelerations of accelerating

accelerations involved here," he says, and goes on, "the next point for a significant new chapter would be around 1975. . . . What that will be we can only guess a t — s e n d i n g around the world by radio?"

ourselves

This may appear to be a fantasy,

but who is prepared to affirm that a quantum jump in this field is improbable in a not distant future? However, what I am pretty sure about is that, should a new portentous development in supersonic travel occur, it would create immensely more problems and difficulties than benefits, unless matched by similar advances in many ancillary or related fields (air traffic and safety rules, infrastructure, passenger handling, ground transportation, etc.), and more particularly

by 139

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION equally revolutionary breakthroughs in social technologies and political thinking—which are already abundantly antiquated. A hue and cry must be raised to stop the anarchy of the colossal mismatch already occurring between the impetus for change, concentrated in some sectors, and the resistance or unadaptability to adjust of other parts of the system.

This will be

an uphill fight because the industrial countries and many pressure groups in them are essentially interested in enjoying the frosting of progress—as proved by the immense R and D

investment

made to create new technology in every military or profit-promising field, while only marginal attention is given to bracing people for its possible consequences. T a k e , as another example, the increasing speed of events, the rates at which events are happening and compounding our situation.

T h e quick tempo of change is caused by u s — a l b e i t per-

haps inadvertently—and we delight in the excitement of what has been called the acceleration of history.

W e may accept that

change has consistently been faster with the passing of centuries, that there has always been some slight acceleration of the rate of change, that nowadays events move much more quickly.

But the

fact remains that that acceleration has suddenly leaped forward, enormously. It took several centuries of hammering at the R o m a n Empire's frontiers and countless invasions to bring about that Empire's downfall.

For all its horrors, how long did the Third Reich last?

In the Arctic Circle and the Himalayas, people who never used wheeled vehicles now live with airplanes.

Technology has driven

them at once from the Stone A g e to the Jet A g e . If you are asked to draw a profile of the year 1967, you have to compact in just those twelve months or thereabouts an incredible crop of happenings—the British pound devalued and the dollar unmistakably put on notice; the international

monetary

system bailed out of trouble albeit temporarily by the already mentioned 140

difficult-to-reach

and

far-from-unequivocal

agree-

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE ment signed in R i o de Janeiro; the greatest country of the world becoming divided as never before; the war in Vietnam escalated to maximum technology

short of

the nuclear one,

and

still

baffling to our minds and to all computerized calculus; undeclared local conflict boomeranging

all over the world; wide-

spread bloody struggle and arson for the first time in most large United States cities; universities in revolt from T o k y o to Berkeley, R o m e to Warsaw, Louvain to Rio; the vanguard of great famines in India; the cultural revolution, and to our eyes generalized confusion, reaching its climax in China; the historic British decision to withdraw from East of Suez; the Soviet entry with naval and probably land bases in the R e d Sea and the Mediterranean; the nonproliferation treaty challenged and still unsigned; the ominous appearance of new abstruse weapon concepts embodied by weird acronyms like A B M , F O B S , M I R V ; and many others—which shows how fast events are moving and interacting, and how their acceleration influences the size of issues. This

acceleration

has

been

vividly

expressed

by

Kenneth

Boulding, the economist and social thinker, in his book Meaning of the Twentieth

Century.

The

There he points out that "as

far as many statistical series related to activities of mankind are concerned, the date that divides human history into two equal parts is well within living memory."

Roughly calculated, for

instance, one-half of all the energy consumed by mankind in the past 2,000 years has been consumed within the last one hundred.

For many statistical series of quantities of metal ores and

other materials extracted, this date {i.e.,

the dividing line), is

about 1 9 1 0 : man took about as much out of mines before 1910 as he has since. This is a staggering concept if followed through to all its implications: It means that our century is quite literally the median strip through the center of human history.

It also reminds us

that the concept of acceleration of history is far more than a dramatic metaphor.

M y friend Franco Fiorio, a keen European 141

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION scientific observer in the United States, holds that it is around 1945 that the old world was really swiped from us: " T h e jet engine took over the job of powering airplanes"—he writes in an e s s a y — " a n d the sound barrier was crashed and forgotten; the transistor and other solid-state devices put the electronics industry in a frantic pace of development; and the atomic bomb, with its awesome release of energy, entered another dimension in the realm of destructive power."

A n d the old units of measurement

were no longer v a l i d — t h e M a c h and Megaton took over. T h e incredible acceleration of technical progress over the centuries has been strikingly represented by Louis A r m a n d ,

the

encyclopedic Frenchman (Louis A r m a n d and Michel Drancourt, Pladoyer pour I'Avenir, page 3 1 ) . slightly modified, in Figure 3.

T o express it, I use his graph,

W e do not know how to humanize

or rationalize or even simply handle intelligently all our actual and potential techno-scientific bounty. other at a crazy quickening pace.

Events succeed one an-

T h e y give us, to adapt an

expression of Professor Dennis Gabor, what may be called a whirling dervish dizziness; and leave us less and less time to solve our problems—just when there are more and more questions that must be answered, to use a computer expression, in real time. Wherever you turn, physical dimensions compounded by acceleration are bewildering.

It has been calculated that there is a

doubling of the scientific effort every fifteen years in Western Europe, every ten years in the United States, about every seven years in the U S S R .

It has also been calculated that at this

moment there live more scientists than those produced by humanity in the whole of its history.

Someone has estimated that 90

percent of all scientists of all time are now alive.

Their future

discoveries and inventions may have an infinitely more u s e f u l — or for that matter, destructive—potential than all we know of today.

Think what this means.

Think, too, of how fast the

rapid succession of inventions tends to make them obsolete before they may be fully exploited. 142

O r consider that it took only a

technical

p r o g r e s s 1896:

curve

1700:

1831:

^

1500

1600

\

1700

/

1800

Invention of the steam-engine \ ( Watt and Stephenson ) \

\ Birth of electricity ( Faraday) x

I

y

/

Commencement of the atomic era (scientists of the Manhattan Plan )

Beginning of aviation (Wright brothers )

1942:

Fig. 3 The acceleration curve of technical progress.

(Copernicus and Galileo )

1500: Beginning of modern science

of

The a c c e l e r a t i o n

"

1955: Computers begin to multiply ( research and development on an industrial scale )

,957:

(Barnard's heart transplant)

1968: Enters human engineering

|

/

/

/ /

I

1900

I

^^^^^^^

^

J

/

^^

^^^^^^^^^^

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION few decades for Einstein's and Rutherford's ideas about the atom to bear fruit as the atomic bomb. A s nature's secrets are explored ever deeper, as new physical principles are discovered faster and faster, and practical sciencebased applications mushroom, the mere record-keeping of this knowledge expands so rapidly that it becomes harder and harder for even the most sophisticated to keep track of it all. ready mentioned the information explosion.

I have al-

T h e number of sig-

nificant scientific journals being published around the world is now about 1 5 , 0 0 0 — w i t h perhaps one million significant papers in them each year.

Chemical abstracts alone are estimated to

amount to some 13,000 pages a year. But while the output of scientific knowledge is increasing exponentially, not all our knowledge is scientific.

There is an even

greater mass of information and data of all sorts springing from, and intended to keep track of, the activities of this teeming and articulate humanity of ours.

Half a million published pages,

admittedly not all of them worth the paper they use, are said to be added every minute to the immense stockpile already in existence.

I calculate that a steady reader reading ten hours a day

could not, during his lifetime, read through the printed material coming out in a fortnight.

A revolution within the technological

revolution is necessary to devise and organize the hardware and software required to handle this information o v e r l o a d — t o sort, classify, code, tabulate, store, retrieve, display, reproduce, condense, epitomize, and make usable the bounty of information that should be preserved, and conversely prune in due time that which happens to have lost, or never had, significance. A l l considered, I believe that this massive increase of manengineered speeds and dimensions over a finite world tends to bring people into closer contact; though the process may be long and difficult, eventually it will have a unifying effect.

But many

obstacles must be overcome, and the most formidable are our outdated 144

institutions,

not responsive enough to c h a n g e — t h e great

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE lack of phasing between the dynamism of modern life and the sclerosis of our formal organization.

"It

is not

technology

which represents the actual danger for civilization, it is the inertia of the structures" (Pladoyer pour I'Avenir,

page 8 7 ) .

In a time of swift change most institutions become vested in the past, and are slow to accommodate themselves to the present influx.

This is true of the Catholic Church and organized labor,

of university structures, and most public administrations.

Great

concern must therefore be felt when future needs are analyzed. While we cannot delve into the unending ramifications of this problem area, I think that we must have a word about that part of this obstacle against the modernization of society that

is

represented by the present forms of national and international political institutions.

If one may generalize, the former

are

archaic and egocentric, and consequently ineffectual, while the latter are rather abstract in design, and scarcely representative in practice. The whole of this sick political body is under challenge.

To

start our criticism at home, I see that we in the West are still captive to the concept of the national state we inherited from the last century and whose contemporary expressions are buttressed by still very strong companion vestiges of nationalistic pathos, limited views, parochialism, cultural slant, and plain

interests

built around the magic word nation. The concept of nation-state was in keeping with political, military, and institutional

requirements,

dynastic

traditions,

geo-

graphical dimensions, and the organizational capacities of the European monarchies

in past centuries—which

to other parts of the world.

passed

it on

It represented the natural area of

solidarity and cooperation in an age of different technology, speeds, and dimensions.

But nations still behave as individuals

would if there were no laws.

T o d a y , although many of its biased

inspirations are almost generally considered as o u t m o d e d — " m y country,

right or wrong,"

"beggar

my

neighbor,"

etc.—this 145

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION model is so deeply rooted in juridical and political thinking that it has outlasted many of its erstwhile justifications, and defeats current criticism. On the one hand, it is accepted as the logical and sole institutional solution for continental states (such as the United States, the Soviet Union, and the Europe-to-be).

Admittedly, this is a

dimensional and organizational improvement.

It may be good

for the sixties and probably the early seventies; but, I am afraid, it will again be a structure behind the times in the world ten years from n o w — u n l e s s its basic sociopolitical—and ceptions are profoundly changed.

national—con-

O n the other hand, the anti-

quated European model, with all its limitations and drawbacks, has been enthusiastically adopted by the new states that have sprouted up since the war from the splitting up of former colonial territories—and all the more so because of the accompanying ceremonial paraphernalia, ritual, attributes, and military and diplomatic pageantry. T h e leaders of these new, and generally undersized nations, the great majority of whom have a European cultural background, have taken hold of this vintage European prototype as the symbol and affirmation of independence and sovereignty, and naturally also as a convenient justification of their personal power.

or

party

According to Bertram R . Gross, "the absence of any

wide sense of 'nationhood' compels them to engage in the arduous labors of nation-building.

What has not been usually recog-

nized, however, is that nation-building efforts may too readily create a widespread illusion of national autonomy."

Neopatriot-

ism and policies of economic independence are the worst obstacles to many a small nation's development. T h e result of this process has been the birth of scores of unviable political entities, lacking any real state structure or potential, but having all the costly pretences of statehood.

Unable to

solve elementary problems of their own subsistence and development, they render equally impossible, to all practical purposes, 146

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE the efficient management community of states.

of what is called the

international

This is a blind avenue toward the future

we cannot afford to pursue. T h e fault of the more mature societies of the West is not only that they have permitted and even encouraged the transfer of their own stylized and obsolescent state formulae to the context of these largely improvised, unprepared new political tions.

forma-

It is not even that, paradoxically, "in its contemporary

form, this egocentric deformation induces the thought that all societies are drawn toward this question-mark which is American society" (Austruy, Le Scandale

du Developpement,

page

62).

The fault is primarily that the Western nations—and no less the other

industrialized

nations,

especially

the

communist

states

which find it expedient to camouflage in ideological clouds the starchiest advancement of their national interests—are

them-

selves captive of a very strong national bias. For all their power and wealth, they are setting the worst example to the weak and poor nations of the world.

Their fault

is that of being incapable of the institutional and political innovations required in the technological age, of misrepresenting facts and disguising realities to suit their own designs, using double talk and double standards whenever expedient, cloaking in respectability acts of piracy, spoliation, or abuse, of spying, intimidation, and corruption, and so o n — p r o v i d e d a cover, however flimsy, may be found to justify it all in the name of supreme national interests or, even better, defense of democracy peace.

and

A n d their fault is that of exporting to the weaker coun-

tries the incongruous mixture of their forward-geared technology and w e a p o n r y — a n d effete political thinking.

They thus con-

tribute to the present contentious international anarchy perpetuates in today's new global t e r m s — a n d international

organizations—that

incongruous

which

notwithstanding play

of

forces,

without restraint or corrective, which was the pattern of relations and rivalries between states in bygone eras. 147

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION What is certain is that this outmoded national and international setup needs profound change if the world is to meet any measure of unity, safety, and progress. (Daedalus,

Lawrence K .

Frank

Summer 1967, page 809) says: " W e urgently need a

new political theory to replace that which was formulated in the late-eighteenth century and has become cumulatively inadequate and frustrating for the present and an impediment to the future." The problem of how to update and modernize—without revolution or w a r — o u r

nineteenth-century

institutions, so that

the

hiatus between them and the onrushing reality does not lead to a general crisis, falls outside the scope of this book, and I would be quite incompetent to tackle it.

1 would, however, like to reg-

ister the impression that most people who write about the political future do not reckon with a further acceleration of history, and consider that events will concede us a longer time to transform our political framework than, in my opinion, they actually will.

Herman Kahn and Anthony J. Wiener in their scenarios of

the Year

2000 still speak of nations; and some other writers

judge that only the last decade of the century will see the beginning of the breakdown of the nation-state system.

A s already

stated, my hunch is that the process will be, has to be, much quicker. I believe that in practice there will be a progressive deflating of national sovereignty—or "desovereignization" of the state, similar to the proposed demonetization of the other myth, gold—parallel to the formation of other spheres of power of varying multinational or regional composition, at times with overlapping borders or jurisdiction, which will seek and find a mutual balance as imposed by the logic of technology and planning.

This process

of creating new institutions superseding the family of nationstates will be powerfully influenced by the attitude the advanced nations adopt toward the future.

Should they revise their image

of international life, and come to a meeting of minds that only through their cooperative action can world affairs be intelligibly 148

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE organized and managed, as is advocated in Part III of this book, then the task of devising, experimenting with, and enacting new institutional setups may attract, as is necessary, some of the best legal and political minds of our time. Often in these pages, while recording worrying trends and contemplating dark perspectives, I have voiced the conviction that we will pull up and straighten things.

This is another case in

point, because of the strong undercurrents now heading in the right direction.

A s a reaction to the anachronistic official men-

tality and structures, there is under way a multiple and diversified process of internationalization of opinion, thinking, and interests, which is one of the most strident developments of recent years. It is not confined only to the new generations and the intellectuals.

Many groups of people continuously seek to expand, as

Austruy says darity."

(ibid.,

page 2 6 8 ) , their "closed space of

soli-

In this progression, the optimum for each stage is a

suboptimum for the next one, and in the end the true optimums are mankind or the world as a whole.

T h e slow, unsystematic

movement creeping through the old structures is toward a continental and then multicontinental unity in diversity. portant fact, however, in my opinion is that this process gressive globalization

or planetization

appeal of an idee-force,

T h e imof pro-

has in itself the germ and

because its foundations are cast in the

triumphant realities of this age. This phenomenon is particularly present and strongly felt in Europe, which today provides an extreme contrast between the narrowness of national structures and the requirements of modern life, and where the resultant inconvenience has reached a crisis pitch in men's consciences and activities.

In old Europe it has

proved impossible to break down in a short space of time the powerful barriers that were erected between one nation and another over such a lengthy period by the events of history and by differences of language, customs, and culture, and which are defended by deep-seated interests, by tradition, and by the weight 149

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION of institutions that tend to perpetuate themselves.

Here, the

new,

with

live

European

forces—no

longer

identified

schemes but trained on the f u t u r e — a r e indeed

past

transnational.

These transnational processes, cutting through individual national societies, create scattered communities that are alive although still predominantly sectoral—of science and technology, of culture, of university students, in the field of the cinema and T V , of popular songs, jazz, comics and popular magazines, of the world of sports, and so on.

They are vital because they are

movements of the young or avant-garde elites.

A s a conse-

quence, some awareness has grown up also among the general public that we are "one world," that modern transportation and communications have linked us all together, that we are all becoming neighbors on this planet, that it is high time to do away with many prejudices about race, credo, and even ideology and nationality. Bertram M. Gross, as the prescient commentator on our contemporary situation he is, puts it this way in his Space-Time Post-Industrialism

and

(pp. 4 5 - 4 6 ) :

Today, unheralded and uncelebrated, a world society is slowly and painfully coming into being.

It is characterized by the

growth of increasingly interdependent nations, both industrializing and post-industrializing, of world-spanning organizations, of urban world centres, and of world-oriented elites. interdependence is facilitated by

This growing

communication-transportation

systems that, for some activities, are continuously decreasing the spacetime

distance

between

Washington

and

Moscow

more

rapidly than that between Washington and Wichita or Moscow and Minsk.

A f t e r indicating its features, he concludes: " L i k e Megalopolis, the world society is a territorial entity without a government.

It

is an all-inclusive complex macro-system with remarkably complicated and unpredictable—although increasingly 150

structured—

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE mechanisms of mutual adjustment."

N e w political initiatives and

theory are needed to raise and channel popular consensus, and guide the formation of this new kind of society, but its seeds are already in the ground. The modern corporation, for one, has been quick to see that this one-world perspective offers an ideal framework and unprecedented opportunities to maximize profits earned and services rendered.

In effect, the business organization has already be-

come so big that for many companies only the world offers adequate scope and dimension for their activities. Fortune

magazine (July 1 9 6 7 ) , recording the situation of the

500 largest United

States industrials

in the preceding

year,

said: It was, of course, a year of awesome growth—and now that the figures are in for the 500 largest industrial corporations, the growth looks more awesome than ever. Sales of the 500 reached unprecedented heights, and so did profits, assets, the number of employees, invested capital, and most other measures of corporate growth. But growth in itself is a very unoriginal proposition in the universe of the 500. Although 1968 showed a levelling of growth, a pause at high level, it is worth remembering that the sales of the biggest big business, the General Motors Corporation (more than twenty billion dollars), are bigger than the gross national product of Belgium (eighteen billion dollars), and nearly one-third that of Italy (sixty-six

billion

dollars).

In

addition,

one

may

estimate

that the aggregate turnover of the five biggest United States companies in our era is not far from the total world gross product at the beginning of the last century.

A n d size of enterprise is going

to dominate the world of tomorrow even more.

There is specu-

lation in fact that in ten years, two-thirds of all manufactures in the nonsocialist world will be produced by 300 giant enterprises. 151

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION T h e philosophy, the interests, and the operations of the international company will help in creating a transnational society. B y definition, they will differ from those of the national state, whose outlook is coeval with such old-fashioned (but, alas, still alive) concepts as visas, passports, certificates of origin, change of monies, trade following the flag, customs barriers, dumping practices, domestic versus foreign operations, and national plants exporting abroad. T h e new international company is a radical departure from these old ideas.

It will deliberately decide to set up factories

where the juxtaposition of the various factors of production is most favorable; to acquire the financial means it requires on the most convenient markets, wherever these may be; to recruit its work force and particularly its best executives regardless of nationality; to conduct research on an international basis; to make rapid application of technological

innovations wherever these

prove profitable, irrespective of national frontiers; and to identify itself to the utmost extent with all countries, since in fact it will feel foreign hardly anywhere.

Many obstacles, including com-

pany habits, have to be overcome, b u t — a g a i n — t h e process will be unarrestable because it is based on today's and tomorrow's realities. "In a thoroughly pragmatic spirit"—says George W. Ball in a recent ad hoc paper—"businessmen have improvised the institution they need to shake free from strangling political impediments," which are those of the too narrow national state boundaries.

and

constrictive

He proposes, for the more usual "in-

ternational company," the expression "world company," as more responsive to the nature of this new tool of innovation.

A good

approach to give them a new status may be the suggestion of denationalizing them, for instance creating, as there are flags of convenience, an international zone of convenience, real or virtual, for their incorporation. Perhaps the major contribution of world companies to world unification will be the example they set by adopting the principles 152

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE and practices of worldwide strategy.

Their example will be

endemic for other companies because of the competitive edge gained by deploying resources throughout the world and using the comparative advantages of each and any point in the system. The thrust they will thus give to thinking and planning globally will influence the techno-structure of all nations involved in their movement, and partially shift the government-industry interface to a supranational level.

Thus the political structure of the na-

tional state itself—which in the words of Mr. Ball, "is evolving only at a glacier pace in response to new world requirements of scope and s c a l e " — w i l l inevitably be drawn into a new phase of movement and evolution. However, the concept of international status, and function of this newest, innovative form of large-scale organized undertaking are still to be thoroughly explored.

T h e new and more compre-

hensive studies which are presently being made on many of its institutional and operational aspects by men of the caliber of Professors Raymond Vernon and James B. Quinn, Dr. Sidney Rolfe, and Dr. Erich Jantsch, will certainly produce valuable ground material

and insight both on the more

back-

conventional

aspects of the world company or enterprise and the potential for change it represents.

Most interesting, in my opinion, will be

these latter aspects: the new roles for industry in a world or large international framework (regional or multinational hydroagricultural or industrial developments, city problems, over-all education programs), the enterprise contribution as a planner for society in that framework (its transnational planning, the operation of global systems, and integration of corporate objectives with technological innovation and social goals), and how in this larger context medium and long-term programs can be organized by experienced, hard-nosed management. Labor is also preparing to match the scope and structure of the world corporation by moving some of its negotiations from national to international level.

Suffice it to remember the World

Conference of Automotive Unions held in M a y

1968 in Turin 153

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION with the participation of twenty-six organizations, whose main objective was to seek the progressive harmonization of economic treatment and work norms throughout the sector, and the international solidarity of all auto workers.

Churches of vari-

ous faiths or denominations are drawn together in the search for a new unity and common values over and above rivalries, which, being principled and age-old, as befitting such traditional institutions, are also difficult to compromise.

The activity of the

World Council of Churches is noteworthy in this sense. Even in the Catholic

Church

aggiornamento

is gaining

ground,

and

among the new lymphs and ferments it brings to the surface, has renewed the Church's pristine and true ecumenical

vocation,

which had lain dormant for centuries. A s my friend Altiero Spinelli sees it, the rise of transnational forms of associated life and hence of values and standards of behavior may take place "even before that of the standards of living and income levels." A l l these movements

are encouraging, notwithstanding

the

frictions and inconveniences which will accompany the creation of the new structures, institutions, and instrumentations success involves.

their

However, to be realistic, this process will be

not only painful, but also relatively long.

This means that the

world will have to live with the present obsolescent institutions— national and international—for many years, and that the new course to adopt in human affairs must be undertaken before new institutions can be devised which are valid and vital enough to compete with and supersede the old ones.

A n d from this recog-

nition, we may draw another guideline on which to base our New Approach, namely that the search ways to attack the tumultuous precede, tional

not be contingent and

international

and implementation

problems

advancing

of new

upon us must

on, the radical reform of present

na-

institutions—whatever

and

its

need

urgency. Our review of the centrifugal and centripetal forces, of the 154

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE quickly changing situations, and the perspectives of the world in our age could go on.

However, I believe I have given the reader

a fair sampling of how present situations are dynamic, and would like to sum up my interpretation of it all, before touching on some of the macroproblems confronting us. Clearly, mankind's road ahead is forked.

There are two main

directions it may follow, and the choice depends mainly on decisions which will be taken by the Atlantic nations. The first, and present course, leads inevitably to the precipice of disaster.

It is the easier to follow, and therefore, the more

likely to be taken—unless we wake up to the new realities. the course which our forefathers followed—admittedly, totally different conditions.

It is under

A n d it is the course the last two or

three generations have so far confirmed as their choice—though they will go down in history as the black generations of two world wars and two atom bombs.

It presupposes a world divided into

great chunks of populations and nations, which may be called East, West, North, South, or developed and underdeveloped, the free world and the communist bloc, or any other names, provided each group of nations or even every nation is inward-looking, essentially interested solely in its own welfare, and only marginally, if ever, cooperating with the others, and that each of them develops technology inordinately, making sure that it will essentially serve its own immediate, egotistic interests. We must also realize that this present direction in the course of human affairs has much appeal at least on the surface, or for some peoples.

If we look back into history, we see human strife,

rivalries, deception, ignorance, war, massacres; we see entire cities, communities, peoples, and races enslaved, ausrotten, away.

swept

Human greed, ignorance, cruelty, and intolerance were

the cause, and human pain, sorrow, and death the consequence. Y e t the human species survived—and progressed.

This is what

may induce many of us to express a positive judgment on it, and pursue the same path. 155

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION T h e fight against the enticement of the present course and its advocates, therefore, will be an uneasy one.

They are solidly

entrenched in most of the world's establishments, and it will be hard to smoke them out.

T h e y are in a safe position to cast

anathema against heretic, unpatriotic, revolutionary (or counterrevolutionary) innovative thinking and postures.

They will use

the argument that man's mind has developed and his judgment has based itself on the teachings of history, rightly because the human venture has so far been rather profitable.

( A f t e r all,

when heads fell, they were others' heads, and history is written by those who survived.)

Based on this logic of the past, they will

advise against changing a course that has after all proved itself fruitful, and to which we are driven by hitherto constant forces as nationalistic spirit, self-interest, egocentrism, racial and religious prejudice, and, not least of all, inertia. It will also be pointed out that the Atlantic peoples in particular never had it so good.

A l l indicators point upward: G N P ,

personal income, consumption of meat or paper or toothpaste, number of telephone calls or motorcars, longer vacations farther away, shorter working hours, more and better T V ment.

entertain-

In a society so affluent, and so intoxicated and literally

swept away by a technological spree, to implement new policies will be an uphill

fight.

But it must be carried on, at all costs,

because, whereas all these arguments for the present course are understandable, no one should at this point miss that the present course has created problems bigger than anything before, bigger than ourselves.

There is no virtue in saying that we do not know

how to solve them, that we are very uncertain as to when and if ever we will master them.

This for today's problems: our course

in meeting them can no longer be guided by political philosophies anchored in the past, nor can their solutions be constrained within the absurdly narrow limits of obsolete institutions. mean careening toward catastrophe.

This would

The means of incapacitat-

ing or destroying other human beings—which a dominant culture or a conqueror, be he Hadrian or Attila, Napoleon or Hitler, 156

BETWEEN EXPLOSION AND CONVERGENCE possessed in the p a s t — w e r e limited.

T h e people who lived in

the next valley or country or region or continent were safely out of his range.

T o d a y the situation is different: a holocaust may

strike all of us at the same time. A s now we possess enough information and warning that this mass of problems will grow more formidable and intricate with the phenomenal increase in the value and number of factors active in the conglomeration of our social and ecological systems —speeds,

dimensions,

interrelationships,

gaps

and

tensions,

population, needs and expectations, etc.—there is no hiding our head in the sand or building castles in the air that will improve the situation.

W e must brace up and face reality.

A n d this is

another tenet of our New A p p r o a c h : the growing complexity magnitude

of problems,

lenge they pose, require

and the nature of the threat and new postures

and planning

them, as practically no margin for error or leeway for correction is left any longer, as in past

in

and chal-

meeting

subsequent

periods.

These are the reasons that justify the abandonment of the present course, that render imperative the Great Change of Direction that must be brought about. yet clearly charted.

However, the new path is not

I have tried to point out some of the basic

principles that should guide us in searching for it.

But to define

its course, we must explore, analyze, and thoroughly canvass any likely avenues. ing.

T h e choice will be difficult, sometimes anguish-

It will require imagination, creativity, and leadership—and

certainly will entail many risks.

Luckily enough, we still have

some slim but real chance of making it, and some time in hand, but not too much, strenuously to study the new direction for mankind to march along. Conceptually, and in our strategic and political decisions, we must be guided by a unitary view of the world.

This is the only

one consistent with the new kind of problems that will confront us in the near f u t u r e — t h e macroproblems of the technological age.

57

C H A P T E R O F

5.

A

T I D A L

G L O B A L

W A V E

P R O B L E M S

Urban Problems—Not

the

Largest

WITH THE TYPE of civilization that is being developed, and the speed and dimensions of every phenomenon on the increase, there is a growing number of important problems that present the same characteristics with different peoples or areas of the world. They may be called the large repetitive problems.

Such are gen-

erally the problems of urban life that stem from the needs, whims, and sheer agglomeration of an increasing number of human beings in big cities and their suburbs and satellite townships. Notwithstanding

great disparities, basically

these

problems

have analogous features, whether they refer to Tokyo, Moscow or the Great Parisian Region, the San Francisco Bay Area or Greater London.

They call for, if not identical solutions, at least

the adoption of similar techniques and a fruitful exchange of experience. Such are the problems of individual and public transport in city traffic, fast interurban transport, air approach to the city; of the utilization of the subsoil for underground transport and utility networks and for the location of utility facilities, warehouses, and parkings; of the organization of the educational establishment and the provisions for leisure; of crime prevention, control of smog and other local pollution; of providing the flow of foodstuffs and other supplies and the disposal of waste, and many others. These problems are very important because they concern a 159

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION great proportion of the entire population, particularly in the industrial nations.

Their complexity is easily understandable, not

only when we think of the state of our own city, but also when we consider that the modern city is an instrument of accelerating change, and the highest expression of human association

and

polity: home, workplace, forum, academy, stadium, and restplace at the same time. These problems impose on the city administrators and the mass of citizenry an extremely tough t a s k — t h a t of a very great number of interrelated points and questions, each one of them knotty and controversial, to be solved at the same time.

This

challenge may be summarized in how to "industrialize" the city functioning and at the same time preserve, or better restore, wholesome and enriching qualities to its life.

T h e enticement of

the city ought not to be centered mainly on its glimmerings and lights, on the excitement of noise and of being among people, albeit anonymously, on the easier intermingling with the other sex (or for those who care, borderline and homosexual experimentation). T h e city must profoundly transform itself while it grows if it is to be the permanent living place of progressive people, worthy citizens, civic-minded electors, responsible taxpayers, and not of disaffected, uncommunicative, alienated, and occasionally rebellious multitudes.

T h e problem of laying the conditions for an

adequate quality of life to flourish in tomorrow's cities, when they will become, as they say, megalopolises, is a very difficult problem to solve, even without meeting the minimum demands of the sociologists, anthropologists, educators, hygienists, and aesthetes who study it.

This is an even more difficult problem to

solve than those of assuring a reasonable traffic flow or breathable air. In December 1966 President Johnson asked Mr.

McGeorge

Bundy to "explore the state of international knowledge about some of the larger problems faced by the industrialized societies" 160

A TIDAL WAVE OF GLOBAL PROBLEMS and the possibility of establishing an international center for studies of these problems, with the participation of Western and Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union.

This is an excellent idea,

which covers a wider ground than the urban problems sensu,

strictu

although, if I am not wrong, the problem of managing

urban society will form the core of interest for this joint undertaking when it materializes. T h e highly interesting program outline of this project was presented during 1967 and the first part of 1968 to many prominent scholars and political personalities in the U S S R and E u rope.

A s the idea received encouragement and consensus a con-

ference was organized in June 1968 at the University of Sussex, focusing its attention on the general question of the extent to which it is possible to use advanced techniques to improve the quality of life in urban, industrialized societies.

