Searle's Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement (Philosophy of History and Culture, Vol. 27)

Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy

BO MOU_F1_i-xx.indd i

5/8/2008 7:21:53 PM

Philosophy of History and Culture Editor

Michael Krausz Bryn Mawr College Advisory Board

Annette Baier (University of Pittsburgh) Purushottama Bilimoria (Deakin University, Australia) Cora Diamond (University of Virginia) William Dray (University of Ottawa) Nancy Fraser (New School for Social Research) Clifford Geertz† (Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton) Peter Hacker (St. John’s College, Oxford) Rom Harré (Linacre College, Oxford) Bernard Harrison (University of Sussex) Martha Nussbaum (University of Chicago) Leon Pompa (University of Birmingham) Joseph Raz (Balliol College, Oxford) Amélie Rorty (Harvard University) VOLUME 27

BO MOU_F1_i-xx.indd ii

5/8/2008 7:21:54 PM

Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy Constructive Engagement

Edited by

Bo Mou

LEIDEN • BOSTON 2008

BO MOU_F1_i-xx.indd iii

5/8/2008 7:21:55 PM

This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data ISCWP International “Constructive-Engagement” Conference (2nd : 2005 : Hong Kong University of Science and Technology) Searle’s philosophy and Chinese philosophy : constructive engagement / edited by Bo Mou. p. cm. — (Philosophy of history and culture ; v. 27) Includes index. ISBN 978-90-04-16809-1 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Searle, John R.—Congresses. 2. Philosophy, Chinese—Congresses. I. Mou, Bo, 1956– II. Title. III. Series. B1649.S264I83 2005 191—dc22 2008009737

ISSN 0922-6001 ISBN 978 90 04 16809 1 Copyright 2008 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. printed in the netherlands

BO MOU_F1_i-xx.indd iv

5/8/2008 7:21:55 PM

CONTENTS Acknowledgments ....................................................................... Note on Transcription and Guide to Pronunciation ................... Contributors ................................................................................ Constructive-Engagement Movement in View of Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: A Theme Introduction ............................................................ Bo Mou

ix xiii xv

1

PART ONE

SEARLE ON GLOBALIZATION OF PHILOSOPHY Chapter One The Globalization of Philosophy ...................... John R. Searle

17

PART TWO

CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT OF SEARLE’S PHILOSOPHY AND CHINESE PHILOSOPHY A. Mind Chapter Two Analysis of Searle’s Philosophy of Mind and Critique from a Neo-Confucian Point of View ...................... Chung-ying Cheng Reply to Chung-ying Cheng by John R. Searle Chapter Three Wú-Wéi, the Background, and Intentionality .......................................................................... Chris Fraser Reply to Chris Fraser by John R. Searle

BO MOU_F1_i-xx.indd v

33

63

5/8/2008 7:21:55 PM

vi

contents

Chapter Four A Daoist Critique of Searle on Mind and Action ..................................................................................... Joel W. Krueger Reply to Joel W. Krueger by John R. Searle Chapter Five The Philosopher and the Sage: Searle and the Sixth Patriarch on the Brain and Consciousness .................... Robert E. Allinson Reply to Robert E. Allinson by John R. Searle Chapter Six Searle and Buddhism on the Mind and the Non-Self ................................................................................. Soraj Hongladarom Reply to Soraj Hongladarom by John R. Searle

97

131

169

B. Language Chapter Seven Reference, Truth, and Fiction ......................... A.P. Martinich Reply to A.P. Martinich by John R. Searle Chapter Eight How to Do Zen (Chan) with Words? An Approach of Speech Act Theory ...................................... Yiu-ming Fung Reply to Yiu-ming Fung by John R. Searle Chapter Nine Searle, De Re Belief, and the Chinese Language ................................................................................ Marshall D. Willman Reply to Marshall D. Willman by John R. Searle

197

229

247

C. Morality Chapter Ten Confucianism and the Is-Ought Question ......... A.T. Nuyen Reply to A.T. Nuyen by John R. Searle

BO MOU_F1_i-xx.indd vi

273

5/8/2008 7:21:55 PM

contents Chapter Eleven Xun Zi on Capacity, Ability and Constitutive Rules ....................................................................................... Kim-chong Chong Reply to Kim-chong Chong by John R. Searle Chapter Twelve Weakness of Will, the Background, and Chinese Thought .................................................................... Chris Fraser and Kai-yee Wong Reply to Chris Fraser and Kai-yee Wong by John R. Searle

vii 295

313

D. Meta-philosophical and Methodological Issues Chapter Thirteen Searle on Knowledge, Certainty and Skepticism: In View of Cases in Western and Chinese Traditions ................................................................................ Avrum Stroll Reply to Avrum Stroll by John R. Searle

339

Chapter Fourteen Searle’s Theory of Intentionality as a Philosophical Method for Research in the Human Sciences ................................................................................... B. Jeannie Lum Reply to B. Jeannie Lum by John R. Searle

355

Chapter Fifteen Unconscious Intentionality and the Status of Normativity in Searle’s Philosophy: With Comparative Reference to Traditional Chinese Thought ............................ Yujian Zheng Reply to Yujian Zheng by John R. Searle

379

Chapter Sixteen Searle, Zhuang Zi, and Transcendental Perspectivism .......................................................................... Bo Mou Reply to Bo Mou by John R. Searle Index of Names and Subjects .....................................................

BO MOU_F1_i-xx.indd vii

405

437

5/8/2008 7:21:55 PM

BO MOU_F1_i-xx.indd viii

5/8/2008 7:21:55 PM

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS My deep appreciation goes to Professor John Searle whose rich, significant and thought-provoking ideas on extensive fronts of philosophical inquiry and whose vigorous engaging participation have greatly inspired and contributed to this constructive-engagement project. Very seriously, Professor Searle has invested his tremendous energy and time both in the oral critical discussion on the scene of the engagement forum and in his thoroughly reading all the other contributors’ essays and generously contributing his engaging replies to each of them as well as his own valuable keynote essay to this volume. It is also worth mentioning one thing that has substantially contributed to the inception of this project. When starting this project in late 2004, we then did not have guaranteed resources to cover his travel expenses to participate in the related conference project as an important face-to-face critical-engagement forum; Professor Searle loved the emphasis of the project on the critical engagement of his thought instead of mere celebration; he thus made his firm commitment to his participation in the engagement forum even if that then would mean possibly using his own resources. Professor Searle’s encouragement and support in this aspect is one of the crucial contributing elements to timely and effectively launching the project. I appreciate his persistent support and valuable participation in this project from its very beginning through the end. I am indebted to all the other contributing authors of this volume, Robert Allinson, Chung-ying Cheng, Kim-chong Chong, Chris Fraser, Yiu-ming Fung, Soraj Hongladarom, Joel Krueger, Jeannie Lum, Al Martinich, Anh Nuyen, Avrum Stroll, Marshall Willman, Kai-yee Wong and Yujian Zheng, for their valuable contributions, all of which are previously unpublished pieces written expressly for this book, and for their patience, cooperation, and understanding throughout the whole process, during which I have learned a lot from them in various connections. My special appreciation goes to Yiu-ming Fung for his important contribution to the success of the related conference project. To understand such importance, let me first give a brief background introduction to the conference project and its relation to the anthology project. To effectively fulfill the constructive-engagement purpose, this anthology

BO MOU_F1_i-xx.indd ix

5/8/2008 7:21:55 PM

x

acknowledgments

project is accompanied with its conference project to provide a critical discussion and engagement platform. In this way, although the anthology project per se is an independent project instead of the conference proceedings, the latter is rather a very important stage for the sake of fulfilling the goal of this anthology and effectively implementing the constructive-engagement strategy; it also serves the purpose of bringing good international academic-exchange opportunities to the interested scholars of the conference host region and, more generally speaking, the homeland of Chinese philosophy. As the foregoing theme and purposes of the conference well fit the goal and agenda of the International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy (ISCWP) of which I then assumed president (2002–05), the conference is formally identified as “The 2nd ISCWP ‘Constructive-Engagement’ International Conference” on the constructive engagement of Searle’s philosophy and Chinese philosophy. In this background, Yiu-ming Fung as Acting Head of the Division of Humanities at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST) timely offered to have his home institution take on the role of the conference host and made great efforts (from seeking internal and external financial resources to mobilizing other resources at HKUST and the Hong Kong philosophical circle) in support of the conference project. While the ISCWP took care of its academic organization, the conference host party was in charge of all the other aspects of the conference under Fung’s outstanding leadership. I appreciate Yiu-ming Fung’s important contribution to the success of the conference as well as his valuable contribution to the anthology. I am grateful to Paul Ching-Wu Chu, President of HKUST, for his valuable support of the conference project being held at HKUST. I am grateful to Joseph C.T. Lee for his substantial donation as well as his academic participation. I am grateful to the members of the Executive Committee of the Conference Host, Charles Wing-hoi Chan, Kimchong Chong, Yiu-ming Fung, Kam-ming Yip and Min Zhang, for their excellent organization work. I am thankful to the following student volunteers at HKUST, Qing-hua Cai, Hung-shing Hung, Chiu-tuen Chow, Chiu-chee Hung, Jenny Hung, Hay-man Kam, Kee-yeung Luk and Ke Sheng, for their helpful and effective logistics supports for the conference. I am grateful to Wan-Chuan Fang, Yiu-ming Fung and Linhe Han for their very professional reviews and their precious time offered during the process of reviewing the submissions to the conference project. I am grateful to those speakers other than the contributors to this volume,

BO MOU_F1_i-xx.indd x

5/8/2008 7:21:56 PM

acknowledgments

xi

Wan-Chuan Fang, Ding-zhou Fei, Gang He, Joseph C.T. Lee, Jianyou Lu and Min Zhang for their engaging talks at the conference and for their valuable participation and contribution to the success of the conference, though their conference papers are eventually unable to be included in this volume for various reasons. My sincere thanks also go to Charles Wing-hoi Chan, Chad Hansen, Qingjie Wang, Simon Man-ho Wong, and Kam-ming Yip for their professional service as the conference session chairs. I am grateful to Xianglong Zhang and Tao Jiang, my colleagues in the 2002–2005 board of the ISCWP, for their very collegial cooperation and persistent support of the conference project. I am indebted to the American Philosophical Association’s Committee on International Cooperation (CIC), under the leadership of its chair Ernie Lepore, for its valuable support and co-sponsorship for the aforementioned international conference project on Searle’s philosophy and Chinese philosophy during 2004–2005 when I served as a member of the CIC. I am grateful to Roger Ames, Editor of the journal Philosophy East and West, and He Li, Editor of the Chinese journal World Philosophy, for their generous supports by publishing the “call for papers” of the project in the above journals. I am grateful to my school, San Jose State University in USA, and its Department of Philosophy for their various substantial supports that are related to this anthology project. A California State University Lottery Grant for 2004–2005 has substantially contributed to my work on this anthology project. I am thankful to Brenda Hood and Christopher Kinney, who are my graduate-student assistants respectively in fall 2006 and fall 2007, for their relevant professional assistance that they have completed timely. I am indebted to Michael Krausz for his vision and wise judgment of the nature and significance of this anthology volume and his strong recommendation to the publisher that the current volume be included in his edited series “Philosophy of History and Culture” at Brill. I am grateful to our editors at Brill, Hendrik van Leusen, Boris van Gool, Kim Fiona Plas and Renee Otto, for a variety of kindly and timely professional assistance and support. Bo Mou Albany, California December 8, 2007

BO MOU_F1_i-xx.indd xi

5/8/2008 7:21:56 PM

BO MOU_F1_i-xx.indd xii

5/8/2008 7:21:56 PM

NOTE ON TRANSCRIPTION AND GUIDE TO PRONUNCIATION Because of its official status in China, its relative accuracy in transcribing actual pronunciation in Chinese common speech and consequent worldwide use, we employ the pinyin romanization system in this volume for transliterating Chinese names or terms. However, Chinese names and terms are left as originally published in the following cases: (i) the titles of cited publications; (ii) the names whose Latinizations have become conventional and widely recognized (‘Confucius’ and ‘Mencius’); and (iii) the names of the writers who have had their authored English publications under their regular non-pinyin romanized names (such as ‘Fung Yu-lan’). The titles of cited Chinese books and essays are given in their pinyin transcriptions with their paraphrases given in parentheses. The following rule of thumb has been used in dealing with the order of the surname (family) name and given name in romanized Chinese names: (i) for the name of a historical figure in Chinese history, the surname appears first, and the given name second (such as ‘Zhu Xi’); and (ii) for contemporary figures, we follow their own practice when writing in English (typically, those who have had their English publications tend to have their given name appears first while the surname second). In the pinyin versions of Chinese publication titles and those proper phrases that contain two or more than two Chinese characters, hyphens may be used to indicate separate characters. Transcription Conversion Table

BO MOU_F1_i-xx.indd xiii

Wade-Giles

Pinyin

ai

ei

ch

zh

ch’

ch q

hs

x

ien

ian

5/8/2008 7:21:56 PM

xiv

BO MOU_F1_i-xx.indd xiv

note on transcription -ih

-i

j

r

k

g

k’

k

p

b

p’

p

szu

si

t

d

t’

t

ts, tz

z

ts’, tz’

c

tzu

zi

ung

ong

yu

you

5/8/2008 7:21:56 PM

CONTRIBUTORS Allinson, Robert E. is Director of Humanities and Professor of Philosophy at the Soka University of America. He is an Institute Fellow at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He is the author or editor of seven books including Understanding the Chinese Mind: The Philosophical Roots (ed.) (1989, 2000), Chuang-Tzu for Spiritual Transformation: An Analysis of the Inner Chapters (1989, 1996, 2003), Harmony and Strife: Contemporary Perspectives, East and West (co-edited) (1988), Space, Time and the Ethical Foundations (2002), A Metaphysics for the Future (2001), Saving Human Lives (2005). He is the author of over two hundred academic papers. Cheng, Chung-ying is Professor of Philosophy at University of Hawaii at Manoa, USA. He received his Ph.D. degree from Harvard University (1964). Cheng is the founder and honorary President of the International Society for Chinese Philosophy and International Society for the Yijing; he is the Editor-in-Chief of Journal of Chinese Philosophy. He is the author of many articles and books on Chinese philosophy and comparative philosophy, including Peirce’s and Lewis’s Theories of Induction (1969), Modernization and Universalization of Chinese Culture (1988, in Chinese), New Dimensions of Confucian and New-Confucian Philosophy (1991). He is coeditor of Contemporary Chinese Philosophy (2002). Chong, Kim-chong is Professor at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Division of Humanities. He previously taught at the National University of Singapore, where he served as Head of Department for several years. His interests are in ethics, Chinese philosophy, and comparative philosophy. His publications include Moral Agoraphobia: The Challenge of Egoism (Peter Lang, 1996); The Moral Circle and the Self: Chinese and Western Approaches (co-edited, Open Court, 2003); and Early Confucian Ethics (Open Court, 2007). Fraser, Chris is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He holds a B.A. from Yale, an M.A. from National Taiwan University, and a Ph.D. from the University of Hong Kong. His main research interests are mind, language, knowledge, action, and ethics in early Chinese thought. He has published work on Mohism,

