Skillful Means: The Heart of Buddhist Compassion (Buddhist Tradition)

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MOTILAL BANARSIDASS

In commenting on this passage , Alexander Nehamas ob­ serves that Ni etzsche is not thinking of the "etern a l return" as ar. objective "truth" about the universe . Rather, he is i n ­ terested in "the attitude o n e must h a v e toward onese l f in or­ de r to react with joy and despair to the possibi l i ty the demon raises'' ( N e h a m as 1 98 5 , p . 1 5 1 ) . In other word s , N i etzsche u ses the idea of the eternal return as a narrative device that he thinks wi l l transform a l i fe based i n fear and resentment

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Skillful Means

to one of joy a n d c r e a t i v i t y . He us e s it as a cat a l y s t . To a s k whe t h e r the ete r n a l re t u r n is true or fa l s e , or w h e t h e r it d e p i c t s a n accurate onto l ogica l picture of t h e w o r l d , not o n l y m i s s e s the po i n t of the s t o r y , b u t t u r n s a s i m p l e n a r r a t i v e ta l e into a m e t a phys i c a l pro b l e m .

T h e Vi m a la k i rt i n i rdesa a d o p t s a s i m i l a r m e t h o d for de a l i ng w i t h t h e Bud d h i s t t e a c h i ngs . I t te l l s us t h a t "emptiness," the

"two

s t ra t e g i e s

n i r v li f.l a ,

trut h s " us e d

i m pe r m a n e n c e ,

are within

not h i n g a

mo re

p a rt i c u l a r

"non-self," than

and

rhe t o r ic a l

discours e ,

and

w a rn s aga i n s t t h e d a nge rs of beco m i n g a t t a c h e d to these

t e a c h i ngs . The characte r Vi m a l a k i rt i

embodies

t h i s no n - a t t ach ed a t t i t u d e b y e m p h a s i z i n g pe d agogi c a l

v e rs a t i l i t y , aud i e n ce a w a r e n e s s

,

a n ci a s p i r i t ua l res o l v e

t o h e l p ot h e rs , a n d b y cha s t i s i n g t h o s e w h o fo rget the upay i c

status o f the Bud d h a ' s d i s co u r s e s . Acco r d i n g to

M i chae l Pye : V i rn a l a k i rt i is i n d e e d hard to p i n dow n . Th i s i s be ­ c a u s e e v e ry fo rm of re l ig i o u s l a nguage , whe n co n ­ c e i v e d i n te r m s of s k i l fu l m e a n s , i s fi rst a l l us i v e a n d the n d i s po s a b l e . Th i s a p p l i e s to 't e a c h i n g B u d ­ d h i s m , ' t h a t is 't u r n i n g t h e w h e e l o f D h a rm a , ' a n d i t e v e n a p p l i e s to 'e n t e r i n g ni rva n a ' as o b s e rv e d b e fo re in

Th e Lot u s Su t ra . I n s h o rt

it a p p l i e s n o t

m e re l y to the pre l i m i n a ry sugge s t i o n s of t h e re ­ l i g i o u s sys t e m , but above a l l t o i t s fu n d a m e n t a l a s s u m p t i o n s and fi n a l t e r m s . ( Pye 1 9 7 8 , p . 1 0 1 )

Mahiiyiina Buddh ism

87

Summary

It is tempting to think that M ahayana Buddhism sign i ­ fies a complete break w i t h early Buddhism, and that t h e d e ­ ve lopment of "emptiness , " t h e "two truths," t h e bodhisattva idea l , and u p ay a is an e ntire ly new syste m of Buddhist though t . I t is also t e m p t i n g to t h i n k that the attack on Abh i d h a r m a Buddhism entai ls the rejection of all the medi­ tation p ractices and re l i g i o us disci p l i nes that are fou n d throughout t h e abhidharma texts . A s we s a w w i t h V i ­ mal aki:rt i , howeve r , t h e i s s u e i s less about the creation of new phi losophical doctrines or world-views than an attempt to restate the basic message of non-attachment. When Vi­ m a l aki:rti condemns S ari putra (a "Hi:nayana" Buddhist) for misinterpreting Buddhism, for example, he is not saying that S ari putra has a metaphysically incorrect view of the world or that Abhidharma praxis is somehow w rong in itse lf. The his­ tory of Abhidharma Buddhism in Southeast As ia would cer­ tai n } � prove him wrong on this point. Rather, he is attacking S ari putra on metapractical grounds , argu i n g that his at­ tach ment to Buddhist doctrine contradicts the mess age of compassion that was inaugurated by the Buddha. Th us , the issue between the Mahayana and the Abh idharma is not about whether the a b h i d h a r m a texts a re efficac i o u s , or whether this or that type of meditation works , but about the ph i l osophical j ustification for how one should meditate . I n this regard , the M ahayan ists argue from the perspective of upaya , saying there is no fixed methodology or doctrine to ar­

gue about., and that any attempt to i nsti tute a monol ithic form of praxis not only violates the teachings of the Buddha, but destroys the abi l i ty to respond compassionately. I n thei r view , t h e idea t h a t one can metapractica l ly j ustify a single

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Skillful Means

practice for a l l people in a l l circumstances i s not j ust anti­ Buddhist and unorthodox. It i s counterproductive , harmfu l , and ineffective. Vimal aklrti symbol izes the opposite of the Abhidharma view because he refuses to teach others according to a fixed doctri n e . W h e r e a s s o m e o n e l i ke S ari p u t r a - a n e x p e rt "Hinayana" philosopher-can recite a l l the categories, princi­ ples, a n d doctrines of Buddhist thought at w i l l , he also as­ sumes that the mere recitation of these "truths" will faci l i ­ tate l iberation . His attachment t o doctrin e , therefore , severs him from his audience , a n d he preaches without knowing anyth ing about the thoughts a n d i n c l i n ations of others . Vi­ m a l a kl rti , on the other hand, emphasizes intimacy a n d a keen awareness of the d i ffe re n t levels of human beings . Rather than begi n n ing with an abstract conception o f B u d ­ d h i s t "truth" which he then teaches indiscri m inate ly to eve­ ryone, he first begi ns with the concrete dispositions of others a n d then "teaches the D h a r m a a p p r o p r i a t e l y to each " < Thurman

1 986 ,

p.

20).

H i s e m p h a s i s on the " n u m e rous

teachings" and "varied expl anations" underlines the fact that there a re d i ffe ren t prob lems depending on the i n dividua l , a n d makes the point that a p l u r a l ity of ap proaches , doc­ trines, and teachings are necessary to address the different types of suffering that exist i n the wor l d . For this reason, says the Vi malallirtin irdesa , Vimalaklrti has fu l ly integrated his wisdom with "ski l l - in-means . "

Chapter 4 Nagarjuna's Middle Way In troduction

Nagarjuna is widely recognized as one of the most i m ­ portant t h i n kers i n t h e Buddhist phi losoph i c a l tradition . Born in South India sometime during the second century

C.E.,

Nagarjuna deve loped a style o f thinking that cha l l e nged a l l the major ph i l osophica l systems in I n d i a . H e debated ortho­ dox Buddh ists and H i n dus al ike, estab l i s he d the " M i d d l e Way" ( M adhyamika ) schoo l of phi l osophy, and refined a dia­ lectical method (su nya ta or "emptiness") that gave b i rth to Buddhist traditions th roughout India, China, Tibet, and Ja­ pan . I n m any Buddhist circles, Nagarjuna is regarded as the Second Buddha, a bodh isattva who clearly expressed the fundamentals of the "Way." Nagarjuna has recently become im portant for Western phi losophers as wel l . Because many of his texts re ly on

re ­

ductio ad a bs u rdu m logic, and because he is seen as criticiz­ ing prob lems surrounding caus al ity , subjectivity, s pace , and

timl::' , he is thought to be a phi l osopher of stature . I ndeed, he is often compared to such i m portant Western thinkers as Kant, Hege l , Hume, Wittgenstein , and Derrida, and is often

situated within the same intel lectual discourse as the West­ e rn tradition . According to m any schol ars , N agarj u n a not only does metaphysics but also actually thinks l iberation re­ quires it. Whether he is depicted as a mystic, convention a l ist, ni h i l i s t ,

or deconstructionist , and w hether or not his dia lectic

of "emptiness" (sunyata ) undermines al l positive philosophical 89

Skillful Means

90

positions , it is common l y assumed that his ph i l osophy ad ­ dresses metaphysica l problems , and that he thinks Buddhist praxis is somehow incomplete without it. If we read Nagarj un a as operating within a n upiiyic context , however, then this way of framing his proj ect is mis­ leading. The poi nt to remember is that upiiya has little in common with traditiona l Western metaphysics: it is not con­ cerned with the n ature of space and time, caus al ity, persona l identity, o r consciousness , and i t resists the tendency t o con ­ ceptua l i z e l i be ration a part from Buddhist praxis . To think otherwise assumes that the Dharma can be abstracted from its soteriological and rhetorical context, and that Buddhism can be preached w i thout any particular audience in m i n d . Given the Buddhist i ns istence o n the i n dispensable nature of practice , however, and given Nagarjuna's own position withi n the Mahayana tradition, i t is high ly unl ikely that he is rais­ ing traditiona l metaphysical question s , and even more un­ l ikely that he thinks Buddhist soteriology depends on it. The purpose of this chapte r is to offer a d i ffe ren t ac­ count of Nagarjuna than i s found i n contemporary Western schol a r s h i p . I t w i l l not ask what i t means for caus a l i ty , truth , the self, o r consciousness t o b e "empty" in a very gen ­ e r a l sense, b u t h o w "emptiness" re l ates t o t h e soteriologica l practices of Buddhism and what it means for those practices to be "empty" of in herent nature . Before exa m i n i n g key pass ages from N a g a rj u n a ' s

Miidhya m i k a kii rikii that criticize Abhidharma praxi s , i t is important to situate Nagarjuna within the M ahayana tradi ­ tion . W h i l e m ost Buddhist scholars acknowledge Nagarj un a's pl ace within the Mahayana, many of them negl ect the "ski l l -

Nagarju na 's Middle Way

91

in-mean s " di mension o f this tradition . The next section w i l l therefore situate N agarjuna within the Mahayana genera l ly, and will be fo l lowed by a "ski l l - i n - m e ans" readi n g of his Miidhyamilwlliirikii.

