Presidential Science Advisors: Perspectives and Reflections on Science, Policy and Politics

Presidential Science Advisors Roger Pielke, Jr. · Roberta A. Klein Editors Presidential Science Advisors Perspective...

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Presidential Science Advisors

Roger Pielke, Jr. · Roberta A. Klein Editors

Presidential Science Advisors Perspectives and Reflections on Science, Policy and Politics

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Editors Roger Pielke, Jr. Center for Science and Technology Policy Research University of Colorado 1333 Grandview Ave., Campus Box 488 Boulder, CO 80309-0488 USA [email protected]

Roberta A. Klein Center for Science and Technology Policy Research University of Colorado 1333 Grandview Ave., Campus Box 488 Boulder, CO 80309-0488 USA [email protected]

ISBN 978-90-481-3897-5 e-ISBN 978-90-481-3898-2 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-3898-2 Springer Dordrecht Heidelberg London New York Library of Congress Control Number: 2010922883 © Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 No part of this work may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording or otherwise, without written permission from the Publisher, with the exception of any material supplied specifically for the purpose of being entered and executed on a computer system, for exclusive use by the purchaser of the work. Cover design: Assisted by Ami- Nucu Schmidt Printed on acid-free paper Springer is part of Springer Science+Business Media (www.springer.com)

Preface

This book grew out of a 2005–2006 lecture series titled “Policy, Politics, and Science in the White House: Conversations with Presidential Science Advisors.” Organized by the Center for Science and Technology Policy Research1 at the University of Colorado-Boulder in the wake of criticism over the science-related policies of then-President George W. Bush, the series was intended to gain perspective on the role of science in policy and politics at the highest levels of government while also exploring how science is used and sometimes misused in policy and politics. Seven science advisors to the US President participated in the series: Drs. John Marburger III, Neal Lane, John H. Gibbons, George A. Keyworth II, Frank Press, Edward David, Jr., and Donald Hornig. Dr. D. Allan Bromley was scheduled to participate but unfortunately passed away soon before his visit. Dr. Robert Palmer, Staff Director, US House of Representatives’ Committee on Science 1993–2004, also participated in the series, providing a perspective on science advice from the legislative branch. Each science advisor separately visited CU-Boulder for 2 days, meeting with students, faculty, researchers and community members. Their visits culminated in a presentation with three components: a presentation by the advisor focusing on his tenure as science advisor, a public interview by then-Center director Roger Pielke, Jr., and a question-and-answer session with audience members. The advisors came from different political parties and different eras, so we were able to explore how the complexities of science policy issues have changed in the White House over time. This volume presents the perspectives of the seven science advisors on their tenure advising the President, along with several external perspectives on science advice in the White House and beyond. Further information, including webcasts and transcripts of the presentations and interviews, can be viewed from the series website at http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/scienceadvisors/.

1 The Center is within the Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences (CIRES). CIRES is sponsored jointly by the University of Colorado at Boulder and the Office of Oceanic and Atmospheric Research of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA).

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Preface

Since the conclusion of that series President George W. Bush’s term ended, and Barack Obama was elected President. Soon after the election President Obama announced he intended to appoint Harvard professor Dr. John P. Holdren as his science advisor, and Holdren was confirmed in March 2009. President Obama’s intentions regarding science advice are as follows: The truth is that promoting science isn’t just about providing resources—it’s about protecting free and open inquiry . . . It’s about ensuring that facts and evidence are never twisted or obscured by politics or ideology. It’s about listening to what our scientists have to say, even when it’s inconvenient—especially when it’s inconvenient. Because the highest purpose of science is the search for knowledge, truth and a greater understanding of the world around us. That will be my goal as President of the United States—and I could not have a better team to guide me in this work.2

2 Change.Gov (2008). Newsroom: Blog. The Office of the President-Elect. December 2008. http:// change.gov/newsroom/entry/the_search_for_knowledge_truth_and_a_greater_understanding_of_ the_world_aro/. Accessed 28 August 2009.

Acknowledgements

The lecture series would not have been possible without generous contributions from the following sponsors: Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences (CIRES); University of Colorado Graduate School, Office of the Vice Chancellor for Research, Provost’s Office, College of Engineering and Applied Science, and Dean’s Fund for Excellence; Southwest Research Institute; The Hennebach Program in the Humanities under the direction of Carl Mitcham at the Colorado School of Mines; and ICAT. Many individuals also helped make the series possible. From the University of Colorado: Susan Avery, Stein Sture, and Todd Gleeson; from Colorado School of Mines: Carl Mitcham; from the University of Colorado Center for Science and Technology Policy Research: Radford Byerly, Ami Nacu-Schmidt, and Linda Pendergrass; and from the Cooperative Institute for Research in Environmental Sciences: Konrad Steffen. We are deeply indebted to them for making possible the series and this book.

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Contents

Part I

Overview and Critique of Presidential Science Advising: Introduction Roger Pielke, Jr. and Roberta Klein

1 Science, Politics, and Two Unicorns: An Academic Critique of Science Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . David H. Guston

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Part II The Science Advisors in Their Own Words 2 Science Advice in the Johnson White House . . . . . . . . . . . . . Donald Hornig

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3 Science, Politics and Policy in the Nixon Administration . . . . . . Edward David, Jr.

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4 Science and Technology in the Carter Presidency . . . . . . . . . . Frank Press and Philip M. Smith

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5 Policy, Politics and Science in the White House (The Reagan Years) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . George A. Keyworth II

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6 Science Advice to President Bill Clinton . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . John H. Gibbons

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7 Threats to the Future of US Science and Technology . . . . . . . . Neal Lane

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8 Science Advice in the George W. Bush Administration . . . . . . . John H. Marburger III

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Part III A View from the Hill: Introduction Daniel Sarewitz 9 Science Advice in the Congress? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Radford Byerly

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Contents

Science, Policy and Politics: A View from Capitol Hill (Twenty Years of Schoolin’ and They Put You on the Day Shift) . . Robert Palmer

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Part IV Synthesis and Critique 11

The Rise and Fall of the President’s Science Advisor . . . . . . . . Roger Pielke, Jr. and Roberta Klein

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Appendix . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Contributors

Radford Byerly Chief of Staff, US House of Representatives’ Committee on Science and Technology 1991–1993, Washington, DC, USA, [email protected] Edward David, Jr. Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Science Advisor to the President, President Richard M. Nixon 1970–1973, Office of Science and Technology, Washington, DC, USA, [email protected] John H. Gibbons Director of the Office of Science and Technology, Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, President William J. Clinton 1993–1998, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Washington, DC, USA, [email protected] David H. Guston Co-director, Consortium for Science, Policy & Outcomes, Political Science, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA, [email protected] Donald Hornig Director of the Office of Science and Technology, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, President Lyndon Johnson 1964–1969, Office of Science and Technology, Washington, DC, USA, [email protected] George A. Keyworth II Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Science Advisor to the President, President Ronald Reagan 1981–1985, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Washington, DC, USA, [email protected] Roberta Klein Managing Director, Center for Science and Technology Policy Research, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, USA, [email protected] Neal Lane Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, President William J. Clinton 1998–2001, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Washington, DC, USA, [email protected]

1 See

Chapter 7 for current affiliation

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Contributors

John H. Marburger III Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Science Advisor to the President, President George W. Bush 2001–2009, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Washington, DC, USA, [email protected] Robert Palmer Staff Director, US House of Representatives’ Committee on Science and Technology 1993–2004, Washington, DC, USA, [email protected] Roger Pielke, Jr. Environmental Studies and Center for Science and Technology Policy Research/CIRES, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, USA, [email protected] Frank Press Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Science and Technology Advisor to the President, President Jimmy Carter 1977–1981, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Washington, DC, USA, [email protected] Daniel Sarewitz Co-director, Consortium for Science, Policy & Outcomes, Arizona State University, Washington, DC, USA, [email protected] Philip M. Smith Associate Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy 1976–1981, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Washington, DC, USA, [email protected]

2 See 3 See

Chapter 8 for current affiliation Chapter 4 for current affiliation

Part I

Overview and Critique of Presidential Science Advising: Introduction Roger Pielke, Jr. and Roberta Klein

Under the presidency of Barack Obama, many observers have expressed hopes that the science advisor to the President of the United States might be returned to a position of influence, following years of perceived neglect under George W. Bush. Understanding the historical role of the science advisor is central to evaluating the position under any Administration. This book provides a set of first-hand accounts of the role of science advisor as well as a number of perspectives on the position and the messy relationship of science and politics from the 1950s to the present. The origins of the modern1 Presidential science advisor position, summarized briefly below but elaborated on throughout this book, can be traced to a 1950 recommendation by Wall Street investment banker turned government consultant William Golden that President Truman appoint a full-time science advisor (Golden 1950). Truman responded by establishing the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization (SAC/ODM). In November 1957, in the aftermath of the Soviet launch of Sputnik, President Eisenhower elevated SAC/ODM into the President’s Science Advisory Committee and named James R. Killian, Jr., President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), as his full-time science advisor. In 1962 President Kennedy established the Office of Science and Technology as part of the Executive Office of the President. By 1973 relations between President Nixon and the science advisory apparatus had soured. He abolished the White House S&T office and transferred the science advising function to the National Science Foundation (NSF). President Ford chose to bring back the science advisor position through legislation. The National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act of 1976 was signed on May 11, 1976. It created the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). The OSTP director is appointed by the President but is not a member of the Cabinet. The director also goes by the title “Science Advisor to the President.” Some science advisors have also been given the title “Assistant to the President for Science and Technology” or “Special Assistant to the President” (Stine 2009).

1 Throughout

history, US Presidents have sought science advice from a variety of sources.

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A complete list of Presidential science advisors and the dates of their service follows2 :

President

Science advisor

Dates

Truman

Oliver E. Buckley3 Lee A. DuBridge4 Lee A. DuBridge5 Isidor I. Rabi6 James R. Killian, Jr. George B. Kistiakowsky Jerome B. Wiesner Jerome B. Wiesner Donald F. Hornig Lee A. DuBridge Edward E. David, Jr. H. Guyford Stever7 H. Guyford Stever Frank Press George A. Keyworth II William R. Graham, Jr. D. Allan Bromley John H. Gibbons Neal F. Lane John H. Marburger III John P. Holdren

1951–1952 1952–1953 1953–1956 1956–1957 1957–1959 1959–1961 1961–1963 1963–1964 1964–1969 1969–1970 1970–1973 1973–1974 1974–1977 1977–1981 1981–1985 1986–1989 1989–1993 1993–1998 1998–2001 2001–2009 2009–present

Eisenhower

Kennedy Johnson Nixon

Ford Carter Reagan George H.W. Bush Clinton George W. Bush Obama

Much attention has been devoted to the role of the science advisor during the presidency of Republican George W. Bush when many scientists openly confronted the Administration over its decisions about an enormous range of science-related issues, from the funding of stem cell research to the stacking of science advisory committees.8 In 2004 some scientists mobilized in opposition to President Bush’s re-election campaign and the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), an advocacy group, supported John Kerry against President Bush in the 2004 Presidential election. During the Bush Presidency the typically prosaic pages of Science magazine published more than 40 editorials by its chief editor critical of the

2 From Office of Science and Technology Policy 2009, http://www.ostp.gov/cs/about_ostp/ previous_science_advisors; Stine (2009). This list does not include acting science advisors. 3 Chairman of the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization. 4 Id. 5 Id. 6 Id. 7 Also NSF director 1974–1976. 8 Some of these conflicts are chronicled in Mooney (2005).

Part I Overview and Critique of Presidential Science Advising: Introduction

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Bush Administration, whereas it published only a single such editorial critical of Democratic President Clinton’s policies during his two terms in office.9 Responsibility for responding to such criticism fell upon John Marburger, science advisor to George W. Bush, who sought to defend the Bush Administration against allegations by the USC as well as Congressman Henry Waxman (D-CA) of a pattern of “misuse of science.”10 His responses turned Dr. Marburger into an object of attack by his fellow scientists. For example, a prominent Harvard professor said on National Public Radio that Dr. Marburger had “become a prostitute” (Glanz 2004), and one of his predecessors who served as a science advisor under President Clinton said that were he in Dr. Marburger’s situation, he would have already resigned (Brumfiel 2004). The first year of the Obama Administration has seen very little drama involving the broader scientific community, with John Holdren being appointed and assuming the role with little attention or fanfare. Holdren’s experience represented a stark difference from that of his predecessor. Before even assuming the positions of science advisor and director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), Dr. Marburger had seen the science advisor position demoted, at least formally, when President Bush decided not to confer upon him the title of “Assistant to the President” that his immediate predecessors had carried (Brumfiel 2004). Soon after 9/11 the offices of OSTP were moved to a building down the street, away from the White House (Schultz 2001).11 In this context, the frequent conflicts between members of the scientific community and the Bush Administration should have been anticipated, despite President Bush’s Chief of Staff Andrew Card’s rather implausible comment concerning Dr. Marburger’s limited role that “He is closer to the pulse in the White House than any of his predecessors, to my knowledge” (Glanz 2004). The battle between scientists and the Bush Administration – and the great passions that it stirred – obscured the fact that science advice at the highest levels of government has seen a long-term decline since what now appear to be, from the perspective of many scientists, the halcyon years of yore (see Pielke, Jr. and Klein, Chapter 11 in this volume). The conflicts may have raised expectations for the position under President Obama to unrealistic levels (Sarewitz 2009). In an era where scientific and technological content can be found in every issue of importance it may seem odd to suggest that there may no longer be a role for a “science advisor to the President” at least not as commonly understood in the scientific community. Instead, the “science advisor” has taken on a role that might

9 These numbers were arrived at by searching Science for editorials authored by its chief editors, Daniel Koshland, Floyd Bloom, and Donald Kennedy, from January, 2003 to December, 2008. The editorial critical of the Clinton Administration focused on its policies related to needle exchange programs. 10 See UCS (2004a, b), and Waxman (2003). For Dr. Marburger’s response to the USC allegations see Marburger (2004). 11 Marburger’s opinion about the significance of this move can be found in the transcript of his public interview during the science advisor lecture series that we organized at the University of Colorado, located at http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/scienceadvisors/marburger_transcript.html.

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be more aptly described as a coordinator of budgets and programs, and thus more closely related to the functions of the Office of Management and Budget than the development of Presidential policy. This role dramatically enhances the position of the scientific community to argue for its share of federal expenditures. Yet, scientific and technological expertise permeates every function of government policy and politics, and the science advisor is only rarely involved in wider White House decision making. The pages that follow present a first-hand perspective on some of the issues that Presidential science advisors have dealt with, from the earliest days of the Johnson administration in 1964 up to the present. They also provide a glimpse into the dayto-day functioning of the White House, some personal anecdotes about the men who assumed the role of President, and a few never-before revealed tidbits of Presidential history.

References Brumfiel, G. (2004). US Science Policy: Mission Impossible? Nature, 428(6980), 250–251. Glanz, J. (2004). At the Center of the Storm Over Bush and Science. The New York Times, March 30. Golden, W. T. (1950). Mobilizing Science for War: The Science Advisor to the President. Memorandum for the President. December 18. http://archives.aaas.org/ golden/pdf/393_19501218.pdf. Accessed 28 August 2009. Marburger, J. (2004). Statement of the Honorable John H. Marburger, III on Scientific Integrity in the Bush Administration April 2, 2004. http://stephenschneider.stanford.edu/Publications/PDF_Papers/ResponsetoCongressonUCSDocumentApril2004.pdf. Accessed 28 August 2009. Mooney, C. (2005). The Republican War on Science. New York: Basic Books. Sarewitz, D. (2009). The Rightful Place of Science. Issues in Science and Technology, Summer, 89–94. Schultz, W. (2001). Advising the President. Chemical & Engineering News, 79 (52), 23–27. Stine, D. (2009). The President’s Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP): Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service. CRS Report for Congress, 7-5700, RL34736, June 3. UCS (Union of Concerned Scientists). (2004a). Scientific Integrity in Policy Making: An Investigation into the Bush Administration’s Misuse of Science. Union of Concerned Scientists. March. http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/ scientific_integrity/rsi_final_fullreport_1.pdf. Accessed 28 August 2009. UCS (Union of Concerned Scientists). (2004b). Scientific Integrity in Policy Making: Further Investigation of the Bush Administration’s Misuse of Science. Union of Concerned Scientists. July. http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/

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scientific_integrity/scientific_integrity_in_policy_making_july_2004_1.pdf. Accessed 28 August 2009. Waxman, H. (2003). Politics and Science in the Bush Administration. US House of Representatives, Committee of Government Reform, Politics and Science. November 13. http://democrats.reform.house.gov/features/politics_and_science/ pdfs/pdf_politics_and_science_rep.pdf. Accessed 28 August 2009.

Chapter 1

Science, Politics, and Two Unicorns: An Academic Critique of Science Advice David H. Guston

Providing an “academic critique” of science advice, or rather the discussions of science advice that appear in the volume, is quite a challenge. In one sense, assembling the recollections of the seven living Presidential science advisors in this volume is a great public service and a tribute to seven men who committed many difficult years to improving the life of the nation through reason. During their tenures – ranging from the Kennedy Administration to the George W. Bush Administration and broken in continuous representation here only by the hand of fate – these men contributed to the recurrent demonstration that the federal government and the scientific community can partner for acclaimed achievements in building knowledge and using science to advance legitimate political goals. Critiquing their accounts could only be a disservice. In another sense, the critique of powerful actors and powerful institutions is absolutely essential, especially because these recollections here include still more examples of the rhetoric of obfuscation and self-justification that helps make politics, to many, such a distasteful enterprise. Their drearily similar styles are the stock and trade of political communication: A folksy tone, adopted by the powerful, renders that power more palatable to the people. Obligatory references to Franklin and Jefferson locate their activity in constellations of patriotism and Enlightenment. Rehearsals of the successes (and near-successes) of their tenure seek to secure their and their patrons’ contributions to posterity. And conveyances of the folkways of Washington, particularly the importance of the personal within the political, offer lessons to the novice suggesting that the human qualities of politics still rule. Although I was not present at the lectures that generated these essays, I have more than passing familiarity with most of their authors. Of the Presidential science advisors, I can say, perhaps oddly given our distance in years, that Don Hornig was a student of mine: He was visiting at the Kennedy School of Government when I was a doctoral fellow there, helping Bill Clark and Lewis Branscomb teach a course on D.H. Guston (B) Co-director, Consortium for Science, Policy & Outcomes, Political Science, Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA e-mail: [email protected]

R. Pielke, Jr., R.A. Klein (eds.), Presidential Science Advisors, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-3898-2_1,

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“The Role of Science in Democratic Politics.” Hornig, along with other such luminary science policy practitioners as Harvey Brooks and Bob Frosch, regularly sat in on the course. Shortly before that time, as a very junior staffer I worked with Ed David when he chaired a committee on scientific integrity at the National Academy of Sciences, when Frank Press was the president of the Academies and Phil Smith was executive officer. Still before that, I worked for a brief period of time at OTA1 when Jack Gibbons was setting its short-sleeved but highly professional tone. I have not worked for, or for that matter taught, Neal Lane, but I’ve had a few pleasant conversations at science policy meetings with him, and I do not believe that I have ever met George Keyworth. Of the late D. Allan Bromley, much missed in this volume, I can say that I learned science policy at his knee, at Yale as an undergraduate. On the congressional side, I have tapped both Rad Byerly and Bob Palmer for information again and again, and occasionally have been tapped back. So my critique of their remarks may be tempered by some familiarity and perhaps even some admiration and gratitude, but I nevertheless hope that it still remains honest, direct, and helpful. Reading between the tribute and the tropes in this collection, what can we glean about the intersection of science and politics?

Durable and Particular Aspects of Science Advice One of the chief contributions of this volume is its portrayal of the long term of science advising, in particular, and science policy in general. Although several of the contributors pay homage to Vannevar Bush as an earlier science advisor, or even to Lewis and Clark, it is virtually impossible to begin timelines or commence comparisons prior to the appointment of James Killian by President Eisenhower. Pace Marburger that most of the institutions of the federal conduct of R&D were in place by 1950, their relative importance has changed radically. For example, even though by 1951 the National Institutes of Health had existed for 20 years, the extramural program did not begin until the war’s end and their drive to pre-eminence in civilian R&D funding did not begin until the 1960s. The creation of independent agencies like EPA (Environmental Protection Agency) with regulatory science capacities changed the R&D landscape again in the 1970s, and similarly the elevation of the National Bureau of Standards to the National Institute of Standards and Technology helped make the Department of Commerce into a major R&D policy player. So there have been changes in the organization of federal science that science advisors have had to fashion and manage, and as Hornig and others point out, providing centralized management to this diverse and dynamic group of R&D sponsors and performers has been a durable – and increasingly important – role for the science advisor.

1 The

Congressional Office of Technology Assessment.

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Science, Politics, and Two Unicorns: An Academic Critique of Science Advice

9

Another change is perhaps more subtle than the changing roles of the research agencies, and it involves the professionalization of science in its advisory capacity. Although several of the contributors in this volume pay homage to Vannevar Bush, I find reference to Killian, the man who actually pioneered the role of special assistant to the President for science and technology, but once by Hornig, who gives reference perhaps because he was the only contributor here to have worked with Killian directly. Killian is a problematic figure for these advisors because, as Hornig notes, he was despite his MIT experience not a natural scientist or engineer. I cannot see the appointment of someone without a doctoral degree in an appropriate discipline happening today with anything but grumbling or worse from scientists – let alone the acclaim that greeted Killian. Although there have been many Presidentadvisor relationships that have been at least ambiguous if not contrary with respect to partisanship – neither Roosevelt nor Truman trusted the Brahmin Bush politically, Gibbons’ partisan affiliation was largely unknown when he left OTA for the Clinton White House, and Marburger was perhaps the highest profile Democrat serving in the Bush Administration – beyond Killian they have all been physical scientists or engineers. Moreover, when the Union of Concerned Scientists blasted the Bush Administration for political meddling in science, it also attacked its appointment of Richard Russell as one of the associate directors of OSTP for his lack of a Ph.D. and research experience (he has an undergraduate degree in biology from Yale and worked on the Hill for years). So scientists have become more demandingly professionalized over their ostensible representation in the White House. Killian arrived in the White House as a consequence of Sputnik, which also had the consequence of totalizing the Cold War by recruiting more segments of society – e.g., students in the sciences, engineering, and foreign language and area studies through the National Defense Education Act – under the aegis of national defense. All subsequent science advisors would have defense issues prominent among their responsibilities, although Gibbons, relieved of the burden of Cold War competition directly with the Soviets, still counted nuclear weapons issues generally and the novel issue of terrorism as security issues that he and his successors confronted. In addition to security, the science advisors confronted a range of issues – health, environment, energy, space, and education – that were in some ways remarkably stable on the one hand but remarkably dynamic on the other. Environmental issues rose to the national agenda almost instantaneously with the publication of Silent Spring in 1964, and within a decade not only was the entire federal environmental science and policy apparatus overhauled, but it was beginning to make initial engagements with global environmental issues in addition to managing environmental toxins. The space program leapt from the Gemini preparations for the spectacle of Apollo to the meteoric rise and falls of the Shuttle program to the perils-of-Pauline salvations of the Space Station by narrow congressional majorities and, of all people, by the Russians. Some issues, or the attention they garnered or their place on the national agenda were, however, sui generis. The depth with which the Carter Administration plumbed industrial innovation was unique, although some of its achievements spread through congressional action into the Reagan Administration (by whom they

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D.H. Guston

were greeted indifferently, ignored, or threatened with vetoes). Although part of the general Cold War responsibilities of the advisor, the Strategic Defense Initiative consumed the vast amount of Keyworth’s time. Bioethics – particularly cloning – became part of the portfolio of science advice during the Clinton Administration, which also resurrected attention to science and technology in service to the economy as a primary issue. And of course the integrity of science advice itself became an issue that kept Marburger with an oddly high profile during the G.W. Bush Administration. At least some of these particular issues suggest that differences among science policy agendas may have partisan origins.

Ideology and Partisanship With few exceptions, however, there is a great silence among these essays on questions of ideology and partisanship regarding science, technology, research, and innovation. The science advisors of course acknowledge that Washington is a political city, that the White House is a locus of political intrigue and agendas, and that a great deal of their activities revolved around the budget and the politics of distribution and redistribution inherent in it. But Hornig, for example, offers no insight here into how he spanned Republican and Democratic administrations. The recollections of that period often emphasize the relatively technocratic orientation of the earlier Eisenhower and later Kennedy administrations, and the easy access that the apolitical scientific elite had to both. But is there not more of a story here when the “missile gap” alleged by Kennedy was both a crucial issue in the Democrat’s campaign against Eisenhower’s sitting Vice President and a matter of relevance to the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) in which Hornig served? Similarly, David offers no insights into how Congress’s rivalry with Nixon’s imperial Presidency influenced decisions about large-scale technology development like the SST, or about government science policy organizations like the Office of Technology Assessment. Surely some observations by the man at the center of the dismantling of the executive science advisory apparatus – one of the most “politicized” incidents in science policy – could offer some greater wisdom into the nature of political loyalty, scientific identity, and bureaucratic practice that have vexed the relationship between the G.W. Bush Administration and many scientists both inside and outside of government. In distinct counterpoint to David, with whom he nominally shares a partisan attachment, Keyworth trumpets support for the pursuit of pure knowledge as both the most productive and – by the way – the most appropriate object of governmental support. This position is a convenience for conservative ideology that is often discarded – usually in the name of defense R&D but often in the name of commercial competitiveness as, for example, the Reagan Administration acceded to a large number of congressional initiatives in technology policy. But it has become, since the Republican take-over of Congress in 1995, a core belief in the Grand Old Party about the relationship of government and science, to the point of ongoing

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attempts to do away with many elements of the technology policy legacy of the 1980s, e.g., the Advanced Technology Program. Yet this ideology would have been largely unrecognizable to most Republicans of Nixon’s era. Indeed, David, having had experience in industrial research, instead believes in the purposeful direction of publicly sponsored research, or what he has called “the integrity of purpose.” Gibbons, meanwhile, offers no perspective on his boss President Clinton as a polarizing political figure whose Administration made the economically and socially transformative power of science and technology more of a centerpiece than perhaps any Administration since Kennedy. Despite Gibbons’ decade at OTA – and indeed, his dominion over the only relatively stable political times OTA had – he offers little novel insight into the partisan and institutional rivalry that led to OTA’s demise shortly after his departure. Finally, Marburger focuses his attention on that great unicorn of science policy, the science budget (which I treat more fully below), which holds greater promise in posterity’s eye for the administration in which he served than most other science policy issues. Marburger dwells on published comments by my friend and colleague Dan Sarewitz about the stability of the R&D budget as a share of discretionary spending, as well as Sarewitz’s remark that federal science policy is largely played out as budget policy. While I’m fairly certain that Sarewitz meant to disparage federal science policy making by this remark, I’m much less certain about Marburger – who simply performs the nature of Sarewitz’s critique by avoiding potentially rich discussions of the National Nanotechnology Initiative, the President’s Bioethics Advisory Council, or other leading aspects of the Bush Administration’s science policy. Indeed, there are two issues related to Marburger’s essay that I will return to below – the budget and the scientific community. First, I want to discuss the exceptions to this neglect of the basic, and occasionally base, politics of science policy: the pieces by the congressional science staffers, Byerly and Palmer, but particularly the latter. One could speculate on reasons for this asymmetry of perspectives: Perhaps in the unitary and isolated executive branch one is apt to believe that one is doing policy whatever one is doing; whereas, in the feuding and fragmented legislative branch, one cannot even pretend to escape politics. Byerly calls this the “non-scientific environment in which policy is made,” and it is likely more robust in Congress than in the Executive branch. Palmer tells a convincing story of the demise of the norm of bipartisanship consequent to the rise of Newt Gingrich, which had the effect of crippling not only uncontroversial science policy legislation (like regular authorizations) but also undermining congressional oversight of executive programs. In Palmer’s account, however, the conflict over science policy is not so much over differing partisan visions of how science ought to be but rather over the higher-order, strategic instruments of power and which party would control them. In this game, science policy became a pawn like any other, but perhaps a more tragic one for its greater loss of a bipartisan tradition. Byerly and Palmer suggest other reasons why congressional science policy might be different from executive science policy. One that struck me was the seemingly greater autonomy of congressional staff. Although the accounts of the Presidential

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science advisors are replete with examples of direct questions with expansive policy consequences, there’s nothing quite like the freedom of action implied by Byerly’s account of being told, “Let’s do a bill!” The flip-side to this autonomy, however, is service to a long and convoluted legislative process. Regardless of whether Presidents take the advice of their science advisors – as Kennedy did not from Wiesner on the decision to go ahead with Apollo but Carter did on the review of domestic policy toward innovation – the advisors are still engaged with a relatively direct relationship with a unitary executive branch and, potentially, in a personal relationship with that executive.

The Two Unicorns Above I referred to the science budget as a “unicorn” because, although it is often discussed and represented, it is still a mythological beast. It is thus surprising, as a mythological beast, that it should have characteristics – like its share of the discretionary budget – that are so invariant over time. Wary that I might be undermining my colleague Sarewitz, I do want to explore the nature of this ostensible invariance a little bit, because I expect that it conceals as much as it reveals. The first thing to notice is that the statistic quoted is the share of R&D in the discretionary budget, which sounds to me like it includes the defense budget (as opposed to the domestic discretionary budget, which excludes defense and foreign aid – more unicorns!). Through most of the period that Marburger and Sarewitz are concerned about, the defense R&D budget was both larger and more stable than the civilian R&D budget. So some of the variability in domestic R&D is concealed by the size and stability of military R&D. This relationship is particularly important to note in the transition from the Clinton Administration to the Bush Administration, where the overall stability of R&D as a share of the discretionary budget had been bought by military R&D at the expense of civilian. Rightly or wrongly, the Clinton Administration set a policy goal of parity between civilian and military R&D and over eight years largely achieved it (by both growing civilian R&D in absolute terms and slowing the growth of military R&D). Rightly or wrongly, the Bush Administration reversed this policy and raised the share of military R&D from near-parity to about 60%. Such fluctuations have substantive meaning, particularly for the agencies whose R&D budget is squeezed within an overtly stable system. A second thing to notice is that even if the share of R&D as part of the discretionary budget is relatively stable, it is not absolutely stable, and those few tenths of 1% translate into significant sums. Using Marburger’s numbers of 11% as the historical average and 10.8% as a current measure, 0.2% of the R&D budget is approximately $300 million. While this is a piddling sum in many political games, even in R&D terms at NIH for example, it is a significant sum in a variety of areas including regulatory R&D and the social sciences – even agriculture and energy. It is even a reasonable sum for the first 2 or 3 years of a national initiative such

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as nanotechnology, or a princely sum for the ethical, legal and social implications research of such an initiative. Again, thinking that we could trade such sums off among various R&D projects is deluding ourselves with the unicorn of the science budget, but we might be able to learn a bit about horses or antelopes by looking at unicorns closely. I also want to talk about a second unicorn, that of the scientific community. Just like there are useful fictions about political aggregations of other people, e.g., “the Catholic vote” or “soccer moms,” there is “the scientific community.” What makes the latter more mythological, however, is that there are regular, consistent and methodologically sophisticated ways of attempting to discern how Catholics or soccer moms feel about an issue. There are almost no similar attempts to discern the beliefs or opinions of scientists; even if they represent the least common denominator, efforts like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) are few and far between. Moreover, except in the most sophisticated attempts like the IPCC, there is little hope of discerning whether members of the scientific community hold a particular belief because of their scientific identity or because of other common identities or because of completely accidental ones. That is, do they hold their beliefs and opinions because they are arriving at them scientifically, or because they are socialized as educated white-collar seculars, or for no particularly coherent reason? These are important questions about the authority of science in public decision making, and about the authority of the science advisor. Both David and Lane discuss the potentially troublesome idea that the science advisor is in some way a representative of the scientific community. In David’s case, White House staff saw his predecessor Lee DuBridge as representing academic scientists, a community with whom the White House was frequently at odds. This in part explains why the Nixon Administration might have sought out David as the first science advisor from industry, but also why David sought assurances from the White House before taking the job that support for academic science in the national interest was on the agenda. Alas, both parties ended up disappointed. As David suggests, issues like stem cells and global climate change are implicated in the same kind of conflict: Does the science advisor, in representing what scientists believe, represent a community expressing a point derived from a scientific perspective or a socio-political one? Can one actually distinguish? Who should judge? In Lane’s discussion, the overall health of the research enterprise is an agenda item that languishes because no one other than the science advisor and OSTP care about it as such. Thus, Lane suggests, the science advisor can be mistakenly perceived as representing the interests or advocating for the scientific community, and he does not believe that any science advisors have actually and intentionally adopted that position because it would mean then appearing to be an unreliable advisor. But, on the other hand explains Lane, science advisors do represent the scientific community by representing the best scientific opinion in matters. He leaves the resolution of this admittedly “narrow line” to the parties involved.

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What All This Means for Science Advising “Who will advise the advisors?” is not as deeply compelling a question as “Who will watch the watchers?” – everyone, if given the chance, will advise them. So I will join the party. With respect to the overall context of science advising, the scope of issues seems to have broadened, from the Cold War security issues that triggered the creation of the special assistant to the President for science and technology to a broader array of environmental, economic, and social/ethical issues today. This expansion seems to represent a greater recognition of the broad role of science in society. Similarly, the standards for science advice have changed – no social scientist for example, however esteemed, would be greeted with the same acclaim as Killian was. But it would be a mistake, I think, to take these two facts as anything other than an expression of the increased social and political power of scientists to communicate their agenda, rather than, say, a greater recognition and desire on the part of politicians and the public to have scientists play these roles. There is thus some irony in the greater role of science being a product of the “non-scientific environment” of science policy. Although the topics on which science is brought to bear may be politically critical, science policy as practiced in Killian’s time as well as our own is a low-salience activity in which elites have a great deal of latitude. Such latitude means that partisan or ideological differences in scientific and technical agendas exist and will rarely be settled by appeals to democratic resolution. Given the gap between what science can say and what politics needs, political leaders will not only be able to make ill-advised decisions, but they will both need to do so and cause conflict with scientists in doing so. Politicians, their advisors, and even we academic critics need to be very cautious about interpreting these conflicts because without well-conceived inquiries it is impossible to know as an empirical matter whether they are “really” about science or about something else. Many of these conflicts, however, are about what science policy “really” is about. A budget is a policy, to be sure, but the size of one’s budget does not fully express the health of the budgeted activities, or their effectiveness in producing societal outcomes, or the justice of those societal outcomes that they do produce. This is especially the case when the budget is a fiction – that is, when it is not generated as one entity with a set of priorities among the elements and there is no real ability to make trade-offs among those various elements. In my view, science advisors would be well-advised not to speak of a science budget that suggests a coherent but mythical approach, but rather to speak of R&D priorities, R&D expenditures, and how S&T capacities interrelate with national priorities. Similarly, I would think that science advisors would be well-advised not to speak of some unformed or imaginary scientific community. Whereas, it is often necessary to consolidate the opinion and beliefs of scientists, whether through something long-term and highly structured like IPCC or something a bit more ad hoc like a committee of the National Research Council, recognize that these are political

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organizations, too, achieving political goals and not simply translating what scientists believe they know for political consumption. The information they produce is neither oracular nor idiosyncratic, and it should be treated as neither. Science advisors would also likely be well-advised not to speak to some unformed or imaginary scientific community, because even if it existed it would not be the science advisor’s constituency. Speak to the President in the role of advisor, to the public at large about the vision the President has for how science and technology advance what we value as a nation, and to scientists about how their publicly sponsored roles advance those national values rather than advance their particular community. Finally, it has been suggested to me that in my hunt for unicorns, I have left a third one a-lurking. Indeed, part of the mythology of the science budget and the scientific community, as I have alluded above, is that they are not unitary, comprehensive, collective and readily identifiable things. Part of the reason this is true, of course, is that science itself is not unitary, comprehensive, collective, and even readily identifiable. A fuller exploration of this mythical character of science is beyond the scope of this chapter. But seeing science itself as a unicorn would help explain many of the challenges of having one man, however talented, represent one science in a hierarchical political structure. Recognizing the plurality and partiality of science might translate into organizing a science policy apparatus for the White House that more closely resembled the much-missed OTA, which was designed explicitly for Congress as a fragmented entity (and is now fading into myth itself). There might be more emphasis on committee work and a more vast network of disciplinary and interest-based contributors to the development of policy. The President’s Council on Bioethics, in fact, suggests just such a modus operandi, and agree or disagree with its view of the issues, it has brought a fresh, salient scrutiny of S&T issues to the White House. Science policy making would certainly be different without the science budget, the scientific community, or for that matter science. But unicorns make lovely tapestries, not good policies.

Part II

The Science Advisors in Their Own Words

Chapter 2

Science Advice in the Johnson White House Donald Hornig

I It is no longer necessary to argue that an understanding of science and the technology based on science is essential to the wise conduct of national affairs. That was understood by Benjamin Franklin, Thomas Jefferson, John Quincy Adams, and other political leaders 200 years ago. That understanding has been incorporated in the programs of the Department of Agriculture, the armed forces and other agencies. However, the current debate over science in the White House concerns the role of science in the development of public policy at the political center, the presidency. By presidency, I mean the President himself, the National Security Council, the Bureau of the Budget (now OMB – the Office of Management and Budget), the Council of Economic Advisers, and the White House staff, which supports the President in many ways. These various advisors are powerful in their own right because they monitor access to the President, filter the information which reaches him, and assist him in his relations with the Congress, the media, and the public. As Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, I was a member of that staff under President Lyndon Johnson. I will confine my observations to my own experiences with Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson. Before doing so, I remind you that I am a Neanderthal with a fading memory of my experiences 40 or 50 years ago and perhaps a dangerously lively imagination. Nonetheless, although the actors and the times have changed, a surprising number of issues look very much the same. I have in mind such questions as the environment, the provision of health care, the future supply of energy, and a national program of scientific research and education. What are some current problems? Many discussions concern the enormous collection of technical programs carried on by federal agencies or funded by D. Hornig (B) Director of the Office of Science and Technology, Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, President Lyndon Johnson 1964–1969, Office of Science and Technology, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected]


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the federal government. Each such program has a scientific staff, its particular management style and traditions, and its unique problems. That is, each needs scientific research to support its programs. I don’t think a single science policy to guide DOD (Department of Defense), HEW (Health, Education and Welfare, now HHS – Health and Human Services), NASA (National Aeronautics and Space Administration), NSF (National Science Foundation), and the Department of Commerce, for example, would be useful. The notion of an overarching Department of Science with cabinet status has often been proposed. However, in my view science is an ingredient of the programs of many departments. For the most part it is not central in itself, especially at the Presidential level. The best analogy with which we have experience is economics. Economics is pervasive but the Council of Economic Advisers does not make rules, does not oversee departmental affairs, and does not control departmental budgets. It does provide guidance to the White House on economic policy. I believe something analogous is called for with respect to science. As I see it, that is an important role of the science advisor. Despite the multiplicity of its goals the ship of state needs to be steered and that is ultimately the job of the President. The goal for the science advisor has to be to assist him in all matters where the policy choices require scientific and technical judgments. This shows up in the appointment letters of most, if not all, of the science advisors. The key phrase is “to advise and assist the President in all matters affected by or pertaining to science and technology.” The trouble is that this straightforward phrase is subject to many interpretations and is hard to interpret without a sound understanding of the choices the President then in office faces. The science and technology factors have to be seen as part of a political whole. Otherwise they will mean little to those in the presidency who must make decisions. Scientists must make the relation between scientific reality and political considerations clear. This is clearly the case when the President has to deal with such contentious issues as global warming or stem cell research. A separate but closely related question, which has been of particular concern to the Congress, is the extent to which the science advisor and his staff should be involved in the management of federal science and technology programs, especially their coordination. In 1959 a first step was to set up the Federal Council of Science and Technology (FCST, colloquially known as “fixit”), sort of an internal science advisory committee. It consisted of a senior officer from each S&T agency and BOB (Bureau of the Budget), and was chaired by the science advisor. It never played an important role. In 1962, while Jerry Wiesner was science advisor, a fundamental reorientation was brought about by the passage of the Reorganization Plan of 1962. The plan established the Office of Science and Technology (later OSTP) as part of the Executive Office of the President. The office was more analogous to BOB than to the President’s White House staff which includes the various special assistants and reports directly to the President. Unlike the appointment as special assistant, the nomination for the director was subject to confirmation by the Senate, and the director was charged with advising the President about many things, including the

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“review, integration and coordination of major Federal activities in science and technology.” Finally, although not stated in the plan, he would have to defend his activities and his budgets before appropriations committees of the Congress. Moreover, he was expected to testify before Congress on numerous scientific and technological matters and to explain the administration’s position when science or technology was involved. The result was a basic dichotomy which has persisted. First, there was the private role of the special assistant as a personal advisor to the President and the presidency, including direct personal access to the President, directed by the personal requirements of the President. Secondly, there was a wide and expanding public role as Director of OST, open and responsive to the Congress and the public as well as the President. This second role sometimes diverges from the first. In my mind the first was most important. Whether the second should be the responsibility of the same individual or office has yet to be legislatively resolved, but so far this has been the case.

II Let me double back now to discuss some specific S&T-related decisions made at the Presidential level. It started in earnest with the discovery in Germany in late 1938 that uranium undergoes fission when bombarded with neutrons. The realization of the impact of that discovery – the possibility of making an atomic bomb – on the impending war with Nazi Germany and the thought that the Nazis might be the first to utilize this new power led to frantic efforts by Leo Szilard and other physicists to alert President Roosevelt to the hazards and possibilities this presented. The result of their efforts was a letter to the President signed by Albert Einstein, which was conveyed to the President by the financier Alexander Sachs on October 11, 1939. The result was a decision by the President that “this requires action.” This was followed by much internal pulling and hauling until the fission project – for secrecy it was called the Manhattan District – was put under the leadership of Vannevar Bush, former president of the Carnegie Institution of Washington and chairman of the National Defense Research Council (NDRC). He had become the President’s de facto science advisor. In 1941 he was succeeded at NDRC by James Conant, a chemist and former President of Harvard University, who became the President’s second de facto science advisor. The Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), which Bush headed, was responsible for development of strategic weapons, including the atomic bomb at Los Alamos and radar. Both my wife, Lilli, and I were supported as graduate students at Harvard in 1942 by OSRD. Its most conspicuous success was the development of the atomic bomb. General Groves and the Army managed the organization of the Manhattan District and its colossal facilities program. Universities contracted to manage personnel and facilities, and a host of scientists, mostly physicists, were enlisted to provide scientific leadership.

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When the war was winding down in 1944 and victory seemed assured, the question of what to do next regarding science became important, especially since OSRD was about to be demobilized. President Roosevelt formally asked Vannevar Bush to think about the postwar status of science in the United States. The result was the seminal report Science: The Endless Frontier, which provided the philosophical underpinnings of federal support for science for many years. President Truman, who succeeded President Roosevelt in 1945, praised the report but ignored most of its recommendations. However, the National Science Foundation (NSF), which it proposed, was approved eventually in 1950. As an example of his disregard for the Bush report – which would have scientists making such recommendations – President Truman asked William Golden, an investment banker, to investigate ways in which the nation’s civilian scientists could contribute to the Korean War effort. Golden’s report in December 1950 urged the President to appoint a prominent scientist as his personal science advisor, with a staff and office in the White House. Although the President liked the idea it was shot down by elements of the federal bureaucracy. Instead, a Science Advisory Committee was established in 1951 as part of the Office of Defense Mobilization (SAC/ODM). It met infrequently and had little influence on subsequent developments. The 1950s were dominated by the Cold War between the US and the USSR Russia tested its first atomic bomb in 1949 and its first thermonuclear device in 1953, shortly after the United States had done so. By 1954 it was apparent that Hbombs could be carried by ICBMs and that the Soviet Union was probably ahead of the US in the development of long-range rockets. That year saw a revival of the Presidential advising system when Lee DuBridge and the SAC/ODM advised President Eisenhower that the US might become the target of a surprise attack. The President responded by appointing James Killian, then president of MIT and a member of SAC/ODM, to investigate the question. The resulting 1955 report, Meeting the Threat of a Surprise Attack, stressed the seriousness of that threat. The discussion we are now having about science in virtually the whole government started in earnest in 1957 when the Soviet Union launched Sputnik. The Russian launch meant it had the capacity to produce a long-range rocket capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. Against the background of the Cold War this produced a major public shock, and not only because of its military implications. It stimulated public concern and discussion of the state of American science, our technological capabilities relative to those of the USSR, the quality and nature of American higher education, and so on. It induced a very fundamental self-examination. What quickly emerged was that except for the military, which he didn’t trust because of its vested interests, the President had no one to whom he could turn. As a general, President Eisenhower understood the importance of a reliable and loyal staff to back him up. In the government, there were economists, lawyers, businessmen, and so on, but no one was equipped to think about this new range of critical developments arising from scientific advance. President Eisenhower’s response was to create the post of Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, to which he named James Killian (who was not himself a scientist). A little later Eisenhower transferred ODM’s Science Advisory Committee to the White House Office, reconstituting and enlarging it

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as the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), to be appointed by the President and reporting directly to him. Neither of them had any statutory authority. PSAC consisted of about fifteen distinguished scientists, some academic and some with industrial backgrounds, but all with broad experience in dealing with large public problems, mostly acquired in World War II. We have no equivalent training ground now for public servants to learn how to cross the line from science to politics. The NAS/NRC system of advisory committees has some of the functions of PSAC and could be called similar. However, PSAC members were personal and direct appointees of the President, met with the President from time to time, ate in the White House mess and, as members of the “President’s family”, were directly involved with issues with which the President was concerned or which they thought ought to be brought to his attention. The NAS/NRC system is more related to the efforts of OST committees that mainly report to the relevant OST staff members. The scale, sophistication, and variety of problems have grown enormously but the problem remains, reaching beyond the Cold War to societal challenges like health, education, and the environment. The President’s advisors are mainly non-scientists – economists, lawyers, and so forth. Whether the White House needs its own science and technology apparatus and what its role should be, or could be, has been debated ever since. This has led to repeated calls for some form of a science czar. I have already indicated that I don’t think we need a central science oversight or management staff. We have an OMB and various agencies that can take on those roles in their areas of responsibility. For the President we need a source of wisdom, experience, and perspective drawn from the entire world-wide scientific and technical community. We should ask how we can help the President to lead in the midst of an ongoing transformation which has been proceeding with breathless speed, and not be misled by those who promise him technological miracles. Think of it. Petroleum-powered transport began during my grandparents’ lives. The first airplane flew when my parents were children. Commercial radio could first be heard when I was a child. I remember my father bringing home an acid-battery-powered radio in 1924 to listen, miraculously, to voting reports on the Presidential election. Sulfa drugs were introduced in the 1930s, followed shortly by penicillin. Technical advances helped turn the tide in World War II, and the war ended a week after use of the second atom bomb. Since then, the process of scientific discovery and technological advance has not only continued but has accelerated. In many ways it has become the central initiator of large-scale changes in the economy, in the structure of society, and in many facets of our culture. It is even a political force.

