Russian Fisheries Management: The Precautionary Approach in Theory and Practice (Publications on Ocean Development, V. 43)

RUSSIAN FISHERIES MANAGEMENT: THE PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH IN THEORY AND PRACTICE

Publications on Ocean Development Volume 43 A Series of Studies on the International, Legal, Institutional and Policy Aspects of Ocean Development General Editor: Vaughan Lowe Chichele Professor of Public International Law and Fellow of All Souls College, Oxford University

The titles published in this series are listed at the end of this volume.

Russian Fisheries Management The Precautionary Approach in Theory and Practice

GEIR HØNNELAND The Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Norway

MARTINUS NIJHOFF PUBLISHERS LEIDEN / BOSTON

A C.I.P. Catalogue record for this book is available from the Library of Congress.

ISBN 90-04-13618-5

Published by Brill Academic Publishers P.O. Box 9000, 2300 PA Leiden, The Netherlands E-mail: Website:

Printed on acid-free paper.

ISBN 90-04-13618-5 © 2004 Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands Brill Academic Publishers incorporates the imprint Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

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CONTENTS

Preface ................................................................................................ List of Abbreviations and Acronyms ................................................ English Abbreviations .................................................................... Russian Abbreviations and Acronyms ............................................

ix xv xv xv

I BACKGROUND Chapter 1. Introduction ...................................................................... The Fisheries Under Investigation .................................. The Emergence of the Precautionary Approach to Fisheries .......................................................................... The Questions to be Asked .............................................. Methodological Considerations ...................................... Outline of the Book ........................................................ Chapter 2. Legal and Political Context ............................................ Federalism and Regional Self-Government: The Soviet Legacy .......................................................... From RSFSR to the Russian Federation ........................ Evolving Centre-Region Relations .................................. Legal aspects ................................................................ Political aspects .......................................................... Economic aspects ........................................................ Political Organisation of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts ........................................................ Conclusions ......................................................................

3 5 8 14 16 18 27 27 29 30 31 33 34 35 38

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Contents II STRUCTURE AND PRINCIPLES

Chapter 3. Fisheries Management at the Federal Level .................. The International Level .................................................... The National Level .......................................................... Legislation .................................................................... Objectives and principles ............................................ The institutional set-up ................................................ Conclusions ......................................................................

49 50 53 53 55 58 61

Chapter 4. Fisheries Management at the Regional Level ................ The Northwest Russian Fishing Industry ........................ The Role of Regional Authorities .................................. The Role of Federal Agencies in the Region ................ The Role of Others .......................................................... Target Groups .............................................................. NGOs and Research Institutes .................................... Conclusions ......................................................................

78 79 83 86 90 90 94 95

III PROCESS AND PRACTICES Chapter 5. Scientific Advice and Quota Allocation .......................... Practices at the International Level ................................ Scientific recommendations and establishment of TACs ........................................................................ Perceptions of scientific knowledge ............................ Concern about national interest .................................. Concern about the institutional set-up ........................ Practices at the National Level ........................................ Quota distribution at the inter-regional level ............ Quota distribution at the regional level ...................... Have fresh principles led to fresh practices? ............ Conclusions ......................................................................

109 110 110 111 117 120 121 123 124 127 129

Chapter 6. Technical Regulation and Enforcement .......................... 138 Implementation Performance and Target Compliance .... 139 The Establishment of a Joint Enforcement Arrangement with Norway .............................................. 142

Contents The Proposals of the Expert Group ................................ Initial Co-Operative Measures ........................................ Main Areas of Co-Operation Since 1994 ........................ The Effectiveness of the Collaboration .......................... Conclusions ......................................................................

vii 143 146 147 151 153

IV CONCLUSION Chapter 7. Prospects for a Precautionary Fisheries Management? .................................................................. Conclusions ...................................................................... The precautionary approach and other principles .... Scientific advice and quota allocation ........................ Technical regulation and enforcement ........................ Explanations .................................................................... New incentives ............................................................ Institutional conflict .................................................... Prospects .......................................................................... System shortcomings .................................................... Institutional ‘assets’ ....................................................

167 167 167 168 170 171 171 174 176 176 177

Index .................................................................................................... 189

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PREFACE

This book marks the end of one and a half decade’s engagement with Russian fisheries both practically and in research terms. From 1988 to 1993, I worked as a Russian-language interpreter and fishery inspector for the Norwegian Coast Guard in the Barents Sea. After graduating in political science (MA) from the University of Tromsø in 1993, I was approached by the Norwegian College of Fisheries Science and, subsequently, NORUT Social Science Research Ltd in Tromsø, to do research on the Russian fishing industry and the country’s system for fisheries management. I became affiliated with the Fridtjof Nansen Institute at Lysaker outside Oslo in 1996 and finished my PhD on compliance in the Barents Sea fisheries at the University of Oslo in 2000. Beside my doctoral work, I conducted a number of smaller applied research projects on Russian fisheries management. Up till 2000, I continued to take occasional assignments as an interpreter and translator for Norwegian fishery authorities, notably for the Joint RussianNorwegian Fisheries Commission and the Permanent Russian-Norwegian Committee for Management and Enforcement Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector. Although I draw on all the knowledge I have acquired over the years about Russian fisheries management in the discussion, one particular grant has made the present book possible: grant No. 142891/110 (‘Responsible Management of Northwest Russian Fisheries – the Precautionary Approach in Principle and Practice’) for 2001-02 from the programme Market and Society under the Research Council of Norway’s Division for Bioproduction and Processing. The programme also generously awarded me an overseas fellowship to support my stay at the Department of Human Ecology at Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey, from August 2002 to June 2003, during which period the present manuscript was finalised.

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From my early days with the Norwegian Coast Guard up to this present visit to Rutgers, I have incurred debts to many different people for insight into Russian fisheries management and for help in practical matters related to my studies. As I explain more fully in the section on methodology in Chapter 1, I have decided not to reveal the identity of my Russian interviewees. I would, however, like to mention by name a few experts on Russian fisheries management with whom contact has been particularly fruitful over the years: Vyacheslav Zilanov, former Soviet Deputy Minister of Fishing Industry, Aleksandr Zelentsov, former head of Murmanrybvod and since 1999 representative of the State Committee for Fisheries of the Russian Federation in Norway, Ernst Lukmanov, scientist at the research institute PINRO in Murmansk, and Lyudmila Ivanova and Anatoliy Vasiliyev, researchers at the Institute of Economic Problems at Kola Science Centre, the Russian Academy of Science. Among my Norwegian colleagues and collaboration partners, I would in particular like to extend my thanks to two dear friends and fellow students of Russian fisheries: my former colleague Anne-Kristin Jørgensen, since 2002 Counsellor on Fisheries at the Norwegian Embassy in Moscow, and Frode Nilssen of the Norwegian Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture Research. I deeply cherish the memory of our numerous trips to Russia together and look forward to developing our collaboration still further in the future. Director of the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, Arild Moe, has created a stimulating working environment at the institute and been a rewarding scholar with whom to discuss Russian politics over the years, as has another friend, Helge Blakkisrud, head of the Centre for Russian Studies at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. My colleagues Olav Schram Stokke and Davor Vidas assisted in the final stages of the preparation of the manuscript in addition to being stimulating discussion partners on issues of international fisheries law and politics. Bonnie McCay, head of the Department of Human Ecology at Rutgers University, generously accepted me as visiting scholar and lecturer on international environmental politics for the academic year 2002-03. Camille Bevere and Geraldine Brustowicz provided invaluable secretarial assistance during my stay, as did Rigmor Hiorth and Maryanne Rygg back home at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute. Kari Lorentzen, librarian at the Fridtjof Nansen Institute, has, as always, been a model of efficiency, providing support from the floor above (to August 2002) and from the other side of the Atlantic (thereafter). Chris Saunders has once again done a splendid job in correcting my English and ensuring the right stylistic balance for a book of this nature. Last but not least, I am grateful to Martinus Nijhoff Publishers’ anonymous reviewer who indicated a number of inconsistencies in the first

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draft of the manuscript, which I have tried to correct to the best of my abilities. All, to varying extents, have left their imprint on the book as it now emerges in its final form. In discussing as sensitive an issue as Russian fisheries management, surrounded as it is by rumours of corruption and inefficiency, it is even more important than usual to underscore that all judgements, findings and conclusions are mine alone and should not be imputed to any of the above. Parts of the book build on material previously published in articles or other books by the author. The last half of Chapter 5 is a revised and shortened version of Geir Hønneland and Frode Nilssen (2001), ‘Quota Allocation in Russia’s Northern Fishery Basin: Principles and Practice’, Ocean & Coastal Management 44: 471-488 (Elsevier Science). The second part of Chapter 6 builds on Geir Hønneland (2000), ‘Enforcement Co-operation between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea Fisheries’, Ocean Development & International Law 31: 249-267 (Taylor & Francis). Likewise, part of the background material on Russian law and politics in Chapter 2 is an updated version of material previously used in my and Anne-Kristin Jørgensen’s books Integration vs. Autonomy: Civil-Military Relations on the Kola Peninsula (Ashgate, 1999) and Implementing International Environmental Agreements in Russia (Manchester University Press, 2003). The first part of Chapter 5 is also found in my book Russia and the West: Environmental Co-operation and Conflict (Routledge, 2003). Thanks are due to the publishers for permission to re-use the material in this book. A note about reference style: All references are given in endnotes. Full references (including translations, if any, to English from Russian and Norwegian) are supplied the first time a text is mentioned in a chapter. Thereafter, works are referred to by author, title and year of publication. In order to facilitate the reading of individual chapters separately, complete references are repeated if and when necessary. The same applies to abbreviations. Page numbers are only indicated for direct citations and hard facts, such as figures. When transcribing Russian into Latin characters, I have tried to pay attention both to general practice and consistency. Although I would give priority to consistency, I occasionally allow of greater variation in order to avoid departing overmuch from what might be considered general practice. Russian e is written as ye at the beginning of words and after vowels, but y is skipped in proper names that already have a common spelling in English, e.g. Karelia. The hard and soft signs used in Russian are not transcribed. The names of Russian organisations are generally rendered in English translation rather than by their Russian acronyms, which would probably have

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little meaning for readers without Russian. Exceptions are made in the case of organisations whose full names are seldom used in Russian. For instance, I write the State Committee for Fisheries (instead of the more colloquial Goskomrybolovstvo), but maintain acronyms such as Sevryba and Murmanrybvod. All translations from the Russian and Norwegian are mine. The book contains extracts of interviews and media reports. While I have attempted to render these more or less in correct English, I wanted at the same time to retain some of their original idiomatic flavour and colloquial spirit. *

*

*

Writing a book about the principles and practices of Russian fisheries management is a challenging task. First, the ‘principles’ of this management system are not clearly traceable in any official form; even insiders disagree on which rules and regulations are at any given time in effect. And while Russia has of yet no federal law on fisheries, a large number of documents at lower levels of the legal hierarchy than formal law are constantly being issued by various bodies of governance – though their actual political impact may be questioned, to say the least. Second, the ‘practices’ of Russian fisheries management are even less traceable in the sense that it is extremely difficult to obtain an exhaustive picture of what actually takes place, or explanations for this or that development or decision. As mentioned above, allegations of corruption within the Russian fisheries management system have surfaced in recent years that have damaged its legitimacy, at least judging by the reaction of outsiders. Both in Russia and the West, the view of Russian fishery authorities as ‘corrupt’ is pervasive. In the Russian context, as I set out in the book, these allegations are partly seen as bargaining strategies devised by different government agencies wanting a (bigger) say in the management of fisheries. In concurring with the view that Russian government bodies in charge of fisheries management are ‘by definition corrupt’ (discussing the allegations with a veteran Russian fisheries manager, the official sighed and said: ‘there’s nothing we can do about it; we have democracy now and everyone can say what they want!’), they can draw on the disaffection of the populace with their authorities while increasing their chances of influencing the potentially lucrative allocation of fish quotas, for instance. As seen from the West, it is easy to adopt the same approach in dealing with an over-complex management system: ‘the system is most probably “corrupt” so let’s assume that it is until the opposite is proved!’ Some readers familiar with Russian politics, or even fisheries management, might find my account surprisingly ‘benign’; corruption is

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not a main issue in this presentation though I do set out some reflections on the subject in the concluding chapter. As mentioned, the book is to some extent a report ‘from within’ the Russian fisheries complex; I have for many years worked closely with Russian fisheries officials. While I have encountered my share of roguish Russian fish folks – shipowners and civil servants more interested in making a quick buck than ensuring the long-term sustainability of the fish stocks – the majority of the officials I have met over the years I know as people of high professional standards and moral integrity. From a methodological point of view, the reader should bear this in mind: on the one hand, I have had a broader access to Russian fisheries management than most Western observers who, I might add, tend uncritically to dismiss as ‘corrupt’ the whole arrangement and hence hardly worthy of further study. On the other hand, it may, admittedly, be more difficult for me to accuse people I have come to know at a personal level of ‘corruption’. More than anything, I wish to add substance to the debate. While I deny that the Russian system for fisheries management is little more than an organisation run by gangsters, it does not mean that people otherwise known as highly moral individuals might not occasionally – or even regularly – try to get what they perceive as a rightful piece of the fisheries revenue cake. This is territory I explore in the concluding chapter of the book. While it is impossible, naturally, to paint a complete accurate picture of the ‘corruptness’ of Russian fisheries management bodies, I suggest that the story is not only methodologically but also substantially not that straightforward. A person is not necessarily either simply corrupt or honest; much less so a government body. This is a book about Russian fisheries management. As the reader will discover, however, it does not address every imaginable fisheries issue in the Russian Federation; that would have been an insurmountable task. But I do try to cover major developments at the federal level and then use the northern basin, whose main fishing ground is the Northeast Atlantic, as an example of developments at the regional level. Further, the management of one particular fish stock, the Northeast Arctic cod, is most often used to illustrate these events. The far eastern fishery basin is the most important in the country in terms of catch levels, and also the most notorious in terms of illegal fishing and alleged corruption. The northern basin is, however, the most important in European Russia and its stock of cod, in turn, by far the most important for the basin’s fishers. Things change quickly (and sometimes dramatically) in the Russian system for fisheries management. At the time of writing, rumours are surfacing of an imminent reorganisation of the entire Russian federal structure

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of governance which may augur the third demise of the State Committee for Fisheries as a separate body (it was under the Ministry of Agriculture and Foodstuffs in 1991-92 and 1997-98). Furthermore, Yevgeniy Nazdratenko, its head since 2001 and frequently referred to in this book, was suspended in February 2003 and ousted two months later. Although I have tried to keep the book as up-to-date as possible, more than anything is should be read as a historical account of Russian fisheries management in the first decade after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Geir Hønneland New Brunswick, NJ May 2003

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

English abbreviations ACFM CIS CPSU EEZ FAO ICES MSY NAFO NEAFC NGO RSFSR TAC UNCED

Advisory Committee for Fisheries Management (ICES) Commonwealth of Independent States Communist Party of the Soviet Union Exclusive Economic Zone Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations International Council for the Exploration of the Sea Maximum sustainable yield Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission Non-governmental organisation Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic Total allowable catch United Nations Conference on Environment and Development

Russian abbreviations and acronyms AMPO Arkhangelskrybprom FSB Glavrybvod

Arkhangelsk Fish Kolkhozes Arkhangelsk Fisheries Enterprise (shipowner) Federal Security Service Department of Protection and Reproduction of Fish Stocks and Regulation of Fisheries (State Committee for Fisheries)

xvi

List of Abbreviations and Acronyms

Karelrybflot Karelrybkolkhozsoyuz Karelrybvod Kolkhoz Murmanrybprom Murmanrybvod Murmankolkhozsoyuz PINRO Roskolkhozsoyuz SevPINRO Sevryba Sevrybkholodflot Sevrybpromrazvedka Sevrybvod VNIERKh VNIRO

Karelian Fisheries Fleet Karelian Union of Fish Kolkhozes Karelian Fisheries Inspection Service Collective farm (here: collective fishing fleet) Murmansk Fisheries Enterprise (shipowner) Murmansk Fisheries Inspection Service Murmansk Union of Fish Kolkhozes Knipovich Scientific Polar Institute for Marine Fisheries Research and Oceanography Russian Union of Fish Kolkhozes Northern Institute for Marine Fisheries Research and Oceanography (Arkhangelsk) Association of Enterprises in the Russian Northern Fishery Basin Northern Fish Freezing Fleet (Murmansk) Northern Fish Exploration Fleet (Murmansk) Northern Fisheries Inspection Service (Arkhangelsk) All-Russian Institute of Economic Fisheries Research All-Russian Scientific Institute for Fisheries Research and Oceanography

Only abbreviations and acronyms mentioned more than once in the text are included in the list. The English versions of Russian abbreviations and acronyms are intended as explanations, not as direct translations of the Russian designation. See preface for a note on translation/acronymisation of the names of Russian organisations.

I BACKGROUND

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CHAPTER ONE Introduction

This book is the first comprehensive introduction to Russian fisheries management in the Western literature. Whereas there is an abundant body of literature on systems of fisheries management in the West,1 and also a growing focus on such systems in developing countries,2 surprisingly little has been written about how post-Communist states organise the management of their marine living resources.3 The present book – which focuses on the largest of the post-Communist countries, the Russian Federation – is hence an attempt to fill this gap. The book sets out the basic principles and organisational structure underlying Russian fisheries management and describes associated processes and practices. The Russian Federation consists of eighty-nine federal subjects. The governing structure of the state is situated at two main levels: the level of the federation and the level of federal subjects, normally referred to as the regional level. There is also a certain degree of co-ordination between the two levels, for instance in the eight inter-regional economic associations set up between 1992 and 19944 and the seven federal districts – each covering a number of federal subjects – introduced by President Putin in 2000 to enhance the implementation of federal decisions in the regions.5 In the area of fisheries management, governance takes place at the federal level and at the inter-regional level in the country’s five fishery basins: the far eastern, the northern, western, the Caspian Sea and the Azov and the Black Seas.6 In principle, the fishery basins are not related to specific ocean areas, but cover a group of federal subjects of the Russian Federation. Hence, each basin embraces those fishing vessels whose home port is in one of the federal subjects that constitute it.7 The book focuses attention on fisheries management at the federal level and in Russia’s northern fishery basin, encompassing the fishing activities of all vessels belonging to the federal subjects of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk

4

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Figure 1.1. The Barents Sea and the northern fishery basin of the Russian Federation

Oblasts, the Republic of Karelia and Nenets Autonomous Okrug; see Figure 1.1.8 The northern basin is the second most important of the country’s five fishery basins, only inferior in terms of number of vessels and catch level to the large far eastern basin, which covers fishing activities in the Pacific Ocean. The primary fishery of Russia’s northern basin takes place in the Barents Sea, where a bilateral Russian-Norwegian management regime has been in place since the mid-1970s.9 The book focuses on the principles and practice of Russian fisheries management at the federal level, at the regional level in the northern basin and on the interface with Norwegian fishery authorities at both federal and regional levels.10 There is also a theoretically oriented ambition to the book in its desire to evaluate the achievements of Russian fisheries management in relation to the standards of modern international fisheries law. During the 1990s, the precautionary principle became the leading device in international law on the management of the environment and natural resources.11 Originating in more general international environmental law towards the end of the 1980s – in particular related to industrial pollution – the principle was incorporated into international law on fisheries in a less stringent form as what came to be known as the precautionary approach in the mid-1990s.12 The precautionary approach was incorporated into the most important global legal fisheries instruments of the decade, the UN Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (in the following referred to as the UN Fish Stocks Agreement),13 the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible

Introduction

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Fisheries (hereafter FAO Code of Conduct),14 and a number of regional fishery agreements.15 In short, the precautionary principle demands that states take regulatory action even in the absence of incontrovertible scientific evidence of environmental degradation. Related to fisheries management, the precautionary approach implies that coastal states do not wait to introduce protective measures until it is scientifically proved that a failure to do so will cause serious harm to the fish stocks. The introduction of the precautionary approach hence reversed the earlier burden of proof: whereas regulators once could continue a given management practice until it was ‘proved’ that it failed to maintain stocks at an acceptable level, the precautionary approach states that a more protective orientation be introduced if regulators cannot prove that the existing system works satisfactorily. After an initial focus in the literature on the nature of the precautionary principle (in fisheries: the precautionary approach) and its status in international law, attention has turned since the mid-1990s to its implementation.16 This book aims at contributing to this growing literature, asking to what extent Russian fisheries management practice since the early 1990s qualifies as precautionary. In the following, I describe the fisheries under investigation, i.e. the resource base of the Barents Sea and the Russian-Norwegian regime set up to manage the fish stocks of the area. Thereafter, a more detailed outline is provided of the emergence of the precautionary principle/approach in international law in general, and in international law on fisheries in particular. Research issues are elaborated and a note on methodology given towards the end of the chapter.

THE FISHERIES UNDER INVESTIGATION The Barents Sea comprises those parts of the Arctic Ocean that lie between the North Cape on the Norwegian mainland, the South Cape of Spitzbergen Island in the Svalbard archipelago, and the Russian archipelagos Novaya Zemlya and Franz Josef Land; see Figure 1.1. Traditionally, the fish and marine mammals of the Barents Sea have provided the basis for settlement along its shores, particularly in Northern Norway and in the Arkhangelsk region of Russia. Since the 1917 Russian Revolution, the city of Murmansk on the Kola Peninsula has functioned as the nerve centre of the Russian northern fishery basin.17 The Barents Sea contains a large abundance of fish stocks of a variety of species.18 The reason for this abundance is the rich plankton production in these waters, providing food for large stocks of pelagic fish, i.e. fish

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living in the space between the seabed and the surface. The pelagic fish stocks, first and foremost capelin and herring, are in turn the prey of groundfish, such as cod, haddock and saithe. Both pelagic fish and groundfish serve as food for sea birds, marine mammals and people. Cod, capelin and herring are key species in the ecosystem. Cod feed on capelin, herring and smaller cod, while herring feed on capelin larvae. Periods of growth in the cod and herring stocks along with a reduced capelin stock tend to alternate with periods of low cod growth, no herring, but abundant capelin. The Barents Sea capelin (Mallotus villosus) stock used to be among the largest and most important stocks in the Northeast Atlantic. One major trait of this stock is that large year on year variations in individual growth lead to substantial fluctuations in stock size, with considerable implications for the whole ecosystem. Over the last decades, the total biomass has fluctuated from close to 9 mill. tonnes (1975) to 0.2 mill. tonnes (1986). The size of the capelin stock remained relatively stable during the 1970s, but fell dramatically in the 1980s. Overfishing reinforced a natural downward trend, bringing the stock close to total collapse. Commercial fishing for capelin was halted in 1986, and the stock started to recover. Fishing was resumed again in 1991. A new collapse occurred in 1993. It has recovered once again – at least partly. Fishing was resumed in 1999 for the first time since 1993. The quota that has been established is quite moderate. The stock of Atlanto-Scandinavian herring (Clupea harengus) was the largest fish stock in European waters until its collapse in the late 1960s. The normal migration pattern from the North Sea to the spawning grounds off the Norwegian coast was interrupted in 1970. The stock had then become so reduced that the remaining fish found sufficient food off the Norwegian coast. The old migration pattern resumed only in the mid-1990s. The stock has increased considerably in recent years, and herring catches in the North Sea are approaching those of the 1950s. However, the stock is now thought to be in decline again. The cohorts from 1993 onward seem to be weak. Some herring fry drift with the Gulf Stream into the Barents Sea each year, although their numbers are highly variable. Each age group spends three years here, feeding on capelin while they drift northward. While contributing to the total herring stock, the young herring of the Barents Sea may be considered a threat to the capelin. However, the herring also relieves the pressure on capelin, since it is itself preyed upon by cod. Although herring is not commercially exploited in the Barents Sea, its presence does affect the fishing in the area. The Northeast Arctic cod (Gadus morhua) spawns along the coastline of Norway from the age of seven. After spawning, they return to the Barents

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Sea. Fry of this species also drift into the northern parts of the Barents Sea. From the age of four, cod prey upon capelin as the latter species moves southwards to its breeding grounds. The cod stock reached a total of some four million tonnes at the end of the 1960s, then decreased steadily throughout the 1970s, bottoming out at less than one million tonnes in 1984. Strong age groups were recruited during the years 1983-85, but these cohorts fell back in 1986-88 due to lack of food and extensive fishing. It was not until the beginning of the 1990s that the level of the late 1970s was regained. This increase was mainly realised through the imposition of quotas, which significantly limited the fishing of cod. The cod stock has shown a decline since 1993. Furthermore, scientists cut their stock estimates in 1998 with the discovery that their estimation method had given inflated figures. The cod quota has been cut significantly in recent years. The Northeast Arctic haddock (Melanogrammus aeglefinus) stock in the Barents Sea tends to follow the same pattern as the cod. Having reached an all-time low in 1983-84, an increase was brought about by strong age groups from the years 1982-83. Another decline took place in the late 1980s. From 1990, recruitment improved markedly until 1995. In recent years, a modest overall decrease has been observed, but the spawning stock has increased. Fluctuations in the size of age groups are more significant for haddock than for cod, and the total stock is also considerably smaller. Thus, it is generally considered to be difficult to sustain a stable haddock fishery over time. Other important groundfish stocks in the Barents Sea include saithe (Pollachius virens), redfish (Sebastes mentella and Sebastes marinus) and Greenland halibut (Reinhardtius hippoglossoides). The United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, which opened in 1975 and in 1982 resulted in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,19 led to a transition from multilateral negotiations for the Barents Sea fisheries under the auspices of the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC)20 to bilateral negotiations between coastal states with sovereign rights to fish stocks. Norway and the Soviet Union entered into several bilateral fishery agreements in the mid-1970s.21 The Russian-Norwegian management regime for the Barents Sea fish stocks defines objectives and practices for bilateral management – in addition to national-level management procedures – within the fields of research, regulations and compliance control.22 The collaboration of Russian/Soviet and Norwegian scientists in the mapping of the Barents Sea fish resources dates back to the 1950s. It is now institutionalised within the framework of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES). The main participants are the Knipovich Scientific Polar Institute for Marine Fisheries Research and Oceanography (PINRO) in

8

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Murmansk, the Norwegian Institute of Marine Research in Bergen and the Norwegian Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture Research in Tromsø. The Joint Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission includes members of the two countries’ fishery authorities, other governmental agencies, marine scientists and representatives of fishers’ organisations.23 The Norwegian delegation to the commission is headed by a leading official at the Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries.24 The Russian delegation is normally headed by the first Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Fisheries of the Russian Federation.25 The Commission meets at least once a year, establishing total allowable catches (TACs) for the joint fish stocks of the Barents Sea: cod, haddock and capelin.26 Cod and haddock are shared on a 50-50 basis, while the capelin quota is shared 60-40 in Norway’s favour.27 In addition, quotas of the parties’ exclusive stocks are exchanged.28 Russia has traditionally given a share of its cod quota to Norway in return for a share in Norway’s quotas of redfish, herring and Greenland halibut.29 However, after the introduction of reforms in the Soviet Union in the late 1980s, the Russians have kept a larger portion of their cod quota.30 After the sessions of the joint commission, the two parties conduct further quota exchanges in bilateral negotiations with third countries.31 Traditionally, the Soviet Union/Russian Federation gives part of its Barents Sea cod quota to the Faeroes, while Norway transfers a share of its quota to the EU in exchange for shares in the North Sea.32 An enforcement co-operation between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea has been in place since 1993.33 During the 1990s, the joint Russian-Norwegian fisheries management set-up was generally assessed to be fairly successful.34 Most stocks had grown steadily since the end of the 1980s. The capelin stock, with its rapid fluctuations, represented a departure from this tendency. While the stock had quickly recovered from almost total collapse in 1985-86, a new setback loomed in 1992-93. Furthermore, the Greenland halibut stock had been declining menacingly since the early 1990s, and is still only taken as by-catch (except for a limited direct fishery with passive gear).35 The TAC of Northeast Arctic cod amounted to 700-850,000 tonnes in the mid-1990s.36 When the stock started to decline again, the quota was reduced from 850,000 tonnes in 1997 to 480,000 tonnes in 1999.37

THE EMERGENCE OF THE PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH TO FISHERIES While the precautionary principle was established in international law in the early 1990s, its emergence in environmental law dates back to at least

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the 1970s. Several authors point to the German Vorsorgeprinzip as its origin.38 The concept was used by the German Federal Government in a report for the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution in 1976: Environmental policy is not fully accomplished by warding off imminent hazards and the elimination of damage which has occurred. Precautionary environmental policy requires furthermore that natural resources are protected and demands on them made with care.39

The precautionary principle found its way into international law on the back of German proposals to the International North Sea Ministerial Conferences.40 Its first explicit formulation is contained in the 1987 Declaration of the Second International North Sea Conference on the Protection of the North Sea (the London Declaration), where the participants declared that in order to protect the North Sea from possibly damaging effects of the most dangerous substances, a precautionary approach is necessary which may require action to control inputs of such substances even before a causal link has been established by absolute clear scientific evidence.41

The principle was repeated and adopted as a premise for future work in the 1990 Declaration of the Third International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea (the Hague Declaration).42 Its geographical scope was extended to the Northeast Atlantic through the work of the Oslo and Paris Commissions, which also adopted instruments for its implementation.43 The works of these commissions resulted in 1992 in the incorporation of the precautionary principle in the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the Northeast Atlantic (OSPAR).44 Further, the precautionary principle was adopted in a number of international environmental agreements45 before it became a pillar of international environmental policy by its introduction in the Rio Declaration at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in 1992. Principle 15 of the Declaration states that In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.46

Freestone and Hey argue that the distinctive feature of the precautionary principle is not that it dictates specific regulatory measures, but the way in which and the time at which the measures are to be adopted.47 Science does not always provide the insights necessary to protect the environment

10

Chapter One

in an effective way, and undesirable consequences may result if measures are taken only when science finally manages to provide such insights. Further, they maintain that the precautionary approach entails that 1) clean production methods, best available technology and best environmental practices must be applied; 2) comprehensive methods of environmental and economic assessment must be used in deciding upon methods to enhance the quality of the environment; 3) research, particularly scientific and economic research, that contributes to a better understanding of long-term options available must be stimulated; and 4) legal, administrative and technical procedures that facilitate the implementation of this approach must be applied and, where not available, developed.48

The leading international device for fisheries management has until recently been securing the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) from fish stocks. MSY denotes the level at which the greatest quantity of fish can be caught annually without the total size of the stock being reduced. This principle is laid down in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention,49 the major global arrangement related to the management of fisheries. At the UNCED Conference in Rio in 1992, there was little support from fishing interests for applying the emerging precautionary principle to fishing activities.50 As noted by Garcia, The wide adoption of the principle could change drastically the state of affairs in marine living resources conservation and could offer an opportunity to improve fisheries management and ensure sustainable fisheries development. Its careless generalization to fisheries could, however, lead to economic and social chaos in the fishing industry.51

The scepticism towards the application of the precautionary principle in fisheries settings was partly inspired by the manner in which the United Nations General Assembly had treated the issue of high seas drift-net fishing since the late 1980s, eventually introducing a moratorium on such fishing effective from 31 December 1992.52 The decisions regarding drift-net fisheries reversed the normal burden of proof. It would now be up to the users of the fishing gear in question to demonstrate that effective conservation and management measures were in place to prevent unacceptable repercussions. The UN resolutions on the use of drift-nets were interpreted by fishing nations as precedent for the application of the precautionary principle in fisheries management, but already endorsed by the UNCED and the UN General Assembly, the principle became a matter of discussion also within the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO).53 A

Introduction

11

technical consultation on high seas fisheries was held in September 1992, initiating debates about the role of the precautionary principle in fisheries management.54 At this meeting, Japan, Korea, Norway and the Russian Federation expressed grave reservations about the use of precaution as a mechanism of fisheries management.55 The consultations led to an agreement that the precautionary principle should not be applied to fisheries management since fishing is an activity fundamentally different from more damaging practices such as toxic waste dumping, for which the principle had originally been adopted.56 In the event, the FAO came to advocate the precautionary approach for fisheries management as an alternative to the precautionary principle. The approach is considered to be a less stringent variant of the principle, entailing a more flexible application of precautionary measures.57 The precautionary approach was incorporated into the main global instruments on fisheries management established during the 1990s, i.e. the 1995 FAO Code of Conduct and the 1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement, which state that States should apply the precautionary approach widely to conservation, management and exploitation of living aquatic resources in order to protect them and preserve the aquatic environment. The absence of adequate scientific information should not be used as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and management measures.58 States shall apply the precautionary approach widely to conservation, management and exploitation of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks in order to protect the living marine resources and preserve the marine environment.59 States shall be more cautious when information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate. The absence of adequate scientific information shall not be used as a reason for postponing or failing to take conservation and management measures.60

Hence, the essence of the precautionary approach to fisheries management is that lack of scientific knowledge should not be used as a reason for failing to undertake management measures that could prevent the degradation of fish stocks. Whereas it was once considered reasonable to take such measures only when it was established with a high degree of certainty that stocks would be seriously threatened without such intervention, the introduction of the precautionary approach reversed the proof burden: preventive measures should be postponed or omitted only when there was full scientific certainty that they were not necessary.

12

Chapter One

The FAO Code of Conduct and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement also pay particular attention to the implementation of the precautionary approach: In implementing the precautionary approach, states should take into account, inter alia, uncertainties relating to the size and productivity of the stocks, reference points, stock condition in relation to such reference points, levels and distribution of fishing mortality and the impact of fishing activities, including discards, on non-target and associated and dependent species as well as environmental and socio-economic conditions.61 States and subregional or regional fisheries management organisations and arrangements should, on the basis of the best scientific advice available, inter alia, determine: a) stock specific target reference points and, at the same time, the action to be taken if they are exceeded; and b) stock specific limit reference points and, at the same time, the action to be taken if they are exceeded; when a limit reference point is approached, measures should be taken to ensure that it will not be exceeded.62 States shall take measures to ensure that, when reference points are approached, they will not be exceeded. In the event that they are exceeded, States shall, without delay, take the action determined under paragraph 3 (b) to restore the stocks.63 Where the status of the target stocks or non-target or associated or dependent species is of concern, States shall subject such stocks and species to enhanced monitoring in order to review their status and the efficacy of conservation and management measures. They shall revise those measures regularly in the light of new information.64

The FAO Code of Conduct and the UN Fish Stocks Agreement thus emphasise the balance between scientific uncertainties and the best scientific knowledge available. They prescribe the use of stock-specific reference points as a tool to deal with matters of risk and uncertainty in fisheries management. In Annex II to the UN Fish Stocks Agreement, a precautionary reference point is defined as ‘an estimated value derived through an agreed scientific procedure, which corresponds to the state of the resource and of the fishery, and which can be used as a guide for fisheries management’.65 Further, the Annex states that two types of precautionary reference point shall be used: limit reference points and target reference points.66 The former sets boundaries intended to contain harvesting within safe biological limits within which the stocks can produce maximum sustainable yields.67

Introduction

13

The latter reference points are intended to meet management objectives. Management strategies are supposed to seek to maintain or restore stocks at levels consistent with the agreed target reference points and include measures that can be implemented when reference points are approached.68 It should be a goal for fisheries management systems to ensure that target reference points are, on average, not exceeded.69 The fishing mortality rate – or in non-scientific terms: the catch rate – that generates the maximum sustainable yield should be regarded as a minimum standard for limit reference points.70 This implies that a management body that sets a limit fishing mortality rate above maximum sustainable yield would have to demonstrate why it is considered to be precautionary. In line with Freestone and Hey’s list of criteria that must be met by systems of environmental management to be in compliance with the precautionary approach (see above), the precautionary approach to fisheries has also been specified beyond the general criteria of reversing the previous burden of proof. Hewison recounts how ‘an environmental approach to the application of the precautionary principle to fisheries management’ should involve, inter alia, a minimum estimate of stock biomass, a scientifically-based and tested management system, a decision-making procedure characterised by transparency and stakeholder (including environmental non-governmental organisations [NGOs]) participation, as well as mechanisms to secure compliance among fishers.71 Garcia names the following steps: improving participation of ‘non-fishery users’, improving decisionmaking procedures, and strengthening monitoring, control and surveillance as well as raising penalties to deterrent levels.72 The FAO guidelines to a precautionary approach to fisheries state: An important element of the precautionary approach is to establish legal or social management frameworks for all fisheries, which is not the current situation. At a minimum, such frameworks should establish rules controlling access to fisheries (e.g., all boats must be licensed), data reporting requirements, and processes for planning and implementing more comprehensive fishery management. Plans for management institutionalize prudent foresight that takes into account potential consequences of fishery development and events affecting it. Comprehensive plans for fisheries can take a long time to develop. For this reason the legal or social management framework should include interim measures that safeguard the resources until such plans are adopted.73

Further, the FAO guidelines recommend that all stages of planning should involve consultation with the fishing industry, conservation groups and other

14

Chapter One

interested parties,74 that monitoring should be based on various sources of information,75 and that enforcement systems should have the flexibility for prompt action by redeployment of monitoring and enforcement resources.76 Hence, while the precautionary principle is associated with the ‘hard line’ regimen proposed for the management of highly polluting activities, the precautionary approach refers to practical ways and sets of measures which are precautionary in nature but may lead to more realistic application in fisheries.77 Various requirements for a system of fisheries management to be in accordance with the precautionary approach involve improving the decision-making process and strengthening monitoring and enforcement. The significant difference between a ‘traditional’ system for fisheries management and a system based on the precautionary approach is that the burden of proof rests with conservation interests in the former and with the management system in the latter. Under a system functioning on the basis of the precautionary approach, regulators have to prove that current fishing activities do not cause undue harm to the fish stocks; environmental organisations can require the introduction of conservatory measures as long as regulators or scientists cannot prove that this is the case. Further, a precautionary approach to fisheries involves transparency in the decision-making process and the participation in this process by all relevant stakeholders, including ‘conservation interests’ such as environmental NGOs.

THE QUESTIONS TO BE ASKED While the precautionary approach has yet to reach the status of customary international law, it is proceeding rapidly in that direction.78 The present book evaluates the fisheries management system of one of the world’s largest fishery nations, the Russian Federation, in relation to the precautionary approach, tracing both principles and practice of this system.79 One first question concerns therefore whether the structure and principles of Russian fisheries management reflect the requirements of the precautionary approach. Next, we must ask whether actual management practices reflect the principles laid down in official statements and legal documents. Fisheries management is often divided into three main arenas or types of activities: first, research and provision of scientific advice; second, quota allocation and technical regulation of fisheries; and third, enforcement of fisheries regulations. The present investigation seeks to trace the principles and practice of Russian fisheries management within these three arenas and evaluate them in relation to the requirements of a precautionary approach

Introduction

15

to fisheries. First, does the provision of scientific advice take place according to the criteria of precautionary fisheries management? For instance, have the required reference points been established by the relevant bodies, and are the necessary studies conducted to ensure that these are as ‘correct’ as possible? Second, is the scientific advice followed in the establishment of quotas, and have technical regulations been introduced in and heeded by the management process to secure a precautionary fishery? Are the relevant stakeholders, including environmental NGOs, given access to and powers to influence the management process? Third, are the established regulations enforced through an effective system for monitoring, control and surveillance? Throughout the study, focus will also be on the ability and willingness of the management system to take proper action in situations where the criteria put forward by the precautionary approach are obviously not met, e.g. when reference points are approached or when the fishers’ compliance with regulations is on the wane. The questions in the forefront of the investigation are presented in Table 1.1.

Table 1.1. Main research questionsa Structure/principles

Process/practices

Research

• Is a system for provision of scientific knowledge on fish stocks in place? • Have scientific bodies formally adopted the precautionary approach? • Have the necessary reference points been adopted?

• Does the system for provision of scientific knowledge on fish stocks function as intended? • Are the reference points used in practice?

Regulation

• Is the precautionary approach reflected in Russian fisheries legislation? • Is a system for fisheries management (notably for quota allocation and introduction of technical regulations) in place?

• Are quotas established in accordance with scientific recommendations? • Is proper regulatory action taken when reference points are approached? • Are user groups and ‘non-fishery’ stakeholders (such as environmental

16

Chapter One

Table 1.1 (cont.) Structure/principles • Are user groups and ‘non-fishery’ stakeholders (such as environmental NGOs) given access to decision-making processes according to established principles? Enforcement

a

• Is an enforcement system in place? • Does the enforcement system foresee flexibility in redeployment of resources?

Process/practices NGOs) given access to decision making in practice?

• Is the enforcement system capable of inducing compliance among fishers? • Does the enforcement system show flexibility on a day-to-day basis? • Is proper action taken when the enforcement system experiences difficulties in inducing compliance?

The table is not meant to be exhaustive as far as the questions posed in the book are concerned; rather it visualises some of the most important issues discussed.

METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS The investigation is based on two main types of empirical evidence: official documents, including legal texts, on the one hand, and interviews and media reports, on the other. In addition, observational data are also used on occasion. Like many other sectors of post-Soviet Russian society, the fisheries management system of the new federation has effectively evolved in a legal vacuum. Although a new Russian constitution was in place as early as 1993, the process of elaborating a supplementary legal framework at the level of law has been slow and fumbling, largely as a result of political in-fighting within the Federal Parliament (between the State Duma and the Federation Council) and between the Federal Parliament and the President.80 The State Duma worked on a Fisheries Act throughout the 1990s; it finally reached agreement in 2000. The Act was halted in the Federation Council and sent back to the State Duma for further clarification. When the Federation Council finally accepted the Act in 2001, it was stopped by the presidential admin-

Introduction

17

istration.81 Hence, at the time of writing the Russian Federation as yet has no federal law on fisheries. While a range of legal documents at lower levels in the legal hierarchy are continuously produced, their political clout – or de facto influence on actual management practice – varies, to say the least. Numerous Presidential Decrees, Governmental Resolutions and Orders issue from various governing bodies about which attempts at enforcement are never made – they are sometimes not even published. Hence, while the present study attempts to give as exhaustive as possible a presentation of the formal principles underlying Russian fisheries management, it cannot claim to have covered the entirety of official documents related to fisheries management. However, the inclusion of the most relevant ones is secured through close contact with Russian fishery officials. The interview data used in the investigation stem from frequent field trips made over several years to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts and Moscow. A large number of interviews were conducted with representatives of federal and regional authorities, industries, NGOs and others.82 Regional media have also been useful. I have elsewhere elaborated the difficulties associated with conducting social science research in Northwestern Russia:83 as one of the most heavily militarised areas in the world and rather ‘conservative’ politically,84 the region is, in general, characterised by suspicion of curious foreigners. Since Russia has no long-standing tradition of ‘free’ social science research, foreign researchers are often mistaken for journalists or even spies. Furthermore, foreign involvement in environmental affairs has, since the arrest of Aleksandr Nikitin in February 1996,85 come to be closely linked to espionage in the minds of many inhabitants of Northwestern Russia.86 In addition to a careful and gradual build-up of trust with potential sources of information, the well-known Russian method of using acquaintances has been indispensable also for this study. I have chosen not to reveal the identity of my interviewees nor the exact date of the interviews, merely to indicate the interviewee’s professional category (e.g. ‘Russian government official’) and the place, month and year of the interview (e.g. Murmansk, November 1998). This is done mainly since a precondition for many of the interviews was that the names of the interviewees should not be revealed. Also where such agreements were not explicit, I have chosen anonymisation in order to protect my Russian interviewees from untoward repercussions at home. I have participated in several meetings of the Joint Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission (1999),87 the Permanent Russian-Norwegian Committee for Management and Enforcement Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector88 (meetings in 1993, 1996, 1998, 1999 and 2000) and joint Russian-Norwegian seminars for fishery inspectors (in 1993, 1995, 1996, 1998 and 1999) as an

18

Chapter One

interpreter. Observational data are sporadically referred to in order to supplement interview material and written sources, though only to the extent that the delegates to the meetings themselves have publicly reported similar events and impressions. Moreover, I worked as an interpreter in the Norwegian Coast Guard in the period 1988-93. A few events from this period, especially related to Russian overfishing in 1992 and the subsequent initiative to establish a working group on enforcement co-operation (presented in Chapter 6), are also referred to. Here, ‘author’s own observation’ is used as a reference instead of searching for a newspaper report about things of which I have first-hand knowledge. Likewise, it would seem odd to interview former colleagues about incidents in which I was myself involved. Again, however, reference is only made to episodes already known to the public.

OUTLINE OF THE BOOK The book is divided into four main parts. Part I sets out the background to the investigation. Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 draws up the political context of the investigation, presenting the legal and administrative systems of the Russian Federation at the federal level and regional level in Northwestern Russia. Part II of the book focuses on the principles and structures underlying Russian fisheries management at the federal (Chapter 3) and regional (Chapter 4) administrative levels. These two chapters give an overview of the main principles for fisheries management found in legal texts and other official statements and of the organisational structures set up to take care of the state’s fisheries management at the federal level and the regional level in the country’s northern fishery basin. Part III presents and discusses the practices and processes related to the same management system in the management areas (covering processes at both federal and regional administrative levels) of scientific advice and quota allocation (Chapter 5) and technical regulation and enforcement (Chapter 6). Chapter 7 in Part IV of the book sums up the main findings of the investigation, asking to what extent Russian fisheries management meets the criteria posed by the precautionary approach.

