Naval Issues: Background and Operations

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DEFENSE, SECURITY AND STRATEGIES

NAVAL ISSUES: BACKGROUND AND OPERATIONS

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DEFENSE, SECURITY AND STRATEGIES

NAVAL ISSUES: BACKGROUND AND OPERATIONS

ANTHONY D. EANUZZI EDITOR

Nova Science Publishers, Inc. New York

Copyright © 2011 by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted in any form or by any means: electronic, electrostatic, magnetic, tape, mechanical photocopying, recording or otherwise without the written permission of the Publisher. For permission to use material from this book please contact us: Telephone 631-231-7269; Fax 631-231-8175 Web Site: http://www.novapublishers.com

NOTICE TO THE READER The Publisher has taken reasonable care in the preparation of this book, but makes no expressed or implied warranty of any kind and assumes no responsibility for any errors or omissions. No liability is assumed for incidental or consequential damages in connection with or arising out of information contained in this book. The Publisher shall not be liable for any special, consequential, or exemplary damages resulting, in whole or in part, from the readers‘ use of, or reliance upon, this material. Any parts of this book based on government reports are so indicated and copyright is claimed for those parts to the extent applicable to compilations of such works. Independent verification should be sought for any data, advice or recommendations contained in this book. In addition, no responsibility is assumed by the publisher for any injury and/or damage to persons or property arising from any methods, products, instructions, ideas or otherwise contained in this publication. This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information with regard to the subject matter covered herein. It is sold with the clear understanding that the Publisher is not engaged in rendering legal or any other professional services. If legal or any other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent person should be sought. FROM A DECLARATION OF PARTICIPANTS JOINTLY ADOPTED BY A COMMITTEE OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION AND A COMMITTEE OF PUBLISHERS. Additional color graphics may be available in the e-book version of this book.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA O'Rourke, Ronald. Naval issues : background and operations / [edited by] Anthony D. Eanuzzi. p. cm. Includes index. ISBN 978-1-61122-288-3 (eBook) 1. United States. Navy--Operational readiness. 2. United States. Navy--Weapons systems. 3. United States. Navy--Procurement. 4. Sea-power--United States--History--21st century. 5. United States--History, Naval--21st century. I. Eanuzzi, Anthony D. II. Title. VA58.4O76 2011 359'.030973--dc22 2010035903

Published by Nova Science Publishers, Inc. † New York

CONTENTS Preface

vii

Chapter 1

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress 1 Ronald O’Rourke

Chapter 2

Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress Ronald O’Rourke

Chapter 3

Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress Ronald O’Rourke

35

Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress Ronald O’Rourke

65

DOD Leases of Foreign-Built Ships: Background for Congress Ronald O’Rourke

91

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Chapter 7

Navy Aegis Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization: Background and Issues for Congress Ronald O’Rourke

19

103

Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background and Issues for Congress 115 Ronald O’Rourke

Chapter Sources

139

Index

141

PREFACE A navy (sometimes called a maritime force) is the branch of a nation's armed forces principally designated for naval warfare and amphibious warfare; namely, lake- or ocean-borne combat operations and related functions. It includes anything conducted by surface ships, amphibious ships, submarines, and seaborne aviation, as well as ancillary support, communications, training, and other fields; recent developments have included space related operations. This book discusses the issues facing the United States Navy, including warfare and counterterrorism operations; leases on foreign-built ships; Navy force structure and shipbuilding plans; and aircraft carrier programs. Chapter 1- The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy‘s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional defense committees for the past several years. The Navy‘s FY2011 budget submission retains, for the time being at least, the goal of achieving and maintaining a 313-ship fleet that the Navy first presented to Congress in February 2006. Although the 313-ship goal remains in place, some elements of Navy ship force planning that have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from elements of the 313-ship plan. The Navy‘s report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan refers to a forthcoming force structure assessment (FSA). Such an assessment could produce a replacement for the 313-ship plan. It is not clear when the FSA might be conducted, or when a replacement for the 313-ship plan might be issued. Chapter 2- Names for Navy ships traditionally have been chosen and announced by the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President and in accordance with rules prescribed by Congress. Rules for giving certain

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types of names to certain types of Navy ships have evolved over time. There have been exceptions to the Navy‘s ship-naming rules, particularly for the purpose of naming a ship for a person when the rule for that type of ship would have called for it to be named for something else. Some observers in recent years have perceived a breakdown in, or corruption of, the rules for naming Navy ships. Chapter 3- CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80 are the first three ships in the Navy‘s new Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs). CVN-78 was procured in FY2008 and is being funded with congressionally authorized four-year incremental funding in FY2008-FY2011. The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget estimates the ship‘s procurement cost at $11,531.0 million (i.e., about $11.5 billion) in then-year dollars, and requests $1,731.3 million in procurement funding as the final increment to complete this estimated procurement cost. CVN-79 is scheduled for procurement in FY2013, and has received advance procurement funding since FY2007. The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget estimates the ship‘s procurement cost at $10,413.1 million (i.e., about $10.4 billion) in then-year dollars and requests Chapter 4- The Navy has been procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) at a rate of one per year for the past several years, and a total of 12 boats have been procured through FY2011. The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget increases the procurement rate to two boats per year. The eight boats to be procured in the five-year period FY2009FY2013 (boats 11 through 18) are being procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement. The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget requests $3,441.5 million in procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of the 13th and 14th Virginia-class boats. The FY2011 budget estimates the combined procurement cost of these two boats at $5,344.4 million, and the boats have received a total of $1,903.0 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) and Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) funding. The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget also requests $1,436.8 million in AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in future years, and $254.4 million in Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) purchases of long-leadtime items for Virginia-class boats to be procured under the FY2009-FY2013 MYP arrangement. Chapter 5- Prior to the enactment of the FY2008 defense authorization act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008), 10 U.S.C. §2401 stated DOD may not lease a vessel or aircraft for a period of more than five years unless it

Preface

ix

is specifically authorized by law to make such a lease. Operating under this provision, the Department of Defense (DOD) in recent years used lease options and renewals to lease some foreign-built cargo ships for total periods of almost 10 years—a length of time that some observers argue effectively circumvented a legal requirement that U.S. military ships be built in U.S. shipyards. These observers, particularly the American Shipbuilding Association (ASA), proposed reducing the current five-year legal limit on ship leases to two years for foreign-built ships. DOD opposed the idea, arguing that its ship leases are the most cost-effective way to meet its needs for the ships in question. Chapter 6- The Navy has begun a program to modernize its 22 in-service Aegis cruisers and the 62 Aegis destroyers procured in FY2005 and prior years. Under Navy plans, the modernization of these 84 ships would occur over a period of more than 20 years. The program‘s estimated total cost is about $16.6 billion in constant FY2010 dollars. The modernizations are intended to ensure that the ships can be operated cost-effectively throughout their entire 35- or 40-year intended service lives. The modernizations of all 62 destroyers and at least 10 of the cruisers are to include the installation of a capability for conducting ballistic missile defense (BMD) operations. Chapter 7- The Department of Defense (DOD) is placing an increased planning and budgeting emphasis on irregular warfare (IW) operations, such as counterinsurgency operations. In addition, counterterrorism (CT) operations have been a DOD area of emphasis since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The Navy for several years has carried out a variety of IW and CT activities, and has taken some steps in recent years to strengthen its ability to conduct such activities. The Navy‘s IW and CT activities pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including the definition of Navy IW activities, specific Navy IW budget priorities, and how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets.

In: Naval Issues: Background and Operations ISBN: 978-1-61122-008-7 Editors: Anthony D. Eanuzzi © 2011 Nova Science Publishers, Inc.

Chapter 1

NAVY FORCE STRUCTURE AND SHIPBUILDING PLANS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS Ronald O’Rourke SUMMARY The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy‘s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional defense committees for the past several years. The Navy‘s FY2011 budget submission retains, for the time being at least, the goal of achieving and maintaining a 313-ship fleet that the Navy first presented to Congress in February 2006. Although the 313-ship goal remains in place, some elements of Navy ship force planning that have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from elements of the 313-ship plan. The Navy‘s report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan refers to a forthcoming force structure assessment (FSA). Such an assessment could produce a replacement for the 313-ship plan. It is not clear when the FSA might be conducted, or when a replacement for the 313-ship plan might be issued. The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget requests funding for the procurement of nine new battle force ships (i.e., ships that count against the 313-ship goal). The nine ships include two attack submarines, two destroyers,

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two Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), one amphibious assault ship, one Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (i.e., a maritime prepositioning ship), and one Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV). The Navy‘s five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding plan includes a total of 50 new battle force ships, or an average of 10 per year. Of the 50 ships in the plan, half are relatively inexpensive LCSs or JHSVs. The Navy‘s FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan includes 276 ships. The Navy estimates that executing the plan would require an average of $15.9 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars. In past years, the Congressional Budget Office‘s (CBO‘s) estimate of the cost of implementing the 30-year shipbuilding plan has been higher than the Navy‘s estimate, reinforcing concerns among some observers about the prospective affordability of the plan. CBO is now assessing the potential cost of the Navy‘s FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan. The Navy projects that implementing the 30-year plan would result in a fleet that grows from 284 ships in FY2011 to 315 ships in FY2020, reaches a peak of 320 ships in FY2024, drops below 313 ships in FY2027, declines to 288 ships in FY2032-FY2033, and then increases to 301 ships in FY2039FY2040. The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan.

INTRODUCTION The planned size of the Navy, the rate of Navy ship procurement, and the prospective affordability of the Navy‘s shipbuilding plans have been matters of concern for the congressional defense committees for the past several years. The Navy‘s FY2011 budget submission retains, for the time being at least, the goal of achieving and maintaining a 313-ship fleet that the Navy first presented to Congress in February 2006. Although the 313-ship goal remains in place, some elements of Navy ship force planning that have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from elements of the 313-ship plan. The Navy‘s report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan refers to a forthcoming force structure assessment (FSA). Such an assessment could produce a replacement for the 313-ship plan. It is not clear when the FSA might be conducted, or when a replacement for the 313-ship plan might be issued.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background...

3

The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget requests funding for the procurement of nine new battle force ships (i.e., ships that count against the 313-ship goal). The nine ships include two attack submarines, two destroyers, two Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs), one amphibious assault ship, one Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ship (i.e., a maritime prepositioning ship), and one Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV).1 The Navy‘s five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding plan includes a total of 50 new battle force ships, or an average of 10 per year.2 Of the 50 ships in the plan, half are relatively inexpensive LCSs or JHSVs. The Navy‘s FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan includes 276 ships. The Navy estimates that executing the plan would require an average of $15.9 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars. In past years, the Congressional Budget Office‘s (CBO‘s) estimate of the cost of implementing the 30-year shipbuilding plan has been higher than the Navy‘s estimate, reinforcing concerns among some observers about the prospective affordability of the plan. CBO is now assessing the potential cost of the Navy‘s FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan. The Navy projects that implementing the 30-year plan would result in a fleet that grows from 284 ships in FY2011 to 315 ships in FY2020, reaches a peak of 320 ships in FY2024, drops below 313 ships in FY2027, declines to 288 ships in FY2032-FY2033, and then increases to 301 ships in FY2039FY2040. The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan.

BACKGROUND 313-Ship Force-Level Objective of 2006 The Navy‘s FY2011 budget submission retains, for the time being at least, the goal of achieving and maintaining a 313-ship fleet that the Navy first presented to Congress in February 2006. Table 1 shows the composition of the Navy‘s planned 313-ship fleet and compares it to previous Navy ship force structure proposals.

Ronald O‘Rourke

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Table 1. Navy Ship Force Structure Proposals Since 2001

Ship type

February 2006 Navy proposal for 313-ship fleet 14

Early-2005 Navy proposal for fleet of 260-325 ships 260-ships 325-ships 14 14

2002-2004 Navy 2001 QDR proposal for 375- plan for 310ship Navya ship Navy

Ballistic 14 14 missile submarines (SSBNs) Cruise missile 4 4 4 4 2 or 4b submarines (SSGNs) Attack 48 37 41 55 55 submarines (SSNs) Aircraft 11c 10 11 12 12 carriers Cruisers, 88 67 92 104 116 destroyers, frigates Littoral 55 63 82 56 0 Combat Ships (LCSs) Amphibious 31 17 24 37 36 ships MPF(F) shipsd 12d 14d 20d 0d 0d Combat 30 24 26 42 34 logistics (resupply) ships Dedicated 0 0 0 26e 16 mine warfare ships Otherf 20 10 11 25 25 Total battle 313 260 325 375 310 or 312 force ships Sources: U.S. Navy data. a. Initial composition. Composition was subsequently modified. b. The report on the 2001 QDR did not mention a specific figure for SSGNs. The Administration‘s proposed FY2001 Department of Defense (DOD) budget requested funding to support the conversion of two available Trident SSBNs into SSGNs, and the retirement of two other Trident SSBNs. Congress, in marking up this request, supported a plan to convert all four available SSBNs into SSGNs. c. For a time, the Navy characterized the goal as 11 carriers in the nearer term, and eventually 12 carriers. d. Today‘s Maritime Prepositioning Force (MPF) ships are intended primarily to support Marine Corps operations ashore, rather than Navy combat operations, and thus are not counted as Navy battle force ships. The MPF (Future) ships, however, would contribute to Navy combat capabilities (for example, by supporting Navy aircraft operations). For this reason, MPF(F) ships are counted by the Navy as battle force ships.


5

e. The figure of 26 dedicated mine warfare ships includes 10 ships maintained in a reduced mobilization status called Mobilization Category B. Ships in this status are not readily deployable and thus do not count as battle force ships. The 375-ship proposal thus implied transferring these 10 ships to a higher readiness status. f. Includes, among other things, command ships and support ships.

Although the 313-ship goal remains in place, some elements of Navy ship force planning that have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from elements of the 313-ship plan. For example:  







The Navy is planning to replace its 14 existing ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) with a new class of 12 next-generation SSBNs.3 The planned composition of the Navy‘s cruiser-destroyer force has changed considerably since 2006 due to the truncation of the Zumwalt (DDG-1000) destroyer program to three ships, the restart of Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer procurement, and the Navy‘s proposed cancellation of the CG(X) cruiser program.4 The Navy‘s new mission of ballistic missile defense (BMD) operations in Europe may also put upward pressure on the cruiser-destroyer force-level goal.5 The Navy acknowledges that meeting a requirement for being able to lift the assault echelons of 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEBs) would require a minimum of 33 amphibious ships rather than 31.6 Within the category of support ships, the original 313-ship plan included 3 Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs), but the Navy now plans to build and maintain a force of about 23 JHSVs.7 Navy shipbuilding plans no longer call for building a 12-ship squadron of next-generation Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F), ships; they now call for building 6 new maritime prepositioning ships—three Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) class dry cargo ships (which have already been funded) and three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships—that are to augment the three existing squadrons of maritime prepositioning ships.

The Navy‘s report on its FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan refers to a forthcoming force structure assessment (FSA).8 Such an assessment could produce a replacement for the 313-ship plan. It is not clear when the FSA might be conducted, or when a replacement for the 313-ship plan might be issued.

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Five-Year (FY2011-FY2015) Shipbuilding Plan Table 2 shows the Navy‘s proposed five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding plan. Table 2. Navy Five-Year (FY2011-FY2015) Shipbuilding Plan (Battle force ships—i.e., ships that count against 313-ship goal) Ship type FY11 FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 Total Ford (CVN-78) class 1 1 aircraft carrier Virginia (SSN-774) class 2 2 2 2 2 10 attack submarine Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) 2 1 2 1 2 8 class destroyer Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) 2 3 4 4 4 17 San Antonio (LPD-17) class 1 1 amphibious ship Large-deck amphibious 1 1 assault ship (LHA[R]) Fleet tug (TATF) 1 1 Mobile Landing Platform 1 1 1 3 (MLP) ship Joint High Speed Vessel 1 1 2 2 2 8 (JHSV) TOTAL 9 8 12 9 12 50 Source: FY2011 Navy budget submission. Note: The FY2011-FY2015 shipbuilding plan also includes two oceanographic ships (one in FY2011 and one in FY2012) that do not count against the 313-ship goal.

Observations that can be made about the Navy‘s proposed five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding plan include the following: 

The plan includes a total of 50 new battle force ships, or an average of 10 per year.9 This is an increase from the single-digit numbers of battle force ships that have been funded each year since FY1993. Shipbuilding supporters for some time have wanted to increase the shipbuilding rate to 10 or more ships per year. A rate of 10 ships per year is above the steady-state replacement rate for a fleet of 313 ships with an average service life of 35 years, which is about 8.9 ships per year. The average shipbuilding rate since FY1993 has been substantially below 8.9 ships per year.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background... 

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7

Although LCSs and JHSVs account for less than 25% of the 313-ship requirement, they account for 50% of the ships in the five-year plan. In this sense, these relatively inexpensive ships are overrepresented in the five-year shipbuilding plan relative to their portion of the 313-ship requirement, making it easier to procure an average of 10 ships per year within available resources. At some point in the future, when the LCS and JHSV programs run their course and are no longer overrepresented in the shipbuilding plan, procuring an average of 10 ships per year could become a considerably more expensive proposition. On this basis, the FY2011-FY2015 shipbuilding program‘s average of 10 ships per year does not necessarily imply that the Navy has solved the challenge it faces concerning the long-term affordability of its shipbuilding plans. The FY2010 budget shifted the procurement of the next aircraft carrier from FY2012 to FY2013. The planned procurement rate of Virginia (SSN-774) class submarines is consistent with Navy planning since the submission of the FY2009 budget to increase the procurement rate of these ships to two per year starting in FY2011. Virginia-class submarines were procured in FY2010 and previous years at a rate of about one per year.10 The planned procurement rate for DDG-51 class destroyers reflects the Navy‘s proposal, approved by Congress as part of its action on the FY2010 defense budget, to stop procurement of DDG-1000 class destroyers and restart procurement of DDG-51s. The planned procurement rate of Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) does not rise above four per year. Previous Navy plans called for building as many as six LCSs per year. The new planned maximum rate of four ships per year reflects a new acquisition strategy for LCSs announced by the Navy in September 2009.11 The San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship planned for FY2012 would be the 11th ship in the class. The 33-ship goal for amphibious ships includes 11 LPD-17s. The FY2011-FY2015 plan contains no amphibious ships in FY2013FY2015. This could result in a dip in workload starting in FY2013 at the yards that build amphibious ships—Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding‘s (NGSB‘s) Gulf Coast yards (the Avondale yard upriver from New Orleans, LA, and the Ingalls yard at Pascagoula, MS).

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The three Mobile Landing Platform (MLP) ships in the plan reflect the Navy‘s decision to cancel the planned MPF(F) squadron and instead build six new ships, including three MLPs, to augment the three existing squadrons of maritime prepositioning ships.

30-Year (FY2011-FY2040) Shipbuilding Plan Table 3. Navy 30-Year (FY2011-FY2040) Shipbuilding Plan FY 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

CVN

1

1

1

1

1

1

LSC 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

SSC 2 3 4 4 4 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

SSN 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1

SSBN

1

AWS 1 1

1 1

1

1

1

2

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1

CLF

2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1

1 1

Supt 2 1 3 2 4 2 3 3 3 4 2 3 3 2 1

1 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2

Total 9 8 12 9 12 9 12 9 13 9 11 10 11 8 8 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 11 8 10 7 10 9 10 7


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Source: Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2009. Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC = small surface combatants (i.e., Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs]); SSN = attack submarines; SSGN = cruise missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious warfare ships; CLF = combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; MPF(F) = Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ships; Supt = support ships.

Table 3 shows the Navy‘s FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan. The plan includes 276 ships. The Navy estimates that executing the plan would require an average of $15.9 billion per year in constant FY2010 dollars. In past years, the Congressional Budget Office‘s (CBO‘s) estimate of the cost of implementing the 30-year shipbuilding plan has been higher than the Navy‘s estimate, reinforcing concerns among some observers about the prospective affordability of the plan. CBO is now assessing the potential cost of the Navy‘s FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan.

Resulting Projected Force Levels for FY2011-FY2040 Table 4 shows the Navy‘s projection of force levels for FY2011-FY2040 that would result from implementing the 30-year shipbuilding plan shown in Table 3. Table 4. Projected Force Levels Resulting from 30-Year Plan FY Goal in 313-ship plan 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19

CVN LSC SSC SSN SSGN SSBN AWS CLF Supt Total 11 88 55 48 4 14 31 30 20 313a

11 11 10 10 11 11 11 11 11

84 84 85 86 88 90 91 93 94

42 41 37 32 28 32 33 37 37

53 54 55 55 54 51 51 50 51

4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4

14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14

29 30 30 30 31 33 33 33 33

29 29 29 30 30 30 30 30 30

18 20 23 24 25 27 31 33 37

284 287 287 285 285 292 298 305 311

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20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

12 12 12 11 11 12 12 12 11 11 12 12 11 11 11 12 11 11 11 11 11

96 96 95 94 94 92 89 87 85 81 77 73 71 69 67 68 70 72 74 76 76

Table 4 (Continued) 39 49 4 14 39 49 4 14 41 48 4 14 39 48 4 14 40 46 4 14 41 45 4 14 43 44 4 14 45 43 2 13 46 41 1 13 48 40 0 13 49 39 0 12 51 41 0 12 52 41 0 12 53 42 0 12 54 43 0 12 55 44 0 12 56 45 0 12 56 46 0 12 56 45 0 12 56 45 0 12 55 45 0 12

33 34 34 35 36 35 36 35 36 34 33 33 32 31 33 30 30 29 29 29 30

30 31 29 29 28 28 28 26 26 25 25 24 25 26 26 25 26 27 27 28 28

38 39 41 45 47 46 45 46 46 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44

315 318 318 319 320 317 313 308 304 296 291 290 288 288 290 290 294 297 298 301 301

Source: Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2009. Key: FY = Fiscal Year; CVN = aircraft carriers; LSC = surface combatants (i.e., cruisers and destroyers); SSC = small surface combatants (i.e., frigates, Littoral Combat Ships [LCSs], and mine warfare ships); SSN = attack submarines; SSGN = cruise missile submarines; SSBN = ballistic missile submarines; AWS = amphibious warfare ships; CLF = combat logistics force (i.e., resupply) ships; MPF(F) = Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) ships; Supt = support ships. a. The 313-ship plan also includes a 12-ship Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future), or MPF(F), squadron. The Navy‘s FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan does not contemplate building a 12-ship MPF(F) squadron.

Observations that can be made about the above force-level projections include the following:  The Navy projects that implementing its 30-year shipbuilding plan would result in a fleet that grows from 284 ships in FY2011 to 315 ships in FY2020, reaches a peak of 320 ships in FY2024, drops below 313 ships in FY2027, declines to 288 ships in FY2032-FY2033, and then increases to 301 ships in FY2039-FY2040.

Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background... 

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The Navy projects that the attack submarine and cruiser-destroyer forces will drop substantially below required levels in the latter years of the 30-year plan. The projected number of attack submarines drops below the required level of 48 boats in FY2022, reaches a minimum of 39 boats in FY2030, and remains below 48 boats through 2040. The projected number of cruisers and destroyers drops below the required level of 88 ships in 2027, reaches a minimum of 67 ships in FY2034, and remains below 88 ships through FY2040. The Navy projects a force of more than 40 support ships in FY2022 and beyond, compared to a goal of 20 support ships in the 313-ship plan. The 20 support ships in the 313-ship plan include three JHSVs, but the Navy now plans to build and maintain a force of about 23 JHSVs.

OVERSIGHT ISSUES FOR CONGRESS Potential oversight issues for Congress concerning the Navy‘s planned 313-ship fleet, the five-year (FY2011-FY2015) shipbuilding plan, and the 30year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan include the following: 

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What is the Navy‘s schedule for performing the new force structure assessment (FSA) mentioned in the Navy‘s report on its 30-year shipbuilding plan? Will this FSA result in a new force-level goal to replace the 313-ship plan? If so, when does the Navy intend to issue the replacement plan? Why has the Navy decided to retain, the for time being at least, the 313-ship plan, when certain elements of Navy ship force planning that have emerged since 2006 appear to diverge from that plan? Given the Administration‘s September 2009 announcement of its new plan for ballistic missile defense (BMD) in Europe, which includes a significant use of BMD-capable cruisers and destroyers, would the 88-ship force of cruisers and destroyers called for in the 313-ship plan be adequate? Has the Navy accurately estimated the cost of implementing the 30year shipbuilding plan? In past years, the Congressional Budget Office‘s (CBO‘s) estimate of the cost of implementing the 30-year shipbuilding plan has been higher than the Navy‘s estimate,

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

reinforcing concerns among some observers about the prospective affordability of the plan. CBO is now assessing the potential cost of the Navy‘s FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan. What would be the operational implications of the shortfalls in attack submarines and cruisers-destroyers that the Navy projects for the latter years of the 30-year shipbuilding plan?

LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY FOR FY2011 The Navy‘s FY2011 budget submission, including the five-year (FY2011FY2015) and 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plans, were submitted to Congress in early February 2010. For legislative activity on individual Navy shipbuilding, conversion, and modernization programs, see the following CRS reports:  CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.  CRS Report R41129, Navy SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.  CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.  CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.  CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.  CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

APPENDIX A. ADEQUACY OF PLANNED 313-SHIP FLEET Some observers have questioned whether the overall planned total of 313 ships would be adequate, particularly in light of Navy plans in recent decades for larger total numbers of ships. One possible method for assessing the appropriateness of the total number of ships being proposed by the Navy is to compare that number to historical


13

figures for total fleet size. Historical figures for total fleet size, however, might not be a reliable yardstick for assessing the appropriateness of the Navy‘s proposed 313-ship fleet, particularly if the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy ships for performing missions all change over time. The Navy, for example, reached a late-Cold War peak of 568 battle force ships at the end of FY1987,12 and as of September 30, 2009, had declined to a total of 285 battle force ships. The FY1987 fleet, however, was intended to meet a set of mission requirements that focused on countering Soviet naval forces at sea during a potential multi-theater NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict, while the September 2009 fleet is intended to meet a considerably different set of mission requirements centered on influencing events ashore by countering both land- and sea-based military forces of potential regional threats other than Russia, including non-state terrorist organizations. In addition, the Navy of FY1987 differed substantially from the September 2009 fleet in areas such as profusion of precision-guided air-delivered weapons, numbers of Tomahawkcapable ships, and sophistication of C4ISR systems.13 In coming years, Navy missions may shift again, to include, as a possible example, a greater emphasis on being able to counter improved Chinese maritime military capabilities.14 In addition, the capabilities of Navy ships will likely have changed further by that time due to developments such as more comprehensive implementation of networking technology and increased use of ship-based unmanned vehicles. The 568-ship fleet of FY1987 may or may not have been capable of performing its stated missions; the 285-ship fleet of September 2009 may or nor may not have been capable of performing its stated missions; and a fleet years from now with a certain number of ships may or may not be capable of performing its stated missions. Given changes over time in mission requirements, ship mixes, and technologies, however, these three issues are to a substantial degree independent of one another. For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet‘s ability to perform its stated missions. An increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet‘s ability to perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet‘s mission requirements might be increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability. Similarly, a decreasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet‘s ability to perform stated missions is decreasing, because the

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fleet‘s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in total ship numbers. Previous Navy force structure plans, such as those shown in Table 1, might provide some insight into the potential adequacy of a proposed new force-structure plan, but changes over time in mission requirements, technologies available to ships for performing missions, and other forceplanning factors suggest that some caution should be applied in using past force structure plans for this purpose, particularly if those past force structure plans are more than a few years old. The Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy, for example, was designed for a Cold War set of missions focusing on countering Soviet naval forces at sea, which is not an appropriate basis for planning the Navy today.15

APPENDIX B. SIZE OF THE NAVY AND NAVY SHIPBUILDING RATE Size of the Navy Table B-1 shows the size of the Navy in terms of total number of ships since FY1948; the numbers shown in the table reflect changes over time in the rules specifying which ships count toward the total. Differing counting rules result in differing totals, and for certain years, figures reflecting more than one set of counting rules are available. Figures in the table for FY1978 and subsequent years reflect the battle force ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules established in the early 1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy. As shown in the table, the total number of battle force ships in the Navy reached a late-Cold War peak of 568 at the end of FY1987 and began declining thereafter.16 The Navy fell below 300 battle force ships in August 2003 and included 285 battle force ships as of September 30, 2009. As discussed in Appendix A, historical figures for total fleet size might not be a reliable yardstick for assessing the appropriateness of the Navy‘s proposed 313-ship fleet, particularly if the historical figures are more than a few years old, because the missions to be performed by the Navy, the mix of ships that make up the Navy, and the technologies that are available to Navy


15

ships for performing missions all change over time. For similar reasons, trends over time in the total number of ships in the Navy are not necessarily a reliable indicator of the direction of change in the fleet‘s ability to perform its stated missions. An increasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet‘s ability to perform its stated missions is increasing, because the fleet‘s mission requirements might be increasing more rapidly than ship numbers and average ship capability. Table B-1. Total Number of Ships in the Navy Since FY1948 FYa 1948 1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960 1961 1962 1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968

Number 737 690 634 980 1,097 1,122 1,113 1,030 973 967 890 860 812 897 959 916 917 936 947 973 976

FYa 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989

Number 926 769 702 654 584 512 496 476 464 468 471 477 490 513 514 524 541 556 568 565 566

FYa 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Number 547 526 466 435 391 373 356 354 333 317 318 316 313 297 291 282 281 279 282 285

Source: Compiled by CRS using U.S. Navy data. Numbers shown reflect changes over time in the rules specifying which ships count toward the total. Figures for FY1978 and subsequent years reflect the battle force ships counting method, which is the set of counting rules established in the early 1980s for public policy discussions of the size of the Navy. a. Data for earlier years in the table may be for the end of the calendar year (or for some other point during the year), rather than for the end of the fiscal year.

