Rephrasing Heidegger: A Companion to 'Being and Time' (Philosophica)

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REPHRASING HEIDEGGER

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REPULSING HEIDEGGER A Companion to Being and Time

RICHARO SEMBERA

THE UNIVERSITY OF OTTAWA PRESS OTTAWA

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Acknowledgements

ix

Introduction

xi

Chapter 1: The Origins of Phenomenology 1.1 The History of the Term "Phenomenology"

1

1.2 The "Crisis" of European Science

7

1.3 Husserl's Phenomenological Foundation

13

1.4 Heidegger's Hermeneutics of Facticity

20

1.5 The Vicissitudes of the Phenomenological Movement

28

Chapter 2: Hermeneutic Phenomenology as Fundamental Ontology 2.1 Understanding versus Perception

33

2.2 Why Ask the Question of Being? (§§ 1-4)

38

2.3 The Structure of the Book Being and Time (§§5,6,8)

45

2.4 Heidegger's Concept of Phenomenology (§ 7)

53

2.5 The Everyday World (§§ 9-27)

62

a) The Worldliness of the World

64

b) The One-self

76

2.6 The Indifferent Mode of Being-in (§§ 28-34): Sensibility, Understanding, and Talk

82

a) Sensibility

83

b) Understanding

85

c)Talk

91

2.7 The Inauthentic Mode of Being-in (§§ 35-38): Turmoil, Curiosity, and Crosstalk

100

a) Crosstalk

101

b) Curiosity

103

c) Ambiguity

105

d) Turmoil

106

e) Falling

107

2.8 Authentic Sensibility: Angst (§§ 39-40)

108

2.9 The Primeval Structure of Dasein as Concern (§§41-42)

117

2.10 Reality and Truth (§§ 43-44)

124

a) Concern, Truth, and Authenticity

125

b) Being, Entities, and Dasein\

132

Chapter 3: The Timing of Timeliness 3.1 The Problem of Completeness and Authenticity (§§45-46) 141 3.2 Authentic Understanding: Death (§§ 47-53)

147

3.3 Authentic Talk: The Call of Conscience (§§54-60)

163

3.4 The Structure of Authenticity as Decidedness (§§61-62)

178

3.5 Timeliness as the Sense of Concern (§§ 63-66)

188

a) The Future: Advent

192

b) The Past: Continuance

192

c) The Present: Encounter

193

d) The Ecstatic Structure of Timeliness

194

3.6 Timeliness and Its Modifications (§§ 67-71)

199

3.7 The Foundation of Historicity (§§ 72-77)

210

3.8 The Vulgar Concept of Time (§§ 78-83)

220

Appendices Appendix A: Glossary of Technical Terms

227

Appendix B: German-English Lexicon

259

Appendix C: Important Conceptual Divisions

263

Endnotes

269

Selective Bibliography

297

Index of Names

307


ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This book has helped me more than any other project I have undertaken to appreciate how little academic work is really a solitary undertaking. When a book carries the name of a sole author, we tend to view that one person as the origin of the book, as its single and unique efficient cause. In fact, writing a book is really a common project to which many people contribute. It is rather like a movie or a play: we tend to remember the most visible figures, the so-called stars, and to forget the many others without whom the work could not have been accomplished. It is, in a way, a Heideggerian point: the full drift of the work prefers to conceal itself in the background for the sake of the clear display of the foreground. Here at least I would like to invite some of the many who have helped me finish this project a moment to share the opening credits with me. I would first like to thank the Dominican University College as a whole for its financial support of the publication of this book. I would also like to thank my colleagues in the Department of Philosophy, particularly Gabor Csepregi, Maxime Allard, Jean-Frangois Methot, and Francis Peddle, for their friendship and assistance. I am also indebted to my doctoral thesis supervisor, Prof. Dr. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, for his formative influence upon my academic style. I have learned much from my students, especially the ones who took the seminar in which I developed the basic ideas for this book, ix

X

Rephrasing Heidegger

but in particular I feel that I have learned from working with Alan Gschwind, Christopher Kelly, Joseph Lo Mascolo, and Christian Wojcikiewicz. I am very grateful to Mr. Eric Nelson of the University of Ottawa Press for his unfailing support of my book. Most of all, however, I am indebted to my wife, Bharathi Sriraman, who believed in and offered encouragement for this project in its incipient stages, long before anyone else did.

INTRODUCTION

[...] Heidegger's philosophical significance will have to rest on his publications. There is no way of getting around these. Few, if any, second-hand accounts can pave the way to them. Almost all of those now available in English are marred by the mere fact that they are found in the misleading context of accounts of existentialism, which Heidegger repudiates. Most of them fail to realize the development in Heidegger's thinking. And they are even less adequate as introductions to the phenomenological aspects of Heidegger's work. Thus the challenging problem of providing a real introduction to Heidegger's thinking remains unsolved to this hour. In stating this I do not mean to imply that it can be solved, especially at this stage when important evidence is still missing. Yet the attempt ought to be made, if only for the sake of better relations between the main philosophical currents of our time. (Herbert Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement. A Historical Introduction. Second edition. Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague/ Boston/London, 1978; p. 274.)

The aim of this book is to present the main ideas of Being and Time, Heidegger's most important philosophical work, in a clear and accessible manner. In so doing, the book also strives to correct certain fundamental misconceptions of Heidegger's thought, including the mischaracterization of Heidegger as an "existentialist." xi

xii


No one could plausibly deny that Being and Time is a dense and difficult philosophical treatise. Its stylistic flaws, even in the original German, are too obvious to excuse. Nevertheless it is equally undeniable that Being and Time is an original, systematic, and epoch-making philosophical work. Without a doubt it was one of the most influential books of the 20th century, and its influence on contemporary thought is continuing and pervasive. I think it is fair to say that on the whole Heidegger's own stylistic excesses, as well as those of his imitators and, I fear, his detractors, have tended to produce a nimbus of unintelligibility surrounding what Heidegger actually believed and thought. The present exposition is devoted to making the conceptual underpinnings of Being and Time transparent in order that its philosophical significance may be better understood. The title of this book, Rephrasing Heidegger, was chosen in order to emphasize this point. While a certain amount of technical terminology is indispensable to any intellectual work, there are ways of minimizing the burden placed upon the reader's goodwill. For the sake of intellectual honesty, I have made concessions that Heidegger himself—it must be emphasized—was not prepared to make. An author, like an educator, has an ethical obligation to the audience to be clear and comprehensible. Whether Heidegger's rejection of this obligation can be philosophically justified is a question that I myself have answered in the negative. Often it seems as though biography and exposition are confused in outlines of Heidegger's thought. The impression is sometimes produced that political criticism of Heidegger, as justified as it may be, ebbs over into ad hominem arguments against his philosophy. For this reason, there will be a firm emphasis throughout the whole of the present book on Being and Time as a work of philosophy. Other writers have addressed the question of Heidegger's rather less than laudable political activities at length, and I see no reason to belabour the point here. The present book concentrates on Heidegger's philosophy as it is expressed in Being and Time, and it is left to the reader to form an opinion concerning the connection, if any, between Heidegger's philosophical beliefs and his political beliefs.

Introduction

xiii

Rephrasing Heidegger is addressed primarily to students, both graduate and undergraduate, encountering Heidegger for the first time, as well as to anyone who is in need of a solid acquaintance with Heidegger's philosophical thought. It is also hoped that the book will be useful as a textbook or companion to seminars on Heidegger, since it was written to fulfill that function for my own seminars. I was first able to employ and develop the material in this book during my undergraduate seminar on Readings in Contemporary Philosophy at the Dominican University College in Ottawa. During this seminar, which employed the English translation of Being and Time by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, I had an opportunity to study the peculiar difficulties which English translations of key terms from Being and Time pose for beginners. After reflecting on the matter, I decided that a thorough re-translation of much of Heidegger's technical vocabulary was necessary. The result, I hope, is a controlled, strict, and transparent English philosophical vocabulary that is both relatively easy to learn and reasonably faithful to Heidegger's original vocabulary. There is a certain precedent for this undertaking in Heidegger scholarship; I have found that many writers on Heidegger substitute their own translations for certain key terms where they find the current translations inexact or clumsy. My enterprise differs from theirs only with respect to its scope. It should also be said that I do not necessarily think my translations to be the last word on the problem of translating Heidegger into English. Ease of use and faithfulness to the German original have been my primary concerns when translating Heidegger's key terms into English. Heidegger scholarship is still, relatively speaking, in its infancy, and as the various facets of Heidegger's thought are more clearly grasped there will be a growing need to revise earlier translations in the light of this deeper understanding. In addition to the criticisms of Heidegger scholarship mentioned by Spiegelberg in the passages I have cited at the beginning of this introduction—criticisms which, broadly

xiv


speaking, are still valid as of the date of this writing—there are other reasons why a book of the present sort is an important contribution to contemporary Heidegger scholarship. The first translation of Being and Time by Macquarrie and Robinson, published in 1962, is still the most frequently used, and it is still through this volume that most readers make their initial contact with Heidegger's philosophy. Though an excellent translation for its time, the text also reflects an earlier level of scholarship, and it has, from the point of view of the scholar and educator, two main defects. Firstly, without a detailed line-by-line paraphrase and explanation of the translation, I have found that students are generally unable to make any headway at all reading the book on their own. Secondly, even after having just refreshed one's memory with the original German text, I have found that it is extremely difficult to recognize the corresponding passages in the English translation. One often has to resort to counting the indented paragraphs in order to orient oneself in the translation at all. I think that at this point one can charitably and accurately say that the Macquarrie-Robinson translation is a valiant but fundamentally flawed attempt to render Heidegger into intelligible English. The 1996 translation by Joan Stambaugh does go a long way towards eliminating these difficulties, at least to the extent permitted by such a dense and elaborate original as Being and Time. Nevertheless, I believe that it is possible to streamline the translation of Heidegger's technical terms to a still greater extent. Since I can expect virtually all of my readers to be acquainted with Macquarrie and Robinson's translation, my technical discussions tend to focus primarily upon their work. While I would have liked to discuss Stambaugh's translations at length, any more extensive discussion would have led to immoderately large appendices and so reduced, rather than increased, their usefulness to the reader. In any event, I have significantly more praise than criticism of Stambaugh's work. The German, French, and Anglo-American Heidegger scholarship seem to have developed more or less independently

Introduction

XV

even during Heidegger's own lifetime. One reason for this is, no doubt, the wildly divergent renditions of Heidegger's terminology into other languages. Another important factor in this development was the political climate of the time, which played a decisive role in the reception of Heidegger's philosophy. Although to a great extent the responsibility for his unfavourable reputation rests squarely with Heidegger, the debris of 20th century politics also played a certain role in the Anglo-American attitude to German and French thought. The excesses of early Heidegger scholarship, both pro and contra, are too well known to require explicit mention. Against this background, an attempt to present Heidegger's thought in a simple, unambiguous, and unprejudiced manner clearly faces an uphill battle. There is, I think, a clear need not only for a beginners' guide to Heidegger but also for a volume that presents an accessible yet nuanced summary of the truly essential features of his core philosophical position in Being and Time. Such a guide would also be of use to those who are not beginners, but who are seeking a solid orientation in their journey along the many valleys and peaks in the landscape of Heideggerian thinking. The present work is an attempt to meet these requirements. It aspires to be a comprehensive presentation of Heidegger's philosophy that is still an accurate reflection of the original. It is my personal conviction that this is how Heidegger himself would have preferred to be read and understood. In this book I have adopted a number of approaches towards simplifying and summarizing the original source material. In the course of my expositions, I will develop and maintain a small and strictly controlled technical vocabulary. I will introduce translations of key Heideggerian terms as they become necessary and only when necessary. When a new term is introduced, I will always provide the reader with a clear definition of the term in question. I will not hesitate to translate technical terms differently than the current consensus among Heidegger scholars indicates, should I feel this to be necessary. Finally, I will both simplify the original vocabulary Heidegger uses and restate his ideas in

xvi


plain English, though with qualifying remarks where they are appropriate. I have also not hesitated to depart from the order in which Heidegger himself introduces particular concepts or analyses when it seems to best serve the reader's purpose. Many of Heidegger's works show clear signs of having been written in haste and without adequate revision. This is particularly true of Being and Time, which was probably written with a clear conception of its structure and purpose but without a definite notion of what was to be said in individual sections. This results in a particularly annoying voyage for the reader: one frequently discovers indispensable information, absolutely essential to the understanding of earlier sections, remarked in passing in later sections. In my own revision of the material I will remedy such defects by discussing all relevant information in one place. One example of this approach will be in Section 2.4, "Heidegger's Concept of Phenomenology," where I pull together Heidegger's scattered remarks on methodology from §§ 7, 18, 32, 44, and 63 of Being and Time. All of this material is vitally important to understanding what phenomenology means for Heidegger, and it is fair to say that when it is not read together no adequate comprehension of Heidegger's phenomenology is possible. I will argue, based on this material, that the frequently encountered characterization of Heidegger's phenomenology as a purely descriptive method is incorrect. Heidegger's approach is a hermeneutic phenomenology, that is, a phenomenology that does seek an adequate description but as a basis for further interpretation, as these passages make clear. Another significant example of the necessity to restructure Heidegger's manner of presentation can be found in Section 2.1, "Understanding versus Perception," where I introduce the basic concepts of Heidegger's analysis of the world with no Heideggerian terminology. It is a peculiar feature of Being and Time that the initial sections of the book presuppose an acquaintance with the results of Heidegger's analysis of the "worldliness," or underlying structure, of the world. Without

Introduction

xvii

an understanding of this analysis the initial sections of Being and Time are incomprehensible. Most beginning readers are so frustrated by the initial sections that the later sections containing the world analysis will either never be read or not be understood even if they are. I will circumvent this difficulty by presenting a streamlined account of Heidegger's model in Section 2.1 and by translating it back into the controlled technical Heideggerian vocabulary I develop in the course of the later sections of the work. Test-runs with students have shown this to be an essential and, thus far, invariably successful approach to introducing newcomers to Being and Time. Chapter 1, entitled "The Origins of Phenomenology/7 begins with the history of the term " phenomenology" and goes on to identify the historical influences leading to the creation of a phenomenological approach to philosophy by Edmund Husserl. Those with no acquaintance with phenomenological method should study this section in particular. I will discuss how the collapse of the 19th century scientific and philosophical world view was the "crisis" to which the two main streams of 20th century philosophy, phenomenology and Analytic philosophy, are a direct response. The reasons why Husserl thought a descriptive approach could resolve the "crisis of European science," as he was to call it, will be clarified. In short, Husserl believes that the problems facing the logic, mathematics, and physics of his day are due to an insufficient grasp of the acts of consciousness through which we experience the concrete facts of our world. Section 1.4 focusses on Heidegger's attempt to modify Husserl's phenomenological method by melding it with what was then popularly called "life philosophy" or Lebensphilosophie. It is precisely the attempt to phenomenologically identify the experiential basis of human activity that permits Heidegger to combine influences from Kant, Nietzsche, Hegel, Kierkegaard, Dilthey, Bergson, Scheler, Jaspers, and hermeneutics. Despite his concern with the main themes of Lebensphilosophie, there is a subtle but essential nuance giving Heidegger's theoretical approach a greater affinity with the later Wittgenstein and Gilbert Ryle

xviii


than with the "existentialism" of Jean-Paul Sartre. Although this topic cannot be discussed at length within the framework of the present book, I have given numerous indications as to how this connection can be made. Chapter 2 contains the detailed discussion of Being and Time up to and including §44. In addition to a simplified introductory presentation of Heidegger's interpretation of the world-phenomenon, I will discuss Heidegger's concept of phenomenological methodology as presented in Being and Time, what the question of Being is and why Heidegger thinks it is important, and the structure of Being and Time, which, in its present form, is in fact only the first part of the complete book Heidegger originally intended to write. New readers are advised to concentrate on Sections 2.1 to 2.6, and 2.10. These sections give a general overview of the essential theoretical perspective of Being and Time without entering into questions of detail. A good knowledge of these sections is necessary for an adequate comprehension of Chapter 3, which addresses Heidegger's more difficult conception of time. Further sections address Heidegger's analysis of the everyday world and our relation to it, the characteristic structural features of human beings or "Dasein," the fundamental structures of sensibility, understanding, and talk, and the authentic and inauthentic modes of these structures. Of particular interest are Heidegger's interpretation of the primeval structure of Dasein as "concern," his conceptions of reality and truth, and his interpretation of the sensibility of angst. Chapter 3 discusses the remaining sections of Being and Time. Here it is shown that for Heidegger angst, death, and the conscience, as authentic modes of Dasein's relation to the world, characterize Dasein's authenticity as decidedness. Finally, Heidegger's interpretation of the structure of concern as timeliness, or the primeval temporal state of Dasein, is explained with reference to the concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity, historicity, and the everyday concept of time. These sections contain more difficult material and more detailed analyses, and the reader is advised to ensure that the material in Chapter 2 has been adequately understood before going on. Here I address

Introduction

xix

issues that are often simplified or blurred in other presentations, and my aim is to present the full detail of Heidegger's original text without overburdening the reader. In this chapter I have generally chosen depth over simplicity of presentation precisely because this is not usually done. For those who wish to inquire further into the original German terms used by Heidegger as well as for those who will be using the present book to work with existing Heidegger translations and Heidegger scholarship, Appendix A contains a glossary of technical terms with an explanation of their meaning, the original German, and a commentary on problems facing the translator. Appendix B is a German-English lexicon in which Heidegger's original German terms are cross-referenced with my translations, Macquarrie and Robinson's, and Stambaugh's. For the convenience of the reader, Appendix C contains a number of tables clarifying the relations between important concepts in Being and Time. Since this book is intended primarily as a beginners' manual, I have generally tried to avoid long footnotes and burdensome discussions of the secondary literature. Following the appendices, however, a selective bibliography lists reference works in the case of which an exception to this rule seemed advisable along with other primary and secondary literature. It also lists some available English translations of German primary sources. Throughout this work I cite German primary sources by their original German titles when quoting directly from them. All translations from the German are my own. For this attempt at a simplified presentation of an essentially complex body of thought, my model has been Anthony Kenny's peerless book Wittgenstein, and it is my hope to be of as much service to the non-specialist as Kenny has been. I have also been inspired by Nicholas Rescher's Leibniz, a masterpiece of philosophical exposition and condensation. Gilbert Ryle has been my stylistic model of lively and clear philosophical English, though I am all too conscious of the difficulty of living up to such a lofty ideal.

xx


The purpose of this work will have been achieved if it contributes meaningfully towards the elimination of much of the unnecessary confusion and frustration a first contact with Heidegger normally involves. In the case of more advanced scholars I also have the secondary ambition of awakening a new appreciation of Heidegger as a truly systematic thinker. The main philosophical currents of our time being what they are, that this book might contribute towards establishing better relations between them is probably too much to hope for.

CHAPTER 1

THE ORIGINS OF PHENOMENOLOGY

1.1 THE HISTORY OF THE TERM "PHENOMENOLOGY" The term "phenomenology7' is a compound word formed from the Greek roots phainomenon and logos. Phainomenon is frequently translated as "appearance," while the meaning of logos varies depending on the context; typical English renderings are "word/7 "argument," or "reason." We will discuss the Greek etymology in more detail in Section 2.4. For our present purposes, we can define "phenomenology" as "giving an account of appearances." The word "phenomenology" does not belong to the vocabulary of classical Greek. To the best of our knowledge it is a neologism entering common usage in 18th century Germany. It first appears in print in the mystical and philosophical literature of the day.1 The manner in which the term is introduced suggests that readers were expected to be already familiar with its meaning, so that we may conclude that "phenomenology" was already in current use by the middle of the 18th century at the very latest. Heidegger himself2 believed that the term originated among the followers of Christian Wolff (1679-1754), an early systematizer of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and the first important German philosopher to write extensively in German rather than Latin or French.3 1

2


One of the earliest and best known philosophical works to characterize itself as "phenomenological" is the Phenomenology of Spirit by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770-1831). Here the term " phenomenology" is intended to distinguish Hegel's own "science of the experience of consciousness" from the transcendental idealism of Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). Although Hegel may or may not have been an inspiration behind Husserl's appropriation of the term "phenomenology" as a label for his own philosophical enterprise,4 it is important to keep in mind that Hegel's version of phenomenology differs markedly from Husserl's in many important respects, as we shall soon see. We will begin with a brief outline of Kant's position on the limitations of human knowledge in order to explain why Hegel felt that a "phenomenology," or an account of appearances, was an appropriate methodological response to Kant. This outline will provide the historical background for the discussion of Husserl's phenomenology in the following two sections. The philosophy presented in Kant's main work, the Critique of Pure Reason, is in essence an early form of what is now termed the philosophy of science. Kant's main concern is to defend the Newtonian science of his day against the skeptical criticism levelled against it by David Hume (1711-1776), who denied that completely certain and reliable judgements concerning matters of experience were possible. In opposition to Hume, Kant maintained that the mathematics, geometry, and theoretical physics of his day were absolutely true, demonstratively certain, and completely informative concerning matters of experience. These disciplines, according to Kant, are able to arrive at necessary truths about our world despite the fact that they are based on reason alone and not on experience or experiment. If, for example, I consider the statement that 7 + 5 = 12, its truth is immediately obvious. Known through reason alone, this mathematical truth is also true of the world of experience. It is true of any seven and any five objects in the world regardless of their nature. It is not necessary to actually consult experience to verify the truth of 7 + 5 = 12; in fact, the attempt to verify its truth by experimental means, such as repeatedly adding seven

The Origins of Phenomenology

3

objects to five objects and then counting the resultant number of objects, is pointless and redundant. This is because we have an immediate intellectual apprehension [Anschauung] of the truth of such rational or a priori judgements, which obviates the need for any experimental or a posteriori verification. How are such a priori judgements possible? We might be inclined to believe with the Hume of the Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding that the judgement 7 + 5 = 12 simply expresses the same concept in two different ways. On this account, such a judgement is tautological because it says the same thing twice: 7 + 5 simply is 12, but stated differently. Thus 7 + 5 = 12 is true because 12 belongs to the definition of 7 + 5, just as the statement "a bachelor is an unmarried man" is true because the predicates "unmarried" and "man" belong to the definition of a bachelor. Kant calls such judgements analytic because they represent an analysis, so to speak, of the subject term. Kant, however, denies that 7 + 5 = 12 is in fact an analytic a priori judgement. On Kant's interpretation, the concept 7 + 5 contains nothing beyond the notion that 7 and 5 are to be added together. 7 + 5 is merely an instruction to perform the operation of addition on 7 and 5. This, Kant states, is categorically different from the concept 12, which specifies a given number of objects. While it is true that 7 + 5 also refers to a number of objects, it says nothing as such about the specific number to which it refers, and much less that this number happens to be the number 12. Rather than resembling the statement "a bachelor is an unmarried man," 7 + 5 = 12, on Kant's account, is much closer to a statement like "bachelors are carefree and jovial" (with the difference that the former is always true without exception whereas the latter is not). In the case of such statements essentially new predicates are added to the predicates already specified by the definition of the subject term. Accordingly, Kant calls such statements synthetic because they undertake a synthesis or conjunction of several initially unrelated terms. The central problem of the Critique of Pure Reason is: "how are synthetic a priori judgements possible?" In plain English

4


this problem can be restated as: "how is it possible to make true and informative statements about the world using reason alone, independently of experience?" Kant's answer is that reason, or the faculty of intellectual apprehension, is like a mould into which the stream of experience is poured. Reason imposes its own structure on the world just as a stamp imposes its own form on soft wax. Our actual experience of the world is thus a hybrid product with two sources, one source being the matter of the experience, provided by the objects which stimulate our senses, and the other source being the form of all possible experience, the framework within which alone experience is possible. Reason is able to provide us with true and certain knowledge concerning matters of experience because reason itself imposes a rational order upon experience. Our minds reshape the world in the image of their own rational structure. Because of this spontaneous imposition of form upon the confused matter of the information we perceive through our senses, events in the world are experienced as happening in conformity with rational principles. Why, then, is 7 + 5 = 12 true? Why is it true that any seven objects added to any five objects will result in twelve objects? Because our minds contain a fundamental mathematical structure which they impose upon our experience of the world, rather like a navigator who imposes latitudes and longitudes upon the globe and then finds that any point on the surface can be specified in terms of these parameters. Although in both cases the structure in question is a superimposition upon the world, in the case of the navigator a deliberate and conscious decision is taken to make use of latitudes and longitudes, whereas in the case of our minds and their acts of perception, the structure of reason is superimposed automatically and unconsciously, or as Kant puts it, "spontaneously/7 For Kant, geometry is founded in the pure intellectual apprehension of the rules of space. Similarly, mathematics is founded in the pure intellectual apprehension of the rules of time, because Kant conceives of numbers as the results of sequences


5

(5 is "1 and then 2 and then 3 and then 4 and then 5").5 The truths of geometry and mathematics are true of the world because our minds spontaneously superimpose the structure of space and time on our experience of the world. In short, space and time are conceptual overlays through which we interact with a world which is inherently not spatial or temporal, just as, returning to the example of the navigator, the globe is inherently not marked off into latitudes and longitudes. In order to account for other concepts such as cause and effect, Kant proceeds to argue for the existence of further such intellectual overlays which he terms "categories." The further details of this argument do not concern us here. The important point is that in all cases Kant draws a distinction between the object of experience as such and the object of experience insofar as we experience it through a conceptual overlay. The difference between "the object as we experience it" and "the object as such" is reflected in Kant's distinction between phenomena and noumena.6 "Phenomena" or "appearances" are things as we are able to experience them. Phenomena are experienced by us within a spatio-temporal framework which, on Kant's account, is overlaid upon them by our own minds. Thus the laws of space and time, and correlatively the truths of geometry and of mathematics, are indeed universally and necessarily valid when speaking of phenomena, just as any point on the earth's surface can be specified by a particular latitude and longitude. However, this universal validity does not extend beyond the boundaries of human experience. Such laws hold true for phenomena and only for phenomena, only for objects as we experience them. "Noumena," a Greek word literally meaning "thought things" but used by Kant in the sense of "theoretically postulated entities" [Verstandeswesen] is Kant's term for "things in themselves," or things as they exist outside of our experience of them. As human beings, we have no other access to objects than through our own human experience. According to Kant, since we do have experiences of objects at all, it is reasonable to assume that they do in fact exist independently of our experiences of them.

6


However, we can never say more of them than this; and even the assumption that they do exist independently of us can never be more than a theoretical assumption because our limited human faculties can never transcend the sphere of possible experience. Similarly, the navigator cannot use latitude and longitude to specify points which are not found on the surface of the earth. Accordingly, the world view that emerges from Kant's transcendental idealism is split into two distinct realms: a realm of phenomena, or the sphere of experience; and an utterly unknowable realm of noumena, which in some mysterious fashion—assuming that it even exists—underlies and maintains the existence of the realm of phenomena. Kant's aim, as he states in the preface to the second edition of the Critique, was to abolish knowledge in order to make room for faith; but it is hardly surprising that not every philosopher wished to follow him in this. On a purely theoretical level it is hardly satisfying that Kant, on the one hand, wishes to prevent any speculation that transcends the limits of human experience, and yet on the other hand postulates the existence of a realm of noumena whose defining feature is that it does transcend the limits of experience. The early post-Kantian philosophers Johann Gottlieb Fichte (1762-1814) and Friedrich Wilhelm Josef Schelling (1775-1854) were unanimous in their conviction that this was the weakest point in Kant's system. They dealt with this theoretical problem by evolving alternative Kantian systems in which there was no need to postulate the existence of a "thing in itself" beyond the boundaries of human experience. For these philosophers, the founders of the philosophical movement now generally referred to as German Idealism,7 there simply was nothing beyond human experience. The world simply was the sum total of phenomena as they were encountered within the entire vista of human experience. We thus see that the immediate reaction of post-Kantian philosophy to the theoretical difficulties of the Kantian scheme consisted in a rejection of the realm of noumena or "things in themselves." This amounts to an identification of reality with phenomena or the spontaneous products of mental activity.


7

The reduction of reality to phenomena undertaken by Fichte and Schelling does not amount to a claim that all reality is an illusion. Rather, it amounts to a claim that in some non-trivial sense reality is a product of mental activity, or of an activity which is mind-like in nature. The mind, in other words, imposes a form upon its own constituent" stuff/' not upon an unknowable noumenon foreign to itself. The phenomena of everyday life, though ultimately mental in nature, are not chaotic images, not disordered dreams or hallucinations. They are appearances with a regular structural pattern that observably follow certain well-defined laws. In modern terminology, we would call such appearances processes.3 Kant's mistake, according to the post-Kantians, was to believe that phenomena required an existential anchor in an unknown and unknowable world of noumena. For post-Kantian philosophy, however, and for Hegel in particular, phenomena require no support outside of their own structural constitution. The attempt to grasp and articulate this structural constitution within a comprehensive system of philosophy is what Hegel terms phenomenology, or the science of the experience of consciousness. It is an attempt to give an all-embracing account of the mindlike laws that determine the essentially mind-like structure of phenomena. These laws, pertaining as they do to activity that is fundamentally mental or mind-like, are the principles of logic in the Hegelian sense. In the dual forms of phenomenology and logic, which Hegel eventually combined and further developed in his Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences, for much of the 19th century the phenomenon-oriented approach of Hegel's absolute idealism became the dominant philosophical current in Germany and a large part of the English-speaking world.9 1.2 THE "CRISIS" OF EUROPEAN SCIENCE By the beginning of the 20th century the influence of Hegelianism in Germany had waned significantly, and many dominant forms

8


of philosophy in Germany were variants of Neo-Kantianism. The renewed interest in Kant's attempt to secure a theoretical foundation for the sciences of his day was triggered by what Husserl was later to call a "crisis of European science." The most obvious crisis and its resolution, namely the collapse of the Newtonian world view and its replacement with the physical theories developed from the work of Einstein, is a matter of common knowledge, in outline at least. However, the "crisis" to which Husserl refers occurred on a much broader front than that of the physical sciences. For the purpose of a brief introduction to phenomenology and the problems with which it was originally created to deal, it is sufficient to concentrate on the effects of this general crisis in a few main areas: geometry, mathematics, logic, and of course philosophy. For several decades, it had been a common view among philosophers of science that Kant had secured a theoretically adequate—indeed, in Kant's own estimation, absolutely certain—justification of Newtonian science and the traditional mathematics and geometry on which it was based. As later history has shown, however, the Newtonian scheme does not actually fit the observable facts about our universe. The practical application of a modern relativistic model, which fits the observable facts rather better, demands the use of non-traditional forms of physics, geometry, and mathematics. Unfortunately for Kant, whose philosophy apparently demonstrates that Newtonian physics, Euclidean geometry, Aristotelian logic, and traditional mathematics are absolutely certain and incapable of improvement, the obvious implication is that Kant's theory is wrong in at least some important respects. The weaknesses in Kant's basic assumptions begin to come to light with theoretical developments in geometry and mathematics. Kant, as we pointed out, had assumed that traditional Euclidean geometry was the sole possible geometry and therefore the only true geometry. Towards the end of the 19th century it was discovered that alternate forms of geometry were possible, the so-called non-Euclidean or curved geometries,


9

which describe curved surfaces rather than rectilinear Euclidean planes. It is possible to formalize such geometries in such a manner that no serious problem due to lack of internal selfconsistency arises. Accordingly, we are faced with the problem of determining which of the many possible geometries is in fact the true system of geometry. Since the various geometries are internally coherent, it seems that we are forced to rely on external criteria in order to decide which geometry best fits the facts about our world. When we do so, however, yet another problem emerges. Euclidean geometry in fact provides a much closer description of space at the level of medium sized objects such as rabbits, people, and tables than any non-Euclidean geometry, while non-Euclidean geometry is a much better model of space at the level of large sized objects such as comets, planets, and galaxies. It would, in other words, be as absurd to expect an astronomer to rely on Euclid as it would be to force a carpenter to build a table according to Lobachevsky. The apparent necessity for there to be one authoritative system of geometry has disappeared. The concept of "local" geometries, specific systems applicable to specific tasks or situations, replaces that of "global" geometries, or universally valid descriptive systems.10 In mathematics the situation is similar. On the one hand, Kant was able to preserve the absolutely certain character of mathematics — an ideal which was to be the chief inspiration of the founders of all important streams of 20th century philosophy— but at the cost of reducing mathematics to a quirk (though an objective and universally valid quirk) of the structure of the human mind. In Kant's system, mathematics is true primarily of the human mind, and true of the empirical world only in a secondary, derivative sense. As we have seen, it was precisely this feature of Kant's system that allowed Hegel to formulate a "logic," or system of ontological categories, that was wholly based on a theory of the behaviour of mental and mind-like processes. In Hegel, however, these processes are still considered to be "objective" in the sense that they are independent of

10


specifically human minds, being existentially anchored in the omnipresent thought of a universal mind, which Hegel terms Geist or "spirit." Under the influence of John Stuart Mill (1806-1873) and the newly-developing experimental psychology, and in some variant approaches in alliance with Hegel,11 a movement began whose ambition was to create a theoretical foundation for mathematics in the psychological laws of specifically human thought. For the mathematicians of the time, however, such an attempt had the effect of compromising the clarity and certainty that, in their opinion, characterized their subject in contrast to all others. In this theoretical approach, mathematics becomes a quirk of the human mind; but now it is a purely psychological and thus purely subjective quirk in contradistinction to the purely objective quirk described in the Kantian system. Along with the perceived need to defend the formal validity of mathematics against the conceptual assault of psychologism,12 traditionally puzzling features of mathematics, such as the existence of irrational numbers and the nature of number itself, began to be taken more seriously and to cause a certain disquiet among philosophers of mathematics. How could mathematics claim to be a perfectly certain and perfectly transparent conceptual system if, on the one hand, a serious attempt to reduce it to psychological thought was even possible? Was not the proliferation of psychologism ultimately based on an omission of mathematicians themselves, namely their failure to secure an absolutely certain theoretical basis for mathematics? How could the traditional dignity of mathematics be maintained if traditionally puzzling features of mathematics had still not been dealt with, indeed had simply been let lie for centuries? Surely this must mean that the theoretical foundations of mathematics had in fact never at any point in its own history attained the desired level of clarity and transparency? History shows us that the two main streams of 20th century philosophy, Anglo-American or Analytic philosophy so-called and Continental philosophy so-called, trace their origins back


11

to the manner in which two German philosophers, Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) and Edmund Husserl, dealt with this crisis in European science.13 Frege's approach to the problem is simple to understand even if its concrete execution is not. Logic is the foundation of truth. It is the very science of truth itself. If, then, we are puzzled by the features of mathematics, the solution is straightforward: we reduce mathematics to a form of logic. In Kantian terms: we prove that every proposition of mathematics ultimately has an analytic a priori form, that is, is true by definition. This has the advantage of making the conceptual foundations of mathematics absolutely transparent. Nor is an existential anchoring of the truth of mathematics in subjectivity, whether human or superhuman, required in this case. Should we succeed in this undertaking and bring the programme of logicismu to a successful conclusion, mathematics becomes a branch of the one absolute canon of truth, namely logic. As promising and as auspicious as this ambition seems, it turned out in the course of time that Frege, and along with him the entire logicist movement, was to be deeply unsettled and bitterly disappointed. The further details of this intriguing story are not, however, relevant for our present purposes.15 The mathematician Edmund Husserl (1859-1938) began his philosophical career under the influence of Franz Brentano (1838-1917). For Brentano, the ultimate theoretical foundations of all formal disciplines, of mathematics as well as philosophy, were to be sought in the principles of psychology. In order for a theoretical justification of a particular discipline to be adequately effected, however, a fundamental discipline was required; the aim of this fundamental discipline was to provide the theoretical basis for the reduction of any and every discipline to its own individual theoretical foundation. Accordingly, Brentano's aim was to develop just such a "universal science/' For Brentano, this universal science took the form of a "descriptive" or "phenomenological"16 psychology whose aim it was to restrict itself exclusively to empirically accessible "phenomena" and

12


to adequately describe these "phenomena." As a proponent of psychologism, Brentano thought it clear that the soughtafter phenomena were ultimately structural features of consciousness. Under Brentano's influence, Husserl began as a supporter of psychologism. His first book, the Philosophic der Arithmetik (1891), undertakes a psychologistic derivation of the main concepts of arithmetic. Husserl's flirtation with psychologism quickly ended in disillusionment; by the time he published his groundbreaking Logische Untersuchungen (1900/01), Husserl had become a vitriolic opponent of psychologism and its intellectual ideals. So complete and so thorough was this conversion, and so influential was its theoretical justification in the first volume of the Logische Untersuchungen, that scholars are generally agreed that this groundbreaking work dealt psychologism the death blow in Germany. What caused such a dramatic change in Husserl's estimation of the theoretical status of mathematics? It seems that Husserl was an admirer of and greatly influenced by Frege's early work, in particular the small book Die Grundlagen der Arithmetik (1884). The precise intellectual relationship between Frege and Husserl is a matter for continuing investigation, but it is reasonably clear that while Husserl shared Frege's ideals, he was utterly at odds with Frege concerning the means by which these ideals were to be attained: A founding of arithmetic on a series of formal definitions from which all the propositions of this science could be deduced in a purely syllogistic manner is Frege's ideal. It will thus not be necessary to discuss at length why I cannot share this view [...]. One can only define the logically compound. As soon as we hit upon the final elementary concepts, all defining comes to an end. [...] The goal that Frege has set himself is thus to be regarded as chimerical. It is thus also no wonder that his work, despite its perspicaciousness,


13

strays into unfruitful hypersubtilities and ends without a positive result.17

It was rather more Frege's attitude towards psychologism that seems to have influenced Husserl;18 although there is evidence that Husserl did study Ludwig Wittgenstein's (18891951) Tractatus, like many mathematicians he generally seems to have taken little interest in the specifically logical argumentative apparatus of Frege and Russell. Turning to Hume, Kant, and Rene Descartes (1596-1650) for inspiration, Husserl developed a new philosophical approach which he was later to call transcendental phenomenology. Phenomenology in Husserl's sense is a purely descriptive discipline, which seeks a comprehensive and accurate description of acts of consciousness. Unlike the empirical sciences (including psychology), it is concerned not with experience per se but with the structures of consciousness that underlie all experience and thus make experience as such possible. Unlike the formal deductive disciplines of logic, mathematics, and geometry, phenomenology is concerned not with abstract definitions, implications, and deductions per se but with the f oundational acts of consciousness that underlie all abstract thought and thus make abstract thought possible. For Husserl, then, "phenomenology" is the descriptive study off oundational structures of consciousness. Yet the question remains to be asked: why did Husserl think this would shed light on the formal problems of mathematics at all? What was fundamentally wrong, in Husserl's opinion, with the Fregean approach to resolving the theoretical problems of mathematics?

1.3 HUSSERL'S PHENOMENOLOGICAL FOUNDATION Husserl's solution to the theoretical problems of mathematics was to return "to the things themselves." For Husserl, this amounts to: "let us return to the original facts upon which the

14


fundamental concepts of mathematics are based, to these facts as they are experienced in consciousness." By studying the foundational notions of mathematics within the structures of consciousness necessary for their apprehension, we will be in a position to clear up the experiential basis from which our theoretical formalizations of mathematics proceed. By clearing up this basis—namely the experience of mathematical facts as facts of consciousness—we have secured a proper foundation for our further theoretical enterprises. Having secured a firm and certain foundation, we should then be able to build a lasting and satisfying theoretical edifice upon this foundation. The phenomena of which our Husserlian phenomenology is an account are accordingly logical-mathematical objects in their relation to consciousness. In order to make this approach plausible I would like to use an illustration of my own invention. This particular example is also intended to emphasize the features of Husserl's phenomenology that Heidegger found particularly appealing and valuable in a philosophical context. The illustration involves a very ancient, and as yet unsolved,19 problem put forth by the philosopher Zeno of Elea, who was born early in the 5th century BCE. Zeno was a close associate—according to some ancient sources, the lover—of the Presocratic philosopher Parmenides, who argued that change, motion, and plurality were illusions.20 According to Parmenides, the universe is in fact one infinite, unchanging, and homogeneous mass, which is falsely perceived by human beings as a manifold and changing world. Parmenides' argument, in short, is that nothing can properly be said to exist but Being itself; any process of change is a process of Becoming, which is not Being; therefore Being itself is utterly free of change. What is free of change can never be give rise to difference; accordingly, nothing exists that can properly be said to be different from Being. To support this claim, Zeno formulated a number of paradoxes intended to show that the concepts of space, motion, and plurality were incoherent. The paradox that we shall use as an illustration is generally known as the "Dichotomy" or the

15


"Stadium/7 probably the best-known Zenonian paradox. The ancient Greeks believed, and we have all been taught in geometry class, that any line is infinitely divisible. That is to say: any line can be repeatedly divided into smaller parts, and these smaller parts can themselves be subdivided into yet smaller parts, and so ad infinitum. The smallest possible part, since it results from an infinite process of division and subdivision, is infinitely small. Such an infinitely small part is termed a "point/' Thus any and every line in fact consists of an infinite number of points. Supposing, then, I find myself within the precincts of a stadium, and within this stadium I wish to move a certain distance along a given line AB (hence the first name of the paradox, the Stadium). It follows from the general proposition that any and every line is infinitely divisible that before I move the entire distance, I must first move half the distance, namely AB'. However, thanks to the concept of infinite divisibility, it also follows that before I can move half the distance, I must first move half that distance as well, or one-quarter of the whole distance I wish to move, which is indicated on the diagram by the line segment AB". In turn, before I move this distance I must first move half this distance as well, namely one eighth of the whole distance, or AB"'. (It is from its reliance on the procedure of continually halving the remaining distance that the paradox derives its other name, the Dichotomy.) The "Stadium" or "Dichotomy"

A

B1"

B"

B1

B

Now since the line is infinitely divisible, this situation, namely always having to move half any given distance before I move the whole distance, will always be present. The conclusion: since there is always something I have to do before I can complete the desired motion, namely move half the distance, I will never move at all.

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How can we deal with this apparently inescapable paradox? Can we refute the paradox at all, and if so, how? How do we deal with it in real life? By directing our attention to any given instance of motion in our immediate environment. How convinced are we that such a procedure truly refutes the paradox? Not convinced at all, somewhat convinced, or absolutely convinced? Most of us would probably agree that (for practical purposes at least) we were absolutely convinced. If we accept this, there are three obvious consequences for the manner in which we approach mathematical and geometrical paradoxes. (1) The first consequence is that we can use sight (in the widest sense of apprehension, whether "physical" or "mental") to decide, with absolute certainty, what is and is not the case. It is by means of "sight" in this sense that we were able to decisively refute the paradoxical conclusion that, on the assumption of the infinite divisibility of any and all distances, motion is impossible. If we so desired, we could presumably go on to give a perfectly accurate and theoretically satisfying account of motion, even on a formal level.21 (2) The second consequence concerns the general significance of theory, that is, of our ability to conceptualize mathematical relations involving such concepts as motion, divisibility, and time. We are faced with a centuries-old paradox that is based on apparently sound reasoning. It follows naturally from our usual conceptions of distance and motion. Either movement is truly impossible—which we believe not to be the case —or there is something wrong with the manner in which we conceptualize movement when we use concepts such as infinite divisibility. (3) The third consequence concerns the structure of consciousness as the foundation of theory. Note that to resolve the paradox, we do not need to actually observe real motion in the real world; it is sufficient to consider


17

what is involved in the consciousness of motion as such, whether real or imaginary. In this the peculiar " sight" of the phenomenological approach consists. When we consider real movement in the real world in this way, motion does not appear as a constant "hopping" from point to point in space. Motion, such as walking from one end to the other of a stadium, seems rather to "flow" or in some sense to be continuous rather than composed of real discrete units. Of course, we do experience "hopping" motions from time to time, but within each "hop" motion is as we have described it: continuous rather than "broken" into an infinite number of infinitely small "hops" through an infinite series of infinitely small points. (The clumsiness of description alone should give us pause.) Thus by invoking no agencies other than sight (in the abovementioned sense) and our experience, we can conclude that the paradox arises as a result of the theoretically inadequate expression of real movement as movement through an infinite number of infinitely small points.'22 To sum up our conclusions with a few words, it seems that whenever we come across a paradox, whether in mathematics or geometry, the fault seems to lie in our concepts, in our conceptual scheme, rather than in reality itself. Clearly motion is possible. If we are able to derive a paradox from a formal conceptualization of motion, then the conceptualization, not the structure of reality itself, must be the source of the paradoxical conclusion. Accordingly, if we call the direct experience of reality the pre-theoretical level of consciousness and the formulation and use of conceptual systems the theoretical level of consciousness, we seem entitled to conclude that conceptual problems arise at the theoretical rather than the pre-theoretical level If, when we encounter paradoxes, the fault lies in our theoretical conceptual scheme, our first task as philosophers — as phenomenologists — must be to gain direct access to the pre-

18


theoretical reality underlying our conceptual schemes. In the case of our refutation of the Dichotomy or Stadium, we proceeded by abandoning the conceptual scheme that puzzled us—by quitting the theoretical level — and turned to the phenomena which this conceptual scheme was supposed to express, that is, we returned to the pre-theoretical "things themselves" of which the theoretical formalization is a model or expression. In the terminology of the later Husserl, the aim of phenomenology is to undertake a methodologically secured return to the pre-theoretical life-world [Lebenswelt]: the fundamental phenomena of experience as they exist in consciousness before we attempt to grasp them in terms of formal theoretical systems. Let us pause to reformulate our conclusions in more precise and more familiarly Husserlian terms.23 For Husserl, the essence of the phenomenological method lies in a particular modification of our "natural attitude" [naturliche Einstellung]. This natural attitude is the level at which we go about our business in daily life. A chief characteristic of this natural attitude is our "naive belief in existence" [naiver Seinsglaube], that is, in the existence of external objects in an external world. Husserl also calls this belief in the reality of the external world the "general thesis of the natural attitude." For the purposes of philosophical reflection, this natural attitude can, however, be radically modified; it can become what Husserl calls the "phenomenological attitude" [phanomenologische Einstellung]. This phenomenological attitude is the sine qua non of a methodologically secured return to the experiential basis of all theory. The phenomenological attitude is characterized by the adoption of the Husserlian epoche. Epoche is a Greek term meaning "the act of holding back or refraining," or more simply "restraint." It was originally a Skeptic technical term meaning "suspension of judgement." In Husserl's sense, exercising the epoche means disabling (exercising restraint towards) the general thesis of the natural attitude. In other words, insofar as we are practising phenomenological thought, we are utterly indifferent to the question as to the objective reality of our experiences. This


19

has to be correctly understood. "If I do so, as I am fully free to do, then I do not negate this 'world' as if I were a Sophist, I do not doubt its existence, as if I were a Skeptic; but I exercise the 'phenomenological' epoche, which fully closes off every judgement concerning spatio-temporal existence to me."24 In so doing we completely eliminate the changeable external world as a possible source of error and restrict ourselves to a realm in which complete certainty is possible because this realm is the transcendental foundation of all further experience. A remarkable fact, according to Husserl, is that consciousness has its own peculiar "stream," which is not affected by the phenomenological epoche. This stream of consciousness Husserl calls the "phenomenological residue" [phanomenologisches Residuum] of the "bracketing out" [Ausklammerung] of the world. This transcendental consciousness is a type of experiencing that is prior both to the experience of the world and to the act of conceptualization, and so lacking any feature which could introduce the possibility of error. It is the wellspring from which all truth is ultimately derived. Yet how are we to make use of this phenomenological residue in a philosophical context? A further modification of consciousness produces a self-reflexive act whose aim is to explicitly grasp and describe the structures of transcendental consciousness involved in experience as such. The act of self-reflection permits us to undertake a methodical and systematic description of transcendental consciousness in its entirety. In this way the transcendental consciousness exposed by the epoche serves as the basis of a completely new and fundamentally descriptive science —the science of phenomenology. Along with the bracketing out of the world, we also eliminate any recourse to existing sciences and scientific theories as a possible source of explanation. Thus in beginning from the level of transcendental consciousness exposed by our adoption of the phenomenological attitude, we have undertaken a complete destruction of our previously held opinions, opinions that were founded in the naive belief in existence of the natural

20


attitude. In so doing we commit ourselves to a fundamentally new philosophical enterprise: the re-construction of a completely self-evident system of beliefs, theories, and sciences on the basis of our own ultimate self-borne responsibility [aus letzter Selbstverantwortung]. 1.4 HEIDEGGER'S HERMENEUTICS OF FACTICITY In his earliest phenomenological work, the Logische Untersuchungen (1900/01), Husserl made use of the term "phenomenology" to denote an approach or methodology as opposed to a fully-developed system of philosophy with its own set body of dogmas and doctrines. By the time he published the first volume of his Ideen zu einer reinen Phdnomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophic (1913), however, Husserl was hard at work systematically reshaping his phenomenology into a form of transcendental idealism. This development partially reflected the enduring influence of Kant's epistemology on Husserl's thought, but also shows Husserl's developing admiration of Cartesianism and its skeptical considerations. In establishing and fortifying his fundamentally idealist position, Husserl continued to remain strongly oriented towards the formal problems of mathematics and geometry. Throughout his life, he continued to produce works in which he applied the results of his ongoing phenomenological investigations to the task of securing an adequate theoretical foundation for logic and mathematics. Husserl's ultimate aim, like Descartes', was to rebuild the conceptual edifices of logic, mathematics, and geometry upon an absolutely unshakeable theoretical foundation—the sphere of the ego cogito or of transcendental subjectivity. Many philosophers who appreciated Husserl's fundamentally descriptive methodology and its way of handling philosophical problems were dismayed at Husserl's emphatic introduction of idealistic premises into his phenomenological technique of analysis.25 To these philosophers, the greatness of


21

HusserFs innovation lay precisely in his introduction of a new method of description, which remained, or should have remained, neutral towards traditional epistemological and metaphysical positions. The original contribution of phenomenology, on this view, was that one could concern oneself with the "things themselves" and not bother about the historical accretion of theoretical problems, especially those associated with the debate of Idealism versus Realism. Was not Husserl, in effect, compromising his own supposedly pre-theoretical methodology by committing it to a particular theoretical stance concerning the dependence of the real world on consciousness? Did this not contradict the very nature of the phenomenological epoche, which was supposed to prevent every judgement concerning spatiotemporal existence and its dependency (or lack thereof) upon the sphere of transcendental consciousness? Other critics of this enterprise were unsettled by HusserFs evident admiration of the formal sciences. HusserFs phenomenology ostensibly presented itself as a foundation on which other disciplines, such as psychology and ethics, could build. Yet Husserl had a strong inclination to emphasize those structures of consciousness that he felt were intimately connected with logical, mathematical, and geometrical thinking. This was taken by some critics as evidence of HusserFs own bias in favour of mathematics and geometry as models of philosophical thinking. And if it was indeed a bias, to what extent could Husserl claim to have formulated a truly objective phenomenological methodology? There are further problems with the notion of using a method to gain access to a pre-theoretical sphere of consciousness. Husserl, or so he claimed, was concerned with developing a methodologically secured approach to the phenomena or "things themselves." However, it seems that every method must be based on a theory concerning what is to be approached and how to approach it. Since Husserl clearly has such a theory, how can the theory claim to permit access to a pre-theoretical level at all? The realm that HusserFs phenomenological epoche allows

22


us to access cannot, it seems, be truly pre-theoretical because it is conditioned by Husserl's own theoretical assumptions. And these assumptions are geared towards one specific goal: that of an absolutely certain foundation of logic, mathematics, geometry, and other formal scientific disciplines. In short: who is to say that the "things themselves" are in fact transcendental structures of consciousness? The development of Heidegger's own version of HusserFs phenomenology was the result of a theoretical reassessment of the meaning and significance of the phenomenological method. It was motivated and supported by the above-mentioned lines of criticism in conjunction with Heidegger's own extracurricular philosophical interests. This development in Heidegger's thought is complex and manysided, and its various aspects must be considered carefully if it is not to be misinterpreted, as it sometimes is, as a wilful and violent appropriation of HusserFs phenomenology for essentially alien purposes.26 It may surprise some of us to know that Heidegger began his career as a specialist in traditional philosophical logic. An early summary of recent developments in logic, written and published in 1912, shows that Heidegger was acquainted not only with Russell's Principles of Mathematics but also with Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica and Louis Couturat's Les Principes des Mathematiques.27 His dissertation dealt with psychologism and its theory of logical judgement. His Habilitationsschrift2288 addressed Duns Scotus' theory of categories and meaning. Interestingly, a footnote to the lecture Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz (1928) indicates that Heidegger was also acquainted with the work of Russell and Couturat on the philosophy of Leibniz.29 This is, of course, not to say that Heidegger was in a position to follow the intimate details of 20th century innovations in mathematical logic—nor, for that matter, were most of the philosophers and mathematicians of his time. However, he was certainly able to appreciate their wideranging originality and significance.30 If Heidegger rejected the notion that logic as such should be a central concern of his version


23

of phenomenology, it certainly was not, as some commentators have proposed, due to a global ignorance of logical issues. Heidegger was well able to appreciate the strengths of Husserl's phenomenological methodology and its significance for a theoretical justification of mathematics and logic. However, as he began to examine Husserl's phenomenology more closely in the light of existing criticisms, he began to agree that Husserl's orientation towards a philosophy of consciousness and towards a traditional conception of science—in other words, his focus on the theoretical problems of logic and mathematics—was misplaced. Where, at the pre-theoretical level, do we ever encounter anything like a "phenomenological residue"? Clearly this "sphere of transcendental consciousness" was a theoretical construction of Husserl's insufficiently radical theoretical assumptions. Husserl, rather than discovering the foundation of the formal sciences in consciousness, had imposed a theoretical foundation upon consciousness for the sake of justifying the ultimate validity of logic and mathematics. It seems that the "lived" world around us as we encounter it at an everyday level, the truly pre-theoretical life-world, bears only a faint and distant resemblance to the world as it is described in logic, mathematics, and geometry. The question then arises: if the true pre-theoretical life-world bears only a faint resemblance to the formal worlds of the formal disciplines, what is the true world actually like? And how was it at all possible for Husserl to confuse the formal "worlds" of the theoretical sciences with the actual pre-theoretical life-world of everyday experience? Heidegger's philosophy developed as a direct response to these questions. One of Heidegger's early names for his revamped and expanded phenomenology was the hermeneutics of facticity.31 By "facticity" Heidegger means the lived world of everyday existence, the truly pre-theoretical level, which Husserl's phenomenology overlooked owing to its emphasis on science. Heidegger's phenomenology is thus an attempt to put forth an interpretative description of the lived world as it is experienced before any theoretical modification of this experience.

24


Heidegger found a rich account of the true phenomena of everyday life, lived life rather than a "phenomenological residuum" exposed by an artificial theoretical " reduction/7 in the writings of the Lebensphilosophen (proponents of "lifephilosophy"32) of his day.33 These writings are supplemented by Heidegger's readings of prominent figures of late 19th century philosophy, such as S0ren Kierkegaard (1813-1855) and Friedrich Nietzsche (1844-1900), who are frequently, if inaccurately, assimilated to the so-called existentialist movement. This constitutes the source material that Heidegger employs as a basis for his own phenomenological account of the foundational structural constitution of human life. Heidegger further bases his revised understanding of the phenomenological method on central themes of hermeneutics, the theory of interpretation.34 There are, of course, many other important influences upon Heidegger during this early developmental period, but as these are of lesser significance for the comprehension of Being and Time, which will form the subject material of Chapters 2 and 3, we will leave these influences aside for the moment. The Heidegger of Being and Time reacts to philosophical influences in three ways: rejection, appropriation, and critical revision: (I) Rejection. Although Karl Jaspers (1883-1969) is very much a background figure in Being and Time, it is clear that Heidegger rejected the philosophical approach of Jaspers' Psychologie der Weltanschauungen (1919) and wished to distance himself from it.35 This is particularly ironic in that Jaspers, influenced by his reading of Being and Time, later went on to write a threevolume work entitled Philosophie (1932), the founding work of Existenzphilosophie ("existence-philosophy") in Germany. This work, more than any other, is the source of the approach and ideology of the later "existentialism." Popular in tone and more accessible than Being and Time, Jaspers' work provided many early commentators the means to approach Heidegger, leading to the misconception that Heidegger was a proponent of existencephilosophy in Jaspers' sense. It is highly likely that Jean-Paul


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Sartre's (1905-1980) understanding of Heidegger and his version of "existentialism" originate with Jaspers.36 Heidegger also categorically rejects the philosophy of Descartes and, in direct opposition to Husserl, denies his importance as a philosophical role model. §§ 12-24 of Being and Time should be understood as an attempt to undermine the Cartesian foundations of Husserlian phenomenology. We will discuss these topics more fully in Sections 2.5 and 2.10. (2) Appropriation. The most obvious direct influence on Heidegger's philosophy in Being and Time is Kierkegaard, whose chief philosophical concerns are reflected in much of the subject matter of Being and Time. Heidegger incorporates much of Kierkegaard with little or no significant change into the conceptual framework of Being and Time, his main goal being to accurately describe the complex structural constitution of anxiety, death, and the conscience. In so doing, Heidegger hopes to demonstrate that these topics are essential structural features of the truly pretheoretical level of human existence and are amenable to serious methodical philosophical treatment.37 Heidegger was also directly influenced by Wilhelm Dilthey (1813-1911), the best known proponent of life-philosophy in Germany. Concerned with grasping the vital and fundamentally irrational nature of human life, Dilthey was interested in the philosophy of history and in preventing the dominance of science and scientific method in the humanities. Still a highly influential figure in Germany, he is widely considered to have made decisive contributions to the theoretical foundations of the humanities as separate disciplines independent of the natural sciences. (3) Critical revision. Heidegger's primary influence in Being and Time is of course Husserl, and it is Husserl's concept of phenomenology that Heidegger considers both most important and most in need of critical revision. There is also a marked tendency to emphasize the Kantian elements in Husserlian phenomenology insofar as Heidegger, like Kant, is concerned with fundamental structural features of the human epistemic constitution. (As Heidegger puts it: he is concerned with identifying primeval existentials of Dasein38.)

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Heidegger further attempts to strengthen Husserl's phenomenology by introducing concepts from hermeneutics. The term "hermeneutics" is derived from the Greek verb hermeneuein, meaning "to explain," "to interpret," or "to translate." Traditionally it referred to the theory of interpretation in general, and to Biblical interpretation in particular. Hermeneutics traces its ancestry to 18thcentury Germany, where it began with the theoretical works of Johann Martin Chladenius and Georg Friedrich Maier on text interpretation.39 Its best known proponent, however, was the theologian Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (17681834). By recasting Husserl's phenomenology as a technique of interpretative description, Heidegger hoped to avoid the pitfalls to which Husserl fell prey, namely the questionable possibility of using a theoretical technique to explore a pre-theoretical level of experience. Heidegger's version of phenomenological hermeneutics will be further discussed in Sections 2.4 and 2.6. The foregoing three reactions to philosophical influences do much to explain the style of Being and Time. The resulting unique combination of "theoretical" and "practical" philosophy is one of the most peculiar and most fascinating aspects of Heidegger's work. Taking all of the foregoing considerations into account, we can identify four fundamental characteristics of Heidegger's phenomenology that emerge from these influences: (1) Anti-rationalism. Here I am using "rationalism" in the sense in which Descartes, Baruch (Benedictus) de Spinoza (1632-1677), and Leibniz are said to be "rationalist" philosophers. Heidegger denies that logic, mathematics, or geometry are suitable models for philosophical thinking because he believes that the task of philosophy is to grasp the pre-theoretical level of human existence. The notion is simply that rational argument is based upon other fundamental structures (for Husserl these are structures of consciousness) and that therefore arguments are not concerned with the primeval facts with which philosophy should be


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concerned. This is often (inaccurately) expressed by the assertion that Heidegger's phenomenology is a purely descriptive methodology in contrast to the argumentative methodology employed, for example, by Spinoza. It has nothing to do with "irrationality" in any sense of the word. (2) The shift from consciousness to the world. For Husserl, phenomenological description was dependent upon the suspension of our belief in the reality of the external world. It was precisely this epoche that made it at all possible to study the pure structures of transcendental consciousness. For Heidegger, on the other hand, this is a mistake, because our primeval experience, the sphere in which we live, is not an experience of our own consciousness but of the world (our being-in-the-world). (3) The position that the fundamental structures of our relation to the world are in some way hidden. One might think that a philosophical account of being-in-the-world should be fairly simple —after all, we spend most of our time relating to the world. Husserl even emphasized that it was precisely this everyday relationship to the world that obscured philosophical thought and so had to be eliminated by means of the phenomenological epoche. For Heidegger, however, it is precisely because we are so deeply involved with the world in every moment of everyday life that we fail to appreciate the structural complexity of our relation to it. As a result of this lack of acquaintance with the very world in which we live we turn to logic, mathematics, and geometry, failing to appreciate the conceptual poverty of such formal systems. The task of phenomenology, then, is to make these hidden structures of the everyday world clear to us. (4) A pronounced emphasis on ontology in the form of the "question of Being/' To explain the reasons for this emphasis at this point would take us too far away from our general outline of the history and development of

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phenomenology. The meaning of the question of Being is highly technical and will be addressed separately in Section 2.2. These four characteristics are adequate for a comprehension of Heidegger's general philosophical position at the time of the writing of Being and Time. Addressing later developments in Heidegger's conception of phenomenology and the phenomenological enterprise is too vast an undertaking for the context of the present work. 1.5 THE VICISSITUDES OF THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL MOVEMENT Through Husserl, the terms "phenomenology" and "phenomenological" acquired a certain vogue, appearing in the works of thinkers as divergent in their interests as Albert Einstein40 and Carl Gustav Jung. In this popular usage, "phenomenology" was, without further qualification, more or less equated with "description" and "phenomenological" with "descriptive." This popular use was coupled with connotations that were still less desirable, as "phenomenology" and "phenomenological" came to be understood as mutually exclusive with respect to the terms "explanation" and "explanatory." The very specific methodological considerations with which Husserl himself meant to link the term "phenomenology" failed to enter the popular consciousness.41 It was, no doubt, a mistake for Husserl to choose this particular name for his philosophy. On the one hand, its strong associations with Hegel invited confusion between Husserl's own methodology and the Hegelian dialectic, and on the other hand, the term already had a firmly entrenched popular meaning of its own. The resulting ambiguity permitted a great deal of latitude in the interpretation of what was and was not "phenomenology," so that it is customary among scholars to speak of "the phenomenological movement" rather than of "phenomenology."