Introduction

19

NOTES

1. This literature is both of an empirical and theoretical character and too encompassing to enumerate here. Theoretically, the debate has centred around the nature of fishers’ behavioural choices and the need for constraining their actions through state intervention. Two of the main theoretical traditions populating the area are rational choice theory which assumes that an unregulated fishery will necessarily lead to a situation analogous to the tragedy of the commons, and co-operative action theory which stresses the constraining nature of norms, communicative action and repeated games; for further reading see G. Hønneland, Coercive and Discursive Compliance Mechanisms in the Management of Natural Resources (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000). 2. See, e.g., recent contributions in journals such as Marine Policy, Ocean & Coastal Management and Ocean Development & International Law. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) has also produced a number of works on fisheries management in developing countries. The contributions are too numerous to list here. 3. Exceptions include P. Riggs, ‘Fisheries and Coastal Management in the Republic of Estonia’ (1994) 22 Coastal Management 25-48; B. Marciniak and S. Jentoft, ‘Fisheries Management in Post-Communist Poland’ (1997) 34 Ocean & Coastal Management 73-81; C.G. Pautzke, Russian Far East Fisheries Management. North Pacific Fishery Management Council Report to Congress (Anchorage: North Pacific Fishery Management Council, 1997); M. Vetemaa, V. Vaino, T. Saat and S. Kuldin, ‘Co-operative Fisheries Management of the Cross Border Lake Peipsi-Pihkva’ (2001) 8 Fisheries Management & Ecology 443-451; M. Vetemaa, M. Eero and R. Hannesson, ‘The Estonian Fisheries: From the Soviet System to ITQs and Quota Auctions’ (2002) 26 Marine Policy 95-102; T. Allison, ‘The Crisis of the Region’s Fishing Industry: Sources, Prospects, and the Role of Foreign Interests’, in J. Thornton and C.E. Ziegler (eds), Russia’s Far East. A Region at Risk (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002). See also some of the previous work of the author of this book: G. Hønneland, ‘Autonomy and Regionalisation in the Fisheries Management of Northwestern Russia’ (1998) 22 Marine Policy 57-65; G. Hønneland and F. Nilssen, ‘Comanagement in Northwest Russian Fisheries’ (2000) 13 Society & Natural Resources 635-648; G. Hønneland and F. Nilssen, ‘Quota Allocation in Russia’s Northern Fishery Basin: Principles and Practice’ (2001) 44 Ocean & Coastal Management 471-488; G. Hønneland, ‘Centre-Periphery Tensions in the Management of Northwest Russian Fisheries’, in G. Hønneland and H. Blakkisrud (eds), Centre-Periphery Relations in Russia. The Case of the Northwestern Regions (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001); G. Hønneland and A.K. Jørgensen, ‘Implementing Russia’s International Fisheries Agreements. Lessons from the Northern Basin’ (2002) 26 Marine Policy 359-367.

20

Chapter One

4. H. Blakkisrud and G. Hønneland, ‘Introduction’, in G. Hønneland and H. Blakkisrud (eds), Centre-Periphery Relations in Russia, 2001. 5. B. Risnes, ‘Relations between Moscow and the Regions of Northwestern Russia – The Legal Aspect’, in G. Hønneland and H. Blakkisrud (eds), Centre-Periphery Relations in Russia, 2001; H. Blakkisrud, ‘The Russian Regionalisation Process: Decentralisation by Design or Disintegration by Default?’, in G. Hønneland and H. Blakkisrud (eds), Centre-Periphery Relations in Russia, 2001. 6. G. Hønneland, ‘Autonomy and Regionalisation in the Fisheries Management of Northwestern Russia’, 1998. 7. Ibid. 8. The various categories of Russian federal subjects are explained in more detail in Chapter 2. 9. A.H. Hoel, ‘The Barents Sea: Fisheries Resources for Europe and Russia’, in O.S. Stokke and O. Tunander (eds), The Barents Region. Cooperation in Arctic Europe (London: SAGE Publications, 1994); O. Nakken, ‘Past, Present and Future Exploitation and Management of Marine Resources in the Barents Sea and Adjacent Areas’ (1998) 37 Fisheries Research 23-35; O.S. Stokke, L.G. Anderson and N. Mirovitskaya, ‘The Barents Sea Fisheries’, in O.R. Young (ed.), The Effectiveness of International Environmental Regimes. Causal Connections and Behavioral Mechanisms (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999); G. Hønneland, Coercive and Discursive Compliance Mechanisms in the Management of Natural Resources, 2000. 10. For the sake of simplicity, the term regional level is here used to denote management both inside the individual federal subjects belonging to the northern basin and what strictly speaking should be referred to as the inter-regional level, i.e. processes taking place between these federal subjects. 11. See, e.g., E. Hey, ‘The Precautionary Concept in Environmental Law and Policy: Institutionalizing Caution’ (1992) 4 Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 303-318; T. O’Riordan and J. Cameron (eds), Interpreting the Precautionary Principle (London: Earthscan, 1994); H. Hohmann, Precautionary Legal Duties and Principles of Modern International Environmental Law. The Precautionary Principle: International Environmental Law between Exploitation and Protection (the Hague: Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1994); J.M. McDonald, ‘Appreciating the Precautionary Principle as an Ethical Evolution in Ocean Management’ (1995) 26 Ocean Development & International Law 255-286. 12. S.M. Garcia, ‘The Precautionary Principle: its Implications in Capture Fisheries Management’ (1994) 22 Ocean & Coastal Management 99-125; T. Lauck, C.W. Clark, M. Mangel and G.R. Munro, ‘Implementing the Precautionary Principle in Fisheries Management through Marine Reserves’ (1998) 8 Ecological Applications S72-S78; S.B. Kaye, International Fisheries Management (the Hague: Kluwer Law

Introduction

21

International, 2001); J. Ellis, ‘The Straddling Stocks Agreement and the Precautionary Principle as Interpretive Device and Rule of Law’ (2001) 32 Ocean Development & International Law 289-311. Although some of these works in their titles refer to the precautionary principle, it has become generally accepted to use the term approach when speaking of the less stringent variant applied to fisheries; cf. Kaye, International Fisheries Management, 2001, pp. 167ff. 13. ‘Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks’ (New York, 4 August 1995) (1995) 34 International Legal Materials 1547-1580. 14. ‘Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries’ (Rome: the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 28 September 1995), reproduced in G. Handl (ed.), Yearbook of International Environmental Law, Vol. 6 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996). 15. An overview is given in S.B. Kaye, International Fisheries Management, 2001. 16. See, e.g., D. Freestone and E. Hey (eds), The Precautionary Principle and International Law. The Challenge of Implementation (the Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996); D.V. Gordon and G.R. Munro (eds), Fisheries and Uncertainty. A Precautionary Approach to Resource Management (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1996); A. Deville and R. Harding, Applying the Precautionary Principle (Sydney: The Federation Press, 1997); T. Lauck, C.W. Clark, M. Mangel and G.R. Munro, ‘Implementing the Precautionary Principle in Fisheries Management through Marine Reserves’, 1998. 17. For a brief overview of the history of Northwestern Russia, see H. Blakkisrud and G. Hønneland, ‘Introduction’, 2001. 18. This description of the Barents Sea resource base is derived from annual publications issued by the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries and Institute of Marine Research, which discuss the state of the individual fish stocks of the Barents Sea. See, in particular, Havets ressurser (‘Resources of the Sea’) (Bergen: Directorate of Fisheries and Institute of Marine Research, 2002). 19. ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’ (Montego Bay, 10 December 1982), U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122, (1982) 21 International Legal Materials 1261ff. 20. ‘Convention of Future Multilateral Cooperation in the North-East Atlantic Fisheries’, Official Journal of the European Communities, 1981 L227/22. 21. ‘Avtale mellom Regjeringen i Unionen av Sovjetiske Sosialistiske Republikker og Regjeringen i Kongeriket Norge om samarbeid innen fiskerinæringen’ (‘Agreement between the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Government of the Kingdom of Norway on Co-operation in the Fishing Industry’), in Overenskomster med fremmede stater (‘Agreements with Foreign States’) (Oslo:

22

Chapter One

the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1975, pp. 546-549); ‘Avtale mellom Regjeringen i Kongeriket Norge og Regjeringen i Unionen av Sovjetiske Sosialistiske Republikker om gjensidige fiskeriforbindelser’ (‘Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Norway and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Mutual Fishery Relations’), in Overenskomster med fremmede stater (‘Agreements with Foreign States’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1977, pp. 974-978). 22. This presentation of the Barents Sea fisheries management regime is based on A.H. Hoel, ‘The Barents Sea: Fisheries Resources for Europe and Russia’, 1994; O. Nakken, ‘Past, Present and Future Exploitation and Management of Marine Resources in the Barents Sea and Adjacent Areas’, 1998; O.S. Stokke, L.G. Anderson and N. Mirovitskaya, ‘The Barents Sea Fisheries’, 1999; G. Hønneland, Coercive and Discursive Compliance Mechanisms in the Management of Natural Resources, 2000. 23. See, e.g., Protokoll for den 30. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Protocol for the 30th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 2001). The working of this body is discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 5. 24. Ibid. 25. Ibid. 26. Ibid. 27. Ibid. 28. Ibid. 29. O.S. Stokke and A.H. Hoel, ‘Splitting the Gains: Political Economy of the Barents Sea Fisheries’ (1991) 26 Cooperation & Conflict 49-65. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. G. Hønneland, ‘Enforcement Co-operation between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea Fisheries’ (2000) 31 Ocean Development & International Law 249267. The enforcement co-operation between Russia and Norway will be further presented in Chapter 6. 34. A.H. Hoel, ‘The Barents Sea: Fisheries Resources for Europe and Russia’, 1994; O. Nakken, ‘Past, Present and Future Exploitation and Management of Marine Resources in the Barents Sea and Adjacent Areas’, 1998; O.S. Stokke, L.G. Anderson and N. Mirovitskaya, ‘The Barents Sea Fisheries’, 1999; G. Hønneland, Coercive and Discursive Compliance Mechanisms in the Management of Natural Resources, 2000.

Introduction

23

35. See, e.g., Protokoll for den 30. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, 2001. 36. O. Nakken, ‘Past, Present and Future Exploitation and Management of Marine Resources in the Barents Sea and Adjacent Areas’, 1998. 37. Protokoll for den 26. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Protocol for the 26th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 1997); Protokoll for den 28. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Protocol for the 28th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 1999). The establishment of quotas by the Joint Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission will be further discussed in Chapter 5. 38. D. Freestone and E. Hey, ‘Origins and Development of the Precautionary Principle’, in D. Freestone and E. Hey (eds), The Precautionary Principle and Environmental Law. The Challenge of Implementation, 1996; J. Cameron and J. Abouchar, ‘The Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law’, in D. Freestone and E. Hey (eds), The Precautionary Principle and Environmental Law. The Challenge of Implementation, 1996. 39. K. von Moltke, The Vorsorgeprinzip in West German Environmental Policy, 12th Report of the Royal Commission on Environmental Pollution, HMSO, 1988; cited in J. Cameron and J. Abouchar, ‘The Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law’, 1996, p. 31. 40. D. Freestone and E. Hey, ‘Origins and Development of the Precautionary Principle’, 1996. 41. Paragraph VII, the London Declaration, London, 25 November 1987; cited from D. Freestone and E. Hey, ‘Origins and Development of the Precautionary Principle’, 1996, p. 5. 42. The Hague Declaration, 8 March 1990; D. Freestone and E. Hey, ‘Origins and Development of the Precautionary Principle’, 1996. 43. Ibid. 44. ‘The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the NorthEast Atlantic’ (1993) 8 International Journal of Marine & Coastal Law 50-76. 45. For an overview, see D. Freestone and E. Hey, ‘Origins and Development of the Precautionary Principle’, 1996. 46. ‘The Rio Declaration on Environment and Development’ (Rio de Janeiro, 14 June 1992) (1992) 31 International Legal Materials 874-880, p. 879. 47. D. Freestone and E. Hey, ‘Origins and Development of the Precautionary Principle’, 1996.

24

Chapter One

48. Ibid., p. 13. 49. ‘United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’, 1982, Art. 61 (3), Art. 119 (1) (a). 50. S.B. Kaye, International Fisheries Management, 2001. 51. S.M. Garcia, ‘The Precautionary Principle: its Implications in Capture Fisheries Management’, 1994, p. 100. 52. For a presentation of these developments, see G.J. Hewison, ‘The Precautionary Approach to Fisheries Management: An Environmental Perspective’ (1996) 11 International Journal of Marine & Coastal Law 301-332. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid. 57. For overviews of this development, see, e.g., S.M. Garcia, ‘The Precautionary Principle: its Implications in Capture Fisheries Management’, 1994; S.B. Kaye, International Fisheries Management, 2001. 58. ‘Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries’, 1996, Art. 7.5.1. 59. ‘Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks’, 1995, Art. 6.1. 60. Ibid., Art. 6.2. 61. ‘Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries’, 1996, Art. 7.5.2. 62. Ibid., Art. 7.5.3. 63. ‘Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks’, 1995, Art. 6.4. 64. Ibid., Art. 6.5. 65. Ibid., Annex II, Para. 1. 66. Ibid., Annex II, Para. 2. 67. Ibid., Annex II, Para. 2. 68. Ibid., Annex II, Para. 4. 69. Ibid., Annex II, Para. 5.

Introduction

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70. Ibid., Annex II, Para. 7. 71. G.J. Hewison, ‘The Precautionary Approach to Fisheries Management: An Environmental Perspective’, 1996, pp. 320ff. Hewison bases his argument in particular on J. Cooke and M. Earle, ‘Towards a Precautionary Approach to Fisheries Management’ (1993) 2 Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 252-259. 72. S.M. Garcia, ‘The Precautionary Principle: its Implications in Capture Fisheries Management’, 1994, p. 120. 73. Precautionary Approach to Fisheries. Part 1: Guidelines on the Precautionary Approach to Capture Fisheries and Species Introductions, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 350/1 (Rome: The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 1995), p. 6. 74. Ibid., p. 7. 75. Ibid., p. 10. 76. Ibid., pp. 10-11. For example, the first signs of by-catch problems should be followed by more extensive sampling in problem areas according to an agreed procedure or enhanced surveillance of the fishery. 77. S.M. Garcia, ‘The Precautionary Principle: its Implications in Capture Fisheries Management’, 1994, p. 104. 78. S.B. Kaye, International Fisheries Management, 2001. 79. The Russian Federation signed the UN Fish Stocks Agreement at the time of its signature and ratified it on 4 August 1997; . 80. The conflict between the Federal Parliament and the President has waned since the 1999 State Duma elections. For an overview, see B. Risnes, ‘Relations between Moscow and the Regions of Northwestern Russia – The Legal Aspect’, 2001. 81. These developments are further explained in Chapter 3. 82. All interviews were conducted in Russian without interpreter. This is assumed to enhance the validity of the interview data. 83. G. Hønneland and A.K. Jørgensen, Integration vs. Autonomy: Civil-Military Relations on the Kola Peninsula (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 1999), pp. 6-7. 84. Murmansk is one of the few Russian cities where a Lenin statue still dominates a main thoroughfare – in this case the Lenin Prospekt. 85. Former Northern Fleet officer Aleksandr Nikitin was accused of espionage while collecting data on the nuclear risk on the Kola Peninsula for the Norwegian environmental NGO Bellona. Charges were finally dropped in 2000. An overview

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of the Nikitin case is found at . 86. Cf. a recent news bulletin from Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty under the heading ‘Murmansk – a Hotbed of Foreign Spies’: ‘Foreign intelligence services have targeted Murmansk Oblast as a “priority” area for their activities, Nikolai Zharkov, head of the Federal Security Service (FSB) directorate in Murmansk Oblast, told Interfax North-West on 28 December. [. . .] Zharkov also revealed that foreign governments frequently “pursue their own interests” under cover of environmental organizations’ (RFE/RL Newsline, 30 December 2000). 87. The working of this body is discussed in more detail in Chapters 3 and 5. 88. The working of this body is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.

CHAPTER TWO Legal and Political Context

The Russian Federation, in the form it has taken since the disintegration of the Soviet Union, is the direct successor of the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic (RSFSR). Some central traits of this structure, particularly those concerning the formal arrangements of centre-periphery relations, are retained in the new federation. However, the substance of these relations has undergone considerable change since the Soviet era. After a brief outline of the Soviet legacy, the main legal, political and economic features of the new Russian federalism will be presented in this chapter. This is followed by a brief overview of the administrative systems of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts, the largest federal subjects in Russia’s northern fishery basin.

FEDERALISM AND REGIONAL SELF-GOVERNMENT: THE SOVIET LEGACY1 Unlike its predecessor the Russian empire, the Soviet Union was organised in a federal structure.2 Originally, the rationale for establishing a federal state structure was partly tactical, partly a consequence of Bolshevik nationalist theory. From a tactical point of view, the organisation of the RSFSR as a federal unit in January 1918,3 as well as the establishment of the Soviet Union four years later, can be regarded as a historical compromise between the Russian-dominated Bolshevik party and their non-Russian allies.4 The Bolsheviks were having to fight a civil war and deal with secessionist tendencies among groups loyal to the empire. The most important ethnonational groups were granted a certain degree of autonomy in return for signing up to the new federal state formation. The establishment of a federal

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structure partly followed the prescriptions of Marxist ideology. Marx himself had characterised the Russian empire as the ‘prison of nations’, and his words that ‘no nation is free as long as it suppresses another nation’ were frequently cited by Lenin.5 The Soviet federal structure that evolved under Stalin was a compromise between these ideological currents and the demands of practical politics. The result was a form of ‘pro forma ethno-federalism organised after the matryoshka principle’.6 Ethnic groups of more than one million people living within a geographical region that could easily be demarcated and whose territory bordered on a third state were allowed to create union republics. Groups failing to meet one or more of these requirements were granted a more limited level of autonomy within the borders of the union republics. Depending on various conditions, such as the size of the population and its level of development, these groups could establish autonomous republics, autonomous oblasts (regions) or autonomous okrugs (districts). The administrative division of the union was subject to frequent revisions under Stalin, and later, though less extensively, under Khrushchev. From the early 1960s to its dissolution in 1991, the Soviet Union consisted of 15 union republics, 20 autonomous republics, 8 autonomous oblasts and 10 autonomous okrugs. Parallel to the ethno-federal structure was a strictly administrativeterritorial division into krays (territories) and oblasts (regions) within the greater union republics. These territorially defined units were directly subordinate to the union republics and were thus not part of the federal structure. On the other hand, krays and oblasts could themselves contain federal units, as an autonomous oblast could be included in a kray, and an autonomous okrug in either a kray or an oblast. Despite this formal arrangement of both the Soviet Union and the RSFSR as federations, their power structures were extremely hierarchical and centralised.7 In effect, a total subjection to central party organs was required. The Soviet system of government consisted of three parallel hierarchies: the representative or legislative organs (soviets); the executive organs (which were nominally subordinate to the soviets at each level); and the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). At each administrative level (union, republic, oblast, okrug etc.), there was a soviet, an executive committee and a party organisation.8 The CPSU provided the vertical line of command that held the system together. The soviets were large, ‘decorative’ assemblies that met rarely, and did little more than rubber-stamp the decisions of the executive committees, which had usually been agreed with the party organisation at the relevant level. The soviets, on their part, worked according to the paradoxical principle of democratic centralism: deputies at each level were accountable both to their electorate and to the soviet at

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the next level up. In practice, however, centralism generally had the upper hand, and, as said, party organs exercised a complete control over decisions in soviets and executive committees.

FROM RSFSR TO THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION Among the most dramatic results of Gorbachev’s reforms was the nationalistic awakening that eventually led to the dismantling of the Soviet Union itself. After the 1991 August coup attempt failed, the very processes that the coup makers tried to prevent started to accelerate. Gorbachev’s authority grew even weaker than it was before the coup, and institutions at the union level lost most of their legitimacy, influence and, eventually, also financing. By December 1991, the actual decision-making authority in the Soviet Union had been transferred to the republic level. One republic after another declared itself sovereign, and when the leaders of the RSFSR, Ukraine and Belarus met in early December to create the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the demise of the Soviet Union was formalised. There seems to have been no disagreement among Russian leaders that a federal structure should be retained also in the new Russian state formation. There were, however, different opinions as to which form of federalism should be chosen.9 The outcome of the debate was quite pragmatic: in the unstable political situation of the day, extensive administrative reforms were perceived as too hazardous, and it was agreed to preserve a slightly modified version of the old structure. The system of both ethnically and territorially defined federal subjects was retained. The latter were kept unchanged, while there was an upgrading in administrative status of the autonomous republics and four of the five autonomous oblasts, which were hereafter defined as republics.10 The new Russian Federation consists of 89 federal subjects, of which 32 are ethnically defined (21 republics, one autonomous oblast and ten autonomous okrugs) and 57 are territorially defined (six krays, 49 oblasts and two cities with status as federal subjects). The federal subjects vary widely with respect to both population and territory. Whereas the autonomous areas comprise more than 50 per cent of the federation’s territory, they contain only 18 per cent of its population. The most controversial issue in Russian politics during the years 199293 was the elaboration of a new federal constitution. The primary conflict straddled the basic fault lines of Russian politics: the balance of power between the President and the Parliament, and between federal authorities and the regions. The process of elaborating a new constitution had started as early as 1990, but it was only with the dissolution of the Soviet Union

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and the establishment of the Russian Federation that the need for a new basic legal framework became urgent. Various drafts were presented during 1992 and the first half of 1993. Two of these became the object of serious discussion, one produced by President Yeltsin and one by the Constitutional Committee. As was to be expected, the President’s proposal prescribed a strong presidential role; that of the Constitutional Committee implied a parliamentarian model. The federal subjects diverged in their views of the proposals. The vertical division of power, i.e. the federal structure, was more important to them than the horizontal organisation of the state. As the controversy heated up, the President and the Parliament vied with each other in granting new concessions to the regions in an attempt to win their support. Several aspects of President Yeltsin’s proposal were clearly designed to suit the interests of the ethnically defined federal subjects. In June 1993, Yeltsin summoned a constitutional conference. A month later this conference presented a draft combining elements from both proposals. A working group was appointed in September to implement further harmonisation, but before it could present its proposal, political realities in Russia had changed dramatically. On 21 September, Yeltsin dissolved the Parliament and ordered new elections. Fierce protests from the opposition followed immediately. The dispute culminated on 3 and 4 October when the protesting parliamentarians and their supporters, who had barricaded themselves within White House, were overcome by force. As Parliament was now eradicated as a political competitor, the President no longer needed the same level of support from the federal subjects as before. Several of the privileges they had won in the course of the previous power struggle were now trimmed down or even omitted from the constitution draft. For instance, the republics were no longer described as sovereign entities. When the draft was put to the vote in a referendum on 12 December, it was rejected by more than half of the republics and 11 territorially defined federal subjects. In some cases, it was rejected by default because fewer than 50 per cent of the electorate turned out to vote. In the others, the electorate simply said no. Nevertheless, the new Constitution was adopted since it received support from 58.4 per cent of the electorate at the federal level, and since election turnout was above 50 per cent (54.8 per cent).

EVOLVING CENTRE-REGION RELATIONS The 1993 Constitution replaced the centralised administrative regime of the Soviet period with a system that grants federal subjects a considerable de-

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31

gree of legal autonomy. Executive power of the regions is nested with the regional administration and its head of administration, or governor (in the republics: president). The large regional soviets (with 200-250 members) are replaced by smaller legislative bodies – most often named dumas11 – at the regional level. This section provides a brief overview of main aspects of the legal relationship between Moscow and the subjects of the Russian Federation. It also raises the question whether the formal rights of the federal subjects have been followed up in practice. First, we ask if political realities in postSoviet Russia allowed the devolution of power to take place within the legal stipulations of the Constitution, and second, if decentralisation was accompanied by adequate financial autonomy for the regional level or if it was more an exercise in judicial or political good intentions. Legal aspects12 The Constitution lays down a threefold framework for the distribution of jurisdiction between federal and regional authorities.13 Article 71 lists all areas where federal authorities have exclusive competence, including foreign and security politics.14 Article 72 defines a comprehensive list of areas over which federal and regional authorities have joint jurisdiction.15 Article 73 states that except for the areas of jurisdiction mentioned in Articles 71 and 72 the federal subjects ‘exercise the entire spectrum of state power’.16 The picture is completed by Article 76, Paragraph 5, which states that on matters of joint jurisdiction ‘laws and other regulatory legal acts of the subjects of the Russian Federation may not contravene federal laws’.17 In a discussion of centre-region relations, Article 72 is clearly of most interest since it involves both the federal and regional level. The Article lists 14 different areas in which the two levels share jurisdiction, among them ‘issues of possession, use and management of the land, mineral

CONSTITUTION

FEDERAL JURISDICTION Const. Art. 71 Federal const. laws Federal laws

JOINT JURISDICTION Const. Art. 72 Federal laws Regional laws

REGIONAL JURISDICTION Const. Art. 73 Regional constitutions Regional laws

Figure 3.1. The legal hierarchy for distribution of competence between the federal and regional levels 18

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resources, water and other natural resources’19 and ‘management of natural resources, protection of the environment and ecological safety’.20 In accordance with Article 76, Paragraph 5, the Constitution grants federal legislation priority over regional legislation in areas of joint jurisdiction.21 On the other hand, the scope of regional legislation is not limited by the areas covered by federal legislation. In practice, the federal legislature has so far failed to pass legislation on a variety of important issues under Article 72, leaving considerable room for regional legislators to freely draft regulations.22 In addition to working through the above-mentioned legal initiative in the regions, some federal subjects have tried to mollify the impact of the legislative vacuum by concluding bilateral agreements with the federal centre. These agreements normally contain declaratory provisions on co-operation between federal and regional authorities, but are followed by a number of sub-agreements regulating more practical questions of particular importance to the federal subject in question. Although initially conceived as a way to bring a reluctant Republic of Tatarstan back into the Federation, the bilateral treaties soon developed into a dynamic tool for regulating centre-region relations. By the turn of the millennium, more than half of the federal subjects had adopted such agreements. On the one hand, the adoption of bilateral agreements strengthens the legal basis of centre-region relations; on the other, they increase the diversity and inconsistency of the legal system as a whole. Finally, it should be noted that the centralised administrative structure of the Soviet period has not disappeared altogether. Compared to the significant changes in Russian law and politics over the past decade, the bureaucracy has changed surprisingly little. Most important spheres of politics are still the exclusive prerogative of federal authorities – ministries (24), state committees (6), federal commissions (2), federal services (13), federal agencies (8) and supervisory agencies (2) – and these have a fine-meshed net of representations in the regions. The new legal status of regional authorities resulted in a need for co-operation between regional administrations and regional branches of federal authorities. The collaboration was often co-ordinated by the presidential representative in the region, a position introduced by President Yeltsin to oversee the implementation in the regions of decisions made at the federal level.23 In general, the presence of federal authorities in the regions appears to have constituted a buffer against effective transferral of power to the federal subjects. On the other hand, it has been claimed that regional authorities in reality have enjoyed considerable influence over federal administration in the regions. As a result, President Putin in May 2000 introduced seven new federal administrative districts

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33

aimed at managing the work of federal agencies in the regions (see next section). At the same time, he took an initiative to bring all regional legislation into accordance with federal legislation and review the future of the bilateral agreements. Political aspects 24 The years prior to the adoption of the 1993 Constitution had been characterised by demands for increased sovereignty for political entities at all levels in the Soviet Union/Russian Federation, often referred to as the ‘Parade of Sovereignties’.25 As noted above, however, President Yeltsin no longer depended on the strong support of the regions after his defeat of the Supreme Soviet in the autumn of 1993. Already before that, he had secured for himself the right to personally appoint the heads of regional administrations (governors) although the Parliament – against the veto of the President – in the spring of 1991 had adopted a law which opened for direct election of heads of administration.26 Combined with the introduction of presidential representatives in the regions (see previous section), what clearly characterises the years 1993-96 is Yeltsin’s tightening grip on regional executives.27 Moreover, the division of powers emerging during this period developed along what has been called the ‘executive vertical’, replacing the CPSU as the ‘transmission belt’ in relations between the regions and political centre of the state. At both the federal and regional level, the legislatures were referred to subordinate political positions. After 1996, the Russian regions have consolidated their position and, to some extent, also increased their autonomy. A major event in centreregion relations was the long awaited gubernatorial elections organised during the winter 1996-97, referred to as the ‘Parade of Governors’. The heads of the regional administrations can now point to a popular mandate rather than a presidential decree as their source of legitimacy, clearly reducing their dependence on federal authorities. The centre can no longer rely on direct control over the executive vertical and has now to resort mainly to the budgetary process in its efforts to influence development in the regions (see next section). Recent years have again witnessed efforts by the federal authorities to stop the devolution of power from the centre. As mentioned above, giving the presidential representatives responsibility for overseeing the activities of federal agencies in the regions was no guarantee of these representatives’ loyalty to federal authorities. In practice, the majority of presidential representatives appear to have ‘gone native’, ending up as allies of the governors

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or republican presidents. In the May 2000 reorganisation mentioned above, President Putin introduced a new administrative layer between the centre and the federal subjects, the federal okrugs. Seven federal okrugs were established, led by presidential representatives. The old system of presidential representatives in the federal subjects was abolished. It can be argued that the reorganisation represents a re-centralisation. Simultaneously, the regional leaders lost the control they had acquired over federal agencies located on their territory. Shortly after, Putin also curbed the legal power of the regional heads of administration by depriving them of their representation in the Federation Council, the upper house of the Federal Parliament. Economic aspects 28 In the period that followed the establishment of the Russian Federation, the economy of the country underwent radical reforms. The main elements were privatisation, price and tax liberalisation and the adoption of a number of laws to facilitate the introduction of a market economy. Economically, Russian federalism rests on three main pillars: the division of responsibility between federal, regional and local authorities; the re-distributive effects of the tax system; and transfers between the federal and regional level. The division of responsibility between the different levels of government implies that the federal level is responsible for macro economic stabilisation, interregional distribution and the provision of public goods of national interest, such as defence. Sub-regional authorities cover expenditures such as health, primary education and housing subsidies.29 The Russian tax system consists of local, regional and federal taxes. The most important taxes are VAT, corporate profit tax and personal income tax.30 Eighty-five per cent, 81 per cent and 3 per cent, respectively, of these taxes is transferred to the federal budget. The tax system is generally considered to be complicated, and compliance is low. Transfers from federal authorities to the regions is the third instrument of fiscal federalism in Russia, constituting approximately 10-12 per cent of the total federal budget in recent years.31 McAuley finds that more support is transferred to regions that are poorer than the national average compared to other regions.32 Moreover, ethnically defined federal subjects are, almost without exception, net receivers of federal support.33 Until the eve of the rouble crisis in August 1998, the Russian economy seemed to have stabilised and even embarked on a slightly positive trend. During the crisis – which Russians call simply August – Russia changed its exchange rate regime from a fixed exchange rate to a floating one. The devaluation was regarded as a major defeat for the Russian stabilisation

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35

policy,34 but in hindsight appears to have implied one step back in order later to take two steps forward. The rouble has stabilised, inflation did not accelerate, the trade balance has improved, and, most importantly, Russia has experienced economic growth since 1998. Under the Soviet central planning system, political priorities, and not market mechanisms, determined which resources should be developed and where production should take place. The extremely centralised decisionmaking process, low perceived transportation costs and remote sources of raw materials contributed to a decentralised economic geography. A byproduct of Soviet resource exploitation and industrial policy was the construction of a large number of mono-industrial towns in the resource-rich, formerly largely unpopulated northern peripheries of the Soviet Union. During the Soviet period, the centripetal forces that have depopulated Western peripheral regions were not in operation in Russia. Paradoxically, the introduction of decentralised economic decision making may reactivate these centripetal forces. Exposed to new demands for profitability and competitiveness, the transport-intensive Soviet-style economy faces severe structural problems. Depopulation may spark a negative spiral at the regional level: less people means a decreasing home market for local industries. This has two implications for a region’s industrial potential. First, it reduces the market for local supply industries. Second, it reduces the incentives for other industries to locate in the region. Ironically, then, economic decentralisation in a post-Soviet Russian context thus might lead to depopulation and centralisation.

POLITICAL ORGANISATION OF MURMANSK AND ARKHANGELSK OBLASTS35 The regions of the Russian Federation are organised politically along the same lines as the federal level: a sharing of responsibility between a legislative duma and a directly elected head of the executive power (a president at the federal level and in the republics, and governors in the other federal subjects). The latter are not answerable to the former. The political organisation of Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts is laid out in their Regional Charters of 26 November 199736 and 23 May 1995,37 respectively. According to the Charters, the executive branch of government is lead by a head of administration (Governor).38 The Governor is elected for five (Murmansk)39 or four (Arkhangelsk)40 years and can only hold the post for two periods.41 For all practical purposes, he is the leading

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political figure of the regions.42 The legislative body of Murmansk Oblast, the regional Duma, consists of 26 deputies elected for a five-year period.43 In Arkhangelsk Oblast, there is a regional Sobraniye consisting of 41 representatives (including one from Nenets Autonomous Okrug).44 The Governors have the right to propose new legislation and summon extraordinary sessions of the Duma/Sobraniye.45 The Arkhangelsk Oblast Sobraniye is considered to work well with its regional administration,46 the Murmansk legislature has apparently been more hostile, at least up to the turn of the century.47 In Murmansk Oblast, a regional government, consisting of the leaders of all the departments of the regional administration (Deputy Governors), is appointed by the Governor.48 Until 1996-97, most governors were appointed by President Yeltsin, among them Yevgeniy Komarov in Murmansk and Pavel Balakshin and later Anatoliy Yefremov49 in Arkhangelsk, all recruited from the old party nomenklatura.50 In the run-up to the gubernatorial elections in Murmansk Oblast in late 1996, Komarov enjoyed substantial economic and moral support from the Kremlin.51 Prime Minister Chernomyrdin even visited Murmansk on the eve of the elections with the apparent intention of supporting the incumbent.52 Nevertheless, Komarov did not succeed in his bid. None of the candidates achieved the necessary 50 per cent of the votes in the first round.53 In the run-off, Komarov (40.7 per cent) lost to Yuriy Yevdokimov (43.5 per cent), former First Secretary of the Oblast Committee of the Communist Party and former Chairman of the Oblast Soviet (1990-93).54 Yevdokimov’s political platform was the Congress of Russian Communities, the party for which General Aleksandr Lebed had ran in the State Duma elections in 1995, and his candidacy was supported by Lebed’s new Honour and Motherland movement.55 Yevdokimov has latterly been associated with the Fatherland movement of Moscow’s Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov and threw his support behind Putin after he had been installed as Acting President.56 In the following elections in March 2000, Yevdokimov was re-elected with 59.8 per cent of the votes in the first round of elections.57 He appears as an active and entrepreneurial governor who succeeds relatively well in defending the interests of the region vis-à-vis federal authorities. Within the military, he is particularly popular for having launched an adoption campaign for the vessels of the Northern Fleet, whereby other federal subjects, cities and business enterprises contribute material supplies to the crisis-ridden fleet.58 In Arkhangelsk Oblast, the incumbent succeeded in securing a popular mandate in the 1996 election. Anatoliy Yefremov had been in office for less than nine months and was probably less associated with the negative impact on the population of economic and social reform. Running against

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the Communist Yuriy Guskov, he could also draw on the entire reformoriented electorate in the run-off. He won a solid victory, 62.0 per cent to Guskov’s 28.8 per cent.59 In the 2000 election, Yefremov won 49 per cent in the first round to former oblast Prime Minister Nikolay Malakov’s 32.3 per cent.60 In the run-off, Yefremov won 58.5 per cent of the vote while Malakov got 31.6 per cent.61 As follows from the first section of this chapter, bilateral power-sharing agreements between Moscow and the federal subjects have become an important instrument filling the legal vacuum in Russian centre-region relations. However, of the Northwest Russian federal subjects, only Murmansk Oblast has concluded a power-sharing agreement with federal authorities.62 The agreement was signed by President Yeltsin and Governor Yevdokimov on 30 November 1997.63 By this time, the process of developing Russian federalism through such agreements was on the wane, and the agreement was not as advantageous to the oblast as the early bilateral agreements of 1994-95. In addition to declarations on co-operation, it lists a range of areas as joint responsibilities, including the environment and management of natural resources.64 Arkhangelsk began drafting an agreement, but negotiations stalled.65 Federal authorities are heavily represented on the territory of Northwestern Russia. First, some 40-55 federal agencies have their representations in the federal subjects of the region.66 The Northwestern Federal Okrug, which has its main office in St Petersburg, is also represented. Second, the region is heavily militarised, and as a result large parts of its territory are under federal (military) control. In addition to military base areas, there are six so-called closed towns in Murmansk Oblast – making Murmansk the federal subject with most closed towns in the entire Russian Federation – and one in Arhangelsk.67 These are the direct responsibility of federal, not regional authorities. In 1992, a new law, On the Closed AdministrativeTerritorial Formation, gave some 45 formerly secret cities in Russia civilian names and divided responsibility between civilian and military authorities within them.68 The closed towns on the Kola Peninsula have not been significantly integrated into the surrounding civil society since the disintegration of the Soviet Union; politically, economically and socially, the inhabitants and authorities of the closed towns relate more to Moscow and other parts of the Russian Federation than to the regional centre of Murmansk.69 Finally, it should be observed that the stance of federal subjects of Northwestern Russia to the federal centre has tended to be less confrontational than Russian regions in general.70 They have only to a very limited extent adopted legislation that contradicts federal law, and the elected governors in the area have generally been eager to remain on a good footing

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with the Kremlin.71 There are several possible explanations for this deference. First, it can be assumed that federal authorities have more control over militarised regions such as Northwestern Russia than over less strategically important regions. Second, the abundant natural resources of the region may have made federal authorities particularly eager to maintain control here. Third, it can be argued that the economic vulnerability of the region – Arkhangelsk is a net recipient of the federal budget; Murmansk is a donor, but its industrial future is insecure due to the large concentration of mono-industrial towns here – reduces its leaders’ appetite for skirmishes with the authority of the federal government.72

CONCLUSIONS The management of natural resources falls under Article 72 of the Russian Federation and hence under the joint jurisdiction of federal and regional authorities. According to Article 76 of the Constitution, federal law has priority over regional law in areas of joint jurisdiction, but the regional authorities nevertheless enjoy considerable room for manoeuvre. First, federal legislation is still poorly developed, and it can be difficult for federal authorities to change long-established practices that have been followed in accordance with regional legislation. Second, there is an almost unlimited number of conflicts that can arise within any specific area of law, but Article 76, Paragraph 5, refers only to instances of direct contradiction between legislation at the two levels. In addition comes the fact that discrete bilateral agreements have tended to fill the legal vacuum between the federal centre and more than half of the subjects of the Russian Federation. Also interesting for our investigation is the political ‘tug-of-war’ between various agencies at various levels. A main line of conflict clearly runs between the federal and regional level. The former is represented by ministries, state committees, supervisory agencies and others, the latter by the regional administrations under the leadership of governors (in the republics: presidents). The governors strengthened their position during the second half of the 1990s, but President Putin in 2000 introduced various measures that curbed their authority. A second line of potential conflict is in the interface between regional authorities and the representations of federal agencies located on their territories. There are indications that representatives of the latter tend to ‘go native’, becoming primarily spokespersons of their own geographical entity in their dealings with federal authorities. Third, conflicts probably make themselves felt between various agencies at the

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same administrative level. At the federal level, different ministries or state committees may fight over formal powers not least because such powers normally bring with them allocations from the federal budget. For instance, the responsibility to manage natural resources often involves control of revenues from extraction of these resources. At the regional level, the number of actors is more limited. One sometimes sees conflicts between the regional administrations and the regional legislature. Such problems have so far not become a major issue in Russian regional politics since the authority of the legislature is so limited compared to the regional executive. Finally, the political clout of the former industry complexes – which in Soviet times managed economic activities at enterprise level and were responsible for implementing state policies – and various political bodies at both federal and regional levels continues to be of interest and will be referred to later in the book.

NOTES

1. This and the next section are partly adapted from G. Hønneland and A.K. Jørgensen, Integration vs. Autonomy: Civil-Military Relations on the Kola Peninsula (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 1999), which in turn was based on H. Blakkisrud, Den russiske føderasjonen i støpeskjeen (‘The Russian Federation in the Making’) (Oslo: Spartacus, 1997). Additional reference is provided only when the argument is based on other authors’ judgment. For further reference regarding facts and events, see H. Blakkisrud, Den russiske føderasjonen i støpeskjeen, 1997. 2. The Russian empire was divided into gubernii which were ruled by governors and directly subordinate to the cabinet in St Petersburg. With a few exceptions, their borders were not drawn in accordance with ethno-demographic realities. 3. The first federal unity within the RSFSR, the Volga-German Autonomous Workers’ Commune, was established in October 1918, but it was only after the end of the Civil War that the federalisation process gathered momentum. 4. G. Smith (ed.), Federalism: The Multiethnic Challenge (London: Longman, 1995). 5. R.J. Kaiser, The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

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6. H. Blakkisrud, Den russiske føderasjonen i støpeskjeen, 1997, p. 13. 7. Since their unity was maintained through power at the centre, some observers have described them as pseudo-federations; see, e.g., I.D. Duchacek, Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics (Lanham: University Press of America, 1987). 8. There was arguably a fourth hierarchy, that of the central ministries whose enterprises (each with its own party cell) operated independently of the soviets and the executive committees; see S. Whitefield, Industrial Power and the Soviet State (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993). 9. Among other things, they included a proposal to dissolve the ethnically defined entities and create fewer and larger territorially defined federal subjects. For a discussion, see P. Hanson, Regions, Local Power and Economic Change in Russia (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994); R. Sakwa, Russian Politics and Society (London: Routledge, 1993). 10. The Jewish autonomous oblast (Birobidzhan) was the only autonomous oblast not to gain the status of republic. It was, however, recognised as an independent federal subject separate from the kray of Khabarovsk, to which it had previously been subordinate. 11. The designations sobraniye (assembly) and soviet (council) can also be used. 12. This section is based on B. Risnes, ‘Relations between Moscow and the Regions of Northwestern Russia – The Legal Aspect’, in G. Hønneland and H. Blakkisrud (eds), Centre-Periphery Relations in Russia. The Case of the Northwestern Regions (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2001). 13. ‘Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii’ (‘Constitution of the Russian Federation’), in B.A. Strashun, Federalnoye konstitutsionnoye pravo Rossii. Osnovnye istochniki (‘Russia’s Federal Constitutional Law. Fundamental Sources’) (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Norma, 1996). An English translation of the Constitution is found at . 14. ‘Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, Art. 71. 15. ‘Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, Art. 72. 16. ‘Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, Art. 73. 17. ‘Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, Art. 76, Para. 5. 18. B. Risnes, ‘Relations between Moscow and the Regions of Northwestern Russia – The Legal Aspect’, 2001. 19. ‘Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, Art. 72, Para. 1 v) [1 c) if the Latin alphabet is used].

Legal and Political Context

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20. ‘Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, Art. 72, Para. 1 d) [1 e) if the Latin alphabet is used]. 21. ‘Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, Art. 76, Para. 5. 22. A striking example is the regulation of ownership of land. It took the federal authorities several years and several drafts to produce an acceptable land code. It was finally adopted in the autumn of 2001. The delays were caused by disagreements between the President and the State Duma. In the meantime, more than 50 federal subjects had adopted land codes of their own. The issue of land ownership being an Article 72 issue, it is not difficult to imagine the political battles that may follow the adoption of the federal land code. 23. A system of presidential representatives in the oblasts and krays was first introduced immediately after the failed coup in August 1991. Later, it was extended to the republics, and eventually institutionalised in the 1993 Constitution. Such representatives were not sent to all federal subjects. Generally, Yeltsin seemed more reluctant to station his representatives in ethnically defined than in territorially defined federal subjects. 24. This section is based on H. Blakkisrud, ‘The Russian Regionalisation Process: Decentralisation by Design or Disintegration by Default?’, in G. Hønneland and H. Blakkisrud (eds), Centre-Periphery Relations in Russia, 2001. 25. A famous statement representing this development is Boris Yeltsin’s, then newly elected Chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR, invitation to the autonomous areas of the Union to ‘take as much sovereignty as you can swallow’. 26. Several regional elections were actually held, where heads of administration were replaced by representatives of the local establishment. For details, see P. Hanson, Regions, Local Power and Economic Change in Russia, 1994. 27. The picture is not as straightforward as it may appear, however. In general, leaders of the ethnically defined federal subjects were elected, and they also tended to escape the interference of presidential representatives. 28. This section is based on P.B. Maurseth, ‘Russian Regions in Transition: Centralisation through Decentralisation?’, in G. Hønneland and H. Blakkisrud (eds), Centre-Periphery Relations in Russia, 2001. 29. During the first years of the existence of the Russian Federation, there were signs of regional authorities providing services that were obviously a federal responsibility, such as issuing ‘surrogate money’. This seems to have become less widespread in recent years. 30. The VAT rate was 20 per cent in 2000, tax on profit 30 per cent and tax on personal income 13 per cent.

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31. The Federal Fund for Financial Support of the Regions was set up in 1994 to create a more coherent framework for channelling resources to the most needy regions. The fund, partly financed by VAT receipts, still constitutes the major source for federal transfers to the regions. 32. A. McAuley, ‘The Determinants of Russian Federal-Regional Fiscal Relations: Equity or Political Influence?’ (1997) 49 Europe-Asia Studies 431-444. 33. Ibid. 34. Keeping the rouble within the predetermined ‘rouble corridor’ was viewed as essential to deflate the economy. This had been achieved since 1995, and economic growth that followed after 1997 was regarded as a well-deserved result of this monetary stabilisation. 35. This section is based on G. Hønneland and A.K. Jørgensen, Implementing International Environmental Agreements in Russia (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003). 36. Ustav Murmanskoy Oblasti (‘Charter of Murmansk Oblast’) (Murmansk: Murmansk regional administration, 1997). The Murmansk regional charter with changes introduced up to 2002 is found at . 37. ‘Ustav Arkhangelskoy Oblasti’ (‘Charter of Arkhangelsk Oblast’), published in Volna, 2 June 1995, pp. 3-6. 38. Ustav Murmanskoy Oblasti, 1997, Art. 66, Sub-section 1; ‘Ustav Arkhangelskoy Oblasti’, 1995, Art. 27, Sub-section 1. 39. Ustav Murmanskoy Oblasti, 1997, Art. 62, Sub-section 2. The election period was changed from four to five years by regional law of Murmansk Oblast No. 27101-ZMO of 14 June 2001. 40. ‘Ustav Arkhangelskoy Oblasti’, 1995, Art. 28, Sub-section 1. 41. Ibid., Art. 28, Sub-section 1; Ustav Murmanskoy Oblasti, 1997, Art. 62, Subsection 2. 42. For instance, Ustav Murmanskoy Oblasti, 1997, Art. 64, Sub-section 1 a) states that the Governor represents Murmansk Oblast in relation to the federal authorities, local authorities and the authorities of other subjects of the Russian Federation. For a discussion of the relationship between the Governor of Murmansk Oblast and the regional Duma, see G. Hønneland and A.K. Jørgensen, Integration vs. Autonomy: Civil-Military Relations on the Kola Peninsula, 1999, pp. 103-105. 43. Ustav Murmanskoy Oblasti, 1997, Art. 56, Sub-section 1. The election period was changed from four to five years and the number of representatives from 25 to 26 by regional law of Murmansk Oblast No. 271-01-ZMO of 14 June 2001.

