Rethinking Transnationalism: The Meso-link of Organisations (Tranationalism)

Rethinking Transnationalism

During the last two decades transnationalism has become an important conceptual approach and research programme. However, the term has steadily become vague and indistinct underlining the need for conceptual précising as well as more defined empirical research. Rethinking Transnationalism does this in two ways. On the one hand it presents theoretical contributions to the transnationalism approach and, on the other hand, it offers empirical studies in the field of the transnationalisation of organisations. The book integrates outstanding international scholars of transnationalism and migration studies with specialists from a broad variety of disciplines that apply the transnationalism approach to different organisations such as NGOs, feminist networks, educational spaces and European Works Councils. Presenting an overview of transnationalism and the surrounding debates, this interdisciplinary volume will be of interest to students and scholars of Politics, International Relations, Sociology, Anthropology, Educational Sciences, Migration and Geography. Ludger Pries is Professor at the Department of Social Science, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany.

Transnationalism Series Editor: Steven Vertovec, University of Oxford ‘Transnationalism’ broadly refers to multiple ties and interactions linking people or institutions across the borders of nation-states. Today myriad systems of relationship, exchange and mobility function intensively and in real time while being spread across the world. New technologies, especially involving telecommunications, serve to connect such networks. Despite great distances and notwithstanding the presence of international borders (and all the laws, regulations and national narratives they represent), many forms of association have been globally intensified and now take place paradoxically in a planet-spanning yet common arena of activity. In some instances transnational forms and processes serve to speed up or exacerbate historical patterns of activity, in others they represent arguably new forms of human interaction. Transnational practices and their consequent configurations of power are shaping the world of the twenty-first century. This book forms part of a series of volumes concerned with describing and analysing a range of phenomena surrounding this field. Serving to ground theory and research on ‘globalization’, the Routledge book series on ‘Transnationalism’ offers the latest empirical studies and ground-breaking theoretical works on contemporary socio-economic, political and cultural processes which span international boundaries. Contributions to the series are drawn from Sociology, Economics, Anthropology, Politics, Geography, International Relations, Business Studies and Cultural Studies. The ‘Transnationalism’ series grew out of the Transnational Communities Research Programme of the Economic and Social Research Council (see http://www.transcomm.ox.ac.uk.). It is currently associated with the Research Council’s Centre on Migration, Policy and Society located at the University of Oxford (see http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk). The series consists of two strands: Transnationalism aims to address the needs of students and teachers and these titles will be published in hardback and paperback. Titles include:

Culture and Politics in the Information Age A New Politics? Edited by Frank Webster Transnational Democracy Political Spaces and Border Crossings Edited by James Anderson

Routledge Research in Transnationalism is a forum for innovative new research intended for a high-level specialist readership, and the titles will be available in hardback only. Titles include:

1 New Transnational Social Spaces International Migration and Transnational Companies in the Early 21st Century Edited by Ludger Pries 2 Transnational Muslim Politics Reimagining the Umma Peter G. Mandaville

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9 Culture and Economy in the Indian Diaspora Edited by Bhikhu Parekh, Gurharpal Singh and Steven Vertovec 10 International Migration and the Globalization of Domestic Politics Edited by Rey Koslowski

3 New Approaches to Migration? Transnational Communities and the Transformation of Home Edited by Nadje Al-Ali and Khalid Koser

11 Gender in Transnationalism Home, Longing and Belonging among Moroccan Migrant Women Ruba Salih

4 Work and Migration Life and Livelihoods in a Globalizing World Edited by Ninna Nyberg Sørensen and Karen Fog Olwig

12 State/Nation/Transnation Perspectives on Transnationalism in the Asia-Pacific Edited by Brenda S. A. Yeoh and Katie Willis

5 Communities across Borders New Immigrants and Transnational Cultures Edited by Paul Kennedy and Victor Roudometof 6 Transnational Spaces Edited by Peter Jackson, Phil Crang and Claire Dwyer 7 The Media of Diaspora Edited by Karim H. Karim 8 Transnational Politics Turks and Kurds in Germany Eva Østergaard-Nielsen

13 Transnational Activism in Asia Problems of Power and Democracy Edited by Nicola Piper and Anders Uhlin 14 Diaspora, Identity and Religion New Directions in Theory and Research Edited by Waltraud Kokot, Khachig Tölölyan and Carolin Alfonso 15 Cross-Border Governance in the European Union Edited by Olivier Thomas Kramsch and Barbara Hooper

16 Transnational Connections and the Arab Gulf Edited by Madawi Al-Rasheed 17 Central Asia and the Caucasus Transnationalism and Diaspora Edited by Touraj Atabaki and Sanjyot Mehendale

20 Geopolitics of European Union Enlargement The Fortress Empire Edited by Warwick Armstrong and James Anderson 21 Rethinking Transnationalism The Meso-link of organisations Edited by Ludger Pries

18 International Migration and Security Opportunities and Challenges Edited by Elspeth Guild and Joanne van Selm 19 Transnational European Union Towards a Common Political Space Edited by Wolfram Kaiser with Peter Starie

* Also available in paperback

Rethinking Transnationalism The Meso-link of organisations

Edited by Ludger Pries

First published 2008 by Routledge 2 Park Square Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business. This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2008. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

© 2008 Ludger Pries selection and editorial matter; individual contributors, their contributions All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Rethinking transnationalism : the meso-link of organisations / edited by Ludger Pries. p. cm. - (Routledge research in transnationalism ; 21) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Transnationalism. 2. International cooperation. 3. GlobalizationEconomic aspects. I. Pries, Ludger. JV6035.R475 2008341.2–dc22 2008003406 ISBN 0-203-89369-7 Master e-book ISBN

ISBN 10: 0-415-46789-6 (hbk) ISBN 10: 0-203-89369-7 (ebk) ISBN 13: 978-0-415-46789-6 (hbk) ISBN 13: 978-0-203-89369-2 (ebk)

Contents

List of tables Notes on contributors 1

Transnational societal spaces: which units of analysis, reference, and measurement?

viii ix

1

LUDGER PRIES

2

Constructing transnational studies

21

SANJEEV KHAGRAM AND PEGGY LEVITT

3

Beyond methodological ethnicity and towards city scale: an alternative approach to local and transnational pathways of migrant incorporation

40

˘ LAR NINA GLICK SCHILLER AND AYSE CAG

4

Transstate spaces and development: some critical remarks

63

THOMAS FAIST

5

Transnational humanitarian NGOs? A progress report

81

DENNIS DIJKZEUL

6

Transnational social movement networks and transnational public spaces: glocalizing gender justice

105

ILSE LENZ

7

Transnational organisations in education

127

CHRISTEL ADICK

8

European works councils as transnational interest organisations?

154

LUDGER PRIES

Bibliography Index

175 205

Tables

1.1 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.5 7.1 7.2 8.1

Types of international studies Summary of four types of international organisations: strategy Summary of four types of international organisations: structure Comparison of the transnational ideal type and Malteser International: strategy Comparison of the transnational ideal type and Malteser International: structure Comparison of the transnational ideal type and Malteser International: coordination Educational spaces Transnational educational organisations Production, employment and EWC-representatives in European GM-sites (end of 2006)

7 89 90 94 95 98 134 139 168

Notes on contributors

Christel Adick has been Professor for Comparative Education at RuhrUniversität Bochum, Germany since 1993. She has also been a visiting professor at the Humboldt-University of Berlin and at the University of the West Indies. Her memberships of various academic institutions include the German Educational Research Association, the Comparative and International Education Society, the Paulo Freire Society and the African Studies Association in Germany. Her main areas of research include international and intercultural education, colonial and contemporary education in the “Third World”, globalisation and educational development. She has written and edited several books and a wide range of articles in German and is the editor of the series ‘HistoricalComparative Research on Education and Socialisation’ (IKO-Verlag für Interkulturelle Kommunikation, Frankfurt/Main). Ayse Cag˘ lar is Associate Professor and Head of the Department of Sociology and Social Anthropology at the Central European University in Budapest, Hungary. In 2004 she finished her habilitation thesis and received her Dr.habil. in Anthropology and Sociology at Freie Universität Berlin, where she had been an Associate Professor since 1994. Her areas of specialisation include nationalist discourses, labour migration to Germany, urban anthropology, postcolonial cities, popular culture and consumption. Her articles have appeared in journals such as American Ethnologist, Global Networks and Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies. In recent years she has been a frequent contributor to books on transnationalism, migration and ethnicity. Dennis Dijkzeul is Professor for Management of Humanitarian Crises at the Institute for International Law of Peace and Armed Conflict at RuhrUniversität Bochum, Germany. From 2000 to 2002, he was Director of the new Program for Humanitarian Affairs at the School for International and Public Affairs of Columbia University in New York. He has been working as a consultant for international organisations in Africa, Central America, Europe and the US. His main interests concern the management

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Notes on contributors of international organisations and the (non)-participation of local communities in development and humanitarian programmes. His recent books include Supporting Local Health Care in a Chronic Crisis (with Caroline Lynch: National Academies Press, 2005), Between Force and Mercy: Military Action and Humanitarian Aid (Berliner Wissenschaftsverlag, 2004) and Rethinking International Organizations: Pathology and Promise (with Yves Beigbeder: Berghahn Books, 2003).

Thomas Faist has been Professor for Transstate Relations and Sociology of Development at the Department of Sociology, Universität Bielefeld, Germany since 2004. He is Director of the Centre on Migration, Citizenship and Development (COMCAD). His research focuses on international migration, ethnic and national minorities, citizenship, and social and developmental policies. Recent books include Citizenship: Theory, Discourse and Transnational Prospects (with Peter Kivisto: Blackwell, 2007) and Dual Citizenship in Europe: From Nationhood to Societal Integration (Ashgate, 2007). Sanjeev Khagram is Associate Professor of Public Affairs and International Studies at the Evans School of Public Affairs, University of Washington. He holds a joint faculty appointment with the Evans School and Jackson School of International Studies. He serves as the director of the Marc Lindenberg Center for Humanitarian Action, International Development, and Global Citizenship at the Evans School. Khagram previously held faculty positions at Stanford University’s Institute for International Studies and Harvard University’s JFK School of Government. Recent books include Dams and Development: Transnational Struggles for Water and Power (Cornell University Press, 2004) and Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, and Norms (with Kathryn Sikkink and James V. Riker: University of Minnesota Press, 2002). Ilse Lenz is Professor for Social Structure and Gender at the Faculty of Social Science and co-opted Professor at the Faculty for East Asian Studies at Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Germany. Her research interests include labour markets and gender relations in Japan and Germany, the Japanese women’s movement, integrative approaches to research on social structures, intercultural research, as well as globalisation and cultural change. Together with Professor Michiko Mae, she is the coordinator of the yearly workshop on gender research of the German Association for Social Science Research on Japan. Her most recent English publication is Gender Orders Unbound. Globalisation, Restructuring and Reciprocity (with Charlotte Ullrich and Barbara Fersch: Budrich, 2007). Peggy Levitt is Associate Professor in the Department of Sociology at Wellesley College and Research Fellow at the Hauser Center for

Notes on contributors

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Nonprofit Organizations and the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs at Harvard University. She received her PhD in Urban Studies and Planning from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1996. Before becoming a Professor at Wellesley College, she was, among other academic appointments, an Associate Professor at Harvard University’s Sociology Department. Recent Publications include God Needs No Passport: Immigrants and the Changing American Religious Landscape (New Press, 2007) and The Transnational Studies Reader: Intersections and Innovations (with Sanjeev Khagram: Routledge, 2007). Ludger Pries is Professor at the Department of Social Science, Ruhr University Bochum, Germany. Nina Glick Schiller is Professor of Anthropology and, since 2007, Hayes Chair recipient at the University of New Hampshire, and has recently been a visiting Research Associate at the Max-Planck Institute for Social Anthropology/Germany. Since 2007 she has been Director of the new Cosmopolitan Cultures Institute (CCI) at the University of Manchester. Recently, transnational cities, people and migration issues have been a common theme throughout her research career. Books published include Georges Woke Up Laughing: Long Distance Nationalism and the Apparent State (Duke University, 2001) and Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States (with L. Bash and C. Blanc-Szanton: Gordon and Breach, 1994).

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Transnational societal spaces Which units of analysis, reference and measurement? Ludger Pries

During the 1990s, pioneer research on transnational migration and on transnationalism in general, especially when confronted with sceptical criticism, frequently concentrated its efforts on proving the mere existence of transnational phenomena. Today, the transnationalism approach as a research programme has spread into such different disciplines as geography, sociology, political science, anthropology, economics, literature and history; moreover, the actual occurrence of transnational ‘social facts’ can be considered to be substantiated in many ways. Sometimes the terms transnational and transnationalism are used so vaguely and indistinctly that they are likely to become ‘catch-all and say nothing’ terms, as was the case with the globalisation concept. Therefore, conceptual precision and debate, as well as more explicit and closely defined empirical research, is needed. As underlined by a number of authors,1 the main task is currently no longer to show that transnational social phenomena exist, but rather, as most researchers in this field agree, to demonstrate that the successful establishment of transnationalism as a valuable concept has led to new theoretical and empirical challenges. Many of the volumes – already more than twenty! – of the Routledge Research in Transnationalism series focus on analysing transnational social phenomena in areas such as migration, identities and citizenship. Other volumes concentrate on such different topics as transnational value chains and fashion, transnational feminist approaches in literature, transnational policy and security, or regional approaches to transnationalism in the European Union, the Islamic world, or Asia. Thus, the Routledge Research in Transnationalism series is a vivid example of the broad scope of disciplinary, thematic and regional traditions of the transnational studies field. However, whereas a fair amount of volumes concentrate on empirical research in specific themes, only a few volumes focus on conceptual, theoretical and methodological issues of transnationalism as a research programme.2 While many of the volumes represent specific approaches and traditions, this volume addresses both central current theoretical and methodological issues of the field as well as what has been, until now, a largely ignored aspect of transnationalism: transnational organisations. Thus, the

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specific ‘add on’ of this volume is twofold. The first four chapters represent more general readings in this field and make conceptual proposals for further research. In Chapters 5 to 8, the ‘meso-level’ of transnational organisations is treated as a specific approach to transnational research between the macro-view on general, institutional, and societal relations, and the microlevel of individual and everyday life social relations. This chapter aims at integrating the contributions of the book by identifying the main advances and challenges of transnationalism as a research programme, as derived from the first part of each chapter, and by addressing the meso-level of transnational organisations, as treated in the second half of this volume. First, it identifies four main challenges of the transnational studies approach that result from a general reading of the transnationalism debate. In a second step, it concentrates on one of these pending problems: the appropriate definition of units of analysis and units of reference for transnational social phenomena and studies. It discusses different units of reference for analysing transnational phenomena and develops a proposal for conceptualising different ideal types of transnational social spaces. Then it looks at the following chapters of the book and underlines some important proposals made in order to cope with the aforementioned general challenges, especially in the field of transnational organisations. Finally, some conclusions will be drawn.

Challenges to transnationalism as a research programme Taking into account the aforementioned and other transnationalism literature, a general common sense approach to important pending problems of transnationalism as a research programme can be agreed upon. Four primary challenges can be identified. First, instead of expanding the notion of transnationalism to a new catch-all concept, and of ‘viewing transnational relations in any corner’, it is necessary to define appropriate units of analysis for transnational societal phenomena. The simplest transnational societal unit of analysis could be a ‘transnational social relation’, like the communication and interchange between a migrant and his or her family abroad. But is there anything new about these types of transnational relations? They have existed for as long as nations, nation states and national societies have existed – and with these socially constructed units, social practices, such as interchanging and trading goods and information across socio-geographic units, emerged (see Khagram and Levitt in this volume). Therefore, transnational relations and transnational practices have existed since the very beginning of such social artefacts as nations, states and national societies. In order to use the transnationalism concept in a more precise manner, transnational studies should focus not on transnational relations in general, but on transnational societal units as relatively dense and durable configurations of transnational social practices, symbols and artefacts (for this argument, see e.g. Hannerz 1996; Martínez 1998; Pries 2001 and 2004; Voigt-Graf

Transnational societal spaces

3

2004). To this end, it is necessary to explicitly define the specific relation between the (transnational) units of analysis, the (local, national, regional or global) units of reference and the (micro, meso or macro) units of research; these components characterise the transnational perspective and distinguish it from a global or simply comparative point of view. The following section of this chapter will deal with the problem of defining the appropriate units of analysis for transnational research or, sticking to the terminology used by Sanjeev Khagram and Peggy Levitt in this volume, will treat some aspects of methodological transnationalism. A second task identified by the scholars of transnational studies refers to what Khagram and Levitt label as empirical transnationalism: the need to measure the real empirical extent of transnational social phenomena and especially of durable and dense transnational societal units. On the one hand, the multifaceted and ubiquitous existence of transnational social phenomena and relations is a direct result of building socio-geographic container units such as nations, states and societies – and, in this broader sense, transnational relations are recognised as commonplace in transnational studies. On the other hand, transnational social or societal spaces3 could also be conceptualised in a narrow sense. By this, they could be understood as nation states and national societies spanning interaction frameworks in the dimensions of (1) intensive and stable social practices, (2) systems of symbols, and (3) artefacts. Used in this more specific sense of transnational spaces, these could be considered as a relatively novel topic recently discussed since the last quarter of the twentieth century. The development of these transnational social spaces was pushed by innovative and cheap international communication technologies, such as the telephone, fax-machine, Internet and airplane transportation (as a mass medium rather than an elite mobility system). But where exactly do different types of transnational social spaces actually exist? Does transnational migration make up a large proportion of all international migration? Are there a lot of transnational families as a result of transnational migration relations? Do transnational business companies play an important or at least a considerable role when compared with multinational, global or focal companies? The second half of this volume will concentrate on the conceptual and empirical aspects of transnational organisations – although it has to be stressed from the start that in general there is little knowledge about the real magnitude of transnational organisations and of the spread of transnational societal units in general. It therefore remains an important issue to measure, more precisely, the range of distribution and occurrence of such transnational societal units of analysis as compared to other societal units of analysis.4 A third challenge pointed out by transnationalism studies is to analyse the internal structures and processes of such transnational societal units as well as the interrelation between transnational and non-transnational types of societal units of analysis. This is crucial to avoid suggesting the existence of the same structures and processes in transnational societal units as in other

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societal units of analysis, or – the other way round – to ascribe structures and processes to transnational units completely different from non-transnational units. This leads to questions such as: What are the similarities between the internal structures (namely the distribution of assets, interests, values and power) and the dynamics (namely the mechanisms of coordination between the different and distant units of the transnational spaces) of transnational societal spaces as compared with other types of societal spaces? Are the dimensions and dynamics of social differentiation and integration the same in transnational social spaces as in other types of social spaces? For instance, do gender aspects of social differences or religion – as an integral aspect of social life – vary systematically in transnational societal units (transnational families, for example) as compared to their dynamics in national societies? As underlined by several scholars (Faist 2000 and in this volume; Koopmans and Statham 2001; Al-Ali 2002; Al-Ali and Koser 2002; Olwig 2003), there is a need to examine both agents and structures. Apart of the lack of insights into transnational societal units, there is also little knowledge about the systematic relation between them and other types of societal units. How do transnational families influence locally bound families? Under what conditions are transnational migrant organisations a challenge and/or an opportunity for national social integration? Is the multitude and nature of transnational societal units influenced by local, national or regional fields of power? Under which circumstances does an assimilationist approach of nation states on migrants’ national society integration encourage or prevent the emergence of transnational migrant organisations? Until now, there has been little empirically based and systematic knowledge on these relations between transnational societal spaces and other types of societal spaces that could be interpreted as part of what Khagram and Levitt (in this volume) call ‘theoretical transnationalism’ In the last part of this chapter some general considerations on this problem will be made. As a fourth desideratum of current transnationalism studies, there still remains the need for developing an adequate methodology and satisfactory methods for transnational research. Scholars, such as George Marcus (1995), defined some excellent general rules for transnationalism studies, such as the famous ‘followings’ (follow the people, follow the thing/commodity chain, follow the metaphors, follow the plot/story/allegory, follow the life/biography, and follow the conflict). This is definitely an important step towards adequate methods, but, in the light of the aforementioned points, these rules do not resolve the problem of how to identify transnational societal units and how to distinguish them from simple transnational relations. The qualitative methods adopted primarily from the fields of anthropology, ethnography and sociology (holistic approach, participatory fieldwork, the ‘following-strategy’, open interviews, etc.), and developed by scholars such as Michael Kearney (1995 and with Carole Nagengast 1989), George Marcus (1995), Karen Olwig (2003), Federico Besserer 2004, Fernando Herrera (2001) and Peggy Levitt (2001b), represent important advances in tracing goods and people in

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order to identify and analyse transnational social relations. Levitt et al. (2003) argue for a dimensional focus on different aspects (economic, political, socio-cultural and religious dimensions) of transnational social life as a heuristic strategy. In addition to these steps and in addition to taking the aforementioned first challenge – the definition of appropriate units of analysis for transnational societal phenomena – into account seriously, there arises a need for, not only new methods, but also a general development in methodology as such. In social sciences the units of analysis could be taken for granted for no reason, but always had to be constructed theoretically. Within the framework of methodological nationalism (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002), the corresponding spatial units of reference were traditionally considered as ‘naturally given’ by the local, national and global geographic level. Differentiating absolutist and relativist concepts of space (Pries 1999), however, leads to fundamental revisions of the relation between the units of analysis and the spatial units of reference – the latter cannot be taken for granted as coherent and contiguous geographical ‘containers’, but have to be considered as (potentially) pluri-local and constructed by social practices, symbols and artefacts: “The local, regional, national, and global are not automatic, taken-for-granted social arenas, but rather categories that must be investigated as constructed and contested social facts” (Khagram and Levitt 2005: 26). In qualitative terms, this raises new methodological problems, because the units of analysis and the units of reference appear definitely as what they are (and always have been): inextricably entangled. Some aspects of this fourth challenge will be treated explicitly in the next section of this chapter.

Strengthening the conceptual fundament for transnational research Based on the aforementioned challenges and desiderata of transnational studies, four proposals will be made in this section. First, differentiation criteria between units of analysis, units of reference and units of measurement will be proposed in order to make the characteristics of transnational studies, as opposed to cross-national comparison and world system or global studies, more distinct. Second, apart from the well-known problem of constructing appropriate units of analysis in social sciences, transnational studies must pay special attention to the challenge of finding the adequate (socio-spatial) units of reference. Third, the definition of a specific and narrowly bound concept of the terms ‘transnational’ and ‘transnationalism’ must be addressed to avoid using these terms as ‘catch-all categories’. Finally, the understanding of social or societal spaces has to be made more explicit so as not to replace traditional concepts such as ‘community’ or ‘society’ by another vague term. One crucial problem in the social sciences in general is the search for an adequate definition of ‘units of analysis’. In transnationalism studies this

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problem becomes even more obvious and virulent because often used traditional concepts of ‘container units of analysis’ (like the national society or nation-state-based social classes) will not work. In this volume, there are some interesting reflections on this problem, and proposals for defining appropriate units of analysis are made. Khagram and Levitt discuss the problem of finding clear definitions of ‘borders’ or ‘boundaries’, which are required or presupposed in order to look at transnational phenomena and units of analysis that are crossing or transgressing these borders and boundaries. Nina Glick Schiller and Ayse Cagˇ lar question the notion of ethnic groups as adequate and exclusive units of analysis for transnational studies. Instead, taking the example of religious groups analysed at city level they discuss individual migrants, networks, organisations and social fields (the latter as ‘networks of networks’) as possible units of analysis. All the chapters of the first half of this volume stress the necessity to look for adequate units of analysis or units of reference for transnational studies. One possibility is to question units traditionally ‘taken for granted’ to relativise their boundaries, or to underscore their permeability. A second possibility – that will be developed in the following section – is to reflect upon the relations between units of analysis, units of reference and units of measurement more explicitly. This seems to be an essential endeavour in further developing the conceptual framework of the specific nature of transnational studies in a narrow sense. Transnational studies in a broader sense could be understood as all research focusing on border crossing and pluri-local objects of study. But in a programmatic way, the term ‘transnational studies’ will be developed here in a narrow and specific understanding of transnational societal spaces as units of reference. We define ‘units of analysis’ as the theoretical-analytical entities about which a scientific statement is made. In an investigation entitled ‘The fragmented identities of rural-urban Mexican migrants in Mexico-City during the 1990s’, the fragmented identities would represent the units of analysis – whatever the operationalisation of the theoretical-analytical concept of fragmented identities would look like. In this example, the term ‘rural-urban Mexican migrants’ would indicate the units of measurement as those entities to which the data collection would be related. Finally, the expression ‘in Mexico-City during the 1990s’ would point to the spatial-temporal unit of reference that relates to the scientific statements.5 Differentiation between units of analysis, units of reference and units of measurement is useful for distinguishing systematically between different types of international research, namely international comparison, world system or global studies and transnational studies (see Table 1.1 with nonexhaustive examples for units of analysis and units of measurement). In the traditional case of international or cross-national comparison, the units of reference are the given or taken for granted nation states or national societies. The units of analysis could range from social classes to rituals, from social institutions to organizations, or from concepts of labour to religious orientations and practices. Ultimately, the units of measurement could be

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Table 1.1 Types of international studies

Units of reference

Units of analysis

Units of measurement

Cross-national Comparison

World System Research

Transnational Studies

nation states, national societies, boundary-fixed containers social classes, values, institutions, identity

macro regions, world system, entire globe

border crossing, pluri-local, societal spaces

Centre–periphery structures of social classes, values

individuals, households, rituals, texts, practices

flows of goods and information, organisations

biographies, families, organisations, institutions, identity individuals, households, rituals, flows of goods

individuals, households, for-profit/non-profit organisations, movies, newspapers, certain products, special ceremonies (like weddings), and so on. Whereas, in the case of cross-national comparison, the national societies are taken as the ‘quasi natural’ units of reference, in macro-regional, global or world system studies the unit of reference is extended so as to include a greater region (like Europe, the Asia-Pacific-rim or Latin America) or the world as a whole. In this case, the units of analysis could be the same as in the case of the cross-national comparison, now focusing, for instance, on a longitudinal perspective on changes in time. An example could be a study about ‘Shifts in courtly life in Medieval Europe from the fourteenth to the seventeenth century’ (given the fact that nation states and national societies in the modern sense did not exist at that time in the open-boundary macroregion of Europe). As an alternative to diachronic cuts through macroregions or the entire globe, with the same units of analysis as those used in cross-national studies, there is also the possibility of creating socio-spatial (configurations of) units of analysis, such as the centre–periphery figure, and combining these with the aforementioned units of analysis. The work of Immanuel Wallerstein (1974) is a good example of the embedding of the social-class category not in ‘national containers’ but in centre-periphery circles. The units of measurement could be the same as those in crossnational comparisons, but often flows of goods and information, or the spread and structure of economic and other organisations, are the focus of world system studies. In the case of cross-national research, methodological nationalism is prevalent and obvious, but for traditional regional and world system studies the globe as a whole is divided into concentric circles and geographic spaces that are mutually exclusive with midpoints of repulsion. In both cases –

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cross-national comparison and world-system studies – the time-space related units of reference are basically rooted in absolutist concepts of space and in the ‘double binding’ and mutual exclusiveness of geographic space and social space: (1) in one geographic-spatial unit (like the territory of a nation state) there is place for just one social-spatial unit (like a national society); and, (2) each social-spatial unit needs just one geographic-spatial unit. In social sciences in general, the units of reference have long been conceptualised as contiguous and (related to the social spaces inside this geographic unit) relatively homogeneous geographic units (as compared to the socio-spatial differences between various geographic units). During the 1990s scholars such as Saskia Sassen (1991) began to questions this classical model, arguing that, for instance, global cities could combine the very centre and the real periphery in just one geographic place. At the same time the units of analysis and the units of reference became more complex, as they could be divided among different geographic places or plots in completely dissimilar socio-cultural regions, as in the case of international for-profit and non-profit organisations. In this way, the relation between social spaces and geographical spaces became more complex. In transnational studies the units of measurement could be quite the same as in crossnational research – even if, empirically, the analysis of flows of social practices, flows of symbols and flows of artefacts are more frequently observed. The units of analysis in transnational studies are most frequently biographies, families, organisations, institutions and identities. The units of reference, by definition, are considered as pluri-local and geographically dispersed, distributed and non-contiguous, but socially more or less homogeneous and coherent societal units. But how could these transnational societal spaces, such as border crossing and pluri-local units of reference, be defined and identified? This is an epistemologically challenging question. In the case of cross-national research, the units of reference are taken for granted as nation states and national societies. These are defined by referring to one social unit within one geographical unit, as could be confirmed in practically all dictionaries or encyclopaedias of Sociology. To cite an example: in the HarperCollins Dictionary of Sociology (Jary/Jary 1991: 467) the term ‘Society’ is defined as, ‘1. the totality of human relationships. 2. any self-perpetuating human grouping occupying a relatively bounded territory, having its own more or less distinctive CULTURE and INSTITUTIONS, for example, a particular people such as the Nuer or a long- or well-established NATION-STATE, such as the United States or Britain’ (capitalisation retained from the original). Shmuel Eisenstadt (2004: 25) refers to this dominant view and argues: many of sociology’s basic images refer to Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft. And Gemeinschaft is the nation-state. When people talk about the Gemeinschaft, the image of the Gemeinschaft they have, unless it is a tribe, is the nation state. Other types of Gemeinschaften have not really

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been studied except esoteric kleine Gemeinschaften. So the difficulty for sociologists is to free themselves of the implicit assumption that any society means nation state. While sociologists were used to having to construct their units of analysis by theoretical-analytical reasoning, they generally took the units of reference as given. This is no longer the ‘natural’ or adequate approach. Peter Mandaville, citing James Clifford and George Marcus, points to this problem as the crucial issue of social sciences: There is no longer any place overview (mountaintop) from which to map human ways of life … Mountains are in constant motion. So are islands: for one cannot occupy, unambiguously, a bounded cultural world from which to journey out and analyze other cultures. Human ways of life increasingly influence, dominate, parody, translate, and subvert one another. Cultural analysis is always enmeshed in global movements of difference and power. How [then] … can ethnography – at home or abroad – define its object of study in ways that permit detailed, local, contextual analysis and simultaneously the portrayal of global implicating forces?’ I take this to be the central problem of the social sciences at the present time. (Mandaville 2001: 29) The problem of how to define the units of analysis, reference and measurement (called altogether ‘object of study’ here) is exactly one of the most challenging questions for transnational studies. In the case of world-system studies the unit of reference is just expanded to the maximum (in the geographical sense of the globe and/or in the theoretical sense of Wallerstein’s functionally integrated system, or of Luhmann’s ‘possible reach of communication’). For transnational studies, this way of treating the relations between societal and geographic spaces is not adequate. A first step in dealing with this problem is – as proposed above – to distinguish explicitly between units of reference, units of analysis and units of measurement, and to reflect on the theoretical-analytical construction of the units of reference in the case of transnational studies. A second step is to reflect on how to construct adequate units of reference for analysing transnational societal spaces. Recalling the fundamental epistemological considerations of John Stuart Mill (1860[1843]) about the scientific methods of comparison, these transnational units of reference should comply with the following conditions. First, the similarities of relevant variables or characteristics within the transnational unit of reference should be considerable in comparison to the similarities in other (local, national, regional or global) units of reference. In order to identify a transnational societal space in the context of labour migration, the similarities in money spending and household economies of those units of measurement (e.g. individuals, households), possibly ascribed

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to this transnational space, should be greater than the common features of money spending and household economies at a local or national level. Second, the differences between the transnational societal unit of reference and the local, national, regional or global units of reference are considerable in comparison to the differences between the local, national or regional units of reference. Concerning the example of transnational labour migration, money spending and household economies in transnational societal spaces should differ significantly from the corresponding patterns in local, national or regional units of reference. Third, strengthening the conceptual foundation for transnational studies concerns the differentiation between transnational and other types of international relations and characteristics. In order to develop a specific and empirically useful approach on transnationalism, generally societal spaces are considered transnational only if they differ from other types of international and transnational relations and conform with the following criteria: the distribution of resources, culture, interests and power is polycentric and not monocentric; and, the relations and coordination between the different nations spanning local subunits are strong, dense and durable. This sets transnational societal spaces apart from, for instance, simple multinational societal spaces in which the distribution is polycentric but coordination is only weak, and from monocentric societal spaces where coordination mechanisms could be strong but distribution is centre–periphery-like rather than homogeneous (Pries 2005). In this sense, the proposed concept of transnational societal space is narrower than the rather unspecific terms ‘transnational network’ or ‘transnational field’, as used by Glick Schiller and Cagˇ lar (in this volume). Using these defining criteria it is possible, for instance, to distinguish a transnational migration family from a simple emigration/immigration, return migration or Diaspora migration family. In the immigration/emigration case, the ongoing coordination mechanisms for resources (like sending remittances), for culture (such as making transnational phone calls once a week or sending letters), for interests (like going to school or having a stable working career) and for power relations (such as the competency to decide over who goes where and when), become more and more centred in the society of arrival. In the case of return migrants all these aspects are strongly centred and focused on the society of departure. In contrast, actual transnational migration and the corresponding transnational societal spaces span more or less homogeneously and without a clear centre or point of reference between different locales, countries or regions. Gipsy families, and clans and organisations like Attac or McKinsey, could come near to this ideal type. But many durable and dense border crossing societal spaces are not transnational but come close to a type of Diaspora migration. In this case, the borderspanning activities are ‘anchored’ in an imagined and/or in a physically existing ‘promised land’. Fourth, an element in strengthening the transnationalism studies approach refers to the concept of social, respectively, societal spaces itself. If ‘society’

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and ‘community’ are problematic or misleading terms — as mentioned above by Shmuel Eisenstadt — for representing the only or unquestioned social units in times of global changes, the concept of societal spaces could be a promising approach for qualifying transnational societal units. Social spaces, understood and perceived as human-life relations, generally comprise three different dimensions, analogous to the x, y and z axes of social life. First, social spaces always contain the social practice dimension as the active examination and working by actors with other people, with nature and with oneself. All three relations (human–nature, human–human and ego–self) are constitutive and indispensable for any form of human lifepractice. By definition, these relations imply an expansion in space and time and refer to the active and intervening side of human life entanglements. Work (in the form of hunting, constructing dwellings, sowing and reaping corn, baking bread, building machines, preparing food, etc.) has been the most important social practice in the human–nature relation for millions of years, but it also always encompassed the human–human and the ego–self relation. In the transition to the knowledge and information society, work increasingly takes on an intermediary role between human–nature, human– human and ego–self relations. Additionally, however, informing, recounting, loving, representing and thinking have all been genuine parts of social practice since humans’ anthropogenesis from the ape and encompass all three human-life relations. Second, social spaces always include the dimension describing the presence and effectiveness of symbol systems, i.e. of complex frameworks of significant symbols. In this sense, symbols are not simply to be understood as sensory inputs, just as, for example, certain light-waves are registered on the retina as signs for the colour red or green, or as the temperature of a fluid or object is registered by the skin as a sign of warmth or cold. Rather, a symbol is a complex sign for and in a context. It represents a mode of giving sense to social practice and of structuring social practice by meaningful behaviour. A symbol is primarily conditioned not by a ‘natural situation’ but rather by culture. Significant symbols evoke the same connotation in differing agents living within the same cultural context. For example, in north-western European social spaces, a wedding ring represents a very complex context of an enduring (and up until the twentieth century) heterosexual relationship based upon mutual affection and free will, approved by religious institutions and by the state. The relative importance of certain symbol systems (e.g. characters, movies, funeral rituals) can vary tremendously. Language is a very complex, universal and indeed constitutive symbol system in human social spaces. Finally, the third dimension, which encompasses all social practices, comprises the production and use of artefacts. This includes all objectified results stemming from human action – especially human work. As objects formed by humans, artefacts are also always the result of the active human–nature relation. However, the two other human acquirement relations – the human–

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human and the ego–self relation – cannot be separated. Crafting a spear for hunting, forging a ring and preparing a meal are results of and aimed at all three human-life relations. Certain social theories are almost completely blind regarding the importance of artefacts from human beings’ social world and social spaces. For example, in Luhmann’s system theory artefacts are not ascribed the deserved systematic consideration when compared with social practices and symbol systems. It should therefore be stressed that the two other dimensions of social spaces – social practices and symbol systems – cannot be understood without making systematic reference to artefacts. In distinguishing social practices, symbols and artefacts as the three constitutive dimensions of dense and durable societal spaces with ‘relations of entanglement’ (Verflechtungsbeziehungen in terms of Norbert Elias), at least three ideal types of societal spaces could be identified as relevant for transnational studies: everyday life, organisations and institutions. When developing his concept of everyday life, Alfred Schütz differentiated between two ideal types of the social: the social environment (soziale Umwelt) and the social co-world (soziale Mitwelt) of human beings. According to Schütz, social environment denotes the immediately perceived world as simultaneity of space, time and the co-presence of a ‘you’-perspective. It is a world in which ‘I focus upon the conscious experiences of others by my own vivid and open awareness’ (Schütz 1993: 202). The social environment is therefore oriented towards the alter ego, towards my fellow humans. Alfred Schütz distinguishes between the social environment and the social co-world as follows: Beyond this social environment which connects me to the community in time and space, further social spheres exist. Some, I currently experience because they were formerly my environment and I can (at least in principle) always make them my environment. Others which were never part of my environment and of which I could therefore have no experience, represent possible experiences. Let us call these social regions the social co-world. (Ibid.: 202) Schütz constantly stresses the importance of the simultaneity of space and time for the social environment: ‘The spatial and temporal immediacy is fundamental for the environmental situation’ (ibid: 228). In my opinion, this is where, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, fundamentally new developments arise. Modern transport and communication infrastructures available to broad population groups today makes ‘conscious experiences of others by my own vivid and open awareness’ possible even across long geospatial distances. Thus, social environments can span across several spaces pluri-locally and transnationally more easily than, for example, a century ago. The term ‘more easily’ is meant to imply that pluri-local and boundarytransgressing social spaces have already existed to a certain extent – as in the

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form of the millennia-old church and monastery tradition and the even older Jewish Diaspora (cf. Smith 1997). Apart from everyday life on a micro-level, organisations represent a second ideal type of societal spaces. They may be defined as relatively durable interaction-frameworks (of people) with membership rules (who belongs and who doesn’t belong to the organisation), deliberately established structures and processes of division of labour (who has to do what), rules and rituals of behaviour (what is accepted and expected behaviour and what is not), power (who says what is to be done and who reports to whom) and planned and variable goals and ends. Whilst organisations as ideal typical societal spaces are situated on a meso-level, societal institutions represent the macro-level of societal spaces. They can be understood as inherited frameworks of routines, rules, norms and mutual expectations, which structure specific areas of human life and offer action programmes, identities, integration and stability for relatively expansive interaction-networks (e.g. societies, communities, ethnicities, organisations etc. Examples: heterosexual matrimony, professions, fifteenth-birthday festivity).

Transnationalism studies – central issues and new proposals The contributions in this volume relate to the conceptual definitions and proposals for developing transnational studies, which have been presented in the preceding section, and represent substantial contributions to the ongoing debates. The first half concentrates on résumés and proposals of outstanding international scholars of transnationalism and migration studies. The second half integrates theoretical and empirical studies of specialists from a broad spectrum of disciplines, which apply the transnationalism approach to different areas of transnational organisations. Transnational phenomena and transnationality are not novelties ascribed to the twentieth or twenty-first century. Contrary to some transnationalism scholars who stressed or are stressing the ‘newness’ of their field of study, many historians argued that transnationality is as old as nations and national societies themselves (Morawska 1998; Osterhammel 2001; Patel 2004). Khagram and Levitt (in this volume) reaffirm this argument, distinguishing systematically between transnationality as social matters of fact and transnationalism or transnational studies as the scientific reflections on such societal reality and phenomena. The general notion of transnationalism is used for the ‘real phenomenon’ of transnational practices, symbols and artefacts, and could be defined as ‘a set of sustained, border-crossing connections’ (Vertovec 2003b: 3); however, Khagram and Levitt use this term and the term ‘transnational studies’ in the narrower sense of the specific scientific endeavour and perspective on social reality. In order to develop an integrated and interdisciplinary view on this field Khagram and Levitt distinguish between five different intellectual cornerstones of transnationalism: empirical transnationalism as the field of

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empirical research about transnational phenomena and dynamics, methodological transnationalism as the effort to reclassify existing data and develop innovative research designs and methods, theoretical transnationalism as the search for new scientific interpretations and theoretical frameworks (sometimes reconstructed from or completing existing theories and sometimes forming new theoretical constructs which compete with existing paradigms), philosophical transnationalism as fundamental and epistemological reasoning that social life is first and foremost transnational in nature and, finally, public transnationalism as the discursive arena where (normative) options for (transnational) life and social spaces could be detected, developed and discussed. After this stimulating invitation to an interdisciplinary streaming of the transnationalism studies field, based on empirical fieldwork in the USA and Germany, Glick Schiller and Cag˘ lar start their chapter questioning the normally taken for granted category of ‘ethnic group’. In order to conceptualise a framework for the study of migration, settlement and trans-border connection, they focus on the role of the location of settlement in the migrant incorporation processes.6 According to this, the main indicator of incorporation is to be seen in the participation of an individual in personal or organisational, formal or informal networks and the access to social fields provided by these networks. The significance of these social fields is based on their ‘capacity to command scarce resources’. With this proposal, Glick Schiller and Cag˘ lar open empirical, theoretical and methodological transnationalism in a very interesting manner: there is no longer a need (like in classical integration studies) to define neither the interesting and/or most important dimensions of incorporation nor the locations of specific groups nor their ethnic ascription ex ante. Rather, the transnationalism researcher can explore the dimensional significance and local reach or scope of local, national and transnational relations by following the network ties of individuals. Relevant resources to be included could be money, employment, social recognition or prestige; also, identifying the units of analysis is part of the research outcome, not its input. In terms of the proposal made here to differentiate units of analysis, units of reference and units of measurement, taking individuals as units of measurement and their networks as units of reference, Glick Schiller and Cag˘ lar could inductively construct their units of analysis by looking for different modes of incorporation (like politics or religion) without changing their research in accordance with assumptions about the existence of ethnic communities or ethnic identities. Taking the dense and diversified transnational networks and governance structures, as outlined by Federico Besserer, and the transnational pathways and mechanisms of incorporation, as developed by Glick Schiller and Cag˘ lar, an important question develops, leading directly to the chapter written by Thomas Faist: Would it be possible to make use of these transnational connections of people for the economic, social, cultural and/or political development of societies? Faist argues that transnational ties and

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flows deriving from international migration have definitely increased in the last decades in absolute and relative volume; they have also increased in their forms, such as economic remittances, knowledge and human-capital impacts in the region of migrant departure, or in ‘political remittances’ as ideas and knowledge of the principles of law, good governance or human rights. This emerging issue of transnational social ties and flows of remittances still has not been included into the general strategic outlines of international bodies such as the United Nations – it is worth considering more systematically the relationship between communities, the state and the market as three important ‘principles of how social order is produced’. Faist differentiates between the constituencies and action logics of communities – the state and the market – and he proposes a theoretical frame of reference that could be combined with the notions of units of analysis, units of reference and units of measurement. While all three ideal types could be used as theoretical-analytical units of analysis, states could also function as sociospatial units of reference. Markets, on the contrary, are similar to the world system figure as more or less globally spanning logics and mechanisms of social order. Communities (as defined by Faist) as integrated upon the principles of trust, reciprocity, loyalty and solidarity are quite amorphous units of research that have to be defined as units of analysis in order to define more explicitly the corresponding units of measurement and units of reference. Whereas Faist concentrates on community, markets, and the state as three types of social order, another very important type of social order or societal space is organisation. The topic of transnational organisations is at the very centre of the second half of this book. In the following section, some general aspects of these contributions are resumed.

Can transnational organisations be the micro–macro link in transnational studies? During the last twenty years or so, transnational studies developed strongly in anthropology and sociology, but also in other scientific disciplines such as economics, political science and history. But until now, only in the field of economics was the meso-level unit of analysis of organisations addressed systematically. Most social scientists, especially anthropologists and sociologists, focused either on the micro-level (i.e. on individuals, households and their social networks) or on the macro-level (i.e. on social institutions, governance or migration systems). All chapters of the first half of this volume try to overcome this micro-macro schism, including Glick Schiller’s and Cag˘ lar’s chapter, which focuses on the meso-level of ethnic groups and the scale of cities, and Faist’s chapter, which, starting with a macro-level distinction of community, state and market as social orders and institutions, arrives at a more meso-level oriented notion of communities. In organisation studies – as well as in economics and management or economic sociology – a long tradition of theoretical and empirical research

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about international (that is, border crossing in a general sense) organisations exists. This branch of research first concentrated on profit-organisations, but, following the massive emergence of non-profit and non-governmental social movements and organisations in the international arena during the last twenty years or so, a broad variety of literature on all types of international and transnational organisations has emerged. One general aspect that transnational studies, in the Khagram and Levitt sense, could adopt from these organisation studies is the differentiation between ideal types of international organisations, according to their structure of resource distribution and coordination mechanisms. Organisations with internationally decentralised resources (e.g. investments, employment, production facilities, research and development) and weak coordination features (control and communication direction and intensity, e.g. of a ‘centre’ over ‘peripheral’ sites) are usually referred to as multinational organisations. Organisations with centralised resources and strong coordination are generally referred to as global organisations. Organisations with centralised resources and weak coordination patterns are frequently called international or focal organisations. In this framework, transnational organisations are characterised by their decentralised resources and, at the same time and opposite to multinational organisations, intense coordination. Therefore, transnational organisations could be understood as highly decentralised and border-crossing pluri-locally distributed and, at the same time, intensely coordinated, stable and dense cooperation frameworks with membership rules, deliberately established and variable structures, as well as more or less explicit goals and intentions. Since approximately fifteen years ago, transnational organisations have become more and more of an issue in organisational research. This is due, on the one hand, to increasingly complex and internationally spanned production and value chains of goods and services and, on the other hand, to the emergence of important transnationally active non-profit organisations with more or less decentralised resource structures and, at the same time, effective and strong coordination patterns (such as Greenpeace, Attac and Oxfam). International for-profit and non-profit organisations are all confronted with the challenge to ‘square the circle’: On the one hand, optimal decentralisation and adaptation to local conditions are necessary, while on the other hand, optimal generalisation of knowledge and resources is also a requirement (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Doz et al. 2001). Using such a narrow and specific definition of transnational organisations, the chapters of the second half of this volume all focus on measuring the existence and extent of this ideal characterisation of transnational organisations in a broad range of nonprofit organisations. Dennis Dijkzeul analyses international humanitarian NGOs, and concretely presents the case of Malteser International’s work in the Democratic Republic of Congo. He argues that international humanitarian aid organisations have to adapt smoothly to the specific circumstances, conditions, power relations, norms and values and ways of doing things in sometimes

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very local contexts. However, these organisations have a responsibility to their donors and supporters in other countries, and they have to coordinate their local activities, for example in the DR Congo, with other internationally active NGOs, with national governments and with international organisations. The chapter presents the state of research in this specific sector of international organisations and asks whether Malteser International comes close to the ideal type of a transnational organisation. In general, until now there are not very many scientific studies on the topic of international aid organisations, and even fewer scientific studies oriented towards the aforementioned contradicting needs and challenges of international aid organisations. Another important area of transnational organisational studies refers to international women’s networks and issue-centred organisations. Starting with the groundbreaking study of Keck and Sikkink (1998) about transnational advocacy networks, Ilse Lenz argues that many transnational women’s networks could be characterised as issue networks. They are flexible and quite horizontally organised, and follow the logic of issue-development instead of interest orientation. Analysing two concrete case studies (the Latin American and Caribbean Women’s Health Network and the Network on Violence against Women in Asia), the author concludes that it is difficult to view transnational women’s networks as transnational organisations in the sense of the above outlined ideal typical characteristics (decentralised resource distribution and strong pluri-local coordination). International women’s networks often have a clear centre-periphery structure or are very weakly coordinated. Whereas in the case of international women’s networks and organisations a body of literature now exists, in the field of international educational organisations the state of scientific knowledge is similar to the field of international aid organisations – that is, there are only few studies referring to the transnational dimension, even if the term ‘transnational education’ has recently become quite popular. Christel Adick starts by distinguishing between national, international and transnational educational spaces as units of reference, characterised by their corresponding mode of regulation or decision-making and their framework of reference for legitimacy. These transnational educational social spaces consist of individual actors and their social practice, of network relations and of (in-)formal groups and organisations. The author distinguishes between four different subtypes of transnational educational spaces: the education and socialisation of individuals into transnational social spaces, the transnational educational advocacy by international or transnational NGOs, the border crossing educational programmes, practices and institutions not pertaining to any national educational system, and the transnational educational corporate business organisations. Analysing, in more detail, four transnational corporate business organisations (Jones International University, University of Phoenix, Sylvan Learning Systems, and German University of Cairo) Adick concludes that transnational educational organisations still play a minor role as

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compared to international or national educational spaces and organisations. Transnational educational organisations will expand in the future, but be concentrated in the spaces outside the compulsory educational systems. The challenge to develop towards a truly transnational organisation stems from the need, on the one hand, to circulate knowledge, programmes, contents and people transnationally and, on the other hand, to adapt to the corresponding national and regional environments and institutions in order to attain legitimacy and recognition. Another area of research into the possible emergence of transnational organisations is the broad field of international interest organisations within international companies. A unique example is the institution of European Works Councils (EWC) as international non-profit organisations regulating labour related interests in Europe-wide active for-profit organisations. EWCs were introduced by the European Council in 1994 as a new interest mediation mechanism at the European level. Their legal basis is a complex multilevel framework of supranational European law, inter-national treaties, national implementation law and transnational agreements, all at the company level. A further major characteristic is their quality as European law-based nonprofit organisations working with and embedded in and towards national law-based for-profit organisations. Even taking into account that only about one third of all companies falling under the EWC directive actually have a EWC, their importance and impact for labour regulation at a transnational level should not be underestimated: they represent a total of about 17 million employees and workers across the entire European Union. The corresponding last chapter in this volume by Ludger Pries first presents a brief history of the emergence of EWC as a new type of organisation. It then goes on to present some empirical findings and the state of empirical research about EWC, stating that the corresponding studies focus on an industrial-relations approach and a capital–labour view. In a third step, an alternative perspective is proposed to view the EWC as a special type of international non-profit organisation, and a distinction is made between global, focal, multinational and transnational organisations. Finally, some hypotheses on the spread, conditions and dynamics of transnational EWC are developed.