III Although I have participated in a variety of government advisory committees, my direct experience with events at the level of our considerations here started in 1958, when I was named to the newly created Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences, which Lloyd Berkner chaired. Its mission was to help design

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a program for NASA, which had just been started as successor to the National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics and didn’t yet have a staff appropriate to its enlarged responsibilities. I first met President Eisenhower in 1959 when he asked me to serve on his Science Advisory Committee, PSAC. In January of 1960 I was formally appointed. PSAC focused on the military, intelligence, arms control problems, a nuclear test ban, and nuclear energy. It also devoted itself to a major effort to stimulate education in the sciences. That was conceived to be a central responsibility from the beginning. President Kennedy continued my term on PSAC. He was an interested President and a good listener. As I have indicated, Jerry Wiesner was his science advisor. But it is chastening to realize, when one tries to say how great all the science advisors and PSAC were, that the President rejected the negative advice of his science advisor and PSAC in arriving at his decision to go to the moon. This may have been the biggest, or at least the most expensive, science-related decision of the time. My subsequent contact with President Kennedy was – as Chairman of the Booster Panel and Space Science Panel of PSAC – to accompany him on a visit to nuclear and space installations in Colorado and New Mexico. Maybe – I say maybe – our conversations on Air Force One during this trip led to his asking me on November 7, 1963, to serve as his Special Assistant, but I really haven’t the faintest idea. On November 14, 1963, he announced my appointment. He was assassinated on November 23, 1963. I was in no-man’s land until Lyndon Johnson asked me if I would stay on. On January 24, 1964, he formally appointed me as Special Assistant. On the same day, he sent to the Senate my nomination for a separate job, Director of the Office of Science and Technology. On Monday morning, the twenty sixth, Senator Lister Hill called and we had a rather amazing conversation. He asked “Can you think of any reason why anyone might object to your appointment?” I said “no” I didn’t think so. Without holding any hearings, the committee voted that same day. I was confirmed in what must be record time. My staff had about 35 professionals, and they worked closely with BOB on programs and budgets. Most of our work was done through committees and panels involving about 150 consulting scientists. My agenda quickly broadened beyond national security problems. In 1964, when task forces were being organized to provide the new President with initiatives he might undertake, Rachel Carson had just published her highly acclaimed book Silent Spring. I sent a memo to Bill Moyers, Special Assistant to the President who was organizing the task forces, suggesting that pollution and problems with the environment were going to be some of the big political issues of our time and that it was important for our administration to take the lead. He liked the idea, as did the President. That summer we set up a task force chaired by John Tukey of Princeton to develop the idea. Subsequently its report, Restoring the Quality of the Environment, was issued by the President, who wrote a foreword to it. In the next 5 years we tackled many issues, mostly dictated by my sense of what mattered to the President at any given time or trying to anticipate for him what was going to matter. This led to efforts in such areas as developing the potential of the

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oceans, coping with the world food problem, dealing with urban problems, and very importantly, meeting the need for basic research and advanced research in science and technology. Another activity of my office was to provide support to the scientific and technical leadership in the various government departments, many of whom had the same problems communicating with their colleagues and bosses that we did in the White House: the problem of talking to those who don’t know a thing about science. For example, we were important channels of communication between the agencies and relevant offices and officers of the BOB. I learned to appreciate the wondrous power of small nudges from the White House to help smooth lots of things and stimulate action. In one case I went beyond anything that could be called a “nudge” and certainly beyond my statutory authority. I learned that in fact you have quite a lot of power if you only use it. This was in 1964 when Nick Katzenbach, the Attorney General, and I co-chaired the Telecommunications Policy Committee. Its mission was to coordinate government policy related to INTELSAT and COMSAT. A big issue was whether DOD could use COMSAT for military communications, something the Secretary of Defense wanted to do very badly, for a variety of reasons. Others on the committee were unsure this was a good idea, in part because of concerns about communication security. But because there were no solid objections the plans progressed to the point where one Saturday afternoon the Deputy Secretary of Defense, Cy Vance, was going to sign the agreement with COMSAT, committing DOD to use COMSAT rather than building their own communication satellites. During that morning an idea which had been gelling finally settled hard in my mind. In order to have secure military communications a high-frequency band reserved for government use would have to be given to COMSAT, and thus made available for commercial use. I said to myself, “Gee, this is more fundamental and concrete than the general debates we had in the committee. In effect we hand over this whole band and start training the Europeans in how to work at these high frequencies, whereas now the only technology is American. We would have traded off a big piece of the frequency spectrum for no good purpose. This is wrong and dangerous.” This was within hours of the planned signing. I called Katzenbach and told him my story but he basically said “It’s just too late.” He didn’t want anything more to do with it. But the more I thought about it, the more upset I got, so finally I called Cy Vance and just told him flatly “You can’t do it.” I was mightily surprised when his reaction to that was “Okay, I won’t do it. But let’s convene a group right away to start looking at the questions you raised.” By 3:30 P.M. we did have such a group convened, and eventually the original agreement was discarded. That was when I learned that when you call from the White House and just say “Don’t,” whether you have the authority or not, something tends to happen at the other end of the line. Lastly, I should mention that science is a wonderful lubricant for foreign policy initiatives. It is relatively apolitical, and by and large everyone loves science, though that may not be as true now as it used to be.

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I first realized that in the spring of 1964 when Konstantin Rudnev, Deputy Premier of the USSR, invited me to come to the Soviet Union as the first half of an exchange of which he would be the return visitor. We sensed the vested interest on his part. I thought it would a good idea to accept, and the President concurred. Immediately after he won the 1964 election, I therefore made the trip to Moscow in one of the President’s airplanes, a 707, accompanied by a distinguished group of industrial scientists that included Emanuel Piore, a vice president of IBM, Robert Hershey, a vice president of DuPont, James Fisk, president of Bell Labs, and Herbert Holloman, the Assistant Secretary of Commerce. Their status in the US made the Soviets take us seriously. The policy outcome was to raise real questions as to whether our policy of trying to inhibit the flow of industrial technology to the Soviet Union was productive or might even be self-defeating. The visit was, I believe, the first time that it really became clear to the President that science and technology had a role to play in foreign affairs. Something similar happened in the spring of 1965, when President Park Chung Hee of Korea met President Johnson in Washington. The day before his meeting with Park, the President called me on the phone, saying that the material he had from the State Department was “a lot of crap” and he wanted something creative. Fortunately PSAC was meeting that day so we closed down our agenda and discussed various possibilities, homing in on the idea of helping them to establish an industrial research laboratory. After PSAC adjourned, a rump group including Frank Long of Cornell, Ken Pitzer, then president of Rice University, and I worked on a plan for what we called an Institute for Applied Research and Industrial Development, which I presented to President Johnson approximately one hour before President Park arrived at the White House the next morning. President Johnson liked the proposal. At the meeting President Park was completely surprised because he thought he ought to be notified in advance of these things (as did our State Department) but he was pleased. At the end of the meeting, President Johnson had agreed, without consulting me, to send me to Korea backed by “a distinguished delegation,” to see whether the idea could be implemented. The proposed program was enormously successful. Now, 40 years later KIST, the Korean Institute for Science and Technology, is thriving. It has been a model for at least the technical aspect of development in several countries. It also has a whole string of offshoots in Korea, notably KAIS, the Korea Advanced Institute of Science. These outcomes obviously gave the President ideas. The next summer Prime Minister Sato of Japan was coming to visit. The night before the visit the President called me at home when I was in the kitchen, sort of second-guessing my wife, Lilli, at the stove. He wanted a fresh idea again. You know, fresh ideas “on demand.” This time, after consulting with my deputy, Colin McCloud, an MD, I proposed a US-Japan medical cooperation program for all of Southeast Asia. Medical cooperation is always safe. I worked all night on it, consulting medical experts all over

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the country by telephone. At their meeting the next day the US-Japan medical cooperation program was agreed to and has since been implemented through NIH. It is going strong still. However, things were not as smooth as they looked: An amusing incident occurred below the surface of the meeting. The morning of the meeting there was a desperate effort to get organized. We put our proposal on paper and took a few copies to the White House. There was just time for LBJ to read and approve it before Sato arrived. In the meeting the President described his proposal to Sato, who was of course surprised, as was his whole delegation. All the Japanese wanted to see a copy and the result is that they got all the copies. The next day the Japanese embassy called saying that all the copies had been taken back to Japan and requesting another copy from us. We then learned that we had none. Fortunately a handwritten copy was recovered from a wastebasket to bail us out. These stories show how Presidents often feel frustrated by the bureaucracies whose inherent caution stifles creative ideas. Further, if the President feels comfortable with the science advisor he can become very effective as a sort of general troubleshooter. On the other hand he can also become a target of bureaucratic anger when the President decides to go outside normal channels. We were never directly involved in the war in Vietnam but panels of PSAC continued to work on military questions. In fact, throughout the Vietnam War period about half of the efforts of the Science Office were devoted to defense, intelligence, and space questions as opposed to perhaps 90% before that period. However, from 1967 to 1969 there was a continuing erosion of confidence in the political loyalty of our office and PSAC, particularly in dealing with plans for an anti-ballistic missile (ABM) and the supersonic transport aircraft (SST), both of which many scientists opposed. Once these programs were on the front burner and this opposition surfaced, there was a gradual erosion in respect to everything else we did. This erosion was reinforced by our lukewarm support of the Vietnam War. The fact is that there was never an overt conflict but there was a cooling off. That contributed to a total breakdown of Presidential confidence in science advice under my successor, Lee DuBridge, and the elimination of the White House science office by President Nixon. As we know, the White House apparatus for science advice was fairly quickly reestablished after Nixon’s resignation, but that is another story.

Chapter 3

Science, Politics and Policy in the Nixon Administration Edward David, Jr.

Let me briefly talk about science advising in the Nixon Administration. I will draw some conclusions from my experiences there. I have put these in the form of vignettes, brief accounts of events regarding such issues as politics versus science and engineering, also the representative aspect of the science advisor’s job, the ways of science and political thought and the differences, the lack of compatibility between science and politics, and the narrow line between intellectual integrity and political expediency. Then, too, I have some comments on Presidential attitudes toward science. Let me say that I will mention the names of several persons involved in such matters. But I don’t mean to criticize their honesty, integrity, or capabilities. Before setting out on this agenda, let me try to tell you briefly where I am coming from. My career has been research based. My work at Bell Labs, as President of Exxon Research and Engineering, and my publications always have had an element of moving technological innovation forward. That implies an integration of science and engineering with the broad range of national policies and needs. That integration requires a process for transferring research achievements from labs into the marketplace where they can benefit the public and the commercial world. The US is at a point where public benefits and commercial progress are the expected outcomes of science and technology programs. Indeed, such expectations have been satisfied in many instances. The role of clear purposes by researchers and consideration of priorities are less well registered as essentials in the process. By bringing purposes and priorities into the picture, the efficiency and effectiveness of research and development can be increased and perhaps assured. At one time I called this the integrity of purpose. I still believe that clear purposes by researchers yield an integrity of research and its follow on, namely technological innovation. My sensitivity to this matter was instilled in me by my time at Bell Labs through my many mentors there. The recognized purpose for Bell Labs was “to improve electrical and electronic communication.” So all that leads me to be

E. David, Jr. (B) Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Science Advisor to the President, President Richard M. Nixon 1970–1973, Office of Science and Technology, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] R. Pielke, Jr., R.A. Klein (eds.), Presidential Science Advisors, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-3898-2_3,

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enthusiastic about purposeful activity as opposed to spontaneous action. This idea is much more widely held today by scientists and engineers than it once was. It means that it is prudent to ask in response to a research proposal, not only “why?” but also “compared to what?” When there are not enough resources, or an oversupply of ideas mostly unevaluated and of uncertain outcomes, that is the time to consider purposes and priorities. So you see my bias toward purposeful research and development with high priority outcomes. There is one other matter of prime importance. That is the interpersonal relations necessary to bring off success beyond just purposes and priorities. Personal relationships are critical to successful outcomes. They are especially important in matters where science, engineering, and politics come together. So I am always looking to see if people involved are adequate, whether they are communicative, and whether they are flexible enough to adapt to the unexpected events which usually occur in research and politics. There is still another necessity; that is education; including schooling, college level education, post graduate learning, all depending at least in part on research universities such as those here. Accomplished people have a high regard for education based on such institutions. None of the above will surprise you, so we can now revert to the subjects aforementioned. I joined the Nixon Administration in September 1970 after first being contacted about the job in the spring of that year. I was appointed after certain dissatisfactions with Lee DuBridge, the President’s science advisor at that time, were aired publicly. It was the White House staff and not the President that was disaffected. That episode illustrates an important source of tension for all science advisors, namely that the job seems to have a certain representative aspect. In this case, the White House staff viewed Lee DuBridge as a representative of the academic science community. His concerns about academia and its fortunes stem from his career capped by his Presidency of California Institute of Technology. At the time of his stay in the White House, the academic community, among others, was causing the administration considerable discomfort over issues such as the antiballistic missile program (ABM), the supersonic transport (SST) and other subjects. It was clear that a representative of the opposition community was unacceptable within the White House itself. There had been several leaks of information which the White House staff considered private, not an unusual occurrence in Washington. Furthermore, the White House staff desired science advice that was more broadly representative of industry and technology as opposed to pure or basic science. I was the first science advisor from industry. After talking to a number of people in the White House, including Henry Kissinger, John Ehrlichman, Peter Flanigan, and the President, I took the job on the condition that it was administration policy to further science and technology in the national interest, including basic research in the universities. It seemed that they were very strong on that, but thinking back on it, I should have been a little more skeptical. The issue of being in the White House and representing a constituency rather than serving the President is still before us. It has reappeared in the issue of stem

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cell research and the availability of stem cell lines. Also there is the controversy over global warming, its credibility, and what should be done. That leads to questions of energy supply-demand and hydrocarbon burning. I won’t say more about that because I think you probably know what they are all about. But it is worth noting a recent article by Dr. James Schlesinger, former Secretary of Energy, entitled “The Theology of Global Warming”. It appeared in early August in the Wall Street Journal, and contrasts political theology with scientific evidence, as a significant and growing distinction. One of my early contacts with the President illustrates another important point. At that time, aircraft hijacking was becoming a nuisance. Planes were being hijacked to Jose Marti airport in Havana by people wanting to join the early Castro government. Out of the blue, I was called to the Oval Office to discuss the hijacking matter with the President, John Ehrlichman, Peter Flanigan, and Henry Kissinger. The President in effect asked me how science could be used to stop the incidents. I had the distinct impression that he expected a final solution to be laid on the table at once. I’m afraid I told him the rather unwelcome news that the situation was extremely complex and there was neither a sure fix, nor any technological magic that I could conjure up to solve this problem. I pointed out that the problem was mostly sociological and not technical. I did suggest that handguns could be magnetically detected (no guns made of polymers existed at that time) and that baggage could be searched or X-rayed fairly expeditiously. That all seems so routine today, but those ideas seemed outlandish then. The group I met with decided my suggestions were not practical and certainly did not have the gravitas the public expected from the White House. Nevertheless, that meeting and subsequent events eventually yielded today’s effective security measures. Before the equipment and the airport security procedures we are familiar with now were implemented, federal marshals were put on flights to prevent hijacking. When that recommendation was made I objected. I thought it was more dangerous and much more expensive than just having an unscheduled stop at Jose Marti airport. However, the President decided that the air marshals were just what the situation demanded. Of course, they did prove effective in deterring hijacking for a while. In my mind, this episode illustrates that Presidents tend to look upon science and technology as tools with which to execute policy, rather than as activities to be valued on their own. This issue also remains before us. Unfortunately, some technical people have tried to take advantage of Presidential naivete regarding science in order to accomplish their own ends and agendas. The so-called Cancer Cure program begun in 1971 by the Nixon Administration is an example of this in my opinion. As I recall, one of the President’s lay supporters, Mr. Bebe Robozo and also Mary Lasker lobbied him to establish and support this program. I’m reminded of Lord Keynes’ statement to the effect that it is not difficult to bamboozle a president but it is very difficult to debamboozle one. Another interesting situation I found myself involved with was the Apollo program. When I arrived on the White House scene, two Apollo missions had already been cancelled. They were Apollo 18 and 19. There were originally plans, as I remember for 20 and 21. Apollo 21 never really got off the drawing boards. The

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possible cancellation of Apollo 16 and Apollo 17 was in the wind, even though those two missions were slated to provide important scientific information. Most of the man-hours on the moon came during those two missions. In fact, most of the scientific measuring equipment they placed on the moon is still there. After examining this issue closely with the help of the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) and specifically the help of Professor Tommy Gold of Cornell, I wrote a memo to the President saying in effect that since the nation had bought everything for these trips except the fuel, we ought to go ahead in light of the potential knowledge to be gained. That memo had some effect and Apollo 16 and 17 proceeded. The interesting aspect of this was the reason for considering cancelling Apollo 16 and 17 in the first place. That reason was essentially political. It focused on the timing of those two launches vis-à-vis the 1972 Presidential election. Apollo 17 was slated to launch about a month before the election day, early in November 1972. The big worry of the political forces was the possible effect of an Apollo 17 accident on the election outcome. By suggesting that Apollo 17 be postponed until December and that Apollo 16 was too early to have much influence on the outcome, we did win that day for the final two moon missions. This illustrates that political thinking is very different from scientific thinking. Anyone coming to the science advisory post without considerable experience in the political milieu is due for some rude shocks. A further point is raised by the infamous Supersonic Transport tussle which went on in 1969–1971. The SST program began as a federally-subsidized Boeing project. The issue of continued federal support for that program, an essentially commercial venture, precipitated a major fight in Congress. Lee DuBridge had commissioned a PSAC study of this project presumably in order to advise the President. Dick Garwin, who some of you know, was the chairman of that committee. The report was not made public but the conclusion that PSAC was opposed to the SST was leaked. Congress wanted the report but the administration balked, so legal action was instituted to force the administration to release the report. All of that was really nothing more than a foil. Dick Garwin testified against the administration program on Capitol Hill and that infuriated the White House staff. The real issue was, I think, twofold. First, there was some concern that the SST was a white elephant, that it was not economical as an operational aircraft. Second, there was the argument that the feds were getting involved in commercial activities where they had no business, and the program was a subsidy for Boeing. Garwin and other scientists felt very strongly that the SST was an expensive boondoggle. They also worried – something that I still worry about, not with respect to the SST but with other projects – that a large expenditure or commitment of the kind that the SST required would unbalance the US science and technology program. In other words, so much money would go into one effort that others which were just as important or more important might be neglected. You have to remember that at that time the federal R&D budget was well over 60% of the total US expenditures on R&D. The SST program lost in the Senate by one vote. In a way, of course, it was a shame. Hundreds of millions of dollars had been spent on developing the prototype aircrafts (two of them) at Boeing. They were almost ready to fly: only some

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20 million dollars separated them from actual flight testing. Boeing argued that further production of that plane would be based on commercial orders. In other words, the federal government would have subsidized only the R&D that went into developing the plane. But that would have worked only if the aircraft were economical to buy and operate. Clearly airlines were not going to buy an aircraft that was not economical over the long run. If it wasn’t economical, the opponents were convinced, and I think they were right, further federal funds would be forthcoming to subsidize the cost of the airplanes so that the program would not look like a total failure. What does this flap tell us about science advising? It tells us that the ways of science, which basically include argumentation and discussion of alternatives, are not the ways of politics. It tells us that science advice in a political setting is part of a larger picture that sometimes overwhelms the scientific view. The implications of these points are profound. On the one hand, I believe that if Dick Garwin’s ideas had been given influence in the NASA shuttle program, we might have ended up in a sounder position than we are in today. Perhaps we would have a mixed fleet of reusable and expendable vehicles. Actually we do have something like this, with the help of the Russians and their Soyuz capsules. On the other hand, we have to realize that without federal support, we probably would not have jet aircraft at all. Neither would we have communication satellites, super-computers and other useful devices and systems which we now have. Where does that leave us? It means that the science advisor must walk a very narrow line between intellectual integrity and political expediency, if there is any such line at all. The conflict between politics and science and engineering was illustrated for me by a confrontation between me and Pat Buchanan, a Nixon speech writer at that time (now a well-known commentator and writer for the press and the media). At one time he was a candidate for President. The confrontation concerned earlier science advisors and a few distinguished members of the PSAC. It had been established by tradition that previous science advisors and some thought leaders such as Dr. Edwin Land of Polaroid fame, who were former members of PSAC, were invited as ex officio guests at meetings of PSAC. I intended to continue that practice. Pat heard about this and showed up in my office to denounce the idea on political grounds. My explanation was that invitees of this caliber could be invaluable in carrying out studies and making judgments about S&T matters. That was to no avail and John Ehrlichman agreed with Pat. This incident showed me that science, engineering, and politics are often incompatible. I should make it clear that not all members of the White House staff took such a hard nosed view of maintaining political purity. Recall that two of my colleagues at that time were George Shultz and Pat Moynahan. Both took a more sane view of how to raise science and engineering advice in a political surround. The science advisor can be in an untenable position. Politicians, and many business executives as well, are little interested in science except as it can be used to further short-term immediate goals. To put it succinctly, the time constant of science on the one hand, and politics and business on the other, are wildly incompatible. Furthermore, premature closing out of pathways to desired goals is not a

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usual step for most engineers and scientists. Rather, maintaining such options rather than long-term commitments to a single path is the currency of politics and business. Reflecting this axiom is the fact that the science advisor’s office, the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), has no formal function in the White House at all. The activity is only what the science advisor makes it and what the White House staff allows. When I left the White House in January of 1973, I wrote a recommendation that the office be given a function. I suggested that it be allowed or asked to approve all of the agency and departmental R&D budgets before they are sent to OMB. In other words, the office of science advisor (OSTP) would perform a function akin to the authorization committees in Congress. Then the OMB would do the analog to appropriating funds. Such an arrangement would permit OSTP to pull together federal programs across all of government as well as to see that sound technical programs go forward and unsound technical programs do not. The chances, however, of such a proposal being accepted are nil. OMB is not likely to give up any turf, and the agencies and departments would look on OSTP as merely another barrier to jump over. This takes us to the point of asking that fundamental question, do we need a science advisor and his supporting OSTP? The latter is now mandated by legislation. Neither one has a generally recognized function. The political environment is basically hostile. Scientists and engineers are not so adroit at managing conflicting interests, yet they are the people in the office of the science advisor. Since the time scales of R&D are not compatible with federal budget or political time scales, science advisors have difficulty getting in step. The situation is becoming worse rather than better. The old style science advisor, a distinguished person whom the President looked upon as his house intellectual to be listened to on the complex and new issues of nuclear arms, nuclear defense, advanced technologies, infectious disease, and so on is not likely to recur soon. Science advisors in the 1960s and perhaps the early 1970s came from a community that had supported government policy unflinchingly. That was the legacy of World War II. Today the community has basically detached itself and is a critic, not a friend, of the administration. That went for the Carter, Johnson, and Nixon Administrations as well as for the Reagan and Clinton Administrations. There are additional trends that make the science advisory task increasingly oblique to national policy. The federal government is no longer the principle support for US R&D. Industry is becoming increasingly dominant in that sphere. The latest figures that I’ve seen indicate that industry supports around 60% of the total R&D expenditures in the United States. The federal government supports about 40% and a small part comes out of other funding, especially from the states. Basic research is losing its identity as international competitiveness becomes a prime national goal. Defense sees research as a part and parcel of national policy, and SDI (Strategic Defense Initiative) is the prime example there. Industry-university couplings are increasingly sought, not only by the National Science Foundation (NSF) and the National Institutes of Health (NIH), but also by state and local governments in the service of economic development. In other words, the traditional activities and

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viewpoints of science and research are becoming increasingly submerged in the wider goals reflected in government and business. Another indicator of this trend is the popularity of emergent enterprises and entrepreneurship, particularly small business innovation. Witness the congressionally mandated “set-aside” for such activity (small business innovation research, the SBIR program). It’s probably one of the only real “set-asides” that has been passed in the last 25 years. How much further are these trends going to go? Where will R&D be 10 or 12 years from now? It’s clear, I think, that technological ventures, for example small business start-ups and small business generally, will become a larger and more recognized part of R&D and science policy. That stage is emergent today and will grow further. People both in government and industry will begin to look upon small business enterprise start-ups as a part of their R&D activities. On the federal side, DARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) has adopted such a viewpoint. The preponderance of research and development is aimed at the commercial, competitive world. The federal government takes a remote view of this world with some exceptions. Federal interests tend to focus on military and defense matters, on health and the life sciences, on environmental preservation, on the nation’s infrastructure to assure adequate transportation, and the necessities of life and living including education and energy across the board, all under the banner of infrastructure. All of these matters and much more were evident during my stay in the White House. It is interesting and significant that much of what occupies science and technology policy today began over 30 years ago, in the twilight of World War II. The energy matter arose when OST (that was the name before OSTP was initiated in 1976), was considering new technology programs. This effort was started by Bill Magruder, an assistant to John Ehrlichman, in late 1971. No new programs or technologies actually came out of the effort, but one of the candidate projects was a large parcel of energy R&D including solar, nuclear, wind, and so on. OSTP was heavily involved with all this, but the point is that early efforts in several current fields were spawned in 1972 or before. Yet the important matters of cost and price of alternative energies was not mentioned. Regarding the science advisor, we need to ask what the White House believes that it needs in the way of science advice, because that’s what it probably will get. It clearly needs a professional capability to analyze the technical dimension of issues and make recommendations. That capability must be politically astute, not so that it can tell the President what he would like to hear but so that the view can be convincing and timely. The White House needs to be able to tap the movers and shakers outside the White House for research and analysis of complex topics, such as global warming and its sources and consequences. Furthermore, the ability to canvass those on the outside and to do the analytical work in-house, requires longevity. Let me just cite an example of how effective long term tenure can be. We have the case of one Mr. Hugh Loweth, associate director of OMB for many years. He had science and related budgets as one of his principle responsibilities. Through his actions and insights on what was good or bad for science, engineering, and new technology development, he has, in effect, guided policy

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beyond what any science advisor could have possibly done. That’s mainly due to his longevity there. He knows how the system works and how to make it go. The trend today is away from fundamental research as a good to be pursued for its inherent merit. Rather the objectives of economic development and defense against terrorism are in the minds of most R&D sponsors. This has already led to new federal programs and others sponsored by the states individually. An example of such a program was in Colorado under the control of the Colorado Advanced Technology Institute (CATI). State programs are now widespread around the country, and provide a diverse framework for R&D funding aimed partially at local interests. The effect of this trend on R&D activities and advice for the highest levels of government is bound to be profound. Careful thinking about this situation may very well bring us to a different concept of science advising for the future.

Chapter 4

Science and Technology in the Carter Presidency Frank Press and Philip M. Smith

Introduction Each presidency becomes a collage, a complex art piece that represents the political vision set forth in the campaign and by the citizens’ ballot box decisions, the often unforeseen or unanticipated economic, domestic and international forces that a President must immediately start addressing, the compromises with the Congress, and the other political forces that shape any administration. Each science advisor and his staff have had to find their way into the White House’s operating environment and respond to unanticipated events so they could contribute effectively to the developing Presidential collage. Looking back, there were four large science and technology policy themes during the Carter presidency: • Growth in the support of basic research and its support by the mission departments and agencies. • Formulation of policy changes to facilitate technological innovation by industry. • An increased role for science and technology (S&T) in regulatory decision making and for informed technical judgments on energy, health, and environment technology and policy issues. • Among national security and international cooperation in S&T activities and issues, emphasis on S&T for capacity building in industrializing nations.

F. Press (B) Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Science and Technology Advisor to the President, President Jimmy Carter 1977–1981, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] P.M. Smith (B) Associate Director, Office of Science and Technology Policy 1976–1981, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] Current affiliation: Science Policy and Management, 767 Acequia Madre #2, Santa Fe, NM, 87505, USA R. Pielke, Jr., R.A. Klein (eds.), Presidential Science Advisors, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-3898-2_4,

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We will provide some highlights in each of these areas, but will start with a discussion of the operating environment for S&T policy and for the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) in the Carter presidency.1

The Operating Environment in the Carter Presidency The OSTP staff numbered 32. There were three associate directors. Ben Huberman, associate director for national security and international affairs, had a dual appointment as member of the National Security Council (NSC) staff. Gil Omenn was the associate director for life sciences and health. Philip Smith (PS) covered natural resources, energy, the other civilian mission agencies, and government-universityindustry relations. Jack Ruina and Gene Skolnikoff from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) served as senior consultants for 4 years. Other consultants and a few R&D agency details were brought in on specific issues. The Carter White House had much strength and also some notable weaknesses that reduced the President’s effectiveness and the effectiveness of Executive Office of the President (EOP) offices such as OSTP. The picture changed over 4 years, but some of the weaknesses persisted throughout. The daily life and effectiveness of OSTP was positively reinforced by: • President Carter’s interest in S&T and recognition that sound S&T advice is needed in many Presidential decisions helped us get off to a good start, especially in establishing working relationships with others in the White House and EOP. • The early appointment of Frank Press (FP) as Presidential science advisor facilitated establishment of working relationships and participation in the daily flows of information, e.g., the senior staff meeting in the Roosevelt Room at 7:30 A.M. every morning. The three associate directors regularly participated in substantive meetings with senior staff in Office of Management and Budget (OMB), Domestic Policy, NSC, Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), and others, depending on the topic. FP and the three associate directors had White House Mess privileges.2 • FP had direct access to President Carter, along with other senior staff, and got fast turn around on memos to the President, often overnight. The President frequently initiated inquiries to FP on S&T matters. Some queries dealt with S&T aspects of emerging issues he faced. Some were questions about breaking scientific discoveries and were more for his personal interest than a Presidential policy issue. 1 The most complete account of the Carter OSTP, from the perspective of the participants, appeared in Science (Press 1981a, b). 2 The White House Mess is in the basement of the West Wing, operated by the US Navy. It is adjacent to the White House Situation Room, where critical NSC meetings take place. Those who have never been to the Mess cannot appreciate its importance as an instrument for policy influence.

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• FP’s early appointment also enabled his active participation in the selection of R&D appointees for many departments and agencies. This early pattern of collaboration with the White House Personnel Office continued over the 4 years. Involvement in appointments strengthened relationships with R&D leaders across government. • Relations with OMB were excellent, strengthened by the fact that PS had worked in OMB earlier, and during the Ford presidency, had worked closely with OMB while at the National Science Foundation (NSF) and in the re-established OSTP. • President Carter did not desire to have a Presidential committee on science and technology. He had no animus about a science committee per se. Instead, he felt that there had been a general proliferation of standing Presidential committees and trimming was in order across the board – an issue that Presidents have wrestled with over the decades. OSTP employed a number of ad hoc committees and task groups focused on specific problems, many of which were appointed by President Carter. We also asked the National Academy of Sciences (NAS) to convene several quick turn-around studies.3 We will mention some of these OSTP and NAS committees. The congressional committees that had only recently enacted the OSTP legislation and many in the science community were displeased by the President’s decision not to have a Presidential science committee. The reality was that if President Carter did not want the committee, its activity would have been counterproductive. • The Federal Coordinating Council for Science Engineering and Technology (FCCSET) and the Intergovernmental Science Engineering and Technology Panel (ISETAP), both statutorily provided in the OSTP act, were active. FCCSET operated mainly through sub-committees targeted on specific issues.4 ISETAP, made up of governors, mayors, and county officials proved to be an effective mechanism for dialog, specific initiatives, and assistance on some issues, such as policies for high and low level radioactive waste management, because the mechanism gave OSTP entrée to leaders in state and local government. • In every presidency there are many unanticipated events, some with S&T elements. In the late 1970s they included failures of federal and private dams, the Three-Mile Island nuclear plant accident, and the Mt. St. Helens volcanic eruption. There were also unexplained, mysterious sonic booms experienced along the East coast and a light flash over the South Atlantic recorded by a Vela satellite that possibly could have been a nuclear explosion. In all these and other technical issues, President Carter immediately turned to FP and OSTP. 3 President Carter, in reinforcing the importance of the Academy’s objective advice, sent a letter to

Academy President Philip Handler praising the Academy’s work but asking for faster studies. 4 FCCSET suffered then and has since suffered from the fact that the designated Cabinet-level representatives can’t attend many meetings. Their deputies cannot commit their Cabinet-level bosses on many questions, and furthermore, they often work mainly to build their own program budgets. We used FCCSET with these realities in mind.

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• The Carter presidency devoted considerable time and political capital, perhaps too much capital, to government reorganization. We were regularly consulted on technology and research missions of departments and agencies. We helped structure research offices for the newly forming Departments of Energy (DOE) and Education (DOEd), and developed a civilian natural disaster preparedness and response mission for the then new Federal Emergency Management Agency. On the other hand, reorganization in the natural resources area on which OSTP expended considerable energy along with others in the EOP failed, as had many similar plans advanced earlier, for example, by Richard Nixon in the early 1970s and Franklin Roosevelt in the 1930s. Vice President Walter Mondale was very supportive of FP and OSTP. However, he deferred to President Carter on S&T issues.5 In spite of the President’s recognition of the importance of S&T and the relatively good and early access to the White House machinery, information flows, and access enjoyed by the Carter OSTP in decision making, many other advisors to the President started the administration with the assumption that the science and technology advisor was primarily a lobbyist for science and engineering funding. OSTP’s effectiveness grew in the second year and beyond as this attitude was laid to rest by the office’s performance and its contributions to Presidential policy decisions as an administration team player. Political and substantive tensions in every presidency exacerbate staff relationships, often creating axes among advisers. We tried to present objective scientific and technological advice and to work with all in the EOP and West Wing. On some issues such as energy, however, our positions satisfied neither environmental nor energy advocates and we found ourselves seemingly aligned with OMB and CEA more often than not. This was not purposeful but instead resulted from the three offices’ analyses of technical, budgetary, and economic aspects of proposals.6 The weaknesses in the Carter presidency affected the larger life of the presidency, along with the effectiveness of OSTP: • As is always the case, White House staff included a number of fierce loyalists more dedicated to their President than to governance. Those who had been with Carter when he was governor of Georgia were knowledgeable about small state government not the federal government. They had been with the President throughout his hard-fought campaign for nomination and election. Many were young – the White House jobs being their first in some instances. Some were 5 Late in the Carter Administration, the Vice President said to Frank “Your analyses have saved the government many hundreds of millions of dollars.” We frequently included Richard Moe, his chief of staff, in our EOP and West Wing discussions. 6 In one budget meeting with President Carter in the Cabinet Room, when we expressed serious reservations about a technology’s readiness, the Energy Secretary said “Mr. President, those arguments are just the fuzzy headed analyses of MIT professors.” In that case, at least, the President chose the recommendation from his science advisor.

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in jobs for which they were poorly prepared, e.g., the personnel process where knowledge about the missions of the departments and agencies is essential. The lack of experience with the government required patience, tact, and a willingness on the part of experienced staff, including OSTP, to provide quiet coaching and instruction. By the third year, the whole of the White House-EOP operation was shaken down and much more seasoned. Several advisors with prior government experience were added, replacing some of those who had come from the campaign. Most notably Anne Wexler and Lloyd Cutler assumed senior positions on the Carter staff; these seasoned Washington veterans greatly improved the functioning of the Carter White House. • The exception to this general improvement in operations was the ongoing relationship with the Hill, which remained uneasy even though Democrats were the majority in both bodies. Many proposals sent to the Hill took committees by surprise, adding to the residual hostility against the presidency created by the then recent budget impoundment battles between the Nixon Administration and the Congress and the excesses of the “Imperial Presidency” which ultimately led to Nixon’s resignation. The uneasy relation with the Hill was something we had to constantly be aware of. On occasion in our work with committees and staff, we had to be prepared to absorb pent up anger not really directed toward us but to the White House legislative staff. We note some of the effects of these weaknesses in our discussion of OSTP’s substantive work Finally, in discussing the operating environment in the Carter presidency, we should recall some international and domestic events that forced their way onto the agenda in terms writ large because they affected the operating environment. The economy was not good. The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) had tightened production for the second time in the 1970s, driving crude oil prices upward. Inflation was double digit, which not only greatly reduced in real terms the substantial budget increases for R&D that we achieved but also seriously affected the national economy and thus the perception of the President. The USSR’s invasion of Afghanistan caused President Carter to direct a cessation of most US–USSR science and technology agreements, effectively ending government-to-government S&T cooperation that had been started in 1973. Third, the Iranian hostage crisis that occupied President Carter in his last year left him politically weakened and diminished and thus the whole agenda, including the work of OSTP, lost effectiveness in the fourth year.

Growth in the Support of Basic Research and Its Support by the Mission Departments and Agencies Between 1968 and 1975, the level of federal support for R&D, including basic research, was flat in most departments and agencies. The Apollo program ended, efforts to apply space technology and the NASA mission philosophy in areas such

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as transportation and housing had for the most part not worked, and Presidents Johnson and Nixon were suspicious of scientists because of criticism of the Vietnam War. In Nixon’s case he became frustrated with the Presidential Science Advisory Committee (PSAC) because of its technical recommendation (along with those of the economic advisers) that a supersonic transport was infeasible. Other proposed administration policies and programs drew sharp criticism from PSAC. The Department of Defense (DOD) suffered a further decline in basic research support because of the Mansfield amendment.7 The economy had turned downward, and the federal budget was constrained by the costs of the war and the then already growing entitlement payments for Medicare. The two Ford budgets reversed the decline in basic research support and set the stage for the work we did to increase basic research support in the Carter presidency. Our work was guided by our belief that the mission departments and agencies, as well as the National Institutes of Health (NIH) and National Science Foundation (NSF), should propose basic research supportive of their missions, and if it passed muster in the budgetary review, it should be supported. OMB shared this view. We used several mechanisms in our work with OMB: • Panels reviewed basic research in DOD, DOE, and Transportation (DOT) (Office of Science and Technology Policy (1978a, b, c). The studies formed the basis for budgetary increases. Our work with DOD, where William Perry was Director of Defense Research and Engineering, was the most successful. Some of the then new DOD research that was initiated led to the technologies first used in the Gulf War. For example, aircraft stealth technologies that proved so effective in the War started as an accelerated materials research program in the DOD R&D build up in 1978. • We increased support for the recently established competitive grant program at Agriculture, which began as an OSTP initiative under Ford. The funding requests met resistance in the appropriation committees, an experience many of our successors encountered. OSTP also worked with Agriculture, other agencies, and committees of the Congress on aquaculture research and development, resulting in legislation signed by the President in 1980.8 7 In 1970, the late Senator Mike Mansfield inserted restrictive language in DOD’s authorization: “None of these funds . . . may be used to finance any research project or study unless such project or study has, in the opinion of the Secretary of Defense, a potential relationship to a military function or operation” (Sec. 203, PL 91–441). The amendment was in effect only 1 year, but the chilling effect on DOD-supported basic research continued over the 1970s and into the early Reagan years. 8 PL 96–362, the National Aquaculture Act of 1980, established Agriculture as the lead agency for aquaculture research and development, set up an interagency coordinating mechanism involving Agriculture, Commerce, Interior, and other agencies and established the National Aquaculture Information Center at the National Agricultural Library. It was authorizing legislation presciently advocated by the late George Brown. He was ahead of both science and government on this issue and many others, e.g., scientific cooperation with Mexico and natural hazards prediction and mitigation. R&D funding has varied. Aquaculture in the US flourishes 30 years later, albeit not without environmental and health concerns.

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• In the final three Carter budgets, we were able to make some “topping-off” adjustments to agency research budgets as the annual budget process neared conclusion. This involved adding additional funding for selected programs or projects after a cross-agency review. Even though the federal budget was constrained, there was a capability of making such additions out of a reserve that was set aside by OMB early in the budget review process. Recent science advisors and OMB directors have not had that capability because of the tightness of the discretionary budget.9 • In 1977, we made this a formal process, through a memorandum from the President to all Cabinet officers and agency heads asking them to conduct an internal exercise to identify ways that basic research could enhance their missions. The list of ideas and proposals that resulted was exceedingly interesting, and gave us the basis for the distribution of some additional funding that year.10 We should note that some of our efforts failed, e.g., the Interior Secretary turned down some additional funding for the US Geological Survey (USGS) 1 year, and OSTP’s credibility with OMB would have been damaged if we had forced the additional budget increase on Interior in light of the Secretary’s opposition. • At the NSF and the NIH, in addition to increases for basic research, we supported increases in funding of scientific instrumentation and facilities at research universities. The program was modest, however, far from meeting the need that continued to grow in the 1980s and into the 1990s. Those agencies also worked out additional means for time- and cost sharing of valuable scientific resources and facilities. To buttress support for these and similar initiatives, and because of President Carter’s personal interest in doing so, we worked with the White House offices and the departments and agencies on a message to Congress on science and technology that was sent to the Hill in March 1979 (The White House 1979a). The President also commissioned a study of scientific and engineering personnel and education that was undertaken jointly by the Department of Education (DOEd) and the NSF (National Science Foundation 1980). This DOEd-NSF report’s impact was muted,

9 The reserved amounts were not large and in the neighborhood of $100 million, but they were important in two ways. First, they permitted funding for some worthy initiatives that had to be deferred earlier in the budget review process before the budget totals were known. Second, since the “R&D budget” is really an aggregation of department and agency accounts, the reserve permitted “error correction,” e.g., adding some funding in a field of basic research where the sum of the individual agency proposals left a field under funded. 10 Science historian Gerald Holton and his colleague Gerhard Sonnert have recently reviewed the work we did in 1977, and have termed it “Jeffersonian science.” See Holton and Sonnert (1999). By this they mean basic or longer-term research with mission applications. The policy of supporting basic research across the mission agencies took root after World War II and continued into the late 1960s. Rather than seeking to develop a new paradigm, we saw our effort as one of restoring a tradition whose genesis lay in the Bush and Steelman Reports and had been interrupted in the late 1960s and early 1970s (Bush 1945, 1990; Steelman 1947, 1980).

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because it appeared in the midst of the election campaign and follow up was limited because of the effort in the early Reagan years to eliminate the Department of Education.11

Technological Innovation By the time of the Nation’s bicentennial, the public and American corporate leaders were worried by the rising technological prowess of many European and Japanese corporations. American dominance in technology-based products was being seriously challenged. In some sectors, industry investment in R&D was declining. PS had been sensitized to these concerns earlier at NSF and the Ford OSTP, because Guy Stever and PS met from time to time with corporate technology leaders and the leadership of the Industrial Research Institute (IRI). Industry leaders were quick to point to government as a cause of decline, but the problems were more complex. Industry management shared the responsibility.12 They had let facilities age and often hung on to old processes instead of shifting to new ones. Still, government regulatory, patent, antitrust, and other policies played an important role in industry’s performance. Frank Press continued the informal meetings with industry R&D leaders that Guy Stever had initiated. These conversations led FP to recommend to President Carter that there should be a comprehensive review of government policies and actions that encouraged or restrained innovation. There had been prior reviews, but none at the cabinet level and which spanned all agencies of the government. The review, undertaken in a manner analogous to a NSC Review, was cooperatively undertaken by OSTP and the Domestic Policy Council and the Department of Commerce (DOC) and was managed by Assistant Secretary of Commerce Jordan Baruch. Many corporate, small business, and consumer organizations and individuals participated actively, as did most of the departments and the White House offices such as OMB and CEA. The review resulted in a number of Presidential decisions announced in a Presidential message to the Congress in October 1979 (The White House 1979b). The review also sensitized cabinet leaders and large numbers of staff at all levels of government to the effect of their actions on industry’s ability to innovate. The policy adjustments flowing from the review resulted in a host of administrative and legislative actions. These included:

11 Reagan’s

campaign pledges to shrink government lost momentum by the second year of his presidency. As president, Reagan personally invested no political capital in governmental re-organizational matters but a report such as the Education-NSF report that appeared as the Presidential transition began became mired in campaign rhetoric. See Cannon (1991, p. 813). 12 As the Carter domestic policy review of industrial innovation wrapped up, greater attention was beginning to be focused on corporate executive failure to anticipate and respond to global changes in industry. See Hayes and Abernathy (1980).

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• Patent reforms, such as the establishment of a single patent court of appeals, liberalization of the use of government patents by universities and small businesses, patent term extension and modernizing the patent office information system. Implementation of many of the patent reforms was carried forward by Bruce Merrifield, Jordan’s Reagan Administration successor at Commerce, including work with the Congress on passage of the Bayh-Dole Act. Bruce remarked to us in the early 1980s: “You made my job easy because you did all the solid groundwork and analysis.” • A Department of Justice guide to joint research ventures was issued (US Department of Justice 1980). The innovation review had revealed that precompetitive cooperation in research by companies was hindered by a perception that such cooperation was illegal. The guide clarified this issue, gave hypothetical examples of appropriate collaborations, and encouraged appropriate industrial collaboration in pre-competitive research. • The NSF Small Business Innovation Research Program was extended to other departments and agencies and the NSF program’s funding was increased. • An accelerated and simplified depreciation schedule to encourage renewal of capital plant was put in place. • The Employment Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) was amended, making it permissible for fund managers to invest in innovative start-up companies. The resultant investments became a significant additional source of capital for venture funding. The innovation review also recommended a number of direct R&D investment strategies to be implemented by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), NSF, and other agencies. They included increased support of what have come to be called generic technologies useful in many sectors, e.g., robotics, and an expansion of then existing industry-university cooperative projects. There was also a proposal for a program in compliance technology, designed to help small industries meet environmental, health, and safety regulations. Two larger government-university-industry funding efforts were planned involving NSF and, in one case, DOT. They were the Cooperative Automotive Research Program (CARP), a basic research program involving the US automobile makers, NSF, and DOT. The second was the Ocean Margin Drilling Program (OMD) to pioneer state of the art deep drilling technology beneficial to fundamental geological and geophysical research but also of future use in exploration, supported by NSF and a number of oil companies. These two programs focused on quite fundamental research and technology, and were quite different in character than the NIST Advanced Technology Program of the late 1980s and 1990s or the Clean Car Initiative of the 1990s. Looking back, CARP and OMD struck a balance in government-industry cooperation that had a narrower role for government than many programs that followed. Still, CARP and the OMD were deemed “industrial policy” by the incoming Reagan presidency and were killed by David Stockman, the OMB director, long before George Keyworth was designated to be President Reagan’s science and technology advisor.

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Some recommendations originating in the innovation review met resistance then and have since. We recommended, for example, that an R&D tax credit for companies investing in R&D be made permanent. This perennial issue has carried forward to the present.