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44. H. Blakkisrud, ‘The Russian Regionalisation Process: Decentralisation by Design or Disintegration by Default?’, 2001; ‘Ustav Arkhangelskoy Oblasti’, 1995, Art. 20, Sub-section 2, states that the regional Sobraniye can have up to 100 representatives. 45. Ustav Murmanskoy Oblasti, 1997, Art. 64, Sub-section 1; ‘Ustav Arkhangelskoy Oblasti’, 1995, Art. 32, Sub-section 2. 46. H. Blakkisrud, ‘The Russian Regionalisation Process: Decentralisation by Design or Disintegration by Default?’, 2001. 47. Ibid.; G. Hønneland and A.K. Jørgensen, Integration vs. Autonomy: CivilMilitary Relations on the Kola Peninsula, 1999. 48. Ustav Murmanskoy Oblasti, 1997, Art. 67, Sub-sections 1, 2. 49. Balakshin was removed from office in February 1996, allegedly due to economic mismanagement; H. Blakkisrud, ‘The Russian Regionalisation Process: Decentralisation by Design or Disintegration by Default?’, 2001. 50. Ibid. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid. Yevdokimov displays an astonishing talent to play on the wrong horses: as leader of the regional Soviet in 1993, he supported Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoy and Chairman of the Supreme Soviet Ruslan Khasbulatov in their struggle with President Yeltsin. Later, he supported Sergey Kiriyenko in August 1998 and Yevgeniy Primakov in April 1999, at times when both prime ministers were on the verge of being removed from power; see J. Hedenskog, Mellan Nordpolen och Moskva: Murmansk oblast och relationen till centralmakten (‘Between the North Pole and Moscow: Murmansk Oblast and its Relations to the Central Power’) (Stockholm: Defence Research Establishment, 2000). 57. H. Blakkisrud, ‘The Russian Regionalisation Process: Decentralisation by Design or Disintegration by Default?’, 2001. 58. When asked in a television interview in October 1999 what had been his most important achievement as a politician, Yevdokimov referred to this adoption campaign. For a more detailed account of the campaign, see G. Hønneland and A.K. Jørgensen, Integration vs. Autonomy: Civil-Military Relations on the Kola Peninsula,

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1999; A.K. Jørgensen, ‘The Military Sector: Federal Responsibility – Regional Concern’, in G. Hønneland and H. Blakkisrud, Centre-Periphery Relations in Russia, 2001. 59. H. Blakkisrud, ‘The Russian Regionalisation Process: Decentralisation by Design or Disintegration by Default?’, 2001. 60. Ibid. 61. Ibid. 62. ‘Dogovor o razgranichenii predmetov vedeniya i polnomochiy mezhdu organami gosudarstvennoy vlasti Rossiyskoy Federatsii i organami gosudarstvennoy vlasti Murmanskoy oblasti’ (‘Agreement on the Delimitation of Subjects of Governance and Authorities between Agencies of the State Power of the Russian Federation and Agencies of State Power of Murmansk Oblast’), signed in Moscow 30 November 1997, published in Rossiyskiye vesti, 25 December 1997. The agreement was cancelled in May 2003; . As mentioned above, President Putin in 2000 took steps to review the future of the bilateral power-sharing agreements, and there has since been a trend towards cancellation of these agreements. 63. ‘Dogovor o razgranichenii predmetov vedeniya i polnomochiy mezhdu organami gosudarstvennoy vlasti Rossiyskoy Federatsii i organami gosudarstvennoy vlasti Murmanskoy oblasti’, 1997. 64. Ibid. 65. H. Blakkisrud, ‘The Russian Regionalisation Process: Decentralisation by Design or Disintegration by Default?’, 2001; B. Risnes, ‘Relations between Moscow and the Regions of Northwestern Russia – The Legal Aspect’, 2001. 66. The exact figure varies. In late 1999, the number for Murmansk was 40 and for Arkhangelsk 54. Ibid. 67. G. Hønneland and A.K. Jørgensen, ‘Closed Cities on the Kola Peninsula: From Autonomy to Integration?’ (1998) 22 Polar Geography 231-248; G. Hønneland and A.K. Jørgensen, Integration vs. Autonomy: Civil-Military Relations on the Kola Peninsula, 1999. 68. O zakrytom administrativno-territorialnom obrazovanii (‘On the Closed Administrative-Territorial Formation’), Federal Law of the Russian Federation No. 3298-1 of 14 July 1992. 69. G. Hønneland and A.K. Jørgensen, ‘Closed Cities on the Kola Peninsula: From Autonomy to Integration?’ 1998; G. Hønneland and A.K. Jørgensen, Integration vs. Autonomy: Civil-Military Relations on the Kola Peninsula, 1999. 70. H. Blakkisrud and G. Hønneland, ‘Conclusions’, in G. Hønneland and H. Blakkisrud (eds), Centre-Periphery Relations in Russia, 2001.

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71. Ibid. 72. Relations between Moscow and the federal subjects of Northwestern Russia are discussed at length in G. Hønneland and H. Blakkisrud, Centre-Periphery Relations in Russia, 2001.

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II STRUCTURE AND PRINCIPLES

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CHAPTER THREE Fisheries Management at the Federal Level

This chapter reviews the principles and structure of Russian fisheries management at the federal level. In line with the questions laid out in Table 1.1, we ask whether the Russian fishery authorities have officially adopted the precautionary approach and whether systems are in place for research, regulation and enforcement that satisfy the requirements of this approach. In particular, do these systems contain provisions or mechanisms that make them flexible enough to take proper action when undesirable situations arise, for instance when reference points are approached?1 The major fish stocks of the Russian northern basin’s most important fishing ground, the Barents Sea, are managed bilaterally by Norway and Russia (see Chapter 1). Stock assessments and scientific recommendations are produced by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) through its Advisory Committee for Fisheries Management (ACFM), on the basis of work carried out by Russian and Norwegian scientists. The Joint Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission (in the following referred to as the Joint Fisheries Commission) annually establishes total allowable catches (TACs) for the joint stocks of Northeast Arctic cod, Northeast Arctic haddock and Barents Sea capelin. Hence, for the purposes of the present analysis we need to investigate whether the precautionary approach has been adopted by these two international institutions, ICES and the Joint Fisheries Commission. We also ask what stance the Russian party has taken concerning the introduction of the precautionary approach here.2 After this review of the international context of the Russian northern fishery basin, we turn to legislation, principles and structure of the fisheries management system internally in Russia. How has fishery legislation developed in the country since the break-up of the Soviet Union? What are the official principles for fisheries management, including the general objectives

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of fishery authorities and more specific criteria for quota allocation? What is the institutional set-up of the system for fisheries management at the federal level? In the concluding section of the chapter, we ask whether the post-Soviet development, as far as development of fisheries legislation, principles and governing institutions is concerned, has favoured the precautionary approach.

THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL In the autumn of 1996, it was decided at the 84th Annual Science Conference of ICES to establish a Study Group on the Precautionary Approach to Fisheries Management (hereafter the Study Group).3 The mission of the Study Group was to draft a new form of ACFM recommendations incorporating the precautionary approach.4 In its first report, the Study Group stated that ‘the adoption of the precautionary approach has considerable implications for fishery management agencies and the fishing industry. It also provides an impressive list of tasks which the scientific community, in general, and ICES, in particular, needs to address’.5 Further, it stated that the FAO Code of Conduct and the UN Agreement on Straddling Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (see Chapter 1) would require the following technical actions: 1. the determination of reference points, with a priority for limit reference points that define the constraints on long-term sustainability, both in theory and as applicable to each stock; 2. improvements in the methods for dealing with uncertainties, notably in relation to evaluating the risk of either approaching or exceeding the limit reference points; 3. the evaluation of how well alternative harvest control rules either maintain stocks in, or restore them to, healthy states.6

On this basis, the Study Group proposed that ICES should: 1. explicitly consider and incorporate uncertainty about the state of stocks into management scenarios; explain clearly and usefully the implications of uncertainty to fishery management agencies; 2. propose thresholds which ensure that limit reference points are not exceeded, taking into account existing knowledge and uncertainties; 3. encourage and assist fishery management agencies in formulating fisheries management and recovery plans. To do this effectively may

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require ICES to assist fishery management agencies in the development of coherent, measurable objectives; 4. quantify and advice on the effects of fisheries on target and non target species, and on biodiversity and habitats; 5. provide advice on fishing fleets and multispecies fisheries systems as well as on single stocks; 6. evaluate fisheries management systems incorporating biological, social and economic factors as appropriate.7

In its discussion about the management implications of the introduction of the precautionary approach, the Study Group concluded that a change in culture was necessary within management agencies towards a management approach less focused on and influenced by short-term considerations and more on long-term sustainability.8 Its report goes on to elaborate the basis for calculations of concrete reference points for the various fish stocks within ICES’s area of jurisdiction.9 The reference points are viewed as signposts for the provision of information on the status of the stocks in relation to predefined limits that should be avoided and targets that should be aimed at in order to achieve the management objectives.10 In 1998, ICES proposed concrete reference points for the Northeast Arctic cod stock, see Table 3.1.

Table 3.1. ICES reference points for Northeast Arctic cod stock11 ICES considers that

ICES proposes that

Blim is 112,000 t, the lowest observed in the 53 year time series classes

Bpa is set at 500,000 t, the SSBa below which the probability of poor year increases

Flim is 0.70, the fishing mortality associated with potential stock collapse

Fpa be set at 0.42. This value is considered to have a 95% probability of avoiding the Flim

a

spawning stock biomass

B refers to the size of the spawning stock while F indicates fishing mortality or catch rate. The -lim values represent levels of spawning stock and catches associated with potential stock collapse (‘limits to be avoided’); the -pa values imply precautionary approach levels for the spawning stock and

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catch rate (‘targets to be aimed at’). A catch rate higher than Fpa is defined as overfishing; a stock with a spawning stock biomass lower than Bpa is considered to be overfished. Hence, the management of the Northeast Arctic cod stock is held to be in accordance with the precautionary approach only as long as the stock’s spawning mass is larger than 500,000 tonnes and the catch rate is lower than 0.42. The reference point for the spawning stock size of 500,000 tonnes equals the ‘safe biological limit’ applied by ICES for this stock since 1986.12 The precautionary approach looms in the protocols of the Joint Fisheries Commission, implicitly since 1997 and explicitly since 2000. In the protocol from its 1997 session, the Joint Fisheries Commission noted: The parties agreed on the need to develop further long-term strategies for the management of the joint stocks of the Barents Sea. Until such a strategy is available for cod, the parties agreed that the annual total quota is to be established so as the spawning stock is maintained above 500,000 tonnes at the same time as the fishing mortality in the next years is reduced to less than Fmed [safe biological limit]=0.46.13

These words are repeated in the protocol from the 1998 session, with the specification that fishing mortality shall be reduced to less than 0.46 ‘no later than in 2001’.14 In the protocol from the 1999 session, Fmed (safe biological limit) is changed to Fpa (precautionary approach) and the aimed-at catch rate level reduced from 0.46 to 0.42,15 i.e. brought into accordance with the recommendations from ICES. In 2000, the Joint Fisheries Commission requested ICES to ‘reconsider the Bpa in light of the dynamics of the cod stock over the last 30-40 years’.16 This replicates a unilateral Russian request in a letter to ICES of 7 August 2000.17 Although the wording of the letter urges ICES to ‘reconsider’ the reference point, it is clear that both the Joint Fisheries Commission and the Russian Government are in fact calling for a reduction. ICES has so far declined to reduce the reference point, referring to on-going analyses that may lead to such a change at a later date.18 To sum up, ICES adopted a strategy for incorporating the precautionary approach in its scientific recommendations in 1997 and established concrete reference points for the Barents Sea fish stocks in 1998. Russian scientists have participated in this work and are hence believed to have approved of its conclusions.19 The Joint Fisheries Commission, it can be argued, has adopted the precautionary approach through its use of the term Fpa reference point, and its establishment in accordance with the recommendations from ICES, since 2000.20 However, the Joint Fisheries Commis-

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sion in 2000 urged ICES to reconsider the level of the Bpa reference point, which meant in practice: to reduce the minimum precautionary approach level of spawning stock biomass. Earlier the same year, the Russian Federation had unilaterally sent a similar request to ICES. This is an indication that Russian authorities find the concrete strategies of ICES ‘more precautionary than necessary’ although it does not say anything about Russia’s principal position towards the precautionary approach. Nor does it say anything about the Russians’ willingness to follow the concrete outcome of these strategies, i.e. quota recommendations; this will be further discussed in Chapter 5.

THE NATIONAL LEVEL Legislation In Chapter 2, we observed that post-Soviet Russian politics have evolved in a virtual legal vacuum. Although a new constitution was in place as early as in 1993, the elaboration of a complementing legal framework has been slow and fumbling, partly as a consequence of the continuous struggles between the presidential administration and the Federal Parliament. Centreregion tensions have also hampered the legislative process. The Parliament’s Upper House, the Federation Council – consisting of the leaders of the executive and legislative authorities of Russia’s 89 federal subjects21 – has often rejected bills after passing the necessary readings in the State Duma.22 Since the early 1990s, the Federal Parliament has been drafting a law on Russian fisheries and the protection of aquatic biological resources of the Russian Federation.23 After having been rejected several times, the bill was finally approved by the State Duma on 19 July 2000.24 However, the Federation Council rejected it on 26 July 2000 because of strong disagreement among the leaders of the different regions.25 A conciliatory commission was established on 20 September 2000 to review the most ‘burning’ issues of the draft.26 From the northern fishery basin, the Governor of Murmansk Oblast and the President of the Republic of Karelia, who had both emerged as strong opponents of this version of the bill, were represented on the conciliatory commission.27 When the Federal Parliament finally passed the bill in the spring of 2001,28 the President refused to sign it citing inconsistencies with other federal legislation.29 The bill was returned to the Federal Parliament for further clarification.30 A second conciliatory commission was established on 7 June 2001.31 On 24 December 2002, the State Duma rejected the revised draft.32

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The centre-region tensions were apparently one of the main hindrances to reaching agreement on the Fisheries Act in the Federal Parliament up till the late 1990s.33 The draft foresees the continuation of federal control over fisheries management, including the economically important quota allocation.34 It even reduces the power of the regional level as compared to the possibilities for regional control spelled out by the Constitution: while the Constitution opens up for regional influence on the management of natural resources in the internal waters and territorial water of the Russian Federation (see Chapters 2 and 4), the draft Fisheries Act defines fish resources in these waters as federal property,35 and hence the prerogative of federal authorities to regulate.36 What also provoked fear among regional actors was the suggestion to introduce levies for quota shares, increase the amount of quotas sold to foreign shipowners and the application of stricter controls by more federal agencies than those already involved in the enforcement of fisheries regulations.37 After a system for quota auctions was introduced in 2001 (see next section), this has been the most burning issue also in discussions about the draft Fisheries Act.38 The fact that a federal fisheries act has not yet been adopted does not imply that Russian fisheries management takes place in a total legal vacuum. The Law on the Russian Exclusive Economic Zone was adopted in 1998, laying the legal foundation for state enforcement in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ).39 A Maritime Doctrine for the Russian Federation up to the year 2020 was adopted in 2001, specifying objectives for the state’s maritime fisheries.40 More importantly, a range of fisheries management issues are regulated by Presidential Decree, Governmental Resolution and, in particular, management decisions at lower levels of the legal hierarchy (primarily Orders from the State Committee for Fisheries; see below). A large amount of such provisions are issued – in the fisheries sector as well as other sectors of Russian politics and economy – but they are often simply not enforced. There is abundant anecdotal evidence of Decrees and Resolutions concerning fisheries management for which not even the slightest attempt has been made to enforce them;41 hence, they can at best be interpreted as symbolic expressions of political will. Many of the decisions in the bilateral management regime for the Barents Sea fish stocks are only codified in a form whereby information about the decision is distributed by management or enforcement bodies to the fishing fleet by fax or telex.42 Typically, the industry association Sevryba43 or the enforcement body Murmanrybvod44 will inform all fishing vessels that Norway and Russia have agreed on a particular regulatory measure, and that the fishing vessels are obliged to comply with this decision from

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a specific date.45 In sum, the development of a Russian fisheries legislation seems to be characterised by inertia at the higher levels of the legal hierarchy and a flood of legal documents at its lower levels. The problem is not so much the inability to produce legal documents but the opposite, i.e. if we exclude the level of law. The ease with which Presidential Decrees, Governmental Resolutions, Orders and Provisions at ministerial level are issued might even reduce the probability of their enforcement. Partly, the enforcement bodies may find some decisions ‘impossible’ to enforce and hence find out that it is not worth taking the trouble to even make an effort in this direction. Partly, decisions clash with each other making it impossible to enforce them at the same time. As the objects of fisheries regulations, i.e. the fishers, get accustomed to not having to take these legal documents seriously, they become alienated from the higher bodies of the administrative and legal hierarchy, and tend to rely more on concrete instructions following from the regulatory and enforcement bodies located in their own region.46 Hence, sending a telex from Sevryba to the fishing fleet of the Barents Sea might prove a more effective ‘legal’ measure than having the decision elevated to the level of order or provision from the federal fisheries management bodies. Objectives and principles As mentioned in the preceding section, Russia has no federal law on fisheries as yet, and it has not been possible to find references to the precautionary approach in the jungle of normative documents issued at lower levels of the legal hierarchy in the area of fisheries; see above.47 Nor is the precautionary approach mentioned in the 1998 Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation48 or the 2001 Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation.49 The Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone instead speaks of principles such as ‘rational use of marine bio-resources’50 and ‘protection of the marine environment’51 as separate entities. Likewise, the Maritime Doctrine emphasises the development aspect of fisheries management, e.g. the need for securing ‘preservation and expansion of the raw materials base of the Russian Federation and ensuring its economic and food independence’.52 Also in statements to the public, Russian fishery authorities tend to emphasise the exploitation of the country’s fish resources as a more important objective than their protection.53 In particular, a main goal seems to be to direct more deliveries of catches from Russian vessels to Russian ports in order to secure employment at Russian fish-processing plants, tax revenues to the Russian state budget and food supplies to the

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Russian population.54 This is particularly evident in recent years’ principles for quota allocation.55 During the Soviet era, the basic principle for quota allocation was potential for production, i.e. catch capacity.56 Quotas were distributed among the various fleets (i.e. ‘enterprises’ or ‘shipowners’) according to the expected catches, with each fleet using the vessels at its disposal.57 Shipping companies had to prove that they had vessels at their disposal of sufficient capacity, and that last year’s quota was fished before they could apply for a new quota.58 From 1995 to late 2000, the allocation of quotas was regulated by a preliminary provision of 22 March 1995 from the State Committee for Fisheries.59 In addition to the criteria of proven catch capacity60 and fished quotas of previous years,61 several circumstances are listed that may affect quota allocation. These include: the rights of indigenous peoples,62 the interests of fishery-dependent communities,63 contributions to research funding, rescue service, supervision and reproduction of fish stocks,64 and compliance with fishing regulations.65 For the 1997 quota allocation, a new distribution system was tested in the northern basin.66 The system was never fully implemented since the regional authorities felt they lacked the guidelines for its practical implementation.67 Still, it gives an idea of the priorities made by federal authorities in the quota allocation process. Crucial to this proposed arrangement was the federal authorities’ interest in using catch quotas as a governing instrument to achieve federal objectives. Fifty per cent of the total catch quota, the so-called technical quota, was to be distributed as before, based on the number of vessels and the former catches of each shipowner.68 The remaining 50 per cent were to be reserved for shipowners that in various ways contributed to fulfilling governmental objectives in fisheries policy.69 Twenty per cent – the so-called social quota – was to be allocated according to the enterprises’ commitment to securing jobs, social benefits for the employees (e.g. nursery schools) and tax payments last year.70 The stimulation quota, supposed to constitute 20 per cent of the total quota, was to be distributed on the basis of the enterprises’ catch of fish stocks other than cod and haddock.71 It should thus be regarded as an incentive to increase the catch volume of the Russian Federation – primarily in the form of pelagic fish – rather than only economic revenue. Finally, 10 per cent of the total quota was to be allocated for a so-called competition quota.72 This was intended as a paid quota, reserved for Russian enterprises with fishing licenses in the Barents Sea that had not been caught for serious violations of the fishing regulations.73 Revenues from the sale of this quota share were to be paid into a fund for stimulating fisheries that make an exceptional

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contribution to fulfilling federal and regional needs, but which are not necessarily economically profitable.74 Thus, Russian federal fishery authorities expressed their clear intention to use fishing quotas as an instrument to support enterprises that play a part in maintaining employment and other social benefits and also in securing the government’s food supplies and tax revenues. Furthermore, they wanted to reward enterprises that showed compliance with fisheries regulations. During the autumn of 1999, discussions arose about new criteria for quota allocation.75 The State Committee for Fisheries prepared a proposal for a preliminary provision on quota allocation.76 The provision contained two new criteria for quota allocation: the delivery of catches to Russian fish-processing plants at levels to be fixed by the federal subjects77 and timely payment of taxes.78 The provision came with a letter from the State Committee for Fisheries stating that ‘in the preparation of [the provision], our mandate has been to clearly strengthen the government’s role in the management of aquatic resources, taking into account the constitutional rights of the federal subjects and the users of the aquatic resources’.79 The letter also stated that the draft had been considered by the Russian Federation’s Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, Ministry of Justice and the State Committee for Environmental Protection, which produced ‘several important, mutually exclusive comments in connection with use of the criteria’.80 It emphasised the introduction of new criteria for quota allocation (fish supplies to the domestic market and payment of all due taxes) as a major element of the provision.81 The letter stated frankly that the purpose of the listed criteria was to ‘give priority to users of aquatic resources that have their own catch fleet, deliver catches to the domestic market and are not in arrears to any level of the government budget’.82 As was the case with the 1997 proposal, this provision was never implemented.83 In late December 2000, a new provision for quota allocation finally emerged, in the form of a Governmental Resolution.84 The Governmental Resolution was confirmed and specified by an Order from the State Committee for Fisheries.85 To a large extent, the new provisions confirm the objectives and principles expressed in both the existing Order No. 49 from 1995 (which was now annulled)86 and the attempts at strengthening the provisions of this order in 1997 and 1999. In particular, parts of the quotas at the regional level shall be allotted to fishing companies that contribute to the development of Russia’s land-based fish-processing industry and that build new fishing vessels at Russian shipyards.87 The ‘traditional’ criterion of catch capacity is maintained, as are the criteria of the fishing companies’ record related to catch of previous years’ quotas, tax payments and compliance

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with fishery regulations.88 A major change as compared to the previous situation was, however, the introduction of quota auctions.89 The main architect behind the new provision was the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, which wanted greater transparency in the quota allocation process and, not least, increased revenues from the fishery sector to the state budget.90 To achieve these ends, an undefined part of the Russian fish quotas is, according to Governmental Resolution No. 1010, to be sold on auction.91 The other main quota categories, according to the Resolution, are international quotas,92 research quotas,93 and industrial quotas not to be sold on auction.94 We return to the actual distribution of quotas between the mentioned categories, federal subjects and individual shipowners in Chapter 5. The institutional set-up There are currently two major federal bodies responsible for fisheries management and enforcement in the Russian Federation, the State Committee for Fisheries and the Federal Border Service, respectively.95 The former is the direct successor to the Soviet Ministry of Fishing Industry. The status of the federal body responsible for fisheries was reduced from a ministry to a committee under the Ministry of Agriculture and Foodstuffs in connection with the break-up of the Soviet Union and the establishment of the Russian Federation in December 1991.96 In 1992, it became independent of the Ministry of Agriculture and Foodstuffs, and in 1996 it was granted the status of a state committee.97 As mentioned in Chapter 2, ministries and state committees are different types of ‘independent’ administrative bodies at the federal level; the ministries are placed higher in the political hierarchy since their leaders are members of the federal Government, but the state committees are not subordinate to any ministry.98 Hence, the federal body for fisheries management was ‘degraded’ in connection with the dissolution of the Soviet Union as it was subsumed into the Ministry of Agriculture and Foodstuffs. It later regained its status as a separate administrative body, albeit at a lower level in the Russian administrative hierarchy. The State Committee for Fisheries, as the successor of the Soviet Ministry of Fishing Industry, is the federal body traditionally responsible for all aspects of fisheries management in the country.99 Research institutes under the Committee collect and analyse data on fish stocks in waters under Russian jurisdiction.100 The Committee is responsible for regulatory action with a view to preservation of these fish stocks. It represents the Russian Federation in international fisheries negotiations – the Russian delegation to the Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission is always headed by the

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Chairman or Deputy Chairman of the Committee – and has the main responsibility for implementation of Russia’s international obligations in fisheries. The Committee decides major regulatory principles and has an important role in advisory or decision-making bodies where several agencies from both the regional and the federal level are represented. It has the last word in all management decisions where other agencies are responsible for the practical work leading up to these decisions.101 For example, the Russian shares of the Barents Sea quotas are distributed among the federal subjects of Northwestern Russia by the so-called Scientific Catch Council and further distributed among shipowners in fisheries councils within each federal subject.102 However, the decisions of both the Scientific Catch Council and the fisheries councils have to be approved by the State Committee for Fisheries.103 Finally, although responsibility for inspections at sea has been transferred to the Federal Border Service (see below), the State Committee for Fisheries’ Department of Protection and Reproduction of Fish Stocks and Regulation of Fisheries (Glavrybvod) and its regional inspection bodies104 are still heavily involved in activities usually understood as enforcement.105 It is the regional inspection bodies, not the Federal Border Service, that license fishing vessels, keep track of how much of the fishing companies’ (and foreign states’) quotas that have been taken at any moment and administer the system of closing and opening of fishing grounds.106 For instance, the regional fishery inspection body in Murmansk, Murmanrybvod, administers a fine-meshed system for the closing and opening of fishing grounds in cases where excessive numbers of undersized fish are detected in the catches.107 Inspectors from Murmanrybvod can close a ‘rectangle’ (a square nautical mile) on site for a period of three days.108 After three days, the ‘rectangle’ is re-opened if scientists from the Knipovich Scientific Polar Institute for Marine Fisheries Research and Oceanography (PINRO; see Chapter 1) make no objections (i.e. if the proportion of undersized fish in catches does not continue to exceed legal limits).109 In addition, the regional inspections still carry out physical inspections in port.110 The most conspicuous issue related to the status, responsibilities and performance of the State Committee for Fisheries in recent years is its fight to defend itself against interference from other federal agencies, in particular the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, the Ministry of Natural Resources, the Ministry of Agriculture and Foodstuffs (later: the Ministry of Agriculture) and various ‘power agencies’. First, an attempt was made to ‘dissolve’ the State Committee for Fisheries by again depriving it of its status as a state committee and incorporating it into the Ministry of Agriculture and Foodstuffs as a department for fisheries in March 1997.111

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Its status as state committee was restored in September 1998 in connection with a general reorganisation of the Russian federal bureaucracy.112 However, responsibility for the collective fishing fleet and fish farming remained under the Ministry of Agriculture and Foodstuffs (later: the Ministry of Agriculture),113 and the Minister of Agriculture (currently Aleksey Gordeyev) is at the same time Deputy Prime Minister responsible for the fisheries sector, i.e. the person in the Government set to oversee the working of the State Committee for Fisheries.114 Second, responsibility for enforcement at sea was transferred from the State Committee for Fisheries and Glavrybvod to the Federal Border Service115 in accordance with a Presidential Decree from August 1997.116 The decision to strip the Committee of responsibility for enforcement was followed by a media campaign – obviously arranged by the ‘power agencies’ and, many would have it, the presidential administration – depicting it as corrupt and hence unfit for this type of task.117 However, the decision met with fierce resistance throughout the fishing industry118 and was only implemented a year later, 1 July 1998.119 Third, the recent introduction of a system for the satellite tracking of fishing vessels in the Russian EEZ120 by Glavrybvod and the Federal Border Service was hampered by the Ministry of Natural Resources, and this Ministry has increasingly attempted to get involved in fisheries management more generally since the late 1990s.121 None of the pieces of fisheries legislation reviewed above (except for the draft Fisheries Act; see below) foresee any role for the Ministry of Natural Resources in fisheries management. However, the Provision on the Ministry of Natural Resources (the Ministry’s ‘constitution’) states that this Ministry shall ‘within the boundaries of its competence ensure the protection of the marine environment and its natural resources, conservation of the biological diversity and compliance with the norms of ecological safety in the Russian Federation’s internal waters, territorial water, continental shelf and exclusive economic zone’.122 The Ministry of Natural Resources has exploited this particular clause to elbow in on the fisheries management process.123 The draft Fisheries Act also foresees a role for this ministry in fisheries management, including the allocation of quotas.124 Fourth, officials on the State Committee for Fisheries accuse a range of other federal agencies, among them the ones they are supposed to cooperate most tightly with, of sabotaging the attempts of the Committee at redirecting the deliveries of Russian-caught fish to Russian ports.125 Fifth, the old tradition of appointing leaders of the Committee from within the fishery complex is no longer followed. During the final years of the 1990s, leaders of the Committee were changed frequently and primarily selected from among candidates with a professional background in ‘power agencies’. In February 2001, the contentious ex-Governor of Primore Kray, Yevgeniy

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Nazdratenko, was appointed head of the State Committee for Fisheries.126 Finally, the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade orchestrated the introduction of a system for the sale of fishing quotas by auction (see above),127 a procedure the State Committee for Fisheries is negative to. In the opinion of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, the auction system brings more transparency to a system of quota distribution that is already suspected of corruption.128 The auctions also bring revenues to the state budget from an industrial sector that in preceding years had contributed little to society since so much catch was delivered abroad.129 The State Committee for Fisheries responded that the system would not be beneficial to Russian society since many fishing enterprises would go bankrupt as a result of the reform, leading to a reduction in jobs and tax revenues.130 It should be noted that the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade not only instigated the reform, but is also given responsibility for overseeing the auctions, according to Governmental Resolution No. 1010.131 In sum, the Russian Federation has a centralised system for fisheries management with the State Committee for Fisheries responsible for research and regulation and the Federal Border Service in charge of enforcement at sea. The State Committee for Fisheries of the Russian Federation is the successor of the Soviet Ministry of Fishing Industry and reflects an attempt to continue the Soviet-type ‘industry-complex approach’ to fisheries management, in which one federal body is responsible for all aspects of the fisheries. It also emerges as a ‘defender of fishery interests’, supporting ‘traditional’ values and objectives, such as securing the provision of food to the population and jobs in the fishing industry, rather than ‘modern’ ideals such as market-economy viability at the enterprise level. However, it has repeatedly had to defend itself in recent years from attacks aimed at reducing its traditional all-embracing influence over fisheries management. In striking back it has been partly successful. But while it has succeeded in maintaining its independence as a separate administrative body, it has been deprived of important tasks and had to bow to interference from other federal agencies in areas it has generally managed alone. It is therefore pertinent to wonder if ‘keeping one’s head above water’ has caused goals to change: has simple survival become the main objective of the Committee?132

CONCLUSIONS The Russian Federation has a system in place for fisheries management, covering the three functional fields of research, regulation and enforcement. Building largely on the remnants of the sector-embracing Soviet Ministry

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of Fishing Industry, the system is relatively well equipped in terms of competence and technology. However, new problems have arisen in the postSoviet era, both within the fishing industry (such as a reduction in catches and deliveries to Russian fish-processing plants) and in the fisheries management system. Notably, the authority of the federal body for fisheries management has been questioned by the state’s highest political leadership. It is cut down in status from a ministry to a state committee, deprived of its powers and standing of former days, and surrounded by allegations of corruption and inefficiency. It was twice subsumed under the Ministry of Agriculture and Foodstuffs as a department for fisheries management (in the periods 1991-92 and 1997-98), and the collective fleet and fish farming issues have remained the responsibility of this Ministry. The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade succeeded in introducing a system for auctions of fish quotas against the will of the State Committee for Fisheries, and emerges as an agenda setter of increasing importance in the country’s fishery policy. The Federal Border Service has taken over responsibility for enforcement at sea, while the Ministry of Natural Resources also attempts to have its say in fishery politics. In this situation, institutional survival, as well as the survival of traditional ‘fishery complex values’ such as increasing catch volumes and jobs in the fishing industry, have become important issues in the State Committee for Fisheries. It is therefore hardly a propitious time to introduce the precautionary approach to fisheries management. The precautionary approach is not mentioned in documents stating the main objectives and principles for Russian fisheries management. Although the country still lacks a law to regulate the fisheries sector, the precautionary approach is not mentioned in related legal documents, such as the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation and the Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation to the Year 2020. Nor is it included in the draft Fisheries Act that was approved by the Federal Parliament and rejected by the President in spring 2001. Hence, the sector appears to be struggling between the ‘traditional exploitation values’ expressed by the State Committee for Fisheries, and ‘modern exploitation values’ pursued by the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade.133 The precautionary approach has been adopted by the international institutions involved in the management of the Barents Sea fisheries, the most important fisheries in the Russian northern basin, but Russia has formally requested a revision in ICES reference points for the Northeast Arctic cod stock, indicating that it finds the basis for scientific recommendations ‘too precautionary’.

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NOTES

1. The question of whether the system is transparent and open to participation by all relevant stakeholders, including protection-oriented groups such as environmental NGOs, is addressed in Chapter 4 after all the bodies involved in the distribution of quotas in Russia’s northern fishery basin – ranging from the Joint Fisheries Commission at the international level (presented in this chapter) via the Scientific Catch Council at the inter-regional level to the regional fishery councils within each federal subject – have been presented in more detail. 2. Only the adoption of principles and practical tools such as reference points is at issue in this chapter. Chapter 5 explores whether the actual setting of quotas is in accordance with the precautionary approach, and whether the two parties to the Joint Fisheries Commission are in agreement concerning quota levels. 3. Report of the Study Group on the Precautionary Approach to Fisheries Management (Copenhagen: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 1997). 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid., p. 4. 6. Ibid., p. 5. 7. Ibid., p. 5. 8. Ibid. 9. Ibid. 10. Ibid. The method of calculating reference points is detailed further in a second report from the Study Group; see Report of the Study Group on the Precautionary Approach to Fisheries Management (Copenhagen: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 1998). 11. ACFM Report 1998 (Copenhagen: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 1998). 12. B. Aasjord, ‘Norsk-russisk rulett i Barentshavet? Fiskeriforvaltning i lys av havrett og internasjonal folkeskikk’ (‘Norwegian-Russian Roulette in the Barents Sea? Fisheries Management in Light of the Law of the Sea and International Practice’) (2001) 59 Internasjonal politikk 303-332. 13. Protokoll for den 26. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Protocol for the 26th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 1997), p. 2.

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14. Protokoll for den 27. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Protocol for the 27th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 1998), p. 2. 15. Protokoll for den 28. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Protocol for the 28th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 1999), p. 2. 16. Protokoll for den 29. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Protocol for the 29th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 2000), p. 2. 17. ACFM Report 2000 (Copenhagen: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 2000). 18. ACFM Report 2001 (Copenhagen: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 2001). 19. See Chapter 5 for a further discussion of Russian scientists’ views on the establishment of Northeast Arctic cod quotas since the late 1990s. 20. Notably, we here speak of the adoption of a goal by the Joint Fisheries Commission in accordance with recommendations from ICES. We do not speak of the adoption of actual quotas, which will be discussed in Chapter 5. 21. As of 2002, the regional leaders will not themselves occupy a seat on the Federation Council; instead, they shall appoint representatives. This change was part of Putin’s ‘spring reorganisation’ of 2000 (see Chapter 3), but has not been implemented at the time of writing. 22. B. Risnes, ‘Relations between Moscow and the Regions of Northwestern Russia – The Legal Aspect’, in G. Hønneland and H. Blakkisrud (eds), CentrePeriphery Relations in Russia. The Case of the Northwestern Regions (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, 2001). 23. Interviews with Russian fisheries officials during the period 1993-2002. The draft that was approved by the Federal Parliament and rejected by the President in spring 2001 (see below) is published as ‘O rybolovstve i sokhranenii vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov’ (‘On Fisheries and the Conservation of Aquatic Biological Resources’), 2001, . It consists of 15 chapters and 83 articles. 24. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Moscow and Murmansk, October 2000. An overview of the draft’s entire history from it was first presented for discussion in the State Duma in 1996 until the second conciliatory commission was established on 7 June 2001 (after the draft had been rejected by the President on 18 April 2001) is found on the State Duma’s website under the list of drafts that have been rejected by the President: . The approval by the State Duma was given in resolution ( postanovleniye) No. 586-III GD; . 25. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Moscow and Murmansk, October 2000. The rejection was given in resolution ( postanovleniye) No. 228-III-SF; . 26. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Moscow and Murmansk, October 2000. The conciliatory commission was established in accordance with resolution ( postanovleniye) No. 628-III GD; . 27. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Moscow and Murmansk, October 2000. 28. The approval by the State Duma on 21 March 2001 was given in resolution ( postanovleniye) No. 1265-III GD; ; the approval by the Federation Council on 4 April 2001 in resolution ( postanovleniye) No. 105-SF; ibid. 29. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Murmansk, June 2001. The draft was rejected by the President in letter No. Pr-722 of 18 April 2001; . 30. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Murmansk, June 2001. 31. The new conciliatory commission was established in accordance with resolution ( postanovleniye) No. 1594-III GD; . 32. Russian Fish Report, No. 1 (76), January 2003, p. 3. 33. Interviews with Russian government officials, Moscow, October 2000 and February 2001. 34. Ibid.; ‘O rybolovstve i sokhranenii vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov’, 2001. Article 11 of the draft states that governing agencies of the federal and regional level participate in the protection of aquatic biological resources under the powers given to them by the Constitution of the Russian Federation. Management of aquatic bio-resources on the continental shelf and in the exclusive economic zone of the Russian Federation, as well as all other resources that are federal property, is defined by Article 14 to be a federal responsibility. Article 15 empowers federal subjects to regulate the use of such resources as are the property of the federal subject, and to take part in the regulation of resources defined as federal property. The definition of federal property in draft Article 23 covers, among other things, resources found within the borders of two or more subjects of the Russian Federation, in the Russian Federation’s internal waters and territorial water, and ‘transboundary’ (transgranichnye) resources. Article 19 gives the Government of the Russian Federation the duty to regulate the country’s fisheries either directly or through ‘the federal body of the executive power in the area of fisheries and its territorial (basin) bodies’.

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35. ‘O rybolovstve i sokhranenii vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov’, 2001, Art. 23. 36. Ibid., Art. 14. 37. Interviews with Russian government officials, Moscow, October 2000 and February 2001. The draft’s Articles 49 and 79 open up for payment for quota shares; ‘O rybolovstve i sokhranenii vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov’, 2001. As far as other federal agencies’ involvement in fisheries management is concerned, there is plenty of reference to ‘the federal body of the executive power responsible for environmental protection’; cf., e.g., Articles 41, 48, 50 and 51 of the draft. Since 2000, the Ministry of Natural Resources performs this task; cf. the discussion below. 38. See, e.g., Russian Fish Report, No. 1 (76), January 2003, p. 3. The draft foresees the continuation of the quota auctions; ‘O rybolovstve i sokhranenii vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov’, 2001, Art. 49, Art. 53. The disagreement about the auction system is by many seen as a continuation of the centre-region conflict: ‘the centre’ is in charge of the auctions and gets most of the profits from them, the argument goes; interviews with Russian civil servants, Murmansk, November 2001, and Moscow, April and December 2002. 39. Ob Isklyuchitelnoy Ekonomicheskoy Zone Rossiyskoy Federatsii (‘On the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation’), Federal Law of the Russian Federation, adopted by the State Duma 18 November 1998 and by the Federation Council 2 December 1998, Moscow. Published in English translation as ‘Federal Act on the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation’ (2001) 46 Law of the Sea Bulletin 37-63. 40. Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation to the Year 2020, approved by the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, 27 July 2001, Pr.-1387 (English version of the Doctrine provided by the Norwegian embassy in Moscow; on file with the author). 41. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Moscow and Murmansk, during the period 1994-2001. 42. Ibid. Observation by the author during the period 1988-2000; cf. section on methodology in Chapter 1. 43. See Chapter 4 for a presentation of this association. 44. This body is further presented in the sub-section on institutional set-up below, as well as in Chapter 4. 45. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Moscow and Murmansk, during the period 1994-2001. Observation by the author during the period 1988-2000; cf. section on methodology in Chapter 1. 46. The issue of fishers’ compliance is further discussed in Chapter 6.

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47. According to some officials in the Russian system for fisheries management, the precautionary approach has been discussed and rejected as a principle for Russian fisheries management by the State Duma during its preparation of a federal law on fisheries; interviews with Russian civil servants, Moscow, April and December 2002. It has not been possible to find verification of this claim in written sources. Article 3 of the present draft does state, though, that the generally accepted principles and norms of international law and international agreements concluded by the Russian Federation in the area of fisheries are an integral part of the legal system of the Russian Federation; ‘O rybolovstve i sokhranenii vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov’, 2001. 48. Ob Isklyuchitelnoy Ekonomicheskoy Zone Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 1998. 49. Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation to the Year 2020, 2001. 50. Ob Isklyuchitelnoy Ekonomicheskoy Zone Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 1998, Chapter 2. 51. Ibid., Chapter 5. 52. Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation to the Year 2020, Chapter 3. As far as protective measures are concerned, the doctrine contains the following general passage under its list of goals pertaining to marine commercial fishing: ‘more active participation of the Russian Federation in the activities of international fishing organizations in connection with further development of the processes of international coordination, international legal regulation of fishing and enhanced requirements to the protection and preservation of the marine environment’ (ibid.). 53. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Moscow and Murmansk, during the period 1994-2001. Observation by the author during the period 1988-2000; cf. section on methodology in Chapter 1. See also next note for a media reference. The draft Fisheries Act, in turn, lists as its aims to ensure ‘rational use and protection of aquatic bio-resources’ and ‘sustainable supplies of fish products to the population of the Russian Federation’; ‘O rybolovstve i sokhranenii vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov’, 2001, Art. 4. Among the leading principles of the draft Fisheries Act are listed: ‘conservation of aquatic bio-resources and their biological diversity’, ‘rational use of aquatic bio-resources’, ‘sustainable development of the economy of the fishing industry’, ‘development of a coastal fishery’ and ‘priority of the interests of Russian citizens’; ibid., Art. 18. 54. For a recent overview, see interview with the head of the State Committee for Fisheries (until May 2003), Yevgeniy Nazdratenko, in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 14 August 2002, p. 1. Commenting on the dilemma between securing food supplies to the population and hard currency for shipowners, he says: ‘If the authorities had decided that the fish should be a source of hard currency like oil, then this is obviously one way of viewing things. So far, this approach has been the prevalent one,

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but I am a supporter of the position that we should provide food for the population ourselves and secure the country’s ability to provide for itself.’ 55. This section only reviews the principles of quota allocation. Whether fishery authorities have in fact followed up these principles in the actual distribution of quotas, will be further discussed in Chapter 5. 56. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Murmansk, February and June 1994. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. Vremennoye polozheniye o poryadke raspredeleniya obshchikh dopustimykh ulovov vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov (‘Preliminary Provision on the Order for Allocation of Total Allowable Catches of Aquatic Biological Resources’), Order of the State Committee for Fisheries of the Russian Federation No. 49 of 22 March 1995. 60. Ibid., Art. 11.3, Art. 12. 61. Ibid., Art. 11.6, Art. 14. 62. Ibid., Art. 11.1. 63. Ibid., Art. 11.2. 64. Ibid., Art. 11.4. 65. Ibid., Art. 11.6, Art. 13. 66. Vremennoye polozheniye o raspredelenii kvot vylova vodnykh bioresursov predpriyatiyam Severnogo rybokhozyaystvennogo basseyna v 1997 godu (‘Provisional Regulation of the Distribution of Quotas of Biological Water Resources to Enterprises of the Northern Fishery Basin in 1997’), the State Committee for Fisheries of the Russian Federation, 27 January 1997. The system was to be evaluated at the end of the year for possible introduction in the other Russian fishing basins; interviews with Russian civil servants, Murmansk, September 1997. 67. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Murmansk, September 1997 and April 1998. 68. Vremennoye polozheniye o raspredelenii kvot vylova vodnykh bioresursov predpriyatiyam Severnogo rybokhozyaystvennogo basseyna v 1997 godu, 1997, Art. 3.1. 69. Ibid., Art. 3. 70. Ibid., Art. 3, Art. 4. 71. Ibid., Art. 3, Art. 5. 72. Ibid., Art. 3, Art. 6.

