The Anglo-Afghan Wars 1839-1919

GREGORY FREMONT-BARNES holds a doctorate in History from Oxford Modern University a n d s e r v e s as a S e n i o ...

Author: Gregory Fremont-Barnes

159 downloads 2003 Views 34MB Size Report

This content was uploaded by our users and we assume good faith they have the permission to share this book. If you own the copyright to this book and it is wrongfully on our website, we offer a simple DMCA procedure to remove your content from our site. Start by pressing the button below!
Report copyright / DMCA form

DOWNLOAD PDF

GREGORY

FREMONT-BARNES

holds a doctorate in History from Oxford

Modern University

a n d s e r v e s as a S e n i o r L e c t u r e r i n W a r Studies at t h e R o y a l M i l i t a r y A c a d e m y Sandhurst, d i v i d i n g his w o r k b e t w e e n t e a c h i n g cadets o n site a n d c o m m i s s i o n e d

officers

of the British A r m y posted to garrisons t h r o u g h o u t t h e

UK

a n d a b r o a d . H i s w r i t i n g focuses principally o n the military

and

naval history of the 1 8 t h a n d 1 9 t h centuries.

PROFESSOR ROBERT

O'NEILL,

A O D.Phil. ( O x o n ) , H o n D. Litt. ( A N U ) , F A S S A , is t h e S e r i e s E d i t o r of t h e Essential Histories. His w e a l t h of knowledge

and

e x p e r t i s e s h a p e s t h e series content and provides up-to-them i n u t e research a n d theory.

Born

in 1936 an Australian citizen, h e served i n t h e Australian A r m y , a n d has h e l d a n u m b e r of e m i n e n t p o s i t i o n s i n h i s t o r y circles, including

C h i c h e l e Professor of

t h e H i s t o r y of W a r at A l l Souls College, Oxford, a n d

Chairman

of the Board of the Imperial W a r M u s e u m a n d the C o u n c i l of the I n t e r n a t i o n a l Institute for Strategic Studies, L o n d o n . H e is t h e a u t h o r o f m a n y b o o k s including works o n the

German

A r m y a n d t h e N a z i Party, a n d t h e Korean a n d V i e t n a m wars.

Now

based i n Australia o n his r e t i r e m e n t f r o m O x f o r d h e is t h e Director of t h e L o w y Institute for International Policy a n d

Planning

Director of t h e US Studies C e n t r e at t h e U n i v e r s i t y of Sydney.

Essential Histories

T h e Anglo-Afghan W a r s 1839-1919

Essential Histories

The Anglo-Afghan Wars 1839-1919 Gregory Fremont-Barnes

Readers s h o u l d n o t e t h a t consistent t r a n s l i t e r a t i o n f r o m Pashtun, D a r i and o t h e r A f g h a n languages into English is

Glossary

p r o b l e m a t i c , particularly w i t h respect t o place names and family names, m a n y o f w h i c h b o r e different renderings in t h e

Abattis

D e f e n c e w o r k consisting o f a t r e e w i t h

19th c e n t u r y t h a n t h e y d o today, thus: K a n d a h a r / Q a n d a h a r ;

s h a r p e n e d branches, felled so t h a t its branches

Kabul/Cabool/Cabul/Cabaul/Qabul;Jellalabad/Jalalabad;

point outwards

Jugdulluk/Jagdalak; K h o o r d C a b u l Pass/Khurd-Kabul Pass; Ali Musjid/Ali Masjid; Gilzai/Gilzye, e t c . T h e a u t h o r has t h e r e f o r e

Doolie

C o v e r e d s t r e t c h e r litter o r palanquin f o r t h e evacuation o f t h e w o u n d e d

adopted t h e most c o m m o n l y accepted f o r m o r that which m o s t closely reflects local p r o n u n c i a t i o n .

Feringee

A disparaging t e r m f o r a European

O n an historical n o t e , readers s h o u l d be a w a r e t h a t until 1858

Ghazi

Fighter f o r t h e Faith w h o has killed an infidel

Havildar

Indian infantry sergeant

Infidel

Unbeliever

Indian affairs w e r e m a n a g e d j o i n t l y b e t w e e n C r o w n officials and t h o s e o f t h e East India C o m p a n y (EIC). In L o n d o n , t h e apparatus o f t h e f o r m e r consisted o f t h e S e c r e t a r y o f State f o r W a r and t h e C o l o n i e s , w h o issued instructions t o t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l in C a l c u t t a and t h e Board o f C o n t r o l , w h o s e

Jezail

L o n g - b a r r e l l e d m a t c h l o c k musket carried by t r i b e s m e n

president, as a cabinet m i n i s t e r was a c c o u n t a b l e t o Parliament. In C a l c u t t a w a s t h e EIC, originally a c h a r t e r e d c o m p a n y w i t h

Jihad

Holy war

Jirga

A s s e m b l y o f tribal elders o r representatives

Kotal

M o u n t a i n pass

purely c o m m e r c i a l c o n c e r n s , b u t w h i c h by t h e 18th c e n t u r y exercised w i d e political and military c o n t r o l o v e r m u c h o f t h e s u b c o n t i n e n t o n behalf o f t h e C r o w n . T h e EIC m a i n t a i n e d its o w n armies, w h i c h s e r v e d in c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h o s e o f t h e C r o w n , all c o m m a n d e d by a c a b i n e t - a p p o i n t e d c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f a n s w e r a b l e t o t h e W a r O f f i c e in L o n d o n . In I 858, t h e EIC was disbanded, t h e C r o w n assuming all a u t h o r i t y o v e r India via t h e S e c r e t a r y o f State f o r India, w h o

Lakh

100,000 rupees, t h e equivalent o f £ 10,000 t o d a y

Mullah

Religious teacher, leader o r holy m a n

Nullah

Small valley o r ravine

Poshteen

Sheepskin jacket w i t h a fleece lining

Sangar

Stone b r e a s t w o r k

Sepoy

Indian i n f a n t r y m a n

sat in t h e cabinet, a civilian viceroy, and a c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f o f t h e n e w l y established, British-led Indian A r m y .

Sirdar

Commander

Sowar

Indian cavalry t r o o p e r

Wazir

C h i e f minister o r advisor

First published in G r e a t Britain in 2 0 0 9 by O s p r e y Publishing, M i d l a n d H o u s e , W e s t W a y , Botley, O x f o r d O X 2 0 P H , U K 4 4 3 Park A v e n u e S o u t h , N e w York, N Y 1001 6, U S A E-mail: i n f o @ o s p r e y p u b l i s h i n g . c o m

FOR A C A T A L O G U E O F A L L B O O K S PUBLISHED BY OSPREY MILITARY A N D A V I A T I O N PLEASE C O N T A C T :

© 2 0 0 9 O s p r e y Publishing Ltd. O s p r e y D i r e c t , do R a n d o m H o u s e D i s t r i b u t i o n C e n t e r A l l rights r e s e r v e d . A p a r t f r o m any fair dealing f o r t h e p u r p o s e

4 0 0 H a h n Road, W e s t m i n s t e r M D 21 157

o f p r i v a t e study, research, criticism o r review, as p e r m i t t e d u n d e r

Email:

[email protected]

t h e C o p y r i g h t , Designs and Patents A c t , 1988, n o p a r t o f this p u b l i c a t i o n may be r e p r o d u c e d , s t o r e d in a retrieval system, o r t r a n s m i t t e d in any f o r m o r by any means, electronic, electrical, chemical, mechanical, optical, p h o t o c o p y i n g , r e c o r d i n g o r otherwise, w i t h o u t t h e prior w r i t t e n permission o f t h e copyright o w n e r Enquiries s h o u l d be addressed t o t h e Publishers. A CIP catalogue r e c o r d f o r this b o o k is available f r o m t h e

Page layout by: M y r i a m Bell Design, France Index by Fineline Editorial Services Typeset in GillSans and I T C S t o n e Serif Maps by T h e M a p S t u d i o O r i g i n a t e d by P D Q Media, Bungay, U K P r i n t e d in C h i n a t h r o u g h B o o k b u i l d e r s II

12

7DW

E-mail: c u s t o m e r s e r v i c e @ o s p r e y p u b l i s h i n g . c o m O s p r e y Publishing is s u p p o r t i n g t h e W o o d l a n d Trust, t h e UK's leading w o o d l a n d c o n s e r v a t i o n charity, by

www.ospreypublishing.com

ISBN: 9 7 8 I 8 4 6 0 3 4 4 6 6

10

C07

f u n d i n g t h e d e d i c a t i o n o f trees.

British L i b r a r y

09

O s p r e y D i r e c t , T h e B o o k Service Ltd, D i s t r i b u t i o n C e n t r e , C o l c h e s t e r Road, Frating G r e e n , Colchester; Essex,

13

1 0 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2

1

Contents Introduction

7

Chronology

10

PART l:THE FIRST A N G L O - A F G H A N W A R , 1839-42 Origins and background o f the war

14

W a r r i n g sides

I8

The fighting

20

H o w the w a r ended

33

Portrait of a civilian: Florentia, Lady Sale (1787-1 853)

37

The w o r l d around war: the playground of the Great Game

43

PART ll:THE S E C O N D A N G L O - A F G H A N W A R , 1878-81 Origins and background of the w a r

50

W a r r i n g sides

54

The fighting

56


72

Portrait of a soldier: A r t h u r Male, A r m y chaplain, I 3th Hussars

74

PART IILTHETHIRD A N G L O - A F G H A N W A R , 1919 Origins and background of the w a r

80

W a r r i n g sides

82

The fighting

83


85

Conclusion and consequences

86

Bibliography and further reading

92

Index

94

Introduction

O n 13 J a n u a r y 1 8 4 2 , a British officer,

Afghanistan would become a byword

p e r c h e d o n t h e r o o f t o p of t h e fortress at

savage a n d c u n n i n g e n e m i e s ,

Jalalabad in eastern Afghanistan,

climate, bitter winters, scorching

summers

and rugged and beautiful terrain,

including

a lone horseman, h u n c h e d over exhausted, ponderously

spotted and

approaching.

T h e rider was D r W i l l i a m B r y d o n ,

deep ravines a n d precipitous

an

for

inhospitable

mountains,

all ideal for m o u n t i n g defence a n d a m b u s h .

a r m y s u r g e o n a n d t h e sole s u r v i v o r o f a n

Afghanistan appeared a seemingly

A n g l o - I n d i a n a r m y of 1 6 , 0 0 0 soldiers

unconquerable place w h e r e

and

heroism,

c a m p followers t h a t h a d left K a b u l o n l y a

c o w a r d i c e a n d sacrifice a b o u n d e d ,

and

week before - n o w utterly annihilated

where death awaited those foolish

enough

by

exhaustion, frostbite a n d almost

continuous

t o v e n t u r e across t h e f r o n t i e r w i t h o u t

attack by A f g h a n tribesmen. T h e

total

m o s t careful a t t e n t i o n paid to strategy

destruction of the A r m y of the

Indus

exemplified the nature of fighting this forbidding a n d hostile populated by fiercely

in

environment,

independent,

ferocious w a r - m i n d e d peoples, perhaps the most formidable

indeed

proper supply, organization a n d

T h e country's i n f a m o u s reputation for causing suffering o n c a m p a i g n

I n d i a n a n d G u r k h a soldier of this p e r i o d ,

inspired

Rudyard Kipling to produce o n e of the m o s t p o p u l a r p o e m s of t h e age:

T h e British camp at Pezwan, September I 880. (Author's collection)

and

transport.

guerrilla

fighters i n t h e w o r l d . To t h e British,

the

8

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 1 9

t o t h e p r o b l e m at t h e h e a r t o f t h e first t w o

W h e n y o u ' r e w o u n d e d a n d left o n

c o n f l i c t s , at least, c o u l d n e v e r lie i n m i l i t a r y

Afghanistan's plains,

intervention alone.

A n ' the w o m e n come out to cut u p

Britain's fear of Russian e x p a n s i o n i n t o

what remains, Jest r o l l t o y o u r r i f l e a n ' b l o w

A f g h a n i s t a n f o r m e d t h e b a c k d r o p o f its f i r s t

out

t w o conflicts; i n t h e first i n s t a n c e , f o u g h t

your brains,

between 1839 and 1842, the

A n ' go t o y o u r G a w d like a soldier.

Governor-

G e n e r a l of I n d i a insisted u p o n a n invasion Yet if A f g h a n i s t a n was to p r o v e t h e graveyard

e v e n after t h e ostensible reason for hostility

of m a n y a soldier, it was o n l y o n e

h a d passed. T h e consequences w e r e

amongst

d e v a s t a t i n g , f o r after t h e i r i n i t i a l l y successful

m a n y of the conflicts waged b y Britain d u r i n g Victoria's reign ( 1 8 3 7 - 1 9 0 1 ) .

Every

c a m p a i g n , i n w h i c h A n g l o - I n d i a n forces

year o f h e r r e i g n saw h e r forces d e p l o y e d

imposed o n the Afghans an unacceptable

o n c a m p a i g n s o m e w h e r e across t h e g l o b e ,

ruler, t h e y p r o c e e d e d d o w n t h e r o a d of

particularly i n Africa a n d Asia, i n a n

folly by attempting to control the country

u n i n t e r r u p t e d series o f c o l o n i a l w a r s a n d

t h r o u g h m e r e o c c u p a t i o n . T h e r e s u l t is w e l l

m i n o r operations to protect British nationals

k n o w n : unable to hold even Kabul, the army

a n d British interests, shift a frontier i n t h e

w i t h d r e w t o w a r d s I n d i a , o n l y t o m e e t its

Empire's favour, suppress a m u t i n y or revolt,

inevitable demise along the

or r e p e l a n a t t a c k . As t h e w o r l d ' s l e a d i n g

r o a d s a n d passes e n r o u t e t o J a l a l a b a d .

snow-bound

i m p e r i a l power, Britain w a g e d these

Subsequent operations w e n t some w a y

campaigns without hesitation, and

t o w a r d s resurrecting British prestige, b u t

w i t h the full confidence of ultimate

t h e lesson w a s clear: despite a c e n t u r y of m i l i t a r y success i n I n d i a , B r i t i s h a r m s w e r e

v i c t o r y against foes w h o w e r e i n e v i t a b l y n u m e r i c a l l y superior, yet t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y

and

organizationally inferior. Such was the price

not invincible, and Afghanistan could not l o n g be h e l d u n d e r f o r e i g n sway.

of m a i n t a i n i n g a n d e x p a n d i n g the Empire,

Nevertheless, Anglo-Russian rivalry in

o f u p h o l d i n g t h e n a t i o n ' s p r i d e i n its o w n

C e n t r a l Asia led to a second British i n v a s i o n

perceived cultural, economic a n d political

of Afghanistan ( 1 8 7 8 - 8 1 ) , leading to yet

superiority i n t h e w o r l d - a n d usually at

another partial and temporary -

r e l a t i v e l y little cost.

m i l i t a r i l y m o r e successful -

A m o n g s t all these conflicts, however, three Anglo-Afghan Wars ( 1 8 3 9 - 4 2 ,

the

1878-81

a n d 1919) stand out. I n military terms they

though

occupation,

for effective c o n t r o l , especially of t h e vast countryside, again proved impossible. As i n t h e first war, t h e British w o u l d

shared m u c h i n c o m m o n w i t h other British

suffer a c r u s h i n g defeat, at M a i w a n d ,

campaigns - initial, sometimes

w i t h t h e i r r e p u t a t i o n o n l y restored after

even

catastrophic failure, but ultimate victory

a c h i e v i n g a decisive victory over t h e

i n t h e field. Yet i n p o l i t i c a l t e r m s t h e wars

A f g h a n s at K a n d a h a r . But t h e w a r

e n d e d u n e a s i l y at best a n d disastrously at

f i n i s h o n t h e basis o f c o m p r o m i s e ,

would with

worst, w i t h a n extension of British influence

Britain controlling the foreign policy of

b u t never extensive a n n e x a t i o n or evidence

Afghanistan, a p o i n t that largely contributed

that the original aims could not have been

t o a t h i r d , b u t m u c h s h o r t e r a n d less c o s t l y

achieved t h r o u g h diplomacy alone. T h e wars

conflict i n 1919, w h e n Afghanistan sought

w e r e m a r k e d b y v a r y i n g degrees of political

t o t h r o w o f f t h e last vestiges o f B r i t i s h

a n d military incompetence a n d brilliance,

c o n t r o l o v e r its i n t e r n a l affairs.

disaster a n d t r i u m p h i n r a p i d succession.

T h e origins of Britain's wars i n

T h e r e w e r e also p l e n t i f u l e x a m p l e s o f

A f g h a n i s t a n m a y b e t r a c e d t o its o b s e s s i o n

supreme folly by politicians, w h o

w i t h the vulnerability of the

failed

Indian

t o i d e n t i f y at t h e outset clear p o l i t i c a l

s u b c o n t i n e n t - its greatest i m p e r i a l

objectives or recognize t h a t t h e

possession - to possible i n v a s i o n b y

solution

Introduction

feringees

9

Afghan tribesmen lie in ambush a m o n g rocks during t h e

the invading

Second Afghan W a r Eastern Afghanistan is ideal ground

for a E u r o p e a n ) . O v e r t h e course of a c e n t u r y

for irregular warfare. (National A r m y Museum)

(a d i s p a r a g i n g t e r m

of British rule, w h i c h c o n c l u d e d w i t h t h e i n d e p e n d e n c e o f I n d i a a n d its p a r t i t i o n

R u s s i a v i a A f g h a n i s t a n . K n o w n as ' t h e G r e a t

i n 1947, m a i n t a i n i n g security along the

G a m e ' , t h e c o m p e t i t i o n for influence i n

N o r t h - W e s t Frontier ( n o w t h e 'tribal areas' of

C e n t r a l Asia f u e l l e d t h e fears o f t w o

western Pakistan) w o u l d require the dispatch

generations of V i c t o r i a n soldiers, politicians,

of dozens of p u n i t i v e o p e r a t i o n s . I n effect,

colonial administrators and the public.

the Anglo-Afghan Wars m a y more

W h e n s h o r t l y after t h e First A f g h a n W a r

the

accurately

b e d e s c r i b e d as t h r e e c o n f l i c t s c o n d u c t e d

in

border of British India e x p a n d e d to include

A f g h a n i s t a n p r o p e r , a n d a series o f s p o r a d i c ,

w h a t b e c a m e k n o w n as t h e

low-intensity operations conducted between

North-West

Frontier - a l a n d peopled largely b y Afghans

A n g l o - I n d i a n forces a n d A f g h a n

of various tribes - t h e m i l i t a r y

along the North-West

commitment

o f B r i t a i n a n d t h e Raj p e r f o r c e e x p a n d e d , removing any further buffer

with

tribesmen

Frontier.

T h o u g h l i t t l e is r e m e m b e r e d o f t h e s e conflicts - i n d e e d , the t h i r d lasted b u t a f e w

Afghanistan and drawing into the Empire

weeks a n d concluded nearly a century ago

a r e g i o n n o t o r i o u s f o r its v o l a t i l e , w a r l i k e

their relevance to Britain's interests i n t h e

p o p u l a t i o n of disparate tribes. These tribes,

region stands o u t all t h e m o r e

w h i l e largely hostile to o n e another,

s i n c e t h e d e p l o y m e n t o f its a r m e d forces i n

g e n e r a l l y m a d e c o m m o n cause t o o p p o s e

the country in November 2 0 0 1 .

prominently

-

Chronology

First Afghan War, 1839-42

23 November Brigadier-General John S h e l t o n is s o u n d l y d e f e a t e d b y

1836

1837

4 March Lord Auckland

A f g h a n rebels i n t h e B e h m a r u Hills

appointed

Governor-General of India

11 December Anglo-Afghan

2 0 J u n e Princess V i c t o r i a succeeds t o

agreement; British t o w i t h d r a w

t h e British t h r o n e at t h e age o f 18

K a b u l o n t h e 1 5 t h u n d e r safe c o n d u c t

September Captain Alexander

2 3 D e c e m b e r Sir W i l l i a m

Burnes

Mohamed

K h a n d u r i n g negotiations respecting

1 D e c e m b e r P e r s i a n siege o f H e r a t

t h e safe w i t h d r a w a l o f t h e K a b u l garrison

begins 1 9 D e c e m b e r I v a n V i t k e v i c h , Tsar's

William

commander-

1 O c t o b e r A u c k l a n d issues a m a n i f e s t o

in-chief i n Afghanistan, concludes a n agreement w i t h Akbar K h a n for

Shuja t o t h e A f g h a n t h r o n e b y force

t h e safe c o n d u c t o f a l l B r i t i s h t r o o p s

10 December Bengal division marches

to Peshawar

f r o m Ferozepore i n India

6 J a n u a r y A n g l o - I n d i a n garrison

19 February A n g l o - I n d i a n forces r e a c h

of 4 , 5 0 0 troops a n d 1 2 , 0 0 0 civilians

west b a n k of t h e Indus

leaves K a b u l o n m a r c h t o Jalalabad

1 0 M a r c h Sir J o h n K e a n e ' s A r m y

13 J a n u a r y Last s t a n d o f t h e

o f t h e I n d u s e n t e r s t h e B o l a n Pass,

4 4 t h Foot at G a n d a m a k

beginning the invasion of Afghanistan

10 J a n u a r y A k b a r K h a n takes

3 May A r m y of the Indus

Elphinstone a n d Shelton prisoner

concentrated at Kandahar; Shah Shuja

A p r i l S h a h S h u j a is m u r d e r e d

crowned

in Kabul

Amir

2 3 J u l y Keane's forces s t o r m fortress

7 A p r i l Sir R o b e r t Sale, a t J a l a l a b a d ,

of

m a k e s a m a j o r sortie against his

Ghazni

besiegers i n h o p e o f assisting t h e

K a b u l a n d i n s t a l l s S h a h S h u j a as n e w

a d v a n c e of a relief c o l u m n u n d e r

Amir; Dost M o h a m e d , t h e deposed

Major-General George Pollock

A m i r , flees n o r t h t o t h e H i n d u December Dost M o h a m e d

Kush

surrenders

Spring British build outside

16 April Pollock's force relieves t h e garrison at Jalalabad 2 3 April E l p h i n s t o n e dies i n c a p t i v i t y

to t h e British

1841

1 January Major-General

d e c l a r i n g i n t e n t i o n t o restore S h a h

6 August A r m y of t h e Indus enters

1840

1842

Elphinstone, British

special e n v o y , arrives i n K a b u l

1839

Macnaghten

a n d a n aide are m u r d e r e d b y Akbar

arrives i n K a b u l o n m i s s i o n t o Dost

1838

from

cantonment

Kabul

2 N o v e m b e r Start o f a n t i - S h u j a r e v o l t

at Tezeen 2 0 A u g u s t Pollock leaves Jalalabad i n an advance o n Kabul

i n Kabul; Burnes, t h e British resident,

15 S e p t e m b e r Pollock's troops

his brother a n d others m u r d e r e d i n

retake Kabul

Kabul

12 October T h e 'Avenging A r m y '

22 November Akbar Khan, Dost

leaves K a b u l for Peshawar; Dost

M u h a m e d ' s eldest son, arrives i n

M o h a m e d later released f r o m British

Kabul to lead t h e ongoing rebellion

c u s t o d y a n d r e i n s t a t e d as A m i r

Chronology

1843

23 D e c e m b e r British troops reach

21 January Stewart occupies

Ferozepore

Kalat-i-Gilzai

January Dost M o h a m e d returns to his

21 F e b r u a r y Sher A l i dies; his son,

t h r o n e w i t h British approval

Y a k u b K h a n , agrees t o n e g o t i a t e

II

6 April G a n d a m a k occupied by AngloI n d i a n forces

Second Afghan War, I 8 7 8 - 8 I

8 M a y Y a k u b K h a n arrives at t h e British c a m p at

1878

Gandamak

2 N o v e m b e r Lord Lytton, Viceroy of

26 M a y Treaty of G a n d a m a k ,

I n d i a , sends Sher A l i , t h e A f g h a n A m i r ,

a n apparent e n d to the conflict

a n u l t i m a t u m , d e m a n d i n g h e accept a

2 4 J u l y Sir P i e r r e L o u i s N a p o l e o n

British d i p l o m a t i c mission i n K a b u l

C a v a g n a r i enters Kabul

bringing

2 2 N o v e m b e r M a j o r - G e n e r a l Sir

3 September Attack o n the British

S a m u e l B r o w n e captures t h e fortress

Residency at K a b u l

at A l i M a s j i d

26 S e p t e m b e r Y a k u b K h a n leaves

24 N o v e m b e r B r o w n e occupies Dacca

Kabul

2 December Major-General

6 O c t o b e r Battle of Charasia

Frederick

Roberts takes Peiwar K o t a l

13 O c t o b e r Roberts enters K a b u l

1 3 D e c e m b e r S h e r A l i a p p o i n t s as

28 O c t o b e r Yakub K h a n abdicates

r e g e n t his s o n , Y a k u b K h a n , a n d flees his capital 20 D e c e m b e r B r o w n e occupies Jalalabad 1879

British cavalry and horse artillery in action outside Kabul, I I D e c e m b e r I 879, w h e n Brigadier-General D u n h a m Massy, w i t h only 2 0 0 officers and t r o o p e r s o f t h e 9th Lancers, a b o u t 4 0 Bengal Lancers and f o u r guns o f

8 J a n u a r y M a j o r - G e n e r a l Sir D o n a l d

t h e RHA, blundered into an Afghan force o f thousands

Stewart occupies K a n d a h a r

and was obliged t o retreat t o w a r d s Sherpur.

I2


In t h e years b e t w e e n t h e t h r e e A n g l o - A f g h a n wars, sporadic warfare c o n t i n u e d in t h e rugged f r o n t i e r

Third Afghan W a n 1919

t e r r i t o r y H e r e , as t h e G o r d o n Highlanders s t o r m t h e Dargai Heights o n 2 0 O c t o b e r I 897 - p a r t o f t h e T i r a h campaign against an Afghan t r i b e , t h e Afridis - Piper Findlater continues t o play despite his w o u n d s , f o r w h i c h e x t r a o r d i n a r y act he received t h e V i c t o r i a Cross. ( A u t h o r ' s collection)

1919

3 M a y A f g h a n t r o o p s cross i n t o I n d i a a n d occupy village of Bagh 9 M a y British forces a t t a c k t h e Afghans at Bagh 17 M a y A f g h a n s a b a n d o n their defences at Dacca

1880

1 April Stewart leaves K a n d a h a r

27 M a y British troops capture A f g h a n

for Kabul

fortress o f S p i n Baldak; N a d i r

19 April Battle o f A h m a d

Khel

Khan

besieges T h a i

2 M a y Stewart arrives i n K a b u l

3 1 M a y British agree t o g r a n t

22 July Abdur R a h m a n declared A m i r

armistice requested b y Afghans

27 July Battle of M a i w a n d

3 J u n e Armistice signed

6 A u g u s t A y u b K h a n besieges K a n d a h a r 8 A u g u s t Roberts leaves K a b u l f o r Kandahar 11 A u g u s t Stewart leaves K a b u l f o r

Shah Shuja (Shuja-ul-Mulk), w h o s e installation as

31 August Roberts marches i n t o

A m i r o f Afghanistan o n 3 May I 839 f o r m e d t h e

Kandahar

ostensible basis o n which Anglo-Indian forces

1 September Battle of K a n d a h a r 1881

O p p o s i t e page:

India

2 2 April British evacuate

Kandahar

had invaded t h e c o u n t r y t w o months earlier (National A r m y Museum)

Part I

The First Anglo-Afghan W a r I 839-42

Origins and background of the war T h e o r i g i n s o f Britain's r i v a l r y w i t h Russia

w e r e n o t t o a t t a c k A f g h a n i s t a n a t Russia's

i n C e n t r a l Asia m a y be traced t o t h e 1820s,

behest. H e r a t u n d e r Persian c o n t r o l could

w h e n Russia b e g a n t o e x p a n d s o u t h t h r o u g h

l e a d t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a base for

t h e C a u c a s u s i n t o n o r t h - w e s t Persia, a

f u r t h e r i n c u r s i o n i n t o A f g h a n i s t a n - at least

process unsuccessfully o p p o s e d b y British

as f a r as K a n d a h a r - w h e n c e t h e R u s s i a n s

d i p l o m a t i c s u p p o r t for Persia a n d T u r k e y .

could reach India, either via Kabul a n d

B y t h e e a r l y 1 8 3 0 s , Persia h a d b e c o m e a

t h e K h y b e r Pass o r s o u t h - e a s t t h r o u g h t h e

v i r t u a l Russian satellite. To c o m p e n s a t e for

B o l a n Pass. T h u s u n d e r n o

losses i n t h e n o r t h - w e s t , t h e S h a h , w i t h

w a s B r i t a i n p r e p a r e d t o t o l e r a t e Russia or

circumstances

Russian e n c o u r a g e m e n t , seized territory

a R u s s i a n - b a c k e d Persia e s t a b l i s h i n g a

i n western A f g h a n i s t a n , specifically t h e

presence i n Afghanistan. This antagonism

region around Herat, ruled by Kamran,

c o n s t i t u t e d w h a t b e c a m e k n o w n as t h e

w h o s e g r e a t - g r a n d f a t h e r h a d t a k e n it f r o m

' G r e a t G a m e ' , w i t h t h e First A f g h a n W a r

Persia. I n 1 8 3 5 , t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l o f

as i t s o p e n i n g m a n i f e s t a t i o n .

India recognized in a m e m o r a n d u m

for

A s f a r as t h e n e w l y a p p o i n t e d

Governor-

his superiors i n L o n d o n t h a t Russia c o u l d

General of India, Lord Auckland, together

e x p a n d i n t o A f g h a n i s t a n v i a its i n f l u e n c e

w i t h t h e East I n d i a C o m p a n y ( E I C ) w e r e

o v e r Persia, t h u s i m p e r i l l i n g B r i t i s h I n d i a :

c o n c e r n e d , t h e best m e a n s of o b v i a t i n g Russian influence i n Afghanistan was to

I t is t h e i n t e r e s t o f R u s s i a t o e x t e n d strengthen t h e Persian Empire,

and

which

ensure that Dost M o h a m e d , the present A m i r i n K a b u l , s u p p o r t e d British interests i n t h e

occupies a central position b e t w e e n

region. T h e question posed before Auckland

t h e d o u b l e lines of o p e r a t i o n of t h e

a n d his advisers i n 1 8 3 7 was w h e t h e r or n o t

Autocrat to eastward and westward, a n d

D o s t M o h a m e d satisfied this n e e d .

as P e r s i a c a n n e v e r b e a r i v a l o f R u s s i a

T h e S h a h o f Persia, despite British

the a u g m e n t a t i o n of her strength can

w a r n i n g , c o n t i n u e d t o m a i n t a i n a close

o n l y increase t h e offensive m e a n s of

r e l a t i o n s h i p w i t h Russia, a n d l a u n c h e d a

Russia... W h a t t h e Russian p o l i c y

r e n e w e d c a m p a i g n against H e r a t i n late July

might

b e a f t e r t a k i n g p o s s e s s i o n o f H e r a t i t is

1 8 3 7 , l a y i n g siege t o t h e c i t y o n 1 D e c e m b e r ,

u n n e c e s s a r y n o w t o c o n s i d e r b u t i t is

w i t h resistance e x p e c t e d to be brief. British

impossible to d e n y t h a t she m i g h t

fears w e r e h e i g h t e n e d w h e n , o n t h e 1 9 t h ,

arrive

at t h a t p o i n t i n l e g i t i m a t e support of her

a Cossack officer b y t h e n a m e of I v a n

a l l y , t h e K i n g o f P e r s i a , a n d i t is e q u a l l y

V i k t o r o v i c h V i t k e v i c h , b e a r i n g a letter

difficult to d e n y that f r o m that point

f r o m Tsar N i c h o l a s I w h o h o p e d t o establish

she m a y p r o c l a i m a crusade against

diplomatic relations w i t h the Amir,

British I n d i a , i n w h i c h she c o u l d be

i n K a b u l . D o s t M o h a m e d w a s less i n t e r e s t e d

arrived

j o i n e d b y a l l t h e w a r - l i k e , restless

i n a c o n n e c t i o n w i t h Russia t h a n i n u s i n g

tribes t h a t f o r m e d t h e

t h e letter to his advantage i n a n o t h e r way.

overwhelming

force of T i m u r .

Since September t h e British already h a d a special e n v o y at t h e A f g h a n capital i n t h e

T h e Persians f a i l e d t o seize H e r a t i n

1834,

f o r m of C a p t a i n A l e x a n d e r Burnes, sent b y

a n d Lord Palmerston, the British Foreign

A u c k l a n d . Burnes h a d m a d e his r e p u t a t i o n

Secretary, h a d issued a w a r n i n g t h a t t h e y

as a r e s u l t o f h i s r e c e n t l y p u b l i s h e d a c c o u n t

T h e First A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r I 8 3 9 - 4 2

I5

of his travels t h r o u g h C e n t r a l Asia a n d

Sir W i l l i a m M a c n a g h t e n , A u c k l a n d ' s

Afghanistan, d u r i n g t h e course of w h i c h

Secretary, o f f e r i n g n o clear n e g o t i a t i n g

Chief

journey he h a d established g o o d relations

powers a n d lacking detail b e y o n d

w i t h Dost M o h a m e d i n 1830. Burnes was

e m p h a s i z i n g t h e n e e d to favour t h e interests

in Kabul o n account of a n appeal f r o m the

of R a n jit S i n g h over those of D o s t M o h a m e d ,

A m i r for British aid i n his quarrel w i t h t h e

w h o m Burnes was to a d m o n i s h n o t to begin

powerful Sikh k i n g d o m i n the

negotiations w i t h a n y other power over the

neighbouring

Punjab, u n d e r their f o r m i d a b l e ruler R a n jit

issue o f P e s h a w a r . T h e s e i n s t r u c t i o n s p l a c e d

Singh. Four years earlier t h e Sikhs h a d seized

Burnes i n a difficult p o s i t i o n at K a b u l ; yet

Peshawar, f o r m e r l y t h e richest p r o v i n c e i n

h e u n d e r s t o o d t h e u r g e n c y of affairs, for

Afghanistan. T h e British were n o t entirely

Dost M o h a m e d h a d given h i m a copy of

amenable to interfering between the Afghans

t h e Russian e n v o y ' s letter.

a n d t h e Sikhs, for t h e latter w e r e allies o f t h e E I C b y treaty. T h e r e w a s also n o

obvious

Burnes, i n possession of his n e w instructions but aware that he must

advantage i n m e d d l i n g in a dispute between

give priority to Sikh interests, i n f o r m e d

i n d e p e n d e n t states, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e f a c t

Auckland that the A m i r was o n

that British I n d i a a n d the P u n j a b shared a

terms w i t h Britain, but he was chiefly

c o m m o n border. Such sentiments

interested i n t h e recovery of Peshawar.

formed

friendly

t h e basis o f A u c k l a n d ' s m e s s a g e t o D o s t

Barring a change i n British policy i n t h e

M o h a m e d , b u t h e d i d express a strong

f o r m of some a c c o m m o d a t i o n w i t h Dost

desire t o discuss t r a d e b e t w e e n I n d i a

M o h a m e d , t h e y risked alienating the Amir,

and

A f g h a n i s t a n a n d t h e u s e o f t h e I n d u s as

d r i v i n g h i m i n t o t h e a r m s of Russia i n t h e

a w a t e r w a y to facilitate c o m m e r c e . Burnes

pursuit of a n alternative ally against the

had therefore arrived in Kabul to encourage

Sikhs. Burnes characterized D o s t

commercial relations.

as m o r e i n c l i n e d t o B r i t a i n t h a n t o R u s s i a ,

Yet it w a s s o o n a p p a r e n t t h a t t h e A m i r was n o t interested i n discussing trade; his

Mohamed

s t r e n g t h e n i n g t h e case b y e n c l o s i n g t h e Tsar's l e t t e r i n h i s d i s p a t c h b a c k t o C a l c u t t a .

troops, u n d e r Akbar K h a n , h a d recently returned following their failure to take the

D o s t M o h a m e d , A m i r o f Afghanistan, w h o s e reign

fort at J a m r u d f r o m t h e Persians. W h a t

stretched f r o m I 834 t o I 863, i n t e r r u p t e d by exile

he

desired, instead, w a s British assistance i n recovering Peshawar f r o m t h e Sikhs, u n d e r R a n jit S i n g h . Burnes h a d n o p o w e r t o negotiate political terms a n d thus h a d to await further instructions. These were i n fact o n their way. Auckland h a d received f r o m t h e Secret C o m m i t t e e o f t h e EIC's C o u r t o f Directors a m e m o r a n d u m requiring

him

t o m o n i t o r e v e n t s i n A f g h a n i s t a n closely, w i t h t h e specific i n t e n t i o n of p r e v e n t i n g t h e progress of Russian i n f l u e n c e t h e r e . T h e m e a n s to a c c o m p l i s h this objective w e r e left t o h i m , b u t if h e saw fit h e w a s a u t h o r i z e d t o interfere i n A f g h a n affairs directly. Auckland was almost certainly the w r o n g person i n w h o m to invest such w i d e powers, o w i n g t o his i n e x p e r i e n c e of A f g h a n affairs, w h i l e Burnes h i m s e l f was o n l y a j u n i o r officer w i t h little k n o w l e d g e of d i p l o m a t i c affairs. Burnes received n e w instructions, drafted b y

during t h e First Afghan W a r (Author's collection)

I6


a volte face i n h i s p o l i c y , B r i t a i n w o u l d n o t offer h i m friendship. This h a r d e n i n g of t h e British attitude, a n d Dost M o h a m e d ' s

need

for a n a l l y i n h i s struggle against t h e Sikhs a n d t o k e e p t h e Persians i n check, l e d t h e A m i r t o t u r n t o t h e Russians w h e n , i n A p r i l 1838,

h e m e t w i t h Vitkevich. Burnes h a d

been proved right and, w i t h his mission over after seven m o n t h s , t h e Scotsman returned to India. In turn, Auckland viewed the d e v e l o p m e n t s as j u s t i f y i n g h i s d i s t r u s t o f Dost M o h a m e d , a n d consequently led the Governor-General to consider t h e Amir's replacement w i t h a n e w ruler

favourably

i n c l i n e d b o t h t o t h e British a n d t h e Sikhs for t h e purpose of curbing either direct Russian or Russian-backed Persian influence i n A f g h a n i s t a n , so r e s t o r i n g t h e b a l a n c e o f British i n f l u e n c e i n C e n t r a l Asia. T h e m o s t suitable candidate appeared to be a previous Amir, the Shah Shuja-il-Mulk, w h o m a i n t a i n e d f r i e n d l y t e r m s w i t h R a n jit S i n g h a n d w h o , after h i s last a t t e m p t t o retake h i s throne from Dost M o h a m e d i n 1834, h a d M o h a m e d A k b a r Khan, eldest son o f D o s t M o h a m e d ,

settled i n L u d h i a n a i n western I n d i a u n d e r

w h o led t h e uprising in Kabul in late 1841 and promised

British protection. Both t h e E I C a n d t h e

t o guarantee t h e safe passage o f Elphinstone's army and

Sikh court argued strongly i n favour of

camp followers back t o Jalalabad. His helmet, mail and

his suitability, a n d this insistence, together

shield o n his back are testament t o t h e fact that Afghan w i t h unsubstantiated reports that h e w o u l d

forces proved formidable o p p o n e n t s despite their medieval e q u i p m e n t and lack o f formal training.

be well received i n t h e A f g h a n capital,

(National A r m y Museum)

was sufficient to persuade A u c k l a n d a n d

For t h e n e x t three m o n t h s , Burnes

b e p l a c e d o n t h e t h r o n e . T h e British also

M a c n a g h t e n that Shah Shuja ought to

to advocate support for t h e Amir,

continued unaware

entertained the hope that, w i t h

financial

backing f r o m t h e treasury i n Calcutta,

that i n India Auckland a n d Macnaghten were growing increasingly unsympathetic to

t h e Sikhs w o u l d p r o v i d e t h e troops t o

t h e A f g h a n g o v e r n m e n t , n o t least w h e n

reinstall Shah Shuja i n Kabul, for they

Dost

M o h a m e d completely rejected a c o m p r o m i s e

h a d m u c h to gain f r o m his restoration:

plan over Peshawar - a rejection that fuelled

specifically, r e c o g n i t i o n o f Ranjit Singh's

Auckland's suspicions t h a t t h e A m i r w a s

r i g h t t o t e r r i t o r y o n t h e w e s t e r n side o f

i n fact hostile t o British views. Evidence

t h e I n d u s River, w h i c h D o s t

appeared to support his contention, for

d i s p u t e d . Still, t h e n o t i o n t h a t t h e A f g h a n

Dost M o h a m e d h a d received i n his capital

people m i g h t n o t take kindly to their

Mohamed

a d i p l o m a t i c r e p r e s e n t a t i v e f r o m Russia,

Sikh enemies imposing o n t h e m a n e w

w h i c h m a i n t a i n e d a military presence w i t h

m o n a r c h does n o t appear t o h a v e figured

t h e Persian a r m y besieging Herat a n d offered

i n Auckland's calculations.

assistance i n n e g o t i a t i n g t e r m s w i t h Persia.

Ranjit Singh was not, however,

prepared

Furthermore, h e was n o t prepared to reach

t o b a c k t h i s p l a n w i t h h i s o w n forces,

a n a r r a n g e m e n t w i t h R a n jit S i n g h . W i t h o u t

so w h i l e h e i n i t i a l l y s u p p o r t e d t h e


I7

signatory to the tripartite Treaty of Simla, concluded in June 1838 between

himself,

S h a h Shuja a n d t h e British, w i t h t h e Sikhs receiving i n t u r n a guarantee of possession of the trans-Indus territory. Shah Shuja was to be restored to his t h r o n e w i t h British aid, after w h i c h h e w o u l d agree t o British c o n t r o l of his foreign policy - thus e n a b l i n g a n d Calcutta to ensure n o u n d u e

London

Russian

i n f l u e n c e i n A f g h a n affairs. I n a m a n i f e s t o issued o n 1 October, A u c k l a n d declared his i n t e n t i o n s

respecting

A f g h a n i s t a n , stated t h e reasons w h i c h justified British i n t e r v e n t i o n - n o t least the corrupt malpractices a n d illegitimacy of D o s t M o h a m e d ' s g o v e r n m e n t - a n d stressed above all t h e security of British I n d i a .

The

w e l f a r e o f o u r possessions i n t h e East,' h e a n n o u n c e d , 'requires t h a t w e s h o u l d h a v e Sir Alexander Burnes, assigned as British diplomatic

on

o u r w e s t e r n f r o n t i e r a n a l l y w h o is i n t e r e s t e d

representative at Kabul by Lord Auckland, t h e GovernorGeneral o f India. Burnes was killed by an Afghan m o b o n

i n resisting aggression, a n d

establishing

tranquility, i n t h e place of chiefs r a n g i n g

2 N o v e m b e r I 8 4 1 . (Author's collection)

themselves i n subservience to a hostile enterprise h e negotiated different terms

power a n d seeking to p r o m o t e

w i t h M a c n a g h t e n , w h o agreed to furnish

of conquest a n d aggrandizement.' T h e war,

C o m p a n y troops for t h e u n d e r t a k i n g . T h e

h e w e n t o n , was n o t to be conducted

Sikhs w e r e c o m m i t t e d t o n o t h i n g m o r e

a v i e w t o w a r d o c c u p a t i o n or territorial

than

m a i n t a i n i n g a reserve force at Peshawar for

schemes

with

a g g r a n d i z e m e n t ; as p r o o f o f t h i s p l e d g e ,

eventualities, the circumstances of w h i c h

British troops w o u l d w i t h d r a w f r o m t h e

n e v e r b e c a m e clear. I n t h e e n d , R a n jit S i n g h

c o u n t r y o n c e S h a h Shuja h a d b e e n safely

d i d c o m m i t h i m s e l f t o t h e e n t e r p r i s e as a

a n d rightfully installed.