Nagarjuna and Mahayana Buddhism The fact that N a g a rj u n a even operated w i t h i n a Mahayana context is not obvious to some scholars . For exam ­ p l e , A. K. Warder argues that there i s very l ittle Mahayana influence in Nagarjuna's writings : Modern s tudents have sometimes s upposed t h a t he i s criticizing ea rly Buddhism, or t he e arl y schoo l s , in order to set up Mahayana i nstead . Is there any truth i n this s upposition? We have a l ready poi nted out that there i s n ot hin g overt ly M a haya n i s t i n h i s though t . (W ar de r

1 973, p. 13) T h e prob lem with Warder's v i e w i s that i t can e a s i ly mis lead us when it comes to understanding N agarj u n a's phi­ losophy. I n the Twelve Gate Treatise N agarj una s ays that his project is based on c l a ri fying the principles of Mahayana Buddhism : I want to reveal and make clear the su}>re m e l y gre at teach ings of the Tathagata. Therefore , I will explain the teachings of M a h ay a n a . ( C heng 1 9 8 2 , p . 53-54 )

Skillf'ul Means

92

And i n the Bodhisarrzbhara (ka) , or "The Accumulations for E n lightenment," N agarjuna expresses views that c learly originated in the Prajniipiiramita texts : Praj flapararnita is the mother of Bodhisattvas, s ki l l-in­ means is their father, and compassion is their daughter. Attracting with gifts , teaching the Dharm a , l istening to the teaching of the Dharm a , and also practicing acts of benefit to others-these are the skil lful means for at­ tracting l others I . While benefiting l iving beings without t i ring and with­ out care l essness, [a bodhisattva) expresses his aspira­ tion for e n l ightenment: To benefit others i s to benefit oneself! Let us not desert living beings ! I n order to benefit living beings , first generate thi s attitude and then come to possess the practice of the doors to l iberatio n . ( Lindtner 1 986, p. 1 2 7 ) M o s t W e s t e r n accounts foc us exc l u s i v e l y o n t h e Madhya m i k a ka ri k a a n d the Vigra h a vy av a rta n t , h i s most

famous texts . However, N agarjuna's writings extend beyond these two books . He wrote for Buddhist monks, l ay peo p l e , orthodox Hindus, and kings , w i t h varying themes and ph i ­ l osophical motives. H i s writing style ranges from the simple to the complex, spanning personal devotional hymns, such as found in the Ca tu�zsta va , to the more phi losophica l ly ab­ stract, such as found in the Ka r i k a s . The d iversity of ap­ proaches Nagarj una adopts in commun icating with different audiences s ituates him within a "ski l l ful means" tradition that runs from the Buddha and through the Mahayana.

Nagarjuna 's Middle Way

93

C h ristian Lindtner is one of the few scholars to recog­ nize N agarjuna's diverse l iterary talents , and attributes this to the notion of upaya : I n my v i e w , the decisive reasons for the variety of Nagarj una's writings is to be sought in the author's de­ s i re , as a Buddhist, to address himself to various audi­ ences at various leve l s and from various perspecti ves. This motive w o u l d of course be consistent with

the

M ahayana ideal of upaya k a u sa ly a ( s k i l l f u l m e a n s ) . Thus, the Mulamadhyamakakarika , the S unyatasaptati, and Vigra h a uya vartal we rt! intended to be studied by phi losophica lly minded monks . The Vaida lyaprakara lJ-a was written as a cha l l enge to N aiyayikas . The Yu k ­ ti�a�tillti , the Nya v a h a ra s i ddi , and the Pratltyasa m u t ­ padahrdayalltirillti as we l l are contributions to Buddhist

exegesis . The Ca t u 1zstava is a document confessing its author's person a l faith i n the Buddha's doctri ne, w h i l e texts

l i ke

the

Sutra -samuccaya , t he B o d h i c i t t a ­

vivaralJ-a , the Bodh i - sa f?l b h ara(ka ) , the S u h rllek h a , and

the Ratnavall on the whole a d d ress themselves

to

a

wider Buddhist a udience , monks as we l l as l ayme n . ( Lindtner

1 98 6 ,

p.

33 1 l

L i n d tner groups a l l of N agarj un a's texts u n d e r the h eading "ski l lful mean s . " It is not j ust his supposed "minor" works that are geared toward a particular audience , but even th ose that deal with d ifficu l t conce pts in Buddhist phi loso­ phy, such as the Madhya mikallarika and the Vigrahavya. var­ ta nt . Whi le no one can be s ure Nagarj una wrote a l l the texts

as crib ed to h i m , i t is understandab l e why L i n d t n e r sees N agarjuna as a "ski l l - i n-means" thinker, and why he views

Skillful Mea ns

94

the high ly logica l teaching of "emptiness" on the same foot­ ing as those given to kings , lay people, and disciples. As a M a hayana B u d d h i s t , N agarj u n a re a l i zes t h a t n o s i ngle teach ing is sufficient to cover the various " i l lnesses" of sen ­ t i en t beings , and because t he world manifests itsel f i n differ­ e n t degrees of karmic growth , d i ffere n t d iscourses a re needed . As he says in the Exposition of Bodhicitta : The teachi ngs of the protectors of the world accord with the ! varying] reso lve of l iving bei ngs . The Buddhas em­ p l oy a w e a l th of s k i l lful me a n s , which take many worldly forms. ( Lindtner 1986, p. 65 ) Nagarjuna is saying nothing new here . I t was e mpha­ s i zed by the Buddha, the L o t u s Sutra , and the Prajnapara · m i l a , a l l of which emphasize the need to be sensitive to the

rhetorica l context of sentient bei ngs . W h i le N agarjuna rare ly re fers to any of these texts s peci fica l ly, his devotion to this tradition is expressed th rough his diverse literary talents and his use of skil lful means. In the Ma dlz y a m i lw ll a r i ll a , N agarj u n a further a l igns himse lf with this tradition when he says : That there is a self has been taught, And the doctrine of no-self, By the Buddhas, as we l l as the Doctrine of neither self nor nonse lf. ( Garfie ld 1 995, p. 49 1. This pass age suggests that the Buddh a's teachi ngs

a re

s ituated within a rhetorica l context, and that he re l ies on various teachings to l i berate se nt i e nt be ings . Some of the s e teac h i ngs i n c l ude t h e i d e a t h a t there i s

a

s e l f , t h a t there i ,;

Nagarjuna 's Middle Way

95

n o- se lf, and the rejection of both alternatives. N agarj un a ex­ presses a similar view when he says : Everything is real and is not rea l , Both rea l a n d not rea l , Neither rea l nor not rea l , This i s the Lord Buddha's teaching. (Garfield 1995, p. 49) Nagarjuna's student Aryadeva was infl uenced by this way of t h i n k i n g , a s we can see from h i s root text , t h e

Catu�, ..�ata lw : A student e m e rges for a certai n l teacher l , a teach e r emerges for a certain l student l . A person who knows the methods l upayavid l instructs ignorant living bei ngs by various methods . Just as it is rare for a ski l led physician not to cure pa­ tients, it is very rare for a bodh isattva who has acquired the ! t ra in in g ! not to have l students l to be trai ned. ( Lang 1 986, p. 57 ) In C hapter 6 of the same text, Aryadeva gives an exam­ ple of how ski l l - i n-means is practiced in Buddhis m :

l A s t u d e n t unde r t h e i nfl uence ofl d e s i re shou l d be treated l i ke a servant, s i nce harshness i s its ant idote . l A s t u d e n t u n d e r the i n fl u e n ce o fl h a t red s h o u l d be treated l i ke a king, s i nce ki ndness is its antidote . ( Lang 1 986, p. 65 J A ry ad e v a ' s co m me n t s e x press h i s co m m i t m e n t to N aga rj una's style of teach ing, and gi v e v o i c e to an e n t i re