BO MOU_F1_i-xx.indd xv

5/8/2008 7:21:56 PM

xvi

contributors

Zhuang Zi, and early Chinese philosophy of language and is currently preparing a new edition of the Later Mohist Canons. Fung, Yiu-ming is Chair Professor of the Division of Humanities at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. He received his Ph.D. degree in philosophy from the Chinese University of Hong Kong in 1984. Fung is the author of several books in Chinese, including The Methodological Problems of Chinese Philosophy (1989); Chinese Philosophy in the Ancient Period, 4 volumes (1992); Kung-Sun Lung Tzu: A Perspective of Analytic Philosophy (1999); and The Myth of Transcendent Immanence: A Perspective of Analytic Philosophy on Contemporary Neo-Confucianism (2003). He has also published more than 80 research papers both in Chinese and in English. Hongladarom, Soraj is an Associate Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Ethics of Science and Technology at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok, Thailand. He has published books and articles on such diverse issues as bioethics, computer ethics, and the roles that science and technology play in the culture of developing countries, as well as Buddhist perspectives on these issues. His works have appeared in Journal of Philosophy in the Contemporary World, Eubios: Journal of Asian and International Bioethics, The Information Society, AI & Society, Philosophy in the Contemporary World, and Social Epistemology, among others. Krueger, Joel W. is a postdoctoral research fellow at the Danish National Research Foundation: Center for Subjectivity Research at the University of Copenhagen. He works mainly in phenomenology and philosophy of mind, continental philosophy, and Asian and comparative philosophy. Lum, B. Jeannie is an Associate Professor at the University of Hawaii, Manoa. She received her Ph.D. and M.A. from the University of California, Berkeley in Philosophy of Education and her B.A. from the University of California, Irvine in Comparative Cultures. She has co-edited two books: Globalization and Identity: Cultural Diversity, Religion, and Citizenship and Knowledge, Teaching and Wisdom, and has published articles about intentionality as a philosophical method for human research. Martinich, Aloysius P. is Roy Allison Vaughan Centennial Professor of Philosophy and Professor of History and Government at the University of Texas at Austin, U.S.A. He received his Ph.D. from the University of

BO MOU_F1_i-xx.indd xvi

5/8/2008 7:21:56 PM

contributors

xvii

California at San Diego. He is the author or editor of many books and articles. His books include Philosophical Writing (3rd edition, 2005), The Philosophy of Language (5th edition, 2008), Hobbes: A Biography (1999), The Two Gods of Leviathan (1992) and Communication and Reference (1984), Much Ado About Nonexistence: Fiction and Reference (2007). Mou, Bo is Director of the Center for Comparative Philosophy at San Jose State University, USA. After receiving B.S. in mathematics, he received M.A. from Graduate School, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Ph.D. from University of Rochester, USA. He was president (2002–5) of International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy. He has published in analytic philosophy, Chinese philosophy and comparative philosophy, concerning philosophy of language, metaphysics, philosophical methodology and ethics. He is contributing editor of several books including recent Davidson’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy (2006) and History of Chinese Philosophy (2008). Nuyen, Anh Tuan received his Ph.D. from the University of Queensland (Australia). He taught there for many years and was Reader in Philosophy when he left, in 2001, to take up his current position as Associate Professor of Philosophy at the National University of Singapore. His research interests are wide-ranging. He has published on the philosophy of Hume and Kant, Continental philosophy, ethics and applied ethics, and comparative Chinese-western philosophy. His works in comparative philosophy have appeared in Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Asian Philosophy, Philosophy East and West and Copenhagen Journal of Asian Studies. Searle, John R. received his D. Phil. from University of Oxford and is Willis S. and Marion Slusser Professor of the Philosophy of Mind and Language at the University of California at Berkeley, USA. His work ranges broadly over philosophical problems of speech acts, consciousness, social reality, ethics, rationality, free will etc. His representative works include Speech Acts (1969), Intentionality (1983), The Rediscovery of the Mind (1992), Construction of Social Reality (1995); his recent books include The Mystery of Consciousness (1997), Mind, Language and Society: Philosophy in the Real World (1998), Rationality in Action (2001), Consciousness and Language (2002), Mind (2004), and Freedom and Neurobiology (2006). Stroll, Avrum is Research Professor of Philosophy at the University of California, San Diego. He received his Ph.D. from the University of California at Berkeley. He is the recipient of numerous awards and

BO MOU_F1_i-xx.indd xvii

5/8/2008 7:21:56 PM

xviii

contributors

academic honors, such as the Constantine Panunzio Award and a Simon Guggenheim fellowship. His major fields of interest are epistemology, the philosophy of language, Wittgenstein studies, and twentieth-century analytic philosophy. He is the author of about 150 articles and the author or co-author of seventeen books, including Moore and Wittgenstein on Certainty, Surfaces, Sketches of Landscapes, Wittgenstein, and Did My Genes Make Me Do It? Willman, Marshall D. is currently Visiting Assistant Professor at the University of Iowa, where he received his Ph.D. His primary interests are in philosophical logic and the philosophies of language and mind. Having taught at academic institutions in both China and the United States, he has favored a highly comparative approach in philosophy that draws on recent trends in Chinese philosophy and linguistics. By investigating the grammars of different natural languages with the tools and methodologies of formal logic, he aims to shed light on how language understanding and use fit into the broader system of human cognition. Wong, Kai-yee is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the Chinese University of Hong Kong, where he has worked since 1993. He received his B.A. and M.Phil. degrees from the Chinese University and his Ph.D. from the Australian National University. He has published papers on philosophical logic, philosophy of language, teaching philosophy, modal semantics, and applied ethics. Zheng, Yujian is Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department, Lingnan University, Hong Kong. With BS degree in engineering mechanics, he turned to philosophy of science at the MA level in China, and finally got his PhD in philosophy from Bowling Green State University, Ohio, USA. He has numerable paper publications in the overlapping areas of dynamic rational choice theory, philosophy of mind and action, and moral philosophy. His current research interests include evolutionary and naturalist account of normativity or emergence of intentionality.

BO MOU_F1_i-xx.indd xviii

5/8/2008 7:21:57 PM

BO MOU_F1_i-xx.indd xix

5/8/2008 7:21:57 PM

John Searle and most of the participants in the 2nd “ISCWP ‘Constructive-Engagement’ International Conference” on “Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy” at the conference site, Sze-yuen Chung Council Chamber, Academic Building, the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, on 14th June 2005.

John Searle and the volume editor, Bo Mou, at the coffee shop of King Library, San Jose State University, on March 7, 2005 before Searle gave his colloquium talk at SJSU. (Photographed by Dagmar Searle).

BO MOU_F1_i-xx.indd xx

5/8/2008 7:21:57 PM

CONSTRUCTIVE-ENGAGEMENT MOVEMENT IN VIEW OF SEARLE’S PHILOSOPHY AND CHINESE PHILOSOPHY: A THEME INTRODUCTION Bo Mou The central theme of this anthology, “Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement”, is to investigate how John Searle’s philosophy and some thoughts and strands in Chinese philosophy can jointly contribute to the common philosophical enterprise in some philosophically interesting ways. The volume is the result of a recent collective research project in the constructive-engagement movement in comparative philosophy (or doing philosophy in a global context), generally speaking, and in modern Chinese philosophy, specifically speaking. Its nature, goal and significance need to be understood in this background. In the following, in Section 1, I will emphasize, and spell out, some distinct characteristics of the background of the constructive-engagement movement; in Section 2, I will explain how the current project is related to the whole constructive-engagement movement and what distinguish the current project from the others within the movement. In this way, the reader can look at this ad hoc constructive-engagement project in a broader setting and understand its nature, features and significance with a wide vision. In Section 3, I briefly explain the organizational strategy and structure of the current volume. As a theme introduction, this writing lays emphasis on the contents of the first two sections. 1 Though the current project focuses on the constructive engagement between the philosophy of a prominent figure in the contemporary analytic philosophy and (the contemporary studies of ) the classical Chinese philosophy, the constructive-engagement movement as a whole is not limited to that between Chinese philosophy1 and Western analytic 1 By ‘Chinese philosophy’ here I primarily mean various movements of philosophical thought in China from the Zhou Dynasty (roughly eleventh century to 256 B.C.)

BO MOU_F2-1-14.indd 1

5/8/2008 7:23:53 PM

2

bo mou

philosophy2 but that between Chinese philosophy and any movement of thought in the Western philosophical tradition (or even any movement of thought in any other philosophical traditions) in a global context.3 Therefore, to understand the nature and status of the current project, one needs to understand some general characteristics of the constructive-engagement movement as a whole. The identity of the constructive-engagement movement can be viewed from different angles. As a collective trend in comparative philosophy, it considers philosophy in a global context and through the constructive engagement of philosophies from around the globe. As a collective enterprise in modern Chinese philosophy, it emphasizes the constructive engagement between Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy (or any other philosophical traditions) and between distinct movements of thought within Chinese philosophy. They share the same constructive-engagement strategy or orientation of philosophical inquiry: to inquire into how, via reflective criticism and self-criticism, distinct modes of thinking, methodological approaches, visions, insights, substantial points of view, or conceptual and explanatory resources from different philosophical traditions and different styles/orientations of doing philosophy, can learn from each other and jointly contribute to the common philosophical enterprise and/or a series of common concerns and issues of philosophical significance. The label ‘the constructive-engagement movement’ can be understood in a weak sense and in a strong sense. In its weak sense, the phrase means a more or less collective trend in studies of Chinese philosophy

through the early Qing Dynasty (1644-mid 19th century and their contemporary developments and studies. 2 By ‘Western analytic philosophy’ or ‘Western philosophy in the analytic tradition’ I mean a Western mainstream philosophical tradition from Socrates, Plato and Aristotle via Descartes, British empiricism and Kant to the contemporary analytic movement. Note that, besides indicating a historical connection between Western philosophy in such a tradition and some methodological approaches taken in this tradition, such phrases as ‘Western analytic philosophy’ and ‘Western philosophy in the analytic tradition’ used here are not intended to imply that those methodological approaches are, intrinsically or conceptually, exclusively connected with Western philosophy. 3 From the point of view of studies of Chinese philosophy, the current project is also one project in modern Chinese philosophy. At the most recent stage of the development of modern Chinese philosophy, one of its prominent features (at least in regard to one significant portion of modern Chinese philosophy) lies in its moving towards world philosophy via the constructive-engagement movement. In this sense, and to this extent, the context of the recent development of modern Chinese philosophy and the mentioned global context have merged into the essentially same context.

BO MOU_F2-1-14.indd 2

5/8/2008 7:23:54 PM

introduction

3

and comparative philosophy as shown in the past few decades in the direction of the foregoing constructive-engagement strategy, whether or not its involved meta-philosophical and methodological issues have been consciously and systematically examined, whether or not the trend has its explicit systematic agenda in print, and whether or not it has been explicitly promoted by a certain academic organization with its articulate constructive-engagement purpose. Nevertheless, in its stronger sense, the term means a movement that has emerged especially since the earlier years of the 21st century with its explicitly specified research agenda, some related academic organizations or institutions as a collective driving force, various coordinated systematic efforts for the constructive-engagement purpose, and some other distinct features to be addressed below. Such systematic efforts have formed up some major collective research programs and resulted in substantial outcomes. The current volume is one prominent case in this connection; a previously published sister volume, Davidson’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement (Brill 2006), is another case. Clearly, the nature and characteristics of the current volume as one project in the constructive-engagement movement should be understood in the context of the constructive-engagement movement as a whole. The nature and features of the constructive-engagement movement in the foregoing strong sense4 can be characterized in the following ten connections. First, generally speaking, the constructive-engagement movement as a whole has moved beyond some previous individual efforts, each of which typically features this or that specific perspectives in comparative studies, and has been guided under a wider vision concerning how to look at various eligible but seemingly competing perspectives in comparative studies of Chinese and Western philosophy: essentially it renders complementary those eligible perspectives that respectively capture some aspects, layers or dimensions of objects of study, instead of indiscriminately subscribing to one single finite perspective or rendering it exclusively eligible without doing justice to other eligible perspectives. In this connection, it is neither to ‘reform’ studies of Chinese philosophy exclusively by virtue of analytic approach nor to ‘reformulate’ studies of Chinese philosophy exclusively by the resources

4 It is arguably correct that some of those indicated features are also applicable to characterizing the constructive-engagement movement in the weaker sense, whether they are shown in some explicit or implicit, manifest or obscure, ways.

BO MOU_F2-1-14.indd 3

5/8/2008 7:23:54 PM

4

bo mou

of ‘Continental’ philosophy. Nevertheless, that amounts to saying neither that any specific project that is part of the movement has to be comprehensive in its manifest current coverage nor that it has to take a comprehensive perspective complex as its current working perspective; what makes a difference lies in the foregoing sort of methodological guiding principle that guides the project with a wide vision concerning how to look at the relation between the current subject/concern and other subjects/concerns and between the current working perspective and other eligible perspectives. Second, as far as the methodological dimension of the movement is concerned, a systematic, in-depth meta-philosophical discussion of the relation between the Western (especially analytic) philosophical tradition and Chinese philosophical tradition concerning philosophical methodology and the nature of philosophical inquiries has provided a necessary theoretical and meta-philosophical preparation for a comprehensive, systematic constructive-engagement enterprise. For example, as analytic philosophy and the classical Chinese philosophy have been considered by many to be less relevant or even alien to each other, some recent systematic and in-depth meta-philosophical discussions of how their constructive engagement is possible especially in view of their respective methodologies has provided an indispensable methodological preparation for subsequent in-depth investigations on how they can jointly make contribution to our understanding and treatment of a series of concrete issues.5 When a movement of thought in philosophy has its systematic meta-philosophical reflection on its own nature, direction and methodology, this reflective endeavor would be viewed as one mark of its maturity and one necessary condition of its long-term healthy development. Third, as far as its subject coverage is concerned, the constructiveengagement movement is comprehensive, including the engaging examination on a series of fundamental or significant issues and concerns in those central or important areas of philosophy like metaphysics, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of mind, epistemology, etc., instead of focusing merely on the issues in ethics and social & political philosophy. In the past, there is one quite widespread stereotype under-

5 One of such systematic methodological examinations is presented in the anthology book, Two Roads to Wisdom?—Chinese and Analytic Philosophical Traditions, Open Court, 2001.

