Normativity And Empirical Research In Theology (Empirical Studies in Theology)

Normativity and Empirical Research in Theology

Empirical Studies in Theology Editor

Johannes A. van der Ven

VOLUME 10

Normativity and Empirical Research in Theology Edited by

Johannes A. van der Ven Michael Scherer-Rath

BRILL LEIDEN • BOSTON 2004

This book is printed on acid-free paper. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Normativity and empirical research in theology / edited by Johannes A. van der Ven, Michael Scherer-Rath. p. cm.—(Empirical studies in theology; v. 10) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 90-04-12663-5 (alk. paper) 1. Theology—Research. I. Ven, J. A. van der, 1940– II. Scherer-Rath, Michael. III. Title IV. Series. BR118.E66 20004 202’.072—dc22

2004054401

ISSN 1389-1189 ISBN 90 0412663 5 © Copyright 2005 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change.    

CONTENTS Introduction ................................................................................

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PART ONE

EXPLANATION ABOUT NORMATIVITY Theological Normativity: Ideology or Utopia? Reflections on the Possible Contribution of Empirical Research .......... J S. D

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What You See is What You Get. Social Construction and Normativity in Practical Theology ................ R. R G

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Normative Explanation in Practical Theology ........................ A  J

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Given through the Senses. A Phenomenological Model of Empirical Theology ............................ H-G H

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Which Normativity and what Kind of Empirical Research? From Dualism to Multiple Interplays .............................................. F S

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An Empirical or A Normative Approach to Practical-theological Research? A False Dilemma .......................................................................... J A.   V Personality Theory, Empirical Theology and Normativity .... L J. F

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137

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 PART TWO

NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH How “Adult” is the Religiosity of Adults? Normative Implications of Empirical Theological Research into Religious Development in the Second Half of Life ........................ U F-L & T K

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Normative Implications of Designing Empirical Research Family Research and Reflective Theological Normativity .................... C M

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The Position of God Images in the Theoretical Research Model ...................................................................................... M S-R

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Normative Claims in Pastoral Ministry Research .................. H S Empirical Research in Practical Theology as a Strategy of Intervention ............................................................................ U Fr. S Freedom of Religion as a Meta-norm. Relating Theological and Pedagogical Normativeness in Empirical Research into Religious Education ................................................ P V

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251

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Empirical Methodology and Normativity ................................ H-G Z

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List of Authors ..........................................................................

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Index ..........................................................................................

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INTRODUCTION The theme of the first congress of the International Society of Empirical Research in Theology (ISERT), held from April 12 to 14, 2002 on the campus of the Radboud University Nijmegen, was ‘Empirical Research and Theological Normativity’. In its by-laws, the Society had given itself three objectives: to offer a platform for the development, execution and evaluation of programmes and projects in empirical research, both quantitative and qualitative, in theology and their theological legitimation; to contribute to the clarification of foundational, epistemological, methodological and conceptual implications of conducting empirical research in theology, and to facilitate an international network for researchers in this field. It seemed logical to choose a theme for the congress that would be sufficiently central to empirical research in practical theology that it could contribute in a significant way to the clarification of foundational, epistemological, methodological and conceptual implications of conducting empirical research in the field of theology. It was therefore decided that the congress would focus on the relationships between theology and the human sciences, specifically the normative aspects of the relation between theology and empirical research. Whereas in years gone by the academic debate was largely dominated by a methodological question, namely the debate over the primacy of quantitative versus qualitative methods in empirical research, the question was now seen as revolving once again around the nature of the relationship or relationships between the various empirical research methods on the one hand and the theological research on the other. This book is a collection of academic papers and articles that were either presented at the congress or written for the book. All are concerned with how the normative aspects of theology find expression in empirical studies in the area of practical theology, and the value that is and should be ascribed to this theological normativity within the context of concrete empirical research projects. The book is divided into two parts. The first is made up of articles dealing more generally with the problem of theological normativity and empirical research, while the papers in the second part explore the subject with reference to actual empirical research projects. Part 1

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begins with a contribution by Jaco S. Dreyer, who asks whether theological normativity in empirical research in fact takes us in the direction of ideology or utopism. He concludes that practical theologians are challenged to play a constructive role in mediating between our Christian traditions and practices and the modern and postmodern contexts without falling prey to the dangers of ideology and utopism, and that empirical theological research is one of the means by which this can be done. R. Ruard Ganzevoort advocates a social constructionist approach and shows that in empirical studies of religious praxis, one frequently encounters social constructions in which normative criteria are inherent and cannot be imposed from outside. He emphasizes that the theological and normative dimension of practical theology is not something added on to empirical investigations, but is already present in the material being studied. Aad de Jong challenges us to study the normative explanations in practical theology and identifies possibilities for how this could be done. Hans-Günter Heimbrock develops a phenomenological model of empirical theology and suggests ways in which the discipline of practical theology could develop in the direction of a ‘life-world oriented theology’. Friedrich Schweitzer explains why the simple dualism that makes normativity and empirical research in theology look like two separate entities must be overcome, and proposes closer study of the multiple interplays between normative and empirical approaches to reality. Johannes A. van der Ven shows why the question of whether practical theological research should take an empirical or a normative approach is a false dilemma, making it clear that empirical research always encompasses strong normative aspects as well. Leslie J. Francis illustrates how personality theory can illuminate some key problems in practical theology and how empirical research in personality psychology can form the proper basis for theological reflection and for the examination and development of theological normativity. Part 2 is concerned especially with the normative implications of actual empirical research projects. In the first article, Ulrich FeeserLichterfeld and Tobias Kläden present the results of a study on religious development in the second half of life and explore the normative theological implications. They argue that normative criteria are part of the entire empirical research process, so that from a diachronic perspective the relationship between normativity and empirical research takes on the form of a spiral. Christoph Morgenthaler argues that reflective theological normativity can and should influence the design of an

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empirical study at important points of the planning process. Using a family research project as an example, he shows that empirical research and theology are in some regards complementary systems of scientific activity. Michael Scherer-Rath explores the significance of normative theological implications in terms of a comparison between two theoretical research models with the same key-variables. Without the stringent application of theological theory formation within the research model, meaningful empirical research and subsequent evaluation of the research results is not possible. Hans Schilderman analyses some characteristics of the normative claims studied in pastoral ministry research, focusing on the who, when, where, why and how of these claims. Udo Fr. Schmälzle, in his article about a “Caritas” study, makes the case that empirical research will be an essential part of future theological research. Since empirical research methods are a valuable means of solving controversies about alternative pastoral concepts, they are of fundamental importance for practical theology. Paul Vermeer looks at the normativity debate from the perspective of an empirical research project in the field of religious education. He shows that when it comes to the praxis of religious education, the empirical-theological researcher cannot ignore the fact that normative theological claims are always and inevitably accompanied by normative pedagogical claims and the other way around. And, finally, Hans-Georg Ziebertz shows that normativity plays in important role in the whole of the empirical cycle and looks at how it is addressed discursively. In so doing he distances himself from the concept of normativity that is integral to politically motivated ideologies, and explains why it is important to clearly disclose the normative aspects of theories and practice, and thus to render the decision-making process transparent. The publication of this volume would not have been possible without the financial support of the Sormani Fund Foundation, the Porticus Foundation and the Faculty of Theology of the Radboud University Nijmegen. We are very grateful for their support of our scientific work. We also thank Barbara Schultz and Marcelle Manley for the translation and revision of many of the articles, Anneke Mooij for creating the index. Nijmegen, October 2004 Johannes A. van der Ven Michael Scherer-Rath

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PART ONE

EXPLANATION ABOUT NORMATIVITY

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THEOLOGICAL NORMATIVITY: IDEOLOGY OR UTOPIA? Reflections on the Possible Contribution of Empirical Research1 J S. D Introduction A few years after the first democratic elections in South Africa in 1994, which formally ended the Apartheid era, the country still faces massive social, economic and political problems. Some of the challenges that lie ahead, to mention just a few, include the immense poverty of the majority of people, landlessness, HIV/AIDS, reconciliation between groups, environmental conservation, economic reconstruction, and the establishment of a human rights culture. These contextual challenges form the backdrop for the following important question: How can religion, and the Christian faith in particular, contribute to meeting these challenges? It cannot be assumed unconditionally that religion will and can play a constructive role in building up the South African society. We are just too aware of the role of religion in unresolved conflicts all over the world. This is also true of South Africa. The history of Apartheid has made people wary of theologies and theologians. Prominent theologians, of the Dutch Reformed Church in particular, used Scripture to legitimate the Apartheid policy of separate development. The political and juridical system of Apartheid was thus theologically legitimated. This negative role of theology was not restricted to individuals. Churches also actively or passively supported the Apartheid ideology. The report of the Truth and Reconciliation Committee (TRC) reminds us of this failure on the side of the churches. The Commission concludes in its report on the faith community in South Africa that Christianity, as the dominant religion in South Africa, promoted the ideology of Apartheid in many ways. Faith communities often acted as agents of oppression and contributed to social

1 This article is an abridged and revised version of a paper that was read at the first conference of the International Society for Empirical Research (ISERT) in Nijmegen, The Netherlands, on 13 April 2002.

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and other divisions in society: “In most cases, faith communities claimed to cut across divisions of race, gender, class and ethnicity. As such, they would seem by their very existence to have been in opposition to the policies of the apartheid state and, in pursuing their own norms and values, to have constituted a direct challenge to apartheid policies. However, contrary to their own deepest principles, many faith communities mirrored apartheid society, giving the lie to their profession of a loyalty that transcended social divisions” (TRC Report, vol. 4, chapter 3). On the other hand, religion, through religious leaders such as Archbishop Desmond Tutu, also contributed to the dismantling of Apartheid. Pieterse, Nel and Njumbuxa (1994) argue that religion played a major positive role in averting civil war and helping to have a relatively peaceful political transition. The work of the TRC was also clearly motivated by a “religious-redemptive narrative” (Wilson 2001, 109–121). On the basis of the history of the past few decades one can conclude that the public role of religion in general, and of the Christian faith in particular, remains at least ambivalent. If we look towards the future of South Africa, the following important question can be asked: Will religion play a positive role in the reconstruction of the South African society and the establishment of a human rights culture, as for example outlined by Villa-Vicencio (1992) in his book A theology of reconstruction: nation-building and human rights? In this paper I would like to reflect on the possible contribution of empirical research in theology to this task of mediating the Christian faith, with its implied normativity, to social contexts. This reflection will be done by drawing on Paul Ricoeur’s critical hermeneutical theory. In section two we first look briefly at the issue of renewal and reinterpretation of the Christian tradition from Ricoeur’s ideas on ideology and utopia. This forms the background for the third section in which the possible contribution of empirical research in this linking of normativity and context is discussed. The article ends with a short conclusion. 1. Theological Normativity in the Tension Between Ideology and Utopia In an article on normativity and context from a sociological perspective, Kaufmann (1999) refers to the endangered tradition of Christianity in post-modern culture. In this article he discusses the relationship

 :   

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between (religious) normativity and social context. Some argue (the traditional position) that religious normativity is independent from the actual social context (the idea of a transcendent normativity). Others (the modern, or perhaps better contextual approach) maintain that there is an intimate relationship between normativity and social context. Kaufmann maintains that both positions can be criticised. He says that the traditional position can be challenged because there has indeed been substantial change in the interpretation of the Gospel during history, and because the normative core of Christianity has not always been defined in the same way. The modern position can be challenged of relativism and a lack of identity if the normativity of the Christian faith is totally dependent on the social context. The tension between these two positions is captured in the following question that Kaufmann (1999, 280) raises: “Does the normativity of the Gospel remain independent of its actual relevance or does actual relevance determine what is normative in it?”. From a sociological perspective he argues that “the Christian Gospel has never been passed through history without assimilating specific social contexts” (Kaufmann 1999, 281). The Christian Gospel has been inculturated in new contexts. He writes: “The fascinating point is that the commitment to the Christian Gospel never ended with the end of a specific constellation of its social and cultural forms but always found new expressions and followers in a new context” (Kaufmann 1999, 281). On the other hand, despite the inculturation, there is still a specific Christian identity. The problem thus seems to be to renew our religious or Christian traditions (theological normativities) in particular contexts in such a way that they retain their specific religious or Christian identities. It is at this point that Ricoeur’s theory of the cultural (or social) imagination seems to be particularly useful as a conceptual framework to get insight in this problem.2 A central assumption of his theory of the cultural imagination is that all action is symbolically structured. “Ideology and utopia have ultimately to do with the character of human action as being mediated, structured and integrated by symbolic systems”, writes Ricoeur (1976, 21). One can therefore say that all actions, whether in the fields of politics, culture or economics,

2 Taylor (1986, xi) writes in the Editor’s Introduction to Ricoeur’s Lectures on ideology and utopia that “Ricoeur discusses ideology and utopia not as phenomena but as concepts.”

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are influenced by traditions, collective stories or histories. Ricoeur refers to this “symbolic universe” that influences our actions as the “social” or “cultural” imagination. This, however, does not mean that we are totally dependent on our traditions. Although the social imagination on the one hand functions to preserve an order, imagination can also function as disruption. Ricoeur (1986, 265–266) describes this dual function of imagination as follows: On the one hand, imagination may function to preserve an order. In this case the function of the imagination is to stage a process of identification that mirrors the order. Imagination has the appearance here of a picture. On the other hand, though, imagination may have a disruptive function; it may work as a breakthrough. Its image in this case is productive, an imagining of something else, the elsewhere. In each of its three roles, ideology represents the first kind of imagination; it has the function of preservation, of conservation. Utopia, in contrast, represents the second kind of imagination; it is always the glance from nowhere.3

The social imagination therefore presents us with a dialectical tension between ideology and utopia.4 Ricoeur maintains, however, that there is not only a polarity between ideology and utopia, but also a polarity regarding each of these poles (cf. Ricoeur 1979). The main function of ideology is that of conservation. In the words of Ricoeur (1991, 318): “. . . ideology has one fundamental function: to pattern, to consolidate, to provide order to the course of action.” This can, however, become pathological, and then ideology distorts (Ricoeur 1991, 323). The main function of utopia, on the other hand, is that of critiquing established systems of power and of rethinking alternative ways of living. The pathology of utopia, however, is a flight from reality, from the imperfections and challenges of praxis, that is escapism. Ricoeur (1991, 322) adds that the pathology of utopia con-

3 In his later works on narrative, Ricoeur also refers to the disruptive, innovate function of imagination. Through imagination, narratives provide opportunities to articulate “imaginative variations”. In taking part in the composition of a group’s story, we conduct “a thought experiment by means of which we try to inhabit worlds foreign to us” (Ricoeur 1988, 249). In the dialectic between memory and imagination “the space of experiences” and “horizons of expectation” are connected (Ricoeur 1992, 161). 4 This dialectic between stability and change appears in his later work on narrative identity, in particularly regarding the temporal dimension of narrative identity, in the tension between stability and change, between sedimentation and innovation (cf. Dreyer 2000).

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ceals under this escapism and futurism “the nostalgia for some paradise lost.” The interplay of ideology and utopia is such that ideology needs the critical and subversive function of utopia in order to prevent it from developing its pathology of distortion, and utopia needs the integrative and conserving function of ideology to prevent it from developing its pathology of escapism. This theory of the social or cultural imagination provides insight in the problem of relating normativity and context. If we apply the concepts of Ricoeur to the problem of relating normativity to context, one can say that our religious or theological normativities, as handed down in particular traditions, need innovation. Traditions are necessary as they provide integration and identity in the positive sense of ideology. However, a tradition cannot survive without innovation. If there is no innovation, the danger is that it will take on the negative functions of ideology, namely distortion. On the other hand, if innovation loses its connection with tradition, it becomes escapism and loses its connection with praxis. A vivid example of this dialectical tension between tradition and innovation is provided by the way in which the normativity of the Christian Bible was used in the theology of Apartheid. Apartheid as legal and political system was legitimised on theological grounds by prominent theologians such as E.P. Groenewald and A.B. du Preez. In an article The Bible and apartheid Vorster (1983, 95) argues that the theological (scriptural) legitimation of Apartheid by the Dutch Reformed Church has a presupposition that “the Bible is the Word of God containing eternal and unchanging norms that have to be applied by those who wish to do the will of God”. Vorster (1983, 98) clearly demonstrates how an ideology was used as a “grid” to read Scripture and in the end became an ideology based on Scripture. The history of South Africa testifies to the problematic and contextual nature of theological normativity. Theological normativities easily become ideological. As mentioned in the introduction, the challenge today is to renew our religious and Christian traditions in South Africa in this dialectical tension between ideology and utopia. 2. Empirical Research in the Tension Between Ideology and Utopia In the previous section we referred to the importance of linking normativity and context. On the basis of Ricoeur’s hermeneutical theory we gained some insight in the tension between ideology and utopia

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that has to be preserved in the renewal of our religious or Christian traditions. In the process it is important to keep the tension between the “spaces of experience” (which include our theological traditions) and the “horizon of expectations”. In “Ricoeurian language”, innovation needs integration and sedimentation, but sedimentation is constantly in need of semantic innovation. In order to deal with this contextual challenge, many theologians, and practical theologians in particular, adopted the use of empirical methods. The role of empirical research in the renewal of the Christian tradition is not a new idea, and the possible contribution of empirical research in the interaction between theory and praxis has been widely discussed in the past two or three decades. The recent constitution of the International Society for Empirical Research in Theology (ISERT) testifies to an interest in empirical research in theology, and a vision that empirical research in theology can play a constructive role in linking normativity and context, in mediating faith in modern or postmodern contexts. This assumption is, however, not without problems. As we will argue below, there is today a deep distrust of empirical research. The following important questions thus have to be raised: Can empirical research play a constructive role towards the mediation of normativity and context? How should this research be conducted in order to contribute to this central theological task? We start with the first question: can empirical research in theology play a constructive role towards the mediation of normativity and context? Although it may seem obvious for some practical or contextual theologians that empirical research can play a vital role in this regard, many theologians and so-called postmodern thinkers will disagree. From a brief glance at the discussion on the role of empirical research in the social sciences one can deduce that empirical research is under attack from many sides, even from social scientists themselves. The limited success of social-scientific research to provide “usable knowledge” brings the value of empirical research into question. Stehr (1992, ix; cf. Gergen 1994, 4) says for instance that practitioners and even social scientists themselves are sceptical of the practical usefulness of social scientific knowledge. More importantly in this context, however, is the accusation that social scientific knowledge, based on empirical research, sustains oppressive structures or itself acts as an oppressive force in society (cf. Harvey 1990, 7; Gergen 1994, 29–34, 98–100). The sociology of knowledge indicates

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that knowledge is often used to legitimate the researcher’s (or research institution’s) ideologies (cf. Dant 1991, 204). A brief look at the history of the social sciences clearly demonstrates its ideological character. Empirical research is often used in the service of “hard” cultural engineering (cf. Villa-Vicencio 1994, 31–32), and often fulfills the role of supporting the dominant ideology. This mistrust of social-scientific (empirical) research may be even higher in South Africa due to the use of empirical research to legitimate the system of Apartheid. In the book Knowledge in black and white: The impact of Apartheid on the production and reproduction of knowledge (Prah 1999), a number of scholars from diverse disciplines demonstrate how the production of knowledge in South Africa was influenced by the Apartheid ideology.5 The question whether empirical research in theology can contribute to the linking of Christian traditions (theological normativities) and contexts, to the renewal of theological theories in which the dangers of ideology and utopia are circumvented, is thus not so easy to answer. The irony is that empirical research itself does not escape the tension between ideology and utopia. It is itself symbolically laden action. Empirical research can negatively function as legitimator of ideology (distortion). On the other hand it can also negatively function as utopia, providing and supporting utopian dreams, far removed from the stresses and strains of everyday life, or by neglecting the “identities” implied by our traditions. These dangers of empirical research, in fact of all research and even of all human action, are our constant companions. Despite the dangers of empirical research functioning to legitimate ideologies in the negative sense or to provide unrealistic utopias, I would like to argue that empirical research from a theological perspective can contribute positively by giving us insight in the religious imagination, the symbolic frameworks, the attitudes and ideas that influence people’s religious actions. The project “Human rights and religion among South African youth” undertaken by the Department of Practical Theology of the University of South Africa in cooperation with the University of Nijmegen provides us with numerous examples of the 5 Prah (1999, 12) says in the introduction: “The papers captured within these covers take the work of exposing the sociological influence of apartheid on knowledge production further and deepen our understanding of the social context of knowledge production under apartheid.”

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contribution of empirical theological research in this regard. By means of this research we gained, for example, insight in the God images (Van der Ven, Dreyer & Pieterse 1997; 2001a), Jesus images (Pieterse, Dreyer & Van der Ven 2000), ecclesiastical orientations (Van der Ven, Dreyer & Pieterse 2001b), interreligious orientations (Dreyer, Pieterse & Van der Ven 1999), and the religious and human rights orientations (Dreyer, Pieterse & Van der Ven 2001) of a number of grade 11 students in Anglican and Catholic church-affiliated and public schools in Johannesburg and Pretoria. Empirical research in theology thus provides a means for the description of and reflection on the self-understanding of religious communities and current religious praxis by means of descriptive and explanatory research (cf. Dingemans 1996, 83). In this way, it can give us insight in our identities, in who we are. Empirical research then fulfills the positive function of ideology. Empirical research in theology is, however, not only important in terms of providing insight in religious praxis. It can also fulfill an important role in opening up new possibilities, in the innovation of our religious traditions. In terms of Ricoeur’s theoretical ideas one can say that empirical research can also fulfill the positive function of stimulating our imaginations in order to renew our traditions, thus functioning as utopia in the positive sense. It is interesting to note, for example, that the grade 11 students who participated in the above-mentioned research show a richness and complexity in their God images (cf. Van der Ven, Dreyer & Pieterse 1997; 2001a) and Jesus images (cf. Pieterse, Dreyer & Van der Ven 2000) that challenge our Christian traditions.6 Furthermore, empirical research can also provide insight in the action strategies that are necessary to bring about change in the world of action, for example by means of action research. In this way empirical research can help us to conceptualize and implement, in the words of Ricoeur, “paths towards utopia”, thus linking our theories to praxis. 6

Van der Ven, Dreyer and Pieterse (2001a, 213) write for example: “It is remarkable that our students evaluate die (sic) immanent-transcendent codes as the most positive, that is, code II: God as personally present regarding nature (average, 4.4), and code III: God as personally present regarding history (average, 4.5). But it also is remarkable that the metapersonal codes—the codes which in the Christian traditions to a certain degree are considered ‘heretical’—are positively subscribed by our students, that is, code IV: God as a meta-personally transcendent supreme being, present regarding nature and history (4.1), and code V: God as metapersonally immanent, but being beyond any iconicity (3.6).”

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Without going into much detail, I therefore would like to argue that empirical research has the potential to contribute positively in meeting the challenge to renew our religious or Christian traditions, and towards relating normativity to context. This brings us to the second question: How should this research be conducted in order to contribute to this central theological task without becoming ideological or utopian in the negative sense referred to above? In response to this question, I take as point of departure that a critical hermeneutic framework could help to reduce the risks of empirical research becoming ideological or utopian in the negative sense. The importance of this combination of empirical, hermeneutical and critical perspectives is well stated by Ziebertz (1993, 229): Hermeneutics without a critical perspective can become an ideology; hermeneutics without an empirical perspective may lose touch with reality; the empirical perspective without the hermeneutical perspective can lead to a positivistic understanding of empirical research; the empirical perspective without a critical perspective can lead to an uncritical use, or the misuse, of empirical research results. A critical hermeneutical framework for research has important implications for the methodology of empirical research (cf. Harvey 1990, 196–212; Kincheloe & McLaren 1994, 151–154). It influences the basic epistemological assumptions, the methods of empirical research, the relationship between a researcher and the researched, the aims of research, the interpretation of the “data”, and the “application” of the “knowledge” that was constructed.7 Here we have to

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Van der Ven (1994) mentions five general hermeneutical principles that should inform our research practices. The first principle implies that the researcher’s prejudices come into play throughout the research process. Researchers must therefore become conscious of their prejudices. This principle requires that practical theologians adopt a self-reflective stance regarding ideological imperatives and epistemological imperatives that inform their research. A second principle refers to the fact that the empirical researcher participates in the life world of those human beings whose praxis is studied. This principle has important implications for the relationship between the researcher and the participants in the research and can also facilitate the interpretation of research results. The third principle concerns the historical dimension involved in all research endeavours. It is important to give deliberate attention to this historical dimension. In the South African context, for example, it is important to attend to aspects such as the Apartheid system and the struggle to build a democratic, nonracial and non-sexist South Africa. A fourth principle says that we should take account of the multidimensional context of the research participants. This means we have to pay conscious attention to the political, economic, social, cultural and ecological factors that influence the religious praxis that we

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take note of insights from critical social science, feminism, and postmodernism to mention a few. Issues such as reflexivity (cf. Alvesson & Sköldberg 2000) and the ethics of research have to be taken seriously. We cannot discuss all these aspects in this article. With reference to Ricoeur’s critical hermeneutics I briefly refer to the importance of the dialectics of belonging and distanciation in the research endeavour.8 In the essay “Science and ideology” Ricoeur (1991, 246–269) discusses the problematic distinction between science and ideology. He argues that a sharp and clear-cut distinction between the social sciences and ideology can only be upheld if these sciences are viewed in a positivist way (Ricoeur 1991, 256). When the positivist criteria for social theory are abandoned (which he argues must be the case because they are untenable), the possibility of an epistemological break between science and ideology is lost: “We cannot play and win on two tables at once; we cannot abandon the positivist model of science to give an acceptable meaning to the idea of social theory, and at the same time take advantage of this model in order to institute an epistemological break between science and ideology” (Ricoeur 1991, 258). Ricoeur further argues that a clear break between science and ideology presupposes a subject capable of total knowledge of ideological differences, a freischwebende Intelligenz capable of evaluating ideologies from a non-evaluative and non-subjective stance. With reference to Gadamer’s work he says that this creates a dilemma that is impossible to overcome due to the ontological condition of pre-understanding, “the very structure of a being that is never in

study. The fifth principle is that we have to take an ideological-critical point of view. We have to take as a basic assumption that certain groups in our societies are privileged over others. It is thus necessary to employ a “hermeneutics of suspicion” (cf. Thompson 1981) in all research endeavours. 8 The following section is based on a previous article (Dreyer 1998) in which the importance of the dialectic of belonging and distanciation, and the methodological implications thereof, are discussed in more detail. Another hermeneutical perspective with methodological consequences opened by Ricoeur is the role of hermeneutical imagination (cf. Kearney 1991). This relates to the important aspect of the creativity of the researcher and the research. With regard to the imagination one can say that the researcher has to do empirical research with poetic imagination, that is, a playful, exploring attitude. However, research also has to be conducted with ethical imagination. The importance of the hermeneutical imagination for research will be explored in another article. It seems fruitful to further explore the role of poetic and hermeneutical imagination regarding the dialectical tension between belonging and distanciation.

 :   

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the sovereign position of a subject capable of distancing itself from the totality of its conditionings” (Ricoeur 1991, 266). Should we therefore renounce the opposition between science and ideology? In a characteristic fashion of his methodological style Ricoeur rejects this possibility.9 Instead Ricoeur (1991, 267–269; cf. Bien 1995, 304) presents us with four hermeneutical propositions. (1) All objectifying knowledge about ourselves in relation to society, social class, cultural tradition and history is preceded “by a relation of belonging upon which we can never entirely reflect” (1991, 267). (2) Although objectifying knowledge is always preceded by a relation of belonging, it is not totally dependent on this relation of belonging. It renders absolute knowledge impossible, but relative autonomy of objectifying knowledge is still possible due to the factor of distanciation. This distanciation that allows for a partial critique (Bien 1995, 304) of ideology also implies a self-distancing, “a distanciation of the self from itself ” (Ricoeur 1991, 268). The essence of this proposition is summarised by Ricoeur (1991, 268) in the following statement: “. . . distanciation, dialectically opposed to belonging, is the condition of possibility of the critique of ideology, not outside or against hermeneutics, but within hermeneutics.” (3) Due to distanciation, a critique of ideology can partially free itself from the relation of belonging and can be organised in knowledge. However, this knowledge will always remain incomplete, supported by an interest as Habermas has argued: “It is condemned to remain partial, fragmentary, insular knowledge; its incompleteness is hermeneutically founded in the original and unsurpassable condition that makes distanciation itself a moment of belonging” (Ricoeur 1991, 268). (4) A critique of ideology is necessary, but this task can never be completed: “Knowledge is always in the process of tearing itself away from ideology, but ideology always remains the grid, the code of interpretation . . .” (Ricoeur 1991, 269). Can these hermeneutical principles, and more specifically the dialectic between belonging and distanciation, help us to do research that avoids the pitfalls of ideology and utopia, namely as distortion or

9 Ricoeur (1991, 263) makes the following interesting remark in this regard: “Must it [the distinction between science and ideology—JSD] be purely and simply renounced? I admit that I have often been very close to thinking so when reflecting on this puzzling issue. Simply to renounce it, however, would be to lose the benefit of a tension that can be reduced neither to a comfortable antithesis nor to a confusing mélange.”

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escapism? My thesis is that the aspect of belonging can help us to reduce the possibility of escapism. The researcher’s belonging to a specific normative tradition and his/her immersion in the lifeworld(s) of the researched can help to reduce the pitfall of escapism. On the other hand, the aspect of distanciation can help us to reduce the possibility of distortion, the negative aspect of ideology. Distanciation implies a critical distance from ideological interpretations (“false consciousness”) of the researched and of the researcher him/herself (the self-distancing which is implied by distanciation). The researcher therefore cannot take the interpretations of the researched at face value, but has to take a critical (objectifying) stance (the moment of distanciation).10 If we let go of the “primordial relation of belonging”, the result is an alienating distanciation (Verfremdung) or even escapism (cf. Ricoeur 1991, 272; 297). On the other hand, if we ignore the moment of distanciation, we lose the possibility of a critique of ideology, with the danger of lapsing “into full relativism, into complete historicism” and a killing of research itself (cf. Ricoeur 1991, 265). Conclusion We started with the importance of linking the normativity implied by our religious and Christian traditions to the contexts in which we live and work. On the basis of Ricoeur’s theory of the cultural imagination we have argued that this linking of normativity and context has to reckon with the inescapable tension between ideology and utopia. In the next section we discussed the possible contribution of empirical research in this process of linking normativity and context. We argued that empirical research has the potential to contribute positively to the renewal of our religious and Christian traditions by providing insight in the cultural and social imaginations, the ideologies and the utopias in different contexts, and by stimulating the social imagination towards the innovation of our religious traditions. However, empirical research itself can be ideological or utopian in the negative sense that Ricoeur attaches to these concepts in his theory of the cultural imagination. Although we can never

10 “Distance is a fact; placing at a distance is a methodological attitude” (Ricoeur 1991, 281).

 :   

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escape the tension between ideology and utopia, we have argued that conducting empirical research from a critical hermeneutical framework, and embodying the tension between belonging and distanciation, are important conditions for eliciting the positive potential of empirical research. An important challenge for practical theologians is to play a constructive role in mediating our Christian traditions and practices to modern and postmodern contexts, amongst other things by means of empirical theological research, without falling prey to the dangers of ideology and utopia. References Alvesson, M. & Sköldberg, K. (2000). Reflexive methodology: new vistas for qualitative research. London: Sage. Bien, J. (1995). Ricoeur as social philosopher. In L.E. Hahn (Ed.), The philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (287–305). Chicago: Open Court. Dant, T. (1991). Knowledge, ideology and discourse: a sociological perspective. London: Routledge. Dingemans, G.D.J. (1996). Practical theology in the academy: a contemporary overview. Journal of Religion 76(1), 82–96. Dreyer, J.S. 1998. The researcher: engaged participant or detached observer? A reflection on the methodological implications of the dialectics of belonging and distanciation for empirical research in practical theology. Journal of Empirical Theology 11(2), 5–22. —— (2000). The lens of collective narrative identity: ecclesiological explorations from South Africa. Practical Theology in South Africa 15(2), 21–52. Dreyer, J.S., Pieterse, H.J.C. & Van der Ven, J.A. (1999). Interreligious orientations among South African youth. Religion & Theology 6(2), 194–220. —— (2001). Religious and human rights attitudes among South African youth in a time of transformation. In F.A. Swanepoel (Ed.), Religion, morality and transformation (103–134). Pretoria: RITR, Unisa. Gergen, K.J. (1994). Toward transformation in social knowledge. (2nd ed.) London: Sage. Harvey, L. (1990). Critical social theory. London: Unwin Hyman. Kaufmann, F.-X. (1999). Normativity and context in sociological perspective. In F. Schweitzer & J.A. Van der Ven (Eds.), Practical theology —International perspectives (273–288). Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang. Kearney, R. (1991). Poetics of imagining: from Husserl to Lyotard. London: Harper Collins Academic. Kincheloe, J.L. & McLaren, P.L. (1994). Rethinking critical theory and qualitative research. In N.K. Denzin & Y.S. Lincoln (Eds.), Handbook of qualitative research (138–157). Thousand Oaks: Sage. Pieterse, H.J.C., Dreyer, J.S. & Van der Ven, J.A. (2000). Images of Jesus among South African youth. Practical Theology in South Africa 15(1), 53–81. Pieterse, H.J.C., Nel, M. & Njumbuxa, B. (1994). The role of Christian Church leaders in the peace process in South Africa. Religion & Theology 1(1), 65–76. Prah, K.K. (ed.) (1999). Knowledge in black and white: the impact of apartheid on the production & reproduction of knowledge. Cape Town: Centre for Advanced Studies of African Society.

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Ricoeur, P. (1976). Ideology, utopia, and faith. In Protocol of the colloquy of the Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modern Culture (21–28). Berkeley, California: The Center for Hermeneutical Studies in Hellenistic and Modern Culture. —— (1979). Ideology and utopia as cultural imagination. In D.M. Borchert & D. Stewart (Eds.), Being human in a technological age (107–125). Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press. —— (1986). Lectures on Ideology and Utopia. New York: Columbia University Press. (Ed. by G.H. Taylor.) —— (1988). Time and narrative III. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Tr. by K. Blamey & D. Pellauer.) —— (1991). From text to action: essays in hermeneutics II. London: The Athlone Press. (Tr. by K. Blamey & J.B. Thompson.) —— (1992). Oneself as another. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. (Tr. by K. Blamey.) Stehr, N. Practical knowledge. London: Sage. Taylor, G.H. (1986). Editor’s introduction. In P. Ricoeur (Ed.), Lectures on Ideology and Utopia (ix–xxxvi). New York: Columbia University Press. Thompson, J.B. (1981). Critical hermeneutics: a study in the thought of Paul Ricoeur and Jürgen Habermas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. TRC Report. (1998). Institutional hearing: the faith community. Vol. 4, chapter 3. Van der Ven, J.A. (1994). Empirical methodology in practical theology: why and how? Practical Theology in South Africa 9(1), 29–44. Van der Ven, J.A., Dreyer, J.S. & Pieterse, H.J.C. (1997). Belief in God among South African youth. Hervormde Teologiese Studies 53(3), 840–863. —— (2001a). Human rights in the name of God? In H.-G. Ziebertz (Ed.), Imagining God: empirical explorations from an international perspective (191–228). Münster: LIT. —— (2001b). Is there a church for human rights? Journal of Empirical Theology 14(2), 20–52. Villa-Vicencio, C. (1992). A theology of reconstruction: nation-building and human rights. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. —— (1994). The quest for a national identity. Journal of Theology for Southern Africa 86, 31–32. Vorster, W. (1983). The Bible and Apartheid 1. In J.W. de Gruchy & C. VillaVicencio (Eds.), Apartheid is a heresy (94–111). Cape Town: David Philip. Wilson, R.A. (2001). The politics of truth and reconciliation in South Africa: legitimizing the post-apartheid state. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Ziebertz, H.-G. (1993). Komplementarität von Forschungsmethoden. In J.A. van der Ven & H.-G. Ziebertz (Eds.), Paradigmenentwicklung in der Praktischen Theologie (225–260). Kampen: Kok.

WHAT YOU SEE IS WHAT YOU GET.1 Social Construction and Normativity in Practical Theology R. R G Introduction WYSIWYG: What You See is What You Get. That was the message in the early days of graphic interfaces for word processors. For those unfamiliar with the term, it is what you are working with if your computer displays the text as it will appear on paper, complete with fonts, images, and so on. In one sense, it was just a technique for enabling the author to imagine what the text would look like once printed. In another sense, it changed the process of writing. Layout and presentation became part of the writing itself, instead of an add-on feature created by others than the original author. One might say that in the field of practical theology a similar shift occurred. In the history of our discipline, there has been a strong current of understanding practical theology as applied theology. That is, practical theology was understood as the discipline where theology was applied to practice, especially to the professional practice of ministers and priests. Practical theology added the layout and presentation so to speak to the texts that other theologians had written. The emancipation of practical theology into a discipline of its own rights is a fairly recent development. As Edward Farley (1990, 934) remarks in the Dictionary of Pastoral Care and Counseling, practical theology could be defined as a field in clergy education focussing on ministerial activities or church life, or—and this is the newer understanding—as a discipline of theology covering Christian practice and contemporary situations and thus as a form of contextual theology. Practical theology’s process of emancipation has benefited greatly from the empirical turn, which provided a method and form unparalleled in other theological disciplines.

1 An earlier and shorter version of this chapter appeared as Ganzevoort, R.R. (2002) WYSIWYG. Social construction in Practical Theological Epistemology. Journal of Empirical Theology 15(2), 34–42.

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This development of the discipline involved more than the introduction of new research methods. As in the case of WYSIWYG, it changed the process of doing theology. Or—to be a bit more careful—it may change the process in the years to come. I would like to share some initial ideas on where we may be heading and invite you to join me in a critical dialogue. I will first describe practical theology as a multi-conversational discipline. In each conversation specific demands are placed on discourse, governed by specific criteria for truth claims. Then I will distinguish two levels of discourse, where discourse is understood as including constructions and communication, experiences and action. In these discourses social constructions can be found, analyzed and critiqued. This will be illustrated in the normative criteria that can be categorized through Browning’s levels of practical moral reasoning. Finally I will claim that the theological and normative dimension of practical theology is not something added to empirical investigations, but present in the material we research. 1. A Conversational Discipline True perhaps for every discipline, practical theology’s possibilities and challenges lie in the specific conversations it engages in. It is one of the core suppositions of social constructionism that discourse determines our understanding of the world, so that content and communication cannot be separated. As leading spokesperson Ken Gergen (2002, 6–10) summarizes: – The terms by which we account for the world and ourselves are not dictated by the stipulated objects of such accounts; – The terms and forms by which we achieve understanding of the world and ourselves are socially derived products of historically and culturally situated interchanges among people; – The degree to which a given account of world or self is sustained across time is not principally dependent on the objective validity of the account, but relies on the vicissitudes of social process; – Language derives its major significance from the way in which it is embedded within patterns of relationship; – None of the propositions making up the social constructionist web are candidates for truth.

      

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We could of course apply this approach to the fields we study. In fact, certain strands in practical theology have done just that as a recent volume by Hermans and others (2002) demonstrates. Critical practical theology, feminist and otherwise liberationist practical theology, narrative studies and the like are methodologically close to social constructionist approaches. In that sense, social constructionism is not a new paradigm but the reflection of age-long debates (cf. Van der Ven 2002, Ganzevoort 1998). We could also—and that is what I am attempting here—take a social constructionist look at practical theology itself. I will not focus on the methodical or methodological dimension of social constructionism, but address the issues of normativity in empirical practical theology. To do so invokes an analysis of the conversations practical theology partakes in, and the discursive demands and constraints of those conversations. Here we enter the domain of practical theological epistemology. WYSIWYG: Discourse determines how observations or experiences are understood, what counts as knowledge, and what we want to achieve. But practical theology is not involved in just one conversation, but in several, each with its own demands and conventions. What practical theology is and how the empirical and normative dimensions are framed will sound differently in each conversation. Let me mention just a few of these central conversations, following David Tracy’s (1981, 5) analysis of the threefold audience of theology: society, academy, and church. He states: ‘The more general question “What is theology?” first demands (. . .) a response to a prior question: What is the self-understanding of the theologian? To ask that question as a personal and in that sense an irrevocably existential one is entirely appropriate.’ But ‘. . . one risks ignoring the actual complexity of different selves related to the distinct plausibility structures present in each theologian. Behind the pluralism of theological conclusions lies a pluralism of public roles and publics as reference groups for theological discourse.’ Tracy aptly describes each of these publics as heterogeneous. The academic public will function differently in a seminary as compared to a department of religious studies in a secular university. Or to give one Dutch example: In Kampen the department of practical theology includes social scientists, which brings about intensive cooperation. In Utrecht on the other hand, social sciences are not part

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of the church-related department of practical theology, which brings about sharper distinctions between the two. Beyond academe, practical theology finds a natural audience in the community of faith, but there is always communication with the wider society as well. Before these two audiences, practical theologians will need to develop both explicit or Christian and implicit or secular language (cf. Bailey 1997). The interaction between these two languages may become one of the most intriguing tasks of practical theology in the years to come. But it is not simply a matter of different discourses about something—in these discourses practical theology itself takes on different meanings. The locus of conversation defines in part the shape and tasks of the discipline. In each locus of conversation, correspondence to and difference from the other party define the identity of practical theology. In relation to the church, practical theology may stress its academic nature in its efforts to serve the community of faith. In relation to the academic realm it may focus on empirical and strategic efforts, communicating with social sciences on the one hand and other theological disciplines on the other. Obviously then, each practical theologian will develop his or her own definition of practical theology within the specific configuration of relations of the person. 2. First and Second Order Discourses To me it seems helpful to distinguish between two orders of theological discourse. Academic discourse belongs to the second order. Discourse of religious or non-religious individuals and communities belongs to the first (Ganzevoort 2001). George A. Lindbeck (1984, 69) works with the same distinction.2 Speaking of theological propositions in a cultural-linguistic approach, he states: ‘Technical theology and official doctrine [. . .] are second-order discourse about the first-intentional uses of religious language. Here, in contrast to the common supposition, one rarely if ever succeeds in making affirmations with ontological import, but rather engages in explaining, defending, analyzing, and regulating the liturgical, kerygmatic, and ethical modes of speech and action within which such affirmations from

2

With thanks to Mark Cartledge for the reference.

      

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time to time occur. Just as grammar by itself affirms nothing either true or false regarding the world in which language is used, but only about language, so theology and doctrine, to the extent that they are second-order activities, assert nothing either true or false about God and his relation to creatures, but only speak about such assertions. These assertions, in turn, cannot be made except when speaking religiously, i.e., when seeking to align oneself and others performatively with what one takes to be most important in the universe by worshipping, promising, obeying, exhorting, preaching.’ I follow Lindbeck in this basic distinction, but stress two points that may be slightly different form his position. First, I would suggest that the difference between the orders is not the presence or absence of truth claims but the different criteria for truth claims and the different lines of reasoning governing the discourses. Second, I am not sure that official doctrine should be regarded as second-order discourse. The criteria for truth claims and the lines of reasoning seem to be more akin to first-order discourses of religion. There are in both first and second order discourse varying degrees of reflection as well as more individual or more collective utterances that are more or less validated. Official church doctrines are more reflected, collective, and validated, but they still abide with the rules of first order discourse. The formula of first and second order discourse may overcome negative connotations of Henning Luther’s terms ‘Laienperspektive’ and ‘Laientheologie’ (lay perspective and lay theology) and confusion arising from the terms faith and theology. Heitink (1993, 114–115), for example, seeks to address these levels when he states: ‘The direct object of research is faith. The indirect object, God, cannot be the object of research. God is only the direct object of faith.’ Convenient as Heitink’s solution may seem, the perspective of scientific practical theology as a second order construction and of religion and world-view as first order constructions questions its validity. If God is the object of first order constructions, and cannot be the object of second order constructions, then what is the nature of the relation between the object and the constructions? In what way is ‘speaking of God’—theology—different when it is done by believers as compared to scientists? Even worse, the dichotomy quoted suggests that the acts of speaking are categorically different, because the believer’s speaking can include an object that is inaccessible to the scientist’s speaking.

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For practical theology, the notion of first and second order discourse implies that in both cases knowledge of self, world and God is socially constructed and dependent on specific criteria that govern the discourse at hand. Constructed experiences and truth claims regarding the constructions are evaluated according to these criteria. Following Marcel Viau (1999), we can identify criteria on the levels of object and discourse, closely related through experience. This results in two types of criteria: referential and performative. The referential dimension of language denotes the way words refer to phenomena, either in the material world, or in the speaker’s mind (the experienced object). The performative dimension of language refers to the way words try to accomplish something in the social world (conversation or discourse). Truth claims in first order constructions are both experiential (referential) and determined by the performative aims one has in relating to others. These performative aims are influenced by the frame of reference of for example the religious community one belongs to. When a person confesses his or her faith in the midst of this community, the truth of this confession will be judged by tradition-specific criteria, like glossolalia in Pentecostalism or the awareness of sin in orthodox Protestantism. The frame of reference of the community and its tradition provides the performative criteria. Referential criteria on the other hand are determined by the experience of reality. Fundamental with respect to experience are criteria of authenticity and functional significance. Second order construction’s truth claims are equally located in experience and perspective, determined by referential and performative criteria. For practical theology experience is systematized in empirical data; performative criteria are found in rhetorical persuasiveness and compliance with conventions of a ruling paradigm. In conversations with social scientists, this will be a different paradigm than in conversations with systematic theologians. First and second order constructions are central not only to the work of practical theologians. Both theology in general and the social sciences have to reckon with these two levels, even when first order constructions come in different shapes. For biblical theology, for example, first order constructions are found in the classics of the Christian tradition. Unfortunately, in many cases either the distinction between the two orders is blurred or their interaction is not articulated.

      

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3. Practical Theology as Empirical Theology In practical theology, the material of our second order discourse is the first order of human praxis of faith. It is the experiences and constructions of individuals and communities, responding to what they perceive, construct as coming from God, and their discourse about God and towards God. I use the term ‘God’ here in a broad sense, as I am working with formal, not material categories. Whatever practical theologians may investigate, it is always connected in some way to human discourse in relation to God. For participants in first order discourse—either believers of non-believers—there is a reference to this discourse: God—and experiences of God function as referential criteria in this first order discourse. More importantly, there is a performative dimension to this discourse, not only within human conversations, but also in the relation to God. That is, humans construe their discourse with the purpose of making, shaping or breaking the relationship with God. (Day 1993) In social constructionist terms, then, there is no reason why this discourse and its connection to God could not be investigated scientifically. We can describe the first order discourse, analyze the constructions and the way these constructions function in the relation to God and in relation to other individual and social phenomena. This is where we will meet social scientists of religion. Beyond description, we enter into discussions of a normative nature, including truth claims and ethical standards. That is in itself not a unique feature of practical theology. Psychologists and sociologists do the same. We have to be aware though that in second order discourse the criteria for knowledge or truth are not the same as in first order discourse. Although the basic types—referential and performative— return, their content is different because we partake in a different conversation. Performative criteria rest in the ruling scientific paradigms with their procedures, theories, and so on. Referential criteria lie in the observations, in those experiences that we count as facts. Whether or not God is accepted as a reference depends on the specific conversation with for example social scientists or systematic theologians. The benefit of this constructionist approach is that we can develop theological discourse, even God talk, and still avoid the pitfall of ontological statements that would jeopardize our conversations with social scientists (Cf. Roukema-Koning 2002).

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Let me give one brief example of what this may contribute to practical theology. In some reflections on the relationship with God in prayer, I have distinguished several roles attributed to God and the complementary roles attributed to humans. In line with Sundén, I focussed on the traditionally offered roles for God, but beyond that I devoted attention to the human roles that are available for an individual with a specific life story and audience. As a practical theologian I cannot answer the question how God really ‘is’. But I can work with the question how specific human-God role-relations function in religious conversation and how they contribute to or maybe harm the person’s relation with God (Ganzevoort 1999). Obviously, many scholars would agree that objective knowledge is beyond our grasp because culturally different meanings and frames of reference always determine us. The advantage of a social constructionist approach is that this is not regarded as a hindrance to be overcome, but as the starting point for constructive dialogue. Instead of asking ‘what is?’ we start asking ‘what if ?’ 4. Practical Theology as Normative Theology Empirical theology (or descriptive theology in Browning’s terms) should not be mistaken in a positivistic sense as providing objective data to be interpreted afterwards. Praxis—including the praxis of church and ministry—is theory laden, and our perception of that praxis is already determined by our Vorverständnis. In the same way, our theological interpretations and the theological tradition in which we stand have grown out of the previous praxis of church and ministry. In the hermeneutical circle of theory and praxis, we need to ask ourselves where we find the normative criteria to create new strategies or to evaluate existing ones. One classic way of doing this is taking the paradigms of biblical and systematic theology as providing the normative criteria, or even the very concepts that lie at the heart of normative theology. In a sense, this approach is present in most practical theological contributions. In some currents of the Christian tradition (e.g., in orthodox protestantism), biblical theology plays the central normative role. Mainstream western practical theology locates normativity in systematic theology. Heitink’s (1993) grand scheme for example, integrating empirical, hermeneutical, and strategic approaches presents

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the hermeneutical as the most theological. He states that empirical approaches are insufficient because we need to acknowledge the normative claims of the Christian tradition. Strategic and empirical approaches are important, but their theological normativity is derived from the hermeneutical interaction with tradition. It is in that part of his book that Heitink is deeply involved with systematic theologians, rather than practical theologians. The same can be observed in Browning’s (1991) proposal. He solidifies the position of practical theology by reclaiming the praxis-orientation for the whole theological enterprise and by stressing the descriptive and strategic phase. However, the interpretive ‘movement’ is defined by systematic theology, more specifically theological ethics. In this phase practical theology has no particular contribution. Insightful and balanced, Heitink and Browning succeed in avoiding the pitfalls of theologia applicata and in gaining some ground for a truly practical theology. Both however have difficulties in describing the theological nature of practical theology in its own right and not as a derivative of systematic theology. Perhaps the most radical approach locating normativity in the praxis is found in those shapes of practical theology that are influenced by liberation theologies. At the heart of all this is the hermeneutical discussion on the nature of our knowing and doing things. As stated, praxis and interpretation are always intertwined. We have learned from hermeneutical philosophers like Gadamer and Ricoeur that there is no direct access to the original meaning of texts nor to the intrinsic meaning of present practices. All too easily we will read our interpretations into the texts and into the praxis, misunderstanding them both. It seems to me that even a critical reading does not safeguard us against these risks, because it still seeks some original—in a way objective— meaning. For practical theology, the question of normativity cannot be delegated to systematic or practical theology, nor to our understanding of the needs of our situations. Neither of these can function as a direct source of normative criteria for the observations we do, the interpretations we are to make, or the strategies we have to develop. This conclusion is reached when one truly acknowledges the various discourses in which practical theology partakes. Privileging one discourse over the others invariably obstructs the other discourses. Beyond this communicative reason, there may also be a theological reluctance toward normative criteria. Speaking in faith language, we

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might have to say that the true source of normative criteria is God Himself. This should caution us against the hubris that is inherent to our every effort to define absolute criteria. Paradoxically, precisely this humility may bring us to the point where we can establish some criteria. Not the ultimate ones, but penultimate criteria that will do for our present situations. If God, truth, and absolute criteria are not accessible to us, maybe we can value the many pathways where we find traces of God. In more methodological terms, we may come to appreciate the use of triangulation: the combination of more than one source and method. We may read the Bible as witness of living with God, and in the same way we may read our present situations as ways of living with God. If we take this approach, our task as theologians is to foster the dialogue. This is precisely what all hermeneutically oriented practical theologians have argued. There is, however, one more question. And if one answers this question negatively—as I do—our task becomes even more humble. The question is this: Do you believe that theologians should make normative statements and provide the right strategies for the church (and/or society)? It seems to me that answering ‘yes’ to this question grants the theologian an authority that he or she does not merit. The empirical description of the praxis, the interpretations and criteria we may come up with, the models and strategies we may develop, they are in no way better, more normative, or more true than what the participants of first order discourse (the church, the believers, and others) can offer. This is a daring statement and one to be disputed. But it is not just a particular theological opinion. It is also a methodological critique that is right at the heart of the theme of normativity and empirical research. I would like to challenge the habit of theologians like ourselves to blur the distinction between our professional and/or academic task on the one hand, and our role of believer or minister on the other. As believers or maybe even ministers and priests, we are part of the church, and together with others we evaluate the situation, search for the will of God, and develop new ways of being and acting. In fact, it may be our ministry to guide this process, and show the ‘right’ direction. But as professionals, and especially as academics, we have to be aware of the limits of our insights and engage in scrupulous self-critique. We partake in the entirely different second order discourse of academe. It is a major challenge for prac-

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tical theology to clarify the distinction and the connection between our professional academic discourse and the church’s communication—internally between members, externally with other groups and naturally with the texts and traditions that are the sources of her understanding of God. A social constructionist approach to practical theology focuses on the discourses in which meanings develop and function. We do not expect to find normative criteria outside of these discourses. Instead the discourses themselves are investigated and critiqued in order to elucidate the often implicit and possibly conflicting normativities that are used in these discourses. For practical theology, the main discourse to be investigated is the first order discourse of (religious) praxis. This is the realm where normative criteria are found and challenged, especially through dialogues with other relevant discourses found in tradition, theology, and social sciences. 5. Parameters Now, modest as our task may be, we are to work on theological description, interpretation, and strategy. To do so systematically, I will propose some parameters we may consider in this task of clarification and critique of normative criteria. These parameters guide us in each stage of practical theological research: empirical description, interpretive theory, and strategic innovation. My main example will lie in the development of models of practical ministry.3 The function of these parameters is to provide the formal logic for these models. As parameters, their value—that is, their content—may be altered, and each variation will result in a changed model. I take my parameters from Don Browning’s (1991) encyclopedic proposal for what he calls a fundamental practical theology. Browning distinguishes five levels or dimensions of practical moral reasoning: The visional level, the obligational level, the social-environmental level, the rulerole level, and the tendency-need level. As for the visional level, Browning claims that our theological thinking is embedded in a tradition determined by stories and

3 This example arises from the collaboration between the Theological University of Kampen and Debreceni Református Hittudományi Egyetem (Debrecen Reformed University of Theology—Hungary).

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metaphors that shape our self-understanding. Each model for practical ministry will involve a vision of the identity of the minister. Theological discussions on ministry often seem to focus on this level, but for empirical research and developing strategies this is only one part of the picture. Three basic notions seem important here. The first is ministry as an ordained position. The second is ministry as a profession. The third, often appearing in and through the other two, is ministry as personal charisma. These three concepts of ministry all have a long history.4 In different currents of Christianity, the balance between these concepts may differ, resulting in different models of practical ministry. It is useful to note that these concepts originate in different discourses as well, as I will illustrate for ordination and professionalism. Ministry as an ordained profession stems from the religious tradition and was fortified through biblical images like the priest, systematic theological interpretations of vocation, and historical developments of church hierarchy. The ecumenical discussion portrays variations in the vision of the relation between the ordained minister and the congregation. For the discourse of social scientific research of religion this religiously articulated view of ordination is not useful. Instead the concept of ordination is understood as social and religious legitimization in which power dynamics become an important topic. In first order discourse of the congregation ordination may serve as the crystallization point for expectancies and projections of transcendence. Practical theological discourse has to foster the dialogue between these discourses, overcome the barriers in this dialogue that arise from normative claims and interests of these discourses, and develop a common language for discussing normativity. Ministry as professional action stems from the organizational domain. Professionalism is understood as a twofold concept. On the one hand it denotes the development of a specific occupation with well-defined standards and aims. In this sense professional ministry

4 Weber (1980) identified charismatic, traditional, and legal-rational leadership. Building on his distinctions, others added functional-rational leadership. Given indications that legal-rational leadership correlates highly with traditional leadership (Van der Ven 1993, 258), I focus on the three notions mentioned. Ministry as ordained profession depicts the traditional and legal-rational type; ministry as profession the functional-rational type; ministry as personal charisma the charismatic type.

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can be identified and measured. On the other hand professionalism is the process whereby workers in a specific occupation employ strategies (like stressing a specific expertise) to strengthen and defend their position. (Brouwer 1995) The discourse of professionalism in ministry therefore is defined by interests and issues of power and by the understanding of profession as a definable set of tasks and performances. For systematic theological discourse, this understanding poses questions regarding the action of God through and behind the professional activities of the ministers. At times reference to a spiritual dimension in ministry seems obsolete in the discourse of professionalism. In first order discourse of the congregation, professionalism in ministry evokes ambivalence. It may enhance the quality of work done by ministers, but it also resists congregational expectations of unlimited availability. Practical theological studies of ministry encounter a void when it comes to the dialogue of the discourse of professionalism and the discourse of theology of ministry. (Schilderman 1998) The two discourses use different perspectives and different normative claims. The analysis of these discourses, their conflicting normativity, and the purposes and interests for which these are employed is a major task for the practical theologian. The second level is the obligational. This has to do with the ethical demands or general moral principles. These obligations are relatively independent, yet embedded in the visions. As an ethicist, Browning underlines this ethical dimension. For the purpose of my argument here, I would distinguish these two levels slightly differently. My proposal is to take the visional level to indicate the identity of the minister according to the various discourses. The obligational level then may be used to describe the mission. What is our task, our direction, our mission? The obligational level then applies to the core business of the minister. Is it to represent God, to bring God’s Word? Is it to represent authentic humanity before God? Is it to serve the people? Is it management, education, counseling? Is it the explanation of ancient texts? The three basic notions of ministry—ordained position, professional functioning, and personal charisma—may all lead to a different description of the task and mission of the minister. Again the discourse chosen will determine the discussion on normative criteria for this obligational level. The actual performance of ministers and the experiences and expectancies of parishioners reflect the outcome of

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often implicit negotiations regarding these obligations. Empirical practical theological research on ministry thus deals with normativity long before the practical theologian begins to evaluate the practices. The praxis of ministry is truly theory-laden and therefore normativityladen. This praxis is part of the first order discourse that practical theology investigates and brings into dialogue with second order discourses of theological and social-scientific disciplines. The third level is called the tendency-need level. In moral reasoning this has to do with the needs and the pre-moral good. In our discussion it may provide parameters for the practical and personal needs of ministers and congregations. No matter how elevated our ideals, how spiritual our vision, we live with specific tendencies and needs. The relation between minister and church is defined largely by concrete issues. Browning (1991, 106) states that ‘the mere existence of these needs, whether basic or culturally induced, never in itself justifies their actualization . . . [but] . . . [the] higher order moral principles always function to organize, mediate, and coordinate these needs and tendencies . . .’ The tendency-need level of practical reasoning investigates the hierarchy of pre-moral needs and tendencies, and therefore is normatively defined. This is apparent in discussions on the vocation and remuneration of the minister, but also in discussions about homosexuality or euthanasia. They all circle around the question of the relative weight of conflicting needs and tendencies. The important issue for practical theological investigations here is the awareness that first order discourse on these topics is informed by second order discourses of e.g., psychology and theology. Many debates about homosexuality are framed in the conflict between ‘people are what they are’ and ‘the bible says so’. These first order understandings portray different normative criteria grounded in naive anthropologies or readings of Scripture. For the practical theologian the task is to clarify and perhaps challenge these understandings. Obviously, the practical theologian’s personal opinion will influence this task. Empirical investigation of the normative criteria will include these first order understandings, the opinion of the practical theologian himself or herself, and the second order discourses of (in this case) biblical theology and sexology. This dialogue will display conflicting hierarchies of moral principles. The fourth and fifth are the environmental-social and the rulerole level. The environmental-social refers to the social-structural and

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ecological constraints of a particular congregation and ministry. The rule-role level refers to the most concrete level of actual guidelines for practices and behaviors, together with the institutional structures of—for example—a denomination. It is here that the sociological and psychological analysis is more than needed to understand the possibilities and limits of the theological models we are to develop. That is not to say that the social sciences are only present at this level. As my description may have illustrated, they too are concerned with vision and obligation, just as much as theology has to engage in tendency-need, environmental-social, and rule-role levels. As theologians usually are not very well equipped for this, the contribution of social scientists is much wanted. Inter- or intradisciplinary integration of social scientific insights has rightly been an important feature of empirical practical theology. Just like the tendency-need level, these two levels contain a normative dimension. In Browning’s model, they are aspects of the practical moral reasoning that is present in the first order discourse of the congregational praxis. Therefore, they will be attended to in descriptive or empirical theology. My effort has been to show that the normativity as categorized in these levels is elemental to the objects investigated in empirical practical theology. The analysis of the normative dimension in first (and second) order discourses is essential to overcome the seeming gap between quasi-objective empirical research and normative theological interpretation. 6. On Developing Empirical Theology Given the situation that the type of first order discourse we are dealing with is human praxis, practical theology is empirical by nature. That is to say, the material consists of human actions and discourse. This is the main difference between practical theology and other theological disciplines. The correspondence between theological disciplines lies in the fact that they all investigate first order discourses in relation to God—be it in the Bible, confessions, or church history. If this line of thinking is accepted as valid, then it is not just the term ‘practical’ that points to the empirical. The term ‘theology’ is likewise an indicator of the empirical nature of the discipline. It seems to me that the theological nature of practical theology is often discredited, or filled with categories of a systematic theological kind.

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All too often practical theological studies are counted as theological if and only if they include a systematic theological discussion. To me that is one of the weaknesses of our discipline at present. The challenge ahead is the development of theological categories from the material of our own discourse, and that is praxis. Practical theology might truly become theology of praxis: building theological theory from the material of human praxis. This development op truly practical theological categories is mandatory, I think, if we take seriously the social constructionist insight that the meaning of concepts depends on their place in specific discourses. Each discourse has material of its own and purposes of its own. If we take systematic-theological categories as our theological framework, we may not only discover a fundamental misfit with our empirical data, we may even work with a categorical mistake in that the concepts take on different meanings when transposed to a different conversation. The theological categories we are to develop will function at the intersection of the various conversations in what Tracy called critical correlation. Our normative discussions therefore are framed within the combined discourses. The answer to the question what is true or good has to comply with the demands of social scientific discourse, of broader theological discourse, and of first order discourses inside and outside the church. That of course is a daunting task. Let me conclude with the example of worship. Between empirical analyses and strategic proposals, we have to address the normative question as to what defines proper or good or true worship. Here we will encounter normative statements of other theological disciplines. But my point is that even a normative discussion in practical theology will be thoroughly empirical. The starting and ending point for practical theological normative discussion is the existing human praxis of faith with the values, ideals, and norms inherent to this praxis. Worship is good in a practical theological sense if it is psychologically healthy, sociologically sound, systematic theologically correct, and adequate within the first order discourse of the religious community. I started my reflections with the emancipation of practical theology. The development and use of empirical methods has been crucial in creating new discourses both with other theologians and with social scientists. The next step may be a practical theological approach that is conversational throughout. In each part of the process—

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description, normative interpretation, and strategy—we communicate with several audiences. If we don’t, we simply become irrelevant to their discourses. References Bailey, E.I. (1997). Implicit Religion in Contemporary Society. Kampen: Kok. Brouwer, R. (1995). Pastor tussen macht en onmacht. Een studie naar de professionalisering van het hervormde predikantschap [Pastor between Power and Powerlessness. A Study of the Professionalization of Dutch Reformed Ministry]. Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum. Browning, D.S. (1991). A Fundamental Practical Theology. Descriptive and Strategic Proposals. Minneapolis: Fortress. Day, J.M. (1993). Speaking of belief. Language, performance, and narrative in the psychology of religion. International Journal for the Psychology of Religion 3(4) 213–229. Farley, E. (1990). Practical Theology. Protestant. In R. Hunter (Ed.), Dictionary of Pastoral Care and Counseling (934–936). Nashville: Abingdon. Ganzevoort, R.R. (1998). De praxis als verhaal. Introductie op een narratief perspectief [Praxis as Story. Introduction to a Narrative Perspective]. In R.R. Ganzevoort (Ed.), De praxis als verhaal. Narrativiteit en praktische theologie [Praxis as Story. Narrativity and Practical Theology] (2–27). Kampen: Kok. —— (1999). Stemmen van het zelf en rollen van God. Fragment en identiteit in religie en pastoraat [Voices of the Self and Roles of God]. Praktische Theologie 26(1), 3–23. —— (2001). Theologie als zwijgen over God? Praktische theologie als duidingswetenschap van de geloofspraxis [Theology as being silent about God? Practical Theology as Science of Interpretation of the Praxis of Faith]. In J.H. van der Laan et al. Speuren naar geloof [Exploring Faith] (60–81). Kampen: THUK. Gergen, K.J. (2002). Social Construction and Theology. Let the Dance Begin. In C.A.M. Hermans, G. Immink, A. de Jong & J. van der Lans (Eds.), Social Constructionism and Theology (3–22). Leiden: Brill. Heitink, G. (1993). Praktische theologie. Geschiedenis, theorie, handelingsvelden. Kampen: Kok. [ Translated as: Practical Theology. History, Theory, Action Domains. Grand Rapids (MI): Eerdmans 1999]. Hermans, C.A.M., G. Immink, A. de Jong & J. van der Lans (Eds.) (2002). Social Constructionism and Theology. Leiden: Brill. Lindbeck, G.A. (1984). The Nature of Doctrine. Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age. Philadelphia: Westminster. Roukema-Koning, B. (2002). Het sociaal-constructionisme en zijn meta-theoretische betekenis voor de theologie [The Social Constructionist Paradigm and its Relevance for Theology]. Nederlands Theologisch Tijdschrift 56(1) 49–64. Schilderman, H. (1998). Pastorale professionalisering [Pastoral Professionalization]. Kampen: Kok. Tracy, D.W. (1981). The Analogical Imagination. Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism. New York: Herder & Herder. Van der Ven, J.A. (1993). Ecclesiologie in context [Ecclessiology in Context]. Kampen: Kok. —— (2002). Social Constructionism and Theology. A Dance to be Postponed? In C.A.M. Hermans, G. Immink, A. de Jong & J. van der Lans (Eds.), Social Constructionism and Theology (291–307). Leiden: Brill. Viau, M. (1999). Practical Theology. A New Approach. Leiden: Brill. Weber, M. (1980) Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie [Economics and Society. Sketch of the Interpretive Sociology]. Tübingen: Mohr.