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skillful-means tradition that runs from S akyamuni Buddh a through the M ahayana tradition . As a Mahayana Buddhist en gaged i n a debate with the Abh i d harma Buddhists , Nagarjuna is surely concerned with praxis and with how to co mmunicate Buddhism to others . But what s pecifica l l y divides h i m from the Abh i d h a rm a thinkers, an d w h y does he t h i n k they a re w rong? D o they have a fa lse conception of rea l ity? Are they givin g a fa l la­ cious metaphysics? Most Western scholars see the Abhid­ harma Buddhists as concerned with traditiona l metaphysical i s s ue s , and see N agarj u n a a s a ttac k i n g them on these groun ds . According to Gudmunsen , for exa m p l e , the Abhid­ harmists are Russ e l lian phil osophers concerned with i s o l at­ ing sense data and wondering how words refer to logica l bits of experience ( Gudmunsen 1 9 7 7 ) ; for Si derits they are "epis­ te mologi c a l rea l ists" forging a correspondence theory of truth ( S iderits 1 988); for Katz they are "denotation theorists" ( Katz

1 98 1 ); for Garfie ld they are "esse n t i a l ists" unwi l l ing to ac­ cept the convention a l n ature of phenomena ( G arfie l d 1 99 5 ) ; and for Loy and Coward t h e Abh i d h armists a r e proposing a meta phys ical view of language ( Loy 1 9 8 7 ; Coward 1 990). When we f r a m e N agarj un a's audience as concerned with these issues, however, then it means he must be dea l i ng with them as wel l . That i s , if the Abhidharmists are s i m i l a r t o t h e Logical Atomists , epistemological rea l ists, metaphysi ­ c i a n s , or p h i l osophers of language the n , s ince N agarj u n a i s attacking t h e i r v i e w s , he m u s t b e part icipating in this meta­ phys ical disco urse . But to see why this is mistaken we need to re member that the Abhidharma thi nkers a re specifica l ly concerned with metapraxis, and that the ge neral Mahayana critique is leveled at comments such as Vas ubhandu's , when he s ays :

Nagarjuna 's Middle Way

97

Because there i s no means of pacifying the passions without close i nvestigation of existents, and because it is the passions that cause the world to wander i n this great ocean of transmigration , there fore they say that the teacher-which means the Buddha-spoke this sys­ tem a i med at the c l ose examination of exi stents . For a student is not able to c losely i nvestigate existents with­ out teaching in true doctrine. ( Pruden 1 9 8 8 , p . 5 7 ) T h e "close investigation" that Vasuban d h u mentions i s a precise meditation o n the nature o f dharmas, a meditation that is mindful of the i m perm anent, caus a l , and s e l fless n a ­ ture of experience . He a l s o i m p l ies t h a t without meditating i n a particul a r way ( i . e . , without "reviewing" the S a r va s t i ­ uadin analysis of dharmas ) then it is i m possible t o attain lib­

eration . I n saying this , Vas ubandhu is estab l ishing t.he nec­ essary conditions for practice , a n d , in l i n e with tradition a l Abhidharma B uddhist though t, justifyi ng a single praxi s for a l l people. Nagarj u na's philosophy needs to be seen as a d i rect at­ tack on this way of thinking. Like the Buddha's critique of the "s ixty-two" views a n d Vim a l akirti's condemnation of the disciples and bodhisattvas , N agarj un a is trying to undermine the idea that liberation is attainable only upon a "close inves­ tigation" of dha rmas . His way of doing this is to examine the meditative "matrixes" of the Abh i d h a r m a tradition--fro m causal ity and the five aggregates to impermanence, nirvar:w, an d the Four Noble Truths-arguing that each is "empty" of i n h e re nt n a t u re . W h i l e i t may a p p e a r t h a t N agarj u n a' s method i s excessively logical and a na lytic i n the fo l lowing discussion , we must remember that he is addressing a scho­ lastic tradition that favors l ogical precision and analysis, and

Skillful Means

98

that he is therefore using their own way of communicating and their phi l osophical discourse to achieve the best rhetori­ c a l effect. The next few sections of this chapter-dea l i ng with N agarj u n a's critique of caus a l ity, the aggregates , suf­ fering, and the Four Noble Truths-wi l l strive to i l l umin ate this rhetorical style, e m phasizing its upayic ro le against the Abhidharma Buddhists.

Nigirjuna's Critique of Causality

I n the Madhya mikakarika,

N agarjuna

attacks

the

Abhidharma view of praxis by uti l izing a system of logic that offers negative res ponses to fo ur poss i b l e a l ternative s . C a l led t h e catu$ko,i , it is often depicted in t h e fo l lowing form :

1 . It is not the case that x is y. 2 . It is not the case that x is not-y. 3 . I t is not the case that x is both y and not-y. 4. It is not the case that x is neither y nor not-y. Nagarjuna uses these four state ments against a variety of arguments ranging from caus a l ity and the se lf to imper­ manence, space , time, and motion . Against a particu lar view of causation , for exa m p l e , N agarj u n a ap p l ies the calu$ko'i and conc ludes that dharmas (x) are not produced (y), not non­ produce d , neither bot h , nor neither. Or, against a particular view of motion he appl ies the dia lectic and concl udes that motion ( x ) is not moving ( y ) , not non- moving, neither bot h , n o r neither.

Nagarju na 's Middle Way

99

In Chapter 1 of the Karika s , Nagarjuna uses this l ine of re asoning against the Abhidharma views of causation : Neither from itse lf nor from another, Nor from both , Nor without a cause , Does anything whatever, anywhere a rise. (Garfie ld 1 995 , p. 3 ) T h i s is t h e begi n ning of Nagarj un a's attack on caus a l ­ ity . Thi ngs a re either caused from themse lves , from some­ t h i n g e l s e , from both , o r from no cause w h atsoeve r . Nagarj un a denies a l l four a lternative s , trying t o show that each view of causation is absurd . He does this by saying that any understanding of cause and effect presupposes our ability to either affirm or deny caus a l identity. I n other words , a cause is either identical to its effect , different from its effect, both , or neither. Saying they are identical is absurd s ince this destroys the language of cause and effect that te l ls us something h a s ch anged or has become d i fferent from what it was . I f cause and effect are identica l , then there is no change from the cause to the effect, which means that nothing was ever rea l ly "caused" at a l l . N agarj u n a denies this a l ternative , saying that thi n gs cannot arise from themselves . Does this mean that cause and effect is a re lation be­ tw e e n

two

d i f fe r e n t

t h i ngs

( arising

from

another)?

Nagarj una denies this a l ternative a s we l l , a rguing that it i s logica l ly i m possible f o r two separate entities t o b e caus a l ly re l a te d . If two t h i ngs are fu ndam e nta l l y d i ffe re n t , then th ere is no connection between them whatsoeve r , which de­ stroys their ability

to

interact causally. Just

as

causal identity

Skillful Means

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denies the necessary re l ationship that must exist betwee n causes and e ffects , so the idea of absol ute difference rup ­ tures any caus a l connection between two things that are sup­ posedly re l ated . According to Nagarjuna, this idea must be rejected because it denies our abi l ity to speak cohere n t l y about causation . " Perfect otherness ( o r di ffe rence ) , " says C a n d ra k i r t i , " a m ounts to no cause at a l l " (Sprung 1 9 7 9 , p. 42).

This leaves the last two alternatives , wh ich are a lso de­ nied by N agarj un a , the first for being contradictory, and the second for being i l l ogica l . Saying that cause and effect are both identical and non-identical is a basic contradiction : x and not (x

=

=

y

y ) ; and saying that a cause arises from nowhere

is not only logical ly impossible ( how can a non -cause bring something into existence? ) , but implies that things can arise from any source whatsoever. N:. Buddhapal ita says: Th i n gs cannot arise w i thout a caus e , because that wou l d e n t a i l that anything cou l d arise a t any time , anywhere . (Sprung 1979, p. 4 3 ) T h e result o f Nagarjuna's dialectic is t o say that causa­ tion is "empty ," without essence , i n herent nature, or sub­ stance . But what does Nagarj una mean by saying that causa­ tion is "empty," and why is he attacking these theories in this way? Most Western accounts say that Nagarjuna is dea l i n g w i t h metaphys ical prob lems. According t o M urti ( 1 9 5 5 ) a n d Loy ( 1 98 7 ) , f o r exa m p l e , Nagarj u n a is argu ing for a tran­ scendental expe rience beyond l anguage and conceptua l i z a­ tion ; for Siderits ( 1 988 ), he is argui ng against the prob lem of "rea lism"; for Ka lupahana ( 1 986) Nagarjuna is similar to the

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Logi c a l Positivists w h o a rgue against non-empirical meta­ physical views; and for Garfield ( 1995 ) N agarj una is arguing for the "conventiona l " nature of rea l ity . These schol ars a lso see N agarjuna as saying that we cannot attain l i beration un­ t i l we fu l l y deconstruct our metaphys i c a l attac h m e n t s . Garfiel d makes this clear when he writes: I t cannot be overemphasized that as far as N agar­ jun a-or any other M ahayana Buddhist philosopher, for that matter-is concerned , the view that the things we perce ive and of which we conceive , to the extent that they exist at a l l , do so inherently, originates as an in­ n ate misapprehension and is not the product of sophis­ ticated phi losophica l theory. That is, we n a i ve ly and pretheoretica l l y t ake things as substantia l . This, as N agarj un a wi l l argue , and as t he Bu d dha h i m s e l f ar ­ gued, is th e root de l usion that l ies at the bas is of a l l human suffering. ( Ga rfie ld 1 995, p . 88) Garfield's genera l ization about all Mahayana Buddhist phi losophers is puzz l i ng, especi a l l y since, at least from the M a h ayana perspective, the prob lem with the Abh idharma Buddhists ig not thei r supposed metaphysica l views but their attempt to justify one soteriological praxis a bove all others . That a l l Mahayana philosophers a re conce rned with meta­ phys ics is certainly not obvious ; nor it is obvious that all hu­ man suffering is ca used by taking thi ngs as "substantia l . " Such

a

sweeping genera l ization presents a biased account of

Buddh ist phi losophy and assumes that human suffering can be exp lained i n a tota lizing way. I f Nagarjuna is saying this , then he is gui lty of offering the type of "poison ous remedies" that was rejected b y t h e Buddha and Vimalakirt i .