Outlook: organisations as a new research field of transnationalism Both the first and second half of this volume suggest that transnationalism and transnational studies could gain a lot from the organisational research approach on transnational organisations as a micro–macro link. Between the micro-level research topics such as everyday life, identity, migrant families and mobility on the one hand, and units of analysis such as border crossing transnational migration systems or governance structures, societal institutions that structure transnationality, citizenship and value chains on the other hand, lies the perspective of meso-level units of analysis such as

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(transnational) organisations. Broadening the focus towards transnational organisations could integrate other scientific disciplines, such as economics, organisation research or sociology of organisations. At the same time, the organisational perspective invites interdisciplinary research between historians, sociologists, psychologists, anthropologists, economists, political scientists, lawyers and others. Developing the organisational perspective in transnational studies could definitely help to cope with the challenges that the study of transnationalism faces. In organisational research a long tradition of differentiating between transnational and other types of international organisations such as multinational, global or focal exists. For the field of transnational studies, this tradition facilitates a precise and narrow concept of transnationalism and transnationality, thus avoiding the argument that transnationalism converts into just a new fashion and catch-all term, replacing global and globalisation. The organisational approach is also helpful in reflecting on the relation between geographic and societal space more explicitly. As long as all types of international organisations are societal units distributed over different geographic locales, the problem of reflecting on the interrelations between the social and the spatial is inevitable. Another advantage of concentrating on organisations is based on their ‘operationalibility’. Organisations are defined by more or less explicit structures and boundaries, as indicated by the membership criteria. This makes it easier to define who belongs to an organisation and who does not. At the same time, there is a long tradition of developing and testing the instruments in order to characterise and measure the structures of organisations (e.g. Scott 2003). Ultimately, the organisational research tradition allows for comparisons of for-profit and non-profit organisations, thus integrating different streams of transnational studies, such as economic or sociological analysis of corporate business and for-profit organisations on the one hand, and anthropological, sociological or political analysis of non-profit organisations on the other hand. In summary, a lot of theoretical and empirical research still has to be done to explore the field of transnationality. The contributions of this volume add some valuable knowledge on the conditions, forms and impacts of transnational societal spaces; they also make many conceptual proposals for analysing transnational societal spaces and for coping with the theoretical challenges of transnationality. In future research, the organisational perspective in the transnational studies field still has to be integrated, exploited and developed adequately. Furthermore, the transnational debate on transnational studies still has to be organised in the most integrative way possible.

Notes 1 Portes et al. 1999, Levitt 2001a, Vertovec 2004, the authors of the special volumes of Ethnic and Racial Studies No. 22 (2003): 2 and of International Migration

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2 3

4 5 6

Ludger Pries Review No. 37 (2003): 3 (especially Vertovec 2003a and Levitt et al. 2003), as well as many contributions to Global Networks, Journal of Transnational Affairs, and explicitly the authors of the first part of this volume. For an overview of the series see http://www.routledge.com/politics/series_list.asp? series=18. The terms social spaces and societal spaces are used in this chapter with a synonymous meaning and just for a literal variety and change; they will be defined more explicitly in the second section of this chapter. In a strict sense, ‘societal’ is the more comprehensive term, including social, economic, cultural, political, etc. aspects or dimensions. In earlier publications (e.g. Pries 1999 and 2001) I used only the term ‘social space’, but in its extensive meaning of societal space. In order to underline its broad and sociological scope it is interchanged here with the more precise but linguistically more ‘unwieldy’ term societal space. For the use of terms like international, transnational, multinational, supranational, etc. see Pries 2005 and the second section of this chapter. For a similar distinction see Friedrichs 1978. Concerning the concept of incorporation see also Glick Schiller 2003 and Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004; in Pries 2003a and 2003b this term is developed explicitly against the notions of assimilation and integration.

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Constructing transnational studies Sanjeev Khagram and Peggy Levitt1

Social life crosses, transcends and even transforms borders and boundaries in myriad ways. Social movements mobilize constituencies around the globe on issues such as human rights, gender justice, and family values campaigns. Many adherents of pan-Muslim, Hindu, Christian, and other faith-based movements value their religious membership more than their national or racial allegiances. Economies are organized around trans-continental investment, manufacturing, and consumption chains. Associations set common standards for professionals working around the world. Hip-hop “heads” in Gugulettu and Rio draw inspiration from their Los Angeles counterparts. Tandoori chicken is one of the best-selling snacks in London. And migrants and non-migrants form thick, broad social networks that link those in sending communities to people in communities of reception. The destruction of the World Trade Center, one of the most potent symbols of global capitalism, by members of the cross-border Al Qaeda terrorist network is a striking example of the “transnational” nature of the world.2 While the U.S. government’s response was to re-assert the primacy of the nation-state, even a superficial analysis reveals that various transnational phenomena and dynamics—money laundering and criminal networks, transgovernmental police coalitions, dispersed but linked diasporic communities, humanitarian civil society nongovernmental organizations, and multinational business initiatives—were at work pre- and post-September 11th. These ostensibly novel transnational phenomena have clear historical analogues. One need only think of colonialism and imperialism, missionary campaigns, anti-slavery and workers’ movements, pirating networks, and jazz. Indeed, human social formations and processes have always been transborder and trans-boundary to a significant degree. Even contemporary nation-states and the nation-state system have been transnationally constituted and shaped over time and space in powerful ways. It is no longer enough, if it ever was, to only compare experiences within or across presumably bounded or closed societies or social units, whether they be localities, regions, nation-states, empires, or world systems. The forms and processes of transnationality are the focus of a burgeoning yet fragmented body of scholarship undertaken across the social sciences.3

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But the researchers working in these areas do not generally see themselves as part of the same conversation. There is thus tremendous value and potential in defining a field of Transnational Studies (TS). Not all of the scholars we include in this field identify with or agree with our intellectual agenda and, if they do, they are likely to disagree over its intellectual foundations. These differences, however, are as important to the vitality and prospects for transnational scholarship as are the areas of overlap and agreement. Based on an ongoing in-depth survey of scholarship to date, Transnational Studies includes at least five intellectual foundations: 1. Empirical transnationalism focuses on describing, mapping, classifying and quantifying novel and/or potentially important transnational phenomena and dynamics. These transnational processes are understood to be derivative of or stand in contrast to bounded and bordered units, actors, structures and processes that are generally associated with the local, regional, global or the nation-state system. TS use comparativehistorical and ethnographic strategies to identify and explain similarities, differences, linkages and interactions among different transnational phenomena. It also examines the differences between transnational and bounded forms and processes across space and over time. 2. Methodological transnationalism involves, at a minimum, reclassifying existing data, evidence, and historical and ethnographic accounts that are based on bounded or bordered units so that transnational forms and processes are revealed. Even more so, it requires creating and implementing novel research designs and methodologies generating new types of data, evidence and observations that more accurately and rigorously capture transnational realities. This often requires utilizing non-traditional or multiple units of inquiry, levels of analysis, and time frames. 3. Theoretical transnationalism formulates explanations and crafts interpretations that either parallel, complement, supplement or are integrated into existing theoretical frameworks and accounts. In some cases, theories generated by TS complement conventional theories by identifying and explaining previously obscured kinds of phenomena and dynamics. In others, transnational theories elucidate some aspects of these forms and processes better than traditional theories. Transnational theories may also compete with explanations of phenomena and dynamics previously theorized in local, national, international or global terms. Finally, transnational accounts might be integrated with conventional explanations, which combined, produce more compelling theoretical accounts. 4. Philosophical transnationalism starts from the metaphysical assumption that social worlds and lives are inherently transnational. In other words, transnational phenomena and dynamics are the rule rather than the exception, the underlying reality rather than a derivative by-product. Such a view requires an epistemological lens or way of researching, theorizing and understanding social relations that allows analysts to uncover

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and explain the transnational dynamics in which bounded and bordered entities are embedded and by which the latter are constituted. Any explanation or interpretation that does not identify and explicate the proximate or deeper transnational forms and processes involved would be incomplete. This does not mean that TS does not enter into conversation with other philosophies of knowledge. On the contrary, it is purposefully framed to encourage encounters and exchanges with other perspectives from the positivist to the interpretivist to the constructivist. 5. Public transnationalism creates space to imagine and legitimate options for social change and transformation that are normally obscured, by purposefully abandoning the expectation that most social processes are bounded and bordered. By letting go of this assumption, questions and problems can be reframed and innovative approaches may come to light. The first three pillars of TS are fairly common in the scholarly literature. The last two are less well represented because they challenge conventional paradigms and praxis more fundamentally, moving beyond dominant forms of scholarship, philosophical assumptions, and prescriptive orientations. In the next section, we begin to differentiate transnational scholarship from existing perspectives and paradigms, distinctions we develop further throughout this article. We then lay out Transnational Studies’ five intellectual foundations. We conclude by summarizing our central arguments and proposing ways to transnationalize the social-science community to achieve this intellectual agenda.

Distinguishing transnational scholarship Transnational scholarship is not entirely new nor does it argue for a complete jettisoning of related research paradigms and perspectives. But, as Hannerz (1996) notes, it is a response to both strengths and weaknesses in contemporary scholarship: I am rather uncomfortable with the rather prodigious use of the term globalization to describe just about any process or relationship that somehow crosses state boundaries. In themselves, many such processes and relationships obviously do not at all extend across the world. The term “transnational” is in a way more humble, and often a more adequate label for phenomena which can be of quite variable scale and distribution, even when they do share the characteristic of not being contained within a state. It also makes the point that many of the linkages in question are not “international,” in the strict sense of (only) involving nations—actually, states—as corporate actors. In the transnational arena, the actors may now be individuals, groups, movements, business enterprises, and in no small part it is this diversity of organization we need to consider. (At the same time, there is a certain irony in

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Sanjeev Khagram and Peggy Levitt the tendency of the term transnational to draw attention to what it negates—that is, to the continued significance of the national.) (Hannerz 1996: 6)

This view, which we associate largely with empirical transnationalism, and thus only a step in the direction we wish to pursue, nonetheless provides an entry point into the potential distinctiveness of transnational scholarship. World systems and world society research, as well as more recent forays into globalization or global studies, have much to say about aspects of transnational forms and processes—particularly those that are transplanetary or at least transcontinental in scope. Few can deny the World System’s Perspective’s central role in intellectually de-centring the nation-state as the only independent or at least predominant organizing principle of social experience. Building on this premise, World Society scholars have compellingly argued that nation-states are constituted and conditioned by worldwide cognitive and ideational scripts accounting for a range of formal institutions and organizations otherwise poorly explained.4 But this “worldist” scholarship tends to equate all trans-border and transboundary phenomena with planetary integration and worldwide isomorphism. Structures and processes that are really quite different are depicted as comparable in strength and character wherever they register. Variations in scale and scope and the multi-directionality of flows and interactions are often overlooked. Even David Held who, along with his colleagues, has developed some of the most nuanced theoretical ideas and empirical analysis in this field, conceptualizes globalization as “a process (or set of processes) which embodies a transformation in the spatial organization of social relations and transactions … generating transcontinental or interregional flows and networks of activity, interaction, and the exercise of power” (Held et al. 1999: 1).5 Globalist scholarship then is often not fine-tuned enough to capture crossborder agents, structures, and interactions that are not all worldwide in scope. Furthermore, actors are often depicted as so heavily constrained that they cannot possibly react against these universalistic systemic forces. As Beverly Silver (2003) points out, for World Systems and World Society perspectives, “local attributes and behaviour are seen as the product of a unit’s location in the system. The larger system has a steamroller-like quality, transforming social relations at the local level along a theoretically expected path” (Silver 2003: 25–26). Perhaps most importantly, much worldist and globalist scholarship takes for granted the very existence of bounded or bordered social units—particularly the “world” or the “nation-state”—and the structures and processes associated within them.6 Research focusing on the local, meaning micro-territorial units with micro-cultural communities, also contributes a great deal to the elucidation of transnational phenomena and dynamics. Particularly in this age of globalization frenzy, this scholarship reminds us of the potential relative

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autonomy and enduring importance of other, personalized life-spaces. It drives home the importance of the socio-historical context and the danger of making universalistic generalizations that wash out critical shades of difference. It also demonstrates the continuing importance of individual agency, local knowledge, and cultural practices.7 But while these studies produce richly detailed accounts of local territorial and cultural spaces, they frequently overlook how broader social processes influence these localities. A great deal is learned about a particular site and a particular time but not enough about how the “local” is historically situated and connected to other levels and sites of social interaction. In contrast, a transnationally-oriented problematic answers the question so cogently framed by Arjun Appadurai, “What can locality mean in a world where spatial localization, quotidian interaction, and social scale are not always isomorphic?” (Appadurai 1996: 167).8 Moreover, a transnational lens conceptualizes the local or micro in non-territorial terms such as an economic development project, the “cell” of a broader criminal network or a link in a larger commodity chain. The field of TS does not assume away the importance of the global and local, or the nation-state system form.9, 10 But because the social sciences came of age in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, during an intense period of “national-state” growth and legitimization, terms like “society,” “government,” “citizenship,” “democracy,” and “culture” carry with them embedded nationalist assumptions that impair our capacity to grasp transnational forms and processes (Scott 1998; Lie 2004).11 For example, research on twentieth-century business development almost always uses comparative approaches which privilege the nation-state rather than focusing on firms and markets as parts of networks of investment, production, distribution, and exchange (White 2002; Fligstein 2001; Guillén 2002; Granovetter and Swedberg 1992).12 Studies of religion and politics have been similarly hampered, despite abundant evidence that movements as diverse as evangelical Protestantism, Roman Catholicism, freemasonry, trade unionism, and political progressivism ignore national boundaries and create powerful transnational communities and identities.13 A number of scholars have called into question the widespread view that the social is automatically organized into neat, nation-state containers (Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Sparke 2003; Braithwaite and Drahos 2000). Such a view obscures the many processes, relations, and institutions that predate, cross, and transform borders and boundaries. It also gives too much credence to the historically recent, uneven, and incomplete articulation of the nation-state system.14 Transnational Studies go even farther by advancing the claim that the global, regional, national, and local can be analyzed through transnational methodological, theoretical, and epistemological lenses. That is, in contrast to traditional perspectives, which see transnational phenomena and dynamics as a subset of those occurring somewhere between the national and the

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global, TS includes another, in some cases, more productive option. What are assumed to be bounded and bordered social units are understood as transnationally constituted, embedded and influenced social arenas that interact with one another.15 From this perspective, the world consists of multiple sets of dynamically overlapping and interacting transnational social fields that create and shape seemingly bordered and bounded structures, actors, and processes. Thus, the appellations “transnational” or “transnationalism” or “transnationality” are partly misnomers, in that they imply that the only things we are interested in includes dynamics across or beyond—whether over short distances or transcontinental—nations, states, or within the (nation-) state system. We mean much more by these terms. They are placeholder adjectives, categories, and signifiers that help describe social realities and dynamics, offer distinct perspectives on the world, generate shared sets of questions and puzzles, and suggest ways to answer them. Phenomena and dynamics that cross, transcend, and alter pre-national-state and potentially postnational state borders are also included. Also included are forms and processes that cross and transcend boundaries beyond those of nations and states. At present, everyday and scholarly language does a poor job capturing transnational dynamics. Nevertheless, a heuristically powerful set of ideas and options is emerging that helps to clarify TS both conceptually and analytically. These intellectual foundations call into question fundamental assumptions about a range of sociological concerns such as power, identity, race, governance, and production. In the following section, we elaborate these components of TS in greater detail.

Empirical transnationalism A first foundation for the emergent TS field involves the identification, description, mapping, quantification, and categorization of transnational phenomena and dynamics. Much of the scholarship on transnationalism to date addresses these tasks. Transnational economic processes and corporations, transnational social movements and nongovernmental organizations, and transnational migration and communities have received the bulk of attention.16 There are also growing empirical literatures on transnational misconduct and governance but less work on subjects such as transnational religion, popular culture, or social stratification.17 Identification and description are two essential tasks of Empirical Transnationalism. To be identified are a broad range of forms and processes such as transnational ethnic communities, religions, professional associations, and terrorist groups. TS also encompass discourses, material flows, cultural interactions, and artistic genres that are produced and exchanged across borders. A novel transnational capitalist class has emerged, according to Leslie Sklair, including executives of multinational corporations,

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globalizing bureaucrats and politicians, professionals, merchants, and media that promote the globalization of capitalism and an associated consumer culture (Sklair 2000).18 Mary Kaldor maps the transnational dynamics of “new wars” involving a range of non-state actors and processes including ethnic militias, hawala financing, and U.N. peace-keepers (Kaldor 2001). Jackie Smith and colleagues identified transnational social movements while Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink described transnational advocacy networks as sets of activists across at least three countries linked by shared principled ideas and dense exchanges of information (Smith et al. 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998). This descriptive work has generated useful generative classification systems. Consider the following typology of transnational collective actors categorized by their central motivation. Transnational corporations are organized around profit, social movements around moral values, epistemic communities around scientific ideas, professions around technical expertise and shared standards, and trans-governmental networks around common mandates (Khagram and Alvord 2006). These groups can then be sorted according to whether they employ physical violence. Like corporations, transnational criminal organizations are motivated by material gain but unlike their profit-seeking counterparts, they often use physical violence to achieve their goals.19 Like cross-border social movements, transnational terrorists are likely to be motivated by powerful principled ideas, but unlike their social movement counterparts, they often use violence to pursue them. Transnational scholarship often focuses on social forms and processes that are initially seen as novel or particularly important in the contemporary period. Data is assembled to demonstrate the dramatic increase in the numbers of transnational corporations, their expanding share of economic activity, and their growing capacity to shape social reality in various parts of the world. It is discovered that revolutionary and “ethnic” violent conflicts (most of which actually cross country borders or are “transnational” in other ways) far outnumbered inter-state wars between 1946 and 1999.20 Differences between transnational coalitions, networks and social movements constituted largely by nongovernmental or social movement organizations are identified (Khagram et al. 2002). The identities and memberships of transnational migrants are examined and documented (Smith 1998; Glick Schiller and Fouron 2002; Levitt 2001). These dynamics are understood to emerge from extant nations, states, nation-states, or the nation-state system. But as Roger Waldinger and David Fitzgerald rightfully note, transnational scholarship must be careful to not to reproduce “the familiar antinomies of social science, most notably that of a “closed” past and “open” present … ” (Waldinger 2004). Much of the work of empirical transnationalism has focused on phenomena that are or are understood to be by-products of the nation-state system which unnecessarily limits Transnational Studies’ potential analytical reach.

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Methodological transnationalism To empirically map and categorize transnational phenomena and dynamics as we have outlined requires new kinds of observations and new kinds of methods for collecting them. A second intellectual foundation of TS— methodological transnationalism—reformulates existing data and accounts, invents new kinds of information and evidence, applies existing investigative approaches in novel ways, and designs novel research tools and approaches with which to analyze, explain, and interpret transnational phenomena and dynamics. Most existing data sets, historiographies, and ethnographies make transnational analyses difficult if not impossible. They suffer from what is called “methodological nationalism” or the tendency to accept the nation-state form and even its contemporary borders as given. Many surveys are based on national-state units and are designed to make comparisons between countries. They are not intended to capture flows, linkages, or identities that cross or supersede other spatial units or the phenomena and dynamics within them. Understanding the regional identities generated in response to environmental crises, the trans-territorial underpinnings of organized crime, or the existence of transnational stratification systems is difficult because so few data lend themselves to these kinds of analyses. The researcher can only make inferences based on information from national (or other bounded) data sets that are unlikely to reveal transnational dynamics easily or cleanly. Transnational scholarship requires that data be collected on multiple units, scales and scopes of analysis.21 Saskia Sassen’s identification of the global city, Paul Gilroy’s conceptualization of the Black Atlantic, and Arjun Appadurai’s notion of scapes are all examples of this kind of research. While multi-sited and multi-level research is ideal for studying these interactions, transnational dynamics can also be investigated by asking interviewees about the cross-border aspects of their identities, beliefs, and activities, and those they are connected to, in a single setting (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). TS thus reorient researchers away from traditional geographies of inquiry toward queries about the actual topography of social life. Transnational scholarship also requires methods that can capture the complex temporalities in which particular dynamics or relations occur. Postmodern insights about time/space compression challenge expectations about the relationship between geography and history (Harvey 1989). Transnational scholarship builds upon these by employing life-cycle, crossgenerational, long durée, epiphenomenal, and cyclical types of temporal analyses (Braudel 1980; Eckstein and Barberia 2002). Transnational dynamics cannot be studied at one point in time because they involve multiple, interacting processes rather than single, bounded events. For example, because transnational practices ebb and flow over long periods, a one-time snap shot misses the many ways in which migrants periodically engage with their home countries during election cycles, family or

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ritual events, or climatic catastrophes—their attention and energies shifting in response to a particular goal or challenge. Studying migrant practices longitudinally reveals that in moments of crisis or opportunity, even those who have never identified or participated transnationally, but who are embedded in transnational social fields, may become mobilized into action (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). Moreover, what makes the outsourcing of many high-tech service jobs to Bangalore and other “high-tech” cities possible today is that when people are asleep in Silicon Valley, it is the workday in South Asia and visa versa. The fact that more and more South Asians have been educated and lead professional lives that cross borders over the last fifty years has also contributed to these changing economic arrangements. Finally, even a brief foray into history drives home the necessity of taking the long durée. Most of the contemporary territorially demarcated states did not even exist at the turn of the nineteenth century (Dussel 1998). In contrast to the current state of affairs in Iraq, Baghdad was the centre of a transcontinental regional political-economic field that existed in the ninth century. Beverly Silver’s research strategy for her book Forces of Labor on workers movements provides an exciting example of transnational methodological innovation. She begins by engaging both the “encompassing comparison” utilized in world historical work and long-standing comparative-historical methods for cross-national research. But, Silver argues, these methods are inherently limited. They impede the analysis of relations between and among allegedly separate units, they obscure local agency, and they are based on assumptions about the type, if not characteristics, of the bounded units of analysis, even though how these units are constructed and transformed is a critical piece of the analysis. In response, Silver uses a combined “incorporating comparison” research methodology and modified “narrative mode” of causal analysis to capture how relational processes in space unfold in and through time (Silver 2003).

Theoretical transnationalism Methodologically innovative research contributes to and is shaped by theory and theory building. A third intellectual foundation for the field of TS is to construct and test explanations and craft interpretations that parallel, complement, replace or transform existing theoretical accounts. Many scholars recognize transnational phenomena and have proposed theoretical accounts to explain them. Transnational theories interact with conventional theories in several ways. In some cases, they are parallel exercises because they interpret or explain different phenomena and dynamics. In other complementary cases, they do a better job at explaining some aspects of the phenomena under study while traditional theories are better at explaining others. Transnational theories also compete with accounts and models that are already well developed in local, national, international or global terms.

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Finally, transnational scholarship is sometimes used in combination with conventional conceptual frameworks to generate hybrid theoretical accounts. The academic enterprise is often about which theory wins. There is no question that competitive hypothesis testing plays a vital role in the development of knowledge. In the 1970s, Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye introduced a “transnational relations” framework for mapping world politics that highlighted the role of cross-border actors and interactions (Keohane and Nye 1971). Theirs was not a theory of transnational relations but a pointing exercise which concluded that there were so many anomalies in the dominant state-centric realist paradigm that it needed to be conceptually revisited. In Power and Interdependence, they later elaborated a theoretical framework that combined realist and transnational ideas to develop testable hypotheses (Keohane and Nye 1977). Certainly, scholarly debates about the rise and fall of nation-states and inter-state relations with other actors, structures, and processes across time and space will continue for the foreseeable future. Indeed, Arjun Appadurai in Modernity at Large argues that not only have nation-states weakened but that the nation-state system itself is in crisis due to the influence of transnational phenomena and dynamics. Saskia Sassen writes of “denationalization” or the idea that power, authority, and identity formation will migrate away from the nation state upwards towards inter-state and even supra-state institutions and agencies and downwards to “global cities” that are the geographical loci of dominant nodes of cross-border forms and processes.22 But, she also writes that the “global” is transnationally, albeit variably, reproduced ideationally and materially in the “national” and the “local,” meaning that the nation-state is qualitatively transformed not just quantitatively weakened. Thus, the field of TS will involve multiple different types and forms of theorizing and processes of theory development. Its goal is not to arrive at a single paradigm or master narrative but to find ways to hold these different theoretical accounts and approaches in productive conversation with one another. The world is too broad, deep, and complex to be captured by just one theoretical apparatus. Instead, TS abandons that expectation, creating a broad enough tent to tolerate the productive tension between, possible co-existence of, and potential cross-fertilization among different theoretical frames.

Philosophical transnationalism The fourth jumping off point for the field of Transnational Studies is to adopt an alternative set of ontological and epistemological assumptions about the nature of the world and what knowledge consists of. Philosophical transnationalism is based on the metaphysical view that social life is transnational to begin with—transnational phenomena and dynamics are the rule rather than the exception, the central tendency rather than the outlier. Philosophical transnationalism rejects the notion that social life is automatically or primarily organized within or between nations, states, or other

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types of bordered or bounded social system containers. Unlike traditional social science, with its dominant “unit-ism” or “system-ism,” the ontological premise of TS is that social worlds are fundamentally cross-boundary and cross-border. A second premise is that ostensibly bounded or bordered human organizations are, as a rule, embedded in and influenced by crossborder and cross-boundary phenomena and dynamics. Thus, scholarship should focus on the production of social difference and differentiation rather than investigating or comparing nations, societies, or cultures that are assumed to be whole (Gupta and Ferguson 1997). Philosophical transnationalism does not deny the importance of bounded or bordered social groups. Rather, one of the central meta-theoretical puzzles it attempts to solve is why certain boundaries arise to begin with and how are they reproduced and perpetuated. A transnational ontology assumes, for example, that the emergence of the nation-state system is historically idiosyncratic—a set of social facts that needs to be explained and interpreted (Tilley 1975). It takes a similar approach to allegedly national religions and the transnational religious communities to which they belong. The local, regional, national, and global are not automatic, taken-for-granted social arenas but categories to be investigated as constructed and often-contested social facts. Furthermore, a transnational ontology is based on the assumption that social phenomena and dynamics take place within (and across) transnational fields. Pierre Bourdieu used the concept of fields to call attention to the ways in which relations of power and meaning structure social interactions (Bourdieu 1980). Sociological institutionalists theorize and examine organizational fields of various kinds (Powell and DiMaggio 1991; Scott 2001). Most recently economic sociologists and social movement theorists have proposed the notion of “strategic action fields” (Fligstein and McAdam unpublished manuscript). While this work does not rule out the possibility that these fields are transnational, it does not directly and systematically address that possibility either. The Manchester School proposed a notion of social field similar to Bourdieu which acknowledged that the migrants they studied belonged to tribal-rural localities and colonial-industrial cities at the same time. Migrant networks stretching between these two (or more) sites constituted a single social field created by a network of networks. By understanding social relations in this way, these researchers introduced levels of analysis underneath, across, and beyond the study of the individual, the community, the colony, and even the empire (Morawska 2003). Building on Bourdieu and the Manchester School, some transnational migration scholars define social fields as a set of multiple interlocking networks of social relationships through which ideas, practices, and resources are unequally exchanged, organized, and transformed. Social fields are multidimensional, encompassing interactions of differing forms, depth, and breadth, such as organizations, institutions, and movements. National boundaries are not necessarily contiguous with the boundaries of social fields. National social

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fields are those that stay within national boundaries while transnational social fields involve direct and indirect relations and dynamics across borders and boundaries that may or may not be national (Khagram 2004). A transnational ontology goes hand and hand with a transnational epistemology. In order to describe, explain, interpret, theorize, and alter assumptions about the nature of social worlds, expectations about how social worlds can be known and understood must be rethought. Philosophical transnational scholarship, building on ontological transnationalism, probes the extent to which transnational dynamics are at work and attempts to explain variations in their strength and scope. Any analysis that does not take the possibility of transnational processes into account, while potentially useful and even illuminating, is likely to come up short. For example, Tamara Kay’s work demonstrates that changes in transnational rather than national political systems and institutions stimulated alliances among workers in Canada, the United States, and Mexico (Kay 2005). Beverly Silver showed that the rise and fall of domestic labor movements was linked to transnational relocations of business enterprises and the transnational diffusion of collective action repertoires (Silver 2003). Howard Winant’s work on the dynamics of race relations over time highlights the analytical purchase gained by using a transnational lens and William Julius Wilson explains the decline of African-American inner-city communities with an implicitly transnational explanation (Winant 2001; Wilson 1997).

Public transnationalism A fifth entry point into Transnational Studies is a more open ethical and prescriptive approach to scholarship. Public transnationalism creates a space to imagine options for social transformation that are obscured when borders, boundaries and the structures, processes and actors within them are taken as given. By calling into question borders and boundaries, and the assumption that the nation-state is the automatic container within which social life occurs, TS opens up a range of possibilities for political positions and praxis that might otherwise be obscured. TS fits squarely within the social science’s renewed commitment to forging stronger links between theory and praxis and academics and practitioners because it tries to go beyond description, analysis, and understanding to practice (Burawoy 2004; Calhoun 2004). It rejects the false neutrality characterizing much scholarship. Rather than ignoring the hard set of ethical and practical questions that research poses, it embraces them. At the same time, TS does not begin from a prescribed political position nor does it assume that transnational solutions are automatically best. Rather, an integral part of TS is to go beyond description, analysis, and explanation and specify the range of policy choices indicated by research findings. Ann Marie Slaughter’s work on transgovernmental networks, which argues that a critical element in producing stability in world affairs are the links that bureaucratic agencies

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form across disaggregated and decentralized states, is an excellent example of this kind of scholarship (Slaughter 2004; Keohane and Nye 1974). Luis Guarnizo’s work on the macro-economic impacts of migrants’ micro-level transnational economic activities is another case in point (Guarnizo 2003). Nikos Passas’s work on the unintended negative consequences of nation-state and inter-state regulation of informal money transfer systems, like Hawala, is another example (Passas 1999). Toward this end, TS is deeply concerned about the power dynamics underlying social relations. It pays careful attention to ways in which explicit ideological and methodological assumptions skew the questions that get asked, the answers that are proposed, and the practices that are pursued. It does not assume, for example, that everything originates and flows from the west and north but that the direction, intensity, and effects of global cultural flows is an empirical question. There are innumerable examples of various kinds of “brokers”, “travellers”, “bridgers”, and “diffusers” contributing to the transnational spread and transformation of norms and practices, as well as promotion of greater cross-cultural understandings (Brandy and Smith 2005). The resources, skills, and mobilization generated in one setting can be successfully applied to another. The often purposeful and targeted transnational diffusion of ideas and practices under the rubrics of good governance, accountability, and democracy are increasingly utilized tools. But these transfers are by no means one way. Ideas about micro-credit, participatory budgeting, or good water use can be and have been systematically spread from South to North and East to West. Thus, public transnationalism does not equate transnationality or transnationalization with global westernization or Americanization. It does not assume that everything originates and flows to the rest of the world from the west and north. Civil Rights activists like Martin Luther King and Ceasar Chavez in the United States, for example, were clearly inspired by the strategies Gandhi used in South Africa and India. Rather than clinging to or trying to re-coup a world in which the nation prevails, TS wants to understand how citizenship, governance, human security, and cultural diversity, among others, change when we assume a world that is transnationally constituted. Moreover, transnational forces are clearly not a factor in every case. If we find, for example, that centralized states are better at alleviating human suffering and at promoting sustainable and equitable development, then scholarship and praxis should pursue that route. If research reveals, however, that novel, multi-stakeholder, and crosssectoral forms of transnational governance are more effective, then it is our responsibility to embrace that perspective.

Towards a Transnational Studies research program Taken together, the five interacting components of TS offer an exciting set of intellectual foundations for the field. While not every scholar will work across all five, we believe they constitute a rich menu for research, theory,

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and action. We do not wish to imply there is a value hierarchy between these five elements. Rather, each can be understood as one point that, when connected, represent a pentagonal field of possibilities. Furthermore, we believe that productive research programs can be formulated within this intellectual space. The task of Transnational Studies is to uncover, analyze, and conceptualize similarities, differences, and interactions among trans-societal and trans-organizational realities, including the ways in which they shape bordered and bounded phenomena and dynamics across time and space. This research can take several possible directions. We elucidate some exciting possibilities here. Ongoing research by Federico Besserer and Michael Kearney provides one excellent example. They began by studying indigenous migrant communities across different parts of Mexico and the United States. Their respondents are transnational because they live across various cultural and territorial borders and because they have always been at the interstices of symbolic and political boundaries (as subaltern citizens of Mexico, for example). They are neither global nor national nor local. Besserer and Kearny soon realized that the discourses and practices they uncovered could not be understood without taking into account transregional economic dynamics and the political relations between local, state, and federal-level actors in all three countries. In addition, the human rights campaigns in the communities they studied borrowed heavily from the transnational nongovernmental advocacy networks these groups worked with. Moreover, their pre-Mexican indigenous governance systems had been extended across territories (Besserer and Kearny 2001). A first type of sociological transnational scholarship thus involves analyzing a particular type of transnational form or process across space. Do we find similar types of transnational migrant communities in Europe or the United States in contrast to those in South Africa or Brazil? How do the transnational experiences of people who migrate internally within a country and those who move across close or even contiguous borders within regions like Africa, Eastern Europe or the Caribbean compare to those who move from “south” to “north” (Toyota 2003)? How do transnational religious practices vary across social contexts? Why is a much greater share of remittances from overseas Chinese directed towards business investment compared with that of non-resident South Asian Indian groups? A second type of research examines a particular type of transnational form or process across time. How do contemporary human rights or environmental movements compare to the anti-slavery and labour movements of the past (Keck and Sikkink 1998; Khagram et al. 2002; Silver 2003; Kay 2005; among many, many others)? How do historical state responses to pirating networks compare to governmental attempts at controlling transnational terrorism?23 Why do transnational infectious diseases and invasive species seem so prevalent in some historical eras and contexts but not in others? Scholarly exchange on the differences between transnational

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migration of the late nineteenth century with that of the late twentieth century is a particularly productive example of this type of scholarship. A third type investigates different kinds of transnationalisms. Transnational business, crime, professional, social movement, religious, and migration networks all cross borders, but to what degree are their forms and activities like one another? Why do individuals join profit-making transnational corporations as opposed to violent transnational terrorist groups? What explains why different transnational groups interpret universal discourses, norms and strategies cast in universalistic terms in distinct ways (Hall and Biersteker 2002; Josselin and Wallace 2001)? Are the factors that lead to “local” adoption of transnational fashion the same as that of transnational professional practices? A fourth type examines interactions among transnationalisms. Some transnational forms and relations operate in isolation while others complement or subvert each other. Under what conditions do transnational epistemic communities alter the activities of transgovernmental networks? The social and financial organization of Al Qaeda provides another striking example. Its legitimacy and capacity depend, in part, on its social embeddedness in transnational extended family, kinship and religious communities. Its complex financial organization combines legal philanthropic and commercial concerns and illicit and criminal activities on a trans-continental scale. A fifth type compares and contrasts transnational phenomena and dynamics with those that are ostensibly tightly bounded and bordered (or non-transnationalisms, for lack of a better word) such as those societies or organizations constituted globally, regionally, nationally, or locally. How, for example, do the forms and consequences of internal migration from the Peruvian highlands to the capital, Lima, compare to those resulting from international migration from Lima to Barcelona, Spain? What difference does it make for people’s everyday lives when they identify primarily with domestic unions rather than international labor federations? How does the way in which local small firms think about business responsibility compare to the ways in which multinational corporations approach these issues?24 A related and sixth type of analysis explores transnational phenomena and dynamics that allegedly compete with or supplant local, national, state, and global societal and organizational entities with those that complement, interact with or transform them. Trans-continentally organized economic activities often replace nationally organized production arrangements while transnational civil society organizations are more likely to engage, influence and be shaped by domestic social movement organizations. Commodity chains relegating aspects of the production process to the far corners of Southeast Asia replaced the factories that produced entire shoes in Lynn, Massachusetts. In contrast, Indonesian or Argentine human rights organizations often link up to transnational advocacy networks. Their domestic activities complement and are complemented by these cross-border partnerships. Similarly, some argue that the Mexican government’s program to issue

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consular identity cards to Mexican migrants in the United States (so they can obtain driver’s licenses and open bank accounts) is a transnationallyorganized political intervention that disrupts the sovereignty of the U.S. state. Others see this as a logical manifestation of the Mexican government’s continuing responsibility for emigrants. The TS research program thus departs from traditional scholarship in important ways. First, transnational social fields and transnational structuring processes are its ontological foundations. Second, while potentially useful and illuminating, any explanation or interpretation that does not identify and explain the proximate and/or deeper transnational forms and processes at play is considered epistemologically incomplete. Implementing the TS research program will not be easy or routine. It will require imagination, risk-taking, and perseverance. We believe the attempt, even if it ultimately fails to live up to its promise, is well worth the effort.

Conclusion Transnational Studies is clearly driven by a different set of assumptions about the world and expectations about knowledge than most traditional scholarship. Since a central premise is that not all theories can do all things, and that more productive insights come from combining or contrasting different theoretical explanations and interpretations, its goal is to uncover the heuristic power of these theoretical interactions. One of its primary concerns, in fact, is to understand the intersection and collision of the many layers of relations, perspectives, and cosmologies. TS, therefore, allows for a creative interaction between different philosophies of knowledge—from positivism to post-modernism and from interpretivism to constructivism—in contrast to the all-too-common polarized and un-productive stalemates that arise when arriving at a single type of theoretical explanation is the goal. There is much room and opportunity for those interested in formulating testable and potentially falsifiable hypotheses under the umbrella of TS. But there is also support and encouragement for post-modern critiques of “regimes of truth” that mask unequal power relations. Both this expectation about the nature of social worlds, of reality, and what we expect of scholarship that sheds light on it, reflect a set of beliefs about what academic interaction is capable of and responsible for doing. Instead of trying to artificially contain or clean up complexity and constructive conflict, TS embraces, encourages, and facilitates it. In conclusion, the success of TS also depends on the transnationalization of the social sciences. Clearly, there is already a good deal of scholarly exchange between and among scholars across borders and boundaries. But, in many ways, just as field building is constrained by rigid disciplinary boundaries, so the U.S. social science community is hindered because it builds bridges selectively to particular places at specific times. For one thing, only a select group of primarily western scholars often participate. When

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those from the South or the East are included, they often do so as junior partners. Access to resources and opportunities among non-Western scholars is limited and the legitimization process unequal because of the overwhelming predominance of the English language. The community of scholars within TS will be much more productive and successful to the extent that it becomes transnational itself. This requires casting a broader net and encouraging a wider range of transnational collaborative partnerships structured on more equal terms. Indeed, we may learn how to do this through our studies of the transnational phenomena that concern us.

Notes 1 This is a co-authored essay, jointly conceived and written by both contributors. Support has been generously provided by the Hauser Center for Non-Profit Organizations, The John F. Kennedy School of Government, The Weatherhead Center for International Affairs, The Wellesley College Faculty Research Fund, Atlantic Philanthropies, The Ford Foundation, The Rockefeller Foundation, The Stanford Institute of International Studies, the Lindenberg Center and Evans School at the University of Washington. Earlier versions were presented at the Hauser Center, University of California Davis Sociology Colloquium, Brown University Seminar on Anthropology and Demography, and the Princeton University Center for Migration and Development. We would like to thank the following people for their comments: John Meyer, Suzanne Shanahan, David Kyle, Joseph Nye, Jonathan Fox, Peter Dobkin Hall, Xavier Briggs, Viviana Selizer, Gabriele Bammer, and Josh DeWind. We would also like to thank a number of research assistants for their invaluable support, particularly Catrina Lucero. 2 The hearings and conclusions of the 9–11 Independent Commission appointed by President George Bush have been particularly fascinating in this regard. One of the most revealing sentiments conveyed was that what happened on 9–11 was “completely beyond our imagination.” Perhaps if those officials had a set of conceptual and analytical tools which brought transnational dynamics to light, these events would not have been so inconceivable. 3 See among others: Angnew and Corbridge 1995; Glick Schiller et al. 1992; Smith and Guarnizo 1998; Levitt 2001; Levitt and Waters 2002; Kyle 2000; Ong 1999; Al-Ali and Moser 2001; Grewal and Kaplan 1994; Abelmann and Lie 1995; Hannerz 1996; Hoeber Rudolph and Piscatori 1997; Risse-Kappen 1995; Josselin and Wallace 2001; Smith et al. 1997; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Florini 2000; Khagram et al. 2002; Khagram 2004; Sklair 2001; various issues of the journal Transnational Organized Crime (London: Frank Cass, 1995–); Passas 1999; Slaughter 1997; Portes et al. 1999; Portes et al. 2002; Guarnizo et al. 2003; Joppke and Morawska 2003; Levitt et al. 2003; Glick Schiller and Fouron 2001; Kivisto 2001; Yeoh et al. 2003; Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004; Kennedy and Roudometof 2003; Mitchell et al. 2003. 4 For world systems, a key source is Wallerstein 1979 and the classic reference for world society studies is Thomas et al. 1987. For an early volume that includes both approaches, see Bergesson 1980. Of course, much more has been produced in these scholarly traditions over the last quarter century. It is important to note that a great deal of the “dependency” scholarship of the 1970s departed from an overly rigid adoption of world unitism or systemism. We would consider much of the latter work to be firmly part of the field of TS and highly recommend (de

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5 6

7 8 9 10 11 12 13

14 15

16

17

Sanjeev Khagram and Peggy Levitt Janvry 1981) for an excellent intellectual review of the world systems and dependency literatures. Of the vast literature of variable quality on globalization, see also Lechner and Boli, as well as Jameson and Miyoshi 1998. It is revealing to note that a portion of the scholarship that uses the language of globalization, globality or globalism does in fact take cognizance of multi-directionality, cross-border/boundary phenomena and dynamics that are not necessarily transcontinental or planetary, as well as agency and variation across levels, scales and scopes. Unfortunately, the language that is utilized tends to either obscure these factors and facets or inadequately theorizes them. For two of the better, albeit not fully successful attempts of linking ideas of globalization and transnationality, see Appadurai 1996; Sassen 1998. The list of localist scholarship that includes village studies, community studies, neighborhood studies, and so on, is voluminous, making it virtually impossible to cite here. Some “localist” scholars certainly do a better job at taking transnationalisms into account. In particular, see the selections in (Gupta and Ferguson 1997; Mahler 1995; Goldring 2002; Parrenas 2001). By no means does this imply that other units such as regions are unimportant— indeed, the growing scholarship on various forms and kinds of regionalism is particularly useful in explicating transnational phenomena and dynamics. In addition to the voluminous work on regional (especially European) integration in sociology and political science see, for example, Angnew and Corbridge 2002; Courchene 1995. This linking of knowledge and institutional orders around the “national-state” has had a profound impact on scholarship. Virtually the entire sub-field of economic sociology has explicitly or implicitly taken the nation-state form and even more so contemporary countries for granted as the obvious units of analysis if not objects of study. The key social movement texts until recently are all domestic or comparativenational in orientation (for example: Tarrow 1994; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 1996; and McAdam et al. 1996). Although there is an ample body of work on religion and globalization (see, for example, Beyer 1994; Robertson 1992), scholars have only recently begun to formulate a transnational perspective on religion and there is little agreement about what that perspective actually entails (see, for example, Rudolph and Piscatori 1997; Peterson et al. 2001; Vasquez and Marquardt 2003; Mandaville 2001; Vertovec and Cohen 1999; Menjivar 1999; Hondagneu-Sotelo et al. 2004; Stolow 2004; Spohn 2003). For perhaps the best work along these lines that could be considered transnational scholarship, see Tilly 1975, 1990. Also, see the growing literature on sovereignty, for example, Biersteker and Weber 1996; Krasner 1999, 2001. There is thus an interesting set of overlaps between the Sociology of Transnationalism and Cultural Studies, particularly with regard to borderland and post-colonial studies (see, for example, Anzaldua and Yang 2003; Gaonkar 2002; Grewel 1999; Chatterjee 1998; Cunningham and McC. Heyman 2004; Soja 2000). The literature on transnational corporations has a very long history indeed. For an important contribution, see Modelski 1979. For two key books from the dependency tradition, see Cardoso and Faletto 1973; Evans 1979. More recently, see Strange 1996; Sklair 2000. For transnational popular cultural production, see Flores 2000; Sommer 2004; Hernández, Fernández-L’Hoeste and Zolov 2004; Simonett 2001; Parks and Kumar 2002; Hitchcock 2003; Hedetoft and Hjort 2002; Lazarus 1999; Mignolo 2000).

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18 Of course, work in the dependency tradition long ago posited the existence of transnational classes and class alliances. 19 Of course, many firms do use physical and other forms of violence so the difference between transnational corporate citizenship and corporate criminality is often a fine line. 20 This statement is based on the statistical database assembled by Ted Robert Gurr, “Global Warfare Totals, 1946–99,” and “Trends in Violent Conflict.” Indeed, it is interesting to note, that the Cold War created an illusion of stability, as increasing incidents and growing magnitude of violent conflict around the world characterized the period between 1950 and 1989. See also Kaldor 2001. 21 Systems thinking, when not rigidly applied, might be particularly usefully utilized. 22 This is very similar to Strange, The Retreat of the State, as well as numerous others. 23 It is interesting to note that indigenous peoples and pirating networks of the eighteenh and nineteenth century were the only other non-state entities besides contemporary transnational terrorists against which federal governments declared war since U.S. independence in 1776. Of course, governments of many countries (such as the Tamil/Sinhalese conflicts in Sri Lanka) have been in long and protracted violent conflicts with transnational non-state groups (revolutionary, liberation, ethnic, etc.) of various kinds. For a more general perspective, see Gallant 1999. 24 It has been argued that local businesses, because they are socially embedded in communities, are likely to act with greater responsibility and that transnational corporations that are comparatively disembedded are more likely to fit the idealtypical profit-maximizing firm, in a Polyani-esque way.

3

Beyond methodological ethnicity and towards city scale An alternative approach to local and transnational pathways of migrant incorporation Nina Glick Schiller and Ayse Cag˘ lar1

Ever since Nathan Glazer and Daniel Moynihan (1963) advised us to move “beyond the melting pot” in our analysis of immigrant settlement and identity, migration researchers have tended to follow what amounts to a recipe in developing a research design. Choose an interesting gateway or global city, locate an ethnic group, add a research question and mix well. The recipe is much the same, whether the researcher’s concern has been to assess the degree of integration into a new locality or to explore the cross-border relationships that migrants maintain or establish. If the research follows a transnational paradigm then there may be another site explored as well— perhaps a village in the migrant’s homeland. However, whatever the analytic framework adopted, the narrative often moves between data specific to a sampled population within a specific city or set of cities to generalizations about an entire ethnic group and its pattern of settlement within a specific nation state. Researchers describe “Turks” in Germany, “Mexicans” in the United States, “Pakistanis” in England. When processes of migration settlement are compared across nation-states, then variations in ethnic group settlement patterns are generally explained in terms of various states’ different opportunity structures including their public policies. The ethnic group research design leaves several key issues under-researched and under-theorized. Among these are possible non-ethnic forms of settlement and transnational connection and the significance of the specific locality in shaping migrant departure and settlement. The failure to develop a theory of locality is especially ironic because one of the foundations of immigrant studies was the “Chicago School,” whose scholars focused on the “ecology” of particular urban neighborhoods, structures, and localized intergroup dynamics (Park and Miller 1921). The central concern of this chapter is to develop a conceptual framework for the study of migration, settlement, and transborder connection that is not dependent on the ethnic group as the unit of analysis. We argue that localities of departure and settlement, if analyzed within global hierarchies of power, provide a fruitful approach to the study of

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migration. To illustrate our non-ethnic approach to migrant settlement we draw on our ethnographic research we led from 2001 to 2005 in two smallscale cities, Manchester, New Hampshire, USA and Halle/Saale, SachsenAnhalt, Germany.2 Our broader study explores multiple pathways of local and transnational incorporation including familial, non-ethnically organized businesses, friendships, charitable, and religious networks.3 In this essay we will use the example of fundamentalist Christian pathways of incorporation. Research on the study of migrant settlement in global or gateway cities has focused on bounded ethnic populations with a shared identity and mode of incorporation (Clark 2004; Ley 2003; Waldinger 2001; Waldinger and Bozorgmehr 1996). Small-scale cities are particularly important locales to obtain insights necessary to move migration research beyond the study of ethnic groups.

The problematics of ethnic groups as units of analysis Studies of what researchers often call ethnic “communities” document divisions based on class, gender, generation, religion, region of origin, or politics among members of the “same” group. Building on the need to acknowledge internal diversity, recent work on “superdiversity” in British cities recognizes the impossibility of using the ethnic lens for both research and policy. Yet this perspective does not offer a perspective completely free from the grip of ethnic research categories (Vertovec 2005). The ethnic lens is faulted as a useful descriptive tool because the increasing fragmentation of ethnic groups in terms of language, place of origin, legal status, and stratification produces too much complexity for policy development tailored to reflect ethnic cultural difference. Other researchers have contested the facile use of concepts of “ethnic community” and detailed the institutional processes through which ethnic categories and identities are constructed and naturalized (Brubaker 2004; Cag˘ lar 1990, 1997; Erikson 1994; Glick Schiller 1977, 1999; Glick Schiller et al. 1987a, 1987b; Hill 1989; Rath and Kloosterman 2000; Sollors 1989). Despite the contributions of the constructionist perspectives and the manifold descriptions of diversity within what is being characterized as a culturally uniform group, most migration scholars continue to use “ethnic community” as both the object of study and the unit of analysis in migration research. Some such as Stephen Castles (Castles and Miller 1993; Castles and Davidson 2000) have moved from an initial concern with the migration process as a globally shared migrant experience to discussions of “ethnic mobilization,” “ethnic politics,” and “ethnic minorities.” The new diaspora studies perpetuate the problem by defining the unit of study as people who share an ancestry and a history of dispersal (Gillespie 1995; Aksoy and Robbins 2002; Robbins and Aksoy 2001; Soekefeld 2003). The methodological ethnicity of these scholars shapes—and, in our opinion, obscures—the diversity of migrants’ relationships to their place of settlement and to other localities around the world.