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NORMATIVE EXPLANATION IN PRACTICAL THEOLOGY A  J Norms are guidelines for action and thought. They determine what must and what must not happen. If people do not know exactly what is permissible or impermissible, they can research it, also scientifically. The legal sciences, for example, do so very thoroughly; so does ethics. And from the start practical theology has been very much normatively oriented. It has made a point of trying to evolve scientific guidelines for pastoral work, church development and religious experience. Excessive emphasis on normativeness, however, entails a risk of unrealistic idealism. That certainly applies to theologians. But nowadays a growing number of practical theologians seek to avoid this as far as possible or, where necessary, overcome it. Accordingly they want to see more emphasis on empirical research in their discipline. By this they invariably mean systematic study of actual facts in the field of (Christian) faith and religion, using empirical methods derived from the social sciences but applying them in a theologically oriented conceptual framework (Van der Ven 1983; 1987; 1988; 1990; 1993; Ziebertz 1994; 1996; 1998). Such research, its advocates maintain, also enhances the status of practical theology. Most other theologians endorse the importance of empiricism. But some have raised the critical question whether the way in which ‘empirical theological’ research has been conducted up to now has not been at the expense of what they call ‘theological normativity’ (Weichbold 1992; Fuchs 2000; Fuchs & Bucher 2000). This has led to robust debate among practical theologians on the relation between normativity and empiricism. The present volume is a case in point. So far the debate has been confined to the norms practical theologians themselves apply in their empirical research and in their reflection on empirical data. Hence in both cases they are norms introduced, or at any rate considered important, by the researchers themselves. But so far hardly any attention has been paid to the norms that guide their research subjects. That is a pity, for it would broaden the debate and take it a step further. Not just the debate, but also the actual point at issue—the improvement of practical

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theology—would benefit greatly. Hence in this article I shall focus on the norms observed by ‘respondents’ and the extent to which these help to explain their decisions in religious matters. The fact that little or nothing of the kind has been done up to now is understandable. In scientific methodology obligations and prescriptions, which should not be reduced to personal desires, have never been seen as phenomena for empirical research, the assumption being that empirical work has to do with what ‘is’, not with what ‘ought to be’ (cf. Kuypers 1984, 29). Nevertheless some empirical studies of the influence of religion on human behaviour do include questions designed to ‘measure’ the so-called ‘norm-conformity’ of respondents and the extent to which they allow themselves to be influenced by ‘social control’ (e.g. Spruit 1991). But these are not practical-theological studies. In practical theology there is an—often unresearched— assumption of ‘an empirically demonstrable lack of theological content in praxis’ (Fuchs 2000, 207; our translation). I question the tenability of both these assumptions, but they exist and they are pertinacious. If one at all disagrees, it has to be substantiated. In this article, therefore, I shall first examine in some detail what the normative explanations that strike me as important in this context actually entail (section 1). Then I shall indicate why it would be a good idea systematically to look for such explanations in practical-theological empirical research (section 2). Finally I briefly consider how this could be done in a methodologically sound way (section 3). 1. What is a Normative Explanation? A simple example of a normative explanation is: ‘Muslims pray five times a day because it is mandatory’; or the sentence, ‘Roman Catholic priests do not marry because it is not permitted’. These explanations clearly do not require empirical research. Often, however, normative explanations are less self-evident, for instance when they concern pastors’ decisions in the course of their work, religious teachers’ choices about their lessons, and people’s religious beliefs, longings and practices. Why, for example, do parents have their children baptized? It seems likely that they do so largely for normative reasons. To find out if this is true one would have to conduct empirical research. By the same token one could research empirically whether

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Catholics are less inclined to resort to euthanasia than atheistic humanists because it is forbidden by the church’s doctrinal authority. And the extent to which pastors’ conduct can be explained in terms of biblical norms can hardly be determined without proper research. All these are instances of normative explanations, which are fundamentally of the same nature. What does this imply? In social psychology certain theories have been evolved which account for human behaviour not just in terms of attitudes but also of norms. The best-known is probably the theory of reasoned action of Ajzen and Fischbein and its extension in Azjen’s theory of planned behaviour. This theory, which is often used as a basis for empirical research, seeks to discover why people behave the way they do. For this reason it would seem to offer useful insights for practical-theological research as well. The premise is that, ‘generally speaking, people intend to perform a behavior when they evaluate it positively and when they believe that important others think they should perform it’. Azjen (1988, 117) calls the first factor ‘attitudes’, the second ‘subjective norms’. My concern is with the latter. Are normative explanations in fact based on subjective norms? In terms of Searle’s philosophical notions in Rationality in action (2001) that is the issue, and Azjen’s theory at the very least needs specification, amplification and some correction. In this section, therefore, I shall consider what normative explanations in practical theology entail and do not entail by critically confronting Azjen’s theory of reasoned action and planned behaviour with Searle’s analysis of rational explanations. 1.1

Reports of Causal Reasons

The very first point concerns the notion ‘explanation’. This is a controversial term in theory of science, even more so when it is linked with the adjective ‘normative’. Ajzen does not say explicitly what he understands by explanation, but from the manner in which he uses the term one gathers that he takes the explanation of behaviour to mean that certain forms of behaviour can be attributed causally to certain ‘determinative antecedents’. That is also the view current in empirically oriented practical theology. Van der Ven (1990, 93f.) defines explanation as ‘answering the why question’ and as ‘insights into the cause-effect relations between variables’. I doubt, however, whether these are definitions of the same thing. Usually explanations are a type of human speech act. That applies to normative

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explanations as well. Sometimes such an explanation exists only in the researcher’s mind and is not communicated. In that case the explanation is no more than a psychic state, hence an insight. But in our context the distinction between explanation-in-speech and explanation-in-the-mind is less pertinent. For this reason Searle (2001, 102) avoids a theoretical analysis of speech acts, simply stating that explanation is not a specific kind of speech act but usually entails a set of assertive speech acts. A point that is easily overlooked but nonetheless important in our context is that explanations are not free-floating messages without senders, nor are they propositions without subjects. An explanation is always an explanation by someone, for instance a practical theologian or a respondent or both. This also applies to normative explanations. The point is important, inter alia because people may be mistaken in their explanations and different people may explain the same phenomenon differently. It is a point that Azjen may well concede but does not raise explicitly, because he is more concerned with the content and truth value of behavioural explanation and with how to determine its truth. That in itself is in order. But because researchers and respondents sometimes offer very different explanations it is important to stress the ontologically subjective character of explanations. It is all the more important, because it relates to a further point that Azjen and other empirical researchers tend—wrongly—to disregard. This is that explanations always include at least one complete proposition by somebody which points to something or someone (reference) and which attributes a particular characteristic to that thing/person (predication) because something else is such or such. This kind of statement cannot be reduced to the establishment of a causal relation between two or more variables or phenomena. One cannot reduce an explanatory statement to the following: (the value of ) independent variable x influences/causes (the value of ) dependent variable y. Why not? Because a predication cannot be reduced to a reference, since the logical attributes of a reference differ from those of a predication. Thus if my wife ascribes my bad mood to a headache, she is not saying anything about my headache, only about my bad mood. And if she wants to check whether her explanation holds water, she need not check whether I in fact am in a bad mood (she already knows that) but whether I actually have a headache and whether it is causing my bad mood. The explanation cannot be

    

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reduced to the establishment of a causal relation between my bad mood and my headache or to the statement, ‘your headache is causing your bad mood’. The same applies to statements in normative explanations. The statement, ‘Muslims’ mandatory prayers cause their prayer practice’ means something different from the statement, ‘Muslims pray because it is mandatory’. The first statement is about Muslims’ mandatory prayers and predicates that this is the cause of their prayer practice. If one wants to determine how true that is, one would have to investigate the consequences of the duty to pray, for instance by asking Muslims whether the requirement to pray five times a day causes them to do so. If most of them affirm that it does, it still does not explain their prayer practice. After all, the fact that something always has a particular phenomenon as its effect does not mean that the phenomenon is always caused by that factor. The fact that headache invariably causes a bad mood does not mean that bad moods are invariably caused by headache. The same applies to mandatory prayer. The fact that its effect on most Muslims is to observe a particular prayer practice does not mean that most Muslims’ prayer practice is caused by the mandatory prayers. To say that explanations contain a complete statement also does not imply that they can be reduced to these statements, for statements also express somebody’s belief that the predication is true. When giving an explanation one is not asking a question or making a request, one is affirming a statement. In that sense an explanation is an assertive or a set of assertives containing at least one proposition in which one affirmatively predicates that another party’s behaviour is attributable to a particular cause. However, causal explanations are a particular type of assertion. In technical terms they are intensional (with an s). In lay terms, they are reports of beliefs. Hence, although causal explanations are or express beliefs, the content of that belief is itself ‘just’ a belief. The thing the explanation refers to does not necessarily exist. In explaining something you are not, so to speak, saying that x is so because y is so. You are saying that you or somebody else believes that x is so because y is so. Without going into all the logical characteristics of intensionality, in the case of causal explanations it implies at least the following. Whether and to what extent a statement has the force of an explanation does not depend on whether it tallies with the facts. Its explanatory force depends on the way in which, and the extent to

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which, the explanatory and explained phenomena are described in terms of aspects relevant to the explanation. Thus the statement, ‘priests do not marry because it is not permitted’, explains their celibacy, not because they in fact do not marry and in fact are not permitted to marry, but because the party making the statement believes that mandatory celibacy is the explanatory cause of their de facto celibacy. Consequently the statement does not permit any other inferences about priests’ unmarried state, for instance that it makes them miserable or that they have to spend more time on housekeeping than married men. By the same token one cannot make any inference from a causal explanation of a phenomenon other than that somebody advances that cause for that phenomenon. Does that mean that the distinction between the reasons people advance for something and the ‘real’ reasons is not valid? To be sure, but then the ‘truth’ of the causation depends not only on the correspondence between the explanation and the phenomenon being explained, but also on the correspondence between the explanation one articulates and the explanation one has in mind. Besides, practical theologians’ causal explanations of, for example, youths’ God concepts or the content of hospital chaplains’ interviews need not reflect their own beliefs about the motives for young people’s God concepts or the chaplains’ reasons for what they say; they can also reflect the chaplains’ and the youths’ own reasons. I shall return to this point below. At all events, the notion of reasons is crucial to explanation. Explanations advance reasons. But what exactly is a reason? It is not the same as a cause. This is a major difference between the views of Azjen (and many other empiricists) and Searle. In his model Azjen reduces norms to causes. According to Searle, however, although reasons often specify causes, the causes are usually events, whereas reasons never are. Reasons are always factitive entities. These could simply be real-life facts, such as that it is raining or that Jesus was the son of Mary. Indeed, some philosophers maintain that all reasons are facts (cf. Raz 1975). Searle, however, feels that is too limited: they could also be psychological states such as conceptions, desires, memories, plans, intentions, perceptions and feelings. Thus to many people the desire for a more democratic church could be a major reason explaining a lot of their objections to the way bishops are appointed in the Catholic Church. But explanatory reasons

    

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could also be entities like rights and duties, needs or commitments. All these ‘things’ can be reasons for people to do or refrain from doing, to think or to want something. What all the different kinds of reasons have in common is a propositional structure. Note: this no longer refers to the propositional structure of the reason or explanation given, but to the propositional structure of the actual reason one advances or on which one bases one’s explanation of a phenomenon. In the example of celibacy the reason, ‘because priests are not permitted to marry’ has a propositional structure with a reference to ‘priests’ and a predication, ‘are not permitted to marry’. True, the propositional structure of reasons also implies that they themselves can never be things, objects or events. Something can only be a reason if it refers to something in the world and predicates something about that entity. The Bible itself can never be the reason for a particular religious belief; the authority ascribed to the Bible could. Searle also points out that the distinctive feature of reasons is that the entity concerned always relates to other phenomena. The statement that the Bible says, ‘First seek the kingdom of God and his righteousness and all these things shall be yours as well’ is not in itself a reason for some people to try and do just that. It becomes a reason if they consider the statement to be authoritative and they want to follow biblical guidelines. That establishes a relation between the statement and the phenomenon that people try to follow biblical guidelines. The relation between a reason and the phenomenon being explained can also be a means-ends relation, a constitutive byway-of relation, a conditional relation, a causal relation or a justificatory relation. Finally, a reason has to be known, recognized and acknowledged as such. In an appraisal prompting a given act, a need, obligation or objective fact will only function if the actor is convinced of that fact or recognizes it in some way. Rain is no reason to open up my umbrella unless I know it is raining or think it is about to rain. Of course, one can deny that a thing is so and constitutes a reason for doing or thinking something. One can refuse to admit that one has an obligation to do something. But for someone who knows that she has an obligation or that a fact exists and is a reason for doing or desisting from something, such denial or refusal is unreasonable.

42 1.2

   Intentional Causation

We have noted already that the relation between reason and phenomenon may vary. The main difference in this regard is that between a justificatory and a causal relationship. A justificatory reason answers the question why something is good, true or beautiful, rather than why it is successful. A causal reason, on the other hand, answers the question why something is what it is or why one does, thinks, wants or feels something. Explanation in a scientific sense usually entails advancing reasons of a causal nature. Accordingly Azjen appears to interpret the term ‘factor’ mainly in a causal sense, even though this interpretation is not altogether clear. At all events, when I focus on normative explanations in practical theology I am speaking only about reasons of a causal nature. And their causal nature requires clarification, for its meaning is controversial. The controversial character of the notions of explanation and reason is mainly because theorists of science often disagree about what causation actually is. My premise is that reasons of a causal nature imply a very specific kind of causation and that this causation can only happen in a particular context. This has major implications for empirical research aimed at normative explanation, so I shall dwell on it at some length. Causal reasons are primarily about causation, which cannot simply be reduced to causal relations. The causal nature of the relations between reasons and the phenomena being explained lies in the fact that the reasons cause the phenomena. That is not the same as a causal relation between permanent states of affairs, such as the force of gravity and the fact that this book stays on the desk. Causation always entails the influence of one event on another. Hence we can only speak of causation in the true sense if the cause is an event that ensures that something else happens or that some change occurs, which we then call the effect. Hence to speak of causation it is not sufficient if the direction of the relation between reason and the phenomenon being explained is from reason to phenomenon and not, for instance, the other way round. Even a definition of the relation in terms of cause and effect is inadequate. The way I use the term one can only speak of causation if the reason causes the phenomenon to happen or to change, and in that sense is a factor. That goes one step further than Azjen’s conception of the term ‘factor’ and the conception underlying causal explanations by means of regression analysis, path analysis and other statistical analyses.

    

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Rational explanations likewise entail a special kind of causation, namely intentional causation. That means that either the cause or the effect consists in an intentional state such as a perception, an intention, a memory, a plan, a belief or a desire. Alternatively both the causal reason and the phenomenon being explained may be an intentional state, for instance if an obligation evokes negative feelings. That has certain implications. Here I am speaking of intentional causation in general and about the most crucial distinction into types. That is the distinction between top-down and bottom-up causation, which is based on a difference in the direction of causation. Examples of top-down causation are activities caused by intentions, plans and desires. Here the mental orientation causes the activities, so the direction of causation is from mind to world—hence the description top-down. In the case of cognitive orientations such as perceptions, memories and beliefs the direction of causation is bottom-up or from world to mind. When perceiving a flower, for example, it is the actual flower that causes the mental state of perception; and it is the real-life Jesus of Nazareth that caused and still causes the memory of him. In our context this distinction is especially important, because causal explanations always record the belief that the entity advanced as a reason causes the phenomenon being explained and therefore proceeds top-down, or from mind to world. If one cites mandatory celibacy as the reason for priests’ celibate lifestyle, one is recording the belief that the obligation causes the lifestyle, not the other way round. In the case of causal and, in that sense, explanatory reasons the causal relation between cause and effect is not seen as the object of orientation but constitutes the content of a perception or an intention in behaviour. Hence an explanation based on a causal reason is a record of that experience. Obviously this point, too, has great significance for empirical research aimed at such explanations, for it means that strictly speaking one cannot research the reasons for a belief or pastoral praxis, but only the experience of these reasons and of the causal relations between the reasons and the belief or praxis concerned. In explanations involving intentional causation, which is always the case in normative explanations, there is a further point at issue. Such explanations are only possible in a given temporal and spatial context and against a corresponding background. Biblical norms can only be regarded as causal reasons for biblical religious experience

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if people are familiar with the Bible and are accustomed to heeding it. In that case the background does not consist in psychological representations but in non-representative, self-evident things, practices, dispositions, attitudes and capacities. Hence to identify causal relations, that is to advance causal reasons, one needs to assume certain ‘plan-able’ regularities. Clearly these are not laws in the scientific sense, for that would preclude voluntary choice. Neither are they rules people have to observe in their actions, thinking or decisions. They are regularities in the sense that to those who establish or discern the causal relations these regularities must be there if they are to advance reasons based on such relations. These backgrounds are essential for normative explanation. Obviously it is an important consideration in empirical research aimed at finding such explanations. It means that one can only look for normative explanations if the necessary contextual background exists. If there is any doubt on this score, one must first determine which regularities can always be assumed to operate at that particular place and that particular time, with due regard to the cultural and religious context in which the causal explanation is advanced. 1.3

Norms as Binding External Reasons

We are not dealing with causal explanation generally, however, but with a specific variety, namely normative explanations. What is specific about them? Firstly, they are external in the sense that they come from outside and not from within. More precisely and without using the spatial metaphor, they differ from internal reasons like beliefs, desires or other intentional states in the sense that their existence and acknowledgment do not depend on the human mind. To be sure, external reasons, too, can only function if they are represented by those to whom they constitute reasons. They have to be known or at any rate recognized as reasons. If one does not know that Catholic priests have to remain celibate, one cannot advance it as a reason for their unmarried state. And if one does not believe that in Jesus Christ God revealed in a special way what he wants from human beings, that belief cannot be a reason for living accordingly. Apart from knowing, recognizing or in some way internally ‘representing’ external reasons, one must also acknowledge them as reasons. But that still does not make them internal reasons. They remain inde-

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pendent of our desires insofar as they exist, not as reasons, but nonetheless as factual entities independent of the human mind. Normative reasons are not just external but also binding. That means that their normativeness lies in the fact that they entail obligation. Here norms differ from both rights and values. Both rights and norms are social realities. But rights consist in what people can or may do, think, et cetera, whereas norms are guidelines indicating what people must and must not do. Norms also differ from values or ‘value preferences’. Values are simply positive qualities that people ascribe to something, whereas norms are (binding) guidelines for their own conduct and thought. Consequently norms cannot be reduced to normative beliefs, as Azjen (1988, 125) does. They are not beliefs but binding guidelines. On the whole norms do not exist in isolation but form part of a total reason in the sense of a set of factitive entities. Christians’ reason for trying to imitate Jesus may consist in a belief that God wants them to do so. But that is only a reason if it forms part of a total reason, which could include a duty to obey God’s will and an expectation that God will reward that obedience. Such a set of factitive components, which together constitute a total reason, must include at least one element that functions as a motivator and therefore has a causal direction from mind to world. And if that is a norm, it can only be described and identified as a motivator in an observer-relative sense. Thus Muslims’ religious duty to pray five times a day can only be identified as motivating their prayer at those times if the meaning of the identificatory description is linked to the people who are motivated by it. That does not mean that the motivators are determinative, which makes Azjen’s description of explanations as ‘determinative antecedents’ somewhat unfortunate. Motivating reasons, even when they are normative, do not abrogate freedom of choice. As long as we are speaking of rational beings, they can always decide not to meet an obligation or follow a guideline. For the normative character of normative explanations does not require that the normative reasons advanced for a phenomenon tally with the facts. Even if a Muslim prays five times a day for reasons quite different from the obligation to do so, an explanation based on that obligation remains normative. To sum up: by normative explanations as the goal of empirical research I understand researchers’ reports of external reasons of a binding nature for the praxis of research subjects, which those

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researchers in their cultural and religious context recognize as reasons and which, according to them, usually guide their research subjects’ decisions. 2. Why Look for Normative Explanations? Up to now practical theologians have made hardly any attempt to find such normative explanations for religious and pastoral praxis. I said in the introduction that this is a pity and that it would be a good thing to do. Why is that? The first and principal reason is, of course, the surmise that people’s praxis is very much guided by normative reasons. The observation that ‘the normative reasons we have for acting in particular ways may have an increased chance of actually becoming operative in our decision-making’ (Graham 2002, 187) applies in the religious and pastoral sphere as well. That in itself makes it meaningful to determine as exactly as possible what these normative reasons actually are and how greatly they influence people. But in view of the debate on normativeness and empiricism I want to adduce three more focussed arguments why there is a need to look for normative explanations in empirical projects in practical theology. All three arguments derive from the ambitions and aspirations of present-day practical theology. 2.1

Objective Experiential Knowledge

The first argument derives from the fact that practical theology today wants to be a science. That refers not to the contents of its knowledge but to the nature, quality and basis of that knowledge. Science aspires to the most certain, objective and valid knowledge possible. Hence the question is in how far empirical research aimed at finding normative explanations can enhance the scientific quality, in this sense, of practical-theological pronouncements on norms. The first point here is that science must indeed be concerned with knowledge. As a science practical theology seeks to acquire knowledge, not to give directives or design blueprints. That implies at least the following. Knowing or knowledge is a form of orientation to something in reality and hence a psychic representation of that thing. That much knowledge has in common with norms. The difference is that knowledge is a cognitive representation of reality, whereas a norm is a volitive representation of an activity. I have already mentioned this distinction in relation to reasons generally and normative

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reasons in particular. But because it is so crucial for the unique character of scientific acquisition of knowledge I shall dwell on it in more detail. One aspect of this distinction is that cognitive representations can be true or false in the sense of either tallying or not tallying with reality, which does not apply to volitive representations like norms. In fact, here it may work the other way round: does reality correspond with the representation? Because the direction of correspondence differs, it is defined differently in the two cases. Thus we do not say that a guideline is true or false, but that it is either observed or not. We refer to the realization of an intention or the fulfilment of a desire, not to their truth. This difference brings us to a third feature of scientific knowledge. ‘Knowing’ and ‘knowledge’, like ‘realizing’ and ‘fulfilling’, are success terms. Knowing and knowledge define successful cognitive representations. In that respect knowledge differs from, for example, surmises or beliefs. By the same token an insight or explanation differs from a norm. Thus a norm need not be realized to be a norm. But if an explanation or insight does not hold water, it ceases to be an explanation or an insight. This point is important for the scientific character of practical theology and for its inquiry into norms. As a science practical theology does not seek to make the world conform to norms, hence it does not lay down norms. It should try to make its knowledge—including its knowledge of norms, their realization and influence—correspond with reality. When practical theology lays down norms without establishing whether these are in fact realized, it is being less than scientific in at least two respects. In regard to normativeness it would not be trying to achieve correspondence between mental representations and the realities they represent, and it would not be confining itself to cognitive representations. But if it tries to discover what normative reasons in fact guide people’s religious praxis, that would be one way (obviously not the only one) to deal scientifically with norms. That would enhance the scientific quality of practical theology. It would be confining itself to exactly what it can strive to achieve as a science: a successful cognitive representation of reality when it comes to normativeness, namely the observance of norms. Hence concentrating empirical research on normative explanations would make practical theology’s concern with norms more scientific. When the search for normative explanations is conducted ‘empirically’ this certainly improves the scientific quality of practical theology’s concern with normativeness. After all, experience is generally

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regarded as the best way to obtain optimally reliable scientific knowledge. And the more the experience on which the knowledge rests is shared by others, the more reliable the knowledge. That follows, for experience is the substance of the most direct representations of reality. This applies to both observer experience and experience derived from action. Hence if one tries to determine ‘empirically’ what normative reasons guide people’s religious praxis, it broadens the experiential base of practical theology’s insight into, and its pronouncements about, normativeness. The word ‘empirical’ is deliberately put in quotation marks. After all, optimally reliable normative explanations of the religious praxis of people other than the researcher should be based on those people’s own experience and not on the researcher’s observations of their physical behaviour. Hence empiricism means understanding. Empirical research into the normative reasons that guide people in fact means optimally understanding what they communicate about their experience in this respect. If practical theologians empirically search for normative explanations it broadens the experiential basis of their knowledge of normativeness, thus enhancing the scientific quality of that knowledge. Hence more empirical research aimed at normative explanations would make practical theology’s concern with normativeness more scientific in the sense that it will be more firmly and more thoroughly based on direct experience. That would also make the knowledge more objective, which is rightly considered an important criterion of scientific quality. Naturally objectivity has to be conceptualized epistemologically. That means that the content of the knowledge or scientific pronouncement does not depend on the researcher’s subjective preferences, tastes or opinions. Nonetheless it remains the researcher’s knowledge and hence, in an ontological sense, subjective. After all, knowing and knowledge are psychic states of a person. Their mode of existence is clearly not objective in the sense that a mountaintop or an aids virus is objective, for these exist independently of the human mind. Knowledge, including scientific knowledge, cannot exist thus independently. Neither, indeed, can the experience that people incur when they allow their religious praxis to be guided by normative reasons. In an ontological sense this experience, too, is subjective. Hence when practical theologians try to understand these normative reasons ‘empirically’, their knowledge becomes epistemologically more objective the more seriously they take the ontological subjectivity of such experience. Again it enhances the scientific quality of practical-theological knowledge

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about normativeness. Hence more empirical research aimed at normative explanations would make practical theology’s concern with normativeness epistemologically more objective and thus more scientific. In this way the debate on normativeness and empiricism in practical theology could be taken a step further. For one thing, we could establish how tenable Fuchs’s assumption is that there is an empirically demonstrable lack of theological content in the praxis. And in the search for norms that must be observed it would enable us to take into account the norms that people actually appear to observe in practice. 2.2

Rational Theology here and now

The second argument for focussing empirical projects in practical theology on normative explanations of the religious/pastoral praxis of respondents has to do with the nature and quality of that knowledge as theological knowledge. The decisive factor here is not that practical theology wants to be a science; nor is it the distinction between knowledge and faith. It is that practical theology wants to acquire theological knowledge and not, for example, psychological, sociological or physical knowledge. As a theological discipline it should strive to acquire knowledge about reality in respect of relations between the world and God. And inasmuch as theology is a form of experiential knowledge it should focus on the religious aspect of the world, more particularly the human world. One relation between people and God is faith. Another important relation is that God wants certain things from human beings. God’s will is binding, not in the sense of excluding human free will, but in the specifically normative sense of advancing binding reasons for decisions. God reveals his will in various ways, such as scriptures, tradition and human experience. Theology’s task is to interpret these sources of revelation in their interrelationship and thus to arrive at the best possible interpretation of God’s will. To this end it has to probe the experiential sources as best it can. That is exactly what practical theology does, not only when it tries to determine empirically what people believe, but also when it seeks to discover what normative reasons guide them in their living. The people themselves need not necessarily regard these as religious motives. It is up to theology to determine whether and to what extent they have to do with God’s will. But it can only do so if it

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tries as empirically as possible to discover the people’s own normative explanations. In this sense concentrating on empirical research aimed at normative explanations would make practical theology’s concern with normativeness more theological. Another major criterion of the quality of theology is its rationality: it should strive to meet maximum standards of rationality. It has to find ‘good reason’ for faith and religious experience. That applies all the more when it comes to normativeness. In practice this criterion means that theologians have to consider as many relevant reasons of a normative nature for religious decisions and discover as accurately as possible how they operate. This clearly calls for empirical research, also into normative explanations for these decisions. After all, to incorporate normative explanations into theological reflection one has to know what they are. Hence concentrating on empirical research aimed at normative explanation would make practical theology’s concern with normativeness theologically more rational. Finally, such an approach also makes it possible to meet another requirement that is rightly set for theology in our time, namely that it must be relevant. The whole of theological hermeneutics is aimed at enabling theology to meet this qualitative requirement. But relevance does not mean measuring present facts against norms from the past. The only way to develop theological insight into normativeness that is relevant here and now would be to take into account the actual operation of normative reasons against the background of the present cultural and religious context. Naturally one first has to establish what this context is. Thus concentrating on empirical research aimed at normative explanation would make practical theology’s concern with normativeness theologically more relevant. 2.3

An Action Science that Genuinely Contributes to Liberation

Finally there is a third argument that makes a strong case for empirical research into normative explanations of religious/pastoral praxis. It derives from practical theology’s present understanding of itself as a theological action science that wants to contribute actively to people’s liberation here and now. Although the designation ‘action science’ is still being debated, there is consensus on at least one point. The term refers to the specific character of the theological content of the knowledge that practical theology seeks to acquire. It does not qualify the scientific

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nature of that knowledge nor the theological character of its content, but the practical nature of that theological content. Hence it does not concern the difference between knowledge and laying down guidelines, but between knowing how and knowing how to do. In practical theology the aim is not so much knowing what is or what was, but knowing how and what to do. That is what distinguishes practical theology from historical and dogmatic theology. Here, too, the difference lies in the direction of fit and the direction of causation, albeit not those of theological knowledge as a cognitive orientation but of the content of that knowledge. Knowledge of what is is not a representation of reality but reality itself. Knowledge of how to do, on the other hand, is not knowledge of reality but a representation—a volitive representation, hence a direction of causation from mind to world and a direction of fit from world to mind. When a practical theologian knows how pastoral interviews can or should be conducted, the substance of that knowledge is a conception. It is not a conception of the actual situation, however, but of what should be done. When a dogmatist knows how Christ’s divine nature works, her knowledge does not cause it to work that way but the fact that it actually works that way causes her to know. In the case of knowledge of how to do one knows that what one says about reality has to be realized (do it in such or such a way). Concentrating on empirical research aimed at normative explanations would make practical theology’s concern with normativeness theologically more practical. Hence it is not a matter of offering guidelines but of knowing what they are; knowing them, moreover, in a way that can be useful for praxis, that is real in the sense of providing efficient, practical guidelines. After all, research aimed at normative explanations seeks to discover what norms in fact motivate people’s praxis. Thus it is not aimed at discovering the content of norms as something in the minds of people who recognize these norms as guidelines. Rather it strives to discover in how far they are recognized and actually function, hence influence people’s behaviour causally. Looking for empirical normative explanations means determining to what extent norms are observed in real life. And this search for operative guidelines and how effectively they operate is a hallmark of practical theology. Concentrating on empirical research aimed at normative explanations would make practical theology’s concern with normativeness theologically more real.

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The specifically practical-theological quality of concern with normativeness has a third aspect. This has to do with practical theology’s ambition to further human autonomy in religious matters. Ever since the anthropological revolution in the 1960s the subject has been characterized by an ever stronger striving for liberation. Normative explanations no longer curtail people’s freedom of choice but actually give them more leeway to decide for themselves by invoking heteronomous reasons as well. Concentrating on empirical research aimed at normative explanations would make practical theology’s concern with normativeness theologically more liberating. 3. How to Research Normative Explanations? The next question is what methodology to use in scientifically and theologically sound research into normative explanations and how the findings can be incorporated appropriately into practical theology as a whole. It is not possible to work out all the details here. But, in the light of the preceding sections, I want to highlight a few key issues that strike me as particularly relevant to research methods. 3.1

Questions About Normative Motivators

The first point pertains to the research phase commonly known as data collection. In this phase the researcher’s main activity is asking questions. In the quest for normative explanations this entails giving respondents guidelines on how to answer the questions in a way that will satisfy the researcher’s desire to learn something he didn’t know before. For questions are not assertives or commissives but directives. They offer other parties guidelines on how to do something, namely to give the kind of answer one is looking for. And like all guidelines, those given in questions have to be followed in the sense that such answers are in fact forthcoming. The chances of this happening are obviously better the more accurately, unambiguously and intelligibly the questions are phrased, and phrased, moreover, as directives. Thus it is extremely important that researchers should explain carefully to respondents what they want them to do and how they should do it. To put it bluntly: questions can never be ‘closed’ enough. At the same time the answers must tell the researchers some-

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thing they did not know before which they want to find out. For this reason question have to be open-ended. How does one harmonize these two criteria for good research questions? In principle it is quite simple. The clearer researchers are about what they want to learn from respondents, the more accurately they can phrase their questions. When looking for normative explanations this means, more particularly, that they want to know what normative reasons guide respondents’ decisions in the field under investigation. Firstly, then, the questions must be personal in the sense that the respondents see that the researcher wants to learn about a particular personal experience. It strikes me as advisable to stress this in the formulation of questions. Questions designed to find normative explanations should be phrased in the second and first person rather than the third person. Thus a question like, ‘Which agreements with your colleagues influence you most when planning your catechism courses?’ is better than the question, ‘What agreements with colleagues in one’s team influence one most when planning catechism courses?’ Secondly, questions must be topical in the sense that respondents realize that the researchers want to know which norms guide them in real life here and now. That, too, must be underscored in the questions, possibly by specifying time and place quite closely, for instance ‘the past few weeks/months/years’ and ‘in your present workplace’. Thirdly, and most importantly with a view to normative explanations, researchers must obviously indicate that they want to know whether and to what extent the relation between normative reasons and what they effect is genuinely motivating. This can be incorporated into questions by asking, for instance, which normative reasons are ‘most decisive’ for respondents. To understand the meaning of the answers properly researchers naturally have to check carefully from what background respondents are answering. By background I don’t mean factual particulars like sex, age, education, place of residence, political preference and the like, or at any rate not that alone. I mean background in the sense already explained to some extent in section 1.2 (causal explanations), that is the totality of attitudes, capacities, assumptions—the contextual preconditions that make meaning possible or complicate it. Of course, if these things are the same for researcher and respondents, they pose no problem. But sometimes they differ considerably, making it

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difficult for the researcher to understand respondents’ answers directly. This applies particularly when researcher and respondents come from different subcultural backgrounds. Examples are when older people do research among youths, or when researching people with a completely different ecclesiastic orientation or social environment. Usually this can be overcome by making an adequate study of the literature before and during the research. One could also consider collecting more relevant information about the respondents’ background via the actual data collection. But it has to be done indirectly, for instance by sketching frustrations and then asking respondents why they see no point in trying to do certain things. 3.2

Analysing Contents and Relations

Once the responses have been collected they have to be analysed. This primarily entails understanding respondents’ intentions optimally. It is particularly important if the questions were open-ended and the responses therefore consist of one or more sentences composed by the respondents. It is not a matter of interpretation in the sense of determining the meaning in terms of the researcher’s frame of reference, but of identifying the respondents’ intentions in terms of their own background. To the extent that this is successful, the researcher must then analyse the total set of answers in more detail. This involves determining the components of that totality as well as their interrelationships. Analysis is therefore more than just determining similarities and differences through comparison. It also entails tracing other logical and mathematical relations between answers, for instance conditional or sequential relations. Such analysis pertains, firstly, to the content of responses. On the premise that in the search for normative explanations the researcher asked no questions about what respondents want but only about what they consider actually to be the case, the responses will all be assertives. Hence the analysis need not focus on the kind of speech acts respondents perform but can concentrate on propositional content. Since propositional content always consists of references and predications, substantive analysis cannot be reduced to mere analysis of concepts. This strikes me as important, because in empirical methodology some researchers tend to apply the concept ‘variable’ far too indiscriminately without distinguishing between referential and predicative variables. Since the smallest independent unit of mean-

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ing is a complete speech act, only such complete speech acts can be treated as variables in a susbtantive sense, or—if one confines oneself to assertives—only complete propositional contents. In making the analysis it could make sense to lump all statements about identical objects together and merely look out for variations in predication. The procedure cannot be reversed, however: one cannot lump all predications with the same meaning together and then check how the references vary. The following example illustrates the point. Suppose a researcher investigating adult catechism asks respondents if their choice of a theme for their courses was guided by diocesan policy in this regard. Suppose, furthermore, that 65% answers affirmatively, 30% negatively and 5% is unsure. What the respondents are doing is predicating about themselves whether or not they follow diocesan directives. If they are working in different dioceses, the predications will clearly also differ. But even if they all received the same diocesan guidelines, it still does not mean that their predications will be the same. The fact that John follows the same diocesan guidelines as Peter does not mean that John will do so in the same way as Peter. To assume that would be to make the same mistake as to assume that John has Peter’s toothache in the event of both having the same kind of toothache. That makes it clear that analysis may well consist in distinguishing between types, in the same way that one can distinguish between types of objects, and that here, too, substantive analysis may consist largely in finding type distinctions and, following that, looking for relations between types (norms, respondents, etc.). By means of factor analysis one can also combine a number of questions into a smaller number of ‘factors’, retaining as many substantive elements of the original responses as possible in the contents of the new constructs. But analysis need not be restricted to contents. To gain greater insight one also has to analyse proportions. Here statistical calculations can serve a useful purpose. For a simple description of proportions calculating the frequency, centrality (mean, median and mode) and distribution of responses (variance, standard variation and range) is sufficient. To make reliable estimates of entire populations on the basis of samples one has to calculate the standard error and reliability interval as well. To determine in how far differences between responses are random or correlate systematically with other variables one has to conduct statistical tests with specific degrees of significance. If the discrepancy between the values of the responses or of other

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variables is constant or equal, one can also compute a correlation between the variables so that the score on one variable tells one something about the score on another with a high degree of probability. This can be done by calculating what is known as the correlation coefficient. Finally, in order to determine the power of normative explanations as opposed to the ‘influence’ of non-normative factors one can use regression analysis or more sophisticated statistical analyses. But, as mentioned already, contents do not provide causal explanations in the true sense of the word. 3.3

Improving Possibilities of Deliberation

Finally the analysed responses have to be incorporated into the researcher’s practical reasoning, which culminate in ‘conclusions’. These should consist in the presentation of practical options. Such arguments can never be absolutely logical deductions or inductions according to the rules of classical propositional logic. After all, that is a logic of assertions, in the sense that they express cognitive orientations, more particularly convictions. The practical reasoning at issue here cannot go beyond systematic weighing of the relative forcefulness of different reasons. It is not a matter of universally binding truths but of guidelines and desires, which do not imply the same commitment and which always allow freedom of choice. Naturally such evaluation only makes sense for practical theologians inasmuch as they can base it on principles, that is on fundamental commitments that they share with those to whom the evaluation is submitted. That does not mean that practical theologians can dish up their own preferences as conclusions from their research. The aim of scientific research is to expand knowledge, not to offer encouragement or guidelines. At the same time it should culminate in knowing how to do, hence in knowledge of rationally substantiated options for action. Consequently practical theologians cannot stop short at mere explanation, not even if it is normative. At the very least they have to indicate what it implies for action. In so doing, it is meaningful first to make an ‘internal’ evaluation. By this I mean that one should weigh the normative reasons that respondents advance for their praxis against other reasons that they advance in the same study. These could be their own beliefs, desires or intentions, but they could also be ‘inspiration’ derived from other people, which is not normative to them per se but nonethe-

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less influences them. They could also be ‘sober facts’, such as financial opportunities, time (constraints) or staffing. In effect it means comparing the values of the various reasons and reflecting on responses with a view to determining the respondents’ options. This internal evaluation can then be incorporated into an ‘external’ evaluation. By this I mean that the rationality of the possible options concluded from the analysis of respondents’ responses in the study is compared with that of options derived from, for example, other theological reflections. This may give rise to mutual criticism and fruitful synthesis. A decisive criterion of practical-theological conclusions, to my mind, is to what extent the various options can realistically further the pursuit of God’s kingdom and its righteousness here and now. For I wholeheartedly agree with many of my fellow practical theologians that the summons to ‘first seek the kingdom of God and his righteousness’ is the cardinal theological norm in whatever evaluations we have to make. References Azjen, I., Fischbein M. (1980). Understanding Attitudes and predicting social Behavior. Englewood-Cliffs, NJ. Ajzen, I. (1988). Attitudes, Personality, and Behavior. Stony Stratford. Fuchs, O. (2000). Wie funktioniert die Theologie in empirische Untersuchungen? [The function of theology in empirical research] Theologische Quartalschrift 180 (3), 191–210. Graham, K. (2002). Practical Reasoning in a Social World. How we act together. Cambridge. Korsgaard, C. (1996). The Sources of Normativity. Cambridge. Raz, J. (1975). Practical Reason and Norms. London. Searle, J.R. (2001). Rationality in Action. Cambridge. Spruit, L.G.M. (1991). Religie en abortus. Interactiemodellen ter verklaring van de houding tegenover abortus. [Religion and abortion. Interaction models to explain attitudes to abortion.] ’s-Gravenhage. Ven, J.A. van der (1983). Op weg naar een empirische theologie. [Towards an empirical theology] In H. Häring, T. Schoof & A. Willems (Eds.), Meedenken met Edward Schillebeeckx [Contemplating with Edward Schillebeeckx] (93–114), Baarn. —— (1987). Empirische theologie: een repliek. [Empirical theology: a response.] Tijdschrift voor Theologie 27, 292–296. —— (1988). Practical Theology: from applied to empirical theology. Journal of Empirical Theology 1 (1), 7–27. —— (1990). Entwurf einer empirischen Theologie. Kampen-Weinheim. —— (1993). Practical Theology: An Empirical Approach. Kampen. Ven, J.A. van der & Ziebertz, H.-G. (Eds.) (1993). Paradigmenentwicklung in der Praktischen Theologie [Paradigm development in Practical Theology]. Kampen-Weinheim. Weichbold, V. (1992). Zum Verhältnis empirischer und theologischer Sätze in der Praktische Theologie [On the relationship of empirical and theological approaches in Practical Theology]. Hamburg.

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Ziebertz, H.-G. (1994). Religionspädagogik als empirische Wissenschaft. Beiträge zu Theorie und Forschungspraxis [Religious pedagogy as an empirical science. Contributions to theory and research praxis]. Weinheim. —— (1996). Objektivität und Handlungsnormativität. Ein Dilemma der empirisch orientierten Praktische Theologie? [Objectivity and normativity of action. A dilemma of empirically oriented Practical Theology?] Theologisch-Praktische Quartalsschrift 144 (4), 412–428. —— (1998). Objekt, Methode, Relevanz. Empirie und praktische Theologie [Object, method, relevance, empiricism and practical theology]. Pastoraltheologische Informationen 18, 305–321.

GIVEN THROUGH THE SENSES. A Phenomenological Model of Empirical Theology H-G H In this article, I will give an outline of practical theology as empirical theological research based on a specific type of methodology. Central to my argument is the understanding of phenomenology, using and explaining the key concepts, as well as methodological approaches. The intention is to develop with this approach the discipline of Practical theology as a “life-world oriented theology”. Next, as to a general outline of phenomenological theology, this article will focus on normative correlations of method and theory used. Phenomenology essentially says that what is given through the human senses is the starting point. As a specific example to clarify how it functions, and the expected theological impact, I will focus on an area that is crucial in understanding modernity, urban culture. This specific focus may render for us discernible steps in praxis, while clarifying some key concepts of practical theological research and underlying methods. This will lead to an understanding of religion in a broader, more imaginative perspective. 1. The Issue and Initial Problems: Phenomenology as Empirical Theology? I want to make a few initial observations regarding my understanding of the theoretical background within practical theology. For many generations practical theology, as a theological discipline, was not considered much more than a technical transmission of faith to specific people in specific situations, in church life. A shift from this “source-to-application concept” (Farley 1983a, 135) to a new, contextual approach was stimulated some decades ago (cf. Bevans 1994). Trying to give productive answers to the “crisis of relevance” new models for theology emerged during the 1970’s. Attempts for “Empirical theology” tried to combine classical hermeneutic instruments with modern empirical hermeneutics of social scientific theories (Gerkin 1984; Heimbrock 1984; van der Ven 1991; Browning 1991). The German catholic theologian R. Zerfaß presented a prominent model

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for a theological praxis theory of religious action in 1974, picking up ideas of US-American pastoral theologian S. Hiltner (Zerfaß 1974). The proposal was to take religious life, behavior and activities of people, and make it accessible to empirical social analysis. Practical theology, which is related to reality in a social scientific way, does neither consist solely of applicable steps of normative theological bites produced, nor borrowed, by biblical, historical, and dogmatic knowledge. It conceives empirical analysis of relevant objects and situations as a genuine task of its own. Often empirical research in contemporary practical theology is conceived within a three steps model. First, identify the object of research on the basis of theoretical theological reflection. Second, to choose suitable instruments of empirical analysis and collect data. And third, to interpret the data in the light of theoretical frameworks, and to draw practical and theoretical conclusions, based on this empirical analysis. This simplified model suggests a division of labor between “ought” and “is”. Usually the first and third tasks are expected to deal with normativity. In theological inquiry, with values based on scripture and church doctrines about how to understand God and world, good and evil, life and death, we can see the pole of “ought”. The second pole of this empirical research as such, focuses on people’s practice related to these issues in order to correct false assumptions about reality. This “is”, knowledge of actual practice, might enable professional religious practitioners to adjust strategies in order to be more effectively, if not faithfully. It follows the initial normative interests of the gospel theology and church practice. Thanks to the reflection on the implicit normative rationale of social scientific theory and methods presented by H. Peukert (Peukert 1984) today most of the more elaborated types of social scientific research (and their application in Practical Theology) do not follow a naïve positivistic model of science, but are aware that also empirical work is based on normative assumptions like every other theoretical research. In consequence it is highly significant that “. . . research in practical theology is normative, not despite but because of its empirical character.” (Van der Ven 2002, 7). And in recent times, there has been developed a wide plurality of different empirical methods. Nevertheless the overall value empirical research provides for theology usually is an expectation of a broader and unbiased picture of the actual situation. The logic is, to put it simply, to follow first

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a descriptive analysis, and to continue this with some normative interpretation of the described situation (cf. Browning’s model of ‘descriptive’ and ‘strategic’ practical theology; Browning 1991). It is a symbolic of, and at the same time an effect of this rationale to ask for instruments of empirical research that follow deliberately a methodological a-theism. The scientific quality of research is not guaranteed by specific “religious” empirical methods but rather the opposite by using appropriate social scientific theories and methods. The theological quality seems to be guaranteed by starting in step one with theological norm and by coming back to this line in the third step, which is directed to shape Christian practice in a more effective way. Given a broad consensus in recent international discussions to shape Practical Theology as empirical or at least empirical related enterprise, phenomenology as a tool for this theological interest has been introduced only on a few places, mainly in pastoral psychology (Oden 1969; Aden 1990) there is much argument about the usefulness of phenomenology to make a substantial contribution, such as that of empirical theology. There is a twofold critique, from the theological as well as from the empirical side, and it seems to come down to a dilemma. And it is important to recognize, in our context, that this dilemma is centered in the concept of normativity. On the one side, it is argued that phenomenology since Husserl, is of less theological value due to its neutrality towards normative approaches to reality. It is critiqued as not being capable to express an understanding of the essence of faith in revelation, but rather deals with faith reductively, taking it only as a matter of human consciousness. Second, phenomenology with its epoché, the way of “bracketing out” the essential normative implications of reality is said to be more or less descriptive. On the other side, from modern social sciences, there is great suspicion about the phenomenological approach to reality not following postulates and rationales of hard empirical sciences. From this view phenomenology is suspected as ignoring or even contradicting common rules and standards of empirical research like objectivity and generalization, because it is not interested in formulating exact hypotheses about distinct objects. Its results are mistrusted because the theory is said to be able to proof its results in a process of falsification and puts an emphasis on a rather dubious subject centered epistemology. I would like to show a way out of this dilemma by proving that the phenomenological model contributes to an empirical theological way,

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and at the same time using this method leads to new insights on normative elements of empirical research. According to the inductive epistemology of phenomenology I start with a short sketch about an issue that is based on a life world approach. In that regard I have chosen a field in reality that has been misrepresented in Christian perspectives especially by following certain normative presuppositions; namely the urban culture. Conventional theological approach to city life was highly value laden and contained many ideological distortions of reality. This asks for correcting the picture by way of empirical research. 2. Urban Culture: Phenomena and Concept The “City” is not a traditional topic of Christian dogmatics. Nevertheless it is an old issue in Christian and Hebrew tradition. Hebrew and Christian scripture start with the image of an idyllic garden, but end up with the great vision of a great city. However in church history, urban life was definitely not a prominent model to explain faith to Christians. On the contrary, Sodom and Gomorrah, the great whore Babylon, or Rome, all through the centuries were used almost as horror image to contrast the eternal purity of faith against the temptations of mundane life. The heavenly Jerusalem was expected to be created by God himself, not by mankind. Modern urban culture, was perceived, especially by pious Protestants, as place of evil, as a powerful source of the decline of church life and religion. The growing of modern urbanity with its social uprooting and anticlerical economic-proletariat in ecclesiastical polemics was regarded as a “cesspool of sin.” Traditional theological understanding regards city life as a dark background, to show the value and essence of true message of the gospel in the foreground. In general, if theology dealt with the city at all, it followed a model of interpretation that was negative. It is worthwhile to note, that the above given simplified historical review does not fit social history of modern urban culture in Europe or the US, nor does it fully represent contemporary elaborated theological thinking about urban life. It has been demonstrated and investigated how Protestantism had been a powerful resource and motor of the foundation and further shape of urban life, in terms of economic, scientific as well as cultural issues. A less biased and enlarged

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theological analysis of urban culture has been presented by Harvey Cox’s socio-historical study “The secular city” (Cox 1965). He tries to give a more positive theological view on modern “metropolis” on the basis of a new use of dogmatic concepts like “law” and “gospel”. Another study of this phenomena was done by the Finnish Lutheran Seppo Kjellberg, in the city of Tampere (Kjellberg 2000). In his socio-ecological model he tries to introduce the biblical concept of ‘Koinonia’ into public discourses about modern urban developments to describe theological norms for civilised living together. While I embrace the valuable insights of these mentioned studies, my phenomenological approach to the issue differs a lot from Cox as well as from Kjellberg, in many elements. The practical theological model I suggest follows a phenomenological way of empirical investigation to urban culture. Of course within the limits of this article it is only possible to give a rough sketch of this approach. I will first give a short ‘outline’ of what I see as the practical steps, and then I will discuss the conceptual and methodological issues by reflection. What are we talking about when we say ‘urban life’ or “city”? City could be defined as a geographic, economic or as an administrative entity, in figures of inhabitants or of amounts of taxes and revenues. People on the street have different opinions and pre-concepts of a city in their mind, this according to different perspectives and experience. So every scientific approach to urbanity is working with reductions and generalizations. As to the theological view on urban life, a strict and narrow empirical research focuses on an explicit religion in a given city in terms of church service attendance, numbers of inscribed members, changings of congregations in connection to other variables, etc. My approach takes its starting point at phenomena of the field of urban life in an unspecified sense. The phenomenological model I am suggesting does not start with a complete definition of the research object, but rather enters a “field” of everyday life; it tries to get in touch with every day life of a city from an ethnographic perspective. Perceived in this way urban life is not interpreted in dogmatic theological or socio-structural concepts, but by way of sensual perception, by images, preconscious encounters, feelings, atmospheres and dreams of the researchers as human beings. And, an important characteristic for the theological use of phenomenology is not to foreclose the picture too soon, not to start with a concentration on isolated bits of “explicit religion”

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but with a more open approach, actually to see urban life in a life world perspective, as context of living religion. This enables practical theology to discover religious layers and elements not only as a process of finding memory of pre-established concepts, but to get in touch also with changes and creative developments of religion as integrated part of culture on the whole. Of course sensual perception is not innocent, has its preconditions and implications. And it is obvious, that such a model works on assumptions about the relation between religion and culture. Later I will reflect on the implicit methodology of this approach. The initial question however is: What can be perceived about people’s life and how communication shapes people’s life, shapes cultural patterns and even world views, what is the daily routine; what are extraordinary, strange elements within a personal encounter with city life? What provokes experiences of “aha”? Given the limitations of this article it is not possible to give a complete set of all steps of phenomenological method (as described structurally later on). Nevertheless it might be useful to give an abbreviated presentation of some phenomenologically based interpretations of urban culture. To indicate this research I will suggest six elements of crucial importance. 2.1

Life-style

Urban life is a most influential cultural model of life, no matter if we live as citizens in a metropolis or in a small village outside. People’s habits of dress, musical tastes; automobile fetishes; the use of leisure time; athletic endeavours, professionally and recreationally; food, from McDonalds to the finest restaurants within a culture; traffic and catastrophes of traffic; crime, the direct effect on victims as well as the indirect effect on all of the culture; all this and much more is modelled according to an image of urban life style, how flexible and diffuse that might be. It is not always a matter of fact but moreover a collective fantasy, nevertheless an effective means to influence people’s experience, and behaviours. This life-style is transported and reinforced by daily mass media consumed, especially on the visual domain. Therefore, in many regions of Europe and Northern America it is almost impossible to escape it, even if you live outside an urban area.

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Fast Food or Dinner Party

The city as symbolic cosmos and as a place of life patterns that affect human social and physiological existence becomes a concretised entity when dealing with nourishment and patterns of food consumption. People drive downtown to work, or to do shopping, and in the course of this time they may also participate in one or another type of meal. Forms of eating are an effective cultural screen of life and how it is lived, and how it can be regulated. In larger cities people find a great plurality of tastes, with regional as well as international cocking, that can be enjoyed in numerous varieties, depending on financial resources. The form this meal takes can determine patterns of communications, and because of the multicultural aspect of the city, the meal can be a place of initial intercultural encounters. This intercultural encounter can happen beyond all of the forces that may mitigate against it, like colonized, functionalised, and sometimes sterile tourist marketing and globalisation of looks and products, by multinational restaurant companies. And of course, there is also the other side of the coin, in fact the extreme of the other side, that of the hungry beggar, looking for some bits of food in waste containers; it is unfortunately a typical picture in urban culture. 2.3

Spatial Identity and Non-places

The experience of a city is connected to a spatial extension; it has a “gestalt”. In ancient times the skyline of a city, depicted on copperplates, had been a very important means to shape and support a collective identity of a town or city. Despite all attempts to have a particular skyline or something approximating this visual and architectural uniqueness, this former identity mark is got lost. Post-modern urban areas resemble each other on many elements. Under the surface of artificial modelling of tourist images, in everyday life cities for ordinary people have lost their face and former identity. Wellknown aspects of cities are more and more transformed into mere façades or tourist media images. Due to growing globalisation something new is developing; the shape of architecture, places, locations, streets is changing into something else. The product so far can be called a growing realm of “non-places”. Think of modern central stations, shopping malls, uniformed flats, parking areas, congress centres. One city, or indeed, one place in a city, looks like another,

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and an address is only that, an identity spot, to be sure to know where you are at, for it feels and looks like nowhere, yet everywhere. What has been lost is the experience of a city, and more important, city dwellers, that was connected to a spatial identity, a “gestalt” of space and architecture that needed not to look the same to be in identity with each other. As the formations of local context and the global environment of life are mixing, and changing traditional meanings of particular locations of high emotional value for individuals are dissolving, the experience of space has an even deeper influence on a person’s life view and self-image. “The space of a non-place frees anybody who enters this place from his or her former destiny. He or she is only existing as that, what he or she is doing now: being passenger, customer or car driver” (Aden 1994, 120). 2.4

Home in Transition

Life in urban cultural centres is shaped according to general social tendencies of mobility and migration. The centeredness of one’s own everyday experience is decentred in a spatial as well as on an emotional level. Becoming at home again in a city, where you only work, perhaps only for the next five years, where 500.000 people every day are driving in for work, is always a broken home, a home in estrangement. Nevertheless, under post-modern conditions new tendencies to become at home in the midst of anonymous circumstances can be identified. People like their pub, their cafe, return to favourite places, develop their daily routines to do things, to travel. The condition of homelessness is extremely true for those growing minorities who have been forced to leave their former homes and are forced to come into the metropolis by economic or political catastrophes and now are looking for a place to survive and to rest. They don’t speak the language of the majority, live in separate areas, and have tremendous difficulties with integration, if they even try that (or if it is allowed by the majority). But despite these elementary difficulties, if one communicates with these groups and their ethnic surrounding, you would easily recognise new attempts to make themselves at home; a search for temporary shelter in a strange world, bringing their memories to the new places, adjusting their old world by mixing it with cultural elements of the new. This process has been described as process of “creolization” (Rebholz & Rech 1998, p. 22).

    2.5

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Virtual City

Perhaps a complementary development to the dissolution of spatial identity, as an important element of post-modern urban life style is the growing virtualisation of life in the epoch of computer. This cultural wave has touched all aspects of our living, most poignantly our leisure time. In a seminar we discovered that nearly 75.000 users per month visit an almost perfect visual simulation of urban reality (e.g. like websites as www.funcity.de.) actually is nothing else than an universe of chat-rooms, where people might have computer mediated contacts with others, even with members of churches. A more directly intrusive and serious aspect of the virtual city is a growing element of computer enhanced planning strategies for cities of the future and related models of culture. Others have tried to even capture the past, with virtual reconstructions of medieval urban architecture. A critical inquiry of those websites and one comes to the conclusion, that the city becomes even more of a remarkable story, “. . . it loses its historical context.” (Cf. The project Medieval New York). But the virtuality of urban life is not only an issue of entertainment, or of planning experts. It has already become reality in administrative praxis of metropolis. Registration as inhabitant at the city authorities and getting personal documents is becoming a matter of virtual communication. As people communicate more and more via computer with administration centres, personal human contact is being devalued and seen as being worthless. Real buildings, things, and people that can be touched and perceived by all the senses tend to become meaningless in times of cyberspace. Virtuality has a tendency to decontextualise life. Technical innovations induce powerful changes in a worldview. A virtual city makes space and people superfluous in everyday-life. That will have a great impact on people’s sense of reality. 2.6

Life: Feast and Fragility

One last facet, also a rather ambivalent one, in the context of urban culture, is that people have developed specific forms to express their attitudes towards life. On the one side you would find street fests, multi-cultural parties, spontaneous and organized entertainment to celebrate the joy of life in the quarter. Many of these events are organised by urban authorities for marketing purposes. Their intention

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or by-product is to contribute to local collective identity formation. These urban feasts have forerunners even in early modern times, if we consider rituals in Italian cities like “Gioco del Calcio” in Firenze or “Palio” in Sienna. One might even suggest that in the face of so much devaluing these fests hearken back to a time when the festival was the icon of a oneness. In the face of virtuality, the fest becomes a hold on to memories of a past, and former time. Urban celebration of life on the other side might also lead to expressions of quite opposite feelings. Despite all dissolution of space and time in the midst of the mass culture of the metropolis people from time to time express their deep concern towards life and death in most expressive and perceptive ways. Events like Christopher Street Day, the death of Lady Day or Queen Mom in England, are not only celebrated officially. They are accompanied by personal expressions of joy at mourning that lead to immense hills of flowers, candles, teddies or other signs of joy and mourning. Thus far we have presented an encounter with a specific field for empirical theology, entered in a phenomenological way. Of course this short sketch is everything but exhaustive for a substantial inquiry into city life and its religious implications. But it may demonstrate that this is a phenomenon that has to be taken in account by empirical theological investigation of urban culture in a broader context. There are two important points for theology. First, a useful concept of city has to be pluralistic in its dimension. The term “city” is a combination of facts and construction; it is used as social reality and as symbol. Second, the phenomena described above not only indicate details of a contextual description in terms of a frame for a specific issue ‘religion’, but these details can be related to religion and to theological issues. They must be viewed seriously for a substantial analysis of religious life and a correlating theological interpretation of the cities. In the next paragraph I draw on underlying theoretical assumptions of a phenomenological model of practical theology that have been used in my field study so far. 3. Key Concepts and Theoretical Basis 3.1

A Twofold Concept of Religion

Basic to a phenomenological model of practical theology is a theoretical reflection on religion, which works with a twofold meaning

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of the concept (as part of academic language), combining elements of semiotics and phenomenology. First, it refers to “religion” in the meaning of codified, collective, symbolic systems of religious bodies with a truth claim that concerns the ultimate, eternity, and God (Geertz 1973b). This theoretical perspective takes religion as body of given cultural traditions, as a symbolic universe that can be deciphered. However the subject encounters different layers of symbols, different qualities of the same symbols. Religion is not fully described as an endless system of signs and meaning giving bits that appear and disappear in the process of cultural formation. It makes sense to call ‘religion’ also those forms of life that may not be so self-evident. This experiential basis broadens the concept of religion beyond the semiotic definition. A second phenomenological perspective, called “living religion,” connects the theory and research of religion to the expressive and symbolic behavior of people in their everyday life. Religious experience and living religiously in general, therefore, has to be also understood as an open, searching movement within everyday life. Its praxis might consist of meaning making processes in individual prayers, preaching and other forms of proclamation like individual witnessing, but it also includes other phenomena like dreams, mystical encounters, moments of extreme fascination towards that what cannot be expressed by human language, towards the numinous and the holy. This twofold concept is part of a theoretical reflection. To say, “‘Religion’ and ‘the religious’ are principally to be seen as “discursive activities” (Matthes 1992, 129.), and it does not mean the attempt to clearly identify religiously qualified things in reality. Instead, it does prevent making religion a thing. My bi-polar concept of religion does not have two sections (areas) of objects “out there in reality” (divided up according to institution and individual). Instead, my theory deals with two perspectives similar to the unity of “noema” and “noesis” described by Husserl (Husserl 1970). Religious traditions can be perceived and described not only as final results, but also as processes of becoming. One can also reconstruct productive forces for new explanations of meaning. Naturally, individuals do not always formulate new forms of meaning but refer to that which is pre-given, the suppositions of life that come from the experience of humanity. Individuals do not necessarily describe such seeking activity and such expressive acts in their everyday language as “religious” (Waardenburg 1984, 239). It is the task and the responsibility of the

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academic to reconstruct such processes theoretically; to present them as being of great significance for religion, insofar as they describe religion in it’s becoming. That is, where ever “this our world appears as another world, as a world that is not complete but in its becoming” (Waldenfels 1994b, 236). It is my conviction that a broader, thus phenomenological perspective of everyday culture in a life world sense challenges theology to a broader understanding of religion. And this challenge is not solely only about trying to understand new forms of religion, but more so about discovering neglected essential elements and behaviours in traditional forms of religion. Key words for this discovery might be, nonverbal expressive behaviours, the experience of atmosphere at particular places, irritation and encounters with the strange, dreams, images of home and homelessness, self-images, the feasts and fragilities of life, and yes, the enjoyments of life. 3.2

The Primacy of Perception and Life-world

Corresponding to a theological concept of “living religion” is a genuine phenomenological way to perceive and to conceive reality from a life-world perspective. The overall interest can be caracterized as “seeking to describe rather than to explain, in valuing interpretation rather than ‘objective truth’, in opposing reductionism while focusing on intentionality, coherence, and intelligibility, and in assuming a fundamental pre-reflective, non rational part of experience, which is consciously available to the person” (Aden 1990, 911). Phenomenological theory founded by Husserl has been developed through the 20th century in various and even different movements, as a transcendental philosophy of consciousness, as an ontological analysis of existence, even as a phenomenology of religion (van der Leeuw). Central to my theological model is none of these types but rather a phenomenological habit based on a ‘science of the life world’ developed by Husserl (Husserl 1936) and further developed as a ‘phenomenology of perception’ by the French M. Merleau-Ponty (Merleau-Ponty 1962), and the German B. Waldenfels (Waldenfels 1994a). Essential to the concept of sense perception I am using are several elements (cf. Heimbrock 2002). Specifically human perception does not happen in an abstract, intellectualistic, way nor in a causalmechanistic way, but rather in a situated connection to a finite bodily subject of perception, living and perceiving the world in a specific

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spatial situation. Through my body, I understand the other, I become aware of ‘things’ through my body (Merleau-Ponty). Perceptions grounded in the body, as meaningful gestures, are, like the subject him/or herself, to be understood through my body, even though these meaningful gestures are in situations of daily life not the results of previously taken, conscious decisions to act. Perception might focus on particular objects, however it always takes place in situative contexts and fields, which have a foreground and a background, a horizon of perception. Describing a distinct object always includes steps of abstraction to everyday situations. Out of this follows the perceptivity and ‘unfinishedness’ of the perception of any given object. Every world-view “Welt-Anschauung” is being formed perspectively, i.e. out of certain indistinguishable standpoints. Furthermore, perception is interactive and intentional. It is me who listens, who examines, who looks at, who tries to understand something. There is no perception without elementary human activity, e.g. in the form of paying attention. So, acts of perception and perceptually grounded formations of meaning are not to be misunderstood as being naturalistic, because they are always pre-formed through social codes and superimposed by unconscious desire. And very often they carry a heavy value load, might it be a friendly smile, a critical look or even an “evil eye”. A phenomenological concept of perception leads to an open concept of experience that is not fixated towards facts like a positivistic model does. Reality is conceived differently. In this theoretical interpretation there is heavy stress on the possibility that perceptive activities lead to the awareness of the limits of our ‘regular’ seeing. Every now and then, that which is unclear, the opaque, the borders of normality, irritating and strange phenomena, that which is “beyond” the expected shows itself. A phenomenological concept of perception, unlike a naive sensualism, emphasizes the ambivalence of perception. This idea is pointing in two directions. On the one side this model of perception, does not aim at a photocopy theory of senses. On the other side, phenomenology is pointing at those elements of perception where reality is fading from our view. It is also sensually given that together with the perceptibility, visibility, and audibility of things, they are hiding, disappearing, becoming invisible. “Das Sichzeigen geht Hand in Hand mit einem Sichnichtzeigen.” (Waldenfels 2001, 63).

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As a consequence phenomenology does not lead to a naïve empirical theology. Using phenomenological understanding of different qualities of perception leads to a shift of the interpretation of faith. The phenomenological notion of seeing the world differently could be used to point at faith in a different way, focussing on its behavioural or process characteristic and reinforcing process thinking. It leads to the question of whether faith is fully described as a complete and fixed universe of symbols labelled religious, Christian, and biblical, or not. Different modes and intentions of human perception, particularly “seeing the world as another” do not indicate a range of facts in reality. That is exactly the point where a theological necessity arises to broaden the concept of religion and include also elements of everyday life. To introduce the phenomenological concept of perception in theology is not only connected with a concept of human beings as embodied subjects but also with a specific perspective on everyday life, taken as ‘life-world’. Life-world in the sense of the Husserl’s ‘science of the life world’ (Husserl 1970) aims at the pre-scientific encounter with the world; it precedes any conceptual structuring of reality by naming this reality with human language. In this way reality appears to us first as a whole and as a “gestalt” before we distinguish different pieces in conscious activities (Husserl 1970). Reflecting on the life world means stepping back from the self-evident, and given basics of life. Therefore to think in the life world subjectively is not to circumvent the context, as a horizon or as a form of praxis of life, nor does restrict thinking in a narrow, circumspect way. Rather, it stimulates in that it encourages reflection about the blind spots of any perception. Inasmuch as the unusual and extraordinary is grounded in the usual, in the everyday life, in theology we also have to take serious ‘life-world’ as a basic of meaning-giving processes and as a universal horizon, to which meaning is aiming at. ‘Life-world’ in this sense may be the object of theoretical criticism, but at the same time it remains as a source to critique the very science and method that may tend to forget about life or even be imperialistic against life. In theory the concept can function as a critical advocate in favor of the subject against the institution.

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4. How to Do Phenomenological Research in Practical Theology? I will now try to indicate the methodological steps, and tools of phenomenological research in practical theology. How do we perceive and conceive of religion in urban life? How do we study, in discernable forms and formats, how one relates religion to one’s own life in the most basic and general way? Because the living forms of religion embedded in urban culture do not simply repeat or illustrate a general concept of religion in a particular local setting. One will not develop a complete picture of religion in the city if it is only deduced from traditional and general concepts. The research process is neither a naïve collection of data in an undefined process, nor is it the testing of pre-established hypotheses, a process that only refines elements in a picture that has already been drawn. Phenomenological reflection about perception has shown in detail that observations and perception of reality are always preconditioned, sometimes even distorted by inner emotional forces, perspectives and interests, like e.g. by images of mass media or by ruling metaphors in society. My methodology combines more generalised formulations with specific steps of the way to study the concrete object of living religion in urban everyday life, or objects of religious relevance. This process is inductive, trying to avoid a know-it-all theory, before we know anything in this life world approach. There are some characteristic elements for a research approach that follows phenomenological theory, or better, a research ‘habit’, but there is no purely ‘phenomenological method’ for empirical research. It is necessary to combine methodological steps of several disciplines in line with phenomenological key ideas, among them, hermeneutics, social phenomenology, ethnography, gestalt psychology, and psychoanalysis. I give some clarifications, remembering some concrete element within the field of urban culture, that has been outlined above. 4.1

The Methodological Paradox

Scientific validity of any research is based on methodical ways to get knowledge that can be controlled and used, or falsified. Applying this principle to a research methodology based on phenomenology leads to a fundamental paradox. The approach sketched above which is oriented towards “living religion” essentially insists on the openness

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of the concept of religion against every attempt to take too much control of the subject matter by way of foreclosing, or fore ordaining the results, through using narrow definitions from the beginning. But how can this be objectified and controlled in a research process? How do we organise a research routine to approach the unexpected and the strange? It is evident that it cannot be planed completely if the method excludes the very object. This argument is a strong warning against the ‘technisizing’ of the phenomenological method in empirical theology. Out of this necessary objection follows that this phenomenological attitude can never be—neither methodologically nor conceptually—a substitute for the exactness of scientific knowledge or of logical concepts. However, its “precise imprecision” (Moxter 2000) is not an epistemological deficiency, instead, it is a plus for method and research. In principle this is in accordance with a theological understanding of reality according to a spiritual perception of reality as an open process. 4.2

Perception

Research praxis does not start with a sterile sifting of data, nor does it start judging perceptive elements at once, it rather starts with an open awareness. It will activate unspecific perceptions, using an “ignorant eye” (Lealman 1998). So we start by seeing and listening to the scenery in the mall, through smelling and touching at a central station. This makes the researcher’s awareness of, and resonance with a specific atmosphere within a particular situation (‘Anmutungsqualität’), the initial ‘gestalt’ that is perceived as a whole prior to specific and guided perceptions of distinct object, critical for a self control. This activity is related to a broader spectrum of sources, including not only written official documents but also those things from daily culture, from dreams, from paintings, and many more things from an aesthetic perspective. Relevant are also the hesitations, open places and omitted steps of people’s comments to the researcher’s stimulus. The research process is a constant, circular movement, between discovering, perception, understanding and interpretation. Likewise it is a good test question for the researcher to ask him or herself about what cannot be investigated about the research object through sensual perceptions.

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The Research Situation as Field

Proceeding in the life world perspective asks for one to enter a situation in everyday life as a concrete setting, as a field, it might be even a “field of dream” This concrete scenery has a spatial as well as temporal structure. A ‘field’ in ethnography is an unknown and unstructured terrain, which a researcher enters bodily and mentally, gets involved in, and may meet known or unknown images, visions, and occurrences. This field is set up by perceptions as well by activities. But it is not completely pre-established as a static entity. It is rather a dynamic interactive space, where people will develop connections and contexts (Waldenfels 1994a, 135). We see a customer taking a concrete position on a market, with his body and gestures and with verbal communication. We perceive meaning making processes of communication and interaction between people. But we perceive the field of a street corner also shaped by nature, by the particular shape of the sunlight that falls upon the building or by the elegant marble steps we touch with our feet mounting the way to the entrance of a bank building. 4.4

The Researcher as Subject

The above given brief outline of key concepts for a phenomenological understanding is not only relevant as theoretical model for everyday life as object of research, but has crucial impact on the research process as well. It asks for a methodology as well as for an actual research praxis in which the researching human being perceives his research field not only as distinct object, but also in the described sense by way of a life world approach. To deal deliberately with the results of this approach is the next and reflexive step. The challenge however, of phenomenological research is not to extinguish them. But inasmuch as bodily rooted perception is an interactive process, it is also of great relevance for the researcher to note how perception is affecting the subject and him, the researcher. Each perception will yield data of great importance for this interaction. It can determine mood, for example, which may effect the researcher’s interpretation of the subject’s reaction, or perception.

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Usually empirical research starts with clarifying the research object as much as possible. In this logic a concrete object is taken as “a case of ”, as a representation of general principles. The model I refer to takes a ‘phenomenon’ as a more open ‘field’ or scenery. Doing research then starts with the researcher’s suspicion that he or she initially has to unfold the very object of research because he/she does not know everyday life completely. It is behaving like a detective. A researcher has an overall idea guiding his or her open perspective, nevertheless is looking for elements of a puzzle, he or she has not perceived before. I enter a school building to listen to a Religious Education class. However my first attention is captured by the disgusting smell of cleaning material. 4.6

The Intention: A Phenomenological Description

The overall intention of the research process is to give a “phenomenological description.” It partly resembles what ethnographic methodology calls “thick description” (Geertz 1999); which means not simply collecting a cadre or an inventory of facts of consciousness. The “thick description” unfolds meaning; its task is “saying something of something, and saying it to somebody (Geertz 1973a).” This type of description comes down to a procedure that resembles the experiential process itself. It intends to gain access “to the conceptual world in which our subjects live, so that we can . . . converse with them” (Geertz 1999, 24). It is this intention to perceive and accept other people in their life situation with their forms of expression of the meaning in life as subjects of religion, that makes cultural anthropology a useful ally in empirical research. Ethnography as well as phenomenology hold that discovering reality in cultural theory is not refining data in the sense of mere reproductions. This type of hermeneutic, scientific activity contains a constructive element, that shows something, which is not simply “a matter of fact.” Participant observation and ethnographic description, although related to given realities, have a creative and imaginative element, they are a piece of art (Waardenburg 1984). “A successful description makes visible with words, it helps us to see, what we would not see without it.” (Waldenfels 2001, p. 76). And there is no exact and final interpretation of life.