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If we read Niigiirj una as a "ski l l - i n-means" thinker,

however, then we wi l l not arrive at this concl us ion . To do so, we need to remember that, l ike the Buddha's criticism of the "sixty two" views, Niigiirjuna is trying to resol ve a major con ­ fl ict in the Buddhist community over "correct" soteriological praxis . For most Abhidharma traditions, for instance , libera­ tion depends on a "correct" meditation of dharmas: how they arise and cease , how they are conditione d , and how they cause suffering. While they a l l agreed on the need to medi­ tate on dharmas , they fought over the "correct" way of going about this. The Sarviistiviidin held that underlying the "moments" of meditation there are unchanging substances (suablzauaJ that adhere throughout ti me . These underlying substances were termed a dha rm a 's "se l f nature," and were seen as piv­ ota l in meditative practice . To meditate on a dharma 's "se l f nature" m e a n t t h a t o n e wou ld no longer b e captivated by fleeting appearances or attached to "turbulent" phenomen a . One c o u l d t h e n s e e t h e causes o f suffering a n d mental anxi­ ety, and rest peaceful l y in the "calm" of n iruti !J. a . The abi l ity to discern the substance of dlz a rm a s was the refore tanta­ mount to liberation . Niigiirj una's prob lem with this is that it contradicts the view that one must meditate on caus a l ity in order

to

attain

liheration . I f d lz a rm a s stay the same then they are not caused at a l l because they never change ; and if they a re "se lf-caused" then they are identical to themse lve s , which d e n ies t h e doctri n e of " d e p e n d e n t a r i s i ng . " Thus , for Niigiirj u n a , the Sarviistiviidin view of dharmas is absurd within the con text of a Budd hist meditation , since the idea of

dlwrmas contradicts t h e Buddhist doct rin e of "dependent arising."

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T h e Sautrantikas a l so rejected t he Sarvastivadin posi­ tion but proposed the idea that meditation is com posed of contin uous " f l a s h i n gs " of " m o m e n ts " i n to consciousn e s s :

dharmas arise and cease each moment, they come from no­ where , "flash" for an instant, and then vanish . To see this process-to "review" it-was the goa l of meditative practice that supposedly ends in liberation . For Nagarj un a, this j ustification of praxis suffers from s i m i l a r i n consistencies as the Sarvastivadin vie w . If one must meditate on dharmas as point-in stants that h ave n o con tinuity between o n e moment and t h e n e x t , t h e n w h a t h a p p e n s t o t h e caus a l process t h a t is vita l to Buddhist praxis? If dharmas are nothing more than distinct "moments" in meditative equi l i brium, then what is the connection be­ tween one dharma and the next? Since there seems to be no connection whatsoever, then how can we make sense of "de­ pe n d e n t a r i s i n g"? N agarj un a ' s point i s t h a t , l i ke the Sarvastivadin view, the Sautrantikas are proposing inconsis­ tent views of praxis: they say one must meditate on causal ity in order to be l i be rated , but then deny caus a l i ty b) saying that one must meditate on certai n moments (dharmas ) that are non-caus a l . W h a t is t h e significance of t h i s criticism? I s N agarjun a saying th at we sh oul d never meditate on caus a l i ty , or that any meditation on dharmas is a l w ays w rong? I s he saying that the Abhidharma views of causation are useless because they are contradictory? It is doubtful Nagarj u n a wants us to come to t h i s con c l usion . Not only wou ld this contradict the Budd ha's own teachings about causation , it wou l d mean that N agarj u na is trying to re s o l ve the co n f l ict be t w e e n the Ab h i d h a rma trad itions by re nouncing Abhidharma pra c t i c e al toge t h e r . However. N iiga rj u n a knows that con flicts are

not

Skillful Means

1 04

caused by "views ," even i f they a re metaphysica l ly or logi ­ ca l ly fa l s e . T h e probl e m l i es m uch deeper t h a n this for Nagarj u n a , and he knows that i t has nothing to do with the Abhidharma view of dharmas or causation i n itse lf. Like the Buddha who criticized the "s ixty two" views because the phi­ losophers who proposed them were "ca ught i n the net" of b l i n d grasping, Nagarj u n a cou l d care less about the meta­ phys ical status of d h a r m a s . Hi s concern is why the Abh i ­ dharma philosophers t h i n k there i s o n l y o n e type o f causal meditatio n , and why they think there i s on ly one way to at­ tain l i beration . By arguing for the "emptiness" of causation , he is reminding the Abhidharma Buddhists that causation , i n t h e form of "dependent arising," i s s i m ply o n e of the ma ny med itative practices taugh t . by the Buddha, and that it is t h erefore noth i n g more than a ski l l f u l "device'' used to counter certai n forms of attachment . Rather than argu i n g against

a

metaphysical v i e w of causat ion , h e i s s i mply re­

c a l l i ng the Buddha's own words on the subject: "If you c l ing to it, if you fon dle it, if you treasure it, if you are attached to it, then you do not understand that the teaching is s i mi l ar to a raft , which is for crossing over , and not for getting hold of" ( Rahula 1 9 7 4 , p. 1 1 ) .

The Five Aggregates In C hapter 4 of the Ka r i k a s , Nagarj un a continues h i s criticism o f t h e Abhidharma trad1tion b y examining t h e "five aggregates" (or ska ndhas ) , which, l ike caus a l ity , is central to Buddhist m e d i tation . Begin ning with the first aggrega te , form ( rilpa ) , N agarjuna applies h i s reductios against the idea that either form or the cause of form must exist i n a substan­ tial way:

Nagarjuna 's Middle Way

1 05

Apart from the cause of form, Form cannot be conceived. Apart from form, The cause of form is not seen. I f apart from the cause of form , there were form , Form would be without cause. But nowhere is there an effect Without a cause. If apart from form, There were a cause of form , I t would be a cause without an effect. But there are no causes without effects . ( Garfie ld 1 995, p. 48) I n these lines, Nagarjuna argues against the idea that the rupa aggregate exists essentia l ly or contain s a sva b h iiva ("sel f nature"). I f we keep in mind the Abhidharma view that a dharma 's "se l f nature" is wound up with an explanation of caus a l ity , we w i l l un derstand what Nagarj u n a is u p to in these passage s . The Abhidharma pos itions res t on the idea that a dharma is either diffe rent from or identical to its causa l properties , and Nagarjuna is trying to show how both views lead to absurd conclusions. I f the Sautrantikas are right in saying that a thing is essenti a l l y different from its cause , then we shou ld be able to s peak of cause and effect as two separate things . On the other h a n d , if the Sarvastivadin a re right in saying that a

dharma is identical to its caus a l re lation s , then we should not be able to distinguish a cause from its effect since they are numerica l ly the same. What N agarj una s ays about both

106

Skillful Mea ns

positions is contained in the above verses . It makes no sense , h e says , t o se parate the aggregate rilpa from its cause be­ cause we then have the concl usion that riipa can exist with­ out any caus a l rel ations whatsoever, i . e . , that cause and ef­ fect a re two separate "things . " This means that an effect can exist without a cause, and that a cause can exist without an effect. But this conc l usion is absurd, says Nagarjuna, s ince nowhere do we find causes without effects , or effects without causes . The two terms stand in a re l ation , thus making it logically impossible to assert their independence . I n the next th ree verses, Nagarjuna con tinues his cri­ tique by saying that i f riipa has a n identifi a b l e essence , something that cou l d be c l a s s i fied as svabhiiva , the n i t makes no s e n s e t o speak of something e l se "caus ing" it to a rise since it a l ready exists as an independent entity. Simi­ larly, a non -existent cause for riipa is logica l ly incohere n t , since if it is non-existent then it makes no sense t o claim that it could cause other things to arise : When form exists , A cause of the arising of form is not tenable. When form is non-existent, A cause of the arising of form is not tenable. Form itse lf without a cause I s not possible or tenable. Therefore , think about form , but Do not construct theories about form . The assertion that the effect and cause I s not acceptabl e .