Warring sides

T h e forces t h a t B r i t a i n c o u l d b r i n g t o bear

W h e n t h e First A f g h a n W a r b e g a n i n 1 8 3 9 ,

against t h e A f g h a n tribes w e r e c o m p o s e d

the Bengal A r m y contained 6 9 regiments of

almost exclusively of those of the EIC.

sepoys

For t h e p r e v i o u s c e n t u r y these forces h a d

o f o n e b a t t a l i o n , as w e l l as 1 5 l o c a l

e n j o y e d a l m o s t u n h i n d e r e d success i n t h e

battalions, including three of Gurkhas:

a n d o n e of Europeans, each consisting

field against indigenous I n d i a n armies, some

superb, h i g h l y reliable troops recruited

of whose troops took u p e m p l o y m e n t i n one

f r o m Nepal. T h e Madras presidency mustered

of t h e C o m p a n y ' s three separate s t a n d i n g

5 1 sepoy

armies, representing each presidency: Madras,

2 6 . C a v a l r y s e r v i n g i n t h e C o m p a n y ' s forces

battalions, t h e B o m b a y presidency,

B o m b a y a n d Bengal. T h e r a n k a n d file o f

consisted o f t w o types: regular regiments o f

these forces w a s d r a w n f r o m t h e area i n

light cavalry - three f r o m Bombay, a n d eight

w h i c h they were recruited, a n d they trained,

each f r o m the Bengal a n d Madras armies -

dressed a n d f o u g h t i n t h e style o f t h e British

outfitted, a r m e d a n d trained like their counterparts i n British light dragoon

A r m y , w i t h w h i t e officers i n c o m m a n d . B y t h e t i m e o f t h e First A f g h a n W a r , e a c h

sepoy

(infantry) c o m p a n y served u n d e r t h e

regiments, a n d irregular m o u n t e d units, of w h i c h Bengal supplied four a n d B o m b a y

c o m m a n d o f a British captain or lieutenant,

o n e . T h e C o m p a n y h a d its o w n

together w i t h a British subaltern a n d t w o

of artillery, b o t h o f foot a n d o f horse (the

complement

I n d i a n officers w h o h a d risen f r o m t h e ranks,

d i s t i n c t i o n b e i n g t h a t t h e crews o f t h e f o r m e r

w i t h ten such companies composing a

m a r c h e d o n foot, whereas those o f t h e latter

' N a t i v e ' b a t t a l i o n (or r e g i m e n t , a l l s u c h u n i t s

m o v e d o n horseback), composed entirely

c o m p r i s i n g b u t a single b a t t a l i o n , u n l i k e their

o f E u r o p e a n p e r s o n n e l . T h e C o m p a n y also

counterparts i n t h e British A r m y , w h i c h h a d

m a i n t a i n e d a n engineering capacity i n the

two), under a major or lieutenant-colonel.

f o r m o f sappers a n d m i n e r s o f b o t h E u r o p e a n

A similar system existed for regiments o f

and indigenous composition.

c a v a l r y , w h e r e t r o o p e r s w e r e k n o w n as

sowars.

I n a d d i t i o n t o C o m p a n y forces i n British

A m o n g s t t h e l o c a l ' a n d irregular corps, o f

I n d i a , t h e C r o w n itself sent o u t f r o m h o m e

w h i c h there were m a n y i n India, only the

d e p o t s its o w n t r o o p s - t h a t is, r e g u l a r f o r c e s

c o m m a n d i n g officer,

second-in-command

a n d a d j u t a n t were British, Indians filling all t h e r e m a i n i n g officers' positions, w i t h exclusively I n d i a n troops beneath t h e m . Regular c a m p a i g n i n g , w h e t h e r against fellow I n d i a n forces o r i n t h e First B u r m e s e W a r o f 1 8 2 4 - 2 5 , h a d helped develop a strong b o n d o f m u t u a l respect a n d trust b e t w e e n t h e

sepoys

a n d t h e i r British officers, a n d N a t i v e u n i t s g e n e r a l l y f o u g h t w e l l a n d l o y a l l y - a t least until m u c h of the Bombay A r m y mutinied i n 1 8 5 7 . T h e r e w e r e also ' E u r o p e a n ' u n i t s maintained b ythe EIC, composed entirely of British ( m o r e specifically, m o s t l y Irish) s o l d i e r s , s u c h as t h e B e n g a l H o r s e A r t i l l e r y .

Baluchis in the Bolan Pass, 1842. (National A r m y Museum)


h o l d i n g t h e Q u e e n ' s c o m m i s s i o n - t o serve

escorts; s e e k i n g i n t e l l i g e n c e o f t h e e n e m y ' s

i n one of the presidency armies, n u m b e r i n g

strength a n d disposition a n d guarding the

20 battalions of infantry a n d four regiments

i n f a n t r y ' s f l a n k s a n d rear.

of light cavalry. Troops posted t o I n d i a

I9

Little c a n said of t h e i r A f g h a n o p p o n e n t s ,

generally spent m o s t of t h e i r a d u l t lives t h e r e ,

for t h e A m i r s m a i n t a i n e d n o s t a n d i n g force of

since t h e m a n y m o n t h s ' t r a v e l t o r e a c h t h e

a n y k i n d , r e l y i n g instead e n t i r e l y o n a large,

subcontinent m i l i t a t e d against regular

s p o n t a n e o u s l y raised force of irregular fighters

rotation to another station. Thus, a regiment

of v a r y i n g reliability a n d effectiveness.

m i g h t r e m a i n i n I n d i a for t w o decades or

T h e y were d r a w n f r o m the countryside

m o r e , w i t h w a s t a g e - f r o m disease, especially

assembled o n the w o r d of a local

sirdar

and

mullah

c h o l e r a , b u t also h e a t , excessive d r i n k ,

(religious teacher or leader),

casualties or discharge - r e p l a c e d b y drafts

c o m m a n d e r ) or t h e A m i r himself, w h o

of recruits sent o u t f r o m B r i t a i n . Troops f r o m

theory could s u m m o n up untold thousands

(tribal in

home, once acclimatized and experienced o n

of tribesmen w h e n required, t h o u g h w i t h

campaign, proved hardy and dependable, and

n o established t e r m s o f service, a n d t h u s

together w i t h their

sepoy

counterparts proved

rendering their long-term

commitment

a f o r m i d a b l e f i g h t i n g force; their forebears

u n c e r t a i n at best a n d d u b i o u s at worse.

h a d , after all, i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h

They wore no uniform and employed the

Company

forces, c o n q u e r e d B e n g a l u n d e r C l i v e ,

simplest of tactics, s n i p i n g f r o m hillside cover

southern India from the French and the

with the

sultans of M y s o r e , a n d later c o n q u e r e d t h e

w i t h d i s t i n c t i v e c u r v e d stock - or, w h e n

Mahrattas i n t h e west.

jezail

- a long, hand-crafted musket

s e e k i n g t o close w i t h t h e i r e n e m y ,

W h e t h e r belonging to a Queen's regiment

attacking

i n great swarms w i t h o u t consideration of

or a C o m p a n y ' s , all units w e r e o r g a n i z e d a n d

f o r m a t i o n , cutting a n d slashing w i t h their

a r m e d identically, their principal weapons

l o n g , s t r a i g h t s w o r d s a n d k n i v e s . (As m a n y

consisting of the smoothbore,

muzzle-loading

as h a l f a d o z e n k n i v e s a t a t i m e w e r e t u c k e d t i g h t l y i n t o t h e i r w a i s t scarf.)

flintlock m u s k e t a n d b a y o n e t for t h e i n f a n t r y , a n d t h e sabre or l a n c e c a r r i e d b y t h e cavalry. A r t i l l e r y w a s also s m o o t h b o r e ,

Afghan tribesmen a r m e d w i t h t h e famous long-barrelled, hand-made jezail, w h o s e extraordinary range enabled t h e

f i e l d b a t t e r i e s c o n s i s t i n g o f six 6 - p d r s , w i t h

t r i b e s m e n during t h e First Afghan W a r t o pick off enemy

heavier pieces, i n c l u d i n g m o r t a r s , reserved for

t r o o p s f r o m beyond t h e range o f t h e standard-issue

siege o p e r a t i o n s , t h o u g h m o u n t a i n o u s t e r r a i n

British s m o o t h b o r e muskets.

often rendered transportation of heavy artillery all b u t impossible. T h e i n f a n t r y w e r e dressed s m a r t l y y e t i m p r a c t i c a l l y for t h e c l i m a t e i n h e a v y s c a r l e t t u n i c s , w h i t e cross belts, black leather p o u c h e s , haversacks a n d tall black shakos. T h e y m a r c h e d i n closely ordered ranks, deployed

shoulder-to-shoulder

as a t W a t e r l o o a g e n e r a t i o n b e f o r e a n d i n d e e d as u n d e r M a r l b o r o u g h m o r e t h a n a c e n t u r y earlier, a d v a n c i n g i n c o l u m n b u t d e p l o y i n g for a c t i o n i n lines consisting of t w o ranks. T h u s t h e y m a d e best use o f d i s c i p l i n e d volleys to repulse t h e e n e m y or u n n e r v e

him

sufficiently that a b a y o n e t attack could drive h i m off. C a v a l r y m a n o e u v r e d b y s q u a d r o n , either i n line or i n c o l u m n , t h e troopers w i e l d i n g t h e i r sabres i n t h e c h a r g e , b u t m o r e o f t e n t h a n n o t s e r v i n g as s c o u t s a n d b a g g a g e

"he fightin

F r o m t h e start, British m i l i t a r y a u t h o r i t i e s

A r m y consisted of t w o Queen's regiments

h a d to tackle the p r o b l e m of dispatching

of foot - the 2 n d a n d 17th - four regiments

a m a j o r e x p e d i t i o n f r o m I n d i a across t h e

of B o m b a y Native Infantry, the 4 t h Light

Sutlej a n d m u c h f u r t h e r east. T h e shortest

D r a g o o n s (a Q u e e n ' s r e g i m e n t ) , t w o

route available to the ' A r m y of the Indus'

regiments of n a t i v e cavalry, t w o c o m p a n i e s of

lay f r o m Peshawar t h r o u g h the Punjab. Even

f o o t artillery (all E u r o p e a n ) a n d o n e

this route was 4 0 0 miles a n d w o u l d

o f sappers a n d m i n e r s . I n a d d i t i o n t o these

require

company

m o v i n g t h e a r m y a n d its m a t e r i e l - a b o v e a l l

forces, a separate force o f 6 , 0 0 0 irregulars

its b a g g a g e a n d g u n s - t h r o u g h t h e

w a s raised i n I n d i a for S h a h Shuja's use,

Khyber

a n d o t h e r passes o n a s l o w j o u r n e y t o i t s

consisting of four regiments of infantry,

ultimate destination, Kabul. The

t w o regiments of cavalry a n d a troop of

journey

w o u l d p r o v e a l l t h e m o r e d i f f i c u l t as t h e

horse artillery, e q u i p p e d f r o m British

Sikhs, t h o u g h f r i e n d l y a n d supportive of

m a g a z i n e s a n d l e d b y British officers.

t h e e n t e r p r i s e , w o u l d n o t g o so f a r as t o

L i e u t e n a n t - G e n e r a l Sir J o h n K e a n e ,

p e r m i t B r i t i s h forces t o cross t h e i r t e r r i t o r y .

c o m m a n d i n g the B o m b a y division, was

T h e best a l t e r n a t i v e , therefore, was to take a

to m o v e initially by water from

far l e n g t h i e r r o u t e t h r o u g h B a l u c h i s t a n

and

to Sind, there to rendezvous w i t h the

t h e B o l a n Pass, p r o c e e d i n g t o K a n d a h a r

and

thence to Kabul - a journey more t h a n three

Bengal division, led by

Bombay

Major-General

Sir W i l l o u g h b y C o t t o n , w i t h a f u r t h e r

times the distance of the route originally

1,200-mile trek t h r o u g h Baluchistan to

p r o p o s e d , b u t less a r d u o u s i n t e r m s o f

K a n d a h a r . T h e c o n t i n g e n t raised for S h a h

n a t u r a l obstacles at t h e outset, a n d w i t h

S h u j a was t o m o v e d o w n t h e Sutlej a n d

some l i m i t e d transport available for t h e

Indus where, w i t h the entire a r m y unified,

first 4 5 0 m i l e s , i n t h e f o r m o f f l a t - b o t t o m e d

Keane w o u l d assume overall c o m m a n d ,

barges o n t h e Sutlej a n d I n d u s rivers. I n t h e

M a j o r - G e n e r a l Sir W i l l i a m N o t t l e a d i n g t h e

with

event, this was the route chosen b y British

B o m b a y d i v i s i o n . Sir W i l l i a m M a c n a g h t e n ,

military planners.

the n e w l y a p p o i n t e d e n v o y to Shah Shuja,

The expedition would

would accompany the expedition.

comprise

a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1 0 , 0 0 0 British a n d I n d i a n

Even before the a r m y could advance, the

t r o o p s i n t w o d i v i s i o n s o f d i f f e r i n g sizes,

casus belli

w i t h t h e force f r o m t h e Bengal presidency

for unexpected news arrived a n n o u n c i n g the

of the war appeared to evaporate,

consisting of n i n e infantry regiments, one

c o n t i n u e d resistance of H e r a t against Persian

being a Queen's regiment a n d the others

forces, n o t least d u e t o t h e l e a d e r s h i p of

C o m p a n y troops: the 1 3 t h Foot, t h e Bengal

L i e u t e n a n t Eldred Pottinger, a n officer i n t h e

Europeans a n d seven regiments Bengal Native

EIC w h o h a d offered to organize the defence

Infantry. Five regiments of cavalry w o u l d

of the place u p o n f i n d i n g himself i n Herat

a c c o m p a n y the expedition, one of w h i c h was

during an unofficial

a Queen's r e g i m e n t - t h e 1 6 t h Lancers -

o p e r a t i o n i n A f g h a n i s t a n . T h e Persians, w o r n

and

four of Bengalis. O t h e r units i n c l u d e d a t r o o p

intelligence-gathering

o u t b y a n u n p r o f i t a b l e n i n e - m o n t h siege,

of horse artillery a n d t w o companies of foot

a n d b o w i n g t o t h e d i p l o m a t i c pressure

artillery, all w i t h E u r o p e a n personnel, plus

a p p l i e d b y t h e Russians, w h o n o longer

t w o c o m p a n i e s of sappers a n d m i n e r s . T h e

w i s h e d t o s u p p o r t this enterprise, raised t h e

smaller contingent provided b y the

siege a n d w i t h d r e w , r e m o v i n g a l l t h r e a t o f

Bombay


2I

Russian e x p a n s i o n i n w e s t e r n A f g h a n i s t a n .

consisted n o t m e r e l y of necessities like

N o t o n l y that, t h e Russian ambassador to

a m m u n i t i o n , f o o d a n d fodder, b u t

Tehran, w h o had played an

quantities of officers' kit, m u c h of this m o r e

instrumental

huge

part i n e n c o u r a g i n g t h e Persians t o attack

appropriate to living in camp rather t h a n

H e r a t , w a s r e c a l l e d b y t h e T s a r , as w a s

the field. All armies operating i n a n d out of

in

Vitkevich f r o m the A f g h a n capital. Auckland

I n d i a w e r e f a m o u s for their prodigious t r a i n

received news concerning Herat i n early

of vehicles a n d e q u i p m e n t , b u t this was

N o v e m b e r 1 8 3 8 . This d i d n o t dissuade

him

f r o m proceeding w i t h his g r a n d e x p e d i t i o n ,

exceptional, w i t h knapsacks, blankets t o n s o f o t h e r stores, especially t h a t

and

most

however, for h e was d e t e r m i n e d to oust Dost

essential of all: water. V e r y little t h o u g h t

M o h a m e d f r o m power, a n enterprise

b e e n given to m e t h o d s of re-supply, w i t h the

had

supported b y the Board of C o n t r o l , the b o d y

a r m y foolishly relying substantially o n the

i n L o n d o n w i t h responsibility over t h e affairs

p u r c h a s e o f l o c a l g o o d s a n d services t h r o u g h

of the EIC. T h e e x p e d i t i o n , therefore, w o u l d

the civilian contractors w h o

p r o c e e d as p l a n n e d .

t h e e x p e d i t i o n , as w e l l as b y l i v i n g o f f t h e

O n 10 December, the Bengal division

accompanied

l a n d - a practice w h i c h i n verdant

India

left Ferozepore a n d o n 19 F e b r u a r y 1 8 3 9 all

h a d generally sufficed d u r i n g operations

forces w e r e o n t h e w e s t b a n k o f t h e I n d u s ,

i n t h e past, b u t c o u l d n o t be a p p l i e d t o

w i t h t h e deserts o f B a l u c h i s t a n y e t t o

m u c h of Afghanistan. T h e folly of these

traverse. T h e force was e n o r m o u s , w i t h a

m e t h o d s soon c a m e apparent, for t h e

massive train of c a m p followers a n d baggage

wastes of Baluchistan bore n o r e l a t i o n to

animals. T h e Bengal division comprised

t h e p r o d u c t i v e areas o f t h e P u n j a b or t h e

9,500 troops, b u t a staggering 3 8 , 0 0 0

Ganges Valley, leaving t h e m e n short of

followers a n d 3 0 , 0 0 0 camels, the

camp

numbers

enlarged b y t h e fact t h a t m a n y officers w e r e a c c o m p a n i e d b y several - s o m e t i m e s e v e n d o z e n s - o f s e r v a n t s , as w a s t h e n o r m

in

I n d i a n armies. T h e vast a m o u n t of baggage

T h e great fortress at Ghazni, which blocked Sir John Keane's advance o n t h e Afghan capital in 1839. T h e defenders bricked up all t h e entrances apart f r o m t h e Kabul Gate (centre), against w h i c h a d e m o l i t i o n party placed a large charge o f gunpowder.

22


Routes of the Anglo-Indian invasion during the First Afghan War O Bokhara T

U

R

K

E

S

T

A C

H

I

N

A

/

I

N

D

I

A

Delhi O

1. 2. 3. 4.

December 1838 February 1839 Armies combine,April 1839 Entry into Kabul, 7 August 1839 Bengal A r m y Shah Shuja's A r m y Bombay A r m y British A r m y o f t h e ' c o m b i n e d forces)

Indus

250 miles ARABIAN

SEA

f o o d a n d w a t e r a n d suffering at t h e h a n d s

sufferings of t h e troops were c o m p o u n d e d b y

o f a h a r s h , u n f o r g i v i n g t e r r a i n . Beasts o f

i n a p p r o p r i a t e c l o t h i n g , for

b u r d e n , transport a n i m a l s a n d horses

the intense heat, they wore the same heavy

suffered especially. N o r was t h e a d v a n c e

l e a t h e r shakos a n d scarlet t u n i c s used i n

unopposed; hostile tribesmen

frequently

notwithstanding

Britain. O w i n g to the weakness of their

h a r a s s e d t h e c o l u m n i n t h e B o l a n Pass,

horses, m a n y troopers h a d to

w h e r e a n y stragglers, especially a m o n g s t

a n d m o v e o n foot, prodding their animals

t h e c a m p f o l l o w e r s , fell easy v i c t i m .

w i t h their lances. Despite these hardships,

O n 3 1 M a r c h 1 8 3 9 , C o t t o n a n d Keane's

dismount

the army reached Kandahar o n 3 M a y

and

divisions, t o g e t h e r w i t h S h a h Shuja's

oversaw the c o r o n a t i o n of Shah Shuja,

c o n t i n g e n t , j o i n e d at Q u e t t a , b u t f u r t h e r

for w h o m his people offered o n l y a cool

delay occurred w h e n headquarters failed to

reception. Supplies p r o v e d m o r e readily

consider the m o s t efficient routes, leading

available here, but the a r m y

t o t h e loss o f t r a n s p o r t a n d m a t e r i e l . T h e

f r o m malaria a n d dysentery.

suffered


W h i l e K a b u l still r e m a i n e d 3 2 5

miles

23

O n 2 0 July, skirmishers f r o m Keane's force

away, t h e r o u t e a h e a d at least o f f e r e d m o r e

scattered t h e e n e m y outposts before

f o r a g e a n d , as t h e e l e v a t i o n r o s e , b a l m i e r

a n d r e c o n n o i t r e d t h e fortress, w h o s e walls

temperatures. Moreover, apart f r o m the

t h e y discovered to be exceedingly strong

harassing attacks b y t r i b e s m e n i n t h e Bolan,

a n d y e t t h e a r m y ' s f o u r g r e a t siege g u n s h a d

t h u s far t h e progress of t h e a r m y h a d

b e e n left w i t h N o t t at K a n d a h a r , a n d n e i t h e r

b e e n seriously opposed, for D o s t

not

Mohamed

Ghazni

-

m i n i n g n o r escalade w o u l d suffice against

h a d b l o c k e d t h e K h y b e r Pass w i t h h i s b e s t

walls of such thickness a n d height.

troops to p r e v e n t t h e Sikhs, s h o u l d t h e y

d e s c r i b e d t h e p l a c e i n a l e t t e r t o Sir J a s p e r

Keane

make the attempt, from advancing o n Kabul.

Nicholls, the commander-in-chief in India:

H e believed the British, w i t h Shuja i n Kandahar, w o u l d be focusing o n

operations

O n t h e m o r n i n g of t h e 21st July t h e

around Herat. T h e road to Kabul was n o t

A r m y i n t h r e e c o l u m n s m o v e d close t o

entirely o p e n , however, for h a v i n g left N o t t

the outworks of the place, a n d instead

i n K a n d a h a r at t h e e n d o f J u n e , K e a n e still

o f f i n d i n g i t , as t h e a c c o u n t s h a d s t a t e d ,

faced a gruelling m a r c h i n s u m m e r heat of

v e r y w e a k a n d i n c a p a b l e of resistance,

2 0 0 miles to the north-east to G h a z n i , w h i c h

a second Gibraltar a p p e a r e d before us.

lay i n his p a t h . G h a z n i presented walls

70ft

A h i g h r a m p a r t i n g o o d repair built

high, the whole surrounded by a moat,

with

a scarped m o u n d a b o u t 35 feet h i g h ,

a powerful garrison under 21-year-old

Hyder

flanked by numerous towers, a n d

K h a n , o n e of D o s t M o h a m e d ' s sons. A n o t h e r

surrounded by a well constructed

on

son led 5 , 0 0 0 G h i l z a i cavalry, posted i n t h e

[escalade] a n d a w i d e w e t d i t c h . I n s h o r t

hills o n e i t h e r side o f t h e r o a d .

we were astounded, but there we were.

British t r o o p s storming t h e fortress at Ghazni, 23 July 1839. In t h e absence o f a siege train, no alternative

Intelligence received f r o m A b d u l Rashid,

remained but t o take t h e place by a coup de main.

a disgruntled n e p h e w of Dost M o h a m e d ,

(National A r m y Museum)

r e c o m m e n d e d a surprise s t o r m of t h e

Kabul

24


gate, w h i c h rather t h a n b e i n g bricked u p like

M o h a m e d , w h o d u r i n g t h e f i g h t i n g at

the others was merely lightly barred to allow

G h a z n i had 13,000 m e n nearby but declined

t h e passage of t r o o p s . K e a n e chose t h i s

to c o m m i t t h e m to battle, recalled Akbar

o p t i o n , w i t h a diversion or feint directed

K h a n a n d his forces f r o m t h e K h y b e r t o

against t h e s o u t h e r n face of t h e fortress.

defend Kabul, and a combined

A m i d s t a n i g h t - t i m e gale, a c o n t i n g e n t of

contingent, advancing f r o m Peshawar under

sappers u n d e r C a p t a i n Peat a n d

Lieutenant

Anglo-Sikh

General Claude Wade, moved through the

D u r a n d quietly approached the walls b y

pass w i t h o u t e n c o u n t e r i n g resistance. T h e

traversing a d i t c h just before d a y l i g h t

A m i r a t t e m p t e d t o gather a d h e r e n t s t o his

on

2 3 July. T h o u g h observed at 1 5 0 yards b y

cause t o o p p o s e Keane's a d v a n c e , b u t n o n e

t h e defenders a n d fired u p o n , t h e sappers

w o u l d materialize, for M a c n a g h t e n h a d p a i d

m a n a g e d t o p l a c e 751b bags o f p o w d e r

o u t generous bribes to t h e chiefs, leaving

against t h e gate a n d l i g h t t h e c o t t o n fuse.

D o s t M o h a m e d n o o p t i o n b u t t o flee

C a p t a i n J a m e s D o u g l a s , a staff officer

n o r t h w a r d s , w i t h Akbar's cavalry i n train.

with

t h e reserve c o l u m n , n o t e d :

T h e A r m y of the Indus entered Kabul o n 6 August 1839, w i t h the 60-year-old Shah

T h e scene at this m o m e n t

Shuja arriving the following day o n a white

was

m a g n i f i c e n t . T h e fire was u n r e m i t t i n g

charger to take u p a t h r o n e he h a d n o t

o n b o t h sides. I t w a s n o t y e t d a y l i g h t ,

o c c u p i e d i n three decades. T h e enterprise

a n d t h e indistinctness of objects, t h e

h a d taken ten m o n t h s , but Auckland's plan

r u d e walls, a n d queer figures f o r m e d

h a d t h u s far succeeded at relatively little

a picture more beautiful, more grand,

cost t o t h e a r m y , t h o u g h sickness h a d t a k e n

t h a n a n y t h i n g I h a v e ever i m a g i n e d .

a toll. W i t h Shah Shuja n o w in power,

Suddenly an explosion, louder

than

Keane returned to India w i t h the

Bombay

thunder, broke t h r o u g h the roar of

division a n d t h e cavalry, leaving C o t t o n

artillery; t h e n a pause; t h e n a cheer;

c o m m a n d i n g at K a b u l a n d N o t t a n d a

the unmistakable English cheer rent the

small garrison to occupy

air; t h e n t h e o l d w a l l s a n d b a t t l e m e n t s i l l u m i n a t e d w i t h the flash of arms, a n d then the busy musketry went

chattering

t h r o u g h t h e streets.

Kandahar.

T h e presence of British troops i n A f g h a n i s t a n was essential, for restoring S h a h Shuja to the t h r o n e was n o t sufficient i n a turbulent country where he enjoyed virtually n o support. Consequently, recognizing the

I n short, t h e gate was b l o w n a w a y a n d a

n e e d for a l o n g - t e r m British garrison i n t h e

s t o r m i n g party, consisting of four

capital, engineers constructed a c a n t o n m e n t

companies

of European infantry, rushed the opening.

o n t h e outskirts of t h e city i n the spring

G r e a t c o n f u s i o n i n i t i a l l y arose a m i d s t t h e

of 1840, w i t h the garrison establishing

s m o k e a n d noise, for conflicting orders

t h e i r lives o n t h e I n d i a n m o d e l , e n j o y i n g

disoriented the troops a n d prevented the

i m p r o m p t u h o r s e races, sports c o m p e t i t i o n s ,

m a i n c o l u m n f r o m advancing until a bugler

a m a t e u r theatricals, cricket matches

f r o m t h e 1 3 t h , refusing to s o u n d t h e 'Retire',

concerts r u n b y t h e r e g i m e n t a l bands, all

and

instead blew the 'Advance', causing the

to the b e m u s e m e n t of the A f g h a n populace.

infantry to rush forward w i t h bayonets fixed.

W i t h garrison life established o n a relatively

There followed bitter h a n d - t o - h a n d

civilized footing, t h e families of some

fighting

i n t h e streets u n t i l B r i t i s h a n d I n d i a n t r o o p s

officers e v e n m a d e t h e h a z a r d o u s

prevailed and triumphantly planted the

to join t h e m .

U n i o n Jack o n t h e r a m p a r t s of t h e fortress, w h o s e e n t i r e g a r r i s o n l a y d e a d at a cost t o K e a n e of 2 0 0 A n g l o - I n d i a n casualties. T h e capture of G h a z n i led to a n u m b e r of military developments elsewhere. Dost

journey

Some of t h e garrison began to insinuate themselves w i t h the female population of Kabul, thus engendering the hatred of Afghan m e n , building up resentment in a society w h e r e vengeance f o r m e d a n integral


part of tribal life. Burnes was considered

India. But this expedient could n o t

b y the populace to be the worst offender,

indefinitely, for b o t h Britain's n e w

w i t h A f g h a n sensitivities a b o u t a l c o h o l also

g o v e r n m e n t u n d e r Sir R o b e r t P e e l a n d

continue Tory

largely t r a m p l e d u p o n . Still, t h e city r e m a i n e d

C o m p a n y officials i n C a l c u t t a w e r e

quiet throughout 1840, the m o n o t o n y

a n x i o u s a b o u t t h e r i s i n g costs t o t h e

only

25

growing Indian

r e l i e v e d b y t w o d e v e l o p m e n t s . First, n e w s

revenue. W i t h a n eye for e c o n o m y , therefore,

arrived i n J u l y t h a t t h e Russians h a d r e n e w e d

M a c n a g h t e n b e g a n t o r e d u c e t h e size o f

operations by launching a n expedition

p a y m e n t s - A u c k l a n d slashed b y over half

against t h e K h a n of K h i v a , 7 0 0 miles t o t h e

the £ 8 , 0 0 0 subsidy he paid a n n u a l l y to t h e

north-west beyond the H i n d u Kush, t h o u g h

Ghilzais - and ordered the withdrawal back

this h a d c o m e t o grief i n t h e deserts. S e c o n d ,

t h r o u g h t h e K h y b e r t o I n d i a o f Sir R o b e r t

o n 6 N o v e m b e r , after f a i l i n g t o defeat a s m a l l

Sale's b r i g a d e , w h i c h l e f t K a b u l e n r o u t e f o r

force of I n d i a n cavalry, D o s t

Mohamed

surrendered himself to M a c n a g h t e n ,

who

sent h i m i n t o h o n o u r a b l e exile i n I n d i a . Despite the inefficiency a n d

unpopularity

of Shuja's g o v e r n m e n t , t h e c o u n t r y

Quetta o n 10 October. Both measures proved g r a v e m i s t a k e s . T h e G h i l z a i chiefs east o f

appeared unexpectedly i n Kabul a n d

remained

t r a n q u i l t h r o u g h o u t m o s t o f 1 8 4 1 , n o t least o w i n g t o t h e large subsidies f u r n i s h e d b y

Kabul, incensed b y the reduction of the s u b s i d y , c o n f r o n t e d Sale's f o r c e i n t h e

narrow

d e f i l e s o f t h e K h u r d - K a b u l Pass, o b l i g i n g t h e b r i g a d e t o f i g h t its w a y t h r o u g h a n d f i n d refuge i n t h e fort at Jalalabad. British fortunes n o w t o o k a t u r n for t h e

t h e C o m p a n y t o t r i b a l c h i e f s , s u c h as t h o s e

worse. Officers out s h o o t i n g g a m e

of the Pathan Ghilzais, w h o

themselves stoned b y a n g r y villagers a n d

controlled

the western approach to the Khyber, to keep t h e m pacified a n d to m a i n t a i n

open

c o m m u n i c a t i o n s a n d supply lines back to

found

s o l d i e r s w e r e set u p o n i n t h e s t r e e t s . I n l a t e October a n isolated outpost i n Kohistan, n o r t h of K a b u l , h e l d b y S h a h Shuja's troops u n d e r British officers, was destroyed b y

Encampment o f Major-General W i l l i a m N o t t s army, fresh f r o m Kandahar outside Kabul, late September 1842.The

tribesmen, and o n 2 November, a howling

city lies beyond t h e rows o f tents, w i t h t h e fortress o f

m o b , angered b y his p h i l a n d e r i n g ,

the Bala Hissar on t h e hillside (left) overlooking t h e city.

s u r r o u n d e d B u r n e s ' h o u s e i n K a b u l , set i t

26

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 19

o n fire a n d m u r d e r e d Burnes, his b r o t h e r

m o r n i n g brings a n d t h e n t h i n k w h a t can be

a n d a n o t h e r officer. S t r o n g a c t i o n o n t h e

d o n e . ' I n d u e course M a c n a g h t e n

part of the garrison m i g h t have averted

E l p h i n s t o n e t o o c c u p y t h e Bala Hissar,

further trouble, but C o t t o n had

ordered

a r o y a l palace a n d fortress o v e r l o o k i n g

returned

t h e city, i n a n effort t o i n t i m i d a t e t h e

to I n d i a for reasons of h e a l t h a n u m b e r o f m o n t h s e a r l i e r a n d h i s successor,

p o p u l a t i o n , b u t t h e riots c o n t i n u e d

Major-General W i l l i a m Elphinstone, was not

u n a b a t e d , a n d w i t h greater intensity.

t h e stuff of r e s o l u t i o n a n d s o u n d leadership

T h e crisis d e e p e n e d w h e n , t w o d a y s l a t e r ,

but rather a mere figurehead appointed by

a f o r t c o n t a i n i n g a l l t h e garrison's stores

A u c k l a n d as a c i p h e r l i k e l y t o c a r r y o u t

became isolated f r o m the

M a c n a g h t e n ' s decisions w i t h o u t question.

w h i c h c o n t a i n e d o n l y t w o days' rations.

Old, crippled w i t h rheumatic gout, w i t h n o field experience since W a t e r l o o

T h e s i t u a t i o n g r e w m o r e p e r i l o u s as

and

tribesmen entered the city to join those

possessed o f a c o u r t e o u s m a n n e r i n a situation that d e m a n d e d

cantonment,

of their compatriots w h o chose to snipe

decisiveness

at British a n d I n d i a n troops, isolated a n d

a n d resolution, Elphinstone failed to take

penned up. W i t h Elphinstone

a c t i o n as a r e s u l t o f B u r n e s ' d e a t h , w h i l e h i s

ill, c o m m a n d devolved u p o n Shelton w h o ,

immediate subordinate,

w i t h most of Kabul n o w i n the hands of the

Brigadier-General

increasingly

J o h n Shelton, jealous of his position, a l l o w e d

rebels, r e m a i n e d w i t h a small b o d y of troops

events to deteriorate, if o n l y t o spite his

i n t h e Bala Hissar to d e f e n d S h a h Shuja. H e

superior. I n a letter t h a t b e t r a y e d t h e v e r y

e v a c u a t e d t h e rest, a b o u t 6 , 0 0 0 , i n f a v o u r o f

essence o f E l p h i n s t o n e ' s u n s u i t a b i l i t y for

t h e c a n t o n m e n t , a r e c t a n g u l a r area n o larger

such a n i m p o r t a n t post i n a period of

t h a n 1,000 b y 6 0 0 yards surrounded b y a

p r o f o u n d crisis, h e a d d r e s s e d

Macnaghten

a f t e r B u r n e s ' m u r d e r : ' W e m u s t see w h a t

the

low rampart and a narrow ditch. The whole c a n t o n m e n t was overlooked by high ground, w h i c h the Afghans immediately occupied,

Afghan t r i b e s m e n dragging an artillery piece o n t o t h e

d o m i n a t i n g i t o n a l l sides a n d r e n d e r i n g t h e

crest o f t h e Bemaru ridge overlooking Kabul, w i t h t h e

A n g l o - I n d i a n force e x t r e m e l y vulnerable

Bala Hissar in t h e middle distance, c. N o v e m b e r 1841. T h e vulnerable position o f t h e British cantonment, immediately below, rendered it indefensible against b o m b a r d m e n t .

u n d e r e f f e c t i v e siege. E l p h i n s t o n e

and

himself

h a d c o m p l a i n e d i n A p r i l a b o u t t h e p o o r state o f t h e city's defences i n g e n e r a l a n d of t h e


cantonment's i n particular,

notwithstanding

British troops, w h o fled back to the cantonment, the situation

m o r e defensible positions to h a n d :

27

remained

u n c h a n g e d . At the e n d of the m o n t h , T h e C i t y is e x t e n s i v e , v e r y d i r t y

hostilities were replaced w i t h negotiations,

&

for t h e g a r r i s o n w a s close t o s t a r v a t i o n , t h e

c r o w d e d & a great deal of business a p p a r e n t l y g o i n g o n i n t h e B a z a r [sic].

horses r e d u c e d t o g n a w i n g at t e n t pegs a n d

I t is s i t u a t e d i n a h o l l o w ,

t r e e b a r k , a n d m o r a l e w a s c o l l a p s i n g , as

surrounded

b y h i g h m o u n t a i n s ... T h e

L i e u t e n a n t V i n c e n t Eyre observed: ' O u r force

cantonment

is . . . n o t v e r y d e f e n s i b l e w i t h o u t a

resembled a ship i n danger of wrecking, for

n u m b e r o f m e n , as p e o p l e c a n c o m e

w a n t of a n able pilot.' M a c n a g h t e n

i n f r o m w i t h o u t at m a n y points. This,

talks o n 11 D e c e m b e r w i t h t h e A f g h a n s ,

in the event of troops being requested

led by Akbar K h a n , Dost M o h a m e d ' s son,

elsewhere, w o u l d be very

fresh f r o m Turkestan. Their

inconvenient,

& I a m a g o o d d e a l p u z z l e d [as t o ]

what

opened now

unenviable

position d o m i n a t e d British thoughts: r e m a i n i n K a b u l a n d starve - o n l y t w o days'

is n o w t h e b e s t t h i n g t o b e d o n e .

supply of f o o d r e m a i n e d - or a b a n d o n

the

To m a k e matters worse, Elphinstone

c a n t o n m e n t w i t h o u t a promise f r o m their

constantly interfered w i t h

o p p o n e n t s o f safe passage b a c k t o I n d i a .

Shelton's

c o m m a n d a n d m a d e a n u m b e r of poor

I n negotiations conducted o n the banks

tactical decisions, i n c l u d i n g failed a t t e m p t s

of t h e K a b u l River, t h e British agreed n e v e r

to drive off t h e Afghans; e v e n t h e 4 4 t h Foot,

to enter Afghanistan again w i t h o u t

t h e general's o w n r e g i m e n t , refused to

express request of t h e A f g h a n

obey orders.

i n e x c h a n g e for i m m e d i a t e provisions

T h e f u t u r e s o o n b e c a m e still m o r e b l e a k : m o b s carried a w a y t h e garrison's g r a i n a n d

the

government, and

their w i t h d r a w i n g f r o m Kabul o n the 15th. T h e w i t h d r a w a l w o u l d b e u n d e r safe c o n d u c t

m e d i c a l stores, i n e x p l i c a b l y p l a c e d i n a n o l d

as f a r as L u d h i a n a , o n I n d i a n s o i l -

stone fort almost a quarter of a m i l e outside

p a y m e n t s , effectively bribes, m a d e to various

the perimeter of the c a n t o n m e n t , a n d thus

tribes i n e x c h a n g e for t h e i r

impossible to protect adequately. Food a n d

during the w i t h d r a w a l a n d the neutrality of

f o d d e r w e r e r u n n i n g s h o r t , Sale's b r i g a d e w a s

Akbar Khan.

five days' m a r c h f r o m K a b u l at

Gandamak

a n d thousands of Ghilzai fighters h a d

with

non-belligerence

T h e Bala Hissar was d u l y e v a c u a t e d o n t h e day appointed, leaving Shah Shuja to carry

flocked to t h e area, b l o c k i n g a n y prospect

o n as b e s t h e c o u l d , b u t t h e m a i n

of the general returning even t h o u g h he was

garrison i n the c a n t o n m e n t , complete

recalled. M e a n w h i l e , m o r e t h a n 3 0 0 miles t o

its l a r g e c o n t i n g e n t o f d e p e n d e n t

t h e south-west at Kandahar, a n y a t t e m p t

by

British with

women,

c h i l d r e n , s e r v a n t s a n d sick, n o w f a c e d a

N o t t to b r i n g relief w o u l d take five weeks of

difficult a n d dangerous journey, w i t h all

m a r c h i n g - a n d o n l y so l o n g as t h e passes

t h e necessary p r e p a r a t i o n causing delays

were n o t blocked b y s n o w a n d his I n d i a n

to departure. Five inches of s n o w already

contingent, accustomed to the warmer

covered t h e g r o u n d . T h e British stalled for

c l i m a t e s o f I n d i a , c o u l d s u r v i v e as a n

time, while the Afghans added to the terms

effective f i g h t i n g force w h i l e t h e

already agreed. M a c n a g h t e n believed he

thermometer continued to descend

could divide his enemies w i t h promises of

below freezing.

further payments to come, but the Afghans

T h u s , w i t h n o m e a n s o f b r e a k i n g t h e siege

g r e w suspicious of such a ploy, a n d at a

and w i t h circumstances g r o w i n g increasingly

meeting w i t h Akbar o n 23 December

desperate, o n 19 N o v e m b e r M a c n a g h t e n

consider n e w terms for t h e w i t h d r a w a l

and

to

Elphinstone agreed that the a r m y could n o t

of the army, M a c n a g h t e n was killed, a n d

w i n t e r i n K a b u l , a n d after f i g h t i n g a r o u n d

w i t h his d e a t h all trust b e t w e e n t h e

t h e village of B e m a r u , i n w h i c h rebels r o u t e d

sides e v a p o r a t e d .

two

28


Kabul f r o m t h e v i e w p o i n t o f t h e royal palace and f o r t k n o w n as t h e Bala Hissar (Author's collection)

l i k e l y t o b e a d i s a s t r o u s - as w e l l as a d i s h o n o u r a b l e - journey, especially Macnaghten, w h o emphasized h o w

O n Christmas Day, i n return for t h e British leaving b e h i n d t h e m i l i t a r y treasure,

the

a r m y w o u l d be a b a n d o n i n g massive a m o u n t s o f g o v e r n m e n t p r o p e r t y as w e l l as S h a h

c a r r y i n g w i t h t h e m o n l y six f i e l d pieces, a n d

Shuja himself, whose installation had been

t h e surrender of hostages i n t h e f o r m of all

t h e v e r y basis f o r t h e a r m y ' s p r e s e n c e i n

the married m e n a n d their families, Akbar

A f g h a n i s t a n i n t h e first place. A c c o r d i n g t o

p r o m i s e d safe c o n d u c t t o P e s h a w a r .