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Here we will forego the attempt to distinguish "phenomenology" proper from "pseudo-phenomenologies." Discussions as to the legitimacy of the use of the name "phenomenology" by specific philosophical schools are all too likely to become acrimonious and unproductive. Suffice it to say that from a Husserlian point of view the popular conflation of "phenomenology" and "existentialism" is the most perilous and damaging of all, particularly in view of the notorious ambiguity of the latter term.42 For our purposes it is enough to emphasize that there are very significant differences between the various flavours of "phenomenology." It is too late to eliminate the ambiguity of the term "phenomenology" (if it was indeed ever possible) and so the question of whether its various flavours have anything else in common besides the name is moot. It is also worth mentioning in this connection that a true continuity between Husserl's and Heidegger's versions of phenomenology has sometimes been denied. Again, for our purposes, it is enough if the manner in which Heidegger modified Husserl's basic assumptions has been made clear. The decision as to whether or not the resulting product is "phenomenology" can safely be left to the reader's own sensibilities. Among the German phenomenologists, the best known after Heidegger is Max Scheler (1874-1928). Disenchanted with Kant and Neo-Kantianism, Scheler's fortuitous meeting with Husserl in 1901 led him to study Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen. Scheler found Husserl's methodology an ideal tool for his ethical studies. Scheler's use of a modified phenomenological approach to investigate moral and religious issues was highly regarded by Heidegger, who cites his works approvingly in Being and Time.43 His concern with the problems of human existence and his interest in sociology led him in a philosophical direction he designated as "philosophical anthropology." This development foreshadowed and probably influenced Heidegger's treatment of existence in Being and Time, although Heidegger's philosophy is clearly not a "philosophical anthropology" in Scheler's sense. The two philosophers who have done the most to further the association of "phenomenology" with "existentialism" are Karl

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Jaspers, the founder of Existenzphilosophie, and Jean-Paul Sartre, the founder of "existentialism" proper. Jaspers, who began as a physician and psychologist, transformed the psychological and philosophical framework of his earlier work into an "existential" framework inspired by his reading of Heidegger's Being and Time. As mentioned previously, his main work, Philosophie (1932), is the first recognizably and unambiguously "existentialist" book. Jaspers employs a Heidegger-derived terminology to put forth his own philosophical position with respect to human existence. Jaspers' account, inspired by Kierkegaard and the work of the sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920), is notable for having begun the "existentialist" precedent of suppressing the traditionally objective concerns of philosophy in order to speak of subjective human experience. The accessibility of Jaspers' account and his obvious dependence on Heidegger led many early Heidegger interpreters to believe that Heidegger himself was doing the same. Heidegger, however, is interested in human existence in a very different sense, as we shall see in Chapter 2. To Sartre, who coined the term "existentialism" to designate his particular blend of phenomenology, literature, Cartesianism, Hegelianism, and Marxism, belongs the dubious honour of having been by far the most visible and most popular member of the phenomenological movement. Posterity has, on the whole, been extremely critical of Sartre's philosophical legacy, and his influence as a philosopher has proportionately diminished in importance since its peak in the 1950s and 1960s. Sartre's historical importance for the prevailing trends in modern French philosophy cannot, however, be doubted. For better or for worse, he was almost single-handedly responsible for an infusion of German thought into the French intellectual atmosphere, whose continuing influence upon the style and concerns of French philosophy is evident in the works of many of its pre-eminent representatives, including those of Jacques Derrida (1930-2004) and Michel Foucault (1926-1984). Sartre first learned of Heidegger through the Japanese philosopher Shuzo Kuki (1888-1941), who had engaged Sartre as


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a private tutor in Paris towards the end of 1926. Kuki had taken a course with Heinrich Rickert, the co-supervisor of Heidegger's doctoral thesis,44 in 1922, and studied with both Husserl and Heidegger from 1927 to 1928. It was Kuki who provided Sartre with a letter of introduction to Heidegger.45 The esteem in which Heidegger held Kuki can be judged from the fact that he is mentioned in Heidegger's dialogue "Aus einem Gesprach von der Sprache. Zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden/7 published in Heidegger's Unterwegs zur Sprache.46 Though he was also personally acquainted with Henri Bergson (1858-1941) and studied his writings, the main influence on Kuki's philosophical development came from Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology. In 1929 Kuki was appointed a lecturer at Kyoto Imperial University on the recommendation of Nishida Kitaro. The chairman of the Department of Philosophy at this time was Nishida7s successor Tanabe Hajime, who himself had studied with Husserl and met Heidegger in the period 1922-24. Kuki is best known for his work on aesthetics, in which he attempts to define the Japanese concept of the aesthetically elegant, or iki, and for his work on Japanese culture and on the categories of ontological contingency. Despite his contact with Nishida and Tanabe, he is not generally considered part of the Kyoto School.47 The French phenomenological tradition did not, of course, end with Sartre but continues to flourish to the present day. We will briefly mention only two of its chief representatives: Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961) and Paul Ricoeur (19132005). Influenced by Sartre and also directly by Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty's best known work is the Phenomenologie de la perception (1945). Although "existentialist" in character, his work is both more faithful to Husserl's conception of phenomenology and more erudite than Sartre's, which has ensured it a permanent audience among philosophers with a serious interest in phenomenology and phenomenological method.48 Ricoeur too has done much to further the clear distinction of Husserlian phenomenology from the ideological

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programme of Sartre. One of the few students of phenomenology who have investigated the early phenomenological movement in significant detail, Ricoeur was an original and stimulating thinker in his own right, with important contributions to phenomenological method, the theory of metaphor, and many other areas.

CHAPTER 2

HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY AS FUNDAMENTAL ONTOLOGY

2.1 UNDERSTANDING VERSUS PERCEPTION In Chapter 1 we discussed the history of the phenomenological movement and emphasized the themes and approaches that are particularly significant for an adequate comprehension of Heidegger's philosophy as it is presented in his main work, Being and Time.1 We noted that in order to understand Heidegger's phenomenological methodology, it is particularly important to begin with a basic knowledge of the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl. Without a knowledge of Husserl, it is very easy to confuse Heidegger's philosophical methodology with a merely " descriptive" approach, a confusion that we will address in the course of the following sections. Of course, the Heidegger of Being and Time also modifies the Husserlian approach in important and decisive ways; these modifications will be addressed in further detail in Section 2.4. Even when the requirement of a familiarity with Husserl's phenomenology has been met, further difficulties present themselves when first approaching Being and Time as a philosophical work. Chief among these difficulties is the peculiar lack of organization that the book exhibits. Particularly frustrating for the first-time reader is the fact that the initial sections of Being and Time all presuppose an acquaintance with Heidegger's conception of understanding [Verstehen] and are not 33

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comprehensible without it. Unfortunately, Heidegger's own presentation of his concept of understanding in Being and Time is not particularly accessible, the more so because it presupposes an acquaintance with the initial sections of Being and Time. I am not inclined to attribute any deeper significance other than lack of literary foresight to this peculiar arrangement of the material. However, the fact remains that the material must be presented differently if there is to be any hope of helping readers along towards a real appreciation of the philosophical meaning and significance of Being and Time. It would hardly be an exaggeration, as Sections 2.2 to 2.6 will demonstrate, to call Heidegger's conception of the act of understanding the foundation of his philosophy. From this conception Heidegger derives his unique view of the world and of the structural constitution of human existence. As important as it is unusual, with this conception Heidegger's entire philosophy stands or falls. If one is thoroughly acquainted with the concept of understanding as presupposed in the book, then the approaches and analyses of Being and Time are clear and easily understood. If not, Heidegger's intentions and arguments appear incomprehensible. Although it is usually best to present a philosophical line of thought after the manner of the philosopher in question, in this particular case to do so would clearly be counterproductive. Because of the central role played by Heidegger's concept of understanding and because of the highly inaccessible manner in which Heidegger himself presents this concept in Being and Time, we will in the present section of the book introduce a highly simplified and condensed illustration of Heidegger's theory. With this initial grasp of the subject matter, we will then be in a position to supplement our original account with Heidegger's own perspectives and terminology in the following sections. Being and Time begins with a phenomenological analysis of the world and our relation to it. This analysis has puzzled many readers because, despite its claim to articulate the structures of our experience of the world at a basic, everyday level, the

Hermeneutic Phenomenology

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concrete results of the analysis seem to be utterly at odds with the world as we usually conceive of it. It is, however, crucial that we understand that Heidegger's phenomenology is not a theory of perceptual experience in the manner of, say, John Locke (1632-1704), George Berkeley (1685-1753), or Hume.2 It is, rather, a theory of interaction with the things we encounter in the world around us. Heidegger, in short, is interested not in the act of perception as such and in isolation from other possible human acts, but rather in our manners of comportment [Verhaltungen] towards others, towards ourselves, and towards the various things or entities we find in our immediate surroundings. " Comportment" in this sense is a general term referring collectively to all the possible ways of interacting with things in our immediate environment. Thus buying, selling, cooking, longing, thinking, considering, willing, wanting, wishing, admiring, observing, perceiving, viewing, pondering, managing, and so on are all ways in which we comport ourselves towards the things we come across in daily life. Heidegger's term for the "things" towards which we can comport ourselves is Seiendes, which we will render as "entities." Heidegger uses the term "entity" to designate all the animate and inanimate things (in the widest sense of "thing") that are possible "targets" or "goals" of our comportments. Heidegger believes, for reasons that are obviously connected with his phenomenological approach, that our everyday manner of comportment towards entities is not primarily a perceptual one. He thinks, in fact, that perceptions so-called are a theoretical superimposition on our actual experience by way of a later theoretical re-interpretation of this experience. Recalling the third fundamental characteristic of Heidegger's phenomenology in Section 1.4, the position that the fundamental structures of our comportment towards entities are in some way hidden,3 for Heidegger it is our very familiarity with entities that disguises the true structural complexity of our comportments towards them. (There is a further and more technical reason, involving Heidegger's account of inauthenticity, why the familiar structures of everyday life are hidden. See Section 2.8 for details.)

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This point is really quite commonplace; for example, a proficient guitarist might find it difficult, when asked by an eager beginner, to explain exactly how a particular technique is executed. Similarly, when asked by non-native speakers to explain grammatical and syntactical peculiarities of our mother tongue, we are frequently at a loss for an explanation, although we ourselves appear not to make mistakes with respect to the point under consideration. In both cases, it frequently happens that we even give the wrong explanation. In a similar fashion, then, we might out of habit, when asked about our comportments towards entities, simply give the wrong answer, namely that the most important comportment was the act of perception. Using a phenomenological approach, Heidegger believes that he can show that the actual range and variety of our comportments towards entities in the world is much wider than the restricted sphere of purely perceptive acts would allow. For Heidegger, then, there is a more fundamental range and structure of comportment than perception. This primeval [ursprunglich] structure of comportment (which, as we will see in Section 2.5, Heidegger calls being-in-the-world) influences and determines the manner in which all other comportments, including and in particular perception, take place. Heidegger's first philosophical ambition in Being and Time is to work out a comprehensive theory that describes the basic structures that underlie all particular manners of comportment. Accordingly, the theme of §§ 9-44 of Being and Time is the preparatory fundamental analysis of human existence, or Dasein.4 For Heidegger, one of the fundamental manners in which we comport ourselves towards entities is understanding. Understanding has what we can call (for now) a referential structure. On this account, when I "understand" a particular entity, I understand it with reference to —that is, in terms of, or on the basis of—something else. This wider context or frame of reference with reference to which I understand particular entities is what Heidegger calls meaningfulness [Bedeutsamkeit]. In practical terms, this is very easy to illustrate. Consider, for


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a moment, a piece of chalk. How do I understand what this chalk is? For Heidegger, I understand the chalk with reference to the act of writing on a blackboard (for example). The chalk as a whole and as such simply is the sum total of purposes for which it can be used.5 The blackboard, in turn, is understood with reference to the wider system of references involved in the classroom; the classroom is understood with reference to the educational institution in which it is found, be it a school, college, or university. The classroom is understood with reference to the institution as a whole and with reference to the particular educational context carried with it, the institution is understood with reference to the province in which it is located, and so on. In short: we understand particular entities such as the chalk and the blackboard with reference to interlocking and nested systems of meaningfulness. According to Heidegger's account of human comportment, we comport ourselves towards entities by understanding their meaningfulness. Meaningfulness is always situated in a context. Without this understanding of their meaningfulness, this understanding of what they are and of what they are for within a wider frame of reference, my mere perception of these entities can tell me nothing about them. A merely perceived entity, an entity that is not meaningful in our specific terminological sense of "meaningfulness/7 is simply "mutely there/' like letters in a foreign alphabet, which are not even recognized as letters, but only perceived as "not-even-squiggles." In order to perceive entities in any significant and informative way, I must first understand their meaningfulness. Accordingly, it seems that we have a case for arguing with Heidegger that understanding is more fundamental to our interaction with entities than perception. Ultimately, the various interlocked and interrelated "systems of reference" considered as a totality of meaningfulness constitute what Heidegger calls the worldliness of the world. That is to say, they are the characteristic fundamental structure and defining feature of the world phenomenon as such.

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2.2 WHY ASK THE QUESTION OF BEING? (§§ 1-4) Following these explanations, we are in a position to address Heidegger's use of the term "Being" as well as the meaning and purpose of the "question of Being/' both initially perplexing Heideggerian notions. We will begin with a preliminary explanation of "Being." As we saw in the last section, entities are always understood within a particular frame of reference, that is, as meaningful. Given that this is so, it is also the case that particular types of entities are defined by their common meaningfulness. Thus everything belonging to a classroom situation shares in the meaningfulness defined by the classroom frame of reference, everything properly found within a workshop shares in the meaningfulness defined by the workshop frame of reference, and so on. This is not to say that everything actually found in a workshop, for example, is necessarily understood as meaningful within the workshop. It might be that a particular object, say a musical instrument, is so strongly tied to its own meaningfulness that it is felt to be in the wrong place when it is found in the workshop. The essential point is merely that particular types or ranges of entities are defined by shared meaningfulness. It is also clear that meaningfulness itself is structured into interlocking or nested systems. Even within the workshop as a whole, there are particular objects that are defined by a "subsystem" of meaningfulness. Thus chisels all share in chiselling-meaningfulness; screwdrivers all share in screwdriving-meaningfulness; hammers all share in hammeringmeaningfulness; and so on. Within these systems we could distinguish still smaller subsystems, such as the specific meaningfulness belonging to handles, blades, and heads. This pattern of interrelated systems of meaningfulness is, however, also true on a larger scale. The workshop as a whole could belong to a homestead. The homestead could be one of many in a particular county; the county could belong to the meaningfulness particular to a province; the province could share in the meaningfulness of a particular country; the country could belong to the meaningfulness of a particular continent, and so on.


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Is there any fundamental meaningfulness that underlies all the various interlocking or nested systems of meaningfulness? Heidegger believes that there is. Recall that the fundamental feature of all meaningfulness is that meaningfulness defines particular entities as the entities that they happen to be. Thus a hammer is only a hammer because it is found within the particular system of meaningfulness that makes it possible to understand the act of driving nails and its specific purpose. The fundamental feature of meaningfulness is thus that it permits us to comport ourselves towards entities as those particular entities that they are. There is, in other words, a basic structure to all meaningfulness, a general, overarching frame of reference with reference to which we understand what it means for something to be an entity at all. This can be slightly rephrased by saying that there must be a fundamental frame of reference by means of which we understand the difference between existence and nonexistence. This overarching and fundamental frame of reference according to which we discriminate between what actually exists and what does not is what Heidegger calls Being [Sein, das Sein].6 It may seem, at first glance, strange that such a criterion exists at all, or that it exists without our knowing what it is, or that (for the later Heidegger) such a criterion can change in different historical epochs. However, we can better understand what Heidegger means by taking a concrete example. Let us consider a particular theoretical position to the effect that scientific knowledge is the final arbiter of truth and falsity. In some extreme forms, this position is put forth as the thesis that only those things and events that can be measured and quantified under strictly controlled laboratory conditions are in fact real. For our purposes, we can give a Heideggerian characterization of this theory as the definition of existence as observability under laboratory conditions. This particular definition of existence, or to put it in more Heideggerian terms, this planning [Entwerfen] of entities towards

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Being understood as laboratory observability, has interesting consequences for the proponents of such a definition. With our present technology, biochemical and biomechanical events can indeed be observed in the laboratory and quantified; therefore they exist. Emotions, thoughts, wishes and the like—the "mind" or "soul" in the widest traditional sense—cannot. Therefore, according to this position, either these phenomena do not exist— their existence is not acknowledged and they are ignored—or, where their existence is acknowledged at all, it is re-interpreted in terms of those entities that are recognized as existent, namely biochemical and biomechanical events. On this view there arises the familiar "behaviourist" denial of consciousness, or at least of the importance of consciousness for a properly scientific theory. Character and inclination are defined in terms of heredity. Love is compared with a chemical addiction. There follows the well-known "epiphenomenalist" theory, according to which consciousness is a non-essential byproduct of the chemical activity of the brain, as meaningless to properly scientific explanation as the noise of a lawnmower is to the act of mowing the lawn. Why is it that such theories do not acknowledge the existence of certain classes of entities while other theories do? Why is their existence concealed or obscured within the laboratory meaningfulness schema and not in other systems of meaningfulness? We might be tempted to say: because these entities are not found in the laboratory, the proponent of a radically materialist behaviourist theory decides that they do not exist. The existence of such entities has not, on this view, been confirmed by careful and systematic scientific investigation; therefore their existence is doubtful. Upon further reflection, however, we see that this conclusion is unwarranted. The supposedly doubtful status of the existence of such entities cannot be justified by an appeal to the results of laboratory experiments because the possible results of laboratory experiments are determined in advance by the conditions of the laboratory. If, for example, we peer through a pair of binoculars, we obviously will not be able to see protozoa, which are too


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small to be observed except through a microscope. Similarly, we cannot conclude from our laboratory experiments that certain types of entities do not exist at all, because having entered the laboratory, we can only interact with the type of entity that has meaningfulness in a laboratory frame of reference. If, nonetheless, we do go on to conclude, based on the range of entities we come upon in the laboratory setting, that our experiments have categorically disproved the existence of certain types of entities, the argument is obviously circular, because we began with the assumption that the laboratory is in fact the proper arbiter of the entire range of truly existent entities. The experimental results cannot justify the criterion of laboratory observability, because the criterion of laboratory observability is already assumed by the interpretation of the experimental results. Our interpretation of the laboratory results in fact does nothing but make our hidden assumptions evident. It is an argument in a circle. For Heidegger, neither is this circularity a simple mistake nor does it characterize the physical sciences as such. This circular structure is, so Heidegger believes, an essential feature of all acts of understanding. Since we can never comport ourselves towards entities except insofar as they are characterized by meaningfulness, the system of reference from which their meaningfulness is derived must precede any actual comportment towards them. This necessary and unavoidable prestructure of understanding constitutes what Heidegger calls the hermeneutic circle. For Heidegger, there can never be any question of abolishing or putting aside the essentially circular structure of our understanding. Philosophically speaking, an adequate understanding is not a matter of " getting out of" the hermeneutic circle but of "getting into it" in the proper manner. In other words: our understanding can never function without a presupposed frame of reference from which the meaningfulness of entities is derived. Thus an adequate understanding is dependent upon beginning with an appropriate frame of reference suitable to the nature of the entities in question. (Compare the remarks on Heidegger's concept of phenomenology in Section 2.4.)

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Every act of understanding, then, assumes an ultimate frame of reference or horizon [Horizont]7 with reference to which we understand whatever is understood. We will address the subject of understanding and its circular structure in more detail in Section 2.6. For now, it is sufficient to underscore in passing that Heidegger believes that it is simply not possible to comport ourselves towards entities unless they are understood as meaningful. That is to say: we must always assume some prior frame of reference in order to understand what entities are, and it is never possible to comport ourselves towards them outside of the meaningfulness conferred upon them by this frame of reference. Thus in the case of our example, it would be wrong to say that entities exist in some objective non-meaningful state and that this state is merely layered over with a surface interpretation, which does not affect their essential objective nature. Rather, from Heidegger's point of view, the definition of Being as laboratory observability quite literally determines what does and does not exist because it determines how we do and do not comport ourselves towards the entities in question.8 Returning to our example, it has become reasonably obvious that if we make the decision that whatever cannot be observed under laboratory conditions does not exist, this decision cannot properly be the result of our laboratory experiments but only of a criterion of existence that we assume beforehand. This implied criterion does not appear to arise from a conscious decision to restrict oneself to laboratory facts in our example. It is rather more the case that it has the status of a latent background assumption. How, then, does it come about that we make such assumptions? We could almost say—and Heidegger does say—that such background assumptions are emotional in nature. They occur prior to any actual working out of conceptual systems and systems of meaningfulness. The proponents of radical behaviourism and of radical materialism, on this account, begin with an inclination to acknowledge laboratory phenomena and a disinclination to acknowledge the existence of entities outside the laboratory.9 Heidegger's term for this sort of inclination and disinclination is sensibility [Befindlichkeit].


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According to Heidegger's phenomenological analysis, it is only on the basis of sensibility that a person can be concerned or occupied with entities in the world at all. This is because one's basic sensibility—one's emotional state or mood — determines the range of entities towards which one is inclined or disinclined. Heidegger sometimes puts this, as we shall see in Section 2.6, by saying that sensibility reveals to us the fact that we ourselves exist and have the task of existence before us. It is because of our basic sensibility that we can comport ourselves towards entities in the world at all. This sensibility is the foundation of what we call emotions, feelings, and states of mind. In other words: radical behaviourism and similar positions are not merely theoretical positions. They are associated with a certain sensibility, that is, with a certain fundamentally emotional relation to the world. From a Heideggerian point of view the theoretical position of radical behaviourism is a consequence of this particular emotional relation to the world, and not vice versa. The priority of feelings and emotions, of sensibility, in Heidegger's description of our comportment towards entities in the world is a unique feature of his philosophy, and it is this feature that, in his later writings, lends his philosophical aesthetics its peculiar and fascinating explanatory power. Let us pause to take stock of the results of our explanations. On Heidegger's account of understanding, entities in the world are always understood in terms of their meaningfulness. The various systems of meaningfulness are interlocked or nested. Furthermore, for Heidegger, there is a fundamental overarching system of meaningfulness with reference to which we determine what does and does not exist. Heidegger's name for this system or criterion is Being. In short: every possible comportment towards entities presupposes an understanding of Being, since it is only with reference to Being that we are able to understand what does and does not exist, what is and is not to be found within systems of meaningfulness at all. In order to make this idea plausible, we interpreted a radical form of materialist behaviourism as a theoretical position arising

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from a particular restricted definition of Being. It is, however, evident that the criterion of laboratory observability is not the only possible definition of Being, nor is it necessarily even the most fundamental. Most of us do not make use of this particular criterion—and yet we have no problems comporting ourselves towards entities at the level of everyday life. On Heidegger's view, there must be a fundamental understanding of Being, since without this understanding we would be unable to comport ourselves towards meaningful entities at all. The question then arises: what is the fundamental everyday understanding of Being upon which all our comportments towards meaningful entities in the world is based? We began with two initial definitions of "Being": (1) that with reference to which we understand what it means for something to be an entity at all; and (2) that by means of which we understand the difference between existence and non-existence.10 To borrow a distinction from Leibniz,11 it is clear that these two definitions are merely nominal definitions. That is to say: they do indeed specify unique and characteristic features of Being, but they do not yet tell us what Being in fact is. The aim of Heidegger's Being and Time is to supplement these nominal definitions with a real definition: to specify the precise criterion in terms of which we understand an entity as at all meaningful, as something to which it is possible to comport ourselves at all. "Being" in Being and Time is that which characterizes entities as such, that is, the criterion with reference to which we decide what is and is not an entity (or demarcate the existent from the nonexistent, both terms taken in their usual sense). It is particularly important not to confuse this sense of "Being" with the other senses in which Heidegger uses the term. Thus the "being" in "being-in-the-world" simply means "the human act of existing (in the world)." There is absolutely no implication that Being is manifesting in the world through human agents; thus Heidegger's concept of Being is not at all to be equated with Hegel's concept of Geist or "spirit." Furthermore, Heidegger sometimes speaks of the "being" of a particular phenomenon.


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This use of "being" simply means the characteristic feature of the phenomenon in question. Thus, when Heidegger speaks of the "being of entities/7 he simply means their defining feature, which, for entities as such and as a whole, is Being.12 A frequently repeated claim in Being and Time is Heidegger's insistence that "Being is not something like entities/' By this, he simply means "If we want to know what Being is, it makes no sense to examine entities and find out what 'stuff they happen to be made of, whether 'atoms' or 'substances' or anything of that sort because it will not answer our question—our answer would be determined in advance by our hidden assumption of what Being is. What we really need to do is inquire into the fundamental criterion we use to decide what the basic defining feature of entities as such is; and this is 'Being' in the proper sense of the word. Once we have this answer, then we can go back and ask what they happen to be made of and get a proper answer."13 The difference between Being and entities is neither mysterious nor mystical. It is as simple as the distinction between a criterion for meaningfulness (Being) and the meaningful thing itself (entities). 2.3 THE STRUCTURE OF THE BOOK BEING AND TIME (§§5,6,8) Being and Time, in the form in which we have it, is in fact only a portion of the first part of a much longer projected work, which Heidegger never finished writing. Up until the publication of the seventh edition in 1953, Being and Time carried the words "First Half" on its title page; they were deleted with the publication of the seventh and following editions. Generally speaking, when scholars refer to the book Being and Time they are referring only to the portion of the book that was actually written and published by Heidegger. We will retain this use of the title Being and Time as meaning only the actually published work unless it is explicitly stated that we are discussing the originally planned book as a whole. Note that some commentators refer to the published

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portion of Being and Time as "Division I," following Macquarrie and Robinson's translation of Heidegger's Table of Contents, where the main text of Being and Time is referred to as the Erster Tell (the "first part"). In order to understand the true significance of the published parts of Being and Time, it is important to clarify their function within the much larger work that Being and Time was originally intended to be. Heidegger tells us in § 8 of Being and Time that the book as a whole is divided into two parts, corresponding to the two tasks involved in working out the answer to the question of Being.14 Each of these two parts is divided into three sections as follows: Part One. The Interpretation of Dasein towards Timeliness and the Explication of Time as the Transcendental Horizon of the Question Concerning Being. 1. The Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein. 2. Dasein and Timeliness. 3. Time and Being. Part Two. Fundamentals of a Phenomenological Destruction of the History of Ontology Following the Guiding Theme [Leitfaden] of the Problematic of Temporality. 1. Kant's Doctrine of Schematism and of Time as a Preliminary Stage of a Problematic of Temporality. 2. The Ontological Foundation of Descartes' "cogito sum" and the Incorporation of Mediaeval Ontology into the Problematic of the "res cogitans." 3. Aristotle's Treatise on Time as a Turning Point15 for the Phenomenal Basis and the Limits of Ancient Ontology. Before we go on to further discuss the structure of Being and Time, a few brief remarks concerning Heidegger's terminology are in order. Dasein is Heidegger's term for humans and for the particular manner of existence that characterizes them. It is an


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ordinary German word and in everyday speech means the same as "existence." Etymologically, Dasein is a compound of the adverb da, meaning "there/7 and the infinitive sein or "being." As Heidegger frequently plays upon the literal meaning of the word, it is important to somehow preserve the etymology in translation, but there unfortunately seems to be no elegant means of doing so. In order to avoid such clumsy neologisms as "therebeing," most translators simply retain the original German word Dasein. As this word has become more or less familiar to the English-speaking philosophical world, we will also follow this convention here. It is important to keep in mind that Heidegger's use of the term Dasein in Being and Time is equivocal. In the strict sense, the term Dasein refers to "being-in-the-world," or the structural unity of the world, the self, and the world-self relation. In some passages, however, Heidegger uses Dasein as a synonym for the self alone. This equivocation may occasion some confusion as to whether Heidegger believes that there is a plurality of "Daseins." As we shall see, Heidegger of course believes that there are many separate selves. However, the world in which these selves exist is indeed a shared world common to all. These points should be firmly kept in mind in order to avoid the confusion of Heidegger's concept of Dasein with a "universal mind" and similar philosophical constructions. With respect to the German words Zeitlichkeit and Temporalitat, it is important to break with the convention established by Macquarrie and Robinson.16 Both terms are normal German words with the same meaning, namely "temporality." Unfortunately, Heidegger appears to use both words in distinct terminological senses. Zeitlichkeit seems to refer to the authentic time of Dasein, whereas Temporalitat is Heidegger's terminological designation for the most primeval manifestation of time. This distinction allows Heidegger to later say that temporality "is the most primeval timing of timeliness as such."17 It is thus important to maintain the distinction in English translation. For Temporalitat we will use the obvious translation "temporality,"

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while we will appropriate the word "timeliness"as a translation of Zeitlichkeit. Bear in mind that "timeliness" in this sense has nothing to do with the usual meaning of the word. These terms will be further addressed in Section 3.5. A brief glance at the Table of Contents of Being and Time shows us that the book as we have it consists only of the first two sections of Part One. Technically speaking, Being and Time is in fact less than the " First Half" of the book Heidegger originally planned to write. We do, however, have a fair idea of the issues Heidegger would have addressed in the unfinished parts of Being and Time had he decided to follow his original outline. From a note to the first page of the posthumously published lecture Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie, originally held in 1927, we know that Heidegger intended the lecture as an attempt to work out the contents of Section Three of Part One, "Time and Being," to his satisfaction.18 As Being and Time was itself published in 1927, we can be reasonably certain that the contents of the lecture were being considered for possible inclusion in the "Second Half." The historical analysis that the lecture undertakes is meant to justify the introduction of the concept of the "ontological difference," a topic to which Heidegger would return in 1929 in "Vom Wesen des Grundes." The intended contents of Section One of Part Two, "Kant's Doctrine of the Schematism and of Time as a Preliminary Stage of a Problematic of Temporality," can be guessed at by examining the unpublished lecture Phanomenologische Interpretationen von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft (1927/28) and the book Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, published by Heidegger in 1929. Heidegger was particularly fascinated by a particularly obscure section in the second book of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason entitled "Of the Schematism of the Pure Concepts of Understanding."19 In this section Kant believes it necessary to introduce mediating structures between the Categories and the appearances (phenomena) given to us in experience. Kant terms such a "mediating representation" a "transcendental schema." A transcendental schema is able to "subsume appearances under


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Categories" by means of the "transcendental determination of time/' time being common to both "the manifold of the inner sense," whose "formal condition" it is, and to the Categories, whose generality implies a transcendental determination of time. Accordingly, the transcendental schemas are manners in which transcendental subjectivity generates the temporal structure of experience. Kant's treatment of the subject bears a certain resemblance to Heidegger's investigation of the temporal structure of Dasein in Being and Time, which suggests that Heidegger's interest in this Kantian framework was based on more than simple historical curiosity. Although Heidegger's remarks on Kant, Descartes, and Aristotle in § 6 give us a rough idea of the planned contents of Part Two, Heidegger does not appear to have worked out the contents of Sections Two and Three of Part Two at any great length. His probable general line of argument can be inferred from a reading of §§ 19-21 of Being and Time, which contain Heidegger's critique of Descartes' determination of the "world" as a res extensa, read in conjunction with §§ 78-81, which address the origin of the "vulgar" (inauthentic) concept of time. The brief remarks on Aristotle in §§ 81-82 along with the comments on the measurement of time in §§ 78-80 allow an educated guess as to Heidegger's concrete objections to Aristotle's theory of time. (See Section 3.8 for further details.) Heidegger's own presentation of the outline of Being and Time is particularly clumsy. He discusses the intended structure of the work as a whole in § 8, from which the outline of the two parts given above was taken, but explains the actual contents of Part One in § 5 and the contents of Part Two in § 6. To compound the confusion, it is not even clear that § 5 corresponds to Part One and § 6 to Part Two, because the reader can only figure this out by matching up the titles and contents of § 5 and § 6 with the structural outline given in § 8. To ensure that the reader will almost certainly overlook the connection, Heidegger inserts the notoriously obscure § 7 on the concept of phenomenology between the two sections on the detailed contents of the book

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(§ 5 and § 6) and the final section on its structure as a whole (§ 8). Since there is no point in repeating this error, we have begun the present section of this book by addressing the structural outline in § 8 and will go on to address the detailed outlines of Parts One and Two in § 5 and § 6. We will reserve the discussion of § 7 on Heidegger's concept of phenomenology for Section 2.4.20 In § 5 of Being and Time, entitled "The Ontological Analytic of Dasein as an Exposure of the Horizon for an Interpretation of the Overall Sense of Being/' Heidegger emphasizes, in accordance with his phenomenological method, that the task of Part One is to identify and describe fundamental structures of human existence —of Dasein—in its "average everydayness" [in seiner durchschnittlichen Alltaglichkeit]. The point of describing Dasein at the level of average everydayness is to avoid the artificially restricted contexts of scientific explanations (recall the quasi-behaviourist example discussed in Section 2.2) as well as the artificially created sphere of transcendental consciousness resulting from the Husserlian epoche. (See Sections 1.3 and 1.4.) The "sense" [Sinn] of the being of the entity called Dasein will, so Heidegger tells us, turn out to be "timeliness" [Zeitlichkeit]. This analysis is a preparatory analysis (recall the title of Section One of Part One, namely "The Preparatory Fundamental Analysis of Dasein"), because it will serve as a foundation for going on to inquire what the overall sense of Being [der Sinn von Sein uberhaupt], and not just the being of Dasein, is. The preparatory analysis will lead to the question of "Dasein and timeliness" (Section Two). It will be shown, says Heidegger, that it is with reference to time that Dasein can at all understand and interpret what Being is (hence the title of Section Three of Part One, "Time and Being"21). The concrete answer to the question concerning the sense of Being will arise as a result of the problematic of the "temporality of Being." In § 6, entitled "The Task of a Destruction of the History of Ontology," Heidegger describes the fundamentally historical task of Part Two of Being and Time. Early interpreters of this section typically failed to realize that Heidegger was using


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the term "destruction" in its literal Latin sense, namely the act of "unlayering" or of "taking apart/' and not in the sense of "destroying."22 This mistake in turn frequently led early interpreters to maintain that the importance of history could be taken as a reliable indicator of the difference between the early and the late Heidegger. It is, however, plain that Part Two of Being and Time was from the very beginning intended to contain a number of historical analyses concerning the origin and development of our present understanding of Being. We can sum up Heidegger's aim in Part Two in three questions: (1) Why does Kant identify time as the structure mediating between the phenomena of experience and the spontaneous subjective activity expressed in the Categories? (2) Why does Descartes conceive of the existence of the ego (or res cogitans) as absolutely certain, and why does he follow mediaeval ontology in conceiving both of the ego and of the world (res extensa) as temporal creations of a timeless and uncreated Divinity?23 (3) Why is the ancient Greek conception of time oriented towards presence (i.e., duration) and the present, and in what sense is Aristotle's explanation of time in the Physics a historical turning point for the comprehension of time? In the following chapters we will present an interpretative overview of the main theses of Being and Time in its published form, that is, of Sections One and Two of Part One. The rather confused and confusing Table of Contents that Heidegger himself published at the beginning of Being and Time is of little use in organizing the material in a comprehensible fashion. It would perhaps not be too much of an exaggeration to claim that the main contribution of the complicated arrangement reflected in the Table of Contents is to obscure the underlying conceptual structure of the book. Accordingly, we will employ a somewhat

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different arrangement of the material, which rather better reflects the true conceptual structure of Being and Time: Remaining Introductory Material Section 2.4: Heidegger's Concept of Phenomenology (§ 7) The World Analysis Section 2.5: The Everyday World (§§ 9-27) The Indifferent and Inauthentic Modes of Existence Section 2.6: The Indifferent Mode of Being-in (§§ 2834): Sensibility, Understanding, and Talk Section 2.7: The Inauthentic Mode of Being-in (§§ 3538): Turmoil, Curiosity, and Crosstalk Authenticity I: Sensibility Section 2.8: Authentic Sensibility: Angst (§§ 39-40) The Consideration of Primeval Structures Section 2.9: The Primeval Structure of Dasein as Concern (§§ 41-42) Section 2.10: Reality and Truth (§§ 43-44) Authenticity II: Understanding and Talk Section 3.1: The Problem of Completeness and Authenticity (§§ 45-46) Section 3.2: Authentic Understanding: Death (§§ 47-53) Section 3.3: Authentic Talk: The Call of Conscience (§§54-60) From Authenticity to Timeliness Section 3.4: The Structure of Authenticity as Decidedness (§§ 61-62) Section 3.5: Timeliness as the Sense of Concern (§§ 63-66) Timeliness and Temporality Section 3.6 Timeliness and Its Modifications (§§ 67-71) Section 3.7 The Foundation of Historicity (§§ 72-77) Section 3.8 The Vulgar Concept of Time (§§ 78-83) It should also be kept in mind that in each section we will be discussing only the highlights of the sections in Being and Time to which the sections of this book correspond. Our aim is


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an adequate understanding of Heidegger's philosophy as it is expressed in Being and Time. An exhaustive commentary would surely require many volumes. 2.4 HEIDEGGER'S CONCEPT OF PHENOMENOLOGY (§ 7) In § 7 of Being and Time Heidegger puts forth his concept of the "phenomenological method of investigation/7 The section is divided into three subsections entitled "The Phenomenon Concept/' "The Concept of Logos/' and "The Preliminary Concept of Phenomenology." Heidegger's aim is to explain the meaning of "phenomenology" by explaining the meanings of its two component words. This can, however, only result in a preliminary concept of phenomenology because, as we shall see, Heidegger's concept of phenomenology is decisively influenced by the results of his analysis of the act of understanding. In this section we will attempt to unite these disparate threads of Heidegger's exposition and weave them into a coherent and consistent whole. Following Heidegger, we can begin with a consideration of the etymology of the terms in question. The word "phenomenon" is a transliteration of the ancient Greek word phainomenon, a form of the verb phaino, meaning "to show," "to bring to light," or "to make appear." The verb, used in an intransitive sense, can also mean "to shine" or "to gleam." Unsurprisingly, phaino is also etymologically related to phaos (or phos), meaning "starlight," "brightness," or "daylight." We are familiar with the distinction in English grammar between the active voice and the passive voice of verbs: the former communicates that the subject of the verb is itself undertaking the action expressed by the verb ("I see"), while the latter indicates that the subject in question is undergoing the action which the verb expresses ("I am seen").24 Ancient Greek recognized a third or middle voice, which was used to indicate a close relationship between the subject and the action expressed by a verb. Thus

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when the middle voice is used, the action is done to, for, or by the subject itself. Heidegger calls attention to the fact that phainomenon is a present participle of the verb phaino in the middle voice (-0men-) with a neuter ending (-on). If, following Heidegger, we render phaino into English as "showing," we can approximate the literal meaning of phainomenon in English as "a thing that shows itself by itself/'25 Two issues are particularly important here: that a phenomenon shows itself, and not something else; and that it does this by itself, that is, in an "objective" manner. Thus "phenomena" are, for Heidegger, the "totality of that which is clear as day or can be brought to light" [§ 7 A, p. 28]. Phenomena in this Heideggerian sense are clearly not phenomena in the Kantian sense, that is, not mere appearances of an unknown and unknowable thing in itself. In order to further clarify the meaning of "phenomenon" and, in particular, to divest the word of its peculiarly Kantian associations, Heidegger introduces conceptual distinctions between a "phenomenon," a "semblance" [Schein], and an "appearance" [Erscheinung]: (1) A phenomenon in the proper sense is a "self-showing" thing, that which shows itself as it truly is. (2) By contrast, something that shows itself as other than it in fact is, such as fool's gold, Heidegger terms a semblance. (3) Finally, something that, in showing itself, indicates something else, is an appearance. Thus reddened cheeks, a sweaty forehead, trembling, and so on are, for Heidegger, appearances of the underlying fever. By means of these conceptual distinctions, Heidegger arrives at what he terms the "formal phenomenon concept." The formal phenomenon concept is a characterization of the manner in which something shows itself; whatever shows itself as what it truly is is a phenomenon. No definite sort of thing is being spoken of at this stage. This also holds true of our definitions of semblance


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and appearance. In each case we are concerned solely with the manner in which things — any and all things — show themselves. In order to undertake a concrete phenomenological investigation of a particular subject, however, we must make a decision as to precisely which things we will address as the phenomena of our investigation. We must, in Heidegger's words, "deformalize" the formal phenomenon concept.26 If we make the decision to allow entities (in the Heideggerian sense; see Section 2.1) to serve as our phenomena, we arrive at the vulgar phenomenon concept. It must be kept firmly in mind that here, as everywhere else, Heidegger always uses the word "vulgar" in the original sense of the Latin vulgaris, namely "general/7 "usual," and "everyday." Heidegger never uses the word in a pejorative sense. The vulgar phenomenon concept refers merely to the usual habit of considering entities as the primary objects of interest. Heidegger further distinguishes a second deformalized phenomenon concept, namely the phenomenological phenomenon concept. The phenomena of phenomenology—in the sense of that which phenomenology wants to bring to light—are the obscured and hidden features of experience as such, that which is constantly present in every experience as such but which is also constantly overlooked in experience.27 Recalling what we said in Section 2.1 about Heidegger's position that it is our very familiarity with entities that disguises the true structural features of our comportments towards them, it is clear that for Heidegger the phenomena of phenomenology are simply these very structural features. That is to say: the phenomena of Heidegger's phenomenology are the defining structural features of entities themselves and as such: the being of entities, or more generally, Being itself. This is why Heidegger can say that "taken concretely, phenomenology is the academic discipline that addresses the being of entities —ontology."28 Having clarified the subject matter of Being and Time by explaining the word "phenomenon," we will go on to clarify its approach by considering the meaning of the word logos.

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The Greek verb legein, from which logos is derived, originally meant "to gather together/' "to collect/' or "to harvest." Depending on the particular context, the chief meanings of logos include "speech," "reason," "rationality," "sense," "meaning," "definition," "argument", "principle," and "account." For his own purposes, Heidegger settles on the literal translation of logos as "talk" [Rede]. Following Aristotle, Heidegger sees the essential feature of logos or "talk" as the ability to reveal that which is talked about, the ability to indicate something, to make one aware of it. In Aristotelian terminology, this peculiarity of revealing (delouri) the matter in question through talk occurs as an apophainesthai. This verb is a compound word consisting of the preposition apo-r meaning "away from," "down from," "hither from," and the verb phainesthai, the middle-voice infinitive of phaino, whose meaning we discussed in connection with the word phainomenon. According to Heidegger, talk as apophainesthai is in some way connected with phainomena: talk "brings something to light," "clears matters up," and it does this for (expressing the middle voice) the talker and the partners in conversation themselves.29 There is no reason for us to be particularly surprised by this evaluation of the logos-, our whole academic culture is founded upon the assumption that talk does indeed have the power to clarify matters, to bring hidden facts to light, and ultimately to correct mistakes and misapprehensions. Consider the common function of talk in Plato's dialogues, in democratic government, in careful explanation, in verbal instruction, and in everyday conversation. In each case, we assume that talk does indeed have the ability to clear up difficulties, and not merely in the abstract and formal sense of isolating and correcting merely "logical" errors. Given that talk does indeed have the ability to clear up matters in this way, what is the fundamental nature of its clarificatory activity? In § 7 B, Heidegger renders Aristotle's apophainesthai into German as Sehenlassen, or "letting see." In German, the verbal phrase sehen lassen has two possible senses. If the object is a thing, etwas sehen lassen, then its meaning is


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"to let something be seen/' If, on the other hand, the object is a person, jemanden sehen lassen, the meaning of the phrase is "to cause someone to see." The nominalized form used by Heidegger, Sehenlassen, has the double meaning of "to let see" and "to cause/allow to see." For Heidegger, then, the fundamental characteristic of talk is to let something be seen and to have someone see. Elsewhere I have suggested that in analogy to words such as "encumber," "ennoble," "enflame," and "entangle," Heidegger's use of Sehenlassen could be reflected in English by means of the term envisioning.™ Following Heidegger, then, we will denote the fundamental character of logos as talk as envisioning?1 According to Heidegger, "the function of the logos consists in the unembellished envisioning of something, of letting entities be found out".32 Logos as talk thus plays an essential role in the phainesthai ("self-showing") of the phenomenon ("self-showing thing"). This special role of talk in making things evident is reflected in the Greek etymology of the terms, although the connection is not merely etymological. Talk has the capacity to envision phenomena. By this we do not mean that talk alters our physical perceptions of the world around us; rather, we mean that talk has the capacity to modify our comportments towards entities such that we envision them as they truly are. The phenomena that are envisioned in this way are envisioned through talk. That is to say: phenomena are envisioned by talking about them. For a phenomenologist working in the Heideggerian tradition, then, talk is the manner in which we gain access to phenomena.33 What, then, is the meaning of "phenomenology" as a compound of phainomenon and logos? Quite simply, phenomenology is the systematic pursuit of envisioning phenomena through talk. Heidegger's name for this systematic pursuit is hermeneutic phenomenology. The discussion of the hermeneutic character of Heidegger's phenomenology in § 7 C begins with the following words: It will emerge from the investigation [i.e., from Being and Time] itself: the methodological sense of phenomenological

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description is interpretation [Auslegung]. The logos of the phenomenology of Dasein has the character of hermeneuein, through which the actual sense of being and the fundamental structures of its own being are declared [kundgegeben] to the understanding of being belonging to Dasein itself. [§ 7 C, p. 37]

In ancient Greek, the verb hermeneuein has the meanings "to explain/7 "to interpret/' and "to translate." Heidegger chooses to call his phenomenology hermeneutic phenomenology because it is by means of talk that Being is to be investigated. In contrast to Husserl's methodological use of the epoche, it is through talk alone that Heidegger wishes to envision the ontological structures that are its chosen phenomena. In so doing, Heidegger's phenomenology does nothing more than to articulate what we already know from our everyday practice and experience, although this knowledge, which is tacitly assumed by every manner of comportment, typically remains ungrasped and unarticulated. It is clear from this, however, that Heidegger's method in Being and Time cannot be purely descriptive in nature. Were it a purely descriptive approach, it could never expose hidden features of existence but would have to remain content with a description of the features that are not hidden.34 (See the further explanations below.) The context of the first sentence of the passage quoted above makes it clear that in speaking of the methodological sense of phenomenological description as "interpretation," Heidegger is referring to § 32 of Being and Time, which is entitled "Understanding and Interpretation." It is important to combine what is said in § 7 with the detailed analysis of interpretation in § 32. For our purposes, however, this can be deferred until the discussion of the circular structure of understanding in Section 2.6. For the present, it is sufficient to remark in passing that the second title used by Heidegger to designate his philosophical enterprise in Being and Time, namely fundamental ontology, is derived from the concept of hermeneutic phenomenology. For Heidegger,


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hermeneutic phenomenology also seeks to work out the conditions under which ontological investigation is at all possible35—that is to say, it attempts to give a detailed and accurate account of what any and all acts of understanding and interpretation in the widest sense entail. Because it works out the foundation of any possible ontology, hermeneutic phenomenology is also fundamental ontology, that is, the philosophical basis upon which all other ontologies have to build. As we have briefly seen in Section 2.2 and as we shall see in more detail in Section 2.6, for Heidegger understanding has an essentially circular structure. What does this mean for the methodology of Being and Time? Heidegger addresses this question briefly in § 61 and towards the end of § 62, at length in § 63, and in passing in § 65 and § 69 b). Without a consideration of these sections it is not possible to truly understand the nature of Heidegger's descriptive and interpretative method in Being and Time. We will, however, restrict ourselves to the main points. Towards the end of § 61, Heidegger remarks that a genuine method "is founded in a suitable preliminary glimpse [Vorblick] of the fundamental constitution of the 'object' or object realm [Gegenstandsbezirk] that is to be disclosed" [§61, p. 303]. Accordingly, in order to come up with a genuine method at all, we must already know something in advance about the essential nature of the objects of our concern. Towards the end of § 62, Heidegger notes that his phenomenological interpretation of Dasein is not presuppositionless in any true sense. He claims, in effect, that a truly presuppositionless philosophy is impossible. However, genuine philosophy will employ presuppositions in a legitimate manner, namely to bring to light the character of the phenomena with which it is occupied. In § 63 Heidegger addresses the question of method at length by addressing the hermeneutic situation that his philosophical explorations have attained. The "hermeneutic situation" is a "preliminary clarification and securing out of and in a fundamental experience of the 'object' that is to be disclosed" [§ 45, p. 232]. It is the initial situation with which

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every interpretation begins. Since every interpretation is also an act of understanding, the hermeneutic situation is characterized by its threefold structure: "prepossession" [Vorhabe], "preview" [Vorsicht], and "preconception" [Vorgriff]. (These terms will be addressed at length in Section 2.6.) This threefold structure expresses the sum total of the methodological presuppositions that every interpretation requires. Ontological interpretation too, such as Heidegger undertakes in Being and Time, is characterized by this structure.36 If no philosophical interpretation can be truly presuppositionless, is Being and Time in effect not presupposing the very points that its phenomenological analysis is supposed to demonstrate? Is Heidegger not in effect arguing in a circle? Heidegger addresses the problem with the following words: The " circle reproach" levelled against the existential interpretation claims: the idea of existence and of overall Being is "presupposed" and "afterwards" Dasein is interpreted in order to derive the idea of Being from it. But what does "presupposing" mean? Is a proposition put forth with the idea of existence from which we deduce further propositions concerning the being of Dasein according to the formal rules of implication? Or does this pre-supposing not rather have the character of an understanding planning [des verstehenden Eniwerfens], such that the interpretation which elaborates such an understanding first lets the interpreted itself speak out so that it can decide of itself whether it, as this entity, yields the being-constitution towards which it was disclosed [...] in the plan [Entwurf]! [§ 63, p. 314-315]

In other words: for Heidegger every act of understanding inevitably and necessarily involves presuppositions. This is a fundamental trait of the human act of understanding. Accordingly, even in a phenomenological investigation of the fundamental structure of Dasein, such as we find in Being and Time, presuppositions are inevitable. However, it is not the case


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that these presuppositions are arbitrary. Ideally, they are founded in a preliminary understanding of the subject matter, in this case the structure of Dasein itself. The hermeneutic situation of Being and Time (ideally, at any rate) is deliberately structured so as to bring this essential feature of human understanding to light in an appropriate manner. Having done this, the reader, who is himself or herself also Dasein, can go on to decide whether Dasein has been appropriately characterized by this conceptual schema. Heidegger, in effect, claims to be articulating a convenient conceptual schema within which certain essential features of Dasein become visible. This conceptual schema is meant to articulate what we always already know and do in contrast to Husserl's awkward and artificial theoretical modification of the everyday point of view. Husserl's approach had been criticized by other philosophers because any theoretical observation of a state of consciousness alters it. Thus the state of consciousness being studied is not the same as the original state. It becomes an observed state rather than the lived state it originally was before undergoing Husserl's theoretical modification. Heidegger, who agreed with this criticism in principle, replies that we already know how we interact with the world. Therefore we do not need to theoretically study this interaction, but rather merely articulate it. In putting forth a conceptual schema for the articulation of Dasein's everyday comportment towards the world, Heidegger is of course not merely putting forth an arbitrary set of ideas. He also believes that this conceptual schema is particularly suited to express the structure of Dasein. Just as every interpretation is dependent upon presuppositions, Dasein itself is dependent upon " presuppositions" as to what constitutes Being in order to be able to interact with entities at all. (Recall the example in Section 2.2.) The interpretation of Dasein put forth in Being and Time is adequate when it brings the circular structure of understanding to light and when it identifies the presuppositions involved in any interaction with entities (i.e., when it is able to answer the question of Being). The conceptual schema of Being and Time is thus to be understood as a particularly suitable, but

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not necessarily the only, hermeneutic situation within which such an interpretation is possible. In any case, Heidegger explicitly and repeatedly states that Being and Time itself, being an interpretation, shares in the circular structure of understanding. On Heidegger's own account of understanding and interpretation (§§ 31-32) a purely descriptive account is impossible. It follows that a characterization of Heidegger's methodology as purely descriptive in nature is onesided and inadequate. Hermeneutic phenomenology does not just involve observation. It is also intensely practical. It is supposed to have a concrete effect on the way we live our lives. As we shall see in Section 2.6, Heidegger also believes that no act of understanding, and thus no act of interpretation, can take place without a particular sensibility [Befindlichkeit]. That is to say: every interpretation is dependent upon a particular mood or emotional timbre. No doubt some of the peculiar stylistic features of Being and Time can be traced back to this conviction of Heidegger's. This topic is too complex to explore here, but the interested reader should compare § 69 b) of Being and Time with the remarks on retrieval [Wiederholung] as authentic continuance [Gewesenheit] in Section 3.6. 2.5 THE EVERYDAY WORLD (§§ 9-27) Let us now return to the subject of Section 2.1 and begin translating our initial presentation of the subject matter into a more properly Heideggerian framework. As we saw previously, a central feature of Heidegger's philosophy in Being and Time is its conception of the world and its relation to Dasein. In § 9 of Being and Time, Heidegger points out that an essential feature of Dasein is that it is characterized by selfhood. Dasein is in some sense a "self." This characteristic of Dasein Heidegger terms "evermineness" \Jemeinigkeit]. Anticipating the content of later analyses, Heidegger distinguishes three37 existential modes of evermineness: "authenticity" [Eigentlichkeit], "inauthenticity" [Uneigentlichkeit], and "averageness" [Durchschnittlichkeit] or


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"indifference" [Indifferenz].38 The analyses of §§ 14-34 of Being and Time are concerned with indifferent modes of existence, that is, with existence insofar as it is neither properly authentic nor properly inauthentic. Inauthenticity is the subject of §§ 35-38, while §§ 39-40 and §§ 45-60 investigate fundamental structures of Dasein with a view towards explaining the concept of authenticity. (Compare the outline of Being and Time given in Section 2.3.) At this point in the ongoing analyses of Being and Time, the primeval structure of Dasein is grasped by Heidegger as beingin-ihe-world. (As we shall see in Section 2.9, Heidegger will later understand being-in-the-world in terms of a more primeval structure, namely concern, and will go on to understand concern in terms of a still more primeval structure, namely timeliness, as we shall see in Section 3.5.) "Being-in-the-world" is a term referring to the essential unity of three different fundamental structures of Dasein, namely, (1) the world in which Dasein exists and towards which it comports itself; (2) the entity that is in the world and that is characterized by evermineness, namely the self, and (3) the relation that exists between the world and the aforementioned entity, namely "being-in."™ Two important points must be made at this juncture. Firstly, in Being and Time Heidegger, rather inconveniently, uses Dasein in two senses. In the loose sense, Dasein denotes the self, or an entity characterized by selfhood; in the strict sense, Dasein refers to the entire structure of being-in-the-world, that is, the world, the self, and being-in. The reader must constantly be aware of the context when reading Being and Time in order to decide in which of the two senses the term Dasein is presently being used. Secondly, note that the "being" in "being-in-the-world" is not the same as the "Being" that it is the task of the question of Being to define. In "being-in-the-world" the word "being" is simply an

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equivalent term for existing in a world. (See the commentary on "being-in-the-world" in Appendix A for more details.) The third chapter of the first section of Part One of Being and Time is comprised of §§ 14-24 and is entitled "The Worldliness of the World." In these sections Heidegger undertakes a detailed phenomenological analysis of the concept of world and attempts to isolate and describe its defining structural features or "worldliness" [Weltlichkeit]. In the fourth chapter, which includes §§ 25-27 and is entitled "Being-in-the-world as Being-with and Being-self. The 'One'," Heidegger investigates the structural foundations of the self and selfhood. We will address both these topics, Heidegger's third and fourth chapters, in the present section, namely Section 2.5. Finally, in the fifth chapter of the first section of Part One, which includes §§ 28-38 of Being and Time, Heidegger is concerned with working out the structural details of the relation between the world and Dasein. He addresses the indifferent structures of the Dasein-world relation in §§ 29-34 through his phenomenological delineation of the roles played in everyday life by sensibility, understanding, and talk. We will devote Section 2.6 to these three indifferent modes of Dasein's comportment towards the world. In §§ 35-38 Heidegger addresses these same three structures in their inauthentic modes, which he calls "turmoil" [der Wirbel], "curiosity" [Neugier], and "crosstalk" [Gerede]. These inauthentic modes of existence will form the subject matter of Section 2.7. a) The Worldliness of the World We might think that our interaction with the world is a familiar enough comportment; why, then, should a detailed phenomenological analysis be necessary at all? Again we stumble upon a peculiar feature of everyday life: that it is possible to carry out actions without an explicit knowledge of what these actions involve. (Recall Section 1.4.) As a preliminary justification for a phenomenological analysis of the world, consider the trivial example of walking through a hallway. How do we actually experience the hallway when we make use of it to get from one place to another?


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A theoretical description might take into account the total distance travelled and divide it by the total time taken to traverse the distance in question. We might conclude from this that our experience of walking through the hallway must involve an awareness of travelling so many feet per second. And yet, if we attend closely to our experience of the hallway, we discover something very different from what the theoretical account leads us to expect. If, for example, I leave a classroom and make for the nearest exit, I typically am not focussing on the hallway in the process of making use of it to leave the building. Rather, I am focussed on a particular purpose, for instance, that of getting home in order to eat lunch. While I am actually walking through the hallway, the hallway itself seems to "fade into the background" while I am going about my task. True, the hallway does not "disappear" altogether; but my experience of it is quite different from what the theoretical account suggests it should be. There is, typically, no awareness of travelling so many feet per second and of counting off time second by second, no awareness of making progress foot by foot; rather there is a sort of "flowing along" from the classroom through the hallway and, finally, into my home. Given that we do in fact experience our everyday world in this way (or in a manner more or less resembling the above description), and given that we spend most of our lives interacting with the world at this level, the level of pragmatic everyday use, why do we expect an ultimate explanation of the world to come from a theoretical reflection upon our experience? It surely is inappropriate to describe our usual everyday experience of walking through a hallway as a marking off of travelled distance and elapsed time. Given that this is the case, it seems that a proper account of our experience of the world requires a completely different type of analysis. In order to understand our world, then, it is important to begin with a phenomenological, that is, descriptive-interpretative, account of our interaction with the world that preserves the original and distinctive character of this interaction. Only in this manner can we prevent our theoretical

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accounts from obscuring the very phenomena that they are supposed to reveal. Heidegger begins his investigation of the world phenomenon with an ontological analysis of the entities we come upon in the immediate everyday environment. This type of analysis differs from the analysis of Being as such because it focusses on a very narrow range of entities, namely those that we employ in the accomplishment of everyday tasks. Heidegger warns us in the initial paragraphs of § 14 that the world phenomenon is something different from the totality of "intramundane" [innerweltlich] entities and as such cannot be understood in terms of such entities. The analysis of intramundane entities serves only as a preparatory stage from whose perspective the world phenomenon as such can be sighted. In sighting the world phenomenon our final aim is to specify the "worldliness" [Weltlichkeit] of the world, that is, its fundamental and defining structural feature. The subject of our preliminary analysis is everyday intramundane entities insofar as they are met with in the comportment of "concernedness" [Besorgen].40 Concernedness refers to the range of comportments that are characterized by manipulation and use. Entities that we manipulate and use are "tools" [Zeug]. The term "tools" is used here in the widest possible sense. Anything used as a means to an end or to get something done is a tool. Tools include door handles, hammers, pliers, nails, needles, pliers, pens, pencils, paper, cars, elevators, computers, cups, glasses, knives, forks, spoons, and so on. Any entity exhibiting the characteristic of "usability" [Verwendbarkeit] for a particular purpose or "what-for" [Wbzw] counts in Heidegger's terminology as a "tool." In turn, Heidegger calls the entity to which the what-for of a tool refers (the entity to which the tool is applied) the "for-that" [Dazu] of that particular tool.41 A fundamental characteristic of tools is that they are never found in isolation but always within "tool-wholes" [Zeugganzes]. A tool-whole is the sum total of "references" [Verweisungen] that constitute a particular "in-order-to" [Um-zu]. Within tool-wholes


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as systems of reference (compare the less detailed explanation in Section 2.2), individual tools are assigned their particular whatfor. That is to say: tools are only recognizable as tools and can only function as the particular individual tools they happen to be when they are found within an appropriate context. In order for a hammer to be recognized as a hammer, I must understand the particular tool-whole in which it appears, that is, the general context of hammering, which includes such specific tasks as driving nails in order to fasten two boards together. Beginning with the tool-whole, which is characterized by a particular inorder-to (in this case, the particular in-order-to of fastening two boards together), I go on to assign the particular individual entity that I come upon in my immediate environment a particular what-for (in this case, the what-for of driving the nail that will hold the boards together). On Heidegger's "top-down" account, in the course of our everyday comportments towards entities we never begin with entities, but rather with tool-wholes, with general contexts or entire systems of reference. Beginning with tool-wholes, which constitute specific purposes, or in-order-tos, we go on to comport ourselves towards particular entities in our immediate environment. It is only by being found within tool-wholes that specific tools acquire their individual applications or what-fors. In other words: a workshop is not merely the totality of individual entities found within it. It is not a whole assembled from the sum of its parts. Rather, a workshop in the strict phenomenological sense is a particular tool-whole or context within which work is accomplished. Upon entering the workshop, I already expect the individual entities found within the workshop to have some relation to the work accomplished there. Beginning with this expectation, that is, with an understanding of the sort of work accomplished within a workshop, I go on to interpret the individual entities I find within the workshop with reference to my specific understanding of what takes place within a workshop. It is first within this interpretation with reference to tool-wholes that individual entities can be used as tools at all.

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Of course, this act of interpretation (see Section 2.6 for Heidegger's analysis of interpretation) does not create the entities in any real sense.42 When I come upon and employ tools within their particular tool-wholes, I clearly find and use them as separate from me (compare Section 2.10 for details on Heidegger's rejection of idealism). But it is equally clear that tools must be interpreted with reference to tool-wholes on order for their specific what-fors to be understood, that is, for them to be used as the tools that they in fact are. Imagine the visit of the luthier to the examining room of the X-ray technician, or of the dentist to the sculptor's studio. It is clear in each case that the tool-wholes are different from the ones to which the luthier and dentist are accustomed, and thus the particular entities they come upon within their immediate environment are lacking in meaningfulness for them. The particular entities that the luthier and the dentist find within the examining room or the studio are interpreted as unfamiliar tools, or in extreme cases, may fail to be interpreted as tools at all. There is, then, a certain plausibility to Heidegger's contention that tool-wholes are prior to individual tools, and that individual tools only acquire meaningfulness within tool-wholes. We will conclude our example by briefly noting that the physical workshop as such is itself an entity, that is, a tool acquiring its significance from a specific tool-whole. The wider tool-whole in which the entitial workshop acquires its particular what-for, namely to act as a convenient location for accomplishing particular sorts of work, is, for example, the building in which the workshop is located. This building is itself a tool with its own what-for (to house workshops, stores, apartments) rooted in a yet wider tool-whole (the municipal economy), and so on. In every instance it is the case that a tool-whole must be understood before the individual tools within that particular tool-whole are interpreted and used as tools. It is only because of the prior understanding of a tool-whole that a tool can be happened upon at all. Similarly, it is only because of the prior understanding of Being that an entity can be experienced as an entity.


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Another interesting feature of our tool-using comportments is their characteristic form of "knowledge." When we actually make use of tools in everyday situations, we are not explicitly aware of the tools in the process of using them. A hammer has a certain mass, colour, shape, and density, and all of these objective characteristics can be isolated, observed, and quantified. Even without scientific instruments it is possible, at an everyday level, to undertake a detailed study of the hammer and its physical properties. However, it is a fundamental characteristic of the successful use of tools that we are not aware of them in this way. In fact, such a " theoretical" comportment towards a tool would rather hinder our actual use of it by getting in the way of our ability to concentrate on the task before us. It seems that during actual successful use a tool "fades into the background" in a certain sense, just as, when entering a room, we are not distinctly aware of the door whose handle we turn, but rather simply make use of the door without an explicit consciousness that we are doing so. At the same time, our use of items is not "blind." There is a very definite awareness of the tool, its what-for, and the inorder-to belonging to the tool and our comportment towards it. This practical awareness of the tool is, however, very different from the sort of awareness involved in a deliberate systematic observation of the tool. The "view" we have of tools in their actual pragmatic use Heidegger calls our "purview" [Umsicht]. The literal meaning of the German term Heidegger uses is "view around." "Purview" is, accordingly, the view we have of a tool during its use, that is, when we are occupied with the totality of references assigned to the tool by the in-order-to of its specific tool-whole and that determine its what-for. Heidegger's term for the characteristic feature of tools found within our purview is "to-handedness" [Zuhandenheit]. To-handedness denotes the peculiarly "transparent" quality of a tool whose use is smooth and uninterrupted. This quality can be contrasted with the distinctive quality of a tool that is involved in a theoretical comportment in which it is observed rather than used. The characteristic feature

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of observed tools is their "at-handedness" [Vorhandenheit]. Such tools are merely available; they simply lie around. They cannot even be considered tools in the proper sense, since they are not at all in use. A tool is only truly experienced as a tool when it is being used in a proper manner. The theoretical consideration of tools, whether formally scientific or informally descriptive, robs them of their tool-character. What, then, confers tool-character upon entities experienced as tools, and what is lost when our theoretical comportments relate to tools as at-handed rather than to-handed? In § 16 of Being and Time Heidegger attempts to answer this question by analyzing cases in which the successful use of tools is impeded. Heidegger distinguishes three characteristics of tools in such situations: (1) a tool that is unusable, that is, not in a state to accomplish its particular function, is characterized by "conspicuousness" [Auffalligkeit]; (2) a tool whose use is hindered by something missing that is required for its use is characterized by "obtrusiveness" [Aufdringlichkeit]; and (3) a tool whose use impedes something else and is in the way is characterized by "defiance'' [Aufsassigkeii]. We can clarify these characteristics by means of a concrete example: (1) the hammer is available, but the head is loose; the unusable hammer is characterized by conspicuousness', (2) the hammer is usable, but the nails are missing; the missing nails cause the hammer to become characterized by obtrusiveness) and (3) I have to lock up the workshop and be home by six, but I still have to finish the hammering (the hammer is usable and nails are available); the hammer is characterized by defiance in the face of the other task I have to accomplish.