It is worth quot-

ing from its report. The conference met during a critical phase in the evolution of modern industrial societies. Profound and rapid changes were creating great strains which revealed themselves in widespread doubts about the ability of existing institutions to adapt themselves to the basic needs of modern society. Indeed, in the light of some recent events, the validity of institutions themselves was being subjected to challenge. These problems are urgent. They demand action. New problems call for new approaches. . . . Moreover, they are dwarfed by the magnitude and gravity of the political, economic, and social problems facing the world as a whole. I hope that, from all quarters, this project will receive strong and sincere support due to the quality of the people who are behind it, the nature of the problems it considers, and the fact that it tends to create a permanent meeting ground for a comparative, objective study of problems shared by advanced societies.

However, I am firmly convinced it has to be complemented 161

THE WORLD IN CONVULSION by other and greater efforts aimed at the world as a whole, and not only its northern part.

W e must realize that a stable solution

to the problems specific to advanced societies is, all considered, contingent on a successful attack on the other, larger problems which represent a threat or challenge to the whole of society and civilization.

F r o m all we have said so far, it would be just

wishful thinking to imagine the privileged peoples of the world can tend their oasis of welfare in a climate of tranquility of the spirit and security, secluded from the rest of the world where these latter problems may rampage. What we have called world problems are primary because the final solution of all other problems, including the great ones of our cities, is dependent on their solution. macroproblems

of our time.

They are the real

T h e y interest all mankind, not only

the urban part of it, all nations, not only the advanced ones, and they are increasing in number and becoming more complex, more acute, and more difficult to resolve as years pass.

They are

interlocking, and any one of them is packed with forces capable of disrupting the entire world system.

Therefore they must be

faced jointly and severally, and they must be tackled now, before they are beyond solution. What are these macroproblems? seems to me that they are problems threat or challenge

rather good definition

to most or all the peoples

sense that their solution

a

common

of the earth, in the

is in some way intensely desired by, and

the type of solution or nonsolution of these

A

that represent

will vitally affect, the majority

peoples.

I do not know if this class of problem has been categorized. A s a layman I see six main areas of overlapping and interplaying macroproblems, if we divide them according to the functions of the human societies. overpopulation

A t the bottom there is the problem of

or of regulating the presence of men on this

planet, which has now become basic to all others. are the problems of the supply of vital resources, 162

Then there

which refers to

A TIDAL WAVE OF GLOBAL PROBLEMS the function of catering for man the consumer, who needs all sorts of food and water, energy and materials for his civilized well-being. physical

Third, there are the problems of control of his bio-

environment,

which groups the functions of preserving

and improving the biosphere, judiciously exploiting the mineral resources, protecting natural balances, and further exploring the earth and its surroundings. psychosocial

evolution,

T h e n come the problems of his

or men's association and organization,

covering a wide field related to institutions, security, development, communications, planning. problems of human

fulfillment,

Next, related to them, are the centered on man's personality,

which include problems of education, culture, expression, leisure, and quality of life in general. problems of the philosophy

A t the top there finally are the

of life, which include questions of

a moral, ethical, and spiritual character, of human

society's

system of values and objectives, and which embrace and should give direction to all other problems. Of course, not all problems of these various kinds we must tackle above.

are

presently

macroproblems

in

the

sense

indicated

Some of them, however, are already at the root of the

anguish and uncertainty which pervades every nook and cranny of our planet, and appropriate solutions must therefore urgently be found to study and face them if we are going to shape and manage our collective future.

W e must not be mistaken: if we

are slow or inefficient in handling the whole package of today's problems, the only thing we can expect in this period of reckless acceleration is that many others will surface, and that one day we will find that all of them have inextricably knotted together forming such a formidable complex that no way out or any plan or design of Atlantic or world scope will any longer seem p o s s i b l e — except by Gordian, or ultimate, solutions. I will—again as a l a y m a n — t r y to outline in the following pages the essence of a few of these major problem areas.

163

t h e w o r l d in

convulsion

The Dramatic

Race Between

Population

and

Food

W e are losing the race between population and food.

"In the

developing countries per capita food production has declined to the lowest point in a decade," declared U N Secretary-general U Thant in 1968.

T h e world population is now growing at the

unprecedented rate of 2 percent annually, and food production is not keeping pace with it, its present increase being at half that r a t e — 1 percent per year.

This divergence is ominous, and its

accretion is compounded.

These are the figures taken by Hasan

Ozbekhan as the basis for his analysis, an insightful, comprehensive essay on Goals in the Solution he made for O E C D in 1968.

of the World Food

Problem

N o w , as the situation in this

country is the reverse, and generally the problem does not present itself in the temperate zone areas, this means that the situation is much more serious in other countries—the hungry areas.

The

graph, Figure 4, prepared by O E C D on the basis of other data, shows the curves of population growth and food demand, production and need, projected up to the years 1980 and 2000.

It is a

dramatic representation which would be even more disquieting if we broke down the total to show the conditions of the different regions.

Some are areas of actual impending distress.

A Presidential Committee on the World F o o d Problem, which I shall quote later, estimated that the worsening population-food situation may even reach an economically or ecologically irreversible state of imbalance

in twenty years.

Since our planet has

finite dimensions, to maintain a reasonable proportion between demographic growth and the space and resources available, man is dramatically faced with the necessity of reducing the former and making the best use of the latter. Overpopulation versus food supply is generally considered the most basic of our macroproblems, which cannot be bypassed in the nuclear-electronic-supersonic age. 164

Both phenomena are of

1SS1 1970 Fig. 4 Forecast on population and food demand, production and requirements in developing countries excluding China. (Indices: 1960=100) 1. For population, the "high" variant of the projection calculated by the United Nations has been taken {"World Population Prospects as Assessed

in

1963").

2. The demand for food has been calculated on the basis of population and income forecasts, and FAO income elasticities of demand for food. 3• For food production projections are based on the trend for the last five or ten years, assuming the higher value of the two for each country. 4- For the need for food, the nutritional targets as indicated by FAO for 7975 and 2000 are taken ("Third World Food Survey1).

t h e w o r l d in

convulsion

such dimensions and character that they demand a global approach.

They pose an immediate threat.

Their solution rejects

tactical expediency, anything less than total commitment; it requires long-term strategy and cooperative effort by all the most powerful nations and at least the major developing countries. Though every civilized spirit ought to quiver with shame when facing the tragic apparition at this late hour in human history of the question of so many mouths to feed and such an uncertain food supply, I hold that it is despicable and uncivilized—as too often h a p p e n s — t o locate the contour of the overpopulation problem just, or mainly, around this question.

I wish I had the time

and ability to deal adequately with the m o r a l — a n d

financial—

escapism that underpins this belief or attitude, whichever it is. Human beings are not just, or mainly, a digestive apparatus. The expression population language.

explosion

has entered our common

A f t e r thousands of centuries the world's population

reached the billion mark only 140 years ago. growth became swifter and swifter.

Then the rate of

A t the present rate of

human proliferation, if A d a m and E v e were born in the year o, now we would be some 500 trillion. about 3.5 billion.

W e are fortunate to be only

But if this increasing rate does not cease,

we will be four billion in 1 9 7 7 , five billion ten years later, and so on.

M a n y of us and our children will still be alive to w i t n e s s —

according to an "average" hypothesis—about six billion people greeting the year 2000.

T h e number of people will continue to

grow thereafter, for all we know, to even greater figures, and we are told

(with incredible irresponsibility)

that our

hospitable

planet may finally accommodate fifteen or more billion inhabitants. T h e causes underlying this impressive rise in population reside in a biological revolution by which we have upset the balance between the number of births and deaths that throughout the centuries has governed the development of the human species. Another breakthrough of this revolution is the substantial pro166

a tidal wave of global

problems

longation of l i f e — a virulent, though personally enjoyable development.

But if we are not successful in again controlling the

whole of this cycle, then life as we ordinarily understand it today will become practically impossible on earth well before the turn of the century. Gigantic problems loom on the horizon, anyhow. just touch upon some of them.

W e may

T h e present patterns of distribu-

tion of the world population by race, region, occupation, and age will be profoundly modified, compounding the political, nomic, and social problems as we know them now.

eco-

It is calcu-

lated that the peoples south of the Tropic of Cancer will multiply at a rate three times as great as that of their northern brothers. The intolerable gap between the economic conditions of

the

wealthier nations and those of the poorer countries will widen still more.

Already in the first half of the 1960^ the per capita

income in the latter countries increased by barely ten dollars, whereas it soared by three hundred dollars in the countries with a developed market economy.

Urbanization will reach unparal-

leled proportions, and the overcrowding of towns and suburbia will create serious problems—all the more acute in the less advanced countries because of the ordeal and misery of raw rural masses in adapting themselves to the unaccustomed harshness of city life and work. Increased fertility and life expectancy will profoundly modify the age structure of the population, swelling and complexifying educational problems, and creating new social burdens as well, because of the greater percentage of dependent groups with respect to active adults in the total population.

Naturally, the

consequent costs and inconvenience will, again, be most strongly felt in low-income countries.

T h e conflicts between generations,

accentuated by the quicker pace of social evolution, will be further multiplied by the fact that where formerly there existed three generations, there will now be four or five living at the same time.

T h e effects, social, psychological, political,

economic— 167

t h e w o r l d in

convulsion

and biological—of this revolution still have to be fully understood. T h e most agonizing prospect, however, remains the threat that entire populations tion.

might be destined

literally

to die of

starva-

W e read that the race between agricultural production and

the increase in population has probably already been lost in India, at least for a generation, and that a gradual decline in the supply of foodstuffs per head of population is to be feared in other parts of Asia, in North A f r i c a , and in South America. "Unless

these

trends

are

reversed,

they

will

mean

massive

famines and death by starvation to an extent never previously experienced in world history, involving hundreds of millions of people.

This is undoubtedly the greatest and most fundamental

and well-nigh insoluble problem the human race has ever had to tackle" (Dr. Raymond Edwell, T h e Victor Fund for International Planned Parenthood, Report No. 2, June 1 9 6 6 ) . T h e problem is not only quantitative, circumscribed in the number of calories available per person; it also concerns serious dietary deficiencies.

A very widespread condition, having lasting

effects on individuals and entire communities, is known as calorieprotein malnutrition.

W e read in a F A O report that "even tak-

ing account of the differences in climate, in weight of the human body and other factors determining needs for calories and for nutritive elements, the level of nourishment in developing countries is so very inadequate that at least one person in five is starving, one in three suffers from undernourishment in proteins and three in five from malnutrition." Such human tragedies not only assail our conscience as civilized beings, but are also the harbingers of chain reactions and of unrestrainable disorders throughout the world.

Ugly is the polit-

ical face of hunger, comments Nigel Calder.

"Next to the pur-

suit of p e a c e " — s a i d President Johnson in his 1967 State of the Union M e s s a g e — " t h e really great challenge to the human family is the race between food supply and population increase. . . . 168

The

a tidal wave of global time for rhetoric has clearly passed.

problems

T h e time for concerted

action is here, and we must get on with the job." T h e report of the ad hoc panel organized by the President's Science Advisory Committee to study the problem is a most forthright and courageous document.

It starts by stating that

this study "would be meaningful only if it included an examination of broad scope which would place the problem of food in the context of the more general questions of economic development and foreign assistance."

A n d one of its main conclusions is that

"the scale, severity and duration of the world food problem are so great that a massive, long range, innovative effort unprecedented in human history will be required to master it." Even if we consider, for one moment, the primary need for food, as if it were the only extant world problem, and try to figure,

on this extremely simplified assumption, what ought to

be the concerted action to attack this "challenge to the human family," we will quickly perceive that the effort to be mounted to undertake this one and only job surpasses our imagination.

In

reality, the proportion of this undertaking would by itself call for a general mobilization of resources and capabilities in every country, whether developed or not. Ozbekhan's paper is essentially a technical essay on a normative approach to what he calls the large and complex food/population system

problem,

aimed at analyzing the nature of the

options before us, the goals we must choose, and the processes that govern such choices.

Nonetheless, he draws deep political

conclusions, including that real solutions can only be conceived, developed, and applied by the rich nations.

"If the requirements

of our moral identity do not prove sufficient, then surely the requirements of our physical survival in a more or less stable world make it imperative that we define that objective which will lead us to initiate the concerted action the situation clamors for."

A n d he goes on to conclude that, within the framework of

an all-comprehensive strategy, "the fundamental operational goal i6g

t h e w o r l d in

convulsion

would obviously be to start an international institution which is geared exclusively—i.e., by c h a r t e r — t o the solution of the world food problem." Though admiring Ozbekhan's penetrating views and mastery in handling abstruse matters, I think that in this case he has failed to explore sufficiently what the effective cost will be of redressing this fundamental and global maladjustment. show its staggering burden. averages one acre per person.

A few figures will

Presently the land under cultivation N o w , supposing that between now

and the year 2000 the world population increases by 3 billion people, an additional

3 billion acres of cultivated land

tracted from pastures and wooded

areas

or reclaimed

subfrom

jungles, swamps and deserts, are required to maintain the same acreage per person.

A l l improvement in the present quantitative

and qualitative substandard diet should be taken care of, on this assumption, by increasing the yield per acre, or developing and making palatable nonconventional foods.

T h e direct investment

necessary to realize this colossal land reclamation of marginal, virgin, and sometimes impervious areas, and to build the pertinent basic infrastructures, in my own view, may be costed out to something like 4,000 to 5,000 billion dollars, and must be made many years in advance of actual exploitation.

Suppose that by

technological magic a half acre can do the job of one, the prospect is still that we will have to appropriate an average of some 100 billion dollars every year until 1990 only for this

purpose.

However, the greatest effort, in my own view, would finally be not financial, but organizational—supposing a political meeting of wills is reached between the nations concerned and the goahead decision made.

A n d we must rest assured of the f u t i l i t y —

whatever our e f f o r t — o f attacking this problem out of the context provided by the ensemble of macroproblems.

A l l the same, to

suit our mind's habit of compartmentalizing issues, taking them one by one, let us momentarily suppose, again, that this is the only macroproblem on our hands. 170

T h e exercise will serve to

a tidal wave of global

problems

train our lazy minds at least to become accustomed to new magnitudes and envisage new kinds of solutions.

What is urgently

n e e d e d — w e would s a y — i s a coordinated global plan with twin strategic objectives.

Leaving out all other considerations, we can

look at these. The first objective

is to increase worldwide agricultural pro-

duction and to devise a worldwide strategy to mobilize all surpluses and direct them to meet needs wherever they occur. It is clear that developing countries, where the problem really lies, possess neither the material means nor the technical knowledge to carry out the research, experiments, and investments necessary to modernize their agriculture and step up output appreciably.

Under this plan they must therefore receive massive

and continued technical and financial aid from the more advanced countries, covering such needs as mechanization

and

pesticides, the establishment of cooperatives and better irrigation techniques, animal breeding and processing plants, agribusiness management and hybrids.

Moreover, since the increase in agri-

cultural productivity and the bringing of new lands into cultivation are long-term processes, the plan must provide for considerable supplies of foodstuffs from the advanced countries of the temperate zone, and the even more difficult task of their transport and distribution, for many years, in order to cope with the food deficit in the underdeveloped countries. However, the most important and innovative parts of the plan are, on the one hand, its research, engineering, and technological undertaking of world scope, and on the other, the search for new, imaginative, international arrangements, institutions, and agreements to mobilize aid and trade.

On the first count, the task is

most dramatic, and hopefully it is capable of firing public imagination and eliciting support.

T h e question is to map all over the

world the still untapped land and water resources suitable to intensive or extensive agricultural or livestock exploitation with the aid of the most advanced technology, and to blueprint the 171

t h e w o r l d in

convulsion

projects for their development, and then organize the human and material resources to carry them out according to a plan of priorities.

In its global aspect, this is the joint effort required of

all industrialized countries, while in its regional or national expressions, the full participation of countries concerned is, of course, a must. But, although a good deal of information is already available on which to base the undertaking, and even supposing this multinational cooperation could start forthwith and function smoothly, it is difficult to expect appreciable results before the end of the seventies, when mankind will be one billion people larger than now.

This shows how tremendous is the challenge, and under-

lines the necessity of making a parallel effort in the other line of attack, that of devising new institutional, economic, and financial instrumentations and arrangements by which, in the meantime, to mobilize existing surpluses and intensify food production

and

diversification throughout the world. Without the global girdling cooperation indicated above, I am at a loss to see how the objective of rationalizing, though not yet optimizing, world food production can be obtained within a mammoth, but still manageable, budget, and the compact span of time dictated by humanitarian and political necessities.

N o r how

it is possible to mount a similar effort in R and D to make available—and a c c e p t a b l e — t o the world's multibillion population new, unconventional foods drawn from algae and petroleum or by fixing atmospheric nitrogen. T h e second rate.

The

objective systematic

is that of drastically reducing the birth adoption

of

mechanical

or

chemical

methods of birth control for mass use raises serious dilemmas for our conscience.

It obviously interferes with the human being's

most mysterious and most delicate cycles and functions, without the consequences being predictable with certainty.

A d d e d to

these moral, health, and biological preoccupations are the political undertones and racial implications of the substitution, for the 172

a tidal wave of global

problems

natural regulators, of individual and collective measures to control population growth and s i z e — o n a different

basis from one

country to another. Nevertheless, we have now reached a point where we can contemplate no path other than systematic family-planning under the aegis of moral and scientific authorities, and directed possibly by an appropriate international organization. large consensus.

This is a point of

There is even a resolution of the U N General

Assembly, couched in rather cautious terms, but unanimously approved in December 1965. Even religious, moral, and political leaders of a conservative leaning

agree

on

this necessity—save

some

few

exceptions.

Pope Paul V T s recent encyclical letter against any interruption of the generative process, which enjoins Catholics the world o v e r — even those living in highly prolific hunger-ridden zones, such as parts of South A m e r i c a — t h a t artificial contraception is illicit, is the most notable one. in the conscience of

It has placed doubt and disconcert

many

faithful, and created

everywhere

the sense of an important battle lost, because this theological pronouncement

came

after many

years

of

investigation

and

meditation, and apparently against the overwhelming advice of the commission of high lay and clerical personalities set up by John X X I I I to examine birth control. In any case, what seems indispensable, to start with, is a generalized recognition of facts and their cold logic, on the basis of which all or most peoples must unite and declare that humanity is going to face unprecedented calamity, and that everything will get out of control if it cannot reasonably control its numbers.

What

the contents of the document, or exactly the next step, will be, I cannot know.

But, as John F . Kennedy said, even a thousand-

mile trip starts by a first step.

What I do know, however, is that

a nonproliferation declaration or accord of some kind, a world population plan, is pressing—and that one day it will come. Only in this way is there perhaps still a chance to achieve some 173

t h e w o r l d in

convulsion

measure of birth control in a civilized manner, largely by persuasion, education, and the diffusion of contraceptives, through the responsible decision of the parents and self-rules of

re-

straint. Otherwise, some solution will come the hard way. hypotheses have been advanced.

Many

I will cite three ghastly solu-

tions that are ventilated as belonging to the realm of the possible.

One is biological: nature, which maintains so many bal-

ances, will see to it that human incontinence will be remedied, through some new germ or virus.

Another is constrictive and

prophylactic: the day may not be far off w h e n — b y grafting of population from one region to another, forced exodus, or mass sterilization, or with the help of other clean methods biochemistry might suggest—a ceiling on population or new births will be enforced, in some nations by due process of law, in others perhaps by international measures.

A n d the third, the harshest, is hinted

at in a most pessimistic essay by Professor J. D. Bernal (Enormity or Logic

and Hypocrisy

in the Ultimate

Solution,

October

1 9 6 7 ) — " t h e r e is no limit to human folly and callousness"—in the sense that all will end, as the only compassionate and rational solution left, with the elimination of all surplus humans, who will of course belong to the poor of the world.

N o comment is

necessary. In conclusion, we must firmly fix in our minds that, even taken in isolation, the population-food complex cannot be attacked but by a concerted, revolutionary, long-term plan, embracing both aims outlined above and many other collateral measures, and conceived and accomplished with a forward vision of the world and by means of a radically new type of intercontinental dialogue and collaboration.

T h e political and moral commitments and

the financial and technical solutions that must support such programs could constitute in themselves a turning point in the history of relations among the various human societies. But this problem of balancing, in the next decades, the re174

a tidal wave of global

problems

quirements f o r , and the supply o f , f o o d is only one of the m a c r o problems c o n f r o n t i n g us.

T h o u g h central and p a r a m o u n t , it is

interpenetrated with other p r o b l e m s of similar s w e e p i n g magnitude and c o m p l e x i t y .

W e o w e admiration and gratitude to D r .

D o n a l d F . H o r n i n g and his eminent c o l l e a g u e s on the Science A d v i s o r y C o m m i t t e e and the panel on the w o r l d f o o d supply f o r the r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s of their cited report.

T h e y point out that

an entirely n e w direction in our course is n o w n e c e s s a r y : The Panel is convinced from its study of the world food problem that food storages and high rates of population growth in the developing countries are not primary problems.

Rather, they are

manifestations of a more fundamental difficulty, lagging nomic development

in the hungry countries.

eco-

W e find the pros-

pects for the future both sobering and alarming. A s we now view the situation, the United States faces

two

choices: 1. The first is for the United States to continue to provide technical and capital

assistance

and

private

investment

to

poor

countries willing to make the self-help effort to achieve selfsustaining growth.

This course would be unsuccessful

or reversing the rapid deterioration tion in the developing lose

in halting

of the population-food

situa-

countries and the world would continue

to

ground.

2. The other alternative in mounting

a global

nations

with

and

is for the United States to take the lead effort,

in concert with other developed

international

organizations,

to reverse

the

downward course of the developing countries and to restore the chance of their peoples for a better life. We are unanimous in the belief that, at this point in history, a new long-term policy direction is indicated urgently—a policy that deals massively, directly, and effectively with this central problem of today's world. We are unanimous, also, in the belief that the United States must assume leadership

of the free world and all of its

international 175

t h e w o r l d in

convulsion

institutions in a coordinated, long-range development strategy for raising the economic level of the poor nations, thereby meeting the threat of hunger, increasing the volume of world trade and economic activity, and contributing to the achievement of the goal of ultimate importance, a lasting peace. This is a page of statesmanship, only obscured by a lingering ideological division of the world into two parts, one " f r e e " and the other not to be counted on, even when the future of all humanity, as the report implies, is at stake.

However, this may

be a question of rhetoric, dictated by domestic political expediency.

The Unmet Demand

for Economic

Development

Overpopulation is the focal issue of the next few decades because it is the factor that most influences all other problem areas. Solutions concerning practically all large global, continental, national, or regional problems will have to be tailored to this central f a c t o r — t h e presence, movement, and demands of growing masses of people.

In the preceding pages, we have considered

only the first and more primary need of these multitudes, that of eating enough to keep decently alive.

But as civilization pro-

gresses, the chain of demands rolls on faster, and these needs expand,

diversify, and upgrade

themselves,

from

elementary

ones, such as clothing and shelter, to the higher ones inherent in the human condition, and those still higher which make for the quality of life. If we consider them with some attention, we are simply by their number and magnitude.

awed

Our capacity to meet t h e m — a t

least judging from our record of achievement so f a r — i s patently short of requirements, to the point that when we examine in depth any macroproblem confronting us, it seems so enormous that no larger one is imaginable.

Thus development has been

said to be the greatest problem of the I96O'S. 176

a tidal wave of global

problems

Socioeconomic development is all but impeded by the uncurbed population growth, while the elimination of hunger is one of its preconditions and goals.

However, its horizons are vaster,

as in their larger acceptation they collimate with the progress of mankind in peace, prosperity, or at least sufficiency, and dignity.

In a cursory review of this problem area, I will now single

out some aspects which are more connected with things economic.

A n d their consideration will serve again, I hope, to open

our minds to new avenues of approach with which we must familiarize ourselves. A sweeping impression of the present situation may be obtained by glancing at another world map, The

Planisphere

of

Truth (Figure 5 ) , which I d e r i v e — a d d i n g the great shadows of population—from

a

recent

Maurice Guernier (La page 4 9 ) .

and

Derniere

worthy Chance

book

of

my

du Troisieme

It represents the world in 1966.

friend Monde,

However, the situa-

tion is highly dynamic, and its trends truly discouraging.

In

another solemn resolution of the United Nations General Assembly adopted in December 1 9 6 1 , the aim was proclaimed to accelerate progress of the developing nations and their social advancement, and the target was established of a minimum annual rate of growth of 5 percent in their aggregate national income during the decade.

But soon this objective turned into a mere

dream. The target is not being attained, and it is now clear that yet another battle is being lost.

T h e second

imperative—second

only to averting an explosion of unreason, as it was c a l l e d — t h a t of assuring a productive explosion, remained on paper.

"Our

hopes for achieving the goals of the first Development Decade appear to be frustrated," says U Thant.

A n d George D . Woods,

when he was still president of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development ( I B R D ) , joined others in saying that this decade may recede into history, instead, as a decade of disappointment. 177

Fig. 5 The planisphere of truth: Percentage distribution by region of resources and population.

a tidal wave of global

problems

The expected 5 percent annual growth rate was based on performances recorded in the 1 9 5 0 - 1 9 5 4 period.

But already in the

late fifties and the beginning of the sixties, this rate had dropped to 4 percent and below, which means that, when allowance is made for population growth, the net improvement dwindles to 1 percent a year or less.

A t this growth rate, the average per

capita income in the less developed countries will move from the present 120 dollars to hardly 170 dollars annually at the end of the c e n t u r y — w h i c h corresponds to the income the Western countries had a century a g o — w h e r e a s the increment for the latter, according to various estimates, will be between thirty and sixty times as big.

"This is crude arithmetic.

But its implications are

plain and sobering," commented Mr. Woods.

"If present trends

are allowed to continue, there will be no adequate improvement in living standards in vast areas of the globe for the balance of this century." There is, however, another big if attached to this forecast: if, in the meantime, something revolutionary does not happen in the world to terminate this intolerable situation—by rational and reasonable cooperation and planning, or otherwise.

A n d with

the gap widening and human dignity continuing to suffer, it is far more likely that only waves of hatred and violence will erupt from the abyss which now separates the rich and the poor of the world.

But under present conditions, no program of hard work,

spartan austerity, far-reaching social reforms, birth control, and unimpeachable administration that the underdeveloped countries may adopt, nothing of the sort—albeit necessary—can promise to redress this imbalance in the world economy, and set these countries really on the move.

N o r can the tools of international

economic intercourse, namely trade, aid—including investment— and technical assistance as presently conceived, turn the table. They are both inadequate and misused. Even if all the present shortcomings were made good, the concepts that seemed bold just a few years ago would not be enough 179

t h e w o r l d in today.

convulsion

They would leave unfulfilled the urge for development,

the central drama of our time: the gap between the rich and poor of the earth, between the affluent and the derelict, the secure and the desperate.

It is senseless and irresponsible, in my view, to

blink at this reality.

A n d it is time to persuade ourselves that no

headway can be made to relieve appreciably the immense tensions mounting in the world, unless we are determined to operate a truly revolutionary change of approach, and this revolutionary change is supported by a massive and combined

international

effort, responding to a new conception of the world and the pursuit of global objectives. Alas, this turning point is not yet in sight. United

Nations

Conference

on

Trade

A s a result of the and

Development

( U N C T A D ) held in Geneva in 1 9 6 4 — t h e largest ever to that t i m e — a new agency was created—the United Nations Trade and Development B o a r d — a n d a new conference was held in N e w Delhi in early 1968.

T h e first conference undoubtedly served

the purpose of focusing on the myriad problems that divide the two categories of countries.

Developing countries,

indulged mostly in claims and recriminations, and countries in much lecturing.

however, developed

F e w realistic solutions that were

aired could be adopted, much less implemented. The

even bigger N e w

Delhi Conference

was

inevitably

a

greater failure, despite the admirable spirit and dedication of those who organized it.

T h e developed countries' attitude—a-

part from some flowery speeches—confirmed that they still seem to treat as alien the notion that they have a vital stake in a more harmonious development of the entire world, and that the economic growth of the countries on the other side of the fence is a matter of the highest priority for them also. A t N e w Delhi, after countless speeches and fifty-five tons of paper to print twenty million pages and reproduce 3,000 documents in five languages, a paper-thin agreement was reached on preferences for exports of the developing countries, while there 180

a tidal wave of global

problems

was no agreement on the other two main items on the agenda, namely

commodity

agreements

and

increase

of

financial

re-

sources to developing countries. T o all practical ends, this is just a face-saving accord.

The

preference document says only that a plan should be drawn up as soon as possible.

It fails to spell out what products and which

countries are to benefit, what safeguards to be built into the scheme, and all the other crucial points of meaningful agreement — a n d thus provides no guidance for the genuine negotiations that will have to take place if the plan is ever to come into being. In more general terms, our present approach to

international

trade cannot take us very far.

There is no excuse for its back-

wardness.

and organization

Human

endeavor

have

been

at

home with the exciting challenge of trade at least since the Minoan

Mediterranean

and

passed through the Pillars of Hercules several millennia ago.

sailing

boats

started

plying

the

My

Venetian forefathers were actively exploring the eastern reaches of the physical world then known, and sent M a r c o Polo to China in 1250, so moved were they by a vision of the worldly and cultural benefits of exchanging goods and ideas and of knowing other peoples' mores.

The trade outlook and entrepreneurship of these

civilizations, incidentally, were far more advanced

than

ours

when we compare their rudimentary technology, information and means with our instant communications and our great variety of hedges against commercial, even political, risks. N o w , many centuries later, the Kennedy Round negotiations based on the Trade Expansion A c t of 1962 and laboriously concluded in 1967 have been applauded as the greatest tariff reduction known so far.

A s a matter of fact, one could rejoice not

only for their positive conclusion but even more so for the grave political implications apprehended in their failure. late hour, after four years of intense quid pro quo, bargaining—which

mobilized

Y e t , at this bazaar-like

officials and experts from

fifty181

t h e w o r l d in

convulsion

three nations and the entire G A T T organization—the happy but meager result is that the world is finally heading toward the freer trade conditions existing before World War I. Even the great trading countries of Europe and North A m e r ica, which are bound to reap the richest harvest from unfettered commercial intercourse, have not been able to attack during the Round the whole diversified, cumbersome area of nontariff obstacles, which thus constitute a Trojan horse left in the hands of the still rampant protectionist forces.

N o country goes blameless

for having devised, through an ingenuity that would be better used in the promotion of trade flows, all sorts of unilateral and objectionable measures.

It is quite obvious that, although few

could stand the test of objective criticism, each measure is justified by the government responsible on various grounds, including the defense of national interests.

T h e same governments that

concluded the Kennedy Round are now pressured by a protectionist backlash clamoring for discriminatory policies and practices, which may in turn trigger off a vicious circle of measures and countermeasures, and perhaps practically nullify any headway made in 1967. There is yet another reason why the Kennedy Round has not gone to the heart of the problem of actually liberalizing trade among nations.

Only traditional forms of trade were considered,

not technological

exchanges.

But nowadays,

the transfer of

know-how, patents, licenses, experience, and the like is, as we have seen, just as necessary for furthering progress as technological innovation itself, and just as important for welding nations together, as the exchange of goods and capital among them. We may conclude that the principle of international

trade

liberalization has only had a partial and reticent application, even among the developed countries. half mast.

Its flag has been hoisted only at

A s for trade with less developed countries, the Ken-

nedy Round negotiations produced even scantier results.

The

most significant example of a concerted policy in this field is still represented by the Treaty of Association of African States to the 182

a tidal wave of global E E C , an outgrowth of past colonial paternalism.

problems

It provides a

pattern of over-all cooperation, insofar as preferences are established for the benefit of trade with the eighteen African countries concerned, and financial assistance is also provided through the European Development Fund.

Whether a similar arrangement

could be devised on a worldwide basis including all developed and developing countries is rightly one of the questions that cannot be answered optimistically at the present reading.