BO MOU_F2-1-14.indd 4

5/8/2008 7:23:54 PM

introduction

5

standing of the nature and scope of the traditional Chinese philosophy that renders traditional Chinese philosophy philosophically valuable only in regard to its thoughts on moral and social-political issues. Though also emphasizing the necessity of Western philosophers and Chinese philosophers learning from each other, some scholars consider such mutual beneficial engagement valuable and valid only or largely in regard to limited areas like ethics and social & political philosophy. But this view has turned out to be incorrect, as some individual scholars’ explorations in the past decades and some recent collective engagement projects in those important areas like metaphysics, the philosophy of language and the philosophy of mind together with their fruitful research results have already clearly and convincingly shown it. Fourth, as far as its engagement mode is concerned, the movement emphasizes the direct and critical but constructive dialogue between the engaging parties (whenever situations allow) for the sake of effectively carrying out reflective criticism and self-criticism and jointly making contribution to the common enterprise of philosophy. Indeed, this is one of the due meanings of the phrase ‘constructive engagement’ that captures one crucial character of philosophical inquiries, i.e., the critical engagement for the sake of making joint contributions to understanding and treatment of the common concerns. Such a critical engagement character, instead of mere celebration, has effectively motivated relevant engaging parties in participation. For example, the current project and its sister project on the constructive engagement of Davidson’s philosophy and Chinese philosophy have well adopted such a critical engagement approach. Fifth, as far as its collective and systematic character is concerned, the constructive-engagement movement is not some individual scholars’ personal project but has already developed into a collective enterprise with its systematic character and extensive joint efforts. This shows the degree of its matureness, results from its in-depth theoretical preparation, and helps to bring about its related academic community that can provide decent critical examination of the works in the constructive-engagement scholarship. Especially, the movement is now well implemented through some effective organizational forces. Among others, one contributing force in this connection is an academic association, the International Society for Comparative Studies of Chinese and Western Philosophy (ISCWP), which was formally established in 2002. The ISCWP has systematically planned and organized a series of academic events and projects explicitly for the sake of the constructive-engagement purpose

BO MOU_F2-1-14.indd 5

5/8/2008 7:23:55 PM

6

bo mou

and agenda. The foregoing conception of constructive engagement of Chinese and Western philosophy has been explicitly and formally documented in the ISCWP Constitution as follows: With the preceding general purposes, the Society emphasizes (but is not limited to) the constructive engagement between Chinese philosophy and Western mainstream philosophy (analytic tradition as well as continental tradition in the West in their broad senses); the Society stresses the sensitivity of such comparative studies to contemporary development and resources of philosophy and their mutual advancement; and, through the characteristic path of comparative studies of Chinese and Western philosophy, the Society strives to contribute to philosophy as common human wealth as well as to respective studies of Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy. The Society also emphasizes building up a channel and outlet for the academic exchange and communication between the homeland of Chinese philosophy and the Western world in philosophy.6

The reader can see that the above citation from the ISCWP Constitution, though in a concise way, well reflects a number of the key features of this movement and actually serves as the guiding line of the association for its agenda and organizational activities. Sixth, as far as the constitution of its participants are concerned, they are limited to neither those who major in traditional Chinese philosophy nor those who are native Chinese philosophers but also include scholars from other philosophical communities of the world (for example, the mainstream philosophical circle in the English-speaking countries). In this aspect and to this extent, the constructive-engagement movement in modern Chinese philosophy has already become an international enterprise (as one significant part of the constructiveengagement movement in global philosophy) and provides one effective channel by which scholars from different traditions and/or with distinct styles/orientations of doing philosophy carry out international cooperation, constructive dialogue and comparative engagement in studying Chinese philosophy towards world philosophy. For example, in recent years, two prominent analytic philosophers, Donald Davidson and John Searle, are among the active participants in the movement through their substantial participations in the two sister projects, the previous one on ‘Davidson’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy’ and the cur-

6 The full text of the ISCWP Constitution (both in English and in Chinese) is available at the ISCWP website whose current address is ‘http://sangle.web.wesleyan. edu/iscwp/’.

BO MOU_F2-1-14.indd 6

5/8/2008 7:23:55 PM

introduction

7

rent one on ‘Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy’. Some other well-respected scholars in the analytic tradition have also been drawn to this enterprise.7 Though studies of Chinese philosophy are not among their speciality areas, they have made contributions to studying Chinese philosophy either via their valuable works on some meta-philosophical and/or methodological issues involved in the constructive engagement of Chinese and Western philosophy or directly through exploring some commonly concerned issues in such studies. Seventh, as far as its research outcomes are concerned, the movement, with the aforementioned systematic efforts, has already produced substantial research results on a series of philosophical issues, neither merely stopping at a sort of armchair speculation of the mere possibility nor merely remaining at the level of purely meta-philosophical discussion of how such constructive engagement is possible, though the latter discussion is necessary and has provided indispensable theoretic and methodological preparation for its healthy development, as emphasized before. Such in-depth detailed analysis of how distinct approaches in the Chinese and Western philosophy to some concrete issues can constructively engage with each other have been given not merely in some individual scholars’ works that have contributed to the development of the constructive-engagement movement, but also in some remarkable research results from the recent collective efforts that have been made expressly for the constructive-engagement purpose. Among others, the current volume and its sister volume on Davidson’s philosophy and Chinese philosophy for the two aforementioned collective research projects in the movement have already come out in print. Eighth, as far as its relation to contemporary philosophy is concerned, the movement is especially sensitive to various resources of the postKant stage of modern philosophy, or sometimes labeled ‘contemporary philosophy’ in its broad sense, especially those of the 20th century contemporary philosophy, in both analytic tradition and ‘Continental’ tradition. The reason is this. One primary purpose of the constructive-engagement strategy in studying Chinese philosophy is to inquire into how to make contributions to the common issues and concerns in the common enterprise of philosophy; for this purpose, the movement as a whole has paid much attention to, and has been concerned

7 Such as Michael Krausz, Ernie Lepore, A.P. Martinich, Adam Morton, Avrum Stroll, and Samuel C. Wheeler.

BO MOU_F2-1-14.indd 7

5/8/2008 7:23:55 PM

8

bo mou

especially with, two things: (1) distinct approaches to those common issues and concerns that have been suggested from other traditions (especially, those in contemporary analytic philosophy and ‘Continental’ philosophy in the Western tradition), and (2) new developments of philosophy as explored in various areas of contemporary philosophy. The concern (1) renders the movement comparative in character, while the concerns (2) together render the movement sensitive to the updated development of philosophy and conceptual-explanatory resources in contemporary philosophy; the concerns (1) and (2) together render the movement especially active in comparative engagement with various distinct approaches from other traditions in contemporary philosophy and in adoption of various relevant conceptual-explanatory resources developed in contemporary philosophy.8 Ninth, as far as its own standard for the philosophical scholarship is concerned, the constructive-engagement agenda and fruitful research results of the movement with the preceding characteristics have raised a higher standard for the philosophical scholarship of studying Chinese philosophy to this extent: the philosophical (instead of merely historical) studies of Chinese philosophy needs in-depth understanding and command (not merely introductory-level knowledge) of the developments of contemporary philosophy in various closely related central areas together with their conceptual and explanatory resources, instead of treating them as things irrelevant or alien. It has been realized that such understanding is not a mere preference but a must for the constructiveengagement purpose and agenda. In other words, when carrying out studying Chinese philosophy for the constructive-engagement sake, one cannot be satisfactory merely with an introductory level of knowledge of relevant subjects and their related conceptual-explanatory resources in contemporary philosophy; rather, one needs to have updated, indepth understanding of them, including carefully reading the relevant literature of contemporary philosophy and being sensitive to its new developments on relevant fronts.

8 For example, to jointly implement the two related concerns in this connection, the ISCWP as one contributing force to the movement has established its workshoproundtable series, i.e., ISCWP’s Beijing Roundtable on Contemporary Philosophy, which directly and explicitly address the two concerns in a joint way. Now the Beijing Roundtable on Contemporary Philosophy has already successfully held three workshops respectively in the summers of 2005, 2006 and 2007 and well implemented the agenda in this regard.

BO MOU_F2-1-14.indd 8

5/8/2008 7:23:55 PM

introduction

9

Tenth, as far as its fundamental nature and direction is concerned, the movement is part of global philosophy (or part of comparative philosophy in general as doing philosophy in a global context), instead of a mere local one associated with Chinese philosophy alone and of comparative studies of Chinese and Western philosophy alone, in the following two senses or connections. (1) As far as its fundamental agenda is concerned, as already highlighted before, one fundamental agenda of the movement is such a general constructive-engagement strategy: to inquire into how, via reflective criticism and self-criticism, distinct modes of thinking, methodological approaches, visions, insights, substantial points of view, or conceptual and explanatory resources from different philosophical traditions and/or from the complex array of distinct approaches of the same tradition in a global context, can learn from each other and jointly contribute to the common philosophical enterprise and/or a series of common concerns and issues of philosophical significance.9 In this way, the issues and concerns under its reflective examination are eventually general and cross-tradition ones instead of idiosyncratically holding for Chinese philosophy alone. (2) As far as its basic methodological strategy is concerned, in view of its foregoing fundamental agenda, the constructive-engagement movement in modern Chinese philosophy is not limited to its constructive engagement with Western philosophy but also with other philosophical traditions as well as the constructive engagement between distinct movements within Chinese philosophy. To this extent, the constructive engagement between Chinese and Western philosophy can serve as a methodological template for the constructive engagement between any two (or more than two) seemingly competing approaches in philosophical inquiries towards world philosophy, say, between Chinese tradition and other non-Western philosophical traditions like Indian, African, Latin-American ones.

9 As a matter of fact, this strategy has been already implemented through some of the ISCWP’s recent projects (say, via its annual workshops of “Beijing Roundtable on Contemporary Philosophy”) in which Chinese philosophers and international scholars working in analytic philosophy and ‘Continental’ philosophy sat side by side exploring some commonly concerned issues and learning from each other via critical engagement.

BO MOU_F2-1-14.indd 9

5/8/2008 7:23:55 PM

10

bo mou 2

In the foregoing general background, and in view of the need and significance of the constructive dialogue and engagement of Chinese and Western philosophy, one effective way to carry out such studies is to focus on one philosophically significant figure or one significant movement of philosophical thought, either in the Chinese tradition or in the Western tradition, in constructive comparison with various relevant thoughts in the other tradition. It is rendered especially philosophically interesting, rewarding, and significant to carry out a case investigation of the constructive engagement between John Searle’s philosophy in the Western analytic tradition and some thoughts and strands in Chinese philosophy for four major considerations. First, from his groundbreaking book Speech Acts and his influential “Chinese Room” argument to his most recent studies of intentionality, freedom, social reality, and rationality, John Searle is known as one of the most influential figures among the contemporary philosophers as well as among the analytic philosophers. His work is discussed in a wide variety of disciplines as well as philosophy. He is a rare figure in the analytic tradition to actively carry out a critical engagement with ‘Continental’ philosophy. He has a strong interest in the issue of crosstradition understanding and engagement. Searle’s works involve a series of significant issues and concerns in philosophy many of which various thinkers in the Chinese philosophical tradition have also explicitly or implicitly addressed and somehow made their distinct contributions to; those issues include (but not limited to): (1) the relations between language, thought, and reality; (2) how to understand and interpret human rationality; (3) meaning and reference; (4) speech acts; (5) the philosophy of mind; (6) what counts as understanding language. Their constructive engagement on those issues would jointly contribute to our understandings and approaches to them. Second, a variety of related meta-philosophical ideas and insights of Searle’s philosophy concerning Background, rationality, etc. together with his holistic approach to various issues under his examination have significant implications to the relation and engagement among distinct modes of thinking, methodological approaches or points of view from different philosophical traditions including Chinese and Western philosophies. On the other hand, there are significant meta-philosophical thoughts in Chinese philosophy with regard to how to look at different

BO MOU_F2-1-14.indd 10

5/8/2008 7:23:55 PM

introduction

11

approaches and points of view. It would be especially philosophically interesting and significant to investigate how some significant metaphilosophical ideas in Searle’s philosophy and in Chinese philosophy can contribute to (our understanding of ) the constructive engagement among distinct modes of thinking, methodological approaches or points of view from different philosophical traditions as well as within (the complex array of different approaches of ) the same tradition. Third, Searle is one of the most important and influential philosophers in the contemporary Western philosophy in the analytic tradition, and a research result from this case study would play a strong exemplary role for further constructive engagement of this kind both in view of methodological approach and with regard to substantial treatment of some fundamental issues and concerns in philosophy. Fourth, similar to its sister volume on the constructive engagement of Davison’s philosophy and Chinese philosophy, this project would provide an effective way to look at how the philosophy of one of the major figures in the Western analytic tradition has crossed cultural and national boundaries to contribute to the common philosophical enterprise. As indicated at the outset, the central theme of this anthology project is to investigate how Searle’s philosophy and some thoughts and strands in Chinese philosophy could jointly contribute to the common philosophical enterprise in some philosophically interesting ways. With this central theme, the volume has the following three objectives. (1) Through the preceding theme of the project, the volume is to investigate how Searle’s philosophy and Chinese philosophy could jointly contribute to the common philosophical enterprise and to constructive engagement among different philosophical traditions in philosophically interesting ways. (2) Through this challenging case study of the constructive engagement between Searle’s philosophy and Chinese philosophy, the volume is to show how Chinese philosophy and Western philosophy (including its analytic tradition) are not essentially alien to one another: they have common concerns with some fundamental issues and have taken their characteristic approaches to some of those issues; they can learn from each other and jointly contribute to the common philosophical enterprise in complementary ways. (3) Through the above (1) and (2), this project is to show how the constructive engagement in comparative studies is possible and how such comparative methodology of constructive engagement concerning distinct modes of thinking, methodological

BO MOU_F2-1-14.indd 11

5/8/2008 7:23:55 PM

12

bo mou

approaches or points of view from different philosophical traditions or within the same tradition is important or even indispensable in general philosophical inquiry. This volume has a number of distinguishing features. First, the anthology carries out the investigation at an in-depth level of the constructive engagement between a major figure in the contemporary Western philosophy in the analytic tradition and some thoughts and strands in Chinese philosophy through such a critical elenchus dialogue (both as a written one through an essay-reply format in the current volume and as an oral one through an engagement-conference forum which provides the necessary engagement preparation for this volume) between this figure himself and his contemporary scholars in Chinese philosophy.10 Second, this anthology volume is the first to explore how Searle as a major figure in the contemporary Western philosophy in the analytic tradition and contemporary scholars in studies of Chinese philosophy could jointly contribute to the common philosophical enterprise in philosophically interesting ways. Third, this anthology volume as a whole (and many an individual contributed essay in the volume) is to investigate some fundamental issues and concerns in philosophy from some distinct comparative approaches that would resort to the conceptual and explanatory resources from both the analytic tradition and the Chinese tradition instead of merely from one tradition. Fourth, through this case study of the constructive engagement, the current volume will show how Chinese philosophy and a mainstream Western philosophy in the analytic tradition are not essentially alien to one another: they have many common concerns with a series of fundamental issues and could jointly contribute to the common philosophical enterprise. Fifth, through the above third and fourth features, this anthology volume is intended to show how the constructive engagement in comparative studies is possible and how such comparative methodology of the constructive engagement is important or even indispensable in general philosophical inquiry. Sixth, this anthology volume, through the above first, second and third features, would play a positive or even strong exemplary role for further constructive engagement of this kind both

10 The aforementioned anthology volume, Davidson’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy: Constructive Engagement, has the similar constructive-engagement orientation. Nevertheless, due to Donald Davidson’s unexpected passing away in the course of its preparation, the volume is unable to make it in this aspect (with Davidson’s own participation and written contribution), though it is effective and fruitful in other aspects.