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5. Dealing with Normativity As to the issue of normativity this model of empirical theology in the key concepts and research methods derived from phenomenology shows a specific profile. The first point is a productive reservation. Phenomenological research does not start with an explicit and completely predefined normative basis of a concept of faith, from which it would draw the findings of research, nor does it simply pretend to collect observations in a neutral way. Practical theology with an empirical interest can profit from the approach to living religion, because it is able to protect life-world against an all too narrow normative preoccupied concept of ‘pure’ religion. Phenomenology in that sense is helpful for theology as an “anti-formalist correction”, as Farley has called it (Farley 1975, 52). As to the issue of religious elements in urban culture, remembering powerful religious symbols like “Babylon as the great whore” or the proverbial use of “Sodom and Gomorrah”, it is evident that a theology interested in reality gains much if it frees itself from these biased and value laden images. Opening the picture for a broader cultural context of religious life enables research to show productive forces and sources of new religious elements within urban life. Second, however, it would be an error to identify this with a neutral stance without any norms. Phenomenology, although using the ‘epoché’ for some steps of description, is based on normative ground, and its specific methods have normative implications. Following Husserl’s and Merleau-Ponty’s prevalence of perception in the scientific process of empirical theology introduces a specific combination of openness and nevertheless orientedness. There might be no doubt, that this broader approach to research on religion arises from normative decisions. Phenomenological research draws on implicite pre-reflective normativity within life world praxis. Reflecting on these normative layers makes it possible to identify them and to discuss their interrelatedness with explicit theological values of Christian faith. That can be indicated in terms of objects as well as of methods. As to my overall research object, in clear contrast to the traditions of ‘phenomenology of religion’ a life world approach does not deal with distinct ‘religious things’, but always starts and ends up with a broad perspective on life, connected to everyday culture. If

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Practical Theology is oriented to the object of ‘living religion’ it is crucial to avoid a reductive approach of only studying ‘faith’ or a ‘religious community’, but to distinguish between religion of the ‘experts’ and religion of lay people. Distinguishing between official teachings of Christianity as ‘theology’ and ‘religion’ as the personal related process of a creative answer to institutionalised religion is a typical modern distinction between ‘theology’ and ‘religion’ historically dating back to enlightenment theology (Ahlers 1980). It essentially advocates the role of the individual as subject of his or her religion and is highly related to the protestant value decision concerning the subject’s faith. Theology fully picks up the ‘life world’ approach only if it makes use of the broadness and ambiguity of this concept. Life world means at least two elements: first the ensemble of elements given through the senses, but second, it points at a meaningful world to the perceiving subject. Everyday life also is not neutral or chaotic in terms of values, and structures of order. Not only ethical judgments contain a world view. Already observing and describing sensual perceptions through body and mind carries on an understanding of life, on a meaningful world for me, a world of self evidence or an encounter with the extraordinary, the strange, or sometimes with the holy. So life world is a genetic basis for normativity (Waldenfels 1994a, p. 129ff.). The normative impact of phenomenological methods also can clearly be indicated. To perceive the atmosphere on a football field as ‘living’, ‘fascinating’ or ‘frightening’ is always a particular subject related perception, rooted in bodily conditions and coloured by specific cultural values that were relevant in my previous biography. Husserl’s ‘epoché’ by no means tries to gain total neutrality of perception: “The phenomenological method is one which acknowledges the subjective nature of all experience and helps people to become aware of and set aside their particular subjective stances. It is recognized that neutrality is impossible.” (Leech 1998, p. 94). To stay at the subject related perceptions and not to reduce the findings to generalised trends is another theoretical decision that again is value laden in itself. To be attentive to life in terms of a phenomenological habit is, profiled against a quantitative approach, that measures correlations or factors, another value decision. Compared to many other empirical theories the phenomenological model introduces normativity on a new level, identifying normativity

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not only as the precondition or as the consequence of the research process as stated in the three steps model mentioned in the first passage. To start with an explicit pre-established body of generalised norms or expelling them from the empirical research process in favor of a better contact to ‘reality’ is perhaps too short. The involvement of norms within a scientific theory cannot be reduced to dealing with explicit normative propositions. Phenomenology underlines, as other empirical theories, that also enacting methodical ways in itself contain elements of normativity. Further on it contests the illusion of any empirical research to get a direct ‘access’ to the ‘facts’ of life underneath a normative basis. And it emphasises the value of a perceiving subject, again in itself a norm that seems to be of high theological interest. Of course all these arguments do not want to replace explicit ‘high’ normative principles of ethical reflection in theology or philosophy. They rather try to point at some of their roots in everyday life. 6. Phenomenological Research and Progress in Contextual Theology Reflecting on normative qualities of phenomenological methods already gave way to an evaluation of my model in a general theological perspective. In the final passage I try to enlarge the view again indicating some contributions of empirical theological based on phenomenology to the overall contextual orientation of theology, mentioned in the first passage. 6.1

New Understanding of Context

A phenomenological research model opens the theological horizon to perceive religion and faith in a much broader sense than the usual textual hermeneutical way. Religion, and also faith in a theological understanding, must not be restricted to teachings and to texts. It is more than communicating about textual messages seen in a hermeneutic model, but it must also include nature and cosmology. Studying “living religion” asks for discovering also new issues and phenomena outside official church interpretations which are relevant for theology. Introducing the concept of ‘field’ opens also the understanding of what “con-textual” might mean. Everyday life taken as theological context is more than the frame, it is the field of contextualisation.

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Everyday life might not be restricted to a field where only answers are given concerning religious experiences made on Sundays, where norms and values have to be applicated and proved. In contrast, a life world approach enables to get a clearer impression of the productive capacities of human subjects concerning religion in their everyday lives. 6.2

Doing Theology

The phenomenological approach with its emphasis on the subject picks up a central notion of liberation theology that people do theology themselves, rather than only receive it from the experts. The idea of discovering religion in everyday life opens the perspective for conceiving human religious praxis as the practical aspects of subjects inseparably tied to cultural contexts in the steps of “Constructing Local Theologies” as R. Schreiter has pointed out (Schreiter 1985). Stressing this idea follows a core pre-text of the Reformation, people being self responsible and capable for their faith, for their particular way to encounter God; and another critical ideology of the Christian creed. The Spirit is the ongoing presence of God’s creation and revelation within this world. 6.3

Everyday Culture

That model again stresses the approach of theology as cultural theory. Enculturation of the gospel is not a secondary formation of the substance of the gospel standing for itself, but can only be adequately understood as a concrete formation of the gospel within certain situations of life. So life world theology contributes to the reshaping of theology as a cultural science. However it does not follow the unconscious bias to simply deal with high culture (which is typical at least for European Protestantism). Not only with high cultural experiences like paintings of Rembrandt or music from Bach, but also with and through the most simple materials and occurrences of daily routine (like furniture or cars, or the riding of the subway) there can be interpreted a “gestalt” of life models, inasmuch as individuals take them as “transfigurations” of the pure material (Mädler 2001). This contributes to a reshaped theology of creation and a self-critical question about the mentalistic narrow-mindedness of modern theology.

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Beyond the Visible

Finally: the phenomenological approach to experience by way of sensual perception helps to reinforce the central theological dialectics experiencing God described by M. Luther in his model of God between “revelatus” and “absconditus”. All perception of God through the human being, all awareness of transcendence in immanence— may it be seen as a new way of speaking, a new way of seeing or a new way of hearing—does, theologically, not aim at an act of uncovering or fixing. Instead, it aims at the act of opening oneself to the mysterious structure of life and to its dignity and protection. References Aden, L. (1990). Phenomenological Method in Pastoral Care. In R. Hunter (Ed.), Dictionary of Pastoral Care and Counseling (911f.). Nashville Abingdon Press. Ahlers, B. (1980). Die Unterscheidung von Theologie und Religion. Ein Beitrag zur Vorgeschichte der modernen Praktischen Theologie im 18. Jahrhundert. Gütersloh: Gerd Mohn. [The distinction between theology and religion. A contribution to the history of modern practical theology]. Augé, M. (1994). Orte und Nicht-Orte. Vorüberlegungen zu einer Ethnologie der Einsamkeit. Frankfurt/M: S. Fischer. [Places and Non-places. Considerations about an ethnography of loneliness]. Bevans, S.B. (1994). Models of contextual Theology. New York: Orbis Books. Browning, D.S. (1991). A Fundamental Practical Theology. Descriptive and Strategic Proposals. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Cox, H. (1965). The Secular City. New York. Farley, E. (1975). Ecclesial Man. A Social Phenomenology of Faith and Reality. Philadelphia: Fortress Press. —— (1983). Theologia. The Fragmentation and Unity of Theological Education. Philadelphia: Fortress Press. —— (1983b). Theology and Practice outside the Clerical Paradigm. In D. Browning (Ed.), Practical Theology. (21–41). San Francisco. Failing W.H. & Heimbrock, H.-G. (1998). Gelebte Religion wahrnehmen. Lebenswelt— Alltagskultur—Religionspraxis. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer [Perceiving living religion. Lifeworld—everyday culture—religious practice]. Failing, W.E. & Heimbrock, H.-G. & Lotz, T.H. (2001). Religion als Phänomen. Sozialwissenschaftliche, theologische und philosophische Erkundungen in der Lebenswelt. Berlin: De Gruyter. [Religion as phenomenon. Sociological, theological, and philosophical inquiries to the life world]. Gerkin, C. (1984). The Living Human Document. Re-Visioning Pastoral Counseling in a Hermeneutical Mode. Nashville: Abingdon Press. Geertz, C. (1973a). Thick Description. Toward in Interpretative Theory of Culture. In C. Geertz (Ed.), The Interpretation of Cultures. (3–30). New York: Basic Books. —— (1973b). Religion as a cultural system. In C. Geertz (Ed.), The Interpretation of Cultures (3–30). New York: Basic Books. Heimbrock, H.-G. (1984). Empirische Hermeneutik in der Praktischen Theologie. In J.A. van der Ven & H.-G. Ziebertz (Eds.), Paradigmenentwicklung in der Praktischen

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Theologie (49–67). Weinheim: Deutscher Studien-Verlag. [Empirical hermeneutics within practical theology]. —— (2002). Wahrnehmung als Element der Wahr-Nehmung. In A. Grözinger & G. Pfleiderer (Eds.), “Gelebte Religion” als Programmbegriff Systematischer und Praktischer Theologie (65–90). Zürich. [Perception as element of perceiving truth]. Husserl, E. (1936/1970). The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. Evanston, Il.: North-western University Press. Kjellberg, S. (2000). Urban Ecotheology. Utrecht: International Books. Lealman, B. (1998). The Ignorant Eye: Perception and Religious Education. In H.-G. Heimbrock (Ed.), Religionspädagogik und Phänomenologie. Von der empirischen Wende zu Lebenswelt (131–137). Weinheim: Deutscher Studien-Verlag. Leech, A.J.H. (1998). Another Look at Phenomenology and Religious Education. In H.-G. Heimbrock (Ed.), Religionspädagogik und Phänomenologie. Von der empirischen Wende zur Lebenswelt (93–100). Weinheim: Deutscher Studien-Verlag. [Religious Education and Phenomenology. From the empirical turn towards life world]. Luckmann, T. (1991). Die unsichtbare Religion. Frankfurt/M: Suhrkamp. [The invisible religion] Macleod, R.B. (1964). ‘Phenomenology: A Challenge to Experimental Psychology’. In T.W. Wann (Ed.), Behaviourism and Phenomenology. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Mädler, I. (2001). “Habeo ergo sum” oder Besitz muss nicht vom Teufel sein— Praktisch-theologische Anmerkungen zu einer Kultur des Habens. In M. Witte (Ed.), Religionskultur—Zur Beziehung von Religion und Kultur in der Gesellschaft. Beiträge des Fachbereichs Evangelische Theologie an der Universität Frankfurt am Main (367–411). Würzburg: Religion-und-Kultur-Verlag. [“Habeo ergo sum” or: property must not be diabolical. Practical theological remarks on the culture to have]. Matthes, J. (1992). Auf der Suche nach dem Religiösen. Reflexionen zur Theorie und Empirie religionssoziologischer Forschung. Sociologia Internationalis (30), 129–142. [In search of the religious. Reflections on theory and practice of research in sociology of religion]. Merleau-Ponty, M. (1962). Phenomenology of Perception. London. Moustakas, C. (1994). Phenomenological Research Methods. Thousand Oakes London: New Delhi: Sage Publications. Moxter, M. (2000). Kultur als Lebenswelt. Tübingen: Mohr. [Culture as life world]. Oden, T.C. (1969). The Structure of Awareness. Nashville: Abingdon Press. Peukert, H. (1984). Science, Action and Fundamental Theology. Cambridge. Rebholz, J. & Rech, S. (1998). Frankfurt am Main: An Anthropological City Guide. Frankfurt/M: Institut für Kulturanthropologie und Europäische Ethnologie der Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität Frankfurt am Main. Schreiter, R. (1985). Constructing Local Theologies. New York: Orbis Books. —— (1999). The New Catholicity. Theology between the Global and the Local. New York: Orbis Books. Van der Leeuw, G. (1938). Religion in Essence and Manifestation, London: Allen and Unwin. Van der Ven, J.A. (1991). Entwurf einer empirischen Theologie. Kampen: Kok. [Practical Theology. An Empirical Approach] —— (2002). An Empirical or a normative approach to practical-theological Research? A false Dilemma. Journal of Empirical Theology 15 (2), 5–33. Waardenburg, J. (1978). Reflections on the Study of Religion. The Hague: Mouton. —— (1984). Über die Religion der Religionswissenschaft. NZSThRPh 26, 238–255. Waldenfels, B. (1994a). In den Netzen der Lebenswelt. Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp [In the web of life world] —— (1994b). Ordnungen des Sichtbaren. In: G. Boehm (Ed.), Was ist ein Bild? (231–252) München: Wilhelm Fink. [Orders of the visible]

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—— (2001). Phänomenologie der Erfahrung und das Dilemma einer Religionsphänomenologie, In W.E. Failing, H.-G. Heimbrock & T.H. Lotz (Eds.), Religion als Phänomen. Sozial-wissenschaftliche, theologische und philosophische Erkundungen in der Lebenswelt (63–84). Berlin: De Gruyter. [Phenomenology of experience and the dilemma of phenomenology of religion]. Zerfaß, R. (1974). Das Theorie-Praxis-Problem in der Praktischen Theologie. In F. Klostermann & R. Zerfaß (Eds.), Praktische Theologie heute (103–119). München, Mainz: Grünewald. [The theory-praxis problem within practical theology]. The project Medieval New York (http:/www.fordham.edu/halsall/med/medny.html).

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WHICH NORMATIVITY AND WHAT KIND OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH? From Dualism to Multiple Interplays F S The relationship between normativity and empirical research in theology is often treated without allowing for the full implications of this topic. Inadequate judgments occur almost with necessity when the discussion is limited to the developments of the time since the 1960s when empirical research started to play a more important role in practical theology and religious education. At that time, empirical research was often identified with an approach to reality which supposedly was not normative. More recent understandings of empirical research are much more cautious in this respect. They clearly acknowledge the importance of normativity within the actual process of empirical research (most recently cf. van der Ven 2002; Ziebertz 2002). In the present chapter I want to affirm this understanding from a somewhat different point of view. First, I will have a closer look at the situation in the 1960s when empirical methods started to play a more important role in theology. Here I will argue that it was a specific stage within theology which made normativity and empirical research look like opposites. Second, I will refer to Schleiermacher’s Brief Outline as one of the most influential models of modern theology in order to show that both, normativity and empirical research, are indispensable for theology. Moreover, Schleiermacher’s model can also make us aware of different types and levels of normativity and empirical research which must play a role for theology. Third, I will offer one of our recent Tübingen research projects as a case study to illustrate how the more limited context of a particular study mirrors the general considerations on the nature of theology. My basic argument aims at moving beyond the simple dualism which makes normativity and empirical research in theology look like two separate entities. The dualistic understanding goes back to a limited understanding of both, of empirical research as well as of normativity. Rather than holding on to this kind of dated understanding, we should allow for the multiple interplays between normative and empirical approaches to reality.

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1. The “Empirical Turn” in Theology and the Opposition to Normativity At least for theology and specifically for practical theology in Germany, one can speak of an “empirical turn” which was announced and actually took place, even if only to a limited degree, in the 1960s (Wegenast 1967) and which many refer to in order to identify a new phase of theological research. This turn implied that human experience should be taken much more seriously as a starting point for theology than was the case in the preceding period of theological theorizing. Yet treating the relationship between normativity and empirical research in theology by making the context of the 1960s the starting point has two major implications which are often overlooked. First, empirical research is identified with its often positivistic understandings held by many social scientists of the time. And second, normativity is identified with the particular kind of theology which was dominant during the decades before the 1960s. Consequently the relationship between normative and empirical views appears highly contradictory. Both approaches are considered to be mutually exclusive and incompatible. There are several reasons why this way of posing the problem is insufficient. The attempt of including empirical research within theology has in fact a much longer history than the last 30 or 40 years. Its earliest beginnings go back at least to the eighteenth century when, for example, first collections of studies in the psychology of religion were published under titles like “anthropology” or the “experiential study of the human soul” (Erfahrungsseelenkunde, Karl Philipp Moritz). Moreover, in the early twentieth century, empirical research pertaining to religion and theology became a central topic of practical theological discussions. The psychology of religion reached a new level through the highly influential studies of theologians and social scientists like William James, Edwin Diller Starbuck, George Albert Coe, Stanley Hall, and others in the United States and Wilhelm Wundt, Sigmund Freud, and others in Germany and Austria. At the same time, the sociology of religion also made considerable headway, following the lead, for example, of Max Weber and Ernst Troeltsch or of practical theologians like Otto Baumgarten and Paul Drews (cf. Drehsen 1988). Practical theologians and religious educators also started their own if often limited empirical studies at that time which indicates that the integration of empirical work within theology can-

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not be understood as long as we limit ourselves to what has to be considered the latest reappraisal of empirical research rather than taking account of the prolonged process of its actual introduction. This insight can also make us aware of the wide range of different methodologies which have been used for empirical research in the context of theology. Empirical research is not equivalent to positivism, and it is not expressive of a dominance of the social sciences. Even if there have been times when the social sciences played a dominant role in theology, the major tendency behind the empirical interest was never limited to a particular sociological or psychological approach. If it is possible to identify a single background for this tendency, it is the intention of living up to the challenges of modern culture (Drehsen 1988; Osmer & Schweitzer 2003). This is why I suggested that hermeneutical and empirical methods in theology are not opposed to each other but actually serve the same task of doing theology in the context of modern life worlds (Schweitzer 1993). Broadening our understanding of the place of empirical research in theology is an important task which leads us beyond the limited discussions of the 1960s. A similar task which is no less important refers to the understanding of theological normativity. We have to ask both questions—what kind of empirical research, and which normativity. When empirical research was (re-)introduced in the 1960s, theological normativity was often taken to mean normative expectations derived directly from revelation and from the Bible. In its juxtaposition to empirical research normativity seemed to imply that theology holds norms which contradict reality and which must be opposed to the experiences of contemporary people. In extreme cases, human experience appeared to be of no real importance to theological normativity. Obviously such an understanding of normativity holds true only for certain kinds of theology, like those kinds of kerygmatic or revelation theology which prevailed during the decades before the 1960s. Saying this, it is also clear that there are other kinds of theology which entertain different understandings of theological norms and of their relationship to human experience. Recent examples are correlational theologies or theologies of liberation which intentionally develop their normativity in close contact to human experience. And this kind of experiental theology is not limited to our present. A classic and probably the most influential example of a theology which is inclusive of historical and contemporary experiences

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can be found with Friedrich Schleiermacher whose model I will take up below. It is easy to see from these initial considerations that we cannot determine the relationship between normativity and empirical research if we limit ourselves to the so-called empirical turn in theology of the 1960s. The opposition between normativity and empirical research in theology probably made sense at that time but for a fuller understanding of their relationship we must take into account that we are in fact dealing with two variables, the understanding of empirical research and the understanding or theological normativity, and that different understandings of these variables will lead to different views of their relationship. This implies that we must look beyond practical theology and that we must ask what kind of normativity is supported by a certain kind of theology, how theological norms should operate or be applied from this respective point of view, and what role empirical insights are expected to play. This is another reason why I will take up, in the next section, Schleiermacher’s understanding of theology which offers a number of helpful insights into different kinds of theological normativity. Furthermore, his model of theology is also helpful for identifying the role of empirical research in theology. For reasons of space, I will however not pursue here the second question implied by my considerations on the so-called empirical turn in theology, i.e. the question of how empirical research and methodologies have developed since the 1960s. Clearly, the developments in fields like psychology, sociology, cultural studies, religious studies, etc. make it impossible to consider empirical research a single methodology or to identify empirical research with positivism. A more comprehensive account of the relationship between normativity and empirical research would have to include ample reference to these more recent varieties of doing empirical work and to the ways in which they have been taken up in theology (cf. Ziebertz 2001). It will also not be possible here to take up the important question of the relationship between theology and other academic disciplines like the social sciences—a question which must also be addressed in ways which are clearly different from the 1960s and which take account of the issue of pluralism within the academic world (cf. Herms 1996).

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2. Normative and Empirical Perspectives in Schleiermacher’s Understanding of Theology In this section I want to take up Schleiermacher’s foundational model of theology which he developed in the context of the new Berlin university and which he published in his famous Brief Outline in 1811 (Schleiermacher 1966). I will however not go into the discussions about this model because I am not trying to recommend this model here in any normative sense. The intention of what follows is much more limited. I do not want to quote Schleiermacher as the authority for today’s understanding but I want to use his model to demonstrate a number of insights which, at least from my point of view, hold true quite independently of the question if we want to adopt his model as a whole or not. Schleiermacher’s understanding of theology entails a view of theology as a complex process across various theological fields and subdisciplines which nevertheless implies the aim of theological unity. While many interpreters assume that today’s shape of the study of theology goes back to the so-called Berlin model first developed by Schleiermacher (cf. Farley 1983; Kelsey 1993), his model for theology is in fact quite different from what we commonly find today in theological faculties or seminaries. It is true that Schleiermacher’s Brief Outline on the Study of Theology of 1811 probably was the most important document in terms of introducing the new sub-discipline of practical theology. Yet rather than describing the sequence of subdisciplines from Old Testament Studies all the way down to practical theology as it is often done today, Schleiermacher only suggests three parts or phases of theology: philosophical theology, historical theology, practical theology. Most importantly it is the interplay between all three of them which makes theology possible. The three phases of theology are genuinely interdependent so that none of them can claim superiority or fulfill its specific task without the others. The task of philosophical theology is to determine what Schleiermacher calls the “essence of Christianity”, i.e. its distinctive character (Schleiermacher 1966, 25). Clearly, philosophical theology has a normative task. Theology is a normative discipline. But it is important to note that, for Schleiermacher, philosophical normativity is not independent from historical reality. His philosophical as well as his theological ethics is based on a historical-hermeneutical theory of culture which develops in constant conversation with the reality

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of contemporary Christian life (for an excellent introduction to this understanding of theology and ethics still see Birkner 1964). So he suggests a procedure which he calls “critical” because it compares the historical or empirical reality with theoretical notions: “The distinctive nature of Christianity no more allows of its being construed purely scientifically than of its being apprehended in a strictly empirical fashion. Consequently, it admits only of being defined critically . . ., by comparing what is historically given in Christianity with those contrasts by virtue of which various kinds of religious communities can be different from one another” (ibid., 29). In other words, from Schleiermacher’s point of view, it does not make sense to understand theological normativity as independent from the historical or empirical reality of Christianity or as just opposed to it. Ethics is not a free standing normative system but should be seen as the “science of the principles of history” (ibid., 30). At the same time, empirical reality cannot claim an ultimate status but has to be evaluated from a normative point of view (which in turn is, in part, empirical). The second part of theology which is called historical theology, aims at “knowledge” of Christianity. Here Schleiermacher mentions different levels of knowledge pertaining to Christianity—knowledge “(a) of its situation at any given time, and (b) of its past, with the realization that this community, regarded as a whole, is a historical entity, and that its present condition can be adequately grasped only when it is viewed as a product of the past” (ibid., 26). In this scheme historical theology includes much more than church history does today. It includes exegesis, church history, and what Schleiermacher calls “historical knowledge of the present condition of Christianity” (ibid., 71). The study of the present condition of Christianity is again subdivided into dogmatics on the one hand and church statistics on the other. Dogmatics is concerned with the “knowledge of doctrine now current in the evangelical Church”, while statistics refers to the “knowledge of the existing social condition in all the different parts of the Christian Church” (ibid., 71). Finally, as the last part of theology in this model, practical theology is considered the necessary consequence of the interplay between philosophical and historical theology. When philosophical theology critically considers the “condition of the Church at any given time”, an impulse arises toward “deliberative activity” based on this critical judgement (ibid., 91). Practical theology is responsible for developing

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“correct procedures” which can also be called “rules of art” (ibid., 92f.)—a reminder that such procedures must always be more than simple deductions from either normative or empirical perspectives. Rules of art necessarily include a creative element and are open for the future. It is also important to note that, in Schleiermacher’s model, the material field of practical theology covers the more traditional areas of worship and pastoral work but also more comprehensive areas like the internal structure of the church or the relationship between church and state. As mentioned earlier I am not interested here in evaluating Schleiermacher’s model as such. I am only using it in order to gain some insights into the interplay between normative and empirical aspects in this model. As has become clear even from my short rendering of this model, the relationship between these two aspects is present not only at one point but it permeates the whole model and consequently reoccurs at various different levels and junctures. Five different respects are of special importance: – Concerning the philosophy of science, theology is seen as a science which has its position between the speculative and the empirical sciences (which, by the way, does not mean that Schleiermacher wanted to shape theology according to the model of the natural sciences; ‘science’ is used here as a translation of the German word Wissenschaft which has a much broader meaning, including philosophy as well as history, exegesis as well as cultural studies, etc.). Moreover, with its philosophical, historical, and practical dimensions theology is in constant dialogue with speculative or normative disciplines as well as with empirical disciplines. – Concerning its historical task (which includes the present state of Christianity) theology depends on empirical knowledge. – The object under study in philosophical and historical theology is itself of a normative nature. It entails ethical orientations as well as creedal convictions which must be reconstructed on the basis of empirical knowledge. – Concerning its practical task theology must combine normative, historical/empirical, critical as well as practical (“technical” but nor “mechanical”) perspectives. – In all respects it is important to keep in mind that Schleiermacher’s whole model depends on an understanding for which normative perspectives are not isolated from empirical developments. As

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  mentioned above, his most comprehensive normative theory— called ethics—outlines “the principles of history”. In other words, it is itself a theory which is developed in constant dialogue with history in an empirical sense.

Since this understanding of ethics or normativity will probably not be familiar to many readers it may be helpful to point out some contemporary parallels from the field of philosophical ethics. Until today, normativity has often been set apart from historical and empirical considerations. Influential theorists like John Rawls (1971) or Jürgen Habermas (1984; 1987) advocate the view that normative statements can only be accepted if they can be shown to be universal. Following Kant’s rule of generalization expressed in the categorical imperative, they claim that any ethics based on history, tradition, or empirical arguments and therefore on contingent considerations necessarily falls short of the demand for universal validity. In contrast to this kind of universalism and more in line with Schleiermacher’s understanding, Michael Walzer (1983) is critical of what he perceives as the abstract character of this kind of ethical universalism. For him, normative statements must be developed in a recurrent process of interpretation which makes constant reference to different spheres of life in their actual or empirical shape. From all of this it is easy to see that the relationship between normativity and empirical research cannot be determined without taking into consideration theology as a whole. This is true even if the question is just about practical theology and its methodology. The possible role of empirical research will be judged very differently depending on the respective understanding of normativity which prevails in a certain kind of theology. The term normativity is ambiguous because it can refer to very different understandings of the character of theological norms—apart from empirical reality in one case and as deeply related to empirical reality in another case. Keeping in mind the place of practical theology within the overall scheme of theology is also helpful in becoming clear about the normative character of this sub-discipline. Recently, some practical theologians have criticized the so-called action model of practical theology (cf. Failing & Heimbrock 1998; Steck 2000). According to them, this model runs the risk of not allowing for fully adequate accounts of the empirical reality of religion in its various individual and social contexts. The normative interest in action, so the argu-

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ment runs, will easily curtail the interest in clear perception. For this reason, a phenomenological model should take over from the action model of practical theology (for further discussion see Schweitzer 2001; Mette 2001). As far as this proposal would lead to a purely empirical understanding of practical theology (in the sense of a phenomenological methodology) it will hardly be convincing, at least not as long as practical theology is to stay theology. Theology will and must always be normative. Otherwise the distinction between theology and religious studies would collapse—theology would cease to be theology and turn into religious studies. Moreover, as can easily be seen from Schleiermacher’s model, theology will always be critical of the given state of Christianity which implies that it includes the impulse for action. Consequently, in order for the cycle of theological studies to be comprehensive and complete, there must be a practical theology which is empirical and normative. To put it in a more general manner: What we can learn from Schleiermacher’s model (without making his model authoritative) is that theology can hardly function without giving due emphasis to a number of tasks which entail both, normative perspectives as well as empirical knowledge: – As Christian theology, this discipline must be conscious of the normativity which its Christian character implies. – If Christian normativity should not mean that its relationship to the historical situation can be neglected (a view which has not always been accepted in theology but which is at least very plausible, cf. Browning 1991), theology depends on empirical knowledge of—putting it into today’s terminology—the situation within the church as well as without the church or of culture, society, and religion in the broadest sense. – If the relationship between normative and empirical insights should not only be of theoretical interest but should include the impulse for improving the given situation according to norms like, for example, peace and justice, theology must also be interested in designing as well as evaluating strategies towards this goal. And again this practical interest in strategies includes normative as well as empirical tasks. These insights are of a general nature and can probably be shared by most theologians. This kind of consensus cannot be expected in respect to the understanding of theological normativity in its relationship to

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historical reality. Until today there are different views on this which are reflective of different theological traditions like Lutheran, Reformed, or Roman-Catholic traditions as well as different views within each of these traditions. A telling example in this respect is O. Fuchs’ recent attempt to conceptualise the relationship between practical theology and empirical research (Fuchs 2001). What he says about the need for critical theological evaluations of empirical data is quite in line with Schleiermacher’s model. Yet Fuchs bases his argument on an explicitly Roman Catholic teaching —the “sensus fidelium” and its role within the church (ibid., 7). This indicates that we must remain aware of different types of theology within different traditions. So the general conclusion in this respect can only be that, in determining the relationship between normativity and empirical research in theology, we must indeed ask both questions: Which normativity, and what kind of empirical research? Since my arguments in this chapter so far may sound too historical and too far away from contemporary research situations, I will now try to connect these considerations to some of my own research projects. 3. Normative and Empirical Aspects in Practical Theological Research Today: The Example of Researching Cooperative Religious Education In this section I want to take up one of our recent research projects in Tübingen as an illustration for the more abstract considerations in the first two paragraphs of this chapter. In doing this, my intention is not to give an account of this project as we have done elsewhere (Schweitzer et al. 2002, short version in English: Schweitzer & Boschki 2004). Rather, I am interested in the relationship between normative and empirical aspects in this piece of research. Consequently, my considerations in the following will be focussed on this interplay. The topic of the research project is cooperative religious education in German schools. While the cooperative model applies to ecumenical as well as to interreligious cooperation and also to cooperation with ethics or philosophy, the examples studied in this project have their focus on cooperation between Protestant and Catholic religious education. Our own project was empirical. It entailed interviews with students, teachers, and parents as well as classroom observation and the analysis of classroom interaction. At the same time, this project

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clearly shows an interplay of empirical and normative aspects which can illustrate, at least to some degree, what has been said above in reference to Schleiermacher’s model of theology. The starting point for this project was the controversial discussion about the confessional or non-confessional shape of religious education in German schools. Many contributions to this sometimes heated discussion were based, implicitly or explicitly, on factual claims about students’ wishes for a certain type of religious education, about teachers’ views, about cognitive and emotional development, about identity formation, etc. While all of these questions refer to empirical observations, the respective claims were based on personal impressions rather than on any kind of systematic research. The discussion about the shape of school religious education can be seen as a mix of normative and empirical claims concerning ecumenical theology as well as educational and psychological factors. Questions of the following kind play an important role: – Concerning church and theology: What kind of cooperation does justice to the insights gained in ecumenical dialogue? – Concerning the students, teachers, and parents: How do they feel about their own denominational identity? Do they even have a denominational identity? What are their wishes and expectations for the future concerning the relationship between different denominations? – Concerning the educational process: Do denominational factors play an actual role for teaching and learning in the classroom? Even this short list of questions clearly shows that normative and empirical aspects are very much interwoven in this project from the beginning. It was our intention to help clarify a number of normative issues which were themselves based on empirical assumptions. Moreover, theological arguments concerning normative ecumenical directions formed an important background of this project but they did not provide us with the answers needed for decisions about the practise of religious education. Helpful perspectives could only be achieved in constant dialogue between normative theological claims and empirical or practical insights. In my understanding, this can be considered an example for how different types of normativity play their roles. A type of ecumenical theology or normativity which sets itself apart from all historical considerations can hardly be used in

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an empirical context. An ecumenical theology which is inclusive of such considerations is open for empirical research. The research process itself which had to be carried out in this project included another important normative choice. Since a single empirical study can never cover all possible aspects it will always be selective. But what criteria control the selection of the aspects which will actually be addressed? In our case we made the decision to put the strongest emphasis on the children involved. Normative educational as well as anthropological convictions concerning the child make this choice mandatory for us (cf. for example Bunge 2001). This does not mean that, in making decisions about the shape of religious education, we should just look at what the children themselves are wishing for. But it does mean that decisions about education must always be based on what children need and what they can profit from (see Schweitzer 2000 concerning children’s right to religion). Inevitably, the focus on the children implied that other perspectives could not be researched with equal care. We could, for example, not give equal attention to the parents because our limited resources did not allow for more than one main focus. Clearly, this is an example of a considered normative choice which, at least in part, preceded our empirical research and which affects its results. Finally, our project lends itself to an interpretation in the sense of the threefold process of philosophical, historical, and practical theology. 1. The philosophical or theoretical starting point consists in theological views on ecumene which constitute normative expectations even if they are, among others, based on earlier experiences with ecumenical encounters and cooperation. In addition to this, it includes normative educational perspectives, for example, on the task of the school which again are not independent from empirical research. 2. Our empirical (or, in Schleiermacher’s terminology, historical) research allows for insights into the contemporary situation in respect to the views on ecumene of those who are involved in religious education, i.e. of students, teachers, and parents. It is important to note that these views can only be taken up through some kind of empirical investigation because they are not available, for example, in the form of books. At the same time, such views clearly include their own normativities. They express expectations, wishes, hopes, longings, etc.

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3. Practical perspectives can only be achieved by holding together the normative expectations and the empirical insights from the first two steps and by creatively designing strategies which are in line with both, the normative and the empirical insights. Moreover, such strategies constitute another kind of normativity, this time in relationship to the practise of religious education, and they also are in need of empirical evaluations in terms of their actual consequences. Other models of theology will probably use a different terminology and may also include more than the three steps which Schleiermacher refers to. Nevertheless they will somehow have to parallel the complex movements between normativity and empirical research described in this threefold procedure. 4. Conclusion It was my intention in this chapter to move beyond a simplistic dualism of normative and empirical approaches to reality in theology. From my point of view, we have to allow for multiple interplays between both of these approaches. An important step in this direction is to realize that there are not only different types of empirical research and corresponding methodologies but that the same holds true for theological normativity. Different theologies or theological normativities allow for different ways of being in dialogue with empirical research. It has also become clear that such methodological considerations are helpful but that they should not make us forget that they must be seen against the backdrop of even more far-reaching foundational questions of theology. The empirical turn of theology which can be observed since the eighteenth century is expressive of the attempt to correlate tradition and contemporary culture—not by falling prey to modernist adaptations but by critically evaluating both, traditional views and contemporary developments, and by tapping their potentials for a more humane life based on justice (Schweitzer 2003). The ultimate test of normative as well as of empirical approaches is not their methodological status (which necessarily plays an important role in the process of theological research) but is the challenge of a dialogical theology which is conversant with the inhabitants of our contemporary world.

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Birkner, H.J. (1964). Schleiermachers christliche Sittenlehre [Schleiermacher’s Christian Ethics]. Browning, D.S. (1991). A Fundamental Practical Theology: Descriptive and Strategic Proposals. Minneapolis: Fortress Press. Bunge, M.J. (2001). The Child in Christian Thought. Grand Rapids/Cambridge: W.B. Eerdmans. Drehsen, V. (1988). Neuzeitliche Konstitutionsbedingungen der Praktischen Theologie. Aspekte der theologischen Wende zur sozialkulturellen Lebenswelt christlicher Religion [Modern Foundational Conditions of Practical Theology: Aspects of the Theological Turn to the Sociocultural Life World of Christian Religion]. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus. Failing, W.-E. & Heimbrock, H.-G. (1998). Gelebte Religion wahrnehmen. Lebenswelt— Alltagskultur—Religionspraxis [Perceiving Lived Religion: Lifeworld—Everyday Culture— Religious Praxis]. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Farley, E. (1983). Theology and Practice Outside the Clerical Paradigm. In D.S. Browning (Ed.), Practical Theology: The Emerging Field in Theology, Church, and World. (21–41). San Francisco: Harper & Row. Fuchs, O. (2001). Relationship Between Practical Theology and Empirical Research. Journal of Empirical Theology 14 (1), 5–19. Habermas, J. (1984, 1987). The Theory of Communicative Action. 2 vls. Boston: Beacon. Herms, E. (1996). Die Theologie als Wissenschaft und die Theologischen Fakultäten an der Universität [Theology as a Science and the Theological Faculties at the University]. In J. Henkys & B. Weyel (Eds.), Einheit und Kontext. Praktisch-theologische Theoriebildung und Lehre im gesellschaftlichen Umfeld. Festschrift für Peter C. Bloth zum 65. Geburtstag. (155–186). Würzburg: Stephans-Buchhandlung. Kelsey, D.H. (1993). Between Athens and Berlin: The Theological Education Debate. Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans. Mette, N. (2001). Practical Theology: Theory of Aesthetics or Theory of Action? In P. Ballard & P. Couture (Eds.), Creativity, Imagination and Criticism: The Expressive Dimension in Practical Theology. (49–63). Cardiff: Academic Press. Osmer, R.R. & Schweitzer, F. (2003). Religious Education between Modernization and Globalization: New Perspectives on the United States and Germany. Grand Rapids/Cambridge: W.B. Eerdmans. Rawls, J. (1971). A Theory of Justice. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press. Schleiermacher, F. (1966). Brief Outline on the Study of Theology. Atlanta: J. Knox. Schweitzer, F. (1993). Praktische Theologie und Hermeneutik: Paradigma— Wissenschaftstheorie—Methodologie [Practical Theology and Hermeneutics: Paradigm—Philosophy of Science—Methodology]. In J.A. van der Ven & H.-G. Ziebertz (Eds.), Paradigmenentwicklung in der Praktischen Theologie. (19–48). Kampen/ Weinheim: Kok/DSV. —— (2000). Das Recht des Kindes auf Religion [Children’s Right to Religion]. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus. —— (2001). Creativity, Imagination and Criticism: The Expressive Dimension in Practical Theology. In P. Ballard & P. Couture (Eds.), Creativity, Imagination and Criticism: The Expressive Dimension in Practical Theology. (3–15). Cardiff: Academic Press. —— (2003). Postmoderner Lebenszyklus und Religion. Herausforderung für Theologie und Kirche. Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus [English edition: Postmodern Life Cycle and Religion. St. Louis: Chalice Press, to be published in 2004]. —— et al. (2002). Gemeinsamkeiten stärken—Unterschieden gerecht werden. Erfahrungen und Perspektiven zum konfessionell-kooperativen Religionsunterricht [Strengthening Togetherness—

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Doing Justice to Differences: Experiences and Perspectives for Cooperative Religious Education]. Freiburg/Gütersloh: Herder/Gütersloher Verlagshaus. Schweitzer, F./Boschki, R. (2004). What Children Need: Cooperative Religious Education in German Schools: Results from an Empirical Study. British Journal of Religious Education 26 (1), 33–44. Steck, W. (2000). Praktische Theologie. Horizonte der Religion—Konturen des neuzeitlichen Christentums—Strukturen der religiösen Lebenswelt [Practical Theology: Horizons of Religion—Contours of modern Christianity—Structures of the religious life world]. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Van der Ven, J.A. (2002). An Empirical or Normative Approach to PracticalTheological Research?. Journal of Empirical Theology 15 (2), 5–33. Walzer, M. (1983). Spheres of Justice: A Defense of Pluralism and Equality. Basic Books. Wegenast, K. (1967). Die empirische Wendung in der Religionspädagogik [ The Empirical Turn in Religious Education]. Der Evangelische Erzieher 20, 111–124. Ziebertz, H.-G. (2001). Empirical Orientation of Research in Religious Education. In B. Roebben & M. Warren (Eds.), Religious Education as Practical Theology: Essays in Honour of Professor Herman Lombaerts. (105–123). Leuven: Peeters. —— (2002). Normativity and Empirical Research in Practical Theology. Journal of Empirical Theology 15 (1), 5–18.

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AN EMPIRICAL OR A NORMATIVE APPROACH TO PRACTICAL-THEOLOGICAL RESEARCH?* A False Dilemma J A.   V Introduction The opening sentence of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics reads: “Every art (texnh) and every inquiry (meyodow), and similarly every action (prajiw) and choice (pro iresiw), is thought to aim at some good” (Nicomachean Ethics 1094a1).1 That is how Aristotle puts forward his action theory. Whatever that good may be (and what it is will be a matter of personal choice [Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics 1214b6–11]), not every good intrinsically contributes to the “good life” or, as Marcel Proust called it, the “true life”. Goods like money, power and fame are not good in themselves, even though they may contribute extrinsically to the good life as expressed in happiness, which is human flourishing. Genuine, intrinsic goods are friendship and love, and especially virtues like justice, temperance, fortitude and wisdom. These contribute to human flourishing —in fact, they are intrinsic to it (Sherman 1989; Adler 1991; Dent 1984; cf. Van der Ven 1998a, 349–352). As the opening sentence of the Nicomachean Ethics states, not only every prajiw but also every texnh is aimed at achieving some good. What is meant by texnh? From a modern point of view one might get the impression that it refers to proficiency at using certain methods and techniques. But this would be inaccurate, for texnh indicates, not some instrumental skill, but knowledge: a body of knowledge, elaborated understanding, science. Besides, texnh does not refer to something adequate but, as the quotation points out, to something

* An earlier version of this revised chapter appeared in Journal of Empirical Theology 15(2), 5–33. 1 All quotations from Aristotle are from The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Edition, edited by Jonathan Barnes, Princeton University Press, Princeton 1995.

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good. In Book I of Aristotle’s Metaphysics four characteristics of texnh are identified: it is exact knowledge, it is causally explanatory knowledge, it is generalised knowledge that permits prediction and, as mentioned already, it is aimed at some good (Metaphysics 980b26–982a2). Whereas prajiw refers to action that is aimed at some good, texnh indicates the scientific knowledge about prajiw, and is likewise aimed at some good. What forms of texnh does Aristotle cite? He calls practical philosophy a texnh, specifying ethics and political philosophy as instances. These scientific disciplines do not constitute an episthmh in the Platonic sense, for texnh implies knowledge about observable phenomena, while episthmh refers to a deductive system concerned throughout with universals such as identity, non-contradiction, the excluded middle, and so on. In other words, the texnh of ethics and political philosophy possess the four attributes mentioned above. But Aristotle also mentions another texnh: medical science. This science is a texnh par excellence, evidenced by the fact that Aristotle uses it as a model to explicate the nature of practical philosophy. This analogy had been used in Hellenistic philosophy before, by Democritus, Socrates and Plato (Nussbaum 1996, 53), and possibly others. Just as medical texnh aims at healing physical disease, so ethics is aimed at healing those who are mentally sick or feeble. There is good reason for bringing Aristotle into a paper on practical theology at the very beginning. Aristotle’s general characterisation of texnh provides me with two basic features that are relevant to a discussion of the nature of practical theology. The first basic feature is this: like Aristotelian texnh, practical theology as a practical science is directed toward phenomena; that is to say, its orientation is practical with a view to gleaning knowledge of four kinds: knowledge that is exact, causally explanatory, predictive and teachable. The second basic feature is that, like Aristotelian texnh, practical theology as a practical science aims at promoting human flourishing; that is to say, its orientation is normative. The same may be said about practical theology, because it assumes God’s absolute freedom aimed at goodness and his solidarity with suffering human beings as proclaimed and celebrated in the metaphor of God’s kingdom.2 This 2 For the relation between God’s freedom, goodness and solidarity, see Schillebeeckx 2002, 15–34; for God’s kingdom as metaphor of God, see Schillebeeckx 1989, 130–141.

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is underscored by the fact that God’s solidarity is concretely embodied in the prajiw of solidarity among human beings.3 Let us combine the two basic features: practical theology is both empirical and normative. In terms of the Aristotelian notion of texnh, practical theology may be regarded as the empirical science of human prajiw inasmuch as it is inspired by, and oriented toward, the prajiw of God’s solidarity. My paper is based on these two basic features. My thesis is that practical theology, because it is an empirical science, is normative. In other words: research in practical theology is normative, not despite but because of its empirical character. Of course, I do not base this on Aristotle alone. My paper seeks to clarify the modern epistemological status of practical theology in terms of the two basic Aristotelian attributes: empiricism and normativity.4 Neither do I stop at the insights described in my own earlier books and articles on the subject, as will emerge in due course: by its very nature science, including practical theology, is characterised by incremental insight. I shall try to explain the notion that practical theology is normative, not despite but because of its empirical character, as follows. A condition for the claim that practical theology is a normative science is that the empirical research conducted in this discipline must not be positivist but should be seen as wholly theory-laden (1). I then look into the normative orientation itself, with reference to one of the founders of empirical methodology, Karl Popper, focussing more particularly on the goal and the application of the results of empirical research (2). However, the methodical and technical “linkage” between goal and results is no less normative, in practical theology as well. I shall argue this point, with special reference to the complementary relation between qualitative and quantitative methods

3 This is not to say that God’s own praxis is the direct object of practical theology. The direct object is the praxis of solidarity among human beings, from the perspective of God’s solidarity, which forms itself the indirect object (cf. Van der Ven 1990, 119; Van der Ven 1993b, 103). 4 Of course, the relation between the empirical and normative orientation in practical theology’s status in the theory of science, to which I confine myself in this article, is not the only theme at issue when it comes to the normative aspects of empirical research in practical theology. Other themes include the relation between researcher and researched, researcher and colleagues, researcher and society, researcher and government, researcher and contract partners, researcher and co-workers; cf. Swanborn (1995).

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(3). This leads to a critical reflection on evaluation, which should be the culmination of every form of empirical research (4). In conclusion I shall reflect critically on the praxis concept in practical theology (5). 1. Empirical Research beyond Positivism We have pointed out that Aristotle, in developing his practical philosophy, proceeded from actual phenomena. He attached great importance to this, because he saw his task as liberating phenomena and the truth they represent from Plato’s speculative stranglehold. His slogan might have been: Back to phenomena! But what are these phenomena? In Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics he observes: “We must, as in all other cases, set the phenomena before us and, after first working through the puzzles, in this way go on to show, if possible, the truth of all the reputable beliefs about these experiences or, failing this, of the greater number and the most authoritative” (Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 1145b1–6, 1809).5 The combination of “phenomena”, “experiences”, “puzzles” and “beliefs” in this quotation is significant: they manifestly belong together. For science does not proceed from facts that exist independently of human beings, but from appearances (phenomena) that present themselves to people as data in which the facts “appear” to them (experiences). Because these data are associated with opinions (beliefs) about which people may differ, they pose problems of perception and interpretation (puzzles). And if the disagreements persist, we may be wise to follow the ideas of the majority (greater number) of scientists, and/or the most eminent (authoritative) among them. Hence phenomena are both observed and interpreted “facts”, or rather data, that give rise to debate: in principle every observer sees and interprets the “facts” differently. To put it in modern terms: there are no “hard facts”, there are “only” phenomena. These are constructions of our perception and interpretation, or rather, they are products of our per-

5 We have slightly modified Barnes’s translation in accordance with the translation of this passage by Nussbaum (1997, 240). Barnes’s translation reads: “We must, as in all other cases, set the phenomena before us and, after first discussing the difficulties (diaporhsantaw), go on to prove (deiknunai), if possible, the truth of all the reputable opinions (endoja) about these affections (ta payh) or, failing this, of the greater number and the most authoritative.”

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ceptual interpretation or interpretive perception, and hence open to discussion (Nussbaum 1997, 240–263). Empirical researchers in practical theology frequently debate the meaning of the data they have collected. These debates are not merely about the difference between qualitative and quantitative methods: within each method we sometimes question the meaning of our own data collection or that of another researcher. In the case of the qualitative method one might ask whether the active role of the researcher does not in fact entail more interpretation than perception. But even in the case of the quantitative method different operationalisations and measuring instruments raise the question of whether, and which aspect of, the phenomena at issue have actually been measured. How far removed are these considerations from the positivism of Bacon and Locke and the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle of Schlick and Carnap? As if empirical researchers merely register passively, as if they can “bracket” or suspend all the prejudices ( préjudices as well as “pré-judices”, as Gadamer would have said)6 that might inhere in their opinions and beliefs, as Husserl still believed, thus excising all historicity from the data (Ricoeur 1998). Anyone who has been educated in Popper’s school—originally a member of the Vienna Circle, Popper later became, along with Wittgenstein (albeit on very different grounds),7 one of its fiercest critics—can say with Aristotle: hard facts do not exist. According to Popper, one of the pioneers of empirical research, not only our hypotheses about the real word are theory-laden, because they consist of inferences from theories; the very concepts that we use in our hypotheses are determined by theory in every respect. Concepts have no meaning apart from the theories in which they are, wittingly or

6

Gadamer distinguishes between préjugés légitimes et illégitimes; cf. Gadamer 1960,

255. 7 The antagonism between these two philosophers stems partly from the fact that Wittgenstein maintained that there are no philosophical problems, only linguistic puzzles. This outraged Popper, who had for many years grappled with such philosophical problems as human knowing, induction and deduction, finitude and infinitude, and moral problems. When they met each other in 1946 on the occasion of a paper read by Popper at King’s College, Cambridge, Wittgenstein brandished a poker to emphasise a particular objection he was making to the paper. When he challenged his opponent finally to cite just one serious moral problem, Popper replied: “Not to threaten visiting lectures with pokers”, at which Wittgenstein stormed from the room; cf. Popper 1976, 123; Edmonds & Eidinow (2001), ch. 13.

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unwittingly, embedded.8 Even the methods that we use to observe reality, the very ‘facts’ that we observe, are all theory-laden. There are no theory-free ‘facts’, only theory-laden data (Popper 1986, 49–53). Thus Popper writes: “I mean the view that observations, and even more so observation statements and statements of experimental results, are always interpretations of the facts observed; that they are interpretations in the light of theories.”9 Throughout his life Popper opposed the proponents of pure inductivism, because in his view they, above all, denied the theory-laden nature of empirical research. He accused them of not fathoming Hume’s problem and of believing that one can infer a general conclusion or even a general theory from a finite set of observations. He called this an unscientific inductive leap. There is no such thing as inductive inference—that is based on the “myth of induction”; there are only deductive conclusions. In other words, Popper is saying that anyone who has—or rather, “makes”10—experiences with particular attributes, develops a speculation, has a certain expectation, is formulating a surmise, is making a prediction that certain, as yet unresearched experiences will turn out to have similar characteristics; and they do so on the basis of a conscious or unconscious, more or less explicit theory from which they deduce the prediction at issue.11 In conjunction with this, the principle of verification, which

8 Here Popper differs essentially from proponents of ordinary language analysis, at least inasmuch as the latter assume that such analysis reveals the meaning of words. Because Popper held that there is no such thing as “the” meaning of words, he opposed every form of definitional essentialism; Popper 1986, 59, note *1; Popper 1983, 310: “One should never get involved in verbal questions or questions of meaning, and never get interested in words. If challenged by the question of whether a word one uses really means this or perhaps that, then one should say: ‘I don’t know, and I am not interested in meanings; and if you wish, I will gladly accept your terminology’. This never does any harm. (. . .) We are interested in theories and how they stand up to critical discussion; and our critical discussion is controlled by our interest in truth.” 9 Footnote *3, which Popper added to the English edition (1959) of his original German methodological magnum opus of 1935, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1986, 107), starts as follows: “I now feel that I should have emphasized in this place a view which can be found elsewhere in the book.” 10 Popper is not a proponent of a “passivist” or “receptacle” theory of knowledge based on the “bucket theory of mind”, but of an “activist” theory of knowledge; cf. Popper 1974, 213–214. 11 Popper’s solution to Hume’s problem lies in a distinction between the logical and psychological approaches to the problem of induction: it is a psychological fact that we make predictions about future states of affairs on the basis of past experi-

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is only applicable once an infinite range of similar experiences has been researched, should be replaced by a principle of falsification, on the basis of which the prediction at issue is falsified, which falsifies even the theory itself. Thus there are no verified theories, only nonfalsified theories.12 2. The Norm-Laden Character of Empirical Research As we have said, Popper in no way denies the theory-laden character of research. But has he also recognised that our opinions and beliefs with which we approach reality are themselves marked by norms and values? Does he acknowledge—acknowledge sufficiently— the normative nature of theory-laden empirical research? This question is seldom asked, and it would seem that if it were asked, the answer would tend to be negative. Why? Popper devoted himself mainly to unravelling the philosophical methodological aspects of problems in mathematics and the natural sciences and was less concerned about the distinctive character of the human sciences.13 Yet

ence, but logically this cannot be sustained (cf. Popper 1983, 1–105), even though pragmatism considers it adequate vindication (cf. Ricoeur 1979, 73). 12 Whether Popper succeeded in solving Hume’s problem of induction by underscoring the importance of inductively testing the prediction deduced from the theory is questionable, at any rate in terms of the pragmatist epistemology underlying Peirce’s triad of deduction, induction and abduction, even though, on analysis of the terms used by both of them, the difference appears to be less great than might appear at face value; cf. Hookway 1992; on the significance of Peirce’s triad for theology, practical theology and religious education, see Gelpi 1994; Van der Ven 1998, 138–142; Prokopf & Ziebertz 2000, 19–50. 13 Popper also dealt with economics and history, albeit mainly in the framework of political philosophy. In that context he objected strenuously to what he called “historicism”, by which he meant a philosophy of history which describes and explains the course of history as intrinsically determined by its teleological structure and the future as almost deterministically governed by a “historicist prophecy”, prompting his charge of “oracular philosophy”; cf. Popper, The Poverty of Historicism 1944/1945; Popper 1974, 224; Popper 1997, 40–45. Not only Marxist or Nazi philosophy of history come under fire for their totalitarianism; Popper also attacks a theology of history, partly on theological grounds which he bases on Barth, as if God reveals himself in history and thus imparts meaning to it (Popper 1974, 271–273). However, by his own admission he was never as strongly drawn to the human sciences as to the theoretical natural sciences; neither did he consider himself primarily as a political philosopher; cf. Popper 1976, 121, 148. He also considered the difference between the natural sciences and the human sciences to be less great than did the exponents of the distinctive nature of the Geisteswissenschaften: “Yet there is no sharp division there” (Popper 1983, 183). This is because the

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such an answer is unsatisfactory, for on those occasions when he did deal with the human sciences, while not disregarding the value-laden character of empirical research, he tried as far as possible to play it down. According to the sociology of knowledge, says Popper, all knowledge of whatever kind is invariably influenced and even determined by social conditions such as social classes and social interests, and hence every form of knowledge degenerates into ideology. Only “the freely poised intelligence” (die freischwebende Intelligenz), which is only loosely anchored in social traditions, so the sociology of knowledge says, is capable of rising above ideologies and thus of unmasking them in social analyses, just as a Freudian psychiatrist is able to psychoanalyse an individual patient in order to expose the person’s illusion (Mannheim 1936). But, Popper maintains that such an ideology-critical social analysis can only be accomplished by a fraternity of, scientists, not by an individual intellectual. Only collectively, through their method of mutual criticism and public testing of research findings, can they reveal, step by step, the ideological aspects of knowledge in the scientific forum on the basis of “friendlyhostile cooperation”. This scientific forum consists in institutions such as the laboratory, workshops, scientific periodicals, seminars, conferences and congresses (Popper 1974, 212–223). In a nutshell, ideologycritical science stands or falls by the public character of the scientific forum.14 Hence Popper does not deny the value-laden character of empirical research, especially in the social sciences, but seeks as far as possible to repress it because of its potentially ideological nature. Only when it has been repressed as much as possible, says Popper, can research focus on that on which, morally, it should focus: alleviating the inhuman conditions to which groups, communities and pop-

humanities also apply the three principal components of every scientific method: problem solving, conjecture and refutation. To underscore the point he adds: “It is practised in reconstructing a damaged text as well as in constructing a theory of radioactivity” (1983, 185). Then he goes on the offensive with regard to positivism: “This alleged but non-existent method (. . .) is slavishly aped by some historians who believe that they can collect documentary evidence which, corresponding to the observations of natural science, forms the ‘empirical basis’ for their conclusions” (1983, 186). 14 Ricoeur responds very differently to the notion that sociology of knowledge is wholly determined by ideology, simply because the Archimedean position that sociologists are supposed to occupy does not exist. Ideology can only be adequately criticised on the basis of a concrete utopia; cf. Ricoeur 1986a, 159–180.

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ulations are subjected, because, on moral grounds, they deserve to be treated as equals, that is to say “as possessing equal rights, and equal claims to equal treatment”.15 Those who disregard the fact that all empirical research, particularly in the human sciences and in theology, is value-laden are in fact saying that it is value-neutral. In so doing they overlook the fact that such neutrality is a supposed neutrality which in itself conceals a whole network of norms and values.16 This network of values can be explained at two levels, one formal, the other material. On the formal side a supposed neutrality conceals what is known as a grand design. It is based on a belief that one can construct allencompassing laws and theories about natural, social and psychological phenomena. The aim is to devise a “theory of everything”, not just about nature around us, but also about society of which we are part and even about the individual human being as individual human being. The criteria are as follows: the written, the universal, the general, and the timeless (Durkheim 1982, 147–158; Van Brakel & Van der Brink 1988). As a result of critical reflection on this hidden agenda of modernity, current theory of science has come to realise that “the ‘modern’ focus on the written, the universal, the general, and the timeless (. . .) is being broadened to include once again the oral, the particular, the local, and the timely” (Toulmin 1990, 186).17 It favours and appreciates that which differs and varies, which does not fit into the theory once established, which differentiates and again de-differentiates, which is contextualised and again de-contextualised. It sees knowledge, beliefs, values, and norms as people’s contextual constructions in a given time and space, and sees them being deconstructed from different angles in different “decontexts”. It also sees institutions as socially and ideologically constructed, as radically historical entities, whereas they themselves practise “institutional reflexivity” 15 This excludes particularism in solidarity, which often occurs in religion (also in Christianity) and in fact includes universalism. The aim of public policy, and of the social sciences that must contribute to that policy, is not interpersonal love (no one can be compelled to love, and if people are it often leads to the hell of religious intolerance), but the alleviation and prevention of pain, suffering, injustice, to the benefit of each and every person in society; cf. Popper 1974, 224–258. 16 This is apparent in the mere fact that there is no neutral justification of neutrality, as evidenced by the differential positive and negative evaluations of it in Western and Islamic countries; cf. Struijs 1998; Taylor 1994a, 62. 17 From this perspective postmodernism can be interpreted in terms of reflexive modernity; cf. Schweitzer 2001, 173–175.

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and see themselves as self-reflexive and self-critical. The underlying Zeitgeist is an awareness of “self-conscious contingency” (Baumann 1990, 411–444). Theology, too, has been critical of modern grand design thinking, which has resulted in all sorts of changes, for instance in exegesis, church history, systematic theology and practical theology (Giddens 1991; cf. Hermans et al. 2002). As for the material level, empirical research based on grand design thinking appears to contain no vestige of substantive normative tradition, but that is another illusion. Every piece of research may be regarded as a project that forms part of a programme comprising several projects, while this programme fits into a scientific macroprogramme. The latter in its turn comprises various other programmes and itself forms part, instrumentally or contributively, of a form of life, to use a typical Wittgensteinian term (Brümmer 2001, 55–72). This form of life always comprises a particular normative tradition, including economic, political, social, cultural and religious norms and values, whether it is articulated or not.18 The distinction between project, programme, macro-programme and form of life is important when it comes to justifying empirical research. This is true in practical theology also. For example, the justification for a project on theodicy lies in a programme on God’s solidarity, and the justification for a programme on God’s solidarity lies in a macro-programme on God’s basileia, while the justification for a macro-programme on God’s basileia lies in a Christian form of life.19 In the debate between liberalism and communitarianism, representatives of the latter maintain that modern grand design thinking is based on the normative tradition of liberalism, which centres on the development of a liberal, universal, individualistic, de-traditionalized, rational society (MacIntyre 1988, 326–348). That society does not seem to harbour any particular “overriding good”, because every individual chooses and pursues his or her individual preferences; but again it is an illusion: the hidden, though dominant “overriding good”

18 Doezer identifies the following levels of scientific research: project, programme, macro-programme and form of life; these parallel the levels of evaluation of scientific research: evaluation, validation, vindication and form of life (Doezer 1980, 113–119). 19 Because Weichbold does not make this distinction, he unfairly criticises the fact that in my general overview of practical theology (on the macro-programme level) I focus on the symbol of the basileia (Van der Ven 1990, 80ff.; 1993b, 69ff.), but fail to do the same in my research on theodicy (cf. Weichbold 1992).

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that permeates everything in society and in science is that of “disengaged individuality”, according to some communitarianists.20 In their view the scientific ideal underlying the liberal tradition rests on the assumption of the power of “pure” and “abstract” rationality, divorced from tradition and context (Taylor 1994). This pure and abstract rationality is, they maintain, aimed at providing society, and more particularly the market economy, with economically vital “constancy” and “predictability”.21 If one reconstructs Popper’s methodological work from this perspective, one must admit that the formal normative ideal of the grand design is manifestly present. But is his methodology also characterised by the “pure” and “abstract” rationality of market thinking? That strikes me as doubtful; at any rate market thinking is not the be-all and end-all of it. On the contrary, as we have seen, he explicitly states—notably in The Open Society and Its Enemies—that research should be aimed at alleviating inhuman conditions and treating the people who are subject to these conditions as equals, that is to say “as possessing equal rights, and equal claims to equal treatment”. Max Weber, one of the founders of empirical social science, gives us a more precise picture of the normative nature of empirical research. He points out that not only the goal, and hence the research problem is value-laden, but that the application of its results is likewise influenced by values. Weber believes, moreover, that the researcher has a duty to explicate this value-laden basis. In his view research is not value-free but value-related, and researchers must indicate their particular choice from the polytheism of values, and specify who or

20 There are also liberals who hold this critical opinion and who regret that liberalism no longer recognises the social and cultural groups and institutions that give people their individual and social identity, just as there have always been two forms of liberalism: traditional liberalism and social liberalism; cf. Kimlycka 1995a; 1995; Cliteur et al. 1993. What traditional liberalism lacks is insight into Hegel’s grounding category of mutual recognition as the basis of human existence; cf. Honneth 1992. 21 See McMylor 1994, 77–108, especially 91–97, which accentuates this constancy and predictability in a comparison between Alasdair MacIntyre and Albert Hirschman, especially Hirschman’s The Passions and the Interests: Political Arguments for Capitalism Before Its Triumph (1977). This is interesting, because MacIntyre himself refers to Hirschman (MacIntyre, 213), and also because it offers an interesting angle on Hirschman’s Exit, Voice, and Loyalty (1970), which forms the basis of the current national interdisciplinary research programme on social cohesion by the National Scientific Research Foundation (NWO) in the Netherlands.

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what represents God and the devil to them. But he holds that the linkage between goal and research problem on the one hand, and application of research results on the other, is free from all norms and values: it is governed purely by the instrumental methods and techniques of sampling and measuring (Weber 1968, 489–540; 1968a, 146–214; 1968b, 582–613). To express it in terms of variables: the choice of dependent and independent variables, which together constitute the research problem, is always value-laden, as are the evaluative applications deduced from the research results in terms of manipulatable variables; but the construction and analysis of these variables are divorced, so Weber, from any explicit or implicit normative choice.22 3. Norm-Laden Character of the Use of Empirical Methods But does this hold water? The very construction of ideal types through data analysis, which is such a hallmark of Weber’s empirical work, is a product of normative choice. He himself considers it a means of describing phenomena constructively through biased emphasis (Steigerung) of a particular viewpoint, but that it does not represent a normative choice (Weber 1968a, 190–205). But surely such an emphasis is not value-neutral!23 To cite only one example: from the Veralltäglichung of the ideal type of charismatic authority that underlies every possible form of authority, Weber infers the ideal types of traditional and legal authority, commenting that he takes the concept of charismatic authority from traditional Christian terminology, which he defines explicitly in terms of sacredness, faith and revelation (Weber 1980, 124). To understand these ideal types of Weber’s one has to interpret them from the inside, that is, in the context in which they originated and the various contexts in which they have featured in history. And these contexts encompass a constantly chang-

22 For the relation between strong causal variables and weak manipulatable variables, see Ellemers 1995, 216–233. 23 Ricoeur maintains that Weber’s ideal types are “configurations of social change, that is, rules for constructing historical sequences (e.g., bureaucracy, towns, etc.) in type fashion”, in terms of which, in my view, social evolution is reconstructed; cf. Ricoeur 1979, 172. To these may be added such concepts as power, elite, liberty, equality, justice, interest and ideology. Ricoeur asks the question: “Can a (. . .) study of ideology itself be ideology-free?” (1979, 144).

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ing network of values and norms. Unless the network is explicated, one cannot discern the meaning of the ideal types. 3.1

Double Hermeneutics

But it is not just the construction of ideal types that is subject to implicit or explicit normative choices. The data on which that construction is based and which serve to illustrate it are likewise permeated with norms and values. After all, the data collected by social scientists, and also by practical theologians, are not divorced from the meanings assigned to them by people. They are themselves constructions of human meaning, in which the researcher as an ordinary member of a group or community participates. Researchers investigate not facts, but meaningful data, which exist as data only in their intersubjective meaning for people and society. They are not collecting measurements of seismological or meteorological processes, but religious beliefs to which people have committed themselves, religious feelings that are precious to them, religious decisions that they take for their lives, religious communities to which they are attached and ecclesiastic institutions to which they are loyal. And in order to collect data about such beliefs, feelings, volitions, communities and institutions, researchers must strive to understand them from the inside and to fathom their meaning from the inside, for they are that meaning. That meaning lies in individual and collective speech and actions of people within their form of life, not outside of it, and it is these actions and words that researchers study to fathom their symbolic core. Hence one could say that the social sciences, and also practical theology, represent a double hermeneutics: it is not only a matter of hermeneutic understanding of traditional and contemporary ideal types and theories such as Weber’s, but also and primarily of hermeneutically understanding the meanings concealed in the “data” in the form of life of groups and communities, to which the researcher, as a citizen and a human being, also belongs (Giddens 1976, 158; Habermas 1982, 162ff.). The next question that presents itself concerns the most adequate method to research the meanings contained in individual and collective human speech and actions. Is it a qualitative or a quantitative method? The answer depends on various factors: the problem that the researcher is investigating; the aim of the study; the focal theme of the research; the breadth or the depth envisaged; whether

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one’s interest is in the general or the particular; the collective or individual nature of the information one is seeking; and more pragmatic aspects such as the researchability of the theme and constraints of a personal or a financial nature. Because of the diversity of factors involved one could advocate the complementary use of both methods (Van der Ven 1998b, 58–60; 1993; 1993a). But there is a deeper epistemological problem at issue: is the qualitative method the most appropriate method to research human meanings, especially religious meanings that are experienced as Godgiven, or is the quantitative method more suitable? Before I rush into a fairly standard Roman Catholic, inclusive both-and approach, let me briefly indicate the aporias one faces if one settles for an exclusive either-or approach. 3.2

The Qualitative Method

Opting for an exclusively qualitative method, one faces problems at two different levels: the individual and the collective. At the individual level one looks for the religious meanings that individual people reveal in their speech and actions, the feelings they mention in the process, the attitudes relating to these, and the way they explain them.24 But what criteria does one use to determine which meanings, feelings, attitudes and explanations are authentic and, more especially, true? Of course, in human communication one provisionally proceeds, and ought to proceed, on assumptions of mutual authenticity and truthfulness. But what does one do when, for example, either the interviewer or the interviewee or both are simply mistaken and look for meaning in, or attribute meaning to, circumstances that could not objectively give rise to those meanings?25 What does one do when the interviewer asks leading questions or suggestively participates in the conversation, when the researcher observes in a biased way, when interviewees express themselves incoherently or their responses are open to rival interpretations by one or more

24

A good example is: Zuidberg 2001. The distinction between an “objective” analysis of a situation and the situation as the agent interprets it is obvious enough to be taken into account, although every “objective” analysis is inevitably the result of (intersubjectively developed) thought by, let us say, scholars (Popper 1983, 179). In addition every “subjective” interpretation may in its turn have implications for the development of the “objective” situation in the sense of being a self-fulfilling prophecy (Ricoeur 1979, 147). 25

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researchers from the perspective of inter-rater reliability (cf. Ricoeur 1979, 160)? The influence of passions arising from human striving for possession (avoir), domination ( pouvoir) and honour (valoir) on people’s speech and actions, particularly those of researchers, interviewers and interviewees, cannot be ruled out; on the contrary, they sneak into every nook and cranny as blind, unconscious forces.26 The symbols that convey people’s actions and words always reveal both truth and illusion, contain both meaning and deceit, stem from both true and false consciousness. Hence every hermeneutics—if properly developed—is always double-faceted: a hermeneutics of recollection and a hermeneutics of suspicion (Ricoeur 1970; cf. Smith 1995, 147–164).27 Problems at the collective level arise when one wants to put observations of, and/or interviews with, individuals and small groups into a broader context, both spatially and temporally. It is important, for example, to relate people’s actions and words to the broader context of the institutions in which they operate. Dispensing with the institutional context means foregoing a significant context such as that of primary socialisation institutions like the family, the school and the religious congregation,28 or institutions that make up adult life like those of people’s private, professional, recreational and civic existence. One finds that the moment practical theology perceives itself as a theological theory of the praxis of lived religion, it too easily becomes reduced to a narrow focus on the everyday religious culture (religiöse Alltagskultur) of individuals interpreted by individuals. The institutional context that ultimately determines the meanings contained in people’s speech and actions hardly enters into it. This applies even more to the type of society in which people live, for instance that of northwestern Europe, where the economic infrastructure is currently changing from a mixed economy to a pure market economy (Kumlehn 2000).

26

For this interpretation of Kant’s triad, see Ricoeur 1986, 111–125; 1986b, 80ff.; 1974, 99–210. The “social desirability” of responses in interviews and statements in a conversation (desirability from the point of view of the interviewer or participant researcher as well as from that of oneself—“self-esteem”) here falls under “reputation” (valoir); cf. Drenth 1975, 295ff. 27 For a critical discussion of the hermeneutics of recollection and the hermeneutics of suspicion, and the transcendence of this polarity by a hermeneutics of contemplation, see Philips 2001. 28 For example: Schmälzle 1993.