It would

involve a new concept of world order and world progress, which is precisely what is lacking. T h e crude fact is that the poorer countries are caught in a vicious circle.

Their international means of payment are insuffi-

cient and dwindling, due to adverse and still worsening terms of trade.

Roughly one-third of these nations depend for more than

one-half of their foreign exchange earnings on the export of one or two crops of primary commodities that must be marketed in the industrialized countries, and that are so subject to great fluctuations in production and demand that no long-term policy can be devised except by broadly based international

agreements.

On the other hand, their efforts at becoming industrialized and competitive, and earning foreign exchange, are thwarted by their poor bargaining position vis-a-vis the already industrial countries, and incapacity to follow the rapid pace of the latters' technological advances.

A n d , as W. Arthur Lewis noted, "most developing

countries have to give the highest priority to providing employment now rather than to maximizing consumption or income or employment in ten years' time."

(Development Digest,

pared by the National Planning Association, April 12).

pre-

1966, page

This lack of modernization is in turn translated into a

larger demand for imports while the domestic industry cannot provide the market.

But scarcity of foreign exchange

makes

curbs and duties on foreign goods prohibitive, and thus domestic prices soar, and the whole economy has no chance of becoming competitive.

A n d so on.

Under these circumstances the industrialized nations must ei183

t h e w o r l d in

convulsion

ther entrench themselves in a walled trade fortress cut off from the rest of the w o r l d — a n d hope for the b e s t — o r show wisdom and accept in both principle and practice the need for an international redistribution

of labor and production

between them and

the developing countries. This latter is an extremely unpalatable proposition, since it requires bold action within the advanced countries themselves and a willingness to face delicate domestic political and economic consequences.

It is, in fact, a double-edged blade, because the

developed nations must decide gradually to eliminate from their own economies the production of certain elementary commodities—and, at the same time, open their doors to the import of these products from abroad.

In the process, domestic produc-

tion and import production will have to compete on an uneven basis. Looking at the global picture, however, this is only one of the measures we should adopt.

Considering the present as a transi-

tion period, I think that we ought to fix as an intermediate goal for our efforts that of accepting and organizing the coexistence of various modes of conducting trade.

Tailoring our goal to reality,

we may devise a more organic world trade system based on a pattern of large and fairly homogeneous areas, and a triple operative standard to promote and regulate the flow of trade in the system: maximum

liberalization

among the Western

industrial

nations, a far greater liberalization than is now conceived or contracted for, accompanied by a code of fair trade practices, to the limit of creating in a reduced number of years one single free trade market among them; planned

trade arrangements

and eco-

nomic cooperation, between this first group and the Soviet bloc countries, on the basis of long-term structural trade agreements, as we have seen earlier; and finally, structured

trade

cooperation

based on progressive preferences, commodity and price stabilization agreements, and trade assistance and financing in favor of the weaker countries, favoring their grouping in free trade areas 184

a tidal wave of global —on

the Central American C o m m o n

Market

problems

(CACM)

and

Latin American Free Trade A r e a ( L A F T A ) pattern, but moving faster—and an organized linking of their economies to those of the advanced nations of the West, and possibly also of the East. T h e Kennedy Round experience shows how herculean this task would be, but a medicine of this kind, sometime, somehow, has to be administered to revitalize the circulation of wares, techniques—and capital—throughout the world.

Unless we clearly

understand that trade between unequal international partners is no longer to be governed on a purely mercantile basis, that it demands instead a global participation in the challenging venture of economic development, we will be faced with a further, highly dangerous deterioration in the objective situation of the greatest part of the world and in the relationships of the Atlantic nations with all other nations. Besides trade, and in combination with it, aid is an indispensable form of international cooperation—if development is seriously pursued.

But at present, aid is stagnant and erratic. Offi-

cial aid (net of amortization) has reached a plateau of six billion dollars a year since the beginning of the 1960's. buys less in 1968 than in i960.

A n d each dollar

In the face of increasing needs,

it has actually shrunk in its purchasing power; and in percentage it decreases with respect to the gross national product of the donor countries.

In fact, the transfer of resources to developing

countries now equals .60 percent of the O E C D countries' national income, while the target set for the Development Decade was a full 1 percent. However, this total volume is misleading if we do not consider its geographical distribution and the present systems of allocation of

financial

aid, and analyze its components,

which—besides

grants—include long and medium-term financing at varying conditions, and also a good share of pure supplier's credit.

This

flow of capital from developed to underdeveloped countries at onerous terms of repayment and interest creates practically in185

t h e w o r l d in

convulsion

soluble problems in the long run.

George D . Woods calls the

accumulating increasing burden on the poor debtor countries the debt

explosion:

In 1956, the outstanding international debt of the low-income countries, stemming from public sources or carrying governmental guarantees, was estimated at just under $10 billion. In 1964, it reached an estimated $33 billion. Because of rising interest rates and the accumulation of short-term debt, the amount of money needed each year to service this debt climbed even faster. From 1956 to 1964, it rose over four times, from $800 million to $3.5 billion. (George D. Woods in Foreign Affairs, January 1966.) A n d he calculated that in the early 1980's this backflow of amortization, interests, and dividend payments from the debtor countries, on the present form, would totally offset the inflow of new capital into them completely.

Again, these are dry facts.

But also qualitatively, aid does not match needs.

A i d imple-

mentation has been a poor performance, crippled by fuzzy programs, bilateralism, and competition among donor countries, by overlapping and uncoordinated national and international agencies, by the givers' spurious motivations as well as by waste and failure on the part of the recipients, and above all by the lack of strategy, regional or otherwise, and long-term views. T h e same thing is true of the third main form of international cooperation, technical

assistance,

management are inadequate.

whose planning, funding, and

" W e are gradually beginning to

deal with long-term problems but we still act with short-term methods: for 20-year problems we prepare 5-year plans, hire personnel on a 2-year basis, and get i-year appropriations" ternational

Development

Review,

September

1967).

(In-

More-

over, it has been consistently—and w r o n g l y — c o n c e i v e d as though it were a separate activity. Its basic objective is the transfer of modern techniques and 186

a tidal wave of global

problems

their method of application to societies largely unprepared to absorb them, which require a great effort of adjustment, if not of reinvention.

A s a matter of fact, it is easier to move goods and

capital across the frontiers and spaces of the world than skills and attitudes, which, however, are the salt of development. It is a question of both principle and practice that technical assistance should belong with capital assistance, foreign trade, self-help, and the reform of structures, institutions, and the educational system to the host of sister measures and programs that have to be undertaken to foster development in the lagging regions.

In order to modernize a country or region and make it

compatible with the contemporary

world, technical

assistance

must, therefore, fit with all these other measures in a plan that will need continuous rethinking and updating. This new, organic strategy of development is the only one that can hold some promise of changing the present state of deprivation of the poor countries into a state of vitalization of their capacity and willpower.

It cannot be the strategy for one coun-

try, but must embrace entire regions in a world context, and it cannot and should not be sponsored by separate donor nations, but must represent a cooperative effort of all or most countries, both developed and underdeveloped. long-term

strategy, with

well-ordered

A n d finally, it must be a priorities

and

different

phases of implementation, geared to suit the strategic goals defined and the different plans and potential for development of the assisted countries.

This is no mere economic gap. It is a seismic fissure driving deep into the earth's sociological crust to a certain, or hidden, faultline. It can produce—it will produce thunderous earthquakes of violence. . . . If the wealthy nations of the world do not do more to close this sundering economic split, which cleaves the abundant northern half of the planet from the hungering southern hemisphere, none of us will ultimately be secure no 187

t h e w o r l d in

convulsion

matter how large our stocks of arms.

(Robert S. M c N a m a r a ,

Address at Millsaps College, February 1967.)

Y e s , this tremendous situation cannot be healed by the arms of war and destruction. peace

It may, I hope, be cured by the weapons of

and cooperation.

though it may include it. may involve it.

"Security

is not military

hardware,

Security is not military force, though it

Security is not traditional military

though it may encompass it.

activity,

Security is development." (Robert

S. M c N a m a r a , Address before the American Society of Newspaper Editors, Montreal, M a y 1 9 6 6 ) .

But, as Robert S. M c N a -

mara himself said, even before knowing that he was to be elected President of the World Bank, it "cannot any longer be resolved by relying on the normal methods of international trade, aid and investment."

This serious warning must be addressed, in

the first instance, to ourselves—the Atlantic n a t i o n s — w h o are doing nothing decisive to start a new course.

W e still pretend to

clean the world with old brooms and keep it secure with our big sticks.

Before the vicious circle of underdevelopment, we hope

to keep peoples quiet by offering them half-truths, half-promises, and half-measures.

So conceited we are that we act as if we

could will the impossible—the maintenance of the status around the world.

quo

This is so because we think alone, we stand

alone, we are alone, and seem resolved to stay a l o n e — a n d yet we do not notice the great chasm that is ripping us apart in the middle of our Atlantic Ocean. Once more we owe it to George Woods for pointing out the right direction.

In October 1967 he proposed a "grand assize"

to judge the world's record and prospect of growth.

I quote him

again at length (Address to Swedish Bankers Association, October 27, 1 9 6 7 ) : What can be done?

I would like to suggest that the governments

of the developed countries—on whose support and resources any

188

a tidal wave of global

problems

more ambitious strategy for the 1970's will depend—decide to get away from rumor and innuendo and half facts and half truths and put themselves in the position to learn the real facts. I suggest that they invite the dozen or more leading

world

experts in the field of development to meet together, study the consequences of 20 years of development assistance, assess the results, clarify the errors and propose the policies which will work better in the future.

In 1947, before Europe and America

could enter whole-heartedly into the experiment of the Marshall Plan, an official body of experts under the leadership of Lord Franks, drawn from the participating nations, studied the whole range of programs and policies required to achieve recovery.

European

Today, it is high time to work out a similar perspec-

tive of the problems of growth in the less developed countries, and to draw, for all to see, a genuinely comprehensive, objective and expert picture of where we are and where we can go from here.

This proposal may provide a good beginning, but should it be carried through only in the limited sphere of the Atlantic community, it would still fall short of the mark.

What is expected of

the Atlantic nations, let me repeat, is not a reformulation of policies which are patently worn out in their basic inspirations and

premises,

but

an

altogether

new

vision

of

the

world.

Whether they can stand up to this momentous challenge

and

mount an unprecedented movement to fight the condition of underdevelopment plaguing two-thirds of mankind, is a matter of conjecture.

But at this stage of the world's economic history,

they must quickly prove their measure, because the time left to act on this macroproblem is even shorter than that for overpopulation. Plainly, the adoption of any grand design of orderly world development must be preceded by still deeper studies and preparation.

Some tentative proposals of a new approach are ad-

vanced here and there. Again I must mention Maurice

Guer189

t h e w o r l d in

convulsion

nier who, with that mixture of logic and encyclopedism which is one of the best traits of Gallic thinking, presents in twelve proposals the outline of a plan for the third world (Ibid., et seq.)

page

167

as a part of the studies of the International Develop-

ment Center headed by Josue de Castro.

A s may be expected,

this is only an indicative plan, by no means exhaustive perfect.

or

However, I see much merit in it because it deals with

the less developed countries in a global framework and contains some sound criteria and suggestions. A m o n g the good concepts it embraces are the necessity of basing industrialization of upcoming nations on agreements with big corporations (or consortia, I would add) of the northern hemisphere, and education on the formation of modern men (not their acculturation), moreover making it selective (because of the prohibitive cost of the classical type of education); and the suggestion of creating an International Development University, a kind of continental federation of universities, each to be specialized in a given sector and offering young people a good formation aimed at their region's development, and disincentives to study or work elsewhere; and of an international civil service made up of nationally mixed and predominantly young teams of experts trained to assist the less developed nations. I have roughly sketched an exercise to help formulate our forward thinking and systematize our approach to problems of this kind in two previous essays (The for

the

World

Underdeveloped see also Atlantic

of

Today,

and

East-West

Community

Challenge

September

1965,

Relations,

Quarterly,

of the and

Seventies Developed-

December

1965;

Spring 1 9 6 7 ) , a kind of

model for the next decade with an Atlantic-centered, development-oriented, unitary view of the world.

The world, as per

Figure 6, was represented by a strong core where the main forces of progress are centered, and which exerts leadership, that is, the Atlantic community.

Around this nucleus, irradiating force and

support, are concentric belts of countries linked to the Atlantic 190

214

a tidal wave of global

problems

platform itself by a variety of bonds and interests which gradually diminish from the center toward the periphery.

This image may

be compared to the layers of an onion, and there are in the plan three principal layers around the Atlantic core: the special relationships countries; the great outside development regions; and areas of later development. T h e countries considered to entertain special relationships with the Atlantic community included all of Eastern Europe,

the

Mediterranean basin, Mexico, the Caribbean, and C A C M countries; plus the developed nations of the Pacific, namely—besides J a p a n — A u s t r a l i a , N e w Zealand, and probably the Philippines. T h e y were deemed to constitute the first objective of a phased, organized, and feasible expansion of the area of common prosperity around the initial Atlantic nucleus. Latin America was seen to belong to the second group as a great, fairly homogeneous area of impending development and a test case of our capacity to think big and act fast, face to face, as we are, with the tide of events.

T h e Soviet Union's development,

according to the view expounded in this book, was considered as a prerequisite for the whole plan, and the U S S R herself a companion and protagonist in the whole p r o c e s s — n o t only in respect to Eastern Europe.

U p to this point, the entire program of

creating a platform of common prosperity from A l a s k a to Cairo, and from Tierra del Fuego to Vladivostok, represented the task ahead for the seventies—even

if one whole decade was, of

course, not enough to complete it. A n d finally, in the third layer, there was the rest of mankind, namely most parts of A f r i c a and Asia, with easily half of the world population if China is included.

These were considered,

structurally, as areas of later development, whose progress was substantially

dependent

on

what

may

in

the

meantime

be

achieved in the other, more advanced regions belonging to the second layer.

A i d in every form to these remaining regions of

the world was to be stepped up, right now.

However, no expec-

Fig. 6 The onion-layer concept.

a tidal wave of global

problems

tation of tangible results should be held until, say, the e i g h t i e s — when a comprehensive plan for their development could be made with the support of the entire area of common prosperity already structured. In this program for the world in the seventies, socioeconomic considerations lead to geopolitical conclusions.

A s it was sub-

mitted as a basis for discussion, I am the first to admit that it may, in fact, be discussed, and should be criticized, and that it can be vastly improved.

However, to me it makes sense, at least

in two of its fundamental premises.

T h a t development, though

necessarily a global issue, cannot be promoted everywhere at the same time nor at an equal rate and with equal success: we must make up our mind as to priorities, where to start, how to proceed, which goals and targets to a c h i e v e — i f we really want to set the world on a development course.

A n d that the important

thing, then, is to join all strong hands to promote it, and to act according to an over-all plan.

The Necessity

of Building

a Second

World

The job of providing the facilities to lodge, educate, occupy, and entertain the generations expected in the last part of this century, though little thought of, is one of the most formidable undertakings to be accomplished under the heading of development. It is worth spending a few minutes to ponder just what the construction problem ahead is.

Merely the announcement that

we will have to build, by the year 2000, housing, community facilities, infrastructures, etc., for a second world

population,

once its magnitude is considered, makes one aghast.

This, how-

ever, is the prima facie requirement in order to accommodate this new shift of inhabitants arriving on the earth before the end of the century.

On closer scrutiny, one can see that the enterprise is

even much greater. It has been estimated that, in the United States alone, in order 193

t h e w o r l d in

convulsion

to meet growing population demands by the year 2000, the building job Americans will have to undertake is equal to that all previous generations have accomplished since the founding of the country.

I take a leaf from the General

uary-March 1 9 6 7 ) :

Electric

Forum

(Jan-

"In effect, this means that in just 33 years a

'Second America' must be laid alongside the first, in rebuilt old cities and whole new o n e s — i n revitalized suburbs, townscapes, and rural areas.

It means not only bricks, steel, concrete, and

glass, but new educational systems, new recreational opportunities, new provisions for cultural interests—for all elements of society, urban or rural." If the job this generation and the next must accomplish is so large in the United States, how much more immense the commitment is when the same problem is brought to the world scale. It is to be faced in every part of the planet, and in some parts of it under much harsher conditions.

In many areas and regions,

the situation of the human habitat is already so desperate that merely to provide a roof and some rudimentary convenience to their present population living at subhuman standards, is one of the most urgent objectives for humanitarian as well as political reasons. This backlog weighs dramatically on the cities and the countryside of the world, well before the new waves of humanity invade them in the years to come.

If we turn our eyes, we see

untenable situations in Saigon and the Vietnam villages torn by war, in West Bengal and the bustees of Calcutta where the stage is set for an immense human tragedy, in the Palestine refugee camps and among the other destitute masses of A f r i c a and Asia, and among the Andean Indios or the Brazilian Nordestinos.

We

have them in some parts of Sicily and the slum areas around R o m e , in Rio's javelas and Buenos Aires' villas miserias, in most cities of the Soviet Union, in the ghettos of American cities and in the suburbs of many European capitals. To

reasonably meet present demand, we still have a tre-

mendous engineering and building job to accomplish, not to 194

a tidal wave of global

problems

speak of that of building the second world according to a time schedule covering three decades. overlap.

Of course, the two jobs will

But there is a third one to be undertaken at the same

time: we will have to modernize and refurbish facilities that have become antiquated, and continuously

adapt and readapt

our

habitat to the dictates of fast-changing technologies and to the changing moods and habits of people and to their greater mobility and leisure time. Just as urgent as doubling housing space is the need for new harbors,

airports,

and

heliports,

highways,

expressways,

and

rapid transport systems, power transmission lines, pipelines, garbage processing plants and refuse dumping grounds, waterworks, other utilities, and communications systems.

There will also be

the manifold increase and modernization of present educational systems, libraries, museums, theaters, cultural institutions, campuses, sports facilities, summer and winter resorts, parks and green spaces, hotels and motels, hospitals and clinics, churches and cemeteries.

Further, there must also be developed the new

industrial capacity to design, manufacture, erect, and service the second physical habitat we shall need in a short time. Finally, there is the problem of space for the new cities, octopus cities or megalopolises of the future as we like to call them now, and for all factories and other structures, space which can be subtracted only from agriculture, pasture, and w o o d l a n d s — and here we have the conflicting requirements of housing versus feeding all this population.

A n d ways must also be found to

compensate for the impossibility of building a replica of the Parthenon or the T a j Mahal, the Sistine Chapel or the Kremlin, and our medieval and Renaissance castles and cathedrals, or to duplicate Venice and Bruges and Jaipur, and for their beauty and inspiration not to be lost in a monstrous outgrowth of purely functional steel and c e m e n t — a n d this is a reminder of the contrasting exigencies of increasing the number and preserving the quality of people. W e are caught on the wrong foot by this macroproblem.

The '95

t h e w o r l d in

convulsion

building industry around the world is considered a traditional industry, with local or national moorings, and which only temporarily becomes international, in the case of very large projects. B y and large it has lagged behind other industries in standardization, rationalization, and productivity.

Besides the problem of

universally adopting the metric system, the apparently marginal subproblem of unifying standards, which are becoming an interminable catalogue of purposeless and maddening differences from country to country and from trade to trade, involves us in an incredible labyrinth of legal and technical difficulties.

Ex-

peditious and rational solutions must be found for uniforming them, if we are efficiently going to undertake the construction job ahead.

But these are not so easy to find.

I read in October 1967 in The New York Times, apropos of a new wonder tank, product of joint United States-German enterprise, that " a particularly ticklish problem, for example, developed because American and German industry use a different screw thread in their nuts and bolts. . . .

A f t e r considerable

negotiation, the two parties agreed in the summer of 1965 that each would use its own screw thread internally in all components designed for the tank.

They decided that each component would

be interconnected using the metric, or European, screw thread." If the military industries, with the formidable setup and immense investment supporting them, have faced difficulty in adopting a common standard for a screw thread, we must really question how a modicum of standardization and rationalization can be obtained for the nonmilitary global industrial and construction venture.

Y e t this formidable undertaking will require perfect

planning, interchangeable parts, and an exceptional capacity for reducing costs on national, continental, and world bases. I do not know if it is possible at this stage to envisage, even in gross figures, what the investment should be during the next three decades to provide living and working place for three billion more inhabitants on this planet. 196

Actual living conditions, the

a tidal wave of global

problems

propensity for investment, conflicting priorities, technological developments, cost trends, and many other elements that escape my judgment, should be taken into account.

M y guess is that under

this heading 2,000 to 3,000 dollars of new investment per capita for this incremental population is on the very low side of reality. The grand total of something of the order of 6,000 to 9,000 billion dollars, only partially overlapping with the amount demanded to put new lands into cultivation, is therefore required to prepare in time, namely, between now and the early nineties, reception for the incoming population—which in turn will be productive, but only later on. M y tentative estimate is that these two items of new investment will command additional appropriations approaching percent of the world's G N P henceforth.

10

I expect that revised

calculations based on more accurate assumptions will soon be made, and will confirm this rough surmise.

But this very pre-

liminary cost hypothesis already gives an idea of the order of magnitude of the outlay

required, and if, as I

figure,

these

amounts are barely enough to receive with due regard the newcomers to the world, then the effort will have to be, as mentioned, mostly conceptional,

organizational,

and managerial.

It will

then be necessary for the best planners, researchers, engineers, industrialists, and constructors to coordinate their efforts just to prepare intelligently to meet this uncommon challenge.

And

again, a new level of international cooperation is unavoidable.

The Immense

Challenge

of

Education

Assuming that through an unprecedented cooperative effort it is possible to provide enough food for everyone, and that in general all the necessities of material life can be satisfied in one way or the other, the most difficult part of the task would still have to be tackled.

T h e imperative of a planned effort on the

797

t h e w o r l d in

convulsion

world scale is also compelling in e d u c a t i o n — o n e of the fundamental wants of modern man's condition.

This may also be the

most tantalizing and baffling goal of our pursuit. I have mentioned elsewhere the problems of education in the United States and Europe and the misgiving and dissatisfaction caused by present situations and future prospects.

But the real

macroproblem we have to face is that of the fearsome cultural and educational disequilibrium between different regions in the world, a greater and greater separation between the culture of the rich and the culture of the poor, the desperate problem in the crowded and potentially hungry countries.

T h e y are inherently

incapable of modernizing themselves; as a result, they are already falling away from the more advanced nations.

F o r all practical

purposes, many of them are already now cut off from history, with the bulk of their peoples living in a different century.

The

ancient Helots probably partook more of their Greek masters' thinking and knowledge than the present multitudes share in our learning, knowledge, and mass culture. While the gift of education,

enlightenment,

know-how,

of

"learn more, to do more, to be m o r e " are being demanded more urgently in every part of the planet, the present world system continues to tolerate—in this golden age of knowledge and scie n c e — t h a t half the world's

adult

population

remains

illiterate

and that their numbers increase annually by twenty-five million more children condemned never to read or write.

According to

U Thant, there are more illiterates today than in i960.

But

even these figures do not reflect the whole reality; they do not consider the "return" illiterates, nor those adults who, while possessing some elementary knowledge of reading and writing, are unable to put this knowledge to use in communicating others.

with

O n the whole, it is estimated that 70 percent of the

human race is today towed along, in a state of relative awareness, by the remaining 30 percent. Unless there is some revolutionary change also in the educa198

a tidal wave of global

problems

tional status of the people of the South, their derelict situation will worsen through the coming generations.

This is why many

believe that the problem of education is at the heart of all other problems.

N o practical solution for it is yet in sight.

T h e United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization ( U N E S C O ) sponsored in 1968 an International Conference on Educational Planning to examine the experience in this field over the last ten years and to assess major tendencies and problems with which educational planning may have to deal in the next decade.

In a U N E S C O document we can read that

"the need for a radical reform of education is so evident throughout the world that it is no longer possible to avoid it.

It is

already progress merely to be conscious of the urgency of this situation."

W e also read here and there that the type of educa-

tion which is most directly relevant to economic progress is "far and away the most costly," and that educational patterns will have to be drastically modified.

I for one am rather skeptical

that veritable solutions are forthcoming. Numberless scarce.

educators are needed,

but they

are

extremely

A s for educational satellites—the last word in audio-

visual devices—they remind me of an old saying concerning the forlorn Russian peasant: " G o d is high above and the C z a r is far away."

Investment in education is basic for any kind of devel-

opment, but it is long-term investment, and dividends are delayed.

In this age of meteoric technological change, for all the

effort that can be made in educating young men and women, one risks producing educationally displaced generations,

preparing

them for a world that is vanishing rather than for the novel and challenging world into which they will emerge.

So says an emi-

nent educator, Dr. Alexander King, who adds (Lecture at Goldsmith's Hall, London, April 1965, on "Education and C h a n g e " ) that "not only is there the built-in and self-perpetuating obsolescence within the substance taught," but also "as accurate a picture as possible must be built up of the probable and desirable 799

t h e w o r l d in

convulsion

society and economy of twenty years from n o w , " which is anybody's guess, at least for so many developing countries. There is another aspect to this drama which must be vented: the colonial age fraud of imposing European methods and programs on peoples with incongruous cultures, outlooks and economic and social structures—another example of Western egocentrism—is still being committed nowadays, albeit in American, or neocolonialism or technological versions.

A n d nobody clearly

knows, or really cares to know, what new forms of education and preparation

are required by the developing countries.

Once

again the original sins of our industrial civilization thus emerge. This

civilization

sets

an overly

mechanical

hallmark

on

all

progress, and then claims that its system of values is good for everybody, even if it is completely unsuited for almost two-thirds of the world's population. Not only are these human beings imprisoned in intellectual darkness, but their traditional cultural values, references, and identity arc being shattered.

Ancient institutions become in-

adequate and crumble, time-honored moral values fall into disrepute, other values which were upheld in the marketplace are dislodged by foreign ones, customs which were the fabric of society itself have to be abandoned, religious beliefs evaporate, and ideologies which came as a promise now prove void. T h e shock impact of our heterogeneous technology on the metaphysical cultures of A s i a and naturalistic cultures of Africa will probably grow, not diminish, with the spreading of our type of culturc

among them, which is inevitable

progress along our road.

These

peoples'

if they have

adaptation

to

to (or

alienation f r o m ) the new cultural hybrid which is formed is at the core of many other problems.

But this is only one rung to

climb in the educational ladder.

Other rungs in that ladder

measure higher because of the loss of a sense of purpose that overcomes entire populations with the collapse of their traditional universe. T h e agonizing puzzle is, therefore, what can be d o n e — q u a l i 200

a tidal wave of global

problems

tatively and quantitatively—to help these nations and help them to help themselves.

What compounds the problem is the usual

imbalance between hardware and software, which underscores so many contrasts of modern life.

W e possess extraordinarily effi-

cient technical means for mass education, that can be farmed out to less advanced nations, but we are still groping in semidarkness with regard to the contents and methods of our own educational renewal. A n d yet human resource is our most precious resource, and, as H. G . Wells once said, "human history more and more becomes a race between education and catastrophe."

Therefore, as we are

speculating that a system of universal and life-long education will have to be devised in our advanced countries, no less attention ought to be given to the immeasurable mission of helping young men and women in the less advanced countries at least to assimi'ate the rules, the modes of thinking and acting, and the basic capabilities which are the indispensable assets to participate in modern life.

M y friend G u e m i e r (ibid., page 82) touches on the

right points in summing it up: The education

the developing countries

lack, and

which

no

teacher has yet dreamt of giving them, is the simple, logical education of man in modern society. rational, and of nonfatalism. and experimentation. effect.

The importance of being

The importance of organization

T h e working of the law of cause and

The distinction between the essential and the secondary,

the meaning of orders of importance. work and progress.

T e a m spirit, and a will to

Respect for the rules of the game.

one's initiative, and having an interest in creative research.

Using Here

is a whole gamut of subjects that will one day have to be defined, framed

in an educational

manual,

and

applied

in

new-type

schools.

For the time being, under the circumstances prevailing for the great masses of the world, it is fatuous to preach that every man is the principal agent of his success or failure.

It is true that man 201

t h e w o r l d in

convulsion

has always searched for the meaning of life.

It is also true that

people now aspire to a richer and fuller life, and not mere survival.

But, alongside a minimal standard of material l i f e — w h i c h

often is l a c k i n g — a minimum of education and adequate appropriate technical and civic training are essential.

and

Not only

is the great majority of mankind denied this possibility of selffulfillment, but the dominating powers of the East and the West alike are investing immensely more in brainwashing and arming them than in helping them out of ignorance and backwardness. T h e human drama of so many millions of people deprived of the basic right to an education has political implications as well because it means that numberless citizens are excluded from participation in their countries' ideological, social, and development.

economic

Considering thus on the whole the human aspect

of the world's progress, we are driven to the conclusion that the quality of human resources is relatively deteriorating.

It is no use

pointing out that in most countries there is an increase in the rate of scholarships or number and quality of educational facilities. T h e important factor is not that some improvement has been made with respect to yesterday, but that the rate of this improvement is slower than that of the other rates of growth and acceleration.

This is why I maintain that the average level of

education is more discrepant with the means and exigencies of organized life in this technological age than it was at any time before with respect to the requirements of the respective eras. A n d that the gaps between individual countries have increased enormously. I have no solution to offer, no approach I could think might in due time redress a situation so desperate that it probably kills in the bud the possibility of solving any of the other macroproblems we have examined in the preceding pages.

I would like to hope,

however, that the more advanced peoples of the East and W e s t — blinded though they are by their success and well-being—do not continue on their separate ways as if the storm gathering from 202

a tidal wave of global

problems

this abysmal condition of the great mass of humanity could never touch them.

T h e y need to find some form of uniting their efforts

to attack this central problem.

The Progressive

Degradation

of Our

Ecosystem

In this summary review of the great world issues that we must understand and control, the problems of natural resources and man's constant, massive violation of nature have an important place.

Special regard must be shown to the biosphere that man

should protect jealously against his own contaminations.

The

House Science Committee recently discussed the "hidden" battle man fights against nature.

Through man's f a u l t — h i s wholesale

misuse of resources, uprooting of animals and plants, outpouring of pollutants—both man and nature are the losers.

It was esti-

mated that at this pace our present surroundings will be altered and partially destroyed beyond repair in twenty-five years. A l l countries are threatened, because radiation and the atmosphere know no frontiers, and the waters, soil, plant and animal life, and mineral wealth are, in a certain sense, the common property of all mankind.

According to Professor John M c H a l e ,

the concept of national ownership of a watershed or key mineral deposit must give way as that of sovereignty over air space: " A s we go towards 2000," he says (Architectural Design,

February

"it will behoove us to accept the facts that the resources of the planet can no more belong,

by geographical accident, to

any individual, corporation, country or national group than the air we breathe." W e have here, no doubt, another macroproblem, whose multiple facets are political, juridical, and social, no less than ecological.

A l d o u s Huxley said a few years ago that "only when we get

into our collective head that the basic problem confronting twentieth-century man is an ecological problem, will our politics improve and become realistic."

Changing harmony through suc203

t h e w o r l d in

convulsion

cessive self-adjustments was nature's design for our planet, and space and time were given aplenty to the human species.

But we

take a pride in crashing through new thresholds and subverting natural equilibria beyond their limit of elasticity. Pathos and absurdity are combined in the drama. picture is really alarming.

T h e present

T o put it in the words of an Italian

scholar, Professor Mario Pavan

( L ' U o m o neU'Equilibrio

della

Natura, page 7 ) : The past centuries have witnessed the indiscriminate destruction of nature and her resources throughout the world, a crime which is now being paid for, which will in the future be paid for very dearly.