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On Heidegger's analysis, these three characteristics are all ways in which to-handed tools become at-handed. The essential feature of such situations, of the transformation of to-handedness into at-handedness, is the disturbance of a reference. When tools cannot be used for their intended purpose, the constitutive reference of the in-order-to to a what-for has been interrupted. For Heidegger, it is precisely in such situations that the structure of the world becomes conspicuous43 by its absence: With the purviewing awakening of the reference to the individual what-for, the latter itself, and with it the workcontext, the entire "workshop/7 comes into view, and it does so as that in which concernedness always already resides [worm sich das Besorgen immer schon aufhtilt]. The tool-context strikes one [leuchtet auf] not as something that one had never yet seen, but rather as a whole, which is constantly already viewed in advance in the purview. With this whole, however, the world makes itself known [meldet sich]. [§ 16, p. 75]

Note that it is precisely because the world, for the most part, does not make itself known that we are able to make proper use of tools at all. Just as the tool itself must remain to-handed in the process of accomplishing its work, the " not-making-itself-known of the world is the condition of the possibility of the not-steppingout of the to-handed from its inconspicuousness" [§ 16, p. 75]. In other words, in order for us to make proper use of tools, we cannot be concentrating on the specific system of references that define the tool as the tool that it is. In the process of hammering, we cannot undertake a thematic analysis of hammering, or we would not be hammering. This accounts for the initial hiddenness of the world phenomenon and its historical neglect (according to Heidegger) in previous philosophical accounts of the worldliness of the world, and above all in Descartes' definition of the world as spatial extension. What, then, is the fundamental being-character of tohanded entities, that is, tools? Heidegger introduces the term

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"connection" [Bewandtnis] in § 18 of Being and Time to designate the fundamental ontological structure of tools. According to Heidegger, the characteristic structural feature of intramundane entities as such is that they can be used as tools. When we come across entities in everyday life, our fundamental comportment towards them, on this analysis, is to use them to accomplish specific in-order-tos. We experience entities on the everyday level as means towards ends. Connection is a binary relation: there is always a connection of with . That is to say: the fundamental structure of a hammer is the connection of (the hammer) with (the nails). Heidegger states that the term "reference/7 which he had previously been using as though it were a more or less transparent notion, is in fact identical with the "of with " relation. This means, however, that we must search for the specific meaning of the term "connection" elsewhere. The act of connection is, according to Heidegger, a name for a specific comportment of Dasein: The connection-whole, however, can finally be traced back to a what-for with which there is no longer any connection, which is not an entity in the being-manner [Seinsart] of a to-handed entity inside a world, but rather an entity whose being is determined as being-in-the-world, to whose being-constitution worldliness itself belongs. This primary what-for is not a for-that [Dazu] as a possible with-which of a connection. The primary "what-for" is a purpose [Worum-willen]. The "sake" [Umwillen], however, always concerns the being of Dasein [...]. The indicated context [Zusammenhang] [...] leads from the structure of connection to the being of Dasein itself, as its actual [eigentlich] and sole purpose [Worum-willen] [...]. [§ 18, p. 84]

The comportment in which we confer a connection upon the entities we come upon in the world and so allow them to serve us as tools is termed "discovering" [entdecken] by Heidegger. "Discoveredness," then, functions as a term that indicates the


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appearance of an entity within the world as a result of Dasein's comportment towards it. The discovery of entities is an activity of Dasein. The discovery of intramundane entities occurs by comporting ourselves towards them such that we make a connection between the entity as a tool and a particular whatfor. This connection, however, can only be made with reference to a purpose, that is, to a particular use or end that we desire to attain. Heidegger's claim is that at the everyday level our fundamental interaction with the objects in our immediate environment consists in viewing them as means for achieving our own ends.44 It is important to emphasize that in Heidegger's phenomenological account of such an interaction with entities, these entities are not created by Dasein's comportment towards them, such as they might be considered within an idealist framework. Rather, it belongs to the very nature of Dasein's discovering that entities are discovered as already having been there before Dasein comported itself towards the entities in question. We find entities in our environment, whether natural products such as trees, animals, and metals, or products of human craft, such as hammers, chisels, and screwdrivers, to be things that are already particularly suited to achieve certain ends. They are discovered and not created by Dasein's experience of them. At this point we can briefly mention a technical definition of meaningfulness, which Heidegger, typically, first introduces much later on in Being and Time, namely in the first two sentences of § 69 c). There we are told that meaningfulness is the "context" [Zusammenhang, literally "hanging together"] of the relations inorder-to, what-for, for-that, and purpose. The manner in which these four relations are woven together in our comportments towards intramundane entities constitutes meaningfulness. It is to their structural unity that Heidegger refers when he speaks of the "worldliness" of the world. More light will be shed on Heidegger's position towards entities and their independence from Dasein in Section 2.10, but for now it should be sufficient to clarify Heidegger's position by

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quoting a short passage from § 39 of Being and Time: " Entities are independently of the experience, acquaintance, and knowledge through which they are disclosed, discovered and determined. Being, however, only 'is7 in the understanding of the entity to whose being such a thing as the understanding of being belongs" [§ 39, p. 183]. In opposition to idealism, Heidegger affirms that entities do indeed exist independently of us and our mental activity. However, the overarching framework by means of which alone we are able to comport ourselves towards entities, namely Being, is a part of us and belongs to our essential structure as Dasein. In Being and Time at any rate, Being is there only as long as we are. The comportment by which we assign connections to entities in order to discover them as tools is, according to Heidegger, the understanding of world. In the act of understanding world, Dasein refers itself to an " in-which" as the medium or environment for Dasein's ability to relate to entities characterized by connection.45 This, on Heidegger's analysis, is the phenomenon of world. In plain English, the world is simply the sum total of connections and connection-wholes within which Dasein discovers entities. Since connections are an element of Dasein, the structure of the world is itself a part of Dasein's structure. Since connections always emerge as a result of Dasein's purpose, the world—the sum total of connections and connection-wholes — is simply an expression of Dasein's purpose. The world is the "in-which" that Dasein carries along with itself as the area for its interaction with entities. This area is not to be understood as a physical space (though Heidegger will later contend that physical space is a function of this primeval spatiality); rather it is the network of references that connect entities as tools to each other and so to their individual what-fors. This entire system of references or relations emerging from Dasein's particular purpose, and which functions as the area in which Dasein can discover entities, is the phenomenon of the world. We saw that for Heidegger, there is a fundamental comportment, namely understanding, in which the fundamental


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structure of the world as such is created and maintained. For Heidegger, the world emerges from an act of understanding. This act of understanding creates the system of references that Dasein uses to guide itself in the course of its comportments towards intramundane entities. Insofar as individual references are grasped by Dasein in individual acts of understanding, Heidegger refers to them as having " meaning/7 The sum total of these individual "meanings" Heidegger calls "meaningfulness" [Bedeutsamkeit]. In the act of assigning meaningfulness to intramundane entities, Dasein understands its world. That is to say: the world is not an independent extended space in which human beings happen to find themselves; rather, the world is an essential structural feature of Dasein itself. We are not contained in the world. Rather, we carry the world along with us. Such a fundamental structural feature of Dasein is what Heidegger terms an existential. Meaningfulness is an existential of Dasein. It is this meaningfulness, as we shall see in the next section, that is of particular significance for Heidegger's analysis of language as talk.46 With the conclusion of the world analysis, we have finished our phenomenological investigation of one of the fundamental structures of being-in-the-world, namely the world in which Dasein exists and towards which it comports itself. Before we go on to discuss the second fundamental structure of being-in-theworld, namely the entity (Dasein) that is in the world and that is characterized by evermineness or selfhood, let us, following Heidegger at the end of § 18, briefly sum up the main points of the world-analysis: (1) the being of the intramundane entities that we first discover in our everyday comportments is tohandedness; (2) the being of to-handed entities is connection f (3) the being of entities insofar as they are discovered in theoretical comportments is at-handedness;

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(4) worldliness itself is a system of references [Verweisungszusammenhang]; and (5) the worldliness of the world is an existential, a structural feature of Dasein.48 Heidegger terms the types of being expressed in (1) and (3), namely to-handedness and at-handedness, categories, because they refer to entities that do not have the character of Dasein. By contrast, structures of being that refer to Dasein rather than intramundane entities are not categories but existentials. One of the fundamental distinctions to emerge from Heidegger's world analysis, then, is the distinction between intramundane entities and Dasein. The characterizations or categories that are applicable to the former are not, for Heidegger, under any circumstances applicable to the latter.49 Given that this is the case, how do we go on to characterize Dasein in contradistinction to entities? What and who is Dasein at the everyday level? b) The One-self In the course of the world analysis we investigated the fundamental nature of Dasein's comportments towards the entities it interacts with at the everyday level. In the process, we saw that the what-for of entities so discovered is a function of a particular purpose. Since the being of to-handed entities (or tools) is understood with reference to connection, and connection itself arises from a purpose of Dasein, it is clear that the being of tools is rooted in the being of Dasein. In order to complete our analysis of intramundane entities, it is therefore necessary to consider the being who interacts with these entities. Who is it that makes use of tools on the level of everyday interaction? As we previously saw, Heidegger's term for the essential quality of selfhood is evermineness. Evermineness is what allows me to recognize my own existence as my own. The term expresses the fact that in existing, I myself am concerned with my own existence. The choices I make are my choices, choices that belong to me and my life history and that are made by me and not by another. The inquiry into the evermineness of Dasein


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is accordingly an inquiry into the existential structures that make selfhood and the self at all possible. Why are my choices my own, and who is it that makes them at the everyday level of interaction with the world? To answer these questions, Heidegger picks up the threads where he left them upon the conclusion of the world analysis. In order to answer the question concerning the evermineness of Dasein, we will continue our investigation at the everyday level of Dasein7 s comportment, the average level of existence at which Dasein is first and foremost [zunachst und zumeist]50 to be found: its discovering of tools in the world. When we consider the use we make of tools, we see that the what-for of tools, that is, the particular work that they are meant to accomplish, often exhibits an essential reference to others. That is to say: if we consider a shoemaker at work, the shoemaker's product, namely the shoe, is not merely produced for the shoemaker's own purpose. The shoe, as a shoe, is meant to be worn by another. The shoe has an essential connection with a wearer. Similarly, to follow Heidegger's examples, a field belongs to and is properly tended by ; a book was bought at and gifted to us by ; the boat at anchor is sailed by ; and so on. It seems, then, that an essential feature of the worldliness of the world as such is that it contains lasting and unmistakable references to other people (others who are also Dasein51). It belongs to the world structure as such that it is a shared world.52 These other people we meet with in the course of our use of tools are neither to-handed nor at-handed. Their manner of being is radically different from the being of tools. They too are characterized by Dasein. That is to say, they too are experienced as characterized by purpose. They too are there in the world as Dasein together with our own Dasein. Dasein's being-in-theworld is necessarily and fundamentally also a shared being-inthe-world. This is a somewhat subtle point, the significance of which is likely to seem obvious to non-philosophers or those without

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an in-depth knowledge of the history of philosophy. In short, Heidegger's analysis is directed against Descartes' account of subjectivity. One could argue that this account is the distinguishing feature of Modern philosophy, as it has exercised a decisive influence on virtually every important philosophical movement following Descartes. For our purposes, the Cartesian theory of subjectivity can be interpreted as having two main influential features: (1) knowledge of one's own perceptions is held to be more reliable than knowledge of the external world; and (2) our knowledge of the external world is held to be some sort of inference from our own perceptions. These two theoretical features lead to the central problem of how to demonstrate the existence of other subjects beside oneself in the world (the problem of solipsism). Husserl, who was strongly influenced by Descartes, addresses this problem in the Cartesianische Meditationen, fifth meditation, §§ 42-62. For Husserl, our perception of other people as fellow subjects with conscious experiences resembling our own is an inference from their bodily movements. These bodily movements, experienced as similar to ours, are therefore understood to be the results of a conscious awareness similar to our own. Heidegger, by contrast, attempts to deal with the problem by denying that the Cartesian theory in fact accurately reflects our experience of the world. At the level of everyday comportment we do not begin with an encapsulated ego, which, possessed of certainty concerning its own existence, goes on to examine the content of its perceptions and infer the existence of other conscious beings in a spatially extended world. Rather, the world in which we live at the everyday level is first and foremost a shared world. We begin with the conviction that there are other people in the world along with us. Since we begin with this conviction, there is no need to explain it in theoretical terms. It is a brute fact of our experience. In fact, in order to arrive at the conception of an epistemologically isolated ego conceived as a Cartesian res cogitans ("thinking thing") we have to subject our experience of the world to a thoroughgoing theoretical revision. Descartes


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has to obliterate our everyday experience of the world in order to carry out his "method of universal doubt" and arrive at the proposition "I think, therefore I am." Of course, Heidegger might reply, theoretical problems will arise after the superimposition of this stripped-down theoretical framework upon our experience of the world. Our experience of the world has not been explained but erased. The problem of solipsism is a natural result of the fact that the theory is fundamentally unsuited to the facts it purports to explain. Of course, the fact that our world is by nature and prior to all theoretical analysis a shared world does not mean that we never make mistakes — that we never, for example, mistake a storefront mannequin for a real person at a distance. However, it does mean that beginning with an epistemologically encapsulated perceiving ego-thing and then attempting to explain how this ego-thing gets outside the range of its perceptions into a real world with real people is very much a case of putting the cart before the horse. The more interesting question is how Descartes could possibly have overlooked something that was as plain as the nose on his face.53 How, then, do we in fact experience this shared being-inthe-world at the everyday level? Who, in other words, are these others whom we happen to find along with ourselves in the world? According to Heidegger, they are precisely those "from whom one mostly does not distinguish oneself, among whom one also is" [§ 26, p. 118]. This everyday existence, in which no strict difference is made between oneself and others, Heidegger terms "being-there-with" [Mitdasein],54 that is, being together with others in a world of entities towards which we all comport ourselves in the manner of concernedness. That is to say: at the everyday level, we meet with people at work. The Other is experienced with respect to the shared purpose of concerning oneself with entities as tools. We interact with each other by going about our business, that is, by pursuing the purpose we have in our concernedness with entities and their use as tools, as means for achieving ends.

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It belongs to the essential structure of Dasein that others are there in the world along with us and that in our primary interaction with them we make no strict distinction between our purposes and theirs in our use of tools. The proprietor of the corner store is there to sell me ice cream. The bus driver is there to drive me downtown. The teacher is there to teach me. The newspaper vendor is there to sell me a newspaper. In all these examples concerning the use of entities as tools, whether ice cream, the bus, information, or the newspaper, the manipulation of these entities is understood as fulfilling a common purpose. In selling me ice cream, the proprietor is fulfilling his own purpose of selling ice cream, while at the same time he is fulfilling my own purpose by doing so. Thus, strictly speaking, we should speak not of two different purposes but of one common purpose: exchanging ice cream for currency. The same is true of the vendor's perspective on the matter; and it is also true in the case of the other examples.55 Heidegger, continuing the theme of the essential difference of Dasein from to-handed and at-handed entities, introduces a special term for comportments towards other people (other entities characterized by Dasein). Whereas our fundamental comportment towards entities used as tools is concernedness (i.e., employment and use), Heidegger terms the fundamental character of our comportments towards others "concernfulness" [Fursorge]. Concernfulness is an existential: a fundamental ontological structure of Dasein. This implies that Dasein, insofar as it exists within a world, is not only possessed of an understanding of its own existence but also understands itself as essentially linked with others in the act of existing. That is to say: "As being-with [Mitsein], Dasein 'is7 thus essentially for the sake of others." Even when a particular Dasein happens to be neglecting its proper concernfulness towards others, the fact that this is recognized as neglect at all shows that Dasein is essentially linked with others. For Heidegger, it is never possible to free oneself from the shared character of the world. The choices we make in our everyday life as we pursue our concernedness with


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entities always have consequences for others. For Heidegger an existential isolation from others is impossible, because the existential structure of Dasein necessarily implies the presence of others. The "isolation" of which Heidegger speaks in the context of authenticity has an entirely different sense, as we shall see in Section 3.3. In order to complete our analysis of evermineness, we need to consider more closely the fundamental character of sharing the world with others. We mentioned in passing above that in meeting others in the comportment of being-with, for the most part we find them at work. At this level of everyday comportment, others are what they do. One particular person is a bus driver; another is a newspaper vendor. At the everyday level we make no clear distinction between occupation and selfhood. This is because the everyday level of comportment is oriented towards concernedness with entities. It is concerned with tools, with the use of entities in order to fulfill a purpose of Dasein's. According to Heidegger's analysis in § 27, it is also a distinguishing characteristic of the everyday level of interaction with others that the different purposes of Dasein are to a large extent fixed. One's purposes are prescribed and regulated by an understanding of what "simply is not done/7 of what "one should do in such circumstances." In Heidegger's own words, We enjoy and delight ourselves, as one enjoys; we read, see, and judge literature and art as one sees and judges; but we also withdraw from the " great mass" as one withdraws; we are "outraged" by that which one finds outrageous. The one, which is no one in particular [kein bestimmtes] and which everyone is, though not as a sum, prescribes the being-manner of everydayness. [§ 27, p. 126-127]

The regulation or standardization of everyday life is, for Heidegger, a fundamental structural feature of Dasein (an existential). The self of Dasein at the everyday level is the "oneself" [das Man-selbst]. At the everyday level of existence, which

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is primarily oriented towards the use of entities as tools, the concrete comportments of concernedness and concernfulness are all prescribed by an awareness of what is and is not done, of what "one" should and should not do. As Heidegger repeatedly points out in § 27 and elsewhere, the one-self is an essential structural feature of Dasein. The one can never be done away with because it is the basis of any form of shared existence. In any situation where a number of people are involved, whether it be a classroom or a corporation, there must be some general understanding of what one can and cannot do. To do away with this standardization of comportment would of course mean chaos and disorder. In fact, for Heidegger completely doing away with social rules and norms is technically impossible, since the one-self is an existential of Dasein. Unfortunately, Heidegger's terminology suggests that his conception of such existential structures as the one-self is entirely negative. It is thus easy and tempting to read Heidegger as an advocate of "radical freedom" along the lines of Jean-Paul Sartre's "existentialism." Heidegger is, however, more subtle than this. As we shall see in the later chapters (principally in Sections 2.10-3.6) addressing Heidegger's concept of authentic selfhood, authenticity in the Heideggerian sense is not a question of eliminating the one-self. Rather, it is a question of not being caught in the one-self as the only and exclusive way for Dasein to exist. For the moment we will simply quote Heidegger's own words at the conclusion of § 27: "Authentic self-being [Selbstsein] does not rest upon an exceptional state, cut off from the one, of the subject, but rather z's an existential modification of the one as an essential existential." 2.6 THE INDIFFERENT MODE OF BEING-IN (§§ 28-34): SENSIBILITY, UNDERSTANDING, AND TALK In order to complete our analysis of being-in-the-world we now turn to its last structural feature, namely the relation holding


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between the world and the entity that is ever mine (Dasein). Heidegger's term for this relation, as we saw earlier, is "beingin." As Heidegger points out in § 12, "in" in this sense has no connection with the usual spatial meaning of the preposition "in." The usual meaning of "in," according to Heidegger, is properly applicable only to spatial relationships between athanded entities. The character of such relations is "categoreal"56 [kategorial]. The character of the "in" in "being-in" is, by contrast, existential, that is, refers to structural features of Dasein. When we speak of Dasein7s "being-in" the world, we do not mean that Dasein is in the world the way water is in a glass. (This should be evident from the analyses of the last section.) Rather, we mean that Dasein is "acquainted with" a world in which it "resides." Dasein, in other words, is able to understand what world means and is able to interact with entities discovered within this world.57 What, then, are the fundamental comportments that make this interaction possible? What is involved in living within the system of references that constitute the worldliness of the world? For Heidegger there are three coeval [gleichursprunglich] comportments that play the most fundamental role in the relation of Dasein to its world. These three comportments are "understanding" [Verstehen], "sensibility" [Befindlichkeit], and "talk" [Rede]. In the present section we will be discussing these three in their indifferent mode. That is to say: we will be observing their essential structural features without reference to the question of whether the comportments themselves are authentic or inauthentic.

a) Sensibility

Let us begin with the fundamental comportment of sensibility.58 Sensibility manifests itself at the familiar level of everyday life as the possibility of having moods, feelings, sentiments, and emotions. The task of the phenomenological analysis of sensibility is to give a clear philosophical account of this possibility. Moods, according to Heidegger, make one's own state apparent. By disclosing this state, moods and emotions also bring Dasein

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before its world. They do this by means of "inclination and disinclination" [An- und Abkehr].59 In order for us to concern ourselves with entities at all (to understand them as tools for accomplishing a purpose) we have to be inclined towards them in a certain manner. If, for example, I visit a workshop, but am completely bored by the situation, the individual entities within the workshop are not discovered as tools. Rather, insofar as they are discovered (noticed) at all, they appear as useless entities, entities with no particular what-for, as far as I myself am concerned with them. Similarly, if I happen to have eaten painfully spicy food, in the resulting sensibility I will be concerned with nothing at the table but the nearest means for doing away with the pain. Table, cutlery, chairs, tablecloths, other food —all these will disappear (fail to be discovered) in the particular sensibility (mood or emotion) resulting from having eaten too much spice.60 If Heidegger's analysis is essentially correct, then the fact that we can relate to connection-wholes at all, and the manner in which we relate to them, is dependent upon our moods and emotions. (Recall the laboratory example in Section 2.2.) From these considerations we can propose a definition of sensibility: sensibility is the primeval comportment that discovers connections and connection-wholes and simultaneously discloses the existential possibilities for comportment towards intramundane entities. It is the existential structure that makes inclination and disinclination possible; it is "the fundamental manner in which Dasein has itself be addressed [sich angehen laftt] by the world."61 As Heidegger further puts it: sensibility both brings Dasein before the world and before itself. It discloses that Dasein exists and that existence is its task.62 An important existential character of Dasein made evident through sensibility is "thrownness" [Geworfenheit]. Thrownness designates the simple fact that coming into existence at all is not one of Dasein's own possibilities. One cannot have an inclination or disinclination to be born: one simply is born, hurled or thrown into the world. An important consequence of this fact is that Dasein, through sensibility, discovers connection-wholes as


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already there, that is, independent of its own choosing. In short, sensibility discovers connection-wholes as existing prior to and independently of Dasein's own existence. In Heidegger's own words: "In [thrownness] the fact discloses itself [enthullt sich] that Dasein always already is [i.e., exists]63 as mine, and as this one, in a particular world and in a particular sphere [Umkreis] of particular intramundane entities" [§44 b), p. 221]. It is this feature of thrownness — the independence of large areas of the world from Dasein's own choice—that makes history at all possible and that plays an essential role in Heidegger's analysis of the past, as we shall later see.64 b) Understanding The second fundamental comportment of being-in is understanding. Understanding is the comportment in which (1) tools are discovered within tool-wholes, that is, apprehended as means towards ends; and (2) the possible uses of such tools are grasped. In other words, the act of understanding reveals both the structure of the world and the possible ways in which Dasein can exist in the world (use tools). In Heidegger's own words, In purpose, existing being-in-the-world as such is disclosed [erschlossen]; this disclosedness was called understanding. In understanding purpose, meaningfulness, which is founded in purpose, is co-disclosed [miterschlossen]. The disclosedness of understanding [i.e., the disclosedness resulting from the act of understanding], as the disclosedness of purpose and meaningfulness, involves [betrifft] the full [phenomenon] of being-in-the-world in a coeval fashion. [§ 31, p. 143]

By "disclosed" and "disclosedness" Heidegger refers to the emergence or appearing of structures of Dasein within the range of Dasein's experience. (In fact, Heidegger coins these expressions precisely because he wishes to avoid such philosophically loaded terms as "experience".) The term is used by Heidegger in opposition to "discoveredness," which denotes the givenness

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of entities and entitial structures within the world. Accordingly, one speaks of the disclosedness of the world in understanding, the world being a non-entitial structure of Dasein. On the other hand, one would speak of the discoveredness of a tool within a particular tool-whole, or of the discoveredness of the tool-whole itself, since we are referring in both cases to entities or entitial structures. It is important to keep in mind that Heidegger's use of the term " under standing" is very different from the usual meaning of the term. Normally, when we speak of " understanding/' we refer to the act of intellectual comprehension or apprehension. Heidegger, however, is using the term to indicate a much wider and more fundamental comportment of Dasein. For Heidegger, the primeval comportment of understanding has two aspects. On the one hand, it is the act by which we relate tools to tool-wholes. More plainly, it is the fundamental human act that allows us to actually follow the linked systems of references that constitute our world. On the other hand, in permitting us to make sense of these linked systems of reference, the act of understanding simultaneously discloses the various ways in which we can make use of these references to accomplish our purposes. In understanding intramundane entities as tools, we simultaneously understand their possible uses (the possibilities they offer us), that is, our own purposes in comporting ourselves towards them. This is why Heidegger often identifies understanding with Dasein's "being-ability" [Seinkonnen], or its ability to pursue various courses of action (more technically, to discover tool-wholes in the act of disclosing purposes). Let us pause to briefly consider the contrast between the respective functions of sensibility and understanding. Sensibility, we said, is the primeval comportment that discovers connections and connection-wholes and simultaneously also discloses the existential possibilities for comportment towards intramundane entities. This sounds remarkably like the definition we have just given of understanding, but there is a fine nuance. Sensibility, as inclination and disinclination (moods and emotions in the widest sense), is the primeval comportment making it possible


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for us to relate to connection-wholes at all. Understanding, by contrast, is the primeval comportment making it possible for us to relate to connection-wholes in specific ways, to discover a tool as the specific tool which it is. To give a specific example: my particular sensibility makes it possible for me to do productive work within the tool-whole of the workshop (because I have the proper inclination). My act of understanding, however, makes it possible for me to discover individual tools with respect to the tool-whole of the workshop and thus use them as the individual tools that they happen to be. The fact that we can be occupied with connection-wholes and tool-wholes at all, as well as the range of connection-wholes and tool-wholes with which we are able to be occupied, is a function of sensibility. The fact that I can experience particular tools as meaningful within these connection-wholes and tool-wholes is a function of understanding. In Heidegger's own terminology, sensibility discloses thrownness into the world (that particular connection-wholes, and not others, happen to be "present" or "discoverable"), while understanding plans and interprets the entities that are discovered within this world. We have already seen that for Heidegger understanding has an essentially referential structure. We have previously explained this feature of understanding by saying that, for Heidegger, whenever something is understood, it is always understood with reference to something else. This locution is particularly appropriate when speaking of entities discovered within the referential structure of the world, but in § 31 Heidegger adds yet another dimension to his analysis of the understanding. According to Heidegger, the fundamental existential structure of understanding is the "plan" [Entwurf\. "Planning," the characteristic act of understanding, is the ability to disclose and pursue Dasein's own possibilities (as opposed to thrownness, the existential character of possibilities that are not open to Dasein to choose). With this more elaborate conception of understanding, we can introduce a preliminary definition of the difference between

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authenticity and inauthenticity. For Heidegger, inauthenticity is characterized by an understanding that "places itself primarily in the disclosure of the world, that is, Dasein can first and foremost understand itself hither from its world [aus seiner Welt her]" By contrast, authenticity is characterized by an understanding that throws itself primarily into purpose, that is, Dasein exists as itself. Understanding is either authentic understanding, emerging from one's own self as such, or it is inauthentic understanding. The "in-" [in "inauthentic"] does not mean that Dasein cuts itself off from its self and "only" understands the world. World belongs to its being a self [zu seinem Selbstsein] as being-in-the-world. Authentic as well as inauthentic understanding can in turn be genuine or not genuine. [...] But shifting oneself [das Sichverlegen] into one of these fundamental possibilities does not put aside the other. [§ 31, p. 146]

Two points in particular are to be emphasized: Firstly, as we saw in Section 2.5, both the world as such and evermineness necessarily belong to the structure of Dasein. Accordingly, the difference between authenticity and inauthenticity can only be based on a shift of emphasis. In the case of authentic understanding, the emphasis is on selfhood. Here Dasein emphasizes its own purpose rather than that of the one-self. By contrast, in the case of inauthentic understanding, the emphasis is on the interaction with the what-fors of tools.65 Furthermore, it is important to emphasize that Heidegger further distinguishes between genuine understanding and understanding that is not genuine [unecht]. Just because an act of understanding attempts to emphasize the purpose of Dasein does not necessarily mean that it thereby succeeds in doing so. The same is true in the case of inauthentic understanding. In both cases, it is still possible to be mistaken. The mere attempt does not guarantee success. It is clear that Heidegger does not wish his analysis of authenticity to be either prescriptive or prescriptive in any sense. He merely wishes to explain what authenticity and inauthenticity,


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or genuine and false selfhood, are. In accordance with this aim, Heidegger declines to give any concrete guidelines of judging others' actions to be either authentic or inauthentic. I am inclined to believe that Heidegger felt the enterprise of judging others' existential (but not necessarily ethical) decisions to be inauthentic by definition. The reader interested in pursuing this line of thought is referred to the discussion of death as Dasein's "ownmost" and "irrespective" possibility in Section 3.2. In §32, Heidegger goes on to discuss the structure of planning in more detail. Every concrete interaction with intramundane entities takes place within the general framework of a plan. Within the framework of a plan, entities are interpreted as the particular tools that they happen to be. In Heidegger's words, "There is always already a connection, disclosed in the understanding of the world, with intramundane entities as such, which is brought out by interpretation [die durch die Auslegung herausgelegt wird]" [% 32, p. 150]. Interpretation is the act of understanding that "brings out" the connections of tools by understanding them with respect to connection-wholes.66 For Heidegger, interpretation is characterized by an "as-structure": in interpreting a tool as a hammer, for example, I discover the hammer as a hammer; I experience it as the tool that it in fact is. This act of interpretation is only possible, however, because of the "pre-structure" of understanding. This pre-structure is composed of three structural elements: "prepossession" [Vorhabe], "preview" [Vorsicht], and "preconception" [Vorgriff]. According to Heidegger, (1) prepossession is an already understood connectionwhole that serves as the framework or context of an interpretation; (2) preview is the angle or perspective from which the interpretation will be carried out; and (3) preconception is the set of concepts that will be used in order to carry out the interpretation.67

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Heidegger intends these "pre-" words to reflect the fact that there is no such thing as a presuppositionless interpretation. Every interpretation must begin with some preliminary understanding of the thing in question, with some preliminary frame of reference. Otherwise it would be impossible even to see the need for interpretation at all, and it would be impossible to know how to begin. As Heidegger puts it, "Every interpretation that is to produce an understanding must already have understood that which is to be interpreted" [§ 32, p. 152]. (Recall the account of the hermeneutic circle in Section 2.2.) Taken together, the definite prepossession, preview, and preconception involved in any given interpretation are called the hermeneutic situation. (See § 45, p. 232.) The function that the threefold pre-structure of understanding—that is, the hermeneutic situation—plays in the act of interpretation is to organize the sense of the interpretation. In carrying out an act of interpretation we begin from a particular hermeneutic situation and progress towards a particular sense. "Sense" [Sinn] is defined by Heidegger as "the towardswhich of the plan, structured by prepossession, preview, and preconception, hither from which something becomes understandable as something"68 [§ 32, p. 151]. In other words, sense is that with reference to which something derives its meaningfulness. Thus, for example, the sense of intramundane entities is the worldliness of the world. Typically, Heidegger reserves a clear definition of "sense" for a much later point in Being and Time, where it is mentioned only in passing. In § 65, p. 324, we learn that [...] sense is that within which the understandability of something is kept without itself being explicitly and thematically seen. Sense means the with-respect-to-which [Womufhin] of the primary plan hither from which something can be conceived as what it is in its possibility. Planning discloses possibilities, that is, that which makes possible.


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According to this definition, the " sense" of something is the background against which it is understood as what it is. In the act of understanding the thing in question, the background is not explicitly grasped as such. It remains as the latent structure with reference to which we accomplish the act of understanding. The background functions, in Kantian terms, as the " condition of the possibility" of the thing. It is the latent conceptual structure that makes it possible to understand the thing as what it is at all. "Sense," then, is Heidegger's term for the conceptual background necessarily presupposed, but not explicitly grasped, in each act of understanding a given thing, and in terms of which the thing in question is understood. It is important to understand Heidegger's use of the word "sense" because the question of Being, which Heidegger also calls "the question of the sense of Being," has a particular technical nuance that we could not previously make clear. In investigating the sense of Being, Heidegger is not asking what it means to be, nor is he asking whether it makes any sense to exist. Heidegger is attempting to clarify what the universal criterion or framework is within which we understand what does and does not "exist," that is, what can and cannot be discovered (entities) and what can and cannot be disclosed (existential structures of Dasein). Ultimately, as we shall see towards the end of Chapter 3, Heidegger's answer will be that the sense of Being is primeval timeliness as the unity of horizontal and ecstatic time. c) Talk As we have seen, sensibility makes it possible for us to comport ourselves towards entities at all; this it does by discovering connection-wholes through inclination and disinclination. By contrast, understanding, in the form of planning and interpretation, makes it possible for us to comport ourselves towards individual entities within the wider framework of connection wholes. Understanding makes it possible for us to recognize entities as the particular entities that they happen to be. In § 34 of Being and Time Heidegger introduces another

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fundamental comportment, "talk" [Rede], which, he informs us, is "coeval with sensibility and understanding/' "Talk" in this sense, like interpretation, is not a human activity that occurs now and then in particular situations; talk is a fundamental human comportment that makes it possible for us to relate to the world at all. Like § 7 of Being and Time, § 34, which addresses Heidegger's philosophical conception of language, is infamous for its unintelligible treatment of a vitally important subject. That Heidegger himself attributed a great significance to § 34 is clear from his dialogue "Aus einem Gesprach von der Sprache," published in the anthology Unterwegs zur Sprache. When the "Japanese" interlocutor remarks that Heidegger's treatment of language in Being and Time is "quite meagre" [recht sparsam], the "Questioner," Heidegger himself, replies, "But perhaps you will read § 34 in 'Being and Time' more attentively after our conversation sometime."69 Leaving the question of the "meagreness" of § 34 aside for the moment, we can surely agree with the reply: "I have already read it often and regretted each time that it was kept so short." In § 34, Heidegger introduces a distinction between "talk" [Rede] and "language" [Sprache]. It is difficult to translate this pair of terms elegantly into English, although French possesses a similar distinction in the difference between "parole" and "langue." Language, in Heidegger's terminological sense of the word, is the entitial form of talk, talk insofar as it appears as a to-handed intramundane entity. That is to say, language consists of sounds, characters, and symbols used as tools (in Heidegger's special sense of the word) in the act of talking. This is why Heidegger informs us that "the outspokenness [Hinausgesprochenheit] of talk is language." Furthermore, like all tools, the to-handedness of words (the tools used in language) can, when the tool becomes the matter of a theoretical consideration, be transformed into at-handedness. In Heidegger's words, "Language can be shattered into at-handed word-things" [§ 34, p. 161]. This is, of course, what normally happens in grammar,


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linguistics, and language philosophy. In Heidegger's opinion, these disciplines are characterized by the fact that in them the to-handed quality of language in use is completely suppressed for the sake of a supposed gain in clarity, certainty, and logical transparency. For this reason Heidegger feels justified in calling for a liberation of grammar from logic [§ 34, p. 165]. The logical analysis of language is to be replaced with a phenomenological analysis of the "fundamental forms of a possible meaningful structuring [bedeutungsmaftige Gliederung] of the understandable in general" [§ 34, p. 166]. Only in this way can an intelligible account be given of the to-handed character of language, of language as it is actually experienced and employed in daily life. Talk itself, by contrast, is the fundamental comportment of Dasein that makes language and the use of language-tools (words, sentences, etc.) at all possible. In § 34, Heidegger provides three different definitions of talk: (1) talk is the articulation of understandability [ Verstandlichkeit]; (2) talk is the meaningful [bedeutende] structuring [Gliedern] of the understandability of being-in-the-world; and (3) talk is the meaningful [bedeutungsmaftige] structuring [Gliedern] of the sensible [befindlichen] understandability of being-in-the-world. The sudden introduction of three new technical terms, "articulation/7 "understandability," and "meaningful," is surprising and confusing. If, however, we are careful to keep our previous terminological distinctions in mind, it should be possible to work out what Heidegger in fact means. Comparing the three definitions, it seems reasonable to conclude that Heidegger uses "articulation" as a synonym for "structuring." This articulation or structuring occurs, according to the definitions, "so as to mean" [bedeutend, literally "meaningly"] or "in conformity with

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meaning" [bedeutungsmaftig]. Lastly, that which is articulated in this manner is "understandability." (1) Let us begin by working out the meaning of " articulation/' Heidegger informs us that that which can be articulated in interpretation, and yet still more primevally already in talk, we called sense. That which is structured in talking articulation as such [das in der redenden Artikulation Gegliederte] we will call the meaning-whole [das Bedeutungsganze]. This can be dissolved into meanings. As the articulated of the articulatable, meanings always have sense [sind immer sinnhaft, i.e., are in possession of or qualified by sense]. [§ 34, p. 161]

In the more detailed analysis of § 33, Heidegger refers to interpretation as a "structuring" and to sense as that which is "structured." From the context it is evident that the "structuring" activity of interpretation involves the setting up or putting forth of sense, being that with respect to which the interpreted is understood. From the quote above it is clear that talk undertakes a similar structuring of sense, which, however, occurs prior to the structuring activity of interpretation. In § 33, Heidegger briefly characterizes the as-structure of interpretation as "reaching out [ausgreifen] into a connection-whole." By contrast, a theoretical statement [Awssage] "is cut off with respect to its possibilities for the articulation of reference-relations [Verweisungsbezugen] of meaningfulness, which, as such, constitutes the defining characteristic of the surrounding world [Umweltlichkeit]" [§ 33, p. 158]. Clearly, then, "articulation" is nothing other than the act of discovery of the references that are the defining feature of the world as the sum total of connection-wholes. (2) The term "understandability" literally denotes "the quality of that which can be understood." What is, for Heidegger, that which can be understood? The structure of connection-wholes as defined through the pre-structure, that is, sense. This reading of Heidegger's terminology is supported by the statement that


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understandability "is also already structured [gegliedert] already before acquisitive [zueignende] interpretation/'70 That is to say, even before any act of interpretation takes place by which tools are understood as the tools they are with reference to a particular connection-whole, the entire structure, involving connections, connection-wholes, and tools, is already structured (articulated) by talk. " Understandability/7 then, is simply a term referring to the world-structure insofar as it is structured by talk prior to the further structuring activity of understanding and interpretation. (3) Heidegger also tells us that the product of the act of articulation undertaken by talk is a " meaning-whole" [Bedeutungsganzes]. A meaning-whole "can be dissolved into meanings. As the articulated of the articulatable, meanings always have sense [sind immer sinnhaft]. [...] Words grow upon meanings. It is not, however, the case that word-things are provided with meanings" [§ 34, p. 161]. The term "meaning-whole" is clearly conceived in analogy to "tool-whole" and "connection-whole" and so also refers to an aspect of the worldliness of the world. The term "meanings" is also clearly intended as a reference to "meaningfulness," which, as we saw in Section 2.5, denotes the essential character of the references constituting the worldliness of the world, insofar as they are conceived as acts of Dasein's understanding. As we previously explained, it is in the act of assigning meaningfulness to intramundane entities that Dasein understands its world. A "meaning-whole," then, will be identical with a connection-whole insofar as it is viewed as structured by talk prior to any further structuring activity undertaken by understanding and interpretation. Similarly, an individual "meaning" will be identical with a particular connection insofar as this connection is viewed as structured solely by talk prior to any act of understanding.71 What, then, is talk, insofar as it is conceived as the "meaningful articulation of understandability"? Let us reflect that talk, according to Heidegger, is an existential of Dasein, coeval with sensibility and understanding. Sensibility, we recall, is the comportment that discloses the world and its constituent

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connection-wholes at all. Understanding and its derivative interpretation are the comportments that allow us to discover entities within the worldly network of connection-wholes. Talk, as we have seen in the previous discussion, is the comportment that, before all understanding, structures meaningfulness (meaningwholes together with meanings). These latter—meaning-wholes and meanings —are connection-wholes and connections prior to the act of understanding. The clear implication of the priority of talk with respect to understanding is that talk organizes the meaningfulness-structures that understanding discovers when it understands tools as tools. Sensibility makes it possible for us to relate to connection-wholes at all, while understanding discovers tools within these connection-wholes; but the fact that particular connection-wholes, and not others, "exist" at all is a function of talk.72 This point of view has a certain plausibility to it; in order to comprehend what a workshop is and what sort of tasks may be taken care of within its boundaries, I need to be taught what a workshop is for. In being taught or shown what a workshop is, its organization or structure needs to be made clear to me. Of course, the primary way of doing so is through verbal explanation, through language. It is important, however, to preserve the Heideggerian distinction between language and talk. Verbal explanation cannot "language" an unreal object into existence; but no one who has understood Heidegger's world analysis will believe that this is in any way what Heidegger means. If, on the other hand, we conceive of talk in fundamentally Heideggerian terms as the fundamental comportment by means of which the referential structure of the world is established in order that it may function as the framework for all particular interactions with intramundane entities,73 it becomes quite plausible that there should be such a fundamental phenomenon involved in our comportments towards the world.74 If, for example, I define a "zayzax" as the point of contact between any glass surface and any other surface, I have introduced a completely new meaning into our present discourse.


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This meaning has an entitial aspect, namely the word "zayzax," which has the capacity to function as a tool. If it is made use of as a to-handed entity, the user is enabled to discover many zayzaxes in the immediate environment that were not previously experienced as zayzaxes, but were left completely undiscovered, for example the point of contact between the glass of drinking water at my right hand and the surface of the table. Zayzaxes such as this one simply did not "exist" —were not discoverable as zayzaxes—before the discovery of the meaning "zayzax." Of course, the meaning "zayzax" is not likely to be very useful in a wider context because it is a somewhat artificial meaning whose chief significance is derived from a very specific meaning-whole with a very limited scope, namely explaining a finer nuance of Heidegger's philosophy of language to newcomers. However, the point having been made, we can abandon the use of the term (though the essential rootedness of our experience in talk will really be driven home if the reader is phenomenologically adventurous enough to attend to his or her experience of the world for the next few days and note how zayzaxes now suddenly appear to be everywhere). The above example is, of course, meant to be informative and entertaining, and its purpose is fulfilled if it successfully manages to be both. Nonetheless, it can perform yet another service by shedding some further light upon Heidegger's concept of phenomenology. Recall that in Section 2.4 we characterized Heidegger's phenomenology as envisioning phenomena through talk. It is not immediately evident when one first reads through § 7 of Being and Time that the talk that, as the logos of phenomeno/ogy, is involved in any phenomenological description is the same phenomenon that is analyzed and described by Heidegger in § 34. This is the reason that Heidegger, near the beginning of § 34, makes the somewhat cryptic comment, "We have already constantly made use of this phenomenon [namely talk] in the interpretation of sensibility, understanding, interpretation, and statement up to this point, but, so to speak, suppressed it in the course of the thematic analysis" [§ 34, p. 160-161]. In a

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phenomenological analysis, then, we are doing nothing more than allowing meaning-wholes to "speak out" [zu Wort kommen, literally "to come to word"]. In so doing, we permit the meanings that are already present in our experience of the world prior to any act of understanding or interpretation to find their way into linguistic expression. That is to say, we furnish these meanings with an entitial form ("words") of their own in order that they can be discussed and pointed out by means of language (in Heidegger's technical sense of the word). Again, it is vital for the reader to remember to distinguish sharply between talk and language. The former is a pre-verbal and pre-linguistic comportment of Dasein by means of which Dasein structures meaning-wholes. The latter is a comportment of Dasein through which meaning-wholes are dissolved into meanings and furnished with an entitial shape, that is, words and sentences, "language" in the usual sense. These specific technical definitions must be borne firmly in mind. Using terms in a vague and loosely philosophical sense, which is, moreover, alien to Heidegger's conception of language, can only lead to hopeless confusion. The further elaborate details of § 34 are not directly relevant for our purposes. As such, we will end this section with a brief presentation of the four structural features of talk Heidegger isolates by means of his phenomenological analysis. We will address the topics of hearing and listening in Section 3.3, since they are more informatively handled in connection with Heidegger's analysis of the conscience as the authentic mode of talk.75 It should be noted that Heidegger's analysis of the four constitutive structural features of talk is oriented towards its role in being-with. That is to say, it is primarily an analysis of actual situations of talking with each other at the everyday level. It is evident from § 34 that Heidegger does not mean to imply that talk only takes place when we are talking to each other; talk is a fundamental existential of Dasein that is coeval with sensibility and understanding.76 As such, talk structures both being-with and being-self (evermineness).


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According to Heidegger, talk has four constitutive structural features. (1) the "discussed" (i.e., the subject matter addressed by the talk) [das Beredete] or the ''about-which" [das Woruber]. This is what the talk happens to be "about"; (2) the "spoken" [das Geredete]. This is the manner and scope in which the discussed is addressed, what is in fact said about it; (3) "announcement" [die Mitteilung]. "Announcement" is the structural feature of talk that allows it to be shared with others, its fundamentally communicative aspect (note that although Mitteilung means "message" or "act of informing"; its literal meaning is "with-sharing"). "Its being-tendency aims at bringing the hearer into participation in the disclosed being unto [that is, attitude or comportment towards] the discussed of talk" [§ 35, p. 168], that is, it tries to establish the same comportment towards the discussed in the listener as in the talker; and (4) "self-expression" [das Sichaussprechen, literally "speaking oneself out"], also referred to as "proclamation" [Bekundung]. This is the sensibility associated with talk, its emotional quality. According to Heidegger, it is particularly exhibited in pitch, modulation, tempo, and in the "manner of speaking." Although it would be beyond the scope of the present section to discuss the considerable influence of this philosophical conception of language on Heidegger's aesthetics, the reader is certainly now in a position to understand its far-reaching significance by considering the following quotation: "The announcement [Mitteilung] of the existential possibilities of sensibility, that is the disclosing of existence, can become the proper goal of 'poetic' talk" [§34, p. 162]. Art in this sense is certainly much more than the contemplation of the beautiful.

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2.7 THE INAUTHENTIC MODE OF BEING-IN (§§ 3538): TURMOIL, CURIOSITY, AND CROSSTALK In Subsection A of Chapter Five (of Section One, Part One), consisting of §§ 29-34, Heidegger, as we have just seen, undertakes a phenomenological analysis of sensibility, understanding, and talk. Sensibility, understanding, and talk together constitute the indifferent mode of being-in. That is to say, they are the basis of being-in insofar as no particular decision with respect to authenticity or inauthenticity has been taken. They are the fundamental structural features of being-in, structural features common to both the authentic and inauthentic modes. After completing this analysis, Heidegger turns in Subsection B to a brief account of the inauthentic modes of these three existentials. In Subsection B, which is comprised of §§ 35-38, Heidegger discusses "the everyday being of the There [Da] and the falling of Dasein." Heidegger, working in reverse order (from that in which the indifferent modes were presented), discusses the inauthentic mode of talk, crosstalk, in § 35; the inauthentic mode of understanding, curiosity, in § 36, and the inauthentic mode of interpretation, ambiguity, in § 37; and finally he completes the analysis in § 38 by presenting the inauthentic mode of sensibility, turmoil In order to prevent any confusion between Heidegger's phenomenological analysis of the modes of being-in and "existentialism" in the loose sense of the word, it is important to keep in mind that Heidegger is not undertaking an exposition of the "human condition." Nor is Heidegger pursuing a philosophical anthropology or sociological investigation of everyday cultural situations. Rather Heidegger is concerned with showing how the fundamental ontological structures of Dasein give rise to certain peculiar and disturbing features of everyday existence. These features are neither psychological nor social in any sense; they are a necessary and unavoidable consequence of the ontological structure of human beings and their communal existence. When conceived of as psychological


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and sociological in nature, however, the inauthentic modes of being-in do not exhibit an essentially necessary character but are viewed as incidental, that is, contingent upon psychological or sociological factors. Heidegger's innovation and his great philosophical contribution is that he has made it possible to discuss, in a stringently philosophical manner, wider features of human existence that are normally left to psychology and sociology because they have no other place. a) Crosstalk The German word Heidegger uses to denote the inauthentic mode of talk is Gerede, which in everyday German simply means "rumour-bearing talk77 or, in some contexts, "gossip/7 Heidegger warns his readers at the beginning of § 35 that he is not using the expression Gerede in a derogatory sense. Far more important for understanding Heidegger's use of the term is the etymology of the word Gerede. The prefix ge-, when it does not indicate the formation of the past participle, frequently has a collective meaning. Das Gebusch, for example, literally means "a collection of bushes/7 that is, "the bush/7 "bushes/7 or "shrubbery77 in English. A similar meaning can be seen in the words Geback ("cakes/7 "cookies77), Gedrange ("milling crowd77), Gefieder ("plumage77), Geflugel ("poultry77), Gefluster ("whisperings77), Gelaber ("utterly ridiculous talk77), and so on. Gerede, for Heidegger, will thus mean something along the lines of "a mass of talk/7 "talk for talk's sake/7 "chatter.77 Its main structural feature is that it obscures what is being talked about. For this reason it seemed most appropriate to translate Gerede by "crosstalk/7 that is, talk at cross-purposes. Talk, for Heidegger, is a fundamental comportment of Dasein. Its function is to structure meaning-wholes. These meaning-wholes serve as the fundamental basis for all further acts of understanding that we undertake in comporting ourselves towards intramundane entities. The account Heidegger gives of talk in § 34 is, however, incomplete in one important respect. If talk really does structure the world in the way that Heidegger says it does, and if talk is preserved in language, then how is it

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possible for any particular statement to be wrong? What is the structural difference between a "true" statement and a "false" statement?77 As we saw in the last section, the aim of the announcement structure of talk is to establish the same comportment towards the discussed in the listener as in the talker. That is to say, the aim of talk is for the hearer to understand what is being spoken (the second structural feature of talk) about a particular discussed entity (the first structural feature of talk). The remaining structural feature of talk, self-expression, anchors the other three features in a particular sensibility. Only by sharing this sensibility can the listener experience the other three structures of talk as they are truly meant. Talk can, however, undergo a modification in which the aim is not for the hearer to understand what is being spoken. By listening to what is spoken rather than understanding the discussed entity, it becomes possible to understand the talk without understanding what the talk is about. This form of talk becomes "talk for its own sake." One no longer talks in order to address a particular entity or intramundane state of affairs. Rather, one talks simply in order to say something. In this form of talk, crosstalk, self-expression, or the emotional quality of talk, and announcement, or the social aspect of talk, attain a heightened importance. No longer does one talk in order to point out or clarify real states of affairs in the world. Talk becomes crosstalk, talk for the sake of merely saying something. In crosstalk, who does the saying, what is being said, and why it is being said are more important than the truth of the talk. Accordingly, in crosstalk the four constitutive features of talk are modified in the following manner: (1) in crosstalk, the discussed (what the talk is about) appears to be understandable independently of any actual verification or confirmation of what is spoken; (2) crosstalk also emphasizes the spoken as such at the expense of the discussed, that is, at the expense of a real


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understanding of the talk, resulting in "talk for talk's sake"; (3) the announcement structure of crosstalk aims at creating the same superficial relation towards the discussed in the hearer as in the talker, so that crosstalk spreads itself in ever-widening circles and acquires the authority of general consensus; and, finally, (4) the self-expression or proclamation structure of crosstalk establishes the dominance of those and only those possibilities of sensibility that are permitted by the inauthentic one-self. Crosstalk in this phenomenological sense is the existential foundation for meaningless talk. It is the structure that makes false and misleading talk at all possible. In its more harmless form, it is mere idle gossip; in a less harmless form, it is malicious rumour-mongering, and in its most pernicious form it is statesponsored propaganda. It is, however, important to keep in mind that for Heidegger inauthentic is not necessarily synonymous with bad, nor is authentic necessarily synonymous with good. Crosstalk, or inauthentic talk, is an unavoidable consequence of the ontological structure of talk. It is simply not always possible or practical to verify the ultimate truth of any particular instance of talk. Whether this is good or bad, desirable or undesirable, will depend on the situation and on the standards of good and bad being employed. It is, for example, probably good—for practical purposes, at least—that high school students are able to understand geometry without being forced to investigate Zeno's paradoxes; although teaching of this sort is quite likely to be rooted in crosstalk at some ultimate existential level. b) Curiosity Heidegger's term for the inauthentic mode of understanding is Neugier, the ordinary German word for "curiosity." Its literal meaning, however, is "greed [Gier] for new [neu] things." In curiosity, the purview of our everyday interaction with the

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world is modified in a decisive fashion. As we saw in Section 2.5,"purview" is Heidegger's term for the view we have of a tool and its surroundings when we make use of it. It is the special pretheoretical awareness we have of tools when we are occupied with tool-using situations. According to Heidegger, purview can become altogether disconnected from tool use. That is to say, when the work has been interrupted or successfully brought to an end, purview can become free and altogether detached from work. No longer bound to the proximal world, it can abandon tohanded entities and seek out the "far, wide world." It becomes concerned with the "look" [Aussehen] of the world as such. In this form of concern, Dasein lets itself be carried along by the look of the faraway world. Its concernedness is aimed at unburdening itself of being-in-the-world. It seeks detachment and freedom from everyday to-handed entities. It abandons its factual responsibilities and seeks diversion and entertainment for their own sake rather than as refreshment, as an end in itself rather than as a means of returning to the task at hand with new vigour and inspiration. The characteristic feature of the purview involved in curiosity is that it seeks to view for the sake of viewing. Purview is no longer guided by a particular purpose. It does not seek to view the look of the world in order to understand it; rather, its aim is to be distracted by the manifold and variegated look of the world. Curiosity, in Heidegger's words, is "everywhere and nowhere." It is characterized by three fundamental features: (1) "unrest" [Unverweilen], or the abandonment of proximal entities, the lack of interest in what is to hand; (2) "dispersion" [Zerstreuung], or the constant need for new looks to view, to know for the sake of knowing; and (3) "nonresidence" [Aufenthaltslosigkeit], the fact that curiosity is everywhere and nowhere. In its harmless forms, curiosity is the ontological basis for mere entertainment and mindless diversion. In a more sinister


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form, it is the basis of the superficial and patronizing study of supposedly "primitive" cultures, undertaken in order to disguise the obvious flaws in one's own cultural milieu. Note too that in §61, p. 304, Heidegger suggests that a characteristic of "the falling understanding of Being" is the understanding of Being as at-handedness. In the later philosophy, this line of thought will inspire the inquiry into the "forgetfulness of Being" [Seinsvergessenheit]. c) Ambiguity Heidegger's term for the inauthentic mode of interpretation is Zweideutigkeit, literally "two-meaning-ness." The word is usually translated as "ambiguity." Owing to the predominance of crosstalk and curiosity at the everyday level, it is soon impossible to tell the difference between genuine understanding and false understanding. Heidegger calls this characteristic of everyday being-in ambiguity. As a result of ambiguity, "everything looks as if it were genuinely understood, grasped, and spoken of, and yet at bottom is not, or it does not look as if it were and yet at bottom is."78 This ambiguity not only affects our understanding of the world and of intramundane states of affairs; it also blinds us to our own possibilities of existence as Dasein. We no longer know which ways of life are authentic and inauthentic, and we no longer have any criteria for deciding. A further peculiarity of ambiguous situations, according to Heidegger, is that everyone involved claims to know what is truly happening and what really should happen in order to improve things. If, however, by some chance the supposed improvement should one day become a reality, then "ambiguity has already ensured that interest in the attainment immediately dies out. This interest only exists [besteht] at all in the manner of curiosity and crosstalk, as long as non-committal shared presentiment [Nurmit-ahnen] is still a possibility" [§ 37, p. 174]. It is tempting to see ambiguity as a fundamental characteristic of so-called political discourse.79

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In short, ambiguity as the inauthentic mode of interpretation ensures that entities are not understood as the entities that they in fact are. Since they are not genuinely understood at all, any interpretation is possible. They can be interpreted as anything that it is convenient to interpret them as. Since it is impossible for any interpretation to be proven wrong, the illusion of genuine understanding is maintained. d) Turmoil Finally, in § 38 Heidegger introduces the concept of "turmoil" [der Wirbel] to refer to the inauthentic mode of sensibility.80 Turmoil is the emotional quality of everyday life that permits the one-self to function as the self of everyday experience. As we saw in Section 2.5, the one-self is characterized by the lack of a distinction between my own purposes and the purposes indicated to me by the prevailing world-structure. It is the emotional state in which no strict distinction is made between my purpose and the common purpose (the word "purpose" being used here in the strict terminological sense). Heidegger's name for the actual concrete sensibility or emotion that turmoil discloses is the "downfall" [Absturz] of Dasein.81 The downfall of Dasein is characterized by four structural features: (1) "Temptation" [Versuchung]. Because, as we have repeatedly pointed out, inauthenticity is a necessary consequence of the structure of Dasein, it does not have an external source. Inauthenticity is a possibility that arises from Dasein itself. The fact that inauthenticity is rooted in the very structural organization of Dasein, and not in an external source, Heidegger terms temptation. (2) "Reassurance" [Beruhigung]. While Dasein is predominantly inauthentic, the inauthentic modes of being-in disguise their essentially inauthentic nature. Existing as the one-self, nothing appears to be wrong because everyone else is doing the same thing.


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(3) "Alienation" [Entfremdung]. Along with the reassurance that one is behaving properly because one is living as everyone else is living, the fact that one can also choose one's own possibilities for existence is submerged in the one-self. Dasein becomes alienated from itself as a being for whom existence is a matter of its own being. (4) "Entanglement" [Verfangen]. Finally, by succumbing to temptation, reassurance, and alienation, Dasein also undergoes entanglement. In such a situation, Dasein's possibilities of existence, and in fact all the concrete choices Dasein makes, are taken over from the one-self. One's own existence follows the path prescribed for it by the world. It should be noted in passing that for Heidegger primeval sensibilities such as the downfall of Dasein are not quite identical with emotions or moods in the everyday sense. Sensibility is the ontological foundation for concrete emotions and moods. As we shall see in more detail in Section 2.8, for Heidegger a sensibility is much more like the essential emotional structure of a particular situation. In this sense one could say that just as the downfall is the essential emotional structure of everyday life, love is the fundamental emotional structure of a successful marriage. We are speaking of ontological features of Dasein rather than of factual psychological events. e) Falling From the preceding descriptions of the inauthentic modes of being-in it will have become clear that they all have an essential structural characteristic in common: the dominance of the oneself in everyday concernedness with the world. Heidegger's term for this common structural characteristic is Verf alien. Verfallen in everyday German means the process of "falling" in the sense that one would speak of the decline and "fall" of the Roman Empire —to "decay" or "collapse." However, it can also mean "to succumb" or "to fall prey to," to "fall" to an opponent.

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As Heidegger warns us, the "fallenness" of Dasein in this strict terminological sense is not to be conceived of as a literal fall from a higher state or a fall from grace [§ 38, p. 176]. Rather, falling to the world in the existential-ontological sense means "immersion [Aufgehen] in being with one another [Miteinandersein], insofar as it is led by crosstalk, curiosity, and ambiguity" [§ 38, p. 175]. The falling of Dasein is a "fundamental manner of the being of everydayness." As we shall later see in Section 2.9, it is a modification of the "being-among" [Sein-bei] structure of concern, the fundamental structural element of Dasein. For the moment, it is sufficient to emphasize with Heidegger that falling "reveals [enthullt] a necessary and essential [wesenhaft] ontological structure of Dasein itself, which can hardly be said to determine its night-side, as it constitutes all its days in their everydayness."82 2.8 AUTHENTIC SENSIBILITY: ANGST (§§ 39-40) At this point in Being and Time Heidegger undertakes the first of several attempts to ensure that the essentially unitary character of Dasein is not obscured by the bewildering multiplicity of structural features that his phenomenological analyses reveal. Heidegger's attempts are directed towards coming up with a primeval phenomenon that serves as the foundation of the multiplicity of Dasein's existential features. In so doing, Heidegger does not mean to reduce the many phenomena to one single phenomenon. Rather, he wishes to show how the multiplicity is grounded in a single, underlying phenomenon that, so to speak, pulls them all together, much as the trunk of a tree produces and supports its many branches. In the pursuit of this aim, Heidegger begins with the analysis of "angst" [Angsf] in § 40 and continues on to work out the fundamental structure of Dasein as "concern" [Sorge] in § 41. In § 39, Heidegger informs the reader that the unity of Dasein cannot be preserved by putting together or assembling the various existential structures that have emerged in the course of our


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philosophical inquiry up to this point. Any such attempt would presuppose a knowledge of the unified structure according to which the process of assembly would have to take place. This is the point of Heidegger's laconic remark "That would require a blueprint [Bauplan]" (See §39, p. 181.) Instead, Heidegger proposes that we attempt to "peer through" the structures we have hitherto uncovered in order to obtain a glimpse of the "primevally unitary phenomenon that already lies in the whole so that it serves as the ontological foundation of each structural feature in its structural possibility" (§ 39, p. 181; note the strongly Kantian overtones of this passage. Also compare Plato's Republic 432b-e and 434e-435a). We will discuss how and why Heidegger feels that the threefold structure of concern preserves the unity of Dasein in Section 2.9. In the present section we will concentrate on the conception of angst as the authentic mode of sensibility, since it is the phenomenon through which Heidegger glimpses the primeval structure of concern. As we saw in the preceding sections, an initial analysis of being-in-the-world indicates that the everyday self is first and foremost inauthentic, that is, the one-self. Dasein, as Heidegger puts it, has always already fallen—that is, has always already succumbed —to the world [§ 39, p. 181]. If we call to mind the characteristics of the inauthentic mode of being-in mentioned in the last section, it is clear that much of everyday existence is occupied with disguising the fact that one's own existence is at stake. Everyday existence aims at relieving one of personal responsibility for one's own decisions. The one-self alters the purview of everyday existence such that the authentic self and authentic possibilities of existence are obscured. Along with the suppression of authentic possibilities of existence, the oneself offers other public, social, and political comportments, all of which have a quieting, reassuring effect on Dasein. Yet this reassurance is false. As this inauthentic but socially and politically engaged one-self, Dasein can both/0z7 to exist as its own self and simultaneously falsely reassure itself that it is in fact giving its all in the act of existence.