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73. Ibid., Art. 3, Art. 6. 74. Ibid., Art. 3, Art. 6. 75. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Murmansk and Moscow, October 1999. 76. Vremennoye polozheniye o raspredelenii kvot na vylov vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov vo vnutrennikh vodoyomakh, vnutrennikh morskikh moryakh, territorialnom more, na kontinentalnom shelfe, v isklyuchitelnoy ekonomicheskoy zone Rossiyskoy Federatsii, v zonakh inostrannykh gosudarstv i v rayonakh deystviya mezhdunarodnykh konventsiy po rybolovstvu (‘Preliminary Provision on Quota Allocation of Catches of Aquatic Biological Resources in the Russian Federation’s Rivers and Lakes, Internal Waters, Territorial Water, the Continental Shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone, as well as in Other Countries’ Zones and in the International Convention Areas for Fishing’), the State Committee for Fisheries of the Russian Federation, 1999. 77. Ibid., Art. 12. 78. Ibid., Art. 12. 79. Poyasnitelnaya zapiska (‘Clarification’), attached to Vremennoye polozheniye o raspredelenii kvot na vylov vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov vo vnutrennikh vodoyomakh, vnutrennikh morskikh moryakh, territorialnom more, na kontinentalnom shelfe, v isklyuchitelnoy ekonomicheskoy zone Rossiyskoy Federatsii, v zonakh inostrannykh gosudarstv i v rayonakh deystviya mezhdunarodnykh konventsiy po rybolovstvu, 1999, p. 1. 80. Ibid., p. 2. 81. Ibid., p. 2. 82. Ibid., p. 2. 83. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Moscow and Murmansk, June 2000. 84. O kvotakh na vylov (dobychu) vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov vnutrennikh morskikh vod, territorialnogo morya, kontinentalnogo shelfa i isklyuchitelnoy ekonomicheskoy zony Rossiyskoy Federatsii (‘On Quotas of Catch [Exploitation] of Aquatic Biological Resources of the Russian Federation’s Internal Waters, Territorial Water, Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone’), Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1010 of 27 December 2000. 85. Ob utverzhdenii polozheniya o raspredelenii kvot na vylov (dobychu) vodnykh bioresursov vo vnutrennikh morskikh vodakh, v territorialnom more, isklyuchitelnoy ekonomicheskoy zone i na kontinentalnom shelfe Rossiyskoy Federatsii mezhdu zayavitelyami, zaregistrirovannymi v subyektakh Rossiyskoy Federatsii, territorii kotorykh prilegayut k morskomu poberezhyu (‘On the Confirmation of the Provision on the Distribution of Quotas [Exploitation] of Aquatic Bio-resources in the Russian Federation’s Internal Waters, Territorial Water, Exclusive Economic Zone and on

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the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation between Applicants Registered in Subjects of the Russian Federation, whose Territories Border on the Coastline’), Order of the State Committee for Fisheries of the Russian Federation No. 344 of 1 November 2001. 86. Ibid., Art. 2. 87. O raspredelenii kvot na vylov (dobychu) vodnykh bioresursov vo vnutrennikh morskikh vodakh, v territorialnom more, isklyuchitelnoy ekonomicheskoy zone i na kontinentalnom shelfe Rossiyskoy Federatsii mezhdu zayavitelyami, zaregistrirovannymi v subyektakh Rossiyskoy Federatsii, territorii kotorykh prilegayut k morskomu poberezhyu (‘On the Distribution of Quotas [Exploitation] of Aquatic Bio-resources in the Russian Federation’s Internal Waters, Territorial Water, Exclusive Economic Zone and on the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation between Applicants Registered in Subjects of the Russian Federation, whose Territories Border on the Coastline’), attached to Ob utverzhdenii polozheniya o raspredelenii kvot na vylov (dobychu) vodnykh bioresursov vo vnutrennikh morskikh vodakh, v territorialnom more, isklyuchitelnoy ekonomicheskoy zone i na kontinentalnom shelfe Rossiyskoy Federatsii mezhdu zayavitelyami, zaregistrirovannymi v subyektakh Rossiyskoy Federatsii, territorii kotorykh prilegayut k morskomu poberezhyu, 2001, Art. 3 g) [3 d) if the Latin alphabet is used]. The share of a federal subject’s total quota to be directed to such goals should be at least 20 per cent; ibid., Art. 7. 88. Ibid., Art. 6. 89. O kvotakh na vylov (dobychu) vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov vnutrennikh morskikh vod, territorialnogo morya, kontinentalnogo shelfa i isklyuchitelnoy ekonomicheskoy zony Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 2000, Art. 2 v) [2 c) if the Latin alphabet is used], Art. 4. 90. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Moscow, February 2001. 91. O kvotakh na vylov (dobychu) vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov vnutrennikh morskikh vod, territorialnogo morya, kontinentalnogo shelfa i isklyuchitelnoy ekonomicheskoy zony Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 2000, Art. 2 v) [2 c) if the Latin alphabet is used], Art. 4. The position taken by Russian fishery authorities to the auctions is discussed in the section on institutional set-up below. 92. Ibid., Art. 2 a). These are shares of quotas in other states’ EEZs that the Russian Federation has purchased or acquired through exchange of quotas. 93. Ibid., Art. 2 b). These are shares of quotas mainly intended for research vessels but can also be used to finance enforcement bodies. In such cases, the enforcement bodies are allocated a quota share which they can subsequently sell to ordinary fishing companies. 94. Ibid., Art. 2 g) [2 d) if the Latin alphabet is used].

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95. I.e. if we limit ourselves to the main traditional tasks of fisheries management; as follows from the discussion below, other bodies of governance have also demanded a say in the fisheries management of post-Soviet Russia, some quite successfully. 96. Otchet o nauchno-issledovatelskoy rabote po teme: Nauchno-issledovatelskiye raboty v oblasti rybnogo khozyaystva Rossii (‘Report on Scientific Research Work on the Theme: Scientific Research Works in the Field of Russia’s Fishing Industry’) (Moscow: VNIERKh, 2002). 97. Ibid. 98. The independent committee (i.e. not a state committee, nor a committee subordinate to a ministry) is not used as a category of federal governing agencies in the Russian Federation at present; cf. . 99. In 2001, the State Committee for Fisheries consisted of seven departments: Department of Biological Resources and Organisation of Fisheries (36 employees and 3 subordinate divisions), Department of Protection and Reproduction of Fish Stocks and Regulation of Fisheries (known by the acronym Glavrybvod) (29 employees and 5 subordinate divisions), Department of Research (22 employees and 4 subordinate divisions), Department of Economy and Finance (46 employees and 7 subordinate divisions), Department of Ocean Affairs (22 employees and 3 subordinate divisions), Department of International Co-operation (18 employees and 3 subordinate divisions) and Department of Personnel Administration and Educational Institutions (24 employees and 3 subordinate divisions). In addition, the Committee comprised two independent divisions, the Legal Division and the Administrative Division; G.M. Gibatov, Upravleniye rybnym khozyaystvom Rossii i regiona. Opyt i perspektivy (‘Management of the Fishing Industry of Russia and the Region. Experience and Perspectives’) (Moscow: OOO Alba, 2001). 100. Two federal research institutes are subordinate to the State Committee for Fisheries: the All-Russian Institute of Fisheries Research and Oceanography (VNIRO) and the All-Russian Institute of Economic Fisheries Research (VNIERKh). VNIRO, in turn, has nine subordinate research institutes and the regional level: PINRO in Murmansk, SevPINRO in Arkhangelsk, AtlantNIRO in St Petersburg and TINRO, KamchatNIRO, SakhNIRO, MagadanNIRO, KhoTINRO and ChukhotTINRO, all in the far eastern fishery basin; ibid. 101. I.e. if we limit ourselves to the traditional ‘fisheries complex’; as follows below, other bodies of governance have challenged the supremacy of the State Committee for Fisheries in post-Soviet Russian fisheries management. 102. The composition of these bodies is set out in Chapter 4. 103. Vremennoye polozheniye o poryadke raspredeleniya obshchikh dopustimykh ulovov vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov, 1995, Art. 17; O raspredelenii kvot na vylov (dobychu) vodnykh bioresursov vo vnutrennikh morskikh vodakh, v territorialnom more, isklyuchitelnoy ekonomicheskoy zone i na kontinentalnom shelfe

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Rossiyskoy Federatsii mezhdu zayavitelyami, zaregistrirovannymi v subyektakh Rossiyskoy Federatsii, territorii kotorykh prilegayut k morskomu poberezhyu, 2001, Art. 2. However, things may be less straightforward in practice than they seem judging on the basis of this provision. The head of the State Committee for Fisheries, Yevgeniy Nazdratenko, was removed from office in spring 2003 precisely because he had interfered with the quota allocation in the far eastern fishery basin. It is a typical example of post-Soviet legislation being inconsistent, imprecise or simply not enforced, and that power or money decides its interpretation. The State Committee for Fisheries does indeed demand a considerable amount of changes in regional fishery regulations each year, and these are obviously by and large complied with. For information about the process that led up to Nazdratenko’s removal, see, e.g., Moscow Times, 5 May 2003, p. 3; Moscow Times, 6 May 2003, p. 8. 104. In 2001, Glavrybvod had approximately 30 regional inspection bodies; G.M. Gibatov, Upravleniye rybnym khozyaystvom Rossii i regiona. Opyt i perspektivy, 2001. 105. General directions for co-ordination and exchange of information between the Federal Border Service and Glavrybvod are given in Polozheniye o vzaimodeystvii i koordinatsii deyatelnosti organov i voysk Federalnoy pogranichnoy sluzhby Rossiyskoy Federatsii i organov po okhrane, vosproizvodstvu rybnykh zapasov i regulirovaniyu rybolovstva Gosudarstvennogo komiteta Rossiyskoy Federatsii po rybolovstvu v sfere okhrany vodnykh bilogicheskikh resursov (‘Provision on Interaction and Co-ordination of the Activities of Organs and Troops of the Federal Border Service of the Russian Federation and the Organs Responsible for Protection, Reproduction of Fish Stocks and Regulation of Fisheries under the State Committee for Fisheries of the Russian Federation in the Sphere of Protection of Aquatic Biological Resources’), Order of the Federal Border Service of the Russian Federation and the State Committee for Fisheries of the Russian Federation of 12 January 1999. 106. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Murmansk, September 1998, January and March 1999. 107. Ibid. 108. Ibid. 109. Ibid. 110. Ibid. 111. O sovershenstvonanii struktury federalnykh organov ispolnitelnoy vlasti (‘On the Modification of the Structure of the Federal Organs of the Executive Power’), Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 249 of 17 March 1997. 112. O strukture federalnykh organov ispolnitelnoy vlasti (‘On the Structure of the Federal Organs of the Executive Power’), Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 1142 of 22 September 1998.

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113. The present tasks of the Ministry of Agriculture are outlined in its ‘constitution’, Polozheniye o Ministerstve selskogo khozyaystva Rossiyskoy Federatsii (‘Provision on the Ministry of Agriculture of the Russian Federation’), confirmed by Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 901 of 29 November 2000. For further information (in Russian) on the Ministry of Agriculture, see . 114. . 115. A ‘service’ (sluzhba) is also an independent federal agency immediately below ministry level; cf. Chapter 2. Although often referred to as a ‘military’ agency, the Federal Border Service is not answerable to the Ministry of Defence. In spring 2003, however, the Federal Border Service was incorporated into the Federal Security Service (FSB) (RFE/RL Newsline, 12 March 2003). 116. O merakh po obespecheniyu okhrany morskikh biologicheskikh resursov i gosudarstvennogo kontrolya v etoy sfere (‘On Measures to Secure Protection of Marine Biological Resources and State Control in this Sphere’), Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 950 of 29 August 1997. 117. An example is the massive headline on the front page of Izvestiya on 12 September 1997: ‘The Mafia Has Beaten the Fishery Inspection. Can the Border Guard Beat the Mafia?’ 118. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Murmansk, September 1998. See Chapter 4 for further reference. 119. Ibid. As mentioned above, general directions for co-ordination and exchange of information between the Federal Border Service and Glavrybvod are given in Polozheniye o vzaimodeystvii i koordinatsii deyatelnosti organov i voysk Federalnoy pogranichnoy sluzhby Rossiyskoy Federatsii i organov po okhrane, vosproizvodstvu rybnykh zapasov i regulirovaniyu rybolovstva Gosudarstvennogo komiteta Rossiyskoy Federatsii po rybolovstvu v sfere okhrany vodnykh bilogicheskikh resursov, 1999. 120. O sozdanii otraslevoy sistemy monitoringa vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov, nablyudeniya i kontrolya za deyatelnostyu promyslovykh sudov (‘On the Establishment of a Sector System for Monitoring of Aquatic Biological Resources and Surveillance and Control of the Activity of Fishing Vessels’), Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 226 of 26 February 1999. 121. Without the signature of the Minister of Natural Resources, the fishery authorities, i.e. Glavrybvod and the Federal Border Service, cannot take action with fishing vessels on the basis of data from the system for satellite tracking, according to established practice; interviews with Russian civil servants, Moscow, April and December 2002. A recent interview with Yevgeniy Nazdratenko, head of the State Committee for Fisheries until May 2003 (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 14 August 2002, p. 1) reads as follows regarding the fishery authorities’ conflict with the Ministry

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of Natural Resources: ‘[Journalist:] Your conflicts with the Ministry of Natural Resources are legendary. People say that Minister [of Natural Resources] Artyukhov does not even lift the receiver when you call on the telephone, and that he has never spoken to you directly. Is that correct? [Nazdratenko:] You could try – please, go ahead! [Journalist rings the number.] [Journalist:] Yes, that’s right. They don’t answer. [Nazdratenko:] You could try to argue your way to a meeting with him. And if you do ever get to see him he will tell you that the State Committee for Fisheries consists of a bunch of idiots. [. . .] The Ministry of Natural Resources thinks that the State Committee for Fisheries should be a department under the Ministry of Natural Resources, nothing less. But we do not think so.’ The Ministry of Natural Resources in May 2000 ‘co-opted’ the (then) State Committee for Environmental Protection, which in turn had had its status reduced from that of a ministry in 1996. For an account of these events, see G. Hønneland and A.K. Jørgensen, Implementing International Environmental Agreements in Russia (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003). 122. Polozheniye o Ministerstve prirodnykh resursov Rossiyskoy Federatsii (‘Provision on the Ministry of Natural Resources of the Russian Federation’), confirmed by Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 726 of 25 September 2000, Art. 6, Sub-section 13. For further information (in Russian) on the Ministry of Natural Resources, see . 123. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Moscow, April and December 2002. 124. The draft speaks of the ‘federal body of the executive power responsible for environmental protection’. As mentioned, this has been the prerogative of the Ministry of Natural Resources since the State Committee for Environmental Protection was disbanded in 2000. The draft Fisheries Act foresees a role for this agency in the production of fishery regulations (Art. 41), the establishment of TACs (Art. 48) and quota allocation at the inter-regional (Art. 50) and intra-regional (Art. 51) level; ‘O rybolovstve i sokhranenii vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov’, 2001. 125. The argument is that Russian vessels choose to deliver their catches abroad not primarily due to variations in price levels, but because the regional offices of many Russian federal authorities have intensified their inspections of fishing vessels since the early 1990s as they have come to rely more on the results of their own work (e.g. fines) and less on transfers of federal funds. The newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta (14 August 2002, p. 1) lists 25 federal agencies that inspect Russian fishing vessels when they arrive in a Russian port. The author’s interviews with Russian fishers (Båtsfjord, November 1997, June and August 1998) confirm this impression. Whereas a delivery procedure in a Norwegian port takes less than an hour, a similar procedure in Murmansk would take several days since the skippers have to physically show up at the premises of the agencies in question, ‘knocking on every door’. The fishers complain that the veterinary service is one of the federal agencies that make deliveries in Russian ports a hassle. The veterinary ser-

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vice is under the Ministry of Agriculture, and this is one reason why relations between this ministry and the State Committee for Fisheries are strained (see above). 126. It is commonly believed that Nazdratenko was offered the post of head of the State Committee for Fisheries by the state’s leaders to prevent him from entering the race for governor in his home region once more. See, e.g., Vedomosti, 26 February 2001. 127. O kvotakh na vylov (dobychu) vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov vnutrennikh morskikh vod, territorialnogo morya, kontinentalnogo shelfa i isklyuchitelnoy ekonomicheskoy zony Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 2000, Art. 2 v) [2 c) if the Latin alphabet is used], Art. 4. This is an example of how more general legislation appearing before the Fisheries Act reduces the scope of action for fishery management authorities. Although a formal law ranks higher in the legal hierarchy than a Governmental Resolution, it may prove difficult to change institutional practices once they have settled. In this case, the principle of quota shares being sold on auctions was incorporated in the draft Fisheries Act; ‘O rybolovstve i sokhranenii vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov’, 2001, Art. 49, Art. 53. See also Russian Fish Report, No. 1 (76), January 2003, p. 3. 128. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Moscow, February 2001. As this manuscript is being finalised, the corruption rumours seem to become substantiated; cf. the following extract from State Duma deputy and self-proclaimed corruption fighter Boris Reznik’s article ‘The Mafia’s Ocean’ (Izvestiya, 28 February 2003, p. 1): ‘On February 13, 2003, Prime Minister Kasyanov sacked Leonid Kholod and Yuriy Moskaltsov from their posts as deputy chairmen on the State Committee for Fisheries after District Attorney Vladimir Ustinov had briefed him in writing on the corruption investigations involving executives on the committee. [. . .] Indeed, allegations of shady dealings implicating the committee are far from a fresh occurrence. Everybody knows that committee members take bribes of staggering proportions, and that stealing takes place on a grand scale. [. . .] Over the space of a year, fishing companies on Kamchatka paid about 5 million dollars to corrupt committee officials. Let the investigations uncover whose Bahamas accounts grew by the sum of 250 000 dollars, paid in by the Pollux concern. Likewise, Fishrain, another company, poured 250 000 dollars into the account of a firm registered in Cyprus. [. . .] In a report for Prime Minister Kasyanov, D. Kislitsyn, head of the government’s control department, says that “Profoundly negative processes have been apparent in the Russian fisheries business for several years. The State Committee for Fisheries deals inappropriately with the funds procured from the sale of resources caught for scientific and regulatory purposes, funds which rightfully should be transferred into the accounts of the specialised scientific research stations . . . Instead, the money ends up lining the pockets of the shipowners who share out some of it, but retain 75 percent for themselves. The State Committee for Fisheries is hence deprived of more than three quarters of its proceeds overall.”’ For a further update,

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see IntraFish, , 6 April 2003 (‘Does Russia’s State Fishery Agency Have a Problem with Embezzlement?’). 129. The head of the State Committee for Fisheries until May 2003, Yevgeniy Nazdratenko, comments on the auction system in the following way: ‘The quota auctions are for raw and cynical people. I say it aloud for everyone to hear: We don’t carry out the auctions. Not us! It is not us who choose the auction houses where the auctions take place. At the last auction in July, for instance, the house earned 33 million roubles just in rent for the premises. Imagine if we had been able to send this money to Severodvinsk to build purse seiners! But no – there is no money for purse seiners. And after the auction, two lavish dinners were organised for the people involved. If an ordinary fisher had been treated like that, he wouldn’t have believed it. It’s shameful. It should be possible after all to arrange even things like these auctions less cynically. But however unpleasant it gets, we’ll get by somehow’ (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 14 August 2002, p. 1). The quote says something about the ideological gap between the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade and the State Committee for Fisheries. For further information (in Russian) on the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, see . Interestingly, the State Committee for Fisheries does not, unlike most federal bodies of governance in the Russian Federation, have its own ‘constitution’ ( polozheniye) which sets out its tasks and responsibilities (cf. reference to the ‘constitutions’ of the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Ministry of Agriculture above). Allegedly, this is the result of disagreement both within the fishery complex and between the State Committee for Fisheries and other bodies of governance regarding the actual tasks of this agency; interviews with Russian civil servants, Moscow, April and December 2002. Head of the State Committee for Fisheries until May 2003, Yevgeniy Nazdratenko, repeatedly demanded such a ‘constitution’ on behalf of his agency, complaining that he was working bez polozheniya (‘without “constitution”’); ibid. According to G.M. Gibatov, Upravleniye rybnym khozyaystvom Rossii i regiona. Opyt i perspektivy, 2001, p. 116, the State Committee for Fisheries had a ‘constitution’ before it was subsumed into the Ministry of Agriculture and Foodstuffs in 1997. The State Committee for Fisheries is also one of the few federal bodies of governance in Russia without an official website; cf. the website of the Russian state system: . 130. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Moscow, February 2001. See also interview with Yevgeniy Nazdratenko referred to in the last note. 131. O kvotakh na vylov (dobychu) vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov vnutrennikh morskikh vod, territorialnogo morya, kontinentalnogo shelfa i isklyuchitelnoy ekonomicheskoy zony Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 2000, Art. 4. The State Committee for Fisheries and the Ministry of Finance are also supposed to take part in the organisation of the auctions, but the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade is in charge; ibid.

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132. More ambitiously, leading officials of the State Committee for Fisheries see it as their task to regain its ministerial status. For instance, Yevgeniy Nazdratenko, head of the Committee until May 2003, says: ‘I am utterly convinced that it is necessary to re-establish a strong Ministry of Fishing Industry. Russia is the only country without a minister to manage the fish. Even a small island like Nauru has its own minister of fisheries. I’m not doing this to thwart the appointment of Nazdratenko, that’s fair enough, but I do want to see the resurrection of the Ministry of Fishing Industry!’ (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 14 August 2002, p. 1). The draft Fisheries Act states that fisheries management is performed by the Government of the Russian Federation ‘directly or through a federal body of the executive power in the area of fisheries and its territorial (basin) bodies’; ‘O rybolovstve i sokhranenii vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov’, 2001, Art. 19. As mentioned in the preface of this book, rumours are in spring 2003 surfacing of a third dissolution of the State Committee for Fisheries as a separate body. 133. ‘Exploitation’ is not used to denote anything suspicious here, simply to contrast the desire to ‘exploit’ fishing resources to their ‘protection’. In this context, the State Committee for Fisheries seeks to extract societal goods such as food and jobs, whereas the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade wants to see revenues pouring in from the fisheries sector.

CHAPTER FOUR Fisheries Management at the Regional Level

As we saw in Chapter 2, management of natural resources in the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Russian Federation is a strictly federal responsibility, as set out in Article 71 of the 1993 Constitution.1 As Article 72 of the Constitution sets out, other natural resources than those found in the EEZ (e.g. those found in the state’s territorial water) are the joint responsibility of federal and regional (i.e. of a federal subject) authorities.2 In its Article 76, Paragraph 5, the Constitution grants federal legislation precedence over regional legislation in areas of joint jurisdiction.3 However, the scope of regional legislation is not limited by the areas covered by federal legislation. Article 73 of the Constitution states that, except for the areas of jurisdiction mentioned in Articles 71 and 72, federal subjects ‘exercise the entire spectrum of state power’.4 On the basis of this, one would expect federal authorities to control the management of the Russian fisheries within the country’s EEZ, and federal and regional authorities to have agreed on some form of joint responsibility for regulating fisheries in the territorial water.5 However, as the role of regional authorities, especially of the executive branch of government (the governors and their regional administrations), has grown since the mid-1990s (see Chapter 2), one might be tempted to ask if the regional administrations in Northwestern Russia have done anything to expand their sphere of influence to include fisheries management also in the EEZ. Apart from discussing the aspirations of regional authorities in this respect, a particularly interesting question concerns the stance taken by federal agencies located in the region (in particular, regional representations of the State Committee for Fisheries and the Federal Border Service; cf. Chapter 3) on issues concerning delineation of responsibilities between federal and regional authorities. Do these federal agencies in the region primarily represent the interests of their superiors in Moscow, or

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have they ‘gone native’, identifying more with the interests of the regional ‘fisheries complex’? This chapter reviews the role played by regional authorities, federal agencies located in the region, and others – in particular, target groups, research institutes and non-governmental organisations (NGOs) – in the management of Russia’s northern fishery basin since the early 1990s. What are the formal roles of the various actors in the management process, notably in the allocation of fish quotas? What are the defined goals of regional authorities in fishery politics? Have regional authorities established their own principles of quota allocation, or do they follow a strategy set out by federal authorities (see Chapter 3)? Further to the questions pertaining to the federal level explored in Chapter 3, this chapter addresses the representation of user groups and other key stakeholders in the management process.6 First, a brief overview of the Northwest Russian fishing industry.

THE NORTHWEST RUSSIAN FISHING INDUSTRY7 The fishing industry of Northwestern Russia developed rapidly after the Russian Revolution in 1917. The Murmansk Trawl Fleet was established in 1920, and a development programme for the fisheries sector was launched in 1926 by the central Soviet power. The building of the Murmansk Fish Combinate, which was to become the largest industrial fish processing complex in the Soviet Union, began via this government initiative. As in other areas of the industrial sector in the Soviet Union, the sector principle was the template used to organise the fisheries sector. The union’s economic interests were divided into a certain number of sectors, each delegated to a separate ministry. Apart from Khrushchev’s attempts in the years 195764 to organise Soviet industry on a territorial basis, the sector principle prevailed until the post-Soviet privatisation project took over in 1992. The association of fishing companies in the northern basin of the Soviet Union, Sevryba (an acronym for North Fish), was founded in 1965. It was given the status of General Directorate of the Soviet Ministry of Fishing Industry in the northern basin. Similar bodies were set up in the Far East (Dalryba), the Baltics (Zapryba), the Caspian Sea (Kaspryba), the Azov Sea and the Black Sea (Azcherryba, later re-named Yugryba). After several less comprehensive reorganisation efforts, Sevryba was reorganised as a private joint-stock company in the autumn of 1992. Twenty-three companies with various core activities (ranging from shipowners, on-shore processing factories, a shipyard, research institutions, sales and supply organisations and

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various other firms) constituted the founders of the company. In April 1993, the Union of Private Fishery Enterprises in the North was assimilated in the Sevryba structure. This union, founded in 1992, comprises approximately 100 small private firms directly involved in or connected to the fishing industry in Northwestern Russia. However, only around 70 of them are involved in the catching of fish, and less than 20 have a cod quota in the Barents Sea. The core activity of most is not fishery; they catch or sell fish primarily to raise funds for other types of production or trade. The main structure of the fishing companies continued into the new institutional framework, which means that the majority of the approximately 450 fishing vessels located in Northwestern Russia are still controlled by a handful of fishing companies. The rest are divided among kolkhozes (the collective fleet) and other so-called new small private fishing companies. The total number of vessels has remained relatively stable during the postSoviet era since few old vessels have been decommissioned (despite exceeding their anticipated lifetime), and relatively few new vessels purchased. The fishing companies in Northwestern Russia can be divided into five different categories; cf. Table 4.1.

Table 4.1. Five types of Northwest Russian fishing companies8 Inside Sevryba

Outside Sevryba

• the ‘traditional’ fleets (Murmansk • about 30 kolkhozes (fishing Trawl Fleet, Murmanrybprom, collectives) organised in Sevrybkholodflot, Sevrybpromrazvedka, Roskolkhozsoyuz Arkhangelsk Trawl Fleet Base, • 8 kolkhozes organised in the Arkhangelskrybprom and Union of Fishing Collectives in Karelrybflot) the North • The Union of Private Fishery • The Union of Coastal Fishers Enterprises in the North (about 100 (about 40 enterprises conducting enterprises, of which approximately fishery with passive gear from 70 are involved in fishing) vessels of less than 36 metres)

The ‘traditional’ fleets consist mainly of medium-sized (50-70 metres) and large (over 70 metres) vessels, and each company owns between 30 and 95 vessels. All in all, there are 250-300 vessels in this category. Before the dissolution of the Soviet Union, they were used mainly in the exploitation of pelagic species in distant waters and pelagic and demersal species in the

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Northern Atlantic and the Barents Sea. Now, they mainly fish for cod in the Barents Sea. The kolkhozes represent in some respects fleet structures similar to the traditional fishing companies, but with significantly fewer vessels, ranging from one to ten vessels each. They count around 80-100 vessels altogether. Nearly all are mid-sized (50-70 metres). An important characteristic of the fishing collectives is their more diversified business activities than the other fishing companies and they are also more engaged than the others in the fishing of pelagic species. The new companies (including the coastal fishing fleet)9 have the smallest fishing fleet, both in terms of numbers and size, which clearly limits the range of the vessels and, in practice, also the sales markets for the fish in geographical terms. The fleet consists mainly of fresh/salt fish combination vessels, but freezing vessels are gradually taking over. It counts some 100 vessels in all, including about 30 coastal fishing vessels of less than 50 metres. The rest are mid-sized (50-70 metres). Although the structure in the Russian northern fishery basin fleet remained largely unchanged for around a decade after the dissolution of the Soviet Union (apart from the emergence of a number of small private shipowners, partly from the remains of former kolkhozes), a few development trends are discernible. First, some organisations have been made redundant by the wider changes in organisational structure and fishing patterns, notably the freezing fleet Sevrybkholodflot and the exploration fleet Sevrybpromrazvedka. The former is now engaged in general sea transport, the latter is dissolved. Second, the auction system introduced in 2001 has made it difficult for some of the traditional players to survive; Murmanrybprom has, for instance, had to sell off many of its vessels and is allegedly in dire economic straits. Third, the system of bare-boat charter has become the main means by which the Northwest Russian fishing fleet is renewed; vessels are built abroad, particularly in Norway, and ‘paid for’ by future deliveries of fish.10

Table 4.2. Total catch by the vessels of Russia’s northern fishery and catches taken in the Northeast Atlantic (the Norwegian and Barents Seas) basin during the period 1990-2000 (in thousand tonnes)11 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 Total catch 1,593 1,464 1,205 Catch in the 234 633 858 Northeast Atlantic

905 707

725 662.4 669 568 589 617

623.3 577 724 843 566 529 639 792.2

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350

300

250

200 150

100

50 0

1988

1989

1990

1991

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

Figure 4.1. Export of cod from Russia’s northern fishery basin 1988-1999 (in thousand tonnes)12

The northern basin fisheries sector employed some 80,000 persons at the end of the Soviet period. The Murmansk Fish Combinate alone accounted for more than 6,000 employees in the land-based processing industry, while the largest fleet, the Murmansk Trawl Fleet, employed more than 17,000 persons at its peak. A sharp reduction in catches, and subsequently in jobs, set in at the beginning of the 1990s. As follows from Table 4.2, the total catch by vessels from the Soviet/Russian northern fishery basin dropped year by year from nearly 1.6 mill. tonnes in 1990 to a low point of less than 600,000 tonnes in 1998, since when catches have increased slightly. The main reason for the drop was heightened fuel costs which made distant water fishing uneconomic. As a result, since the early 1990s the vessels have mainly stayed in the nearby Barents Sea. Table 4.2 shows that catches in the Northeast Atlantic in the 1990s were fairly stable at about 600-800,000 tonnes.13 Added to the problems of the land-based processing industry in Murmansk, Russian landings of fish abroad soared in the same period. While the export of cod from the northern basin constituted only some 25-40,000 tonnes annually until the early 1990s, for the years 199597 the Russians exported nearly 300,000 tonnes of cod annually. After 1997, there has been a small reduction, but exports still reach some 200-250,000 tonnes each year; cf. Figure 4.1. The increase in exports since the early 1990s comes from the need of Northwest Russian fishers to compensate

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Table 4.3. Production of fish products on mother-ships and at land-based processing plants of Russia’s northern basin 1990-98 (in thousand tonnes)14 Type of organisation and output

1990

1992

1994

1995 1997

1998

128.2 103.9

32.4

2.9

2.6

-

Mother-ships Consumer products Canned foods

26.0

7.9

1.1

-

-

-

Non-consumer products

26.9

16.5

3.1

0.5

-

-

Consumer products

83.3

30.7

17.7

13.1

11.1

10.1

Canned foods

30.6

21.0

16.1

16.9

12.3

9.5

Non-consumer products

27.1

14.1

4.4

2.5

1.1

1.0

Land-based processors

both for the termination of state subsidies and an overall reduction in total catches (loss of distant water fishing opportunities). The main effect of landing most Russian-caught fish abroad is fewer jobs in Murmansk, both in the active fishing fleet and in processing industries ashore and at sea (on board so-called ‘mother-ships’). The Murmansk Fish Combinate and the northern basin fleet of mother-ships have seen activities fall off significantly since the mid-1990s; cf. Table 4.3. The fleet of mother-ships has practically been at a standstill since 1994-95. The production of consumer goods at the land-based production facilities in Northwestern Russia dropped from more than 80,000 tonnes in 1990 to some 10,000 tonnes annually from 1995. The number of jobs connected with the northern fishery basin is believed to have dropped to about 35-40,000.15

THE ROLE OF REGIONAL AUTHORITIES Regional authorities, in Soviet times totally subservient first to federal authorities and then the Communist Party, have traditionally had no role in the management of Northwest Russian fisheries. The 1993 Constitution also states that the management of natural resources in the EEZ is an exclusive federal responsibility; cf. Chapter 2.16 As we further saw in Chapter 2, however, the role of regional authorities, especially the governors and their regional administrations, has been strengthened quite markedly during the

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1990s. Have the regional administrations of Northwestern Russia attempted to expand their spheres of influence to fisheries management? The answer is that they have indeed tried to do so, but that the results of their efforts are more uncertain. A major attempt by the Northwest Russian federal subjects to gain influence in fisheries management was made in the early 1990s. Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and Karelia established fisheries departments under their regional administrations in 1993-94 and demanded to have a say in the quota distribution, then dominated by Sevryba, which, in reality, functioned as a regional representative of the State Committee for Fisheries.17 In late 1993, the Governor of Murmansk Oblast boasted about having reached an agreement with the Committee that the regional administration was to take over Sevryba’s management responsibilities.18 This conclusion appeared to be premature, but the regional administrations were from now on represented on the bodies which distributed fishing quotas.19 The northern fishery basin quotas have in recent years been distributed in two stages. The first stage is managed by the inter-regional Scientific Catch Council ([basseynovyy] nauchno-promyslovyy sovet), the second by regional fishery councils (territorialnyy rybokhozyaystvennyy sovet) inside each federal subject. The Scientific Catch Council was in operation also in Soviet times, but the regional catch councils emerged in the mid-1990s, after preliminary provision No. 49 of 22 March 1995 was issued by the State Committee for Fisheries; cf. Chapter 3.20 The practice was confirmed in Order No. 344 of the State Committee for Fisheries of 1 November 2001,21 following up the decisions of Governmental Resolution No. 1010 of 27 December 2000.22 The Scientific Catch Council divides the catch between the federal subjects and decides how much of it is to be allocated for ‘basin purposes’, i.e. to finance essential operations such as research and monitoring.23 Throughout the 1990s, the Council was lead by Grigoriy Tishkov, long-standing managing director of Sevryba.24 Since 2001, its head has been the director of the State Committee for Fisheries’ Department of Biological Resources and Organisation of Fisheries, and later a Vice Chairman of the Committee.25 The regional fisheries councils are led by the heads of the fisheries divisions of the regional administrations (i.e. representing the governors/republican presidents).26 All decisions made by both the Scientific Catch Council and the regional fisheries councils must be approved by the State Committee for Fisheries.27 A central discussion topic in Russia’s northern fisheries community at the end of the 1990s was the question of establishing a new ‘basin management body’, i.e. an official body in charge of managing the entire northern fisheries basin.28 Scientists from the Kola Science Centre proposed creating

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such an organisation in a memorandum to the Murmansk Oblast administration in 1997.29 The ‘basin body’ would be based on the remains of Sevryba and placed under both the State Committee for Fisheries and the executives of the four federal subjects in Northwestern Russia.30 In May 1999, the Murmansk Oblast administration submitted a formal proposal to the State Committee for Fisheries to establish a new ‘basin body’.31 The proposal gained support at a meeting of the Northwestern Economic Association (see Chapter 1) in early autumn, but it was suggested that the main office should be located in St Petersburg.32 This led to more intensive lobbying from Murmansk.33 When Acting Chairman of the State Committee for Fisheries Yuriy Sinelnik visited Murmansk in October 1999, he announced to the press that a ‘basin body’ would be established in Murmansk as a trial project and that similar organisations would later be created in the other fisheries basins of the country.34 A possible outcome would be its permanent establishment, thus ‘strengthening’ the regional fisheries management by the addition of an organisation ‘stronger’ than Sevryba and the regional administrations, while retaining federal authorities’ ability to control and sanction decisions made in the region. As of autumn 2002, the ‘basin body’ has yet to be put in place.35 This notwithstanding, in early 2002 the Murmansk regional administration adopted a preliminary provision on the distribution of fish quotas.36 According to its Article 1.2, the provision decides the order for distributing Murmansk Oblast’s quotas of catch of individual species of marine living resources in the Russian Federation’s internal waters, territorial water and EEZ, as well as outside these areas, among legal entities and individual enterprises, registered on the territory of Murmansk Oblast.37 Most importantly, the provision establishes Murmansk regional administration’s control over the regional fishery council which allocates quota shares among shipowners within the federal subject,38 and criteria for the distribution of the region’s fish quotas among shipowners.39 Article 1.11 states that quota shares are allotted to individual enterprises on the basis of their catch capacity, economic effectiveness and record of tax payment, catch of previous years’ quotas and compliance with fishery regulations.40 According to Article 1.12, at least 20 per cent of the quota allotted to Murmansk Oblast by the Scientific Catch Council shall be given to support institutions of particular economic significance to the region, the region’s land-based fish-processing industry, and shipowners that build fishing vessels at Russian shipyards or reconstruct their vessels at the shipyards of Murmansk Oblast.41 In conclusion, the regional authorities of Northwestern Russia have shown great perseverance to get involved in fisheries management and have

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clearly succeeded in enhancing their role significantly as compared to Soviet times. They have established their own fisheries departments, although each employs only a handful of people, which have achieved some influence over the most important practical management measures, namely the distribution of quotas. Notably, they have – at least formally, and probably also in practice – a significant influence on the distribution of quota shares within the federal subject; their ability to influence the distribution of quotas among federal subjects is more limited. Until 2001, the head of the Scientific Catch Council was the general director of Sevryba. Since then, it has been led by a senior official on the federal State Committee for Fisheries. The draft Fisheries Act also foresees a strengthening of federal control over this body. Further, the regional fisheries departments are not involved in the elaboration of other regulatory measures than quota distribution, nor in enforcement of fishery regulations. Apart from their participation in the regional fisheries councils that distribute the quotas among shipowners in the region (over which the draft Fisheries Act also foresees increased federal control), they seem to perceive their role as largely that of an advocate of the fishing industry of the region, articulating its needs in relation to federal authorities. Finally, it should be observed that the formal criteria for distribution of quota shares among shipowners in Murmansk Oblast, introduced by the regional administration of the oblast in 2002, are completely in line with the declared objectives of the federal fishery authorities (cf. Chapter 3): to reward shipowners that deliver catches to Russian ports, thus benefiting local fishing communities, rather than attending to company profits.42 A new criterion was introduced to reward shipowners that build vessels in Russia or rebuild existing vessels at shipyards in Murmansk Oblast. All this complements the general picture of Russian fishery authorities as primarily concerned with securing the viability of the ‘traditional’ fishery complex, including local fishing communities in the Russian periphery.43 The regional legislatures in Northwestern Russia have played a very minor role in fisheries management. Murmansk Oblast’s regional Duma has passed a law on coastal fisheries,44 but it was later annulled by the regional legal authorities.45 Former Director of Sevryba Grigoriy Tishkov was elected to the Murmansk regional Duma in 1997, but this does not seem to have had any impact on fisheries management in the region.46

THE ROLE OF FEDERAL AGENCIES IN THE REGION Federal agencies located in the region have traditionally played a very important role in the fisheries management of the Soviet/Russian northern

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basin. As noted earlier in this chapter, Sevryba was originally created as the northern basin’s General Directorate under the Soviet Ministry of Fishing Industry. Although its name was changed several times, it retained its role as both an association of all fishing industry actors and the main fisheries management body of the region throughout the Soviet period.47 Sevryba was the ‘extended arm’ of the Ministry of Fishing Industry in the region, in other words: a typical ‘implementing’ body.48 It ‘governed’ the entire fishing industry of the region down to the specifics of deciding where each particular vessel was to fish at any given time.49 It controlled the distribution of quotas among the shipowners (or ‘fishing organisations’, as they were designated in the Soviet period) of the region and issued other regulatory measures on behalf of the Ministry of Fishing Industry.50 The privatisation of Sevryba in 1992 initiated a process that within a few years had rendered its status and competence both as an industry actor and an administrator highly unclear.51 An immediate consequence of privatisation was loss of control over the enterprises that formed Sevryba.52 From having employed more than 500 people in clerical and administrative jobs in the ‘good old Soviet times’, Sevryba saw its numbers reduced to a few dozen within less than five years; most financial and ‘industrial’ tasks were now taken care of at the company level.53 Hence, in the first years after privatisation it was important for Sevryba, i.e. the administration of the association, to maintain its role in the management process (since most of its former tasks had been lost to its founding companies).54 When the regional administrations of Northwestern Russia in 1993-94 attempted to move in on the management process, Sevryba retaliated vigorously, arguing that the fish stocks in the EEZ were a federal concern and that practical regulatory experience in the region lay within Sevryba, not the governors’ offices.55 As the previous section showed, regional authorities were partly successful in their work and acquired some influence over the distribution of quotas. However, Sevryba retained considerable power in this area along with continued responsibility for most other regulatory issues.56 In the mid-1990s, Sevryba acquired its first vessel, purchased on a bareboat charter basis, the ‘Sevryba-1’.57 The administration was then in a position to secure favourable quota conditions for its own vessel, which was registered in Cyprus, and suddenly it emerged as a small, but lucrative oneboat fishing company.58 At the same time, the management tasks were increasingly handed over to the regional administration (see previous section) and Murmanrybvod (see below).59 The institutional identity of Sevryba was again changing; with the new possibilities represented by the acquisition of ‘Sevryba 1’, and several sister ships already under way, it seemed increasingly ready to let go of management responsibilities.60

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Another important federal agency located in the region is the enforcement body Murmanrybvod. It is subordinate to Glavrybvod, the department of the State Committee for Fisheries responsible for reproduction of fish stocks and enforcement of fishery regulations (see Chapter 3).61 Murmanrybvod has traditionally been in charge of the enforcement of fishery regulations in the rivers and lakes of Murmansk Oblast, in the Barents Sea and in international convention areas where the Northwest Russian fishing fleet is active, 62 notably the areas under the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission (NEAFC) 63 and the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO).64 Most of the 300-400 employees at Murmanrybvod have been involved in the enforcement of fishery regulations in the rivers and lakes on the Kola Peninsula; only some 20 inspectors have been assigned to enforcement tasks in the Barents Sea and the international convention areas.65 As follows from Chapter 3, responsibility for fisheries enforcement at sea in the Russian Federation was transferred from Glavrybvod to the Federal Border Service in August 1997,66 a decision made effective as of July 1998.67 In the northern fishery basin, the Murmansk State Inspection of the Arctic Regional Command of the Federal Border Service was established to take care of fisheries enforcement.68 The main argument put forward by supporters of the reorganisation in Northwestern Russia was that the Border Service had far more and far faster vessels than Murmanrybvod’s two old rebuilt fishing vessels.69 As in the rest of Russia, the decision to strip the traditional enforcement body of its responsibility for enforcement at sea met with fierce resistance also in the northwestern region.70 Both the fishing industry and the rest of the fishery management apparatus supported Murmanrybvod in its battle with the ‘intruders’ from the ‘power agency’ of the Border Service.71 As in Sevryba’s battle with the regional administrations, Murmanrybvod’s main argument was that the necessary expertise and experience were to be found in the ‘traditional’ body.72 Murmanrybvod turned out to be less successful than Sevryba – the Federal Border Service was obviously a stronger opponent than the regional administrations – and was forced to relinquish responsibility for enforcement at sea.73 However, it is only its authority to carry out physical inspections at sea that has been transferred to the Border Guard. Murmanrybvod is still in charge of keeping track of quota fulfilment by the individual shipowners at any one time.74 It has also retained powers to close fishing grounds in areas with excessive intermingling of undersized fish, a very important regulatory measure in both the Russian and Norwegian part of the Barents Sea;75 see also Chapter 3 on this issue. Finally, Murmanrybvod is still responsible for enforce-

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ment in international convention areas.76 In practice, Murmanrybvod can place its inspectors on board Northwest Russian fishing vessels planning to fish in the NEAFC of NAFO areas.77 A fisheries department has been established under the Northwestern Federal Okrug, the new administrative layer introduced by President Putin in May 2000 (see Chapter 2).78 This department, located in St Petersburg and mostly occupied with the co-ordination of fisheries research, has not been given a role in the regulatory process.79 It is not represented on the Joint Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission or the Scientific Catch Council.80 One recent reform that has influenced centre-region relations in the area of fisheries management is the introduction of a system for quota auctions in 2001; cf. Chapter 3. The auctions are organised by the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade (they even take place in Moscow), which is not only a federal body of governance, but also an ‘outsider’ in fisheries management. The reform clearly increases the influence of one federal body of governance at the expense of both regional authorities and the federal authorities traditionally in charge of fisheries management. In sum, federal agencies located in the region appear as the main participants in Russian public authorities’ efforts to manage the Northwest Russian fishing fleet. The federal bodies themselves are only involved to a limited extent in the management process, and regional authorities have not proven ‘strong’ enough to wield influence beyond the distribution of the regional quotas among shipowners. The old general directorate, Sevryba, retained much of its influence well into the 1990s notwithstanding its ever more dubious formal status in the regulatory process. Murmanrybvod has been stripped of its enforcement tasks at sea, but is still an important actor in the regulation and enforcement of Northwest Russian fisheries. A new federal agency was established in the region in connection with the enforcement reorganisation: the Murmansk State Inspection of the Arctic Regional Command of the Federal Border Service. Hence, most practical ‘regulatory activities’ aimed at players in the Northwest Russian fisheries take place from Murmansk – from the regional administration, Sevryba (at least up to the late 1990s), Murmanrybvod and the Border Service’s Murmansk State Inspection – although steps have to be approved by federal authorities. The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade is an important ‘newcomer’ on the arena, responsible for the quota auctions that were introduced in 2001. This has led to a certain centralisation in Russian fisheries management as the Ministry, naturally, is a federal agency, and the auctions take place in Moscow.