N o t only

the economy, but also the most

delicate

aspects of our life feel the effects, since in some instance these profound deteriorations have occurred in those

environmental

features most suitable to living beings in general and human existence in particular.

A m o n g many others, pollution is probably the greatest danger.

It is perhaps an inevitable concomitant to, and detritus of, a

technological society, but at the same time it shows our uncivilized disregard, as individuals, for the common weal, and the inadequacy of our institutions to protect and conserve what has been called the World Heritage.

T h e effects of pollution are on

the increase as population grows and technology spreads.

The

most threatening aspect is that we seldom know the consequences of our tampering with and desecrating the complex,

dynamic

system in which man and all other living organisms live and interact. According to the November Quality

of

our Environment"

1965 report on "Restoring the by

the Environment

Pollution

Panel appointed by the President's Science Advisory Committee: Pollutants have altered on a global scale the carbon

dioxide

content of the air and the lead concentrations in ocean waters

20 4

a tidal wave of global and human populations.

problems

Pollutants have reduced the produc-

tivity of some of our finest agricultural soils, and have impaired the quality and the safety of crops raised on others.

Pollutants

have produced massive mortalities of fishes in rivers, lakes and estuaries and have damaged or destroyed commercial shellfish and shrimp

fisheries.

Pollutants have reduced valuable popula-

tions of pollinating and predatory insects, and have appeared in alarming amounts in migratory birds.

Pollutants threaten the

estuarine breeding grounds of valuable ocean fish; even Antarctic penguins and Arctic snowy owls carry pesticides in their bodies.

Let us glance first at animal life.

A l l living things are related

one to another and man is but one species living in a world with numerous others; he depends on many of these others not only for his comfort and enjoyment but for his life.

But man de-

stroys both his fellow animals and their habitat.

Insofar as

fauna is concerned, we outbreed and outsmart the beasts.

We

hunt and destroy them irrationally for food, economic reasons, and other immediate uses, but also for sport and caprice or out of ignorance,

thereby

irremediably

impoverishing

the world

for

coming generations. I am filled with infinite sadness when I read of the vanishing animal species; that eighty of them have disappeared in the last fifty years, and many more are irremediably condemned to extinction in every continent; that during the course of this century the African big game population was reduced by 90 percent; that even the largest mammal, the blue whale, is slaughtered to oblivion, for commercial purposes; and that sprawling human settlements,

roads

and

airports,

industrial

waste,

deforestation,

defoliation, herbicides, pesticides, and what not will complete man's shameful destruction of wildlife. What poetic wisdom was instead contained in the Arusha Manifesto,

issued

by

the

government

of

Tanganyika

(now

Tanzania) in 1961 upon achieving independence:

205

t h e w o r l d in

convulsion

The survival of our wildlife is a matter of grave concern to all of us in Africa.

These wild creatures amid the wild places they

inhabit are not only important as a source of wonder and inspiration but are an integral part of our natural resources and of our future livelihood and well-being.

In accepting the trusteeship of

our wildlife we solemnly declare that we will do everything in our power to make sure that our children's grandchildren will be able to enjoy this rich and precious inheritance.

T h e ensemble of plant and animal life is an essential complement to the human population.

Plants constitute the principal

mechanism to transform energy from the sun for the use of the earth's inhabitants. rates.

But deforestation has gone on at appalling

According to Professor Pavan, the chroniclers report that

in the sixteenth century the armies could move from southern Spain to the northernmost part of Europe without leaving the forests.

Nowadays, you can make the same trip by ten itiner-

aries without encountering one.

T h e relation between human

population and plants will be further degraded in the next decade.

We can only imagine with a sense of guilt what will be the

individual endowment of green spaces left when our successors are six or seven billion, and as some foresee, the megalopolises of the future have grown to touch elbows with one another and thus become ecumenopolises, a frightening, unitary, organized settlement, sprawling, say, from Paris to Peking. It is estimated

that

for the maintenance

of

three

billion

humans, the plant yield required must be sufficient to accommodate an animal population more than four times larger.

This

animal population is needed to transform inedible plant products into foods fit for human consumption.

" A n animal is really just

a factory for processing foods humans cannot eat.

Animals

clean out the toxins, refine low-grade protein, and make animal fat; thus they make a high-grade palatable product out of something that we cannot eat." 206

(William H. Sebrell, Jr. in

Techno-

a tidal wave of global logical Innovation

and Society, page 1 0 1 ) .

problems

So, by manipulating

and upsetting the interacting web of living things, by downgrading and overturning the ecological conditions in many areas, by voluntarily or inadvertently

tampering with the

balancing

mechanisms of the ecosystem, we are jeopardizing our chances of a sane, wholesome life for future generations. Equally dampening is the misuse and ruthless exploitation of the earth's beautiful land wherever we tread or unleash bulldozers.

our

In our haphazard search for profit and space, we

seem moved by a great urge to urbanize as much land as quickly as we can, unconcerned that, once urbanized, it cannot virtually be restored to agricultural use.

A n d equally well known are the

problems of erosion, siltation, laterization, salinization, and overexploitation,

which

are threatening

so many

precious

fertile

lands, and are caused by mistaken farming, stockraising, and irrigation practices. " O n e of the reasons our unplanned use of land has been so destructive both in this country (witness the Dust B o w l eras of 1830 and

1930)

and elsewhere

(the impoverished

lands

of

Greece and Spain, the man-made deserts of Australia and New Zealand, the treeless plains of China and the man-made deserts of North A f r i c a and the Mediterranean basin), is that man's horizon has been so limited, both by terrain and the curvature of the earth, that he could not see himself as a major force at work upon his environment.

What he did was expedient and local, but

its cumulative effect has been, all too often, disastrous" Dynamics

of Change by Don Fabun, II, page 8 ) .

(The

But although

we have now learned to fly, we seem all the same resolved to perpetuate this disastrous trend. Analogous considerations arise regarding mineral

resources.

These are not inexhaustible; indeed, some of them have almost reached a critical volume of existence.

Instead of being their

custodians for future generations as well, we ransack them. However, the most extensive areas of imminent crisis are those

207

t h e w o r l d in of air and water.

convulsion These are problems that have equally great

social and technological connotations.

According to Professor

McHale, about 95 percent of the water available exists in the ocean; the remaining 5 percent of natural fresh water is consumed at a prodigious rate.

Others claim that water will be the

most scarce of raw materials until we have truly economic industrial systems of desalinization. Meanwhile, the waterways and lakes of the highly industrialized areas are subject to growing pollution.

It has been calcu-

lated that in the United States alone industrial and civil waste is fed into inland waters and the atmosphere at an annual rate of 173 million tons and 133 million tons, respectively. society,

Effluent

she has been called. Even majestic L a k e Baikal in Si-

beria, lying among immense woodlands far away from human conglomeration, and once so pure that its waters were considered usable in electric batteries, is now contaminated by a couple of new pulp plants erected on its shores. Professor L a Mont C . Cole says (in a paper presented at the American Association for the Advancement of Science in December 1 9 6 7 ) that we are dumping into the oceans vast quantities of pollutants consisting "of as many as a half-million substances, many of which are of recent origin and biologically active materials such

as pesticides,

radioisotopes,

and detergents,

and

to which the earth's living forms have never before had to try to adapt."

A s only a minute fraction of these substances, and

combinations of them, have been tested for toxicity to marine diatoms or other vital forms, he says, " w e are trusting to luck that we will not upset any of the indispensable biogeochemical cycles."

A n d he quotes many other cases of brinkmanship or

disregard with respect to natural cycles of such chemical elements as oxygen, nitrogen, and carbon, and the cycle of photosynthesis, and the discharge of isotopes by nuclear reactors, and the proposed pacific use of nuclear explosives, all of which we accomplish without knowing in the least what will be the consequences. 208

a tidal wave of global

problems

They might occur suddenly and disastrously, and so he gives to his paper the proper title: Can the World Be Saved?—that

is,

by man, from man, for man. T h e wreck of the Torrey

Canyon,

an oil tanker of

118,000

t o n s — a n d there is speculation about tankers of 500,000 tons and m o r e — a n d its sinking off the coast of Cornwall are a grave warning about how vast stretches of coastland and ocean areas can be rapidly polluted.

Everyone knows the great harm caused almost

everywhere to fish stocks by the industrial pollution of sea and river waters and the construction

of dams and diversion

of

waterways. A s for the atmosphere, we infect and contaminate it with wastes and poisons, as though it were some great gaseous sewer, not something to preserve for the good of all and which we ourselves breathe.

The observations made during the Inter-

national Geophysical Y e a r reveal that the increase in the air's carbon dioxide content is 0.2 percent per annum, with a total of 10 percent since the beginning of the industrial era; that carbon dioxide is being added to the atmosphere by the burning of fossil fuels at the rate of six billion tons a year; that in the year 2000 there will be about 25 percent more of it, leading to a progressive heating of the atmosphere.

"If present trends of carbon

dioxide release continue until the year 2000, global temperatures could be increased, through a greenhouse effect, by as much as 4° C "

(Frederick Sargent, II, in Scientist

and Citizen,

May

1 9 6 7 ) — a n d nobody apparently knows what effects it will have on our lives, although marked changes in climate and a chain of obnoxious, perhaps dangerous, consequences may be easily expected. Returning to Professor M c H a l e , he points out (ibid.)

that "in

addition to fouling, it has been calculated that certain elements essential to life, such as argon, neon, krypton, etc., are now 'mined' out of the atmosphere by industrial operations at a faster rate than they are being produced by the earth's

atmosphere

209

t h e w o r l d in

convulsion

hydrosphere litosphere process."

He concludes with a series of

imperatives that must be observed for the rational administration of

our resources

knowledge.

and

for the intelligent

application

of

our

Thus, we ought to make greater and greater use of

the " i n c o m e " sources of energy—solar and nuclear, wind and water-produced—rather than consume our "capital" sources represented by fuels that sooner or later will be exhausted. Case histories and quotations could be continued more or less ad infinitum.

But even this cursory glance reveals that the atti-

tude of man, the dominant animal of the biosphere, concerning land, water, air, plants and other animals, and the natural cycles, which are at the basis of human life itself, is totally irresponsible, and that the psychosocial system he has built is busily preparing the conditions

for

disaster.

Our

Olympian

indifference,

as

though all this ravage and contamination, and this subversion and pilferage, were occurring on another planet, is certainly the sign of a deep disorder in ourselves.

T h e wreck we indiscrimi-

nately cause in our ecosystem is but the reflection of graver imbalances in our values and judgment. I would like to conclude with a quotation again from Professor M c H a l e : "It should be apparent to all, that we now live in such close community, and within such delicate 'life' margins, that all our actions are now cast on a planetary scale and that our gross ecological errors may reverberate for centuries."

A s all sources

concur that ecological degradation knows no national frontiers, that it may unexpectedly reach some appalling point of no return, the mind and spirit cry out for order and reason. Many

proposals have been put forward.

page 141 et seq.)

Gardner

(ibid.,

cites and comments on some of them, mainly

to be realized within the framework of the United Nations, and ranging from a World Institute for Resource Analysis, to an International Conservation Quinquennium, applying the knowledge gained during the Hydrological Decade, the Biological Program, and the Geophysical Y e a r , and to a Trust for the World 210

a tidal wave of global

problems

Heritage for the identification, establishment and management of the World's natural and scenic areas and historic sites. Instead of waging another kind of battle, this is the crusade that we ought to call for and effectively carry out at the end of this twentieth century, and which should unite all peoples to keep livable the thin film around the planet earth where they live.

Global

Dimensions

to Our

Thinking

T h e picture I have given of the world and its macroproblems in our epoch may be distressing, but so is reality if we do not resolve to face it squarely and undertake to make it different. Far from being exaggerated, this picture does not include other large multicontinental or world problems that are already towering or looming up. T o cite an instance, I discussed the problem of development essentially in relation to the crying needs of the less developed countries.

But the nations of the industrialized North themselves

are not immune from it. industrial countries

A n d , as sustained

development

of the

is a prerequisite to attack the array of future

problems from a strong basis, this must be considered an issue of global interest. I will not deal with our economic situation, because the reader is surely in a position to find all information about it in his daily paper.

However, I would like to note that the economic diffi-

culties of the industrial countries may become greater than we generally consider possible, and actually cripple many an international program. technical terms.

W e call them by names often clouded in Foremost is the so-called problem of interna-

tional liquidity, or of creating new monetary reserve means to complement those invested in gold, dollars and pounds, and thus sustain world production and trade.

A n international

crisis may have very grave consequences.

financial

Not only would it

impair the steady rate of growth of the strong economies, and 211

t h e w o r l d in jeopardize

the

convulsion maintenance

of

assistance

to

underdeveloped

countries, even at present insufficient levels, but it could also bring into existence practically overnight political and social tensions such as to preclude the solution of any other

macro-

problem. Another question certainly of world dimensions I have only indirectly touched is that of security.

The chilling fascination of

the atom being able to blow the world apart has given a "nuclear" connotation to the concept of security, and has tended to obscure produce

the importance chemical,

and the dangers of

microbiological,

which may be the upcoming threat.

and

the

biological

cheaper-toweapons,

These and still other "im-

provements" in our military technology should, however, give us equally chilling jitters. (Unless ix),

Peace Comes,

In a scientific forecast of new weapons edited by Nigel Calder, Introduction, page

A b d u s Salam writes: "Less well known than the nuclear is

the awesome destructive potency of the chemical weapons already in existence—nerve gases, incapacitants, psychic poisons. Still less appreciated is the progress made in recent years with aerosol spraying of deadly biological agents, and very few of us indeed have suspected the possibilities of tampering with the geophysical environment—for example, the burning of a selected territory on earth with intense ultraviolet rays from the sun, by puncturing holes in the naturally protective ozone layer above." A n d Nigel Calder (ibid.,

page 2 4 1 ) adds: " N o really objec-

tive definition of 'human' or 'inhuman' weapons seems possible. O n the other hand, the automation of warfare and the possibilities for attack from great distances must tend to dehumanize military operations and whittle away any remaining sympathy for the sufferings of one's enemies." For the moment, regarding nuclear arsenals, a healthy step away from the usual conception of the (unexisting) equality of sovereignty among nations was to all practical effects taken with the (yet to be signed) nonproliferation treaty. 2/2

It presupposes a

a tidal wave of global

problems

broad agreement that there are nowadays several categories of nations, and this was a decision which, though not relished by all, represents a strictly necessary bow to new realities.

This first

attempt at establishing solidarity among all nations in front of a vital necessity to one and all—though still a negative s o l i d a r i t y — was however gravely vitiated by still being pegged to concepts of power politics, and by not being morally binding enough on the full nuclear powers. T h e real issue to face is that The Bomb is against man's nature and primary interests, and must be banned, period.

T h e solemn

covenant of nations must be that those which do not have it shall not seek it, and those which have it shall not use it.

In matters

of life and death on the modern mass scale, no international treaty can stand unless it is backed by a fair and strong body of moral and political

principles

consistent

with the

technological

age. A new approach to national, continental, and world security is, indeed, one of the major problems of our time.

T h e depth of the

present threat to all of us, and to civilization, and even to mankind's survival, is unfathomable.

Certainly no comfort can be

derived for the future from the recent United States decision to go ahead with the deployment of a "light" defense system against a "small-scale" missile attack, at the "initial" cost of 5 billion dollars, or the equally insensate measures of the Soviet U n i o n — the only other full nuclear power until China breaks the duopoly —which

apparently

provoked

this decision.

Both

sides

are

still prisoner to the balance of terror complex, and while they sow the atomic wind, the whole world reaps the whirlwind.

N o family

and no nation is any longer secure, and no elite and no generation, which is not blind to contemporary realities, can delude itself that this is a way to stable solutions.

Heady nuclear power

can provide only the tyrant's sleepless security: its insane logic demands that, when it appears to be threatened, it must be used. Still another issue of universal scope and scale which I have 213

t h e w o r l d in

convulsion

not discussed is that of the dominance

of man over

progress.

Until recent years, science remained "pure," relatively apart from technology.

N o w extraordinary developments in hard sciences

and related technologies have totally altered the human condition over a remarkably short span of time.

Their tremendous success

has bred arrogance to, and conferred unparalleled political power on, a sector of our society centered around the physical sciences complex. During this period, the social and human sciences, although arising from the same cultural matrix, have been regarded as lesser domains of intellectual and academic challenge in our kind of society.

Is it due to the hard sciences being geared to the

future, and the humanities instead being retrospective?

O r be-

cause these latter are the home of universal and permanent values and seek an equilibrium, whereas the former embody the glamor of the iconoclast and the promise of a modern

philosopher's

stone? Whatever the case, should the present dichotomy continue and be accentuated—as many e x p e c t — b y breakthroughs in biochemistry, pharmacology and in genetic and human engineering, unmatched by a new advancement and

flourishing

of philosophy

and moral sciences capable of blending these innovative streams into the main fold of culture, it is difficult to imagine the emergence of an enlightened society from the present turmoil.

Pro-

fessor Dennis Gabor, in a recent paper for the Science of Sciences Foundation, lists more than one hundred social inventions and innovations which, in his judgment, ought to offer to young, creative thinkers a challenge to assure a high quality of life during the rest of the century.

In a sense, they should countervail the well-

known one hundred technical innovations Kahn and Wiener consider likely in the same period. T o bring about cross-fertilization among the different branches of the systematized knowledge accumulated by man, which are the various sciences, and a balanced interplay of all of them for 214

a tidal wave of global

problems

human development, is the urgent task of the world intellectual community.

If they fail, the society of men may well become a

nightmarish, mechanistic, regimented, and soulless beehive. W e actually have here two main questions: One is to control and steer progress, and the other is to define new values and objectives for the new society.

O n the first count, what both

scientists and laymen should fully understand is that progress in itself means nothing. are relative.

Its great sweeps forward, like all motion,

It isn't only that advancing progress leaves in its

wake a whole hinterland that has to be systematized and organized.

T h e real problem is to achieve control over the direction

and quality of this techno-scientific progress.

I know that it is

difficult to put the genie back into the bottle, but society ought to prepare to restrain and discipline it.

Unless we seriously do so,

we will find it more and more peeping into the privacy of our lives, exploring our minds, subjecting our will, constraining our freedom, and exposing our lives to intolerable hazards. On the other hand, this new effort to re-orient progress and make it subordinate to, and not dominant over, human designs implies that these designs must be clarified.

Here is the crux of

all our problems, and the most difficult test for our generation and the next ones.

But there is no escaping from facing it.

We

are going so fast, and always faster, that we must check our bearings, reconsider our standards, define our goals, and revise our values, which are at the base of it all, before we come to crash point. I do not know if what I have been saying so far is sufficient to depict the formidable barrier of difficulties we have to navigate in the next few decades.

Many of the hopes, problems, and situa-

tions that characterized the postwar period are gone; a new intense, restless, and hard world is before us.

When 1 compare

what I imagine may be the next ten or twenty years to what have been the last ten or twenty years, and consider that many of today's large and complex problems are the direct consequence 215

t h e w o r l d in

convulsion

of complacency, improvidence, and irresponsibility of the recent past, I realize how essential it is for the human race to adopt an entirely new attitude toward its future. We must get accustomed to the idea that the period in which we live is not an ordinary phase in the ascent of human society, when natural regulators of the system at a certain moment automatically intervened to reestablish equilibrium or when half measures and improvisation sufficed to cope with maladjustments when they were detected. We live in the most revolutionary period of human history.

I

wish I could define how much more revolutionary this period is than any other period of the past; I can only s a y — a s I have s a i d — t h a t the speed of all phenomena influencing our lives is immensely greater than ever before, a difference of order not simply of degree; that the number of people affected by change is now enormously bigger than at any other time, which represents another qualitative jump; that where, heretofore, peoples were touched by change only here and there and at different times, and therefore could progressively

adjust themselves to it, so that

change in the long run was probably affecting all of them in the same general direction, nowadays change happens to all peoples or interests, all of them at the same time, and its impact propels them in different directions; and that the density of people all over the earth is much greater, so that peoples so basically different from one another are now living literally or virtually in each other's backyard.

I cannot quantify these factors, but I am

pretty sure that the entire world is going through a greater revolution than any dreamt of by any great revolutionaries of the past. "In historical terms the shift from the industrial age to the cybernetic age is as big as the shift from the agricultural age to the industrial age" (Donald N. Michael in Technological and Society,

page 1 4 9 ) .

Innovation

This second shift, however, is taking

place over the span of only one generation, ours. T h e prime driving force of this revolution is no longer religious 216

a tidal wave of global

problems

belief, ideology, economic pressure, or social injustice, but technological change.

This makes it altogether different from the

revolutions of the past.

Though one may find in it familiar traits

of lesser components or submotives of economic, national, geographic, or ideological o r i g i n — a n d , as a consequence,

odious

racial strains—one cannot rely for its understanding on interpretations based on models of the past. " W h a t is truly new in our time is the fact that man has either achieved, or now has the ability to achieve, unlimited power over his environment in several dimensions" 150).

(Michael, ibid.,

page

These splendid achievements of man, however, are paral-

leled by his incredible misuse of the power thus acquired.

The

overriding issue is therefore of this great beast of technology sitting among us and presiding over our destiny; the issue is of learning to tame it.

It is a revolutionary development by itself

that man-made machines and forces are taking over our planet and anarchically and unpredictably shaping our lives while we remain engrossed in producing these machines and forces and inventing new ones, not knowing how fully to use them to our benefit. In these circumstances the first and paramount act in the process of arriving at correct conclusions with respect to our problems, is to understand the dynamic context in which they have emerged and are to be resolved.

In the case of the very large

problems, those which will decide the future of the Atlantic community and our civilization, or the fate of most or all peoples, this framework cannot be but the world system itself, and the dynamics to be considered are represented by the contrast between the present and future global situations.

A t the same time

we must be constantly aware that, at this level, any mistake we may make in our conduct could have disproportionate and irreparable consequences. It is from the comprehension of these new dimensions that we must derive a congeneric rational framework, the new mental

2/7

t h e w o r l d in

convulsion

frame and ground rules for reason and action, which correspond in our time to the simple principles and intuitive wisdom that up to a few decades ago were sufficient for our ancestors to guide themselves in their relatively uncomplicated

environment

and

solve their problems well enough. T h e day we are able to acquire this global vision and understanding of our destiny, the Great Change

of Direction

in our

stride which now appears so hard to bring about, will seem a matter of course, the natural and right way for our peoples to follow.

T h a t day we will truly start taking the history of the next

crucial decades into our hands. If the reader still has the patience to follow me, I will now try to put forward in a more organized way a few ideas about this N e w A p p r o a c h to our future.

218

P A R T

T H R E E

The Great Change of Direction

CHAPTER 6. "PROJECT 1969"

The New Approach:

First

Step

IN MY VIEW, the first effective step that can be made to promote the acceptance and adoption of the N e w A p p r o a c h to the macroproblems of the world is what I propose to call Project

1969.

This project

feasi-

is intended

bility study on systematic,

to be a multinationally

sponsored

long-term planning of world

scope.

T h e purpose of this unprecedented study program would be multiple.

It would be generally aimed at identifying and study-

ing the problems which require a coordinated global attack, and the related situations, threats and challenges, and ascertaining the possibility of establishing coordinated plans of action to organize their solution according to the goals we may determine.

It

would aim at understanding more clearly the nature of these macroproblems, and their critical interconnections, and at determining whether the existing information about them is quantitatively and qualitatively sufficient, and what should be done to make it more responsive to the necessity of planning.

It would

also explore how existing or new forecasting and planning techniques should be employed to describe present situations and

219

the great change of

direction

trends, calculate projections, draw alternative paths and solutions to reach these goals, and generally foster a greater rationality and objectivity in the decision-making process.

A n d it would investi-

gate which are the most appropriate ways and means to organize in a permanent and efficient form this cognizance of the present, prospection of the future, and a continuous linkage between the two.

Finally, it would aim at preparing factual reports and rec-

ommendations not only for the enlightenment and use of decision centers, but also for national and international public opinion. Whereas urgent guidance on policy-making is the expected outcome, and while specific studies might be focused on certain continents or regions of concern, the long-term view and global context which characterize Project 1969 would be taken as the necessary norm and framework for the study program. T h e newness and exceptional nature and difficulty of a project of this kind, are matched only by its urgency and necessity.

I do

not know of any other study, forecasting or planning endeavor comparable to Project 1969 as to range of subjects and breadth of scope.

A n idea of the mobilization of talent it will require

may be given by the White House Conference on International Cooperation called by President Johnson in November 1965 to discuss "every conceivable approach and avenue of cooperation that could lead to peace." Richard N. Gardner, in Blueprint

for

Peace, page 1, writes: Nothing quite like it had ever happened before.

Some 5,000

people, representing all aspects of American society, gathered in Washington in response to personal invitations.

Thirty

com-

mittees, including leading authorities in each field, presented reports to the Secretary of State containing over four hundred recommendations on subjects ranging from A r m s Control Y o u t h Activities.

to

A n d two hundred and twenty private organ-

izations presented statements on their activities in the field of international cooperation.

220

"project

1969"

However, that conference was a different thing, being nationally centered and therefore, whatever its lofty inspirations, subject to national motivations and interests.

A n d also because the

various subjects were not strictly coordinated, such as the previous pages have abundantly demonstrated to be now necessary, and finally because the hundreds of recommendations put forward, some of them exceptionally worthy, were unfortunately relegated to the shelves of "things to be done," rejoining those of so many committees before and after this c o n f e r e n c e — w h i c h is the fate of too many one-sided proposals concerning international life.

T h e y may be the right proposals, but people resent being

dished out schemes which they themselves have not participated in shaping. Project 1969 partakes more of the nature and scope of the work being done by the Commission on the Y e a r 2000, but in the world context.

This initiative of the American A c a d e m y of Arts

and Sciences is the most inspiring, and intellectually and professionally relevant undertaking in the orderly prospection of the future.

I wish more people could share in the results of its

labors.

T h e Summer 1967 issue of Daedalus

makes the most interesting reading.

dedicated to it,

In the words of Daniel Bell,

the commission chairman: It is an effort to indicate now the future consequences of present public-policy decisions, to anticipate future problems, and to begin the design of alternative solutions so that our society has more options and can make a moral choice, rather than be constrained, as is so often the case when problems descend upon us unnoticed and demand immediate response.

The objective of Project 1969 is similar, but the change of scale from the United States to the world as a whole, the aggregation of extremely different areas, the majority of them in a pathetic condition, the nature and gravity of the world problems, 221

the great change of

direction

and the lack of a uniform statistical basis render the task immensely more complicated, and require that the forecasts, prospecting, and planning involved in the exercise be studied and expressed in far more general terms.

These particular features

inject also political difficulties—and implications—of order into Project 1969.

the

first

O n the other hand, not only must we

brace our thinking to accept this global context henceforth as a standard norm when the long-period future is considered in general terms, but we should recognize that nowadays it represents an indispensable reference for any such national or continental prospection as the Commission on the Y e a r 2000, or other similar bodies, may further undertake. M y present conception of this newest human venture is perforce preliminary, as it is unorthodox.

But at all events here is

an outline of the project, as I see it, for all those who know better to improve upon. ( a ) Project 1969 would be a joint undertaking scope,

involving

the combined

capacities

of world of

the

advanced countries: the United States, Europe,

the

Soviet Union, and Japan. It is important that Project 1969 be conceived from the beginning as a joint venture of the developed countries, which recognize the inescapable moral and historical necessity that the major problems of our age should now be thoroughly studied in a global perspective.

In deciding to undertake this study by a combined

effort, they should make it clear that they consider this as a service being rendered not only to themselves, but to the entire world community.

It is likewise important that it should be

initiated without delay, namely soon after the completion of the preparatory period required to define more clearly the various basic concepts and work out a concrete project proposal.

222

"project ( b ) Project 1969 would be a study of the general bility of forecasting, world

prospecting,

1969"

feasi-

and planning at

scale.

A s we know, the motivation of the entire study program is that in the technological age society can no longer have a wait-and-see attitude as events rush along, particularly because the possibility cannot be discarded that the deterioration of many world situations and problems—and consequently, also those of nations and continents—may be quickening beyond our worst expectations. Faced by this necessity and this perspective, Project 1969 would address itself to the question of whether it is possible to substitute for the present short-term, piecemeal, uncoordinated and generally improvised and ineffective approach to the modern world, some kind of rational and planned approach by which adequately to face realities and resolve problems so extraordinarily large and complex as those confronting us in the future. T h e purpose of this collective study would in substance be to examine, in a professional and dispassionate spirit, according to the art of planning and the body of knowledge existing now or in the foreseeable future, what our capacity is to conceive coherent long-term schemes, plans, and goals of world scope; and what are the new concepts, methods, techniques, instruments, and institutions which may help the powers that be to formulate the corresponding implemental strategies and policies. T o execute this feasibility study, a formidable multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary effort would be required, consisting mainly of an inventory and critical evaluation of elements available, interpretation of data and trends, exploratory and research activities, forecasts, expert opinion and conjectures about specific future developments, and coordination of measurable phenomena with intuitive assessment.

Admittedly, these activities would in

part reach toward the frontiers of knowledge or the vacuum space between one body of knowledge and another, but they 223

the great change of

direction

ought to maintain all the same the highest possible level of objectivity and dependability. ( c ) Project 1969 would consider a phased, approach to the final objective control of the

progressive

of how we can gain

future.

Being a highly integrated and composite effort covering an immense field and branching out in many as yet uncharted directions, Project 1969 would permit a most varied set of focalizations in the study of the subject matters, and in turn its format may be considered from different angles.

Bearing in mind, how-

ever, that by definition the objective is to ascertain the feasibility of nothing less than a system-wide prospection and planning of world scope, I would put the accent on the necessity of engaging in the task by progressive steps.

Three phases of increasing

difficulty and importance, though in practice overlapping, seem to me conceptually identifiable according to the main types of activity that have to be undertaken. T h e first phase, informative

or cognitive,

should be devoted as

already mentioned, to a critical review of both capacities and information existing or developing in qualified quarters, and if and how this base could be improved and complemented to suit our objective of preparing for the future. O n the one hand, an inventory should be made of the state of the art of both forecasting and planning, and of the systematic analysis of the most general and integrated problems of society. In Technological

Forecasting

in Perspective,

a comprehensive

and penetrating survey he made for O E C D in 1966, and which has since become a textbook, Dr. Erich Jantsch has offered a very valuable summing up of the state of forecasting theory and practice, particularly with regard to aspects related to economic growth.

T h e more we investigate, the larger, we discover, is the

ground to be explored, as well as the key role of technology and 224

"project

1969"

its i m p a c t — b o t h positive and n e g a t i v e — o n every aspect of modern life.

It is not only that "all mainstreams of technology can

ultimately be placed within a broad social context" (page 9 0 ) , but, Jantsch adds, one may even "discern a 'natural' trend to fuller and fuller integration of forecasting and planning so that in the 1970's the technological forecasting function may be increasingly 'dissolved' in the planning function" (page 8 3 ) . B y this convergence, a new branch of science is probably being formed, as complicated as a n y — t h a t of organizing active thinking about the future.

It will encompass also the intellectual tools

and particularly the formal and systematic methods by which large systems can be designed and analyzed, and the great mass of data obtained by observation or forecasting be processed, and their combined significance evaluated, so as to supply an appropriate working basis for our planning.

V e r y much however has

to be done also to take stock of existing capacities in this field. International comparison and coordination in it is still in its infancy.

Even the language is not yet systematized.

T h e report of

the Sussex Conference I have already mentioned states textually that "there is much overlap, factually and historically, between the terms 'systems analysis,' 'operational research,' 'operational analysis,' 'large system theory,' and 'cybernetic methodologies,' and there are differences at present in connotation in different countries." F o r certain, in the whole of this area there would be much scope for work under Project 1969.