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The context of temporal duration is also important in this regard. It is not much use scrutinising the real-life developments that determine the ups and downs observed in everyday life, measured in terms of the lives of individual people, without relating these to trends over the period of a generation, or their structure over several generations. The distinction between a short time span and a long time span is important in this regard. In one sense research over a short time span is superficial, because it is “the history of short, sharp, and nervous vibrations”, while underneath this history and its individual time there unfolds “a history of gentle rhythms” with a long time span. Here it is a matter of long-term influences and deep-lying trends (Braudel 1984, 101ff.). Thus both at the individual level, where a hermeneutics of recollection is inadequate and needs to be complemented by a hermeneutics of suspicion, and at the collective level, where data have to be collected about institutional contexts over a longer time span, the qualitative method falls short. It needs to be complemented with forms of data collection and data analysis using quantitative methods and techniques. At the individual level a hermeneutics of suspicion can benefit by the regulative principle of objectivity, in the sense of intersubjectivity, that characterises the quantitative method. As for the collective level, according to Ricoeur the narrative approach (namely in the case of popular culture and popular religion in historiography, where there is a similar debate on quantitative versus qualitative research) needs to be complemented with statistical material and causal explanations in order to place the phenomena on the broader scale of institutions and on a longer time scale (Ricoeur 2000). 3.3

The Quantitative Method

When opting for an exclusively quantitative method one confronts equally insuperable constraints. Identifying the quantitative method with positivism is too simplistic. Positivism is outdated, as I indicated when examining the theory-laden and value-laden character of all empirical research. In other words, there is no such thing or there should not be such thing as context-free quantitative empirical research in the human sciences, including theology; there is no such thing or there should not be such thing as quantitative empirical research in the human sciences—including theology—that is not dependent on a specific form of life.

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But it is no less simplistic to identify the quantitative method with deductionism, since research always entails a combination of induction and deduction. Empirical researchers who follow what is known as the empirical cycle (in our case the empirical theological cycle), which comprises five phases and 15 sub-phases,29 enter the field in the first phase in order to find both a research problem and a research aim that are relevant to the field, or to gear their research problem and research aim to the needs and interests of representatives of that field. In the second phase they find themselves back in the field in order to pick up people’s experiences by means of observation, participation, conversation, interviewing and ongoing reflection and feedback, to explore their speech and actions, discover the meanings they attribute to their speech and actions, and decipher the symbols embedded in these meanings. In so doing they are not rigidly bound by their predetermined problem and goal but are open to every conceivable inductive and abductive process that crops up in the exploration. Desk work only starts in the third phase, when the miscellany of data produced by the exploration in the second phase is systematised and conceptualised, on the basis of which expectations, surmises or hypotheses are inferred and the various concepts are operationalised. In this phase researchers enter the field a third time in order to try out their measuring instrument on a selected group of people.30 In the fourth phase the hypotheses are tested, again in encounters in the field, this time with members of the population other than the original contacts, since otherwise there is a risk of contamination. In the fifth and final phase the entire study is evaluated—a process we shall discuss in due course.31 29 In the following description I correct the description of the empirical-theological cycle in my Entwurf (1990; 1993b) Chapters 4 and 5, on certain important points. 30 This third phase in its totality is wrongly called the deductive phase (also in my Entwurf [1990, 256; 1993b, 225]: phase 3), because the term deduction, at least in a logical sense, refers only to deduction of predictions from a theory as happens in the development of hypotheses. The conceptualisation of experiences previously acquired in the field and theoretical systematisation of these (subphase 7), the development of a conceptual model (subphase 8) and the operationalisation of these concepts (subphase 9) in themselves do not entail deduction in a logical sense; cf. Popper 1986, 59–62. De Groot, by his own admission, uses the term “deduction” in a methodological (and hence broader) sense rather than in a logical sense, and I relied on his terminological choice when I named the deductive phase—although it is not clear what “deduction” in a methodological sense actually means; cf. de Groot 1964, 31. 31 I am aware that I have previously mentioned only two interactions with the

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The main problem with the quantitative method when used in empirical theological research is usually twofold. First, do the items in the questionnaire, which serve to operationalise the relevant concepts, adequately represent the unique, authentic meanings that the people themselves attribute to their speech and actions? This is the perennial question of what is known as the content validity of items, which cannot (or hardly ever) be answered with any certainty.32 Secondly, are these unique and authentic meanings not lost sight of altogether through the use of descriptive and inductive (hypothesis testing) (sic!) statistics? Even more to the point, does interpretation of such unique and authentic meanings not require a hermeneutic approach rather than a causal strategy that seeks to explain them from the outside with the aid of regression and path-analytical models, or should a hermeneutic and a causal explanatory strategy complement each other? Here I concur with Ricoeur, who often advocated the complementarity of hermeneutic narrative and causal explanatory methods, inter alia through his acute analyses of terms like cause and motive, causality and intentionality, causal and teleological explanation (Ricoeur 1984, 132–143; 1992, 56–112). At all events, it is widely acknowledged that this is a fundamental, even a radical limitation. In quantitative research the results obtained relate only to general characteristics of the research population, or to general characteristics of the total population to which the findings of the research population are generalised. In other words, the authenticity and uniqueness of the individuals and their meanings are inevitably lost. One is left only with models of collective meanings and with models of causal relations. They are collective models, one might say, with an empirically tested general relevance. They have general relevance because they reveal general diagnostic indications and general diagnostic causal relations, which have direct significance for groups of people in certain classes of situations rather than for each individual person in each specific situation. By way of

field (in the second and fourth phases; cf. God Reinvented, 53, 55), whereas here there are four such interactions (in the first, second, third and fourth phases). This is because I am explaining and reconstructing what actually happens in the execution of empirical theological research. 32 Considering the current state of methodology we should speak of content validity as a limit concept (cf. A.D. de Groot, 275; Boesjes-Hommes, 213–218). Note that in determining validity the aim of the study or the research instrument should be taken into account (Drenth, 237).

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example: we know that South African youths in a church context are more drawn to a human rights culture when the church shows itself to be involved and competent in dealing with social problems than when it shows itself to be aloof and incompetent (Van der Ven, Dreyer & Pieterse 2001). This knowledge is of no direct use when choosing an adequate learning strategy for a lesson on the church and human rights for a specific group of pupils in a specific situation in a specific school. It is useful, however, when designing a curriculum to be implemented for similar groups in similar situations in similar schools. At all events, when studying authentic, unique attribution of meaning the quantitative method needs to be complemented with the qualitative method. 4. Evaluation of Empirical Research Results An important normative implication of empirical research in theology that I want to deal with explicitly relates to the evaluation of research results. This evaluation is made in the perspective of truth.33 This has two crucial aspects: the evaluation of research results in relation to theological statements, and the evaluation of research results in relation to faith statements.34 For the distinction between

33 Evaluation of research results entails more than just evaluation in the perspective of truth, such as evaluation of methodic and methodological aspects and praxis-related aspects; cf. Van der Ven 1990, 238ff.; 1993b, 209ff. Besides, introducing the perspective of truth looks easier than it is, since “truth” can be conceived of from various angles, for example: (a) correspondence truth, in which, in conjunction with the intratextual sense (Sinn) of a statement, its reference to reality (Bedeutung) plays a key role (Frege); (b) coherence truth (“For how much more they [i.e. theological ideas—vdV] are true, will depend entirely on their relations to other truths that are also to be acknowledged” in: James 1975, 40–41); (c) pragmatic truth, in which a theological statement proves to have value for concrete life, for instance in an existential crisis such as suicide (“What reason can we plead that may make such a brother or sister willing to take up the burden again?” in: ibid., 28), and (d) problem-related truth, which has two aspects: problem raising and problem solving; these two are dialectically interrelated, because the “path of science” is marked by the striving for knowledge and the search for truth; Popper 1986, 278. 34 Both terms—“theological statement” and “faith statement”—should be understood in the sense of performative (Austin) or illocutionary (Searle) speech acts, without ignoring their constative (Austin) or locutionary (Searle) implications.The term “theological statement” should be understood mainly in the sense of an assertive speech act and the term “faith statement” mainly in the sense of an expressive speech act; cf. J.L. Austin, How To Do Things With Words; J.R. Searle (1969), Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language; Searle (1979), Expression and Meaning: Studies

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theological statements and faith statements I rely on Pannenberg, who posits that the believer’s truth is a hypothesis to the theologian, even if the two are one and the same person playing two different roles—that of a believer and that of a scientist (Pannenberg 1973).35 Evaluation of research results in relation to theological statements is a two-sided process. On the one hand, evaluating research results in relation to theological statements implies that the results are placed in a particular theological perspective, which may enrich, augment, purify or even correct them. On the other hand, the research results may also shed light—even critical light—on theological statements, which may be fruitful for the further development, purification or even correction of these statements and perhaps, partly, of the particular theological tradition to which the statements in question pertain. This second point is important, because theologians often make statements that, on closer analysis, turn out to have a—conscious or unconscious—empirically descriptive or even empirically causal import. I see it as the theologian’s scientific duty, analogous to that of all scientists, to submit such statements to the forum of empirically critical reason to determine whether they are tenable, also and especially when they are subjected to stringent tests. If not, then they are considered—in Popper’s terminology—to be uncorroborated and hence falsified. I conducted such a critical test on a statement by J.B. Metz, to the effect that bourgeoisie and the theodicy model of retaliation correlate positively, and bourgeoisie and the theodicy model of compassion correlate negatively (Metz 1977; Moltmann 1972); in my study this statement was empirically falsified (Van der Ven 1990, 241; 1993b, 212).36 We now turn to the second kind of evaluation: the evaluation of research results in relation to faith statements. This entails estab-

in the Theory of Speech Acts; for Searle’s significance for practical theology, see A. de Jong (1990), Weerklank van Job: over geloofstaal in bijbellessen; cf. Van der Ven 2002. 35 From this point of view I do not see a sharp distinction between theology and religious studies or Religionswissenschaft—without regarding Religionswissenschaft as a theological discipline, as Pannenberg does. This is because there is a considerable overlap between the two academic disciplines, at any rate if one assumes that both use the exchange of participant and observer perspectives, or insider and outsider perspectives; cf. Van der Ven 2001. 36 Of course a single falsification does not automatically lead to total rejection of a hypothesis, but to its weakening. In this regard Popper speaks in terms of degree of corroboration, referring to a report on the positive and negative results of empirical studies; Popper 1986, 251; 1976, 141–148.

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lishing a relationship between the beliefs that people cherish according to the research findings (e.g. faith in an iconic or an-iconic God, a personal or a non-personal God, a transcendent or an immanent God, perhaps even an absolutely immanent God) on the one hand, and on the other the Christian sensus fidei and consensus fidelium (Schillebeeckx 1964, 159–170; Rahner 1984, 152; Fuchs 2001a, 246; Van der Ven 1990, 124–128; 1993b, 106–110; 1995, 421–424).37 The question is, how does one make such an evaluation if one wants to steer clear of both relativism and fundamentalism.38 Here I want to consider two aspects, since I neither can nor wish to deal exhaustively with this complex issue in its entirety. These are: the choice of a hermeneutic model and the choice of a hermeneutic method. The first aspect relates to what hermeneutic model should be used to evaluate the research results in relation to faith statements. If one is to avoid both relativism and fundamentalism, one has to settle for a hermeneutic model that Cl. Boff (1987) explicated in his still important work on theological epistemology. After rejecting two earlier models—the text/application-model and the correspondence of terms model39—he opts for a third which he calls the correspondence of relations model, the criterion of which is that there should be an equation between the relationship of the old texts to the old contexts and the relationship of the current texts to the current contexts. The 37 One should also make a substantive distinction between sensus fidei and consensus fidelium, which are in themselves complex concepts when it comes to retrieving their content hermeneutically and empirically; and the sensus defunctorum should probably be understood as consensus defunctorum, which complicates it even further; cf. Haarsma 1970. 38 Here we are dealing with two extremes: relativism means that every interpretation or evaluation is defensible, which ultimately leads to agnosticism; fundamentalism means clinging to the literal definition of a religious truth without allowing for the linguistic and historical context of the definition. In addition the term “fundamentalism” may be criticised for its specifically Protestant background, and especially because it ignores the fact that all kinds of recent “fundamentalist” movements are not so much intent on going back to their sources, but are rather a reaction to modernisation, which takes place under the influence of the project of the Enlightenment, which is considered undesirable; cf. Dutch Foundation for Scientific Research (NWO) 2001, 8–9. 39 The text/application model is based on taking one line from the Bible, more specifically the New Testament texts, and applying it directly to the present situation. The correspondence of terms model proceeds from the terms used in biblical texts and the contexts of those days in order to infer terms that are applicable to the present situation. For example: exodus means the liberation of the Hebrew people from enslavement in Egypt, hence today exodus means the liberation of the people from the enslavement of oppression in the current context.

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text/application model is based on taking one line from the Bible, more specifically the New Testament texts, and applying it directly to the present situation. The correspondence of terms model proceeds from the terms used in biblical texts and the contexts of the time when those texts were produced in order to infer terms that are applicable to the present situation. For example: exodus means the liberation of the Hebrew people from enslavement in Egypt, hence today exodus means the liberation of the people from the enslavement of oppression in the current context.40 When one proceeds from the research results and the respondents’ convictions contained in these results, Boff ’s model entails asking the following questions: (1) Does the relation between the respondents’ convictions and their current context correspond with the relation between similar Old Testament statements and their Old Testament contexts? (2) Does the relation between the respondents’ convictions and their current context correspond with the relation between similar New Testament statements and their New Testament contexts? (3) Does the relation between the respondents’ convictions and their current context correspond with the relation between similar statements in the early church and their early church contexts? (4) Does the relation between the respondents’ convictions and their current context correspond with the relation between similar statements in church history and their specific contexts in church history? It is an extremely complex set of aspects in this model, which cannot be circumvented if one wants to do justice to the complexity of the old texts, namely biblical documents and church history, as well as to the complexity of the historical contexts against the background of which the texts have to be understood (Boff 1987, 146–150; cf. Schillebeeckx 1983; 1989, 59–63). The complexity is partly a result of the pluralism, not only of all these texts and contexts in different historical periods, but also of all these texts and contexts in the same historical period; and even within the same texts and within the contexts in the same historical period (Schillebeeckx 1972). In addition

40 Following in the footsteps of Boff (147) this model can be schematized with the help of this equation: “old texts: their contexts = current texts: current contexts”.

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one must allow for conflicting interpretations to which pluralism gives rise within texts and contexts (Ricoeur 1974; 1981). On the basis of this analysis one cannot but advocate a hermeneutically based creative fidelity, in which the spirit of the gospel prevents one from looking for “formulas to ‘copy’, or techniques to ‘apply’, from scripture”. Boff writes: “What scripture will offer us are rather something like orientations, models, types, directives, principles, inspirations— elements permitting us to acquire, on our own initiative, a ‘hermeneutic competency’, and thus the capacity to judge—on our own initiative, in our own right (. . .). The Christian writings offer us not a what, but a how—a manner, a style, a spirit.” (Boff, 149).41 However appealing this conclusion may sound, it has the drawback of being too global. Consequently I want to make a suggestion that offers a methodological-hermeneutic handle on it. My suggestion is inspired by Ricoeur, who believes that the process of finding truth in the human sciences is similar to the way a judge arrives at a verdict in judicial procedure (Ricoeur 2000, 413–436; 1991, 176–195; 1995, 185–192). I also draw on the methodologist Wentzel van Huyssteen, who accentuates the approximate truth quality in the evaluation process, and then applies this notion to theology.42 In my view this makes it possible to make an adequate evaluation of the truth value of people’s convictions that emerge from the results of empirical research. One could interpret such an evaluation as a sort of theological conduct of a case, a judicial-theological process in hermeneutic perspective. In this judicial-theological process the theologian has to observe rules like:

41 Fuchs advocates what he calls a comparative hermeneutics based on the “essentials” of the Judaeo-Christian tradition. The problem is that Boff ’s hermeneutics of the correspondence of relations does not provide us with a static system of contextfree and conflict-free “essentials”, while what he calls “essential” only manifests itself in the contingency of history, and can therefore only be reconstrued on the basis of that contingency, in all its fragility; cf. Fuchs 2001a, 7–9. 42 Wentzel van Huyssteen explains that the judgments passed by (human) scientists are characterised by the fallible process of weighing pros and cons and tracing “the best reasons”, to such an extent that the truth they find must be described in terms of a “weak notion” as estimated truth; cf. Wentzel van Huyssteen 1991, esp. 156–178, here 163. In other words, it is a matter of “our best current estimates of the truth”; cf. Gregersen & Wentzel van Huyssteen 1998, 33; cf. Wentzel van Huysteen 2001.

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(1) assuming the authenticity of the people presenting the convictions recorded in the research results; (2) listening to proponents and opponents of these convictions as carefully and as fully as possible, as well as to their witnesses and expert witnesses, also in a cross-examination; (3) allowing for the specific context and situation in which the relevant convictions are imbedded, according to the research; (4) allowing for certain positive relations of correspondence (in Boff ’s sense), selected by theological experts, so as to reveal the positive value of the convictions; also allowing for any negative relations of correspondence that will reveal their negative value; (5) weighing the arguments for and against the convictions; (6) weighing the advantages and disadvantages, effects and unintended side-effects of the convictions; (7) finally, arriving at an attestatory judgment, where “attestatory” implies that this is a valid, well-considered—albeit fragile—judgment, based not on mathematical proof but on rational insight; based not on a logical conclusion but on a reflective decision; not intended for all eternity but based on currently available data and insights; and that it will come up for review when new data or insights become available (cf. Van der Ven 2001, 11–12). I hasten to add that it is not up to practical theology alone to undertake all the work of the hermeneutic correspondence of relations model and the hermeneutic judgment. This is essentially a task for the whole discipline of theology, including literary, historical, practical, and especially systematic theology. Practical theology does not and should not bear the burden of the whole of theology on its shoulders. What it must do is conscientiously to maintain a dialogue with the other theological disciplines. In my view its task is to indicate, on the basis of its empirical research findings, the direction and certain broad lines along which the hermeneutics of correspondence of relations and the hermeneutic judgment can or ought to take place. It is purely a matter of indicating the direction and certain broad lines, no more and no less. 5. The Concept of Praxis To conclude this paper with some final comments I refer to the author whom I cited at the outset: Aristotle. As I pointed out, Aristotle

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tried to explain the distinctive nature of practical philosophy in terms of a medical model. One might say that the immediate goal of medical science is to gather and synthesise empirical knowledge, and its indirect but actual aim is to restore and promote human flourishing via the person’s bodily condition. According to Aristotle the following statement is analogous to the texnh of both practical philosophy and medical science: “For we do not wish to know what bravery is but to be brave, nor what justice is but to be just, just as we wish to be in health rather than to know what being in health is, and to have our body in good condition rather than to know what good condition is” (Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics 1216b21–25; Nussbaum 1996, 59). What applies to practical philosophy also applies to practical theology: a focus on praxis. It is not for nothing that practical theology since Schleiermacher has been regarded as the theological theory of praxis (Schleiermacher 1850, 12). Critical and constructive scientific thought about this orientation to praxis on the part of practical theology is not, however, very advanced. Often authors confine themselves to exhortations and normative statements that praxis is, or should be, the be-all and endall of all practical theology, and/or they do their best to conclude their discussion with a few coherent practical indications, guidelines or directions. Sometimes it is hard to see the connection between these and the preceding research, which also applies to authors in the field of empirical theology. Even worse, empirical-theological researchers in particular are often accused of being too unconcerned, or not sufficiently concerned, about clarifying the significance of their research results for praxis.43 Either way, this is manifestly a fundamental problem that urgently requires clarification, since the praxis concept of practical theology as such is at issue.44 I have no ambition,

43 This objection has been leveled at my own work as well, which is surprising, since even in a strictly theoretical methodological work like Entwurf (1990, 245–248) or Practical Theology (1993b, 215–218) I deliberately inferred from my empirical theodicy research certain rules for pastoral practice, not to mention the theodicy research into pastoral practice as such in Van der Ven & Vossen 1995. Besides, about 50% of the close to 30 Nijmegen empirical research projects whose reports were published in book form over the past 25 years employed what is known as a quasiexperimental design, in which carefully defined practical processes in the ecclesiastic and pastoral field are the actual objects of study. 44 To my mind a more detailed explanation of the praxis concept in terms of action theory is essential. This would require a (syncretistic) choice from action theories in at least 40 disciplines and subdisciplines, ranging from psychology, sociology,

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even if it were possible, to unravel the entire problem here. All I want to do is to contribute to the debate that will, one hopes, be continued at this and subsequent congresses of ISERT, for it is sorely needed. As my point of departure I choose another text from Aristotle’s Metaphysics, a work which I quoted at the beginning. “And art (texnh),” says Aristotle, “arises, when from many notions gained by experience one universal judgment about similar objects is produced” (Aristotle, Metaphysics 981a5–7; cf. Nussbaum, 95). In other words, as a science (texnh) practical philosophy—and, I would add, practical theology as well—does not focus on concrete, specific, unique situations but on classes of situations. From the point of view of the praxis concept of practical theology this is a highly significant statement. It is not a matter of the simplistic distinction of science versus practice, but of a distinction between science as the theory of classes of practices versus a concrete, specific, unique practice. Let me explain this distinction with reference to some examples of the respective tasks of academic scientists and professionals in the field (cf. Brus 1978). A natural scientist researches the attributes of classes of natural materials, whereas an engineer makes concrete calculations for building a specific bridge. An educationist studies the learning processes of classes of pupils, whereas a teacher guides the actual teachinglearning process of specific pupils. An academic psychologist identifies personality types, whereas a psychotherapist counsels actual people in their unique situations. An academic ethicist analyses the legitimations of moral decisions in classes of crisis situations, whereas an ethical consultant offers advice to real people in a specific crisis sitcultural anthropology, ethnology and ethology to mathematical, natural and medical sciences. In my view a philosophical approach should be preferred, albeit in conjunction with these disciplines and subdisciplines, so as to probe the question of who acts, why one acts, and what action is. This in its turn would call for another (syncretistic) choice from Continental hermeneutic philosophy, Anglo-Saxon analytical philosophy, and—again a very different approach—certain branches of logic, such as norm logic, action logic, decision logic and plan logic; cf. Lenk 1977; Ricoeur 1992; 1995, 83–115. Without fundamental reflection on the concept of praxis on the basis of a chosen action theory, practical theology will remain bogged down in either exhortatory or practico-practical allusions. Hence I certainly do not believe that the action theory paradigm of practical theology is a thing of the past, as Heimbrock and others maintain. Instead I agree with Mette that the time has finally come to conceptualise it fundamentally; cf. Heimbrock 2000; Mette 2000, 145–149.

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uation. By analogy, a practical theologian who operates empirically, researches causal relations between faith in God and bereavement among groups of people, whereas a pastor in real life counsels individuals in their unique situation of coping with bereavement (SchererRath 2001). As Aristotle put it: it is always a matter of a universal judgment about a group of similar things, or similar situations. In other words, practical theology is about general rather than singular practical processes. Again: its involvement with praxis is scientific and hence necessarily abstract in nature. Which classes of situations are at issue, in which domains and at which social levels? To put it very briefly, I would say that it is always a case of (a) classes of action and speech situations, (b) in each and every kind of domain (i.e. economic, political, social and cultural) (c) on each and every level (i.e. the micro level of a person’s private life, the meso level of social institutions, especially the church, and the macro level of society), whereas (d) the peculiar viewpoint from which practical theology investigates these classes of situations is the perspective of transcendence (i.e. the perspective of religion, especially the Christian faith). Secondly, because the universal judgments about these classes of situations in practical theology must always—as was agreed with Aristotle at the beginning of this paper—aim at some good, we need to ask what normative aspects are involved. Habermas indicated that, in whatever situation we find ourselves, we have to ask three normative questions. The first is a teleological question relating to our personal and communitarian life: who are we, what do we consider good, what do we strive for, what do we value? The second is a deontological question relating to our responsibility to each and everybody and to humankind as a whole: what is just, what is right, what is our duty, what are we obliged to do? The third question is pragmatic or utilistic, relating to effectiveness and efficiency: which action will produce the teleologically desirable and deontologically obligatory result with the least resistance and the least personal and material input (Habermas 1993, 197–201; 1993a, 1–19)? To these I would add a fourth normative question, which is no less important for the praxis concept of practical theology, namely a consequentialist question relating to foreseen and unforeseen effects

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and side-effects: what risks are entailed by which actions, and to what extent is taking these risks morally justified?45 It might seem as if only the first two questions—the teleological and the deontological question—are normative, without any empirical slant, whereas the last two questions—the utilistic and the consequentialist question—are purely empirical without any normative slant. A truly portentous question for this paper, which deals, after all, with the interrelationship between normative and empirical aspects. However, that is very far from the truth. To start with the teleological question: if only there really was just one good or just one overriding good! There is always a plurality of goods, even a conflict of goods, not only in our communitarian life (e.g. the conflict between survival goals and mission goals in our communities, especially our church communities) (Commissaris 1977) but also in our personal life (e.g. the conflict between our love life and our professional life).46 The perennial question is what the conditions are for finding an agreement, in terms of consensus, an agreement about disagreement, or a compromise, while the actual inquiry into these conditions is empirical in nature.47 The deontological question, too, is characterised by the entanglement of normative and empirical aspects, as is evident in the conflicts about justice in our society. In a country like South Africa, should we give priority to the achievement of human rights in the economic sphere, the political sphere, or the social sphere? For, as Walzer

45 Following in the footsteps of M. Weber, consequential ethics may be associated with his ethics of responsibility (‘Verantwortungsethik’), which he distinguished from the ethics of conviction (‘Gesinnungsethik’). The ethics of conviction and the ethics of responsibility can go together, as for example when, during the Balkan war, the Dutch government, from a kind of ethics of conviction, sent its Dutchbat as a peacekeeping force to the so-called ‘safe haven’ of Srebrenica, in Bosnia, in order to show its international ambition as well as its compassion with the Bosnian Muslims, but from a kind of ethics of responsibility tried to reduce the risks Dutchbat ran at the moment Bosnian Serbs actually attacked this enclave in 1995, with devastating consequences for about seven thousand of male Bosnian Muslims, who were killed by the Bosnian Serbs; Weber 1977; cf. Weber 1980, 348ff.; NIOD 2002. 46 S. Freud, The Complete Works, Vienna. 47 Habermas holds that only the concept of consensus is applicable to value conflicts, and the concept of compromise applies only in the case of conflicts of interests. That may be so at a highly abstract level of values and interests, although even at that level finding what is known as a “thin theory” within an “overlapping consensus” may mean striking a compromise. Besides, in the operational practice of everyday life the line between values and interests is often extremely fine; cf. Habermas 1993, 175; Rawls 1999; cf. Lindemans 2001.

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points out, they cannot be achieved equally in all of these spheres simultaneously in the absence of sufficient material, personal and administrative means (Walzer 1993; cf. Ricoeur 1992, 252; 1995a, 76ff.). And when it comes to the churches, should their primary aim be to care for the millions of HIV and AIDS sufferers in their own communities, or to strive for structural change of the economic conditions of poverty and oppression that are causing the epidemic (Dreyer 2002; Van der Ven 2002a; Van der Ven, Dreyer & Pieterse 2002; 2001a)? Again, the conditions for seeking and finding new compromises are an object for empirical research. Both the utilistic and the consequentialist question are equally fraught with the complex and often contradictory interrelationship between normative and empirical aspects. The empirical aspects have to do with risk assessment, which entails research into questions like the following: what is the degree of probability that which undesirable and/or unforeseen side-effects will manifest over what period? Such questions play a major role in all policy making. This is true in the churches also, for example when it comes to reform of monocratic structures, liturgical renewal, diaconal transformation, catechetic curriculum changes, and post-conventional or anti-conventional pastoral approaches. To concretise these questions: does the professionalisation of pastors result in a proliferation of bureaucracy and technocracy, and/or in increased competence (Schilderman 1998)? Does pastoral group work among the bereaved tend to purely functionalise their faith in God and/or promote openness to the mystery of God being simultaneously present and absent (Zuidgeest 2001)? Does a curriculum that focuses on interreligious dialogue reduce the relevance of the Christian faith or increase it (Sterkens 2001)? Does a similar curriculum on theodicy result in rationalising the question of the relation between faith and suffering out of existence and/or in continuing the “unending quest” (Vermeer 1999)? The normative aspects relate to their radically aporetic structure: which effects of actions are really foreseeable in the short, medium and long term, and for which of these are people accountable as moral agents?48 Also, which effects and consequences of which actions, once taken, are reversible? Are actions always irreversible, can they never be

48 Ricoeur 1992, 106: “An agent is not in the far distant consequences as he or she is in a sense in his or her immediate act.”

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reversed—not even some of the effects, not even partially (Ricoeur 1991a, 43–66)? And which persons are morally responsible for which effects and consequences, considering the inextricable entanglement of human agency, pre-moral passions, luck, institutional pressure and the operation of societal mechanisms, which gives human agency, also in the church, an aporetic, tragic character and makes everyone groan about the vulnerability of the good human life?49 These empirical and normative questions in the utilistic and consequentialist approaches converge dramatically when one is faced with a problem like the following: which risks should I take, and how many risks are still morally justified? In practical theology, as we have pointed out, this is not a matter of the real risks of concrete actions taken by actual people in unique real-life situations (these are weighed by policy makers in society and church), but of normative and empirical research into what types of options are at the disposal of what sorts of agents in what kinds of circumstances: that is what utilitarianism and consequentialism aim at.50 Obviously I have not dealt with every important aspect of the praxis concept in practical theology, let alone all the relevant aspects. I have merely tried to make it quite clear that practical theology is not directly involved in concrete forms of praxis in concrete situations of concrete people, but rather in classes of praxis in classes of situations of classes of people; and secondly, that in this praxis normative and empirical aspects are always fundamentally interwoven. Conclusion Underscoring the intertwinement of normative and empirical aspects brings me back to the opening sentences of this paper. The task I 49 Nussbaum 1997, especially the chapters on activity and disaster (ch. 11), relational goods and their special vulnerability (ch. 12), luck and the tragic emotions (interlude 2), the betrayal of convention (ch. 13). 50 Pettit 1994, 237: “In any such case, however, what the theory is committed to recommending is not just this or that choice by this or that agent, but the choice of this type of option by that sort of agent in these kinds of circumstances; this is a commitment, as it is sometimes said, of universalizability.” The character of “universalizability” expressed here is particularly relevant when it comes to deontological aspects relating to moral obligations and the formulation of “ought” sentences: “This is because there is implicit a principle which says that the statement applies to all precisely similar (vdV.) situations”, in: Hare, 456); for the relevance of Hare’s moral idea of universalizability to practical theology, see Hermans 1986.

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set myself was to show that practical theology is normative in nature, not despite but because of its empirical character, and hence that the choice of either an empirical or a normative approach represents a false dilemma. Does this mean that every point discussed in this paper must always be raised explicitly in every report on every empirical research project? Let me reiterate the five points that I have highlighted. Must every report explicate the theory-laden character of empirical research? Must every report deal with the norm-laden character of empirical research, especially as regards its aim and the application of its findings? Must every report demonstrate the complementarity of qualitative and quantitative methods? Must every report deal with all aspects of the evaluation of the research results, especially their relation to truth? And must every report explain the orientation to praxis? No. What is required of an empirical researcher is the ability to explicate all these aspects and to reconstruct and account for them if called upon to do so in response to questions, comments, discussions and objections on the part of the scientific forum. References Adler, M.J. (1991). Desires Right and Wrong: The Ethics of Enough. New York. Aristotle (1995). The Complete Works of Aristotle, The Revised Oxford Edition, edited by Jonathan Barnes. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Austin, J.L. (1975). How To Do Things With Words, 2nd edition. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Bauman, Z. (1990). Philosophical affinities of postmodern sociology. Sociological Review 38 (3), 411–444. Boesjes-Hommes, R.W. (1974). De geldige operationalisering van begrippen. Meppel: Boom. Boff, C. (1987). Theology and Praxis: Epistemological Foundations. New York: Orbis Books. Braudel, F. (1969). Écrits sur l’histoire. Paris. Brümmer, V. (2001). The Enlightenment project and the human image of God. In H.-G. Ziebertz et al. (Eds.), The Human Image of God (55–72). Leiden: Brill. Brus, B.Th. (1978). Didactiek naar menselijke maat: een perspectief? Tilburg: Zwijsen. Cliteur P.B. et al. (Eds.) (1993). Filosofen van het klassieke liberalisme. Kampen. Commissaris, J. (1977). Planning van kerkelijke vernieuwing, dissertation. Leiden: KU Nijmegen. De Groot, A.D. (1964). Methodologie. Den Haag. De Jong, A. (1990). Weerklank van Job: over geloofstaal in bijbellessen. Kampen. Dent, N.J.H. (1984). The Moral Psychology of the Virtues. Cambridge. Doezer, M.C. (1980). Tussen objektiviteit en praksis: over wetenschappelijke objektivi-teit in een konfrontatie tussen Popper en Wittgenstein. Delftse Universitaire Pers, 113–119. Drenth, P. (1975). Inleiding in de testtheorie. Deventer. Dreyer, J. (2002). Justice for the oppressed: The HIV/Aids challenge. In J.S. Dreyer & J.A. van der Ven (Eds.), Divine Justice, Human Justice (85–112). Fs. Hennie Pieterse. Pretoria.

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PERSONALITY THEORY, EMPIRICAL THEOLOGY AND NORMATIVITY1 L J. F 1. Practical Theology Roots in practical theology help to shape the agenda addressed by empirical theology and help to define the subject matter with which empirical theology works. Practical theology is concerned at heart with the mission and ministry of the church. Ballard and Pritchard (1996) characterise the activity in the subtitle of their study Practical Theology in Action as ‘Christian thinking in the service of church and society.’ Such concerns bring practical theology face to face both with the rich variety of theological traditions (such as revelation, scripture, doctrine, and history) and with the practical realities of the contexts within which mission and ministry operate (such as social institutions, cultural heritages, and individual people). Broadly conceived practical theology finds itself concerned with issues like homiletics, preaching, communication, catechetics, religious education, liturgy, worship, pastoral care, prayer, and spiritual formation. Practical theology shares with other branches of theology the fundamental problem of determining the methodological perspectives which provide appropriate and legitimate tools for theological enquiry. Theology as a discipline has become much more clearly defined in terms of the subject matter of study than in terms of methodologies brought to bear on that subject matter. While etymologically speaking theology can be defined as the ‘study of God’, in practice God eludes direct academic scrutiny. Consequently theologians find themselves studying the human experience of God. The raw material of theological enquiry is found in the examination of the revelation or experience of God in a variety of forms, including the sacred texts, the historic formularies of faith, the traditions

1 An earlier version of this revised article appeared in Journal of Empirical Theology 15(1), 37–53.

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of the church, the natural world, and the living and dynamic experiences of the contemporary faith community. It is on the bases of such enquiry that theological normativity is established and tested. The academic study of theology comprises rational reflection on, systematisation and critical evaluation of such raw materials concerned with the human experience of God. Different perspectives will lead to different evaluations of the path that can be taken from reflection on the human experience to definition of the divine reality. As members of the faith community, theologians properly engage with the religious experience of their tradition (presiding at mass or speaking in tongues). As members of the academic community, theologians are required to stand back from the immediate experience of faith and to test that experience by means of what they regard as appropriate methodological perspectives. While tests of faith may be appropriate for the theologian operating in the arena of the faith community (presiding at mass or speaking in tongues), tests of faith may be absolutely inappropriate for the theologian operating in the academy (in the laboratory or in the lecture theatre). Across the various branches of theology, theologians find themselves engaging with academic tools shared with other disciplines. Sometimes these academic tools have had their origins in other disciplines and then they have been shaped and refined within departments of theology. The discipline of biblical studies, for example, is defined much more closely by the subject matter (for example, the Book of Numbers or Mark’s Gospel) than by the methodological perspective brought to study that subject matter. Biblical studies have clearly shared methodological perspectives with other disciplines concerned, over time, with such activities as archaeology, linguistics, textual analysis, form criticism, redaction criticism, and sociology. 2. The Nijmegen School Roots in Nijmegen help to shape the methodological perspective of empirical theology as pioneered by Johannes van der Ven and as fostered by the Journal of Empirical Theology. Van der Ven’s perspective on practical theology seems to be characterised by two key principles (see, for example, van der Ven, 1993, 1998). The first principle is that tools shaped by the social sciences provide legitimate methodology for addressing the agenda of practical

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theology. It seems to be the case that many questions raised by practical theologians are not radically different in the ways they require addressing from questions raised by social scientists. Practical theologians raise questions, for example, about the functioning of institutions, about the nature of cultural context, and about the effectiveness of models of ministry and mission which can be illuminated by proper empirical investigation. It is precisely such issues which social sciences develop research techniques to address. The social sciences themselves, of course, offer a very varied range of perspectives. Sociologists, anthropologists and psychologists may see the same question in very different ways. Even within one social scientific perspective (for example, psychology) enormous debates exist between, say, quantitative and qualitative emphases. The point, however, is that van der Ven’s view of empirical theology permits such methodological perspectives refined by the social sciences to be regarded as legitimate means for investigating the agenda of practical theology. The second principle is that tools shaped by social sciences should be integrated within practical theology itself. This notion of integration is illuminated by the distinction between intra-disciplinary and inter-disciplinary perspectives. Van der Ven favours the intradisciplinary perspective, according to which the tools of the social sciences become the tools of the practical theologian. In van der Ven’s worldview there is a very clear distinction between the social scientific study of religion (or the social scientific study of problems posed by practical theology) and the exercise of empirical theology. There are two clear implications from this worldview. The first implication is that the social sciences become implemented in a distinctive way within empirical theology. The parallel is with, say, the way in which textual criticism became handled in a highly distinctive way by biblical studies. The requirements of the Journal of Empirical Theology make this emphasis plain. According to van der Ven’s worldview, the problems posed by practical theology and addressed by the social sciences need to be shaped within a framework informed more sharply by theological perspectives than by social science perspectives, and the data generated by empirical enquiry need to be reflected on within a theological framework more than within a social science framework. The second implication is that social scientists themselves may find it difficult to engage with the output of empirical theology. The

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language and assumptions of empirical theology may at points become impenetratable to social scientists. During the mid 1980s, when the Nijmegen school of empirical theology was being shaped by van der Ven in the Netherlands, an independent initiative was being shaped in the United Kingdom by Leslie J. Francis and his associates, especially William K. Kay (see Kay and Francis, 1985, 1996). More recently this initiative has tried to trade under van der Ven’s inspired terminology of ‘empirical theology’, although it has remained careful not to highjack that terminology and initiative. These two perspectives on empirical theology pioneered in Nijmegen and in the United Kingdom have recently been contrasted by Cartledge (1999). Francis’ worldview shares one key principle in common with van der Ven, but at the same time emphasises one key difference. In common with van der Ven’s perspective, Francis wishes to see the methodologies of the social sciences fully integrated within the discipline of practical theology. Francis claims to be working not as a social scientist (more specifically a social psychologist) who happens to be studying material relevant to practical theology. Rather, he claims to be working as a practical theologian (often specifically focused through a Centre for Ministry Studies or through a Centre for Religious Education, where religious education is conceived of as a proper component of practical theology) who is competent in the field of social sciences. Francis’ agenda is shaped by the subject matter of ministry and mission. Possibly at some variance with van der Ven’s perspective, Francis wishes to see empirical theology engage equally with debates in theology and in social sciences. In this sense he maintains a preference for advocating an inter-disciplinary view of empirical theology as well as and alongside an intra-disciplinary view. The inter-disciplinary approach is emphasised to maintain the integrity of empirical theology as a social scientific discipline. Francis argues that, if empirical theology is serious about employing and indeed developing the tools of social sciences, then work undertaken by empirical theologians needs to be accessible to and publicly tested by social scientists themselves. It is for this reason that the United Kingdom tradition of empirical theology insists on being published widely through the peer review journals in the social sciences (and psychology in particular). For the contributions of empirical theologians to be taken seriously by social scientists, Francis argues that, when problems are set up in empirical theology which

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resemble problems set up in other aspects of the social sciences, the practical theologian needs to take into account the relevant theoretical and methodological debates currently pursued in the social sciences themselves. Alongside the inter-disciplinary approach, the intra-disciplinary approach is emphasised to maintain the integrity of empirical theology as a theoretical discipline. As such empirical theology remains committed to testing and developing theological normativity. The question of personality theory provides an interesting test for these arguments. 3. Theology and Personality There is clearly no one agreed view as to what is being discussed within the notion of ‘personality’. The way in which the term is being used in the current presentation is in the sense of ‘personality and individual differences’. The starting point is provided in the recognition that individuals differ from one another. Discourse about personality provides a vocabulary through which such individual differences can be discussed, interrogated, and possibly understood. There are a number of different starting points from which it is possible to argue that theology is concerned with personality understood in this sense of individual differences. One possible theological starting point is within the domain of biblical studies and begins with close scrutiny of the gospel narratives. According to the synoptic tradition, Jesus himself was a highly skilled observer of individual differences. Jesus observed, and Jesus commented on his observations. In so doing Jesus was able to transcend the specific and draw attention to some generalisable individual differences which resonated with his listeners. Take, for example, the passage from Luke 18, where Jesus contrasts some basic individual differences observable in two visitors to the temple. Two men went up into the temple to pray, one a Pharisee and the other a tax collector. The Pharisee stood and prayed thus with himself, ‘God, I thank thee that I am not like other men, extortionists, unjust, adulterers. . . .’ But the tax collector, standing far off, would not even lift up his eyes to heaven.

Depending on the interpretative framework, here are individual differences concerned with self-esteem, with penitence, or with respect for the creator.

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Or take for a second example the passage from Luke 10, where Jesus contrasts some basic individual differences observable in two sisters. A woman named Martha received Jesus into her house. And she had a sister called Mary, who sat at the Lord’s feet and listened to his teaching. But Martha was distracted with much serving.

Depending on the interpretative framework, here are individual differences concerned with the contrast between giving priority to Jesus’ teaching or giving priority to worldly business. Others may see here the contrast between the stable introvert and the neurotic extravert. Or take for a third example the passage from Luke 15, where Jesus contrasts some basic individual differences observable in two brothers. There was a man who had two sons, and the younger of them said to his father, ‘Father, give me the share of the property that falls to me’. And he divided his living between them.

Depending on the interpretative framework, here are individual differences between a prodigal son and a faithful son, or between those who are within the fold and the lost after whom God goes seeking. Others may see here the contrast between two very different Jungian types (ENTP and ISFJ) whose strengths and weaknesses Jesus so aptly summarised. A second possible theological starting point is also within the domain of biblical studies and begins with close scrutiny of the Pauline theology of the Body of Christ. A fundamental key to Paul’s understanding is the concept of ‘gifts differing’. Take for example, the following passage from Romans 12. We have gifts that differ according to the grace given to us: prophecy in proportion to faith; ministry in ministering; the teacher, in teaching; the exhorter, in exhortation; the giver, in generosity; the leader, in diligence; the compassionate, in cheerfulness.

A third possible theological starting point is within the domain of Christian doctrine. Personhood is fundamental to doctrines concerning the nature of God, creation, and natural revelation. Take, for example, the doctrine of the Trinity, concerning the nature of God, classically expressed as one substance but three persons. In one classic expression in the so-called Athanasian Creed the doctrine is con-

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cerned neither to confuse the persons nor to divide the substance. In the nature of God individual differences are taken seriously. Or take for a second example, the doctrine of creation, according to which men and women were created in the image of God. Here in the doctrine of creation is fundamental theological justification for taking seriously the rich variety of individual differences among the creatures created in the image of the creator. Or take the doctrine of natural revelation, according to which the mind and heart of God is revealed through all that is created. Here in the doctrine of natural revelation is further theological justification for taking individual differences seriously. 4. Psychology and Personality The scientific study of personality and individual differences promoted by psychology is a systematic attempt to develop description and vocabulary capable of making sense of the rich variety within human beings (for recent reviews, see Funder, 1997; Hogan, Johnson and Briggs, 1997; Caprara and Cervone, 2000). Contemporary personality psychology, which is concerned with the science of individual differences, has its roots in two very different branches of psychology. On the one hand, depth psychology, as characterised by pioneering names like Sigmund Freud and Carl Gustav Jung, has offered important language and theories for discussing individual differences, based on clinical experience. On the other hand, social psychology has offered broader, more empirically grounded, concepts and theories, based on large population studies. My intention is to illustrate potential for empirical theology by building on the second of these two traditions. The kind of personality theories advanced and discussed by social psychologists are characterised by a finite number of personality factors and self-completion questionnaires constructed to measure these factors. There is considerable debate among social psychologists regarding the number and nature of the personality factors which it is most useful to employ. No one current theory can really claim to say all that there is to be said about individual differences. Currently four main theories attract most attention and all four have been used in studies relevant to or shaped by empirical theology. These four theories speak in terms of 16, 5, 4 and 3 main personality factors.

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The number 16 is associated with the work of Raymond Cattell in the United States of America and the ‘16PF’ personality questionnaire (see Cattell, Eber and Tatsuoka, 1970). This model of personality concentrates on 16 primary or lower order personality factors. These 16 factors are generally defined by reference to the low scoring and high scoring poles as: reserved—outgoing, less intelligent – more intelligent, emotionally less stable – emotionally stable, humble – assertive, sober – happy-go-lucky, expedient – conscientious, shy – venturesome, toughminded – tenderminded, trusting – suspicious, practical – imaginative, forthright – shrewd, self-assured – apprehensive, conservative – experimenting, group-dependent – self-sufficient, undiscipline self-conflict – controlled, and relaxed – tense. The number 5 is associated with the work of Costa and McCrae and the ‘Big Five’ personality questionnaire (see Costa and McCrae, 1985). These 5 factors are generally defined as: extraversion, agreeableness, conscientiousness, emotional stability, and openness to experiences. The number 4 is associated with Jungian based typologies as expressed through the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (Myers and McCaulley, 1985) and Keirsey Temperament Sorter (Keirsey and Bates, 1978). These 4 factors are generally defined as: orientation (extraversion or introversion), perceiving process (sensing or intuition), judging process (thinking or feeling), and attitude toward the outer world ( judging or perceiving). The number 3 is associated with the work of Hans Eysenck in the United Kingdom as expressed through the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1975) or the Revised Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (Eysenck, Eysenck and Barrett, 1985). The 3 factors are defined as: extraversion (introversion, through ambiversion, to extraversion), neuroticism (emotional stability, through emotional lability, to neurotic disorders), and psychoticism (tendermindedness, through toughmindedness, to psychotic disorders). Each of these four models is capable of offering three important contributions to empirical theology. The first contribution concerns provision of a theoretical framework and established instrumentation for illuminating key problems confronting practical theology. Recent work in this area includes the methodology of preaching (Francis and Atkins, 2000, 2001), the dynamics in congregational life (Baab, 1998), and burnout among the clergy (Francis and Rutledge, 2000). The second contribution concerns enabling practical theologians to benefit from established research findings in other fields relevant

 ,    

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to their own sphere of interest. For example, survey work concerned with modelling the influence of religious faith on young people would now be unwise to ignore the recognised potential contaminating influence of individual differences in personality. Sex differences are routinely taken into account in studies concerned with religion, because sex has been shown consistently to interact with a range of outcomes (see Francis, 2001). Now that individual differences in personality are known to function in a similar contaminating way, studies conducted within empirical theology may be subject to proper peer criticism from the social sciences, if personality variables are not also taken seriously into account (see, for example, Francis and Montgomery, 1993; Francis and Jones, 1994; Jones and Francis, 1995; Francis, 1996, 1997a, 1997b, 1998, 1999). The third contribution concerns enabling empirical theology to participate in developing and testing theoretical perspectives treated seriously within the parent disciplines upon which empirical theology draws. In a truly inter-disciplinary endeavour there needs to be proper two way traffic between the disciplines involved. As a matter of principle current debates and techniques in the social sciences should be enhanced through contributions made by empirical theologians. 5. Personality Theory and Theological Normativity Empirical theology is able to employ data provided by theologically driven empirical research using psychological models of personality in ways in which the social sciences themselves are not empowered to employ such data. In the hands of the theologian these data can be tested against theological norms, can be used to test theological norms, and can be used to develop and shape theological norms (cf. Astley, 2002). One example will be offered of each of these activities. The way in which empirical description of personality can be tested against theological norms can be illustrated by the following example which refers back to the domain of biblical studies and begins with close scrutiny of the gospel narrative. Empirical psychology is able to describe both higher order and lower order personality factors and to profile character traits. Empirical psychology is able to quantify the correlation between personality factors, character traits, and optimal human functioning as defined by a variety of

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perspectives. Empirical psychology is able to describe the level and distribution of such factors and traits within society, talking in terms of statistical norms. Empirical psychology is not able, however, to pronounce on which factors or traits are valued in the eyes of God, which should be reinforced within the Christian community, and which should become the subject of penitence, confession, repentance, and change. Looking back at the personality profile of Martha and Mary in Luke 10, the personality psychologist might reasonably have profiled Martha as the extravert, busy in the outside world and concerned with matters of social hospitality, and Mary as the introvert, at home with the interior world of peace and calm, content to listen much and to say little. Using statistical data, the personality psychologist might go on to observe that Mary was positioned closer to the population norms for women in general within a male-dominated society. Biblical studies may go beyond these empirical descriptive data to tease out the evaluative perspective offered by Jesus in the context of the normative expectations within the Christian community. On one (less favoured) account, Jesus may be thought to favour the introverted perspective of Mary and to reject the extraverted perspective of Martha. On the other (more favoured) account, Jesus may be thought to defend the right of the introvert to her preferred mode of self expression, in face of the undeserved criticism of the extravert who complains that the introvert behaves differently from her own extraverted preferred mode of behaviour. Looking back at the personality profile of the two visitors to the temple in Luke 18, the personality psychologist might reasonably have profiled the Pharisee as self-confident, self-assertive, and morally concerned, and the tax collector as submissive, low in self-esteem, and suffering from high levels of guilt and anxiety. Using statistical normative data, the personality psychologist might go on to observe that the Pharisee scored above the population norms on self-esteem, but below the population norms on guilt, while the tax collector scored below the population norms on self-esteem, and above the population norms on guilt. Biblical studies may go beyond these empirical descriptive data to tease out the evaluative perspective offered by Jesus in the context of normative expectations within the Christian community. The generally accepted exegesis of the Lucan narrative is that Jesus affirmed the stance of the tax collector and

 ,    

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rejected the stance of the Pharisee. Such a theological evaluation makes sense only against a theologically informed appraisal of the network of doctrines concerned with creation, fall, and redemption. The way in which empirical description of personality can be used to test theological norms can be illustrated by the following example which refers back to the domain of the doctrine of creation. A key tenet of the doctrine of creation is that God created human beings in God’s own image. Two key issues of normativity relevant to empirical theology flow from this claim. The first issue concerns the recognition and positive embracing of plurality within humanity. One of the biblical strands concerning creation within Genesis speaks of plurality in the form of gender differences. The text asserts that men and women were both created in the image of God. In this sense theological normativity affirms the existence of and respect for individual differences as part of the divine intentionality. Personality psychology is able to open up and to examine the nature and the extent of such individual differences. Here empirical data on sex differences in personality is able to affirm that the differences between men and women, in the sense of statistical norms, are psychological as well as biological. The way in which empirical description of personality can be used to shape theological norms can be illustrated by the following example which continues to build on the domain of the doctrine of creation. If it is accepted that men and women are created in the image of God, then not only can what is known about the nature of God illuminate what it means to be human, but also close scrutiny of men and women themselves can help illuminate the nature of God. Of course any such argument of extrapolation predicated on the doctrine of creation (affirming that men and women are created in the image of God), needs also to give proper weight to the doctrine of the fall (asserting that the image of God within men and women has been marred by original sin). Of particular interest is the distinction made in personality psychology between fundamental personality factors (which are enduring and stable individual differences like the colour of our eyes) and the more surface character traits (which are subject to development and change). Introversion and extraversion, as illustrated by Mary and Martha, are examples of personality factors. Arrogance and humility, as illustrated by the Pharisee and tax collector, are examples of character traits. It is the identification

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of the enduring personality factors which may give theological insight into the nature of God and from which normative guidelines can be drawn for the practice of the Christian community. If basic individual differences like introversion and extraversion can be hypothesised to be built into the very fabric of what it is to be human (the fall not withstanding), in the sense of being created in the image of God, then the way in which such differences are valued, evaluated, and treated within the Christian community becomes a matter of significant theological importance and an issue of significant theological normativity. The relevance of taking this perspective seriously for the development of Christian ministry and for the proper pastoral care of the clergy is illustrated by the Pastoral Care Survey. 6. Pastoral Care Survey The Pastoral Care Survey was sponsored by the EA/Evangelical Alliance and by CWR/Waverley Christian Counselling in order to profile the understanding and needs of clergy affiliated with the Evangelical Alliance in England and Wales (see Francis, Robbins and Kay, 2000). The Pastoral Care Survey was mailed to 2,570 pastors on the Evangelical Alliance mailing list. This mailing produced 1,093 returns, a response rate of 43%. Since only 5% of the Evangelical Alliance affiliated pastors are women, the analysis was conducted on the 1,037 male pastors among the respondents. The survey included the short-form Revised Eysenck Personality Questionnaire described by Eysenck, Eysenck and Barrett (1985). This is a relatively brief instrument in which Eysenck’s three major dimensions of personality are assessed by 12 items each. The instrument also includes a 12-item lie scale. Each of the 48 items is assessed on a simple dichotomous scale: yes and no. This instrument was chosen because it had also been included in a series of clergy studies in the United Kingdom, including surveys among Roman Catholic priests (see Louden and Francis, 1999, 2001; Francis and Louden, 2001), male and female Anglican clergy (see Francis, 1991; Francis and Rodger, 1994; Robbins, Francis and Rutledge, 1997), Methodist ministers (see Jones and Francis, 1992; Robbins, Francis, Haley and Kay, 2001), and Pentecostal pastors (see Francis and Kay, 1995; Kay, 2000). Eysenck’s three dimensional model of personality has two important key features. First, the model argues that these three higher order factors (or dimensions) provide an adequate and thorough sum-

 ,    

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mary of the broad range of individual differences. Conceptually each of the three dimensions is regarded as combining seven interrelated traits. Second, the model argues that there is continuity (rather than discontinuity) between normal personality as assessed by these dimensions and abnormal personality or psychopathology. Eysenck’s dimensional model of personality speaks in terms of the three higher order factors of neuroticism, psychoticism, and extraversion. The neuroticism scale assesses a continuum ranging from emotional stability, through emotional lability, to neurotic disorder. The psychoticism scale assesses a second continuum ranging from tendermindedness, through toughmindedness, to psychotic disorder. The extraversion scale assesses a third continuum ranging from introversion, through ambiversion, to extraversion. Some of the best and most recent definitions of neuroticism, psychoticism, and extraversion are presented in the manual to the Eysenck Personality Scales (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1991). The person who records high scores on the neuroticism scale is described as: an anxious worrying individual, moody and frequently depressed. He is likely to sleep badly, and to suffer from various psychosomatic disorders. He is overly emotional, reacting too strongly to all sorts of stimuli, and finds it difficult to get back on an even keel after each emotionally arousing experience.

The person who records high scores on the psychoticism scale is described as someone who: may be cruel and inhumane, lacking in feeling and empathy, and altogether insensitive. He is hostile to others, even his own kith and kin, and aggressive, even to loved ones. He has a liking for odd and unusual things, and a disregard for danger; he likes to make fools of other people, and to upset them.

The person who records high scores on the extraversion scale is described as someone who is: sociable, likes parties, has many friends, needs to have people to talk to, and does not like reading or studying by himself. He craves excitement, takes chances, often sticks his neck out, acts on the spur of the moment, and is generally an impulsive individual. He is fond of practical jokes, always has a ready answer, and generally likes change.

Inclusion of the personality inventory in this survey generated a series of insights from the data relevant to the concerns of empirical theology, as illustrated by the following examples.

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Eysenck’s dimensional model of personality provides interesting insights into sex differences between men and women. The evidence is clear across a range of international studies that women record higher scores than men on the neuroticism scale (Francis, 1993). The evidence is also clear that men record higher scores than women on the psychoticism scale (Eysenck and Eysenck, 1976). While the evidence is less stable in respect of extraversion, until quite recently men routinely recorded higher scores than women on the extraversion scale. Such established differences between the sexes make it possible also to speak in terms of psychological gender profiling. Thus men who score low on psychoticism and extraversion but high on neuroticism may be said to display a characteristically feminine personality profile, while women who score low on neuroticism and high on psychoticism and extraversion may be said to display a characteristically masculine personality profile. Studies among male Anglican clergy reported by Francis (1991) and by Francis, Jones, Jackson and Robbins (2002), among male Methodist ministers reported by Robbins, Francis, Haley and Kay (2001), and among Roman Catholic priests reported by Louden and Francis (1999) and by Francis and Louden (2001) all draw attention to the way in which male clergy in these denominations in England and Wales all tended to display certain aspects of a feminine personality profile. It is also evident that these denominations have become highly feminised environments in terms of the ratio between male and female worshippers. Studies among Pentecostal pastors in England and Wales, however, as reported by Francis and Kay (1995) and by Kay (2000) identified a more masculine profile among male pastors. It may be more than coincidence that Pentecostal churches are able to attract a higher proportion of men into membership. Alongside Anglican clergy and Pentecostal pastors, the Pastoral Care Survey generated data on Baptist ministers, Free Evangelical ministers, and New Church ministers. These data demonstrated that Free Evangelical, Pentecostal, and New Church ministers recorded significantly higher extraversion scores and significantly lower neuroticism scores in comparison with Anglican and Baptist ministers. In other words, Free Evangelical, Pentecostal, and New Church ministers displayed a more masculine personality profile. Overall these denominations appear to have a more successful ministry among men.

 ,    

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Another test of this theory examined the relationship between personality and the proportion of men comprising the overall Sunday congregation. A significant correlation was found between extraversion and the proportion of men in the congregation. Theological reflection on these data may lead to significant insights regarding respect for individual differences in church life. The finding that different denominations may attract different personality qualities into leadership roles, may help to reconceptualise denominational differences in terms of personality style as much as in terms of doctrinal perspectives. Such an appreciation may help to reshape ecumenical expectations by providing grounds for valuing difference as well as seeking mutual understanding. The finding that men may feel more at home in some church traditions than in others may help to reshape evangelistic outreach among men and to direct male enquirers in the direction of some congregations rather than others. Choices here may be better understood and interpreted in psychological categories rather than in traditional theological categories. 8. Personality and Church Growth Some churches clearly seem to grow faster and bigger than others. The question which must fascinate practical theology concerns the extent to which such differences should be attributed to random chance or to the guidance of the Holy Spirit? Is any of the variability attributable merely to the character of the pastor in charge and can such variability be explained in terms of simple personality theory? Straightforward theories can be extrapolated on the basis of two of Eysenck’s dimensions of personality. Congregational growth and congregational maintenance both require considerable people skills and considerable interaction with people. According to the theory extraverts are better than introverts at high energy investment in people. People management also requires a high degree of emotional stability. Pastors who are easily hurt by people or who themselves easily give offence to others are less likely to be equipped to lend confidence and stability to congregational life. According to this theory, stable extraverts are better than neurotic introverts at building community. Data from the Pastoral Care Survey confirmed these predictions. Size of church membership and size of adult attendance both correlated positively with extraversion and negatively with neuroticism.

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Theological reflection on these data may help to formulate sensible and workable laws of church growth which give proper weight to the psychological dynamics associated with leadership potential and with congregational response. 9. Personality and Ministry Priorities It is clear that different clergy express their priorities in ministry in different ways. The question which must fascinate practical theology concerns the extent to which such differences should be attributed to random chance or to specific and targeted gifting by the Holy Spirit. Is there any possibility that ministry priorities can be predicted from personality profiling? Could personality profiling help to locate clergy within pastorates in which their ministry priorities were both valued and appreciated? Some earlier work among Anglican clergymen by Francis and Rodger (1994) and Anglican clergywomen by Robbins and Francis (2000) had already demonstrated a link between personality and ministry priorities. Data from the Pastoral Care Survey confirmed and extended these earlier findings. Aspects of ministry emphasised by those who recorded high scores on the extraversion scale included the ministry of pioneer, leader in the local community, evangelist, apostle, prophet, and fellowship builder. Congregations which need such ministries may well find that these needs are best met by higher scoring extraverts. Aspects of ministry emphasised by those who recorded high scores on the neuroticism scale included sacramental ministry, leader of public worship, and the ministry of theologian. Those who score high on the neuroticism scale choose those areas of ministry which are well protected by the clerical office and so shield the minister from unexpected stresses. Congregations which need such ministries well planned and well executed may well find that these ministries are best fulfilled by high scoring pastors on the neuroticism scale. Aspects of ministry emphasised by those who recorded low scores on the psychoticism scale include pastoral ministry, visiting, and teaching. Those who score low on the psychoticism scale are more likely to exercise a ministry of sympathy and empathy, but they are also less likely to be able to handle tough situations, take tough decisions, or chair tough meetings. Congregations which emphasise a

 ,    

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tenderminded approach to ministry may well find that their expectations are best fulfilled by pastors who score low on the psychoticism scale. Theological reflection on these data may help to appreciate how God appears to equip different individuals for different forms of ministry within the church. The proper discernment of how different personality profiles may bring distinctive strengths to ministry could enable church leaders to collaborate more insightfully with God’s way of gifting, and to do so for the greater benefit of the whole church and for the specific benefit of individual pastors. After all, there may be little virtue in persisting to fit round pegs into square holes. 10. Personality and Health in Ministry It is clear that there are significant variations in the level of health experienced by clergy. The question which much fascinate practical theology concerns the extent to which individual differences in health (physical health, mental health, and spiritual health) should be attributed to random chance or to the effectiveness of individual prayer. Is there any possibility that differences in health can be traced to individual differences in personality? Could personality link psychological, physical, and spiritual health? Data from the Pastoral Care Survey demonstrated that 6% of the clergy did not perceive their state of mental health as being good. The proportion rose to 12% who did not perceive their state of physical health to be good. The proportion rose further to 20% who did not perceive their state of spiritual health to be good. Data from the Pastoral Care Survey went on to demonstrate that individual differences in perceptions of mental, physical, and spiritual health could all be predicted from extraversion scores and from neuroticism scores. The highest levels of health were associated with stable extraversion, while the lowest levels of health were associated with neurotic introversion. Theological reflection on the costs of poor mental, poor physical, and poor spiritual health, both to the individual pastors themselves and to the congregations which they serve, may help the churches to recognise how routine personality profiling could identify those clergy most in danger of self-perceived health difficulties. Given the ability to predict such experiences, it might be reasonable to expect

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denominational hierarchies or local congregations to put in place strategies to support the more vulnerable clergy. 11. Personality and Exit from Ministry Many denominations in the United Kingdom are conscious of the exit rate from ministry. Some clergy take the route of early retirement in response to ill health or stress. Some clergy leave ministry to follow a secular occupation, perhaps returning to the career which they had left to enter ministry. Some clergy leave ministry in response to relationship problems or behaviours considered incompatible with the clerical profession. Early exits from ministry may be considered unfortunate for three reasons. It is economically inefficient after the denomination has incurred cost in training. It is strategically inefficient given the general shortage of vocations to Christian ministry. It is pastorally inefficient when congregations see their pastor packing up business. Once again, the question which must fascinate practical theology concerns the extent to which premature exits from ministry should be attributed to random chance or to some transcendent battle between forces of good and forces of evil? Is there any possibility that a key predictor of leaving ministry can be identified within the personality of those selected and trained for ministry? Data from the Pastoral Care Survey indicated that over half (53%) of the clergy reported that they sometimes entertain thoughts of leaving ministry. This appears to be a very high proportion, given the fact that other clergy were not even included in the survey since they had already left ministry. Data from the Pastoral Care Survey also demonstrated that thoughts of leaving ministry were significantly correlated with neuroticism scores. Theological reflection on the costs of leaving ministry to the sponsoring denomination, to the local congregation, and to the individuals themselves who exit ministry may help the churches to appreciate the value of being able to predict those most likely to think of leaving. Once again being able to predict those most vulnerable to thoughts of leaving ministry could help churches to offer additional and appropriate support to such pastors.

 ,    

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12. Personality and Charismatic Gifts The Pastoral Care Survey was conducted among clergy of a sufficiently evangelical persuasion to self-affiliate with the Evangelical Alliance. This constituency included individuals touched by the charismatic movement as well as individuals untouched by this movement. The relationship between personality and charismatic experience is a contested and controversial area. Some strands of speculation within the psychology of religion have associated charismatic gifts in general and glossolalia in particular with evidence of psychological instability or pathology. Some theological perspectives, on the other hand, have maintained the beneficial nature of charismatic experiences. Projected onto Eysenck’s dimensional model of personality, these contradictory perspectives would predict opposite relationships between glossolalia and neuroticism scores. The view that glossolalia may be an expression of psychological instability would be reflected in a positive correlation with neuroticism. The view that glossolalia is a psychologically healthy phenomenon would be reflected in a negative correlation with neuroticism. Data from the Pastoral Care Survey were able to test these hypotheses. By reporting a significant negative correlation between glossolalia and neuroticism scores the data supported the view that charismatic gifts are associated with psychological stability. The data also demonstrated a positive correlation between glossolalia and extraversion. In other words, stable extraverts represent the clergy who are most likely to be attracted to and influenced by the charismatic movement. The finding that charismatic gifts are associated with stable extraversion is consistent with the findings from three other studies, two studies among Anglican clergy reported by Francis and Thomas (1997) and by Robbins, Hair and Francis (1999) and one study among Catholic priests reported by Louden and Francis (2001). Theological reflection on these data need to take into account the empirical observation that there are consistent replicable relationships between the charismatic movement and basic individual differences in personality. The gifting of the Spirit to the Church may, after all, not be totally haphazard and random, but rather some individuals may be shaped by their very personality to be more receptive to such gifting. To identify scientifically discernable laws in such gifting may not be that far away from the basic teaching of Jesus in the parables. For in the parables Jesus himself was at pains

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to point out the continuity between the way things are in the Kingdom of God and the way things are in the natural universe (seeds and dough) and the way things are in the social universe (wedding feasts and high tables) (cf. Butler, 1844). 13. Conclusion This study has argued that personality theory is not only a legitimate, but also an essential component of empirical theology. The case has been advanced to regard empirical theology’s relationship with the social sciences not only as an intra-disciplinary activity but as an inter-disciplinary activity as well. Within this understanding of empirical theology there is both a theological and a psychological imperative for taking personality theory seriously. Examples from the Pastoral Care Survey have illustrated how personality theory can illuminate some key problems in practical theology and how empirical research in personality psychology can form the proper basis for theological reflection and for the examination and development of theological normativity. References Astley, J. (2002). Ordinary Theology: looking, listening and learning in theology. Aldershot: Ashgate. Baab, L.M. (1998). Personality Type in Congregations: how to work with others more effectively. Washington, DC: Alban Institute. Ballard, P. & Pritchard, J. (1996). Practical Theology in Action. London: SPCK. Butler, J. (1844). The Analogy of Religion. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Caprara, G.V. & Cervone, D. (2000). Personality: determinants, dynamics, and potentials. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Cartledge, M.J. (1999). Empirical theology: inter- or intra-disciplinary? Journal of Beliefs and Values 20, 98–104. Cattell, R.B., Eber, H.W. & Tatsuoka, M.M. (1970). Handbook for the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF). Champaign, Illinois: Institute for Personality and Ability Testing. Costa, P.T. & McCrae, R.R. (1985). The NEO Personality Inventory. Odessa, Florida: Psychological Assessment Resources. Eysenck, H.J. & Eysenck, S.B.G. (1975). Manual of the Eysenck Personality Questionnaire (adult and junior). London: Hodder and Stoughton. —— (1976). Psychoticism as a Dimension of Personality. London: Hodder and Stoughton. —— (1991). Manual of the Eysenck Personality Scales. London: Hodder and Stoughton. Eysenck, S.B.G., Eysenck, H.J. & Barrett, P. (1985). A revised version of the psychoticism scale. Personality and Individual Differences, 6, 21–29. Francis, L.J. (1991). The personality characteristics of Anglican ordinands: feminine men and masculine women? Personality and Individual Differences 12, 1133–1140.

 ,    

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—— (1993). The dual nature of the Eysenckian neuroticism scales: a question of sex differences? Personality and Individual Differences 15, 43–59. —— (1996). The relationship between Rosenberg’s construct of self-esteem and Eysenck’s two dimensional model of personality. Personality and Individual Differences 21, 483–488. —— (1997a). The impact of personality and religion on attitude towards substance use among 13–15 year olds. Drug and Alcohol Dependence 44, 95–103. —— (1997b). Christianity, personality and concern about environmental pollution among 13–to 15–year olds. Journal of Beliefs and Values 18, 7–16. —— (1998). Dogmatism and Eysenck’s two-dimensional model of personality revisited. Personality and Individual Differences 24, 571–573. —— (1999). Happiness is a thing called stable extraversion: a further examination of the relationship between the Oxford Happiness Inventory and Eysenck’s dimensional model of personality and gender. Personality and Individual Differences 26, 5–11. —— (2001). The Values Debate: a voice from the pupils. London: Woburn Press. Francis, L.J. & Atkins, P. (2000). Exploring Luke’s Gospel: a guide to the gospel readings in the Revised Common Lectionary. London: Mowbray. —— (2001). Exploring Matthew’s Gospel: a guide to the gospel readings in the Revised Common Lectionary. London: Mowbray. Francis, L.J. & Jones, S.H. (1994). The relationship between Eysenck’s personality factors and fear of bullying among 13–15 year olds in England and Wales. Evaluation and Research in Education 8, 111–118. Francis, L.J., Jones, S.H., Jackson, C.J. & Robbins, M. (2002). The feminine personality profile of male Anglican clergy in Britain and Ireland: a study employing the Eysenck Personality Profiler. Review of Religious Research, (in press). Francis, L.J. & Kay, W.K. (1995). The personality characteristics of Pentecostal ministry candidates. Personality and Individual Differences 18, 581–594. Francis, L.J. & Louden, S.H. (2001). Parish ministry and Roman Catholic regular clergy: applying Eysenck’s dimensional model of personality. International Journal of Practical Theology 5, 216–226. Francis, L.J. & Montgomery, A. (1993). Personality and school related attitudes among 11–16 year old girls. Personality and Individual Differences 14, 647–654. Francis, L.J., Robbins, M. & Kay, W.K. (2000). Pastoral Care Today: practice, problems and priorities in churches today. Farnham: CWR. Francis, L.J. & Rodger, R. (1994). The influence of personality on clergy role prioritization, role influences, conflict and dissatisfaction with ministry. Personality and Individual Differences 16, 947–957. Francis, L.J. & Rutledge, C. (2000). Are rural clergy in the Church of England under greater stress? a study in empirical theology. Research in the Social Scientific Study of Religion 11, 173–191. Francis, L.J. & Thomas, T.H. (1997). Are charismatic ministers less stable? a study among male Anglican clergy. Review of Religious Research 39, 61–69. Funder, D.C. (1997). The Personality Puzzle. New York: W.W. Norton. Hogan, R., Johnson, J. & Briggs, S. (Eds.) (1997). Handbook of Personality Psychology. London: Academic Press. Jones, D.L. & Francis, L.J. (1992). Personality profile of Methodist ministers in England. Psychological Reports 70, 538. Jones, S.H. & Francis, L.J. (1995). The relationship between Eysenck’s personality factors and attitude towards truancy among 13–15 year olds in England and Wales. Personality and Individual Differences 19, 225–233. Kay, W.K. (2000). Pentecostals in Britain. Carlisle: Paternoster. Kay, W.K. & Francis, L.J. (1985). The seamless robe: interdisciplinary enquiry in religious education. British Journal of Religious Education 7, 64–67. —— (1996). Drift from the Churches: attitude toward Christianity during childhood and adolescence. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.