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By dissolving into the one-self Dasein is relieved of the necessity of having to be involved with its own self. Clearly, Dasein strives in some sense both to be relieved of the burden of its own authentic existence and to be unaware that it is in fact so relieving itself of the problem of choice. Average everydayness, as Heidegger tells us in § 40, has the character of a flight [Flucht] of Dasein. Dasein's everyday level of comportment is first and foremost a flight from itself towards the world. As Heidegger points out, every flight presupposes something that is fled. In order for there to be a flight from Dasein towards the world, there must already be a disclosure of Dasein. We cannot flee something of which we are completely unaware. To flee, we must at some level know or at the very least suspect what we are fleeing. Since our analyses show that Dasein flees into an inauthentic mode of existence, Dasein's flight must be a response to the prior experience of Dasein's authenticity. Thus Dasein's falling to the world is a defence against the prior disclosure of its own self as such. Heidegger's argument in Being and Time at this point is subtle and fascinating. In order to flee from itself at all, Dasein must already know itself. Accordingly, we should be able to study the character of the everyday flight of Dasein from itself in such a way that it becomes clear what precisely Dasein is fleeing. Note, however, that Heidegger emphasizes the point that Dasein, in falling to the world, does not necessarily explicitly grasp the nature of its flight. At the everyday level there is no conscious awareness that Dasein is fleeing itself. Rather, it is an essential feature of the turmoil and downfall of Dasein that average every dayness is simply characterized by a vague sense of unrest or unease. It is a characteristic feature of turmoil that the awareness of the true reason for the fall to the world is suppressed. This is an appropriate place for a few remarks on Heidegger's phenomenological methodology. Recall that in Section 2.1 we mentioned that it is the very familiarity of everyday features of existence that hides their structural details from us. We can now enlarge upon this account by pointing out that this unfamiliarity


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is an essential feature of average everydayness, which is first and foremost an inauthentic mode of existence as the one-self. The one-self hides from itself the fact that it is inauthentic. This compounds the difficulty of an accurate and faithful description of existential structures of Dasein, because the one-self does not wish to know that it is essentially a flight from itself. This is why a special technique of phenomenological analysis is required, and it is also why Heidegger repeatedly and continually insists throughout the course of his philosophical development that philosophy is not and cannot be a purely theoretical discipline. On Heidegger's account it is impossible for a philosopher to recognize the essential structures of existence through a secondhand account. The analysis of Dasein is always primarily the investigation of one's own Dasein. Without a willingness to call one's own manner of being into question, the phenomenological investigation of existence is impossible: The question of [Dasein's] ability to be whole [Ganzseinkonnen] is a factual-existentic question. Dasein answers it as decided Dasein [als entschlossenes]. The question of Dasein's ability to be whole has now completely shed its originally indicated character, as though it were simply a theoretical, methodological question of the analysis of Dasein, arising from the effort to attain a complete "givenness" of Dasein as a whole. [§ 62, p. 309; the first two sentences are italicized in the original]

We now turn to Heidegger's interesting and provocative use of angst in the context of the phenomenological analysis of Dasein. At this stage of Heidegger's continuing interpretations it becomes particularly clear that his phenomenology is not merely descriptive but also hermeneutic, or interpretative, in nature. Without a careful analysis of the text it may seem that Heidegger merely splices angst into his philosophy without any real justification, its connection with the previous philosophical material being tenuous at best.83 However, if we recall Heidegger's characterization of falling as a flight, it becomes clear that any

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flight must be a flight from something. Since falling is a flight into inauthenticity, it is clear that the something that falling flees is Dasein's authentic state. If it were not, why should Dasein flee into inauthenticity? Heidegger's proposed course of action, then, is to describe the flight of Dasein and in so doing infer the character of the state from which it is fleeing. As such we will "merely undertake the explanation of that which Dasein itself ontically discloses" [§40, p. 185]. Of course, this inference has to be confirmed by firsthand experience. But we should not lose sight of the fact that angst is introduced into the structure of the text as an inference. Heidegger begins by pointing out that the type of flight involved in the sensibility of "fear" [Furcht] is, strictly speaking, always a flight from an intramundane entity. To be afraid of something, in Heidegger's use of the term, literally means to be afraid o/some thing, of an object with entitial characteristics. However, the type of flight associated with falling is not a flight from an intramundane entity but rather a flight from Dasein itself. Not only is the flight that characterizes falling not a flight from intramundane entities (not a fear), but it is in some sense the precise opposite: it is a flight to intramundane entities, a falling to the world. Accordingly, it would be quite misleading to characterize falling as a reaction to fear. Instead, Heidegger terms the sensibility of the state that inauthentic Dasein flees the sensibility of "angst" [Angsf]. Angst is the usual German word for "anxiety" or "apprehensiveness," but since (thanks to Heidegger) it has passed into English with more or less the same meaning, there are no serious objections to simply using the word "angst" as a technical term in the course of our further explanations. In speaking of the sensibility of angst it is important to keep in mind that for Heidegger sensibilities are the existential foundations of emotions, moods, and feelings. A sensibility—this is particularly evident in the original German word Befindlichkeit, which has the literal meaning of "locatedness"—is the structural arrangement of a particular situation, the location (within the referential structure of the world) at which Dasein happens to find itself.


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Thus, as we pointed out in the last section, love is the sensibility that characterizes a successful marriage. This does not mean that the emotion of love is consciously and explicitly felt at every moment throughout the duration of the marriage. It does not mean that there is no space for disagreement or even argument. It does mean that the structure of the marriage is characterized by love, even at moments when one is disagreeing or arguing. There is no need for love to be experienced as a conscious emotion in every waking moment of one's happily married life; this would, in fact, be psychologically impossible. However, the sensibility that characterizes a happy marriage is love, and this sensibility is constantly and continually present as the background to all the individual comportments that are part of the marriage. One does not have to continually remind oneself of the fact that one is married and in love in order to behave like a happily married person. One simply does behave this way, even if the fact is not explicitly present in one's consciousness. One can act upon sensibilities without needing to be conscious of them. One only needs to be explicitly conscious of them in situations where this is appropriate —when one wants to remind oneself why one does what one does, or when something appears to have gone wrong. Similarly, because average everydayness is characterized by a flight from authenticity towards the world there is no reason that the psychological state we call "anxiety" should be constantly experienced throughout one's waking moments. There is no reason for the sensibility of angst to exclude the factual experience of real joy and real happiness. Still less is there a reason for cultivating the faddish angoisse of coffeehouse "existentialism," since the ontic experience of emotion does not necessarily accurately reflect the true underlying sensibility. Nor, we might add, does it need to. As Heidegger puts it, "Along with the sober angst which brings us before our isolated being-ability [das vereinzelte Seinkonnen] comes the ready joy at this possibility" [§62, p. 310]. In authenticity we understand the possibility of angst as the unique sensibility that does not restrict and confuse us. "It frees

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[us] from 'empty' [nichtig] possibilities and allows [us] to become free for authentic ones" [§ 68 b), p. 344]. We should, then, not be misled by the everyday meaning of the words "angst" and "anxiety" into thinking that the sensibility angst is necessarily associated with an unpleasant or unhappy emotional state. The authentic experience of angst is perfectly compatible with factual happiness. On the other hand it is characteristic of the inauthentic one-self that the true underlying sensibility (namely angst) is hidden by the flight to the world. Precisely how we cover over our angst is an individual quirk. Our emotions may be superficially in agreement with angst; or they may superficially contradict it. We can hide our angst from ourselves both through euphoria and through melancholia. In the one-self our emotions serve to disguise the underlying sensibility to which they are a flight reaction. In short: psychological states — whether positive or negative, pleasant or unpleasant—are not reliable indicators of whether or not angst has been authentically experienced. What, then, z's angst according to Heidegger? We have already seen that it is the authentic sensibility that characterizes the state that falling Dasein flees. Accordingly, if we wish to investigate this authentic sensibility in detail, we must investigate the flight involved in falling with reference to the structure of Dasein as being-in-the-world. According to Heidegger, angst is characterized by two basic features: an "of" [Wbzw] and a "for" [Worum]. These two features are best illustrated by means of fear (though we must remember that angst is not fear, since it is not a flight from intramundane entities). We can speak of fear "of" something, that is, the object of the fear, that which one is afraid "of." Similarly, we can speak of the person "for" whose safety one fears. The "for" of fear is thus the person who is threatened by the "of," or object of fear. Although fear too is characterized by an "of," since fear is always fear of some intramundane entity, the "of" that characterizes angst is of a radically different nature. Since angst is never angst "of" an entity, its "of" is totally unrelated


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to connections and connection-wholes. Angst is never angst of a particular threat. Rather, the "of" belonging to angst is completely indeterminate. Angst is not anxious84 about or afraid of anything that is part of the entitial world, whether at hand or to hand. Rather, in the sensibility of angst the world, so to speak, "collapses into itself. The world has the character of complete meaninglessness" [§ 40, p. 186]. Note that in speaking of the "complete meaninglessness" of the world, Heidegger is not speaking of "meaninglessness" in the everyday sense. He is using the term as the opposite of "meaningfulness" in the strict terminological sense established in Section 2.5, that is, the essential character of the references constituting the worldliness of the world. In the sensibility of angst, whose of is "nothing and nowhere," the connectionstructure of the world is disrupted. This disruption of the world structure, however, should remind us of the discussion in Section 2.5 of the three ways in which tool use is impeded, namely conspicuousness, obtrusiveness, and defiance. And as we saw there, for Heidegger in the disruption or disturbance of a reference the structure of the world as such becomes "conspicuous by its absence." When we experience angst as a sensibility, the meaninglessness we experience brings us before the world as such. In the sensibility of angst we understand what the world is—the system of references that Dasein carries along with itself in order to exist. In angst the bare structure of the world as such is disclosed along with the fact that it exists in order to fulfill Dasein's purposes, that is, it exists for the sake of Dasein. This is the direct opposite of inauthentic existence, which is the state in which one exists for the sake of the world. In falling to the world as the dissolution in the one-self, Dasein is fleeing from the world as such (from its bare structure as the area in which Dasein seeks to fulfill its own existence) into the world of everyday concernedness with entities as tools. That is to say, using Heidegger's own words, the of belonging to angst is being-in-theworld, and more specifically the world as such. Afraid of its own world, of the area it creates in order to exist, Dasein seeks to forget this area and its purpose by occupying itself with entities within this area. We flee to things in order to escape ourselves.

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What of the other structural feature of angst, namely the "for" belonging to angst? Just as its of is nothing in particular, the for that characterizes angst is not angst for one particular possibility of Dasein. It is angst for the possibilities of Dasein as such. Here too, angst turns out to be angst for being-in-the-world as a whole. By reducing the world to its bare structure, angst also completely prevents falling Dasein from understanding itself with respect to the "world" and public interpretedness [Ausgelegtheit]. It throws Dasein back to that for which it is anxious [sich angstet], its authentic capacity for being-in-theworld. Angst isolates Dasein in its ownmost being-in-theworld, which as understanding essentially plans itself towards possibilities. Thus with the for belonging to being anxious [des Sichangstens], angst discloses Dasein as being possible, and as such as what it can only be with a view to itself [von ihm selbst her] as isolated in isolation [als vereinzeltes in der Vereinzelung]. [§ 40, p. 187-188]

Thus along with the bare structure of the world (its "of"), angst also discloses the bare structure of the self as existence (its "for"). Angst brings Dasein before its world as the world and before itself as the self. In Heidegger's turn of phrase, angst brings Dasein as itself before itself as being-in-the-world. Angst, accordingly, is the sensibility belonging to the primeval act of Dasein through which Dasein is enabled to exist in a world at all*5 Heidegger's term for the essential emotional quality of angst (i.e., angst viewed purely as a sensibility) is Unheimlichkeit, which we will translate as "unsettlement." Here too we must guard against the interpretation of this term as a mere psychological state or feeling. The German word means "uncanniness," but its literal meaning is "unhomeliness." Heidegger uses the etymology of the term to reflect the essentially "unsettled" and "unsettling" feature of angst as a sensibility.86 The sensibility of angst prevents one from "settling down" to the daily affairs of the one-self. In fact, it interrupts the factually existing systems of reference that allow us to comport ourselves towards entities


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and thus prevents us from falling to the world. Instead, we are confronted with the basic fact of our existence: that we exist in a world and that existence is our task. 2.9 THE PRIMEVAL STRUCTURE OF DASEIN AS CONCERN (§§41-42) Having investigated the phenomenon of angst as a primeval sensibility, in § 41 of Being and Time Heidegger returns to his original question: is there a way of grasping Dasein as a structural whole despite the bewildering multiplicity of ontological features that have become evident in course of the analysis of existence? As we saw in the last section, angst is a fundamental sensibility disclosing Dasein in its authenticity. It is the state that everyday falling flees. In falling, Dasein as the one-self flees towards concernedness with intramundane entities. By contrast, angst discloses authentic Dasein, that is, Dasein as itself, as it truly is prior to the confused state of turmoil. Angst, as authentic sensibility, frees Dasein from its immersion in concernedness with intramundane entities, and in so doing brings Dasein before the bare structures of the world and of its own self. The fundamental authentic sensibility of angst discloses Dasein in its pure "that it is and has existence as its task" [daft es ist und zu sein hat]. Accordingly, if we wish to identify a primeval existential structure of Dasein that underlies the multiplicity of structural features hitherto revealed, we should begin with an analysis of the manner in which Dasein is disclosed in angst. Heidegger begins this analysis in § 41 with a review of the essential points covered in the discussion of angst. These essential points are (1) angst, as a sensibility, is a "manner" [Weise] of being-inthe-world; (2) the "of" [Wbuor] characterizing angst is thrown beingin-the-world (i.e., being-in-the-world considered with respect to its thrownness); and

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(3) the "for" [Worum] characteristic of angst is the abilityto-be-in-the-world [In-der-Welt-sein-konnen], that is, being-in-the-world considered with respect to its ability to plan (in Heidegger's technical sense of the word) its own existence [§ 41, p. 191]. Note that in each point of the summary, an essential aspect of being-in-the-world is addressed. In (1) angst reveals a manner of being-in-the-world; in (2) angst reveals being-in-the-world as thrown-, and in (3) angst reveals being-in-the-world as existence. This is important because it hints at the fact that there is indeed an underlying structural unity despite the multiplicity of Dasein's existential characteristics. Our next step will be to further examine these three aspects as a preparation for isolating and identifying this underlying unity. Following Heidegger, the three main aspects of angst allow us to discern three fundamental structural features of being-in-the-world. The technical terms Heidegger introduces for these three features are (1) "being-fallen" [Verfallensein], which corresponds to the manner or way in which one exists in the world (see the more detailed explanations that follow); (2) "facticity" [Faktizitat], the quality of being thrown into a world, that is, the fact that Dasein always exists in concrete (or factual) situations in which it has to make concrete decisions concerning its existence; and (3) "existentiality" [Existenzialitat], the quality of having to exist, that is, the ability of Dasein to understand its own possibilities for existence. According to Heidegger, by studying the phenomenon of angst we have identified and isolated the essentially unitary structure of Dasein. As Heidegger says, "These [three] existential determinations are not parts of a composite in which one part could be missing now and then; rather, a primeval context [Zusammenhang] weaves in them, which constitutes the soughtfor unity of the structural whole" [§ 41, p. 191].


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But how is this unity to be characterized? How can we reduce these three structural features to their most fundamental existential character? Heidegger carries out yet another series of phenomenological analyses aimed at identifying the primeval character of the three features discussed above. Beginning with existentiality, Heidegger repeats his definition of Dasein: Dasein is an entity that, in its being (i.e., existence), is occupied with its own being. As we saw in the analysis of understanding as a mode of being-in, this "being occupied with ..." [es geht um ...] is, in a concrete sense, selfplanning towards one's ownmost being-ability [sichentwerfendes Sein zum eigensten Seinkonnen]. In understanding, Dasein always understands its own possibilities for existence in the world, whether in an authentic or inauthentic fashion. This ability to understand possibilities is disclosed in a primeval and authentic manner in angst. How are we best to describe Dasein's understanding of its own possibilities, that is, its "being unto itself? Heidegger suggests the formulation: in its concrete existence, Dasein is always open to possibilities. As such, Dasein is fundamentally and necessarily always "being-aheadof-itself" [Sich-vorweg-sein]. Heidegger sometimes refers to this fundamental structure of Dasein as das Sich-vorweg or Vorwegsein. For the sake of simplicity, we will use the two equivalent expressions "the self-ahead" or "being-self-ahead." Turning to facticity, Heidegger points out (as we saw in Section 2.5) that Dasein is always essentially in a world. Dasein always finds itself thrown into a world. (Recall the relationship between sensibility and thrownness from Section 2.6, and recall that Heidegger's word for sensibility, Befindlichkeit, can also mean "the state of being found somewhere".) This abandonment to a world in which Dasein has to exist is also disclosed authentically and primevally by angst. The second fundamental structure, then, is "being-already-in-a-world" [Schon-sein-in-einer-Welt]. Following Heidegger, we will sometimes abbreviate this expression simply as "being-already-in" or, still more simply, as "being-already." Accordingly, Dasein is not simply self-ahead; it is self-ahead-in-being-already-in-a-world.

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Heidegger uses this somewhat frightening hyphenated expression to indicate that being-self-ahead and being-already are not separate elements somehow fused together to make up Dasein. Rather, being-self-ahead and being-already are aspects of the same structure. Dasein's existence is always factual. Its possibilities for existence are possibilities of existence in the world. To use the terminology of the world analysis in Section 2.5, the totality of references constituting meaningfulness is always anchored in a purpose, that is, an expression of Dasein's possibilities for existence. It belongs to the essential and unitary ontological structure of Dasein to be existence in a world, "thrown planning." This leaves one remaining structure, that of being-fallen, or the manner in which Dasein exists in the world. Dasein is not merely a thrown ability-to-be-in-the-world in an abstract sense. Rather, Dasein always finds itself already involved in some concrete, factual situation in the world. Dasein is always occupied in some manner with the world of concernedness, occupied with the manipulation and use of entities as tools as means for achieving its purposes. We saw in Section 2.7 that Dasein was essentially and constantly involved in the act of falling to the world. Towards the end of Section 2.8, we saw that this falling was also a flight in the face of unsettlement. We emphasized repeatedly that falling is not a psychological state that could conceivably be eliminated at any stage of Dasein's development. Falling is an existential—an essential, characteristic structure —of Dasein. The possibility of comporting ourselves towards entities in the world necessarily implies the possibility that in these comportments we will place the accent on manipulating entities, and in so doing neglect our own proper existence. The quality or structural feature common to all these existential characteristics of Dasein, however, is the fact of "being-among" [Sein bei] intramundane to-handed entities as objects of concernedness. Being-among is just as much an essential feature of Dasein as are being-self-ahead and being-already-in. The world in which we exist is always a system of references for the discovery


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of ultramundane entities. Similarly, our own possibilities of existence are always possibilities for comportment towards intramundane entities as tools with which we fulfill our purposes. Accordingly, the full and complete primeval expression of the being of Dasein is being-self-ahead-in-being-already-inthe-world-as-being-among-in tramundanely-confron ting-en titles. More briefly: Dasein is self-ahead-being-already-in-(the world)-among(entities). This structural unity which—despite its unity—is distinguished by three clear functional divisions, Heidegger terms concern [Sorge]. In using the term Sorge, Heidegger is reaching back to two terms he introduced in the course of his world analysis: concernedness [Besorgen] and concernfulness [Fursorge]. The former, we recall, denotes comportments towards entities, while the latter denotes comportments towards other people. Sorge is the root word common to both Besorgen and Fursorge. Heidegger uses this etymological relation to indicate that Sorge or concern is the fundamental existential comportment making both concernedness and concernfulness possible. It is (at this stage in our ongoing phenomenological investigations) the most primeval structure in terms of which we can understand Dasein. A short digression in order to clarify the meaning of concern is justified in the face of several misunderstandings to which the term can easily fall prey. Firstly, recall that "concern" is a name for a structural feature of Dasein. It is not the name of a sensibility. This should make it obvious that in speaking of concern Heidegger means nothing like the mood or emotional state of "worry/7 "anticipation," or "anxious involvement/' "Concern" is a term referring to the structural whole constituted by being-self-ahead, being-already, and being-among. This is all it means. Secondly, it is important to emphasize that in locutions such as "Dasein exists for its own sake" [Dasein ist umwillen seiner] Heidegger does not mean anything more than that Dasein is characterized by selfhood, that is, by the ability to make its own choices and the necessity of doing so.871 cannot exist for others any more than a personal trainer can exercise/or his or her clients.

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Similarly, when Heidegger says "The expression 'self-concern/ in analogy to concernedness and concernfulness, would be a tautology" [§ 41, p. 193], he means no more than that concern, as being-self-ahead, always discloses possibilities for existence that are not simply free-floating and up in the air but essentially and necessarily characterized by a reference to a self whose personal and private task it is to choose among those possibilities. Statements of this sort must always be read together with companion statements such as "Concern is always, if only in a privative sense, concernedness and concernfulness" [§ 41, p. 194]. To sum up, the existential possibilities we ourselves grasp necessarily also involve, and have consequences for, the world and for other people. Nonetheless, we must make these choices, and only we can make them for ourselves. Others cannot make them for us. Let us pause to summarize the results of this section. We found that our analyses of angst and the phenomena it discloses were indeed able to lead us to a primeval and unitary structure of Dasein, which is the existential foundation of the multiplicity of previously revealed structures. Heidegger's term for this structure is concern. Despite being a single, unified phenomenon, it has a threefold arrangement, which we can summarize in the following table: concern being-already-in (facticity)

being-self-ahead (existentiality)

being-among (being-fallen)

sensibility and thrown ness

understanding and planning

falling

There is one surprising feature of this arrangement, which should not go unmentioned, namely the absence of talk. Talk is absent here because, as we shall later see in Section 3.6, it is a comportment of Dasein that plays a fundamental and allencompassing role in the existence of Dasein. Talk is not an "isolated" comportment of Dasein; rather, it permeates the entirety of concern.88


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One immediate and obvious advantage of the concept of concern is that it provides a more sophisticated, if still preliminary, manner of grasping the difference between inauthenticity and authenticity. According to Heidegger in § 41, inauthenticity is the result of a fundamental modification of being-self-ahead. The character of being-self-ahead does not disappear in inauthenticity; even in an inauthentic state Dasein is still, as it always necessarily is, occupied with its own existence. However, in an inauthentic state, the self of being-self-ahead is the one-self [§ 41, p. 193]. The fundamental existential character of concern remains, but beingself-ahead has been modified such that the self that Dasein is ahead of is no longer its own self, but the one-self. The modification of being-self-ahead in inauthenticity is accompanied by a modification of being-already-in. Insofar as inauthentic Dasein is characterized by an absorption in concernedness with intramundane entities, being-already-in no longer discloses the world as the world of Dasein. Rather, being-already-in is modified in such a way that it makes an absorption in tool use possible. Being-already-in, in Heidegger's words, becomes "just-always-being-already-among ... " [Nurimmer-schon-bei ... ]. Both these characteristic modifications of inauthenticity will be investigated at a deeper level in Section 3.6 from the point of view where timeliness is seen to be the fundamental structure of concern. We will end this section with a brief remark on the relationship between falling and being-among. Note that, strictly speaking, being-among is merely the existential structure that enables Dasein to discover entities within a world. Falling, however, is the existential structure that makes specifically inauthentic comportments towards intramundane entities possible. Obviously, comportments towards intramundane entities are not in themselves inauthentic. Heidegger's somewhat unfortunate tendency to use terms with a pejorative everyday meaning in a terminologically neutral sense has occasionally led to confusion on the part of interpreters. As we briefly discussed in Sections 2.5 and 2.7, the one-self is not

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merely inauthentic; it is also a necessary foundation of any sort of common enterprise. Any standardization and regulation will necessarily involve giving up some of one's own possibilities of existence. The deciding factor is, however, whether this is done from deliberate choice or without explicitly choosing. Authenticity is not and cannot be an abolition of the one-self; rather, it is, as Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes, a modification of the one-self, an authentic manner of coming to terms with this primeval and necessary existential characteristic of Dasein. Similarly, in speaking of falling to the world, we should be sensitive enough to the nuance of the original text to realize that Heidegger does not mean to say that concernedness with intramundane entities is something that can or should be done away with. We are not to become phenomenological hermits, existing in the barrenness of the desert, far from the madding crowd. In fact, on Heidegger's own analysis it is inherently impossible to do away with concernedness. Of course, one can renounce the world in a factual sense, but the existential structure of concernedness remains. It merely glides into a privative mode, becoming the "absence-of-entities-in-concernedness." Renunciation of everyday life serves only to make the burden of existing with others in the workaday world conspicuous by its absence. It is clear that falling, in falling to the world, is essentially falling into concernedness, but this should not mislead us into thinking that concernedness is evil or bad as such. In making being-among part of the structure of concern, Heidegger is, in part, attempting to establish a more obviously neutral term for the comportment of Dasein towards entities than falling. Naturally, being-among still remains the existential foundation for all comportments towards intramundane entities, including and especially falling and its concomitant inauthentic comportments.89 2.10 REALITY AND TRUTH (§§ 43-44) In this section we will focus on §§ 43-44 of Being and Time with a view to clarifying three important issues: (1) the dependence of


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Being on Dasein; (2) the independence of entities from Dasein; and (3) the connection between concern, truth, and authenticity. Heidegger does of course address other important topics in the course of §§ 43-44, such as skepticism and the reality of the external world, but for the purposes of an introductory exposition the three aforementioned issues are the most important. We will begin with the third issue, the connection between concern, truth, and authenticity. a) Concern, Truth, and Authenticity In order to understand Heidegger's conceptions of reality and truth, it will be necessary to consider somewhat more deeply the nature of concern. In § 44 b), Heidegger informs us that the discoveredness of intramundane entities is founded in the disclosedness of the world. Disclosedness, however, is the fundamental manner [Grundart] of Dasein according to which it is its there [Da]. Disclosedness is constituted by sensibility, understanding, and talk and coevally involves [betrifft] the world, being-in, and the self. The structure of concern as self-ahead—being already in a world —as being among intramundane entities harbours [birgt] disclosedness of Dasein in itself. With and through it [i.e., the disclosedness of Dasein] is discoveredness; thus it is first with the disclosedness of Dasein that the most primeval phenomenon of truth is attained. [§ 44 b), p. 220-221]

This quotation gives us important information with respect to the connection between concern and the structure of being-inthe-world. There are three important points: (1) Disclosedness is the fundamental manner of Dasein according to which it is its "there." In other words, disclosedness is the most basic comportment (in Husserlian terms, the fundamental act or universal synthesis) of Dasein, the comportment that "defines" Dasein at the most basic level.

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(2) Disclosedness is constituted by or characterized by sensibility, understanding, and talk; and coevally by the world, being-in, and the self. Sensibility and understanding are the two fundamental existentials we addressed in the course of our analysis of being-in. The world, being-in, and the self together constitute the structure that Heidegger terms being-in-the-world. Talk, as we saw in the last section, is assigned a more comprehensive function the exact status of which is still to be clarified. (3) The concern structure of Dasein, which consists of being-self-ahead while already-in a world and beingamong intramundane entities, harbours disclosedness in itself. How are we to make sense of these three statements? In saying that concern harbours disclosedness in itself, Heidegger means that disclosedness is the most fundamental or core comportment of Dasein. All other comportments are in a sense based on or are modifications of the fundamental disclosedness of Dasein.90 This comportment, the comportment by virtue of which Dasein is enabled to comport itself at all, is the basic and essential feature of Dasein. Disclosedness is the existential feature of Dasein that makes concern at all possible and upon which the three structural characteristics of concern are based. It is harboured in concern, that is, structurally implicated or contained in concern as the "condition of its possibility/' to use a Kantian turn of phrase. It is the existential-ontological foundation of concern, the phenomenon without which concern could not occur as a comportment at all. What of being-in-the-world? How is it related to the structure of concern? As we saw in the last section, sensibility corresponds to being-already-in, while understanding corresponds to beingself-ahead. By "corresponds" I mean to indicate that sensibility is a modification or derivative of the already-in structure of concern, just as concern itself is a derivative structure based on or founded


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in the disclosedness of Dasein as such. Similarly, understanding is a derivative or modification of the self-ahead aspect of concern. These two existentials, sensibility and understanding, are coeval constituents of being-in, the comportment of the self towards its world. Accordingly, we see that being-in unites or mediates between two other structural features that are also rooted in or based on the structure of concern. These structural features, namely the self and the world, are to be considered as further modifications of the concern-structure of Dasein, which emerge at the existential level of being-in. The term " Dasein" itself, as Heidegger tells us, is merely a collective term for disclosedness and for all of the existential modifications to which it gives rise. We can sum up our results concerning the structure of Dasein in the following diagram. The arrows are meant to indicate a movement towards a more profound level of interpretation: The Structural Multiplicity of Dasein (§§ 1-44) being-in-the-world (the world—being-in—the self) being-in (sensibility/thrownness—understanding/planning) concern (being-already-in—being-self-ahead—being-among) c//sc/osec/A7ess

Note that the lowest tier of the diagram indicates the most primeval ontological level, while the highest tier is the most derivative level. Note too how we see from the diagram that the course of Heidegger's analyses in Being and Time proceeds backwards from the most derivative level of comportment towards the most primeval or least derivative. In undertaking our phenomenological analysis of Dasein we are in effect retracing the steps by which our more concrete comportments emerge or "trickle down" from the fundamental level of disclosedness.

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There are, of course, obvious parallels between the structural elements of each level of comportment, but it would probably be somewhat artificial to attempt to discover a one-to-one correspondence between them, and this is how Heidegger intends it to be. Each more derivative level of more concrete comportment is a decisive modification of the previous, more primeval ontological level. As such, the individual structural elements characteristic of each level also undergo a decisive transformation as they go forth from the immediately preceding, more fundamental level. Note that Heidegger does not tell us either how or why these modifications occur. He feels, however, that a hermeneutic phenomenology is able to show that they do occur, and that they are all founded in one basic and essential structure: disclosedness (but compare the following remarks on talk). In his attempt to clarify the relation of concern to being-inthe-world, Heidegger lists four constitutive existential structures of Dasein [§ 44 b), p. 221-222]. These are (1) "disclosedness in general" [Erschlossenheit uberhaupt], (2) thrownness, (3) the plan, and (4) falling. Note how Heidegger combines elements from several different levels of comportment in order to map the structure of being-in onto the structure of concern. For our purposes, it is most important to concentrate on what Heidegger says concerning the first and the last of the listed structures. In § 34 of Being and Time, as well as in the last section, we saw that Heidegger repeatedly emphasizes that talk "permeates" [durchgreift] the entire structure of Dasein. We will have more to say on this topic in Section 3.6. For now it is sufficient to briefly call attention to a statement that Heidegger makes further on in Being and Time. The first sentence of § 68 d) runs, "The full disclosedness of the There [Da], constituted by understanding, sensibility, and falling, receives its articulation through talk." Compare this with Heidegger's statement in § 44 b) concerning disclosedness in general: "It permeates the whole of the beingstructure that has become explicit through the phenomenon of concern." By "disclosedness in general" Heidegger means the fundamental disclosedness upon which the disclosedness


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of all other comportments of Dasein is dependent. (Heidegger also speaks of the "disclosedness of the world" or of specific existential structures of Dasein.) The sentence quoted from § 68 d) implies that disclosedness in general is articulated, that is, differentiated into other derivative structures by the activity of the phenomenon of talk. While we should emphasize that this is merely an inference from various statements that Heidegger makes in Being and Time, it dovetails nicely with the role that talk plays in his later philosophy and explains the importance he places on § 34 of Being and Time in the dialogue " Aus einem Gesprach von der Sprache. Zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden" in Unterwegs zur Sprache?1 The second important issue we need to address at this point is the role that falling plays in Heidegger's clarification of the relation of concern to being-in-the-world. With respect to falling, Heidegger tells us, First and foremost, Dasein is lost to [i.e., has fallen to] its "world/' Understanding [...] has displaced itself there. The immersion in the One means the dominance of public interpretedness [Ausgelegtheit]. [...] Being unto entities is not extinguished, but it has been uprooted. Entities are not completely concealed; it is precisely the case that they are discovered, but at the same time disguised; they show themselves—but in the mode of semblance [des Schemes]. [...] Because it is essentially falling, Dasein is according to its existential constitution [Seinsverfassung] in "untruth." [...] Undisclosedness [Verschlossenheit] and coveredness [Verdecktheit] belong to thefacticity of Dasein. [...] But only insofar as Dasein is disclosed can it also be closed; and only insofar as intramundane entities are always already discovered with Dasein can they [...] be covered (concealed) or disguised [verdeckt (verborgen) oder verstellt]. [§ 44 b), p. 221222]

According to this quotation, falling, which is rooted in beingamong intramundane entities, is the source of " untruth/7 That

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is to say, falling to the world involves an uprooting of Dasein's comportments towards entities (what Heidegger calls its "being unto" them). In falling to the world, Dasein no longer comes upon entities in their true light. This is because falling, as the immersion in the one-self, implies that Dasein's own structures are hidden. As such, they are understood in an inauthentic manner, and as a result Dasein no longer correctly interprets its own possibilities for existence. This confusion is, according to the previous quotation, the existential foundation of the possibility of error. We can only make mistakes when our interpretation of intramundane entities is confused. It can only become confused at all because we have the inherent tendency to become confused, that is, to interpret wrongly. Wrong interpretation is a result of the possibility of not comporting oneself properly as Dasein, as an entity to whose structural constitution interpretation necessarily and essentially belongs. Accordingly, the possibility of error is rooted in Dasein's capacity to fail to be that entity which it is, in its capacity to be inauthentic.92 What, then, is truth for Heidegger? Recall that we spoke of disclosedness as the fundamental comportment of Dasein, the comportment which permits all other comportments, including the comportments that discover "truth" in the everyday sense of the word. According to Heidegger, truth in the primary sense is the phenomenon upon which all other truth-discovering comportments are based.93 Accordingly, truth, in the primary sense of the word, is nothing other than the disclosedness of Dasein. Falling, however, belongs to the disclosedness of Dasein, as we have previously seen. Falling is nothing other than the tendency for the disclosedness of Dasein to become undisclosed (i.e., obscured or hidden in the everyday sense of the words). When Dasein falls, it fails to understand its own existence properly. In so doing it is characterized by inauthenticity, which is nothing other than a failure to understand its own existence as it actually is, as characteristically and essentially its own existence. Failing to understand this, it is immersed in the one-self. Immersed in the one-self, Dasein shifts the emphasis of its understanding to


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the interpretation and manipulation of intramundane entities. "Error" in the sense of undisclosedness belongs to the disclosedness of Dasein. The undisclosedness of Dasein then in turn results in factual error at the everyday level. Note that Heidegger does not believe that it would ever be conceivable to do away completely with the possibility of factual error through authenticity. Undisclosedness and thus the ever-present possibility of error belong to the essential nature of Dasein. The two points that are brought out in this discussion are thus: (1) truth, in the most primeval sense of the word, is the disclosedness of Dasein, to which the discoveredness of intramundane entities, and thus the possibility of error in the everyday sense, belong; and (2) Dasein is coevally characterized by both truth (disclosedness) and untruth (undisclosedness).94 In this manner Heidegger attempts to link the concept of authenticity with the concept of truth. Authentic existence is existence in conformity with the true structural nature of Dasein. Inauthentic existence is existence that is not so in conformity, that is, that is based on a false or confused understanding of what existence is. This inauthentic self-understanding is the reason that Dasein can fall to the world at all and immerse itself in the one-self, lost in the use and manipulation of entities at the behest of the world. Heidegger's treatment of truth and authenticity should not, I think, deceive us into thinking that the philosopher necessarily always has some sort of advantage over others in the act of existence. Authentic self-understanding is not necessarily an explicit theoretical understanding of Dasein. One can act well without being able to explain how or why one acts well. By way of comparison, a musician can perform well without a systematic knowledge of music theory. Nevertheless, every good performance implies an underlying familiarity with the nature of good music, even when the musician cannot give an

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explicit theoretical formulation of the rules guiding his or her performance. We would of course expect a knowledge of music theory to improve the musician's ability to perform well. Still, it need not. There are some musicians who become worse when they are forced to play by the rules. A final brief remark on the subject of authenticity may be helpful at this point. The exact nature of authenticity in Being and Time is still very much a matter for scholarly dispute. However, my own solution to the problem involves distinguishing between two senses of authenticity. In the first sense, authenticity is identified with disclosedness and opposed to inauthenticity, which is in turn identified with undisclosedness. In the second sense, however, authenticity is understood as the awareness and acceptance of inauthenticity and of authenticity in the first sense as mutually antagonistic and yet equally necessary features of Dasein. For arguments in support of this interpretation see Section 3.3 and the second half of Section 3.4. b) Being, Entities, and Dasein We will now turn to the remaining two important issues, namely the question of the dependence of Being on Dasein and of the independence of entities from Dasein. In our introductory example in Section 2.2, we described how a particular scientific attitude could result in the re-definition of certain types of entities as non-existent. These entities were those that were not observable under laboratory conditions. At that time it was convenient to speak of consciousness and emotions as entities that were defined out of existence by the belief that only entities that are observable under laboratory conditions truly exist. Of course, for Heidegger consciousness and emotions are not entities."Consciousness" is a philosophically inadequate concept referring to a phenomenon that is more accurately described as existentiality. Similarly, emotions in the usual sense are derivative phenomena ontologically rooted in sensibilities. In Heideggerian terminology, we can go on to rephrase our example in the following more stringent way. In the scientific


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attitude we described in Section 2.2, the being of entities is planned (in the strict terminological sense) with a view to laboratory observability. This plan is then extended to the being of all entities, including those that are not particularly suited to an interpretation whose criterion of existence and non-existence is laboratory observability, such as Dasein. Thanks to this plan, fundamental existential characteristics of Dasein, such as existentiality and facticity (sensibility) succumb to undisclosedness. The plan, however, also prevents us from realizing that this has occurred, since within the framework of this plan no sense95 can be attributed to these aspects of Dasein. Accordingly, insofar as they are disclosed at all, they are interpreted with a view to the criterion of laboratory observability. "Consciousness" becomes a mere epiphenomenon accompanying the true phenomena, namely observable quantifiable biomechanical processes. Moods become a function of hormones. Intelligence becomes a product of evolution assisted by chance.96 The point of view of everyday common sense gives rise to a temptation to regard the planning of entities towards definite conceptions of Being as a merely psychological procedure. On this line of thought, entities (such as human beings) are always in possession of certain properties. If these properties are not evident within certain systems of thought, it can only be because they are ignored. This ignorance is the result of a mental attitude that causes one to take no notice of them. However, entities still retain their properties, even in the course of ignoring them. On this view, a radical behaviourist (for example) does not in fact alter the being of entities by planning them with a view to laboratory observability. A radical behaviourist simply fails to apprehend certain aspects or features of the entities subjected to the plan. It is this fundamental misunderstanding of the status of Being and entities that gave rise to the confusion of Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology with "existentialism/7 On this view, the relation between entities and Dasein is conceived as a psychological one. Entities exist objectively all on their own,

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without reference to Dasein. Accordingly, when Heidegger speaks of planning, he is speaking of a purely psychological procedure, something in our heads, an attitude or stance that affects our apprehension of the entities in question but does not affect the entities themselves. The entities remain what they are. Their being too remains what it is, unaffected by the manner in which we apprehend them. They exist independently of us and of our apprehension of their properties. This interpretation is, however, as we have seen in detail, an inversion of Heidegger's actual line of thought in Being and Time. For Heidegger, entities are indeed independent of Dasein. Yet they are not independent of Being; and Being itself is dependent on Dasein. In order to explain this startling state of affairs, we have to clarify the sense in which entities can be said to be independent of Dasein. Recall that for Heidegger, the being of entities is connection. Connection is the most fundamental structure of the worldliness of the world. Accordingly, the being of entities is the capacity to appear within a world in connection with other entities. This appearance within the referential structure of the world Heidegger terms discoveredness. Since discoveredness is the basic feature of entities as such, their being, we will no longer speak in an ontologically unenlightened way of the "existence" of entities, this term being too vague for proper philosophical use. Instead, we will speak of the discoveredness of entities. Our question then becomes: in what sense is the discoveredness of entities independent of Dasein? An entity that is truly independent of Dasein is an entity that is outside any possible connection. We will refer to such an entity as an "entity in itself." If we call to mind the pertinent details of the world analysis and of the discussion of being-in from Sections 2.5 and 2.6, it is clear that we can never understand or interpret such an entity. Entities are only discoverable in connections, and as such only discoverable within the world structure. An entity in itself, being wholly outside of any possible connection, is an entity to which we can never comport ourselves and as such an entity that can never be discovered. This is not to say that Dasein


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creates the entities it discovers in an idealistic sense. However, it does mean that the condition of entities in themselves — entities outside and beyond the world —is, for us, absolutely incomprehensible: Before Newton's laws were discovered, they were not "true"; this does not imply that they were false, nor even that they would become false when no more discoveredness is ontically possible. [...] That Newton's laws were neither true nor false before him cannot mean that the entities that they indicate in the act of discovery [entdeckend aufzeigen] did not previously exist [sei vordem nicht gewesen]. The laws became true through Newton, with them entities in themselves [Seiendes an ihm selbst]97 became accessible. With the discoveredness of entities, they show themselves precisely as entities that previously already existed. To discover in this way is the being-manner [Seinsart] of "truth." [§ 44 c), p. 226-227]

Our comportments, in discovering entities, do not create them. Yet at the same time, it is impossible to discover entities except within the world. The world, in turn, is a structure of Dasein. It thus clearly follows that the discoveredness of entities — but not their existence in the everyday sense of the word —is dependent on Dasein. Although the entire referential framework within which alone entities can be discovered belongs to Dasein, entities are nonetheless discovered as truly independent entities. Dasein discovers them as having previously been around prior to the act of discovery. At the same time, we can say nothing about them except what we have discovered through our comportments towards them. Accordingly, All truth, according to its essentially Dasein-like being-manner, is relative to the being of Dasein. Does this relativity amount to: all truth is "subjective"? If one interprets "subjective" as "dependent upon the arbitrary whim of the subject" [in das Belieben des Subjekts gestellt], then certainly not. For discovery,

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according to its deepest sense [eigenster Sinn], separates [entzieht] the act of making statements [das Aussagen] from "subjective" whims and brings Dasein, in the act of discovery, before the entity itself. And only because "truth" as discovery is a manner in which Dasein exists [eine Seinsart des Daseins ist] can it be separated from its whims. [§ 44 c), p. 227]

Can we talk things into existence? Obviously not, but we can invent new words, or use old words in new ways, such that previously undisclosed meanings (in the terminological sense) become disclosed. Can we talk things out of existence? Of course not, but we can misuse words in such a manner that previously disclosed meanings become hidden. Are the properties of entities created by our plans? Definitely not, but the degree of access to entities of which we are capable will be dependent upon the richness of our plan. Does Heidegger's interpretation of the world as a system of references result in a philosophical, moral, or cultural relativism, in the popular sense of the word? Certainly not, but we must keep in mind that very different plans may discover entities in very different manners, and it may not be immediately certain, particularly in view of the everyday dominance of the one-self, which plan is "better" according to any given criterion of "better." The popular charge of postmodernist relativism, insofar as it is applied to Heidegger, must be rejected as essentially groundless. What, then, of Being, namely the fundamental ontological structure with reference to which all entities of whatever type are understood as entities? Here Heidegger is equally unambiguous: That reality is ontologically founded in the being of Dasein cannot mean that real things [Reales] can only be as what they are in themselves [an ihm selbst] if and as long as Dasein exists. However, only as long as Dasein exists [ist], that is, the ontic possibility of the understanding of Being, "is there" Being.


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If Dasein does not exist, then "independence" and "initselfness" do not "exist" either. Things of this sort are then 4.78 x 7.61 in.txt4.78 x 7.61 in.txt Then intramundane entities are neither discoverable nor can they lie in concealedness [Verborgenheit]. Then it can no longer be said that entities are, nor that they are not. Now, as long as the understanding of Being exists [ist] and thus also the understanding of at-handedness, it can of course be said that then entities will still continue to be. [§ 43 c), p. 211-212]

In Being and Time, Heidegger maintains that there is a dependence of Being, but not of entities, upon Dasein. This can also be described as a "dependence of reality, not of real things, upon concern" [§ 43 c), p. 212]. In short, the world is dependent on Dasein but entities are not. Being, as the most primeval frame of reference for the discovery of entities, as the most fundamental sense of what it means to be an entity, is only given in Dasein's understanding. This should be obvious enough: since we can only discover entities in the act of understanding them, the fundamental sense with reference to which they are understood is also a function of the act of understanding. In short, Being, and with it the whole world structure of which it is the cornerstone, is merely a feature of Dasein's act of understanding. Without Dasein, Being itself would cease to be. Without Dasein there would no longer be any understanding. There would no longer be any criterion for the distinction between real and unreal. There would be nothing making this distinction anymore. Yet the ontological dependence of Being on Dasein does not compromise the independence of entities from Dasein, despite the dependence of entities on Being. The entities that Dasein discovers within the referential framework of the world can be understood only within this framework, and so their discoveredness is dependent on Dasein's understanding of Being. At the same time, however, the act of discovery does not create the entities Dasein discovers:

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Entities are independent of the experience, knowledge, and grasping through which they are disclosed, discovered, and determined. But Being only "is" in the understanding of the entity to whose being such a thing as the understanding of being belongs. [§ 39, p. 183]

Similarly, in reading a book, my comprehension of the text is a function of the interpretative structure I apply to the text (corresponding to Being) in conjunction with the acts of interpretation I carry out within this framework (my understanding). Any sense the book has is a sense arising in my understanding of the book. At the same time, it would be wrong to claim that I authored the book merely because its sense is a function of my understanding. The book is truly independent of me, not my creation (unless, of course, I happen to be its author; but this is not the point of the example). Yet its sense is dependent upon the frame of reference I bring along with me to the act of reading. Without this frame of reference—my knowledge of the language, my technical background, my expectations — I cannot even begin to read the book. The book has no meaning independently of some frame of reference for its comprehension. Still, the book is not created by being understood within this frame of reference. It is allowed to emerge into my experience to the fullest degree that my frame of reference allows it to do so. It is fairly obvious that Heidegger's position is essentially a reworking of the Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena,98 the noumena in this case being entities insofar as they are considered independently of Dasein's understanding. Thus we can see that far from being a truly "existentialist" project, Heidegger's Being and Time is in essence a refurbished Kantianism with existential structures of Dasein replacing Kant's pure concepts of the understanding or "categories." In Being and Time Heidegger differs from Kant in that the existential structures are derived from a pragmatic analysis of experience rather than read off from a quasi-logical "Table of Judgements." We will leave the question open as to whether the Heidegger of Being


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and Time manages to avoid the paradoxes inherent in the Kantian distinction between phenomena and noumena." In conclusion, it is important to emphasize an aspect of Dasein's understanding of entities that we have not yet addressed. A superficial reader may be inclined to think that Heidegger believes that the sense of intramundane entities is always and solely dependent upon individual interpretations. Hostile critics might be inclined to conclude that Heidegger is, after all, a proponent of a sort of individualistic relativism. However, a brief consideration of the material we discussed in the course of the present section will show that this cannot be the case. In the first place, the act of discovery, according to its own nature, discovers entities to be independent of the act itself. Accordingly, it belongs to the very sense of interpretation that no interpretation creates meaning, but only reveals, in a more or less appropriate and suitable manner, the independently existing meaning of the entity in question. Thus a purely individualistic interpretation is, by definition, impossible. Secondly, it belongs to Dasein's very essence that it is characterized by thrownness into a world. Dasein, in formulating its own understanding, must always begin from a previous understanding of entities that it cannot create anew but only modify. Every new interpretation grows from the soil of already existing interpretations, which it influences and modifies in turn. Since the self of Dasein exists first and foremost in a shared world, in a world characterized by the presence of others, one's own interpretation, by definition, must also take others' interpretations into account—even if in the merely privative and inauthentic manner of denying their relevance in everyday ambiguity.


CHAPTER 3

THE TIMING OF TIMELINESS

3.1 THE PROBLEM OF COMPLETENESS AND AUTHENTICITY (§§ 45-46) After finishing the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein in Section One of Part One of Being and Time (which consists of §§9-44), Heidegger turns to the question of Dasein and timeliness [Zeitlichkeit] in Section Two (which consists of the remaining part of Being and Time, namely §§ 45-83). In order to make the transition from the theme of Section One to the theme of Section Two, Heidegger introduces a new concern in the metaphilosophical reflections of § 45: the problem of the completeness and the authenticity of our analysis of Dasein. In Section One, we initially characterized Dasein as being-inthe-world. The structural details of being-in-the-world, namely the world, the self, and being-in, turned out to be modifications of the disclosedness of Dasein, whose fundamental structure is concern. Concern is a unity of three primeval structural elements, namely already-in, self-ahead, and being-among. We recall, however, that Heidegger's ultimate aim in investigating the structural details of Dasein was not to give a coherent account of Dasein as such but rather to answer the question of Being. In what sense can the description and interpretation of Dasein be said to have helped us towards this goal? 141

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In § 45, Heidegger informs his readers that answering the question of Being is equivalent to explaining how it is possible for Dasein to understand Being at all. This is because answering the question of Being means specifying the sense of Being, the framework with reference to which Being is understood. This framework, as we saw in Section 2.10, is a construct of Dasein's understanding. Accordingly, answering the question of Being simply means explaining how Dasein can come up with a framework for understanding Being. And this in turn simply means giving an adequate account of those comportments of Dasein that are involved in creating and maintaining the framework within which Being is understood.1 How are we to know when this account is in fact an adequate account? What does "adequate" mean in the sphere of fundamental ontology? According to Heidegger, an adequate account must be a primeval account. A primeval account of Dasein is one in which the fundamental structures of Dasein are clearly apprehended and appropriately interpreted. But how are we to recognize a truly primeval account? What are its identifying features? In Heidegger's opinion, a truly primeval account of a phenomenon is characterized by (1) an appropriate hermeneutic situation and (2) its ability to address the entire phenomenon in question. A hermeneutic situation, as we recall from Sections 2.4 and 2.6 b), is the individual combination of prepossession, preview, and preconception employed in a particular interpretation. When, following Heidegger, we say that a primeval account addresses the entire phenomenon of which it is an account, we mean that the phenomenon has been brought into prepossession as a whole and that the preview addresses the unity of the structural features belonging to the phenomenon. If these two conditions have been met, preview and prepossession will then themselves indicate the appropriate preconception of the ontological structures we are to interpret (compare § 45, p. 232). Having worked out the necessary criteria of a primeval account to his satisfaction, Heidegger goes on to ask whether the

The Timing of Timeliness

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interpretation of Dasein undertaken in Section One meets these criteria. Was the hermeneutic situation able to reveal the ultimate primeval structures of Dasein? Was the analysis able to address Dasein in its entirety? One thing, at any rate, is clear: the analysis of Dasein in Section One concentrated on the indifferent (§§29-34) and inauthentic (§§ 35-38) modes of Dasein's being-ability. Since the authentic mode of Dasein has not at all been thematically addressed, the results of the analysis are necessarily incomplete. The structure of authentic existence has not been incorporated into the results of our preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein. This being the case, there can be no doubt that our interpretation is not truly primeval, since its hermeneutic situation is not equal to the task of interpreting authentic existence. It fails to address Dasein in its entirety and is therefore incomplete. Not only is our analysis obviously lacking in that it has failed to address Dasein's authenticity, but it is also lacking in that it has completely ignored the everydayness of Dasein as existence between birth and death. As long as Dasein continues to exist, there are possibilities that it has not yet seized upon. The existence of Dasein is thus necessarily always incomplete. So long as Dasein can exist, there are always possibilities of existence that Dasein has yet to choose. Is the structure of concern, the most fundamental structure that we have hitherto been able to reveal in Dasein, able to account for the essential incompleteness of Dasein? Heidegger thinks not. Accordingly, the preparatory fundamental analysis of Section One is inadequate in two respects: (1) it has failed to give an account of the authenticity of Dasein, and (2) it does not include an account of the essential incompleteness of Dasein's existence. There is a further nuance to Heidegger's argument that it is worth taking the time to bring out. In German, the primary meaning of the word eigentlich is "actual" or "real." It can also be used as an adverb, in which case it tends to acquire the meaning of "truly," for example in the question Hat er das eigentlich gemacht? In English, we could render the question in three ways: "Did he

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really," "Did he truly/' or "Did he actually do that?" Used as an adjective, in some special cases it can even acquire the meaning of "genuine" or "proper," as in Der eigentliche Satz besteht aus Subjekt und Verb, "A genuine sentence consists of subject and verb," "The sentence proper consists of subject and verb." As part of an adverbial phrase eigentlich can also mean something along the lines of "strictly speaking," for example in Eigentlich mufite man das einen Fehler nennen, "One should, strictly speaking, call that a mistake." Heidegger's neologism Eigentlichkeit, a noun derived from eigentlich by adding the feminine suffix -keit, corresponding to the English "-ness," is usually rendered into English as "authenticity," but strictly speaking this is a translation of Echtheit, "genuineness," since a German speaker would use Echtheit where we would speak of the "authenticity" of a signature or painting, for example. The problem is further compounded by the fact that "actual" and "real," the two primary renderings of eigentlich into English, correspond more naturally to the German word wirklich. How, then, are we to understand the specific terminological sense in which Heidegger uses the word Eigentlichkeit? For Heidegger, the word Eigentlichkeit, which we will continue to render as "authenticity," has two main meanings when applied to Dasein: (1) the state of being "genuine" and (2) the "true" state of being. Heidegger often expresses the first meaning, which I have termed "being genuine," by means of locutions involving or implying the self: when Dasein exists as itself or understands its own possibilities as such, rather than merely following the existential possibilities that have been assigned to it by the one-self, then Dasein is "genuine" in the sense of existing as itself. This meaning of "authenticity" is closely related to the second, which I have called the "true" state of being. In this sense, Dasein is characterized by authenticity when it exists in conformity with an accurate understanding of the ontological structures of existence. Viewed from this perspective, the everyday inauthentic self is inauthentic precisely because it obscures or ignores the true existential structure of Dasein and


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thus does not exist in conformity with Dasein's nature. Thus the two senses in which Heidegger uses the term Eigentlichkeit ultimately refer to the same thing seen from two different points of view. Dasein is truly itself when it exists in conformity with the nature of Dasein, and when it exists in conformity with its own nature it is truly itself. The term Eigentlichkeit very deliberately combines —and equates — selfhood with truth. One clear implication of this position is that inauthenticity is a type of ignorance—hence the importance of a phenomenological account of authenticity (compare the last paragraph of Section 2.10 a). How does Heidegger exploit this deliberate equivocation in the meaning of Eigentlichkeit or "authenticity" in § 45? As we have seen, the analysis of Section One concentrated on Dasein in the modes of indifference and inauthenticity. As such, it failed to address the question of Dasein's "authenticity" — its authentic selfhood. But since the authentic selfhood of Dasein has been left out of the analysis, and since authentic selfhood is existence in conformity with the true nature of Dasein—"authentic" existence in the sense of "conformity to the facts" —this means that the analysis has also left some of the facts out. Thus by failing to account for Dasein7s authentic selfhood, the analysis of Section One has also necessarily failed to give a complete account of the structural features of Dasein. In plain English: if we have neglected to account for an essential possibility of Dasein— namely authentic existence—we must have also have neglected to identify the existentials in which this possibility is rooted. If we omit something Dasein can do, we also omit the description of something Dasein is. There are, accordingly, three senses in which the account of Section One can be said to be inadequate: (1) it has failed to give an account of authentic selfhood; (2) it has failed to give an account of the ontological structures that make authentic selfhood possible; and (3) it has failed to give an account of the essential incompleteness of Dasein understood as the continual availability of possibilities that Dasein has yet to choose (existence between birth and death). Because our account of Dasein thus

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far is incomplete, it has not brought Dasein as a whole into its prepossession. Since our account has failed to do so, it is not yet authentic—not a description of the true or actual structural features of Dasein. The missing structural feature is authenticity in the sense of true selfhood. Only when an adequate account of this authentic selfhood has been given can we be assured that our account is an authentic—accurate and complete —description of the existential structure of Dasein. In formulating an adequate account, we will also be required to explain the essential incompleteness of Dasein (its finitude, as we shall see in the next section) and its connection with Dasein's authentic selfhood. Such is the complex and tangled argument in §45 with which Heidegger bridges the gap between the preparatory fundamental analysis of Dasein in Section One and the analysis of being unto death in §§ 46-53, which together make up the first chapter of Section Two. Some readers may find the argument somewhat forced, but is important to keep in mind that an argument along these lines is absolutely necessary for Heidegger to be able to embed the analysis of death into the previously established framework of the fundamental analysis of Dasein.2 If a phenomenological account of authenticity is not equivalent to an adequate and accurate account of Dasein's fundamental ontological structures, then Heidegger would be unable to introduce the topic of death via the necessity for a complete account of Dasein. One of Heidegger's main ambitions in Being and Time is to demonstrate that a Kierkegaardian-style analysis of the existentiality of Dasein is possible within an objective, Kantianstyle philosophical framework. Only in this way can the study of the existence of Dasein be reclaimed from psychology, sociology, and biography; or so Heidegger thinks. Heidegger's overcoming of psychologism, unlike Husserl's, does not merely aim at separating psychology—and psychological approaches in the widest sense—from philosophy. Heidegger is not satisfied with showing that the conceptual foundations of philosophy do not require a theoretical justification from psychology.