BO MOU_F2-1-14.indd 12

5/8/2008 7:23:56 PM

introduction

13

in view of methodological approach and in regard to substantial treatment of some fundamental issues and concerns in philosophy. Seventh, all the contributed essays in this anthology volume are previously unpublished pieces, written expressly for this volume, and unavailable anywhere else. 3 The main text of the anthology comprises two parts, which consist of total 31 contributing writings, all of which are previously unpublished pieces written expressly for this volume. The first part is Professor Searle’s keynote essay entitled ‘The Globalization of Philosophy’. The second part, the constructive-engagement part, includes 15 engaging pairs of essay-reply dialogues, each of which consists of one essay, contributed by some expert(s) in the relevant areas of study, and Searle’s engaging reply. This organizational feature highlights the critical engagement nature of this volume, which encourages the reader to read both the contributing essay and Searle’s reply to it as a whole and demands an attentive reading of both sides’ arguments and explanations instead of a mere rough look. (For this consideration, specially in this volume, I do not take a usual introduction-writing approach to give a brief description of each contributor’s essay piece by piece; for I render this both needless and less helpful to the reader for the sake of the above comparative-engagement purpose.) The constructive-engagement part of the book focuses on five broad issues or thematic topics that are respectively the subjects of the following four sections into which the fifteen essays together with Searle’s replies to them are organized: A. B. C. D.

Mind; Language; Morality; Meta-philosophical and Methodological Issues.

Within each of the sections, the articles are arranged in an order either roughly following the historical line (if any) or based on some prudent considerations that are understandable. For example, in Section A on mind, the order is given in that of Confucianism, Daoism and Buddhism. The topics are considered to be among those that are

BO MOU_F2-1-14.indd 13

5/8/2008 7:23:56 PM

14

bo mou

most conducive to the constructive-engagement-concerned comparative treatment in view of Searle’s philosophy and Chinese philosophy. Nevertheless, in so saying, that certainly does not mean that the current four topics have ever exhausted all the actual or potential aspects of such comparative engagement of Searle’s philosophy and Chinese philosophy; rather, the current selection of the topics more or less reflects the points of interest where a certain level of quality research results have been generated in the current scholarship on the constructive-engagement front of Searle’s philosophy and Chinese philosophy. Also notice that, because of the comprehensive nature of some of the contributing essays, and because of the intrinsic connections of those topics in Searle’s philosophy, the way to organize the entries is not exclusive. The reader who focuses on reading the entries on one topic (say, those in Section A) can thus have a cross reference to some of the entries in the other sections’ (say, Section B and Section D).

BO MOU_F2-1-14.indd 14

5/8/2008 7:23:56 PM

PART ONE

SEARLE ON GLOBALIZATION OF PHILOSOPHY

BO MOU_F3-15-30.indd 15

4/24/2008 4:33:09 PM

BO MOU_F3-15-30.indd 16

4/24/2008 4:33:10 PM

CHAPTER ONE

THE GLOBALIZATION OF PHILOSOPHY* John R. Searle I am extremely grateful to the organizers and sponsors of this conference for their efforts and support. There are so many organizations and individuals that I cannot express my gratitude to each individually but only give my collective thanks to all of them. This conference is especially welcome as one of the first steps toward expanding a dialog between Chinese philosophers and the philosophers in the rest of the world. I am sorry to say that I know almost nothing about traditional Chinese Philosophy and I hope to overcome some of my ignorance in the course of these few days. I do however know something about Philosophy in Europe and in North and South America and I will remark on some of its features and on the directions that it seems to have been going during my intellectual lifetime. Philosophy was often supposed to be identified with particular national cultures in such a way that each national culture was presumed to have its own distinctive national philosophy. In the United States many universities routinely offered a course in “American Philosophy”. The tacit idea was that “American Philosophy” referred to something more well defined than philosophy that happened to have been practiced within the boundaries of the USA and American philosophers were supposed to have something more in common than geography. Indeed, I took such a course as an undergraduate. There were also supposed to be other distinct national philosophies such as English Philosophy, (inaccurately so called, because its most famous exemplar, Hume, was Scottish; and Berkeley, another star, was Irish) and of course there was German Philosophy, French Philosophy, Italian Philosophy, etc. This raises an interesting question, namely, to what extent is it correct or * This essay is a revised version of Professor John Searle’s keynote speech delivered at the 2nd ISCWP “Constructive-Engagement” International Conference on “Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese Philosophy” on June 14, 2005, The Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, Hong Kong.—the volume editor.

BO MOU_F3-15-30.indd 17

4/24/2008 4:33:10 PM

18

john r. searle

useful to identify different styles of philosophy with points of national origin? And to what extent, indeed, should we see different philosophies as expressions of different general cultural outlooks? My discussion of these issues is going to ramble over many centuries and many different cultures, but I hope to draw certain general conclusions. Philosophy in the West was invented by the Greeks. It is conventionally thought to be the invention of the pre-Socratics but I think it is really in Athens, in the classical period, with Socrates, Plato and Aristotle, that we meet Philosophy in the sense in which we all recognize it today. The greatest invention of the Greeks is one that is seldom remarked on: they invented the idea of a theory. By ‘theory’ I mean a set of propositions concerning a specific domain that are logically related to each other, and such that the propositions give a general account of the domain. In some theories the logical relations, are matters of logical derivation, as in the case of Euclid’s elements. It is hard to exaggerate the importance of the idea of a theory, because most of the intellectual advances that matter to us are in the form of theories. A true general theory is a wonderful thing because it gives a comprehensive account of a whole domain. So we now think of theories in physics, theories in economics and theories in logic, and we have a pretty good idea about what we mean by “theory” in each case. For the ancient Greeks, philosophy was the ultimate domain of theory, because philosophy articulates the theories that comprehend all other theories. Most philosophers today are less confident about the centrality of philosophy, but I think there is something right in the Greek conception. It is fair to say, again wandering rapidly over centuries, and , indeed, millennia, that the philosophical achievements of ancient Rome are not remotely comparable to that of the ancient Greeks. There is no “Roman philosophy” comparable to Greek philosophy. Indeed, it was not until the so-called mediaeval period, that philosophy began to flourish again in the West, first in monasteries, and later in universities, and it also needs to be emphasized that philosophy was flourishing in Moslem countries. Oddly, nothing did so much to re-awaken interest in philosophy as the re-discovery, and translation, of certain surviving texts of Aristotle. It is difficult today to appreciate Aristotle’s impact on the philosophy of the mediaeval period and the early modern period. With the development of Christian philosophy, and with the attempt, especially, by Aquinas, to make a synthesis of Christian philosophy and Aristotelianism, philosophy in the Greek theoretical sense, as a set of

BO MOU_F3-15-30.indd 18

4/24/2008 4:33:10 PM

the globalization of philosophy

19

systematical propositions, logically related to each other, flourished, once again, in the West. However, as we all know, and as we all teach our students, there was an enormous breakthrough that took place in the seventeenth century, in philosophy and the sciences, especially as inaugurated by the work of Descartes and Bacon. During the seventeenth century and after we began to get the concept of distinctly national philosophies. And, indeed, by the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, there were even certain stereotypical and clichéd conceptions. Thus it was thought that the distinctive philosophy of the United States was pragmatism, of Britain it was empiricism, of France it was rationalism, and of Germany it was idealism, though there was so much philosophy going on in Germany, that it is less plausible to saddle the Germans with a national stereotype, than it was with the other countries. I said that this conception of philosophy as being a matter of national disciplines survived into the twentieth century. The conception was that there was a distinctive style of philosophy associated with different national cultures. If one thinks of disciplines varying in their essential definition by the culture of their origin, then there would be a continuum, ranging from poetry and literature on one extreme to mathematics and physics on the other extreme. We do indeed think that literature in general and poets in particular is the expression of special, culturally specific modes of sensibility, and that the styles, of, let’s say, French poets of the late nineteenth century, are in fact quite different from the styles of the American poets of the same era. They are, in turn, different from English poets of the nineteenth century. But when we turn to mathematician and physicists, such subjects appear to be genuinely international. Cultures may vary in the amount of interest they give to one topic or another, but there is no such thing as French mathematics as opposed to American mathematics. It’s an odd fact, for example, that the French did not develop the kind of interest in mathematical logic that characterized both the German speaking and the English speaking world, but this is a matter of historical accident. (Indeed, I think a lot of it was due to Poincaré’s distaste for mathematical logic.) But it is certainly not essential to French culture that it was inhospitable to symbolic logic, nor is it one of the defining features of American culture that it is hospitable to symbolic logic. These are just historical accidents. I think the idea was that philosophy stands somewhere between mathematics and poetry. Like poets, philosophers were presumed to

BO MOU_F3-15-30.indd 19

4/24/2008 4:33:10 PM

20

john r. searle

articulate a cultural sensibility, but, like mathematician and physists, they were supposed to be able to state their results as universal truths, valid across cultures and times. To some extent this perception still survives. I am sometimes surprised to see myself referred to in English and French popular newspapers and magazines as a typical American philosopher. And I have been approached, at more than one occasion, after giving a lecture in Europe, by people who told me that they like my American style and that they hope to be able to adopt the American style of philosophy. I have only the faintest idea of what they are talking about. At this point I want to advance what I take to be the first controversial thesis in this talk: In the West, at least, the idea of distinctive national philosophies is now obsolete. I said that I was often taken to be the typical American Philosopher, but, in fact all of my degrees are from Oxford, and in so far as I have developed a distinctive style of philosophy, it was influenced more by J.L. Austin and Peter Strawson, than it was by any American Philosophers. I was once asked by a famous French intellectual historian, if I had been heavily influenced by a philosopher, whom he referred to as “Day Vay”, I could not figure out whom on earth he had in mind until it occurred to me that he was referring to John Dewey. He was assuming that as an “American philosopher” My philosophical views must have been formed by previous American philosophers. But the answer is, Dewey had no influence on me at all. I read some works by Dewey and I read one book of his very carefully, his Logic the Theory of Inquiry, and I was unimpressed by it. I have not been influenced to any great degree by American philosophers in the way that I have been influenced by Gottlob Frege and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Indeed, if I were asked who were the philosophers most influential in my own work, I would have to say, they would be Austin, Strawson, Frege and Wittgenstein, far more than any others. (I sometimes see myself characterized as follower of G.E. Moore, or at least sharing with Moore a certain “common sense” conception of Philosophy, but I am made very nervous by this identification with Moore. I have not found Moore’s work inspiring, and it often seems to me that Moore misses the point of philosophical questions. His famous “refutation” of Idealism is an example.) In my university we no longer offer courses in American Philosophy as such (though for reasons of “political correctness” we offer something on multicultural influences on American philosophy), nor do we offer courses in German or French Philosophy. We do indeed offer courses in certain movements in Philosophy, such as British Empiricism, or 19th

BO MOU_F3-15-30.indd 20

4/24/2008 4:33:10 PM

the globalization of philosophy

21

century German Idealism but the idea is to explore a certain set of philosophical ideas, not to articulate a particular national vision. But it seems to me someone might reasonably object by pointing out that there is a traditional distinction, one that can hardly be nonexistent, between “Analytic” Philosophy and “Continental” Philosophy. This way of stating the distinction obviously contains a gross category mistake, in that a method of Philosophy, analysis, is being contrasted with a geographical location of Philosophy, the European Continent. It is as if one said, there are two kinds of things going on in America, business and Kansas. But, avoiding the category mistake, we can say with some qualifications, there do seem to be stylistic and subject matter differences between so called “analytic philosophy” and “phenomenology” or “existentialism” and there is some, though not a great deal, of geographical and national localization of these philosophical movements. For example, Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Quine, and most of the philosophers present here are reasonably construed as part of an analytic tradition. But there is also a distinct tradition that includes Nietzsche, Heidegger, Sartre and Foucault. There are important differences between these two traditions, but it is not easy to characterize these differences precisely, in a non-question begging fashion. Perhaps it is best to think of these as differences in style and subject matter rather than in competing theories. For instance, I have had very useful conversations with Quine, and I have had very useful conversations with Foucault. The differences are mostly a matter of interests and styles but I would not suppose that there are many propositions such that Quine would assert the proposition and Foucault would deny it. They have a different range of interests and different set of priorities. Far more important than their doctrinal differences, I believe, is the fact that they appeal to rather different publics. To put the point very crudely, Quine appeals to a public that is more oriented towards science and mathematics; Foucault appeals more to the public that is oriented towards literature and textual studies and to some of the social sciences. Both were obsessed with language, but in quite different ways. I am going to come back to this alleged difference between analytic and Continental philosophy, but first I want to say something about my own experiences. Beginning in 1985, I tried to make it a matter of policy to accept invitations to teach summer courses or at least to give summer lecture series in foreign universities. I had previously been a visiting professor in several American universities as well as universities in Canada (Toronto),