a re

similar

Nagarjuna 's Middle Way

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The assertion that they are not similar I s a lso not acceptable. (Garfield 1 995 , p. 49) The Sarvastivadin position was a l ready shown to lead to absurdity, and is therefore quickly dismissed in the above sections. If cause and effect are identic a l then it makes no sense to speak about causation since causation i m p l ies that there is some amount of change that occurs between things . The conclusion , as N agarjuna asserts in verse six, is that an essential effect is neither different from nor similar to an es­ sential cause , s ince the whole idea of someth ing having a n essence, either a "se l f nature" o r a n "other nature," i s absurd: The assertion that the effect and cause are similar Is not acceptable. The assertion that they are not similar I s a lso not acceptable. (Garfie l d 1 995 , p. 49) Note that Nagarjuna does not propose another correct view of "form" over and above the Abhidharma traditions. He simply a rgues against their views by showing how their dis­ cussion is incoherent, and rather than propose another view he simply says to "think about form" but not to get attached to it:

Therefore, think about form , but Do not construct theories about form. (Garfield 1995, p. 50)

In other words , meditate on the body, the sense organs, and experiences of taste, sme l l s , sensations, and sounds, but do not construct metapractica l justifications for these medi-

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tative experiences. This conclus ion is then extended to a l l the other aggregates as wel l : Fee lings , discrimination and dispositions And consciousness and a l l such things Should be thought of In the same way as material form. ( Garfield 1 995, p. 50) The majority of arguments in the Karikas proceed al ong these lines. The idea of svabhiiva , essence, s ubstance , or in­ here n t n ature is attacked for being inconsistent, which makes the Abhidharma insistence on needing to meditate in a particular way utterly foolish. From an ana lysis of caus al ­ ity and th e aggregates , Nagarjuna moves o n to the other ma­ j o r factors i n Abh idharma ana lysis of expe rience, performing the same task in each cas e : decon structing the view of

svabhiiva without putting another definitive view of praxis in its place.

Suffering, Attachment, and Bondage

In the chapter "Exam i nation of Suffering," N aga rjuna argues against the view that suffe ring can be explained in an essenti a l istic way. T h i s i s an i m po rta nt c h a pter of the

Karikas because it goes against the prevai l ing view in Indian ph i l osophy that suffering needs to be an object of meditative prax i !' , i .e . , that we must meditate on the nature of s uffering and how it arises in order to achieve l i be ration . Nagarjun a hegins by laying out four popu l ar theories on how suffering arises:

Nagarju na 's Middle Way

1 09

Some say suffering is sel f-produced, Or produced from another or from both . Or that it arises without a cause . It is not the kind of thing to be produced . ( Garfield 1 995, p. 33) N agarj u n a ends the verse by stating the concl usion : Suffe ring is not the kind of thing that can be exp lained by appe a l i ng to some form of inherent production . He then goes on to explain that suffering is not se lf- produced because that wou l d entai l s peaking of production in isol ation from caus a l condition s , i . e . , production without a n y rea l cause and effect . It cannot come from someth ing who l ly other because t h e idea of essentia l diffe rence precl udes the necessary re lationship that must adhere between conditioned things . The fina l two alternatives are rej ected for leading to s i m i l a r conclusions : T o s ay that s ufferi n g i s both s e l f- p roduced a n d other­ produced is a basic contradiction , and saying that it arises without any cause whatsoever implies that things can arise from nowhere , which make l ittle sense . Nagarjuna concludes the chapter by criticizing an essentialistic view of suffering: Not only does suffering not exist In any of the fourfold ways : No external entity exists In any of the fourfold ways . ( Garfiel d 1 995, p. 34) Nowhere in this chapter does Nagarjuna say what s uf­ fering is in itse lf. He offe rs no new theory on how it comes about, what its na ture is, or what we need to know in order to ach ieve l iberation . His goal is simply to refute those theories th at re ly on an essenti alistic understanding of s uffering. Not

Skillful Mea ns

1 10

only does suffering l ack an essence ( at least in the way the Abhidharma thinkers think of it), but it is absurd to speak

of

"externa l entities" as existing in this way as we l l . By attack­ ing the idea that suffering has an essence, he is trying to un­ dermine the view that suffering must be an object of medita­ tive praxis . Nagarj una's critique of essentia l ism in regards to su f­ fering is also appl ied to the causes of s uffering. According

to

a n umbe r of Indian ph i l osophie s , one needs to meditate on the causes of suffering in order to overcome it, and most tra­ ditions agreed that suffering, sa rizsara , bon dage , and disease are caused by attach ment, either to the fruits of action , the gu �ws,

Prallrt i , an em pirical "se l f," friends, rel atives, o r ma­

teri a l things . N agarjuna a l so shares this view , but ascribes no sign ificance to the idea that attachment must be an object of med itative praxis . Just as causal ity, rupa , and suffering are "empty , " then so too is attachment-without essence , substance, or inherent nature . T h i s idea is deve loped in t h e "Examination o f Bondage" chapter, in which Nagarjuna argues against the idea that the essence of sa 1il sa ra can be l ocated i n the act of "gras ping." The gist of the argument is that if grasping ( attachment) has an inherent nat ure then we shou l d be able to identify the subject of attachment, the "grasper." I n other words , if there is "grasping" then there must be some essential subject that actually does the grasping. But since no essential subject can be found, according to Nagarjuna, it fo l lows that the idea of an essential "grasping" is impossible. I f grasping were bondage, Then the one who is grasping would not be bound .

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But one who is not grasping is not bound . I n wh a t circumstances w i l l o n e be bound? If prior to binding There is a bound one, There woul d be bondage, but there isn't. The rest has been explained by the gon e , the not-gone, and the goer. ( Garfiel d 1 995, p .4 1 ) Nagarj una's goa l here i s t o drive a we dge between bondage and the person bound . I f bondage does have an es­ sence , then, like all essences, it must exist as an independent phenomenon , separate from and prior to the person becoming bound . S i m i l a r l y , if a person has an essence , a svabhiiva , then it too must be separate from the act of grasping that is identified as bondage . What Nagarjuna says above, however, is that this creates a n untenable dua l i s m . I f the person "grasping" has an inherent nature independent from that act, then it is obvious ly not bound, and if it is not bound , then the whole idea of needing to get out of bondage makes no sense. The separation between the s ubject which grasps, the act of grasping, and the experience of being bound--al l th ree of w hich are needed to iden tify an essential "graspi ng" -is a separation that exc l udes the n ecess a ry re l ation s h i p t h a t must adhere between these activities . I t is l ike severing the rela tion between motion and moving, which , as N agarj u n a expl a i n s in C h a pter 2 o f t h e Karikas , l e a d s to t h e absurd conclusion that there is no movement. The reification of s uffering, attach ment, a n d bondage that N agarjuna criticizes here goes hand in hand with a reifi­ cation of non-attachment, or n irvar.ta, as wel l . When samsara is es sential ized into a fixed principle with its own "inherent

Skillful Means

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nature"-then nirviifJa is separated off, distinguished from a l l other thi ngs , and reified into a rea l m of independence . Such a radica l separation severs any possible re l ationsh i p be­ tween bei ng bound and achieving l iberation , and leads to the conc lusion that whatever is bound must necessarily re main boun d , and w h atever is re leased must stay re l ease d . As Nagarjuna puts it: Whoever is bound is not re leased . Whoever is not bound does not get re lease d . ( Garfie ld 1 995, p. 4 2 ) T h i s is an un.a cceptable .concl usion for Nagarj u n a-or any other Indian phi losopher who values l iberation-and is why N agarj una ends the chapter with the fol lowing question : When you can't bring about nirvaQa , Nor the purification o f cyclic existence , What is cyclic existence , And what is the n i rvaQa you examine? ( Garfie l d 1 995, p. 4 2) Nagarj una's point here is t o say t hat l i beration is im­ poss ible if sa ritsara and n i rvfzfJa are substantia l ly existent thi ngs . To think of gras ping, bondage , suffering, and l ibera­ tion as distinct obj ects of meditative praxis treats them as fixed and static entities, which severs any possible re l ation ­ s h i p between the m . I f this ha ppen s , then someth ing boun d can never become unboun d , and someone who suffers can never hope for re lease. Since this is an unacceptabl e con c l u­ s ion for any Buddhist, then the prob lem lies in the way l i b ­ eration is being conceived.

Niigiirju na 's Middle Way

1 13

I n moving from caus a l ity, the aggregates , and the e l e ­ ments of existence to suffering, attachment, sa m s a ra , a n d nirvtiT,la , Nagarj un a h a s covered t h e major areas of Buddhist

p ra c t i c e .