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The distinction between public authorities and others might appear slightly diffuse in the former Soviet Union since much of the administrative structure of the plan economy has been carried over, formally or informally, into the era of the Russian Federation. Sevryba is a case in point. Formally, Sevryba was an association of all major fishing enterprises in the Soviet/Russian northern fishery basin; but more or less informally, during the 1990s it appeared at times to be acting as an extension of the State Committee for Fisheries in the northern fishery basin and, at times, as a small fishing company pursuing purely commercial interests. The ‘traditional’ actors of Northwest Russian fisheries – i.e. all concerned parties except the ‘intruders’ of recent years, notably the Federal Border Service and the regional administrations81 – are clearly perceived in Russia above all as belonging to the ‘fishery complex’. The division between government agency and ‘user group’ hence becomes less relevant.82 Nevertheless, in the following I attempt to show how actors other than public authorities have influenced the management of Northwest Russian fisheries since the early 1990s, especially with regard to the requirement of the precautionary approach that all relevant stakeholders be given the opportunity to participate in the regulatory process. Target groups It should be fairly obvious by now that target groups – i.e. the region’s fishers and their representative bodies – have traditionally been highly involved in the management of Northwest Russian fisheries. Sevryba has been two bodies in one: the main fisheries management body in the region and the association of its fishers. The 1990s showed how organisational constructions like Sevryba had to struggle in the post-Soviet period to ensure their continued existence; partly they clung on to their old functions, partly they adapted to the new environment and created a ‘commercial’ basis for themselves. Sevryba’s role in fisheries management has in recent years been significantly wing clipped. At the same time, Sevryba is no longer the representative of the large shipowners in the region; its founding elements are now independent industry actors. Hence, to the extent that Sevryba still is involved in fisheries management,83 it represents the small fishing companies created recently by its administration, rather than the larger shipowners of the region.84 On the other hand, these industry actors – such as Murmansk Trawl Fleet, Murmanrybprom, Arkhangelsk Trawl Fleet Base and Karelrybflot

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(see Table 4.1) – have increased their direct influence on fisheries management. Whereas they were earlier mainly represented through Sevryba, they now participate in their own right on the bodies responsible for quota distribution in Russia’s northern fishery basin. Table 4.4 shows the governmental and non-governmental bodies that are represented at various levels in the quota distribution process. A main observation is that all large shipowners, as well as the Union of Private Fishery Enterprises in the North – representing the smaller shipowners – are represented at international, inter-regional and regional level. However, these bodies are chiefly occupied with quota distribution; the influence of user groups on other areas of fisheries management is limited, at least formally. It is also unclear how ‘strong’ user groups are vis-à-vis governmental agencies in these corporate bodies. Further, user groups are the only non-governmental stakeholders represented at any level in the management system, except for a labour union’s representation on the Russian delegation to the Joint RussianNorwegian Fisheries Commission. Notably, environmental NGOs are not represented.85

Table 4.4. The main decision-making bodies in the Northwest Russian fisheries sector and governmental bodies and non-governmental stakeholders represented on them86 Decision-making body

Represented governmental bodies

• The Joint Russian• the State Committee Norwegian Fisheries for Fisheries (head of Commission (respondelegation) sible for establishing • the oblast/republican TACs for the joint administrations of stocks in the Barents Murmansk, Arkhangelsk Sea) and Karelia • VNIRO (federal fisheries research institute) • regional fisheries research institutes from Murmansk and Arkhangelsk (PINRO, SevPINRO)

Represented non-governmental stakeholders • the administration of Sevryba • Murmansk Trawl Fleet • Murmanrybprom • Arkhangelsk Trawl Fleet • Karelrybflot • Murmansk Collective Fishing Fleet • The Union of Private Fishery Enterprises in the North • the Russian Seafarers’ Association (labour union)

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Table 4.4 (cont.) Decision-making body

Represented governmental bodies

Represented non-governmental stakeholders

• regional enforcement bodies in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk (Murmanrybvod and Sevrybvod) • Sevryba • Scientific Catch • the State Committee Council (responsible for Fisheries (leader) for distributing quota • the oblast/republican shares between the administrations of federal subjects of Murmansk, Arkhanthe northern fishery gelsk and Karelia basin) • Sevryba • regional fisheries research institutes in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk (PINRO, SevPINRO) • regional enforcement bodies in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk (Murmanrybvod and Sevrybvod) • the Federal Border Service • the Federal Security Service (FSB)

• the administration of Sevryba • Murmansk Trawl Fleet • Murmanrybprom • Arkhangelsk Trawl Fleet • Karelrybflot • The collective fishing fleets of Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and Karelia • The Union of Private Fishery Enterprises in the North

• The regional fishery • the oblast/republican councils (responsible administration in the for distributing quota respective regional shares between entities (leader) individual companies • Sevryba in the respective • research and enforcefederal subjects) ment bodies from the

• the administration of Sevryba • the largest fishing companies in the respective regional entities • the collective fishing

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Table 4.4 (cont.) Decision-making body

Represented governmental bodies respective regional entities

Represented non-governmental stakeholders fleets of the respective regional entities • The Union of Private Fishery Enterprises in the North

A conspicuous trend around the turn of the millennium was the increased influence of some of the small shipowners organised in the Union of Private Fishery Enterprises in the North. Probably the most celebrated example is shipowner Vladimir Gusenkov. He used his position as a nouveau riche to gain broad popular support though his cheap fish programme, an initiative aimed at providing reasonably priced fish products to the population of Northwestern Russia.87 In 1997, he was elected to the regional Duma. Two years later, he succeeded in becoming one of two deputies from Murmansk Oblast to the State Duma.88 Before ending up in Moscow, Gusenkov had become an influential person in Northwest Russian fisheries. Allegedly, he paid for much of the cost of organising negotiations in the Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission in Murmansk in November 1999 for which he was given a seat on the Russian delegation.89 After very difficult negotiations – Norway wishing to follow the recommendations of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) scientists and reduce the cod quota drastically; Russia to disregard the scientific advice – the total allowable catch (TAC) for cod was set at nearly four times the scientists’ initial recommendation.90 Negotiations stalled for several days, with Norway eventually agreeing to the high quota level only in consideration of the importance of fisheries to the crisis-ridden population of Northwestern Russia.91 In the subsequent negotiations between Russia and Norway in November 2000, Gusenkov allegedly emerged as an informal leader of the Russian delegation, again insisting on a quota far above the scientific recommendations.92 It not only reflects the increased influence of Russian target groups and regional actors over Russian policy in bilateral negotiations with Norway;93 more than anything, it reflects the growing ‘malignity’ of the problem at hand. With increased political and economic insecurity on the one hand and the chance of making a quick personal profit on the other, there may be less willingness to think within a longer-term framework – taking cognisance

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of their own and society’s greater good. We return to this question in the discussion on fishery regulations enforcement and compliance in Chapter 6. NGOs and research institutes There are very few other groups, i.e. other than governmental bodies and user groups, involved in Russian fisheries management. NGOs to all intents and purposes are absent in discussions concerning the fisheries. The only exceptions are labour unions and various types of fishers’ associations, but they have no role to play in fisheries management.94 The main ‘external’ agents in Northwest Russian fisheries management are fisheries research institutes at the federal and region level, notably the All-Russian Scientific Institute for Fisheries and Oceanography (VNIRO)95 in Moscow and the Knipovich Scientific Polar Institute for Marine Fisheries Research and Oceanography (PINRO) in Murmansk.96 It is indeed doubtful whether these institutions should be labelled ‘external’; they are both directly subordinate to the State Committee for Fisheries.97 While VNIRO is the main source of scientific input to the Committee at the federal level, PINRO is the major participant in the management process at the regional level in Northwestern Russia. The state of the fish stocks in the Northeast Atlantic and the Barents Sea are constantly being assessed by PINRO researchers, often in co-operation with Norwegian marine scientists. The results of their investigations are discussed by ICES’s Advisory Committee for Fisheries Management (ACFM) and conveyed further to national authorities in the form of fishstock assessments and recommendations for their exploitation; cf. Chapter 3. Hence, the advice given to Russian and Norwegian authorities concerning the Barents Sea fish stocks is based on the work of both Russian (primarily PINRO) and Norwegian scientists. In other words: the State Committee for Fisheries, as the main governmental agency responsible for Russia’s fisheries management, gets scientific information from an international organisation (ICES) which is based on the work of scientists from an institution administratively subordinate to itself. The most striking feature of PINRO’s role in the management process in recent years is the disregard by Russian authorities of ICES’s scientific advice.98 Since the mid-1990s, the Joint Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission has increasingly set TACs well above the scientific recommendations in response to pressure from the Russian party,99 a clear demonstration of the impotency of Russian scientists in the face of government authorities and other pressure groups within the Russian delegation.

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The work of PINRO scientists in the management process is not confined to their co-operation with foreign colleagues in ICES. PINRO is highly integrated in the ‘day-to-day’ management of the Barents Sea fisheries.100 Most importantly, PINRO research ships assist the exploration fleet Sevrybpromrazvedka in finding concentrations of fish for the fishing fleet.101 The unclear distinction between government and user groups discussed above is also reflected in the way fishers perceive the role of marine science and enforcement. In the West, it is generally considered legitimate (or even preferable) for the two to be separate from the user groups (being presumably more concerned about protection of the resource base than exploiting it), at least to the extent that user groups are thought to be solely concerned with their own interests. In Northwest Russian fisheries, marine science and enforcement bodies still largely seem to be perceived by fishers as part of the same entity – the fishery complex – as themselves. For instance, to the extent one sees discontentment among Russian Barents Sea fishers about marine science, it seems to be directed towards the alleged inability of scientists to predict the presence of fish in a short-term perspective.102

CONCLUSIONS Much regulatory action has traditionally taken place at the regional level in the Soviet/Russian northern fishery basin, notably by Sevryba functioning as an extension of the federal fishery authorities in the region. As the regional administrations – the bureaucratic apparatuses of the governors and republican presidents – gained increased political powers throughout the 1990s, their influence over fisheries management in the northern basin grew also. It primarily took place at the expense of the old industry conglomerate Sevryba, which, by the end of the decade, had lost control both over its constituent companies and over the management process. The regional administrations now control the distribution of the regional quota among shipowners registered in the region, although their decisions have to be sanctioned by the State Committee for Fisheries. The influence of the regions has dwindled as far as the inter-regional quota distribution among federal subjects is concerned since the Scientific Catch Council, long under the dominance of Sevryba, is now chaired by a representative of the State Committee for Fisheries. The system for quota auctions introduced in 2001 is also perceived in the region as contributing to centralisation since the auctions are controlled by federal authorities, notably the Ministry of

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Economic Development and Trade, and take place in Moscow. Further, enforcement and practical regulation of the fishery are the remit of federal agencies located in the region, notably Murmanrybvod (subordinate to Glavrybvod, a department of the State Committee for Fisheries) and the Murmansk State Inspection of the Arctic Regional Command of the Federal Border Service. In addition, with the possible exception of the Border Service,103 all agencies involved in the management of fisheries in Russia’s northern basin are perceived to belong to the region’s traditional fishery complex. The regional administration is increasingly acting as a co-ordinating authority for both regulatory and industry actors in relation to federal fishery authorities. The preliminary provision on quota distribution adopted by the Murmansk regional administration in 2002 reflects the importance of the traditional ‘fishing community’ (and even patriotic) values attached to securing raw material to Russian fish-processing plants, the viability of peripheral fishing communities and their supporting structures, such as shipyards. Notably, user groups and scientific research institutes are seen as belonging to the same fishery complex, whereas environmental NGOs obviously are not. As in the case of federal Russian fisheries legislation (see Chapter 3), there is no reference to the precautionary approach to fisheries in regional regulations, nor does it seem to occupy any prominent place in the general fisheries discourse in the region. We return to these concerns in Chapter 5.

NOTES

1. ‘Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii’ (‘Constitution of the Russian Federation’), in B.A. Strashun, Federalnoye konstitutsionnoye pravo Rossii. Osnovnye istochniki (‘Russia’s Constitutional Law. Fundamental Sources’) (Moscow: Izdatelstvo Norma, 1996), Art. 71. An English translation of the Constitution is found at . 2. ‘Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, Art. 72. 3. ‘Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, Art. 76, Para. 5. 4. ‘Konstitutsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii’, Art. 73.

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5. To be more specific, one would have expected them to have agreed on one of the three following regulatory set-ups for fisheries in their territorial water: i) regulating through some kind of joint arrangement; ii) let federal authorities manage them (together with resources in the EEZ); or iii) delegated regulatory authority to regional authorities. 6. Chapters 5 and 6 discuss the outcome of such involvement. 7. This section is a summary of material already published by the author in Norwegian, in particular G. Hønneland, Regionalisering og autonomi i nordvestrussisk fiskeriforvaltning (‘Regionalisation and Autonomy in Northwest Russian Fisheries Management’) (Tromsø: NORUT Social Science Research, 1994). See also T. Davidsen, ‘Sevryba’ – fiskerigigant i nord. Endringer i den sovjet-russiske fiskerinæringen (‘“Sevryba” – Fishery Giant in the North. Changes in the Soviet-Russian Fishing Industry’) (Tromsø: NORUT Social Science Research, 1992) for a history of the Soviet northern fishery basin. A more updated overview of the Northwest Russian fishing industry in English can be found in F. Nilssen and G. Hønneland, ‘Institutional Change and the Problems of Restructuring the Russian Fishing Industry’ (2001) 13 Post-Communist Economies 313-330. In turn, these publications build on numerous interviews with actors in the Russian northern fishery basin and federal fishery authorities, as well as on the author’s observations as an interpreter working in the sector; cf. section on methodology in Chapter 1. 8. G. Hønneland and F. Nilssen, ‘Quota Allocation in Russia’s Northern Fishery Basin: Principles and Practice’ (2001) 44 Ocean & Coastal Management 471-488. 9. It should be noted that the Russian perception of ‘coastal fishing’ differs from that of the neighbouring Scandinavian countries. While a Norwegian ‘coastal’ fishing vessel normally has a crew of 1-3 persons and goes to port to deliver hauls every day, a Northwest Russian ‘coastal’ fishing vessel has a crew of more than a dozen men and stays at sea for a couple of weeks at a time before returning to shore. 10. For an overview (in Norwegian), see C. Esaiassen and F. Nilssen, Bareboat charter mellom norske og russiske aktører i fiskerisektoren (‘Bare-boat Charter between Norwegian and Russian Actors in the Fisheries Sector’) (Tromsø: the Norwegian Institute of Fisheries and Aquaculture Research, 2002). 11. Information provided by Kola Science Centre, the Russian Academy of Science, 2002. 12. F. Nilssen and G. Hønneland, ‘Institutional Change and the Problems of Restructuring the Russian Fishing Industry’, 2001. 13. The exception is the year 1990, when catches in the Northeast Atlantic amounted to only 234,000 tonnes. The low total catch this year partly reflects the very low Barents Sea quotas that year (the quota for Northeast Arctic cod was at its lowest,

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and there was a ban on fishing for Barents Sea capelin), and partly that the retreat from fishing in distant waters had not set in yet. 14. F. Nilssen and G. Hønneland, ‘Institutional Change and the Problems of Restructuring the Russian Fishing Industry’, 2001. 15. It is not possible to calculate the number of jobs in the fishery complex on the basis of official employment statistics. The figure used here is based on assessments by Russian fishery economists; interviews with Russian scientists, Murmansk, during the period 1994-2001. 16. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the draft Fisheries Act limits the influence of regional authorities further as it states that the fish resources of the internal waters and territorial water of the Russian Federation are federal property and the prerogative of federal authorities to regulate; ‘O rybolovstve i sokhranenii vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov’ (‘On Fisheries and the Conservation of Aquatic Biological Resources’), 2001, , Art. 14, Art. 23. 17. Interviews with Russian civil servants in Murmansk, February and June 1994. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. For a more detailed presentation of these events, see G. Hønneland, ‘Autonomy and Regionalisation in the Fisheries Management of Northwestern Russia’ (1998) 22 Marine Policy 57-65. 20. Vremennoye polozheniye o poryadke raspredeleniya obshchikh dopustimykh ulovov vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov (‘Preliminary Provision on the Order for Allocation of Total Allowable Catches of Aquatic Biological Resources’), Order of the State Committee for Fisheries of the Russian Federation No. 49 of 22 March 1995, Art. 7. The role of the Scientific Catch Council is confirmed in Art. 6 of the provision. 21. O raspredelenii kvot na vylov (dobychu) vodnykh bioresursov vo vnutrennikh morskikh vodakh, v territorialnom more, isklyuchitelnoy ekonomicheskoy zone i na kontinentalnom shelfe Rossiyskoy Federatsii mezhdu zayavitelyami, zaregistrirovannymi v subyektakh Rossiyskoy Federatsii, territorii kotorykh prilegayut k morskomu poberezhyu (‘On the Distribution of Quotas [Exploitation] of Aquatic Bio-resources in the Russian Federation’s Internal Waters, Territorial Water, Exclusive Economic Zone and on the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation between Applicants Registered in Subjects of the Russian Federation, whose Territories Border on the Coastline’), attached to Ob utverzhdenii polozheniya o raspredelenii kvot na vylov (dobychu) vodnykh bioresursov vo vnutrennikh morskikh vodakh, v territorialnom more, isklyuchitelnoy ekonomicheskoy zone i na kontinentalnom shelfe Rossiyskoy Federatsii mezhdu zayavitelyami, zaregistrirovannymi v subyektakh Rossiyskoy Federatsii, territorii kotorykh prilegayut k morskomu poberezhyu (‘On the Confirmation of the Provision on the Distribution of Quotas [Exploitation] of Aquatic Bio-resources in the Russian Federation’s Internal Waters, Territorial

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Water, Exclusive Economic Zone and on the Continental Shelf of the Russian Federation between Applicants Registered in Subjects of the Russian Federation, whose Territories Border on the Coastline’), Order of the State Committee for Fisheries of the Russian Federation No. 344 of 1 November 2001. 22. O kvotakh na vylov (dobychu) vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov vnutrennikh morskikh vod, territorialnogo morya, kontinentalnogo shelfa i isklyuchitelnoy ekonomicheskoy zony Rossiyskoy Federatsii (‘On Quotes of Catch [Exploitation] of Aquatic Biological Resources of the Russian Federation’s Internal Waters, Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone’), Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1010 of 27 December 2000. The draft Fisheries Act foresees the continuation of both these bodies and defines their tasks and structure in Art. 50 (the Scientific Catch Councils) and Art. 51 (the regional fishery councils); ‘O rybolovstve i sokhranenii vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov’, 2001. 23. Vremennoye polozheniye o poryadke raspredeleniya obshchikh dopustimykh ulovov vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov, 1995, Art. 6; O raspredelenii kvot na vylov (dobychu) vodnykh bioresursov vo vnutrennikh morskikh vodakh, v territorialnom more, isklyuchitelnoy ekonomicheskoy zone i na kontinentalnom shelfe Rossiyskoy Federatsii mezhdu zayavitelyami, zaregistrirovannymi v subyektakh Rossiyskoy Federatsii, territorii kotorykh prilegayut k morskomu poberezhyu, 2001, Art. 2. 24. Tishkov was ousted as director of Sevryba in late 2000; interviews with Russian civil servants, Moscow, February 2001. 25. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Murmansk, November 2001, and Moscow, April 2002. Order No. 344 of November 2001 states that proposals for distribution of TACs among federal subjects in each fishery basin are prepared by the (basin) Scientific Catch Councils in consultation with the regional administrations of the basin and presented to the State Committee for Fisheries; O raspredelenii kvot na vylov (dobychu) vodnykh bioresursov vo vnutrennikh morskikh vodakh, v territorialnom more, isklyuchitelnoy ekonomicheskoy zone i na kontinentalnom shelfe Rossiyskoy Federatsii mezhdu zayavitelyami, zaregistrirovannymi v subyektakh Rossiyskoy Federatsii, territorii kotorykh prilegayut k morskomu poberezhyu, 2001, Art. 2. The draft Fisheries Act states that the federal body responsible for fisheries management (at present: the State Committee for Fisheries) defines the tasks and structure of the (basin) Scientific Catch Council; ‘O rybolovstve i sokhranenii vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov’, 2001, Art. 50. This indicates the continued federal control over this body. 26. Interviews with Russian civil servants in Murmansk during the period 19952001. Order No. 344 of November 2001 states that the regional administrations present proposals for distribution of quotas among shipowners in the federal subject to the State Committee for Fisheries for confirmation; O raspredelenii kvot na vylov (dobychu) vodnykh bioresursov vo vnutrennikh morskikh vodakh, v territorialnom

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more, isklyuchitelnoy ekonomicheskoy zone i na kontinentalnom shelfe Rossiyskoy Federatsii mezhdu zayavitelyami, zaregistrirovannymi v subyektakh Rossiyskoy Federatsii, territorii kotorykh prilegayut k morskomu poberezhyu, 2001, Art. 3. This implies an increased role for the regional administrations as compared to the regional fishery councils, but federal control is maintained. The draft Fisheries Act states that the federal body responsible for fisheries management (at present: the State Committee for Fisheries) and the executive power of the federal subject in question (i.e. the governor) define the tasks and structure of the regional fishery council; ‘O rybolovstve i sokhranenii vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov’, 2001, Art. 51. This indicates increased federal control over these bodies. 27. O kvotakh na vylov (dobychu) vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov vnutrennikh morskikh vod, territorialnogo morya, kontinentalnogo shelfa i isklyuchitelnoy ekonomicheskoy zony Rossiyskoy Federatsii, 2000, Art. 2; O raspredelenii kvot na vylov (dobychu) vodnykh bioresursov vo vnutrennikh morskikh vodakh, v territorialnom more, isklyuchitelnoy ekonomicheskoy zone i na kontinentalnom shelfe Rossiyskoy Federatsii mezhdu zayavitelyami, zaregistrirovannymi v subyektakh Rossiyskoy Federatsii, territorii kotorykh prilegayut k morskomu poberezhyu, 2001, Art. 2. As mentioned above, the State Committee for Fisheries has since 2001 had the leader of the Scientific Catch Council, and Order No. 344 and the draft Fisheries Act foresee federal control over this body. As mentioned in Chapter 3, however, things may be less straightforward in practice. The head of the State Committee for Fisheries, Yevgeniy Nazdratenko, was removed from office in spring 2003 precisely because he had interfered with the quota allocation in the far eastern fishery basin. See Chapter 3 for a further discussion. 28. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Murmansk and Moscow, October 1999. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. Ibid. 32. Ibid. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. The draft Fisheries Act states that the executive branch of the federal subjects can exert their power directly or through the territorial (‘basin’) bodies under the federal agency responsible for fisheries management if the federal fisheries agency (at present: the State Committee for Fisheries) and the executive power of the federal subject (i.e. the governor) agree on this; ‘O rybolovstve i sokhranenii vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov’, 2001, Art. 20. This formulation does not open up for a management body in the northern fishery basin subordinate at the same time to the State Committee for Fisheries and the regional administrations of Northwestern

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Russia. It implies the possibility of the regional administrations to use the federal representation of the State Committee for Fisheries in the northern basin (at present: Murmanrybvod) to exercise their powers in fisheries management. 36. Vremennoye polozheniye o poryadke raspredeleniya na konkursnoy osnove kvot na vylov (dobychu) morskikh biologicheskikh resursov mezhdu polzovatelyami Murmanskoy oblasti (‘Preliminary Provision on the Order of Distribution on a Competitive Basis of Quotas of Catch [Exploitation] of Marine Biological Resources among Users of Murmansk Oblast’), adopted by the Government of Murmansk Oblast on 24 May 2002. 37. Ibid., Art. 1.2. 38. Article 1.6 states that ‘the Government of Murmansk Oblast each year no later than 1 December, on the basis of this Provision, shall elaborate proposals for the distribution of quotas among users registered on the territory of Murmansk Oblast and forward the proposals for confirmation by the federal organ of Russia’s executive power on fisheries [. . .]’; Vremennoye polozheniye o poryadke raspredeleniya na konkursnoy osnove kvot na vylov (dobychu) morskikh biologicheskikh resursov mezhdu polzovatelyami Murmanskoy oblasti, 2002, Art. 1.6. Also, the provision several times uses the formulation ‘the Government of Murmansk Oblast through the regional fishery council’. For instance, Article 1.11, which sets out the criteria for quota allocation, says that ‘the Government of Murmansk Oblast through the regional fishery council’ can introduce additional criteria to those listed in the provision. 39. Ibid., Art. 1.11. 40. Ibid., Art. 1.11. 41. Ibid., Art. 1.12. The article states that 50 per cent of this ‘special quota’ shall be allotted to support the region’s fish-processing industry, 30 per cent to enterprises that are of particular economic significance for the region, and 20 per cent to shipowners that build fishing vessels at Russian shipyards or reconstruct their vessels at the shipyards of Murmansk Oblast. 42. The criterion to deliver catches to Russian ports is not explicitly mentioned in the preliminary provision of Murmansk Oblast; ibid. However, it is ‘hidden’ behind formulations about supporting enterprises of particular economic significance for the region and the region’s fish-processing industry. For instance, quotas to the fish-processing industry would have either to be given to the processing plants, which in turn would sell them to shipowners in return for promises of deliveries of fish, or allotted directly to shipowners committing them to deliver catches to Russian fish-processing plants. 43. It should be observed that these ‘local fishing communities’ are not like the small local communities with century-long traditions of coastal fishing familiar in the West. They are large cities carefully constructed during the Soviet era with a

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view to extracting a particular type of natural resource, in this case: fish. Further, it is an open question whether the regional administrations’ concern for traditional fishing communities and the region’s shipbuilding industry is genuine. Some would have it that this is only ‘window dressing’ aimed at satisfying federal authorities (who require these principles reflected in regional legislation), and that the regional administrations are, in effect, more concerned about pleasing the large shipowners; interviews in Murmansk during the period 1998-2001. For instance, regional authorities in Murmansk tend to present themselves as defenders of ‘traditional’ fishing community values and against the one-sided emphasis on company profit. In practice, however, they tend to be ‘dependent’ on the backing of the successful regional shipowners. Allegedly, Murmansk Trawl Fleet paid considerable sums to ensure the re-election of Yuriy Yevdokimov as governor in 2000; interviews in Murmansk during the period 2001-02. 44. O pribrezhnom promysle v Murmanskoy oblasti (‘On Coastal Fisheries in Murmansk Oblast’), Regional Law of Murmansk Oblast No. 91-01 of 30 December 1997. 45. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Murmansk, April and September 1998. 46. Interviews with Russian civil servants in Murmansk during the period 19982001. 47. Observation by the author during the period 1988-93; cf. section on methodology in Chapter 1. Interviews with Russian civil servants in Murmansk and Moscow during the period 1994-2002. 48. Ibid. 49. Ibid. 50. Ibid. 51. Interviews with Russian civil servants in Murmansk and Moscow during the period 1994-2002. 52. Ibid. 53. Ibid. 54. Ibid. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid.

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60. After the turn of the century, Sevryba’s fate was less auspicious. It is now split into several smaller shipowning segments and has been plagued by internal disagreement and lawsuits over undelivered trawlers; interviews with Russian civil servants in Murmansk during the period 2000-02. 61. Interviews with Russian civil servants in Murmansk and Moscow during the period 1994-2002. The draft Fisheries Act states that ‘territorial (basin) bodies of the federal body of fisheries management are basin bodies responsible for protection and reproduction of aquatic bio-resources and regulation of fisheries, and also form part of the state inspection for fisheries enforcement in question’; ‘O rybolovstve i sokhranenii vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov’, 2001, Art. 21. 62. Interviews with Russian civil servants in Murmansk and Moscow during the period 1994-2002. Similar bodies are found in Arkhangelsk Oblast and the Republic of Karelia, Sevrybvod and Karelrybvod, but these are responsible for enforcing fishery regulations in rivers and lakes only (plus in the White Sea, as far as Sevrybvod is concerned). Responsibility for the Northwest Russian fishing fleet’s ocean fisheries is wholly under Murmanrybvod. 63. ‘Convention of Future Multilateral Cooperation in the North-East Atlantic Fisheries’, Official Journal of the European Communities, 1981 L227/22. 64. ‘Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries’ (Ottawa, 24 October 1978), Official Journal of the European Communities, No. L 378, 30 December 1978. 65. Interviews with Russian civil servants in Murmansk and Moscow during the period 1994-2002. 66. O merakh po obespecheniyu okhrany morskikh biologicheskikh resursov i gosudarstvennogo kontrolya v etoy sfere (‘On Measures to Secure Protection of Marine Biological Resources and State Control in this Sphere’), Decree of the President of the Russian Federation No. 950 of 29 August 1997. 67. Interviews with Russian civil servants in Murmansk, September 1998. General directions for co-ordination and exchange of information between the Federal Border Service and Glavrybvod are given in Polozheniye o vzaimodeystvii i koordinatsii deyatelnosti organov i voysk Federalnoy pogranichnoy sluzhby Rossiyskoy Federatsii i organov po okhrane, vosproizvodstvu rybnykh zapasov i regulirovaniyu rybolovstva Gosudarstvennogo komiteta Rossiyskoy Federatsii po rybolovstvu v sfere okhrany vodnykh bilogicheskikh resursov (‘Provision on Interaction and Coordination of the Activities of Organs and Troops of the Federal Border Service of the Russian Federation and the Organs Responsible for Protection, Reproduction of Fish Stocks and Regulation of Fisheries under the State Committee for Fisheries of the Russian Federation in the Sphere of Protection of Aquatic Biological Resources’), Order of the Federal Border Service of the Russian Federation and the State Committee for Fisheries of the Russian Federation of 12 January 1999.

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68. Interviews with Russian civil servants in Murmansk, September 1998. 69. Interviews with Russian civil servants in Murmansk and Moscow during the period 1997-99. 70. Ibid. 71. Ibid. There is also plenty of evidence in Russian media from the time. For instance, a representative of the fishers in Murmansk made the following statement to the newspaper Polyarnaya Pravda (19 September 1997, p. 1): ‘The situation in our fishing industry is still difficult. The last six months’ disintegration of the federal management organs renders it extremely alarming, too.’ 72. Interviews with Russian civil servants in Murmansk and Moscow during the period 1997-99. 73. Ibid. 74. Ibid. Fish quotas are in Russia given to shipowners, not to individual vessels. 75. Author’s own observation during the period 1988-2000; cf. section on methodology in Chapter 1. 76. Ibid. 77. Ibid. 78. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Murmansk, October 2000, and Moscow, February 2001. 79. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Murmansk, November 2001. 80. Ibid.; Protokoll for den 29. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Protocol for the 29th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 2000); Protokoll for den 30. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Protocol for the 30th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 2001). 81. Admittedly, the regional administrations since the late 1990s have come to be perceived as part of the ‘fishery complex’. 82. For a further discussion of this dilemma, see G. Hønneland and F. Nilssen, ‘Comanagement in Northwest Russian Fisheries’ (2000) 13 Society & Natural Resources 635-648. 83. As follows from the discussion below (see also Table 4.4), Sevryba is still represented on the Russian delegation to the Joint Fisheries Commission, the Scientific Catch Council and the regional catch councils. 84. As mentioned above, Sevryba has been split into several shipowning segments.

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85. This probably reflects the fact that environmental NGOs are few and weak in Northwestern Russia. They also tend to be more concerned about nuclear safety and industrial pollution than sustainable fisheries management. A contributory cause is, moreover, that in Russia fisheries management is perceived to be the business of the ‘fisheries complex’, i.e. the ‘experts’ rather than ‘amateurs’ or ‘the people’. For a further discussion, see G. Hønneland, Russia and the West: Environmental Co-operation and Conflict (London: Routledge, 2003); G. Hønneland, ‘Fish Discourse. Russia, Norway and the Northeast Arctic Cod’ (in press) Human Organization. Chapter 5 also discusses whether environmental NGOs in Russia and Norway have involved themselves in discussions of the fisheries management of the Barents Sea in recent years. 86. The table is an updated version of the one published in G. Hønneland, ‘CentrePeriphery Tensions in the Management of Northwest Russian Fisheries’, in G. Hønneland and H. Blakkisrud (eds), Centre-Periphery Relations in Russia. The case of the Northwestern Regions (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2001). It is based on protocols from sessions in the Joint Fisheries Commission as well as interviews with Russian civil servants. Cf., in particular, Protokoll for den 28. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Protocol for the 28th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 1999); Protokoll for den 29. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, 2000; Protokoll for den 30. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, 2001. 87. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Murmansk, November 1999. 88. Vladimir Gusenkov passed away in late autumn 2002 (RFE/RL Newsline, 5 November 2002). 89. In the protocol from the session, Gusenkov is identified as member of Murmansk regional Duma; Protokoll for den 28. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, 1999, Annex 1. It seems rather odd to include deputies from the regional legislatures in the delegation since they have no role in fisheries management. Representatives from the other federal subjects of Northwestern Russia are not included. This supports the argument that it was more his position as shipowner and economic benefactor that tipped the scales for his inclusion in the Russian delegation than his status as representative of the regional Duma. 90. Ibid. 91. Ibid., Art. 5.1. Quota setting by the Joint Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission is further discussed in Chapter 5. 92. Interviews with Norwegian civil servants, Oslo, February 2001. 93. Representatives of federal authorities in the Russian delegation were more prepared to enter into a compromise with Norway than were representatives from Northwestern Russia; ibid.

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94. Both labour unions and fishers’ associations are mainly engaged in welfare work. Admittedly, a labour union has been represented on the Joint Fisheries Commission; Protokoll for den 28. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, 1999, Annex 1. However, he has hardly been particularly influential in the Russian delegation. Author’s own observation, Murmansk, 1999; cf. section on methodology in Chapter 1. 95. An overview of VNIRO’s structure and tasks in English is found at . 96. An overview of PINRO’s structure and tasks (in Russian) is found at . 97. Cf. Chapter 3. So-called ‘departmental’ (vedomstvennye) research institutes are very common in Russia. They are subordinate to various governmental agencies and intended to serve their needs. More basic scientific research is carried out at institutions under the Russian Academy of Science. 98. For a further discussion, see Chapter 5. 99. For a further discussion, see Chapter 5. 100. Author’s own observation during the period 1988-2000; cf. section on methodology in Chapter 1. 101. Ibid. 102. In an article in the newspaper Polyarnaya Pravda, fishers from Murmansk complained that they were not warned by the scientists that the big cod had already migrated into the Norwegian zone: ‘If no fish is found in the ocean, then fishers are convinced that science is to blame’ (Polyarnaya Pravda, 18 February 1998, p. 1). The message is: the main task of marine scientists is to help us fishers to catch fish. 103. And with the exception of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, to the extent it can be said to be involved in regional fisheries management.

III PROCESS AND PRACTICES

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CHAPTER FIVE Scientific Advice and Quota Allocation

The formal structures and principles underlying Russian fisheries management at the federal and regional levels were discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. The present chapter turns to the political practices taking place on the basis of these structures and principles, as well as the actual outcome of the practices. Among the questions we ask are the following: Have the scientific recommendations been in line with the precautionary approach, e.g. using the established reference points? Are total allowable catches (TACs) established in accordance with scientific recommendations? Is proper regulatory action taken when reference points are approached? How do relevant stakeholders not involved in the management process view the outcome of the management practices?1 Since TACs for the most important fishable stocks for vessels from the Russian northern basin are established at the international level by the Joint Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission (referred to in the following as the Joint Fisheries Commission), an overview of practice would not necessarily reflect the intentions of Russian fisheries management authorities. After presenting that overview, therefore, we go on to discuss the specific discourses surrounding the establishment of quotas by the Joint Fisheries Commission.2 The main question asked is whether the actual establishment of TACs reflects primarily Norwegian or Russian positions in the Joint Fisheries Commission. Next, I set out the practices of internal quota allocation at the national level in Russia since the mid1990s, among the federal subjects of the northern fishery basin and among individual shipowners in each of the largest federal subjects, Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts and the Republic of Karelia. The main objective is to investigate whether actual quota allocation processes reflect the principles for distribution of quotas and more general goals of Russian fishery authorities at the federal and regional level, as spelled out in Chapters 3 and 4. The discussion goes up to the turn of the century. After Governmental

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Resolution No. 1010 was introduced in December 2000 (see Chapter 3),3 an increasing share of the Russian quota of Northeast Arctic cod has been sold on auctions.4 The results of the auctions are considered business secrets and not made public.

PRACTICES AT THE INTERNATIONAL LEVEL Scientific recommendations and establishment of TACs Since the early 1960s, management recommendations on the Northeast Arctic cod stock have been given regularly by the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) through its Advisory Committee for Fisheries Management (ACFM). The first TAC for this stock was introduced in 1975; until then no effective management measures were in place for demersal fish in the area.5 At the end of the 1970s, catches of cod and haddock started declining while rates of exploitation were far above advised levels.6 The Barents Sea capelin stock collapsed in the mid-1980s, which led to a lack of food for the cod and haddock stocks in the area. In 1990, the total yield from the area was at its lowest point since 1945.7 During the 1990s, the Northeast Arctic cod stock fluctuated from a state of near collapse at the beginning of the decade, through a period of intensive growth in the mid-1990s, and back again to near collapse at the end of the decade.8 As shown in Table 5.1, there was a tendency throughout the period to set higher TACs than advised by ICES.9 This was the case for the years 1992-95 and 1998-2001; only twice – in 1990 and 1996 – were TACs lower than the scientific recommendations. While TACs quickly increased to levels far above recommendations as soon as the stock started to recover (1992-93), the quotas were set in the immediate vicinity of the recommended levels during the ‘prosperous’ years of the mid-1990s (1994-98). When signs of crisis again emerged at the end of the decade, decision-makers were slow to take action. The situation became particularly critical as the time to set the quota for 2000 approached in the autumn of 1999. ICES had provided an ‘all time low’ recommendation of 110,000 tonnes,10 down from a recommended 360,000 tonnes11 and a TAC of 480,000 tonnes for 1999.12 It was only after a breakdown in negotiations lasting several days13 that the Joint Fisheries Commission managed to agree on a TAC of 390,000 tonnes for 2000,14 i.e. a quota almost four times higher than the scientific recommendations. One year later, ICES increased its quota recommendations slightly,15 and the Joint Fisheries Commission for the first time agreed to set a three-year quota of 395,000 tonnes.16

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Table 5.1. Recommended and established total allowable catch (TAC) for Northeast Arctic cod during the period 1999-2001 (in thousand tonnes)17 year

recommended TAC

established TAC

1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001

172 215 250 256 649 681 746 750-850 514 360 110 263

160 215 356 500 700 700 700 850 654 480 390 395

In addition to the discrepancy between recommended and established TACs comes the fact that the quotas recommended by ICES for the Northeast Arctic cod were for most of the years based on inflated estimates of spawning stocks.18 The annual assessments for cod underestimated fishing mortality and overestimated stock numbers.19 In other words, fish were removed from the stock at a higher rate than the scientists bargained for on the basis of their analyses at the time the advice was given.20 Perceptions of scientific knowledge As follows from the preceding section, the TAC for Northeast Artic cod was set higher than recommended by ICES in nine out of ten years in the period 1992-2001. More specifically in relation to ICES’s precautionary reference points, fishing mortality has been higher than 0.42 – i.e. the stock has by definition been overfished – in seventeen of the last twenty years.21 In fifteen of these years, fishing mortality was higher than 0.7, i.e. the catch was at a level considered to represent a risk of stock collapse.22 How do the participants in the regime explain the discrepancy between established principles and political practice? And how do the various players affected by fisheries management regard the research activities and scientific recommendations that underlie the establishment of quotas? On the basis of interviews with Norwegian and Russian fishers (i.e. captains on fishing vessels) made for a study on compliance in the Barents

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Sea fisheries during the period 1997-98, I concluded that the Norwegian fishers seemed to have a deep-rooted scepticism to the work of marine scientists while the Russian fishers revealed a more positive attitude.23 The following interview extracts were typical of the investigation (the first produced by a Norwegian fisher, the second by a Russian): My confidence in marine science is bloody low. It’s impossible to run a business in a reasonable way. It’s an extremely important thing they’re left in charge of, . . . and they keep messing around in the Barents Sea with a couple of vessels, it’s ridiculous! I don’t think they have ever been right [in their estimates]! They ought to put people on the Coast Guard vessels instead [. . .], or alternate between fishing vessels. This year, it was an extremely big problem; everybody has a problem with it. I don’t think there’s much respect for the marine scientists among fishers; people sit in Tromsø and give orders; . . . and the refusals from the Russian zone24 [. . .], it just makes me laugh. Nothing sensible will come out of it anyway. That’s the kind of thing that makes people violate the law. This year, saithe quotas are historically low, and there’s so much saithe in the sea you can’t hide from it! The saithe is a bloody fast swimmer, and we can’t keep the bloody trawl net away from it! It’s the same with the Greenland halibut: it even broke the cod-line! And there’s supposed to be little of that too! I tell you: there’s masses of saithe in the sea! We made a budget for 50 tonnes and have already taken 170 so far this year; and there’s supposed to be no saithe! They should have used the Coast Guard; they’re on the fishing grounds where things happen. The marine scientists are just arrogant. They don’t listen to the Coast Guard either. [. . .] You lose respect for the quotas they establish . . . It’s so bloody insane that I’ve considered giving up fishing.25 I have a positive attitude towards [the marine scientists]. The Barents Sea is not inexhaustible. It’s quite right that the quantity of fish is checked. The fish is to be preserved for future generations. I’m not competent to assess whether the estimates are right; this is a specific science.26

The difference in attitudes between Norwegian and Russian fishers is striking. One possible explanation might be the traditionally strong position of science, and particularly the natural sciences, in Russia. While there seems to be considerable aversion to scientific expertise among Norwegian fishers, it does not seem to be the case with Russian fishers. Another, related, explanation is the fact that most Norwegian fishers are typical representatives of a periphery culture with long traditions of opposition to ‘every-

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thing which comes from the centre’. The homeport of the Russian fishers I interviewed, Murmansk, is, on the other hand, an ‘artificial’ Arctic city in the sense that it was built during the course of the twentieth century. Most Russian captains in the Barents Sea fisheries originally hail from further south in the former Soviet Union and do not share the same geographically peripheral background as the Norwegian Barents Sea fishers. However, we do not find the same differences of opinion between Russian and Norwegian actors in the discussions following the establishment of quotas for the Barents Sea cod stock for the years 1999-2002.27 In fact, the scepticism to scientific opinion might, at least at first glance, seem to be stronger on the Russian side than in Norway.28 A few extracts from media reports are illustrative: ‘The scientists are totally on the wrong track as far as the size of the cod stock is concerned. We could easily have set a quota of 520,000 tonnes,’ says [Russian shipowner], who is far from content despite the fact that the cod quota was once more set far above the scientific recommendations. [. . .] ‘Contrary to the scientists, who go out at sea a couple of times a year, we follow activities at sea every day throughout the year. We know what we are doing!’ [. . .] ‘Catch reports for this year show good concentrations of cod in wide ocean areas. The size of the cod is not bad at all – at least compared to 1998. When I recommended a TAC of 520,000 tonnes for next year, it is based on these observations. We trust them more than we trust the figures that ICES delivers.’29 Everyone who works at sea can see what’s going on and that the scientists are wrong. I think Norwegian and Russian fishers should talk together ahead of the [Joint Fisheries] Commission meeting in Tromsø. The 2001 TAC for cod should be at least 600,000 tonnes. [. . .] We who have several dozens of trawlers in operation every day throughout the year know best how conditions are in the sea.30 ‘The cod stock in the Barents Sea is at the same level as in 1997. The only difference is the quotas, which are only half of the 1997 level,’ says general director Nikolay Tropin of the Union of Private Fishery Enterprises in the North in Murmansk to the Internet newspaper Rybnyy Murman. [. . .] Tropin senses ‘bumps in the ocean’ of fish of all sizes: cod, halibut, herring and other species. None of the figures that the Norwegian Institute of Marine Science and the Russian Polar Institute come up with make sense to Tropin, who disagrees deeply with both Norwegian and Russian scientists. The union [he represents] organises hundreds of small shipowners

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Critical views on the scientific recommendations are also found among Norwegian fishers and representatives of their organisations,32 but there is a growing chorus of voices critical of the practice of neglecting scientific opinion on the Norwegian side. They can be heard in the fishers’ own organisations, in environmental non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and among the public at large, e.g. in the press. As expressed in an editorial published in the largest newspaper in Northern Norway on the eve of the Joint Fisheries Commission’s session in 2000: Today, the results of the Norwegian-Russian [negotiations] will emerge from a negotiation climate, which, seen from outside, is far milder and less troubled than the sea from which the fish are to be caught. Nevertheless, there are stormy clouds over the Barents Sea. They’re not being sent by Our Lord, but by the people in charge of laying the foundations of a management system which should also take into consideration the generations of fish that have not yet hatched and the generations of people that have not yet been born. Such a long-term perspective seems only partly to have guided [the decisions made by the Joint Fisheries Commission]. [. . .] This is gambling with resources, and Norway should oppose it with everything we have of expertise and clout. [. . .] Instead of being a good and safe guarantor of continued life both in the sea and ashore, politics has become perhaps the most dangerous enemy of life. Politicians, whether Russian or Norwegian, let themselves be influenced by a trawler fleet that is far too big and far too effective and which over the years has proved itself incapable of taking responsibility.33

Criticism of management is also emerging among the fishers themselves and their organisations on the Norwegian side. Notably, while they reiterate their scepticism concerning the scientific recommendations, they nevertheless admit that quotas should be based on scientific recommendations if it were possible to improve the underlying processes: ‘The fishers’ criticism of the scientists has been very severe. Maybe we demand the impossible of the scientists today. The most important job our organisation has to do is to create better working conditions for the scientists,’ says [deputy leader of the Norwegian Association of Fishers], who is not overly enthusiastic about next year’s cod quota of 390,000 tonnes.34

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We must not end up in a situation where we blame the scientists [for the miserable state of the cod stock]. If we really think that we want to be world champions in fisheries management, then we must channel more money to research. The research done today simply cannot be good enough and we have to admit it.35

The scientists themselves share the view that their recommendations have not always been optimal, but say that the tendency has been more to overestimate the cod stock than the opposite: The most important lesson, after twenty years of catch quotas, should be that the marine scientists almost systematically have overestimated the cod stock, and that the regulators must take this fact into consideration until we find out why this happens.36

Disagreement between Russian and Norwegian scientists participating in ICES and the bilateral regime seems to be marginal and related more to the interpretation of the data than to substantial issues. We more or less agree on the figures of the cod stock, but there are diverging views [among Norwegian and Russian scientists] about how the figures should be interpreted and which regulatory measures they should lead to. The Russians want to interpret insecurity in one [optimistic] direction while we on the Norwegian side found it necessary to bring in factors that unfortunately point in the opposite direction. [. . .] The Russians’ hopes for the cod stock are based on, among other things, positive outlooks for the marine environment and the growing numbers of capelin in the sea. On our side, we had to emphasise that we have ‘always’ overestimated the stock and underestimated fishing mortality, that the last age groups are weak, and that the oceanographers predict lower temperatures in the sea for the years 2002-04.37 We completely share the views held by Norwegian scientists. There is no major disagreement between us. We work together in ICES, we conduct joint scientific expeditions, and we are all behind the stock assessments and quota recommendations that ICES puts forward. What we do not accept, is the spawning stock reference point of 500,000 tonnes. It should be set far lower, at approximately 250-300,000 tonnes.38

According to a Norwegian scientist who has co-operated with Russian scientists for decades, a difference in opinion is discernible among Russian scientists, notably between the ‘operative’ researchers at the Knipovich Scientific Polar Institute for Marine Fisheries Research and Oceanography

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(PINRO) in Murmansk and their ‘superiors’ at the federal marine research institute in Moscow.39 While the former by and large share the views of their Norwegian colleagues, leading Moscow-based scientists have in recent years taken the quite radical (or, in effect, rather old-fashioned) view that it is mainly the marine environment (e.g. water temperature) that influences the size of the cod stock, not fishing mortality or catch levels.40 This latter position implies that quota sizes are of little consequence; human activity is in any event not the decisive factor in determining the size of the cod stock. Now, although Russian scientists have apparently yet to put this idea before the Joint Fisheries Commission, the ‘scientific views’ of the Russian delegation on the Commission are based on the opinions of mainly Moscowbased scientists who, on other occasions, have endorsed that view.41 In sum, there is a considerable scepticism among Russian and Norwegian fishers, and, to some extent, also among regulators of the two countries, towards the methods and the results of marine science within ICES. A recurring aspect is the assumption that the fishers (and, implicitly, at least some shipowners) themselves are closer to the problem than the scientists and therefore in a better position to have a qualified opinion about the state of the fish stocks. Scientific opinion is hence considered to be fundamentally flawed and needs to take into account the ‘traditional knowledge’, i.e. practical knowledge gained by fishers, in the regulatory process. On the other hand, there is a growing public concern in Norway about the dwindling impact of scientific advice in the establishment of quotas. Environmental NGOs, media commentators, politicians and others criticise the decisions of the current management system. There is obviously a more positive view of scientific knowledge among this section of society. Some Norwegian fishers have joined in the chorus of critical voices, as mentioned above. Actors in the Russian fishing industry and fisheries management system seem to have a stronger basic trust in the ability of marine science to produce guidelines for sound fisheries management. However, there is disagreement about the concrete reference points and the stock assessments and quota recommendations produced by ICES for the Northeast Arctic cod stock. Within the Joint Fisheries Commission, the Norwegian delegation seems to have partly supported the scientific opinion expressed by ICES while the Russians have opposed it. Hence, distrust in the scientific recommendations – or the premises underlying the existing system for the production of such recommendations – may be one reason why the Joint Fisheries Commission has tended to set quotas far above the scientific recommendations. In particular, the misgivings of the Russian delegation to the Commission about the scientific data may well have kept quota levels above