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Keirsey, D. & Bates, M. (1978). Please Understand Me. Del Mar, California: Prometheus Nemesis. Louden, S.H. & Francis L.J. (1999). The personality profile of Roman Catholic parochial secular priests in England and Wales. Review of Religious Research 41, 65–79. —— (2001). Are Catholic priests in England and Wales attracted to the charismatic movement emotionally less stable? British Journal of Theological Education 11, 65–76. Myers, I.B. & McCaulley, M.H. (1985). Manual: a guide to the development and use of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Palo Alto, California: Consulting Psychologists Press. Robbins, M. & Francis, L.J. (2000). Role prioritisation among clergywomen: the influence of personality and church tradition among female stipendiary Anglican clerics in the UK. British Journal of Theological Education 11, 7–23. Robbins, M., Francis, L.J., Haley, J.M. & Kay, W.K. (2001). The personality characteristics of Methodist ministers: feminine men and masculine women? Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 40, 123–128. Robbins, M., Francis, L.J. & Rutledge, C. (1997). The personality characteristics of Anglican stipendiary parochial clergy in England: gender differences revisited. Personality and Individual Differences 23, 199–204. Robbins, M., Hair, J. & Francis, L.J. (1999). Personality and attraction to the charismatic movement: a study among Anglican clergy. Journal of Beliefs and Values 20, 239–246. Van der Ven, J.A. (1993). Practical Theology: an empirical approach. Kampen: Kok Pharos. Van der Ven, J.A. (1998). Education for Reflective Ministry. Louvain: Peeters.

PART TWO

NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF EMPIRICAL RESEARCH

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HOW “ADULT” IS THE RELIGIOSITY OF ADULTS? Normative Implications of Empirical Theological Research into Religious Development in the Second Half of Life U F-L & T K Introduction Evidence pointing to an unprecedented level of religious individualization and pluralization can be considered the quintessential finding of research in sociology and psychology of religion and empirical theology in recent decades. The socio-cultural manifestations of these radical transformations of religion and faith have generated massive tensions between the traditional, historical forms of religion and the pluralistic consciousness of modern society, leading to considerable adaptive efforts being expected of the churches and religious communities. At the same time these complex processes of change also shape the development of the individual’s personal religiosity, which in many cases today is characterized by a markedly dynamic progression over the course of the person’s entire lifetime, and demanding a constant process of critical individual conciliation of personal experience with the traditional religious beliefs. Here the normative implications of empirical theological research into the development of faith become apparent: Is it possible to formulate criteria that can be used to assess the maturity of actual forms of expression of religiosity by adults? Against this background, we set out in the following to explore the possibilities and limits of an empirical measurement and description of the phenomenon of religiosity, as well as of the theological interpretation and evaluation thereof, by drawing on the research project on “Religious Development in Adulthood” (“Religiöse Entwicklung im Erwachsenenalter”), carried out jointly by the Seminar for Pastoral Theology at the University of Bonn (Prof. Dr. W. Fürst) and the Diocese of Aachen (Dr. A. Wittrahm) from 1999 to 2003 with funding from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG). We shall begin by describing the empirical generative approach underlying the research project (1), and then proceed to outline the methodology

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and results of the project against the background of the problematic relationship between empiricism and normativity (2). Finally the fundamental criteria of mature religiosity are discussed (3), followed by a look at future perspectives and conclusions (4). 1. From the Normativity of the Factual to the Generativity of the Empirical So as not to run the risk of turning the question of the normative implications of empirical theological research into a purely selfreferential discourse, it is worth taking a look at how the empirical approach in Practical Theology is perceived from the outside. Instead of a stronger reception of empirical theological methodology, some observers predict a paradigm shift from the perspective of empirical reflection to one that is aesthetically, semiotically and lifeworld oriented (cf. Lämmlin & Scholpp [eds.] 2001; Meyer-Blanck 2001). Others argue that we are seeing the end of the “phase of an entirely natural and even rather innocent reception of the methods and insights of the human sciences in theology”, a phase in which Practical Theology ran the risk of falling into a “methodological positivism” that “studies ecclesial and religious praxis without reaching conclusions founded on the power of action and insight inherent in the concepts of our faith” (Fuchs & Bucher 2000, 23f.) Are these differences based simply on different understandings of the concept of Empirie or empirical knowledge, or is empirically oriented theology—only a few decades into its development—already outmoded, even before it could establish itself securely in the course of the transformation of Practical Theology from an applied science to a science of action? Or, to view the problem from a slightly different angle: even if the empirical stream in Practical Theology is not yet ready for the academic scrap heap, how can we go about gaining a more exact understanding of this empirical orientation, and in what form can it be reconciled with the growing aesthetic trend in Practical Theology (cf. Feeser-Lichterfeld & Kläden 2002)? Empirical research, in our view, is characterized in that it does not evaluate hypotheses and theories solely on the basis of thorough consideration and discussion, but that it also endeavours to formulate and operationalize these as precisely as possible and to test them against experiential data selected specifically for this purpose. The responses, measurements or test results are obtained through system-

 “ ”     

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atic investigation and with the help of observation, interviews and surveys, or experiments. Thus the concept of “empirical” research in Practical Theology should not be understood to cover any and all situations in which theoretical reflection draws on subjectively experienced or intuitively generalized “reality”, but rather the systematic and scientifically rigorous capture and analysis of experience. In order for a study to meet these criteria and be considered truly empirical, it is therefore essential to establish a priori how the characteristics being studied will be measured, the nature of the hypotheses and how they will be operationalized, and the correlations or causal relationships that are believed to exist between the variables. Out of the multi-stage sequence of empirical steps a creative generative process can then arise, which does not stop at the testing of a hypothesis, but can lead into the generation of new hypotheses through critical analysis of the research results and research process. For example, the relationship between the observed variables or the scope of the phenomena under investigation might be considered from a more restrictive or a more broadly defined perspective. In this way the positivistically misunderstood encounter with “reality”, where that which is assumed to have been correctly perceived is declared, with little or no justification, as an objective fact (and thus not seldom as a normative value as well), is contrasted (or perhaps more accurately, compared) with the critical approach to everyday knowledge as well as (one’s own) scientific experience and insight. Nevertheless the relationship of Practical Theology and empirical research remains, in our view, necessarily precarious: Practical Theology is a science of action; its goals are reflection on and evaluation of existing praxis and the encouragement of new and better forms of praxis—i.e. more adequate to the directives of the Gospel and the demands of the situation—through the development of concepts and impulses for action. The concept of action per se is tied to the question of right action, so that Practical Theology is necessarily dependent on criteria and intimately linked to normative questions. The task of empirical research on the other hand is first of all to perceive “reality” in as unprejudiced and value-free a manner as possible. Its job is to describe, explain and predict empirically relevant phenomena, without prejudicing previously determined action choices (an ideal view that, as will be demonstrated further on, can never be wholly adhered to in reality, nor should even be attempted). If, however, one attempts to set empiricism and normativity off against

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each other as two entirely different constructs, then empirical research, especially in the field of theology, becomes vulnerable to two potential flaws of development which, if they are overemphasized or if the existing protective mechanisms are ignored, can also lead to misunderstandings about the nature of empirical research as such. Such flaws or misunderstandings can appear on both sides of the relationship between empiricism and normativity or, to be more precise, empirical theological research and Practical Theology. To begin with the perspective of empirical research, there is the risk of the naturalistic fallacy, i.e. of the positivistic deduction of normative claims from empirically acquired facts. This occurs when, for example, the collection of data about attitudes or opinions is extrapolated linearly to directives for action. Even if it should be evident on logical grounds that prescription cannot simply be derived from description, it is nonetheless easy to slip into such a fallacy, since the normative implications of empirical constructs and research programs are not always immediately identifiable as such. Although for this reason it is important to devote attention to avoidance of the naturalistic fallacy, conversely it is also important that in developing criteria for action choices, facts are not entirely ignored and norms are through this established on purely deductive grounds. To avoid empirical evidence entirely for fear of committing a naturalistic fallacy would be to underestimate the importance of empirical data in the process of theological evaluation. Sensitivity to such errors can be awakened and heightened by creating a corresponding methodological awareness. What is even more important in connection with theological questions is not to lose sight of the sensus fidelium, the religious sense of God’s people, since it possess the status of a locus theologicus, or source of theological insight. Empirical theological research can help to ensure that the sensus fidelium is not neglected. But it can surely not play an exclusive role in determining what the sensus fidelium is, because that sensus cannot simply be derived from the results of opinion research in the religious-theological sphere. Turning the problem around and approaching the issue from the perspective of Practical Theology that is turning toward empirical research, it must be acknowledged that empirical research is driven by knowledge interests from the beginning. These knowledge interests drive the development of research projects in that they determine the research question to be asked, the variables to be observed, the methods to be used, the population to be studied and the analytical

 “ ”     

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methods to be applied. They also influence the thought processes involved in the discussion and interpretation of results. These knowledge interests derive from the researchers’ practical theological theories and from other conscious or unconscious background assumptions. It would be naïve to believe that empirical research could become entirely neutral and be performed without particular knowledge interests in mind; this naïve belief becomes dangerous when the erroneous assumption of an absence of preconceptions becomes grounds for according the results of the research process a special authority, namely the normative force of the factual. It is therefore important not to conceal the inevitable normative aspects in the planning and interpretation of empirical studies, but to lay them open so that they can be taken into account in the evaluation of the research process and the planning of potential follow-up studies. Of course every empirical study must also adhere to the norms of the methods it uses and the rules and standards associated with them. This includes the quality criteria for empirical tests such as objectivity (user-independency in execution, evaluation and interpretation), reliability and validity, as well as the use of statistical analytical methods lege artis. Finally, (minimum) quality criteria such as logical consistency, empirical content, i.e. potential for falsification, and empirical corroboration, i.e. surviving falsification attempts, apply to empirical theological theory formation as well. All in all, normative criteria are present at every step of the empirical research process (cf. van der Ven 2002; Ziebertz 2002), so that from a diachronic perspective the relationship between normativity and empirical research is spiral in form. Critical to the value and acceptance of empirical research within theology will be the extent to which the self-imposed, dual claim of an empirical theology is actually fulfilled: namely to meet the standards that have been determined to be constitutive both in theology and in the empirical scientific disciplines and to contribute to their further development. Within the framework of a specifically theological approach, the autonomy of theology in this regard needs to be clearly set out. With regard to the normative implications of empirical research, in the interpretation of empirical theological results the consciously intended or even unconsciously accepted notion of the “normativity of the factual” should be replaced by emphasis on the generative potential of empirical-critical ways of thinking and working in theology: for perceiving, withstanding and attempting to reconcile the dialectical and at times aporetic tension between tradition,

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the present and future in the interests of a more compelling and more situation-appropriate mediation of the Christian message (cf. Hunze & Feeser 2000; Feeser-Lichterfeld 2000). 2. Religious Gestalts in Adulthood In the second part, the normative implications of an empirical orientation in Practical Theology discussed in the foregoing will be illustrated based on the example of the research project “Religious Development in Adulthood” (“Religiöse Entwicklung im Erwachsenenalter”), a project that was carried out jointly by the Seminar for Pastoral Theology at the University of Bonn and by the Diocese of Aachen, with funding from the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft. This research project was designed as a retrospective collection of remembered and current biographic and religious data through biographic exploration (cf. Kruse 1987; Jüttemann & Thomae [eds.] 1987). In the main part of the study, 135 interviews, most of them between two and three hours in length, were held in six locations in Germany. In order to ensure that the longitudinal questions would not be solely based on retrospective recall, one and a half years after the main study one third of the useable sample (38 respondents) were interviewed a second time about biographic and religious developments that had occurred in their lives in the meantime. This follow-up study also served to provide a consensual validation (cf. Kaiser 1989) of the data explored in the interviews in the main part of the study with regard to development of gestalts of religiosity. The difficulty of the topic with its connections to the socio-cultural processes transforming religion as a result of individualization and pluralization, as well as the orientation problems for the individual that these entail, were already discussed at the outset of this paper. In addition, the discussed project shares with similar undertakings the difficulty of defining the terms religion and religiosity, and must fall back on normative background assumptions for formulating dimensions or categories of individual religiosity. The hypothetical construct of the “religious gestalt” that was first used in a pilot study (cf. Fürst, Severin & Wittrahm 1997; Wittrahm & Leicht 2003), plays a key role in the research project “Religious Development in Adulthood”, in the interest of a well-differentiated perception of religious attitudes and behaviours, and their dynamic

 “ ”     

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transformation over the course of the individual’s lifespan, the “religious gestalt” is captured in the five dimensions ‘image of God’, ‘subjective understanding of religion’, ‘affiliation to a religious community’, ‘religious praxis’ and ‘religious knowledge’. The assumption guiding the research was that the whole that is made up of these five dimensions possesses gestalt quality or gestalt order and can be characterized by the properties of over-summativity and transposability. Thus the religious gestalt is not composed of arbitrarily selected individual variables. Rather, it forms an ensemble that is more than the mere sum of its parts (over-summativity). Depending on the particular expression and combination of the variables it generates discrete, mutually delimitable forms that can be reduced to a workable number or set. A distinction is made between the individual expression of this form, as a gestalt of religiosity, and forms that occur in more than one person, which become a collective gestalt type. Drawing on the lifespan approach to developmental psychology (cf. for example Baltes 1990; 1999; McFadden 1999), we further postulate that in different periods and situations of the individual’s life, the religious gestalt will be modified and adapted to the changing environmental conditions. Changes to the religious gestalt over the person’s lifespan are therefore not only possible but in fact inevitable, if the religious gestalt is to remain in harmony with the individual biography and if it is to remain useful for responding to changing biographic challenges. In this sense the religious gestalt is transposable or transferable to changing life situations, without the quality or order of the religious gestalt necessarily being changed by the modifications that this entails. Changes to the quality of the religious gestalt are nonetheless possible as a result of certain, significant changes. In this case we speak of a religious gestalt change, a phenomenon that nearly 60 percent of our interview partners reported having experienced at least once during their adult lifespan. The results of the study to which we refer here (cf. Kläden 2003) confirm the assumption that the selected concept of the gestalt is a useful construct for understanding religiosity and its development since, as it happens, certain expressions of the variables making up the five dimensions in combination occur with more than random frequency, i.e. as a concise gestalt. The gestalt concept has therefore proven a useful construct for studying the development of religiosity, enabling us to distil the many variables, forms and expressions down to seven types of religious gestalts. These are: ‘traditional

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church-oriented’, ‘communal church-oriented’, ‘cultural Christian’, ‘cultural church-oriented’, ‘postmodern-religious’, ‘indifferent-religious’, and ‘a-religious’. Overall, the religiosity of around 95 percent of the respondents interviewed could be categorized as belonging to one of these seven gestalt types at various retrospectively explored points of their life. The characterization of the individual religious gestalt in the course of analysis was confirmed by the respondents in the followup phase (consensual validation) with a very low error rate of only seven percent. The gestalt typology was created using a hermeneutic circle method. First, pastoral theology experts on the research team and the project’s academic advisory panel were asked to describe the gestalt types they would expect to find and their respective expressions in the five dimensions, against the background of existing analyses of contemporary religiosity. These gestalt types were compared with the empirically determined gestalts and modified until they could represent as many as possible of the gestalts identified at the various measurement time points, while at the same time offering sufficient differentiation between the individual types, thereby reducing the large number of gestalts found empirically to a workable number of types. Certain dimensions or individual expressions of these dimensions can be identified as crucial to the differences that were used for the determination of gestalt types, while other dimensions or expressions do not achieve this criteriological character. Determining factors in this sense were found to be the dimensions of image of God, connection to a religious community, and religious praxis. Concretely, the gestalt typology was generated by bringing together the two dimensions of image of God and subjective understanding of religion into a cognitive, ideas-based meta-dimension, while connection to a religious community and religious praxis were combined into a behaviour-based meta-dimension. Both meta-dimensions can take on the forms ‘Christian’, ‘religious’ (i.e. not specifically Christian), or ‘non-religious/a-religious’. To generate the gestalt types, the possible expressions of the two meta-dimensions were combined, although not all nine theoretically possible combinations occur in practice, and the combination ‘Christian ideas—Christian behaviour’ was further differentiated. In addition to the successful application of the gestalt model, which represents an important outcome in itself and is likely to be of greatest interest in the context of the present volume, some other findings—

 “ ”     

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reported here in only the briefest of terms—were: Only 40% of our respondents maintained a constant religious gestalt over their entire adult lifespan; 60% experienced at least one gestalt change in adulthood. The traditional church-oriented type that predominates in childhood and youth loses ground to all the other types in the course of adulthood; in younger cohorts this pluralization is accelerated. Within the religious gestalt, the behaviour-based dimensions exhibit a greater constancy than do the cognitive dimensions. These very brief statements must suffice to suggest that religious development in adulthood can be understood in the context of the lifespan developmental approach, according to which religiosity develops in a highly plural, multidirectional manner as a result of the interaction of individual and environment over the entire lifespan. Now that the study has been completed and the results already quite widely discussed (cf. Fürst, Wittrahm, Feeser-Lichterfeld & Kläden [eds.] 2003), the combination of a (pastoral) aesthetic and an empirical theological approach can be judged to have been constructive and successful. The “religious gestalt” construct builds on similar attempts in the sociology and psychology of religion to come up with a dimensional categorization. It represents a subjectively coherent ensemble of religious attitudes, ideas, experiences and behaviours, which characterize the relationship of an individual to God (transcendence) as well as to his or her faith community and the ensuing action consequences. At the same time the gestalt reflects the individuality of religiosity, because different gestalts are possible— and are also found empirically—as life situations and life experiences change. The gestalt has aesthetic qualities, meaning that it can be perceived and intersubjectively evaluated in terms of its closure, clarity, transparency and consistency. 3. Building Blocks for a Criteriology of “Adult Religiosity” The quality criteria for religious gestalts described in the last paragraph point to some initial elements of the criteriology of “adult religiosity” that we aim to establish. Even if such criteria cannot simply be derived from the quantitative results of the empirical research project, the instrument of gestalt typology that we used provides some clues to the desired criteriology. These criteria do not arise automatically from our typology, even though, for theological reasons,

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the sympathies of the research team overall tend toward the church oriented gestalts, and particularly the communal church-oriented type. The characterization of the cultural church-oriented and the cultural Christian types, with their difference between theological cognition and religious praxis, as what might be called broken types (cf. Wittrahm 2003, 60), also implies an underlying valuation of these types as being subject to contradictions and tensions that ought preferably to be resolved and overcome in the direction of a more coherent overall gestalt. Independently of these judgements that are tied to the theological convictions of the authors of this gestalt typology, further reflection is necessary in order to extract from the typology and the data obtained with it meaningful criteria of adult religiosity. More readily apparent are the normative implications of the structural genetic phase models of religious development, which are based on the notion of an internally motivated logic of development that can be described as a linear series of steps. In these models, religious development is seen as process of maturing or psychogenetic construction, in which the influence of the environment is of secondary importance for the developmental process. The linearity of these phase models expresses—even more directly than does the gestalt concept described above—a normative aspect: The higher the stage of religious development that a person has reached on the “ladder” of the phase model, the more mature his state of religious development is deemed to be. The most desirable (though practically impossible to demonstrate empirically) are the highest levels, in which the relation between the subject and the ultimate becomes generalized in the direction of a universal solidarity. This indicates that the empirical confirmation of phase models of religious judgement (Oser & Gmünder 1984) or of life belief (Fowler 1991) in intermediate and advanced adulthood (cf. Wittrahm & Leicht 2003, 26–28; Wittrahm & Hammerschmidt 2003) has not been convincing so far. Whereas in childhood and youth a high correlation is found between age and the lower stages, a corresponding correlation between age and the higher stages in intermediate and advanced adulthood has not been demonstrated. Furthermore, in advanced age the individual not infrequently regresses to lower stages, while the highest stages are reached seldom or not at all. This suggests that while the phase models describe ideal types of mature and biographically coherent forms of religious gestalt as the goals of religious development, they contribute little to an under-

 “ ”     

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standing of actual religious development in adulthood and of the determinants of this development. It would be more meaningful to view the actual religious development in adulthood, according to the results of our study, in the context of the lifespan approach to developmental psychology (cf. for example Baltes 1990; 1999), which looks at development as a life-long, multidirectional process, characterized by loss and gain over a person’s entire lifespan and comprehensible only in connection with the concrete contextual influences on the individual. In this approach, moreover, normative background assumptions play a lesser role. Oversimplifying somewhat, one can say that the structural genetic phase theories are more criteriologically or normatively oriented and hence interested chiefly in the characteristics of mature religiosity, while the study described here is more descriptively oriented and is more closely focussed on the actual development of religiosity in adults and the transformation processes and conditions to which that development is subject, than on the criteria for distinguishing between the quality of the various religious gestalts (cf. Englert 2003, 93f.). The aim here is not to set up either one of these approaches as better than the other, since they start from different perspectives and cannot be faulted for failing to achieve something that they never intended to do. Rather, these two research approaches could well prove complementary, each focussing on different life stages (childhood/youth versus adulthood). As formal criteria for the maturity of religiosity from a structural genetic perspective, one could posit, with Englert (2003, 91–94), the growing capacity for religious self-determination, which sees the ultimate commitment not as a contradiction but rather as a foundation for personal freedom, and the growing capacity for interreligious communication. Regarding the latter, further discussion is merited on whether the commitment to intersubjective communication and, flowing from it, a claim not just to a particular truth but rather to the universal truth of faith, which would then also have to be justified in the forum of reason, should be considered as additional criteria for mature religiosity. In addition to the problem alluded to earlier, namely that this structural genetic approach cannot make sufficient provision for contextuality, multi-directionality and multi-causality, the reverse criticism can also be made, namely that this concept is excessively normative, in the sense of a Western or rationalistic postulate of autonomy, to be suitable as a formal, fundamental criterion for mature religiosity. Nevertheless, the two criteria of capacity for religious self-determination

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and capacity for interreligious communication can be retained as a basis for discussion. Additional criteria for adult or mature religiosity are implicit in the background assumptions of the research project “Religious Development in Adulthood”. Considering that they are embedded in the developmental psychology approach of a developmental dynamic that extends over the whole of the lifespan, is multidirectional and characterized by processes of both growth and decline, we find the criteria of biographical coherence (synchronicity) and provenness in challenging life situations (functionality) emerge as important additional criteria for mature religiosity. In this same sense Englert (2000) posited “transformation”, “provenness” and “vocation” as basic categories of adult religiosity. According to his theory, adult religiosity must prove or have proven itself as capable of evolving in correspondence with biographic crisis experiences (transformation). It must express standards and visions of a fulfilling life (provenness). And finally, with a view to the aforementioned transformation process, it should be open to the recurring search for ways to interpret and build on religious traditions, especially the tradition of Judeo-Christian faith, so as to bring out their individual, biographic meaning (vocation). A last set of criteria for mature religiosity grow out of the concepts for the understanding of religiosity used in this study (cf. Englert 2003, 94–98). To a greater extent than the structural genetic theories, these criteria explicitly reflect the consciously intended references to the research team’s own Judeo-Christian tradition and, consequently, their embeddedness in a concrete lifeworld. A first criterion is what may be called the ideal of a correlative relationship between biography and faith, which can already be derived from the interview guidelines. Thus the religious tradition is accorded an important meaning in its own right as a corrective to lifeworld-oriented interpretations and patterns of plausibilization. The second criterion, the gestalt nature of religiosity that was discussed in detail above, emphasizes the importance of the consistency and internal logic of a concrete religious gestalt, and is difficult to reconcile with a patchwork religiosity in which there is no connection between the various dimensions or where contradictory practices or views exist within a dimension. Finally, in the choice of the dimensions of the gestalt of religiosity, in which both the connection with a religious community and religious praxis play an important role, the importance of the collective character of religious and religiosity that is expressed in a communal guiding ideal becomes clear.

 “ ”     

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Looking beyond the present research project and its gestalt concept to theological criteria for mature faith, the fundamental criterion for religiosity that is mature in the Christian sense—and which we allude to here in only the briefest of terms—is the belief in Jesus Christ’s gospel of the coming kingdom of God, expressed through a praxis that is in keeping with that message a well as with individual life circumstances, and that looks forward to the immanent realization of God’s kingdom. Distortions, on the other hand, occur when one of these elements is overemphasized or neglected in relation to the others (cf. Fürst & Wittrahm 2002, 208). 4. Outlook and Conclusion In the preceding reflections a variety of normative implications of an empirical theological research approach were identified, based on the research project “Religious Development in Adulthood”. In closing we would like to briefly point out that of course the practical theological consequences and options that are formulated at the conclusion of such a research process do not “automatically” or “necessarily” arise out of the empirical findings, but are the result of values-based decisions and choices. There is no escaping the fact that Practical Theology, even in the empirical theological mode, is “Reflexion auf Entscheidung hin” (“reflection aiming toward decision”) (Rahner 1995, 505). As one consequence of the findings of the research project “Religious Development in Adulthood”, Fürst and Feeser-Lichterfeld (2002; 2003) apply the lifespan approach that has already been widely adopted in modern gerontology to the field of Practical Theology. Their concept of what is called: “Pastoral der Lebensspanne und der Lebensbezüge” proposes a type of pastoral practice that considers the full span of life and its diverse and changing relationships. It also refers to the fact that all Christians are responsible for such a pastoral work. First and foremost such an understanding of pastoral work and pastoral theology is concerned with a view of Christians as a collective that effects sustainable action both personally and socially only in and through the collective. It covers all age groups and seeks to integrate the variety of groupings within congregations and in other fields of pastoral work. Without desiring to detract from the concerns and accomplishments of past decades, this understanding seeks to establish a

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certain counterweight to the countless specializations, differentiations and professionalizations of pastoral work (in particular the view of pastoral care of the aged as a special-needs or marginalized form of pastoral work). “Lifespan pastoral theology” is predicated on a collective vocation to the collective salvation of all Christians, inwardly toward the community of faith as well as outwardly toward society as a whole, and thus on the collective prophetic mission through baptism and confirmation. Ideally, the understanding of pastoral work presented here will be seen as an intergenerational undertaking that takes into account the radical synchronous and diachronous differences between the generations; an undertaking that takes this difference and foreignness as grounds for careful, respectful and interested encounter and acquaintance; an undertaking that sees the experiences of contrast as a source of gain, not threat, and therefore does not seek to eliminate the differences. The highly plural and dynamically evolving religious biographies that were described in the research project “Religious Development in Adulthood” require places and times for exchange characterized by respect and attentiveness as well as communal interpretation and meaning-giving; these then, should be the aim of a “lifespan pastoral care”. Such encounters provide an opportunity for authentic and hence highly effective religious impulses for all participants. Within the context of such a mystagogical sharing of faith and life, the elderly may have a special “productivity” or “wisdom” to contribute. For when the focus of the aging person is no longer directed primarily toward his or her own interests, but increasingly toward a social and interactive context, an opportunity is created for potential qualities such as life experience, equanimity or prudence be expressed for the benefit of others. In this way old people may, naturally and unobtrusively, become a model for the younger ones, just as the old people may come to know and learn from the following generations. As a summation of the reflections presented here on the basis of the research project “Religious Development in Adulthood”, we can say that normative aspects play a sometimes more, sometimes less apparent but always decisive role in the whole of the empirical theological research process. The extent to which the twofold claim of quality of empirical research as well as theological quality has been fulfilled, can only be determined through critical discourse; that an empirical study of this kind holds generative potential is shown by the ideas and suggestions presented in the immediately preceding

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paragraphs concerning pastoral and pastoral theological consequences. Empirical findings play an important role in the formulation, further development and evaluation of norms and impulses for action in Practical Theology and elsewhere. Potential risks that arise out of this not always clear-cut relationship can often be averted by promoting an awareness of this situation. Empirical knowledge and normativity must be differentiated methodologically and must not be blithely equated with one another, even if, on the other hand, the two are always closely linked to one another and can never be entirely separated. Indeed, the relationship of empirical research and normativity could be described—cum grano salis—as “separate and undivided”. References Baltes, P. (1990). Entwicklungspsychologie der Lebensspanne. Theoretische Leitsätze [Lifespan developmental psychology. Theoretical principles]. Psychologische Rundschau 41, 1–24. —— (1999). Alter und Altern als unvollendete Architektur der Humanontogenese [Age and aging as an uncompleted architecture of human ontogenesis]. Zeitschrift für Gerontologie und Geriatrie 32, 433–448. Englert, R. (2000). Grundkategorien erwachsener Religiosität: “Transformation”— “Bewährung”—“Berufung” [Basic categories of adult religiosity: “Transformation”, “provenness”, “vocation”]. In Initiativkreis Religiöse Erwachsenenbildung (Ed.), Was ist erwachsene Religiosität? [What is adult religiosity?] (57–62). Mönchengladbach: Kühlen. —— (2003). Von der Deskription der Religiosität Erwachsener hin zu Kriterien erwachsener Religiosität [From the description of the religiosity of adults to criteria of adult religiosity]. In W. Fürst, A. Wittrahm, U. Feeser-Lichterfeld & T. Kläden (Eds.), “Selbst die Senioren sind nicht mehr die alten . . .”. Praktisch-theologische Beiträge zu einer Kultur des Alterns (89–100). Münster: Lit. Feeser-Lichterfeld, U. (2000). Von der Normativität des Faktischen zur Generativität des Empirischen [From the normativity of the factual to the generativity of the empirical]. Pastoraltheologische Informationen 20, 15–17. Feeser-Lichterfeld, U. & Kläden, T. (2002). Empirisch-theologische Forschung — Stolperstein oder Baustein der Pastoralästhetik? [Empirical theological research— Stumbling block or building block for pastoral aesthetics?] In W. Fürst (Ed.), Pastoralästhetik. Die Kunst der Wahrnehmung und Gestaltung in Glaube und Kirche [Pastoral aesthetics. The art of perception and creation in faith and church] (311–319). Freiburg/Br.: Herder. Fowler, J.W. (1991). Stufen des Glaubens. Die Psychologie der menschlichen Entwicklung und die Suche nach Sinn [Stages of faith. The psychology of human development and the search for meaning]. Gütersloh: Mohn. Fuchs, O. & Bucher, R. (2000). Wider den Positivismus in der Praktischen Theologie! [Down with positivism in Practical Theology!] Pastoraltheologische Informationen 20, 23–26. Fürst, W. & Feeser-Lichterfeld, U. (2002). “Je älter, desto religiöser”? Pluralisierung und Dynamik der Glaubensentwicklung in der zweiten Lebenshälfte als Aufforderung

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zu einer “Pastoral der Lebensspanne” [Do we become more religious with age? Pluralization and dynamic of religious development in the second half of life as a call for a “lifespan pastoral practice and theology”]. Theologie der Gegenwart 45, 263–271. —— (2003). “Pastoral der Lebensspanne und der Lebensbezüge”. Elemente und Essentials eines möglichen christlich-kirchlichen Beitrags zur “Alternskultur” in der Gesellschaft [“Lifespan pastoral practice and theology”. Elements and essentials of a possible christian-ecclesiastical contribution to the “culture of aging” in society]. In W. Fürst, A. Wittrahm, U. Feeser-Lichterfeld & T. Kläden (Eds.), “Selbst die Senioren sind nicht mehr die alten . . .”. Praktisch-theologische Beiträge zu einer Kultur des Alterns (153–180). Münster: Lit. Fürst, W., Severin, B. & Wittrahm, A. (1997). Glaubensentwicklung in der zweiten Lebenshälfte und die pastoralen Konsequenzen—eine qualitative Pilotstudie [Faith development in the second half of life and pastoral consequences—a qualitative pilot study] (2nd, revised edition.). Bonn: Universität Bonn, Seminar für Pastoraltheologie. Fürst, W. & Wittrahm, A. (2002). Gestalten erwachsener Religiosität [Gestalts of adult religiosity]. In G. Bitter, R. Englert, G. Miller & K.E. Nipkow (Eds.), Neues Handbuch religionspädagogischer Grundbegriffe [New handbook of basic concepts of religious pedagogy] (204–208). München: Kösel. Fürst, W., Wittrahm, A., Feeser-Lichterfeld, U. & Kläden, T. (Eds.) (2003). “Selbst die Senioren sind nicht mehr die alten . . .”. Praktisch-theologische Beiträge zu einer Kultur des Alterns [“Even senior citizens aren’t what they used to be . . .”. Practical theological contributions to a culture of aging]. Münster: Lit. Jüttemann, G. & Thomae, H. (Eds.) (1987), Biographie und Psychologie [Biography and psychology]. Berlin: Springer. Hunze, G. & Feeser, U. (2000). Von der Normativität zur Generativität des “Faktischen”. Plädoyer für empirisch-kritische Denk- und Arbeitsweisen innerhalb der Theologie [From the normativity to the generativity of the “factual”. An argument for empirical-critical ways of thinking and working in theology]. Religionspädagogische Beiträge 45, 59–68. Kaiser, H.-J. (1989). Handlungs- und Lebensorientierung alter Menschen. Entwurf einer interpretativen Gerontopsychologie [Action orientations and life orientations of older people. Proposal for an interpretative gerontopsychology]. Bern: Huber. Kläden, T. (2003). Zentrale Ergebnisse des Forschungsprojekts “Religiöse Entwicklung im Erwachsenenalter” im Überblick [An overview of key results of the research project “Religious development in adulthood”]. In W. Fürst, A. Wittrahm, U. Feeser-Lichterfeld & T. Kläden (Eds.), “Selbst die Senioren sind nicht mehr die alten . . .”. Praktisch-theologische Beiträge zu einer Kultur des Alterns (67–84). Münster: Lit. Kruse, A. (1987). Biographische Methode und Exploration [Biographical method and exploration]. In G. Jüttemann & H. Thomae (Eds.), Biographie und Psychologie (119–137). Berlin: Springer. Lämmlin, G. & Scholpp, S. (Eds.) (2001). Praktische Theologie der Gegenwart in Selbstdarstellungen [A contemporary practical theology in self-portrayals]. Tübingen: Francke. McFadden, S.H. (1999). Religion, Personality, and Aging: A Life Span Perspective. Journal of Personality 67 (6), 1081–1104. Meyer-Blanck, M. (2001). Zwischen religiöser Rede und der Rede über Religion. Die Praktische Theologie als Vermittlungstheorie zwischen Theologie, Kirche und Kultur [Between religious discourse and discourse on religion. Practical theology as a mediating theory between theology, church and culture]. Evangelische Theologie 61, 414–424. Oser, F. & Gmünder, P. (1984). Der Mensch —Stufen seiner religiösen Entwicklung. Ein strukturgenetischer Ansatz [Stages of human religious development. A structural genetic approach]. Zürich: Benziger.

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Rahner, K. (1995). Die Praktische Theologie im Ganzen der theologischen Disziplinen [Practical theology in the context of the theological disciplines]. In K. Rahner, Selbstvollzug der Kirche. Ekklesiologische Grundlegung praktischer Theologie [Self-realization of the Church. Ecclesiological foundations of practical theology] (503–515). Solothurn: Benziger. Van der Ven, J.A. (2002). An Empirical or a Normative Approach to PracticalTheological Research? Journal of Empirical Theology 15 (2), 5–33. Wittrahm, A. (2003). Religiöse Entwicklung im Erwachsenenalter. Anliegen und Anlage eines Forschungsprogramms [Religious development in adulthood. Aims and outline of a research program]. In W. Fürst, A. Wittrahm, U. FeeserLichterfeld & T. Kläden (Eds.) (2003). “Selbst die Senioren sind nicht mehr die alten . . .”. Praktisch-theologische Beiträge zu einer Kultur des Alterns (41–84). Münster: Lit. Wittrahm, A. & Hammerschmidt, M. (2003). Der Herr kennt den Weg der Gerechten. Glaubensentwicklung und religiöse Erwachsenenbildung [ The Lord knows the way of the righteous. Faith development and religious education of adults]. In W. Fürst, A. Wittrahm, U. Feeser-Lichterfeld & T. Kläden (Eds.) (2003). “Selbst die Senioren sind nicht mehr die alten . . .”. Praktisch-theologische Beiträge zu einer Kultur des Alterns (109–126). Münster: Lit. Wittrahm, A. & Leicht, B. (2003). Gestalten und Gestaltwandel erwachsener Religiosität. Von der Pilotstudie zum Forschungsprojekt „Religiöse Entwicklung im Erwachsenenalter“ [Gestalts and gestalt change of mature religiosity. On the pilot study for the research project “Religious development in adulthood”]. In W. Fürst, A. Wittrahm, U. Feeser-Lichterfeld & T. Kläden (eds.) (2003). “Selbst die Senioren sind nicht mehr die alten . . .”. Praktisch-theologische Beiträge zu einer Kultur des Alterns (21–39). Münster: Lit. Ziebertz, H.-G. (2002). Normativity and Empirical Research in Practical Theology. Journal of Empirical Theology 15 (1), 5–18.

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NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS OF DESIGNING EMPIRICAL RESEARCH* Family Research and Reflective Theological Normativity C M 1. Introduction How can a dialectical relationship between empirical research and theological normativity be established during the planning of a particular project of empirical research? The following article argues that reflective theological normativity can and should influence the design of an empirical study at important points of the planning process. It draws on the systems view of scientific activity proposed as a working model for family research by Lavee & Dollahite (1991). In planning empirical research a number of decisions connected with norms and values must be taken with regard to the selection of research topic, theoretical and methodological approaches as well as the application of research findings. Besides that normativity which is rooted in the consensual knowledge of the scientific community, deployment of a reflective theological normativity can also give to such decisions a critical and disclosive power. This problem will be discussed with regard to a research project, recently initiated at the Institute of Practical Theology in Bern, concerning rituals in families with young children.1 Taking seriously the plural contexts of today’s society, the project is aimed at studying the form, content and function of rituals and ritualisations in families of different types, the contextual conditioning of these rituals and their effects on the lives of these children and their families. It focusses

* An earlier version of this article appeared in Journal of Empirical Theology 15 (1), 19–36. 1 Our project “Rituals and Ritualisations in Families: Religious Dimensions and Intergenerational References”, is part of a national research program called “Childhood, Youth and Intergenerational Relationships in a Changing Society” (NRP 52). It is supported by the Swiss National Science Foundation and will be realized in collaboration between the disciplines of religious education (Prof. Maurice Baumann), homiletics/liturgy (Prof. Christoph Müller) and pastoral care (author) 2003–2005.

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on three types of rituals and ritualisations: (1) baptism, representative of a ritual that is simultaneously familial and trans-familial and is celebrated once in a lifetime, (2) Christmas celebrations, representative of inter-familial and season-specific rituals and (3) parents’ and children’s bedtime interactions, representative of intra-familial and daily rituals. The project is still in its infancy, so results cannot yet be presented. Instead, I would like to draw the attention of the reader to the importance of theological normativity for designing such a research project. “In the beginning” of the research process many decisions must be taken. These contribute in an important way to the creation of the small research world such a project will become. How are theological normativity and empirical research to be related in designing an empirical-theological study? This question is of particular importance for a research project based in the theological department of a state university and ranked with other research projects stemming from various social-scientific disciplines. 2. A Systems View of Scientific Activities in Family Science and its Consequences for the Discussion of Normativity The relationship between empirical research and normativity is not a new question in family science. It has often been discussed (e.g. Schneewind 1999, 87; Klein & White 1996, 48): Are propositions of an evaluating and normative type part of scientific family theories or not? The objectives and style of family theories and associated research will vary depending on the answers to this question. This is also true of the problem of relating empirical research to theological normativity in family science. Theology as a discipline develops its own normative criteria (especially in the field of ethics) on the premises of biblical and church traditions. In addition, theology develops frames of interpretation for human activity and human experience in a broader sense, connected to specific claims of truth and validity. These also imply claims to normativity. If this is so, at precisely which points in constructing the research process do normative criteria emerge? Is it possible as part of the empirical research process to assess adequately the theological influence of normativity? And conversely: Is a normative definition of theology sufficiently open to the empirical influence of research? More ade-

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Figure 1. A systems model of scientific activities in family science SCIENTIFIC SYSTEM

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quately: How might empirical research, which understands normativity as its own concern, be related to a theology integrating empirical research as an essential part of its own task? These are the questions I would like to adress now. A systems view of scientific activities in family science will help us to state these problems more clearly. Lavee & Dollahite (Lavee & Dollahite 1991) in their reappraisal of empirical research in family science during the last five decades find that a closer and more explicit mutual relationship between theory and research is of paramount importance for future empirical investigations into new fields of family science. They therefore propose a systems view of scientific activities and review it with regard to empirical research in family science (see Figure 1).

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Their systems view of scientific activities in family science brings together three levels or subsystems of scientific activities: 1. theoretical frameworks (TF) or general theories refer to a body of interrelated concepts and propositions about family phenomena in general (such as symbolic interaction, choice and exchange, and general systems theory); 2. middle range or substantive theories (MRT) refer to lower-order theories, more limited in scope, about specific substantive areas (such as mate selection, violence, intergenerational continuity) that are intermediary between the minor hypotheses evolved during the day-to-day routines of research and the master conceptual schemes (TF) of empirical research; 3. empirical research (ER) refers to the various methods of data collection and analysis. From a systems theory point of view, the scientific process can begin or end at any subsystem. The model therefore describes any scientific activity in family science: building or refining a general theoretical approach, building middle-range theoretical models, and conducting empirical research. Lavee & Dollahite (1991, 364) state their central assumption as follows: “Although each subsystem has its output, which may be of value in and by itself, a continuous feedback loop among the system’s components is necessary for the system’s optimum operation. In other words, each component in the system is able to generate some information about family phenomena, but it is the interaction among the components that leads to a systematic explanation of family phenomena”. Each step of the scientific scrutiny of a specific family problem—i.e. choice of unit of study, of variables and measures, of research methods, of methods of data analysis and presentation of research—must be guided and controlled by theory. Lavee & Dollahite (1991, 370) come to the following conclusion: Research, as good as it may be, “is only a part of the scientific cycle and is only able to supply limited information. It is theory that gives meaning to research findings, and it is theory that enables the development of systematic consensual explanation of family phenomena”. While it is impossible to go into their argument in more detail, I find their systems model of scientific activities useful for formalising and explicating decisions that need to be taken in designing an empirical study such as ours. The selection of the components of the model and the ways of connecting these components each mirror decisions

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which have to be taken in scientific research. The actual operation of the system of scientific activities presented by Lavee & Dollahite always implies a selection of specific scientific activities and of couplings (“Koppelungen”) between selected activities. Each step of selection of systemic components and couplings is connected with values, norms and rules. Depending on the selection and coupling of the components and their pragmatic transformation in specific research strategies, different types of research emerge. Ten points at which such decisions are taken and choices between possibilities are made are identified here (see Figure 1). 1. Decisions at the level of the selection of phenomena to be studied: Which phenomena are selected? What norms and values guide these decisions (why investigate, to take but one example, religious influences of families rather than religious influences of education at school)? 2. Decisions at the level of TF: Which fundamental theoretical stances are selected (shall we draw on functional or symbolic-interactional theories in our understanding of families)? 3. Decisions at the level of MRT: Which middle-range theories are selected for developing hypotheses and explaining family phenomena (for example, MRT pertaining to solidarity or to ambivalence, see below p. 189ff.)? 4. Decisions pertaining to the co-ordination of theory and empirical research: How are theory and empirical research connected (for example: “theory first, then empirical research” or the “composite approach” according to Lavee & Dollahite 1991, 365)? 5. Selection of specific research questions: Why and how are specific research questions selected (bedtime versus dinnertime ritualisations)? 6. Conception of empirical research: Decisions with regard to methodology, variables, methods of analysis, etc. 7. Type of knowledge: What type of knowledge is chosen as the objective of the research? Is it knowledge of the interpretative or of the explanatory type, or should we connect interpretation and explanation? 8. Feedback loops between theory and research: Are such feedback loops built into the research strategy? Where and how? What is their function? (bottom-up versus top-down/bottom-up feedback loops) 9. Level of output: At what level of abstraction should the output

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of the research be formulated (theoretical formalisation of a problem versus “substantive” output concerning a specific problem of family science, such as intergenerational transmission of religion)? 10. Application of knowledge: How is the knowledge produced by empirical research to be applied? Is this stated in an explicit or implicit way? With these aspects in mind, we can now show how theological normativity and empirical research must be related to each other at certain points of designing a particular study. In the following, I will look more closely at four of these aspects. 3. Theological Normativity and Inputs to Empirical Research How are empirical research and normativity connected in a social context? Let us focus first on the input side of the system of scientific activities. How is this input of family phenomena into scientific research managed? Indisputably, what appears to be a “problem” is structured and filtered through the social, political and historical context shaping “family phenomena”. On the other hand, the system of scientific activity itself also works in a selective manner. Scientific paradigms, traditions of scientific work, control mechanisms of the scientific community and so on influence the selection of phenomena. This is not at all a formal and value-neutral process. Rather, it is the first point where the dialectic of empirical research and normativity comes into the open (see figure 1, point 1). Our research project, too, is situated in a social-historical and political context favouring (or hindering) adequate politics concerning family research. Family research and politics in Switzerland are not currently as well developed as in many countries of the EU. This ought to be changed. Early in the year 2002, the Swiss National Science Foundation launched a new national research program entitled “Childhood, Youth and Intergenerational Relationships in a Changing Society” (SNSF 2002). The declared objective is “to shed new light on the living conditions and the needs of children and adolescents in Switzerland, and how these may evolve in the future” (4). Our team has applied to this program for the public funding of its research project. But can theology contribute to a better understanding of the living conditions of children and adolescents? It is noteworthy that the-

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Figure 2. The interplay between contextual normativity and theological normativity Contextual Normativity 1

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ology is not once mentioned as a scientific discipline in the implementation plan, and churches appear under the rubric of clubs and societies! The problem is fundamental: Theological research trying to promote itself in the context of the scientific policy of a secular state must yield results that are of tangible pragmatic relevance for a welfare policy. What are the implications of this? Are theology and empirical research in theology relevant only insofar as they are useful? Should empirical research in theology become the dumbwaiter for state research interests by trying to prove its usefulness to a welfare policy? Or is it important that theology stresses the “nonfunctional” aspects of religion, its own and unique normativity? Let me outline a possible response at a particular point of the project. The national research program not only puts a theme on the agenda of the scientific disciplines, but also a specific perspective: It “aims to investigate the living conditions and needs of children and adolescents in Switzerland. It assumes as a basic premise that the young can actively contribute to shaping their living environment, and should do so” (SNSF 2002, 5). What does “compliance with objectives”, which is stated as one of the decisive criteria for the evaluation of the projects by the research board, mean in this case? The project’s research objective itself is presented as a normative judgement. Not only can the young actively contribute to shaping their living environment, but they “should do so”. This is a good example of normativity inherent in a social context and resulting from a social-political process leading to a research policy. The problem can now be restated as follows: Are norms that are implicit in contextual expectations of social-scientific research, such as appear

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in this implementation plan, compatible with theological normativity? What is the appropriate relationship between social and theological normativities at this point? In seeking an answer, I propose that a constructive relationship between social and theological normativity could be conceptualised as a four-step process (see figure 2). First step: Careful theological analysis of normative implications in the social expectations for the research (contextual normativity 1). What does it mean for theological thinking if the implementation plan stresses the perspective of children and their ability and right to shape their environment? How well prepared is theology to take this perspective as possible for its own thinking about family and intergenerational relations? I cannot discuss this question at length. But consider what Marcia Bunge (2001) writes on the current state of theological reflection on children in her introduction to a seminal volume with the title The Child in Christian Thought (in the Religion, Family, and Marriage Series edited by D. Browning and others). “In the first place, until very recently, issues related to children have tended to be marginal in almost every area of contemporary theology” (3). And later: “However without further knowledge about what the church yesterday and today has said about children, and without focused attention on children in contemporary theology, it is easy to assume that what Christian theology offers to contemporary reflection on children is at best irrelevant and at worst destructive” (5). I think it is important for theology, and for an adequate positioning of theological normativity, that normative claims appearing in the social context of research should be taken as a serious challenge for the theological thinking and rethinking of normativity (theological normativity 1). How can theology contribute in a meaningful way to the social discourse about children, their rights, unique perspectives and contributions to the shaping of their living environment, if it is as badly prepared for that task as Bunge argues? This leads us to the second step: the “reworking” and reprocessing of theological normativity within the theological debate itself, of its guiding metaphors and theological frameworks, and of the corresponding ethical consequences (theological normativity 2). This is essentially the purpose and scope of the volume just mentioned: “to offer a critical examination of past theological perspectives on children in order to strengthen ethical and theological reflection on children today and to contribute to the current academic and broader public discussion on children” (Bunge 2001, 7). Theological re-evaluation

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of original sin with respect to children, but also of children as models of faith could, as some of the articles in Bunge’s volume argue, lead to a critical re-evaluation of the ambivalence in children’s own activities. This leads to the third step: Such a reshaping of theological normativity leads to refined categories of normativity pertaining to the problem at hand (contextual normativity 2). “Children at times devote themselves to activities that are not always life-giving but instead are self-centered and harmful to themselves and others” (Bunge 2001, 19). This theologically informed perspective on childhood could lead to a careful reconsideration of “the responsibilities of children and the possible level of their accountability” (ibid.). In turn this could inspire critical questions concerning the normativity implicit in a research policy. Yes, children are able to shape their environment. But do they always shape it in a life-giving way? How can they become the responsible actors they are supposed to be, and what if they do not act in a responsible way? How can we avoid turning them into little adults again, as they were regarded—not always to their advantage!—for centuries, as theology reminds us? And how can we strengthen the responsibility of parents and adult society in such a way that children can be valued as active agents in their life worlds—and accepted as dependent, imperfect, sometimes volatile beings too? Such theologically informed questions could be fed back into the continuing discussion process within the research context. This would help to alter and refine the normative categories implied in the research policy (step 4). In this way, theology would contribute, in a critical discussion, to the reworking of contextual normativity. This leads us back to step 1, but on a new level of reflection. Dreyer (1998) posed the dialectic of belonging and separateness as a fundamental working principle of empirical research in Practical Theology. Is the four-step model just presented not another embodiment of this dialectic of belonging and separateness on the level of the normative implications of empirical theology stressed in Dreyer’s article? In some ways Steps 1 and 2 mirror the position of theology as a participant in modernity, meeting normative social claims to research on their own ground. In Steps 3 and 4 this gives way to a distancing, critical movement toward normative reflection. Theological reprocessing of social norms leads to a distancing from social expectations, fuelling new research perspectives in the light of Christian traditions.

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This clarification is important for the start of any research process. Consequences for our project could be drawn as follows: It is an interesting scientific, theological and methodological challenge to look at ritualisations and rituals from a new perspective: How do children contribute as actors to the formation of family rituals? How do they shape this part of their living environment? And in what way is their contribution to the construction of such ritualisations—like the contribution of their parents—ambivalent, at times constructive and at times destructive? Such a shift of perspective could also be of help both in theological reflection and in empirical research. As Bunge (2001, 10) says with regard to the history of Christian thinking about children: “Just as when scholars have used gender as a category of analysis for understanding the past, when one uses the category of children . . . one is able to disclose neglected areas in the history of Christianity.” Taking up this change in perspective, we could add that empirical research might disclose areas in the contemporary practice of Christianity neglected to date. It might be, to highlight but one idea, that as active members of our societies children contribute in a much more extensive way to intergenerational transmission and shifts in religion than we ever realized. 4. Theological Normativity and the System of Scientific Activities How, then, can our question be stated with regard to the internal dynamics of the whole system of scientific activities? This is my second question. Here, the problem is more delicate. How important is normativity, and specifically theological normativity, within the system? The model presented by Lavee & Dollahite highlights the problem by stating it in terms of systems theory. From a systems point of view it is obvious that science is governed by its own rules and is coupled only structurally with its context; in other words, science has its own logic and cannot be directly instructed by the context (as theories of autopoietic systems put the problem). Is there still a place for theological normativity within this system? My answer is: yes. Points at which important decisions in the research process are made were highlighted in Figure 1 (Points 2–8). Normativity also plays a role within the system of scientific activities at each of these points. I select two of these intersections of normativity and empirical research for a short discussion.

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The Selection of Appropriate MRT ( figure 1, point 3)

How are family phenomena transformed into “explained family phenomena”, as Lavee/Dollahite describe the fundamental procedure of empirical research? I believe this transformation cannot take place without reference to middle-range theories. They help to conceptualise problems in a form that is both meaningful in relation to broader theoretical frameworks and accessible to empirical research through the refutation of specific hypotheses. Let me show how this is relevant to one aspect of our study. One of the perspectives proposed in the implementation plan is that intergenerational relations should stand centre-stage in research. We take up this perspective in centring the research on ritualisations in parentchild interactions. Now, in what ways can these intergenerational relations be conceptualised and placed in a theoretical perspective? One important strand in the empirical study of intergenerational relations stresses intergenerational solidarity (see for example an influential series of articles and books by Bengston and colleagues, Bengston & Harootyan 1994, Silverstein & Bengston 1997): positive emotions between generations, consensus, shared values across generations, commitment to mutual assistance. This approach was criticised as overly biased in a positive way. It cannot really account for other aspects in intergenerational relations, such as isolation, conflict, abuse, love-hate relationships, emphasised in a second line of research (Marshall et al. 1993). Lüscher & Pillemer (1998) propose ambivalence as a third and more useful concept: Societies and the individuals within them are ambivalent about relationships between parents and children. “Intergenerational relations generate ambivalences. That is, the observable forms of intergenerational relations (among adults) can be social-scientifically interpreted as the expression of ambivalences and as efforts to manage and negotiate these fundamental ambivalences” (p. 414). Ambivalence has two aspects: it includes both ambivalence at the social, structural level and the contradictory perceptions and subjective experiences of individuals. The relevance of these MRTs for our study is obvious. It is through theoretical transformations that ritualized parent-child interactions observable at a certain time of the day become objects for empirical research. Depending on the theoretical perspective applied, the need for interpretation is focused in different directions. If parent-child-interactions are scrutinised in the light of the premise of intergenerational solidarity,

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research questions will appear as follows: What is the contribution of early ritualised parent-child interactions to the foundation of intergenerational solidarity? How do ritualisations contribute to the promotion of mutuality, positive emotion, shared values? If parent-child interactions are studied from the point of view of ambivalence, research questions, hypotheses and the need for interpretation shift in another direction: How do forms of intergenerational ambivalence appear in parent-child-relationships? How are they rooted in socialstructural factors such as the “dynamic organization of norms and counter-norms” (Lüscher & Pillemer 1998, p. 415) attached to the roles of mothers or fathers, for example? Do ritualisations contribute to an adequate handling of such ambivalences? Has their function changed during the past few decades? Were they (and the connected forms of religion) validating solidarity in older generations, while in contemporary families they help parents and children with the management of ambiguity? On what suppositions do we now base our selection of one middlerange theory or another? I think that here again, normativity and specifically theological normativity are key. This is not undisputed. Some would say that such decisions must be made on the basis of norms immanent to scientific research: productive development of theory, adequacy with regard to the research topic, economy of assumptions, power of explication could be cited as criteria. Differing theories can themselves be put to the empirical test through the establishment of research strategies that help to decide between them on empirical grounds. But I hold that the categorisation of intergenerational relations by differing theories has normative implications far beyond these purely scientific criteria. It could be argued that Lüscher & Pillemers’ (1998) assumption of ambivalence is of greater value because of its greater complexity, which is more adequate to the complexities of roles and role-enactment in the post-modern age and to the social conflict zones which cut right through family life today. There is also a range of anthropological assumptions underlying this decision. Lüscher & Pillemer (1998) try to integrate two traditions of thinking about human relations and the human capacity to relate: a pessimistic view of man as “homo homini lupus” (man is the wolf of man) on the one hand, and an optimistic view of man as capable of fundamentally positive social contracts on the other, two grounding figures in European tradition of thinking since Hobbes and Rousseau.

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Why do we prefer ambivalence as an organising concept for the purpose of our study? In addition to the arguments already cited, theological normativity once again comes into play at this point. We prefer ambivalence because of problems put forward by theology, especially feminist theology, connected with the other possible principles. Take as an example the term “solidarity”. Christian theology and ethics have always sympathised with a solidarity view of intergenerational relations. However, feminist critique of this ethical concept has clearly shown that this view is connected in important ways with roles women are thought to take over in family life. As a matter of fact, women are the ones who usually bear the burden of activities aimed at strengthening this intergenerational solidarity. A theoretical stance favouring solidarity is liable to hide this fact and even to validate it within the frame of reference of a theological normativity that has been central to Christian thinking for a long time. This holds true as well for interpretations of sin as a form of autonomy, which again have a strong bias in traditional Christian thinking (Plaskow 1975; Miller-McLemore 1996). Sin in alternative feminist thinking, however, has been reinterpreted in terms of over-dependency and loss of autonomy in relations. Ambivalence as a category at least gives room for the dynamic of norms and counter-norms within social roles. This is not insignificant for the empirical study of parentchild interactions. Take the example of the interaction of mother and child. To interpret it in terms of the categories of solidarity, compassion and affection alone is likely to underestimate the dynamic of the role of being “also a mother” (Miller-McLemore 1994 referring to the pressure on women to perform in all spheres of life and be maternal too in today’s society). To interpret it in this way is also liable to take solidarity as the main theological norm, a theological operation with a longstanding “holy” tradition, certainly, but with a long tradition of implicit and explicit oppression of women, too. A dialectical relation between concepts chosen for empirical research and critical theological thinking can shed critical light on possible negative and oppressive effects of such categorisation, and has also a power of disclosure for the perception of the empirical reality of child-mother interactions.

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Which research strategies are chosen for a specific study? What methods of computing the results of empirical research do we prefer? In what ways do the subjects of empirical research control the data they help to generate? Decisions on questions of this nature are influenced by criteria immanent to the system of scientific activities. They depend on the consensual knowledge of the scientific community about adequate methodologies in connection with specific research questions, on selection of TF and MRT, on technical knowhow and the availability of resources, to cite but a few important criteria. But I hold that normativity and specifically theological normativity are again important at this point of the research process. To take but one example, we would like to use video recording and playback of bedtime routines, ritualisations and rituals as a methodological approach. What are the implications of this? Such video recordings seem technically feasible. Families become accustomed to such recordings. Techniques of analysis are available. Control over the recordings can be carefully handled and ethical standards respected. So where is the problem? Let me put it in this way: Is it right to make intimate moments of interaction between parents and children into objects of scientific scrutiny? Is it right to engage parents and children in the playback and interpretation of their own ritualisations? How does this methodological operation influence the actual “object” of research, the ritualised interactions between parents and children and the way these ritualised interactions are conceptualised, analysed and interpreted by the researcher? In other words: What is the impact of the “scientific ritualisation” of video playback on day-to-day family ritualisations? For “ritual” is not a category applying only to bedtime ritualisations. In many ways it applies to scientific procedures too. Methodologies are not only formal procedures. They affect their objects. And objects at times affect methodologies. Since I cannot delve into the details of this problem, let me explore just one corner of it. Theoretical approaches to ritual have a long history. These approaches can be classified, very roughly, into three types of reasoning: The first type aims at restoring rituals as a way of restoring the normative foundations of society, in order to compensate for modernisation with its by-products of disintegration, desolidarisation and the decay of values (see as an example Jons 1997). The second type,

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most prominently held by Habermas, aims at clarifying those effects of ritual practices which were for a long time not accessible to reason, but which must be clarified in order to save the project of modernity from breakdown. In other words, modernity should be able to integrate the ritually sanctioned normative consensus of premodern times into the rational affirmation of domination-free discussion and socially accepted values (Habermas 1981, 118f.). The third type of theorising tries to overcome the alternative of either a forced autonomization of the human subject or the restoration of ritually sanctioned forms of community by centring reflection on the relation of subjectivity to the alterity of the “Other” symbolized in rituals. “Rituals are not in themselves the strange and the other, but they mediate the relation to such spheres and as places of boundary experiences they reflect the enigmatic shine of the totally other falling back onto them, giving them a mysterious character”, as Wimmer & Schäfer (1998, 13) put it. What is the significance of this for our study? The choice of an analytical methodology appears to be connected in important ways to this question of the interpretation of rituals. What is the objective of our study on a deep level of analysis? Do we intend to generate knowledge about ritualised parent-child interactions, with the hope of finding ways to re-ritualize intergenerational relationships? Or are we, on the contrary, trying to shed the light of rational analysis onto a realm of intergenerational relationships that resists rational understanding, even in modernity and post-modernity? Or do we assume that ritualisations in parent-child interactions reflect the strange dimension of alterity, of a third party, of incommensurability in human interaction? And is video recording and playback compatible with the first, the second or the third approach? We have not yet come to a conclusion. Probably we will not do so before we have carefully considered the relation of this question to theological normativity again. As the two examples just mentioned show, the dialectic of empirical research and critical theological reflection is indeed relevant for the discussion of decisions within the system of scientific activities. As theories of autopoietic systems state the challenge, this discussion cannot be initiated from without but only from within the boundaries of this system of scientific activities. Tracy (1981, 14–21) argues that theology as an academic discipline must develop the power of its “analogical imagination” also with regard to the academic public.

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One way of doing this could well be the critical theological discussion of the intricacies, details and decisions of empirical research. Naming and reflecting normative implications of empirical research could well be a way of influencing the system of scientific activities from within its boundaries and could become an important arena of the deployment of analogical theological imagination as a form of public theology. 5. Theological Normativity and the Output of Empirical Research (Figure 1, Point 10) Let us come back in a last step to the context of empirical research in theology. This context is important in shaping and influencing normative social expectations to empirical research. I have tried to show this on the input side of our research project. What role does normativity play at the other end of the queue, on the output side of empirical research? It seems a consensus widely accepted today in family research that values and norms influence application-oriented empirical research. Schneewind (1999), to cite but one example, believes this to be the case with respect to the legitimation of research objectives, the transformation of empirically laden theories for the sake of scientifically sound interventions in families, the assessing of implementation and the evaluation of interventions. “The critical point is . . . the legitimation of objectives which is not fed by an explicative or interpretative version of social science alone but is dependent ultimately on definitions and explications of other disciplines such as theology, social philosophy, ethics, pedagogy, politics, economy” (89).2 We state the objective of our research project as follows: Processes of ritualisation will be empirically described, and their transmission and function within family life made clear. How their formation can be influenced by the practice of churches will be demonstrated. The study will show how children and their parents can be stabilised and

2 Translation by author: “Kritischer Punkt ist . . . die Legitimation von Zielen, die sich nicht aus einem erklärenden oder verstehenden Wissenschaftsverständnis speist, sondern letztlich auf die Festlegungen und Begründungen anderer Disziplinen und Instanzen, wie Theologie, Sozialphilosophie, Ethik, Pädagogik, Politik oder Wirtschaft, angewiesen ist” (Schneewind 1999, 89).

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inspired to mutual, just and life-enhancing relationships by the creative practice of institutionalised and familial rites and rituals. This is an objective with a clear normative component. Again, we could legitimate it with reference to the objectives of the Swiss research programme “Childhood, Youth and Intergenerational Relationships in a Changing Society”, which states that studies “should provide practical bases and innovative suggestions to strengthen the family and extrafamilial infrastructures—municipal, cantonal and federal—required for children and adolescents to thrive” (SNSF 2002, 4). But again, theological normativity can provide a helpful frame for empirical research with application-oriented normative goals. I will say only a few words concerning this point. What is the main topic of empirical research within theology? Van der Ven referred (in the very first issue of JET 1988) to the formal object of empirical theology being the dialectical relation between what religious praxis is and what it should be. It is—to use a genuinely theological symbol—the psychological reflection and formation of the communicative practice of the Gospel in our societies from the perspective of liberation in the kingdom of God (Van der Ven 1994, 76ff.). Theology is not only interested in reality as it is. It is also interested in reality as it could be, in reality in transformation, in reality that has still to come into being. It is interested in reality in the light of a transformed future symbolised by the kingdom of God. Empirical research is value-laden because it serves social objectives, whether they are made transparent or not. Empirical research in theology is—in a similar, but more specific way—inherently valueladen because it inscribes itself into this perspective of transformation of the kingdom of God. It makes explicit its own normative assumptions concerning mutual, just and life-enhancing human relationships in the transforming perspective of the kingdom of God. And it tries to contribute to the continuing transformation of reality in a changing society in an inspiring and life-giving way. The three decisions made in the foregoing discussion mirror in some ways this perspective of the kingdom of God. Children should be seen as participants in the humanising transformation of reality. Family relationships should be seen as fundamentally ambivalent. They can foster mutual, just and life-enhancing relationships, within and beyond family. But their idolisation, their twists and abysses should also be seen and criticised from the point of view of justice and liberation in the kingdom which has come and is still to come.

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Ritualisations in parent-child interactions can be empirically investigated, because there is no theological reason or need to sacralise the family by its re-ritualisation and immunisation to reason. But methodologies should be used or modified in such a way that the possible alterity of the experience of the participants hinting at a dimension of liberation beyond human possibilities is not destroyed. 6. Conclusions What conclusions can we draw? Considering what has been said, the first conclusion is this: Reflecting on the relationship between empirical research and theological normativity is of particular importance at the design stage of an empirical study. Secondly, the systems view of scientific activity presented by Lavee & Dollahite (1991) is a helpful tool for clarifying the normative implications of empirical research in theologically informed family science. Thirdly, there is ample room for theological normativity in empirical research, provided the normative implications of empirical research are adequately brought into the open through rational discussion. I hold that theological normativity functions best when its dialectical relation to empirical research is explicated at important points of such research, and when its power of disclosure is combined with sound and reflected empirical strategies. The fourth conclusion therefore is this: besides normativity rooted in the consensual knowledge of the scientific community, normativity connected with other basic social values and norms, mediated through academic disciplines such as theology, influences the process of empirical research at every stage. In order to take this influence into full account I propose an enlarged model of Lavee & Dollahites’ (1991) systems view of scientific activity (see Figure 3). There are again three inter-related levels in this model. Social scientists and “empirical” theologians act on these three levels. In their day-to-day work they set in motion the system of scientific activity. In doing this, they are in some ways citizens of two or more different communities with differing normative obligations. They belong to the scientific community with its guiding root metaphors and its normative regulation of scientific action, and they are citizens of other public communities they belong to with their own peculiar normative expectations and regulations, for example churches or political parties. Reflection on these normative obligations not only

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Figure 3. A systems view of theological normativity and empirical research Theological Normativity as the Reflection of Anthropologies, Values, Norms, Conventions and Rules of Action The System of Scientific Activities and its Context

Conventions and Norms of Scientific Activities as Criteria for the Evaluation of TheoryConstruction and Methodology

enhances the quality of ethical reflection in empirical research but also widens its disclosive power. Such personal reflection and the handling of the role-strain associated with tension between differing loyalties is part and parcel of scientific work as I understand it. My fifth and last conclusion is this: Empirical research and theology are in some ways complementary systems of scientific activity: In theory theology stresses the importance of normativity for human life. There can be no meaningful human action without respect for values and norms. Yet it tends in its actual performance to neglect the mediation of normativity to empirical reality. Research as it is carried out in the social sciences stresses the importance and intricacies of the human relationship to “reality”. There can be no successful human action without adequate knowledge of this reality. Yet it tends in its actual performance to neglect the reflection of normativity implied in its procedures. Thus, theology and empirical research can both draw strength from a higher degree of co-operation. References Bengston, V.L. & Harootian, R.A. (1994). Intergenerational Linkages. Hidden Connections in American Society. New York. Bunge, M.J. (Ed.) (2001). The Child in Christian Thought. Grand Rapids, Michigan/ Cambridge, U.K. Dreyer, J.S. (1998). The Researcher: Engaged Participant or Detached Observer? Journal of Empirical Theology 11, 5–22.

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Habermas, J. (1981). Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns, [Theory of communicative action] Bd. 2. Frankfurt/M. Jons, U. (1997). Familienrituale. Zwang oder Chance? [Family rituals. Coercion or chance?] Hall im Tirol. Klein, D.M. & White, J.M. (1996). Family Theories. Thousand Oaks, CA. Lavee, Y. & Dollahite, D.C. (1991). The Linkage Between Theory and Research in Family Science. Journal of Marriage and the Family 53, 361–373. Lüscher, K. & Pillemer, K. (1998). Intergenerational Ambivalence: A New Approach to the Study of Parent-Child Relations in Later Life. Journal of Marriage and Family 60, 413–425. Marshall, V.W. et al. (1993). Elusiveness of Family Life: A Challenge for the Sociology of Aging. In G.L. Maddox & M.P. Lawton (Eds.), Annual Review of Gerontology and Geriatrics: Focus on Kinship, Aging, and Social Change. New York. Miller-McLemore, B.J. (1994). Also a Mother: Work and Family as Theological Dilemma. Nashville/New York. —— (1996). Family and Work. Can Anyone “Have It All”? In A. Carr & M.S. van Leeuwen (Eds.), Religion, Feminism and the Family (275–293). Louisville, Kentucky. Plaskow, J.E. (1975). Sin and Grace. Women’s Experience and the Theologies of Reinhold Niebuhr and Paul Tillich. Yale University Press. Schneewind, K.A. (1999). Familienpsychologie. [Family psychology] Stuttgart etc., 2nd revised edition. Silverstein, M. & Bengston, V.L. (1997). Intergenerational Solidarity and the Structure of Adult Child-Parent Relationships in American Families. American Journal of Sociology 103, 429–460. Swiss National Science Foundation (2002). Childhood, Youth and Intergenerational Relationships in a Changing Society—Implementation Plan. Bern. Tracy, D. (1981). The Analogical Imagination. Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism. London: SCM Press Ltd. Van der Ven, J.A. (1988). Practical Theology: From Applied to Empirical Theology. Journal of Empirical Theology 1, 7–27. —— (1994). Entwurf einer empirischen Theologie. 2. Auflage. [Practical Theology. An Empirical Approach 1993] Kampen. Wimmer, M. & Schäfer, A. (1998). Einleitung: Zur Aktualität des Ritualbegriffs [Introduction: On the actuality of the concept of ritual]. In A. Schäfer & M. Wimmer (Eds.), Rituale und Ritualisierungen [Rituals and Ritualisations](9–47). Opladen. Winnicott, D.W. (1985). Vom Spiel zur Kreativität (Konzepte der Humanwissenschaften). 3rd edition, Stuttgart [Playing and reality, London: Tavistock 1971].