S&T’s Role in Regulatory Decision Making and in Energy, Health, and Environment Policy Concerns about industry’s ability to innovate invariably raise discussion of regulatory policies. Industry technology executives had sensitized us to their concerns. A second factor forced regulatory decision making on to White House agenda, namely, the enactment of a large number of new health, worker safety, and environmental laws in the late 1960s and early 1970s. By 1977 it was clear that the science base in some of the legislation and the rulemaking that flowed from the laws needed sorting out. Energy technology was also high on the list of priorities in the Carter presidency. And, in science itself, the then new recombinant DNA technology was bursting on the scene along with all of its unknowns and public fears. It was clear that these issues would be on OSTP’s agenda and FP and PS staffed accordingly at the beginning of the Carter Administration.13 Some highlights of OSTP’s regulatory decision making work included: • An analysis of the scientific principles underlying carcinogen risk assessment and the establishment of a framework for identifying and characterizing chemicals that might pose a carcinogenic risk (Calkins et al. 1978). The report was a basis for a uniform government policy. • Active participation in an NIH-led review of the risks and benefits of DNA technology and the establishment of NIH guidelines for DNA research.14 • Analysis of potential health effects of diesel emissions in the event that automobile makers introduced diesel vehicles into the US passenger fleet. This led to the setting of particulate emission standards issued by EPA to reduce diesel vehicle contributions to surface ozone beyond 1985, an accelerated diesel emission research program funded by DOE and encouragement, with strong support from other White House offices, for DOE, DOT, and EPA to jointly fund a diesel emission health effects study at the National Academy of Sciences.

13 In addition to Ted Greenwood, Lawrence Linden and Richard Meserve on PS’s staff, Gil Omenn

had Denis Prager, David R. Calkins, and John Ball in his group. All of these staff members and one or two agency staff on detail contributed to our work with the EOP groups, EPA, the Food and Drug Administration, Agriculture, Labor, and other agencies. 14 The late Donald S. Fredrickson served as NIH director in the Ford and Carter presidencies. His memoir about forging a government policy on recombinant DNA is the definitive case study. See Fredrickson (2001).

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• Ionizing and non-ionizing radiation and their health consequences, a perennial issue, was the focus of another government task force that OSTP led (Office of Science and Technology Policy 1978c). OSTP was a regular participant in two White House activities over this period, a Regulatory Council and a Regulatory Analysis Review Group (RARG) both chaired by CEA.15 RARG’s objective was to instill a more informed economic, scientific, and technical analysis in the rulemaking proposals flowing upward from the agencies. Energy policy and energy technology were constantly on the front burner in the Carter presidency just as they had been in the last Nixon years and for President Ford. There was a natural gas shortage during the 1976–1977 winter due to abnormally cold weather. A nationwide coal strike took place in the winter and spring, 1978, and the second OPEC embargo occurred in late 1978. We have already mentioned OSTP’s role in structuring the office of energy research in DOE. Our energy work included much review of the budgets for energy R&D, and the evaluation of specific technologies. For example: • A comprehensive assessment of the world’s uranium supply, proliferation, and fast breeder reactor technology contributed to the President’s decision to ask the Congress to stop funding for the Clinch River Breeder Reactor. • Technologies to enhance oil supply, e.g., coal liquefaction and oil shale, required technical and economic analyses that we conducted in concert with OMB and CEA. These projects, which grew out of the first OPEC embargo and the Project Independence response, were costly and in many cases not cost effective. They had begun to take on lives of their own with their own industrial and political constituencies whose expectations for continuing government subsidies exceeded technological and economic promise. • Years of delay in reaching a national consensus on a plan for the management of radioactive and other nuclear waste led to a comprehensive review by a Presidentially established interagency group that John Deutch, then DOE’s director of energy research, and PS ran. We also established outside expert advisory groups to assist in our review. There was much consultation with state officials. The framework for high and low level radioactive waste management that we recommended formed the basis for legislation enacted in 1981 and 1982 (National Technical Information Service 1979).16 15 For

a good discussion of the Regulatory Analysis Review Group and the Regulatory Council, see White (1981). 16 Nuclear waste management illustrated the tension in dealing with the Congress present in the Carter presidency. As our proposed technical framework began to emerge we in OSTP knew that it required congressional support and legislation. Some in the White House wanted to hold the plan close until it had been sent to the Hill. We in OSTP, on the other hand, recognizing that proposals we were developing needed consultation and vetting with congressional committees, as well as the states, wanted to start discussions with the members and staff and incorporate them into the

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• Solar and wind and other renewable energy technologies were also reviewed and they were a source of considerable division in the White House staff. Political and environmental advisors to the President proposed ambitious goals. On many of these issues we found our policy allies to be OMB and CEA. The scientific evidence that increased carbon dioxide was or would cause environmental changes led to our commissioning NAS studies on the status of climate modeling and an assessment of carbon dioxide build up in the atmosphere, something several successor science advisors have also done. We were also participants on a visionary taskforce that produced The Global 2000 Report to the President, an effort led by CEQ Chairman Gus Speth and the Department of State’s Office of Oceans, Environment and Science, at the time headed by Ambassador Tom Pickering. We supported the importance of the initiative but had trouble with the science in the models and resultant projections. We also found the report too pessimistic, because it undervalued new technologies that could ameliorate food shortages, create new sources of energy, and clean up industrial processes.17

S&T in International Relations and National Security International cooperation in science was one of the hallmarks of scientific advance in the twentieth century, and in many ways such cooperation has helped us advance our own research and national interests. All recent Presidents have seen S&T cooperation as an avenue to bridge political, cultural, and ideological differences between the US and other nations. Cooperation to manage technologies that have a global impact, e.g., safe use of nuclear energy, has also been a feature of the post World War II landscape and in the portfolio of science advisors. President Carter understood these important aspects of S&T. He also had a great interest in the role of science in the development of programs and institutions that would strengthen developing countries and help their scientists and engineers to use science and engineering in beneficial ways. All four of these international objectives occupied OSTP during the Carter presidency. Our efforts produced one of our greatest and historic successes and also one of our saddest failures. As noted, Ben Huberman had a dual appointment as an associate director in OSTP and as a member of the NSC senior staff. On a day-to-day basis, this integrated OSTP’s technical expertise into the national security process. FP, Ben and his staff, and on occasion other OSTP staff participated in NSC reviews.18 process. At the time PS said to one of his colleagues on the Domestic Council staff: “Well, it may be the President’s proposal, but radioactive waste won’t be stored under the White House lawn. It’s going to be in one or several states. We are going up to the Hill to go talk with members and staff.” 17 The report made its appearance near the end of President Carter’s term and promptly disappeared from view (Government Printing Office 1980). 18 We should observe that while we worked on many national security issues, the relation with the NSC was inevitably different than the science advisor’s role in national security in the

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President Carter used his science and technology advisor as a high level emissary, directly to foreign heads of state. These were missions where scientific understanding was a major factor in a particular international matter. The Secretary of State and National Security Adviser were involved in this planning. Some examples follow: OSTP participated in a wide range of arms control reviews and chaired an NSC interagency working group on the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. President Carter used FP to discuss the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty by sending him to meet with then United Kingdom Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher at Number 10, Downing Street to explain the technical basis for the US proposal because of her opposition to the US approach. As the administration was getting underway, China was also just beginning its renewed modernization drive, an undertaking of enormous magnitude then and now and the genesis of China’s interest in acquiring technology from the West. Trade, science, technological, and academic contacts had been taking place since the Nixon initiatives, but they were private, non-governmental exchanges and contacts.19 The President and National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski asked FP to develop a possible program of government-to-government cooperation in S&T. After a few months of preparation, FP led a large delegation, including the heads of NSF, NASA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), NIH, USGS, the cabinet level research directors of DOE and DOC, and other government R&D leaders on an extended visit to China. At the time it was, and may still be, the largest official R&D delegation of government S&T officials to go abroad. They went in their own Air Force plane, which added prestige to the visit from the perspective of their Chinese hosts.20 The delegation was received by the Chinese leader Chairman Deng Xiaoping who personally engaged in the discussions and gave a warm welcome to FP. It was the warmest reception that a US delegation had ever received since 1949 (Rose 1995, p. 159). The mission led to the formal agreement on cooperation in science and technology signed by the President and Chairman Deng Xiaoping in early 1979, initiation of government-to-government cooperation in R&D, and the start of the influx of Chinese students studying in American universities. There’s an interesting anecdote related to Chinese student

Eisenhower and Kennedy presidencies when the science advisor and the President’s Science Advisory Committee were deeply involved in the development of reconnaissance satellites and evaluating competing missile technologies. By the 1970s, the intelligence communities’ network of consultants was in place and DOD had a greatly strengthened science advisory system of its own. By our time, national security had evolved to include issues such as commercial and civilian use of the GPS system along with technical issues such as the siting of the proposed MX system. 19 The National Academy of Sciences Committee for the Scholarly Communication with the People’s Republic of China was a main point of contact for exchanges from 1972 until the late 1970s when the government-to-government exchanges were put in place. Anne Keatley (now Anne Solomon), who had staffed the NAS committee, joined OSTP to work on the China initiative. 20 The three OSTP associate directors were scheduled to be on the China trip. But PS did not go. About a week before scheduled departure FP said to PS: “You would know how to handle a request from the President, or what to do if anything happens to us. I don’t think you should make the trip.” FP and PS rarely travelled together when at OSTP.

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study in US universities. FP may be the only science advisor who could get through to a President in the middle of the night with a phone call from another country. In his book Beyond the White House President Carter relates the incident this way: “I sent my science adviser Dr. Frank Press to Beijing . . . and was surprised to receive a telephone call from Frank one night, long after I had gone to bed. He informed me that he was with Deng [Xiaoping] who asked him about sending Chinese students to study in American Universities. I responded, Frank, I have already told you that we would welcome the students, and there would not be a limit. He said, Mr. President he asked me if he could send five thousand and he wants an answer directly from you. Tell him to make it fifty thousand, I responded.” (Carter 2007, p. 107) In the further discussion of Chinese student study with Deng, FP cautioned that it was possible that some students would choose to remain in the US to pursue their scientific careers. After a pause, the Chairman responded: “Dr. Press, we have plenty more!” On another occasion President Carter sent FP to Japan to deliver and explain a personal letter to then Prime Minister Masayoshi Ohira. The Prime Minister came off the campaign trail to receive him. This was a time when Japan was receiving criticism in the United States for commercializing American scientific and technological advances while contributing relatively little to the global pool of basic research. In his letter President Carter urged the Japanese Prime Minister to increase Japan’s contribution to world science. President Carter also asked FP to lead similar S&T missions to South America and Africa in a White House plane. The mission to South America and Caribbean countries led to the start of several exchange programs that were continued in the 1980s. The expedition to Nigeria, Zimbabwe, Kenya, and Senegal came late in the Carter presidency and did not succeed for the most part in establishing cooperative programs, because capacity building in developing countries did not receive attention early in the Reagan Administration. It was a surprise for the delegation to be met at the airport by the Nigerian Minister of Defense in full regalia. He had been a post-doctoral fellow in applied mathematics at FP’s laboratory at Caltech. In a March 1978 speech in Venezuela, President Carter announced his intention to create what came to be called the Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation (ISTC). The new institute’s objective would be strengthening S&T capacity in developing countries. FP, Gene Skolnikoff, Ambassador Henry Owen, a Presidential advisor on international economic issues, and OSTP with input from Huberman, Omenn and PS and their staffs worked intensely on the development of ISTC for 3 years. But the ISTC was not to be. Though congressionally authorized and with the House appropriation committee supportive, the Senate appropriation committee refused to provide funding, indicating they did not want to create a new agency.21 However, Congress did provide funding for a new office of science at the Agency for International Development (AID) that enabled AID to take on some of

21 This was another issue where the Carter Administration’s often poor relations with the Congress

may have influenced the outcome of the ISTC in the Senate.

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the activities intended for ISTC.22 Our failure to establish ISTC was a deep disappointment for the President and for us. All of us involved in the ISTC battle have great admiration for President Carter’s continued pursuit of ways to develop human capacity, including S&T capability, in industrializing nations through the work of the Carter Center. OSTP organized panels to assess Soviet computer, space, battlefield weapons, nuclear warhead, and high-energy laser technologies. Later in the administration, OSTP and its expert consultant panel reviewed missile modernization and subsequently advised on the complex MX missile deployment issue. This issue, together with the CEQ-State Department-led global 2000 forecast and solar energy goal that we have mentioned, were issues where our technical judgments were at variance with the eventual Presidential decisions. President Carter said in these cases that he did not disagree with OSTP’s recommendations but that, for other policy or political reasons, he had arrived at a different end point. Work on space policy was divided, as has been the work of most recent science advisors, between the classified space programs for national security and the civil space programs, including those run by the NOAA and the USGS as well as NASA. Within NASA, there was a perpetual struggle to preserve an adequate scientific research and exploration program in face of the always increasing costs and cost overruns for manned space activities. After a half a decade of delays, the Shuttle was ready to enter flight, but it was clear that it would not meet the payload and economic promises advanced at the time President Nixon approved shuttle construction. Operation costs would be greater than NASA forecast and payloads would be smaller. The disparity between hope and reality in the Shuttle’s capability was a source of much tension with NASA and its congressional advocates. For NOAA and the USGS, the issue was an unrealistic proposal, advanced by OMB, that weather and land-observing satellite systems could be fully “spun off” as privatized enterprises. Looking back, our most significant work without question was our advocacy of and contribution to the development of a policy for non-military use of the DOD’s Global Positioning System (GPS). We worked closely with NSC, OMB, DOD, and DOT on the issue. It was a hard-fought debate because of justifiable national security concerns that declassified geographic positioning information would be available to enemy states. A second hard-fought space policy issue was a Presidential decision to acknowledge publicly the very existence of reconnaissance satellites. By the mid 1970s, the whole world had learned of their existence and about some of their remarkable capabilities, but DOD and the intelligence agencies were forced to dissemble when questioned about national reconnaissance programs. Some in the military and intelligence communities wanted to cling to the outdated policy of denial. OSTP led the review that led to a declassification of the fact that the reconnaissance programs existed, and President Carter publicly acknowledged the policy change in a speech at the Kennedy Space Flight Center in October 1978. 22 AID

contracted with the National Academy of Sciences’ Board on Science, Technology and International Development (BOSTID) to initiate S&T capacity building programs in a number of nations.

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Two Cultures in the Corridors of Power It is rare that political decision makers have had any training in science and communication with them on technical issues is not easy. President Carter’s science advisor was fortunate in serving as an assistant to a politician who may have been the most technically literate President since Thomas Jefferson. However, the other senior White House advisors, all of whom were important in political decision making, were ill tutored in the way scientists think and work, in the scientific method, in the natural role of probability and uncertainty in scientific discourse. An example, both amusing yet potentially crucial in impact, comes to mind. At one of the early morning meetings that President Carter regularly held with his staff, he called out across the long table of the Roosevelt Room in the West Wing: “Frank, I see that in today’s New York Times it is reported that there are too few neutrinos being emitted from the Sun. What do you make of it?” At seven o’clock in the morning FP, hardly prepared for this out-of-place question, mumbled something like “perhaps the neutrinos may have mass”. The answer seemed to satisfy the President. At the end of the meeting after the President left the room, staffers ran up to FP and in excited voices wanted to know if this was a serious crisis. They asked: “Should we inform the Cabinet members and send cables to alert all of our embassies?” So, there really are “two cultures in the corridors of power” as C.P. Snow recognized, adding to the burden of science advisors (Snow 1959, 1961). We found the appropriate approach to the political and cultural differences among White House staff was to use a low-key approach in which we tried to factually explain the science and technical issues to others on the White House and EOP staffs. We always recognized that their expertise was also necessary in the crafting of Presidential policy.

When Should a Science Advisor Resign? What does a science advisor do if his client adopts policies contrary to his advice? Should he or she resign if this happens? We hope not, since with this attitude an advisor’s tenure would be short lived. An example: During President Carter’s term in office, his political staff proposed that he should commit to a national goal that by the year 2000, the United States would draw 20% of its energy from renewable energy sources, that is, other than hydrocarbons and nuclear. They argued for this action on many grounds, among them that this would improve the President’s political standing. These individuals implored FP to join them in their initiative out of concern that the President might not accept their proposal if the science advisor did not agree with them. FP and his staff decided not to support their proposal, because though laudable, in their opinion it was not an achievable goal. However despite this technical advice, the President decided to accept the proposal of the political staff. To set a national example, solar panels were installed on the roof of the colonnade between the President’s House and the West Wing to provide hot water for the White House Mess. On this

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and several other occasions President Carter told us that he agreed with our technical evaluation but would follow another course for political reasons – a reasonable action, it seems to us, for a President who has weighed all sides of a policy decision. There was only one occasion in 4 years where FP would have resigned had the President decided to proceed in a certain direction. During the Presidential election campaign of 1980, candidate Ronald Reagan announced that he believed in the biblical story of creation, called Creation Science at the time. Reagan thought that Creation Science should be taught in schools together with the scientific theory of Darwinian evolution. Reporters immediately called our office and asked what President Carter’s views were. The President asked FP and a few other members of the White House staff to draft a response for him to examine. We all knew that President Carter was both deeply religious and scientifically literate. (He read the book Understanding Earth, co-authored by FP, in one weekend!) (Press et al. 2003). This is the statement we prepared and that he approved: The scientific evidence that the earth was formed about 4.5 billion years ago and that life developed over this period of time is convincing. I believe responsible science and religion can work hand in hand to provide important answers to our existence on the earth. . . . My own personal faith leads me to believe that God is in control of the ongoing processes of creation. In so far as the school curriculum is concerned, school officials should exercise their responsibility in a manner consistent with the Constitutional mandate of separation of church and state.

In his statement President Carter recognizes the difference between a theory based on scientific evidence and a personal belief based on religious faith. The US Constitution has clauses in it that requires the separation of church and state. The President cites the Constitution to require that only scientifically based material is taught in science classrooms. Beliefs based on religious faith are appropriate for discussion in other venues. A few years later the US Supreme Court, in agreement, ruled against the teaching of Creation Science in the public schools. The issue is relevant today because President Bush announced in August 2005 that he believed that a new version of Creation Science called Intelligent Design should be taught in schools together with the scientific theory of evolution (The Washington Post 2005). When interviewed by a reporter his science advisor, physicist John Marburger, stated that “evolution is the cornerstone of modern biology” and that “intelligent design is not a scientific concept.” This difference between a President and his science advisor, on so important a constitutional issue, has not been resolved in the Bush Administration and many state reviews of teaching creation science in the public schools show how divisive the issue continues to be in the nation.

Conclusion PL 94–282, the act that created OSTP, guarantees a presence for S&T advice in a presidency, a voice that now cannot be stilled without consent of Congress. OSTP’s transition into the Carter presidency was the first “test” of the legislation’s vitality.

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PL 94–282 provides flexibility for staffing, e.g., whether to have a deputy or associate directors, and this has permitted adoption to differing Presidential interests and operating styles. The statutory provisions mandating the Presidential science advisory committee, FCCSET and ISETAP, have caused tension with the Congress and the S&T communities because they have not been deployed uniformly over the last three decades but the use of these committees must fit the style of a presidency. We were criticized for not fighting hard for a Presidential science advisory panel, but if President Carter did not want it, its existence would have been counterproductive. Instead, we obtained extensive outside advice from committees appointed for focused analysis and from the Academy, and this approach was effective. Important as the legislation is, the working relationship between the President and his S&T advisor charts the course for OSTP in any presidency. We were successful in large part because of the positive factors in OSTP’s operating environment which we have noted. The most important of these were President Carter’s interest in S&T advice in decision making and his own personal curiosity about scientific discoveries, the early selection of FP as S&T advisor, and our good relations with OMB. Much else flowed from these three factors. Over the years the academic S&T policy community, university scientists, and the science media have focused on the frequency of meetings between a science advisor and a President as the measure of an advisor’s effectiveness. Access is important, and in the case of President Carter, we had a President knowledgeable about S&T who gave his advisor easy access and with whom he consulted regularly. What is less well understood on the outside is that much of OSTP’s effectiveness depends on its relationships with others on the White House staff and in the EOP in the day-in and day-out policy work of the White House where technical advice must be melded together with budgetary, domestic, national security, economic, and other advice that ultimately leads to a Presidential decision. The science advisor must gauge when issues should go directly to the President, and how to deploy the OSTP capabilities in the work with others in the White House. And the advisor must constantly balance relationships with cabinet and agency R&D leaders who are generally more than willing to draw OSTP into their operations that, however interesting, inevitably chew up scarce time and limited staff. Most of all, there must be some “reserve capacity,” that is, the ability to direct time and resources to new Presidential initiatives and to the unexpected. Looking back, FP was relatively successful in handling these balances. Another important factor contributed to our effectiveness. It is this: leadership in the S&T policy community, to some extent partisan to be sure, nonetheless generally reaches across partisan lines on the issues of S&T policy and the critical questions of investments in R&D. That FP and PS had worked with Guy Stever and the earlier science advisors, leaders such as William O. Baker, Simon Ramo, Solomon Buchsbaum, and many others over the preceding years, facilitated the 1977 transition of OSTP from one administration and one party to another and it helped again in 1981 when PS worked with Art Bueche who was leader of the Reagan S&T transition team. Bueche was an old friend with whom PS had worked earlier when Bueche was an elected officer of the IRI in the 1970s. This tradition of bipartisanship

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in science policy leadership has continued to the present and hopefully it will carry forward into the future. Substantively, the interesting aspect of this retrospective review of OSTP’s work in the late 1970s is that many critical issues then are also key S&T issues today at the start of the twenty-first century. The Nation has been unable to chart a constant policy and budgetary course for emerging energy technologies. The growing consequences of anthropogenic pollutants like CO2 were recognized in the mid-1970s. The evidence for man-caused climate changes accumulated over the last 25 years is very strong, enough so to act upon. Yet the political debate over the “science of climate change” continues. The science base for regulation remains important and remains controversial. Innovation in the face of global competitiveness continues to be a vital issue for national leaders as well as corporate executives. Nutrition, health, and food safety issues that were infrequent issues for earlier science advisors became a larger focus for analysis in the Carter OSTP and have increasingly been on the agenda of the OSTP in all recent presidencies. To be certain progress has been made on many fronts from energy conservation to improved water quality. Nonetheless the differing time horizons for resolving problems between scientists who focus on multi-year approaches to problems and their solutions and political decision makers with their short attention spans continue to make for an erratic, not steady policy course in our democracy. Meanwhile, scientific discovery drives forward at a rate faster than that which either the political system or the public can cope. Thorny new issues such as stem cell research force their way onto the science policy and political agendas.23 We do not expect any diminution in the rate of scientific discovery or in the invention of technologies, e.g., information technology, which have their own social benefits as well as liabilities. The case for a Presidential science advisor and an OSTP is as strong today than at any point over the more than 50 years since the time of Vannevar Bush, I. I. Rabi, Jim Killian, and the other early Presidential science and technology advisors.24

References Bush, V. (1945, 1990). Science – The Endless Frontier: A Report to the President on a Program for Postwar Scientifi Research. Washington, DC: Reprinted by the National Science Foundation. Calkins, D. R., Dixon, R. L., Gerber, C. R., Zarib, D., Omenn, G. S. (1978). Identification Characterization, and Control of Potential Human Carcinogens: A Framework for Federal Decisionmaking. Washington, DC: Office of Science and Technology Policy, Also (1980). Journal of American Cancer Institution 64 (169). Cannon, L. (1991). President Reagan: The Role of a Lifetime. New York: Simon & Schuster. Carter, J. (2007). Beyond the White House. New York: Simon and Schuster.

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an excellent discussion of science’s rapidly accumulating knowledge and social and human repercussions of these discoveries see Shapiro (2001). 24 Reconstructing events that took place a quarter a century ago is challenging! We want to acknowledge the valuable recall, comments, and critique of this paper provided by Gene Skolnikoff, Lawrence H. Linden, H. Guyford Stever, and Michael McGeary.

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Fredrickson, D. S. (2001). The Recombinant DNA Controversy: A Memoir. Washington, DC: American Society for Microbiology Press. Government Printing Office (1980). The Global 2000 Report to the President: Entering the TwentyFirst Century. Volumes one and two. Washington, DC: Government Printing Office. Hayes, R. H. and Abernathy, W. J. (1980). Managing Our Way to Economic Decline. Harvard Business Review, July 1. Holton, G. and Sonnert, G. (1999). A Vision of Jeffersonian Science. Issues in Science and Technology, Fall, 61–65. National Science Foundation (1980). Science and Engineering Education for the 1980s and Beyond. Washington, DC: National Science Foundation and Department of Education, October. National Technical Information Service (1979). Report to the President by the Interagency Review Group on Nuclear Waste Management. Washington, DC. Office of Science and Technology Policy (1978a). Report of the Working Group on Basic Research in the Department of Defense. Washington, DC. Office of Science and Technology Policy (1978b). Report on Basic Research in the Department of Energy. Washington, DC. Office of Science and Technology Policy (1978c). A Technical Review of the Biological Effects on Non-Ionizing Radiation: Report of an Ad Hoc Group. Washington, DC. Office of Science and Technology Policy (1980). Report of the Advisory Panel on Basic Automotive Research in the Department of Transportation. Washington, DC. Press, F. (1981a). Science and Technology in the White House, 1977–1980, Part 1. Science, 211, 9 January, 139–145. Press, F. (1981b). Science and Technology in the White House, 1977–1980, Part 2. Science, 211, 16 January, 249–256. Press, F., Siever, R., Grotzinger, J., Jordan, T. S. (2003). Understanding Earth. New York: W.H. Freeman and Company. Rose, R. S. (1995). Negotiating Cooperation: The United States and China, 1969–1989. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Snow, C. P. (1959, 1961). The Two Cultures and the Scientifi Revolution. New York: Cambridge University Press, and Science and Government. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Shapiro, H. T. (2001). Science, Anxiety and Meaning. Proceedings: White House Office of Science and Technology Policy 25th Anniversary Symposium, Cambridge, MA: MIT. Steelman, J. R. (1947, 1980). Science and Public Policy. Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office. Reprinted New York: Arno Press. US Department of Justice (1980). Anti-Trust Guide Concerning Joint Research Ventures. Washington, DC, November. The Washington Post (2005). August 2. The White House (1979a). The President’s Message to Congress on Science and Technology. Washington, DC, 27 March. The White House (1979b). The President’s Message to Congress on Industrial Innovation. Washington, DC, 31 October. White, L. J. (1981). Reforming Regulation: Processes and Problems. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Chapter 5

Policy, Politics and Science in the White House (The Reagan Years) George A. Keyworth II

The first 5 years of the Reagan Administration was a time of disruptive change. Domestically this was seen in attempts to downsize government and free up nongovernmental forces to stimulate economic expansion. Internationally it was seen in shifts in relations with foreign nations based not so much on US economic selfinterest as on the projection of American values of independence and individual freedom. During those 5 years US–Soviet tensions first heightened, then waned, then led just a few years later to the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the end of the Cold War. For reasons I will present in this chapter, the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) played a larger than usual, and larger than expected, role in helping President Reagan during that intense period of transitions. In 1981 OSTP was, and remains today, somewhat of an anomaly among the different Executive Offices of the President. It is viewed by some White House staffers as an asset, but by some others as an imposition. How a resolution of those diverging views emerges has much to do with how the office functions. And circumstances differ. Each OSTP Director has advised different Presidents under unique circumstances. Priorities varied, pressures were different, and personalities created different relationships. While not intending to speak generally about the nature of those relationships, either in fact or in recommendation, I cannot describe my own experience as science advisor without dwelling on the key relationships that developed during my tenure. Stated most simply, they were critical to my ability to be effective. I joined the Reagan Administration in early May 1981, 4 months after the President’s inauguration and after the assassination attempt. During the first few months, as well as during the transition planning, there had been much debate over whether a science advisor was, in fact, even needed. Opposition stemmed largely from the perception that OSTP in its then-form had been re-created by the Congress

G.A. Keyworth II (B) Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Science Advisor to the President, President Ronald Reagan 1981–1985, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected]


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to represent its, and the scientific community’s, interests in science and technology, while the White House staff was there to serve the President. Consequently, a number of the President’s close and trusted friends and advisors viewed a science advisor as someone likely to be different from them and likely to come with an agenda that might conflict with the President’s. The countervailing view, which eventually prevailed, was simply that since so many of the Administration’s top priorities – for example, defense, energy and the changing economy – were deeply rooted in science and technology, they needed a team member with competency and credibility in science. Without expertise on the President’s policy team, the White House would be dependent upon the external agencies, and they would be even less certain to share the President’s priorities. By the time I was invited to Washington as a candidate for science advisor, the debate was over and resolved, and I sensed a real spirit of welcome. At the outset of the first term, policy development in the Reagan Administration was more centrally organized than in many administrations. Edwin Meese, who bore the title of Counselor to the President, coordinated all policy making, spanning domestic, defense and even foreign policy. This wide-ranging power, along with Meese’s real talent for the job and his uniquely close relationship with the President, led to him often being referred to in the press as the “Deputy President”. One of the many means Meese used to coordinate policy development was to hold meetings each evening in his office, with leaders of each White House office involved in policy matters, including the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), from four to six of us, to discuss both the tactical issues of the day and some of the longer-lasting, more strategic ones. Ed Meese made it possible for me, early on, to develop a relationship with the President and with the other members of the President’s senior staff. A President has many assistants, but few bona fide advisors. Only he can make that distinction. You’re hired as an assistant. Whether you ever become an advisor depends on the value you can provide. Sometimes the opportunities may come in ways that you would not have expected. In the summer of 1981, one of the President’s children began to appear frequently in the press in sympathy with a number of anti-nuclear activists. Worried about her being exploited, the President turned to Ed Meese for advice. Ed suggested I might help. The President then called me to ask if I would mind coming over to talk about a personal matter. Sensing that his daughter would probably not react well to his own counsel, the President asked if I would go out to California and talk with her. I did, and that became the first step in my personal relationship with the President. Just a few weeks later the President, also at Ed Meese’s suggestion, asked if I would “mind coming over to discuss an issue he was pondering.” He put the question quite simply. A lot of good people were suggesting to him that we commit a hundred billion dollars or so to this new radar-evading technology called “Stealth”, and he needed to know some basics before making that commitment: In particular, he queried “does it really work, and if so will it continue to do so?” This was a turning point for me, in two different ways. One is that, as I started to give an answer, it suddenly occurred to me that this wasn’t the kind of scientific

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exchange I was used to engaging in with my colleagues at Los Alamos. Here, there would be no opportunity to revise my best guess. Catching myself, I deferred in answering until I could gain enough knowledge to be confident in my advice. As it turned out, it took several months. While still at Los Alamos, Edward Teller and I had looked at the effectiveness of Stealth. We had concluded that it was vulnerable to several countermeasures, including multiple or bi-static radars. In 1981, when I looked at it more deeply, I was able to take into account the broader implications of electronic countermeasures. At the low signal levels involved we could “actively cancel” an incoming radar beam. I became confident that Stealth technology would not only work but that it would continue to be an advantage for the US for some time. The combination of specular reflection, radar-absorbing materials and active cancellation may not make a Stealth vehicle undetectable, but it can make it very difficult to track. And this is especially true for a vehicle flying at very low altitudes, in the radar ground “clutter”. I became a strong advocate of the then highly-classified F-117 fighter, as well as a supporter for including the Stealthed B-2 bomber as a priority in our program for strategic force modernization. While the USSR was building a complex network of air defenses, this new technology would allow us to maintain the airplane leg of the deterrent triad. This was a rather complex technical issue where the President was able to get knowledgeable advice from a member of his own staff. The second reason this question posed to me by the President about Stealth technology was a turning point was that this was the first time I confronted one unusual aspect of advice to the President. That is the isolation of the President, an isolation that was made even more so by President Reagan’s natural aloofness. One can hardly avoid being keenly aware of the extraordinary isolation the President has in so many of the key decisions he must take. And I saw that isolation time and time again, particularly in his decision to propose his Strategic Defense Initiative, which is discussed later in this chapter. As a result of that simple question as to the viability of Stealth, and the challenge that responding to it entailed, we were able to develop within OSTP some substantial expertise in some of the more arcane, and more sensitively classified areas of defense technology. These included Stealth, anti-submarine warfare, space-based surveillance and other key technologies that underlay our defense modernization efforts. As a result, we became “credentialed”, and OSTP became a full member of the President’s team. We were assigned a role both in advising on defense issues and in articulating the basis for decisions on defense. In the very early eighties, clearly the Administration’s top program priority was defense. As a result of the role OSTP played I became a regular attendee of the National Security Planning Group – the pared down version of the Cabinet that dealt with issues of national security. One issue that was assigned to us shortly after I arrived was space policy. Richard Allen, the President’s first National Security Advisor, suggested that I take responsibility for space policy in the White House. To put that in context, the shuttle’s first flight occurred in our Administration’s first year and NASA was then seeking support for the Space Station. After

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some months of study, we made two central conclusions that would shape our Administration’s debate over space policy. The first was that dependence upon a manned launch vehicle – the Shuttle, with all its additional restrictions, limitations, and cautions over those required for simpler unmanned launches – for putting essential military assets into space presented a dangerous and unnecessary risk to the continuity of defense needs. The second was that the Space Station, being sold to the public as a scientific advance, had little scientific rationale. Instead, its more nebulous role was to keep for the US, as NASA spokesmen often maintained, a “permanent manned presence in space.” NASA fought a hard battle to make the shuttle the sole heavy launch vehicle for the US, an institutionally self-serving position but hardly a responsible one for the country. Fortunately, we were able to work effectively with the Air Force, especially with the then-Under Secretary Pete Aldrich, to ensure that there would be support for the Titan IV unmanned launch vehicle as an alternative to the Shuttle. It turned out to have been a fortunate decision. The battle over the Space Station turned out to be even more frustrating. Arguments to support the Space Station were simply too weak to withstand any meaningful scientific or technical review, so NASA took its case to the more accommodating media and to the aerospace industry lobby. Throughout his first term, President Reagan did not voice support for the Space Station, despite NASA’s heated efforts. However, the architects of the 1984 reelection campaign changed that, viewing lack of Space Station support as a potential liability. President Reagan never placed a high priority on space policy, save for defense needs, and his eventual, albeit muted, support for the Space Station emerged only as a campaign issue, never as a statement of space policy. Since the Challenger tragedy occurred early in his second term, the Space Station became secondary to deciphering what to do about space access, but I had departed by then. Now, let me return to that initial concern that the science advisor might have an agenda separate from the President’s. I did have a special, personal agenda. Fortunately, I never felt it was inconsistent with the President’s larger agenda. I strongly believed, and still do, that no federal research dollars gain more fruitful rewards than do those relatively few committed to basic research, the search for pure knowledge. In contrast, federal R&D ostensibly directed toward aiding the economy largely fails. We had quite a few opportunities to weigh in on policy issues having to do with international technological competitiveness, such as the rise of Japanese microelectronics. Fortunately, we generally wound up advising no action, which turned out to be the best policy. I was committed to making basic research a major priority in our Administration’s support of R&D. While that may not have been, initially, much of an Administration priority, it was consistent with the President’s views of the proper role of government. And, to an extent, as a member of the President’s personal team, I had the unique opportunity to argue the cause for basic research. And I did. But, to be truly effective in getting major new funding, it takes more than simple persuasion. There are too many competing needs. Instead, one has to earn what I’ll simply refer to as “points”, the means to barter effectively for competing priorities.

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Just as in other walks of life, one earns “points”, or credibility, by producing value. One opportunity occurred in the fall of 1982, when the Administration was having a difficult time finding a politically acceptable basing mode for the landbased MX missile. This would be the long-overdue, new land-based missile to replace the aging Minutemen and Titans. As the final link in the Administration’s program to modernize nuclear forces – and central to returning to more realistic arms reduction negotiations with the Soviet Union – much hinged on solving this problem. One nagging requirement was the need to ensure that any fixed site would not be vulnerable to a preemptive nuclear attack. Earlier, President Carter had proposed basing the MX in a movable concept, somewhat akin to a “shell game”, where there is uncertainty under which shell the object lies. Many options were reviewed, a process in which OSTP played a prominent role. Finally, agreement began to emerge on a somewhat arcane concept, called “Densepack.” In densepack, the missiles would be protected by being in a closely spaced array. While the technological rationale was simple in concept, it was not intuitive; moreover, it was a concept that few wanted in their neighborhood. Simply put, the system’s survivability derived from the fact that a successful first strike against the MX array would require precise, massive attacks by incoming nuclear warheads. But when the MXs were closely spaced, the radiation from the first exploding warhead (it was beyond technical capability for them to be detonated simultaneously) would destroy subsequent warheads, leaving most of the MX missiles operable after a massive attack. Thus the term “fratricide”. After selecting densepack, controversy arose over just who would articulate the technically complex rationale behind the decision. In an effort to resolve an impasse between the National Security Council (NSC) and the Pentagon, NSC suggested that OSTP take on the task. It took months of effort by a good portion of the OSTP staff and turned out to be a particularly difficult job. In the end we failed to win congressional support, but we did succeed in raising awareness of the importance the President put on completing the MX program, and that paid off later. The battering that OSTP took on this effort, in hearings before House and Senate Committees, in the press and within the arms-control embracing scientific community, along with the evidence that we could hold our own in this nasty public and congressional battlefield, earned us some additional legitimacy. We had acquired some “points” with the President and with other members of the White House staff. Few people who come to Washington for the first time really understand what they’re getting into. This is especially applicable to science advisors, who tend to come from a wholly different world, generally from either universities or research laboratories. So you either learn, and quickly, or you become irrelevant. Fortunately, early in my tenure in Washington, an acquaintance had suggested that I study the wisdom to be found in Machiavelli’s writings, especially in The Prince, perhaps the greatest treatise ever written on the exploitation of power. Unlike business, Washington is far more about power than it is about process. Where we in OSTP most needed power was in the budget process. While the

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Administration had agreed that funding for basic scientific research, particularly in universities, deserved the special protection first defined by Vannevar Bush, the noted science advisor who served during World War II, as a “federal trust”, there was of course a range of opinion as to what funding increases were needed. The 1970s had been a generally tough decade for basic research, especially with the high rates of inflation of the previous few years, and we in OSTP felt that some pretty heroic funding increases were required. This is where we chose to spend our points. We spent them on the subsequent 18% annual increases in NSF’s budget; on the introduction of a number of major new programs such as the NSF Centers and Presidential Young Investigator Awards; and on new facilities not in agencies’ initial budget requests. Those and other increases were the result of negotiations where such “points” were required. While each of these thrusts was consistent with Administration policy, the individual initiatives could only be obtained because OMB knew we were prepared, and confident, to take those differences to Ed Meese or even to the President for resolution. Finally, let me come to the single issue that most shaped OSTP in the Reagan years. It is the one issue for which OSTP during that time was best known. Both controversial and divisive, it also had the most impact on the world. From my earliest meetings with the President, and with him of course knowing about my background at Los Alamos, he often spoke to me about his concern over the basic premises upon which nuclear deterrence was founded. Like Presidents before him, he was saddled with a defense strategy that relied on the threat of genocidal retaliation to prevent nuclear attack. From the start he detested the concept of mutual assured destruction. Unlike his predecessors, and most of the defense community, he had little, and lessening, confidence that it served either the nation’s or the world’s long-term interests. He also observed that, in spite of various arms control treaties and agreements, the nuclear arms race continued. Still more distressing to the President was his observation that even the fundamental assumption about the validity of nuclear deterrence, i.e., its presumed stability, was eroding. In nuclear deterrence, stability is the all-important condition that defines the likelihood of one side deciding to risk a pre-emptive strike that would be capable of reducing the chance of significant retaliation. With stable deterrence, there’s simply no incentive for anyone to initiate an attack. This was the case for decades, where population centers were targeted – both sides could reasonably conclude that the costs in terms of loss of life in initiating an attack outweighed any potential benefits. However, with two technological advances of the seventies – more precise targeting of warheads, and the ability to mount multiple warheads on single missiles – it became feasible to make the other sides’ weapons, such as missiles in silos, the targets. While still unlikely, successful preemption was beginning to be conceivable. One could see the trend lines, and the result was that stability was going to continue to erode over time. The situation would just get more dangerous. During his first 2 years, the President’s top priority was modernizing the nation’s strategic forces and rebuilding the military. He was immersed in every aspect of it. In weighing the various options for modernizing our strategic forces, in moving

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arms control from the SALT framework – strategic arms limitations – to START – strategic arms reductions – and simply in trying to understand the Soviet Union’s motives and intentions, President Reagan grappled with all the intricacies of deterrence. As a consequence, when the opportunity presented itself in early 1983 in the form of new technologies, he decided to take the bold step of embracing SDI, or the Strategic Defense Initiative. Expressed most simply, he concluded that the stability of deterrence was eroding and that there had to be a better way, in the long term, to ensure our national security. And he was taking the long view, not proposing a development project but proposing a research program that would lead to development. In this sense he was a science advisor’s best and most demanding client. He believed, based on evidence of some remarkable new technologies, that US efforts in science and technology could develop better, more humane, and more lasting responses to nuclear threats than currently existed. He challenged the science and technology community to make it happen, and he never wavered in that determination. OSTP’s role in all of this is not well understood. This is one of those areas where most people on the outside had little idea of what really occurred. So let me correct just two of the many myths that unfortunately masquerade as accepted knowledge. First, the policy concept of SDI – and decision to propose it when he did – was entirely the President’s idea. It was not mine, nor was it Edward Teller’s. It had roots that went back many years in the President’s mind, and he had bided his time through his first 2 years as President until he could find the right time to bring it to fruition. I know that because we talked about deterrence on many occasions. Few people on the outside knew it because they only saw the visible first stage of his defense planning, which I characterized earlier as the strategic modernization program, which focused on traditional weapons systems. So SDI was his idea, waiting to emerge. Second, the proposal for SDI was based on new and sound technological progress. There was substantial technical assessment of SDI’s long-term feasibility prior to the announcement. When I was consulted by him, I already had the benefit of some recent studies by a classified subpanel of my advisory group, the White House Science Council, that revealed, among other things, a number of new opportunities in defensive technologies. One of the more noteworthy of these was a then-recent set of experiments that demonstrated the ability to compensate for the distortion of light passing through the earth’s atmosphere, using deformable mirrors, thus permitting powerful lasers to be located on the ground where they could be defended, rather than in space, where they are vulnerable. (In addition to adding an opportunity to explore for missile defense, it led to a renaissance in observational astronomy.) So I was well prepared when the President asked me for a go/no-go opinion on SDI’s feasibility, which was the most momentous decision I was ever confronted with, then or later. But my role was as an advisor, and to tell him what was possible. The President wrote virtually the entire announcement of SDI himself. I advised him, helped edit the speech and offered him choices for restating key points. I did my best to explain the President’s intent to other members of his staff or his Cabinet.

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George Shultz, in his book Turmoil and Triumph argues that the President relied too heavily on my advice. For technology assessments, he did rely heavily on me, but that was my job. But I had little initial input into shaping the larger policy, and my input was not needed. One need only reexamine how Ronald Reagan carried out his negotiations, personally, with Soviet Union leader Mikhael Gorbachev, to see just how independent and determined he could be. The President had, from the beginning, a clear vision of where he was leading the country, and SDI was part of how to get there. He and he alone made the estimates of the risks and benefit. And he never wavered. From the point at which SDI was announced, March 23, 1983, I became a singleissue science advisor. Those were my orders. Fortunately we had already set in motion the restoration of support for basic research, and the OSTP staff did a good job of maintaining that pressure in the years following. But the President asked me to represent his interests and intentions on SDI, so that was my priority. I did that as a very visible spokesman inside and outside the White House, and I coordinated the beginning and re-orientation of research efforts until a formal program was established in the Pentagon. In particular, while the diplomats were trying to position SDI as just another pawn to be traded away in return for some modest gains in arms control, I was traveling the world, visiting leaders in key allied states, carrying the President’s message that SDI was not open for negotiation. I knew his commitment as well as anyone, and spoke with a conviction about the President’s stance that nearly everyone else thought was misplaced. It was not until the end of 1986, at Reykjavik, that the rest of the world recognized the depth of Ronald Reagan’s commitment to SDI. He turned down a remarkable offer of arms reductions from the Soviets because the price of it was to kill SDI. The world, or at least most of it, was aghast and accused him of a massive blunder. They were wrong, and it was at Reykjavik that the Berlin Wall began to fall. While my years in OSTP took place at a particularly dynamic time, at the end of the Cold War and as the Information Economy was just beginning to take root, it may not in fact prove to be as different an era as I suspect many believe. The end of the Cold War has not seen as much diminution in defense spending as some had expected, and it has brought into focus new, and demanding technological challenges in national security. And I suspect that arguments that the post-war emphasis upon basic research is no longer necessary are as unjustified as was the suggestion, more than a century ago, to abolish the patent office since most ideas had already been invented.

Chapter 6

Science Advice to President Bill Clinton John H. Gibbons

The first recommendation about creating the post of Science Advisor to the President (to President Harry Truman) was by a friend of mine, Bill Golden, who at 95 is still going strong.1 And that began the process. That event occurred at the end of World War II as it became abundantly clear that we faced a future to be heavily influenced by advanced science, especially electronics and nuclear science and engineering, that was emerging. Thus the first science advising, and for many years following, was strongly influenced by the Cold War: trying to keep nuclear weapons both useable and not used. This was a major challenge to the Executive Office of the President and others, who knew very little about nuclear energy, but who knew a lot about the implications if we didn’t develop adequate control mechanisms. I was lucky in my time as science advisor (1993–1998), because after the fall of the USSR science advising began to move toward a focus on the impact of burgeoning, explosive developments in science and technology on our environment, our economy, preventing and containing deadly conflict, and on our health. And so, I felt not only very fortunate when President-elect Clinton asked me to become his science advisor, but I felt enormously privileged that I was in the very first group of cabinet and cabinet-level nominees that he announced on Christmas Eve of 1992. By coming into the Clinton-Gore Administration early, I was able to affect choices of people destined for high levels of responsibility in science and technology in the Executive agencies, as well as a lot of other things that happened early on. So I was very lucky – not only in affecting the choices of people, but also being involved in the selection of Presidential initiatives and developing the first budget to the Congress. If you don’t get to the White House early, there’s no seat left. J.H. Gibbons (B) Director of the Office of Science and Technology, Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, President William J. Clinton 1993–1998, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] This chapter is an abbreviation of oral comments made by Dr. Gibbons Golden passed away on October 7, 2007, just a few weeks shy of his 98th birthday.