BO MOU_F3-15-30.indd 21

4/24/2008 4:33:10 PM

22

john r. searle

Britain (Oxford) Norway (Oslo) and Brazil (Campinas). But the policy of teaching summer courses was in addition to the usual sequence of conferences like this one or invitations to give single lectures. The accidents of the Berkeley academic calendar, where we stop teaching in early May, allowed me to teach summer courses at other Universities, especially in Europe. Since 1985 I have taught as visiting professor at the universities of Frankfurt and Berlin in Germany, Florence, Venice and Rome (Roma Tre) in Italy, Graz in Austria, Aärhus in Denmark, The Collège International de Philosophie in Paris, Lublin in Poland and the Univerrsity of Lugano in Switzerland. In addition I have given lecture series in a number of places, the Sorbonne and twice in the College de France in Paris, and various universities in Spain. In China, I spent three weeks lecturing in Beijing, Xian and Shanghai as a representative of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1988, and a week at several universities in Shanghai in 2003. In my experience, globalization is not something that is simply a remote possibility, but is actually occurring as we speak and in a sense this conference itself is a form of the globalization. This is the second controversial thesis I want to advance: Globalization in philosophy is already occurring. Now, what exactly does that mean? “Globalization” is often used pejoratively to mean the spread of international big business corporations world wide. There is a great deal of opposition to economic globalization, but I do not see how this opposition to globalization can be carried over to academic and intellectual globalization. What globalization in philosophy means, as far as my experience is concerned, is: You can go to a very large number of places in the world today and lecture to audiences that are remarkably sophisticated, well trained and well read in a common family of problems. The problems are mostly in what used to be called “analytic philosophy”. But the dispersal of the so-called analytic techniques is now so world wide that it is probably better just to think of these as academic philosophy, that is, philosophy conducted at a university level. And this is especially so because the apparent alternative to analytic philosophy namely phenomenology, is now, at least in part assimilated to analytic philosophy. I lectured, for example, last year in Kirchberg, at the annual Wittgenstein conference and on this occasion the common theme of the conference was phenomenology. I was anxious, in my talk, to point out the limitations of some of the phenomenological authors I am somewhat familiar with, but the methods and the techniques of phenomenology seem to me

BO MOU_F3-15-30.indd 22

4/24/2008 4:33:11 PM

the globalization of philosophy

23

at best to be simply a part of philosophy broadly construed. In short, at its best, phenomenology is not something opposed to but something in addition to logical analysis. What are the conditions necessary for globalization in philosophy, so construed? That is, what are the conditions of success for a globalized philosophy construed as a common world wide endeavor and not bound by any national or cultural traditions? Well it seems to me one can state a number of conditions: First, there has to be a common language. For reasons of historical accident, having nothing to do with the intellectual merits of the English language, English has become the international Lingua Franca. It plays a role in international discussion today that Latin played in the Middle Ages. I welcome this, partly because it makes it easier for me personally, but whether it is English, or some other language, there has to be a common language in which intellectuals all over the world can address each other. Perhaps one day it will be Spanish or Chinese, because there are more people speaking these languages than are speaking English, but for the moment at least it is one of the great intellectual pleasures that I have had in my life, that I can go almost anywhere in the world and lecture to sophisticated and intelligent audiences in English and have every confidence that I will be completely understood and that the discussion will take place in English. It is, by the way, an annoying fact, about some Anglophone philosophers, that they take for granted that everybody can speak perfect English and they engage in discussions with people for whom English is the second or third language as if these people were completely at home speaking English. Some Anglophone philosophers make no concessions. So it is common to hear people mumble in a style that was considered fashionable, and even aristocratic, in my Oxford days, or some people talk too fast and too aggressively and do not wait for their conversation partners to finish speaking. If English is to be a successful Lingua Franca we should try to develop an international style of English, written and spoken with total clarity and intelligibility. A second requirement of globalization, and this one is perhaps more controversial, is that there ought to be certain common standards of rigor and clarity, otherwise communication cannot take place. There is in some quarters a currently fashionable view to the effect that rationality is not a cultural universal, but is only defined relative to specific times and places, and usually in the interest of certain specific power groups. I believe this view is totally mistaken.

BO MOU_F3-15-30.indd 23

4/24/2008 4:33:11 PM

24

john r. searle

General criteria of rationality are universal, because the constraints of rationality are built into the very structure of thought and language. I argued for this conception of universal rationality at some length in Rationality in Action, a book I published a few years ago. You cannot have a language or engage in thought processes without your thoughts and speech acts being subject to the universal constraints of rationality. However, the fact that there are universal constraints of rationality does not mean that all forms of philosophy are equally committed to standards of rigor, clarity and truth. On the contrary, I have discovered at least some branches of so-called post modernism that are deliberately committed to obscurantism and certain forms of irrationality. I don’t know for how long this sort of nonsense can survive, but it is still fairly strong in certain parts of the world, and it tends to be more influential in certain non-philosophical disciplines, such as literary theory and literary criticism, than it is in philosophy. This conference is a good example of how high standards of rationality can reach across cultural and linguistic boundaries. I have had a chance to take a look at some of the papers prepared for this conference and I can say they are uniformly of a high standard of clarity, intelligence and rigor. So the idea that you cannot have a truly international conference where you can take for granted that people from all over the world will share certain common standards of rationality seems to me completely mistaken, and this conference is a good refutation of the mistake. The third feature of globalization in Philosophy is less easily stated, but since it is a phenomenon that is actually occurring, I can point to it. It is essential that philosophers should engage in a more or less common set of research projects and that they can assume and take for granted a certain amount of background knowledge when discussing particular philosophical problems. I was, for example, delighted to see among the topics to be discussed at this conference such topics as “Confucius on the is—ought question”. The assumption is made, and I think it is a correct assumption, that there are certain common problems that cut across the cultural and national boundaries, and that philosophy can reach across these boundaries by discussing these common problems. Globalized philosophy has a common agenda of problems, even though this agenda is constantly growing and developing. A fourth feature of a successful globalized philosophy is one that we cannot take for granted but now seems to me widespread. Philosophers above all have to able to speak with their own individual voices and

BO MOU_F3-15-30.indd 24

4/24/2008 4:33:11 PM

the globalization of philosophy

25

not be expected to represent particular religions, political ideologies or organizations, including nations. Before the collapse of Soviet communism it was very common when attending conferences in communist countries to find that there were really two conferences going on. One, officially, where philosophers from behind the iron curtain spoke with caution and under surveillance. Another more interesting conference took place in private conversations where people could tell you what they actually thought. There are still pressures for ideological conformity in some countries, but successful philosophy requires intellectual independence. And the globalization I am talking about, to be successful, requires that philosophers not speak as specimens or representatives but as individual and independent thinkers. The intellectual independence I am talking about would include, but goes far beyond, academic freedom in the traditional sense. If you have these four features, a common language, common set of criteria of rationality, intelligence and truth, a common (though changing , and developing) problematic, and forms of intellectual independence that go beyond mere academic freedom, then it seems to me that the success of globalization in philosophy is reasonably well assured. Now I want to say something about the agenda of a globalized philosophy. Philosophical problems are not timeless, eternal and universal; but they are not temporary, ephemeral and local either. Many philosophical problems arise because of permanent features of human life such as the problem of the nature of consciousness or the problem of how to achieve a good life. Sometimes philosophical questions arise because of events occurring outside of philosophy. Two obvious examples were the philosophical fallouts from the political upheavals in Europe in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Philosophy both contributed to those upheavals and was a response to them. More importantly, from my point of view, the scientific revolutions of the seventeenth century raised serious philosophical problems about the nature and extent of human knowledge. Indeed, Locke’s major book, the Essay, was described precisely by him as an inquiry into the nature and extent of human knowledge It is difficult for us today to appreciate the extent to which the possibility of knowledge that could be certain, objective and universal was regarded as problematic in the seventeenth century. It is, I think, no exaggeration to say that the epistemic bias in philosophy which was introduced by Bacon and Descartes tended to dominate philosophy for the next three hundred years. The central problems in Philosophy were seen as centering around objectivity,

BO MOU_F3-15-30.indd 25

4/24/2008 4:33:11 PM

26

john r. searle

certainty, knowledge, evidence, proof, etc. And one essential task of philosophy was to address skeptical arguments. The tendency to treat epistemology as the center of philosophy continued into the twentieth century. In my intellectual childhood the problem of induction, the problem of other minds, the problem of skepticism generally and the problem of objectivity in ethics were among the dominant problems in the subject. It was typically believed that Russell and Wittgenstein had transformed the traditional question, How do you know? Into the question, What do you mean? But what you mean was taken to be prior to how you know, and the philosophical examination of language was supposed to give us an entering wedge into solving the traditional problems of skepticism. In my opinion, there has been a sea-change in philosophy that occurred in my intellectual lifetime. And I will briefly describe how I see it. The central intellectual fact of the present era is that knowledge grows. We know vastly more than our grandparents’ generation did, and the generation of our grandchildren will know vastly more than we do. If you go to any University bookstore today and go into the sections for biology, or engineering or any other discipline containing a large body of established truths, you will find textbooks containing an enormous amount of straightforward factual information. You will find a sheer volume of established knowledge that would have taken Descartes’ breath away. For more than one reason we cannot take skepticism seriously in the way that philosophers once did. Partly this is due to the philosophical arguments against skepticism, mounted by Wittgenstein and Austin, as well as other people, but, I think, more importantly than the actual philosophical arguments is that with the sheer fact of the growth of knowledge that is universal, certain and objective we have reached a point in philosophy where it is hard to treat the skeptical questions as at the center of the subject in a the way that our philosophical ancestors did. There is a place in philosophy for traditional epistemology but such questions as, Can I really know of the existence of an external world, or that the sun will rise in the east tomorrow?, we treat as puzzles like Zeno’s puzzles about space and time. It is a philosophical puzzle how I can get to the other side of the room, if first I have to go half way, and before that, half of that half, etc. And it is a philosophical puzzle about how I know that the sun will rise in the East tomorrow, but just as it is not rational to doubt that I can cross the room, so it is not rational to doubt the existence of certain, universal and objective knowledge.

BO MOU_F3-15-30.indd 26

4/24/2008 4:33:11 PM

the globalization of philosophy

27

Assume for the sake of argument that traditional epistemology, with the threat of skepticism always lurking in it, no longer has the force for us that it once had, then where do we find ourselves in a globalized Philosophy? The situation we are in has certain analogies with Greek philosophy in the transition from Socrates and Plato to Aristotle. Socrates and Plato took skepticism seriously and tried to answer it. In a sense they prepared the ground for Aristotle by dealing with skepticism in a way that enabled Aristotle to move from epistemology to ontology. I do not want to overstate the analogy, but we can think of Wittgenstein and “ordinary language philosophy” as similarly dealing with skepticism in a way that enables for us a similar shift from epistemology to ontology. The epistemic obsession has now been resolved and we can now move on to ontology. What then is the form that the ontological questions should take for a globalized philosophy. It seems to me, (and here I am speaking in a very summary fashion) that there is one overriding question in philosophy, and it is this: How do we as human beings fit in with what we already know about how the world is anyhow? We have pretty solid knowledge of the world from physics and chemistry, and a good understanding of our own evolution from evolutionary biology. We know that the world consists entirely of physical particles in fields of force, that these are organized into systems and that on our earth some of those systems, with big carbon based molecules and lots of hydrogen, nitrogen and oxygen, have evolved into living biological systems, including animals like ourselves. We have in short a pretty good account of the basic physical, chemical and biological structure of the world, but how do we fit in? How do we make our self conception consistent with what we know about how the world is anyhow? How do we, as mindful, conscious, intentional, rational, political, social, speech-act-performing and free-will-having beings, fit into a universe of mindless, meaningless physical particles. Perhaps in the end we cannot make all the features of our self conception consistent with our factual knowledge of the world. But we will not know of the possible successes and failures without doing the work. I had been doing philosophy professionally for more than a couple of decades, before it occurred to me than this is the problem that I have spent all my life working on, even though I had not been entirely aware of it. So the problem of speech acts, for example, is: how do you get from the brute sounds that come out of the mouths of speakers to statements, questions, commands, promises, etc.? The problem

BO MOU_F3-15-30.indd 27

4/24/2008 4:33:11 PM

28

john r. searle

of consciousness is: how is it possible for a hundred billion neurons to cause and sustain conscious states? The problem of society is: how it is possible that there can be an objective social and institutional reality of money, government, languages, marriage, property , etc. in a world of beasts like ourselves, and which in some sense exists only because we think it exists? And so on with other problems, such as the problem of ethics, rationality, free will etc. In any case, this is my philosophical agenda and I think it is the agenda of a rather large number of philosophers in the present era. I see it as an ideal global agenda. I think global contributions can give us insights into many of these problems that we would not otherwise have. For example, I have always been suspicious of the branch of ethics I was brought up on in Oxford, because it always seemed to be so very local. A typical ethical subject was the obligation to return a borrowed book. Now I am not even sure that our concept of ethics translates universally into all human languages. I say this, not to argue in favor of some sort of mindless ethical relativism. I think that is nonsensical. Rather I think our theory of ethics has to be grounded in a more biologically fundamental theory of human rationality, one that can accommodate both the universality of ethical concerns and enormous cultural differences in ethical conceptions. I want to mention two last questions that are faced by the conception of globalized philosophy that I am attempting to articulate. First, what is its relation to the history of philosophy? And second, what is its relation to other disciplines? Attitudes to the history of the subject vary notoriously among different sorts of philosophers. One strand, the Hegelian strand, thinks that we can never overcome our past history and that we should see ourselves, at any given point, as simply extensions of the previous history of the subject. In the Hegelian vein, all philosophy is history of philosophy. That is not my attitude. My attitude would be more like that of a miner. The history of philosophy consists of a series of huge repositories and we should attempt to mine as much philosophical utility out of these various repositories as we can. I realize that this attitude is not as reverential as it might be, but I think that the history of philosophy is immensely useful to us if we are able to learn from our predecessors and build on their achievements. Furthermore, this is where globalization really comes into its own. It is a lamentable fact about my education that I have learned nothing, literally nothing, from my official university training about several of the important philosophers discussed in this conference. It seems

BO MOU_F3-15-30.indd 28

4/24/2008 4:33:11 PM

the globalization of philosophy

29

to me important that we pay an enormous respect to the tradition of Confucianism, Buddhism and others precisely by seeing how they bear on our contemporary issues. Actually I do not see the bifurcation I mentioned earlier, between the reverential attitude toward the history of the subject and the miner’s extractionist attitude, at any deep level, as inconsistent with each other. It is perfectly OK with me if people want to treat the history of the subject with more reverence than I do, I just want to be allowed to make use of the history in the way I have been proposing. Let us put this in very crude terms. I see a real interest in Chinese philosophy and in Asian Philosophy generally on the part of people who are working in a European tradition as giving those people enormous resources that were previously unavailable to them. Finally, what about other subjects? Philosophy in my intellectual childhood was pretty much treated by its practitioners as separate and independent from other disciplines. And there was a great deal of effort made to show that we were doing something different from Psychology, or from linguistics, when we were doing the Philosophy of mind or the Philosophy of language. I think all of that is a very serious mistake. One of the truly amazing things about the research project that I have been describing, is how readily it meshes with and how much it can learn from, and how much it can teach to other disciplines. I once had a public debate with Richard Rorty, where he argued that what he called analytic philosophy had little or nothing to say to other subjects. In my own experience, this has been a breathtakingly false assessment. The last three journals that I have been asked to contribute to have been The Annual Review of Neuroscience, for an article about consciousness, The Journal of Anthropological Theory, for an article about social ontology, and the Journal of Institutional Economics for an analysis of the ontology of human institutions, economic and otherwise. After this conference, the next conference I will attend is one of Neurobiology and the philosophical implications of neurobiology for the study of consciousness. One of the main reasons that philosophy is more exciting now than it was half a century ago, is that it connects with the rest of intellectual life in a way that has not always been the case in the past. And I see a globalized philosophy as increasing those connections.