THE POSITION OF GOD IMAGES IN THE THEORETICAL RESEARCH MODEL M S-R Scientific studies usually start with a question arising from an interest in a specific area of knowledge. The question that formed the starting point of the present paper is one I owe to the religious psychologist Jan van der Lans of Nijmegen, who, unfortunately for us, died in 2002. He raised it during the public defence of my dissertation on pastoral care and counseling of people undergoing life crises (Scherer-Rath 2001), in which I studied the influence of personal characteristics (including religious aspects and specifically God images), suicide crisis aspects, experiences of tragedy and guilt, and attitudes toward death, on the individual’s expectations with regard to a pastoral counseling in a suicide crisis situation. In the process I found that those expectations were influenced in particular by attitudes toward death, and that these in turn were shaped by the individual’s personal belief in God (Scherer-Rath 2001, 197–202). Van der Lans expressed great interest in the results of that study, but questioned the theoretical research model in which personal characteristics, including personal belief in God and the suicide crisis aspects, functioned as independent variables, the experiences of tragedy and guilt as well as attitudes toward death as intermediate variables, and the expectations regarding pastoral counseling as the dependent variables. His question was whether the belief in God influenced attitudes toward death, or whether it was not, rather, the case that the person’s attitude toward death influenced his or her belief. In his view the personal belief in God and specifically God image should have occupied the position of intermediate variable in the theoretical research model, while attitude toward death and experiences of tragedy and guilt ought to have functioned as the independent variables. To this day, I have not been able to forget his question. Was Van der Lans right? Ought I to have followed a different research model? At the time I replied that a person’s belief in God and his or her attitude toward death were almost certainly not entirely independent concepts, but that personal faith in God was a far broader concept that would naturally affect the person’s attitude toward death.

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My purpose in this article is to pursue Van der Lans’ question in a more systematic and specifically empirical-theological way. In particular, I will examine the normative implications of personal belief in God or God image as a concept within the research model. To begin with, I will attempt to show how normative aspects are embedded in the methodology of the empirical cycle in practical theological studies (1), before turning to the normative implications of the theoretical research model (2). The third part is concerned with empirical testing of the modified theoretical research model (3), while in the fourth and last section I evaluate the two theoretical research models in view of the empirical analyses and in the context of the theoretical premises (4). 1. Normative Aspects of the Empirical Cycle Empirical studies imply a whole series of normative aspects that are permanent elements of the empirical cycle. In the following I would like to consider more closely certain normative aspects of the theoretical research model as part of the empirical cycle (1.1), and then concretise these with the help of an example (1.2). 1.1

The Theoretical Research Model in the Empirical Cycle

The empirical methodology is the theory of the way in which an empirical study is to be carried out. The ‘way’ consists of a path or course to be followed and a goal or objective to be achieved, and both are of central importance when carrying out an empirical study (Hart et al. 2001, 135). Within the framework of the empirical research cycle, which according to Van der Ven (1998, 52–56) consists of five phases (development of the methodological problem and goal, theological induction, theological deduction, empirical theological testing, theological evaluation), there are three specific moments at which attention is paid explicitly to the goal and the path of the ‘empirical way’. These moments, or way points, are the formulating of the research objective and research question (development of the theological problem and goal), which occurs when the researcher is preparing to set out, the determination of the theoretical research model (a central element of theological deduction), which is when the course and direction are set, and the evaluation of the study

      

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(theological evaluation), in which the research determines whether and with what results the study has actually remained on the established path. While the research objective describes the goal that the study is supposed to achieve (‘why’ is something being studied?), the research question provides more detail about the content of the study (‘what’ is being studied?) (Hart et al. 2001, 77). The goal and content of the study are thus closely related and must not be viewed as separate entities. The research objective and the research question will determine the type of study (fundamental research, applicationoriented research). The further planning of the study, in other words the course and nature of the ‘path’, is highly dependent on the research objective and the research question: Where and when does the study take place? Who or what is being studied? The theoretical research model is the schematic representation of the research objective and the overall steps that must be taken in order to reach the goal (Verschuren & Doorewaard 2003, 45–64). It can be compared with a navigator who collects data about the target data and desired way points, processes the information, in other words compares it with existing data material, and presents the route to be followed in the form of a model. Thus the theoretical research model of an empirical research project lays out the operational and analytical course of the study in the form of specific questions and on the basis of the research objective and the research question. The development of a theoretical research model is embedded in the process of theological deduction. This phase of the empirical cycle must be seen as closely interconnected with the preceding phase of theological induction. While the inductive phase is concerned with finding empirical regularities and connections among phenomena that are described, tentatively interpreted and finally generalized by means of induction, the deductive phase focuses on the theoretical analysis of these initial hypotheses. Concepts that are central to the research question are defined as precisely as possible and as broadly as necessary with reference to the theological and philosophical literature, and placed within a network of all of these concepts (Hart et al. 2001, 112–121; De Groot 1994, 42–44; Van der Ven 1998, 53–54). In this way a system of possible connections among the phenomena to be studied is created: the theoretical research model. Not only does it form a conceptual network, but it

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also brings together the context of discovery, the context of justification and the context of application. An important, though implicit part of the research model is the theological motivation that leads the researchers to undertake a theological research project in this very specific way. The use to which the results will be put (application) also underlies of the model, while the justification determines the structure of the assumed system (Kromrey 2002, 77–82; Ziebertz 2001). In the evaluation phase, the study process and results are judged in terms of the research objective and research question, as well as with reference to the ‘route description’ of the theoretical research model. 1.2

Example of a Theoretical Research Model

In the following I would like to illustrate the three way points in an empirical study in Practical Theology, as outlined above, by looking at a research project I conducted in Germany from 1992 to 1994. The goal was to explore, describe and explain the experiences and expectations of people caught up in a suicide crisis, and to do so from an empirical theological perspective (research objective). By means of an empirical-analytical study using an exploratory-explanatory approach (De Groot 1994, 322–324; Van der Ven 1990, 140–147), I sought to determine what expectations people in such crisis situations had regarding pastoral counseling that was offered to them (research question 1) and how personal characteristics, including God image, the aspects of the suicide crisis, limit experiences of tragedy and guilt and attitudes toward death affected those expectations Figure 1. Theoretical research model with limit experiences as intermediate variables

• Experience of tragedy • Personal characteristics – demographic – life view – religious (God images) – coping style • Suicide crisis aspects

• Experience of guilt

• Attitude toward death

• Pastoral counseling

      

203

(research question 2). Behind the project was the motivation to make a contribution to pastoral crisis intervention, which until now has received little attention in practical theological research. Although the overall structure of this research project puts it in the area of fundamental research, it is of undeniable practical relevance for pastoral counseling and care of people in crisis. The research objective and research questions produced the theoretical research model shown in Figure 1. It is based on the theoretical premise that limit experiences are dependent on personal characteristics (demographic, lifeview, religious (God images) and coping style) and crisis aspects, which in turn, and in that order, will influence the expectations that persons in a suicide crisis will have about a pastoral counseling. It was this premise that Van der Lans questioned. His thesis was that limit experiences are not influenced by the person’s religious characteristics, but that rather the religious characteristics, including God images, are dependent on the limit experiences. His assumptions produced the following theoretical model. The two research questions remain formally unchanged by the change to the research model. What does change is the theoretical premise on which the research model is based, which determines hypothetically the relationships among the individual concepts within the research model. Is it merely a matter of switching around concepts or variables? In fact, the conceptual change is likely to have far-reaching consequences for the contexts of justification and application (see sections 3 and 4 below). But above all it calls into question the theoretical premise of the original research model and with it the theoretical implications underlying the individual concepts in that model (personal religious characteristics, experiences and attitudes Figure 2. Theoretical research model with God images as intermediate variables

• God Image A • • • • •

Experience of tragedy Experience of guilt Attitude toward death Suicide crisis aspects Personal characteristics

• God Image B

• God Image C

• Pastoral counseling

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 -

in limit situations), which lend the project its normative character. The significance of this will be discussed in the following section. 2. Normative Implications of the Theoretical Research Model Theoretical research models are based, as I have shown above, on premises that lend structure not only to the model but to the study as a whole. This structure is like a map that shows the way through the jungle of empirical data. If parts of the model change, it has consequences for the structure of the entire study, in other words the map is altered. This is only possible though if the altered research model is tested to ascertain that it still concurs with the theoretical premises, or if the premises have previously been revised. In the example above it was a matter of switching the intermediate variables. Instead of the experiences and attitudes in limit situations (experiences of tragedy and guilt and attitudes toward death), it was decided that the God images would function as intermediate variables. This also alters the theoretical premise that the personal religious characteristics (God images) influence the limit experiences and attitudes toward limit situations, so that the premise is now the reverse. However, we must ask whether the reversal of the premise accords with, for example, the theological implications of the concept of “God image”. Is the premise of an altered relationship between two concepts based on the same normative implications of these concepts? Or, we could ask: Can the results of the empirical analyses carried out on the basis of the two different research models, each with different theoretical premises, be interpreted on the basis of the same normative implications? This is an important normative question, especially for the evaluation of the empirical results, as will be seen in more detail in section 4. In order to shed more light on the significance of the normative implications for empirical theological research, I would like to discuss the normative implications of the God images that play an important role in both of the research models (2.1). Then I will try to concretise the formulated implications with the help of our example study (2.2). 2.1

Normative Implications of God Images

God images are often ascribed central importance in academic works that concern themselves with human religiosity, because they usually

      

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start from the assumption that God images relate to and explicate the core of an individual’s personal faith. Before looking at the possible ways in which this faith and its symbolic explication may be understood, it is necessary to determine the theological implications that underlie and shape the analysis of these symbolic explications and how these explications fit into the research model. God images are the source (‘Quellort’) of theology (Werbick 1999, 4) and thus an important frame of reference for reflection on belief in God. In a religious philosophical sense that belief can also be conceived of as the ground of meaning (‘Sinngrund’) and being (‘Dasein’), the foundation of living and dying (Schlette 1966, 12). If this is so, and I presume for the purpose of the present discussion that it is, then it is important to define this source more closely. The God image as a symbolic version of the God idea must be distinguished from the God idea itself. If a God image symbolizes the God idea in a contingent understanding of God, then it must not be equated with the God idea as the orientation point of (religious) life. “God” as word or sign is, in contrast to the respective semantic symbol, an indexical means of orientation. The index word “God” marks a spatio-temporal orientation relationship. It does not designate anything that can be interpreted in and of itself. It creates a point of reference “within the horizon and perspective of which all else is perceived, viewed and understood. And just as a viewpoint itself cannot be perceived, so all is perceived in the light of God, but God Himself is only a mirror of what is perceived within his horizon” (Dalferth 2003, 466–478, here 467). God as the Unnameable can thus be understood theologically as the point of reference of a (religious) life orientation, or ground of meaning, which is implicit in every symbolic explication (Schleiermacher 1960, 28–29). Every God image implies that the person holding that image see himself or herself as God’s creature, and expresses the person’s attitude of being in a relationship of created to the Creator. The world and human life are thus not self-evident, but contingent. This contingency is not cancelled out simply because nothing new is added to the world. This contingency is the location of God’s presence, which has consequences for how people shape their lives and how they deal with the contingency of everyday life (Dalferth, 468–469).1 At 1 It is therefore not a matter of overcoming contingency but rather affirming it (Houtepen 2000, 129).

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the same time, the orientation function of the God idea must not be left out of the picture if God images, i.e. symbolic explications of the God idea, are to be adequately understood in the context of religious praxis. “They never symbolize only one (particular or singular type of ) reality, but they symbolize that by which human beings ultimately orient themselves” (ibid., 476). How the God idea is explicated in God images, concretely and contingently (form and content), tells something about how the Unnameable is perceived and experienced as co-author of perception, thinking, will and action in the human life context (the means of awareness). 2.2

God Images in the Theoretical Research Model

The structure of the original theoretical research model was based on the theological implications of the God idea set out in the foregoing. Against this background, the reason why the God images were accorded the position of independent rather than intermediate variables may become theologically plausible. God images point to the awareness of the inherent ultimate ground of meaning that functions as the orientation point for the individual’s own (religious) life. This life orientation has consequences for concrete human thinking, feeling, will and action in everyday life. In other words, the orientation function of the God idea become visible—and thus can be described and analysed—only in praxis, for example in practical life attitudes that help to organize and process limit experiences. This suggests that, from the theological point of view, the God image can acts as a predictor of practical life attitudes and experiences. It is against this background that one must understand the research model’s underlying premise that God images influence experiences of tragedy and guilt and attitudes toward death. In other words, the normative implications set out above suggest that the kinds of expectations people have of a pastoral counseling session, and their experiences of and attitudes toward limit situations, will provide insight into the meaning of their God images and thus also into the orientation function of the God idea in their lives. In this way normative implications determine the basic structure of the research model. It is important to note that we are talking about a theological perspective that gives a distinct orientation to the theoretical research model for the interpretation and evaluation of empirical results. The respondents in the study are free to respond to this orientation function by either agreeing with or distancing themselves from the religious perspective.

      

207

Significantly, the structure of the modified research model stands in contradiction to these theological implications. In the modified model, the orientation function attributed to the God images, which can be expressed in practical life attitudes, is less definite. Instead, in this model the symbolic explication of the God idea becomes the object of study. How are those God images influenced? Of course it could be pointed out here that neither God images nor practical life attitudes and experiences are formed context-free. The psychology of religion in particular continually reminds us that God images must be seen relationally and contextually (Murken 1998; Van der Lans 1994). The dependence of concrete God images on influences in the social environment does not contradict the theoretical premises of the two research models. The above normative implications of the God idea also underscore that God images are contingent and must be interpreted in context. At the same time, however, they also provide a theological justification to treat the practical life attitudes and experiences as dependent from a methodological point of view, as was done in the original model. 3. Empirical Study After the normative implications, I would now like to move on to the empirical testing of the research question. What are the empirical consequences of the altered research model? As already shown elsewhere (Scherer-Rath 2001) the assumptions of the original model confirmed that the God images do function as predictors of practical life attitudes and experiences in limit situations, as well as of pastoral counseling expectations. What about the premises of the modified research model? Do the results confirm Van der Lans’ hypothesis that practical life attitudes and experiences in limit situations function as predictors for God images? And how do God images influence expectations about pastoral counseling? Before I come to the study results that can provide answers to these questions, I would like to take a look at the God images from an empirical methodological perspective (3.1), and then to present the analysis of the empirical results of the two models (3.2). 3.1

God Images as Concepts of Belief

Following the theoretical examination of the theological implications of the God idea, and of God images as the symbolic explication of

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that idea, it is now time to turn to the methodological application of what until have now been purely theoretical considerations. Specifically, how was research into “God images” as the symbolic explication of the God idea carried out in this study? The empirical data from the research project on which this article is based was obtained using a quantitative research design. Seventy-three women and men, all of whom were in a suicide crisis at the time of the study, were interviewed about their expectations with regard to pastoral counseling, their experiences of tragedy and guilt, their attitudes toward death, certain aspects of the crisis, and personal characteristics. The interview was based on a questionnaire containing closed-ended and a few open-ended questions. The category of personal religious characteristics included seven questions about the respondent’s personal image of God. In this way quantitative data about God images was obtained. The respondents were asked about their level of agreement with seven items relating to three God images, on a five-point scale. Possible answers were (1) strongly disagree, (2) disagree, (3) not sure, (4) agree, (5) strongly agree. The three concepts being studied were deductively obtained. According to Berger (1981, 69), there are two ways in which people, in their religious practice, arrive at beliefs by which they attempt to explicate God’s implicitness in all perception, thought and life.2 First there is the inductive way, referring to a process of perception and thought in the religious field that starts from human experience in everyday life to arrive at symbolic explications of the God idea. On the other hand there is the deductive way of theoretical assumptions and conceptualisations that are believed to explicitly influence the symbolic explication of the God idea. In keeping with the deductive way, it was assumed in this study that God images that are explicated from theoretical conceptualisations, i.e. faith concepts that serve as the models for certain theological and philosophical theories (Verschuuren 1981, 154–160), can serve as aids to reflection and interpretation of the images of God held by the participants in the study. For this reason, models of belief in God were chosen that can be considered typical of people in a modern society (Van der Ven 1998, 173) on 2 At this point I wish to emphasize that in the religious praxis of everyday life, this explication surely does not occur in as sophisticated a manner as was theorized in connection with the theological implications of the God idea in the preceding sections.

      

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the one hand, while on the other hand they can be operationalised and instrumentalised in such a way that they do not contribute to any specific God metaphors, but rather allow the respondents to locate their own God images in the concepts offered. Three God images were selected, which concern the nature of the God-man relationship. The first is that of an interpersonal relationship between God and man, in which God is believed to be present for and to care for each individual human being. The Old Testament revelation of God as the “I am that I am” (Ex 3,14) implies such an interpersonal relationship. The God images of philosophical and theological theism also express such personal notions of God, for example the theist creator God, all-knowing and all-powerful, as the personal Godhead. These theist God images do, however, run into theological and philosophical problems of justification in connection with the theodicy question (Dalferth 2003, 257–275, 307–333). The second God image refers to an intrapersonal relationship of human beings to God or the divine. God is only to be found in the totality of the good and the valuable that exists in human beings and in the world. God or the divine is understood to be immanent in the world, the ‘soul’ of human existence. This intrapersonal relationship is found in pantheism. The central element of the pantheist God image is the idea of an absolute unity of the world and all things that exist in it. The transcendence of God’s action is rejected, since the Absolute is identified with all that is (Dalferth 2003, 262). Or, more precisely, “Pantheism interprets the God-the world relationship as the inherence of accidents in a substance. The beings of the world as accidents are inherent in the divine unique substance. They are substance only by their inherence in God” (Meckenstock 1994, 123). The third God image is about the absence of any kind of personal relationship between God and man. It does not deny the existence of a higher reality. Rather, it is the deist attempt to reconcile religion and human reason. Deism, it should be noted, is not a single unitary doctrine, but is expressed in variety of scattered positions (Taylor 1999, 413). The crux of all of these positions is the question of whether a rationally founded faith is possible (Schmidt 1994, 205). In the process the interweaving of divine salvation and human innerworldly history into salvation history in the Judeo-Christian tradition is unravelled. While God or the higher reality is seen as the source and creator of the world, who has provided a plan for the overall welfare and happiness of his or her creation, deism does not

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recognize a special providence, i.e. God’s intervention in history (Taylor 1999, 483–484). 3.2

Study Results

These three God images were operationalised with the help of the corresponding items from the SOCON (Socio-Cultural Developments in the Netherlands) research program of the Department of Sociology of the University of Nijmegen (Felling, Peters & Schreuder 1986).3 The interpersonal God image was operationalised in two items: “There is a God who wants to be there for us as God”, and “There is a God who cares for each of us personally”. The intrapersonal God image also comprised two items: “To me, God is nothing other than that which is good and valuable in human beings”, and “God does not exist above human beings, but only in their hearts”. The non-personal God image was operationalised with three items: “There is such a thing as a higher reality that controls life”, “Something exists that is outside of this world”, and “I believe in the existence of a higher being”. A look at the percentage of the 73 respondents (Table 1) who agreed with each of the God images shows that the percentage who agreed or strongly agreed with the intrapersonal and the interpersonal God images differs very little (45% and 46% respectively). Nearly 38% disagreed with the intrapersonal image and 41% with the interpersonal image, while 13 and 17% respectively were not sure. However, the variance between the responses is significant. In the case of the interpersonal God image the range between those who strongly agree and strongly disagree with the image is noticeably larger than it is for the intrapersonal God image. The distribution for the non-personal God image paints a clear picture: 70% agreed or strongly agreed, 19% were not sure and 11% did not agree. Thus there is far more agreement about the non-personal God image than about the other two.

3 This research program studies religious developments through trend studies. Such trend studies were conducted in 1979, 1985, 1995 and 2000. In 1995 the Department of Empirical Theology at the University of Nijmegen participated in the design of the questionnaire and data analysis. In earlier empirical studies the three God images were given different labels, which are theologically misleading, i.e. theism, deism and pantheism/immanentism. This was the case in Scherer-Rath 2001; Van der Ven 1998; 1990.

      

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Table 1. Scale of agreement with God images Intrapersonal God image Absolute Strongly disagree Disagree Not sure Agree Strongly agree

%

Interpersonal God image valid %

Non-personal God image

Absolute

%

valid %

Absolute %

valid %

4

5,5

6,1

9

12,3

13,2

1

1,4

1,4

21 11 22

28,8 15,1 30,1

31,8 16,7 33,3

19 9 11

26,0 12,3 15,1

27,9 13,2 16,2

7 13 17

9,6 17,8 23,3

10,1 18,8 24,6

8 7

11,0 9,6

12,1 Missing

20 5

27,4 6,8

29,4 Missing

31 4

42,5 44,9 5,5 Missing

73

100,0

100,0

73

100,0

100,0

73

100,0

100,0

But how do the personal characteristics, suicide crisis aspects and limit experience influence the three God images? To answer this question I performed three multiple regression analyses, i.e. one for each God image. The object of a multiple regression analysis is to predict one variable (dependent variable) with the help of various other variables (independent variables) or to measure the effect of the independent (explanatory) variables on the dependent variables. To do this one calculates the regression coefficient b, which indicates the predictive value (Slotboom 1991, 141; Frenzel & Hermann 1989, 161–162).4 In addition the coefficient of determination R2 is determined, which gives the declared variance as a proportion of total variance, and thus provides information about the quality of the prediction (Frenzel & Hermann 1989, 163). In this work I use the corrected coefficient of determination ‘adjusted R-square’ (adj.R2). The regression analysis thus determines the controlled direct influence of personal characteristics, suicide crisis aspects and limit experiences on each of the three God images. The sequence of all regression analyses was as follows: A dependent variable and all of the independent variables were introduced into the analysis, Then, using the stepwise method, a first regression analysis was performed. In all three multiple regression analysis the following personal characteristics, suicide crisis aspects and limit experiences were introduced 4 The regression coefficient b is the slope of the regression line and thus expresses the change in the dependent variables when the value of the independent variable increases by one unit.

212

 -

as independent variables: demographic characteristics (sex, age, education, occupational status, living situation, church affiliation), characteristics relating to the person’s lifeview (family-oriented/conservative, social-critical, hedonistic, economic-bourgeois, autonomistic value orientation and relevance of lifeview), religious characteristics (religious self-definition, religious activity in childhood, religious activity in adulthood), coping style (active coping style, repressive coping style), hopelessness, perceived cause of suicidal thoughts or actions (partner, illness, loneliness), motivation for suicidal thoughts or actions (revenge, death wish, cry for help), experience of tragedy (societal, interpersonal, individual, religious), experience of guilt (personal, interpersonal, societal, religious) and attitude toward death (immanentism, agnosticism, immortality of the soul, transition, reincarnation, perfection, judgment).5 Gradually, the independent variables with the lowest significance and the smallest standardized beta-coefficient were eliminated, leaving only significant independent variables. In the case of dummy variables (dichotomized, normally distributed variables), after appropriate statistical processing of the dummy variables a final regression analysis was calculated with the “enter” method (Eisinga et al. 1991). Table 2 shows the results of the three multiple regression analyses, in each of which a God image functioned as the dependent variable and the personal characteristics, suicide crisis aspects and limit experience functioned independent variables. The intrapersonal God image is influenced by two variables. The first is the social aspect Table 2. Multiple regression analysis of God images with their predictors Independent variables

b

Dependent variables

×

adj.R2

Tragedy—social Sex*

.40 .31

Intrapersonal God image

3.1

.14

Death as perfection Active coping style Religious self-definition

.51 .32 .19

Interpersonal God image

3.2

.74

Death as immortality of the soul Motivation: death wish Cause: partner Religious activity in childhood

.63 .24 .23 .19

Non-personal God image

3.9

.48

* Dummy variable (compound)

5

For a full description of these variables see Scherer-Rath 2001.

      

213

of tragedy and the second is sex: in this case it is men who are more inclined to this God image than women. The experience of social tragedy is the experience of personal powerlessness in light of suffering, environmental degradation, war, terrorism and violence in society and on this earth, of being unable to fulfil what is perceived as a social responsibility. Thus it is not surprising that the social tragedy aspect acts as a predictor for the intrapersonal God image, as this image does not recognize a transcendent force that can be ascribed final responsibility for the welfare and woe of this life on earth. These two independent variables, however, can account for only 14% of the intrapersonal God image (adj.R2 = .14). This brings me to the interpersonal God image, which is also influenced by three variables, namely the attitude toward death as perfection, the active coping style and religious self-definition. The attitude of death as perfection is an explicitly religious attitude that is deeply rooted in the Christian tradition. Perfection can be seen as the most important theological concept in the Christian eschatology, although there are different versions of it. The variable of “attitude toward death as perfection” used in this study was the result of a merging, through factor analysis, of three Christian concepts, namely a dynamic, a goal-oriented and a pre-established idea of perfection (Scherer-Rath, Van der Ven & Felling 2001). All three ideas have one thing in common: the central focus on a God who is personally involved in the life of every single human being and who also implies the completion or perfection of that life at the time of death. The active coping style means that the person takes an active approach to dealing with crisis situations, even when this involves calling on other people for help. The personal confrontation with the crisis situation, the strategy of making contact with others and the active search for new sources of information appears to influence the personal relation to God as well. Religious self-definition means that respondents reported that religion was important to them and that they defined themselves as religious. It is noteworthy that the two variables together account for 74% of the interpersonal God image. The non-personal God image has four predictors. It is most strongly influenced by the attitude toward death as immortality of the soul, followed by the death wish as a motivation for suicide, and religious activity in childhood. The attitude toward death as immortality of the soul is based on the idea that only the soul has an eschatological

214

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future, while the body is left behind in death. The death wish as a motivation for suicide points to the intense wish to be able to remove oneself from an existential crisis situation through one’s own death. Causes cited for suicidal thoughts or actions in this case are problems with a partner or being emotionally hurt by a loved one or loved ones. Religious activity in childhood means that until the age of 12, respondents either attended church relatively regularly or prayed at mealtimes, on getting up in the morning or going to bed at night or in certain other situations. Overall, the predictive value of the non-personal God image is 48%. The analysis of the predictors of the three God images yielded significantly fewer predictors in quantitative terms, and thus less information than the results of the first model (limit experiences as intermediate variables). The intermediate variables in the original research model have numerous predictors that help to elucidate experiences and attitudes in limit situations from a religious and lifeview perspective. The God images play a particularly important role in this sense. An overview of the predictors is shown in Figure 3 (section 4). The next question is how the influence of the three God images as intermediate variables affects the dependent variables, namely expectations concerning pastoral counseling? It is only in answering this question that it is possible to reach a definitive conclusion about the questions raised at the beginning concerning the empirical testing of the modified theoretical research model. Therefore three more multiple regression analyses were performed, in which the expectations about pastoral counseling functioned as the dependent variables, while personal characteristics, aspects of the suicide crisis, limit experiences and God images served as independent variables. Finally, in accordance with the theoretical research model, I coupled the results of the two series of regression analyses, in order to carry out a path analysis of the influence exerted by individual variables on each other. Consequently, within these path analyses the personal characteristics, the suicide crisis aspects and the limit experience function as independent variables, the God images as intermediate variables and the expectations about pastoral counseling as dependent variables. The three “expectation models” were identified as the participatoryreligious, the thematic-religious and the kerygmatic-religious models.6

6

Elsewhere I have referred to a religious-kerygmatic-communicative model, because

      

215

The first of these had the highest level of acceptance. With a mean of 3.6 on a four-point scale, the respondents expressed their expectation that a pastoral counsellor will use a participatory conversational technique, i.e. that he or she will be emotionally present and listening. The thematic-religious model had the second-highest rate of acceptance with a mean of 3.3. This means that the respondents consider it important that the counseling with a pastoral counselor be oriented toward the themes or subjects of importance to them. The kergymatic-religious model implies expectations that the pastoral counselor will directly address faith issues of the counselee as a way of deepening, renewing or even explaining that faith. As previous analyses have shown, among the respondents there is a group that favours both the participatory and the thematic model. If we now look at the results of the three multiple regression analyses with the three expectation models as dependent variables, then we find the following picture (Table 3), which does not differ from the results of the three regression analyses performed on the basis of the ‘old’ research model (Scherer-Rath 2001, 288). There, the attitude toward death as immortality of the soul and the deistic attitude of death as transition, along with the religious and social aspects of tragedy emerged as significant predictors. They are significant because they appear as intermediate variables, i.e. they are in turn determined by other predictors that, by way of the intermediate variables, influence respondents’ expectations about pastoral counseling. In this regard it is especially important to draw attention to the God images, since they co-determine these expectations by way of the intermediate variables of attitudes toward death as transition and immortality of the soul. The new path analysis confirms that they do not influence these expectations directly. For the path analysis based on the modified research model, we thus find that while there are predictors for expectations about counseling and predictors for the God images as intermediate variables, the God images exert no intermediate influence on the expectations of counseling and thus do not function as intermediate variables.

it is the product of a factor analysis of two models, the kerygmatic and the communicative model (Scherer-Rath 2001). However, because the items associated with this joint factor clearly emphasize the kerygmatic nature compared with the items for the other two models, I have decided to use the designation kerygmatic-religious.

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 -

Table 3. Multiple regression analysis with all predictors of expectations about pastoral counseling Independent variables

b

Dependent variables (expectations about pastoral counseling)

×

adj.R2

Religious self-definition Motivation: death wish Age* Hedonistic lifeview Death as transition Family-oriented/conservative values

.35 .33 –.26 .26 .24 –.20

Participatory-religious

3.6

.40

Death as immortality of the soul Formal education Age* Religious activity in childhood

.50 .30 –.27 .20

Religious-thematic

3.3

.49

Religious tragedy Social tragedy Religious activity in adulthood Religious self-definition

.43 –.34 .28 .24

Kerygmatic-religious

2.3

.50

*Dummy variable (compound)

4. Evaluation of the Empirical Testing of the Theoretical Research Models In this last part, the results presented above are considered from the point of view of whether they corroborate the theoretical research models. This corroboration is evaluated here, first theologically with a view to the normative implications discussed in section 2 above (4.1) and second methodologically with respect to how the theological implications of the theoretical research models are operationalised in empirical research design (4.2). 4.1

God Images and their Practical Life Orientation

In this article, interest centres less on the individual results of the empirical analyses than on the relationship between the normative implications, theoretical research models and the empirical corroboration of those models. Consequently there are two questions to be answered: To what extent do the results of the empirical analyses, which can be understood as the empirical testing of two divergent theoretical research models, differ? And what value can be ascribed to the normative implications of the religious/theological concepts in interpreting the empirical results? To better evaluate this relationship, we need to briefly return to the most important results of the empirical verification of the two

      

217

Figure 3. Path analysis—Experiences and attitudes in limit situations and expectations about pastoral counseling –.20 –.26 Hedonistic value orientation

.26 .33

Motivation: death wish Non-personal God image

.56

Death as transition

.24

Participatory-religious counseling adj.R2=.40

2

adj.R =.49 .35

Religious self-definition

.24

.21 .23 Age Formal education

–.27 .30 .20

.42

Religious activity in childhood .18 Autonomistic value orientation .17

Thematic-religious counseling

.50 Death as immortality of the soul

adj.R2=.49

adj.R2=.60

Sex .45

.48

Interpersonal God image Ökonomic-conservative value orientation

.39

Religious tragedy

.43

adj.R2=.42

.20

adj.R2=.50

Hopelessness .38 .23

Cause: illness

–.34

.26 Social-critical value orientation Lifeview relevance Family-conservative value orientierung

Social tragedy .37 –.23 .32 .21

Intrapersonal God image Motivation: revenge Religious Activity in adulthood

adj.R2=.49

Kerygmatic-religious counseling

.28

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 -

models. Figure 3 shows the final path analysis, based on the original theoretical research model: the God images function as independent variables, the experiences in limit situations and attitudes toward death as intermediate variables, and the expectations with regard to pastoral counseling as the dependent variables. The path analysis confirms the basic assumptions of the original model: the experiences and attitudes in limit situations (in this case attitudes toward death and experience of tragedy in particular) influence the respondents’ expectations about pastoral counseling. Especially important are the personal religious characteristics, which act as independent variables, since they not only affect attitudes toward death and experience of tragedy, but also, through the intermediate variables, influence counseling expectations. This is noteworthy because the theological implications of the God images as a symbolic explication of the God idea, as explored in this article, help to make the path analysis results theologically meaningful and thus offer a way of interpreting and evaluating the empirical results. Normatively speaking, “God” is the indexical point of orientation in any theological evaluation. It is the attitudes and behaviours, whether positive or negative, of the respondents about this point that we are interested in. We therefore take note that the immanentist attitude toward death (“Death is the natural end of a human life”) was strongly advocated by the respondents, but plays no role in the empirical model. The results of the path analysis show how the practical life attitudes refer to this orientation point and how the respondents can examine this relationship either on their own or with the help of pastoral counsellors (context of application). The practical life attitudes and experiences in limit situations are largely influenced by God images, lifeview characteristics and other personal religious characteristics. Because these practical life attitudes have such a strong influence on the respondents’ expectations with regard to pastoral counseling, the predictors of the practical life attitudes indirectly influence the expectations about pastoral counseling. The empirical results were shaped by the significance of the God images as independent variables, while the content of these images, in line with the normative implications discussed in section 2, becomes evident only through the variables that they influence. In this sense the normative implications are of vital importance for the interpretation of the study results. This is confirmed by other predictors as well, for example religious self-definition and the rele-

      

219

vance of lifeview. When this result is translated into pastoral praxis, the practical relevance of this study becomes apparent. Indirectly, by way of the practical life attitudes, God images play a significant role in shaping the respondents’ expectations about pastoral counseling. Even if they do not function as direct predictors, they are indirectly present, for example through attitudes toward death. In other words, this means that even in the case of participatory-religious expectations, that are characterized by the counselee’s wish to determine the nature and content of the pastoral counseling, the non-personal God image can be important in the background. In the thematicreligious counseling model the interpersonal and the non-personal God images are significant, while the kerygmatic-religious model differs in that it is not the attitudes toward death that function as intermediate variables but rather the tragedy aspects. The religious tragedy aspect is not influenced by any God image, whereas the social tragedy aspect is influenced by the intrapersonal God image. Thus the intrapersonal God image has an indirect, negative influence on the kerygmatic-religious counseling model. Pastoral counselors would be well advised to realize that the counselees look to them as religious experts on the themes of death and tragedy including the inherent God images. Pastoral counselors who do not address these religious themes not only do not meet the expectations of their counselees, but are also missing a major opportunity to explore with them the ground of being of human existence, using practical life attitudes as a starting point. By comparison, looking at the final path analysis as an empirical test of the modified theoretical research model (figure 4), it quickly becomes apparent that this research model is only partially confirmed. The God images are indeed influenced by certain experiences and attitudes in limit situations. The God images themselves, however, have no influence on the expectations about pastoral counseling. In this respect the model is not corroborated. As a result, the God images have no orientation function, nor are there any practical life attitudes (expectations) that could provide insight into the meaning of the God images as explications of the God idea. The aforementioned normative implications are of no help in understanding the results of the path analysis. The manner in which God is perceived in the practical life context, which could help pastoral counsellors meet their counselees’ expectations, cannot be determined. Thus the practical relevance of this research model is very limited.

220

 -

Figure 4. Path analysis—God images and expectations about pastoral counseling

Family-conservative value orientation

–.20

Hedonistic value orientation

.26 .33

Motivation: death wish

.24

Participatory-religous counseling adj.R2=.40

Death as transition .35 Religious self-definition Age –.27 Formal education

.30

Religious activity in childhood

.20 .50

Thematic-religious counseling adj.R2=.49

Death as immortality of the soul

.43 .28

Religious tragedy Religious activity in adulthood

Kerygmatic-religious counseling

–.34 adj.R2=.50

Social tragedy .40 Sex

.31

Death as perfection

Intrapersonal God image adj.R2=.14

.51 Active coping style

.32 Intrapersonal God image

Cause: partner

adj.R2=.74

.23 Motivation: revenge

.63 .19 .24

Non-personal God image adj.R2=.48

      

221

Do the conclusions reached here contradict the normative implications discussed in section 2? Not necessarily. The conclusions are rather of a complementary nature, and are probably more meaningful from a psychological or sociological point of view than from a theological one. However, if one looks at the results of the path analysis (especially compared with the analysis of the original model), then it is very clear that the original theoretical model can be theologically legitimated, since the empirical results clearly are in accord with the theological implications, given the practical relevance of the God images. Through the attitudes and experiences in limit situations, the God idea influences the respondents’ expectations about pastoral counseling. In other words, the only way to illuminate the significance of the God idea as the orientation point of everyday life is to look at everyday religious praxis. God images are revealed in attitudes toward death or experiences of tragedy, and in this way become relevant to pastoral counseling. Therefore, to address God images directly in a pastoral counseling is unjustified from theological perspective and irrelevant from a pastoral perspective. 4.2

Methodological Critique

Finally, I would like to take a critical look at whether the concepts that were at the centre of this study, i.e. the God images, were adequately operationalised. God images were studied deductively and in the framework of a quantitative analysis. Without wishing to weigh into the ongoing polemics about which research methods in theology best correspond to the normative implications of theological concepts, I admit that in the case of the God images considered in the context of the theoretical implications set out above, a qualitative study of individual God metaphors would have been desirable. This is because metaphors communicate those theological implications. While metaphors do not inform us in the sense of passing on theoretical knowledge, they can be seen as a tool by which every individual person is shown or gains awareness of something. In this sense a metaphor does pass on knowledge, namely metaphorical knowledge, which Van Herck, following Polanyi, calls tacit knowing (Van Herck 1999, 168; Polanyi 1967). This tacit knowing is not about whether certain qualities or characteristics are present or not, but rather about creating a space for understanding those qualities or characteristics through the characterization of one aspect as the whole.

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Thus the metaphor does not explain the reality, but offers an attitude or a perspective that enables us to grasp one or more aspects of reality. The metaphor rests on a ‘tacit’ ability to understand how the new aspect or new perspective relates to the old. This understanding can also be life-changing, in that the new aspect or perspective tacitly implies a meaning construct that can be expressed only in praxis (practical life attitudes), in other words through action. Inasmuch as metaphor grows out of experience, so too it can and must prove its worth in experience (Zenger 1998, 116–117). Only in this way does it constitute itself, and in the process offer a way of relating to, of explicating, reflecting on and communicating the Unnameable. And this process can then once again be empirically studied. References Berger, P.L. (1969). Auf den Spuren der Engel. Die moderne Gesellschaft und die Wiederentdeckung der Transzendenz (Orig.: A Rumor of Angels. Modern Society and the Rediscovery of the Supernatural). Frankfurt/M.: Fischer. Dalferth, I.M. (2003). Die Wirklichkeit des Möglichen [ The reality of the possible]. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck. De Groot, A.D. 12(1994). Methodologie. Grondslagen van onderzoek en denken in de gedragswetenschappen [Methodology. Foundations of research and thinking in the behavioural sciences]. Assen: Van Gorcum. Felling, A., Peters, J. & Schreuder, O. (1986). Geloven en leven. Een nationaal onderzoek naar de invloed van religieuze overtuigingen [Faith and life. A national study on the influence of religious beliefs]. Zeist. Frenzel, G. & Hermann, D. (Eds.) (1989). Statistik mit SPSS. Eine Einführung nach M.J. Noru“is [Statistics with SPS. In introduction according to M.J. Noru“is]. StuttgartNew York. Hart, H. et al. 5(2001). Onderzoeksmethoden [Research methods]. Amsterdam: Boom. Houtepen, A. (2000). God in het ziekenhuis [God in the hospital]. Praktische Theologie (4), 118–131. Kromrey, H. 10(2002). Empirische Sozialforschung [Empirical social research]. Opladen: Leske+Buderich. Meckenstock, G. (1994). Some Remarks on Pantheism and Panentheism. In S. Andersen (Ed.), Traditional Theism and its Modern Alternatives (117–129). Aarhus: Aarhus University Press. Murken, S. (1998). Gottesbeziehung und psychische Gesundheit. Die Entwicklung eines Modells und seine empirische Überprüfung [The God relationship and psychological health. The development of a model and its empirical testing]. Münster: Waxmann. Polanyi, M. (1967). The Tacit Dimension. New York: Doubleday/Anchor Books. Scherer-Rath, M. (2001). Lebensackgassen. Herausforderungen für die pastorale Beratung und Begleitung von Menschen in Lebenskrisen [Dead ends. Challenges for pastoral counseling and care of people in life crisis]. Münster: LIT. Scherer-Rath, M., Van der Ven, J.A. & Felling, A.J.A (2001). Images of Death as Perspectives in a Life Crisis. Journal of Empirical Theology 14 (1), 27–46.

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Schlette H.P. (1966). Kirche unterwegs [The Church under way]. Olten. Schleiermacher, F.D.E. 7(1960). Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsätzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhang dargestellt [The Christian faith according to the principles of the Protestant Church in context]. Berlin: De Gruyter. Schmidt, A. (1994). Das Erbe des englischen Deismus [The legacy of English deism]. In M. Lutz-Bachmann (ed.), Und dennoch ist von Gott zu reden: Festschrift für Herbert Vorgrimler [And still we talk of God: Festschrift for Herbert Vorgrimler] (186–206). Freiburg/B.: Herder. Slotboom, A. 2(1991). Statistiek in woorden. De meest voorkomende termen en technieken [Statistics in words. The most common terms and techniques]. Groningen. Taylor, Ch. (1999). Quellen des Selbst. Die Entstehung der neuzeitlichen Identität [Orig.: Sources of the Self ]. Frankfurt/M.: Suhrkamp. Van der Lans, J. (1994). Religiöse Universalien in der Psychologie des Selbst [Religious universals in the psychology of the self ]. In J.A. van der Ven & H.-G. Ziebertz (Eds.), Religiöser Pluralismus und interreligiöses Lernen [Religious pluralism and interreligious learning] (71–85). Kampen: Kok/Weinheim: DSV. Van der Ven, J.A. (1990). Entwurf einer empirischen Theologie. [Engl. transl. (1993). Practical Theology: An Empirical Approach]. Kampen: Kok/Weinheim: DSV. —— (1998). God Reinvented? A Theological Search in Texts and Tables. Leiden: Brill. Van Herck, W. (1999). Religie en metafoor. Over het relativisme van het figuurlijke [Religion and metaphor. On realism in the figurative dimension]. Leuven: Peters. Verschuren, P. & Doorewaard, H. 3(2003). Het ontwerpen van een onderzoek [Research design]. Utrecht: Lemma. Verschuuren, G.M.N. (1981). Het modelgebruik in natuurwetenschappen en theologie [The use of models in the natural sciences and theology]. Kampen: Kok. Werbick, J. (1999). Auf der Spur der Bilder [Tracing images]. Bibel und Kirche 54 (1), 2–9. Zenger, E. (1998). Am Fuss des Sinai. Gottesbilder des Ersten Testaments [At the foot of the Sinai. God images in the Old Testament]. Düsseldorf: Patmos. Ziebertz, H.-G. (2001). Normativity and Empirical Research in Practical Theology. Journal of Empirical Theology 15 (1), 5–18.

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NORMATIVE CLAIMS IN PASTORAL MINISTRY RESEARCH H S Examine all things; hold fast that which is good (1 Thess. 5:19–21)

1. Introduction In this article I will analyse some characteristics of the normative claims studied in pastoral ministry research. I use the term ‘normative’ to refer to issues of religious and church authority; to the actors who hold or lay claim to such authority; and to principles of right action for those who wield it in religious and church-based settings. Normativeness implies norms—the effects of our moral ideas put into practice. Church history in many ways offers a kaleidoscope of such norms in the form of opinions, arguments, beliefs, conflicts and claims, both between and within denominations. Let me first offer a glimpse into this kaleidoscope of normative claims in pastoral ministry to indicate the sheer complexity of the research problem they pose in theology. 1.1

Normative Dynamics

Let us take the apostolic debate as a clear historical example of interacting normative claims in pastoral ministry. This debate is characterized by divergent views on the relationship of the present context of ministry and the initial christological context of the early church. One aspect of the controversy is the theological view that the initial charismatic and unstructured community organization of the Christian church was superseded by the institutionalization of pastoral office in later years. This popular hypothesis is based on an archetype that has been vigorously advocated time and again in the history of Christian theology, namely that of the new, true and pristine ministry of the early Christians, reflecting an egalitarian and pure religiosity. This hypothesis not only holds that such a pure ministry actually existed and was meant to be the paradigm of ministry

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from the start, but that it still offers a normative blueprint of pastoral office, to which we can and should return in each age and context. In his fine monograph Burtchaell (1995) describes the proponents of this hypothesis in the various phases of the history of pastoral office. Since the 14th century reformers like Wycliffe, Luther, Melanchton and Calvin—all typical intellectuals of their time—struggled with what they saw as corrupt or superstitious practices and as definitely conflicting with the apostolicity of the church and the faith. They not only became ‘Protestants’ because of their disillusionment with what they saw as decadent pastoral practice, but also because ‘protesting’ views as such were regarded by their opponents as serious threats to vested interests rather than as opportunities for development. Others, such as the Pietists and the Quakers, based their apostolic advocacy of the early Christian church on the necessity they felt for an authentic moral and religious renewal in contrast to the type of conventional Christianity that they did not recognize in their reading of the Bible. Later, in the 19th century, in the wake of biblical criticism, theological scholars like Rothe, Bauer and Ritschl, followed by other German, English and French scholars, began to offer historical and exegetical evidence that the Christian churches and pastoral offices were really products of the 2nd century. On the basis of biblical criticism they reconstructed a chronology, from which they concluded that pastoral ministry—after an unstructured spiritual phase—fell prey to a hierarchical model. The offices of priests, deacons and bishops originated not during but after the apostolic period, so these scholars maintained. In the first half of the 20th century the new ecumenical movement gave rise to fresh discussion of the old hypothesis. This time it was not Catholics debating the issue of apostolic succession with Protestants, but Anglicans arguing with Presbyterians, Congregationalists and Methodists. Even during the latter half of the 20th century there was a whole string of arguments that upheld or redefined the hypothesis, either fuelled by social analyses (Theissen) or criticism of the Catholic Church (Küng, Schillebeeckx, Schüssler-Fiorenza). Burtchaell argues that the hypothesis of an initial egalitarian and pure type of ministry is untenable. In the initial stages of Christianity there is indeed evidence of innovation and a striving for independence from (Hellenistic-)Jewish structures and there are clear indications of the presence of religiously inspired persons with far-reaching

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social and theological influence. There is also evidence, however, to assume the maintenance of continuity between synagogue and church, both in the form of the community and in pastoral offices, for instance in communication and authority structures. Burtchael’s historical and exegetical analyses not only suggest that proper research may falsify persistent theological claims of an originally pristine ministry in past contexts; he also illustrates the importance of accounting for the social and ideological nature of each context if normative claims are to have religious and theological significance in pastoral ministry. 1.2

Sketching the Issues

The historical example of the apostolic debate demonstrates some characteristics of normative claims that are relevant to empirical research in theology. Norms have a certain locus: they are propounded at given junctures in history. Norms are represented by theologians, religious authorities and the faithful: the Christian church is not monolithic but consists of different parties that can be identified by the differing norms they espouse. The social characteristics of these parties and their present-day attitudinal stances can be clarified by empirical research. Furthermore, these parties substantiate their norms by means of certain legitimising procedures in theological thought. How they do so may also represent a meaningful aim for empirical research in theology. Finally, there are ethical claims involved: norms that deal with the rightness of claims. What these claims are and how they attain their status as important legitimations can also be studied empirically. I will now explore these characteristics analytically by elucidating four questions that strike me as important to clarify the issue of normative claims in pastoral ministry research. The first question is about the where and when of normative claims in empirical research. It concerns the socio-cultural and historical context and reads: what is the significance of the setting of pastoral ministry in which normative claims are made? The second question regards the who of normative claims in empirical research. It concerns the institutional context of normative claims and reads: in whose church are these normative claims made? The third question regards the how of normative claims in empirical research. It concerns the political characteristics of normative claims and reads: how is normativeness claimed in pastoral ministry? The fourth question, which concludes this article,

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is about the why of norms in empirical research. It refers to the justification of normative claims and reads: why are specific norms endorsed in pastoral ministry? In examining these four questions I will refer to empirical research in theology—mostly my own into pastoral ministry, but other research as well—to support my view that solid empirical research is indispensable for a scholarly clarification of normative claims in theology, especially those aimed at or implied in pastoral ministry. 2. The Where and When of Normative Claims Unlike the missionary zeal and expansionism that historically characterize discussions of pastoral ministry; the initial motives always seem to be endemic: they stem from specific persons and groups at given times and in specific circumstances. A remarkable and vivid contemporary example is the Dutch Roman Catholic Church over the past four decades. In this section I first outline some aspects of this recent Dutch context of pastoral ministry. Then I offer some observations from an empirical survey conducted among Dutch Catholic pastors in the 1990s. This research clarified these pastors’ attitudes towards church, sacraments and spirituality and their relevance for developmental policies on the pastoral profession (Schilderman 1998). 2.1

Setting of Dutch Pastoral Ministry

Why is the example of the Dutch Roman Catholic Church useful to clarify the relevance of socio-cultural setting to the prevalence and experienced legitimacy of normative claims in pastoral ministry? To answer this question we have to go back to the 1950s when Dutch culture was socio-culturally compartmentalized: each major ideological movement had its own social and institutional infrastructure that acted as a ‘pillar’ supporting the ‘roof ’ of Dutch society for decades. During the 1950s and 1960s these ‘pillars’ of identity resting on a religious or political basis collapsed as each formerly isolated group enjoyed the fruits of emancipation, which the solidly constructed pillars had achieved by consistently propagating their socio-cultural identity. It was impossible to overlook the collapse of the Catholic pillar, since it was explicitly and publicly commented on by theologians. As the Catholic community grew into a body more or less independent of local and national church authorities, these theologians dis-

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cussed how to maintain the formerly enshrined position of pastoral ministry in the church monopoly that the Dutch Catholic Church had provided for so many years. But the effort to retain the socio-cultural position of pastoral ministry was by no means conservative. True to the spirit of the time and encouraged by the aggiornamento of the Second Vatican Council, engaged pastors and theologians tried to incorporate the central values of emancipated Dutch citizenship, such as democracy, self-determination and women’s rights, into the structures and policies of church leadership. This issue was brought to an impressive conclusion at the Dutch Pastoral Council (1966–1970). It drew considerable international attention as an experimental project, but locally it took place in splendid isolation from the world church. Though the Dutch Council presented itself as a grassroots movement within the church, some 71% of the participating members had completed their tertiary education. The ‘Dutch synod experiment’ failed as a result of interventions from Rome. New bishops were appointed in the Netherlands who were more in tune with Vatican church politics, and in most Dutch dioceses the initial renewals were—sometimes inflexibly—restored to the former lines of church practice. Pastors’ reactions varied. The critics among them, along with theologians and liberal Catholics, organized themselves into confessional movements which, while remaining loyal to Rome, expressed their discomfort in critical opinions and protest meetings. The intellectuals retreated into proclaiming a more or less secular gospel, implying academic emancipation from the perceived failure of the church to accommodate itself to modern times. Then there were priests—a substantial number—who left the clergy. Between 1960 and 1990 some 2100 priests abandoned the priesthood, either leaving the church altogether or accepting lay ministries in the church. During the same period the annual number of priest ordinations dropped by 93% from 318 to 21, never to rise again significantly. And finally there were parochial pastors who adjusted to the new situation and focussed on local needs, regarding theological questions about the priesthood or church politics as largely irrelevant to pastoral practice. The Dutch example is interesting since it illustrates the close relationship and interaction between the socio-cultural identity of religious groups and the position of pastoral ministry. During the hundred years that Dutch society was characterized by a ‘pillarized’ structure

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religion provided a vehicle for Catholics’ loyalty, keeping them from abandoning their cultural subsystem. This was reflected in a rich yield of religious vocations and high, unquestioned prestige of pastoral functions. As soon as the emancipation process reached the phase of relative autonomy, church authority was recognized as a particular normative claim, that is, as an alternative moral appeal open to scrutiny, argument and choice. Its legitimation could be challenged and actually was criticized, even from within, by a consortium of pastors and theologians, primarily in terms of the need to adapt pastoral ministry to the perceived ‘signs of the times’. This raising of voices was not answered positively. Both a failure on the part of the Dutch to recognize the world church’s constraints on adapting to local ambitions of socio-cultural emancipation, and the rigid ‘counter-reformation’ action of higher church authorities furthered marginalization of the Catholic Church’s normative influence in the Netherlands. 2.2

Attitudes towards Pastoral Ministry

One wonders how pastors—those that did not leave—evaluate pastoral ministry, especially in regard to normative theological questions. In a survey conducted among Catholic pastors—both priests and deacons and lay professionals (pastoral workers)—an inventory was made of some aspects of the theology of ministry that highlight pastors’ attitudes towards the church, sacraments and spirituality. I cite some relevant examples of pastors’ attitudes towards their office. Let me start by clarifying empirically the example of apostolicity with which I started this article. A major problem in regard to apostolicity is how to validate the relation between the normative character of pastoral ministry and the legitimacy of the Christian tradition. One conception is implied in the classical expression successio apostolica, or the apostolicity of pastoral office. The uninterrupted, intergenerational line of bishops and apostles guarantees the transfer of the apostolic kerygma. This is expressed in the sacrament of ordination that constitutes the divine and juridical basis of the pastoral office in the church and the right to administer the sacraments. The second conception is presupposed in the expression of sequela Iesu, or the apostolicity of the church. Here the apostolic kerygma is guaranteed by observance of Jesus’ evangelical lifestyle, rooted in the kingdom of God. By following this lifestyle local church communities

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hand down their apostolic faith in a religious orthopraxis that expresses the social and historical identity of the Christian tradition. We found that a large majority of pastors hold a view of apostolicity for which this practice of local congregations is important. A large majority (89%) supports the theological notion of the apostolicity of the church. Only 1% rejects this view, whereas 10% of the pastors are doubtful. The apostolicity of pastoral office is less univocal. This theological notion is rejected by 39% and supported by 27% of the pastors, whereas one third (34%) is unsure. The concept of the apostolicity of the pastoral office, according to which episcopal authority is founded on the apostles, is questioned by the clergy and rejected by lay ministers. These pastoral workers give greater support to the concept of the apostolicity of the church than priests (Schilderman, Van der Ven & Felling 1999). The second example pertains to sacraments, more specifically the issue of vocation and ordination. There are two major distinctions with regard to access to the pastoral office. The orthodox view of ordination is that the official heads of the local church have authority to admit candidates to the consecrated office if they meet the official requirements. A small majority (56%) favours this view of ordination, one quarter (23%) is unsure and 21% of the pastors reject this view. The lay ministers show doubt with a strong tendency to rejection, while priests and deacons agree. The other view of access to clerical office comprises both the appeal of a local religious community and local authorization to admit candidates and confer the right to celebrate the Eucharist. The notion of local admission to clerical office is endorsed by one third (34%), doubted by one third (33%) and rejected by one third (33%) of the pastors. Whereas lay ministers are in favour of this notion of admission to clerical office, priests and deacons show a tendency to reject it (Schilderman & Felling 2003a). Finally an example of spirituality: how do pastors understand the relation between their ministry and their personal faith? One view is that a personal spiritual life is a necessary condition for pastoral ministry. Time and again this notion is emphasized by the doctrinal authority of the Catholic Church, but a more psychological variant it is also found in the programmes of the Clinical Pastoral Education movement. Another conception of spirituality is to see spirituality as an aim of pastoral ministry. It is a normative objective to pursue in daily pastoral practice. The results on support of these two attitudes

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show that a large majority (86%) of the pastors feel that religious commitment is an indispensable requirement for pastoral ministry, a very small minority (1%) disagrees, and 13% questions this belief. Seventy percent of all pastors believe that it is a primary task of the pastor to develop parishioners’ religious commitment, 4% rejects this view and a quarter (26%) is unsure. There is hardly any difference between clergy and lay ministers’ views in this respect (Schilderman & Felling 2003b). The attitudes outlined above reflect normative concepts of pastoral ministry in terms of socio-cultural support among pastors. The most remarkable feature is that, even in the case of crucial issues in pastoral ministry, the support is not univocal. Official dissemination of church doctrines by no means guarantees corresponding views among the recipients. Another interesting phenomenon is the variation in views between pastoral and lay church personnel. Sometimes there is consensus, sometimes disagreement. Sometimes the perspective of the official church authorities is accepted, sometimes that of local church communities. These findings underline the fact that normativeness in pastoral ministry presupposes and implies sociocultural plurality, socio-cultural interests and the adoption of a sociocultural perspective. If we do not take these where’s and when’s into account, we fail to understand normative claims in pastoral ministry. 3. The Who of Normative Claims The empirical research findings cited in the previous section show that even though core notions of pastoral ministry may refer to shared interests, this does not necessarily imply a common opinion among those involved in ecclesiastic matters. On the contrary, there is manifest diversity of opinion on whose normative claims are important. To account for this diversity, I will consider three perspectives: a religious; an institutional and a social perspective, each of which will be illustrated with empirical research findings. 3.1

Religious Normativeness

From a religious perspective, the question of the actor in normative claims is usually answered in the metaphors of the Christian tradition. In issues of pastoral ministry the question, ‘who is in charge?’, can be rephrased paradigmatically as a question of church owner-

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ship: ‘who owns the church?’. Answers are couched in a variety of symbols: the church is understood as God’s church, Jesus’ church, the Spirit’s church, the church’s church, or the people’s church. The answers are symbolic because they employ a language of religious signs which associate social and metaphysical realities. These church images can be regarded as signs that locate complex social realities in a religious symbolic universe that is more or less unproblematic, at least initially and at least insofar as they are interpreted in their own terms. Thus to refer to God’s church can imply the prerogative of God in all ultimate matters of the church, but it may also invoke the inviolability of certain religious answers about church ownership and reject others. Jesus’ church can refer to specific Jesuological or christological interpretations of the church that embed its dignity in some social and cultural settings but exclude other settings that are deemed less suitable. The Spirit’s church may identify the church as living experience susceptible to specific emotional aspects of our lifestyle but probably less so to other personality dynamics. The church’s church can indicate that the church is an expression and function of God’s salvation that enhances our well-being in a spiritual but probably not in a material sense. The people’s church may characterize the church as constituted by God’s bond with his people, while allowing some emancipatory understanding of pastoral status differentiation and ensuring the necessary church order. On closer scrutiny all these religious signs of the church not only have a connotative function for the varieties of spiritual life but also a denotative function in the sense of defining stakeholders in the issue of church ownership. It is by no means irrelevant which image is used when a church is labelled and experienced: who employs which symbol at what time and in which context is significant. In answering this question, religious codes can be considered operational instructions for the use of signs. These codes represent norms that determine if, when and how aspects of reality should be interpreted as religious (Van der Ven 1996). Thus normativeness can be understood as a religiously encoded prescription for the use of religious signs. In pastoral ministry these codes have practical utility when administering religious signs. They guide the official and professional usage of religious signs and represent the church’s purpose for the actors involved, their addressees and their audiences. But within this social network of the church, in which pastors themselves are fully integrated, there is no guarantee whatsoever that codes univocally

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combine religious signs in similar interpretations sent to or received as significant messages by all parties. Unless strong (sub-)cultural reference frames act as an ‘iron cage’ for the coding of religious signs, the diversity of signs may be as flagrant as the diversity of codes and the differences in interpretation. 3.2

Institutional Normativeness

From an institutional perspective the diversity of responses to the question of who is the actor in normative claims in pastoral ministry calls our attention to the organization of these actors within church structures. Neglecting the question of the institutional location of actors in the church incurs a serious ideological risk that the basic equality of actors’ normative views may be assumed, whereas actually these views are closely connected to the tasks and responsibilities of these actors in the institutional structure of the church. The issue is all the more important since churches are regarded as typical examples of normative organizations, as Etzioni (1975, 3–22) demonstrated in the case of the Roman Catholic Church. According to him, normative organizations are characterized by a type of compliance, based not on enforcement or profit but on symbolic power. This type of claim corresponds with the use of symbolic rewards and deprivations. It can take two forms. Pure normative power is directly related to the manipulation of symbols, ideally represented by internalized moral commitment in which one identifies with the symbols. Social power, on the other hand, relates to the personal and social effects of these symbols, ideally expressed in meeting the requirements of primary relations and membership of significant groups. While social relations are an end in themselves, pure moral relationships tend to become means to achieve collective goals. This distinction explains a structural normative difference between pragmatic and fundamental models of normativeness, in which claims differ even if still based on the same or similar religious signs and pastoral codes. The way these normative claims are asserted in normative organizations also has to be taken into account. In the Catholic Church normative claims are typically pursued on the basis of routinized and ascribed charisma. This charisma is distributed among all line positions of the normative organization, unless specific ranks are able to attach charisma to specific knowledge or specialized skills (Etzioni 1975, 305–316; 337–350).

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This leads me to the observation that normative claims in pastoral ministry depend not only on the nature of religious codes of the church, but also on the different ways in which actors identify with these codes in the church. The manner of identification is by no means irrelevant to the study of pastoral ministry. The routinized charisma of the Roman Catholic Church, for instance, demands personalityoriented normative role sets that need to accord with the hierarchical organization of this church with its clear-cut, above all legally formulated norms of pastoral ministry. 3.3

Social Normativeness

From a social perspective the variety of answers to the question of the actor in normative claims also requires that we look at the variety of audiences addressed by theologians. Tracy (1981, 28–31) has pointed out the need to clarify the social portrait of theologians in the different publics of society, academia and the church to account for often implicit aspects of public discourse that are embedded in theological thought. Tracy’s social portrait of a theologian gives rise to three observations. Firstly, publics are defined dialectically. Actors usually do not define their audience, but interpret and shape their acts according to given scenarios, roles, plots and gestures; and if they perform this type of role-making well, their audience consents to be an involved and committed public. Similarly, theologians do not appoint their public by decree but can only captivate it by appealing to the authority ascribed to their claims. This dialectic of theological invocation of some authority and ascription of such authority by a public is a crucial characteristic of the social tissue entailed by the normative structure of the church. It is a necessary condition for assuming publics in one’s theological enterprise. A second remark about theological publics pertains to the connotation of the term ‘public’, namely that theologians more or less act on stage before a public. Theological theatres, however, are far from that. Theologians interact with their publics in various ways, often blurring distinctions between actor and public. At certain times and places there may be no audience whatsoever and theologians put on acts before audiences that have already left the theatre or were not expected to show up in the first place. This may be the case when theological discourse addresses theologians only, or when

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it has already lost all significance. On some occasions theologians relate to specific publics, as happened at the Second Vatican Council and the Dutch Pastoral Council, where theological expertise proved to be highly influential in setting the church’s course for the next few decades. On other occasions, theologians explicitly identify with social interests in the public realm, claiming a role as advocate for deprived parties and causes, such as the poor, women, peace, ecological movements and socio-cultural minorities. And if their academic autonomy or their university position is at stake, theologians have good reason not to identify with the church at all and tend to dissociate themselves from all specific publics except the academic one. Thus there may be every reason to suppose that theologians’ public interaction co-varies with sectional interests. Addressing publics does not necessarily imply an altruistic theological attitude towards these publics. A third remark about publics is that they are not homogenous groups. Each consists of interacting networks of groups that fuel the dynamics of concordant and discordant issues and interests. Thus when theologians address their publics they make choices for specific parties and interests and thus become stakeholders in the dynamics of their publics. When theologians identify with specific parties and interests this implies role-making and role-taking: meeting role expectations and changing role perspectives. This immediately has social consequences for the ascription of authority to their claims; that is to say, these claims are no longer exclusively understood as skillbased in terms of the expertise expected of academic or church settings but—also—as position-based according to the socio-culturally canonized status of specific parties and their sectional interests. 3.4

Empirical Clarification of Normative Perspectives

Having clarified religious, institutional and social perspectives of normativeness in answer to the who question of normativeness, I will now illustrate the significance of these distinctions from my empirical research into pastoral ministry. I do so by offering a description of religious images of the pastoral role and comparing these with notions of church authority. In that way I hypothesize that for pastors role-sets (religious and social perspectives) are firmly connected with their views of the structure of the church (institutional perspectives). In my research I was able to categorize 16 religious images of the

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pastor into five generic images of the pastoral role (Schilderman & Felling 2003b). The first image is that of the leader, which combines images that stress official ministry to the faithful (priest, father, spiritual leader, shepherd, spiritual advisor). For 36% of the pastors this is an attractive image, for a quarter (25%) it is not, whereas 39% questions it. The second image, that of the counsellor, stresses normative guidelines in interpersonal contact (prophet, guide and teacher). For 37% this is an appealing spiritual image; for 19% it is not attractive, whereas 44% is doubtful. The third image is that of the caretaker (social worker, therapist, companion). It expresses concern for persons in distress and subsequent professional support and relief. Thirty-one percent engages with this image and 13% does not, which leaves a majority (56%) doubting. The fourth image, that of the fellow human being, expresses basic equality as an essential responsibility in interpersonal contact (friend, sidekick, brother). A majority (57%) is in favour of this image, 13% is not, whereas 30% doubts its appropriateness. Finally, there is the image of woman that consists of female family images (mother and sister). For a minority of the (largely male) pastoral population (16%) this is an appealing image, and for a majority (67%) it is not, leaving 17% in doubt. In the same research two types of the normative institution of the church were identified: an attitude that ascribes normative authority to the hierarchical-pyramidal institution of the church, and one that links this normativeness with an adaptive-communitarian church institution (Schilderman, Van der Ven & Felling 1999). The hierarchical-pyramidal concept of the church is based on a religious class system which legitimizes the power of the ordained pastor in a topdown distribution of power, guided by the principle of sacramental competence. The hierarchical-pyramidal attitude is supported by 11%, rejected by 57% and 32% of the pastors question it. The adaptivecommunitarian concept of the church assigns a community priority to the charisms of individual church members, since church structures are subject to the gospel. The adaptive-communitarian concept of the church, too, lacks a strong support base. Some 18% of the pastors support this attitude and 49% rejects it, leaving 33% in doubt. Can my hypothesis about a firm relationship of religious roleimages and attitudes towards institutional church structures be upheld? On the basis of a correlation analysis the answer must be differentiated. Three out of five religious images of the pastoral role indeed show significant attitudinal differences: these socio-religious images make

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Leader image Counsellor image Caretaker image Fellow human image Woman image

Hierarchical-pyramidal institution

Adaptive-communitarian institution

.50** .01 –.12* .04 –.10*

–.11* –.01 .16** .12* .16**

** Correlation significant at 0.01 level (2-tailed) * Correlation significant at 0.05 level (2-tailed)

a real difference when it comes to support for normative views of the institutional church. The image of the leader role is clearly associated with the hierarchical-pyramidal view of the church and dissociated from the adaptive-communitarian view. The relationship is reversed in the case of the caretaker and woman images, which are associated with the adaptive-communitarian and dissociated from the hierarchical-pyramidal view of the institutional church. The image of counsellor seems to be institutionally uncontroversial. 3.5

Interaction of Normative Perspectives

In accounting for the diversity of answers to the who question regarding normative claims in pastoral ministry from a religious, institutional and social perspective, we can now make four relevant observations. First, religious answers can be seen as signs for social answers that encode practical utility in professional ministry. Secondly, we cannot ignore the fact that pastoral ministry is embedded in a normative structure that depends on the symbolic power of normative claims and the ascribed charisma of church officials. Thirdly, answers to this question must take into account theologians’ interaction with their publics and the authority they gain or lose in these settings by making specific choices for parties, roles and interests. Fourthly, the foregoing empirical data suggest that the three perspectives are relevant and call for empirical research into pastoral ministry to determine the relationship between pastoral roles, the associated religious signs and the institutional framework of these religiously encoded roles. One can ask how the complex reality of interacting parties within the normative structure of the church can be critically assessed by theologians while simultaneously maintaining a unified conception of

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the church. The question is indeed complex. From a religious perspective the social reference to metaphysical reality may give unassailable answers that could preclude the perspective of varying church positions altogether. The conventional character of religious codes guiding the use of these signs, which may obviate diversity and difficulty beforehand, may reinforce this. From the institutional perspective, compliance with these codes is likely to be directed by symbolic compliance, which may hinder unprejudiced, rational discussion, thus incurring a risk of religious ideologies. From the social perspective these ideological risks may be reinforced if theologians overor underestimate the influence of social realities on their interaction within the church. Thus a key issue to be resolved is how to critically link the church’s religious codes with its normative compliance while taking into account one’s relative and contextual position in the church. This relates to the more generic question of the how of normative claims. 4. The How of Normative Claims The question of the how of normative claims transcends the issue characteristics of pastoral ministry. Having clarified the socio-cultural conditions of normative claims in pastoral ministry and the actors involved in a church public, we now turn to the more generic question of the normative method of accounting for religious signs and codes in theology. I will briefly present three basic, relevant answers to this question, namely those of classical apologetics, hermeneutic interpretation and conjectural criticism. Then I will consider if and how empirical research in theology can help to answer these how questions about issues in pastoral ministry research. 4.1

Classical Apologetics

In classical apologetics the how of normative claims is usually understood as a defence of ultimately unassailable truths. The cardinal claim in classical apologetics is that truth and faith are not essentially contradictory. Thus the proposition is not that faith itself is acquired by rational argumentation, but that opponents’ criticism of this faith can be met with shared propositions. In evidential apologetics the defence arguments are drawn from sources of revelation, whereas in presuppositional apologetics the critics’ assumptions are

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attacked. Positively stated, apologetics is the justification of faith, both its message ( fides quae creditur) and its appropriation ( fides qua creditur). In Catholic school philosophy this accountability was embedded in an epistemology that aimed at reasoning—from a nonreligious conceptual frame of reference—the possibility of faith (credibilitas) and the obligation to believe (credentitas) (Seckler 1993, 839–842). But this apologetic system did not relate how questions to the where and when or who questions of normativeness in religious matters. The system was socio-culturally and contextually closed: it functioned as the academic defence apparatus of a specific party—the religious authorities of the Catholic Church. This, however, by no means implies that apologetics is an artefact of the past. For instance, as interreligious dialogue gains theological significance it needs clearcut theological justifications to account for the normative principles and propositions of religious signs and codes that make up one’s religious identity and facilitate rational communication with other religions. Hence one can develop standards for apologetic argument such as that doctrinal pronouncements must be comprehensible within and between religions and that commensurability of normative claims should be substantiated across religious borders and be open to criticism (Griffiths 1991; Dembski & Richards 2001). 4.2

Hermeneutic Interpretation

A modern alternative to classical apologetics is offered by the paradigm of hermeneutic interpretation. In a way hermeneutic theology can also be understood as apologetic in that it underpins faith with its impetus to establish faith, its analytical orientation to comprehend faith and its practical clarification of actual opportunities for faith. But in several respects it differs from classical apologetics. It does not regard tradition as a given source of unique and necessarily enduring propositions. In hermeneutic interpretation tradition is understood as a complex system reflecting a plurality of interpretations, not only between contemporary and historical understanding but also within the authoritative texts themselves. This plurality is implied in the contextual constraints that appertain to any interpretation. Giving a normative account is such an interpretive practice. From this point of view any account of the authority of tradition is interwoven with the intelligibility of faith in and for different eras and contexts. The essence of hermeneutics is not just orthodoxy but orthopraxis (Schreurs 1982, 144; Schillebeeckx 1983, 14–17; Van der Ven 1990, 47–69).