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Now, there are some questions about the roles of the science advisor. There are two main responsibilities for the science advisor. The first is to be the President’s eyes and ears . . . not to bother him when he doesn’t need to know something, but to be sure to acquaint him when things do need to be known. The second is to act on behalf of the President in terms of the budgets, interagency activities, public/private interactions, international negotiations, and the implementation of his initiatives. And that’s a very large measure for a very small office. The first role has to do with the Assistant to the President for Science and Technology; the second role with the Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy. They are distinctly different roles. The first role, Assistant to the President, is a Presidential appointment and meant that generally I could not be required to go to Congress and testify with that hat on, in order to protect confidentiality. The second role, Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) in the Executive Office of the President (created by Congress in 1976) meant I was subject to Senate confirmation and was fully available to Congress to answer questions, testify, help present budgets, and do all sorts of other things. In fact, funding for the office of OSTP is a separate provision under the House Appropriations Subcommittee on HUD (Housing and Urban Development), VA (Veterans Affairs) and independent agencies not under the White House budget. OSTP is a separate agency within the Executive Office of the President, akin to the military personnel who are in the White House but paid by the Department of Defense (DOD). It is not part of the general White House budget. A third role refers to activities that we devised early on in the Clinton Administration; namely, to try to identify Presidential initiatives that reflect on major overarching national goals. We saw science as not an overarching national goal, per se, for the President. It is only as it serves to help achieve larger goals that science takes its place in the crown of important activities for the President.2 The Presidential priorities and activities in the Clinton Administration could be classified as follows: first and foremost, science and technology were seen as engines to both push and pull economic growth and other measures of national progress. And the record is clear that among other things, science and technology have aided and abetted progress materially, accounting for half or more of all our national economic progress in the last half century. That was a major justification for our continued public investment in research and technology development despite the very tight focus maintained on reduction of the deficit. A second priority/activity was improving human health, a universal concern, and we’ve seen steady progress in budgets in that regard. That is something that’s very close to the hearts of everyone. President Clinton once described to me why it was that he thought that the National Science Foundation (NSF) was much harder to defend than the National Institutes of Health (NIH). He said NIH means that some 2 A more comprehensive accounting of issues, challenges, and accomplishments of OSTP, and reports issued by the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC) and the President’s Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST) can be found in OSTP’s Biennial Reports to Congress. See for example, Office of Science and Technology Policy (1997a).

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day they’re going to save your life, or your wife’s health, or provide some other personal benefit. You can personalize that process. But, he said, it’s harder to defend NSF budgets to provide for a new superconductor magnet for high-energy physics – “what is that going to do for Harry Homeowner?” So you have to devise other ways to describe the benefits of fundamental physical science. Harold Varmus, the first Nobel Laureate to lead the NIH and who is now president of Memorial SloanKettering Cancer Center in New York, wrote a marvelous paper (Varmus 1998) at the AAAS sesquicentennial on the essential importance of a great variety of fields of engineering and science, and even computer sciences and mathematics, to the progress of human health. This is a good example of where you need all of these advances in engineering, math, and the sciences in order to maintain progress in human welfare. Effective multidisciplinary work was an important thing. We gave constant emphasis to cooperation on health questions . . . not only US, but international. The same emphasis was placed on integrated approaches to other challenges such as automotive efficiency, climate change, and military systems. A third priority/activity was protecting the environment, and we didn’t do all we wanted to do, but we tried to achieve as much as we could in the face of an increasingly hostile Congress, which became Republican-dominated after the first year that Clinton was in office. Climate change was, perhaps, the centerpiece of those arguments, as well as energy policy. A fourth overarching goal was prevention and containment of deadly conflict. How can we devise ways through international negotiations and international cooperative activities to head off conflict before it becomes deadly? And how can we also devise weapons systems that can help contain deadly conflict once it arises? Finally, but not to be ignored: the inherent value of expanding knowledge itself was seen as one of our overarching national goals. Reflecting all the way back to Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson and their successors, the involvement of the Nation in exploration through research and other forms of exploration is a legitimate and historic component of long-term national commitment of people to pool their resources and make these advancements. I call it the modern-day equivalent of “barn raising” (I’m an old Virginia boy) in the Shenandoah Valley. When a family wanted to raise a barn that was more than a family could do without help they would call the neighbors in and the neighbors would all get together and help them build a barn. The next year, another neighbor would be helped. So that kind of cooperation enabled the whole to be much greater than the sum of the parts. Those are the sorts of things we tried to do as a means of using science and technology to achieve over-arching national goals. Now, in order to get there, we had to devise some mechanisms for doing it. We developed more effective interagency cooperation because most of these things require multiple agencies for their success. President Clinton created the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC),3 3 President Clinton established NSTC by Executive Order on November 23, 1993. This Cabinetlevel Council is the principal means for the President to coordinate science, space, and technology policy across the Federal government. The NSTC through nine standing committees acted as a virtual agency for science and technology to coordinate the diverse parts of the Federal R&D

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which was an interagency council consisting of the principals of the cabinet agencies physically chaired by the President, or the Vice President when the President was not available, and me when neither were available (which was most of the time). This process enabled the agencies to be assured from the top of the line – from the Secretary – that the agencies were, in fact, working together. A lot of rivalry naturally exists among agencies just like divisions in a university. Someone once said that Harvard is a collection of independent dean fiefdoms loosely connected by a common heating plant. Another thing we sensed early on in the Administration was the rising imperative to face the challenges of modern molecular biology and what that implied for ethics in governance. How do we foster this kind of new science and at the same time protect society from the down-side implications of the applications of that science. How do we establish a proper societal oversight as well as technical oversight of these activities. So the President created in 1995 the National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC) that comprised people from not only the health community, but also from ethics, and law, and social concerns. Almost immediately upon NBAC’s formation, Dolly the sheep was cloned, and the first task handed NBAC was to report to the President on the matter. The Commission was carried over into the Bush Administration (renamed the President’s Council on Bioethics), as was the National Science and Technology Council (NSTC). NBAC was a way of drawing on external, high-level expertise in developing policy in the Executive Branch – which I strongly favor. Underneath all our emphasis on devising ways to move effectively and thoughtfully into the twenty-first century, we were first guided by the imperative for federal deficit reduction. From the first day, deficit reduction was in the front of Clinton’s mind because we went into office facing a 300 billion-dollar deficit and multi-trillion dollar national debt. A lot of people don’t understand the difference between deficit and debt. The $300 billion is the deficit for a given year. The multi-trillion dollar debt is so big it’s beyond the ability of most people to comprehend. So the President said we must have deficit reduction . . . that we’re going to have to be tough as nails in terms of both spending and taxes. At the same time, we’ve got to move ahead with the necessary programs of government. So what we had to do was tell the executive agencies that we wanted to do new things . . . to start things, but that they must be innovative and creative. In fact, we said that’s the way the agencies are going to get extra virtual resources: they are going to come through productivity gains rather than through increased budgets. This hard fact was driven into the agencies year after year. Each year, in the early spring, the head of OMB and I jointly wrote a letter on behalf of the President to all the heads of agencies reminding them about their priorities in the area of science and technology. We gave this kind of guidance early enterprise. The NSTC was chaired by the President. Members included the Vice President, the Science Advisor, Cabinet secretaries, and agency heads with significant S&T responsibilities (e.g., EPA, NSF, NIH, OMB) and Presidential Assistants for Science and Technology, National Security Affairs, Economic Policy, and Domestic Policy. Office of Science and Technology Policy Associate Directors chaired the Committees.

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in the budget cycle so that people could take that into consideration in their budget proposal. I think the agencies were pretty responsive in this regard. And I’m pleased that we were able to be a part of the extraordinary deficit reduction and economic growth that followed throughout the remainder of the Clinton Administration. In forming the National Bioethics Advisory Commission, we understood the coming need for guidance due to rapid advances in molecular biology. So did members of Congress. And we had a lot of bipartisan support from members of Congress about establishing such a commission, because as Senators Kennedy and Hatch told me, they couldn’t do it on the Hill because they had such interference and such rancor from different stakeholders about who would serve on the Commission. And they had finally given up. So they encouraged us to do it at the White House. And the President agreed. We took a long time in establishing the Commission, both its charter and operating procedures and particularly in selecting its membership. For example, we worked for about 6 months to be able to obtain the outstanding chairman: Harold Shapiro, then President of Princeton University. About 2 months after the Commission was formally established and staffed Dolly was cloned, and off we went in a hurry to prepare a paper requested by the President on human cloning. I’m grateful that we had the lead time to enable the President to establish the Commission carefully. And it still exists, too, though considerably modified in composition. The chair is now a very conservative individual but nonetheless, it is still there, and still is trying to do its work. These are only a few examples of some of the interagency initiatives we instituted. There are others, such as the Space Program, involving not only NASA, but NOAA, and Defense, and ultimately Intelligence and Commerce in various operations in space. What to do with the Space Station was a big topic, and that was one of the first long briefings I had to give the President. The outcome was to redesign the Station to a smaller size and a major realignment that brought in Russia as a partner and shifted the Station’s orbit to enable it to be reached from Russian launch sites. (Later, following the Shuttle Columbia disaster in 2003, access to the Russian bases and equipment saved the entire program.) We also went on to space launch systems and international agreements such as the Cassini spacecraft and the Global Positioning Satellite System (GPS). I believe the most important ingredient for successful interagency agreements was White House leadership through the NSTC and my position as Assistant to the President for Science and Technology. In the military-civil area, again, interagency cooperation took a lot of work, but it enabled us to merge the weather satellite programs of the government. We used to have separate independent weather satellites for defense and for the civil sector. We managed to persuade the agencies that saving a few billion here by merging operations is really a savings, and we were able to get these “converged” into a single operating system. We were able to work with the interests in the commercial sector, namely, Commerce and the State Department in declassifying the GPS to permit a much greater precision (higher resolution of images) to within 300 ft, and to get the agreement of the defense community to continue to operate these systems. The Defense Department agreed to continue to fund the operations, and in

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exchange we agreed to adjust operations so that DOD could protect access in case of national need. But at the same time it enabled a breakout – it was a year of tough negotiations – in terms of transforming a basically intelligence/military system into a dual-use system, which all of us profit by having. You can locate your best fishing hole a lot easier these days! Those were some of the interagency science and technology cooperation efforts that were my responsibility as part of the science advisor job. I had to be within the White House complex in order to get the Cabinet agencies to work together effectively. One traumatic issue I weighed in on as science advisor was whether to formally cease any further explosive testing of nuclear weapons. After considerable dialog the right decision was made to continue indefinitely the moratorium. Then, there were the public/private partnerships. I argued for and the President strongly supported the notion of getting away from so much traditional rancor between the public and private sectors. As President Clinton said about Superfund, “Instead of going to the lawyers all the time let’s drive some bulldozers together.” And this is what we did. We formed some cooperative arrangements between the executive agencies and the private sector. The first, and the one I was most proud of, was to recognize the national need to have a much more efficient automobile that also had very low emissions. And it was clear that Detroit could not, and would not, re-invent the automobile on its own because the market wouldn’t drive it. And I said, let’s try it as a cooperative venture in which both public and private sectors commit to supporting sustained R&D, sharing in management and in guidance, and profiting in the fruits of the outcome. We formed the Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV) with the big three auto manufacturers, and six federal agencies. We centered the federal participation under the Department of Commerce because we were aiming not just for demonstration of advanced science and engineering, but for a market-producible and saleable automobile within a 10-year timeframe. And we set the goal for the performance of the automobile well above what the market would tolerate by itself. By adding public participation, we set forth on what was a very interesting adventure. Vice President Gore was extremely helpful in helping sustain PNGV. Several times a year he would get all of the engineers involved, and they would meet up at the Vice President’s house, they’d bring along their wives, and they’d spend a day talking about the most important advances that had occurred, and they’d have a reception afterward. This direct and substantive engagement of the Vice President created an esprit de corps which was very helpful in building confidence, trust, and new ways of thinking about national programs. I was told by a retired chairman of General Motors that the PNGV work greatly helped progress on hybrid technology, fuel cells, advanced fuels, and other advanced systems by about 5 years over what would have likely happened otherwise. I’m extremely grateful that we were able to do that, because it reflects a spirit of cooperation and mutual need between the public and private sector instead of old legalistic tensions between them. Sadly, the American public’s passion for power, combined with the political reluctance to require higher efficiency standards, and the enormous profitability of SUVs for the manufacturers, caused a drag on efficiency

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improvement – while Japanese models moved ahead. Only the recent run-up in oil prices put new energy into the move toward progress. On the international front, I had long felt that we needed to improve our international cooperation, and there’s no better place to do it than in science and technology: areas that ultimately would become common knowledge anyhow. Areas in which there is common need and mutual interest for the advancement of technology. And so we pushed hard on addressing a variety of issues of the global commons which had to do with ocean biodiversity and fisheries, global climate change and similar issues. And obviously, other areas such as the sequestration of fissile materials, in which we had a lot of cooperation not only from our traditional allies, but also from Russia and the former Soviet states in gathering up this material and getting it better protected. A subcommittee of the President’s Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST)4 led by John Holdren wrote a key issue briefing on nuclear materials for the President that figured in his negotiations with the Russian Premier weeks later. I remember one evening months later it fell to me (because I had come from Tennessee and knew the then-Governor Don Sundquist, a Republican, from my days as Director of the US Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA)) to call the governor and tell him that the President needed to transport about a half ton of highly enriched U-235 from Kazakhstan down to Oak Ridge for storing and processing. Skeptics said that they will never let you cross the state border with it, but the transfer went smoothly because of mutual trust. The highly enriched uranium was purchased from Kazakhstan, blended with U-238, fabricated into fuel elements for power reactors, and sold to industry – recovering the federal costs. NASA’s Cassini mission recently began an exciting encounter with Saturn, and the pictures are extraordinary, including the pictures of a Saturn moon. That was an international venture in which we, basically, were responsible for the spacecraft and its launch. In addition, a European consortium prepared the instrumentation for landing a probe on Titan, one of Saturn’s moons. Because Cassini was nuclear (heat) powered by Plutonium 238, my direct legal (safety) role in authorizing the launch was either to (1) approve the launch, or (2) refer the approval decision to the President. I felt that I should shoulder that decision – and did. I chose to allow the launch because an additional, independent technical analysis that I requested convinced me about the very low probability of catastrophic failure. In hindsight,

4 President Clinton established PCAST by Executive Order on November 23, 1993. PCAST advised the President on matters involving science and technology and assisted the NSTC in securing private sector involvement in its activities. PCAST, which consisted of distinguished individuals from industry, education and research institutions, and other nongovernmental organizations, served as the highest level private sector advisory group for the President and the NSTC. The direct link to the activities of the NSTC reflected the Administration’s intention to incorporate advice from the private sector in developing the science and technology budgets and policies of the Administration and to secure private sector advice in the implementation and evaluation of budgets and policies. PCAST was co-chaired by the Science Advisor and a member of the private sector (John Young, former Chairman and CEO, Hewlett-Packard Company).

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the decision was clearly one for the science advisor to make because it was based on complicated, technical analysis. In the Space Station, we are still an international group. At the beginning of the Administration as we internationalized that effort from being a Cold War, US-only effort we changed the Station’s orbit to higher inclination so that it would go over Russian territory. We can thank our lucky stars, not only for the success of the launches and the Space Station itself, but also the fact that when in 2003 Columbia blew up and we lost the Shuttle, it was only Russian resupply vehicles that enabled us to keep it going at all. And it’s only because we had changed the orbit to incorporate Russia into an international consortium. It’s not widely known. These examples dealt with, not only the current issues, and issues that we had inherited, but also in anticipation of future needs and activities. At the bottom line, the job of science advisor, in my book, is not only these operational things that I’ve described to you, but also it is to help the President and the American people gain a better understanding of where we are with science and technology and what the future holds for us so we can do a wiser job of governance. I found that C.P. Snow said it long ago, that “A sense of the future is behind all good politics. Unless we have it, we can give nothing – either wise or decent – to the world.” I think that Snow’s notion of having a “sense of the future” is critical. Our S&T community has a penchant for thinking carefully about the future and trends, and understanding time constants of change that can be much different among politics, economics and global systems (for example, energy transformations). And it is this giving a credible sense of the time dimension of change . . . not what the specific future will be, but what the plausible possibilities are, pro and con, plus and minus. I believe that is almost a bottom line responsibility for our S&T community because our community now influences the future so profoundly. Now, let me end with just a couple of thoughts about my last messages to the President about “crossing the bridge” into the twenty-first century, and what we need to do in terms of leaving a sense of the future. President Clinton kept talking about the need to have the capability to lead to a world that is better than we found it. (That is going to take a lot of work, given the way we are presently headed!) I emphasized to him four mega-challenges that we face. One is human population growth, which is slowly but surely eroding our flexibility and our capability of leaving this century gently if we hope to have economic growth along with population growth and at the same time protect the planet for future generations. When you think, for example, about the fact that nearly half of Saudi Arabia now comprises people under the age of fifteen, you gain a sense of the kind of extraordinary demands on resources and the opportunities for frustration and terrorism that can come out of that condition. And Saudi Arabia is just one example of countries that have unsustainable birth rates. Afghanistan is worse. So what can we do? Population is number one. A second mega-challenge is energy, which is a surrogate for climate change and resource depletion, other very important dynamics that are going to have to be dealt with in this century. I think you are familiar with the facts on atmospheric carbon dioxide concentration (see Fig. 6.1). Numbers prior to 1960 are derived from ice core measurements, and those since 1960 are atmospheric measurements begun by

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Fig. 6.1 Carbon dioxide concentrations (Office of Science and Technology Policy 1997b)

Charles David Keeling and others, especially Roger Revelle. The annual variations reflect the summer and winter of growing plants which are mostly located in the Northern Hemisphere. So when it is summer in the Northern Hemisphere (where most of the land mass is located) CO2 goes down as the plants grow and in the winter in the Northern Hemisphere plants die off, they give off CO2 , and so the CO2 goes back up again. But the CO2 curve rises inexorably toward levels of CO2 that are honestly not tolerable, and I’ll try to tell you why (see Fig. 6.2). The upper curve is carbon dioxide concentration, and the lower curve is the average earth surface temperature. There is not a one-to-one correlation between temperature and CO2 , but a lot of obvious similarity between them. And the thing that is important is what has happened over the last 10,000 years since the end of the Pleistocene. Earth’s average temperature has been extraordinarily stable. In the last 100 years, however, CO2 concentration has risen from about 270 parts per million (ppm) where it sat for ten millennia – to nearly 380 ppm with no signs of slowing down. This recent rise is driven by anthropogenic activities. It is carrying us into a region of CO2 concentration and, therefore, average long-term earth temperatures that exceed anything seen in the last half million years or more. The implications are profound. The current estimate is that, unless we do something in this century, we may witness a sea level rise – by thermal expansion of the oceans and by melting of ground-based glaciers – that expands the sea very far inland in many countries. In Bangladesh, 20% of the land goes under. South Florida and the Gulf Coast are inundated.

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Fig. 6.2 Atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations and temperature change (Office of Science and Technology Policy 1997b)

This estimate is not a figment of imagination but a real challenge with highly credible evidence that increases daily. Sadly, with a dispassionate public and a President who does not want to address it except to say we’ll continue to do research, we are shirking our rightful role. It is clear that we can’t only do research, because if you go back and look at a model of where the CO2 is going (see the curve in Fig. 6.3 labeled “Business as Usual”), and then if you note the curve where experts generally agree that we ought not to exceed concentrations greater than 550 ppm (which is twice that of pre-industrial) – this means we have to go through some kind of change in human behavior in this century in order to achieve that goal. Research is necessary but not sufficient! The “550 ppm curve” aims to represent about the most well behaved function. It implies that we need to begin to peel away from business-as-usual, not just some time later in this century, but within the next 10 or 20 years! Otherwise, we have

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Fig. 6.3 Atmospheric stabilization emissions paths (Office of Science and Technology Policy 1997b)

a much more difficult task to arrive at a satisfactory equilibrium of concentrations. Indeed, “. . .time and tide wait for no man. . .”. That is why I hope the President talks about this sometime soon, but I’m not too confident he will And then we could talk about the challenge of energy transition. We also could talk about a fourth challenge that I call “de-materialization.” A Chinese colleague asked me once, does that mean you are going to become monks or start living in caves? I said no, it means we want to start using high technology so that we don’t have to use up so many resources in providing goods and services. In other words, as Al Gore has said, “We are going to get, and act, smarter.” We do need, especially in the academic world, to think about a new kind of a paradigm, expressed in Fig. 6.4, where growth is not assumed just to be exponential. We talk about sustainable growth and yet we keep growing exponentially at 3% per year as though that is to be expected. Three percent per year means doubling every 23 years. You can’t go on very long that way without running into big trouble. We must think in terms of futures in which we move toward some kind of equilibrium condition. As you know a “climax” forest is in dynamic equilibrium. That does not mean that the forest is dead; it means that it has a mature mixture of age. The forest flora and fauna are still in a vigorous, highly competitive condition. So it is not as if equilibrium means we are going down the tube. It takes a lot of thinking, and technology lies at the heart of the opportunity, to move from an exponential society to a truly sustainable society. Ultimately, it is like the cartoon showing a small, over-loaded rowboat filled with rabbits. The lead rabbit says “I’m going to say this one more time. Our only chance is self-control.” I think

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Fig. 6.4 Alternative growth models (Gibbons date unknown)

that is a message for all of us as we move further into this century and we try to prepare the way for our descendants. That message in various forms was a constant reminder in our work products both at OTA and at OSTP. We trust that our clients, then and now, will be instrumental in persuading society that the future of humanity depends upon such a transformation.

6.1 Appendix The following is the transcript from the question and answer sessions following Dr. Gibbons’ April 28, 2005 speech at the University of Colorado-Boulder. Dr. Pielke:

Dr. Gibbons:

Okay, great. Well, I have a number of different topics to touch on, and I thought we’d start with some general questions. I’m sure we’d like to know what your interactions with President Bill Clinton were like. Can you tell us some examples of a situation or two that he called upon you for advice or input on policy decisions? Well, my favorite in terms of personal memory was, I was home on the farm on a Saturday afternoon, and the phone rang, and it was President Clinton calling. And he doesn’t usually do that. And he said, I’m getting ready to write a speech about “the bridge to the 21st century”, and I’d like some ideas about what sorts of things could we plausibly imagine happening here in the next, say, decade or two, that arise from advances in science and technology. I swallowed hard and – when you get to that, everything you knew sort of disappears in your mind. But I said, “Let me call you back.” (laughter) So I called the President back in

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5 min and I said, I think there are a lot of things we could talk about, but one is a somewhat nebulous thing that I call “inner space (inner space being the opposite to “outer space”). We do have a big focus on going off to planets and other worlds, and we have wonderful advances in astronomy. But inner space is our increased understanding of what happens at the molecular level, at the atomic level, in materials. And learning how to, not only understand what happens in that inner space, but how to take fuller advantage of it as we learn how to get more out of less. The President built it into a talk, and it turned into – I think Dr. Neal Lane probably gave it the terminology of “nanotechnology.” I didn’t want to use “nano” because I didn’t think very many people would know what that meant. But that was the origin of nanotechnology stuff. And, oh, there are other times the President wanted – early in the Administration he wanted me to set up briefings, simultaneous briefings in the space of 2 h, on both the Space Station and on the Superconducting Supercollider. And I swallowed hard again but we did it, and President Clinton and Vice President Gore stayed there the entire time, listening carefully. He ultimately made decisions on the basis of that dialog. Well, similarly, everyone knows that Al Gore is famously interested in the environment, science and technology. What was it like working with Al Gore? And what was his presence like in OSTP? Al had a very strong presence in the Administration in terms of science and technology. I guess I would have to say he was Clinton’s “guru” in a lot of areas of politics, and the politics of science and the applications of science in helping achieve Presidential goals.. Al was not my competitor, he was a partner, and I therefore, fortunately, had two champions, not one. Unlike poor Al Bromley who had to struggle with some of the White House administrators, I had nothing but help from those quarters. You know, Al Gore went to Harvard to study, I think, social sciences, probably economics and political science. But while he was there he took a course on population and environment from Roger Revelle. And it was in that course that Gore found the shades falling from his eyes. He came to recognize the central issue of resources and people. His later book Earth in the Balance emerged from that experience. He became highly knowledgeable, especially in climate change research, and remains to this day very importantly

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involved. So he was a real champion. And a task-master, too, (chuckle) because he’d always want more information. One of my favorite staff members at OSTP was Dr. Rosina Bierbaum. And Vice President Gore used to call her day and night, for data and advice. And that was legitimate and important. So we helped feed him the good stuff. As a science advisor, outside observers of OSTP recognize that the science advisor wears different hats. One of those hats, for better or worse, is that of chief ambassador from the scientific community to the highest levels of government – and in that role the science advisor represents a very large, now one hundred and thirty-five billion dollar ($135 billion) science budget. And at the same time the science advisor is supposed to provide wise counsel to the President on how to use science effectively, and oftentimes make difficult budget decisions about scientific priorities. How do you balance the two hats between working as a representative of a larger scientific community and also speaking back to that community and maybe imposing some limits? I honestly think it’s not all that hard. Because, representing the process of science and its value to the American people is an easy thing to advocate, and it is legitimate. There’s no way I would ever get in a pleading for this or that project or university, but I was nonetheless a strong advocate for science itself. That’s consistent. At the same time, people at OMB have long been besieged with people who wanted to have more of what they were interested in. And so I tried to be very careful when we worked with OMB when they would send us, say, a budget proposal from an agency. We worked very carefully to try not only to identify the things that we thought were most important of what they proposed, but also some of the areas where it was, in our judgment, maybe less important and therefore subject to scrutiny. And it worked out pretty well. No one tried to shoot anybody. But you have to apply that kind of judicious oversight to these budgets or they’ll get away from you and you’ll lose. You made a transition early in your career from a physicist to a director of an environmental program at Oak Ridge, on up the line to OTA. What kind of advice would you give to scientists who might be in the audience who are thinking that maybe somewhere up the line there’s a policy career there. Is there anything that worked particularly well

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for you or that you might have done differently, looking back? Well, I think fate rewards a prepared mind. And my good fortune was that I was working at Oak Ridge National Lab at the time, and we lived, basically, in the shadow of the Cumberland Mountains. The mountains, in turn, because of the modern technology of earth moving, were being torn down for coal. The mountains were literally disintegrating over there on the western horizon. And that caused me great concern about how we were mining coal and how we were using technology. So I got more and more interested in environmental issues in the Appalachians. And my wife and I both got interested in the almost complete unavailability of assistance for family planning in those same counties. It was miserable. Miserable! A common – a frequent occurrence was that a woman would try to stop her pregnancy by drinking turpentine or do other things that often killed the woman. Not a very satisfactory way to practice family planning! So we worked hard in the Cumberlands in terms of broad environmental issues, including energy. And that led me, at ORNL, to start work on energy efficiency and conservation – a new concept. This was 1969, 1970. And then I went on to the University of Tennessee in Knoxville, because when you gravitate toward public policy, you can’t do that very well in a national laboratory. Jerry knows that very well. So I moved to the university and was the first director of the Energy, Environment and Resources Center. It was interdepartmental and intercollegiate. And a lesson in and of itself was how to get different departments to go the line. I learned things like sharing overhead returns, which was a very important key to effective cooperation. But anyhow, that led me to further work (technical, economic, and legal) on energy efficiency and conservation. Soon I was asked to join the Nixon Administration. They wanted to start doing some work on energy use in the federal agencies because there was a plausible chance of a shortage of heating oil in the winter of 1973–1974, and President Nixon didn’t like the thought very well that he might have to face that prospect. So he established the Office of Energy Conservation. And he put it over at the Department of the Interior because the Secretary of the Interior was a good friend of his. And they looked around for someone who knew something about efficiency and energy consumption and they found me. I agreed to

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set up the office, and that was early summer 1973. And about sixty days after I first got to Washington, the Yom Kippur War broke out. And so I suddenly found myself in Cabinet meetings and other things that I had not anticipated. It was a real fast learning experience. When I left to return to the University of Tennessee in the late summer of 1974, I left almost on the same train as Nixon when he left town. (laughter) So I said to myself, if I ever go back to Washington, it will be to some other branch of government. And then I did come back several years later to direct OTA, and went from there to the White House. So as a physicist I said, okay, this is going to be a good last job in Washington because I started out in a Republican administration and then I came back and ran a totally nonpartisan congressional office for both the House and the Senate. Now, if I stay and join a Democratic administration, that’ll be a totally symmetric function and I can leave town. And that’s what I did. (laughter) Can you tell us more about OTA, the Office of Technology Assessment, which was defunded by Congress in 1995? Can you tell us a little bit about what the provision of science advice to Congress was like during your 13 years there? What, maybe, is missing today? Well, for any new activity in a delicately balanced political process such as Congress, if you try to start something new in that environment, you’re immediately suspect. And we were. We were called the Office of Technology Harassment by some and the Office of Technology Arrestment by others because they saw us as a tool of leftwing liberals who they thought would wipe out American industry and do all sorts of things. It took us about 6 years for the gestation period to complete – and for Congress and the greater public, especially the industrial public, to gain confidence in OTA as being a place where you could really get an authoritative, fair shake on an issue; and it could be reported to Congress in a helpful way. OTA did not have political bias in it. And it worked, I think, remarkably well. OTA reports are still used. We ran a cropper with one study we had to do. It was a study on space-based missile intercepts at the same time that President Reagan was hell-bent for a so-called Star Wars system. We delivered our report, and it was like hitting a very large hornet’s nest with a very large baseball bat. And we caught hell for it. It took a retired Air Force general and Dr. Charles Townes and other people

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to look at our work and say, “Yes, it’s okay” to prevent the Star Wars fans from trying to wipe out OTA on the spot. So that was one major flag raised, about whether OTA was capable of doing truly nonpartisan but expert analysis. I think we were right. I don’t think they had a case on us. But they lay in wait a long time. Some people called the demise of OTA (which was led by Rep. Newt Gingrich) as being “Reagan’s Revenge.” Many members of Congress simply saw no need for that kind of analysis. Even Gingrich himself said that while OTA did accurate work, they did it too slowly and we don’t really have a need for it. So how can you fight that? Further while they were cutting budgets, they needed a sacrificial lamb. OTA was less than 1% of the congressional budget, and less visible, and therefore it was chopped off. There are still members of Congress, Republicans and Democrats, who would very much like to reestablish something like an OTA. Maybe as a new wing of the “Generous Accounting Office” [that was a joke] (laughter) or, as they now call it the General Accountability Office. So how does decision-making in the legislative branch suffer for lack of an OTA? First of all, they don’t get very much foresight on science and technology issues. And secondly, they get a lot of input that they try to handle themselves by checking with a friend here or a consultant there and the likes, and it’s a very spotty process. The Congress is not well served by the community of science and technology, in my book. So you’re obviously not in government now but you’re an observer. How would you characterize the changes in the role of science under the Bush Administration, the role of a science advisor? How do things look different, from your perspective, from your tenure? Someone said, I guess it was Yogi Berra, that you can see a lot by observing. (laughter) I haven’t tried to observe too closely because the present Bush II Administration is not transparent. But what I do see is a continued support for science research. That’s broadly the case in the Congress. It’s not a very well digested support, but it’s there – widespread. I see a shift away from this notion of Presidential initiatives such as environment improvements. I see a shift toward a singular focus on the military. And now even the military research budget is suffering. The DOD 6.1 and 6.2 programs are badly suffering now. And all that tells me is they’re interested in

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building weapons, not developing new weapons for new needs. And those are the basic and applied research programs. Yes, 6.1 is basic and 6.2 is applied. And so I think the current Administration is misguided. There was an article in The New York Times two Sundays ago authored by Bill Perry and John Deutch, who really took after the Administration on these points. So what do we do? I don’t know. We suffer through. We give our feelings about the matter, and we hope things will come out right. Let’s go down this path a little further. The Bush Administration has been criticized more than any administration for the misuse of science. And there’s been a series of reports by Congressman Henry Waxman, the Union of Concerned Scientists, I believe you signed onto the Union of Concerned Scientists. Yes, I agreed with their report. What do you think about the claims of the misuse of science, and how should outside observers in the scientific university community make sense of this? Because, in some respects Henry Waxman, he’s a Democrat, and the Union of Concerned Scientists helped to support John Kerry. In the work that I do I try to point out that there’s something more than just partisanship here. I would say there’s very little partisanship in this. It’s a reflection of very genuine concerns. Not so much about the misuse of science, but the misrepresentation of science, a very selective representation of scientific results, and the politically creative and selective labeling of proposed projects. You all have heard of the Healthy Forests Act. (response) And you know about the Clear Skies program. These are cleverly developed terms, but they totally misrepresent what the state of science is on those very issues and what is in it. So it’s much more of a PR game than it is a substantive change for the improvement of these issues. So that causes a great deal of angst. I must say it is not just science that the angst is based on; it is a basic concern about openness of government, about the way that facts and opinions are represented in an almost totally politically-oriented way. I have to blame a lot of this on Karl Rove, who’s an absolute mastermind in political maneuvering. Incidentally, Rove said that the definition of a Democrat is a person with a Ph.D. (laughter) Sounds like he’s been to Boulder a few times.

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I think it is a matter of concern about honesty in terms of a fair representation of what the science community has to say. It has been badly misrepresented in climate change, and it is still apparent, even though they are still trying to work out of that one. They also fudge around on things such as stem cells. They claimed there are many lines of stem cells, and everyone knew that was wrong. They had included all the marginal stuff they could. I think it genuinely causes angst on the part of our community. And we ought to be raising our concern about the misuse of science to make a political point. What practical advice, again, for scientists far from the Beltway and the – what kind of advice would you give to the university scientists or federal lab scientists in this environment? I told this to a group of Nobel Laureates once who came to the White House. I said that when the mantle of recognition goes onto your shoulders, it doesn’t come free, it comes with extra responsibilities. The fact that science and technology now so dominate the shape of our society, and the future options we have to deal with things in the coming century, makes ours a heavy mantle. It is exhilarating to know that is where we’ve gotten, but it’s mind-boggling to think about the kind of responsibility that comes with it. So I think we would be untrue to our own selves if we, the science and technology community, did not become increasingly aware of these issues. Aware of the current discussion of them in political dialog. And then make our best thoughts known. Some people say that if you are a scientist, you shouldn’t be talking about politics. I think that’s total nonsense. The scientist is a citizen just as much as an economist is a citizen. And the economists don’t hesitate. (laughter) I’d like to turn to climate change. The Boulder Front Range area is home to one of the greatest concentrations of climate scientists per square mile any place in the world. Good stuff. Yes. President Bush has had a lot of criticism for his refusal to support Kyoto. I gave you an extended quote from former Colorado Senator Tim Wirth, who was critical of the Clinton Administration. He said, and I’ll just read part of this quote, that the Clinton Administration “Never mounted a serious campaign internationally or domestically after retreating from its public commitment

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to aggressive action on global warming within 24 h of the successful conclusion of the Kyoto talks in December of 1997.” I guess the question would be, if you are looking at trends in emissions or other metrics, scientific metrics, you wouldn’t see much of an inflection point from among George Bush I, Bill Clinton, and George Bush II. What’s your perspective on how the Clinton Administration handled global warming and how it contrasts with the current President? Well, it was a tragedy in the Clinton Administration because Clinton had lost a lot of his power. This was near the mid-point of his second term, and Congress was increasingly polarized. We even had, for instance, Capitol Hill demands placed on OSTP – to do no travel with respect to climate change – to do no travel, and also to make no statements about automobile fuel efficiency. It was as bad as the – what was it called – the Whitewater witch hunt that went on earlier, of people trying to stifle the legitimate work within the Administration. We were really bound by the zealots up on the Hill. I had left just a few months after Kyoto in April 1998, and Neal Lane was taking over. I felt very disappointed but not surprised at the outcome of the Kyoto Protocol meetings. Al Gore went over and desperately tried to help make it work better. A couple of my people were there trying to help out. But the bottom line was that the forces were so massed against doing anything formal, that the best we could do would be to take it as far as we could. To try to go beyond that in the waning months of that Administration would only mean that Congress would rebuff us. There were votes on the Hill saying essentially the treaty would be dead on arrival if we ever sent it up there. Byrd spoke because he comes from a coal state. He later reversed himself on this, but there was a lot of antipathy and suspicion about what Kyoto would imply. When Bush II, however, said, well, Kyoto would mean it would cost us economically, that was a shallow shot. Everyone knows that the economic cost of responding to Kyoto, even for the US, which would be the hardest to do, would be maybe a tenth of a percent in our GDP growth. The reaction shows a non-recognition of the severity of the problem and the cost of delay in addressing it. On the good news side the support of research in global climate change has been strong and growing, and Bush II’s people have supported it, although they do it with borrowed money. (laughter) And that’s easier than if you’re

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doing it taking it out of your own hides. I feel that the US government sadly failed across the board in overcoming partisan self-interest about the urgency of taking definitive action on climate change. Despite some improvement, the situation is still ominous for our descendants. I have to think back to the advice a wise person gave me years and years ago: my wife and I were concerned about lack of family planning capability in the Appalachian South, and we were asking this person, who was an old seasoned reporter, about what to do. We said, how do we get people’s attention to the plight of these folks and enable us to get some action? He said, I tell you there’s one thing you can do, and that is, “talk about it.” Talk about it. And he said it doesn’t even matter which side you take! Talk about it. Get it to be part of the public agenda. And that’s what I hope is going to happen with Kyoto now that it’s approved and in place. It’s embarrassing that we aren’t part of it. But the evidence is rolling in now at an extraordinary rate on the validity of our concern. Even greater concern than we had thought a few years back. So I think things are going to happen. But we can’t afford to sit back. The longer we sit back, the tougher it’s going to be to take action. And there are still going to be people who will try to kill it for various selfish reasons. Yesterday President Bush gave a speech, and I know you haven’t had a chance to hear it or read it, but we talked about this a little bit earlier, in which he called for a major new initiative in nuclear power. Then he tied that to the greenhouse gas issue. And since you have expertise in energy, what are your thoughts on – again, looking toward nuclear power, as either a way to limit the reliance on foreign sources of energy, or to deal with the greenhouse problem, or anything else? In the late ‘60’s I made several talks about greenhouse and electricity and nuclear power when I was at Oak Ridge National Lab. We talked about it at OTA. Nuclear is but one option of several to help cut down on the amount of greenhouse gases. Nuclear is coming into its own. It’s getting competitive; it’s getting reliable. We still haven’t closed the back end of the fuel cycle (waste), and it is still very suspect on the part of the American people because we screwed up so many times before in the way we managed it. I feel that it is an important option for the future. The last thing we want to do is to throw away something that

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seems to work while we go after things that don’t seem to work. So I’m very sympathetic and so was President Clinton. In fact, we moved ahead with relicensing of plants during the Clinton Administration. But we can’t count on it entirely. We can spend ourselves into the ground trying to just bail our way out of the energy problem with folks singling out one kind of power. But we must not retreat from it. We’ve just got to resolve the remaining problems. It’s not going to be simple. So I say if nuclear power is President Bush’s energy plan, then he doesn’t have a plan. Let’s spend the last 15 min or so taking questions from the audience. See what’s on your mind. We’ll have to repeat the questions up here so that they get on the tape. Why don’t we open things up. How can we depoliticize the global climate change issue? First of all, any important issue is going to be politicized. Just like any important new invention is going to have opportunity for both ill and good. Gutenberg’s printing press created great opportunity for mankind, but also for enslavement in other ways. Every important new idea has this dual principle for good or for ill. On climate change, how do we depoliticize it? As long as it remains important, people are going to politicize it in that they are going to take sides. The fossil fuel industry is never going to be happy with climate change actions. Neither are the oil-producing countries, the Saudis and others. They funded a lot of people that we know the names of here in the States who published ads and articles aimed against climate change. So you can’t depoliticize climate change in that sense. But here’s an example of partial depoliticization: the formulation of the IPCC (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change), a panel of experts from many nations, charged with comprehensive analysis of climate change and impacts. The process that IPCC goes through for reviewing critiques of its studies is excruciatingly careful. And in that sense it ought to be taken as a non-political input to illuminating the situation. But it is bound to going to get politicized too. People are going to claim that interests weren’t represented and that sort of thing. Every important decision, and action on global climate change is an important international political decision, is going to have a degree of politicization in it. And I think our goal is to try to do these things despite this politicization. To overwhelm it, overcome it, and push things aside.

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As Congressman George Brown would say, the thing that will most readily help is very careful work done that can be very persuasive in terms of how it’s used. Both in terms of the economics and the technology of alternatives, and of the science itself. And I think we’re making good progress, especially in climate – paleoclimate studies. The North Atlantic Conveyor Belt now is seen as a reality rather than a figment of imagination. It is just part of human nature to have parties at interest line up on opposite sides on these issues. What do you think the role of the public should be in making decisions about science policy? Well I think it should be front and center because it’s the public that’s supporting our enterprise. The public needs to be better informed about these issues and about the decisions that we all face as a society: where to go with science investments, and what to do with the technologies that emerge. Sadly we’re not. I fear that the train is leaving the station of the advancement of science and technology and most of the people that actually are paying for the train are still standing back in the station. How many people, for instance in Boulder here, a university town, believe that the Earth was formed 6,000 years ago? A fair number I imagine. In the US it is an unbelievable fraction of our population. So our people need to get better informed because if we are going to maintain a democracy we have got to have a participatory society that governs. And you can’t govern without knowledge. James Madison said it well. He said that if we mean to be our own governors, we must develop and use the power that knowledge gives. I have a flip side to that question. Both the description of Clinton’s efforts to advocate to the NSF versus the NIH, or the challenges of addressing the issues of global warming, or having an informed populous, might be better addressed by having a well-educated population. Whether that’s the population in Congress or as OTA was attempting to do, or the public in voting and leaning on Congress to act in a particular way. So my next question is, how do we do that? What is the role of scientists, the politicians, and the science advisor in education and, particularly, in science education? Or, I can put it further and say, not what’s the role, but what’s the obligation? To be a good citizen means you need to use your knowledge and your talents in the political process as well as in the scientific world. We’re not excused. Some people

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don’t think that way. A lot of folks tend to think, well, we’re doing really important work in our profession, and that has great national importance. And we don’t have time to divert to participate in politics. But that’s wrong. That’s wrong. I think we all ought to be informed and involved. And I think we have to stand up and shout when people start going off into the far right conservative realms of religion and then claim that they have found the truth. There can be an enormous difference between opinion and fact, between faith and fact. This argument on evolution, the argument on stem cells: it sneaked into the White House. It sneaked into the Oval Office. And that’s a very bad sign. So that’s why I flunked retirement about four times now. And I hope the rest of you will, too, when you get older. Could you please comment on OSTP’s role in diplomatic relations. In particular, what role do you see the Science Advisor to the Secretary of State having in the future – the position you helped to establish? Okay, the issue is the role of science in our international diplomacy. In my position, there is – it’s probably one of the most under-attended options in our quiver of arrows that have to do with foreign policy in part because, as someone described the State Department to me once, the State Department is a bunch of technophobes. They tend to be people who have almost no background in science and even less interest so they don’t see it as part of international endeavors. When I was in the White House I found that in a number of instances with respect to world trade, with respect to other things. Since leaving the White House I have worked with the National Academies. And The National Academies were interested in this because they live across the street from State. And they said, my gosh, we don’t have any science activities in the State Department. And so they went out and solicited some support from, guess who? Bill Golden, the person who originally made the suggestion to President Harry Truman to create the job of Science Advisor to the President. Golden supported a study at the Academies on the role of a science advisor to the Secretary in the State Department. And then it was delivered to Secretary Madeline Albright. I at the time was also hired as a part-time consultant to go over to the State Department, and I talked with them about science and technology and its relevance to the issues they were facing beyond nuclear weapons. And Albright bought it. She appointed Norm Neureiter, an extraordinary

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person, to become science advisor to the secretary. When Colin Powell succeeded Albright, he decided to keep Neureiter. That was the real acid test: could you go through the transition from a Democratic President to a Republican President and still have that science advisor stay there. That was Neureiter’s role, and he did beautifully. Now they’ve gone from something like four postdoctoral Science Fellows at State to twenty. Most of them are provided at no extra cost to the State Department by the professional organizations such as AAAS, the American Chemical Society, the American Physical Society, and engineering societies. They’ve chosen people to go and work in State for a year or two, and many of them stay. Once they’re there the State Department begins to realize how important they are. They are now embedded in a number of our overseas missions. So I think maybe we have turned the corner in State recognizing the enormous opportunity that science and technology provides our diplomats in terms of options that we can use in our foreign policy missions. So I think it’s working. But it’s not guaranteed. You’re going to State are you? Good luck. They need you. Let’s take one more question before we wrap it up. Yes. One of the major things we try to do at the university and all faculty try to do at the university is to teach critical thinking. It appears that people make their way up the level politically without some of that education. (laughter) That’s a very diplomatic statement. And I wonder, how do you deal with people at a high level who have not learned critical thinking? Well, first of all, you have to approach them with some awe because they manage to get elected. And some of them never do anything more after that. (laughter) But it is tricky because these people must deal with an enormous number of parameters they have to take into account when they make a decision. You know the French writer Victor Hugo. He said “Science says the first word on everything and the last word on nothing.” All of the scientific deliberations, most of them, have to be taken into account. But there are so many other parameters, so many other variables. I could tell you horror stories about some decisions made at OMB in terms of where are we going to put this or that project that’s proposed by three different universities. And the other things they have had to take into account when they were trying to make a decision about who ought to

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get the award. So the Hugo quote is my motto for tonight. Remember that we have very important things to say, but we’re trying to swim in a very large pond with some other big fish. On that note let’s thank Dr. Gibbons for a wonderful evening. (applause) I can’t tell you how flattered I am that you came out on this snowy night. (applause)

References Office of Science and Technology Policy (1997a). Science and Technology: Shaping the TwentyFirst Century. Washington, DC: United States Office of Science and Technology Policy. Office of Science and Technology Policy (1997b). Climate Change State of Knowledge. Washington, DC: United States Office of Science and Technology Policy. Varmus, H. (1998). New Directions in Biology and Medicine. Plenary Lecture, American Association for the Advancement of Science 150th Anniversary Annual Meeting, Philadelphia Marriott Hotel, Philadelphia, PA, February 13.

Chapter 7

Threats to the Future of US Science and Technology Neal Lane

The title I have chosen for this chapter, “Threats to the Future of US Science and Technology,” is a way of letting the reader know that I think all is not right with US science and technology these days. I will start with a brief “personal journey”, to provide some context and, perhaps, help explain why I feel so strongly about some of the issues I will touch on. Then, I will add a few comments about how the White House works, or rather how I worked in the White House when I was privileged to serve there. I’ll close by describing four “threats” to science and technology in this country and speculate on what the President’s Science Advisor and the rest of us can do.