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The use of ethnic groups as units of analysis is a logical but unacceptable consequence of the methodological nationalism of mainstream social science. Methodological nationalism is an ideological orientation that approaches the study of social processes and historical processes as if they were contained within the borders of individual nation-states (Beck 2000, 2006; Martins 1974; Smith 1983; Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002a, 2002b). Nation-states are conflated with societies, and the members of those states are assumed to share a common history and set of values, norms, social customs, and institutions. Some writers prefer to label this orientation the container theory of society to highlight that most social theorists, including Emile Durkheim, Max Weber, and Talcott Parsons, have contained their concept of “society” within the territorial and institutional boundaries of the nation-state (Beck 2000; Urry 2000). We find the term methodological nationalism more useful, however, because it reminds us that conventional “objective” social theory harbors a political position. To posit that it is migration that introduces diversity into the territory of a nation-state is a stance that excludes from analysis the many sources of difference within a national population as well as the shared commonalities of native and migrant. Caught in a logical loop that arises from the way they enter the study of migration in the first place, social scientists in North America and Europe continue to debate theories of migrant settlement such as the “new assimilationism” of U.S. scholars or renewed calls for “integration” in Germany (Alba and Nee 2003; Brubaker 2004; Heckmann 2003; Sackmann et al. 2003).4 These debates are seriously disconnected from ethnographies that describe migrants’ lives and from several decades of historical research documenting past transatlantic migrations.5 The ethnic lens is a product of twentieth century nation-state building processes that legitimated a political ideology that portrayed individuals as having only one country and one identity. When assessing the implications of migration across state borders, researchers came to see differences in national origin as the most significant social and cultural divide within the population of a particular nation-state. Through a single discursive act those who were native to the territory of a nation-state were transformed into participants in a shared and homogenous culture; those departing from one national territory to settle in another were likewise seen as sharing identity and culture so that they became identified by the nationality of their homeland (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2002a, 2002b). At the beginning of the twentieth century these migrating populations were identified as “nationalities” or “races”. By the end of the twentieth century, from a scholarly perspective, they had become ethnic groups, although the earlier terminology still remains embedded in popular narratives. The propensity of migration scholars to use a concept of ethnic group as their sample and unit of analysis can be termed methodological ethnicity. Methodological ethnicity is problematic for several reasons. First of all, it often results in the exclusion of non-ethnic forms of social settlement and

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connection. These other social relationships include familial, religious, economic, occupational, class, political, social, and locally based networks of interaction, each with their concomitant forms of identity and possibilities of local, national, and transnational connection and incorporation. Such nonethnic social relationships may preclude or be simultaneous with ethnic forms of organization. But unless we begin with a different unit of analysis, non-ethnic interactions and identifications are often routinely precluded from the final narrative and theorizing about migrant incorporation (Cag˘ lar 1997). For example, when Nina Glick Schiller and her colleagues (Glick Schiller et al. 1987a and 1987b) studied Haitian migrants in order to document the forces that contributed to the emergence of a Haitian ethnic identity in New York City, they only followed the networks organized around Haitian identity. They neglected the ties that people had with local block associations, parent–teacher school-based associations, or religious organizations that chose a Christian, Daoist, or Muslim rather than Haitian identity. Similarly, when tracing transnational connections, Glick Schiller and Fouron (1999; 2001) highlighted family ties that led into nationalist and ethnic political projects and identities. They were much less interested in those families whose social mobility was unmoored from identification with culture and nation.6 Secondly, ethnic “pathways” are only one of many diverse “pathways” of incorporation migrants establish. We are not arguing that ethnic forms of incorporation don’t exist; our point is that they co-exist with other forms of local and transnational incorporation. Non-ethnic forms of migrant incorporation connect migrants in social relationships built on factors other than a claim to common culture, peoplehood, or history given by the “ethnic” category. A political mode of incorporation, whether local or transnational, for example, can follow an ethnic pathway so that ethnic networks are used to organize social relationships with institutions such as a political party (Gerstle and Mollenkopf 2001; Guarnizo et al. 2003). However, migrants may become linked to political institutions through non-ethnic pathways that highlight other aspects of their lives including religion. In our research in both Manchester and Halle migrants generally have become members of city councils or state legislatures through their engagement in local party politics rather than through the support of an ethnic constituency.7 Religion also provides diverse pathways of both locally and transnational incorporation (Werbner 1999). While some migrants build religiously organized ethnic and homeland ties, others pursue religious pathways that are specifically non-ethnic. Although most research on migration and religion highlights ethnic identities and homeland ties, some scholars emphasize religious identities and networks (Chafetz and Ebaugh 2002; Corten and Marshall-Fratani 2001; Karagiannis and Nina Glick Schiller 2006; Levitt 2003; Robbins 2004; Vásquez and Marquardt 2003). These researchers trace the contemporary growth of globe-spanning religious networks and organizations to the development of unequal globalization (Vásquez in press;

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Vásquez and Marquardt 2003). Islam, in particular, is being studied as a global project, with its transnational networks coming under intense scrutiny (Allievi and Nielsen 2003; Schiffauer 1999; Amiraux 2002). Caribbean and Latin American migrants’ appropriation of conservative U.S. Pentecostalism as a response to their economic, social, or legal marginalization in urban contexts has been increasingly researched (Brodwin 2003; Gill 1990). Much of the research on migrant settlement and transnationalism in the United States and Europe, however, conflates religion and ethnicity, whether scholars have studied Christian or Muslim migrants (Hunt and Lightly 2001; van Dijk 2004; Warner and Wittner 1998: 9; Amiraux 2001). By assuming that a population being studied already share an ethnic identity, the analyst risks neglecting or obscuring processes of local and transnational incorporation that eventuate in the emergence of ethnic or pan-ethnic identities and organizations. At best, careful researchers who begin with an ethnic lens conclude that the migrants in their study chose non-ethnic forms of incorporation. For example, many studies of so-called “ethnic” entrepreneurs and “enclaves have noted that manufacturers and small businessmen conducted business, sought workers and built a customer base that were varied in their ethnic backgrounds (Light et al. 1999; Portes and Alejandro 1995; Rath and Kloosterman 2000). Yet despite the consistency of these findings, the concept of the ethnic entrepreneur as the general pattern of migrant settlement has assumed a life of its own in the literature on migration. Finally, methodological ethnicity has also impeded the analysis of locality as a significant variable shaping migrant incorporation. The scale of the particular locality of departure and settlement is rarely systematically examined, compared, and theorized because the unit of analysis is the ethnic group within or across the borders of a nation-state.8 We argue that an advance in studying the role of locality in migrant incorporation locally and transnationally can be made by developing and deploying the concept of city scale. As developed by Neil Brenner (1998, 1999a, 1999b, 2004), Neil Smith (1995), Erik Swyngedouw (1992, 1997), and others, working from initial formulations of Henri Lefebvre (1991), scale theory allows one to take locality into consideration but within the intersection of hierarchies of power, which extend across the borders of nation-states. The term scale can be defined as the summary assessment of the differential positioning of cities determined by the flow of capital and structures of economic, political, and cultural power as they are constituted within regions, states, and the globe. An assessment of scalar position is particularly necessary in the contemporary context of neoliberal global capitalism, in which cities are no longer embedded within a nested hierarchy of power that is primarily structured by regional and nation-state institutions. Cities increasingly must compete globally and respond to global institutional forces as well as state policies, which themselves reposition cities within the national territory in a differentiated way.

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Several discrete aspects of state policy and capitalist investment are subsumed under the rubric of the “neoliberal agenda” (Harvey 2005). These include the reduction in state services and benefits, the diversion of public monies and resources to develop private service-oriented industries from health care to housing (sometimes in arrangements called “public–private partnerships”), and the relentless push toward global production through the elimination of state intervention in a host of economic issues from tariffs to workers’ rights. Each of these aspects of neoliberalism has different impacts on particular urban areas, but all affect the relationship between migrants and cities of settlement. The new and differential pressures on cities have been addressed by scholars concerned with neoliberal urban restructuring (Brenner 2004; Guldbrandsen 2005; Brenner et al. 2003). These scholars have noted that, increasingly, local officials must work to attract foreign capital and market their cities by recasting their localities as centres of knowledge, finance, tourism, and cultural industries (Cag˘ lar in press; Rath 2006; Guldbrandsen 2005; Henry et al. 2002; Holland et al. 2006; MacLeod and Goodwin 1999; Zukin 1991). It is also clear that in the competition between cities, there are winners and losers. Just how a city is rescaled within this continuing quest for positioning, both globally and within a state’s national territory, has implications for the opportunities it provides for its migrants. Within the changing geography of networked spaces in contemporary globalization, the relational inequalities between the places shape the differential livelihood possibilities of the inhabitants, including the migrants, of the cities. The demise of Keynesian economic policies that relied on the redistribution of tax revenues to reduce regional disparities within national borders and the advent of neoliberal agendas, although implemented to different degrees in different nation-states, account for the increased salience of scale factors in assessing the fate of specific cities. Although the art of assessing city scale is relatively underdeveloped, we can project a series of measures that mark the differences between smallscale cities and global cities (Sassen 1992, 2000). Indicators of a small-scale city include relatively small finance and banking sectors, lack of corporate command and control centers, difficulty in attracting flows of capital for the growth of dynamic forms of sectoral activities such as technology, a marked lack of employment opportunities for college-educated youth, a shrinking local tax base, and an almost complete lack of money for locally funded social programs. The size of the population of the city, rather than being an absolute measure, is a reflection of regional, national, and global relationships; it is not, in and of itself, an indicator of scale but very often interacts with the factors just listed. Proximity to other urban centers also must be considered in scalar assessment, as the latter is an outcome of the vertical as well as the horizontal connectivity of the cities in question (Sheppard 2002). The existing literature on neoliberal urban restructuring has not addressed the relationships between migration and cities, although a few seminal studies demonstrate that urban officials and elites view questions of migration

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from the perspective of their city’s struggle for positioning with respect to regional, national, and global flows of capital (Brettell 2005; Henry et al. 2002; MacLeod and Goodwin 1999). Migration scholars confront the challenge of situating migrants, their social relations, their local trajectories of opportunities and variations in identity politics within an analysis of the contemporary rescaling of cities. In moving in this direction Jonathan Friedman’s (2001, 2002) insights into the global processes of “double polarization” will prove useful. Double polarization refers to the fluctuations in power contained within the contemporary transformations of the global system and the accompanying dislocations of wealth, hegemony, and spatial hierarchies that produce two simultaneous tensions. Friedman notes that the growing salience of a politics of identity—national, ethnic, and religious—is anchored in a worldwide shift. Whereas the vertical polarization pulls the political and cultural elites upwardly and transnationally, this very same process pushes the lower echelons of societies into a horizontal competition for resources on the basis of religious, ethnic, and cultural categories. This complex process of “double polarization” of cultural fragmentation and the formation of economic, social, and cultural transnational networks set the context for the urban transformations we observe in different parts of the world in current neoliberal times. If scale is indeed an important variable in shaping migrant incorporation, including the establishment of transborder networks, then it is important to develop research in cities of different scale to complement what is known about the cultural politics of global cities and their migrants. If we accept that the success of places in global urban restructuration is contingent on their relational advantage in terms of economic, political, and cultural characteristics, then the factor of migration must be considered as both as an outcome of and a contributor to the scalar positioning of a city. Not only do we have to analyze the local pathways of migrant incorporation in close relationship to scalar positioning of the cities, but we also have to take the migrants into consideration in the scalar assessment of cities. Migrants are an important part of politics of scale. Small-scale cities may contain social capital and community-building strategies that are shaped by the scarcity of economic capital, commercial opportunities, and professional employment. That is to say, cities that differ in scalar dimensions may make certain modes and pathways of incorporation more salient. For example, whereas migrants in cities of various scales are turning to forms of born-again Christian identity, this form of incorporation may have heightened importance in smallscale cities. If scale is indeed an important variable in shaping migrant incorporation, including the establishment of transborder networks, then it is important to identify the scale factors at play in the sending and receiving localities of individual migrants. Aside from some pioneering work on global cities, this task has generally been neglected. The dominance of an ethnic model of migration analysis means that migrants from villages are lumped together

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with migrants from large cities under an ethnic label such as Turkish, Pakistani, or Dominican (Cag˘ lar 1995; Schiffauer 1995; Werbner 1995; Torres-Saillant and Ramona Hernandez 1998). The ethnic model equally obscures the significance of locality of settlement. While in urban studies global cities are identified for comparative purposes as differing significantly from other cities in terms of their degree of global integration, in migration studies these same urban centers are relabeled as gateways and their reputed singularity in power hierarchies is disregarded. This single discursive move makes it legitimate to use data from cities such as New York, London, Berlin, and Los Angeles as representative of the process of the settlement of an ethnic group throughout an entire nation-state. Each ethnic group is assumed to have a uniform mode of incorporation throughout the national space. The ethnic lens homogenizes the differentiated opportunities, processes, and forms of migrant incorporation within the national territory. Meanwhile, comparative studies of migrant settlement in different nationstates usually have been made by contrasting state policies and assuming that modes of migrant integration within a state vary according to the policy of each state and the culture of each ethnic group. In contrast, we argue that not only the state policies but also the actual impact of public policies need to be explored in relation to the location of particular places within the national space. Local opportunity structures are influenced by city scale and in times of neoliberal globalization, they cannot be considered to be homogenous within the national space.

Towards a conceptual vocabulary to study non-ethnic forms of simultaneous incorporation In the approach we are advocating, we set aside the language of integration and assimilation, whether old or new. Similarly we discard sterile debates of assimilation versus transnationalism, understanding that incorporation can be local, national, and global at the same time. Our focus is on processes and social relations rather than on culture, identity, or the “functional” domains of integration within a particular nation-state. This focus encourages the exploration of multilevel ties within and across the boundaries of nationstates and facilitates the discussion of simultaneity—incorporation both within a nation-state and transnationally (Glick Schiller 2003, 2005a; Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). Seeking a conceptual vocabulary that does not obfuscate from the outset the local and transnational processes being queried, we use the term incorporation. Incorporation can be defined as the processes of building or maintaining networks of social relations through which an individual or an organized group of individuals becomes linked to an institution recognized by one or more nation-states. Our entry points into the study of incorporation are individual migrants, the networks they form, and the social fields created by their networks. Social fields are networks of networks that may be

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locally situated or extend nationally or transnationally (Glick Schiller 2003, 2005b). Incorporation can be situated within or across nation-states and local, national, and transnational pathways of incorporation can be built simultaneously and reinforce each other (Levitt and Glick Schiller 2004). Social fields are the aspect of social relations through which broader social forces enable, shape, and constrain individual migrants and their networks. Although our approach provides the conceptual space to follow individuals into organized groups, it is not dependent on the study of formally organized activities. Consequently, our analysis takes into account the impact of social structures and global forces in shaping social fields while moving the study of migrant incorporation beyond the scholarly preoccupation with organized membership (formal employment, legal status, or citizenship) or subjective identification. Moreover, each mode of incorporation has multiple possibilities. We speak of “multiple modes of incorporation” and delineate diverse pathways within each mode (Glick Schiller et al. 2005). Individual migrants may incorporate using one or several modes of incorporation and follow different pathways within each mode. The same individual for example might engage in ethnically based politics and non-ethnically organized religious and business activities.

Examining a non-ethnic pathway of simultaneous incorporation: born-again incorporation On first approach the two born-again churches in Halle/Saale Germany in which we worked could be seen as ethnic organizations, one predominantly Congolese and the other predominantly Nigerian. But it is significant that the members of congregation did not see themselves in ethnic terms—at least in the context of prayer and of building the church. They were not building an ethnic church identified by the cultural or national identity of its members. Rather both churches in Halle, the English-speaking predominantly Nigerian Miracle Healing Church9 and the French speaking predominantly Congolese L’Esprit Church, situated themselves within a global Christian mission and in organizations that linked them not to homeland churches but to a Pentecostal movement now being organized throughout Germany, Europe, and globally. As is legally necessary, both were formally registered in Germany. In addition, both congregations worked with a native German Pentecostal church in Magdeburg to become formal members of a German Pentecostal organization (Bund Freikirchlicher Pfingstgemeinden, or BFP), which provided them with access to a broad network of Pentecostal churches (Bund Freikirchlicher Pfingstgemeinden KdöR n.d.). In the summer of 2003 members of the English speaking church, the Miracle Healing Church, attended a large prayer conference in Berlin that sought to take Berlin for God. By 2005 the Miracle Healing church, supported by a U.S. missionary Mennonite church and a German missionary project led by a GermanEgyptian pastor, held its own prayer conference in Halle. The conference, at

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which many people were “healed” and “delivered” from demons sent by Satan, attracted more than 250 people, most of whom were German. The pastors of both churches belonged to transnational religious networks which brought visiting preachers to their church on a regular basis. Both the fact of these networks and the sermons of the visitors reinforced for church members that they were part of a broader project of ridding the city of Satanic forces and winning Halle and Germany for God. Migrants of both churches stated “it was not by accident that I came to this city.” They saw themselves not as ethnics but as God’s missionaries being sent to do his work. The significance of this doctrine and the transnational networks that foster and reinforce this set of beliefs becomes clear when we also look at our research on the Resurrection Crusade, a coalition of more than eighteen born-again congregations in Manchester New Hampshire, U.S.A.10 The Resurrection Crusade was organized by Heaven’s Gift, a Nigerian refugee, who settled in Manchester five years ago. He was able to obtain refugee status, at least in part, because of his membership in a global Christian network and he brought those network connections to Manchester. The member churches of the Resurrection Crusade include migrants but the majority of most of the congregations were white natives of New Hampshire. In Manchester, the Crusade became significant enough that the Republican Governor of New Hampshire and the Democratic Mayor of Manchester attended their prayer breakfasts. Of the 150 people who also attended the breakfasts, most were non-immigrant white New Hampshire residents but about one fifth of the participants were immigrants from several African and Latin American countries and the Philippines. At the Breakfasts and during Prayer conferences and other events, Heaven’s Gift repeatedly led those assembled to pray that God will take over Manchester. In a city such as Manchester, NH forming a Nigerian congregation would have been difficult since there were only a handful of Nigerians in the city and they included Catholics and Muslims. However, Heaven’s Gift might have had success in using a pan-ethnic African identity to form a church. There are several hundred African Protestants in Manchester and an African identity is becoming part of public discourse and these migrants’ self-ascription. Instead, Heaven’s Gift joined a home church that was mostly white working class but included in its ranks migrants from Ghana, Iraq, and Sudan. And he invested most of his energies into building a religious network that linked believers together on the basis of a born-again Christian rather than ethnic, national, or racial identity.11 In Halle, there were enough migrants to organize Nigerian and Congolese churches that assumed a national identity and linked the congregations to homeland churches. This path of incorporation, which can be found in other larger scale cities such as London where there are Nigerian identified congregations, was not taken in Halle (Hunt and Lightly 2001).

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The Resurrection Crusade belonged to a born-again Christian social field that extends around the world. It included a Nigerian pastor now living in England and a husband and wife evangelical team from Texas who make yearly visits to Manchester in a circuit that takes them around the world. They brought with them and infused into the prayers of the Manchester churches a militant language calling for “spiritual warfare” by “prayer warriors.” The Texas couple headed a U.S. Prayer Center that produced books, videos, and DVDs and distributes them into dozens of countries. They were experts in “spiritual housecleaning,” a process of prayer that claimed to remove demonic forces from a house. As do the pastors and members of the two churches in Halle and Heaven’s Gift and members of the Crusade in Manchester, these white American Texas preachers portray world events and human sickness in terms of an ever-present battle between God and Satan. The Crusade trains “prayer intercessors” in “strategic or city level spiritual warfare” against the devil that assigns his “territorial spirits to rule geographical territories and social networks (Smith 1999: 23). In 2005 the Crusade established a Prayer Center in an office building in the business district of Manchester where Christians could come to pray or could call to speak to a spiritual counselor. The Crusade was more than an organizational nexus. It had its own individual activists who pulled members and their own personal networks into an expanding field of Christian activity and connection. Between 2002 and 2005, migrants from all over the world increasingly joined this social field that was constructed and expanded by Heaven’s Gift and the Crusade’s core activists. The number of migrants in the core also increased. About twenty percent of those who attended conferences, prayer breakfasts, and prayer events sponsored by the Crusade were migrants of African, Caribbean, Latin American, and Asian origin. Most of the congregations that joined the Crusade were composed primarily of white New Hampshire natives, with a smattering of migrants. There was a Spanish speaking congregation and an African American congregation that participated in Crusade activities but these churches did not define themselves in ethnic terms but as true bornagain Christians. The transnational religious connections of the pastors in both Halle and Manchester were important for locating migrants into multilayered networks and for providing legitimacy and social ties for individual migrants. Heaven’s Gift brought the U.S. Prayer Center’s leading preachers to speak at prayer conferences in Manchester. In the course of several years, the core members of the Crusade, both migrants and natives, established personal relationships with these preachers. Shaking hands with the Mayor or Governor, hosting visiting preachers who have met presidents or kings, or sharing personal testimony with them during intimate prayer sessions gave the migrants who participated in activities of the Crusade a sense that they personally were part of something powerful and that they had access to power. The Crusade website linked them to the website of the U.S. Prayer Center where network

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members could see the same Texas preachers who prayed with them in Manchester, posed with Miss America, Benny Hinn (a globally known preacher), and pastors in Pakistan, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, and Indonesia (U.S. Prayer Center, 2004). The mailings they received from the U.S. Prayer Center informed them that there is now “One Superpower under God” and promised copies of a book by President Bush if they donated money. Migrants reported that because their born-again networks stretched into the U.S. White House and into centers of power throughout the world, they knew they would obtain whatever they needed. Joshua, the pastor of the Miracle Church, aspired to provide similar experiences for his congregants. The Miracle Healing participated in the Morris Cerullo World Evangelism organization to which Heaven’s Gift in Manchester had some connection. Morris Cerullo has met with important dignitaries in the Philippines, Jordan, and Russia where he claims to have preached to crowds of up to 100,000 (Morris Cerullo World Evangelism 2005). Pastor Joshua had not met Cerullo but he hopes to attend his conferences in the future. Joshua has insured that the Miracle Church sent funds to Cerullo’s efforts to convert Jews in Israel. He and the activists of his church, both Nigerian and native German, also have developed ties to born-again Christian missions and missionaries in Halle who were themselves part of broader German or transnational religious organizations. There were several such organizations in Halle, including a U.S.-based Mennonite mission that attracted growing numbers of German converts and a mission led by an Egyptian-German man and his German wife who strove to unite born-again Christians in Halle using a rhetoric similar to that of Heaven’s Gift in Manchester. In Halle, as in Manchester, weak ties had significance in several different ways (Granovetter 1973). Through their pastors, both the migrant Christians and the German natives of the city were exposed to and experienced themselves as part of overlapping Christian globe spanning networks in ways that imparted to them a sense of belonging and connection to the city. These networks allocated to the believers the task of bringing God to the city. This validated the presence of the migrants in the city and the ability of the migrants in linking natives to religious movements and important persons beyond the city. The ties that connected the local to the global were a form of social capital that could on occasion be shrewdly manipulated. Heaven’s Gift had been able to come to the United States as a refugee through such ties. A previous pastor of the Miracle Church had used transnational ties to Belgium to obtain asylum there. Church networks facilitated employment and housing opportunities in Manchester and marriage opportunities, which open different venues of participation in Halle. Relationships to Christian projects elsewhere situate migrants in broader Christian missionary projects and reflect and reinforce their understanding and the understanding of the native church members that migrants are part of a movement that reaches far beyond the city in which the migrants settle.

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How do scale factors affect local and transnational incorporation? To provide the context for the non-ethnic Christian pathways of local and global incorporation that we found in both Manchester and Halle, it is helpful to compare these cities from the perspective of the factors of scale that shape the lives of migrants and natives. In Manchester and Halle, ethnic community formation is difficult because of the lack of a number of factors that are generally taken for granted in research on ethnic groups in largescale or global cities. The cities lack a critical mass of migrants of a single ethnic group, resources for ethnic organizing, an ethnic niche economy, a continuity of migration, and a migrant population with an established middle class or a history of intellectual leadership. Halle/Saale and Manchester, New Hampshire, can be understood as small-scale cities. The two cities share certain factors in their relationship to hierarchies of political and economic power that can be summarized in terms of their scalar positioning. Although they are similar in terms of the absolute size of their metropolitan area populations, each numbering under 250,000, it is their similarities of scale that are important to compare.12 Both are, relatively speaking, marginalized cities, on the peripheries of more successful urban centers. Despite the efforts of each city to project a high-tech profile, both cities have found themselves in relatively weak competitive positions within national and global urban hierarchies. At this point, we can only begin to outline the similarities of scale, but the evidence we have assembled provides a useful perspective on what otherwise might seem puzzling aspects of the relationship between each city and its migrants. Halle is a declining industrial city characterized by low-wage jobs and a high rate of unemployment, its scalar position considerably weakened by German unification in 1989. An arts and culture project funded by the German Federal Cultural Foundation conferred on Halle a dubious distinction by designating it as a “shrinking city,” noting that it had lost 70,000 people in a decade (Long 2004). Competing with the neighboring city of Leipzig and located 100 miles from Berlin, the nearest large-scale city, Halle has had trouble attracting investments in new high-tech enterprises and institutions that oversee and service finance capital. After unification, the large industrial plants that were the base of its economy were sold to foreign investors. More than 30,000 people lost their jobs when most of the factories were closed or downsized. Some German and EU private and public capital has been invested in Halle over the past 15 years but not in sectors that provide much employment for local people or migrants. Banking and commercial enterprises have been built, housing has been renovated, and redevelopment in the city centre continues. Although there has been some investment in the modernization of Halle’s industrial sector to increase productivity, this type of investment has done little for the city as a whole because the retooling has resulted in the employment of far fewer workers (Barjak 2000). Since the 1990s, the level of unemployment in the city has

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been very high (just under 20 percent in 2004), leading to severe competition for even unskilled work and illegal work. In addition, construction and supply contracts often have gone to firms from western Germany; the inflow of investment capital has not provided profits for local companies and even construction workers on these projects have often not been residents of Halle. Most of the people who have benefited from the reconstituted financial sector have come from western Germany. The limited size of this sector has left few professional jobs for natives of the east and almost none for migrants, especially for non-EU nationals. The city leadership of Halle has spoken of developing the city as a centre of knowledge and technology on the basis of its nineteenth-century history as a centre of science and its current hosting of several German research institutions and a 500-year-old university. In an effort to boost its scientific resources, two research institutes were located in Halle in the 1990s. City leaders have been hampered in their effort to develop the profile of Halle as a knowledge centre, however, because Halle is not a political centre. After German reunification in 1989, the city of Halle lost the competition to become the capital of the new state of Sachsen-Anhalt, even though it was its largest city. Without political power, the city leaders could not prevent the closure or restructuring of academic departments within the city’s university and medical school, which impeded their ability to command the nexus of resources that might transform the city. In 2004, on the city’s own website, Halle officials described the city as “the nucleus of a wide area constituting an economic metropolis, in which service industries and technology centers predominate” (Halle. Die Stadt n.d.). Yet the same website reported that the “best known local products are Hallorenkugel chocolates, Kathi cake mix, and railway rolling stock built at Ammendorf,” ignoring the low-tech nature of chocolate and cake-mix production and the closure of the railway-car factory. In 2005, the biggest economic news was the opening of a call center, which assured several hundred jobs, although most were neither high tech nor high salaried. Because the level of unemployment in the city has been very high, there has been severe competition for even unskilled work and illegal work. NonEU migrants with legal permission to work have found few opportunities for employment and even less chance for occupational mobility. Within this rather grim picture, some migrants have established small businesses, realizing that business development is the only path to employment for themselves and members of their families and networks. The native population, with its socialist background, did not have much commercial experience or access to wholesale networks. Consequently, migrants were to compete with natives, although the poverty of the local population has set the parameters of the types of businesses that can succeed. This was especially true of start-up retail businesses in the early 1990s. More recently, migrant businesses often have been offshoots of businesses first established elsewhere in Germany and then expanded into underdeveloped market niches.

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Because of the factors that discourage migrant settlement, the number of foreigners in Halle was rather low, especially in comparison with German cities of larger scale. Although the size of the migrant population of Halle doubled between 1990 and 2000, migrants constituted only 4 percent of the population, with the largest number coming from the European Union. Among the non-EU foreigners, African migrants from a wide range of countries and Vietnamese constituted small but visible minorities. There were Kurdish refugees from several countries but, unlike many other German cities, there were very few Turkish residents. Given the local economy, few migrants have come voluntarily to Halle. Most have come through resettlement policies that distribute refugees among all the German states and do not permit resettlement without an offer of employment. Most refugees who could, left and settled in western Germany, where the possibilities for both legal and “off the books” employment have been much greater. The migrants who remained included people in a diverse array of legal categories: asylum seekers, who were not allowed to seek employment or move; refugees or immigrants with German partners or children through such partners; elderly refugees, either Russian Jews or “ethnic Germans” who did not believe they would be employable elsewhere in Germany; students; small business owners; and workers recruited within business networks. City leaders often portrayed migrants as uneducated and undesirable, in contrast to the technologically skilled foreigners they hoped would come rebuild the city as a center of knowledge. Nevertheless, there were skilled professionals among the unemployed migrants. Some of them had even been educated in Halle. In fact, relatively few migrants actually were without any education. Fifty-eight miles north of Boston, Massachusetts, Manchester is not a shrinking city; in fact, according to is own promotional material, Manchester was designated the seventh “Best Small City for Doing Business in America” in 2005 (Manchester Economic Development Office, n.d.). And yet, like Halle, Manchester faces severe problems in terms of competition for investment capital, for high-tech industries, and for well-paying jobs. Manchester lost most of its large-scale industry between the 1930s and the 1960s. In the 1990s, Manchester, like Halle, experienced an influx of capital, including investment in the industrial sector. This led to a brief period of optimism in which it seemed that small, non-unionized factories with low wages and a short, flexible supply chain to high-tech and defense industries centered in the greater Boston area might contribute to an economic resurgence in Manchester (Gitell 2001). Many of these industrial shops (including operations that manufactured wire and cable, light bulbs, and other materials for defense and electronics products) were actually parts of large transnational corporations whose headquarters and primary investment centers were located elsewhere. A new reversal of fortunes began with the high-tech crash in 2000. Manufacturing declined in the following years. The percentage of the workforce employed in manufacturing in New Hampshire declined from 13.4 percent in 1998 to 9.5 percent in 2004. Because it was through

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manufacturing that the city played a larger role within complex regional and international supply chains, which in turn triggered foreign direct investment, its decline weakened the city’s links to global markets. Although service industries have grown, they have done so in ways that reflect the small scale of the city. Much of the service sector is concentrated in hospitals and other charitable institutions. Meanwhile, expansion of the population provided some employment in construction. Through the short-term hightech boom and the subsequent crash and moderate recovery, Manchester did succeed in maintaining a rate of unemployment that is lower than in much of the United States and dramatically lower than in Halle. The rate was 2.4 percent in 2000 and 4.3 percent in 2004 (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics 2006). Unlike Halle, which has a rapidly shrinking population, Manchester has grown in size since 1990, attracting internal migrants, both native and foreign born, from further south in New England, as well as international immigrants and refugees whose first place of settlement in the United States is Manchester. The 2000 census reported that 6.58 percent of the population of Manchester was foreign born. The foreign born who have arrived in the past 15 years make up 4.2 percent of the population of greater Manchester, a proportion similar to that of Halle. As in Halle, Africans from many different countries and Vietnamese are among the most visible migrants, but Manchester also has attracted people from throughout Latin America, the Spanish-speaking Caribbean, and Haiti. The newcomers have been attracted to Manchester because of the synergy between its industrial expansions in the 1990s and its relatively inexpensive housing costs and low crime rates. By 2005, however, housing prices had risen dramatically and rental property was priced beyond the reach of most residents. Manchester resembles Halle in terms of the aspirations of its city leaders, who hoped to build a new, vibrant high-tech economy. The leadership of both cities understood that their city must be competitively positioned within the global economy to succeed; to date, both cities have failed in this endeavor, although both have attracted investment focused on reconstructing the central city. In 2004, Manchester officials rather plaintively called for assistance in developing a “Strategy for the New Economy.” In an Internet advertisement, they acknowledged that Manchester needed to analyze its “relative position in the world economy” (City of Manchester n.d.) so that it could compete in the next decade. In fact, the city leadership did have a development strategy in the 1990s and took high political risks to implement it. In place of external capital flows, officials turned to borrowing and raising taxes to fund an entertainment industry, investing first in a new arena suitable for hockey and various concert venues on the main street of the city and then in the construction of a minor league ballpark near the central business district. Whether this gamble would be any more successful than the EU investment in the urban redevelopment of Halle was unclear. What immediately became apparent were the political costs of rejuvenating the

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real-estate market of the city center and making it a more attractive place for those with ready money to visit or live in. Property taxes rose, and the mayor who led the downtown revitalization lost the 2005 election. In terms of their position on migration, both Halle and Manchester were pulled in different directions by competing sets of interests that reflect the cities’ similar positioning as small-scale cities. On the one hand, foreigners were seen as a new, criminal factor in urban life and one that seriously drains local services. To make concrete the drain on city services, especially on schools, the media, political leaders, and service providers in both cities often referred to the large number of languages spoken in the city that make service provision difficult. Halle public schools reported that, among students, more than fifty languages are spoken. Manchester public schools reported that at least 76 languages are spoken among their students and that they serve approximately 1,700 children in their English as a second language (ESL) programs (Southern New Hampshire Area Health Education Center 2005). On the other hand, both cities have had occasions during which they preferred to celebrate the new migrants. In Manchester, much of the business and political leadership, including the former mayor, has seen new immigrants as providing the diversity needed to market Manchester as a global city as well as sustain Manchester’s low-wage industries. In a ten-minute videotape about the city, available in 2004 on Manchester’s official website, the diverse nature of the workforce was mentioned seven times. Celebrations of cultural diversity were organized by a community centre that provides ESL classes. A Cultural Diversity Task Force circulated a monthly newsletter noting the holidays of various ethnic groups in the city, although most of these groups were not well organized, if at all. Whereas Halle certainly did not need more labor, for certain purposes it did need foreigners. In discussions with city officials, including the mayor, we learned that Halle officials wished to dispel the city’s reputation as unwelcoming to foreigners, which it had earned through neo-Nazi youth violence against foreigners. The officials believed that to compete globally for investors, corporations, and highly skilled professionals, the city must be viewed as culturally diverse and open to foreigners and newcomers. The official presentation of Halle was of a city in transition from manufacturing to service industries and from service to knowledge society. The new slogan for Halle, “City in Change,” signaled the substitution of the lost jobs in the industrial and manufacturing sector by jobs in service and know-how sectors. Consequently, Halle celebrated its newfound cultural diversity through public rituals. Although the asylum seekers and migrants from countries like Nigeria and Iraq are not exactly the foreigners the city is striving to embrace in this transition to a knowledge society, the migrants were part of the muchneeded culturally diverse image Halle wanted to cultivate to attract foreign investment to be globally competitive. The city endorsed the celebration of Foreigners’ Week, a federal initiative that must be implemented with local

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resources and funding. In addition, Halle provided funding through Eine Welt Haus, a nongovernmental organization that organizes programming about foreigners or for foreigners throughout the year. The city also funded a community center dedicated to foreign–native interaction, which primarily occurs through cultural events.

Conclusions: specific and general In short, in both cities it seems likely that the scale of the city was linked to the way in which migrants are represented, understood, and incorporated. And in turn, the opportunities and local trajectories of participation patterns, which the cities were able to offer migrants, affected the pathways of both local and transnational connections the migrants forged, pathways that constitute incorporative acts for migrants and natives alike. Both cities had a place for migrants as part of their public representation. City officials and business leaders looked to migrants to market their cities as localities of cultural diversity. While the importance of concepts of diversity changed in each city over time, reflecting the constant efforts to reinvent the city so as to reposition it globally, the city boosters in each locality recognized that to improve its global positioning their city needed a cosmopolitan appearance, although neither has been able to build and rejuvenate their urban economy around representations of cultural difference or on the basis cultural industries. In both Halle and Manchester, city leaders have tried to reposition their cities through different aspects of culture-knowledge industries: scientific and high-tech knowledge in Halle and entertainment and high-tech in Manchester. Within the contemporary cultural economy of cities, the marketing of various guises of culture—tradition, ethnicity, art, crafts, cuisine, cultural production, entertainment, specialized knowledge, design, or architecture—is itself a product of the synergy between the urban economy and its successful competition for regional, national, and global capital. Cultural industries anchored in diversity may become particularly important for certain economically depressed industrial areas but only if those cities are able to attract public or private funding for such industries and thus provide renewed opportunities for migrants (Cag˘ lar in press; Scott 2004; Rath 2006). This has not been the case for Halle or Manchester. Both cities have been struggling with the many consequences of their weak positionality and at the same time, both have been trying to make use of migrants as representations of difference and cultural performances of diversity. In both places, migrants have a small but persistent presence in representations of the city.13 But underneath the public representations of the city, neither locality was able to offer any significant degree of social mobility and prosperity for the migrants. In the new geographies of governance (Peck 1998: 5), both Halle and Manchester have reduced access to public monies and resources. Both have little money for city services and little or no money for services for migrants. Manchester increasingly offers low-wage service jobs with even a lower wage

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scale than factory work; Halle offers minimal social benefits. Neither of the cities could support most migrants’ efforts to achieve social recognition and status within the city through working within city sponsored programs or through opportunities provided by an expanding economy. Unlike larger-scale cities, such as Berlin or New York, very few public or private agencies provided migrants with opportunities to develop careers as culture brokers who can represent the needs or interests of particular ethnicities. Those few migrants who worked in social-service agencies generally did not occupy paid managerial positions. Those few migrants who achieved political or public prominence advanced not as ethnic leaders but on the basis of a broader non-ethnic constituency. Sometimes, they played the role of public foreigner—persons called on to be general representatives and spokespeople for foreigners in the city. While on the one hand ethnic community formation as a form of incorporation may be less feasible in small-scale cities, on the other, incorporation through Christian congregations that preach global Christianity may be more possible and more salient.14 In these cities, a religion like Christianity, especially in its born-again or Pentecostal varieties, offers connections to people ranging from international preachers to political leaders who are important in local, national, or global arenas. Such forms of connection and the social capital that its weak ties provide were certainly visible in both cities, although in ways that reflect the differences between the cities. In both Manchester and Halle, the scale of the cities marked migrants, especially African migrants, as highly visible, despite their small numbers. In both Halle and Manchester, while local businesspeople and officials saw migrants as useful colorful bodies that represent a necessary component for marketing the city as a global actor, a sector of the population that was native to the city or country cast migrants as dangerous or exotic others. The migrants who joined the churches that could not be easily designated as ethnic churches were looking for a setting that did not highlight their public differentiation and brought them together with the natives in terms of commonality rather than difference. The universalistic Christian messages of the churches were welcoming on many levels. Christian born-again churches such as those in the Resurrection Crusade network or the Pentecostal churches of Halle divide the world between the saved and unsaved. This categorization allowed migrants to be among the saved, allocating them legitimacy and including them among the saviors of the city. It is interesting to note that Pentecostal and born-again Christian organizations specifically encourage identification with the local city. The global evangelizing networks to which the congregations we studied belong all made reference in their literature and their websites to the need to wage spiritual warfare in order to root out the evil within each locality. By choosing to emphasize a Christian universalism rather than an ethnic particularism, some migrants sought ways to become incorporated as local and global actors on their own terms. The non-ethnic Christianity we have been examining offered migrants in small-scale cities a transnational network

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of incorporation into social relations, which gave them access to various kinds of local social, economic, or political resources and eased their social, cultural, and political participation in the city life. Migration studies tend to cast all patterns of migration settlement into the same model, arguing for a model of assimilationism, multicultural pluralism, or transnationalism. We have argued for a different approach, one that traces multiple overlapping modes of migrant incorporation adopted by migrants, each with multiple pathways. Factors of city scale may be structuring the opportunities available to migrants and the barriers they face in settling. This is a call to analyze the pathways of migrant incorporation in relation to the differentiated local trajectories of globalization. It is these trajectories that, as they are shaped by each city’s vertical and horizontal connectivity beyond the national space, in turn shape the modes of participation and opportunities to a city’s inhabitants—including its migrants. Indifference to the significance of specific urban positionality in theorizing migration is anchored in a methodological nationalism that uses ethnic groups and the nation-state as the framework of analysis rather than examining the scalar positioning of cities. In response to global restructuring, neoliberal economic agenda, coupled with neoconservative rhetoric of morality (Harvey 2003), the modes and pathways of migrant local and transnational incorporation that predominate within particular cities may vary. It is possible that non-ethnic pathways play a greater role in overall migrant incorporation in smaller scale cities. It is also probable that non-ethnic pathways of incorporation have a greater impact on small-scale cities and their migrant populations, providing the nexus for some migrants to become prominent or to exert influence on the cultural practices, beliefs, and civic life of the city without being a “representative of” or “leader of” a particular ethnic “community.”15 However, without a careful comparative research of migrant incorporation in cities of different scale, it is not possible to do more than generate hypotheses. Comparative studies are needed to more fully theorize the frequency and distribution of different pathways of migrant incorporation, including various types of non-ethnic pathways. But, of course, the first step is to acknowledge that there are different, multiple, and simultaneous pathways, and this is the step we have taken in this article. While this section closes with a plea for studying migrant incorporation beyond the ethnic lens, it is important not to draw facile political lessons. We are certainly not arguing that ethnic identities are destructive and speaking in favor of born-again Christian organizing. Although the born-again Christians among whom we worked were anti-racist and welcoming to immigrants, they were not tolerant of other belief systems and were supportive of U.S. imperialist projects around the world (Glick Schiller 2005b, 2006). The implications of all forms of identity and religious politics must be examined as they are configured within the changing global geographies of capital. Such a global perspective on migration is only possible if we look beyond the ethnic lens.

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Notes 1 We wish to thank the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation (Program on Global Security and Human Sustainability), the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology, Central European University, and the Center for the Humanities and Sidore Fellowship Program of the University of New Hampshire (UNH) for supporting the research in Halle, Germany, and Manchester, New Hampshire. Thanks to Malmö Högskola for support to Nina Glick Schiller with a Willy Brandt Fellowship. Drafts of this article were delivered at seminars, conferences, or meetings of the House of Culture, Berlin; the University of Florida; the European Association of Social Anthropologists, Vienna; Massachusetts Institute of Technology; the University of Turin; Ruhr-Universität Bochum; and the University of New Hampshire. A German version of the House of Culture conference paper has been published (Glick Schiller, Cag˘ lar and Guldbrandsen 2006a) and an expanded version of this paper appeared in the American Ethnologist (Glick Schiller et al. 2006b). 2 Our ethnography included interviews with city leaders, and more than sixty interviews with migrants in each city. In addition, we participated in events and activities of migrant religious organizations and interviewed core activists in both cities. The research team in Manchester consisted of Nina Glick Schiller, Thaddeus Guldbrandsen, and Peter Buchannan and in Halle of Nina Glick Schiller, Evangelis Karagiannis, and student assistants. 3 The term incorporation is widely used in migration literature published in the U.S. See, for example, Portes and Borocz (1989) and Schmitter Heisler (1992). Ludger Pries also argues for the utility of the term within the European migration debate. He states that incorporation “[…] (seems more neutral and less value loaded than those of assimilation, adaptation or integration). Incorporation first of all is an open-ended process as far as its result and its further development are concerned” (Pries 2003: 447). See also Pries (2006). Schlee and Horstmann (2001) have developed a conceptualization of integration that differs from the one used in European migration literature and resonates with migration scholars’ use of the term incorporation. For research designs exploring pathways of local and transnational incorporation that extend beyond the ethnic lens and critique the concept of the second generation see analyses of migrant youth/popular culture in gateway cities (Cag˘ lar 1998; Maira 2002; Sharma et al. 1996; Soysal 2001; Karakayali 2005). 4 Anthropologists have paid attention to the city as context (Bretell 2003; Cag˘ lar 2001, 2005, 2006, in press; Goode and Schneider 1994; Leeds 1980; Soysal 2001; Straßburger et al. 2000; Yalcin-Heckmann 1997). By the 1990s, migration researchers in Europe had begun to note relationships between the size, significance, or political configuration of particular cities in which migrants were settling and the pattern of incorporation of these migrants (Bommes and Radtke 1996; Koopmans and Statham 2000; Rex 1996; Schiffauer 1999; Schmitter Heisler 1998). With the exception of the global cities literature, however, studies of particular cities contain little or no examination of the relationship between the positioning of the city within broader domains of financial, political, and cultural power and of the trajectories of migrant settlement (Stepick and Portes 1993; Waldinger 2001; Waldinger and Bozorgmehr 1996). 5 Almost fifty years ago migration historians began to consider global restructurings of opportunity and its effect on localities and regions, sparked by a seminal paper by Frank Thistlethwaite. As Erikson (1994: 7) has noted, Thistlethwaite emphasized that international migration and internal migration needed to be analyzed together and that “European migrations were not so much national in

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scope, from Sweden to America for example, as constituted by particular streams from one village or region to a particular country or city elsewhere.” Almost all the migration literature on Turkish immigrants in Germany falls into this category. In the only exception to this pattern, a “Hispanic” candidate who received support from other Hispanics campaigned to and was supported by Democratic Party loyalists of all backgrounds. State policies are compared in terms of the regulation of migration, citizenship, access to work, level of employment, and public benefits. See Joppke (1999) and Castles and Miller (1993) for approaches that point to similarities in migrant patterns of incorporation in various European States and in the United States, despite differences in state policies. The names of the churches and the pastors have been changed in accordance with commitments made to respondents and the procedures of the Institutional Review Board of the University of New Hampshire. There are ethnic congregations in Manchester but if we configure our research by focusing only on ethno-nationalist churches or transnational communities that build such churches we miss important transnational processes. Manchester did have some Protestant churches that were Spanish language but Christian in identity and several Korean protestant congregations that seem to have promoted their ethnic distinctiveness. The core members of these congregations seem to have been part of a secondary migration from the Boston area where ethnic organizing is more pronounced. The population of Halle was reported to be 240,119 in 2003 (Brinkhoff 2004). Halle at that time contained within its administrative boundaries the region of Halle-Neustadt, which, before the unification of Germany, had been considered a separate, suburban city. Manchester is also relatively small, with the 2004 census estimate projecting a population of 109,310 residents (Manchester Economic Development Office 2004). Greater Manchester (population 205,440 in 2000) includes towns that directly border on Manchester, and it is both a federal statistical unit and a catchment area for the provision of certain social services (Manchester Economic Development Office, 2004) By 2006, in Halle global connections were portrayed in terms of Halle’s historic prominence rather than through migrants, but they continued to maintain migrant-foreigner programs with representations of cultural diversity. In Manchester the increasing evidence of a renewed down-turn in the manufacturing sector meant that inexpensive immigrant labor was no longer featured but cultural diversity remained significant to promoting the city. This may be true for other religions as well. In metropolises or gateway cities, we often see non-ethnic forms of incorporation through popular (youth) culture.

4

Transstate spaces and development Some critical remarks Thomas Faist

Transstate1 communities and associations have been at the centre of the optimistic visions of national and international economic development policy establishments since the early 2000s. There are three central elements of this new enthusiasm. First, over the past three decades the surge in remittances transferred by transstate migrants has given rise to a kind of euphoria (Kapur 2004). Migrant remittances2 are perceived to be a nearly ideal form of bottom-up financial development; indeed, looking at overall numbers, annual remittances to developing countries have more than doubled during the 1990s and have been approximately 20 per cent higher than official development assistance (ODA) to these countries. And certainly migrant remittances have been on a par with foreign direct investment in many parts of the developing world. Remittances have increased with the upward trend in the rate of transstate migration (United Nations 2004). Second, knowledge transferred through networks of scientists and experts from immigration to emigration countries are increasingly seen as ‘brain circulation’, beneficial to all parties involved (cf. Findlay 2003). The transfer of ideas is seen as helping developing and transformation countries to participate in knowledge societies, which are the basis for innovation, productivity and development. Third, even the transfer of political remittances, namely ideas regarding the rule of law, good governance, democracy, and human rights, has achieved a growing prominence in the aftermath of interventions into armed conflicts and efforts at reconstructing countries ravaged by civil war – evidenced lately in Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq. Occasionally, diasporas made up of exiles, refugees, and labour migrants are hailed as mediators in conflict resolution – for example, in the cases of South Africa or Nigeria (cf. Shain and Barth 2003). The argument put forward in this analysis is that the new enthusiasm over the crucial role of transstate communities and migrant associations constitutes an effort to fuse principles of community with those of the global market. Yet there are both compatibilities and incompatibilities between community and market principles. Moreover, the principles of transstate communities and the national state may clash – those who have chosen the geographical exit option of migration also have a voice because they

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partake in decision-making but are not affected by the consequences of these decisions. How, in fact, do transstate communities and associations interact with the principles of states and markets in flows across borders and boundaries? In order to answer this question it is necessary to first address the following questions. First, how has academic and policy thinking on development cast the role of communities and non-state organisations? Second, in what ways are the activities of transstate cliques, groups, and organisations that embody some of the community principles complementary to or incompatible with those of other institutions functioning according to the logics of states and markets? Indeed, little is actually understood about what role transstate groups and associations play vis-à-vis states and markets when it comes to the transfer of financial capital, such as remittances and investments, knowledge and political ideas. The perspective taken here is not one of global governance but of transstate subjects, starting with migrants and their communities. What is needed is an examination of the role of communities for development and the role communities actually play in relation to other principles of social order, such as the market and the state. The booming interest in the role of diasporas and transstate migrant organisations reflects changes in the concepts of development that guide public policies of international and national institutions and NGOs – and the shift in attention may signal more fundamentally the changing balance of communities, states and markets. Therefore, the problématique raised relates to the more general question of the shifting balance of community, state and market under conditions commonly called globalisation. Heuristically, one may distinguish three principles of social order: community, state and market. Here, the community principle refers to the notion that social order presupposes, or at least benefits from, the rights and duties that are attached to members of concrete communities of persons. Communities constitute the cement that integrates the members of concrete communities into sharing values of trust, reciprocity, loyalty, and solidarity, bounded by rights and obligations of members towards each other. Rights and duties delimit the boundaries of communities, which may rest on diverse mechanisms such as kinship lineage, shared knowledge and values, belief in common institutions, or religious beliefs. Here, the community principle is supplemented by association, which refers to organisations of persons interested in common causes. The boundaries of the market are quite different, in that dispersed competition is ideally driven by the interest of human agents in the purposive acquisition of individual goods without much, or indeed any consideration of or control over, what impact the pursuit of acquisitive purposes may have on others or on other persons’ future selves. The principle of state consists of hierarchical control, carrying out binding decisions in political communities. State authority is meant to serve the common good – in the case under consideration here, culminating in the notion of development. Whereas communities are characterised by various notions of boundaries of

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‘us’ distinct from ‘others’ and markets exist without geographical borders, states – in their modern incarnations since the Westphalian Peace at any rate – are defined both by clear territorial borders and boundaries set by their function to implement authoritatively binding decisions by the force of power and legitimacy. In short, community and associations, market and state are master mechanisms of social order characterised by incompatibilities, yet also requiring one another in order to function (Streeck and Schmitter 1985). Empirically, the community and associations principle is studied through categories such as cliques, groups and organisations of mobile people, the state principle by looking at government and publicly authorised actors and the market principle by looking at firms. This analysis focuses on various transstate subjects – namely, groups and organisations of mobile persons, including families, epistemic communities and diasporas. Such transstate social formations mobilise very diverse forms of capital: financial capital, such as money in the form of remittances and/or investments; knowledge and professional experience; and political ideas, such as ideas on forms of government, rights and responsibilities and democracy. Financial capital, knowledge, and political ideas can be mobilised within the bounds of social capital – that is, through various forms of reciprocity and solidarity (Faist 2000: ch. 4), sometimes called ‘social remittances’ (Levitt and Nyberg-Sørensen 2004). Accordingly, the notion of development is understood here in the way that it is used by different kinds of transstate social formations: in the case of transstate families, as an informal insurance against economic risks and as an investment in their children’s future; in the case of village associations, as the improvement of the infrastructure and the provision of local collective goods such as education and health; in the case of networks of businesspersons, as opportunities for investment and optimal interest; in the case of epistemic communities, as the unhindered flow of knowledge; and in the case of national communities, as a high degree of political autonomy, sometimes even involving the formation of an independent nation-state. All these notions resemble the overall lowest common denominator that the term development has carried since the late 1940s – namely, the vague hope of progression and betterment for those parts of the world deemed ‘underdeveloped’ (for a trenchant critique, see Escobar 1995). A transstate approach means looking not only at developing countries and countries in transformation but also at highly industrialised countries. In the latter case, there is value added in; for example, the contributions of migrants to social security and welfare state provisions, the closing of labour market gaps in the informal service economy and the values of democracy and human rights transported by the highly skilled. The first part of this analysis outlines the ideational shift to communities and associations as a reference category for development thinking on the part of international organizations and OECD country governments over the past three to four decades. The second part discusses the role of the three

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principles of social order – in particular community and association vis-à-vis state and market in development processes – and looks at how migrant organisations and groups have been complementary or incompatible with state and market principles. Transstate analysis involves studying the ties that cross emigration and immigration states as well as sending and receiving regions, and must transcend the interdependence between closed units in opening up transstate social spaces. The third section of this analysis touches on the implications for further research and argues that the concept of transstate social spaces, that is, spaces in between the local and the global but also between national states, can be used as an instrument to shed light on the dilemmas of border-crossing democracy and citizenship without relying simply on state-centred notions. Of course it goes without saying that states themselves – in contrast to more recent ideas on the balance between state, market and community and association in development – have to be brought back into the analysis to unearth opportunity structures for the emergence of transstate social spaces and thus the role of transstate groups and associations in development policy.