Captain George Lawrence,

N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e d e s p e r a t e straits i n

secretary, M a c n a g h t e n h a d observed t h a t :

w h i c h he f o u n d himself, Elphinstone

Macnaghten's

could

n o t possibly agree to such terms, a n d t h u s

... e v e n if w e c o u l d m a k e g o o d o u r

t h e a r m y w o u l d h a v e t o f i g h t its w a y

r e t r e a t , w e c o u l d c a r r y w i t h us n o

t h r o u g h t h e w i n t e r snows. 'I fear b u t f e w of

shelter for t h e troops, w h o w o u l d i n

us w i l l live t o r e a c h t h e p r o v i n c e s

c o n s e q u e n c e , at this i n c l e m e n t season,

whether

w e g o b y t r e a t y or n o t / L a d y Sale, w i f e

suffer i m m e n s e l y , w h i l e o u r c a m p

of the general, p e n n e d i n her diary; her

followers, a m o u n t i n g to

anxieties worsened b y the widely held view

thousands, must inevitably be utterly

that Elphinstone was utterly incapable of

d e s t r o y e d . As t o a n y h o p e o f successful

h a n d l i n g affairs. N o sooner was a n order

n e g o t i a t i o n s , it appeared to h i m i n v a i n ,

many

issued t h a n it was c o u n t e r m a n d e d ; his

so l o n g as t h e r e w a s n o p a r t y a m o n g t h e

subordinates questioned his

commands

insurgents of sufficient strength a n d

to the extent that they virtually flouted

influence to insure t h e f u l f i l m e n t of

his authority, a n d w i t h enemies all a r o u n d

a n y treaty w e m i g h t enter into.

a n d inadequate leadership w i t h i n , the w h o l e of the a r m y became demoralized amidst a

Against such advice, Elphinstone prevailed.

g r o w i n g l o g i s t i c a l c r i s i s , as s u p p l i e s

After t h e Afghans p o s t p o n e d the date of

dwindled

a n d the t e m p e r a t u r e c o n t i n u e d to fall. M a n y m e m b e r s o f his staff w a r n e d Elphinstone n o t to undertake w h a t was

withdrawal w i t h disingenuous

excuses

that they had yet to accumulate

sufficient

stocks of supplies for t h e j o u r n e y a n d pleas


29

t h a t a n escort h a d y e t t o b e a r r a n g e d ,

t r a n s p o r t e d a n d w e r e left t o their fate - t h e

Elphinstone ordered the c o l u m n to

m e r c y , s u c h as i t w a s , o f t h e A f g h a n s .

move o n t h e m o r n i n g of 6 January 1 8 4 2 . T h e advanced guard consisted of t h e 4 4 t h (Queen's) Foot, irregular

T h e garrison duly emerged f r o m

Kabul

i n t o sub-zero temperatures a n d foot-deep

Indian

snow, m a k i n g for t h e m o u n t a i n s b e y o n d ,

cavalry units, t w o 6-pdrs, sappers a n d

w i t h 9 0 miles t o traverse u n t i l assured safety

miners, m o u n t a i n artillery a n d other

in Hindustan.

elements ahead of the m a i n

body.

Once the column wasunderway,

order

T h e m a i n b o d y itself i n c l u d e d t h e 5 t h a n d

b r o k e d o w n r a p i d l y as t h e b i t i n g c o l d

3 7 t h N a t i v e Infantry, t h e army's treasury,

n u m b e d t h e t r u d g i n g figures, t h e c o m m a n d

m o r e irregular cavalry, a r e g i m e n t of loyal

a n d staff s t r u c t u r e ceased t o f u n c t i o n a n d

Afghan infantry a n d t w o 6-pdr guns. T h e

G h i l z a i tribesmen constantly harassed

rearguard was composed of t h e 5 4 t h

Native

Infantry, 5 t h Native Cavalry, a n dt w o

the column, killing a n d plundering w i t h i n c r e a s i n g i m p u n i t y as t h e t r o o p s

6-pdrs. I n total, t h e force consisted of

a n d followers grew ever m o r e w e a r y a n d

690 m e n of t h e 4 4 t h Foot a n d t h e Horse

frost-bitten. W i t h o u t food or fuel, thousands

A r t i l l e r y , 3 , 8 0 0 sepoys

a n d sowars, 3 6

British w o m e n a n d c h i l d r e n a n d 1 2 , 0 0 0

died daily, especially a m o n g s t t h e civilians, whose panic drove t h e m into t h e ranks

under-nourished, freezing a n d fear-stricken

of t h e soldiery, d i s t u r b i n g their order a n d

camp followers, nearly all of t h e m

i n c r e a s i n g t h e sense o f despair. E y r e r e c o r d e d

Indians.

T h e sick a n d w o u n d e d c o u l d n o t b e

Afghan tribesmen in w i n t e r dress, c. 1842, wearing poshteens: coats w i t h a leather e x t e r i o r lined o n t h e

t h e ghastly spectacle:

D r e a r y i n d e e d w a s t h e scene over

inside w i t h f u r T h e s e w e r e ideal protection in a land w i t h

w i t h d r o o p i n g spirits a n d d i s m a l

long, forbidding winters.

forebodings w e h a d to bend our

which

30


The retreat from Kabul, 6-13 January 1842 Last stand of the 4 4 t h Foot. D r Brydon, sole survivor, reaches safety. t f r o m Kabul j t e t o Jalalabad

Bygram

>

\Pass s

\

*

Khoord Kabul

Gandamak

N

u n w i l l i n g steps. D e e p s n o w c o v e r e d

Still, o n t h e t h i r d d a y of t h e retreat t h e

every i n c h of m o u n t a i n a n d p l a i n w i t h

surviving Europeans w i t h wives and children

o n e u n s p o t t e d sheet of d a z z l i n g w h i t e ,

w h o surrendered themselves to Akbar's

a n d so i n t e n s e l y b i t t e r w a s t h e c o l d , as

p r o t e c t i o n w e r e n o t h a r m e d , as a g r e e d .

to penetrate a n d defy the defences of

T h e ambushes a n d sniping nevertheless

the warmest clothing.

c o n t i n u e d : t h e Afghans drove off w h a t was left of t h e baggage a n i m a l s a n d

continued

C l e a r l y , A k b a r ' s p r o m i s e o f safe c o n d u c t

t o c u t d o w n stragglers. O n 8 J a n u a r y ,

h a d either b e e n a p r o d u c t of subterfuge or

covered o n l y t w o miles the day before, the

having

a p l e d g e m a d e o n t h e basis o f c o o p e r a t i o n

miserable straggling c o l u m n approached the

w i t h tribes w h o later r e n e g e d o n t h e i r offer.

i m p o s i n g f i v e - m i l e l o n g K h u r d - K a b u l Pass.

W h a t e v e r t h e case, t h e a r m y a n d its

T h e d e f i l e w a s o f s u c h d e p t h as t o b l o c k o u t

d e p e n d e n t s w e r e left to r u n a gauntlet

direct sunlight o n the icy stream that flowed

f r o m w h i c h it possessed v i r t u a l l y

t h r o u g h its c e n t r e . O n t h e h e i g h t s t h o u s a n d s

no

p r o t e c t i o n , least of all t h e civilians.

o f fearless G h i l z a i s a s s e m b l e d t o issue a

Captain Charles Mackenzie

destructive fire. T h e y h a d erected small

observed

a little I n d i a n girl:

stone b r e a s t w o r k s b e h i n d w h i c h t h e y lay,' Mackenzie recorded, 'dealing out death w i t h

It was a b e a u t i f u l little girl a b o u t t w o years

perfect i m p u n i t y to themselves.' By the t i m e

o l d , j u s t s t r o n g e n o u g h t o sit u p r i g h t w i t h

t h e t r o o p s , baggage carts, a n i m a l s a n d c a m p

its l i t t l e legs d o u b l e d u n d e r i t , its g r e a t

followers h a d negotiated their w a y

b l a c k e y e s d i l a t e d t o t w i c e t h e i r u s u a l size,

t h e pass, 5 0 0 soldiers a n d m a n y t i m e s t h a t

fixed o n t h e a r m e d m e n , t h e passing

n u m b e r of c a m p followers h a d perished.

c a v a l r y a n d all t h e strange sights t h a t m e t

through

By 10 January, little was left of t h e

its g a z e . . . o n e o f t h e m a n y i n n o c e n t s

original force apart f r o m E l p h i n s t o n e

[later t o be] s l a u g h t e r e d o n t h e r o a d .

h i s staff, 5 0

sowars

of the 5 t h

(Native)

and


3I

Cavalry a n d perhaps 2 0 0 m e n of the Horse Artillery a n d 4 4 t h Foot, w h i c h

though

drastically reduced i n n u m b e r , r e m a i n e d a disciplined force. T h i s m o v e d i n single file, or i n pairs at best, t h r o u g h t h e

50-yard

T u n g h i Taraki Gorge, where the Afghans a g a i n lay i n a m b u s h . By t h e t i m e it emerged a n d reached the village of Tezeen o n t h e afternoon of t h e 1 0 t h , Elphinstone's c o m m a n d was d o w n to a mere 2 4 0 Europeans, a h a n d f u l of

sepoys

and

3,000 of the original 1 2 , 0 0 0 c a m p followers. T h e remains of the army, m i n d a n d b o d y frozen, could do n o t h i n g more t h a n simply carry o n , struggling t h r o u g h t h e snows, w h i c h apart f r o m the cold offered a further agony. ' M y eyes', C a p t a i n J o h n s o n c o m p l a i n e d , ' h a d b e c o m e so i n f l a m e d f r o m t h e r e f l e c t i o n o f t h e snow that I was nearly blind, a n d the p a i n intense.' F r o m T e z e e n it was a n o t h e r 2 0 miles t o t h e t w o - m i l e J a g d a l a k Pass w h e r e , as b e f o r e , tribesmen massed o n the heights picked off m e m b e r s of t h e c o l u m n , n o w partially protected b y darkness. O n t h e e v e n i n g of t h e Last stand o f t h e 4 4 t h (East Essex) Regiment at Gandamak, during t h e retreat f r o m Kabul t o Jalalabad, Captain Colin Mackenzie, Madras Army, c. 1842, f o r m e r l y

I 3 January I 842. Captain Soulter concealed t h e

one o f the hostages held in Kabul, wearing native Afghan

regimental colours by w r a p p i n g t h e m around his

dress. (National A r m y Museum)

waist beneath his poshteen. (National A r m y Museum)

\

32


'The Remnants o f an A r m y ' , an engraving based on Lady Butler's famous late Victorian oil painting o f D r W i l l i a m Brydon, t h e only m e m b e r o f t h e Kabul garrison t o reach

O n l y a single survivor of this m a r c h of death r e m a i n e d : D r W i l l i a m

Brydon,

a 3 0 - y e a r - o l d Scot, a n assistant s u r g e o n

t h e f o r t at Jalalabad, after t h e destruction o f t h e A r m y w h o w i t h five others h a d left t h e Jagdalak

o f t h e Indus in January I 842.

Pass a t n i g h t a n d t a k e n a r o u t e o v e r t h e 11th, o n accepting a n invitation f r o m Akbar

hills t o w a r d s Jalalabad, i n t h e course

t o discuss t h e d i f f i c u l t y o f e n f o r c i n g t h e

of w h i c h hostile villagers killed his

Ghilzais' agreement to allow the

companions and wounded him. O n

column

the

to proceed unhindered, Elphinstone a n d

1 3 t h , e x h a u s t e d b u t still m o u n t e d a t o p his

Shelton f o u n d themselves prisoners.

bedraggled, dying pony, he approached the

M e a n w h i l e , t h e r e m n a n t s of the

Army

fortress at Jalalabad, w h e r e h e was spotted

of the Indus, n u m b e r i n g b u t 1 5 0 m e n of

f r o m a r o o f t o p b y a staff officer

the 4 4 t h , 16 d i s m o u n t e d artillerymen,

M a j o r H e n r y H a v e l o c k , w h o w o u l d later

and

named

distinguish himself in the Burma

campaign

under Brigadier-General T h o m a s Anquetil,

a n d , above all, d u r i n g the I n d i a n

Mutiny,

c o n t i n u e d their retreat towards Jalalabad,

in w h i c h he w o u l d play a prominent

h e l d b y G e n e r a l Sale, w i t h t h e 4 4 t h r e p u l s i n g

p a r t as a s e n i o r c o m m a n d e r . ' A s h e g o t

t h e G h i l z a i s w i t h t h e i r b a y o n e t s o n at least

nearer/ Havelock recorded of Brydon's

one occasion a n d slowly negotiating their

slow approach:

25 troopers of the 5 t h Light Cavalry,

w a y towards the e n d of the

now

Khurd-Kabul

Pass. T h e r e t h e t r a c k n a r r o w e d t o n o t

much

... it w a s d i s t i n c t l y seen t h a t h e w o r e

m o r e t h a n a goat p a t h , blocked b y a n abbatis

European clothes a n d was m o u n t e d

t h r o u g h w h i c h , after a p a n i c u n d e r fire t h a t

a travel-hacked yaboo [pony], w h i c h

on

left A n q u e t i l a n d m a n y others dead, a f e w

h e was u r g i n g o n w i t h all t h e speed of

d o z e n survivors emerged. A n d thus, o n

w h i c h it y e t r e m a i n e d master. A signal

13

J a n u a r y , t h e last o f t h e s u r v i v o r s - a h u d d l e d

was m a d e to h i m by someone o n the

g r o u p o f 2 0 m e n o f t h e 4 4 t h - m a d e a last

walls, w h i c h he answered by

stand o n a small icy hill near the village of

a p r i v a t e soldier's forage cap over his

G a n d a m a k , t h e officers c a r r y i n g o n l y their

h e a d . T h e C a u b u l gate was t h e n

swords a n d pistols, t h e m e n their muskets

o p e n a n d several officers, r u s h i n g out,

w i t h three or four cartridges apiece.

When

they h a d expended their a m m u n i t i o n

they

waving

thrown

received a n d recognised i n the traveller t h e f i r s t , a n d i t is t o b e f e a r e d t h e l a s t ,

fought w i t h bayonet and clubbed musket

f u g i t i v e of t h e ill-fated force at C a u b u l

before falling before the onslaught.

i n Dr. B r y d o n .

How the war ended

W i t h the total destruction of the A r m y of

lay i n decay. Several A f g h a n attacks f o l l o w e d

the Indus, the A n g l o - I n d i a n garrison under

over t h e course of N o v e m b e r a n d

G e n e r a l Sale at J a l a l a b a d s t o o d p e r i l o u s l y

a n d o n 19 December a n

isolated, w i t h n o i m m e d i a t e prospect of

h a p p e n e d t o h i t t h e area, w r e c k i n g

relief a n d n o h o p e of r e a c h i n g t h e safety of

o f Sale's w o r k o n t h e d e f e n c e s , b u t a l s o

December,

earthquake much

India w i t h o u t reinforcement. Brydon's lone

disrupting his o p p o n e n t s ' plans. T h e n , w i t h

appearance forcefully revealed h o w little

the e l i m i n a t i o n of the A r m y of the Indus,

Sale - w h o n a t u r a l l y a s s u m e d h i s w i f e h a d

Akbar K h a n arrived in February 1842 to

perished w i t h the others - could rely o n the good faith of the Afghans to p e r m i t

s u r r o u n d t h e p l a c e . Sale h a d n o c h o i c e b u t him

to remain

in situ,

for h e h a d received w o r d

a n u n m o l e s t e d w i t h d r a w a l f r o m their soil.

t h a t n o relief w o u l d arrive f r o m

H e h a d b e e n h o l d i n g t h e fortress of J a l a l a b a d

for several m o n t h s .

since N o v e m b e r 1 8 4 1 w i t h a force c o m p o s e d of the 1 3 t h Foot, t h e 3 5 t h Bengal N a t i v e

Peshawar

T h e siege o f J a l a l a b a d h a s e n t e r e d t h e a n n a l s o f V i c t o r i a n l e g e n d . Sale m o u n t e d

Infantry, a squadron of the 5 t h Bengal Light

a spirited d e f e n c e , l a u n c h i n g sorties t o

Cavalry, a troop of loyal A f g h a n irregular

i n t e r f e r e w i t h A f g h a n siege o p e r a t i o n s ,

horse a n d a small c o n t i n g e n t of gunners

r o u n d i n g u p e n e m y cattle a n d

a n d sappers. W i t h these h e dispersed a l o c a l

critically needed forage to sustain t h e

collecting

b o d y of tribesmen i n t h e v i c i n i t y a n d t h e n

garrison u n t i l relief c o u l d arrive. A i d was,

proceeded to repair the fortifications,

i n f a c t , o n its w a y , t h a n k s t o t h e p o l i c y o f

which

L o r d E l l e n b o r o u g h , A u c k l a n d ' s successor Brigadier-General Sir R o b e r t Sale, defender o f Jalalabad.

as G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l o f I n d i a , i n t h e

(Author's collection)

of 8,000 m e n comprising the aptly a n d

form

grandly n a m e d ' A r m y of Retribution' under M a j o r - G e n e r a l George Pollock,

who

o n 5 April attacked the Afghans holding the K h y b e r Pass. I n t h i s , t h e f i r s t B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y experience along this famous route b e t w e e n India a n d Afghanistan, Pollock did n o t c o m m i t the folly of m a r c h i n g straight t h r o u g h t h e Pass. I n s t e a d , h e m a d e a proper study of the place a n d realized that his o n l y c h a n c e of m a k i n g it t h r o u g h was to c o m m a n d and hold the heights by

sending

out strong patrols to drive the Afridis off the heights, thereby enabling the

slower-moving

m a i n body, guns a n d baggage to negotiate t h e pass u n m o l e s t e d . P o l l o c k ' s m e n

took

each p r o m i n e n t p o s i t i o n o n e after another, until the route to Jalalabad was open. D u r i n g Pollock's advance, m a r k e d b y bitter h a n d - t o - h a n d fighting the length of t h e T e z e e n a n d J a g d a l a k passes, L i e u t e n a n t

34


J o h n G r e e n w o o d recorded his impressions

force drove off Akbar's m e n , captured

of one of the m o r e barbarous recorded

his guns, b u r n e d his c a m p a n d drove i n

incidents i n a conflict notorious for

a flock of 5 0 0 sheep a n d goats, persuading

its s a v a g e r y :

his o p p o n e n t to m a k e n o further attempts t o harass o r seize J a l a l a b a d . O n t h e 1 6 t h ,

T h e r e is a f e r o c i t y a b o u t t h e A f g h a n s

1 5 5 d a y s a f t e r t h e siege b e g a n , P o l l o c k ' s

w h i c h they seem to imbibe w i t h their

m e n reached t h e t o w n , f i n d i n g instead of

m o t h e r ' s m i l k . A soldier ... s a w a

a s t a r v i n g a n d d e m o r a l i z e d g a r r i s o n , Sale

K y b e r e e b o y a p p a r e n t l y a b o u t six years

a n d his m e n i n h i g h spirits f r o m t h e i r

of age w i t h a large k n i f e , w h i c h his p u n y

r e c e n t success a n d j o c u l a r l y

a r m h a d scarcely sufficient s t r e n g t h t o

i n t h e relief force w i t h t h e 1 3 t h Queen's

welcoming

wield, engaged i n a n a t t e m p t to hack off

p l a y i n g t h e Scottish tune, 'Eh, b u t ye've

t h e h e a d of a d e a d sergeant. T h e

b e e n l a n g a' c o m i n g ' .

young

u r c h i n w a s so c o m p l e t e l y a b s o r b e d i n his savage task, t h a t h e h e e d e d n o t t h e

Pollock's force h a d arrived s i m p l y to relieve Jalalabad, for L o r d E l l e n b o r o u g h , at

a p p r o a c h of a soldier of t h e d e a d m a n ' s

his post since February, strongly w i s h e d to

regiment - w h o coolly took h i m

w i t h d r a w all British a n d I n d i a n troops f r o m

o n his b a y o n e t a n d t h r e w h i m

up

over

A f g h a n i s t a n o n c e t h e r e m a i n i n g garrisons h a d b e e n rescued. T h e A r m y of the Indus

t h e cliff.

was of course n o m o r e a n d t h e garrison of I n April 1842, u p o n an u n c o n f i r m e d report

G h a z n i h a d f a l l e n p r i s o n e r , b u t Sale h a d

t h a t Pollock's force was b e i n g h e l d back

b e e n saved a n d other troops c o n t i n u e d to

i n t h e K h y b e r , Sale d e c i d e d t o l a u n c h a

h o l d o u t at Kalat-i-Gilzai, b e t w e e n K a b u l

large-scale sortie w i t h a v i e w t o

supporting

t h e relief c o l u m n ' s advance. W h e n broke o n the 7th, he attacked the

dawn Afghan

a n d Kandahar. W i t h d r a w a l n o w h a d to be c o n d u c t e d so as t o r e t a i n as m u c h B r i t i s h Major-General G e o r g e Pollock's column meeting

c a m p , situated t w o m i l e s west of t h e city,

resistance during its advance t o t h e relief o f Jalalabad,

w i t h three c o l u m n s . W i t h i n t w o hours his

5 A p r i l 1842.


p r i d e a n d p r e s t i g e as p o s s i b l e . W h i l e

Pollock

35

t h e y e n c o u n t e r e d t h e skeletal r e m a i n s of

was relieving Jalalabad, reinforcements were

m o r e of E l p h i n s t o n e ' s c o l u m n , m a n y still

a r r i v i n g at K a n d a h a r , e n a b l i n g G e n e r a l N o t t

wearing the tattered remnants of their

i n t u r n to relieve Kalat-i-Gilzai i n M a y . T h a t

u n i f o r m s . 'I shall never forget t h e sight

accomplished, Ellenborough ordered both

I saw here,' G r e e n w o o d recorded. ' T h e p o o r

forces o u t o f A f g h a n i s t a n , a task t h a t n e i t h e r

fellows w h o h a d fallen in

c o m m a n d e r could achieve until adequate

retreat, lay together i n heaps. T h e i r bodies

Elphinstone's

baggage a n i m a l s were available. M o r e o v e r ,

a b s o l u t e l y c h o k e d u p t h e n a r r o w pass, a n d

b o t h generals h o p e d to r e m a i n i n t h e

our m e n were m a r c h i n g a m i d a mass of

c o u n t r y u n t i l s u c h t i m e as t h e A f g h a n s

h u m a n corruption.'

could be bested i n battle a n d their capital

N o t t d i v i d e d his force, w i t h

one

once again occupied b y British troops, for

contingent retiring through Baluchistan to

a n u n k n o w n n u m b e r of British prisoners a n d

Sind, a n d the other under himself

various other hostages r e m a i n e d i n A f g h a n

its a d v a n c e f r o m K a n d a h a r o n 1 0 A u g u s t .

custody. E l l e n b o r o u g h c o n s e n t e d to his

His troops sharply defeated t h e A f g h a n s at

beginning

generals' wishes, a n d i n late July ordered

G h a z n i h a v i n g , like Pollock, occupied the

Pollock to m o v e against the capital, w h i l e

heights i n the w a k e of the m a i n b o d y

N o t t was given the o p t i o n of retiring to the

swept a w a y t h e bands of tribesmen o n either

and

Indus via K a b u l or r e t u r n i n g b y a m o r e direct

side o f t h e l i n e o f m a r c h . A g a i n l i k e Pollock's

route. N o t w i s h i n g to forego his part i n

c o l u m n , N o t t ' s force also passed o v e r

wreaking revenge against the Afghans,

o f t h e area still b e a r i n g e v i d e n c e o f t h e

he chose t h e f o r m e r o p t i o n .

much

remains of Elphinstone's ill-fated c o l u m n . T h e y e n c o u n t e r e d t h e i d e n t i c a l spectacles

W i t h Sale's b r i g a d e n o w p a r t o f h i s division, Pollock left Jalalabad o n 2 0 A u g u s t

of horror a n d the folly that can follow poor

a n d o n 8 S e p t e m b e r r e a c h e d t h e site o f t h e

military decision-making: h u m a n

4 4 t h ' s last s t a n d at G a n d a m a k , a scene e e r i l y

t h e r e m a i n s of t h o u s a n d s of bullocks, horses

skeletons;

described i n G r e e n w o o d ' s diary:

a n d camels, their bones l o n g since p i c k e d clean by vultures a n d wolves; b r o k e n - d o w n

T h e top of t h e hill was t h i c k l y strewed

artillery, a b a n d o n e d carts a n d w a g o n s ; a n d

w i t h the bodies of t h e slain. S o m e were

t h e other detritus of war. O n r e a c h i n g K a b u l o n 15

m e r e skeletons, whilst others were i n better p r e s e r v a t i o n . T h e i r h a i r w a s still

September,

P o l l o c k e s t a b l i s h e d h i s c a m p o n t h e site

o n their heads, a n d their features were

of a racecourse originally

perfect, a l t h o u g h d i s c o l o u r e d ... a

b y Elphinstone's m e n before the revolt.

vulture w h i c h had been banqueting

on

t h e m h o p p e d carelessly a w a y t o a little

constructed

N o t t ' s force a r r i v e d t w o days later, a n d

with

t h e U n i o n Jack o n c e a g a i n f l y i n g over t h e

distance, lazily f l a p p i n g his h u g e wings

Bala Hissar it n o w r e m a i n e d t o decide w h a t

... As t h e f o u l b i r d g a z e d listlessly a t m e ,

course to take, t h e A f g h a n chiefs fearing

I almost fancied h i m the genius of

widescale retribution. Pollock ordered the

destruction gloating over his prey.

destruction of the C h a r C h o w k bazaar i n reprisal for M a c n a g h t e n ' s m u r d e r a n d t h e

A k b a r d i s p u t e d his a d v a n c e at t h e Jagdalak

public display of his m u t i l a t e d body, w h i l e

a n d T e z e e n passes, b u t P o l l o c k ' s e x p e r i e n c e

Sale l e d a p u n i t i v e e x p e d i t i o n i n t o K o h i s t a n ,

i n m o u n t a i n f i g h t i n g h e l d his force i n

w h e r e h e b u r n e d d o w n t h e t o w n s of Istalif

g o o d stead, a n d h e a d v a n c e d w i t h

minimal

a n d Charikar. T h e hostages a n d m o s t of t h e

casualties w h i l e e x a c t i n g a h e a v y t o l l o n t h e

h a n d f u l of prisoners t a k e n d u r i n g t h e retreat

Afghans, w h o s e attacks dried u p before t h e y

w e r e m i r a c u l o u s l y still alive - a p a r t

withdrew northwards, abandoning the route

Elphinstone, w h o had died in captivity

t o K a b u l . As A n g l o - I n d i a n forces a d v a n c e d

dysentery - a n d t h e Afghans released t h e m

u n o p p o s e d t h r o u g h t h e K h u r d - K a b u l Pass,

u n h a r m e d . Shah Shuja had been

from from

murdered

36

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s

1839-1919

General Sir Samuel Browne, c o m m a n d i n g t h e Peshawar Valley Field Force, enters Jalalabad, 20 September I 878. (Author's collection)

T h e British a r m s n o w i n possession of Afghanistan will n o w be w i t h d r a w n t o t h e [River] Sutlej [in t h e P u n j a b ] .

t h e previous April, his son h a v i n g t a k e n

T h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l w i l l leave it

his place, b u t Akbar, c h a s t e n e d t h o u g h still

t o t h e A f g h a n s themselves t o create a

i n t h e field, c o n t i n u e d to pose a m i l i t a r y

government amidst the anarchy which

threat. Shuja was to be left to his

is t h e c o n s e q u e n c e o f t h e i r c r i m e s .

own

devices, for Pollock h a d orders n o t to interfere i n political matters, a n e w

policy

O n 12 October, h a v i n g laid waste to most

o f n o n - i n t e r v e n t i o n i n A f g h a n affairs issued

o f t h e c i t y a p a r t f r o m t h e Bala Hissar,

i n the f o r m of Ellenborough's

t h e A r m y of R e t r i b u t i o n left K a b u l e n

of 1 October

proclamation

1842:

r o u t e t o Peshawar. A p a r t f r o m several a t t a c k s c o n d u c t e d i n t h e passes a g a i n s t

Disasters u n p a r a l l e l e d i n t h e i r e x t e n t

the rearguard under Nott,

unless b y t h e errors i n w h i c h

forces e n c o u n t e r e d n o f o r m a l

they

Anglo-Indian opposition

originated, a n d by the treachery by

to their withdrawal f r o m Afghanistan, and

w h i c h they were completed have, in

o n 2 3 D e c e m b e r Pollock's c o m b i n e d

o n e s h o r t c a m p a i g n , b e e n a v e n g e d ...

f i n a l l y reached I n d i a at Ferozepore.

army

Portrait of a civilian

Florentia, Lady Sale (1787-1853)

F l o r e n t i a , L a d y Sale, h e r o i n e o f t h e r e t r e a t

a n d was o n e of the few surviving witnesses

from Kabul in 1842 a n d her subsequent

of a tragedy t h a t left v i r t u a l l y every o t h e r

period of captivity, was the wife of M a j o r -

participant dead along

G e n e r a l R o b e r t Sale, w h o it w i l l b e r e c a l l e d

m o u n t a i n paths, i n t h e d e e p gorges of t h e

h a d b e e n sent back t o I n d i a f r o m K a b u l ,

K h u r d - K a b u l Pass a n d o n t h e b o d y - s t r e w n

o n l y to find himself forced to take refuge

s u m m i t o f t h e h i l l at G a n d a m a k .

i n t h e fort at Jalalabad e n r o u t e .

Having

decided to r e m a i n b e h i n d w i t h the garrison

snow-driven

It w i l l be recalled t h a t

Elphinstone's

d e m o r a l i z e d , e x h a u s t e d a r m y left K a b u l o n

still c o n t r o l l i n g t h e A f g h a n c a p i t a l , L a d y Sale

6 J a n u a r y 1 8 4 2 . I n all, A n g l o - I n d i a n forces

became an u n w i t t i n g participant in one of

n u m b e r e d 4,500 troops a n d 12,000

t h e greatest catastrophes i n British m i l i t a r y

followers, m a n y of t h e latter b e i n g soldiers'

camp

history, d u r i n g w h i c h t i m e she w i t n e s s e d

wives and children, but mostly

the destruction of the A r m y of the Indus

retainers, servants, m e r c h a n t s a n d their

a n d endured a period of harsh captivity.

families. T h e d a y w a s clear a n d frosty, w i t h

Indian

Yet t h r o u g h o u t t h i s o r d e a l she m a i n t a i n e d

nearly a foot of snow already o n the ground.

an invaluable account of her experience,

T e r m s f o r t h e s a f e c o n d u c t o f t h e c o l u m n as

Florentia, Lady Sale, t h e indomitable wife o f Major-

sirdars

General Sir R o b e r t Sale. By choosing t o remain w i t h t h e

e x t o r t i o n a t e cost o f 14 a n d a h a l f

f a r as P e s h a w a r h a d b e e n m a d e w i t h

Kabul garrison after t h e departure o f her husband f o r Jalalabad, she later found herself an unwitting participant in the fateful retreat o f January 1842. H e r m e m o i r s

the

a n d M o h a m e d A k b a r K h a n at t h e

lakhs.

T h e c o l u m n b e g a n t o m o v e at 9 . 3 0 a m

on

6 January w i t h n o molestation of the advance

number amongst many excellent reminiscences o f t h e

g u a r d , as 5 0 - 1 0 0 A f g h a n s m i l l i n g a b o u t t h e

First Afghan W a r

gates o f t h e c a n t o n m e n t w a t c h e d t h e scene. L a d y Sale r o d e n e a r t h e h e a d o f t h e c o l u m n , together w i t h other p r o m i n e n t civilians,

4*.

m o s t l y officers' w i v e s a n d c h i l d r e n . Progress w a s v e r y s l o w a n d t h e first m i l e w a s o n l y covered i n t w o a n d a half hours. T h e bullocks f o u n d great difficulty i n dragging t h e g u n carriages t h r o u g h t h e s n o w a n d m u c h o f t h e c o l u m n lumbered through the bottleneck created b y a narrow, makeshift bridge constructed the n i g h t before over the Kabul River, a l t h o u g h reconnaissance h a d a l r e a d y d e t e r m i n e d it was easily f o r d a b l e nearby, albeit o n l y to those prepared to brave t h e freezing water. A great deal of baggage a n d c o m m i s s a r i a t supplies was left b e h i n d i n t h e s t r u g g l e t o cross t h i s f i r s t o b s t a c l e - j u s t o n e characteristic of t h e travails y e t i n store. T h e troops themselves h a d been o n half r a t i o n s d u r i n g t h e w h o l e p e r i o d o f t h e siege, w i t h e v e n less f o r c a m p f o l l o w e r s , w h i l e

the

38


cattle - n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g a recent supply

o n the m o r n i n g of the 7th the rearguard

of b a r l e y - h a d l o n g subsisted o n twigs a n d bark, leaving t h e m fatally w e a k e n e d

o n l y reached t h e m a i n b o d y at 2 . 0 0 a m , in

w i t h s t r a g g l e r s m a k i n g e n q u i r i e s as t o

freezing conditions. I n any event, they were

t h e whereabouts of their units. W i t h the

fated never to reach their destination, for t h e

b r e a k d o w n of unit cohesion came the

poorest a n d hungriest c a m p followers rapidly

d e c l i n e o f m o r a l e , w i t h a sense o f f o r l o r n

devoured those animals that collapsed f r o m

i n e v i t a b i l i t y r e i n f o r c e d as t h e g r o w i n g l i g h t

starvation. Apart f r o m the desperate shortage

r e v e a l e d t h e f r o z e n corpses o f t h o s e w h o

of f o o d , b o t h soldiers a n d civilians suffered

h a d s u c c u m b e d d u r i n g t h e n i g h t . L a d y Sale,

f r o m a total absence of firewood, forcing

still i n t h e a d v a n c e g u a r d , m o v e d off at

t h e m to burn everything combustible:

7 . 3 0 a m w i t h o u t t h e t r o o p s r e c e i v i n g so m u c h

boxes, chests of d r a w e rs a n d all m a n n e r

as a n o r d e r t o p r o c e e d o r a b u g l e s o u n d i n g .

of f u r n i t u r e still i n t h e i r possession, apart

A s d i s c i p l i n e a m o n g t h e sepoys

f r o m the waggons themselves. Indeed, Lady

collapse, some w a n d e r e d a h e a d of t h e

began to

Sale's l a s t d i n n e r a n d b r e a k f a s t a t K a b u l h a d

advance guard. Others could n o t locate their

b e e n cooked w i t h the w o o d of a m a h o g a n y

u n i t s a n d cast a w a y t h e i r w e a p o n s t o l i g h t e n

d i n i n g table.

t h e l o a d , w h i l e some, t o o i n j u r e d or t o o w e a k failed to keep up, resigning themselves to

W h e n t h e rearguard f i n a l l y left t h e cantonment, the Afghans

c e r t a i n d e a t h . N o sooner was baggage left

immediately

b e g a n to o c c u p y t h e b u i l d i n g s a n d fire

b e h i n d t h a n Afghans began to appear a n d

u p o n t h e last p a r t y t o d e p a r t . T h i s caused

p l u n d e r it. T h e e a r l y signs o f t h i s f o r m o f

p a n i c a m o n g s t t h e s e r v a n t s , w h o cast aside

d e p r e d a t i o n w e r e a l r e a d y e v i d e n t i n t h e fact

t h e i r l o a d s a n d r a n o f f , so a b a n d o n i n g

that the c a n t o n m e n t was looted a n d burned

m u c h of the privately carried baggage, the

s h o r t l y a f t e r its e v a c u a t i o n ; t h e f a t e o f t h e

c o m m i s s a r i a t a n d a m m u n i t i o n at t h e v e r y

w o u n d e d left b e h i n d c a n o n l y be surmised.

outset of t h e retreat. Before t h e d a y was even out m e n , w o m e n and children -

an

a p p a l l i n g a s s o r t m e n t o f t h e sick, d e a d a n d d y i n g - b e g a n to litter t h e roads, deprived of t h e w i l l to persevere a n d resigned to their fate. T h e i r b o d i e s e n c u m b e r e d t h e passage of others, all n u m b e d b y the intense cold a n d i g n o r a n t of t h e other foe yet to appear. T h a t night, i n t h e c o m p l e t e absence of tents - m u c h less a n y p r o p e r p r o t e c t i o n f r o m t h e elements - a n officer m a n a g e d to p i t c h a m a k e s h i f t c o v e r i n g o v e r L a d y Sale a n d a f e w of her c o m p a n i o n s , p r o v i d i n g t h e barest of c o m f o r t as t h e w i n d b l e w i n u n d e r t h e s i d e s t o a t t a c k t h e o c c u p a n t s , stiff a n d in their

poshteens

huddled

(a s h e e p s k i n j a c k e t w i t h

a fleece l i n i n g ) . B y t h e e n d o f t h e first day, L a d y Sale h a d o n l y t r a v e l l e d six m i l e s b u t hundreds of civilians a n d some of the troops h a d already fallen by the wayside, the

army

h a d a b a n d o n e d t w o horse artillery pieces o n t h e road, a n d , o m i n o u s l y , all of t h e S h a h Shuja's troops h a d n o w deserted. So p o n d e r o u s p r o v e d t h e j o u r n e y a n d so s t r u n g - o u t h a d t h e c o l u m n b e c o m e , t h a t

Lady Sale on horseback during t h e retreat.

P o r t r a i t o f a civilian

But w o r s e n o w f o l l o w e d , w i t h t h e first serious attacks o n t h e c o l u m n

beginning

39

since t h e horses c o u l d n o longer p u l l t h e m , leaving o n l y t w o serviceable guns

remaining

a n d almost n o a m m u n i t i o n - m u c h of w h i c h

o n the 7th - o n l y the second day of t h e retreat - w h e n a force of s c r e a m i n g

h a d already been abandoned

A f g h a n s sallied o u t of a small fort a n d briefly

i n e p t i t u d e , carelessness a n d l a c k o f a n i m a l

c a p t u r e d t w o pieces of artillery; w h i c h

transport. By t h e e n d of t h e second day,

when

sepoys

through

r e t a k e n after a stiff f i g h t w e r e a b a n d o n e d ,

L a d y Sale o b s e r v e d t h e

t h e guns spiked b y t h e officers t o r e n d e r

w i t h the c a m p followers, w i t h n o h o p e of

mixing

t h e m i n o p e r a b l e . As t h e c o l u m n a d v a n c e d ,

r e f o r m i n g themselves i n t o their respective

t h e A f g h a n s g r e w i n n u m b e r s a l o n g its f l a n k s

units. I n a n y event, t h e y h a d suffered such

a n d i n c r e a s i n g l y h a r a s s e d its c e n t r e a n d r e a r ,

g r i e v o u s losses f r o m d e a t h a n d d e s e r t i o n t h a t

the c a m p followers suffering the most,

their u n i t designations bore little relation to

as L a d y Sale r e c o r d e d : ' N u m b e r s o f

reality. E v e n w i t h s n o w i n a b u n d a n c e , w a t e r

unfortunates have dropped, b e n u m b e d

was n o t easily o b t a i n e d , for t h e r e was n o

w i t h cold, to be massacred b y t h e e n e m y . '

f i r e w o o d w i t h w h i c h t o m e l t it, a n d t h o s e

After m a r c h i n g five miles since m o r n i n g ,

w h o sought to gather water f r o m streams

the c o l u m n halted before the o p e n i n g of the

still u n f r o z e n w e r e fired o n b y t r i b e s m e n .

K h u r d - K a b u l Pass. L a d y S a l e w a s e x c e e d i n g l y disconcerted b y t h e stoppage, for she k n e w

By 8 January a n already dire situation

had

utterly degenerated, w i t h an atmosphere of

t h e t r o o p s possessed o n l y f i v e a n d a h a l f days' rations w i t h w h i c h to reach Jalalabad, a n d the animals could n o t forage o n account of the snow o n the g r o u n d , w h i c h was m o r e t h a n a foot deep. T h e senior officers

T h e t h i r d day o f t h e retreat f r o m Kabul, 8 January I 842. Emboldened by t h e inability o f Anglo-Indian t r o o p s properly t o defend themselves and by t h e helplessness o f t h e camp followers, Afghan tribesmen snipe f r o m elevated positions and make forays directly against t h e

squabbled over w h e t h e r to c a m p or p u s h o n ,

column, seizing Captain and Mrs Anderson's young

before finally agreeing o n t h e latter course,

daughter (left) and fatally w o u n d i n g Lieutenant Sturt

and by the time they reached

Bhoodkhak

(right), son-in-law t o Lady Sale ( m o u n t e d , centre background), w i t h General Elphinstone t o her front.

t h e r e was scarcely a n y baggage r e m a i n i n g of a n y k i n d . T w o m o r e 6-pdrs were a b a n d o n e d ,

A l o n g t h e hillside (right) soldiers o f t h e 4 4 t h fruitlessly a t t e m p t t o disperse t h e harassing Ghilzais.

40


1839-1919

f o r e b o d i n g i n t h e air. ' A t s u n r i s e / L a d y S a l e

t h e m , w o u n d i n g several p e o p l e a n d horses

observed, ' n o order h a d b e e n issued for t h e

i n t h e a d v a n c e g u a r d , i n c l u d i n g Sale, h e r

m a r c h , a n d the confusion was fearful. T h e

a r m struck b y a m u s k e t ball. Three other

force was perfectly disorganized, nearly every

m u s k e t balls passed t h r o u g h her

m a n p a r a l y s e d w i t h c o l d , so as t o b e s c a r c e l y

near the shoulder, but w i t h o u t

able t o h o l d his m u s k e t or m o v e .

injury. T h e principal attack, however,

Many

f r o z e n corpses l a y o n t h e g r o u n d / S o m e of the

sepoys

still w i t h t h e ranks - or i n a n y

poshteen

causing

struck t h e m a i n b o d y of t h e c o l u m n , w h a t r e m a i n e d of the baggage train, a n d

e v e n t still o n t h e i r feet - t o o k t h e futile a n d

t h e rearguard, w i t h a n u m b e r of civilians,

fatal d e c i s i o n t o b u r n t h e i r caps a n d clothes

i n c l u d i n g c h i l d r e n , b e i n g a b d u c t e d or killed.

for t h e m o d i c u m of fleeting w a r m t h this act

Sale d e s c r i b e d t h e h a r r o w i n g e x p e r i e n c e o f

of desperation provided. But the increasing

m a n y of her civilian compatriots,

forays b y t h e A f g h a n s caused t h e greatest

t h e m a c e r t a i n M r s M a i n w a r i n g , a n officer's

distress, a n d w h e n a force o f t r i b e s m e n

wife w i t h the most precious of burdens:

among

a t t a c k e d t h e rear of t h e c o l u m n a p a n i c ensued, the c a m p followers rushing to the

She n o t o n l y h a d to w a l k a considerable

f r o n t for p r o t e c t i o n f r o m t h e troops,

distance w i t h her child i n her arms

a l t h o u g h m a n y soldiers w e r e n o l o n g e r e v e n

t h r o u g h t h e d e e p s n o w , b u t h a d also

under arms. The Afghans continued to

to pick her w a y over the bodies of the

gather i n greater a n d greater n u m b e r s ,

dead, dying, a n d w o u n d e d , both

harassing the c o l u m n f r o m the heights w i t h

a n d c a t t l e , a n d c o n s t a n t l y t o cross t h e

their long, accurate

jezails.

'Bullets kept

men

streams of water, w e t u p to t h e knees,

w h i z z i n g b y u s , as w e s a t o n o u r h o r s e s , f o r

pushed and shoved about by m e n

h o u r s / L a d y Sale r e c o r d e d , t h e 4 4 t h

animals, the e n e m y keeping u p a sharp

and

and

3 7 t h N a t i v e I n f a n t r y r e t u r n i n g f i r e as b e s t

fire, a n d several persons b e i n g killed

t h e y could against a virtually unseen

close t o her.

enemy

p e r c h e d a m o n g s t t h e rocks a n d precipices high above t h e m .