O n the other hand, even if

we could clearly grasp where we are with all these complicated techniques, and what will be their trend in the near future, the major and truly delicate task would remain.

This is that of

identifying what elements and knowledge we possess, or are necessary,

about

the

starting

basis

of

the

whole

process—the

present, which is both elusive and in flux. Only by firmly establishing an objective and reliable base of statistical series and other data about the present, for both measurable and the more

225

the great change of

direction

subjective phenomena, can we meaningfully start reasoning about the future. But even in a country as statistically minded as the United States the sources of information that may provide the factual input for the forecasting and planning process are by and large inadequate, quantitatively

and qualitatively.

And

within

the

United States, even in familiar and limited fields, uncertainties and contradictions abound.

F o r example, let me quote Professor

Donald A . Schon, who cites (Daedalus, ibid.,

page 7 6 5 )

that

in the case of new production equipment, "efforts at forecasting are plagued by a lack of appropriate, uniform, complete, credible and timely data.

Because there are no formats for standard data

or mechanism for collection and analysis, there is little reliable, uniform, credible data." Considering the far greater complexity of the civilian problems of the world with respect to that of the new production equipment manufactured in the United States, and the scarcity of organic information about them, a question of the first importance in Project 1969 is to decide which data under the present circumstances are reasonably necessary, and then critically review the present information sources and supply, examine how they can be improved and coordinated, and how the elements gathered should flow to the processing centers.

T h e difficulty of the task

is made even greater by the fact that our generation is so taken aback by the current upheaval of change that it has lost its grasp of which things really express the sense of our time, and in which direction they are moving.

Therefore, to put together the terms

of reference of the dependable information base necessary to this type of project is in itself a very tall order, and probably will require a continuing effort as the project goes along, lasting well beyond its completion. Another major difficulty is then to ensure to the best of our collective capacity that the base of our reasoning is objective and not distorted, as is often the case when the national and the 226

"project international mingle.

1969"

There is no need to stress again that infor-

mation, both factually correct and politically unbiased, is by all means essential.

Incredible harm is done by the ubiquitous mis-

representation of facts and motives for the sake of national, class, or ideological interests.

Twisting reality to accommodate one's

own aims and policies has been inherited as the second and legitimate nature of politics and diplomacy from times when this unwarrantable practice was less deleterious than today.

However, it

is being perpetuated to this day, as we all know, in spite of the great role it played in bringing about two disastrous world wars, the cold war, and a latent state of belligerency throughout the world. A n d though things are already so complicated that they vastly exceed our capacity to understand them, the vision of billions of people is being further distorted and their minds warped by the mystifications, fabrications, half-truths of the various propaganda machines, especially when political interests are at stake.

Mass

communications media help in this brainwashing, though in the end they will prove the worst enemy of brainwashing, and the strongest instrument for people to form their own independent judgment.

A very valuable by-product of Project 1969 would

thus be that of offering the major powers a good occasion to reconsider their propaganda efforts—they are canceling themselves out mutually, a n y h o w — a n d realize that objectivity pays also dollarwise. T h e second phase would be speculative.

It would be con-

cerned with exploring what futures may emerge from the present. In this phase, focal problems and phenomena, namely

those

having a determinant effect on the general future, should be more accurately recognized, and their nature, contours, dynamic behavior, and critical interrelationships identified to the best of our capacities.

T h e n some of these problems requiring urgent attack

should be submitted to intensive study with a view to forecasting various possible futures which may be expected to be generated

227

the great change of

direction

from present conditions under different sets of carefully selected assumptions.

These are futures that with a high degree of prob-

ability can result from the dynamics of the system and our supposed action.

Whenever possible, models should be used simu-

lating as closely as possible the present situation, the momentum and directions of the lines of force characterizing these problems and their relation with the global system or the subsystem to which they pertain.

A number of feasible trends could thus be

projected into the foreseeable future, and hence a spectrum of coherent and realistic future alternatives p r e p a r e d — a s many as our information elements and our techniques can insure. M u c h can be said about the validity of the conjectures and anticipations—economic,

scientific, technological,

demographic,

medical, e t c . — t h a t it is now fashionable to make about the future, and as mentioned, undoubtedly much more has to be done to perfect today's methodology and techniques in this respect. For sure, we must recognize that few absolute statements about the future can be formulated with the certainty that they will not be disproved as time goes on, and that the limitations on our capacity generally to predict future events and trends are still overwhelming. A t the same time, we may rejoice in seeing that a great deal of research, analysis, and reflection is under way in America, Europe, and the Soviet Union to acquire a firmer notion of what is likely to happen in many

fields.

Coupled with the extraordinary

advances made by information science and technology, they provide excellent material for international cross-fertilization—a development that Project 1969 would certainly facilitate. I know of two major schools of advanced modern thinking about the future.

Of the French one, where it all started with

Gaston Berger immediately after the Second World War, the two main expressions are the Perspective

group, and that founded by

Bertrand de Jouvenel, who is considered the symbol of the more general, social and humanistic meditations on the future. 228

He

"project adopted and diffused the word futuribles,

1969"

the possible futures

likely to eventuate out of presently known situations.

The Anglo-

Saxon school is more influenced by the formal techniques of systems analysis initially used in defense work, and now to be applied to the general social context. Granted, for quite a number of years to come there will still be a very wide margin of imperfection and subjectivity in the intellectual exploration of what the future may turn out to be by the occurrence of certain facts and the adoption of certain policies. However, this sobering observation will not detract from the fact that we can make better choices the more we can say about the future, and that this continuous and refined speculation cannot but fortify our knowledge about which type of options and alternative paths are open to us in this difficult world.

Therefore,

even if the exercise of Project 1969 should stop at this stage, it would

make

an invaluable

contribution

to our forward

and

global thinking. But it would include a third phase as well which would be normative,

being devoted, as a f u r t h e r — a n d more sophisticated,

and more necessary—intellectual exercise, to defining patterns of coherent

futures that not only can emerge, but which we want to

create for the world system between now and, say, the year 1990 or 2000.

T h e core of the idea of these willed futures

is to

construct alternative models of the future responding to our goals, and then to test their feasibility by iterative feedback confrontation with the present.

" T h e future should be viewed as a

solution to the present"—advises O z b e k h a n — " n o t as an extension of it."

T h e exercise would concern itself with the situations

and developments we wish to determine or promote for a certain period ahead, but also include negative prescriptions, conditions we want to foreclose or prevent.

namely

It would bring us to

explore the possibility to which we have finally to accustom our thinking, that of inventing or shaping the future. In point of fact, there are some problem areas within the gen-

229

the great change of

direction

eral system in which s o c i e t y — t o survive, or simply to progress and preserve certain fundamental qualities of l i f e — m u s t pretty soon establish what are its goals in the world order ten, twenty, or thirty years hence; and then, to be sure of reaching them, work backward to the present, in order to deduce intermediate targets and the conditions required all along that span of time for their attainment.

On the basis of this normative, future-creative plan-

ning, the strategies and policies should be defined which, by alternative ways, are apt to assure the maintenance of these conditions, and eventually the attainment of the goals decided upon. This future-to-present normative planning at global scale is indispensable, for instance, to bring under effective control certain major issues in the population-food, education, and conservation problem areas.

security,

A n d in more general terms, a

strategy of rational and flexible responses to drastic change and gigantic phenomena, particularly in domains of great societal consequence, will have to have increasing recourse to the normative approach to the future and the dynamic planning it entails. But normative planning constitutes a totally new exercise, particularly at this scale.

Moreover, to be effective, it has to be a

continuous undertaking.

Not only must a mutual reconciliation

be found, within a rational loop, between the present (where we a r e ) , the future (where we want finally to b e ) and the in-between continuum (the path or paths to f o l l o w ) , but, as time goes b y — and situations change, and our knowledge of these situations becomes better, and also our preferences, values and views possibly change, and experience is g a t h e r e d — w e must be prepared to refine the entire loop and adjust our planning to these evolving realities. I am sure that the tremendous chain of difficulties to overcome need not be stated twice.

T h a t is why Project 1969 should be

firmly in the hands of the most advanced nations, and why it has to be a feasibility study executed by progressive steps.

Should its

conclusion be that at the present stage of our capacities a mean230

"project

1969"

ing f ul normative planning design of world scope is practically unfeasible, or still premature, the benefits derived by

Project

1969 would all the same be immense. Project 1969 would forcefully inject into our thinking the twin necessities of making an objective diagnosis of the serious world situation, and of rationalizing the basis for long-term

action.

Moreover, one of the important traits of the normative outlook is that it is less subject to the political and emotional influence of the present.

It is more logical because it is based on prior effort

to define coherent future goals and environment.

A n d it is edu-

cative, because it develops in our mind a more balanced relationship between the present and the future, which in turn will foster the desire more objectively to understand our time, and develop future-conscious and futures-creative attitudes.

Finally, it will

put to society some moral choices, for most normative goals will have to respond to higher philosophical and ethical standards than the usual policy aims, which are too conditioned by immediate interests. Beyond any doubt, the question of goals is extremely difficult to define, and is bound to raise bitter, even dogmatic controversies.

Lamentably none of our societies is accustomed to thinking

about long-term goals—indeed, the practice of organizing rational thought about the future is very r a r e — a n d at present there is not even a standard base of values which may guide them in defining common goals.

Many fundamental values are upset

nowadays, or are undergoing profound changes in all societies as these are being transformed by the technological

revolution.

However, I estimate that this discussion is also necessary and that the exercise would be fruitful; and that by tentatively pinpointing vital goals for mankind to pursue, more convergence than dissent will emerge among societies otherwise at loggerheads with one another even on matters of trivial or passing importance.

231

the great change of

direction

( d ) Project 1969's time-horizon

would be

sufficiently

jar ahead. T h e significance and usefulness of overly long-term forecasts or conjectures on too wide a front, for instance, up to the year 2000 and beyond, may be questioned.

O n e fundamental reason

for skepticism is that the longer the period, the greater the probability that the unexpected may occur.

Thirty years ago, for ex-

ample, nobody could have foreseen the great spread of information and computer technologies, of automation, cybernation, and nucleonics, nor was it possible to imagine the application of laser and maser, of artificial satellites, of cryogenics and holography, the discovery of the D N A codes, or the advances on the frontiers of human engineering and biochemistry. However, a very long-term framework is inherent in the concept itself of normative planning at world level, or is plainly necessary to bring under control macroproblems of the kinds we have discussed.

What should be made here is a distinction be-

tween the time-frame required to regain that control, and achieve our ideal g o a l s — a s may be defined n o w — w h i c h may go well beyond the frontier of year 2000 itself, and the over-all timeframe to be adopted for operational planning.

Let us suppose

that the advisability would become apparent that normative goals be built around a certain stability of the population-food complex, or the integral solution of the education problem, or rational use of the world's land, or global control of fresh water of the natural and man-manipulated cycles.

In this case, projec-

tions and goals should be extended, for instance, up to fifty years and more from now, if this were considered the time-space required to make these goals attainable.

A n d as they would be

reached in progressive stages of relative equilibrium and accomplishment, intermediate checkpoints and goals would have likewise to be established.

The

important

thing is not to

fix

intermediate goals in isolation, independently from the long-term 232

1969"

"project

normative trend, because this would constitute a departure from the solution course adopted. O n the other hand, Project I969's objective would be to answer reliably the question whether we have the capacity, and by which ways and means, to plan our way by tackling the macroproblems complex in an orderly and effective manner, instead of going on confusedly struggling with these problems in a heap; and its end product should be a service—the guidance provided for the practical business of policy-making.

Moreover, the mul-

tiplicity of problems to be considered, their diverse nature and requirements, the nonuniform availability and reliability of basic information, and our capacity to forecast aboilt some phenomena better than about others, and to assert our planning in some sectors more than in other sectors, all suggests that our various prospections should be made on different time-horizons.

And

that the time-frame to be selected to organize some endeavor of world scale operational planning be compatible with our capacity to follow it through by reaching pertinent decisions and then enacting them. In this respect, my guess is that a time-bracket of some ten years would prove to be representative and manageable enough to be adopted to coordinate, assemble, and consolidate the mass of elements resulting from the exercise.

In the case of normative

goals whose fulfillment requires a longer lapse of time, consolidation would be made based on the intermediate goals and plans pertinent to the shorter period considered.

A n d this aggregation

would constitute the fundamental intellectual and factual base from which to draw conclusions from the study program executed under Project 1969, and norms for further work. A t all events, the exercise would be but the tentative and preliminary manifestation of what, to be really fruitful, must be a continuing program,

an institutional

practice of the

civilized

w o r l d — o f which Project 1969 itself is, in fact, intended to be only the first step.

Hence, profound modifications and perfecting 233

the great change of

direction

would follow this first step.

Not only would the sliding forward

or rolling on method, in which a year is added at the end of the period to replace each year as it is completed, and the other known practices to update current plans be adopted, and a continued stewardship of the work going on made, but innovations and more advanced techniques would be introduced.

A n d the

effect would probably be that the future would be progressively scanned further than the time-horizon of my present guess. ( e ) Project 1969 would

be a scientific,

nonpolitical,

nonpartisan, and nonmilitary-oriented

undertaking.

T h e purely scientific character of the entire study p r o g r a m — isolated from any outside influence or contamination, like a lab experiment—would be an essential prerequisite for the credibility and success of Project 1969. This is a self-evident requirement.

Although it would have to

be promoted and funded mainly by political entities, which are the governments of the advanced countries, its worthiness would depend on its objectivity and remoteness from political interference.

A n d here is another reason for its sponsorship to be, as

far as possible, nationally balanced, and its execution entrusted to men of high scientific integrity and independent judgment, hailing from different countries. The covenant by which Project 1969 would be enacted should include all sorts of safeguards in this respect.

Reciprocally,

these safeguards would probably protect the exercise from undue external meddling.

It is possible that the sponsoring c o u n t r i e s —

each one beset by its own troubles, as they a r e — m i g h t expect from it the suggestion of some ingenious, unthought-of, or facesaving way out of their impasse

in many areas.

But without a

doubt they would not for its sake compromise in advance any ideological or policy postures, and would probably like to see written in clear letters, from the start, that no conclusion of Project 1969 is binding on any party to it. 234

"project ( f ) Project 1969 would, however, mately have deep political

by definition,

1969"

ulti-

implications.

Behind the idea of Project 1969 stands the conviction that a great plurality of people in all countries, in East and West alike, though still largely ignorant of the growing seriousness of problems throughout the world, sense that there is something fundamentally wrong in the way we are going, and are, therefore, prepared to subscribe to practically any reasonable formula of comprehensive international planning directed at relieving the tensions of the present and meeting the threats of the future. A n d that particularly among the younger generations, there actually exists such a common denominator of deep concern and restlessness about how the world is being m a n a g e d — t h e irrepressible worldwide university turmoil is proof of this, for all to s e e — a s would support a joint effort to find a new, more rational, and more enlightened direction for human affairs. Therefore, everything in Project 1 9 6 9 — t h e new language, the shoulder-to-shoulder work, the search in common of true meanings and plain realities, the quest for wider and farther horizons and more universal values, the adventurous spirit of building the greatest empire ever dreamt of, the city of man—everything it would embody and stand for has finally a political sense and impact.

This essence does not need any advertisement or propa-

ganda, nay, it ought to remain very far in the background until the project has been well launched—lest spirits trapped in the past and privileges vested in the continuation of the present should kill the effort in the bud.

But, when on, Project

1969

would itself be a political reality. Finally, why Project

1969?

An

undertaking of this kind

should have been started by all means when it first became apparent that assured disaster for the whole of mankind in a not far distant future could not be ruled out as the possible outcome of human intolerance and stupidity.

But this was not done. 235

I

the great change of

direction

think that now it can be done. Project

This is the reason for calling it

1969.

A corollary reason is that those who speculate about the future usually indulge in imagining the wonders, or even hazards, of the year 2000, or draw our attention to horizon 1985 or depict the probable world of 1975.

This kind of prognostication glamoriz-

ing the future, for good or bad, acts as an opiate, and obscures the real issues we are in the throes of, subtly inducing into the present a bewildered expectancy, whereas alertness and purpose should be our banner flying high. answer the right questions. ture?

A n d it does not help much to

H o w can we get to this far-off fu-

Is mankind, are we ourselves, on the right track, or are we

all on the wrong one careening toward some colossal collision with situations and forces that grow stronger than us? still put them under control, if we start acting now?

C a n we

A n d , in any

case, is there not a way to build a saner, more humane future than those we thus predict? This is why our study and our effort must start now, and our project must be 1969.

Though looking far ahead, it is from right

now that we must plan and toil, and while we undertake presently this work, we must never lose sight of our distant goals. these verbs are in the present tense—the why of

All

1969—because

it is from the present that we have got to start, and then carry on over all this space of time, the task of building the new society of man.

Recapitulating Now

that

a

the

tentative

Premises outline

of

Project

1969

has

been

sketched, I will again pick up the thread of what I have been saying in previous pages, overviewing the condition of the contemporary world. In my exposition, I have tried to simplify the congeries of problems and systems we have to deal with to more or less un236

"project derstandable proportions.

1969"

A s already mentioned, simplification

and synthesis involve the selection by subjective judgment of the most relevant factors. arbitrary.

T h e choices made may sometimes be

In my review of the different issues, I have adopted

various focal elements to get a better insight into the nature of each issue.

This is necessarily a personal interpretation of their

relevancy, and in the course of further studies altogether different assumptions and viewpoints may, by all means, be adopted. However, I think that the choices I have made are warranted. In the case

of

the

Atlantic

community,

I have

considered

technology-engendered societal transformation—which in turn is about to create a most decisive chasm between America

and

E u r o p e — a s by far the dominant factor at this phase of history, and have discussed the problems of Atlantic compactness principally from the angle of a common strategy to achieve unity in the present dynamic technological context.

While there are many

other forces and problems to be analyzed, here

technological

developments are, in my opinion, the key element inasmuch as they are capable of wrecking the Atlantic platform, and thus not only endangering the future of the Atlantic peoples, but also preventing them from taking the lead in a general overhaul of the world system. When we have cast a panoramic glance at the present world organization, it has seemed to me that at this juncture the most striking element is, however, its state of geopolitical explosiveness.

China is the strategic and most frightening powder keg in

this picture, but the flames that may spark it, and the entire planet, into a telluric eruption are still simmering.

One day, all

other peoples will be confronted by imperious, probably inexorable demands or actions by this giant among them. A s there is some time in hand—perhaps a decade or m o r e — I have not discussed these problems.

But this is still another reason for the

Atlantic peoples to take the lead and see that the rest of the world is fairly organized by then.

A n d if in doing so, they are 237

the great change of

direction

wise and b o l d — a n d keep strong—there may be a good chance, when that fateful day comes, that fruitful across-the-board agreements may be reached for a long-haul, constructive world settlement, with the full participation of that mighty people of ancient and shining civilization.

Let us keep our fingers crossed, and

prepare. A s we then moved on to consider specifically the Soviet bloc and its relations with the West, I suggested that the determinants of the future are to be found principally among the economic factors.

T h e y really lie at the roots of the anguishing suspense

that may now motivate one way or the other the Kremlin leaders, the Muskovites, and all other R u s s i a n s — a n d , with them, the Czechs, Hungarians, Poles, etc.

If they are sure to get their

economy really going for the next five or ten years, they will be mutually lenient, from top to bottom, and the risks and pleasures of a more open society will be generally accepted, with their lights and shades, mixed as they will be with a long-awaited, more generous dose of well-being. While I am writing, the summer crisis of 1968 in Czechoslovakia is just off its peak.

Trying to see through the low f o g of

the conflicting news, rumors, and assessments, and considering the trend of the present not less than the potential of the future, I confirm my analysis that the development perspectives in the U S S R are crucial in this respect.

Let me again say that East-

West contrasts may easily be escalated to a critical confrontation should the Soviet economy experience a serious breakdown, or if the Soviet rulers anticipate that it will soon happen*, and that conversely, if the Soviets can successfully pursue their recently initiated process of radical economic transformation—with

all-

out Western help—altogether new situations will emerge permitting East to join West in considering ways and means to assure a period of generalized stability and development throughout the world. For the remaining and far more numerous multitudes of the 238

1969"

"project

less developed or poor countries, and the essential question of their relationships with the industrial nations, I have but repeated what is practically a truism n o w a d a y s — t h a t the overwhelming and pressing sense.

question

is their

development

in

the

broadest

This has built up into a primordial urge, which however

is wholly unsatisfied, and is probably unsatisfiable unless nearly miraculous solutions are engineered in a host of related domains, from education improvement to population containment.

An-

other momentous day, this urge may manifest itself with primeval force.

However, right now we must be aware that in the core

or periphery of these areas are rooted many of the macroproblems which represent the threat and challenge of the next decades, and which, therefore, must be solved before it is too late.

But no

solution to these problems is possible without the full commitment of the strong n a t i o n s — E a s t and West together—jointly to undertake studies and action of really global scope. Finally, I have singled out for a cursory direct examination some of the macroproblems marking our time, and have quoted reliable and respected sources to show how desperate is the need for new types of solutions—effective solutions—and how mense the undertaking required to produce them.

im-

In outlining

the problems specifically involving our natural environment, I have not adopted any specific focal element, because I simply do not know which issues are really the most critical and important ones.

However, since I am afraid that one day we will suddenly

discover that something is irreparably

changed in the

world

around us, and find ourselves face to face with some grave ecological crisis, I have just indicated to the best of my knowledge which are the main problems looming up. O n the whole, looking at all the issues together in a futureoriented historical perspective, I have underlined that two central imperatives stand out. sions, Atlantic

A t this time of global change and convul-

solidarity

and

East-West cooperation,

in

that

order, are, and for a couple of generations probably will remain, 239

the great change of

direction

the indispensable prerequisites for all other problems to be tackled effectively and for the world to progress. the two Great Keys to the future. of the advanced countries.

T h e y represent

Both of them are in the hands

T h e question is whether the genera-

tions on which this commitment rests are capable of understanding its imperativeness, and of generating the moral, intellectual, and political forces which are necessary to follow them through. For all its shortcomings and simplifications, I trust I have offered in the preceding chapters a fairly accurate compendium of the precarious state of the world at this time.

I know that my

effort cannot be as erudite as some of the expert sectoral analyses or specific problem studies of which there is an abundant crop nowadays.

This is why, whenever I could, I have

highly authoritative opinions and documentation.

utilized

On the other

hand, I have had to try and keep a rather vast and heterogeneous bulk of matters balanced and manageable. A s already stated, my purpose was to show the reader the real state of the w o r l d — w e need an objective State of the World Message—evidencing particularly key global problems and areas of concern, their continuous mutual interaction and the growing complexity of their swollen tangle, with the idea of proposing a new, adequate way to face their multiple menace to world stability: the N e w A p p r o a c h we have been discussing.

A n d my pur-

pose was also to show that inherent to the objective of moving toward a new stage of global cooperation, or at least a more rational and civilized management of world affairs, is a new concept of man's role, and the role of advanced peoples, in this age of science and technology. In describing the contemporary human drama, and advocating this new approach, I may possibly have overstated the

threat

element, and given the impression that the threat is here and now while, in all objectivity, it may materialize sometime in the future, maybe in ten or twenty years. about this emphasis.

W e should spare a word

T o depict with today's crude light tomor-

row's disasters, knowing that one day or the other they will visit 240

"project

1969"

us, unless we take an altogether new course, falls within the scope of this essay.

Moreover, I hold it to be an essential de-

mand of civilization that the future be considered equal, not next, in importance to the present. A n d now that human society is invested by phenomena of unheard-of character or violence, the threat theme needs to be a cardinal trait of our thinking anyhow.

W e would fail to be

realistic if we were not aware that threat and potential threat dominate our lives.

We cannot afford to repeat the basic mis-

take which is at the origin of the present predicament of our societies, namely to extrapolate from the past

arithmetically,

when the progression of the phenomena bearing on our situation is geometrical, and their combination exponential. There is finally a corollary motivation to the rationale of being blunt in presenting the entire world situation in this gloomy light.

It is the compulsion of fighting a negative complex which

is particularly to be deprecated because it tends to polarize Western society's response to present threats to the extremes either of doing nothing, or using a heavy hand.

This complex is a mixture

of complacency (for our feats, strength), and self-delusion (what needs doing is done when our experts study the problem), of fatalism (these problems have no solution), and carpe diem egotism (coming generations will worry about it).

These negatives

prevail in the conventional, generally retrospective outlook of our political class—though they are not its exclusive prerogative.

A

cry of alarm probably will not directly budge our political establishment, but public opinion may be the transmission pulley. Project 1969 stems from the premises thus summarized.

We

may now likewise run over the sum and substance of the main principles which should guide its conceptual formulation.

Four Basic

Principles

I am confident that the outlines of the new rational framework that should henceforth support and guide us in an intelligent 241

the great change of

direction

approach to the world's macroproblems will appear rather simple and natural if only we succeed in liberating ourselves from the overwhelming involvements which frame our mind in the present, and orientating instead our vision toward the future.

Certain

concepts that are at the source of this new stream of forward thinking, and some of the guidelines to apply it have appeared here and there in these pages during the discussion of individual subjects and problems.

A l s o the global dimension which is re-

quired of this new thinking has been mentioned, albeit a little too hastily for the importance of this topic. This rational framework and all these related concepts and principles are by no means novel or extraordinary, for they are repeatedly ventilated and heralded with various degrees of sincerity and conviction in many parts of the world.

What at this

early stage is lacking is an organized intellectual endeavor to coordinate and systematize the new thinking in theory and formulation so as to organize the conceptual basis of the new science of programming the future.

For the moment this will remain a field

of study, until some scientist of science has a hard look at all this matter and starts a movement to lay the foundations of the new science of the future. Pending this better definition and structure of our forward thinking, I venture to say that some of its key ideas may be condensed

around the following four basic principles,

which

should govern the purpose, scope and direction of Project 1969. ( a ) Mankind tegrated system,

and his environment

macrosystem,

the

extremely

constitute

an in-

complex

world

which results from the aggregation of a very

great number and variety of interacting systems and subsystems.

The

different societies,

problems,

and

problem families are systems embedded in larger systems in turn encompassed by the world system.

All

these systems continuously interact with one another, in 242

1969"

"project highly-dynamic, mutual-influence relationships.

Ade-

quate study of large problems having paramount importance for man's future can be made only in the context of this planetary framework. ( b ) Many of the component under the threat of major tion.

systems are

breakdowns,

constantly

even

destruc-

T h e main direct or indirect cause of this state of

instability is accelerated and uncontrolled technological progress.

The

consequences—destabilizing

and

un-

predictable—of serious disruption in any major system seriously

affect many

other systems

and the

entire

macrosystem. (c)

To

match

the extreme

complexity

mism of this plurality of interlocking vent disaster, gently needed.

new planning

and

dyna-

systems, and pre-

of worldwide

scope

is ur-

This planning, on the other hand, is

also indispensable to improve the state of the major systems, and indirectly of the whole complex. (d)

To organize

implementation

world planning and its

is the collective

groups in a position to undertake

obligation

subsequent

of all human

them.

These principles embody many intermeshing concepts.

A t this

stage I would like to make some further brief remarks on the question of putting across to public opinion those related to the words: system, planning, world scale.

complexities,

and cooperation,

all on a

A n d this because public opinion, world public

opin-

ion, or at least a very large body of what is called more often international public opinion, is a force on the ascent in the interplay of forces which affect the way we do things, the way we may change things.

I do not wish to fall into the mistake of generaliz-

ing the importance of too recent events, but I see signs of this growing importance of world public opinion in what happened, 243

the great change of

direction

domestically, in the United States, and internationally, to the Soviet Union, in this fateful 1968. T o imagine man and his environment as forming one system in which everything is interrelated with everything else, and in which the interrelationships become more important as the forces we generate grow, is not conceptually difficult even for the ordinary man and woman.

What is difficult is to have this concept

generally understood, and accepted, as a necessary platform for new positive thinking and a basis for action.

In fact, this ap-

proach to reality represents a drastic departure from what is the usual, conventional, compartmented, and egocentric way of discussing the general interests of people and nations. Particularly in our advanced countries, besides the factors I have already mentioned, inertia cushions the impact of the very disagreeable things happening elsewhere, but which may affect our lives.

T h e danger of such issues as the population explosion

and nuclear holocaust is shock-absorbed in our minds by the false faith that, thanks to our scientific proficiency and security investments, technology will take care of everything, and the naive belief exists that distances in our planet are still such that when catastrophe hits, it occurs far a w a y — a n d we see it only on TV. I will not tire, however, of recalling that, nonetheless, people in their subconscious are already prepared for a radical redirection of our collective thinking.

N o t only are they aware of the grow-

ing incompatibility between the old frames of reference now used to conduct man's affairs and the new realities surging up everywhere, and expect guidance to realign their thoughts, but they have also become familiar with the catchword "system"

and

broadly sense what it m e a n s — t h o u g h many experts are at a loss to define it c l e a r l y — a n d will not be too surprised when told that the world is becoming one, and that that means many things.

new

N o w , if they are taught also to consider what they them-

selves, their families, community, and nation will be up against in

244

"project

1969"

the next decade, I believe that most of them will find the concept of a universal and systematic approach to staving off threats both convincing and appealing. It is the task of our press, techno-structure, academia, and also political c l a s s — a few new leaders, after all, are e n o u g h — t o keep public opinion informed of the reality of one world, and of the repercussions its macroproblems have on every country, and indeed, every family.

If this is done, I am sure that our peoples

will prove mature enough to support with their vote, and if necessary with their own sacrifice, not only this new thinking and this new approach, but also the strategy and policy decisions they will require. W e have no reason to shrink from this Copernican or Galilean change of optics in our societies.

If these concepts are clearly

stated, everybody will see how much better on the long haul our own interests are served when we know that our country and nation are but part and parcel of a larger system which cannot be extricated from the master system of the world, and how much more logical it is to place ourselves in a global framework consistent with this age of world-embracing technology, and then proceed from the universal to the particular, to which we belong — t h a n delude ourselves that the world rotates around our interests. A s to the concepts of planning, and planning as integral to the art of living, I assume that, if they have not actually entered our mores, they are no longer seriously disputed at the individual, family, community, corporate, or national levels.

It is not,

therefore, too arduous to let people accept that planning has become indispensable at the world level as well. What will be more difficult to explain is that it will require an unprecedented e f f o r t — a n d here this concept combines with another concept that is here to stay, that of complexity—and

that

we must eradicate some of the old thinking habits that by and large we conserve when we contemplate the planet, namely a 245

the great change of

direction

physiocratic reliance on automatism, and our subordinate leaning toward crisis management.

A noteworthy trait of the present

conduct of human affairs throughout international society, besides the gross ignorance that presides over this activity, is, in fact, the disregard of the remote or indirect consequences of actions undertaken. Recourse to crisis

management—a

procedure so frequently

adopted that there are now specialists in this field—is often made imperative, not because from time to time the unforeseen or the unforeseeable occurs, but because people had not prepared in time against foreseeable developments.

Just as policies followed

in the past, or lack of them, and more generally, yesteryear's improvidence,

are making

crises now,

the present

persistent

proneness to focus on immediate interests or expediencies, disjointed from strategic planning ahead, is bound to create troubles for tomorrow. However, with the growing dynamism and complexity of mode m life, not only does the unexpected have more chance to happen, but the crises of the future are likely to dwarf those of today.

Already

in

many

geopolitical

or

functional

areas

throughout the world the situation has been permitted to become potentially so critical that, irrespective of whatever effort may now be made in the way of planning for the future, it will certainly grow worse before it can be made better. Similar remarks can be made about automatism.