The conceptual evolution of the role of community and association in development The importance of principles such as community and association as a pillar of development has increased over the past three decades. The more recent focus of development policy on transstate subjects in the context of increasing remittances of migrants fits with a context in which the roles of the state and the market have been fundamentally re-evaluated by international development organisations. There has been an obvious shift of thinking in the international development policy establishment, which has rediscovered transstate migration as a set of processes involving the transfer of resources from developed to developing countries. For example, international institutions such as the World Bank, but also national organisations and governments, have recognised an increased role of communities, associations and transstate communities in development processes in particular (cf. Biao 2005). In 1962, John Kenneth Galbraith described migration as ‘the oldest action against poverty’ (Galbraith 1962; cited in House of Commons 2004). This statement seems to rest on solid foundations in economic theory – if one were to liberalise transstate migration, large gains could accrue. Theoretically, migration will decrease under a global system of free trade for all factors of production, including labour, because of factor price equalisation – that is, the tendency of wages to equalise as workers move from poorer to richer regions of the world. Over time, differences in the prices of goods and the wages of workers should be reduced with freer trade. One of the byproducts would be a significant drop in the wage level and, probably, welfare state provisions in highly industrialised immigration countries (cf. Hamilton and Whaley 1984).

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As expected, there have been critical voices calling into question overly simplistic expectations and spurious causalities. Certainly, remittance flows through migrants and transstate communities and associations are not a panacea for development problems. After all, the onset and success of development processes depend, among other things, on macro-structural conditions, such as land reform, a favourable investment climate and an efficient, transparent, and non-corrupt bureaucracy and system of governance (to mention only a few of the most obvious candidates). Overall, the evidence for development outcomes is contradictory and fragmentary. Much of the analysis that supports beliefs about the overall costs and benefits of migration is based on micro-level research and cannot conclusively demonstrate the validity of macro-level conclusions. It is deeply problematic to extrapolate from micro-level evidence to macro-level outcomes without specifying the mechanisms of the aggregation processes. With respect to knowledge transfer, it may be of little practical value for emigration countries, immigration countries and mobile persons simply to rename what used to be called ‘brain drain’ as ‘brain gain’. Such a facile renaming overlooks the fact that there are indeed deleterious effects resulting from the emigration of so-called highly skilled professionals, such as the care drain in the health sector in Southern Africa, or the exit of natural scientists and engineers in the least developed countries, where there is little potential for replacing those who leave. Lastly, the involvement of exiles, migrants and refugees in political development as carriers of ideas of human rights and democratisation ignores the role that some of these groups may have played at the very core of perpetuating violent conflicts instead of resolving them (see, for example, the Tamil Tigers’ long-distance nationalism). It is noteworthy that the documents presenting the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) declared by the United Nations (UN) make no mention of any links between transstate migration or diasporas and development. Very few of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSP) acknowledge migration or refugee flows and their connection to development. Yet all these caveats have not seriously challenged the emphasis on transstate subjects as carriers of development projects. Still, the role of transstate communities and migrant associations is largely an emerging issue, discussed in more specialised forums, such as the Global Commission on Migration. Bringing ‘community’ and ‘association’ back into thinking on development policy can be seen as an incremental process that has occurred over roughly four successive stages. The first refers to the long period after World War II in which development, such as import substitution industrialisation, occurred under mainly state-led industrialisation. Corresponding academic theories, such as the modernisation theory of the 1950s and 1960s, did not attribute a crucial active role to (small) groups and organisations – other than as recipients of massive cultural, political and economic change. This state of affairs began to change, marking a second stage, launched by the World Bank’s 1973 call for targeting development efforts to the ‘poorest of

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the poor’. This proclamation produced a shift in focus away from growth and towards issues of redistribution and equity. Understandably, this ideational move involved an increasing emphasis on community participation and associational activities in development. Whether labelled ‘farmer-first’, ‘bottom-up’ or ‘grassroots’ development strategies, the focus was on decentralisation, localisation and the satisfaction of basic human needs for food, shelter, health and what we today call ‘human security’. The foregrounding of community and association coincided with increasing criticism of the ‘developmental’ state and, above all, allowed for a greater role for market principles. Organisations like the World Bank called for greater participation in the world market, in marked contrast to policies inspired by dependency theory, which advocated a partial dissociation from world market participation (e.g. Senghaas 1974). Influenced by events of the 1970s and 1980s, such as the debt crisis in Latin America and the implosion of post-colonial states in parts of Africa and elsewhere, academic studies also emphasised the economic distortions effected by rent-seeking elites in command of predatory states (e.g. Bates 1988). International development institutions began to place more faith in the operation of more or less unfettered markets and the benefits of market-driven growth as promising for societies whose potential for economic growth had been stymied by what were considered inefficient state institutions. A shorthand description of this trend was the ‘Washington Consensus’. Indeed, international organizations, like the International Monetary Fund (IMF), pressured recipient governments to rely on price signals and little else for social coordination, thus advocating privatisation, deregulation and the demolition of labour rights and social subsidies (cf. Chang and Grabel 2004). In crafting policy, international development agencies increasingly bypassed developing country governments, choosing instead to rely on the mediation of international and local non-governmental agencies. The trend toward marketisation coincided, perhaps awkwardly but certainly not incidentally, with an anti-étatist notion that development entailed the empowerment of communities and associations of individuals to undertake the development project. Obviously, the emphasis on local autonomy and grassroots participation was meant to provide a useful corrective to topdown development strategies of the past. In policy thinking, in short, the state was retreating as a mechanism for creating social order and the community and association emerged as compensating mechanisms. In a paradigmatic conceptual innovation, the international development policy agencies began to use new concepts presumed to drive development – the concept of ‘social capital’ being one of the most important (cf. Evans 1996). Conceptually, the notion of social capital hints at the marriage of the market and community/association principles. Resources inherent in social ties – such as reciprocity, trust and solidarity – are thought to constitute interest yielding capital from, for example, access to financial and other social resources. Major actors in development policy, such as the World Bank and

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myriad NGOs, propagated more participatory forms of development on the local level. Ideas of globalisation from below have logically focused on diasporas, cross-border associations and transstate communities. In this process, the role of the state as a principle of social order in development has changed as well. It is now a service provider for markets and, partly, communities, creating the very conditions for market exchange through non-corrupt rule-making, a stable bureaucracy and the guarantee of minimum human, civil and political rights. In a nutshell, political and legal structures provide the necessary infrastructure for economic growth (North 1990). Notions such as good governance and establishing the rule of law in the aftermath of the ‘third wave of democratisation’ (Diamond 1996) rule supreme in the universe of developmental concepts. In summary, there has indeed been an ideational change in bringing community and association back in the development discourse and, most recently, transstate groups and organisations. While there is certainly a strong link between changing concepts and actual public policies, it is necessary to go far beyond the supposed role of community, association, state and market to unearth the distinct roles of each set of principles of social order.

Community and association vis-à-vis market and state: complementarities and incompatibilities While states authoritatively enforce borders and boundaries, and markets verge on a borderless world, communities and associations as boundary markers occupy a distinct niche in creating social order across borders. The focus here is on how small kinship groups, business networks and epistemic cliques interact with actors in states and markets.3 Financial capital as remittances: small kinship groups For many of the persons belonging to the smallest type of transstate group – namely, families or kinship groups – border-crossing ties and living modes emerging out of migration may serve as a livelihood strategy, quite akin to income out of migration as an insurance mechanism (Nyberg-Sørensen et al. 2002: 2). This involves split households in various states. Monetary remittances frequently bind immigrants to their kin over long distances through ties of reciprocity and solidarity; this happens with, for example, exchange between generations when children work abroad and support their elderly parents and other family members in the country of origin. Instances of congruence of community and association transactions with state and market principles are obvious. Transfers of family members signal the dual role of some immigrants as providers both for families abroad and for the coffers of the welfare state in the country of employment. In social security systems for old age pensions, for example, the younger average age

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of immigrants compared to the rest of the population leads to substantial transfers. A study on Germany in the late 1980s found that immigration generated positive short-run benefits in selected sectors of the welfare state. The 3.6 million people who immigrated between 1988 and 1991 made significant contributions: according to this study, 100,000 immigrant employees generated €16 billion for social security, against costs of only €7 billion (Barabas et al. 1992). On the other hand, transstate migrants may support kin in the country of origin. Such communities and states often lack stateorganised social security systems, and, if they exist, they are inadequate to ensure a minimum standard of living. The limits to this dual role lie in the, sometimes unsteady, flow of remittances across the life-cycle of migrants. There is a general understanding in the literature that remittances are likely to decline over time as migrants may become more committed to the country or region of settlement. On average, there is a peak period of three to five years in which remittances are sent, often followed by a decline at the point at which a migrant achieves permanent resident status abroad. A further element of congruence is macro-economic. Some emigration states, especially those with large amounts of remittances and those in which such transfers reach high percentage of GDP, have come to use the amount of current and future remittances to upgrade their creditworthiness in the financial sector. In this way, migrants’ solidarity and reciprocity with their shadow households, residing in the country of origin, have become a ‘hardcurrency receivable’ used as a ‘tradable security’ to secure foreign loans for economies whose creditworthiness has been downgraded in the international market (Guarnizo 2003). The apparent incompatibility in the case of these transactions concerns the ways in which small kinship groups compete with banks and other market institutions that constitute formal remittance channels. Briefly put, market giants may, in some instances, compete with solidarity systems, such as the unofficial and sometimes illegal hawalla and hundi transaction systems. The latter are organised on trust among, for example, members of religious communities and associations, and are used in manifold situations. These systems allow migrants who wish to transfer remittances to do so without incurring high fees. The sending end transmits information to the receiving end, and the remittances are issued immediately – based on reciprocal trust (for details, see Ballard 2005). These forms of transactions clash with the more recent involvement of large financial corporations in the control of the transfer of remittances worldwide. For example, Western Union and MoneyGram controlled, as of 1996, as much as 97 per cent of the remittance market and 81 per cent of the estimated 43,000 outlets in the US (Guarnizo 2003: 686). While the US-Mexican market is dominated by larger corporations, remittances to South Asia seem to take place through unofficial channels. A study in Bangladesh, for example, shows that 40 per cent of remittances are sent through informal hundi sources, 4.6 per cent through

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friends and relatives, 8 per cent are carried by hand by migrants when they return, and only 46 per cent go through official sources (Hugo 2003: 9). In the aftermath of 11 September 2001, various Western governments have closed down unofficial channels, arguing that they were used for illicit money laundering and explicit terrorist purposes (cf. Mellyn 2003). The compatibility between community transactions and state efforts to tap these transactions is also questionable. It is often assumed in studies on remittances that the migrants concerned emigrated more or less voluntarily. Little attention is paid to refugees, or more precisely, those who had little element of freedom in exiting. Contentious state–citizen relations in the original emigration countries may go a long way in shedding light on the resistance to emigration states’ efforts to tap remittances, especially where one of the motivations to emigrate was to flee the influence of authoritarian governments. Moreover, if migrants feel that governments are simply seeking to tax their diaspora, the compliance to indirect taxation is called into question. In the case of Eritrea, the young state tried to tax expatriates at two per cent, the so-called ‘healing tax’, in the late 1980s. Later, the state used the funds remitted to finance the war with Ethiopia. In important ways, incompatibilities affect small groups, which are changing as a result of learning during the migration process itself. In some cases, the ‘feminisation of migration’ resulted in the very transformation of gender relations, which constituted the backbone of the migratory arrangements in small and large kinship groups. In Bangladesh, the migration of women to Malaysia led to changes in social practices. Malaysia is considered a role model for Bangladesh, and is also a Muslim country. Once the flow of women from Bangladesh to Malaysia had started, young women sought to emigrate, resulting in increased economic independence. Those engaging in migration gave loans to other women and also participated in the labour force in Bangladesh. Since female labour-force participation in Malaysia is relatively high, migrant and even non-migrant women adopted some of the same practices in Bangladesh (Dannecker 2004). Yet, we also know of other cases in which transstate practices exacerbated gendered power structures, especially when control over financial remittances rested with men (cf. Mahler and Pessar 2001 on El Salvador). These examples suggest that transstate groups should not be regarded simply as unitary actors in all respects but rather as social collectives connected by sometimes conflicting social and symbolic ties. Financial capital as investments: networks of businesspersons Emigrants and the children of emigrants living abroad are sometimes seen by the government in the country of origin as effective middlemen (e.g. China) who play a crucial role in brokering foreign investments or investing themselves. Yet it is also a common assumption that development defined as economic growth does not depend primarily on the inflow of financial capital

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but on entrepreneurial spirit (Hirschmann 1958). Businesspersons as communities of practice may foster an atmosphere in which an entrepreneurial spirit and other kinds conducive to economic success might grow. Studies on such entrepreneurial spirit have been done on mainland China, Taiwan and India. Overseas Indians who settled in Silicon Valley in the US, for example, contributed to the rise of the region around Bangalore as the hub of the Indian industry in information technology. Indian emigrants who worked as highly skilled specialists in Silicon Valley invested in the burgeoning Indian IT industry. Software specialists in India were already employed by overseas companies to process data and develop programmes; the Indian investors from Silicon Valley added another dimension by setting up companies in India. Other foreign companies from the US and Europe followed suit (cf. Cornelius et al. 2001). The Taiwanese experience parallels this case (Tseng 2000). In these cases of a large and well-educated tertiary sector of citizens living abroad, the potential for foreign investment is high. Again, about 20 million citizens from India live abroad, a diaspora second in size only to that of China. It is estimated that the income of this category amounts to more than a third of India’s GDP. It is therefore no surprise that this category, called ‘non-resident Indians’ (NRI), provided about 10 percent of foreign direct investment (FDI) in India and a sizable part of venture capital. The People’s Republic of China may serve as a case par excellence: about 50 per cent of FDI comes from some 30 million overseas Chinese. Successive Chinese governments have created incentives for capital investment by overseas Chinese in selected enterprise areas (e.g. Saxenian 2002). Undoubtedly, global production chains, in this case software development and processing, have made investments like these more feasible and more profitable. Yet, we know very little about the networks and cliques businesspersons entertain among each other and with bridging brokers in the emigration country. We need to know more about how businesspersons act as brokers, as communities in between – sometimes called ‘transnational workers’ or ‘temporary returnees’ who work in emigration and immigration regions and play a role as middlemen linking businesses in the two regions with their personal networks and technological and market know-how. It seems plausible to assume that quite a few expatriates investing in their countries of origin have insider advantages, such as knowledge of the language and local customs, and are likely to enjoy the trust of bureaucrats who administer economic planning (cf. Rauch 2001). Governments have implemented a host of policies to attract both highly skilled emigrants from abroad as returnees and entice those who stay overseas to maintain productive links. For example, the Indian government offers tax incentives for expatriates, and tries to use their expertise, advice, and ideas to equip Indian companies and to create opportunities for overseas Indian companies. One symbolic but highly visible instrument has been a special resident status for expatriate businesspersons, akin to dual citizenship (on dual citizenship, see Faist 2007; Faist and Kivisto 2007). This status has created added entry options for privileged groups.

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This example already hints at potential incompatibilities between communities of practice and states. The Chinese state, for instance, encourages cross-border flows of financial capital but certainly objects to the import of political ideas via expatriates. Expatriates’ ideas concerning liberalisation of the political regime and a greater recognition of human rights and democratic ideals have certainly not been welcome, albeit the groups involved in the transfer of economic versus political capital are not one and the same – students versus businesspersons. For immigration countries, immigrant or ethnic entrepreneurship may be part of beneficial transstate business ties. Canadian-based studies have shown that a doubling of skilled migration from Asia saw a 74 per cent increase in Asian imports in Canada (Page and Adams 2004). Ethnic entrepreneurship may also be instrumental in creating jobs for immigrants and natives. Markets may expand in two directions. First, nostalgia among immigrants for the foods and products of the country of origin creates markets for those products in the immigration country, fostering local production and international trade (e.g. Turkish immigrants in Germany). Second, migrant entrepreneurs may invest in the countries of origin and thus contribute directly to economic development abroad. Although there is heated debate over the exact benefits provided by so-called ethnic niches, enclaves and ethnic markets, and for which category (e.g. ethnic entrepreneurs versus coethnic workers; cf. Faist 2000: ch. 8), migrant entrepreneurship is a prime example of financial capital following persons, or more precisely, capital accumulated by those persons first attracted abroad by capital. In all these processes, social capital is a crucial bridging mechanism. Knowledge: epistemic communities Epistemic communities of scholars and experts are exemplary communities of practice without spatial propinquity. Scientists and professional experts share common models, theories and sometimes even lifestyles, characterised by high geographical mobility. Recently, major political actors, including international organisations and governments, have started to focus on not only the emigration or re-migration, or return, of highly skilled professionals but also on the formation of transstate networks. This shift of perspective is partly a result of the fact that while many of the highly skilled professionals do not return to their region of origin, they nonetheless form border-crossing epistemic networks in which the countries of origin are sometimes involved. For example, half of all foreign students who earn PhDs in the USA remain in the United States five years later. The OECD estimates the total brain drain from developing countries to OECD countries to be about 12.9 million persons, with 7 million in the US alone. Conversely, there is a massive outflow from emigration regions: according to the World Bank, Africa, for example, lost one-third of its executives between 1960 and 1987 (Stalker 1994). In short, the role of knowledge exchange for economic growth and

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development has regained importance over recent years; indeed, resource transfers across countries are nowadays discussed within the framework of the knowledge society (Stehr 1992). There are numerous claims about the importance of knowledge transfer and scientific cooperation for development (World Bank 1999). In connection with public policies, there have been increased efforts to connect migration policies to research policies in the developing states, transformation states, and industrial countries (e.g. BMZ 2001: 12). It is noteworthy that academic analysis of the developmental consequences of the mobility of highly skilled persons has paralleled political expectations: in the 1960s, a majority of analyses entertained the idea of a brain gain for developing countries, and mobility was seen as a resource for modernising developing countries. In the 1970s and 1980s, the reverse was true – that is, the more critical view of the brain drain carried the day, with the underlying assumption that emigration was harmful to developing countries. This is not surprising because such studies situated the phenomenon within the dependency literature paradigm. In the course of the 1990s, the dominant academic and political mood shifted again. Experts and politicians from industrial countries in need of highly skilled technological specialists now assert that there is a ‘brain circulation’, an apparently neutral term. There are claims about mutual benefits for all actors involved, for the highly skilled as well as for the emigration and immigration countries themselves, such as the creation of jobs in the software industry and increasing capital investment from abroad. In highly industrialised countries, public policies directed toward recruiting highly skilled migrants now routinely also include efforts to attract international students. Subsequently, some OECD countries, such as Germany, have recently changed their legislation to allow international students to remain or to re-enter, once they have completed their studies. At the same time, countries of emigration have begun to take initiatives to reverse the brain drain. Examples include the Indian government’s efforts to sponsor investments by expatriates in the Information Technology (IT) sector. There are various possible outcomes of brain transfer: (1) brain drain followed by brain gain, (2) brain drain and (3) a ‘global brain chain’. In the first case, brain drain followed by brain drain, there is usually deficit at exit, followed by possible gains not only for migrants and immigration countries but also for emigration countries. The emigration of the highly skilled professionals may be advantageous for those remaining in the country of origin, when educated people leave and report back that they have been economically successful. Such communication creates an incentive to those left behind to improve their knowledge and social capital – for example, by investing in higher education. Such processes may happen on a large scale, but only a small percentage of those whose capital assets have improved will actually leave, while the rest will stay in the country of origin and benefit from improved education in the home country (Stark and Wang 2001). In the case of brain drain, there is no replacement capability, an outcome that seems to

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affect the poorest countries especially. Prominent empirical examples include the so-called (health) ‘care drain’ from Zambia, Liberia and Zimbabwe. Nurses and medical doctors from these and other countries of Sub-Saharan Africa fill the gaps in the health systems of developed countries although the deficits in their countries of origin are very large, not least because of the AIDS/HIV pandemic in Southern Africa. Meanwhile, health care systems in OECD countries reap the benefits. In the UK, for example, one in ten persons working in health care came from developing countries in the early 1990s. The third possibility is a global brain chain or ‘staged cascade’, which may involve both brain drain and brain gain. A noteworthy example is medical doctors who move from Canada to the US, who are, in turn, replaced by South Africans in Canada. At the far end of the chain, physicians from other sub-Saharan countries relocate to South Africa. In immigration countries, notions of economic globalisation have led to an increased effort by companies and states to attract post-secondary international students and future scientists. OECD countries have thus changed their legislation, moving from a red card to a red carpet strategy. The hunt for knowledge workers is nonetheless reminiscent of ‘body shopping’ and the poaching of workers, a well-known strategy employed by many countries emulating the success of economic leaders (for example, eighteenth-century England employed this strategy to attract workers from the Netherlands (cf. Chang 2002)). The difference, however, is that nowadays it is not the countries catching up that engage in poaching but those who are furthest ahead. The US is currently the only country with a positive balance vis-à-vis all the other countries in the world at the same time. Persons of foreign origin make up 12 per cent of the entire highly qualified segment of the US labour market. Nonetheless, this share is similar in other OECD countries. Thus, while in simple numbers the contribution of the developing world to the developed is relatively marginal, it is nevertheless strategically important since it eases shortages in the labour market in the target countries. For developing and some transformation countries the volume of skills involved is sizeable. What constitutes a small proportion of personnel in the North – the so-called developed countries – is a large one for the South – the so-called developing countries. For instance, about one-third of researchers and engineers who work in OECD countries have originated in developing countries. Generally, transformation countries, such as the People’s Republic of China, have greater leverage and may succeed in re-attracting their intellectuals. Also, proportionally fewer and fewer Chinese students go abroad to study (Meyer 2005). Overall, there is mounting evidence that epistemic communities of scholars and experts are well connected to both countries of origin and countries of destination (see, e.g., Barré et al. 2003). Obviously, in the case of brain gain, we observe a congruence of community on the one hand and market and state on the other hand, while an incompatibility exists in case of brain drain, such as the care drain out of least-developed countries.

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Interestingly, there are clear limits to state sponsorship and hierarchical control of epistemic communities. Currently, roughly 40 such networks are documented throughout the world, involving about 35 developing countries. These networks concern activities such as joint research projects, information exchange, technology transfers, joint ventures or training sessions. Many of these epistemic communities are based on the idea that return is not the only alternative to a skills’ exodus – for them, there is an alternative transstate option. Not only national governments but also international organisations are engaged in setting up such networks, as is reflected in, for example, policy programmes like the United Nations Development Program’s ‘Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals’. The policy involves the production of databases of skilled nationals overseas who may be willing to engage in particular development projects. Another example is the International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) ‘Migration for Development in Africa’ (MIDA) programme, which seeks to mobilise the skills of African nationals abroad for the benefit of Africa’s development. However, emigration of the highly skilled can be beneficial only if there is already a minimal stock of highly qualified people; otherwise, there is no replacement capacity. An indication of this is that about 250,000 African-born professionals work outside Africa, and 100,000 non-African professionals in Africa are employed by UN agencies or through NGOs. While systems of training and research are predominantly organised along national lines, epistemic communities often evade the narrow principles of the national interest. An important case in point is the network Red Caldas, set up by the Colombian government in the early 1990s (Chaparro et al. 2004). This experience suggests the importance of specialised research communities, built along decentralised networks, which have a genuinely transstate orientation. In the first phase, the government set-up centralised radial networks, which developed later into epistemic communities with a decentralised character. In this stage the project developed along national nodes from the early to mid-1990s. The government established national nodes in all countries around the globe which had a critical mass of Colombian graduate students and researchers – all in all 27 countries and 874 researchers and graduate students were involved. Working groups formed, bringing together researchers in Colombia, Colombian researchers in the various countries abroad and researchers from developed countries who were interested in these topics. Red Caldas maintained a registry of such projects. In the second half of the 1990s it turned out that both researchers based in Colombia and those abroad did not congregate so much around the national nodes but congealed in specialised epistemic communities. Also, Red Caldas evolved into a network of networks when support from the centre – the government – diminished. The national nodes practically disappeared in the late 1990s. The epistemic communities in which researchers associated with Colombia actually participated had a more clearly defined membership and defined activities, and were characterised by a more participatory rather than

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hierarchical model. In sum, the state-centric effort to establish transstate epistemic communities along national lines failed, while decentralised networks succeeded in attracting natural and social scientists. Epistemic communities and the associated flows of knowledge are an excellent example of the different principles of providing goods in communities, markets and states. Communities and associations provide club goods, as distinct from private and public goods. While public goods, and thus the common good, provided by states are characterised by the twin principles of nonexcludability and access for all (that is, non-exclusiveness), private goods are exclusive and restricted to a selected portion of the population. Club goods fall somewhere in between, as non-members can actually be excluded. However, based on membership, the goods provided are indeed collective (cf. Breuer et al.1995). Put briefly, it is the boundaries between members and non-members that matter most in the provision of club goods. In the case of epistemic communities, knowledge is akin to a club good, situated in between knowledge as a public and a private good. On the one hand, the increasing knowledge flows across borders, helped by the rapid dissemination and adoption of information and communication technologies, suggest that knowledge, an essential value for development, can be considered a public good. On the other hand, knowledge is a private good, reflected in the importance of industrial property rights (IPRs) and other forms of knowledge appropriation. The production of and the access to knowledge is therefore selective. Transstate epistemic communities provide mechanisms for the translation of science into knowledge as a factor of production and decision-making. Certain forms of knowledge are generated through communities of practice of like-minded people or peers who work in a given field or on a given topic. Epistemic communities are also connected to extension workers and end-users (socalled stakeholders). In short, epistemic communities of practice are organisational forms for producing and accessing protected knowledge that circulates freely only within these communities, and is accessible only to members.

Outlook: transstate social spaces and states This analysis has suggested some of the ways in which communities and associations play a role in cross-border processes and development in pointing out interaction with other principles of social order, especially market and state. Two issues need to be considered in further research: first, the reconstruction of transstate groups, associations, networks and organisations and, second, the changing role of how states open and restrict transstate social spaces. The former helps to avoid the essentialisation of transstate subjects and to counter the tendency of both academic research and policymaking to reconstruct transstate collective subjects as unitary actors. The latter focus is necessary to clarify the changing role of states. More attention needs to be paid to how states structure transstate social spaces, for example, through the regulation of transstate migration.

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The empirical examples discussed here suggest that transstate collectives, such as groups, associations, organisations and diasporas cannot be treated as unitary actors if one wants to understand the tensions inherent in transstate spaces and the implications for the conceptualisation of transstate structures and processes. Certainly, the opportunities for transstate actors have changed in the process of globalisation, not only for migrant-based collectives (cf. Evans 2000). Because of the apparent increase in interconnectedness through long-distance communication, facilitated face-to-face communication and interaction through travel, as well as the diffusion of ideas and knowledge, social life across the state borders has become more dense and extensive – the spaces ‘in between’ states have multiplied. Some of the cherished concepts of migration research need to be questioned because they may not be adequate to capture more fluid lifestyles, modes of action and collective behaviour. The lives of migrants are not necessarily characterised by one-time settlement and commitment to one society or associations and groups in one society. Clearly, transstate social spaces do not necessarily imply that communities of origin and communities of destination are congruent in terms of interests and ideas. As aforementioned, transstate activists who do not permanently reside in the community of origin may hold very different notions of development from those ‘at home’. This problem of incongruence has not received sufficient attention in terms of its conceptual implications. For example, notions such as ‘transnational citizenship’ are used to describe political participation, rights, duties and belonging of transstate migrants through mechanisms such as hometown associations. But, an important element of citizenship is equal political freedom through the principle of democracy – a principle that holds that those making decisions (voice) should not be able to exit at will. While we may still want to use the term ‘citizenship’ in a transstate context, we would want to avoid the ecological fallacy of simply transposing concepts from the nation-state level to transstate social spaces (cf. Kivisto and Faist 2007). The concept of the nation-state is critical to defining the opportunity structures in transstate social spaces and transactions connected to development. Contrary to assumptions about the declining role of the state principle pertaining to market and community, states do play an active role in shaping the very conditions for transstate subjects engaged in development issues. The relationship of community to what is called globalisation has been even more obvious in the efforts of national governments to reshape immigration policy. In a departure from the 1960s, public policies now focus not only on return migration as a way to development but also on the sponsorship of transstate networks. Policymakers in advanced welfare states in OECD countries have connected immigration with the future of social provisions. Facing a demographic transition of considerable magnitude, one line of argument sees immigration as a contribution to rejuvenate labour markets, maintain population size to ensure future economic growth and soften the transition to other forms of old-age pension schemes. In short, the issue of

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replacement migration (UN 2000) has climbed up the ladder of policy instruments in the contemporary restructuring of welfare states. One of the justifications for using immigration for economic purposes, and thus clearly defining the ‘national interest’ in European countries, is the effort to recast the effects of transstate migration for developing countries. This trend is nowhere as visible as in the issue of migrants with a tertiary education. Contemporary immigration policy in the OECD world, as we have seen, is partly concerned with competition for the best brains in the world, in efforts to attract not only highly skilled workers as permanent or temporary settlers for sectors, such as information technology, but also international students. This investment in knowledge will help, it is believed, to weather the storms of global economic competition and the increasing competition among institutions of higher education and research (see, e.g., Bericht der Unabhängigen Kommission Zuwanderung 2001 in Germany). Increasingly, the obvious criticism of the brain-drain effect of such policies is countered by references to the actual evidence and potential rewards of brain gain. The French and the British governments, for example, have rationalised the selective recruitment of highly skilled experts by introducing cooperative development schemes (cf. House of Commons 2004). Such trends lie not only in the economic dimension of social order but also in the political realm. New international political constellations after the breakdown of the Communist world, the long-term spread of human rights and democracy as normative meta-discourses and the rampant implosion of political order in some parts of the developing world have led to an ever increasing number of armed interventions, such as those that are often justified on humanitarian or counter-terrorism grounds. Western powers have intervened to end conflicts in the non-OECD world, and have engaged in post-war reconstruction efforts on a large and still expanding scale. These efforts require an army of experts to build the rudiments of the rule of law, sometimes from scratch, as in Afghanistan for example. One of the crucial management questions has been the selection of personnel for such ventures. There is an ongoing debate on whether to look for refugees and exiles of the first generation who are likely to be intimately familiar with the situation based on their own experience or to seek out younger persons, such as the children of migrants with a migration background, who may not be personally involved (see, e.g., Von Carlowitz 2004). These considerations already suggest that the changing role of the state in development policy thinking and actual policies should go beyond its function in maintaining boundaries – that is, go beyond establishing infrastructural tasks for markets. Indeed, states play a much more activist role in development policy in addition to and beyond providing macro-economic conditions. To take but one example, the border control policies of immigration countries are intimately connected to enabling and restricting transstate mobility of persons and the potential of transstate groups and associations. The EU moved its policies from fighting ‘root causes’ to the

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conditionality of development aid (cf. European Commission 2002). At the 2002 European summit in Seville, the leaders of the member states agreed that each future association or cooperation agreement which the EU/EC concludes with any country should include a clause on joint management of migration flows and compulsory readmission in the event of illegal immigration. Yet the EU’s effort to link migration control to external aid is somewhat lopsided in favour of the control side. The largest share of the budget was allocated to the management of migration flows, that is, to strengthening border control and mitigating illegal or irregular migration. Even more explicit are contracts between immigration and emigration countries on a bilateral level, which rest on emigration countries being willing to take back rejected asylum seekers and to control undocumented migration. The lead was taken by Italy when it offered temporary work permits and official development aid to willing countries such as Albania and Tunisia. It is noteworthy that the EU and its Mediterranean rim may be a special case not comparable to other forms of supranational organisation, because the EU has engaged in a logic of expansion, creating the need for increased border control functions for the set of countries adjoining the current EU borders – linked to the prospect of joining the EU in the long run. It is of the utmost importance to consider not only direct development policies but also indirect and powerful mechanisms like border controls, and thus, internal boundaries of states.

Notes 1 Here, I use the terms ‘transstate’ instead of ‘transnational’ interchangeably. The term ‘transstate’ is more precise than transnational because it indicates that the point of departure is not relations and spaces in between nations but in between states and across states (Faist 2000). For a discussion of the term ‘social space’, see Faist 2004. 2 Remittances are transfers of money by foreign workers to their home countries. The regional distribution pattern of remittances looks as follows: Latin America and the Caribbean receive the most remittances ($30B), followed by South Asia ($18B), East Asia and the Pacific ($18B), the Middle East and North Africa ($13B), and Europe and Central Asia ($10B). Sub-Saharan Africa, including the poorest countries in the world, receives the smallest amount of remittances ($4B). In Latin America, remittances amount to 2 per cent of the GDP. Yet in smaller economies the proportion is much higher: 29 per cent of GNP in Haiti, El Salvador and Honduras, and about 15 per cent of GDP in the Dominican Republic (cf. Orozco 2002). 3 Village communities and political diasporas are not dealt with here.

5

Transnational humanitarian NGOs? A progress report Dennis Dijkzeul

Introduction Humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) can be expected to be transnational organisations pur sang. They usually operate in various localities – different humanitarian crisis zones – in a decentralised manner through their activities – in particular the provision of food, water, shelter, medicine, clothing, and oftentimes protection – in, above, and between the traditional “container spaces” of national societies. When a state is no longer able or willing to protect the lives of its citizens, these organisations step in. Still, little research has been done on the actual management of these humanitarian organisations and the degree to which they have become transnational. This is surprising because, in business literature, transnational organisations have often been seen as an ideal-typical organisational form well equipped to deal with the challenges of simultaneous decentralisation for local flexibility, while also supporting knowledge transfer, sharing of limited resources, and organisational capacity building throughout the organisation in all its locations. It will be interesting to see if humanitarian NGOs have in fact consciously used transnational management approaches to enhance their effectiveness. In this respect, it is useful to refer to the question Pries asked in the introductory chapter to this volume: can these organisations square the circle by combining decentralisation with strong coordination of resources and knowledge? Using literature on transnational enterprises to formulate an ideal type of the transnational organisation as a basis for comparison, this study attempts to establish to what extent Malteser International functions as a transnational organisation. The empirical research focuses mainly on Malteser International’s work in Sud Kivu, a province in the eastern part of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). In particular, it looks whether and how the organisation attempts to combine the benefits of decentralisation with stronger internal coordination. This chapter first assesses the actual state of studies on the management of humanitarian NGOs; it shows a lack of credible data on the functioning of

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these organisations. Next, it explains the grave humanitarian challenges in the eastern DRC and the responses to them. Third, it attempts to operationalise the ideal type of the transnational organisation for a humanitarian organisation. Empirically, the chapter focuses on Malteser International, which has an office in Bukavu – the capital of Sud Kivu – that provides humanitarian assistance. Finally, I will discuss whether Malteser International resembles the transnational ideal type and address issues that need to be taken up for further research.

The state of the non-state According to Khagram and Levitt (2005: 2), the forms and processes of transnationality are the focus of a burgeoning yet fragmented body of scholarship across sub-fields of sociology and closely related social science disciplines. But scholars who produce this work generally treat their efforts as unconnected to each other or work on them in isolation. And one may add, as far as it concerns humanitarian and other NGOs, scholars tend to use the term “transnational” in a superficial way; the burgeoning and diverse literature on NGOs increasingly uses this term, but does not define it as a central concept (Dijkzeul 2006a). Only in the 1970s did limited attention to transnationalism in international relations appear, but it rarely centred on NGOs. DeMars (2005: 35–36) writes: literature on “transnational relations” gained popularity … in response to a combination of factors: the decline of security threats with the withdrawal of the United States from Vietnam and a period of relaxation in the Cold War; the rise of economic threats with the 1971 breakdown of the Bretton Woods monetary system and the 1973 oil crisis; and the spread of counter-cultural trends after the transnational students protests of 1968 and the advent of broad human rights and environmental movements. As quickly as it had appeared, transnationalism disappeared from the central theoretical debates of the discipline during the 1980s when security threats returned to the foreground of international affairs. DeMars continues: The first transnationalism broke new ground, but its usefulness for the empirical study of NGOs was limited. John Burton’s world society approach concentrated on transnational processes and transactions, particularly communications links, and not on actors such as NGOs. Harold Jacobson viewed NGOs as auxiliaries to intergovernmental

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Dennis Dijkzeul organisations like the United Nations and European Community. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye, as well as Richard Mansbach and his collaborators, cast a broad net to encompass multinational corporations, religious communities, and revolutionary movements, devoting relatively little attention to NGOs themselves. Indeed, Peter Willetts published his 1982 edited volume … ‘in reaction against the omission of non-economic groups by Keohane and Nye.’ Keohane and Nye later subsumed transnational relations under their broader theory of interdependence, which was more state-centred [and realist]. For all these reasons, 1970s transnationalism failed to spawn a sustained agenda of theoretically informed empirical research on NGOs in world politics.

Khagram and Levitt (2005: 23) reach a similar conclusion about this period. Archer (1983) conceptually distinguished “transnational” from “international”, but he only did so to discuss the history and operations of international organisations in general. In the 1980s, the study of states and, to a lesser extent, UN organisations diverted attention away from NGOs. Yet, during the same decade, an NGO bloom started. NGOs were often seen as an alternative to inept or corrupt state structures. The Washington Consensus and the rise of neo-liberal economics in general provided a – politically conservative – push for non-state actors and a shift away from state and multilateral organisations, such as those of the UN system. Simultaneously, NGOs were also perceived in a positive light in more “progressive” circles. They were often seen as “‘voluntary organisations’1 in which people [spontaneously] engage for idealist purposes and ‘good’ causes in their free time” (Martens 2002: 279). With the increase in the number of Southern NGOs, these organisations also had a positive grassroots image as organisations working closely and in solidarity with local people. State or UN institutions were perceived as more remote. In addition, NGOs were seen to work in issue areas that had a positive image, such as human rights (e.g. Sikkink 1993), humanitarian assistance, environmental protection, and gender awareness. As a result of the above trends, NGOs received growing scholarly interest. Related topics such as governance and global policy networks spurred further attention – especially at the international policy level, where the term “transnational” reappeared. At the large international conferences (for example, Rio – environment, Beijing – women’s rights, Cairo – population, and Vienna – human rights), NGOs and NGO networks were seen as important actors that could link and leverage the needs and voices of local actors that would otherwise not receive sufficient support in their own country. Such transnational support had thus important cross-border moral, emancipatory, advocacy, and/or capacity building effects2 (Alvarez 2000; Carmin, Hecks and Beckmann 2003; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Martens 2000; Roth 2001; Smith 1998, 2002). In this way, NGOs also provided alternatives to traditional political parties (see van der Heijden 2002).

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However, as the 1990s progressed, scientific and press attention became increasingly critical (Dijkzeul and Beigbeder 2003; Igoe and Kelsall 2005). In particular, during humanitarian crises NGOs often became unwitting accomplices of warring factions. To put it briefly, NGOs frequently failed or faced considerable difficulties when states failed. Also, in development circles, they often failed to live up to their status as the hoped-for “magic bullet” (Edwards and Hulme 1996). NGOs came under fire from many sides: their official donors demanded measurable results and a higher degree of efficiency; their Southern counterparts demanded less paternalism and more “direct funding” from official donors; some Northern private donors demanded more transparency; their own staff felt squeezed between the demands of institutional growth and efficiency (more turnover with less costs at shorter terms); and, their developmental impact proved to be rather slow (Biekart 1999: 76). In addition, attention grew in regards to the negative consequences of NGO actions. Some NGOs were linked to or used as fronts by dictatorships and communist regimes (DeMars 2005: 42). For example, the Rwandanbacked rebel movement, Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RDC, see below), that controlled the eastern DRC, set up and ran an NGO called Tous pour la Paix et le Développement (Jackson 2005: 189–92; Tull 2002). Other NGOs were established and used by unpopular industries to lobby and do PR in their interest – for example, by the tobacco, mining and forestry industries (so-called “greenscamming”). Moreover, the rapid growth of the number of NGOs, including humanitarian ones, also had unforeseen negative effects. De Waal (1997) notes how humanitarian assistance could actually undermine accountability of elites and indirectly cause (greater vulnerability to) famines. Moreover, coordination and competition problems arose from the sheer number of NGOs in existence. Terry (2002: 15) describes that “[s]ome 250 NGOs were present in Rwanda after the 1994 genocide, working beside at least eight UN agencies, three branches of the Red Cross and Red Crescent movement, and military contingents from eight different countries”. Cooley and Ron (2002) have similarly indicated how competition and the need for organisational survival hamper NGO effectiveness and cooperation at the field level. In brief, competition among NGOs does not necessarily lead to better quality programming and service delivery. Recently, there have been more attempts to bring the “transnational” back into scientific debate (see Khagram and Levitt 2005: 23–24). DeMars’s (2005) NGOs and Transnational Networks: Wildcards in World Politics offers a highly original approach to the study of NGOs and their often inadvertent political consequences. He describes NGOs as part of transnational networks, including humanitarian, human rights, and development actors. He contends that power games in these networks determine the outcomes of an NGO’s activities more than the official goals and structures of an NGO itself. In particular, because other actors, NGOs, state institutions, private enterprises, warlords, and so on, try to use the NGOs for their own benefit.

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Yet, DeMars does not clearly delineate what he means by ‘transnational’. It seems he is merely stating that attention to transnational phenomena can spur scientific interest in NGOs, but how the two are related still needs to be elaborated in more detail. If we review these trends in research, then it does not seem that NGOs have fulfilled their promise that they would do better than the UN and other governmental organisations. Moreover, the growing attention to NGOs has been uneven – there have been many case studies and less theory building. Political decision-making, advocacy, and inter- or trans-national policy networks have received far more attention than the organisation’s internal management issues or implementation networks. Furthermore, development and humanitarian NGOs are often treated together, with development NGOs getting the lion’s share of attention. The greater emphasis on policy rather than on internal functioning and implementation problems also implies that there are no specific transnational managerial characteristics, other than non-state organisations working in several countries, being studied. More attention needs to be focused on the ways in which these organisations deal with the managerial demands imposed by working in several countries, often in complex networks and under adverse conditions, while retaining – a level of – organisational coherence. The tensions between decentralisation for flexibility in the field and the need for mutual knowledge transfer, sharing of limited resources, and organisational capacity building are well known. Yet, literature about evaluation and organisational learning with regards to NGOs is relatively limited (Minear 1998; Ebrahim 2005). Some NGOs may be on their way to becoming more transnational in their management, but empirical information on the actual and potential benefits of a transnational approach to humanitarian organisations is lacking. It is therefore important to operationalise what transnational management means for humanitarian NGOs, because, as the next sections will explain, these organisations face difficult challenges that require both decentralisation and internal control and coordination. The following section explains the humanitarian crisis in the eastern DRC as a highly challenging context for transnational organisations.

The humanitarian situation in the eastern DRC: another type of non-state To call the DRC a failed state would be giving it an undue compliment, because this assumes that the state actually functioned before it failed (Tull 2003). Efforts at state building have never taken off in the history of the DRC. At independence in 1960, international interference, ethnic tensions, and secessionist movements almost destroyed national unity. And Mobutu’s kleptocratic rule (1965–97) was marked by an increasingly accelerating decline of state and, later, civil society institutions. In the early 1990s,

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attempts to institute democracy in the DRC failed and the dire economic situation deteriorated further, while ethnic tensions escalated.3 Due to the Rwandan civil war and the genocide in 1994, over one million refugees entered the eastern DRC. This refugee crisis prompted an influx of humanitarian organisations. The refugee camps, however, were quickly used by Hutu génocidaires – Interahamwe – as bases to regroup, rearm, and carry out attacks on Rwandan territory. In cooperation with Uganda, the Rwandans responded by setting up and supporting the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Liberation du Congo (AFDL), which was led by Laurent Kabila. Officially, the Rwandans intervened to foster the return of the refugees and attack the génocidaires in the camps. Many refugees indeed returned home, but the intervention also left tens of thousands refugees and Congolese citizens dead, while the Interahamwe fled into the rainforests, from which it preyed on the local population. The disciplined AFDL made rapid progress and overthrew Mobutu in May 1997. Over the next one and a half years, however, the alliance between Kabila and the Rwandans unravelled. In August 1998, the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD), with support from the Rwandan, Ugandan, and Burundian armies, started another war to replace Kabila’s regime, which soon reached a stalemate. Kabila received unexpected support from Angola, Zimbabwe, Chad, and Namibia, while Uganda and Rwanda grew apart over their differing economic interests and began to support different rebel groups.4 As a result, the country became divided into three parts. The RCD – supported by the Rwandans – maintained control over the eastern part, and the Kabila government controlled the south-western part. The Front de Liberation du Congo (FLC), led by Jean Pierre Bemba and supported by the Ugandans, occupied the northern part of the DRC.5 In the meantime, the Interahamwe continued to destabilise and loot parts of eastern DRC, while various Mai-Mai – originally local self-defence groups fighting against foreign occupation, but increasingly turning into armed bandits – were also active in RCD- and FLC-held territory. Over time, the different warring factions and their international supporters generally became more interested in economic extraction and exploitation – for example, diamonds and coltan – than in ending the war (see United Nations S/2001/357). Hence, at the local level, the Congolese war broke down into an ever-changing pattern of overlapping micro-wars in which almost all the victims were civilians (Economist 2002; Reyntjens 2005). At the national and international political levels, peacemaking progressed at a snail’s pace. In 1999, negotiations between the warring factions led to the establishment of a UN peacekeeping force (United Nations Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo – MONUC), which was placed close to the frontline. After the assassination of Laurent Kabila in January 2001 and the subsequent succession as President by his son, Joseph Kabila, the peace process picked up pace. In the course of the next five years, the

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country was reunified, foreign forces withdrew, and Joseph Kabila became the officially elected President. After the election of Kabila, however, more armed conflict, instigated by a renegade Banyamulenge General, ensued in the North-Kivu province. Other forms of violence also continued, especially in the eastern part of the country. Regular political killings and widespread impunity persist, while rebel forces – mainly Interahamwe and Mai Mai – continue pillaging and raping the local population. To summarise, despite the peace process and elections, the DRC still has a fragmented economy based on the extraction of natural resources and the exploitation of the local population. This low-key “war without borders” can best be seen as a set of overlapping networks of cooperating and competing criminal business elites and state officials from different countries. These transnational networks constitute an oligopoly of violence and lawlessness, which continues to weaken the remaining state institutions so that they cannot prevent violence and corruption. State weakness, ongoing violence, and firmly entrenched economic interests have also caused a severe and chronic humanitarian crisis. An International Rescue Committee study has estimated that from 1998 to 2004, the DRC had an excess mortality of 3.8 million people, with another 1,000 civilians dying each day (Coghlan et al. 2004). This makes the crisis in the DRC by far the most deadly crisis zone of our time. Not surprisingly, many humanitarian organisations, the UN as well as NGOs, are active in the DRC; in addition, diplomatic actors are active at national and international levels. Just like the war itself, the international response constitutes a network that stitches together transnational and international elements.

Operationalising transnational management for humanitarian organisations The ongoing crisis renders humanitarian NGO management extremely challenging in the DRC. Yet, the DRC is not the only chronic crisis to which these organisations respond. In fact, many of the current humanitarian crises and war economies share similar exploitative and chronic traits (Kaldor 1999). Humanitarian organisations generally have a hard time responding to such chronic crises. On the one hand, it is difficult for them to understand what exactly is going on, while the warring factions will attempt to use them to their own ends. On the other hand, they have had to adapt their traditional modes of operation; just entering a crisis, saving lives and leaving again is not possible in a chronic crisis. They increasingly stay for longer periods and feel forced or tempted to take over traditional state tasks in rehabilitation, capacity building, aid coordination and development.6 It thus seems likely that humanitarian organisations are adapting, if not professionalising, their strategies, structures, and processes in order to execute these tasks.

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Yet, no humanitarian organisation is able to take on all humanitarian and rebuilding tasks on its own – they all need to cooperate with many other actors. Just like the inter-organisational networks of which they are part, NGOs themselves may also become less hierarchical and more network-like in their own internal organisation; in other words, their management may become more transnational. Hence, the analysis of the war and humanitarian actors can take place with two different types of units of analysis: either the network(s) or the organisations themselves. This study focuses on the management of one humanitarian organisation: Malteser International. Transnational management theory Since there are no well-known ways to operationalise transnational management for humanitarian NGOs, this chapter will mainly rely on Ghoshal and Bartlett’s Managing across Borders: The Transnational Solution, in order to formulate an ideal type of transnational humanitarian NGO management. Ghoshal and Bartlett’s transnational approach, however, has not been applied to humanitarian NGOs before, which is unfortunate because the challenges that humanitarian NGOs confront are far more intense – in fact, they often concern questions of life and death. Strategy Ghoshal and Bartlett studied the transnational management aspects of large worldwide operating companies, such as NEC, Matsushita, Philips, and Unilever.7 The main theme of their research is that the diversity of crossborder operations in organisations should be reflected in their management strategy, organisational structure, and internal coordination. They argue that in the past, organisations have often searched for one single competitive advantage and then sought for a best fit between structure and strategy – for example by exploiting cost effectiveness. In other words, in different organisational environments, organisations vary in their key strategic needs and capabilities, which also have an impact on their structure and coordination mechanisms. However, companies that operate worldwide increasingly have to become more flexible: there is no one-size-fits-all solution to function optimally – they need to address several strategic needs and capacities simultaneously. Simple dichotomies, such as centralisation vs. decentralisation or control vs. innovation do not hold any longer. In particular, organisations should simultaneously combine the contradictory demands of global integration of their far-flung activities and local responsiveness to their different markets. They should thus combine several different competitive advantages. Depending on the environmental complexity of the organisation, Ghoshal and Bartlett distinguish four types of cross-border organisations: the multinational, global, focal,8 and transnational organisations. The latter is more an ideal type; the first three are more descriptive phenomena.