T w o regiments, the 4 4 t h and 3 7 t h Native

Eventually, negotiations began between E l p h i n s t o n e , his officers a n d A k b a r K h a n ,

I n f a n t r y , p r o t e c t e d t h e rear, b u t as t h e y a p p r o a c h e d t h e K h u r d - K a b u l Pass t h e A f g h a n s

w h o a g r e e d t o g u a r a n t e e t h e c o l u m n ' s safe

increased t h e i r fire f r o m a m o n g s t t h e rocks.

a d v a n c e across t h e b o r d e r , b u t w i t h t h e

T h e n u m b e r o f w r e t c h e d soldiers o p p o s i n g

stakes raised: f u r t h e r p a y m e n t a n d t h e

t h e m c o n t i n u e d to dwindle, a n d those that

surrender of t h r e e senior British officers t o be

survived, t h e i r h a n d s s w a d d l e d i n gloves

d e t a i n e d as h o s t a g e s as t h e p r i c e f o r G e n e r a l

a n d cloth, were barely able to load their

Sale's e v a c u a t i o n o f J a l a l a b a d a n d

withdrawal

w e a p o n s , m u c h less m a n i p u l a t e t h e t r i g g e r .

i n t o I n d i a n territory. These terms were a

To c o m p o u n d the column's predicament,

blatant f o r m of blackmail f r o m those

progress ceased for several h o u r s :

who

h a d already violated the original terms of the agreement, but Elphinstone believed he

had

O w i n g to a halt h a v i n g t a k e n place i n

n o c h o i c e b u t t o accept. A h a n d f u l of officers

f r o n t , t h e pass w a s c o m p l e t e l y

r e m a i n e d b e h i n d as h o s t a g e s a n d t h e

u p ; a n d for a considerable t i m e t h e 4 4 t h

march

choked

r e s u m e d a b o u t m i d d a y , L a d y Sale d e s c r i b i n g

w e r e stationary u n d e r a h e a v y fire, a n d

t h e t r o o p s as ' i n t h e g r e a t e s t s t a t e o f

w e r e fast e x p e n d i n g t h e i r a m m u n i t i o n .

disorganization: the baggage was m i x e d w i t h the advance guard; and the

in

camp

The 3 7 t h continued slowly m o v i n g

on

w i t h o u t firing a shot, being paralysed

followers all p u s h e d ahead i n their

w i t h cold to such a degree t h a t

precipitate flights towards H i n d o s t a n ' .

a m o u n t o f persuasion b y t h e i r officers

N o sooner h a d they advanced half a mile w h e n t h e A f g h a n s o p e n e d a h e a v y fire o n

no

c o u l d i n d u c e t h e m to m a k e a n y effort to dislodge the enemy, w h o took f r o m

P o r t r a i t o f a civilian

some of t h e m n o t o n l y their firelocks,

scenes t h a t a w a i t e d us. T h e r o a d c o v e r e d

but even the clothes f r o m their persons.

w i t h a w f u l l y m a n g l e d bodies, all n a k e d :

4I

f i f t y - e i g h t E u r o p e a n s w e r e c o u n t e d ... the natives innumerable. N u m b e r s of

Eventually, the c o l u m n halted, some o f t h e soldiers still d e t e r m i n e d t o h o l d

t h e c a m p f o l l o w e r s w e r e still alive, frost

o n t o the o n e r e m a i n i n g artillery piece b y

bitten a n d starving, some perfectly out

m a n h a n d l i n g it w i t h o u t t h e a i d of horses,

o f t h e i r senses a n d i d i o t i c ... T h e s i g h t

w h o s e strength c o u l d n o t sustain such a

was dreadful, the smell of blood

laborious enterprise over b r o k e n g r o u n d deep

s i c k e n i n g , a n d t h e c o r p s e s l a y so t h i c k

i n snow. O t h e r m e a n s of defence stood i n a n

it was impossible t o l o o k f r o m t h e m ,

e q u a l l y p a r l o u s state. W h e n t h e a r m y h a d left

as i t r e q u i r e d c a r e t o g u i d e m y

K a b u l , L a d y Sale r e c k o n e d t h a t e a c h

sepoy

horse

so as n o t t o t r e a d u p o n t h e b o d i e s .

carried 4 0 r o u n d s of m u s k e t a m m u n i t i o n i n h i s p o u c h a n d 1 0 0 spares. N o w , o n l y t h e t h i r d

D u r i n g t h e e v e n i n g o f t h e 8 t h , L a d y Sale

d a y i n t o t h e retreat, just t h r e e a m m u n i t i o n -

t o o k stock o f t h e disaster, e s t i m a t i n g t h a t

bearing camels r e m a i n e d i n the c o l u m n , w i t h many

sepoys

possessing n o t a single cartridge

5 0 0 troops a n d about 2,500 c a m p

followers

h a d died f r o m e x h a u s t i o n , cold or

a n d n o system of distribution i n place.

starvation, or fallen at t h e h a n d s of t h e

T h e c o m m i s s a r i a t h a d ceased t o f u n c t i o n ,

Afghans. W i t h the prospect of reaching

r e g i m e n t a l i n t e g r i t y h a d i n m a n y cases b r o k e n

Jalalabad g r o w i n g ever m o r e unlikely, she lay

d o w n , desertion was rife, discipline a n d

d o w n t o s l e e p i n t h e b i t t e r c o l d , w r a p p e d as

m o r a l e s t o o d a t b r e a k i n g p o i n t , a n d t h e scenes

b e f o r e i n h e r poshteen

of suffering c o n t i n u e d i n u n r e m i t t i n g fashion:

c r a m p e d space w i t h t h o s e officers a n d t h e i r

a n d sharing a

w i v e s w h o h a d t h u s far m e r c i f u l l y It w o u l d be impossible for m e t o

survived

a n ordeal of catastrophic proportions.

describe t h e feelings w i t h w h i c h w e pursued our w a y through the dreadful

T h e approach t o Jagdalak, 8 S e p t e m b e r I 842.

42


Rising o n t h e m o r n i n g of t h e 9 t h , she d i s c o v e r e d t h a t m a n y of t h e soldiers h a d

c o m p a n i o n , w h o s e h u s b a n d h a d just d i e d of his w o u n d s ] n o r I were i n a fit

a l r e a d y m o v e d off, t o g e t h e r w i t h a large

state t o d e c i d e for ourselves w h e t h e r

b o d y of c a m p followers. ' M o r e t h a n one half

w o u l d a c c e p t t h e sirdar's

we

o f t h e f o r c e is n o w f r o s t b i t t e n o r w o u n d e d /

not. There was b u t faint h o p e of our

she r e c o r d e d i n h e r j o u r n a l , ' a n d m o s t of t h e

e v e r g e t t i n g safe t o J e l l a l a b a d ; a n d w e

m e n c a n scarcely p u t a f o o t t o t h e g r o u n d .

followed the stream.

p r o t e c t i o n or

T h i s is t h e f o u r t h d a y t h a t o u r c a t t l e h a v e h a d n o f o o d ; a n d t h e m e n are starved w i t h

T h e w o m e n a n d children, together w i t h

cold a n d h u n g e r / A m i d s t this d e e p e n i n g

their surviving husbands a n d others, were

crisis, a

sirdar

rode o u t to British headquarters

guided b y a circuitous route to the fort

suggesting t h a t t h e t h r e e senior officers,

w h e r e L a d y Sale f o u n d A k b a r K h a n a n d t h e

Pottinger, M a c k e n z i e a n d Lawrence, approach

hostages, together w i t h t h e civilians t a k e n

the A f g h a n garrison of the K h u r d - K a b u l fort

prisoner over t h e preceding days. Here began

a n d request p r o t e c t i o n for t h e wives a n d

a l e n g t h y period of i m p r i s o n m e n t ,

c h i l d r e n , g u a r a n t e e i n g t h e i r safe e s c o r t

w h i c h t i m e m o s t of t h e captives, apart f r o m

during

t o Peshawar at a later date. Barring this

Elphinstone (whose death almost certainly

expedient, there seemed n o possibility

saved h i m f r o m disgrace before a court

of their survival. General Elphinstone,

martial) survived the primitive conditions to

n o w t o o ill to c o n t i n u e i n c o m m a n d ,

b e r e s c u e d l a t e r t h a t y e a r w h e n , as w e h a v e

agreed to this proposal, 'in the t w o f o l d

seen, British m i l i t a r y operations resumed.

h o p e / L a d y Sale s u r m i s e d :

L a d y Sale's h u s b a n d d i e d t h r e e y e a r s l a t e r at t h e battle of M u d k i , d u r i n g t h e w a r i n

... of p l a c i n g t h e ladies a n d

children

Sind, a stretch of w i l d c o u n t r y bordering

b e y o n d the dangers a n d dreadful

south-west A f g h a n i s t a n , l e a v i n g his w i d o w

p r i v a t i o n s o f t h e c a m p , a n d also o f

w i t h a special p e n s i o n f r o m t h e Q u e e n .

showing the

sirdar

t h a t h e was sincere

i n his w i s h to negotiate a truce, a n d

W h e n L a d y Sale h e r s e l f d i e d at C a p e T o w n o n 6 July 1853, the inscription o n the simple

thus w i n f r o m h i m a similar feeling of

granite obelisk over her grave s u m m e d u p

confidence. Overwhelmed w i t h

her character perfectly: ' U n d e r n e a t h this

affliction, n e i t h e r M r s Sturt [her

domestic

s t o n e reposes all t h a t c o u l d d i e of L a d y Sale.'

The world around war

Afghanistan: the playground of the Great Game Dramatic geography dominates Afghanistan

that penetrated this forbidding region were

a n d h e l p s e x p l a i n its r o l e i n B r i t a i n ' s s t r a t e g y

k n o w n , a n d w h e r e t h e eastern H i n d u Kush

f o r t h e d e f e n c e o f I n d i a , its g r e a t e s t c o l o n i a l

c o n n e c t s w i t h t h e c e n t r a l H i n d u K u s h , several

possession. A t t h e n o r t h e r n e n d o f t h e

r o u t e s p r o v i d e d access i n t o A f g h a n T u r k e s t a n ,

subcontinent, t h e H i m a l a y a s r u n for

w h i c h m e a n t t h a t as R u s s i a s l o w l y b u t

1,900 miles, dividing Afghanistan a n d I n d i a

inexorably expanded southwards, the

f r o m T i b e t a n d C h i n a . For t h e w h o l e o f t h e

H i n d u Kush remained the only principal

1 9 t h century, these m o u n t a i n s p r o v i d e d I n d i a

barrier t o A f g h a n i s t a n . A n y foreign force t h a t

w i t h a secure f r o n t a g a i n s t i n v a s i o n . For t h o s e

penetrated b e y o n d this c h a i n of m o u n t a i n s

concerned w i t h the defence of India, the m a i n

w o u l d still face t h e e a s t e r n H i n d u K u s h , w h o s e

issue w a s t h e s e c u r i t y p r o b l e m s p o s e d b y t h e

ridges e x t e n d e d s o u t h w a r d i n t o W a z i r i s t a n

north-western frontier w i t h Afghanistan.

a n d B a l u c h i s t a n , n e a r l y as f a r as t h e A r a b i a n

Specifically, s t r e t c h i n g for 6 0 0 m i l e s t o

Sea. T h e y p r o v i d e d a n u n i n t e r r u p t e d n a t u r a l

t h e b o r d e r w i t h Persia sits t h e f o r m i d a b l e

barrier b e t w e e n I n d i a a n d Afghanistan, w i t h

H i n d u Kush, consisting of a massive c h a i n

t h e I n d u s River f l o w i n g r o u g h l y parallel,

of m o u n t a i n s , some rising m o r e t h a n 20,000ft,

t o t h e east, s e r v i n g as a m e t a p h o r i c a l m o a t

r e n d e r i n g access t o a n d f r o m C e n t r a l A s i a n o t

t o t h i s fortress w a l l .

i m p o s s i b l e , b u t c e r t a i n l y n o s i m p l e affair. M o s t of this region was c o m p l e t e l y u n e x p l o r e d b y E u r o p e a n s i n t h e 1 9 t h c e n t u r y , b u t t h e passes

Afghan chiefs and some o f their sons during t h e Second Afghan W a r

44


n e i g h b o u r a n d t h u s , if m o v i n g i n t h e

T o t h e east o f t h e I n d u s l a y areas o f

o p p o s i t e d i r e c t i o n , as o n e o f t h e t w o

considerable settlement. To t h e west, m u c h m o r e sparsely p o p u l a t e d a n d w i t h

an

m a i n a v e n u e s for progress i n t o C e n t r a l Asia.

ill-defined border, lay t h e tribal territories;

A n invasion f r o m the west obviated the need

partly i n British I n d i a a n d partly i n

f o r a n a t t a c k i n g f o r c e t o cross t h e d r e a d e d

Afghanistan, i n reality neither the British

H i n d u Kush, a n d once i n control of the city

authorities nor Kabul h a d more t h a n a very

a n i n v a d e r possessed n o t o n l y shelter for his

limited juristiction over t h e m . V o l u m e s can

troops against a harsh climate, but a fortified

be w r i t t e n a b o u t Afghanistan's vast a n d

city, a m p l e f o o d for his a r m y a n d p l e n t y

varied geography, b u t for t h e purposes

of fodder f r o m t h e s u r r o u n d i n g fertile

of this study it was i n t h e eastern area

-

t h r o u g h w h i c h access t o a n d f r o m I n d i a w a s

c o u n t r y s i d e for his horses a n d beasts of b u r d e n . T h u s f o r c e n t u r i e s H e r a t s e r v e d as

p o s s i b l e - t h a t t h e s t r a t e g i c issues c o n n e c t e d

a n i m p o r t a n t strategic objective for all

w i t h the Anglo-Afghan Wars were central.

i n v a d i n g forces a n d a focus of i n t e n s e

For it was this region, stretching f r o m t h e

interest to the British g o v e r n m e n t i n India,

B o l a n Pass i n t h e s o u t h t o t h e K h y b e r Pass

w h o u n d e r n o circumstances w o u l d accept

i n t h e n o r t h - w i t h o t h e r , less s i g n i f i c a n t

its o c c u p a t i o n b y P e r s i a n o r R u s s i a n t r o o p s .

routes i n b e t w e e n - that connected eastern Afghanistan w i t h western India. A f g h a n i s t a n ' s t h r e e c h i e f cities w e r e , a n d c o n t i n u e to be, Kabul, K a n d a h a r

K a b u l ' s i m p o r t a n c e , n o t m e r e l y as t h e c a p i t a l c i t y , l a y w i t h its p o s i t i o n a t t h e

and

crossroads o f t w o i m p o r t a n t a v e n u e s o f communication: a road leading through the

H e r a t . H e r a t sits a t t h e w e s t e r n e n d o f t h e

H i n d u Kush into Turkestan and penetrating

H i n d u K u s h , n e a r t h e f r o n t i e r w i t h Persia,

f u r t h e r i n t o C e n t r a l Asia, a n d a m o u n t a i n o u s

p r e s e n t - d a y I r a n . S i t u a t e d as i t is i n a f e r t i l e

route to Peshawar, i n t h e British Punjab, a n d

r e g i o n , H e r a t s e r v e d as t h e p r i n c i p a l r o u t e

b e y o n d to India's n o r t h e r n plains. A third

o f a d v a n c e i n t o A f g h a n i s t a n f r o m its w e s t e r n

m a j o r m e a n s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n across Afghanistan ran f r o m Kabul to Kandahar,

T h e Jagdalak Pass during t h e First Afghan W a r

m o v i n g south-westwards through Ghazni,


w h i c h controls the second m a i n avenue


i n t o I n d i a - t h r o u g h t h e v i t a l B o l a n Pass. K a n d a h a r , l i k e K a b u l , is s i t u a t e d a t t h e confluence of t w o i m p o r t a n t

45

Entrance t o t h e Bolan Pass f r o m Dadur, I 842. (National A r n r

V

Museum)

communications

routes of strategic significance - t h e H e r a t t o

t o S i n d ( a n n e x e d after c o n q u e s t b y British

Kabul road, a n d that w h i c h connected Herat

I n d i a i n 1 8 4 3 ) v i a t h e B o l a n Pass. S i n c e H e r a t ,

46


I

.

V

.

1

ilk

T h e Chunari Pass t h r o u g h t h e Khurd-Kabul Range.

p r i n c i p a l a r t e r i e s o f c o m m u n i c a t i o n across

Precipitous mountains and n a r r o w defiles such as

t h e c o u n t r y , i t is p e r h a p s u n d e r s t a n d a b l e

these depicted here made Afghanistan an extremely

t h a t British authorities i n I n d i a should have

challenging e n v i r o n m e n t in which t o prosecute military operations, especially in t h e depths o f w i n t e r o r t h e

r e g a r d e d t h e H i n d u K u s h as t h e b e s t b a r r i e r

scorching heat o f s u m m e r (Author's collection)

of defence i n the north-west. T h e further the

Kandahar and Kabul were connected to

f o r m i d a b l e barrier, t h e b e t t e r t h e state o f

o n e a n o t h e r b y roads t h a t constituted t h e

security for I n d i a . Failure to keep Russian

Russians c o u l d b e k e p t at b a y b e y o n d this


p e n e t r a t i o n a t b a y , e s p e c i a l l y as f a r as

47

t h e y seized c o n t r o l of t h e c o u n t r y after t h e

Kabul or Kandahar, w o u l d a l l o w t h e m t o

d e a t h o f t h e E m p e r o r o f Persia, N a d i r S h a h .

influence - a n d possibly e v e n encourage to

T h e D u r a n i s w e r e a n d still are best associated

hostility - t h e frontier tribes, against w h i c h

w i t h t h e areas a r o u n d K a b u l , J a l a l a b a d a n d

n o n a t u r a l barrier existed to separate t h e m

Herat, w h e r e a s their p r i n c i p a l rivals, t h e

from the remainder of India.

Ghilzais, w h o h a d ruled m u c h of the south of

Thus Afghan geography a n d the peculiar

the country prior to the D u r a n i ascendancy,

d i s t r i b u t i o n o f its p e o p l e w e l l i n t o B r i t i s h

l i v e m o s t l y t o t h e east o f a l i n e d r a w n

territory played a n i m p o r t a n t role i n

Kabul to Kalat-i-Ghilzai. T h e Ghilzais for t h e

from

encouraging Anglo-Indian intervention.

most part lived nomadically, spending their

I n d e e d , n o t h i n g less t h a n t h e t h r e a t , r e a l

winters o n the plains a n d shifting to the

or perceived, t o t h e I n d i a n

subcontinent

central highlands i n the s u m m e r

months,

could have inspired military operations i n

w i t h large n u m b e r s t r a v e l l i n g i n t o I n d i a v i a

so f o r b i d d i n g a n e n v i r o n m e n t . T h e

t h e v a r i o u s passes f o r p u r p o s e s o f t r a d i n g a n d

featured extremes of temperature,

climate with

w i n t e r s b r i n g i n g s n o w a n d sub-zero blasts of piercing w i n d s , f o l l o w e d b y a rapidly

a l l o w i n g their flocks t o graze. T h e tribes o n t h e N o r t h - W e s t

Frontier,

u n d e r British c o n t r o l after t h e defeat of

approaching spring that i n t u r n quickly gave

t h e Sikhs i n 1 8 4 9 , w e r e also e t h n i c A f g h a n s .

w a y to b u r n i n g s u m m e r temperatures

T h e y consisted of peoples related to b o t h the

-

rising to 110°F a n d above b y June, c o m p l e t e

Duranis and Ghilzais, sharing between

w i t h dust-storms a n d l o n g absences of

a c o m m o n l a n g u a g e i n v a r i a n t f o r m s as

rainfall. A d d to this a seemingly endless

either Pashtu or Paktu ( t h o u g h D a r i a n d

them

series o f r o c k - s t r e w n h i l l s , n a r r o w d e f i l e s ,

a h o s t of o t h e r l a n g u a g e s are also s p o k e n

a bleak a n d waterless terrain, a d e t e r m i n e d

throughout the country), with

e n e m y m a k i n g use o f t o p o g r a p h y i d e a l l y

p l a y i n g some part i n their classification - a

geography

suited to a m b u s h a n d e x t e n d e d defence,

d i s t i n c t i o n is m a d e b e t w e e n t h o s e l i v i n g i n

a n d the British h a d t h e ingredients of a

the plains a n d those m a k i n g their

protracted a n d costly conflict.

i n t h e hills a n d m o u n t a i n s . T h e

I n a c o u n t r y o f severe g e o g r a p h y a n d c l i m a t e , w h e r e l i f e is a r d u o u s , i t is s c a r c e l y

homes

Duranis

a n d Ghilzais b e l o n g i n t h e f o r m e r category, together w i t h various o t h e r tribes w h o

surprising t h a t t h e c o u n t r y bred a t o u g h

inhabit the plain around Peshawar a n d the

p e o p l e , i n f l u e n c e d as m u c h b y I s l a m as b y

valleys further n o r t h . T h o s e tribes situated i n

weather a n d terrain. T h e label 'Afghanistan',

t h e m o r e r u r a l areas a l o n g t h e e a s t e r n b o r d e r

w h i c h literally m e a n s 'Land of the Afghans',

o f A f g h a n i s t a n - s t r a d d l i n g b o t h sides, i n

c a n o n l y b e p r o p e r l y a p p l i e d t o t h a t state

f a c t - o c c u p y w h a t is n o w c a l l e d t h e ' t r i b a l

f r o m 1 7 4 7 , a n d l a r g e l y s t a n d s as a

territory' or 'tribal lands' t h a t e x t e n d

19th-century m e a n s for describing m o r e

Swat i n t h e n o r t h to t h e t o w n s of Sibi a n d

from

of a n ill-defined geographical area t h a n a n

Pishin i n t h e south. T h e area runs a l o n g

actual unified political entity. Nor, to be

m u c h of the length of w h a t was the

strictly accurate, does t h e t e r m ' A f g h a n '

Afghan-British India border, n o w i n

apply o n l y to those peoples living w i t h i n the

Pakistan. T h e s e peoples are e t h n i c a l l y

modern

borders of t h e c o u n t r y called A f g h a n i s t a n , for

diverse, a n d i n c l u d e t h e Orakzais, M a h s u d s ,

t h e y also i n c l u d e t h e P a t h a n s l i v i n g i n w h a t

M o h m a n d s , Afridis, Wazirs a n d others,

was t h e n India i n t h e region stretching f r o m

of w h o m p l a y e d key parts i n t h e

many

numerous

the Swat Valley i n the n o r t h to Waziristan

minor campaigns and punitive

i n the south. I n a d d i t i o n to these, t h e

f o u g h t b y British a n d I n d i a n troops for half

A f g h a n s are d i v i d e d i n t o t w o large t r i b a l

a c e n t u r y after t h e Second A f g h a n War.

c o n f e d e r a t i o n s k n o w n as t h e D u r a n i s a n d

H o w e v e r diverse ethnically

expeditions

and

the Ghilzais, the former of w h o m came to

linguistically, A f g h a n s share m u c h

prominence in the mid-18th century

c o m m o n w i t h one another, placing a high

when

in

48


Across m u c h of t h e c o u n t r y l i v e d various

v a l u e o n f a m i l y l o y a l t y a n d closeness, p e r s o n a l h o n o u r , hospitality, fierce

n o m a d i c peoples w h o b y definition never

independence a n d physical courage.

coalesced i n t o a n organized, cohesive w h o l e ,

As s u c h , l o y a l t y t o f a m i l y a n d t r i b e or c l a n

as w e l l as v a r i o u s o t h e r n o n - n o m a d i c p e o p l e s

stands a b o v e l o y a l t y t o t h e state. O n

too n u m e r o u s to m e n t i o n . T h e heterogeneous

the

o t h e r h a n d , w i t h t h i s h e i g h t e n e d sense

n a t u r e of t h e c o u n t r y m i l i t a t e d against a n y

of independence comes unreliability

u n i f i e d system of defence against British

fickleness. Similarly, t h e emphasis

and

i n v a s i o n a n d yet, conversely, rendered a n

on

p e r s o n a l h o n o u r , w h i l e a v i r t u e u n t o itself,

invasion of Afghanistan extremely

c a n m a n i f e s t itself i n a d r a w n - o u t

p r o b l e m a t i c a l , w i t h rival groups n o r m a l l y at

c a m p a i g n of vengeance, w i t h

personal

blood-letting

a c o m m o n a n d accepted m e a n s of satisfying t h a t n e e d . M o r e o v e r , t h e obsession -

from

each other's throats t e m p o r a r i l y u n i t e d i n resisting a foreign foe. N o t surprisingly, w h i l e control over the

the Western perspective - w i t h physical

n a t i o n ostensibly lay w i t h the A m i r i n Kabul,

c o u r a g e c a n m a n i f e s t itself i n t h e acts

t h e vast e x t e n t of t h e c o u n t r y a n d the

o f a g g r e s s i o n a n d v i o l e n c e t h a t p l a y so

primitive nature of c o m m u n i c a t i o n ,

p r o m i n e n t a part i n A f g h a n life. A n d

c o m b i n e d w i t h t h e stronger, m o r e localized

while

hospitality, w h e t h e r extended to friends,

allegiances, r e s u l t e d i n t h e exercise o f a sort

s t r a n g e r s o r e v e n e n e m i e s , is p i v o t a l t o

o f n o m i n a l , q u a s i - r u l e f r o m t h e c a p i t a l at

A f g h a n c u s t o m s a n d m o r e s , i t possesses

best a n d , at worst, c o m p l e t e

i t s o w n l i m i t a t i o n s ; t h u s , as a c o n s e q u e n c e

e n j o y e d b y the m o r e remote peoples. This

independence

of i n s u l t or o f f e n c e , f o r m e r guests of

a c c o u n t e d for t h e e n d e m i c a n d chronic

a h o u s e h o l d m a y at a stroke b e c o m e

i n s t a b i l i t y so c h a r a c t e r i s t i c o f A f g h a n

r e - c l a s s i f i e d as f o e s a c c o r d i n g t o t h e

politics. Nevertheless, a degree of central

carefully established conventions

laid

d o w n b y generations of tradition. O f the approximately four million Afghans

c o n t r o l c o u l d b e a p p l i e d , a n d state r e v e n u e was raised, n o t o n l y t h r o u g h links w i t h t h e tribal system, b u t t h r o u g h t h e n e t w o r k of

p o p u l a t i n g t h e c o u n t r y i n t h e last q u a r t e r

feudal obligations t h a t e n t i t l e d a chief, or

o f t h e 1 9 t h c e n t u r y , t h e largest g r o u p after

sirdar

t h e D u r a n i s a n d Ghilzais w e r e t h e Tajiks, a

tribe a n d h o l d i n g his post for life), to

(elected f r o m t h e leading f a m i l y of the

f a r m i n g people, a l t h o u g h a m i n o r i t y sustained

c o m m a n d t h e strict l o y a l t y o f his p e o p l e . I n

t h e m s e l v e s as s h o p k e e p e r s a n d a r t i s a n s .

turn, the

T h e Tajiks l i v e d p r i n c i p a l l y a r o u n d H e r a t a n d

lands g r a n t e d b y t h e A m i r i n e x c h a n g e for

Kabul, a n d further n o r t h i n a b a n d of territory

his service, u s u a l l y t a k i n g t h e f o r m of levies

stretching into Turkestan n o r t h of the central

of a r m e d m e n to be furnished d u r i n g periods

highlands. T h e d o m i n a n t people of the central

of hostility. Thus, even w h e r e n o

highlands a n d i m m e d i a t e l y to t h e west of

a r m y e x i s t e d , as d u r i n g t h e F i r s t A f g h a n W a r ,

K a b u l w e r e t h e H a z a r a s , also P e r s i a n - s p e a k i n g ,

t h e A m i r c o u l d raise s u b s t a n t i a l n u m b e r s o f

b u t of Turkish or M o n g o l descent, a n d again

fighters - unquestionably brave a n d strongly

sirdar

often was t h e recipient of

standing

largely a n agricultural people. I n contrast to

m o t i v a t e d b y religious fervour

m o s t A f g h a n s , w h o are S u n n i M u s l i m s , t h e

xenophobia, but often indisciplined to boot.

Hazaras w e r e Shi'ites, a fact t h a t c o n t r i b u t e d t o t h e i r isolation f r o m o t h e r tribes.

and

Such, i n very brief terms, stood this most formidable land and people.

A t t a c k o n t h e Peiwar Kotal by t h e 5th Gurkha Rifles and 7 2 n d Highlanders, 2 D e c e m b e r I 878. T h e Gurkhas advance w i t h yatagan bayonets fixed t o their Sniders while t h e Highlander in t h e foreground carries t h e n e w e r M a r t i n i - H e n r y rifle. (National A r m y Museum)

PART II

The Second Anglo-Afghan War, I 878-8 I

Origins and background of the war B y t h e 1 8 6 0 s , w i t h its d e f e a t a t t h e h a n d s o f

W i t h i n t h r e e years h e h a d i m p o s e d a treaty

Britain, France a n d Turkey i n the

o n the A m i r of Bokhara b y w h i c h

Crimean

Samarkand

W a r ( 1 8 5 3 - 5 6 ) n o w squarely b e h i n d it,

f e l l u n d e r R u s s i a n c o n t r o l a n d free passage

Russia w a s free t o c o n t i n u e e x p a n s i o n i n

w a s o b t a i n e d t h r o u g h t h a t state. F u r t h e r

C e n t r a l Asia. T h e p o t e n t i a l threat to British

t o t h e west, t h e Russians b u i l t a base at

I n d i a w a s u s e d as a p o s s i b l e b a r g a i n i n g

K r a s n o v o d s k o n t h e eastern shores of t h e

chip i n negotiations over such questions

Caspian, squeezing Khiva between their

as n a v a l access t h r o u g h t h e B o s p h o r u s

possessions o n b o t h sides. P r e d i c t a b l y ,

and

Dardanelles, a point denied t h e m under the

t h e Russians t o o k t h e city, i n 1 8 7 3 , w i t h

T r e a t y o f Paris o f 1 8 5 6 . E v e n if t h e Russians

K h o k a n d f o l l o w i n g t h r e e years later, t o be

never seriously c o n t e m p l a t e d a n i n v a s i o n of

converted into a n e w province by the name

I n d i a - a n d n o s t r o n g e v i d e n c e for t h i s exists

o f F e r g a n a . T h u s , i n less t h a n t w o d e c a d e s

- there r e m a i n e d the possibility of a Russian-

t h e d i s t a n c e b e t w e e n Russia's C e n t r a l A s i a n

inspired revolt along the North-West

possessions a n d British I n d i a h a d decreased

Frontier

a n d w i t h i n I n d i a itself: t h e s a m e spectre t h a t

f r o m 1,000 miles to a mere 4 0 0 miles,

h a d inspired Britain to war in 1839

inspiring the n e w governor of Fergana,

and

w h i c h w o u l d c o n t i n u e t o exercise successive

G e n e r a l M i k h a i l S k o b o l e v , t o g o so f a r as t o

g o v e r n m e n t s , t h e Press a n d t h e p u b l i c a l i k e

p r o p o s e t o h i s s u p e r i o r s i n St P e t e r s b u r g a

for t h e r e m a i n d e r of t h e 1 9 t h century.

three-pronged invasion of India

W h e n the Crimean War ended the

originating

f r o m K r a s n o v o d s k , S a m a r k a n d a n d Kashgar.

Russian threat to Afghanistan - a n d , b y

Q u i t e n a t u r a l l y , Russia's g r a d u a l a d v a n c e s

extension - to India, was m i n i m a l . Indeed,

s o u t h t h r o u g h C e n t r a l Asia d i d n o t go

a t h o u s a n d miles separated Peshawar

u n n o t i c e d b y British authorities either i n

from

t h e closest Russian o u t p o s t s i n C e n t r a l Asia,

L o n d o n o r C a l c u t t a . A s e a r l y as t h e 1 8 6 0 s ,

situated at t h e n o r t h e r n ends of t h e

J o h n J a c o b , C o m m i s s i o n e r f o r S i n d (a r e g i o n

Caspian

a n d t h e A r a l Seas. L y i n g b e t w e e n B r i t i s h a n d

a n n e x e d t o British I n d i a b y force i n 1 8 4 3 ) ,

Russian possessions s t o o d b a r r e n p l a i n s ,

h a d suggested a p e r m a n e n t British presence

desert wastes, t h e H i n d u K u s h a n d o t h e r

i n Q u e t t a , b e y o n d t h e B o l a n Pass, e n a b l i n g

f o r m i d a b l e n a t u r a l obstacles, n o t t o

t r o o p s t o t h r e a t e n t h e f l a n k a n d rear of a n

mention

various khanates w h o w o u l d contest a n y

e n e m y s e e k i n g t o e n t e r t h e K h y b e r Pass.

Russian p e n e t r a t i o n i n t o their d o m a i n s .

Yet this advice w e n t i g n o r e d u n t i l 1 8 7 6 .

Nevertheless, f r o m t h e 1 8 6 0 s t h e Russians

Some in the Indian government

began a cautious advance d o w n the line

the establishment of a l i m i t e d protectorate

suggested

o f t h e S i r - D a r y a R i v e r f r o m t h e A r a l Sea,

status for A f g h a n i s t a n , w h i c h since t h e d e a t h

justified i n 1 8 6 4 b y t h e Russian Foreign

of Dost M o h a m e d i n 1863 h a d been ruled b y

M i n i s t e r , P r i n c e G o r c h a k o v , as n e c e s s a r y

his son, Sher A l i K h a n . Such a scheme w o u l d

to subdue hostile tribes o n t h e Empire's

enable British troops to control Kandahar

southern frontiers. This advance led to the

a n d Herat. But this did n o t appeal to

capture of Tashkent i n 1865 a n d the creation

successive g o v e r n m e n t s i n L o n d o n , w h i c h

of a n e w province, Turkestan, w i t h a n e w

p r e f e r r e d t o n e g o t i a t e w i t h Russia r a t h e r

governor, General Konstantin

t h a n c o n f r o n t it, for t h e r e w a s m u c h to be

Kauffmann,

w h o was n o t i n c l i n e d to slow his country's

commended in an understanding by which

s e e m i n g l y irresistible a d v a n c e s o u t h w a r d s .

b o t h n a t i o n s ' A s i a n possessions w e r e

The Second Anglo-Afghan W a r I 8 7 8 - 8 I

5I

t h e H i n d u Kush or e v e n t h e line of t h e O x u s River - a fantastic n o t i o n t h a t required m o r e t h a n k e e p i n g a w a t c h f u l eye o v e r Sher Ali's intentions, but controlling h i m

outright.

W h e n the A m i r politely declined Lytton's o v e r t u r e s for t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f close relations w i t h British I n d i a , officials i n C a l c u t t a felt all t h e m o r e strongly persuaded t h a t force of arms m i g h t be required t o p r e v e n t t h e Russians f r o m o b t a i n i n g s o m e sort o f f o o t h o l d i n A f g h a n i s t a n . Anglo-Russian tensions were heightened i n 1 8 7 7 b y the Russo-Turkish War. D u r i n g t h a t c o n f l i c t , t h e Tsar's t r o o p s m a d e progress i n t h e i r m a r c h o n

considerable

Constantinople,

w h o s e capture w o u l d p r o v i d e t h e Russians w i t h u n r e s t r i c t e d access t o t h e e a s t e r n M e d i t e r r a n e a n - t h e p r i n c i p a l cause of t h e C r i m e a n W a r , a n d n o w m o r e sensitive still for British interests since t h e o p e n i n g of t h e Suez C a n a l i n 1 8 6 9 . B r i t a i n h a d n o t g o n e t o w a r w i t h Russia 2 0 years b e f o r e t o p r o t e c t The advance guard o f t h e Anglo-Indian army on

T u r k e y o n l y t o see C o n s t a n t i n o p l e f a l l t o t h e

the frontier w i t h Afghanistan, N o v e m b e r 1878.

Tsar's f o r c e s a n d t h e M e d i t e r r a n e a n


opened

t o t h e R u s s i a n B l a c k Sea F l e e t . N o r w a s t h e Russian threat pure fantasy: a division of

separated f r o m o n e a n o t h e r b y n e u t r a l buffer

1 5 , 0 0 0 t r o o p s established itself i n t h e area

states. I n a n y e v e n t , a n a g r e e m e n t o f

between the Oxus and the H i n d u Kush.

1873

s e e m e d d e s t i n e d t o satisfy b o t h parties b y

Yet t h e r e w e r e i n fact n o p l a n s t o d r i v e i n t o

r e c o g n i z i n g A f g h a n i s t a n as f a l l i n g w i t h i n

A f g h a n i s t a n , a n d t h e Tsar c o u l d n o t h a v e

Britain's sphere o f i n f l u e n c e , w i t h Russia

deployed substantial n u m b e r s of troops i n

e n j o y i n g t h e s a m e status r e s p e c t i n g B o k h a r a .

the country while simultaneously

A change of ministry i n L o n d o n i n

1874,

engaging

the Turks hundreds of miles to t h e west.

however, altered matters. B e n j a m i n Disraeli,

Nevertheless, w i t h Russian i n t e n t i o n s

leading the n e w Conservative

u n c e r t a i n a n d t h e fall of C o n s t a n t i n o p l e

government,

eyed Russian advances i n C e n t r a l Asia

possible if n o t i m m i n e n t , Disraeli d i s p a t c h e d

w i t h considerably m o r e suspicion t h a n his

a fleet t o t h e Dardanelles a n d troops t o M a l t a .

predecessors. H i s n e w Secretary of State for I n d i a , L o r d Salisbury, w h i l e n o t

anticipating

a Russian i n v a s i o n , also r e m a i n e d

anxious

U n l i k e the Russo-Turkish conflict that began in 1853 and widened to include Britain a n d France, the Russo-Turkish W a r of

about indirect influence, specifically w i t h

1 8 7 7 - 7 8 did n o t draw i n other belligerents.

respect t o A f g h a n i s t a n . Salisbury

H o w e v e r , w h e n Russia, p r o f i t i n g b y its

appointed

L o r d L y t t o n as V i c e r o y o f I n d i a ( t h e n e w

successes i n t h e f i e l d , s o u g h t t o n e g o t i a t e

designation for t h e f o r m e r post of G o v e r n o r -

terms w i t h Turkey f r o m a position of

General, w h i c h was abolished

considerable strength, Britain a n d various

immediately

after t h e M u t i n y a l o n g w i t h t h e E I C ) ,

o t h e r G r e a t P o w e r s t h r e a t e n e d w a r t o redress

i n s t r u c t i n g h i m t o keep Sher A l i clear of

t h e b a l a n c e unless Russia a g r e e d t o n e g o t i a t e

Russian i n f l u e n c e . L y t t o n , p e r c e i v i n g d a n g e r

more lenient terms w i t h the Ottomans.

w h e r e n o n e existed, d e t e r m i n e d t h a t t h e key

Congress of Berlin, c o n v e n e d i n m i d - 1 8 78,

The

to k e e p i n g t h e Russians at b a y l a y i n h o l d i n g

b r o u g h t a n e n d t o t h e crisis a n d o b l i g e d

52


Afghanistan and the North-West Frontier in the 19th century R U S S I A N C E N T R A L ASIA Kyzyl Kum Desert

r

^ - W

K

u/r

Kara Kum

E

S

T

*

ashgar

Gj=okTep?t\ Mazar-iSharif

w

•I-ISH

AFGHTurkestan AN P

E

R

S

A

rat )

/

^

*

AN

*

,

W

O fKhyberPoss °? .OA Jaa la lbad_ Q T OGhazni . Peshawar"*tR \•awalpindi AFGHANISTAN ^ ^

A

CHINA

^

KabUlU

(

KASHMIR

I

0

er Kandahar y> PUNJAB, % Ocharnan S-dey ^ J FerozepoA nd , Quetu Aoera ^ D » T _ — " V - BotonPoss Ghazi \ V* ^^ Kaa ltO X * KHA" DelhiK F

C NEPAL '" H 1

>

N

ARABIAN

SEA

Russian forces t o w i t h d r a w b o t h f r o m

t h a t Russia w a s s e e k i n g t o m a n i p u l a t e

T u r k e y ' s E u r o p e a n p o s s e s s i o n s as w e l l as

A f g h a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y . I n d e e d , t h e last a n d

f r o m t h e borders of Afghanistan. But British

most important point in w h a t a m o u n t e d to

a p p r e h e n s i o n s w e r e f a r f r o m a l l a y e d . E v e n as

a n u l t i m a t u m clearly, t h o u g h n o t explicitly,

t h e C o n g r e s s w a s b e g i n n i n g its p r o c e e d i n g s

r e f e r r e d t o Russia:

i n G e r m a n y , a Russian d i p l o m a t i c mission under General Nikolai Stolietov appeared,

1. T h e reception of British missions i n

w i t h o u t i n v i t a t i o n , i n K a b u l . Sher A l i , w h o

Kabul whenever the Indian

h a d carefully avoided e n t a n g l e m e n t

d e e m e d it necessary.

with

e i t h e r B r i t a i n o r Russia, w a s p l a c e d i n a n

Government

2. T h e establishment of a p e r m a n e n t

i n v i d i o u s p o s i t i o n , for h e h a d just refused

British m i l i t a r y mission at Herat; a n d

the dispatch of a British mission f r o m India.

p o s s i b l y B a l k h a n d K a n d a h a r as w e l l .