There is a

startling contrast between the acceleration and possible sudden downward spiraling of events that characterizes our time, and the laissez-faire

attitude of our society, which has been fed with the

myth of the "invisible hand" that in nature and the economy comes

to

the rescue

and

when it has been upset.

promptly

reestablishes

equilibrium

This complex perhaps explains, but

does not at all justify, our attitude as spectators on the world scene just when we must instead be, and indeed are, as already explained—as in the "comedy of a r t " — i t s playwright and leading actors. 246

"project

1969"

Public opinion is becoming too well informed not to be unconsciously ripe for these new concepts, and to understand that the point has been reached when planning must henceforwards be extended to the whole world, and that the future success of a nation or of mankind depends on the effort it devotes to planning ahead, not on that absorbed by its current affairs.

But, in the

words of Donald N. Michael, "one of the major requirements for coping with the future is to have more people speak and write to alert the public." A n d the most advanced public must also be brought to embrace and understand a new order of complexities.

1 may com-

plete here a paragraph by Ozbekhan from which I have quoted before which epitomizes

our condition:

"We

stand,

perhaps

more conscious and knowing than ever before, in the grip of present worldwide complexities and future uncertainties trying to define those modes of action that will best order the one and reduce the other.

T h e organizing principles of these modes of

action are what we have recently become reconciled, with some reluctance, to calling planning." Our extraordinary ventures in space, from walking and docking in the high skies to putting a satellite on a lunar orbit and softlanding on Venus, the exceptional (albeit exceptionally expensive) experience gathered for military purposes in researching, forecasting,

and

planning

in

the

realm

of

complicated

systems, and a thousand other achievements in technology and organization, in knowledge and industry, are proof enough that, when we purposefully direct intellectual and material resources to an objective, new tools and techniques are developed which are adequate to attacking problems of the highest complexity and size.

We must, however, be sure and strong in our spirit that

now we are up against even more formidable complexities, and that when we engage in planning to master the future, we have to get across still another threshold of difficulties. Project 1969 should not only cast some light on our capacity to understand, describe, and resolve the complexities of the world 247

the great change of

direction

system but will also catholicize international research and systematization in this field, and foster a movement of

opinion

towards global thinking.

Finally, the concept thus emerges of a

new kind of cooperation.

A n d we may detect in it two subcom-

ponents.

T h e first is the concept of capacity,

because planning

of world scope for the future is an enterprise so large and complex and involving the combination of such diversified and advanced skills that only the highly developed nations, in cooperation among themselves, may undertake it. T h e second is a concept of duty, because the collective situation of human societies has reached such a state of impending or potential disaster that those societies that have the capacity to intervene cannot release themselves from the historical obligation of joining in a common undertaking—how to manage the world during the next decades. What I maintain, and will explain in some later pages, is that public opinion also in the developing countries is prepared to accept that a design for world peace, order, and progress be studied, as their principal responsibility, by the advanced nations — i f a new spirit animates them, the spirit of Project 1969. N o w that we have gone through the premises, and we are armed with some definitions, principles and concepts, and general considerations, we can see how Project 1969 may be organized.

The Preparatory

Phase

T h e universal vision of the world as a macrosystem

from

which no society can escape and in which all societies operate as conditioning-conditioned elements, and the concept of long-term world-scope planning as the main mode of regulating their membership in, and exploitation

of, that system—these

ideas no

doubt will need a great deal of reflection and refinement. Taking some time off from my other occupations, I started expounding and testing these ideas in the beginning of 1966, and 248

"project

1969"

then went on to discuss them on different occasions in Europe and America.

I was often assisted and advised by my friend,

Paolo Rogers, whose understanding and knowledge of world situations can be exceeded by very few people, and whose eagerness to find new ways of cooperation between the United States and Europe is a source of continued inspiration. Interest and some consensus were aroused by what we said. But there was far greater skepticism that anything practical might eventually be made out of this talk. these were not new ideas.

Of course, substantially

What perhaps was novel was the at-

tempt to use them as tools in redirecting thinking and action in the international a r e n a — w h i c h I think should be our ultimate goal. In a nutshell, what I said in that first round of exploratory talks was that confronted with the undisputed fact that the problems on the world horizon are even more formidable than those we are failing to solve now, it is urgent to devise new ways and means to cope with a situation becoming outright alarming; that, as the point has been reached where the human condition is at bay and the future of mankind is growing ever more dramatically insecure, some control must be rapidly gained over the doings of human society with respect to itself and its environment; and that, in view of these considerations, the Atlantic nations should lose no time in taking the initiative to launch a study program to examine the feasibility of some sort of planning for the whole world. A t that time, I saw no way of a first move being made in the right direction other than by the impulse of a very strong hand in the United States, possibly the top of the Administration, taking the initiative of having this study program sponsored and carried out by one of the large foundations, which in turn could co-opt similar bodies in other countries.

Although I took great pains to

make it clear that this roughly sketched and venturesome proposal was a suggestion merely to initiate preliminary

studies 249

the great change of

direction

toward what I called universal

planning,

my pleas went largely

unheeded. In more than one year of sporadic campaigning in my spare time, however, I gathered the impression that no fundamental objections were raised to the ideas themselves, but about their practicability.

This discovery encouraged me to believe that,

perhaps, no insuperable road blocks existed against their adoption.

T h e y would, however, have to be submitted to prior con-

structive criticism by some reliable scientific and philosophical minds, and then condensed in papers and presented in a more organic way. A t the same time, the world situation was worsening,

and

concern was mounting as to the solutions proposed and policies adopted to counter this deterioration. context, this down-trend

Considered in a broader

in human affairs provided

evidence

enough of our present collective incapacity of managing the modern w o r l d — w h i c h

confirmed the necessity

of

a

fundamental

change of direction. These are the reasons that perhaps justify the rather quixotic idea that an industrial manager could try to spark off an effort aimed at exploring our capacity to forecast and plan on a world scale.

What was, in any case, necessary, and I took upon myself

to do, was to get some people of high intellectual caliber and ecumenical outlook to express their judgment on how a blueprint could be prepared for the initial studies, so that the project may then be proposed to institutions or groups endowed with the capacity and means of furthering them. I warmly thank the few friends in Europe and the United States who encouraged me to make this step.

A s some meaningful

effort is already being made in the United States to structure systematic thinking on very large, complex problems including those of a nonmilitary nature, the suggestion was made that this initiative should start in Europe.

I then consulted a man of very

wide knowledge, interests and wisdom, who has been able to

250

"project

1969"

serve as an excellent international servant while maintaining his imagination and initiative in high gear.

He is the respected Di-

rector of Scientific Affairs of O E C D , Dr. Alexander King, whom I have already quoted.

O n his suggestion, I asked Dr. Erich

Jantsch, an astronomer turned scientific consultant and planning scientist, and whom I have also repeatedly quoted, to write a provocative paper on this matter.

Dr. Jantsch, in my view, did a

splendid job in putting together concepts which otherwise were rather loose and in making abstruse matter readable.

His paper,

" A tentative framework for initiating system-wide planning of world scope," was in fact used as a basis for discussion at a meeting called among Europeans. I am very much indebted to both Dr. King and Dr. Jantsch and to the Giovanni Agnelli Foundation, which undertook to sponsor and organize a first meeting in Rome.

But I wish to make it

clear that the responsibility is mine if the basic ideas behind this initiative prove to be extravagant and nearer to the realm of dreams than to the world of the possible and practical, and if, finally, the initiative itself

flounders.

T h e National A c a d e m y

of L i n c e i — w h i c h

was founded

in

1603 and whose name derives from a desire "to see into the secrets of nature with a perception as acute as that of a l y n x " — put at the disposal of the conferees a sixteenth-century called " T h e Farnesina."

villa

In its rooms—decorated by such fa-

mous painters as Raphael, Sebastiano del Piombo, the Sodoma, Giulio Romano, and Baldassarre Peruzzi—Renaissance

clerics,

nobles, poets, men of letters, artists, and early scientists used to congregate in mundane and intellectual symposia.

It was a mod-

ern replica of their meetings that in April 1968 brought around a single table economists, planners, geneticists, sociologists, politologues, and managers to consider the new shape of human activities and interests. The R o m e meeting was only a partial success.

T h e referents

were not clear, and the participants were of too mixed origin, 251

the great change of

direction

some of them of uncommon stature but principally interested in specific problems and their detailed analyses.

In Europe, while a

common language and amalgamated reference basis have not been developed as a combined approach to this new age, there do exist cultural baronies, schools and cloisters, national centers of excellence, and exceptional intellectual elites of high nobility and experience.

But they have far less geographic and professional

mobility than in the United States.

In such matters as thought

and culture, Europe's fragmentation is evident, though at a lesser degree than in things political.

A s one can easily expect with

such a new topic as world-scope planning, some theological and semantic battles could not be avoided, as well as a conceptual debate

on

the

computer-based

applicability techniques

of

systems

to some

of

analysis these

and

elusive

other subject

matters. But the ice was broken with this group of Europeans recognizing that there is a growing number of interrelated problems facing humanity, which are of a complex and multivariant character, will become an increasing preoccupation of our societies, will impose the necessity of global attack, and which contain aspects of growing concern in relation to the quality of life of contemporary man throughout the world. There was consensus that at present we lack sufficient understanding of these problems, their elements and their interactions.

It followed that there is an immediate need to provide by

deep study the information base without which it is impossible to have an accurate knowledge of any of them and their delineation.

It was finally recognized that the task of planning compre-

hensively in these problem areas is at present beyond our capability, and that we shall probably succeed in developing methods of attack and solutions only by tackling together a number of particular cases. A

steering board 1

was

named

at

the

Rome

1 Its members are Erich Jantsch, Alexander King, Max Jean Saint-Geours, Hugo Thiemann, and myself.

252

meeting

to

Kohnstamm,

"project

1969"

maintain intra-European contacts and eventually suggest some path of action.

Similar contacts have been established across the

Atlantic, evidencing that nearly identical preliminary considerations on the necessity of starting a global approach to the future are going on in this country.

Personally, I have also tested the

intellectual attitude of some outstanding Soviet scientific personalities—with an encouraging response.

A l r e a d y in September

1967 I had the privilege of presenting a paper and of addressing the young scientists of A k a d e m g o r o d o k — t h e Siberian City of S c i e n c e — o n the necessity of joining hands to make, by a new form of planning, the world of tomorrow "a more civilized and more human and decidedly a better place for our children and grandchildren" (Aurelio Peccei, "Considerations on the Need for World-Wide Planning," an ad hoc paper, September 1 9 6 7 ) .

I

am sure that sincere agreement exists among many Soviet leaders and the majority of Soviet scientists that this is the road we must jointly find, jointly chart, and jointly travel. Those who have read the essay by Soviet nuclear physicist and academician Andrei Sakharov on a scientific—and c o o p e r a t i v e — approach to the future as published by The New

York

Times

(July 22, 1968) should have no doubt as to the convergence of views on this dramatic necessity among the most enlightened intellects of our epoch.

Seen through Sakharov's eyes:

division of mankind threatens it with destruction.

"The

Civilization is

imperiled by a universal thermonuclear war, catastrophic hunger for most of mankind, stupefaction from the narcotic of 'mass culture' and bureaucratized

dogmatism,

a spreading of

mass

myths that put entire peoples and continents under the power of cruel and treacherous demagogues, and destruction or degeneration from the unforeseeable consequences of swift changes in the conditions of life on our planet.

In the face of these perils, any

action increasing the division of mankind, any preaching of the incompatibility of world ideologies and nations is madness and a crime.

Only universal cooperation under conditions of intellec-

tual freedom and the lofty moral ideals of socialism and labor, 253

the great change of

direction

accompanied by the elimination of dogmatism and pressures of the concealed interests of ruling classes, will preserve civilization." M u c h anxiety is voiced and much pioneering and preparatory work is being done in various parts of the world. my best to follow it.

I for one do

This book is a sign of all this, and I will be

glad if many people find an echo of their thoughts herein, and an encouragement to redouble their efforts. A n d this is how the idea of Project 1969 was started. submitting it in all humility to the reader's judgment. sure if this project will be born the way I have expectations

about

their offsprings are

once born, what will be its fate.

often

I am

It is not yet

figured—fathers' mistaken—and,

A s at the time of writing the

preparatory phase is all but started, I hope that greater support will be enlisted in the m o n t h s — I hate to say y e a r s — t o come, and that stronger hands will grasp Project 1969 and make it b e t t e r — and workable.

The Institutional

Framework

T h e preparatory phase will be concluded when a consistent proposal is presented to the governments and foundations that are supposed to sponsor and fund the project.

Then an act of

political will is required for the actual launching of Project 1969. A t that moment some of the initial psychological and political hurdles would at least temporarily be overcome, but the really difficult part of the task would just begin. The success or failure of Project 1969 would then depend on how it is organized, managed, and staffed.

A s always in great

human ventures, the deciding factor is people.

T h e very caliber

and nature of this undertaking of blueprinting the future is reason enough for devoting the utmost care to prestudying these aspects. The uncommon cooperative effort to carry out Project 1969 suggests that ad hoc institutional and organizational frameworks 254

1969"

"project be devised—autonomous,

flexible,

and innovative.

envisage a new center, and call it World Forum.

We

may

This center

ought to be separate from any other agency or institution, and established initially for the duration of the project, which may be estimated from two to three years, and it should be organized for the sole purpose of executing this feasibility study program of world scope.

When this mission has been accomplished and the

feasibility proved, the World Forum might u n f o l d — o r become a permanent future-prospecting agency. Prima facie, I imagine the Forum as a completely autonomous body governed by an International tities sponsoring it.

Board

appointed by the en-

Its members, ten to twelve in

number,

should be outstanding, nonpolitical American, European, Soviet, and Japanese scholars, executives, and moral leaders, who would be solely and entirely responsible for carrying out the project, and should devote their full time to it.

I imagine that they would

like to act collectively as the Board of Directors of a corporation or the Board of Trustees of a foundation, and adhere to some reasonable rule of decision by majority, avoiding the cumbersome safeguards of a veto power as unbecoming for a scientific venture.

T h e autonomous character, the intellectual freedom

and the ideological independence of the Forum, its Board and the entire organization are of fundamental importance, and should be upheld at all costs. T h e Board should have the power not only to approve or modify the statutes of the Forum, co-opt other members to the Board itself, elect its chairman (probably adopting the principle of rotation) and delegate functions to any members, but also to define the terms of reference

of the project and adjust and re-

define them according to the experience gathered during its execution.

In a difficult project the question of the terms of refer-

ence is second in importance only to that of brainpower.

At a

stage when with respect to many issues we are still groping in the dark, the process of identifying and stating problems and deter255

the great change of

direction

mining the approach to their solution, as mentioned, is even more important than solutions themselves.

T h e Board should

also

have full authority to determine the type and size of the organization, select and hire executives, scientific personnel, and supporting staff, and decide on the studies, surveys, and other programs to be executed or contracted out, and on all other m a t t e r s — f r o m methodology to acceptance of grants, from press releases to the substance and form of its conclusions and recommendations. One may anticipate that the Board would select a somewhere in Europe for the Forum headquarters.

location

T h e suitabil-

ity of Europe in similar cases is rather generally recognized when multinational aspects and interests are preeminent, and the facilities of an advanced country need to be available.

T h e Board,

however, might feel it expedient to establish branches in other strategic locations as well. The primary function of the Forum should not be to do research and studies itself, but to make use of, coordinate, and occasionally sponsor work done elsewhere, on which to base its interpretations, conclusions, and recommendations.

Therefore,

it should establish close contacts with, and utilize and promote studies by, centers of excellence in various fields all over the world—academies and universities, study groups, national and international agencies, laboratories, and think tanks.

The pipe-

line network of information would be most vital to its functions. Obviously, the Forum would become a think tank itself and the central switchboard and clearing house for information and ideas concerning world problems. manent secretariat

Hence, it would need a per-

and very efficient backup

services,

which

should be kept slim, flexible, and adaptable to changing needs. Around this core, I envisage the activity of teeming

workshops

and panels, studying and digesting available material, drawing up and cross-checking conclusions, and then reporting on problem areas, and suggesting how to reconcile heterogeneous conclusions. 256

"project

1969"

T o do all this work, the Forum would have to husband the talents of a wide range of academic and professional specialities —assorted groups of physicists, economists, sociologists, urbanists, agronomists, biologists, anthropologists, philosophers, educators, planners, and managers—of various nationalities, including other countries than those sponsoring the project.

Some

people I have spoken with would put the accent on the political scientists; others consider the psychologists and zoologists more important because they would know more of the nature and behavior of the human animal. Organization and coordination of these different assizes of topflight

leaders, in a way to assure maximum

intellectual

and

imaginative freedom and yet a down-to-earth realism, and continuous pragmatic criticism throughout the project, would be a tremendous job.

N o less exertion and appeal would be required

to attract these first-class people from their usual occupations, but I submit that society can honor and remunerate them handsomely.

A f t e r all, the total fare for this well-conducted tour into

the future would be less than what its sponsors currently spend in one single hour on the military. T h e results expected from the work groups are more than the sum of the experience and conclusions of individual disciplines, and would include the synergetic effects of multidisciplinary coordination and confrontation.

For this purpose, among their

other qualities, the panelists should have, along with eminence in their own fields, human understanding, a broad philosophical and international outlook, public-mindedness, and a propensity for teamwork. A b o v e all, they ought to possess and promote the development of the capacity glected so far.

of synthesis,

a capacity that has been ne-

This neglect might have been excusable in cen-

turies and decades past, when decision-making was a simpler job in a simpler world, when it was the prerogative of the few who were

not even

accountable

for their decisions.

But

in

the 257

the great change of

direction

present, pluralistic, and hectic world, the desideratum is the capacity to incorporate the essence of disparate elements in a synoptic view. A t the cost of repeating myself, I must stress that this is one of the fundamental traits of Project 1969.

It needs to be

syncretic,

in that it is aimed at combining and reconciling disharmonious elements, situations, problems, and phenomena of a technological, social, economic, psychological character, which originate and develop independently

of one another, possess

disparate

natures, resilience, dimensions, speeds, and trends, but collide and interact to form the integrated complex, and changing contemporary world.

If we want not to lose our bearing in this

multifarious aggregate, and indeed to carry out Project 1969, we must try to take in the whole picture resulting from the combination of all these elements, and specifically consider the major variables that characterize them. I would finally like to add that when referring to these men as scientists, and their work as scientific, the word science is used in a broad sense to convey concepts of profound knowledge, orderly thought, systematic research, and impartial attitude.

I mean that

all these people would accomplish their tasks with the dedication and integrity of the scientist.

A s a group, they would have to be

both specialists and generalists, men having a solid scientific and humanistic background, some experience in the art of management, a common-sense soundness of judgment—yes, and even that grain of folly necessary to stake one's reputation on a search for the future. The final report and conclusions

which the International Board

would prepare for the sponsors of Project 1 9 6 9 — a n d probably the p u b l i c — a t the end of the studies should again aim at scientific objectivity.

These documents would have to reflect the re-

sult of the research, review, exercise, and discussion made by the World Forum, investigations contracted out to other centers of excellence and consultations with leading world experts.

They

would possibly indicate also alternative, coordinated goals, paths, 281

"project

1969"

strategies, and policies in the different problem areas specifically studied, pursuable within reasonable limits of feasibility.

Fur-

ther, they would have to express judgments on the capacity, limits, reliability, and possible use of forecasting and planning technology to provide rational modes systematically to control and shape the world's future.

Essentially the question to be

answered would be that implied in the theme—whether, and with what qualifications, an organic long-term planning of world scope is possible. T h e Board might also wish to make specific

recommendations

on institutional, strategic, and policy matters based on the experience gathered and ideas formulated during the execution of Project 1969.

But I feel sure that already the nature of its

labors, the scope itself of the project, and the confluence of many exceptional minds at the World Forum, would cause Project 1969 to be much more than the feasibility study it started out to be.

Not only could the framework be defined for further studies,

test runs for actual planning probably made, and new institutions of the highest intellectual level created to continue the Forum work, but also a fuller and clearer vision of the societies of tomorrow,

their

mutual

relationship,

and

their

environment

would be gathered. Sooner or later, the Board's recommendations would political weight.

carry

T h e work done by the World Forum would

become a fountainhead of inspiration, and new ideas be formed about that difficult a r t — o r will it already be a science?—that we must invent and learn: the art, or science, of managing the modern, technological world, of organizing the future, and of running a new kind of civilization. For this reason, I believe that, if Project 1969 can be initiated, it will have an incredible, built-in potential, because it will contain the beginning of an answer to the question Linus Pauling implicitly asked when he said that man must now decide what he is going to do with his planet.

259

CHAPTER 7. THE POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS

An Act of Political As I

HAVE SAID,

Will

an act of political will is necessary to launch

Project 1969. 1 would like to remind the reader that I have looked at the world through the eyes of a manager who sees that too many grave problems remain unsolved and become more serious every year, while others emerge ominously and intertwine with them; and who proposes to find out how this continuing degradation of the global situation

amidst peaks

and plateaus

of

material

(though uneven) progress can be stopped, things thought out anew, and the whole business of human affairs conducted in a more intelligent way. In this search for solutions, however, we perceive with dismay that the antiquated political philosophies, organization, and instruments that characterize present-day international society preclude the profound innovation necessary to cope with the mass of these new, compelling problems surging up in front of

it—

whether in the realm of security, development, self-fulfillment, or of other yearnings of the milling population of the earth.

And

that, at the same time, the situation in large parts of the planet is soon likely to become untenable—dragging all or most of mankind toward a catastrophic epilogue. The task is still more complicated because, on rational no less than moral grounds, we cannot adopt as valid such pseudo and extreme solutions as those stemming from the resigned conclusion that the world is tangled up in an impasse without acceptable outlets, and that only entrenched enclaves (mainly the West-

261

the great change of

direction

ern nations) can hold out until something happens to turn the evil tide; or the belligerent negative conclusion that we (again the West) must understand that the future can be faced only by enforcing (our) law and order in the world wherever and whenever it is necessary

(for our s a k e ) ; or the contestative,

and

equally negative, conclusion that only tragedy or revolution can transform the rotten setup evolved by our (capitalist but, why not, also communist) civilization. solutions,

the palliatives

that can

Nor can we accept, as real be

produced

by

applying

the traditional, outdated approach to these newest

situations.

W e must, instead, stand up and face the new realities.

W e must

try to understand them.

A n d we must find intelligent, workable,

and sound solutions by the use of our brains and whatever tools and resources we possess. A s indicated by one of the guidelines of the New Approach, the task of searching for modern solutions to modern problems cannot wait for the reform of the present social-political organization.

T h e fortress of the national state, though a relic of the

past, is still such a stronghold that no frontal attack against it is possible for the moment, while the necessary radical institutional reforms are not yet conceptually prepared either.

Their discus-

sion is likely to occupy the greater part of the seventies. meantime, we must act. situation

In the

A n d it is by our N e w Approach that the

may progressively

be modified, a more

modern outlook kindled, and new elites promoted.

generalized In turn, all

this will provoke a quicker reform of our political organization. A s history shows, it is from new social terrain that new institutions flourish. A t this point, a manager's opinion on the extreme case of mismanagement which is the global conduct of human affairs, is that, whatever new solution we deem possible, it will require a great deal of preparatory s t u d y — t h e why of Project 1 9 6 9 — a n d call

for

a

good

mixture

of

sophistication

and

pragmatism.

Alongside the ultimate in forecasting technology, mathematical 262

the political programming,

social system accounting,

implications

systems analysis

and

management, etc., a large dose of down-to-earth common sense is necessary, such as that shown by Jean Monnet at the outset of French planning when he tried gradually to simplify the most difficult concepts until they became clear even to his wife. But from where can the initial spark, the go-ahead signal and the support for the plan, the act of political will, come? The forum.

United

Nations

is too

"politicized"

and

rhetorical

a

Its indispensable role in the present period is far from

being challenged here.

However, its authority and function are

more apt to be asserted in airing principles, voicing the conscience of the world's peoples (although not all of them are members), exerting moral pressure, or even applying sanctions in international crises—than suited to engineering a technical enterprise of this nature.

Its large membership and voting rules make

it the antithesis of efficiency.

A s the meeting point of more than

120 nations, it represents also the sum of their weaknesses and inadequacies.

Finally, the East-West

divisions, the

fractures

within the blocs themselves, and the widening political and psychological North-South gaps, which have full resonance in it, rule out the United Nations as a starting point of Project

1969—

although the United Nations approval and blessing to it ought by all means to be sought. T h e same observation can be made about any other international organization, when "international" means "all or most of the nations." composition

It is difficult for a large body of heterogeneous to back

with

positive

support,

not

perfunctory

words, the unified, yet realistic and creative conception of the world that is at the basis of this venture.

This excludes all the

United Nations specialized agencies—which have only specific objectives, anyhow, and are cumbersome structures. T h e inefficiency of the F o o d and Agricultural

Organization

( F A O ) , for instance, was rudely exposed in the stock-taking exercises that preceded the election of a new Director-General in 263

the great change of November 1967.

direction

Those who have followed the rise and fall of

hopes that accompanied the first four years of U N C T A D will understand that this general negative judgment is directed much more at the type of organization which perforce combines the inefficiencies, ambitions, and rivalries of scores of nations, and adds to this drawback its own propensity for bureaucracy and inertia, than at the people who staff i t — t h o u g h they too are not free from blame.

T h e first faltering steps of the United Nations

Industrial Development Organization ( U N I D O ) , since its first monumental but inconclusive conference in Athens in December 1967 holds no better promise for the future.

I am tempted to

say, paraphrasing the well-known quip, that world development is too serious and urgent a matter to be left in the hands of wellmeaning bureaucrats. N o r can we imagine that a project of this kind could be launched by the United States government, acting alone or as the main protagonist, because other nations would fear that they would be in for another bout of arm twisting to the benefit of their big brother trying to jam American policies down their throats.

F o r other reasons, quite different in nature, but equally

negative, it is unrealistic to expect the governments of divided, inward-looking, and frustrated Europe to stand up and sire a powerful initiative of world scope in the near future. A s I have repeatedly said, a supreme and coordinated effort vastly surpassing the combined capacity of the Atlantic community is necessary to face the oncoming threats and challenges. A n d , as the call is for more unity of purpose and action, any unilateral unprepared initiative by the Atlantic nations would but irk and alienate the Soviet Union.

B y the same token, then, this

disposes also of O E C D , at least in its present form, because the U S S R and Eastern Europe are not members.

A n d finally, there

is no need to stress that any initiative from the East would be equally or more unproductive. 264

In conclusion, it is only logical

the political

implications

that active sponsorship of Project 1969 should come from all those who can and will effectively participate in the effort. Finally, I would be less than candid if I pretended that meaningful initiative or support could come also from the weaker nations, hopelessly incapacitated as they are even to meet their own present, let alone the future.

It would be futile to expect

that their participation in the project would represent a significant contribution to the fulfillment of a compact, comprehensive study of such complexity.

What is important, however, is that the

views, individuality, aspirations, rights and whatnot of all major national, ethnical, cultural, and religious groups be recognized and considered during the labors of the World Forum. In conclusion, the tremendous concentration of brainpower, knowledge,

information,

and performance

required

in all

its

phases by Project 1969 can emanate only from the nations which possess the major share of scientific, economic, and organizational means and capacities, and at the same time, bear the heaviest

world

responsibilities.

initiative and cooperation.

It

calls

directly

for

their

joint

A s mentioned, Project 1969 is their

collective obligation. Hence, launching and executing this grand and vital enterprise requires the combined political wills and best capacities of what we may call the Great Four.

Ideally, in fact, I s e e — b e y o n d the

scars of World War II, beyond outdated conceptions, boundaries, gaps, and curtains, and beyond the renewed, grave tensions of summer 1 9 6 8 — t h a t , as the essence and preview of the things of tomorrow, there are four great entities to undertake it. is America

(United States and C a n a d a ) ; the second is

T h e first Europe

(the true Europe, namely the E E C enlarged to include the U . K . or the whole of E F T A , or any other combination including the major European nations and, in some near future, when the spirit of cooperation at last prevails, also those of Eastern E u r o p e ) ; the third is the Soviet

Union

(plus, initially, at her side, the 265

the great change of

direction

C M E A nations, unless or until all European peoples, West and East, join in a great c o m m u n i t y ) ; and the fourth, Japan. In this troubled eve of the seventies, the future hinges on the decisions of the Great Four. tomorrow.

N o doubt, this is the direction for

But let us not delude ourselves either, by the appeal

of logical schemes.

T h e political framework effectively required

to launch the project, in 1969, is not even as large as that.

What

is really necessary is a simultaneous act of political will by the two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, which we may be sure will be immediately followed by a few key European nations (this may be an occasion to start enlarging the E E C ) , and Japan.

A n d what these sponsoring nations should

do is but to declare that now is the time jointly to support the great scientific exercise of Project 1969. C a n we hope that this meeting of wills is itself feasible? I am not such an optimist as to ignore the political hurdles that have to be overcome before reaching this moment of truth—even for a purely scientific joint enterprise.

But only three conditions seem

to me really essential. T h e first one (which chronologically will probably be the second to be realized) is a propitious political moment, a favorable development in international affairs, which may spring the tide of hope again—peoples working together for a basically improved world situation.

A n y good occasion should be seized as soon as

it manifests i t s e l f — f o r instance, the removal from everybody's life of the poisonous sting of the Vietnam tragedy.

Just a clear

opening in our overcast skies can be sufficient to get the project started. T h e second condition is some quiet, off-the-record talks about the future between Washington and M o s c o w .

They may start by

contacts at a purely scientific level, and can be conducted even during periods of tension.

T h e need for something much vaster

than just a nonproliferation agreement is in the air.

A n d this

something cannot be just another step to de-escalate the arms 266

the political race.

implications

B y this time it cannot even be just limited to what could be

done in the whole realm of defense and security, though the big push may perhaps come only from there.

The talks would then

logically move to the next item in men's minds: What will we do with the enormous human and material resources so released? How can we make the world safer, more secure against a militarist backlash, wherever it might come from? else that we can do together?

Is there anything

Here is a unique and exceptional

opportunity for the United States' new administration to conquer people's hearts at home and abroad, and open a new way to the future. T h e third condition is that the preparatory phase be completed, or well advanced, by the collaboration of ad hoc groups of citizens, scientific institutions, foundations, universities, industrial organizations, etc. of various countries, East and West. This preliminary w o r k — w h i c h corresponds to the air survey of an unmapped land in the preinvestment study for a big p r o j e c t — is necessary in order to define the broad outline of the feasibility study itself. If

the preparatory

work

by

the promotional,

nonpolitical

groups has the wide objective base and refined thinking expected of it, it should not be too difficult, at the right moment, to present a dozen governments and a number of foundations with a draft proposal, and ask them to fund Project

1969—an

intellectual

undertaking that requires no waiving of sovereignties, no disclosure of military secrets, no change of policies, no tax levying, no ideological compromise.

Just a few million dollars per coun-

try will be enough to defray its expenses. Assuming the necessary tone and atmosphere, it is therefore not unrealistic to expect this act of political will to be accomplished.

In fact, it is a project that every statesman or every

party could eventually claim to be the result of his or its own farsightedness, because all statesmen and all parties have professed at least once that they favor international

cooperation,

267

the great change of

direction

disarmament, progress through planning, and the use of science for the benefit of mankind, especially that part of it condemned to a meager life at present. A n d it is not wishful thinking that it will receive support. new potential elite—of

A

modern men and women, most of them

young and little k n o w n — e x i s t s on both sides of the Atlantic. With them are the younger generations of the world who are ready to dedicate themselves to rescuing from the distortion of ignorance and propaganda the great issues of today and tomorr o w — b u t only if they are given the opportunity.