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This hermeneutic paradigm has led to keen awareness of the plurality of the Christian faith, both in the past and today. Most hermeneutic theologians fully realize that conflicting interpretations are an inescapable fact of tradition. There is no exclusive validity of particular perspectives, but only critical discourse that discusses the relative adequacy of these particular perspectives. In this type of discourse the interpretations of scholarly elites are not sufficient answer. These interpretations demand critical assessment of the interpretations of those who are subjects of, or subjected to, these interpretations (Tracy 1975). A recalcitrant problem in hermeneutic theology, however, is how to harmonize retrospective and prospective views of interpretive action critically. Orthopraxis as the guiding norm of action seems to offer critical criteria for interpreting history, while it also suggests critical criteria for future action. However, even if we manage to interpret past action, what guarantee do we have that what was good in the past also meets the challenges of the future? Is it enough to follow Tracy’s ‘analogical imagination’ and state that ‘as different’ as our traditions are, so ‘as possible’ are our futures if we put them to the critical test of ultimate hope (Tracy 1987)? 4.3

Conjectural Criticism

Finally we propose conjectural criticism as an alternative way of answering the how question of normative claims. Popper does not share Tracy’s postmodern terminology of the ‘terror of history’ as an incentive for interpretation but starts by analysing the ‘poverty of historicism’. He addresses the problem of interpretation not from a hermeneutic but from a logical frame of reference. Instead of the postmodern rhetoric of resisting violent historical extrapolations to the future, Popper tries to systematically understand the faulty reasoning of historicism and learn from the future through conjecture and refutation. Popper argues from the logical perspective that we cannot rationally predict the future course of human history on the basis of knowledge gained from the past. The emotional appeal to historicism, however, makes us susceptible to accepting ‘hidden purposes behind the apparently blind decrees of fate’ that deify certain normative claims while rejecting others (Popper 1964, 159–161). Popper’s critical rationalism has ethical roots in his principle of fallibility in a conjectural discussion aimed at the approximation of truth (Artigas 1999, 121–131). The shift from logic to ethics is guided by Popper’s hermeneutic rule: ‘Always try to reformulate the position

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under discussion in its logically strongest form’ ( Jarvie 1999, 77). The agenda of public policies is ill addressed by ‘eternal solutions’ or utopian ideals projected from history onto the future. Instead Popper develops a pragmatic, normative approach of negative utilitarianism, in which the maxim is not to maximize advantages but to minimize disadvantages (Popper 1973). This inversion of utilitarianism challenges the traditional notion of an ethical symmetry between suffering (implying concern about disadvantages) and happiness (implying increased benefit). The kind of piecemeal social engineering that Popper proposes holds that fallibility as a normative criterion applies to our problem-solving skills. This calls for institutional guarantees of tolerant, rational discussion of our moral fallibility in procedures of listening to different sides, criticism and counter criticism, trial and error. Or, negatively phrased: avoiding the types of historicism, determinism and reification that lead to immunization strategies against criticism (Shearmur 1996; Jarvie & Pralong 1999; Tormey 1996; Burke 1983; O’Hear 1980, 147–170). These three answers (apologetic, hermeneutic, conjectural) to the how question of normative claims are not mutually exclusive. Depending on the aim of normative claims, an apologetic approach is necessary to clarify and justify the shared normative consequences of belonging to a given religious community. In other instances one cannot circumvent and disregard plurality and ambiguity, especially in cases where religious codes lack a guiding function. Finally, one should adequately address the indissoluble relation between normative claims, problems and mistakes. 4.4

Opportunities for Empirical Clarification

Surprising as it may seem, empirical research is relevant to all three perspectives that I have sketched. Classical apologetics is the least likely candidate. Empirical research, as in the case of pastoral ministry, may reflect differences of opinion among pastors, even on core issues in pastoral ministry such as the church, sacraments and spirituality. Discordance in the institutional structure of the church, especially when expressed by official role players in public addresses, may be considered fatal to defence against the attacks that especially West European churches face. On the other hand, covering up differences and presuming or even proclaiming concordance in sheer contradiction to obvious facts hinders assessment and adjustment strategies

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as well. Empirical research contributes to analysis of perceived threats or actual conflicts both within and outside the church. What is more, it can clarify and test corresponding strategies in theology and pastoral ministry to find, clarify and solve problems. All, of course, on the assumption that classical apologetics cherishes, namely that argumentative effort is necessary to find common ground for propositions that are shared with one’s opponents. For hermeneutics, the case is straightforward. If one questions given traditions and assumes discordance in its interpretation due to diverse historical and social-cultural contexts, one cannot disregard the need for research into these differences. In fact, this is the course academic theology has taken, in which it has established traditions of its own, for instance in biblical exegesis and critical-historical research into the sources of Christianity. Schillebeeckx (1981) exemplifies such hermeneutic research into pastoral ministry by exploring the developmental dynamics of the pastoral office. For practical theology an empirical approach is appropriate if one takes contemporary hermeneutic-communicative praxis as its object, understood in terms of its relevance to the Christian tradition (Van der Ven 1990, 47–69). The advancement of this praxis in pastoral ministry will need empirical research into its conditions, issues, aims, methods and effects (Schilderman 2001). Finally, conjectural criticism is an approach amenable to empirical research. This is so, firstly by definition, since the fallibility implied in its methodological stance does not allow inductive generalisation and causal explanations but demands clear-cut definitions, empirically open-ended in probabilistic explanations. Secondly, conjectural criticism is not only amenable to the kind of reconstructive reasoning so typical of the hermeneutic approach, but it may also prove to be less biased against normative futures. What would our religious practice look like if we were simply to engage in conjecture and refutation? What if we were to invent our pastoral ministry in laboratories and experiment in scenarios, trials and tests? These questions are not as strange as they may look at first sight. In most academic professional education facilities, for instance academic medical centres, vocational training and professional development are closely linked with conjectural types of research. This is because such research projects offer valid answers to how questions, in terms of which skills can be developed to meet the current requirements of a discipline, an institute and a profession. For pastoral ministry empirical research

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that puts pastoral action to the test is indispensable in modern times and rapidly changing contexts. 5. The Why of Normative Claims In this final section I look at the why question of normative claims in pastoral ministry research. Even if one felt free to share the notions that I derive from the where and when, the who and the how questions of normative claims, one can—and should—still question their ethical significance. Are these notions not merely about the claiming, and not about the norm itself ? To answer this question, I start by describing the nature of answers to the why question, namely legitimations. Secondly, I show how empirical research in pastoral ministry may offer explanations for legitimations. Thirdly, I indicate how justifications support these legitimations. Finally, I summarize the outcome of this article. 5.1

Legitimations

One would expect the answers to why questions to legitimize a certain point of view. Legitimations thus substantiate normative claims. From the perspective of sociology of knowledge one can distinguish between an explanatory and a justificatory function of legitimations. The explanatory function demonstrates the cognitive validity of actual meanings. The justificatory function assigns normative dignity to practised imperatives (Berger & Luckmann 1967, 63–146). From the perspective of ethical theory an analogous distinction can be made by arguing the significance of normative claims. A criterion of explanatory adequacy is necessary to determine why and how normative claims have psychological and social effects. This criterion accounts for the influence that normativeness has as soon as it is put into practice. A criterion of justificatory adequacy is needed to prove that these normative claims are substantiated by valid arguments. Thus this criterion vouches for the necessity to act according to these normative claims. Though explanatory and justificatory claims in normative theory can easily be confused, one should not dichotomize them but integrate them in a theory that respects the specific validity of each claim (Korsgaard 1996, 10–21). Can empirical research, in this case pastoral ministry research, offer legitimations? According to the aforementioned distinctions one

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might say that empirical research in theology can contribute to explanations adequate for normative argument and that these explanations can be ethically validated and generalized to justify multi-perspective assent to the normative claim. I illustrate this with an example from my own pastoral ministry research and its ethical reflection. 5.2

Explanations

In explaining the support for various professionalization aims in pastoral ministry, I took attitudes towards pastoral ministry as predictors. Four professionalization aims were included. The first was competence development, directed to enhancing both the knowledge and skills of the professional group. A vast majority (95%) supports this objective, whereas 5% is doubtful. The second was a strategy to stimulate the practical utility of labour aims by attuning labour tasks to clients’ needs and interests. This aim is supported by a majority of the pastors (82%); only a very small minority rejects this strategy (3%) and 15% is unsure whether to agree or not. The third aim was remunerative representation of interests, marked by trade union characteristics reflecting the need to promote the employment interests of pastors. This strategy is supported by 33% of the pastors and is rejected by 33%, whereas 34% is unsure. Finally, the collective power aim refers to the need for ecclesiastic influence by pastors as a professional group. More than half the pastors (56%) approves of such a strategy, whereas a minority (15%) disapproves and 28% is doubtful. Can these attitudes be explained by the normative views reflected in the theology of pastoral ministry? To find out what views underlie the various aspects of pastoral ministry I performed a second order factor analysis on all of the pastoral ministry scales. Four views of pastoral office were identified (Schilderman 1998, 158–169; 303–313). The orthodox view includes all scales that emphasize the prerogatives of church authority and doctrine. It is supported by 23% of the pastors, rejected by 33% and questioned by 44%. The communitarian view of pastoral office refers to theological attitudes that stress the priority of local church communities. A large majority (89%) of the pastors are attracted by this view, 1% rejects it and 10% is doubtful. The third view is relational in that it combines four role images of the pastor that stress the significance of personal contact in ministry. Half the pastors (52%) doubts this view of their office, while

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24% supports it and 24% rejects it. Finally there is a view that stresses the religious significance of pastoral ministry. This religious view is supported by a large majority of pastors (85%); 14% doubts it and 1% rejects it. Do the views of the pastoral office in fact help to explain the support for professionalization aims? To answer this question a regression analysis was conducted, in which these views were taken as independent variables to predict attitudes towards professionalization as the dependent variable. A glance at the table below immediately shows that legitimation can assume three values. Professionalization can be predicted positively, as in the case of the religious and relational views and, most strongly, the communitarian view. This table supports the hypothesis that professionalization can be theologically legitimized from pastors’ point of view. By contrast an orthodox view in most cases predicts negative support for professionalization. Here one can hypothesize that theology may also de-legitimize support for professionalization. Finally, there can be no prediction at all, as in the case of the prediction of the collective power aim from a relational or religious view of pastoral office. Thus sometimes theological views of pastoral office show indifference to developmental strategies. Of course, this explanation depends greatly on the context (Dutch Roman Catholicism in the 1990s), the social and institutional view (of pastors), the method (a quantitative survey); it also leaves a lot of surplus (unexplained) meaning (by opting for limited concepts and scales). But this in fact highlights the point I want to make in this article, namely the need to be as modest and as precise as possible; and thus to clarify empirically the where and when, who and how questions in empirical research of normative claims. Professionalization aims

Regression analysis: Professionalization aims (dependent) Views of pastoral office (independent) Orthodox view Communitarian view Relational view Religion view R2

Knowledge and skills

.29 .13 .12

Value-in-use

Remunerative representation of interests

Collective power

–.11 .24 .10 .20 .16

–.42 .20 .11

–.24 .26

.26

.14

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Justifications

Transposing the question of legitimation from the perspective of explanation to the perspective of justification calls for caution. Normative claims cannot be justified simply by offering an empirical explanation. This naturalistic fallacy confuses actual support of normative claims with its foundation in ethical argumentation, which in certain circumstances could very well point in diametrically opposite directions. On the other hand, one can endeavour to find out if and to what extent explanations can be ethically validated, especially in the sense that they warrant multi-perspective assent to the normative claim. There is a host of justifications to support legitimation, such as freedom, equality, justice and solidarity, to mention just a few. In empirical research in theology these values or norms can be studied in terms of their support in various contexts. One can also employ justificatory views to draw up an evaluative framework for interpreting empirical results of explanatory research. In my own research I employed the ethical principle of subsidiarity from the social doctrine of the church to determine to what extent the strong and broad communitarian support of professionalization that I found among pastors can be reconciled with an orthodox view of the church. By arguing from the ethical principle of subsidiarity one can demonstrate that increased professionalism attuned to shared values of church communities may offer a legitimate basis to make an argued appeal for a certain sense of autonomy. Elsewhere I clarified the relevance of this notion to pastoral ministry (Schilderman 1998, 215–224; Schilderman, Van der Ven & Felling 1999, 82–85). Thus, while there are opportunities to empirically describe, compare and explain justificatory aspects of legitimations, one can also evaluate descriptions, comparisons and explanations from a justificatory perspective. This twofold use of empirical research has implications for future research into pastoral ministry. 5.4

Outlook

Having sketched some approaches to the where and when, who, how and why questions implicit in normative claims in pastoral ministry research, I hope to have provided a multifaceted view of pastoral ministry. I also hope to have illustrated the relevance of empirical research in pastoral ministry as an aid to answering these questions.

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Normative claims in pastoral ministry vary with time and context. Empirical research in theology is one of the ways to describe and compare the characteristics of these settings by showing the variety and influence of the social location of normative claims. Normative claims in pastoral ministry differ according to the social and institutional actors and the religious imagery that they employ to link worldly and sacred meanings. Empirical research in theology can identify these actors and their interaction and clarify the codes they use. Normative claims are validated by means of different procedures, to all of which empirical research in theology can contribute by way of insight into their instrumental characteristics, conditions and effects. Finally, normative claims in pastoral ministry may function in explanations of core issues in pastoral ministry and facilitate evaluations of the practices related to these issues. Again, empirical research in theology can clarify these functions of normative claims while simultaneously exploring the results of these explanations. Developing a theology of ministry in this way presents a fruitful challenge for empirical theology in the decades to come. References Artigas, M. (1999). The ethical Nature of Karl Popper’s Theory of Knowledge. Including Popper’s unpublished comments on Bartley and critical rationalism. Bern: Peter Lang. Berger, P.L., Luckmann, Th. (1967). The social construction of reality. A treatise in the sociology of knowledge. Garden City (N.Y.): Doubleday. Burke T. (1983), The Philosophy of Popper. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Burtchaell, J. (1995). From Synagogue to Church. Public services and offices in the earliest Christian communities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Dembski, W.A. & Richards, J.W. (2001). Unapologetic Apologetics. Meeting the Challenges of Theological Studies. Downers Grove, Ill.: Intervarsity Press. Etzioni, A. (1975). A Comparative Analysis of Complex Organizations. On Power, Involvement, and Their Correlates. New York: Free Press; London: Collier Macmillan Publishers. Griffith, P.J. (1991). An Apology for Apologetics. A Study in the Logic of Interreligious Dialogue. New York: Orbis Books. Jarvie, I. (1999). Popper’s Ideal types: open and closed, abstract and concrete societies. In I. Jarvie & S. Pralong (Eds), Popper’s open Society after fifty Years. The continuing Relevance of Karl Popper. (71–82) London, New York: Routledge. Jarvie, I. & Pralong, S. (Eds) (1999). Popper’s open Society after fifty Years. The continuing Relevance of Karl Popper. London, New York: Routledge. Korsgaard, C.M. (1996). The normative Question. In: O’Neill (ed.). The Sources of Normativeness. Cambridge: Camvridge University Press. 1996, 7–48. Leys, A. (1995). Ecclesiological Impacts of the Principle of Subsidiarity (dissertation Nijmegen). Kampen. Link, E. (1955). Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip. Sein Wesen und seine Bedeutung für die Sozialethik. Freiburg: Herder.

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Nell-Breuning, O. von (1990). Baugesetze der Gesellschaft: Solidarität und Subsidiarität. Freiburg: Herder. O’Hear (1980). Karl Popper. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul. Popper, K. (1964). The Poverty of Historicism. New York: Harper & Row. —— (1973). The open Society and its Enemies. Routledge & Kegan Paul: London. Schilderman, J., Visscher, C.A.M., Ven, J.A. van der & Felling, A.J.A. (1995). Pastorale bekwaamheid als kerkelijke survivalstrategie. [Pastoral competence as an ecclesiastic survival strategy.] Praktische theologie 22 (2), 21–43 (141–63). Schilderman, J. (1998). Pastorale professionalisering. Een empirisch-theologisch onderzoek onder rooms-katholieke pastores naar de betekenis van de ambtstheologie voor de professionalisering van pastorale arbeid. [Pastoral professionalisation. An empical-theological study among Roman Catholic pastors to determine the importance of the theology of pastoral office for the professionalisation of pastoral work.] Kampen: Kok. Schilderman, J., Ven, J.A. van der & Felling, A.J.A. (1999). Professionalizing the Shepherds. Journal of Empirical theology. 12 (1), 59–90. Schilderman, J. (2001). Blazing the Trail of Empirical Theology. In H.-G. Ziebertz, H.-G., F. Schweitzer, H. Häring & D. Browning (Eds), The Human Image of God (405–433). Leiden: Brill. Schilderman, J. & Felling, A.J.A. (2003a). Sacramental Incentives in Pastoral Ministry. International Journal of Practical Theology. 7 (2), 249–276. —— (2003b). Spiritual and professional Commitment in pastoral Ministry. Studies in Spirituality. 13, 293–320. Schillebeeckx, E. (1981). Ministry, leadership in the community of Jesus Christ. New York: Crossroad. —— (1983). Theologisch geloofsverstaan anno 1983. [Theological understanding of faith in 1983.] Baarn: Nelissen. Schreurs, N. (1982). Geloofsverantwoording. Van apologetiek naar een hermeneutische theologie met apologetische inslag. [Accounting for faith. From apologetics to a hermeneutic theology with an apologetic orientation.] Nijmegen. Schneider, L. (1983). Subsidiäre Gesellschaft: implikative und analoge Aspekte eines Sozialprinzips. Paderborn: Schnöningh. Seckler, M. (1993). Apologetik (geschichtlich). In Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche. 837–842. Shearmur, J. (1996). The Political Thought of Karl Popper. London, New York: Routledge. Tormey, S. (1996). Liberalism. ‘The Problem with “Problems”: Popper, negative Utility and the open Society’. Political Studies Association, Annual Conference Papers, 642–653. Tracy, D. (1975). Blessed Rage for Order. The new Pluralism in Theology. New York: Seabury Press. —— (1981). The analogical Imagination. Christian Theology and the Culture of Pluralism. New York: Crossroad. —— (1987). Plurality and Ambiguity. Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope. London: SCM Press. Utz, A.F. (1953). Das Subsidiaritätsprinzip. Heidelberg: Kerle. Ven, J.A. van der (1990). Entwurf einer empirischen Theologie. [Practical Theology. An Empirical Approach 1993] Kampen: Kok/Weinheim: Deutscher Studien Verlag. —— (1996). Ecclesiology in Context. Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans.

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EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN PRACTICAL THEOLOGY AS A STRATEGY OF INTERVENTION U Fr. S 1. Introduction Theological research that aims to base its theories and concepts on empirical methods, that seeks not only to copy the results and definitions of reality from the human sciences but to define reality from a theological perspective on the basis of its own ‘knowledge interests’ ( J. Habermas) does not have a long history. The discussion about the use of empirical methods in theological research is full of controversies. Theological tradition is characterised by the monopolistic claim of church and theology in any definition of reality. The end of the Ptolemaic system brought about by exact astronomic measurement not only meant the beginning of modern science. The “Copernican revolution” also meant the beginning of the end of the ecclesiastical monopoly in defining reality. It was a slow and painful process, and it was marked by religious violence. The church fought vehemently against alternatives. Empirical science formed its identity and its position by contesting the church’s monopolistic claim, and to this day, it dissociates itself pointedly from a religious construction of reality. In the natural and human sciences’ struggle for independence from theology and church, the empirical methods are of great importance. Within the coordinates of time and space, scientists began to describe the animate and the inanimate world according to number, measure and weight. This new methodological approach to nature was reinforced by the knowledge interests underlying the postulates of the Enlightenment. After centuries of anti-modern condemnation on the part of the church, the Second Vatican Council finally came to terms with the “Copernican revolution” and acknowledged the methodological independence and autonomy of the natural and human sciences. The Council, however, not only debates methodology, but also takes up fundamental issues of modernity. In the Pastoral Constitution

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and in the Declaration on Religious Freedom, it acknowledges the modern postulate of freedom. By acknowledging religious freedom the post-Vatican II church is confronted with the fact that every individual is both protagonist and producer of a new construction of reality. This does not mean that the search for truth and for objective reality is suspended. But it makes possible the participation of theology as a science in a construction of reality that is free of religious violence and prohibitions against free thinking. What is the task of today’s theology? The days when theology used to doubt that empirical ways of describing reality were legitimate or reasonable are over. Even if there are still church officials who, when confronted with critical empirical data, say “Let us pray that the figures and numbers are incorrect”, it is a fact that no pastoral planning can do without results from the human sciences and church sociology. Likewise, no one any longer seriously questions the use of empirical methods of research in theology. The central question that theology has to face is: What does it understand by ‘reality’, i.e., what is its material object? How does it deal with this reality methodologically? Theology needs to investigate its access to reality using the methods that are standard in today’s investigation and construction of reality. There are numerous points of contact and overlap with the various disciplines of the human sciences and their findings. The thesis of this article* is that empirical research will be an essential part of future theological research. Since empirical research methods are a valuable means of solving controversies concerning alternative pastoral concepts, they are of fundamental importance for practical theology. The article consists of two parts: The first one presents a number of theses pertaining to the epistemological concept of a theology based on empirical methods. In the second part, an example that illustrates the conflict-solving potential of an empirical orientation in practical theology is analysed: The controversy about the future of the Christian faith-based social service agencies Caritas and Diakonie proves that empirical research can be a suitable tool for making decisions involving controversial action concepts.

* An earlier version of this chapter appeared in Journal of Empirical Theology 16 (1), 5–19.

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2. Theses Concerning the Epistemological Concept of Practical Theology 2.1

Setting a Target for Practical Theology

According to Lumen Gentium, ecclesial praxis shall be “a sacrament or . . . a sign and instrument both of a very closely knit union with God and of the unity of the whole human race” (LG 1). Man’s uniting with God is actualised in a free relationship between man and God based on love. The realisation of this relationship is compassion for suffering persons. The church will increasingly become a sacrament for the “unity of the whole human race” (LG 1) if its praxis internally, interdenominationally and interreligiously qualifies itself in free and identity-productive encounters, and if it becomes an advocate of the poorest of mankind. 2.2 The Identity Crisis of Church Praxis: Biblical Provocation and Ecclesial Reality In the Council, the “People of God” began a new dialogue with the “human family”. Man, the one and whole man, became the centre of Vatican II doctrine. Ecclesial praxis underwent profound changes in the universal Church, and even greater ones in the particular churches. The introduction of a new pastoral axiomatics resulting from the rediscovered theological anthropology led to polarisations and tensions within the church that have lasted until today. In many fields, the church is so much concerned with its own affairs that it does not carry out its mission in the service of “the unity of the whole human race”. It is the task of practical theology to emphasise the intentions of the Council and help resolve the identity crisis in ecclesial praxis. 2.3

The Material Object of Practical Theology

The material object of practical theology is the interactive process that is initiated again and again throughout history by the Spirit that “blows wherever it pleases” and by the people who are “born of the Spirit” ( John 3:8). Considering the Word of God, people start to act in the name of God; they must take care that they do not exploit or misuse the name of God for their own interests and aims. Only if the holiness of the name of God is preserved in His eschatological nature (LG 48), will He be relevant for man’s salvation.

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 .  Interaction is Content

Jesus not only talked about God’s love. His incarnation gave a concrete form to God’s love for man. For this reason, theology is actualised within the tension between word and action, content and interaction. Theological truth is always truth about Jesus Christ. Its existential truth becomes concrete empirically and incarnatively only in action, that is, theological truth implies more than the mere reformulation of doctrine. In religious praxis of faith, interaction amalgamates substantially with content. Interaction becomes content if action implicitly testifies love. Church praxis is counterproductive if its actions contradict the teachings of the Bible. 2.5

Practical Theology and the Other Theological Disciplines

Practical theology must qualify itself functionally and methodologically as an independent discipline within theology. It can do this by – making sure that church praxis corresponds to the action-guiding intentions of the gospel (cf. Mark 8:33); – ensuring that church praxis actually reaches the people, who have a right to be perceived in the name of Jesus Christ (cf. Matthew 25:31–46). – serving the union with God and the “the unity of the whole human race”. Practical theology must identify (and communicate with) people and groups who show by their actions the presence of the Spirit promised by the Father, the Spirit that “blows wherever it pleases” (cf. John 3:8). 2.6

Dimensions of Church Praxis

The presented definition of the material object of practical theology presupposes the term ‘interaction’. It is both about the interaction between God and man and the interaction between people, the latter being qualified by the former. Every actualisation of the church implies that by the church’s evangelisation this process of interaction is initiated again and again from one generation to the next. The term ‘interaction’ modifies traditional heteronomous concepts of “imparting faith”, of “religious socialization” or of “passing on faith”, which concentrated on dogmatic content and factual aspects. When practical theology looks at the ways in which Christians in families, parishes, associations, schools and youth groups learn to live and to believe, it necessarily assumes four dimensions:

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– a kerygmatic-material dimension (‘what?’); – a didactic methodical dimension (‘how?’); – a personal-interactional dimension (‘for whom?’): the context of forms/cultures of encounter and communication in which people live and transmit their faith ; – a sociocultural dimension (‘where?’): the context in which people live. Between these dimensions, there are overlaps and interdependencies. It is particularly important to consider the means-end relation. 2.7 Evaluation of Praxis ‘in the Name of Jesus Christ’ Within and Outside of the Church The formal object of practical theology is not only the church’s actualisation ‘in the name of Jesus Christ’ but also the actions of individuals and groups ‘in His name’. Practical theology must take into consideration that there are individuals and groups who refer to the gospel and to Jesus Christ in their actions without being committed to the church. In every historical situation, the gospel of Jesus Christ must be realised anew in word and action. Consequently, practical theology must pay special attention to the foundations and to the evaluation of both ecclesiastical and other forms of praxis ‘in His name’. 2.8

Research Methods in Practical Theology

The material object of practical theology is the interaction process that is set off time and again by the gospel of Jesus (cf. 2.3). From a formal point of view, practical theology can use empirical methods and/or those of the humanities. In practical-theological material objects, both dimensions can be found: those that can be described with the help of empirical methods, but also those that cannot be grasped empirically. It is practical theology’s task to investigate both dimensions of practical-theological material objects. 2.8.1 Evaluation of Ecclesial Praxis and the Dialogue with the Human Sciences The current social interaction process caused by the gospel of Jesus Christ can only be perceived properly if the whole spectrum of theses and conclusions from the field of human sciences research is included. The specific task of theological research serves to critically

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examine the diverse conclusions concerning the consequences of this interaction process and to confront them with Jesus Christ’s precepts according to the gospel. Theology must not ignore non-theological hypotheses and theories about the causes and consequences of this ecclesial praxis; it should be aware of these hypotheses and theories, critically discuss them and, if possible, clarify them. 2.8.2 Knowledge Interests of Practical Theology The theology-specific characteristic of such research projects consists in theologically justified knowledge interests. Such knowledge interests are present if: – terms and categories from the social sciences are analysed with regard to theological material objects (categorial analysis); – concepts from the social sciences are examined with regard to their basic assumptions (axiomatic analysis); – a theologian presents new designs and dimensions for theological material objects on the basis of his own faith-based knowledge interests and investigates their empirical validity (empirical analysis). 2.8.3 Integration of Research Methods from the Human Sciences The individual theological disciplines have shaped and will continue to shape their methodological identity by adopting methods from non-theological disciplines in order to be able to examine specific theories and integrating them into theology. A certain fixation in theology (and hence also in practical theology) on historical sediments of the interaction process initiated by the gospel of Jesus Christ has led to a primacy of historio-critical and hermeneutic methods. This methodological fixation is one reason why practical-theological research does not always adequately perceive the presence of the aforementioned interaction process. The consequence of this is a lack of theological rationality when developing pastoral plans for the future. In most cases, theses of non-theological disciplines can be clarified only if theological research adopts the methods of these disciplines and applies them to its own theological material objects.

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3. An Intervention: Controversies About the Future Structure of Diaconia in the Church For several years now, the Catholic and Protestant churches in Germany have been involved in an intense debate over the church’s central task of diaconia as well as the ecclesiastical character of Caritas (Deutscher Caritasverband) and Diakonie (Diakonisches Werk der Evangelischen Kirche Deutschlands), the social service institutions of the Roman Catholic and Protestant churches respectively (cf. Deutscher Caritasverband 1985; 1987). Although the process of cultural pluralisation and individualisation has led to an apparent loss in the importance of worship and church membership, making religious praxis more and more a private matter, the churches’ charitable services are still appreciated (cf. Zerfaß 1992a; Steinkamp 1994; Bach 1991; Fuchs 1993). Diakonie and Caritas show people who are no longer interested in liturgy and the sacraments that the churches are still useful for some things. The fact that society has distanced itself from religion has only had a minimal impact on the acceptance of the churches’ social and charitable involvement. For the Protestant Church, Martin Ruhfuß states that “Diaconia contributes substantially to the church’s acceptance in society. Without diaconia, the loss of relevance of the parish would be considerably bigger” (Ruhfuß 1991, p. 18). Yet this development is observed critically both inside and outside the churches. Cardinal Karl Lehmann already warned against the instrumentalisation of Caritas and Diakonie (Lehmann 1994, p. 21). Are the churches mutating into ‘social service companies’, their services increasingly interchangeable with those of secular agencies? Gronemeyer speaks of the churches’ “social belly” that keeps getting fatter, and their “theological legs” that keep getting thinner. Given the contemporary crisis of relevance and acceptance of the churches, is it up to the full-time employees of Caritas and Diakonie to rescue, by their praxis, the identity of the church, while at the same time the faith-based identity of the employees is questioned? Social science and theological research have produced a great variety of conclusions about Caritas, its history, its relation to the church and the parishes, and its employees’ motivations and ways of thinking and acting. Far too often, however, these conclusions are mere speculation. In addition, some analyses and explanatory models from social science have to be contradicted from a theological point of view. Is it correct, for instance, to explain the development of Caritas

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from an organisation-theory perspective only within the context of the general evolution of social services, without considering the impact of new concepts of church and diaconia? 3.1

Key Issues from a Social Research Perspective

The most important and most influential model for the relationship of organized social work to the other actualisations of the church was developed by Niklas Luhmann (cf. Luhmann 1973). His analysis starts with pre-modern cultures, where there was still a direct, personal network of interdependence and help. Luhmann develops a structural logic for systems in a modern society based on the principle of the division of labour. In his social system, subsystems are structured according to their particular function and their particular achievement for the system. Religion is such a subsystem. According to Luhmann, the function of religion is to explain the unexplainable in order to overcome the problem of contingency, while its achievement for society is diaconia. The shortcoming of this kind of diaconia turns out to be that ”socio-structural problems are perceived in a personalized form, that is, in connection with particular persons (which, in a way, also means that they are not perceived as sociostructural problems at all)” (Luhmann 1982, p. 58). According to this concept, church diaconia does not actually deal with the social causes of poverty: it does not get beyond a treatment of the symptoms. Those who have read the 1992 poverty study (“Armutsstudie”) of the Deutscher Caritasverband and recall the processes that church action groups in Latin America, Africa, the Philippines and the former GDR were involved in during the last quarter of a century will soon recognise the limitations of this concept. It becomes apparent that in diaconia the churches and their organisations do most certainly deal with political causes of social problems and aim at structural solutions. Their work, however, is characterised by a different understanding of religion than Luhmann’s. According to Luhmann, religion has to “stick to what it is familiar with, transform contingencies and qua diaconia and pastoral care have a healing impact on society” (Dallmann 1994, p. 192; cf. Welker 1985, p. 108). Yet, it must be admitted that the expectations and preferences of large parts of the Catholic population show a similar tendency. In the Allensbach study of church membership decline, respondents were asked what church tax revenue should be spent on. At the top of the list were

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the services of Caritas, while activities concerned with structural solutions to social problems were at the bottom: “political education” was chosen by 3 per cent, and “support for political liberation movements” by 4 per cent of respondents (Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach 1993; cf. Schmälzle 1995). At this point the question arises of how full-time employees of Caritas see themselves and their relationship to the church. At the same time, the concept of diaconia becomes a key issue, which also requires an answer from a theological perspective. Lately, social scientists have begun analysing potential intentions and motives of the church’s involvement in social work. The underlying assumption is that the church is trying to “compensate for the weaknesses of spiritual and intellectual communication” through its charitable work (Wagner 1991, p. 240). Horst Herrmann goes even further: He questions the willingness to stick to Christian charity and thereby the Christian motivation in general: “The type of pastoral care that is loudly marketed as being for the benefit of everyone only in order to ensure that it is financed by everyone is an extremely dubious occupation. Pastoral care is for the benefit of a lobby that is altruistic only in a most limited sense. If the ways of thinking and acting of this lobby are examined more closely, they are revealed—historically as well as currently—as being most questionable” (Herrmann 1993, p. 150). This is no longer a detailed analysis of the social and religious evolution of Caritas but a general attack on the church’s social work. Of course, theses like these are taken up by all those groups and institutions that are competing with Caritas on the social services market. According to Michael N. Ebertz, the current attempts by the state to regulate welfare and health matters are resulting in the growing alienation of Caritas and its employees from the church (Ebertz 1996, p. 44). Ebertz summarizes the results of current research as follows: – loss of an explicitly Christian motivation among Caritas employees (cf. Nübel 1994, pp. 27f.) – neglect of religious denomination by those responsible for the recruitment process (cf. Blum 1991, p. 31) – dominance of the criteria of professional training, specialisation and competence in the recruitment process (cf. Nachbauer 1991, p. 391) – identity crises in the religious life of employees (cf. Degen 1994, p. 3)

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Ebertz’ bibliographical references show how fragile the empirical database for these observations and analyses is. Moreover, if one considers how these theses are taken up and by whom, and which conclusions can be rashly drawn from them, the importance of a representative study among employees and management of Caritas becomes immediately clear. It is only the results of such a study that can provide empirical evidence for Ebertz’ prescription for Caritas and the church: The representatives of Diakonie and Caritas are challenged to investigate whether (and to what extent) these elements of their previous identity [. . .], their denominational character and their ecclesiastical integrity as well as their social involvement based on democratic internal structures and honorary activity, should be part of their future structure. (Ebertz 1996, p. 50)

3.2

Man is the Way for the Church: Overcoming the Diaconal Blackout

Luhmann defines religion as a “system of spiritual communication” (cf. Luhmann 1982, pp. 56ff.) in which man by ritual action tries to cope with that which is unexplainable in the world. Here, diaconia is understood as a service that has nothing to do with the religion per se, which raises the general question of the underlying concept of ‘diaconia’. The distinction between diaconia and the spiritual realisation of faith corresponds to a pre-Vatican II concept of religion and diaconia. Studies on the concept of the offices of Teacher, Shepherd and High Priest prior to the Second Vatican Council have been summarised by Martin Lehner: “The doctrine of the three offices of Teacher, Shepherd and High Priest corresponds to an oblivion of diaconia in pastoral theology, which leads to a loss of diaconia in the church” (Lehner 1994, p. 43). The conciliary turn was brought about by a new reflection upon the diaconal real presence of Christ in the world (cf. Mt. 25:31–46). Before the Council, actualisation of the church was concentrated on Eucharistic real presence and on the ministerial or hierarchical priesthood (‘sacerdos ministerialis’, PO 2). The participation of the laity in the priestly, prophetic and kingly functions of the church was already postulated by Yves Congar (1952) and Ferdinand Klostermann before the Second Vatican Council. The Council adopted this theology and confirmed it in the Dogmatic Constitution of the Church (cf. LG 31). On this basis, a consensus was developed between systematic and practical theologians as regards the central tasks of the

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church, which Walter Kasper and Karl Lehmann described as follows: “Basically, there are three essential tasks of the church: preaching the Word, sacramental praxis and the service of charity” (Deutsche Bischofskonferenz 1970, p. 69). Since then, liturgy, teaching and diaconia have been the essential dimensions of Christian and church actualisation. This theology was definitely not developed in order to compensate for spiritual and religious deficits. The church accepts these deficits only when it is necessary in order to carry through Vatican II’s reforms. It wants to be open to “the joys and the hopes, the griefs and the anxieties” not only of Christians but of all men. At the same time, it has developed a pastoral program that aims to make man the way for the church.—This program contains a vision! The Council members’ intention is “to make ourselves the neighbor of every person without exception, and of actively helping him when he comes across our path.” (GS 27). This blows up the pre-Vatican II view of church and world. At the same time, the Council appreciates human rights, and in the doctrine of the common priesthood of the faithful (LG 10–13) it confirms the responsibility of all baptised people for the actualisation of the church. This new ‘option for man’ is justified christologically: “Whoever follows after Christ, the perfect man, becomes himself more of a man.” (GS 41,1). With respect to the praxis of the church, this means that “the Church, therefore, by virtue of the Gospel committed to her, proclaims the rights of man; she acknowledges and greatly esteems the dynamic movements of today by which these rights are everywhere fostered.” (GS 43,3). In his encyclical Redemptor Hominis, John Paul II considers this ‘program’ in great detail: “Since this man is the way for the Church, the way for her daily life and experience, for her mission and toil, the Church of today must be aware in an always new manner of man’s ‘situation’.” (RH 14). With declarations like these, the church once and for all gives up its role as a consoler in history’s valley of tears. Instead, it joins all those people and organisations that are worried about the future of man and mankind; it begins to develop a theology and a pastoral concept that is able to take up this challenge. In Luhmann’s terminology the church has developed a new code for its religious self-concept and its pastoral actualisation. The dissonances between preaching and charity are resolved, as are the dissonances between sociostructural and personal forms of helping. Henning Luther refers to the pastoral praxis resulting from this code as “diaconal pastoral

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care”. By that he means “a way of realizing the ‘communication of the gospel’. ‘Communication of the gospel’ has an altogether ‘healing’ (‘soteriological’) characteristic: It is all about a liberating objection to ‘man’s self-destruction’ (E. Lange), in favour of ‘another’ succeeding life ‘in the light of the promise’ (E. Lange). The devotional characteristic of the gospel is an altogether liberating help. Everyone is in need of this ‘help’” (Luther 1988, pp. 475f.). Vatican II theology is the attempt to renovate the whole building of the church and its theology. A quarter of a century after the Council, this theology is reflected in the particular churches and in their institutions, associations and organisations. The renovation of ‘the whole building’ thereby also includes the internal structure of particular churches. Yet, great problems for this internal renovation result from the fact that the Council faces the problems of mankind in a general way but refrains from defining precisely the consequences of this programme for the different pastoral situations in different particular churches. Caritas has accepted to participate in this learning process. It has tried to redefine its relationship to society and to the church and to keep its own identity. Therefore, the process of the transformation of official goals into institutional praxis needs to be assessed to determine whether and how they consider the context of the Vatican II program of reform (cf. Schmälzle 2001). 3.3

Alternatives of a Future Development

Considering the present problems surrounding Caritas, mere speculation will lead nowhere. The internal pressure demands real reform. The reform programme is based on four principles that have been confirmed by research on social and structural change in organisations and institutions: – A system constantly interacts with its environment. – A system constantly has to clarify its goals and try to reach these goals. – A system can secure its future if, on the basis of given goals, it manages to constantly reproduce itself. It must ensure that it both maintains its own identity and remains open to change. – Maintaining a system’s identity is only possible if a system is willing to openly discuss conflicts of values, and manages to preserve its internal cohesion during the conflict.

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At present, two models are under discussion: 1. If the church is to survive, it will have to distance itself from the associative structure of Caritas. The Caritas institutions must be made independent and autonomous. The sooner the church succeeds in finding its way back to its specific religious actualisation, i.e. worship and preaching, the sooner it will also succeed in overcoming the present loss of identity and relevance. This line of argument is employed by fundamentalist groups within the church. Yet it is also used by those social scientists who advocate a radical secularisation of the churches’ charitable and diaconal services. 2. The churches must try to reinforce the Christian profile of Caritas and Diakonie, so that their institutions can maintain the particular identity that distinguishes them from other welfare organisations. Here, the question arises as to how a specifically Christian intent of concrete welfare and social work can be distinguished from other motivations, and whether such a distinction is even necessary. Also, considering the practical constraints of a large institution, the existing employee-employer relationships and the internal structure among the staff, it is debatable how such an image-building could be realised at all. So far, advocates of these options can be found among both denominations. In Catholic research, the first option was most plainly illustrated by Heinrich Pompey, whose model propagates the ”separation of Caritas domains” and the “handing over of Caritas agencies” to secular institutions. The aim of this model is to “cultivate decisively ecclesiastical institutions” (Pompey 1992). Similarly, Götz Harbsmeier argues that the work of the Diakonisches Werk makes the church a service industry where Christian love is exploited in order to legitimise the church’s existence in today’s society. Harbsmeier is concerned about saving worship and liturgy, too: “Faith and worship appear to be relics of former times when compared with the effectiveness of welfare and its direct use” (Harbsmeier 1977, p. 14). Far more differentiated in his judgement is Jürgen Moltmann, who rejects all of the accusations against Diakonie and Caritas. Instead, he argues that their conditions are such because in the Christian church, diaconia has fallen into oblivion: “Professional diaconia inevitably has to suffer from the question whether and to what extent it is ‘Christian’, since it is a compensation for parishes without any diaconia at all” (Moltmann 1984, p. 37).

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In Catholic theology, Rolf Zerfaß has become an advocate of the second alternative, and there is no doubt whatsoever that by initiating the discussion about the transformation of official goals into institutional praxis Caritas has decided in favour of this option. According to Zerfaß, there are four central questions: – – – –

Where do we come from? In which direction do we want to go? What does our environment look like? What can we change?

Zerfaß is of the opinion that “as long as the representatives of the institutions do not discuss these four questions with their employees (as the ones immediately affected) and answer them (to the best of their ability), new official goals of ‘the’ Caritas as such cannot be developed” (Zerfaß 1992b, p. 34). The focus of both options is on the employees of Caritas. In his model, Pompey tacitly and manifestly assumes that an “in-house identity” of the staff is “absent or at least not cultivated” (Pompey 1992, p. 12), and that many employees have become alienated from religion and the church. He states, “The lack of clarity in the recruitment process for church service, the lack of an introduction to the ‘philosophy’ of the association as well as to the fundamental aspects of identification with the church’s mission, the lack of knowledge even of some employers in the church lead to the above-mentioned conflicts. They are intensified by the fact that the competence to solve conflicts is in many cases missing” (Pompey 1992, p. 22). Statements like these radically criticise the legitimation of Diakonie and Caritas. It means that the theological controversy has reached a stage where dialogue is no longer possible unless it is based on empirical data. It also means that everything has to be done to help maintain the identity of the organisations: Openly discussing the conflicts that have to be solved is an important measure. Up to now, the focus has been mainly on the employees. This means that those who are in charge—whose task it is to develop new ideas—are not called to account. In this context, Zerfaß emphasises the diaconal character of management within the institution as the entirety of measures that make a praxis of diaconia possible (Zerfaß 1996, p. 12). If at all levels of the institution the employees are confronted with many different and dissimilar theological principles and goals, disorientation and demotivation must inevitably result. These controversies

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about the theological profile require people who have the courage to resolve conflicts, with the ability to develop workable perspectives for the future, and who do not shy away from making clear decisions. 4. The Empirical Facts: Summary Religious and ecclesiastical identity of the employees were analysed according to the following dimensions: 1. What meaning does belief in God have in terms of the employees’ practical work? (vertical dimension) 2. What do employees understand by ‘diaconia’? (horizontal-diaconal dimension) 3. How do you understand your work in relation to other pastoral fields of action in parish and church? (ecclesiological dimension) The results of the interviews of the Caritas employees can only be summarised here. They are presented in the article “Mitarbeiter verwirklichen Kirche” (Schmälzle 1997b). a. Faith and Work One question in the interview was: “How important is it for you to be able to integrate your faith into your work?” Of the total, 57% of Caritas employees considered this to be important, 27% considered it not quite so important, and 10% considered it not important at all. It is remarkable that patterns of attitudes differed among the age groups. Less than half of the respondents stated: “Faith gives me the strength to do my job.” b. The Option for the Poor is Missing While about two thirds of the Caritas employees who are committed to the church are satisfied with the status quo Caritas has reached in fulfilling its ‘option for the poor’ so far, employees who have either a critical or a distanced attitude towards the church are not at all satisfied with the status quo. The figures clearly prove that it is incorrect to say that for the so-called ‘critical’ and ‘distanced’ employees the praxis of Christian discipleship is irrelevant. On the contrary, an essential element of their criticism seems to be that the church does not show enough sense of responsibility towards people in need, and defines its identity too much from orthodoxy (liturgy and the sacraments), so that orthopractical diaconal fields of action are neglected.

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c. The Diaconal Profile of the Institutional Church Answers to the question of whether respondents feel supported by the parishes and the church revealed considerable differences between younger and older employees. Notably, however, across all age groups only one out of every ten employees actually reported feeling supported by the institutional church. In my opinion, these figures are alarming. It is not only the employees who have to engage in an open discussion concerning the official goals of the institution, but the institutional church needs to find ways of overcoming the present oblivion of diaconia. The data proves unambiguously that the Caritas employees feel left alone and deserted by the institutional church. It seems to me that this is one of the most important results of this survey. According to the survey, the profile of Caritas employees is as follows: They feel responsibility for people in need, they defend the cause of the marginalised in society, and they try to integrate their faith into their work. There is no reason whatsoever to doubt the ‘Christian’ identity of Caritas and to exclude its different organisations from the church. Translated by Robert Gibbels. Thanks to Barbara Schultz for her corrections. References Bach, U. (1991). Getrenntes wird versöhnt. Wider den Sozialrassismus in Theologie und Kirche [From segregation to reconciliation. Against social racism in theology and in the church]. Neukirchen-Vluyn. Blum, H. (1991). Klinikum. Tagebuchnotizen einer Ärztin [Clinic. Diary of a woman doctor]. Freiburg/Br. Congar, Y. (1952). Der Laie. Entwurf einer Theologie des Laientums [The layman. Outline of a theology of the laity]. Stuttgart. Dallmann, H.-U. (1994). Die Systemtheorie Niklas Luhmanns und ihre theologische Rezeption [The systems theory of Niklas Luhmann and its theological reception]. StuttgartBerlin-Köln. Degen, J. (1994). Zur Identität der Diakonie [On diaconal identity]. DiakonieKorrespondenz, 1–8. Deutsche Bischofskonferenz (Ed.) (1970). Pastoral. Handreichung für den pastoralen Dienst, Bd. 1: Die Heilssendung der Kirche in der Gegenwart [Doing pastoral work. Recommendations for pastoral service. Vol. 1: The Church’s salvific mission in the present day]. Mainz. Deutscher Caritasverband (Ed.) (1985). Der ekklesiologische Ort der Diakonie. Zur gemeindebildenden Funktion und Bedeutung der Diakonie heute [The ecclesiological place of diaconia. On the community-building function and importance of diaconia today] (DCV Materialien 5). Freiburg/Br.

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—— (Ed.) (1987). Diakonische Praxis und Praktische Theologie. Zur gesellschaftlichen Wirksamkeit der Diakonie [Diaconal praxis and practical theology. On the societal impact of diaconia] (DCV Materialien 10). Freiburg/Br. —— (Ed.) (1997). Meinungsbild Caritas: Die Allensbacher Studien zum Leitbildprozeß [Caritas: The Allensbach studies on the process of leitbild development.] R. Köcher (Ed.), Bd. 1: Ergebnisse [Vol. 1: Results]; E. Baldas, J.M. Gleich & U.Fr. Schmälzle (Eds.), Bd. 2: Perspektiven [Vol. 2 Perspectives]; E. Baldas, J.M. Gleich, R. Köcher & U.Fr. Schmälzle (Eds.), Bd. 3: Tabellarische Ergebnisse [Vol. 3: Tables]. Freiburg/Br. Ebertz, M.N. (1996). ‘Leitbildnerei’ in sozialen Dienstleistungsorganisationen. Über den Zwang zur Selbsthematisierung von organisierter Diakonie und Caritas [The tyranny of the mission statement in social service organizations]. In R. Öhlschläger & H.-M. Brüll (Eds.), Unternehmen Barmherzigkeit. Identität und Wandel sozialer Dienstleistung. Rahmenbedingungen—Perspektiven—Praxisbeispiele [Operation Compassion. Identity and change in the social services. Conditions—perspectives—practical examples] (39–51). Baden-Baden. Fuchs, O. (1993). Ämter für eine Kirche der Zukunft. Ein Denkanstoß [Offices for a church of the future]. Lucerne. Harbsmeier, G. (1977). Glaube und Werke in der totalen Arbeitswelt [Faith and works in a work-oriented world]. Neuenkirchen. Herrmann, H. (1993). Die Caritaslegende. Wie die Kirchen die Nächstenliebe vermarkten [The caritas legend. How the churches market brotherly love]. Hamburg. Institut für Demoskopie Allensbach (1993). Begründungen und tatsächliche Gründe für einen Austritt aus der katholischen Kirche [ Justifications and real reasons for leaving the Catholic Church]. Allensbach. Lehmann, K. (1994). Nachwort [Afterword]. In: G. Schmied, Kirchenaustritt als abgebrochener Tausch. Analyse von Lebenslaufinterviews im Rhein-Main-Raum [Leaving the Church as an unfinished exchange. Analysis of biographical interviews in the Rhine-Main area] (Bischöfl. Ordinariat) (21). Mainz. Lehner, M. (1994). Das Bett des Prokrustes. Systematisierungsversuche in der Pastoraltheologie [The Procrustean bed. Attempts at systematisation in pastoral theology]. Orientierung, 58(4), 41–45. Luhmann, N. (1973). Formen des Helfens im Wandel gesellschaftlicher Bedingungen [Forms of helping in a changing society]. In A.-U. Otto & S. Schneider (Eds.), Gesellschaftliche Perspektiven der Sozialarbeit (1. Halbband) [Societal perspectives in social work (1st half-volume)] (21–43). Neuwied-Berlin. —— (1982). Funktion der Religion [The function of religion]. 2Frankfurt/M. Luther, H. (1988). Diakonische Seelsorge [Diaconal ministry and pastoral care]. Wege zum Menschen, 40, 475–484. Nachbauer, K. (1991). Berufliche Mitarbeit in der Caritas—Bedingungen, Bedarf, Motive [Working for Caritas—Conditions, requirements, motivations]. Caritas ’91. Freiburg/ Br., 389–397. Nübel, H.U. (1994). Die neue Diakonie. Teilhabe statt Preisgabe. Mitarbeiterinnen und Mitarbeiter kommen zu Wort [The new diaconia. Sharing, not surrender. Employees speak]. Freiburg/Br. Moltmann, J. (1984). Diakonie im Horizont des Reiches Gottes. Schritte zum Diakonentum aller Gläubigen [Diaconia in the light of the Kingdom of God. Steps toward a diaconate of all believers]. Neukirchen-Vluyn. Pompey, H. (1992). Das Profil der Caritas und die Identität ihrer Mitarbeiter/innen [The Caritas profile and the identity of its employees]. Caritas ’93. Freiburg/Br., 11–27. Ruhfuß, M. (1991). Diakonie lernen in der Gemeinde [Learning diaconia in the community]. Rothenburg. Schmälzle, U.Fr. (1995). Zur diakonalen Dimension der Allensbacher Kirchenaustrittsstudie [The diaconal dimension of the Allensbach study on church-leaving]. Caritas ’96, 244–255.

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—— (1997a). Auf dem Weg zur Überwindung der Diakonievergessenheit in der nachkonziliaren Kirche und Theologie: Der Kontext der Mitarbeiterstudie [Steps to overcoming the forgetting of diaconia in the post-conciliar church and theology: The context of the employee study]. In Deutscher Caritasverband (Ed.), Meinungsbild Caritas: Die Allensbacher Studien zum Leitbildprozeß. E. Baldas, J.M. Gleich & U.Fr. Schmälzle (Eds.), Bd. 2: Perspektiven. (39–51). Freiburg/Br. —— (1997b). Mitarbeiter verwirklichen Kirche [Employees creating the reality of the church. In Deutscher Caritasverband (Ed.), Meinungsbild Caritas: Die Allensbacher Studien zum Leitbildprozeß. E. Baldas, J.M. Gleich & U.Fr. Schmälzle (Eds.), Bd. 2: Perspektiven (92–108). Freiburg/Br. —— (2001). Dienstleistungsqualität in den sozialen Organisationen der Kirche— ein Beitrag der katholischen Theologie [Quality of service in the social organizations of the church—a contribution of Catholic theology]. In K. Bopp & P. Neuhauser (Eds.), Theologie der Qualität—Qualität der Theologie. Theorie-Praxis-Dialog über die christliche Qualität moderner Diakonie [Theology of quality—quality of theology. The theorypraxis dialogue about the Christian quality of modern diaconia] (222–254). Freiburg/Br. Steinkamp, H. (1994). Solidarität und Parteilichkeit. Für eine neue Praxis in Kirche und Gemeinde [Solidarity and partisanship. For a new praxis in church and community]. Mainz. Wagner, F. (1991). Was ist Religion? Studien zu ihrem Begriff und Thema in Geschichte und Gegenwart [What is religion? Studies of the concept and subject in history and today]. Gütersloh. Welker, M. (1985). Die neue ‘Aufhebung der Religion’ in Luhmanns Systemtheorie [The new ‘annulment of religion’ in Luhmann’s systems theory]. In M. Welker (Ed.), Theologie und funktionale Systemtheorie. Luhmanns Religionssoziologie in theologischer Diskussion [Theology and functional systems theory. A theological discussion of Luhmann’s sociology of religion] (93–119). Frankfurt/M. Zerfaß, R. (1992a). Lebensnerv Caritas. Helfer brauchen Rückhalt [The Caritas lifeline. Supporting the helpers]. Freiburg-Basel-Wien. —— (1992b), Das Proprium der Caritas als Herausforderung an die Träger [The proprium of Caritas as a challenge to the sponsoring organizations]. Caritas ’93. Freiburg/Br., 27–40. —— (1996). Die Caritas unter dem Druck des Marktes—eine Chance zur Inkulturation des Evangeliums in unsere Gesellschaft? [Caritas under pressure from the market—an opportunity for inculturating the Gospel in our society?] In: R. Öhlschläger & H.-M. Brüll (Eds.), Unternehmen Barmherzigkeit. Identität und Wandel sozialer Dienstleistung. Rahmenbedingungen—Perspektiven—Praxisbeispiele [repetition of M.N. Ebertz (see above)] (9–24). Baden-Baden.

FREEDOM OF RELIGION AS A META-NORM. Relating Theological and Pedagogical Normativeness in Empirical Research into Religious Education P V 1. Introduction As all the articles in this volume point out, normativeness always, and inevitably, features in practical theology. Van der Ven (2002) explains that this is because practical theology is a practical science. The aim of all practical sciences, including practical theology, is to produce knowledge of human actions in order to improve them with a view to human flourishing. The nature of the practical sciences, therefore, is both normative and empirical, because knowledge of human actions can only be acquired by empirically describing people’s actual practices as well as their ideas and beliefs about these. As mentioned already, this also goes for practical theology. Practical theology is empirically oriented, because it investigates, describes and studies instances or phenomena of religious practices. In addition it has a normative orientation, because these religious practices are studied not merely to acquire knowledge about them, but also—perhaps even more so—to improve them. Thus practical theology seeks to contribute to good religious praxis, which, according to Van der Ven, is a praxis of solidarity among people as a concrete embodiment of God’s solidarity with humankind. This view of practical theology as both an empirical and a normative theological discipline is illustrated very nicely by one of the first empirical studies carried out in the field of practical theology at Nijmegen. The aim was to improve the ability of pastoral volunteers to assist mourners by way of an educational programme (cf. Vossen 1985). The actual empirical research was directed to the effects of the educational programme in order to determine whether pastoral volunteers really could be trained in this way. At the same time the study had a strong normative orientation, namely to make pastoral volunteers more competent to practise solidarity with mourners from the perspective of God’s solidarity with suffering human

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beings. This example underscores the fact that normative and empirical orientations are not opposed to each other but are really two sides of the same practical-theological research coin. However, this view is not uncontested. Above we simply assumed that normativeness in the field of practical theology is theological—a perfectly natural assumption. After all, would practical theology still be theology if it did not consider religious practices from the perspective of the Christian faith? Clearly practical theology has to do this. Still, there are instances of empirical research in practical theology—especially research into religious education—where it is at least questionable whether or not theology should be the only normative perspective. Research into religious education differs from strictly theological research in that improving the praxis of religious education is not just a theological matter: it concerns pedagogy as well. This may even cause some sort of tension between theology and pedagogy if the theological understanding of good praxis in religious education differs from the pedagogical understanding. Here we enter into the very intricate debate on the relation between theology and pedagogy, which has haunted religious pedagogics ever since (practical) theology and pedagogy became independent scientific disciplines in the second half of the 20th century. Against the background of this ongoing discussion, the thesis I shall be defending in this article is that the normativeness of empirical research into religious education cannot be the concern of theology alone. It is both theological and pedagogical. This applies, I contend, from the very beginning of a research project, when the aim and problem of the study are stated, down to the evaluation of the research results. Ziebertz (2002) maintains that normativeness plays as great a role in the context of justification as in the contexts of discovery and application. To this I would like to add that in each context a theological normative perspective is always accompanied by a pedagogical normative perspective, at least when the object of inquiry relates to religious education. This means that I need to reflect on the interrelationship between these two normative perspectives, for in view of the possible tension between theology and pedagogy, practical theologians cannot confine themselves to giving separate accounts—one theological, the other pedagogical—of what constitutes good praxis in the field of religious education. Hence I want to introduce freedom of religion as a kind of meta-norm, which,

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in my opinion, combines the theological and pedagogical normative orientations to religious education. Below I will elaborate on these notions by presenting my own theodicy research as an illustrative example (Vermeer 1999). The aim of this research was to advance an educational theory on theodicy. That is to say, by designing and empirically testing a religious education curriculum on the theodicy issue I tried to gain theoretical insight into how this subject could best be dealt with in religious education. Thus my ultimate aim was to improve the praxis of religious education, which makes this a highly pertinent example to illustrate the present discussion. I commence by briefly describing my actual research (section 2), after which I deal in more detail with the different theological and pedagogical perspectives underlying the research (section 3). Next I focus on the tension between the two perspectives which gradually emerged in the course of the study (section 4). Then I introduce freedom of religion as a useful meta-norm, especially for practical-theological study of religious education (section 5). The article ends with a few concluding remarks (section 6). 2. Theodicy Research: an Illustrative Example In this overview of my theodicy research I limit myself to a short description of the religious education curriculum I used, followed by my most important research findings. 2.1

A Curriculum on Theodicy

The religious education curriculum I used highlighted three idealtypical theodicy models as three distinct ways of coping with suffering in a religious manner. Each model was presented to students as providing a different answer to the theological dilemma of why, if God is omnipotent and perfectly good, human beings must suffer. The models were the retaliation model, which accounts for human suffering as divine punishment for sin; the plan model, based on the idea of the ultimate goodness of creation in which everything, including evil and suffering, serves God’s good purposes; and finally the compassion model, which considers suffering as inimical to a caring and compassionate God. The curriculum was designed not only to increase comprehension of these theodicy models, but also to improve students’

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ability to pass a meaningful judgment on theodicy. Thus they were presented with a dual standard of rationality, which was meant to enable and challenge them to compare different theodicy models and evaluate these in terms of plausible religious answers to the problem of human suffering (cf. also Vermeer, Vossen & Van der Ven 1991). My primary goal was to make students more competent to deal with the theodicy issue, expressed by the following educational objective of my theodicy curriculum: “The student is able to render a meaningful theodicy judgment, which means that the student comprehends three ideal-typical theodicy models and their underlying structure, that the student is aware of the function of these models in the coping process and [. . .] is able to structure the anomic experience of innocent human suffering in terms of the theological dilemma. Furthermore, the student comprehends a standard of rationality applicable to theodicy and is able to compare theodicy models [. . .] to explain which model exhibits the highest degree of rationality” (Vermeer 1999, 102–103). As this educational objective indicates, my conviction was that students’ ability to pass a personal and meaningful theodicy judgment could be enhanced by increasing their comprehension of three idealtypical theodicy models. Hence my religious education curriculum aimed at informing students about the various ways in which suffering is interpreted in the Christian tradition (theodicy comprehension), so as to enable them to arrive at a personal evaluation of the various Christian interpretations (theodicy judgment). 2.2

Research Findings

The key questions in my empirical study were the following: 1. To what extent does a curriculum based on the retaliation model, the plan model and the compassion model influence comprehension of these models? 2. To what extent does a curriculum based on the retaliation model, the plan model and the compassion model indirectly influence theodicy judgment through its influence on theodicy comprehension? To determine the effects of my theodicy curriculum on theodicy comprehension and theodicy judgment, and thus find answers to the foregoing questions, I created quasi-experimental conditions by implementing this curriculum in several classes for lower general secondary

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education at Roman Catholic schools. The field research encompassed 746 students with an average age of 15.6 years. The research design I used is known as the untreated control group design with pretest and posttest (Cook & Campbell 1979). Following this design, the experimental and control groups simultaneously underwent similar pretests and posttests for theodicy comprehension and theodicy judgment.1 Between the pretest and posttest the curriculum was implemented in the experimental group. It was then easy to determine the effects of my curriculum on theodicy comprehension and theodicy judgment with the aid of path analysis and multivariate multiple regression analysis.2 Figures 1, 2 and 3 respectively give the results for theodicy judgment in terms of the retaliation model, the plan model and the compassion model. When we compare these results it is clear that the curriculum had a considerable effect on theodicy comprehension. This effect is most noticeable with regard to comprehension of the plan model. In the case of comprehension of the retaliation model and the compassion model, however, the effect of the curriculum almost equalled the effect of the respective pretest scores, but was nevertheless considerable. When it came to theodicy judgment the effect of the curriculum was not as great. For the most part theodicy judgment could be explained in terms of the influence of the respective pretest scores. This was certainly the case with theodicy judgment in terms of the retaliation model and the compassion model. Only in the case of

1

Theodicy comprehension was measured using a multiple-choice test consisting of twelve items, each theodicy model being represented by four items (Vermeer 1999, 133–137). Based on De Corte’s (1973) classification of educational objectives, comprehension referred to interpretive production of information. Theodicy judgment was measured using four so-called hypothetical contingency dilemmas involving situations of innocent human suffering. For each dilemma the respondents were asked what they thought the principal character should do—renounce the faith or maintain religious commitment. After this the respondents were asked to rate three religious considerations, exemplifying the three theodicy models in terms of their importance for providing a religious answer to each dilemma (Vermeer 1999, 127–133). To this end I adapted the format of a multiple-choice test for assessing moral judgment, the Defining Issues Test (cf. Rest 1979), and applied it to theodicy. 2 In order to determine the effect of the curriculum on theodicy comprehension and theodicy judgment more accurately I also controlled for relevant background characteristics like degree of urbanization, socioeconomic status, value orientation, church involvement, religious belief, theodicy interest and formal reasoning ability (Vermeer 1999, 119–125). Since these are not pertinent to the present discussion, they are not shown in figures 1, 2 and 3.

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Figure 1. Theodicy judgment in terms of the retaliation model (R2adj..18) Pretest judg. retal.

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theodicy judgment in terms of the plan model the curriculum exercised some influence, mainly due to its direct effect on theodicy judgment. In sum, my curriculum proved to be a relatively successful instrument for enhancing students’ comprehension of three ideal-typical theodicy models, but it did not contribute much to their ability to pass a meaningful theodicy judgment. With regard to this latter aspect, the only exception was that my curriculum made students

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pass a theodicy judgment mainly in terms of the plan model, just as it contributed most to their comprehension of that particular model. What this means for the normative aspects of my research will be explained in the next section. 3. Normative Aspects of Theodicy Research Having presented my theodicy research in a nutshell, let me now detail the most salient theological and pedagogical orientations underlying this research project. 3.1

Theological Normativeness

On the basis of the theological normative orientations that guided my research two major propositions were made. The first pertained to the theological importance of the theodicy issue as such, the second to the degree of rationality of the three ideal-typical theodicy models. What guided my research from the outset was the conviction that the problem of theodicy is at the heart of present-day theological thought. Many modern theologians consider it to be a matter of fundamental theology. That is to say, when human beings in their present-day cultural surroundings ask about God they are asking about the problem of evil and suffering. It is longing for God, or the Ultimate, that makes people aware of the enormous imperfections of our world, but these negative worldly experiences also call into question God’s very existence (Peukert 1978, 335; cf. also Neuhaus 1996). Thus there seems to be a dialectical tension between the experience of evil and human longing for God. The human quest for God is both prompted and challenged by the experience of evil. From this more or less fundamental-theological point of view, therefore, the problem of theodicy appears to be important subject matter for religious education. The second conviction underlying my research was that it is possible to distinguish between rational and non-rational theological answers to the problem of theodicy. This idea stems from the sociology of religion of Weber (19855, 314–319), who relates the problem of theodicy to the emergence of monotheism, which he considered the result of rationalization of the way people conceptualize God. Inspired by this idea, I came to understand the problem of theodicy as a basically theological problem or dilemma: if God is omnipotent

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and perfectly good, why do human beings suffer? Next, I reconstructed the history of Christian thought about this theological problem and identified the three ideal-typical theodicy models mentioned above (cf. section 2.1). Finally, I undertook a conceptual analysis of these models on the basis of a twofold standard of rationality (Vermeer et al. 1991; Vermeer 1999, 53–76). This analysis revealed that the compassion model is the most rational and most plausible theological answer to the problem of theodicy, because it ‘solves’ the theological problem in a logically consistent way and also provides the most abstract perspective on human suffering. In line with a large part of modern theological thought, the compassion model is characterized, firstly, by a different understanding of divine omnipotence: God is no longer considered to be the unique cause of all things, so that this model gives the most consistent and plausible answer to the problem of theodicy. Secondly, also in line with modern theological thought, on the basic principle that God is compassionate towards suffering humankind, God’s love is considered to be a universal category within the framework of the compassion model, so this model also provides the most abstract perspective on suffering. Thus my theological reconstruction and conceptual analysis finally resulted in the theological proposition that the compassion model is the most rational, modern and, therefore, plausible Christian answer to the problem of theodicy. Thus religious education should concentrate on bringing this model to students’ attention. 3.2

Pedagogical Normativeness

As far as pedagogical orientations are concerned, my research was again determined by two important normative propositions. The first related to the educational value of the theodicy issue as subject matter for religious education; my second proposition was that this subject matter could best be dealt with in class by way of an argumentativecommunicative approach to religious education. The theodicy issue not only constitutes the core of present-day theological thought, it also dominates the religious consciousness of modern youth. Research among youngsters indicates that theodicy is one of the few issues that still evokes religious questions (Hutsebaut 1995, 79, 93); at the same time it is one of the major reasons why youths, who are largely unable to resolve this issue in a plausible way, abandon the faith (Nipkow 1987, 52–69; 1988, 46–50). Against

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this background, the theodicy issue struck me as an important educational topic that merits classroom discussion. The aim would not be to strengthen students’ faith or prevent them from abandoning it, but to give them a more balanced picture of religious faith in relation to human suffering. Human suffering indeed raises questions about the plausibility of religious faith generally and the Christian image of God in particular; on the other hand religious faith also offers a way of coping with suffering. Apart from this, there is another reason why I considered it important to discuss the theodicy issue in class. Educational treatment of theodicy renders youngsters more sensitive to suffering in all its different manifestations. It is not unlikely that the overwhelming presence of suffering in the world causes young people to withdraw from these daily experiences and turn to their own private worlds (cf. Schmitz 2001). Thus the educational value of discussing the theodicy issue in class, I maintain, is that it offers young people a more balanced view of the intricate relationship between human suffering and religious faith and, secondly, that it makes them more sensitive to suffering. In line with this view of the educational value of the theodicy issue, I concluded that the educational treatment of this subject matter calls for an argumentative-communicative approach to religious education. The most important aim of such an educational approach is to make students competent to reflect critically on their own and other people’s religious ideas, notions and convictions. They should become competent to assess the degree of rationality (i.e. validity and plausibility) of people’s religious beliefs. This educational approach is based on several normative points of departure. Perhaps the most important of these is what is known as the ethics of belief (Hobson & Edwards 1999, 85–104), which states that one of principal aims of education is to instil a concern for reason. This means that students should be educated in such a way that they do not accept beliefs, statements, propositions and the like on the teacher’s authority but only on the basis of rational evidence. It presupposes that every (religious) believer has an ethical responsibility to account for his or her convictions with rational arguments. Elsewhere I have called this evaluative learning and pointed out the need for students to engage in a process of meta-reflection (Vermeer 1999, 100–101), which means that they should be willing to reflect critically on their own position regarding the theodicy issue. Another important normative orientation is neutrality. For if students have to learn to reflect

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critically on the theodicy issue generally and the three theodicy models in particular, it is not appropriate to tell them in advance which model, theologically speaking, offers the most rational and plausible answer to the problem (Nipkow 1987, 57–60). They have to decide for themselves, but with the help of the aforementioned twofold standard of rationality that was imparted to them in class. 4. Theology versus Pedagogy Empirical study of processes of religious education reveals a normative perspective from the very beginning of a research project. Furthermore, as mentioned in the introduction, this normative perspective is both theological and pedagogical. This thesis is clearly supported, I believe, by the foregoing description of the theological and pedagogical orientations underlying my theodicy research. From both a theological and a pedagogical perspective the theodicy issue turned out to be important subject matter for religious education. When it came to the contents and method of theodicy education both the theological and pedagogical perspectives again proved to be useful guiding principles. In the course of the research, however, a tension gradually emerged between the theological and pedagogical orientations. As mentioned already, through empirical research practical theology ultimately seeks to improve religious practices. It tries to contribute to good religious praxis. By the same token the aim of my theodicy research was to contribute to an educational theory on theodicy which would indicate how this issue can best be dealt with in religious education. Here my normative orientations represent a theoretical picture of what good religious education praxis regarding theodicy should look like, while my research findings indicate how well this theoretical picture withstands the empirical test. As far as the theoretical picture is concerned, from the perspective of modern theology good religious education praxis should advocate the compassion model, since my theological analysis showed that it offers the most rational and plausible answer to the problem of theodicy. My pedagogical perspective indicated that good religious education praxis should respect students’ autonomy and, therefore, should enhance their ability to reason about theodicy rather than teach them just one specific theodicy model. At first glance this may seem contradictory: a the-

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ological option for the compassion model combined with a neutral, argumentative-communicative approach to religious education. But on careful consideration this turns out not to be the case. For my research was also based on the hypothesis that students would themselves favour the compassion model if they came to understand the three ideal-typical theodicy models as well as a standard of rationality applicable to theodicy. However, this hypothesis was not corroborated by my empirical findings. In the event my experimental theodicy curriculum made students reflect on the theodicy issue mainly in terms of the plan model rather than the compassion model (cf. section 2.2). But how to value this result? This is one of the cardinal questions to be answered during the final, evaluative phase of what is called the empirical-theological cycle, in which empirical results are interpreted and considered in the light of the initial theoretical assumptions and expectations with a view to the research aim. Van der Ven (1993, 175–177) only speaks of theological interpretation and theological reflection, but when it comes to religious education—at least, that is my thesis— this is too limited. If, as in the case of my theodicy research, the research project is influenced from the outset by both a theological and a pedagogical perspective, interpretation and reflection on the results should occur from both perspectives. That is where my theodicy research reveals a tension. For what seems an unfavourable result from the perspective of theology is not that unfavourable when viewed from the pedagogical perspective. From the perspective of my theological analysis of the theodicy issue it is not that favourable a finding that the experimental theodicy curriculum promotes comprehension and a theodicy judgment based mainly on the plan model. It means that my experimental theodicy curriculum pre-eminently promotes a way of reflecting on the theodicy issue which, from the point of view of modern theology, is not that plausible. On the other hand, given that my experimental theodicy curriculum has a positive effect on the comprehension of theodicy models and also, though to a very limited extent, influences the way students pass a theodicy judgment, it would be unfair to conclude that my pedagogical option for an argumentative-communicative approach to religious education was wrong. Hence pedagogically my curriculum did rather well, but unfortunately not in the ‘right’ theological direction!