Personal Journey My personal journey took me from Oklahoma, where I was captivated by the storms, to Colorado, where I experienced the 90 mph winds on occasion, to Rice University, where we have different kinds of storms (Katrina and Rita being recent examples), to Washington, where I found that the really big storms are caused by human activity. I mention the election of 1994 and the following Gingrich revolution as just one example. My early involvement in federal science policy was the usual service on National Science Foundation (NSF) advisory committees, congressional testimony, and membership on various National Academies’ National Research Council committees. I joined the NSF staff as a “rotator” serving 1 year (1979–1980) as Director of the Physics Division of NSF. While 1 year is a very short time in government, I learned an enormous amount about how the federal government works. N. Lane (B) Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, President William J. Clinton 1998–2001, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] Current affiliation: Malcolm Gillis University Professor, Fellow of the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy and Professor of Physics and Astronomy, Rice University, Houston, TX, USA


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I also gained a greater appreciation and respect for the NSF and its hard-working staff. That experience sparked my interest in public policy and increased my comfort level when other opportunities came along. I was invited to join the Clinton Administration in 1993, as Director of the NSF. I did not know President Clinton prior to my joining his Administration. But I greatly admired him and his ideas and what he had set out to accomplish as President. So I was delighted to play a small part. NSF is a terrific agency and I thoroughly enjoyed my time there. Every NSF Director has trials, crises, tussles with the White House and Congress, occasional terrifying moments. But, I look back on my NSF years as some of the most rewarding of my career. People often ask me how I ended up in this position and I answer that I don’t know. Most likely, when the Administration was searching for candidates and asking for suggestions from scientific leaders and professional organizations, my name came up, along with many others. At that point in the process, the White House goes through a screening process and contacts individuals to see if they might consider a nomination. Often people on the list do not want to be considered, so that process leads to a shorter list. In the end, for a variety of reasons, the President announces his intention to nominate (for consideration by the Senate) a single individual. Then, if there is not a storm of public protest, the President sends the formal nomination to the Senate, requesting confirmation. In 1998, either because President Clinton liked what I had been doing at NSF or he didn’t, he asked me to come over to the White House to replace John (Jack) Gibbons as his Science Advisor (Assistant to the President for Science and Technology) and Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP). In my opinion, no one could really “replace” Jack Gibbons. Jack was a strong and effective science advisor, had the confidence of both President Clinton and Vice President Gore, and put together an outstanding team at OSTP, which I inherited. I found Jack to be a strong supporter of science and technology and of the NSF, in particular. I considered it a privilege to follow him in the White House. As to why I was selected as Jack Gibbons’ successor, I simply do not know. But, I assume that both Jack Gibbons and Vice President Al Gore thought it was a good idea.

How One Science Advisor Worked in the White House Colleagues often ask: How does the White House work? Well, the truth is that the White House doesn’t always work – at least it does not always work well. And every White House is different on some level, just as every President is different. I have some impressions; but they are based on my one experience, in the second term of President Clinton. I’ll make five points. First, the principal focus of everyone in the White House is the President, his agenda and priorities, and anything that seems to be getting in their way. For example, President Clinton, keenly aware of the promise of stem cell research, wanted the National Institutes of Health (NIH) to be able to fund research on cell lines from

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embryos that were being stored in in vitro fertilization clinics but that were to be discarded. However Congress, through the Dickey Amendment, placed language in the relevant appropriations bill to prevent that from happening. As a result, we were not able to put a successful policy in place before the end of President Clinton’s Administration. (The G.W. Bush Administration, with the cooperation of Congress, placed a much more restrictive policy on NIH supported embryonic stem cell research. As a result, the US continues to fall behind in this promising area of medical research.) Presidents can ask hard questions, and they expect – or least, should expect – honest answers. It was well known that Vice President Gore was fascinated by science and technology. In fact, he would read some of the technical articles, e.g., in the area of environmental science, climate change in particular. And OSTP would work with his office to bring in experts in these areas to talk with him and answer technical questions. But I was surprised to learn that President Clinton also was keenly interested in science and technology. Indeed, on one occasion, President Clinton sent me a copy of an article he had read in “The Economist” magazine on the subject of dark matter in the universe, with underlined passages on topics we had discussed in a previous briefing. In his FY2001 budget request to Congress, the President asked for very large increases in research funding, with particular emphasis on the physical and mathematical sciences and engineering. In this budget, the President requested nearly double the largest dollar increase that the NSF had ever received; and he launched his $500 million National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), which he would playfully refer to as “my tiny little initiative!” Of course, he meant “tiny” in dimension not in dollars or importance. Second on my list of impressions, consistent with keeping the principal focus on the President’s agenda, the day-to-day activities of the White House deal with matters that are urgent (fiscal crises, natural disasters, wars, missteps, scandals, troublesome press coverage), strategic (regarding the President’s agenda in health or education, dealings with Congress, foreign affairs, national and domestic security), and routine (speeches, meetings and events, message of the week, questions and answers for press briefings). When any of these matters involve science and technology, the Science Advisor and OSTP staff are engaged. For example, in the area of foreign affairs, the science advisor represents the President at all ministerial-level international events that relate to science and technology, e.g., bilateral meetings as specified under agreements like the US – China Science and Technology Agreement. An example of unwelcome press coverage was what the media portrayed as a horse race between the international Human Genome Project, directed by NIH’s Francis Collins, and the private company Celera Genomics, led by Craig Venter, to see which group would be the first to sequence the human genome. The story being told was that a private company could do it faster and much more cheaply than the government’s efforts, suggesting a waste of taxpayer money. In this case I was asked by the President to see what could be done. With the help of other government officials, particularly Ari Patrinos of the Department of Energy (DOE), we were able to calm the situation. President Clinton hosted an event in the East Room of the White House in which Collins and Venter shook hands and

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celebrated, together with the President, the completion of the first draft sequence of the human genome. Third, working in the White House, the science advisor can be effective only as a member of a team, including the Vice President, White House staff, other Presidential aides and key people in all the federal agencies. The job requires a balance of trust and collegiality (e.g., being available to help other White House staff with their jobs) and assertiveness (so people are forced to pay attention to S&T, in the din of politics and other distractions). A little humor, in good taste, sometimes helps. For example, I was approached by the Press Secretary to participate – indeed be the principle party – in a skit that would poke good-natured fun at another of the President’s senior staff during one of the morning senior staff meetings. I was not particularly anxious to take this on, since one never knows how such a ribbing will be received. But, in the spirit of being a member of the team, I did it. Almost everyone enjoyed the event and my personal relationships with all members of the staff remained intact, at least as far as I know. A more substantive example was the process used to develop the proposal to the President for an initiative enhancing nanotechnology research. The NNI could not have become a reality had it not been for the close working relationship that existed between OSTP staff and our counterparts in the National Economic Council and the Office of Management and Budget. Fourth, the science advisor often speaks for the President on matters of science and technology. That means publicly supporting the President’s policies, regardless of whether he or she agrees with those policies. But it does not require sacrificing one’s integrity, e.g., making incorrect or misleading statements about science. Indeed, I am not aware that any science advisor has done that. If the President makes a misstatement about science, the science advisor has the opportunity to set the record straight by explaining what the President meant to say. This is not really so different from how the President’s economic, domestic and national security advisors handle their jobs. However, science is simply more foreign to the average citizen than many other issues, so there is more opportunity for confusion. The science advisor also is expected to help insure that federal agencies pay attention to the President’s priorities that relate to science and technology. This can be challenging in a government like ours, where power and responsibility are divided up among a large number of cabinet-level departments that vary enormously in their missions, from Agriculture to Energy to Commerce and Homeland Security. Science and technology are important to the activities of all departments and federal agencies and many of them support research and development activities; but attempting to coordinate multi-agency programs and science and technology policies across such a broad range of federal entities is challenging. In the two-and-one-half years I was in the White House, OSTP dealt with a host of diverse issues that relate to science and technology but also to a broader range of national needs, e.g. energy production and consumption; environmental protection, from clean air and water to global warming and climate change; national security and counter-terrorism; information technology, internet access and cyber-security; storage of spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste; health matters, from sequencing the human genome to proteomics, cloning, stem cells, fight against infectious

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diseases such as AIDS and malaria; science, math and engineering education and workforce development; NASA and the space program, the shuttle, international space station, international space partnerships with Russia and other nations; food safety and security as well as biotechnology; policies on how science is supported and conducted, e.g. rules on science misconduct; and the R&D budgets and overall assessment of the health of science and technology in the nation. At OSTP, each member of the professional staff was assigned one or more of these policy areas. They kept me informed through regular reports, briefings, phone calls and email. From the perspective of someone running one of the federal agencies, trying to move a science and technology policy agenda forward is always challenging, in part because of the separation of powers in our government and the openness demanded, appropriately, by the American people. Agencies have two “masters”, the President, who is the CEO, and the Congress (two Houses, with many committees and subcommittees) and its members, some of whom assume that they run the federal government. So, in reality, there are many “masters,” and usually, they don’t all agree. At the same time, one must listen to the voices of many interested parties, from the business world, to non-governmental organizations (NGOs), to university presidents, to patient advocacy groups, and so forth. In addition, the media are anxious to have their say. There is a constant din of input from all directions. It is not surprising that policy moves slowly, or not at all – and, sometimes that is all to the good. This brings me to the fifth point about working in the White House: the science advisor needs to recognize that science, while fundamentally important to the future of the nation, is not at the top of anyone’s political agenda. I think this is because voters do not easily connect science and technology with their most immediate concerns, e.g., the economy, jobs and wages, access to and affordability of healthcare, personal safety and security, the quality of K-12 education and the price of gasoline and electricity. Of course, science and technology are relevant to all of these. But the impact of technological innovation often is in the future. And politics – the next election – can’t wait. Not being high on anyone’s political agenda is both good and bad. Most science policy issues should not be wedge issues in campaigns. (We are not likely to get the most thoughtful policy on embryonic stem cells as a result of a political slugfest.) On the other hand, science should be one of the things candidates can agree is important; and they should say so. In addition to (or perhaps because of) science not being high on political agendas, aside from the science advisor and other OSTP staff, and one or two congressional committee chairs, nobody else in the federal government spends much time thinking about the overall health of US science and technology and how to improve it. Because of this fact, the science advisor can easily be perceived as “representing” the research community, to make sure the community’s voice is heard in the White House and keep the research dollars coming. All past science advisors, to the best of my knowledge, have made clear that they did not consider this as part of their responsibility. Indeed, were that perceived to be the case, the science advisor would be viewed as biased and unreliable as an advisor to the President. Of course, in one sense, the science advisor does represent the views of the science community, simply by giving the President the most accurate picture of scientific advances,

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technological breakthroughs, opportunities to improve the federal government’s policies and management of its programs. It is necessary to walk a narrow line. Working in the White House is more complicated than I have indicated. But I think these points summarize the job, at least as I experienced it. Everything else is detail. And, of course, every day in the White House there are surprises – some offering opportunities, others threatening near disasters. The science advisor cannot get anything done without outstanding staff as well as “moles” burrowed in various other offices of the White House; and I was fortunate to have the best. I should hasten to add that by “moles” I don’t really mean undercover staff, rather individuals who know and have the respect of all the offices of the White House, including the political folks. It helps avoid misunderstandings and keeps the information flowing both ways. Even for a well-run White House – and joining the Clinton White House midway through the second term, I found a very smooth operation – it is still the case that a small number of individuals must be on top of a large number of complex issues that change in real time. It is easy to forget to invite all the relevant people to an important meeting. I almost missed a key budget meeting with the President. You have to know what is going on all the time, be ready to get to the table when you think it is essential that you be there, and consult with the President’s Chief of Staff before popping in, unannounced.

Four Threats to Science and Technology With this background as context, I want to shift to the present, share some concerns I have about science (which I interpret broadly, to include mathematics and research and technological development in engineering and medicine) and science policy in this country, and offer an opinion on what the President’s Science Advisor can or cannot do to address them. And, I want to be clear that I am not only talking only about the G.W. Bush Administration. Many of the issues I will discuss have a long history, having been around for several administrations and multiple science advisors, both Republicans and Democrats. I want to start with a couple of assertions – things I believe to be true – that I think will help you understand why I have the concerns I do. First, science and technology are vital to the national interest, and they touch the lives of all Americans. But from a political perspective, as mentioned earlier, science usually does not convey urgency. A politician’s support or lack of support for science seldom makes a difference in the upcoming election or gaining the chairmanship of most congressional committees. There are plenty of urgent things, not closely connected with science and technology, that are on people’s minds when they cast their votes. Second, science and politics are intertwined – like it or not – and sometimes in unhelpful ways. The present political debates over embryonic stem cells, global climate change, intelligent design, and reproductive medicine, just to name a few, have put most Republicans and Democrats in opposing positions. The funding of research is not necessarily partisan, except when it touches one of these sensitive

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issues. In the past, both parties have tended to be generous to science when they are in a spending mood. Each of these assertions is debatable. But, for the moment I will take them to be roughly correct as I describe my “concerns” about the future. I have chosen to list four concerns; or to make the point more sharply, I am calling them “threats” to the future of science and technology in the US. My first concern is about money – money to support research in the universities and national laboratories. Most research these days, regardless of field, is expensive (or at least seems expensive, depending on what people are using for comparison). But, in my view, we have failed to match federal funding with the true importance of science and the opportunity it offers to help deal with a host of societal needs. By considering the total federal spending pie, one can get a sense of how research budgets are likely to fare in the future. I’ll focus on the President’s budget requests for a few years (the actual appropriated budgets don’t change the overall picture much). For FY 2004, the President requested $2.2 trillion. Two years later, in FY 2006, the request was $2.6 trillion. Two-thirds of the total federal spending pie goes to mandatory (non-discretionary) expenditures, such things as interest on the national debt, social security, Medicare, Medicaid, and other non-discretionary expenditures. Of the 1/3 discretionary slice, over half is for defense needs – and that slice has been increasing. R&D funding in the FY2006 request amounts to roughly $132 billion ($75 billion for defense R&D and $57 billion for non-defense R&D). Total federal research funding is approximately $55 billion, and over half of that is for biomedical research supported by NIH. It’s clear that the total federal budget pie has been growing rapidly in recent years, largely due to escalating defense spending. And with a national debt of over $10 trillion (October 2008), having increased over 70% since 2001, and with large annual trade and budget deficits and a costly war that is largely off-budget (but still costs several hundred billion dollars per year), there is increased pressure to rein in spending in other areas. Historically, funding for non-defense R&D has closely tracked overall discretionary non-defense spending, except for the period in the 1960s and early 1970s when non-defense R&D was boosted to fund the Apollo moon program. Aside from that special time, whenever the President and Congress were willing to spend more money, they were happy to invest more in research. From a political perspective (whether Democrats or Republicans are in charge), science has, on average, been considered as important as most other things our tax money goes for. But, when budgets are tight, politicians tend to argue that science is not urgent – or politically important – and can be cut. Why do we need to make a particular discovery this year? Why not wait a few years? Why does the research need to be done in the US? Why not let someone else do it, and then we can reap the benefits? Over the past several years, agency research budgets have experienced this squeeze and I am concerned that the situation could be worse in the future. Given how positive the American people are about funding research, at least according to surveys such as those included in the National Science Board’s Science and Engineering Indicators,

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one might ask why the public allows this to happen. One reason is that they don’t know it is happening. Since there is no R&D budget or research budget in the US system, only the hundreds of pieces of R&D activity in all the different agencies, no one official or subcommittee has to take responsibility for the entire federal effort. In bad times, the pieces simply fall through cracks, virtually unnoticed by anyone except a small number of concerned researchers and their institutions. The G.W. Bush Administration, picking up cues from Republicans as well as Democrats in Congress, began to be concerned about federal research funding. In the President’s FY2007 budget, he requested increases in three agencies and programs: NSF, the Department of Energy’s Office of Science, and the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), as a part of his “American Competitiveness Initiative”. This may, in part, have been a response to the National Academies’ report “Rising Above the Gathering Storm”, which recommended increases of 10% per year for 7 years, thus doubling federal funding of research, especially in the physical sciences and engineering. The report received strong bipartisan support in Congress, and gave rise to a number of bills calling for increased research funding and science and math educational initiatives. This is all good news for science. However, Congress has had a significant challenge dealing with the Administration’s deep cuts in many popular programs. Moreover, the President’s budget requests have held NIH funding roughly flat, losing to inflation for 6 years in a row. And the President’s total requests for federal science and technology funding have trended downward. It is appropriate to ask several questions – how much research funding is optimal?; will more funding necessarily provide more benefits?; is there a sufficient demand for all the Ph.D. scientists and engineers that graduate each year?; and other similar questions. I think it is clear from the economic studies that have been done that funding research is a high-return investment for the American people strictly in economic terms. However, many of the benefits cannot be measured in dollars, and quantitative measures may be hard to come by. I have not heard sound arguments against increased research funding beyond questions about the workforce demand. But viewing the nation’s research activities and investments as a jobs program is short sighted. More important is the likelihood that advances in science and technology will lead to innovative applications that, through positive feedback, will increase the demand for technically skilled employees. It is not a linear system. This will be especially true, I believe, if our universities examine their graduate programs and make the changes necessary to give their graduates the knowledge and skills necessary to be successful in a world that is very different from the one their thesis advisors grew up in. Much has changed in the 60 years since Vannevar Bush wrote his famous report Science, the Endless Frontier and established the notion of a partnership between the federal government and the nation’s premier universities. In my view, the arguments for the partnership are still strong; but industry is now a strong third partner, and the implications of that for US science and technology policy have not been fully examined. Moreover, it is not clear that all the traditional modes of setting research priorities and implementing change in the programs and policies of

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federal agencies are appropriate to the world today. In short, I believe it would be a mistake to simply continue “business as usual!” But that is a topic for another paper. My second concern or “threat” to US science has to do with people, finding the educated and skilled men and women – scientists, mathematicians, engineers and other technical professionals – we will need to make the future discoveries, invent the future technologies and apply them to things people need and care about. For many decades we have been unsuccessful in attracting a sufficient number of young women and men who are born in the US to careers in science and engineering. And, given the demographic projections for this country, our dismal record of attracting young people from underrepresented minority communities to science suggests we will have even more trouble in the future, unless we figure out how to respond effectively. We are fortunate that young people from all over the world have chosen to come here to study and, many of them, to work. Otherwise, I believe, US science and technology would be in a much weaker position, and that would be reflected in our economy and our influence in the world. But, a combination of factors – visa restrictions after 9/11; a deteriorating image of the US as a welcoming nation; new opportunities for young people in many other countries – are threatening to turn off this flow of talent we have long enjoyed. Meanwhile other nations, particularly in Asia, are not standing still. In 2001, Asia (primarily China and Japan) graduated more Ph.D.s in natural sciences and engineering than the US and nearly as many as all of Europe, and the curve continues upward. If the US is to remain a world leader in science and technology, it will have the challenge of doing that with a science and engineering workforce that is a small fraction of that of other parts of the world, particularly Asia. As I discussed in the earlier section, some question whether there really is a workforce problem in science and engineering. I won’t try to argue that further here, only to say that once we have unequivocal evidence of a serious shortage, it will be too late. The National Science Board pointed out in a recent report that it takes 20 years to produce a scientist or engineer. There are arguments that market forces will take care of any shortfall, i.e., demand and salaries will go up and people will choose their careers accordingly. I am skeptical. Perhaps the market will work – but will it work fast enough? And is the market the sole determinant of where the US should be in science and technology in the future? The third concern or “threat” on my list is the public understanding of science. This one clearly relates to K-12 education, but it also reflects the quality of the science courses and requirements in most university and college academic programs. And, beyond that, it has to do with cultural issues, e.g. the influence of fundamentalist religious groups that discourage the teaching of modern biology. As a result, the average person knows very little about science. In its Science and Engineering Indicators, the NSB gives the results of polls that provide insights into what the American people know about science and what they believe, even if there is no scientific evidence to support those beliefs. The NSB reports that 50% of the American people do not know that it takes a year for the Earth to go around the sun (this is the same number of people who believe

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humans lived with dinosaurs). So, perhaps it is not surprising that over 60% of the population believe that creationism should be taught in our schools, either with or without evolution. I personally feel that this reflects more a lack of understanding of what evolution is all about than it does an outright rejection of such an important field of science and medicine. The good news is that the NSB surveys continue to show that the American people think science is important, even if they don’t understand much about it. But how much longer can we expect such good will? We are seeing fissures in public opinion surrounding such issues as evolution and human embryonic stem cell research. People are willing to dismiss scientific knowledge when it conflicts with their beliefs. It is not obvious what the federal government can and should do to improve the public’s understanding of science. Most federal agencies have programs focused on science and mathematics education, from K-12 to university to public education. However, like so many other agency activities, there is no interagency coordination. Hence, the whole is likely to be no greater (perhaps even less) than the parts. This could be changed. In K-12 education, the federal government should get serious about encouraging all states to adopt uniform national standards, based on the excellent work of the National Academies, American Association for the Advancement of Science (better known as AAAS), and other organizations. The federal agencies and philanthropic organizations should expand their support of science centers and museums of natural sciences, places where millions of young people and their parents experience the excitement of science, and innovation in new teaching technologies, which hold great promise for the future. Finally, we in the science community, our professional societies, and the federal agencies could do a much better job of helping people understand the connection between the research that their tax dollars support and the benefits we all hope to receive for ourselves or our children. My fourth and final concern or “threat” – and the list could be much longer of course – is a challenge to the integrity of science. This is a relatively new concern; and, admittedly, it does focus, specifically, on policies and practices of the G.W. Bush Administration. Some of you may be aware that in 2004 over 60 scientists, including Republicans as well as Democrats, signed a statement criticizing the Bush Administration for what we described as a “pattern” of misrepresentation of science that was unprecedented in earlier Administrations, regardless of their political stripes. The statement was based on personal inquiries, media stories, congressional statements, and research done by the Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS). The examples were mostly in the areas of environmental science (e.g. climate change, industrial pollution, endangered species) or health (e.g. reproductive health and birth control). The Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, John Marburger, responded on behalf of the Administration that these were isolated instances and easily explained, that there was no conspiracy, saying “people sometimes do dumb things”, and that President Bush believes that policy should be based on sound science. Indeed, President Bush has said this. But some of the

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people he appointed did not get the message or else did not believe that he meant it. The Congress did take note. An amendment to the FY2006 appropriations bill for the Department of Health and Human Services (which contains NIH) directs the Department to insure that political litmus tests are not given to candidates for scientific advisory committees and that the Department does not misrepresent science. Some of the concerns on my list have been around for a long time. We tend to chip away at them, sometimes making progress, sometimes sliding back. What worries me right now is that all of them, taken together, present a daunting challenge to science in this country, particularly in an unsettled post-9/11 era. And I don’t see any quick way to reverse what I see as especially disturbing trends, trends that reflect the priorities, values, and beliefs of a large fraction of the American population. It’s that concern that worries me far more than what one public official or administration or Congress does at any point in time.

Conclusion – What Can Be done? What can a science advisor to the President – any President – do about all these threats? My answer is, not much! The science advisor can offer advice to the President, who may or may not take it. He or she can make every effort to connect science with the President’s priorities and other important national issues, working closely with other White House staff to do this. She or he can look for opportunities for the President to speak out on science and education matters. He or she can encourage the leadership of federal agencies to make science a higher priority for funding, insure that it is not abused, and remove barriers to openness in research and international cooperation (e.g. the visa delays and export controls). But the science advisor must publicly support the President’s policies or step down. And his or her advice to the President must be private. Let me close with a couple of quotes that I think convey an important message for all of us to hear. The year 2005 was the “year of physics” (so named by physicists), commemorating the 100th anniversary of Einstein’s “miracle year” when he published many of his most significant discoveries. Einstein had several lessons for us that apply today. I’ll mention two. In 1931, in a speech he gave at Cal Tech, Einstein said: “Concern for man and his fate must always form the chief interest of all technical endeavors in order that the creations of our mind shall be a blessing and not a curse to mankind. Never forget this in the midst of your diagrams and equations.” In 1938, in a commencement address at Swarthmore, he said: “Everything that is really great and inspiring is created by the individual who can labor in freedom.” Einstein’s messages, especially at a time when the truth and value of science are being questioned in ways that are disturbing, suggest to me that scientists and technical professionals of all kinds need to get much more involved in the political process. We need to help the public understand why science is special and the risks as well as the benefits of its application. And we need to understand the public

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better, to hear what’s on the minds of the people who are our friends, neighbors, fellow citizens, and who elect our political leaders. It’s time for a dialog. This is the role I have referred to as the “civic scientist”, a term invented by a speechwriter of mine at NSF, Patricia Garfinkel, who used the term to express the notion of her former boss, the late Congressman and great champion of science, George Brown (D California). What I mean by a “civic scientist” is a scientist, engineer, or other technical professional who uses his or her knowledge, skills, or fame to reach out to the public and policy makers to improve their understanding of science and technology and to influence important public policy. Indeed, some “civic scientists” devote their scientific careers to working on problems of obvious societal importance. I’ll close by mentioning a few “civic scientists” in American history. Benjamin Franklin was the first American scientist, who made original contributions to our understanding of electricity, and made the ultimate sacrifice by giving up his research to help establish a new nation. Albert Einstein used his fame to reach President Roosevelt and share his concerns that Hitler might be developing an atomic weapon. And, there are many contemporary examples of “civic scientists.” I would certainly include nuclear physicist, Allan Bromley, who sadly died in 2005, and who contributed to public policy throughout his lifetime, including his service as Science Advisor to former President George H.W. Bush. And Rice University’s Rick Smalley, who also died in the same year, shared the Nobel Prize for the discovery of buckminsterfullerene (carbon 60) and spent the latter part of his life alerting the public and policy makers to the looming world crisis in energy and the need to invest in potentially transformational technologies like nanotechnology. Of course there are many more “civic scientists” in this country – providing scientific advice, serving in the federal government, working with our K-12 teachers, speaking and writing for the public, creating and appearing in educational television and film, and in many other ways. All scientists understand the challenges and the joys of a career in science. Adding to the world’s knowledge of nature and things created by humans already is a significant contribution to humankind. But I think it is important for each of us to take a little time out, when we can, to get involved with the public and the people they elect to represent them in government. They would like to hear from you! Tell them “Neal sent me!”

Chapter 8

Science Advice in the George W. Bush Administration John H. Marburger III

Part I: Remarks Given at the University of Colorado, February, 2005 (Revised and Updated) I would like to acknowledge the contribution of one of my predecessors, D. Allan Bromley, advisor to President George H.W. Bush, and a friend. Allan died of a heart attack last week at Yale, where he had continued to lecture long after many of the rest of us would have retired completely. Allan enjoyed his role as a science advocate, and spoke fearlessly on behalf of science and its needs. I think he reflected accurately the feelings of many scientists, and won their admiration for his defense of basic research. When President Gerald Ford sought to create a statutory foundation for White House science advice in 1976, Congress responded with an impressively broad mandate (Public Law 94–282). The new Office of Science and Technology Policy was to advise the President (and by implication the Executive Office), coordinate science policies and budgets among federal agencies and with the private sector, build partnerships with the science community and federal, state, local, and international governments, and forecast and evaluate the federal science and technology enterprise. That is a tall order for a relatively small staff office within the White House. OSTP, however, has access to powerful resources. The challenge is not so much meeting expectations with limited resources as determining what, precisely, is the effective content of all this advice, coordination, partnershipping, forecasting and assessment? What specific things can OSTP do that will make a beneficial difference in the course and societal impact of US science? For many reasons, this turns out to be a difficult question. There is no job description for a science advisor, no one to say how to carry out the mandate from Congress J.H. Marburger III (B) Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy, Science Advisor to the President, President George W. Bush 2001–2009, Office of Science and Technology Policy, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] Current affiliation: Vice President for Research at Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY, and University Professor of Physics and Electrical Engineering R. Pielke, Jr., R.A. Klein (eds.), Presidential Science Advisors, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-3898-2_8,

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or how to engage the machinery of the White House to get things done. I will discuss a bit of relevant history, and then draw your attention to two commentaries, one old, one new, that frame the challenge of science advising and give clues as to how one might go about meeting it. Thomas Jefferson launched federal science two centuries ago with his commission to Lewis and Clark. Territorial expansion and the industrial revolution continued to drive US science and technology policy, such as it was, throughout the nineteenth century. The two World Wars and their aftermaths were primary factors in the twentieth century. Among these varied influences World War II stands out as a unique turning point in this history. Our attitudes today toward government’s role in science were formed during the 1940 s, and the institutions that support this role were largely in place by 1950, the birth date of the National Science Foundation. The larger Department of Energy laboratories were already in existence by then (under the Atomic Energy Commission), and each of the military services had an official research office by 1951. At that time the National Institutes of Health (NIH) had existed for 20 years. NASA and (D)ARPA (Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency) came 8 years later. Some reorganizations occurred after 1960, notably the metamorphosis of the AEC into the Department of Energy and more recently the creation of the Department of Homeland Security, but since 1960 the federal framework has evolved very little. The 1940 s and 1950 s were obviously busy years for science advisors, for whom the archetype during this period was Vannevar Bush. During the war they linked the President and top government policy makers with the nation’s technical infrastructure in universities and industry. Within the White House they filled gaps in technical knowledge of the rapidly developing fields of science that would strongly influence the course of the war, transform the nation’s economy in its aftermath, and revolutionize society following the disintegration of the Soviet Union in the century’s last decade. The early Presidential science advisors came from a small group who had played important roles during the war, including the Presidents of Bell Labs, MIT, and Caltech, and scientists who were active in the Manhattan Project or other wartime ventures. The unambiguous focus of science advice was military preparedness. The advisory arrangements have changed relatively little since 1950. Presidential science advisors are still mostly physicists known to each other, and national security is still an important focus of science advice (with a new homeland security angle). Given the enormous changes that have occurred in the landscape of science and the technical infrastructure of society, this invariance of the government machinery for science is mildly surprising. It speaks, perhaps, to the wisdom of the postwar policy architects, but it should also awaken a concern that the structure and practice of science policy today may diverge from the functions it needs to perform in a dynamic society. Stability versus change is a theme of two of my favorite essays on science policy, which lie at either end of the postwar history of technological growth. At the near end is Daniel Sarewitz’s (2003) essay “Does Science Policy Exist, and if so Does it Matter?” At the far end, on the leading edge of the dramatic leap in federal science funding in the early 1960s, is Alvin Weinberg’s (1961) article “Impact

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Fig. 8.1 Federal R&D spending (Outlays in billions, constant 2000 dollars)

Fig. 8.2 Non-Defense federal R&D spending (Outlays in billions, constant 2000 dollars)

of Large-Scale Science on the United States”. This is the essay that defined and launched the concept of Big Science, but it also suggests, almost implicitly, how one ought to think about priorities for federal science. (Figures 8.1 and 8.2 show total and non-defense federal R&D since 1949 in constant 2002 dollars.) In his 2003 essay, Sarewitz points out the remarkable stability of federal R&D funding as a fraction of the domestic discretionary budget (DDB) over four decades, except for the bulge of the Apollo moon program. Since 1961, omitting Apollo, non-defense R&D spending has fluctuated slightly above or below a constant 11% (exactly on the 30 year average of 10.8% in the current FY06 Presidential budget proposal now before Congress). “This stability,” says Sarewitz, is particularly amazing given the Balkanized manner in which science budgets are determined. The first thing to note here is that there is neither a capacity nor an intent to undertake centralized, strategic science policy planning in the U.S. The seat of American science policy in the Executive Branch is the Office of Science and Technology Policy,

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whose director is the President’s science advisor. The influence of this power has waxed and waned with time (mostly waned) [That’s a plausible assumption, but too simple], but it never exercised significant influence over budgetary planning. That influence came from the Office of Management and Budget [OMB] . . . which solicits budgetary needs from the many Departments and Agencies that conduct R&D, and then combines them for reporting purposes into categories that could be considered to reflect a cumulative R&D budget – but the process is largely bottom-up. The situation in Congress is even more decentralized, with numerous authorizing and appropriations committees in the Senate and House each exercising jurisdiction over various pieces of the R&D enterprise. Moreover, the jurisdiction of the authorizing committees does not match that of the appropriations committees; nor does allocation of jurisdiction among Senate committees match those of the House. Finally, the appropriations process puts S&T agencies such as NSF and NASA in direct competition with other agencies such as Veterans Affairs and Housing and Urban Development. (Sarewitz 2003)

That is an excellent short summary of the science funding process. It omits the additional complexity of the competition science faces within its own departments, and it ignores the fact that the OMB process is not just one of combining requests from the Departments and Agencies – that process includes significant policy decision making and prioritizing. But it captures the decentralization and fragmentation of the process that makes the stability of the science share of the DDB pot all the more remarkable. (Figure 8.3 shows the stability Sarewitz is talking about. The Apollo program bulge is clearly evident.) After I showed this figure at a science

Fig. 8.3 R&D as percent of discretionary spending (Source: AAAS, based on Budget of the US Government FY 2010. FY 2009 and 2010 data are estimates. © 2009b AAAS)

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policy conference celebrating Neal Lane’s 65th birthday, Allan Bromley expressed surprise at this remarkable invariance. This brief analysis suggests one answer to the question of what science advisors need to do – engage the budget process. In the Bush Administration I have been blessed with two OMB Directors, Mitch Daniels and Josh Bolten, who included me in the policy levels of budget deliberations. In today’s OSTP we set our work schedule and products deliberately to synchronize with the budget cycle. According to long time OMB staff, OSTP today has unprecedented input in the budget process and the language of the budget itself. But this is beside the deeper and somewhat mysterious point of the stability of the science share of discretionary spending. Within this relative stability of overall domestic budget market share, the fortunes of science have shifted substantially among fields. A popular graph compiled by The American Association for the Advancement of Science from OMB historical data (AAAS 2009) shows the three major trends that have defined postwar science: the 15 year Apollo hump starting in about 1960, the post Arab Oil Embargo energy research bulge in the mid 1970 s, and the inexorable rise in the NIH budget, culminating in the 5 year doubling period ending in 2003. I agree with Sarewitz that “It is not only axiomatic but also true that federal science policy is largely played out as federal science budget policy” and it is clear from the mega-trends that the policy is impelled by societal issues external to science. (Figure 8.4 shows the now famous AAAS graph.) The stability of market share that Sarewitz noted began only after an abrupt adjustment following the launch of Sputnik in 1957. Federal non-defense R&D outlays rose by a factor of ten in constant dollars in the 5 years following 1958. This was when Alvin Weinberg wrote the second of my favorite science policy essays. Weinberg’s rhetoric opposes “big” and “small” science, but his underlying principle is that the likely societal impacts of different areas of science are different, and we should acknowledge this and use it as a funding criterion. For example, investments in biomedical research will probably have higher returns to society than investments in astrophysics. In Weinberg’s day, the big sciences were space exploration and high energy physics. Today the need for expensive equipment in many applied fields (x-ray synchrotrons, for example, or super-computers) has blurred the significance of bigness in Weinberg’s argument, but it has not diminished the need to understand the likely impact on society of different patterns of investment. Here are Weinberg’s own words on the matter: . . .it is presumptuous for me to urge that we study biology on earth rather than biology in space, or physics in the nuclear binding-energy region, with its clear practical applications and its strong bearing on the rest of science, rather than physics in the Bev region, with its absence of practical applications and its very slight bearing on the rest of science. What I am urging is that these choices have become matters of high national policy. We cannot allow our over-all science strategy, when it involves such large sums, to be settled by default, or to be pre-empted by the group with the most skillful publicity department. We should have extensive debate on these over-all questions of scientific choice: we should make a choice, explain it, and then have the courage to stick to a course arrived at rationally. (Weinberg 1961)

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Fig. 8.4 Trends in Nondefense R&D by funcion (outlays for the conduct of R&D on billions of constant FY 2009 dollars) (Source: AAAS, based on Budget of the US Government FY 2010. Constant dollar conversions based on GDP deflators. FY 2009 and 2010 figures are estimates based on the President’s request. Note: Some Energy programs shifted to General Sciences in FY 1998. © 2009a AAAS)

I think one of the important roles of OSTP and national science advisors is to introduce such considerations into the complex process of requesting and appropriating resources, and not simply to be an advocate for everything any scientist wants to do, or to go along with societal inclinations that may be shaped, as Weinberg put it, more by public relations than by an objective assessment of importance to society. The extraordinary flowering of technology in the post WWII period has produced an unprecedented frontier of opportunity in science fields that are strongly linked to societal needs. The expense of pursuing these makes Weinberg’s plea even more appropriate today than 40 years ago.

Part II: An Interview with Roger Pielke, Jr., February, 2005 (Revised and Updated) My contribution to this series has a curious history whose background gives some insight into the challenges faced by scientists who enter public service at the highest level. As with the other contributors, I prepared the above remarks for a public address followed by an interview conducted by Roger Pielke, Jr. before the same

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audience. There was a subtext in my prepared remarks whose message needs to be articulated, and bears substantially on the theme of the series. My address occurred a few months after the Presidential election of 2004 which was marked by a vigorously partisan campaign in which the President’s opponents sought to undermine his credibility in all policy areas, including science policy. President Bush’s decision permitting for the first time the expenditure of federal funds for embryonic stem cell research, but limiting the research to cell lines already in existence, became an easy target for a strategy Pielke later identified in his 2007 book The Honest Broker. Advocates presented Bush’s decision as a scientific issue, when it was in fact a values issue. His position on climate change, a subject already strongly politicized by Al Gore, was distorted beyond recognition by opinion leaders who linked it with other less-than-environmentallyfriendly administrative actions, such as off-shore oil permitting, to brand him not only an anti-environment President, but an anti-science one. The overwhelming media attention to these issues created an image of science and science advice in the Bush Administration that bore little resemblance to the real world in which my colleagues and I were living and working. Policy scholars understand these things, but my audience on February 14, 2005 consisted of scientists and academics who mostly do not. My academic audiences are invariably surprised to learn of the complexity of the science policy atmosphere, the wide range of issues encompassed in the advisory process, and the existence of issues of the utmost importance to science that rarely if ever emerge in media accounts. During my tenure as President Bush’s Science Advisor, I took advantage of every opportunity to explain to academic audiences just what it is science advisors do, why it is important, and how it differs from the media image. I am not alone among my colleagues to make these points over and over again, as Neal Lane has recently done yet once more in a Science Magazine editorial (Lane 2009). Hence the “boring” prepared remarks. I repeated some of these remarks in my keynote speech to the 2005 AAAS Policy Forum two months after my talk at Boulder. In the interview that follows, Pielke gave me good opportunities to illustrate my prepared remarks. The questions and answers are quoted nearly verbatim from the transcript, with light editing for length and clarity. Q1. What does the Science Advisor do? What is your interaction with the President like? Give us an example of a situation when your advice was called for. A1. I speak at conferences like this. I interact with other scientists in government, with other White House policy shops, and with federal officials and science and technology stakeholders. Science enters into policy-making in a hierarchical process. Most of the decisions that depend on technical content get made within departments and agencies at a level far below the White House. Only rarely do technical issues come to the White House for decisions or for policy direction. The most common route is through the budget process. When I am not traveling I begin each day with the 7:30 A.M. White House Senior Staff meeting. That focuses on events of current salience and I offer whatever comments seem relevant, but usually science is not part of those day to day issues.

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When technical issues do arise that require Presidential attention my office prepares briefing documents that I share with other White House policy offices. We identify controversies or differences of opinion, try to work those out if we can, and leave the remaining items for the President to decide. This is the normal policy coordination process within the White House, and it accounts for most of my interactions with the President. The briefings and recommendations for decision normally reflect very substantial input from the Agency or Department responsible for that area. For example the Presidential decision to move ahead on the Yucca Mountain nuclear waste facility was based on materials prepared by the Department of Energy. I reviewed them with my office, discussed them with other relevant offices, such as the National Economic Council, and then joined the others in the briefing for the President conducted by the Secretary of Energy, and I contributed to the discussion. The President asked questions about the options and then made the necessary decisions at the meeting. Q2. Didn’t OSTP play a more operational role following the anthrax incidents in fall of 2001? A2. The funds for doing things in federal government are appropriated to the Departments and Agencies to spend in organized programs. Staff offices like OSTP rarely have an operational function. But in the months after 9/11, technical issues arose at the White House level that required immediate attention. Following the anthrax incidents, for example, the US Postal Service needed immediate advice on the disposition of contaminated letters. Boxcars full of mail had been contaminated with anthrax spores in the mail processing machinery. OSTP quickly assembled a team of experts from relevant agencies like NIST, FDA [Food and Drug Administration], USDA [US Department of Agriculture], Sandia National Laboratories, and the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute. These agencies had personnel with expertise in anthrax and in the sterilization of spore-forming bacteria. The team advised the Postal Service through OSTP on a rather specific course of action. This was an operational role that we try to avoid. In a similar situation today the new Department of Homeland Security would perform this function. Q3. During the first Bush term the fact that the OSTP offices were moved farther from the West Wing of the White House was interpreted as reflecting a diminished role for science advice in this administration. At the same time, President Bush’s Chief of Staff, Andrew Card, said last year that you were “closer to the pulse of the White House than any of his predecessors.” Could you clarify these apparently contradictory signals? A3. I would listen to Andy Card. OSTP occupied a wing of the old Executive Office Building that faces 17th Street, the only part of the White House complex on an open street. The whole wing was evacuated after 9/11 out of concern for truck bombs on 17th Street, and is currently being renovated. Our new quarters, about a block and a half away, were in a modern office building much better suited for our operation than the old, and I was disappointed when we had to move back into the New Executive

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Office Building (also on 17th Street) when space became available last year. I don’t think location makes much difference as long as it’s just a short walk from the White House. We are not, after all, in a day-to-day support mode for the President. The President needs people close to him who will support his activities during his busy daily schedule. The time scale of science advice is much longer than that, and we tend to work out science issues with the other policy staffs and the Agencies long before they ever get to the President. Q4. What role, if any, did OSTP or you personally play in the development of the President’s stem cell policy, announced in August 2001 before you were confirmed? A4. This was the President’s decision, and he made it before I reached Washington. The Administration was in close touch with experts within NIH at that time, but OSTP was not in the loop on that process as far as I know. Q5. The New York Times quotes you as saying “no one will know my personal position on issues as long as I am in this job. I am here to make sure that the science input to policy-making is sound and that the Executive Branch functions properly with respect to its science and technology missions.” It is widely known that you have announced yourself as a life-long Democrat, so can you explain a little bit to us about the role that politics plays in the science advisor position? Is politics less of a consideration for the science advisor than other high-level appointees or, alternatively, should it be? A5. Yes, politics is less of an issue for the science advisory role. Science enjoys broad bipartisan support in Congress in both Houses and it always has. Doing something about the distribution of resources or allocation of new funds is another matter, but in general science is not regarded as an essentially political issue in Congress, and I don’t think it should be. I think it’s very important for science advisors, the science advisory apparatus, and the image of science to be as non-political as possible. Incidentally, I never “announced” my Democratic registration. That was a media phenomenon based on a simple response to a reporter’s question about party registration. I have never been politically active. Q6. The Bush Administration made clear, in March of 2001, that it wasn’t going to participate in the Kyoto Protocol. What is the Administration’s position on climate science? Does the Bush Administration accept the conclusions of the IPCC and the National Research Council? What role does scientific judgment play in the Administration’s climate change policies? A6. First I think it’s important, although you didn’t ask the question this way, to try to separate the Kyoto Protocol from climate change policy. The Kyoto Protocol has become symbolic in some sense, and somewhat separated from actual actions that have to be taken to have a significant impact on CO2 emissions. This was sorted out by the White House and the Cabinet in the months before I was even nominated for my position. Following critical reaction to the President’s decision, the Administration turned to the National Academies and asked them to make a study, which they did in record time, informing the Administration about the validity of the

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science in the documents that supported the Kyoto Protocol. That study is the principal source of scientific guidance for climate policy in this Administration. Shortly after it appeared the President defined Administration policy in a speech which everyone interested in this subject should read. I cannot resist quoting from it here: President Bush said “we know the surface temperature of the earth is warming.” “There is a natural greenhouse effect that contributes to warming.” “Concentration of greenhouse gases, especially CO2 , have increased substantially since the beginning of the industrial revolution. And the National Academy of Sciences indicates that the increase is due in large part to human activity.” “Yet, the Academy’s report tells us that we do not know how much effect natural fluctuations in climate may have had on warming. We do not know how much our climate could, or will change in the future. We do not know how fast change will occur, or even how some of our actions could impact it.” But, he goes on to say, that is no reason not to take action. “The policy challenge is to act in a serious and sensible way, given the limits of our knowledge. While scientific uncertainties remain, we can begin now to address the factors that contribute to climate change.” “Our country, the United States, is the world’s largest emitter of manmade greenhouse gases. We account for almost 20% of the world’s man-made greenhouse emissions. We also account for about onequarter of the world’s economic output. We recognize the responsibility to reduce our emissions. We also recognize the other part of the story – that the rest of the world emits 80% of all greenhouse gases. And many of those emissions come from developing countries.” In his speech (June 11, 2001) the President announced the formation of two programs: a climate change science program, which re-focuses the pre-existing climate change science activities, and a climate change technology program to develop technologies that will replace our existing energy technologies and reduce or eliminate the emission of CO2 into the atmosphere. Each program encompasses activities funded at the multi-billion dollar level, far more than any other nation invests in climate-related research and development. Despite these definitive and sensible statements of policy and tangible evidence of commitment to climate issues, the public discourse remains fixed on the seriously flawed Kyoto Protocol. That is frustrating to me because even if the provisions of the Kyoto Protocol were totally implemented it would make negligible difference to the climate by the end of the century. To have significant impact on the climate, you need to introduce very different ways of generating and using energy. Every country is going to have to use new technology, either to remove the CO2 from emissions from hydrocarbon burning power plants or to use some alternate method of energy generation. This is why we need substantial investments in new energy technologies, and I think we should get on with it and not get hung up over the Kyoto Protocol. Q7. How does the political debate on climate change affect science? My personal opinion is that climate science is fully politicized and every research finding that is put out is interpreted in the context of this political debate. Do you agree with this interpretation, and, if so, is there any advice that you might give about the science to the climate science community about participating in climate politics?