In

each

case

he

undermines

the

idea

of

suabhaua-th u s underm i n i n g the a s s u m ption that these

terms, categories, and experiences are necessary for l ibera­ tion . I f there is no essence to caus a lity, to s uffering, to at­ tachment, or to n irutirz a , then they are , as Nagarj u n a says , "empty" of inherent n ature; and if they are "empty ," then the Abh idharma view that one m u st med itate on them is unwar­ ranted . This does not mean that one should never meditate on causal ity, the dharm as, ska ndhas , or samsara as e lements of experience , or that there is anything inherently w rong with the abh idharma texts themse l ves . Nagarj u n a is not a rguing against the meditative practices of these texts , but against the phi losophical j ustifications of the Abhidharma ph i l oso­ phers who a re justifying these texts as the only soteriological "rafts" in Buddhism. I n this sense, Nagarj u n a , a long with the Lot u s S u tra, the Prajnaparamita , and Vi mala k i rt i n i rdesa , takes a strong ph i l os o p h ic a l s t a n c e :

t h e r e a re no fixed o r a b s o l ute

metapractical criteria i n Buddhism, and the attem pt to j us ­ tify a n y single practice for a l l people under a ll circumstances not only contradicts Buddhist doctrine , but goes against the spi rit of compassion that meditative praxis is trying to faci l i ­ tate . W h i l e thi:; m a y look l ike simply o n e more "view" among a l l the others , it i s not a meta practica l-or metaphysi­ cal-"view" that seeks to tota lize Buddhist praxis under a single heading. In this respect, N agarjuna has no "view ."

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Nagarjuna's Critique of the Four Noble Truths

Chapter 24 of the Kiirikiis contains some of the most important sections of the entire text, and begins with an ob­ vious rejoinder to everything N agilrjuna has argued against up to this point . If it is true , as Nagarj una says, that caus a l ­ ity , i m permanence, suffering, bondage , and so on a re a l l "empty," then what i s left of Buddhism? I n other words, if it is true that the Abhidharma justifications of practice a re "empty," and if it is true that their views of praxis are centra l to Buddhist meditation and doct rine, then Nagarjuna seems to be undermin ing everything that is vita l to Buddhism. He begins C hapter 24 by expressing this com p l a i n t i n the fol ­ lowing way: I f a l l of this is empty , Neither arising nor ceasing, Then for you, it fol lows that The Four Noble Truths do not exist. If the Four Noble Truths do not exist, Then know ledge , abandonment, Meditation and manifestation Wil l be completely impossible. I f these things do not exist, The four fruits wil l not arise . Without the four fruits , there wil l be no attainers of the fruits. Nor will there be the faithful .

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I f so, the s piritual community w i l l not exist. Nor w i l l the eight kinds of person . I f the Four Noble Truths do not exist, There w i l l be no true Dharma . I f there is no doctrine and spiritua l community, How can there be a Buddha? If emptiness is conceived in this way, The three jewels are contradicted. (Garfiel d 1 995, p. 6 7 ) I n the above passage s , t he Abh idharma oppone nt a r­ gues that if Nagarj un a is right about ''emptiness ," then the very practices that make Buddhism soteriologica l l y effica­ cious will be destroyed. That is, if it is true that the Four No­ ble Truths are "empty," then there is no such thing as the Buddha , the Dharm a , and the Sangha, no such thing as im­ permanence, "non-self," and nirvalJ.a , and the practices that supposed ly lead to l iberation will be destroye d . N agarj una responds to this complaint by saying it re lies on a misinter­ pretation of siinyata : We say that this u nderstanding of yours Of emptiness and the purpose of emptiness And of the sign ificance of emptiness is incorrect. As a consequence you are harmed by it.

( Garfield 1 995, p . 68) Because the Abhidharma opponent takes "emptiness" to mean the non-existence of the Four Noble Trut h s , h e is "harmed by it," in other words , he sees "emptiness" as de­ s troy i n g Buddhist praxis a l together. But his reason for

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thinking l ike this is because he thinks that practice requires fixed metapractical criteria. Nagarjuna responds to this assumpt i on by reversing the tables, saying that what destroys practice is not "emptiness," but rather the idea that there must be an essentia l practice

(svabhiiva) that appl ies to everyone univers a l ly : If you perceive the existence o f a l l things In terms of [svabhii va}, Then this perception of a l l things Wi l l be without the perception of causes and condition s . Effects and causes An� agent and action And conditions and arising and ceasing And effects wil l be rendered impossible . Garfiel d 1 995, p. 69) N agarj u n a goes on to say that the reason svabhiiva mil itates against causal condition s , arising, ceasing, agency, and so forth, is because svabhiiva enta i l s independence, and if things are independent then it is impossible for them to in­ teract caus a l l y . I f this is true then there is no "dependent arising," a n d without "dependent arising" it is i m possibl e to make sense of the abi lity to cultivate a virtuous l ife . I n other words , without the process of change the whole idea of c u l ti· vating t h e "fruits" of a Buddhist l ife is rendered nonsensica l . I n short , h e says that Buddhist praxis must b e "empty" i f are t o make a n y sense o f the Four Noble Truth s : I f dependent arising is denied, Emptiness itsel f is rejected.

we

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This would contradict Al l of the worldly conventions. I f emptiness is rejected, No action wil l be appropriate . There wou ld be action which did not begi n , And there would b e agent without action . If there is [svabhava ] , the whole world W i l l be unarising, unceasing, And static. The entire phenomenal worl d Wou ld b e immutable. I f it ( the world) were not empty , Then action would be without profit. The act of ending suffering and Abandoning misery a n d defi lement w ou l d not exist. ( Ga rfie ld 1 995, p. 7 2 ) Nagarj u na has t h u s shifted t h e debate . Whereas the Abhidharma thinker began with the assumption that fixed meta pract ical

criteria

a re

n e c e s s a ry

for

l i be ra t i o n ,

. N agarjuna counte rs by saying that Buddhist pract ice-an d hence liberation-is undermined by treating it as a fixed sys­ tem . Like the first chapter on causation , N agarj u n a is at­ tacking the Abhidharma Buddhists for the i r attachment to meditation and for thinking that one can reduce Buddh ism to an abso lute soteriol ogica l guide. The Four Noble Truths are supposed to be medicinal "rafts" that h e l p particu l ar human beings overcome attach ment, but if one becomes attached to those practices of non-attachment then the entire thrust of Buddhism

is

lost .

Thus ,

N a g a rj u n a

s ays

that

the

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118

Dharma-which incl udes causation , i mpermanence , suffer­ ing, bondage, and liberation-must remain "empty."

Summary

During Nagarj u n a's time there were prol ific debates over issues such as the nature of personal identity, the mind, consciousness, the status of know ledge , caus a l ity, and the structure of experience. While it is possible to discuss these debates in pure ly metaphysical terms and apart from their South Asian milieu, we need to remember that these debates take pl ace within a sote riological context and are l i n ked to issues of praxis . The deb a tes over caus a l ity in the Buddhist tradition , for example, are not about knowing how the world is structured or getting an obj ective view on causation , but about how a meditation on dharmas a l lows us to overcome the causes of suffering, attachment, and bondage . Likewise, the debates over the " m eans of know ledge" (prama!J-a ) be­ tween the Nyaya and Buddhist phi losophers has l ittle to do with the epistemo logica l prob lem of how we know, or how we know that we know , but is abou t the ro le of know ledge and cogn ition in meditative praxis . Thus, while it might be inte r­ esting to examine these issues apart from how they operate in a metapractica l discourse , and whi le we cou l d discuss them in rel ation to genera l metaphysical , onto logica l , or epis­ te mologica l problems, we end up distorting the issue if we frame these debates apart from their metapractica l context and a part from how they re l ate to issues of mediation , prac­ tice, and soteriology . I t is neverth e l ess common to confuse N agarj un a's meta practical critique-deal ing with attachment to Buddhist

Nagiirjuna 's Middle Way

1 19

praxis-with metaphysics because it appears that the Ahhid­ harma phi losophers are giving a metaphys i c a l j ustification for their views . As was discussed in C hapter 2, however, i t is doubtful that the conflict between the Abhidharma traditions can be framed i n this way s ince their views are inseparably linked to praxis : they are not offering theories of causality i n t h e abstract-but metapract i c a l j ustifications of h o w o n e should meditate. N agarj un a 's phi l osophy c h a l l e n ges s u c h

justifications , arguing f o r t h e ' emptiness" of caus a l i ty , the dharmas , s k a n d h a s , the Four Noble Truth s , and suffering.