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ICES’s recommendations. On the other hand, scientific knowledge is not unanimously frowned upon – not even by fishers – and there is growing public concern, at least in Norway, over recent developments. Concern about national interest In addition to the legitimacy of scientific recommendations, concern about interests has loomed in the debate on the establishment of the Barents Sea cod quotas. In Norway, the public debate centres mainly around interest conflicts between various groups of players within the country and the need to balance short- and long-term concerns.42 These concerns seem to be absent from the Russian debate.43 Instead, there is a clear tendency in Russian fishery circles to speak of the battle of interests between the two states involved, Norway and Russia. First, the Russian delegation has apparently been quite unambiguous in emphasising at sessions of the Joint Fisheries Commission that it is not ready to reduce the year-on-year cod quota any further.44 (This spurred a Norwegian journalist to coin the term no-fish-Ivan for the Russians.)45 There was a meeting in the regional administration with participants from the fishing industry and scientists from PINRO where [. . .] the tactics and strategy of the Russian party [to the Joint Fisheries Commission] were discussed. The principle that ‘ours’ were to follow in the establishment of TACs for cod and haddock was adopted unanimously: don’t give in [to the Norwegians] on a single kilo.46

Second, the Russians seem to perceive Norway as a rational, unitary actor whose motives in the establishment of TACs for the joint stocks in the Barents Sea are mainly economic. The Norwegians’ insistence on internationally accepted principles for fisheries management, such as sustainability and the precautionary approach, are perceived to be a smoke screen behind which they hide their real intentions. Norway has a very rational administrative system situated in a stable political environment. Before last year’s quota negotiations, the Norwegians calculated exactly how large a loss their fishing industry could bear, made plans for compensating losers with revenue from the aquaculture sector, and decided to go in for a reduction in the cod quota at this level.47 Right from the start, the Norwegian delegation pursued a hard line based on ICES’s recommendations which, to put it politely, are ‘a bit more pre-

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Chapter Five cautionary than necessary’ as far as the assessment of the cod stock is concerned. Here, it should be observed that a range of experts do not exclude the possibility that one of the factors behind the stipulation of these recommendations, with all due respect for this indisputably very respectful organisation, have been the interests of Norway and the EU countries, whose representatives constitute the majority of the members of ICES’s working groups. And it is quite possible that the Norwegian delegation’s strong demands for reductions in the cod catches are aimed at maintaining the high price of the country’s fish export commodities. [. . .] This is the third year in a row that the Norwegian party has tried to get reductions in the cod quota, and it is absolutely possible that this insistence has something to do with the fact that Norway has started farming cod. In two to three years’ time, the quantity of this fish may reach 180-200,000 tonnes a year, that is, practically equivalent to their share of the quota of ‘wild’ cod. And in order to maintain future prices, they want to ‘freeze’ this catch level. Whether you like it or not, the Norwegians at the session [of the Joint Fisheries Commission] gained additional support for their argument in the demands from the ‘greens’ and parts of the local press.48 There is another reason why the Norwegians went in for the establishment of a fixed cod quota for three years ahead. The Russian participants to the session were told sub rosa that it is expected that in the course of exactly the next three years Norway will succeed in breeding amounts of cod that, if it happens, will make it possible to reduce the quota of the stock sharply.49

Third, there is direct reference by the Russians to (what they perceive as) Norway’s pivotal economic calculations as a ‘natural’ thing. The first quote below follows immediately on the extract above that inferred that Norway was using ICES for its own economic purposes. [I]t is quite possible that the Norwegian delegation’s strong demands for reductions in the cod catches are aimed at maintaining the high price of the country’s fish export commodities. In principle, there is nothing strange about this – every country defends its own interests with the means available to it.50 Norway does everything it can to destroy the Russian fishing industry. And that’s good. That’s how it should be. It’s just a pity that the Russian state isn’t strong enough to defend the interests of its inhabitants in the same manner.51

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Fourth, there is a clear tendency in the Russian press and among actors involved in Russian fisheries to refer to the work of the Russian delegation to the Commission primarily in terms of defending Russia’s national interests. ‘There’s a deep misunderstanding that Russia won this year’s fishery negotiations in Murmansk,’ says [deputy director] Vladimir Torokhov of Sevryba. To the newspaper Rybnaya Stolitsa in Murmansk [he] says the opposite, that it was Norway that got its way. ‘Our crafty neighbours ended up with the figures at the end of the negotiations they’d had in their heads right from the start. [. . .] We didn’t learn the lessons of the previous negotiations and defended our national interests badly.’52 Of course, it’s necessary to mention the efforts of the Russian scientists in the negotiations [of the Joint Fisheries Commission], which, to a considerable extent, made possible the achievement of many acceptable results for the members of our northern fishery complex. [. . .] Our scientists really did a good job at the negotiations.53 [In the Joint Fisheries Commission, the Russian scientists] defended the Russian positions in a precise and well-prepared manner.54

Finally, the issue of Russia’s national interests also figures in the debate concerning the internal organisation of Russian fisheries management and market access for the fish. We need [a new regional fisheries department] which can defend us against Norwegian dominance in the fishing grounds. [. . .] We tried to get one of Sevryba’s experts to assist us in [an ongoing trial in Norway], but it proved to be impossible. Sevryba as an organisation needs fundamental changes. It has to become a strong department which not only co-ordinates us in the fishing industry, but also defends us [against the Norwegians].55 ‘If the cod quotas for next year are set in accordance with the scientific recommendations, we will deliver our fish to Canada and Portugal. Not a kilo will go to Norway.’ The message from the fishing industry in Northwestern Russia was clear at a press conference in Murmansk yesterday evening. Norway was also accused of speculating in low quotas in order to gain control of the Barents Sea fish. [. . .] ‘Norway stands firm on the low quotas because they calculate that Russian vessels will deliver their catches to Norway,’ said [leader of the association of small shipowners in Northwestern Russia]. He was supported by the Vice Governor of Murmansk Oblast, Yuriy Myasnikov, among others, reports news editor Andrey Privalikhin on Murmansk TV.56

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In conclusion, representatives of the Russian fishing industry and management system appear to agree that the Norwegians should be seen as rivals, not as partners: Northern basin fishery entrepreneurs and scientists held a ‘round table’ session in Murmansk to work out recommendations for [the] national delegation to future sessions of the Joint Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission. ‘It’s about time for us to think of the Norwegians as rivals rather than partners, in competition for marine bio-resources,’ said Gennady Stepakhno, head of the Northern Fishery Enterprises Association, at the opening of the meeting. Indeed, it seems to have been the general feeling of the meeting – along with the view that ‘there is plenty of fish in the sea, and we must press ahead with our demands for an increase in the total allowed catch’.57

Concern about the institutional set-up There is growing concern among players in Russia’s northern fishery basin about whether the Joint Fisheries Commission is in fact fit to secure Russian national interests. As the preceding section showed, the attitude of Russian fisheries actors is that Norwegians take advantage of Russia’s adverse economic and political situation. As expressed by a former Soviet Deputy Minister of Fisheries and current advisor to the country’s fishery authorities at both federal and regional (northern basin) level: Diplomatic relations with Norway within the fisheries sector have, mildly speaking, been faltering for several years. [. . .] It all began a couple of years ago with what seemed like a trifle: because of our economic difficulties, we were not able to carry out several joint scientific programmes.58 Then concessions were made [from our side] in a range of negotiations. Although they appeared insignificant at first glance, they had unfortunate consequences. For instance, we agreed too soon to introduce selection grids in the cod trawl [as proposed in] the Norwegian scheme.59 [. . .] Or take the last negotiations on a trilateral agreement between Iceland, Norway and Russia.60 Yes, this agreement was necessary; no one disputes that fact. But it should not have given special rights to the party that is not a coowner of the Barents Sea resources. Today, our fishers quite rightly query the Norwegian inspections in the Svalbard area, which are very rigid – sometimes outspokenly biased.61 For me, and I know the Norwegian fishery control system well, it sometimes seems strange. What worries me is that their inspectors’ motives for closing fishing grounds seem doubt-

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ful – alas, there are too many undersized fish in the catches . . . [. . .] There has been a generational shift in our fishery diplomacy. Some have retired because of old age. Others have just ‘retired’, and, as a result, the logic of our management system has broken down. But that being as it is, does it give the other party the right to take advantage of his partner’s mistakes and snatch more for himself than is rightly his?62

Correspondingly, Russian trust in ICES seems to have shrunk in recent years. Central members of the Russian delegation [to the Joint Fisheries Commission] show no mercy [in their condemnation of] the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, ICES. While [the Joint Fisheries Commission] will probably set a cod quota for next year that lies far above the scientific recommendations discarding the scientists’ views on [sustainable] fishing patterns, the powerful shipowner and [State] Duma representative Vladimir Gusenkov says that ICES is far from having the necessary credibility and objectivity. ‘ICES reminds me a bit of the scientific advice that we had during the Soviet era, where all recommendations were in accordance with the government’s special interests. The difference is that ICES defends Norwegian interests in each and every way.’63

To sum up, the tendency of the Joint Fisheries Commission to set quotas far above scientific recommendations since the late 1990s can be traced mainly to the position of the Russian party to the Commission. While the Norwegians have expressed concern about the long-term viability of the Northeast Arctic cod stock and the obvious failure to follow precautionary procedures adopted by both ICES and the Commission itself, the Russians have been more concerned about securing their ‘national interests’ in the quota distribution game with the Norwegians.64 This development can, in turn, partly be traced to the increased influence of wealthy user groups in the Russian delegation to the Joint Fisheries Commission, and in Russian fisheries management more generally, towards the end of the 1990s; cf. the discussion in Chapters 4 and 7.

PRACTICES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL In the following, I review the distribution of shares in the Russian total cod quota in the Barents Sea among the federal subjects by the Scientific Catch Council, and by the regional fisheries councils among the various parties of the federal subjects during the period 1995-99.65 Since TACs have varied

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considerably during this period, the distribution of shares is shown in per cent to allow optimal comparison over time. It should be emphasised that these tables give an approximate picture. Answers are given to questions about differences in distribution trends in Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and Karelia, and how much of the quota has been allotted to the fishing kolkhozes (collectives), to coastal fishing and small businesses in the Union of Private Fishery Enterprises in the North (see Chapter 4). It should be noted that the tables showing the internal distribution in Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and Karelia (Tables 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5) do not give a complete picture of whom in each area was given a cod quota, since the quota of the Union of Private Fishery Enterprises in the North is distributed at a higher level, by the Scientific Catch Council. Table 5.2 shows the relative size of the cod quota allocated to this union, but does not indicate the location of the member companies. Most of these companies are located in Murmansk and thus come in addition to the players listed in Table 5.3. It should also be noted that some smaller shipowners have been members from time to time of the Union of Private Fishery Enterprises in the North or one of the fishing kolkhoz associations. This is why they are presented in the tables as independent players in some years, in others they are ‘hidden’ behind the Union of Private Fishery Enterprises in the North or a kolkhoz association.66 A dash in the tables means that the party was not allocated a quota that year. Zero per cent means that the party received a quota but that it was less than 0.5 per cent of the total quota. The point of departure for the discussion is that, in Soviet times, Murmansk had the highest catch capacity of the regions of the northern fishery basin and hence received a major share of the quotas. Moreover, the entire quota was allotted to a handful of large fishing companies and kolkhozes. The crucial question is whether a redistribution of quota shares took place in the latter half of the 1990s following the introduction of new criteria for quota distribution in 1995 (see Chapter 3). As for the first step in the distribution (between the four federal subjects, performed by the Scientific Catch Council), we need to ask: Has Murmansk Oblast maintained its sizeable share of the quota on the basis of its continued greater catch capacity? Or has, for instance, Nenets Autonomous Okrug67 received a higher share of the quota since the 1995 introduction of the principle that indigenous peoples shall be given priority in the distribution? Moreover, is a larger share given to coastal fisheries (where catch capacity is lower than in the ocean fishery) than in Soviet times? As far as the second step in the quota distribution process is concerned (between shipowners, overseen by the regional fisheries councils in each of the federal subjects), the main ques-

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tion is whether the one-time Soviet fishing companies still receive the major shares of the quota, or whether smaller firms, among them companies engaged in coastal fishing, have succeeded in challenging their supremacy. Quota distribution at the inter-regional level Table 5.2 shows the approximate size of the shares of the Russian Northeast Arctic cod distributed among the federal subjects of the northern fishery basin by the Scientific Catch Council for the years 1995-99. As follows from the table, Murmansk Oblast received a little less than half of the total quota year-on-year, Arkhangelsk Oblast around 20 per cent and the Republic of Karelia around 10 per cent. Since 1998, Nenets Autonomous Okrug – located within the territory of Arkhangelsk Oblast – was allocated a separate quota. The distribution of shares to the various players has generally been quite stable. The Union of Private Fishery Enterprises in the North increased its quota from 12 per cent in 1996 to 18 per cent in 1997 and has since maintained this level. Arkhangelsk Oblast received less during this period, even when taking into account Nenets’ reclassification as a separate group with a right to a quota of its own from 1998. Of the Russian federal subjects that are not part of the northern fishery basin, Kaliningrad and Leningrad Oblasts68 both belonging to the country’s western fishery basin, were given a small share of the Barents Sea cod quota. Kaliningrad Oblast experienced an increase from 1 per cent in 1995 and 1996 to 2 per cent in 1997 and 1999 and 4 per cent in 1998. Leningrad Oblast received a quota share only in 1997 and 1999; both years its share was less than 0.5 per cent of the total Russian quota that year. The share set aside for ‘basin purposes’ fell slightly over the period, from 8 per cent in 1995 to 5 per cent in 1998.

Table 5.2. Distribution of shares in the Russian total cod quota among federal subjects, the Union of Private Fishery Enterprises in the North and for basin purposes 1995-1999

Murmansk Oblast Arkhangelsk Oblast The Republic of Karelia Nenets Autonomous Okrug

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

48% 21% 10% -

48% 23% 10% -

44% 21% 9% -

42% 16% 12% 2%

49% 16% 13% 3%

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Table 5.2 (cont.)

The Union of Private Fishery Enterprises in the North Basin purposes Kaliningrad Oblast Leningrad Oblast Coastal fisheries TOTAL

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

12%

12%

18%

18%

17%

8% 1% 0% 100%

6% 1% 100%

6% 2% 0% 100%

5% 4% 99%

2% 0% 99%

Quota distribution at the regional level A similarly stable quota allocation pattern can generally be observed in relation to the largest shipping company, the Murmansk Trawl Fleet, and the kolkhoz association Murmanskolkhozsoyuz within Murmansk Oblast as regards allocations; cf. Table 5.3. The former received around 40 per cent of the total quota over the period while the collective enterprises maintained a stable level of around 17-18 per cent. The second largest shipping company, Murmanrybprom, saw its quota fall from 24 per cent in 1995 to 18 per cent in 1999. Two of the other ‘traditional’ players, the exploration fleet Sevrybpromrazvedka and the transport/freezer fleet Sevrybkholodflot witnessed a steady reduction in their cod quotas too. The ‘winners’ were Sevryba and, from 1999, the Murmansk Governor Fleet Ltd. In 1998 and 1999, a quota share of 1-2 per cent was reserved for the processing plants ashore (for resale).69 Moreover, it is worth noting that the Russian ‘coastal fisheries’ constitute a minuscule share of the total quota: their shares remained at around a steady 1 per cent.

Table 5.3. Distribution of shares in the cod quota in Murmansk Oblast 1995-99

Murmansk Trawl Fleet Murmanrybprom Sevrybpromrazvedka Sevrybkholodflot Murmankolkhozsoyuz Volna

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

41% 24% 12% 6% 16% 1%

39% 23% 11% 6% 19% 1%

38% 21% 11% 3% 17% 1%

42% 19% 9% 3% 18% 1%

39% 18% 8% 2% 18% 1%

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Table 5.3 (cont.)

Sevryba Sevryba 2 Murmansk Governor Fleet Ltd. Coastal fisheries Regional competitive fleet Quota to the processing plants TOTAL

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

0% 100%

1% 100%

3% 1% 2% 97%

4% 1% 1% 2% 1% 101%

2% 2% 6% 1% 2% 99%

The distribution between the various participants in Arkhangelsk Oblast shows once again that the largest of the ‘traditional’ shipping companies, the Arkhangelsk Trawl Fleet Base, managed to maintain its leading place in the allocation queue; cf. Table 5.4. Overall it received a bit more than half of the total quota for Arkhangelsk Oblast. The main ‘loser’ here is the collective fleet organised in the association AMPO, which saw its share fall steadily from 39 per cent in 1995 to 27 per cent in 1999. The ‘winners’ are a handful of independent small businesses, of which some at times have been organised in the Union of Private Fishery Enterprises in the North.

Table 5.4. Distribution of shares in the cod quota in Arkhangelsk Oblast 1995-99

Arkhangelsk Trawl Fleet Base Flotarkhrybprom AMPO (fishing kolkhozes) Arkhryb combinate Jagry Gavan Stomar Belomorryb combinate Komservfish Tiko Utshpromflot Regional competitive quota Reserve/undistributed quota TOTAL

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

54% 4% 39% 3% 1% -

56% 3% 35% 1% 4% -

101%

99%

52% 3% 33% 3% 3% 0% 6% 100%

48% 3% 30% 3% 4% 3% 0% 4% 0% 1% 3% 99%

53% 3% 27% 6% 1% 0% 0% 9% 98%

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In the Republic of Karelia, as opposed to Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts, we see that the quota allocated to the largest shipping company, Karelrybflot, fell considerably during the latter part of the 1990s, from 73 per cent in 1997 – it received 65 per cent in 1995 and 63 per cent in 1996 – to 40 per cent in 1999; cf. Table 5.5. Shares allocated to the association of collective enterprises, Karelrybkolkhozsoyuz, have fluctuated, but for 1995 and 1999 they were approximately at the same level. New enterprises in Karelia that are not members of any association have received relatively large shares of the cod quota in recent years; the company Virma, for instance, received 16 per cent in 1998 and 10 per cent in 1999.

Table 5.5. Distribution of shares in the cod quota in the Republic of Karelia 1995-99

Karelrybflot Karelrybkolkhozsoyuz Pobeda Alternativa Alternativa (closed joint-stock company) Alternativa (open joint-stock company) Albion Severnaya Avrora Passat Pomortral Belomorskaya ekspeditsiya Virma Karelryba Kareltrust Forpost Coastal quota Regional competitive quota Undistributed quota TOTAL

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

65% 17% 7% 6% -

63% 21% 5% -

73% 23% -

47% 12% 3%

40% 18% 5%

-

-

-

4%

0%

4% 1% 100%

8% 2% 2% 101%

3% 1% 100%

0% 2% 0% 2% 3% 16% 5% 0% 6% 100%

3% 7% 10% 4% 4% 2% 0% 8% 101%

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Have fresh principles led to fresh practices? Before the break-up of the Soviet Union, the main quota allocation principle was a company’s catch capacity. In practice, the quota was divided between a handful of large fishing companies, each employing several thousand fishers, and a few fishing kolkhozes. The catch capacity principle was retained as an important quota allocation measure after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. However, it was supplemented with several other criteria in the preliminary provision on quota allocation of 1995, such as the rights of indigenous peoples, the interests of fishery-dependent communities, contributions to research funding, rescue service, supervision and reproduction of fish stocks, and compliance with fishing regulations; cf. Chapter 3. In connection with the attempted reorganisation of the quota distribution system in 1997, yet another range of new criteria were put in place for organisations to follow: maintenance of employment, contributions for the social welfare of fishers, payment of taxes, and catch of other species than cod and haddock (contributing to fish volume). Finally, supplying fish to the domestic market was emphasised in the 1999 proposal as a main criterion to be included in the quota distribution process.70 In practice, the new criteria are not equally important for the quotas given to players. For instance, all shipowners contribute indirectly to the funding of research, rescue services, and the supervision and reproduction of fish stocks through the part of the total quota that goes to the research and enforcement authorities for resale. Moreover, it can be argued that some of the newly introduced criteria are more aimed at reintroducing what were considered important social arrangements in Soviet times than at resource management in general. Before 1991, jobs, social welfare and adequate volumes of fish were secured by the state’s overarching economic system. Likewise, taxes were normally paid (to the extent they existed in the Soviet system), regulations largely complied with (at least according to Soviet authorities),71 and catches delivered to the domestic market. Hence, from the introduction of the more general political principles in 1995, such as the rights of indigenous peoples and the protection of interests of fisherydependent communities, the established principles for quota distribution appear gradually through the rest of the decade to have been intended to solve pressing political problems through demanding payment of taxes and deliveries of fish to the domestic market.72 To what extent have the enacting political bodies – i.e. the Scientific Catch Council and the regional fish councils of Murmansk, Arkhangelsk and Karelia – followed up these principles in their distribution of quota

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shares? The most noticeable feature in the distribution of quotas in the Russian northern fishery basin from 1995 to 1999 is its stability throughout the period. First, the division of shares between the four federal subjects of the region is practically unchanged. Second, the large Soviet-day fishing companies of the region still receive the bulk of the quotas (particularly in Murmansk and Arkhangelsk Oblasts). Third, to the extent that small private firms are allotted quotas, it seems partly to have taken place at the expense of companies that have seen demands for their services fall significantly since the Soviet period, e.g. the freezing fleet (the fishing vessels now either deliver fresh catches or freeze the fish themselves) and the exploration fleet (the vessels search for their own fish in a market context). In other words, they are quota shares that have been ‘vacated’ by the structural changes in the Russian northern fishery basin. It seems that the old principle of catch capacity is still a major criterion in the system of quota distribution of Russia’s northern fishery basin; the companies receive quota shares according to their potential to actually fish the allotted quota. This is confirmed in interviews with representatives of the management system for the northern fishery basin.73 The general principles introduced in 1995 seem to have had little effect on distribution. The indigenous peoples of the region, notably the Nenets, have not seen their share increased to any significant degree, nor have fishery-dependent coastal communities.74 The data employed here do not allow for an assessment of whether the criteria of payment of taxes and compliance with fishery regulations have in practice been applied. However, general knowledge of the management practices leads us to exclude the possibility that they have been used other than in rare instances.75 Likewise, it is obvious that the Russian fishery authorities have not been able to implement the 1999/2000 (see Chapter 3) principle to redirect catches to the domestic market.76 It should be mentioned, however, that while this has been a major goal for Russian fishery authorities also before it was incorporated into provisions for quota allocation, they have not managed to introduce measures that would ‘force’ Russian fishers to deliver their catches at home.77 Finally, it can be argued that the principles aimed at the restoration of certain Soviettime arrangements have been employed to the extent that the large traditional fishing companies have been given continued priority in the quota distribution process. On the other hand, it is difficult to see whether this distribution pattern reflects a will to secure the jobs and social welfare of fishers, or the application of the principle of catch capacity. The stability of the quota allocation system indicates that in practice the latter criterion has been the more important principle.78

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CONCLUSIONS TACs for Northeast Arctic cod, the most important stock for the Russian northern fishery basin, have increasingly been set above the scientific recommendations issued by ICES since the mid-1990s. Admittedly, the TAC for this stock is set not by Russian authorities alone, but by the Joint RussianNorwegian Fisheries Commission. However, the way in which TACs are perceived in fisheries and wider circles in Russia and Norway clearly indicates that scientific recommendations were discounted as a result of Russian pressure on the Joint Fisheries Commission. There is a tendency in Russia to deal with the scientific recommendations coming out of ICES as a battle between Russia and the West; the Western countries are in majority in ICES and give their support to Norway’s desire to reduce the TACs for the Northeast Arctic cod, the argument goes. Although the Joint Fisheries Commission has adopted the precautionary approach to fisheries (cf. Chapter 3), its practice in setting TACs has come under increasing attack from Norwegian environmental groups (and even groups within the country’s fishery sector) since the late 1990s for lack of compliance with the approach. In Russia, on the other hand, the Joint Fisheries Commission is generally criticised for not defending Russian national interests successfully enough, i.e. for succumbing (at least to some extent) to Norwegian pressure to reduce the quotas. The Russian unwillingness to reduce TACs in light of scientific advice must be seen in relation to the increased influence of individual shipowners on the Russian delegation to the Joint Fisheries Commission and in Russian fishery politics in general; cf. Chapter 4. Moreover, there is a general tendency in post-Soviet Russian society – as a result of the legal, political and economic insecurity – to give priority to short-term economic gain at the expense of the long-term viability of natural resources. Chapter 7 will revisit this territory. Quota distribution practice in the Russian northern fishery basin has not changed in accordance with changes in principles for quota allocation, introduced since 1995. The old catch capacity criterion was widened with the addition of a number of general political principles for the management of marine resources in 1995, including a duty to give priority to indigenous peoples and coastal fisheries. Other requirements aimed at solving present political concerns, notably getting the parties to deliver fish to the home market, were introduced during the latter half of the 1990s. None of these principles are reflected in the actual process of quota distribution in Russia’s northern fishery basin in the period 1995-99. In fact, this distribution pattern reflects the general approach that prevailed in Soviet times

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and, it may be argued, the unwillingness of Russian fishery authorities to change the established practice.

NOTES

1. We have already established, in Chapter 4, that the only stakeholders given formal access to the regulatory process in the Russian northern fishery basin are user groups, i.e. shipowners, and a politically rather impotent seafarers’ trade union. The shipowners, in turn, are closely integrated in the traditional sense of a regional ‘fishery complex’ and can thus hardly be viewed as ‘external’ to the management system. We also observed that individual shipowners in recent years have increased their direct influence on the quota allocation process at the expense of the old industry conglomerate Sevryba. 2. No in-depth discourse analysis is given here; for a more thorough discussion of different Russian and Western discourses surrounding various areas of environmental management in the European Arctic, including fisheries management, see G. Hønneland, Russia and the West: Environmental Co-operation and Conflict (London: Routledge, 2003); G. Hønneland, ‘Fish Discourse. Russia, Norway and the Northeast Arctic Cod’ (in press) Human Organization. 3. O kvotakh na vylov (dobychu) vodnykh biologicheskikh resursov vnutrennikh morskikh vod, territorialnogo morya, kontinentalnogo shelfa i isklyuchitelnoy ekonomicheskoy zony Rossiyskoy Federatsii (‘On Quotas of Catch [Exploitation] of Aquatic Biological Resources of the Russian Federation’s Internal Waters, Territorial Water, Continental Shelf and Exclusive Economic Zone’), Resolution of the Government of the Russian Federation No. 1010 of 27 December 2000. 4. In 2002, 60,000 tonnes were sold on auction, 101,000 tonnes distributed as industrial quota and 20,000 tonnes reserved as research quota; Russian Fish Report, No. 9 (72), September 2002, p. 3. For 2003, 106,500 tonnes were sold on auction, the industrial quota was 56,500 tonnes and the research quota 20,000 tonnes; Russian Fish Report, No. 1 (76), January 2003, p. 16. Rybnaya stolitsa, 10 December 2002, p. 3, gives slightly different figures for 2003: 106,700 tonnes to be sold on auction, 56,800 tonnes as industrial quota and 20,000 tonnes as research quota. 5. O. Nakken, ‘Past, Present and Future Exploitation and Management of Marine Resources in the Barents Sea and Adjacent Areas’ (1998) 37 Fisheries Research 23-35.

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6. Ibid. 7. Ibid. 8. Ibid. 9. O. Nakken, ‘Past, Present and Future Exploitation and Management of Marine Resources in the Barents Sea and Adjacent Areas’, 1998; B. Aasjord, ‘Norsk-russisk rulett i Barentshavet? Fiskeriforvaltning i lys av havrett og internasjonal folkeskikk’ (‘Norwegian-Russian Roulette in the Barents Sea? Fisheries Management in Light of the Law of the Sea and International Practice’) (2001) 59 Internasjonal politikk 303-332. 10. ACFM Report 1999 (Copenhagen: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 1999). 11. ACFM Report 1998 (Copenhagen: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 1998). 12. Protokoll for den 27. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Protocol for the 27th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 1998). 13. Author’s own observation; cf. section on methodology in Chapter 1. 14. Protokoll for den 28. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Protocol for the 28th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 1999). 15. ACFM Report 2000 (Copenhagen: International Council for the Exploration of the Sea, 2000). 16. Protokoll for den 29. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Protocol for the 29th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 2000). 17. O. Nakken, ‘Past, Present and Future Exploitation and Management of Marine Resources in the Barents Sea and Adjacent Areas’, 1998; B. Aasjord, ‘Norsk-russisk rulett i Barentshavet? Fiskeriforvaltning i lys av havrett og internasjonal folkeskikk’, 2001. 18. Ibid. 19. Ibid. 20. Ibid. 21. B. Aasjord, ‘Norsk-russisk rulett i Barentshavet? Fiskeriforvaltning i lys av havrett og internasjonal folkeskikk’, 2001. 22. Ibid.

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23. G. Hønneland, ‘Compliance in the Barents Sea Fisheries. How Fishermen Account for Conformity with Rules’ (2000) 24 Marine Policy 11-19; G. Hønneland, Coercive and Discursive Compliance Mechanisms in the Management of Natural Resources (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000). 24. The reference here is to repeated refusals by Russian authorities in 1997 and 1998 to calls from Norwegian and Russian marine scientists to mount joint scientific expeditions in the Russian exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of the Barents Sea. 25. Interview with Norwegian fisher, Båtsfjord, August 1998. 26. Interview with Russian fisher, Båtsfjord, August 1998. 27. The two investigations are not directly comparable. The compliance study involved interviews with individual fishers, i.e. captains of fishing vessels, while it was primarily shipowners who voiced their opinions in the debate about quota levels around the turn of the millennium. Further, the former investigation was geared towards revealing general attitudes while the second concentrated on attitudes to scientific advice on quota levels. Lastly, the first study was done in 199798 when stocks were relatively abundant, the second at the turn of the century when stocks had fallen again. 28. The views on scientific advice found among Norwegian fishers are more divergent than those found among Russian fishers. One reason might be that the Norwegian fishing fleet is less homogeneous than the Russian and the various groups ‘use’ the issue of scientific advice to advance their own special interests. 29. Fiskeribladet, 23 November 1999, p. 3. 30. Russian shipowner to Fiskeribladet, 15 September 2000, p. 20. 31. Fiskeribladet, 14 December 2001, p. 6. 32. See, for instance, the following statement by the leader of the Norwegian Association of Shipowners to Fiskeribladet (14 January 2000, p. 14): ‘It’s a fact that our trust in the Norwegian marine scientists, and in particular the ACFM, has evaporated. [. . .] The establishment of quotas for Northeast Arctic cod reveals that neither Norwegian nor Russian authorities have much confidence in the scientific recommendations. At the same time, it’s a paradox that we neglect the scientific recommendations for stocks they probably have quite a good picture of but follow the recommendations nearly slavishly when it comes to stocks that they know less about, for instance saithe, redfish and halibut. [. . .] In my opinion, it’s meaningless to set constant reference points for catch rates and spawning stocks for a predatory fish like cod and call it precautionary management. It is, in fact, quite the opposite. We cannot regulate the cod as a plankton eater, as we do today, we need to take more into account the presence of [living] food [for the cod] in the sea when we set quotas.’ 33. Nordlys, 16 November 2000, p. 2.

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34. Fiskeribladet, 23 November 1999, p. 2. 35. Deputy leader of the Norwegian Association of Fishers to Fiskeribladet, 12 November 1999, p. 8. 36. Norwegian marine scientist to Fiskeribladet, 12 November 1999, p. 6. 37. Norwegian marine scientist to Fiskeribladet, 18 May 2000, pp. 1-2. 38. Interview with Russian scientist, Murmansk, October 2000. 39. Personal communication, Norwegian scientist, Bodø, February 2002. 40. See Fiskeribladet, 5 October 2001, p. 2, for an interview with Russian marine scientist Vladimir Borisov on this issue. 41. Personal communication, Norwegian marine scientist, Bodø, February 2002. 42. An overview of this debate is given in G. Hønneland, Russia and the West: Environmental Co-operation and Conflict, 2003. 43. Of course, it could be argued that this is a natural consequence of the greater homogeneity of the Russian fleet than the Norwegian one, consisting, as it does, nearly exclusively of trawlers. As follows from the discussion below, however, it is my opinion that this is not the main reason for the direction taken by the Russian discourse. 44. There have been no signs in official statements, the press or my numerous interviews with actors within the Russian fisheries sector of diverging opinions within the Russian delegation to the Joint Fisheries Commission. As far as the Russian population at large is concerned, it is naturally impossible to exclude that there are people who are sympathetic to the Norwegian position, but I have been unable to find any of them during my stays in Russia or represented in written material. 45. Fiskeribladet, 12 November 1999, p. 3. To Norwegian ears, the sobriquet alludes to the nickname given to the former Minister of Fisheries Jan Henry T. Olsen in the early 1990s when the Norwegians were discussing whether to apply for EU membership or not. Minister Olsen had said at the time that Norway was not willing to part with a single fish as part of an EU membership deal, a stance which earned him the title no-fish-Olsen. 46. Rybnaya stolitsa, 15 November 1999, p. 1. 47. Interview with Russian civil servant, Murmansk, February 2000. 48. Rybatskiye novosti, No. 3-4, 2001 (cited from an unpaginated copy of the article; on file with the author). 49. Rybnyy biznes, November 2000 (cited from an unpaginated copy of the article; on file with the author).

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50. Rybatskiye novosti, No. 3-4, 2001 (cited from an unpaginated copy of the article; on file with the author). 51. Interview with inhabitant of Murmansk, Murmansk, April 2001. 52. Fiskeribladet, 14 December 1999, p. 4. 53. Rybnyy biznes, November 2000 (cited from an unpaginated copy of the article; on file with the author). 54. Vice Governor of Murmansk Oblast to Murmanskiy vestnik, November 2000 (cited from an unpaginated copy of the article; on file with the author). 55. Russian shipowner to Fiskeribladet, 12 October 1999, p. 3; referred from Murmanskiy vestnik, 23 September 1999. Interestingly, as late as 1999 Sevryba was, according to this quote, still perceived as the main fisheries management body in the northern basin; cf. the discussion in Chapter 4. At this point, management tasks had been transferred to Murmanrybvod and the regional administrations, but the interviewee does not call for the strengthening of either of these agencies. 56. Nordlys, 18 November 1999, p. 7. 57. IntraFish, , 2 November 2001. 58. As mentioned above, Russian authorities in 1997 and 1998 repeatedly refused to give permission to joint scientific expeditions in the Russian EEZ of the Barents Sea. The problem has persisted up to the present. The refusals allegedly come from the Ministry of Defence while the Ministry of Natural Resources, as the federal agency responsible for environmental protection since 2000 (see Chapter 3), has also objected to the proposed expeditions; interviews with Russian civil servants in Moscow and Murmansk during the period 1997-2002. It is not quite clear why the author of this newspaper article refers to economic difficulties as the source of the problem, unless he alludes to bureaucratic in-fighting over scarce budgets. 59. See Chapter 6 for a presentation of the introduction of selection grids in the cod fishery of the Barents Sea. 60. Iceland, Norway and Russia on 15 May 1999 concluded an agreement that for the first time gave Iceland a quota in the Barents Sea fishery; ‘Avtale mellom Norge, Island og Russland om visse samarbeidsforhold på fiskeriområdet’ (‘Agreement between the Government of Norway, the Government of Iceland and the Government of the Russian Federation Concerning Certain Aspects of Co-operation in the Area of Fisheries’), Overenskomster med fremmede stater (‘Agreements with Foreign States’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1999, pp. 838-846). Since the early 1990s, Icelandic vessels (partly under flags of convenience) had been fishing in the so-called ‘Loophole’ outside the EEZs of the Barents Sea and the Fishery Protection Zone around Svalbard (see next note). Observation by the author during the period 1992-99; cf. section on methodology in Chapter 1. For discussions of the Barents Sea loophole and the agreement between Norway, Iceland and Russia,

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see R.R. Churchill, ‘The Barents Sea Loophole Agreement: A “Coastal State” Solution to a Straddling Stock Problem’ (1999) 14 International Journal of Marine & Coastal Law 467-490; O.S. Stokke, ‘The Loophole of the Barents Sea Fisheries Regime’, in O.S. Stokke (ed.), Governing the High Seas Fisheries. The Interplay of Global and Regional Regimes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 61. Norway has traditionally chosen a ‘gentle enforcement’ regime in the Fishery Protection Zone around Svalbard, giving violators of fishery regulations oral and written warnings, but not penalising them further. I have discussed this at length elsewhere; see G. Hønneland, ‘Compliance in the Fishery Protection Zone around Svalbard’ (1998) 29 Ocean Development & International Law 339-360; G. Hønneland, ‘Co-operative Action between Fishermen and Inspectors in the Svalbard Zone’ (1999) 35 Polar Record 207-214; G. Hønneland, Coercive and Discursive Compliance Mechanisms in the Management of Natural Resources, 2000; G. Hønneland, ‘Fisheries in the Svalbard Zone: Legality, Legitimacy and Compliance’, in A.G. Oude Elferink and D.R. Rothwell (eds), The Law of the Sea and Polar Maritime Delimitation and Jurisdiction (the Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2001). After Norway in 2001 for the first time arrested a Russian fishing vessel in the Svalbard Zone, the Chernigov, a prevalent discourse on the Russian side has been that the Norwegians are trying to ‘press them out’ of the area; G. Hønneland, Russia and the West: Environmental Co-operation and Conflict, 2003; G. Hønneland, ‘Fish Discourse. Russia, Norway and the Northeast Arctic Cod’, in press. 62. Murmanskiy vestnik, 18 September 1999, p. 3. 63. Fiskeribladet, 17 November 2000, p. 2. See also Fiskeribladet, 21 November 2000, p. 4, where Gusenkov refers to ICES as ‘an instrument in the hands of the Norwegian government’. See also Chapter 4 for a discussion of Gusenkov’s role in regional fisheries management (being a wealthy shipowner) before he was elected to the State Duma. As mentioned, Gusenkov passed away in autumn 2002. 64. The question why the Russians ‘won’ the negotiations with the more cautious Norwegians is discussed in G. Hønneland, Russia and the West: Environmental Co-operation and Conflict, 2003; G. Hønneland, ‘Fish Discourse. Russia, Norway and the Northeast Arctic Cod’, in press. 65. This section is based on G. Hønneland and F. Nilssen, ‘Quota Allocation in Russia’s Northern Fishery Basin: Principles and Practice’ (2001) 44 Ocean & Coastal Management 471-488. The figures on quota allocation have been compiled on the basis of annual quota allocation surveys issued by the State Committee for Fisheries: Ob utverzhdenii promyslovykh kvot vylova vodnykh bioresursov v Severnom promyslovom basseyne na 1995 g. (‘On the Confirmation of Catch Quotas of Aquatic Bio-resources in the Northern Fishery Basin for 1995’), Order of the State Committee for Fisheries of the Russian Federation, 1994; Ob utverzhdenii promyslovykh kvot vylova vodnykh bioresursov v Severnom promyslovom basseyne na 1996 g. (‘On the Confirmation of Catch Quotas of Aquatic Bio-resources in the

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Northern Fishery Basin for 1996’), Order of the State Committee for Fisheries of the Russian Federation, 1995; Ob utverzhdenii promyslovykh kvot vylova vodnykh bioresursov v Severnom promyslovom basseyne na 1997 g. (‘On the Confirmation of Catch Quotas of Aquatic Bio-resources in the Northern Fishery Basin for 1997’), Order of the State Committee for Fisheries of the Russian Federation, 1996; Ob utverzhdenii promyslovykh kvot vylova vodnykh bioresursov v Severnom promyslovom basseyne na 1998 g. (‘On the Confirmation of Catch Quotas of Aquatic Bioresources in the Northern Fishery Basin for 1998’), Order of the State Committee for Fisheries of the Russian Federation, 1997; Ob utverzhdenii promyslovykh kvot vylova vodnykh bioresursov v Severnom promyslovom basseyne na 1999 g. (‘On the Confirmation of Catch Quotas of Aquatic Bio-resources in the Northern Fishery Basin for 1999’), Order of the State Committee for Fisheries of the Russian Federation, 1998. 66. In Table 5.4, for instance, enterprises such as Tiko and Jagry were allocated quotas only for some years. In reality, they received quotas in the other years too, but as members of the Union of Private Fishery Enterprises in the North. 67. See Chapter 2 for an overview of the various types of federal subjects found in Russia’s northern fishery basin. 68. The oblast surrounding the city of St Petersburg, which is a federal subject in its own right, retained its Leningrad name even after the city got its original name back. 69. Interestingly, this happened before support to the region’s fish-processing industry was formally established as a criterion of quota allocation in 2002; cf. Chapter 4. 70. Most of these principles were repeated in the new federal and regional regulations pertaining to quota allocation, introduced in 2000/2001 and 2002 respectively; cf. Chapters 3 and 4. At the time of writing (2002), it is too early to evaluate the consequences of these regulations. Also, as an increasing share of Russia’s Northeast Arctic cod quota is sold on auctions (see introduction to this chapter), the amount of fish distributed according to these principles is correspondingly reduced. 71. This is further discussed in Chapter 6. 72. See Chapter 3 for a discussion of the ideological fundament of the State Committee for Fisheries as compared to that of other parts of the Russian federal administrative system involved in issues of fisheries management. 73. Interviews with Russian civil servants in Moscow and Murmansk during the period 1994-2001. 74. I.e. if we perceive of ‘coastal communities’ as small local entities with century-long traditions for fishing; cf. the discussion in Chapter 4. Although these are few in Northwestern Russia, they do exist.

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75. Interviews with Russian civil servants in Moscow and Murmansk during the period 1994-2001. 76. Interviews with Russian civil servants and representatives of Russian fishing enterprises during the period 1999-2002. 77. This speaks to the effect of the relative impotency of the State Committee for Fisheries and the regional administrations of Northwestern Russia – which both have the return of fish deliveries to Russian ports as a declared goal – as compared to the influence of other, more market-oriented bodies of governance, notably the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. 78. As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, an increasing share of Russia’s Barents Sea cod quota has been sold on auctions since 2001. The distribution among shipowners is considered a business secret and not made publicly available. It is a well-known fact, however, that Murmansk Trawl Fleet has consolidated and probably even strengthened its role as the largest shipowner of the northern fishery basin after the auctions were introduced; interviews with Russian civil servants, Moscow, April and December 2002. Further, the distribution between the federal subjects of the northern fishery basin seems to have remained at more or less the same level also after 1999. For 2003, for instance, Murmansk Oblast was given 60 per cent of the cod and haddock quota, Arkhangelsk Oblast 22.2 per cent, Nenets Autonomous Okrug 2.8 per cent, the Republic of Karelia 13 per cent, Kaliningrad Oblast 1.5 per cent, Leningrad Oblast 1.17 per cent and the city of St Petersburg 0.33 per cent; Rybnaya stolitsa, 10 December 2002, p. 3. The Union of Private Fishery Enterprises in the North was not singled out as a separate entity in this distribution, as in Table 5.2. The majority of the companies in this union are located in Murmansk, which speaks to the effect that Murmansk Oblast received approximately the same share of the quota in 2003 as in the period 1995-99. Also, the city of St Petersburg is a newcomer in the quota distribution of the northern fishery basin after the turn of the century.

CHAPTER SIX Technical Regulation and Enforcement

Chapters 3 and 4 above have dealt with the organisational set-up of and the principles on which the Russian fisheries management system is based. Chapter 5 dealt with the scientific input and quota settlements seen since the mid-1990s. Underlying principles and ‘correct’ quota levels bring little joy, however, if the regulations are not complied with by the target groups of fisheries management, i.e. the individual fishers. According to the precautionary approach to fisheries, management systems shall contain enforcement mechanisms that enable them to induce compliance among the fishers; cf. Chapter 1. Notably, management systems shall be able to introduce sanctions sufficiently severe to influence the fishers’ behaviour in a compliant direction. Further, the enforcement systems shall be sufficiently flexible to allow rapid responses to more general changes in the fishers’ incentive structure. Russian fishers’ incentive structure has obviously changed dramatically as a result of the abolishment of the Communist system’s plan economy. As seen in Chapter 4, the fishers of the Russian northern basin have tended since the early 1990s to deliver their catches abroad, primarily in the near-by Norwegian fishing ports. The incentive to do so was initially the prospect of better payment for the fish, and in hard currency to boot. Since the mid1990s, the main incentive has been to avoid the irritating inspections initiated by large numbers of federal agencies located in the region, now ‘forced’ to earn their living by extracting fines from prosperous sectors of the economy; cf. Chapter 3. In any event, this has resulted in major changes in the ability of Russian enforcement authorities to keep track of the catches by Russian vessels in the northern fishery basin since the Soviet enforcement system was based on controls of deliveries in port. In addition comes the fact that there were fewer incentives to cheat in Soviet times due to the absence of possibilities of making a profit to line the pockets of the shipowners, captains and fishers.

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The main question asked in this chapter is how Russian authorities have responded to the challenges emerging from the changed incentive structures for the fishers and the reduction in the authorities’ opportunity to conduct inspections in port since the early 1990s. The chapter first discusses briefly how the changes have actually influenced the propensity of Russian fishers to comply with regulations. This section is built on anecdotal evidence since inspection statistics for the fisheries sector are not made public in Russia. The immediate results of the transfer of responsibility for enforcement at sea from Glavrybvod to the Federal Border Service in 1997-98 (cf. Chapters 3 and 4) are also discussed in this section. This discussion is centred around the question how Russian enforcement authorities have managed to implement the decisions made at the rule-producing levels of the country’s fisheries management system. Reference is made to similar processes at other levels, notably with respect to the allocation of quotas. The rest of the chapter is devoted to a presentation and discussion of the joint enforcement policy organised by Russian and Norwegian fisheries authorities in the Barents Sea since 1993. This partnership was the direct result of reduction in compliance among Russian fishers noted in 1992 (in turn, the result of changed incentive structures and reduced Russian enforcement capacity to detect violations without contact with Norwegian enforcement authorities). Some aspects of the activities of the Russian ‘enforcement’ bodies, notably Murmanrybod, and the ‘enforcement’ partnership between Russia and Norway, should, strictly speaking, be referred to as ‘technical regulation’ of fisheries (e.g. the introduction of selection grids in the cod fishery). For the sake of simplicity, I use the term ‘enforcement’ to cover all activities typically handled by ‘enforcement bodies’ and by the Russian-Norwegian ‘enforcement co-operative arrangement’ in the Barents Sea.