BO MOU_F3-15-30.indd 29

4/24/2008 4:33:12 PM

BO MOU_F3-15-30.indd 30

4/24/2008 4:33:12 PM

PART TWO

CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT OF SEARLE’S PHILOSOPHY AND CHINESE PHILOSOPHY

SECTION A

MIND

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 31

5/8/2008 7:24:58 PM

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 32

5/8/2008 7:24:59 PM

CHAPTER TWO

ANALYSIS OF SEARLE’S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND AND CRITIQUE FROM A NEO-CONFUCIAN POINT OF VIEW Chung-ying Cheng 1. Problem of Explicating “Biological Naturalism” John Searle has made important contributions to contemporary philosophy of mind. His philosophical position on mind is not just based on an analysis of the language of mind. He has developed the philosophical theory of speech acts before he developed his theory of mind that is rooted in the central paradigms of speech acts. He titled his 1992 book on philosophy of mind The Rediscovery of the Mind,1 suggesting a new discovery of an old entity. But he was criticized for the implication of this claim, because there were others who have made this claim. However, I know no other philosopher to have made this claim as clearly and as meaningfully as Searle. Hence I do regard his work as a “re-discovery” and an important one for his time: this is because he has clearly identified the unique characteristic of mind as consciousness and described it as a unique quality not to be reduced to the brain. This is a relatively new position in a time when the materialist identity theory of mind and body has been quite in vogue. To call his work a “re-discovery of mind” indicates that he has given mind a new identity that is independent of brain and body, even though it is regarded as being caused by the brain by Searle. He explicitly says that brains cause minds and calls his position “biological naturalism”.2 One may still ask: Is Searle’s biological naturalism after all identistic if not materialist ? Namely, whether mind is still identical with some function of the brain even though it is not reduced to a materialistically

1 Searle, John (1992), The Rediscovery of the Mind, Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press. 2 See Searle (1992), p. 1; also see Entry on John Searle written by John Searle in Companion to the Philosophy of Mind, edited by Samuel Guttenplan (1994), Malden: Blackwells, p. 544.

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 33

5/8/2008 7:24:59 PM

34

chung-ying cheng

conceived brain? Apparently, Searle would deny this, because minds are “simply states that the whole neuronal system is in at certain times and under certain conditions”.3 Minds are not separate substances but are states of brains under certain conditions, which presumably are to be stated as physical or biological terms. Then, is this position dualistic after all if not Cartesian? But I doubt that Searle would condone such a label either. He wants to reject dualism of properties apart from rejecting dualism of substances. Of course, he cannot be an epiphenomenalist, because minds are real and their activities are essential for the maintenance of the brains and the living bodies. With regard to cognitive-scientific interpretation of minds, Searle is vehemently negative. But he is correct in showing that the mental (in understanding) is semantic, not simply syntactic and that even the syntactic is interpretative and hence observer-relative. This means that we simply have to presuppose a mind in interpreting mind in the brain. With all these disclaimers, I am not quite sure of how Searle identifies or explicates his own position called “biological naturalism”. One may suspect that his position could be a type of “anomalous monism” (to be abbreviated as AM) at best, because Searle has to reconcile the physical or physio-neurological origin and cause of consciousness with the unique quality of intentionality in mental consciousness with contents which cannot be reduced to the brain and which are “observer-relative”, to use his own words. It could be a fact that the same brain state is realized in two mental states of different contents. Hence it appears that he cannot escape from recognizing the distinction between “token identity” and “type diversity” offered by anomalous monism. But from Chapter 2 of Searle’s book this position was clearly rejected on the ground that it cannot identify the mental features of mental content.4 What this means is not quite clear, because for those who hold AM such as Donald Davidson and W.V. Quine, the mental features of mental content are recognized as contents of the propositional attitudes or propositional acts of language and are to be attributed to the human persons who speak the language. It was Donald Davidson who invented the term “anomalous monism” and he described the position of AM as follows: “The position that says there are no strictly lawlike correlations between phenomena classified

3 4

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 34

Ibid., p. 545. Searle, op. cit., 53.

5/8/2008 7:25:00 PM

analysis of searle’s philosophy of mind

35

as mental and phenomena classified as physical, though mental entities are identical, taken one at a time, with physical entities. In other words, there is a single ontology, but more than one way of describing and explaining the items in the ontology.”5 W.V. Quine was impressed by this position and he endorsed it in his book Pursuit of Truth.6 He described its as token physicalism: “There is no mental substance, but there are irreducibly mental ways of grouping physical states and events.”7 In his 1995 book From Stimulus to Science,8 Quine re-iterates the same endorsement but gives an a more elaborate description: “Each occurrence of a mental state is still, we insist, an occurrence of a physical state of a body, but the groupings of these occurrences under mentalistic predicates are largely untranslatable into physiological terms. There is token identity, to give it the jargon, but type diversity.”9 Both Quine and Davidson can be said to be materialist identist who are devoted to seek an extensional explication or reduction of intensions (conceptual or propositional contents of mental states) embedded in the language of propositional attitudes and language of propositional acts (speech acts). But this effort remains basically a program that has not produced any universally acceptable rendering of mentalistic language into the materialist or physicalist language. Nor has it given a systematic procedure for generating conditions of satisfaction in physical terms for the use of mental language, despite interesting efforts and exciting analyses have been made on piecemeal basis. It is interesting to note that the reason on why there is no full-scale success was not fully explored nor questioned. The term “anomalous monism” is simply an invitation to solution, just like the term “biological naturalism”. Given these circumstances it is certainly important to ask whether Searle’s assertion of consciousness as having intrinsic qualities and as being not irreducible to the brain contains an adequate explanation or rational/ empirical justification. It is also important to note that Quine has described the AM as a matter of token identity in brain and type diversity in mind. Given this observation, if mind is not reducible to 5 See his paper “Mental Events”, 1970, reprinted in Donald Davidson (1980), Actions and Events, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Quoted here from his paper “Could There be a Science of Rationality?” in Problems of Rationality, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004. 121. 6 Published in Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1992. 71–72. 7 See Pursuit of Truth, 72. 8 Published in Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995. 9 See From Stimulus to Science, 87.

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 35

5/8/2008 7:25:00 PM

36

chung-ying cheng

brain in a substantive sense and enjoys its diversity versus the ontological identity or singularity of brain, could we say that mind is also ontologically real like brain except it has a unique mode of existence which nevertheless is still related to the brain as material existence. If so, could we say that Searle is a property dualist of mind and body on one level (the biological) and a causal materialist identitist on another (the systematic). He would be a dualist of two levels if not dualist of two substances. 2. Connecting Background Thesis to Zhu Xi In making the above suggestion, however, I recognize Searle’s central ideas regarding biological environment and background ability thesis. He suggests that our minds arise from brains in a largely evolving biological system of life and that brains as organs of life-bodies naturally give rise to (i.e. “cause”) the activities and dispositions of mind. He further holds that intentional states of mind function against a Background of non-intentional abilities and dispositions that are causally efficacious. But for the purpose of understanding the truth of the matter, it is up to Searle to clarify his notion of “causation” of mental states from brain states on which both his critique of cognitive science and his Background thesis rely. He says: “A genuine science of cognition would allow for at least three levels of explanation—a neuro-biological level, a level of intentionality, and a functional level where we identify the operation of Background capacities in terms of their functional roles in the life of the organism.”10 From this scheme, it is natural to expect that the causation of mind by brain or the causal efficacy of brains with regard to mind is rather a very complicated one. But then, Searle’s introduction of the Background Thesis is both helpful and obscuring. On the one hand, Searle denies that there is an intermediate level of computation between the level of mental (first person description) and the level of the neurobiological (the third person description). On the other hand, the Background seems to function precisely like an intermediate level although we need not to consider the Background as computational rather than biologically organic. As the Background contains no intentional states, it has to give rise or cause

10

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 36

Samuel Guttenplan, op. cit. Searle’s Entry cited, 550.

5/8/2008 7:25:00 PM

analysis of searle’s philosophy of mind

37

intentional states from a biological structure. It is a two-way self-connecting principle. The only difference from the computational model appears to be that the Background is biological and causal whereas the computer is not. But then could we imagine some biological machine as Descartes thought of the animals? I do think that Searle’s idea of a Background is highly suggestive because it is largely an open and heuristic concept and thus could lead to a position which is congenial with the philosophy of mind of Zhu Xi (1030 –1200), the great Neo-Confucian philosopher who argues for and explains the relationship between mind (xin) and nature (xing) as a relation between vital force (qi ) and structured being (pattern, law, principle, li ) based on the onto-cosmological theory of creative ontogenesis. Zhu Xi’s approach may appear to be metaphysical, but it is nevertheless based on first-person experience of consciousness of his mind and mind reflection as shown in his reflection on the presence of mental awareness with regard to mental activities and responses called the emotions (qing) on the one hand, and to non-activated state of mental dispositions called nature (xing) on the other. Hence his methodology and position are both metaphysical and experiential. Given Searle’s thesis on the Background, one may strongly question whether Searle could explain the generation and activities of consciousness from a brain basis without becoming both metaphysical and experiential like Zhu Xi. As we shall see, if consciousness cannot be explained reductively by brain, and yet is embodied by brain, there must be a deeper principle which enables mind or consciousness to present itself through the activities of brain and yet not to be fully identified with the brain. This is precisely like the working of the qi in li and li in qi where li presents itself in the living context of qi and qi presents itself in the structuring of li. It is in light of this analogy to Zhu Xi that I say that Searle has to become more metaphysically dynamical and creative in developing his “connection principle”, the principle that calls forth consciousness in connection and in relation with the biological brain. We may even suggest that, in this context, the only way-out for adequately explicating the position of “natural biologism” is for Searle to think like a Neo-Confucian Chinese philosopher, redefining not only his idea of brain-to-mind causation (or causal efficacy), but his ideas of the brain and the idea of the mind in the life-activities of the whole person in relation to his onto-cosmological environment. Searle may not perceive the importance of this suggestion which provides a way out for his thesis of biological naturalism of consciousness, not just brain, because he

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 37

5/8/2008 7:25:00 PM

38

chung-ying cheng

may not be familiar with the well-known philosophical thesis of Zhu Xi in Chinese philosophy.11 For any reader who knows both Searle and Zhu Xi and takes comparative philosophy seriously could easily see how Zhu Xi could be relevant and helpful as far as the concept of Background is concerned and as far as the explanatory power of the Background Hypothesis is concerned. At this juncture, a methodological remark is in order: My concern in this paper is not to find a suitable title for Searle’s position on mind, but to understand it so that we can find in it a clear, coherent, deep and yet comprehensible theory of mind and consciousness. Whether one could develop such a theory based on understanding of human experience of mind in its structure, process and diversity is a challenging question. It may appear for me to demand too much if we place such an expectation on Searle. But in my view Searle is as good as anyone if not better for possibly meeting this expectation. In this following sections of my article I shall raise some basic questions of coherence and clarity regarding Searle’s claims and then test his theory with some request for ontological depth without asking for achieving a comprehensive scope such as involving considerations of different functions of mind as one sees in Plato, Kant and Zhu Xi. It will be shown that despite his good intention and broad ambition Searle’s theory of mind may have left several loopholes and doubts that should prompt us to seek a broader perspective and to develop a new vision based on his initial insights. Hence I still wish to argue that Searle’s theory may already point toward such a new departure and a new vision without himself being quite aware of these. The fundamental methodological issue is how we understand experience, language and reference to reality both experientially and onto-hermeneutically. As a matter of fact, a prior ontological insight is needed to see the need for a new ontological paradigm on our language of experience for description or re-description and for explanation. This description and explanation must be based on recognition of intrinsic qualities of experience. What I have suggested with regard to Zhu Xi is precisely to serve this purpose of re-description and explanation. We may then see that Zhu Xi would agree with Searle in Searle’s strict understanding

11 See Appendix of this article on Zhu Xi’s philosophy of substance and function in li and qi.

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 38

5/8/2008 7:25:00 PM

analysis of searle’s philosophy of mind

39

of consciousness of mind, but he would elaborate on and then explain the mind in an ontological and yet experiential manner as a function (of the qi ) in relation to the substance (of the li ) which is not simply confined to the brain and the body. In making this explanation the conception of creative generation (sheng-cheng) rather than causation ( yin-guo) would be more appropriate. We may perhaps further explain this sheng-cheng relation of the body (brain included) to mind as one of holistic origination-emergence and systematic supervenience in modern analytical terms. To see otherwise is to commit the fallacy of simple location. 3. Intrinsic Issues in Searle’s Position In the following we shall raise several key issues in Searle’s conception of mind as consciousness that has led to puzzlement and dispute. Nevertheless, we can show that Searle’s position is open to new interpretation, which would resolve the puzzlement and hopefully settle the dispute. Is consciousness located in the brain? Apparently if consciousness were located in the brain, which is spatially and temporally organized, it would be externally observed in the brain by a third person. But we have no single idea as to how consciousness can be spatially and temporarily located in the brain as a space having a time span. The primary sense of space is that it is externally extended and it is potentially to be observed by an observer. Our internal observation or introspection on consciousness in the brain is denied by Searle to be possible. (This is another issue to be treated separately). But even granted some form of external observation from an epistemic internalist point of view, what we have observed is a sequence or stream of occurring and vanishing events (if not acts) of consciousness in time to be marked as past, present and future. Where is the spatial place for various parts of consciousness to be located? It cannot be located in any single place or area of the brain even though we may have known the specific natures of areas of the brain as related to types of mental dispositions of a person. The reason for the non-locality of mental states or mental events is not only that the mental has to be understood as a whole that arises from the brain as a whole. The consciousness could be said to constitute a mental space and mental time that seem to co-exist with the space and time of the brain. There is a system-to-system relationship of dependence and variation rather than point-to-point correspondence.