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1. The multinational organisation sees responding to local needs as its main competitive advantage. It therefore attempts to achieve economies of scope by building a strong local presence. Not surprisingly, its structure is rather decentralised with country organisations operating quite independently from each other and headquarters. Concomitantly, control and coordination have a light touch; they are mainly achieved through personal ties, socialisation of core employees, and simple financial controls. 2. The global organisation sees the whole world as an integrated market. Its main competitive advantage is therefore a high degree of efficiency. Hence, it primarily pursues economies of scale, while its organisational structure is centralised. Centralised decision-making, tight reporting, and administrative procedures foster worldwide control and coordination. 3. The focal organisation achieves its main competitive advantage over other organisations by learning and innovation on a worldwide basis. It thus searches for economies of factor costs. Its organisational structure is that of a coordinated federation: some core competencies are centralised, others are decentralised, but generally, knowledge developed at the centre is transferred to the overseas units, so that control and coordination are mainly attained by the formalisation of decision-making, planning, reporting, and administrative procedures. 4. The transnational organisation is “characterised by [its] decentralised resources and … intense coordination. Therefore, transnational organisations could be understood as highly decentralised and border-crossing pluri-locally distributed and, at the same time, intensely coordinated, stable and dense cooperation frameworks … ” (Pries, in Chapter 1 of this volume). The transnational organisation needs to simultaneously optimise local responsiveness, global efficiency, and leverage innovations, originating in its diverse operations. Its structure resembles an integrated network, and internal coordination takes place through multiple, flexible arrangements. Structure The strategic aspects of these four organisational types correspond with their structural aspects. Their configuration of assets and capabilities, and in particular the decision-making authority between headquarters and subsidiaries, is strongly determined by the main type of economies that they strive for. The multinational organisation type resembles a decentralised federation: many key assets, responsibilities, and decisions are decentralised so that the subsidiaries become (nationally) self-sufficient. They can exploit local opportunities flexibly on their own initiative. In contrast, the global organisation resembles a centralised hub model that operates on a global scale, with most strategic assets, resources, responsibilities and decisions centralised from headquarters. The subsidiaries implement the strategies that come from headquarters.

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Table 5.1 Summary of four types of international organisations: strategy Type of Organisation

Multinational

Global

Focal

Transnational

Need for learning/ innovation on a worldwide basis through economies of factor costs Example: Telecommunications, switching Worldwide learning (Generation and diffusion of knowledge)

Need for local responsiveness, global efficiency and worldwide leveraging of innovations through simultaneous optimisation

Exploiting parent company knowledge and capabilities through worldwide diffusion and adaptation

Flexible integration of multiple organisational processes

Strategy Environmental complexity and main type of economies required

Need for responsiveness through economies of scope Example: Branded package goods

Need for efficiency through economies of scale Example: Consumer electronics

Key strategic demand

Multinational flexibility (local differentiation between markets)

Key strategic capability

Building strong local presence through sensitivity and responsiveness to national differences

Global competitiveness/ World market as an integrated whole (Scale resulting in cost leadership) Building cost advantages through global-scale operations

Multinational flexibility, global competitiveness and learning capability simultaneously

The focal organisation is more a coordinated federation, where the sources of the organisation’s core competencies are centralised, but the many assets, resources, responsibilities, and decisions that are decentralised and only controlled from headquarters. Its local organisations depend on but can adapt the competencies that the parent company has developed. Finally, the transnational organisation functions like an integrated network: its specialised resources and capabilities are dispersed, but interdependent. Different parts of the units work with each other, depending on the task at hand. At times, headquarters plays a central role; at other times, the subsidiaries take the initiative. So, there can be a large flow of components, products, resources, people, and information among

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interdependent units, but these are all integrated within the overall organisational framework. Coordination The differences in strategy and structure are also reflected in the coordination and other internal adjustment mechanisms, such as learning and knowledge sharing within the organisation. In the multinational organisation, top management regards the overseas operations as a portfolio of independent businesses. Control is often personal with simple financial controls and socialisation of core employees. Knowledge is developed and retained within each unit and rarely shared throughout the organisation. The global organisation treats its overseas operations as delivery pipelines to a unified global market; it thus employs tight central controls. Knowledge is developed and retained at the centre of the organisation. The focal organisation regards its overseas operations as appendages to a central domestic operation. It promotes administrative control by formal planning and control mechanisms. Coordination takes place by formalised decision-making, reporting, and administrative procedures. Knowledge is developed at the centre and then transferred to overseas units. The transnational organisations attempt to combine these different approaches between headquarters and subsidiaries. Hence, these approaches legitimise diverse perspectives and capabilities throughout the organisation. They combine personal, operational, and administrative control and develop flexible coordination processes, with a focus on shared decision-making – in particular, knowledge is developed jointly and shared worldwide.

Table 5.2 Summary of four types of international organisations: structure Type of Organisation

Multinational

Global

Focal

Transnational

Structure Configuration of assets and capabilities Role of overseas operations

Decentralised federation

Centralised hub

Coordinated federation

Integrated network

Sensing and exploiting local opportunities

Implementing parentcompany strategies

Adapting and leveraging parentcompany competencies

Differentiated contributions by national units to integrated worldwide operations

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Differences in operationalisation Whereas Ghoshal and Bartlett focused on business enterprises, their attention to the complexity and diversity of cross-border organisations may also be usefully adapted to non-profit NGOs. However, transnational approaches to humanitarian management have never been developed explicitly, and recent management literature on NGOs does not offer any transnational approaches or strategies.9 There are also several crucial differences between the operations of humanitarian NGOs and private enterprises. It will be useful to keep these in mind when studying humanitarian activities. Strategy For non-profit organisations, consumer satisfaction is not reflected in sales figures or profits; instead, these NGOs need to cater to donor organisations, their partner organisations, and target groups simultaneously. This crucial distinction, which implies that attention needs to be given to donors and target groups simultaneously, needs to be reflected in strategy, structure and coordination. In principle, a transnational management approach could help in achieving such simultaneous attention. A further important strategic specification in this respect is that humanitarian organisations are diversified among themselves. Some work mainly on food aid, others in medicine, and yet others in shelter or water and sanitation. Moreover, humanitarian organisations face the strategic question of whether to integrate more rehabilitation and development tasks into humanitarian work.10 Humanitarian organisations often hold very different ideas on whether and which tasks they should take over in rehabilitation and development work – which further reinforces the diversification among NGOs. Structure The need for local responsiveness for humanitarian NGOs is so high that centralisation at headquarters is no viable option. Aside from that, it is not clear whether and to what extent the four organisational types are useful in understanding humanitarian NGO management. Coordination The categorisation of Ghoshal and Bartlett needs adaptation in order to reflect the different types of activities and functional management areas of humanitarian NGOs (e.g. HRM, finance and administration). Ghoshal and Bartlett neglect these functional management areas to a large extent. They also fail to discuss many specific management instruments for strengthening transnational management.

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Finally, it may well be that one key element for NGOs is similar to that of business organisations: they know that their environment is changing, they recognise what they have to do to enhance their global competitiveness, but it is unclear how they should develop the organisational capability to do so (Ghoshal and Bartlett 1998: 4). Alternatively, it could be that, within the humanitarian NGOs, an awareness of changing global context and local demands exists; however, responses remain confined to a few managers dispersed throughout the organisation, who take their own initiatives and are barely or only slowly able to change the operations of the whole organisation. Taking into account the differences between humanitarian NGOs and business enterprises, the next section further develops the ideal-typical transnational organisation and compares this with the operations of Malteser International.11

NGO response: Malteser International International background In 2005, the Foreign Aid Division of Malteser Germany, a German NGO, formalised a long-standing partnership with the Emergency Corps of the Order of Malta (ECOM).12 It renamed itself “Malteser International” to better reflect its global scope and aspirations,13 as well as strengthen and coordinate the activities of the 47 national associations of the Order of Malta into a more unified worldwide relief service. With a history dating back to the hospitals of the crusades, the Order of Malta is a legally recognised international body with its own ambassadors in many countries. If Malteser International succeeds in merging the international humanitarian work of the Order of Malta, it will have a diplomatic access and status that many other NGOs will envy. And it may become an interesting hybrid of international status and transnational activities. Malteser International finances its programmes and projects from various sources, in particular private donations14 and large donor organisations, such as ECHO (European Community Humanitarian Aid), German ministries, the Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW), and UNHCR. The organisation focuses mainly on Africa and Asia, where it is running programmes and projects in 19 countries. It is further in charge of supporting partnerships with Malteser relief services in many Eastern European countries and occasionally supports projects in Central and Latin America. Its headquarters are based in Cologne, Germany, and its fieldwork is organised through a network of regional and local offices. Malteser’s Great Lakes regional office is located in Kampala. Its Congolese offices are located in Mahagi, Ariwara, and Bukavu. This “progress report” focuses on Malteser Bukavu. Malteser Bukavu As the concept of transnational management is not known within humanitarian circles, Malteser International has never given explicit attention to

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developing a more transnational approach. Nevertheless, it will be useful to examine the extent to which the organisation displays transnational characteristics and whether it can or should develop them further. Tables 5.3 to 5.5 adapt Bartlett and Ghoshal’s approach to humanitarian non-profit organisations in terms of strategy, structure, and coordination. For each characteristic, it describes what the ideal-typical transnational NGO would look like, and then compares this with the outcomes of the empirical research on Malteser Bukavu. Strategy After the Rwandan genocide and exodus of 1994, Malteser supported water and sanitation activities at the Cimanga refugee camp, which was located in the Walungu health zone, close to Bukavu. Later, it also set up way stations for returning Rwandan and Burundian refugees, helped to rehabilitate health structures, started nutrition programs, and supported local hospitals in Fizi and Bukavu. In 1998, it began to rehabilitate nutrition and health centres in two neighbouring health zones close to Bukavu: Walungu and Nyangezi. The next year, it continued with further rehabilitation and supplying equipment to local health facilities. In 2000, Malteser began to support the health zone bureaus and health centres with the distribution of medications.15 In July 2002, a new expat management team took over and Malteser Bukavu, which functioned weakly, started to expand more rapidly. Currently, Malteser operates health and nutrition activities in ten health zones: Walungu, Kaniola, Mubumbano, Kaziba, Mwana, Mwenga (Chefferie de Lwindi), Mulungu, Nyangezi, and Nyantende. In Kalehe it carries out nutrition activities. When Malteser began its activities in Sud Kivu, its approach was in many ways a follow-up of its earlier physical rehabilitation work, in which it purposely worked through the local health system. Malteser has continued this line of work by expanding its activities and developing a more integrated approach. It now carries out more capacity building, supervision, training, and evaluation activities. Importantly, it also carries out programmes in the areas of: • VAS (Victimes d’Agression Sexuelle) for raped women and children;16 • nutrition and food security; and • emergency road rehabilitation to render hard to reach health centres more accessible, for example by restoring bridges.17 As a consequence of this expansion and more integrated approach, Malteser Bukavu now increasingly combines purely humanitarian with longer-term rehabilitation activities. Its main objective, however, remains to improve access to health care in these ten zones (mentioned above). Ultimately, Malteser Bukavu hopes to expand to the Shabunda territory, an

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Table 5.3 Comparison of the transnational ideal type and Malteser International: strategy Characteristics

Ideal type

Malteser International

Strategy Humanitarian focus: Food, water, shelter, medicine, protection and/or rehabilitation and/or development?

Conscious strategy: Either pure humanitarian organisation or explicit choice for integrating rehabilitation and development

Environmental complexity and key strategic demand

Simultaneous need for national responsiveness, global efficiency and worldwide leveraging of innovations

Humanitarian medicine as basis (including nutrition, GBV), but increasingly rehabilitation tasks, e.g. food security, road reconstruction and capacity building (Bukavu), building houses (Kosovo) Simultaneous need for national responsiveness, global efficiency and worldwide leveraging of innovations; but the question is how to realise this without direct customer feedback (e.g. sales or profits). Most innovations take place locally. The central strategic dilemma is how to link donor influence with strong attention to and from local target groups

isolated area deep in the rain forest, which suffers terribly from the ongoing violence. It is interesting to note that this important strategic decision toward geographical expansion and integrating more – state-like – development tasks has been taken by the local management, and was then approved by headquarters in Cologne. Malteser International formulated strategy papers for Africa and Asia in 2001. These explicitly considered the different competences and mandates of the various offices. The papers were not initiated by headquarters; instead they were developed and discussed at the annual workshops for each continent, in which all the expatriate and many local staff members participated. Not everybody in the organisation, however, was convinced of the need for such a strategy; an elaborate discussion about which operations at which level of the organisation needed to be strengthened, integrated, or (de)centralised has not yet taken place.

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Structure The Malteser Bukavu office operates rather autonomously from the rest of Malteser International. It maintains regular communication with headquarters in Cologne and the regional offices in Kampala and Nairobi. As Malteser International does not (yet?) have a clearly established internal decentralisation and coordination strategy, it resembles a multinational federation more than an integrated network. Coordination Due to the small size of its own endowment, its auditing rules and the role of its donors, Malteser headquarters strongly monitors the financial aspects of its local offices and their programmes. In addition, it has a special Desk Officer who coordinates and checks the quality of project/programme proposals to ECHO and other donors. ECHO, which has a regional office in Bukavu, provides most of the funding, but the UN Office for the Table 5.4 Comparison of the transnational ideal type and Malteser International: structure Characteristics

Ideal type

Malteser International

Structure Configuration of assets and capabilities (Decision-making authority between HQ and subsidiaries) Role of overseas operations (Internal structure of: HQ, regional office(s), country HQ and local office(s)

Integrated network

Multinational federation

Cross-organisational relations supported among country/regional offices, local offices and HQs. Different offices can take the initiative

HQ staff vs. field staff

Flexible arrangement – field staff may have leading positions

Attempts to institutionalise such crossorganisational relations in terms of competences and mandates, but strategy (see above) requires stronger followup. Contact between regional office and local offices differ. Some local offices operate more independently than others. No cross-cutting teams or task forces yet Organisation is in principle hierarchically structured, but local offices have considerable leeway, e.g. road rehabilitation

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Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and the World Food Programme (WFP) also make contributions to specific projects. Malteser’s level of centralisation makes strong sense, because proposal formulation and project implementation need to follow strict donor rules and regulations. If these are not followed then ECHO, for example, may provide less funding. At the same time, the Bukavu office has taken the initiative to simplify its reporting by basing its reports on the logical framework of its project proposals. This practice is well accepted by its donors. At the moment, Malteser is developing its integrated management information system (IMIS), which mainly aims to modernise its accounting and programme management. Malteser sent out tenders and different software firms reacted, but progress with the system, called Fundtrac, took more time than foreseen. Setting up such a system is a demanding task; if it operates well the organisation can promote integration in terms of management control, different functional areas, and field activities. However, if the system is inflexible or complex and does not pay sufficient attention to field-level circumstances, it may become a drag on the whole organisation. It is difficult to strike a balance between complexity and breadth of activities and searching for (relatively) simple solutions. Currently, only a small number of staff are specialised in logistics at headquarters level,18 and many of the related tasks are carried out by regional and country Desk Officers. Local staff made a case that the importance of logistics is not yet well acknowledged at headquarters, although in 2004 the first logistics workshop formulated guidelines. In addition, local staff members may have considerable expertise and skills that they could contribute to headquarters. Logistics may be one of the key areas in which Malteser could attempt to work with task forces that straddle the different levels and locations of the organisation. In 2004/2005, Malteser International also began formulating an organisational handbook, which is a form of coordination by formalisation. The idea of a handbook and parts of a first draft were discussed at the annual workshop in 2005. Coordination by centralisation as a general strategy is not an option for the organisation, and it has only attempted such coordination in some crucial functional areas, such as finance. With the combination of centralisation and decentralisation being context dependent, Malteser International exhibits an important, but still underdeveloped transnational trait. The values and principles of humanitarian action lend themselves well for socialisation as a coordination tool. My observations show that the humanitarian principles play such a role for the expatriates and in the norms and values that the organisation promotes, but socialisation as a coordination tool is probably underutilised – especially local staff members could be further involved because they tend to be less familiar with the principles. However, there are no local language documents that could foster such

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involvement. In general, decentralised coordination tools and teams should be developed further. Interestingly, organisational learning also takes place through the interorganisational networks in which many humanitarian organisations participate. In particular, Overseas Development Institute publications are widely disseminated and read within the humanitarian community. Malteser Bukavu is changing its nutrition activities into food security activities. As a consequence, it is now replacing the labour-intensive and corruption-prone nutrition centres with community-based therapeutic care on the basis of a 2004 ODI publication (Collins 2004). Similarly, Malteser changed its foodfor-work emergency road rehabilitation into cash-for-work road rehabilitation (Harvey 2005). Malteser could make beneficial use of both publications because it was already looking for alternatives to food aid in response to a failure by WFP to deliver the amounts of food aid as agreed in the MalteserWFP contractual agreements. How transnational is Malteser International? In the final analysis, it is a relatively small organisation, and its staff members, in the field as well as at regional offices and headquarters levels, lack a comprehensive strategy process and resources to follow up on important initiatives in strategy, logistics, IMIS, HRM, food aid, and handbook formulation. If well carried out, though, the cumulative benefits of these initiatives could be considerable. As yet, it is too early to assess their complete impact, but several functional management areas are making slow progress. It seems that the organisational adaptation of Gresham’s law holds true: routine drives out planning.19 And one may add that it is also driving out learning, although there are important “pockets” of expertise, especially with local staff that could be of use to the whole organisation. As a result, Malteser does not correspond fully to the transnational ideal type and to some extent resembles the multinational type.20 The organisation faces considerable obstacles in achieving a higher degree of internal coordination and control. In addition, sharing knowledge or transferring lessons learned from one crisis to another generally turns out to be very difficult. In response to the changing and challenging humanitarian context, Malteser could benefit considerably from rethinking the benefits of a more transnational approach to its management, but the concept of transnational management is simply not yet known within humanitarian circles, and comprehensive transnational management strategies and instruments still need to be developed.

Further research This research is a progress report in three senses. First, the concept of transnational management and its operationalisation require further attention. For example, the study of the mentality and organisational culture(s) needed to make the transnational management

Well known throughout the organisation Staff selection, international exchange and training emphasised to foster organisation-wide learning and innovation. Job opportunities for local staff throughout the organisation. Longterm contracts fostered to create better knowledge of and response to local situation and integrate more development and rehabilitation tasks IMIS among different countries and functional areas. Promotes other opportunities for regular info exchange IMIS with central control and support, and integrated with HRM, administration and logistics.

Decentralisation and coordination policy

Control: Human Resources Management (HRM)

Control: Finance & Administration

Control: Communications Technology

Combination of socialisation, formalisation and (de-) centralisation

Coordination/Internal Adjustment

Ideal type

Coordination form

Characteristics

Table 5.5 Comparison of the transnational ideal type and Malteser International: coordination

IMIS (Fundtrac) could become a formalised system that links up the different levels without fostering undue centralisation. Socialisation mainly takes place for expat staff. Attempts at formalisation are taking place, for example, with an organisational handbook. Progress is slow Needs to be elaborated and formalised further In staff selection: expats are recruited on the initiative of the local offices, but vetted by HQ. HQ does not focus on local staff, which is a task for the local offices. Limited budget for training and learning. No explicit policy for further involving local staff in the organisation. Various expats in, e.g., the DRC and Afghanistan stay for several years IMIS (Fundtrac) is being developed. Email and telephone are crucially important Central attention, because the organisation is not independent in its financing. As its name implies, Fundtrac focuses primarily on financial administration

Malteser International

Tensions

Control: PR/Advocacy

Follows local initiatives, but checked at HQ, based on knowledge of donors and on the basis of IMIS

Control: Programming • Proposals • Reporting • Evaluation Control: Audit Audit as both management control and learning opportunity Distinction between organisation-wide campaigns and local campaigns Tensions resolved through special committees and task forces consisting of staff members from all over the world

Central to organisational effectiveness. Part of IMIS

Coordination/Internal Adjustment

Ideal type

Control: Logistics

Characteristics

Table 5.5 (continued)

(continued on next page)

Tensions resolved through hierarchy and allowing high degree of independence of field offices, and to a certain extent through the annual workshops

In medicine, procurement has recently become more centralised in order to conform to ECHO guidelines. Field offices would like to improve logistics. This could become a key area for a more transnational approach, but is not yet considered as such throughout Malteser. It could also be linked closer with IMIS Field office takes initiative, even in reporting formats and contacts with donors (ECHO), but central control for ECHO rules and regulations remains necessary Internal monthly audits, annual external audit, and ECHO audits In principle controlled by HQ

Malteser International

Widely promoted within organisation. Organisations promotes in formulation, training and evaluation of such initiatives, e.g., International Red Cross Code of Conduct, ODI/ALNAP, Sphere Project,1 People in Aid, and Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP)

External learning tools

Many initiatives: • Organisational handbook is being developed • Expats and local staff work for many years in some offices. • Local language courses depend on local initiatives • Malteser does not have a central learning unit or policy • Training underdeveloped • General humanitarian principles promoted throughout Malteser • Annual workshops, follow-up could be strengthened • No central evaluation database Malteser plays a visible role in the German humanitarian community. Initiatives from Sphere and documentation by ODI/ALNAP are implemented in the local offices, e.g. with community-based therapeutic care. Local offices cooperate officially with CAP.2

Malteser International

Notes: 1 The Sphere Project is a joint initiative in which many humanitarian organisations cooperate. It consists of the Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. 2 This is limited, however, to emergency road reconstruction.

Many initiatives: • Competences/areas of interest • Duration of contracts/length of stay • Local language course • Learning centre/unit • Learning policy • Training • Principles and norms • Annual meetings/workshops • Evaluation database

Coordination/Internal Adjustment

Ideal type

Internal learning tools

Characteristics

Table 5.5 (continued)

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approach a success is an understudied topic with regards to humanitarian NGOs. Second, most studies of humanitarian NGOs deal with the policies and principles of humanitarian assistance, yet more comparative research to implementation and internal management would be useful in this respect. In addition, more research is needed within each functional management area, as well as with coordination mechanisms. This research was mainly carried out in the eastern DRC – it should ideally be complemented with longitudinal, multi-site research at headquarters, regional and other local offices. Third, part of the comparative research should deal more extensively with the transnational network aspects of both war economies and the multi-organisational humanitarian networks. This type of research will be one of the main challenges of the study of humanitarian NGOs in the coming decade. For example, does the humanitarian network constitute an industry?21 If so, what are the characteristics of the industry and how are they changing?

Conclusions: how transnational are the humanitarian NGOs really? Humanitarian NGOs increasingly operate in contexts where highly visible international interventions and highly disruptive transnational war economies combine in unexpected ways. The actors active in these networks often view humanitarian NGOs as prizes to capture or threats to suppress (DeMars 2005). Warlords, criminals, business elites, and corrupt government officials can bide their time and opportunistically see how they can use humanitarian activities to their own advantage. State and inter-state institutions are manipulated in a similar manner. One should thus be careful with using the concepts ‘international’ and ‘transnational’ because ‘the’ international and transnational often interact in subtle and unexpected ways. As such, humanitarian NGOs are part of hybrid transnational-international networks. In response, humanitarian organisations are changing the way in which they operate. Either out of desire or need, they are taking over various state tasks in the areas of rehabilitation and development. Malteser International is an example of a humanitarian NGO slowly taking on aspects of the transnational ideal type, but it has not done so fully. Malteser’s managers that want to promote change are dispersed throughout the organisation and their various initiatives can be linked more tightly. This is not very surprising, because none of the managers has a unifying concept that transnational management can offer. Malteser’s different decentralised offices thus often operate on their own initiative, and Malteser International can still develop an explicit and coherent long-term strategy to reap the (potential) rewards of a more transnational approach. As with so many other humanitarian organisations, Malteser International struggles to combine central control with decentralised flexibility. Just like business organisations at an earlier stage, humanitarian NGOs wrestle with the question of how to go about becoming more transnational.

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Notes 1 In the (British) English literature “Private Voluntary Organisation” is often used with the same meaning as NGO, but it has a more national connotation. 2 Regular criticism remained that there were still elite vs. local population or North vs. South contrasts and contradictions, which, for example, led to subtle forms of exclusion or inadequate priority setting (e.g. Etzioni-Halevy 2002). 3 This following section is partly based on Dijkzeul (2006b). 4 The Burundian, Chadian and Namibian armies never played a big role in the conflict. The other forces, however, stayed much longer in the DRC. 5 In addition, a breakaway RCD group in Ituri was also supported by the Ugandans (Ilunga Mathiesen 2005: 54). 6 Frequently, donor governments and militaries push for the integration of humanitarian action into their policies. This has been highly visible – but rarely successful – in Afghanistan and Iraq. It contradicts the traditional humanitarian principles of neutrality, impartiality and independence. An in-depth treatment of the issue of integration falls outside the scope of this chapter. See Harmer and Macrae (2004). 7 In a similar vein, Pries (2005) focuses on General Motors. 8 Following Pries in the introductory chapter to this volume, I prefer the term “focal organisation” to Ghoshal and Bartlett’s more confusing concept of international organisation. 9 The two leading institutes on the study of humanitarian affairs, the Overseas Development Institute (ODI), a humanitarian and development think tank based in London, and the Feinstein International Center at Tufts University, have not paid attention to transnational management. See The Alan Shawn Feinstein International Famine Center (2004) Ambiguity and Change: Humanitarian NGOs Prepare for the Future, a Report prepared for: World Vision, CARE, Save US, Mercy Corps, Oxfam USA, Oxfam GB, International Rescue Committee, Catholic Relief Services, Feinstein International Famine Center, Friedman School of Nutrition Science and Policy, Tufts University, Boston. ODI has three humanitarian parts: the Humanitarian Policy Group, the Humanitarian Practice Network, and the Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action. It produces an impressive range of papers on humanitarian affairs, but has not published any papers on transnational management. Nor has recent NGO literature drawn heavily on transnational approaches; see Dijkzeul (2006a) and Lindenberg and Bryant (2001). 10 This is called the “linking relief, rehabilitation and development” debate (LRRD). 11 Data for this research was collected in the summer of 2005. 12 In 1992, nine European national associations of the Order of Malta founded ECOM in order to merge the forces of the Order in the area of international provision of relief. 13 International is the preferred term in many NGO names, as for example in Amnesty International. Within Malteser the word – or concept – of transnational was not considered. After all, Malteser Transnational does not sound very good. 14 These tend to fluctuate heavily – for example, the donations for Asian Tsunami relief were much larger than those in other years. 15 See Dijkzeul and Lynch (2005) for an analysis of the managerial and financial aspects of this support to the health system. 16 In English, the term gender-based violence (GBV) is more common. 17 To strengthen its strategic presence in Bukavu, Malteser executed together with the World Food Programme (WFP) the so-called cantines alimentaires, a schoolfeeding program. Many NGOs located in Bukavu, but carrying out their main

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21

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activities outside of town, are under pressure to establish local activities because this facilitates contacts with local authorities and prevents dissatisfaction among the local population. WFP decided to terminate this cooperation with Malteser Bukavu in late 2005, instead ADSSE, a local NGO, took over. One of these staff members is also responsible for IT at headquarters. The traditional approach of short-term interventions in humanitarian crisis is still reflected in relatively short funding cycles, short-term assignments and high staff turnover, which hampers long-term capacity building and strategy formulation. On the basis of my work in or with other humanitarian/development organisations (IRC, MSF, NOVIB, World Vision), it is safe to say that Malteser International is not alone in this respect. These other NGOs have important mutual peer review systems, communication technology, mutual support with building country offices and organisation-wide HRM (personnel selection, promotion policy for local staff, and training) policies to foster organisational coordination or integration, but none has developed a strategy to become more transnational. These organisations do not (yet?) consider transnationalism as a central management issue. Nor do these humanitarian organisations come close to the ideal-typical transnational organisational form in the literature reviewed for this chapter. One of the more exciting topics in this respect is the institutionalised relationship between donor organisations and humanitarian NGOs (see Ebrahim 2005).

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Transnational social movement networks and transnational public spaces Glocalizing gender justice Ilse Lenz

Social movements contest and negotiate with the driving forces of economic globalization. By engaging with globalization, however, they contribute to the emergence of political and cultural globalization. Some social movements have expanded from the 1970s in the context of international exchange and cooperation, and even the so called “anti-globalization movements” have created global networks and global spaces of communication. In this emerging global public space, transnational movement networks have developed, which interact with international social movement organizations (SMOs) and international institutions, as well as with nation-states (cf. Snow et al. 2004; Chen 2005; Tanaka 2007; Ferree and Mueller 2004; della Porta and Tarrow 2005; Bandy and Smith 2005; Smith and Johnston 2002; Tarrow 2005). This section aims to contribute to some issues of research on transnational organizations, as outlined by Ludger Pries in this volume, by analysing transnational feminist networks. The first intention is to look at the unit of analysis. By looking at transnational and international SMOs, some empirical evidence is taken beyond the transnational enterprise organizations on which organization research has concentrated until now. The focus is primarily on transnational women’s networks and, to that end, on introducing a new unit of analysis: the concept of reflexive, horizontal, and flexible transnational networks (see below). The second topic is to look at what Ludger Pies calls the units of reference of transnational research and to relate it to the approach of context structure or opportunity structure in newer social movement theory (McAdam 1996; Tarrow 1996). Which kinds of social spaces are woven by the discourses and practices of transnational social movement organizations? Can they be characterized as “border crossing, pluri-local, societal spaces” (cf. Pries in this volume)? What kind of role do the nations and regions play in these transnational public spaces regarding the formation of the context structure of these organizations? Transnational feminist networks have interacted with international institutions, such as the UN and the EU, nation-states and regional communities and have influenced their policies and norms. What does this mean for the global social space they create as the units of reference?

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International social movements have been active in several “movement sectors” such as ecology, human/women’s rights and migration. The international movement sector of women’s movements was selected for several reasons. It took part in an exemplary case of global governance in which egalitarian gender norms and institutional mechanisms were established on the international level, in dialogue with nation-states, social movements, and civil society (Finke 2005; Lenz 2007; Moghadam 2005; Zwingel 2005). It created discourses of equality and peace while respecting and integrating cultural difference, and thus contributed to a new universalism based on diversity. In this context, some transnational feminist networks have evolved after 1975 by using global opportunities and arenas, and by relating to international and national larger women’s organizations. They developed new discourses, goals and functions in the context of political, economic, and cultural globalization, including: 1. the creation and spread of new forms of knowledge and norms on the rapidly evolving gender issues in transcultural ways. The demand and needs for such knowledge and norms have increased in the process of globalization; 2. negotiations with international institutions and national governments to recognize and use that knowledge and to set new norms and rules of gender equality; and 3. thus, the opening of transnational social spaces to ensure international communication and exchange on gender issues in a set of crucial fields like work, family, health, human and women’s rights, and social peace. In these ways, some transnational feminist networks are building bridges between national and international women’s organizations and international institutions like the UN, the ILO, the Commission on Human Rights or the WHO and their gender departments (Moghadam 2005; Lenz 2007; Schmidt 2007). In other words, transnational feminist networks develop in interplay with international and national state institutions as well as international and national movement organizations. The main argument of this chapter is that transnational feminist networks evolved in the political opportunity structures created by the UN Decade for Women (1976–85), reformist national governments, and women’s movements. Looking at global norm setting in terms of the policy cycle analysis,1 they could influence the establishment of global and national gender norms in several ways: They played an important role as ‘epistemic networks’ (Cogburn 2003; Zdravomyslava 2007) in creating, classifying, and integrating gender knowledge into social change. They were very influential in problem definition and agenda setting and had some impact on policy formulations, but their influence on implementation at the national and local level was limited. Their character as transnational epistemic networks gave them advantages in creating and framing the issues, but also disadvantages in influencing policies and implementation.

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These transnational networks and their context will be analysed through social movement theory and organizational sociology, highlighting their importance for unfolding a global public space and their character as transnational networks; combining strong coordination mechanisms at the core, these networks, with decentralized resources, make for flexibility and efficiency in operating in the global multilevel system. To substantiate this argument the trajectories, the key arenas and institutions, and some results of international women’s movements, will be summarized. This will be followed by a short reflection on the main currents of research on international social movements. Then the organizational forms of the transnational networks, which can be seen as reflexive organizations for creating and maintaining knowledge and communication and of the international women’s organizations, will be discussed. Finally, this will be illustrated with three case studies of such networks.

The global women’s movements and the UN Decade for Women: searching for egalitarian regulations and global gender democracy The modern women’s movement has continuously developed in the context of international exchange and international organizations (cf. Rupp 1997; Berkovitch 1999). However, from the start of the UN Decade for Women in 1975 up to now, global feminist networks emerged in unprecedented scope (Meyer and Prügl 1999; Wichterich 1996, 2001; Moghadam 2005; Ferree and Mueller 2004; Ferree 2007). They met and mobilized in emerging international spaces and exchanged and debated problems, like women and equality in work and family or domestic violence, from different cultural and regional perspectives. At the First UN Women’s Conference in Mexico 1975, women’s groups from the South framed women’s problems in the context of international inequality and hierarchies. This approach resonated with the contemporary postcolonial and developmental discourses. In the following UN Decade for Women’s meeting, women’s networks from South, East and North created convergent international concepts in which their differences could be respected, while calling for equality and justice. For example, women’s movements from different socio-cultural backgrounds came to share concepts like equality in work or struggling against violence against women or women’s empowerment on a global level; but, women’s networks associate these concepts with different meanings and develop different strategies for realizing these concepts in their contexts (Meyer and Prügl 1999; United Nations 1995; Ruppert 1998). After 1985, the ‘women’s/human rights approach’ proved very productive in bridging differences and developing convergent strategies of women’s movements in the South, East, and West. Also, this approach could be translated into the global discourses on human rights and social issues. Women’s movements were thus able to achieve legitimacy in the international institutional contexts by somewhat overcoming the polarization of the

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North and South, East and West. They also succeeded in influencing, and in some cases initiating, political problem definition2 with a multifocal set of issues. Women’s movements used and expanded the opening international opportunities provided by the international institutions and nation-states, oriented towards gender reform after 1975 (Elson 2007; Lenz et al. 2007). They built on a long history of international women’s activities, as the international women’s movement had already participated in the constitution of the League of Nations (cf. Rupp 1997). But after 1970, the UN expanded its goals and appeals to social and political issues for broad majorities beyond the state governments. The UN launched the Decade for Women after 1975, in the context of its initiatives for social equality and peace. The UN Women’s World Conferences were held in different regions across the world – namely, in America (Mexico 1975), Europe (Copenhagen 1980), Africa (Nairobi 1985), and Beijing (1995). The regional UN Commissions of the UN Economic and Social Council organized preparatory processes and sessions for these conferences, which became arenas for the meeting of femocrats, social organizations and women’s organizations in main world regions. Gender perspectives were also integrated into the social UN conferences of the 1990s, such as the Rio de Janeiro Conference on Ecology 1992, the World Population Conference in Cairo 1994, the Human Rights Conference in Vienna 1993, and the Social Summit in Copenhagen 1996 (Finke 2005; Pietila 2007: 42–56). Two different organizational developments can be highlighted in this context: The UN Women’s Conference in Mexico 1975 and the UN World Action Plan of 1980 had committed governments to establishing women’s departments or focal points in the central government. Women’s political machineries (WPM; cf. Stetson and Mazur 1995; Mazur 2002) – women’s offices or ministries, EO (equal opportunities) departments, etc. – were enlarged or established in the subsequent national negotiations on UN gender norms, and their tasks included the implementation of these norms (Lenz 2007; Unifem 2000: 37–61). At the beginning, WPMs were critically understood by women’s movements as controlling state instruments. But, after the first feminist bureaucrats – so called “femocrats” – emerged around 1980, WPMs were perceived in a double role as antagonists as well as possible sources of support, so that relations of antagonistic cooperation emerged between international and state institutions and women’s movements. The second development was the formation of women’s NGOs and networks as global actors who were attracted and promoted by the opening global opportunities. NGOs and individual women, especially from the convening regions, rushed to the UN Conference NGO forums. By organizing workshops and individual and group meetings they established international networks of exchange and cooperation. Women’s groups also lobbied the preparatory meetings and the UN official conference with their state delegations. International women’s networks are different from transnational

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networks in their internal structure and processes: they are characterized by international cooperation of women from different nations for a shared goal; they combine structures of bureaucratic and centralistic coordination with a decentralization of resources – examples of which are the large professional or academic women’s organizations. Transnational women’s networks also evolved in the context described above (for example: DAWN (Development Awareness for Women Network), Women living under Muslim Law, etc.). Their cooperation has transcended the idea that members of these networks represent their national interest or movements; instead, these networks define and process issues by creating aims and perspectives, which combine the universal and the regional contexts, or, in other words, integrate equality and cultural differences. One example is DAWN, which calls for equal access to participation and resources for men and women in the North and the South (cf. below). These networks were especially committed to problem definition, naming and defining gender inequality from everyday experience of women in different regions, and the creation of knowledge about these problems and possible ways to find solutions. Three results of the UN Decade for Women should be highlighted in this context (Stetson and Mazur 1995): 1. They provided spaces for communication and agenda setting by femocrats and inter/transnational women’s networks. 2. They established universal norms for gender equality, especially at the UN World Conferences on Women.3 3. They provided for and stimulated the establishment of gender policy institutions in the national states’ so-called women’s political machineries (WPM). After 2000, the change in the international environment has led to new barriers for international women’s movements and a trend from proactive strategies to strategies of holding on to the norms and regulations achieved in the series of the UN women’s conferences. The momentum and political innovation of the UN process has receded since the Beijing Conference 1995. The UN follow-up conferences for the Beijing Conference in New York 2000 and 2005 were characterized by inward concentration on the bureaucratic and femocrat institutions of the UN and member states (Wichterich 2007), and by a decline of feminist mobilization and the intervention of strong counter-movements. The UN meeting in 2005 barely reconfirmed the platform in a defensive way while the US and some fundamentalist states interfered and obstructed further progress. The shift in international politics has changed the opportunity structure for women’s movements: the search for a multilateral peaceful new world order, centring on the UN processes after the fall of “Soviet-style socialism”, has shifted towards concepts of military and civil security, safeguarding the

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present world order. After the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks by the fundamentalist Islamic male network al-Qaida, the US, as the one remaining superpower, tends to emphasize unilateral strategies and military strength in its war on terrorism, and to disregard the UN as the core global legitimate institution of peace negotiation. Fundamentalist male-centred movements as well as armed conflicts have contributed to the renaissance of the ideals of the male warrior or “tough single global leader” and armed violence. Civil counter-movements also mobilize aggressively against the global gender norms for equality, which were decided at the UN Beijing conference 1995.4 For example, fundamentalist and anti-abortionist Catholic and Islamistic male-centred groups mobilize against reproductive freedom. Whereas institutional progress appears blocked, the global women’s movements are also experiencing some stagnation and internal problems. One main internal problem is strategy building in view of the increasing plurality of feminisms and loss of overarching forums. Other ones are internal democracy, independence, and sustainability: The democratic mechanisms of representation, feedback and accountability to the “women back home”, their local and national constituency, tend to become attenuated while lobbying in global arenas. International women’s networks are hampered by the lack of autonomous resources, and the networks still largely rely on external resources like development funds, state support, or women’s offices. Members of feminist networks have entered political governance structures and organizations, but have not gained a firm foothold or a clear power base (Alvarez 1999; Lenz 2007; Wichterich 2001; Woodward 2004, 2007). Global feminists are worrying about the generation gap to younger women. Coalition building with other social movements, such as the critical globalization groups, has been complex and siphons off resources and energies. However, women’s movements have succeeded in integrating the gender issue into debates on global development and in influencing the establishment of global norms for gender equality, including global, national, and regional institutional machineries for women or gender policies. Not the least achievement is the founding and maintaining of transnational women’s networks over several decades as actors in global governance.

The relevance of international social movements: are they unfolding global spaces or using nodes between nations? The international context and structure of global social movements have been interpreted in highly different ways by several currents of research. The international relations approach of global governance has seen global social movements as main actors in an emerging global space in which international corporations, institutions, and NGOs have become central actors (Rosenau 1998).

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However, Sidney Tarrow, a leading researcher on social movements, emphasizes the continuing importance of nation-states. He defines internationalism as “a dense, triangular structure of relations among states, nonstate actors, and international institutions, and the opportunities this produces for actors to engage in collective action at different levels of this system” (Tarrow 2005: 25). Tarrow’s argument of the continuing importance of states in international politics and institutions is based on his long research of the dynamics of social movements and is convincing, but his analysis is characterized by a certain dualism between the international and the national, or “domestic”. States seem to stand for the power of setting norms and laws whereas international institutions appear as niches for nodes of social movements. Furthermore, states play the leading role in his triangle of internationalism because international institutions, regimes, and treaties “reflect state relations and state power” (Tarrow 2005: 219). However, international institutions have proved able to establish international norms, regimes, and treaties (and in the case of the EU “hard” treaties and law), as in the context of the UN Decade for Women. Therefore they are certainly more than the colourful “coral reefs”, in Tarrow’s terms (ibid.), which provide meeting places and arenas for transnational activists. This focus on states and their power may be related to a classically narrow view of the political. As a researcher of modern social movements, Tarrow concentrates on the political opportunities and processes in the context of the nation-state, its power, and its decisions. In this view, the sphere of discourses and symbolic representations, as well as personal relationships (as in families or networks), are external to politics. But women’s or migrant’s movements, for example, had to overcome these barriers between the cultural and the political sphere, or the personal and the political space, in order to gain a public voice and claim citizenship; so they are indeed relevant for political processes. International social movements, and especially women’s movements, have raised issues at different levels of the international multilevel system (Lenz 2007); they are moving between and combining activities at the global, national, regional, and communal level. One example is the demand for gender mainstreaming – an issue raised in preparation for the fourth UN women’s conference in Beijing (1995), by several European and the South African government delegations and NGOs – which was then adopted in the Beijing declaration and world platform of action. After 1995, the Beijing World Action Platform again influenced the drafting of the EU Amsterdam treaty in 1997 with its strong legally binding provision for gender equality. Women’s movements influenced these political processes by mobilizing in these levels of the global (UN), the greater region (EU), and the nationstates, in a vivid interplay between coordinated discourses and actions. For these strategies, Sidney Tarrow offers the approach of internalization – namely internalizing international issues into domestic politics when global norms are contested and argued for at the national level. The opposite

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process in his view is externalization; that is, externalizing national issues to international institutions. This approach again positions the national against the international in a dualistic way.

Disposing of the boomerangs? Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink observed such processes of multilevel engagement in their groundbreaking study on international advocacy coalitions as policy networks for human rights (1998). For the special situation of human rights advocacy in Latin America, they coined the term of “boomerang effect”: described by Sikkink as a situation “where non state actors, faced with repression and blockage at home, seek out state and non state allies in the international arena, and in some cases are able to bring pressure to bear from above on their government to carry out domestic political change” (2005: 154, following Tarrow 2005: 145). Since then, boomerangs have been flying in diverse international contexts as varied as the EU policy on sexual harassment (Zippel 2004) or the Japanese policy formation for gender equality under UN influence. But the trajectory of a boomerang would be decided solely by the special group which launches it and not by the social actors who would take it up, change, and re-carve it, and send it on further new ways and flights in the global space. So, maybe, it is time to put the boomerang metaphor away. The case of the interplay at the global and national levels of the multilevel system is much more complex: it is far more complex than turning to pressure from above when pressure from below has been put down by unresponsive or dictatorial governments. Tracing the discourses and practices of transnational and international SMOs can be a fruitful way to analyse this interplay.

Social movements, organizations, and networks Transnational and international SMOs, however, have rarely been studied as organizations – that is, from perspectives of organizational sociology. This is somewhat surprising in light of the fact that SMOs are seen as crucial and central actors in the currents of social movement theory, which concentrates on resource mobilization by SMOs and their “entrepreneurs” (cf. McAdam 1996). A broad formal view of organizations can provide a starting point of discussion: they are defined as a set of constant cooperative relations characterized by agreed goals, a formal structure with certain rules and procedures (often with a division of functions and “roles”) and with coordination of members’ activities.5 Members of organizations retain a certain autonomy and power and they can play micro-political games for influence and resources in the organization (Crozier and Friedberg 1979). Furthermore, organizations are shaping their structures, rules and processes in interaction with their environments.

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SMOs operate in the public sphere, which can be conceived according to the logic of knowledge and communication; there, they attempt to mobilize persons, as members or supporters, and time or money for financing their organization and activities. The public sphere in modern societies is characterized by the tensions between universal norms and values (as freedom/ autonomy or equality) and particularistic interests (as the male-centred exclusive employer’s federations, trade unions, or academic associations of the twentieth century). SMOs are negotiating in the public space of meanings, knowledge, and interests. In this manner, they differ from enterprise organizations, which are oriented directly towards the market and its logic of chances for profit. Some special characteristics can be tentatively outlined in the following points: 1. Their agreed goals are oriented towards mobilizing resources, gaining influence with other social and political actors (such as the state or international organizations), and generally effecting social change (McAdam 1996; Raschke 1988; Rucht 1997). 2. In this context, the creation of new knowledge and symbolic representations by the SMOs and their leaders plays a crucial role; for example the invention of the “new woman” (and the “new man” as her comrade) by feminism was fundamental for mobilizing for women’s movements.6 As reflexivity on the self and one’s social context and scientification become increasingly important in modern societies (Giddens 2007: 122–23), social movements tend to develop (counter-)expertise and scientific knowledge. 3. SMOs rely on high normative and cultural integration to increase and stabilize mobilization. They emphasize knowledge and symbolic forms, like strong images, shared activities and rituals while they also appeal to the interest of members. As mobilized communities they are integrated by shared norms and values, symbolic representations, and practices. 4. SMOs are therefore characterized by a tension between value and symbolic integration and “interest logic” of leadership and/or members. This tension is also apparent between leadership and members in influencing the political system (Streeck 1999). 5. SMOs show a wide structural variety from bureaucratic mass organizations to flexible horizontal networks. As Dieter Rucht has shown, they adapt to mobilization needs in the sense mentioned above (1997), to movements’ history and culture as well as to the political and social context. The large bureaucratic trade unions and the bureaucratic women’s councils were formed in the development of national “organized” welfare states. In globalization, however, transnational and international networks have become more important. 6. SMOs interact with social actors in their environment – in the case of global SMOs these include supernational organizations like the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, the EU, nation-states, other social movements, and civil society, including the counter-movements. For example, they respond

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to (or even anticipate) the strategies and needs of such organizations. While they may contest with them, as a rule they also negotiate with them. They enter into relations of contestation and cooperation with these organizations and actors, which are different from the exchange relations of enterprise organizations mediated by the market. In short, SMOs are oriented towards mobilizing resources and towards gaining influence with other social and political actors. They are characterized by the tension between high symbolic and cultural integration (including the creation of knowledge) and interest representation in order to mobilize their members. Networks are organizations characterized by linkages between their nodes or focal points – this gives them highly decentralized internal communication and flexibility. They are especially efficient in horizontal exchange, communication, mobilization, and coordination (Sydow 2005). According to Valentine Moghadam, transnational women’s networks “seem to have devised an organizational structure that consists of active and autonomous local/national women’s groups or individual members based in various countries, while also transcending localisms or nationalisms … Their discourses and objectives are not particularistic but are universalistic” (2005: 102). They emerged and were constituted in the context of creating much needed knowledge and communication for global, national, and regional political institutions and organizations along the global multilevel system. They are characterized by high value and symbolic integration for gender justice, equality, and social peace (Moghadam 2005). In their organizational form, horizontal participation, as much as efficiency of task fulfilment is highly valued (ibid.). Thus, SMOs neither conform to the bureaucratic national women’s mass organizations nor the structureless groups of the 1960-style feminist process. Rather, they evolve as horizontal and flexible network structures, which provide space for empowerment and the use of the full individual potential of network members. In place of bureaucratic hierarchies and control, they operate with intense horizontal personal cooperation and exchange in a pluri-local context, which allows them to utilize the decentred resources of knowledge, communication, and social and political capital of the individual members. These transnational feminist networks correspond to the framework of transnational organizations, as developed by Ludger Pries (in this volume), which are … characterised by their decentralised resources and are, at the same time, opposed to multinational organisations’ intense coordination. Therefore, transnational organizations could be understood as highly decentralised and border-crossing pluri-locally distributed and, at the same time, intensely coordinated stable and dense cooperation frameworks with membership rules, deliberately established and with variable structures, as well as more or less explicit goals and intentions.

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The members contribute resources from their regional and personal backgrounds to the goals of knowledge creation as well as the communication with and influencing of global public spaces. The cooperation, however, is based on high goal commitment and value integration in flexible personcentred social networks. It relies more on diffusion and dense coordination of pluri-local contributions and tends to minimize structural differentiation according to rules. Research on social movement networks has often referred to Manuel Castells’ network concept in the Information Age (1999) referring to horizontal networks in which all nodes can become focal points of exchange. Castells assumes that these horizontal networks have become highly efficient for information processing and exchange, due to new information and communication technologies like the internet, and can compete with bureaucratic organizations (1999). However, he does not give a closer view on the organizational structures and mechanisms of networks. In the new German debate on flexible enterprise organizations, Jörg Sydow has elaborated the efficiency of strategic networks outreaching from the centre: they perform efficiently in information, innovation, and the coordination of diverse decentred actors (2005). Arnold Windeler outlined the concept of reflexive network organizations, which can monitor and reflect on their own decentred processes, as well as on their interchange with diverse environments (2001). Sydow and Windeler work on enterprise networks and their governance, which are important for network communication and reflexivity. Drawing on these authors, in the following section, the concept of epistemic transnational reflexive networks in social movements, which focus on knowledge creation and communication, will be developed and illustrated with some short case studies.

Three transnational feminist networks Three transnational women’s networks shall be outlined below, mainly by looking at their goals, their formal structure with its rules and procedures, and their coordination activities. The three women’s networks to be analysed are the global network DAWN (Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era), the expert network WIDE (Women in Development Europe) and the Latin American network LACWHN (Latin American and Caribbean Women’s Health Network). DAWN is selected as a knowledge creating and communicating network, WIDE as an institution lobbying and mobilizing network in Europe, and LACWHN as a regional network working in the multilevel system and creating a regional and global public space.7 DAWN (Development Alternatives with Women for a New Era) DAWN is a network of women researchers and activists from developing countries, with supporters and friends in the global North. It was

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formed August 1984 in Bangalore, India, when the economist and activist Devaki Jain invited women from the South, from her personal network, to discuss issues of structural adjustment, poverty and the UN Decade for Women. The founding members were highly educated, had a socialist feminist or Marxist feminist background and cosmopolitan attitudes and experiences; many had worked as experts in the field of women and development (Moghadam 2005: 106ff.) The long-term vision and the agreed goals provide symbolic integration to DAWN. The vision of the network was developed in the first manifesto published by Gita Sen and the US economist and gender expert Caren Grown in 1987: We want a world where inequality based on class, gender, and race is absent from every country and from the relationships among countries. We want a world where basic needs become basic rights, and where poverty and all forms of violence are eliminated. Each person will have the opportunity to develop her or his full potential and creativity, and values of nurturance and solidarity will characterize human relationships. In such a world women’s reproductive role will be redefined: Men will be responsible for their sexual behavior, fertility and the well being of both partners. Childcare will be shared by men, women, and society as a whole. We want a world where the massive resources now used in the production of the means of destruction will be diverted to areas where they will help to relieve oppression both within and outside the home. This technological revolution will eliminate disease and hunger and give women means for the safe control of their fertility. We want a world where all institutions are open to participatory democratic processes, where women share in determining priorities and making decisions. (Sen and Grown 1987: 80–81 from Moghadam 2005: 108) An abridged version is still shown prominently at the network’s homepage. This vision combines the goals of economic and social gender/global justice and global gender democracy. Therefore, this formula for structural transformation and democratization has a universal core transcending cultural differences. However, symbolic integration of an organization by value-based global programmes contains no automatic mechanism for its ethical dimension, as Sidney Tarrow has reminded us (2005); this can be observed in transnational organizations, which differ from feminist networks or religious Islamic or Catholic fundamentalists. Rather, the emphasis must fall upon the quality of the vision and the ideology, as well the mechanisms to put it into practice. The vision appeals

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to universal equality (including gender), to the elimination of poverty and violence, and to individual development of one’s full potential and creativity. As Moghadam (2005: 87) points out, women’s movements internationally faced the double challenge of neoliberal market ideology aiming to cut back the welfare state and its provisions for childcare, as well as Islamic or Hindu fundamentalism or communalism campaigning for neopatriarchal gender roles, which were perceived as core symbols of their religion. Learning from these struggles, the DAWN vision transcended nationalism and culturalism, which has disrupted other global social movements and somewhat bridged the global divide between the South and North. Also, from its beginning, DAWN has analysed women’s organizations and their respective meaning for its vision (DAWN 1991). The typology of women’s movements set-up by the group in 1991 has contributed to an understanding between different currents and organizational types. Thus, the network built a solid base for coalition building with other international and national women’s organizations. The DAWN network embraces several project areas with different multiregional focal points. The coordinators in different regions each coordinate certain project fields: in Asia and Southeast Asia the focus is on the political economy of globalization, in South Africa on political restructuring and social transformation, and in Latin America on sexual and reproductive rights (Moghadam 2005: 101; DAWN Informs November 2006: 31). In view of this complex coordination, DAWN has developed a loose, flexible, and multiregional structure in which coordination relies on the motivation and input of thematic and local coordinators who then provide feedback between local and regional networks and the global level. The secretariat has been rotating through the world regions: it formally started in India 1986, then moved to Rio de Janeiro in 1988 and installed a formal secretariat there, moved to the Caribbean in 1990, then to Fiji in 1995, and now it is located in Nigeria (Moghadam 2005: 107). This regional mobility of the centre has contributed to building up multiregional networks and expertise and thus counteracts the tendency of transnational networks to get lost in global space. The steering committee consists of the past and present coordinators, four research coordinators on the main project areas and seven regional coordinators.8 It thus also combines project oriented and multiregional coordination. Communication and exchange with members are carried out informally – i.e. on the internet as well as by holding regional and interregional meetings to share the framework and “draw on the collective wisdom of feminist scholars and activists” (Slatter n.d.: 2–3). In this way, coordination proceeds in an interplay of coordinators’ inputs and exchanges with members’ transnational contributions based on their high motivation, voluntary commitment, and expertise. It seems to be based on the political and cultural integration by the shared vision and values and on the space and respect for individual expertise and achievement.