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Rather, Heidegger also wants to liberate the lion's share of the subject matter of psychology from the theoretical framework of psychology. Although it is typically assumed that the existentiality of Dasein is a properly psychological topic properly addressed within the theoretical framework of psychology, Heidegger believes that his hermeneutic phenomenology provides a more suitable theoretical framework within which existentiality can be addressed in an objective manner, that is, without in any way reducing it to a merely psychological phenomenon. Whether Heidegger in fact succeeds in this ambition remains an open question.3 3.2 AUTHENTIC UNDERSTANDING: DEATH (§§47-53) As we saw in Section 2.8, the authentic mode of sensibility is angst. The analyses we undertake in the present section will reveal to us that the authentic mode of understanding is Dasein's comportment towards death. The connection between understanding and death is not immediately obvious and will be made clearer in the course of our further explanations. By way of an introductory clarification, we can say that just as the function of understanding is to disclose Dasein's possibilities of existence, the function of Dasein's comportment towards its own mortality is to disclose one very special possibility of Dasein's existence—namely the possibility of the cessation of existence. Thus the common link between understanding and death is the disclosure ofDasein's possibilities. The theme of death is important to Heidegger because the unique possibility of one's own death is employed in Being and Time to introduce the discussion of Dasein's wholeness. As we saw in the last section, Heidegger identifies the wholeness of Dasein with its authenticity. Since Dasein's final mode of existence is to die, it appears that the completion of Dasein cannot arise until the moment of death. Since Dasein is essentially incomplete, or lacking in wholeness, until the moment of death, it seems that

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authenticity is impossible during life. How is this problem to be dealt with? Heidegger replies with two distinct lines of investigation. Heidegger will first demonstrate, by means of a more satisfactory understanding of the experience of death, that authentic existence is in fact possible, if only at the ontological level of investigation. That is to say: we can indeed describe authentic Dasein even if authenticity should turn out to be factually impossible. Once the possibility of authenticity has been demonstrated, we also need to show that the practice of authenticity is truly a viable undertaking. Heidegger's second line of investigation is thus meant to demonstrate that authenticity can indeed also appear at the ontic or practical level of existence. It is not just a mere possibility; it is also something Dasein can really do. A discussion of this point will follow in Section 3.3. The first chapter of Section Two of Being and Time is entitled "The Possible Wholeness [Ganzsein] of Dasein and Being unto Death." In this chapter Heidegger undertakes an analysis of the phenomenon of death in order that the philosophical account of Dasein in Being and Time should be complete. Being complete, the account of Dasein will also include the phenomenon of Dasein's authenticity. Thus by undertaking the analysis of death, the fundamental analysis of Dasein will finally be able to give an exhaustive account of Dasein7 s structurally constitutive features. There is, however, an apparent problem with this undertaking. In the analysis of concern in Section 2.9, we saw that one of the fundamental structures of Dasein is being-selfahead. The fact that Dasein is characterized at a basic level by being ahead of itself means that it is constantly planning with a view to its own possibilities for existence in the world. As long as Dasein exists, there continue to be possibilities for existence that it has not yet seized upon. Continued existence is characterized by the continual openness to future possibilities. This implies, however, that Dasein, so long as it exists, is characterized by an essential incompleteness because there is always something that Dasein has


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not yet become. As long as Dasein exists, there is always something left for Dasein to do. If Dasein is essentially incomplete, Heidegger argues, Dasein's own fundamental nature appears to frustrate any attempt to give a complete account of Dasein as a whole. Even a state of "hopelessness," as Heidegger points out, does not truly do away with the self-ahead structure of concern. It is simply a modification of the manner in which Dasein comports itself towards future possibilities — a comportment of rejection towards possibilities, which are still disclosed despite the act of rejection. Giving up hope does not mean that there is nothing left for Dasein to do. Giving up hope means abandoning the possibilities that Dasein has left. These possibilities can, of course, be severely curtailed at the factual level of existence, and this may give rise to hopelessness. However, Dasein's possibilities cannot altogether disappear. The state in which they do altogether disappear, the state in which the possibilities of Dasein are finally and utterly exhausted, is death. Thus in order to give a complete account of Dasein as "complete," that is, when it no longer has any remaining possibilities ahead of itself, it seems that we would have to give an account of Dasein's experiences in a dead state. This is, however, obviously impossible. It is important to emphasize once again, particularly in view of his treatment of hopelessness, that Heidegger is not speaking of possibilities and of death in a psychological or poetic fashion. The point is most definitely not that a human being without a future is as good as dead. The point is that the experience of existence is characterized by the experience of remaining possibilities. This is how we experience being alive at the deepest level. Being alive means being able to understand and grasp future possibilities. When this experience of an open future ceases, then we are also no longer alive—because there is no longer existence at all.4 The attentive reader might correctly suspect at this point that the experience of possibilities that Dasein has yet to seize is in fact a preliminary way of describing Dasein's experience of the future. We will address this topic at more length in Section 3.5;

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however, it is worth mentioning in passing in order to make a more plausible link between death and the loss of possibilities. From our experience of the deaths of others, we know that death is in some sense a transformation of Dasein from beingin-the-world into the mode of "no-longer-being-in-the-world." However, it is obvious that our experience of others' deaths is not the same as actually experiencing death ourselves. The temptation to substitute an analysis of the experience of others' deaths for an analysis of death itself has to be resisted. Yet this only emphasizes the nature of the problem. A complete analysis of Dasein requires an analysis of all its essential experiences, including the experience of death. But how are we to know what death is like until we are dead? When we are dead, it will be impossible to give an account of death. It seems, so far, that a complete analysis of Dasein is impossible. As we briefly mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the doctrine of the essential incompleteness of Dasein has interesting consequences for the ontological account of authenticity. If completeness and authenticity are ultimately the same thing, authenticity must be defined as Dasein's being everything it truly is as Dasein. But if the experience of death is constantly lacking until the end of Dasein, it seems that Dasein's existence must be characterized by inauthenticity right up until the moment of death. This problem remains in the background in the initial stages of the analysis of death, although Heidegger touches upon it briefly towards the end of § 52, and it is essentially solved before it is explicitly addressed, but the problem of the real possibility of authentic existence will return in Section 3.3, where it plays an important role in Heidegger's analysis of the conscience. Nevertheless, we can make the best of the present situation and note an interesting feature of the experience of death. At the everyday inauthentic level of being-in, as we saw in Section 2.7, no strict difference is made between oneself and others. This inauthentic manner in which others are met with is the foundation of another important phenomenon of everyday life, namely the "substitutability" [Vertretbarkeit] of one Dasein for another. (See § 47, p. 239; compare § 26, p. 122, and all of § 27.) This phenomenon


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is the foundation of every situation where one person takes over the role of another and the presence of a significant difference between them is denied or suppressed. (Think of the modular structure of perpetually unstable labour markets.) In such a situation, the difference individual characters make as well as the difference between skilled and unskilled labour is widely and deliberately suppressed in favour of the ability to replace one person with another at one's convenience. We can hardly fail to see the inauthentic one-self as the existential foundation of the phenomenon of substitutability (on the part of both the worker and the employer). The one-self makes it possible both for one Dasein to present itself as another's replacement and for that other Dasein to be replaced. As we have seen, however, death is characterized by the fact that it is a fundamental human experience in which substitutability is impossible. "No one/' as Heidegger puts it, "can take another's dying away" [§47, p. 240]. Of course, it is possible to die for another person in the sense of giving up one's life to save another's. However, it is not possible to die as another. Every Dasein's experience of death is entirely and uniquely its own and no one else's. In Heidegger's words, "Death is ontologically constituted by evermineness and existence" [§ 47, p. 240]. The experience of death is essentially and necessarily non-substitutable, because no Dasein can substitute itself for another in the actual existential process of dying. In addressing the subject of death, we have thus far discovered three important facts: (1) Dasein, as long as it continues to exist, is characterized by a not-yet [Noch-nicht] which it is yet to become, by a constant lack [standiger Ausstand]. (2) The disappearance of the not-yet, or the "making good" of the lack [die Behebung des Ausstandes], has the character of no-longer-being-Dasein, or death. (3) Coming-to-end in this manner is an absolutely nonsubstitutable mode of an individual Dasein's being.5

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Our problem, however, remains: if Dasein is existentially and necessarily characterized by a constant lack, how is it possible to give a complete account of Dasein, that is, of a Dasein that is not lacking the firsthand experience of death? According to Heidegger, the problem has its source in a misunderstanding of the nature of Dasein. It is founded in a confusion between a "lack" in the entitial and a "lack" in the existential sense. When applied to intramundane to-handed entities, "lack" indicates the absence of parts. An entitial whole can be reconstructed by gathering and assembling its missing parts. But as we saw in Chapter 2, Dasein has a completely different manner of being than intramundane entities. Dasein is not characterized by tohandedness, or even by at-handedness, but rather by existence. Thus in speaking of a "constant lack" arising from the self-ahead structure of concern, we were wrong in speaking of possibilities that Dasein was missing—at least, if we mean "missing" in the way that entitial parts can be lost to an entitial whole. While it is true that there are always possibilities Dasein has yet to seize, Dasein is fundamentally characterized by the constant experience of a lack. Dasein's possibilities, however, are actually present in the not-yet of Dasein's future. That is to say, Dasein's future possibilities are not merely lacking; they are experienced by Dasein as possibilities. A possibility is precisely something that can come to pass, something that Dasein can do. If a possibility were simply nothing, it would not be a possibility at all. It follows that Dasein experiences its possibilities in and as the experience of them as presently lacking. Dasein's possibilities are experienced as future possibilities, but despite their lack of immediacy they are still objects of experience. Dasein does not "lack" future possibilities in the sense that they are totally absent. Rather, our phenomenological analysis has shown that to experience possibilities as lacking means that they are present to us as absent. We are not completely cut off from them. Rather, we are defined both by the possibilities that we have chosen to pursue and by those that are open to us, but that we have not yet chosen to pursue. Of course, this line of argument has the inconvenient result of complicating matters to a certain extent. Heidegger's


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original reason for the introduction of the topic of death at all was the necessity of considering Dasein as a whole, including the experience of its death. Now, however, it turns out that an experience of death as such is not required for our analysis, because the essential incompleteness of Dasein can be experienced at any moment prior to its actual death. That is to say, it is true that in order to grasp Dasein as a whole, we must also grasp the manner in which it experiences its end (its death). But Dasein's factual experience of its end in death, as it turns out, is not the same as the experience of coming to its end. As phenomenologists, we can substitute the experience of Dasein's coming to its end for the factual experience of our own deaths. It is probably worth rephrasing this argument in completely non-Heideggerian terms, since its essential sense can be preserved at a much simpler level. In essence, our task is to give a complete and coherent account of every important structural feature of Dasein. One of these structural features is its mortality—the inescapable and inexorable fact that I, as Dasein, will someday come to an end. Our phenomenological methodology, however, limits us to phenomena, to those things we actually discover in experience. We cannot, however, describe a state of death for the simple reason that we are not dead yet, and even if we were, with the end of Dasein there is no longer any experience to describe. How, then, can we give a phenomenological account of death? The task of our phenomenology is to give a hermeneutic account of Dasein as Dasein, that is, of human existence as such. If there is an end to all existence with death, there can be no more phenomena to describe. If there are no phenomena, our phenomenological methodology is no longer applicable. There is nothing in the state of death that could possibly be described. Despite our inability to experience the actual state of death, however, we can give an account of death insofar as the certain expectation of a future end influences and is experienced by Dasein in the course of its continued existence. This would be an account of the experience of death, of death insofar as it is experienced in the process of dying (in the everyday sense of the word). We do

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not need to wait for the actual occurrence of death in order to complete our analysis, because Dasein is subject to a continuous process of dying. We experience the process of dying not only as a constant expectation of death lout as the constant certainty that our possibilities for existence are limited precisely because of the imminent certainty of death. Accordingly, a satisfactory phenomenological account of death, insofar as such an account is at all possible, is equivalent to a satisfactory phenomenological account of the manner in which Dasein comports itself towards its inherent and essential finitude. This interpretation is supported by a passage in § 62, p. 305:"Dasein's fremg-at-an-end [Zw-Ende-sein], however, means, in an existential sense: being unto the end [Sein zum Tode]." Existentially speaking, Dasein's ending can be grasped as its comportment towards its own end. In short, what is important for a phenomenological analysis of death is not the actual experience of death (which cannot, strictly speaking, be experienced at all) but rather the experience of dying. The experience of dying is Dasein's comportment towards its own ending, towards its own mortality and finitude, or, in Heidegger's language, its "being unto death" [Sein zum Tode}. It is owing to this modified conception of death that Heidegger can say at the beginning of § 49 that "death, in the widest sense, is a phenomenon of life" [§ 49, p. 246]. He goes on to distinguish three senses in which one can speak of the end of life: (1) "ending" [Verenden], which is the end of life in a purely biological sense; (2) "passing on" [Ableben], which refers to the inauthentic experience of death; and (3) "dying" [Sterben] in the proper sense, or Dasein's authentic comportment towards death. The terminological definitions of these three terms allow Heidegger to make the rather puzzling statement that "Dasein


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never ends. It can, however, only pass on insofar as it dies/7 This simply means that Dasein does not experience death the way purely biological life that is not characterized by Dasein, for example a plant, does. It always comports itself either authentically or inauthentically towards death, whereas a plant does not have this option. Dasein, however, can only comport itself inauthentically towards death insofar as it flees the authentic experience of death, an authentic experience of which it must already have in order to flee it at all (recall the analysis of falling in Section 2.7). Heidegger does also include a short disclaimer in § 49 to the effect that his phenomenological analysis of death says nothing about the possibility of life after death. This is, of course, quite in keeping with the limitations of a phenomenological methodology. Heidegger's analysis of death is purely immanent in the sense that "it merely interprets the phenomenon [of death] with respect to the question of how, as a being-possibility of each Dasein, it juts into Dasein [in dieses hereinsteht]" [§ 49, p. 248]. In other words, it is an existential—not a psychological, sociological, theological, moral, or "existentialist" —analysis of the experience of mortality. In the remainder of the chapter, Heidegger undertakes a preliminary analysis of being unto death in §§ 50-51 followed by a concluding analysis in §§ 52-53. We will proceed to outline the important features of these analyses. In § 50, Heidegger announces that he will undertake a preliminary sketch [Vorzeichnung] of the phenomenon of death (that is, of being unto death) with respect to the three structural components of concern, to which Heidegger refers as "existence," "facticity," and "falling." A quick glance at Section 2.9 will remind us that, strictly speaking, these three structures should be referred to as existentiality, facticity, and being-fallen. Heidegger is similarly inconsistent throughout Being and Time, which has confused some early commentators.6 It is therefore incumbent upon us to compensate for Heidegger's inconsistencies by being particularly attentive.7

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In § 50, Heidegger begins by discussing the manner in which the phenomenon of death exhibit the structure of existentiality. With respect to its character as a possibility of Dasein, the possibility of death is distinguished by being Dasein7 s " ownmost" [eigenste], "irrespective" [unbezugliche], and "unattainable" [unuberholbare] possibility. These three distinguishing features of death appear to correspond to the three structural elements of being-in-the-world, namely the self, being-in, and the world, as we shall see later in more detail. According to Heidegger, death is, (1) Dasein's ownmost possibility because, as we saw previously, death is an absolutely non-substitutable mode of an individual Dasein's being. Death is always necessarily one's own death and no one else's; (2) an irrespective possibility because all of the "respects" [Bezuge, normally translated "connection," "relation," or "link"] in which it could rely upon others to deal with the threat of its own impending death are ineffectual, Dasein being left utterly alone and isolated—that is, thrown completely back onto its own resources — in the face of its ownmost possibility, namely death; and (3) an unattainable possibility because, unlike other possibilities, it is impossible for Dasein to "leave death behind" or "get over it" in any conceivable manner. All other possibilities can be pursued, seized, and then abandoned or forgotten when they are no longer desirable or convenient, but death is unique in that it cannot be finished or done with. Once attained, it is permanent. Continuing with the analysis, how is death related to concern? In what way is the structure of concern exhibited in the existential structure of death? (1) According to Heidegger, the element offacticity (corresponding to being-already-in) is exhibited by


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death insofar as Dasein is thrown into the possibility of death. No Dasein chooses to be mortal; its mortality is an inexorable result of its throwitness into the world. Dasein's thrownness into the world is thrownness into the inexorable certainty of death. The fact of Dasein's thrownness into the world, and thus also into being unto death, is primevally and authentically disclosed in the sensibility of angst. (2) What of existentiality (corresponding to the second feature of concern, being-self-ahead)? In Section 2.8, we saw that angst discloses Dasein in its bare structure of thrown existence. Angst is angst for and of being-inthe-world as such. But since thrownness into existence is equivalent to thrownness into being unto death, angst of being-in-the-world is also essentially angst of death. Angst is the authentic sensibility that discloses Dasein's finite existence in a finite world. (3) The remaining element of concern, being-fallen (or falling), is discussed by Heidegger in connection with death in § 51. Here, Heidegger begins by taking a cue from average everyday crosstalk concerning the possibility of death. The prevalent interpretation of death in the one-self s inauthentic everyday existence is crosstalked, according to Heidegger, in the phrase "One too dies in the end, but for now one is oneself unaffected/' An alternative formulation is offered at the beginning of § 52: "One will also die sometime, but for the moment not yet." What essential modification has the existential structure of being unto death undergone in order that such crosstalk be at all possible? To answer this question, Heidegger proceeds to "map" the structure of death onto the structure of turmoil (to which he refers in § 51 as the structure of falling). Turmoil, as we saw in Section 2.7, is characterized by four structural elements: temptation, reassurance, alienation, and entanglement. These

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four structures reappear in the inauthentic structure of being unto death that underlies the everyday crosstalk concerning death: (1) inauthentic being unto death exhibits a temptation because it encourages Dasein to ignore the possibility of death of its own volition. It does so by crosstalking that one dies in the end, that is, the one-self or no one in particular. It disguises the fact that individuals die, including and in particular the individual that one happens to be, and so encourages Dasein to seek an inauthentic safety in the anonymity of the one-self; (2) simultaneously, inauthentic being unto death exhibits the structure of reassurance by suggesting that the possibility of death can be avoided, for example through an anticipated medical miracle sometime in the perpetually near future. Reassurance also encourages the one-self to disguise the fact that death occurs at all, either by lying to the terminally ill ("everything will be all right") or by reducing the death of others to "a social unpleasantness, if not a downright tactlessness, from which the public should be preserved" [§ 51, p. 254]; (3) this inauthentic mode of being unto death is also characterized by the alienation of Dasein from the incontrovertible fact of its own mortality by suppressing the sensibility of angst; and, finally, (4) it exhibits the structure of entanglement because it hurls Dasein into a constant and unceasing flight from authentic being unto death. With these remarks, the preliminary analysis of being unto death comes to an end. The concluding analysis of being unto death begins in § 52, in which Heidegger introduces two new insights into the existential structure of death. The possibility of death, we are told, is both "certain" [gewift] and "indefinite"


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[unbestimmt]. These two structural features of death appear to correspond respectively to understanding and to sensibility, as we shall later see in more detail. (1) The possibility of death is certain because it is a necessary feature of the disclosedness of Dasein. One may, of course, half-seriously hope that modern medical science will figure out how to suspend the aging process indefinitely, and so do away with death. But we would do well to heed Heidegger's warning and not confuse ending with passing on, and still less with dying. Even if it were possible to preserve the biological life of the body indefinitely, the very act of doing so would itself be a privative mode of being unto death. Each Dasein must take up a particular comportment towards the incontrovertible fact of its mortality. The indefinite artificial prolongation of life would not be a refutation but rather a confirmation of the certainty that the structure of mortality belongs to Dasein by nature. Death—in Heidegger's terminological sense of the word, the necessity of a comportment towards mortality — is therefore certain. Everyone must choose some way of dealing with death, and there is no way of avoiding this choice. (2) In addition to being certain, the possibility of death is also indefinite. Death is possible at any time. Not only is it continually possible at every moment of waking life, but the moment of its actual occurrence is quite indefinite. We know that we will die, but not when. The everyday inauthentic one-self disguises this possibility by encouraging Dasein to immerse itself in the possibilities of comportment towards intramundane entities. The true function of the absorption in the mundane is to offer possible ways in which the indefinite character of death can be hidden from oneself.

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We have, then, a total of five essential structural characteristics of death: death is the ownmost, irrespective, unattainable, certain, and indefinite possibility of Dasein. Thus far, we have only examined these characteristics of death in their inauthentic modes. But what of the possibility of an authentic being unto death? In § 53, entitled " An Existential Plan of an Authentic Being unto Death/' Heidegger attempts to clarify what the structure of a truly authentic being unto death might involve. An authentic being unto death, according to Heidegger, can neither "avoid" [ausweichen] nor "cover over" [verdecken] nor "reinterpret" [umdeuten] the possibility of death. An authentic being unto death has to preserve the possibility of death as a possibility. Thus suicide cannot be an authentic comportment unto death precisely because suicide eradicates death as a possibility—namely, by transforming it from a possibility into a reality. Similarly, authentic being unto death cannot consist in a memento mori attitude. Chewing the cud of death exhibits the same essential weakness as suicide, though in a less drastic form: its aim is to deprive death of its character as a possibility by means of desensitization, rather like dealing with a fear of flying by repeatedly imagining a trip by airplane. A truly authentic comportment towards death must be able to withstand death as a possibility. In authentic existence we would have to accept not that death is some vaguely foreshadowed future event but that death is death-in-life. We must be able to accept that living is dying, and we must reject any and all means of escape from this fact. Heidegger's name for the comportment in which the possibility of death is experienced and its character as a possibility is preserved—rather than denied or suppressed —is "forerunning" [vorlaufen]. By forerunning into the possibility of death, Dasein understands itself with respect to its most extreme [auflerste] possibility: its final possibility. The final possibility of Dasein, its death, is its ownmost, irrespective, unattainable, certain, and indefinite possibility. Insofar as Dasein foreruns into the possibility of death in the mode of an authentic being unto death, death appears


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(1) as the ownmost possibility of Dasein because it discloses Dasein's being-ability as truly and irrevocably its own. In this way death liberates Dasein from the indeterminate one of the one-self; (2) death also appears as the irrespective possibility of Dasein because it addresses Dasein as an individual, and as that particular individual that it happens to be. The fact that concernedness and concernfulness fail Dasein as strategies for dealing with the possibility of death does not mean that Dasein abandons its interactions with entities and with others—recall that concernedness and concernfulness are essential constitutive structures of Dasein—but rather that Dasein engages itself in concernedness and concernfulness in a manner guided by its own understanding of itself rather than that of the one-self (compare § 53, p. 263-264); (3) by forerunning into death, death is experienced as the unattainable possibility of Dasein because Dasein is enabled to understand death as its ultimate, final end, and in so doing to free itself from any entanglement in the one-self and its prescribed manners of interacting with the world and with others; (4) forerunning into death also allows Dasein to understand death as certain, as a fundamental and essential possibility of Dasein, which necessitates a comportment, some choice, decision, or attitude, whether authentic or inauthentic, as a response from Dasein; and, finally, (5) an authentic being unto death permits Dasein to experience the possibility of death as indefinite, that is to say, Dasein is able to experience death as a constant "threat" [Bedrohung]. In so doing, it keeps itself open to the threatening character of death from which the inauthentic one-self flees into inauthenticity, that is, it experiences the fundamental authentic sensibility of angst.

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Heidegger sums up the structure of authentic being unto death in the following words: Forerunning reveals its lostness in the one-self to Dasein and brings it before the possibility of being itself, unsupported by concernful concernedness [die besorgende Fursorge]', itself, however, in passionate freedom unto death, freed from the illusions of the one, factual, certain of itself, and angst-sensing [sich angstigenden]. [§ 53, p. 266]8

Thus an authentic being unto death is the comportment making authenticity as such at all possible. The indefinite character of death frees Dasein for the experience of the authentic sensibility of angst, while its certain character emphasizes the primeval disclosure of the mortality of Dasein in understanding. Its unattainable character prevents Dasein from attempting to leave death behind by falling to the world, while its irrespective character prevents Dasein from relying on an inauthentic mode of being-in to allay the angst of death. Finally, death, as Dasein7 s ownmost possibility, discloses Dasein as an individual self thrown into the world whose task in the world is to exist as itself. With this summary it seems that Heidegger has in fact succeeded in mapping the authentic structure of death onto the structures of sensibility, understanding, and being-in-the-world. This existential concept of an authentic being unto death is, as Heidegger concedes towards the end of § 53, factually speaking, a "fantastic imposition" [phantastische Zumutung] upon Dasein. Is it even possible to live out such a complex philosophical construct in the real world? In the next chapter of Being and Time, Heidegger attempts to demonstrate that an authentic being unto death, despite all suspicions we may have to the contrary, is indeed existentically possible—that is, possible in practice. This attempt leads to the fundamental ontological analysis of the phenomenon of the call of conscience.


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3.3 AUTHENTIC TALK: THE CALL OF CONSCIENCE (§§54-60) As we saw in the last section, an authentic being unto death is the basis of the possibility of authenticity as such. Our phenomenological analysis of being unto death has confirmed, according to Heidegger, that authenticity is in fact possible for Dasein. Heidegger feels, however, that we still need to show that this possibility can indeed become a reality. We must show that in everyday life this possibility is within the grasp of everyone who chooses to seize it. In other words, in addition to the ontological possibility of authenticity its ontic possibility must also be demonstrated. What is possible at the existential level must also be livable at the existentic level of our everyday comportments towards intramundane entities and towards others. We must show that the phenomenological possibility of forerunning into death that we constructed in the course of our phenomenological interpretations is in fact "authorized" [bezeugt] by Dasein itself at the ontic level of everyday experience. Only in this manner can we convincingly show that authenticity, whose ontological possibility was demonstrated in the last section, is also unreservedly possible at the ontic level. Accordingly, the task at this point in Being and Time is to show that Dasein, which is first and foremost lost in the inauthentic one-self, always has the concrete possibility of finding itself. That is to say, we need a demonstration that the one-self never becomes so dominant that it is impossible for Dasein to come back to itself and seize the authentic possibility of truly being itself. Heidegger calls the phenomenon responsible for this constant "self-awareness" even in the midst of inauthentic existence as the one-self an "authorization" [Bezeugung] of authenticity. The usual meaning of the verb bezeugen is "to attest" or "to testify to," but Heidegger appears to use Bezeugung in a sense derived rather from the literal meaning of its roots. The verb zeugen has two basic sets of meanings: "to beget," "to generate," or "to produce"; and "to testify" or, with appropriate prepositions, "to witness":

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zeugen von means "to bear witness to." The Bezeugung of factual authenticity that we seek will, accordingly, be a comportment by means of which Dasein both produces and witnesses its own possible authenticity. In view of the nuanced meaning of the term in Heidegger's usage, it seems more advisable to translate the term as "authorization/7 whereby one should keep the literal meaning of the root "author" in mind. Heidegger begins by introducing the "call" [Ruf] of conscience as a possible authorization of the required kind. Heidegger begins by assuming that there is in fact such a thing as the call of conscience, though he will later go on to explain why one might (falsely) be inclined to doubt its existence. Starting from the everyday concept of the conscience, Heidegger will proceed to phenomenologically excise layer after layer of accrued opinion, until finally the hard phenomenological core of the call of conscience will be revealed. At this point we will (hopefully) recognize the exposed phenomenon as the very authorization of which we were in search. Heidegger begins with the apparently trivial point that the conscience is indeed a call and that a call is only apprehended by an act of listening. This is, however, not as trivial as it may seem, for the phenomena of calling and listening clearly indicate that the conscience is a function of the phenomenon of talk. Recall that for Heidegger talk is a fundamental comportment of Dasein, a manner in which the understandability, and thus also the disclosedness, of Dasein are articulated. This means, as we have previously seen, that talk does not necessarily require actual vocalization [stimmliche Verlautbarung] in order to occur. Rather, vocalized, audible speech is only possible on the basis of the phenomenon of talk. The two are by no means straightforwardly identical. The conscience, then, does not talk with a voice in the sense of the production of audible words, or even in the sense of words that one hears in one's head. The conscience—in its primeval form—is not a reproduction of the experience of parental authority. The call of conscience is rather a manner of "giving-


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to-understand" [Zu-verstehen-geben]. The call of conscience, as a mode of talk, gives us to understand that in listening to the one-self—in allowing our disclosedness to be articulated by crosstalk—we have become inauthentic. For Heidegger, at the factual level the difference between authenticity and inauthenticity is a function of the phenomenon of talk. The everyday level of inauthentic existence dominated by falling to the world is characterized, as we saw in Section 2.7, by the prevalence of crosstalk. Now, Heidegger argues in § 55, if the conscience is in fact the sought-for authorization of Dasein's authenticity (and remember that this still remains to be proven) then the manner in which the conscience, as authentic talk, calls us, must be directly opposed to the manner in which crosstalk occurs. How might authentic talk be structured? Heidegger answers this question in §§56-57, in which he describes the call of conscience in terms of the four basic structures into which he had previously analyzed both talk (see Section 2.6) and crosstalk (see Section 2.7). Beginning in § 56, Heidegger's analysis reveals the following: (1) The call of conscience is clearly addressed to Dasein itself, since it is Dasein and no other that is "called upon" [angerufen] by the call. In saying that Dasein and no other is called upon, we mean that the one-self is "bypassed" [iibergangen] by the call. The conscience addresses itself to Dasein's own—and therefore authentic —self. (2) What is spoken by the call is in fact nothing. No words are used and no possibilities for the manipulation of entities are disclosed by the call. In contrast to the structure of crosstalk, which is characterized by an emphasis on what is spoken, in the call of conscience what is spoken is completely unimportant. Of cardinal importance to phenomenal structure of the call is that the call be heard, that is, that Dasein be called upon to become the authentic self.

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(3) Similarly, the announcement of the call of conscience is characterized by "silence" [Schweigen]. It has nothing it wishes to communicate to Dasein. In opposition to crosstalk, whose announcement structure enables it to spread in ever-widening circles until it acquires the semblance of authority, the silent call of conscience discloses that the understanding of Dasein cannot expect any concrete communication, no concrete indication as to what is to be done. It is only in this manner that Dasein can be freed by the dominance of the one-self—by awakening to its own individual responsibility. (4) Finally, the self-expression or proclamation structure of the call, which Heidegger discusses in § 57, accounts for the "disturbing" emotional quality usually associated with the conscience. The call of conscience is unsettling because it calls from the unsettlement ofangst. It is worth elaborating on this last point for the sake of clarity. We recall from Section 2.8 that the fundamental emotional quality associated with angst is unsettlement. In Section 2.9, we saw that inauthenticity, as falling to the world, is characterized by a flight from unsettlement into the types of comportments towards intramundane entities sanctioned by the inauthentic one-self. If the call of conscience is indeed the authorization of authenticity that we are seeking, it makes perfect sense to expect that its function is to reverse this flight. The call of conscience as the desired authorization will thus be the call of unsettlement. In Heidegger's words, in the call of conscience "unsettlement pursues Dasein and threatens its self-forgetful lostness [Verlorenheit]" [% 57, p. 277]. But what does this mean in concrete terms? Heidegger's elaborate structural analyses tend to make his concept of the conscience seem more difficult to grasp than it really is. This is how the matter stands in plain English. Dying is something we, and we alone, do as individuals. I am the one who has to die when


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my life is over. No one else can do this for me. The knowledge that I have to die — I and no one else in my place—also makes me aware of the fact that my life is my own as well. Just as no one else can die for me, no one else can live for me. This is something that I and I alone can do—indeed must do. Now in Heidegger's analysis of Dasein there are three basic ways in which we experience any given factual situation: through understanding, sensibility, and talk. Every situation in my life is grasped, felt, and articulated (meaningfully structured). I grasp that my life is my own when I understand that my death is my own. No one else can die for me, and this knowledge throws me back upon myself. The primeval feeling or emotion accompanying this realization is angst. I feel my own responsibility for my choices when I feel angst, which liberates me from the confusion of the one-self. Angst is the feeling of being utterly on my own, utterly left to myself. How is angst articulated? What is its meaning for me? The conscience is just the type of meaningfulness that characterizes angst. This meaningfulness is a function of talk. It is how we "hear" angst as opposed to understanding and sensing it. Talk discloses angst by remaining silent. The source of this silence is the conscience; and the conscience is silent because there is nothing to say. The silencing of crosstalk—the creation of an empty area for authentic existence and authentic talk—is its sole content and its sole message to me. The conscience is the cessation of crosstalk, its absence, and nothing more. But who is in fact the caller of the call of conscience? Is it an "alien power" [fremde Macht] intruding into the sphere of Dasein's disclosedness? Heidegger believes that a careful phenomenological analysis indicates that the caller is none other than Dasein's authentic self. This should not be taken to mean that there is a second or higher self that attempts to communicate with the inauthentic everyday self. The conscience is not an independent voice that calls out a concrete message to us. Rather like Socrates7 daimon, it has an essentially negative function. It turns us away from inauthentic courses of action but never points us in any particular direction. (See Plato's Apology 31d.) It only

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points away from inauthenticity. It is the primeval experience of ourselves as meaningful, and therefore the primeval existential unsettlement from which falling flees. As we have seen, the flight from unsettlement never quite succeeds in its effort to fall completely to the world—if it did, the flight would cease. This cannot be, for Heidegger's analysis of falling indicates that average everydayness is characterized by a continual and never-ending flight from authenticity. The lingering background awareness that the flight is ultimately futile is nothing other than the persistent, never completely extinguished phenomenon of the call of conscience. Dasein cannot fall so far to the world that authenticity becomes impossible. This analysis is supported by the obvious fact that the call comes "out o/me and yet upon me" [aus mir und dock iiber mich] [§57, p. 275]. Surely, Heidegger believes, that is more than strong enough evidence that Dasein itself is both the caller and the called. But why then, we might ask, is there a tendency to experience the conscience as an alien power that interferes with our lives? Heidegger answers that it is perfectly natural that the inauthentic one-self, characterized by a constant flight from unsettlement, should experience authenticity as something that is fundamentally alien to its entire manner of existence. The oneself and the authentic self are not two different selves. They are the same self in two different modes of existence. But what could be stranger to the one-self than the true self, which it is precisely its aim to suppress? In order to maintain its inauthentic state the one-self has to continually disown its own ultimate responsibility for itself. This is taken to such an extreme degree that the authentic mode of existence falsely appears to it to be an entirely different self than it presently is. The one-self's experience of the conscience as an alien power is really just a result of its own radical alienation from itself. There is no need to think of the intrusion of the call of conscience into our everyday inauthentic existence as a divine intervention. The conscience is not the voice of God. The flight from authenticity being inherently futile, the very structure of


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inauthentic existence itself guarantees that the call will intrude. The more insistent the flight, the more threatening is that before which Dasein flees. The more inauthentic Dasein is, the louder becomes the call of conscience. Whether the call is attended to is, however, another matter entirely. The call itself does not guarantee an appropriate existential response. This is, as always, the prerogative of Dasein. In fact, inauthentic Dasein can exploit the very strangeness of the unsettling call of conscience in order to ignore the call. Which modern person could believe that the conscience is not merely an introjection of parental authority but a primeval and necessary ontological structure of Dasein? Which religious person could admit that the conscience does not require the theological backing of any divine commandment but derives its indisputable authority solely from itself—that is, from the existential structure of Dasein? For Heidegger, doubting the actual existence of the conscience as well as ignoring its call are both only possible in a state of inauthenticity. The conscience is the awareness of responsibility, and it is only through inauthenticity that we can disclaim our own responsibility for what we choose to do. If Dasein is both the caller and the called in the phenomenon of conscience, this can mean nothing other than that the conscience reveals itself as the call of concern. That is to say, the phenomenon of conscience — authentic talk—is embedded in the fundamental structure of Dasein. For Heidegger, as plainly stated in § 57, the conscience permeates the entire structure of Dasein's disclosedness: The caller is Dasein, sensing angst [sich angstigend] in thrownness (already-being-in ...) for its being-ability. The one who is called upon is just this Dasein, called to its ownmost beingability (self-ahead ...). And Dasein is called upon through the call up [Anruf] out of falling into the one (already-being-among the concerned [besorgt] world). The call of conscience, that is, the conscience itself, has its ontological possibility in the fact that Dasein is fundamentally [im Grunde] concern. [§ 57, p. 277-278]

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But surely, we may object, the conscience has something to do with right and wrong in the moral sense? Surely the true function of the conscience is to make us aware of our ethical shortcomings? Do we not speak of having a "guilty" conscience? Is it not, perhaps, even the primary function of the conscience to evaluate the extent of our guilt? The conscience does not call until and unless we have done or are about to do something wrong; and this is its primary function—to ward off wrongdoing and to punish it after it has occurred. What, then, does guilt have to do with authenticity? Heidegger believes that he can reply to this objection by means of a detailed analysis of the concept of guilt. In following the intricacies of this analysis we are somewhat hampered by the absence of any word in English with the same meanings and nuances as the German word Schuld, the everyday German word for " guilt." In German, as Heidegger points out, the word schuldig, the adjectival form of Schuld, has four basic meanings: (1) indebted, as in the sentence Ich bin ihm 5 Mark schuldig, "I owe him 5 Marks" (this meaning is not reflected in the English word "guilty"); (2) responsible for or being the cause of, as in "I am guilty of eating the last candy bar"; (3) incurring a penalty or making oneself punishable, as in "He is guilty of breaking the law"; and (4) influencing the actions of another (for the worse), as in "I am guilty of having misled him."9 According to Heidegger, all of these senses of the word "guilty" are, strictly speaking, only applicable to situations involving our everyday concernful existence with others. They are entitial and not existential terms. They are appropriate when we are speaking of entities, but not when we are speaking of Dasein. The call of conscience however does not address entities at all on the one hand, and on the other its announcement is characterized by silence. The call of conscience has nothing to do


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with everyday inauthentic comportments towards intramundane entities and towards others. The call is a call back to the authentic individual self and thus to authentic individual responsibility. If we wish to understand the sense in which the call of conscience reveals our guilt, we have to employ the word "guilty" in an entirely different sense — an existential sense instead of an entitial one. Heidegger defines the formal existential sense of "guilty" as "being the ground of a being determined [bestimmt] by a Not— that is, being-the-ground [Grundsein] of a nullity [Nichtigkeit]" [§58, p. 283]. Guilt in this sense simply means being the origin of a limitation (nullity). If Dasein is existentially responsible for a limitation, then it is existentially "guilty" of that limitation (responsible for it, its origin or cause). But of which nullity is Dasein the ground or origin? Clearly, if Dasein is both the caller and the called in the phenomenon of the conscience, the nullity in question can only be Dasein's own nullity. But in what sense can Dasein be said to be the cause of its own nullity? And in what precisely does the nullity of Dasein consist? In order to answer this question, Heidegger once again turns to the triadic structure of concern as a framework for his analysis of the nullity of Dasein. Here, he identifies the three structures in question as "facticity (thrownness), existence (plan), and falling" [§ 58, p. 284]. Accordingly, the analysis of the nullity of Dasein addresses three types of nullity: (1) facticity (thrownness). The thrownness of Dasein implies that Dasein does not and cannot itself choose to come into existence. The "ground" or reason for its own existence is permanently outside of the sphere of its volition. However, insofar as Dasein continues to exist, it can be regarded as the ground of its own continued existence. Dasein can and must choose to go on living, even if the fact of its own birth permanently remains something Dasein did not itself choose. In choosing continued existence however, Dasein chooses

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to accept and affirm its nature as an individual who did not (the nullity) choose to come into existence as that particular individual with that particular individual background. Dasein, considered as the ground of its own continuing existence, is being-the-ground of a nullity. Dasein is essentially guilty (in our specific terminological sense) because, in choosing to exist in many concrete ways, it can and must choose to accept the fact of its thrownness into an existence it did not itself choose. Choosing to live means choosing to be responsible for the consequences of a birth we did not ourselves choose. But if we choose to be responsible for our lives, the fact that we did not choose to be born becomes irrelevant. In accepting its own limitations Dasein becomes their ground. It plays the hand it was dealt rather than folding and doesn't stop to blame the dealer. (2) Existence (plan). As we saw in Section 3.2, Dasein's possibilities of understanding are essentially finite. In planning its own existence with a view to possibilities of existence, there are always possibilities it has not seized—that it has rejected, abandoned, or failed to pursue. In every case where we chose to pursue a particular possibility of existence, there are alternative possibilities we have not chosen. Certain possibilities by nature exclude other possibilities. The fact that we cannot choose every single possibility disclosed in the course of our existence indicates a second nullity in the ontological structure of Dasein. Choosing something means not choosing something else. Every choice is an affirmation of a negation: in choosing we negate all the possibilities that are incompatible with that choice. Thus Dasein is once again seen to exist as being-theground of a nullity because the structure of its planning necessarily implies that every concrete choice excludes other alternative possibilities that were not chosen.


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Thus in the very act of existence, Dasein is necessarily guilty because it is the reason that certain events did not take place in the course of its existence. (3) Falling. Finally, as we saw in Section 2.9, falling is an existential belonging to Dasein's own structure. Falling, however, is the ground of Dasein's inauthenticity; it is the reason that Dasein, first and foremost, is not its own authentic self. If, however, the ground of inauthenticity is to be found in the ontological structure of Dasein itself, the implication is clearly that Dasein is ultimately the cause if its own inauthenticity. Here too, then, Dasein is found to exist in the mode of being-theground of a nullity, because it is itself the cause of its own prevailing inauthenticity, of the fact that, first and foremost, it is not itself. From this analysis of the nullity of Dasein, Heidegger draws the conclusion that Dasein is ''permeated through and through by nullity" [§ 58, p. 285]. Accordingly, we can re-interpret the structure of concern in the light of our results as " (nullified) beingthe-ground of a nullity" [§ 58, p. 285]. By "nullified" [nichtig] Heidegger wishes to indicate the thrownness of Dasein; being-theground refers to the structure of existence-, and the nullity of which Dasein is the ground or cause is its own inauthentic existence at the level of everyday life, its falling. Our final conclusion, then, can only be that Dasein as such is guilty—is the ground of its own nullity. Guilt is existentially rooted in the structure of concern. The call of conscience, then, can be equated with Dasein's understanding of its own guilt. That is to say, the call of conscience is the act by which Dasein grasps that its own existence is decisively influenced by factors that it cannot change but must accept (thrownness); that it cannot possibly choose to do everything (planning)', and that inauthenticity is a permanent and necessary feature of its own existence for which it alone is ultimately responsible (falling). The existential guilt of which Heidegger speaks in Being and Time is nothing other than the

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essential finitude of Dasein. It is this finitude that makes the phenomenon of the conscience in the usual sense possible. The conscience, understood as a sense of moral right and wrong, can only exist on the basis of the disclosure of one's own ultimate responsibility for one's actions. Since we are responsible for choosing the manner of our own existence, we are also responsible for every moral decision taken in the course of this existence. Responsibility is an inherent and essential ontological feature of Dasein. Nothing can obliterate Dasein's responsibility for its own choices. This responsibility cannot even be successfully hidden. The very attempt to flee this responsibility—falling—makes Dasein's responsibility for its own fall all the more evident. The call of conscience cannot be silenced. It is the silence (angst) that Dasein chooses to flee. Incidentally, it would also be a mistake to assume that the thrownness of Dasein implies that there are some decisions for which Dasein may not itself be responsible. We cannot blame our unfavourable surroundings or a bad upbringing for our own personal errors and shortcomings. Heidegger is quite clear on the point that in continuing to exist, Dasein chooses its own thrownness into the world. It is, of course, never responsible for the manner of its own birth; but it does choose to exist as that thrown Dasein that it is. A card player who chooses not to fold is responsible for his or her conduct in the game — personally responsible for the way he or she plays the cards he or she was dealt. If you choose to stay in the game you cannot blame the dealer for the outcome, whether you win or you lose. The glory and the blame are both yours. From Heidegger's viewpoint, then, one's own background or social milieu can never be used as an excuse for one's actions. Existence implies that Dasein has accepted the responsibility for dealing with the continued influence the decisions it did not make exercise upon the decisions it does make. Despite thrownness, there is no escape in Being and Time from one's own responsibility for one's own actions.10 Heidegger's motive in analyzing the phenomenon of the call of conscience is, we remember, to prove that there is indeed an


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authorization of authenticity at the level of factual existence. In other words, Heidegger wants to prove that even in the midst of an inauthentic existence dominated by the inauthentic one-self there is always an awareness of the authentic existence that the one-self is fleeing; and with this awareness, there is necessarily also the possibility of choosing that authentic existence. This has two important implications: Firstly, as we have seen, it means that one is always responsible for one's own inauthenticity. No one else is to blame and no one else has chosen inauthenticity but one's own self. Secondly, it means that there is always the possibility of reversing the decision to fall to the world. If the oneself were to completely dominate one's inauthentic existence, the authentic self would be permanently lost. If, however, there is always an experience of the authentic self in the call of conscience, no matter how suppressed and disguised the call might be, then there is always the possibility of leaving the mode of inauthentic existence. We can never irrevocably lose ourselves. Has Heidegger in fact succeeded in showing that there is such a permanent inextinguishable disclosure of one's own authentic existence? Has he shown that there is always a call of conscience? Heidegger has two strategies for dealing with this problem. The first is outlined in § 57, p. 276, which I will paraphrase in a somewhat more accessible form. As we have seen, the call of conscience is characterized by its unsettling quality. The call of conscience is the call of unsettlement, which is the essential emotional character of angst. The act of falling to the world has the essential character of a flight from unsettlement. Inauthentic Dasein seeks to flee from its own unsettlement by falling to the world. And in order for Dasein to flee unsettlement at all, it must first experience the unsettlement in order to flee it. However, inauthentic existence is a continual flight from unsettlement. This means that unsettlement must be continually disclosed in order for inauthentic existence to maintain itself as a state. The continual disclosure of unsettlement in the midst of inauthenticity, which Dasein continually flees, is nothing other than what Heidegger terms the call of conscience. Accordingly, the

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sought-for authorization of authenticity is in fact part of Dasein's inauthentic everyday experience. In order to be authentic, Dasein merely has to stop fleeing, if only for an instant. Heidegger's second strategy for dealing with the problem is to explain why we might be falsely tempted to doubt the existence of the conscience at all. In so doing, he insists upon the alien character of the call of conscience as the reason that the inauthentic one-self might deny the existence of the call. The call of conscience is experienced as alien by the inauthentic self because it calls Dasein back to its authentic self. What could appear stranger to the inauthentic self than the very authentic self it is continually engaged in fleeing? Additionally, the call of conscience is characterized by silence in contrast to inauthentic crosstalk. The silence of the call—which should not be confused with muteness —is informative in a way that crosstalk cannot be. The essential difference of the call from supposedly informative crosstalk can be used as an excuse to deny its very existence: That one, hearing and understanding only pure crosstalk, cannot" ascertain" any call, is attributed to the conscience with the excuse that it is "mute" and obviously not at hand. With this interpretation the one only covers over [verdeckt] its own deafness [Uberhoren] to the call and the curtailed range of its "hearing." [§ 60, p. 296]

Of course, even though the inauthentic one-self may claim not to hear the call, ultimately the call is heard, however distant and suppressed it may be. But what of Dasein that, hearing the call of conscience, goes on to explicitly acknowledge the call? What happens with a Dasein that hears the call and reacts by wanting to be authentic? How does the conscience authorize authentic existence when Dasein is prepared to listen? Once again, Heidegger answers this question with reference to the structure of the "disclosedness" of Dasein (presumably meaning the structure of concern). In § 60, he identifies the relevant structures as sensibility, understanding,


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and talk. How are these three structures modified in Dasein when it chooses to heed the call of conscience? Heidegger addresses this question in § 60, p. 295-296: (1) Sensibility. The heeding of the call discloses one's own Dasein in the unsettlement of its "isolation" [Vereinzelung]. That is to say, the self is cut off from the inauthentic understanding offered to it by the one-self. The unsettlement disclosed by this existential (not factual) isolation is genuinely disclosed in the sensibility of angst. Accordingly, the heeding of the call of conscience is characterized by the "readiness for angst" [Bereitschaft zur Angst]. (2) Understanding. Insofar as Dasein chooses to heed the call, it allows its ownmost self "to act upon itself from out of itself in its own guiltiness/' It proceeds to understand its own existence not in terms of the inauthentic possibilities prescribed by the crosstalk of the one-self, but it plans with a view towards the authentic existence revealed to it in the silence of the call. When heeding the call, Dasein7s understanding is characterized by "wanting-to-have-conscience" [das Gewissen-haben-wollen]. (3) Talk. The call brings Dasein back to its own essential guilt and frees its own authentic self from the allencompassing crosstalk of the one-self. In so doing, the pernicious influence of crosstalk is arrested. Dasein does not need to answer the call in words. The meaning of the call is immediately evident. Any concrete vocalization, even at the mental level, would merely obscure the immediacy of the call: The conscience only calls silently [schweigend], that is, the call comes out of the soundlessness [Lau tlosigkeit] of unsettlement and calls the Dasein which is called upon to become quiet [still] back

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into the quietness [Stille] of itself. The wanting-tohave-conscience thus only appropriately understands this silent [schweigende] talk in quietedness [Verschwiegenheit]. It [quietedness] leaves the clever [verstandig, literally " understandinglike'7] crosstalk of the one wordless [Sie entzieht dem verstandigen Gerede des Man das Wort]. [§ 60, p. 296]

Thus "quietedness" designates the manner in which talk is modified in a Dasein heeding the call of conscience. Quietedness denotes the replacement of the phenomenon of crosstalk by quietness. Dasein hears the quiet voice of its own conscience and in so doing knows itself. This quietness, as the primeval mode of authentic talk, can then serve as the ontological basis of vocalizations characterized by authentic meanings. We can go on to talk about silence and to describe it. In fact, talk is only truly possible against the background of silence. Silence is its ultimate source. 3.4 THE STRUCTURE OF AUTHENTICITY AS DECIDEDNESS (§§ 61-62) In § 60, which concludes the second chapter of Section Two of Being and Time, Heidegger undertakes a description of the authentic existence authorized by the call of conscience. In order to express the unity of the structural features that his description reveals, Heidegger introduces the concept of "decidedness" [Entschlossenheit]. Decidedness is the characteristic structure of authenticity at the existentic level, at the factual level of everyday life. Heidegger chooses this route because in the third chapter of Section Two, which is comprised of §§ 61-66, he will attempt to combine decidedness with the existential level of authenticity that we investigated in the course of the analysis of being unto death. The combination of decidedness with forerunning, or authentic being unto death, will permit Heidegger to undertake yet another


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more primeval analysis in an effort to expose a primeval unity underlying the emergent multiplicity of existential structures. This unity will be the timeliness of Dasein, the primeval sense of concern. Let us return to the authentic existence authorized by the call of conscience. In what does this authenticity consist? Clearly, in the authentic modes of the three primeval phenomena underlying sensibility, understanding, and talk.11 As we have seen in the course of the preceding analyses, these three primeval phenomena are angst, being unto death, and the call of conscience. We know from Section 2.8 that angst is the authentic and primeval phenomenon underlying sensibility. In Section 3.2, we saw that the authentic mode of being unto death was forerunning.12 Since, however, we are approaching the phenomenon of understanding from the point of view of our analysis of conscience, authentic understanding appears to us, for now, as being-guilty rather than as forerunning. Following the course of Heidegger's analysis in Being and Time, we will re-introduce the concept of forerunning in the next section. Finally, in Section 3.3, we saw that the authentic mode of the call of conscience, the primeval phenomenon underlying talk, was quietedness. Clearly then, the disclosedness of Dasein situated in [liegend in] wantingto-have-a-conscience is, accordingly, constituted by the sensibility of angst, by understanding as planning the self towards its ownmost being-guilty, and by talk as quietedness. This distinguished authentic disclosedness, authorized in Dasein itself through its conscience — the quieted, angst-ready self-planning towards one's ownmost being-guilty—we will call decidedness. [§ 60, p. 296-297]

Decidedness has a threefold structure corresponding to sensibility, understanding, and talk. Consider the following arrangement, which should clarify the essential points of the passage quoted above:

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decidedness is structured according to 1. sensibility

2. understanding

and 3. talk;

which, in the phenomenon of decidedness, take the forms of 4. angst

5. being-guilty

and 6. quietedness;

accordingly, decidedness is the 8. angst-ready,

9. self-planning towards being guilty

7. quieted,

of Dasein resulting from an authentic response to the call of conscience.

Decidedness is Heidegger's term for the structure of factual authenticity insofar as it is authorized by the call of conscience. The German term that Heidegger uses is Entschlossenheit, usually translated "determination" or "resolution/7 Entschlossenheit does not, however, mean a determination or a resolution; rather, it indicates the state of being determined or the state of being resolved. Heidegger also intends an etymological parallel to the term Erschlossenheit, which we have translated as "disclosedness." By contrast, the literal meaning of Entschlossenheit is something like "unclosedness." (Entfalten is the German word for "to unfold" and has a similar etymology; also see the commentary on the translation of "plan" in Appendix A.) Unfortunately, no English term able to combine the two meanings —"the state of resolution or determination" and "unclosedness" —suggests itself. Accordingly, it has been thought best to translate Entschlossenheit by "decidedness," which unambiguously preserves the first meaning. Decidedness, or the quieted, angst-ready, self-planning towards being-guilty, is the primeval truth of Dasein. As the structure of Dasein in its authenticity, it is also the structure of Dasein in truth—the most accurate and complete description of Dasein that we can give at this point in our ongoing phenomenological investigation. Insofar as decidedness emerges


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at the factual level as a result of heeding the call of conscience, Heidegger in § 60, p. 297 terms it "authentic decidedness/' This should not be taken to imply the existence of an inauthentic decidedness. Rather, what Heidegger means is that decidedness, being the primeval structure of Dasein, can be understood and expressed at the factual level as authentic existence. It can also be misunderstood and disguised in the course of inauthentic existence—even though it persists as the underlying structure of Dasein. Inauthentic Dasein does not cease to be authentic in the sense of becoming an entirely different being with an entirely different structural constitution. Rather, in existing inauthentically, Dasein misapprehends its own nature and behaves in accordance with this misapprehension. We shall see in Section 3.6 that inauthenticity can be grasped at a still more primeval level as a modification of the "timely"™ structure of Dasein. A frequent point of contention for some Heidegger scholars is Heidegger's affirmation that it is not possible, within the fundamental ontological perspective of Being and Time, to give a concrete answer to the question of what exactly Dasein should decide to do in the existential state of decidedness. "The answer," Heidegger states, "can only be given by the decision itself" [§ 60, p. 298]. In other words, authenticity is rather more a matter of how one decides than what one decides. Here hostile interpreters have found fulcrum and lever apparently ready-made to topple the philosophical edifice of Being and Time, particularly in the light of Heidegger's personal biography. It seems almost as if Being and Time were in need of being defended against its own author. In the first place, it is worth pointing out that this standpoint—that the existential analysis of Dasein can yield no concrete guidelines for factual choice—is entirely consistent with Heidegger's previous analyses of authenticity and inauthenticity and is also to some extent necessitated by them. Recall that it is a fundamental characteristic of the inauthentic one-self that particular and definite actions are prescribed for and proscribed to the individual. If Heidegger had indeed given concrete

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indications as to how an authentic Dasein should behave—that is, if he had worked out a philosophical ethics in the modern sense—he would have been running the grave risk of allowing the one-self to contaminate his concept of authenticity by preventing his readers from understanding their own authenticity with reference to their own individual authentic selves. Any concrete guidelines automatically undermine the independence and therefore the responsibility of the person to whom they are addressed. Even at the level of common sense this attitude is reasonable: surely doing what you are told to do simply because you are told to do it can hardly be characterized as a "right" decision even if your actions are "right" in a strict ethical-moral sense? It is also worth pointing out in Heidegger's defence that authenticity cannot merely be a matter of how one decides rather than what one decides. Authentic action is true action. That is to say: authentic existence must be in conformity with the truth of Dasein. The truth of Dasein—its existential structure—must therefore influence what authentic Dasein factually decides to do. For example, treating Dasein as if it were a thing, a mere object, cannot be an authentic choice, since it is in direct contradiction with the nature of Dasein. The essence of Dasein is existence. The being of entities is connection. Thus using Dasein as though it were a tool rather than an end in itself is straightforwardly and undeniably inauthentic. It seems, then, that Heidegger cannot say the ethical without compromising the reader's freedom of choice. But like Wittgenstein, he can point to the ethical; and Heidegger's means of doing so is to keep silent—imitating, and so hopefully awakening, the experience of the call of conscience, and so also awakening the reader's sense of his or her personal responsibility for his or her life. Wouldn't shifting the responsibility for your existence onto Heidegger be an inauthentic decision? But isn't this precisely what the demand for concrete ethical guidelines consists in? The later Heidegger does, of course, reject "ethics" in the sense of a rigid system of behavioural rules because he believes


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that all regulation of this sort belongs to the "technique" characteristic of the forgetfulness of Being.14 In the language of Being and Time we might say that any attempt at regulation is based upon a confusion of Dasein with entities at hand. The latter are the proper objects of theoretical and scientific study, and that is why they can be regulated and systematized at all. But entities as such are characterized not by at-handedness but by tohandedness. Why should a theoretical comportment that is not even adequate to a description of intramundane entities be used to grasp a radically different being, namely Dasein? How can we expect any truly ethical concepts to emerge from an analysis fundamentally unsuited to the being in question? Finally, Heidegger nowhere says that concrete guidelines concerning ethical or moral actions are impossible or undesirable. Obviously, laws function to some extent as ethical and moral guides, as do religions and personal codes of ethics. We would not want to cease teaching our children the difference between right and wrong simply because of a technical point made in Being and Time. But while we do need codifications of ethical and moral systems for organizational, legal, and educational purposes, it would be wrong to assume that these codifications are themselves sufficient for a truly ethical life. Morality is rooted in the individual's free choice to freely make ethical decisions. There is a world of difference between someone who is too weak for vengeance but wants it, someone who forgoes vengeance through fear of retribution, and someone who, while capable of vengeance, decides against taking it because of an authentic understanding of its wrongness. Heidegger's system in Being and Time clearly allows both for freedom of choice and for existential responsibility—indispensable requirements for any philosophical ethics.151 see no reason that Heidegger should be accused of having neglected moral and ethical considerations, at least in Being and Time. For Heidegger, ethical action in the authentic sense of ethical is based on the experience of the essential structure of Dasein— an ontological structure to which being-with-others and concernfulness

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for others essentially, necessarily, and ineradicably belong. Anyone who wants to ignore this fact surely can, just as anyone who truly wants to commit murder will never be stopped by the fact that murder is wrong. What, then, is supposed to be the point of a system of ethics that supposedly demonstrates the existence of an ethical compulsion that, in practice, can be ignored at will? Any attempt at a deontological ethics (such as Kant's) is immediately refuted by the fact that at the existentic level there is no factual compulsion to be ethical. For Heidegger, however, there is always the silent call of conscience: the persistent awareness of one's own responsibility for one's own actions. Surely Heidegger's description is more in line with the obvious facts than the assumptions on which many deontological ethical systems are based? The fact that no concrete guidelines can be given for authentic existence should not, however, lead us to conclude that nothing whatsoever can be said about authenticity. Heidegger believes that it is quite possible to describe the structure of an authentic action, even if the question as to whether specific actions are authentic has to remain unanswered: "Decidedness is only certain of itself as a decision. But the existentic indeterminacy of decidedness, which is first determined in each respective decision, nonetheless has its existential determinacy" [§ 60, p. 298]. Let us now turn to another vexing question, namely the relationship between authenticity and inauthenticity. If falling, and therefore inauthenticity, is an essential structure of concern, how will an authentically existing Dasein deal with the constant possibility of inauthenticity? Inauthenticity, obviously, cannot on Heidegger's account be permanently done away with. Heidegger's answer is, in effect, that inauthenticity remains a constant possibility and a constant threat to Dasein's authentic existence. As we saw in Section 2.10, Dasein is coevally characterized by both truth and untruth. "Closedness" [Verschlossenheit] and "coveredness" [Verdecktheit] necessarily belong to the facticity of Dasein [§ 44 b), p. 222]. Accordingly,


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Truth (discoveredness) must always first be wrested from entities. Entities are torn away from concealedness [Verborgenheit], The factual discoveredness in each respective case is, so to speak, always a theft [Raub]. Is it a coincidence that the Greeks express themselves concerning the essence of truth in a privative expression (a-letheia)? [§ 44 b), p. 222]16

Authentic existence implies the necessity of a constant struggle to preserve the authentic state in the face of the ineradicable possibility of inauthenticity.17 We can never do away with inauthenticity completely, but we can manage it. Managed inauthenticity, however, is not the same as inauthenticity proper. Managed inauthenticity, or the acceptance of the necessary and unceasing struggle to maintain authenticity, is the only possible authentic comportment towards Dasein's unavoidable and structurally necessary inauthenticity. This is what Heidegger means to express when he says, [Decidedness] appropriates [eignet sich zu] untruth in an authentic manner. Dasein is always already, and perhaps again soon, in undecidedness. [...] The undecidedness of the One nonetheless remains dominant, only it is unable to impugn [anfechten] decided existence. [...] The decision too remains dependent [angewiesen] upon the One and its world. Understanding this also belongs to what it discloses, insofar as it is decidedness that first provides Dasein with authentic transparency [Durchichtigkeit]. [...] The decision does not withdraw from " reality/7 but rather first discovers what is factually possible, in such a manner as to seize it as it is possible as one's ownmost being-ability in the One. [§ 60, p. 299]

It is again important to emphasize what Heidegger says about the dependency of authentic Dasein upon the one-self and its world. By "dependency" Heidegger simply means that the authentic self, in existing factually, still must exist within the

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world into which it has been thrown; and that world has been shaped to a greater or lesser degree by the one-self. Authentic Dasein cannot escape its surroundings, though it can modify them in accordance with its authentic understanding. This is made particularly clear by Heidegger's position concerning authentic Dasein's relationship to others. We are told that decidedness modifies both the discoveredness of the world and the disclosedness of others in a coeval manner. Of course, the world as such is not changed by the mere act of decidedness, nor is one's circle of acquaintances exchanged.18 However, the structure of Dasein's comportments towards both is decisively influenced. As authentic self-being, Dasein is not "isolated into a free-floating ego" [isoliert auf ein freischwebendes Ich]. Such an existential isolation is impossible — due to the very nature of Dasein itself, to which being-with belongs as an ineradicable existential. And since authenticity simply means being authentically in the world, authenticity necessarily implies that an authentic comportment towards others —in whatever factual form—must be preserved. In fact, decidedness "thrusts [the self] into concernful beingwith others" [§ 60, p. 298]. This is because decidedness first brings Dasein before the possibility of meeting with others as the others they truly are. Authenticity—the decidedness to be one's own self—is the basis of an authentic comportment towards others: "It is from the authentic self-being of decidedness that an authentic with-another can first emerge" [§ 60, p. 298]. But why is authentic being-with-another dependent upon the decision to be one's self authentically? Might not a hostile critic intimate that this implies a selfish attitude towards others? No more so, we might answer, than conventional morality's insistence upon taking responsibility for the moral consequences of one's own actions. No one else can make you moral. If you want to be moral, then the decision must be taken and put into practice by you and by you alone. All morality, therefore, is rooted in an authentic experience of being the self.


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One can, of course, go on to ask whether a philosophical language that employs the concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity is really the most suitable in order to express Heidegger's insights. Perhaps there is indeed a certain selfish tinge to the vocabulary of Being and Time. Heidegger might even agree with this criticism; certainly the concepts of authenticity and inauthenticity seem to be de-emphasized by the later Heidegger.19 But insofar as the fundamental intention of Being and Time is concerned, I think that it is possible to argue strongly against the view that the fundamental perspective of authenticity is in any way asocial, unsocial, immoral, unethical, self-centered, or selfish. Finally, we will attempt to reply to a final possible misunderstanding, namely the belief that Heidegger is articulating a theoretical concept of authenticity that has no bearing on actual practice. This interpretation, as attentive readers will have guessed, arises from an inadequate appreciation of Heidegger's concept of understanding. Understanding in Heidegger's sense is not a passive act of observation or contemplation in whatever sense. For Heidegger, understanding is the fundamental comportment upon the foundation of which we disclose our own possible comportments towards the world. It is not the case, as some interpreters have claimed, that Heidegger ignores or blurs the distinction between theory and practice, or even that he attempts to redefine theory as a type of practice. Rather, Heidegger conceives understanding as an essential comportment that is in essence practical. To use more familiar terminology, Heidegger's understanding is a pragmatic concept referring to the practical manner in which we apprehend or grasp the possible ways of comporting ourselves towards the world and towards others. It is a type of doing rather than a type of knowing. It is for this reason that Heidegger can say, "As decided, Dasein already acts" [§ 60, p. 301]. Authentic understanding entails authentic action. Understanding and practice are inseparable.20

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3.5 TIMELINESS AS THE SENSE OF CONCERN (§§63-66) Through the analysis of being unto death Heidegger hopes to gain a phenomenological understanding of the authenticity of Dasein. The analysis of being unto death suggests that authenticity is indeed possible, and the comportment of forerunning is the manner in which the existential possibility of authenticity becomes a concrete reality.21 By contrast, Heidegger's analysis of the call of conscience suggests that the existential possibility of authenticity is not just a mere possibility. It is a possibility that Dasein can always factually choose. Dasein can always choose decidedness because the call of conscience is embedded in the very structure of Dasein's disclosedness. There is no true escape from the conscience calling Dasein back to its own authentic self. In the next chapter of Being and Time, which consists of §§ 6166, Heidegger begins with an attempt to link decidedness, or the existentic authenticity of Dasein understood from the perspective of an authentic response to the call of conscience (Section 3.3), with forerunning, the existential possibility of authenticity as seen from the point of view of the analysis of being unto death (Section 3.2). Why is this peculiar approach necessary at all? Why does Heidegger begin with a demonstration that authenticity is existentially possible (the analysis of being unto death), turn to a demonstration that authenticity is also factually possible (the analysis of the call of conscience) and then attempt to combine the results of the two analyses? There is an interesting passage in § 62, p. 309 that appears to hint at an answer: The question of the ability to be whole [Ganzseinkonnen] is a factual-existentic question. Dasein answers it as decided Dasein. The question of Dasein's ability to be whole has now completely shed its originally indicated character, as if it were merely a theoretical, methodological question of the analysis of Dasein,


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arising from the attempt to attain a complete "givenness" of Dasein as a whole. The question of the wholeness of Dasein, originally discussed only as an ontological-methodological question, was justified, but only because its foundation goes back to an ontic possibility of Dasein.

We have already encountered these passages in Section 2.8, though in a slightly different context. We can add the following remarks to our previous discussion. Heidegger believes that the existentic authenticity authorized by the call of conscience is the foundation of the existentially possible authenticity conceived as forerunning. The structure of decidedness itself authorizes not only existentic authenticity but also the existential necessity of an authentic being unto death. The ontological legitimacy of forerunning is authorized by decidedness. In other words, it is possible to formalize what we do when we are authentic. This formalization took place in our account of forerunning. Everyone who is authentic accepts the inevitability of death. But how do we know that this formalization is a genuine reflection of practical authenticity? How do we know that all authentic Dasein does indeed forerun into death? We can answer: because Dasein has a inherent existential structure, an essential nature, factual authenticity implies a general pattern of authentic comportment. What authenticity involves at the concrete individual level is dependent on individual decidedness, but decidedness implies a general pattern common to all concrete authentic acts: the acceptance of death as an essential and necessary limitation of Dasein. Decidedness has the form of forerunning just as a die has the form of a cube. But how exactly does Heidegger make the connection between decidedness and forerunning? Why does decidedness imply forerunning as its characteristic pattern? Decidedness, as we saw in the last section, is the quieted, angst-ready, self-planning towards one's ownmost being-guilty. In this characterization, whose perspective is that of wanting-to-have-aconscience, "quieted" corresponds to the authentic mode of talk,

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"angst-ready" corresponds to the authentic mode of sensibility, and "self-planning towards being-guilty" corresponds to the authentic mode of understanding. The authentic mode of being unto death, namely forerunning, is conspicuously absent from this description of authenticity. This is, of course, because decidedness is a concept emerging from our analysis of the call of conscience. Its perspective remains within the perspective of the phenomena we brought to light in the last section. From the perspective of concern rather than of decidedness, the authentic modes of sensibility, understanding, and talk are respectively angst, forerunning, and quietedness. Decidedness, however, as a result of its emergence from the perspective of conscience, incorporates self-planning towards being-guilty instead of forerunning into its structure. Making a connection between self-planning towards beingguilty and forerunning is relatively easy. Dasein's being-guilty is its comportment towards its own nullity, that is, towards its own inherent limitation. From Section 3.3, we know that there are three ways — corresponding to facticity, existentiality, and being-fallen—in which Dasein is characterized by nullity: Dasein is not the cause of its own existence; Dasein cannot choose every possibility, but necessarily rejects some possibilities in the act of pursuing others; and Dasein is, first and foremost, not its own authentic self, but rather the inauthentic one-self. These three nullities are all limitations of Dasein's existence. They all express Dasein's essential finitude. And the primeval and authentic expression of Dasein's finitude, as we saw in Section 3.2, is death. The fact that Dasein is constantly, at every moment of its existence, coming to its end is primevally disclosed to it in the act of understanding its ownmost, irrespective, and unattainable possibility—the possibility of its own non-existence. Dasein's understanding of itself as limited by death is characterized according to facticity, existentiality, and being-fallen. Dasein's being unto death primevally discloses its thrownness into the


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possibility of death; its angst of death disclosed in thrownness in turn discloses Dasein as finite existence in a finite world. Finally, Dasein7s own falling is disclosed as a flight from an authentic understanding of death. Dasein7s authentic being unto death, forerunning, discloses the essential limitations of Dasein's existence. Decidedness, on the other hand, insofar as it incorporates being-guilty into its structure, discloses Dasein's planning towards its own essential limitations — the essential limitations that are primevally and authentically disclosed in forerunning. In beingguilty, Dasein accepts its own nullity; but the possibility of Dasein's absolute nonexistence, its death, is its most essential, most authentic nullity. In planning towards its own being-guilty (its essential finitude) Dasein understands itself with respect to the primary manner in which it is finite - its mortality. Planning towards being-guilty, accepting one's own essential limitations, means understanding oneself as characterized by mortality, by the final and fundamental limitation of not being able to continue indefinitely in existence. In short, decidedness is only a complete and adequate expression of Dasein's authenticity when it is understood as "forerunning decidedness" [vorlaufende Entschlossenheit]. The authentic structure of the conscience must be linked with the authentic structure of being unto death in order to adequately characterize the essential, authentic, and primeval ontological structure of Dasein.22 Forerunning decidedness is thus the authentic and primeval structure of Dasein. Accordingly, our fundamental analysis of Dasein has now attained a still more primeval level than the level at which we were able to describe the fundamental structure of Dasein as concern. Again, according to Heidegger, our analyses are faced with a bewildering multiplicity of structural elements. How are we to grasp the unity of these structures despite the constantly emerging multiplicity of ontological features? Clearly, a new manner of describing the structural unity of Dasein is required.

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a) The Future: Advent The analysis leading to this new concept of the primeval structure of Dasein is undertaken by Heidegger in § 65 of Being and Time. There, we are told that forerunning decidedness is Dasein's authentic "being unto its ownmost distinguished being-ability." That is to say, forerunning decidedness is the comportment in which Dasein understands what Dasein actually is. This feature of Dasein was expressed in the structure of concern as being-selfahead. In being-self-ahead, Dasein understands itself in terms of the possibilities it is still able to pursue. These open possibilities are manners in which Dasein itself can exist. In being-self-ahead, then, Dasein is letting itself (that is, future possibilities of its existence)" come towards" itself (affect its present understanding). This existential structure of Dasein, the comportment in which Dasein opens itself towards possibilities of its own existence, is what Heidegger calls the "advent" [Zukunft] of Dasein. Zukunft is the normal German word for the "future/' but Heidegger uses the word in a special terminological sense derived from its etymology. Zu is a preposition meaning "to" or "towards," while -kunft is a noun-forming morpheme derived from the verb kommen, "to come." (Ankunft, literally "oncoming," is the normal German word for "arrival".) Zukunft, then, designates the primary comportment of Dasein through which future possibilities are enabled to come towards or approach Dasein in its understanding of existence. Heidegger uses the normal German word for "future" to designate this phenomenon because, as we shall shortly see, he believes that it is the ontological basis for what we normally, though wrongly, think of as the future in a chronological sense. Because of the importance of the etymology, it has been thought better to translate Zukunft as "advent," from the Latin advenire, literally "to come towards," "to come up to." b) The Past: Continuance Similarly, forerunning decidedness understands Dasein as essentially guilty. In being-guilty, Dasein must accept that it exists as the ground of a nullity (Section 3.3). In so doing, Dasein


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is accepting its own essential limitation. Its primary limitation is its thrownness (into death). Accepting its thrownness, however, means that Dasein must authentically be what it always already "was," namely thrown, or determined by possibilities of existence that it did not and could not itself choose because they were "prior" to its own existence. The acceptance of thrownness means that Dasein accepts itself in its "beenness" [Gewesen]. Dasein can only exist authentically when it acknowledges the limitations its thrownness (or "beenness") has imposed upon it. Accordingly, Dasein's authentic advent requires Dasein to come back to its own authentic thrown existence. The existential comportment by which Dasein accomplishes the primeval disclosure of its own thrownness is the "continuance" [Gewesenheit] of Dasein. Gewesenheit is a term coined by Heidegger from the past participle of the verb sein, meaning "to be," and the suffix -heit. Its literal meaning is "beenness." Heidegger uses the term to designate the existential concept of the past. The usual German word for the past is Vergangenheit, literally "gone-byness." Clearly, the neologism Gewesenheit is meant as a contrast to Vergangenheit. Wesen, which exists both as a noun meaning "essence" and as part of the conjugated forms of sein in modern German, is derived from the Middle High German verb wesen, meaning "to be," "to reside," or "to happen." The Middle High German verb is in turn derived from the Old High German verb wesan, derived in turn from the Gothic wisan, thought to be derived from the Indo-Germanic ues, meaning "to linger," "to live," "to spend the night."23 Heidegger avoids the use of Vergangenheit in order to emphasize that the past does not merely go by but continues to affect both the present and the future. Where we are and where we are going is always a function of where we have been. It has accordingly been thought appropriate to translate Gewesenheit as "continuance." c) The Present: Encounter Finally, forerunning decidedness discloses the present situation of Dasein as existing in a world in which it comports itself

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towards entities in concernedness. Comporting itself towards intramundane entities is only possible for Dasein if these entities be "encountered" [gegenwartigt] on the basis of a primeval comportment of Dasein—the comportment by means of which Dasein discovers entities within the overarching framework of the world. Accordingly, the final primeval structural element of Dasein, which corresponds to the present, is the "encounter" [Gegenwart]: the comportment by means of which Dasein understands its own existence in a world together with intramundane entities. Gegenwart is the usual German term for the present. It is a compound of the preposition gegen, meaning "against," and the morpheme -wart, a form of -warts, a suffix indicating direction and corresponding to the English "-wards": vorwarts means "forwards." The literal meaning of Gegenwart is, accordingly, "against-ward-ness." It is just possible that Heidegger intends there to be a link with the archaic noun Wart meaning "guardian," "protector," or "overseer."24 It has been thought best to preserve the literal meaning as far as possible by means of the translation "encounter." The word then denotes the comportment of Dasein by means of which it recognizes entities as "counter to" or "in a direction away from" itself. d) The Ecstatic Structure of Timeliness Heidegger calls the unitary structure consisting of advent, continuance, and encounter "timeliness" [Zeitlichkeit]. It is the phenomenon of the "continuing-encountering advent" [gewesend-gegenwartigende Zukunft]. As the most primeval existential structure of Dasein, it is also the sense of authentic concern. Concern, up until now the most primeval structure we had exposed in the analysis of Dasein, is now seen to be dependent on the timeliness of Dasein. Timeliness is still more primeval than concern. In fact, in arriving at timeliness we have reached the ontological bedrock of Dasein. There is no going any deeper. How can we link concern with timeliness? Being-selfahead is founded in the phenomenon of the advent of Dasein.