Similarly, a decreasing number of ships in the fleet might not necessarily mean that the fleet‘s ability to perform stated missions is decreasing, because

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the fleet‘s mission requirements might be declining more rapidly than numbers of ships, or because average ship capability and the percentage of time that ships are in deployed locations might be increasing quickly enough to more than offset reductions in total ship numbers.

Shipbuilding Rate Table B-2 shows past (FY1982-FY2010) and requested (FY2011FY2015) rates of Navy ship procurement. Table B-2. Battle Force Ships Procured or Requested, FY1982-FY2015 (Procured FY1982-FY2010; requested FY2011-FY2015) 82 17 99 5

83 14 00 6

84 16 01 6

85 19 02 6

86 20 03 5

87 17 04 7

88 15 05 8

89 19 06 4a

90 15 07 5a

91 11 08 3a

92 11 09 8

93 7 10 7

94 4 11 9

95 4 12 8

96 5 13 12

97 4 14 9

98 5 15 12

Source: CRS compilation based on examination of defense authorization and appropriation committee and conference reports for each fiscal year. The table excludes non-battle force ships that do not count toward the 313-ship goal, such as certain sealift and prepositioning ships operated by the Military Sealift Command and oceanographic ships operated by agencies such as the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). a. The totals shown for FY2006, FY2007, and FY2008, have been adjusted downward to reflect the cancellation two LCSs funded in FY2006, another two LCSs funded in FY2007, and an LCS funded in FY2008.

End Notes 1

The proposed FY2011 budget also requests funding for the procurement of an oceanographic ship that does not count against the 313-ship goal. 2 The five-year plan also includes two oceanographic ships (one in FY2011 and one in FY2012) that do not count against the 313-ship goal. 3 For further discussion, see CRS Report R41129, Navy SSBN(X) Ballistic Missile Submarine Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 4 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke, and CRS Report RL34179, Navy CG(X) Cruiser Program: Background for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 5 For further discussion, CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.


17

6

For further discussion, see CRS Report RL34476, Navy LPD-17 Amphibious Ship Procurement: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 7 Source: Navy briefing to CRS and Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plan, March 17, 2010. 8 U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011, February 2010, pp. 14, 19, 25. 9 The five-year plan also includes two oceanographic ships (one in FY2011 and one in FY2012) that do not count against the 313-ship goal. 10 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 11 For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 12 Some publications, such as those of the American Shipbuilding Association, have stated that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however, is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle force ships figure is the number used in government discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total number of active ships has been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval Historical Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships in another year is thus an apple-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method. 13 C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance. 14 For a discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O‘Rourke. 15 Navy force structure plans that predate those shown in Table 1 include the Reagan-era 600ship plan of the 1980s, the Base Force fleet of more than 400 ships planned during the final two years of the George H. W. Bush Administration, the 346-ship fleet from the Clinton Administration‘s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (or BUR, sometimes also called Base Force II), and the 310-ship fleet of the Clinton Administration‘s 1997 QDR. The table below summarizes some key features of these plans. Features of Recent Navy Force Structure Plans Plan 600-ship Base Force 1993 BUR 1997 QDR ~600 ~450/416a 346 ~305/310b Total ships c 100 80/~55 45-55 50/55d Attack submarines e f 15 12 11+1 11+1f Aircraft carriers g ~150 ~124 116 Surface combatants 242/228 ~75h 51i 36i 36i Amphibious ships Source: Prepared by CRS based on DOD and U.S. Navy data. a. Commonly referred to as 450-ship plan, but called for decreasing to 416 ships by end of FY1999. b. Original total of about 305 ships was increased to about 310 due to increase in number of attack submarines to 55 from 50. c. Plan originally included 80 attack submarines, but this was later reduced to about 55. d. Plan originally included 50 attack submarines but this was later increased to 55. e. Plus one additional aircraft carrier in the service life extension program (SLEP). f. Eleven active carriers plus one operational reserve carrier.

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g. Plan originally included 242 surface combatants but this was later reduced to 228. h. Number needed to lift assault echelons of one Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) plus one Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB). i. Number needed to lift assault echelons of 2.5 MEBs. Note how number needed to meet this goal changed from Base Force plan to the BUR plan—a result of new, larger amphibious ship designs. 16 Some publications have stated that the Navy reached a peak of 594 ships at the end of FY1987. This figure, however, is the total number of active ships in the fleet, which is not the same as the total number of battle force ships. The battle force ships figure is the number used in government discussions of the size of the Navy. In recent years, the total number of active ships has been larger than the total number of battle force ships. For example, the Naval Historical Center states that as of November 16, 2001, the Navy included a total of 337 active ships, while the Navy states that as of November 19, 2001, the Navy included a total of 317 battle force ships. Comparing the total number of active ships in one year to the total number of battle force ships in another year is thus an apple-to-oranges comparison that in this case overstates the decline since FY1987 in the number of ships in the Navy. As a general rule to avoid potential statistical distortions, comparisons of the number of ships in the Navy over time should use, whenever possible, a single counting method.


Chapter 2

NAVY SHIP NAMES: BACKGROUND FOR CONGRESS Ronald O’Rourke SUMMARY Names for Navy ships traditionally have been chosen and announced by the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President and in accordance with rules prescribed by Congress. Rules for giving certain types of names to certain types of Navy ships have evolved over time. There have been exceptions to the Navy‘s ship-naming rules, particularly for the purpose of naming a ship for a person when the rule for that type of ship would have called for it to be named for something else. Some observers in recent years have perceived a breakdown in, or corruption of, the rules for naming Navy ships. The 10 most recently named aircraft carriers have been named for U.S. presidents (8 ships) and Members of Congress (2 ships). Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines are being named for states. An exception occurred on January 8, 2009, when the Secretary of the Navy announced that SSN-785, the 12th ship in the class, would be named for former Senator John Warner. Destroyers are named for U.S. naval leaders and heroes. Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) are being named for small and medium-sized cities. San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships are being named for U.S. cities. An

20

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exception occurred on April 9, 2010, when the Secretary of the Navy announced that LPD-26, the 10th ship in the class, would be named for the late Representative John P. Murtha. The Navy announced on June 27, 2008, that the first LHA-6 class amphibious assault ship would be named America, a name previously used for an aircraft carrier (CV-66) that served in the Navy from 1965 to 1996. Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) class cargo and ammunition ships are being named for noted explorers and pioneers of various kinds. Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs) are being named for American traits and values. An exception has occurred with JHSV-4, the Navy‘s second JHSV (JHSVs 1 and 3 are to be operated by the Army), which the Secretary of the Navy announced on March 25, 2010, was being named Fall River. Fall River is a city in Massachusetts that is the location of Battleship Cove, a maritime museum and war memorial with several deactivated warships, including a post-World War II cruiser named Fall River. The Navy historically has only rarely named ships for living persons. At least 11 U.S. military ships since the 1970s have been named for persons who were living at the time the name was announced. Members of the public are sometimes interested in having Navy ships named for their own states or cities, for older U.S. Navy ships (particularly those on which they or their relatives served), for battles in which they or their relatives participated, or for people they admire. Citizens with such an interest sometimes contact the Navy, the Department of Defense, or Congress seeking support for their proposals. Congress has long maintained an interest in how Navy ships are named, and has influenced the naming of certain Navy ships. The Navy suggests that congressional offices wishing to express support for proposals to name a Navy ship for a specific person, place, or thing contact the office of the Secretary of the Navy to make their support known. Congress may also pass legislation relating to ship names. Measures passed by Congress in recent years regarding Navy ship names have all been sense-of-the-Congress provisions. In the 111th Congress, H.Con.Res. 83 would express the sense of the Congress that that a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, either CVN-79 or CVN-80, should be named for former Senator Barry M. Goldwater, and H.Res. 330 would express the sense of the House of Representatives that the Secretary of the Navy should name an appropriate Navy ship in honor of Marine Corps General Clifton B. Cates of Tiptonville, TN. Section 1022 of the FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) designated the historic Navy ship USS Constitution as ―America‘s Ship of State.‖

Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress

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BACKGROUND Authority for Naming Ships Names for Navy ships traditionally have been chosen and announced by the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President and in accordance with rules prescribed by Congress. For most of the 19th century, U.S. law included language explicitly assigning the Secretary of the Navy the task of naming new Navy ships.1 The reference to the Secretary of the Navy disappeared from the U.S. Code in 1925.2 The Code today (10 USC §7292) is silent on the issue of who has the authority to name new Navy ships,3 but the Secretary of the Navy arguably retains implicit authority, given the location of §7292 in subtitle C of Title 10, which covers the Navy and Marine Corps.

Navy’s Process for Selecting Names In discussing its name-selection process, the Navy cites the abovementioned laws and states: As with many other things, the procedures and practices involved in Navy ship naming are as much, if not more, products of evolution and tradition than of legislation. As we have seen, the names for new ships are personally decided by the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary can rely on many sources to help him reach his decisions. Each year, the Naval Historical Center compiles primary and alternate ship name recommendations and forwards these to the Chief of Naval Operations by way of the chain of command. These recommendations are the result of research into the history of the Navy and by suggestions submitted by service members, Navy veterans, and the public. Ship name source records at the Historical Center reflect the wide variety of name sources that have been used in the past, particularly since World War I. Ship name recommendations are conditioned by such factors as the name categories for ship types now being built, as approved by the Secretary of the Navy; the distribution of geographic names of ships of the Fleet; names borne by previous ships which distinguished themselves in service; names recommended by individuals and groups; and names of naval leaders, national figures, and deceased members of the Navy and Marine Corps who have been honored for heroism in war or for extraordinary achievement in peace.

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In its final form, after consideration at the various levels of command, the Chief of Naval Operations signs the memorandum recommending names for the current year‘s building program and sends it to the Secretary of the Navy. The Secretary considers these nominations, along with others he receives as well as his own thoughts in this matter. At appropriate times, he selects names for specific ships and announces them. While there is no set time for assigning a name, it is customarily done before the ship is christened.4

Naming Rules for Ship Types Rules for giving certain types of names to certain types of Navy ships have evolved over time. Attack submarines, for example, were once named for fish, then later for cities, and most recently for states, while cruisers were once named for cities, then later for states, and most recently for battles. The Navy states that while it ―has attempted to be systematic in naming its ships, like all institutions it has been subject to evolutionary change, and the name sources of the Navy‘s ships have not been immune to this change.‖5 There have been exceptions to the Navy‘s ship-naming rules, particularly for the purpose of naming a ship for a person when the rule for that type of ship would have called for it to be named for something else.6 Some observers in recent years have perceived a breakdown in, or corruption of, the rules for naming Navy ships.7 For example, the three-ship Seawolf (SSN-21) class of attack submarines—Seawolf (SSN-21), Connecticut (SSN-22), and Jimmy Carter (SSN-23)—were named for a fish, a state, and a president, respectively, reflecting no apparent rule. For ship types now being procured for the Navy, current naming practices can be summarized as follows: 



Eleven of the 12 most recently named aircraft carriers (those with hull numbers 67 through 79) have been named for U.S. presidents (9 ships) and Members of Congress (2 ships). The most recent carrier that was not named for a president or Member of Congress was the second of these 12 carriers, Nimitz (CVN-68), which was procured in FY1967.8 Virginia (SSN-774) class attack submarines are being named for states. An exception occurred on January 8, 2009, when thenSecretary of the Navy Donald Winter announced that SSN-785, the














23

12th ship in the class, would be named for former Senator John Warner.9 Destroyers are traditionally named for U.S. naval leaders and heroes. The Navy is currently procuring Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers. The Navy in FY2007-FY2009 also procured three DDG1000 class destroyers. The first DDG-1000 was named for Admiral Elmo R. ―Bud‖ Zumwalt, Jr., who was the Chief of Naval Operations from 1970 to 1974. On October 29, 2008, the Navy announced that the second DDG-1000 would be named for Michael Monsoor, a Navy SEAL (i.e., a member of the Navy‘s special operations force) who was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for his heroic actions in Iraq in September 2006. Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs) are being named for small and medium-sized cities. The Navy has named the first two LCSs Freedom and Independence, after multiple U.S. cities with these names. The third and fourth ships have been named Fort Worth and Coronado. San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ships are being named for U.S. cities. An exception occurred on April 9, 2010, when the Secretary of the Navy announced that LPD-26, the 10th ship in the class, would be named for the late Representative John P. Murtha.10 The Navy announced on June 27, 2008, that the first LHA-6 class amphibious assault ship would be named America, a name previously used for an aircraft carrier (CV-66) that served in the Navy from 1965 to 1996. The previous eight Wasp (LHD-1) class big deck amphibious assault ships were named for World War II-era Navy aircraft carriers and earlier Navy ships. Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1) class cargo and ammunition ships are being named for noted explorers and pioneers of various kinds. The Navy announced on October 9, 2009, that the 13th ship in the class would be named for the civil rights activist Medgar Evers.11 Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs), which are being procured for both the Navy and Army, are being named for American traits and values.12 On July 16, 2009, the Secretary of the Navy and the Secretary of the Army announced that the first three JHSVs had been named Fortitude (JHSV-1), Vigilant (JHSV-2), and Spearhead (JHSV-3). JHSVs 1 and 3 are to be operated by the Army; JHSV-2 is to be operated by the Navy.13 An exception to the naming rule for this class has occurred with JHSV-4, the Navy‘s second JHSV, which the

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Secretary of the Navy announced on March 25, 2010, was being named Fall River.14 Fall River is a city in Massachusetts that is the location of Battleship Cove, a maritime museum and war memorial with several deactivated warships, including a post-World War II cruiser named Fall River.

Ships Named for Living Persons The Navy historically has only rarely named ships for living persons. As shown in Table 1, at least 11 U.S. military ships since the 1970s have been named for persons who were living at the time the name was announced.

Public’s Role in Naming Ships Table 1. Ships Named for Persons who were Living at the Time Ship type Aircraft carrier Attack submarine Destroyer Aircraft carrier Sealift ship Aircraft carrier Destroyer Attack submarine Aircraft carrier Destroyer Attack submarine

CVN-70 SSN-709

Carl Vinson Hyman G. Rickover

FY1974 FY1974

In service 1982 1984

DDG-51 CVN-74 TAKR-300 CVN-76 DDG-94 SSN-23

Arleigh Burke John C. Stennis Bob Hope Ronald Reagan Nitze Jimmy Carter

FY1985 FY1988 FY1993 FY1995 FY1999 FY1996

1991 1995 1998 2003 2005 2005

CVN-77 DDG-108 SSN-785

George H.W. Bush Wayne E. Meyer John Warner

FY2001 FY2004 FY2010

2008 2009 2015

Hull number

Ship name

Procured

Source: Compiled by CRS. SSN-23 was originally procured in FY1992. Its procurement was suspended, and then reinstated in FY1996.

Members of the public are sometimes interested in having Navy ships named for their own states or cities, for older U.S. Navy ships (particularly


25

those on which they or their relatives served), for battles in which they or their relatives participated, or for people they admire. Citizens with such an interest sometimes contact the Navy, the Department of Defense, or Congress seeking support for their proposals. An October 2008 news report suggested that a letter-writing campaign by New Hampshire elementary school students that began in January 2004 was instrumental in the Navy‘s decision in August 2004 to name a Virginia-class submarine after the state.15

Congress’s Role in Naming Ships Congress has long maintained an interest in how Navy ships are named,16 and has influenced the naming of certain Navy ships. For example, one source states that ―[the aircraft carriers] CVN 72 and CVN 73 were named prior to their start [of construction], in part to preempt potential congressional pressure to name one of those ships for Admiral H.G. Rickover ([instead,] the [attack submarine] SSN 709 was named for the admiral).‖17 Another example was a rivalry of sorts in Congress between those who supported naming the aircraft carrier CVN-76 for president Truman and those who supported naming it for president Reagan; the issue was effectively resolved by a decision announced by President Clinton in February 1995 to name one carrier (CVN-75) for Truman and another (CVN-76) for Reagan.18 One press report suggests that the decision to name CVN-77 for President George H.W. Bush may have been influenced by a congressional suggestion.19 Section 1012 of the FY2007 defense authorization act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2006), expressed the sense of the Congress that the aircraft carrier CVN-78 should be named for President Gerald R. Ford, and the Navy announced on January 16, 2007, that CVN-78 would be so named. The Navy suggests that congressional offices wishing to express support for proposals to name a Navy ship for a specific person, place, or thing contact the office of the Secretary of the Navy to make their support known. Congress may also pass legislation relating to ship names (see below).

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Table 2. Recent Enacted Provisions Fiscal Year 2007 2001 1999 1996 1996

1996 1991 1989 1989 1989

Public Law P.L. 109364 P.L. 106398 P.L. 105261 P.L. 104106 P.L. 104106 P.L. 104106 P.L. 101510 P.L. 100456 P.L. 100456 P.L. 100202

Bill

Section

Ship

Name(s)

H.R. 5122

1012

CVN-78

Gerald R. Ford

H.R. 4205

1012

CVN-77

Lexington

H.R. 3616

1014

Clifton B. Cates

S. 1124

1018

an LPD-17 class ship LHD-7

S. 1124

1018

S. 1124

1019

Marine Corps battles or members of Marine Corps Joseph Vittori

H.R. 4739

1426

H.R. 4481

1221

LPD-17 class amphibious ships an appropriate ship the next DDG51 the next SSBN

H.R. 4481

1222

Bob Hope

H.J.Res. 395

8138

an appropriate ship CVN-74 or CVN-75

Iwo Jima

Samuel S. Stratton Melvin Price

John C. Stennis

Source: Prepared by CRS. All of these provisions expressed the sense of the Congress about how a Navy ship should be named.

Past Legislation on Naming Ships Table 2 shows recent enacted provisions regarding the names of Navy ships. All of these measures expressed the sense of the Congress about how a Navy ship should be named. Table 3 shows examples of proposed bills and amendments regarding the names of Navy ships going back to the 93rd Congress. Some of these measures expressed the sense of the Congress about how a Navy ship should be named, while others would mandate a certain name for a ship. Although few of these measures were acted on after being referred to committee, they all signaled congressional interest in how certain ships should be named, and thus may have influenced Navy decisions on these matters.


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Table 3. Examples of Proposed Bills and Amendments [Congress] and Bill [111th] H.Res. 330 [111th] H.Con.Res. 83 [109th] S. 2766 [107th] H.Con.Res. 294 [106th] S.Con.Res. 84 [105th] S.Amdt. 2812 to S. 2057 [104th] H.J.Res. 61 [104th] H.R. 445 [104th] S.Con.Res. 62 [104th] S.J.Res. 17 [104th] S.Amdt. 2277 to S. 1026 [104th] S.Amdt. 2277 to S. 1026 [104th] S.Amdt. 4350 to S. 1745 [103rd] H.R. 5283 [102nd] H.Con.Res. 354 [102nd] H.R. 6115 [100th] H.Amdt. 614 to H.R. 4264 [100th] S.Amdt. 1354 to H.J.Res. 395 [98th] H.Res. 99 [97th] H.Con.Res. 312 [97th] H.Res. 174 [97th] H.R. 4977 [93rd] H.Con.Res. 386 [93rd] H.Con.Res. 387 [93rd] H.J.Res. 831

Ship an appropriate ship CVN-79 or CVN-80 CVN-78 a new naval vessel CVN-77 LPD-17 class ship

Proposed name(s) Clifton B. Cates Barry M. Goldwater Gerald R. Ford Bluejacket Lexington Clifton B. Cates

CVN-76 CVN-76 SSN-774 CVN-76 LHD-7

Ronald Reagan Harry Truman South Dakota Ronald Reagan Iwo Jima

LPD-17 class ships

famous Marine Corps battles or heroes South Dakota

a SSN-774 class submarine an appropriate ship a guided missile cruiser CVN-76 next SSBN-726 class submarine deployed after enactment CVN-74 or CVN-75 an aircraft carrier a nonlethal naval vessela an aircraft carrier CVN-72 CVN-70 CVN-70 CVN-70

Joseph Vittori Pearl Harbor Harry S Truman Melvin Price

John C. Stennis Wasp Corpus Christia Wasp Hyman G. Rickover Carl Vinson Carl Vinson Carl Vinson

Source: Prepared by CRS. a. The resolution expressed the sense of Congress that the attack submarine Corpus Christi (SSN-705) be renamed, and that a nonlethal naval vessel be named Corpus Christi.

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LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY IN THE 111TH CONGRESS H.Con.Res. 83 (Regarding Naming CVN-79 or CVN-80 for Barry Goldwater) H.Con.Res. 83 would express the sense of the Congress that that a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier, either CVN-79 or CVN-80, should be named for former Senator Barry M. Goldwater. The text of H.Con.Res. 83 states: CONCURRENT RESOLUTION Expressing the sense of Congress that a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier of the Navy, either the aircraft carrier designated as CVN-79 or the aircraft carrier designated as CVN-80, should be named the U.S.S. Barry M. Goldwater. Whereas Barry M. Goldwater served as a pilot in the United States Army Air Corps during World War II and was later a Major General in the Air Force Reserve; Whereas Barry M. Goldwater was an avid pilot throughout his military career and after his retirement; Whereas Barry M. Goldwater was instrumental in the desegregation of Phoenix schools, restaurants, and the Arizona National Guard; Whereas Barry M. Goldwater was elected to the City Council in Phoenix in 1949, and served as a United States Senator from Arizona from 1953 to 1965 and again from 1969 to 1987; Whereas throughout his tenure in Congress, Senator Goldwater was as avid a proponent of a strong national defense as he was a staunch opponent of communism and totalitarianism; Whereas Senator Goldwater served as chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and was responsible for the unanimous Senate passage of the Defense Department Reorganization Act of 1986, which streamlined command channels at the Pentagon; Whereas Senator Goldwater was nominated by the Republican Party as a candidate for President of the United States in 1964; Whereas Senator Goldwater memorably declared at the 1964 Republican Convention, `I would remind you that extremism in the defense of liberty is no vice. And let me remind you also that moderation in the pursuit of justice is no virtue‘; and Whereas Senator Barry M. Goldwater was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1986 by President Ronald Reagan: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the House of Representatives (the Senate concurring), That it is the sense of Congress that a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier of the Navy,


29

either the aircraft carrier designated as CVN-79 or the aircraft carrier designated as CVN-80, should be named the U.S.S. Barry M. Goldwater.

H.Res. 330 (Regarding Naming a Navy Ship for Clifton B. Cates) H.Res. 330 expresses the sense of the House of Representatives that the Secretary of the Navy should name an appropriate Navy ship in honor of Marine Corps General Clifton B. Cates of Tiptonville, TN. As shown in Table 2, Section 1014 of P.L. 105-261 (the FY1999 defense authorization act, which was signed into law on October 17, 1998) expressed the sense of Congress that a San Antonio (LPD-17) class amphibious ship should be named for General Cates. In the years since the enactment of this measure, the Navy has not named a ship for General Cates. The text of H.Res. 330 states: RESOLUTION Expressing the sense of the House of Representatives that the Secretary of the Navy should name an appropriate Navy ship in honor of Marine Corps General Clifton B. Cates of Tiptonville, Tennessee. Whereas Clifton B. Cates of Tiptonville, Tennessee served as a United States Marine during World Wars I and II and the Korean War; Whereas Clifton B. Cates entered the Marine Corps as a Second Lieutenant in 1917 at the beginning of World War I, during which he fought in the crucial Second Battle of the Marne; Whereas during that fight, then-Lieutenant Cates was wounded and gassed but refused to be evacuated; Whereas Clifton B. Cates was the most decorated Marine Corps Officer of World War I, having been awarded the Navy Cross, Army Distinguished Service Cross with Oak Leaf Cluster, Silver Star Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, Purple Heart Medal with Oak Leaf Cluster, the Legion of Honor, and the Croix de Guerre with Gilt Star and 2 palms; Whereas during World War II, Clifton B. Cates led Marines at Guadalcanal, and the seizure of Iwo Jima, and in recognition of his service was awarded the Legion of Merit with Combat `V‘ and the Distinguished Service Medal with a gold star; Whereas Clifton B. Cates was one of the few officers of any branch of the United States Armed Forces to command, under fire, a platoon, a company, a battalion, a regiment, and a division; Whereas Clifton B. Cates was advanced to the rank of General in 1948 and was named the 19th Commandant of the United States Marine Corps;

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Ronald O‘Rourke Whereas Clifton B. Cates served his country as a United States Marine for 37 years through 3 wars; and Whereas members of the Clifton Cates Memorial Fund led by retired Colonel Otto Melsa and Ed Youngblood have worked tirelessly to bring recognition to the significant accomplishments of General Clifton B. Cates: Now, therefore, be it Resolved, That it is the sense of the House of Representatives that the Secretary of the Navy should name an appropriate Navy ship in honor of Marine Corps General Clifton B. Cates of Tiptonville, Tennessee.

FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84) The FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) does not include any provisions regarding the naming of Navy ships. Section 1022 of the act, however, designates the historic Navy ship USS Constitution as ―America‘s Ship of State.‖20 Section 1022 states: SEC. 1022. DESIGNATION OF U.S.S. CONSTITUTION AS AMERICA‘S SHIP OF STATE. (a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings: (1) In the Act entitled ‗‗An Act to Provide a Naval Armament‘‘, approved on March 27, 1794 (1 Stat. 350, Chap. XII), the 3rd Congress authorized the construction of six frigates as the first ships to be built for the United States Navy. (2) One of the six frigates was built in Boston, Massachusetts, between 1794 and 1797, and is the only one of the original six ships to survive. (3) President George Washington named this frigate ‗‗Constitution‘‘ to represent the Nation‘s founding document. (4) President Thomas Jefferson, asserting the right of the United States to trade on the high seas, dispatched the frigate Constitution in 1803 as the flagship of the Mediterranean Squadron to end the depredations of the Barbary States against United States ships and shipping, which led to a treaty being signed with the Bashaw of Tripoli in the captain‘s cabin aboard the frigate Constitution on June 4, 1805. (5) The frigate Constitution, with her defeat of the H.M.S. Guerriere, secured the first major victory by the young United States Navy against the Royal Navy during the War of 1812, gaining in the process the nickname ‗‗Old Ironsides‘‘, which she has proudly carried since. (6) Congress awarded gold medals to four of the ship‘s commanding officers (Preble, Hull, Stewart, and Bainbridge), a record unmatched by any other United States Navy vessel.

Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress (7) The frigate Constitution emerged from the War of 1812 undefeated, having secured victories over three additional ships of the Royal Navy. (8) As early as May 1815, the frigate Constitution had already been adopted as a symbol of the young Republic, as attested by the [Washington] National Intelligencer which proclaimed, ‗‗Let us keep ‗Old Ironsides‘ at home. She has, literally become the Nation‘s Ship ... and should thus be preserved ... in honorable pomp, as a glorious Monument of her own, and our other Naval Victories.‘‘. (9) Rumors in 1830 that ‗‗Old Ironsides‘‘, an aging frigate, was about to be scrapped resulted in a public uproar demanding that the ship be restored and preserved, spurred by Oliver Wendell Holmes‘ immortal poem ‗‗Old Ironsides‘‘. (10) ‗‗Old Ironsides‘‘ circumnavigated the world between 1844 and 1846, showing the American flag as she searched for future coaling stations that would eventually fuel the steam-powered navy of the United States. (11) The first Pope to set foot on United States sovereign territory was Pius IX onboard the frigate Constitution in 1849. (12) On April 25, 1860, ‗‗Old Ironsides‘‘ evacuated the midshipmen of the United States Naval Academy from Annapolis, Maryland, to Newport, Rhode Island, preventing the young officers and the esteemed ship from falling into Confederate hands. (13) In 1896, Congressman John F. ‗‗Honey Fitz‘‘ Fitzgerald introduced legislation to return ‗‗Old Ironsides‘‘ from the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in New Hampshire, where she was moored pier side and largely forgotten, to Boston for her 100th birthday. (14) Thousands of school children contributed pennies between 1925 an 1927 to help fund a much needed restoration for ‗‗Old Ironsides‘‘. (15) Between 1931 and 1934, more than 4,500,000 Americans gained inspiration, at the depth of the Great Depression, by going aboard ‗‗Old Ironsides‘‘ as she was towed to 76 ports on the Atlantic, Gulf, and Pacific coasts. (16) The 83rd Congress enacted the Act of July 23, 1954 (68 Stat. 527, chapter 565), which directed the Secretary of the Navy to transfer to the States and appropriate commissions four other historic ships then on the Navy inventory, and to repair and equip the U.S.S. Constitution, as much as practicable, to her original condition, but not for active service. (17) Queen Elizabeth II paid a formal visit to the U.S.S. Constitution in 1976, at the start of her state visit marking the bicentennial of the United States. (18) The U.S.S. Constitution, in celebration of her bicentennial, returned to sea under sail on July 21, 1997, for the first time since 1881, proudly setting sails purchased by the contributions of thousands of pennies given by school children across the United States.

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(19) The U.S.S. Constitution is the oldest commissioned warship afloat in the world. (20) The U.S.S. Constitution is a national historic landmark. (21) The U.S.S. Constitution continues to perform official, ceremonial duties, including in recent years hosting a congressional dinner honoring the late Senator John Chafee of Rhode Island, a special salute for the dedication of the John Moakley Federal Courthouse, a luncheon honoring British Ambassador Sir David Manning, and a special underway demonstration during which 60 Medal of Honor recipients each received a personal Medal of Honor flag. (22) The U.S.S. Constitution celebrated on October 21, 2007, the 210th anniversary of her launching. (23) The U.S.S. Constitution will remain a commissioned ship in the United States Navy, with the Navy retaining control of the ship, its material condition, and its employment. (24) The U.S.S. Constitution‘s primary mission will remain education and public outreach, and any Ship of State functions will be an adjunct to the ship‘s primary mission. (b) DESIGNATION AS AMERICA‘S SHIP OF STATE.— (1) IN GENERAL.—The U.S.S. Constitution is hereby designated as ‗‗America‘s Ship of State‘‘. (2) REFERENCES.—The U.S.S. Constitution may be known or referred to as ‗‗America‘s Ship of State‘‘. (3) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that the President, Vice President, executive branch officials, and members of Congress should use the U.S.S. Constitution for the conducting of pertinent matters of state, such as hosting visiting heads of state, signing legislation relating to the Armed Forces, and signing maritime related treaties. (4) FEE OR REIMBURSEMENT STRUCTURE FOR NONDEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY USE.—The Secretary of the Navy shall determine an appropriate fee or reimbursement structure for any nonDepartment of the Navy entities using the U.S.S. Constitution for Ship of State purposes.

End Notes 1

A law approved in 1819 (Res. of March 3, 1819, §1, 3 Stat. 538, No. 7) stated ―That all of the ships of the navy of the United States, now building, or hereafter to be built, shall be named by the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President of the United States‖ in accordance with rules specifying that ships of the first class were to be named after states of the Union, and second and third class ships were to be named, respectively, after rivers and principal cities and towns. A law approved in 1858 (Act of June 12, 1858, c. 153, §5, 11 Stat. 319) provided a similar rule for ―steamships of the navy,‖ except that third-class


33

vessels (those with fewer than twenty guns) were to be named by the Secretary of the Navy as the President may direct, taking care that no two vessels in the Navy shall bear the same name.‖ Section 1531 of the Revised Statutes of 1873-1874, citing the 1819 and 1858 laws, states: ―The vessels of the Navy shall be named by the Secretary of the Navy, under the direction of the President‖ in accordance with rules similar to those above, varying slightly depending on whether the vessel was a sailing ship or a steamship. In 1898, Congress passed a law (Act of May 4, 1898, c. 234, 30 Stat. 390 [appropriations for the naval services]) prescribing rules for the naming of ―first-class battle ships and monitors,‖ which specified that these were to be named after States and ―shall not be named for any city, place, or persons until the names of the States, shall have been exhausted.‖ The provision did not explicitly state whose duty it would be to assign names to vessels. Congress repealed this provision in 1908 as it pertained to monitors, permitting those vessels to be named ―as the President may direct.‖ (Act of May 13, 1908, c. 166, 35 Stat. 159.) 2 The reference to the Secretary of the Navy found in §1531 of the Revised Statutes of 1873-1874 (see previous footnote) is absent from the U.S. Code of 1925, which covers Navy vessel names in Title 34, §461-463. 3 34 USC §461-463 of the 1925 U.S. Code (see previous footnote) were later recodified as 10 USC §7292. 10 USC §7292 provides that battleships are to be ―named for a State. However, if the names of all the States are in use, a battleship may be named for a city, place, or person.‖ It specifically authorizes the Secretary of the Navy to ―change the name of any vessel bought for the Navy,‖ §7292(c), but does not explicitly assign responsibility for ensuring that no two vessels have the same name, §7292(a), or for naming battleships, §7292(b). 4 Naval History and Heritage Command, ―Ship Naming in the United States Navy,‖ available online at http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq63-1.htm. 5 Ibid. 6 Ohio (SSBN-726) class ballistic missile submarines, for example, were named for states, but one (SSBN-730) was named for Senator Henry ―Scoop‖ Jackson of Washington, who died in office in 1983. Los Angeles (SSN-688) class attack submarines were named for cities, but one (SSN-709) was named for Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, the longtime director of the Navy‘s nuclear propulsion program. Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers were named for battles, but one (CG-51) was named for Thomas S. Gates, a former Secretary of the Navy and Secretary of Defense. 7 See, for example, Donald R. Bouchoux, ―The Name Game,‖ U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, March 2000: 110-111; Norman Polmar, ―Misnaming Aircraft Carriers,‖ U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 2006: 30-31; and Norman Polmar, ―Misnaming Navy Ships (Again),‖ U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 2009: 89. 8 CVN-68 was named for Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, a five-star admiral who commanded U.S. and allied forces in the Pacific in World War II. Nimitz died in 1966, the same year that Congress considered the FY1967 defense budget that funded the procurement of CVN68. 9 Warner served as a sailor in World War II, as a Marine in the Korean War, as Under Secretary of the Navy in 1969-1972, and as Secretary of the Navy in 1972-1974. Warner served as a Senator from January 2, 1979, to January 3, 2009. He was a longtime member of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and was for several years the chairman of that committee. Winter‘s January 8, 2009, announcement assigned a name to SSN-785 eleven months before the ship was fully funded. (The ship was fully funded by the FY2010 DOD appropriations act [H.R. 3326/P.L. 111-118], which was signed into law on December 19, 2009.) Naming a ship almost a year before it is funded is unusual. Winter stepped down as Secretary of the Navy on March 13, 2009. If SSN-785 had not been named for Warner, the 111th Congress might have had an opportunity to consider whether CVN-79, the next Fordclass carrier, should be named for Warner. One author has argued that in light of Warner‘s record and past traditions for naming Navy ships, ―he should be honored by an aircraft

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carrier (two CVNs [nuclear-powered aircraft carriers] have been named for members of Congress) or possibly the lead ship for the planned class of CG(X) cruisers – but not a submarine.‖ (Norman Polmar, ―Misnaming Navy Ships (Again),‖ U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 2009: 89.) The Navy may have named SSN-785 for Warner – LHA-6 for America – in part so that the Navy could give CVN-79 a different name, such as Enterprise. The current Enterprise (CVN-65) is scheduled to retire in 2012, and CVN-79 is scheduled to be procured in FY2013. CVN-65 is the eighth American naval fighting ship to be named Enterprise; earlier ships by that name date back to the Revolutionary War. (See, for example, the Naval History & Heritage Command‘s Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships, available online at http://www.history.navy.mil/DANFS/ index.html.) 10 Murtha served in the Marine Corps in from 1952 to 1955, and again from 1966 to 1967. During the second of these two periods, he served in the Vietnam War, receiving multiple decorations, including the Bronze Star with a Combat ―V‖ for valor and two Purple Hearts. He served in the Marine Corps Reserves from 1955 to 1966, and again from 1967 to 1990, retiring as a Colonel. He was the first Vietnam War combat veteran to be elected to the House of Representatives. He served as a Member of the House from February 5, 1974, until his death on February 8, 2010. For many of his years as a Representative, he was the chairman or ranking member of the Defense subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee. 11 ―Navy Names Ship After Civil Rights Activist Medgar Evers,‖ Navy News Service, October 9, 2009. 12 Source: Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, in a telephone call to CRS following the July 16, 2009, naming announcement for JHSVs 1 through 3. 13 ―Navy, Army Name First Three Joint High Speed Vessels,‖ Navy News Service, July 16, 2009; Christopher P. Cavas, ―Independence Shows Its Moves,‖ Defense News, July 20, 2009: 3. JHSVs are intended for fast intra-theater transportation of troops, vehicles, and equipment, and are being procured for the Army and Navy through the Navy‘s shipbuilding account. 14 Kevin S. O‘Brien, ―Secretary Names JHSV, Meets with Vets and Students,‖ Navy News Service, March 26, 2010. 15 Dean Lohmeyer, ―Students Who Helped Name the Navy‘s Newest Sub Tour State‘s Namesake,‖ Navy News Service, October 25, 2008. 16 For example, the 1819 and 1858 laws cited in footnote 1 set forth naming rules for certain kinds of ships. Today, 10 USC §7292(b) still requires that battleships (which the United States has not built since World War II) be named after states. 17 The Naval Institute Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet, op cit, p. 113. See also p. 70 and p. 86. 18 Patrick Pexton, ―Clinton Compromise: Carriers Truman And Reagan,‖ Navy Times, February 13, 1995: 19. See also ―Navy Announces Aircraft Carrier To Be Named For President Truman,‖ Associated Press, February 2, 1995. CVN-75 had been preliminarily named the United States. 19 The article, which reported on the ship‘s official naming ceremony, states: ―[Senator] Warner recalled that he first suggested naming a carrier in the senior Bush‘s honor last year [i.e., in 2001], during a ceremony in Newport News to christen the [previous] carrier Ronald Reagan.‖ (Dale Eisman, ―Navy Names New Aircraft Carrier For Elder Bush,‖ Norfolk Virginian-Pilot, December 10, 2002.) 20 The provision was included as Section 1014 in the Senate-reported version of the FY2010 defense authorization bill (S. 1390).


Chapter 3

NAVY FORD (CVN-78) CLASS AIRCRAFT CARRIER PROGRAM: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS Ronald O’Rourke SUMMARY CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80 are the first three ships in the Navy‘s new Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs). CVN-78 was procured in FY2008 and is being funded with congressionally authorized four-year incremental funding in FY2008-FY2011. The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget estimates the ship‘s procurement cost at $11,531.0 million (i.e., about $11.5 billion) in then-year dollars, and requests $1,731.3 million in procurement funding as the final increment to complete this estimated procurement cost. CVN-79 is scheduled for procurement in FY2013, and has received advance procurement funding since FY2007. The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget estimates the ship‘s procurement cost at $10,413.1 million (i.e., about $10.4 billion) in then-year dollars and requests $908.3 million in advance procurement funding for the ship. CVN-80 is scheduled for procurement in FY2018, with advance procurement funding scheduled to begin in FY2014. The Navy‘s proposed

Ronald O‘Rourke

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FY2011 budget estimates the ship‘s procurement cost at $13,577.0 million (i.e., about $13.6 billion) in then-year dollars. On April 6, 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced a number of recommendations he was making for the FY2010 defense budget. One of these was to shift procurement of carriers to five-year intervals. This recommendation effectively deferred the scheduled procurement of CVN-79 from FY2012 to FY2013, and the scheduled procurement of CVN-80 from FY2016 to FY2018. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated on April 6, 2009, that shifting carrier procurement to five-year intervals would put carrier procurement on ―a more fiscally sustainable path.‖ Potential oversight issues for Congress for FY2011 for the CVN-78 program include the following:  

Did shifting carrier procurement to five-year intervals put carrier procurement on a more fiscally sustainable path? What is the likelihood that the estimated procurement costs of CVNs 78, 79, and 80 will increase from the estimates shown in the FY2011 budget?

INTRODUCTION CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80 are the first three ships in the Navy‘s new Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class of nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs). CVN-78 was procured in FY2008 and is being funded with congressionally authorized four-year incremental funding in FY2008-FY2011. The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget estimates the ship‘s procurement cost at $11,531.0 million (i.e., about $11.5 billion) in then-year dollars, and requests $1,731.3 million in procurement funding as the final increment to complete this estimated procurement cost. CVN-79 is scheduled for procurement in FY2013, and has received advance procurement funding since FY2007. The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget estimates the ship‘s procurement cost at $10,413.1 million (i.e., about $10.4 billion) in then-year dollars and requests $908.3 million in advance procurement funding for the ship. CVN-80 is scheduled for procurement in FY2018, with advance procurement funding scheduled to begin in FY2014. The Navy‘s proposed

Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and... 37 FY2011 budget estimates the ship‘s procurement cost at $13,577.0 million (i.e., about $13.6 billion) in then-year dollars. On April 6, 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced a number of recommendations he was making for the FY2010 defense budget. One of these was to shift procurement of carriers to five-year intervals. This recommendation effectively deferred the scheduled procurement of CVN-79 from FY2012 to FY2013, and the scheduled procurement of CVN-80 from FY2016 to FY2018. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated on April 6, 2009, that shifting carrier procurement to five-year intervals would put carrier procurement on ―a more fiscally sustainable path.‖1 Potential oversight issues for Congress for FY2011 for the CVN-78 program include the following:  

Did shifting carrier procurement to five-year intervals put carrier procurement on a more fiscally sustainable path? What is the likelihood that the estimated procurement costs of CVNs 78, 79, and 80 will increase from the estimates shown in the FY2011 budget?

BACKGROUND The Navy’s Aircraft Carrier Force The Navy‘s aircraft carrier force consists of 11 nuclear-powered ships— the one-of-a-kind Enterprise (CVN-65) and 10 Nimitz-class ships (CVNs 68 through 77). The most recently commissioned carrier, the George H. W. Bush (CVN-77), the final Nimitz-class ship, was procured in FY2001 and commissioned into service on January 10, 2009.2 CVN-77 replaced the Kitty Hawk (CV-63), which was the Navy‘s last remaining conventionally powered carrier.3

Aircraft Carrier Construction Industrial Base All U.S. aircraft carriers procured since FY1958 have been built by the Newport News, VA, shipyard that forms part of Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB). NGSB‘s Newport News yard is the only U.S. shipyard

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that can build large-deck, nuclear-powered aircraft carriers. The aircraft carrier construction industrial base also includes hundreds of subcontractors and suppliers in dozens of states.

Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) Class Program The Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class carrier design is the successor to the Nimitz-class carrier design.4 Compared to the Nimitz-class design, the Fordclass design will incorporate several improvements, including an ability to generate substantially more aircraft sorties per day and features permitting the ship to be operated by several hundred fewer sailors than a Nimitz-class ship, significantly reducing life-cycle operating and support costs. Navy plans call for procuring at least three Ford-class carriers—CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN80.

CVN-78 CVN-78, which was named in 2007 for President Gerald R. Ford,5 was procured in FY2008 and is being funded with congressionally authorized fouryear incremental funding in FY2008-FY2011.6 The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget estimates the ship‘s procurement cost at $11,531.0 million (i.e., about $11.5 billion) in then-year dollars, and requests $1,731.3 million in procurement funding as the final increment to complete this estimated procurement cost. CVN-78 is scheduled to enter service as the replacement for Enterprise (CVN-65). The Navy projects that there will be a 33-month period between the scheduled decommissioning of Enterprise in November 2012 and the scheduled commissioning of CVN-78 in September 2015. During this 33month period, the Navy‘s carrier force is to temporarily decline from 11 ships to 10 ships. Since 10 USC 5062(b) requires the Navy to maintain a force of at least 11 operational carriers, the Navy asked Congress for a temporary waiver of 10 USC 5062(b) to accommodate the 33-month period between the scheduled decommissioning of Enterprise and the scheduled commissioning of CVN-78. Section 1023 of the FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009) authorizes the waiver and requires the

Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and... 39 Secretary of Defense to submit a report on the operational risk of temporarily reducing the size of the carrier force.

CVN-79 CVN-79 is scheduled for procurement in FY2013, and has received advance procurement funding since FY2007. The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget estimates the ship‘s procurement cost at $10,413.1 million (i.e., about $10.4 billion) in then-year dollars and requests $908.3 million in advance procurement funding for the ship. In the FY2009 budget, CVN-79 was scheduled to be procured in FY2012. On April 6, 2009, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced a number of recommendations he was making for the FY2010 defense budget. One of these was to shift procurement of carriers to five-year intervals. Since CVN-78 was procured in FY2008, this recommendation effectively deferred the scheduled procurement of CVN-79 from FY2012 to FY2013. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates stated that shifting carrier procurement to five-year intervals would put carrier procurement on ―a more fiscally sustainable path.‖7

CVN-80 CVN-80 is scheduled for procurement in FY2018, with advance procurement funding scheduled to begin in FY2014. The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget estimates the ship‘s procurement cost at $13,577.0 million (i.e., about $13.6 billion) in then-year dollars. Secretary of Defense Gates‘ April 2009 recommendation to shift carrier procurement to five-year intervals (see above discussion of CVN-79) effectively deferred the procurement of CVN-80 from FY2016 to FY2018.

Procurement Funding Table 1 shows procurement funding for CVNs 78, 79, and 80. Each ship is being procured with several years of advance procurement funding, followed by four-year incremental procurement funding of the remainder of the ship‘s cost.8 The funding profile for CVN-78, for example, includes advance procurement funding in FY2001-FY2007, followed by four years of incremental procurement funding in FY2008-FY2011.

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Table 1. Procurement Funding for CVNs 78, 79, and 80 (Millions of thenyear dollars, rounded to nearest tenth) FY FY01 FY02 FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 FY11 (requested) FY12 (projected) FY13 (projected) FY14 (projected) FY15 (projected)

CVN-78 21.7 135.5 395.5 1,162.9 623.1 618.9 735.8 2,685.0 2,684.6 737.0 1,731.3 0 0 0 0

CVN-79 0 0 0 0 0 0 52.8 123.5 1,210.6 482.9 908.3 494.8 2,418.3 3,158.5 760.7

CVN-80 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 228.1 1,523.8

Total 21.7 135.5 395.5 1,162.9 623.1 618.9 788.6 2,808.5 3,895.2 1,219.9 2,639.6 494.8 2,418.3 3,386.6 2,284.5

Source: FY2009, FY2010, and FY2011Navy budget submissions. Note: Figures may not add due to rounding.

Increase in Estimated Unit Procurement Costs As shown in Table 2, the estimated procurement costs of CVNs 78, 79, and 80 in the FY2011 budget submission are 10.3%, 13.3%, and 26.7% higher, respectively, in then-year dollars than those in the FY2009 budget submission.9 The increases in the estimated procurement costs of CVNs 78, 79, and 80 since the FY2009 budget submission have at least four potential causes: 

 

one additional year of inflation being incorporated into the cost of CVN-79 as a result of its scheduled procurement being deferred from FY2012 to FY2013, and two years of additional inflation being incorporated into the cost of CVN-80 as a result of its scheduled procurement being deferred from FY2016 to FY2018; increases in projected annual rates of inflation; higher estimates of real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) material costs, real labor rates, or labor hours (given a certain position on the production learning curve) for building CVN-78 class carriers; and

Table 2. Estimated Procurement Costs of CVNs 78, 79, and 80 (As shown in FY2009, FY2010, and FY2011 budgets, in millions of then-year dollars)

Budget FY09 budget FY10 budget FY11 budget % increase: FY09 budget to FY10 budget FY10 budget to FY11 budget FY09 budget to FY11 budget

CVN-78 Estimated Scheduled procurement fiscal year of cost procurement 10,457.9 FY08 10,845.8 FY08 11,531.0 FY08

CVN-79 Estimated Scheduled procurement fiscal year of cost procurement 9,191.6 FY12 n/aa FY13b 10,413.1 FY13

CVN-80 Estimated Scheduled procurement fiscal year of cost procurement 10,716.8 FY16 n/aa FY18b 13,577.0 FY18

3.7

n/a

n/a

6.3

n/a

n/a

10.3

13.3

26.7

Source: FY2009, FY2010, and FY2011Navy budget submissions. a. n/a means not available; the FY2010 budget submission did not show estimated procurement costs for CVNs 79 and 80. b. The FY2010 budget submission did not show scheduled years of procurement for CVNs 79 and 80; the dates shown here for the FY2010 budget submission are inferred from the shift to five-year intervals for procuring carriers that was announced by Secretary of Defense Gates in his April 6, 2009, news conference regarding recommendations for the FY2010 defense budget.

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increased costs due to loss of learning and reduced spreading of fixed overhead costs resulting from shifting to five-year intervals for procuring carriers.

Procurement Cost Cap Section 122 of the FY2007 defense authorization act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109364 of October 17, 2006) established a procurement cost cap for CVN-78 of $10.5 billion, plus adjustments for inflation and other factors, and a procurement cost cap for subsequent Ford-class carriers of $8.1 billion each, plus adjustments for inflation and other factors. The conference report (H.Rept. 109-702 of September 29, 2006) on P.L. 109-364 discusses Section 122 on pages 551-552. The Navy on February 19, 2010, notified the congressional defense committees that, after making permitted adjustments in the cost cap for inflation and other factors, the estimated cost of CVN-78 is $224 million below the cost cap for that ship.10 The Navy on April 19, 2010, informed CRS and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) that, after making permitted adjustments in the cost cap for inflation and other factors, the estimated costs of CVN-79 and CVN-80 each remain several hundred million dollars below the cost cap for those ships.11

ISSUES FOR CONGRESS Potential oversight issues for Congress for FY2011 for the CVN-78 program include the following:  

Did shifting carrier procurement to five-year intervals put carrier procurement on a more fiscally sustainable path? What is the likelihood that the estimated procurement cost of CVN78, CVN-79, or CVN-80 will increase from the estimates shown in the FY2011 budget?

Each of these issues is discussed below.

Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and... 43

Shift to Five-Year Intervals: A More Fiscally Sustainable Path? As mentioned earlier, when Secretary of Defense Gates announced on April 6, 2009, that he was recommending that carrier procurement be shifted to five-year intervals, he stated that this would put carrier procurement on ―a more fiscally sustainable path.‖ This was interpreted as meaning that shifting to five-year intervals (compared to a combination of four- and five-year intervals in previous Navy 30-year shipbuilding plans) would reduce the average amount of funding required each year for procuring carriers. As a simplified notional example, if carriers are assumed to cost $10 billion each, then shifting from a four-year interval to a five-year interval would reduce the average amount of carrier procurement funding needed each year from $2.5 billion to $2.0 billion, a reduction of $500 million per year. This simplified notional example, however, assumes that shifting from four- to five-year intervals does not by itself cause an increase in the procurement cost of the carriers. Increasing the procurement interval could by itself increase the procurement cost of the carriers by causing reduced learning-curve benefits (i.e., loss of learning) from one carrier to the next, and by reducing the spreading of fixed overhead costs at the Newport News shipyard and at supplier firms. An increase in carrier procurement costs due to such effects would offset at least some of the reduction in the average amount of carrier procurement funding needed each year that would result from shifting to five-year intervals. Shifting to five-year intervals for procuring carriers could also increase the costs of other Navy ship programs. NGSB‘s Newport News shipyard performs mid-life nuclear refueling complex overhauls (RCOHs) on Nimitz-class carriers, and jointly builds Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines along with another shipyard (General Dynamics‘ Electric Boat Division). In addition, vendors that make nuclear-propulsion components for carriers make analogous components for nuclear-powered submarines. A reduced spreading of fixed costs at NGSB‘s Newport News yard and at nuclear-propulsion component vendors due to the shift to five-year intervals for carrier procurement might thus also increase costs for Nimitz-class RCOHs and Virginia-class submarines. Increases in costs for these programs would further offset the reduction in the average amount of carrier procurement funding needed each year that would result from shifting to five-year intervals for carrier procurement. Potential key oversight questions for Congress for FY2011 include the following:

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How much of the increase since the FY2009 budget submission in the estimated procurement costs of CVNs 78, 79, and 80 (see Table 2) is due to the shift to five-year intervals for procuring carriers? How do potential increases in the costs of CVN-78 class aircraft carriers, Nimitz-class RCOHs, and Virginia-class submarines caused by the shift to five-year intervals for procuring carriers affect the calculation of the net change in average annual funding requirements that results from shifting carrier procurement to five-year intervals?