IMPLEMENTATION PERFORMANCE AND TARGET COMPLIANCE In the post-Soviet period, three features stand out in the development of Russian fisheries management, one partly following from the other: i) the diffusion of management responsibility; ii) the degeneration of implementation performance; and iii) the reduction in target compliance. We have seen throughout this book how the post-Soviet fisheries management system has been challenged from different angles. Various ‘power agencies’, notably the Federal Border Service, have successfully challenged the task of the State Committee for Fisheries and its subordinate regional agencies

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to conduct enforcement at sea.1 The Ministry of Economic Development and Trade has interfered in the quota allocation process through its introduction of a system for auctions of fish quotas.2 The regional administrations of Russia’s federal subjects have, somewhat less successfully, attempted to take over management responsibilities from federal agencies located in the region.3 A decline in implementation performance has followed partly from the fact that the ‘newcomers’ are less fit for the job than were the old agencies, and partly from confusion due to the unclear responsibilities resting on ‘new’ and ‘old’ management bodies respectively.4 The former refers to poor standards in both competence and material resources. The regional administrations have had only a handful of persons employed in their fisheries departments; in comparison to Sevryba’s once large and well-experienced staff they have had little to show for their efforts.5 More apparent is the lack of experience and resources in the Federal Border Service (whose tasks have also come to be more extensive than those of the regional administrations).6 For one thing, officers in the Murmansk State Inspection of the Federal Border Service generally lack experience in fisheries management and enforcement; this has partly been compensated by relocating some of Murmanrybvod’s inspectors to the agency.7 More apparent is the lack of material resources to maintain presence at sea. Contrary to the entire point of the exercise to reorganise the enforcement system, the presence at sea of monitoring vessels has declined since the Federal Border Service took over in 1998.8 Precise data for presence at sea and inspection frequency are not available, but Jørgensen estimates that the Federal Border Service performed around 160 inspections at sea in 1998, which represents a significant reduction compared to an estimated 700-1,000 inspections annually at sea by Murmanrybvod prior to the reorganisation effort.9 For several months on end during 1998, not a single enforcement vessel was to be seen on the fishing grounds in the Russian part of the Barents Sea.10 Officials of the Federal Border Service put it down to lack of funds to purchase fuel.11 Critics question the sincerity of the Border Service’s will to play a role in fisheries management.12 The result of the reorganisation has in any event so far been a tangible reduction in the effectiveness of Russian enforcement in the Barents Sea.13 Unclear delineation of duties might also have led to poorer performance although it is more difficult to point to concrete effects here. Again the conflict between Glavrybvod/Murmanrybvod and the Federal Border Service is the most striking example. After the decree prescribing the reorganisation of the system was issued in 1997 (see Chapter 3), both agencies con-

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tinued for some time to perform their enforcement duties, but at a low intensity and without co-ordination between them.14 Lack of co-ordination has remained a problem also after the decree was actually implemented – i.e. when a clear division of duties was established – in 1998.15 The same can partly be said about the relationship between Sevryba and the Murmansk regional administration, particularly in the early and mid-1990s, when a pretty fierce battle was going on between the two institutions.16 A kind of ‘peace’ emerged towards the end of the decade when Sevryba proved ‘stronger’ than its opponent but at the same time conceding to the latter some say in the quota allocation process.17 But ‘confusion’ grew again as Sevryba started to lose interest in management issues and its role as a ‘lucrative, small shipowner’ became more important.18 As mentioned, it is difficult to point to concrete management deficiencies as a result of this atmosphere of ‘confusion’; one can only assume that a certain reduction in performance took place. Data on target compliance in Russian fisheries are not publicly available. We can assume that target compliance was generally high in the Soviet period, partly as a result of the absence of incentives to cheat.19 It seems fair to conclude that the overall compliance level in the Russian part of the Barents Sea has decreased in the post-Soviet era. For one thing, in 1992 Norwegian authorities took extra steps to calculate the total Russian catch in the Barents Sea that year; the figures indicated the Russians were overfishing at a rate of more than 100,000 tonnes.20 The sudden rise in overfishing coincided with Russian fishers starting to deliver the bulk of their catches abroad, primarily in Northern Norway.21 At the same time, export directly to Norway gave the fishers even greater incentives to underreport catches (since they were paid better abroad), and reduced the chance of Russian authorities to keep track of the catches since, as mentioned, they used to check catches as they were offloaded in Russian ports. This greater motivation to violate the regulations probably led to a reduction in target compliance, although the joint enforcement regime with Norway (to be discussed below) put a stop to any chances for Russian fishers to conceal their real hauls from Russian authorities when delivering in Norway. Combined with the sharp decline in the efficiency of the Russian enforcement system – evident in the absence of monitoring vessels at sea for considerable periods – there is reason to assume that the fall in target compliance is not insignificant. Interviews with Norwegian and Icelandic fishers who fished in the Russian part of the Barents Sea in 1997-99 indicate that a considerable illegal fishery of undersized fish was taking place during the period without enforcement vessels policing the grounds.22

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In conclusion, a certain erosion of implementation and performance standards among Russian authorities took place in the northern fishery basin throughout the 1990s. The traditional ‘fishery complex’ management bodies, which had taken care of implementation in a satisfactory way until the break-up of the Soviet Union, were now challenged by other governmental agencies wanting a piece of the budgetary cake, and a growing ‘malignity’ of the problem. At least initially, the ‘traditional’ agencies – mainly Sevryba and Murmanrybvod – emerged as more successful in their implementation efforts than the ‘newcomers’, notably the Federal Border Service and the regional administrations. The former were far better off in terms of competence and, to some extent, also material resources, than the latter. To the extent that ‘newcomers’ have taken over, it seems to have led to a reduction in implementation performance and target compliance. On the other hand, with rumours of corruption affecting the State Committee for Fisheries and Sevryba having become more of a commercial actor than a management body, it seems rash to simply regard the various reorganisations as errors of judgement.

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A JOINT ENFORCEMENT ARRANGEMENT WITH NORWAY23 In the course of 1992, the Norwegian Coast Guard reported a dramatic increase in cases of underreporting by Russian vessels, and attempted to estimate the total Russian catch in the Barents Sea for that year.24 In the autumn of 1992, Norwegian fishery authorities presented these figures to their Russian colleagues. As said above, the Russians had fished more than 100,000 tonnes illegally.25 Overfishing constituted 25 per cent of the total cod quota in the Barents Sea for 1992. Russia had 170,000 tonnes at its disposal, of a total allowable catch (TAC) of 396,000 tonnes, following internal quota exchanges with Norway.26 This estimate was supported by the export statistics, which indicated that an amount close to the total Russian cod quota in the Barents Sea had been exported to Norway at the same time as considerable quantities had been exported to other Western countries and some cod landed in Murmansk.27 Towards the end of 1992, the Norwegian and Russian authorities seem to have become aware of the shortcomings of the control of Russian fisheries in the Barents Sea. At the 21st session of the Joint Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission (the Joint Fisheries Commission) in November 1992, the heads of the two delegations jointly proposed the appointment of a

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working group to consider co-operation between the enforcement bodies of the two states.28 This was reflected as follows in the Protocol from the session: The Parties agree to appoint a joint working group consisting of experts in the fields of fisheries regulation, legislation, statistics and control. The working group shall present proposals for concrete co-operative measures by the first quarter of 1993.29

No reference was made in the Protocol to what was then still only an inkling of overfishing. However, after the expert group had submitted its proposals in May 1993 (see below), the Joint Fisheries Commission convened for a meeting under its 21st session in early June 1993. The problems related to overfishing and the working group proposals were the only issues on the agenda. At this meeting, unequivocal reference was made to overfishing in the Protocol: Problems connected with preventing the overfishing in the Barents Sea.30 The Parties noted that a considerable overfishing of cod in all likelihood had taken place in the Barents Sea. Due to the great significance of the fish resources to the two countries, the Parties agreed on the necessity to strengthen fishery control in the Barents Sea. In this connection, the Parties referred to Art. 11 of the Protocol from the 21st Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission and to subsequent correspondence between the Ministers of Fisheries of the two countries. The Parties agreed to ascertain by available means as soon as possible the extent of the overfishing and exchange data on findings.31

THE PROPOSALS OF THE EXPERT GROUP The expert group had four representatives from each country. The Norwegian delegation was entirely composed of officials from the Directorate of Fisheries, and was headed by Deputy Director Lisbeth W. Plassa from the Directorate’s legal department. The other members came from the legal, statistical and control departments. The Russian delegation was headed by Deputy Director Viktor A. Gorokhov from Sevryba. Murmanrybvod, the Knipovich Scientific Polar Institute for Marine Fisheries Research and Oceanography (PINRO) and the State Committee for Fisheries were also represented.32 The expert group met three times during the spring of 1993, in Bergen, Tromsø and Sortland (Norway) to acquaint the Russian delegates with the Norwegian

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enforcement system, and once in Murmansk to enlighten the Norwegian members about the Russian system. A further meeting was held in Bergen to discuss co-operative measures.33 The expert group presented a list of eighteen concrete proposals within the categories of legislation (two), information (five), control (nine) and others (two).34 Most of them referred to exchange and co-ordination of information and procedures. In the Protocol from the subsequent meeting under the 21st session of the Joint Fisheries Commission in June 1993 (see above), the work of the expert group and its proposals were assessed as follows: The Parties expressed great satisfaction with the work of the NorwegianRussian expert group on co-operation and management of resources. The proposals put forward in the Protocol of 29 May [. . .] were regarded as very useful. [. . .] The Parties discussed their further implementation. The Parties agreed that enforcement authorities in the two countries shall take steps to strengthen enforcement efforts at sea and in connection with landings of catches. There was agreement to establish routines for direct contact between the enforcement authorities of the two countries for exchange of information, concerning practical enforcement routines among other things, so that the Parties in co-operation can make enforcement more effective. The first meeting of the enforcement authorities of the two countries will take place in Kirkenes [Norway], 15-16 June 1993. As regards the proposal to place observers on each other’s vessels, the Parties referred to the planned Coast Guard seminar in Norway, where it will also be possible to discuss further proposals to harmonise enforcement procedures. Further, the Parties agreed to prepare for Norwegian and Russian personnel to accompany vessels used in connection with the closing and opening of fishing grounds. In accordance with the proposals from the expert group, Norwegian enforcement authorities will require fishery and port permits to be produced on board Russian vessels. In cases in which such documents are not produced, a report will be made to Russian fishery authorities. [. . .] The Parties agreed to work for the establishment of a uniform system of conversion factors35 to be applied by all who fish in the Barents Sea. The Parties agreed that Norwegian authorities shall convey data on landings of Russian vessels in Norwegian ports to Russian authorities.36

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The Parties agreed on the necessity to establish direct contact between the official sales organisations so that payment for Russian catches landed in Norway can take place through official sales organisations. Further, the Parties agreed to exchange upon request copies of weekly catch reports and information about inspections. The Parties plan to establish a system of data exchange with the help of modern information technology. The practical details will be clarified by experts from the two countries. The Parties agreed to exchange routinely complete texts of laws and regulations of current interest with a view to an enhanced understanding of each other’s fisheries management systems and a possible harmonisation of the regulations in certain fields.37

Hence, the parties agreed to establish means to enable direct contact between their various enforcement bodies, and exchange law texts, observers and catch data.38 They also agreed on more ambitious initiatives, such as the elaboration of uniform conversion factors for fish products.39 Moreover, six months after the Joint Fisheries Commission had broached the enforcement problems for the first time, the parties agreed on several concrete cooperative enforcement measures. For example, Norwegian enforcement authorities would immediately start forwarding data on Russian landings in Norway to their Russian colleagues, and the Norwegian Coast Guard would start checking Russian fishery permits (giving the captain the right to fish) and port permits (giving the vessel the right to fish).40 The parties agreed to appoint a Permanent Committee under the Joint Fisheries Commission which could meet at short notice to discuss management and enforcement issues. The committee was a carry-over from the expert group and came to be known as the Permanent Russian-Norwegian Committee for Management and Enforcement Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector, hereafter referred to as the Permanent Committee. The composition of the Permanent Committee has changed little since its establishment in 1993. As for the Norwegian delegation, the Coast Guard were given a seat in connection with the transition from expert group to Permanent Committee.41 Lisbeth W. Plassa has remained head of the Norwegian delegation. Aleksandr Zelentsov, head of Murmanrybovd, became leader of the Russian delegation in 1996 and was replaced by his successor Boris Prishchepa when he became the representative of the Russian Federation’s State Committee for Fisheries in Norway in 1999.42 Since 1995, the State Committee for Fisheries has not participated in the Russian delegation to

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the Permanent Committee.43 As a result of the reorganisation of the Russian fisheries enforcement system (see Chapters 3 and 4), representatives of the Murmansk State Inspection of the Arctic Regional Command of the Federal Border Service were included in the Russian delegation at the meeting in May 1999.44 In addition, various experts from the two countries’ fisheries administrations and research institutions have occasionally met on the Permanent Committee. The number of representatives in the Norwegian delegation has varied from three to eleven, from three to eight in the Russian (excluding interpreters, but including observers).45

INITIAL CO-OPERATIVE MEASURES The above-mentioned exchange of information started immediately after the proposals of the expert group had been approved by the Joint Fisheries Commission in June 1993. The most important measure was the supply of information on Russian catches landed in Norway to Russian enforcement authorities. Russian overfishing in 1992 had occurred because Russian authorities were unable to keep track of landings from their own vessels in Norway. As a result of the co-operation between the two countries’ enforcement bodies, data about these landings were now automatically conveyed from the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries to Murmanrybvod.46 Moreover, routines for the informal exchange of information between the Norwegian Coast Guard and Murmanrybvod about the situation at sea were established.47 These measures were facilitated by Norwegian aid to improve communications with the Russian side. Both Murmanrybvod and Sevryba were connected to the Norwegian telecommunications system, and fax machines were purchased at the expense of Norwegian fisheries management authorities.48 Likewise, systems for electronic transfer of data were established.49 Another important feature was that the Norwegian Coast Guard, at the request of Murmanrybvod, started to check whether Russian vessels were carrying valid fishery and port permits (see above).50 Until then, the Coast Guard had only checked that the vessel was licensed for fishing in the Norwegian exclusive economic zone (EEZ).51 One increasing problem, according to Russian enforcement authorities, was that Russian vessels with a permit to fish only shrimp and pelagic species were fishing cod too.52 Earlier, Russian authorities would have detected fraud when the fish was landed. Now that the fish was mostly landed in Norway, the vessels could fish for cod in Norwegian waters and deliver it in Norwegian ports, escaping surveillance from Russian enforcement bodies altogether. In May 1993,

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the Norwegian Coast Guard was already controlling the species the Russian vessels were allowed (by Russian authorities) to fish by examining their fishery and port permits.53 During summer and autumn 1993, a handful of vessels with permits only to fish shrimp were detected fishing cod in Norwegian waters.54 Murmanrybvod was informed and the captains in question had their fishery permits withdrawn.55 The first in a series of joint Norwegian-Russian ‘Coast Guard seminars’ was held at the Northern base of the Norwegian Coast Guard at Sortland in September 1993.56 Two Norwegian cabinet ministers (the Minister of Fisheries and the Minister of Defence) were in attendance,57 emphasising the political importance of the joint enforcement deal with the Russians. The protocol of the 22nd session in the Joint Fisheries Commission in November 1993 shows how the emerging co-operation between the enforcement agencies was viewed: The Parties expressed satisfaction that in accordance with the Supplement to the Protocol from the 21st session of the [Joint] Fisheries Commission, a Coast Guard seminar had been organised at Sortland, where representatives of Norwegian and Russian enforcement authorities discussed improvements in enforcement procedures and future co-operation. The Parties noted that procedures for exchange of information between Norwegian and Russian enforcement authorities have now been established. The Parties observed that the system for transfer of data on landings by Russian vessels in Norwegian ports functions satisfactorily. The Parties referred to the fact that the two countries’ resource and regulation controls had become more effective through the co-operation of the enforcement authorities of the two countries. The Parties noted that the installation of modern telecommunications equipment had led to a substantial improvement in the Parties’ enforcement activities.58

MAIN AREAS OF CO-OPERATION SINCE 1994 The activities of the Permanent Committee since 1994 can be divided into three main categories: i) discussions on currents issues related to fisheries management and enforcement practices in the two countries; ii) the administration of exchange of personnel (inspectors and observers) and data; and iii) the execution of more comprehensive tasks assigned to it by the Joint

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Fisheries Commission.59 Most importantly, the meetings of the Permanent Committee enabled Norwegian and Russian fishery authorities to discuss issues of current and sometimes urgent interest in greater depth than is possible by means of ordinary correspondence. For instance, Russian authorities have frequently requested clarification concerning the interpretation of Norwegian regulations and the enforcement procedures followed by the Norwegian Coast Guard when dealing with Russian fishers.60 Likewise, current information about the parties’ national legislation as well as management set-up and procedures is always on the agenda at the Committee meetings.61 Finally, the Permanent Committee was the natural place to address the critical situation that arose in the winter and spring of 1999 with a massive intermingling of undersized fish in the Barents Sea catches.62 Exchange of data and personnel was one of the main proposals to come out of the expert group (see above) and has been one of the Permanent Committee’s main concerns since it was established. Procedures and practical arrangements for the exchange of catch and landing data were soon established and have functioned without particular problems. Since 1994, it has been noted as a matter of routine in the Protocols of the Joint Fisheries Commission that the exchange of data functions to the satisfaction of the parties and will hence be continued.63 Another measure that proved effective and has since been continued was the participation of Russian inspectors from Murmanrybvod as observers on inspections of Russian vessels in Norwegian ports carried out by the enforcement division of the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries. Russian inspectors have usually made six trips annually to Norway to participate in such inspections.64 In 1995, the parties agreed to include in the exchange programme exchanges of inspectors from Murmanrybvod and the Norwegian Coast Guard at sea.65 The first exchange of inspectors (as observers) at sea happened in December 1995.66 There has since been one exchange at sea each year; the inspectors usually spend five days on board the other party’s inspection vessel.67 In addition, personnel from Murmanrybvod, PINRO and the Norwegian Surveillance of Fishing Grounds (the department of the Norwegian Directorate of Fisheries responsible for closing and opening of fishing grounds) have occasionally visited each other’s vessels involved in opening and closing fishing grounds since 1994.68 Finally, joint seminars for enforcement officers from the two countries have been organised annually since 1994, at alternately the Coast Guard base at Sortland and in Murmansk.69 The seminars include inspectors from the Coast Guard and the Directorate of Fisheries on the Norwegian side and Murmanrybvod on the Russian side.70 They are intended to pro-

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vide an opportunity for discussions of current issues and focus mainly on the practical inspection work at sea and in port.71 In addition to the administration of the exchange programmes and discussions of pressing issues, the Permanent Committee has done more on behalf of the Joint Fisheries Commission. One major task was the elaboration of joint conversion factors for products of fish caught in the Barents Sea. As mentioned above, the introduction of a uniform system of conversion factors was proposed by the expert group in 1993. During the session in November 1993, the parties agreed ‘that it is necessary to elaborate a uniform system of conversion factors, and that the question should be discussed in the Permanent Committee for Management and Enforcement [Cooperation].’72 The Permanent Committee appointed a working group to look at the issue. It concluded that some conversion factors were already shared by Norway and Russia, some were slightly divergent whereas others differed significantly.73 The Joint Fisheries Commission ordered in 1994 the Permanent Committee to ‘continue its work to clarify reasons behind the divergent conversion factors, participate in each other’s survey cruises and elaborate measuring methods with a view to achieving revised and uniform conversion factors’.74 In 1995, the Permanent Committee organised two joint Norwegian-Russian survey cruises, and concluded that it should be possible to reach an agreement. 75 The Joint Committee requested in November 1995 that the Permanent Committee propose a uniform system of conversion factors and a common method to establish them. Agreement on the method was reached in 1996.76 The Joint Fisheries Commission expressed ‘great satisfaction with the work carried out [by the Permanent Committee]’,77 and said it would ‘adopt the method for use in the future establishment of conversion factors’.78 Detailed measurement instructions were finalised by the Permanent Committee79 and adopted for use in the Barents Sea fisheries by the Joint Committee in 1997.80 Common conversion factors have been put in place for all species and products except haddock.81 A second important task for the Permanent Committee was the elaboration of common procedures for the closing and opening of fishing grounds. This is a widely used management measure in both the Norwegian and Russian parts of the Barents Sea, but the procedures used have varied significantly between the two countries. In short, Russian procedures are far more flexible than the Norwegian82 and there is considerable dissatisfaction among fishers with the way the system works in Norwegian waters.83 At the meeting of the Permanent Committee in September 1997, the Norwegian delegation requested a briefing about the Russian system for the closing

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and opening of fishing grounds.84 During the Joint Fisheries Commission’s subsequent meeting under its 26th session in June 1998, the Commission ordered the Permanent Committee to propose new criteria for decisions on closing and opening fishing grounds.85 Detailed instructions were put together by the Permanent Committee in September.86 The Joint Fisheries Commission decided in November the same year to put them into practice on a trial basis.87 A few minor changes were proposed by the Permanent Committee in May 1999, and the main framework is now in place.88 In addition to these two major achievements, the Permanent Committee has played a significant role in paving the way for the introduction of compulsory selection grids in the cod fishery and satellite communications to track fishing vessels in the Barents Sea. During the Permanent Committee’s meeting in September 1994, the parties informed each other about on-going experiments with selection grids,89 and the Joint Fisheries Commission that same year noted that tests with grid technology had proved promising.90 Based on positive results from joint Norwegian-Russian experiments during 1995, the parties of the Joint Fisheries Commission in November 1995 agreed to introduce compulsory selection grids in cod trawls in specific areas of the Barents Sea as of 1 January 1997.91 The Permanent Committee co-ordinated joint experiments and the transfer of test results from the national projects. It has also produced a set of instructions for the NorwegianRussian control of selection grids92 and functioned moreover as a forum to exchange experiences with the use of selection grids.93 Tracking vessels by means of satellite surveillance was on the agenda for the first time at the Permanent Committee’s September 1996 meeting, at which the parties informed each other about their respective national satellite tracking projects.94 One year later, the Joint Fisheries Commission requested the Permanent Committee to assess the possibility of the two countries collaborating on satellite tracking in the Barents Sea.95 In the Permanent Committee, the parties continued to exchange information on national plans for satellite tracking systems,96 and in November 1998 the Joint Committee ordered the preparation of a plan to set up a joint NorwegianRussian satellite tracking initiative in the Barents Sea fisheries.97 At the Permanent Committee’s meeting in May 1999, the parties agreed on an agenda for a separate meeting with experts on satellite tracking.98 Finally, mention should be made of the efforts of the Permanent Committee to standardise the various types of fisheries statistics used in Norway and Russia.99 The only unsuccessful initiative seems to have been the attempt by the Permanent Committee to transfer the payment for all Russian landings in Norway to the Norwegian sales organisation system.100

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THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE COLLABORATION Norwegian and Russian fisheries management authorities claim that enforcement co-operation has been highly successful. They hold it up as an example to be followed by other states.101 Undoubtedly, the collaboration has been successful in the sense that the parties have managed to ‘do something together’. However, the elaboration and implementation of regulative measures are not automatically equivalent to the solution of the problems that spurred their introduction. The effectiveness of such initiatives can be evaluated according to different standards.102 On the one hand, one can assess the relative improvement of the situation by comparing status before and after the introduction of the measure. On the other hand, one can take the optimal situation as the point of departure and discuss the extent to which the problem is solved by the introduction of the measure. Even an extensive relative improvement may sometimes prove ineffective. In other cases, a marginal improvement might be sufficient to reach the optimal situation. Hence, measures should be studied from both these angles when their effectiveness is at issue. The problem that triggered the establishment of a Norwegian-Russian enforcement arrangement in the Barents Sea fisheries was the overfishing by Russian vessels in 1992. It also seems fair to conclude that the arrangement soon developed broader ambitions than simply hindering Russian overfishing. It set itself the target to counter regulation and enforcement problems in the Barents Sea in general.103 The measures proposed combined the exchange of data and personnel, more frequent and extensive consultations on issues of importance, and concrete initiatives such as co-ordination of conversion factors, procedures for closing and opening of fishing grounds and national schemes for such management initiatives as obligatory use of selection grid and satellite tracking. First, though, we need to ask: did the Norwegian-Russian enforcement venture put a stop to Russian overfishing in the Barents Sea? It can be argued that the 1992 overfishing episode was related to the new incentive structures facing Russian fishers. Landing fish abroad not only made it possible for them to underreport catches; it was only now that it became profitable for them to do so. Under the plan economy of the Soviet system, authorities had to urge fishers to fulfil their plans rather than prevent them from overfishing their quotas. Since goods were considerably scarcer than purchasing power, minor rewards in roubles were not sufficient to get people to overfish their quotas. The chance of landing fish abroad suddenly made it considerably more profitable to fish more – even more

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than one’s quota allowed – if the difference between real and reported catches could be transformed into money and sent straight into the captain’s or fisher’s own deposit box. Misreporting catches was suddenly a tempting prospect. At this point, the existing Russian enforcement system was proving inadequate, not primarily because of its lack of information about the catches landed by the vessels, but because of its failure to change the incentives and get the fishers to stay within the law. The old system based on document control in port was probably adequate in the Soviet period. The few incentives to exploit resources made coercive measures (including physical inspection) unnecessary.104 With the emergence of such temptations, the shortcomings of the old system became apparent. The core of the enforcement problem lay not only in the fact that catch data escaped the knowledge of Murmanrybvod, but more importantly, there were no social mechanisms in place to persuade fishers to keep within lawful bounds. The work of the Norwegian and Russian enforcement bodies has served the purpose of getting information to the Russian authorities about the activity of Russian fishing vessels in Norwegian waters and ports. Russian fishers can no longer write incorrect reports about the species and volumes they have caught to Murmanrybvod without being discovered. However, the crucial question is whether this represents a sufficient step in adapting the enforcement system to its new surroundings. As already suggested, access to information is in itself hardly enough to ensure lawful behaviour among fishers. Coercive measures necessarily rely on the ability to enact sanctions in the event of violations. Whether this actually happens in today’s Russia is largely an open question. Indeed, one can question whether fishers fear the sanctions Murmanrybvod has in its arsenal: How threatening is a moderate fine in roubles when the shipowner, captain and crew can expect hefty incomes abroad, at least by Russian standards? In sum, the exchange of catch data between Norwegian and Russian enforcement authorities has provided one link in the chain of necessary measures to avoid overfishing. Despite the lack of hard evidence, there is still reason to believe that the situation has improved since 1992 (assuming that many previous violators have become compliant), but the problem is very likely not completely solved.105 The other co-operative measures are more broadly aimed at improving the conditions for effective management and enforcement in general. The elaboration of a uniform system of conversion factors is one such measure; the calculation of correct catches (in round weight) from product weight is dependent upon the correctness of the conversion factors used. It is beyond the competence of a social scientist to evaluate the accuracy of the factors

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arrived at by the Permanent Committee. Provided they are ‘correct’ by scientific standards, it can be assumed that they represent a relative improvement in relation to the old factors, or even that the optimal situation in this respect might have been approached. Likewise, such measures as exchange of personnel and co-ordination of procedures for the closing and opening of fishing grounds are also mainly aimed at improving the general conditions for effective enforcement. The exchange of inspectors at sea may increase the individual inspector’s experience and knowledge base and hence improve the likelihood of effective enforcement. It seems fair to see a relative improvement here; the distance to the optimal situation is uncertain.

CONCLUSIONS The enforcement co-operation initiative between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea has been successful in the sense that the parties have managed to extend their long-standing co-operative patterns in the spheres of research and regulation of the Barents Sea fisheries to include enforcement issues. The expert group, and later the Permanent Committee, proved to be effective bodies in registering management and enforcement problems, elaborating and proposing solutions, and implementing the tasks assigned to them by the Joint Fisheries Commission. The success of the enforcement initiative can probably be attributed to a similar understanding of the problems between the parties, good personal relations across the national divide in the expert group/Permanent Committee, and the advantage of several years’ experience of Norwegian-Russian co-operation in the fisheries sector. As far as problem-solving is concerned, the effects of the enforcement partnership are more uncertain. There is reason to believe that overfishing on a 1992 scale has not been repeated in recent years. On the other hand, investigations as thorough as those put in action in 1992 and the next few years have not been conducted either, so there is no way of saying whether it has or has not been avoided. The exchange of catch and landing data between Norway and Russia is a necessary, but insufficient factor in the elimination of underreporting of catches. Sanctioning mechanisms in Russia represent an uncertain element in this respect. Finally, the Permanent Committee has successfully co-ordinated many of the enforcement procedures of the two countries and administered a fruitful exchange of personnel. But the effects of these measures in terms of their ability to solve problems can only be evaluated over time.

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Norwegian and Russian collaboration in fishery enforcement endeavours is important in understanding internal Russian enforcement mechanisms. For one thing, protocols from the enforcement collaboration are a rare source of written information about the workings of the Russian enforcement system.106 Substantively, it gives an insight into aspects of the Russian system of fisheries management enabling a more detailed evaluation than was possible for most of the structures and processes discussed earlier in the book. First, Russia is relatively well equipped in terms of scientific competence and ‘regulatory manpower’ in the fisheries sector. In the day-to-day regulation of Russian fisheries, a large number of scientists and technical experts form the backbone of an experienced and tested regulatory system. All in all, Russia has therefore a considerable ‘capacity to govern’, often overlooked by Westerners always keen to ‘teach the Russians’ how to do things. Second, there was a will in the Russian system to solve the problem of overfishing in the northern basin.107 Although it could be argued that the enforcement partnership was instigated by Norway,108 the Russians clearly gave the issue high priority and participated on an equal footing with the Norwegians. Third, and partly related to the presence of a ‘theoretical’ capacity to govern, the Russians were – also in practice – able to effectively put their technical competence and regulatory capabilities to use when they chose to work together with Norway. Evidence from the enforcement initiative is an important counterweight to the more pessimistic conclusions of the first part of this chapter concerning the ability of Russian government agencies to co-ordinate their activities to ensure effective enforcement of the fisheries regulations.109 The determination and ability to pursue a regulatory policy that could clearly be characterised as ‘precautionary’, e.g. in its ability to respond to changing demands within the enforcement system, stand in glaring contrast to Russia’s unwillingness to lower TACs for the Northeast Arctic cod stock in accordance with scientific recommendations, discussed in Chapter 5. We will return to this paradox in Chapter 7, arguing that ‘the Russian fisheries management system’ should not necessarily be understood of as a single, consistent, rational actor.

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NOTES

1. See Chapters 3 and 4. 2. See Chapter 3. 3. See Chapter 4. 4. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Moscow and Murmansk, during the period 1994-2001. 5. Ibid. 6. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Murmansk, during the period 1998-2001. Observation by the author during the period 1998-2000; cf. section on methodology in Chapter 1. 7. Ibid. 8. A.K. Jørgensen, Norsk og russisk fiskerikontroll i Barentshavet – en sammenligning med hensyn til effektivitet (‘Norwegian and Russian Fisheries Enforcement in the Barents Sea – a Comparison with Regard to Effectiveness’), MA Thesis (Oslo: University of Oslo, Department of Political Science, 1999). 9. Ibid., pp. 88-90. 10. Ibid. 11. Ibid. 12. Ibid. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Murmansk, during the period 1998-2001. 13. The reader might ask: ‘Why did Russia choose this solution when the old system functioned well enough?’ I see two possible answers to this question. One is that it makes quite good sense to transfer responsibility for enforcement to an agency independent of the rest of the fisheries management system as long as the latter is plagued by allegations of corruption. Another is that there was probably no uniform strategy behind the decision to strip the State Committee for Fisheries/ Glavrybvod of its enforcement capacity; rather, the reorganisation campaign was the result of a fight over budget funds. With increased responsibility come increased funds, and the Federal Border Service were more interested in the latter than the former, the argument – often employed by representatives of the ‘fishery complex’ – goes; interviews with Russian civil servants, Moscow and Murmansk, during the period 1998-2001.

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14. Interviews with Russian civil servants, Murmansk, during the period 19982001. Observation by the author during the period 1998-2000; cf. section on methodology in Chapter 1. 15. Ibid. A.K. Jørgensen, Norsk og russisk fiskerikontroll i Barentshavet – en sammenligning med hensyn til effektivitet, 1999. 16. See Chapter 4 for a further discussion. 17. See Chapter 4 for a further discussion. 18. See Chapter 4 for a further discussion. 19. For a further discussion, see G. Hønneland, ‘Autonomy and Regionalisation in the Fisheries Management of Northwestern Russia’ (1998) 22 Marine Policy 57-65. 20. This is further discussed in the next section. 21. See Chapter 4 for a further discussion. 22. A.K. Jørgensen, Norsk og russisk fiskerikontroll i Barentshavet – en sammenligning med hensyn til effektivitet, 1999, pp. 105-106. 23. The remainder of this chapter is a shortened and revised version of G. Hønneland, ‘Enforcement Co-operation between Norway and Russia in the Barents Sea Fisheries’ (2000) 31 Ocean Development & International Law 249-267. 24. The Norwegian inspectors used the catch logs of the Russian vessels to calculate each individual vessel’s total catch that year. Normally, they would only have been interested in catches taken in Norwegian zones, but on this occasion they included catches taken in the Russian exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Author’s own observation; cf. section on methodology in Chapter 1. 25. Ibid. 26. Protokoll for den 20. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Protocol for the 20th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 1991). 27. See Chapter 4 for a further discussion. 28. Protokoll fra møte i den norsk-russiske ekspertgruppe for forvaltningssamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, mai 1993 (‘Protocol from Meeting in the NorwegianRussian Expert Group on Management Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector, May 1993’) (Bergen: the Directorate of Fisheries, 1993), Introduction. 29. Protokoll for den 21. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Protocol for the 21st Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 1992), Art. 11.2.

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30. The use of the definite form (the overfishing) indicates that the concrete overfishing at the time – and not overfishing in general – was the issue. The use of the verb ‘prevent’ instead of e.g. ‘terminate’, however, alludes to overfishing that has not yet taken place and is hence not elegant language in either English or Norwegian in this particular case. 31. Supplement til protokoll for den 21. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Supplement to Protocol for the 21st Session of the Joint NorwegianRussian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 1993), Art. 3. 32. Protokoll fra møte i den norsk-russiske ekspertgruppe for forvaltningssamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, mai 1993, 1993. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. Factors used to calculate the weight of round fish from the weight of fish products. 36. This measure had been proposed by the Joint Fisheries Commission one year earlier, but does not seem to have been put in place before the expert group ended its inquiry in the spring 1993; Supplement til protokoll for den 20. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Supplement to Protocol from the 20th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 1992), Art. 5. 37. Supplement til protokoll for den 21. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, 1993, Art. 5. 38. Ibid. 39. Ibid. 40. Observation by the author; cf. section on methodology in Chapter 1. 41. Protokoll fra det 2. møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltnings- og kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, september 1994 (‘Protocol from the 2nd Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector, September 1994’) (Bergen: the Directorate of Fisheries, 1994), Introduction. 42. Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltningsog kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Murmansk 10.-13. september 1996 (‘Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector, Murmansk 10-13 September 1996’) (Bergen: the Directorate of Fisheries, 1996), Appendix 1; Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltnings- og kon-

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trollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Svanhovd, 13.-17. september 1999 (‘Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector, Svan-hovd, 13-17 September 1999’) (Bergen: the Directorate of Fisheries, 1999), Appendix 1. 43. Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltningsog kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Murmansk, 29. august-1. september 1995 (‘Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector in Murmansk 29 August-1 September 1995’) (Bergen: the Directorate of Fisheries, 1995), Appendix 1. 44. Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltningsog kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Sortland, 3.-7. mai 1999 (‘Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector, Sortland, 3-7 May 1999’) (Bergen: the Directorate of Fisheries, 1999), Appendix 1. 45. Until the May 1999 meeting, only two or three representatives of each country were referred to as ‘the delegation’; the rest were called ‘other participants’. In the practical work of the Permanent Committee, no difference was made between ‘the delegations’ and ‘the others’. In the Protocol from the meeting in May 1999, all participants were formally included in their respective delegations; Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltnings- og kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Sortland, 3.-7. mai 1999, 1999, Appendix 1. 46. Observation by the author; cf. section on methodology in Chapter 1. 47. Ibid. 48. Ibid. 49. Protokoll for den 22. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Protocol from the 22nd Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 1993), Art. 11.2. 50. Observation by the author; cf. section on methodology in Chapter 1. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid. The problem is indirectly reflected in a protocol from a meeting of the expert group: ‘During the meeting of the Working [Expert] Group in Murmansk, the Norwegian party was given copies of the fishery and port permits issued by Murmanrybvod to Russian fishing vessels. The Norwegian enforcement bodies have started to check these documents and will inform Murmanrybvod when Russian vessels are unable to produce them’; Protokoll fra møte i den norsk-russiske ekspertgruppe for forvaltningssamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, mai 1993, 1993, Art. 3.

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53. Ibid. Observation by the author; cf. section on methodology in Chapter 1. 54. Observation by the author; cf. section on methodology in Chapter 1. 55. Ibid. 56. Ibid. 57. Ibid. 58. Protokoll for den 22. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, 1993, Art. 11.2. 59. It should be observed that a complete list of all activities of the Permanent Committee is not presented here. 60. Cf., e.g., Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltnings- og kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Murmansk, 29. august1. september 1995, 1995, Art. 4. 61. Author’s own observation during the period 1993-2000; cf. section on methodology in Chapter 1. 62. Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltnings- og kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Sortland, 3.-7. mai 1999, 1999, Art. 5. 63. Protokoll for den 23. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Protocol for the 23rd Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 1994); Protokoll for den 24. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Protocol for the 24th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 1995); Protokoll for den 25. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Protocol for the 25th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 1996); Protokoll for den 26. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Protocol for the 26th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 1997); Protokoll for den 27. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Protocol for the 27th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 1998). 64. Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltningsog kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Sortland, 14-18. september 1998 (‘Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector, Sortland, 14-18 September 1998’) (Bergen: the Directorate of Fisheries, 1998), Art. 9. 65. Protokoll for den 24. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, 1995, Art. 11.2; Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltnings- og kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Murmansk, 29. august1. september 1995, 1995, Art. 9.

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66. Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltningsog kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Murmansk 10.-13. september 1996, 1996, Art. 3.5. 67. The only exception was 1998, when uncertainty caused by the reorganisation of the Russian enforcement system (see above) hindered the exchange of inspectors at sea. However, a meeting at sea (in the Barents Sea Loophole), where Russian inspectors visited a Norwegian Coast Guard vessel for a few hours, took place on 26 August 1998; Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltnings- og kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Sortland, 14.-18. september 1998, 1998, Art. 9. 68. Protokoll fra det 2. møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltnings- og kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, september 1994, 1994, Art. 8. 69. Protokoll fra det 2. møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltnings- og kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, september 1994, 1994; Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltnings- og kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Murmansk, 29. august-1. september 1995, 1995; Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltnings- og kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Murmansk 10.-13. september 1996, 1996; Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltnings- og kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Murmansk, 9-14. september 1997 (‘Protocol from Meeting in the Permanent Norwegian-Russian Committee for Management and Enforcement Co-operation within the Fisheries Sector, Murmansk, 9-14 September 1997’) (Bergen: the Directorate of Fisheries, 1997); Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltnings- og kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Sortland, 14.-18. september 1998, 1998. 70. Ibid. 71. Ibid. 72. Protokoll for den 22. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, 1993, Art. 11.3. 73. Protokoll fra det 2. møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltnings- og kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, september 1994, 1994, Art. 6. 74. Protokoll fra den 23. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, 1994, Art. 11.3. 75. Protokoll for den 24. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, 1995, Art. 11.3. 76. Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltningsog kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Murmansk 10.-13. september 1996, 1996, Art. 2.

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77. Protokoll for den 25. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, 1996, Art. 11.3. 78. Ibid. 79. Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltningsog kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Murmansk, 9.-14. september 1997, 1997, Art. 2. The instruction is found as Appendixes 3A (Norwegian version) and 3B (Russian version) to the Protocol. 80. Protokoll for den 26. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, 1997, Art. 11.3. 81. Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltningsog kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Sortland, 3.-7. mai 1999, 1999, Art. 8. 82. Decisions on preliminary closure of an area can be made by individual inspectors on the Russian side; cf. Chapter 4. In Norway, only the Director of Fisheries can make such decisions. Furthermore, the Russians tend to close smaller areas than the Norwegians, and they have more flexible follow-up test hauls after the area is closed. For a further account, see A.K. Jørgensen, Norsk og russisk fiskerikontroll i Barentshavet – en sammenligning med hensyn til effektivitet, 1999. 83. G. Hønneland, Coercive and Discursive Compliance Mechanisms in the Management of Natural Resources (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000). 84. Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltningsog kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Murmansk, 9-14. september 1997, 1997, Art. 8. 85. Supplement til protokoll for den 26. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Supplement to Protocol from the 26th Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 1998), Art. 1. There is no reason to assume that the initiative was the result of the mentioned dissatisfaction with the Norwegian system among fishers; G. Hønneland, Coercive and Discursive Compliance Mechanisms in the Management of Natural Resources, 2000. Rather, it should be regarded in the wider context of a decreasing cod stock and increasing uncertainty about the existing stock estimation models. 86. Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltningsog kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Sortland, 14-18. september 1998, 1998, Art. 2. The instruction is found as Appendix 3 to the Protocol. 87. Protokoll for den 27. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, 1998, Art. 5.2. 88. Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltningsog kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Sortland, 3.-7. mai 1999, 1999, Art. 6. The revised instruction is found as Appendix 5 to the Protocol.

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89. Protokoll fra det 2. møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltnings- og kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, september 1994, 1994, Art. 5. 90. Protokoll for den 23. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, 1994, Art. 4.3.2. 91. Protokoll for den 24. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, 1995, Art. 4.3.2. 92. Protokoll for den 26. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, 1997, Art. 12.2. 93. Cf., e.g., Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltnings- og kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Murmansk, 9.-14. september 1997, 1997, Art. 7. 94. Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltningsog kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Murmansk 10.-13. september 1996, 1996, Art. 7. 95. Protokoll for den 26. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, 1997, Art. 12.2. 96. Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltningsog kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Sortland, 14.-18. september 1998, 1998, Art. 3. 97. Protokoll for den 27. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, 1998, Art. 12.2. 98. Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltningsog kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Sortland, 3.-7. mai 1999, 1999, Art. 7. The agenda is found as Appendix 6 to the Protocol. 99. Cf., e.g., Protokoll fra møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltnings- og kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, Murmansk, 29. august1. september 1995, 1995, Art. 3 and Appendix 4. 100. Protokoll fra det 2. møte i Det permanente norsk-russiske utvalg for forvaltningsog kontrollsamarbeid innenfor fiskerisektoren, september 1994, 1994, Art. 2. 101. Cf., e.g., the protocols of the Joint Fisheries Commission’s 24th and 25th Sessions: ‘The Parties observed that the way in which enforcement co-operation between Norway and Russia is organised is an example for other states to follow’, Protokoll for den 24. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, 1995, Art. 11.2; Protokoll for den 25. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, 1996, Art. 11.2. Similar statements are often given by members of the Permanent Committee and other representatives of Norwegian and Russian fisheries

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management systems when speaking about the enforcement co-operation. Observation by the author during the period 1993-2000; cf. section on methodology in Chapter 1. 102. Cf., e.g., A. Underdal, ‘The Concept of Regime “Effectiveness”’ (1992) 27 Cooperation & Conflict 227-240. 103. Cf. the proposals of the Expert Group and the subsequent measures implemented by the Permanent Committee above. These are directed towards management and enforcement problems in the Barents Sea in general, and not only the one of overfishing. 104. For a discussion of coercive and discursive measures in fisheries management, see G. Hønneland, Coercive and Discursive Compliance Mechanisms in the Management of Natural Resources, 2000. 105. The extent of overfishing after 1992 is in fact uncertain. Official data do not give evidence of any massive overfishing in subsequent years, but they did not do so in 1992 either. Overfishing by Russian vessels that year had not been discovered if it were not for the efforts of the Norwegian Coast Guard to calculate the total catch of Russian vessels since the beginning of the year (including their catches in the Russian EEZ; this information was obtained from the catch log during inspections in Norwegian waters). Similar calculations have not been undertaken in recent years as one seems to assume that the problem has been solved. It can even be argued that Norwegian authorities have an interest in presenting enforcement cooperation with the Russians as a successful joint initiative and hence would prefer to avoid such calculations. On the other hand, it should be emphasised that there are no indications of significant overfishing in recent years. The enforcement problems described under the heading ‘Implementation performance and target compliance’ above relate primarily to the catch of excessive amounts of fish below the legal minimum. 106. While information about the internal workings of the Russian enforcement system, e.g. inspection statistics, is not made publicly available, data on the work of the Permanent Committee is, at least on the Norwegian side. 107. This determination was not only demonstrated at the establishment of the enforcement agreement in 1993, it has obviously remained there ever since. 108. As seen above, the collaboration formally came about at the initiative of the delegation leaders of both the countries in the Joint Fisheries Commission. There is, however, reason to believe that, informally, the first steps were taken by the Norwegians. 109. The temporal aspect partly explains the disparity here. The first part of this chapter (under the heading ‘Implementation performance and target compliance’) focuses on the negative effects of the 1997-98 reorganisation of the Russian system

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for fisheries enforcement, which transferred responsibility for inspections at sea from the Glavrybvod system to the Federal Border Service. The idea of joining forces to enforce regulations emerged and found its form, it can be argued, a long time ahead of these changes.

IV CONCLUSION

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CHAPTER SEVEN Prospects for a Precautionary Fisheries Management?