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Being-already-in, in turn, is a modification of the continuance of timeliness. Finally, being-among is made possible through the phenomenon of the encounter [§ 65, p. 327]. Concern, far from being the primeval structure we originally held it to be, is in fact an existential modification of timeliness. The three structural features of the timeliness of Dasein, namely advent, continuance, and encounter, are interesting in that they share a similar structure. In the case of the advent, Dasein goes " beyond itself' towards future possibilities (existentiality) in order to "return to itself and understand its past (thrownness) and its present (being-fallen) in the light of these possibilities. Similarly, in the case of continuance, Dasein goes "beyond itself towards thrownness in order to "return to itself" and understand its present (being-fallen) and its future (existentiality) in the light of this thrownness. Finally, in the case of the encounter, Dasein goes "beyond itself" towards intramundane entities in order to understand its past (thrownness) and its future (existentiality) in the light of its comportment towards these entities. In each of the three cases, there is a common existential movement in which Dasein goes "beyond itself" towards one of the three temporal structures of timeliness in order to "return to itself" and understand the other two temporal structures in the light of the structure towards which Dasein initially went "beyond itself." Heidegger translates this peculiar timely motion of being "beyond oneself" with the help the Greek word ekstasis. This word is a compound of the prefix ek, corresponding to "ex," literally "out of," and stasis, "the act or process of remaining, standing, or staying." Accordingly, ekstasis literally means "the act of standing outside (oneself)," or, in idiomatic usage, "the act of being beside oneself (due to any strong emotion, for example rage, joy, or fear)." When Heidegger refers to the three structures of timeliness, advent, continuance, and encounter, as "ecstasies" [Ekstasen] of timeliness, he is thinking only of the literal meaning of the Greek word. They are ecstasies not because they in any way resemble or cause "ecstasy," but because they exhibit the common feature of "beyond itself—return to itself." The reference to the

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literal meaning of the Greek root must be kept in mind when using this term. (Note that it is the apparent resemblance of the ecstatic nature of timeliness to Hegel's conception of Spirit [Geist] as "returning to itself from otherness" or "identity-in-difference" that leads Heidegger to distance himself from Hegel in § 82.) For the sake of clarity, it is probably worth pausing to consider the connection between past, present, and future in the usual sense with the highly abstract and technical meanings of continuance, encounter, and advent. Once again, it is important to keep in mind that Heidegger is employing a phenomenological method. The aim of hermeneutic phenomenology is to unearth and interpret the primeval phenomena underlying our usual, phenomenologically naive concepts. In the case of timeliness, Heidegger is attempting to expose the fundamental ontological structures we usually understand as the "passage of time." In Section 3.8, we shall see how Heidegger explains the origin of the usual or "vulgar" conception of time as a sequence of passing moments. For now, however, it is enough to ask ourselves why Heidegger believes that time is best described as the three ecstasies of advent (future), continuance (past), and encounter (present). In order to answer this question, it will be helpful to introduce a distinction that Heidegger himself does not explicitly make in Being and Time (although the distinction is clearly implied by his analysis). We will refer to this as the distinction between experienced and constructed time. It is an obvious feature of experienced time that it passes at a variable rate. Thus five minutes spent waiting in a dentist's office before a scheduled root canal may be experienced as longer than a full hour that just flies by in the process of having fun. By contrast, constructed time always passes at a fixed rate of one second per second. The passage of constructed time is "constructed" or inferred from certain events in experienced time. Thus even though the five minutes of anxiety in the dentist's office are longer than the hour of fun at the festival in experienced time, I can tell by consulting my watch at opportune moments that the latter period of time lasted twelve times as long as the former in constructed time.


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The question arises, however, as to which of the two is to be given priority in a philosophical analysis of time. Heidegger, as a result of his phenomenological approach, clearly decides in favour of experienced time. Experienced time is the pre-theoretical basis of all other experiences of time. It is the time in which we live. Constructed time, as we pointed out, is not actually the time in which our experiences take place; it is an inference from certain events (such as consulting a chronometer). Having inferred, rather than experienced, the passage of constructed time, we then work backwards and impose the framework of constructed time onto real, experienced time: we say, "Waiting in the dentist's office 'felt' like a whole hour, but it was 'really' only five minutes." There is a theoretical re-interpretation of pre-theoretical phenomena in the light of theoretical reflection. But this is, in essence, precisely the sort of theoretical obscuration of the primeval phenomena of existence it is the task of phenomenology to prevent. Having reinterpreted experienced time in terms of constructed time, we no longer realize that there is any experienced time at all to be taken into account in giving a philosophical explanation of time. How, then, does Heidegger prevent the phenomenon of experienced time from being obscured and hidden by constructed time? In Being and Time, Heidegger's guiding conception of Dasein is that Dasein is an entity that understands its own being. Dasein exists-, and this means: it makes choices. It is distinguished from all other entities by comporting itself towards its own existence. Let us call to mind the phrase repeated so often throughout Being and Time to the effect that the "essence" of Dasein is its "existence." Heidegger, in Being and Time, is attempting to give a philosophical account of Dasein in which existentiality is the basic explanatory concept. All other structural features of Dasein are explained in terms of existentiality. This has nothing to do with a priority of "existence" over "essence" in an AristotelianScholastic sense. It simply means that Dasein must ultimately be explained in terms of its ability to make choices. How can Heidegger express the distinction between past, present, and future through Dasein's ability to choose?

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Quite simply, the future for Heidegger is the experience that there are possibilities that are still open to Dasein at any given moment, possibilities that are yet to be pursued, seized, and acted upon. Similarly, the past is the experience of possibilities that are no longer open, either because they have already been chosen and are no longer choosable, having been "put behind oneself [iiberholt]," or because they never could have been chosen by the individual in question. Finally, there are possibilities Dasein is in the process of choosing, possibilities that are being seized and lived out. These possibilities correspond to the present in the usual sense of the word. Our fundamental experience of time at the pre-theoretical level is, for Heidegger, an experience of a qualitative difference in the possibilities for existence open to existing Dasein. For Heidegger, this is time as we experience it prior to any physicalist theories about the passage of measured or constructed time. It is because Heidegger, in speaking of timeliness, zs always and exclusively speaking of experienced time that he can say that Dasein's finitude is something quite different from a point in time at which Dasein will actually "stop." Rather, finitude—the death of Dasein—is a character of timeliness itself [§ 65, p. 330]. The timeliness of Dasein is finite experienced time—time (in the sense of the three ecstasies) that experiences itself as having a beginning (thrownness) and an end (death). Timeliness has a beginning—a past—because there are possibilities it can no longer and never could choose. Timeliness has an end —a limitation—because it cannot choose every single possibility. It can only choose for so long before it cannot choose anymore. The fundamental and primeval experience of time in Dasein discloses timeliness (experienced time) as finite in contrast to the inauthentic infinite and endless constructed time of which use is made in daily life (at the behest of the one-self) and in scientific and technical undertakings. We would, of course, never be able to dispense with constructed time altogether—being-fallen is, as we have repeatedly seen, an essential and necessary structure of Dasein. We can, however, prevent constructed time from being the framework within which experienced time (timeliness) is under-


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stood. It is, here as elsewhere when issues of authenticity are concerned, largely a question of emphasis and nuance. In the following section, we shall see how Heidegger returns to the structure of concern in order to re-interpret its structure in terms of the primeval and authentic conception of the timeliness of Dasein. His aim in so doing is to demonstrate that the fundamental analysis of Dasein in terms of timeliness has finally attained the deepest level of analysis possible, since it can unfailingly account for all of the existential structures that have emerged in the course of Being and Time. 3.6 TIMELINESS AND ITS MODIFICATIONS

(§§67-71)

In the fourth chapter of the second section of Being and Time, which consists of § 67-71, Heidegger undertakes a thoroughgoing re-interpretation of all the previously discussed existential structures of Dasein in terms of timeliness. Accordingly, the chapter is entitled "Timeliness and Everydayness" [Zeitlichkeit und Alltdglichkeit]. In § 67, p. 334-335, Heidegger announces that the analysis will begin with the structures "in which disclosedness is constituted" and identifies these structures as understanding, sensibility, falling, and talk. Somewhat further on in § 68, p. 335, Heidegger refers to these four structures as the "structural moments of concern." A central task of the chapter is, then, to account for concern (disclosedness) in terms of timeliness. But what of the other structures exposed in the course of the fundamental analysis of Dasein? We remember from Section 2.6 that being-in consists of three structures: sensibility, understanding, and talk. We also saw in Section 2.9 that concern consists of three structures: being-already-in (facticity), being-self-ahead (existentiality), and being-among (being-fallen). At times, Heidegger mentions only these three structural elements; at other times, he speaks of talk

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as permeating all three.25 It is clear, however, that the alreadyin and self-ahead structures of concern correspond directly to sensibility and understanding. The main difference between concern and being-in is accordingly that the former contains the additional structure of being-fallen: being-in (indifferent modes) sensibility

understanding

talk

CONCEN

being-already-in (facticity)



sensibility

understanding

falling

talk (permeates the whole structure of concern)

Since being-in has in effect been incorporated into the structure of concern, Heidegger's reduction of concern to timeliness in §§ 68-69 is simultaneously also a reduction of being-in to timeliness. This leaves two structures of being-in-theworld unaccounted for, namely the self and the world. If we subject the structure of Being and Time to a careful and critical scrutiny, we note that Heidegger, inconveniently enough, has already undertaken the necessary analysis of the self—in fact he does so in the process of introducing the concept of timeliness before the necessity of reducing the structures of being-in-theworld and of concern to timeliness has even been made plain. The clue is the title of § 64: "Concern and Selfhood." Since we have already discussed the analysis of timeliness in the last section, little need be said about Heidegger's reduction of the self to timeliness other than a few brief explanatory remarks. In § 64, Heidegger discusses the notion of the "ego" [das Ich, literally "the I"]. The defining quality of the ego, it turns out, is that it is responsible for holding together the many and variegated structural features of consciousness. But what is the


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ego? Heidegger rejects the everyday identification of the ego with the "subject" of experience along with the Kantian conception of the ego as the universal form of consciousness (the transcendental unity of apperception). Both these conceptions of the ego are inadequate because they conceive the unity of the self in terms of an at-handed entity. At-handedness, however, is a distinguishing feature of intramundane entities and not of Dasein. In what, then, does the true existential selfhood of Dasein consist? Dasein is most itself in the phenomenon of forerunning decidedness. Forerunning decidedness discloses the selfhood of Dasein in a truly authentic manner. What, then, is the self in an existential sense? Nothing other than a structural feature of concern insofar as it is authentically disclosed in forerunning decidedness. The self is an existential modification of concern: "The structure of concern, fully conceived, includes the phenomenon of selfhood" [§ 64, p. 323]. The final clarification of the nature of the self, then, "occurs as the interpretation of the sense of concern." The sense of concern, as we saw in the last section, is timeliness. In the final analysis, the essential nature of the self the process or occurrence of primeval timeliness. Heidegger's term for the processual character of timeliness, its occurring, is die Zeitigung der Zeitlichkeit, which we will render as "the timing of timeliness." The German verb zeitigen normally means "to ripen," "to move towards fruition," or "to have as an effect or consequence." The literal meaning of the verb is "to time." Note, however, that the verb "to time" in English normally means to measure time. This connotation is excluded from our technical use of the word "timing." Macquarrie and Robinson prefer "temporalizing," although this is misleading because Heidegger probably intended to use Temporalitat, "temporality," at a much later stage of analysis.26 Accordingly, we will employ the locution "the timing of timeliness" to mean the comportment of Dasein that discloses primeval timeliness. It is the process or activity by which timeliness — the essential and authentic self—is generated.

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The self can now be understood as the timing of timeliness, while being-in, as we have previously discussed, is re-interpreted as timeliness along with the analysis of concern in § 68. The remaining structure of being-in-the-world, namely the world, is addressed as a mode of timeliness in § 69, which is entitled "The Timeliness of Being-in-the-world and the Problem of the Transcendence of the World." In the course of these analyses, then, Heidegger will reduce all the previously exposed structures of Dasein—being-in-the-world as the self, the world, and beingin, along with concern as being-already-in (facticity), being-selfahead (existentiality), and being-among (being-fallen) — to the primeval and unitary phenomenon of timeliness. Let us first turn to the analysis of concern. The goal that Heidegger sets himself at the beginning of the chapter, as we previously mentioned, is to interpret sensibility, understanding, falling, and talk in terms of timeliness. Heidegger undertakes a series of complicated and involved investigations in order to make the connection between timeliness and concern, but we will not enter into these in any detail, as the connection can plausibly be made at a glance by comparing the structure of timeliness with the structure of concern and being-in: Structural Parallels between Timeliness, Concern, and Being-in (Preliminary Form) timeliness

continuance

advent

encounter

concern

beingalready-in (facticity)

being-selfahead (existentiality)


being-in

sensibility

understanding

talk

For the sake of greater comprehensibility, we can supplement this table with the simplified paraphrase of timeliness that we introduced towards the end of Section 3.5:


experienced time

"closed" possibilities

"open" possibilities

"seized" possibilities

constructed time

past

future

present

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Just as being-already-in is an existential modification of the timely structure of continuance, being-self-ahead is a modification of the advent, while being-among is a modification of the encounter. One feature of this table is, however, slightly puzzling: the inclusion of talk as a modification of the encounter. This would appear to imply that talk is an essentially inauthentic phenomenon, since it is thereby correlated with being-fallen in the structure of concern. In order to explain the link between talk and inauthenticity we must first discuss the more elaborate structural arrangement of the various modes of timeliness that Heidegger introduces in § 68 a). Here, Heidegger distinguishes an indifferent, an authentic, and an inauthentic mode for each of the three ecstasies of timeliness: The Modes of Timeliness ecstasies

continuance

advent

encounter

indifferent mode

already-in

self-ahead

being-among

authentic mode

retrieval

forerunning

instant

inauthentic mode

forgottenness (retention)

awaiting

encountering

A few remarks on the derivation of this table are in order. The three modes listed as indifferent are, of course, the three structural divisions of concern. Heidegger informs us in § 68 a), p. 337, that the "formally indifferent term for the advent can be found in the designation of the first structural moment of concern, in the self-ahead." Similarly, though less unambiguously,

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Heidegger refers to the being-among structure of the encounter [§ 68 a), p. 337, last line of the page], leaving us, presumably, to infer the identification of the already-in structure of concern with the indifferent mode of timeliness.27 Similarly, the "forerunning" that Heidegger designates as the authentic mode of the advent is, presumably, identical with the forerunning that we first encountered in Section 3.2, and that is the authentic mode of Dasein's being unto death. Accordingly, the inauthentic mode of the advent must correspond to an inauthentic being unto death. The noun Heidegger uses to designate this mode, Gewartigen, is derived from a verb meaning "to expect" or "to be prepared for." Following Macquarrie and Robinson, the term is rendered into English here as "awaiting." Although Heidegger does not use this term in the context of his analysis of death, in § 53, p. 261-262, he refers to "expecting" [Erwarten] as a type of "tension" [Gespanntsein] that does not preserve the possible character of future possibilities. "Expecting" is a type of waiting [Warten] because it views the possible with respect to its "actualization" [Verwirkliching] and as such cannot constitute an authentic being unto death. Presumably Heidegger uses Gewartigen in the present context in order to strengthen the conceptual link of "expecting" with timeliness.28 Heidegger's original term for the authentic encounter is Augenblick, "instant," "moment," or "blink of an eye." Its literal meaning is "eye-glance." It is intended, presumably, to indicate the type of purview (see Section 2.5) guiding authentic Dasein's comportments towards intramundane entities. By contrast, Heidegger calls the inauthentic encounter Gegenwartigen, a nominalized verb form Heidegger infers from Gegenwart, the usual German word for the present. Its literal meaning is thus something like "present-izing." The term is rendered into English here as "encountering" in order to preserve the etymological link with Gegenwart, which we have translated as the encounter. Finally, the word Heidegger uses to designate the authentic continuance is Wiederholung, the normal German word for


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"repetition/7 Its literal meaning, however, is "again-getting." Heidegger uses the word in order to indicate the existential comportment by means of which Dasein authentically discloses its own thrownness. Since the connotation of "getting again" or "getting back" is most important for Heidegger, I have rendered the word into English as "retrieval." Heidegger uses two different terms to designate inauthentic continuance; in § 68 a), p. 339, he introduces the term Vergessenheit, which simply means "forgottenness," but in § 79, p. 406 (see the first four sentences of the second indented paragraph), he introduces Behalten or "retention" as a synonym.29 To return to our original question: how does Heidegger explain the correlation of talk with the being-among structure of concern and thus with being-fallen? Heidegger tells us in once again in § 68 d) that talk permeates the entire structure of disclosedness, namely "understanding, sensibility, and falling." It follows from this, according to Heidegger, that "talk does not generate itself primarily in one particular ecstasy." However, Heidegger continues, Because talk at the everyday level factually for the most part expresses itself [sich ausspricht] in language and initially in the manner of concerned-addressing conversation [des besorgendberedenden Ansprechens] about the "environment" [Umwelt], encountering has a preferred constitutive function. [§ 68 d), p. 349]

In other words, talk in its authentic form does indeed permeate the entire structure of timeliness; this is why Heidegger, a few lines down, speaks of the "timeliness of talk, that is of Dasein as such [uberhaupt]." However, in its inauthentic form, namely crosstalk, there is an intimate relation to the inauthentic encounter. This is, of course, because inauthenticity is a flight from authenticity towards the world (of intramundane entities). We can thus emend our previous table to the following:

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Structural Parallels between Timeliness, Concern, and Being-in (Final Form) timeliness

continuance

advent

encounter

concern

beingalready-in (facticity)

being-selfahead (existentiality)


being-in

sensibility

understanding

crosstalk

talk

This topic leads naturally to Heidegger's timely interpretation of falling and inauthenticity. According to Heidegger, the phenomenon of inauthenticity can itself be understood as a peculiar shift of emphasis in the timing of timeliness. When the timely structure of Dasein is characterized by the ecstasies of continuance, advent, and encounter in the modes of f or gottenness, awaiting, and encountering, Dasein is inauthentic. In concrete terms, Dasein is then distinguished by an inability to experience its own thrownness (forgottenness), an inauthentic being unto death (awaiting), and a primary emphasis upon comporting itself towards intramundane entities (encountering). Concernedness with intramundane entities displays an essentially inauthentic structure because in order to make use of tools, Dasein must shift itself into a mode in which it forgets everything else in order to concentrate upon the work, awaits the finished product of its work (as something that will be "done and over with" and then "put behind itself"), and encounters the tool in the process of manipulating it in order to get the work done. (Compare § 69 a.) By contrast, authentic Dasein is characterized by retrieval, forerunning, and the instant. Its own thrownness is authentically disclosed (retrieval), it is characterized by an authentic experience of death (forerunning), and it comports itself towards intramundane entities such that they are understood not as ends in themselves but means towards fulfilling Dasein's own purpose (instant). Heidegger has already described the concrete lived structure of this authenticity as forerunning


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decidedness. Accordingly, the difference between authenticity and inauthenticity can be adequately and completely described as a difference in the manner in which timeliness occurs. Finally, the question remains as to the status of the world in Heidegger's tabulation of the timely structures of Dasein. As we saw in the course of the analysis of being-in-the-world, the world does not exist independently of Dasein. The world, for Heidegger, is an existential structure belonging to Dasein itself. We emphasized in Sections 2.5 and 2.10 that this conclusion does not force Heidegger into an idealist position. In Heideggerian terms, idealism would be the position that the world is ontologically dependent upon the ego. For Heidegger, however, both the world and the self are aspects of the unitary primeval structure that we first understood as being-in-the-world and that we are now in a position to understand as timeliness. According to Heidegger in § 69 c), if we wish to explain the phenomenon of worldliness in terms of timeliness, we will need to expand upon our previous analysis. As we saw in Section 3.5, timeliness has an ecstatic structure. The three ecstasies of timeliness are manners in which Dasein goes beyond itself towards the continuance, the advent, and the encounter in order to return to itself. In the course of this beyond itself-return to itself process, the ecstatic disclosedness of Dasein is manifested. Dasein can only exist at all because of its ecstatic nature. But towards what exactly does Dasein go beyond itself? And what is it from which Dasein returns to itself? According to Heidegger, the ecstatic timeliness of Dasein requires a "horizontal" timeliness. This horizontal timeliness is the direction towards which Dasein goes beyond or transcends itself towards a non-self: towards the phenomenon of the world. Accordingly, the three ecstasies of timeliness must be supplemented by three horizontal structures. Heidegger refers to the structural unity of these three structures as the horizontal schema of timeliness.30 The concept of a "schema" is derived from Kant, and the reader interested in the historical details should briefly review the comments on Kant's schematism of the pure concepts of the

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understanding in Section 2.3. For our present purposes, however, it is sufficient to briefly outline and comment upon the three "ecstatic horizons" that Heidegger introduces: timeliness

continuance

advent

encounter

horizontal schema

before-which

sake-of-self

in-order-to

The terms that Heidegger introduces for the three ecstatic horizons of which the horizontal schema is comprised are reminiscent of terms from the world analysis. Wovor, which I have translated literally as "before-which," recalls the abundance of Wo- compounds (e.g., Wozu) in the original German text. This schema is the one in which Dasein "is disclosed to itself in sensibility as thrown"; it is the "before-which of thrownness" or the particular factual situation into which Dasein has been thrown [§ 69 c), p. 365]. This schema corresponds to continuance in timeliness. Similarly, the schema corresponding to the advent, Umwillen seiner, which I have rendered as "sake-of-self," is verbally reminiscent of Worum-willen, literally "for-the-sake-of-which," which I have translated as "purpose." It is the name for the schema in which Dasein, whether authentically or inauthentically, "approaches itself in the manner of the advent [zukiinftig]" [§ 69 c), p. 365]. Finally, Heidegger calls the schema that corresponds to the encounter Um-zu, a term taken directly from the world analysis. The term, which was previously translated as "in-order-to," is already familiar to us. The three ecstatic horizons of the horizontal schema of the timeliness of Dasein constitute the primeval structure of the world. As Heidegger puts it, The horizontal unity of the schemata of the ecstasies makes the primeval connection [Zusammenhang] of the in-order-torelations with purpose [Um-willen] possible. This implies: upon


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the basis [Grund] of the horizontal constitution of the ecstatic union of timeliness, such a thing as a disclosed world belongs to [Dasein]. [§ 69 c), p. 365]

The most fundamental and most primeval phenomenon of our entire reality is the timing of timeliness. The world, the self, and being-in as the relation between the two crystallize out of the timing of timeliness. The self is a structural elaboration of ecstatic timeliness (continuance, advent, encounter). The world, by contrast, is a structural modification of horizontal timeliness. The transcendence of the world,31 or the difference between the world and Dasein, is the primeval phenomenon in which beingin is founded. Dasein and the world are held together within the structure of a wider-reaching phenomenon, namely being-in-theworld, whose essential unity is a function of the ontological unity of the ecstasies and their corresponding horizons in the timing of timeliness. Dasein, understood as the phenomenal unity of the world and the self, is now seen to be nothing other than the primeval manifestation or timing of timeliness. With this conception of the ontological unity of ecstatic and horizontal timeliness the answer to the question of Being has been found. As Heidegger tells us in § 65, p. 324,"sense" in the strictest meaning of the term is the "towardswhich [Woraujhin] of the primary plan of the understanding of Being/' In this act of planning Dasein understands both "the being of the entity, which it itself is" as well as "the being of intramundanely discovered entities." The overall sense of Being is, accordingly, that with reference to which we understand the difference between the self and the world. The difference between the self and the world is, however, disclosed in the most primeval fashion in the unity of ecstatic and horizontal timeliness. The act or process by which the difference between the self and the world is generated is, as we have seen, the timing of timeliness. This can then only mean: the overall sense of Being is timeliness. Being is the timing of timeliness.

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3.7 THE FOUNDATION OF HISTORICITY (§§ 72-77) As we saw in Section 3.5, Heidegger, owing to his phenomenological methodology, believes that experienced time must be given priority over constructed time. For Heidegger, experienced time consists of the phenomenon of timeliness: in brief, of the experience of our own possibilities of existence as still open (future), as no longer open (past), and as presently being pursued (present). This ecstatic character of timeliness is able to extend itself to the world owing to the horizontal schema of timeliness. The horizontal schema makes it possible for intramundane entities to be experienced as involved in the pursuit of our own possibilities of existence. In this way, intramundane entities are brought into the domain of timeliness. As such, timeliness is the overarching framework giving meaning not only to the self but also to the world and the self-world relationship. What, then, of constructed time — the time that is a product of clocks and watches, the time to which we normally refer when we use the word time? What is its origin, and how is it related to timeliness as experienced time? Heidegger himself refers to what I call "constructed time" as "the vulgar concept of time." In this phrase, the word "vulgar" is not to be understood in the sense of "offensively crude." Rather, it should be understood in the original Latin sense of "ordinary" or "everyday." The vulgar concept of time is our common and usual understanding of what time is. According to this understanding, temporal events "consist of a sequence of experiences 'in time' [§ 72, p. 373]." By "consist of" Heidegger means that an event is in fact "assembled" from an infinite number of "now-points" \Jetztpunkte]. Strictly speaking, only the experience contained in the present now-point is truly real, since past now-points no longer exist and future now-points have yet to come into existence. This vulgar concept of time, as familiar and everyday as it is, necessarily leads to a very peculiar and philosophically very suspicious notion of experience. On this account it


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follows that Dasein only truly exists in each successive and instantaneous now-point, while the passage of time occurs as Dasein so to speak "hops through" the sequence of nowpoints, springing from moment to successive moment [§ 72, p. 373]. This naturally leads to the problem of how to explain the "life-context" [Lebenszusammenhang, literally something along the lines of "manner in which life is held together"] of Dasein. How can Dasein continuously exist if it is composed of a series of instantaneous now-points, only one of which exists at any given time? What "assembles" the infinity of instantaneous points into a coherent, flowing stream of experience? Furthermore, how can Dasein "hop" towards a future now-point that does not yet exist? In what sense can a past now-point be said to be non-existent? If I held up a bank yesterday, surely I am still a robber today, despite the supposed non-existence of the past. The vulgar concept of time leads, it seems, to difficulties in accounting for the continuity and identity of Dasein as an experiencing entity. The question facing Heidegger in Chapter Five of Section Two of Being and Time, entitled "Timeliness and Historicity," is how to account for the "extension" [Erstreckung] of Dasein between birth and death. Clearly, the vulgar concept of time is problematic. But if we reject the vulgar concept of time, how can we explain the continuity and identity of Dasein in terms of the primeval phenomenon of timeliness? Heidegger's answer to this question is divided into two approaches. One approach is to demonstrate that the vulgar concept of time is derived from the observation of intramundane entities and is therefore essentially inauthentic. Since it is essentially inauthentic, it necessarily fails to reflect the true timeliness of Dasein and can be ignored within the context of a philosophical investigation of Dasein's extension. Heidegger pursues this approach in Chapter Six, which contains the concluding sections of Being and Time (§§ 78-83). In Chapter Five, which consists of §§ 72-77, Heidegger attempts to explain the extension of Dasein by giving an adequate account of historicity.

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The connection between the extension of Dasein and historicity is relatively obvious. In speaking of Dasein's extension, we are in fact referring to its life history, to the connection between individual events and episodes in its biography. Explaining how the extension of Dasein is possible is equivalent to explaining how it is possible for Dasein's experience to make up a coherent personal history. Accordingly, historicity is nothing other than the structure of Dasein making it possible for the past to form a continuous whole with the present and the future. In inquiring into the nature of historicity, we are asking how it can be possible for the past to have a continuing influence on the present and the future. The possibility of this continuing influence constitutes Dasein's extension. Heidegger expresses the same point in a rather more obscure manner: We will call the specific movedness [Bewegtheit] of extended self-extension [des erstreckten Sicherstreckens] the occurrence [Geschehen] of Dasein. The question of the "context" of Dasein is the ontological problem of its occurrence. The exposing of the occurrence-structure and the existential-timely [existenzialzeitlichen] conditions of its possibility means gaining an ontological understanding of historicity. [§ 72, p. 375]

Heidegger also makes an attempt at the beginning of the chapter to employ another "completeness" argument similar to the one with which he introduced the analysis of death (see Section 3.1). Briefly, Heidegger claims in § 72, p. 372-373, that thus far in Being and Time we have concentrated on understanding Dasein with respect to its end (being unto death). In so doing, we have remained oriented towards the future (i.e., existentiality). However, in raising the question of the extension of Dasein, we are inquiring what Dasein is as a whole. The inquiry into the wholeness of Dasein thus necessitates the complementary analysis of its being unto its own beginning ("birth"), or its relation to the past in the widest sense (thrownness). Thus a


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comprehensive account of Dasein as a whole requires an account of historicity.. It is worth noting in passing that this argument appears to suggest that the world analysis corresponds to an analysis of Dasein's present, while the existential analysis of Dasein is an analysis of the future. It follows that the planned but unwritten "destruction of the history of ontology" in Part Two of Being and Time would have corresponded to an analysis of Dasein's past. Within the perspective of Being and Time, a truly comprehensive account of Dasein as a whole is dependent upon the successful completion of the destruction of the history of ontology in Part Two. Because this task was never completed, Being and Time remains a textual and philosophical torso. Heidegger's analysis of historicity, or of the continuity of Dasein, is based on three conceptual elements: "inheritance" [Erbe], "destiny" [Schicksal], and "lot" [Geschick]. The bulk of this analysis is contained in § 74. There we are told that the question of historicity is in essence a question concerning the source of the existential possibilities towards which Dasein plans itself. This question is necessary because forerunning self-planning towards the unattainable possibility of existence, namely death, only guarantees the wholeness and authenticity of decidedness. The factually disclosed possibilities of existence, however, are not to be derived from death. And that is even less the case to the extent that forerunning into the possibility does not mean any speculation concerning it, but rather a returning to the factual there [Da]. [§ 74, p. 383]

Insofar as Dasein exists authentically, Dasein accepts the inevitable possibility of its own death. In so doing, it experiences the primeval sensibility of angst. Angst, as a sensibility, is the structure of Dasein in which the world as such is authentically disclosed. The world, however, is disclosed not as Dasein7s own creation but as a network of existential possibilities (meaningwholes) not chosen by Dasein itself—that is, into which it has

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been thrown. Authentic existence, then, involves the acceptance of thrownness, or the acknowledgement of the finitude of Dasein's possibilities for existence, since these possibilities, including the final possibility of their coming to an end, are not all chosen by Dasein. They are forced upon Dasein in thrownness. Accordingly, authentic Dasein must disclose the authentic possibilities of its existence by starting from the "inheritance" that it accepts. The word "inheritance" denotes the sum total of thrown possibilities for existence presented to Dasein by the world. Since decidedness involves the acceptance of thrownness, authenticity can be understood, from our new perspective, as the "transmission of an inheritance" [§ 74, p. 383-384]. Forerunning into death means the acceptance of Dasein's inheritance—its inheritance of all the possibilities, including the possibility of death, which it did not itself choose. Insofar as Dasein exists authentically, it chooses to accept its inheritance of possibilities for existence. Its task is to comport itself authentically towards possibilities that it did not itself choose but that are imposed upon it by the very act of its existence. Heidegger terms the authentic comportment towards inheritance Dasein's "destiny" [Schicksal]. "Destiny" denotes the comportment in which decided Dasein's authentic existence is disclosed to itself in an inherited but nonetheless chosen possibility [§ 74, p. 384]. In short, it is the acknowledgement of the historical situation, arising from inheritance, in which one happens to find oneself. In speaking of "acknowledgement," Heidegger most emphatically does not mean that one simply must go along with one's cultural and social milieu and find them necessarily good. Heidegger is speaking of "acceptance" in the sense that, firstly, one truly recognizes the possibilities the inheritance offers, rejecting the inauthentic crosstalk obscuring the genuine inheritance of a particular historical era. Secondly, in speaking of an "acceptance," Heidegger means an authentic comportment towards the true inheritance of one's own historical situation. This involves neither a denial of this inheritance nor a vain


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attempt to escape it, but rather an authentic manner of accepting it that is not determined by the everyday, falling, and inauthentic social milieu. In this context, Heidegger makes the initially puzzling statement that Dasein "can only be struck by blows of fate [Schicksalsschlage] because in the basis [Grund] of its being it is destiny in the previously characterized sense." This formulation is somewhat misleading, because it can be taken to suggest that destiny is the result of some mysterious intelligence (i.e., "Being") that consciously plans future occurrences. Heidegger's real meaning, however, is somewhat more prosaic. Heidegger simply means that coincidence, whether happy or unhappy, acquires a meaning only within the wider framework of destiny— in the specific terminological sense of an acknowledgement of one's own historically conditioned situation. It is only when one is aware of the past that one can recognize certain events as necessary consequences of this past and attribute others to mere coincidence. If one is not aware of the past, and such is the case with undecided (inauthentic) Dasein, then no event appears to be a result of the past. Events merely happen, exhibiting no connection with each other and no wider meaning. This is why Heidegger notes that undecided Dasein too "is driven about by [conditions and eventualities], and this even more than the one who has chosen, and nonetheless can 'have' no destiny" [§ 74, p. 384]. Finally, because being-with is a fundamental and ineradicable existential structure of Dasein, Dasein's historical situation, its inheritance and its destiny, are necessarily and inescapably shared with others. This shared relationship to a common past is what Heidegger terms their "lot" [Geschick]: If, however, destined Dasein as being-in-the-world exists essentially in being-with [Mitsein mit] others, its occurring [Geschehen] is an occurring-with [Mitgeschehen] and determined as a lot. With this we denote the occurring of the community, of the people. The lot is not assembled from

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individual destinies [...]. In being-with-one-another in the same world and in the decidedness for particular possibilities destinies are already guided in advance. It is first in announcement [Mitteilung]32 and in struggling [im Kampj] that the power of the lot is unleashed \frei]. The destined lot [das schicksalhafte Geschick] of Dasein in and with its generation [Generation] constitutes the full, authentic occurring of Dasein. [§74, p. 384-385]

It is worth pointing out that in Heidegger's use of the term the "lot" of a people does not mean "what it is meant to accomplish and undergo by providence/7 The "lot" of a people during a particular historical period is the sum total of possibilities not that it has itself chosen but that determine its present historical situation. In other words, the "lot" of a particular people is its own past—the past that influences and shapes its future and with which it necessarily must come to terms. In speaking of the "lot of a people," no more is meant than this. Finally, it is important to recognize that all three fundamental terms used by Heidegger in his analysis of historicity necessarily involve authenticity. There is no inauthentic inheritance, destiny, or lot. Inauthenticity is characterized by the absence of these three existential structures. Historical inauthenticity, for Heidegger, is historical rootlessness—the simple lack of an authentic comportment towards the past. Whether this lack is an actual and explicit rejection or merely an insincere and superficial affirmation of the past is immaterial. The essential point is that in either case the inheritance has not been acknowledged but simply ignored, broken with, or hushed up—perhaps even to affirm a falsified version of it and trumpet it about all the more loudly in crosstalk. In order to avoid any misunderstanding, it is worth pointing out the equally clear fact that on Heidegger's terms a rejection of the past can indeed be authentic z/it is based on an authentic disclosure of the past (i.e., on the timing of timeliness in the mode of retrieval [§ 74, p. 385]). It is quite possible both for an individual and for a people to authentically recoil in horror


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from their own inheritance. It is also quite possible for them to authentically rediscover (retrieve) their own dependence upon their inheritance, and to realize that their supposed historical originality and uniqueness are much more closely tied to the supposedly bygone past, and perhaps even to the inheritance of other nations, than was previously supposed. Heidegger's discussion of historicity has a dual purpose: it is meant to prepare and justify the anticipated philosophical discussion of the philosophical inheritance of the West in Part Two of Being and Time, and it is meant to deal with the problem of the relationship between primeval timeliness and the vulgar concept of time. In the latter case, we recall that the problem was to account for the unity and the continuity of Dasein's experience when, according to the vulgar concept of time, experience consists of an infinite series of momentary and instantaneous events ("now-points") unable to form any true unity. In the next section we will follow Heidegger in inquiring into the origin of the vulgar concept of time. We will conclude the present section with Heidegger's account of the relationship between timeliness and the vulgar concept of time. Dasein's experience, as we have hitherto analyzed it, is the continuous and unitary phenomenon of finite timeliness characterized by historicity. It does not consist of a series of instantaneous events. Rather, the timeliness of Dasein is a type of "extending." Dasein's experience of timeliness is "stretched," much closer to the episodic time of a novel or film than to the laboratory time with which physical science operates. Our experience of time as we go about our daily business is clearly quite different from our experience of time when we count off a sequence of individual seconds by observing the motion of the second hand of a watch. The latter experience of time, "clockwatching," clearly is a sequence of instantaneous moments. It is, however, just as clear that the former experience of time, or lived time, is not a sequence, but a historically extended unity. Why do we have the tendency to confuse lived time with clock-watching (in the technical sense in which these two terms

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are used in the preceding paragraph)? It seems that somehow we have the inclination to confuse the time of intramundane entities with Dasein's own time. This confusion is already familiar to us as the tendency to understand Dasein in terms of the world rather than in terms of itself. Our technical term for this comportment is/fl//mg—the comportment that is the existential foundation of inauthentidty. How is it possible for there to be two different sorts of time, one for Dasein and another for intramundane entities? In § 75 of Being and Time, Heidegger informs us that the historical process is a process occurring in being-in-the-world. Accordingly, the historicity of Dasein is necessarily also the historicity of world [§ 75, p. 388], since both the world and the self are functions of the unitary phenomenon of primeval timeliness. Both the world and the self are modifications of timeliness, manners in which the timing of timeliness occurs. Accordingly, "With the existence of historical being-in-the-world, entities to hand and at hand are already drawn into the history of the world [§ 75, p. 388; this sentence is italicized in the original text]/' Intramundane entities, insofar as they partake of the historical world-process, are "world-historical" entities [das Welt-Geschichtliche]. "World-history," according to Heidegger, has two meanings. On the one hand it is the "occurring of world in its essential, existent unity with Dasein." On the other hand it is the "intramundane 'occurrence' of to-handed and at-handed entities," that is, the discoveredness of entities as tools in one of two manners, namely as to-handed or as at-handed [§ 75, p. 389]. Dasein, rooted in the timing of timeliness, is a coherent, unitary, and finite stream of experience with an essentially historical character. The question as to how the unity of Dasein is to be "assembled" from an infinite series of instantaneous now-points can only arise when the temporal character of at-handed entities, exhibited in a theoretical comportment of Dasein towards them, is confused with the primeval and pre-theoretical timeliness of Dasein, whose ontological structures are existential rather than categoreal33 In other words, the question can only be asked when, owing to the


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inauthenticity resulting from falling, Dasein is understood with reference to entities discovered as at-handed tools rather than in terms of its own primeval timely structure. When Dasein is understood inauthentically—with reference to intramundane entities—it is understood falsely. (See Sections 2.9, 3.1, 3.3, and 3.4 on Heidegger's identification of authenticity, wholeness, and truth.) It follows that, for Heidegger, any and all questions derived from the vulgar and inauthentic concept of time, insofar as they are raised within the context of the fundamental analysis of Dasein, are completely misguided. The true question, then, according to Heidegger, is not "How do we account for the unity of experience given that time is an infinite series of infinitesimally small temporal points?" but rather "In which manner of being itself does [Dasein] lose itself such that it so to speak must retroactively pull itself together from dispersion34 and think up an all-embracing unity for togetherness [das Zusammen]?" [§ 75, p. 390] By contrast with this inauthentic situation, authentic historicity is the decided "retrieval of the inheritance of possibilities" [§ 75, p. 390]. It is apparent that Dasein7s comportment towards time is intimately linked with its own authenticity and inauthenticity. Heidegger describes the somewhat complex connection in the following words: The decidedness of the self against the inconstancy [Unstandigkeit] of dispersion is in its self [in sick selbst] the extended constancy [erstreckte Standigkeit] in which Dasein as destiny keeps birth and death and their "in-between" "drawn into" its existence, such that in this constancy it is instantiated35 [augenblicklich] for the world-historical [features] of its particular situation. [...] Constancy does not first assemble itself through and out of the mutual connection of "instants" [in the usual sense of the word] rather these emerge from the already extended timeliness of continuing retrieval in the manner of the advent. [§ 75, p. 390-391]

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The "fragmentation" of Dasein arising as a result of the vulgar concept of time is an expression of dispersion, which is an existential consequence of inauthenticity. As a result of falling, the primeval, already extended timeliness of Dasein becomes obscured and forgotten. Thus the phenomenon of inauthenticity in the mode of dispersion is itself the reason for the experience of time as a succession of instantaneous now-points. Further light will be shed on this connection in the following section, which discusses the closing section of Being and Time. 3.8 THE VULGAR CONCEPT OF TIME (§§ 78-83) In the final chapter of Being and Time, Heidegger attempts to clarify the relationship between primeval timeliness and the vulgar concept of time by studying "concerned time" [besorgte Zeit]. "Concerned time," or the form of time characterizing Dasein's manipulation of tools in concernedness (see Section 2.5 a), is an intermediate form of time between primeval timeliness and the vulgar concept of time. While not, strictly speaking, inauthentic as such, concerned time is the basis of a further modification, which in turn gives rise to the properly inauthentic vulgar concept of time. By studying this modification of concerned time, Heidegger attempts to trace the origin of inauthentic time back to timeliness, its primeval and authentic origin. It is important to keep in mind that despite its inauthenticity, Heidegger does not wish to do away with the vulgar concept of time. As he points out later on in the chapter, within very specific limits the use of the vulgar concept of time is quite justified and even necessary: The vulgar characterization of time as an endless, expiring, irreversible now-sequence arises from the timeliness of falling Dasein. The vulgar notion of time has a natural justification [ihr natiirliches Recht]. It belongs to the everyday manner of being of Dasein and to the understanding of being that is initially dominant. [...] This interpretation of time only loses


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its exclusive and especial justification when it claims to yield the "true" concept of time and to indicate [vorzeichnen] the sole possible horizon for the interpretation of time. [§ 81, p. 426]

It is impossible to do away with the vulgar concept of time, because it is the time characterizing Dasein in its average everydayness. Without this conception of time it would be impossible to manage our time in any way—to measure elapsed time, to agree to meet at the same time, and to arrange our time so as to get everything done. As we have repeatedly seen in the course of our interpretation of Being and Time, falling and therefore inauthenticity are both anchored in the very structure of Dasein itself. Authenticity, therefore, cannot consist in excising inauthenticity from the sphere of human experience. Rather, authenticity consists both in the acknowledgement that inauthenticity is an ineradicable part of human experience and in an authentic response to this inescapable fact. In the course of his analysis, Heidegger identifies four fundamental characteristics of concerned time. These structural characteristics belong properly to the timeliness of concern, that is, to the specific modification of timeliness that appears in Dasein's use of tools. We could say that concerned time is neither primeval timeliness nor the time characteristic of the world as such (the vulgar concept of time), but rather the form of time that is exhibited in the everyday world-self relationship. Heidegger's analysis of these four fundamental characteristics of concerned time is spread out between two sections, § 79 and § 80, and matters are complicated still further by Heidegger's use of several different technical terms to refer to the same characteristics. In order to simplify the presentation of the core ideas, we will adhere strictly to the terminology that Heidegger introduces in § 80, p. 416: "datability" [Datierbarkeit], "stretchedness" [Gespanntheii36], "publicity" [Offentlichkeit], and "worldliness" [Weltlichkeit]. The analysis of datability occurs in § 79, p. 407-409, that of stretchedness takes place in § 79, p. 409410, while the analysis of publicity takes up the last paragraph

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of § 79 and the first four paragraphs of § 80; the analysis of worldliness runs from the fifth paragraph of § 80 in § 80, p. 412, to § 80, p. 414, the rest of § 80 being occupied with commentary and further exposition. According to Heidegger, concerned time exhibits four principal and fundamental structural features: (1) "Datability" [Datierbarkeit] is the association of time with a particular entitial state of affairs: "now that—the door is slamming, now that—my book is missing, and so on" [§ 79, p. 408]. Datability has three basic forms corresponding to the present, the past, and the future: "now that..." \jetzt, da ...], "back when ..." [damals, als ...] and "later as ..." [dann, wann ...]. Datability is the quality making it possible to assign dates to occurrences or events [§ 79, p. 407]. (2) "Stretchedness" [Gespanntheit] is the feature of concerned time making it possible to speak of duration in the sense of the length of a particular state of affairs. It is the length of time during which a state or arrangement of entities persists. This quality of concerned time is a further modification of the extension, or primeval timely unity, of Dasein. (See Section 3.7.) [§ 79, p. 409] (3) "Publicity" [Offentlichkeit] refers to the public or universally binding character of concerned time, its universalization. Concerned time is not merely private; it acts as a generally established temporal framework considered to be universally valid for all peoples, events, and occurrences. The universal character of concerned time is a function of the one-self; it is only because it is the time with which one reckons that it can be binding for all individuals [§ 79, p. 411]. (4) Finally, "worldliness" [Weltlichkeit]37 is the suitability (and unsuitability) of specific times for particular manners of comportment towards entities, that is, for the accomplishment of particular tasks. Worldliness has


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a structural feature to which Heidegger refers as the "time-to" [Zeit-zu] structure. The time-to structure of any particular time reveals an in-order-to, a fundamental characteristic of meaningfulness, and thus of Dasein's use of entities as tools, familiar to us from Section 2.5. These four characteristics are the fundamental structural features of concerned time. Insofar as this concerned time functions as the ontological basis of the meaningfulnessstructure underlying our experience of the world, Heidegger speaks of "world-time" [Weltzeit]. By contrast, intramundane entities encountered within world-time exhibit "intrachronicity" [Innerzeitigkeit; see the commentary to "Timeliness" in Appendix A]. Lastly, time, insofar as it is measured using instruments of whatever sort—"the world-time that is 'sighted7 in such a manner in the use of the clock" [§ 81, p. 421] -is "now-time" [Jetzt-Zeit]. Now-time is the conceptual foundation of the vulgar concept of time. How are we to understand the relationship between now-time and world-time? In the vulgar concept of time, which is derived from now-time, the essential relationship of datability to meaningfulness is ignored. Whereas world-time is by nature associated with entities, now-time is a "pure sequence." It is an empty form or arrangement in which events take place, as in a sort of vessel. Being a purely formal structure, now-time has no true relationship with the entities filling it. It can exist completely on its own, whether full or empty of entities. Similarly, the stretchedness of world-time, the duration of entities or entitial states of affairs, for example the duration of an evening meal, becomes fragmented in now-time. No longer do events take time and endure throughout their span of time; rather, in now-time, stretchedness is replaced by an "uninterrupted and gapless" [§ 81, p. 423] sequence of empty nows. Because of its essential disconnectedness from meaningfulness, nowtime appears as an endless and beginningless now-sequence, obscuring the essentially finite nature of primeval timeliness.

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As a further result of its detachment from meaningfulness, now-time appears as a "free-floating in-itself of an at-handed now-sequence" [§ 81, p. 414; the phrase is italicized in the original German text]. With this further development time becomes "objective" and therefore universally binding. Accordingly, in the vulgar conception of time, the now-sequence remains completely unrecognizable with respect to its origin in the timeliness of individual Dasein in everyday togetherness [Miteinander]. And how should it affect the march of "time" in the least when a human being, present [vorhanden] "in time/' no longer exists? Time goes on, just as it already "was" when a human being "came into life." One only knows the public time that, levelled off [nivelliert}, belongs to everyone, and that means to no one. [§ 81, p. 425]

When we consider the manner in which the three aforementioned structures of world-time are modified in nowtime, it seems clear enough that the transition from world-time to now-time takes place when the fourth characteristic of worldtime, namely worldliness, is suppressed. The separation of worldtime from its essential connection with meaningfulness permits the theoretical construction of an abstract and objective — and therefore apparently absolute — form of time. This form of time, now-time or the vulgar conception of time, is not the time involved in our everyday experience. It is not the time that lasts longer when we are in the dentist's office waiting for our root canal to begin, nor is it the time that flies when we are having fun. However, in the vulgar conception of time, the time whose length is variable, namely experienced time, is branded "subjective." It arises, on this interpretation, due to psychological quirks of the human mind. It would not arise at all if the human mind were not limited by the tendency to remember interesting events and to forget events of lesser importance. It is therefore ignored in favour of constructed time, which is "universal" and "objective." Experienced time, on


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this account, arises due to the failure of the subjective human mind to apprehend objective time objectively. In short, the vulgar conception of time affirms precisely the opposite of what Heidegger believes is the true state of affairs. It is the inauthentic conception of time that—in Heidegger's view—underlies the entire history of Western ontology, from Aristotle to Hegel, and whose pervasive yet hidden influence continues to dominate the present era of philosophical and scientific thought.

Being and Time ends with a short reflection on the course Heidegger's phenomenological analysis has taken throughout the entire book. The last sentences of the book contain a string of tantalizing and important questions: "Is there a way that leads from primeval time to the sense of Being? Does time itself reveal itself as the horizon of Being?" [§ 83, p. 437] For the moment, at least, these questions must remain unanswered. Later, Heidegger would claim that the existential-ontological framework of Being and Time was inadequate to the task of answering the question of Being. In an extended letter to Jean Beaufret written in the fall of 1946 and later published as "Brief iiber den 'Humanismus,'" Heidegger implies that the approach of Being and Time still relied too heavily on traditional metaphysical conceptions. (See Wegmarken p. 327-328.) Explaining how and why this should have been the case is a task for a future work. The planned "destruction or the history of ontology" in Part Two of Being and Time would have shown how the overall sense of Being had consistently and progressively been obscured in the course of the development of Western philosophy instead of being properly understood with reference to timeliness. While it is impossible to reconstruct the precise path Heidegger would have taken had he gone ahead with the writing of Part Two, we can at least outline the interpretative situation with which we are left at the end of Part One. The arrows in the diagram are meant to indicate a movement towards a more profound level of interpretation:

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timeliness = being of intramundane entities + = horizontal timeliness +

being of Dasein ecstatic timeliness

their unity = the overall sense of Being

This interpretative framework, in which the overall sense of Being is understood with respect to primeval timeliness conceived as the unity of horizontal and ecstatic timeliness, would have been used in Part Two in order to interpret the history of ontology, that is, the significant epochal developments in the occidental understanding of Being throughout its progressive development. Heidegger would eventually feel that it was precisely the task of trying to unify two separate realms of Being that made it impossible to answer the question of Being within the interpretative framework of fundamental ontology. According to this later self-interpretation, the very distinction for which Heidegger is perhaps best known, the "ontological difference," or the difference between entities and Being, contained a hidden element of "metaphysics." Heidegger would later claim that the essentially metaphysical nature of the ontological difference made it impossible to explain the connection between Being and entities. The concept of the "transcendence of Dasein," introduced in order to bridge the gap, further complicated matters without leading to a satisfactory resolution of the problem. Eventually, Heidegger would decide to abandon the ontological difference altogether along with the concept of transcendence in favour of an entirely new form of philosophical investigation: ontohistorical thought [das seinsgeschichtliche Denken].

APPENDIX A

GLOSSARY OF TECHNICAL TERMS

This glossary focusses on key terms recurring frequently throughout the text whose translation is in some way problematic or uncertain. The commentaries focus on the more influential and more widespread Macquarrie-Robinson translation, though I have included some remarks on Stambaugh's choice of technical terms. On the whole my own translations are far more in agreement with Stambaugh's than with Macquarrie and Robinson's. It goes without saying that my criticisms are not in any way meant to detract from the considerable achievements of these three translators. As I have learned in the course of writing this book, translating even minute parts of Being and Time is a colossal task. It is further complicated by the need to not only consider internal terminological consistency but also to maintain some sort of consistency throughout the whole of the Heideggerian corpus. For the time being I have been cured of any desire I might have had to attempt a systematic translation of the entire text of Being and Time myself. I can only all the more respect those who have made such an attempt and succeeded. In the text of the glossary, the English terms I use as translations are in bold type. The original German terms used by Heidegger are [italicized between square brackets], within which, following the German convention, nouns are capitalized, while other parts of speech are not. Definitions and general remarks are in regular type. Detailed discussions are in small type. 227

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Advent [Zukunft]. One of the three ecstasies of timeliness. Corresponds to the future. The comportment in which Dasein opens itself towards future possibilities of its own existence; Dasein's ability to "let itself come towards" itself (allow future possibilities of its existence to modify its present understanding of existence in the light of its past). Zukunft is the normal German word for the "future," but Heidegger uses the word in a special terminological sense derived from its etymology. Zu is a preposition meaning "to" or "towards," while -kunft is a noun-forming morpheme derived from the verb kommen, "to come." Zukunft thus literally means "act of coming towards." Heidegger uses the term to designate the comportment of Dasein by means of which future possibilities are enabled to come towards or approach Dasein in its present understanding of existence. Because of the importance of the etymology, it has been thought advisable to translate Zukunft as "advent," from the Latin advenire, literally "to come towards," "to come up to." Ambiguity [Zweideutigkeit]. The inauthentic mode of interpretation. Characterized by the inability to distinguish genuine understanding from false understanding, i.e., by the inability to understand entities as the entities they in fact are. Zweideutigkeit literally means "two-meaning-ness." It is usually translated as "ambiguity." German also recognizes the variant Mehrdeutigkeit, "many-meaning-ness." Angst [Angsf]. Authentic sensibility. The sensibility that discloses Dasein authentically as existence in a world. Macquarrie and Robinson opted for "anxiety," while Stambaugh uses Angst. It seems to me that the word is now current enough in English for it to be written without italics or capitalization. At-handedness [Vorhandenheit]. The characteristic feature of tools (or, more generally, of entities) that are observed rather than used. In German, the adjective vorhanden means something like "available," "lying around." Heidegger coins the noun Vorhandenheit by

Glossary of Technical Terms

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adding the suffix -heit or "-ness" to the adjective. Macquarrie and Robinson's "presence-at-hand" is misleading because it introduces the term "presence" [Anwesenheit], which Heidegger uses in the context of his analysis of timeliness. For similar reasons I am not fond of Stambaugh's "objective presence."

Authenticity [Eigentlichkeit]. The mode of evermineness in which Dasein plans its own existence towards itself rather than towards the world. The adverb eigentlich is normally used in the sense of "actually" or "really"; when used as an adjective it means "actual," "real," or "genuine." Etymologically (but not idiomatically) Eigentlichkeit literally means "own-like-ness," i.e., "the state of resembling that which is one's own." See the detailed explanations in Section 3.1.

Authorization [Bezeugung]. The comportment through which Dasein both produces and understands the possibility of its own authenticity despite its immersion in the inauthentic one-self; the call of conscience. The usual meaning of the verb bezeugen is "to attest" or "to testify to," but Heidegger appears to use Bezeugung in a sense derived rather from the literal meaning of its linguistic roots. The verb zeugen has two basic sets of meanings: "to beget," "to generate," or "to produce"; and "to testify" or, with appropriate prepositions, "to witness": zeugen von means "to bear witness to," while zeugen fur means "to act as a witness for someone." The Bezeugung of which Heidegger speaks in Being and Time is the comportment by means of which Dasein both produces and witnesses its own possible authenticity, i.e., the call of conscience. In view of the nuanced meaning of the term, it seems more advisable to translate the term as "authorization," whereby one should keep the meaning of the root word "author" in mind. Dasein is both the caller ("author") and the hearer (the one who receives the "authorization") of the call of conscience.

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Awaiting [Gewartigen]. The inauthentic mode of the advent; inauthentic being unto death; the inauthentic comportment towards existentiality. Gewartigen is a nominalized form of a verb whose meaning is "to expect" or "to be prepared for." Following Macquarrie and Robinson, the term is rendered into English here as "awaiting." The verb is a compound of four morphemes: ge-wart-ig-en. On the meaning of ge-, see the commentary to Gerede. Compare the commentary on Gegenwart for the meaning of wart; the umlaut (a) is a result of adding the adjectival suffix -ig. The ending -en is the infinitive ending in German. The literal meaning of the verb is thus something along the lines of "to anticipate [be influenced or determined by] the sum total of that which comes towards [one]." Being [Sein, das Sein]. In Being and Time, the characteristic feature of entities as such in the widest possible sense, including both intramundane entities and Dasein; the standard by means of which we are able to distinguish between the existent and the non-existent. In German, Sein with a capital S is a noun; with a small s (sein) it is an infinitive. The German use of articles is slightly different than in English; in German one would frequently write das Sein where English would simply have "being." For the sake of clarity I have capitalized "Being" wherever Heidegger means the general "defining quality" of everything "existent" in the widest sense; when he refers to the "defining quality" of specific types of existent things, e.g., "the being of entities" or the "being of Dasein," I have written "being" with a lowercase initial letter. I have also used a lowercase initial letter wherever Heidegger uses the infinitive in compounds, e.g., I have rendered In-der-Welt-sein as "being-in-theworld." Stambaugh prefers to avoid capitalization altogether. Being-ability [Seinkonnen]. Dasein's ability or capacity to pursue various courses of action; more technically: to disclose purposes and, in one and the same act, to discover tool-wholes. Konnen is an ordinary German verb with the meaning "to be able to." The compound Seinkonnen accordingly means "ability to be"


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or "being-ability." Macquarrie and Robinson's "potentiality-forBeing" is misleading, firstly because it should be "potential" rather than "potentiality," and secondly because it implies the Scholastic technical concepts potentia and potentialitas, typically rendered in German as Potential or Potentialitat. While it is true that these nouns are derived from the Latin posse, a direct equivalent of konnen, the meaning of the English "potential" is based on the Scholastic use of the term and not on its etymological connection with posse.

Being-already-in [Schon-sein-in]. The structural feature of concern corresponding to facticity. Being-among [Sein-bei]. The structural feature of concern corresponding to falling. German has several prepositions corresponding to the English "at": auf (auf dem Markt, "at the market"), an (an der Universitat, "at the university"), and bei (bei den Nachbarn, "at the neighbours' [place]"). Bei can also mean "next to" (Ich stand beim Fenster, "I stood next to the window"), "near to" (Ich blieb beim Auto, "I stayed near the car,") or even "with" (Ich safi bei ihm im Seminar, literally "I sat with him in the seminar," i.e., "I took his course"). Its use is highly governed by idiomatic rules. Macquarrie and Robinson's "being-alongside" is overly literal and idiomatically wrong in English. Strictly speaking, "being-among" would be Sein-unter in German (literally "beingunder"), but this rendering seems to be the most understandable and elegant English possibility. Another possible, though perhaps more clumsy, translation of Sein-bei is "being-at."

Being-in-the-world [In-der-Welt-sein]. The preliminary conception of the primeval structure of Dasein (later replaced by concern, and then by timeliness). The term expresses the unitary structure of the world, the entity living in the world (Dasein), and the world-Dasein relation (being-in). Note that in German, all nouns are capitalized; however Heidegger does not capitalize sein in the hyphenated compound In-der-Weltsein. Accordingly, if we reserve the capitalized English word

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"Being" as the translation of Heidegger's Sein (i.e., the object of the question of Being), it is misleading to capitalize "being" in "beingin-the-world," as some translators have done. The "being" in "being-in-the-world" simply means existing in a world. Heidegger does not mean to imply that Being itself is present in the world in ourselves in the way that Hegel's Spirit or Geist takes on finite forms of subjectivity in order to experience itself as Spirit. Being-self-ahead [Sich-vorweg-sein]. The structural feature of concern corresponding to existentiality. Being unto [Sein zu]. A Heideggerian locution meaning "comportment towards." Being unto death [Sein zum Tode]. Dasein's comportment towards its own end, i.e., its mortality or finitude. Heidegger's use of the preposition zu (zum is a contraction of zu dem, dem being the masculine singular dative form of the definite article) in the locution Sein zum Tode is not in accord with German idiomatic use and is somewhat awkward. The closest German parallel is in the idiomatic phrase Liebe zum Nachsten, "love of one's neighbour." It would be awkward and misleading to render Sein zum Tode as "being of death," since the meaning of the phrase is really "attitude" or "comportment towards death." Translating zum as "towards" accurately captures the sense of the preposition in the phrase Sein zum Tode, but the word "being" tends to be perceived as a noun rather than as a gerund in English, the active sense of the present participle being lost in the process; as a result, the sense of the locution "being towards death" is not immediately evident. The preposition "unto" retains just enough of the sense of "towards" to be used in this context and sounds far more elegant when used together with "being," since it hints at the sense of the present participle. Coeval [gleichursprunglich]. Adjective designating equally fundamental existential structures of Dasein.


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The literal meaning of gleichursprunglich is "equally primeval/' Macquarrie and Robinson employ the neologism "equiprimordial." See the entry on "Primeval" for a detailed criticism.

Comportment [Verhaltung]. A general concept referring to all the possible ways in which Dasein can behave or conduct itself towards tools, other people, and itself. Verhaltung literally means "a particular behaviour"; "behaviour in general" is Verhalten. It is derived from the reflexive verb sich verhalten, meaning "to behave" (Verhaltenstherapie is "behavioural therapy"). In English, the word "behaviour" is too strongly associated with Behaviourism in the popular consciousness for it to translate Heidegger's actual use of the term Verhaltung', in German, this association does not arise between Verhaltung and Behaviourismus. The translation "comportment" is preferable to "interaction" because it can be used along with "to comport oneself" to translate passages in which Heidegger uses the reflexive verb sich verhalten. "Conduct" is also satisfactory but does not have a convenient plural form.

Concern [Sorge]. Dasein conceived as the unity of existentiality, facticity, and falling. Existentiality is grasped as "being-selfahead/' facticity as "being-already-in-(the-world)," and falling as "being-among-(intramundanely encountered entities)/' See Section 2.9 for details. Macquarrie and Robinson opt for "care"; Stambaugh follows them. For my general remarks see the commentary to "Concernedness."