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There are actually two ways of dealing with this tension. Taking the research findings very seriously, one possibility is to reflect critically on my theological conceptualization of the three theodicy models and to question the result of my theological reconstruction that the compassion model contains the most rational and plausible answer to the problem of theodicy. That is what Van der Ven (1993, 176) understands by theological reflection on empirical data and what Ziebertz (2003, 194–195) calls the critical function of empirical research in theology. It is a legitimate thing to do in empiricaltheological research, because it prevents practical theology from studying only how concepts derived from systematic theology can best be applied to the different fields of religious praxis. Apart from this more or less empirical-inductive approach, which takes empirical data as the point of departure for theological reflection, it is also possible to reflect critically on the experimental theodicy curriculum itself. Starting from the theological, normative point of view, the critical question would be why the curriculum did not cause students to favour the compassion model. But such a normative-deductive approach again subsumes pedagogy under the umbrella of theology. It not only reduces religious pedagogics to a kind of applied science of theology (cf. Lämmermann 19982, 66–69), but also seriously limits the influence of empirical research. Empirical research in this case is restricted to empirical evaluation of didactic methods, hence it loses its aforementioned critical function in theology. Does this mean that one should opt for an empirical-inductive approach to this tension? In my opinion this question cannot be answered with a simple “yes” or “no”, because the empirical-inductive approach, too, does not adequately resolve the tension between theological and pedagogical normativeness in empirical research. To avoid the danger of empiricism, Van der Ven (1993, 176) stresses that the phase of theological reflection should be characterized by a dialectic between normative theological concepts and empirical data. That is to say, reflection should not focus only on the implications the data have for the theological concepts, but should also use the theological concepts to interpret the data anew. But this again highlights the tension between theology and pedagogy. For if one conducts empirical research into the praxis of religious education and uses a quasi-experimental research design (cf. section 2.2), the data one collects cannot be separated from the experimental conditions that elicited the students’ responses. Put differently: the empirical

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reality that confronts my theological conceptualization is mediated by an educational treatment. Hence the proposed dialectic between normative theological concepts and empirical data in a typical case of this kind of educational research essentially boils down to a dialectic between theological and pedagogical normativeness. This brings me back to my earlier proposition. If a research project is marked from the outset by both a theological and a pedagogical normative perspective, evaluation of search findings should also be from both perspectives, and not be limited to theological reflection. As a result the question of the relation between theology and pedagogy returns even more pressingly during the final evaluative phase of the empirical-theological research cycle. I shall deal with that in the next section. 5. Reconciling Theology and Pedagogy Is it possible to define a norm for what constitutes good religious praxis in the field of religious education—one that is tenable from both a theological and a pedagogical point of view and may serve as a kind of criterion to evaluate empirical-theological research into religious education? My answer to this question is affirmative. I already mentioned in the introduction that in my view the constitutional right to freedom of religion may serve as such a norm. Below I will first discuss this right from a theological and a pedagogical perspective, after which I will use it to reconsider my research findings. 5.1

The Right to Freedom of Religion

From a legal point of view the right to freedom of religion or religious liberty is a fundamental civil and human right, which is recognized in the constitutions of all West European countries. It is rooted in the notion that individual conscience is paramount and that this gives all individuals the right to choose their own religion, as well as to leave or change their religion, without incurring any restriction of their civil and political rights. Underlying the right to freedom of religion, therefore, is the principle of non-discrimination (Ferrari 2002, 7–8). Philosophically the right to freedom of religion is ultimately based on human autonomy, which in its turn is rooted in human dignity. Hence to accord human beings this right is to respect them as persons and consider them of the same value as

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oneself. Consequently one cannot respect persons without at the same time according them the right to freedom of religion (Van der Ven 2002, 17). This fundamental right thus constitutes a person as a person, as a result of which it can be understood rather passively. As a person you do not have to ‘earn’ this right, because as a person it is already accorded to you. But there is also an active side to this right, since it implies the positive task of religious self-realization. That is to say, the right to freedom of religion presupposes that people are able to construct their own religious identities in an autonomous, responsible way. If they are unable to do so, the right to freedom of religion remains empty and meaningless. Consequently, as I have explained elsewhere (Vermeer 2003), making students competent in this regard—that is, guiding and supporting them with a view to forming a personal religious identity—can be seen as a major religiouspedagogical task. In this sense religious education becomes an important instrument for advancing religious freedom as a fundamental human right. But can this religious-pedagogical task of advancing human autonomy in the field of religion be considered a legitimate task from both a theological and a pedagogical point of view? In my opinion it can. From a theological point of view human autonomy or freedom must be regarded as a genuine constituent of humanity as such. As created beings people are created in such a way that they can encounter God, relate to God and respond to His word. In this sense humans can be called ‘respondable’ creatures, that is capable of responding. Furthermore, responding to God’s word actually means responding to God’s love. The word of God is a word of divine love, to which humans respond in love through an act of faith. This human response can only be loving if it is given in freedom. A loving response cannot be forced, for it would immediately cease to be loving (Berkhof 19855, 179–188). Hence if one of the central teachings of Christianity— namely that God wants humans to enter into a filial, personal relationship with him (Hick 19852, 271–275)—is to make sense at all, theology cannot but assign people genuine freedom. Without genuine freedom every human response to God in faith, love and worship would be inauthentic. Consequently theology has to presuppose human freedom as a necessary condition for authentic faith. From a pedagogical point of view human autonomy may be considered one of the cardinal aims of formation and education. Ever

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since Kant (1969), in his little treatise Was ist Aufklärung? written in 1784, defined the Enlightenment in terms of human emancipation and intellectual self-determination, pedagogy has come to understand human formation (Bildung) and education in terms of the facilitation of human autonomy and freedom of thought (Klafki 19965, 19–20). And although the idealistic nature of this view of formation and education is hotly debated among pedagogues up to the present day, the orientation towards self-determination nevertheless seems to be an important aspect of modern pedagogics. Due to all kinds of geographical, biological, social and psychological constraints (Van der Ven 1985, 67–78), human autonomy nowadays is considered a limited freedom, leading to a more balanced and differentiated pedagogical understanding of human self-determination. This is evident in the threefold way the German pedagogue Klafki views human self-determination as the aim of formation and education. According to Klafki (19965, 52), formation and education, firstly, should advance human self-determination in the sense of the ability to lead a meaningful life. This means, for example, that persons should be educated in such a way that they can freely choose a profession, but it may also mean that they are able to attribute meaning to their lives autonomously and independently. Secondly, formation and education should advance human self-determination in the sense of the ability to participate in shaping one’s cultural, societal and political environment. And in the third place, human self-determination as the aim of formation and education relates to the human ability to act in solidarity with those whose self-determination is threatened as a result of political or other oppression. Hence, the task of advancing human autonomy in the field of religion, or promoting the right to freedom of religion, is an important as well as a legitimate educational task. Theologically the educational advancement of human religious autonomy is a necessary condition for authentic religious faith. In the same way, from a pedagogical perspective it represents an important educational aim with a view to human self-determination. In short, from both a theological and a pedagogical perspective it appears that good religious practice in the field of religious education should always be aimed at advancing the right to freedom of religion.

284 5.2

  The Right to Freedom of Religion and Theodicy Research

On the basis of the foregoing theological and pedagogical reflections, I consider the right to freedom of religion a useful meta-norm for assessing the results of empirical-theological research into the praxis of religious education. By way of illustration I will apply this norm to my own theodicy research. According to this norm the guiding question in the final evaluative phase of the empirical-theological cycle should be: to what extent does the religious education curriculum under consideration advance the right to freedom of religion? Applied to my research this would mean, for instance, that my theodicy curriculum warrants a more positive evaluation. For despite the fact that the curriculum predominantly caused students to reflect on the theodicy issue from the perspective of the plan model rather than the compassion model, there is evidence that students’ overall ability to pass a meaningful, independent theodicy judgment increased. This is borne out not only by the fact that my curriculum really advanced their comprehension of three different theodicy models, but also by the way they passed a theodicy judgment. As figures 1, 2 and 3 indicate (cf. section 2.2), with the exception of theodicy judgment in terms of the retaliation model, the students in fact consider alternative positions when passing a theodicy judgment in terms of the plan model and the compassion model. Or, to put it differently, in these instances divergent thinking features as an important characteristic of evaluative learning (cf. section 3.2; cf. also Vermeer & Van der Ven 1998, 90–91). In view of this I think I can justifiably say that, especially with regard to the plan model, my curriculum facilitated independent religious thought. From the angle of the meta-norm I propose in this article this result outweighs the strictly theological, negative evaluation that my curriculum apparently did not succeed in making students reflect on the problem of theodicy from the perspective of God’s solidarity with suffering humankind. Thus I value independent religious thought more than the students’ acceptance or rejection of specific theological concepts. But does this evaluative approach to my research findings not subordinate theology to a pedagogical ideal? No, it does not. The ability of independent, religious thought, which the students apparently display—and which, incidentally, was also emphasized by Kant (1969, 7–8) as a feature of the Enlightenment—can be seen

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as an important characteristic of religious freedom. Consequently, inasmuch as this ability increased under the influence of my curriculum, I can justifiably claim that the curriculum actually promoted the right to freedom of religion. And as I argued above, the promotion of religious freedom may be considered an extremely valuable result from both a theological and a pedagogical point of view. However, does such an application of the meta-norm not mean that detailed theological and pedagogical evaluation of the research findings is no longer necessary, useful or legitimate? On the contrary, as mentioned in the introduction, practical theology as a practical science aims to establish a body of knowledge of religious practices in order to improve these practices in the light of some good. Ziebertz (2002, 6) calls such a body of knowledge an object theory of practice. These are known as third degree theories, after everyday theories and reflected theories, which do not influence religious practices directly by way of specific practical directives, but rather seek to describe and analyse these practices in order to gather well-established knowledge about them. In the field of religious education, then, the actual practices are described and analysed from the perspective of the right to freedom of religion. To advance this right is the good praxis religious education strives for, which is described, analysed and critically reflected on in third degree practical-theological theories on religious education. This in turn raises all kinds of intricate theological and pedagogical questions. To give some examples relating to theodicy education: Should every theological approach to the theodicy issue be discussed in a religious education curriculum if religious education as such aims to advance religious freedom? What about theological approaches that seem to imply a heterogeneous image of human beings, such as the retaliation model? Should such a theodicy model be included in the theological contents of a religious education curriculum? Or, to pose a more specific theological question: How does the plan model actually relate to religious freedom? Is it indeed determined by a heterogeneous image of human beings or can one relate the plan model to religious freedom in a more positive way? One can also raise some pedagogical issues: How can the right to freedom of religion be operationalized in specific student behaviour? Is the ability to pass a meaningful theodicy judgment indeed an indication of religious freedom? Does education towards religious freedom not overestimate the intellectual capabilities of young children?

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And if so, should formal religious education not be restricted to certain age groups? Et cetera. These examples make it clear, I believe, that using the right to freedom of religion as a meta-norm for assessing the results of empirical-theological research into the praxis of religious education by no means reduces the importance of specific theological or pedagogical reflection. On the contrary, this meta-norm offers common ground for theological and pedagogical reflection, and thus makes it possible for empirical theologians to build a truly integrated religiouspedagogical theory of the praxis of religious education. 6. Conclusion I am fully aware that my reasoning in this article is very tentative and perhaps even somewhat controversial. So let me balance it a bit by admitting that my position certainly needs to be worked out in far more detail. I also want to stress that what I have said here only applies to empirical-theological research into the praxis of religious education. I am not making any claims about empirical-theological research generally, nor about other fields of religious praxis like liturgy, church development or pastoral counselling. But when it comes to the praxis of religious education the empirical-theological researcher cannot ignore the fact that theological normative claims are always and inevitably accompanied by pedagogical normative claims, for two reasons. First, reflecting on the question of what constitutes good religious-educational praxis simply cannot be a matter for theology alone, because the very question is partly pedagogical. Second, designing an experimental religious education curriculum, implementing it in the classroom and finally measuring its effects essentially amounts to questioning youngsters about religious topics by way of pedagogical, that is educational, intervention. In this respect there is a qualitative difference, I believe, between merely administering a questionnaire to students, and teaching them a certain topic and then questioning them about it afterwards. As was the case with my theodicy research, data collected in this way cannot be considered without allowing for the experimental, educational conditions that elicited the students’ responses in the first place. Hence empirical-theological research in the field of religious education entails dealing with theological and pedagogical normative

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claims at the same time. This unavoidably raises the question of how these normative claims may be reconciled. It is in view of this question that I introduce the right to freedom of religion as a kind of bridging concept or meta-norm. I call it a meta-norm because it goes beyond specific theological and pedagogical normative claims and thus enables practical theologians to evaluate their research findings on the basis of a unifying normative principle. By considering the results of my theodicy research anew I tried to show that this meta-norm serves well in this respect. Apart from being very tentative, therefore, I also believe that the proposition made in this article is a promising one. References Berkhof, H. (19855). Christelijk geloof. Een inleiding tot de geloofsleer. [Christian faith. An introduction to the doctrine of faith.] Nijkerk: Callenbach. Cook, T.D. & Campbell, D.T. (1979). Quasi-Experimentation. Design and Analysis Issues for Field Settings. Boston: Houghton Mifflin. Ferrari, S. (2002). Islam and the Western European Model of Church and State Relations. In W.A.R. Shadid & P.S. van Koningsveld (eds). Religious Freedom and the Neutrality of the State: the Position of Islam in the European Union. (6–19). Leuven: Peeters. Hick, J. (19852). Evil and the God of Love. London: Macmillan. Hobson, P.R. & Edwards, J.R. (1999). Religious Education in a pluralist Society. The key philosophical Issues. London: Woburn Press. Hutsebaut, D. (1985). Een zekere onzekerheid. Jongeren en geloof. [A certain uncertainty. Youths and faith.] Leuven/Amersfoort: Acco. De Corte, E. (1973). Onderwijsdoelstellingen: bijdrage tot de didaxologische theorievorming en aanzetten voor empirisch onderzoek over onderwijsdoelen. [Educational goals: a contribution to didactic theory and starting points for empirical research into educational goals.] Leuven: University Press. Kant, I. (1969). Was ist Auklärung? [What is enlightenment?] In I. Kant, Ausgewählte Kleine Schriften [Selected short writings]. (1–9). Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag. Klafki, W. (19965). Neue Studien zur Bildungstheorie und Didaktik. Beiträge kritisch-konstruktiven Didaktik [New studies of educational theory and didactics. All-round education for today and critical-constructive didactics]. Weinheim: Beltz. Lämmermann, G. (19982). Grundriß der Religionsdidaktik [Outline of the didactics of religion]. Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. Neuhaus, G. (1996). Menschliche Identität angesichts des Leidens. Wonach fragt die Theodizeefrage? [Human identity and suffering. The theodicy question] In G. Fuchs (Ed.), Angesichts des Leids an Gott Glauben? Zur Theologie der Klage [Believing in God in light of suffering? The theology of lament]. (18–52). Frankfurt am Main: Knecht. Nipkow, K.-E. (1987). Erwachsenwerden ohne Gott? Gotteserfahrung im Lebenslauf [Growing up without God? Experiences of God in the course of a life]. München: Kaiser. —— (1988). The Issues of God in Adolescence under growing post-Christian Conditions—A Württembergian Survey. Journal of Empirical Theology 1 (1), 43–53. Peukert, H. (1978). Wissenschaftstheorie—Handlungstheorie—Fundamentale Theologie. Analysen

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zu Ansatz und Status theologischer Theoriebildung [Philosophy of science—Action theory—Fundamental theology. Analysing approaches to and status of theological theory formation]. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp. Rest, J.R. (1979). Development in judging moral Issues. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Schmitz, S. (2001). Die Leidproblematik als religionspädagogische Herausforderung. Relevanz und Vermittelbarkeit von Grenzsituationen des Lebens für den Religionsunterricht [The problematic of suffering as a challenge to religious pedagogy. Relevance and transmissibility of limit situations in religious education]. Münster: Lit. Van der Ven, J.A. (1985). Vorming in waarden en normen. [Formation of values and norms.] Kampen: Kok. —— (1993). Entwurf einer empirischen Theologie [English translation: Practical Theology: An Empirical Approach. Kampen]. Kampen/Weinheim: Kok/Deutscher Studienverlag. —— (2002). Godsdienstvrijheid als ecclesiologisch paradigma. [Religious freedom as an ecclesiological paradigm.] In C. Sterkens & J.A. van der Ven (Eds.), De Functie van de Kerk in de hedendaagse Maatschappij. Opstellen voor Ernest Henau. [The function of the church in present-day society. Essays for Ernest Henau.] (17–61). Averbode: Altiora. —— (2002). An empirical or normative approach to practical-theological research? A false dilemma. Paper presented at the first meeting of the International Society of Empirical Research in Theology (ISERT). Vermeer, P. (1999). Learning Theodicy. The Problem of Evil and the Praxis of religious Education. Leiden: Brill. —— (2003). De vorming van een religieuze identiteit als nieuw godsdienstpedagogisch concept. [Formation of a religious identity as a new concept in religious pedagogy.] In H. van Crombrugge & N. Vansieleghem (Eds.), Kleur(en) (be)kennen. Onderwijs, levensbeschouwing en religie. [(Re)cognition of colour(s). Education, world-view and religion.] (113–136). Gent: Academia Press. Vermeer, P. & Van der Ven, J.A. (1998). Learning to cope with suffering. In: A. Ploeger & C. Sterkens (eds). Search for meaning. Education into realms of meaning in a plural society. (63–93). Kampen: Kok. Vermeer, P., Vossen, H.J.M. & Van der Ven, J.A. (1991). Theodicy and Rationalization. Bijdragen: Tijdschrift voor filosofie en theologie 52 (3), 293–317. Vossen, H.J.M. (1985). Vrijwilligerseducatie en pastoraat aan rouwenden. Een pastoraaltheologisch onderzoek naar een curriculum voor vrijwilligers in het pastoraat over het bijstaan van rouwenden. [Volunteer education and pastoral assistance to mourners. A pastoraltheological study of a curriculum for volunteers in pastoral assistance to mourners.] Kampen: Kok. Weber, M. (19855). Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft. Grundriß der verstehenden Soziologie [English translation: Economy and society. An outline of interpretive sociology]. Tübingen: Mohr. Ziebertz, H.-G. (2002). Normativeness and empirical Research in Practical Theology. Journal of Empirical Theology 15 (1), 5–18. —— (2003). Religious Education in a plural Western Society. Problems and Challenges. Münster: Lit.

EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY AND NORMATIVITY H-G Z 1. The Problem Any consideration of normativity, particularly theological normativity, first demands an answer to the question, What kind of normativity is intended? Is normativity to be understood, for example, as religious and ritual laws and instructions, like the legal traditions in the Old Testament? Are we to understand normativity as concrete commands and restrictions as listed in the Decalogue? Do we speak of normativity in a prophetic sense, where it is a matter of the charge of a particular practice, combined with the call to complete change? Should we think of normativity, as indirectly suggested in the wisdom literature, as partly in the inductive, partly in the deductive tradition (Otto 1994)? Are we to think of normativity as it is conveyed in the warning speeches and sermons of the New Testament (Paränese)? Is it therefore a question of material-ethical normativity, which induces us to reflect upon how contradictory values and norms should be dealt with and how their contextuality is to be assessed? In the end, we question whether normativity is simply that which is taught by an ecclesiastical or spiritual authority, or a matter of the theological options which are advocated by theologians. Do we identify normativity in one of these material spheres? There is no doubt that normativity is related to both the material object of research as well as to the formal object. But it is not only within this area that normativity comes up. Another sphere in which normativity plays a role is the process of research. In research, normativity is in fact ‘unavoidable’ because when a particular problem (or facets of a problem) is chosen and the decision for a specific project is made, other problems (or facets) are excluded. Furthermore, every research project has its unavoidable normative goals. It can also be a matter of the direct goals which relate to an immediate purpose, or the indirect goals which refer to the indirect purpose of a research project. In the end, normativity is unavoidable in the testing of hypotheses because no methodology exists to regulate the research process internally.

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In the following reflections, normativity in the research process is prominent and, more precisely, is directed towards empirical research in the theological discipline known as “Practical Theology”. First I want to make the distinction between “Empirical Theology” and “Empirical Research in Practical Theology.” A theological mode of operation can be labelled as empirical theology which, through an empirical orientation, differs from a hermeneutical or ideology-critical theology. An empirical orientation is possible in all theological disciplines. However if one specifically attaches the term “empirical” to practical theology, further substantiation is possible. I am of the opinion that the discipline of practical theology essentially differs from historical, biblical and systematic theology in two ways. Firstly: practical theology finds its material object in the “religion of everyday life” i.e. it does not acquire its theories at a distance from this everyday practice, but is itself part of the practice and partly contributes to this practice through its own discourse. By reflecting, classifying and describing in theoretical terms the everyday practice of religion, it is partaking in the universe of discourse in which an understanding emerges of what religion, the church and faith actually are. Its scope of reference is not the past 2000 years (biblical theology), the history of Christianity (historical theology) or the consideration of church doctrine (systematical theology). Its scope of reference is therefore, to state it briefly, the religion that is “practiced” not the religion that is “taught.” Practical theology therefore administers a critical function whereby it identifies tensions and conflicts between the religion that is taught and that which is actually practiced, and gives a voice to “everyday-practiced religion” in theological discourse. Secondly: the type of theory which emerges from the discipline of practical theology has a particular character. “Practice” of course comes up in all theological disciplines. However it is the specific task of practical theology to concern itself in a systematic way with practice— and not to deduce theological normativity from practice. In this way however, the special place and role of practical theology is yet to be sufficiently grasped, for an empirically established theory of everyday-practiced religion could also be part of the sociology of religion. It is the type of theory in which practical theology is interested as well as its goal of creating a theory of practice which highlights the special position for this discipline. When we speak of normativity and empiricism, we thus do so with a view to the specific theological discipline of “practical theology.”

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First, it will be shown that normativity is already connected with the goal of Practical Theology i.e. the development of descriptive object/subject theories (theories about practice) (2). Second, it will be posited that normativity is also unavoidable in empirical methodology (3). In the three following sections, the role of normativity in the context of discovery (4), in the context of justification (5), and in the context of application will be put in concrete terms (6). A discussion of normativity in empirical practical theological research as discursive normativity forms the conclusion. (7). 2. Normativity and Practical Theology In order to answer the question, which theory in Practical Theology is being discussed, a short clarification of the concept “Practical Theology” is necessary. Trying to grasp a precise understanding of “practical” as an adjective can be difficult. Is the “practical” element to be contrasted with “theoretical” theology? Does the “practical” arise when Practical Theology translates “theoretical theology” into practice? Does it aid theology to become “practical”? Does Practical Theology show how religious practice should function? If one answers these questions in the affirmative, then it is the duty of Practical Theology to provide theory for practice. In this context, the role of normativity would clearly be limited. It would lie directly in the numerous premises that such theories contain. However, the forefathers of Practical Theology in the nineteenth century, Anton Graf (1811–1867) for example, have already rejected such a deductive conception of theory and practice as unsatisfactory (cf. Ziebertz 1998; 1999). If theory does not serve to standardize practice, what then is meant by theory? According to Norbert Mette (1978; 1984), the connection between theory and practice has changed to the effect that Practical Theology no longer provides “Theory for practice”, but is rather—modifying the phrasing of Schleiermacher—“Theory of practice”. Religious practice is the material object of Practical Theology. The distinction between whether “religious practice” is to be understood narrowly (in the form of participation in organized religion) or broadly (in the form of spiritually oriented practice in church and society) does not require further examination (cf. Ziebertz 2001). For Mette, one theory of practice is “reflexive”: it is “enlightening” in relation to present

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and future conduct.1 It makes possible an educational and decisionmaking process for those seeking orientation for their goals as well as principles for the shaping of structured conduct, but it does not directly say what should be done. Dietrich Rössler also argues along similar lines: first and foremost, Practical Theology is and produces theory (Rössler 1994). It does not in itself constitute practice, rather its practical worth is expressed in that it contributes towards or aids knowledge, and also in that it lays the foundations for and enables judgmental ability in relation to practice. How then is normativity connected with such practical-theological theories? In this context, the differentiation of three types of theory is helpful. – Firstly, everyday theories may be observed, which serve a function of orientation in routine everyday conduct. – Secondly, we have what are called reflected theories of conduct. They have a higher degree of reflection and complexity, and they guide professional conduct. – The third theory group concerns itself with object theories in a scientific sense. A practical-theological theory of the nature of that highlighted above can be classified as part of this third group. How does normativity come into play in such theories? The educationalist Erich Weniger (1964, 7–22) has demonstrated that a theory in the “third degree” first and foremost serves knowledge. A “third degree” theory offers enlightenment through analysis and description. It strives to encompass its subject matter/object adequately. The basis of merit expressed in such a theory is an interest in truth and a decision for rationality (from which an array of further consequences arise i.e. from a methodological aspect). Consequently, normativity is expressed in “third degree” theories neither as an option nor as an appeal to potential recipients, but rather in a discursive way. Secondly, a “third degree” theory helps to make practice more conscious. In practice, it offers the actor a regulatory system for the reflection upon and orientation of his conduct—i.e. it contains critical 1 Due to the several unsatisfactory possibilities for translating the German term ‘Handeln’, the term ‘(human) conduct’ will be used in this document to mean the process of decision-making and taking action within a real-life context. The term will be highlighted to mean ‘Handeln’ each time it is used.

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ideas for reflected theories of conduct (thus “second degree” theories). It is the goal of heightening consciousness that those who are engaged in practice may be able to decide responsibly (i.e. with knowledge of the available facts and in awareness of alternative aims and consequences). The relationship to practice of “third degree” theories differs clearly from that of the first two theory types. Normatively, it does not aim to improve practice in a direct sense. Whether and to what extent a “third degree” theory contributes towards a change in practice depends on those who act responsibly in practice. On condition that we are dealing with a good theory and that those acting in practice can be classified as “professional”, it can be taken that: (1) they recognize their practice in the theory, (2) they (can) understand the theory as “theory”, and (3) they are able to relate their “practice” and this theory to one another (cf. Ziebertz 1996). Normativity is also implicit in “third degree” theories. The underlying implications of value are the recognition of a difference between theory and practice; the recognition of a difference between scientific or academic reflection and responsibility for practical decisions; and the appreciation of the value of the professional autonomy of those engaging in practice. Normativity in practical-theological theories is not to be ignored, nor does it have the form of an appeal, but rather it is brought up discursively. 3. Normativity and empirical Methodology For a “theory of practice”, an empirically well-founded theory is necessary. The second question to be dealt with is thus, how are normativity and empirical methodology linked? 3.1

In the Tradition of (Neo-)positivism

In the tradition of logical inductivism, particularly positivism, there is a tense relationship between empirical methodology and normativity. According to Francis Bacon’s work “Novum Organon”, knowledge should be based on the inductive method i.e. on the careful collection of observations and systematic notes. Bacon wanted to track down the inherent laws of nature and explain nature in the

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process. He assumed that a theory-free observation of reality was possible. Thus, empirical research should directly depict reality. He rejects hypotheses because these contain “prejudices” (i.e. normativity) and influence the perception of reality. The aim of the research is the direct registration of the facts. The logical positivism at the start of the 20th Century dismantled Bacon’s naivety. Representatives of the “Vienna Circle” (Wiener Kreis) worked on the assumption that presumptions (hypotheses) about practice cannot be avoided. To avoid mixing science and speculation, the import of hypotheses is restricted to the function of an “overture”. In hypotheses, academics formulate presumptions that guide research but which are not scientifically relevant. The real business of research begins with the independent examination of hypotheses. Accordingly, the distinction between the “setting up of a hypothesis” (context of discovery) and its “justification” (context of justification) is conceptually established. Reichenbach shaped these concepts in 1938 in his book “Experience and Prediction” (Kelle 1987). Karl Popper (1980) also adopts this distinction. The context of discovery for him is “free-floating heuristics” or “divine inspiration”, which in any case has nothing directly to do with scientific research (see critically Vollmer 1993, 183ff.). It is here that grounds for a research project emerge. The intuition of the researcher, observations, discussions, and analyses in academic debate, practical problems, as well as other factors, can tip the balance in order to examine a particular problem more precisely. First, there is improvisation and association. According to Popper, this first phase in the research process can neither be rationalized nor approached methodically. It contains a strongly “inductive” moment, about which not much can be said. When Popper speaks about scientific research, it is not about the question of how ideas occur to us. His attention is focused on the context of justification of empirical research. The context of justification examines how a problem is methodically examined. It is here that systematic and controlled work takes place. It is governed by rules i.e. along exactly laid out steps. While Reichenbach still supposed an “iterative” relationship between the “context of discovery” and the “context of justification”, both appear in Popper’s formulation as successive “phases,” following one after the other (Kelle 1997, 135). For Reichenbach, hypotheses are not the consequences of divine inspiration, but rather the logical

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connection of known theories with possible explanations; thus, they contain induction and deduction. The discovery of a research problem and the context of justification must indeed be distinguished, but we are not dealing with two strictly separate areas. By contrast, Popper and methodologists after him understand induction and deduction as two successive phases. In this model, normativity is contained in the induction i.e. in the motivation to examine a particular question or problem. In the further development of the research, induction and normativity are not relevant. The context of application experiences a similar fate to the context of discovery in (neo-) positivism. According to Immanuel Kant’s two questions—“What can I know?” and “What should I do?”—the first is understood as a question about the context of justification and the second as a question about the context of application. (Neo-) positivist thinking separates the two questions strictly; the first concerns academic research, the second morals. The first is descriptive by nature, the second normative. It is readily apparent that “discovery” and “application” play a role in a practical theological theory. Practical Theology is about the analysis of a particular practice and it seeks to contribute towards the improvement of practice. To that end, it needs a methodology that shows how both areas interact. 3.2

Empirical Research as Epistimology and Anthropology

For some time, there has been movement and change in methodological discussion. In that respect, we are not concerned with Paul Feyerabend’s proclamation of a methodological “anything goes”. Thomas Kuhn has criticized neo-positivist methodology in a way worthy of consideration, and thus the point of criticism concerns Popper’s division between the context of discovery and the context of justification. For Kuhn, the firm division between questions that concern the genesis of knowledge and questions that assess and justify knowledge becomes blurred in certain phases of academic research development. Above all, this is the case in times of crisis. For example, it can become apparent in the context of justification that traditional methods or yardsticks no longer suffice. This ascertainment still does not state which alternatives are available. To develop alternatives, according to Kuhn, the contexts of discovery and justification are to be brought into an experimental relationship. In the search for new ideas, new standards, and new justifications, a “uniform

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methodology” (such as Popper’s logical-rational line of reasoning according to the falsification principle) is still only one way. Alongside that, others are searched for and tested. Thus, Kuhn puts into perspective the dominant function of the context of justification. He describes a research situation in which competing theories are available to the researcher, all of which have withstood a strict empirical examination. That means that the methodology does not help any further to justify the choice (see Par. 4). The principle for the selection of a theory is instead the obvious (that is to say expected) practical value. The selection does not just take place for reasons of methodological quality. Where the practical value of a theory lies will, however, be judged differently by different individuals. In that case, researchers are referred back to individual standards. They go back to the context of discovery, and they incorporate the aim of the research (the context of application). It is in this way that Kuhn shows that there may be rational reasons to blur Popper’s strict division between the three knowledge areas. The net result of Kuhn’s considerations is to further the theory of knowledge. The methodology not only has an epistemological, but also an anthropological dimension. It may not simply pose questions about the product and about definitions; rather it must also encompass in terms of understanding how knowledge is attained. It must learn to recognize science as (human) conduct (cf. De Vries 1995, 136). On this note, the idea of a fundamental difference between the “perceiving subject” and the “perceived object” is questionable. In this context, Descartes had distinguished the levels “res extensa” (object) and “res cogitans” (subject). The “facts”, however, do not simply lie in waiting so that a researcher need only discover them. On the contrary, the interaction between researcher and the object of research shifts to the forefront. How this interaction is constituted should be revealed in view of the contexts of discovery, justification, and application of the research. 4. Context of Discovery What is the significance of henceforth considering the context of discovery more strongly than was the case in Popper’s methodology? An immediate consequence is that the context of discovery of a research problem is no longer treated as a “pre-scientific” area, but

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rather is understood as the systematic search for the core problems in the object area of the relevant academic discipline. Core problems are those that represent unresolved facts and whose solution appears desirable given the expected practice-relevant consequences. Because of this position, problem finding in research practice must become a constituent element in theoretical scientific reflection. Behind this lies the assumption that the context of discovery can also be rationally reconstructed. Researchers can explain how a problem question has come about, how the selection of perspectives occurred, what background the objectives and interests connected with the problem have, and so on. Science is a social phenomenon and it fulfils a social function. For this very reason there is an interest in the rational registration and control of the context of discovery and in an equivalence of importance to the context of justification. Criteria for decisions that affect the whole examination are obtained inside the context of discovery, and they establish the course of the examination and the utilization (expected-desired benefit). This information cannot be obtained from the analysis of the methodological procedure in the context of justification i.e. it is not only in the context of justification that it is decided whether a discovery has a scientific quality (Erdmann & Petersen 1979 II, 11ff.). Applied to practical theology, it is readily apparent that the theological core of a research programme is based in the context of discovery: in the perception of a problem as “problematic”, in the working out of “questionable” aspects, in the anticipation of possible solutions etc. For Werner Meinefeld, a comprehensive inspection of the knowledge thus includes the initial structuring of the object concerned: “The understanding process begins long before the formulation of explicit hypotheses and its result is influenced by this ‘pre’-phase, so that the theoretical analysis of the research work must also concern itself with this aspect” (Meinefeld 1995, 280). Every research result is dependent on factors that were not examined explicitly within the scope of the context of justification. “Then, the theoretical discussion cannot restrict itself solely to the methodical aspect; thus the scientific theory must include the interplay that constitutes ‘discovery’ between ‘object’ and ‘activity of discovery’. This also means that the scientific theory must become ‘more object-related’, thus including, in the deliberation on the appropriate method of research, the available specialist knowledge about the nature of the

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field of experience of which the object is constituted” (Meinefeld 1995, 273). If one concurs with these propositions, one also accepts that every function of knowledge is (theory-) guided. At the stage of limiting the research field and problem, there is already a relevant, albeit unconscious, influence by the researcher. There are the contours of expectation that structure the perception of the problem, producing a certain perspective, which, in turn, influences the research (cf. Soeffner & Hitzler 1994). The perception of problems is structured by these contours of expectation, and they lead to a certain perspectivity and selection, which is connected to that perspectivity (Lämmermann 1981, 115f.). In what theoretical framework the discoverable practice is evaluated and interpreted, and which anticipation of a desired practice is interwoven therein, is based on hermeneutical-theological reflection on the object field. This includes a selfexplanation of the perspectivity of the perception. 5. Context of Justification In Popper’s methodology, scientific research takes place in the context of justification. It has already been pointed out that decisions and interpretations in the research process are not restricted to the context of justification; instead, they are connected retrospectively with the context of discovery and prospectively with the context of application. When analysing the steps that make up the empirical analytical procedure, we see several areas where a decision or interpretation on the part of the researcher becomes necessary. One example of this is factor analysis. Factor analysis serves to filter out hidden dimensions (a plan, a structure, etc.) within a large number of items, thereby reducing the amount of data. This analysis is not just about randomly pushing a key on the computer. Mathematical statistics have produced and keep producing more and better methods of this form of analysis, and only a study of the factor clusters, commonness, and variance can tell us which method is the right one. One could opt for a high level of factor discrimination, but that could lead to a weaker variance among other things; one could go with a higher variance, but would then have to accept clustering a single item on two or more factors. The decision as to which result ought to be used for future analysis is not possible without an estimate on the

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part of the researcher. The result must be meaningful and relevant as well as interpretable. This also means that both theoretical knowledge gained by deduction and experience gained by induction are essential in order to make a well-founded decision. With a research example from a study with teachers of Religious Education (RE) in Germany, it can be illustrated why the context of justification cannot be viewed in isolation. As an example, a scale with various models of RE has been chosen. The study can only be briefly outlined; it is described in detail elsewhere (cf. comprehensively Ziebertz 1994, 125–140; and Ziebertz 1993). To understand the context it must first be pointed out that RE is taught denominationally in Germany. Here two problem areas tie together: – On the one hand, it is controversially debated in a formal context, whether RE should formulate the learning process in religion, about religion or from religion. Idealistically, what is referred to here is the “initiation of children and adolescents into a belief system,” “neutral information about one or several belief systems,” and “religious education from one or several religious traditions.” – On the other hand, it is debated in a material context, whether the instruction should limit itself to Christianity, or whether there should be a widening of the perspective to all religions and worldviews. The conceptualisation is represented in table 1. The formal models “in/about/from” are divided horizontally; the restriction to Christianity versus the expansion to all religions and philosophies is depicted vertically. Table 1. Conceptualisation of the Educational Models (i) Formal dimension Religious Education . . . in Religion (In) Material 1.2 Dimension

Restriction to Christianity (Chr) In Chr Treatment of all Religions, ./. World-Views/ Philosophies (RelW)

about Religion (Ab)

from Religion (Fr)

Ab Chr

Fr Chr

Ab RelW

Fr RelW

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-  Table 2. Correlation between Concepts (p ≤ .001) and Mean-Values

InChr AbChr FrChr AbRelW Mean

InChr

AbCHr

FrChr

AbRelW

FrRelW

./.

.39

.43 .37

Ns Ns Ns

4,17

4,83

4,38

4,48

Ns Ns Ns Ns 4,21

(mean-values: 1 = negative; 3,5 middle; 6 = positive)

Nine-hundred teachers who take denominational RE classes took part in the study. The question was: whether they identify these models, what relationship they see between the models, and how they judge them. Table 2 shows that the Christianity-oriented ranges correlate and that the coefficients show values in the middle area. The rest of the ranges do not correlate to a significant extent. The positive values lay between 4,17 and 4,83 on a 6-point range (forced choice). Instruction “about” Christianity receives the highest approval (in first place!). Instruction “about” religions follows in second place. Both models can be localized within a religious-scientific frame of reference, within which pupils should receive knowledge “about” Christianity and, as the case may be, “about” all religions. The concept instruction “in” Christianity is valued least positively. The concepts are placed in between to take orientation for life “from” the religions. Table 3 illustrates the decisive facts. It shows a factor-analysis in four steps: first, a free factor-analysis, then analyses in which the number of factors is deliberately reduced. In all of the analyses, the same criteria are applied (see legend in Tab. 3). Through a reduction of factors, it can be made clear which conceptual structure is “rudimentary”. Next, the respondents make a distinction according to the formal structure whether in, about, or from these religious traditions is being worked on. In the first stage of reduction to four factors, the respondents integrate the concepts and . With the reduction to three factors, the concept is additionally integrated. Until this step in the analysis the concepts and remain unchanged. Not until the reduction to two factors are the two concepts integrated. The further the reduction is taken, the more apparent the “discriminating” role of

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Table 3. Factor-analysis Free factoranalysis

Criterium 4 factors

Criterium 3 factors

Criterium 2 factors

Concepts

Variance

InChr FrChr AbChr AbRelW FrRelW 65,8 %

}

}

stable  stable  stable 

stable 

stable  stable  56,8 %

} 50,0 %

41,4 %

Eigenvalue ≥ 1,0 / Factor-loading ≥ .50 / Communality ≥ .25 / Multi-loading diff. ≥ .20 First step: oblimin rotation (factor-corr. Matrix r ≤ .30); second step: varimax rotation/Kaiser The grey fields signify the factors. The columns from left to right show how the factors of a 5-factor resolution conjoin step-by-step to a 2-factor resolution.

the material dimension becomes. A one-factor solution was statistically impossible. The analyses show that the theoretically construed models exist and how the connection between the models is constituted, how it depends on the agreement of the respondents etc. A practical-theological theory, as further described above, looks to go a step further, however, and make statements on the meaning of the findings. To that end, recourse to the contexts of discovery and application of the research project is unavoidable. To give some examples: – It is conceivable that the study has a didactical interest in the linking of the dimensions . The third factor analysis shows that teachers can envisage such an integration in Christian religious education. Until this step in the analysis, that is not equally the case for overly denominational religious instruction. From a pedagogical viewpoint (i.e. in the eyes of teachers), denominational instruction can be further developed, both didactically and integrationally (by way of integration). – It is also conceivable that the context of the study is embedded in a conflict model. An integration into the material dimension is advocated ahead of the background of a model “Religious instruction for everyone”. In view of our increasingly multi-cultural society, such instruction is urgently required. The fourth factor analysis shows that the current teaching body makes a clear distinction between religious instruction centred on Christianity and religious instruction that deals with all religions and world-views. This situation can be understood as an obstacle or a challenge.

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– Furthermore, it is conceivable that in relation to RE teachers’ training, the introduction of the science of religion as an ancillary discipline alongside theology will be discussed. The two-factoranalysis shows that the surveyed teachers make the strongest distinction between both areas. This result can be seen as an obstacle or a challenge. – Finally, it is conceivable that traditional religious instruction should be analysed and that it should be structured according to the ecclesiastical conception as instruction in Christianity. The first factor-solution shows that this model is identifiable and distinct from the other models. The fact that this model met with the least approval of all signifies a problem. The surveyed teachers endorse the “about” model most strongly. This result can be interpreted as a difficulty with in Religious Education or as a challenge. Methodological rules alone are not sufficient to interpret results. Researchers are referred back to which reasons for discovery they had, what perception of the problem played a prevailing role, how they approached the object field, which “solutions” they anticipated, etc. This process may be reconstructed as the “iterative” coupling of the context of justification with the contexts of discovery and application. It is in this way that the constructive aspect of empirical procedure comes clearly to the fore. Between the position of radical constructivism, which holds that objectivity is unattainable, and the position of objectivism, according to which the object is directly perceptible, the focus is on the interplay between the object of discovery and the system of discovery—between object (practice in the field) and scientific practice. Methodical exactness must not supersede the questions of what the result is founded on and what it stands for. Knowledge in practical sciences does not occur without a purpose (for its own sake). It takes place to develop a theory of practice that is in a position to develop scientific theories and to provide professionals in the field with concepts for their orientation. 6. Context of Application The context of application has been mentioned because the question regarding the application of the research does not arise only when one has a result. The anticipation of a solution is already contained

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in the elaboration of a problem. John Dewey developed a structural model of research in his work “The Pattern of Inquiry,” (1938) in which he explains this phenomenon. The potential beginning of a research project is when an undetermined situation throws up certain questions. These questions may be experienced as confusing, obscure or conflicting. A research process begins with the decisive second step, at which point a researcher judges a situation to be “problematic” and allows himself to be challenged by the questions. That means that a problem must be expressly stated “as a problem”, thus, institutionalized. For Dewey, it is a major achievement to have determined what exactly the problem is that makes the research necessary. Without a problem, one is merely groping in the dark. The way in which one understands a problem determines which particular assumptions will be made and which will not, and which particular observations will be made and which will not. In a third step, the issue is the laying down of a solution to the problem. To that end, the aspects that characterise (or constitute) a problematic situation are observed. The observation provides ideas, which in turn guide further observations. For Dewey, ideas are not just assumptions; they are a function of reasoning. It is in ideas that possible consequences are anticipated i.e. already in this phase it is a matter of broadening the field of reference from the discovery of a problem to its solution. In the fourth step it is a matter of developing the meaning of the ideas and associating that meaning with other conceptual structures until a model that can be experimentally tested is achieved. The fifth step builds on the above. Ideas and empirical facts are not identical; facts alone have no meaning. They become meaningful when they are brought into interaction with ideas. With the help of ideas, possible solutions become recognisable in the facts; ideas evoke more observation; through the interaction with facts ideas become clearer and sharper, and, by reason of the new ordering of ideas, new facts can be recognised. The facts have a provisional character. Their function is to help solve a problem. Finally, the sixth step concerns the abstraction of meanings, independent of a particular content in relation to a limited group to which they [the meanings] apply; and thus with the completion of the sixth step, the theory comes into being (cf. Dewey 1938). With this interpretation Dewey shows that the guiding ideas deserve priority attention. It is here that the conceptual hypotheses assumptions on a specific theme are contained and it is here that anticipations of a solution are developed.

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In the context of application, it is not, therefore, a matter of loading empirically elevated factual circumstances with “normativity” or of formulating appeals. Normativity is expressed much more discursively. The function of the context of application is to arrive at a new insight into the problematic situation, with the help of the new ordering of ideas. In addition, the solution anticipated in the context of discovery is distinguished, perhaps even replaced. The result does not exist as concrete recommendations for conduct but rather as theory. Only with the abstraction of the meaning of the empirical data is it made possible to apply it (theory) to other groups and situations. It is in this that the value of a theory of practice lies. It does not just provide facts but also insight into the underlying ideas. It offers a platform for understanding, re-experience and critical judgement (cf. Weber 1904, 151). In itself, the outcome of being able to formulate the starting question in a more refined way at the end of a project constitutes a practice-relevant contribution. Thus, normativity in the context of application is expressed discursively: in the construction and re-construction of leading ideas, in the interaction between ideas and facts, and finally in the abstraction of this interaction through the generation of theoretical statements about a research project. 7. Discursive Normativity This paper has examined the question of whether and how normativity is spoken about in empirical practical-theological research. It has been shown that certain normative decisions are, from the outset, tied to Practical Theology’s claim to develop object theories of practice. Furthermore, it has been emphasised that normativity plays a role in all phases of the empirical research cycle and that the phases overlap. The question is therefore not whether there is normativity, but how normativity is dealt with. The issue of how one speaks of normativity is significant. The concept “discursive normativity” was chosen in the considerations at hand. Thus, it is not a matter of normativity cultivated in politically motivated ideologies used to enforce one’s own notions. The interest is rather to grasp, arrange, and describe the normativity that plays a role in a particular area of practice, that causes conflicts, that breaks down conduct, etc.; to present normativity in theories which seek to illuminate problems

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of a particular practice; to structure the description of normativity in practice and in corresponding theories so that it is reconstructable and that it may be contradicted; to rationally reconstruct the iterative relationship between knowledge and object; and to reveal the implicit decisions so that comment may be made upon the necessity and adequacy of those decisions. Normativity arises discursively and it also evokes criticism. The newer discussion on the social construction of reality serves as a reminder that empirical research also constructs “models”. In these models, certain facets of a particular practice are abstracted in a particular way and for particular reasons, so that something is always accordingly said about both reality and the perception of reality. The aim of such information is to open up discussions and not to close them based on research results. In that case, we are no longer talking about normativity, but rather about hermeneutics. Empirical methodology and hermeneutics are first combined in order to avoid empirically weak hermeneutical speculation. Empirical methods are an enrichment of modern hermeneutics, concerning itself just as much with the explanation of methods of its knowledge as with an adequate grasp of the constitution of its object. Second, empirical methods and hermeneutics are tied together when one seeks to avoid an empirical research methodology which is lacking in ideas. With the help of hermeneutics, empirical research can show that it does make a contribution to the understanding of situations and those acting, as well as showing how it makes that contribution. This combination is the key to qualitatively exacting research that serves as a third degree theory of scientific research and practice. Models aid the understanding of practice. The development of models touches on numerous issues: why this particular practice, why this element of the practice, why these dimensions of concepts, why these methods, why these methods in this variation and not in another, why these analyses, why these criteria during the analyses, why this evaluation, why this scope of reference with the interpretation, why these commendations and why this criticism? It was part of a naïve empiricism to lay claim to and to defend the ability to objectively portray the true face of reality. A critical use of empiricism recognises the decision character of empirical research and the inability to conclude (to put it positively, the principal openness) analyses and theories. The search for the truth is not put into perspective with this concept—it remains a central task of the science. But this truth

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only exists relationally: it exists only in relation to the alternative possibilities, to carry out (empirical) research, and to the alternative decisions which could be made before, during and at the end of the research process. That is exactly why normativity cannot come up any other way other than discursively. An earlier version of this revised chapter in Journal of Empirical Theology 15 (1), 5–18. References De Vries, G. (1995). De ontwikkeling van wetenschap. Groningen. Dewey, J. (1938). The Pattern of Inquiry. In J.A. Boydston. (Ed.) (1986), The Later Works 1925–1953. (105–122). Carbondale/Edwardsville. Erdmann, H.W. & Petersen, J. (1979f.). Strukturen empirischer Forschungsprozesse (Vol. I & II). Kastellaun. Kelle, U. (1997). Empirische begründete Theoriebildung. Weinheim. Lämmermann, G. (1981). Praktische Theologie als kritische oder als empirisch-funktionale Handlungstheorie? München. Meinefeld, W. (1995). Realität und Konstruktion. Erkenntnistheoretische Grundlagen einer Methodologie der empirischen Sozialforschung. Opladen. Mette, N. (1978). Theorie der Praxis. Düsseldorf. —— (1984). Von der Anwendungs- zur Handlungswissenschaft. In O. Fuchs O. (Ed.), Theologie und Handeln (50–63). Düsseldorf. Otto, E. (1994). Theologische Ethik des Alten Testaments. Stuttgart. Popper, K. (1980). The Logic of Scientific Discovery. London. Rössler, D. (1994). Grundriss der Praktischen Theologie. Berlin. Soeffner, H.-G. & Hitzler, R. (1994). Hermeneutik als Haltung und Handlung. Über methodisch kontrolliertes Verstehen. In N. Schröer (Ed.), Interpretative Sozialforschung (28–54). Opladen. Vollmer, G. (1993) (Ed.). Wissenschaftstheorie im Einsatz. Stuttgart. Weber, M. (1904). Die Objektivität sozialwissenschaftlicher und sozialpolitischer Erkentnis. In Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Wissenschaftslehre (146–214). Tübingen. Weniger, E. (1964). Die Eigenständigkeit der Erziehung in Theorie und Praxis. Weinheim. Ziebertz, H.-G. (1993). Religious Pluralism and Religious Education. Journal of Empirical Theology 6 (2), 78–98. —— (1994). Religionspädagogik als empirische Wissenschaft. Weinheim. —— (1996). Objektivität und Handlungsnormativität. Ein Dilemma der empirisch orientierten Praktischen Theologie? Theologisch-Praktische Quartalschrift 144 (4), 412–428. —— (1998). Continuity and Discontinuity. International Journal of Practical Theology 2 (1), 1–22. —— (1999). Religion, Christentum und Moderne. Veränderte Religionspräsenz als Herausforderung. Stuttgart ——, Schweitzer, F., Häring, H. & Browning, D. (2000) (Eds.). The Human Image of God. Leiden —— (2001) (Ed.). Imagining God. Empirical Explorations from an International Perspective. Münster. —— (2001) (Ed.). Religious Individualization and Christian Religious Semantics. Münster.

LIST OF AUTHORS Dreyer, Jaco S. Associate Professor of Practical Theology at the University of South Africa, Pretoria. Feeser-Lichterfeld, Ulrich Assistant lecturer at the Seminar for Pastoral Theology at the University of Bonn, Germany. Francis, Leslie J. Director of the Welsh National Centre for Religious Education and Professor of Practical Theology at the University of Wales, Bangor, United Kingdom. Ganzevoort, R. Ruard Associate Professor of Practical Theology at the Theological University of Kampen, The Netherlands. De Jong, Aad Professor of Identity of Catholic Schools and Religious Education at the University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands. Heimbrock, Hans-Günter Professor of Practical Theology at the University of Frankfurt/M., Germany. Kläden, Tobias Assistant lecturer at the Seminar for Pastoral Theology and Religious Education at the University of Münster, Germany. Morgenthaler, Christoph Professor of Pastoral Care and Pastoral Psychology at the University of Bern, Switzerland. Scherer-Rath, Michael Assistant Professor of Empirical Practical Theology at the University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands.

308

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Schilderman, Hans Associate Professor of Empirical Practical Theology at the University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands. Schmälzle, Udo Fr. Professor of Practical Theology and Religious Education at the University of Münster, Germany. Schweitzer, Friedrich Professor of Practical Theology and Religious Education at the University of Tübingen, Germany. Van der Ven, Johannes A. Professor of Comparative Empirical Theology at the University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands. Vermeer, Paul Assistant Professor of Empirical Practical Theology at the University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands. Ziebertz, Hans-Georg Professor of Practical Theology and Religious Education at the University of Würzburg, Germany.

INDEX action 92, 93, 163 – science 50 adult religiosity 169 analysis 54, 55 – factor 55, 298, 300 – path 214, 215, 218, 221 Apartheid 3, 7, 9 aporetic structure 129 apostolic debate 225 apostolicity 231 approach – theological 165 attitude – towards death 199, 202, 203, 205, 208, 213, 218 – towards pastoral ministry 230 – towards ordination 231 – towards spirituality 231 authentic religious faith 282, 283 authority 41, 112 – concepts of church authority 237, 238 autonomy 282, 283 background 53 behaviour 36, 37 – theory of 37 belief 39, 43, 45 belonging 12, 13 caritas 257, 259, 260, 262–266 – reform models 263 – Christian profile 263, 264 caritas employees 264, 265 – relation to the church 259, 260 – identity of 264, 265 – profile of 266 caritas employees’ attitude towards: – faith and work 265 – option for the poor 265 – diaconal profile of church 266 causal strategy 118 causation 42, 51 – bottom up 43 – intentional 43 – top down 43 challenge 3, 8, 70, 87, 97 character traits 147

church – actualisations of the church 258, 260, 261 – praxis 254 – relevance 257 – task of 260, 261 city 62, 63 classical apologetics 239, 240, 242 communication of the gospel 262 communitarianism 110, 111 conclusion 56 conduct 292, 293 conjectural criticism 241, 242, 243 content-validity 118 context 5, 7, 8, 11, 43, 44 – institutional 115 – temporal duration 116 – of application 202, 295, 296, 298, 301, 302, 304 – of discovery 202, 294–298, 301, 302, 304 – of justification 202, 294–298, 302 contextualisation 79 contingency 205 Copernican revolution 251 decisions 53, 179, 180, 182, 298, 304 deduction 295 deductive 106, 117, 208 development of research projects 164 diaconia 257–259, 260, 262–266 dialectic 184, 187, 193, 280, 281 differences – between generations 174 – in church growth 151 – in church life 151 – individual 141–143, 147, 148 – in effectiveness of prayer 153 – in priorities in ministry 152 discourse 19, 20, 23 – first order 20–23, 26, 28, 30, 31 – second order 20–22, 26, 30, 31 – referential dimension of 22 – performative dimension of 22 distanciation 12, 13, 14 distinction 78 distortion 7, 13 doing theology 80

310



double hermeneutics 113, 115 dual claim 165, 174 Dutch catholic church 228, 229 ecclesial praxis 253 ecumene 96 emancipation 228, 229, 230 empirical cycle 117, 200, 279, 281, 284 – normative implications of 204 – phases of 201, 202 empirical inductive approach 280 empirical methodology 200, 293 empirical methods 251, 305 (see also: research) empirical psychology 146 empirical turn 17, 86, 88, 97 empiricism 35, 48, 103, 164, 305 endemic motives 228 epistemological break 12 escapism 3, 7, 14 ethics 90, 92 – of belief 277 ethical universalism 92 evaluation 56, 57 expectation 298 experience 48, 87 – of evil 275 explanation 37– 40, 42–47, 49–53, 56 – causal 39, 40 – normative 36, 37, 38, 39 – rational 43 explanatory statement 38 faith 72, 239, 240 – experiences of 138 fallibility 241, 242, 243 falsification 107 formation and religion 283 form of life 110 freedom 282 freedom of religion 281–285 function of religion 258 gender profiling 150 general 127 generalisation 118 gestalt 167 – type 167, 168 – typology 168 glossololia 155 God 21, 23 – idea 205, 206, 221

– orientation function of 206 – explications of 205–208, 218, 219 – index word 205 (see also: image) good 101, 127, 128 grand design thinking 110 ground of meaning 205, 206 health 153 hermeneutical framework 11 (see also: theory) hermeneutic – approach 118 – judgement 123, 124 – model 120 text/application 122 correspondence of terms 122 correspondence of relations 122, 123 – method 120, 123 hermeneutic circle method 168 hermeneutic interpretation 240, 241, 243 hermeneutics 305 historicism 241 history 6 – practical theology 17, 59 – pastoral office 226 – empirical research in theology 86 human sciences 251, 255, 256 hypotheses 294 ideas 303, 304 ideology 5–7, 9, 10, 13, 14, 108 image – God 10, 199, 204–209, 214, 215, 218, 219, 221 – contextual 207 – interpersonal 209, 210, 213, 219 – intrapersonal 209, 210, 212, 213 – non-personal 209, 210, 213, 214, 219 – methodological application of 208 – normative implications of 204–207, 218, 221 – operationalisation of 210 – evaluation of 221 (see also: God) Gods will 49

 imagination – cultural/social 5, 6 independent religious thought 284 individualisation 257 induction 295 inductive 106, 117, 208 innovation 7 integration 139, 140 intensionality 39 interaction 254, 255 interdisciplinary 140, 141 intergenerational – ambivalence 189–192 – relations 189, 190 – solidarity 189–191 intermediate variables – switching of 203, 204 interplay 98–91, 94, 95, 97 interpretation 104, 105, 279 intradisciplinary 139, 141 iterative 294, 302, 305 knowledge 13, 46–48, 51, 90, 91, 292, 293, 295–298, 302 – interests 164, 165, 256 liberalism 110, 111 liberation 52 lifespan 167, 173 – pastoral theology 174 – pastoral care 174 life-world 72 – perspective 70 – approach 77, 78 limit experiences 199, 202–205, 208, 211, 212, 214, 218, 219, 221 longing for God 275 macro-programme 110 material field 91 mature religiosity – criteria 171, 172 – theological criteria 173 medical science 102, 125 meta-dimension 168 meta-norm 284–287 metaphor 221, 222 metaphorical knowledge 221 method – phenomenological – normative impact 78 – normative implications 77 – qualitative 105, 114–116 – quantitative 105, 116–118

311

methodological fixation 256 methodological perspective 137, 138 – empirical theology 138 – social sciences 139, 140 methodology – epistemological dimension 296 – anthropological dimension 296 minister 29 ministry 226 – pristine 225, 227 model 89, 91, 93, 305 motivator 45 multiple regression analysis 211 naturalistic fallacy 164, 247 negative utilitarianism 242 neutrality 109, 277 normative choice 96, 112 normative claims 234, 239, 244, 247 – characteristics of 227 – how question of 227, 239 – in pastoral ministry 225, 227, 235, 248 – legitimations 244 – normative power of 234 – pedagogical 286, 287 – social power of 234 – symbolic power of 234, 238 – theological 286, 287 – where and when question of 227, 228, 232 – who question of 227, 238 – why question of 228, 234 normative criteria 24–27, 29, 30, 180 normative explanation 36, 37, 38 normative inductive approach 280 normativeness 47, 49–51, 225, 233, 234, 240, 270 – institutional 234 – pedagogical 270, 276, 280, 281 – religious 232 – social 235 – theological 270, 275, 280, 281 normative organisations 234 normative perspectives – interaction of 238 normative questions 127, 163 – consequentialist 127–129 – deontological 127, 128 – teleological 127, 128 – utilistic 127–29 normative statements 92 normativity 5, 7, 8, 11, 25, 26, 29,

312



30, 35, 85–89, 92–95, 97, 103, 164, 289, 293, 295, 304, 305 – contextual 185–187 – discursive 293, 304, 305, 306 – social 186 – theological 87, 90, 93, 97, 179, 184, 186, 188, 190–192, 195, 194 – positioning 186 – reshaping 186, 187 – and empirical research 196, 197 – in research process 289, 290 norms 35, 36, 45–47, 110, 225, 227 – theological 87, 92 objectivity 48 obligation 45 option for man 261 orientation – ecclesiastical 10 – interreligious 10 – practical 102 – normative 102 orientation point 205, 218, 221 over-summativity 167 Pastoral Care Survey 148–156 – instrument 148, 149 pastoral counseling expectations 199, 202, 203, 205, 208, 214, 215, 218, 219, 221 – models 214 – participatory-religious 215, 219 – thematic-religious 215, 219 – kerygmatic religious 215, 219 pastoral office – views of 245, 246 pastoral praxis 219 pastoral work 173, 174 pastors 229, 230 paradox 73 pedagogical perspective 278, 279, 281, 282, 283, 285 pedagogy 270, 280 perception 70, 71, 104, 105 – ambivalence 71 – concept 70 – sensual 64 – of God 81 – phenomenological concept 71 personal characteristics 199, 203, 208, 211, 212, 214, 218 personality 141 – and charismatic gifts 155

– and church growth 151 – and denominational profile 150–151 – and exit from ministry 154 – and health in ministry 153 – and ministry priorities 152–153 – and psychology 143 – and theology 141–142 personality – dimensions 151 – empirical description – and theological norms 145–147 – factors 143, 144, 147 – profile 146 – psychology 147 – theory 143 – three-dimensional model 148, 149 personality profile – feminine 150 – masculine 150 personal religiosity 161 personality scales 149 – extraversion 149–153, 155 – neuroticism 149–155 – psychotism 149, 152, 153 personhood – in Christian doctrines 142, 143 pexhn (knowledge, science) 101, 102, 125, 126 phenomena 104 phenomenological description 76 phenomenology 59, 61 pillars of identity 228 pluralisation 257 plurality 240, 241 – in humanity 147 positivism 105, 116, 293, 294, 295 – methodological 162 poverty 258 practical moral reasoning 27 – levels of 27–31 practical philosophy 102, 126 practical sciences 269 practical theology 137, 254, 255, 269, 270, 278, 280, 285 – as independent discipline 254 – concern 137, 138 – empirical approach 162 – empirical orientation 269 – normative orientation 269, 270 – goals 163 – material object of 253, 254, 255 – formal object of 254

 – task of 253 – theory 292, 295, 301 practical value 296 practices – classes of 126, 127, 130 – specific 126 prajiw (action) 101, 102 praxis 23, 31, 32, 46, 48, 49, 56, 125, 127, 255 – concept 126, 127 predication 38, 39, 41, 55 premature exit from ministry 154 professionalisation – aims 245, 246 – support of 246, 247 professionalism 28, 29 proportions 55 propositional structure 41 public 19, 20, 235, 236 qualitative method – individual level problems 114 – collective level problems 115 quality criteria 165, 169 rationality 50, 57, 276, 278 reality 47, 48, 89, 90, 93, 294, 305 – construction of 252 – definition of 251 reasons 40, 41, 56 – causal 42, 43 – external 44, 45 – internal 44 – justificatory 42 – normative 45–49, 53, 56 relation 41, 42, 49, 54 – causal 42, 43 relationship 85, 86, 88, 91–93 relevance 50, 185, 186 reliability 115 religion 3, 4, 258, 260 – twofold concept 69 – theoretical reflection 68 religious codes 233, 235 religious – development 169, 170 – genetic phase models 170, 171 – lifespan approach 171 – development in adulthood 161, 166 religious education 94–96, 270, 282, 283, 285, 286

313

– argumentative-communicative approach 277, 279 religious faith 277 religious gestalt 166, 167, 169 – change 167, 169 – five dimensions 167 – seven types 167, 168 religious individualisation 161 religious pluralisation 161 religious practices 269, 278, 281, 285, 291 religious role images 236, 237, 238 religious self-realization 282 religious signs 233, 234 renovation 262 representation 47, 48 research – empirical 8, 9, 10, 36, 45, 46, 49, 50, 60, 61, 85–88, 92, 94, 96, 97, 107–109, 111, 129, 164, 181, 182, 184, 242, 243, 247, 280 – in practical theology 163, 165, 185, 187, 245, 247, 248, 290 – planning 179 – relationship to normativity 165, 175, 180 – task of empirical research 163 – field 75, 76 – instruments, selection of 192 – intention 76 – methodology 293 – model 303 – object 76, 289 – objective 200–203 – practical theological 27 – phenomenological methodology 73 – question(s) 52, 53, 200–203 – reflexive 75 – theological 185 – task of 255, 256 research methods – in practical theology 25 research results – evaluation of 119 reservation 77 reshaping – theology 80 – theological normativity 186, 187 rights 45 risk-assessment 129 ritual 179 – theoretical approach 192, 193 – interpretation of 193

314

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ritualisation 179, 189, 190 – types of 180 science 46, 91, 126 scientific methodology 36 self-determination 283 sensus fidelium 164 sex differences 150 singular 127 social constructionism 18, 19 social-cultural identity 229 social psychology – personality theories 143 social problems 258, 259 social sciences – research techniques 138, 139 sociology of knowledge 8, 108, 244 solution 303, 304 statements – theological 119, 120 – faith 119, 120 statistical calculation 55 story – collective 6 subjectivity 48 subsidiarity 247 suffering 277 suicide crisis aspects 199, 202, 203, 211, 212, 214, 218 systems model 181, 182–188, 258 – subsystems 182 tension 278, 279, 280 theodicy – comprehension 272–275, 279, 284 – judgement 272–275, 279, 284 – theological importance of 275 – educational value of 276, 277 theodicy models – retaliation model 271, 272, 274, 276, 284 – plan model 271, 272, 274, 275, 276, 279, 284 – compassion model 271, 272, 274, 276, 278, 284 – rationality of theodicy models 275, 276 theological enquiry – material 137 theological knowledge 49 theological norm 57 theological perspective 278, 279, 281, 282, 283, 285 theological re-evaluation 186, 187

theological reflection 280 – on children/childhood 186, 187 theological truth 254 theology 85, 88, 89, 92–94, 137, 280, 282 – academic study 138 – contextual 17 – empirical 19–22, 24–26, 31, 32, 68, 140, 141, 143, 154, 290 – dual claim of 165, 174 – formal object of 195 – normative implications of 187 – perspectives on 140 – experiental 87 – historical 89–91, 96 – philosophical 89–91, 96 – practical 17, 19, 36, 46, 47, 49, 51, 86, 88–93, 96, 102, 103, 125–127, 130, 152, 153, 290, 291, 295, 297 – phenomenological model of 68 – material object of 290, 291 – task of 49, 252 theoretical premise 203, 204 theoretical research model 201, 202 – empirical verification of 216–219 theoretical theology – practical element of 291 theory 291–293, 302–304 – critical hermeneutical 4, 11 – general 182 – middle range 182, 189, 190 – phenomenological 70 – systems 182 theory formation 165 theory-laden 105, 106, 107 theory of practice 291, 293, 304 – value of 304 theory of science 109 third degree theory 285, 292, 295 – normativity in 292, 293 total reason 45 tradition 6, 7, 240, 241 triangulation 26 truth claims 21, 22 urban – celebration of life 68 – culture – historical review 62 – theological analysis 63 – phenomenological model – food patterns 65 – homelessness 66

63

 – life-style 64 – non-places 65 – spatial identity 65, 66 – virtuality 67 utopia 5–7, 9

315

value-laden 108, 109, 111, 112, 195 values 45 variable 54, 55 verification 106

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