As set out in Chapter 1, this book has a dual aim: first, to give an overview of the principles and practices of Russian fisheries management in the postSoviet period, and second, to evaluate the achievements of the Russian system for fisheries management in relation to the requirements of the precautionary approach. Rather than summing up the findings of the investigation in any detail, this concluding chapter juxtaposes some of the most central arguments of the preceding chapters in an attempt at explaining the observed development of Russian fisheries management and eliciting some observations for the future. Hence, the following discussion is divided into three main parts: ‘conclusions’, ‘explanations’ and ‘prospects’.

CONCLUSIONS The precautionary approach and other principles The Russian Federation has accepted the precautionary approach to fisheries management through its signing and ratification of the UN Fish Stocks Agreement and its participation in the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) and the Joint Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission (the Joint Fisheries Commission), both of which have formally adopted the precautionary approach. However, no reference to precaution is found in its national fisheries legislation,1 e.g. the 1998 Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Russian Federation or the 2001 Maritime Doctrine of the Russian Federation, both of which deal specifically with issues of fisheries management. Nor is it mentioned in the draft Fisheries Act2 and the most central pieces of fisheries legislation elaborated at lower levels of the legal

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hierarchy, notably the provisions spelling out principles for quota allocation.3 Instead, the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone, the Maritime Doctrine, the draft Fisheries Act and the various provisions on quota allocation issued during the period 1995-2002 all emphasise the ‘development’ or ‘exploitation’ aspects of fisheries management. In particular, they prescribe the extraction of ‘societal goods’ from the fishing industry, such as food and jobs security, and the viability of fishery-dependent communities. In practice, this implies allocating quota shares to shipowners with an attested ability to take above a certain minimum quantity of fish (‘catch capacity’), and deliver the catches to fish-processing facilities in Russia. The 2002 Murmansk Oblast provision on regional quota allocation in addition prescribes that priority be given to shipowners who build new vessels at Russian shipyards or reconstruct old vessels at shipyards in Northwestern Russia. A significant new turn was taken with the issue of Governmental Resolution No. 1010 of 27 December 2000, which introduced an auction system for parts of the Russian fish quotas. The decision was pressed forward by the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade, but was highly unpopular both with the State Committee for Fisheries and the regional administrations of fishery-dependent communities.4 Nevertheless, it was put into force, unlike many of the lower-level legal documents issued by the State Committee for Fisheries, prescribing, among other things, the delivery of catches to Russian fish-processing plants.5 The quota auctions were introduced to create greater transparency in the quota allocation process6 and, first and foremost, to boost revenues flowing from the fishing industry to the state coffers. As we concluded in Chapter 3, the Russian fisheries sector, from an ideological point of view, seems to be struggling between the ‘traditional exploitation values’ supported by the State Committee for Fisheries and regional administrations, and ‘modern exploitation values’ pursued by the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. The former seek to extract societal goods such as food and jobs, the latter monies to the state. Some sort of precaution is necessary to sustain the extraction of such goods over time – be it employment and social security in fisherydependent communities or monetary revenue for the state budget – but Russian authorities have not yet formally introduced the precautionary approach as a basis for its fisheries management.7 Scientific advice and quota allocation Russia has a well-developed system of research institutes in the fisheries sector at both the federal and regional level. In addition to a considerable

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presence in the day-to-day operation of fisheries – for instance, the scientists continuously elaborate prognoses for the various fishing grounds for the fishing fleet – the research institutes provide scientific recommendations for quota levels of the exclusively Russian fish stocks and, most importantly in this context, participate in international scientific organisations to assess the status of fish stocks that Russia shares with other countries. In the northern fishery basin, the Knipovich Scientific Polar Institute for Marine Fisheries Research and Oceanography (PINRO) is the most important scientific player. Scientists from PINRO participate actively to set ICES’s scientific recommendations of total allowable catches (TACs) for the stocks that are shared between Russia and Norway in the Barents Sea. Since the late 1990s, the economically most important stock to the Barents Sea fisheries, the Northeast Arctic cod, is said by ICES to be in a severe crisis. Nevertheless, the Joint Fisheries Commission has set TACs far above the scientific recommendations. Most dramatically, the Commission set a TAC of 390,000 tonnes for 2000, against ICES’s primary recommendation of 110,000 tonnes. Over a somewhat larger time-span, the TAC for the Northeast Arctic cod was set higher than recommended by ICES in nine out of ten years in the period 1992-2001. In relation to ICES’s precautionary reference points, fishing mortality (in practice: catch rate) was higher than 0.42 – i.e. the stock was by definition suffering from overfishing – in seventeen years of the twenty-year period 1982-2001. In fifteen of these years, fishing mortality was higher than 0.7, i.e. the catch was at a level considered to represent a risk of stock collapse. I concluded in Chapter 5 that Russian pressure brought to bear on the Joint Fisheries Commission resulted in them discounting the scientific recommendations in the late 1990s and early 2000s. While there is mounting public criticism in Norway about this practice of ignoring the scientific advice (not least because it violates the precautionary approach to fisheries management; cf. Chapter 5), there is a tendency in Russia to see ICES recommendations as a manoeuvre in the battle between Russia and the West. An argument prevalent both among Russian fisheries managers and in the Russian public, points to the fact that Western countries are in majority in ICES and naturally support therefore ‘allied’ Norway’s desire to reduce the TACs for the Northeast Arctic cod stock. A further perception is that Norway is doing what it can to ‘press’ the quotas down to maintain high prices for cod on the world market as the country prepares itself for industrial-scale cod farming. Others say that because Norway is a rich country that can afford major cuts in cod quotas it can use reductions in order to strike a blow at a political and economic ‘adversary’, namely Russia, which is already more or less on its

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knees. Views like this could well lead one to believe that the likelihood that the Joint Fisheries Commission will start paying more heed to the scientific recommendations in the near future is pretty slim.8 We return to this question in the last section of this chapter. Technical regulation and enforcement As in the area of fisheries research, the Russian system for fisheries management is relatively well-stocked in terms of expertise and man-power as far as technical regulation and enforcement are concerned. In Soviet times, technical fisheries regulation was the responsibility of the regional fisheries associations/general directorates, in the northern basin: Sevryba, while enforcement, both at sea and ashore, was taken care of by the regional bodies of Glavrybvod (the enforcement department of the Soviet Ministry of Fishing Industry/Russian State Committee for Fisheries), in the northern fishery basin: Murmanrybvod. As follows from Chapters 3 and 4, during the 1990s the regional fisheries associations gradually lost their regulatory powers to the Glavrybvod enforcement bodies,9 and the latter, in turn, in 1997-98 were stripped of their former responsibility to supervise enforcement at sea, which was now handed over to the Federal Border Service. In Chapter 6, I observed that this reorganisation, at least temporarily, led to a reduction in the effectiveness of the Russian system for fisheries enforcement, and in the levels of compliance with fisheries regulations. For one thing, the enforcement-related activities of the Federal Border Service and the regional bodies under Glavrybvod, still in charge of all other aspects of enforcement than the physical inspections at sea,10 were for long uncoordinated. Second, in the northern fishery basin the Federal Border Service allegedly had very limited funds to buy fuel for its inspection vessels in the years immediately following the reorganisation, which led to a complete absence of inspection vessels in the Russian EEZ in the Barents Sea for months on end in the late 1990s.11 Interviews with fishers indicate that a massive fishing of undersized fish took place as a result of this failure.12 Third, and largely unrelated to the mentioned reorganisation, there is reason to believe that the level of penalties given to violators of fishery regulations were too low to have any significant deterrent effect on the fishers. On the positive side, since 1993 Russian fishery authorities have engaged in a fruitful collaboration with their Norwegian counterparts on technical regulation and enforcement of fishery regulations. This partnership served to arrest the massive overfishing of the Russian quota of Northeast Arctic cod that took place in the early 1990s. In addition to the exchange of infor-

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mation and co-ordination of the two countries’ enforcement practices in the Barents Sea, the parties have undertaken several other comprehensive tasks, such as elaborating a uniform system of conversion factors, joint routines for the closing and opening of fishing grounds, and a co-ordinated introduction of obligatory use of selection grids in the cod fishery. This indicates that Russia indeed possesses an institutional capacity in its systems for fisheries regulation and enforcement that enables it to respond quickly to changes in its surroundings, an important feature of the precautionary approach to fisheries. I revert to these positive attributes in the discussion of institutional ‘assets’ of the Russian system for fisheries management below.

EXPLANATIONS On the basis of the not overly optimistic conclusions laid out above, two main types of explanations can be singled out as to why the Russian fisheries management regime has failed to move in a more ‘precautionary’ direction – in both theory and practice – since the break-up of the Soviet Union. First, there seems to be a lack of will among certain important players to contribute to such a development. Second, there are institutional factors to consider that generally hamper the conduct of a uniform state policy in the Russian fisheries sector, be it ‘precautionary’ or otherwise. Above all, the ‘Russian fisheries management system’ is no homogeneous category, consisting, as it does, of a large number of players situated in very different places all having to tackle the new possibilities and challenges that followed on the privatisation of the Russian economy. In the following, I discuss how new incentive structures and institutional conflict can explain the development of the way in which Russia has managed its fisheries since the early 1990s. New incentives The large-scale privatisation of the Russian economy that started in early 1992 led to a dramatic change in the incentive structure of a large number of players in the Russian fishing industry and the country’s system for fisheries management. As already discussed in Chapter 6, the private economy of individual shipowners, captains and ordinary fishers alike suddenly depended to a much larger extent than earlier on their actual catches. Where previously there had been no realistic alternative to Soviet ‘middle-of-theroad’ life, the chance of acquiring great personal wealth on the one hand,

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or falling into poverty on the other, now became dramatically more evident. For actors in the Russian fishing industry, the prospects of sudden wealth were probably deemed more likely than the risk of poverty, which most Russians were facing in any event. The distribution of the new wealth emanating from the fishing industry was in many ways accidental, rewarding those who happened to be ‘in the right place at the right time’. As observed in Chapter 4, the division between governmental agencies and ‘user groups’ was blurred in Soviet fisheries, if it existed at all. In addition comes the Soviet convention of ‘rule by experts’;13 most players in the Soviet fishing industry and system for fisheries management had the same educational background (as fishery biologists or economists). Hence, people belonging to the Soviet fishery complex tended to migrate between the various structures, that is, alternating between the scientific, regulatory, enforcement and industrial sectors. For instance, a person could start his career as a fishery scientist, then work a few years at the region’s fishery association or fish processing plant before ending up on the enforcement body. The extent to which one had access to the post-Soviet ‘fortune-making opportunities’ depended largely on who was where when. If you happened to be general director of one of the large traditional fishing enterprises (cf. Chapter 4) at the time of privatisation, you would have a great opportunity to cut a good slice of the ‘prosperity cake’ for yourself.14 But if you were working as a PINRO scientist or regulator in the administration of Sevryba, your chances of getting a slice of the cake – i.e. the cod resources – were much slender.15 This observation has two main implications for our discussion. First, the ‘haphazardness’ with which the post-Soviet ‘prosperity cake’ was divided among players in the Russian fishery complex may well have caused people in less fortunate positions to feel they had a legitimate right to a ‘piece of the cake’ too. As seen in Chapter 4, Sevryba – the umbrella body which lost control of its member organisations in 1992 – after several years battling with the regional administrations over management responsibilities decided to grab its slice and acquire a modern factory trawler of its own, duly named ‘Sevryba-1’.16 PINRO’s slice of the cake came in the form of generous research quotas, while other governmental agencies benefited from the parts of the quotas annually set aside for ‘basin purposes’.17 The research quotas have in recent years partly been allotted through individual agreements between the State Committee for Fisheries and fishing enterprises, which in turn place a couple of PINRO scientists on board the vessels during the ‘scientific cruise’.18 While I am in no position to judge the rumours of corruption within Russia’s fisheries management bodies, it is a fact that

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allegations are rife; cf. Chapter 3. Whether they are true or false, the traditional sense of ‘one for all and all for one’ in the Soviet/Russian fishery sector and the haphazard results of privatisation may explain why elements in the sector might have felt they had a right to a share of the new sources of wealth. The result, if the rumours are correct, might not necessarily be a system that allows massive overfishing of established quotas or other violations of fishery regulations that lead to a rapid depletion of fish stocks. But it is a management system consisting of employees whose aims are ‘misplaced’, that is, they become more concerned with getting what they perceive as their rightful share of the cake, than with effective and just fisheries management.19 Second, while many might feel they are entitled to a ‘piece of the cake’, revenues from the ‘new money’ are, no doubt, unevenly distributed within the Russian fishery sector. Hence, the practices that actually take place are partly explicable on the basis of which players within the sector succeeded in ‘getting it their way’ when the decisions were made. For instance, as seen in Chapter 4, some wealthy shipowners connected with the northern fishery basin have allegedly ‘been buying their way’ into the Russian delegation to the Joint Fisheries Commission from the late 1990s and been instrumental in defining the Russian position at the negotiations, drawing popular support from the feeling among Russians that ‘the West is taking advantage of [our country’s] gloomy economic situation’. If this is correct, people who happened to be ‘in the right place at the right time’ were able to use their position to define Russia’s official negotiation stance to further their own personal ambitions. This would be a typical example of the shortterm economic calculations so prevalent in the situation of economic insecurity in post-Soviet Russia. The result was a quota settlement that by its very nature could never conform with the precautionary management standards set out by ICES, and to a large extent even formally approved by the Joint Fisheries Commission itself.20 A further outcome was a major crisis in relations with Russia’s long-time fisheries management partner Norway, a crisis which stands in stark contrast to the successful work undertaken by regulatory and enforcement officials from the two countries from the early 1990s. This paradox can be explained if we remember that different categories of people within the Russian fishery sector are propelled by differing incentives to seek economic returns from the fishing industry and will naturally seek different strategies in different arenas. The new incentives – the high prospects of economic revenues following from increased (or ‘non-reduced’) quotas – render some arenas of fisheries management, notably the quota allocation, more interesting than others to those with the

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power to transform the potential assets (fish quotas) into actual ones (revenue). If nothing else, a system of fisheries management with more or less subtle opportunities for officials to make a personal profit easily becomes unfocused in its efforts to enact public policy. Institutional conflict As follows from Chapters 3 and 4, the post-Soviet Russian fisheries management regime has been the arena of continuous institutional battles. Two lines of conflict are particularly noticeable: one between the State Committee for Fisheries (representing the traditional, Soviet-type of ‘sector rule’) and a range of other federal agencies, including the highest political leadership of the country; and another between federal and regional authorities. As far as the first is concerned, the federal agency responsible for fisheries management saw its status cut from that of a ministry to a committee under the Ministry of Agriculture and Foodstuffs in connection with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and establishment of the Russian Federation. It regained status as a separate body of governance in 1992 and was granted status as a state committee in 1996. Nevertheless, the federal fisheries management authority has lost its seat on the federal cabinet, which is obviously an important arena for defining the main policy objectives in the country. Further, it was again disbanded as an independent government agency when it was subsumed as a department under the Ministry of Agriculture and Foodstuffs in 1997. Although it regained independence one and a half years later, it has had to fight off – not always successfully – attempts to take over its traditional powers by a number of other federal bodies of governance. For instance, the Federal Border Service took over responsibility for enforcement at sea in 1997-98; the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade orchestrated the introduction of auctions of fish quotas against the will of the State Committee for Fisheries; and the Ministry of Natural Resources and the Ministry of Agriculture and Foodstuffs (later: the Ministry of Agriculture) have on various occasions sought to hamper the implementation of decisions made by the State Committee for Fisheries.21 It gives an indication of the level of conflict that the Minister of Natural Resources allegedly refuses to speak with the head of the State Committee for Fisheries; cf. Chapter 3. In turn, the Deputy Prime Minister responsible for the working of the State Committee for Fisheries in the Government is at the same time Minister of Agriculture, i.e. the head of one of the Committee’s main ‘competing’ federal agencies.

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The centre-region conflict was particularly intense in the years immediately following the establishment of the new state structure. The regional administrations of the northern fishery basin claimed their right to a say in fisheries management in the country’s EEZ, although the 1993 Constitution reserves this right for federal authorities.22 After Sevryba around 1997-98 let go of most of its regulatory responsibilities and instead indulged in reaping the fruits of the new order (see previous section), its tasks were divided among the regional fishery councils (intra-regional quota allocation), largely controlled by the regional administrations, and Murmanrybvod (technical regulation). At the same time, control over the inter-regional quota allocation process was ceded to the federal level, from Sevryba to the State Committee for Fisheries.23 Although central players in the regional fishery complex await the establishment of a ‘basin body’ which may turn out to be stronger than the regional administrations, Murmanrybvod and the regional branch of the Federal Border Service, the conflicts between the federal and regional level tapered off towards the end of the 1990s. The regional administrations seem to have settled with a significant level of influence on intraregional quota distribution along with a more diffuse co-ordinating role in the region’s fishery complex. However, the centre-region conflict has probably been the one most important reason why Russia as yet has no federal law on fisheries; cf. Chapter 3, and it renders in turn the legal framework underlying the Russian fisheries management system highly disputable and partly contradictory. Further, the quota auctions introduced from 2001 have again curbed the influence of regional authorities as an increasing share of Russia’s Northeast Arctic cod quota has been sold on auctions which take place in Moscow under the auspices of the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade. In turn, the quota auctions have also become a burning issue in discussions about the draft Fisheries Act, which foresees the continuation of this system. The State Committee for Fisheries generally emerges as the most ‘troubled’ fisheries management body of governance at the turn of the century. It has barely survived as an independent governmental agency, and has seen its actual influence on fisheries policy wane. Not only has it been forced to accept interference in its traditional areas of responsibility, ceding responsibilities to the Federal Border Service and taking instructions from various ministries, notably the Ministry of Economic Development and Trade; it has also found it increasingly difficult to implement its own policies in areas where no other governmental agencies lay claim or exert influence. The most conspicuous example is the failure of the State Committee for Fisheries to implement one of its main objectives from the mid-1990s,

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namely to get fish caught by Russian vessels delivered to the home market. The Committee has been unable to secure the necessary legal basis in the form of law or governmental resolution (depending on the support for the measures in the Federal Parliament or the Government),24 and the provisions and orders of the Committee itself have largely been ignored by the fishers and shipowners. As the legal foundation of these provisions is either weak or disputable, the Committee has not been able to introduce sanctions to induce compliance either.

PROSPECTS System shortcomings The shortcomings of the Russian system for fisheries management are partly connected with the State Committee for Fisheries and partly with the relations between that agency and other federal and regional bodies of governance. First, the absence of a law regulating fisheries management means that the legal basis for such management is both weak and disputable. It causes confusion as to which governmental bodies are responsible for which managerial areas; or rather: it leaves considerable room for manoeuvre for those who might wish to change the established order. But while putting improvements in the existing structure in place may in principle be a good thing, what one gets in addition is greater leeway for arbitrariness and unpredictability in the management set-up. It is beyond the scope of the present investigation to assess whether auctions of fish quotas are a good or a bad thing – or whether enforcement at sea is best taken care of by an inspection service within the fisheries management establishment or by a semimilitary border service – but the various reorganisations of the Russian system for fisheries management since the early 1990s have clearly been accompanied by co-ordination problems, confusion and reduced effectiveness, at least temporarily. Second, the insecure status of the State Committee for Fisheries and the possibility for individual officials to make money on the side is no fortunate combination. The outcome can easily be a system which no longer adheres entirely to objective and just management principles, but concerns itself with simple institutional survival at the system level and personal gain at the individual. Third, the consequences of increased ‘user group’ participation in the management system creates serious challenges.25 While such participation in the West is normally perceived as an indisputably good thing – e.g. in the generally ‘progressive’ co-management

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literature26 – the result in Russia has been an increased proclivity to let prospects of short-term economic profit upstage the long-term viability of fish stocks; cf. the discussion in Chapter 5. Institutional ‘assets’ Two factors point in a more optimistic direction as far as the prospects of a more ‘precautionary’ Russian fisheries management are concerned: the system’s inherent ‘capacity to govern’ and the constraining effects of Russia’s participation in various international regimes and organisations. Like many developing countries, Russia has a system of fisheries management that sees as its primary goal to ‘exploit’ fish stocks under its jurisdiction to the country’s economic benefit, rather than to ‘protect’ these fish stocks.27 Unlike many developing countries that face the challenge of implementing the precautionary approach to fisheries management, however, Russia is well equipped in terms of scientific, technical and institutional capacity. We are talking about a country that has introduced satellite tracking of its fishing vessels and uses sophisticated scientific methods to produce fishing gear with optimum fish selection capacities, i.e. a country with both the ability and at least a certain resolve to implement typically ‘precautionary’ elements of fisheries management. We are talking about a country that for decades has practised what is generally perceived to be relatively successful management of its fish resources, but since the early 1990s has had trouble adjusting the old management system to a new environment. In other words, Russia has considerable potential for successful fisheries management, aligned to the precautionary approach, if it manages to solve some of the most pressing contemporary problems, notably by putting in place a legal basis for fisheries management, addressing the high level of conflict between governmental agencies and the adverse effects of increased ‘user group’ participation (prevalence of short-term interests in the establishment of TACs). Although we cannot be sure of this, it seems fair to assume that Russia’s participation in various international regimes has limited the most adverse results of post-Soviet changes. In the northern basin, Russian overfishing in the years immediately following the break-up of the Soviet Union came to an end when it entered into joint enforcement arrangements with Norway. In the establishment of TACs for the joint stocks of the Barents Sea, the results of the bilateral negotiations are usually some kind of compromise between Norwegian and Russian positions, although the Russians are generally believed to have ‘won’ the negotiations in recent years. Had Russia

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been left to itself, in other words, overfishing would probably have continued, and the quotas for the Northeast Arctic cod would have been set even further above the scientific recommendations.28 We can also assume that the participation of Russian experts in international organisations and regimes entails some sort of socialisation into the prevalent norms and assumptions of those international arenas, or ‘epistemic communities’.29 While Russian shipowners in the Joint Fisheries Commission keep calling for increased quotas, Russian scientists seem generally to share the assumptions of other countries’ scientists in ICES, and Russian enforcement officials are engaged in a highly fruitful collaboration with their Norwegian counterparts. Since the late 1990s, however, the heavy influence of wealthy ‘user groups’ as well as the prevalent anti-Western discourse in Russian society – in the fisheries sector partly orchestrated by those same shipowners – have tamed the constraining effects of these ‘epistemic communities’. At least, the arguments of the Russian scientists in the Russian delegation to the Joint Fisheries Commission have not had much effect. Or perhaps they have been ‘forced’ to ply arguments that do not conflict with this general discourse. The collaboration with Norwegian officials in technical regulation and enforcement matters does not seem to have suffered to the same extent. One reason may be that this work does not interfere so much with the opportunities of shipowners to realise their quota assets. An optimistic scenario would be that a Russian law on fisheries is imminent, now that the centre-region conflicts are on the wane.30 Once this law is in place, the contention between various federal agencies currently involved in fisheries management may decline; at least, the opportunity for introducing new, far-reaching changes will have been curtailed. In the northern fishery basin, we can also assume that the power of the Joint Fisheries Commission to ignore scientific recommendations will soon be a thing of the past. Criticism of the Commission’s quotas has been mounting in Norway in recent years, as it has in the international community.31 The moment Norway puts its foot down and threatens to withdraw from the bilateral regime, the Russians may give in and agree to more ‘precautionary’ TACs for the Northeast Arctic cod stock. Doing so would constrain the least ‘precautionary’ players within the country.32 With a law on fisheries in place, and decreasing inclination on the part of Western partners to turn a blind eye to the most destructive effects of ‘user group’ participation in Russia, Russian fisheries management policy could be put on a course embracing a more ‘precautionary’ approach – in both theory and practice.

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NOTES

1. I.e. if we speak of the ‘formal’ variant of the precautionary approach, with the requirements to systems of fisheries management spelled out in Chapter 1. When the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Russian Federation speaks of ‘rational use of marine bio-resources’ and ‘protection of the marine environment’, this alludes, naturally, to some sort of ‘precaution’ although the ‘precautionary approach’ is not formally stated to be an underlying principle of the state’s fisheries management. 2. The term ‘draft Fisheries Act’ is used here for the version of the bill that was approved by the Federal Parliament but rejected by the President in spring 2001; cf. Chapter 3. 3. As mentioned in the section on methodology in Chapter 1, an abundance of legal documents at levels below that of formal law is continuously produced by Russian fisheries management authorities, the enforcement of many of which is not even attempted. Hence, while the present study has sought to give as exhaustive as possible a presentation of the formal principles underlying Russian fisheries management, it cannot claim to have covered the entirety of official documents related to fisheries management. 4. The institutional conflicts within Russian fisheries management are further discussed below. 5. The failure of the State Committee for Fisheries to enforce its own provisions (such as ensuring that Russian fishing vessels deliver their catches at home) is the most palpable illustration of the weak political clout of this governing body. As seen in Chapter 5, other official principles of quota allocation, introduced from the mid-1990s (such as the instruction to give priority to indigenous people and coastal fisheries), have not had much effect on actual quota allocation either. However, these principles do collide with the overarching principle of catch capacity and their introduction may hence have been more an issue of ‘window dressing’ than a real effort to change the country’s established quota allocation practice. 6. Transparency is one of the precautionary approach’s requirements to systems of fisheries management; cf. Chapter 1. In this case, it can be questioned whether the change actually led to greater transparency and whether it was, in fact, a central reason to restructure the system. The prospect of higher revenues for the state from the fishing industry constituted the prime incentive for the introduction of auctions of fish quotas in Russia. If nothing else, the reorganisation of the system removed some important decision-making powers from the offices of the Russian ‘fishery complex’. However, critics would have it that the auctions increase arbitrariness and unpredictability in the quota allocation; cf. Chapter 3.

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7. As mentioned in Chapter 3, the division of responsibility between the federal and the regional level has been the main issue of contention in the State Duma’s and Federation Council’s discussions of the draft Fisheries Act. Which formal principles should underlie the country’s fisheries management has probably been of less significance; the general post-Soviet Russian discourse dictates that this should be ‘exploitation’ in some form. According to some officials in the Russian system for fisheries management, the precautionary approach has been discussed and rejected as a principle for Russian fisheries management by the Federal Parliament; cf. Chapter 3. 8. As mentioned in Chapter 5, the Joint Fisheries Commission in 2000 agreed to ‘freeze’ the TAC of Northeast Arctic cod for three years ahead. Hence, the 2003 session will be the first in three years at which Russia and Norway will have to agree on a cod TAC. At the session in November 2002, Norway and Russia agreed on a ‘long-term management strategy’ for the joint fish stocks of the Barents Sea, which points in a more optimistic direction than the conclusions laid out above. The main element of this strategy is to maintain the average fishing mortality rate (catch rate) at the defined precautionary level over three-year periods; Protokoll for den 31. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon (‘Protocol for the 31st Session of the Joint Norwegian-Russian Fisheries Commission’) (Oslo: the Ministry of Fisheries, 2002); see also Pressemelding Nr. 72/2002 (‘Press Release No. 72/2002’), the Norwegian Ministry of Fisheries, 8 November 2002. 9. At the same time, influence on quota allocation was ceded partly to the regional administrations (intra-regional quota distribution) and partly to the State Committee for Fisheries (inter-regional quota distribution); cf. Chapters 4 and 5. 10. Examples of other enforcement activities include the closure and opening of fishing fields and keeping track of how much of their quota shares various (Russian) shipowners and third countries have taken. 11. Sceptics to the reorganisation would have it that the Federal Border Service was not genuinely interested in conducting fishery inspections, but only in the budget allocations that followed this responsibility, and that this was the main reason for the failure to carry out controls at sea; cf. Chapters 4 and 6. 12. See Chapter 6 for references. While I am not a fishery biologist, one can speculate whether this illegal fishery contributed to the catastrophic state of the Northeast Arctic cod stock around the turn of the century. 13. I.e. engineers run factories and medical doctors hospitals; all-rounders, i.e. ‘non-experts’, are not expected to play such administrative roles. 14. This position suddenly became vastly more important not only because the companies were privatised and started to deliver their catches abroad (cf. Chapter 4), but also because they for the first time now emerged as independent of the ‘Sevryba umbrella’.

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15. This was even more true for the Sevryba regulator as the association lost control of its member enterprises; cf. Chapter 4. 16. Although gradually relieving itself of management responsibilities, Sevryba was then still sufficiently influential to secure beneficial quota arrangements for the trawler and its sister ships which were soon to follow. 17. These quotas are sold to fishing companies and hence contribute the revenues of the governmental body in question and/or its leadership/employees. 18. This practice has caused considerable suspicion on the Norwegian side that over-dimensioned ‘research quotas’ might be functioning as a means of giving officials in the State Committee for Fisheries a ‘piece of the cake’ through the payments made by the fishing enterprises for these ‘additional’ quota shares. Thus, some Norwegians believe, PINRO might also have got a share by being party to the ‘scientific agreement’. 19. For instance, if the suspicion referred to in the last endnote is correct, the result would not be overfishing in relation to quotas – the mentioned research quotas are part of the Russian TAC – but a different focus among officials at the State Committee for Fisheries and a less than ideal use of the country’s research quotas. Put differently, the research quotas are acquired by commercial actors with other interests than the purely scientific, and PINRO scientists are little more than a smoke screen set up to give an impression that ‘research is taking place’. 20. As follows from Chapter 3, the Joint Fisheries Commission has requested that ICES reduce the minimum precautionary approach level of spawning stock biomass for the Northeast Arctic cod stock. This disagreement aside, the Joint Fisheries Commission seeks to comply with the requirements of the precautionary approach to fisheries, at least in principle. 21. The fishing kolkhozes are the responsibility of the Ministry of Agriculture (formerly the Ministry of Agriculture and Foodstuffs), as is the veterinary service, one of the federal services that fishers complain make deliveries in Russian ports a hassle; cf. Chapter 4. See Chapter 3 for further details on the relationship between the State Committee for Fisheries and the Ministry of Natural Resources. 22. The draft Fisheries Act goes even further as it states that the fish resources of the internal waters and territorial water of the Russian Federation are federal property and the prerogative of federal authorities to regulate; cf. Chapter 3. 23. Admittedly, a range of institutions, both governmental agencies and ‘user groups’, are represented on these bodies; cf. Chapter 4. Here, I refer to the agency that has chairmanship of the body. 24. The State Committee for Fisheries might well have found considerable support for this policy in the generally (at least until the 1999 elections) nationalisticconservative State Duma, but the issue might not have been considered important

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enough to be regulated by law. In the economically more liberal Government and presidential administration, there has probably been less support for these measures. 25. It can be argued whether ‘user group’ participation has ‘grown’ as compared to the situation in Soviet times. But it is only in post-Soviet times that the Russian fishing enterprises have become real ‘user groups’, with the concomitant incentives to make a personal profit (either on a short- or long-term basis). 26. See Chapter 4 for a further discussion of the applicability of the term ‘co-management’ to Russian fisheries management. 27. Many developed countries are equally oriented towards exploitation in practice, it may be argued, but over the last decades ‘protection’, ‘sustainability’ and ‘precaution’ have come to be defined as underlying principles for their systems of fisheries management. 28. This is a counterfactual assumption, implying that Russia and Norway set separate quotas for the Northeast Arctic cod, e.g. for their own EEZ. As noted above, we cannot be sure if unilateral Russian measures would have been less ‘precautionary’ than the bilateral Russian-Norwegian practice. One can even imagine the opposite happening: that Norwegian ‘precaution’ in many Russians’ view has been so ‘provocatively excessive’ that Russia has demonstratively taken a less ‘precautionary’ approach than it would have had it had to take full responsibility for disregarding the scientific recommendations. 29. An ‘epistemic community’ can be defined as ‘a specific community of experts sharing a belief in a common set of cause-and-effect relationships as well as common values to which policies governing these relationships will be applied’, P.M. Haas, ‘Do Regimes Matter? Epistemic Communities and Mediterranean Pollution Control’ (1989) 43 International Organization 377-403, p. 384. 30. Putin has installed greater federal control over the regions and sorted out many of the incongruities in federal and regional legislation; cf. Chapter 2. The State Duma that was elected in 1999 is also less confrontational towards the President and the Government than its predecessors. On the other hand, the system for quota auctions has taken over as a major issue of contention in discussions about the draft Fisheries Act; cf. Chapter 3. This can be seen as a continuation of the centreregion conflict as regional actors tend to claim that it is ‘the centre’ that is in charge of the auctions and reaps the fruits of the system. It is difficult to be overly optimistic given the fact that the draft Fisheries Act has to go through the entire legislative process of the Federal Parliament anew and was rejected by the State Duma in its first attempt to pass the first of three readings in revised form; cf. Chapter 3. 31. In late 2001, the Norwegian parliament, the Storting, responded to criticism of official fisheries management policy. All of the political parties on the Select Committee on Trade and Industry stated that Norwegian fishery policy was not

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sustainable: ‘The Committee notes with concern that the agreements that have been concluded between Norway and Russia in recent years have not given sufficient consideration to the sustainable management of the cod stock. [. . .] We note that the negotiation results [for 2002] are far above the scientific recommendations and emphasise that the main principle for future negotiations is to give priority to the restoration of the stock’, Fiskeribladet, 7 November 2001, p. 4. This parliamentarian interest means that it will be more difficult for the Norwegian delegation to the Joint Fisheries Commission in the future to accept TACs far above the scientific recommendations. Of course, there was political control over the agreements with Russia before 2001 too, but the Minister of Fisheries had met little resistance, or even interest, in parliament with regard to the agreements. 32. Russian shipowners were not represented on the Joint Fisheries Commission in 2002; Protokoll for den 31. sesjon i Den blandede norsk-russiske fiskerikommisjon, 2002. However, it is unlikely that the informal influcence of user groups has declined.

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INDEX

All-Russian Scientific Institute for Fisheries and Oceanography (VNIRO) scientific input by, 94 Arkhangelsk governor, 35-36 political organisation, 35-38 Regional Charter, 35 Barents Sea area of, 5 bilateral management regime, codification of decisions, 54 bilateral negotiations, 7 collaboration, effectiveness of, 151-154 fish and marine mammals as basis for settlement along, 5 fish stocks in, 5, 49 multinational negotiations, transition from, 7 overfishing, expert group on, establishment, 143 initial co-operation measures, 146-147 members of, 143 Permanent Committee, appointment of, 145 proposals of, 143-146 pelagic fish, 5-6 quotas. See Quotas Russian fisheries, lack of control of, 142-143 Russian-Norwegian management regime, 4, 7 scientific recommendations, 49 stock assessments, 49 Capelin stock, size of, 6, 8 total allowable catches, setting, 8, 49

Cod compulsory selection grids, introduction of, 150 crisis, in, 169 exchange of quotas, 8 exports, 82 fishing mortality, 169 groundfish, as, 6 life cycle, 6-7 management recommendations, 110 reference points, 51 stock, fluctuation in, 110 stock, size of, 7 total allowable catch, 93, 169 setting, 8, 49 Commonwealth of Independent States creation of, 29 Communist Party of the Soviet Union power structure, 28 Drift-net fisheries General Assembly, treatment by, 10 Economy privatisation, 171 Enforcement catches, keeping track of, 138 co-operation initiative, success of, 153 Coast Guard seminars, 147 collaboration, effectiveness of, 151-154 erosion of standards, 142 Federal Border Service, responsibility of, 60, 62 Glavrybvod involvement of, 59, 141 transfer of responsibility from, 139 initial co-operation measures, 146-147 lack of, 140

186

Index

Northwest Russian Fishing industry, responsibility in, 88 Norway collaboration with, 170-171 joint arrangement with, 142-143 Norwegian Coast Guard, checks by, 146-147 Permanent Committee accuracy of factors arrived at by, 152-153 activities of, 147 appointment, 145 closing and opening of fishing grounds, common procedures for, 149-150 compulsory selection grids, introduction of, 150 exchange of data, 148 Joint Fisheries Commission, activities on behalf of, 149 main areas of co-operation, 147-150 precautionary approach, required by, 138 responsibility for, 170 sanctioning mechanisms, 153 sea, at, 140 seminars, 148 State Committee for Fisheries, loss of responsibility, 60 target compliance, 141 Environmental law precautionary principle emergence of, 8-9 international law, in, 4 Exclusive Economic Zone law on, 54-55 natural resources in, management of, 78 Federal Border Service enforcement, responsibility for, 60, 62, 170 experience and resources, lack of, 140 funds, lack of, 170 Glavrybvod, transfer of responsibility for enforcement from, 139 Glavrybvod/Murmanrybvod, conflict with, 140 inspections, number of, 140 Murmansk State Inspection of the Arctic Regional Command, 88, 96 role of, 58 State Committee for Fisheries, challenging, 139 Fisheries legislation centre-region tensions, 54

development of, 49 Exclusive Economic Zone, law on, 54-55 imminent, 178 inertia affecting, 55 Maritime Doctrine, 54 Ministry of Natural Resources, no role for, 60 national level, at, 53-55 objectives and principles, 55-58 Russian Federation, of, 16-17 Fisheries management development or exploitation aspects of, 168 internationally accepted principles, Norwegian insistence on, 117-118 maximum sustainable yield, device of, 10 precautionary approach, application of, 11 precautionary principle, agreement not to apply, 11 Russian. See Russian fisheries management types of activities, 14 West, in, 3 Fishery basins northern, 4 Russian Federation, of, 3 Fishing grounds closing and opening, common procedures for, 149-150 Fishing industry new wealth, distribution of, 172-173 Fishing vessels kolkhozes, 80-81 Northwest Russia, in, 80 Russian, activities in Norwegian waters and ports, 152 satellite tracking, 60, 150 FOA Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries precautionary approach, 4-5, 11-12 scientific uncertainties and scientific knowledge, balance between, 12 technical actions, requiring, 50 Glavrybvod enforcement bodies, 170 conflict with, 140 involvement in, 59, 141 transfer of responsibility from, 139 Groundfish meaning, 6 stocks, 7

Index

187

Haddock groundfish, as, 6 stock, size of, 7 total allowable catches, setting, 8, 49 Halibut Greenland stock, decline in, 8 Herring stock, size of, 6 High seas fisheries technical consultation, 11

Knipovich Scientific Polar Institute for Marine Fisheries Research and Oceanography (PINRO) cake, slice of, 172 fish stocks, assessment of, 94 importance of, 169 management process, involvement in, 94-95 total allowable catches, setting recommendations of, 169

Incentives changed structure, response to, 139 new, 171-174 Russian fishers, of, 138 International Council for the Exploration of the Sea (ICES) Advisory Committee for Fisheries Management, 49 Barents Sea management regime, 7, 49 main participants, 7 methods and results of marine science, scepticism as to, 116 Norway, use for economic purposes of, 118 Russian trust, loss of, 121 Study Group on the Precautionary Approach to Fisheries Management, establishment of, 50 proposals of, 50-51 references points, proposal of, 51

Maximum sustainable yield leading management device, as, 10 Ministry of Agriculture and Foodstuffs collective fishing fleet and fish farming, responsibility for, 60 Ministry of Economic Development and Trade quota allocation system, interference in, 140 role of, 61-62 State Committee for Fisheries, instructions to, 175 Ministry of Natural Resources role of, 60 Murmanrybvod enforcement by, 141 implementation, success of, 142 rectangle, closing, 59 regional inspection body, as, 59 role of, 88-89, 96 Murmansk federal authorities, power-sharing agreement with, 37 Fish Combinate, 79, 83 governor, 35-36 northern fishery basis, as nerve centre of, 5 political organisation, 35-38 regional administration, control by, 85 Regional Charter, 35 regional fishery inspection body, 59 Trawl Fleet, 79, 82

Joint Russian-Norwegian Fisheries Commission federal agency, status of, 174 members of, 8 Northwest Russian Fishing industry, role in, 91 Norwegian delegation, 8 overfishing, expert group on establishment, 143 members of, 143 Permanent Committee, appointment of, 145 proposals of, 143-146 precautionary approach acceptance of, 167 protocols, 52-53 reference points, reconsidering level of, 53 Russian delegation, 8 work of, 119 Russian national interests fitness to secure, 120-121 total allowable catches, setting, 8, 49

Natural resources management constitutional provision, 38 responsibility for, 78, 83 precautionary principle, 4 Non-governmental organisations fisheries management, involvement in, 94 neglect of scientific opinion, critical views on, 114 Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Commission Barents Sea fisheries, negotiations, 7

188

Index

Northwest Russian Fishing industry basin management body, establishment of, 84-85 companies, types of, 80 decision-making bodies, 91-93 development of, 79 exploration fleet, 81 federal agencies, role of, 86-89 fish products, production of, 83 fisheries enforcement, responsibility for, 88 fishing companies, association of, 79-80 fishing vessels, ownership of, 80 freezing fleet, 81 kolkhozes, 80-81 Murmanrybvod, role of, 88-89, 96 Murmansk Trawl Fleet, 79, 82 Northwestern Federal Okrug, fisheries department in, 89 persons employed, 82 quotas, allocation of, 84 regional authorities, role of, 83-86 sector principle, application of, 79 Sevryba. See Sevryba small private shipowners, emergence of, 81 target groups, 90-94 total catch, 81 traditional actors in, 90 Union of Private Fishery Enterprises, 80, 93 Northwestern Russia federal authorities, representation of, 37-38 Pelagic fish Barents Sea, in, 5 herring stock, 6 meaning, 5-6 Pollution precautionary principle, 4 Precautionary approach burden of proof, reversal, 5 criteria, 10, 13 customary international law, approaching status of, 14 enforcement mechanisms, requirement of, 138 fisheries legislation, not mentioned in, 62 fisheries management, related to, 5, 11-12 fisheries, to criteria, 13

emergence of, 8-14 FOA guidelines, 13 international agreements, in, 4-5 Joint Fisheries Commission, protocols of, 52-53 practicalities, relating to, 14 principle, acceptance of, 167-168 Study Group on the Precautionary Approach to Fisheries Management, establishment of, 50 proposals of, 50-51 references points, proposal of, 51 Precautionary principle distinctive feature of, 9 environmental law, in, 8-9 hard line regimes, associated with, 14 international law, emergence in, 9 leading management device, as, 4 original concept, 9 Quotas allocation, building or reconstruction of vessels at Russian shipyards, priority of, 168 catch capacity, based on, 127-129 fresh practices, 127-128 Governmental Resolution, 57 inter-regional level, at, 123 Murmansk Oblast, in, 86 national level, practices at, 121-128 new criteria for, 122, 127 new criteria, discussions on, 57 northern fishery basin, in, 84 preliminary provision, 57 principle for, 56 regional level, at, 124-126 system for, 89 system, interference in, 140 transparency, 58 auction system, 58, 81, 168 Barents Sea, distribution of, 59 competition, 56 establishment, opinions of Russian and Norwegian fishers, 113 fleets, distribution between, 56 high, tendency to set, 121 Murmansk regional administration, preliminary provision adopted by, 85 national interest, concern about, 117-120 northern basin, new distribution system in, 56 social, 56 stimulation, 56 technical, 56

Index Reference points management objectives, meeting, 13 Northeast Arctic cod stock, for, 51 precautionary, 12 regulatory action, 109 Research institutes fisheries management, involvement in 94-95 scientific recommendations by, 169 system of, 168 Russian Federation centralised administrative structure, 32 centre-region relations, evolving, bilateral agreements, 32 conflict, 175 constitutional provisions, 30-31 dumas, 31 economic aspects, 34-35 legal aspects, 31-33 legal vacuum, filling, 37 levels of jurisdiction, 31-32 political aspects, 33-34 political tug-of-war, 38-39 constitution, 16, 29-30 constitutional conference, 30 economy, 34-35 federal okrugs, 3, 34 federal subjects, 3, 29 federalism, pillars of, 34 fisheries legislation, 16-17 fisheries management. See Russian fisheries management governing structure, 3 inter-regional economic associations, 3 international regimes, participation in, 177-178 legal framework, lack of, 53 Maritime Doctrine, 54 regions, autonomy of, 33 Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, succeeding, 27, 29-30 tax system, 34 Russian fisheries management achievements of, 4 associations of fishing companies, 79 centralised system, 61-62 corruption, rumours of, 172-173 criticism of, 114 delineation of responsibilities, 78 development, features of, 139 expertise and man-power, 170 experts, rule by, 172 failure to move in precautionary direction, explanations for, 171-176

189

federal agencies, role of, 86-89 federal bodies responsible for, 58 federal level, at, 3, 49-62 goal, 55 governance, 3 implementation performance, decline in, 140 institutional assets, 177-178 institutional conflict, 174-176 institutional set-up, 58-61 internal organisation, debate on, 119 interview data, 17 legislation. See Fisheries legislation methodological considerations, 16-18 prospects, 176-178 questions to be asked, 14-16 regional level, at, 78-96 relations with Norway, crisis in, 173 shortcomings, 176 technical, 170 Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic ethno-national groups, 27 federal unit, as, 27 power structures, 28 Russian Federation succeeding, 27, 29-30 Scientific Catch Council head of, 86, 95 Northwest Russian Fishing industry, role in, 92 quotas, allocation of, 84 Sevryba change in nature, 90 fishing vessel, 87, 172 implementation, success of, 142 institutional identity, 87 Murmansk regional administration, relationship with, 141 privatisation, 87 regulatory activity, 95 role of, 79-80, 87 technical regulation by, 170 Soviet Union administrative-territorial divisions, 28 demise, 29 dismantling of, 29 ethnic groups in, 28 federal structure, 27 government structure, 28 power structures, 28 republics, oblasts and okrugs making up, 28 Stalin, evolution under, 28

190

Index

State Committee for Fisheries decisions, hampering of, 174 dissolution, attempt at, 59 enforcement, loss of responsibility for, 60 Federal Border Service challenging, 139 institutional conflict, 174 interference, defence against, 59 main objectives, failure to implement, 175-176 restoration of status, 60 role of, 58-59, 62 troubled body, as, 175 Taxation system, 34 Total allowable catches bilateral negotiations, 177 cod, for, 93, 169 establishment of, 49 basis for, 109 Russian or Norwegian position, reflecting, 109 scientific recommendations, 110-111, 129

fishing mortality, 111 levels of, 110-111 precautionary, 178 recommendations for, 169 scientific knowledge, perceptions of, 111-117 setting, 8, 49 UN Agreement on Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks precautionary approach, 4, 11-12 precautionary reference points, definition, 12 scientific uncertainties and scientific knowledge, balance between, 12 technical actions, requiring, 50 Undersized fish illegal fishery of, 141 Union of Private Fishery Enterprises in the North members of, 80 United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea Barents Sea fisheries, change in negotiations, 7