May 2009 Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding Statement A May 2009 Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding statement on the cost impact of shifting to five-year intervals for procuring carriers states: One element of the announcement by the Secretary of Defense last week was to shift from four (4) years to five (5) years between construction start for each new Ford Class carrier. Past Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding experience with carrier new construction has shown that the optimum time between carrier construction is less than 4 years. This allows the most efficient flow of the work force from one ship to the next, and facilitates a learning curve for carriers. Moving to five (5) year intervals between starts will require the shipyard to sub-optimize manning level sequencing and result in added trade training, loss of learning, and added startup costs. Increasing the time between carrier construction can have a large impact on the supplier base, driving cost increases of 5-10 percent, or higher in some cases, above normal escalation. Material costs of suppliers who provide similar components to other Navy programs currently under contract will also experience cost growth. Some equipment suppliers can be expected to exit the market as a result of the additional year with the expense of component requalification being realized. Finally, the decrease in production labor volume on an annual basis, created by the increase in the time interval between carrier construction starts will increase the cost to other programs in the yard. This applies to work already under contract, namely Virginia class submarines (VCS) Block 2 and Block 3, and CVN 78 predominately; and for future work not yet under contract, namely Carrier RCOH‘s, CVN79 and follow-on Ford class carrier construction, and later Blocks of VCS. The impact to work already under contract is expected to be in the range of $100M of cost growth. We also expect cost increases for future contracts yet to be priced. Conservative projections of the shipbuilder cost impact to CVN 79 and CVN80 for the one year delay will be on the order of a 9-15 percent cost increase.12


March 2010 GAO Report A March 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated that if carrier procurement were shifted to five-year intervals, ―the fabrication start date for CVN 80 will be delayed by 2 years, which will increase the amount of shipyard overhead costs paid under the CVN 79 contract.‖13 March 2010 Navy Report Required by Section 126 Section 126 of the FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 11184 of October 28, 2009) required the Secretary of the Navy to submit a report to the congressional defense committees on the effects of using a five-year interval for the construction of Ford-class aircraft carriers. The conference report (H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7, 2009) on H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 stated the following regarding Section 126: The conferees note that a 5-year interval for aircraft carrier construction, as proposed by the Secretary of Defense, may be the appropriate course of action for the Department of the Navy. However, the conferees are concerned that this decision may not have been made following a rigorous cost-benefit analysis. Therefore, the conferees expect that the Secretary of the Navy will take no further action to preclude the ability of the Secretary to award a construction contract for CVN–79 in fiscal year 2012 or the aircraft carrier designated CVN–80 in fiscal year 2016, consistent with the Annual LongRange Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for Fiscal Year 2009, until he completes the required assessment and fully informs the congressional defense committees of any such a decision. (Page 680)

The Navy submitted the report on March 4, 2010.14 The report states, among other things, that 





―It is reasonable to assume that some vendor base inefficiencies, in addition to inflation may occur by increasing CVN build intervals to five years.‖ ―While a five-year interval between carrier construction starts will result in potential inefficiencies and gaps for specific carrier construction trade skills, the Navy plans to closely manage the transition to 5-year centers to minimize the impact of this change on training of individuals required to support ship construction.‖ ―The Navy estimated that a four-year build interval would maximize the opportunity to achieve labor efficiencies due to learning. A fiveyear build interval reduces this opportunity; however, the overall

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



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impact for loss of learning associated with a shift to five-year centers is manageable through Advance Procurement and Advance Construction.‖ ―The Navy assessed the NIMITZ Class cost returns for shipbuilder labor and material and GFE to determine the correlation between these cost elements and the number of years between carrier awards. The Navy estimates that impact to Basic Construction is around 1.0% for CVN 79 and CVN 80.‖ ―The change to five-year build intervals results in an overhead decrease in direct labor workload for aircraft carrier construction, thereby causing the overhead rates to increase proportionately. The Navy estimates the construction portion increase is less than 1% each for CVN 78, CVN 79 and CVN 80.‖ ―The impact of changing the interval between carrier awards to the VIRGINIA Class submarine current Block II and Block III contracts is estimated to be $30-50 million per hull.‖15

The report does not provide an overall dollar calculation of how much of the increase since the FY2009 budget submission in the estimated procurement costs of CVNs 78, 79, and 80 is due to the shift to five-year intervals for procuring carriers. Virginia-class submarines are scheduled to be procured at a rate of two ships per year starting FY2011. If the cost increase of $30 million to $50 million for each Virginia-class boat cited in the Navy‘s report holds for Virginia-class boats procured in FY2011 and subsequent years, then the shift to five-year intervals for procuring carriers would increase Virginia-class procurement costs by $60 million to $100 million per year. For the text of the Navy‘s report, see Appendix A.

December 31, 2009, Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) The Department of Defense‘s (DOD‘s) December 31, 2009, Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) for the CVN-78 program, which was made available in the spring of 2010, states that ―the decision to move to a five-year build cycle increased the CVN 79 and CVN 80 procurement requirements.‖16 The report states that the estimated increases in aircraft carrier procurement costs shown in the report as resulting from shifting to five-year intervals for procuring carriers ―are overstated, and will be corrected in the June 2010 SAR.‖17 The report states that these estimated increases are $1,131.4 million in then-year dollars for CVN-79 and $2,999.8 million in then-year dollars for CVN-80. 18 Since the December 31, 2009, SAR states that these two figures

Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and... 47 are overstated, they presumably will be reduced in the June 2010 SAR. The December 31, 2009, SAR does not show a change in the estimated cost of CVN-78 resulting from shifting to five-year intervals for procuring carriers.

Potential for Additional Growth in Estimated Procurement Costs A second potential oversight issue for Congress for the CVN-78 program concerns the likelihood that the estimated procurement costs of CVNs 78, 79, or 80 will increase from the estimates shown in the FY2011 budget. One possible source of additional cost growth in CVN-78 is new technologies that are being developed for the ship, particularly the electromagnetic aircraft launch system (EMALS)—an electromagnetic (as opposed to the traditional steam-powered) aircraft catapult. Problems in developing EMALS or other technologies could delay the ship‘s completion and increase its development and/or procurement cost.

May 2010 CBO Report A May 2010 CBO report on the potential cost of the Navy‘s FY2011 30year shipbuilding plan states: The Navy‘s projected cost of the lead ship of the CVN-78 class grew by 10 percent between the President‘s 2008 and 2011 budget requests. The Navy now expects the lead ship‘s cost to be about $11.7 billion (about what CBO estimated in its analysis of the Navy‘s 2009 plan). Yet further increases appear likely. The CVN-78 is only about 10 percent complete, and cost growth in shipbuilding programs typically occurs when a ship is more than half finished—particularly in the later stages of construction, when all of a ship‘s systems must be installed and integrated. To estimate the cost of the lead ship of the CVN-78 class, CBO used the actual costs of the previous carrier—the CVN-77—and then adjusted them for higher costs for government-furnished equipment and for more than $3 billion in costs for nonrecurring engineering and detail design (the plans, drawings, and other one-time items associated with the first ship of a new class). As a result, CBO estimates that the lead CVN-78 will cost about $12.5 billion once it is completed. Subsequent ships of the class will not require as much funding for onetime items; however, on the basis of higher projected inflation in shipbuilding costs, CBO estimates the average cost of the six

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carriers in the 2011 plan at $12.4 billion, whereas the Navy estimates their average cost at $10.6 billion…. There are several reasons to believe that the final cost of the CVN-78 could be even higher than CBO‘s estimate. First, most lead ships built in the past 20 years have experienced cost growth of more than 40 percent. (CBO‘s estimate for the lead CVN-78 already accounts for some of that historical cost growth.) Second, Navy officials have told CBO that there is a 60 percent probability that the final cost of the CVN-78 will exceed the service‘s estimate, compared with a 40 percent probability that the final cost will be less than that estimate. Third, a number of critical technologies that are supposed to be incorporated into the ship, such as a new electromagnetic catapult system for launching aircraft, remain under development. Difficulties in completing their development could arise and increase costs, which would affect the costs for subsequent ships of the class.19

March 2010 GAO Report GAO reported the following in March 2010 regarding the status of the CVN-78 program, including the potential for cost growth: Technology Maturity The CVN 21 program has consistently demonstrated the maturity of its critical technologies later than recommended by best practices. Only 4 of the program‘s 19 critical technologies were mature when the construction preparation contract was awarded in 2004. Of the program‘s 13 current critical technologies, 8 have not been demonstrated in a realistic environment. Three of these technologies—EMALS, advanced arresting gear, and dual band radar-present the greatest risk to the ship‘s cost and schedule. While CVN 21 program officials stated that the EMALS program is on schedule to deliver material to the shipyard when it is needed for construction, concurrent EMALS testing and ship construction continue to present cost and schedule risks to the program. The Navy completed a second phase of testing for the EMALS generator—an area of prior concern—and the first phase of testing for the EMALS launch motor in 2009. As a result of the tests, the program identified design changes that are necessary to improve the performance of EMALS, but add cost and schedule risk to the program. The Navy plans to test EMALS with actual aircraft in summer 2010. The advanced arresting gear includes seven major subsystems. Programs officials expect that six of the subsystems will be mature after analyzing data from a recent reliability test. The remaining subsystem—control system software—will remain immature until integrated land-based testing with actual aircraft occurs in fiscal year 2012. This testing will overlap with the first arresting gear

Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and... 49 deliveries to the shipyard. Testing of carrier specific dual band radar functionality is scheduled to conclude in fiscal year 2012. Dual band radar equipment will be delivered incrementally from fiscal years 2012 through 2014.

Design Maturity The CVN 78 began construction in September 2008 without a complete product model. The program began production with approximately 76 percent of the 3D product model complete. In November 2009, the contractor completed the detail phase in the 3D product model. However, program officials reported that while the 3D product model is complete, some product model work will continue up to and after delivery of CVN 78. This additional work includes making design adjustments for planned just-in-time technology insertions or for unplanned delays in contractor or government furnished information.

Production Maturity The Navy awarded the contract for CVN 78 construction in September 2008. Construction of approximately 50 percent of the ship‘s units are complete. According to program officials, these units are low on the ship and only account for 9 percent of the ship‘s production hours. The Navy awarded a not-to-exceed fixed-price production contract to General Atomics for EMALS and the advanced arresting gear in 2009. At the time of award, the contract price had not been finalized. The Navy expects to finalize the price of this contract in March 2010.

Other Program Issues The Navy plans to use the dual band radar on both CVN 21 carriers and DDG 1000 destroyers. Given the recent decision to truncate the DDG 1000 program, CVN 21 program officials stated that the dual band radar production line may be idle for up to 4 years before production begins for CVN 79. The cost of the CVN 79 dual band radar could increase due to the costs associated with restarting the production line. In addition, the fiscal year 2010 President‘s Budget recommends moving the carrier to a 5-year build cycle. If adopted, the fabrication start date for CVN 80 will be delayed by 2 years, which will increase the amount of shipyard overhead costs paid under the CVN 79 contract.

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Program Office Comments The program office generally concurs with the assessment that concurrent technology development, particularly regarding EMALS, the advanced arresting gear, and the dual-band radar system, presents the highest programmatic risk. Officials stated that all critical technologies are being aggressively managed through established processes to mitigate cost, schedule, and development risk and remain on track to meet required shipbuilder in-yard need dates.20

The EMALS development effort was the subject of a July 16, 2009, hearing before the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. Materials from this hearing are presented in the Appendix B.

LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY FOR FY2011 FY2011 Funding Request The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget was submitted to Congress on February 1, 2010. The budget requests $1,731.3 million in procurement funding for CVN-78 and $908.3 million in advance procurement funding for CVN-79.

FY2011 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5136/S. 3454) House The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-491 of May 21, 2010) on the FY2011 defense authorization bill (H.R. 5136), recommends approval of the Navy‘s request for FY2011 procurement and advance procurement funding for CVN-78 and CVN-79 (page 73). Section 1021 of H.R. 5136 as reported by the committee would amend the law (10 USC 231) that requires the Department of Defense to annually submit a 30-year Navy shipbuilding plan. The amendment would, among other things, require that the Secretary of the Navy, in submitting each 30-year plan, ―ensure that such plan—(1) is in accordance with section 5062(b) of this title [i.e., 10 USC 5062(b), which requires the Navy to maintain a force of at least

Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and... 51 11 operational carriers]; and (2) phases the construction of new aircraft carriers during the periods covered by such plan in a manner that minimizes the total cost for procurement for such vessels.‖ The committee‘s report states: Aircraft carriers The committee is concerned that the decision by the Secretary of Defense in April 2009, prior to the completion of the congressionally mandated analysis of the Quadrennial Defense Review, to shift aircraft carrier construction to five-year centers for the stated purpose of ―a more fiscally sustainable path‖ was shortsighted. The committee has recently learned via receipt of Department of Defense Selected Acquisition Reports that the cost to construct the next three Ford-class aircraft carriers is likely to increase by up to $4.0 billion because of the change in construction centers. The committee notes that the current 30-year shipbuilding plan would not maintain a force of 11 operational aircraft carriers past fiscal year 2040 and therefore does not conform to the requirement in section 5062b of title 10, United States Code, to maintain an operational fleet of 11 aircraft carriers. The committee expects that subsequent plans will conform to current law, or the Secretary of the Navy will request a change to statute commensurate with detailed analysis of the effect a reduction to 10 operational aircraft carriers will have on the national military strategy. In title I [sic: Title X – Section 1021] of this Act, the committee directs the Secretary of Defense to phase the construction of aircraft carriers to minimize the total cost for procurement of the vessels. (Page 75)

Senate The FY2011 defense authorization bill (S. 3454), as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 111-201 of June 4, 2010), recommends approval of the Navy‘s request for FY2011 procurement and advance procurement funding for CVN-78 and CVN-79 (see page 677 of the printed bill).

APPENDIX A. TEXT OF NAVY REPORT ON EFFECTS OF SHIFTING TO FIVE-YEAR INTERVALS The following is the text of the Navy‘s report on the effects of shifting to five-year intervals for procuring carriers.21

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I . Report Requirements Section 126 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, P.L. 111-84, (hereinafter ―Section 126‖) requires that a report be submitted to Congress no later than February 1, 2010 assessing the effects of using a five-year interval for the construction of Gerald R. Ford Class aircraft carriers. The assessment shall include impacts with respect to four specified areas resulting from this change in acquisition strategy. This chapter fulfills the Navy‘s reporting obligation pursuant to Section 126. The language of this section is as follows: ―Not later than February 1, 2010, the Secretary of the Navy shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the effects of using a fiveyear interval for the construction of FORD Class aircraft carriers. The report shall include, at a minimum, an assessment of the effects of such five-year interval on the following: (1) With respect to the supplier base(A) the viability of the base, including suppliers exiting the market or other potential reductions in competition; and (B) cost increases to the Ford Class aircraft carrier program. (2) Training of individuals in trades related to ship construction. (3) Loss of expertise associated with ship construction. (4) The costs of— (A) any additional technical support or production planning associated with the start of construction; (B) material and labor; (C) overhead; and (D) other ship construction programs, including the costs of existing and future contracts.‖

II. Assessment Discussion On April 6, 2009, Secretary of Defense announced within a Defense Budget Recommendation Statement that the Navy‘s CVN 21 aircraft carrier program (Ford Class) would shift from a four-year to a five-year build cycle, thereby placing the program on a more fiscally sustainable path. This will result in 10 aircraft carriers after 2040. The five-year build cycle allows for a balance between carrier build-rate and inventory, and a more effective use of

Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and... 53 overall Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy funding between carrier programs and other ship, submarine, support, and amphibious ship recapitalization plans.

1. Impact to Supplier Base It has been the Navy‘s experience that longstanding aircraft carrier suppliers have generally responded to ship construction schedule shifts and extended workload gaps without widespread disruption or loss of continuity for critical products from most vendors. For example, the interval between procurement of CVN 77 and CVN 78 was originally planned to be five years, but grew to seven years. There was no significant impact on the shipbuilder‘s procurement of components to support ship construction. In addition, for a 2009 Navy-funded RAND Corporation study, RAND sought comments from 46 major suppliers regarding the impact of moving the CVN 79 award date to Fiscal Year 2013. The suppliers chosen were those deemed critical to aircraft carrier construction by the shipbuilder. The majority of the 18 major suppliers who responded indicated that less than 20% of their total annual revenues were from aircraft carrier construction, and nearly all responding vendors indicated they provide services to other Navy ship platforms including submarines, surface combatants, and aircraft carrier Refueling and Complex Overhauls (RCOH). It is reasonable to assume that some vendor base inefficiencies, in addition to inflation may occur by increasing CVN build intervals to five years. Efforts by the Navy to drive cross-platform commonality of parts and proactively manage obsolescence also mitigate the risk of economic dependence. As a result, economic dependence on Ford Class aircraft carrier order frequency for the majority of the vendor industrial base is projected to be low. The Navy plans to continue to closely manage this industrial base to minimize impacts and costs. 2-3. Impact to Training and Expertise The construction start of the Ford Class coincides with an overall ramp-up in shipyard production efforts in the Fiscal Year 2010-Fiscal Year 2013 timeframe due to an increase to two per year VIRGINIA Class submarines, more consistent carrier build frequencies, sustained NIMITZ Class RCOH program, and the start of CVN 65 inactivation. While a five-year interval between carrier construction starts will result in potential inefficiencies and gaps for specific carrier construction trade skills, the Navy plans to closely manage the transition to 5- year centers to minimize the impact of this change on training of individuals required to support ship construction.

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The Navy estimated that a four-year build interval would maximize the opportunity to achieve labor efficiencies due to learning. A five-year build interval reduces this opportunity; however, the overall impact for loss of learning associated with a shift to five-year centers is manageable through Advance Procurement and Advance Construction.

4. Cost Impacts There are three primary sources of cost impact associated with increasing the intervals between carrier construction starts - inflation, inefficiencies, and overhead impacts. The effects of these are addressed in paragraphs 4A, 4B, and 4C for CVN 79 and CVN 80. For other work at the shipyard, the collective impacts of the three sources are provided in paragraph 4D. A. Cost of any Additional Technical Support or Production Planning Associated with the Start of Construction Since CVN 79 advance planning and procurement commenced prior to the five-year build interval decision, CVN 79 technical support and production planning will be adjusted for the five-year interval. The Construction Preparation contract will be extended by one year to meet the construction award shift from Fiscal Year 2012 to Fiscal Year 2013. With the exception of costs associated with an additional year of planning amounting to about 1%, there should be no other fiscal implications with this extension. B. Cost of Material and Labor A five-year build interval imposes one additional year of inflation on the CVN 79 and two additional years on CVN 80. The Navy estimates a 3% impact on the Basic Construction Cost and Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) for CVN 79 and an 8% impact to CVN 80. This inflation impact will be addressed in the budget request for these two ships. The Navy assessed the NIMITZ Class cost returns for shipbuilder labor and material and GFE to determine the correlation between these cost elements and the number of years between carrier awards. The Navy estimates that impact to Basic Construction is around 1.0% for CVN 79 and CVN 80. C. Cost of Overhead Overhead rates (percentage of direct labor) at the shipbuilder and major suppliers are directly correlated to the projected direct labor workload. The change to five-year build intervals results in an overall decrease in direct labor workload for aircraft carrier construction, thereby causing the overhead rates

Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and... 55 to increase proportionally. The Navy estimates the construction portion increase is less than 1% each for CVN 78, CVN 79 and CVN 80. The Navy will be working with the shipbuilder on managing overhead in the shipyard. D. Costs of Other Ship Construction Programs, Including the Costs of Existing and Future Contracts The impact of changing the interval between carrier awards to the VIRGINIA Class submarine current Block II and Block III contracts is estimated to be $30-50 million per hull. The increase in costs is associated with workload reallocatjon in the shipbuilding industrial base.

III. Report Summary This chapter, as required by Section 126 of P.L. 111-84, assesses the impacts resulting from the shift of the acquisition schedule to five-year intervals for Ford Class aircraft carriers. A review of available information indicates there will be a minimal impact on the supplier base if closely managed. Since the shipyard has ample opportunity to plan for five-year intervals, any impacts to worker training or trade skill inefficiencies, and workload planning is assessed to be manageable. The change from a four-year to a five-year build interval will result in a unit cost increase to the Ford Class carriers that have funding requirements in the Future Years Defense Program. The Navy is continuing to refine the estimated impacts and will adjust future budget submissions. These increases are due primarily to inflation, inefficiencies, and overhead adjustments that will be factored into the overall budget request for each ship. Despite the inflation adjusted costs per ship, the change in build interval allows carrier annual funding requirements to be spread over longer periods of time, maintains a steady state 11 carrier force structure until after 2040, and facilitates a reduced average annual aircraft carrier funding requirement.

APPENDIX B. JULY 16, 2009, HEARING ON EMALS This appendix presents materials from a July 16, 2009, hearing on the EMALS development effort before the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.

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Chairman’s Opening Statement The text of the opening statement of Representative Gene Taylor, the ranking member of the subcommittee, is as follows: The subcommittee will come to order. Today the subcommittee meets in open session to receive testimony from officials of the United States Navy on the current status of the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System, or EMALS. The EMALS system is an electromagnetic catapult designed for use on the Ford-class aircraft carriers. If the system delivers its full promised capability, the Ford-class carriers will have a catapult system which is far superior to the steam catapults of the Nimitz-class. The operational advantages are increased launch envelopes, that is, the ability to launch both heavier and lighter aircraft than steam catapaults, higher sortie rates, reduced weight, reduced mechanical complexity, reduced maintenance, and reduced carrier manning. Unfortunately, what brings us together today is that the development of this program is so far behind schedule that it threatens the delivery date for the USS Ford. For the record, I would like to briefly summarize the history of this program and the current status: EMALS was a core capability in the design of the next generation aircraft carrier, which the Navy called ―CVN 21‖ for ―21th century‖ technology, and which eventually became the USS Ford (CVN 78) class. In 1999 the Navy entered into technology demonstration contracts with two different contractors; General Atomics and Northrop Grumman Marine Systems to develop prototypes for an electromagnetic catapult. By 2004 the Navy downselected to the system proposed by General Atomics and entered into a System Design and Development contract, or SDD contract, to build a full scale, ship representative prototype at the Navy test facility in Lakehurst, New Jersey. That prototype was contracted to be completed in time for testing to begin in 2007, testing was to have concluded after two years and presumably the lessons learned from the test program would influence the final production system which would be shipped to the carrier construction yard for erection into the ship. It is now July 2009 and full scale testing has yet to begin at the Lakehurst facility. The Navy is now faced with almost complete concurrency of testing and production of the first ship-set if they are to meet the in-yard deliver dates to keep the USS Ford on schedule. There are a number of subsystems to the complete EMALS system and each subsystem has different in-yard deliver dates, but some of those dates are as early as the summer of 2011, and to meet those dates the production of the components or at least the

Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and... 57 ordering of the material for the components must begin now—before full scale testing of the prototype system has begun. To be fair, some testing has already occurred. The High Cycle Test for the Energy Storage System is well underway, as is the Highly Accelerated Life Cycle Testing of the launch motor segments. Those tests have identified some minor redesign issues which can be incorporated into the production components. But until a full scale catapult launch from the prototype occurs, questions will remain on the systems overall performance. I have been briefed, as I believe other Members of this subcommittee have been briefed, that the issues in completing and delivering the SDD components were a result of the contractor‘s inexperience managing a major production effort. I find that answer unsettling because it is the Navy‘s responsibility to oversee what their contractors are doing and to identify problems before they are problems. I will note that a little over a year and a half ago, the contractor did put in place an entirely new management and engineering team, hiring away proven production engineers from both General Dynamics and Northrop Grumman. This new team seems to have righted the ship, but that ship is still in very dangerous seas. So what we have is a program that is so essential to the carrier that if it does not work, the nation has paid billions of dollars for an unusable ship. If the system is delayed, the carrier is automatically delayed. And every day of delay will push the cost of that carrier higher. This is the first in what I intend to be a series of hearings on this program over the next few years. This is too important to not have close congressional oversight. I intend to continue close oversight of this program until it is delivered, installed, tested, and certified for launching naval aircraft off the deck of the USS Ford. Our witnesses today are:   

VADM David Architzel, Principle Deputy to Assistant Secretary Stackley CAPT Randy Mahr, Program Manager for EMALS CAPT Brian Antonio, Program Manager, Ford Class Aircraft Carrier

VADM Architzel is representing the Assistant Secretary as the senior acquisition executive who is ultimately responsible for all Navy and Marine Corps acquisition programs. CAPT Mahr, is the official whose only responsibility is this program. CAPT Antonio is responsible for building the entire carrier—he obviously has an interest in the success of EMALS.

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This year‘s National Defense Authorization Act directs the Secretary of the Navy to keep CAPT Mahr in his position until the completion of the system development testing and the successful production of the first ship-set of components. That means the CAPT, who has been selected to the rank of Rear Admiral, will be in place for another few years and will have the opportunity to visit with us again on this subject. I would now like to call on my friend from Missouri, the Ranking Member of this subcommittee, the Honorable Todd Akin for any opening remarks he may wish to make.

Ranking Member’s Opening Statement The text of the opening statement of Representative Todd Akin, the ranking member of the subcommittee, is as follows: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and welcome to our witnesses. We appreciate your willingness to appear before us today. As the Chairman has indicated, the Electromagnetic Launch System, known as EMALS, is a critical part of the military‘s largest and most expensive ship, the next generation aircraft carrier. The EMALS system is important because of the capability it delivers to the Gerald R. Ford-class carrier, allowing our Navy to increase its sortie generation rate and the carrier to launch both heavier and lighter aircraft, in more operating conditions, than is currently possible. This is a significant attribute, because the first of these carriers will be in service until at least 2065, and in order to maintain its relevance, the carrier will need to be able to launch F-35s, UAVs, and whatever else we may develop in the meantime. Additionally, EMALS is important because the schedule delays and cost growth experienced by the system have put the construction and cost of the carrier in jeopardy. As this subcommittee has noted on multiple occasions, the scale of our investment in aircraft carrier construction means that even small increases in cost have the potential to break the bank. Other shipbuilding programs have recently seen cost growth of close to 200 percent. If the carrier grows by even 10 percent, the impact is in the billions of dollars per vessel. Simply put, the EMALS program has no room for error. It must deliver on time, or put the carrier at risk. To get there, the EMALS program must engage in con-current development and production of the first ship set—a practice we know well from past experience is highly risky. But there is some good news. The contractor has been holding to schedule since the beginning of the year and has agreed to a fixed price production

Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and... 59 contract. The Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition got personally involved and conducted an in-depth review of the program. Secretary Stackley has elected to proceed with the effort, a decision that I agree with, but has taken several steps to strengthen the management of the program. One of these steps includes lengthening the tour of the current program manager, CAPT Mahr, who is with us today. I have often noted that one of the first lessons I learned during my time at IBM, is that for any project to succeed, you need to have one person who is in charge. CAPT Mahr, this subcommittee has heard many good things about you, and your colleague CAPT Brian Antonio, the CVN 21 Program Manager. But we will be holding you to a very high standard. This is your baby and you must deliver. The consequences for the rest of naval shipbuilding are too great to tolerate anything less. In conclusion, I am interested in learning more today about the contract you are putting in place with the EMALS contractor for the production ship set, and the activities required to conclude system development and minimize risk to the CVN 21 program going forward. Thank you again for being here. I look forward to your testimony.