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A7. This discussion occurs on two levels. Climate science is actually a pretty healthy field. A lot of people are doing good work. There is a significant federal investment – close to $2 billion per year – in climate-related science. And as I speak with climate scientists about their work, I don’t find them to be particularly politicized. On another level, the public discourse about climate change is obviously politicized. There was an attempt to make it a political campaign issue last year, and major news media have exploited it and inflamed the controversy. But I don’t think that has affected the science. Keep in mind that climate change science is not a new field. It is a mature and well-organized part of science with a number of different groups with significant capabilities for doing the necessary modeling and data gathering. I think the environment for climate science will remain favorable in the foreseeable future. This issue will be with us for a long time and I think the science community is handling it well. My advice to scientists is to apply the same skepticism to what you read or hear in the news media or on the Internet as you do in your professional work, and keep doing good science. Q8. How do you, as Science Advisor, handle an issue that is only a little bit about science even though the debate is played out in science, but it has all of these other factors wrapped up in it? Presumably these issues are discussed in other committees and organizations in the White House besides just the Science Advisor’s. Do you interface with these other groups, or how does that play? A8. Yes, I do interact with all the policy groups. The most important thing for a science advisor to do is to make sure that the science actually gets into the discussions. We don’t want to intrude in someone else’s business – foreign relations or economics, for example – but we need to be able to say “hey you guys, these are the facts, so take it from us or ask the National Academies, but this is the way it is and you’ve got to know that as you move forward and make your decisions.” My responsibility is to make sure the President and his other policy advisors are aware of what the best science really is saying. Q9. More than any other administration, the Bush Administration has been criticized for the “misuse of science.” You were widely quoted on this issue and prepared several documents – one quite lengthy – in response to these allegations that strongly defended the Bush Administration. First, I’d like to give you a chance just to offer your thoughts on the allegations by the Union of Concerned Scientists and your response? A9. I didn’t like the allegations. I thought they wrapped up a large number of disparate complaints into what I called at the time a conspiracy theory. That was my greatest objection. I just didn’t think it made sense to wrap all of these things up into one big ball and try to draw a conclusion from it. It was certainly not a study that would have qualified for a good grade in a college seminar. It was neither thoughtful nor complete, and my response to it was an effort to indicate that much had been omitted from it and that we needed to address these issues one by one in their context and try to understand them and deal with them. They were all over the map, and I was offended by the sweeping condemnation of “The Administration.”

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Q10. What is a misuse of science? How would we know it if we saw it? A10. I don’t know what misuse of science is. I think I know what science is. My attitude about science may be old-fashioned, but I really do think that while there are many societal issues associated with applications of science, at the core of it science itself is simply a method for continually making our ideas about how nature works less wrong. This method, based on systematically looking at what is actually happening in the world, is the only way we know to arrive at progressively closer approximations to a coherent picture of reality. That is a concept to which the word “misuse” does not readily apply. So “misuse of science” has to refer to peripheral issues associated with science. Are the people who are doing the science honestly reporting what they see? Are they posing as scientists for fraudulent purposes – misrepresenting findings? Some people may deliberately misstate scientific conclusions to support a preconceived notion. That could be called a misuse of science, but I would call it dishonesty. Q11. Where do you come down on the issue of potential Advisory Committee nominees being asked who they voted for? A11. I think it’s a bad idea. Q12. The Union of Concerned Scientists and Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility recently released a survey of Fish and Wildlife Service employees indicating, among other things, that 20% of respondents said that they had been “directed to inappropriately exclude or alter technical information.” The survey wasn’t scientific and had only a 30% response rate, but it led the Union of Concerned Scientists to conclude that “political interference in scientific findings has a chilling effect on scientific candor and staff morale.” Presumably this came to your attention and your office had some response. What was your reaction? A12. We did not respond to it, but I did look into it. I read the report, I looked at the survey and the survey results and how it was done, and I talked to senior officials in the Interior Department to find out their reaction. I am familiar with some of the issues that the Interior Department has had to deal with lately, the enforcement of the Endangered Species Act, for example. And after I looked at it, I concluded that the survey result was not an indication that there was something seriously wrong in the Agency and that, rather, this was a not unexpected result for a survey of this type. The Department does have a new administration that has a broader interpretation of some of the laws they are charged with enforcing. There has been a change, and I would expect that there would be people who would be unhappy with how the new regime does things. I am not implying that everyone is a good manager or that everything is perfect there, but I felt that it was an issue that the Department should be able to deal with. Q13. What effect has the Union of Concerned Scientists’ report and other reports had generally on relations between the scientific community and OSTP? Has it changed?

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A13. In public settings like this evening’s event I do get a lot of questions about these allegations, but otherwise they do not take up much of my time. While concern about the integrity of science is genuine, the actual details that seem to be generating it are peripheral to my job, and peripheral to the operation of science. I don’t see evidence for an undermining of American science, which is very strong. When I meet with scientists we talk about their work, and they seem to be doing it the way they have always done it. I do take concerns and complaints seriously and try to understand them in their context. If it looks like something is wrong and I can do something about it, then I do what I can from my position to fix it. But I do not give a lot of mental space to it, and frankly, although it may be a topic of discussion, I don’t think it is seriously affecting science in the United States. Q14. During the election last year, there was a 527 Advocacy Group organized called “Scientists and Engineers for Change.” It was widely characterized as being the greatest mobilization of scientists and engineers in the Presidential election since the 1960s. And I was wondering, what are your thoughts on scientists and engineers gathering together under the banner of being scientists and engineers and becoming active politically? Do you think scientists should identify themselves as scientists and get into the political fray, or should they spend their time joining existing advocacy groups and environmental causes, nuclear causes, and economic causes – whatever their values happen to lie in? A14. There are two ways to look at it. In the first place, any group of like-minded people is free in this country to join together in some association to engage in political advocacy. That is normal, not anomalous. It’s good, not bad. Second, however, to the extent that people use their common identifier as scientists to justify a nonscientific position, or a position that doesn’t have too much to do with science, that is a questionable practice. Before I would join such a group, I would want to know if the position it advocates is based on science or is that merely what we want people to believe? There is a potential ethical problem here, and scientists have a responsibility to try to avoid misleading the public about the basis for their political or religious or ideological beliefs. These are separate from science. The scientific community has a responsibility to try to separate the science from our beliefs or from non-scientific issues. Q15. The AAAS has said about the President’s FY 2006 budget that “It is striking how much the budget retreats from federal investments in science and technology and important areas.” During the first term of the Bush Administration, funding for research and development increased by 44%. As a percentage of outlays, it was the highest total in 37 years. What is your reaction to members of the scientific community and scientific organizations who criticized the level of investment in science and technology at that aggregate level? A15. I’ve been in science and higher education for a long time, and I have never experienced a year when there were no complaints from some part of the science community when the budget appeared. Today there is a huge appetite for science in this country. A wide frontier of new science has been opened during the past two

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decades by rapidly advancing information technology and the ability to manipulate matter at the atomic level. To put the very fairest light on the reaction of the scientific community, there is a sense of frustration at not being able to do it all at once. Unfortunately the opportunities are much greater than the assets that we can bring to bear to address them. That has always been true, but the opportunities and the capacity for science have been growing much more rapidly even than the expanding science budget. Furthermore, the complexity of the budget process I mentioned in my talk makes it hard for funding patterns to keep in step with changing priorities in the fields of inquiry, so you have the physical scientists, for example, feeling under-funded relative to life sciences. Let me add that I think we should acknowledge that our power as scientists has increased dramatically in these revolutions in instrumentation and information technology. We can do a lot more than we used to be able to do despite the flat budgets in some of the physical science areas. We are still enormously productive in physical science. It is true that China and India and the European community are developing their capacity for research, but I do not think we are in imminent danger of losing our competitive advantage to other countries. Q16. Tell us about Hubble and the decision process on Hubble? A16. Hubble is really a mini-space station because its continuing value depends on what instruments you can screw on to it. It was designed to be serviced by the shuttle and the shuttle has turned out to be an extremely expensive vehicle. So I think there is a money question here, and I think the way NASA has positioned this, it’s a question of whether the scientific community feels that it’s worth it to spend the dollars that are necessary to keep it going. Now we get into a fuzzy area of who pays, and is it just marginal costs or is it the full cost? A representative of the science community told the House Science Committee last week that if the science budget had to pay the full freight, Hubble should not be serviced – we should spend the money on other science missions. On the other hand, if somebody else was willing to pay part of the cost (the shuttle part), then we should go ahead and do it. From the point of view of the Office of Management and Budget, all of that money comes from the same pot. So I would say that the decision not to put the Hubble mission money in the FY06 budget was probably consistent with what we heard from that testimony. Space based observations are very important and there is a federal commitment to the big telescopes. I wish we had designed Hubble so it did not have to be serviced by a shuttle. Q17. How do you see the role of the public in science policy decision making? A17. The most important thing the public can do is what the public is expected to do, which is to vote and to communicate with your elected officials about how you vote and what your important issues are and be serious about it. The public elects top government officials but you don’t see a lot of science in political campaigns. The public who care about science should tell their elected officials they think science ought to be a bigger part of their jobs. I think the general public can have a much greater impact on the issues that become salient in political campaigns than they realize.

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Q18. Should the public be involved in setting research priorities? In Denmark and other places the public does not just advocate for science funding or participate in the electoral process, but is involved in the actual nuts and bolts of decisions that heretofore have been the province of science. A18. I don’t think the public should be involved in telling scientists or any professionals how to do their work. There is a gradation of types of science in which the public should have some say about funding. Only the science community can identify the most promising topics in what I call discovery science. The more applied the science is, however, and the more its work relates to areas like public health or environment or national and homeland security, then I think the public has more of a responsibility to participate in defining its expectations. In my view the most appropriate way to do that is through the democratic political process, as I said in response to the previous question. Q19. Science currently draws on a very small subset of the population. Is it appropriate to include diversity in science budget policy, i.e., Title 9 for science? A19. Yes. I think it is appropriate for agencies that fund science, especially in educational institutions, to have diversity objectives. I think it is important to have materials that attempt to make science more attractive to currently under-represented groups. This has been an objective of the National Science Foundation for a long time and I think we should be proud of that. I know a lot of young people come to college aspiring to be scientists or engineers, and they are turned off after their first year or two and they go into another field. If we could just tap into the stream of young people that already want to be scientists and provide opportunities for them and appropriate types of instruction, then I think we could make faster progress. Q20. “If, as you know, there is no explicit job description for your role, do you see it more as (1) defining the importance of science to the administration, or (2) selling administration policy to science?” A20. Neither of the above. Science is deeply embedded in governmental operations, so no one needs to define the importance of science to an administration anymore. There are far more scientists and science operations in the federal departments and agencies today than there were in the 1940s and 1950s when the science advisory apparatus was being constructed. I am confident that there are competent scientists in the National Science Foundation and NASA and the Department of Energy and the Department of the Interior. Part of my job is to make sure that the political appointees and the Secretary or Under Secretaries in the agencies are taking their own scientists seriously and using the science that they have available to them in appropriate ways in their regulatory processes and decision making. So part of my responsibility is to make sure that the apparatus that exists is functioning, and I try to do that by working with the science organizations within the agencies. I am not a blind advocate for all of science. I can say without exaggeration that I love all science, but at the same time I have to admit that some science is more important for our nation at times than other science is, and we should be

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making choices about how to spend public funds based on that knowledge. It is not my role to sell anything to the science community, but I do try to explain and interpret government actions to the public. Q21. Why doesn’t the White House play a more active role in articulating evolution as good science? A21. Can you really see any White House doing that? Evolution is the cornerstone of modern biology. Period. What else can you say? Q22. How can we justify shifting NASA money from Earth science, for example, or Earth observation satellites, to Moon-Mars exploration at a time when the Earth faces multiple crises, climate change, de-forestation, oceanic pollution, etc.? A22. I believe that Earth is the most interesting thing in the Solar System for many reasons, and I don’t think we should in any way abandon or diminish the importance or significance of Earth science in NASA. NASA has unique capabilities for studying the Earth from the position of space, and I’m not aware of any policy that seeks to undermine that capability in the long-run. I am aware that NASA is under severe budgetary constraints and has to work out its internal priorities, but I don’t see that Earth science is being abandoned by NASA and I don’t think should be. Q23. When you’re working on your book after your time as Science Advisor is over, what’s the title of your book going to be? A23. I am working on a book. Its title is “Beneath Reality,” and it’s about quantum mechanics and the Standard Model of particle physics. I am writing it for educated people who are serious about wanting to learn something about modern physics but don’t have a technical or math background.

References AAAS (2009a). Trends in Non-Defense R&D by Function, FY 1955–2010 (American Association for the Advancement of Science). AAAS (2009b). R&D as percent of discretionary spending (American Association for the Advancement of Science). Lane, N. (2009). Helping the President. Science, 324(5924), 147. Sarewitz, D. (2003). Does Science Policy Exist, and if so Does it Matter? Consortium for Science, Policy and Outcomes at Arizona State University. http://www.cspo.org Weinberg, A. (1961). Impact of Large-Scale Science on the United States. Science, 134(3473), 161–164.

Part III

A View from the Hill: Introduction Daniel Sarewitz

There is just one “Presidential Science Advisor,” which ought to suggest a position of power and influence. But the top-downness of life in the White House leads to a sense of sclerotic formality, perhaps even impotence, in the stories told by the science advisors in this book. While ideology was rarely discussed in the foregoing chapters, it is nevertheless the case that everything a science advisor does must be subservient to the political interests and agendas of the President. When independent advice is not only sought, but heeded – as with Ed David’s advice to go ahead with the Apollo launches (Chapter 3) – it comes as both exception and happy surprise. Congress is, in many ways, just the opposite. In an institution with 535 elected bosses, there is no possibility of a centralized capacity for science advice, vested in one person or even one office. A law, or a budget, emerges only after a protracted process of negotiation and compromise; the vision, values, and interests of any particular elected official can rarely make it through this process fully intact. Yet, perhaps paradoxically, this decentralization of power translates not into disseminated formality and impotence, but into distributed opportunity, creativity, and potential. Because Congress initiates federal budgets and federal lawmaking, the congressional ethos is entrepreneurial and empowering. This is of course particularly true if you’re in the majority, but effective opposition can also be a satisfying role to play, not to mention one that is crucial to a vibrant democracy. Moreover, Congress is an extraordinarily horizontal organization: there are very few hierarchical layers in the bureaucracy, and many staffers interact with their elected bosses on a reasonably regular basis – far more often, and for the most part more substantively, than the science advisor does with the President. There are dozens of elected officials, and considerably more unelected congressional staffers, with at least as much potential influence over national science policy – and probably more – than the Presidential Science Advisor. How is this influence exerted? Let me count the ways. Most obviously, new science policies can be made through legislation. Whether authorizing a new high-technology weapons system at the Department of Defense, a new program to study non-western medicine at the National Institutes of Health, or a new requirement for improved air quality, Congress passes dozens of laws every year that in ways both subtle and profound help to determine what science gets done, and by whom. Perhaps most importantly, the annual budgetary process strongly determines the priorities and organization of

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research and development within the government, in academia, and even in parts of the private sector. But congressional influence can also be brought to bear on science policy decisions through public hearings, oversight and investigations of existing programs, press conferences and op-ed pieces on timely issues, and old-fashioned personto-person interaction behind closed office doors. These more indirect avenues of science policy action illustrate a key distinction between the powers of the President’s science advisor, and the many science policy makers in Congress. The science advisor has no authority or mandate to set agendas, whereas any member of Congress or well-placed congressional staffer can mobilize an array of tools such as those mentioned above to influence science policy decisions. If a member of Congress wants to write an op-ed piece about embryonic stem cell research she does not need to have her opinions vetted by a higher power before going public (she only has to have a staffer who can do the necessary background research – and probably the writing, too). Because Congress writes the laws and approves the budgets that govern and fuel research and development, any sign of congressional interest carries with it an underlying threat of the cudgel or promise of the carrot. One famous example of the former is Senator William Proxmire’s Golden Fleece awards, which, from 1975 to 1988, were bestowed upon federal activities that he deemed frivolous or wasteful. Sometimes, the award singled out a government-funded scientific research project on a particularly obscure or apparently nonsensical topic, such as the September 1987 award to the National Science Foundation for supporting research on “Bullfights and Ideology of the ‘Nation in Spain.” This is the sort of attention that no agency director or department secretary ever wants. Congressional science policy makers – including many senior, non-elected, staff members, have a level of both autonomy and impunity that the President’s science advisor can only dream of. When agency directors and high level department officials come to Capital Hill to testify at hearings or meet with members of Congress, their demeanor is usually deferential. This is a survival tactic. Why antagonize a person who can cut your budget? While I have never attended a meeting between the director of a science agency and the President’s science advisor, one might reasonably suspect that deference is not the default mode of social interaction. Congress, every year, determines the future of the nation’s science activities. The science advisor, in contrast, represents neither much of a threat nor an enticement to the agency bureaucrats who implement the nation’s science policies. Apart from the titular legitimacy that comes from close association with the White House, the science advisor has few tools with which to compel action. Another point of distinction has to do with science advice itself. The ideal notion of a Presidential science advisor suggests that scientific and technical information needs to get condensed, filtered, interpreted, and presented in a comprehensible way to the President as a basis for wise decision making. As the previous chapters have shown, this ideal is often honored in the breach, but nevertheless it seems worth honoring. The congressional situation contrasts not just in the bureaucratic reality that there can be no single purveyor of science advice to serve 535 independent bosses, but also at a deeper, conceptual level. What one finds in Congress is many

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competing, conflicting, and often equally legitimate, sources of science advice. One needs only attend a congressional hearing on an issue where the science is unsettled to see that every elected official can find a way to get the science advice that she wants. Will a new missile system be effective? Will this disease be cured with more funding for research? Does this particular clean-air standard represent a threat to public health? Such questions are at once political and technical, and separating one from the other is often impossible. For such issues, in such an institution, science advice in the singular simply cannot exist. The next two chapters add revealing texture to the contrast I’m outlining here. A few things should become obvious. First, a sense of humor appears to be a more important attribute for science policy advisors in Congress than in the White House. Second, the sense I get from the stories told by the Presidential science advisors is that, despite all their political sophistication, there is still something a bit dirty about politics, and a bit clean about science. Fighting to maintain the separation seems to them to be a worthwhile endeavor. But for congressional staffers, pretty much everything is about politics – about jurisdiction, about public perception, about getting re-elected, about power. Clarity about a fact or two here or there may be useful, as Rad Byerly explains in his story about legislation to protect the ozone layer (Chapter 9), but the politics of getting the bill passed, and getting the right agency to do the research, is much more important. And, as Bob Palmer tells us in Chapter 10, facts may sometimes just have to give way to political needs: If the only way to prevent dumping garbage into Long Island Sound is to designate it as an ocean, then designate it as an ocean. The key to good science policies, it turns out, is not good science advice, but good science politics. In the interests of full disclosure I note that the authors of the two succeeding chapters were each, at one time, my boss. In those days I lost no opportunity to tell them how wise, intelligent, and good they were (or so I recall; they may recollect differently). In reading these chapters, and now that I am no longer dependent on them for my professional survival, I must say that they still strike me as wise and intelligent. I hope they are good, as well. At the very least, as the reader will now see, they are good storytellers.

Chapter 9

Science Advice in the Congress? Radford Byerly

Using several anecdotes from my experience to illuminate science advice in the Congress, this essay complements Bob Palmer’s excellent chapter (see Chapter 10), and provides further counterpoint to those written from the executive point of view. I write specifically about my experience on the staff of the Science Committee1 of the House of Representatives from 1973 to 1993. I saw my job as making the legislative system work to support good and useful science. (For me “good and useful science” means science that is rigorous and serves society’s needs, including the need for new knowledge – other staffers follow other criteria.) The advice given Members is mostly about science policy. Put another way, Congress is not a science agency, it makes policy decisions. It observes the current policy and the consequences of that policy. It decides what policy should be and whether prescribed policies are correctly implemented, and reifies its decisions in legislation. The legislative machinery is complex and inefficient in design and even more so in actual operation. Much of the “advice” staff provide Members of Congress is about operating this machinery. Advice with scientific or technical content is not often significant in congressional decision making. When it might be significant, each side of an issue typically finds some science to support its view, thus not clarifying but confusing the issue. My training was in physics, and before joining the Committee staff I worked in several industries and at the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). This broad experience, especially the physics, was helpful because my responsibilities ranged over many topics. I consider my physics Ph.D. to be a liberal arts degree in science rather than a specialization. And, probably due to background, experience, training, and a skeptical personality, I seem to have a good BS detector. Working in Congress – dealing with advocates of a multitude of interests – exercises and hones one’s BS detector.

R. Byerly (B) Chief of Staff, US House of Representatives’ Committee on Science and Technology 1991–1993, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected] 1

The Committee name has changed over time, this is current as of this writing.


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A word about advising Congress, that is, providing counsel as a guide to action. This is not the same as providing information. Information could be a table of numbers. Too much science advice is of this nature, if not so extremely decontextualized. Counsel as a guide to action is information usable in a specific, timely situation. Members of Congress and staff are awash in information and advice: more of it than they can possibly attend. Scientific information is a small part of it. The limiting resource is not information but attention. Science advice must compete for attention with everything else. This is a subtext to the balance of the chapter (and the book).

Procedures and Organizations for Science Policy Congressional committees are composed of Members of Congress, supported by a professional staff, and led by a Chair which in my time was elected by the majority party caucus. Staff serves “at the pleasure of the chair” and so has no tenure. Most chairs understand the value of professional staff which provides relevant expertise and, more importantly, institutional memory. Thus a new chairman typically retains most but not necessarily all of the staff. Top staff directly connected to the personal/political interests of the chair may leave with the old chair. A congressional committee’s job is to oversee agencies and statutory authority under its jurisdiction, and as it decides, to move legislation in its jurisdiction. For efficiency committee jurisdiction is parceled out to subcommittees, each of which has an elected chair and a small staff. All bills must be introduced in the full House – even those drafted by committee staff, and are then referred by the House leadership to the committee of jurisdiction. Staff, usually given rather general instructions – I once started a multi-year task based on “Rad, let’s do a bill on this” – then takes the steps necessary to achieve a signed law. Those steps include: – identify and clarify the problem to be addressed; – develop a specific legislative approach to the problem; – draft legislation, with assistance from the Legislative Counsel of the House who keep you out of trouble in matters such as conflicts with other legislation; – identify interested parties and knowledgeable witnesses, arrange, convene, and oversee hearings, publish the results, and analyze them as they relate to the proposed legislation; – educate, persuade, and negotiate with the executive branch (at various stages); – redraft the legislation in response to hearings, and redraft again as you learn more, e.g., from lobbyists or Members opposing parts of the bill; – educate members of the Committee about the issues (pro and con) and your approach to them; – educate the press on the issue, including using the popular press to “legitimize” the issue in the eyes of Members not familiar with science issues;

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– shepherd the bill through subcommittee and full committee markups,2 helping the chair accommodate friendly amendments and defend against hostile ones; – take the bill to the House Rules Committee to seek permission to take your bill to the whole House, as well as the conditions on that permission, for example, which amendments will be allowed; – take the bill to the House floor: prepare for debate and amendments there, prepare the Chair’s speech explaining the bill as well as debating points on foreseen issues, work out last-minute problems, learn the parliamentary motions necessary to accomplish what you want to do; – encourage the Senate to pass the bill without too many amendments; – prepare for, arrange, and support the “conference committee” in which members of the House and Senate reconcile their different versions of the bill, get the agreed, compromise version to the floor and passed in the House. This is a skeletal description of the actual complex and lengthy legislative process,3 which is essentially a decision process. The list suggests the difficulty of keeping a bill alive through the various challenges it meets along the way, and of preserving its original intent and policy content. In any given Congress few introduced bills become law. In the 107th Congress (1991–1992), 5,767 House bills were introduced and 377 became law. There are many ways for a bill to fail. Most of the bills that become law originate in Committees, i.e., have the backing of a Committee chair. Often a bill fails because the Member introducing it is the only person, or one of a few, interested in it. As a bill moves through the process broader, often seemingly irrelevant, political conditions and issues determine its fate increasingly more than the specific purposes and policy content. Put another way, the Members most informed about the bill are those on the subcommittee where it originated and in larger fora other considerations dilute this knowledge. For example, a bill encouraging the US to adopt the metric system was amended on the floor to provide subsidies to workers to buy new metric tools. Typically a single staff member responsible for carrying the bill must deal with these diverse considerations (for big bills such as the reauthorization of the Clean Air Act, more are assigned, perhaps two or three). And at any given time a staffer could be at the end of the process on one bill and at the beginning on another. A staffer’s job is continually interesting. Fortunately, Congress and the voting public generally like science and research. Usually they are seen as not-very-important motherhood items, and are rarely controversial. When I worked for the Committee there was no organized popular support of anti-science issues such as creationism or opposition to stem-cell 2 “Markup” is the term for a meeting at which a subcommittee or committee considers a bill, amends it, approves it, and sends it along to the next step in the legislative process – or as we say “reports it out.” 3 In recent years, in an aspect of its strict discipline, the Republican leadership has taken control of legislative procedure, removing some twists and turns for legislation it prefers and simply stopping legislation it opposes.

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research. While these issues are real now, they are mostly narrowly confined and hardly affect broader support for science. For example, Members who oppose stem cell research typically support most other unrelated research, including health research. Since most of this book deals with the President’s Science Advisor and his Office of Science and Technology Policy (hereafter “Science Advisor” includes the Office, OSTP), it may be useful to compare them to congressional staff. The comparison reveals differences and similarities. The biggest differences are that the Science Advisor operates at the Presidential level and is in the separate Executive branch of government, and therefore has a broader national scope and attendant stress. As for similarities, both are staff, not operating, functions. That is, the Science Advisor – like Congress – oversees a massive effort of scientific research and technology development in every major government agency, but – again like Congress – does not “do” science. The Science Advisor, however, sits alone at the top of this massive effort, while the Congress divides jurisdiction: The Science Committee’s legislative jurisdiction includes the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), and research at the Department of Energy (DOE), and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), but other research, e.g., that related to defense, health, and agriculture, reports to other committees. Both the Science Advisor and Science Committee staff have limited legal authority but significant effective power: the President or the Members of Congress make the decisions but in both cases the press of decisions requires substantive support by agile, alert, and knowledgeable staff. As in Congress, as issues move through the executive decision process, broader, more political considerations can dilute and overwhelm technical intent and content. An example involves the NASA Space Station and the decision to involve the Russians intimately in its development. An OSTP staffer once told me that he and others prepared a decision briefing for Vice President Gore (Presidents sometimes delegate responsibility for civil space programs to their Vice President). In it they argued against involving the Russians because they were notoriously unreliable and likely would have severe negative effects on program cost and schedule. At the end of the briefing Vice President Gore said “Is that all?” and upon learning that the briefing was indeed over, he abruptly dismissed them. Staff had not recognized that the purpose of involving the Russians was simply involving the Russians. At a time when we were worried about Russian technology going to “bad guys”, it tied their scientists and engineers to us. Costs to NASA were a detail. (The irony is that as of this writing, i.e., with our Shuttle unreliable, we depend on the Russians for access to the Station.) Prospective congressional science policy decisions need information on conditions and trends, on how current programs are performing. Implemented decisions need to be followed up with evaluation of outcomes compared to intentions. Such activities comprise “oversight.” This essay focuses on new legislation because – with notable exceptions – systematic oversight is not typically a large part of the congressional portfolio. (Even oversight in support of new legislation is too often

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minimal.) Members want to be associated more with positive, proactive problemsolving legislation than with fault-finding or – yawn – finding things are going pretty well. Most members feel oversight brings more political pain than gain. It makes contractors nervous, agency heads get hostile. A Science Committee colleague told me a story illustrating the committee’s attitude: Upon being appointed to the staff of the then-brand-new subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight, he made a single call to the NASA Inspector Generals’ office, and within 2 h was called on the carpet by the Committee chief of staff and told to “leave the agency alone.” This is particularly unfortunate for the Science Committee because, as mentioned above, its legislative jurisdiction is limited. But like the Science Advisor, it has oversight authority over all federal science and research programs. If exercised this jurisdiction would enable it to examine and comment on the effectiveness of scientific activities across the government, which could become a powerful tool for improving science policy. Such systematic congressional oversight could include more evaluation of how existing laws and programs work, which would prospectively feed into and inform the legislative process. For example, oversight could mitigate Congress’ tendency to layer law upon law.

Congressional Science Advice I: On Science Examples of what committee staff actually do show the relative unimportance of science advice in moving legislation. The first example, the “ozone-freon” issue, started with atmospheric science and eventually became whether or not economically important chemicals cause widespread bad effects. In the early 1970s chemists Sherwood Rowland and Mario Molino calculated that a class of chemical compounds, called halocarbons, could destroy much of the stratospheric ozone layer. The ozone layer normally protects the earth from harmful ultraviolet sunlight, and its destruction could cause significant adverse health and environmental effects. A variety of human activities mostly near the surface of the earth release halocarbons, exemplified by the proprietary freons, into the atmosphere. Freons, synthetic chemicals, have many everyday uses from propelling a cosmetic out of its container, to serving as the compressor fluid in air conditioners, to making the bubbles in foam rubber and plastics. A desirable characteristic of freons is that they do not interact with cosmetics, compressors, or plastics. But this inertness also enables them to persist in the atmosphere and diffuse up to the stratosphere. Rowland and Molino recognized that in the stratosphere ultraviolet sunlight breaks up the freon leading to chemical reactions that destroy ozone. They received the Nobel Prize for this discovery. Ozone-freon was my first assignment on the Science Committee – I had worked on it while at NIST. Representative Marvin Esch, a moderate Republican from Michigan, wanted to introduce a bill authorizing research to validate the cause and effect and, if needed, support the regulation of freons. He asked committee staff to brief him, and as the resident “expert” I met in his office with him and a few of his

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personal staff. (That a brand-new junior staffer was the expert, and that a Democrathired staffer was sent to and accepted by a Republican Member shows both the thinness of staff expertise – which continues today, and the bipartisan cooperation that existed on the science committee in 1975 – which is long gone.4 ) Esch began with questions about the science, e.g., how is ozone destroyed. As a newcomer I was diffident, letting his staff answer. But they were getting it wrong. So I interrupted and corrected them. After this happened a few times, Mr. Esch began to direct his questions directly to me, and we quickly moved through the big-picture science. Then he asked something like “So how do we get a bill passed?” meaning for example what are the politics. Luckily I realized that – having just joined the committee – I did not know anything about the answer to this and said so. His staff jumped in, happy to supersede this nerdish newcomer, and for the rest of the meeting I listened. There was real, if elementary, science advice at the beginning of the meeting, and it made the Congressman comfortable with the issue, an important consideration. But the overriding issues needing attention were political, not scientific. I gave Mr. Esch the correct – i.e., small – amount of science advice in part because I did not know much and because he was asking specific questions. Esch probably sincerely wanted to protect the ozone layer, but also probably to please the environmentalists in his district. It was home to many auto executives, and his support in their struggle with EPA over auto emission controls earned him bad points with environmentalists. Staff must know how much science advice Members need. In a meeting with the space subcommittee chair, Ronnie Flippo (D – AL), we went item-by-item through a bill authorizing annual expenditures for NASA programs. President Reagan had pledged to reduce spending, and so had eliminated funding for a NASA space science mission that was one of two comprising a joint program with the European Space Agency to study the north and south poles of the sun. With the NASA mission cancelled, the European spacecraft would become the whole program. Mr. Flippo asked what instrument would have been on the US spacecraft but not on the European. I knew the answer, a coronagraph. He said, what’s a coronagraph? I knew that answer too, but hesitated – literally a second – thinking how to explain it. Mr. Flippo was a kind man, but an efficient one, so . . . sensing I did not know the answer – he went on to the next item, and I never got to explain. I should never have tried to explain, I should have said merely “It takes pictures of the sun.” If in the unlikely event he had wanted more I could have elaborated on the sun’s corona and the instrument’s obscuring disk, etc. This was a failure of science advice because I wanted to tell too much. A microfailure to be sure, but offered because it is clear and common. I would have gone

4

When Newt Gingrich became minority (Republican) leader in 1992 he decreed that the duty of the opposition is to oppose. That is, no longer to negotiate cooperatively with the Democratic majority. When the Republicans became the majority after the 1994 “Contract with America” election he insisted on strict party discipline and no compromise with Democrats. They in turn adopted the “duty to oppose.” Bipartisanship died.

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beyond the politically significant point (after all, it is a political process) into politically irrelevant details as well as exceeding the time available. As a Democratic Congressman Mr. Flippo was looking for ways to oppose the Reagan cuts and I did not give him helpful information. The right information would have enabled the political argument “The President would cut the only instrument in this whole joint program that would take pictures of the sun,” an argument understandable to all Members. Much science advice fails in this way, providing information irrelevant to the decision, trying to transform Members into little scientists, not realizing they are big-picture policy makers.

Congressional Science Advice II: On Process, Policy, Politics Policy content is sometimes squeezed between the complex and daunting legislative process and potent and multidimensional politics. The Founders did not want government to be too efficient, and they got what they wanted. The many steps of the legislative process are meant to prevent inadequate consideration of bills, but they also allow special interests to inject their demands. Once a bill is launched prudent staff moves it as rapidly as possible, knowing the process will not allow inordinate speed. A saying refers to the efforts of special interests to use a bill to advance their own agenda: “A bill likely to pass draws flies.” Committee staff consider policy alternatives early and briefly in the legislative process, but they soon choose one, promoting and defending it against alternatives. The usefulness of policy alternatives and apolitical information depends on good timing. Congress has had two staff offices to support it with scientific, technical, and economic information and advice. Reports of the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA, abolished by the Republican Congress in 1995) and of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) typically contain such information and provide advice that includes several policy alternatives for Members to consider. But for a bill in process new alternatives are a diversion that staff will probably resist. On the other hand, if these offices offer advice when no bill is in play, it may be ignored because staff attention is limited. Such reports typically contain much good information, however, which if relevant to an issue that becomes politically “ripe” for action, can be very useful. The Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress (CRS) also provides science policy advice, but usually avoids policy recommendations. For example, on a hot issue such as energy policy various Members sometimes introduce several bills with different policies and CRS might compare their content. Of course Congress, committee chairs and other Members, and staff get science advice from sources outside Congress. These include the National Academies of Science and Engineering and the Institute of Medicine, scientific professional societies, other relevant NGOs such as the Federation of American Scientists, individual scientists, and federal science agencies. Such advice is mixed with advocacy for a point of view, a cause, a discipline, or a project. To the extent advice admixes

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advocacy it may be selective, value-laden. Typically this advice goes through staff who filter it. For example, if group A advises that project B is terrific, etc., staff might transmit to the Member the politically relevant fact: “A wants B.” As an example of “science for policy,” we return to the 1975 ozone-freon issue. I drafted a bill calling for research on how to protect stratospheric ozone and on health and environmental effects, with EPA as lead agency, and with supporting research roles for NOAA, NSF, and NASA. The bill also contained authority for EPA to regulate emissions of substances found to deplete harmfully the ozone layer. Giving EPA the lead research role gave them a better chance of getting the information needed to write good regulations. The Science Committee had no jurisdiction over such regulatory matters. Environmental regulation was in the jurisdiction of the Commerce Committee, which jealously guards its turf. How could we get such authority into a Science Committee bill? The answer was that the Commerce Committee was in a titanic struggle to re-authorize the Clean Air Act, fighting over automobile and coal-fired power plant emissions, taking on major sectors of US industry. For them the ozonefreon problem was a relatively minor sideshow, but they knew the public was interested in it. They also knew that the chair of the Environment Subcommittee on Science, George Brown (D-CA), was a good environmentalist. So Brown and the chair of the relevant subcommittee of Commerce, Paul Rogers (D-FL), agreed that the Science Committee would handle the ozone-freon issue. To skip ahead, the Science Committee passed my bill, but instead of our taking it to the floor, the Commerce Committee simply pasted our language into their version of the Clean Air Act. So in 1979 it became law: Regulatory authority was enacted long before the 1987 discovery of the “ozone hole.” That discovery generated enough political energy to force regulatory action, but action came easier and faster because the authority already existed. But before the bill even got out of the Science Committee, an internal stalemate arose which provides the example. Ozone-freon was a “sexy” issue at the time, needing high altitude research to validate the Rowland and Molino model. NASA’s Ames Research Center operated modified military spy planes that could fly high enough and carry a large enough payload of instrumentation to do such research. The NASA-Ames director wanted to use this capability, pushed to have the lead research role, and convinced the NASA subcommittee staff to write such a lead role into a NASA bill they were moving. This led to a struggle within the Science Committee between the Environment and NASA subcommittees. At that time the committee was called “the Space committee” for short. NASA was our agency. We felt ownership for their programs. That is, NASA usually got what it wanted from the committee. Eventually, I was called into the office of the Committee chair, Olin E. (Tiger) Teague (D – TX). He greeted me warmly: “Byerly, what the #$#@ is this $%∗& about EPA? NASA wants this ozone bill?” Somehow I avoided answering in terms of EPA needing research support for its regulation, and instead said something like “Well, if this turns out to be a real problem, there is going to be regulation of these

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freons, and they are used in home air conditioners, cars, refrigerators, meat markets, and lots of other places, and I just don’t think we want NASA poking around in this sort of mess.” (This was true if evasive.) After a long, nerve-wracking silence he said “You’re right, give the >?@#$ to EPA. Now get the %$ˆ& out of here.” Just so, science policy was made – with little scientific input to a critical decision. Resolving this sort of small, internal turf fight is not part of the formal legislative process, but exemplifies the non-scientific environment in which science policy is made. The ozone-freon bill dealt specifically with science policy, and the decision to give EPA the lead was, I believe, the right one, even though it was based on the Chairman’s desire to keep his favorite agency out of messy controversies. My advice was based on common sense and micro-political expediency (i.e., subcommittee turf). Another example of a policy decision involving ethical, legal, economic, and international issues concerned Landsat, a satellite land-remote-sensing program which NASA had started and which NOAA ran. The issue was messy in a larger way than ozone-freon, and staff had to lead Members through the mess, which had little to do with science. This began with the Reagan Administration’s decision to turn the Landsat program over to the private sector. Bob Palmer then staffed the NOAA subcommittee; as he describes there was reason to fear this transfer might benefit a big aerospace company at the taxpayers’ expense. We scrambled to pass “Landsat commercialization” legislation to guide the handover away from such deals. I participated as staff of the NASA subcommittee, to which I had moved and which retained an interest in Landsat. (This was the bill that the subcommittee chair, Harold Volkmer (D-MO) launched with “Rad, let’s do a bill on this,” probably because he saw it as his duty, not for specific political gain. He also probably mistrusted the Reagan Administration’s motives.) Although Landsat data supported many technical and scientific applications, the issues we were concerned with revolved around how to fairly and efficiently transfer the program from government to private industry, for example, how to prevent conflicts of interest (Palmer describes the unmasking of one egregious conflict of interest). That is, the issues involved overlaps of law, ethics, and economics so guiding legislation would be different from a typical Science Committee bill and more complex. We needed to make sure that the Members not only understood the bill and the context, but also were comfortable supporting it. If not comfortable they are susceptible to lobbying by special interests. This meant educating the person in each Member’s office who followed the Science Committee and briefed the Member on committee issues and bills. This person is a “Legislative Assistant” or “LA”. My approach was to set up a Friday afternoon seminar. Staff have a real but informal power to convene. Fridays the Members were usually back in their districts, and LAs could attend a briefing. I invited a broad range of people to make presentations: agency staff, aerospace companies, someone from the French embassy to talk about “SPOT,” their competitive land-remote-sensing satellite system, etc. In short I invited everyone involved or interested. And while the target audience was LAs and

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the primary briefers were participants in the issue, I wanted others to be informed as well. These included: – Relevant staff of CRS and OTA; – Senate staff that we hoped to be in conference with; – Intelligence committee staff who were a little nervous about this whole business; and – The press covering the issue. In addition to the presentations I wanted LAs and everyone to hear all of the questions and answers so they could observe the complexity of the issue instead of hearing me assert it. All invited to talk came, and there was good audience attendance and discussion. Again, a process with little technical content developed among the community a common understanding of the issues and where actors were coming from, providing a healthy environment in which to develop and move legislation. The seminar had an unforeseen benefit for me. After it had been running for a couple of months I got a call from a stranger. He had a question about Landsat which I answered as well as I could – he seemed satisfied. But I was curious: How, I asked, did he get my name? He said, “Oh, everyone in Washington says Rad Byerly knows everything about Landsat.” Of course that was not true, but it is better for a staffer to have this reputation than its opposite. I think it happened because lots of people in the community saw me stand up every week or so to introduce the seminar. My physics Ph.D. was irrelevant and invisible. In working the process I became a credible player in it. Low science content in both advice and issues also characterized the development and passage of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act in 1976. Again there was close cooperation between the staffs of the Science and Commerce committees (although different subcommittees). Again, Commerce had the regulatory jurisdiction and we had research and technology. The bill was driven by a belief among many citizens and Members that as a nation our solid waste management practices were wasting resources and polluting land and water. We could do better, with revenue from recovered resources paying the extra costs for their recovery, and recovery of resources also reducing the volume going into landfills. The big, divisive issue was “bottles,” meaning consumer containers of many kinds. There was strong pressure from environmental groups for legislation to make non-returnable containers more expensive, in effect going back to the old days when bottles were returned to the grocery store to redeem a deposit. There were such “bottle laws” in a few states which alarmed the industry. It seemed that there was as much profit in the container as in the beverage and maybe even more jobs. At any rate a very broad management-labor coalition formed to defeat any federal bottle legislation. Our bill had some bottle provisions they did not like. Bit-by-bit we yielded more-and-more until they beat our brains out. They did not want the word bottle or any of its synonyms anywhere in the bill, not even studies relating to bottles. (One thing they did not ask for, an oversight perhaps, was a provision that would override and vitiate state bottle laws. I think we would have fought that successfully.)

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The climax came in a final meeting with the anti-bottle-bill coalition on the day the bill was scheduled to go to the floor. We met in a conference room in the Legislative Counsel’s office. Counsel had helped us remove from the bill all references to bottles, and while we met their staff made multiple copies of the new, clean version. We told the coalition that we had done everything they requested. A secretary came in with a phone message, the bill had been called up on the House floor and our bosses, the two subcommittee chairs, wanted to know where the hell we were. Floor debate had begun: they were killing time with vapid speeches because we had their prepared speeches with us. The coalition wanted to see the bill. We said we can’t show you because it is only now being printed, you have to trust us. They asked us to step outside our own conference room so they could confer privately. Shortly, they called us back in and said, “Okay, but you’ll be in big trouble if you’re lying.” We said don’t worry, grabbed a few copies of the bill – still warm from the copier and about two inches thick – and ran across Independence Avenue to the House floor. We met surly chairs, but calmed them by telling them the coalition would not oppose our bill. The bill passed by a large margin, but it might not have. I say this because as I stood on the House floor by the bill manager’s desk during the 15 min allowed for a vote, member after member approached me with a letter in his or her hand. It might have a Budweiser or Coca-Cola letterhead. Most carried a one sentence message: Please vote against HR xxxx, the solid waste bill. [signed] Your buddy the local distributor. This was grassroots pressure from the district, from old supporters, hard to resist. But I advised each Member, Oh, that’s all been worked out. The Member would say, So it’s okay to vote for the bill? Yes, I advised again. And they all did, right in front of me they put their card in the voting machine, pressed a button – which one I could not see, but I saw the green light come on. Members want to vote for environmental bills if the political price is not too high in their district, so they took my word because the voting clock was running and there was no time for a study of pros and cons. It was the second time in a few hours that lying would bring me big trouble – and the anti-bottle-bill coalition would decide if I was lying. The first couple of times this happened I was surprised at the ease with which Members took assurance from a stranger, but then I realized that I was standing in the aura of the manager’s desk, and that they also knew I would be in trouble if I lied. Most of the work I did on this environmental policy bill and most of the stress it generated had nothing to do with science. And there was virtually no science advising, there was mostly operational work of making the legislative system work. And it worked on the basis of a lot of trust, which seems to be largely absent in the Congress today.

Conclusion Even on the Science Committee, staff are not asked for and do not spend much time on science advice. The job is not science. It is mostly about making the legislative system work to provide for and support science. Science may create issues, as Rowland and Molino surely did, but science alone will not pass legislation.

Chapter 10

Science, Policy and Politics: A View from Capitol Hill (Twenty Years of Schoolin’ and They Put You on the Day Shift) Robert Palmer

Introduction About 6 months ago, my friend Roger Pielke, Jr., wrote an article entitled “The End of Research”, which dealt with federal funding for S&T. Roger concluded that “over the past decade S&T have experienced a second golden age, at least as measured by federal funding, which has increased dramatically in recent years at a pace not seen since the 1960s.” Science budgets will no doubt be discussed in other chapters, but I’d like to address a different question. If this is a golden age for S&T funding, is this also a golden age for science policy? I imagine that the students participating in this series of lectures who are studying science policy might be interested in this question. I will not concern myself with the study of science policy – in universities and elsewhere – which appears to me to be reasonably healthy, based on the readings that Professor Pielke and Rad Byerly assigned me. I’m asking whether this is also a golden age for science policy as practiced at the federal level by the executive and legislative branches of our government. Whatever we conclude about science policy, it is clear that we continue to have a lot of science politics, which I participated in eagerly for the past 25 years. Science politics consist of budget fights, program creation, tweaking, oversight and destruction, and philosophical disagreements of all sorts. This can be a blood sport, and it can also be a lot of fun, even though it has serious outcomes. And in a broader sense, beyond science politics, it is true that the federal scientific enterprise continues in the broadest sense to react to pressing societal issues, as it did with the spikes in space and energy funding in the 1960s and 1970s, respectively. We now have a significant homeland security R&D program, for example. But for many years, both in the executive and legislative branches, there has been no consistent or focused debate about the roles of S&T in meeting our broader national goals, as I believe there has been about the rightful place of other aspects of R. Palmer (B) Staff Director, US House of Representatives’ Committee on Science and Technology 1993–2004, Washington, DC, USA e-mail: [email protected]


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our culture. To list a few, this broader debate has occurred regularly in recent years on issues like abortion and abstinence, federal support of education, the role of the military in promoting democracy worldwide, the role of individual rights in a society threatened by terrorism, and capital punishment. The appropriate place for these and many other issues are sifted and sorted all the time – often because they are seen by our political leaders as fertile ground for drawing political differences between the two parties – but debates over issues which are less overly political – such as the debate about how to connect the conduct and goals of science with broader goals in society – just aren’t taking place, at least not in the national government. So regrettably, I’ve concluded that science policy is in anything but a golden age. It is rusty. It is stagnant. Engagement between the two branches and the two political parties is minimal. The great debates of the day are being held somewhere else. To the extent that they occur at all, science policy debates have gone underground. In short, it is an excruciatingly boring and unproductive time for the practice of science policy in the halls of government. Now I apologize to any students who come to this chapter excited about their future careers in science policy. You could say that I’m just a bitter, retired-toFlorida, out-of-power Democrat and you could well be right. Let me try to explain why I’ve reached this rather grim conclusion. I’ll look at the roles of the Executive Branch and the Congress in setting science policy in the US, particularly the degree of cooperation and conflict between the two over last 25 years. As someone who loves both science and politics, I apologize in advance for the depressing nature of my message.