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DAWN’s individual and personal network character is convenient for this complex coordination and may fit well with its goals of knowledge creation, communication, and exerting influence in global governance. DAWN has consciously developed coalitions with women and men in social justice movements and in international institutions in the North (Slatter n.d.). Still, it is a powerful small network, based on prestigious regional and global leaders well known as researchers and activists; personal social networks may entail limits for other less “distinguished” persons and thus effects of exclusion. Funding is acquired from various global, national, and individual sources as Unifem (the UN Development Fund for Women), the Ford Foundation and the McArthur Foundation in the starting years, and from bilateral donor organizations, especially from Nordic countries which had a pioneer role in establishing funds for gender equality. DAWN leaders have served as resource persons or consultants for Unifem, UNFPA, UNDP, ILO, and UNESCO and could thus prepare analyses and position papers for important institutions and for governments (Moghadam 2005: 109–10, 131–32) by incorporating in their knowledge creation and coordinating potential. From its vision and expertise, as well as from its multiregional and flexible networking, DAWN has been extremely influential in mobilizing and gaining a voice at international institutions and in global civil society (i.e. the World Global Forum). DAWN contributed to the UN World Women Conferences (1975–95) and the UN development conferences of the 1990s – namely the Rio Conference on Ecology 1992, the World Population Conference in Cairo 1994, the Human Rights Conference in Vienna 1993 and the Social Summit in Copenhagen 1996. These development conferences provided spaces to integrate women’s issues from the margins of “women-only conferences” into the mainstream agenda (Sen and Madunagu 2001). According to the DAWN Coordinator, Claire Slatter, DAWN worked “to clarify analysis of the main issues for feminists in these Conferences, and, in collaboration with a core of other women’s organizations and networks, to secure significant commitments to policy changes through platforms and programmes of action” (Slatter n.d.: 2). The conferences proved to be “veritable battle grounds between feminists and fundamentalists”, especially in the informal alliance between the Vatican and fundamentalist Islamic governments (Slatter n.d.: 3). Through sustained feminist advocacy in this series of UN development meetings, the conferences built on one another. The Beijing platform for Action 1995 built on the 1992 Vienna agreements on Human Rights, the 1994 World Population Conference recommendations on reproductive health and rights, and the macroeconomic agenda of the Social Summit 1996 (Sen and Madunagu 2001). DAWN has monitored and coordinated these sequences of norm formulation and setting, as well as the changing global opportunity structure and the developments of women’s movements. It can be seen as a leading feminist transnational reflexive network taking stock of

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the external and its internal development and focusing on knowledge creation, communication, and social transformation.9 WIDE (Women in Development Europe) WIDE was organized after the 1985 UN World Conference on Women, held in Nairobi.10 In its first years WIDE focused on information exchange, solidarity work, and on lobbying for the integration of women’s concerns into the development policies of major donor agencies in Europe. In 1990 WIDE received funding from the European Commission and established a secretariat in Dublin. It was also funded by Nordic Governments, large development NGOs in the Netherlands, Belgium, and Britain, as well as by the Ford and McArthur Foundations. In 1993 it moved to Brussels in order to position itself more strategically in relation to EU policy-making institutions and more visibly alongside other European NGO networks. WIDE set the following goals of: 1) creating expertise on relevant issues for women’s development needs; 2) strengthening national networking by establishing national platforms in women/gender and development; 3) supporting global networking in exchange with DAWN, AWID (Association for Women’s Rights in Development), and other global and regional/national groups, and 4) influencing European development policies, priorities, and programmes and lobbying European and international institutions. WIDE’s organizational structure is also rather flexible and loose, aiming to coordinate pluri-local activities and communication along the multilevel system. The Steering Group is elected by the General Assembly biannually, meets at least twice a year, is charged with setting the strategic directions for WIDE, and supervises activities and the spending of resources. Members come from the diverse European national platforms, namely, the national umbrella networks of groups working in the field of gender and development. Everyday affairs and communications are carried out by a board of three officers from different regions and the secretariat in Brussels. They rely on internet and regular phone conferences. The yearly General Assembly rotates between member regions and is one central space for open policy discussion and formulation and networking with institutions and NGOs in the region. WIDE provided position papers for important European and UN institutions as the EU Committee on Women’s Rights, the UNDP Development Report 1995, the OECD/DAC/WID group, and the preparatory conferences for The Social Summit in the Beijing Conference 1995. It has close contacts with EU Commission officials and Members of the European Parliament (Moghadam 2005: 233–34). The evaluation of the UN Beijing Conference 1995 was scheduled for five years later in the Beijing+5 procedure which was rather ineffective as mentioned above. In this context WIDE refocused on economic issues. It intensified research on and monitoring of international trade and macro-economic

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processes, as well as advocating for women’s economic, social, and political empowerment in economic international institutions, negotiations, and policy arenas. It also refocused on the more national and grassroots level, and addressed younger feminists. Another important component of WIDE’s work in the last years has been building capacity on gender and trade/macroeconomic issues, with WIDE’s capacity-building project (Economic Literacy), which started in mid-2003. WIDE also can be seen as leading feminist transnational reflexive network, focusing on the developing expert knowledge, monitoring economic structural change, and lobbying and influencing core institutions at the EU and the UN levels. LACWHN (Latin American and Caribbean Women’s Health Network) LACWHN was organized during a feminist meeting on women and health in 1984 in Tenza, Columbia. At the start, the coordination of exchange and communication was assigned to the well-known and respected global information ISIS (regional Chile headquarters)11 by the founding members. According to an in-depth study by Chen Yin-Zu (2005), LACWHN developed under the influence of its internal dynamics and its international tasks and opportunities in three phases. In the starting and consolidation phase LACWHN had the goals of coordinating information and communication between members and building Latin American consciousness and expertise on women and health, especially reproductive rights. In the second phase of mobilization and action orientation, the network concentrated on the UN World Conferences of Women and the World Population Conference in Cairo, 1994; it created a diversified understanding of women and reproductive and sexual rights in Latin America. The regional leading image of the mother was combined with mother’s autonomy and strength – which also means the right to decide on bearing children and becoming a mother. To uphold women’s decisions and the right to abortion is extremely difficult in the catholic context of civil society and popular movements, as well as with governments in Latin America. In the third phase of institutionalization after 1995, the goals became more professionalized: support of the implementation of women’s and human rights, especially sexual and reproductive rights in the regional, national, and local context (i.e. by providing resources and finances for local campaigns), including the training of experts in the field. The organizational structures of LACWHN also changed in these phases. In the start and consolidation phase, coordination and organization building were carried out in the context of another feminist NGO, Isis, in Santiago de Chile. Access to the network was open to all groups (with a mail address) and the focus was on coordination and communication, supported by the network’s newsletter. After an evaluation of the network in 1992, a

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commission was established to work with the coordinator. In 1994 the network became independent from ISIS and the commission was changed into a Board of Directors around the coordinator in Santiago. The board of directors is composed of prominent women’s health activists working in Latin America and the Caribbean. It formulates the network’s strategies and policies, and monitors and evaluates the network’s activities. In addition, an advisory board was established to include past board members and the former General Coordinator of the network (Chen 2005: 132–52; LACWHN homepage 29.04.2007). As LACWHN professionalized its aims and tasks, increasingly acquired funding from international institutions, and made large global and regional coalitions, it formalized a hierarchic structure with strong leadership coming from the board of directors. It also established differentiated classes of membership with different rights and opportunities. Such classes are permanent and active members/groups, participants in campaigns, or advisors with special expertise, as well as people who just subscribe to the journal. This formal structure seems to answer to the need for professionalized expertise, credible for national and international institutions and for rationalizing the demands of continually mobilizing the distant regional groups that are coordinated by the campaign events. Participatory elements include debates in the journal, exchange around the campaigns, and transnational conferences of the network. Transnational coordination is intense around the activities and knowledge communication in an emerging Latin American public on gender issues. From the first phase on, LACWHN mobilized and raised issues using interchanges between global level UN processes and national level women’s movements; it coordinated access to the UN Conferences of Women for national and grassroots groups in its membership. Whereas LACWHN could profit from its excellent working relationships with international institutions, it also developed strategies to create interpretations and activities of gender and health issues appropriate for the Latin American context. Chen Yin-Zu analysed the yearly campaigns, establish by LACWHN, on 28 May – in 1998, LACWHN set this date as the international action day for women’s health in the region, and women’s movements and state institutions campaigned and carried public events at the national and regional level. From 1988–92, the action day focused on the mother’s mortality and introduced issues of sexual and reproductive rights in this context: the 1990 slogan was “mother’s mortality: choice for motherhood without risks”, and in 1992, “mother mortality and teenage pregnancies”. Before the World Conference on Population, the mottos called to “end the silence around abortion” (1993) and for “Legal abortion without risks for all women!” (1994). After 1995, the campaign switched from the mother’s mortality and risk towards health and reproductive rights for women. In 1996–97, the slogan was, “access to good health treatment is woman’s right”, and in 1999–2000 it called for “access to information, education and services for reproductive rights for youth” (Chen 2005: 170ff.). The symbol of “mother’s mortality” as a Latin

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American image resonated with the dominant mother image and effected a large diffusion and rooting of new health norms. Building on these results, the human and women’s rights framework then allowed LACWHN to reconceptualise women as “mother-citizens” who demand public rights. In the following campaigns after 1999, the homogenous image of woman/ mother eroded and now young people, or men, are integrated in the campaigns for rights for embodied citizens (Chen ibid.).12 The transnational campaigns of LACWHN are interwoven and embedded with interpretations and actions of national and local groups. In its first year in 1988, 28 activities were carried out in five countries; but in 2000, 150 groups in 14 countries took part in LACWHN campaigns. In these campaigns the slogans and interpretations were created in communication with the slogans of Brazilian groups in 1988: “To create life and to stay alive: all women have this right” – Peruvian women subsequently varied this motto in 1989. The integration of giving life and having a right to life became a basic concept for women’s health groups in Latin America, and was filled with strong consciousness and agency. A group from Guatemala proclaimed in 1992: “As we give life, we also defend”, and the Nicaraguan health campaign followed-up with the idea of transformation of life’s quality – “We do not only want to give life, but also to transform it” (Chen 2005: 184). From 1996 the network coordinated a regional campaign for 25 November, the International Day of Action against Violence against Women in Latin America, which had been proclaimed 1981. It highlights the serious consequences that gender-based violence has on women’s physical and psychological health. In this effort, LACWHN has supported small projects of women’s groups that belong to the Network. Through workshops, artistic events, roundtables, debates and other activities, these groups educate their communities about the different forms of gender-based violence, how this violence affects women’s physical and mental health, and how gender-based violence can be eradicated (LACWHN homepage, 29.04.2007). As these examples show, something like a regional Latin American consciousness on women’s health and public citizenship emerged in these exchanges and coordinated campaigns. LACWHN, as a transnational knowledge creation and communication network, thus coordinates regional and national activities and knowledge development, and contributes to building transnational consciousness and integrating national and local movements into this emerging public space.

Transnational women’s networks and the building of global public spaces As the abovementioned examples illustrate, transnational women’s networks can be considered as reflexive and flexible network organizations, which create and communicate knowledge from pluri-local resources though flexible, person-oriented and horizontal coordination. In the case of DAWN, the

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secretariat is rotated regionally and former directors are included on the steering committee in order to strengthen the transregional character and continuity of coordination. In WIDE, the steering group organizes coordinated communication and activities between the European level and the national platforms. LACWHN, on the other hand, established a professional hierarchical structure in which coordination and decision-making are concentrated at the top. This is accepted by member groups, as it wants to fulfil its coordination and service tasks complementary to the needs of the national women’s organizations this way. It has strived to build a common knowledge base and consciousness on a Latin American level for women’s health movements. Transnational feminist networks are epistemic groups,13 as they create or circulate knowledge on gender and women. They have quickly and rather proactively responded to the rapidly increasing demand for gender knowledge in international institutions, states, and NGOs during the UN Decades for Women, and in reaction to the international new feminist movements. As the state of research on gender issues was quite low and fragmentary, these institutions had little access to effective knowledge on women or gender; according to the equality and human rights paradigm valid in the UN, they had urgent needs for such expertise. Such feminist networks were able to work transnationally by pooling and integrating pluri-local knowledge, and thus further gained high prestige for their innovative universal approaches14 with these institutions. While creating knowledge, coordinating groups, mobilizing and publishing these activities in news media and on the net, these networks “produce” global and transnational public spaces. This concerns the issue of the “unit of reference” raised by Ludger Pries. The boundaries of the new transnational public spaces are being negotiated by the feminist networks in the processes of their constitution. On the one hand, these public spaces extend into spheres formerly guarded off as private. For example, in areas such as women’s health, bodies and motherhood, or domestic violence, feminist networks created discourses and language to analyse these spheres, i.e. the concept of human/women’s rights which includes the right to live without violence towards women’s bodies or sexuality. They aimed to relate these issues to the polity as well as to search for political visions and solutions for them. On the other hand, transnational public spheres bring the states and communities back in to the processes: they are not built “in-between” states, but rather address and lobby states and communities with new norms and knowledge from the global as well as from local spheres. As transnational public spaces are being built up by SMOs in the global multilevel system, they emerge as channels or bridges between these levels and the state institutions and social movements, also located at these levels. So, instead of throwing boomerangs, transnational feminist (and other) networks can be seen as weaving webs and networks of interchanging knowledge, norms and

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values, of negotiating and arguing over these values and thus creating relations of contention and cooperation with international institutions, states, and other social movements. They need persuasive expert knowledge, strategic intelligence, and expert agency to negotiate step by step at the different levels of the multi-level system. If we reflect that the word gender was virtually non-existent before the UN Decade for Women in international politics or development, and that gender equality is now recognized as a global norm, the immense knowledge and communication work of these networks becomes visible.

Notes 1 The policy cycle perspective is used as a heuristic approach while reflecting on its limits – for example, that the phases have no chronological sequence, but its aspects are often intermeshed (cf. Jahn and Wegrich 2003). The basic aspects considered in this context are knowledge creation about the problem and problem definition, agenda setting, policy formulation, implementation, and evaluation. Chen 2005, Schwenken 2006 and Zwingel 2005 have analyzed global feminist networks from a policy cycle approach in an innovative way. 2 Women’s movements initiated political problem definition in the case of violence against women at home, in society and war, in gender and ecology and in gender and migration. 3 ‘Universal’ means the general validity of the modern principles of autonomy/ freedom, equality, and solidarity for all persons while they are shaped by different sociocultural path developments and contexts. Whereas in large parts of poststructuralist feminist theory, it is connoted with homogeneity, it should rather be linked to universality and difference. Especially relevant for the feminist global discourses are the two following documents: The Convention for the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 1979 (CEDAW 1979). It aimed to overcome the first fragmentary UN approaches, after 1945, against “sex discrimination”, by providing an integrated framework to abolish all forms of discrimination. It has legal status in terms of international law for the states, which ratified it, which includes a broad majority of UN member states (but not the US). In article 2 of CEDAW, states pledged to prohibit all discrimination against women and to take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women by any person, organization, or enterprise. Article 11 contains a specific commitment for eliminating all forms of discrimination in employment, including the right to work and equality in recruitment, training, promotion, wages, and benefits (CEDAW 1979; Zwingel 2005). The UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing 1995 came up with a Declaration and Platform for Action (United Nations 1995), which established gender mainstreaming. This has been incorporated in the EU treaty of Amsterdam (1997) and in gender policies of national states. The Beijing Platform for Action also proposes goals, strategies, and measures for gender equality in twelve fields of action and gives detailed time frames with specific targets for supranational organizations, national governments, and organizations from the economy and civil society. See United Nations 1995 and Unifem 2000: 47–60 for a brief overview of developments since the Beijing conference. 4 Fundamentalist Christian as well as fundamentalist Islamic ideologies focus on such neopatriarchal gender norms as women’s chastity, the priority of their

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mother’s role over self-determination, and the subordination of women under male authority. Their leadership is mostly male which is legitimized by invoking the religious tradition. Therefore they can be termed male-centred in contrast to other more egalitarian Christian or Islamic orientations. The Vatican has recently even attacked the concept of gender as a cultural category which is basic to the Beijing platform of action, claiming it may promote mistrust of the family, equal positions for homosexuality, and polymorph sexuality (Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith 2004). Cf. Kieser and Walgenbach 2003: 1–31; Türk et al. 2006. This formal view does not imply the ideal of the “rational organization” in a post-Weberian sense, which has been criticized in the last decades. Rather, it gives a descriptive definition for comparative analysis between different organizational types and fields (like economy, voluntary work, and social movements). Social movements theorists as Benford and Snow have addressed these issues with the concept of “framing”. They assume that social movement entrepreneurs engage in framing issues namely propose discourses, symbols and explanations which are appropriate for mobilizing members and followers (cf. Benford and Snow 2000; Williams 2004). This concept is somewhat narrow in terms of the knowledge creation and symbolic dimensions of social movements. Cf. Zdravomyslava 2007 for the Russian soldiers mothers’ movement for an epistemic SMO. The following short case studies are based on Moghadam 2005 and Chen 2005 as well as on the groups’ homepages and newsletters and some participant observation. Moghadam 2005: 100; regional coordinators are based in the Caribbean, Latin America, Africa (one in Francophone and one in English speaking Africa), Southeast Asia, and South Asia. Ferree analysed the internet communication between feminist networks and found a high prestige (i.e. interconnectedness) for DAWN (2007). This section is based on Moghadam 2005 and newsletters and Annual Reports of WIDE (cf. http://server2.matematici.com/wide/index.jsp?id=19&random= 817703 247916747 accessed on 27.4.2007). ISIS formed in 1974, as an international feminist information and communication network, in Rome and aimed to support Southern women to build their capacities to network and communicate. The Egyptian goddess Isis represents wisdom, creativity, and knowledge, which are the organisation’s credo. Its first offices were located in Rome, Italy, and Geneva, Switzerland. In 1984, Isis International opened an office in Santiago, Chile to coordinate its Latin American and Caribbean programmes. In 1991 the office in Rome moved to Manila to be closer to its constituency of Asian, African, and Pacific regions. Later, in 1994, the Geneva office, called the Isis-Women’s International Cross-Cultural Exchange Programme (WICCE), moved to Kampala, Uganda (ISIS Manila homepage, http://www.isiswomen.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=30& Itemid = 82, 29.4.2007). At the start of RSMLAC 1984, Isis-International in Santiago de Chile had more than 10,000 contacts in 150 countries, a centre of information/documentation with about one thousand publications (including journals and grey materials), including the journal Revista Isis-Internacional de las Mujeres. In her seminal study of women’s movements in Japan, Mackie 2003 has shown that these movements also related citizenship to issues of the body as motherhood, chastity, or autonomous desire of women or psychological and physical violence against women. The economic, social, and political dimensions of citizenship are thus concretised for the “embodied subject” (Giddens). Cogburn proposed the concept of an epistemic community in the context of postmodern regime theory. He defined it as the collection of the forces that can

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influence the acceptable forms of problem definition and solution in regime formation by contributing to create an “accepted” belief system, and shaping the ongoing development of norms, rules, and values in the regime area (Cogburn 2003: 137–38). Zdravosmyslava used the terms of epistemic group for the Russian soldiers’ mother’s movement, which redefined the neopatriarchal powerful image of the Russian mother to criticise patriarchal forces like the army and the nationalists (Zdravomylslava 2007). 14 The universal expertise of these networks built on their pluri-regional resources and reflected the respect for cultural difference. In another context, I have proposed the concept of “reflexive universalism” for such differentiated and inclusive approaches, which have overcome the classical Eurocentric bias of “simple universalism”.

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Transnational organisations in education Christel Adick

Transnational organisations in education represent only part of the larger universe of education. For this reason, this chapter will proceed from macroanalytical perspectives on education, i.e. putting transnational educational organisations into the wider horizon of national, international, and transnational educational spaces. Following the outline on transnational educational spaces, the next section will focus on transnational organisations, which play a role in these educational spaces. Approaches to categorise transnational (or cross-border) education are discussed and a typology for the analysis of transnational educational organisations is developed. In addition, examples of organisations operating in these fields are illustrated. Finally, the chapter summarises some of the findings and highlights, a few general ideas, and possible research hypotheses on this topic.

Transnational educational spaces Discussions and research on education are largely confined to what may be called the ‘national paradigm’ of education, which also prevails in Comparative Education (Adick 2005: 244). This national paradigm results from the fact that for about the last two centuries modern mass-education systems developed and spread around the world as a corollary of the formation of modern nation-states (Meyer 1980, Ramirez and Boli 1987). These national education systems also served and still serve as vehicles of nationbuilding and national integration (Wenning 1996). State-controlled and publicly funded compulsory education systems became universal, i.e. they became the accepted new ‘modern’ model of education world-wide, replacing other forms of pre-modern education (e.g. monastery schools and temple schools) or ultimately bringing them under state control (Adick 1992). This historical process has become so ubiquitous and self-evident that it seems to be quite ‘natural’ to consider education to be ‘a national affair’ and to research it as such. What I have called the ‘national paradigm’ in Comparative Education matches the discussion on ‘methodological nationalism’ in the discourse on transnational studies, as it is presented by Andreas Wimmer and Nina Glick Schiller, who, however, mention that they owe the

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term to an article of H. Martins 1974, where it had been mentioned en passant: ‘Methodological nationalism is the naturalization of the nation-state by the social sciences. Scholars who share this intellectual orientation assume that countries are the natural units for comparative studies, equate society with the nation-state, and conflate national interests with the purpose of social science’ (Wimmer and Glick Schiller 2003: 567). In contrast to the national paradigm of education, phenomena and developments in education called ‘transnational’ have up to now less frequently and less coherently been treated in educational research. Transnational aspects entered educational discourse and research in several quite different ways and with quite different meanings. At least three contexts may be identified: (a) transnational convergences in education; (b) transnational education (TNE) in the sphere of higher education; and (c) transnational socialisation in transmigrant communities. They will be explained below in more detail. Transnational convergences in education Transnational convergences in education have been discussed in the wider context of modernisation theories or more explicitly in convergence analyses. Alex Inkeles (1981: 8–13) surveyed five areas of modern industrial societies for convergence or divergence: modes of production and patterns of resource utilisation; institutional arrays and institutional forms; structures and patterns of social relationships; systems of popular attitudes, values and behaviour; and, systems of political and economic control. In some of these areas converging trends in education were also mentioned. Focussing only on education, Inkeles and Sirowy (1983: 307–26) re-analysed research findings in dimensions of educational change, which represent characteristics of modern schooling; such dimensions of education change include: ideational and legal; structural; demographic; administrative and financial; and interpersonal and institutional dynamics. The findings which were summarised in a table (ibid.: 326–27) show a good number of obviously converging variables, such as the public responsibility for and provision of compulsory schooling, an articulated structure of the school system, teacher training, formal tests, and enrolment ratios. Analysing and theorising transnational trends in modern education are among the main objectives of a research group that includes John W. Meyer, Francisco O. Ramirez, John Boli, and others, who have published on this topic since the 1970s. Their ‘neo-institutionalist’ approach focuses on transnational convergences as ‘isomorphic’ developments within a ‘world polity’. In the absence of a world state as a global sovereign, this ‘world polity’ is constituted by the common belief in rational models of government, schooling or science (Meyer and Ramirez 2000). Despite of the existence of such extended writings, the topic of transnational convergence seems to be ‘discoverable’ ever anew again, since Fazal

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Rizvi (2004) writes on global convergence in the field of higher education without even mentioning Inkeles or Meyer. Rizvi identifies four mechanisms which lead to convergence in higher education due to globalisation: the circulation of ideas and ideologies; the ‘Washington Consensus’ about world development and resulting conventions; international competition regulated in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS); and coercive influences of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The GATS, however, plays a major role in all discussions on transnational education (Robertson et al. 2002). Besides controversies over the existence or non-existence of convergences or isomorphy, attention should be called to arguments on their desirability. This normative discourse can be summarised into pro and con arguments on the virtues and the vices of standardisation (Adick 2002: 221–23). The pro arguments suppose that standardisation prevents arbitrary situations and decisions (e.g. if teachers require a certificate, a headmaster has to obey that rule in his appointments), gives opportunities for greater mobility (moving with a certificate from one place to another), furthers equal rights and opportunities (if education for all is the standard there is no room for ethnic, sex, religious, or other discrimination), and enhances quality by setting standards, facilitates rational decisions etc. The con arguments focus on the danger of cultural imperialism and hegemony (when ‘superpowers’ set the standards), cultural homogenisation (because traditions might be wiped out or amalgamated), cultural sterility (because there is no room for creativity and non-conformism), less autonomy for teachers, and education being turned into a commodity, leading to brain drain (because standard certificates may be used for employment outside the country that offered and paid for the education). Some of these pro and con arguments resemble those which are discussed in the critical discourse on the GATS (Knight 2002: 15ff.; 2004: 24ff.). Transnational education (TNE) The term ‘transnational education’, abbreviated as TNE, has recently appeared in the sphere of higher education. A report of the Confederation of the European Rectors states: ‘Currently, transnational education is an underrepresented and often misunderstood area, with no common understanding, definition or approach’ (Adam 2001: 5). According to a preliminary definition from UNESCO and the Council of Europe, TNE means: All types of higher education study programme, or set of courses of study, or educational services (including those of distance education) in which learners are located in a country different from the one where the awarding institution is based. Such programmes may belong to the educational system of a State different from the State in which it operates, or may operate independently of any national system. (Ibid.: 13)

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However, because this broad definition includes well-established international cooperations and programmes such as twinning and binational arrangements, a more precise definition which captures the newly uprising transnational institutions is to be favoured. Agreeing with Adam, TNE should thus be applied to ‘international branch campuses and franchising operations and provision of education/training by international non-official higher education institutions, off-shore institutions, foreign public universities, various consortia, and corporate universities’ (ibid.: 40). Different from international cooperative arrangements, transnational operations in higher education are detected by their ‘non-official’ or ‘off-shore’ or ‘borderless’ or ‘cross-border’ or ‘consortial’ or, as the case may be, ‘corporate’ status. All these classifications draw attention to the fact that they are taking place beyond or outside governmental activities, even though they might be in collaboration with or regulated by national governments or international institutions representing intergovernmental agreements or conventions, such as the above-mentioned UNESCO and the Council of Europe statement on TNE. The change from state-run to market-driven Higher Education is the topic of a Special Report on Higher Education of The Economist (26 February 2005: 63), which reads: There used to be three near-certainties about higher education. It was supplied on a national basis, mostly to local students. It was government-regulated. And competition and profit were almost unknown concepts. As most education was publicly funded, the state had a big say in what was taught, to how many and for how long. … How that has changed … The text goes on to state that apparently profitable transnational programmes exist in the field of ‘professional vocational training’. The article points to the rapid expansion of a certificate called CFA (Chartered Financial Analyst), which is offered in tertiary, non-university education by the American Association of Financial Professionals and their respective CFA Institute. Formerly only known in the USA, the certificate has expanded world-wide since the 1990’s: “To take the CFA, candidates need only to register, pay fees of $1,455 and turn up to the one of 274 test centres around the world. Most of them study with private providers, who use the freely accessible curriculum and reading list. But some 40 universities are now teaching it as part of their postgraduate courses” (ibid.: 64). This example of a transnational certificate, applicable in the financial service sector, also proves that tertiary education has become ever more diverse within the last decades, with a multitude of post-secondary trainings far beyond the classical academic university education. It also shows that cooperations between public and private stakeholders are possible and do take place.

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Even though TNE has hitherto been applied to ‘non-official’ higher education, it is advocated here in my concept that the horizon should be broadened in order to comprise TNE in all other sectors of education, ranging from pre-school to adult and out-of-school education, including primary and secondary schools. Although schooling – due to the ‘national paradigm’ – was generally deemed to be a national affair par excellence, there are schools operating around the world which have to be called ‘transnational’. For instance, many of the ‘International Schools’ deliver what is categorised here as transnational education. They operate world-wide with their own distinctive non-national curricula and issue a unique certificate, the ‘International Baccalaureate’, which is by now recognised by many universities around the world as a non-national entrance certificate. These schools, many of them offering education from primary level onwards, are mostly private and privately funded, and they are monitored by non-national umbrella organisations such as the European Council of International Schools (ECIS) or other such ‘transnational organisations’, which will be discussed below (Hayden and Thompson 2001). In some countries, such as Germany, international schools are rare and thus extremely marginal. However, in other regions, like Hong Kong, this sector of schooling is expanding. For example, research published in 2003 has shown that there are 47 ‘international schools’ of different affiliation in Hong Kong, making up about 4 per cent of all schools; these schools operate ‘outside the local education system’, applying ‘non-local’ curricula and certificates (Bray and Yamato 2003: 53f.). In adult and further education there are also a lot of programmes and institutions that can be called ‘transnational’ because they operate independently from a national education system in different countries. To give examples: Language schools like the ‘Benedict-Schools’ or ‘InlinguaSchools’, both originally founded in Switzerland, are now operating in many countries outside Switzerland using their own particular ‘brand’ name with their specific methods and curricular approaches to language instruction (www.benedict-school.de; www.inlingua.com). Transnational education in transmigrant communities Transnational education in transmigrant communities draws attention to the fact that transmigrant communities not only establish financial, cultural, religious, or other networks between their place of origin and their various places of residence, but educational links as well. Examples of such links are: Children are sent to their grandparents residing in their country of origin in order to learn their ‘mother tongue’; sons and daughters might have a ‘transnational’ school career with primary school attendance in one country, secondary school in another country, and higher education in yet a different country; students aspire to ‘go back’ to the country from which their parents have come because they can join a family enterprise ‘over there’, whereas

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their cousins from ‘over there’ might be attracted to study overseas and benefit from the existing family networks to get a visa and financial support; and, transmigrant youths establish and jointly operate a transnational enterprise that connects clients of their transmigrant community from various places, thus converting their specific ‘transnational’ cultural capital, in the form of multilingual and multicultural competencies, into economic capital. Although there is a growing amount of literature on transmigration, it seems that its implications for education are yet to be broadly discussed. This might be due to the fact that educational research, directed to questions of migration, still operates with the classical notion of one-way migration processes, centred on concepts of assimilation, integration, cultural identity, multicultural education, and so on, for migrant children and youths (Gogolin and Pries 2004). In her research on Portuguese youths in Germany, Fürstenau (2004: 34ff.) proposes three new perspectives on education and migration, when the concept of transnationalisation ‘from below’ (i.e. by and within transmigrant communities) is applied to educational research. These three perspectives are: transnational mobility should be considered a ‘normal’ way of life for an increasing number of people; transnational networks and social spaces are not transitory but, rather, long-lasting phenomena; and, transnationalism creates hybrid cultural identities. In her research on socialisation in transnational social spaces she found that the parents or, in some cases, even the grandparents of the Portuguese youths she interviewed and case-studied in Hamburg were mostly part of the generation of migrant workers coming to Germany in the 1960s or 1970s, but still upholding close contacts to Portugal and in most cases even owning property there. These youths were socialised across borders, e.g. by regular visits and vacations in their country of origin. They participated in activities with the Portuguese community in Hamburg, such as playing for and supporting the Portuguese football team. These youths considered various transnational education options, including transnational paths of acquiring and applying education, getting a secondary education in Germany and, doing a vocational training in Portugal, studying in Portugal, and working in either Portugal or Germany, or moving to and fro between different education systems (Fürstenau 2004: 40ff.). They also seemed to possess a rather stable ‘hybrid’ (or ‘transnational’) identity, one that was neither Portuguese nor German. Taking into account these diverse and more or less well established ‘traditions’ of applying the concept of transnationalism to education, it is proposed here that the term ‘transnational educational spaces’ be taken as the umbrella term for transnational convergences, TNE, and transnational education in transmigrant communities as well as other possibly forthcoming research fields. For transnational convergences it can be argued that without their existence the other phenomena (i.e. transnational educational programmes and organisations, and transnational education in transmigrant communities) could not exist. Without transnational convergences, neither transnational education at the tertiary or other levels of education nor

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transnational education in transmigrant communities would make sense, because educational arrangements, learning strategies, curricula, certificates, and competencies must somehow be transferable and compatible across borders. Transnational educational spaces thus require some transnational convergences while at the same time fostering their reproduction and renewal and possibly creating new solutions that might become transnational in the long run. Defining transnational educational spaces In a short definition, ‘transnational educational spaces’ will – in analogy to ‘social spaces’ – be defined as transnational social spaces in which people meet and act for the purpose of gaining or transmitting education. In order to clarify this definition, it has to be determined what social spaces are, in contrast to physical or geographical spaces. Following Ludger Pries’s editorial essay in this book, the concept of social spaces – or societal spaces (according to Pries the term is used more or less synonymously) – refers to social, economic, cultural, political and other dimensions of human relations. These comprise intensive and rather stable social practices (like work and interpersonal communication), symbol systems (i.e. complex signs for and in a context which gives meaning to social practices) and artefacts (stemming from human action and work). The next step would be to determine what is meant by education. Conforming to the international terminology, education stands for various forms of upbringing, instruction, school teaching and learning or other training arrangements (cf. Lenhart 1993: 1ff.). The term ‘formal education’ is used in reference to what is commonly known as the compulsory education system of a given country. Formal education is highly formalised, normally government-regulated, and issues standardised certificates. Nonformal education refers to organised forms of instruction and learning which occur outside the formal education system. These arrangements may replace or supplement formal education, e.g. by acquiring knowledge at a later stage in life; non-formal education may also result in special certificates. Informal education, which is sometimes also called ‘incidental education’, means processes and outcomes of learning and enlightenment that occur in everyday life – such as, while participating in family life, in peer groups or in cultural activities. Such informal learning contexts are seldom formalised, are usually less organised (compared to courses or seminars in non-formal education), and often not even intended to be ‘educational’ by those who arrange them. So ‘informal education’ might overlap with the notion of ‘socialisation’. In order to be called ‘informal education’ (and not ‘socialisation’) such activities must contain a minimal degree of intention to offer or to gain enlightenment and insight, to acquire or transmit knowledge, or to further the personal development by those who frequent them. Supposedly much of what is described under the heading of ‘transnational education’ in transmigrant communities would fall into the category of ‘informal education’, whereas most of the organisations operating on an entrepreneurial basis will

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offer certificates pertaining to the non-formal or formal education sectors. In any case, the proposed definition – ‘transnational educational spaces are social spaces in which people meet and act for the purpose of gaining or transmitting education’ – is compatible with all three forms of education. Transnational educational organisations, which will be discussed in the following section, are (only) part of transnational educational spaces, which are constituted by many other phenomena like networks, individual interactions, informal issue groups, and others. The rather broad definition should nevertheless not become a kind of catch-all phrase, as it should distinguish clearly between ‘spaces’ and ‘organisations’. In order to illustrate what this means, I will refer to a recent article by Mark Hanson (2006), who researched ‘Transnational Corporations as Educational Institutions for National Development’, presenting ‘the contrasting cases of Mexico and South Korea’. The author argues that transnational corporations (TNCs) conducting production and business, especially in export processing zones in Third World countries, ‘knowingly and unknowingly function like educational institutions by transferring knowledge and technical expertise to national institutions, including domestic industries, universities and public schools’ (Hanson 2006: 625). I prefer to rephrase this by saying that transnational business corporations (might) contain ‘transnational educational spaces’ when, for example, they offer training for workers using concepts employed within the transnational realms of that firm or when sending people for internships overseas or to other locations of their company. Using expressions like ‘transnational corporations as educational institutions’ or stating that such TNCs ‘function like educational institutions’ might, however, be mistaken as equivalent to the notion of ‘transnational educational organisations’, which they are not, since their prime raison d’être is not education, but business. If, however, such TNCs operate their own specific corporate educational institutions, like the DaimlerChrysler Corporate University or the Lufthansa School of Business (discussed below in Chapter 2), then, of course, these would be termed ‘transnational educational organisations’. The definition of transnational educational spaces would be incomplete without a precise notion of what is meant by transnational. For the purpose of this discussion, it is meant to distinguish between three different types of ‘educational spaces’, each with peculiarities of its own. These three are: national, international, and transnational educational spaces (cf. Table 7.1). Of high importance is especially the distinction between ‘international’ and ‘transnational’. Whereas both these terms are often (unreflectively) used interchangeably or quasi-synonymously, the concept adopted here will try to make valid distinctions, even though there may be some unavoidable overlapping due to the complex realities, created when international governmental and private actions and programmes cooperate and mix. In order to highlight the fact that the term ‘international’ is used here not in a broad sense referring to any activities across national borders, but more precisely in the sense of inter-governmental activities between nation-states, it is hereafter written

Examples (empirical evidence)

•

•

•

•

institutions and programmes of the compulsory education system institutions and programmes outside compulsory education (depending on the national system: preschool, tertiary education and others) training of educational personnel state-controlled, staterecognised and statesubsidised private education, institutions

National

Table 7.1 Educational spaces

•

•

•

• formal international student and youth exchange twinning, dual degree, binational, joint programmes between partner institutions implementation of international education into national systems of education implementation of international educational development goals (e.g. EFA = Education For ALL, or MDG = Millennium Development Goals, or Bologna Process to create a European Higher Education Space)

International

•

•

•

•

(continued on the next page)

transnational education in transmigrant communities (e.g. borderless Islamic religious education) transnational educational advocacy programmes and practices (e.g. transnational NGOs operating in EFA and MDG) educational enterprises offering programmes in one or more countries outside place of origin/location transnational education that is not part of a specific education system

Transnational

Logic (proclaimed legitimisation)

Regulation (decision-making)

Table 7.1 (continued)

• • •

•

•

public welfare equal chances creating loyal citizens

governmental organisations (ministries, administration) government-controlled organisations

National

•

•

•

•

•

•

international cooperation and understanding mutual recognition of qualifications and diplomas fostering world development goals and global citizenship

intergovernmental organisations (e.g. Council of Europe) international organisations (e.g. UNESCO) international public interest organisations (e.g. Teacher Trade Unions)

International

• •

•

•

•

•

entrepreneurialism, innovation, competition global knowledge society global civil society

market mechanisms (competition, profit) GATS (World Trade Organisation) PPP (Public-PrivatePartnership) Regulations

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with a hyphen as ‘inter-national’. Activities called ‘transnational’, then, – in contrast to ‘inter-national’ – are those which operate cross-border, but beyond or outside such inter-national spheres. In the overview (Table 7.1), national, inter-national and transnational educational spaces are characterised by referring to examples (i.e. their empirical evidence), their particular form of decision-making (i.e. mode of regulation) and their legitimisation strategies (i.e. their proclaimed logic). It is assumed that these categories might serve as valid criteria to differentiate ‘transnational’ educational spaces from other educational spaces in order to avoid having the term become a catch-all phrase for any border-crossing educational activities.

Transnational organisations in education Since I want to identify and analyse organisations that act in transnational educational spaces, the term ‘organisation’ has to be defined before going into details about such organisations. It has to be kept in mind, though, that transnational educational organisations are only one part of transnational educational spaces, ‘spaces’ being the wider umbrella term containing individual actions, networks, and informal groups, with highly formalised ‘organisations’ being only a smaller portion of such ‘spaces’. In order to clearly distinguish ‘transnational organisations’ from other transnational phenomena, a two-dimensional typology by Faist (2000: 17–38) is used as a first frame of reference. In this typology Faist uses two dimensions: the degree of formalisation (low/high) and the potential for longevity (short-lived/long-lived). The author basically distinguishes between ‘networks’ and ‘organisations’ by their low or high degree of formalisation. Within ‘networks’, he identifies short-lived communication structures (such as political news communications among transmigrants) and long-lived issue networks (such as national activists who cooperate with a transnational organisation like Amnesty International). Within ‘organisations’, Faist sees the existence of small transnational groups, such as households and family systems that pool their budgetary resources across borders, e.g. by remittances. Internally, such small groups are formalised to a greater degree than communication networks. When defined as ‘organisations’ they are, however, classified as short-lived because they rarely function beyond one generation. Examples of transnational organisations with high longevity are, for instance, religious communities like the Catholic Church, which explicitly declares its identity to be beyond or outside any national and governmental spheres. In this category we also find the well-known Transnational Corporations (TNCs) operating their production and commerce across borders. The criteria ‘high degree of formalisation’ and ‘longevity’ would also apply to transnational non-governmental organisations (NGOs) like Greenpeace or Oxfam, which are often called ‘international’ NGOs, whereas, according to the distinction favoured here, they should be called ‘transnational’ in contrast to international organisations proper, such as

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UNESCO or OECD, which are ‘inter-national’ in the sense that they mediate between nations. Ludger Pries (2007) distinguishes between three ideal types of social spaces which are considered promising for studies in transnationalism: everyday life (at the micro-level), organisations (at the meso-level) and institutions (at the macro-level). Organisations are then defined by the following criteria: they are relatively long-lasting interaction frameworks of people, with membership rules, identifiable structures and processes, rules and rituals of behaviour and power distribution, and planned and variable goals and ends. Organisations are called transnational when they are acting across borders outside and beyond nation-states and international governmental organisations; they are non-governmental in nature, and either for-profit or not-for-profit. Distinguishing transnational organisations from other types of international organisations, their operational modus is decentralised, their presence is pluri-local and they need a relatively high degree of coordination. Their challenge is optimal decentralisation for the sake of adaptation to local conditions, plus, at the same time, optimal generalisation of knowledge and coordination of resources. Focusing on transnational educational organisations, I am not aware of any existing sort of typology for this vast field. In a first approach, transnational educational organisations might be categorised into for-profit (i.e. fully commercial) and not-for profit, or only partly for profit, the latter consisting of independent private financing plus some sort of public subsidies. Public– private partnerships (PPP) can be found, for example, in models of ‘academic entrepreneurialism’, where initial funds of a public mother institution (like a university) are devoted to the ‘outsourcing’ of a programme or a branch campus overseas with the aim to finally make this enterprise independent of further public subsidies. If this fails, the enterprise will then be discontinued. Advocacy organisations depend on privately collected money by the way of donations, but specific projects are often subsidised by public agencies like development ministries. But, if the for-profit/not-for-profit distinction is applied, this would only consider one factor – finance schemes – which is at the same time a non-educational factor – to classify transnational educational organisations. So this approach does not suffice. In reviewing the four modes of cross-border supply of services, including educational ones, which are regulated in the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) under the auspices of the World Trade Organisation (WTO), Jane Knight criticises the lack of educational models, since ‘trade creep’ has come to dominate the discussion on transnational education (Knight 2003: 3). Without being able to discuss the GATS and its implications for education,1 the four modes of GATS might nevertheless be a starting point for an educational typology. They are: (1) cross-border supply; (2) consumption abroad; (3) commercial presence; and (4) presence of natural persons. Using this as a typology for transnational educational organisations, organisations operating along the four respective modes of supply

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would have to be identified and could then be researched accordingly. But – as Knight notes – these categories still represent a trade approach rather than an educational approach to classifying the transnational field. Her attempt to construct a ‘Cross-border Higher Education Framework’, which she considers as ‘work in progress’ (Knight 2003) might therefore be extended to transnational educational spaces other than higher education. Discussing such educational models, Knight distinguishes between: people moving across borders for studying, internships, or research abroad, (model 1); providers focusing on branch campuses, franchise, or other companies (model 2); programmes like partnership arrangements or joint degrees (model 3); and projects and services, like joint curriculum development, or activities within development aid projects (model 4). Looking for transnational educational ‘organisations’, one would definitely find them under ‘providers’, and could also classify them according to their organization of people, programmes, or projects and services. But, even though Knight has to be welcomed for arguing for an educational rather than economical classification, her framework will not be applied here for one main reason: it mixes ‘transnational’ and ‘inter-national’ educational spaces in the same way UNESCO/Council of Europe mixed these concepts in their aforementioned broad definition of ‘TNE’, whereas the author of this article favours the narrower and thus more precise definition of ‘TNE’ presented in Adam (2001), excluding ‘inter-national’ educational arrangements (like twinning, double degrees, student exchange programmes, etc.) from ‘transnational’ ones, which operate ‘beyond’ or ‘outside’ inter-governmental arrangements. So, the narrower definition of TNE might be a starting point for a classification of organisations operating in the fields of transnational education, which results in the following typology (Adam 2001: 14): •

• •

• •

Franchising: defined as the process whereby a higher education institution (‘franchiser’) from a certain country authorises another institution or organisation (‘franchisee’) from the same or from another country to provide its (i.e. the franchiser’s) educational services … Branch campus: established by a higher education institution from one country in another country in order to offer there its own educational programmes/qualifications. Off-shore institution: an autonomous institution which belongs, in terms of its organisation and contents, to one particular national educational system, but without necessarily having a campus in the country (or system) to which it belongs, and is established as an institution in another country. Corporate universities: organising their own higher education institutions or study programmes offering qualifications, without them belonging to any national system of higher education. International institutions: offering ‘international’ qualifications that are not part of a specific educational system.

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Since the objective of this article is to develop an (tentative) educational typology of transnational educational organisations (and not of TNE only), the categories offered above have to be adapted and enlarged. The following categories of transnational educational organisations are distinguished according to types of types of organisation (cf. Table 7.2): One category of such organisations is placed under the heading of transnational educational enterprises, comprising the above-mentioned types of franchising, branch campus, and off-shore institutions. The term ‘enterprise’, calls attention to the fact that they are economically orientated and operate either purely for profit (fully commercial) or at least to such a degree that they are self-funding, i.e. independent from public funding. The reason why self-funding enterprises are included here is that their success depends on their economic viability: in the event that they fail to finance their activities, public subsidies, which might have been accorded for start-up costs, will be discontinued or withdrawn. Hence, not-for-profit organisations in this category are also ‘economically’ orientated and dependent on economic Table 7.2 Transnational educational organisations Types of transnational educational organisations

Examples of transnational organisations operating in the field

1.Transnational organisations for the education of transmigrants

• •

2.Transnational educational advocacy organizations

• •

3.Transnational education that is not part of a specific national education system, but forms a system of its own

• •

• 4.Transnational educational enterprises offering programmes or branches or campus in one or more countries outside their place of origin/location or online

• • • •

Religious organisations offering borderless religious (e.g. Islamic) teaching Cultural organizations of transmigrant communities transmitting cultural traditions International (transnational) NGOs operating in the fields of Education For All (EFA) or MDG Transnational umbrella organisations created to launch and monitor global campaigns European Council of International Schools (ECIS) Corporate Institutions, e.g. DaimlerChrysler-Corporate University or Lufthansa School of Business International Baccalaureate Office (IBO) Jones International University, Ltd. German University of Cairo (GUC) University of Phoenix (Apollo Group, listed on NASDAQ) Sylvan Learning Center

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efficiency, although to a lesser extent than fully commercial enterprises, depending on the stock exchange. The common outlook of this type of transnational educational organisations might tentatively be pinpointed under the motto: Further cross-border educational expansion of your stakeholders under the global laws of supply and demand. ‘Corporate universities’ and ‘international institutions’ will be included in a separate category, because they form a system of their own. Their educational endeavours might also be economically driven, but in a different sense than educational enterprises proper. Corporate educational institutions are intended to maximise a company’s productivity, but their education is not a commodity traded with others. The organisations regulating International Schools do not follow a company’s economic drive, but instead respond to transnational mobile (elite) parents’ choice for their children’s ‘transnational’ education. Their choice might perhaps also represent an individual drive to accumulate economic capital by means of converting cultural capital acquired in these schools. But the main characteristic of this type is that such organisations create an educational system of their own, beyond and outside national education systems, even though they may be cooperating with them, which is the case with some International Schools. The common outlook behind this category of transnational educational organisations might be summarised as: Further the development of your own educational system for the sake of those who maintain it. However, because of the limited scope of the abovementioned transnational higher education typologies, many other transnational educational spaces are not included. Because of this, two areas will tentatively be added and distinguished here: transnational organisations for the education of transmigrants working for and in the fields of education for transmigrant communities and transnational educational advocacy organisations working in the non-profit sector for and in the advancement of education for development purposes. The category transnational educational transmigrant organisations focuses on organisations appearing in transmigrant groups. Although most of the social practices, symbols, and artefacts which make up the transnational social spaces in these groups are to be found in issue networks, informal groups, oral communication, family, and neighbourhood activities, some organisations have emerged from these activities which are or came to be more formalised and established over time; some of these organisations might also attend to educational matters. The common motto of such organisations could be: Further the educational interests of your own reference group. Transnational advocacy organisations might have also grown out of action groups and movements, which became formalised and institutionalised as time went by. These organisations allegedly serve the interests of others, humankind, or global civil society – for example, in the education sector by advocating ‘Education for All’. However, not all of the many cross-border operating NGOs belong into this category; rather, only those which target

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education and which at the same time have transnational coverage are included. If, for example, a NGO in a European country sponsors adult education in her partner organisation in a third world country, these education activities would have to be classified as ‘bi-lateral’. Such an organisation would be called ‘transnational’ only when it operates cross-border and has pluri-local coverage, with branches situated in various countries. The motto behind this type of organisations could be called: Further the alleged educational development of humankind. The four different categories of transnational educational organisations offered in this chapter are possibly still far from being exhaustive. As yet another, fifth, category, transnational educational interest organisations, would come to my mind – this category could include international nongovernmental youth ‘students’ and teachers organisations, which, however, might nevertheless better fall into the category ‘inter-national’ rather than ‘transnational’, because the objectives for their cross-border activities mostly focus on inter-national cooperation and understanding, and not on aims ‘beyond’ or ‘outside’ national and inter-national realms. (They were, therefore, put into the inter-national section in Table 7.1.) Keeping in mind that the typology proposed in this article is only tentative and preliminary, some organisations operating in the various categories of transnational educational spaces are identified and explained in the following section. Transnational organisations for the education of transmigrants Coming back to what has already been said above on education in transnational (transmigrant) social spaces, it is assumed here that this kind of education takes place, overwhelmingly, in informal communication networks within transmigrant communities. This is also the reason why, in most cases, the term ‘informal education’ would apply more often than ‘non-formal’ or ‘formal’ education. For example, such informal transnational educational paths will be organised by family groups who interact across borders by sending children to family members living in different countries in order to gain access to language competencies and cultural orientations, or by helping to get an apprenticeship or admission to university in various places around the world where members of the extended transmigrant family live. Even though most of the interactions will be of the short-lived and rather non-formal networking type, we can also identify some sorts of transnational educational organisations operating in transmigrant communities. I can only point to some areas that might offer challenging research, focusing on such organisations. It is known that religious organisations offer ‘borderless’ religious instruction, which is designated especially to transmigrant communities. For instance, Islamic teaching in many European countries is conducted by non-European teachers who are sent to Koran schools attached to Mosques in Europe by Islamic organisations or welfare foundations residing outside – this is an example of ‘non-formal education’.