And instead of justifying "em ptiness" as a new fixed medita­ tive standard for all Buddhists, Nagarj un a argues that even "emptiness" is "empty . " I n saying this , he not only under­ m i n e s the Abh i d h a r m a fixation with a s pecific fo rm of praxis-those fou n d i n the a b h idharma texts-but tries to undermine o ur own desire to become attached to "emptiness . " W h i l e t h i s m ay presuppose certain assumptions about the nature of the world and human beings , i t does not enta i l a metapractical j ustification for any single meditative practice . And it is i n this sense that we shou l d understand N agar­ juna's claim that he has no fixed "view" (dr�ti ) . The divisions between the t w o M a d hy a m i k a schoo l s t h a t fol lowed N agarj u n a , the Prasailgika and Svatantri k a , a r e separated b y s i m i l a r issues of praxi s, and therefore i m ­ mersed i n a skil l ful - means debate . T h e i s s u e t h a t separates them is about the best way to communicate "emptiness" to oth e r B uddhist a n d non - B ud d hi st schoo l s in I n d i a . The Svatantrika phi losopher Bhavaviveka, fo r exa m p l e , thought the best way to express "emptiness" is to use arguments that conform to accepted modes of argumentation . By re lying on an independent syllogis m (svatantra -anumana ) , he fe l t that the M adhyamikan philosopher wou l d be more effective i n in­ · ducing an understand ing of "emptiness" to others because he

Skillful Means

120

would then use inferential norms accepted by both partie s . According t o Candrakirti, however, t h e Madhyamika system begi ns only with views and assertions of other people and does not rely on an i ndependent inference. It admits o n l y provisiona l ly t h e argument o f t h e opponent and then shows , through reductio ad a bs u rd u m (p ra sa liga ) arguments , the unten abil ity of the position being advanced. As Peter De l l a Santina notes , the issue for the Prasanghika i s n o t whether an argument is true inferentia l ly but whether it w i l l work soteriological ly : They have as the i r paradigm the conduct o f the En­ lightened Ones who by means of appropri ate arguments edify the ignorant. In such a context, the val idity of

an

a rgument i s measured by its efficacy , not b y its confor­ mity to the principles of forma l logic and epistemology . < De l l a Santina 1 986, p. 69 ) From a metapractica l perspective , the debate between the two Madhyamika schools is a debate about the n ature aud efficacy of the Buddhist system, and has l ittle to do with strictly metaphysical or l ogic a l issue s . N agarjuna's debate with the Abhidharma ph ilosophers should be seen in a simi­ lar light: he is not asking how causation is possible at a l l , or which phil osophical theo ry is most fe asib l e , but why the Abhi dharma thinkers are justifying this particu lar view of praxi s , and why they think it represents the highest sote­ riological wisdom of the Buddha .

Chapter 5 Ch'an Buddhism Introduction

The C h'an (Jaj)anese Zen ) Buddhist tradition offers some of the most exciting and interesting uses of upiiya . Al­ though developed fi rst in China and then l ater i n Japan , Ch'an has its roots in India, and claims to preserve the peda­ gogical styles and teachings of the Buddha . Two obvious ex­ amples of "ski l l-in-means" in Ch'an include the use of k u ng­ a n (Japanese koa n ) , that are used to initi ate a s piritual

awake n i n g i n a student, and Ch'an meditation (Japanese zazen ) , that resembles the traditional Buddhist practice of

"mindfulness . " In many Ch'an schoo l s , the doctrine of upiiya is extended to include the devotion a l e lements of Pure Land Buddhism such that faith in Amida Buddha wil l itse l f lead one to the Pure Lan d . This re liance on "other power" ( Chi­ nese t 'o-li; Japanese tariki) in which a practitioner can simply invoke the name of Amida Buddha ( n i e n -fo ) to attain en­ lightenment is con sidered

a

valid path in some Ch'an tradi­

tions , and is said to have originally been taught by the B ud­ dha himself. The Ch'an use of upiiya is particu larly interesting be­ cause it highlights the critical e lement of non-attachment. As we have seen , upaya counteracts the tendency to reify any one teaching, doctrine, or practice by saying that all the B ud­ dha's teachings are rhetorica l ly efficacious : they s uit the dif­ ferent leve ls and karmic dispositior.,; of an audience . Hence , the use of paradoxical k u ng-a n s , ch 'a n meditation (dhyiina ) ,

121

Skillful Mear.. s

1 22

and "ot her power" devotion are fu l ly compat i b l e and sy n ­ cretic doctrines , and make perfect sense within t h e pedagogi ­ cal context of skil lfu l mean s . However, Ch'an is also s e n s i ­ tive t o t h e long-standing prob lem o f essenti a l i z ing Buddhis t practice and the prob lem of saying that only one of these practices w i l l lead to l i bera t ion . While this struggle aga i n s t Buddhist attach ment is by no means unique to t h e C h ' a n tra ­ dition , it did deve lop an iconoc l astic resistance to attachment by exc l a i m ing, as Lin-chi did, that there is no Buddhist doc­ trine whatsoever, no such thing as e n l ightenment, and that the scriptures are nothing more than "old toilet paper to w i pe away excrement . " Such extre me statements -which can a l s o incl ude a s l a p , kick , or punch b y a Ch'an master-take p l ace within a l a rger debate about Buddhist practice and need to be seen as strategic maneuvers within the context of upaya . This chapter is therefore not about the Ch'an tradi tion per se, a lthough it will obviously be the main focus of the fo l ­ lowing discussion . Rat her, this chapter, like a l l the preceding cha pters , i s about exploring· an on-going critica l d i a logue within the Buddhist trad ition , a dialogue that began with the B u d d h a's c r i t i c a l stance toward his o w n t e a c h i n gs ,

re­

emerged i n the Prajiiaparamita texts , the Vi m a la k l. rt i , a n d Nagarj u n a , and is s e e n aga in i n t h e Ch 'an tradition . I t is the refore not a bout Ch'an metaphysics , n o n - d u a l ity, l a n ­ guage , e n l ighte n m e n t , o r the doctrine of "No- M i n d , " but about a l a rger debate over Buddhist praxis. As the Japanese Ch'an master Dogen says :

You should know that in the buddha's house we do not discuss superiority or inferiority of the teaching; nor do we concern ourse lves with the depth or shal lowness of

Ch 'an Buddh ism

1 23

the dharma, but on ly with the gen uineness or fa l seness of practice . (Tanahashi 1 985, p. 149) The fo l l owing section will examine this issue of practice by looking briefly at key representatives of the Ch'an tradi­

tion , such as Hui-neng, Lin-chi , and Dogen . I t wil l end with some concl uding remarks about the harmonious re lationship between Ch'an and Pure Land.

Shen-hsiu and Hui-neng

The prob lem of Buddhist praxis is contained in a fa­ mous struggle between Shen-hsiu and H u i -neng over who w i l l become the Sixth Patriarch of C h 'an Buddh i s m . The Fifth patriarc h , H ung-j e n . had grown old and needed to choose a successor to pass the "robe" of patriarcha l authority , an estab l i shed tradition in C h ' a n s i n c e the B u d d h a first passed it to Maha kashyap a . One day the Fifth Patriarch gathered his disciples before him �.nd said that the monk who writes the best poem (giithii) will receive the robe . The next day, a monk named Shen-hsiu, famous for his inte l lect and unwavering commitment to practice , offered the fo l lowing

giithii to the Fifth Patriarch : The body is the Bodhi tree, The mind is l ike a clear mirror. At a l l times we must strive to polish it, And must not let the dust col lect. Shen -hsiu's gii thii expresses a fund amental point in Buddhis m : the importance of practice . The first l ine compares

Skillful Mean s

1 24

t h e body to th e tree of wisdom u nd e r w hi ch the Buddha sat, and i m p l ies that it is a vita l i n gredient i n a l l meditation praxis , a n d , hence, e n l ighte nment itse l f . The second l i ne compares the mind to a mirror that, when clear, can reflect a l l things as they truly a re . However, the mind of ordinary people is not like this , and they must continua l l y "po l ish" it i n order to reach enlightenment. As Shen -hsiu implies in the third and fourth lines, the way to clear the mind of dust is by contin u a l , vigi lan t practice . Through meditation , the mind will purify itse l f of attach m e nts a n d reve a l the reflective bri l l iance of e n lightenment. Accordi n g to the Platform Siitra , however, Shen-hsiu did not receive the robe from the Fifth Patriarch . Rathe r, it was given to a n uneducated kitchen-hand n a med Hui-neng, who composed his own gathii for the Patriarch: Origina l ly there is no tree of e n l ightenment, Nor is there a stand with a clear mi rror. From the beginning not one thing exists; Where, then, is a grain of dust to cling? Hui-neng's gii thii is d i a metri c a l l y opposed to She n ­ hsiu's . I t rej ects the idea that the body is a "tree" of wisdo m , that the mind i s like a mirror, a n d that there i s any p l ace for dust to col lect. Where Shen -hsiu affirms the body as the ba­ sis of meditation practice , H ui - neng says there is no body , and where Shen-hsiu expresses the i m portance of purifying one's mind, Hui-neng rej ects the mind. Given that Hui-neng seems to be rejecting the very basis of en l ightenment and practice , why did he receive the robe? To understand the issue that Hui-neng's gii t h ii raises we need to see it i n rel ation to a long critica l tradition of