Navy Statement Chairman Taylor, Ranking Member Akin, and distinguished members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to report on the development of the Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS) for Gerald R. Ford (CVN 78) class aircraft carriers and the Department‘s plan ahead for this effort. Steam catapults will continue to deliver the minimum required aircraft launching capability and remain the launching system on the NIMITZ-class aircraft carrier for the next fifty years. However, the steam catapult system limits the full potential of the inherent improved capability of the FORD-class aircraft carrier. As modern aircraft, including the Joint Strike Fighter, grow heavier and require higher launching end speeds, and the maintenance manhours required to maintain the readiness of the steam catapult increases, it is imperative that the Navy continue development of a launching system with reduced manning and increased operational availability. In response to meeting this future need, EMALS is being developed for the CVN 78 class to replace the steam catapult system. EMALS design requirements support the CVN 78 sortie generation rate Key Performance Parameter (KPP) through

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increased reliability and system capability. It provides a higher energy launch capability as well as an expanded launch envelope to support future airwing capabilities. EMALS is also projected to reduce shipboard manning requirements, improve aircraft launching system maintainability, and provide better control and more efficient application of acceleration forces throughout the aircraft launch cycle. EMALS development began with a competitive prototyping effort between General Atomics (GA) and Northrop Grumman Marine Systems in 1999. The Navy down-selected to the GA design in 2004 following completion of approximately 1500 launch demonstration events conducted on both competing systems. Based on the successful prototype testing, the Navy awarded the EMALS System Development and Demonstration (SDD) contract to GA in 2005, which is scheduled to complete in early 2012. The EMALS program is currently executing the test portions of the SDD phase and procuring long lead time material as it begins production of the CVN 78 ship set. Near term events such as successful completion of High Cycle Test (HCT) Phase I and commencement of High Cycle Test (HCT) Phase II, Highly Accelerated Life Testing (HALT), as well as start of commissioning testing for System Functional Demonstration (SFD), will validate the system design and enable transition into production. HCT II testing of a complete power train, with the exception of the launch motor, is ongoing at the GA Tupelo, Mississippi site. HALT testing of the launch motor is taking place at the Naval Air Warfare Center test site in Lakehurst, NJ. Production Readiness Reviews (PRRs) are currently ongoing to support release of EMALS subsystem components for production. Baseline drawing packages are projected to complete by the end of FY 2009. Full scale, full length testing of EMALS, including the launch of manned aircraft, is scheduled to begin at Lakehurst during the summer of 2010. Concurrent with testing, EMALS manufacturing and production efforts began in December 2007 with the first Long Lead Time material procurements to support CVN 78 required in yard delivery dates and will continue through 2014 for delivery of all CVN 78 ship set components. The Navy has placed an undefinitized contract action (UCA) with a not to exceed value with General Atomics leading to an Advanced Acquisition Fixed Price contract for the remaining ship set material. Definitization of this contract is targeted for later this year. The Navy‘s and GA‘s support for a fixed price contract reflects our collective confidence in the EMALS‘ technology maturity and capability. The contract will be based on the EMALS performance specification and Procurement Data Packages. Specific component production release will be

Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and... 61 tied to Production Readiness Reviews and successful completion of specific test events. The Production Integrated Master Schedule shows the program will meet CVN 78 production required in yard delivery dates. As EMALS progressed through SDD tests and began the transition to production, schedule delays and cost overruns were experienced. A series of actions aimed at improving management of the EMALS prime and subcontractors were taken by the Navy. In late 2007, Navy leadership initiated a three-month independent and in-depth Production Assessment Review (PAR). The PAR provided specific recommendations for processes and leadership improvements, which are being implemented. Most recently, senior Navy leadership conducted a detailed assessment of the viability of continuing with EMALS or reverting to a legacy steam catapult system for CVN 78 based on indications that schedule and cost performance was declining. After an extensive review, the Navy re-confirmed it‘s commitment to EMALS as the CVN 78-class aircraft launching system, while implementing additional actions to improve performance and mitigate risk. The production contract will ensure rigorous management and oversight. In April 2004, the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology and Logistics) (USD(AT&L)) established a critical technology Integrated Product Team (IPT) to maintain oversight of all CVN 78 critical technologies, including EMALS development. Additionally, the Navy has implemented two detailed reviews to identify needed improvements to support better schedule and cost performance while completing technical efforts. The review of the PAR in 2008 provided a thorough assessment of GA‘s ability to transition from development to production and to support the CVN 78 production schedule. The Navy aggressively implemented many of the PAR recommendations including leadership changes, new program and technical governance processes, increased involvement of the shipbuilder and a revised test program to mitigate production schedule risks. A three-star Executive Committee, which includes the OPNAV resource sponsor, Commanders of the Naval Sea Systems Command and Naval Air Systems Command, and the Principal Military Deputy for ASN RDA meet quarterly for program reviews and to provide oversight of EMALS development. Most importantly, direct responsibility for EMALS is being executed by the NAVAIR program manager for Aircraft Launch & Recovery Equipment (ALRE), who reports to PEO TACAIR and COMNAVAIR to support delivery of this new program within cost and schedule. Issues with cost and schedule performance have created overlaps between production component manufacturing and system level testing. Cost and

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schedule performance have not been where they need to be. Recognizing this, the Navy has taken steps to better define needed testing, improved management oversight, insisted on near term definitization of the DCA into a fixed price contract, and increased funding to the program to cover anticipated growth. With system level testing ongoing the potential for additional cost increases and schedule delays remain. However, the Navy is putting additional oversight in place to maximize performance and minimize the likelihood of overruns. Given the advantages that EMALS is projected to afford the next generation of aircraft carriers, these actions are essential for providing the fleet what it needs. Component, subsystem, and system testing is identifying technical issues, retiring technical risk, and demonstrating the capability of the EMALS. Key to the Navy‘s strategy is having a management team in place both within the Navy and at its prime contractor that is aggressively attacking these issues and retiring risks on a schedule that supports ship construction. We are working hard towards these ends. The management focus, review processes and oversight that the Navy is employing are mitigating future EMALS SDD phase technical, cost and schedule risks. The Navy will leverage management processes established during the SDD phase by building upon these lessons learned during system production and ship integration, including the extensive involvement of the shipbuilder in the production and integration process. A rigorous process exists for incorporating the results of upcoming testing in the production baseline which will mitigate cost and schedule risks of concurrency between the SDD and production phases. The Navy has also taken steps to include, as mentioned previously, the use of fixed price contracting where appropriate, to control EMALS cost and schedule variances during the subsystem production phase. Mr. Chairman, the Navy understands the concerns you and your subcommittee have expressed, and is aggressively working to improve performance. We are implementing your recommendations to breakout EMALS cost and performance data for separate review by Congress, and to provide stability in the program‘s key technical and management teams. The Department is committed to delivering CVN 78 with EMALS on time and on budget. EMALS will enable current and future generations of Naval Aviators to perform their missions more safely, efficiently and effectively. I thank you for the opportunity to testify and look forward to answering your questions.22


End Notes 1

Source: Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, at April 6, 2009, news conference on his recommendations for the FY2010 defense budget. 2 Congress approved $4,053.7 million in FY2001 procurement funding to complete CVN-77‘s then-estimated total procurement cost of $4,974.9 million. Section 122 of the FY1998 defense authorization act (H.R. 1119/P.L. 105-85 of November 18, 1997) limited the ship‘s procurement cost to $4.6 billion, plus adjustments for inflation and other factors. The Navy testified in 2006 that with these permitted adjustments, the cost cap stood at $5.357 billion. The Navy also testified that CVN-77‘s estimated construction cost had increased to $6.057 billion, or $700 million above the adjusted cost cap. Consequently, the Navy in 2006 requested that Congress increase the cost cap to $6.057 billion. Congress approved this request: Section 123 of the FY2007 defense authorization act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2006), increased the cost cap for CVN-77 to $6.057 billion. 3 The Kitty Hawk was decommissioned on January 31, 2009. 4 The CVN-78 class was earlier known as the CVN-21 class, which meant nuclear-powered aircraft carrier for the 21st century. 5 Section 1012 of the FY2007 defense authorization act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2006) expressed the sense of the Congress that CVN-78 should be named for President Gerald R. Ford. On January 16, 2007, the Navy announced that CVN-78 would be so named. CVN-78 and other carriers built to the same design will consequently be referred to as Ford (CVN-78) class carriers. For further discussion of Navy ship names, see CRS Report RS22478, Navy Ship Names: Background for Congress, by Ronald O‘Rourke. 6 Section 121 of the FY2007 defense authorization act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2006) granted the Navy the authority to use four-year incremental funding for CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80. 7 Source: Statement of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, at April 6, 2009, news conference on his recommendations for the FY2010 defense budget. 8 As mentioned earlier, Section 121 of the FY2007 defense authorization act (H.R. 5122/P.L. 109-364 of October 17, 2006) granted the Navy the authority to use four-year incremental funding for CVN-78, CVN-79, and CVN-80. 9 CBO in 2008 and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in 2007 questioned the accuracy of the Navy‘s cost estimate for CVN-78. CBO reported in June 2008 that it estimated that CVN-78 would cost $11.2 billion in constant FY2009 dollars, or about $900 million more than the Navy‘s estimate of $10.3 billion in constant FY2009 dollars, and that if ―CVN-78 experienced cost growth similar to that of other lead ships that the Navy has purchased in the past 10 years, costs could be much higher still.‖ CBO also reported that, although the Navy publicly expressed confidence in its cost estimate for CVN-78, the Navy had assigned a confidence level of less than 50% to its estimate, meaning that the Navy believed there was more than a 50% chance that the estimate would be exceeded. (Congressional Budget Office, Resource Implications of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2009 Shipbuilding Plan, June 9, 2008, p. 20.) GAO reported in August 2007 that: Costs for CVN 78 will likely exceed the budget for several reasons. First, the Navy‘s cost estimate, which underpins the budget, is optimistic. For example, the Navy assumes that CVN 78 will be built with fewer labor hours than were needed for the previous two carriers. Second, the Navy‘s target cost for ship construction may not be achievable. The shipbuilder‘s initial cost estimate for construction was 22 percent higher than the Navy‘s cost target, which was based on the budget. Although the Navy and the shipbuilder are working on ways to reduce costs, the actual costs to build the ship will likely increase above the Navy‘s target. Third, the Navy‘s ability to manage issues that affect cost suffers from insufficient cost surveillance. Without effective cost surveillance, the Navy will not be able to identify early signs of cost growth and take necessary corrective action.

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(Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Navy Faces Challenges Constructing the Aircraft Carrier Gerald R. Ford within Budget, GAO-07-866, August 2007, summary page. See also Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Realistic Business Cases Needed to Execute Navy Shipbuilding Programs, Statement of Paul L. Francis, Director, Acquisition and Sourcing Management Team, Testimony Before the Subcommittee on Seapower and Expeditionary Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, July 24, 2007 (GAO-07-943T), p. 15.) 10 Source: Letter dated February 19, 2010, from Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus to the chairmen of the House and Senate Armed Services committees and the Defense subcommittees of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees. Copy of letter provided by the Navy to CRS and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on April 19, 2010. 11 Source: April 19, 2010, Navy briefing on the CVN-21 program to CRS and CBO. 12 Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding statement dated May 1, 2009, entitled ―NGSB Statement Regarding Extending the Time Interval between New Build Starts For the Ford Class of Aircraft Carriers,‖ provided to CRS by Northrop Grumman. 13 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-10-388SP, March 2010, p. 54. 14 This is the date of the cover letters to the congressional recipients. The report itself has a cover date of February 2010. 15 Department of the Navy, Report to Congress on Effects of Five-year Build Intervals for Force Class Aircraft Carriers, February 2010, 5 pp. Copy provided to CRS by Navy Office of legislative Affairs on April 8, 2010. 16 Department of Defense, Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), CVN-78, As of December 31, 2009, p. 4. 17 Department of Defense, Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), CVN-78, As of December 31, 2009, p. 4. The statement is repeated on page 25. 18 Department of Defense, Selected Acquisition Report (SAR), CVN-78, As of December 31, 2009, p. 27. 19 Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s Fiscal Year 2011 Shipbuilding Plan, May 2010, pp. 11-13. 20 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-10-388SP, March 2010, p. 54. 21 Department of the Navy, Report to Congress on Effects of Five-year Build Intervals for Force Class Aircraft Carriers, February 2010, 5 pp. The cover letters sent with the report are dated March 4, 2010. Copy of report provided to CRS by Navy Office of legislative Affairs on April 8, 2010. 22 Statement of Vice Admiral David Architzel, USN, Principal Military Deputy, Research, Development and Acquisition, and Captain Randy Mahr, USN, Program Manager for Aircraft Launching and Recovery Equipment (ALRE) and Captain Brian Antonio, USN, Program Manager for Future Aircraft Carrier, Before the Seapower and Expeditionary Warfare [sic: Forces] Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee [Hearing] On Electromagnetic Aircraft Launch System (EMALS}, July 16, 2009, 43 pp.


Chapter 4

NAVY VIRGINIA (SSN-774) CLASS ATTACK SUBMARINE PROCUREMENT: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS Ronald O’Rourke SUMMARY The Navy has been procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) at a rate of one per year for the past several years, and a total of 12 boats have been procured through FY2011. The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget increases the procurement rate to two boats per year. The eight boats to be procured in the five-year period FY2009-FY2013 (boats 11 through 18) are being procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement. The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget requests $3,441.5 million in procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of the 13th and 14th Virginia-class boats. The FY2011 budget estimates the combined procurement cost of these two boats at $5,344.4 million, and the boats have received a total of $1,903.0 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) and Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) funding. The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget also requests $1,436.8 million in AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in future years, and $254.4 million in Economic Order Quantity

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(EOQ) purchases of long-leadtime items for Virginia-class boats to be procured under the FY2009-FY2013 MYP arrangement.

INTRODUCTION The Navy has been procuring Virginia (SSN-774) class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) at a rate of one per year for the past several years, and a total of 12 boats have been procured through FY2011. The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget increases the procurement rate to two boats per year. The eight boats to be procured in the five-year period FY2009-FY2013 (boats 11 through 18) are being procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement. The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget requests $3,441.5 million in procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of the 13th and 14th Virginia-class boats. The FY2011 budget estimates the combined procurement cost of these two boats at $5,344.4 million, and the boats have received a total of $1,903.0 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) and Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) funding. The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget also requests $1,436.8 million in AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in future years, and $254.4 million in Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) purchases of long-leadtime items for Virginia-class boats to be procured under the FY2009-FY2013 MYP arrangement.

BACKGROUND U.S. Navy Submarines U.S. Navy submarines fall into three types—nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines (SSGNs), and nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs).1 The SSBNs‘ basic mission is to remain hidden at sea with their nucleararmed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and thereby deter a strategic nuclear attack on the United States.2 As of the end of FY2008, the Navy included 14 Ohio (SSBN-726) class SSBNs, which are commonly called Trident submarines because they carry Trident SLBMs. Each Trident SSBN can carry 24 Trident SLBMs.

Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement:...

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The Navy‘s four SSGNs, which are a recent addition to the fleet, are former Trident SSBNs that have been converted (i.e., modified) to carry Tomahawk cruise missiles and special operations forces (SOF) rather than SLBMs. Although the SSGNs differ somewhat from SSNs in terms of mission orientation (with the SSGNs being strongly oriented toward Tomahawk strikes and SOF support, while the SSNs are more general-purpose in orientation), SSGNs can perform other submarine missions and are sometimes included in counts of the projected total number of Navy attack submarines. The Navy‘s SSGNs are discussed in another CRS report.3 The SSNs—the focus of this chapter—are general-purpose submarines that perform a variety of peacetime and wartime missions, including the following:      

covert intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), much of it done for national-level (as opposed to purely Navy) purposes; covert insertion and recovery of SOF (on a smaller scale than possible with the SSGNs); covert strikes against land targets with the Tomahawk cruise missiles (again on a smaller scale than possible with the SSGNs); covert offensive and defensive mine warfare; anti-submarine warfare (ASW); and anti-surface ship warfare.

During the Cold War, ASW against the Soviet submarine force was the primary stated mission of U.S. SSNs, although covert ISR and covert SOF insertion/recovery operations were reportedly important on a day-to-day basis as well.4 In the post-Cold War era, although anti-submarine warfare remains a mission, the SSN force has focused more on performing the other missions noted on the list above.

Attack Submarine Force Levels In February 2006, the Navy proposed achieving and maintaining in coming years a fleet with a total of 313 ships, including 48 SSNs (and 4 SSGNs). For a review of SSN force level goals since the Reagan Administration, see Appendix A. The SSN force included more than 90 boats during most of the 1980s, peaked at 98 boats at the end of FY1987, and then began to decline. The force

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included 85 to 88 boats during the early 1990s, 79 boats at the end of FY1996, 65 boats at the end of FY1998, 57 boats at the end of FY1999, and 56 boats at the end of FY2000. It has since numbered 53 to 56 boats. The decline in the number of SSNs since the late 1980s has roughly paralleled the decline in the total size of the Navy over the same time period. The 53 SSNs in service at the end of FY2008 included the following:   

45 Los Angeles (SSN-688) class boats; 3 Seawolf (SSN-21) class boats; and 5 Virginia (SSN-774) class boats.

Los Angeles- and Seawolf-Class Boats A total of 62 Los Angeles-class submarines, commonly called 688s, were procured between FY1970 and FY1990 and entered service between 1976 and 1996. They are equipped with four 21-inch diameter torpedo tubes and can carry a total of 26 torpedoes or Tomahawk cruise missiles in their torpedo tubes and internal magazines. The final 31 boats in the class (SSN-719 and higher) are equipped with an additional 12 vertical launch system (VLS) tubes in their bows for carrying and launching another 12 Tomahawk cruise missiles. The final 23 boats in the class (SSN-751 and higher) incorporate further improvements and are referred to as Improved Los Angeles class boats or 688Is. As of the end of FY2009, 18 of the 62 boats in the class had been retired. The Seawolf class was originally intended to include about 30 boats, but Seawolf-class procurement was stopped after three boats as a result of the end of the Cold War and associated changes in military requirements. The three Seawolf-class submarines are the Seawolf (SSN-21), the Connecticut (SSN22), and the Jimmy Carter (SSN-23). SSN-21 and SSN-22 were procured in FY1989 and FY1991 and entered service in 1997 and 1998, respectively. SSN-23 was originally procured in FY1992. Its procurement was suspended in 1992 and then reinstated in FY1996. It entered service in 2005. Seawolf-class submarines are larger than Los Angeles-class boats or previous U.S. Navy SSNs.5 They are equipped with eight 30-inch-diameter torpedo tubes and can carry a total of 50 torpedoes or cruise missiles. SSN-23 was built to a lengthened configuration compared to the other two ships in the class.6


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Virginia (SSN-774) Class Program General The Virginia-class attack submarine was designed to be less expensive and better optimized for post-Cold War submarine missions than the Seawolfclass design. The Virginia-class design is slightly larger than the Los Angelesclass design,7 but incorporates newer technologies. Virginia-class boats currently cost about $2.6 billion each to procure. The first Virginia-class boat entered service in October 2004. Past and Projected Procurement Rate As shown in Table 1, 12 Virginia-class boats have been procured through FY2010 at a rate of about one boat per year, and the Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget increases the procurement rate two boats per year. Multiyear Procurement (MYP) Under a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement requested by the Navy and approved by Congress in FY2008 and FY2009,8 a total of eight Virginia-class boats (boats 11 through 18 in the program) are to be procured in the period FY2009-FY2013, in annual quantities of 1, 1, 2, 2, and 2, respectively. The five Virginia-class boats procured in FY2004-FY2008 were also procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement. The four boats procured in FY1998-FY2002 were procured under a somewhat similar arrangement called a block buy. The boat procured in FY2003 fell between the FY1998-FY2002 block buy and the FY2004-FY2008 MYP. Table 1. Past and Planned Virginia-Class Procurement FY98 1 FY07 1

FY99 1 FY08 1

FY00 0 FY09 1

FY01 1 FY10 1

FY02 1 FY11 2

FY03 1 FY12 2

FY04 1 FY13 2

FY05 1 FY14 2

FY06 1 FY15 2

Source: Prepared by CRS based on U.S. Navy data. The eight boats procured or to be procured in FY2009-FY2013 are being procured under a multiyear procurement (MYP) arrangement.

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Joint Production Arrangement Virginia-class boats are built jointly by General Dynamics‘ Electric Boat Division (GD/EB) of Groton, CT, and Quonset Point, RI, and the Newport News, VA, shipyard that forms part of Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB).9 Under the arrangement, GD/EB builds certain parts of each boat, Newport News builds certain other parts of each boat, and the yards take turns building the reactor compartments and performing final assembly of the boats. GD/EB is building the reactor compartments and performing final assembly on boats 1, 3, and so on, while Newport News is doing so on boats 2, 4, and so on. The arrangement results in a roughly 50-50 division of Virginia-class profits between the two yards and preserves both yards‘ ability to build submarine reactor compartments (a key capability for a submarineconstruction yard) and perform submarine final-assembly work. The joint production arrangement is a departure from past U.S. submarine construction practices, under which complete submarines were built in individual yards. The joint production arrangement is the product of a debate over the Virginia-class acquisition strategy within Congress, and between Congress and DOD, that occurred in 1995-1997 (i.e., during the markup of the FY1996-FY1998 defense budgets). The goal of the arrangement is to keep both GD/EB and Newport News involved in building nuclear-powered submarines, and thereby maintain two U.S. shipyards capable of building nuclear-powered submarines, while minimizing the cost penalties of using two yards rather than one to build a submarine design that is being procured at a relatively low annual rate. Cost-Reduction Effort The Navy states that it has achieved a goal of reducing the cost of Virginia-class submarines so that two boats can be procured in FY2012 for combined cost of $4.0 billion in FY2005 dollars—a goal referred to as ―2 for 4 in 12.‖ Achieving this goal involved removing about $400 million (in FY2005 dollars) from the cost of each submarine. (The Navy calculates that the unit target cost of $2.0 billion in FY2005 dollars for each submarine translates into about $2.6 billion for a boat procured in FY2012, and about $2.7 billion for a boat procured in FY2013.) The Navy says that, in constant FY2005 dollars, about $200 million of the $400 million in the sought-after cost reductions were accomplished simply through the improved economies of scale (e.g., better spreading of shipyard fixed costs and improved learning rates) of producing two submarines per year rather than one per year. The remaining $200 million in sought-after cost


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reductions, the Navy says, was accomplished through changes in the ship‘s design (which will contribute roughly $100 million toward the cost-reduction goal) and changes in the shipyard production process (which will contribute the remaining $100 million or so toward the goal). Some of the design changes will be introduced to Virginia-class boats procured prior to FY2012, but the Navy says the full set of design changes will not be ready for implementation until the FY2012 procurement. Changes in the shipyard production process are aimed in large part at reducing the total shipyard construction time of a Virginia-class submarine from 72 months to 60 months. (If the ship spends less total time in the shipyard being built, its construction cost will incorporate a smaller amount of shipyard fixed overhead costs.) The principal change involved in reducing shipyard construction time to 60 months involves increasing the size of the modules that form each submarine, so that each submarine can be built out of a smaller number of modules. The Navy says that the goal of reducing shipyard construction time to 60 months is a medium-risk goal, meaning that the Navy believes that there is a moderate (as opposed to low or high) risk that the goal will not be achieved.10

Submarine Construction Industrial Base General In addition to GD/EB and Newport News, the submarine construction industrial base includes scores of supplier firms, as well as laboratories and research facilities, in numerous states. About 80% of the total material procured from supplier firms for the construction of submarines (measured in dollars rather than pieces, parts, or purchase orders) comes from single or sole source suppliers. Observers in recent years have expressed concern for the continued survival of many of these firms. For nuclear-propulsion component suppliers, an additional source of stabilizing work is the Navy‘s nuclearpowered aircraft carrier construction program.11 In terms of work provided to these firms, a carrier nuclear propulsion plant is roughly equivalent to five submarine propulsion plants. Design and Engineering Portion Earlier in this decade, some observers expressed concern about the design and engineering portion of the submarine construction industrial base. Much

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of the design and engineering portion is resident at GD/EB and Newport News. (A small portion is resident at a some of the component makers.) With Virginia-class design work winding down and no other submarine-design projects underway, the submarine design and engineering base faced the nearterm prospect, for the first time in about 50 years, of having no major submarine-design project on which to work. Navy and industry officials, Members of Congress, and other observers were concerned that unless a major submarine-design project is begun soon, the submarine design and engineering base would begin to atrophy through the departure of experienced personnel. Rebuilding an atrophied submarine design and engineering base, Navy and industry officials believe, could be time-consuming, adding time and cost to the task of the next submarine-design effort, whenever it might begin. Concern about this possibility among some Navy and industry officials was strengthened by the UK‘s difficulties a few years ago in designing its new Astute-class SSN. The UK submarine design and engineering base atrophied for lack of work, and the subsequent Astute-class design effort experienced considerable delays and cost overruns. Submarine designers and engineers from GD/EB were assigned to the Astute-class project to help the UK overcome these problems.12 The issue of maintaining the submarine design and engineering base appears to have been addressed by bringing forward the start of design work on the next-generation SSBN. For further discussion, see Appendix D.

Projected SSN Shortfall Size and Timing of Shortfall The Navy‘s 30-year SSN procurement plan, if implemented, would not be sufficient to maintain a force of 48 SSNs consistently over the long run. As shown in Table 2, the Navy projects that the SSN force will fall below 48 boats starting in 2024, reach a minimum of 39 boats in 2030, and remain below 48 boats through 2040. Since the Navy plans to retire the four SSGNs by 2028 without procuring any replacements for them, no SSGNs would be available in 2028 and subsequent years to help compensate for a drop in SSN force level below 48 boats. The projected SSN shortfall has been discussed in CRS reports and testimony since 1995.


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Table 2. SSN Force Level, 2011-2040 (Navy Projection) 11 53 26 44

12 54 27 43

13 55 28 41

14 55 29 40

15 54 30 39

16 51 31 41

17 51 32 41

18 50 33 42

19 51 34 43

20 49 35 44

21 49 36 45

22 48 37 46

23 48 38 45

24 46 39 45

25 45 40 45

Source: Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011, p. 22.

Navy Study on Options for Mitigating Projected Shortfall The Navy in 2006 initiated a study on options for mitigating the projected SSN shortfall. The study was completed in early 2007 and briefed to CRS and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on May 22, 2007.13 At the time of the study, the SSN force was projected to bottom out at 40 boats and then recover to 48 boats by the early 2030s. Principal points in the Navy study (which cite SSN force-level projections as understood at that time) include the following: 







The day-to-day requirement for deployed SSNs is 10.0, meaning that, on average, a total of 10 SSNs are to be deployed on a day-to-day basis.14 The peak projected wartime demand is about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time. This figure includes both the 10.0 SSNs that are to be deployed on a day-to-day basis and 25 additional SSNs surged from the United States within a certain amount of time.15 Reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time to 60 months— something that the Navy already plans to do as part of its strategy for meeting the Virginia-class cost-reduction goal (see earlier discussion on cost-reduction goal)—will increase the size of the SSN force by two boats, so that the force would bottom out at 42 boats rather than 40.16 If, in addition to reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time to 60 months, the Navy also lengthens the service lives of 16 existing SSNs by periods ranging from 3 months to 24 months (with many falling in the range of 9 to 15 months), this would increase the size of the SSN force by another two boats, so that the force would bottom out at 44 boats rather than 40 boats.17 The total cost of extending the lives of the 16 boats would be roughly $500 million in constant FY2005 dollars.18

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





The resulting force that bottoms out at 44 boats could meet the 10.0 requirement for day-to-day deployed SSNs throughout the 2020-2033 period if, as an additional option, about 40 SSN deployments occurring in the eight-year period 2025-2032 were lengthened from six months to seven months. These 40 or so lengthened deployments would represent about one-quarter of all the SSN deployments that would take place during the eight-year period. The resulting force that bottoms out at 44 boats could not meet the peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time. The force could generate a total deployment of 32 SSNs within the time in question—three boats (or about 8.6%) less than the 35-boat figure. Lengthening SSN deployments from six months to seven months would not improve the force‘s ability to meet the peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time. To meet the 35-boat figure, an additional four SSNs beyond those planned by the Navy would need to be procured. Procuring four additional SSNs would permit the resulting 48-boat force to surge an additional three SSNs within the time in question, so that the force could meet the peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time. Procuring one to four additional SSNs could also reduce the number of seven-month deployments that would be required to meet the 10.0 requirement for day-to-day deployed SSNs during the period 20252032. Procuring one additional SSN would reduce the number of 7month deployments during this period to about 29; procuring two additional SSNs would reduce it to about 17, procuring three additional SSNs would reduce it to about 7, and procuring four additional SSNs would reduce it to 2.