This is what

the act of will to start Project 1969 may provide.

The Role of the Atlantic

Community

On the two shores of the North Atlantic the seed of Western civilization was planted, and here it has flowered.

Here are the

deepest roots of faith in the dignity and worth of the individual, the rule of law, and the successful practice of democratic government.

Here lies the great reservoir of moral and material

resources, of intellect, science, and of the political, economic, social, industrial, and cultural development necessary to accelerate the progress of the less developed nations.

A n d here rests a

main challenge of this seventh decade of the 20th century.

With these words General Lauris Norstad, whose views are more those of a modern statesman than a man of arms, introduced Gene E. Bradley's very interesting book Building European

Market:

Planning

for the

the

American-

1970's.

If we believe that this heritage must be preserved, and adapted to changing times, and that it should be passed on and expanded, then this is the time for the Atlantic nations to act accordingly. A n d if we believe that action ought to be preceded by thorough study, investigation, and canvassing of every conceivable avenue for workable solutions, then they must undertake this study. 268

the political

implications

A n d if we feel that, whatever their stature and strength in the modern world, the Atlantic nations can no longer do all these things alone, then they have forthwith to combine

with

the

strongest partners. This has been my argument so far.

Essentially, it is that,

looking at mankind as a whole and the world as an integrated system, there is no option left for the Atlantic peoples but to take the lead in a revolutionary movement to change the condition of that system, and the entire course of world affairs, grouping all the advanced nations in an entirely novel effort.

I have given

many proofs that this is in the general interest of mankind, no less than our own. T h e first prerequisite of this new c o u r s e — o n the assumption that the firm compactness of the Atlantic platform is established — w o u l d be practically to reverse the present posture and policies with respect to the Soviet Union, and with this I have dealt at length.

I am not proposing that we lower our guard prema-

turely, though I believe that we can make many steps in that direction without running excessive risks—even after the recent subjugation of Czechoslovakia.

It has been recently stated that

the Atlantic nations today possess the greatest capacity to create and the greatest capacity to destroy.

Although it seems ines-

capable that with the passage of years those capacities will begin to be acquired in other countries, the predominance of power will remain for the foreseeable future where it is now.

One may

reasonably ask whether this is a sensible state of affairs, or a justifiable state of affairs, or in the long term a stable state of affairs, but there is little question that it is the state of affairs that exists. But there are other risks, and these may be taken.

For in-

stance, we ought to be determined unreservedly and loyally to cooperate with the Soviets and pool highly

valuable—although

(as I suppose) nonclassified—knowledge, information, and experience with them on a quid pro quo basis.

Hence the risk of 269

the great change of

direction

disclosing more than we learn.

Even

these

risks,

however,

should not deter the Atlantic nations—provided they are united — f r o m taking the lead with Project 1969 as the first step along a road which promises to be long and difficult—but also the right one. Their

combined

against these risks.

endowment

represents

sufficient

coverage

It includes a most formidable techno-struc-

ture, a scientific potential without par, abundant resources of all kinds, a vast array of powerful tools, plus the know-how for using them.

T h e new bounties and capabilities of this age are

vested essentially in them, and can be put to task everywhere. We have seen that this score of nations with less than one-fifth of the world's population accounts for practically two-thirds of the world's production—goods and services in excess of 1,500 billion dollars per year.

Their wealth has bedrock foundations.

organizing capacity is unequalled.

Their

In case of need, they can

mobilize human and material resources hitherto undreamed of, and probably not yet well assessed. T o be sure, besides the Soviet Union and Japan, other new and older cultures and peoples of the world must contribute to this joint effort, in particular in searching for a solution to the supreme dilemma of how to reconcile man with the world that he himself is progressively dehumanizing.

But leadership at the

levels I am now speaking of must come from the Atlantic. It is true that the Atlantic nations have not yet recognized the principle of leadership I mentioned in the beginning, nor have they picked up this leadership option.

Whereas in the race for

progress they are far out ahead, this hardly means that they are offering guidance to others, nor that they themselves know where they are going.

But now that the fundamental question comes

down to their willingness to face the future, to will the future, to shape the future, my belief is that they will not fail at least to support an endeavor of clarification, such as the scientific and intellectual undertaking of Project 1969.

270

the political

implications

I have explained at some length that we have no reason to believe that the tides of history will still be on the side of the West if our nations should forfeit their world role and not match up to the challenge of the harsh decades to come. now that these are just the external

I want to add

situations that confirm that

Project 1969 has become indispensable even before we know for sure that what it implies is really possible.

Other reasons con-

cern the internal condition of our society. A s a matter of fact, the drastic change in the direction of our march, the reordering of our priorities to something that is more real and vital, and the redefinition of our objectives, to make them constructive in this age of extreme alternatives, are made necessary not only because the outer world, the other continents, and the natural cycles, are becoming intimately connected with the continental system in which Americans and Europeans live, and influence all its functions every day and every year.

It is not

only that we can no longer plan to walk out of other peoples' history, but that our own world has changed. T h e sharp realization that grows ever more dramatic is that a crisis has entered

our society,

and is unequivocally confronting

the best part of i t — o u r youngsters. Let us not be mistaken.

There must be something wrong in

the core of our society, in the forces that motivate it, if thousands and thousands of young minds and consciences, the students of our universities, rebel in their seats of learning against certain aspects of the society they are about to enter.

It is no use saying

that only a minority, however significant, finds that the political system simply does not produce the answer they want as citizens and human beings, and that only a minority within the minority affirms that the system is hopeless and altogether to be changed. These issues cannot be dealt with by majority and

minority

rules. It is likewise pointless to draw comfort from the fact that this rebellious mood is endemic and has spread to the communist 294

the great change of

direction

countries, where society is so different.

On the contrary, I have

been asking myself whether, with the immediate motives and conditions being so diverse, the parallel does not exist right in the vacuum of the spirit which characterizes technical society, and whether the rejection by the cultured young of the pervading materialism is not, indeed, the best omen appearing in a world otherwise in moral distress. In the United States, it is illusory to hope that the pathogenic element will disappear with the end of the Vietnam war: the Vietnam wound will take much longer to heal.

Similarly, in

Italy, even a sweeping reform of the glorious but medieval university statutes will not purge the accumulated bitterness of the students who have been deprived of their right to the modern type of education for which they yearn. Other s y m p t o m s — a n d reasons—exist of deep malaise in our Western society, and I have indicated some of them.

It is in part

a psychological malaise; one of its causes is a sense of frustration, of lack of purpose.

Project 1969, the initial manifestation

of the N e w A p p r o a c h which places the Atlantic community in a global context, and endeavors to understand the new relationships among all peoples, and identifies the responsibility of the more progressed ones, and recognizes, with Julian Huxley, "the unity of the real species Homo sapiens, in other words, the oneness of mankind," may partly respond to the intense desire for change that animates our young people.

It is cynically said that

it is easier for a man to be loyal to his club than to his planet, but nowadays to try to seclude our affluent society behind a Maginot Line, separating it from other societies, seems only to aggravate its ills. Once we realize that mainly psychological and moral factors are at the roots of the crisis besetting our society, the decision to search for a new orientation consistent with the changed world situation may give people, and particularly the young, a stimulus to bend their energies to the solution of existing problems, not the

272

the political creation of new ones.

implications

" T h e time is ripe," to use once more

Huxley's words, "for a new approach to destiny, a new look at human life through the telescope of comprehensive vision of wholes

instead

of

the

microscope

of

analysis

into

separate

parts." I make a plea to the reader and other modern-minded United States citizens—and also to my fellow E u r o p e a n s — t o consider that this is the time.

During the 1968 Presidential campaign it

was often affirmed that we must think anew, act anew, that people want a change, that we must change things, do things. ing is truer, but let us be clear.

Noth-

T h e change needed is not just a

domestic operation or a correction of emphasis, and there is no standard recipe for it on our conventional shelf of ideas.

It is a

profound transformation of our outlook on life, man, society, and the world, and any cure of the many ills we have at home depends on our capacity to give a universal inspiration and dimension to our new thinking.

Project 1969 can be the springboard

for this, and to launch and support it is part of the role falling to the Atlantic nations. If we do not perceive that momentous decisions of this nature have become necessary, it will be a sign that the gods presiding over our destiny have blinded us to reality, as punishment perhaps for our greed, arrogance, or intolerance, or make us foolishly play with wrong sets of values just as we did when we gave colored beads and firewater to savages whose land and resources we coveted.

Reflections

on the Longer

Term

The theme of this essay has been that the American and European peoples will soon have to make, jointly with the other advanced

peoples,

some

fundamental

decisions

concerning

the

future of the world, and that a change of gear in our over-all thinking may be prompted by the execution of Project

1969. 273

the great change of

direction

The implicit assumption is that if the project is well conducted, and if the feasibility of what it intends to explore is ascertained, this will be a turning point, a change in the outlooks of all the major human groups. N o w , let us imagine in a flight of fancy that Project 1969 is nearing its conclusion and that the scientists involved in it and all people who look over their shoulders, or expect their response, can see beyond any reasonable doubt that there is indeed some light at the end of the tunnel.

In other words, let us suppose that

the question whether systematic, long-range forecasting, prospecting, and planning at world scale are feasible may be answered in the affirmative, and that this approach to the future can be perfected so that even normative goal-setting may become a permanent feature of our type of civilization.

W e will thus be

facing entirely new perspectives and responsibilities. What can be the consequences of a positive conclusion in this sense, showing that men are c a p a b l e — i f they w a n t — o f

taking

their collective destiny in their own hands and actively shaping the future?

This will affect not only the future and fate of one

nation, but the main traits of what will be the course and condition of the whole of mankind in the years and decades to c o m e — which may now be glimpsed and pieced together consistently enough to be acted upon and influenced in advance, at least to avoid irreparable mistakes and disasters.

W e can only speculate

about the consequences of this revolutionary discovery.

But it is

certain that it will put all of us on n o t i c e — a n d particularly our moral and intellectual leaders, and the organs of public opinion, the whole techno-structure and the highest decision centers of the Great F o u r — a s to the need to muster every ounce of energy and creative imagination to make a reality out of this potential capacity to plan a course for the new history of man. In actual fact, the crucial question about the follow-up of this discovery, will be whether and how the advanced technological 274

nations of the

age are willing and capable of organizing

the world

the political for the new kind of mass, tense society the 1970's

and the 1980's.

implications

which is looming

up for

Of course, new world-girdling insti-

tutional conceptions and frameworks will be necessary, but as we have seen that the process of creating them will probably take a long time, we may for a moment suppose that this historical task will be directly assumed by the Great F o u r — w h i c h no doubt responds to what they are inclined to do.

This is an altogether

new theme, which lends itself to a practically endless number of considerations,

and which, one day, has to be discussed

at

length. However, I will just make a few reflections related to what has been said in previous pages.

Let us therefore suppose that a

superrole in organizing the future world is assumed by the Great Four.

It will mean many things.

T o start with, it will mean that

the Great Four must restrain themselves cate their differences,

and find ways to adjudi-

in order to assure the equivalent, in the new

age, of what has up to now been the central issue among armed nations—namely, security and a certain balance of military and political power.

A s it has already been noted, henceforth, it will

not be enough to recognize that armaments cancel themselves out reciprocally, and therefore can be drastically reduced; but it will be necessary to devise new, more intelligent and less costly ways to go beyond the exigency of armaments, and create instead a framework that can absorb tensions arising among the Great Four and throughout the world.

The epoch in which mankind

was organized in armed f a c t i o n s — a n d the values and goals that moved them to wage war on each o t h e r — m u s t at this point and will ever more be looked at as being as obsolete as tribalism, as condemnable as slavery, as irrational as trial by ordeal. It is known that a substantial reduction of expenditure in world armaments—which is of the order of 160 billion dollars per y e a r — w o u l d allow a transfer of immense resources from the area of threat to that of opportunity.

A participant in the work

of the Commission on the Y e a r 2000, Professor Karl Deutsch, 275

the great change of

direction

calculates that "if we cut the arms burdens of the world by the end of the century from roughly 8 or 10 percent of world income, which they are today, to 4 or 5 percent, it might be possible to transfer that much to capital formation; this would in turn add another percent to the growth rate of world income" (Daedalus, ibid., page 6 6 1 ) .

M y feeling is that on the wings of Project

1969's positive outcome a far better target for a much earlier date can be set, whereas if we do not succeed in changing the course of our societies, the cancer of armaments will become altogether incurable, and ultimately will do away with human sodiety's very body which has nurtured it.

These are the only

two alternatives—tertium non datur. M y argument does not make me blind to the easy criticism that this world perspective is more in the nature of dreams than of things that the reader and I are going to see happen. ing though it may be, it belongs to the possible

But dream-

futures.

A n d it

is right in this area that we should recognize and locate the normative goals of our planning of world scope.

For sure, as I

have tried to show, there are other futures equally possible, or even more likely to spring from this troubled decade, packed as it is with pride, prejudice, and the supreme imbecility of man's technology of self-destruction.

But their inexorable, paroxysmal

rationale, which opens up such an appalling vision of crumbling civilizations and Stygian shores, will now be exposed in a context where valid alternatives are o f f e r e d — a n d a little cold logic may finally puncture it. However, the historical task of the Great Four means much more than just saving the world from a nuclear holocaust, or even staving off a major ecological or Malthusian disaster overtaking the earth. human condition

B y this new organization of the world, the should

made more harmonious.

be improved

everywhere

and its ascent

What is necessary at all events, is that

there ought to be a reasonable rate of development and improvement in the conditions of life for all its population or at least the very great majority of it.

276

the political

implications

T h e peoples of the earth, whatever their degree of development, but particularly the derelict and hungry ones, should be convinced that their lot is taking an upward trend, that they are not denied the enjoyment of a fair share of the immense riches of the world, of the benefits of the fantastic progress of our age, and of the enlightenment and uplifting that comes from the incredible and expanding mass of knowledge the advanced nations possess.

A n d they need to be assured that their individuality as

peoples and their personality as individuals are not going to be overlaid by the wealthier, the stronger, and the more advanced, that their voice will be listened to, and, if it has right on its side, that there is some mechanism by which that right will be made good. N o w that the prospect is that the world is becoming one and that a continuum of mass society is going to cover all inhabitable lands, this is the challenge before the developed nations of the world, a challenge especially for their decision centers, intellectual community, and younger leaders: A r e they, by joint effort, capable of organizing the world in this new direction? That they are willing and capable is the feeling and conviction which must enter the hearts and minds of the majority of other peoples, in order that these peoples support with their patience and their votes, with forbearance and taxes, and when need be, other sacrifices, the new organization of the world that America, Europe, Russia, and Japan ought to undertake. There are good reasons in my view that, if the Great Four are effective and behave with discernment, this feeling and conviction may spread across the other nations, which will not be leaders, but have to be followers.

There exists in most human societies a

basic recognition of the facts of life, an earthly common sense and a historical sediment of respect for the chief, the wise, the learned, the healer, the judge, for some sort of establishment which secures the safety and function of the tribe, community, province, or nation.

Nowadays, all peoples are awed and fasci-

nated by the new technologies they do not understand, far less

277

the great change of dominate.

direction

In my opinion, therefore, they are prepared, for quite

a number of years, and on condition, to recognize and respect a new world Moderator, even a new Authority, set up by those who master the esoteric technologies, the Great Four, even if it is a far away, supranational, nonpersonalized, and vicarious authority. T h e condition—unwritten, as are the engagements that are most binding—is that there should exist a new Social

Contract,

or covenant of peoples, or M a g n a Carta, accepted by the Great Four, whose laws and rules should be simple, understandable, substantially kimed at the progress of the weaker peoples, and not, as now, hypocritical, exploitative, based on a double standard and the prejudice of race, culture, or class. A t the same time, the new world organization exceptionally

good and efficient

management.

calls for an

The

would be disruption and chaos on a colossal scale.

alternative T h e formi-

dable combination of talent and treasure that the Great Four can mobilize and direct to generate the forceful and creative thinking necessary to conceive the new world organization and to bring in its sway the other, less advanced peoples must also be capable of making that organization work.

It must succeed in building up

and deploying wherever necessary, at home and abroad, the techno-structure necessary to put the world under a new form of management. Let us put the argument this way.

While the responsibility to

conceive the design for redirecting the course of human affairs and shaping the world's future must substantially and finally, rest with the Great Four, the participation and contribution of the less developed human groups should, by all means, be sought and welcomed.

However, the principle that this undertaking should

have the widest possible base and is intended to serve the urgent and basic needs of mankind in an hour of stress should not obscure the fact that it cannot achieve all or even any of these things if it is not well managed. 278

the political

implications

There is little margin left at this stage for delay and there is practically no margin for error.

This demands stern rules about

voting in this human venture of the next decades.

In this re-

spect, the Great Four are clearly in a different category from the other nations and peoples. Let me be brutal, just for a moment.

A s a point of principle,

we have recognized that in the coming decades a new order and new rules must prevail in any case in this shrunken world to avoid disaster and organize progress, and that this undertaking has to be the doing of the peoples that have the capacity to bring it about.

Once they reach an agreement among themselves, they

have the power to impose it and there is no other alternative for the vast majority of the other peoples but to accept it.

Naturally,

this authoritarian solution by which the Great Four would take upon themselves the role of a benign tyrant would be a most inconsiderate way to organize the world.

It is totally to be

deprecated if for no other reason than that one day it would boomerang against the enlightened tyrant. T o put it again rather bluntly, while perhaps the Great Four do not possess greater wisdom, they do shoulder greater responsibility and, therefore, institutionally they must have greater power in decisions.

In the Social Contract, this delegation of responsi-

bilities and the governing function to the Great Four should be balanced by their statutory commitment to provide all kinds of aids—financial and technical assistance, preferences and planning g u i d a n c e — t o the other nations or communities in a measure responding to these latter's needs, as recognized in a comprehensive global plan, and not proportionate to their capacity of repayment. T h e Great Four would not form a closed club.

There are no

permanent structures in our evolutionary society, any more than in our natural environment.

T h e possibility should, therefore,

remain open to other human groups to undertake greater responsibility in world management as soon as they are capable of it

279

the great change of

direction

and can proportionately contribute to the progress and improvement of the remaining less developed nations. I have in mind Latin America, where three nations, Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico, and possibly also Venezuela, if intensively aided by the Great F o u r or even by America and Europe alone, may be instrumental in bringing forth a substantial change in the condition of the entire continent.

Should Latin A m e r i c a during

the seventies reach a situation of prosperity and be inclined to participate actively in cooperative ventures for the benefit of the needier areas of A f r i c a and A s i a , I am sure that it would inter alia, be a source of excellent human material. I have also in mind for a later period India, and the great unknown which is China. in this picture.

But I am at a loss to place the latter

Of one thing I am sure: the door should always

remain open to her.

Bridges to China is the latest slogan.

The

opinion I have already expressed is that China probably will go on her own way, with patience and ingenuity building up a great power and an original way to the modern w o r l d — a "neo-Chinese civilization"; but, I am afraid, having for a number of years very little intercourse with any other nation.

I may be totally wrong.

However, I believe that the enlarged world platform, the platform which will start from its original Atlantic dimension and expand to include the Soviet Union and Japan, and in due course possibly also Latin America, will be barely enough to accommodate the needs of the rest of the world, or the demands of China when she may choose to advance them. Here I will stop, not without leaving my friend the reader with a conclusive reflection which is outside the scope of this book. The Change

of Direction

in our course is the imperative of the

present, the primary objective, which should have the highest priority.

But, as was noted, once we are on the right course,

more substantive and more ideal goals and objectives ought to be defined.

In these reflections, I have indicated a broad

goal—

how to organize and manage the world efficiently during the 280

the political

implications

seventies and the eighties—and in this respect, the scenario I have rapidly sketched is probably beyond our wildest hopes. However, we must be cautioned against the cult of efficiency. Efficiency is an indispensable condition to maintain the world together and to keep it going, and provide the ground for intellectual vigor and creativity to blossom, but it is not, and cannot be considered, itself a finality, any more than is technological development.

A creative and dynamic society, the humane world

society that we may imagine in our dreams, ought to be able to harmonize the tenets of efficiency with its philosophical, social, cultural, and political finalities. T h e more we try to scan and understand the future and become aware of the extreme alternatives that it encompasses, the more we consider the terrible threats, the challenges and the marvelous opportunities that depend on what man will do, or fail to do, the more we may be awed or proud. Never has man or human society had such tremendous power within its reach, and never was there such a gulf and imbalance between human power and human understanding of that power. This new situation creates all kinds of instabilities.

If our soci-

ety is to progress in the seventies and eighties and nineties, the new situation requires that it be able to produce a new set of values and an altogether new

leadership.

O u r present values and leadership are wholly inadequate for the task ahead, in the United States, in Europe, and everywhere else in the world.

Again, the execution of Project 1969 will be

an occasion to cast light on the present reality in these f i e l d s — which show a marked sag in our moral and intellectual strength — a n d a motive to fortify our decision thoroughly to update and reform them. In all these pages, I have done my best to show that we must not back into the future, but plan our way ahead, and I have tried to convey a sense of scale, time, direction and finality, and pointed out that its understanding should inspire the existence 281

the great change of

direction

and purpose of this segment in the succession of generations which is ours.

I have given my view on the first step that, with

Project 1969, may be undertaken to reorder our thinking and brace our resolve, and I have attempted to show that Atlantic society ought not to fail on any of these major counts, in preventing the Chasm A h e a d , in expanding its platform beyond

its

present narrow limits, in approaching the macroproblems of humanity anew, in conceiving new values and goals to guide our collective action, and in expressing a leadership of new men uncontaminated by the agonies and prejudices of an epoch in transition. A l l along I have been wondering what kind of world and life we are bequeathing to our children and grandchildren, and all their young friends and colleagues, wherever they may live, who — a l b e i t , perhaps, still unaware of it all—sense that a cycle in history and civilization is about to end, and that the omens and chances for the new p e r i o d — w h i c h will be theirs—are

rather

grim, unless our generation has the fortitude to operate a radical change of direction, steering the world away from its present course. T h e results of the failure of our society to do so may not be clear in my mind.

A n d this book may have left the reader

unconvinced, or the design herein sketched may look too Utopian.

What is certainly true, however, is that if we do not pre-

pare a great deal more earnestly to face the threats and challenges of the next decades, we and our youngsters are due for a rude a w a k e n i n g — w h i c h may be catastrophe right ahead, or our future being written in ideograms.

282

Index

Index

Academy of Sciences of the USSR, 119 Advanced

Technology:

for Integration,

A Program

19

Aerospace industry, importance of research in, 22; investment for research in, 20-21; and technological gap, 20-22 Affluent

Society,

The,

81

Africa, 39, 114, 115, 168, 182-83, 191, 194, 200, 207, 280 Agfa-Gevaert combine, 59 Aircraft industry, and technological gap, 19-20, 25, 28 Alaska, 191 Algeria, 112 Alsop, Joseph, 81 "America in the Technetronic Age," 67 American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 221 American Academy of Political and Social Sciences, 81 American Association for the Advancement of Science, 208 American

Challenge,

American Society of Editors, 188 American Telephone graph, 23 Architectural

Design,

Argentina, 194, 280 Armand, Louis, 142

The,

60-61

Newspaper and 139,

Tele203

Arusha Manifesto, 205-6 Asia, 39, 88, 96, 114, 115, 168, 191, 194, 200, 280 Assistance technical: and socioeconomic development, 186-87 Atlantic

Community

Quarterly,

190 Atlantic Institute, 4, 10 Atlantic nations, see Atlantic system Atlantic system, as center of international structure, 97, 155; difficulties involved in solving problems within, 73-74, 75, 76; dissatisfaction of youth with society in, 271-73; economic strength of, 270; effect of technological revolution on, 41; need for crisis management and creative planning, 76, 77-78; need for recognition and redefinition of priorities by, 78-79, 80, 84, 89, 271; need for unity within, 71, 23940; new approach to solution of problems of, 74-77; and problem of planning at global scale, 249; question of American-European cooperation, 94-96; question of Atlantic interdependence, 79-80, 87, 89; relationship to Soviet Union, 264, 269-70; responsibility of to exercise world leadership, xiii-xiv, 96-101, 2372s5

index Atlantic system (continued) 38, 268-73, 282; and socioeconomic development of the Third World, 189-93; threat of divisions within, xi, 1, 2-3, 33-34, 36, 69-71, 73-76, 77, 80, 88, 237; see also Europe; technological gap; United States; West; World system Attila, 156 Australia, 106, 191, 207 Automation

and

Technological

Change, 27-28

Ball, George W., 152, 153 Bank of Italy, 122 Belgium, 56, 109, 151 Bell, Daniel, 221 Bell Telephone Company, 23 Berger, Gaston, 228 Bernal, Professor J. D., 174 Berkeley, Edmund C , 48-49 Biafra, 113 Blueprint for Peace,

129, 220

Boulding, Kenneth, 141 Boumedienne, President, 112 Bradley, Gene E., 268 Brazil, 141, 194, 280 Britain's Action Committee for European Aerospace, 30 British National Economic Development Office, 27 Brzezinski, Professor Zbigniew, 6768, 69-70, 130, 131 Building

the

American-European

Market: Planning for the I970\s,

268 Bundy, McGeorge, 160

Calder, Nigel, 168, 212 C anada, 30, 188, 265 C arli, Dr. Guido, 122

286

Casimir, Dr. H. B. G., 36 Castro, Josue de, 190 Causse Report, 20 Central American Common Market (C A C M ) , 185, 191, "Challenge of the Seventies for the World of Today, The," 190 China (Peoples Republic), 38, 108, 181, 191, 207, 213, 237; assimilation of into international community, 87; cultural revolution in, i n , 141; as a nuclear power, 118; and Project 1969, 280; schism between Soviet Union and, 110-11, 127 Christian

Science

Monitor,

The,

M, 42 Cities, problems of, 159-60, 161, 162 Cole, Professor La Mont C., 208 Comecon, see Council for Mutual Economic Assistance ( C M E A ) Commission on the Year 2000, 221, 222, 275 Committee for the Atlantic Economic Cooperation ( C A E C ) , 4 Communist bloc, xiii, 184, 238; division within, 1 0 9 - n , 118 "Computer as a Tutor, The," 45 Computers and Automation,

48-49

Computer technology, 8, 9, 66, 232, 252; effect on art of management, 17; effect on electronics industry, 18; extensive application of in United States, 16-18, 44-45, 47-49, 54; importance of computer size in, 43; importance of in technological revolution, 15; limited application in Europe, 15-16, 17; systems approach to, 47; and technological gap, 15-18, 43, 44; and United States organizational ability, 4748: United States superiority in

index manufacture and application of, 43-44; United States use of to deal with information explosion, 46-47; United States use of in industry, 45-46; use of in education, 45, 50-53; use of in Soviet Union, 121; use of in telephone communications, 23 Conference on Strategies for Atlantic Technological Development (1968), 4 Conference on Transatlantic Technological Imbalance and Collaboration (1967), 9-10, 34-36 Concord,

20

Congo, 113-14 Connor, John T., 7 Cooper, Richard N., 27 Council For Mutual Economic Assistance ( C M E A ) , 132, 266 Crete, 109 Cuba, 109 Cybernation, 54, 64, 136, 225, 232 Czechoslovakia, xi, 110, 238, 269

Daedalus,

148,

221,

226,

276

Data processing, concept of, 44, 47, 64, 121 Deauville Conference, see Conference on Transatlantic Technological Imbalance and Collaboration De Gaulle, Charles, 57 Derniere Monde,

Chance La,

177,

du

Troisieme

190

Deutsch, Professor Karl, 275-76 "Developed-Underdeveloped and East-West Relations," 190 Development, socioeconomic: and the industrial nations, 211; and liberalization of international trade, 181-85, 188; magnitude of problems concerning, 176—

77; and question of foreign aid, 185-86; and question of technical assistance, 186-87; and the Third World, 177-81, 189-93 Diebold, John, 46-47, 138 Drancourt, Michel, 142 Dynamics

of Change,

The,

207

East, the, xiv, 202, 235, 264, 266, 267; confrontation with the West, 105, 108-9, 115, 127; division within, 109-11; economic resources of, 108; and liberalization of international trade, 127, 184, 185; nations comprising, 106, 108; and question of nationalism, 147, 148-49; relationship to the West, 118, 127, 132, 238, 239, 263; socialist ideology of, 106, 108; see also Communist bloc; Soviet Union Eastern Europe, see East Economic

Report,

5

Education, effect of European methods of on other cultures, 200; imbalance of between industrial nations and Third World, 198-202; need for radical reform in, 199; and overpopulation, 197-98; relationship with industry in United States, 50, 51, 52-53; role of in technological gap, 31 -33, 34, 49-50< 52, 53, 54, 55; and technological progress in the United States, 49-54; use of computer technology in, 45, 50, 53 Ed well, Dr. Raymond, 168 Egypt, 38, 191 Einstein, Albert, 144 Eisenhower, Dwight D.. 82 Electronics industry, and technological gap, 18, 25, 26-27 Encounter, 67-68, 69-70

287

index " E n o r m i t y or L o g i c and H y p o c r i s y in

the

of

internationalization,

1 4 9 - 5 0 ; and question of A t l a n t i c

E u r o p e , W e s t e r n , xii, xiii, 45, 83,

i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e , 7 7 , 89, 90, 9 3 -

142,

Solution,"

process

174

84,

Ultimate 146,

161,

182,

189,

96;

question

of

political

and

198,

228,

249,

250,

252,

255,

e c o n o m i c integration, 5 7 - 5 8 ,

256,

264,

265,

266,

273,

280,

89-95; and race

for

2 8 1 ; and the a e r o s p a c e i n d u s t r y ,

a i r c r a f t , 20; r e l a t i o n s h i p to

2 1 , 92; and a p p l i c a t i o n of

East,

com-

88,

118;

6if

supersonic the

resentment

of

puter t e c h n o l o g y , 1 5 - 1 6 , 17, 5 8 -

U n i t e d States in, 60, 9 1 ; rigidity

59; attitude t o w a r d t e c h n o l o g i c a l

of f a c t o r s o f p r o d u c t i o n in, 35,

g a p , 8 - 9 , 1 2 - 1 3 , 60; attitude to-

36, 48; role of industrial

ward technology

in, 34, 35, 60,

munity

68,

breakdown

gress, 5 8 - 6 0 ; role of in

91,

92-93;

political

structure

denuclearization

in,

60-61;

118;

1969,

com-

technological

222,

274-80;

proProject

role

of

in

devel-

t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , 2 2 - 2 3 ; tech-

o p m e n t o f cities in, 92; disunity

n o l o g i c a l p r o g r e s s in, 6, 7, 8, 9,

o f , 109,

of,

of

in

130; and e c o n o m i c

operation

with

129,

132,

130,

Soviet 133,

co-

Union,

134; effect

of educational system on foreign cultures, tional

200;

effect

system

on

of

educa-

technological

p r o g r e s s o f , 3 1 - 3 3 , 34; e f f e c t of technological

r e v o l u t i o n o n , 42;

and

of

exercise

leadership,

96,

9 7 ; e x p e n d i t u r e o n r e s e a r c h and d e v e l o p m e n t b y , 23, 24; and information

technology,

58-59.