Concernedness [Besorgen]. The comportment in which entities are manipulated and used. The verb besorgen has the meaning "to furnish oneself with," "to obtain." It is composed of the prefix be-, which usually indicates the formation of a transitive verb (much as the English "be-" in "becalm," "bedazzle," "bewitch," etc.), and the root -sorgen, literally "to care for" (sorgen fur) or "to worry about" (sich sorgen machen urn). Heidegger uses the etymology of the word to hint that

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our manipulation and use of entities is a modification of Sorge or "concern/' It is in order to reflect this etymological connection that Sorge is translated here as " concern'7 and besorgen and das Besorgen as "to concern oneself with" and "concernedness" respectively. Stambaugh renders Besorgen as "taking care," leading to the awkward locution "time taken care of" when speaking of besorgte Zeit. I render besorgte Zeit as "concerned time," i.e., the sort of time involved in concernedness. Unfortunately, the transitive sense of the adjective besorgt cannot be straightforwardly preserved.

Concernfulness [Fursorge]. Comportments directed towards other people (rather than towards entities, which Heidegger calls Besorgen). As in the case of Besorgen, Heidegger intends the etymology of the world Fursorge to hint that our comportments towards other people are a modification of Sorge or "concern." The literal meaning of Fursorge is "for-concern." Its everyday meaning is "organized assistance for those in need"; thus staatliche Fursorge is "welfare." It can also mean "care for others" in a more general sense. Macquarrie and Robinson translate Fursorge as "solicitude," while Stambaugh7s translation is "concern." For my remarks see the commentary to " Concernedness."

Connection [Bewandtnis]. The reference of a tool to its what-for; the defining feature of tools; the defining feature of intramundane entities as such. The being of to-handed entities. Bewandtnis and its cognate verb bewenden are difficult to translate into English because they only appear as part of fixed idiomatic phrases. Damit hat esfolgende Bewandtnis ... means something on the order of "it's like this...", whereas the phrase es dabei bewenden lassen means "to leave it at that." The verb bewenden is derived from the Old High German biwenten, meaning "to bring or come to an end." Heidegger is clearly trying to express the relation between tools as means and their purposes as ends, but without using traditional causal terminology (i.e., without referring to final causes). I have tried to express this by the neutral term "connection." Macquarrie


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and Robinson opt for " involvement/' which is also acceptable, though the Latin etymology is, perhaps, somewhat misleading. Stambaugh prefers " relevance/' which is really a translation of Relevanz or Sachbezogenheit. I think it also fails to bring out the link with purpose that Heidegger seems to have in mind.

Connection-whole [Bewandtnisganzheit]. The sum total of connections defining the what-for of a particular tool. Understood meaning-wholes. A Bewandtnisganzheit is closely related to a Zeugganzes ("toolwhole"), but described in terms of the more detailed analyses of references and connections Heidegger undertakes in §§ 17-18. For a more detailed discussion of the relationship between connectionwholes, tool-wholes, and meaning-wholes, see Section 2.6.

Continuance [Gewesenheit]. One of the three ecstasies of timeliness. Corresponds to the past. The comportment through which Dasein discloses its thrownness, i.e., the possibilities that it is not (or no longer) able to choose. Gewesenheit is a term coined by Heidegger from the past participle (gewesen) of the verb sein, meaning "to be," and the suffix -heit. Its literal meaning is "beenness." Heidegger uses the term to designate the existential conception of the past. The usual German word for the "past" is Vergangenheit, literally "gone-by-ness." The neologism Gewesenheit is meant to exclude the literal connotations of Vergangenheit by means of a subtle etymological link. Wesen exists both as a noun meaning "essence" and as part of the conjugated forms of sein in modern German. It is no longer used as a verb. The verb wesen existed in Middle High German and meant "to be," "to reside," or "to happen." In turn, wesen is derived from the Old High German verb wesan, derived in turn from the Gothic wisan, thought to be derived from the Indo-Germanic ues, meaning "to linger," "to live," "to spend the night" (source: Wahrig's Deutsches Worterbuch). Heidegger avoids the use of Vergangenheit in order to make the important point is that the "past" does not merely "go by" but continues to affect both the "present" and the "future." The

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meaning of the term Gewesenheit can accordingly be paraphrased as "the essential feature of the collection of lingering beings/' (See the remarks on the meaning of the prefix ge- under the entry for "Crosstalk".) It has accordingly been thought appropriate to translate Gewesenheit as "continuance." Note that Macquarrie and Robinson's translation of the term as "having been" expresses precisely the connotation that Heidegger coins the neologism in order to exclude.

Crosstalk [Gerede]. The inauthentic mode of talk. Characterized by an emphasis on what is spoken at the expense of what is discussed by the talk. (See Section 2.6.) Gerede in everyday German simply means "rumour-bearing talk," or, in some contexts, "gossip" (harmless "gossip" is Klatsch', "gossip" in a strongly negative sense is ein ubles Gerede). The prefix ge-, when it does not indicate the formation of the past participle, frequently has a collective meaning, and as such requires the gender of the noun to be neuter. (See the remarks on German collective nouns under "Tools" and "Entity".) Das Gebusch, for example, literally means "a collection of bushes," i.e., "the bush," "bushes," or "shrubbery" in English. A similar meaning can be seen in the words das Geback ("cakes," "cookies"), das Gedrange ("press of people"), das Gefieder ("plumage"), das Geflugel ("poultry"), das Gefluster ("whisperings"), das Gelaber ("utterly ridiculous and impertinent talk"), and so on. The literal meaning of Gerede is thus something along the lines of "a lot of talk," i.e., a lot of nonsense, as in "that's just a lot of talk." Its main structural feature is that it obscures the entity or entitial state of affairs addressed by the talk. To preserve the etymological connection with Rede it seemed most appropriate to translate Gerede by "crosstalk," i.e., "talk at cross-purposes." "Chatter" is a tempting possibility, but loses the etymological link between Rede ("talk") and Gerede.

Curiosity [Neugier]. The inauthentic mode of understanding. Characterized by a disconnection of purview from tool use and a concern with "knowing for the sake of knowing/'


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Neugier is the usual German word for "curiosity." Literally, it means "the lust [Gier] for new [neu] things." Dasein [Dasein]. Humans; human existence. Dasein is an everyday German synonym for "existence," whether human or otherwise. It is a compound of the adverb da, meaning "there," and sein, meaning "being." Etymologically, the word expresses that the "existence" of something is its "being there." In using the word to refer to peculiarly human existence, Heidegger intends the da prefix to refer to what is there before us, i.e., the world, whereas the sein stem refers to "existence" [Existenz] in Heidegger's terminological sense of the word, i.e., the primeval existential structure of Dasein as timeliness. Dasein thus expresses that the fundamental ontological structure characterizing humans as such is the unity of horizontal and ecstatic timeliness (the unity of the world and existence). In the preface to her translation of Being and Time, Joan Stambaugh mentions that it was "Heidegger's express wish that in future translations the word Da-sein should be hyphenated throughout Being and Time" (p. xiv). It seems to me that a reader with a knowledge of German does not require the help of this convention, nor would a reader with no knowledge of German be helped by it. I see no reason why Heidegger's wishes should influence the translation of his works into languages of which he was largely ignorant. Decidedness [Entschlossenheit]. The structure of factual authenticity insofar as it is authorized by the call of conscience; constituted by the sensibility of angst, by understanding as planning the self towards its ownmost being-guilty, and by talk as quietedness; accordingly the silenced, angst-ready selfplanning towards one's ownmost being-guilty. (See Section 3.4.) Entschlossenheit is usually translated into English as "determination" or "resolution." Entschlossenheit does not, however, mean a determination or a resolution; rather, it indicates the state of being determined or the state of being resolved. Heidegger also intends an etymological parallel to the term Erschlossenheit, which we have

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translated as "disclosedness." By contrast, the literal meaning of Entschlossenheit is something like "unclosedness." Unfortunately, no English term able to combine the two meanings—"the state of resolution or determination" and "unclosedness"— suggests itself. It has been thought best to translate Entschlossenheit by "decidedness," which unambiguously preserves the first meaning, and to rely upon the reader to keep the second meaning in mind whenever he or she encounters the term. Macquarrie and Robinson render Entschlossenheit as "resoluteness," which is acceptable but forces the somewhat awkward translation of Entschluft, literally "decision," as "resolution," which corresponds to Beschluft in German. An Entschluft is an act of decidedness.

Destiny [Schicksal]. Authentic comportment towards inheritance; the authentic acceptance of possibilities that Dasein does not itself choose but that are imposed upon it by the very act of its existence; the acknowledgement of the historical situation, arising from inheritance, in which Dasein is thrown. The German suffix -sal denotes a state; Triibsal, for example, derived from the verb truben, "to disturb" or "to muddy," means "misery." Schicksal is a similar construction derived from schicken, "to send." Accordingly, the literal meaning of Schicksal is "the state of being sent." Heidegger intends the etymology as a conceptual link with Geworfenheit, "thrownness." Accordingly, Schicksal is the acceptance of historical (as opposed to merely personal) thrownness.

Disclosedness [Erschlossenheit]. The appearing (manifestation) of structures of Dasein as a result of Dasein's comportments; the emergence or accessibility of existential structures in the act of existing. Used in opposition to discoveredness. Since Heidegger uses "existence" in a specific technical sense, Erschlossenheit is used in phrases such as "the disclosedness of the world" to replace the otherwise misleading locution "the existence of the world." Note that Erschlossenheit refers to the "appearing" or "emergence" of structures of Dasein, while the correlative term Entdecktheit refers to the "appearing" or "emergence" of entities and


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entitial structures in the world. The literal meaning of Erschlossenheit is important to Heidegger and can be accurately paralleled by the English "dis-closedness." Discoveredness [Entdecktheit]. The appearing of an entity within the world as a result of Dasein's comportment towards it; a function of the comportment through which we confer a connection upon the entities we encounter and so allow them to serve us as tools. Used in opposition to disclosedness. Entdecktheit is used in phrases such as "the discoveredness of entities" to replace the usual locution "the existence of entities." "Existence" being given a particular technical meaning by Heidegger, it would be confusing to preserve the everyday use of the term. Note that Entdecktheit refers to the appearing or emergence of entities and entitial structures in the world, while the correlative term Erschlossenheit refers to the appearing or emergence of structures of Dasein within the sphere of Dasein's experience. The literal meaning of Entdecktheit or "un-covered-ness" is important to Heidegger and can be accurately paralleled in English by the use of the word "discoveredness." Ecstasy [Ekstase]. One of the three structures of timeliness, namely advent, continuance, and encounter; the structure common to all three in which Dasein "goes beyond itself" and then "returns to itself." (See Section 3.5.) The German word Ekstase is the normal word for "ecstasy." However, Heidegger gives it a special terminological meaning derived from the Greek word ekstasis. This word is a compound of the prefix ek, corresponding to "ex-," literally "out of," and stasis, "the act or process of remaining, standing, or staying." Accordingly, ekstasis literally means "to stand outside (oneself)," or, in idiomatic usage, "to be beside oneself due to any strong emotion," for example rage, joy, or fear. It is, however, only with reference to the etymological meaning of the word that Heidegger denotes the three structures of timeliness, the advent, continuance, and the encounter, as "ecstasies" [Ekstasen] of timeliness. They are "ecstasies" not because

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they in any way resemble or cause ecstasy but because they exhibit the common feature of "beyond itself—return to itself/7 In order to avoid misunderstanding, Macquarrie and Robinson translate Ekstase and Ekstasen as "ecstasis" and "ecstases" rather than "ecstasy7' and "ecstasies/7 Still, since the German word Heidegger uses is laden with the same meaning, and since Macquarrie and Robinson's renditions are somewhat awkward, I have decided to use already existing English words.

Encounter [Gegenwart]. One of the three ecstasies of timeliness. Corresponds to the present. The comportment by means of which Dasein understands its own existence in a world together with intramundane entities; the comportment by means of which Dasein discovers entities within the overarching framework of the world. Gegenwart is the usual German term for the "present/7 It is a compound of the preposition gegen, meaning "against,7' and the morpheme -wart, a form of -warts, a suffix indicating direction and corresponding to the English "-wards77; vorwarts means "forwards/7 The literal meaning of Gegenwart is, accordingly, something like "against-wards/7 It is possible that Heidegger intends a link with the archaic noun Wart, meaning "guardian/7 "protector,77 or "overseer." (source: Wahrig7s Deutsches Worterbuch). It has been thought best to preserve the literal meaning as far as possible by means of the translation "encounter/7 The word then denotes the comportment of Dasein by means of which it recognizes entities as "counter to77 or "in a direction away from77 itself.

Encountering [Gegenwartigen]. The inauthentic mode of the encounter; inauthentic comportments towards intramundane entities. Gegenwartigen is a nominalized verb form that Heidegger constructs from Gegenwart, the usual German word for the "present/7 Its literal meaning is thus something like "present-izing." The term is rendered into English here as "encountering77 in order to preserve the etymological link with Gegenwart, which I have translated as "encounter/7


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Entitial [seiend]. Adjective pertaining to intramundane entities viewed in opposition to Being. Seiend is an adjective derived from the present participle of the verb sein; its usual meaning in German is " existent/7 However, the word acquires a special meaning in Heidegger's vocabulary because he uses the word Seiendes ("existent things") to refer specifically to intramundane objects, i.e., objects we encounter within the referential framework of the world. See the entry on "Entity" for more details. Note that the correct form of the adjective derived from "entity" is "entitiative," but I find this term too inelegant for general philosophical use.

Entity [Seiendes]. All intramundane things (in the widest sense of "thing") whether animate or inanimate; the totality of worldly things towards which comportments are possible. Seiendes is a common German word which is in fact a nominalized present participle in the neuter singular. In other words, its basic grammatical form resembles that of English words like "jumping," "running," "eating," "playing," "writing," "reading," and so on. It is derived from the infinitive Sein, which means simply "to be." The addition of the neuter singular ending turns the present participle into a noun, so that Seiendes could be rendered into English as "beings" in the sense of "things that are." Note too that in German the use of the neuter singular ending parallels the ancient Greek use of the neuter plural: Seiendes can denote both a single "thing that is" as well as a plurality of "things that are." Heidegger in fact intends the word as a literal translation of the Greek on, which has the same grammatical form as Seiendes. Grammatically speaking, the ideal translation would be "existents," but this word has the telling disadvantage that it is (1) homonymous with and (2) derived from "existence," which has a very different technical meaning in Heidegger. Another, less satisfactory, translation is "essents," which has the further disadvantages that it is (1) almost homonymous with and (2) derived from "essence," with which the meaning of Seiendes should not be confused.

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Unfortunately for the translator, other parallel grammatical constructions in English (rather than Latin) usually have a passive sense; thus "leavings" are "things that are left7' rather than things that themselves leave; "writings" are "things that are written" rather than things that themselves write; and "readings" are "things that are read" rather than things that themselves read. In light of all these difficulties, it seems best to use a familiar word that in its natural use has more or less the same meaning: "entity." We will have to use a plural form, "entities," in sentences referring to many Seiendes, but the word at least preserves the grammatical link between sein and Seiendes via the Latin etymology, ens being the present participle of esse.

Evermineness \Jemeinigkeit]. The ontological structure of Dasein that is the basis of selfhood and the self. Evermineness is rooted in the fact that Dasein is able to understand its own existence, that in existing it can and must choose for itself. Macquarrie and Robinson translate Jemeinigkeit as "in each case mineness"; Stambaugh uses "mineness" or "always-being-mine." I find the first and the last clumsy; the second is inaccurate.

Everydayness [Alltaglichkeit]. The essential quality of our usual and primary comportments towards intramundane entities; inauthentic existence in the world. (an) Existential [Existential]. Noun; a fundamental structural feature of Dasein. Existential [existential]. Adjective; pertaining to fundamental being-structures of Dasein. Used by Heidegger in opposition to existentic; compare "ontological." Existentiality [Existenzialitat]. The quality of having to exist and having existence as the task before oneself, i.e., the defining ability of Dasein to understand its own possibilities for existence.


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Existentic [existentiell]. Adjective; pertaining to concrete acts of existence rather than to the analysis of the structure of existence (i.e., the analysis of Dasein). Used by Heidegger in opposition to existential; compare "ontic." In German, existentiell is merely a variant form (not coined by Heidegger) of existential. Both words simply mean "existential." Macquarrie and Robinson translate existentiell by means of the awkward neologism "existentiell."

Facticity [Faktizitdt]. The quality of being thrown into a world, i.e., the fact that Dasein always exists in concrete (or factual) situations in which it has to make concrete decisions concerning its existence. I have chosen to render the adjective corresponding to "facticity," faktisch, as "factual" rather than Macquarrie and Robinson's "factually." The normal meaning of faktisch is "factual," and I think that Heidegger's use of the word is close enough to its normal meaning to permit this translation into English.

Falling [Verfalien]. The dominance of the one-self in everyday concernedness [Besorgen] with the world; the immersion in everyday life insofar as it is guided by crosstalk, curiosity, and ambiguity. The inauthentic mode of the being-among structure of concern. Verfallen in everyday German means the process of "falling" in the sense that one would speak of the decline and "fall" of the Roman Empire—to "decay" or "collapse." However, it can also mean "to succumb" or "to fall prey to," "to fall" to an opponent. Heidegger obviously means Verfallen to echo Sundenfall, the Christian theological term for the "fall from grace" of Adam and Eve. Heidegger probably means to suggest that the same existential constellation he terms Verfallen is re-interpreted in Christian theology as the doctrine of the Fall. Stambaugh renders this word as "entanglement," which would more properly translate Verstricken or Verwickeln. It also fails to render the verbal sense of the German noun.

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First and foremost [zundchst und zumeist]. A frequently occurring adverbial phrase in Being and Time. Used when referring to the primary, everyday level of Dasein's existence. The literal meaning of zunachst and zumeist is "initially and for the most part/' As this phrase is rather clumsy, I have rendered it as "first and foremost/' The reader should keep in mind that the original phrase has a fundamentally temporal sense.

Forerunning [ Vorlaufen]. (1) The comportment in which a possible state of affairs is considered without compromising its character as a possibility; (2) specifically, authentic being unto death; (3) the authentic mode of the advent, and as such the authentic comportment towards existentiality. See Section 3.2 for details. Vorlaufen is a verb meaning "to run ahead" or to "precede/' Its literal meaning is "fore-running." The noun derived from the verb, Vorlaufer, means a "forerunner" or "predecessor." Forgottenness [Vergessenheit]. The inauthentic mode of continuance; the inauthentic comportment towards thrownness. Also see "retention/' For-that [Dazu]. The entity to which the what-for of a tool refers; the entity to which the tool is applied. Stambaugh translates both Dazu and Wozu as what-for, blurring the distinction between the two.

Inauthenticity [Uneigentlichkeit]. The mode of evermineness in which Dasein plans its own existence with reference the world rather than with reference to itself and its own genuine possibilities. Indifference [Indifferenz]. The mode of evermineness in which Dasein has taken no explicit decision as to whether its own existence is planned towards itself or towards the world. A state that is neither authentic nor inauthentic. Indifferenz is used by Heidegger primarily with a view to the sense of the original Latin roots, namely "undifferentiatedness," "lack


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of a distinction/' In the state of Indifferenz, no difference is made with respect to authenticity or inauthenticity. Of course the usual meaning of "indifference" is also present as an undertone. Inheritance [Erbe]. The sum total of thrown possibilities for existence presented to Dasein by the world. The word Erbe can mean both "inheritance" and "heritage". Macquarrie and Robinson choose the latter rendition. "Inheritance" is used throughout the present work because in English "heritage," despite its etymology, is essentially a synonym for "culture"; it does not evoke strong enough associations with the act of "inheriting," i.e., of receiving thrown possibilities, to serve as an appropriate translation of Erbe. In-order-to [Um-zu]. The purpose of a tool as specified by a particular reference of the tool to its what-for. Ultimately rooted in the understanding of Dasein (more specifically, in its purpose). Instant [Augenblick]. The authentic mode of the encounter; authentic comportments towards intramundane entities. Heidegger's original term for the authentic encounter is Augenblick, "instant," "moment," or "blink of an eye." Its literal meaning is "eye-glance." It is meant to refer to the type of purview [Umsicht] that guides authentic Dasein's comportments towards intramundane entities. Macquarrie and Robinson's "moment of vision" is misleading; Stambaugh's "moment" is better. I find that the emphatic tone of "instant" more closely reflects the sense of the original German. Interpretation [Auslegung]. The act that discovers the connections of tools by understanding them within the framework of connection-wholes. Auslegung literally means "laying out" or "taking apart"; in this respect it resembles the ancient Greek analysis, which also means "the act of taking apart," "un-binding." The translation "interpretation" is somewhat unsatisfactory, since the word

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Interpretation also exists in German alongside the finer distinction expressed by Deutung ("an attempt to give meaning to something"); however, any other rendering of Auslegung into English is likely to prove too misleading. Intramundane [innerweltlich]. Adjective pertaining to entities discoverable within the world, i.e., anything that appears as part of the meaningfulness structure of the worldliness of the world. Stambaugh's "innerworldly" is certainly better thanMacquarrie and Robinson's "within-the-world"; it is perhaps a touch too literal. Language [Sprache]. The comportment of Dasein through which meaning-wholes are separated into meanings and furnished with an entitial shape, i.e., words and sentences; the entitial form of talk, talk insofar as it appears as a to-handed intramundane entity. Lot [Geschick]. The common authentic comportment towards shared thrownness (i.e., a shared past) rooted in the existential structure of Dasein as necessarily characterized by being-with; shared inheritance and destiny. The German word Geschick has a variety of meanings including "fate," "destiny," "dexterity," "knack," and "light touch." It is a compound word whose root is derived from the verb schicken, "to send," and the prefix ge-, which indicates a collective meaning (see the discussion of this prefix under Gerede). The literal meaning of the word is thus "a collective state of being sent," whereby the notion of "being sent" is meant to refer to thrownness. Heidegger's use of the term Geschick in Being and Time is not compatible with the notion "what a people is (supposedly) meant by providence to accomplish." The Geschick of a people is, technically, its common authentic comportment towards its shared thrownness, i.e., its historical situation. Accordingly, it has seemed prudent to render Geschick by "lot" rather than by "fate" or "destiny." Meaning [Bedeu tung]. A connection insofar as it is structured solely by talk prior to any act of understanding and interpretation.


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Meaningfulness [Bedeutsamkeit]. The essential character of the references making up the worldliness of the world insofar as they are conceived as acts of Dasein's understanding; technically (see § 69 c) of Being and Time) the context of the relations in-orderto, what-for, for-that, and purpose. Bedeutsamkeit is a nominalized form of the adjective bedeutsam, which means something like "laden with significance/7 "endowed with deep meaning/' It is related to the verb bedeuten, which corresponds to the English verb "to mean/7 Heidegger occasionally hyphenates the verb be-deuten in order to call attention to its literal meaning; the prefix be- often indicates the formation of a transitive verb (though this is obviously not the case with bedeuten), while deuten approximately means "to interpret/' and deuten aufis "to indicate/' "to point at."

Meaning-whole [Bedeutungsganzes]. A connection-whole insofar as it is structured by talk prior to any further structuring activity undertaken by understanding and interpretation. The references constituting the worldliness of the world insofar as they are structured by talk. the One [das Man]. See "the One-self/' the One-self [das Man-selbst]. The form of evermineness (or selfhood) that is predominantly characterized by an understanding of what "one" does and does not do; the absence of a distinction between one's own and others' possible comportments. The German word man simply means "one" (though not in the numerical sense). It parallels the French Von and is often used in impersonal constructions such as man tut so was einfach nicht, "that's simply not done." The word selbst can mean "oneself," "itself," "herself," or "himself"; used as a noun, das Selbst, it means "the self." The locution man selbst literally means "one oneself," e.g., man selbst hat das fur nicht ratsam gehalten literally means "one did not oneself consider that advisable"; in this example man is used to refer to oneself without explicitly doing so in order to soften the

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impact of the criticism or to disclaim explicit responsibility for it. Macquarrie and Robinson translate das Man and das Man-selbst as "the they" and "the they-self," which entirely misses the point.

Ontic [ontisch]. Adjective pertaining to structures of being prior to any thematic analysis. Used by Heidegger in opposition to ontological; compare "existentic." Ontological [ontologisch]. Adjective pertaining to the thematic analysis of structures of being. Used by Heidegger in opposition to ontic; compare "existential" (adjective). Plan [Entwurf]. The fundamental existential character of understanding; the ability to disclose and pursue Dasein's own possibilities. Used in opposition to thrownness. Entwurf normally means mean "draft/7 "outline," or "rough sketch." An Entwurf is by definition unfinished, something still in the process of being refined and polished into a final version. Literally, the word Entwurf means something like "out-throw." Heidegger uses this etymology to underscore his use of Entwurf (free choices) in opposition to Geworfenheit, "thrownness" (choices that could not have been chosen or are no longer free to be chosen by Dasein). There are three nuances of the term Entwurf as it is used in Being and Time that the translator must take into account. (1) The verb eniwerfen, from which Entwurf is derived, means "to draft" or "to mock up." It refers to an outline which is preliminary, incomplete, and unfinished. (2) It can also mean "to project" in the sense of projecting an image upon a screen: das Bild wurde auf die Leinwand entworfen. This locution is somewhat dated and would tend to be replaced with the verb projizieren in contemporary German. (3) As mentioned above, Heidegger uses the term Entwurf tor the sake of the etymological link with Geworfenheit. Macquarrie and Robinson attempt to preserve (2) by translating Entwurf as "projection" and trusting to the Latin etymology to parallel the German and so preserve (3). I am not, however, entirely satisfied with this decision. Heidegger himself appears to use


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Entwurf primarily in the sense of a "draft" or "outline" of Dasein's possibilities for existence, and in any event the term "projection" is laden with undesirable psychological connotations. I have chosen to focus on (1), in my opinion the root meaning of the term, by translating Entwurf as "plan." This preserves the essential sense of the key phrase eniwerfen auf... hin by permitting locutions like "planning towards ..." or "planning with a view to ...". It does not seem possible to preserve the etymological link with Geworfenheit in any straightforward manner in English; translating Geworfenheit by "ejection" in order to complement Macquarrie and Robinson's "projection" would be very inelegant.

Preconception [Vorgriff]. The set of concepts used in order to carry out an interpretation. The common meaning of the word Vorgriff is "an act by which something is anticipated or decided in advance without waiting for the due process according to which the thing in question would normally occur or be decided." Since Heidegger refers to Vorgriff in his sense as the decision to use a particular "conceptuality" (Begrifflichkeit) in an act of interpretation, I have rendered the word as "preconception." It should, however, be kept in mind that "preconception" is used in a purely terminological sense.

Prepossession [Vorhabe]. An already understood connectionwhole that serves as the framework or context of an interpretation. A neologism of Heidegger's coined from the verb vorhaben, "to intend or plan to do something." Literally the word means "beforehaving," which Heidegger appears to use in two senses: "that which one has before one" (spatial sense); "that which one has in advance (temporal sense)." For the sake of retaining the Vor- etymology, I have translated Vorhabe as "prepossession," though it should be noted that the word is being used in a purely terminological sense.

Preview [Vorsicht]. The angle or perspective from which an interpretation is carried out.

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The word Vorsicht means "caution" in ordinary German; Heidegger uses it in its purely literal sense: "before-sight." In order to preserve the Vor- etymology and the connection of Vorsicht with Umsicht and the various -sicht compounds, I have translated the word as "preview."

Primeval [ursprunglich]. Ontologically fundamental; pertaining to basic and structurally foundational elements of Dasein. Ursprunglich is translated by Macquarrie and Robinson as "primordial," which literally means "first with regard to number," a definitely wrong connotation in a Heideggerian context. Literally, ursprunglich means "pertaining to the origin [Ursprung]," "originlike." Heidegger uses the term to refer to more "fundamental," more "basic," and more "hidden" ontological structures, i.e., to simpler structures on which other, more complex and elaborate, structures are based. "Primal" is a possible translation, but the emphatic connotations of "primeval" better suit Heidegger's use of the term, and the Latin etymology is particularly apt, as primaevus is a compound of primus, "first," and aevum, "age." The term "primeval" thus reflects Heidegger's use of ursprunglich to refer to "earlier," i.e., simpler or more hidden, temporal structures, as well as his later tendency to emphasize the ur- prefix in compounds (ur- means "primeval." An Urwald is a "primeval forest" or "jungle"; Urzeit means "primeval age"; and Urgrofimutter means "great-grandmother"). I will use the word "coeval" as a translation of gleichursprunglich ("equally primeval"), rendered as "equiprimordial" by Macquarrie and Robinson.

Purpose [Worum-willen]. The aim with respect to which Dasein, insofar as it discovers tools in the comportment of connection, assigns them their specific what-fors. The phrase worumwillen is a relative adverb used to introduce a subordinate clause; Heidegger nominalizes and hyphenates it to bring out its literal meaning, which is "for the sake of which" or "for whose sake." Heidegger is both trying to avoid the traditional terminology for describing final causes and to imply that connection


251

is always undertaken for the sake of a particular person, i.e., Dasein; but it seems preferable to render the term in English by "purpose" than by the clumsy "for-the-sake-of-which" or the more accurate, and still more clumsy, "for the sake of whom." There are a few passages in which Heidegger uses both the locutions Worum-willen and Um-willen, but in my view they can be treated as synonyms for all practical purposes. Purview [Umsicht]. The view we have of a tool during its actual use; our immersion in the work to be done; our awareness of a tool when we are occupied with the totality of references assigned to the tool by the in-order-to that constitutes its specific tool-whole and that specify its what-for. The literal meaning of Umsicht is "view around." Macquarrie and Robinson translate "circumspection," a good translation via Latin. "Circumspection" is also the everyday German meaning of Umsicht. In order to preserve the connection of Umsicht with Vorsicht and the various -sicht compounds I have translated the word as "purview." Retention [Behalten]. Synonym for forgottenness introduced by Heidegger in § 79, p. 406 (see the first four sentences of the second indented paragraph); compare also § 69 a), p. 353-354. Retrieval [Wiederholung]. The authentic mode of continuance; the authentic comportment towards thrownness. Wiederholung is the normal German word for "repetition." Its literal meaning, however, is "again-getting." Heidegger uses the word to indicate the existential comportment through which Dasein discloses its own thrownness authentically. Since the connotation of "getting again" or "getting back" is most important for Heidegger, I have rendered the word into English as "retrieval." Sense [Sinn]. That with reference to which something derives its meaning; "the towards-which of the plan, structured by prepossession, preview, and preconception, hither from which

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something becomes understandable as something" (§ 32, p. 151). Note that the resemblance of "sense" to "sensibility" is an unfortunate artifact of translation. Sensibility [Befindlichkeit]. The primeval comportment that discovers connections and connection-wholes and simultaneously also discloses the existential possibilities for comportment towards intramundane entities. Befindlichkeit is a neologism coined by Heidegger. The noun Befinden means a person's "condition" or "state," the verb sich befinden means "to be located" or "to feel," while the adjective befindlich means "located." Heidegger's Befindlichkeit is meant to express the idea that one's "emotional state" discloses the meaningfulness structure of the world, one's "location" or "position," so to speak. Translating the term into English is problematic because it is difficult to decide which nuance should be emphasized. There seem to be no terms in English that have a similar dual meaning to that of sich befinden and Befinden. In German, the neologism Befindlichkeit would tend to be understood in a spatial sense, though Heidegger appears most often to use the word in the sense of "emotion" or "mood." With this latter point in mind, I have tried to render the word by the appropriately vague "sensibility," intending a verbal reference to "sense" in the everyday use of the word (as in "a sense of pleasure or ease," "a sense of what is appropriate") and "sensing" (as in "apprehending"). This is probably about as close as one can get to the original in English, though a case could be made for other, more literal, alternatives, such as "stationedness" or "locatedness." "Statedness" probably best reflects Heidegger's intention in coining the term but invites confusion with the verb "stating." "Disposition" is also tempting, but the overt connotations of the word are too psychological, and the association with an "innate subjective tendency" would be harmful to an understanding of Heidegger's use of the term. In any event, Macquarrie and Robinson's "state-of-mind" is clearly inappropriate in the context of a work one of whose main ambitions is to show that Dasein is inadequately characterized by the concept "mind."


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Stambaugh too rejects "disposition" but translates Befindlichkeit as "attunement," which is an overly literal translation of Gestimmtheit, literally "the state of being of a mind to do something," "the state of having a mood." "Attunement" could perhaps also at a pinch pass as a translation of Einstellung, "attitude." Admittedly, no one English word can do the job of the German Befindlichkeit. Why did Heidegger choose such an awkward and peculiar term for moods or emotions? Interestingly, there is another German word with a similar dual aspect: Empfindung. This relatively common word occurs, for example, in the first of Friedrich Schiller's letters in Uber die asthetische Erziehung des Menschen and has been rendered into English by Reginald Snell as "sensibility." The German word combines the meanings of "feeling" and "perception"; it can also be rendered as "sensation," for example a Schmerzempfindung is a "painsensation." Interestingly, Empfindung is etymologically related to sich befinden via the common rootfinden, "to find." Why, then, did Heidegger not use Empfindung in order to combine the meanings of "mood" or "emotion" and "to be located in" in the sense of "to find oneself in a particular situation" (sich in einer bestimmten Situation finden)? The answer is probably that Empfindsamkeit is a German word meaning "sensitivity" or, in some contexts, "hypersensitivity"; it is also the name of an 18th century movement in German literature characterized by an exaggerated emphasis on emotion and feeling. Heidegger probably felt that coining a new word was required in order to avoid confusion.

Talk [Rede]. The meaningful articulation of understandability; the fundamental comportment by means of which the referential character of the world is structured in order to function as the framework for all particular interactions with intramundane entities; a pre-verbal and pre-linguistic comportment of Dasein by means of which Dasein structures meaning-wholes. Rede can mean "speech" in ordinary German, both in the sense of "acts of talking" and in the sense of a public speech. The verb reden means "to speak" or "to talk." "Speech" would also be a possible translation, although "speech," to my mind, emphasizes the

254


"acoustic" rather more than does the German Rede. For this reason the translation "talk" was held to be more suitable.

Temporality [Temporalitat]. See the discussion under "Timeliness." Thrownness [Geworfenheit]. The fundamental existential character of sensibility; the existential character of Dasein that involves (1) Dasein's inability to choose to come into existence; (2) Dasein's ability to discover connection-wholes as already having been, that is, as independent of Dasein's own choice. Used in opposition to plan. Geworfenheit is a neologism of Heidegger's and has no normal German meaning. The word literally means "thrownness." It is employed in opposition to entwerfen, "planning/7 which literally means "to throw forth." Some commentators have tried to draw a connection between Geworfenheit and the verb werfen, meaning "to throw," "to give birth to a litter" (Wurf can mean "throw" or "litter"), although this interpretation strikes me as fanciful. A possible source of the "thrownness" metaphor is Spinoza's letter to G. H. Schaller dated October 1674 (numbered LVIII in Van Vloten's edition), in which Spinoza explains the subjective sense of free will by pointing out that a hurled stone, if it had an intellect, would imagine that it were flying under its own power.

Timeliness [Zeitlichkeit]. The most fundamental existentialontological structure of Dasein; the sense of authentic concern. The structural unity of advent, continuance, and encounter. (See Section 3.5.) Zeitlichkeit is normally translated "temporality," but this rendering of the term leads to problems. In Being and Time, Heidegger also employs the word Temporalitat. According to Macquarrie and Robinson, Temporalitat and cognate expressions only occur on pp. 19, 23-26, and 147 of the original German edition; elsewhere, the use of Zeitlichkeit and its cognates is predominant. It is, however, not completely certain whether Temporalitat is meant to be a synonym


255

for Zeitlichkeit or whether it has a truly distinct terminological sense of its own. One fact speaks in favour of the latter position. In the lecture Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie (1927), Heidegger's first important project after completing Part One of Being and Time, an important distinction is made between Zeitlichkeit, or the primeval phenomenon of time, which is the foundation of the structural constitution of Dasein, and Temporalitdt, which refers to primeval time insofar as it is the foundation of the understanding of Being (see pp. 322-324; 388; 429). It is likely that Heidegger intended to introduce this distinction in Part Two of Being and Time. The translator is accordingly forced to distinguish between Zeitlichkeit and Temporalitdt, if only to prevent confusion with translations of Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie. Macquarrie and Robinson, claiming that Zeitlichkeit should not be translated by "timeliness" since "temporality" comes "much closer to what Heidegger has in mind," chose to render Zeitlichkeit as "temporality" and Temporalitdt as "Temporality" with an initial capital letter, an obviously unsatisfactory solution, since whenever Zeitlichkeit happens to appear in a title or as the first word in a sentence it will be indistinguishable from Temporalitdt. Furthermore, their proposed convention is unsatisfactory for any English translation of Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie, since both terms are used frequently throughout the work, and an initial capital letter is not likely to be enough of a cue for the reader to remember to distinguish occurrences of Zeitlichkeit from occurrences of Temporalitdt. One can, of course, borrow from the Greek, but I find "chronicity" displeasing, and I prefer to reserve it and its cognates for special cases such as Innerzeitigkeit ("intrachronicity"), which has a different root (-zeitig-) from both Zeitlichkeit and Temporalitdt. In order to preserve "temporality" as a translation of Temporalitdt, Zeitlichkeit has been translated literally throughout the present work as "timeliness." Note, however, that "timeliness" in this specific terminological sense excludes the usual meaning of "the quality of having come at the right or appropriate moment."

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Timely [zeitlich]. Adjective; pertaining to the primeval timeliness of Dasein. In this context " timely" is simply an adjective derived from "timeliness"; it does not have the usual meaning of "occurring at the correct or opportune moment." See the discussion under "Timeliness." Timing [Zeitigung]. The disclosure of primeval timeliness; the fundamental comportment of Dasein that accomplishes this disclosure; the process or occurring of timeliness. Zeitigung is a noun formed from zeitigen by the addition of the suffix -ung, which usually indicates a process or procedure. The German verb zeitigen normally means "to ripen," "to move towards fruition," "to bring forth," or "to have as an effect or consequence." The literal meaning of the verb is "to time." Accordingly, I have decided to translate the word as "timing." It must however be noted that the verb "to time" in English means to measure time, a connotation that zeitigen does not have. Macquarrie and Robinson prefer "temporalizing," although this is misleading because Heidegger seems to use Temporalittit, "temporality," in an altogether different sense. (See the glossary remarks under "Timeliness".) To-handedness [Zuhandenheit]. The characteristic feature of tools encountered within our purview; the peculiarly transparent quality of a tool during successful use. The German adjective zuhanden means something like "ready to be grasped," "ready to be used." Heidegger nominalizes the adjective by adding the -heit ("-ness") suffix. Macquarrie and Robinson's "readiness-to-hand" is accurate but clumsy. Stambaugh's "handiness" is good, but it makes it difficult to think of a corresponding translation for Vorhandenheit, which I have translated as "at-handedness." Tools [Zeug]. Entities insofar as they are encountered in concernedness; manipulated and used entities. The German word Zeug is more or less an equivalent of Ding or "thing," but it can also have a pejorative meaning (dummes Zeug


257

means "stuff and nonsense") and a collective meaning (Schreibzeug means "writing implements/' Bettzeug is "bedding"). "Equipment" (which corresponds rather more to the German Ausrustung) is misleading; another possible translation is "implements," which, however, is a more sophisticated term than the monosyllabic Zeug. Heidegger's use of -zeug compounds such as Schreibzeug ("writing implements"), Nahzeug ("sewing equipment"), Werkzeug ("tools"), Fahrzeug ("vehicles"), Meflzeug ("measuring instruments") show that he is thinking primarily of objects used to accomplish a specific purpose, or to "get things done." Note that all of these compounds can also be used with the definite article, in which case their collective meaning is lost and they denote single objects.

Tool-wholes [Zeugganzes]. The sum total of references defining a particular in-order-to within which tools are assigned their particular what-fors. Interpreted connection-wholes. Like Seiendes, Zeugganzes has a collective meaning, although with the definite article it can also denote a particular individual (see also "Tools"). Heidegger's own examples of tool-wholes (§ 15, p. 68) include serviceability [Dienlichkeit], conduciveness [Beitraglichkeit], usability [Verwendbarkeit], and manipulability [Handlichkeit]. Heidegger calls these "different manners of in-order-to."

Turmoil [der Wirbel]. The inauthentic mode of sensibility. Characterized by the predominance of the one-self. (See Section 2.7 for details.) Understanding [Verstehen]. The comportment in which tools are discovered within tool-wholes and the possible uses of such tools are grasped. The act of understanding reveals both the structure of the world and the possible ways in which Dasein can exist in the world. Unsettlement [Unheimlichkeit]. The essential emotional quality of angst.

258


The German word means "uncanniness," but its literal meaning is "unhomeliness." Heidegger uses the etymology of the term to reflect the essentially "unsettled" and "unsettling" feature of angst as a sensibility preventing Dasein from becoming "entangled" (i.e., "settled") in inauthentic concernedness [Besorgen] with entities.

What-for [Wbzw]. The purpose of a tool; the work it accomplishes. Macquarrie and Robinson translate Wozu as "towards-which," which is misleading; the everyday meaning of the question word wozu? is "what for?" Wozu can also be used to introduce subordinate clauses containing a verb requiring the preposition zu, for example, Er weifi nicht, wozu er sich entschlieften soil, "He doesn't know what he should decide [to do]." In some of these subordinate clauses wozu can mean "towards-which," but "what-for" seems both more natural and more in line with Heidegger's usage of the term. Stambaugh translates both Wozu and Dazu as what-for, blurring the distinction between the two.

Worldliness [Weltlichkeit]. The defining characteristic of the world; the sum total of connection-wholes emerging from Dasein's purpose within which tools are assigned their particular what-fors. The meaning and etymology of the German expression Weltlichkeit exactly parallel the English "worldliness." Literally, the adjective weltlich means "worldly," and Weltlichkeit is formed by simply adding the suffix -keit, just as "worldliness" is formed from "worldly" by the addition of the suffix "-ness." Heidegger of course modifies the everyday meaning of the term, but the English "worldliness" is quite capable of reflecting this change of meaning and its etymological motivation. Accordingly, Weltlichkeit should be translated as "worldliness," though some translators have suggested "worldhood" and "worldishness."

APPENDIX B

GERMAN-ENGLISH LEXICON

This lexicon f ocusses on the English translations used in this book as well as Robinson and Macquarrie's and Joan Stambaugh's from their respective translations of Being and Time. I have generally relied on the indices provided by the translators themselves with some occasional cross-checking against the actual text of the translation. Heidegger

This book

Macquarrie & Robinson

Stambaugh

Alltaglichkeit

everydayness

everydayness

everydayness

Angst

angst

anxiety

Angst

Augenblick

instant

moment of vision moment

Auslegung

interpretation

interpretation

Bedeutsamkeit

meaningfulness

significance

significance

Bedeutung

meaning

signification

signification

Bedeutungsganzes

meaning-whole

totality-ofsignifications

totality of significations

Befindlichkeit

sensibility

state-of-mind

attunement

interpretation

Behalten

retention

retaining

retaining

Besorgen

concernedness

concern

taking care, heedfulness

Bewandtnis

connection

involvement

relevance

259

260


Heidegger

This book

Bewandtnisganzheit

connection-whole totality of involvements

total relevance

Bezeugung

authorization

attestation


attestation

Stambaugh

Dasein

Dasein

Dasein

Da-sein

Dazu

for-that

towards-this

what-for

Eigentlichkeit

authenticity

authenticity

authenticity

Ekstase

ecstasy

ecstasis

ecstasy

Entdecktheit

discoveredness

uncoveredness

discoveredness

Entschlossenheit

decidedness

resoluteness

resoluteness

Entwurf

plan

projection

project

Erbe

inheritance

heritage

heritage

Erschlossenheit

disclosedness

disclosedness

disclosedness

Existential (noun)

existential

existentiale

existential

existential (adj.)

existential

existential

existential

existentiell

existentic

existentiell

existentiell

Existenzialitat

existentiality

existentiality

existentiality

Faktizitat

facticity

facticity

facticity

Fursorge

concernfulness

solicitude

concern

Gegenwart

encounter

present

present

Gegenwartigen

encountering

making present

making present

Gerede

crosstalk

idle talk

idle talk

Geschick

lot

destiny

destiny

Gewartigen

awaiting

awaiting

awaiting

Gewesenheit

continuance

having been

having-been

Geworfenheit

thrownness

thrownness

thrownness

gleichursprunglich

coeval

equiprimordial

equiprimordial

In-der-Welt-sein

being-in-theworld

being-in-theworld

being-in-the-world

Indifferenz

indifference

undifferentiated

indifference

innerweltlich

intramundane

within-the-world

innerworldly

German-English Lexicon

261

Heidegger

This book


Stambaugh

Jemeinigkeit

evermineness

in each case mineness

mineness, alwaysbeing-mine

das Man

the one

the they

the they

das Man-selbst

the one-self

the they-self

the they-self

Neugier

curiosity

curiosity

curiosity

ontisch

ontic

ontical

ontic

ontologisch

ontological

ontological

ontological

Rede

talk

discourse

discourse

Schicksal

destiny

fate

fate

Schon-sein-in

being-already-in

Being-already-in

being-already-in

seiend

entitial

being

being

Seiendes

entity, entities

existent, existents beings

Sein, das Sein

being, Being

Being

being

Sein-bei

being-among

being-alongside

being together with

Seinkonnen

being-ability

being-possible

potentiality of being

Sein zu

being unto

being towards

being toward

Sein zum Tode

being unto death

being-towardsdeath

being-towardsdeath

Sich-vorweg-sein

being-self-ahead

being-ahead-ofitself

being-ahead-ofitself

Sinn

sense

meaning

meaning

Sorge

concern

care

care

Sprache

language

language

language

Temporalitat

temporality

Temporality

temporality

Umsicht

purview

circumspection

circumspection

Um-zu

in-order-to

in-order-to

in-order-to inauthenticity

Uneigentlichkeit

inauthenticity

inauthenticity

Unheimlichkeit

unsettlement

uncanniness

uncanniness

ursprunglich

primeval

primordial

primordial

Verfallen

falling

falling

entanglement, falling prey

262


Heidegger

This book


Stambaugh

Vergessenheit

forgottenness

forgetting

forgottenness

Verhaltung

comportment

behaviour

behavior, relation

Verstehen

understanding

understanding

understanding

Vorgriff

preconception

fore-conception

fore-conception

Vorhabe

prepossession

fore-having

fore-having

Vorhandenheit

at-handedness

presence-at-hand objective presence

Vorlaufen

forerunning

anticipation

anticipation

Vorsicht

preview

fore-sight

fore-sight

Weltlichkeit

worldliness

worldhood

worldliness

Wiederholung

retrieval

repetition

retrieve, repetition

der Wirbel

turmoil

turbulence

eddying

Worum-willen

purpose

for-the-sake-ofwhich

for-the-sake-ofwhich what-for

Wozu

what-for

towards-which

Zeitigung

timing

temporalizing

temporalizing

zeitlich

timely

temporal

temporal

Zeitlichkeit

timeliness

temporality

temporality

Zeug

tools

equipment

useful thing

Zeugganzes

tool-wholes

totality of equipment

totality of useful things

Zuhandenheit

to-handedness

readiness-tohand

handiness

Zukunft

advent

future

coming toward

zunachst und zumeist

first and foremost proximally and for initially and for the the most part most part

Zweideutigkeit

ambiguity

ambiguity

ambiguity

APPENDIX C

IMPORTANT CONCEPTUAL DIVISIONS

In this section I have summarized all the important conceptual divisions in Being and Time presented in the course of the book. It is meant as a supplement to the discussions in the main text. I have also found it helpful in my own work to have them all in one place. The arrows found in some tables indicate a movement towards a more profound level of interpretation. C.1 SIMPLE TABLES The course of Heidegger's analyses of the fundamental structure of Dasein (each new level of analysis should be understood as a deeper and more primeval understanding of the previous level) The fundamental structure of Dasein is grasped as: being-in-the-world (§§ 12-38) concern (§§ 39-60) primeval timeliness (§§ 61-83) being-in-the-world (i.e. Dasein) the world (facticity)

the self (existence)

263

being-in (the self-world relationship)

264


being-in (indifferent modes) sensibility

understanding (and interpretation)

thrownness

planning

talk

being-in (inauthentic modes) curiosity (and ambiguity)

turmoil downfall

crosstalk

unrest dispersion unresiding

temptation reassurance alienation entanglement

being-in (authentic modes) forerunning (authentic being unto death)

angst unsettlement

quietedness (authentic response to the call of conscience)

the referential structure of the world structured by talk: meaning-wholes and meanings

structured by understanding: connection-wholes and connections

structured by interpretation: tool-wholes and tools

the pre-structure of planning prepossession

preview

preconception

Important Conceptual Divisions

265

talk the spoken (what is in fact said about the discussed)

the discussed (what the talk happens to be about)

announcement (the communicative aspect of talk)

self-expression (the sensibility of the talk)

concern being-already-in (facticity)



sensibility and thrown ness

understanding and planning

falling

talk (permeates the whole structure of concern)

The Modes of Timeliness ecstasies of timeliness

continuance

advent

encounter

indifferent mode (i.e. concern)

already-in

self-ahead

being-among

authentic mode

retrieval

forerunning

instant

inauthentic mode

forgottenness (retention)

awaiting

encountering

The Horizontal Structure of Timeliness timeliness

continuance

advent

encounter

horizontal schema

before-which

sake-of-self

in-order-to

concerned time (i.e. world-time) datability

stretchedness

publicity

worldliness

266

| Rephrasing Heidegger

The Hermeneutic Situation at the end of Being and Time timeliness = being of intramundane entities

+

being of Dasein

= horizontal timeliness

+

ecstatic timeliness

their unity = the overall sense of Being

C.2 COMPOUND TABLES The Structural Multiplicity of Dasein (§§ 1-44) being-in-the-world (the world—being-in—the self) Jbe/ng-/n (sensibility/thrownness—understanding/planning) concern (being-already-in—being-self-ahead—being-among) cf/sc/osecfness (ultimately: timeliness)

being-in indifferent modes

sensibility

understanding

talk

inauthentic modes

turmoil

curiosity

crosstalk

authentic modes

angst

forerunning

quietedness

Important Conceptual Divisions

267

The Structure of Decidedness Decidedness is structured according to 1. sensibility

2. understanding

and 3. talk;

which, in the phenomenon of decidedness, take the forms of 4. angst

5. being-guilty

and 6. quietedness;

accordingly, decidedness is the 8. angst-ready,

9. self-planning towards being guilty

7. quieted,

of Dasein resulting from an authentic response to the call of conscience.

Structural Parallels between Timeliness, Concern, and Being-in timeliness

continuance

advent

encounter

concern

being-already-in (facticity)



being-in

sensibility

understanding

crosstalk

talk

The Ecstatic-Horizontal Structure of Timeliness ecstasies

continuance

advent

encounter

indifferent mode

already-in

self-ahead

being-among

authentic mode

retrieval

forerunning

instant

inauthentic mode

forgottenness

awaiting

encountering

horizontal schema

before-which

sake-of-self

in-order-to


ENDNOTES

CHAPTER 1 1.

2. 3.

4.

5.

6.

For further details see Wolfgang Bonsiepen's introduction to Hegel's Phanomenologie des Geistes, eds. Hans-Friedrich Wessels and Heinrich Clairmont (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1988). Also see Karl Schuhmann's article '"Phanomenologie': Eine begriffsgeschichtliche Reflexion/7 Husserl Studies I (1984): 31-68. See the last indented paragraph before subsection A in § 7 of Being and Time. Heidegger is probably referring specifically to Johann Heinrich Lambert, a follower of Wolff. Lambert's Neues Organon (1764) used the term "phenomenology" to mean a theory of deceptive appearance used to distinguish truth from falsity. The term was briefly used by Franz Brentano (see Section 1.2), although its frequent occurrence in completely different circles, e.g., by Ernst Mach in an address of 1894, suggests that the term continued to be in widespread use at the beginning of the 20th century. For further details see Herbert Spiegelberg's The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction, vol. 1 (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978) 7-20. See Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996) 191 (B183/A143): "The pure schema of quantity however (quantitatis), as a concept of the understanding, is the number, which is a representation that sums up the successive addition of one to one (things of an identical nature)." See the section entitled "Von dem Grunde der Unterscheidung aller Gegenstande tiberhaupt in Phaenomena und Noumena" in Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft, 267-285 (B294/A236-B316/A260). 269

270

7.


"German Idealism" is often used as an umbrella term for the philosophies of Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, although Kant himself disclaimed any association of his "transcendental idealism" or "critical philosophy" with Fichte's Wissenschaftslehre or theoretical epistemology, and Hegel's preferred term for his own system was "absolute idealism." 8. For a sympathetic overview of this general philosophical trend see Nicholas Rescher's Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996). 9. This remark occasioned so much indignation among several reviewers of the manuscript of this book that I feel some gentle finger-waving to be in order. There can be absolutely no doubt that the 19th century mainstream—and by "mainstream" I mean the totality of philosophical academia minus those figures we now think of as significant or "great" philosophers—was largely Hegelian. Of course, to a certain degree characterizations of any historical period in philosophy depend on perspective; but if my statement as it stands were false, then why is Analytic philosophy commonly presented as a reaction against the Hegelianism of McTaggart, Bradley, and Green? Russell himself describes his own philosophical development as a process of revolution against the neo-Hegelian atmosphere of the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Have the influential neo-Hegelianism of the American philosopher Josiah Royce (in whom Husserl was keenly interested) and the rarefied Hegelian atmosphere of Emerson been so quickly forgotten? Surely Marxism also represents an intellectual reaction against Hegelianism? Surely the various Neo-Kantian schools were also a reaction to something? Why else revive Kant if not to deal with his most famous revisionist? Against whom and what were the logical positivists revolting? What did the whole philosophy of science movement (Mach et al.) oppose? Surely one enemy common to all these last three movements was the Hegelian Naturphilosophie! Of course the 19th century movements that we consider our immediate predecessors are not Hegelian as such, but they have to be understood as reactionary movements, and the background against which they were reacting very definitely was Hegelian. 10. Some theorists attempt to deal with this dichotomy by considering Euclidean geometry an approximation of the fundamentally nonEuclidean structure of our universe, which, on this account, is so gradually curved at the medium-sized level that the curvature is unnoticeable. 11. I am referring to the broad stream of idealist logic within British

Notes

12. 13.

14. 15.

271

Hegelianism. For details see John Passmore's A Hundred Years of Philosophy (Harmondsworth, Middlesex, UK: Penguin Books, 1968). Psychologism can be defined as the position that mathematics, in some non-trivial sense, is wholly or partially reducible to the psychological laws of human thought. The two streams also remained in contact until relatively late in their development. In the preface to the first (1903) edition of his Principia Ethica, G. E. Moore refers approvingly to Brentano, in whose Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis (translated into English in 1902 as The Origin of the Knowledge of Right and Wrong) he finds " opinions far more closely resembling my own, than those of any other ethical writer with whom I am acquainted/' See also Moore's critical review of this book in the International Journal of Ethics 14 (1904): 115-123. Wittgenstein and Ryle are known to have read Heidegger and Husserl, while Spiegelberg reports in his The Phenomenological Movement (93, footnote 1) that Bertrand Russell read Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen while serving his 1917 prison term for pacifist activities. In turn, Heidegger was at least casually acquainted with Russell's work on Leibniz (see also note 29) while Husserl is known to have studied Wittgenstein's theory of tautology in the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. (See the footnote to p. 334 of Husserl's Formale und Transzendentale Logik, Husserliana, vol. 18, ed. Paul Janssen (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974).) G. E. Moore was the chairman at Husserl's fourth lecture on phenomenology at the University of London, held on June 12,1922. (See the facsimile of the announcement reproduced facing p. 155 of Spiegelberg's The Phenomenological Movement.) Max Scheler is known to have been particularly appreciative of Moore's ethical writings; see Scheler's Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, Gesammelte Werke, 6th rev. ed., vol. 2 (Bonn: BouvierVerlag, 1980) 13. For an accessible overview of the development of "Analytic" philosophy, see John Passmore's A Hundred Years of Philosophy. Passmore's account is both eminently readable and for the most part scrupulously accurate. Its main defect is its insistence upon viewing the history of British philosophy as a history of theoretical attitudes towards logic. Logicism can be defined as the position that mathematics, in some non-trivial sense, is wholly or partially reducible to logic. In brief: the British logician and philosopher Bertrand Russell (18721970) discovered a disastrous weakness in the logical derivation of the concepts of mathematics put forth by Frege. Russell, working

272


with his teacher and friend, the mathematician Alfred North Whitehead (1861-1947), produced a more robust derivation in the three volumes of Prindpia Mathematica, but the logician Kurt Godel (1906-1978) in turn discovered an equally disastrous weakness in the system of the Prindpia. Codel's arguments suggest that it is categorically impossible to execute a theoretically satisfying reduction of mathematics to logic. Insofar as there can be anything resembling a general consensus in philosophy, at the present time the consensus appears to be that the logicist programme is a definitive failure. The precise conceptual status of mathematics remains indeterminate, though many "analytic" philosophers, in practice, endorse the general ideology and emotional tenor of logicism. 16. A lecture given by Brentano at the University of Vienna in 1888-89 bore the title "Descriptive Psychology" and the subtitle "Descriptive Phenomenology" [Deskriptive Psychologic oder beschreibende Phanomenologie]. Brentano later employed the term "psychognosy." 17. Edmund Husserl, Philosophic der Arithmetik, Chapter VII: "Freges Versuch," Husserliana, vol. 12, ed. Lothar Eley (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff , 1970) 118-120. Husserl's remarks should be read in light of his remark in a footnote to § 45 on p. 172 of the Prolegomena zur reinen Logik, the first volume of the Logische Untersuchungen, Husserliana, vol. 18, ed. Elmar Holenstein (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975): "That I no longer esteem the prindpal criticism which I directed against Frege's antipsychologistic position in my Philosophic der Arithmetik, I hardly need to say." Note that Husserl only distances himself from his prindpal criticism of Frege, i.e., not from his reservations concerning Frege's general conception of how psychologism was to be countered and the form a true foundation of mathematics should take. 18. Some may disagree, but to me at least the first volume of Husserl's Logische Untersuchungen reads like a pastiche of Frege's style in the Grundlagen der Arithmetik. The exact relationship between Frege and Husserl is a matter of much scholarly dispute. A good introductory overview of the knownf acts can be found in J. N. Mohanty's "Husserl, Frege and the Overcoming of Psychologism," in The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy (Dordrecht/Boston/Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff, 1985) 1-11. Note, however, that Mohanty concludes that Frege's influence was not a decisive factor in Husserl's rejection of psychologism.

Notes

273

19. For an accessible introduction to this topic as well as to some attempted solutions, see Zeno's Paradoxes, ed. Wesley C. Salmon (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2001). 20. Accessible introductions to both philosophers can be found in Chapters 11 and 12 of Philosophy before Socrates by Richard D. McKirahan Jr. (Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994). 21. For a suggestive analysis of related issues see Husserl's treatment of time in Husserliana, vol. 10: Zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewufitseins, ed. Rudolf Boehm (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966). 22. Compare Gilbert Ryle's treatment of a related Zenonian paradox, "Achilles and the Tortoise/' in his lecture series Dilemmas (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). Ryle's account is influenced by the later Wittgenstein, but his method and style are as a whole highly compatible with a phenomenological approach. 23. It should be noted that this is a greatly simplified account of Husserl's methodology. In particular, I have blurred the distinction between the early and late Husserl for the sake of brevity and accessibility. 24. Husserl, Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophie, § 32, Husserliana, vol. 3, ed. Walter Biemel (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950) 65. 25. Compare the discussion in § 41 of Husserl's Cartesianische Meditationen, Husserliana, vol. 1,2nd ed., ed. S. Strasser (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963). Husserl even goes so far as to say that phenomenology is eo ipso "transcendental idealism/' though in a decisively new sense, it is "an idealism which is nothing further than a consistently executed self-analysis, in the form of a systematically egological science, of my Ego as the subject of every possible act of knowledge, and that with respect to every sense of existent things [Seiendem] in which they could possibly have a sense for me, the Ego/' Also compare the first sentence of § 30: "Objects exist for us, and are what they are for us, only as objects of real and possible consciousness [...]." 26. The exact nature of the intellectual relationship between Husserl and Heidegger is still largely a matter for scholarly conjecture. It is clear that Heidegger was never a student of Husserl's in any real sense, being, as Spiegelberg points out, "an established scholar in his own right, with a record of several publications, before he had ever met Husserl" in 1916 (The Phenomenological Movement, 276277). From 1919 to 1923 Heidegger "offered every semester courses and seminars in whose titles the word 'phenomenology' occurred."

274


This self-characterization ceased only after Heidegger took over Husserl's chair in the fall of 1928 as Husserl's designated successor (see The Phenomenological Movement, 275-283). 27. "Neuere Forschungen iiber Logik." Reprinted in Frtihe Schriften, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 1, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978) 17-43. Heidegger largely surveys the more traditional logical currents of his time, though he does comment on "logicism" and "symbolic logic" on p. 41-43. Unsurprisingly, Heidegger criticizes Russell and Whitehead along Husserlian lines, although his comments are in general very appreciative: "The systematic and comprehensive treatment of the problems of logicism appears to have made the most progress in Bertrand Russell. [...] The 'calculus of judgements/ of 'classes/ and of 'relations' treat of the fundamental logical concepts and functions. Through the proof that these and only these fundamental phenomena support the edifice of mathematics the identity of logic and mathematics is shown. With this theory, a new logical task of distinguishing the two disciplines has arisen. In the course of its solution one must, in my opinion, demonstrate above all that logicism does not at all manage to separate itself from mathematics and is incapable of penetrating to the truly logical problems. I see its limitation in the application of mathematical symbols and concepts (above all the concept of a function), through which the meanings and displacements of meaning of judgements are disguised. The deeper meaning of the principles remains in the dark [...]. Mathematics and the mathematical treatment of logical problems hit upon limits where their concepts and methods fail, namely right where the conditions of their possibility lie. "The work outlined here is still to be done, and it will not be over and done with as soon as was the overcoming of psychologism." 28. These two texts are respectively Die Lehre vom Urteil im Psychologismus: Ein kritisch-positiver Beitrag zur Logik (1913) and Die Kategorien- und Bedeutungslehre des Duns Scotus (1915), both published in Fruhe Schriften, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 1. A "Habilitationsschrift" is a postdoctoral thesis, a formal prerequisite for teaching at the university level in Germany. 29. Metaphysische Anfangsgrunde der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 26, ed. Klaus Held (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978). Footnote 3 on p. 36 reads in translation, "Logic as the foundation of Leibnizian metaphysics—thus B. Russel [sic]: A critical exposition of the philosophy of Leibniz, Cambridge 1900; thus the already mentioned book by L. Couturat: La logique de

Notes

30. 31. 32.

33.

34.

35.

36.

275

Leibniz, probably the most important work on Leibniz ever. The attempted refutation has not yet succeeded/' Note also the brief ontological criticism of functions towards the end of § 18 of Being and Time. See Heidegger's 1923 lecture Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizitat), Gesamtausgabe, vol. 63, ed. Kate Brocker-Oltmanns (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1988). Lebensphilosophie is a German catch-all term for turn of the century thinkers with an interest in the irrational, the unpredictable, and the concrete immediacy of human life. Bergson, Dilthey, and Spengler are all frequently characterized as Lebensphilosophen, as are sometimes Kierkegaard and Nietzsche. Schopenhauer is considered a forerunner of the movement. Heidegger's concern with life-philosophy is particularly reflected in the lecture Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie (1919/20), published as vol. 58 of the Gesamtausgabe, ed. Hans-Helmuth Gander (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1993). Hermeneutics proper began as a theory of Bible interpretation formulated by the theologian and philosopher Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834). In the course of time it has come to mean the general theory of interpretation. See for example Heidegger's "Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers 'Psychologic der Weltanschauungen/" republished in Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 9, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976) 1-44. Compare also the footnote in § 60, p. 301, of Sein und Zeit, where Heidegger gently emphasizes that the themes of Jaspers's book belong to "thematic existential anthropology" rather than to Heidegger's own fundamental ontology. Ronald Hayman reports that in 1926 Sartre was working on a collaborative translation of Jaspers' Allgemeine Psychopathologie (1913) with Paul-Yves Nizan. See p. 6 of his Sartre: A Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987). Note too that in his Questions de methode (1957) Sartre selects Jaspers as the representative of "existentialism," dismissing Heidegger with the comment "Le cas de Heidegger est trop complexe pour que je puisse 1'exposer ici," and speaking of Jaspers in terms that disguise the extent of Sartre's own intellectual dependence on Jaspers' reading of Heidegger: "L'apparition, dans 1'entre-deux-guerres, d'une existentialisme allemand correspond certainement—au moins chez Jaspers —a une sournoise volonte de ressusciter le transcendant. [...] Jaspers, lui, joue cartes sur table: il n'a rien fait d'autre que de commenter son maitre, son originalite

276

37.