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However, Muslim organisations may even provide education through private Islamic schools in Europe if state laws permit this. In the case that these private schools are state-recognised (and, in this case, at the same time statecontrolled and state-subsidised) they would more accurately be classified as ‘formal education’.2 Muslim organisations – most often welfare foundations – originating from Muslim countries and operating pluri-locally in Europe or elsewhere, in and for the religious and/or other instruction of transmigrant Muslim communities, would then be classified as ‘transnational educational organisations’. Many transmigrant communities form ‘hometown’ or other cultural or welfare organisations, in their respective places of residence, therefore uphold connections to their places of origin and, for instance, also transmit their specific cultural heritage to the younger generation. If these organisations are long-lived and highly formalised, with membership-rules, constitutions, governing boards, fees and budgets, etc., and if they are created for educational purposes, or at least officially include educational objectives as part of their main agenda, then they could be classified as transnational educational organisations in transmigrant communities. This could perhaps also apply to some Foreign Students Associations or Youth Associations if they stretch over more than one country and cater to those who migrated in order to study overseas, maintaining ‘transmigrant’ life-styles and orientations. Transnational educational advocacy organisations ‘Transnational educational advocacy’ refers to objectives and programmes in which expatriates advocate for the development of education in a foreign country, or set of countries, which are most typically developing countries or the so-called ‘Third World’; also, these organisations are of the non-profit type. They mostly derive their – alleged – legitimacy for their advocacy, if not their ‘external interference’, by referring to human rights arguments or issues of global civil society. The central reference in educational matters is the ‘World Declaration on Education for All’, which was agreed upon at the International Conference organised by UNESCO, UNICEF, World Bank, and UNDP (United Nations Development Programme) at Jomtien/Thailand in 1990 – the target being renewed in a conference at Dakar/Senegal in the year 2000. The actions and programmes of these international organisations, which are responsible for the implementation and monitoring of the Education for All (EFA) process, and among which UNESCO has taken the lead, pertain to what is here called ‘inter-national educational spaces’. There is already a bulk of literature on these international or transnational educational organisations dealing with EFA, which, for reasons of space, cannot be mentioned here (cf. www.unesco.org). But alongside this EFA process there are numerous NGOs worldwide lobbying, financing projects, issuing reports, doing media work, mobilising

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support in the ‘First World’, assisting school projects in the ‘Third World’, sending experts, etc. As research has shown, there has been a remarkable growth in both the numbers and the influence of such international NGOs since the nineteenth century; also, neo-institutionalists view NGOs as important agents of the ‘world polity’ in constructing a ‘world culture’ (Boli and Thomas 1999). Those NGOs that target education represent, in a typical way, the advocacy type of transnational educational organisations. In some instances, they may be operating on a transnational scale, such as when church organisations support projects for street-children, in collaboration with partner churches in various countries of the Third World, like, for example, the Catholic organisation Misereor in Germany. But normally a NGO would not found a separate educational organisation for that matter. So they may be categorized by researchers as ‘transnational organisations’ but cannot be considered as ‘transnational educational organisations’. For example, many cross-border NGOs might engage in aid for educational programmes with local partners overseas; thus they might be classified as ‘transnational advocacy organisations’, but not necessarily as ‘educational’ ones. Only when they fulfil the triple definition of being a formal organisation, operating transnationally and focussing on education, would they qualify for being a ‘transnational educational advocacy organisation’. Having this in mind, one could for instance argue that Terre des Hommes would be considered such an organisation because its prime motive is directed towards ‘educating’ children in a broad sense, including formal, non-formal, and informal education, whereas Greenpeace or Amnesty International would not fall under this heading. Besides single NGOs, there has been a rather new phenomenon of umbrella networks, some of which have become formalized in order to pool together their efforts around the world: Described variously as ‘transnational advocacy networks’ (TANs) or ‘transnational social movements’ (TSMs), these new organizational forms bring together a wide array of nongovernmental organizations, citizens associations, and trade unions in forms of activism that target global-level institutions and issues while they attempt to use global-level visibility to level changes at the national level. These TANs or TSMs are the focus of a thriving and often ethically inspired literature that sets out to study the origins, strength, influence and long-term implications of their activities on the broader development of a world-level political system. They are frequently portrayed as the building blocks of a prototypical ‘global civil society’, with the power to influence, and perhaps democratize, the structure of world politics, both through their increasing influence within existing international institutions and through their capacity to use this influence to leverage change in individual nationstates. (Mundy and Murphy 2001: 85f.)

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It was observed that during the EFA process NGOs of this kind have gained weight and influence comparing their position at Jomtien (1990) to Dakar (2000), not least by the fact that they pooled their dispersed efforts together by forming umbrella organisations: In fall 1999, three nongovernmental actors launched independent advocacy campaigns that targeted the education for all commitment made by governments and international organizations at Jomtien. Two of these, Oxfam and ActionAid, are large, multibranched Northern development NGOs with successful policies of fostering Southern nongovernmental organizational partnerships and experience in developing highly publicized campaigns for fundraising in the North. The third campaign was launched by Education International, an international association of teachers’ unions formed in 1993. In 1999, these organizations joined their campaign to launch a Global Campaign for Education, targeting both the end-of-decade review of Jomtien education for all efforts, the UN follow-up conference of the Social Summit, and the spring meetings of the Group of Seven (G 7). (Ibid.: 103ff.) The article goes on to evaluate the special role of Oxfam in coordinating this Global Campaign for Education, an organisation which has existed for more than 50 years and which, according to Mundy and Murphy, ‘has grown into a ‘transnational’ development NGO. It has autonomous national chapters in 11 countries. These affiliates carry out activities in over 120 countries and have a combined budget of approximately US $390 million (ibid.: 104). Accordingly then, Oxfam would be considered a truly transnational educational advocacy organisation. Transnational educational organisations with systems of their own Transnational education that is not part of a specific national education system, but forms a system of its own, is yet another category of transnational educational spaces, in which transnational organisations can be identified. Here we refer again to the sector of International Schools. These International Schools (often providing primary and secondary education) are mostly private, they demand school fees, they offer a unique certificate – the International Baccalaureate (IB) – and they are to be found all around the world (Hayden and Thompson 2001). The fewer United World Colleges (offering upper secondary education for the IB only) are all private and boarding institutions (Fischer 1991). The oldest coordinating transnational organisation in this field is the ‘International Schools Association’ (ISA), a NGO that was founded in the year 1951. With headquarters in Geneva, and branch offices in the Netherlands and in the United States, ISA coordinates, at present, 95 paid

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membership associated schools (www.isaschools.org: January 2007). ISA has pioneered the IB curriculum development, issues awards, has a consultative status with UNESCO, and cooperates with the International Baccalaureate Office (IBO) in Geneva. Every two years ISA organises a World Conference on topics of International Education. Another important umbrella organisation for international schools is the European Council of International Schools (ECIS). According to the statement on their website, ECIS was established in 1965 and presently coordinates 377 international schools, both primary and secondary, around the world (ECIS; www.ecis.org; January 2007); ECIS is a non-profit corporation registered in the USA and administered in the UK. As an international schools association it links with Nova Southeastern University to offer distance learning for an ‘International Master’s of Education in Teaching and Learning in International Schools’, which could be interpreted as some sort of special teacher training or upgrading for ‘their school system’. The factors that qualify organisations which coordinate and regulate international schools as ‘transnational’ and as having an educational system ‘of their own’ are, above all else, the transnational degree and special curricula they offer: the IB is a non-national certificate, qualifying for university entrance in many (but not all) universities around the world. In most of the international schools the various IB-related curricula, the Diploma Programme (for upper secondary level), the Middle Years Programme (for lower secondary level), and the Primary Years Programme (for primary school level) are taught. The United World Colleges only apply the Diploma Programme in order to prepare their students for the IB.3 The rather longterm existence of international schools and their organisations reminds researchers that ‘transnational’ education is not a totally new phenomenon. In addition, International Schools have already been the focus of some empirical research (cf. articles in Hayden and Thompson 2001; Hornberg work in progress). Transnational educational organisations forming a ‘system’ of their own also applies to corporate institutions; i.e. to business corporations that operate their own educational programmes for upgrading their own personnel. It is interesting to note how dispersed or scarce precise information is – e.g. on courses, number of students, faculty, let alone the financing of such institutions – when looking for them in websites. Denise R. Hearn (2001) states that in 1993 only about 400 companies had corporate universities, whereas the number had risen to 2,000 by 2001. In an article on for-profit higher education, Morey (2004: 138f.) speaks of about 1,600 such ‘universities’ in the USA alone, nearly all of them not accredited and therefore not offering official degrees. Thus, a number of them seek for agreements with accredited institutions of higher education. Only a fraction of such corporate institutions are, however, operating on a transnational scale. For instance, the DaimlerChrysler Corporate University (http://career. daimlerchrysler.com) boasts that it was the first corporate university in

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existence on a worldwide level. This corporate university is intended to further the qualifications of its leading international personnel, and cooperates with internationally renowned business schools and experts. Similarly, the Lufthansa School of Business, which was launched in 1998 as the first Corporate University in Germany (www.be-lufthansa.com), claims to partner with first class academies and universities like the London Business School or the European School of Management and Technology. It also boasts having been chosen as the best Corporate University by the ‘Corporate University Xchange European Excellence Award 2000’. Recently, a new cooperation between Lufthansa and the European Business School/ International University at Reichartshausen resulted in a new Bachelor Programme which provides – for the time being – some 18 Lufthansa students with a BSc in Aviation Management (www.presse.lufthansa.com, 25 December 2006).No further research on such corporate universities was done in this article. They are mentioned here merely to call attention to their existence so as to sensitise researchers who might want to venture into these variants of ‘transnational educational organisations’. Transnational educational enterprises There are numerous examples of transnational educational enterprises in higher education, as well as in areas of professional training, continuing education, and others. Enterprises of this kind have become prominent within the last several years, especially due to the discussion on the GATS, as mentioned above, and the resulting fear that education might become a commodity on a transnational market. Looking closer at these educational organisations, we notice that they are private, and neither publicly funded nor part of an aid scheme, like in the advocacy organisations discussed above. However, fees have to be paid one way or another: by the franchisee, by the students, by the host country, by those studying at a branch campus or by those taking courses online in virtual universities or distance learning. But the main objectives, and thus the financing schemes of transnational educational enterprises, may vary. Tentatively, one may distinguish between enterprises that claim (minimally) to prioritise ‘education’ for the sake of education while at the same time applying ‘self-funding’ schemes. The other type would be enterprises that treat education as a commodity and look for ‘profitable competitiveness’ under market conditions. Self-funding transnational educational enterprises This category refers to cases in which, within the sector of higher education, publicly funded state-run universities offer programmes overseas, in another country; these activities are most often ‘outsourced’ from their mother institution. ‘Outsourcing’ has the objective of minimising the economical risks of

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transnational academic entrepreneurialism of national universities, which are publicly financed (Schreiterer and Witte 2001: 14, 34f., 131f.). The type of such outsourced enterprises may vary, but they are usually required to be self-funding and cost-neutral to their mother institutions, at least in the long run – thus, even not-for-profit educational exports may not be free of charge. It seems, though, that valid and comprehensive data on such transnational educational exports of higher education do not yet exist (Lanzendorf and Teichler 2003: 225). Only recently have types of transnational education been surfacing in Germany, and a special programme was launched in the year 2000 by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) to support German transnational academic entrepreneurialism. This has been due to the fact that it was discovered that Germany lagged far behind other countries like the United Kingdom, Australia, and the United States on the global education market, even though Germany attracted the largest number of foreign students who study abroad in a non-English speaking country (Hahn 2005: 27). The programme, however, was designed to explore enterprise-type expansion of German higher education, venturing into possibilities such as the export of study programmes, branch campuses, or offshore institutions (Lanzendorf 2006). As part of the programme, feasibility studies for possible future market chances of German TNE in various countries like Namibia, South Africa, Brazil, and others were also conducted (examples in Hahn and Lanzendorf 2005). In order to give an example of Germany taking chances in transnational academic entrepreneurialism, the rather new project of The German University of Cairo (GUC) should be discussed. The idea grew out of the aforementioned special programme of the DAAD to further German educational exports, and was subsidised with €10 million from the German government. The foundation for the university was established in October 2001, and the official inauguration took place in October 2003. There were 3,800 applications for the first semester, from which 700 were chosen in 2001, and the university is projected to admit a total of about 4,800 students when fully running. In 2005 there were 3,300 students, 40 per cent of them female. This private university is officially accredited by the Egyptian State as the second foreign university (the first being the long-established American University of Cairo). Students pay between €2,500 and €4,350 per semester (which is approximately half the cost of the American University’s fees), but is still very much less than studying in Germany would cost. Half of the staff is recruited from Germany, but the language of instruction is English, with German as a compulsory course for all students. Courses and degrees are also accredited in Germany, so that students may continue their postgraduate studies in Germany or other countries. Several German universities, ministries of both Germany and Egypt, but also the German Arab Chamber of Industry and Commerce (i.e. a mix of governmental and nongovernmental actors), are cooperating in designing curricula as well as

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Bachelor and Master’s degrees in information and media technology, management technology, pharmacy and biotechnology, and others – PhD programmes and other degrees, like the MBA, are also set to be offered (general information is available on the website of the GUC: www.guc.edu.eg). Fully commercial transnational educational enterprises Alongside self-funding arrangements, there are a lot of overtly for-profit educational enterprises. These enterprises function like any other enterprise, the only difference being that they invest in education as a transnational commodity on a global education market in which the clients pay full price for the instruction they buy from these enterprises. For instance, the British for-profit educational enterprise FT Knowledge, offspring of Financial Times Ltd, offers continuing education courses and degrees in business education and management worldwide via the Internet; these courses and degrees cost the consumer and are in sharp competition to courses and degrees offered by American enterprises like the Apollo-Group (www. ftknowledge.com; www.apollogrp.edu; cf. Schreiterer and Witte 2001: 35f.). There are more and more educational enterprises of this kind, many of them operating as fully virtual universities – that is, as institutions of (digitalised) distance learning (for an overview cf. Seifer 2006). Some such fully commercialised transnational educational enterprises are depicted in more detail below: Jones International University Ltd claims to be the first accredited, fully online university. It was founded in 1993 and launched in 1995. It offers a wide range of Bachelor and Master Degrees in Business subjects, but also a Master of Education Programme for future school teachers or adult educators; this online university is accredited by the Higher Learning Commission, a member of North Central Association in Chicago, USA. The university has faculty from about 25 countries, and students from 57 countries. 90 per cent of them are working adults who study by their home computers. The enterprise forms part of the Jones International Ltd Group, established in 1969 (Schreiterer and Witte 2001: 22). The website boasts faculty coming from ‘the world’s leading universities’, like Oxford University or London Business School, and serving the needs of ‘a convenient and flexible educational environment’ of working adults, with students’ average age being 37 years. A special online library, Jones e-global library, provides students with easy access to the relevant literature and databases for their studies (for general information cf. www.jonesinternational.edu). The University of Phoenix is the largest private university in the US. It is fully for-profit, offering higher education for mostly working adults, and – since 1989 – also online, which makes it internationally accessible. Ann I. Morey, who researched the recent growth of for-profit, degree-granting higher education in the USA, also found a tendency that such institutions have increasingly become international in scope. Analysing the University of

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Phoenix, she sees reasons for its success in the following characteristics (Morey 2004: 136–38): The University of Phoenix also serves the special needs and possibilities of working adults (average age of students being about 35 years), it has no tenured faculty (which reduces costs compared to ‘traditional’ universities), courses are standardised and ‘streamlined’ (including homework for cohorts of students rather than individual assignments), practical experience rather than theory is emphasised (serving the aim of preparation of its students for job placement), there is no costly library (which instead consists only of articles and journals accessible online and some help for access to other sources). The fully virtual University of Phoenix Online offers Bachelor and Master and even Doctoral Degrees in areas of economical, technical, educational, social, and health studies. The website speaks of 17,000 faculty staff and of 200,000 students enrols on campuses and online. It says that attending a college might cost more than $20,000 per year, whereas studying at the University of Phoenix would cost much less and fees could be paid for one course at a time instead of per semester or year at once (cf. www.phoenix. edu; www.online.phoenix.edu). Economically, the University of Phoenix is part of the Apollo Group, which is listed on NASDAQ. It has branch campuses in several countries, which operate as economically independent franchisees. But not all of its forprofit ventures seem to be economically rewarding. In this case it is interesting to note that a branch campus of the University of Phoenix, which was to be established in Germany, did not end up materialising; originally, there were plans to establish a branch campus in Düsseldorf in the year 2001, under the name ‘Apollo International University of Applied Sciences’. After a great deal of policy discussions with the German Government, it had finally been agreed that Northrhine-Westfalia would accredit it to offer MBA degrees; but, shortly before it was to be launched, the Apollo Group resigned for economic reasons: the institution would not have been profitable in Germany (Schreiterer and Witte 2001: 24; Lanzendorf and Teichler 2003: 229f., 236). The last organisation to be presented here, Sylvan Learning Center, is an example of a transnational educational enterprise operating outside the higher education sector, in the field of tutoring students in primary and secondary schools – it is one of the leading providers of such tutoring services worldwide. It was founded in 1979 in the US and has been operating for more than 25 years, mainly in Canada and the US (Davidson-Harden and Majhanovich 2004: 276). It provides instruction in all subjects, such as reading, writing, maths, test preparation for college entrance and state exams, and so on. It currently also operates overseas, like in Germany, under the name ‘Schülerhilfe’, with some 900 institutions. Sylvan Learning Center belongs to the enterprise Educate, Inc., and is also listed on the NASDAQ, being a leading education service company delivering supplemental education (http://educate-inc.com).

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Tutoring has for a long time been done on an individual or local basis by private tutors or small companies, but in the last decades large transnational enterprises have entered the scene. In addition to Sylvan as part of Educate, Inc., Davies and Aurini (2006: 121) cite the case of the Japan based franchise company Kumon, which has 26,000 franchisees in 43 countries, and “was ranked fourth in Entrepreneur’s 2005 list of top global franchises” (ibid.: 134). The authors suggest, in their study on such supplementary or ‘shadow education’, that “these corporations are thriving in niches with relatively little competition from established public schools or non-profit institutions. The largest corporations are publicly traded and rank among the top companies in business circles” (ibid.: 122). They continue to state that such enterprises are ‘hybrid’ organizations that mix educational and corporate elements. While they are ‘technical organizations’ they seek profit through product expansion and diversification, they do so in highly ‘institutional environments’ defined by the contours of public school systems (ibid.). In other words, and using the definition of ‘transnational organisations’ applied here, transnational enterprises have to find ‘niches’ for profitable investment on the global education market, while at the same time adjusting to national and local educational structures and traditions.

Some tentative conclusions and hypotheses on transnational educational organisations What is the relevance of transnational educational organisations for educational research? The macro-level perspective, which was introduced at the beginning of this chapter, points to the fact that transnational educational organisations are on the one hand only a minor facet of education in general, and on the other hand only one phenomenon of transnational educational spaces, which contain more than organisations. They have to compete and interact with a host of national educational institutions and also with international educational arrangements. Sometimes they operate on their own, like in the cases of corporate institutions or for-profit enterprises like Sylvan Learning Systems Inc.; but most often we find some sort of cooperation between transnational, national and/or international organisations: academic enterprises are ‘outsourced’ from their national home universities, and they have to find some kind of agreement with the national authorities of the host country. Transnational NGOs have to come to terms with leading international organisations like UNESCO. International schools or transmigrant religious organisations have to abide by the laws of the state where they are located, and especially so when they are allowed to integrate into the national school system. When researching transnational educational organisations it would therefore be wise to analyse them within the depicted broader horizon of national, international, and transnational educational spaces.

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Is there a common definition for the great variety of transnational educational organisations? Besides the above-mentioned criteria requiring such organisations to abide by their title – i.e. they must be transnational, prioritise education, and be recognisable as formal organisations – two other criteria seem to be characteristic: that they are private, i.e. their initiative, formal ownership, and accountability are private (and not governmental or inter-governmental), and that they are for-profit, which means they are not funded by public money. However, the arrangements vary greatly as to who organises what, pays how much, and for what kind of education. Transmigrant communities either pay for some sort of transnational education for their children on a purely individual basis, e.g. by sending someone ‘home’ for an apprenticeship, or in order to learn the language spoken in the family. They might also collect private money for the purpose of paying an Islamic teacher from outside to teach in their particular mosque, where they feel a belonging. Transnational NGOs practise fundraising by collecting private donations in order to finance educational projects in developing countries – students at private international universities, branch campuses, virtual universities, or tutoring firms have to pay fees. Also, upgrading the education of high-ranking personnel in multinational firms in corporate educational institutions require financing from the firms themselves and not from the state. But even though the criteria ‘private’ and ‘non-public money’ seem to be applicable to all sorts of transnational education, only a tiny minority of transnational organisations operating in the field of education are and may be fully for-profit enterprises. This may be due to the fact that they are what Davies and Aurini (2006) call ‘hybrid organisations’, mixing educational and economic interests (see above). If they were overtly pure money-making – selling education like any other commodity – they would not be accepted by the consumers as learners. The necessity for such education industries to conform to educational, i.e. non-economic, standards is proved by the fact that even fully commercial transnational educational enterprises are seeking official recognition of their programmes and degrees by national or international bodies (e.g. UNESCO) – they want to ensure that they are not publicly disqualified as low-prestige ‘degree-mills’. This seems to be true even for the category of ‘corporate institutions’, which form a system of their own, as in the case of the Lufthansa School of Business a Master’s degree, which fits into the Bologna Process of establishing a common European Higher Education. Who controls transnational educational programmes? Are they a danger to national and/or international educational spaces? It is interesting to note that the OECD has recently published ‘Guidelines for Quality Provision in Cross-border Higher Education’ (OECD 2005), following some former OECD publications pertaining to this matter. The text

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explicitly states: “The purposes of the Guidelines are to protect students and other stakeholders from low-quality provision and disreputable providers… ” and the footnote to this passage says: “In this context ‘disreputable providers’ refer to degree and accreditation mills” (OECD 2005: 9). The OECD Guidelines were developed in close collaboration with UNESCO and line-up with similar declarations on ‘good practice’ previously issued by UNESCO and the Council of Europe (several of them explicitly mentioned in the text, e.g. p. 14, 15, 17, 19). It seems obvious that these international organisations have keenly followed what has been happening in transnational (higher) education, and that they act by the way of recommendations that are not legally binding, but which, however, expect member countries to implement them (OECD 2005: 9). This is, in my view, and in the terminology applied here, a clear indicator for their aim to somehow protect both ‘national’ and ‘inter-national’ educational spaces from ‘inappropriate’ developments in transnational educational spaces, and to somehow put them under some sort of ‘public’ control. In a recent article on transnational (higher) education in China and India, David and Wildemeersch (2006) analyse these two countries, which possibly carry the highest potential for foreign investment due to their explosive demand for higher education. The authors also compare the governmental reactions in these countries: in China, explicit legislative and other measures to regulate transnational education have been formulated, such as requiring foreign institutions to have a Chinese partner, be non-profit, and have the language of instruction to be Chinese. Legislation in India, however, is not so defined and clear, and leaves room for foreign programmes and institutions to undergo a trial period before the government finally decides on their admittance. This case study on China and India reveals that national educational policy towards transnational education is neither impotent nor meaningless. How sustainable is the phenomenon of transnational educational organisations? Far from knowing how many of such varied organisations exist around the world, it may nevertheless be supposed that their number will expand in the future, due to factors which largely fall under the heading of ‘globalisation’, comprising such topics as the global knowledge economy, global migration, the emergence of global civil society, the GATS, human rights conventions, global communication via the Internet, real and virtual mobility across borders, and other aspects. As Davies and Aurini (2006: 123) have stated: “The role of private international education corporations in diffusing models of schooling have been largely overlooked, despite their increasing key role in educating both young and old citizens.” But on the other hand, their importance should not be overestimated, because the universe of education is still far away from a situation in which

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transnational educational organisations challenge or even dominate all educational spaces. In contrast to what seems to be discussed in economics, transnational organisations in education are not (yet) a danger to national or to international education. If we consider the sectors in which education transnational organisations operate, we observe that their actions are largely restricted to activities outside the compulsory education system, which is the core of formal education. From this observation follows the central hypothesis that primary and secondary schools, because they are largely identical with the notion of ‘compulsory’ education along the ‘national paradigm of education’, will remain state-run and state-controlled for a long time to come and thus will continue to form the central model of what has been called here ‘national educational spaces’. Within fields outside of compulsory education – that is post-secondary education, professional training, tutoring, distance learning, continuing education or (non-compulsory) kindergarten education – transnational educational organisations nevertheless may provide additional opportunities for those who can pay for education with their private money. They also offer some innovative and cost-effective alternatives to purely government-run educational programmes in mixed PPP arrangements. Are transnational educational organisations ‘global players’? Seen in a global perspective the distribution of transnational education should be researched: enterprises invest where profit is luring, so we see such educational arrangements especially in the newly industrialising countries in Asia, such as Singapore, South Korea, and others, where there is already competition between different transnational educational enterprises. But non-profit organisations also compete on a global market of donations, relief aid, prestige, and influence. Research should thus focus on the providers and on the consumers of those products offered by transnational organisations in education. Who are the providers and consumers around the world? We will probably not find any providers from, say, Africa, offering educational products in the US or Europe; but, on the contrary, Africa might be a future market for foreign providers (Knight 2004). Moja (2003) speaks of the phenomenon of ‘globalization apartheid’ when looking at the imbalances of power, and Altbach (2003: 7) also warns: “Other countries should not make the mistake of thinking that by legislating free trade in education through GATS they would get into the U.S. market. The only outcome will be to permit increasingly aggressive American educational providers greater access to foreign markets.” This is a clear indication that transnational education has to be analysed in a global perspective in order to determine its impact on and challenge to national and to international educational spaces. While some of the transnational educational organisations described above, like Oxfam in the advocacy sector or Sylvan/Educate, Inc. in the tutoring sector, seem to have acquired the status of ‘global players’, others only operate in

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well-defined niches, like corporate educational institutions of specific business enterprises, migrant organisations, or smaller NGOs. However, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, ‘organisations’ only represent highly formalised forms of ‘transnational education’. More research on their feared or real impact is needed, and this implies the critical analysis of their position in the modern world system.

Notes 1 For a concise overview, cf. Knight 2002. 2 For examples, see: Daun and Walford 2004; Daun and Arjmand 2005; Kiefer 2005: ch. 4. 3 For information on the IB and related curricula, see Fox 1998 and www.ibo.org.

8

European Works Councils as transnational interest organisations? Ludger Pries

European Works Councils (EWCs) were introduced by the European Council of Secretaries in 1994 as a new mechanism of interest mediation at the European level. Their legal basis is a complex multilevel framework of supranational European law, intergovernmental treaties, national implementation law and transnational agreements at company level. Furthermore, the nature of EWCs is interesting because they are effectively European lawbased non-profit organisations working and embedded in national law-based profit organisations. Despite the fact that only about one third of all companies falling under the EWC directive actually have a EWC, their significance and impact upon labour regulation at a transnational level should not be underestimated. In times when the European Union consisted of fifteen member states they represented a total of about 17 million people working in companies with a EWC. Taking into consideration the new EU member states the number of people receiving direct representation is even higher. Meanwhile some scholars hold that EWCs are an unsuitable instrument to cope with economic globalisation. Yet again others stress that EWCs are the most powerful and effective means of organising and expressing workers’ interests at a supranational level. Empirical findings underline, on the one hand, the major impact of national headquarters’ patterns of labour regulation upon the European culture of interest negotiation. On the other hand, certain studies reveal a European dimension of logic and dynamic influencing interest bargaining at the company level. Whereas some students maintain the dominance of a centre–periphery constellation of power and resources in EWCs, others emphasise findings of decentralised and primarily polycentric power structures. In this chapter it is argued that an organisational research approach may serve to enrich and differentiate the traditionally industrial relations-focused research and discussion on EWCs. In this perspective the issue of emerging transnational organisation figures of EWCs is crucial in estimating the dimension and impact of EWCs as border-crossing bodies of labour regulation. The chapter begins by sketching a brief history of the emergence of EWCs as a new type of labour regulation and border-crossing organisation and

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then goes on to present some empirical findings and the state of the art in empirical research on EWCs stating that the corresponding studies focus on an industrial relations approach and a capital–labour view. In a second step an alternative perspective in viewing the EWC as a special type of international non-profit organisation is proposed and global, focal, multinational and transnational organisations will be differentiated. A third section will present the case of General Motors Europe providing an example of what a transnational EWC looks like. Finally, some general hypotheses on the spread, conditions and dynamics of transnational EWCs are developed.

The European Works Council as an innovative cross-border labour regulation body The general directive on the introduction of European Works Councils (EWCs) was passed by the European Council of Secretaries on the 22 September 1994 after about ten years of ongoing discussions and prior attempts. It required the national governments which had backed the EWCdirective1 to create the legal basis for the introduction of EWCs within their states. The respective law in Germany (EWCL) was passed on the 28 October 1996 by parliament. All companies with locations in at least two EU member states, each with at least 150 employees, and which have more than 1,000 employees distributed amongst EU member states, can institute a EWC2 on the basis of an agreement between a ‘special bargaining committee’ and European business management. In 2006 the ETUI-EWC data base registered 773 EWCs in a total of 2.204 companies that would qualify for such a council.3 EWC regulation typically distinguishes three periods of EWCs. The first phase runs from the mid-1980s to 1994, and it was a time when voluntarily agreed-upon employee information and consultation organs were created. In this period 49 EWCs were created in 46 companies (Kerckhofs 2003: 15). The second phase reaches from the period of the passing of the EU directive in September 1994 to its transformation into national law in September 1996. During this phase a number of so-called ‘voluntary agreements’ were reached on the basis of Article 13 of the EWC directive. As these did not necessarily have to accord with the procedure laid down by the directive and it was possible to deviate from the envisaged design, many companies were interested in grabbing the opportunity of reaching a voluntary agreement on the procedure of information and consultation before the directive took effect (Hoffmann 1997: 120; Lecher et al. 2001: 194). During this ‘bargaining under the shadow of the law’ the number of agreements grew rapidly. Almost 400 so-called Article 13 agreements were finalised (see also Kerckhofs 2003). The third, so-called Article 6-phase signifies the period after September 1996 that is, after the implementation of the directive in national law and with it the institution of EWCs according to ‘standard legal procedure’.

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In the expanding social science research on EWCs since the second half of the 1990s very different theses on the possible meaning, effectiveness and development perspectives of EWCs have been developed, with mainly sceptical views predominating. On the one hand, Streeck (1997) criticises the lacking regulatory power of EWCs which lags far behind that made possible by the German model of employee participation. On the other hand, he criticises the deficient link between the EWC institution and Europe. He considers EWCs to be mainly extensions of the lobbies of the respective headquarters’ home country whose structural principles and modes of operation are conveyed to other parts of the company via the EWC. In this spirit EWCs are (dis-)qualified as ‘neither European nor works councils’ (Streeck 1997: 328). In view of the danger of ‘social dumping’ the EWC as an employees’ committee is not an appropriate instrument, neither in intra-company, nor in cross-country competition (Keller 2001). Locational competition has even intensified since 1996 and ‘EWCs have failed to become a pan-European vehicle for trade union coordination’ (Hancké 2000: 55). According to the point of view of some scientists close to labour unions there exists a ‘danger of a European neo-syndicalism’ (Schulten 1997: 97). EWCs are viewed with some criticism, especially because they present themselves as potential partners for collective contracts and therefore directly compete with labour unions as national or even pan-European wage bargaining partners. The argument goes that the increase in company-related regulation of tariff matters on a European level might lead international companies to withdraw from national contract relations, thereby additionally accelerating the erosive tendencies affecting national bargaining systems. Another point of criticism is the voluntarism regarding the concrete form of EWCs. The ‘political effectiveness’ of a EWC accordingly depends on the (single) company power relations and the backing of labour unions (Schulten 1999: 201). Rather optimistic views, in contrast, emphasize the evolutionary dynamic of EWCs which has still to be considered a ‘search and orientation process’ (Platzer and Rüb 1999). Besides, it is argued, the behaviour of some EWCs clearly surpasses the degree of participation provided for by the directive, and that this should lead to positive effects for the European and national systems of labour relations (ibid.). The varying assumptions on the development tendencies and effects of EWCs were also conductive for empirical research. Meanwhile, relatively detailed analyses about (1) the spread of EWCs, (2) the content of the fundamental agreements between management and employees and (3) some aspects of the practical mode of operation of EWCs have been conducted. With regard to the first topic, the actual spread of EWCs, it can be ascertained that by the end of 2006 2,204 companies formally fell under the scope of the directive and 773 EWCs actually existed. This equates to a EWC ratio of about 34.3 per cent.4

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As in comparable analyses on the German works council, economic research focuses mainly on the relationship between the existence of a EWC and specific company factors. In their econometric analysis of the influential company factors concerning the conclusion of voluntary (Art. 13) agreements on the basis of the British broaden survey WERS 98,5 Addison and Belfield (2002) did not find a connection between company structure variables, performance and productivity and the existence of a EWC (Addison and Belfield 2002: 438). Their analysis did show, however, that EWCs were created mainly in those companies which had already implemented labour relations regulation on the supra-company level (ibid.: 437). All in all, there are so far no secured scientific findings on the factors affecting the probability of the establishment of a EWC. Quite a number of studies have been conducted on the content of EWC agreements. These studies demonstrate that the actual form and mode of operation of EWCs is not primarily determined by the EU directive itself or its respective equivalent in national law, but primarily by national labour regulation traditions and by the EWC agreements negotiated by employers and employees’ representatives on the company level (see for example Bonneton et al. 1996; Carley et al. 1996; Gilman and Marginson 2002; Marginson et al. 1998). There are basic differences in the composition of EWCs. Approximately two thirds of the committees are composed of both employee and employers’ representatives – the ‘French model’. In contrast, the other EWCs are purely employee representations – the so-called ‘German model’. In their analysis of 344 EWC agreements Gilman and Marginson identify four influencing factors that justify the variance in contract provisions. Aside from influences stemming from the line of business and the headquarters of an international company, the significance of the model EWC, as conceptualised in the supplement to the directive (statutory model effect), and the model character, with respect to the learning effect of former EWC agreements, are pointed out. The analysis of written agreements yields important findings on the formalised basis of EWC operation, but only allows tentative conclusions to be made regarding the actual EWC mode of operation. It was shown, especially in empirical case studies, that ‘the actual practice usually exceeds the formal content of EWC agreements’ (Müller and Hoffmann 2002: 108). While the analysis of EWC agreements remains to a great extent limited to the level of ‘legal norms research’ in terms of analysis of rules and formal norms, there have lately been a number of studies available that are concentrated on the real function and operating mode of EWCs (Lecher et al. 1999; Waddington and Kerckhofs 2003; Telljohann 2005). An essential aspect of these studies are the conditions for the constitution of EWC as well as their effectiveness for the interest representation of employees – and therefore the impact of different sets of factors and structures on EWCs. Most focused upon, especially in ‘earlier’ EWC studies,6 were particularly ‘the ‘different types’ of EWC, the ‘variables’ influencing their operation and the ‘phases’ through which they develop’ (Waddington 2003: 302). Analysing the

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action and relation fields of altogether 23 EWCs from different countries and lines of business,7 Lecher et al. develop a typology of European Works Councils (see Lecher et al. 1998; Lecher et al. 1999; Lecher et al. 2001). They distinguish symbolic, service-providing, project-orientated and participationorientated EWCs which markedly differ especially in terms of intensity and effectiveness of employee interest representation ‘( … ) only a part has so far developed the traits of a real player’ (Lecher et al. 2001: 200). Significant differences are uncovered by the analysis of participation quality in various issues which are, according to the directive, meant to be the subject of information and consultation of EWCs (Waddington and Kerckhofs 2003).8 In many EWCs important issues are either not brought up or the quality of participation is deficient in the sense of unsatisfactory communication of information or lacking consultation between EWCs and management. A second topic area refers to the effects of EWCs upon national employment relations or company structures (see Müller and Hoffmann 2002). Starting from the analysis of internal modes of functioning, communication and interaction procedures between national representatives in the EWCs, the respective ‘national’ company parts and other actors, as well as the issue of the possible development of a ‘EWC identity’ (Köhler and Gonzalez Begega 2005; Kotthoff and Tech 2005; Telljohann 2005), the issue of ‘downward effects’ (Hoffmann et al. 2002: 2) which stem from the EWC as an institution and affect national labour relations, representation committees and management are becoming the main points of focus.9 Conceptually, the analysis scheme of Lecher et al. (1999) is applied. This scheme differentiates between the analysis of EWC practice in four dimensions, i.e. the relations between EWCs and management, EWCs and labour unions, EWCs and national interest representations as well as EWCs internal relations (see also just recently in this regard Telljohann 2005: 83). Hofmann et al. (2002) identified significant differences in the influence of EWCs upon national labour relations and company-wide interest regulation structures. Indeed an ‘increase in the amount and quality of information made available throughout the companies, resulting in increased transparency of business decisions and their IR consequences’ (Hoffmann et al. 2002: 21) can be found. However, this only holds in companies in which management has a positive stance with regard to EWC and, moreover, provides contact persons specifically for EWC representatives. Not to be neglected is also the issue of whether the interest representation can resort to stable company interest regulation structures on a national level. A third group of studies, finally, deals with case analyses of companies, especially those in the automobile industry (see Eller-Braatz and Klebe 1998; Hancké 2000; Rehfeldt 1998; Schulten 1992; Whittall 2000 and 2003). The European automobile end-manufacturers (OEM) were pioneers in the establishment of EWCs. By 1996, that is before expiry of the Art. 13 phase, all European auto OEMs had such committees (Hancké 2000: 55).Thus far EWCs exist in almost all significant first tier supply companies (EBR-

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Newsletter 2004; eiro-online 2003). Eller-Braatz and Klebe (1998) show in the case of GM Europe how the EWC, even against strict opposition by management, managed to develop a boarder-crossing position on the benchmarking study planned in 1997, to ensure the right of the EWC to information and consultation and even the participation of employee representatives in the study (Eller-Braatz and Klebe 1998). Locational rivalries were able to be contained by the ‘imaginative and timely combination of national information and participation rights’ and the conflict, in effect, lead to the strengthening of both the national interest representations and the EWC (ibid.: 449). The GM EWC was able to take actions surpassing the rights codified in the directive even in more recent developments at GM in late 2004, such as the planning of massive reductions in personnel by management in some European locations (EBR-Newsletter 2005; on BMW see Eckardt et al. 2000; Pries 2005; Whittall 2000). Meanwhile, in the case of General Motors Europe, a more or less decentralised structure of production sites and labour regulation at the EWC level can be observed. The case of Volkswagen may be characterised by a strong but highly centralised structure of interest regulation at the European level. Volkswagen was the first automobile company to institute a EWC (‘European Volkswagen Concern Works Council’, short E-VW-KBR).10 Indeed, the dominance of German representation structures can be observed. The VW EWC has been judged to have had a positive effect on labour interest representation until the end of the 1990s, seeing as its competencies exceed those codified by the directive, intra-company competition could be contained and, moreover, a ‘transfer of high standards’ (Helbig 1999: 258) has taken place from German labour regulation to the other VW sites. In addition, it advanced the development of a ‘global multilevel structure’ in the creation of a ‘global concern works council’ (Müller et al. 2004: 14). Summarising the state of the art of scientific research on EWCs, the narrow focus on the traditional industrial relations perspective is remarkable. Neither the rather political science orientated European integration research (see also Kohler-Koch et al. 2004 on the multilevel system approach), nor the debate on the convergence or divergence of national institutional systems in the process of globalisation (Coates 2000; Hall and Soskice 2001), nor organisationsociological and transnationalisation research (see further below) were systematically considered in EWC studies. It shall be demonstrated in the following that much stands to be gained from taking into account social science organisation research and considering the transnationalisation perspective.

EWCs as European non-profit organisations in nationally bound European companies In the traditional industrial relations approach EWCs are seen as a special type of works council, i.e. as interest mediation bodies between capital and labour. In an organisation research perspective the focus is on EWCs as

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durable and distributed performance organisations whose parts spread over different nation states. Their elements are embedded in and, at the same time, span different national societies with their corresponding institutional settings. The EWCs are international non-profit organisations based on European and national law that are working in Europe-wide active profit organisations that are based exclusively on the national law concerning their corresponding parts. This gives EWCs a unique and tremendously interesting character. Some of their aspects could be approached by the rich literature on international companies produced by the sociology of organisations and management since the 1960s. Other characteristics were focused on by more recent studies on international non-profit organisations, transnationalisation and transnational relations. The development of ideal types of international companies can fall back on a broad tradition in organisation-sociological and general organisationscientific research. The main point of interest was the intense relation between the constitution of rules, norms and institutional structures by nation-states on the one hand, and the resource structures, coordination and controlling mechanisms as well as value and norm orientations within the internationally active performance organisations on the other hand (see also Dunning 1979 and 1995). Based on studies by Perlmutter (1969) and Porter (1986), Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) developed four ideal types of international companies which, in modified form, can be used as a framework in analysing EWCs. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) differentiate two company types which follow a rather centre–periphery relation (global and international) and two rather decentralised and multi-polar structured types of international company (multinational and transnational). They judge the ‘transnational corporation’ to be more promising with regard to future company internationalisation than the global, international and multinational types of company. Transnational organisations therefore exhibit aspects which characterise them as a specific type of international organisation. The main aspects among these are especially the boarder-crossing dispersion and decentralised structure of material resources, locations, employees and knowledge stocks, a not simply ‘cosmopolitan-global’ but polycentric organisation-specific culture, rather hierarchical and spatially dispersed power and interest bundling instead of marked centre–periphery structures and simultaneously close reaction ties and interdependency of dispersed organisational units in the sense of more intense coordination. Transnational organisations are also labelled ‘global learning networks’ or ‘multi-centre structures’ due to the abovementioned factors. It is especially the transnational coordination and controlling processes which enable a dynamic embedding of transnational organisations in their complex and heterogeneous environment. Beside the formation of resource flows of the primary activities, the underlying information, communication and decision-making processes are the main point of focus. These not only form the basis of the effective

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completion of primary tasks, but also form the foundation for learning – and therefore for evolutionary processes. It is assumed that in transnational organisations, classical hierarchical structures and processes are not sufficient to take account of global complexity and heterogeneity. The embedding of organisational units in different local contexts with simultaneously strong supra-local coordination facilitates emerging recursive and reflexive structures and processes in transnational organisations. With regard to the coordination forms it is of major importance which relationship exists between traditional control functions such as technical or bureaucratic control and innovative forms of coordination through target indicators, recourse to value orientation and discursive negotiation. Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) provide demonstrative descriptions of distribution and coordination structures for the four (ideal) typical forms of international profit organisations made out by them. In a sense, Doz et al. 2001 developed their concept of the ‘metanational enterprise’ as a continuation of the Bartlett and Ghoshal thesis and under more intense focus upon the processes of knowledge coordination. How this knowledge coordination is actually organised remains quite undetermined empirically and is therefore a research desideratum, as is the stronger linkage of studies on international profit- and non-profit organisations. In the area of research on international non-profit organisations, one line of research has developed rather independently from organisation-scientific research – transnationalisation research. Transnationalisation research integrates the various social science disciplines (sociology, politics, law, cultural studies etc.; see also Pries 2002, 2007). Central issues are not limited to the questions of knowledge coordination and the overlapping value and strategy orientations but encompass mainly the study of the problem known as the efficiency-legitimisation dilemma (Scharpf 2000) which implies that international organisations need to secure, on the one hand, a minimum of efficiency and, on the other, their internal legitimisation (the organisation as a whole as well as in the individual units) and external legitimisation (the organisation as a whole and in the individual countries) through their distribution and coordination patterns. Besides the traditional industrial relations perspective the various research approaches to international and especially transnational organisations offer an important and innovative platform. Because EWCs can be viewed as genuinely international non-profit organisations which become active and effective within the framework of international profit organisations. While (local and national) works councils are usually viewed as sub-units or parts of a company organisation subject to a unitary national law and institutional setting, the classification of EWCs is significantly more complex. EWCs are based mainly upon European law (the EWC directive) which is concretised by the respective national legal provisions.11 The units of the enterprise as business organisations remain – in contrast to the societas europeae – exclusively subjected to the respective national law and institutional setting. In

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formal-legal terms the EWC is thus a European organisation in the sense of clear-cut membership rules, a predetermined structure and the unambiguous purpose of representation of employees and dialogue with the ‘upper-most management’ at the European enterprise level. The EWC is therefore a European non-profit organisation. Such a perspective on EWCs as European non-profit organisations within Europe-wide national profit organisations appears to be scientifically innovative and relevant. For it enables EWCs to be studied not primarily in the capital-labour resp. employer-employee relation, but empirically in their significance with respect to the overall European socialisation process. If it turns out that EWCs are either multinational or more or less insignificant conglomerations of national or location-oriented particular interests or that they, following a clear centre–periphery relation, represent the strong (global) or weak (focal) dominance and enforcement of headquarters’ interests, then the assessment of EWCs ‘as neither European nor Works Councils’ by Streeck (1997: 328) might indeed be appropriate. If, on the other hand, significant coordination and interest regulation mechanisms of EWCs on the European level can be proven, without there being an unambiguous centre of resources, power, knowledge and culture, then we would be dealing with a rather transnational European constellation. With respect to the European agreement process as a multilevel system, so far mostly intergovernmental negotiations (e.g. of the European Council of Secretaries), the creation of supranational institutions (e.g. the European Parliament or the European Court of Justice) and multinational interest regulation between independent organisations (e.g. in the coal and steel, the agriculture or the electricity industry) as well as the interplay amongst these three levels have been dealt with (König et al. 1996; Kohler-Koch et al. 2004). Making a topic of EWCs under the organisation-sociological question of transnationalisation is an innovative perspective in the light of research so far.

Empirical research on transnational organisations The social-scientific research on international organisations is so comprehensive that it could not possibly be dealt with here. Besides, the theoretical traditions and the empirical fields of research differ significantly between the two areas of profit- and non-profit organisations. Relevant research results for the two areas of profit- and non-profit organisations, taking into special consideration the transnationalisation perspective, will be presented in the following.