Ch 'an Buddhism

1 25

Buddhism . Like Nagarj una's attack against the Abh idharma tra dition and Vimal akirti's anger at the Buddha's immediate disciples, H ui-neng is trying to undermine Shen-hsiu's tradi­ tiona l stance that e n l ightenment only comes about by fol ­ lowing a s pecific practice o f meditation . He rejects the bodi ly postures and "polishing" mind that was a l so standard prac­ tice i n Abhidharma B uddhi s m , and tries to undermine the essentialist attitude toward practice that Shen-hsiu's "dust­ ing" metaphor impl ies . A similar point is made by Ma-tsu when he observes an­ other Ch'an master in meditation : He I M a-ts u ] was residing in the monastery of Dembo­ in where he sat cons tantly in meditation . The master, aware that he was a vesse l of the Dharm a , went to him and aske d , "Virtuous one , for what purpose are you sit­ ting in meditation?" Tao-1 answered, "I wish to become a Buddha . " Thereupon t h e master picked up a t i l e a n d started rubbing it on a stone in front of the hermitage . Tao- 1 asked, "What is the Master doing?" The master re plied, " I am pol ishing ! this tile ] to make . a mirror. " "How can you make a mi rror by · pol ishing a ti le?" ex­ c laimed Tao-i. "An d how c a n y o u m a ke a B u d d h a by practicing

ch 'an?" countered the master. ( Dumou lin 1 988, p . l 63 ) I t is tempting t o think that Ma-tsu a n d Hui-neng are at­ tacking the epistemological assumptions of these other Bud­ dh ists . Both Shen-shui and Tao-1 compare the mind to a mir­ ror, and say that through continua l practice one can attain

Skillful Means

1 26

en l igh tenmen t. By speaking of the mind as something dis­ tinct from its experiences (or the mirror from its dust) they seem to be e recting fa l l acious epistemo logic a l and meta­ phys ical distinctions . A number of Ch'an schol ars tend to frame the problem in this manner, seeing the problem as a dualistic view of the mind. As Steven Laycock put it: O n l y by overcoming the conflictual dual ity of medita­ tion a l practice and the profound "seeing" that is "the­ ory" (theoria ) in a sense akin to that which this term held for the Greeks, cou l d the transaction of ordinary l ife (sa m s a ra ) be rendered consistent with the attain ­ ment of supreme insight (nirviir:ta ) . ( Laycock 1 994, p. 5 ) Laycock sees the issue between Hui-neng and Shen-hsiu as an epistemologica l problem re lated to the idea of a mind that mi rrors the wor l d . Like Richard Rorty's criticism of Western philosophy ( Rorty 1 980), he sees Hui-neng trying to overcome a subject/object dua lism in Shen-hsiu's view of the mind, and says that only by overcoming this "confl ictua l du­ al ity" can liberation be achieved . While there is nothing w rong in viewing Ch'an as a critic a l response to epistemological prob lems , it departs from the issue of practice that is central to Hui-neng and Shen ­ hsiu. The issue that divides them is whether there is any sin­ gle practice that leads to e n l ightenment, and whether the Buddha origin a l l y taught this practice . Shen - h s i u t h i n k s t h e re i s , a n d assumes that e n l ighte n m e n t c o m e s about th rough a cont i n u a l "polishing" of the mind. H e not o n ly separates meditation from e n l i ghtenment but thinks that it is impossible to attain enlightenment without "pol ishing" in a particular way. Hui-neng attacks this view of meditation and

Ch 'an Buddhism

127

promotes a " s u d d e n " a w a k e n i n g that re l ies o n n o pre­ established methodologica l procedure or fixed practice . In his vi ew , there is no caus a l relationship between meditating and attaining e n l ightenment s ince l iberation i s a direct and un­ mediated encounter, or, in the words of Bodhidharm a , "a di­ rect pointing to the mind of man . " Thus , th e differences between Hui-neng and Shen-hsiu are not so much metaphysica l or epistemologica l as they are methodologic a l . That is, Hui-neng is not criticizing Shen-hsiu because Shen-hsiu has a dua l istic view of conscious ness , or because his gatha im p l ies an e rroneous view of the mind, or even because Shen-hsiu tends to substantialize the n ature of "dus t . " Rather, Hui-neng's criticism is leveled at the meth­ odologica l prescriptions involved in Shen-hsiu's account of Buddhist praxis. Shen-hsi u's approach to praxis-which can be found in any n u mber of B u d d h i s t texts from the B u d d h a 's Sa ·

tipaNhana Sutta to Buddhaghosa's Vi s u dd h i

-

m agga -fo c uses

a l most excl usive ly on meditation tech nique s ; on bod i l y pos­ ture , breathing, conce ntratio n , awareness of phys iologic a l sensatio n s , observation , a n d s o fo rt h , a n d emphasizes the need to cultivate insight ( vipasya n a ) i nto our emotion a l and mental l ives. Dogen's advice to his monks on how to practice "just sitting" < J a panese zazen) brings out the flavor in this approach: Loosen your robes and arrange them in an orderly

way.

Pl ace the right hand on the left foot and the left hand on the right h a n d , l igh tly touc h i n g the ends of the thumbs together. With the hands in this position , p l ace them next to the body so that the joined thumb-tips are at the nave l .

Skillful Mea ns

1 28

Straighten your body and sit erect . Do not lean to the left or right; do not bend forward or backward. You r ears shoul d be in l ine with your shou lders , and your nose in l ine with your nave l . Rest your tongue against the roof o f your mouth , an d breathe through your nose . Lips and teeth shou l d be closed. Eyes shou l d be open , ne ither too wide , nor too narrow . H aving adjusted body and mind in this manner, take a b reath and exhale fu l ly . S i t s o l i d l y in sa m a d h i a n d t h i n k not-thinking. H o w do you think not thinking? Nonth inking. This is the a rt of zazen .

< Tanahashi 1 985 , p. 3 0)

B y focusing on meditation practice , t he "gradua l " ap­ proach high l ights th e Buddhist concern for "cul tivating the path ," achieving mindfu lness, and the appropriate methods for overcoming menta l angu ish , suffering, and s pi ritua l dis­ tress , i . e . , sa ri1 sa ra . I n this sense , Shen-hsiu expresses what Conze ca l l s "the very core of the Buddhist approach to life" ( Conze 1 956, p. 1 1 ) , and si tuates himse l f within a med itative trad ition that dates back to S akyamuni Buddha. As Peter G regory notes, the "Sixth Patriarch's criticism of t he form a l . pract ice of m editation in the Pla tform Sii t ra on ly makes sense within the context of the daily regi men of the Ch'an or Zen monk, where seated meditation is an inte­ gra l part of h i s pract ice , if not the major focus of his l i fe" ( G regory 1 986, p . 3 ) . It is the refore doubtfu l that Hu i-ncng has a problem with medi tation itse lf, or thinks that "po l i s h ­ ing" is com p letely ineffectua l . On t h e other hand, w h a t d is­ t u rbs H u i-n eng is that Shen -hsiu seems to focus exc lusivel y o n h o u · to attain e n l ighten ment rather than e n l ightenme n t i t s e l f. a n d t h e re fore red u ces a l l of Bucidh is m to

a

fix e d

Ch 'a11 Buddh ism

1 29

methodo logy . The s e v e n t e e n t h -century J a p a n e s e m as t e r Bankei expresses

a

s i m i l a r point when he says :

Zen maste rs of today ge n e ra l ly use " o l d too l s " w h e n they d e a l w i t h pupi l s , apparently thinking t h e y cannot ra ise the barriers I to e n l ighten m e n t ! w i thout t he m . They d o not teach by thrusting themse lves di rect ly for­ ward and confronting their students without their too l s . These m e n who teach w i t h too ls and cannot d o without them are b l ind men of Zen . < Wadde l l 1973, p, 147 ) Like Vi m a lakirti who scolds S ari putra for his dogm atic attachment to a particular form of meditation , Hui-neng is attacking Shen-hsiu for mistaking "meditation" for ritua lized behavior, and for restricting e nl ightenment to a se l ect few , in oth e r words , to those who can engage i n l e n gthy years of pract ice. Hui-neng's teachings , on the other h an d , a re s u p­ posed ly open to everyone such that even " i l l i te rate barbari­ ans" < l ike Hui-neng) can attain enl ightenment. While the d ifferences between Hui-neng and Shen-hsiu later divided into the Southern and Northern schoo l s , each vying for orthodoxy and cl ai m ing to be in possession of "true" Buddh ist praxis, many C h'an masters see no confl ict whatso­ ever between the m . The J a pane s e C h ' a n m a s t e r Doge n makes this point in h i s discussion of Bodhidharma's tran s ­ mission t o Hui-k'o ( "Huike"): The Twenty-e ighth Ancestor I Bodhidharma l once said to his studen ts , "The time has com e . C a n you express your understanding?" Then one of the students , Daofu , s a i d , "My present view is that we should neither be attached to lette rs nor

1 30

Skillful Mea11s

be a part from letters, and a l low the way to function freely." The ancestor said, "You have attained my skin." The n un Zongchi said, "My view i s that it is like the joy of seeing Akshobhya Buddha's land just once and not again . " T h e ancestor said, "You have attained m y flesh." Daoyu sa i d , "The four great e lements are origi na l ly empty and the five skandhas do not exist. Therefore I see nothing to be attained." The ancestor said, "You have attained my bones . " Fin a l ly H uike answered b y bowing three times, s tood up, and returned to where he was. The Ancestor said, "You have attained my m arrow . " Thus he confirmed Huike as t h e Secon d Ancestor and transmitted to him dharma and robe .