My Initiation in Science Policy I came to Capitol Hill in 1979 as an AAAS Congressional Science Fellow and my first exposure to a science policy issue was the re-authorization of the Ocean Dumping Act. This is the law that was originally passed in response to cities dumping garbage and sewage sludge in the unregulated oceans, exporting their problems 12 or more miles offshore. My boss (Jerry Ambro, Chairman of the Environment Subcommittee on the House Science Committee) had a problem; the dredge spoils from Connecticut harbors on the other side of the Long Island Sound were contaminating the waterfront of his constituents on the New York side of the Sound. Putting science to work, we solved this problem very simply. We amended the Ocean Dumping Act to stipulate that the Long Island Sound was in fact the ocean (a great surprise to Rand McNally), an amendment that brought the tougher dredge regulations of the Ocean Dumping Act into play in the Sound. Twenty years later, something similar happened when, as part of an authorization bill for NOAA’s Sea Grant program, Lake Champlain was actually declared by Congress to be a Great Lake. Then as this Ocean Dumping Act saga continued, I had my first exposure to the second greatest deliberate body on Earth – the floor of the US House of

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Representatives. Now when a vote is taking place on the floor, the sponsors of the legislation typically stand near the entrances to the chamber and explain the gist of the bill to the entering Members. I expected to hear Mr. Ambro saying something like, “Vote yes and you can expect that mercury, cadmium, and lead levels in the sediments of Long Island Sound will slowly decline over the next 50 years.” Instead Mr. Ambro came up with something much catchier: “Vote ‘Yes’ for Clean Fish.” A Member sitting near me looked up at the electronic board displaying each Member’s vote, turned to another Member sitting next to him, and said, “You just voted for dirty fish.” That Member, horrified, quickly re-inserted his voting card and got back on the clean-fish bandwagon. This was all a sobering initial exposure to the use of science in policy making, but I managed to survive the Ocean Dumping Act and another 25 years of science policy in Washington, D.C. before retiring to Florida last year.

When “Bipartisan” Was Not a Dirty Word Science advisors go back to the middle of the twentieth century, or to Jefferson if you want to consider Merriweather Lewis a science advisor. One of the early science advisors – Ed David, who participated in the University of Colorado lecture series (see Chapter 3) – was fired by President Nixon in 1973. At the same time, Nixon abolished the Office of S&T and the President’s Science Advisory Committee, supposedly because Nixon – not the least paranoid man ever to hold the Presidency – felt that he was getting bum advice from his scientific advisory apparatus on issues like the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty and the Supersonic Transport (SST). Ed David, another contributor to this volume, may disagree with that analysis, but at any rate, Gerald Ford – who succeeded President Nixon in 1974 and was a creature of the Congress, having served as House Minority Leader – was eager to re-instate the role of the science advisor, which led 2 years later – in 1976 – to passage of the National Science and Technology Policy, Organization, and Priorities Act. The Act not only established a federal administrative organization for science policy, it also attempted to articulate a science policy for the nation. The goals that the law set are quite general, but they nonetheless represent a serious effort to tie the nation’s S&T enterprise to broader societal goals. For example, the law declares that S&T should contribute to “fostering leadership in the quest for international peace and progress toward human freedom, dignity, and well being. . .” Now I was still in graduate school at the time, but I suspect that the OSTP Act of 1976 was a true collaborative effort between a Republican Administration and a Democratic Congress to restore dignity and visibility to the position of science advisor, 3 years after the sacking of Ed David. In fact, Vice-President Nelson Rockefeller pushed the bill within the Administration and even testified in favor of the bill before the Science Committee. Having a Vice-President testify was a big deal, and it was carefully handled to make sure that no precedent was established that could compel

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future Vice-Presidents to testify. For example, the Committee did not actually invite the Vice President; they welcomed him. I may be romanticizing the passage of the OSTP Act, but in my opinion it represents the last successful effort involving the legislative and executive branches to deal cooperatively and productively with the broadest aspects of national science policy. And that was almost 30 years ago. Since then, there have been a few, largely abortive legislative efforts to catalyze a discussion of national science policy. Congressman George Brown was probably the most successful at this in his role as Chairman of the House Science Committee in the early 1990s. Mr. Brown was legendary for his constant prodding of the scientific community to engage in the political process and to think about and take responsibility for the impacts of their work. And then there was a brief period in the beginning of the Clinton Administration when the government’s S&T resources were overtly and consciously re-directed toward economic competitiveness. In 1995, when Republicans assumed power in the Congress, they brought with them a new direction in science policy, which I would summarize in a nutshell as: “basic research good, everything else bad.” Of course, these new leaders reserved the right to define “basic research,” which, it turned out, included such applied items as the Space Station and hydrogen research. Later in the 1990s Speaker Newt Gingrich assigned Congressman Vern Ehlers, a former physicist, the job of producing a new US science policy. Mr. Ehlers did write a report entitled “Unlocking Our Future: Toward a New National Science Policy.” But that report did not tie S&T policy to any overriding goals, and even Mr. Gingrich later admitted it was a timid endorsement of the status quo. Let me offer one final observation about the recent failure to set broad science policy goals. In 2001, the Bush Administration – particularly its Office of Management and Budget – became very enthused about applying the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA) to the evaluation of lots of government programs, including R&D programs. This exercise had the potential to elucidate the priorities and philosophical underpinnings, as well as the outcomes rather than the outputs, of federal investments in R&D. This is clearly a very difficult exercise, and I applaud OMB for trying, but it’s pretty clear 5 years later that GPRA has not produced a clear set of national S&T priorities, nor has it done much to clarify funding decisions. In fact, today’s OSTP seems more focused on inputs than ever before. It is an OSTP that is obsessed not with outcomes, but with explanations of why its budget numbers are wonderfully healthy.

“Meso-Scale” Cooperation Over the years, I have seen many instances of productive cooperation between the Administration, its science advisors and the Congress – cooperation that goes beyond cordial relations to joint discussion, formulation, planning, and implementation. Admittedly, these instances have all pretty much been issue-related rather

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than sweeping, broad issues of science policy like the passage of the 1976 OSTP Act. In the lingo of atmospheric scientists, these might be called meso-scale issues. For example, the Space Station was under the threat of imminent demise throughout the early 1990s, but was saved by one vote in the House of Representatives in 1993 – and several times after that by slightly larger margins– through a high degree of cooperation involving the Administration, elements in the Congress, and industry lobbyists. I know that the Space Station may not really qualify as “science” but it is certainly technology and besides it’s always been sold as a scientific research laboratory. Cooperation was strong on broad questions of industrial policy both during the first Clinton campaign and during the first 2 years of the Clinton Presidency. This policy involved the creation and nurturing of an alphabet soups of programs aimed at enhancing US competitiveness through joint government-industry R&D programs like the Advanced Technology Program and the Manufacturing Extension Partnership in the Department of Commerce, which were aimed respectively at development of breakthrough technologies and providing technological assistance to small companies. The Clinton industrial policy also included the Technology Reinvestment Program (aimed at conversion of defense resources and facilities to civilian purposes), expanded Cooperative Research and Development Agreements between the private sector and federal laboratories (especially in DOE, NIH, DOD, and NASA), USCAR (a CRADA between several government departments and the Big 3 auto makers), and many other programs. Some of these competitiveness programs were controversial – for example, environmentalists criticized USCAR as a sell-out to the Big 3, who were let off the hook on tougher emissions standards in return for their participation in this massive joint R&D program. Cooperation between the OSTP of George Herbert Walker Bush and the Democratic Congress was also quite strong during the passage of the Global Change Research Act in 1989–1990.1 There were elements in the Administration and in the Congress fighting the passage of the Act, but OSTP and key Congressional Committees joined together to overcome this opposition. Cooperation was also quite strong between the George Herbert Walker Bush Administration and the Congress (and industry lobbyists) in protecting the Super-Conducting Super-Collider. While there wasn’t broad congressional agreement on the SSC, there was at least open, vigorous debate – which ultimately led to the SSC’s demise in an overwhelmingly negative House vote in 1993.

1 Over the years, I had the pleasure of working with the last three Congressmen from Boulder – Tim Wirth, David Skaggs, and the current incumbent, Mark Udall – since all of them served on the House Science Committee. I also came to Boulder regularly in the 1980s for conferences and meetings in the early days of the Global Change Program, and I distinctly recall having a discussion around a small table at NCAR in the mid-1980s about what to call this new science. Should it be the International Geosphere-Biosphere Program, or the Global Habitability Program, or something else? After an hour or two, we all agreed to spread the word that it should be called “Global Change” – it helped that we had leaders like Jack Eddy and Francis Bretherton around the table – and darn if the name didn’t stick.

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Finally, in the early Clinton years, there was again vigorous discussion between the branches of government on the Space Station and specifically the role that the Administration envisioned for the Russians on the Station. Vice-President Al Gore and others in the Administration had direct and frequent interactions with congressional leaders from both parties.2 Ultimately, the Station continued, although the Congress did disagree with the Administration on whether or not the Russians should be a part of the critical path leading to the Station’s completion. In the end, the Russians were put on the critical path – in other words, the Station couldn’t be built or maintained without them. The Congress did not fully support that decision. But 10 years later – after the Columbia Shuttle accident and after the US human space flight program became completely dependent upon Russian launches, Russian re-supply missions, and Russian rescue capability – that decision alone probably saved the Station from crashing into the Pacific Ocean. What do all these issues have in common? First, except for the passage of the OSTP Act, they are all meso-scale issues, each dealing with one limited aspect of science policy. Secondly, they proceeded through regular order, with hearings, committee action, congressional floor debate and floor votes, and regular consultation and discussion. In other words, their resolution was transparent and democratic. Thirdly, they were all resolved more than 10 years ago.

Newt Gingrich and the Death of Bi-partisanship Do I see any of this bipartisan, government-wide engagement now? The answer is virtually none, not even at the meso-scale level. Why? In my perhaps overly partisan view, the problem started in the late 1980s, when S&T became politicized in Congress as part of a broader strategy by Republicans to seize back control of the Congress – a goal that they eventually accomplished in the 1994 mid-term elections. It may surprise some of you to hear that the public partisan fight over science policy – exemplified today in the reports by Congressman Henry Waxman and the Union of Concerned Scientists3 – did not start during this Administration. It has actually been going on in the Congress for about 15 years. There have always been a lot of specific fights on science-related issues on the Hill (for example, on building the Clinch River Breeder Reactor in the early 1980s, where the two sides did not break down neatly on partisan grounds). But partisan fights on science were largely non-existent until the late 1980s when Newt Gingrich – ironically now an outspoken and highly entertaining advocate for science – stirred

2 See a parallel discussion of Vice President Gore’s role in this issue in Rad Byerly’s chapter of this book, Chapter 9, p. 126. 3 Congressman Henry Waxman, Ranking Democratic Member of the House Government Oversight Committee, and the UCS have both published lengthy reports documenting repeated instances in which the G.W. Bush Administration has distorted or suppressed scientific information and analyses in order to advance political ends.

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up his followers in the House of Representatives to fight the Democrats on everything, including science. I do not have room to catalogue all these disputes, but suffice it to say that beginning in the late-1980s, we fought on all sorts of issues and with a spirit of meanness, that had not been seen for decades. Parenthetically, I should mention that I heard the recently deposed Speaker Gingrich give a breakfast speech to an AAAS audience in 2000 or 2001. The speech was mesmerizing, as Mr. Gingrich ventilated fully on the proper role of S&T in our society, specifically the relationship between science and health care, science and the economy, science and international relations. What an irony that a man who has more ideas about science policy and societal goals than any public figure since George Brown created so many of the partisan problems that continue to plague us in science policy. One of the casualties of this new partisanship has been the difficulty of passing significant S&T legislation. Between 1992 and 2005, exactly one NASA authorization bill was enacted. When Rad Byerly (see Chapter 9) worked on space issues on Capitol Hill in the 1970s and 1980s, it was typical for a broad NASA bill to pass at least once if not twice in every Congress. I distinctly recall the NASA bill of 1994. In retrospect, we Democrats should have cut off negotiations and rammed the bill through the House early in that session. But the talks did drag on. Finally, late in that session, all the issues were worked out at a substantive level, but House Republicans used every procedural trick in the book to keep the bill from enactment. Why? Because their playbook called for running a national election against a do-nothing, corrupt Democratic Congress. Even a little NASA bill on which there was no substantive disagreement wasn’t allowed to pass. The current situation in space policy is instructive in that regard. In January 2004, nearly a year after the Columbia Shuttle accident, the President announced a major re-structuring of NASA’s charter, highlighted by a new urgency toward human exploration of the Moon and then Mars, with much of the NASA science program re-oriented toward these new exploration goals. In contrast to Vice President Gore’s frequent meetings on the Hill 10 years earlier regarding Russian participation in the Space Station, Congress was not seriously consulted by the White House on Bush’s major change in space policy. Clearly, the Congress should have been more assertive – either in cooperating with the White House, or in outlining its own policy, or in endorsing or modifying the Administration’s new direction in clear legislative language. There was in fact strong interest among Republican leaders in Congress from 2002 to 2005 in passing a new space policy bill, but apparently they also feared that the votes were simply not there to implement either their vision or the President’s new space vision. So those who control the congressional agenda – like Texas’s ethically challenged Tom Delay – kept a lid on legislation and focused on ensuring, behind closed doors, that the money continued to flow to key NASA centers, like the Johnson Space Center in Mr. Delay’s congressional district. The most significant changes to the nation’s civilian space policy in 40 years were finally addressed in December 2005 with passage of a NASA authorization act, but the debate was 2 years late, and the legislation largely reinforced decisions that had already been made behind closed doors in the White House and, later, in

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the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. The public debate was stunted, out-of-synch, an afterthought. The situation was much healthier 12 years ago, when the fate of the SSC was determined by open, transparent floor votes in the House and Senate. Then at least there was a debate. Or 20 years ago, when the Congress declared that commercial and foreign users of the Space Shuttle should pay exactly $74 million for each launch, rather than the real average cost of more than $500 million. That was a foolish policy, which by establishing an artificial and very low price, discouraged alternative access to space and put our country in a real hole after the Challenger accident. But at least the decision was made in the open, through a transparent process amendable to discussion, amendment, and democracy. By the way, the corrosive effect of this partisanship on resolving public policy issues is not limited to space policy. Environmental legislation has also pretty much ground to a standstill over the last 10–12 years. Significant environmental policy is now made through executive orders or is surreptitiously inserted into legislative riders, rather than through the regular order that we read about in the civics books. Why? Because it’s easier, and because when important environmental provisions are slipped into massive pieces of legislation at the last minute, Members of Congress don’t have to answer for their public votes from a politically active environmental community. In 1995, the cocky new Republican leaders in the House of Representatives charged ahead and went right to work passing the 10 items of the “Contract with America”, a platform of procedural and substantive policies that had been the centerpiece of their election strategy. One of these 10 items was the “Risk Assessment and Cost Benefit Act of 1995” (called the “Regulatory Reform Act” in the Senate). This was a sweeping bill that superseded provisions in many of the environmental statutes passed during the previous 25 years. The bill easily passed the House with only about five Republican defections, but due to pressure from a wide range of public-interest groups, the bill stalled in the Senate. Members who voted for the bill in the House heard from their constituents, and within a year, it was no longer five but about 30–40 Republicans who regularly defected from party orthodoxy on key environmental votes. This rate of defection was not tolerable to House Republican leaders, so environmental legislation simply stopped moving, and the strategy went underground. Within the next few years, the Data Quality Act and the Data Access Act were both slipped into omnibus appropriations bills with little debate or discussion. Industry lobbyists bragged that they had accomplished much more by slipping in these two provisions under the cloak of darkness than they had ever anticipated achieving in 1995 through regular order. The recently issued peer-review regulations are a direct product of these bills, and no hearings have been or will be held on the regulations in Congress. Of course, this approach to governance does take casualties – namely transparency, accountability, and democracy. A final casualty of this increasing partisanship is congressional oversight. One of the most important institutional roles for the Congress is to oversee the executive branch and its operations. I remember working with Rad Byerly in the early 1980s

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on the future of the Landsat program, an episode that he describes in some detail in Chapter 9 of this book. We learned that the OMB had hatched a plan to turn over the nation’s weather and land remote-sensing satellites to a private company – Comsat – in a non-competitive sweetheart deal. We also learned that the Deputy Secretary of Commerce – Guy Fiske – who was responsible for this decision, was negotiating in private to become the new CEO of Comsat. It was the clearest, most brazen conflictof-interest I witnessed in 26 years on Capitol Hill. The Members of Congress that we worked for blew the lid off this arrangement, the Deputy Secretary was fired in 1983,4 and in the long run the Landsat and weather satellite programs were allowed to continue as government programs. In this instance, Congress fulfilled its oversight responsibilities admirably. Today, on the other hand, a highly disciplined Republican Congress conducts virtually no oversight on the Republican Administration. The list of issues that should be examined is long. In many cases, I believe that sincere Republican legislators like House Science Committee Chairman Sherry Boehlert5 would like to examine some of these issues. But orthodoxy is enforced pretty seriously by the party. So, whatever one may think about the issue, we never get a public debate, for example, on the misuse of science and scientific integrity. I would note in passing that the Democrats on the House Science Committee did organize a “hearing” on scientific integrity when the UCS report was issued. We invited UCS and Dr. Marburger, but he demurred. Nor do we get oversight hearings on the commercialization of universities under the Bayh-Dole Act. Or on the militarization of our civilian space program. Or the Administration’s meek response to cyber-security issues. Or NASA’s weak financial management. Or OMB’s new peer review rules. Or the Administration’s various studies on off-sourcing of S&T jobs.

The Importance of Leadership So, assuming that you buy my argument that an increasingly partisan, corrosive atmosphere in Washington has affected even the pursuit of science policy, why should it matter? Science will certainly continue to perk along nicely, buoyed by tens of billions of dollars of federal funding and the seemingly immutable law (discussed by Dr. Marburger in Chapter 8) that science will always receive approximately 11% of federal discretionary funding.6 Perhaps science policy in the end will benefit 4 The Science Committee sent voluminous materials documenting Mr. Fiske’s activities to the Justice Department, but the Department never saw fit to charge Mr. Fiske, or even seriously investigate the allegations. 5 Mr. Boehlert, a Republican moderate, served as Chairman of the House Science Committee from 2001 to 2006, when he retired from Congress. 6 Dr. Marburger, in writings and speeches, has commented on the relatively constant share – about 11% – of federal discretionary spending that always seems to be allocated for R&D despite a highly atomized appropriations process. I disagree strongly with him that this is almost inevitable.

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from flying under the radar screen, immersed in the incremental budgetary machinations that seem to return to Washington every spring as faithfully as the buzzards to Hinckley.7 The problem with this view, and the reason why science and technology policy matters, is that the world is changing incredibly rapidly, and science and technology need to be key elements in helping us understand and respond to these changes. Consider for a minute just how much the policy environment has shifted in the past 7–8 years. In the 1990s we were deeply concerned, first, about how to re-invest the budgetary peace dividend due to us at the end of the Cold War, then later about how to invest the burgeoning federal surplus. Remember that? Today, we have the largest defense budgets and among the largest federal deficits in history. We also have the challenge of terrorism and the threat of attacks on our own soil from weapons of mass destruction. Health care costs continue to spiral upward, threatening our small businesses and our future fiscal stability, despite our massive expenditures on health research, which seem only to exacerbate the cost problem. We face an increasingly competitive and capable Asia, whose current ability to challenge our manufacturing base, and even our high-tech manufacturing base – and before long our research and development base – seems limitless. Off-shoring of more and more technical jobs is inevitable, and no one can say with confidence where the jobs of the future are going to come from in this country. Will the strength of our science and technology mean that we will simply out-innovate the rest of the world? If so, will the so-called creative work remain in the US, while the manufacturing base continues to be out-sourced? If so, does this mean we will need more or fewer trained scientists and technicians? Who knows? And as our new competitors – particularly China and India – continue their rapid development, we will continue to see bottlenecks in the global production and distribution of all sorts of raw materials. This is reflected today in the rising price of gasoline at the pump, and the shortage of building materials in Florida. None of these challenges will be solved by science, but they will all require the wise application of science. My concern is that in an increasingly partisan environment, they won’t even get serious consideration, because of concern about partisan advantage and because of a political culture which makes it increasingly difficult to reach across party and ideological barriers.

In fact, the ultimate share garnered by R&D is a result of many complex factors, most of them quite human and random. For instance, the first budget developed by the new Republican Congress of 1995 would have cut R&D funding by one-third over 5 years, as documented by AAAS. This would have slashed R&D’s share of the budget well below 11%. Why didn’t that happen? Because of a confluence of factors that were far from inevitable, including the intransigence of the Clinton Administration on certain favored programs, the resistance of several senior Democratic Members of Congress, and – perhaps most importantly – the rebellion of several key Republican Appropriations Members fond of science, including Cong. John Porter, Cong. Jerry Lewis, and Sen. Arlen Specter. 7 Forgive me for this reference. I grew up down the road from Hinckley, Ohio, where the buzzards return every March 15, 4 days before the swallows at Capistrano.

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As an example of this debilitating partisanship, I return to Dr. Marburger. When I left the Hill in January, Dr. Marburger had served in his position for three and a half years. Not once in that period did he come up to the Hill to meet, get to know, or pay a courtesy visit to the Ranking Democrat on the House Science Committee. There were two such Democrats during that period, neither of whom was overly partisan. In fact, the first of the two – Congressman Ralph Hall from Texas – later switched his allegiance to the Republican Party. This was all in stark contrast to the last Republican science advisor, Allan Bromley, who seemed to be in my boss George Brown’s office nearly every week during his 4-year tenure. I do not blame Dr. Marburger for this behavior; he is clearly a serious, thoughtful, and decent man. I blame overly partisan White House staff officers who seem to think that Democrats simply don’t matter. As an example of an issue that could use some creative non-partisan scientific and political thinking, consider for a minute the example of comprehensive energy legislation, which finally passed in 2005 after careening around the Congress for the prior 7 years. Any halfway intelligent 10-year-old realizes that for a myriad of good reasons, this country needs to do a much better job of conserving energy and of reducing our reliance on imported oil and gas. I can’t imagine a current crisis that calls out more clearly for political leadership. As a big fan of Robert Caro’s recent book Master of the Senate, I wonder what a leader with the skills of Majority Leader Lyndon Johnson would have done facing this situation. Perhaps he would have brokered a deal that allowed increased oil and gas exploration in the US – offshore and/or in Alaska – but only in combination with, which is to say in return for, much more stringent vehicle efficiency standards. This deal would offend a lot of people and a lot of powerful interests, but it certainly would produce significant results – environmental, economic, and national security results – within a decade. The shame today is that nobody even conceives of grand compromises like these. The political leadership is lacking and the partisan barriers are too steep. If we had an LBJ driving for a political consensus on the issue of energy dependence, science and technology would be freed up to provide a myriad of possible solutions and a wealth of information to inform binding political negotiations and compromises. Without this leadership, science is doomed to remain on the sideline. There is no way that it can lead to a solution by itself. Your federal government is not responding well to the many political challenges of the day – energy, environment, health care, global economic competition – whose resolution would greatly benefit from the wise application of S&T. Otto Bismarck remarked in 1867 that politics is the art of the possible. He didn’t go on to say that science can help us to define what is possible, but that is also true. And when politics is overly fettered by partisanship, so is science – in the sense that its legitimate role in opening up more room for negotiations and the development of policy options is severely limited. This unfortunately is the niche that science policy occupies today.

Part IV

Synthesis and Critique

Chapter 11

The Rise and Fall of the President’s Science Advisor Roger Pielke, Jr. and Roberta Klein

Introduction: The Origins of a Myth In the aftermath of World War II the scientific community was quick to capitalize on its newfound stature to obtain a presence at the highest levels of government (see, e.g. Hart 1998; Kleinman 1995)1 . Most well chronicled of this period were the efforts that led to the establishment of the National Science Foundation (see, e.g., Kevles 1977; Kleinman 1994; Sherwood 1968). But at the same time scientists were actively seeking to establish a permanent beachhead at the highest levels of power in the White House. Prior to 1957 there were several efforts to coordinate high-level scientific advice to government, most notably the establishment of a science advisory structure by President Truman during the Korean War (Bronk 1974). In 1950 William T. Golden, a well-connected investment banker, was invited by the Bureau of the Budget in the Executive Branch to serve as a special consultant with a focus on “special problems of scientific research in the Department of Defense and organization of the Government for the promotion of scientific activities generally during the emergency period” (Lawton 1950).2 After some debate President Truman approved the Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization (SAC-ODM), initially chaired by Oliver Buckley, and subsequently by Lee DuBridge (Bronk 1974). Some on SAC-ODM viewed the effort as a “good-for-nothing committee”

R. Pielke, Jr. (B) Environmental Studies and Center for Science and Technology Policy Research/CIRES, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO, USA e-mail: [email protected] 1 An earlier version of this chapter was published as Pielke, Jr., R. A. and R. Klein, 2009. The Rise and Fall of the Science Advisor to the President of the United States. Minerva, DOI 10.1007/s11024-009-9117-3. 2 Notably absent from the scholarly literature that discusses the history of the president’s science advisor is mention of the “Stewart Committee” of the late 1940 s which recommended a science advisor to the president (for a cursory mention see Blanpied 1995).


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due to Presidential neglect (Damms 2000). A. Hunter Dupree (1963) characterized science advice in the early 1950s as “useful but obscure.” As late as 1957 when President Eisenhower was asked whether he had considered appointing a science advisor, he replied that he “hadn’t given thought to any proposal to establish a scientist in a policy position in the White House or Cabinet.”3 In light of Presidential ambivalence toward creating a more visible and influential position of science advisor to the President, top scientists in government recognized that they would have to wait for a window of opportunity.4 In 1950 Golden described a conversation with Lee DuBridge and James Killian where they agreed that there would be no value in setting up now, or really even in planning an OSRD [Office of Scientific Research and Development] type mobilization for science organization. Their attitude is that when the crisis comes, the organization will spring up virtually automatically around the science leaders who will come to the fore spontaneously (Golden 1950a).

The crisis came 7 years later. On 4 October, 1957 the Soviet Union successfully launched the Sputnik satellite and everything changed. According to Grossberg (1974, p. 32), President Eisenhower “saw more scientists in the two weeks following Sputnik than he had seen in the year before.” President Eisenhower turned to the SAC-ODM for advice on how to respond to the perception (and reality) that the United States had been caught somewhat flatfooted by the launch of the Soviet satellite (Greene 2007). For the scientists seeking access and power, Sputnik provided the keys to the castle. The SAC-ODM, by that time chaired by Isidor I. Rabi, recommended to the President that he install a science advisor in the White House, at once satisfying the scientists’ quest for a place in the White House and meeting the President’s political need to demonstrate to the American public action in response to Sputnik (Killian 1982; Wiesner 1963). President Eisenhower accepted the recommendation. The President’s experience working with a subcommittee of the SAC-ODM (the Technology Capabilities Panel) established in the mid-1950s no doubt bolstered his views of the value of technical advice and familiarized him with leading scientists advising government (Damms 2000). Scientists who participated in the subcommittee’s activities did so, in part, to forge better ties between their community and the Eisenhower Administration. They saw their effort pay off when following Sputnik the President elevated the SAC-ODM to its new status as the President’s Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), and James Killian, the former chairman of the earlier Technology Capabilities Panel of the SAC-ODM, to the position of Science Advisor to the President.

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quoted in Grossberg (1974, p. 29). factor undoubtedly influencing the President’s receptivity to a proposal to establish a science advisor was President Truman’s decision to develop an H-bomb contrary to the advice of leading scientists, and subsequent efforts by the Eisenhower Administration to remove J. Robert Oppenheimer from his advisory roles (Damms 2000; Greenberg 2001). 4 Another

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Perhaps somewhat ironically, Killian was not a scientist at all. His academic training was in management and administration, and his experience included serving as the President of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and on a number of government advisory committees.5 Indicative of how much has changed in the half-century since Killian’s appointment, when President George W. Bush appointed Richard Russell – whose qualifications include a Bachelor’s degree in biology, and who served as chief of staff to OSTP and as staff director for the Subcommittee on Technology of the House Science Committee – to an associate director position in OSTP under John Marburger, the Union of Concerned Scientists characterized the appointment as a “misuse of science” (UCS 2004).6 In a move that is implausible today but which surely has reinforced visions of a mythical golden age of scientific advice, President Eisenhower assured Dr. Killian “that he would enjoy wide latitude in action and guaranteed access to information in every corner of government” (Grossberg 1974, p. 40). The President invoked a technocratic approach to decision making when he publicly announced Dr. Killian’s appointment to the position of Special Assistant to the President for Science and Technology: “Dr. Killian will see to it that those projects which experts judge have the highest potential shall advance with the utmost speed” (Eisenhower 1957). The combination of latitude, access, and power must be the image in mind when scientists look to return to that mythical golden age of science advice. As one observer describes it, “never before or since have scientists had a firmer influence on the reins of power that direct national policies” (Rigden 2007). On the other hand, a foreshadowing of the science advisor’s decline can be found in President Eisenhower’s remark upon departing from office that “in holding scientific research and discovery in respect, as we should, we must also be alert to the equal and opposite danger that public policy could itself become the captive of a scientific-technological elite” (Greenberg 2001). The establishment of the science advisor’s role under Eisenhower had a lasting influence on the scientific community. For instance, in the aftermath of 9/11 one long-time observer of science in government expressed hopes that the tragedy would re-establish science at the top levels of government decision making, saying, “Our model is before World War II and after” (Broad 2001). Despite the “monumental Presidential responsibilities” given to James Killian as first science advisor, contemporaries might have anticipated the fickleness of government’s love affair with science when Dr. Killian’s swearing in ceremony on November 15, 1957 was “unusually brief” because President Eisenhower was eager to leave for a golf vacation in Augusta, Georgia (Finney 1957; Grossberg 1974, p. 44). 5 That the first science advisor was not a scientist does not appear to be widely appreciated, and it is not widely advertised in the science community that Killian did not earn a doctorate. Killian had been awarded an honorary doctorate from Middlebury College in 1945, see Anonymous (1945). Killian was later awarded honorary degrees from Union College, Drexel Institute of Technology, and the College of William and Mary, see Anonymous (1957). 6 Richard Russell’s biography can be found here: http://www.ostp.gov/cs/about_ostp/richard_m_ russell

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Science Advice and the Professionalization of Expertise The seven science advisors that we visited with related stories and vignettes reflecting a long-term trend that may have begun with latitude, access, and power more than five decades ago but which in more recent times is better characterized by constraint, insulation, and enervation. For example, Ed David’s perception of how the role of science advisor has changed since he served under President Nixon (1970–1973) follows: The old style science advisor, the distinguished person whom the president looked upon as his house intellectual, to be listened to on the complex and new issues, at that time, of course, of nuclear arms, nuclear defense, advanced technologies, infectious diseases, and so on, is not likely to recur soon.7

Jerome Wiesner, who succeeded Killian as science advisor under John F. Kennedy, described the “old style” portfolio of responsibilities (Wiesner 1963): Dr. Killian, as the first Presidential advisor on scientific matters, rapidly became involved in matters of the greatest national importance involving education, defense, disarmament, space, and international cooperation. In fact, I don’t think it is stretching a point to say that the impartial assistance provided by Dr. Killian and the Science Advisory Committee made it possible for the President to arrive at many policy decisions which would have been impossible otherwise.

The role of every science advisor since Killian who served the President has been far less influential than that described by Wiesner, and much more consistent with that described by David. One reason for the diminished role of the science advisor is that expert advice to government has grown immensely, making Renaissance-like men or women unnecessary. In 1950 a total of approximately 350 scientists advised the federal government (Mullins 1981). By 2003 approximately 8,000 scientists served on about 400 federal advisory committees (GAO 2004).8 One consequence of the professionalization of expert advice that mirrored the growth of the scientific establishment in the 1960s and 1970s was the evolution of science advice at the highest levels of government from the personal to the instructional. Mullins (1981) describes how rapidly this change occurred: In 1950, many of the (approximately) 350 scientists who were serving on government advisory committees were either friends or “friends of friends.” Many had worked on the same projects during World War II. Relations between the relatively small scientific research community and the new agencies were relatively close. Even the ties between scientists and high officials were close and personal rather than official . . . By 1972, four administrations

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at http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/scienceadvisors/david_transcript.html William T. Golden wrote, “As to how many top echelon or key scientists there are, around whom any mobilization would devolve, [Lee] DuBridge said that there is a continuous spectrum and it would be difficult to decide where to draw the line. However, it appears that the number is probably somewhere between 20 and 200.” (Golden 1950b). GAO (2004) documents that the explosion of advice to the federal government has not been restricted to the scientific or technical, reporting that in 2003 there were 948 advisory committees with 62,497 members. 8 Contemporaneously,

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later, most of the original participants in the system had left the ranks of both advisors and persons being advised. In their place, and in the place of informal personal relations, were systems of rules and regulations. Government staff members holding jobs that required scientific advice knew that the advice would be given routinely, and that it was now attached to the office, not to specific occupants of the job.

The institutionalization of science diminished the importance of scientific advice at the very highest levels of political decision making even as its importance grew for policy implementation across government as a whole: “The process of institutionalization has been marked by the increasing isolation of the advisory system from influences other than the administrative” (Mullins 1981). Historian Daniel Kevles attributes the diminishment of scientists’ influence to the complexity of modern policy issues: “The issues nowadays are unbelievably pluralistic. There is hardly an issue you can think of that doesn’t turn to some extent on technical knowledge” (Glanz 2001). In 2007 a physicist writing in Physics Today looked back to the Eisenhower and Kennedy days and, not surprisingly, found wanting every science advisor since: After Kennedy, however, the prominence of science advice in matters of national policy began to deteriorate. When individuals from the social sciences, the biomedical sciences, and industry became members, PSAC itself lost the coherence it once enjoyed . . . . The breaking point came during the administration of Richard Nixon . . . Through the presidencies of Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, George H. W. Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush, the position of science advisor, while it continues to exist, has been largely isolated, if not muted (Rigden 2007).

But holding science advisors to a standard set in the days soon after Sputnik may be setting unrealistic expectations for the role, reflecting a misunderstanding of the role of science advice in politics at the highest levels of government.

Science Advice as Politics Accusations that the George W. Bush Administration encouraged the politicization of science focused a great deal of attention on science advice to the President. As one critic put it, the Bush Administration engaged in a “war on science” (Mooney 2005). Despite their different evaluations of the Bush Administration’s approach to science-related policies, however, the seven science advisors who participated in the lecture series agreed that politics and science have always been intermixed in complex ways. Consider, for example, the following situation. The President has in his Administration a range of scientific experts on the most important policy issues of the day. However, the President is denied access to that advice by the manipulative actions of one of his primary advisors, nicknamed “the Admiral.” The Admiral has the President’s ear on matters of science but he himself has never had any formal scientific training. He justifies his advice to the President by his fervent belief that the United States is engaged in a fundamental religious, political, and economic conflict between good and evil.

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When two leading government scientists seek to provide advice to the President that differs from the Admiral’s, the Admiral asks the FBI to open investigations of these scientists. One of the scientists subsequently faces hearings on his loyalty to the United States and he never again works as a government scientist. The other scientist warns that this case indicated to scientists that scientific integrity and frankness in advising government on policy matters of a technical nature can lead to later reprisals against those whose earlier opinions have become unpopular. One of the nation’s leading scientists writes that the relationship between government and scientists has been “gravely damaged” because the government has given the impression that it would “exclude anyone who does not conform to the judgment of those who in one way or another have acquired authority.”9 While this tale sounds like something that might have been reported as occurring under the administration of George W. Bush, in fact the year was 1954. The President was Dwight Eisenhower, and “the Admiral” was a man named Lewis Strauss. The scientists were the leading government science advisors from World War II, Robert Oppenheimer, Hans Bethe, and Vannevar Bush. Another incident that occurred during the Eisenhower Administration further illustrates the long history of political conflicts involving science. The director of the National Bureau of Standards (NBS), Allen Astin, released results of a study showing that battery additives failed to perform as advertised. One company whose owner had close ties to members of Congress demanded that its product, AD-X2, be reevaluated. Under pressure from a few members of Congress, the Bureau reran the test and again found the product failed to perform as advertised. The Secretary of Commerce, however, felt that the marketplace rather than the government was the best place for product claims to be evaluated, and subsequently fired Astin from his position. Congress held hearings under much public pressure as the issue gained visibility, and Secretary Weeks reinstated Astin to the directorship of NBS (Neumann and Keaton 1953–1954). Events such as this led one observer in 1955 to describe the “present strains between science and government” (Lamson 1955). These strains included the battery additive case, as well as scientists denied visas for international travel and restrictive communications policies. Such vignettes call into question the characterization of science advice during the Eisenhower era as a “golden age.” To observe that the politicization of science has been a feature of politics for many decades, of course, does not excuse poor decisions by any administration. But it does serve to emphasize that, although science has come to occupy a more significant role in policy making over the last half century, the ubiquity of politics has remained largely unchanged. As one political scientist observed in 1965, “the fact that the content of so many political decisions has become heavily scientific has not yet produced a transformation (or adaptation) of governmental decision-making processes to the scientific model for resolving conflicts of opinion, interest, or power” (Leiserson 1965).

9 This episode in the history of scientific advice, and the sources for the quotes above, are documented in Greene (2007).

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We asked Donald Hornig, science advisor to Lyndon Johnson, to describe an instance when he was asked by the President to “arbitrate on some scientific question or to provide some scientific advice on an issue that he was handling,” Dr. Hornig replied that he knew “of no example of being called to arbitrate a scientific question.” Hornig explained that while science is pervasive in government, “I don’t think science is sort of a thing in the government. Science is kind of like economics, where we have a Council of Economic Advisers and such. [It is] a critical part of all sorts of things the government does”10 . Hornig’s response echoes similar comments made by Isidor Rabi reflecting on his experiences as an advisor to Presidents Truman and Kennedy. Science advice, he said, does not mean, as far as the President is concerned, technical advice in the sense of detailed explanations of the operation of the laws of the universe or detailed descriptions of various devices. The advice one gives to the President must be broadly conceived and it must speak to the President in the sense of a translation into political terms of basic scientific, technical developments in all fields in which his decisions will be important, both for the national security and the national welfare (quoted in Raloff 1981).

Ed David, science advisor to President Richard M. Nixon, explained to us the infamous incident when President Nixon demanded that David cut all federal funding to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) because Nixon was unhappy with some of the political positions of its president: Well, the president of MIT at that time was Jerry Wiesner. Jerry Wiesner was my thesis advisor and I was his first doctoral student. You can imagine we had a very close relationship, and I got a call from the White House and went over there, and John Ehrlichman was there and other people were there, and at the end of the discussion, the President said, “Ed, I want you to go back and cut off all the funds from MIT.” I just sort of sat there dumbfounded, because you know enough about the government that that’s completely impossible, even if you wanted to do it. And, so I went back in my office, sat down in the office puzzled about this for a while and didn’t do anything. And then suddenly my phone rang, and it was John Ehrlichman. I said, “John, what did you think of the President today and what he had to say about MIT?” He said, “Ed, my advice is don’t do anything and it will all go away.” And I didn’t do anything and it all went away11.

While President Nixon’s termination of PSAC is part of the lore of Presidential science advice, another story related by David appears to have been overlooked. David described how the scheduling of the Apollo missions was affected by political considerations related to the 1972 Presidential election. In short, President Nixon was worried that an accident might hurt his re-election prospects. Another interesting situation I found myself involved with was the Apollo program. When I arrived on the White House scene, two Apollo missions had already been cancelled. They were Apollo 18 and 19. There were originally plans, as I remember, for 20 and 21, but 21 never really got off the drawing board. The possible cancellation of Apollo 16 and 17 was in the wind, it was talked around, even though those two missions were slated to provide important scientific information about the moon, and they were basically the payoff of all of the efforts that went into the Apollo program. Most of the man-hours on the moon came

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during those two missions. In fact, most of the scientific measuring equipment the astronauts placed on the moon at that time are still there and many of them are still operational. So there’s an awful lot of data coming in . . . . I wrote a memo to the President saying, in effect, that the nation had bought everything for these trips except the fuel, and that we ought to go ahead in light of the potential knowledge to be gained. That memo had some effect, and Apollo 16 and 17 proceeded, and Apollo 17 put the first scientist on the moon. The interesting aspect of all this was the reason for considering canceling 16 and 17 in the first place. That reason was essentially political. It focused on the timing of those two launches vis-à-vis the 1972 Presidential election. Apollo 17 was slated to launch about a month before the election day, early in November, 1972. The big worry by the political forces in the White House was that if there was an accident of Apollo 17, it would bear heavily on the election outcome negatively. I suggested that Apollo be postponed, however, until December after the election, a month after it, and that Apollo 16 was too early to have much influence on the outcome, we did win that day for the final two moon missions. This shows you how science hangs by a string in such situations. It illustrates that political thinking is very different from scientific thinking. Anyone coming to the science advisory post without considerable experience in politics is in for some rude shocks12 .

When asked about how the politicization of science under the administration of George W. Bush compares with other administrations, Ed David suggested that the intermixing of politics and science is endemic and that such comparisons are not particularly useful: I’d like to know what the metric is for [politicization], because I don’t think there is a metric. You have opinions, and that’s okay, everybody’s got an opinion. But the idea that you can prove by any write- up that the Bush Administration is worse than the administration I worked in or the administration that his father was in, is sort of ridiculous on the face of it. You can’t make the case. I mean, you can cite instances, but the instances will go away. My advice is John Ehrlichman’s advice: Don’t do anything, and it will go away. And it will13 .

David later explained that, “I’m not a strong supporter of what the [Bush] Administration has done in science. I’m really not. But, on the other hand, I have to tell you, I don’t think that what they’re doing or what they have done is going to harm the scientific community.”14 Frank Press, science advisor to Jimmy Carter, explained how during his tenure technical advice on alternative energy proposals was ignored for political reasons: During President Carter’s term in office, his political staff proposed that he should commit to a national goal that by the year 2000, the United States would draw 20% of its energy from renewable energy sources, that is, other than hydrocarbons and nuclear. They argued for this action on many grounds, among them that this would improve the President’s political standing. These individuals implored [Dr. Press] to join them in their initiative out of concern that the President might not accept their proposal if the Science Advisor did not agree with them. The Science Advisor and his staff decided not to support their proposal, because though laudable, in their opinion it was not an achievable goal. However, despite this technical advice, the President decided to accept the proposal of the political staff. To set a national example, solar panels were installed on the roof of the colonnade between the President’s House and the West Wing to provide hot water for the White House Mess. On

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this and several other occasions President Carter told us that he agreed with our technical evaluation but would follow another course for political reasons – a reasonable action, it seems to us, for a person in his position. (see Chapter 4).

When asked about the allegations that the Bush Administration misused science, George Keyworth, science advisor to Ronald Reagan, gave an emphatic reply: “Let me say there are a lot of things the Bush Administration does that I don’t like, but I think that’s just unadulterated nonsense”.15 Keyworth’s views were likely shaped by the fact that he was, in his own words, “a single-issue Science Advisor” focused on issues of national defense and, in particular, the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Perhaps for this reason Dr. Keyworth functioned in practice more as an advisor on military policy than science policy, as he describes his role for much of his time under President Reagan: “I was not OSTP director, effectively. I relinquished – not formally – but I basically made that low priority and I gave it to everybody else to do, because I was asked to do only one task”.16 For Keyworth there was no “science advice,” simply policy advice on SDI in the context of the President’s political agenda. Regrettably, the late D. Allan Bromley did not participate in our series, having died just before he was to visit. In his book on his time in the White House under George H. W. Bush he relates numerous experiences where science and politics were intermixed (Bromley 1994). He saw a proposal that the President focus attention on global population undercut by other White House officials, and he described how efforts to discuss technology policies were fruitless in a free-market oriented atmosphere. Other topics involving science were controversial during the first Bush Administration, including efforts to redefine “wetlands” in such a way as to open up large tracts of previously protected land for development, and the editing of congressional testimony by a NASA scientist (Pielke 2004). Dr. Bromley did not think highly of the UCS report critical of President George W. Bush: “You know perfectly well that it is very clearly a politically motivated statement. The statements that are there are broad sweeping generalizations for which there is very little detailed backup” (Glanz 2004). Bromley, like other modern science advisors, was kept outside the circle of close Presidential advisors. He suggests this was done intentionally due to concerns that he might be called to testify before Congress (then controlled by Democrats) as director of OSTP, whereas other close advisors were not required to testify. The dual nature of the science advisor position – close advisor to the President and Director of the congressionally-established OSTP – resulted from efforts by Congress under President Ford to re-establish the office following its termination by President Nixon. The success in formalizing the position meant that the science advisor would be required to testify before Congress, unlike other close advisors to the President, which had the effect of creating an incentive to keep the science advisor at some distance from the President’s inner circle of advisors. 15 transcript 16 transcript

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We also asked John Gibbons, science advisor to Bill Clinton, directly about the Bush Administration’s science policies. He replied that the concerns were less a matter of the “misuse of science” and more a matter of good government: [The criticisms of the Bush Administration are] a reflection of a very genuine concern. Not so much about the misuse of science, but the misrepresentation of science, of a very selective representation of scientific results. Of the extraordinarily creative and selective labeling of proposed projects. Like you all have heard of the Healthy Forests Act. And you know about the Clear Skies program. These are wonderful terms, and cleverly developed, but totally misrepresent what the state of science is on those very issues and what’s in it. So it’s much more of a PR game than it is a substantive change for the improvement of these issues. So that causes a great deal of angst. I must say it’s not just science the angst, I think, is based on but a basic concern about openness of government, about the way that facts are, and opinions are represented in an almost totally politically oriented way. I have to blame a lot of this on [Presidential advisor] Karl Rove, who’s an absolute mastermind in political maneuvering. . . But I think it is a matter of concern. Honesty in terms of representation, a fair representation of what the community has to say. And it was badly misrepresented in climate change, and it’s still — they’re still trying to work out of that one. But they fudge around on things such as stem cells. They claim there are so many lines of stem cells, and everyone knew that was wrong. They had just taken all of the marginal stuff they could and thrown into it. And I think it genuinely causes angst on the part of our community, which they are sort of quoting indirectly. And we ought to be raising concern about it17 .

Gibbons’ focus on good government is repeated in his description of the role of the science advisor: [T]here are three main activities for the science advisor. And first is to be the President’s eyes and ears. And not to bother him when he doesn’t need to know something, but be sure to notify him and acquaint him when things do need to be known. The second is to act on behalf of the President in terms of the budgets, interagency activities, public/private interactions, international negotiations, and the implementation of his initiatives. And that’s a very large measure for a very small office . . . And the third bullet is the thing that we devised early on in the Clinton Administration. Namely, to try to identify the Presidential initiatives that reflect on national, major overarching national goals. And science is not an overarching national goal for the President. It’s only as it serves to help achieve these larger goals that science takes its place in the crown of important activities for the president18 .