The Navy added a number of caveats to these results, including but not limited to the following:  

The requirement for 10.0 SSNs deployed on a day-to-day basis is a current requirement that could change in the future. The peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time is an internal Navy figure that reflects recent analyses of potential future wartime requirements for SSNs. Subsequent analyses of this issue could result in a different figure.

Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement:... 





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The identification of 19 SSNs as candidates for service life extension reflects current evaluations of the material condition of these boats and projected use rates for their nuclear fuel cores. If the material condition of these boats years from now turns out to be worse than the Navy currently projects, some of them might no longer be suitable for service life extension. In addition, if world conditions over the next several years require these submarines to use up their nuclear fuel cores more quickly than the Navy now projects, then the amounts of time that their service lives might be extended could be reduced partially, to zero, or to less than zero (i.e., the service lives of the boats, rather than being extended, might need to be shortened). The analysis does not take into account potential rare events, such as accidents, that might force the removal an SSN from service before the end of its expected service live.19 Seven-month deployments might affect retention rates for submarine personnel.

ISSUES FOR CONGRESS Planned Procurement and Projected SSN Shortfall Navy 30-year shipbuilding plans for FY2009 and prior years showed the SSN force recovering to 48 boats by the early 2030s. The Navy‘s new FY2011 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) plan shows the SSN remaining below 48 boats through 2040. The change is due to a reduction in planned SSN procurements. As can be seen in Table 3, the FY2009 plan included procurement of 53 SSNs over 30 years, while the FY2011 plan includes procurement of 44 SSNs over 30 years. The reduction in SSN procurements in the FY2011 plan may be due in large part to the planned procurement of 12 next-generation SSBNs in FY2019-FY2033. The FY2009 plan did not account for the cost of these 12 SSBNs, while the FY2011 does, apparently causing reductions in planned procurement rates for SSNs and other types of ships during that period.

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48-Boat Force-Level Goal Table 3. SSNs in FY2009 and FY2011 30-Year Shipbuilding Plans FY 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020 2021 2022 2023 2024 2025 2026 2027 2028 2029 2030 2031 2032 2033 2034 2035 2036 2037 2038 2039 2040 30-year total

Procurement in Procurement in Force level in Force level in FY2009 plan FY2011 plan FY2009 plan FY2011 plan 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 n/a n/a 53

n/a n/a 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 44

53 52 52 53 54 51 51 49 50 49 50 48 48 47 47 46 45 44 43 41 41 42 44 45 47 49 50 52 53 53 n/a n/a n/a

n/a n/a 53 54 55 55 54 51 51 50 51 49 49 48 48 46 45 44 43 41 40 39 41 41 42 43 44 45 46 45 45 45 n/a

Source: Prepared by CRS using data figures from Navy FY2009 and FY2011 30-year shipbuilding plans. n/a means not applicable.

Some observers have argued that the Navy in coming years should seek to maintain a force of more than 48 SSNs, particularly in light of Chinese naval


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modernization20 and the possibility of a rejuvenated Russian submarine force. Other observers argue that given the kinds of irregular warfare operations in which the United States appears likely to participate in coming years, the United States can afford to reduce the SSN force-level goal to something less than 48 boats. For additional discussion of the 48-boat goal, see Appendix B.

Virginia-Class Technology Insertion Regarding Navy plans for inserting new technology into the Virginia-class design, a March 2010 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report stated: There are three new technologies that the Navy plans to incorporate on current and future Virginia Class submarines once they mature—advanced electromagnetic signature reduction (AESR), a conformal acoustic velocity sensor wide aperture array (CAVES WAA), and a flexible payload sail. AESR is a software package comprised of two systems that use improved algorithms to continuously monitor and recalibrate the submarine‘s signature. The basic algorithms required to support this technology have been proven on other submarines. Navy officials stated they are now developing software and conducting laboratory tests in support of further algorithm development. The Navy has completed and released about 80 percent of the software code for this technology and plans to test it on board a submarine in February 2010. The Navy will begin permanent AESR installations with SSN 782. It also plans to install the software on earlier ships when they are modernized. CAVES WAA is a sensor array that is designed to detect the vibrations and acoustic signatures of targets. The Navy has stated that CAVES WAA could save approximately $4 million per submarine. The Navy is analyzing two options for CAVES WAA production—ceramic accelerometers, a mature but more costly technology, or fiber-optic accelerometers, a less expensive but immature technology. According to program officials, the Navy completed testing panels incorporating both types of sensors in December 2008 and plans additional at sea testing in 2010. The Navy is also considering another option, using a more mature conformal array technology manufactured for the United Kingdom‘s Royal Navy. The Navy is evaluating whether or not this technology is a viable candidate for installation on Virginia-class submarines. The flexible payload sail would replace the sail atop the main body of the submarine. Due to recent changes in communications requirements, the Navy is reevaluating the design of the sail and is not certain when this technology will be ready for installation.21

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POTENTIAL OPTIONS FOR CONGRESS Potential options for Congress in FY2011 include approving or modifying the Navy‘s FY2011 funding request for the Virginia-class program and directing the Navy to provide an update on options for mitigating the projected attack submarine shortfall.

LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY FOR FY2011 The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget requests $3,441.5 million in procurement funding to complete the procurement cost of the 13th and 14th Virginia-class boats. The FY2011 budget estimates the combined procurement cost of these two boats at $5,344.4 million, and the boats have received a total of $1,903.0 million in prior-year advance procurement (AP) and Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) funding. The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget also requests $1,436.8 million in AP funding for Virginia-class boats to be procured in future years, and $254.4 million in Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) purchases of long-leadtime items for Virginia-class boats to be procured under the FY2009-FY2013 MYP arrangement.

APPENDIX A. PAST SSN FORCE-LEVEL GOALS This appendix summarizes attack submarine force-level goals since the Reagan Administration (1981-1989). The Reagan-era plan for a 600-ship Navy included an objective of achieving and maintaining a force of 100 SSNs. The George H. W. Bush Administration‘s proposed Base Force plan of 1991-1992 originally called for a Navy of more than 400 ships, including 80 SSNs.22 In 1992, however, the SSN goal was reduced to about 55 boats as a result of a 1992 Joint Staff force-level requirement study (updated in 1993) that called for a force of 51 to 67 SSNs, including 10 to 12 with Seawolf-level acoustic quieting, by the year 2012.23 The Clinton Administration, as part of its 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of U.S. defense policy, established a goal of maintaining a Navy of about 346 ships, including 45 to 55 SSNs.24 The Clinton Administration‘s 1997 QDR supported a requirement for a Navy of about 305 ships and established a


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tentative SSN force-level goal of 50 boats, ―contingent on a reevaluation of peacetime operational requirements.‖25 The Clinton Administration later amended the SSN figure to 55 boats (and therefore a total of about 310 ships). The reevaluation called for in the 1997 QDR was carried out as part of a Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) study on future requirements for SSNs that was completed in December 1999. The study had three main conclusions: 

 

―that a force structure below 55 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and 62 [SSNs] in the 2025 time frame would leave the CINC‘s [the regional military commanders-in-chief] with insufficient capability to respond to urgent crucial demands without gapping other requirements of higher national interest. Additionally, this force structure [55 SSNs in 2015 and 62 in 2025] would be sufficient to meet the modeled war fighting requirements;‖ ―that to counter the technologically pacing threat would require 18 Virginia class SSNs in the 2015 time frame;‖ and ―that 68 SSNs in the 2015 [time frame] and 76 [SSNs] in the 2025 time frame would meet all of the CINCs‘ and national intelligence community‘s highest operational and collection requirements.‖26

The conclusions of the 1999 JCS study were mentioned in discussions of required SSN force levels, but the figures of 68 and 76 submarines were not translated into official Department of Defense (DOD) force-level goals. The George W. Bush Administration‘s report on the 2001 QDR revalidated the amended requirement from the 1997 QDR for a fleet of about 310 ships, including 55 SSNs. In revalidating this and other U.S. military force-structure goals, the report cautioned that as DOD‘s ―transformation effort matures—and as it produces significantly higher output of military value from each element of the force—DOD will explore additional opportunities to restructure and reorganize the Armed Forces.‖27 DOD and the Navy conducted studies on undersea warfare requirements in 2003-2004. One of the Navy studies—an internal Navy study done in 2004—reportedly recommended reducing the attack submarine force level requirement to as few as 37 boats. The study reportedly recommended homeporting a total of nine attack submarines at Guam and using satellites and unmanned underwater vehicles (UUVs) to perform ISR missions now performed by attack submarines.28 In March 2005, the Navy submitted to Congress a report projecting Navy force levels out to FY2035. The report presented two alternatives for

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FY2035—a 260-ship fleet including 37 SSNs and 4 SSGNs, and a 325-ship fleet including 41 SSNs and 4 SSGNs.29 In May 2005, it was reported that a newly completed DOD study on attack submarine requirements called for maintaining a force of 45 to 50 boats.30 In February 2006, the Navy proposed to maintain in coming years a fleet of 313 ships, including 48 SSNs.

APPENDIX B. VIEWS REGARDING 48-BOAT SSN FORCELEVEL GOAL This appendix summarizes the Navy‘s view and an alternative view regarding the appropriateness of the Navy‘s 48-boat SSN force-level goal.

Navy View31 In support of its position that 48 is the correct number of SSNs to meet future needs, the Navy in 2006 argued the following: 

 



The figure of 48 SSNs was derived from a number of force-level studies that converged on a figure of about 48 boats, making this figure an analytical ―sweet spot.‖ A force of 48 boats is a moderate-risk (i.e., acceptable-risk) force, as opposed to the low-risk force called for in the 1999 JCS study. A force of 48 boats will be sufficient in coming years to maintain about 10 forward-deployed SSNs on a day-to-day basis—the same number of forward-deployed boats that the Navy has previously maintained with a force of more than 50 SSNs. The Navy will be able to maintain 10 forward-deployed SSNs in coming years with only 48 boats because the force in coming years will include an increased number of newer SSNs that require less maintenance over their lives and consequently are available for operation a greater percentage of the time. U.S. regional military commanders would prefer a day-to-day forward-deployed total of about 18 SSNs, but total of 10 will be sufficient to meet their most important needs.

Navy Virginia (SSN-774) Class Attack Submarine Procurement:... 

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All 10 of the forward-deployed SSNs are needed for day-to-day missions such as intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), while about 7.5 of these submarines are also needed to ensure that an adequate number of SSNs are in position for the opening phases of potential conflicts in various locations.

On the issue of meeting U.S. regional military commanders‘ requirements for day-to-day forward-deployed SSNs, the Navy states: Each Combatant Commander (COCOM) requests assets to execute required missions utilizing the Global Force Management Process. Broad categories of mission types are used to make requests including National and Fleet ISR, Exercise and Training (supporting US tactical development), Exercise and Operations (supporting US engagement strategy), Carrier Strike Group (CSG) /Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG) tasking, OPLAN (war plans) support, and Other. As assignment of Critical, High Priority, Priority or Routine is assigned to each of the requested missions. The theater allocation request process prior to 2004 did not include a priority breakdown. In general, ISR missions have been assigned as Critical or High Priority requirements. Other mission areas have been assigned from High Priority to Routine, based on the relative importance to the theater commander. No allocation is currently requested to support OPLAN or Other mission areas. Each COCOM has authority to use its allocated SSNs as required to meet current national and theater priorities. The CJCS [Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff] allocation order to the Submarine Force strictly directs an allotted number of SSN days of presence be provided, capable of meeting each theaters‘ [sic] taskings. The breakdown of mission priorities into Critical, High Priority, Priority and Routine is predominantly a construct to demonstrate how a COCOM could meet their priorities, given a specific level of SSN presence. It serves as an aid to the CJCS in apportioning limited SSN presence to the various theaters. The number of SSNs allocated against Critical Missions enabled COCOMs to meet all requirements in 2004 and 2005, and 99% of the requirements in 2006. For High Priority missions, sufficient SSNs were allocated to meet 25%, 50% and 34% of requirements in 2004, 2005, and 2006 respectively. Overall, the number of SSNs forward deployed was sufficient to cover 66%, 61% and 54% of Combatant Commanders‘ requested SSN mission taskings in 2004, 2005, and 2006 respectively.32

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Alternative View Some observers believe that more than 48 SSNs will be needed to meet future needs. One such observer—retired Vice Admiral Albert Konetzni, Jr., a former commander of the U.S. Pacific Fleet submarine force—argued the following in 2006:33 



 



The Navy‘s SSN force-level analyses called for a force of 48 to 60 SSNs. In this context, a force of 48 SSNs looks more like a sour spot than a sweet spot. The Navy‘s SSN force-level analyses reflect ―reverse engineering,‖ in which an SSN force-level number is selected at the outset for affordability reasons, and assumptions used in the force-level study are then adjusted to produce that figure. The 1999 JCS study on SSN requirements remains valid today. All of the U.S. regional military commanders‘ requirements for dayto-day forward-deployed SSNs, and not just the 60% or so of those requirements that are being met, are critical. In light of the potential size of China‘s submarine force in 2020, a force of 48 SSNs in that year will be insufficient.34

APPENDIX C. OPTIONS FOR FUNDING SSNS This appendix presents information on some alternatives for funding SSNs that was originally incorporated into this chapter during discussions in earlier years on potential options for Virginia-class procurement.

Alternative Funding Methods Alternative methods of funding the procurement of SSNs include but are not necessarily limited to the following: 

two years of advance procurement funding followed by full funding—the traditional approach, under which there are two years of advance procurement funding for the SSN‘s long-leadtime










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components, followed by the remainder of the boat‘s procurement funding in the year of procurement; one year of advance procurement funding followed by full funding—one year of advance procurement funding for the SSN‘s long-leadtime components, followed by the remainder of the boat‘s procurement funding in the year of procurement; full funding with no advance procurement funding (single-year full funding)—full funding of the SSN in the year of procurement, with no advance procurement funding in prior years; incremental funding—partial funding of the SSN in the year of procurement, followed by one or more years of additional funding increments needed to complete the procurement cost of the ship; and advance appropriations—a form of full funding that can be viewed as a legislatively locked in form of incremental funding.35

Navy testimony to Congress in early 2007, when Congress was considering the FY2008 budget, suggested that two years of advance procurement funding are required to fund the procurement of an SSN, and consequently that additional SSNs could not be procured until FY2010 at the earliest.36 This testimony understated Congress‘s options regarding the procurement of additional SSNs in the near term. Although SSNs are normally procured with two years of advance procurement funding (which is used primarily for financing long-leadtime nuclear propulsion components), Congress can procure an SSN without prior-year advance procurement funding, or with only one year of advance procurement funding. Consequently, Congress currently has the option of procuring an additional SSN in FY2009 and/or FY2010. Single-year full funding has been used in the past by Congress to procure nuclear-powered ships for which no prior-year advance procurement funding had been provided. Specifically, Congress used single-year full funding in FY1980 to procure the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier CVN-71, and again in FY1988 to procure the CVNs 74 and 75. In the case of the FY1988 procurement, under the Administration‘s proposed FY1988 budget, CVNs 74 and 75 were to be procured in FY1990 and FY1993, respectively, and the FY1988 budget was to make the initial advance procurement payment for CVN-74. Congress, in acting on the FY1988 budget, decided to accelerate the procurement of both ships to FY1988, and fully funded the two ships that year at a combined cost of $6.325 billion. The ships entered service in 1995 and 1998, respectively.37

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The existence in both FY1980 and FY1988 of a spare set of Nimitz-class reactor components was not what made it possible for Congress to fund CVNs 71, 74, and 75 with single-year full funding; it simply permitted the ships to be built more quickly. What made it possible for Congress to fund the carriers with single-year full funding was Congress‘s constitutional authority to appropriate funding for that purpose. Procuring an SSN with one year of advance procurement funding or no advance procurement funding would not materially change the way the SSN would be built—the process would still encompass about two years of advance work on long-leadtime components, and an additional six years or so of construction work on the ship itself. The outlay rate for the SSN could be slower, as outlays for construction of the ship itself would begin one or two years later than normal. Congress in the past has procured certain ships in the knowledge that those ships would not begin construction for some time and consequently would take longer to enter service than a ship of that kind would normally require. When Congress procured two nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs 72 and 73) in FY1983, and another two (CVNs 74 and 75) in FY1988, it did so in both cases in the knowledge that the second ship in each case would not begin construction until some time after the first.

Procuring SSNs in a 2-1-2 Pattern Some potential approaches for procuring additional boats in FY2009FY2011 could result in a pattern of procuring two boats in a given year, followed by one boat the following year, and two boats the year after that—a 2-1-2 pattern. Navy testimony to Congress in early 2007 and early 2008 suggested that if the procurement rate were increased in a given year to two boats, it would not be best, from an industrial-base point of view, to decrease the rate to a single boat the following year, and then increase it again to two boats the next year, because of the workforce fluctuations such a profile would produce.38 This statement may overstate the production-efficiency disadvantages of a 2-1-2 pattern. If two boats were procured in a given year, followed by one boat the next year—a total of three boats in 24 months—the schedule for producing the three boats could be phased so that, for a given stage in the production process, the production rate would be one boat every eight months. A production rate of one boat every 8 months might actually help the industrial


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base make the transition from the current schedule of one boat every 12 months (one boat per year) to one boat every 6 months (two boats per year). Viewed this way, a 2-1-2 pattern might actually lead to some benefits in production efficiency on the way to a steady rate of two boats per year. The Navy‘s own 30-year (FY2009-FY2038) SSN procurement plan calls for procuring SSNs in a 1-2-1-2 pattern in FY2029-FY2038.

APPENDIX D. MAINTAINING SUBMARINE DESIGN AND ENGINEERING BASE Navy and industry officials earlier in this decade appeared to agree that preserving the submarine design and engineering base over the next several years would require funding substantial submarine design and engineering work in the near term. The Navy plans to address the issue by accelerating into the near term the start of design work on the next-generation SSBN. The Navy asked RAND to study the question of sustaining the submarine design and engineering base. The RAND study, which was published in 2007, states that, based on RAND‘s analysis, we reach the following recommendations: —Seriously consider starting the design of the next submarine class by 2009, to run 20 years, taking into account the substantial advantages and disadvantages involved. If the 20-year-design alternative survives further evaluation, the issue of a gap in submarine design is resolved, and no further actions need be taken. If that alternative is judged too risky, we recommend the following: —Thoroughly and critically evaluate the degree to which options such as the spiral development of the Virginia class or design without construction will be able to substitute for new-submarine design in allowing design professionals to retain their skills. If options to sustain design personnel in excess of demand are judged on balance to offer clear advantages over letting the workforce erode, then the Navy should take the following actions: —Request sufficient funding to sustain excess design workforces at the shipyards large enough to permit substantial savings in time and money later. —Taking into account trends affecting the evolution of critical skills, continue efforts to determine which shipyard skills need action to preserve them within the sustained design core.

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—Conduct a comprehensive analysis of vendors to the shipyards to determine which require intervention to preserve critical skills. —Invest $30 million to $35 million annually in the NSWC‘s Carderock Division submarine design workforce in excess of reimbursable demand to sustain skills that might otherwise be lost.39

End Notes 1

In the designations SSBN, SSGN, and SSN, SS stands for submarine, N stands for nuclearpowered, B stands for ballistic missile, and G stands for guided missile (such as a cruise missile). Submarines can be powered by either nuclear reactors or non-nuclear power sources such as diesel engines or fuel cells. All U.S. Navy submarines are nuclear-powered. A submarine‘s use of nuclear or non-nuclear power as its energy source is not an indication of whether it is armed with nuclear weapons—a nuclear-powered submarine can lack nuclear weapons, and a non-nuclear-powered submarine can be armed with nuclear weapons. 2 Although this mission is often associated with the Cold War-era nuclear competition between the United States and the Soviet Union, it has continued, with some modifications, in the post-Cold War era. For a discussion of U.S. strategic nuclear weapons policy and force structure, see CRS Report RL31623, U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Changes in Policy and Force Structure, by Amy F. Woolf. 3 CRS Report RS21007, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O‘Rourke. 4 For an account of certain U.S. submarine surveillance and intelligence-collection operations during the Cold War, see Sherry Sontag and Christopher Drew with Annette Lawrence Drew, Blind Man’s Bluff (New York: Public Affairs, 1998). 5 Los Angeles-class boats have a beam (i.e., diameter) of 33 feet and a submerged displacement of about 7,150 tons. Seawolf-class boats have a beam of 40 feet. SSN-21 and SSN-22 have a submerged displacement of about 9,150 tons. 6 SSN-23 is 100 feet longer than SSN-21 and SSN-22 and has a submerged displacement of 12,158 tons. 7 Virginia-class boats have a beam of 34 feet and a submerged displacement of 7,800 tons. 8 Section 8011 of the compromise version of the FY2009 defense appropriations act (Division C of H.R. 2638/P.L. 110-329 of September 30, 2008) granted authority for using FY2009 funds for an MYP arrangement for the Virginia-class program. Section 122 of the compromise version of the FY2009 defense authorization bill (S. 3001/P.L. 110-417 of October 14, 2008) modified the authority to use an MYP arrangement for Virginia-class boats to be procured in FY2009-FY2013 that was granted to the Secretary of the Navy by Section 121 of FY2008 defense authorization act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008). The modification additionally permits the Secretary to enter into one or more contracts for advance procurement and advance construction of components for the boats procured under the MYP arrangement. 9 GD/EB and the Newport News shipyard are the only two shipyards in the country capable of building nuclear-powered ships. GD/EB builds submarines only, while the Newport News shipyard also builds nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and is capable of building other types of surface ships. 10 For more on the Navy‘s plan for reducing the procurement cost of the Virginia-class design, see Statement of Ms. Allison Stiller, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Ship Programs) and RDML [Rear Admiral] William Hilarides, Program Executive Officer for


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Submarines, Before the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee [hearing on] Force Structure Requirements and Alternative Funding Strategies for the United States Submarine Fleet, March 8, 2007; Richard R. Burgess, ―Sub Force Innovation,‖Seapower, February 2008: 16-19; Dave Johnson and Dustin Muniz, ―More for Less,‖ Undersea Warfare, Winter 2007: 22-23, 28; and William Hilarides, ―2 For 4 in 2012, The Virginia-Class Road Ahead,‖ U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, June 2006: 68-69. 11 For more on this program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O‘Rourke. 12 See, for example, Andrew Chuter, ―U.K. Spending Mounts for U.S. Help on Sub,‖ Defense News, September 13, 2005: 4; Richard Scott, ―Electric Boat Provides Project Director for Astute Class,‖ Jane’s Navy International, May 2004: 33; Richard Scott, ―Astute Sets Out on the Long Road to Recovery,‖ Jane’s Navy International, December 2003, pp. 28-30; Richard Scott, ―Recovery Plan Shapes Up for Astute Submarines,‖ Jane’s Defence Weekly, November 19, 2003, p. 26. 13 Navy briefing entitled, ―SSN Force Structure, 2020-2033,‖ presented to CRS and CBO on May 22, 2007. 14 The requirement for 10.0 deployed SSNs, the Navy stated in the briefing, was the current requirement at the time the study was conducted. 15 The peak projected wartime demand of about 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time, the Navy stated, is an internal Navy figure that reflects several studies of potential wartime requirements for SSNs. The Navy stated that these other studies calculated various figures for the number of SSNs that would be required, and that the figure of 35 SSNs deployed within a certain amount of time was chosen because it was representative of the results of these other studies. 16 If shipyard construction time is reduced from 72 months to 60 months, the result would be a one-year acceleration in the delivery of all boats procured on or after a certain date. In a program in which boats are being procured at a rate of two per year, accelerating by one year the deliveries of all boats procured on or after a certain date will produce a onetime benefit of a single year in which four boats will be delivered to the Navy, rather than two. In the case of the Virginia-class program, this year might be around 2017. As mentioned earlier in the discussion of the Virginia-class cost-reduction goal, the Navy believes that the goal of reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time is a medium-risk goal. If it turns out that shipyard construction time is reduced to 66 months rather than 60 months (i.e., is reduced by 6 months rather than 12 months), the size of the SSN force would increase by one boat rather than two, and the force would bottom out at 41 boats rather than 42. 17 The Navy study identified 19 existing SSNs whose service lives currently appear to be extendable by periods of 1 to 24 months. The previous option of reducing Virginia-class shipyard construction time to 60 months, the Navy concluded, would make moot the option of extending the service lives of the three oldest boats in this group of 19, leaving 16 whose service lives would be considered for extension. 18 The Navy stated that the rough, order-of-magnitude (ROM) cost of extending the lives of 19 SSNs would be $595 million in constant FY2005 dollars, and that the cost of extending the lives of 16 SSNs would be roughly proportional. 19 In January 2005, the Los Angeles-class SSN San Francisco (SSN-711) was significantly damaged in a collision with an undersea mountain near Guam. The ship was repaired in part by transplanting onto it the bow section of the deactivated sister ship Honolulu (SSN-718). (See, for example, Associated Press, ―Damaged Submarine To Get Nose Transplant,‖ Seattle Post-Intelligencer, June 26, 2006.) Prior to the decision to repair the San Francisco, the Navy considered the option of removing it from service. (See, for example, William H. McMichael, ―Sub May Not Be Worth Saving, Analyst Says,‖ Navy Times, February 28, 2005; Gene Park, ―Sub Repair Bill: $11M,‖ Pacific Sunday News (Guam), May 8, 2005.)