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 39

5/8/2008 7:25:00 PM

40

chung-ying cheng

There is another important reason: there are contents of the mental states that contain reference to things or affairs in the world. These things or affairs are intentionally identified by the mental states. They have their own inner spatiality in the sense of relatively organized positioning of things within the system of contents of the mind. It is also necessary to recognize that the inner spatiality is still related to outer spatiality because some things that the mind intentionally identifies are actually located in the external world. Hence the spatiality of the mental state cannot have a singular location in the brain, but must exist as a relation between the mind and things in the world, in terms of which minds can be understood. This also explains why minds cannot be reduced to brains, because in order to explain the mind, we need to refer to what are recognized as intended referents of the mind in the world. In doing so, we have to presuppose that those things referred to in the intentional states of the mind are either independently real or real by interpretation. As such, another person may not have access to what is intended by a mind by the nature of the privacy of mental awareness. He may not have access to what is intended by mind even in perception. Besides, the scenes to be referred to by mental terms as contents may have disappeared in time. We may therefore not be in a position to catch what is encountered in that time by a mind. Experience of intentional reference, like perception, must be considered as a result of many causally facilitating factors, not just the brain. The above-mentioned Neo-Confucian perspective as represented by Zhu Xi regarding the relation between mind and body goes beyond the Western tradition of Plato, Descartes and Kant: Mind as a whole is not just a function of the body, but a function of the whole person in his constant organic interactions with things in the world and cosmos via the presence of the qi. Thus, while mind as intentionalities is neither severally nor collectively reducible to matter and space, it is both severally and holistically real in time and space. In this sense it has its referentiality to the world even though it cannot be reduced to either the brain or the things in the world. It resides simply in a sustained relation of the self to the world, and assumes the form of existence as a process of moving between the brain and things in the world. It is a relation between the brain and the body in relation to the natural environment that is onto-cosmologically explained in the mutual generation of li and qi as explained above. With this said, what Searle has named Background could be said to contain a secondary or virtual spatiality of mind, namely as a mental

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 40

5/8/2008 7:25:01 PM

analysis of searle’s philosophy of mind

41

system that is structurally formed in a hierarchy of dispositions and inducements with capacities for simultaneous occurring events in the human body, which are presuppositions of the functioning of the brain. Thus emotions and desires could occur in a person together with his cognitions in the brain. Both emotions or emotions and cognitions are then spaced out in our simultaneous perceptions. But we must point out that this mental space as we have described is still a metaphor, because it only describes a level of relations among matters of mind, emotions, will, desires, cognitions: each interpenetrates with the other and depends on each other. This interpenetration and mutual dependence become inherent features of human mind or human consciousness as a mental system, which, nevertheless, requires activities of the brain for cognition or recognition. Normally, the brain provides the spatiality of mind, which, like a mathematical space, is to enable us to think spatially so that we can make distinctions and inferences among things, but this does not mean that those distinctions are externally observable on the primary level. We may even suggest that the mental space is a secondary space emerging from and supervening on the primary space as a result of emergence of mind from the human person as an organism in the world. Can we have a dualism without being called dualistic? Searle maintains that even though mind is not reduced to a brain state, it is still something to be considered caused by the brain. I wish to argue that in spite of Searle’s disagreement there is a subtle identity of this position with Davidson’s anomalous monism. In the case of Davidson, the mind as a whole is identifiable with brain. But no special or particular identity can ever be asserted. In other words, there is only generic identity, whereas specific identity requires occasional conditions only to be provided by circumstantial or external-perceptual or internal-mental conditions, which involve factors that are conditioned by the world and environment. E.g. I cannot predict my future state of my perception, my feeling or my desire because I have to become aware or exposed to external conditions that may not yet occur. The brain states provide an open channel to take in new values for unbound variables from experiences in an open world context.12 This openness allows the mind to be causally effective not by itself alone, but by

12

I.e. we are being- in- the world, and we are open beings in an open world.

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 41

5/8/2008 7:25:01 PM

42

chung-ying cheng

combining with circumstances from outside world. Hence there is no causal determinism here. The relation of brain to the mind therefore is both dualistic and monistic: it is generically monistic and it is specifically dualistic. To say that mind is spatial is to say that mind which is generically identified with brain is spatial because brain is spatial. It is not to say that it is spatial when considered as a specific system by itself. To say that the brain causes the consciousness is half-truth: it is to say that brain together with other factors as input from open functions of the brain such as perception and feeling would give rise to consciousness. E.g. the eye would not see a moon unless there is a moon and unless the eye looks at the moon. Hence the image of the moon in the pupil of the iris is a product not of brain alone but of the circumstances that includes the relationship between the moon and the eyes and the relationship between eyes and the brain. It is therefore better to treat consciousness as an event or happening which presupposes a structure that is the structure of mind that supervenes on the brain as an ontologically individuating function of the brain due to activities of the whole person. In light of this argument, we may have a dualistic phenomenon of the distinction between mind and body but they are mutually conditioned in the experience and activities of the whole person. Hence the dualism is not dualistically rooted but instead rooted in a singularly conceived common source with its own complexity. In a sense it is a dualism that is not dualistically rooted. Perhaps we may call it dualistic monism if we recognize that this characterization presupposes an unstated metaphysical thesis on the unity of the duality. Can we have introspection on our consciousness? Searle rejected the possibility of introspection into consciousness. He says: “There could not be introspection because the model of specting intro requires a distinction between the object spected and the specting of it, and we cannot make this distinction for conscious states.”13 As a factual statement, this statement can be made false by claims of the contrary. Self-introspection is possible because I can make the distinction between what I have thought and what I am thinking. The intentionality of consciousness precisely reflects this fact: I could think of a gold mountain and I can think of my, not another person’s, thinking of gold mountain.

13

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 42

See Searle, Rediscovery of Mind, 144.

5/8/2008 7:25:01 PM

analysis of searle’s philosophy of mind

43

This of course does not have to mean that I have a special faculty called introspection, nor to deny that my notion of myself is from my interpretation of my genuine experience of a subject-object structure in experience, even possibly a social construction for that matter. But this ability of thinking this way must be recognized. We do not have to observe the subject of the introspection when the subject is inspecting just as I need not see my eyes when my eyes are seeing things. If we do it in front of a mirror we are then seeing the object, namely that we are seeing. I only see my eyes and I may see the objects as reflected in the mirror. Not the object itself. One may show a picture of myself inspecting a fish. But this is not the same thing as showing myself now engaged in inspecting a fish while seeing myself seeing the fish. There is no adequate reason to hold that “once you get rid of the idea that consciousness is a stuff that is the ‘object’ of introspection, it is easy to see that it is spatial, because it is located in the brain. (105).” That we are able to realize that consciousness is a property of the brain is precisely a result of our introspective reflection on how consciousness could be explained in relation to the brain. It is precisely due to the fact that we are able to introspect our consciousness as objective, we can speak metaphorically that it is spatial as I have explained above. What is and why is there the Background? Is the brain the Background or some functional activities of the brain the Background? John Searle defines his thesis of the Background as the following: “Intentional phenomena such as meanings, understandings, interpretations, beliefs, desires and experiences only function with a set of Background capacities that are not themselves intentional. Another way to state this thesis is to say that all representation, whether in language, thought, or experience, only succeeds in representing a given set of non-representational capacities. In my technical jargon, intentional phenomena only determine conditions of satisfaction relative to a set of capacities that are not themselves intentional. Thus, the same intentional state can determine different conditions of satisfaction, given different background capacities, and an intentional state will determine no conditions of satisfaction unless it is applied relative to an appropriate Background”.14 But what is this Background that forms background conditions for the happenings of the consciousness which has intentional contents? It must be the brain

14

See Chapter 8 of his book Rediscovery of Mind, 175–176.

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 43

5/8/2008 7:25:01 PM

44

chung-ying cheng

in the first place: for it is a set of abilities that are not intentional but which can be activated by perception, thinking and desiring or believing. It can be also circumstantial contexts that are memories of experiences as organized into a body of layers of reference and cross-references. But Searle does not even mention these real possible candidates. For him Background seems to remain more like a metaphorical notion, something to be constructed perhaps in terms of social behavior patterns. How the non-representational or non-intentional Background relates to the intentional and representing consciousness also remains unclear. How are concepts such as “function within”, “succeeds in”, “determine conditions of satisfaction relative to” to be interpreted and understood? All appear to be ill-defined terms. However, I shall make attempt to give the following observations for clarification: 1) Intentional consciousness must take the background conditions which are physically or physiologically characterized as necessary conditions so that the latter may cause the former in collaboration or in combination with circumstantial factors in a situation. In this sense we may actually see consciousness as supervening over the background with supervience defined as contextually co-origination or co-determination or co-causation. Note we may actually treat the brain as part of the Background and treating actual occurring and situational contexts for consciousness as another part of the background. As Searle has demonstrated on page 180 of his above-mentioned book that the notion of Background is such that it cannot be detailed because there is an openness to what can and cannot be counted as Background. His illustration on speaking “bring me a steak with potatoes” is quite illuminating. This actually illustrates the situation of a speech act that occasions the speech and takes speech as part of the occasion. The speech act therefore completes the occasion. 2) It can be seen that given a Background, intentional consciousness could take place and it can take many possible forms. In other words, the Background does not determine the consciousness. Consciousness is under-determined by the Background, just as the Background is underdetermined by consciousness.15 Searle’s idea of conditions of satisfaction, like the idea of conditions of truth, depends on his understanding of

15 This is where indeterminacy of translation occurs and how Davidson comes to formulate his “anomalous monism” in which one cannot infer a brain state from a mental state as described in speech and vice versa.

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 44

5/8/2008 7:25:01 PM

analysis of searle’s philosophy of mind

45

what constitutes the actual occurrence of consciousness and it says that a consciousness could happen with different set of intentionalities. This means that the Background underdetermines consciousness as a whole, which in turn would underdetermine any specific intentionality. There is a double under-determination that is not recognized by Searle. It is misleading for him to say that an intentional state will determine no conditions of satisfaction unless it is applied relative to an appropriate Background. One would think that once intentional consciousness takes place it already has presupposed a Background. The background needs not determine what the intentional state would further be. The intentional state could have different corresponding conditions of satisfaction so to speak. But it may take a specific Background to prompt its choosing one set over another set. 3) The question of the non-representing and non-intentionality of the Background must also be questioned. One cannot but see the functionality of brain and other supporting conditions for mind as an epiphany. We have yet to understand the complexity of the brain activities in order to see how the supervening system of consciousness takes place and correlates with parts of the brain in terms of the functionality of the brain. As there are phenomena of sleep and other mental diseases, whether there are mediating level between a brain state and a mental state is a matter open to investigation. No preemptive conclusion should be made. Mind as a system of dispositions in relationships: Now we have to see mind or consciousness as forming a system of meaning which has coherence of its own and which is also open to new experiences and new development. We need an idea of system as a coherent body of dispositions that allows us to speak of both mind and brain as systems on different levels. To use the term “system” is to stress the idea of internal coherence, organic relationships and sensitivity toward external matter for possible effects. As a system mind or brain can function relatively independently and yet these two relatively independent systems could also form inter-systematic crossings and linkages so that transfer of information can be made. As a system we can see how mind has its relative autonomy just like the brain or the body. Then we can also see how mind as a system can be said to emerge from and supervene over the brain as system. There is systemic dependence as well as systematic interdependence between mind and body in the flow of life of a human person. With the idea of system we are able to then see how brain as background has to be considered a system, albeit a complex

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 45

5/8/2008 7:25:01 PM

46

chung-ying cheng

one, because it has a complex structure as a whole and its relations to the context of a situation is a complex one. We may also conceive the context of a situation as a system or network that remains stable on certain level and unstable on a different level. We may indeed imagine the relationship of crossing-over between and among the various systems as indicated in the circles of the following diagram: brain

mind

background world actual context

world

This means that mind as a system must supervene on both the brain and the actual context of a situation that is part of the world. This implies that mind is part of the world just as brain is a part of the world. The intentional state hence is an active operation of the brain in the context of the world that has abilities to impact the world. With this re-interpretation of the Background as a system or systems, we see how we could make sense of Searle’s observation: “Differences in local Backgrounds makes translation from one language to another difficult; the commonality of deep Background makes it possible at all.”16 This is because the deeper the background is, the more generalized and more defused the mind system is related to the brain and to the world. The idea of a system of layers of backgrounds suggests a layered context of situations in our experience of the world and a hierarchical system of dispositions and abilities that characterize both the brain and the mind. We may conceive local backgrounds as formed by experience and learning. We may speak of the mind as a field that extends over and hangs over the brain as a magnetic field.

16

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 46

John Searle, op. cit., 194.

5/8/2008 7:25:01 PM

analysis of searle’s philosophy of mind

47

Other Issues: The questions of inference, interpretation, and immediate understanding in terms of some a priori conceptual system of beliefs are to be raised in regard to our understanding of mind as a system of dispositions and abilities. Cognitive mind could be considered a sub-systematic entity. But mind-heart as a whole forms correlative and interdependent or dependent systems or clusters of sub-systems, just like systems and sub-systems of the human language. The question arises as to how one system or one cluster of systems originate and whether a computer can be programmed to operate on them so that the system or the cluster of the systems could be made to consistently and successfully work in meeting questions of life of a person. If a computer is successful in doing so, one may treat the computer as identical with a human brain in its systematic intelligence. If this is the case, one might conclude that our mind or consciousness is no more than a set of algorithms of a Turing Machine and there is nothing unique or creative about consciousness or human mind. But Searle would not accept such a position. For him consciousness and mind cannot be imitated or simulated. What is imitated or simulated in a machine cannot be the genuine mind and cannot embody consciousness. There is an aspect of mind and consciousness that is understanding or intentionality that requires an internal structure of the human self and which is rooted in the Background of the person. This seems to be the gist and goal of his well-known Chinese room argument. What are the implications from the Chinese room argument? Searle asks us to imagine that someone who does not understand Chinese to follow instructions in dealing with Chinese language symbols so that he could answer correctly all the questions handed to him in Chinese language while he was locked in a room. From his successful responsive behavior we may conclude that he knows or understands Chinese. We may even infer that the computer or the computer program which formulates correct Chinese answers understand Chinese.17 However, as a matter of fact, the person who answered the questions does not understand Chinese. Nor could a computer or a computer program can be said to understand Chinese. This is because the syntax of a language is not the same as its semantics, as the former can be spelt out formally in formal symbols, the latter cannot be so given. Syntax

17

See op. cit., page 45.