T h e A m i r stalled before b e i n g rescued f r o m

3 . T h e n e e d t o seek B r i t i s h a p p r o v a l

a n u n w a n t e d a g r e e m e n t w i t h Russia

before negotiating w i t h a n y other

b y S t o l i e t o v ' s r e c a l l b y St P e t e r s b u r g ,

country.

a consequence of changing circumstances brought about i n Berlin. Nevertheless, Lytton was furious to

R e f u s i n g t o i g n o r e Sher Ali's failure t o reply, L y t t o n w a r n e d h i m t h a t a refusal t o receive

discover t h e presence of a Russian e n v o y i n

a B r i t i s h m i s s i o n w o u l d b e i n t e r p r e t e d as a n

Kabul. H e repeated his d e m a n d , approved

u n f r i e n d l y act, o n e t h a t m i g h t oblige British

b y P a r l i a m e n t o n 14 August - e v e n after

I n d i a t o d i s a v o w its t r e a t y o b l i g a t i o n s t o

Stolietov's departure - t h a t t h e A f g h a n

Afghanistan. Accordingly, he dispatched

g o v e r n m e n t m u s t receive a British mission,

Sir N e v i l l e C h a m b e r l a i n w h o , o n r e a c h i n g

w h o s e p u r p o s e w a s t o g a i n Sher Ali's

J a m r u d a t t h e h e a d o f t h e K h y b e r Pass o n

agreement to t h e f o l l o w i n g terms, all of

2 1 September w i t h a British mission, was

w h i c h s t e m m e d f r o m a n erroneous belief

b l u n t l y i n f o r m e d that his advance w o u l d

T h e Second A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r I 8 7 8 - 8 I

53

be opposed b y force. C h a m b e r l a i n ' s m i s s i o n ,

stating t h a t h e m u s t agree b y t h e 2 0 t h t o

a m e r e escort a n d h e a v i l y

receive a British d i p l o m a t i c mission i n Kabul,

outnumbered

b y t h e A f g h a n force sent t o m e e t it, d u l y

barring w h i c h troops w o u l d invade his

declined to proceed, signalling to the Viceroy

d o m a i n s . Such a prospect appeared entirely

t h a t e v e n i n g t h a t t h e d i e h a d b e e n cast:

r e m o t e , f o r S h e r A l i , as C h a m b e r l a i n

T h e first act h a s b e e n p l a y e d o u t ; a n d I d o

a m u s i n g l y p u t it, ' h a d n o m o r e

not think that any impartial looker-on can

of apologizing t h a n of t u r n i n g

consider a n y o t h e r course has b e e n left o p e n

a n d a p p l y i n g for a Bishopric'. I n desperation,

t o us c o n s i s t e n t w i t h d i g n i t y t h a n t o o p e n l y

Sher A l i s o u g h t m i l i t a r y assistance f r o m

intention Christian

break w i t h the Amir.' Lytton concurred: a n y

Kauffmann, but by the time he had

c o n t i n u a t i o n o n Sher Ali's p a r t t o refuse t o

back, the u l t i m a t u m h a d expired a n d

accept a British mission, w h i l e

A n g l o - I n d i a n t r o o p s w e r e a l r e a d y across

welcoming

heard

i n t o t h e capital a Russian envoy, h e

the frontier, leaving the Afghans

with

e x p l a i n e d t o t h e Secretary of State for I n d i a ,

n o prospect of military aid f r o m

General

'has d e p r i v e d t h e A m i r of all c l a i m u p o n

Kauffmann, w h o informed the Amir

our further forbearance' a n d must

n o n e c o u l d b e o f f e r e d w h i l e t h e passes

inevitably

that

require a mission's installation i n Kabul b y

through the H i n d u Kush were blocked

British troops.

w i t h snow. T h e A m i r panicked, fleeing

N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g Stolietov's w i t h d r a w a l

n o r t h to o p e n direct contact w i t h the

f r o m Kabul - a n d thus the removal of a n y

Russians a n d a p p o i n t i n g his son,

casus belli

Y a k u b K h a n , as r e g e n t , w h i l e a t d a w n

- a n d divisions of o p i n i o n

his g o v e r n m e n t , t h e Disraeli

within

administration

p e r m i t t e d L y t t o n a strong degree of latitude i n dealing w i t h Sher A l i . Accordingly,

troops

crossed t h e frontier.

on

2 N o v e m b e r t h e V i c e r o y sent t h e A m i r an ultimatum, demanding an apology

on 21 November Anglo-Indian

N C O s o f t h e 8th (The King's) Regiment o f Foot during and

t h e Second Afghan W a r (National A r m y Museum)

Warring sides

Following the Indian M u t i n y (1857-58), the

As c o m p a r e d w i t h t h e p u b l i c ' s suspicious

forces o f t h e E I C w e r e d i s b a n d e d a n d t h e i r

a n d c r i t i c a l a t t i t u d e t o w a r d s its soldiers at

regiments absorbed i n t o the regular British

t h e b e g i n n i n g of Victoria's reign - b y w h i c h

A r m y or the n e w l y created I n d i a n A r m y .

time their high reputation attained under

T h e latter c o n t i n u e d to m a i n t a i n three

t h e D u k e o f W e l l i n g t o n i n S p a i n a n d at

armies based o n the presidencies of Bengal,

W a t e r l o o h a d largely faded - t h e British

B o m b a y a n d M a d r a s , b u t w i t h critical lessons

A r m y h a d b y the t i m e of the Second A f g h a n

applied: improved pay and conditions

in

W a r a c q u i r e d a n e x a l t e d , h e r o i c status. T h i s

Native regiments and the deployment

of

shift w a s d u e t o t h e fact t h a t i n t h e 4 0 years

a m u c h larger n u m b e r of regiments of t h e

since t h e previous c a m p a i g n i n A f g h a n i s t a n ,

British A r m y to India to keep the

the A r m y h a d established a n u n b r o k e n

proportion

record of a c h i e v e m e n t against t h e Sindis,

of B r i t i s h / N a t i v e forces closer t o parity. T h u s , w h e r e a s just prior t o t h e M u t i n y

the

ratio of British to i n d i g e n o u s troops stood at

Baluchis, Sikhs a n d C h i n e s e i n t h e 1840s, t h e Russians a n d I n d i a n m u t i n e e r s i n t h e

a p p r o x i m a t e l y 1:7, o n t h e e v e o f t h e S e c o n d

1850s, the Burmese, Maoris, Abyssinians

A f g h a n W a r the ratio h a d changed radically

a n d the Chinese again in the 1860s, and the

t o 1:2, w i t h 6 5 , 0 0 0 Q u e e n ' s t r o o p s a n d

A s h a n t i s i n t h e e a r l y 1 8 7 0 s . A l l s u c h feats

1 3 0 , 0 0 0 regular N a t i v e troops i n India, all

w e r e w e l l k n o w n t o large segments of a n

a r m e d w i t h the single-shot, breech-loading,

i n c r e a s i n g l y literate society, w h o s e insatiable

b o l t - a c t i o n M a r t i n i - H e n r y or Snider rifles,

appetite for i m p e r i a l a d v e n t u r e was fuelled

w e a p o n s m u c h m o r e accurate t h a n their s m o o t h b o r e predecessors carried i n t o A f g h a n i s t a n a g e n e r a t i o n earlier.

British infantry advancing swiftly during t h e Second Afghan War.

T h e Second Anglo-Afghan W a r I 8 7 8 - 8 I

55

by n e w generations of war correspondents. T h e t y p i c a l r a n k e r , k n o w n s e n t i m e n t a l l y as T o m m y A t k i n s ' , w a s p o r t r a y e d as s t a l w a r t , i n d o m i t a b l e a n d brave b e y o n d his E u r o p e a n counterparts, the noble defender of Empire a n d propagator of W e s t e r n 'civilization'. If p e r h a p s c r u d e a n d u n s o p h i s t i c a t e d , h e stood above all 'savage' o p p o n e n t s , w h o s e superiority lay o n l y i n their n u m b e r ,

though

at t i m e s e v e n m a n y Britons confessed t o a grudging a d m i r a t i o n for their courage.

Many

c o n t e m p o r a r i e s e x t o l l e d their o w n soldiers' virtues i n song, poetry a n d

hagiographic

n o v e l s a n d n e w s p a p e r r e p o r t s . As o n e officer observed:

F r o m close c o n t a c t w i t h t h e B r i t i s h soldier, a n d a p e r s o n a l e x p e r i e n c e e x t e n d i n g over m a n y years, I c a n h o n e s t l y say t h a t s o m e o f t h e g r a n d e s t q u a l i t i e s w h i c h go to m a k e a n o b l e character i n m a n , I h a v e seen over a n d over a g a i n e x e m p l i f i e d i n h i m , w h o [is] so u n s h a k e n i n d i s c i p l i n e , so p a t i e n t i n s u f f e r i n g ,

Major-General Sir Charles N a p i e r pursuing tribal forces

so r e a d y f o r a n y s a c r i f i c e o r s e r v i c e i n

in Sind during his conquest o f t h e region in I 843.

t h e cause o f Q u e e n a n d c o u n t r y !

I n t h e i r first c o n f l i c t w i t h t h e B r i t i s h , t h e


h a u l e d t h e m o u n t a i n g u n s so e s s e n t i a l f o r

Afghans maintained n o standing army,

o p e r a t i o n s i n a r e g i o n w i t h scarcely a n y

relying entirely o n the

roads designed for w h e e l e d transport.

spontaneous

gathering of local militias a n d disparate

T h e artillery, o n l y a small p r o p o r t i o n of

groups of m o u n t a i n tribesmen. By t h e t i m e

whose guns were rifled a n d breech-loading,

of t h e second war, Sher Ali h a d established

was nevertheless t h o u g h t t h e best a r m of

a regular force e s t i m a t e d at 6 2 r e g i m e n t s

t h e service, n o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e v a r y i n g age

of infantry totalling some 3 7 , 0 0 0 m e n ,

of t h e o r d n a n c e it b r o u g h t i n t o t h e field,

16 regiments of cavalry a n d 4 9 batteries

a n d it p e r f o r m e d w e l l i n t h e course of t h e

of artillery, p r i n c i p a l l y d e p l o y e d i n a n d

c o n f l i c t . W h i l e British a n d I n d i a n forces

a r o u n d t h e m a i n cities o f K a b u l , K a n d a h a r

o n the subcontinent exceeded 200,000,

and Herat. T h e infantry e m p l o y e d a n array

o n l y a small p r o p o r t i o n of this impressive

o f f i r e a r m s , s o m e as o u t d a t e d as t h e o l d

figure c o u l d be e m p l o y e d o n f o r e i g n service;

B r o w n Bess f r o m t h e N a p o l e o n i c e r a , w h i l e

thus, t h e three c o l u m n s f o r m e d for t h e

others carried t h e latest Sniders a n d Enfields

invasion totalled only 29,000 m e n

supplied, ironically, b y Britain before t h e war.

1 4 0 g u n s - a n d y e t still c o n s t i t u t e d

A r t i l l e r y batteries c o n t a i n e d six h o r s e - d r a w n

t h e largest force t o serve o u t s i d e I n d i a

guns, w h i l e elephants, m u l e s or bullocks

until

1914.

and

The fightin

U n l i k e t h e disastrous i n v a s i o n of n e a r l y

Frederick Roberts, to proceed f r o m K o h a t

4 0 years before, t h e i n v a s i o n of A f g h a n i s t a n

t h r o u g h the K u r r a m Valley, over the Peiwar

i n N o v e m b e r 1878 was to be conducted via

K o t a l t o t h e S h u t a g a r d a n Pass, a n d f i n a l l y

three routes, a n d w i t h a different

t h e 5 0 r e m a i n i n g miles to Kabul. Finally,

objective

i n v i e w : t h e p a c i f i c a t i o n o f t h e f r o n t i e r areas

i n t h e s o u t h , t h e K a n d a h a r Field Force

a n d the destruction of the Amir's army,

of 12,800 troops a n d 78 guns under

rather t h a n his r e m o v a l f r o m power.

The

t h r e e r o u t e s o f i n v a s i o n w e r e as f o l l o w s . I n the n o r t h , a c o l u m n of 10,000

men

of t h e Peshawar V a l l e y Field Force u n d e r M a j o r - G e n e r a l Sir S a m u e l B r o w n e ,

moving

f r o m Peshawar to Jalalabad via the

Khyber

M a j o r - G e n e r a l Sir D o n a l d S t e w a r t , to advance f r o m Quetta to Kandahar. I n total, the three columns

numbered

some 2 9 , 0 0 0 troops a n d 140 guns. W h i l e Stewart reached Kandahar

on

8 J a n u a r y 1 8 7 9 after a n u n o p p o s e d m a r c h ,

Pass. I n t h e c e n t r e , t h e K u r r a m V a l l e y F i e l d

the two other columns met

Force, a s m a l l c o l u m n of 6 , 6 0 0 m e n

f r o m b o t h A f g h a n regulars a n d t r i b e s m e n ,

18 guns under 46-year-old

and

Major-General

opposition

t h e latter of w h o m , consisting m a i n l y of Afridis a n d M o h m a n d s , p l a g u e d t h e lines of

Major-General Sir Frederick Roberts. O n e o f t h e greatest

c o m m u n i c a t i o n as t h e m a i n f o r c e s e x t e n d e d

Victorian c o m m a n d e r s , he w o n t h e Victoria Cross during

i n t o Afghanistan, obliging the British to

t h e Indian Mutiny before taking p a r t in several m i n o r campaigns in Africa. As commander-in-chief during t h e Second Afghan W a n he achieved fame f o r a series o f stunning victories and an epic march f r o m Kabul t o Kandahar


d e p l o y a reserve d i v i s i o n to o c c u p y their a t t e n t i o n . Roberts, a V i c t o r i a Cross h o l d e r f r o m t h e M u t i n y d e s c r i b e d as ' a d i m i n u t i v e , red-faced, bandy-legged gamecock

with

t h e b e a r i n g of a l i g h t n i n g rod', f o u n d his progress h e l d u p b y A f g h a n regulars. T h e y were well ensconced i n prepared positions, w i t h artillery i n support, o n the

summit

o f a r i d g e o v e r l o o k i n g a n a r r o w pass at t h e P e i w a r K o t a l , a h i l l 9 , 0 0 0 f t a b o v e sea level covered i n cedar pines. W i t h t h e 5,000 Afghans under Karim

Khan

enjoying b o t h numerical superiority and a c o m m a n d i n g position above the valley in w h i c h Roberts was situated, a frontal attack was out of the question. After

reconnoitring

t h e area, h e d e t e r m i n e d t h a t a difficult t h o u g h not impossible route u p a valley to t h e right w o u l d place his troops o n the A f g h a n s ' e x t r e m e left, theoretically

enabling

Roberts to attack t h e e n e m y i n t h e flank. A c c o r d i n g l y , as a r u s e h e l e f t a s m a l l f o r c e of t w o battalions of infantry a n d t w o squadrons of cavalry to his front proceeded by night up the

and

snow-covered


track o n 1 December, t a k i n g w i t h

him

57

off their o p p o n e n t s westwards f r o m their

sangar

a force of 2 , 2 5 0 m e n , consisting of

first

Highlanders, Gurkhas, t w o battalions

c o m p a n y o f H i g h l a n d e r s , c a r r i e d o n t o seize

of Punjab Infantry, a pioneer battalion,

a second entrenchment, followed

a m o u n t a i n battery and four guns f r o m the

7.30am by a vital third, w h i c h

Royal Horse Artillery m o u n t e d o n elephants.

t h e h e a d o f t h e pass. H a v i n g t a k e n t h e

and, in conjunction with a

around

commanded

To protect themselves f r o m t h e bitter cold,

Spingwal Kotal, Roberts t h e n

for t h e first t i m e t h e soldiers w o r e p u t t e e s ,

the c a m p 2,500ft below, ordering a frontal

heliographed

o r leg b a n d a g e s , a f e a t u r e o f m i l i t a r y dress

attack w h i l e h e h i m s e l f c o n t i n u e d to force

t h e r e a f t e r so w e l l a s s o c i a t e d w i t h

back the Afghan line, notwithstanding

imperial

the

troops. T h e A f g h a n defenders consisted

difficult, precipitous, heavily forested a n d

of eight regiments of regular

broken ground which not only

infantry

hindered

a n d 18 guns m o u n t e d i n carefully

movement, but rendered c o m m a n d

prepared entrenchments.

control difficult to m a i n t a i n .

A m i d s t frosty conditions t h e

column

and

By t h e early a f t e r n o o n , Roberts' force

s t r u g g l e d u p t h e steep h i l l s i d e , m a k i n g its

w a s n e a r l y u p o n t h e A f g h a n rear, w h i l e

w a y gingerly a n d surreptitiously

o n e British a n d one Punjabi battalion were

around

b o u l d e r s a n d across s t r e a m s , w i t h b a g g a g e

advancing u p the Peiwar Kotal f r o m the

mules frequently losing their footing o n

valley, w i t h guns of t h e Royal Horse Artillery

t h e loose shale. D e l a y occurred

when

shelling the A f g h a n camp, causing camels

Roberts altered t h e order of m a r c h , b u t

to stampede, tents to burst into flame

w h e n d a w n broke o n the 2 n d the

drivers a n d c a m p guards to p a n i c a n d flee.

Gurkhas

and

a n d 7 2 n d H i g h l a n d e r s s t o o d at t h e base

W i t h their line of retreat threatened, t h e

of the Spingwal Kotal, w h e r e t h e Afghans

Afghans a b a n d o n e d 18 guns a n d dispersed,

observed t h e m . I m m e d i a t e l y the

w i t h Bengali cavalry i n pursuit.

Gurkhas

began to ascend the m o u n t a i n s i d e ,

driving

Amongst

t h e spoils of war, t h e v i c t o r i o u s t r o o p s

The battle of Peiwar Kotal, 2 December 1878

58


British infantry and pioneers advancing against a stockade

d e s c e n t t h r o u g h its r u g g e d f e a t u r e s y e t t o

on t h e ridge n o r t h o f t h e main Afghan position o n t h e

come, but w i t h the route to Kabul n o w open.

Peiwar Kotal, 2 D e c e m b e r 1878. A c o u n t r y blessed w i t h

W i t h n o m e a n s of d e f e n d i n g his capital, Sher

topographical advantages accruing heavily t o its defence, A l i issued a n a p p e a l for m i l i t a r y assistance

Afghanistan consists o f m o r e than merely bleak and sun-baked valleys and precipices, as t h e w o o d e d

f r o m the Russian d i p l o m a t i c delegation,

mountainside depicted here attests.

b u t K a u f f m a n n refused to be d r a w n i n t o hostilities a n d , i n a n y event, observed that s n o w n o w b l o c k e d t h e passes t h r o u g h t h e

discovered a d o c u m e n t , t h o u g h t to be issued b y Sher A l i , calling for

jihad.

'Wage a

H i n d u Kush. T h e Amir, h e therefore advised,

h o l y w a r o n behalf of G o d a n d his Prophet,

o u g h t t o accept w h a t t e r m s h e c o u l d secure.

w i t h y o u r p r o p e r t y a n d y o u r l i v e s / it r a n .

N o t c o n t e n t w i t h K a u f f m a n n ' s refusal to

'Let t h e rich e q u i p t h e poor. Let all die for

h e l p , Sher Ali left K a b u l w i t h t h e Russian

t h e h o l y cause. A f o r e i g n n a t i o n , w i t h o u t

mission o n 13 D e c e m b e r a n d proceeded

cause or t h e slightest p r o v o c a t i o n , has

to Russian-occupied Turkestan w i t h the

m a d e u p its m i n d t o i n v a d e o u r c o u n t r y c o n q u e r it

and

A n d t h u s far, t h e i n v a s i o n w a s

succeeding; Roberts' v i c t o r y at Peiwar

Kotal

i n t e n t i o n o f c o n t i n u i n g o n t o St P e t e r s b u r g , still h o p e f u l h e c o u l d m a i n t a i n his t h r o n e i f t h e T s a r w o u l d p l e a d h i s case b e f o r e t h e

established w h a t was to b e c o m e a brilliant

Congress of Berlin. T h e A m i r duly reached

m i l i t a r y career, for at great risk t o his force

Tashkent, b u t n o further, for he h a d yet to

h e h a d m a n a g e d to drive off a n u m e r i c a l l y

receive a p p r o v a l for t h e c o n t i n u a t i o n of his

superior o p p o n e n t f r o m a strongly

j o u r n e y i n t o Russia p r o p e r .

defended

p o s i t i o n , at a cost t o his o w n force of o n l y 2 0 officers a n d m e n killed a n d 7 8 w o u n d e d . Roberts c o n t i n u e d to advance

through

M e a n w h i l e , the second c o l u m n , Browne's P e s h a w a r V a l l e y Field Force, e n t e r e d t h e K h y b e r Pass a n d m a r c h e d as f a r as t h e

e n e m y country, a n d b y 9 December was

formidable fort of Ali Masjid, w h i c h the

r e c o n n o i t r i n g a satisfactory route to t h e t o p

A f g h a n s u n d e r Faiz M o h a m e d h e l d w i t h

o f t h e S h u t a g a r d a n Pass, w i t h a d a n g e r o u s

3 , 0 0 0 regular infantry, 2 0 0 cavalry a n d


General Sir Samuel Browne, commanding t h e Peshawar Valley Field Force, enters Jalalabad, 20 September I 878. (Author's collection)

59

All three columns were n o w deep inside A f g h a n territory, w i t h the K u r r a m

and

P e s h a w a r f i e l d forces r e g u l a r l y i n c o n t a c t w i t h tribesmen contesting their presence.

artillery m o u n t e d i n smaller

fortifications

Still, t h e w a r a p p e a r e d , e v e n at this early

o n b o t h flanks. T h e w h o l e force was situated

stage, close t o a c o n c l u s i o n , for o n Sher Ali's

o n a hill 500ft above a gorge, a n d

withdrawal f r o m Kabul to Turkestan, Yakub

supported

b y 6 0 0 t r i b e s m e n i n t h e hills o n e i t h e r side

K h a n , h i s s o n , h a d a s s u m e d p o w e r as r e g e n t ,

of t h e m a i n position. B r o w n e , expecting to

a n d shortly thereafter Sher A l i d i e d . I n

be b l o c k e d at this j u n c t u r e , h a d d i s p a t c h e d

February 1879, Yakub K h a n , u n w i l l i n g to

one brigade o n a flanking m a r c h t h r o u g h the

carry o n resistance a n d d i s m a y e d b y British

mountains n o r t h of the Khyber to re-emerge

p e n e t r a t i o n s as f a r as S h u t a g a r d a n

behind the Afghans, while a second brigade

G a n d a m a k w i t h Kabul their ultimate

and

ascended the hills to c o n f r o n t t h e enemy's

o b j e c t i v e , o f f e r e d t o discuss t e r m s . L y t t o n

left a n d a t h i r d m o v e d u p for a f r o n t a l

m a i n t a i n e d a l o w o p i n i o n of Yakub K h a n ,

assault. T h i s last b r i g a d e , c o n s i s t i n g o f

d e s c r i b i n g h i m as ' a v e r y s l i p p e r y c u s t o m e r

t h e 81st, t h e 1 4 t h Sikhs a n d o n e

w h o m w e shall be w e l l r i d o f if h e

Punjabi

regiment, attacked o n 2 1 November,

but

disappears'. M a n y factors, h o w e v e r ,

failed to penetrate the defences, obliging

suggested t h e w i s d o m of peace at this

B r o w n e to halt his offensive b y s u n d o w n .

m o m e n t : the a r m y was suffering badly

The Afghans, meanwhile, o n discovering the

a n outbreak of cholera; the c a m p a i g n was

attempt to turn their position and fearing

p r o v i n g e x t r e m e l y costly; P a r l i a m e n t was

encirclement, quietly withdrew further up

h a u n t e d b y the possibility of a second

t h e pass, w h e r e t h e y c a m e i n t o c o n t a c t

disaster i n A f g h a n i s t a n ; a n d L i b e r a l

with

from

British a n d Sikh troops w h o r o u n d e d u p

opposition MPs under Gladstone were

m a n y o f t h e m as p r i s o n e r s , m a k i n g p o s s i b l e

gaining increasing support against Disraeli.

Browne's progress t o Jalalabad.

L y t t o n felt h i m s e l f constrained t o negotiate.

60


T h e f o r t at Ali Masjid during t h e Second Afghan W a r

o f s i x lakhs o f r u p p e e s a n d t h e p r o m i s e o f Anglo-Indian protection from external aggression - a t h i n l y veiled reference to

M a j o r Sir L o u i s C a v a g n a r i , L y t t o n ' s r e p r e s e n t a t i v e a n d B r o w n e ' s p o l i t i c a l officer,

Persia, b u t a b o v e a l l t o Russia, t h e p r i m a r y

sent a s t a t e m e n t o n 7 M a r c h detailing t h e

threat i n t h e 'Great G a m e ' . T w o of t h e field

essential p r e l i m i n a r y basis u p o n

forces, t h e Peshawar V a l l e y a n d

which

Kandahar,

b o t h w r a c k e d b y cholera, w o u l d be

t h e n e g o t i a t i o n s m u s t rest:

withdrawn, the former immediately

and

1. T h e r e n u n c i a t i o n b y the A m i r of

t h e l a t t e r as s o o n as c l i m a t i c

authority over the Khyber a n d

p e r m i t t e d . Roberts' c o l u m n w o u l d , however,

Michni

conditions

remain in the Kurram.

Passes a n d t h e s u r r o u n d i n g t r i b e s . 2 . P i s h i n , S i b i , a n d t h e K u r r a m V a l l e y as

T h e circumstances confronting the

f a r as t h e S h u t a g a r d a n Pass t o r e m a i n

i n v a d i n g forces s t r o n g l y d i c t a t e d t h e British

u n d e r British protection a n d control.

decision for peace. T h e h a r d s h i p suffered b y

3. T h e r e g u l a t i o n of t h e

Browne's troops, for instance, was acute,

Afghan

government's external relations i n

w i t h t e m p e r a t u r e s i n J u n e a b o v e 110°F, a n d

c o n f o r m i t y w i t h British advice

dust a n d thirst o n l y a d d i n g t o t h e trials of

and

c h o l e r a . As t h e O f f i c i a l H i s t o r y r e c o r d e d :

wishes. 4. P e r m i s s i o n t o station British officers,

. . . e s p e c i a l l y as t h e y m a d e t h e i r f i n a l

w i t h suitable escorts, i n A f g h a n i s t a n .

m a r c h e s , t h e i r distress w a s v e r y O n 26 May, Cavagnari and Yakub

concluded

a treaty at G a n d a m a k , near t h e place w h e r e t h e 4 4 t h h a d m a d e its last s t a n d i n

1842.

British authorities i n India agreed to

a p p a r e n t . T h e i r clothfes] w e r e stiff a n d dirty f r o m the profuse perspiration a n d dust; t h e i r c o u n t e n a n c e s b e t o k e n e d great nervous exhaustion, combined with a

r e c o g n i z e Y a k u b as A m i r , w h o a c c e p t e d t h e

w i l d expression difficult t o describe;

presence of accredited British diplomats

t h e eyes i n j e c t e d , a n d e v e n s u n k e n ,

in

Kabul. T h e treaty ceded the Kurram Valley

a b u r n i n g s k i n , b l a c k w i t h t h e effects

to British I n d i a a n d h a n d e d control of the

of sun a n d dirt; dry tongue; a weak

K h y b e r Pass a n d o f A f g h a n f o r e i g n p o l i c y t o

voice; a n d a thirst w h i c h n o a m o u n t of

British a u t h o r i t i e s b a c k i n C a l c u t t a . For his

fluids seemed to relieve. M a n y of these

part, Yakub w o u l d receive a n a n n u a l subsidy

m e n staggered rather t h a n m a r c h e d i n t o


their tents a n d t h r e w themselves utterly incapable of further

down

6I

Viceroy's s u m m e r residence at Simla, i n northern India:

exertion

u n t i l r e f r e s h e d b y sleep a n d f o o d ... N o r d i d t h e officers appear t o be i n a n y

E m b a s s y [i.e. t h e d i p l o m a t i c

better plight.

entered the city a n d received most

mission]

brilliant reception. Four miles

from

Cavagnari was fluent i n Pashtun, well versed

c i t y sirdars w i t h s o m e c a v a l r y a n d

i n t h e p o l i t i c a l affairs of t h e N o r t h - W e s t

e l e p h a n t s m e t us.

Frontier a n d a c o m p e t e n t officer. H e

now

W e proceeded o n the elephants

two

with

assumed the position of h e a d of the

a large escort of cavalry. O u t s i d e t h e

d i p l o m a t i c m i s s i o n i n K a b u l . I n July h e left

city t w o batteries of artillery a n d n i n e

Roberts' headquarters, k e e n to take u p his

regiments of infantry were d r a w n

p o s t a n d o p t i m i s t i c a b o u t t h e f u t u r e - as

c o l u m n ... t h e i r b a n d s p l a y i n g t h e

in

opposed to Roberts, w h o h a d reservations

British N a t i o n a l A n t h e m . Large c r o w d

about the longevity of peace given t h e

assembled a n d was orderly a n d

restlessness o f t h e c o u n t r y .

respectful. A m i r e n q u i r e d after Viceroy's

Cavagnari

p r o c e e d e d w i t h a s m a l l escort of 75 troopers

health and Q u e e n and Royal Family.

a n d 5 0 sepoys

Amir's d e m e a n o u r was most friendly.

of the Corps of Guides, a n

elite I n d i a n m o u n t e d u n i t f r o m t h e N o r t h West Frontier. T h e A m i r h a d p r o m i s e d

him

But circumstances were n o t w h a t

they

safe p a s s a g e o n t h e 6 0 - m i l e j o u r n e y t o K a b u l , where he arrived o n 24 July a n d established

Major Sir Louis Cavagnari, diplomatic representative o f

his residence i n t h e Bala Hissar. A l l a p p e a r e d

t h e Governor-General o f India, Lord Lytton, negotiating

well i n the city a n d Cavagnari was confident t h a t his stay w o u l d be p e a c e f u l a n d t h a t t h e countryside w o u l d r e m a i n quiet,

sentiments

he expressed i n a telegraph message to t h e

w i t h t h e Shinwaris f o r t h e safe conduct o f Anglo-Indian t r o o p s o n t h e road f r o m Dakka t o Lundi Khana during t h e Second Afghan W a r H e joined t h e ranks o f o t h e r British diplomats w h o m e t a sticky end in Central Asia during t h e 19th century. (Author's collection)

62


T h e Afghan AminYakub Khan (far left) and Major Cavagnari (to his right) sign t h e Treaty o f Gandamak, 26 May 1879. By all appearances, this agreement ought

nearby, t h e c r o w d of troops arrived e n masse, startling t h e escort w h o fired a shot, u p o n w h i c h t h e A f g h a n s w i t h d r e w to collect their

t o have concluded t h e Second Afghan W a r ; but peace weapons and ammunition.

was fleeting. (Author's collection)

T h e A n g l o - I n d i a n p o s i t i o n at t h e seemed, for there was deep r e s e n t m e n t of

c o m p o u n d n o w stood i n peril. T h e

C a v a g n a r i ' s i n t e r f e r e n c e i n n a t i v e affairs

R e s i d e n c y itself consisted of a h a n d f u l of

a n d the liberality w i t h w h i c h he distributed

small, flat-roofed buildings surrounded o n

f u n d s left tribal leaders w i t h t h e

impression

s e v e r a l sides b y o t h e r s t r u c t u r e s a n d l a c k i n g

t h a t he, a n d n o t Y a k u b K h a n , steered t h e

a n adequate perimeter wall. T h e troops m a d e

tiller of state. Y a k u b , b i t t e r l y resentful,

t h e best t h e y c o u l d of a p o o r situation b y

provoked trouble. W h e n in August

Afghan

f o r t i f y i n g t h e g r o u n d s , w h i l e C a v a g n a r i sent w o r d t o Y a k u b K h a n , r e q u e s t i n g assistance.

troops returning f r o m Herat took u p residence i n c a n t o n m e n t s at Sherpur,

having

T h e A m i r sent his y o u n g son a n d a

mullah,

themselves n o t participated i n the recent

t o g e t h e r w i t h a n escort of A f g h a n cavalry,

campaign a n d therefore not tarred w i t h the

b u t t h e gathering m o b m e r e l y jeered

brush of defeat, t h e y o p e n l y

demonstrated

their r e s e n t m e n t at Cavagnari's presence a n d v o i c e d d i s g r u n t l e m e n t at t h e

government's

failure to pay t h e m i n a t i m e l y fashion.

a n d p e l t e d t h e m w i t h stones. M a t t e r s t u r n e d uglier w h e n the m o b joined the 2,000 A f g h a n troops o n their return, u p o n w h i c h t h e assault c o m m e n c e d .

A r r i v i n g at t h e Bala Hissar early o n t h e

T h e o p p o s i n g sides c o n s i s t e d o f f o u r

m o r n i n g of 3 September to collect their

British a n d 75 I n d i a n soldiers o n t h e o n e

wages - t h r e e m o n t h s i n arrears -

h a n d , a n d thousands of Afghans o n the

they

r e c e i v e d less t h a n e x p e c t e d a n d a n g e r t u r n e d

o t h e r . C a v a g n a r i w a s k i l l e d a t a n e a r l y stage

to fury. W h e n a r u m o u r spread t h a t

in the fighting, followed by two

money

was to be h a d at t h e British Residency

other

officers, b u t L i e u t e n a n t W a l t e r H a m i l t o n

and


his G u i d e s c o n t i n u e d resistance f r o m a t o p

Cavagnari's death. M e a n w h i l e , Yakub K h a n ,

t h e roofs a n d b y s a l l y i n g f o r t h o n sorties,

i n a b i d t o m o l l i f y b o t h sides a n d r e m a i n

b a y o n e t s at t h e ready, against t h e crews of

i n power, called for resistance f r o m his

artillery d e p l o y e d against the Residency. I n

o w n people - specifically t h e frontier

d u e c o u r s e t h e A f g h a n s set t h e b u i l d i n g s

Ghilzais - while simultaneously

alight, the n u m b e r of defenders

to t h e British for help. But Roberts was n o t

dwindled

a n d H a m i l t o n d i e d l e a d i n g a n o t h e r sortie. By nightfall o n l y a h a n d f u l of

sepoys

63

appealing

conciliatory, sending envoys back w i t h a

were

stern reply:

left s t a n d i n g , all of w h o m r e p e a t e d l y

and

officers a n d m e n r e m a i n u n b u r i e d or u n c a r e d

s c o r n f u l l y r e j e c t e d calls f o r s u r r e n d e r

and

quarter, appeals h a v i n g b e e n m a d e to

them

b y their co-religionists. T w e l v e hours i n t o

so l o n g as t h e b o d i e s o f t h o s e

for i n Kabul, I d o n o t believe t h e English p e o p l e w i l l ever be satisfied. T h e y w i l l require t h e advance of a British force, a n d

t h e fight, t h e survivors m a d e a f i n a l sortie

t h e a d e q u a t e p u n i s h m e n t of t h e c r i m e ...'

from w h i c h none returned, adding the

Y e t n o s o o n e r h a d R o b e r t s set o f f f o r t h e

defence of t h e Residency, i n w h i c h perhaps

S h u t a g a r d a n Pass o n 3 0 S e p t e m b e r

6 0 0 attackers fell, to t h e m a n y o t h e r heroic

Y a k u b K h a n arrived at his c a m p , expressing

a c t i o n s o f w h i c h t h e V i c t o r i a n e r a is r e p l e t e .

regret for Cavagnari's d e a t h , c l a i m i n g his

than

helplessness at p r e v e n t i n g t h e u p r i s i n g a n d

N o sooner h a d news of t h e action reached I n d i a ( o n 5 September) t h a n orders

a p p l y i n g for p r o t e c t i o n f r o m his o w n

for t h e w i t h d r a w a l f r o m K a n d a h a r w e r e

m u t i n o u s troops w h o m he claimed h a d

c o u n t e r m a n d e d . R o b e r t s set o f f f r o m t h e

deposed h i m . A b o v e all, h e w i s h e d for

S h u t a g a r d a n Pass e n r o u t e t o K a b u l w i t h a

Roberts to halt his advance. To Roberts'

n e w c o l u m n rapidly gathered at K u r r a m

m i n d , the Amir's words constituted

and

k n o w n as t h e K a b u l F i e l d F o r c e , c o n s i s t i n g

nothing

m o r e t h a n a ruse t o ascertain t h e s t r e n g t h

of t w o i n f a n t r y brigades of seven battalions

a n d i n t e n t i o n s of A n g l o - I n d i a n forces a n d

i n total, one brigade of cavalry composed of

pass t h i s i n f o r m a t i o n o n t o h i s o w n v i a t h e

four regiments, a n d four batteries of artillery - i n all 6 , 5 0 0 m e n ready to m a r c h b y 27 September w i t h the a i m of avenging

Sikh t r o o p s in action against Z a i m m u k h t t r i b e s m e n at Zawa, in t h e Kurram Valley, D e c e m b e r 1879. (Author's collection)

64


1839-1919

Theatre of operations during the Second Afghan War, 1878-81


escort. W i t h o u t a n y c o n c l u s i v e p r o o f ,

Herbert Macpherson. W i t h only 4,000

however, Roberts was obliged to a l l o w Yakub

a n d 18 guns, a n d w i t h A f g h a n

t o r e m a i n , a n d t h e c o l u m n d u l y set o f f ,

c o n t i n u a l l y rising, Roberts h a d to m a k e

t h o u g h the shortage of transport prevented

a d e c i s i o n : i m m e d i a t e assault.

Roberts f r o m m o v i n g m o r e t h a n o n e brigade at a t i m e .

65

men

strength

At d a w n , Roberts h a d sent f o r w a r d a force to reconnoitre the defile, but the Afghans

I n t h e event, Roberts' suspicions p r o v e d

h a d r e s p o n d e d b y p o s i t i o n i n g a large force

well f o u n d e d , for intelligence soon reached

o n e i t h e r side o f it. Roberts

h i m t h a t at least 13 r e g i m e n t s o f A f g h a n

chose to p i n the e n e m y i n that position,

consequently

regulars w e r e c o n c e n t r a t i n g a l o n g a r a n g e

sending the brigade under T h o m a s

of hills at Charasia, 1 2 m i l e s s o u t h of K a b u l .

in an outflanking manoeuvre westwards to

Baker

O u t n u m b e r e d b y four times his o w n

attack the m o r e vulnerable extreme

n u m b e r , Roberts appreciated t h a t h e m u s t

right. W i t h H i g h l a n d e r s at t h e forefront, t h e

c o n f r o n t t h i s f o r c e as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e ,

brigade advanced u p the precipitous heights

before reinforcements arrived. W h e n 5 October h e arrived at Charasia,

on

standing

i n t h e t e e t h of serious o p p o s i t i o n

Afghan

from

b o t h A f g h a n regulars a n d t r i b e s m e n . M a j o r

b e f o r e a series o f h i l l s p i e r c e d b y a s i n g l e

Reginald M i t f o r d recorded his impressions

defile, Roberts possessed o n l y his l e a d i n g

of the 9 2 n d o n this occasion:

brigade, w i t h t h e n e x t i n s u p p o r t still a day's m a r c h a w a y . W i t h i n a d e q u a t e

numbers

T h e d a r k g r e e n kilts w e n t u p t h e steep

of troops to take a n d occupy t h e hills before

r o c k y hillside at a f i n e rate t h o u g h

sunset, h e d e c i d e d t o force his w a y

w o u l d occasionally d r o p a n d roll several

through

the defile o n t h e f o l l o w i n g day, t h u s adopting the plan he had employed

one

feet d o w n t h e slope, s h o w i n g t h a t t h e with

r a t t l i n g fire k e p t u p b y t h e e n e m y was

s u c h success a t P e i w a r K o t a l . W h e n t h e s u n

n o t a l l s h o w . B o t h sides t o o k

rose, h o w e v e r , h e f o u n d progress i m p o s s i b l e ,

of e v e r y available a t o m of cover, b u t still

for t h e regular A f g h a n troops o c c u p i e d

t h e kilts pressed o n a n d u p , a n d it was

positions above h i m , w h i l e tribesmen were

a l t o g e t h e r as p r e t t y a p i e c e o f L i g h t

a s s e m b l i n g t o attack his c a m p . W o r s e still,

I n f a n t r y d r i l l as c o u l d w e l l b e s e e n .

advantage

a n A f g h a n f o r c e o f u n k n o w n size h a d manoeuvred between himself and the next brigade b e h i n d , u n d e r

Brigadier-General

Major-General Sir Frederick Roberts and his staff inspecting captured artillery at Sherpun outside Kabul, in O c t o b e r 1879.

66


The Highlanders were soon joined by

R o b e r t s set a b o u t r o u n d i n g u p t h o s e

Gurkhas and Punjabi infantry, the

responsible for t h e September uprising a n d

combined

f o r c e d i s l o d g i n g t h e d e f e n d e r s as t h e y

t h e d e a t h s o f C a v a g n a r i , his f e l l o w officers

progressed towards t h e s u m m i t

a n d t h e Guides, a stern w a r n i n g of w h i c h

overlooking

the defile. T h e Afghans, perceiving this,

h a d c o m e t w o days after Roberts' arrival

m o v e d troops to their right, o n l y to find

with the following proclamation:

t h e m s e l v e s w e a k e n i n g a n o t h e r sector a n d p e r m i t t i n g British a n d I n d i a n infantry to

T h e force u n d e r m y c o m m a n d has n o w

reach the heights and make contact w i t h the

r e a c h e d K a b u l a n d o c c u p i e d t h e Bala

m e n o f Baker's b r i g a d e . W i t h t w o

regiments

of Highlanders a n d a m i x of Gurkhas

and

Indians pressing i n e x o r a b l y f o r w a r d b y early

Hissar; b u t its a d v a n c e h a s b e e n pertinaciously opposed, and the inhabitants of the city have taken a

afternoon, the Afghans, leaving 12 guns a n d

conspicuous part i n the opposition

several h u n d r e d d e a d o n t h e field, gave w a y

offered. T h e y have, therefore, become

a n d fled, pursued b y light cavalry. W i t h t h e Afghans routed, Roberts entered

rebels against t h e A m i r , a n d h a v e a d d e d to the guilt already incurred by t h e m

in

Kabul, a city of 5 0 , 0 0 0 residents, w i t h o u t

abetting t h e m u r d e r of the British E n v o y

resistance o n 13 October. Y a k u b

a n d his c o m p a n i o n s .

Khan

abdicated, although Lytton could t h i n k o f n o s u i t a b l e successor. U n t i l o n e c o u l d b e

T h e alleged culprits were h a n g e d i n front of

f o u n d , Roberts was ordered to r e m a i n i n t h e

w h a t r e m a i n e d of the Residency a n d , sharing

c o u n t r y i n w h a t t h e A f g h a n s i n t e r p r e t e d as

t h e fate o f t h e G r e a t Bazaar i n 1 8 4 2 , t h e Bala

an indefinite sojourn, notwithstanding a British pledge to leave once a n acceptable ruler could be f o u n d , based o n

consultations

w i t h t h e p r i n c i p a l chiefs. I n t h e m e a n t i m e ,

Execution o f t h e Kotwal o f Kabul on 26 O c t o b e r 1879 in f r o n t o f t h e remains o f t h e British Residency w h e r e Cavagnari, his staff and escort had been killed t h e previous m o n t h . (Author's collection)


H i s s a r w a s d e s t r o y e d as a w a r n i n g a g a i n s t

from the Anglo-Indian and

further violence. W i t h winter approaching,

defenders, w h o b y t h e 1 4 t h w e r e safely

Gurkha

t h e troops gathered supplies, fortified t h e

e n s c o n c e d i n S h e r p u r as t h e A f g h a n s

Sherpur c a n t o n m e n t a m i l e north-east

reoccupied Kabul.

of the city a n d built a c c o m m o d a t i o n .