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For further discussion, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 21 Government Accountability Office, Defense Acquisitions[:] Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs, GAO-10-388SP, March 2010, p. 134. 22 For the 80-SSN figure, see Statement of Vice Admiral Roger F. Bacon, U.S. Navy, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare) in U.S. Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Seapower and Strategic and Critical Materials, Submarine Programs, March 20, 1991, pp. 10-11, or Statement of Rear Admiral Raymond G. Jones, Jr., U.S. Navy, Deputy Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare), in U.S. Congress, Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Projection Forces and Regional Defense, Submarine Programs, June 7, 1991, pp. 10-11. 23 See Richard W. Mies, ―Remarks to the NSL Annual Symposium,‖ Submarine Review, July 1997, p. 35; ―Navy Sub Community Pushes for More Subs than Bottom-Up Review Allowed,‖ Inside the Navy, November 7, 1994, pp. 1, 8-9; Attack Submarines in the PostCold War Era: The Issues Facing Policymakers, op. cit., p. 14; Robert Holzer, ―Pentagon Urges Navy to Reduce Attack Sub Fleet to 50,‖ Defense News, March 15-21, 1993, p. 10; Barbara Nagy, ― Size of Sub Force Next Policy Battle,‖ New London Day, July 20, 1992, pp. A1, A8. 24 Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, U.S. Department of Defense, Report on the Bottom-Up Review, October 1993, pp. 55-57. 25 Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, May 1997, pp. 29, 30, 47. 26 Department of Navy point paper dated February 7, 2000. Reprinted in Inside the Navy, February 14, 2000, p. 5. 27 U.S. Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review, September 2001, p. 23. 28 Bryan Bender, ―Navy Eyes Cutting Submarine Force,‖ Boston Globe, May 12, 2004, p. 1; Lolita C. Baldor, ―Study Recommends Cutting Submarine Fleet,‖ NavyTimes.com, May 13, 2004. 29 U.S. Department of the Navy, An Interim Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for the Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2006. The report was delivered to the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations Committees on March 23, 2005. 30 Robert A. Hamilton, ―Delegation Calls Report on Sub Needs Encouraging,‖ The Day (New London, CT), May 27, 2005; Jesse Hamilton, ―Delegation to Get Details on Sub Report,‖ Hartford (CT) Courant, May 26, 2005. 31 This section is based on Navy testimony to the Projection Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on March 28, 2006, and to the Seapower subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 29, and April 6, 2006. 32 Source: Written response by Vice Admiral Charles L. Munns, Commander Naval Submarine Forces, to a question posed by Representative Rob Simmons at a March 28, 2006, hearing before the Projection Forces Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on submarine force structure. Munns‘ written response was provided to CRS on July 5, 2006, by the office of Representative Simmons and is used here with the permission of that office. 33 These points are based on Konetzni‘s testimony to the Projection Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee on March 28, 2006. 34 For more on China‘s submarine force, and China‘s naval modernization effort in general, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O‘Rourke. 35 For additional discussion of these funding approaches, see CRS Report RL32776, Navy Ship Procurement: Alternative Funding Approaches—Background and Options for Congress, by Ronald O‘Rourke. 36 For example, at a March 1, 2007, hearing before the House Armed Services Committee on the FY2008 Department of the Navy budget request, Representative Taylor asked which additional ships the Navy might want to procure in FY2008, should additional funding be


37

38

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made available for that purpose. In response, Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter stated in part: ―The Virginia-class submarines require us to start with a two-year advanced procurement, to be able to provide for the nuclear power plant that supports them. So we would need to start two years in advance. What that says is, if we were able to start in ‗08 with advanced procurement, we could accelerate, potentially, the two a year to 2010.‖ (Source: Transcript of hearing.) Navy officials made similar statements before the same subcommittee on March 8, 2007, and before the Senate Armed Services Committee on March 29, 2007. In both FY1988 and FY1980, the Navy had a spare set of Nimitz (CVN-68) class nuclear propulsion components in inventory. The existence of a spare set of components permitted the carriers to be built more quickly than would have otherwise been the case, but it is not what made the single-year full funding of these carriers possible. What made it possible was Congress‘ authority to appropriate funds for the purpose. See, for example, the spoken remarks of Secretary of the Navy Donald Winter at hearings before the House Armed Services Committee on March 1, 2007, and March 6, 2008, and spoken remarks by other Navy officials at a March 29, 2007, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee and at a March 14, 2008, hearing before the Seapower and Expeditionary Forces subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee. John F. Schank, et al, Sustaining U.S. Submarine Design Capabilities, RAND, Santa Monica (CA), 2007. pp. xxvii-xxviii. (Prepublication copy posted on the Internet by RAND, accessed on May 9, 2007, at http://www.rand.org/pubs/ monographs/2007/ RAND_MG608.pdf.)


Chapter 5

DOD LEASES OF FOREIGN-BUILT SHIPS: BACKGROUND FOR CONGRESS Ronald O’Rourke SUMMARY Prior to the enactment of the FY2008 defense authorization act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008), 10 U.S.C. §2401 stated DOD may not lease a vessel or aircraft for a period of more than five years unless it is specifically authorized by law to make such a lease. Operating under this provision, the Department of Defense (DOD) in recent years used lease options and renewals to lease some foreign-built cargo ships for total periods of almost 10 years—a length of time that some observers argue effectively circumvented a legal requirement that U.S. military ships be built in U.S. shipyards. These observers, particularly the American Shipbuilding Association (ASA), proposed reducing the current five-year legal limit on ship leases to two years for foreign-built ships. DOD opposed the idea, arguing that its ship leases are the most cost-effective way to meet its needs for the ships in question. Section 1011 of the FY2008 defense authorization act amended 10 U.S.C. §2401 to permit the Secretary of a military department to lease a vessel for a period of greater than two years, but less than five years, only if the Secretary provides a notification of the lease to the House and Senate Armed Services

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and Appropriations committees (including a detailed description of its terms, a justification for entering it rather than purchasing the vessel, a determination that entering into it is the most cost-effective option, and a plan for meeting the requirement upon the lease‘s completion), and a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress has expired. The explanatory statement on the final version of the FY2010 DOD appropriations act (H.R. 3326/P.L. 111-118 of December 19, 2009) directed the Navy to update its March 2008 report on the leasing of foreign-built ships and address impacts on American seafarers, sealift capabilities, and naval shipbuilding.

BACKGROUND Current Law Prior to the enactment of the FY2008 defense authorization act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008), 10 U.S.C. §2401 stated DOD may not lease a vessel or aircraft for a period of more than five years unless it is specifically authorized by law to make such a lease. Section 1011 of the FY2008 defense authorization act amended 10 U.S.C. §2401 to permit the Secretary of a military department to lease a vessel for a period of greater than two years, but less than five years, only if the Secretary provides a notification of the lease to the House and Senate Armed Services and Appropriations committees (including a detailed description of its terms, a justification for entering it rather than purchasing the vessel, a determination that entering into it is the most cost-effective option; and a plan for meeting the requirement upon the lease‘s completion), and a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress has expired. (See ―Prior-Year Legislative Activity.‖) Other laws and regulations relating to DOD leases of equipment include 41 U.S.C. §11, Appendix B of Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-11, OMB Circular A-94, and the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, which is Title XIII of Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (H.R. 5835/P.L. 101-508 of November 5, 1990).1 Another legal provision—10 U.S.C. §7309—states that no vessel to be constructed for any of the armed forces may be constructed in a foreign shipyard.

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DOD Leases of Foreign-Built Ships in Recent Years DOD‘s Military Sealift Command (MSC), which operates sealift (i.e., cargo transport and prepositioning) ships, in recent years has leased some foreign-built sealift ships for periods of up to 4 years and 11 months. According to the American Shipbuilding Association (ASA), a trade association representing certain shipyards and shipbuilding-related firms,2 MSC as of June 2006 had renewed the leases of four of these ships for additional periods of up to 4 years and 11 months, providing potential total lease periods of up to almost 10 years.3

American Shipbuilding Association (ASA) Position Supporters of U.S. shipyards, particularly the ASA, have been concerned that, in addition to the four ships cited above, MSC in the future might renew or extend the leases of other foreign-built ships beyond 4 years and 11 months, and that the Defense Logistics Agency (DLA)—another part of DOD—might also begin leasing foreign-built ships.4 ASA has argued that leasing a ship for a period of almost 10 years indicates that DOD has a long-term need for such a ship, and that in such cases, DOD should purchase a ship and have it built in a U.S. yard. ASA has argued that leasing a foreign-built ship for almost 10 years effectively circumvents the requirement in 10 U.S.C. §7309 that U.S. military ships be built in U.S. yards. The ASA has supported changing 10 U.S.C. §2401 to limit leases of foreign-built ships to no more than two years, including all options to renew or extend the contract. ASA has said the proposal is intended to encourage DOD, in cases where DOD has a long-term need for a ship, to purchase the ship and have it built in a U.S. yard, rather than lease a foreign-built ship. In a statement issued prior to the enactment of the FY2008 defense authorization act, the ASA stated that The Department of Defense (DOD) is purchasing, via long-term leases, foreign-built ships to meet long-term military requirements. The leases in question are 5 years in duration and can be, and have been, renewed for another 5-year period. The length of these leases indicate a long-term military requirement, and results in de facto purchases of the ships in contravention of U.S. acquisition law (Section 7309 of Title 10 USC), which states that ships for the U.S. military shall be built in the United States, and the intent of the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990, limiting leases of capital assets....

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Ronald O‘Rourke The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 placed a limit on the duration of leasing contracts for capital equipment by the Executive Branch in an effort to impose budget discipline on future year contract obligations by the Government, and to encourage the purchase rather than leasing of capital assets to meet long-term requirements because of the higher cost associated with leasing. To enforce this budget discipline, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) issued scoring guidelines stating that vessels and other capital assets leased for a period of five years or longer would have to be scored in the budget year in which the contract was entered into, and the budget request in that year would have to include authorization for the total multi-year lease contract. This scoring rule eliminated the budget benefits of leasing versus buying American-built ships. Additionally, in the 1980‘s, Congress passed restrictions in Defense Appropriations Bills limiting ship and other capital leases to not more than 18-months in duration in an effort to deter leasing and discipline out-year funding obligations. DOD has been circumventing these leasing restrictions by entering lease contracts of 59-months (one month shy of five years), thereby avoiding triggering the requirement of scoring the entire cost of the lease in the first year as required by the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990. Many of these 59month leases are being renewed for an additional 59-month period resulting in foreign-built ships operating for DOD for a period of nearly 10 consecutive years. While the Budget Enforcement Act met its intended objective of ending long-term leases of U.S.-built ships, it has opened the door to leasing foreignbuilt assets. Most of the ships under lease are used commercial ships of South Korean manufacture that have been modified to meet U.S. military specifications. DOD states that it needs to have the ability to lease these ships for 59 months to provide the foreign owner of the ship access to private financing to convert a commercial ship to meet a specialized military requirement. U.S. shipbuilders cannot obtain bank financing to build new ships to meet the requirement unless they recover the entire construction cost in the five years of the lease, making the lease payments for newly built ships non-competitive with foreign ships of ten or more years old for which the capital cost has been significantly amortized. While DOD needs to have the flexibility to lease foreign-built ships to meet shorter-term or emergency requirements, the growing reliance by DOD on this practice is resulting in the de-facto purchase of foreign-built ships to meet special, dedicated, long-term military requirements.... [The ASA recommends] Support [for] an amendment to the DOD FY07 Authorization and Appropriations Bills that will limit the duration of DOD lease contracts of foreign-built ships to two years, including contract options.5


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DOD Position DOD has argued that its leases of foreign-built ships are the most costeffective way to meet its needs for the ships in question, and that limiting such leases to no more than two years would make them much more expensive and difficult to implement, and therefore less cost effective. DOD has opposed changing 10 U.S.C. §2401 to limit leases of foreign-built ships to no more than two years. In a statement issued prior to the enactment of the FY2008 defense authorization act, DOD stated that [MSC] charters ships (from the commercial market) to meet the requirements of DoD components and respond to changes in the operational environment. Unfortunately, very few commercial ships with high military utility have been constructed in U.S. shipyards in the past 20 years. Consequently, when MSC has a requirement to charter a vessel, nearly all of the offers are for foreign-built ships. In cases where the need is immediate or subject to change, due to the operational environment or other factors, a commercial charter is the only practical way to obtain the capability. When a requirement for a particular type of vessel is known to be long-term , as was the case with the Large Medium Speed Roll-on/Roll-off [sealift] ships (LMSRs) [that were procured for DOD in the 1990s], the Navy seeks authorization from Congress for a new construction program which can take up to five years for delivery of the first vessel.... In cases where there are long term, consistent requirements that are best satisfied by the construction of new purpose-built vessels, the Navy, upon authorization by Congress, establishes and funds programs such as the LMSRs and the [Lewis and Clark (TAKE-1 class) dry cargo ships], to meet these requirements. We are also moving ahead with the acquisition of the Joint High Speed Vessel [JHSV] as a replacement for the capability currently fulfilled by the WESTPAC EXPRESS Charter.... [DOD] opposes [a provision to limit leases to no more than 2 years], as it would have a severe negative impact on the ability of [MSC] to carry out its mission of providing sealift support for a wide variety of [DOD] activities. To support rapid deployment of military forces, the military services maintain equipment on MSC chartered vessels (some foreign built, converted in U.S. shipyards, all U.S.-flagged and U.S.-crewed) for periods up to five years and budgeted for operational requirements accordingly. MSC also operates vessels chartered for periods up to five years for other unique military requirements. Having to conduct new charter solicitations biennially would greatly reduce the Services‘ ability to effectively plan and budget resources and would severely limit [regional] Combatant Commanders‘ ability to maintain mission readiness, especially for our nation‘s prepositioning force

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and in support of the Global War on Terror. Additionally, the potential necessity to return the ships to the United States for the purposes of transferring the equipment to a newly chartered ship, as ship charters changed, would severely impact DOD readiness. This constant disruption and transition on a biennial basis would defeat the central purpose of the prepositioning program: forward deployment of fully-loaded ships in strategic locations worldwide that are ready to meet warfighting needs at a moment‘s notice. Additionally, such a restriction would adversely impact the U.S. merchant marine industry upon which [DOD] relies to crew surge sealift ships, since any foreign built vessel chartered by MSC must have all reflagging work performed in a US shipyard and, during operation, must be crewed with US merchant mariners. Thus, the charter of foreign-built vessels by MSC has the added benefit of increasing the number of privately owned cargo vessels flying the US flag. Further, any such restriction would be contrary to [DOD‘s] objectives of supporting a vigorous and competitive domestic ship repair industry. Restricting the maximum lease/charter period for foreign built vessels to 24 months would not increase the number of U.S.-built militarily useful ships. It would increase the cost for MSC to charter vessels. Responses to informal queries to the owners/operators of MSC chartered ships indicate that the Government would likely have to pay twice as much [per day] for charters if forced from 59-month to 24-month charter periods. This price differential results from the ship owner‘s ability to amortize capital investment costs over longer periods of time for longer leases. This restriction would do nothing to encourage U.S. ship construction because building new vessels for DOD use would involve unacceptable lead times for current requirements and require substantial additional funding that is not available. DoD is pursuing a [JHSV] capability based on lessons learned from leased vessels.6

POTENTIAL QUESTIONS FOR CONGRESS DOD‘s leases of foreign-built ships raise several potential questions for Congress, including the following: 

How many additional foreign-built ships might DOD in the future decide to lease, with renewals, for total periods of more than five years?

DOD Leases of Foreign-Built Ships: Background for Congress 





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If DOD leases of foreign-built ships were limited to no more than two years, including all options to renew or extend the contract, in how many cases would DOD purchase a ship and have it built in a U.S. yard rather than lease a foreign-built ship? What would be the resulting impact on workloads, revenues, and employment levels at various U.S. shipyards, and on U.S. merchant marine employment? Would this impact be in the national security interest? What is the comparative cost effectiveness of meeting DOD sealift requirements under current ship leasing authorities, under a two-year limit for leases of foreign-built ships, and through purchase of U.S.built ships? How much risk would there be of a mismatch between DOD‘s sealift requirements and DOD sealift capacity if a two-year limit on DOD leases of foreign-built ships resulted in a decision by DOD to purchase U.S.-built ships rather than lease foreign-built ships? What are the potential implications, if any, of DOD‘s leases of foreign-built ships for acquisition of other DOD capabilities, such as capabilities provided by aircraft?

LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY FOR FY2011 FY2011 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5136/S. 3454) House and Senate The House and Senate Armed Services Committees, in their reports (H.Rept. 111-491 of May 21, 2010, and S.Rept. 111-201 of June 4, 2010, respectively) on the FY2011 defense authorization bill (H.R. 5136/S. 3454), do not comment on the issue of DOD leases of foreign-built ships.

PRIOR-YEAR LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY FY2010 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 3326/P.L. 111-118) The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-230 of July 24, 2009) on H.R. 3326, states:

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Ronald O‘Rourke LEASING OF FOREIGN BUILT SHIPS The Committee remains very concerned with the Navy‘s practice of entering into extended leases for foreign built ships. Historically, these leases have met the intent of long term capital lease restrictions on an individual basis, but the recurring nature of several of the leases violates the spirit and intent of the 1990 Budget Enforcement Act. The Committee recognizes that the ships leased by the Navy fill an important role that must be continued through the near term and well into the future, but believes that ships that fill these roles can provide an economic opportunity for the domestic shipbuilding industry. Two years ago, the Committee received a report from the Navy on their practice of leasing foreign built ships and a plan for ending the practice of leasing foreign built ships by 2012. The basic conclusion of the report was that the dependence on foreign built ships would be significantly reduced by the year 2012, principally as a result of shifting requirements and modifications to existing Department of Defense assets. Since the administration is currently undertaking a review of future requirements, the Committee is extremely interested in how that review will affect the Navy‘s practice of leasing foreign built ships. Therefore, the Committee directs the Secretary of the Navy to update the report submitted in March 2008 regarding the practice of leasing foreign built ships. The report should include the Navy‘s updated plan for terminating the practice of leasing foreign built ships to supplement the fleet and using only domestic built ships by 2012. Additionally, the report should include the necessary budget and funding plans that may be required to accomplish this. This chapter should be submitted no later than March 31, 2010. (Page 166)

In lieu of a conference report, the House Appropriations Committee on December 15, 2009, released an explanatory statement on a final version of H.R. 3326. This version was passed by the House on December 16, 2009, and by the Senate on December 19, 2009, and signed into law on December 19, 2009, as P.L. 111-118. The explanatory statement states on page one that it ―is an explanation of the effects of Division A [of H.R. 3326], which makes appropriations for the Department of Defense for fiscal year 2010. As provided in Section 8124 of the consolidated bill, this explanatory statement shall have the same effect with respect to the allocation of funds and the implementation of this as if it were a joint explanatory statement of a committee of the conference.‖ The explanatory statement states:


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LEASING OF FOREIGN BUILT SHIPS There exists strong interest in the impact that the review of future requirements in the Quadrennial Defense Review will have on the Navy‘s practice of leasing foreign built ships. Therefore, the Secretary of the Navy is directed to update its March 2008 report on the use of such leases and address impacts on American seafarers, sealift capabilities, and naval shipbuilding. (Page 169)

FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84) The conference report (H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7, 2009) on H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009, does not contain any provisions relating directly to DOD leases of foreign-built ships. The conference report states: Conversion of certain vessels; leasing rates The House bill contained a provision (sec. 126) that would permit the Secretary of the Navy to use up to $35.0 million from the Weapons Procurement, Navy, account to lease and convert vessels that have defaulted on construction loan guarantees: (1) that have become the property of the United States; and (2) for which, the Maritime Administrator has a right of disposal. The Senate amendment contained no similar provision. The House recedes. The conferees agree that the Navy should, in trying to make near-term additions to the high speed vessel fleet, consider fully the possibility of using vessels within the control of the Maritime Administration. (Page 687)

FY2008 DOD Appropriations Act (H.R. 3222/P.L. 110-116) The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 110-279 of July 30, 2007) on H.R. 3222/P.L. 110-116 of November 13, 2007, stated that it was concerned with the Navy practice of bypassing the intent of the long term capital lease restrictions in the way several foreign built military sealift mission ships are leased.... The Committee believes this leasing practice is harming the Nation‘s shipyards and major ship component industrial base by indirectly denying our shipbuilders the opportunity for additional ship

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Ronald O‘Rourke construction. The Committee recognizes that the ships leased by the Navy fill an important role that must be continued through the near term and into the future.... However, the Committee strongly believes that the American shipbuilders must take advantage of this opportunity. Therefore, the Committee directs the Navy to submit a report that outlines a plan to wean itself off the practice of leasing foreign built ships to supplement the fleet and institute the practice of utilizing only American built ships within four years.... (Pages 230-231)

FY2008 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181) The text of Section 1011 of the FY2008 defense authorization act (H.R. 4986/P.L. 110-181 of January 28, 2008) is as follows: SEC. 1011. LIMITATION ON LEASING OF VESSELS. Section 2401 of title 10, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new subsection: `(h) The Secretary of a military department may make a contract for the lease of a vessel or for the provision of a service through use by a contractor of a vessel, the term of which is for a period of greater than two years, but less than five years, only if— `(1) the Secretary has notified the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the Senate and the Committee on Armed Services and the Committee on Appropriations of the House of Representatives of the proposed contract and included in such notification— `(A) a detailed description of the terms of the proposed contract and a justification for entering into the proposed contract rather than obtaining the capability provided for by the lease, charter, or services involved through purchase of the vessel; `(B) a determination that entering into the proposed contract as a means of obtaining the vessel is the most cost-effective means of obtaining such vessel; and `(C) a plan for meeting the requirement provided by the proposed contract upon completion of the term of the lease contract; and `(2) a period of 30 days of continuous session of Congress has expired following the date on which notice was received by such committees.‘


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End Notes 1

10 U.S.C. §2401(a) and (b) state that the secretary of a military department may make a contract for a long-term lease or charter if the secretary has been specifically authorized by law to make the contract. 10 U.S.C. §2401(d)(1)(A) defines a long-term lease or charter as one the term of which is for a period of five years or longer or more than one-half the useful life of the vessel or aircraft. 2 The ASA (http://www.americanshipbuilding.com) represents six U.S. shipyards owned by General Dynamics (3 yards) and Northrop Grumman (3 yards) that build all of the Navy‘s larger ships, and several dozen other firms that provide ship systems, components, technology, and equipment. 3 The four ships, identified by ASA in a June 14, 2006 e-mail to CRS, are all container ships used to preposition military supplies overseas. They are the Capt. Steven L. Bennett (TAK4296), which ASA says has been leased by MSC since November 1997; the Maj. Bernard F. Fisher (TAK-4396), which ASA says has been leased by MSC since November 1999; the LTC John U. D. Page (TAK-4543; previously designated TAK-4496), which ASA says has been leased since March 2001, and the SSGT Edward A. Carter, Jr. (TAK-4544), which ASA says has been leased since June 2001. The Fisher was built in Denmark; the other three ships were built in South Korea. In the designation ―TAK,‖ T means operated by the MSC, A means auxiliary ship, and K means cargo. 4 Regarding DLA, ASA points to the following news story: Jason Ma, ―Defense Logistics Agency Crafts Concept For Resupply-Ship Program,‖ Inside the Navy, November 28, 2005. 5 ASA point paper provided to CRS on May 3, 2006. 6 DOD point paper provided to CRS on May 25, 2006. Regarding the impact of leases of foreignbuilt ships on U.S. shipyards and the U.S. merchant marine, DOD also states in this point paper: Ships chartered to meet DoD missions are required to be U.S.-flagged and crewed by U.S. merchant mariners. Whenever a foreign-built ship is used for such charters, that ship is required to be converted to U.S. flag, and crewed by U.S. citizen mariners, prior to the beginning of the charter. Moreover, any conversion work needed to bring the foreign-built ship up to U.S.-flag standards must by law, be accomplished in U.S. shipyards. Over the recent past, the reflagging of foreign-built ships to U.S.-flag has resulted in the creation of thousands of jobs for U.S. citizen merchant mariners and millions of dollars of U.S. shipyard work. Presently, 40 percent of privately-owned U.S.-flagged ocean going vessels over 1000 gross tons are foreign-built, including all of the vessels participating in the Maritime Security Program. The proposed legislation would result in exclusion of these and all other foreign-built vessels from competition for longer-term charters. This severe restriction on full and open competition would substantially raise the cost to meet the DoD transportation and prepositioning mission.


Chapter 6

NAVY AEGIS CRUISER AND DESTROYER MODERNIZATION: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS Ronald O’Rourke SUMMARY The Navy has begun a program to modernize its 22 in-service Aegis cruisers and the 62 Aegis destroyers procured in FY2005 and prior years. Under Navy plans, the modernization of these 84 ships would occur over a period of more than 20 years. The program‘s estimated total cost is about $16.6 billion in constant FY2010 dollars. The modernizations are intended to ensure that the ships can be operated cost-effectively throughout their entire 35- or 40-year intended service lives. The modernizations of all 62 destroyers and at least 10 of the cruisers are to include the installation of a capability for conducting ballistic missile defense (BMD) operations. The Aegis cruiser and destroyer modernization program poses several potential oversight issues for Congress, including the Navy‘s overall vision behind the program, which shipyards should be used to perform the modernizations, the potential for expanding the scope of work performed in the modernizations, and the Navy‘s strategy for moving to an open architecture (OA) version of the Aegis combat system. In addition, some observers are concerned that demands from U.S. regional military

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commanders for BMD-capable Aegis ships are growing faster than the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships. One option for addressing this concern would be to accelerate the Aegis destroyer modernization schedule, so as to get more BMD-capable DDG-51s into the fleet sooner. The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget requests funding for one Aegis cruiser modernization availability, three Aegis destroyer modernization availabilities, and long lead-time procurement of equipment for three additional Aegis cruiser modernizations and five additional Aegis destroyer modernizations. The funding request includes, among other things, $357.0 million in Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) funding for Aegis cruiser modernization and $296.7 million in OPN funding for Aegis destroyer modernization.

INTRODUCTION The Navy has begun a program to modernize its 22 in-service Aegis cruisers and the 62 Aegis destroyers procured in FY2005 and prior years. Under Navy plans, the modernization of these 84 ships would occur over a period of more than 20 years. The program‘s estimated total cost is about $16.6 billion in constant FY2010 dollars. The modernizations are intended to ensure that the ships can be operated cost-effectively throughout their entire 35- or 40-year intended service lives. The modernizations of all 62 destroyers and at least 10 of the cruisers are to include the installation of a capability for conducting ballistic missile defense (BMD) operations. The Aegis cruiser and destroyer modernization program poses several potential oversight issues for Congress, including the Navy‘s overall vision behind the program, which shipyards should be used to perform the modernizations, the potential for expanding the scope of work performed in the modernizations, and the Navy‘s strategy for moving to an open architecture (OA) version of the Aegis combat system. In addition, some observers are concerned that demands from U.S. regional military commanders for BMD-capable Aegis ships are growing faster than the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships. One option for addressing this concern would be to accelerate the Aegis destroyer modernization schedule, so as to get more BMD-capable DDG-51s into the fleet sooner.

Navy Aegis Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization: Background and... 105 Decisions that Congress makes regarding the Aegis modernization program could affect Navy capabilities and funding requirements, U.S. shipbuilders, and U.S. combat system manufacturers.

BACKGROUND Aegis Cruisers and Destroyers The Navy‘s cruisers and destroyers are called Aegis ships because they are equipped with the Aegis ship combat system—an integrated collection of sensors, computers, software, displays, weapon launchers, and weapons named for the mythological shield that defended Zeus. The Aegis system was originally developed in the 1970s. The system was first deployed by the Navy in 1983, and it has been updated many times since. The Navy‘s Aegis ships include Ticonderoga (CG-47) class cruisers and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers. These ships are multi-mission platforms capable of conducting missions such as air defense (which the Navy calls anti-air warfare), ballistic missile defense (BMD), antisubmarine warfare, anti-surface warfare, naval surface fire support for forces ashore, and Tomahawk cruise missile strikes. A total of 27 CG-47s were procured for the Navy between FY1978 and FY1988; the ships entered service between 1983 and 1994. The first five, which were built to an earlier technical standard, were judged by the Navy to be too expensive to modernize and were removed from service in 2004-2005. The Navy plans to keep the remaining 22 ships in service to age 35. A total of 62 DDG-51s were procured for the Navy between FY1985 and FY2005; the first entered service in 1991 and the 62nd is scheduled to enter service in late-2011. The first 28 ships, known as Flight I/II DDG-51s, are scheduled to remain in service until age 35. The next 34 ships, known as Flight IIA DDG-51s, incorporate some design changes and are to remain in service until age 40. No DDG-51s were procured in FY2006-FY2009.1 Procurement of DDG51s resumed in FY2010.2 The Navy‘s Aegis modernization program—the focus of this chapter—applies to the 22 Aegis cruisers and the 62 Aegis destroyers procured through FY2005. These 84 ships equate to about 27% of the Navy‘s planned total force of 313 ships.3

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Aegis Ship Industrial Base Construction Shipyards The builders of the Navy‘s Aegis ships are General Dynamics‘ Bath Iron Works (GD/BIW) of Bath, ME, and the Ingalls shipyard of Pascagoula, MS, which forms part of Northrop Grumman Shipbuilding (NGSB). Of the 84 Aegis ships funded in FY2005 and prior years, GD/BIW built or is building 41 (7 cruisers and 34 destroyers), and Ingalls built or is building 43 (15 cruisers and 28 destroyers). Building surface combatants is GD/BIW‘s primary business. Ingalls builds both surface combatants and large-deck amphibious assault ships. Overhaul and Repair Shipyards Several U.S. shipyards maintain and repair Aegis ships, with much of the work done under multi-ship/multi-option (MSMO) contracts. Under a MSMO contract, a shipyard is responsible for conducting depot-level maintenance work on several ships in a class. Combat System Manufacturers The primary contractor for the Aegis system is Lockheed Martin‘s Maritime Systems & Sensors division of Moorestown, NJ. Lockheed and the firms that previously owned the Moorestown facility have been the primary Aegis contractor since the 1970s. Other makers of Navy surface ship combat systems include Raytheon, the maker of, among other things, the combat system for the Navy‘s new DDG-1000 class destroyers, and General Dynamics, the maker of the combat system for the General Dynamics version of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS).4 Although Lockheed is the primary contractor for the Aegis system, Raytheon has a share of the system. Navy Facilities The Navy‘s in-house infrastructure for supporting the development and testing of the Aegis system includes a number of laboratories and test facilities in various locations.