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 47

5/8/2008 7:25:02 PM

48

chung-ying cheng

as external program is therefore no substitute for semantic meaning as embodying the intentional use of a language. Since language has to be learned in contexts of real ostensive situations involving objects and things in the world, there is no background in learning the language of Chinese for the person locked in a room. Hence we must conclude that understanding as a function of consciousness and mind can not be said to be explained by a correct pattern of verbal behavior. From this Searle comes to the conclusion that no AI can be made to substitute for the human mind for it does not have understanding, or for that matter, mind. Given this argument, Searle could be right in denying the mental intelligence with all its attendant features including intentionality and this does appeals to me intuitively at first glance. But upon reflection, Searle’s answer needs not to be necessarily valid. Nor does his answer gives us any insight into how understanding in a mind works. In the first place, one must say that although the computer program cannot be said to understand Chinese, the programmer must understand it in order to write the program for all the instructions. But then how do we ascertain that the programmer knows the Chinese or any one can be said to know the Chinese? The answer is that the programmer or any one knows the Chinese by learning how to speak or use Chinese in real situations and his use of Chinese would incorporate the feature of what Noam Chomsky calls the creativeness of the language in such a way he could produce a new sentence to respond to any new situation and his use of the language works for all practical purposes. It is not just the semantics which is involved in being able to respond to an objective situation, a pragmatics of use based on actual experience and on-going perception is needed for making sure that the response is a genuine response called for in the situation and is rooted in one’s past and present experience of the world. Given this understanding, one can come to see how one develops a Background for mastering the use of the language, namely by interacting in experience with situations in the world. It is a matter of learning and consequent building a body of dispositions that would be elicited in forms of correct linguistic expressions of Chinese in encountering new situations. In this sense consciousness and mind are simply the abilities to learn and to form dispositions to make correct responses in concrete situations of experience and perception. In the learning process brain functions as a tool of learning as if managed by the conscious mind. When the mind has learned the language and therefore can be said to understand the

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 48

5/8/2008 7:25:02 PM

analysis of searle’s philosophy of mind

49

language, the brain as a system of neuronal inter-connections would function as a tool for responding to the situation as if directed by the mind that functions or operates through the brain. What we come to see from this is the fact that mind is indeed not reducible to brain and yet the brain does act as a cause in the given context of a situation to initiate or activate the mind so that it could respond to the world via the activities of the brain. It is not denied that the brain may maintain its own neuro-physiological interactions with its immediate environment, it has to interact with the larger environment of things in the world via the perceptive experience of the world and the intentional cognitive activities of conscious-ness or mind. The Background of understanding in the mind in this analysis suggests that the Background is a system of dispositions that incorporates the interrelated brain functions and mind functions into a unitary system posed toward the world of things. As there could be many such clusters of dispositions in such a system there could be many subsidiary Backgrounds for the many types of response of the mind to the world or for many types of the correct use of the language, which is invented by the mind in terms of accumulated experiences of the world. Understanding of a language or any form of mental activities results from such interaction of the mind-brain complex in its experience of the world. This analysis no doubt would illuminate and reinforce the metaphysical argument for the unity of mind and brain as suggested in connection with Zhu Xi’s philosophy of li and qi. How does this Background formation argument apply to the AI theory of simulation of the mind in the machine or computer? One result needs to be pointed out because it is quite relevant. Namely, if we can create a computer program that enables the computer to learn from experience with its sensors, one might imagine that such a computer would approach the the intelligence of a human mind just as a monkey or ape could be taught to slowly approach the intelligence of a human mind. But on the other hand, as human learning is a long process and it also involves a genetic structure of the brain having evolved from a long history, to approach the human mind would seem to require both a comparable structural design for an artificial brain and a proper development in a human historical environment in order to be said to be successful. Yet we cannot rule out this theoretical possibility. We may even venture to imagine that we could replace a human brain with computer chips bit by bit and part by part so that we may eventually come to a have a computer brain for a human person. It is

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 49

5/8/2008 7:25:02 PM

50

chung-ying cheng

then not clear whether this human person with computer brain would function normally as before. If he does function normally as before, there would be no reason why we may come to have a computer which now can be said to understand a language or to act intentionally. It is nevertheless a matter to be tested and observed and the result cannot be fully and exactly predicated. On the other hand, we may imagine that we could create a Pygmalion who comes to life because we have endowed her with stem cell parts like our own. Is she an instantiation of AI or is it a matter of mind learning because the stem cells form a brain of its own? 4. Concluding Remarks To conclude from above, the cognitive activities of the mind cannot be reduced to just the neuronal activities of the brain, even with a Background at work. It is important for Searle to be able to point this out. But it is equally important to see how the Background involves a history of learning and development so that the mind can be said to work in the brain and the brain can be said to function for the mind as both the brain and the mind belong to a complex system of systems of formed dispositions called the Background. It is in light of the learning experience and in light of the complexity of the brain as part of human organism that mind develops in the brain not only to achieve cognitive activities, but also to develop abilities or capacities for aesthetic, social, political, moral, social and religious understanding and activities. The mind comes to have a creative capacity that would enable it to construct social institutions and formulate moral and political principles for organizing and ordering a whole society of people. One might suggest that all these potential consequences could follow from Searle’s significant notion of Background as he has shown in his other work, The Social Construction of Reality.18

18

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 50

Published in New York: Free Press, 1995.

5/8/2008 7:25:02 PM

APPENDIX: ZHU XI’S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: UNITY OF SUBSTANCE AND FUNCTION In the following I shall give a brief statement on main themes of Zhu Xi’s philosophy of mind from his main works such as Si-Shu-Ji-Zhu and Zhu-Zi-Yu-Lei. My purpose is to present a background understanding of Zhu Xi so that we can see how he is relevant for illuminating the problem of mind and consciousness raised by John Searle in a contemporary analytical philosophical context. The philosophical language of Zhu Xi is metaphysical or onto-cosmological, but it forms a useful contrast with Searle and provides a basis for making a critique of Searle because Searle’s position could be better approached, interpreted and resolved from a metaphysical stance. 1. Unity of Substance and Function: Mind is to be seen onto-cosmologically as a matter of qi (vital force) to go with li (ordering force intrinsic to qi ) that is inherent nature of things and humanity. But qi has many functions and powers, the power of xu-ling-ming-jiao (vacuid- illuminating- perceptiveness) is considered inherited or latent in the human mind. In Xun Zi (298–238 BCE) we see how qi could give rise to life (sheng), how life could give rise to knowledge (zhi ), and how knowledge could give rise norms and values ( yi ). (See Xun Zi, Chapter Wang-Zhi ). In each stage the qi becomes progressively refined and qualitatively transformed. Similarly, the Neo-Confucian Zhang Zai (1020 –1077) has proposed that “From the Great Vacuid (tai-xu) we come to name the heaven (tian), from the transforming activities of the qi we name the Way (the dao). Unifying the xu (vacuid) and qi we come to name xing (nature). Unifying xing and zhi-jiao (perception) we come to name xin (mind).” (See Zhang Zai, Zheng-Meng, Chapter Tai-He). This again suggests how different orders of being emerge from one to the other to form a relation of substance and function. Zhu Xi is able to integrate the classical view of Xun Zi and the Neo-Confucian theory of Zhang Zai into his theory of unity of nature and mind as unity of sustaining substances and developing functions. 2. Although distinctions can be made between being and knowing, continuity between being and knowing is assumed. Although the relation is described as a matter of giving birth (sheng), it has a subtle structure of “emergence” and “supervening” expressed in words like

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 51

5/8/2008 7:25:02 PM

52

chung-ying cheng

“tong” (penetrate or integrate) or “zhu” (rule or lead). This is Zhu Xi’s doctrine of “xing tong xing qing” (mind unifies nature and feelings or mind unifies li and qi ). 3. Nature or xing can be seen as a set of organic capabilities evolved from reality of nature and contains both desires and feelings, not only principles of cognition. Hence it is both qi and li. This is the thesis of “li qi buli buza” (li and qi are neither separate nor merged). 4. Mind acquires the power to organize and integrate. But mind can also reflectively see how nature and feelings take place. The ultimate state of mind as a state of full enlightenment is that it is both intentional and non-intentional because it becomes related to things in direct contact via qi and it is itself a part of reality which is not seeking any other reality. Intentionality means that the mind as qi is reaching for li in reality. 5. Mind emerges from qi in the form of sustainable awareness or consciousness. It exits against a background unity of subject and object and having the properties of both constancy and change, both immanence and transcendence. 6. Mind can be cultivated and developed to reach the state of hitting the target correctly. In the Zhong Yong the state of wei-fa (un-activated) is a state of equilibrium where emotions remain in a state of unity and balance: neither this nor that. The mind relates to things in terms of knowing and perceiving and general feeling. But the mind could respond to things and persons with emotions when circumstances call for such responses. Emotions as responses have also a tendency to achieve a new state of balance and equilibrium from harmonizing with elements from outside world that upset the internal state of balance of mind. This means that mind and the world are ever in a harmonizing state: it is when this state of harmonizing becomes perturbed or disturbed that we need to respond and act to restore such a state of balance and harmony. Emotions are signals and responses in the first place, but emotion takes place under self-understanding and understanding of the world. Hence to maintain a clear understanding of the state of the world is an essential condition for maintaining the balanced state of the mind. Yet mind can also mislead itself: hence to do self-reflection is also crucially important. In the Confucian Analects, Zeng Zi speaks of making reflection on oneself three times a day. This indicates how it is important that we should maintain relationships with the world and how it is important that we must also sustain ourselves in order to be able to maintain

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 52

5/8/2008 7:25:02 PM

analysis of searle’s philosophy of mind

53

our relationships with the world. This means that we have to cultivate ourselves. For Mencius the project of cultivating oneself has three parts: it begins with fulfilling our mind ( jin-xin), which means knowing our feelings and developing them properly for balance, then we must know our nature (zhi-xing), which is our potential for growth and future development. Finally, we must come to know heaven (zhi-tian), which is to know the limit of our capabilities and control our feelings regarding matters of life and death or matters of destiny. His idea of “rectifying destiny” (zheng-ming) is especially significant because it deals with an attitude of confronting the world as a whole and confronting the inherent limitations of the human life. In the Da-Xue and the Zhong-Yong the project of self-cultivation covers also a diachronic or horizontal dimension: how to expand one’s relationship with others so that family, community, state and the world of humanity can become parts of a growing circle of the human concern and human relating and flourishing. Apart from the world of humanity the whole of universe in heaven and earth also becomes integrated so that one’s presence and feeling of relevance leave no thing untouched and unenclosed. This is then called a unity of heaven and man in a horizontal sense of width that is different from unity of heaven and man in a vertical sense of depth. The intrinsic and reciprocal interdependence of inner sageliness (nei-sheng) and outer kingliness (wai-wang) can be regarded as the ideal state of perfect achievement of self-cultivation. 7. How is mind casually efficacious? It affects action: there is no consciousness which has no pragmatic significance as it must be integrated or incorporated into the full circle of consciousness and understanding of the self-cultivation. 8. Given the thesis of “Nature being principle (xing-ji-li )”, the relation between brain and mind is one of creative emergence in the context of a life-and—energy ontology that allows such creative emergence. But in Searle there is no hint of such a possible ontological background. 9. Here we see how a life-ontological realism as developed in NeoConfucianism, while differing from biological naturalism, could function as a metaphysical basis for Searle’s biological realism. But the question hinges on the content of the consciousness and intentionality that Searle speaks about. Searle may well be posed to take account of or take notice of the various ontological and moral implications of his view on consciousness and intentionality.

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 53

5/8/2008 7:25:02 PM

54

chung-ying cheng

10. The significance of Zhu Xi’s philosophy of mind is that it provides a picture of relationship between mind and body in a language that makes macroscopic sense on the level of onto-cosmology and makes microscopic sense on the level of moral psychology and onto-ethics. It has obviously assumed the continuity of the ontological being between the body/ brain and mind and show how they can be largely related and correlated. It provides an experientially meaningful language, namely the language of qi and li, in which the relationship between the two could be understood and monitored by general experience of the human person. What is most important is the recognition of the existence of xing, which participates in both li and qi, and which then provides a realistic foundation for the linking of the brain and the mental. The onto-cosmological paradigm of ti (substance) and yong (function) also applies here smoothly. It shows that body and mind must not be taken to be substances independently of each other, but must be related in such a way that they represent two aspects of the same reality which has a creative energy to be realized on two levels for the development of the underlying unity which is the human being as a whole entity. This process philosophy language makes it possible to see how body and mind could be theoretically transformable into each other and to also see how their functions complement each other as a result of ontogenetic development of an organism. Whitehead in speaking of the physical polarity and mental polarity of a process, also exhibits this underlying unity as basis for unifying the two and seeing the two as two aspects of the same underlying creative process of interaction and development. 11. We may therefore claim that the paradoxicality in Searle’s apparent dualism of mind and brain and in his notion of non-intentional dispositional background for intentional consciousness points to a metaphysical solution, for in science there cannot be a way out because one must reach for objectivity and reduction and elimination of intentionality in science, which leads to behaviorism. If Searle wants to avoid such a result, he would also develop a vision of onto-hermeneutical understanding so that intentionality of mind would have to take on an ontological significance, even in a phenomenological use of language. We may ask what other senses Searle could have given to the notion of consciousness? Unlike Kant, the content of consciousness is important for understanding the whole human person: the aesthetic and the moral, the functional and the teleological all point to such a understanding of the human person as a whole being in which there is a basic unity of nature and mind.

BO MOU_F4-31-62.indd 54

5/8/2008 7:25:03 PM

analysis of searle’s philosophy of mind

55

12. Methodologically, we must maintain that there are three systems of language of description in use: the objective and the scientific language centered the brain, the phenomenological or intentional language centered on mind, and finally the onto-cosmological language centered on our experienced relationships between body (and brain) and mind. Mind may not have rigid and individual reference, but is capable of realizing its own reality in a holistic context of a process of experience. The mental could be even regarded origin for the normative and regulative for practical human action. This third form of language is the language of li and qi which constitutes a basis for the language of both the body and the mind as well as a basis for the language of moral selfcultivation for mind or for the language of health and medical care for body. Thus we have the following relationships of the three languages for describing the relationship of the brain and the mind:

The world < the human body < the human brain < the human nature < the human emotions < the human mind: “