H e r e R o b e r t s sat i n i s o l a t i o n , h i s t e l e g r a p h

T h e p e r i m e t e r m e a s u r e d 4Vz m i l e s i n l e n g t h ,

l i n e s s e v e r e d , t h e h e l i o g r a p h useless o w i n g t o

w i t h a ridge to t h e n o r t h a n d l o o p - h o l e d

cloudy conditions, and while

w a l l s a r o u n d t h e o t h e r t h r e e sides, r e n d e r i n g

were o n the w a y from

reinforcements

Gandamak,

t h e s o u t h a n d west easily defensible b u t

o v e r w h e l m i n g e n e m y n u m b e r s suggested

t h e east w a l l i n c o m p l e t e . T h e a d d i t i o n o f

t h e brigade w o u l d n o t reach t h e besieged

abattis

67

and wire entanglements and the

cantonment. Meanwhile, amongst the

mullahs

p l a c e m e n t of 2 0 pieces of artillery c o m p l e t e d

A f g h a n populace, the fanatical

Roberts' preparations for w i n t e r quarters,

encouraging the flames of revolt, p l a n n i n g a

but w i t h o n l y 7,000 troops, c o m p o s e d of

g e n e r a l assault o n S h e r p u r for t h e 2 3 r d o f t h e

were

5,500 i n f a n t r y (three British, o n e G u r k h a

m o n t h . Roberts h a d intelligence w a r n i n g

a n d five I n d i a n battalions), it was far

of t h e attack; his troops stood at t h e ready,

from adequate.

lining the walls of the c a n t o n m e n t

A n d so i t p r o v e d . I n D e c e m b e r , h o p i n g t o

him

through

t h e n i g h t u n t i l , as a f l a r e e x p l o d e d i n t h e

recover f r o m t h e i r h u m i l i a t i n g reverses a n d

darkness signalling t h e offensive, great hordes

retake Kabul, Afghans b e g a n to gather

m o v e d r a p i d l y across t h e s n o w a g a i n s t t h e

from

p r o v i n c e s across t h e c o u n t r y , e n c o u r a g e d b y their religious leaders' call for a

jihad

the invaders. T h e y concentrated

against

around

Kabul, t h o u s a n d s of w h o s e i n h a b i t a n t s left the city to join their a r m e d

compatriots

poised to attack Roberts' position.

east a n d s o u t h w a l l s , b e a r i n g s c a l i n g l a d d e r s

a n d u r g e d o n b y ghazis. T h e Special C o r r e s p o n d e n t o f t h e

News,

Daily

assigned t o cover t h e c a m p a i g n ,

reported h o w i n the distance 'came a roar of v o i c e s so l o u d a n d m e n a c i n g t h a t i t s e e m e d as

Yet r a t h e r t h a n a w a i t t h e i n e v i t a b l e assault

if a n a r m y 5 0 , 0 0 0 strong w e r e c h a r g i n g d o w n

b y o v e r w h e l m i n g n u m b e r s , Roberts t o o k t h e

u p o n our t h i n line of m e n ' . At the opposite

initiative a n d chose to c o n f r o n t t h e separate

e n d of t h e c a n t o n m e n t , British troops f o u n d

e l e m e n t s of his adversaries' forces b e f o r e

t h e m s e l v e s i n v o l v e d i n fierce f i g h t i n g .

they could c o m b i n e a n d destroy

him

t h r o u g h sheer w e i g h t of n u m b e r s .

' S u d d e n l y . . . a r o s e a d i n as i f e v e r y f i e n d i n h e l l h a d b r o k e n loose,' r e m e m b e r e d M i t f o r d .

D e s p i t e a p o s i t i v e start, his p l a n w a s marred b y the failure to a m b u s h the

T h e u n d e r c u r r e n t or base w a s o n e

A f g h a n s to t h e west of t h e city, w h e n

ceaseless r o l l o f m u s k e t r y b r o k e n a t

Brigadier-General D u n h a m Massy failed to

frequent intervals b y the roar of a h e a v y

a d h e r e t o his orders. M a s s y n e a r l y lost his

g u n . A b o v e t h i s rose British cheers a n d

entire force of 3 0 0 troopers a n d f o u r pieces

Sikh war-cries a n s w e r i n g t h e yells of t h e

of horse artillery to t h e 1 0 , 0 0 0 Afghans

M o o l l a h s a n d Ghazis, screams, shrieks,

under M o h a m e d Jan, into w h o m

he

a n d noises of every h i d e o u s d e s c r i p t i o n .

b l u n d e r e d o n 11 December, b u t i n his hasty

A d d to this that the bullets were

retreat t h e four guns w e r e a b a n d o n e d . For

w h i s t l i n g a b o u t us, k n o c k i n g u p t h e

t h e n e x t t h r e e days, severe f i g h t i n g t o o k

stones, s p l i n t e r i n g t h e abattis, a n d t e a r i n g

place, the Afghans d r i v e n f r o m t h e heights

t h r o u g h the e m p t y tents, a n d y o u

t o t h e s o u t h a n d south-west of t h e city. Still,

f o r m a v e r y i n a d e q u a t e idea of t h e scene

w i t h his o p p o n e n t s ' n u m b e r s r a p i d l y rising,

o n w h i c h t h e p e a c e f u l stars l o o k e d d o w n .

may

Roberts realized t h a t h e h a d n o choice b u t t o w i t h d r a w i n t o t h e relative safety of Sherpur.

T h e British regulars h e l d t h e s o u t h w a l l ,

T h e Afghans reacted immediately,

w h i l e P u n j a b i s a n d G u i d e s h e l d t h e east,

swarming

d o w n o n l y to m e e t d e t e r m i n e d resistance

d i s c h a r g i n g a series o f f u s i l l a d e s w i t h a r t i l l e r y

68


i n s u p p o r t . D e s p i t e serious casualties suffered

r e m a i n e d t h e issue o f a s u i t a b l e A m i r

i n t h e face of disciplined fire, t h e A f g h a n s

that Yakub K h a n h a d abdicated a n d was

continued w i t h their determined

receiving a pension in India. Abdur

until approximately ten in the

onslaught

now

Rahman,

a n e p h e w of Sher Ali, d i d n o t initially m e e t

morning

w h e n , after a n hour's respite, t h e y r e s u m e d

a n a c c e p t a b l e s t a n d a r d , as f o r t h e p r e v i o u s

t h e i r assault, t h o u g h w i t h

d o z e n years h e h a d b e e n receiving a p e n s i o n

somewhat

d i m i n i s h e d ardour. By 1 . 0 0 p m o n

Christmas

Eve, t h e A f g h a n s h a d g i v e n u p t h e effort

and

f r o m t h e R u s s i a n s as a r e s u l t o f h i s e f f o r t s i n 1 8 6 3 t o secure t h e A m i r s h i p for his f a t h e r

-

were w i t h d r a w i n g rapidly, leaving hundreds

t h e Russians' preference - instead of Sher A l i .

of their n u m b e r strewn a r o u n d the

Yet despite his a p p a r e n t

c a n t o n m e n t . T h e n , t h e gates s w u n g o p e n

A b d u r R a h m a n w a s c o n s i d e r e d t h e best

unacceptability,

a n d lancers, Guides a n d Punjabi light cavalry

available candidate b y Lytton, w h o was

t h u n d e r e d after t h e fleeing Afghans, w h o s e

anxious to w i t h d r a w British troops f r o m

numbers were reckoned to have been

A f g h a n i s t a n as q u i c k l y as p o s s i b l e l e s t t h e

100,000, against w h i c h the

Anglo-Indians

h a d lost o n l y t h r e e d e a d a n d 3 0 w o u n d e d . T h e f o l l o w i n g day all was quiet, the

enemy

Russians be p r o v o k e d i n t o a n

intervention

of t h e i r o w n , or t h e c o u n t r y dissolve i n t o a state o f a n a r c h y . I n a n y e v e n t t h e r e was

h a v i n g w i t h d r a w n n o t o n l y f r o m t h e city,

g r o w i n g o p p o s i t i o n t o t h e w a r at h o m e

b u t t h e h i l l s a n d v i l l a g e s , as w e l l .

t h e L i b e r a l s u n d e r G l a d s t o n e . F i n a l l y , as t h e

W i t h t h e start of 1 8 8 0 , t h e

countryside

grandson of Dost M o h a m e d -

from

considered

a p p e a r e d p e a c e f u l , b u t t h e r e w a s as y e t

b y m a n y t o be t h e greatest recent leader of

n o provision for replacing Yakub K h a n .

A f g h a n i s t a n - A b d u l R a h m a n w a s less l i k e l y

Yet c o l o n i a l officials b a c k i n I n d i a w e r e

t o a p p e a r t o h i s p e o p l e as a m e r e p u p p e t ,

n o t going to repeat the mistake of

1842

installed by a foreign power, a n d enjoying

withdrawal

n o p o p u l a r s u p p o r t . T h e British also s o o n

f r o m Afghanistan w i t h o u t establishing some

f o u n d a g o v e r n o r f o r K a n d a h a r , w h i c h Sir

a n d order the troops' precipitous

reliable f o r m of g o v e r n m e n t ; u n t i l such t i m e , Lytton wrote in October 1879, the

army

would remain:

Jagdalak Pass, January I 880. (Author's collection)

I t h i n k w e should instantly take possession o f t h e a u t h o r i t y w h i c h falls f r o m the h a n d of the A m i r into our and promptly, though

own

provisionally,

e n f o r c e t h a t a u t h o r i t y , so f a r as o u r practical p o w e r of enforcing extends, i n e v e r y d i r e c t i o n ... T h e n e x t step w i l l be either to proclaim our

permanent

r e t e n t i o n of t h a t a u t h o r i t y or to transfer it, w i t h v e r y careful a n d copious restrictions, to some of native

Reinforcements under Brigadier-General Gough, bound f o r Kabul, find their path blocked by Afghan forces at the

form

government.

Success o v e r o p p o s i n g forces s p e l l e d t h e e n d of a British scheme originally proposed to d i v i d e A f g h a n i s t a n i n t o separate provinces, a course of a c t i o n predicated o n t h e

notion

t h a t it w o u l d b e easier t o c o n t r o l t h e country's u n r u l y tribes a n d w o u l d a v o i d t h e necessity for a n a r m y of o c c u p a t i o n . T h e r e


69

70

Essential H i s t o r i e s • T h e A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r s I 8 3 9 - 1 9 19

D o n a l d Stewart re-occupied before

devolving

c o m m a n d to General James Primrose, a n officer i n t h e B o m b a y

O n reaching Kabul i n late April, Stewart l e a r n e d t h a t h e was t o succeed Roberts a n d that the g o v e r n m e n t i n L o n d o n h a d fallen,

Army.

Stewart proceeded n o r t h where he

w i t h a Liberal ministry under Gladstone i n

e n c o u n t e r e d considerable resistance at

office. L y t t o n , w h o s e support for A b d u r

A h m a d Khel, about 2 0 miles west of G h a z n i ,

R a h m a n h a d w a n e d , h a d resigned, to be

b y a strong force of Ghilzais a n d o t h e r tribes,

r e p l a c e d as v i c e r o y b y L o r d R i p o n , w h o

as o n p r e v i o u s o c c a s i o n s d r i v e n t o a p i t c h

like Stewart c o u l d s u m m o n u p b u t little

of fanaticism b y a c c o m p a n y i n g

mullahs.

e n t h u s i a s m for t h e candidacy of A b d u r

O n 19 April, 3,000 sword-bearing tribesmen

R a h m a n . N e v e r t h e l e s s , as s u p p o r t w a s r i s i n g

launched a furious attack o n the Anglo-

w i t h i n A f g h a n i s t a n itself, B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s

I n d i a n centre at A h m a d K h e l , w i t h cavalry

gradually decided t h a t h e should rule the

s w a r m i n g o n the flanks i n a bid to reach

country and duly proclaimed h i m Amir on

t h e rear of Stewart's line, f o r m e d i n haste.

2 2 J u l y . H a r d l y h a d a w e e k p a s s e d , a n d as

' D o w n they came,'

troops w e r e o n t h e verge of l e a v i n g K a b u l for

Lieutenant-Colonel

E. F. C h a p m a n r e c a l l e d , ' q u i t e r e g a r d l e s s

t h e return m a r c h to India, t h a n news arrived

o f o u r fire ... t h e w h o l e h i l l s e e m e d t o

o f t h e a n n i h i l a t i o n of Primrose's B o m b a y

be m o v i n g . ' T h e 5 9 t h Foot was nearly

d i v i s i o n a n d t h e siege o f K a n d a h a r , 3 2 0 m i l e s

overwhelmed, but managed to hold o n until

south-west of Kabul, b y 7,500 well-equipped

a b a t t a l i o n of G u r k h a s a n d a n o t h e r of Sikhs,

D u r a n i t r i b e s m e n u n d e r t h e fiercely anti-

w i t h strong artillery i n support a n d aided b y

British p r i n c e , A y u b K h a n . H e p l a n n e d , after

a Punjabi cavalry charge, steadied t h e line.

t h e fall o f t h e city, t o eject t h e r e m a i n i n g

After b r i n g i n g i n his reserves, Stewart h e l d

British troops f r o m t h e c o u n t r y b y m e a n s of a

o n , t h e savage f i g h t c o n t i n u i n g for a f u r t h e r

popular revolt a n d assume the t h r o n e himself.

t w o hours before the Afghans retired. Stewart entered G h a z n i w i t h o u t firing a shot o n the

T h e troops i n question were those of Brigadier-General George Burrows, w h o

on

21st, a n d t w o days later left 4 0 0 d e a d a n d w o u n d e d t r i b e s m e n o n t h e field at A r z u ,

Indian cavalry charging at t h e battle o f Maiwand, 27 July

s e v e n m i l e s t o t h e south-east, at a cost t o

1880.

himself of o n l y t w o dead a n d eight

Crimea, British t r o o p s relied heavily on indigenous

- t h e stark result w h e n

wounded

sword-armed

Like all Victorian campaigns apart f r o m t h e

and o t h e r non-European contingents t o s u p p o r t t h e m in Afghanistan, especially Indians f r o m Bengal and o t h e r

assailants m e t w e l l - t r a i n e d , d i s c i p l i n e d , r i f l e d - a r m e d regulars i n o p e n country.

regions, Sikhs f r o m t h e Punjab and Gurkhas f r o m Nepal. (National A r m y Museum)


7I

14 July was d i s p a t c h e d f r o m K a n d a h a r t o support t h e W a l i of K a n d a h a r i n t h e area a r o u n d t h e H e l m a n d River i n t h e south of the country. By t h a t t i m e , Ayub's army, w h i c h h a d b e e n able to assemble w i t h o u t interference i n distant Herat, h a d substantial progress t o w a r d s t h e

made Helmand

before Burrows h a d even got underway. Burrows' force consisted of a n i n f a n t r y brigade containing one Queen's regiment ( t h e 6 6 t h ) , t h e 1st a n d 3 0 t h

Bombay

I n f a n t r y , o n e b a t t e r y (six g u n s ) o f R o y a l Horse Artillery, a c o m p a n y of sappers a n d t w o B o m b a y cavalry regiments. W h e n

the

British a r r i v e d at t h e H e l m a n d , i n sight of the Wali's e n c a m p m e n t , the Afghans

simply

decamped, abandoning Burrows w i t h a scratch force of o n l y 2 , 7 0 0 m e n , 8 0 m i l e s f r o m t h e nearest support, w h i l e A y u b was g r o w i n g h o u r l y i n strength t h r o u g h Fighting back-to-back, soldiers o f t h e 66th Foot t r i b e s m e n f l o c k i n g t o his cause, t o g e t h e r w i t h e l e m e n t s of t h e Wali's deserters.

make their last stand at Maiwand, 27 July 1880. (Author's collection)

Burrows, aware that he h a d to defend the approaches to Kandahar,

however

g r o u n d for a w h i l e , b u t his cavalry refused to

sepoy

i n a d e q u a t e his force, w i t h d r e w to

charge. W h e n o n e of his i n e x p e r i e n c e d

Khusk-i-Nakhud, 35 miles back, w h e r e

r e g i m e n t s b e g a n to falter u n d e r t h e pressure,

he was instructed to prevent A y u b

from

another gave w a y altogether, causing a panic

circumventing Kandahar i n a n effort to

t h a t left t h e I n d i a n troops m i n g l i n g a m i d s t

take G h a z n i w h i l e e n route for Kabul.

t h e 6 6 t h , w h i c h w i t h its r a n k s d i s t u r b e d

Despite efforts t h r o u g h reconnaissance t o

c o u l d n o longer offer regular fire against

ascertain t h e location of Ayub's m a i n body,

their attackers. T h e single available British

Burrows r e m a i n e d i g n o r a n t of his enemy's

b a t t e r y f o u g h t as l o n g as i t c o u l d u n t i l i t w a s

dispositions, apart f r o m receiving intelligence

obliged to limber u p to avoid capture, a n d

o n 2 6 July that local tribesmen h e l d the

the 66th managed to withdraw

village of M a i w a n d , 13 miles to t h e n o r t h -

towards t h e buildings for w h a t little cover

gradually

east o f h i s p r e s e n t p o s i t i o n . I n t e n d i n g t o t a k e

t h e y offered. There, together w i t h a h a n d f u l

the village a n d block Ayub's p r e s u m e d line of

of I n d i a n soldiers, t h e r e g i m e n t f o u g h t u n t i l

advance, Burrows discovered o n his a p p r o a c h

a n n i h i l a t e d . B u r r o w s ' losses n u m b e r e d

the following day that Ayub h a d already

1,100 dead, w i t h a few survivors reaching

arrived w i t h t h e w h o l e of his force, consisting

K a n d a h a r after a d r e a d f u l retreat. As i n d i c a t e d

of b e t w e e n 1 5 , 0 0 0 a n d 2 0 , 0 0 0 regulars a n d

earlier, A y u b f o l l o w e d u p his v i c t o r y b y

tribesmen, supported b y 3 0 guns. Burrows

l a y i n g siege t o t h e c i t a d e l o f K a n d a h a r ,

failed t o m a k e best use o f a v a i l a b l e g r o u n d ,

garrisoned b y t h e r e m a i n d e r of Primrose's

d e p l o y i n g his forces i n l i n e i n a n e x p o s e d

force, 5 , 0 0 0 m e n a n d 13 guns -

p o s i t i o n i n s t e a d o f m a k i n g use o f n e a r b y

c e r t a i n l y e n o u g h , w i t h t h e a d e q u a t e stocks

buildings a n d a

nullah

(small ravine). Matters

were desperate f r o m t h e outset, for t h e Afghans had the advantage in b o t h

numbers

almost

of f o o d a n d a m m u n i t i o n at their disposal, t o w i t h s t a n d a s t o r m . S t i l l , as a n a d d e d precaution against the possibility of a n

a n d guns, rendering Burrows' position

A f g h a n rising i n t h e city, P r i m r o s e e x p e l l e d

c o m p l e t e l y hopeless. His m e n h e l d their

the entire p o p u l a t i o n of 15,000 inhabitants.

H o w the war ended

To Roberts - w h o , o w i n g to his popularity,

the day a n d temperatures plunging to

retained senior c o m m a n d of A n g l o - I n d i a n

f r e e z i n g at n i g h t , Roberts' forces carried

forces i n A f g h a n i s t a n - r e s t o r i n g British

o n u n d a u n t e d at a n average rate of

prestige i n I n d i a a n d relieving t h e beleaguered

1 5 m i l e s a d a y , w i t h o u t so m u c h as a l i n e

garrison i n K a n d a h a r required a swift a n d

of c o m m u n i c a t i o n back to Kabul. A n d yet,

decisive b l o w against A y u b K h a n . T h u s , o n

o n 3 1 August, after a forced m a r c h of

11 August, after feverish preparations, Roberts'

3 1 3 miles i n 2 1 days over e x t r e m e l y difficult

field force of 9 , 9 0 0 m e n a n d 18 guns left

terrain - albeit w i t h n o fighting e n route but

Kabul a n d m a d e for K a n d a h a r - a forbidding,

w i t h s e r i o u s losses f r o m s i c k n e s s - h e r e a c h e d

almost impossible m a r c h of m o r e t h a n

K a n d a h a r a n d joined the garrison there.

3 0 0 miles. His force consisted of 12 battalions

A y u b h a d r a i s e d t h e siege a n d t a k e n a

o f i n f a n t r y : t h e 6 0 t h Rifles, t h e 7 2 n d a n d

strong position near Dubba, t w o miles to

9 2 n d Highlanders, plus Sikh, G u r k h a

t h e n o r t h - w e s t o f t h e city. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g

and

Punjab infantry, a cavalry brigade, including

t h e e x h a u s t i o n of his troops a n d his o w n

t h e 9 t h Lancers, m u l e s carrying light

ill-health, Roberts l a u n c h e d a n attack

m o u n t a i n b a t t e r i e s a n d as l i t t l e b a g g a g e

o n t h e f o l l o w i n g day, spearheaded b y a

as p o s s i b l e t o ease t h e s p e e d o f m o v e m e n t .

b a y o n e t assault b y t h e 9 2 n d H i g h l a n d e r s a n d

Roberts' m a r c h w o u l d enter the annals of

2 n d G u r k h a s . T h i s i n f l i c t e d 1 , 2 0 0 casualties

B r i t i s h m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y as o n e o f t h e A r m y ' s

a n d d r o v e A y u b ' s forces off i n c o n f u s i o n

g r e a t e s t f e a t s . S t r u g g l i n g across m o u n t a i n s

at a cost t o Roberts o f o n l y 4 0 d e a d a n d

a n d deserts u n d e r a b l i s t e r i n g s u n d u r i n g

228 w o u n d e d - extraordinarily low in return for such a decisive o u t c o m e .

T h e 9 2 n d ( G o r d o n ) Highlanders skirmishing w i t h Afghan t r i b e s m e n during t h e Second Afghan W a r

Indian dollie carriers bearing w o u n d e d t r o o p s through


t h e Jagdalak Pass, January I 880. (Author's collection)


T h e defeat of A y u b K h a n spelled the e n d of the British proposal for t h e break-up of A f g h a n i s t a n a n d its p a r t i a l o c c u p a t i o n b y A n g l o - I n d i a n forces. I n t h e course of great debate a b o u t t h e possible p e r m a n e n t

73

As a consequence o f a rising o f t h e Afridis o n t h e N o r t h - W e s t Frontier in I 897 which resulted in t h e fall o f t h e Khyber Pass, British authorities in India dispatched General Sir W i l l i a m Lockhart w i t h an expedition t o t h e Tirah Valley, w h e r e 2,000 o f his m e n clashed w i t h t w o - a n d - h a l f times t h e i r n u m b e r o n 20 O c t o b e r at t h e

garrisoning of Kandahar, this scheme was

Dargai Heights, t h e key action o f t h e largest f r o n t i e r

rejected, a n d all British a n d I n d i a n troops

expedition ever m o u n t e d by British forces, involving

evacuated the country. Abdur R a h m a n was

a total o f 35,000 men. W h i l e f o r m i n g up t h e G o r d o n Highlanders f o r attack, Lieutenant-Colonel Mathias

left t o rule over his t u r b u l e n t d o m a i n s the treaty concluded w i t h h i m

and

entitled

British I n d i a t o t h e districts of P i s h i n Sibi

declared:'Highlanders! T h e general says t h e position must be taken at all costs.The G o r d o n s will take it!' (Author's collection)

near Quetta, the K u r r a m Valley a n d a p r o t e c t o r s h i p o v e r t h e K h y b e r Pass, h o m e

A f g h a n i n t e r n a l affairs, a n d t h e British

of the t u r b u l e n t Afridis. N o further trouble

a d m i n i s t r a t i o n i n I n d i a was left to m a n a g e

resulted b e t w e e n A f g h a n i s t a n a n d British

as b e s t i t c o u l d t h e u n r u l y t r i b e s o f t h e

India during Abdur Rahman's period of rule.

N o r t h - W e s t Frontier, w h i c h w h i l e a constant

T h e R u s s i a n s d i d n o t - j u s t as t h e y h a d n o t

r u n n i n g sore p r o v e d a f e r t i l e t r a i n i n g g r o u n d

after t h e First A f g h a n W a r - i n t e r f e r e i n

for British troops well into the 2 0 t h century.

Portrait of a soldier

A r t h u r Male, A r m y chaplain, I 3th Hussars Amongst the m a n y memoirs a n d first-hand

a l a n d r e m o t e f r o m h o m e a n d for a cause o f

accounts o n t h e Second A f g h a n War, that of

w h i c h he was most probably ignorant:

a n obscure A r m y c h a p l a i n n a m e d A r t h u r M a l e provides particularly fine insights i n t o

A n d h o w c o m e s it t h a t I, a m i n i s t e r

t h e c a m p a i g n . A t t a c h e d t o Sir S a m u e l

of religion, should be t h r o w n into

Browne's headquarters, he witnessed various

a s s o c i a t i o n w i t h scenes o f b l o o d a n d

operations f r o m the unusual perspective

c a r n a g e ...? S i m p l y because t h e E n g l i s h n a t i o n , w h e n it sends its g a l l a n t soldiers

of a j u n i o r officer w i t h a n ostensibly n o n c o m b a t a n t role (except

in extremis),

and he

i n t o t h e field, credits t h e m

with

r e m a i n e d t h r o u g h o u t t h e w a r i n close c o n t a c t

something m o r e t h a n mere physical

w i t h the higher echelons of field c o m m a n d .

frames to be kept strong a n d i n good

His e x p l a n a t i o n for his presence w i t h

the

fighting trim. T o m m y Atkins,' while he

A r m y reveals m u c h a b o u t his o p i n i o n of t h e

has a strong a r m t o strike for his c o u n t r y ,

s i m p l e V i c t o r i a n soldier, m a k i n g sacrifices i n

has a h e a r t also t o feel a n d s y m p a t h i s e .

He T h e column under Sir Samuel B r o w n e approaches t h e

is a man,

n o t a m a c h i n e ; a n d has

needs other t h a n those w h i c h can be m e t

seemingly impregnable fortress at Ali Masjid, in t h e

b y the daily m e a t ration, the third of a n

Khyber Pass, 22 N o v e m b e r I 878. (Author's collection)

o u n c e of tea, or e v e n t h e r u m r a t i o n .

Portrait o f a soldier

It w i l l be recalled t h a t w h e n i n late 1 8 7 8 ,

T h e fortress o f Ali Masjid, w h i c h t h e Peshawar Valley

the A m i r failed to answer Lord Lytton's

Field Force, consisting o f t h r e e brigades under Sir Sam

u l t i m a t u m d e m a n d i n g the admission of a

75

Browne, discovered occupied by an enemy force during his advance on Jalalabad in N o v e m b e r 1878. W h i l e a

British d i p l o m a t i c mission to A f g h a n i s t a n , three c o l u m n s of British, I n d i a n a n d

Gurkha

troops crossed t h e frontier, o n e o r i g i n a t i n g

frontal assault failed t o dislodge t h e garrison, Browne's t u r n i n g m o v e m e n t persuaded t h e Afghans t o abandon t h e position w i t h o u t f u r t h e r resistance.

f r o m Peshawar a n d led by M a j o r - G e n e r a l Browne. Browne was a veteran of the Sikh

attack o n Ali M a s j i d . W h e n his c o l u m n ,

Wars a n d h o l d e r of t h e V i c t o r i a Cross, t h e

c o m p o s e d of three brigades of troops,

A r m y ' s greatest d e c o r a t i o n . H e e a r n e d t h e

a p p r o a c h e d t h e fortress, B r o w n e

m e d a l , like Roberts, d u r i n g his service i n t h e

Tytler to m a r c h his brigade over t h e hills

ordered

M u t i n y , w h e r e leading a m o u n t e d irregular

a r o u n d t h e e n e m y ' s r i g h t i n a w i d e arc,

u n i t h e killed i n single c o m b a t a rebel

b r i n g i n g his forces t o t h e rear o f t h e fort.

carrying a standard, i n t h e course of

By this disposition, Tytler w o u l d cut off the

w h i c h h e lost his left a r m - a n d h e n c e his

A f g h a n retreat i n t h e event either t h a t t h e

i n n o v a t i o n , still i n use t o d a y , o f t h e S a m

m a i n attack s h o u l d succeed i n e x p e l l i n g

Browne belt. H e h e l d the a d m i r a t i o n

t h e m or t h a t t h e garrison s h o u l d choose to

and

loyalty of I n d i a n a n d Queen's regiments

a b a n d o n t h e p l a c e as u n t e n a b l e . T y t l e r w a s

alike, a n d troops w e r e prepared to f o l l o w

t o m a r c h as s o o n as d a r k n e s s d e s c e n d e d , so

h i m t o t h e e n d s of t h e E a r t h . B r o w n e ' s first

e n a b l i n g h i m to reach his position b y d a w n .

objective, it w i l l b e recalled, w a s t h e

M e a n w h i l e , M a c p h e r s o n , w i t h his brigade,

mighty

fortress o f A l i M a s j i d i n t h e strategically

was to b e g i n his m a r c h four hours before

i m p o r t a n t rocky gorge w e l l k n o w n i n t h e

d a w n a n d occupy the Shagai Heights,

a n n a l s o f t h e B r i t i s h A r m y : t h e K h y b e r Pass.

o n t h e e n e m y left, t h u s clearing t h e hills

It was i n this peculiar capacity that,

o n Browne's right while Appleyard's brigade

amongst m a n y other reminiscences of his

m a r c h e d a l o n g t h e v a l l e y t o strike t h e

time in Afghanistan, M a l e recorded the

Afghan position.

main

76


T h e orders w e r e r a p i d l y c o n v e y e d . Tytler's brigade, consisting of the l / 1 7 t h

;

a regiment

w h i c h h a d s e r v e d i n t h e First A f g h a n W a r , t h e 1st R e g i m e n t o f S i k h s a n d t h e G u i d e s , b e g a n i t s m o v e m e n t as t h e s u n set o v e r t h e h o r i z o n . M a c p h e r s o n ' s b r i g a d e , of Rifles a n d G u r k h a s , m a r c h e d several h o u r s later, w e l l u n d e r the cover of darkness. T h e

following

m o r n i n g , 2 1 N o v e m b e r , just after d a w n , Browne's c o l u m n led b y Appleyard's brigade w i t h its six r e g i m e n t s - f o u r I n d i a n a n d British, together w i t h a m o u n t a i n

two

battery

a n d another of 40-pdrs d r a w n b y elephants

-

entered the Khyber and proceeded towards A l i M a s j i d , as M a l e r e c o r d e d i n h i s m e m o i r s :

T h e g o l d e n glory of the Eastern d a w n f l o o d e d e v e n t h e g l o o m y recesses o f t h e Pass, as t h e m e n , E u r o p e a n a n d n a t i v e , pressed o n , braced u p s o m e w h a t b y t h e k e e n air of t h e early m o r n i n g . Presently, e m e r g i n g f r o m the narrower defile, t h e

Afghan tribesmen, perched behind t h e cover o f a sangor,

s c e n e r y c h a n g e d . O n b o t h sides t h e r e

o r rock-lined redoubt, fire d o w n on enemy troops.

rose a succession of u n d u l a t i n g hills,


u n t i l a w a y i n the distance, a m i l e a n d a h a l f o r s o , o n e c o u l d see F o r t A l i M u s j i d

galloped u p into position a n d began shelling

strongly placed o n a rocky plateau, some

t h e guns of t h e fort. But t h e Afghans i n t e n d e d

6 0 0 feet a b o v e t h e b e d of t h e river,

to stand their ground, a n d immediately

w h i c h f l o w e d i n breaks a n d shallows

r e t u r n e d e f f e c t i v e f i r e , as M a l e r e c o r d e d :

along the valley below.

Impregnable

i n d e e d i t s e e m e d , b y its v e r y p o s i t i o n ,

A n d n o w t h e c r a s h o f t h e s h e l l s as t h e y

f r o w n i n g d o w n f r o m b e e t l i n g crags ...

exploded, a n d the constant rattle a n d

It was built of h a r d m u d , faced w i t h

roll of t h e rifle fire m a d e v a l l e y a n d

stone, w i t h n u m e r o u s g u n s . T h e slopes,

m o u n t a i n side alive w i t h

b o t h above a n d lower d o w n , bristled too

r e v e r b e r a t i o n . T h e m e n pressed o n

with

sung ah s [sangars],

a special f o r m of

deafening

w i t h impetuous valour; but the wild

sung ah

A f g h a n defence consisting of strong

defenders of fort a n d

walls of stone, b e h i n d w h i c h dense

n o t h i n g daunted. G u n answered gun,

bodies of m e n took u p position.

Now

a n d again guns were m o u n t e d here too.

were

w h i l e crowds of A f g h a n warriors could be seen r u s h i n g o u t to m a n t h e outer entrenchments, and even streaming

B r o w n e h a l t e d his m e n for a period to a l l o w

over the hillside.

t h e e l e p h a n t b a t t e r y t o r e a c h its p o s i t i o n u p the narrow paths that composed the crude

W i t h the arrival of the elephant battery came

a n d t r e a c h e r o u s r o u t e . A f t e r a b r i e f rest, t h e

t h e hoarse b o o m of t h e 4 0 - p d r s , striking at

bugles s o u n d e d t h e attack, e c h o i n g a l o n g t h e

t h e m u d a n d stone walls of t h e fort, gradually

m o u n t a i n s as t h e 8 1 s t F o o t a n d 1 4 t h S i k h s

silencing the A f g h a n guns a n d creating

p u s h e d f o r w a r d a l i n e o f skirmishers t o clear

gaping holes i n the walls w i t h explosive

t h e e n e m y f r o m t h e hillsides o n their flanks,

s h e l l s . S t i l l , as M a l e a p p r e c i a t e d , t h e m o s t

w h i l e at t h e same t i m e a b a t t e r y of artillery

difficult task was yet a h e a d , for t h e

sangars

Portrait o f a soldier

77

h a d t o b e t a k e n a n d t h e fortress itself s t o r m e d

failure to lay d o w n a d e q u a t e p r e p a r a t o r y fire

if this v i t a l r o u t e t o K a b u l w a s t o b e secured.

to support the infantry. W i t h the

T h e slopes w e r e l i t t e r e d w i t h t h e s e d e f e n c e s ,

of the enemy's defences better appreciated,

all c o n t a i n i n g concealed parties of r i f l e m e n

a battery of horse artillery c a m e forward,

strength

a n d o n e or t w o pieces of artillery. M a l e

clattering over stone a n d river b e d before

w a t c h e d as a C a p t a i n M a c l e a n , l e a d i n g a p a r t y

unlimbering a n d shelling the

of Sikhs r u s h i n g o n e s u c h e n t r e n c h m e n t , fell

A f g h a n s ' fire p r o v e d o v e r w h e l m i n g ,

sangars.

Yet t h e driving

w o u n d e d t o e n e m y fire, t o g e t h e r w i t h seven

off t h e Punjabis a n d Sikhs, d e c a p i t a t i n g a

N C O s a n d 2 0 r a n k - a n d - f i l e as c a s u a l t i e s . L y i n g

g u n n e r , w o u n d i n g several m o r e a n d

injuring

a n u m b e r of horses. A d d i t i o n a l guns

now

at t h e f o o t of a

sangar,

M a c l e a n called for

support, w h i c h arrived i n the f o r m of M a j o r

arrived i n the f o r m of a heavy field battery

H e n r y Birch at t h e h e a d of t h e 2 7 t h Punjabis,

a n d a m o u n t a i n battery, deployed to support

w h o advanced against h e a v y small arms a n d

elements of the 51st Foot w h i c h , guided b y

artillery fire.

t h e i r c o o l - h e a d e d c o l o n e l , crossed a s t r e a m ,

M a l e w a t c h e d as t h e h a i l o f r i f l e f i r e n o w

w h i c h M a l e w a t c h e d w i t h great suspense:

m e t this n e w target w i t h d e v a s t a t i n g effect: O n they went, and began to climb the D o w n w e n t Birch, shot d e a d , his face

slippery hillside i n support of the native

towards t h e foe, a n d r o u n d h i m

troops. For a m o m e n t t h e A f g h a n fire

thickly

fell his m e n . T h e y w a v e r e d ; t h e n fell

s e e m e d c h e c k e d . But ere this f i n a l , a n d ,

back, w i t h t h e r e m n a n t of Sikhs, a n d

perhaps, decisive m o v e m e n t c o u l d be

t h e w o u n d e d M a c l e a n . Birch's s u b a l t e r n ,

developed a n d carried out the

y o u n g Fitzgerald, w o u l d n o t b r o o k that

o f t h e n i g h t d e s c e n d e d , as t h e y d o i n

shadows

his c h i e f s b o d y s h o u l d lie there exposed

Eastern lands, all t o o suddenly, a n d t h e

to the w a n t o n ferocity of the fanatics,

bugles were h e a r d s o u n d i n g t h e 'Retire'.

w h o were used to mutilate w i t h such

E v e n as t h e m e n , P u n j a b i s a n d S i k h s ,

u n n a m e a b l e barbarity. H e called for

fell back u n w i l l i n g l y , t h e Afghans,

volunteers f r o m his o w n Punjabis to

recovering, swept again t h e slope w i t h

b r i n g i n t h e b o d y of t h e i r leader. But

parting volleys, a n d m a n y another was

alas! t h e A f g h a n f i r e still f i e r c e l y s w e p t

a d d e d t o t h e list o f k i l l e d or w o u n d e d .

t h e slope, a n d t h e r e was n o response. T u r n i n g to t h e Sikhs, w h o w e r e

forming

T h e assault h a v i n g failed, a n d w i t h

no

u p again near by, their o n e officer l y i n g

f u r t h e r p r o s p e c t o f success t h a t d a y , A r t h u r

desperately w o u n d e d , he shouted for

M a l e , i n h i s c a p a c i t y as c h a p l a i n ,

some of t h e m to follow h i m ; a n d fifteen

reflected o n the sullen a f t e r m a t h of battle

now

gallant fellows rushed forward to c l i m b

a n d u n d e r t o o k one of the principal, yet

again t h e slope of d e a t h . U p t h e y w e n t ,

m o u r n f u l , duties of that role -

step b y step, o n e a n d a n o t h e r f a l l i n g

f o r c o n d u c t i n g b u r i a l services f o r t h e f a l l e n :

here a n d there. H a l f w a y u p

responsibility

Fitzgerald

was struck, b u t w i t h h e r o i c r e s o l u t i o n

T h e after-scenes of a battle-field are

h e still pressed o n , i n t e n t o n his task

never pleasant. W h e n actual f i g h t i n g has

of rescue. H e r e a c h e d t h e b o d y o f B i r c h ,

ceased, a n d fierce passions are s o m e w h a t

raised it i n his a r m s , w h e n a b u l l e t a g a i n

allayed, m e n have t i m e to pause a n d to

struck h i m , a n d h e fell dead; t h e t w o

t h i n k , a n d t h e n t h e saddest t h o u g h t s

f r i e n d s t h u s side b y side i n t h e sleep

gather i n u p o n one. O n this occasion,

of death, almost w i t h i n t o u c h of t h e

h o w e v e r , t h e r e w a s scarce t i m e f o r

Afghan guns.

m e n t a l rest, o r p a u s e o r t h o u g h t . T h e fierce struggle was t o be r e n e w e d

A l m o s t n o n e of t h e 15 m e n i n v o l v e d i n t h e

at d a w n ; for t h e p o s i t i o n m u s t be ours

assault r e t u r n e d a l i v e - t h e c o n s e q u e n c e o f a

at all costs.

78


For t h e l i v i n g t h e r e was a m e a l a n d m u c h - n e e d e d sleep; b u t for t h e d e a d t h e i r

t h e i r losses w i t h a s u c c e s s f u l s t o r m , f o r T y t l e r ' s w i d e f l a n k m a r c h h a d succeeded i n occupying

remains h a d to be interred. T h e crew of

the village of Kata Kushta, b e h i n d the Afghan

a battery composed the b o d y of one

position, effectively c u t t i n g off t h e enemy's

of their o w n , f i n d i n g a few coins i n his

line of retreat. O n l e a r n i n g of this, t h e A f g h a n

p o c k e t a n d a l e t t e r f r o m t h e m a n ' s sister,

c o m m a n d e r p a n i c k e d , a b a n d o n e d his guns,

w r i t t e n a m i d the pleasant surrounding of

tents, f o o d a n d o t h e r supplies, a n d m a d e a

the country h o m e , n o w sharing w i t h the

b i d t o w i t h d r a w u n d e r cover of darkness, o n l y

s t r i c k e n soldier t h e c a r n a g e scenes o f t h e

to b l u n d e r straight i n t o positions occupied b y

battle ground, a n d almost, too, the alien

t h e 1 7 t h F o o t , t h e 1st S i k h s , a n d t h e G u i d e s ,

grave. A n d thus o n e a n d a n o t h e r were

w h o h a v i n g r e m a i n e d o n t h e alert t h r o u g h

consigned to t h e quiet resting-place of

t h e n i g h t , s i m p l y r o u n d e d u p large n u m b e r s

m o t h e r earth's b o s o m . A n d t h e l i v i n g

of e n e m y troops, caught utterly unawares a n d

l o o k e d r o u n d f o r s o m e soft s p o t w h e r e

u n a b l e t o m o u n t a d e f e n c e . A n d so i t w a s t h a t

t h e y m i g h t t a k e a l i g h t e r sleep.

M a l e , a c c o m p a n y i n g B r o w n e a n d h i s staff, s t r u g g l e d u p t h e steep slopes a n d e n t e r e d t h e

I n fact, t h e r e was t o be n o f u r t h e r f i g h t i n g t h e

c r u m b l i n g fort, o n w h o s e r a m p a r t s a soldier

f o l l o w i n g day, a n d n o o p p o r t u n i t y t o r e d e e m

q u i c k l y r a n u p t h e U n i o n Jack.

O p p o s i t e page: A n air raid being conducted by a Handley Page V / 1 5 0 0 on an Afghan position, May 1919.

PART III

The Third Anglo-Afghan War, 1919

Origins and background of the war I n the wake of the Second A f g h a n War,

c o n f i d e n c e a n d trust. T h u s w a s it possible,

A n g l o - I n d i a n forces c o n d u c t e d d o z e n s o f

d u r i n g W o r l d W a r I, f o r h i m t o m a i n t a i n

m i n o r operations along the

order over m o s t of the frontier, t h o u g h t w o

North-West

Frontier, m o s t n o t a b l y i n t h e T i r a h Valley,

tribes, t h e M o h m a n d s a n d t h e M a h s u d s , d i d

a r o u n d M a l a k a n d , a n d elsewhere, but

rebel i n 1915; the former were subdued b y a

relations w i t h Afghanistan, t h o u g h

blockade, w h i l e t h e latter were n o t quelled

at t i m e s , r e m a i n e d civil, if n o t

strained

u n t i l t w o years later o w i n g t o t h e d e a r t h of

altogether

disposable troops a l o n g t h e Frontier.

friendly. D u r i n g W o r l d W a r I ( 1 9 1 4 - 1 8 ) , British a n d I n d i a n forces w e r e necessarily

T h u s i t w a s t h a t as R o s s - K e p p e l p r e p a r e d

diverted to the Western Front, Gallipoli,

t o step d o w n f r o m his post i n J a n u a r y 1 9 1 9 ,

Palestine a n d M e s o p o t a m i a ( m o d e r n Iraq).

he confidently informed Lord Chelmsford,

V e r y fortunately for administrators i n India,

the Viceroy, that the frontier was peaceful

however, A n g l o - A f g h a n relations stood o n

w i t h a favourable prospect of a quiet

a f r i e n d l y , e v e n c o o p e r a t i v e , basis.

s u m m e r . Yet his p r e d i c t i o n was f l a w e d , for w i t h t h e r e n e w a l of peace i n Europe a n d the

Such was largely o w i n g to the policy of neutrality helpfully pursued throughout the conflict b y the Amir, Habibulla, to w h o m Sultan of Turkey, a n ally of G e r m a n y ,

the

had

a p p e a l e d as l e a d e r o f t h e M u s l i m w o r l d t o join the

jihad

against t h e Allies. T h o u g h

M i d d l e East, H a b i b u l l a h o p e d t o receive f r o m Britain s o m e c o m p e n s a t i o n for t h e policy of cooperation he h a d adopted during the c o n f l i c t , n o t least o w i n g t o t h e great d a n g e r i n w h i c h h e h a d placed himself f r o m those

anxious to prevent a joint Turkish-German

s t i l l a n g e r e d b y h i s f a i l u r e t o assist T u r k e y .

mission f r o m appearing in Kabul during the

Specifically, h e s o u g h t t o reassert h i s

w a r , lest h e risk c r i t i c i s m f r o m h i s d o m e s t i c

c o u n t r y ' s r i g h t t o m a n a g e its o w n f o r e i g n

pro-Turkish opponents, Habibulla prevaricated

affairs a n d t h u s rescind o n e of t h e p r i n c i p a l

a n d b l o c k e d requests for a c t i o n against

terms of the treaty that h a d concluded the

B r i t a i n . H e w e n t so f a r as t o b a r t r i b a l l e a d e r s

Second A f g h a n War. T h e viceroy was,

f r o m o p e r a t i n g against British possessions

however, prepared to consider A f g h a n

along the frontier, even w h i l e

mullahs,

h o p i n g to bring Afghanistan into the war o n t h e side o f t h e C e n t r a l P o w e r s , s o u g h t t o raise t h e b a n n e r of revolt a m o n g s t t h e tribes. A n y s u c h r e v o l t w o u l d h a v e c o m e at a critical t i m e , for m u c h of t h e I n d i a n

Army

requests a n d thus A n g l o - A f g h a n

differences

did n o t appear irreconcilable. Yet before talks c o u l d b e g i n , t h e A m i r w a s assassinated i n his t e n t w i t h a rifle shot, t o be succeeded b y his brother, 27-year-old Nasrulla, i n c o n t e n t i o n for the title of

w a s o p e r a t i n g overseas a n d British reverses

A m i r w i t h Habibula's third son, Amanulla.

i n G a l l i p o l i a n d t h e M i d d l e East e m b o l d e n e d

A s g o v e r n o r o f K a b u l , A m a n u l l a h a d access

those p r e a c h i n g resistance t o t h e a u t h o r i t y of

to t h e treasury a n d arsenal of Kabul a n d , w i t h

A n g l o - I n d i a n rule. M u c h of t h e credit for t h e

t h e support of t h e a r m y , h e arrested Nasrulla,

security o f t h e f r o n t i e r also l a y w i t h t h e C h i e f

charged h i m w i t h Habibula's murder a n d

C o m m i s s i o n e r of the N o r t h - W e s t

Frontier

sentenced h i m t o life i m p r i s o n m e n t before

P r o v i n c e , Sir G e o r g e R o s s - K e p p e l , w h o

p r o c l a i m i n g h i m s e l f A m i r o n 2 8 February.

earnestly cared for t h e welfare of t h e Pathans

A m a n u l l a s h a r e d his father's desire t o free

w h o i n h a b i t e d parts of this region, was fluent

Afghanistan of foreign control, a position

in their language a n d enjoyed their full

s h a r e d b y g e n e r a l o p i n i o n across t h e c o u n t r y .