(Transnational) profit organisations The two most important questions in the study of international companies relate to appropriate typifying models and also to the appropriate analysis and measurement instruments. With respect to the typifying models of international organisations (1) the spatial distribution patterns of various

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company parts, (2) the specific boarder-crossing cooperation and coordination patterns and (3) the aspects taken into account for the respective identification of (1) and (2) are relevant. Since the early works of Perlmutter (1969), Dunning (1979) and Porter (1986) up until Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) and Doz et al. (2001), the perspective regarding spatial distribution patterns, whereby a differentiation is undertaken between a centre–periphery model and a network model, has largely been established. The ‘powerful thesis’ of the ‘transnational solution’ (Bartlett/Ghoshal 1989) was, and still is, the topic of hot debate in international organisational research both theoretically and empirically. Debated was, for example, the question of to what extent network-shaped organisational structures facilitate or enable the pursuit of transnational strategies in the first place. In this regard the process-oriented study of value creation chains – distributed over many locations and countries – is of great importance (see also Welge et al. 1998; Riedl 1999; Pries and Schweer 2004; Sturgeon et al. 2004 and Sturgeon et al. 2005). With regard to the coordination patterns some authors focus on value orientations and common perceptions of culture in their analysis (Perlmutter 1969; Bartlett and Ghoshal 1989; Hofstede 1997). Other authors identify primarily personnel linkages and networks as the decisive mechanisms enabling the cohesion and collaboration of individual parts of international companies (Carroll and Fennema 2002; Borghoff 2005). Finally, also impersonal organisation-wide mechanisms such as bureaucratic control, benchmarking with respect to performance indicator-based or discursive coordination, are identified as potentially predominant integration forms (Edwards and Scullion 1982; Pries 2000; Dörrenbacher 2000). The spatial distribution patterns and coordination mechanisms which are at the centre of analysis have great influence on the aspects of company internationalisation later considered relevant. International business organisations are identified and characterised, for example by two of the OECD’s indexes: the transnationalisation index12 and the network spread index.13 Both indices are, however, largely restricted to information on the spatial distribution pattern of international activity, but not on their cross-linkages and coordination. Furthermore, only aspects of ‘objectifiable’ activity structures are measured, and not, for example, formal regulations, routines, informational-, communicational- and decision-making structures/processes or even corporate cultures which enable the actual value-added processes in the first place. In indicator-oriented research on international companies and internationalisation strategies (e.g. Ruigrok and van Tulder 1995; RiahiBelkaoui 1998 and 1999), some further concepts that help to determine the degree of internationalisation of companies based on quantitative data were developed.14 Another possibility of measuring international organisations using indicators lies in clustering according to organisational patterns and national cultures (see, for example, Hofstede 1997). More recent methodological concepts attempt to combine culture-specific cluster data with ‘hard’

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geographical distributional data (see also Fisch and Oesterle 2003). Individual studies differentiate global and transnational companies and generate indices such as ‘local interlinkages’, ‘independence’ (from the firm’s headquarters) and ‘organisation design’ (see Harzing 2000). Available studies on internationalisation processes in companies show that the activity structures, on the one hand, and the control mechanisms on the other, may develop asymmetrically in the degree of transnationalisation (see also Hirsch-Kreinsen and Schulte 2002; Borghoff 2005). Personnel interlinkages, capital interlinkages and intermediate product interlinkages between organisations with respect to organisational units can also be registered with the help of network research (for a summary see Borghoff 2005; Rohwer and Pötter 2002: 47; Wassermann and Faust 1994). The focus of research is in the profit area, especially the relations between headquarters and company units in various countries, as well as their manifold roles in the respective local networks (see also Cantwell and Piscitello 1999). Martinez and Jarillo (1989) put forth the thesis that multinational companies in particular tend to grant their company units the greatest possible autonomy. Garnier (1982) and Gates and Egelhoff (1986) filter variables (e.g. product range, capital interlinkages, size of parent and subsidiary companies) which have an impact on the autonomy of the ‘subsidiaries’. Typologies of ‘subsidiaries’ have been defined by White and Poynter (1984) and Delany (1998). Based on studies on social capital, the strength (weak ties versus strong ties) of personnel relations in networks can be established. In the field of qualitative network research, for example, cultural transformation processes can be illustrated by the DNS model which includes both networks and discourses as well as structures in scientific observation (see Kemper 2002). The approaches and findings of social-scientific research on the international and especially transnational organisations sketched out here can be implemented in confronting the issue of EWCs. The characterisation of Europe-wide active companies in which the EWCs are instituted and active is of importance. However, such a typification of company structures and processes has so far not been undertaken. It appears to be indispensable, though, because one has to assume that the respective form of international company organisation influences the form of the respective EWC. Moreover, EWCs – even as international non-profit organisations – can be registered conceptually within the category of international profit organisations. While general transnationalisation research is by now quite extensively developed and many different topic areas such as transnational migration, transnational families, transnational literature and media or transnational social movements have been studied both theoretically and empirically (see Pries 2002; Pries et al. 2004), transnational non-profit organisations have so far been studied relatively sparsely. International non-profit organisations are usually confronted with the problem of coordination of spatially dispersed units more intensely than business organisations, because the latter can

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stimulate compliance from the individual units by means of simple and ‘hard’ mechanisms such as money transfers. International non-profit organisations, in contrast, are usually characterised by a rather bureaucratic and centralistic coordination of actions (e.g. organisations that have evolved from intergovernmental contracts such as the IMF or the OECD) or by a rather loose network structure of largely independent local units (for example, in the case of the non-governmental organisation ATTAC). In contrast to such global or focal and multinational organisational patterns, transnational organisations are, according to the present state of the art, rather exceptional cases in that they display a decentralised distribution and, simultaneously, a high degree of coordination (see Keck and Sikkink 1998). Political-scientific research on the matter of transnational organisations concentrates ‘very extensively on the question of the possibilities of democratic and effective politics under the conditions of economic dissolution of boundaries’ (Jachtenfuchs 1998: 242). The main point of discussion are the effects of global dissolution of boundaries regarding the market on the ability of nation-states to take action internally as well as the influence of economic globalisation on the modern national welfare state and on the restricted social-political scope of highly developed capitalistic nationstates (see Scharpf 2000; Rosenau 1995; Robinson 2001). Although politicalscientific interest in this context is mainly focused upon the study of international regimes, international organisations by all means receive quite some attention with respect to the resolution and coordination of conflicts of interest (e.g. Taylor and Groom 1988; Neyer 1999, Zürn and Wolf 2000). The available analyses on international interest and public welfare organisations continue where the studies on the according organisations on the nation-state level left off by focusing mainly on the questions of regulatory effectiveness. Transnational interest organisations can thereby not only execute regulatory functions in their own interest, but also in the interests of third parties. They therefore function in a manner resembling the self-discipline displayed by associations on a national level (Mayntz 2003: 11). It can be ascertained in this context that international interest organisations, which need not necessarily evolve as mergers of national organisations, but may have been conceived to be transnational, are the main carriers of particularly general and universal values (Mayntz 2003: 11). Regardless of these evolutionary aspects, transnational interest organisations as non-profit organisations are usually characterised by (1) a relatively polycentric resource configuration and interest structure, (2) by a manifest requirement of boarder-crossing regulation or interest articulation, as well as (3) by the necessity to resolve the efficiency–legitimisation dilemma time and again. It is especially the efficiency-legitimisation problem which substantially sets apart profit from non-profit organisations. For while business companies can rely on their efficiency (e.g. by paying satisfactory dividends) as being a source of adequate legitimisation,15 achieving targets efficiently does not secure adequate legitimisation for non-profit

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organisations. Securing a minimum level of efficiency and legitimisation visà-vis its stakeholders are two more or less equal and sometimes diametrically opposed requirements confronting non-profit organisations. This contrast between efficiency and legitimisation, prominent in political science- and organisation sociology research,16 also holds for EWC organisations. Thus, for example, the EWCs constituted according to the German and the French model each face very heterogeneous interest groups to which they are accountable and upon whose legitimisation they depend. The mechanisms of election respecting delegation to the EWCs are altogether regulated very differently in the various European locations (the national delegates for the EWC can, for example, be determined by the respective national works councils, by labour unions or by committees specially convened for the election of delegates). The combination of research perspectives on profit organisations and non-profit organisations promises potentially significant insights especially for the study of structures of EWCs. European interest regulation in automotive companies such as General Motors Europe serves as a good example.

Combining profit and non-profit organisation analysis: the case of the EWC at GME The basic structure and spheres of activity of General Motors (GM) as an international automobile company exemplify the value of combining the analysis of (transnational) profit and non-profit organisations. The headquarters and centre of power of this international corporation is located in Detroit/USA and there are no uncontested genuine headquarters or power centre of General Motors Europe. In spite of this, the administrative headquarters in Europe is Zürich/Switzerland and the most significant concentration of strategic functions is located in Rüsselsheim/Germany. The production sites, however, are almost equally strong and are located in Bochum/Germany, Rüsselsheim/Germany, Antwerpen/Belgium, Ellesmere Port/England and Zaragoza/Spain (see Table 8.1). Due, among other factors, to the GM company internationalisation profile in Europe, the EWC17 structure of GME is far more decentralised than that of other European automobile companies such as Volkswagen, DaimlerChrysler, Renault or PSA. This could be verified by considering the multipolar structure of EWC delegates and by the fact that the dominant business language for EWC meetings is English (and translated to the language of each delegate’s country by professional simultaneous interpreters). Whereas the internal representation structure of the GME EWC is specifically decentralised, at the same time intra-organisational bargaining on the part of workers and inter-organisational bargaining with management are relatively strong. Besides other factors (such as the political and ideological value system of the major actors) this could be understood as an outcome of several restructuring programs whereby Europe-wide agreements were signed by

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Table 8.1 Production, employment and EWC-representatives in European GM-sites (end of 2006) Annual production capacity (units) Austria Belgium/ Luxembourg France Germany (4 sites) Hungary Netherlands Poland Spain (2 sites) Switzerland Sweden (3 sites) UK (2 sites) North Cluster South East Cluster

16,979 + compontes 196,315 27,509 + components 549,349 + components components sales offices only 187,007 + components 485,857 headquarters only 102,909 + components 222,992 not applicable not applicable

Total employment

Number of EWC delegates

1,679

2

3,749

3

1,726

2

25,667

6

664 198 2,819

1 1 1

7,255 302 4,991

3 – 3

4,989 82 531

4 1a 1b

Explanation: Figures for EU and EEA countries only. a sales organisation in Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Norway b sales organisation in Greece, Italy Source: GM-documentation and website (http://www.gm.com/europe/corporate/download/GM_factandfigures_2008_low.pdf)

management and the GME EWC. The First European Framework Agreement was signed in July 2000 in the context of a joint venture between Fiat and General Motors concerning cooperation in the power train and engine production. The second agreement at the European level was signed in March 2001, preventing the closure of the Luton plant in England and fixing the principles of employment reduction without dismissals and of maintaining workers’ rights and employment conditions when shifting from a GME plant towards a supplier. The third European agreement (October 2001) focused on the reduction of production in Europe by 350.000 units and increasing productivity and flexibility. It reaffirmed the principles of no closure of any European plant and no dismissals for economic reasons and of maintaining employment conditions and union rights when changing to a supplier in the course of outsourcing. In sum, in the case of GME there were and are specific preconditions for a transnational labour regulation pattern in the company structure as well as in the development of labour regulation: relatively decentralised plants and the lack of a dominant power centre as well as a strong coordination of intra- and inter-organisational bargaining processes.

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These transnationalisation tendencies can also be observed in the geographic configuration of GM Europe’s space of operations. The GM EWC was founded in 1996 as the European Employees’ Forum and includes representatives from the Opel assembly plants in Belgium, Germany, Poland, Portugal and Spain, as well as delegates from Vauxhall in the United Kingdom and Saab in Sweden. The power train plants in Austria, France and Hungary are represented, as is the European GM distributors’ network. After years of meeting only once a year to exchange information, GM’s EWC has developed into a real transnational societal space with its own social, cultural, political and economic dimensions. Most importantly, there is no clear hegemonic power centre, but a societal space which is constructed through negotiation, communication and trust, and which is based on common social and cultural values and causes that place emphasis on defining common interests and preserving a minimum of solidarity. The most important common cause in this respect was a labour conflict in 2000 and 2001, which erupted over the proposed closure of the Vauxhall plant in Luton. The EWC organised a Europe-wide campaign based on the demands that no plant be closed and that no dismissals take place. In the course of this action, the supra-national EWC law led to the creation of a transnational socio-cultural space in which intra- and inter-organisational bargaining played a decisive role (in both the 2000–2001 conflict and the ‘Olympia plan’ in 2002). These preconditions are important to understand the dynamics of GME’s cost- and staff-reduction programme, which caused harsh conflicts between management and workers since the middle of 2004. In October 2004, GM announced the reduction of about 12.000 workplaces in Western Europe, due to severe financial losses incurred by GM Europe since 2000. On Thursday 14 October 2004 the workers of the Opel plant in Bochum/Germany stopped production and blocked the main entrance. They protested against a declaration of the GM Europe management to reduce about 14,000 workers in Bochum in the context of an overall 12.000 staff reduction plan. On Monday the 18th production in the Opel plant in Antwerpen and Rüsselsheim were affected, after the Europe wide protest day on Tuesday 19th these plants had to stop production. On Wednesday in a general workers assembly the vast majority voted for returning to work, but due to the lack of some auto parts coming from Bochum the Opel Rüsselsheim plant had to wait until Monday the 25th for resuming work (Pries 2004). The dominant interpretation of these events points to the globalisation of financial markets, the globalised competition between places of production and the practice of ‘regime shopping’ as the underlying causes of the situation. But the GM consortium’s overall structural situation and the driving forces and dynamics influencing its actions were more complicated. Certainly financial markets – especially the investment strategies for pension funds – are almost globalised, and in the case of GM this has a strong impact on company strategies. Although a great part of the economic problems of GM

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derives from the specific US pension fund system (the pension and healthcare obligations GM accumulated towards its former workers in 2003 were greater than the shareholders’ and debtors’ claims), these problems – as well as the product policy strategy of building mainly big sport utility vehicles – led to pressures towards restructuring and rationalising the European parts of GM. This went hand in hand with a strong tendency towards supranationalization in the economic and political dimensions of GM’s operations in the geographical region encompassed by the European Union. A striking example is the possibility, since October 2004, of building a European joint stock company. In ‘Societas Europeae’ the plants or parts of a company are considered as part of a European sovereign juridical unit that is subject to European law and jurisprudence. It is interesting that, in the context of crisis and restructuring, GM Europe has the option to integrate the different plants (in Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom, Poland, Portugal, Spain, Sweden) and brands (Opel, Saab, Vauxhall) and to shift its European headquarters from Zurich to Brussels. Such a move to economic and political supra-nationalisation would most probably influence the corporate governance structure of the European part of the GM consortium. But in spite of such a European supra-nationalisation strategy the dynamics of GME Company and EWC structures follow more a transnational pattern. It is just the intertwining of a relatively decentralised production structure of GME as a profit organisation with a relatively decentralised power and intra-organisational bargaining structure of the GME-EWC as a non-profit-organisation that explains the specific dynamics and outcome of labour regulation in General Motors Europe. Meanwhile Greer and Hauptmeier 2007 stress the normative and ideological aspects of workers’ solidarity to explain the different patterns of labour regulation in automobile companies, the focus presented here is on company organisation structures as important for inter-organisational bargaining and on the power structures of workers’ national and European representations as important for intra-organisational bargaining. The GME case could be a good example for a European Works Council with an almost transnational character. The latter (the GME-EWC) as a non-profit-organisation could not be adequately understood without referring to the specific character of the GME company as a relatively decentralised but highly coordinated (transnational) profit organisation in and towards which the EWC is working.

Conclusion From a theoretical and conceptual point of view organisation sociology and transnationalisation research open new perspectives for the study of EWCs. Indeed, management research studies on the topic of international and transnational business organisations are frequently prescriptive in style, as, for example, Bartlett and Ghoshal (1989) in their treatment of transnational organisation forms as a new best practice of achieving business success.

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Nevertheless, research on international profit organisations provides empirically established and manageable, i.e. not overly complex, models which help typify international profit organisations. This fund of social-scientific knowledge can and should be implemented in EWC research. Without a case-related characterisation and typification of Europe-wide active companies as multinational, global, focal or transnational organisations it should prove difficult to appropriately understand and explain the options of the respective EWCs. Research on EWCs needs to refer systematically to the research on international companies, because EWCs act as non profit organisations within and towards these. In addition, EWCs themselves are to be viewed as international (non-profit) organisations, and here again the issue of learning systematically from appropriate NGO and NPO studies arises. Research on international non-profit organisations systematically deals with the distributional structure and the coordination-respecting integration mechanisms between the individual parts, but also makes an issue of the relation between efficiency and legitimisation of the respective overall organisations. EWC research stands to learn a lot precisely from the efficiency–legitimisation problem. In an empirical perspective a four-part typology of global, multinational, focal and transnational companies has proven not to be too complex yet by all means of explanatory power with regard to international profit organisations. The various individual studies usually differentiate aspects of spatial distribution structure (centralised–decentralised) and aspects of coordination and integration (strong–weak). In both dimensions (distribution structure and coordination) indeed quite different aspects are focused upon (such as further above the various indices regarding the distribution structure showed), yet combinations of aspects from both dimensions lead to the proposed discussed types of international organisations. A great number of theses so far discussed in EWC research can be extended to the issues regarding (transnational) organisations sketched out here. Streeck’s terming of EWCs, for example, as ‘neither European nor works councils’ (1997: 328) demonstrates that he in effect (mis)understands EWCs to be focal organisations displaying a strong dominance of a company’s home country and, simultaneously, only weak coordination mechanisms. This implies a greater influence of the home country than, for example, the internationalisation type of the organisation or the evolutionary resp. learning influence of the company itself.18 In methodological respect organisation sociology and transnationalisation research offer diverse instruments to measure and typify international organisational structures. These can be implemented in the characterisation of EWCs as non-profit organisations as well as for the companies in which they are active. The study of EWCs is an interesting and rewarding task for the future especially because of EWCs’ direct importance to millions of European employees, their being a highly innovative European institution and their ability to pioneer new paths of ‘internationalisation from below’.

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Notes 1 Britain made use of its opting-out option and withdrew from the entire process only to join the EWC plan after Labour’s electoral victory in 1997. 2 As an alternative to a EWC the directive offers the option of defining a procedure of information and consultation. 3 For general information on EWCs see the EWC data base (also available as CDROM) at http://www.etui-rehs.org/workers_participation/projects/european_works _councils_database – 1.f. 4 As in many companies the first negotiated EWC agreement has in the meantime been replaced by another one. The ETUI-EWC data ase documents about 1155 EC agreements; see also Kerckhofs 2003: 47 and Waddington and Kerkhofs 2003: 324f. 5 The ‘Workplace Employee Relations Survey’ (formerly: Workplace Industrial Relations Survey, WIRS) is a panel survey of British companies conducted at irregular intervals. Managers or people responsible for personnel as well as interest representations and employees are interviewed personally (see Cully et al. 1999; Millward et al. 2000). 6 Initial quantitative surveys on the distribution and structure of voluntary EWCs were conducted by the early 1990s (see Stützel 1996; Deppe et al. 1997). 7 Companies of the banking, insurance, food, metal/electronics, chemical/pharmace utical, and construction industry were studied. 8 472 EWC members from five countries and 222 companies were interviewed (ibid.: 332). 9 Aside from this, effects of EWCs on the potential emergence of supra-national collective bargaining were studied (see for example Marginson and Sisson 1996). 10 First initiatives to create a boarder-crossing employee representation have been observed as early as 1966. The EWC has existed since 1990 and since 1998 there is also a world works council. The decision to create a EWC was motivated by wanting to assume ‘a pioneering role in the social dimension’ of the EU (Helbig 1999: 247). 11 On the previous European jurisdiction by the ECJ regarding the EWC visit http:// www.euro-betriebsrat.de/ebr/931.php. 12 It is composed of the ratios between foreign assets/total assets, foreign sales/total sales, and number of employees abroad/total number of employees (World Investment Report 2002: 88). 13 It measures the ratio of the number of countries in which a company has a branch to the total number of countries in which this would be possible (World Investment Report 2002: 109). 14 Van Tulder et al. (2001) use the ‘transnationality index’ as a combination of three company-related indicators to operationalise internationalisation. Transnationalisation and internationalisation are measured in terms of the distribution of investments or capital assets, sales and employment (ibid.: 47). Their study of the 100 largest companies (core companies) resulted in a transnationalisation index of around 35 per cent, whilst multinational concerns with the greatest number of internationalisation activities achieve values of around 50 to 55 per cent (ibid.: 57f.). 15 The cautious formulation is owed to the fact that organisation-sociological approaches that are by all means of significant explanatory power state the exact opposite. It is precisely the claim of organisation-sociological neo-institutionalism that organisations align their structures primarily according to legitimacy toward their environment and do not orientate themselves to organisational efficiency or rationality (see Meyer and Rowan 1977 and as an overview Walgenbach 2001).

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16 The general meaning of transnational organisations in this efficiency-legitimacy dilemma in the context of globalisation is discussed by Beisheim and Zürn 1999. The efficiency–legitimisation problem is discussed for labour unions as non-profit organisations in various contributions in Schroeder and Weßels 2003. 17 The exact term denoting the workers’ representation body is European Employee Forum and not EWC – for the GME management the name European Works Council has too much of a participation or even co-determination ring to it. 18 Gilman/Margison (2002: 50) were able to demonstrate in their evaluation of the EWC agreements that, besides the home country effect, the line of business effect and the learning effect are important explanatory factors for the concrete design of the EWC agreements and therefore for the basic structures of EWC activities.

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Index

N.B. Numbers in bold type indicate a table. academic entrepreneurialism, PPP 136 ActionAid 144 Active Learning Network for Accountability and Performance in Humanitarian Action (ALNAP) 100 Adam, S. 129, 137 Adick, C. 17, 126, 128 Advocacy organisations 34–35, 136, 140–41 Afghanistan 62, 78 Africa 34, 67, 72, 153 African migrants, Halle and 54; Manchester 55 African Protestants, Manchester and 49 African-American inner-city communities 32 Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Liberation du Congo (AFDL) 85 Alvarez, S. 82, 109 American Association of Financial Professionals 129 American and Caribbean Women’s Health Network 17 American educational providers, foreign markets and 153 American Texas preachers 50 American University of Cairo 147 Amnesty International 135, 143 analysis of EWC practice, four dimensions 159 Angola 85 “anti-globalisation movements” 104 Antwerpen/Belgium, GM production site 167–69 Apollo-Group, American for-profit enterprise 148–49

Appadurai, Arjun 25, 28, 38n8 Argentine human rights organizations, transnational advocacy networks 35 Article 6-phase, EWCs according to ‘standard legal procedure’ 156 Article 13 agreements, British broaden survey WERS 98, 158, 172n5 Article 13 of EWC directive, ‘voluntary agreements 156 Asia 1, 153 Asia-Pacific-rim 7 assimilation 42, 47,59 Association for the Taxation of Financial Transactions for the Aid of Citizens see ATTAC Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID) 118 ATTAC 10, 16, 166 Aurini, J. 150–52 Australia 147 Austria 168–69 automobile industry, EWCs and 159 Aviation Management, Lufthansa students with BSc 146 Bangalore 29 Bangladesh 69–70 Banyamulenge General, conflict in North-Kivu province 86 ‘bargaining under the shadow of the law’, EWC agreements 156 Bartlett, C.A. 87, 91–93, 161–62, 164, 170 Beijing women’s rights conference 82 Belgium 118, 168–70 Benedict Schools 130 Berlin 47

Index Besserer, F. 4, 14, 34 Bochum/Germany, production site of GM 167–69 Boli, J. 126–27, 143 Bologna Process 138, 151 border-crossing citizenship 65 border-crossing democracy 65 border-crossing regulation 166 Borghoff, T. 164–65 born-again Christian identity, migrants and 46, 49–50 born-again Christians, anti-racist and welcoming to immigrants 59 bottom-up development 67 ‘brain circulation’ 73; networks of scientists and experts 62 ‘brain drain’, renamed as ‘brain gain’ 66, 72–74, 78 brain transfer, outcomes of 73 branch campus 137 Brazil 34, 147 Brazilian groups, LACWHN and 121 Brenner, N. 44–45 Bretton-Woods system, breakdown (1971) 81 Britain 118 British broaden survey WERS 98, Article 13 agreements 158, 172n5 British government, cooperative development schemes 78 Brussels 170 Bukavu 92–93 business activities, migrants and 48 businesspersons, entrepreneurial spirit of expatriates 71–72 Cag˘ lar, A. 5–6, 10, 14–15, 41, 43, 45, 47, 57 Cairo conference on population 82 Canada 32; Asian imports in 72; doctors who move to US replaced by South Africans 74; Sylvan Learning Center 149 capitalism, globalisation of 27 care drain, Southern Africa 66, 74 Caribbean 34, 11 Catholic 49, 115, 143 Catholic Church, high longevity 135 Center-periphery model 7, 17 Chad 85 Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA) 129 Chen, Yin-Zu 104, 119–21 Chicago School, immigrant studies 40 China 70–72, 152

205

Chinese 34 Christian religious congregations 21, 44, 51 “citizenship” 25 city, struggle for positioning 46 city scale, assessing relatively undeveloped 45 clustering, organisational patterns and national cultures 164 Cologne 70–72, 74, 152 Commission on Human Rights 105 Communist world, after breakdown 78 companies in EU member states, EWCs and 156–57, 172n2, 172n4 compulsory schooling, public responsibility for 127, 153 Confederation of the European Rectors states report 128 conferences, battle between feminists and fundamentalists 117 Congolese L’Esprit Church 48, 50 Congolese war, overlapping micro-wars 85 Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) 96 corporate educational institutions, welldefined niches 153–54 corporate universities 137, 140, 145 ‘Corporate University Xchange European Excellence Award (2000)’ 146 Council of Europe 128–29, 139, 152 criminal organisation 27 cross-border organisations 87, 102n8 cross-nation research, methodological nationalism 7 “culture” 8, 25 Daimler-Chrysler 167 DaimlerChrysler Corporate University 133–34, 145–46 Dakar 142, 144 ‘danger of a European neo-syndicalism’ 157 Davies, S. 150–52 DAWN 108, 114–18; secretariat rotated regionally 121–22 DeMars, W.E. 81, 83–84, 101; NGOs and Transnational Networks: Wildcards in World Politics 83 Democratic Republic of the Congo see DRC Detroit/USA, GM headquarters 167 developing countries, brain gain 73; transstate migration 65, 78

206

Index

development assistance (ODA) 62 Development Awareness for Women Network see DA Diaspora migration 10 Dijkzeul, D. 16, 81, 83 Diploma programme, IB-related curricula 145, 154n3 DNS model, networks and discourses 165 “double polarization” 46 Doz, Y. 16, 162, 164 DRC 17, 80, 101; democracy failed 85; fragmented economy 86; Malteser International’s work 16; Mobutu’s kleptocratic rule (1965–97) 84; Tous pour la Paix et le Développement NGO 83 Dunning, J.H. 161, 164 Durkheim. Emile 42 Eastern Europe 34 EBR-Newsletter 2004 159–60 EBR-Newsletter 2005 160 ECHO 92, 95–96, 99 economic globalisation, EWCs and 155 Economist, The 129 education 126–27, 132 ‘Education for All’ 138, 140, 144 Education International 144 educational spaces 133–34, 138–39 efficiency-legitimation dilemma, problem of 162 Egypt 147 Eisenstadt, S.E. 8, 10–11 El Salvador 70 Eller-Braatz, E. 159–60 Ellesmere Port/England, GM production site 167–68 Emergency Corps of the Order of Malta (ECOM) 92, 102n12 empirical case studies, formal content of EWC agreements and practice 157–58 empirical perspective, global, multinational, focal and transnational companies 171 empirical transnationalism 3, 13–14, 22, 24, 26–29 England 40, 74 ‘enterprise’, use of term 137 epistemic communities 72–76 epistemic transnational reflexive networks, concept of 114 Eritrea, ‘healing tax’ for expatriates 70 Ethiopia 70

ethnic, community 41, 59, 61n15; entrepreneur 44;entrepreneurship 72; groups 14, 40–47; label 47; lens 41–42, 47, 59; militias 27; mobilisation 41 ethnic “pathways”, incorporation migrants 43, 46, 49 ETUI-EWC data base, companies that qualify 156, 172n3 EU 78–79 EU Amsterdam treaty (1997) 110 EU Committee on Women’s Rights, WIDE papers 118 EU and Mediterranean rim, special case 79 EU policy on sexual harassment 111 EU/EC, joint management of migration flows 79 Europe 7, 153, 167–68 Europe-wide active companies, EWCs and 165 European automobile endmanufacturers (OEM), EWCs 159 European Business School/International University at Reichartshausen 146 European Community’s Humanitarian Aid Office see ECHO European Council of International Schools (ECIS) 130, 145 European Council of Secretaries 155–56, 163 European Court of Justice 163 European employees, EWCs’ direct importance to millions of 171 European joint stock company, possibility of building 170 European Parliament 163 European School of Management and Technology 146 European Union see EU European Works Councils see EWCs EWC directive, EWCs and 162, 172n11 EWCs 18, 155; analysing 23 from different countries and lines of business 159, 172n7; basic differences in composition 158; European nonprofit organisations in nationally bound European companies 160–63; European organisation with clear-cut membership rules 163; international non-profit organisations 161, 171; research on international companies 171; social science research since 1990s 157, 160; structure of GM

Index in Europe more decentralised than other automobile companies 167 Faist, T. 4, 14–15, 71–72, 77, 135 feminist networks 109, 122 femocrat institutions of UN 108 Ferguson, J. 25, 31 Ferree, M.M. 104, 106 Fiat 168 Fiji, DAWN secretariat (1995) 116 Finke, B. 105, 107 First World, school projects in Third World 143 FLC, led by Pierre Bemba 85 Fligstein, N. 25, 31 focal organisation 87–90 Ford Foundation funding 117–18 foreign direct investment (FDI) 71 formal education, compulsory education 132 formalisation, transnational organisations 135 Fouron, G. 27, 43 France 168–69 franchising 137 French government, cooperative development schemes 78 French model, EWC employers’ representations and 158, 167 Front de Liberation du Congo see FLC FT Knowledge, British for-profit enterprise 148 Fundtrac 96, 98 Galbraith, J.K. 65 Gandhi strategies in South Africa and India 33 GATS 128, 136, 139, 146, 153 Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft 8–9 gender, aspects 4; equality 123; mainstreaming 110 General Agreement on Trade in Services see GATS General Motors Europe see GME genocide 83, 85 German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) 147 German Arab Chamber of Industry and Commerce 147–48 German Federal Cultural Foundation, Halle as “shrinking city” 52 German model of employee participation in EWCs 157–58, 167

207

German Pentecostal organization (Bund Freikirchlicher Pfingstgemeinden or BFP) 48 German University of Cairo (GUC) 17, 147–48 German works council, analyses on 158 Germany 14, 42, 130, 169; Bericht der Unabhängigen Kommission Zuwanderung (2001) 78; debate on flexible enterprise organisations 114; EWCL passed 28 October 1996 156; international students can remain or re-enter 73; Portuguese youths 131; short-run benefits in welfare state 69; transnational education 147; Turks in 40; unification (1989) 52–53 Ghana 49 Ghoshal, S. 87, 91–93, 161–62, 164, 17 Gipsy families 10 Glick Schiller, N., educational spaces 126–27; scale of cities 15; study of ethnic groups 41–43, 47–48, 59; transnational research 5–6, 10, 14; transnational migrants 27–29 global, civil society 152; dissolution of boundaries 166; feminists 109; knowledge economy 152; organisations 16, 87–90; social movements 109 ‘global brain chain’ 73–74 Global Campaign for Education 144 Global Commission on Migration 66 globalisation 23–24, 59; concept 1; cultural 105; financial markets 169; focused on diasporas 68; opportunities for transstate actors 77; political and cultural 104; shifting balance under 63 globalised, financial markets and strategies for pension funds 169 globalist scholarship 24 GM, EWC 156, 160, 167–70; problems from US pension fund system 169–70 GM EWC, developed into real transnational societal space 169; meetings in English 167 GM EWC (1996), European Employees’ Forum 169 GME, cost- and staff-reduction programme, conflicts between management and workers (2004) 169; EWC 156; framework agreements 168; more decentralised than other European automobile companies

208

Index

167–68; normative and ideological aspects of workers’ solidarity 170 “government” 25 Granovetter, R. 25, 51 Greenpeace 16, 135, 143 “greenscamming” 83 Gresham’s law 97, 103n19 Guarnizo, Luis 33, 43, 69 Guatemala, slogan 121 Gupta, A. 25, 31 Haitian migrants 55; Christian, Daoist or Muslim identity 43 Halle/Saale (Sachsen-Anhalt, Germany) 41, 43, 48, 50–54, 60n2; born-again Christians 51; “City in Change, jobs in service 56; Eine Welt Haus and 57; EU investment in urban redevelopment 55; non-ethnic Christian pathways 52; prayer conference 48–49; weak positionality 57 Hancké, B. 157, 159 Hannerz, U. 2, 23–24 Harper Collins Dictionary of Sociology 8 Harvey, D. 28, 45, 59, 97 Hawalla financing 27, 33, 69 Hayden, M.C. 130, 144–45 Heaven’s Gift 49–51 Hindu religious membership 21 Hinn, Benny 51 Hoffmann, A. 158–59 Hong Kong, international schools 130 Human Rights Conference in Vienna (1993) 107, 117 ‘human security’ 67 humanitarian assistance, could undermine accountability of elites 83 humanitarian non-governmental organisations (NGOs) 80, 101 humanitarian organisations, strategy 91 hundi transactions 69–70 Hungary 168–69 Hunt, S. 44, 49 Hutu génocidaires (Interhamwe) 85 ‘hybrid organisations’ 151 ‘hybrid’ or transnational identity 131 ILO 105, 117 IMIS 96–97, 98–99 immigrant settlement and identity, analysis 40 immigrants, dual role of 68 incorporation, definition 47 India 71, 73, 115–16, 152

indicator-oriented research, degree of internationalization of companies 164, 172n14 Indonesian human rights organizations, transnational advocacy networks 35 industrial property right (IPRs) 76 Inkeles, A. 127–28 Inlingua-Schools 130 integrated management information system (IMIS) 96, 98 Interahamwe 85–86 internal migration 34–35 internalization 110–11 international, use of the term 133 ‘international Baccalaureate’ (IB) 130, 144–45 International Baccalaureate office (IBO) 134, 145 International Day of Action against Violence against Women (November 25) 121 international development institutions, unfettered markets 67 international development organisations 65 international education corporations, role of private 152 international interest organisations 18, 139 ‘International Master’s of Education in Teaching and Learning in International Schools’, ECIS 145 International Monetary Fund (IMF) 67, 128 international non-profit organisations 16, 165–66 international organisations, typifying models of 163–64 International Organization for Migration’s (IOM) 75 International Rescue Committee, DRC mortality rate 86 International Schools 140, 144, 150 International Schools Association (ISA) 144–45 international social movement organisations see SMOs international studies, types of 7 international women’s movements 106–7 international women’s networks 17, 107–8 Internet, global communication 152 invasive species 34 Iraq 29, 62

Index Ireland 168 ISA, pioneered IB curriculum development 145 ISIS 119–20, 124n11 Islam, global project with transnational networks 1, 44 Islamic fundamentalists 115–16 Italy, temporary work permits to Albania and Tunisia 79 Jacobson, Harold, NGOs as auxiliaries to intergovernmental organisations 81–82 Japanese policy, formation for gender equality 111 Jewish Diaspora 13 Jomtien education 144 Jones International University Ltd 17, 148 Jordan 51 Josua, pastor of Miracle Church 51 Kabila, Joseph 85–86 Kabila, Laurent, leader of AFDL 85 Kaldor, M 27, 86 Kampala 92, 95; Malteser’s Great Lakes regional office 92 Kay, T. 32, 34 Kearney, M. 4, 34 Keck, M.E. 16–17, 27, 34, 82, 166 Keohane, R.E. 30, 33, 82 Kerckhofs, P. 156, 158–59 Keynesian economic policies, demise of 45 Khagram, S., definitions of borders or boundaries 6, 32; trans-governmental networks works 27; transnationalism 2–3, 5, 13, 16, 34, 81–83 King, Martin Luther 33 Kivisto, P. 71, 77 Klebe, T. 159–60 Kloosterman, R. 41, 44 Knight, J. 128, 136, 153 Knowledge, coordination 162; exchange 72–73; private goods reflected in IPRs 76; society 73; storms of global economic competition 78; transfer 66, 73, 80; workers 74 Kohler-Koch, B. 160, 163 Koran schools, Islamic teaching and mosques in Europe 141 Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) 92 Kumon, Japan based franchise company 150

209

labour regulation and border-crossing organisation, EWCs and 155 LACWHN 17, 114, 119–21, 122 language, human social spaces and 11 Lanzendorf, U. 147, 149 Latin America 7, 67, 111, 116, 119 Latin American and Caribbean Women’s Health Network see LACWHN League of Nations 107 Lecher, W. 156, 158–59 Lenz, I. 17, 105, 107, 109–10 Levitt, P., borders or boundaries 6; incorporation 47–48; religious identities and networks 43; transnational dynamics 28–29; transnationalism 2–5, 13, 16, 81–83 Liberia, ‘care drain’ 74 Lie, J. 25, 38n11 Lightly, N. 44, 49 London 21, 47, 49 London Business School 146, 148 longevity, transnational organisations and 135 Los Angeles 47 Lufthansa School of Business 133–34, 146, 151 Luton car plant 168–69 McAdam, D. 31, 111–12 McArthur Foundation funding 117–18 McKinnsey organisation 10 Mai-Mai, active in RCD and FLC held territory 85–86 Malaysia 70 Malteser Bukavu 92–94, 96; changing to food security activities 97; strategy 94; structure 95 Malteser International 16–17, 101; IMIS 96; international background 92, 102n13; multinational type 97, 103n20; organisational handbook 96; structure 95; VAS (Victimes d’Agression Sexuelle) 93, 102n16; work in Sud Kivu 80–81, 93 Malteser WFP contractual agreements 97 Managing across Borders: The Transnational Solution 87 Manchester (New Hampshire, USA) 41, 60n2; Cultural Diversity Task Force newsletter 56; non-ethnic Christian pathways 52; Resurrection Crusade and prayer breakfasts 49, 61n10; service sector hospitals and

210

Index

charitable institutions 55, 57; seventh “Best Small City for Doing Business in America” 54; “spiritual warfare” by “prayer warriors” 50; “Strategy for the New Economy” 55; weak positionality 57 Manchester School, social field Marcus, G.E. 4, 9 market-driven Higher Education 129 marketisation, anti-étatist notion 67 Marquardt, M.F. 43–44 Martins, H. 42, 127 Matsushita 87 Mazur, A. 107–8 Mennonite mission 48, 51 ‘meso-level’ of transnational organisations 1 methodological ethnicity, problematic 42–43 methodological nationalism 28, 42, 126–27; cross-nation research 7–8 methodological transnationalism 3, 14, 22, 28–29 Mexico 32, 34–36, 133 migrant families 18 migrant incorporation 43, 46, 48 migrant remittances, bottom-up financial development 62, 65, 79n2 migrants, born-again networks in U.S. White House 51; conflict resolution South Africa or Nigeria 62; engage with home countries 28–29; ‘hardcurrency receivable’ used as ‘tradable security’ 69; individual and modes of incorporation 48; “new assimilation” 42; politics of scale 46; with tertiary education 78 migration, diversity 42; ethnic model 46–47; ‘oldest action against poverty’ 65; scholars 46; study of 14, 40–41 Migration for Development in Africa (MIDA) 75 migration scholars 46 Mill, John Stuart 9 Millennium Development Goals (MDG), UN and 66, 138 Mobutu (kleptocratic rule 1965–97) 84–85 modernisation theory of 1950s and 1960s 66 Moghadam, V. 105–6, 113, 115–18 MoneyGram 69 Morawska, E. 13, 31 Morey, A.I. 148; article on for-profit higher education 145

Morris Cerullo World Evangelism organization, Miracle healing and 51 “mother-citizens”, LACWHN and 121 “Mother’s mortality: choice for motherhood without risks” 120–21 Mueller, C. McClurg 104, 106 multinational organisations 16, 35, 39n24, 87–90 Nairobi 95 Namibia 85, 147 NASDAQ 149 nation-states 8, 24–25, 32, 38n6; conflated with societies 42, 110 national boundaries, transnational communities and 25, 38n13 national social fields 31–32 NEC 87 neo-liberal economics, effect of 82 neoliberal urban restructuring, migration and cities 45 Netherlands 74, 118, 168 network spread index 164, 172n13 Network on Violence against Women in Asia 17 networks, definition 113 networks of scientists and experts, ‘brain circulation’ 62 New York 47 newly industrialising countries, educational arrangements 153 NGOs 26, 68, 80–82, 86, 102n6, 122, 138; become more net-work-like 87; development 84; fund raising by transnational 151; humanitarian crises 83, 101; international 143; international humanitarian 16; management 87; Northern development 144; transnational non-governmental 135, 150; “voluntary organisations” 82, 102n1; women’s 107 Nicaraguan health campaign 121 Nigeria, DAWN secretariat 116 Nigerian Miracle Healing Church 48, 50–51, 61n9 non-ethnic forms of migrant incorporation 43, 59 non-formal education or ‘incidental education 132 ‘non-official’ higher education, TNE and 130 non-profit organisations, characteristics 166, 172n15; ECIS 145; strategy 91

Index non-Western scholars 37 nongovernmental organisations see NGOs north-western European social spaces, wedding ring and 11 Northern private donors, demanded more transparency 83 not-for-profit educational exports, not free of charge 147 not-for-profit organisations 137, 140 Nova Southeastern University 145 Nye, S. Joseph 30, 33, 82 ODI 97, 100 OECD 135, 166; ‘Guidelines for Quality Provision in Cross-border Higher Education’ 151–52 OECD countries, brain drain from developing countries to 72; competition for best brains 78; connected immigration with future of social provisions 77; legislation on international students 73–74; researchers and engineers who have originated in developing countries 74 off-shore institution 137 oil crises (1973) 81 ‘Olympia plan’ (2002) 169 Opel plant 169–70 organisation, definition 134–35 organisation sociology and transnationalisation, study of EWCs 170 organisations 13, 19, 154 outsourcing 146–47, 150 Overseas Development institute see ODI Oxfam 16, 135, 144, 153 Oxford University 148 Pakistan 51 Pakistanis in England 40 pan-ethnic African identity, Heaven’s Gift and 49 pan-Muslim religious membership 21 Parson, Talcott 42 Pentecostal movement, Germany, Europe and globally 48 People’s Republic of China see China Perlmutter, H, V. 161, 164 Peruvian women, LACWHN and 121 Philips 87 Philosophical transnationalism 22, 30–32 pluri-local, activities 118; coordination 17; coverage of education 141;

211

knowledge 122; presence 135; resources 121; societal spaces 104, 113; units of reference and 8 Poland 168–70 ‘political effectiveness’ of EWC 157 political institutions, migrants and 43 political remittances, transfer of 62 Porter, M.E. 161, 164 Portugal 168–70 Portuguese community in Hamburg 131 Poverty Reduction Strategy papers (PRSP) 66 “Power and Interdependence” 30 PPP 45, 136, 139, 153 prayer breakfasts 49–50 Pries, L., concepts of space 5, 10; EWC and 18, 160; migrant children and youth 131; Opel Rüsselsheim plant and 169; social science disciplines 162, 165; social spaces 132, 135; transnational organisations 113; transnational societal units 2; units of reference 104, 122; value creation chains 164 profit organisations, transnational 163–67 PSA (Peugeot-Citroën) 167 public policies, return migration and 77 public spaces, spheres guarded off as private 122 public transnationalism 23, 32–33 “public-private partnerships” see PPP Al Qaeda terrorist network 21, 35, 37n2, 109 Ramirez, F.O. 126–27 Rassemblement Congolais pour la Démocratie (RCD) 83, 85 Rath, J. 41, 44–45, 57 Red Caldas network, Colombian government (1990s) 75–76 Red Crescent 83 Red Cross 83 ‘regime shopping’ 169 religion, transnational incorporation and 43, 48 religious organisations, ‘borderless’ religious instruction 141 remittances 68–69, 135 remittances and investments, transstate groups and 63 Renault 167 replacement migration, welfare states and 78

212

Index

research programme, transnationalism approach 1–2 Resurrection Crusade 49–50 return migrants 10 Rio de Janeiro, conference (1992) 82, 107, 117; DAWN secretariat (1988) 116 Rizvi, F. 127–28 Robbins, K. 41, 43 Rosenau, J.N. 109, 166 Routledge Research in Transnational series 1, 20n2 Rupp, L. 106–7 Rüsselsheim/Germany, GM strategic functions and production site 167–69 Rwanda, NGOs present after 1994 genocide 83 Rwandan civil war, refugees entered eastern DRC 85 Rwandan genocide, Malteser and water and sanitation at Cimanga refugee camp 93, 93n15 Saab 169–70 Santiago 119–20 Sassen, S. 8, 28, 30, 45 scalar assessment, proximity to urban centres and 45 scalar position, neoliberal global capitalism and 44 scalar positioning of city, migration and 46 scale theory 44 Scharpf, F.W. 162, 166 Schiffauer, W. 44, 47 Schreiterer, U. 147–49 Schulten, T. 157, 159 Scott, James 25, 38n11 Second European Framework Agreement (March 2001) 168 Sen, G. 115, 117 Seville, 2002 European summit 79 Sikkink, K. 16–17, 27, 34, 82, 111, 166 Silicon Valley 29; Indians and 71 Silver, B. 24, 32, 34; Forces of Labor 29 Singapore 153 skilled persons, mobility of 73 Sklair, L. 26–27 Slatter, C. (DAWN Coordinator) 116–17 Slaughter, Ann Marie 32–33 small-scale cities 45–46, 52, 61n12 Smith, J. 11, 27, 33, 82, 104 SMOs 104–5, 110–13, 122 social capital 67, 72–73; studies of 165 social fields 31, 47–48

social movements, moral values and 27 social order, three principles 63–64 social sciences, definition of ‘units of analysis’ 5; transnationalisation of 36 social spaces 3, 11, 20n3, 132, 135; transmigrant 141 Social Summit in Copenhagen (1996) 107, 117, 144 social-scientific knowledge, EWC research and 171 societal spaces 3, 10–11, 13, 20n3, 104, 113; organisations and 13 ‘Societas Europae’170 “society” 8, 25 sociological transnational scholarship 34 sociology of organisations 19 sociology and transnationalisation research 171 Somalia 62 South Africa 34, 116, 147 South Africa or Nigeria, migrants and conflict resolution 62 South Asia 29; remittances through unofficial channels 69 South Korea 133, 153 Southern Africa, AIDS/HIV pandemic 74 Southern NGOs, less paternalism and more “direct funding” 83 Spain 35, 167–70 state, changing role in development policy thinking 78 state policy, “neoliberal agenda” 45 state-run universities, overseas programmes 146 states, structure transstate social spaces through transstate migration 76 Stetson, D. McBride 107–8 “strategic action fields” 31 Streeck, W. 112, 157, 163, 171 Sub-Saharan Africa, nurses and doctors in health systems of developed countries 74 Sudan 49 “superdiversity” 41 supra-nationalisation, influence on corporate governance of European GM consortium 170 Sweden 168–70 Switzerland 130, 167 Sydow, J. 113–14 Sylvan Learning Systems, Educate Inc. 17, 149–50, 153

Index Taiwan 71 Tamil Tigers Tarrow, S. 104, 110–11, 115 Teichler, U. 147, 149 Telljohann, V. 158–59 Terre des Hommes, educating children 143 tertiary education, diversity of 129 Theoretical transnationalism 14, 22, 29–30 third European agreement (October 2001) 168 Third World, projects for street-children 143 Third World countries, TNCs 133 Thompson, J.J. 130, 144–45 TNCs 26–27, 35, 133, 135 TNE 127, 128–32, 151, 153 ‘trade creep’, transnational education 136 transgovernmental networks 27, 32 transmigrant communities 130–32, 141, 151 transmigration family, distinguish from immigration/emigration case 10 transnational 23, 101, 133–34; advocacy networks (TANs) 35, 140, 143; attempt to bring back into scientific debate 83; capitalist class 26–27; certificate 129; civil society organizations 35; convergences 131; distinguished from “international” 82; dynamics 25–28, 335; economic processes 26; educational spaces 17, 126–27, 132–35; educational transmigrant organisations 140; infectious diseases 34; mobility 131; networks 49, 104, 106, 131; NGO advocacy networks 34; ontology 31– 32; phenomena 13, 21, 25–26, 35; process across time 34; public spaces 122; religious networks 49; scholarship 23–26, 27, 28–30; ‘social facts’ 1; social fields 36, 131; social movements (TANs) 143; social spaces 3, 10; terrorism 34–35, 39n 23; women’s networks 17, 108, 113, 121 ‘transnational citizenship’, definition 77 transnational corporations see TNCs ‘Transnational Corporations as Educational Institutions for National Development’ 133 transnational education see TNE transnational educational enterprises 137, 146; fully commercial 148–50; self-funding 146–48

213

transnational educational interest organisations 141 transnational educational organisations 18, 133, 134–41; for-profit and notfor-profit 136; ‘niches’ for profitable investment 150; not yet danger to national or international education 153; system 145–46; types of educational spaces 137–39 transnational families, influence on locally bound families 4 transnational family systems, remittances 135 transnational feminist networks 1, 105, 113, 122–23; epistemic groups 122, 125n13 transnational ideal type, comparison with Malteser International 98–99 transnational interest organisations, interests of third parties and 166 transnational invasive species 34 transnational management and its operational, further research 97 transnational migration 1, 3–4, 26; nineteenth century 35 transnational organisations 1, 3, 15–16, 19, 87–89; best practice of achieving business success 170; coordination 90; education of transmigrants 141–42; empirical research on 163; meso-level of 2; with own systems 144–46; political-scientific research on 166; social-scientific research on 165; type of international organisation 161 transnational societal units 3, 20n4; lack of insights into 4 transnational studies (TS) 9, 13–15, 18– 19, 22–23, 25–33, 38n9; more productive when more transnational itself 37; task of 34; towards research program 33–36; transnational societal units 3; units of measurement 8 transnational women’s movements, epistemic networks 105 transnationalisation, GM Europe’s space of operations 169 transnationalisation index 164, 172n12 transnationalisation research, different topic areas 165; social science disciplines 162 transnationalism 1, 18–19; challenges 2–5 transnationalisms, different kinds 35 transregional economic dynamics 34

214

Index

transstate analysis, ties that cross emigration and immigration states 65 transstate communities, national state and 62 transstate communities and associations 62–63, 79n1; development and 65; development problems and 66; role in cross-border processes and development 76 transstate migrants 62 transstate practices, gendered power structures and 70 transstate social spaces, concept of nation-state and 77 trasnationalisation perspective, social science organisational research and 160 typologies of ‘subsidiaries’ 165 Uganda and Rwanda, AFDL and 85 UK 74, 147. 168–70 umbrella organisations, Jomtien and Dakar 144 UN 105 UN Decade for Women (1976–85) 105– 7, 110, 122, 123n1; gender and 123; results of 108 UN Development Fund for Women 117 UN peace-keepers 27 UN peacekeeping force (United Nations Mission in Democratic Republic of Congo – MONUC) 85 UN Women’s Conference in Beijing (1995) 82, 107–8, 109–10, 124n4; WIDE and 118 UN Women’s Conference in Copenhagen (1980) 107 UN Women’s Conference in Mexico (1975) 106–7 UN Women’s Conference in Nairobi (1985) 107 UN World Conference on Women (1985), WIDE organised after 118 UN World Conferences on Women 108, 119–20, 123n3 UNDP 117; WIDE papers 118 unemployment, Halle 52–53 UNESCO 117, 128–29, 135, 139, 150, 152 UNESCO /Council of Europe, definition of TNE 137 UNFPA 117 UNHCR 92 Unifem 107, 117

Unilever 87 United Kingdom see UK United Nations see UN United States see US United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) 96 United Nations Development Program’s ‘Transfer of Knowledge through Expatriate Nationals’ 75 United World Colleges 144 units of analysis 2–7, 9, 18, 104 units of measurement 7, 9, 14; in transnational studies 8 units of reference 2, 7, 9, 14, 104, 122; educational spaces and 17; sociospatial 5; time-space related 8 University of Phoenix 17, 148–49 US 8, 14, 32, 34, 74, 147, 153; Mexican migrants 35–36, 40 US and Europe, religion and ethnicity 44 US Pentecostalism, Caribbean and Latin American migrants 44 US Prayer Center 50–51 US-Mexican market, remittances and larger corporations 69 Váaquez, M.A. 43–44 Vauxhall plant, proposed closure and labour conflict (2000 and 2001) 169 Vertovec, S. 13, 41 Vienna conference on human rights 82 Vietnamese migrants, Halle 54; Manchester 55 Voigt-Graf, C. 2–3 Volkswagen 167 Volkswagen Concern Works Council (E-VW-KBR) 160, 172n10 Waddington, J. 158–59 Waldinger, R. 27, 41 Wallerstein, I. 7, 9 ‘Washington Consensus’ 67, 82 Werbner, Pnina 43, 47 Western governments, unofficial channels closed after 11 September 2001 70, 109 Western powers, conflicts in non-OECD world 78 Western Union 69 WHO 105 Wichterich, C. 106, 108–9 WIDE 114, 118–19, 122 Wimmer, A. 5, 42, 127

Index Women in Development Europe see WIDE Women living under Muslim Law 108 women’s movements 105; challenges 116; legitimacy 106–7, 123n2 women’s political machineries (WPM) 107–8 ‘women’s/human rights approach’ after (1985) 106 ‘wordlist’ scholarship 24 Workplace Employee Relations Survey (WERS) 158, 172n5 World Bank 65, 128; call for greater participation in world market 67; efforts to ‘poorest of the poor (1973) 66–67; executives from Africa and 72 World Conference on International Education, ISA and 145 World Food programme (WFP) 96–97

215

World Global Forum 117 ‘world polity’ 127 World Population Conference in Cairo (1994) 107, 117, 119 World Systems 24 World Trade Center destruction 21 World Trade Organisation (WTO) 136 World War II, period after and import substitution industrialisation 66 ‘worldist’ scholarship, trans-border and trans-boundary phenomena 24 Zambia, ‘care drain’ 74 Zaragoza/Spain, GM production site 167–68 Zimbabwe, ‘care drain’ 74 Zürich/Switzerland, European headquarters of GM 167