9 1 - 9 2 ; lack of c o h e s i o n in c o r porate of

community,

scientists

United

and

States,

cooperation

59-60:

loss

technicians

29-31;

with

need

United

8 6 - 8 8 , 9 4 - 9 5 ; need to

to for

States

preserve

11-12,

58-60,

26-27,

60-62,

Atlantic

see

system for

Energy

also

Technological

gap; West; World

(EURATOM),

Atomic 56n

E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y f o r C o a l and Steel

(ECCS),

European

56n

Conference

on

Satellite

C o m m u n i c a t i o n s ( C E T S ) , 21 European

Common

Market,

European Economic Economic

(EEC), 132,

31,

264,

32,

265,

see

Community

European Development European

Fund,

183

Community

59, 266;

109,

115,

American-

E u r o p e a n c o m p e t i t i o n in, 29; and "equitable and

of

United

European C o m m u n i t y

recognition

redefinition

94;

system;

cultural heritage o f , 92; need f o r and

62-63;

States industrial s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r ,

return"

European

clause,

58:

unification,

89-

priorities b y , 7 8 - 7 9 , 9 1 - 9 6 ; and

91,

the

92,

within, 5 6 - 5 7 , 58; T r e a t y of A s -

participation of state in p r o d u c -

sociation of A f r i c a n States, 182—

nuclear

industry,

19,

tion o f g o o d s and services, p e r c e n t a g e of p o p u l a t i o n ing h i g h e r e d u c a t i o n , lem of mon

288

agreement

Market,

63;

receiv-

32:

prob-

within

Com-

56-57,

5^;

and

92;

problem

of

agreement

83

European

Free

(EFTA), European

Trade

57, 91, Launcher

Organization

Association

109,

265

Development

(ELDO),

21

index European Space Research zation ( E S R O ) , Explorer,

Organi-

21

21

Giovanni Agnelli Foundation,

251

"Goals

the

in

World

the

Solution

Food

of

Problem,"

164

G r e e c e , 207, 264 G r o s s , B e r t r a m M . , 4, 42, 8 1 , 146, Fabun, Don,

207

150-51

F a i r c h i l d , 18

Guernier,

F a r E a s t , 88, 1 1 5

Maurice,

177,

189-90,

201

F i a t , 133 F i o r i o , F r a n c o , 141 Food

and

Agricultural

Organiza-

tion ( F A O ) , 2 6 3 - 6 4 F o r d M o t o r , 133 aid,

and

of

Policy

socioeconomic

the

Research

University

Institute

of

Pennsyl-

vania, 9 Fortune,

Program

and

Society,

on

33

H a u s e r , D r . Phillip, 50

development, 185-86 Foreign

University

Technology

Foreign Affairs, 4 6 - 4 7 , 130, 186 Foreign

Hadrian, 156 Harvard

H e w l e t t - P a c k a r d , 28 Hitler, A d o l f , 156 H o l l o m a n , J. H e r b e r t , 7 H o r n i n g , D r . D o n a l d F . , 175 H o w e , H a r o l d , 52 Hungary,

151

F r a n c e , xi, 9, 16, 24, 32, 38, 56, 60, 6 1 , 141

no

H u x l e y , A l d o u s , 203 Huxley,

Sir

Julian,

38,

65,

136,

272, 273

F r a n k , L a w r e n c e K . , 148 F r a n k s , L o r d , 189

India, 1 1 3 , 1 4 1 , 168, 180, 194, 280

F r e e m a n and H a r l o w , 28 Fuller,

Professor

minster, Future,

Richard

Buck-

139

forecasting

and

of, 223-34, 274-75;

Indonesia,

113

Industrial

Revolution,

effects

comparative

size

planning

39, 40

speculation

Industry,

a b o u t , 236

productivity American, tance of

G a b o r , P r o f e s s o r D e n n i s , 142, 2 1 4

of

of, and

European

26-29,

and

35;

impor-

large domestic

market

in, 26, 29, 35;

internationaliza-

G a l b r a i t h , John K e n n e t h , 81

tion

of

re-

G a l i l e o , 21

s e a r c h b y in U n i t e d States,

52,

of

151-53;

support

G a r d n e r , R i c h a r d N . , 129, 2 1 0 , 220

53;

G e n e r a l A g r e e m e n t on T a r i f f s and

puters in, 4 5 - 4 6 ; see a e r o s p a c e ;

T r a d e ( G A T T ) , 132, 182

Corporation,

Information 65,

151

of

com-

nuclear

in-

explosion,

and

puter t e c h n o l o g y , 4 6 - 4 7 ,

com144

Institute f o r the F u t u r e ( I F F ) , 53

G e r m a n y , W e s t , 16, 24, 27, 32, 38, 56, 109, 1 1 8 ,

use

dustry

G e n e r a l Electric F o r u m , 194 Motor

States

aircraft; electronics;

G e n e r a l E l e c t r i c , 19, 133 General

United

196

Institute

of

University

Studies

of

the E u r o p e a n C o m m u n i t y , 31

289

index international Bank for tion and

Reconstruc-

Development

(IBRD),

K o h n s t a m m , M a x , 252// Korea, 113

177 International

Business

Machines,

133 International

Conference

on

cational Planning ( 1 9 6 8 ) , international

Edu199

Development

Center,

190 International Development

Review,

186 International Herald Tribune, 81 International (IMF),

Monetary

Fund

132

International Satellite

Telecommunications

Italy,

Ralph

E., 83

L a t i n A m e r i c a , 168, 173, 1 9 1 ; and Project

1969,

280;

Latin

America

(LAFTA), Layton,

Free

Trade

Christopher,

18,

S. A r t h u r ,

32,

109,

Life, 45

Liberia,

1 5 1 , 194, 2 5 1 , 252, 272

19,

28,

59, 9 2 Vladimir llych,

141,

Area

185

Lewis,

60,

114-

15

Lenin,

56,

separation

from A f r o - A s i a n countries,

(Intelsat),

194 15,

54 Lapp,

Consortium

22 Israel,

Labor, internationalization of, 1 5 3 -

118

183

112

L i n c e i , N a t i o n a l A c a d e m y o f , 251 Lippmann, Walter,

84-85

L u x e m b u r g , 56 Jantsch, D r . E r i c h , 136, 153, 2 2 4 M c H a l e , P r o f e s s o r J o h n , 203, 208,

25, 2 5 1 , 252/1 Japan,

106,

270; and puters,

John X X I I I , 135,

191,

255,

266,

of

com-

manufacture

43;

1969, 222, Johnson,

141, role

of

in

Project

274-80 Pope,

Lyndon

160-61,

McNamara,

Robert

S.,

137,

187-

88

173

M ait riser le Pr ogres, 4

B., 88,

168-69,

J o u v e n e l B e r t r a n d de,

209-10 M c L u h a n , M a r s h a l l , 46, 65

127-28, 2 2 0

228-29

Marshall

Plan,

Massachusetts n o l o g y , 52, Marx, Karl,

189 Institute

of

118

Meaning of the Twentieth K a h n , H e r m a n 148, 2 1 4

Tech-

100 Century,

The, 141

K a u f m a n , D r . R i c h a r d H., 4, 32

Melman, Seymour, 82-83

K e n n e d y , John F., 173

M e x i c o , 1 9 1 , 280

K e n n e d y R o u n d , 99, 1 8 1 - 8 2

M i c h a e l , D o n a l d N . , 2 1 5 , 127, 247

K e p l e r , J o h a n n , 21

M i d d l e East, 109, 1 1 4 , 127

Kerner Report, 8 1 King,

Dr.

Alexander,

M i l l s a p s C o l l e g e , 188 199-200,

2 5 1 , 252n

M o b i l ity,

relationship

K n o p p e r s , D r . A n t o n i e T . , 10, 27

M o n n e t , Jean, 263

K o d a k , 133

M o t o r o l a , 18

290

to

n o l o g i c a l progress, 34, 35

tech-

index N a p o l e o n I, 1 5 6 National

and

Aeronautics

Administration

and

Space

( N A S A ) , 20, 21

food

supply,

164-72,

174-76,

the

177,

197;

problem

of

for

space

National Bureau of Standards, 6

96;

National

rate,

Industrial

Conference

B o a r d , 53 e f f e c t on

world

sys-

145-49

National

new of

172-74;

cities,

195-

reducing

birth

and

the

Third

W o r l d , 167, 168. 1 7 5 - 7 6 ; U n i t e d

Nationalism, tem,

question

States

role

lems of,

Planning

Association,

183

in

alleviating

prob-

175-76

Ozbekhan, Hasan,

100,

164,

169-

70, 229, 247

N a t i o n a l S c i e n c e F o u n d a t i o n , 30 N a t u r a l r e s o u r c e s , d e p l e t i o n o f animal

life,

plant

205-6;

life,

depletion

206-7;

ownership

of,

of

international

203;

misuse

of

Pakistan, 113 Paul V I , P o p e , 173 P a u l i n g , Linus, 259

land, 207; p r o b l e m o f p o l l u t i o n ,

P a v a n , P r o f e s s o r M a r i o , 204, 206

xiii, 203, 2 0 4 - 5 ,

Phillips, 60

208-10

N e t h e r l a n d s , 56

P h i l i p p i n e s , R e p u b l i c o f the,

Newhouse Communication

Center,

81

Planning-Programming-Budgeting

Newsweek, New

191

P i g a n i o l , M . Pierre, 4, 9 2 - 9 3

84

York

System ( P P B S ) , 5

Times,

The,

85,

196,

Playboy, 38, 65 Playdoyer pour I'Avenir,

253

142,

N e w Z e a l a n d , 106, 1 9 1 , 207

Poignant, R a y m o n d , 3 1 - 3 2

Nigeria, 113

P o l a n d , 141

N o r s t a d , G e n e r a l L a u r i s , 268

P o l a r o i d , 28

North Atlantic Treaty Organization

Population

(NATO),

see

Over-

population

118

N u c l e a r i n d u s t r y , and fast b r e e d e r reactor,

explosion,

145

19, 28; and

technologi-

Population cago,

cal g a p , 1 8 - 1 9 , 25, 28

R e s e a r c h and

Training

C e n t e r of the U n i v e r s i t y o f C h i 50

Poullier, Dr. Jean-Pierre, 4 Presidential O l i v e t t i , 133

operation (OECD), 164,

for

Economic

and 25,

185, 224,

251

Our Depleted

Co-

Development

23,

Society,

26,

on 164

President's S c i e n c e A d v i s o r y

O p p e n h e i m e r , J. R o b e r t , 73 Organization

Committee

World Food Problem,

27,

32,

O v e r p o p u l a t i o n , xii, 162, 189, 195,

Com-

mittee, 169, 204 P r o j e c t 1969, f r e e d o m f r o m political 234,

82-83

the

ideology 255;

society

at

of,

and

226-27,

231,

improvement

world

scale

need f o r , 2 3 5 - 3 6 ; need f o r effi-

244; c a u s e s o f , 1 6 6 - 6 7 ; c o n s t r u c -

cient

tion p r o b l e m s presented b y , 1 9 3 -

phased, p r o g r e s s i v e a p p r o a c h

9 7 : effect on e d u c a t i o n ,

control

197-98;

of

276-77;

management of

the

in,

future,

278-80: to

224-34,

314

index Saturday Review, 44

P r o j e c t 1969 (continued) 2 7 4 - 7 5 ; political i m p l i c a t i o n s o f , 2 35>

259, 2 6 1 ; and p r o b l e m s of

Scandale

p l a n n i n g at g l o b a l scale, 2 2 0 - 2 2 ,

Schon,

223-24,

Science,

226-27,

242-43,

245-

54, 274; p u r p o s e o f , 2 1 9 - 2 0 , 262; question of sponsorship of, 2 6 3 68; role o f 268-73;

Atlantic

role

of

industrial

tions

in,

222,

study

of

forecasting

ning,

224-26,

for

world

nations

265-67, 227-34;

as

cooperation,

na-

Science

tool

273-74;

use of i n t e r n a t i o n a l p u b l i c opinion in, 2 4 3 - 4 5 ,

247-48

Le,

Professor

Donald

influence

on

A.,

226

civilization

5 0 - 5 7 ; see also T e c h n o l o g y Science

plan-

Developpement,

o f , 3 7 - 4 0 ; role of e d u c a t i o n in,

in,

274-80;

and

du

147

Advisory of

Committee,

Sciences

175

Foundation,

214 Scientist and Citizen, 209 Sebrell, W i l l i a m H., 206 Senegal, 112 S e r v a n - S c h r e i b e r , Jean-Jaques,

60-

61 S n o w , C . P., 63 Somalia,

Q u i n n , P r o f e s s o r J a m e s B., 153

Soviet 93, Radio

Corporation

of

America,

133 of

the National

Commission (March

on Civil

Union, 108,

xi,

112,

106

13, 63, 86, 113,

122,

92, 141,

142,

146,

150,

161,

191,

194,

208,

228,

244,

255,

264,

265,

266; and the a r m s race, 83, 94,

R a n d C o r p o r a t i o n , 53 Report

113

South A f r i c a , Union of,

Advisory Disorders

1 9 6 7 ) , 81

2 1 3 ; attitude o f scientists t o w a r d world of,

unity,

126-27;

253;

conservatism

economic

strength

Reston, J a m e s , 85

of, 119-20; expectations of con-

R i o de J a n e i r o a g r e e m e n t , 99

sumers

R o g e r s . P a o l o , 249

o f in w o r l d s y s t e m , 1 0 4 - 5 ,

R o l f e , D r . S i d n e y , 153

1 1 6 - 1 7 : low degree of

R o m a n C a t h o l i c C h u r c h , 145, 154

z a t i o n in, 1 2 0 - 2 2 ; potential o f as

R o m a n E m p i r e , 140 Romania, 110 Rossi, M a r i o , 14 R o y a l D u t c h - S h e l l , 59, 60 R o y a l S o c i e t y , 30, 3 1 R u t h e r f o r d , Ernest, 144

in,

119-20;

constructive

United

omy

of,

124-26, ship

ally,

131-34,

with 115, the

question

transformation 238:

Europe,

relationship 21,

with West,

S a k h a r o v , A n d r e i , 253

269-70;

S a l a m , A b d u s , 2 12

Project

1969,

relation130; States,

relationship 118-19, role

222,

120, of

technological

gap

in

274-80;

schism b e t w e e n C h i n a and, 11;

of of,

129,

United

129-30;

128-35,

292

States

120-21;

economic

with

S a r g e n t , II, F r e d e r i c k , 209

111 ^

mechani-

88; p r o b l e m s of m a n a g i n g e c o n -

S a i n t - G e o u r s , Jean, 252n

S a r n o f f , G e n e r a l D a v i d , 44

importance

110-

between

index United

States a n d ,

computer

121;

technology

see also C o m m u n i s t Space-Time

and

use

in, bloc;

of

sociological

problems,

121;

need f o r integrated

East

in a p p l i c a t i o n o f , 4 7 ; n e w

Post-Industrial-

ism, 1 5 0 - 5 1 Spinelli, A l t i e r o ,

solve

154

ties c r e a t e d

by,

8;

organization

137,

reali-

138,

147,

148; relationship of m o b i l i t y

to

progress

in

in,

34, 35; role

of

S p a i n , 207

forecasting

Stalin, J o s e p h , 1 1 8 , 127

and the science based industries,

and

planning,

259;

S t a n d a r d O i l , 133

8, 9, 5 1 ; and the U n i t e d

States,

S t a n f o r d R e s e a r c h Institute, 52

34,

54-55,

S t a n f o r d U n i v e r s i t y , 49, 50

6 5 - 6 8 ; and w a r f a r e , 1 2 - 1 3 ,

137,

Stein, G e r t r u d e , 49

2 1 2 ; see also T e c h n o l o g i c a l

gap

35,

40-42,

Technological

S t u h l i n g e r , E r n s t , 22 Sudan, 113

North

S u e z , 141

Atlantic

spective,

50,

Committee

Technological

S u s s e x , U n i v e r s i t y o f , 161

43,

of

the

Assembly,

Forecasting

9

in Per-

224

Technological gap (between United

S u s s e x C o n f e r e n c e , 225 S w e d e n , 16

States and E u r o p e ) , 3, 5, 6 - 7 1

S w e d i s h B a n k e r s A s s o c i a t i o n , 188

passim,

S w i t z e r l a n d , 16

and

Symposium

on

World Trade Syracuse

Technology (1966),

University,

and

76,

S y s t e m s - a n a l y s i s , 9, 4 7 - 4 8 , 53, 5 7 ,

121,

2019-

28; and

availability

personnel,

29-33;

c o m p u t e r t e c h n o l o g y , 1 5 - 1 8 , 43, 6-10;

and

the

electronics

d u s t r y , 18, 25, 2 6 - 2 7 ;

in-

European

attitude t o w a r d , 8 - 9 , 1 2 - 1 3 , 60;

T a n z a n i a , 205 244,

of and

44, 4 5 ; d e b a t e o v e r existence o f ,

64, 80, 225, 229, 252, 263

Technology,

237;

22; and the a i r c r a f t industry qualified

81

99,

industry

20, 25,

6-9

96,

the a e r o s p a c e

2,

63,

87,

88,

240,

explanations

of,

135;

11 —13; G M

247; a m b i v a l e n c e

for

existence

of,

I B M age, 64-68:

definition o f , 6; e f f e c t on e d u c a -

and industrial size and p r o d u c t i -

tion,

vity,

29, 5 0 - 5 7 ,

199; effect

on

industrial nations, 9 8 - 1 0 1 ; E u r o -

26-29,

35;

meaning

consequences

of,

5,

10,

and

13-14,

pean s u p p o r t o f , 34, 35; i m p a c t

2 3 - 2 4 , 3 3 - 3 4 , 4 0 - 4 1 , 4 2 - 4 3 , 63,

o n e c o n o m i c a c t i v i t y , 4; i m p a c t

68-71,

o n m o d e r n s o c i e t y , xii, 2 - 3 ,

European

40,

63-70,

'35-57 of

73,

103-4,

37-

115-16,

passim, 2 3 1 ; i m p o r t a n c e

computer

technology

in

ad-

7 3 ; need

for

American-

cooperation

87* 9 5 - 9 6 : and

88;

f r a g m e n t a t i o n , 5 5 : and

e r a l i z a t i o n of i n t e r n a t i o n a l trade,

of

182; m a n ' s r e l a t i o n s h i p to,

24-26:

243;

as

135-

means

to

in-

tion o f A t l a n t i c i n t e r d e p e n d e n c e ,

key to the f u t u r e , 7, 8; and lib-

214-18,

close,

d u s t r y , 1 8 - 1 9 , 25, 28; and ques-

v a n c e m e n t o f , 15, 17, 4 7 - 4 8 ; as

37,

to

the n u c l e a r

and

question

research

nological

and

and

of

European question

development,

question

of

transformation

techof

so-

293

index T e c h n o l o g i c a l g a p (continued)

T r a d e E x p a n s i o n A c t o f 1962, 181

ciety, 6 3 - 7 6 ; and r e l a t i o n s h i p of institutional

structures,

35;

role

of d i f f e r e n t c u l t u r a l attitudes in, 62-63,

65-67,

68,

69;

role

e d u c a t i o n in, 3 1 - 3 3 , 34,

Treaty

of

Rome

United

concerning,

1 1 ; and t e l e c o m m u n i c a t i o n s , 2 2 23, 25, 28; and t e l e p h o n e attitude

toward,

Atlantic

system

Technological

United 54;

16, 24,

27,

49-50, U n i l e v e r , 59, 60

23;

89,

T w a i n , M a r k , 22

tative

munications,

56,

of

52, 53, 54, 55; s c a r c i t y o f quantiinformation

(1957),

90

comStates

see

also

Kingdom,

15,

28, 32, 39, 5 7 , 92, 140, 265; and the C o m m o n M a r k e t , 9 1 ; loss of scientists United

and

technicians

States,

30-31;

States as heir to role o f ,

Innovation

ciety, 2 0 6 - 7 , 2 1 6 ,

and So-

127

84-85

United N a t i o n s , 14, 106, 164,

nology

United

Nations

Conference

T r a d e and D e v e l o p m e n t

nological

gap,

and

22-23,

Tech-

25,

tific

T h i r d W o r l d , 106, 265; a g r i c u l t u r a l ward

West,

the

within,

1 7 1 ; attitude 112;

112-15;

sources of,

to-

division

economic

108: e f f e c t of

recolo-

nialism o n , 3 9 - 4 0 ; e f f e c t o f nationalism

on,

eign

question,

264

and

Cultural

146-47;

and

199

Nations

Industrial

opment Organization

Devel-

(UNIDO),

264 United

Nations Trade

and

Devel-

o p m e n t B o a r d , 180 United

States, xii, xiv, 5, 21,

56,

81, 82, 90, 92, 93, 99, 106,

113,

na-

118,

122,

141,

142,

146,

147,

150,

151,

189,

196,

198,

208,

o f in in international trade, 1 8 3 -

213,

221,

226,

228,

244,

249,

85;

in,

252,

255,

264,

265,

266,

267,

1 9 8 - 9 9 , 2 0 0 - 2 ; p r o b l e m of o v e r -

272,

population

toward

comprising, problem

76,

194;

of

in,

185-86;

for-

United

Scien-

Organization

position

tions

aid

180,

(UNESCO),

T h i e m a n n , H u g o 252/1 in,

TAD),

on

(UNC-

United Nations Educational

28

T e x a s I n s t r u m e n t s , 18

production

173,

1 7 7 , 2 1 0 , 263

T e c h n o l o g i c a l r e v o l u t i o n , see T e c h Telecommunications,

to

United

108;

education 167,

168,

relationship

with

175— in-

dustrial nations, 1 0 0 - 1 , 109, 1 1 5 , 238-39: socioeconomic ment o f ,

177-81,

develop-

183-84,

189-

93; and technical assistance question,

186-87

Time, 6 1 - 6 2

of,

294

international:

181-85,

188

10-12,

280,

281:

technological

attitude gap,

13; attitude t o w a r d

nology,

34,

35, 4 1 - 4 2 .

4 3 ' 5.

54-55, 65-68; commercial fits d e r i v e d disunity,

by

60-62;

from

7-8, techbene-

European

confusion

in

national p u r p o s e s o f , 8 0 - 8 6 ; dependency

T o y n b e e , A r n o l d , 38 Trade,

273,

liberalization

of

European

industry

o n , 94; effect of e d u c a t i o n a l system of,

on

technological

3 1 ~33'

34,

49-54:

progress emigra-

index tion o f

European

technicians policy of

to,

scientists 29-31;

export

o f , 9 9 - 1 0 0 ; and

exercise

leadership, 96, 9 7 ;

application

of

and

extensive

computer

tech-

54-55,

62-63,

computers formation

65-68:

by

to

deal

Technolog-

ical g a p ; W e s t ; W o r l d

system

Unless Peace Conies, 2 1 2

49; industry s u p p o r t o f

Uonw

research

53; i n v o l v e m e n t

in

the

F a r East, 88, 1 1 5 ; lead o f in science based industries, 8 - 9 ; m a n agerial 27;

superiority

in

industry,

military-industrial

complex

o f , 8 2 - 8 4 ; need f o r

of in-

e x p l o s i o n , 4 6 - 4 7 ; see

also A t l a n t i c s y s t e m ;

n o l o g y b y , 15, 1 6 - 1 8 , 4 3 - 4 5 , 4 7 in, 52,

use with

neirEquilibria

della Nutura

L\ 204 U r b a n i z a t i o n , effect of o v e r p o p u l a tion o n , 1 6 7 U T h a n t , 164, 1 7 7 , 198

cooperation

with Europe, 77, 86-88,

94-95;

need f o r r e c o g n i t i o n and redefi-

V a r i a n , 28 V e n e z u e l a , 280

nition of priorities b y , 7 8 - 7 9 , 80,

V e r n o n , P r o f e s s o r R a y m o n d , 153

81,

Vietnam,

84,

85,

86,

87;

strength o f ,

19,

tension

power

of

nuclear

82-83;

overex-

of,

xiii,

85,

88,

113,

127,

1 4 1 , 194, 266, 272

84-87;

p r o b l e m of civil rights in, 8 1 - 8 2 ; profit

performance

of

industry

in c o m p a r i s o n to E u r o p e , 2 6 - 2 7 ; promotion by,

7;

of

and

applied question

research of

p o p u l a t i o n and the f o o d

oversupply,

W a r s a w P a c t , xi, W e l l s , H . G . , 201

W e s l y a n U n i v e r s i t y , 53 W e s t , the, xi, 202, 235, 2 6 1 ,

1 7 5 - 7 6 , 1 9 3 - 9 4 ; and q u e s t i o n of

266,

world

the S o v i e t

peace,

94;

relationship

between education in,

50,

51,

between

52-53; 51,

with

115,

with

129-30,

structures

53-54;

Latin

relationship

industry

relationship

institutional

in, 4 9 - 5 0 , ship

and

relation-

America, Soviet

133,

134;

115;

118

Weapon Culture, The, 83

29;

267,

271;

attitude

Union,

division

262,

toward

118-19,

within,

109;

and

division within c o m m u n i s t 111;

effect

145-46,

of

147,

outmoded

bloc,

nationalism 148-49;

of

of

on

institutions

Union,

Third

World,

resent-

nomic

resources

146,

on,

effect 147;

of,

eco-

106; effect

m e n t in E u r o p e o f , 60, 9 1 ; role

of

of

130,

form,

156; and l i b e r a l i z a t i o n

133, 134; r o ^ o f in P r o j e c t 1969,

trade

with

in

East-West

relations,

a f f l u e n c e on the

222, 2 7 4 - 8 0 ; role o f in t e l e c o m -

liberalization

munications,

trade,

research

and

22-23;

support

development

of by,

185,

prising,

2 4 - 2 5 , 35, 5 2 - 5 3 , 87; t e c h n o l o g i -

cooperation 125,

and,

between

Soviet

121; technological

Union progress

o f , 6 - 7 , 8, 9 - 1 0 , 4 0 - 4 1 , 43, 50,

Fast, of

127;

reof and

international

188;

nations

com-

106; need f o r e c o n o m i c

cal

gap

institutional

126,

with

Soviet

129-35;

with the East,

105,

127, 238, 239, 263;

Union,

relationship 108-9,

115,

responsibil-

295

index West {continued) ity

to

Union

Third

World,

112;

see

also A t l a n t i c s y s t e m

in,

1 1 1,

sciences to, 2 1 4 - 1 5 ;

W e s t B e n g a l , 194

of present

W e s t i n g h o u s e , 19

16,

W h i t e H o u s e C o n f e r e n c e on International

104-5,

Cooperation

(1965),

129, 220

116-17;

i m p o r t a n c e of social and h u m a n inadequacy

institutions, xi-xii,

144-49,

150-51,

154,

2,

^61,

2 6 2 - 6 4 ; and increase of a g r i c u l tural p r o d u c t i o n , 1 7 0 - 7 1 ; and information explosion,

W i e n e r , A n t h o n y J., 148, 2 1 4

action

W i e n e r , N o r b e r t , 48

2 4 2 - 4 3 ; and

of

144; inter-

subsystems

within,

internationalization

W i e s n e r , P r o f e s s o r J e r o m e B., 8

o f industry, 1 5 1 - 5 3 , 1 9 6 - 9 7 ; and

W i l s o n , H a r o l d , 59

internationalization

W o o d s , G e o r g e D . , 1 7 7 , 178, 186,

1 5 3 - 5 4 ; and international public opinion,

188-89 World

Conference

of

Automotive

natural

in

resources,

37,

1 4 0 - 4 1 , 148; and a c c e l e r a t i o n o f

world

139-40; states,

and

future, crisis

115-16;

changing

243; need

for

expenditures

armament,

in

275-76;

need

to stress f u t u r e in s o l v i n g p r o b lems of, 2 4 1 - 4 2 ; new

continental of

the

274-75;

and

society,

271-

104,

105-6,

difficulties

present

of

138,

7 3 ; division w i t h i n , hi,

control

163;

control

229-31:

for

nations,

travel,

the

in W e s t e r n

need

141-44,

of

146; and

188; Atlantic

139, 2 1 4 - 1 8 ,

reduction

scientific progress,

of

and

international

of t e c h n o l o g i c a l r e v o l u t i o n , 136—

1 4 1 ; and a c c e l e r a t i o n o f history,

and a c c e l e r a t i o n

247-49;

of

181-85,

labor,

2 6 8 - 7 3 ; need f o r m a n ' s

W o r l d C o u n c i l o f C h u r c h e s , 154 W o r l d s y s t e m , and a c c e l e r a t i o n of

trade,

leadership

U n i o n s ( 1 9 6 8 ) , 153

depletion

243-45,

liberalization

W o r l d B a n k , 188

of

course

of

in af-

to

dealing

136-38,

with

154,

63; n u c l e a r tion

of

East-West

in.

157, 2 1 9 - 2 0 , 261 — weapons

security,

preservation sources,

approach

problems

of

203-11;

and

ques-

212-13;

and

natural

re-

problem

cooperation,

of

239-40;

national-

p r o b l e m of the industrialized so-

ism o n , 1 4 5 - 4 9 ; e f f e c t on t e c h n o -

cieties, 1 6 0 - 6 2 ; p r o b l e m o f inter-

fairs, 1 5 5 - 5 7 : effect o f

logical r e v o l u t i o n o n , xii, 115-16, food

103-4,

1 3 5 - 3 7 passim: and the

supply,

164-66,

168-72,

national

education,

197-203;

p r o b l e m o f international ity,

211-12;

problem

of

liquidover-

1 7 4 - 7 6 , 1 7 7 ; v a p b e t w e e n indus-

population, 164-76, 177, 1 9 3 - 9 7 :

trial

problem

and

underdeveloped

tions, 37, 3 8 - 3 9 , 55,

105,

na187—

88, 2 3 8 - 3 9 : g e o p o l i t i c a l c o n f i g u ration 237; nomic

of,

importance

of

planning

245-54;

on

process o f

global inter-

n a t i o n a l i z a t i o n in, 1 4 9 - 5 4 : ques-

155,

tion o f f o r e i g n aid, 1 8 5 - 8 6 ; ques-

socioeco-

tion of technical assistance, 186—

115-16, in

development

176-93;

296

104-9,

imbalance

scale,

of of

nations, Soviet

87; question of urban

problems,

1 5 9 - 6 0 , 1 6 1 , 162; s o c i o e c o n o m i c

index d e v e l o p m e n t of the industrial nations, 2 1 1 ; and reduction of the birthrate,

172-74;

228, 265; consequences o f , 6, 107, 108

105-

techno-struc-

ture of industrial nations, 9 8 - 9 9 ; threat of c h e m i c a l 2 1 2 ; threat of tion,

weapons

nuclear

to,

156-57 Year 2000, 148

W o r l d W a r I, 182 World

X e r o x , 28

destruc-

W a r II,

10, 98,

116,

124,

Yugoslavia,

110, 132

297

(Continued, from front flap)

and policies, and the adoption of a f o r w a r d posture. His proposal is positive and detailed; unlike the usual " v i e w with a l a r m " book on the problems of the present, The Chasm

Ahead

suggests a way to solve them. Mr. Peccei points out that the once triumphant sharp logic of war no longer endures. The cost of war is prohibitive, the risks monstrous. Men will be obliged to find a new coherence in

peace. W e

can no

longer

be

brainwashed by ideological j u g g e r y , doctored evidence, and a less than candid presentation of issues. T h e book deals in specifics rather than generalities, and coordinates the avalanche of information Here

are

on the

the

transatlantic

facts, buttressed

imbalance. by

figures;

proof conclusive that we must plan now if we are to head off incipient global catastrophe in ming decade. L I O P E C C E I , an international econond businessman, is vice chairman of the of Olivetti. He is also on the Managelommittee of Fiat, the m a n a g i n g direcItalconsult, the Italian think-tank, and tan of the Committee f o r Atlantic EcoCooperation. Jacket design/Tim G a y d o s

THE MACMILLAN

COMPANY

8 6 6 THIRD AVENUE, NEW YORK, N.Y. 1 0 0 2 2