T h e T h i r d A n g l o - A f g h a n W a r 1919

I n ousting f r o m p o w e r his u n c l e a n d o t h e r

81

disputatious factions. W h a t e v e r t h e Amir's

conservative e l e m e n t s i n society, h o w e v e r ,

i n t e n t i o n s , his c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f ,

the n e w A m i r placed himself i n a precarious

M u h a m e d , d r e w u p a p l a n for a n incursion

p o s i t i o n . By A p r i l 1 9 1 9 , it w a s clear t h a t h e

i n t o I n d i a . British authorities h a d arrested

Saleh

h a d to find some m e t h o d of placating b o t h

at Peshawar a n A f g h a n postmaster, w h o s e

t h e conservative a n d progressive e l e m e n t s

papers revealed t h e outbreak to c o m m e n c e

of society i n order t o r e m a i n i n power.

o n 8 May, to coincide w i t h the appearance

M o r e o v e r , as t h e a r m y s u s p e c t e d h i m

of A f g h a n troops i n the N o r t h - W e s t Province.

of c o m p l i c i t y i n his father's m u r d e r ,

T h e u p r i s i n g n e v e r c a m e t o pass, n o t o n l y

A m a n u l l a felt o b l i g e d t o placate t h e troops

o w i n g to t h e authorities w a r n i n g Ross-Keppel

w i t h increased pay, a n d e v e n seriously

beforehand, but by a premature Afghan

c o n t e m p l a t e d a c a m p a i g n to recover Peshawar

crossing of t h e border b y 1 5 0 A f g h a n troops

as a d i s t r a c t i o n t o h i s d o m e s t i c w o e s .

a t t h e w e s t e r n e n d o f t h e K h y b e r Pass f i v e

W h i l e n a t i o n a l i s m c o n t i n u e d o n t h e rise i n

days before t h e p l a n n e d rising. T h i s i n c u r s i o n

A f g h a n i s t a n , so t o o w e r e r u m b l i n g s o f d i s s e n t

resulted i n t h e occupation of t h e village of

in India, where a nascent independence

Bagh, t h e source of t h e w a t e r s u p p l y for t h e

sepoys

o f t h e K h y b e r Rifles s t a t i o n e d

m o v e m e n t h a d s p r o u t e d b e f o r e W o r l d W a r I.

500

Riots b r o k e o u t i n t h e P u n j a b w i t h fatal

o n the nearby Landi Kotal. M u c h of the

consequences, w h e n o n 11 April troops

A f g h a n countryside h a d already responded

under Brigadier-General Rex D y e r fired o n

to t h e Amir's call, a n d t h o u s a n d s of

a crowd i n Amritsar, resulting i n the deaths

tribesmen converged o n Jalalabad,

of 3 7 9 people a n d injuries to another

1,200.

N o f u r t h e r disorder arose, b u t t h e t r a g e d y h a d a p r o f o u n d effect o n I n d i a n p u b l i c o p i n i o n a n d e n c o u r a g e d A m a n u l l a , w h o s e advisers

stimulating the Indian government to order general mobilization. W h i l e the full extent of A f g h a n

intentions

was n o t k n o w n , Ross-Keppel nevertheless

m i s l e d h i m as t o t h e t r u e e x t e n t o f I n d i a n

advised C h e l m s f o r d to eject t h e

dissent, t o c o n d e m n t h e British for w h a t

t r o o p s f r o m B a g h b e f o r e l o c a l tribes rose i n

h e d e s c r i b e d as h e a v y h a n d e d n e s s a g a i n s t a

their support. T h e garrison at L a n d i Kotal

people w h o h a d loyally supported t h e m i n

h a d n o t b e e n fired u p o n , b u t it c o u l d n o t

Afghan

t h e war. M o r e critically, h e expressed support

d e f e n d itself w i t h o u t u r g e n t

for t h e justice of I n d i a n n a t i o n a l i s t aspirations

A t t h e s a m e t i m e , t h e m a i n seat o f a u t h o r i t y

reinforcement.

a n d , t o p r e v e n t a n y u n r e s t s p i l l i n g across t h e

i n t h e p r o v i n c e , at Peshawar, w h e r e

border, a n n o u n c e d his i n t e n t i o n t o m o v e

of Afridis rioted i n t h e bazaars, h a d to be

mobs

troops u p to the D u r a n d Line, the line of

secured to avert a n y possible insurrection.

demarcation established b e t w e e n British I n d i a

A m e r e b a t t a l i o n w a s a v a i l a b l e t o assist t h e

a n d Afghanistan i n 1893. 'Gird u p your loins,'

I n d i a n s at L a n d i Kotal, a n d o n 7 M a y

h e t o l d t h e tribal chiefs t w o days after

was rapidly transported b y a c o n v o y of

this

Amritsar, 'the t i m e has c o m e . ' A n o t h e r

several d o z e n h e a v y lorries t h r o u g h t h e

jihad w a s u n d e r w a y .

Khyber. O n t h e same day, British authorities

I t is n o t c l e a r i f A m a n u l l a i n t e n d e d t o

closed off Peshawar w i t h a c o r d o n of troops

i n v a d e I n d i a or s i m p l y sought t o b e n e f i t f r o m

a n d police, a n d threatened to d e n y water to

a n y disorder t h a t arose i n t h e P u n j a b , w h e t h e r

t h e city unless t h e ringleaders were

b y t h e d e p l o y m e n t of his o w n troops or

over. T h i s d e m a n d was d u l y m e t a n d t h e

through the instigation of a revolt of the

f o l l o w i n g day Peshawar was out of danger

tribes. W h i c h e v e r o p t i o n h e chose, or if h e

a n d business r e s u m e d i n t h e bazaars. Further

handed

m e r e l y t h r e a t e n e d either course, this p a t e n t l y

British a n d I n d i a n reinforcements were

anti-British stance w o u l d distract a t t e n t i o n

m o v e d u p the Khyber, bringing the

now

f r o m his d o m e s t i c p r o b l e m s , n o t least t h e

of troops at L a n d i K o t a l t o a brigade, u n d e r

strength

religious divisions w i t h i n A f g h a n i s t a n ,

Crocker, a n d o n 9 M a y it a t t a c k e d t h e

a n d consolidate support f r o m otherwise

A f g h a n p o s i t i o n s at B a g h .

Warring sides

T h e A f g h a n s at this t i m e m a i n t a i n e d a

b y territorial units composed of part-time

regular s t a n d i n g force of a p p r o x i m a t e l y

soldiers o r i g i n a l l y i n t e n d e d for t h e defence

5 0 , 0 0 0 m e n , o r g a n i z e d i n t o 75 battalions

of the U n i t e d K i n g d o m , but w h o had, w h e n

of infantry, 2 1 cavalry regiments a n d m o d e r n pieces of artillery. To

280

supplement

m o b i l i z e d at t h e o u t b r e a k of t h e war, v o l u n t e e r e d for overseas service a n d b e e n

these forces, t h e g o v e r n m e n t i n K a b u l c o u l d

sent to I n d i a to replace regular units w h o

c a l l u p o n as m a n y as 8 0 , 0 0 0

w e r e d e p l o y e d t o t h e W e s t e r n F r o n t or, l a t e r ,

tribesmen

operating i n a n irregular capacity. To oppose

t h e M i d d l e East. M o r a l e w a s l o w : after f o u r

them, the Indian Army maintained

years o f d u l l service i n I n d i a t h e soldiers w e r e

eight

divisions, five i n d e p e n d e n t brigades a n d

anxious to return h o m e and were not keen

three brigades of cavalry, n o t

t o f i g h t t h e A f g h a n s - so m u c h so t h a t

including

Frontier Militias. Formidable t h o u g h

they

many

w e r e i n c l i n e d t o disobey a n y call for active

were in numbers, their quality could n o

d e p l o y m e n t a n d o n l y declined to carry out

longer m a t c h those of the 1914 I n d i a n Army,

their i n t e n t i o n s u p o n t h e direct appeal of the

f o r m a n y o f its best t r o o p s h a d b e e n lost i n

c o m m a n d e r - i n - c h i e f i n I n d i a . If b o t h C r o w n

t h e f i g h t i n g i n F r a n c e a n d t h e M i d d l e East,

a n d I n d i a n A r m y forces suffered f r o m

a n d w i t h m a n y r e g i m e n t s still overseas

deficiencies i n m a n p o w e r a n d morale,

a w a i t i n g d e m o b i l i z a t i o n , those left b e h i n d

c o m p e n s a t i o n could nevertheless be f o u n d

i n I n d i a were c o m p o s e d of green recruits.

i n technology, w i t h m a c h i n e guns, armoured

W i t h respect t o u n i t s of t h e British A r m y , of the 6 1 regiments stationed i n the

cars, r a d i o c o m m u n i c a t i o n s ,

motorized

transport a n d aircraft all used i n t h e war.

s u b c o n t i n e n t i n 1 9 1 4 , all b u t eight i n f a n t r y a n d t w o cavalry regiments h a d b e e n sent

Afghan officers during t h e third Anglo-Afghan W a n 1919.

overseas t o fight. T h e i r places w e r e filled

(Photo by H u l t o n Archive/Getty Images)

"he fightin

W h e n o n 9 M a y Anglo-Indian troops attacked

w e r e t o p l a y a c e n t r a l p a r t i n h i s s t r a t e g y , as h e

t h e A f g h a n positions at Bagh, h a l f t h e

e x p l a i n e d t o C h e l m s f o r d ' s p r i v a t e secretary:

attacking force h a d b e e n d e t a c h e d t o protect the northern flank, leaving insufficient

There will shortly be a big collection

numbers w i t h w h i c h to capture all their

of troops a n d t r i b e s m e n at D a k k a .

o b j e c t i v e s . S t i l l , s o m e success w a s a c h i e v e d

W e c a n use a e r o p l a n e s t o s m a s h u p t h e i r

w h e n t h r e e R o y a l Air Force (RAF) aircraft

e n c a m p m e n t at D a k k a . W e h a v e

l a u n c h e d a raid o n t r i b e s m e n at Dacca, just

four aeroplanes here, a n d a n attack o n

twenty-

over t h e border i n A f g h a n i s t a n . T w o days later

D a k k a a n d possibly o n Jalalabad

the British resumed their attack, this t i m e

t h e air w o u l d n o t o n l y t a k e t h e h e a r t o u t

from

w i t h 18 pieces of artillery a n d 2 2 m a c h i n e

of the Afghans b u t w o u l d give all those

guns covering the lead attack executed b y the

w h o are at present h a l f - h e a r t e d a v e r y

2 n d N o r t h Staffordshires a n d t w o battalions

g o o d excuse for p u l l i n g out.

of the 1 1 t h Gurkhas, w h o forced t h e Afghans back at t h e p o i n t of t h e b a y o n e t . RAF planes s t r a f e d t h e A f g h a n s as t h e y r e t i r e d b a c k o v e r

Capture o f t h e fortress at Spin Baldak by Anglo-Indian t r o o p s during t h e T h i r d Afghan W a r 27 May 19 19. A late

t h e frontier. Ross-Keppel, seeking to ensure

19th century structure situated on t h e road f r o m t h e

that the Afghans did n o t r e n e w their offensive

Bolan Pass t o Kandahar it could n o t withstand m o d e r n

i n t o I n d i a , d e t e r m i n e d u p o n a p u r s u i t as f a r

artillery and aerial b o m b a r d m e n t . In t h e f o r e g r o u n d Sikh

as D a c c a , w h e r e t h e B r i t i s h c a m p f o u n d i t s e l f b o m b a r d e d f r o m a r t i l l e r y a t l o n g r a n g e as w e l l as t h e o b j e c t o f a n i n f a n t r y a t t a c k . A i r c r a f t

crews man a mountain battery, but in reality t h e artillery deployed was field pieces o f t h e Royal A r t i l l e r y . T h e f o r t fell after hand-to-hand fighting b e t w e e n British infantry (background) and Afghan regulars.

84


T h e British r e p u l s e d t h e assault a n d

Eustace. B e l i e v i n g t h a t T h a i , at t h e s o u t h e r n

l a u n c h e d a c o u n t e r - a t t a c k t h e f o l l o w i n g day,

e n d of the K u r r a m Valley, appeared the

b u t it was n o t u n t i l 17 M a y t h a t t h e Afghans

likeliest target, h e sent reinforcements,

w i t h d r e w f r o m their positions, leaving their

bringing local strength u p to o n l y 8 0 0 y o u n g

guns behind. Operations

a n d inexperienced I n d i a n troops, w i t h four

nevertheless

continued to be hindered by

unanticipated

unrest d e v e l o p i n g i n t h e rear of t h e British

m o u n t a i n g u n s a n d t w o m o r t a r s . T h e r e also r e m a i n e d the possibility that the Afghans

p o s i t i o n e x t e n d i n g t h r o u g h t h e K h y b e r Pass,

w o u l d attack further south, in the upper

h e l d b y t h e K h y b e r Rifles. T h i s i n d i g e n o u s

Tochi Valley, defended b y the N o r t h

force, w h i c h h a d served loyally i n actions

Waziristan M i l i t i a w h o could n o t be

as r e c e n t l y as 1 9 0 8 , b e g a n l o s i n g m e n v i a

expected to h o l d their position without

desertion, a n d w i t h discipline failing a n d

assistance f r o m regular forces, of w h i c h

disaffection g r o w i n g , Ross-Keppel felt

Eustace c o u l d p r o v i d e n o n e . H e therefore

c o m p e l l e d to d i s a r m a n d d i s b a n d t h e corps.

o r d e r e d t h e m i l i t i a posts t o be e v a c u a t e d ,

Moreover, w i t h additional trouble brewing

u p o n w h i c h t h e Wazirs of Tochi rebelled

i n a n d a r o u n d Peshawar, troops were

a n d the Waziris a n d Afridis w i t h i n the

dispatched to observe the situation a n d quell

m i l i t i a deserted or w e r e otherwise

a n y p o t e n t i a l r e v o l t . As a m e a n s o f s t r i k i n g

u n f i t for purpose.

at t h e heart of t h e disaffecting influence, C h e l m s f o r d chose to attack Afghanistan

deemed

M u t i n y arose t h r o u g h o u t t h e area, p a r t i c u l a r l y a r o u n d W a n a , t h e base of t h e

sepoys

itself, a n d o r d e r e d his force t o c o n t i n u e

South Waziristan Militia, where

the advance f r o m Dacca to Jalalabad.

t h e treasury a n d a store of a m m u n i t i o n .

N o sooner w a s this offensive m e a n t t o get

raided

O n l y t h r o u g h the most trying circumstances

u n d e r w a y t h a n circumstances i n the south

w a s t h e c o m m a n d a n t , M a j o r G u y Russell,

t o o k a t u r n for the worse. Together w i t h the

able t o survive his b r e a k - o u t t o safety b y

a t t a c k t h r o u g h t h e K h y b e r Pass, t h e A f g h a n s

m o v i n g south w i t h a small c o n t i n g e n t of

h a d p l a n n e d t w o others: one i n the K u r r a m ,

loyal m i l i t i a m e n , suffering u n d e r a terrible

a n d t h e other against Quetta. T h e

British

sun a n d constant attack by tribesmen a n d

sepoys

r e a c t e d f r o m Q u e t t a first, t h o u g h , crossing

rebel

t h e f r o n t i e r a n d c a p t u r i n g t h e fortress of

w i t h a relief force of m i l i t i a f r o m Z h o b .

u n t i l his force m a d e contact

Spin Baldak o n 27 M a y , forestalling a n y

Disaffection h a d proved the u n d o i n g of

further Afghan activity in the south, but

several units, i n c l u d i n g t h e S o u t h Waziristan

where

Militia, w h i c h was disbanded, together

c i r c u m s t a n c e s a p p e a r e d less h e a r t e n i n g .

w i t h m u c h o f its n o r t h e r n c o u n t e r p a r t .

I n Khost, west of the K u r r a m Valley,

T h e K h y b e r Rifles also ceased t o exist o n

G e n e r a l N a d i r K h a n , t h e best o f t h e

t h e basis t h a t , w i t h a u t h o r i t y b r o k e n

A f g h a n leaders, led 14 battalions t o t a l l i n g

t h r o u g h o u t Waziristan, British authorities

n o t a f f e c t i n g affairs f u r t h e r n o r t h

3 , 0 0 0 w e l l - e q u i p p e d troops, b u t his

could n o longer rely o n such units,

i n t e n t i o n s were u n k n o w n to his British

d e p e n d e n t u p o n r e c r u i t m e n t of local

counterpart, Brigadier-General

levies, for f r o n t i e r security.

Alexander

down

How the war ended

N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g t h e lawlessness g r i p p i n g

a fairly o p e n v a l l e y b e t w e e n steep hills.

Waziristan, British authorities h a d h i g h e r

There was n o w i n d a n d b u t little water,

priorities t h a n restoring order there. N a d i r

a n d as t h e d a y a d v a n c e d t h e s t o n y

K h a n h a d m o v e d a g a i n s t T h a i , l a y i n g siege t o

hillsides b e c a m e a furnace, t h e n a k e d

t h e t o w n o n 2 7 M a y . T h e r e , Eustace suffered

r o c k s t h r o w i n g b a c k t h e s u n so t h a t i t

f r o m a n u m b e r of disadvantages: fewer troops

s e e m e d t o s t r i k e f r o m t h e g r o u n d as

a n d guns t h a n his adversary, a shortage of

f r o m t h e sky.

supplies a n d a n i n e x p e r i e n c e d I n d i a n force, n o n e of w h o m h a d served i n t h e Great War.

D e p l o y i n g his guns against b o t h

A l l t o l d , it was n o t clear if h e c o u l d d e f e n d

b o d i e s , D y e r b e g a n f i r i n g as h e o r d e r e d

t h e place for a n e x t e n d e d p e r i o d a n d a n e w

f o r w a r d his i n f a n t r y against t h e A f g h a n s '

enemy

division, m o v i n g f r o m Lahore to Peshawar

s o u t h e r n position. T h e artillery sufficed to

a n d i n t e n d e d for a n advance o n Jalalabad, was

force t h e t r i b e s m e n to w i t h d r a w before a n

directed instead to K u r r a m , w h e r e elements

infantry battle ensued, a n d by the e n d of

were detached to garrison t h e u n d e f e n d e d

t h e d a y T h a i l a y o p e n t o Dyer's forces.

t o w n of Kohat. At t h e same t i m e , a brigade

O n t h e f o l l o w i n g day, 2 June, D y e r

under Dyer was directed to m o v e hastily to

l a u n c h e d a n offensive t o t h e west; b u t at

relieve T h a i . But D y e r was t h e w r o n g m a n for

this p o i n t N a d i r K h a n sent f o r w a r d a n e n v o y

t h e j o b . Plagued b y illness a n d suffering f r o m

bearing a flag of truce a n d requesting a

fatigue, his r e p u t a t i o n has b e e n t a r n i s h e d b y

ceasefire. As his t r o o p s w e r e a l r e a d y f u l l y

t h e Amritsar massacre. M o r e o v e r , his troops,

c o m m i t t e d to the fight, Dyer resumed the

were of uncertain quality: m a d e u p of

attack, b u t before m a k i n g contact t h e Afghans

Territorials k e e n t o d e m o b i l i z e a n d local troops

w i t h d r e w w e s t w a r d s , w i t h a r m o u r e d cars,

of indifferent quality, a l t h o u g h h e d i d have

a i r c r a f t a n d c a v a l r y i n p u r s u i t . B o t h sides

some reliable G u r k h a s a n d Punjabis. H o w e v e r ,

concluded a n armistice o n 3 June. Militarily,

Dyer showed himself capable of inspiring

D y e r h a d f i n i s h e d t h e w a r o n a successful

t h e m , a n d t h o u g h short of food a n d water

note, but the Amritsar incident continued to

a n d s e l d o m t a k i n g rest o n t h e m a r c h u n d e r a

plague h i m . N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g his insistence

b l a z i n g s u n f r o m Peshawar, his forces c o v e r e d

that he h a d prevented a general insurrection

ground rapidly until they f o u n d b o t h the

i n the Punjab, he was relieved of c o m m a n d

n o r t h e r n a n d s o u t h e r n routes to T h a i blocked.

a n d d i e d a f e w years later i n Britain.

Dyer's biographer recorded t h e situation thus:

T h e peace c o n f e r e n c e o p e n e d at R a w a l p i n d i i n July. T h e A f g h a n s w e r e i n n o

A t T o g h , t h e G e n e r a l addressed his troops,

m o o d to be conciliated, despite t h e fact t h a t

e x h o r t i n g t h e m to m a k e a great effort to

t h e y h a d b e e n evicted f r o m I n d i a n soil. After

rescue t h e i r c o m r a d e s at T h a i . H i s w o r d s

h e a t e d discussions a treaty was

t o u c h e d t h e hearts of t h a t strangely

out a n d signed o n 8 August, w i t h the

assorted force o f v e t e r a n s a n d w a r levies,

Afghans achieving their principal aim: the

P u n j a b i peasants a n d L o n d o n m e n of

r i g h t t o c o n d u c t t h e i r o w n f o r e i g n affairs.

hammered

b u s i n e s s so t h a t t h e y m a r c h e d t o t h e l a s t

B o t h s i d e s r e a f f i r m e d t h e D u r a n d L i n e as t h e

of their strength; some of t h e m d r o p p e d

border, a n d the Afghans m a d e a n

i n their tracks. A t f o u r o'clock i n t h e

p l e d g e n o t t o interfere i n t h e p o l i t i c a l affairs

m o r n i n g o n 3 1 M a y t h e y set o u t a l o n g

of t h e tribes a l o n g t h e N o r t h - W e s t

important

Frontier.

Conclusion and consequences

T h e First Afghan W a n I 8 3 9 - 4 2

o t h e r a s s u r a n c e s t o B r i t a i n a b o u t its

N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g the reoccupation of Kabul

that could not have been accomplished

b y Pollock's force i n 1 8 4 2 , t h e r e p u t a t i o n of

through

intentions, but n o t h i n g h a d been achieved

B r i t i s h a r m s h a d s u f f e r e d c o n s i d e r a b l y as a

diplomacy.

T h e true e x t e n t of t h e w h o l e disastrous

consequence of Elphinstone's ill-fated retreat

enterprise c a m e t o l i g h t o n l y a year after

t o J a l a l a b a d , r e v e a l i n g t h a t t h e forces o f t h e

E l p h i n s t o n e ' s sacrifice of t h e A r m y of t h e

British A r m y a n d EIC - albeit small i n that

Indus, w h e n Dost M o h a m e d returned to

particular c a m p a i g n - could be overcome.

this t h r o n e , complete w i t h British approval.

W i t h i n t h e C o m p a n y ' s forces t h e m s e l v e s ,

T h e r e h e w o u l d r e m a i n i n p o w e r for t w o

particularly those of the Bengal contingent,

decades, n o t o n l y peacefully inclined

some of the

sepoy

regiments had

performed

indifferently, a n d t h e b o n d s of trust b e t w e e n British officers a n d t h e

sepoys

had palpably

w e a k e n e d . F r o m a political perspective,

t o w a r d s British I n d i a , b u t also u n w i l l i n g t o b o w t o t h e pressure of Russian e x p a n s i o n i s m . M o s t astonishing of all, w h e n t h e R a j f a c e d i t s g r e a t e s t crisis o f a l l

A u c k l a n d ' s p l a n h a d failed. Russian forces

and depended o n non-interference

n e v e r e n t e r e d A f g h a n soil i n s u p p o r t of t h e i r

A f g h a n i s t a n - d u r i n g t h e great m u t i n y that

P e r s i a n a l l i e s , m u c h less t h r e a t e n e d B r i t i s h

was to engulf n o r t h e r n a n d central India

I n d i a v i a t h e B o l a n o r K h y b e r passes; a

between 1857 and 1858 - Dost

consequence n o t of t h e EIC's m i l i t a r y

r e m a i n e d obligingly neutral. His neutrality

presence i n t h e c o u n t r y , n o r of S h a h Shuja's

freed British authorities to divert troops

efforts, b u t of n e g o t i a t i o n s u n d e r w a y at t h e

from the Punjab which, having only been

Foreign Office i n L o n d o n a n d t h e Russian

a n n e x e d i n 1 8 4 9 after t w o conflicts w i t h

from

Mohamed

F o r e i g n M i n i s t r y i n St P e t e r s b u r g . A t g r e a t

Britain, c o u l d w e l l h a v e staged a rebellion,

expense i n life a n d m o n e y , t h e w a r

a n d a l l o w e d t h e m c o n c e n t r a t e o n t h e crisis

had

achieved n o t h i n g except to engender

Afghan

hostility towards Britain - specifically British I n d i a . It was exactly t h e reverse of

T h e f u n d a m e n t a l p r o b l e m of t h e British

Auckland's i n t e n d e d policy.

p l a n i n t h e First A f g h a n W a r l a y a r o u n d t h e

V i r t u a l l y n o t h i n g h a d b e e n achieved, for even a cursory e x a m i n a t i o n of the

a r o u n d D e l h i a n d i n O u d h , h u n d r e d s of m i l e s t o t h e east.

outcome

of t h e w a r reveals t h a t t h e circumstances

had

h a r d l y c h a n g e d , except for t h e worse, since

fact t h a t t h e principal a i m , t h e

replacement

of a supposedly anti-British A m i r w i t h one favourably inclined towards L o n d o n

and

Calcutta - w h a t m a y n o w be t e r m e d 'regime

A u c k l a n d h a d l a u n c h e d his enterprise i n

change' - p r o v e d entirely unnecessary.

1 8 3 9 . T h e Russians c o n t i n u e d t o m a k e

T w o c e n t r a l issues h a d n o t b e e n p r o p e r l y

territorial gains i n C e n t r a l Asia, a n d t h e

e x a m i n e d w h e n Auckland dispatched the

EIC's a r m i e s h a d t o g e t h e r lost 1 5 , 0 0 0 officers

e x p e d i t i o n : firstly, t h e r e a c t i o n t h a t c o u l d

a n d m e n ( m o s t l y f r o m disease), q u i t e apart

be e x p e c t e d f r o m t h e various A f g h a n tribes,

f r o m m a n y thousands of c a m p followers.

all fiercely i n d e p e n d e n t , to forcibly i m p o s i n g

Fifty t h o u s a n d camels h a d died i n the w a r

o n t h e m a former ruler of Afghanistan w i t h

a n d t h e cost t o t h e Treasury a m o u n t e d t o

a n u n c e r t a i n degree of popularity; a n d

n e a r l y £ 2 0 m i l l i o n . Russia h e l p f u l l y g a v e u p

secondly, a n e x a m i n a t i o n of t h e prospects of

its c l a i m t o K h i v a a n d p r o v i d e d a n u m b e r

A n g l o - I n d i a n forces r e t a i n i n g c o n t r o l of t h e

of

C o n c l u s i o n and c o n s e q u e n c e s

country, presuming that they could conquer

a m o n t h before his w i t h d r a w a l f r o m t h e

it i n t h e first p l a c e , itself a v e r y s p e c u l a t i v e

capital, confessed to M a c n a g h t e n t h a t t h e

proposition. These were questions that

w h o l e enterprise h a d been a failure:

exercised c o n t e m p o r a r i e s b u t n o t , a p p a r e n t l y , t h e G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l , at least

A n d yet, under the most

n o t w i t h sufficient d e p t h . W i t h

events, I w o u l d h a v e y o u share t h e

remarkable

favourable

foresight, M o u n t s t u a r t E l p h i n s t o n e , t h e

f e e l i n g w h i c h is g r o w i n g s t r o n g l y

former governor of B o m b a y w h o h a d b e e n

u p o n m e - that the maintenance

p r o p o s e d as G o v e r n o r - G e n e r a l i n 1 8 3 5

the position w h i c h we attempted to

but

of

d e c l i n e d it, o u t l i n e d t o a f r i e n d these v e r y

e s t a b l i s h i n A f g h a n i s t a n is n o

points o n the eve of t h e invasion:

to be l o o k e d to, a n d t h a t after our

longer

e x p e r i e n c e o f t h e last t w o w e e k s

[under

... w e h a v e [ n o w ] a s s u m e d t h e p r o t e c t i o n

siege a n d c o n s t a n t a t t a c k ] it m u s t

o f t h e s t a t e [ o f A f g h a n i s t a n ] as m u c h as

t o b e , if n o t i n v a i n , y e t u p o n e v e r y

appear

if it w e r e o n e o f t h e subsidiary allies i n

c o n s i d e r a t i o n of p r u d e n c e far t o o

India. If y o u send 2 7 , 0 0 0 m e n u p t h e

hazardous a n d costly i n m o n e y a n d i n

B o l a n Pass t o C a n d a h a r (as w e h e a r is

life f o r us t o c o n t i n u e t o w r e s t l e a g a i n s t

intended), a n d can feed t h e m , I h a v e

the universal opinion, national

n o doubt y o u will take C a n d a h a r

r e l i g i o u s , w h i c h h a s b e e n so s u d d e n l y

and

and

C a u b u l a n d set u p [ S h a h ] S o o j a h ; b u t f o r

a n d so s t r o n g l y b r o u g h t i n t o a r r a y

m a i n t a i n i n g h i m i n a poor, cold, strong

against us.

and remote country, a m o n g a turbulent people like t h e A f g h a n s , I o w n it seems

The Indian government made a pathetic

to m e to be hopeless.

attempt to claim victory i n the f o r m of a T h e battle o f Miani, t h e principal engagement o f Sir

I n t h e e v e n t , of course, A n g l o - I n d i a n forces did take Kabul a n d establish S h a h Shuja the throne, but even William

on

Elphinstone,

Charles Napier's conquest o f Sind in 1843, w h e n he defeated t h e Baluchis and annexed t h e i r country, w i t h its capital at Hyderabad. (Author's collection)

87

88


p r o c l a m a t i o n issued b y L o r d

Ellenborough

Britain. Dost M o h a m e d was A m i r once again;

at S i m l a o n 1 O c t o b e r 1 8 4 3 , exactly four

S h a h S h u j a w a s d e a d , w i t h his sons i n exile

years after A u c k l a n d h a d issued his o w n

i n India, a n d t h e British were back o n the

proclamation justifying intervention

Sutlej. Total a n d i g n o m i n i o u s failure did not,

in

A f g h a n a f f a i r s . E l l e n b o r o u g h w e n t so f a r as

o n the other h a n d , appear to discomfort

t o r e p u d i a t e A u c k l a n d ' s p o l i c y w h i l e still

B r i t i s h a u t h o r i t i e s i n t h e least, l e a v i n g s o m e

shamelessly asserting t h a t s o m e g o o d h a d

shockingly similar mistakes to be repeated

emerged f r o m the conflict:

less t h a n f o u r d e c a d e s l a t e r : f i r s t , i n t h e f a c t t h a t t h e Russian threat h a d receded even

Disasters u n p a r a l l e l e d i n their e x t e n t ,

before the war h a d begun; a n d second, that

unless b y t h e errors i n w h i c h

w h i l e prior to hostilities t h e Afghans were

they

at least n e u t r a l a n d at best f r i e n d l y , at t h e i r

originated, a n d by the treachery in w h i c h they were completed, having in

conclusion t h e y stood justifiably hostile

one short c a m p a i g n been avenged

a n d resentful.

upon

every scene of past m i s f o r t u n e s ; a n d

But p e r h a p s t h e greatest d a m a g e d o n e

repeated victories i n the field, a n d the

t o B r i t a i n as a r e s u l t o f t h e w a r w a s

c a p t u r e o f t h e cities a n d citadels of

psychological rather t h a n political or

G h a z n i a n d Cabul, have again attracted

f i n a n c i a l , a n d t h u s s o m e w h a t defies analysis.

the o p i n i o n of invincibility to the

T h e b l o w m a d e against British prestige c o u l d

British arms.

n o t be entirely e x p u n g e d b y the subsequent

T h e British a r m y i n possession of

v i c t o r i e s a c h i e v e d b y P o l l o c k , N o t t a n d Sale,

Afghanistan will n o w be w i t h d r a w n

a n d inevitably adversely affected morale i n

to the Sutlej. T h e

t h e C o m p a n y ' s a r m i e s w h i c h , at t h e e n d of

Governor-General

w i l l leave it to t h e A f g h a n s themselves

t h e day, r e m a i n e d t h e bedrock of British

t o create a g o v e r n m e n t a m i d s t t h e

power in India. Ellenborough m a y

a n a r c h y w h i c h is t h e

s o u g h t t o u p h o l d I n d i a n n o t i o n s of respect

consequence

have

for their overlords, a n d to boost the Army's

o f t h e i r c r i m e s ... C o n t e n t w i t h the limits nature appears

m o r a l e a n d r e s t o r e its c o n f i d e n c e i n B r i t i s h

t o h a v e a s s i g n e d t o its e m p i r e , t h e

leadership, b u t n o n e of these measures could

g o v e r n m e n t of I n d i a w i l l devote all

e n t i r e l y efface t h e m e m o r y of t h e retreat

its e f f o r t s t o t h e e s t a b l i s h m e n t

and

f r o m Kabul. O n l y a h a n d f u l of

sepoys -

m a i n t e n a n c e of general peace, to the

p r o b a b l y those w h o deserted ranks i n the

p r o t e c t i o n of t h e sovereigns a n d chiefs,

f i r s t d a y o r t w o - m a d e i t b a c k t o I n d i a as

its allies, a n d t o t h e p r o s p e r i t y

and

h a p p i n e s s o f its o w n f a i t h f u l subjects ... T h e enormous expenditure required f o r t h e s u p p o r t o f a large force i n a false

survivors of t h a t h a r r o w i n g episode, but t h e y b r o u g h t w i t h t h e m accounts of execrable British p l a n n i n g , shockingly

incompetent

leadership a n d instances of cowardice that

m i l i t a r y p o s i t i o n , a t a d i s t a n c e f r o m its

m u s t h a v e eroded trust a n d w e a k e n e d the

f r o n t i e r a n d its r e s o u r c e s , w i l l n o l o n g e r

bonds that existed b e t w e e n the

arrest e v e r y m e a s u r e for t h e

r a n k - a n d - f i l e a n d t h e i r British officers.

improvement

of the country a n d of the people.

Indian

T h e M u t i n y w a s still 15 years i n t h e f u t u r e , b u t t h e r e is s o m e b a s i s f o r t h e t h e o r y t h a t

I n s u m m a r y , t h e w a r cost vast s u m s o f m o n e y , t h o u g h this w a s scarcely a p p a r e n t i n Britain, for t h e e c o n o m i c b u r d e n h a d fallen almost exclusively o n the shoulders of the I n d i a n r e v e n u e , c r i p p l i n g its f i n a n c e s f o r

t h e first seeds o f t h e r e v o l t w e r e s o w n d u r i n g the fateful year of 1842. H e n r y Lawrence, C h i e f C o m m i s s i o n e r of the Punjab, numbered amongst m a n y w h o

supported

this hypothesis:

years t o c o m e . British i n t e r v e n t i o n i n A f g h a n i s t a n h a d left n o c h a n g e except a

A t C a b u l w e lost a n a r m y , a n d w e lost

legacy of mistrust a n d h a t r e d b y Afghans for

some character w i t h the

surrounding


89

states. B u t I h o l d t h a t b y far o u r w o r s t

outside. I n June 1879, i n the wake of the

loss w a s i n t h e c o n f i d e n c e o f o u r N a t i v e

Treaty of G a n d a m a k , w h e n peace seemed to

soldiery. Better h a d it b e e n for o u r f a m e

h a v e b e e n secured for t h e l o n g - t e r m ,

if o u r harassed t r o o p s h a d r u s h e d o n

e x p l a i n e d to C r a n b r o o k precisely these

the e n e m y a n d perished to a m a n , t h a n

hopelessly optimistic a n d naive terms:

Lytton

t h a t s u r v i v i n g Sepoys s h o u l d be able to tell t h e tales t h e y c a n of w h a t t h e y saw

I t h i n k y o u need be u n d e r n o

at C a b u l .

a b o u t t h e satisfactory e x e c u t i o n

E u r o p e a n soldiers a n d officers are

anxiety and

results of t h e K a b u l T r e a t y or a n y

p l a c e d as e x a m p l e s t o N a t i v e t r o o p s , a n d

troubles i n Afghanistan

a g l o r i o u s o n e t h e y h a v e g e n e r a l l y set i n

o n t h e w i t h d r a w a l o f o u r t r o o p s ... T h e

consequent

the field; but w h o can estimate the evil

A f g h a n s w i l l like a n d respect us all t h e

w h e n t h e e x a m p l e is b a d - w h e n i t is

m o r e for t h e t h r a s h i n g w e h a v e g i v e n

not the Hindustani (most exposed to

Sher A l i a n d t h e lesson w e h a v e t a u g h t

c o l d , a n d least able t o bear it) w h o

t o Russia ... T h e A f g h a n p e o p l e c e r t a i n l y

clamours for retreat a n d capitulation,

d o n o t v i e w us w i t h a n y i l l - w i l l .

b u t t h e c r y is r a i s e d b y t h e m e n h e h a s been accustomed to look up to and to

Such views, like those expressed d u r i n g

l e a n u p o n as a s u r e r e s o u r c e i n e v e r y

t h e first war, s m a c k e d o f a d a n g e r o u s

emergent peril.

m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g of the A f g h a n

mentality.

A l t h o u g h f r o m a military p o i n t of view the second war clearly e n d e d o n a higher

note

The Second Afghan War, I 878-8 I

t h a n t h e first, parallels n e v e r t h e l e s s r e m a i n ,

W h i l e British policy h a d originally entailed

t r e a s u r y , q u i t e a p a r t f r o m t h e h u m a n losses

d i v i d i n g A f g h a n i s t a n after t h e defeat of A y u b

- a p p r o x i m a t e l y 8 , 0 0 0 d e a t h s f r o m disease

K h a n , this was n o t pursued,

a n d some 1,850 killed i n action or died

n o t least i n t h e m a n n e r i n w h i c h t h e w a r resulted i n a severe d r a i n o n t h e

notwithstanding

Indian

some debate about the viability of o c c u p y i n g

o f w o u n d s , w h i l e A f g h a n losses d e f y

K a n d a h a r f o r a n e x t e n d e d p e r i o d . I n f a c t , as

e s t i m a t i o n . As i n t h e first w a r , t e r r i t o r i a l

n o t e d earlier, all British garrisons w i t h d r e w

concessions f o l l o w e d , w i t h t h e

f r o m t h e c o u n t r y a n d A b d u r R a h m a n was left

i m p o r t a n t K u r r a m V a l l e y a n d K h y b e r Pass

strategically

t o c o n s o l i d a t e h i s r u l e across A f g h a n i s t a n ,

given over to British responsibility b y A b d u r

t h o u g h w i t h some territorial concessions

R a h m a n . T h e ostensible cause of t h e s e c o n d

granted to British India, i n c l u d i n g t h e

war, m o r e o v e r - to l i m i t Russian influence

strategically i m p o r t a n t areas o f P i s h i n a n d

i n A f g h a n i s t a n - a g a i n i n its basic t e r m s

Sibi, near Q u e t t a , a n d t h e K u r r a m Valley,

r e s e m b l e d t h e m o t i v e s b e h i n d t h e first a n d ,

together w i t h t h e p o w e r t o oversee t h e Afridi

as b e f o r e , h a d n e v e r m a n i f e s t e d i t s e l f as a

c o u n t r y a r o u n d t h e K h y b e r Pass. R e l a t i o n s

b o n a fide threat.

w i t h Abdur R a h m a n proceeded o n a largely

I f , as i n 1 8 4 2 , A f g h a n r e l a t i o n s w i t h

a m i c a b l e basis i n t h e y e a r s t h a t f o l l o w e d t h e

Britain h a d been soured, they were n o better

S e c o n d A f g h a n W a r , w i t h Russia e x c l u d e d

w i t h t h e Russians, for w h o m A b d u r

f r o m a n y i n v o l v e m e n t i n t h e f o r e i g n affairs

e n t e r t a i n e d s t r o n g s u s p i c i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y as

of t h e c o u n t r y , t h o u g h she c o n t i n u e d t o

a result of t h e Russian incursions a l o n g t h e

expand beyond the H i n d u Kush.

northern Afghan border that

As w i t h t h e first c o n f l i c t ,

Indian

Rahman

culminated

i n the a n n e x a t i o n of M e r v i n 1884 a n d the

g o v e r n m e n t officials consistently b e l i e v e d

o c c u p a t i o n of t h e P a n j d e n Oasis a y e a r later.

t h e A f g h a n s w e l l disposed t o at least l i m i t e d

T h e s e e v e n t s p u s h e d B r i t a i n a n d Russia close

British i n f l u e n c e i n A f g h a n affairs a n d , m o r e

to war and emphasized b o t h to the Afghans

remarkably, to leaders i m p o s e d f r o m t h e

a n d t h e British t h e n e e d t o clarify t h e precise

90


demarcation of the hitherto vaguely

defined

N o r t h - W e s t Frontier. I n 1 8 9 3 , therefore,

T h e citadel at Kandahar showing t h e main gate, August I 880. (Author's collection)

A b d u r R a h m a n o p e n e d discussions w i t h the g o v e r n m e n t i n Calcutta respecting a

The Third Afghan War, 1919

c o n f e r e n c e f o r t h i s p u r p o s e . Sir M o r t i m e r D u r a n d a n d his mission d u l y arrived i n

T h e conclusion of the T h i r d A f g h a n W a r did

K a b u l o n 2 October. After several weeks

n o t e n d troubles for British authorities i n

of discussions, t h e m i s s i o n agreed o n

I n d i a , for t h e f i g h t i n g h a d caused unrest that

13 N o v e m b e r t o raise t h e s u b s i d y t o t h e

c o u l d n o t be i m m e d i a t e l y quelled, especially

A m i r i n r e t u r n for a treaty delineating t h e

in Waziristan, where the trouble deepened.

b o u n d a r y f r o m Chitral to Peshawar

and

T h e d i s b a n d m e n t or break-up of militia units

f r o m there to the p o i n t of juncture

between

i n the N o r t h - W e s t Frontier was naturally

Persia, A f g h a n i s t a n a n d B a l u c h i s t a n .

s e e n b y l o c a l t r i b e s m e n as a n

T h e n e w border, stretching m o r e

to f o m e n t trouble. T h e Mahsuds a n d Wazirs,

than

opportunity

a t h o u s a n d m i l e s , b e c a m e k n o w n as

t h o u g h t r a d i t i o n a l rivals, f o u n d a c o m m o n

t h e D u r a n d Line, a n d t h o u g h it solved

purpose i n exploiting British weakness

the p r o b l e m b e t w e e n British India

and

A f g h a n i s t a n , it n e v e r satisfied t h e various

a n d u n i t i n g a g a i n s t t h e m , m a k i n g use of w e a p o n s a n d a m m u n i t i o n l o o t e d or b r o u g h t

affected tribes w h o c l u n g fiercely to their

t o t h e f i e l d b y deserters f r o m t h e m i l i t i a ,

traditional independence a n d regularly

w h o possessed a degree o f m i l i t a r y

defied Anglo-Indian attempts to put

down

t h e i r revolts, t h e first b e i n g i n C h i t r a l i n

e x p e r i e n c e a n d t r a i n i n g useful t o t h e rebels. T h u s b e g a n years of o p p o s i t i o n to British

early 1 8 9 5 . T h u s , after Britain's second

authority, opposition that was to continue

n e a r l y fruitless conflict w i t h A f g h a n i s t a n ,

well into the 1930s.