38. 39. 40.

41. 42. 43. 44.


consiste surtout a mettre certain themes en relief et a en masquer d'autres." Questions de methode (Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1960) 23. Note Sartre's inability to distinguish between the very different philosophical approaches of Jaspers and Heidegger. On the relationship between Kierkegaard and Heidegger, see the appendix to Hubert L. Dreyfus' Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991). This terminology will be explained at length in Chapter 2. Some scholars have called attention to similarities between Spinoza's approach to Bible interpretation in the Tractatus Theologico-Politicus and hermeneutic methodology. Albert Einstein, "Physics and Reality," Journal of the Franklin Institute 221 (1936): "The greatest achievement of Newton's mechanics lies in the fact that its consistent application has led beyond [...] phenomenological representation, particularly in the field of heat phenomena." Quoted by Spiegelberg in The Phenomenological Movement, 10. It is a curious coincidence that the terms "pragmatism" and "pragmatic" should have suffered a similar fate. It is likely that this ambiguity was purposely introduced by Sartre; see Section 1.4. Spiegelberg reports that he overheard Husserl refer to Scheler's phenomenology as "fool's gold" at an informal student gathering (The Phenomenological Movement, 230). There appears to be some confusion in the secondary literature regarding the supervisor of Heidegger's doctoral thesis. In Passmore's A Hundred Years of Philosophy (476) we read, "Heidegger is quite innocent of science: he was trained, first as a Jesuit seminarian, then in an academic department of philosophy under the supervision of Heinrich Rickert." According to Walter Biemel, the supervisor of Heidegger's doctoral thesis was Arthur Schneider, while Rickert was the co-supervisor. See p. 152 of Biemel's Heidegger, Rororo Bildmonographien 200 (Hamburg: Rohwolt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1991). It was, however, Rickert to whom Heidegger submitted his Habilitationsschrift in 1915. (A Habilitation is an unsupervised postdoctoral thesis, a formal requirement for teaching at a German university.) Also see Riidiger Safranski, Ein Meister aus Deutschland: Heidegger und seine Zeit (Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1994) 64, 84. According to Safranski (54), Rickert belongs with the neo-Kantians Natorp and Cohen, since all three were concerned with reconciling modern physical science with the critical philosophy of Kant. Though

Notes

45.

46.

47.

48.

277

it is true that Rickert took no particular interest in Heidegger (84), I fail to see how training as a Jesuit seminarian and an association with Rickert in an academic department of philosophy necessarily entail "innocence of science/' For details on Sartre's connection with Kuki see Stephen Light, Shuzo Kuki and Jean-Paul Sartre (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987), particularly the detailed discussion of Sartre's relationship to Heidegger via Kuki on p. 27. Sartre spent time in Germany during the period 1933-39, although he apparently did not visit Heidegger until 1952. It is reasonably certain that Kuki spoke of Sartre to Heidegger, though some sources, including Simone de Beauvoir, have denied the existence of a letter of introduction. The fictional setting of the dialogue is some years after Kuki's death, though it is relatively certain that the dialogue with the unnamed "Japanese" is based on Heidegger's conversations with Kuki. Also see the section on Kuki in the Sourcebook for Modern Japanese Philosophy, trans, and ed. David A. Dilworth and Valdo H. Viglielmo, with Agustin Jacinto Zavala (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998). The Kyoto School is the most influential stream in 20th century Japanese philosophy. Its three most important members are Nishida Kitaro (1870-1945), Tanabe Hajime (1885-1962), and Nishitani Keiji (1900-1990). Broadly speaking, their highly original works are an attempt to integrate Japanese Zen Buddhism with German Idealism and phenomenology. The Kyoto School as a whole has, in my opinion, received far less attention in the West than it deserves. Much of their work remains unavailable in translation. See Spiegelberg's The Phenomenological Movement, vol. 2, 558: "It is probably safe to say that without Merleau-Ponty, and particularly without his Phenomenologie de la perception, phenomenology would have longer remained a mere tool of existentialism, as it has increasingly become in the hands of Sartre. On a more tangible level, without Merleau-Ponty and without his academic presence phenomenology would hardly have achieved so early the prestige which he has secured for it by his own spectacular career."

CHAPTER 2 1.

Unlike some scholars, I consider the characterization of the Con tribu tions to Philosophy as a second main work a vast exaggeration. The Contributions are obviously a sort of philosophical journal

278

2.

3. 4.

5. 6.

7.

8.


containing much of the half-thought and unfinished material that Heidegger apparently detested seeing in print. As interesting as they may be, I have failed to find anything of significance in them that is not better expressed in the works Heidegger published during his lifetime. This is perhaps the result of a personal bias, as I am largely unsympathetic to Heidegger's later philosophy; but compare Theodore Kisiel's vitriolic article "Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe: An International Scandal of Scholarship/7 Philosophy Today 39 (1995): 3-15. It does, however, bear a striking resemblance to the Kantian project of searching for " conditions of the possibility of experience/' that is, of identifying fundamental structures or "categories" (in Heideggerian terms: "existentials") that influence and shape all human activity, including and in particular perception. The introduction of our new terminology now permits a more exact rendering of this characteristic of Heidegger's phenomenology. Note that in Being and Time Heidegger uses Dasein in two senses. In the loose sense, Dasein denotes the self, or an entity characterized by selfhood; in the strict sense, Dasein refers to the entire structure of being-in-the-world, that is, the world, the self, and being-in. This is a fundamental point that must be kept in mind throughout the further course of this commentary. Compare the more sophisticated and nuanced characterization in Section 2.10 b). Compare the account of "pure being" in Chapter 2 of Leslie Armour's seminal work Logic and Reality: An Investigation into the Idea of a Dialectical System (Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum & Comp. N.V., 1972). Within the framework of his fundamentally Hegelian undertaking Armour discusses the logical and ontological implications of a similar concept of being in illuminating detail. See especially Section iii. Heidegger's use of the "horizon" metaphor is ultimately derived from Husserl; see for example § 27 of the Ideen. In this section Husserl notes that the consciousness of an object is always associated with a "surrounding ring" [Umring] of other objects. This surrounding ring is "partly shot through, partly surrounded by a vaguely conscious [dunkel bewufiter] horizon of indeterminate reality." It is, in other words, the "fringe" of one's perceptual field into which conscious awareness gradually fades. Compare Being and Time § 43 a), p. 207-208: "It is only because Being is 'in consciousness/ that is, understandable in Dasein, that Dasein can also understand and conceptualize being-characteristics

Notes

279

such as independence, 'in itselfness/ and reality in general. Only for this reason are 'independent' entities purviewedly [umsichtig] accessible as things happened upon intramundanely." For the sake of intelligibility I have had to "paint the devil black" in this somewhat oversimplified example. Note that for Heidegger, this particular direction of understanding Being is not characteristic of the physical sciences. Our example merely involves an extreme form of the understanding of Being as constant presence [sta'ndige Anwesenheit], which for Heidegger is precisely the traditional metaphysical understanding of the Being of entities, and thus common to all traditional Western philosophy. For Heidegger, science is simply applied metaphysics. 9. In support of Heidegger's claim, compare Abraham Maslow's "Education and Peak Experiences" in The farther Reaches of Human Nature, Chapter 12 (New York: Penguin Compass, 1993) 171-172: "The picture of the scientist must change, and is giving way to an understanding of the creative scientist, and the creative scientist lives by peak experiences. He lives for the moments of glory when a problem solves itself, when suddenly through a microscope he sees things in a very different way, the moments of revelation, of illumination, insight, understanding, ecstasy. These are vital for him. Scientists are very, very shy and embarrassed about this. They refuse to talk about this in public. It takes a very, very delicate kind of a midwifery to get these things out, but I have gotten them out. They are there, and if one can manage to convince a creative scientist that he is not going to be laughed at for these things, then he will blushingly admit the fact of having a high emotional experience from, for example, the moment in which the crucial correlation comes out right. They just don't talk about it, and as for the usual textbook on how you do science, it is total nonsense." 10. Compare Being and Time § 2, p. 6, where Heidegger explains that Being is "that which determines entities as entities, that with a view to which [woraufhin] entities, however they are explained, are already understood. The Being of entities 'is' not itself an entity." 11. From La logique de Leibniz d 'apres les documen ts inedits by Louis Couturat (Hildesheim, Germany: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1961), 189: "Leibniz etablit entre les definitions nominales et reelles une difference qui n'est guere conforme a 1'usage ni a 1'etymologic, mais qui a une importance capitale dans sa theorie de la connaissance. Une definition est nominate quand elle indique certains caracteres distinctif s de la chose definie, de maniere a permettre de la discerner de toute autre [in Aristotelian terms: the specification of a proprium];

280


mais une definition n'est reelle que si elle manifeste la possibilite ou 1'existence de la chose. C'est cette derniere seule que Leibniz considere comme parfaite et adequate." 12. For an explanation of the capitalization of " Being/' see the entries on "Being/' "Being-in-the-world/' and "Entity" in Appendix A. 13. Compare Being and Time § 2, p. 6: "The inquiry [das Gefragte] of the question to be worked out is Being, that which determines entities as entities, that with respect to which [woraufhin] entities, however they are explained, are always already understood. The Being of entities 'is' not itself an entity. The first philosophical step in the comprehension of the problem of Being is [...] not to determine entities as entities in their origin by leading them back to another entity, just as if Being had the character of a possible entity." 14. Note the title of the Second Chapter of the Introduction to Being and Time: "The Twofold Task in Working Out the Question of Being. The Method of the Investigation and Its Outline." 15. Heidegger uses the term Diskrimen, a Germanized form of the Latin discrimen, which can mean "dividing line," "difference," "distinction," "decisive moment," "turning point," and "danger" or "extreme danger." The incorporation of these secondary meanings is almost certainly deliberate, particularly in light of Heidegger's later interpretation of the history of Being. Compare the MacquarrieRobinson translation: "Aristotle's essay on time, as providing a way of discriminating the phenomenal basis and the limits of ancient ontology." 16. For a detailed explanation see the entry on "Timeliness" in Appendix A. 17. See Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie, 3rd ed., Gesamtausgabe, vol. 24, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997) 429, § 21. In a marginal note to the 1929 edition of "Vom Wesen des Grundes," Heidegger remarks, "and this [Zeitlichkeit] is only [possible] in time as temporality [Temporalitat]." See p. 171 of Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 9, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976), Note A. 18. See Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie p. 1, Footnote 1: "New working out of the 3rd section of the 1st part of 'Being and Time/" The importance of this lecture is confirmed by a marginal note to the article "Vom Wesen des Grundes," reprinted in Wegmarken, p. 134, Note B. 19. Immanuel Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996) 187-194 (B176/A137-B187/ A148).

Notes

281

20. As we shall see, in § 7 Heidegger has yet another surprise in store for us: § 7 is incomplete without the analysis of understanding and interpretation in §§ 31-32 and the scattered remarks on methodology throughout §§ 61-69. 21. Also see the programmatic list of questions given by Heidegger for Section Three of Part One in § 21, p. 100. 22. The term "deconstruction," corresponding to the German Abbau, would be an apposite literal rendition of Heidegger's use of the term " destruction/' had it not already been appropriated by another, quite different, philosophical school. 23. I have had to make an educated guess at the temporal significance of Descartes' philosophy for Heidegger. In § 6 Heidegger introduces the discussion of Descartes with the remark that Kant dogmatically takes over Descartes' position with respect to the subjectivity of the subject, and that for Kant the connection between time and the "I think" remains completely obscure. See Sein und Zeit § 6, last indented paragraph, p. 23 (continuing on to p. 24). 24. Some stylists unacquainted with the grammar of languages other than English believe that the "passive" voice should be avoided in good style as it makes one's writing sound "passive"—clear evidence of the philosophical perils of failing to clearly distinguish between several meanings of the same word. 25. By "thing" I do not necessarily mean "physical object" or an "entity" in the Heideggerian sense. I am using "thing" to avoid repeated uses of the locution "that which," which sounds particularly clumsy in English (though not in German). 26. See Sein und Zeit § 7 C. 27. Of course, if we want to be completely consistent, they are not yet phenomena until we have actually succeeded in bringing them to light. I am following Heidegger's way of speaking. 28. § 7 C, p. 37. For a more detailed discussion of these points, and in particular of the manner in which phenomena can be obscured, see my article "The Phenomenon-Concept in Being and Time and Its Meaning for Hermeneutic Phenomenology" (unpublished paper, Department of Philosophy, Dominican University College, Ottawa, n.d.). The limited scope of this chapter makes it impossible to address such fine-grained terminological distinctions here. 29. Compare § 7 B, p. 32: "The logos lets something be seen (phainesthai), namely that being talked about, and that for the talker (middle voice) and/or for those talking with each other." 30. See Section II d) of my article "The Phenomenon-Concept in Being and Time and Its Meaning for Hermeneutic Phenomenology."

282


31. Compare, however, Section 2.6 for more technical details on logos as talk. 32. §7 B, p. 34: "Und weil die Funktion des logos im schlichten Sehenlassen von etwas liegt, im Vernehmenlassen des Seienden, kann logos Vernunft bedeuten." (I have abbreviated this quote somewhat in the main text for the sake of stylistic fluidity.)" Vernehmenlassen" has a similar double sense as "Sehenlassen" based on whether its object is a thing or a person. The verb "vernehmen" is notoriously difficult to render in English. Its literal meaning is "to find out by hearing"; in a more general sense, it can also mean "to find out" or "to perceive." 33. For a more detailed and technical explanation, see Section 2.6 c). 34. Compare as well the discussion of hermeneutics in the dialogue "Aus einem Gesprach von der Sprache: Zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden" in Unterwegs zur Sprache, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 12, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985) 79-146. The remarks on the necessary complementarity of hermeneutics and criticism in connection with an explicit reference to Schleiermacher on p. 92 are particularly worthy of attention. 35. § 7 C, p. 37: "Now insofar as, however, by discovering the sense of Being and of the fundamental structures of Dasein, the horizon is at all set forth [herausgestellt] for every further ontological investigation of non-Dasein-like entities, this hermeneutics is simultaneously 'hermeneutics' in the sense of the working out of the conditions of the possibility of any ontological investigation." 36. Heidegger tells us in § 63, p. 311, that in Being and Time prepossession is the primeval structure of Dasein, that is, its authentic ability to be whole; preview is the idea of existence; and preconception is the existentiality of Dasein. 37. Not two, as early commentators tended to believe. 38. § 9, p. 42-43: "The two being-modes of authenticity and inauthenticity [...] are founded [in the fact] that Dasein is in general determined by evermineness." §9, p. 43: "At the beginning of the analysis, Dasein shall not be interpreted in the difference of a particular [act of] existence, but rather brought forth [aufgedeckt] in its indifferent First and Foremost [Zunachst und Zumeisi]. [...] We will call this everyday indifference [i.e., non-differentiated mode] of Dasein averageness." § 12, p. 53: "To existing Dasein belongs evermineness as the condition of the possibility of authenticity and inauthenticity. Dasein always exists in one of these modes [Modi], or in the modal indifference of both." Also see § 45, p. 232: "As ever mine, however, being-ability is free for authenticity or inauthenticity or their modal

Notes

39.

40. 41.

42.

43.

283

indifference/7 Heidegger's own note to this sentence refers back to § 9, p. 41 ff. § 40, p. 190: " [...] being-in-the-world according to all its constitutive moments (world, being-in, self)." It may be helpful to briefly contrast being-in with the concept of intentionality. According to Franz Brentano, " intentionality" is the quality of being directed towards an object. Intentionality is a fundamental characteristic of mental states; states that lack this quality of directedness are physical states. Brentano, in selecting this term, was reviving an old Scholastic term derived from the Latin verb intendere, literally meaning "to stretch out towards/7 He also refers to the presence of an object within an act of perception as its Inexistenz, literally its "inexistence" or "being-in/7 Heidegger's selection of the term "beingin77 is perhaps meant to communicate to the reader, by playing on the literal meaning of the term, that intentionality is an inadequate and incorrect characterization of Dasein. Compare Heidegger's comments on the meaning of in and sein in § 12, p. 54 ff. Macquarrie and Robinson render this term into English as "concern77; see the remarks under "Concernedness77 in Appendix A. Stambaugh translates both Wozu and Dazu as what-for, blurring the distinction between the two. Heidegger uses the term Dazu relatively infrequently in comparison with Wozu and the distinction is subtle, but I think it is worth preserving. Compare, for example, § 16, p. 74 (fourth indented paragraph): "A tool is unusable —that implies: the constitutive reference of the in-order-to [Um-zu] to a for-that [Dazu] has been disturbed/7 Also see the first sentence of §69 c), p. 364: "The [...] understanding of a connection-whole is based on [grundet in] a preliminary understanding of the in-order-to [Um-zu], what-for [Wozu], for-that [Dazu], and purpose [Um-willen] relations/7 See §43 c), p. 212, where Heidegger refers to the "dependence of Being, not of entities, from the understanding of Being [Seinsverstandnis], that is, the dependence of reality, not of the real, on concern/7 Note that Heidegger is using the word "real77 in its literal etymological sense, namely "pertaining to a res," a "thing/7 The point is that the "existence77 or "givenness77 of Being is indeed dependent on Dasein, whereas the "existence77 or "givenness77 of things is not. Compare Section 2.10 b) of the present work for a more detailed discussion of this topic. I am here using "conspicuous77 in its everyday, non-technical sense.

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44. Note that Heidegger thinks this a fundamentally inauthentic comportment; see, for example, § 39, p. 181: "But the self is first and foremost inauthentic, the one-self/' In this connection it is also important to review § 40, for example p. 184: "The dissolution [Aufgehen] in the one and among the concerned [besorgt] 'world' reveals something very much like a flight of Dasein from itself as an authentic self-being-ability [Selbst-sein-konnen]." 45. This is a paraphrase of the definition Heidegger gives at the end of the first indented paragraph on p. 86 of Sein und Zeit, § 18. 46. Rather inconveniently, if typically, Heidegger makes the reader wait until § 68 d), p. 349, for anything resembling a definition of this term: "The full disclosedness of the There [des Da], constituted by understanding, sensibility, and falling, receives articulation through talk/7 Also see the discussion of "Talk" in Appendix A. 47. See the last indented paragraph of Sein und Zeit, % 18 p. 87. 48. Compare Sein und Zeit § 18, p. 87-88. 49. Great care must be taken to avoid a confusion that is easily suggested by Heidegger's terminology. The "genus" concept (for lack of a better word) is "entities," that is, whatever is "in" the world. If an entity is "in" the world in the manner of existence within the world, then it is Dasein. If, however, this entity is "in" the world in the sense that it is discoverable within connection-wholes, then it is an intramundane entity, or a non-Dasein-like [nichtdaseinsmaflig] entity. The distinction is further complicated by the fact that Dasein has a unique relationship to an existent that, strictly speaking, is intramundane, namely its own body, but whose intramundane character does not fully emerge within the meaningfulness-wholes of the worldliness of the world until actual physical death. 50. Refer to Appendix A for a brief discussion and clarification of the meaning of this phrase. 51. Heidegger himself never uses Dasein in the plural, preferring instead to refer to "others" [die Anderen], or "the Other" [der Andere]. Occasionally he will also refer to Mitdasein or use locutions that imply the existence of others who are also Dasein, such as in § 47, where he speaks of die Vertretbarkeit des einen Daseins durch ein anderes. However, since it is unambiguously clear from § 26 that Heidegger believes that there are indeed others who share our world with us, and that these others, like ourselves, all have the character of Dasein, there is no reason not to invent an English plural form of Dasein both in order to emphasize this point and to avoid clumsy locutions such as "the others, who also evince [zeigen] the character

Notes

52. 53.

54.

55.

56.

57. 58.

285

of being-there-with [Mitdasein]." Note, however, that strictly speaking Dasein is the whole of being-in-the-world. The self is only one of the three structures; the world as such is common. Curiously, Heidegger himself uses Dasein in an essentially ambiguous manner: sometimes he means the whole structure of being-in-the-world, of which the self is a constituent phenomenon, and sometimes he uses Dasein loosely as a synonym for the self taken on its own—see, for example, § 47, p. 239, second line of the third indented paragraph. Compare § 49 of Husserl's Cartesianische Meditationen, Husserliana, vol. 1,2nd ed., ed. S. Strasser (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963). No doubt this would have been the theme of Section Two of Part Two of Being and Time had Heidegger gotten that far; compare Section 2.3 for details on the intended structure of Being and Time as a whole. Note that Heidegger uses the term "being-with" [Mitsein] to refer to the comportment in which others are met with as Dasein and the term Mitdasein to refer to these others. Keeping this in mind helps clear up many initially puzzling locutions in § 26, such as p. 121: "The being-character of concernedness cannot belong to being-with [Mitsein], although this being-manner is a being unto [Sein zu] entities which we happen upon intramundanely, as is concernedness." This simply means "our comportment towards others does not have the character of our comportments towards tools/7 For a detailed list of the six characteristics of everyday interaction with others see § 27, p. 127-128, in particular the second indented paragraph on p. 128. A detailed examination of these characteristics is largely irrelevant to the present discussion. I have borrowed the adjective "catgoreal" in the sense of "pertaining to categories" from Alfred North Whitehead, who introduces the term in his Process and Reality in order to prevent confusion with "categorical" in the sense of "universally applicable" or "true of all cases." It cannot be stressed enough that the use of the adjective "existential" by Heidegger parallels this use of "categoreal." "Existential" means "pertaining to inherent and essential structural features of Dasein." It does not mean "pertaining to the human condition." Compare Heidegger's etymological observations concerning the original meanings of in and sein, in § 12, p. 54. Note that sensibility is the structure of the "situation" (in a nontechnical sense as such); not a "feeling" that "creates" a state of affairs. This point is discussed in more detail in connection with angst in Section 2.8. Also see § 29, p. 136: "Moods [die Stimmung]

286

59.

60. 61. 62.

63. 64.

65.

66.

67. 68.


come over us. They come neither from 'inside' nor from 'outside/ but rather, as a manner of being-in-the-world, ascend out of [beingin-the-world] itself/' § 29, p. 135. Also compare the analysis of Neigung and Geneigtheit ("inclination" and "inclinedness") in Phanomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einfuhrung in die Phanomenologische Forschung, ed. Walter Brocker und Kate Brocker-Oltmanns (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985) 100-105. This is a superficial example of a superficial sensibility. The example of marriage discussed in Section 2.8 is more satisfactory; I have included this example only for the sake of initial accessibility. § 35, p. 170, first three lines. "Dafi es ist und zu sein hat," Being and Time § 29, p. 134. Literally the phrase means "that it is and has to be," but the verb haben used with an infinitive has a slightly different meaning in German. Ich habe zu arbeiten means "I have work to do," not "I have to (i.e., must) work." In German ist ("is") can be used as equivalent to "exists." Compare §68 b), p. 340: "[...] the fundamental existential character of moods is a bringing back to ..."r that is, the discovery of entities within the world as already there and already determined in their possible uses. The connection between sensibility and thrownness will be further clarified in Section 2.8. It is very difficult to give examples of the difference between authentic and inauthentic actions, especially without the guidance of any specific examples given by Heidegger in Being and Time. My own suggestion is that the statement "you should get a university education to get a good job" would probably, if sincerely acted on, be based upon an inauthentic act of understanding, since the emphasis is not on the beneficial effects of education on Dasein as such but on the increased capacity for the manipulation of tools (in Heidegger's technical sense of the word). Note that for Heidegger a single act of interpretation can be as brief as glancing at a hammer and picking it up or as long and elaborate as writing an exhaustive academic commentary on a major work. It is the structure of the act that determines whether or not it is an instance of interpretation. Compare § 32, p. 150. The idea is that Dasein always understands itself beginning with something "outside" of itself, and returns to itself as something to be understood after it has understood its world. Freud puts it more simply: the infant initially has no self-knowledge, and learns

Notes

69. 70. 71. 72.

73.

74.

75.

287

to understand itself by listening to its parents' judgement of its behaviour and emotional states. "Aus einem Gesprach von der Sprache: Zwischen einem Japaner und einem Fragenden," Unterwegs zur Sprache, 130. § 34, p. 161, second sentence of first indented paragraph. For further details refer to the entry under "Meaningfulness" in Appendix A; also see the definition towards the end of § 69 c) in Being and Time. Compare § 35, p. 167-168: "Talk, for the most part, expresses itself [spricht sich zumeist aus] and has always already expressed itself. It is language. However, understanding and interpretation then already lie in the expressed [im Ausgesprochenen]. Language as expressedness [Ausgesprochenheit] harbours [birgt] aninterpretedness [Ausgelegtheit] of Dasein-understanding [des Daseinsverstandnisses] in itself. This interpretedness is as little simply just at-handed as language itself; rather, its being is itself of the nature of Dasein. Dasein is firstly and within certain limits constantly delivered over to it; it regulates and distributes the possibilities of average understanding and the sensibility that belongs to it. Expressedness preserves [verwahrt], in the entirety of its structured meaning-contexts, an understanding of the disclosed world and coevally with this an understanding of the Dasein-with [des Mitdaseins] of others and of the beingin that is in each case one's own. The understanding that has thus been left behind in expressedness involves [betrifft] both the respectively attained and received [uberkommene] discoveredness of entities as well as the respective understanding of being and the available possibilities and horizons for innovative [neuansetzende] interpretation and conceptual articulation/' Note that this leads to the arrangement: tool-wholes (interpretation); connection-wholes (understanding); meaning-wholes (talk). Toolwholes are thus interpreted connection-wholes; connection-wholes are understood meaning-wholes; and meaning-wholes are references structured by talk. Heidegger works backwards in the world analysis from the most "finished" product to the original existential "ground of its possibility" — a thoroughly Kantian movement. It is this conception of talk that allows Heidegger to say on p. 16 of his Einfuhrung in die Metaphysik, (Gesamtausgabe, vol. 40, ed. Petra Jaeger [Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983]), "It is in the word, in language, that things first come to be and are." It is, of course, to the conscience that Heidegger is referring when in § 34, p. 163, he mentions "the voice of the friend which each Dasein carries with itself."

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76. § 28, p. 133: "Sensibility and understanding are coevally determined through talk." 77. I have put "true" and "false" in quotation marks because truth and falsity have a special technical meaning in Being and Time, as we shall see in Section 2.10. 78. § 37, p. 173. "Looks" is being used in a non-technical sense here. The German I have translated as "at bottom" is im Grunde. 79. Heidegger's comments in § 37 appear to be directed against the contemporary political scene. I am not entirely certain whether a definite political direction is being subjected to criticism or whether Heidegger is merely criticizing political discourse as such. A deeper analysis of the meaning of these remarks is unfortunately beyond the scope of the present work. 80. See §38, p. 179: "Turmoil also reveals the thrown and moved character [den Wurf- und Bewegtheitscharakter] of thrownness, which can force itself upon Dasein itself in sensibility." Note that in German, bewegt (moved) has the same literal meaning (change of position) and metaphorical meaning (being emotionally stirred) as in English. 81. Note the use of the term Bewegtheit on p. 178 of Sein und Zeit to refer to the Absturz. Heidegger uses Bewegtheit in § 38 as a synonym for Befindlichkeit (" sensibility"). 82. § 38, p. 179. The reference is to the book Die Tagesansicht gegenuber der Nachtansicht by Gustav Theodor Fechner. The book is an early treatment of the problem of science [die Nachtansicht, "the nighttime view"] and the everyday world [die Tagesansicht, "the daytime view"]. 83. Two otherwise well-written commentaries that fail, in my view, to properly articulate the line of thought through which Heidegger introduces angst into Being and Time are Michael Gelven's A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, rev. ed. (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989) and Stephen Mulhall's Heidegger and Being and Time (Routledge Philosophy GuideBooks [London: Routledge, 1996]). Gelven introduces the topic of angst with the words, "Within the experience of most reflective and serious people can be found instances of a weird and uncanny feeling, in which the whole familiar world seems to lose its normal significance" (p. 114). Mulhall's line of argument is that angst merely happens to be a "state-of-mind" that is particularly suited to clearing up the philosophical problems at this juncture of Being and Time: "As a mode of existence, it forces inauthentic everyday Dasein to confront the true structure of its existence; and as an object of

Notes

84. 85. 86.

87. 88.

89.

289

phenomenological analysis, it gives us access to a single unifying articulation of Dasein's Being" (p. 109). I will use the locution "angst is anxious" as an equivalent for Heidegger's die Angst angstet sich. Friends of Eastern philosophy will recognize the similarity of angst in the Heideggerian sense to the concepts of duality and dukkha. Heidegger also uses the term in opposition to being-in; compare § 12, where, with reference to Jakob Grimm, Heidegger points out that the German preposition "in" is derived from a verb originally meaning "to dwell" or "to settle." Even inauthenticity will ultimately turn out to be a choice of Dasein, as we shall see in Section 3.3. Heidegger's own lack of clarity on this point has led some interpreters to speak of a "disappearance" and "reappearance" of talk from the structure of concern. To my knowledge this error was first made by W. M. Miiller-Lauter in Moglichkeit und Wirklichkeit bei Martin Heidegger (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1960) p. 54 and further propagated by, among others, Otto Poggeler in Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers (Pfullingen, Germany: Verlag Giinther Neske, 1963) p. 210, Christina Lafont in Sprache und Welterschliefiung: Zur linguistischen Wende der Hermeneutik Heideggers (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1994) p. 114 and elsewhere, and Georg W. Bertram ("Das Denken der Sprache in Heideggers Sein und Zeit," Allgemeine Zeitschrift fur Philosophie 26.3 [2001]: 183). Also see the exhaustive list of authors who share this mistake in Tomy S. Kalariparambirs dissertation Das befindliche Verstehen und die Seinsfrage. Philosophische Schriften Band 29 (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999) p. 304, Footnote 56. For my argument against this position see in particular Footnote 7 in Section 3.2 of the present work. Some of the comments Heidegger makes in passing in §§ 43-44 do tend to give the impression that he believes comportments towards intramundane entities to be necessarily inauthentic, but I think they have to be interpreted in the light of remarks such as the following in § 44 b), p. 223: "The existential-ontological condition for the fact that being-in-the-world is determined by 'truth' and 'untruth' lies in that being-constitution of Dasein which we characterized as the thrown plan. It is a constitutive feature of the structure of concern." In other words, truth and untruth are essential and ineradicable features of Dasein. They cannot be completely eliminated from Dasein's structure. Accordingly, neither can falling to the world, and so neither can comportments towards intramundane entities.

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90. It is worth noting that the expressions "disclosedness" and "discoveredness" are terms that Heidegger uses to avoid the misleading connotations of "existence/' In everyday English we would speak of the "existence" of an object where Heidegger speaks of the "discoveredness" of entities, or the "existence" of a person where Heidegger speaks of the "disclosedness" of Dasein. Heidegger generally avoids the term "existence" altogether, preferring "existentiality" when referring to the ability of Dasein to understand itself as having to choose between various possibilities of comporting itself towards the world. In speaking of the disclosedness of Dasein, Heidegger essentially means, in plain English, "the fact that Dasein 'exists' at all, i.e., the fact that it is there, not nothing, able to live, move, understand, and act, etc." Obviously all other comportments are dependent upon the most basic comportment by virtue of which Dasein can comport itself at all. 91. In light of these considerations we should note Heidegger's use of the expression ''the fundamental articulation in Being" in the lecture Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie, originally held in 1927, the same year in which Being and Time was published. The "fundamental articulation [Grundartikulation] in Being" is Heidegger's expression for the difference between the "content-filledness" [Sachhaltigkeit] and the "manner of being" [Seinsart] of entities (corresponding to the difference between "essence" and "existence" in the traditional sense). Perhaps the use of the term "articulation" is meant to refer to the activity of talk as it is defined in § 34 of Being and Time. See Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie, p. 321. 92. The question of the link between untruth, error, and disclosedness is too complex to be discussed in a more then cursory fashion within the scope of this chapter. 93. Compare "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit," in Wegmarken, p. 185: "If, however, it is only through this openstandingness [Offenstandigkeit] of comportment that the correctness (truth) of statements is possible, then that which makes correctness possible in the first place has a more primeval right to count as the essence [Wesen] of truth." 94. Compare § 44 b), p. 223. 95. In the technical meaning of the term; see Section 2.6 b). 96. It would be interesting, in a different context, to compare the apparently limitless creative powers attributed to "chance" by some contemporary biologists with those formerly attributed to the Greek deities Chaos and Tyche. See, for example, E. R. Dodds' The

Notes

291

Greeks and the Irrational (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951) 242: "When the old gods withdraw, the empty thrones cry out for a successor, and with good management, or even without management, almost any perishable bag of bones may be hoisted into the vacant seat. So far as they have religious meaning for the individual, ruler-cult and its analogues, ancient and modern, are primarily, I take it, expressions of helpless dependence [...]. It was, I think, a related sentiment that gave rise to another characteristic feature of the Early Hellenistic Age, the wide diffusion of the cult of Tyche, 'Luck' or 'Fortune/ Such a cult is, as Nilsson has said, 'the last stage in the secularising of religion'; in default of any positive object, the sentiment of dependence attaches itself to the purely negative idea of the unexplained and unpredictable, which is Tyche." (The italics are mine.) Note that I am not criticizing the theory of evolution as such, which may very well be the literal truth. But I am very interested in the role that the theory of evolution plays in the contemporary psychological economy, for lack of a better phrase. It is quite possible to exploit the literal truth for psychological ends that are alien to it qua mere fact. 97. In German, a "thing in itself is a Ding an sich. Note Heidegger's use of ihm in the phrase Seiendes an ihm selbst (literally something like "in it itself," since Heidegger is using the non-reflexive form of the personal pronoun) in order to distinguish his own concept of "entities in themselves" from the Kantian "things in themselves." The key phrase in the citation is ambiguous in the original German. In my opinion, the sense of the passage is not that Newton's laws provided access to entities as they are in themselves, but that through the discovery of Newton's laws entities, inaccessible in themselves, became accessible through the conceptual framework these laws provided. 98. For more details on the "Kantian overlay and impetus" of Being and Time see Theodore Kisiel's The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1993), in particular 408-416. 99. Heidegger himself appears to have felt a degree of uncertainty with respect to this point. Compare Beitrage zur Philosophic, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 65, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994) 217: "[...] strictly speaking one cannot speak of a transcendence of Da-sein; within the sphere of this approach the representation of "transcendence" in every sense must disappear."

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CHAPTER 3 1.

2.

3.

4. 5. 6. 7.

Heidegger makes the same point in a rather more inaccessible fashion in § 2 of Being and Time and then attempts to buttress his argument in §§ 3-4 with a variety of observations that do not concern us here. The same essential argument is repeated in several places throughout Being and Time. Thus in § 2, p. 7, we are told that "working out the question of Being accordingly means: making an entity—the one that asks the question—transparent in its being/' while in § 63, p. 316, Heidegger asserts, "But if there 'is' only Being insofar as there 'is' truth [...] then the primeval and authentic [eigentlich] truth must be guaranteed by the understanding of the being of Dasein and of being in general [des Seins uberhaupt]." See the very complete discussion of the problem of the transition from Section One to Section Two of Being and Time in Gelven's A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, rev. ed. (DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989) 136-140. I, for one, do not think that he succeeds. Moreover, I think that expecting philosophy to do the work of psychological therapy is unjust to both disciplines. It is also very likely to be hazardous to one's health. The point of the identification of existence with the experience of time will be more obvious after the discussion of Heidegger's theory of timeliness in Section 3.5. Compare Heidegger's own enumeration of these points, whose terminology I have somewhat simplified, in § 48, p. 242. For a partial list see Section 2.9, Footnote 88. Note too that in some sections, for example § 54, p. 269, Heidegger refers to the structure of concern as the structure of the disclosedness of Dasein. Here its constitutive elements are given as sensibility, understanding, falling, and talk. Compare § 68, p. 335, where he refers to understanding, sensibility, falling, and talk as the "structural moments" [Striikturmomente] of concern. In § 67, p. 334335, Heidegger refers to understanding, sensibility, falling, and talk as the constitutive structures of disclosedness. Just a few paragraphs further on in § 68, p. 335, Heidegger calls the same four structures the "structural moments" [Strukturmomente] of concern. In § 64, p. 316, Heidegger refers to the constitutive structures of concern as existentiality, facticity, and "fallenness" [Verfallenheit], this time leaving out talk, presumably since it can be taken for granted that it permeates the entire structure of concern. In § 74, p. 383, Heidegger refers to thrownness as a "fundamental determination"

Notes

8. 9.

10. 11.

12.

13. 14. 15. 16.

17.

293

[Grundbestimmtheit] of concern. Similar inconsistencies occur throughout Being and Time thanks to Heidegger's rather loose adherence to his own terminological conventions. I hope, however, that I have succeeded in convincing the reader that these terminological inconsistencies are not to be confused with conceptual inconsistencies. The entire sentence is italicized in the original; the phrase I have italicized is both italicized and in spaced type. I have satisfied myself with rendering the essential conceptual distinctions between the four meanings into English. Heidegger's own locutions for the four meanings are, respectively, Schulden haben, schuld sein an, sich schuldig machen or Schuldhaben an, and Schuldigwerden an anderen. This is one of the main reasons I object to Heidegger's later decision to shift the blame for technology away from individual Dasein and onto ancient Greek ontology and even onto Being itself. Presumably talk functions as the authentic mode of being-among in authentic Dasein. Yet Heidegger is not explicit on this point, and I hesitate to put it forth as a definite interpretation of the text. Compare Section 3.6 on timeliness, talk, and authenticity. That forerunning is the authentic mode of being unto death is easy to miss thanks to the baroque complexity of Heidegger's treatment of death. Typically, the point is stated clearly in a context in which one would least expect it: see the second sentence of § 61, p. 301-302. We will use the adjective "timely" as a translation of zeitlich, usually translated "temporal." In Heidegger's usage the term means "pertaining to the structure of timeliness." See, for example, his "Brief iiber den 'Humanismus/ " in Wegmarken, Gesamtausgabe, vol. 9, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976) 313-364. I am indebted to my doctoral thesis supervisor, Prof. Dr. F.-W. von Herrmann, for this particular line of argument. I have transliterated aletheia into Roman letters for the sake of accessibility. Aletheia is a Greek compound consisting of the prefix a-, which corresponds to the English "un-," and the root lethe, "forgetting" or "forgetfulness," followed by the suffix -ia, corresponding to the English "-ness." The literal meaning of the word is thus something along the lines of "unforgottenness," though it is usually translated as "truth." Heidegger typically renders the word into German as Unverborgenheit, literally "unconcealedness." Compare also § 62, p. 307-308, which I have not quoted at length here so as to avoid belaboring the point. In brief: authenticity

294

18. 19. 20.

21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26.

27.

28.

29.


implies that one is always ready to withdraw one's decisions in the event that the decision should later turn out to have been motivated by inauthenticity. Authentic decided Dasein must constantly hold itself ready for the possibility of authentically being whole. The possibility of inauthenticity cannot be abolished, but it can be intelligently " managed/' But compare Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (London and New York: Routledge, 1990) Section 6.43. To the ultimate detriment of his later philosophy, in my opinion. Compare § 65, p. 325: "Existing, [Dasein] understands itself, but in such a manner that this understanding does not represent a pure grasping [Erfassen], but rather constitutes the existentic being of factual being-ability." Understanding is Dasein's ability to act within a world. See Section 3.4, Footnote 12, as well as the end of Section 3.2. For the sake of comprehensibility I have somewhat simplified Heidegger's arguments in § 62 of Being and Time. Source: Gerhard Wahrig's Deutsches Worterbuch, various editors and contributors (Munich: Mosaik-Verlag, 1988). Source: Wahrig's Deu tsches Worterbuch. The etymology is particularly suggestive in the light of Heidegger's later term for the essence of Dasein: the tender [Hirt] of Being. See Section 3.2, Footnote 7, for details. This is an extrapolation from the contents of § 8, in which the word Temporalitat is used both in the title of Part Two ("Fundamentals of a Phenomenological Destruction of the History of Ontology Following the Guiding Theme of the Problematic of Temporality") and in the title of its first main subdivision ("Kant's Doctrine of Schematism and of Time as a Preliminary Stage of a Problematic of Temporality"). See Section 2.3 for details. The closest thing to an explicit reference to the being-alreadyin structure of concern is in § 68 a), p. 339: "This ecstasy makes it possible for Dasein to accept [ubernehmen] in decidedness the entity that it already is." Note also Heidegger's remark in §68 a), 337: "Expecting [das Erwarten] is a mode of the advent, founded in awaiting, which generates itself authentically as forerunning. Accordingly, a more primeval being unto death lies in forerunning than in the concerned expecting of it." In the original, the first sentence is italicized. Behalten is also introduced as a synonym for Vergessen in § 69 a), p. 353-354 in the context of the analysis of inauthentic concernedness,

Notes

30.

31.

32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37.

295

although the link is made less explicitly and less clearly than in the passages referred to above. Note that in Being and Time the horizontal schema of timeliness is the foundation of the transcendence of the world, that is, of the difference between the self and the world. This "transcendence" must be strictly and consistently distinguished from the later concept of the transcendence ofDasein. Heidegger, in Being and Time, sometimes speaks of the transcendence of Dasein, but more frequently (and more correctly) of the transcendence of the world, that is, of the difference between the self and the world. This is the only conception of transcendence in Being and Time. Heidegger first begins to speak consistently of the "transcendence of Dasein" in the writings after Being and Time, but within the context of a highly modified analysis of understanding and planning. Note that announcement is one of the four structural features of talk. See Section 2.6, Footnote 56, for this distinction. Note that dispersion is one of the structural features of curiosity, which is the inauthentic mode of understanding. This is a reference to the instant as the authentic mode of the present. Note that the Latin intendere literally means "to stretch towards," making a link with Husserl's concept of intentionality possible. Peculiarly enough, this is the same word Heidegger uses to designate the defining characteristic of the world, its "worldliness."


SELECTIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY

The secondary literature on Heidegger is notoriously voluminous and opaque, and its sheer quantity is both daunting and continually increasing. No one bibliography can be complete, and any that tried to approach this ideal would be out of date almost as soon as it was published. I have dealt with this problem by focussing on two broad areas in the following order of priority: (1) works that are directly relevant to the study of Being and Time, and (2) works that I have quoted in the course of this book. Furthermore, I have chosen to focus on the (1) English, (2) German, and (3) French scholarship, in that order, feeling that this reflects the likely interests and aptitudes of my target audience. I have been forced to rely on secondary sources for bibliographical information in the case of a few volumes I was not able to obtain myself. For ease of use I have divided the following bibliography into five sections, which I will briefly describe: Section A lists my primary sources, that is, original works by Heidegger, and only by Heidegger, to which I have referred in the text. Selected English translations are also included. I have not made any effort to evaluate the relative merits of multiple English translations of the same text. Sections B, C, and D list works of direct relevance to Being and Time, and only to Being and Time. Section B contains works of an introductory nature, while C lists major studies and 297

298


commentaries, and D presents a number of studies of individual themes. Finally, Section E lists other primary sources by philosophers other than Heidegger, commentaries on works by Heidegger other than Being and Time, and other secondary sources. Selected English translations are included for major philosophical works. A. PRIMARY SOURCES WITH SELECTED ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS Heidegger, Martin. "Anmerkungen zu Karl Jaspers. 'Psychologic der Weltanschauungen/" In Wegmarken. Gesamtausgabe vol. 9, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 1-44. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976. "Comments on Karl Jasper s's Psychology ofWorldviews," trans. John van Buren. In Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill, 1-38. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. ." AuseinemGesprach von der Sprache: Zwischeneinemjapaner und einem Fragenden." In Unterwegs zur Sprache. Gesamtausgabe vol. 12, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 79-146. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985. "A Dialogue on Language: Between a Japanese and an Inquirer/7 In On the Way to Language, trans. Peter D. Hertz, 1-54. New York/Hagerstown/San Francisco/London: Harper & Row, 1971. . Beitrage zur Philosophic (Vom Ereignis). 2nd ed. Gesamtausgabe vol. 65, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1994. Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning), trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999. . "Brief iiber den 'Humanismus'." In Wegmarken. Gesamtausgabe vol. 9, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 313-364. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976. "Letter on'Humanism/ " trans. Frank A. Capuzzi. InPathmarks, ed. William McNeill, 239-276. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. . Einfiihrung in die Metaphysik. Gesamtausgabe vol. 40, ed. Petra Jaeger. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1983. Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2000.


299

. Frtihe Schriften. Gesamtausgabe vol. 1, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978. . Die Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie. 3rd ed. Gesamtausgabe vol. 24, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1997. The Basic Problems of Phenomenology, trans. Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982. . Grundprobleme der Phanomenologie (1919/20). Gesamtausgabe vol. 58, ed. Hans-Helmuth Gander. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1993. -. Metaphysische Anfangsgriinde der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz. Gesamtausgabe vol. 26, ed. Klaus Held. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978. The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic, trans. Michael Heim. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1992. . "Neuere Forschungen liber Logik/7 In Fru'he Schriften. Gesamtausgabe vol. 1, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 17-43. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1978. . Ontologie (Hermeneutik der Faktizitat). Gesamtausgabe vol. 63, ed. Kate Brocker-Oltmanns. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1988. Ontology: The Hermeneutics ofFacticity, trans. John van Buren. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1999. . Phanomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles: Einfuhrung in die Phanomenologische Forschung. Gesamtausgabe vol. 61, ed. Walter Brocker und Kate Brocker-Oltmanns. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1985. Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research, trans. Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2001. . Sein und Zeit. Gesamtausgabe vol. 2, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1977. . Sein und Zeit. 16th ed. Tubingen, Germany: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1986. Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. Oxford & Cambridge: Blackwell, 2003. Being and Time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit, trans. Joan Stambaugh. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996.

300


. "Vom Wesen der Wahrheit." In Wegmarken. Gesamtausgabe vol. 9, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 177-202. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976. "On the Essence of Truth/' trans. John Sallis. In Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill, 136-154. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988. -. "Vom Wesen des Grundes/' In Wegmarken. Gesamtausgabe vol. 9, ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, 123-175. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1976. "On the Essence of Ground," trans. William McNeill. In Pathmarks, ed. William McNeill, 97-135. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988.

B. OVERVIEWS AND INTRODUCTIONS TO BEING AND TIME Biemel, Walter. Heidegger. Rororo Bildmonographien 200. Hamburg: Rohwolt Taschenbuch Verlag, 1991. De Waelhens, A. La philosophic de Martin Heidegger. 7th ed. Louvain, Belgium: Editions Nauwelaerts, 1971. Inwood, Michael. Heidegger: A Very Short Introduction. Oxford/New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Macquarrie, John. Martin Heidegger. Richmond, VA: John Knox Press, 1969. Polt, Richard. Heidegger: An Introduction. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1999. Salanskis, Jean-Michel. Heidegger. Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1997. Schmitt, Richard. Martin Heidegger on Being Human: An Introduction to Sein und Zeit. New York: Random House, 1969. Steiner, George. Martin Heidegger. New York: The Viking Press, 1978. von Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm. Subjekt und Dasein: Grundbegriffe von Sein und Zeit. 3nd expanded ed. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2004.

C. MAJOR STUDIES AND COMMENTARIES ON BEING AND TIME Chapelle, Albert. L'ontologiephenomenologiquedeHeidegger: Hn commentaire de Sein und Zeit. Paris: Editions universitaires, 1962. Dreyfus, Hubert L. Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991. Gelven, Michael. A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time. Revised ed. DeKalb, IL: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989.


301

Greisch, Jean. Ontologie et Temporalite: Esquisse d'une interpretation integrate de Sein und Zeit. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994. Kaelin, E. F. Heidegger's Being and Time: A Reading for Readers. Tallahassee: University Presses of Florida/The Florida State University Press, 1988. King, Magda. A Guide to Heidegger's Being and Time, ed. John Llewelyn. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001. Kisiel, Theodore. The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time. Berkeley/ Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1993. Kockelmans, Joseph J. Heidegger's Being and Time: The Analytic ofDasein as Fundamental Ontology. Washington, DC: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology & University Press of America, 1990. , ed. A Companion to Martin Heidegger's Being and Time. Washington, DC: Center for Advanced Research in Phenomenology & University Press of America, 1986. Luckner, Andreas. Martin Heidegger: Sein und Zeit: Bin einfuhrender Kommentar. 2nd ed. Stuttgart: UTB, 2001. Mulhall, Stephen. Heidegger and Being and Time. Routledge Philosophy GuideBooks. London: Routledge, 1996. Polt, Richard, ed. Heidegger's Being and Time: Critical Essays. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005. Rentsch, Thomas, ed. Heidegger: Sein und Zeit. Reihe Klassiker Auslegen. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 2001. von Herrmann, Friedrich-Wilhelm. Hermeneutische Phanomenologie des Daseins: Eine Erlauterung von Sein und Zeit. Band 1: "Einleitung: Die Exposition der Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein." Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987. .Hermeneutische Phanomenologie des Daseins: Ein Kommentar zu Sein und Zeit. Band 2: "Erster Abschnitt: Die vorbereitende Fundamentalanatyse des Daseins." §9 - §27. Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987. Waterhouse, Roger. A Heidegger Critique: A Critical Examination of the Existential Phenomenology of Martin Heidegger. Sussex/New Jersey: Harvester Press/Humanities Press, 1981.

D. STUDIES OF INDIVIDUAL THEMES IN BEING AND TIME Alweiss, Lilian. The World Unclaimed: A Challenge to Heidegger's Critique of Husserl. Athens: Ohio University Press, 2003. Bertram, Georg W. "Das Denken der Sprache in Heideggers Sein und Zeit." Allgemeine Zeitschrift fiir Philosophie 26.3 (2001): 177-198.

302


Blattner, WilliamD. Heidegger's Temporal Idealism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999. Blitz, Mark. Heidegger's Being and Time and the Possibility of Political Philosophy. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1981. Carman, Taylor. Heidegger's Analytic: Interpretation, Discourse, and Authenticity in Being and Time. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003. Demske, James M. Being, Man, and Death: A Key to Heidegger. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1970. Figal, Giinter. Martin Heidegger: Phanomenologie der Freiheit. Frankfurt am Main: Athenaum, 1988. Fleischer, Margot. Die Zeitanalysen in Heideggers Sein und Zeit: Aporien, Probleme und ein Ausblick. Wlirzburg, Germany: Konigshausen & Neumann, 1991. Gethmann, Carl Friedrich. Verstehen und Auslegung: Das Methodenproblem in der Philosophie Martin Heideggers. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1974. Harman, Graham. Tool-Being: Heidegger and the Metaphysics of Objects. Chicago and La Salle, IL: Open Court, 2002. Lafont, Christina. Sprache und Welterschlieflung: Zur linguistischen Wende der Hermeneutik Heideggers. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp Verlag, 1994. Miiller-Lauter, W. M. Moglichkeit und Wirklichkeit bei Martin Heidegger. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1960. Okrent, Mark. Heidegger's Pragmatism: Understanding, Being, and the Critique of Metaphysics. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988. Overgaard, S0ren. Husserl and Heidegger on Being in the World. Dordrecht/ Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2004. Prauss, Gerold. Erkennen und Handeln in Heideggers Sein und Zeit. Freiburg/Miinchen: Verlag Karl Alber, 1977. Raffoul, Francois. A chaquefois mien: Heidegger et la question du sujet. Paris: Editions Galilee, 2004. Sembera, Richard. "The Phenomenon-Concept in Being and Time and Its Meaning for Hermeneutic Phenomenology/' Unpublished paper, Department of Philosophy, Dominican University College, Ottawa, n.d. Stassen, Manfred. Heideggers Philosophie der Sprache in Sein und Zeit und ihre philosophisch-theologischen Wurzeln. Bonn: Bouvier Verlag Herbert Grundmann, 1973. Vogel, Lawrence. The Fragile "We": Ethical Implications of Heidegger's Being and Time. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1994.


303

White, Carol J. Time and Death: Heidegger's Analysis ofFinitude, ed. Mark Ralkowski. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate, 2005.

E. OTHER SOURCES Armour, Leslie. Logic and Reality: An Investigation into the Idea of a Dialectical System. Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum & Comp. N.V., 1972. Bonsiepen, Wolfgang. "Einleitung." Introduction to Hegel's Phanomenologie des Geistes, eds. Hans-Friedrich Wessels and Heinrich Clairmont. Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1988. Couturat, Louis. La logique de Leibniz d'apres les documents inedits. Hildesheim, Germany: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1961. Dilworth, David A., and Valdo H. Viglielmo, trans, and ed., with Agustin Jacinto Zavala. Sourcebook for Modern Japanese Philosophy. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1998. Dodds, E. R. The Greeks and the Irrational. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1951. Dreyfus, Hubert, and Harrison Hall, eds. Heidegger: A Critical Reader. Oxford, UK and Cambridge, MA: Blackwell, 1992. Gemoll, Wilhelm. Griechisch-Deutsches Schul- und Handworterbuch. 9th ed. Rev. and expanded, Karl Vretska. Munich: Verlag Holder-PichlerTempsky/R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1997. Groth, Miles. Translating Heidegger. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2004. Hayman, Ronald. Sartre: A Life. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987. Husserl, Edmund. Cartesianische Meditationen und Pariser Vortrage. Husserliana vol. I. 2nd ed., ed. S. Strasser. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963. Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, trans. Dorion Cairns. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1999. . Formale und Transzendentale Logik. Husserliana vol. XVIII, ed. Paul Janssen. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974. Formal and Transcendental Logic, trans. Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969. . Ideen zu einer reinen Phanomenologie und phanomenologischen Philosophic. Husserliana vol. Ill, ed. Walter Biemel. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1950. Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy,FirstBook:GeneralIntroductiontoaPurePhenomenology, trans. Fred Kersten. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1982.

304


. Logische Untersuchungen. Erster Band. Husserliana vol. XVIII. Ed. Elmar Holenstein. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975. Logical Investigations. Volume 1. Tr. J.N. Findlay. Routledge: London, 2001. . Philosophic der Arithmetik. Husserliana vol. XII, ed. Lothar Eley. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970. Philosophy of Arithmetic: Psychological and Logical Investigations with Supplementary Texts from 1887-1901, trans. Dallas Willard. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2003. -.Zur Phanomenologie des inneren Zeitbewufttseins. Husserliana vol. X, ed. Rudolf Boehm. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time, trans. John Barnett Brough. Dordrecht/Boston/London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991. Kalariparambil, Tomy S. Das befindliche Verstehen und die Seinsfrage. Philosophische Schriften Band 29. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1999. Kant, Immanuel. Kritik der reinen Vernunft, ed. Wilhelm Weischedel. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1996. Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith. Houndmills, UK: Macmillan Education Ltd., 1989. Kaufmann, Walter. "The word 'phenomenology7." Section 35 of Hegel: A Reinterpretation, 148-51. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1966. Kisiel, Theodore. "Heidegger's Gesamtausgabe: An International Scandal of Scholarship," Philosophy Today 39 (1995): 3-15. Light, Stephen. Shuzo Kuki and Jean-Paul Sartre. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1987. McKirahan Jr., Richard D. Philosophy Before Socrates. Indianapolis/ Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1994. Maslow, Abraham H. "Education and Peak Experiences." In The Farther Reaches of Human Nature. Chapter 12,162-172. New York, NY: Penguin Compass, 1993. Mohanty, J. N. "Husserl, Frege and the Overcoming of Psychologism." In The Possibility of Transcendental Philosophy, 1-11. Dordrecht/Boston/ Lancaster: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1985. Miiller-Lauter, W. M. Moglichkeit und Wirklichkeit bei Martin Heidegger. Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1960. Passmore, John. A Hundred Years of Philosophy. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Penguin Books, 1968.


305

Plato. "Apology/' In Five Dialogues. 2nd ed., trans. G. M. A. Grube, rev. John M. Cooper, 21-44. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2002. . Republic. 2nd ed., trans. G. M. A. Grube, rev. C. D. C. Reeve. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1992. Poggeler, Otto. Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers. Pfullingen, Germany: Verlag Giinther Neske, 1963. Rescher, Nicholas. Process Metaphysics: An Introduction to Process Philosophy. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1996. Ryle, Gilbert. "Achilles and the Tortoise/' In Dilemmas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Safranski, Rtidiger. Ein Meister aus Deutschland: Heidegger und seine Zeit. Munich: Carl Hanser Verlag, 1994. Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil, trans. Ewald Osers. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999. Salmon, Wesley C., ed. Zeno's Paradoxes. Indianapolis/Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 2001. Sartre, Jean-Paul. Questions de methode. Paris: Editions Gallimard, 1960. Scheler, Max. Der Formalismus in der Ethik und die materiale Wertethik, Gesammelte Werke, 6th rev. ed., vol. 2. Bonn: Bouvier-Verlag, 1980. Schiller, Friedrich. Uber die asthetische Erziehung des Menschen in einer Reihe von Briefen, ed. Klaus L. Berghahn. Stuttgart: Reclam, 2000. On the Aesthetic Education of Man, trans. Reginald Snell. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, Inc., 2004. Schuhmann, Karl. "Thanomenologie': Eine begriffsgeschichtliche Reflexion/' Husserl Studies I (1984): 31-68. Sembera, Richard. "Heidegger, James, and Ryle on the Problem of Science and the Everyday World/' Science et Esprit 1.59 (2007): 71-85. Spiegelberg, Herbert. The Phenomenological Movement: A Historical Introduction. 2nd ed., Vols. One (p. 1-392) and Two (p. 393-766). The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1978. Wahrig, Gerhard. Deutsches Worterbuch. Various editors and contributors. Munich: Mosaik-Verlag, 1988. Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, Bilingual edition. London and New York: Routledge, 1990.


INDEX OF NAMES

A

F

Aristotle, 46, 49, 51, 56, 225, 280 n.15

Fichte, Johann Gottlieb, 6, 7, 270 n. 7 Foucault, Michel, 30 Frege, Gottlob, 11, 12, 13, 271-272 n. 15 Freud, Sigmund, 286 n. 68

B Bergson, Henri, xvii, 31, 275 Berkeley, George, 35 Brentano, Franz, 11, 12, 269 n. 4, 271 n. 13, 272 n. 16, 283 n. 39

H Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich, xvii, 2, 7, 9, 10, 28, 30, 44, 196, 225, 232, 269 n. 1, 270 n. 7, 270 n. 9, 271 n. 11, 278 n. 6 Heidegger, Martin, ix, xi-xx, 1, 14, 22-31, 33-64, 66-101, 103-134, 136-139, 141-160, 162-171, 173-189, 191-263, 269 n. 3, 271 n. 13, 273 n. 26, 274 n. 26, 274 n. 27, 275 n. 31, 275 n. 33, 275 n. 35, 275 n. 36, 276 n. 36, 276 n. 37, 276 n. 44, 277 n. 44, 277 n. 45, 278 n. 1, 278 n. 2, 278 n. 3, 278 n. 4, 278 n. 7, 279 n. 8, 279 n. 9, 279 n. 10, 280 n. 15, 280 n. 17, 281 n. 20, 281 n. 21, 281 n. 22, 281 n. 23,

c

Chladenius, Johann Martin, 26 Couturat, Louis, 22, 274 n. 29, 279 n. 11.

D Derrida, Jacques, 30 Descartes, Rene, 13, 20, 25, 26, 46, 49, 51, 71, 78, 79, 281 n. 23 Dilthey, Wilhelm, xvii, 25, 275 n.32 Duns Scotus, 22

E Einstein, Albert, 8, 28, 276 n. 40 Euclid, 8, 9, 270 n. 10

307

308


281 n. 25, 281 n. 27, 282 n. 36, 283 n. 38, 283 n. 39, 283 n. 41, 283 n 42, 284 n. 44, 2 n. 45, 284 n. 46, 284 n. 49T, 284 n. 51, 285 n. 51, 285 n. 53, 285 n. 54, 285 n. 56, 286 n. 65, 287 n. 73, 287 n. 74, 287 n. 75, 288 n. 79, 288 n. 81, 288 n. 83, 289 n. 84, 289 n. 85, 289 n. 86, 289 n. 88, 289 n. 89, 290 n. 90, 290 n. 91, 291 n. 97, 291 n. 99, 292 n. 1, 292 n. 92, 292 n. 4, 292 n. 5, 292 n. 7, 293 n. 7, 293 n. 9, 293 n. 10, 293 n. 11, 293 n. 12, 293 n. 13, 293 n. 16, 294 n. 22, 294 n. 24, 294 n. 28, 295 n. 31, 295 n. 37 von Herrmann, FriedrichWilhelm, ix, 274 n. 27, 275 n.

35, 280 n. 17, 282 n. 34, 291 n. 99, 293 n. 14, 293 n. 15 Hume, David, 2, 3, 13, 35 Husserl, Edmund, xvii, 2, 8, 11-14, 18-23, 25-29, 31, 33,

50, 58, 61, 78, 125, 146, 270 n. 9, 271 n. 13, 272 n. 17, 272 n. 18, 273 n. 21, 273 n. 23, 273 n. 24, 273 n. 25, 273 n. 26, 274 n. 26, 274 n. 27, 276 n. 43, 278 n. 7, 285 n. 52, 295 n.36,

J Jaspers, Karl, xvii, 24, 25, 30, 275

n. 35, 275 n. 36, 276 n. 36 Jung, Carl Gustav, 28

K Kant, Immanuel, xvii, 2-11, 13,

20, 25, 29, 46, 48, 49, 51, 54, 109, 126, 138, 139, 146, 184,

201, 207, 269 n. 5, 269 n. 6, 270 n. 7, 270 n. 9, 276 n. 44, 278 n. 2, 280 n. 2, 280 n. 19, 281 n. 23, 287 n. 73, 291 n. 97, 291 n. 98, 294 n. 26, Kierkegaard, S0ren, xvii, 24, 25,

30, 146, 275 n. 32, 276 n. 37

Kuki, Shuzo, 30, 31, 277 n. 45, 277

n.46

L Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, xix, 22, 26, 44, 271 n. 13, 274 n. 29, 275 n. 29, 279 n. 11, 280

n.ll

Lobachevsky, Nikolai Ivanovich, 9 Locke, John, 35 M Macquarrie, John, xiii, xiv, xix, 46, 47, 201, 204, 227-231, 233, 234, 236, 238, 240, 242, 243, 245, 246, 248, 249-252, 254-256, 258-262, 280 n. 15, 283 n. 40 Maier, Georg Friedrich, 26 Merleau-Ponty, Maurice, 31, 277 n.48 Mill, John Stuart, 10 N Newton, Isaac, 2, 8, 135, 276 n. 40, 291 n. 97 Nietzsche, Friedrich, xvii, 24, 275 n.32 Nishida, Kitaro, 31, 277 n. 47

p

Parmenides, 14 Plato, 56, 109, 167

Index of Names

R

Rickert, Heinrich, 31, 276 n. 44, 277 n. 44 Ricoeur, Paul, 31, 32 Robinson, Edward, xiii, xiv, xix, 46, 47, 201, 204, 227-231, 233-236, 238, 240, 242, 243, 245, 246, 248-252, 254-256, 258-262, 280 n. 15, 283 n. 40 Russell, Bertrand, 13, 22, 270 n. 9, 271 n. 13, 271 n. 15, 274 n. 27, 274 n. 29 Ryle, Gilbert, xvii, xix, 271 n. 13, 273 n. 22

S

Sartre, Jean-Paul, xviii, 25, 30-32, 82, 275 n. 36, 276 n. 36, 276 n. 42, 277 n. 45, 277 n. 48 Scheler, Max, xvii, 29, 31, 271 n. 13, 276 n. 43 Schelling, Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph, 6, 7, 270 n. 7 Schiller, Friedrich, 253 Schleiermacher, Friedrich Daniel Ernst, 26, 275 n. 34, 282 n. 34

309

Schopenhauer, Arthur, 275 n. 32 de Spinoza, Baruch (Benedictus), 26, 27, 254, 276 n. 39 Stambaugh, Joan, xiv, xix, 227-229, 230, 233-235, 237, 242-246, 253, 256, 258-262, 283 n. 41

T Tanabe, Hajime, 31, 277 n. 47

W

Weber, Max, 30 Whitehead, Alfred North, 22,272 n. 15,274 n. 27,285 n. 56 Wittgenstein, Ludwig, xvii, xix, 13,182, 271 n. 13,273 n. 22, 294 n. 18 Wolff, Christian, 1, 269 n. 3

z Zeno of Elea, 14,15,103,273 n. 19, 273 n. 22

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