Neal Lane, science advisor to Bill Clinton following Gibbons, explained his participation in signing the UCS statement critical of the Bush Administration: The reason we signed the statement is because the administration, for whatever reason, had false information on the website of the National Cancer Institute about the alleged relationship between breast cancer and abortion because they were pushed by conservative groups to do that, so they did it. They put false information out–or took correct information, valuable health information, off of one of the health websites on the effectiveness of condoms and preventing disease, and replaced it with abstinence only information that was highly misleading. They doctored it, I would say, in a way that went well beyond any kind of editing we would have suggested in government reports.

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The State Department reported first, and then the Environmental Protection Agency reported climate change, essentially changing those words so that it was totally misleading what the science was all about. They muzzled a scientist in the Department of Agriculture and wouldn’t let him publish his work because they found a connection between pesticides, I guess, and the potential for antibiotic resistance to human beings living in the area or something like that. So the health effects of agricultural practices that some agricultural company didn’t like. So it was just becoming very clear that there were some lobbies whose voices were being heard and things were being done that we considered abuse of science. It’s not that policy decisions were made that we disagreed with, where many considerations applied. We didn’t complain about stem cell decisions because nobody was misrepresenting the science. The President made a decision, some of us liked it, maybe some of us didn’t like it, but that’s not the same as the government misrepresenting or falsifying what the scientific record really is. That’s what we were complaining about. So why did I say reach out after all that? Well, you can’t give up. I didn’t expect that we’d all be welcomed into the offices of the people who were just slammed, and we never said - and never believed - I certainly don’t, that the President directed all of these things to happen, or there was some conspiracy in which these high level officials all got together and said, “Hey let’s falsify science to please us.” It just happened. As Jack Marburger himself said, when he was defending the administration, “Sometimes people do dumb things.” Well, these were some of them, so we felt it was a very bad situation19 .

Lane also hinted at several decisions under the Clinton Administration that he might have made differently: And there was also an issue of needle exchange, and the science is pretty clear on needle exchange if you want to cut down on HIV, but the President didn’t go for federal funding for needle exchange, so I know that was an issue that was often talked about. And so there are these issues where the President makes policy decisions. . .20 .

Lane could not recall any complaints from the scientific community about the Clinton Administration’s use of science in policy making. However, there are several notable issues during the Clinton Administration for which science was at the center of political conflict, including regulation of mercury in the environment, the health effects of second hand smoke, justifications for a missile attack on a factory in Sudan, and the firing of a Department of Energy official who disagreed with Al Gore on climate issues (Pielke 2004). Like Bromley and Gibbons before him, Lane also describes himself as being outside the circle of close Presidential advisors, explaining that those closest to the President had their ties – to him and among each other – forged during the intense experiences of the Presidential campaign21 : [President Clinton] would see his political advisors frequently. They’re really the innercircle. They came off the campaign. They’re old buddies, they play hearts together, you know, and that’s their focus. Their focus is this President will succeed. This President will succeed. You know, if something is going on, we will figure out how to fix it. They are

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totally focused on the President’s political agenda and his legacy, so those people see him frequently . . . I’d see the President sometimes once a week and sometimes I wouldn’t see him for three weeks. It just depends on what’s going on. If he had an interview coming up, if he’s got a speech coming up that has something to do with science and technology, if there’s something in his State of the Union Address on science and technology, any of those kind of things, he will call me in and I’ll go in and I’ll brief him on it22 .

When asked about the allegations that the Bush Administration misused science, John Marburger, President Bush’s science advisor, responded: “I didn’t like the allegations. I thought they wrapped up a large number of disparate complaints into a, what I called at the time, a conspiracy theory. And that was my biggest objection. I just didn’t think it made sense to wrap all of these things up into one big ball and try to draw a conclusion from it.”23 Marburger was of course the sitting science advisor when he made these comments. Perhaps when his term is long over, he might be asked if his views have changed. There are a few summary observations to make about the perspectives of the science advisors on the politicization of science under the Bush Administration. First, despite the general unpopularity of George W. Bush among the advisors, their degree of criticism follows political lines, as might have been expected, with Keyworth and David somewhat less critical of the Bush Administration than the science advisors who served under Democratic Presidents. The passage of time may also explain some of the views as well, with recent political battles still evoking an emotional response. Of the advisors serving Democratic Presidents we see Clinton advisors Lane and Gibbons most critical of the Bush Administration, and Carter and Johnson advisors Press and Hornig not passing judgment. Of the three men serving Republican Presidents, Marburger strongly defends his boss, while advisors Keyworth and David are less supportive. But all agree that at the highest levels of government issues involving science will always be influenced by the politics of the sitting administration. David Guston (see Chapter 1) suggests that aspects of science advice might be characterized as “unicorns” or mythical beasts. These “unicorns” are the notion of a “science budget,” the “scientific community,” and even potentially the notion of “science itself” which Guston claims is “not unitary, comprehensive, collective, and even readily identifiable.” This last point is apparent in the conceptual fuzziness seen in the debates over the alleged misuse of science under the Bush Administration. The logical conclusion to be taken from Guston’s argument, and the stories related by the science advisors themselves, is that “science advice to the President” may also be a unicorn-like myth. Since World War II the nature of both science and government has changed. Science has become a sprawling, impressive global endeavor, touching on every aspect of modern life. Similarly, government has expanded to the point that it now touches every aspect of modern life.

22 transcript 23 transcript

at http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/scienceadvisors/lane_transcript.html at http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/scienceadvisors/marburger_transcript.html

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For many reasons we have seen the diminishment of the President’s science advisor, from wise man at the right hand of the President to, in the case of John Marburger, a lower-tier appointee with an office a few streets away from the center of power in the Executive Offices of the President.24 The Bush Administration’s devaluing of the science advisor can thus be seen as part of a longterm trend of institutional decline, exacerbated in this case, many would argue, by the Administration’s heavy-handed control of information and ideological agenda. While some science advisors got along with their President more collegially than others, and various Presidents have been more or less interested in matters of science, the long-term decline of the institution of the science advisor appears to overshadow these idiosyncrasies, and thus might be expected to continue.

Science Advice as Science Budgeting The President’s science advisory apparatus is often seen as a proxy for a “Department of Science.” In the years that followed President Eisenhower’s creation of the science advisor position there was much debate about the possibility of creating such a department (Grossberg 1974). The idea was revived in 1995 by Representative Robert Walker but failed to gain support (see Greenberg 2001, pp. 32–34). The scientific community saw a Department of Science as a way to further enhance the stature of science – and thus science budgets – at the highest levels of government. However, critics of this proposal saw little need to centralize science when it served so many disparate agencies in different ways. Science, they argued, was more often a means to government action rather than an end. The National Science Foundation (NSF), the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), and the Office of Science and Technology (OST) in the Department of Energy (DOE) are the only three U.S. agencies whose legislated missions include “basic research” – i.e., scientific research conducted for purposes of enlightenment rather than in support of an agency mission such as defense or health care (cf. Brooks 1964). In 2007, the collective budgets of these three agencies

24 Since

World War II, if not longer, science has played an important role in international relations (see, e.g., Doel and Harper 2006; Krige and Barth 2006; Miller 2006). As Donald Hornig told us, “Science is a wonderful lubricant for foreign policy initiatives.” For policy makers, the scientific and technological are central to some of the most important questions that they face in international politics, such as trade, defense, and health, while for scientists participation in international relations offers the tantalizing prospect of “additional resources while enhancing their scientific authority and social capital” (Krige and Barth 2006). This topic has been well documented elsewhere (e.g., see the excellent review of Krige and Barth 2006), and thus is not covered here. However, many of the science advisors did refer to international relations as a key element of their tenure.

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for “basic research” was about $8.5 billion out of a total of about $145 billion in federal research and development (R&D) funding. Even though there is no “Department of Science” we know that the US government spends $145 billion on research and development because Congress has directed the NSF since its inception to collect data on government-wide R&D spending. Studies of government science spending date back to 1947 when the first survey was conducted by the President’s Scientific Research Board, a precursor to the subsequent science advisory structure in the White House (Godin 2006). Because science budgets are so carefully measured across agencies they are also used as a metric to evaluate government science policies. Daniel Sarewitz (2007), among others, has asked whether federal science policy is nothing more than federal science budget policy. The institution of the science advisor and his portfolio arguably reinforce a focus on federal science budgets as science policy. John Marburger25 told us that, engagement with the budget process was one of the important jobs of the President’s science advisor. When interviewed, Marburger explained that opportunities to provide science advice, per se, were actually quite rare during his tenure: Most of the decisions that really have technical content get made within the government agencies at a level far below the White House. And it’s only rarely that science issues, or issues with technical content, actually come up to the White House for decisions or for policy direction change, but probably the most common way they come up is in the budget process, and that’s where a lot of the discussions that I have with my colleagues take place26 .

He continued by explaining that while he participated in meetings with senior White House officials, his role as science advisor was often less important than other advisors: What I actually do is I begin my day every morning with a meeting with the Senior White House Staff. We talk about events that are very current, day-by-day, salient and I offer whatever comments I can make about science, but usually science is not part of those salient issues. Rarely, but on important occasions, issues do come up where the President has to make a decision about something that has a technical component. And in those cases, my office helps me to prepare briefing documents that I share with my White House colleagues. We decide if there is any controversy or difference of opinion, try to work those out to the extent that we can, and leave the remaining items for the President to decide on. This is the policy process, policy coordination process, within the White House. And so most of my interactions where advice is given occur in this formal context with briefings for the President that are prepared in cooperation with other policy offices in advance, and usually reflect very substantial input from the Agency or the Department that is responsible for that area. For example, when the Department of Energy was ready to recommend – make a recommendation about Yucca Mountain, whether the nation should move ahead to develop and open Yucca Mountain for the storage of nuclear waste or nuclear radiological material, the Department of Energy prepared some materials, I reviewed it with my office, we sat with other relevant offices, like the National Economic Advisors’ Office,


at http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/scienceadvisors/marburger_transcript.html at http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/scienceadvisors/marburger_transcript.html

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and then sat with the President and gave him the range of options and he made the decision at the meeting. That’s an example. Another different kind of briefing was after the recent Tsunami that devastated so much of the periphery of the Indian Ocean just after Christmas last year. The President was interested in Tsunamis and how they worked and what caused them and what a warning system would look like in preparation for a decision that he made about how America should participate in the international response to that terrible disaster27 .

The science advisor’s role in the mid-1960s, as described by Donald Hornig who was science advisor to President Johnson (1964–1969), as assisting the President “in all matters which require scientific and technical judgments,” does indeed seem Neolithic, as Hornig suggested28 . Consider that at no point in Dr. Hornig’s interview or public lecture did he mention the science advisor playing a role in the federal budget process. In 1973 during the Nixon Administration Ed David recommended that the science advisor’s office share responsibility with the White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) for preparing the President’s annual budget submission to Congress. But such a role would have to wait, as OMB had little interest in sharing its budgetary role, at least formally. However, the President’s science advisor began to play an increasingly important but unofficial role in science budgets beginning at least with the Administration of John Kennedy, which formally established the Office of Science and Technology in 1962 amidst considerable congressional interest in managing the nation’s burgeoning scientific enterprise (Grossberg 1974). After President Nixon unceremoniously terminated the science advisor’s office, Congress chose to re-establish the office with a mandate to “advise the President on scientific and technological considerations with regard to Federal budgets.” When Gerald Ford signed into law the bill that created the President’s Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), his public remarks mentioned coordination of the overall science budget as a measure of the new office’s success, foretelling future evaluations focused on the ups (and very few downs) of the federal research portfolio (Wooley and Peters 2007a). In 1978 President Jimmy Carter reorganized the government science advisory structure, further formalizing the relationship of OSTP with OMB (Wooley and Peters 2007b). Each science advisor since Keyworth emphasized to us the importance of assisting OMB with budget matters. No other interest group that receives funding across agencies has such a unique status in the federal government as do scientists. The creation and focused role of OSTP is likely an important factor in explaining why the federal R&D budget has been stable if not steadily growing for several decades (Pielke 2004; Sarewitz 2007).


at http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/scienceadvisors/marburger_transcript.html at http://sciencepolicy.colorado.edu/scienceadvisors/hornig_transcript.html

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Conclusion: The Triumph of Science Advice as the Demise of the Science Advisor Over the second half of the twentieth century and into the 21st governance can be characterized by an ever increasing reliance on specialized expertise. There are several reasons for this trend, which include the challenges of dealing with risks to human well being and security – from terrorism to the safety of food supplies, from natural disasters to human influences on the environment, from economic shocks, globalization, and many more. Some of these risks are the result of purposive technological innovation, such as the invention and proliferation of nuclear technologies beginning with the Manhattan Project during World War II. Because innovation can create new risks, a new proactive politics has emerged seeking to limit technological innovation and diffusion. Examples of this dynamic can be seen in efforts to limit the presence of genetically modified crops in Europe, to contain research on stem cells in the United States, and to militate against the consequences of economic globalization around the world. In this context, the need for expert advice in government has increased exponentially. But one of the effects of the triumph of expertise has been the diminishment of the President’s science advisor as the “go-to” individual on issues with a scientific or technical component. In many respects, the science advisor is just another person with a Ph.D. staffing the Executive Offices of the President. President Obama received high marks from the scientific community for appointing a number of prominent scientists to administrative positions, including a Nobel Prize-winning physicist to Secretary of Energy, illustrating that the science advisor is but one of many highly qualified people in an administration. The science advisor does have a very unique role in helping to oversee and coordinate the budgets of agencies that support science, but even here the science advisor’s role is subject to the idiosyncrasies of each administration. In the future it seems improbable that the science advisor’s role would return to the exalted position that it held for a brief time during the Eisenhower Administration. In any case, that exalted position may be more mythical than real, which has set the stage today for some unrealistic expectations about the position. Instead, it seems that the science advisor’s role will include some or all of the following responsibilities, subject to the idiosyncrasies of future Presidents and their staff: Budget champion. The science advisor seems likely to continue serving as a coordinator, and at times, a champion for research and development funding across the federal government. The scientific community may look to the science advisor as its “embedded lobbyist” for the scientific community. All of the science advisors that we spoke with expressed caution about taking on the role of defender of the interests of the science lobby, lest they further erode the advisor’s authority in government. Yet, it seems clear that many in the scientific community view the position in exactly this fashion, and it is easy to understand how this perspective might come about when the science advisor repeatedly invokes the size of the federal R&D budget as a metric of science policy success. It may be more than a coincidence that

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criticisms of President George W. Bush by the scientific community peaked during his 2004 re-election campaign, and reached a nadir while he was pressing for congressional action on a 2007 authorization bill that would call for doubling the research budgets of NSF, NIST, and DOE. Issue expert. The science advisor has a unique ability to assemble expertise to focus on specialized or cross-cutting policy issues. When a top scientist in academia or industry receives a call from the President’s science advisor, that call is certain to be returned. This power to convene can quickly bring together top experts to consider issues of national importance. For example, John Marburger described how his office was asked on short notice to prepare a briefing for the President on earthquakes and tsunamis after the 2005 Sumatran earthquake that killed almost 300,000 people in Southeast Asia. Congress can also utilize OSTP based on its legislative mandate to analyze specific cross-cutting science polices relevant to the federal agencies. For example, in 2007, Congress asked OSTP to develop new guidelines for the communication practices of federal agencies involving science and scientists after some scientists complained that public relations officials in their agencies had not allowed them to communicate with the media. But in addition to the desire to improve communication practices, this request also reflected the ongoing political conflict between the Bush Administration and a Democratic-held Congress. Perhaps not surprisingly the request went unfulfilled under the Bush Administration. OSTP is uniquely situated to provide advice as it can equally well draw on expertise in science policy as in science; however, like any agency it can find itself entwined in political conflicts. Options Czar Yankelovich (2003) suggests that the science advisor could take on “the broader role of framer of policy options” and observes that “the more technical the scientific input, the less its relevance to policymakers’ most basic concerns.” While this role would be of value to decision makers (cf. Pielke 2007), the use of the science advisor in this manner would depend upon how the President organizes his office and solicits advice. It is difficult to imagine a President like George W. Bush, who relied on a close circle of political advisors for important decisions, using a science advisor in this manner, but less difficult to envision a President like Barack Obama doing so. This, perhaps more so than the other roles, depends a great deal on the personalities of the President, top staff, and the science advisor. As Neal Lane explained, top advisors often come from the President’s campaign staff, and scientists have been notably absent from such staffs in recent campaigns. The position of science advisor has evolved and changed over the past half century, as has both science and government. The experiences of the science advisors that we were fortunate to visit with chronicle those changes. Underneath the anecdotes and stories that describe Presidents over the past half century is a deeper story, one of the long-term decline of the influence of the President’s science advisor while at the same time, the importance of expertise to government has increased tremendously. The decline of the science advisor, juxtaposed against the rise of government expertise, provides ample reason to reconsider the future role of the Presidential science advisor, and to set our expectations for that role accordingly.

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Appendix

In Memoriam We would like to acknowledge the contribution of D. Allan Bromley, science advisor to George H.W. Bush, and a friend to many of the science advisors. Dr. Bromley died of a heart attack February 10, 2005, at Yale, where he had continued to lecture long after many would have retired completely. “He enjoyed his role as a science advocate, and spoke fearlessly on behalf of science and its needs. He reflected accurately the feelings of many scientists, and won their admiration for his defense of basic research,” according to John Marburger.

R. Pielke, Jr., R.A. Klein (eds.), Presidential Science Advisors, C Springer Science+Business Media B.V. 2010 DOI 10.1007/978-90-481-3898-2,

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Index

NOTE: Numbers in italics indicate a reference to a table or figure 9/11, 3, 99, 101, 110, 151 A Abortion, 136, 158 Academic scientists, 13–14, 23, 30, 54, 75, 109 Adams, John Quincy, 19 Advanced Technology Program, 11, 45, 139 527 Advocacy Group, 115 AD-X2, 154 Afghanistan, 41, 72 Africa, 50 Agency for International Development (AID), 50, 51 n. 22 AIDS, 95 Aircraft hijacking, 31 stealth technologies, 42, 58–59 Air Force, 49, 60, 80 One, 24 Alaska, 145 Albright, Madeline, 88 Aldrich, Pete, 60 Allen, Richard, 59 Ambro, Jerry, 136–137 American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS), 67, 89, 100, 107–109, 115, 136, 141, 144 n. 6 American Chemical Society, 89 American Competitiveness Initiative, 98 American Physical Society, 89 Ames Research Center, 130 Anthrax incidents, 110 Anthropogenic pollutants, 55, 73 Antiballistic missile program (ABM), 27, 30, 137

Apollo program, 9, 12, 31–32, 41, 97, 105–107, 121, 155–156 Arab Oil Embargo, 107 Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, 110 Arms control, 24, 49, 61–64 Army, 21 Asia, 26, 99, 144, 165 Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, xi, 1, 9, 14, 19, 22, 66, 69, 92, 151 Astin, Allen, 154 Atomic bomb, 21–23 Atomic Energy Commission (AEC), 104 B B-2 bomber, 59 Baker, William O., 54 Ball, John, 46 n. 13 Bangladesh, 73 Baruch, Jordan, 44–45 Basic research, 25, 30, 34, 37, 41–44, 45, 50, 60, 62, 64, 103, 138, 161, 169 Battery additive case, 154 Bayh-Dole Act, 45, 143 Beijing, 50 Bell Labs, 26, 29, 104 Beneath Reality, 118 Berkner, Lloyd, 23 Berlin Wall, 57, 64 Bethe, Hans, 154 Beyond the White House, 50 Bierbaum, Rosina, 78 Bioethics, 10–11, 15, 68–69 Biotechnology, 95 Bipartisan/bipartisanship, 11, 54, 69, 98, 111, 128, 137, 140

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172 Bloom, Floyd, 3 n. 9 Board on Science Technology and International Development (BOSTID), 51 n. 22 Boehlert, Sherry, 143 Boeing, 32–33 Bolten, Josh, 107 Booster Panel, 24 Bottle laws, 132–133 Branscomb, Lewis, 7 Bretherton, Francis, 139 n. 1 Bromley, D. Allan, v, 2, 8, 77, 102–103, 107, 145, 157, 159, 169 Brooks, Harvey, 8 Brown, George, 42 n. 7, 87, 102, 130, 138, 141, 145 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, 49 Buchanan, Pat, 33 Buchsbaum, Solomon, 54 Buckley, Oliver E., 2, 149 Bueche, Art, 54 Bureau of the Budget (BOB), 19–20, 24–25, 149 Bush, President George H.W., 2, 83, 102–103, 139, 153, 157, 169 administration, 139, 157 Bush, President George W., v, vi, xi, 1–3, 7, 9–12, 53, 68, 81, 83–85, 93, 98, 100, 103, 107, 109–113, 115, 138, 140–141, 151, 153–154, 156–158, 160–161, 165 administration, 2–3, 7, 9–12, 53, 68, 81, 93, 96, 98, 100, 103, 107, 109–113, 115, 138, 140–141, 153–154, 156–161, 165 Bush, Vannevar, 8–9, 21–22, 43 n. 10, 55, 62, 98, 104, 154 Byerly, Radford, xi, 8, 11–12, 121, 123–124, 130–132, 135, 140–142 C California Institute of Technology/Cal Tech, 30, 50, 101, 104 Calkins, David R., 46 n. 13 Cancer Cure program, 31 Card, Andrew, 3, 110 Caribbean, 50 Carnegie Institution of Washington, 21 Caro, Robert, 145 Carson, Rachel, 24 Carter, President Jimmy, xii, 2, 9, 12, 34, 37–55, 61, 153, 156–157, 160, 163 administration, 9, 34, 40, 46, 49–51 Cassini mission, 69, 71 Castro, Fidel, 31 Celera Genomics, 93

Index Center for Science and Technology Policy Research, v Challenger accident, 60, 142 China/Chinese, 49–50, 75, 93, 99, 116, 144 Clark, William, 7 Clean Air Act, 125, 130 Clean Car Initiative, 45 Clear Skies program, 82, 158 Climate change, 13, 55, 67, 71–72, 77, 82–84, 86, 93–94, 96, 100, 109, 111–113, 118, 158–159 Climate science, 55, 111–113 Clinch River Breeder Reactor, 47, 140 Clinton, President Bill, xi, 2–3, 9–12, 34, 65–72, 76–77, 83, 85, 87, 92–93, 96, 138–140, 144 n. 6, 153, 158–160 administration, 3, 10–12, 34, 65–66, 68–69, 71–72, 77, 83–85, 92–93, 138–140, 144 n. 6, 158–159 Cold War, 9–10, 14, 22–23, 57, 64–65, 72, 144 College of William and Mary, 151 n. 5 Collins, Francis, 93 Colorado, 24, 36, 83, 91 Colorado Advanced Technology Institute, 36 Columbia disaster, 69, 72, 140–141 Commerce Committee, 130, 132 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, 49 COMSAT, 25, 143 Conant, James, 21 Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 129 Congressional Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), 8–11, 15, 71, 76, 78–81, 85, 87, 129, 132 Congressional Research Service of the Library of Congress (CRS), 129, 132 Contract with America, 128 n. 4, 142 Cooperative Automotive Research Program (CARP), 45 Cooperative Research and Development Agreement (CRADA), 139 Cornell University, 26, 32 Council of Economic Advisers (CEA), 38, 40, 44, 47–48 Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ), 38, 48, 51 Creation Science/creationism, 53, 100, 125 See also Intelligent Design Cutler, Lloyd, 41 D Daniels, Mitch, 107 Data Access Act/Data Quality Act, 142 David, Jr, Edward, v, xi, 2, 8, 10–11, 13, 29, 119, 137, 152, 155–156, 160, 163

Index Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), 35, 104 Delay, Tom, 141 Denmark, 117 Densepack, 61 Department of Agriculture, 19, 110, 159 Commerce (DOC), 8, 20, 44, 49, 70, 139 Defense (DOD), 20, 25, 42, 49, 51, 66, 70, 81, 119, 139, 149 Education (DOEd), 40, 43–44 Energy (DOE), 40, 42, 46–47, 49, 93, 98, 104, 110, 117, 126, 139, 159, 161–162, 165 Health, Education and Welfare, 20 Health and Human Services, 20, 101 Homeland Security, 104, 110 Housing and Urban Development (HUD), 66, 106 the Interior, 79, 117 Justice, 45 Science, 20, 161–162 Transportation (DOT), 42, 45–46, 51 Deutch, John, 47, 82 Dickey Amendment, 93 Diesel vehicles, 46 DNA, 46 Dolly the sheep, 68–69 Domestic discretionary budget (DDB), 12, 105–106 Domestic Policy Council, 44 Drexel Institute of Technology, 151 n. 5 DuBridge, Lee A., 2, 13, 22, 27, 30, 32, 149–150, 152 n. 8 Dupont, 26 Dupree, A. Hunter, 150 E Earth in the Balance, 77 The Economist, 93 Eddy, Jack, 139 n. 1 Education-NSF report, 44 n. 11 Ehlers, Vern, 138 Ehrlichman, John, 30–31, 155–156 Einstein, Albert, 21, 101–102 Eisenhower, President Dwight, 1–2, 8, 10, 19, 22, 24, 49, 150–151, 153–154, 161, 164 administration, 150, 154, 164 Emission standards, 46, 70, 75, 84, 111–112, 128, 130, 139 Employment Retirement Income Security Act, 45

173 Endangered species, 100, 114 Act, 114 Energy, 9, 12, 19, 24, 31, 35, 37–38, 40, 46–48, 51–52, 55, 58, 65, 67, 71, 72, 75, 79, 85, 93–94, 102, 104, 107–108, 110, 112, 117, 126, 129–130, 135, 145, 156, 159, 161–162, 164 Environment and Resources Center, 79 Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), 8, 46, 68 n. 3, 126, 128, 130–131, 159 Esch, Marvin, 127–128 European Space Agency, 128 Evolution, 53, 88, 100, 118 Executive Branch, 11–12, 68, 105, 111, 124, 126, 136, 138, 142, 149 Executive Office of the President (EOP), 1, 20, 38, 40–41, 46 n. 13, 52, 54, 65, 66, 103, 110 Exxon, 29 F F-117, 59 Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), 154 Federal Coordinating Council for Science Engineering and Technology (FCCSET), 39, 54 Federal Council of Science and Technology, 20 Federal Emergency Management Agency, 40 Federation of American Scientists, 129 Fiske, Guy, 143 Fisk, James, 26 Fission project, 21 Flanigan, Peter, 30–31 Flippo, Ronnie, 128–129 Florida, 73, 136–137, 144 Food and Drug Administration (FDA), 46 n. 13, 110 Ford, President Gerald, 1–2, 39, 42, 44, 46–47, 103, 137, 157, 163 administration, 137 Foreign policy, 25, 58, 88–89, 161 n. 24 Fossil fuels, 86 Franklin, Benjamin, 7, 19, 67, 102 Fredrickson, Donald S., 46 n. 14 French embassy, 131 Freons, 127, 130–131 Frosch, Robert, 8 G Garfinkel, Patricia, 102 Garwin, Richard, 32–33 General Accountability Office (GAO), 81, 152 n. 8 General Groves, 21

174 General Motors, 70 Georgia, 40, 151 Germany, 21 Gibbons, John H., v, xi, 2, 8–9, 11, 65, 76–89, 92, 158–160 Gingrich, Newt, 11, 81, 91, 128 n. 4, 138, 140–141 The Global 2000 Report to the President, 48 Global Change Program, 139 n. 1 Global Change Research Act, 139 Global Positioning System (GPS), 49 n. 18, 51, 69 Global warming, 20, 31, 35, 84, 87, 94 See also Climate change Golden, William T., 1, 22, 65, 88, 120, 149–150, 152 n. 8 Gold, Tommy, 32 Gorbachev, Mikhael, 64 Gore, Albert, 65, 70, 75, 77, 84, 92–93, 109, 126, 140–141, 159 Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), 138 Graham, Jr, William R., 2 Greenwood, Ted, 46 n. 13 Gulf War, 42 Guston, David H., xi, 7, 160 Gutenberg, 86 H Hall, Ralph, 145 Halocarbons, 127 Handler, Philip, 39 n. 3 Harvard University, vi, 3, 21, 68, 77 Hatch, Senator Orrin, 69 H-bomb, 22, 150 n. 4 Health care, 19, 141, 144–145, 161 Healthy Forests Act, 82, 158 Hee, Park Chung, 26 Hershey, Robert, 26 Hewlett-Packard, 71 n. 4 Hill, Lister, 24 Hitler, Adolph, 102 Holdren, John P., vi, 2–3, 71 Holloman, Herbert, 26 Holton, Gerald, 43 n. 10 Homeland security, 94, 104, 110, 117, 135 The Honest Broker, 109 Hornig, Donald F., v, xi, 2, 7–10, 19, 155, 160–161, 163 Hornig, Lilli, 21, 26 House Appropriations Subcommittee on HUD, 66 House Government Oversight Committee, 140 n. 3

Index House Minority Leader, 137 House Science Committee, v, xi, 39, 116, 136, 138–139, 143, 145, 151 House and Senate Appropriations Committees, 106, 142 Hubble telescope, 116 Huberman, Ben, 38, 48, 50 Hugo, Victor, 89 Human Genome Project, 93–94 Hurricane Katrina, 91 Rita, 91 I IBM, 26 ICBMs, 22 Imperial Presidency, 10, 41 India, 116, 144 Industrial Research Institute (IRI), 44, 54 Institute for Applied Research and Industrial Development, 26 Institute of Medicine, 129 Institute for Scientific and Technological Cooperation (ISTC), 50–51 Intelligent Design, 53, 96 See also Creation Science/creationism INTELSAT, 25 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), 13–14, 86, 111 Intergovernmental Science Engineering and Technology Panel (ISETAP), 39, 54 In vitro fertilization, 93 Iranian hostage crisis, 41 J Japan/Japanese, 26–27, 44, 50, 60, 71, 99 embassy, 27 Jeffersonian science, 43 n. 10 Jefferson, Thomas, 7, 19, 52, 67, 104, 137 Johnson, President Lyndon (LBJ), xi, 2, 4, 19, 24, 26–27, 34, 42, 145, 155, 160, 163 administration, 4, 21, 24, 34 Johnson Space Center, 141 Jose Marti airport, 31 K Katzenbach, Nick, 25 Kazakhstan, 71 Keatley, Anne, 49 n. 19 Keeling, Charles David, 73 Kennedy, Donald, 3 n. 9 Kennedy, President John F., 1, 2, 7, 10–12, 19, 24, 49 n. 18, 152–153, 155, 159 n. 21, 163 administration, 7, 10–11, 163

Index Kennedy School of Government, 7 Kennedy, Senator Edward, 69 Kennedy Space Flight Center, 51 Kenya, 50 Kerry, John, 2, 82 Kevles, Daniel, 149, 153 Keyworth II, George A., v, xi, 2, 8, 10, 45, 57, 157, 160, 163 Killian, James R., 1–2, 8–9, 14, 22, 150–152 Kissinger, Henry, 30–31 Kistiakowsky, George B., 2 Klein, Roberta, xi, 1, 3, 149 Korea, 22, 26, 149 Korean War, 22, 149 Korea Advanced Institute of Science, 26 Korean Institute for Science and Technology (KIST), 26 Koshland, Daniel, 3 n. 9 Kyoto Protocol, 83–85, 111–112 L Lake Champlain, 136 Land, Edwin, 33 Landsat, 131–132, 143 Lane, Neal F., v, xi, 2, 8, 13, 77, 84, 91, 107, 109, 158–160, 165 Lasker, Mary, 31 Legislative Counsel of the House, 124, 133 process, 12, 125, 127, 129, 131 Lewis and Clark, 8, 104 Lewis, Cong. Jerry, 144 n. 6 Lewis, Merriweather, 137 Library of Congress, 129 Linden, Lawrence H., 46 n. 13, 55 n. 24 Long, Frank, 26 Long Island Sound, 121, 136–137 Lord Keyne, 31 Los Alamos, 21, 59, 62 Loweth, Hugh, 35 M Machiavelli, Niccolò, 61 Madison, James, 87 Magruder, Bill, 35 Manhattan District, 21 Manhattan Project, 104, 164 Mansfield amendment, 42 Mansfield, Mike, 42, n. 7 Manufacturing Extension Partnership, 139 Marburger III, John, v, xi, 2–3, 8–12, 53, 100, 103, 143, 145, 151, 159–162, 165, 169 Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), 1, 9, 22, 38–39, 104, 151, 155

175 Master of the Senate, 145 McCloud, Colin, 26 McGeary, Michael, 55 n. 24 Medicare/Medicaid, 42, 97 Meese, Edwin, 58, 62 Meeting the Threat of a Surprise Attack, 22 Memorial Sloan-Kettering Cancer Center, 67 Mercury regulation, 137, 159 Merrifield, Bruce, 45 Meserve, Richard, 46 n. 13 Mexico, 42 n. 8 Middlebury College, 151 n. 5 Military, 12, 22, 24–25, 27, 35, 42 n. 7, 51, 60, 62, 66–67, 69–70, 81, 104, 130, 136, 157 Missile gap, 10 Misuse or misrepresentation of science, v, 3, 81–82, 100–101, 113–114, 143, 151, 157–160 Moe, Richard, 40 n. 5 Molino, Mario, 127, 130, 133 Mondale, Walter, 40 Moscow, 26 Moyers, Bill, 24 Moynahan, Pat, 33 Mt. St. Helens, 39 MX missile, 49 n. 18, 51, 61 N Nanotechnology, 11, 13, 76–77, 93–94, 102 National Academies of Science and Engineering, 129 National Academy of Sciences Committee for the Scholarly Communication, 49 n. 19 National Academy of Sciences (NAS), 8, 23, 39, 46, 48–49, 51 n. 22, 112 National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics, 24 National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), 20, 24, 33, 41, 49, 51, 59–60, 69, 71, 95, 104, 106, 116–118, 126–128, 130–131, 139, 141, 143, 157, 161 National Agricultural Library, 42 n. 8 National Aquaculture Act, 42 n. 8 National Aquaculture Information Center, 42 n. 8 National Bioethics Advisory Commission (NBAC), 68–69 National Bureau of Standards (NBS), 8, 154 National Cancer Institute, 158 National Defense Education Act, 9 National Defense Research Council (NDRC), 21

176 National Economic Advisors Office, 162 National Economic Council, 94 National Institutes of Health (NIH), 8, 12, 27, 34, 42–43, 46, 49, 66–68, 87, 92–93, 97–98, 101, 104, 107, 111, 119, 139 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 8, 45, 98, 110, 123, 126–127, 165 National Nanotechnology Initiative (NNI), 11, 93–94 National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), v, 49, 51, 69, 126, 130–131, 136 National Public Radio, 3 National Research Council (NRC), 14, 23, 91, 111 National Science Board (NSB), 97, 99–100 National Science Foundation (NSF), 1–2, 20, 22, 34, 39, 42–45, 49, 62, 66–68, 87, 91–93, 98, 102, 104, 106, 117, 120, 126, 130, 149, 161–162, 165 NSF Small Business Innovation Research Program, 45 National Science and Technology Council (NSTC), 66–69, 71 n. 4 National Science and Technology Policy Organization and Priorities Act, 1, 137 National Security, 19, 24, 37–38, 48–49, 51, 54, 59, 61, 63–64, 68 n. 3, 94, 104, 145, 155 Advisor, 49, 59, 94 Planning Group, 59 National Security Council (NSC), 19, 38, 44, 48–49, 51, 61 Natural disasters, 40, 93, 163–164 Needle exchange, 3 n. 9, 159 Neureiter, Norm, 88 New Mexico, 24 New York, 67, 136 The New York Times, 52, 81, 111 Nigeria, 50 Nixon, President Richard, xi, 1–2, 10–11, 13, 27, 29–31, 33–34, 40–42, 47, 49, 51, 79, 137, 152–153, 155, 157, 163 administration, 13, 29–32, 34, 41, 79, 153, 163 Nobel Laureates, 67, 83, 102, 127, 164 Non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 71, 95, 129 Non-ionizing radiation, 47 Nuclear arms, 9, 22, 34, 51, 61–63, 65, 70–71, 88, 152, 156, 164

Index energy, power, 24, 35, 39, 48, 52, 65, 71, 85, 94, 107, 156 test ban, 24, 49 waste management, 47, 110, 162 O Oak Ridge National Lab (ORNL), 78–79, 85 Obama, President Barack, vi, 1–2, 3, 164–165 administration, 3 Ocean Dumping Act, 136–137 Ocean Margin Drilling Program (OMD), 45 Office of Defense Mobilization (SAC/ODM), 1–2, 22, 149–150 Office of Energy Conservation, 79 Office of Management and Budget (OMB), 4, 19, 23, 34–35, 38–40, 42–45, 47–48, 51, 54, 58, 62, 68, 78, 89, 94, 106–107, 116, 138, 143, 163 Office of Oceans, Environment and Science, 48 Office of Science and Technology (OST), 1, 20–21, 23–24, 35, 161, 163 Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), xi, xii, 1–3, 9, 13, 20, 34–35, 38–44, 46–51, 54–55, 57, 59, 61–64, 66–68, 73–77, 84, 87, 92–95, 100, 103–104, 107–108, 110–111, 114, 126, 137–140, 151, 157, 163, 165 Act of 1976, 1, 39, 137–140 Office of Scientific Research and Development (OSRD), 21–22, 150 Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), 8–11, 15, 71, 76, 78–81, 85, 87, 129, 132 Ohio, 144 n. 7 Ohira, Masayoshi, 50 Oklahoma, 91 Omenn, Gil, 38, 46 n. 13, 50 Oppenheimer, J. Robert, 150 n. 4, 154 Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), 41, 47 embargo, 47 OSTP Act of 1976, 1, 39, 137–140 Owen, Henry, 50 Ozone-freon, ozone hole, 46, 121, 127–128, 130–131 P Palmer, Robert, v, xi, 8, 11, 121, 123, 131, 135 Partnership for a New Generation of Vehicles (PNGV), 70 Patent reforms, 45 Patrinos, Ari, 93 Pentagon, 61, 64

Index People’s Republic of China, 49 n. 19 See also China/Chinese Perry, William, 42, 82 Physics Today, 153 Pickering, Tom, 48 Pielke, Jr, Roger, v, xii, 1, 3, 76–89, 108–109, 135, 149 Piore, Emanuel, 26 Pitzer, Ken, 26 Porter, John, 144 n. 6 Powell, Colin, 89 Prager, Denis, 46 n. 13 Presidential campaign, 2, 37, 40–41, 44, 53, 60, 95, 109, 113, 116, 139, 159, 165 Presidential Science Advisory Committee (PSAC), 2, 10, 23–24, 26–27, 32–33, 42, 49, 54, 137, 150, 152–153, 155 Presidential Young Investigator Awards, 62 President’s Bioethics Advisory Council, 11 President’s Committee of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST), 66 n. 2, 71 President’s Council on Bioethics, 15, 68 President’s Scientific Research Board, 162 Press, Frank, v, xii, 2, 8, 37–40, 44, 46, 48–50, 52–54, 156, 160 Prime Minister Sato, 26–27 The Prince, 61 Princeton University, 24, 69 Priorities Act, 1, 137 Proxmire, William, 120 Public Employees for Environmental Responsibility, 114 Public understanding of science, 99, 100–102, 116–117 R Rabi, Isidor I., 2, 55, 150, 155 Ramo, Simon, 54 Reagan, President Ronald, xi, 2, 9–10, 34, 42 n. 7, 44–45, 50, 53, 55, 57–60, 62–64, 80, 128–129, 131, 153, 157 administration, 9–10, 34, 45, 50, 57–62, 131 Regulatory Analysis Review Group (RARG), 47 Regulatory Council, 47 Regulatory Reform Act, 142 Reorganization Plan of 1962, 20 Research and Development/R&D, 8, 10–14, 29–30, 32–36, 38, 41–47, 49, 54, 60, 67 n. 3, 70, 94–95, 97–98, 105, 106–107, 108, 112, 115, 120, 135, 138–139, 143–144, 162–164

177 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 132 Restoring the Quality of the Environment, 24 Revelle, Roger, 73, 77 Reykjavik, 64 Rice University, 26, 91, 102 Rising Above the Gathering Storm, 98 Risk Assessment and Cost Benefit Act, 142 Robozo, Bebe, 31 Rockefeller, Nelson, 137 Rogers, Paul, 130 Roosevelt, President Franklin D., 9, 21–22, 40, 102 Rove, Karl, 82, 158 Rowland, Sherwood, 127, 130, 133 Rudnev, Konstantin, 26 Ruina, Jack, 38 Russell, Richard, 9, 151 Russia/Russians, 9, 22, 33, 69, 71–72, 95, 126, 140–141 See also Soviet Union/USSR S Sachs, Alexander, 21 Sandia National Laboratories, 110 Sarewitz, Daniel, xii, 11–12, 104–107, 119, 162 Saudi Arabia, 72, 86 Schlesinger, James, 31 Science Advisor to the President, xi, 1–2, 3, 88, 101, 149–150 Science Advisory Committee of the Office of Defense Mobilization (SAC/ODM or SAC-ODM), 1–2, 22, 149–150 Science budget, 11–15, 78, 105, 107, 116–117, 135, 160–163 Science Committee, US House of Representatives, see House Science Committee Science, The Endless Frontier, 22, 98 Science and Engineering Indicators, 97, 99 Science Magazine, 2, 109 Science policy, v, 8, 10–11, 14–15, 20, 35, 55, 87, 91, 95–96, 103–105, 107, 109, 116, 119–121, 123–124, 126–127, 129, 131, 135–141, 143, 145, 157–158, 162, 164–165 Scientific community, 3–4, 7, 11, 13–15, 23, 30, 40, 54, 58, 61, 63, 72, 77–78, 81–83, 95, 100, 103, 112–118, 138, 149, 151–152, 156, 159–161, 164–165 Scientists and Engineers for Change, 115 Second hand smoke, 159

178 Secretary of Commerce, 26, 44, 143, 154 of Defense, 25, 42 n. 7 of State, 49, 88 Senegal, 50 Shapiro, Harold, 69 Shenandoah Valley, 67 Shultz, George, 64 Shuttle program, see Space shuttle Silent Spring, 9, 24 Skaggs, David, 139 n. 1 Skolnikoff, Eugene, 38, 50, 55 n. 24 Small Business Innovation Research Program (SBIR), 35 Smalley, Rick, 102 Smith, Philip M. (PS), xii, 8, 37–39, 44, 46–50, 54–55 Snow, C.P., 52, 72 Solar panels on White House, 52, 156 Solomon, Anne, 49 n. 19 Sonnert, Gerhard, 43 n. 10 South America, 50 Southeast Asia, 26, 165 Soviet Union/USSR, 1, 22, 26, 41, 59, 61, 63–65, 104, 150 Soviets, 1, 9, 26, 51, 57, 64, 71, 150 See also Russia/Russians Soyuz capsules, 33 Space policy, 51, 59–60, 141–142 Space Science Board of the National Academy of Sciences, 23 Space Science Panel of PSAC, 24 Space shuttle, 9, 33, 51, 69, 95, 126, 142–143 Space Station, 9, 59–60, 69, 72, 77, 95, 116, 126, 138–141 Spain, 120 Specter, Arlen, 144 n. 6 Speth, Gus, 48 Sputnik, 1, 9, 22, 107, 150, 153 Stacking of science advisory committees, 2 Star Wars, 80 See also Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) Stealth technology, 42, 58–59 Steelman Reports, 43 n. 10 Stem cell research, 2, 13, 20, 31, 55, 83, 88, 92–96, 100, 109, 111, 120, 125–126, 158–159, 164 Stever, Guyford, 2, 44, 54–55 Stockman, David, 45 Strategic arms limitations, 63 reductions, 63

Index Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), 10, 34, 59, 63–64, 157 Strauss, Lewis, 154 Sudan, 159 missile attack, 159 Sulfa drugs, 23 Sumatran earthquake, 165 Sundquist, Don, 71 Superconducting Supercollider (SSC), 77, 139, 142 Supersonic Transport Aircraft (SST), 10, 27, 30, 32, 42, 137 Swarthmore, 101 Szilard, Leo, 21 T Teague, Olin E. (Tiger), 130 Technology policy, 10–11, 35, 37, 67 n. 3, 95, 98, 104, 137, 144 Technology Reinvestment Program, 139 Telecommunications Policy Committee, 25 Teller, Edward, 59, 63 Thatcher, Margaret, 49 The Theology of Global Warming, 31 Three-Mile Island nuclear plant, 39 Titan, 60–61, 71 Townes, Charles, 80 Truman, President Harry S., 1–2, 9, 22, 65, 88, 149–150, 155 Tsunami, 163, 165 Tukey, John, 24 Turmoil and Triumph, 64 U Udall, Mark, 139 n. 1 Understanding Earth, 53 Union College, 151 n. 5 Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), 2, 9, 82, 100, 113–114, 140, 143, 151, 157–158 University of Colorado, v, xi, xii, 3 n. 11, 76, 103, 137 University of Tennessee, 79 Unlocking Our Future, Toward a New National Science Policy, 138 USCAR, 139 US-China Science and Technology Agreement, 93 US Congressional Office of Technology Assessment, see Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) US Constitution, 53 US Department of Agriculture (USDA), 19, 110, 159 US Fish and Wildlife Service, 114

Index US Geological Survey (USGS), 43, 49, 51 US House of Representatives’ Committee on Science, see House Science Committee US Navy, 38 n. 2 US Postal Service, 110 US science and technology program, 20, 29, 32 US Supreme Court, 53 US-USSR Science and Technology Agreement, 41 V Vance, Cy, 25 Varmus, Harold, 67 Vela satellite, 39 Venezuela, 50 Venter, Craig, 93 Veterans Affairs (VA), 66, 106 Vietnam War, 27, 42 Volkmer, Harold, 131 W Walker, Robert, 161 The Wall Street Journal, 31 War on science, 153 Washington, George, 7

179 Waxman, Henry, 3, 81–82, 140 Weinberg, Alvin, 104, 107–108 West Wing, 38 n. 2, 40, 52–53, 110, 156 Wetlands definition, 157 Wexler, Anne, 41 White House Science Council, 63 Wiesner, Jerome B., 2, 12, 20, 24, 152, 155, 159 n. 21 Wirth, Tim, 83, 139 n. 1 World War II, 23, 34–35, 43 n. 10, 62, 104, 149, 151–152, 154, 160–161, 164 X Xiaoping, Deng, 49–50 Y Yale University, 8–9, 103, 169 Yom Kippur War, 80 Young, John, 71 n. 4 Yucca Mountain nuclear waste facility, 110, 162 Z Zimbabwe, 50

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