I n d i a was left w i t h m a r g i n a l l y greater s e c u r i t y o n its w e s t e r n f r i n g e s , b u t

T h e war was hardly over w h e n , i n N o v e m b e r 1 9 1 9 , t h e B r i t i s h m a d e t h e i r first

w i t h t h e relentless task of p o l i c i n g

attempt to subdue the insurrection, w i t h

that perennially troubled region, the

M a j o r - G e n e r a l A n d r e w Skeen operating

North-West

against the Tochi Wazirs, w i t h

Frontier.

reasonable


9I

success. B u t t h e M a h s u d s p r o v e d a l t o g e t h e r

c a p a b l e o f f o s t e r i n g - i n s o f a r as is p o s s i b l e

more formidable opponents w h e n , i n early

i n a land of such ethnic diversity a n d

D e c e m b e r , Skeen's largely g r e e n t r o o p s l e d

geographical remoteness - a national identity.

b y i n e x p e r i e n c e d officers failed t o m a k e inroads, a n d it was n o t u n t i l t h e a c t i o n f o u g h t at A h n a i T a n g i t h e

following

year t h a t t h e M a h s u d s suffered grievous

T h e problems faced b y foreign powers b e n t o n direct i n t e r v e n t i o n i n Afghanistan f o r m e d t h e basis o f a l e t t e r w r i t t e n i n

1842

b y a n extraordinarily prescient b u t sadly

losses - 4 , 0 0 0 c a s u a l t i e s a n d t h e b u r n i n g o f

a n o n y m o u s British officer, t h e accuracy o f

their villages. Such injuries persuaded t h e m ,

w h o s e w o r d s o f a d m o n i t i o n a p p l y as a p t l y

for t h e m o m e n t at least, t o cease h o s t i l i t i e s .

t o d a y as t h e y d i d i n t h e e a r l y y e a r s o f

There followed a British offensive i n

Victoria's reign:

N o v e m b e r 1 9 2 0 against the Wazirs i n t h e area a r o u n d W a n a , w h e r e o p p o s i t i o n ceased

To conquer a d o m i n i o n b y

the following m o n t h a n d the city was

t h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t i e s o f a s t a t e is a f e a s i b l e

controlling

r e t a k e n . M i n o r o p e r a t i o n s c o n t i n u e d as

policy, or to r e f o r m b y gradual m e a n s

e t h n i c A f g h a n raids a n d harassing attacks

w i t h o u t annihilating the institutions of

c o n t i n u e d d u r i n g 1 9 2 1 , w h e n the British

a subjugated c o u n t r y m a y be t h e effect

responded w i t h a n e w policy: the

of t i m e a n d perseverance, b u t to subdue

establishment of a p e r m a n e n t

a n d crush t h e masses of a n a t i o n b y

garrison

of I n d i a n A r m y regulars i n W a z i r i s t a n , i n

m i l i t a r y force, w h e n all are u n a n i m o u s

c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h reconstituted local militias

i n t h e d e t e r m i n a t i o n t o b e f r e e , is t o

(their predecessors h a v i n g b e e n d i s b a n d e d

attempt the i m p r i s o n m e n t of a w h o l e

d u r i n g the T h i r d A f g h a n W a r because of

people: all such projects m u s t be

desertions), w h o w o u l d d e p e n d o n t h e

temporary a n d transient, a n d terminate

support of t h e former.

i n a catastrophe t h a t force has ever to dread f r o m the vigorous, ardent,

* * *

concentrated vengeance of a n a t i o n T a k e n together, if a lesson emerges f r o m t h e

outraged, oppressed a n d insulted,

experiences of t h e three A n g l o - A f g h a n Wars

a n d desperate w i t h t h e b l i n d fury

i t is t h i s : t h a t w h i l e m o d e r n , w e l l - e q u i p p e d

of a d e t e r m i n e d a n d u n a n i m o u s will.

armies can defeat their c o n v e n t i o n a l A f g h a n counterparts, v a n q u i s h i n g their irregular

Since t i m e i m m e m o r i a l , operations i n

compatriots i n t h e countryside presents

Afghanistan have posed i m m e n s e

altogether m o r e c o m p l e x a n d perhaps

t o a n y p o w e r s e e k i n g t o i m p o s e its w i l l o v e r

insoluble military problems. T h e experiences

this seemingly unconquerable region of

of all w o u l d - b e c o n q u e r o r s since a n c i e n t

C e n t r a l Asia, w h e r e t h o u g h

times seem to c o n f i r m this point,

has c h a n g e d o u t of all r e c o g n i t i o n

including

technology

t h e abortive Soviet a t t e m p t at o c c u p a t i o n

t h e V i c t o r i a n era, t h e n a t u r e of t h e

from 1979 to 1989 and N A T O

a n d t h e resoluteness of t h e e n e m y

intervention

challenges

from fighting remains

since 2 0 0 1 . T h e m e r e e s t a b l i s h m e n t o f a

largely u n c h a n g e d today. T h e

g o v e r n m e n t at t h e behest of a foreign p o w e r

f a c i n g N A T O forces t o d a y , t h e r e f o r e , m u s t

challenge

is n o s u b s t i t u t e f o r o n e t h a t e n j o y s b r o a d

rest w i t h t h e i r a b i l i t y t o a p p l y successful

s u p p o r t across t h e c o u n t r y , u n t a i n t e d b y

principles of asymmetric warfare i n the

a c c u s a t i o n s t h a t it serves a f o r e i g n m a s t e r .

field, i n c o m b i n a t i o n w i t h a f u n d a m e n t a l

T h e ethnic a n d linguistic diversity of the

r e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e country's social,

c o u n t r y strongly militates against all b u t

economic a n d political infrastructure -

strictly partisan allegiances t o a n y b u t a

challenges of considerably greater

domestically created populist

t h a n those faced b y Britain i n t h e past.

government

all

magnitude

Bibliography and further readin General Dodwell, H.

India,

Small Arms of the East India

H a r d i n g , D . F.

Victoria's Wars ( P e n g u i n , 2 0 0 7 ) H . , e d . , The Cambridge History of

D a v i d , Saul,

( C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 3 2 )

Duncan, John & John Walton,

Heroes for

Victoria ( S p e l l m o u n t , 1 9 9 1 ) Farwell, Byron,

Queen Victoria's Little Wars

(London, Harper & Row, 1972)

Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World ( P e n g u i n , 2 0 0 4 ) F o r t e s c u e , J . W . , A History of the British Army ( N a v a l & M i l i t a r y Press, 2 0 0 4 ) H e r n o n , I a n , The Savage Empire: Forgotten Wars of the Nineteenth Century Ferguson, Niall,

(Sutton,

British Empire

The Rise and Fall of the (Abacus, 2 0 0 0 )

M o r r i s , J a m e s , Heaven's

An Imperial Progress

Command: (Penguin, 1979)

Armies, W e a p o n s a n d Uniforms B l a c k m o r e , H o w a r d L. British Military

Firearms, 1650-1850

( G r e e n h i l l Books, 1 9 9 4 )

The British Army on (1): 1816-1853 (Osprey

Barthorp, Michael,

Campaign

Publishing, 1987)

The British Army on (3): 1856-1881 (Osprey

Barthorp, Michael,

Campaign

Publishing, 1988) Beckett, I a n ,

The Victorians at War

(Hambledon and London, Farwell, Byron,

Mr. Kipling's

All the Queen's

2003)

Army:

Men ( W . W . N o r t o n

& Company, 1981)

Khaki & Red: Soldiers of the Queen in India and Africa

Featherstone, D o n a l d ,

( A r m s & A r m o u r Press, 1 9 9 5 )

Victoria's Enemies: An A-Z of British Colonial Warfare


( B l a n d f o r d Press, 1 9 8 9 )

Weapons and of the Victorian Soldier


Equipment

Books,

1660-1856,

4 vols. (Foresight

1997-99)

H a y t h o r n t h w a i t e , P h i l i p , The Colonial

Sourcebook

Wars

(London, Arms & Armour

Press, 1 9 9 5 )

H e a t h c o t e , T. A . , The Indian Army: The Garrison of British Imperial India, 1822-1922 ( D a v i d & C h a r l e s , 1 9 7 4 ) H o l m e s , R i c h a r d , Redcoat: The British Soldier

in the Age of Horse and Musket (HarperCollins, Holmes, Richard,

2005)

Sahib: The British

Soldier

in India ( H a r p e r C o l l i n s , 2 0 0 1 )

K n i g h t , I a n , Go to Your God Like a Soldier:

2000)

James, Lawrence,

Company,

( B l a n d f o r d Press, 1 9 7 8 )

The British Soldier Fighting for Empire, 1837-1902

( G r e e n h i l l Books, 1 9 9 6 )

M a s o n , P h i l i p , A Matter of

Honour:

The Indian Army, its Officers and Men J o n a t h a n Cape, 1974)

The Khyber Rifles: From the British Raj to Al Qaeda ( S u t t o n , 2 0 0 6 ) S t r a c h a n , H e w , From Waterloo to Balaklava: Tactics, Technology and the British Army, Stewart, Jules,

1815-1854

(Cambridge University

Press, 1 9 8 5 )

Wellington's Legacy: The Reform of the British Army, 1830-1854

Strachan, H e w ,

( M a n c h e s t e r U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 8 5 )

Afghan Wars (general) North-West Frontier/Afghanistan

Soldier Sahibs: The Men Who Made the North-West Frontier ( A b a c u s , 2 0 0 1 ) B a r t h o r p , M i c h a e l , Afghan Wars and the North-West Frontier, 1839-1947

Allen, Charles,

(Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2002) Docherty, Paddy,

The Khyber Pass: A History of

Empire and Invasion Edwardes, Michael,

(Faber & Faber, 2 0 0 7 )

Playing the Great Game

(Hamish Hamilton, 1975) Elliot, M a j . - G e n . J. G . ,

1839-1947

The Frontier,

(Cassell, 1 9 6 8 )

Bibliography a n d f u r t h e r reading

H e a t h c o t e , T o n y , The Afghan 1839-1919

With Roberts to Candahar: A Tale of the Afghan War

Wars,

B r e r e t o n , C a p t a i n F. S.,

(Spellmount, 2003)

H o p k i r k , Peter,

The Great Game: On Secret

Service in High Asia ( J o h n M u r r a y ,

2006)

The Romance of the Indian Frontier ( J o n a t h a n C a p e , 1 9 7 4 ) M i l l e r , C h a r l e s , Khyber: The Story of the North M a c M u n n , L t . - G e n . Sir G e o r g e ,

West Frontier ( M a c d o n a l d a n d Jane's, 1 9 7 7 ) O ' B a l l a n c e , E d g a r , The Afghan

Wars, 1839 to

The Savage Frontier: A History of the Anglo-Afghan Wars ( P a n , 2 0 0 2 ) S c h o f i e l d , V i c t o r i a , Every Rock, Every Hill: The Plain Tale of the North-West Frontier and Afghanistan ( B u c h a n , E n r i g h t , 1 9 8 4 ) S t e w a r t , J u l e s , The Savage Border: The Story of the North-West Frontier ( S u t t o n , 2 0 0 7 ) S w i n s o n , A r t h u r , North-West Frontier: People 1839-1947

(Corgi, 1969).

Afghanistan: A Military History from Alexander the Great to the Present ( D a C a p o Press, 2 0 0 3 ) .

Tanner, Stephen,

Bruce, G . , Retreat from Kabul ( M a y f l o w e r , 1 9 6 7 ) D u r a n d , Sir H e n r y M a r i o n , The First

Afghan

(Lancer Publishers, 2 0 0 9 )

F o r b e s , A r c h i b a l d , Britain

The 1st Afghan

Official Account

(Calcutta,

Army

Headquarters, India, 1908)

F o r b e s , A r c h i b a l d , Britain

The 2nd Afghan Ltd,

in

Afghanistan:

War, 1878-80

(Leonaur

2 0 0 7 ; orig. p u b . 1 8 9 2 )

(Constable, 1910) Hensman, Howard,

1879-80

The Afghan War,

( L o n d o n , 3 vols., W . H . A l l e n ,

1881) James, D.,

Lord Roberts

(Hollis, 1 9 5 4 )

Major-General

Low, Charles Rathbone,

Frederick Roberts

Sir

( U c k f i e l d , East Sussex,

N a v a l a n d M i l i t a r y Press, 2 0 0 2 ; orig. p u b . 1 8 8 3 )

My God - Maiwand! Operations of the South Afghanistan Police Force, 1878-1880 ( L e o C o o p e r , 1 9 7 9 )

M a x w e l l , Leigh,

R o b s o n , B r i a n , The Road to Kabul:

First A f g h a n W a r

War and its Causes

(Blackie, 1 9 2 0 )

C a r d e w , F. G . , e d . , The Second Afghan War:

H a n n a , C o l . H . B., The Second Afghan War

Present (Brassey's, 2 0 0 2 ) R i c h a r d s , D . S.,

and Events,

93

in

Afghanistan:

War, 1839-42

(Leonaur,

2007; orig. p u b .1 8 9 2 ) Intelligence Branch A r m y

Headquarters

I n d i a , Frontier and Overseas Expeditions from India: Vol. Ill - Baluchistan and First Afghan War, 1838-1842 ( U c k f i e l d , E a s t

The Second Afghan (Spellmount, S h a d b o l t , S. H . ,

of 1878-80

War,

The Afghan

Campaigns

( L o n d o n , 2 vols, 1 8 9 2 )

S t a c p o o l e - R y d i n g , R i c h a r d J.,

( T h e H i s t o r y Press, 2 0 0 8 )

Third Afghan War A r m y Headquarters India,

orig. p u b .1 9 1 0 )

a n d M i l i t a r y Press, 2 0 0 4 ) .

Catastrophic

Retreat from Kabul: The British Defeat in

Afghanistan,

1842 ( L y o n s Press, 2 0 0 2 ) .

1838-1842

( C a m b r i d g e U n i v e r s i t y Press, 1 9 6 7 )

Account

(East Sussex,

R o b s o n , B r i a n , Crisis on the Frontier:

Third Afghan

Macrory, Patrick,

N o r r i s , J a m e s , First Afgh an War,

Official

Third Afghan War

1919:

(Richard Bentley, 3 vols, 1 8 5 7 )

Maiwand:

The Last Stand of the 66th (Berkshire) Regiment in Afghanistan, 1880

Sussex, N a v a l a n d M i l i t a r y Press, 2 0 0 6 ;

K a y e , J. W . , History of the War in Afghanistan

1878-1881

2003)

Waziristan,

Naval

The

War and the Campaign in

1919-20

(Spellmount,

2004).

Memoirs, Journals a n d First-hand Accounts M a l e , R e v . A r t h u r , Scenes through

the Smoke

( N a v a l a n d M i l i t a r y Press, 2 0 0 3 )

Second Afghan War A t w o o d , R o d n e y , The March to

Roberts o f Kandahar, Earl,

Kandahar

(Pen a n d Sword, 2008)

The History of Lord Lytton's Indian Administration, 1876-1880

Balfour, L a d y Betty,

(Longmans, 1899)

India

Forty-One

Years in

( N a v a l a n d M i l i t a r y Press, 2 0 0 2 ;

orig. p u b . 1905). Sale, L a d y F l o r e n t i a ,

Afghan

A Journal

of the First

War ( O x f o r d P a p e r b a c k s , 2 0 0 2 ;

orig. p u b . 1 8 4 3 )

ndex Figures in bold refer to illustrations. Abdur R a h m a n (Amir) 68, 70, 72 Abu Akbar 30, 3 1 , 34 Afghan fighters (tribesmen) a g g r e s s i o n / p h y s i c a l courage of 16, 48 a s s e m b l y of 19, 8 2 barbarity/ferocity of 7 - 8 , 9, 34, 48 religious fervour a n d xenophobia 48 Afghanistan climate a n d terrain (influence o n fighting) 7, 9, 27, 28, 2 9 , 2 9 , 30, 3 1 , 4 3 - 4 , 4 5 - 7 , 4 5 , 4 6 , 53, 56, 57, 58, 5 8 , 60 c o n n e c t i o n with India 43, 44, 4 5 - 7 control t h r o u g h o c c u p a t i o n 8 ethnic p e o p l e s of 4 7 - 8 nature of rule from Kabul 4 8 right to c o n d u c t o w n foreign affairs 17, 85 'tribal lands'/'tribal territories' 44, 47 Afridis, actions of 12, 33, 47, 56, 72, 7 2 , 8 1 , 84 A h m e d Khel, resistance at 70 aircraft, RAF use of 7 9 , 8 2 , 83 Akbar K h a n 24, 27, 28, 30, 32, 33, 36, 4 2 Ali M a s j i d fortress, fall of 5 8 - 9 , 6 0 , 74, 75, 7 5 , 7 6 - 8 A m a n u l l a (governor of Kabul), 80, 8 1 Army of Retribution, actions of 3 3 - 5 , 3 4 , 36 Army of the I n d u s 20, 2 1 , 24, 37 withdrawal from Kabul 7, 8, 37-42, 39, 4 1 artillery batteries 18, 19, 20, 2 6 , 2 9 , 32, 3 5 , 38, 4 1 , 5 5 , 56, 59, 6 1 , 63, 70, 7 1 , 76, 77, 83, 8 3 Arzu, actions at/in 70 Auckland, Lord 14, 1 5 - 1 6 , 2 1 , 24, 26, 33 Ayub K h a n (Durani leader) 70, 7 1 , 7 2 - 3

Bagh, action at 8 1 , 83 Bala Hissar fortress/royal palace 2 5 , 2 6 , 27, 28, 3 5 , 36, 62, 66, 67 Baluchis 1 8 , 54, 8 7 Baluchistan 20, 2 1 - 2 , 3 5 , 43, 8 7 Bolan Pass 14, 1 8 , 20, 2 2 , 23, 44, 4 5 , 50, 83 Britain a n d Afghanistan's foreign policy 17, 6 0 controlling the Russian threat ('Great G a m e ' ) 8, 9, 1 4 - 1 7 , 44, 4 6 - 7 , 5 0 - 1 , 5 2 - 3 , 60 a n d priority to Sikh interests 15, 1 6 - 1 7 use of force as imperial power 8 British Residency (Kabul), attack on 62-3 Browne, G e n Sir S a m u e l 56, 60, 74 actions of 3 6 , 58, 59, 5 9 , 74, 74, 75, 7 5 , 76, 78 Brydon, Dr William 7, 3 2 , 33 Burnes, Sir Alexander 1 4 - 1 6 , 17, 1 7 , 2 5 - 6 Burrows, Brig-Gen G e o r g e 70-1 camels, use of 2 1 , 4 1 , 4 4 , 4 5 , 57 C a v a g n a r i , M a j Sir Louis 60, 6 1 , 6 1 , 62, 6 2 , 63, 66 cavalry b r i g a d e s / r e g i m e n t s 18, 19, 20, 2 2 , 24, 56, 58, 6 1 , 62, 63, 66, 68, 70, 7 0 , 7 1 , 72, 82, 85 C h a m b e r l a i n , Sir Neville 5 2 - 3 Charasia, action at 6 5 - 6 C h e l m s f o r d , Lord (Viceroy of India) 80, 8 1 , 84 cholera, outbreaks of 59, 60 C o n g r e s s of Berlin (1878) 5 1 - 2 , 58 C o r p s of G u i d e s , actions of 6 1 , 63, 66, 6 7 - 8 , 76, 78 C o t t o n , M a j - G e n Sir Willoughby 20, 24, 26

Dacca, action at 8 3 - 4 Dargai Heights, action at 12, 7 2 Disraeli, B e n j a m i n 5 1 , 53, 59 Dost M o h a m e d (Amir) 14, 15, 1 5 , 1 6 - 1 7 , 2 1 , 23, 24, 25, 27, 50, 68 D u r a n d Line 8 1 , 85 Durani tribesmen, actions of 47, 48, 70 Dyer, Brig-Gen Rex 8 1 , 85 East India C o m p a n y , armies of 15, 18, 19, 20, 22, 24, 54, 70, 71 e l e p h a n t batteries, use of 4 5 , 55, 57, 6 1 , 76 Ellenborough, Lord 33, 3 4 - 5 , 36 Elphinstone, Maj-Gen William 16, 2 6 - 7 , 28, 3 7 - 4 2 , 3 9 Eustace, Brig-Gen Alexander 84, 85 Eyre, Lt Vincent 27, 2 9 - 3 0 Faiz M o h a m e d 5 8 - 9 Florentia, Lady Sale 28, 33, 37, 38, 3 8 , 39, 3 9 , 4 0 - 2 G a n d a m a k , action at 27, 3 1 , 32, 35, 37, 59, 60, 67, 6 8 Ghazis, actions of 67 G h a z n i fortress, taking of 2 1 , 2 1 , 2 2 , 2 3 - 5 , 2 3 , 34, 35, 40, 44, 70, 71 Ghilzais, actions of 23, 24, 25, 27, 29, 30, 3 1 , 3 1 , 32, 3 9 , 47, 48, 63, 70 G l a d s t o n e , William 59, 68, 70 G o r d o n Highlanders, actions of 12, 1 2 , 4 9 , 6 5 - 6 , 70, 7 2 Great Bazaar, destruction of 66 G u r k h a battalions, actions of 18, 4 9 , 57, 66, 67, 70, 72, 75, 76, 83, 85 Habibulla (Amir) 80, 81 Hazaras, lifestyle/religion/isolation of 48 H e l m a n d , British arrive at 71 H e l m a n d River 71

Index

Herat 14, 23, 47, 50, 52, 62, 71 British interest in 44 defence against Persian forces 14, 16, 20, 44 forces i n / a r o u n d 48, 55, 77 lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n 44, 4 5 - 6 l o c a t i o n / i m p o r t a n c e of 44 Hindu Kush 2 5 , 43, 44, 46, 50, 5 1 , 58 Horse Artillery 29, 31 Hyder Khan 23, 24 Indian Army 18, 20, 2 1 , 54, 6 1 , 67, 70, 75, 80, 8 2 Indian M u t i n y 32, 5 1 , 54, 75 infantry battalions/regiments 9, 19, 20, 55, 56, 57, 6 1 , 63, 6 5 - 6 , 67, 7 1 , 72, 8 2 Jabul garrison 2 6 - 7 , 2 6 Jagdalak Pass, actions in 3 1 , 3 2 , 33, 35, 4 1 , 4 4 , 6 8 , 7 2 Jalalabad fortress 7, 37, 47, 83, 84, 85 attacks o n 2 5 , 3 3 - 4 , 81 British forces a d v a n c e to/enter 16, 2 5 , 32, 3 3 - 4 , 3 6 , 56, 59, 5 9 Brydon arrives at 32, 3 2 defence of 2 5 , 33, 34 effects of earthquake o n defences 33 evacuation of 4 0 isolation/vulnerability of 33 jihad, calls for 58, 67 Kabul 14, 26, 2 8 , 44 Afghan forces d e p l o y e d i n / a r o u n d 5 5 , 67 Amir Sher Ali leaves 58, 59 British forces a d v a n c e on/enter 24, 2 5 , 3 5 , 56, 66 diplomatic m i s s i o n s in 52, 60, 61 destruction of in reprisal 36 preparation for defence of 24 failure to hold 8 lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n from 44-6 location/strategic i m p o r t a n c e of 4 4 - 5 nature of rule from 48 rebels take m o r e control 25-6 resentment towards British 25-6

Russian threat 47 uprising in (1841) 16 withdrawal from (Army of the Indus) 2 8 - 9 account of 37, 3 9 , 4 0 - 1 , 4 2 attacks o n 2 9 , 30, 32, 38, 39, 3 9 , 4 0 - 1 d e a t h a n d disease 2 9 - 3 0 , 3 1 , 32, 3 5 , 38, 39, 3 9 , 40, 4 1 , 4 2 effects of winter weather 30, 37, 38, 39, 40, 4 1 , 4 2 rate of progress 30 r e m n a n t s of 3 0 - 1 , 3 2 route taken 3 0 sole survivor 32, 3 2 surrender of to Akbar protection 30, 3 1 terms for safe c o n d u c t 30, 37, 4 0 Kabul Fighting Force, actions of 65-6, 67-8 Kabul garrison, siege of 2 4 - 7 , 2 6 , 28, 38 Kalat-i-Ghilzai 34, 3 5 , 47 K a n d a h a r 14, 20, 2 2 , 23, 3 5 , 44, 50, 52, 83, 9 0 Afghan forces i n / a r o u n d 55 g o v e r n a n c e of 68, 70 lines of c o m m u n i c a t i o n 4 6 location of 45 o c c u p a t i o n of 8, 24, 35, 56, 63, 7 0 - 1 Russian threat to 47 siege of 70, 7 1 , 72 K a n d a h a r Field Force, actions of 56, 70 Karim K h a n 56 Kata Kushta, o c c u p a t i o n of 78 Kauffmann, G e n K o n s t a n t i n 50, 53, 58 Keane, Lt Sir J o h n , actions of 20, 2 2 , 2 3 - 4 K h a n of Khiva, Russian e x p e d i t i o n a g a i n s t 2 5 , 50 Khan, General Nadir, strength of force 84 Khost, Afghan forces in 84 Khurd-Kabul Pass 2 5 , 30, 32, 3 5 , 37, 39, 4 0 - 1 , 4 6 Khyber Pass 14, 44, 53, 8 1 , 84 attacks i n / p a s s a g e t h r o u g h 20, 23, 24, 2 5 , 3 3 - 4 , 50, 53, 56, 58, 74, 75, 76, 81 protectorship over 72 r e n u n c i a t i o n of authority over 6 0 Khyber Rifles 8 1 , 84

95

Kohat, defence of 85 Kohistan, actions in 2 5 , 35 Kotwal of Kabul, e x e c u t i o n of 66 Kurram Valley, a c t i o n s in 5 6 - 7 , 60, 6 3 , 72, 84 Kurram Valley Field Force, actions of 5 6 - 8 , 5 6 , 5 7 , 5 8 , 59, 6 0 Landi Kotal garrison, reinforcement of 8 1 Lytton, Lord 5 1 , 5 2 - 3 , 5 9 - 6 0 , 6 1 , 66, 68, 70, 75 M a c n a g h t e n , Sir William 15, 16, 20, 24, 2 5 , 26, 27, 28, 35 M a c p h e r s o n , Brig-Gen Herbert 65, 75, 76 M a h s u d tribe 47, 8 0 M a i w a n d , battle of (1880) 8, 6 9 , 70, 7 1 , 7 1 M a l a k a n d , fighting a r o u n d 8 0 Male, Arthur ( m e m o i r s of) 74, 75, 76, 7 7 - 8 Massy, Brig-Gen D u n h a m 1 1 , 67 Miani, battle of (1843) 8 7 M i c h n i Pass, authority over 6 0 Mitford, M a j Reginald 6 5 , 67 M o h a m e d Akbar K h a n 16, 1 6 , 37, 4 0 M o h m a n d tribe 4 7 , 56, 8 0 Mudki, battle of (1845) 4 2 mullahs, role of 19, 62, 67, 70, 80 Nadir K h a n , a c t i o n a g a i n s t Thai 85 Napier, M a j - G e n Sir Charles 55, 8 7 N o r t h Waziristan Militia 84 North-West Frontier 9, 47, 50, 5 3 , 6 1 , 72, 7 2 , 80, 85 Nott, G e n Sir William 20, 2 2 , 23, 24, 2 5 , 2 7 , 35 P a t h a n Ghilzais 2 5 , 47, 8 0 Peiwar Kotal, battle of (1878) 49, 56-8, 57, 5 8 Persia, actions/threat of 14, 16, 2 0 - 1 , 44, 6 0 Peshawar 17, 2 0 , 28, 44, 50, 56, 75, 85 fighting for 15, 16, 36, 8 1 , 84 Peshawar Valley Field Force, actions of 3 6 , 56, 58, 59, 5 9 , 6 0 - 1 , 74, 74, 7 5 - 6 , 7 5 Pezwan, British c a m p at 7 pioneer b a t t a l i o n s 5 7 , 5 8

Index

96

Shagai Heights, occupation of 75 S h a h Shuja-il-Maluk (Amir) 1 3 , 1 6 - 1 7 , 20, 2 2 , 23, 24, 2 5 , 27, 28, 3 5 - 6 , 38 Shelton, Brig-Gen J o h n 26, 27, 3 2 Sher Ali K h a n 50, 5 1 , 5 2 - 3 , 5 5 , 58, 59, 68 Sherpur c a n t o n m e n t , attack o n 1 1 , 62, 6 5 , 6 7 - 8 Shinwaris, n e g o t i a t i o n s with 6 1 S h u t a g a r d a n Pass 56, 58, 59,

Pishin 4 7 , 60, 72 Pollock, M a j - G e n G e o r g e 33, 34, 3 4 , 3 5 , 36 Pottinger, Lt Eldred 20, 4 2 Primrose, G e n J a m e s 70, 71 P u n j a b (the) 15, 20, 3 5 , 81 Punjabi battalions 57, 59, 66, 6 7 - 8 , 70, 72, 85 Quetta

2 2 , 2 5 , 50, 56, 72, 84

Roberts, M a j - G e n Sir Frederick 5 6 - 8 , 5 6 , 5 7 , 5 8 , 60, 6 1 , 63, 6 5 - 6 , 6 5 , 6 6 , 6 7 - 8 , 72, 75

60, 63 Sibi, protection/control of 47, 60, 72 Sikh forces, actions of 15, 23,

Ross-Keppel, Sir George 80, 8 1 , 83, 84 Royal Artillery 1 1 , 57, 7 1 , 8 3 Russia, threat p o s e d by 9, 14, 15, 16, 20, 2 1 , 44, 4 6 - 7 , 50, 54

6 3 , 70, 72, 76, 77 Sikh k i n g d o m 15, 1 6 - 1 7 , 2 0 Sind 2 0 , 3 5 , 4 2 , 4 5 , 50, 54, 5 5 Singh, Ranjit 15, 1 6 - 1 7 sirdars (tribal chiefs), actions of

Sale, Brig-Gen Sir Robert 2 5 , 28, 32, 33, 3 3 , 34, 3 5 , 37, 40, 4 2 Salisbury, Lord 5 1 , 53 S a m a r k a n d , Russian control of 50 sangars, Afghan use of 57, 7 6 - 7 , 7 6 sappers a n d m i n e r s 18, 20, 24, 29, 33, 71 scouts, use of cavalry forces as 19 sepoy (infantry) units 18, 19, 29, 3 1 , 38, 39, 40, 4 1 , 6 1 , 63, 7 1 , 84

19, 37, 48, 61 Soulter, C a p t 3 1 S o u t h Waziristan Militia 84 sowar (cavalry) regiments 18, 29, 3 0 - 1 Spin Baldak fortress, capture of 8 3 , 84 Spingwal Kotal 57 Stewart, M a j - G e n Sir D o n a l d 56, 68, 70 Stolietov, G e n Nikolai 52, 52, 53 Sturt, Lt, d e a t h of 3 9 , 4 2 Swat Valley, P a t h a n s in 47

Visit the Osprey website •

Information about forthcoming books

•

Author information

•

Read extracts a n d see s a m p l e p a g e s

•

S i g n u p for o u r free n e w s l e t t e r s

•

C o m p e t i t i o n s a n d prizes


territorial units (British Army) 82, 85 Tezeen Pass, fighting in 33, 35 Thai, fighting for 84, 85 Tirah Valley, fighting in 12, 7 2 , 8 0 Tochi Valley, defence of 84 Togh, fighting at 85 Treaty of G a n d a m a k (1879), signing of 6 2 Treaty of Paris (1856), restrictions of 50 Treaty of Simla (1838) 17 Tunghi Taraki Gorge, action in 31 Turkestan 43, 44, 48, 50, 58, 59 Turkey 5 1 , 52, 8 0 Tytler's brigade, a c t i o n s / c o m p o s i t i o n of 75, 76, 78 Vitkevich, Ivan Voktorovich 14, 16, 21 Wali of Kandahar, support for 71 Waziristan 43, 47, 8 4 - 5 Waziris, desertion of 84 Wazirs of Tochi, rebellion of 84 Yakub Khan 53, 5 9 - 6 0 , 6 1 , 62, 6 2 , 63, 66, 68 Z a i m m u k h t tribesmen, action against 6 3

About Essential Histories A m u l t i - v o l u m e h i s t o r y of w a r seen f r o m p o l i t i c a l , strategic, t a c t i c a l , c u l t u r a l a n d i n d i v i d u a l

perspectives

Available now (titles listed chronologically)

Each Essential Histories v o l u m e

provides

67

978 1 84603 036 9 Ancient Israel at War 853-586 BC

27

978 1 84176 357 6 The Peloponnesian War 431-404 BC

Philip de Souza

36

978 1 84176 358 3 The Greek and Persian Wars 499-386 BC

Philip de Souza

Brad Kelle

26

978 1 84176 473 3 The Wars of Alexander the Great 336-323 BC

Waldemar Heckel

16

978 1 84176 355 2 The Punic Wars 264-146 BC

Nigel Bagnall

43

978 1 84176 305 7

Caesar's Gallic Wars 58-45 BC

Kate Gilliver

42

978 1 84176 392 7

Caesar's Civil War 49-44 BC

Adrian Goldsworthy

21

978 1 84176 359 0 Rome at War AD 293-696

Michael Whitby

33

978 1 84176 360 6

Byzantium at War AD 600-1453

John Haldon

Campaigns of the Norman Conquest

Matthew Bennett

12

978 1 84176 228 9

1

978 1 84176 179 4 The Crusades

David Nicolle

19

978 1 84176 269 2 The Hundred Years' War 1337-1453

Anne Curry

62

978 1 84176 569 3 The Ottoman Empire 1353-1699

Stephen Turnbull

54

978 1 84176 491 7 The Wars of the Roses 1455-1485

Michael Hicks

46

978 1 84176 480 1 War in Japan 1467-1615

Stephen Turnbull

47

978 1 84176 395 8 The French Religious Wars 1562-1598

Robert J Knecht Richard Bonney

a guide t o a m a j o r w a r or arena o f w a r :

29

978 1 84176 378 1 The Thirty Years' War 1618-1648

t h e origins, t h e key players, h o w

58

978 1 84176 417 7 The English Civil Wars 1642-1651

Peter Gaunt

34

978 1 84176 361 3 The French Wars 1667-1714 - The Sun King at war

John A Lynn

the

w a r was f o u g h t , w h o f o u g h t it, a n d its l a s t i n g i m p a c t o n t h e w o r l d a r o u n d i t .

W r i t t e n b y leading historians f r o m

44

978 1 84176 456 6 The French-Indian War 1754-1760

Daniel Marston

59

978 1 84176 521 1 The Plains Wars 1757-1900

Charles M Robinson III Daniel Marston

6

978 1 84176 191 6 The Seven Years' War

around the w o r l d a n d illustrated w i t h

45

978 1 84176 343 9 The American Revolution 1774-1783

Daniel Marston

photographs and maps.

7

978 1 84176 283 8 The French Revolutionary Wars

Gregory

Each v o l u m e f o l l o w s t h e same clear

66

978 1 84603 030 7 The Wars of the Barbary Pirates

Gregory

41

978 1 84176 466 5 The War of 1812

Carl Benn Alan C Huffines

Fremont-Barnes Fremont-Barnes a n d accessible s t r u c t u r e : Introduction - Chronology -

-

T h e f i g h t i n g - Portrait of a soldier

-

The world around war -

50

978 1 84176 522 8 The Texas War of Independence 1835-1836

25

978 1 84176 472 6 The Mexican War 1846-1848

Douglas V Meed

2

978 1 84176 186 2 The Crimean War 1854-1856

John Sweetman Stephen Badsey

Background

t o w a r - W a r r i n g sides - O u t b r e a k

Portrait

of a c i v i l i a n - H o w t h e w a r e n d e d Conclusion a n d consequences -

-

51

978 1 84176 421 4 The Franco-Prussian War 1870-1871

56

978 1 84176 612 6 The Zulu War 1879

Ian Knight

52

978 1 84176 396 5 The Boer War 1899-1902

Gregory

31

978 1 84176 446 7 The Russo-Japanese War 1904-1905

Geoffrey Jukes

65

978 1 84603 023 9 The Anglo-Irish War

Peter Cottrell

37

978 1 84176 369 9 The Spanish Civil War 1936-1939

Frances Lannon

28

978 1 84176 372 9 The Arab-Israeli Conflict - The Palestine War 1948

Efraim Karsh

8

978 1 84176 282 1 The Korean War

Carter Malkasian

Fremont-Barnes

Index

Praise for Essential Histories 'if y o u w a n t a full n a r r a t i v e o f t h e high p o l i t i c s t h a t led t o t h e N o r m a n i n v a s i o n , o r t h e d e t a i l s o f W i l l i a m ' s

49

978 1 84176 418 4 The Suez Crisis 1956

Derek Varble

c a m p a i g n s in E n g l a n d a f t e r H a s t i n g s , t h e n t h i s is t h e

38

978 1 84176 419 1 The Vietnam War 1956-1975

Andrew Wiest

place t o c o m e . ' (Essential Histories: Campaigns of the

20

978 1 84176 371 2 The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988

Efraim Karsh

15

978 1 84176 422 1 The Falklands War 1982

Duncan Anderson

Norman

Conquest)

Times Educational Supplement

55

978 1 84176 574 7 The Gulf War 1991

Alastair Finlan

63

978 1 84176 805 2 The Collapse of Yugoslavia 1991-1999

Alastair Finlan

5

978 1 84176 856 4 The Greeks at War

6

978 1 84176 881 6

c l e a r a n d c o n c i s e ' History Today

7

978 1 84603 022 2 Liberty or Death Daniel Marston, Carl Benn and Fred Anderson

an e x c e l l e n t series' Military

4

978 1 84176 831 1 The Napoleonic Wars

1

978 1 84176 736 9 The American Civil War

2

978 1 84176 738 3 The First World War Geoffrey Jukes, Peter Simkins and Michael Hickey

3

978 1 84176 830 4 The Second World War Max Hastings, Geoffrey Jukes, Russell Hart and Stephen A Hart

' ... t h e s e v o l u m e s p r o v i d e a lucid a n d c o n c i s e n a r r a t i v e o f t h e c a m p a i g n s . . . as w e l l as p e n e t r a t i n g

Es

analyses o f s t r a t e g i e s a n d l e a d e r s h i p . Ideal f o r c l a s s r o o m use o r f i r e s i d e r e a d i n g . ' J a m e s M McPherson,

tial Histories S

al

Philip de Souza, Waldemar Heckel and Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones

Pulitzer Prize winner, c o m m e n t i n g o n t h e A m e r i c a n Civil W a r b o o k s

Illustrated

Rome at War Kate Gilliver, Adrian Goldsworthy and Michael Whitby

Todd Fisher and Gregory Fremont-Barnes

v e r y useful, f a c t u a l a n d e d u c a t i o n a l ' Reference Reviews

Gary Gallagher, Stephen Engle, Robert Krick and Joseph T Glatthaar

accessible a n d w e l l i l l u s t r a t e d . . . ' Daily Express 'they make t h e perfect starting point f o r readers o f any age' Daily Mail

To o r d e r a n y o f t h e s e titles, o r for m o r e i n f o r m a t i o n o n O s p r e y P u b l i s h i n g , c o n t a c t : N o r t h America:

[email protected]

U K & rest o f t h e w o r l d :

[email protected]


US$17.95 UK£10.99

CAN $19.95

IS B N 978-1-84603-446-6

9

I

781846 034466

5 1 795

The Anglo-Afghan Wars 1839-1919

The Wars

Star Wars: The Clone Wars: No Prisoners

The Water Wars

The Fireseed Wars

After the Software Wars

The Wednesday Wars

The Linguistics Wars

The Water Wars

Hammerfall (The gene wars)

Judge (The Wess'har Wars)

The Kinslayer Wars

The Snake Oil Wars

The Genius Wars

The Illustrated Star Wars

The Man Kzin Wars

The Afghanistan Wars

The Napoleonic Wars

The Eugenics Wars 01

The Wednesday Wars

The Fireseed Wars

The Magic Wars

The Linguistics Wars

The Fire Wars

The Monkey Wars

The Water Wars

The Bug Wars

The French Revolutionary Wars

The Star Wars Trilogy

The Wars of Napoleon

The Man-Kzin Wars

The Anglo-Afghan Wars 1839-1919

The Wars

Star Wars: The Clone Wars: No Prisoners

The Water Wars

The Fireseed Wars

After the Software Wars

The Wednesday Wars

The Linguistics Wars

The Water Wars

Hammerfall (The gene wars)

Judge (The Wess'har Wars)

The Kinslayer Wars

The Snake Oil Wars

The Genius Wars

The Illustrated Star Wars

The Man Kzin Wars

The Afghanistan Wars

The Napoleonic Wars

The Eugenics Wars 01

The Wednesday Wars

The Fireseed Wars

The Magic Wars

The Linguistics Wars

The Fire Wars

The Monkey Wars

The Water Wars

The Bug Wars

The French Revolutionary Wars

The Star Wars Trilogy

The Wars of Napoleon

The Man-Kzin Wars

Recommend Documents