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Aegis Ship Modernization Program Purpose of Program A primary objective of the Aegis ship modernization effort is to improve the ships‘ combat capabilities so that the ships will remain mission-effective to the end of their intended service lives. A second major objective is to make the ships less expensive to operate, maintain, and modernize over the remainder of their lives. The modernization itself is not intended to extend the ships‘ expected lives from 35 years to some higher figure, such as 40 years. The Navy‘s plan to operate Flight IIA DDG-51s for 40 years rather than 35 years could require funding additional maintenance work for these ships. Planned Modernization Work The Navy‘s Aegis ship modernization plan includes modernization of the ships‘ basic hull, mechanical, and electrical (HM&E) equipment, and modernization of their combat systems. In both areas, the Navy plans to install new systems or components that are more capable than the ones they are to replace. Some of the planned changes are intended to permit the ships to be operated with a smaller crew, thereby reducing their annual operation and support (O&S) costs. Planned changes to the ships‘ combat systems are intended to, among other things, begin shifting their Aegis computers and software to a more open architecture (OA), meaning, in general terms, an arrangement that uses non-proprietary computers and software. The Navy believes that moving Aegis to an OA design will permit the Aegis system to be updated over the remainder of the ships‘ lives more easily and less expensively, using contributions from a variety of firms. The Navy in 2008 decided to expand the scope of the DDG-51 modernization program to include the installation of a BMD capability, so that all DDG-51s would eventually be BMD-capable.5 Navy plans also call for equipping at least 10 of the 22 Aegis cruisers with a BMD capability.6 Cost In constant FY2010 dollars, the Navy estimates the average cost of each cruiser modernization at about $220 million per ship, and the average cost of each destroyer modernization at about $190 million per ship.7 On this basis, a program for modernizing 22 cruisers and 62 destroyers would have a total estimated cost of about $16.6 billion in constant FY2010 dollars.

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Schedule Under the Navy‘s plan, the oldest cruisers and destroyers are to be modernized first, followed by progressively younger ships. In general, the Navy wants to divide the modernization work for each ship into two shipyard periods—one for HM&E work, the other for combat system work. An exception was the first cruiser to be modernized (Bunker Hill [CG-52]), which received a combined HM&E and combat system modernization that began in February 2008 and was completed in June 2009. The Navy states that the ship‘s modernization was completed on time and within budget. Two more fully modernized cruisers were scheduled to be delivered in FY2009 and FY2010. Navy plans call for delivering one more in FY2011, and three per year starting in FY2012, until all 22 cruisers are modernized.8 The Navy wants each destroyer to receive its combat system modernization two years after its HM&E modernization. The Navy planned to begin the first two destroyer HM&E modernizations in FY2010, followed by three more in FY2011, and two more in FY2012. The Navy plans to begin the first destroyer combat system modernization in FY2012.9 Shipyards Performing the Work The Navy wants to use competitively awarded MSMO contracts for executing the Aegis modernizations. Under the Navy‘s plan, all U.S. shipyards would be eligible to compete for the contracts. Navy policy calls for modernizations lasting longer than six months to be competed on a coast-wide basis, meaning that competitions would be open to all yards located along the same coast where the Aegis ships in question are homeported. FY2011 Funding Request The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget requests funding for one Aegis cruiser modernization availability,10 three Aegis destroyer modernization availabilities, and long lead-time procurement of equipment for three additional Aegis cruiser modernizations and five additional Aegis destroyer modernizations.11 The funding request includes, among other things, $357.0 million in Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) funding for Aegis cruiser modernization and $296.7 million in OPN funding for Aegis destroyer modernization.

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POTENTIAL ISSUES FOR CONGRESS Accelerating DDG-51 Modernizations following the Some observers are concerned—particularly Administration‘s September 2009 announcement of its intention to use AegisBMD ships to defend Europe against potential ballistic missile attacks—that demands from U.S. regional military commanders for BMD-capable Aegis ships are growing faster than the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships. Much of the concern focuses on the situation over the next few years, prior to the scheduled establishment of two Aegis Ashore sites in Europe, which observers anticipate will permit a reduction in the number of BMD-capable Aegis ships needed for European BMD operations. One option for addressing this concern would be to accelerate the DDG-51 modernization schedule, so as to get more BMD-capable DDG-51s into the fleet sooner.12

Overall Vision behind Program13 Some industry sources have questioned the Navy‘s logic behind the Aegis ship modernization program, arguing that the Navy lacks a sufficiently thought-through overall vision—a desired end point—for the surface combatant force, and that in the absence of such a vision, the Navy is planning to spend money on Aegis ship modernizations in a scattershot manner, without knowing whether this will lead to the best possible future surface fleet for the Navy. These sources argue that, before spending money on Aegis ship modernizations, the Navy should develop a more fully considered overall vision for the future of the surface fleet that looks at the surface force and the Navy as a whole as parts of a larger network of defense capabilities involving other U.S. military forces. One potential alternative to the Navy‘s plan would be to forego some or all of the Aegis ship modernizations, accelerate the planned procurement of new cruisers and destroyers, and replace the unmodernized Aegis ships with the accelerated replacement ships.

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Shipyards For DDG-51 Modernizations Some industry sources have proposed allocating all the DDG-51 modernizations to GD/BIW and NGSB, with each firm receiving one-half of the ships. These sources argue that this would reduce the cost of the DDG-51 modernizations by permitting the two firms to achieve sustained learningcurve benefits in the program, and also support the shipbuilding industrial base by providing additional work to the two yards that have built all Navy cruisers and destroyers procured in recent years. Competitive pressure on GD/BIW and NGSB, these industry sources argue, can be maintained by using Profit Related to Offer (PRO) bidding, under which the two yards would bid prices for performing the modernizations allocated to them, with the lower bid winning a higher profit margin.

Scope of DDG-51 Modernizations Some industry sources have suggested expanding the scope of the DDG51 modernizations in various ways to further increase the ships‘ capabilities or further reduce their crew sizes and operating costs. One proposal would add some electric-drive propulsion equipment to the ships‘ existing mechanicaldrive propulsion systems to more fully interconnect the mechanical-drive components, which could reduce the ships‘ fuel use and create other operational advantages.14

Aegis Open Architecture Some observers have expressed concerns about the Navy‘s plan for moving to an open architecture (OA) on the Aegis system, arguing that it will not shift the Aegis ships to a truly open architecture, or do so quickly enough.15 For firms that make Navy surface ship combat systems, or parts of them, the issue of how to implement open architecture on Aegis ships and other Navy surface ships has potentially very large business implications. Potential candidates for the basis of an eventual common open-architecture combat system for Navy surface ships include (but are not necessarily limited to) a modularized version of Lockheed‘s Aegis system, Raytheon‘s Total Ship Computing Environment Infrastructure, or TSCEI (the core of the combat

Navy Aegis Cruiser and Destroyer Modernization: Background and... 111 system being developed for the DDG-1000 destroyers), and the Core Mission System developed by General Dynamics and Northrop for the General Dynamics version of the LCS. The Senate Armed Services Committee‘s report on the FY2008 defense authorization bill directed the Navy to report to Congress quarterly on the Navy‘s plan and progress in implementing OA.16 The Navy submitted the first such report in February 2008. On September 22, 2008, Raytheon filed a protest with the Government Accountability Office (GAO) for lack of competition in the Navy‘s plan to award a sole-source contract to Lockheed for modernizing the Aegis combat systems on the fleet‘s cruisers and destroyers.17 On December 22, 2008, GAO denied Raytheon‘s protest.18

LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY FOR FY2011 FY2011 Funding Request The Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget was submitted to Congress on February 1, 2010. The budget requests funding for one Aegis cruiser modernization availability, three Aegis destroyer modernization availabilities, and long lead-time procurement of equipment for three additional Aegis cruiser modernizations and five additional Aegis destroyer modernizations. The funding request includes, among other things, $357.0 million in Other Procurement, Navy (OPN) funding for Aegis cruiser modernization and $296.7 million in OPN funding for Aegis destroyer modernization.

FY2011 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5136/S. 3454) House The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-491 of May 21, 2010) on the FY2011 defense authorization bill (H.R. 5136), recommends approval of the Navy‘s FY2011 request for $357.0 million in OPN funding for Aegis cruiser modernization and $296.7 million in OPN funding for Aegis destroyer modernization (page 80, lines 015 and 006, respectively). Section 123 of H.R. 5136 as reported by the committee would require a report on naval force structure and ballistic missile defense that would include,

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among other things, ―an analysis of whether the requirement for sea-based missile defense can be accommodated by upgrading Aegis ships that exist as of the date of the report or by procuring additional combatant surface vessels.‖

Senate The FY2011 defense authorization bill (S. 3454) as reported by the Senate Armed Services Committee (S.Rept. 111-201 of June 4, 2010) recommends approval of the Navy‘s FY2011 request for $357.0 million in OPN funding for Aegis cruiser modernization and $296.7 million in OPN funding for Aegis destroyer modernization (page 679 of the printed bill, lines 15 and 6, respectively).

End Notes 1

The Navy during this period instead procured three Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers. The DDG-1000 design does not use the Aegis system. The first of the three DDG-1000s is scheduled to enter service in late-2013. For more on the DDG-1000 program, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 2 Navy plans call for procuring nine Flight IIA DDG-51s in FY2010-FY2015, and for shifting in FY2016 to procurement of a new version of the DDG-51 called the Flight III version. The Navy‘s 30-year (FY2011-FY2040) shipbuilding plan calls for procuring 24 Flight III DDG51s between FY2016 and FY2031. (Source: Supplementary data on 30-year shipbuilding plan provided to CRS and CBO by the Navy on February 18, 2010.) For more on the Navy‘s plans for procuring DDG-51s, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 3 For more on the Navy‘s planned 313-ship fleet, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 4 For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 5 Otto Kreisher, ―BMD Boost,‖ Seapower, August 2008: 12-14. 6 For more on the Navy‘s plans for BMD-capable ships, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 7 Source: Telephone conversation with Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, May 29, 2009. 8 Navy briefing to CRS and Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on cruiser modernization program, June 10, 2009. 9 Navy briefing to CRS and Congressional Budget Office (CBO) on cruiser modernization program, June 10, 2009. 10 When used in this context, the term availability means a period of time during which the ship is in a shipyard, available for work to be performed on it. 11 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 5-5 (pdf page 78 of 165). 12 For additional discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.

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This issue, and most of the subsequent potential issues for Congress, are based in part on CRS interviews conducted in January 2007 with several major defense firms that have an interest in the Aegis ship modernization program. 14 For more on this proposal, see CRS Report RL33360, Navy Ship Propulsion Technologies: Options for Reducing Oil Use—Background for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 15 See, for example, Dan Taylor, ―Roughead: Navy Could Be Implementing Open Architecture Faster,‖ Inside the Navy, September 29, 2008. See also Dan Taylor, ―Report: All Cruisers, Destroyers To Have Open Architecture by 2025,‖ Inside the Navy, September 8, 2008; and Geoff Fein, ―Navy OA Report To Congress Shows Service Making Gains Across The Enterprise,‖ Defense Daily, September 5, 2008. 16 S.Rept. 110-77 of June 5, 2007 on S. 1547, pp. 272-273. 17 August Cole, ―Raytheon Files Protest On Aegis Work,‖ Wall Street Journal, September 24, 2008: B3; Geoff Fein, ―As A Measure if Last Resort, Raytheon Files Protest Over Lack of Aegis Competition,‖ Defense Daily, September 25, 2008: 2-3; Rebekah Gordon, ―Raytheon Protests Sole-Source Award For Aegis Modernization,‖ Inside the Navy, September 29, 2008. 18 Zachary M. Peterson, with additional reporting by Rebekah Gordon, ―GAO Denies Raytheon Protest of Aegis Contract Awards to Lockheed,‖ DefenseAlert—Daily News (InsideDefense.com), December 24,, 2008; Bettina H. Chavanne, ―Raytheon Loses Protest Bid On Aegis Modernization Contract,‖ Aerospace Daily & Defense Report, January 6, 2009: 6; Geoff Fein, ―Navy‘s Decision To Sole-Source Aegis Work Was ‗Unobjectionable,‘ GAO Says,‖ Defense Daily, January 12, 2009: 6.


Chapter 7

NAVY IRREGULAR WARFARE AND COUNTERTERRORISM OPERATIONS: BACKGROUND AND ISSUES FOR CONGRESS Ronald O’Rourke SUMMARY The Department of Defense (DOD) is placing an increased planning and budgeting emphasis on irregular warfare (IW) operations, such as counterinsurgency operations. In addition, counterterrorism (CT) operations have been a DOD area of emphasis since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The Navy for several years has carried out a variety of IW and CT activities, and has taken some steps in recent years to strengthen its ability to conduct such activities. The Navy‘s IW and CT activities pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including the definition of Navy IW activities, specific Navy IW budget priorities, and how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets.

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INTRODUCTION The Department of Defense (DOD) is placing an increased planning and budgeting emphasis on irregular warfare (IW) operations, such as counterinsurgency operations. In addition, counterterrorism (CT) operations have been a DOD area of emphasis since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. The Navy for several years has carried out a variety of IW and CT activities, and has taken some steps in recent years to strengthen its ability to conduct such activities. The Navy‘s IW and CT activities pose a number of potential oversight issues for Congress, including the definition of Navy IW activities, specific Navy IW budget priorities, and how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets.

BACKGROUND Navy Irregular Warfare (IW) Operations1 Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan Among the most readily visible of the Navy‘s current IW operations are those being carried out by Navy sailors serving ashore in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Department of the Navy, which includes the Navy and Marine Corps, stated in early 2010 that: The Navy has 53,000 active and reserve sailors continually deployed in support of the contingency operations overseas serving as members of carrier strike groups, expeditionary strike groups, Special Operating Forces, Seabee units, Marine forces, medical units, and as IAs [individual augmentees]. Our Sailors are fully engaged on the ground, in the air, and at sea in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. On the ground, our Navy has 12,300 active and reserve Sailors in Central Command supporting Navy, Joint Force and Combatant Commander requirements. Navy Commanders are leading six of the twelve U.S.-lead Provincial Reconstruction Teams in Afghanistan. A significant portion of the combat air missions over Afghanistan are flown by naval air forces. Our elite teams of Navy SEALs [i.e., Sea-Air-Land special operations forces] are heavily engaged in combat operations, Navy Explosive Ordnance Disposal platoons are defusing Improvised Explosive Devices and landmines. Our SEABEE construction battalions are rebuilding schools and restoring critical infrastructure. Navy sealift is delivering the majority of heavy war equipment to CENTCOM, while Navy logisticians are ensuring

Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background...117 materiel arrives on time. Our Navy doctors are providing medical assistance in the field and at forward operating bases. Navy IAs are providing combat support and combat service support for Army and Marine Corps personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan. As IAs they are fulfilling vital roles by serving in traditional Navy roles such as USMC support, maritime and port security, cargo handling, airlift support, Seabee units, and as a member of joint task force/Combatant Commanders staffs. On the water, Navy Expeditionary Combat Command Riverine forces are working closely with the Iraqi Navy to safeguard Iraqi infrastructure and provide maritime security in key waterways. Navy forces are also intercepting smugglers and insurgents and protecting Iraqi and partner nation oil and gas infrastructure. We know the sea lanes must remain open for the transit of oil, the lifeblood of the Iraqi economy, and our ships and sailor are making that happen.2

The Department of the Navy also stated: On any given day there are approximately 12,300 Sailors ashore and another 9,800 afloat throughout the U.S. Central Command region conducting riverine operations, maritime infrastructure protection, explosive ordnance disposal, combat construction engineering, cargo handling, combat logistics, maritime security, and other forward presence activities. In collaboration with the U.S. Coast Guard, the Navy also conducts critical port operations, port and oil platform security, and maritime interception operations. Included in our globally sourced forces are 15,600 IAs serving in a variety of joint or coalition billets, either in the training pipeline or on station. As these operations unfold, the size and type of naval forces committed to them will likely evolve, thereby producing changes to the overall force posture of naval forces. Long after the significant land component presence is reduced, naval forces will remain forward.... Strike operations are conducted to damage or destroy objectives or selected enemy capabilities. Recent examples include simultaneous close air support missions that are integrated and synchronized with coalition ground forces to protect key infrastructure, deter and disrupt extremist operations or hostile activities, and provide oversight for reconstruction efforts in support of Operations Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom.... We are refocusing this strategic capability more intensely in Afghanistan in an effort to counter the increasing threat of a well-armed anti-Coalition militia including Taliban, al Qaeda, criminal gangs, narcoterrorists, and any other antigovernment elements that threaten the peace and stability of Afghanistan. Our increased efforts to deter or defeat aggression and improve overall security and counter violent extremism and terrorist networks advance the interests of the U.S. and the security of the region. The FY 2010/FY 2011 contingency operations requests support the expansion of capabilities

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sufficient to secure Afghanistan and prevent it from again becoming a haven for international terrorism and associated militant extremist movements. 3

More specifically, the Navy states that operations performed by Navy personnel in Iraq and Afghanistan include the following:  

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close air support (CAS) and airborne reconnaissance operations, in which Navy aircraft account for 30% of all such missions; expeditionary electronic warfare operations, including operations to defeat improvised explosive devices (IEDs), 75% of airborne electronic attack operations in Iraq, 100% of such operations in Afghanistan, and operations to counter insurgent and extremist network communications; intelligence and signals intelligence operations, including operations to identify, map, and track extremist activity, and operations involving tactical intelligence support teams that are deployed with special operations forces (SOF); explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) operations, including defusing IEDs, clearing land mines, destroying captured weapon and explosive caches, and investigating blast scenes so as to obtain evidence for later prosecution. riverine warfare operations to secure waterways such as the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and the Haditha dam; maritime security operations, including operations to intercept smugglers and extremists going to Iraq and Kuwait, and operations to guard Iraqi and U.S. infrastructure, facilities, and supply lines, such as ports and oil and gas platforms and pipelines; medical and dental services in Iraq and Afghanistan provided by a total of more than 1,800 naval medical personnel; logistics operations, including transporting of 90% of military equipment for Iraq and Afghanistan on military sealift ships, operating ports in Iraq and Kuwait, and providing contracting services and reconstruction using Iraqi firms; engineering and construction operations, such as rebuilding schools, repairing roads, reconstructing electrical, water and sewer systems, and training and equipping Iraqi engineers; provincial reconstruction operations in Iraq and Afghanistan; and legal operations, including prosecution of special-group criminals and assisting Iraqis in drafting governing documents.

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Other Operations In addition to participating in U.S. military operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the Navy states that its IW operations also include the following: 

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security force assistance operations, in which forward-deployed Navy ships exercise and work with foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces, so as to improve their abilities to conduct maritime security operations; civic assistance operations, in which forward-deployed Navy units, including Navy hospital ships, expeditionary medical teams, fleet surgical teams, and naval construction units provide medical and construction services in foreign countries as a complement to other U.S. diplomatic and development activities in those countries; disaster relief operations, of which Navy forces have performed several in recent years; and counter-piracy operations, which have increased since 2008.4

The Navy states that enduring areas of focus for the Navy‘s role in IW include the following:   

enhancing regional awareness, which enables better planning, decision making, and operational agility; building maritime partner capability and capacity, so as to deny sanctuaries to violent extremists; and outcome-based application of force, so as to maintain continuous pressure on extremist groups and their supporting infrastructure.

Individual Augmentees (IAs) Many of the Navy‘s contributions to irregular warfare operations around the world are made by Navy individual augmentees (IAs)—individual Navy sailors assigned to various DOD operations. The Department of the Navy stated in early 2009 that: The Navy provides approximately 15,600 sailors in the form of IA‘s, including 3,800 personnel in the training pipeline, to fulfill the OCO mission requirements of the Combatant Commanders (COCOM). Approximately 8,500 of these IA‘s are funded in the baseline budget filling core missions such as maritime and port security, airlift support, and JTF/COCOM staff support. An additional 2,700 IA‘s are funded in the baseline budget in

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support of adaptive core missions including Counter IED, Combat Support, Military Police, Base Operations, Intel and Medical. The overseas contingency request includes 4,400 over strength requirements for temporary Navy overseas IA missions such as civil affairs, provincial reconstruction, training teams, detainee operations and customs inspections. IAs are making a significant impact in more than 20 countries around the world. They are assigned individually, rather than as part of a traditional unit, to fill shortages or provide specialized knowledge or skill sets. IAs have been assigned in Afghanistan, Iraq, Kuwait, Djibouti, Liberia, Chad, Cuba, Bahrain, Qatar, Colombia, Philippines, United Arab Emirates, Sudan, Oman, Pakistan, Germany, Spain, Italy, Honduras, Panama, Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, and Haiti. These IA‘s provide commanders with mission tailored, globally distributed forces. The Navy identifies both active and reserve service members with specific skill sets to fill IA roles, and the Marine Corps relies principally on activated reserve members to fill IA positions vacated by forward-deployed active component Marines.5

IW Initiatives in Navy Budget Discussion in FY2011 Department of the Navy Budget Highlights Book The Department of the Navy‘s FY2011 budget highlight books states: The FY 2011 [Department of the Navy] budget is the product of a holistic assessment of capabilities, requirements and risks and is consistent with the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). Enhancements in the area of Irregular Warfare (IW) are realized through increased support of Special Operations Forces and expanded capacity for littoral, brown water, and riverine missions.6

It also states: The FY 2011 budget includes the establishment of a new RC [reserve component] riverine training squadron which will compliment the three existing AC [active component] riverine squadrons. The fourth riverine squadron will increase the riverine capacity to conduct brown water training and partnership activities in order to meet COCOM demands.7

It also states: In keeping with the priorities of the Secretary of Defense, the FY 2011 budget continues to rebalance our investment programs in order to

Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background...121 institutionalize and enhance our capabilities to fight the wars of today and the most-likely scenarios in the future, while at the same time providing a hedge against other risks and contingencies. The FY 2011 budget concentrates investment in platforms and systems that maintain the advantage against future threats and across the full spectrum of operations. Procurement of the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS), Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and other programs that support irregular warfare and capacity building reflect that shift. However, even as the Department begins to shift resources and institutional weight towards supporting the current conflicts and other potential irregular campaigns, we still must contend with the security challenges posed by the military forces of other countries – from those actively hostile to those at strategic crossroads.8

It also states: The Navy‘s shipbuilding budget represents the best balance between high-end, hybrid and irregular warfare capabilities. It funds a continuum of forces ranging from the covert Virginia class submarine, the multi-mission DDG-51 destroyer, the multi-role Landing Helicopter Assault Replacement (LHA(R)), to the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) with their greater access to littoral areas. This balance continues to pace future threat capabilities while fully supporting current irregular warfare operations and supporting maritime security and stability operations in the littorals.9

The book mentions the irregular warfare capabilities of the Navy‘s new P8 aircraft,10 states that Department of the Navy research and development initiatives support both traditional and irregular warfare demands in several aviation programs,11 and states more generally that asymmetric and irregular warfare constitute one of 13 focus areas for the science and technology (S&T) portion of the Department of the Navy‘s research and development efforts.12 The book states the following regarding the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) portion of the Department of the Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget: The current request includes incremental costs to sustain operations, manpower, equipment and infrastructure repair, as well as equipment replacement. These costs include aviation and ship operations, combat support, base support, USMC operations and field logistics, as well as IAs, activated reservists and other special pays. Navy is requesting funding for

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4,400 IAs in the FY 2011 OCO request for service members filling nontraditional Navy missions such as provincial reconstruction teams, detainee operations, civil affairs, training teams, customs inspections, counter IED, and combat support. Finally, both the FY 2010 and the FY 2011 full year requests reflect the initial shift in forces from Iraq to Afghanistan. The Department of the Navy requests $3.9 billion in FY 2010 for supplemental requirements and $18.5 billion for FY 2011 to support increased OPTEMPO for contingency operations. Since 2009, total funding trends reflect the Department‘s efforts to reduce reliance on supplemental appropriations and include OCO costs with the budget request. Figure 6 reflects the current status of FY 2009, FY 2010, and FY 2011 funding for OCO. The FY 2011 OCO O&M request specifically provides the resources required to meet increased CENTCOM demand, to include a substantial increase in flight hours associated with the shift from OIF [Operational Iraqi Freedom—i.e., operations in Iraq] to OEF [Operation Enduring Freedom— i.e., operations in Afghanistan] and the increased Carrier Strike Group presence that ensures there are no Air Tasking Order gaps; the Navy‘s FY 2010 OCO appropriation did not fully capture OEF execution requirements. The supplemental request for FY 2010 and the full-year request for FY 2011 supports the deployment, operation and sustainment of two regimental combat teams, a division-level headquarters unit, Seabee battalions, aviation and ship operations, combat support, base support, transportation of personnel and equipment into theater, and associated enabling forces to Afghanistan. The additional funding will support expansion into new areas of operation and establishment of a new command within the southern region of Afghanistan. Increased funding is also needed for service contracts supporting unmanned aerial systems (UAS) providing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and additional in-theater maintenance. The amendment will also fund increased fuel costs in FY 2010.13

Longer List of Navy IW Budget Initiatives The Navy states that a longer list of Navy budget initiatives for creating or expanding its IW capabilities includes the following, which are not necessarily listed in any particular order of priority: 



shifting funding for the Naval Expeditionary Combat Command (or NECC—see ―Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC)‖ below) from the wartime operations part of the Navy‘s budget into the Navy‘s ―base‖ budget (aka, the ―regular‖ part of the Navy‘s budget); delivering expanded counter-IED and EOD capabilities;

Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background...123   



 

 

deploying riverine squadrons and maritime expeditionary support squadrons; training Navy personnel in foreign languages, regional affairs, and cultures; using the JFK Irregular Warfare Center at the Office of Navy Intelligence (ONI) to provide intelligence support to joint IW/SOF operations; ship operation and acquisition, including:  using ships (such as amphibious ships) as partnership stations, such as the Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and the Africa Partnership Station (APS) (see ―Partnership Stations‖ below);  using ships (such as surface combatants and amphibious ships) for anti-piracy operations;  using hospital ships for humanitarian-assistance operations;  procuring Littoral Combat Ships (LCSs);14  procuring Joint High Speed Vessels (JHSVs), which are highspeed sealift ships;  ending procurement of DDG-1000 destroyers and restarting procurement of DDG-51 Aegis destroyers;15  operating four Trident submarines that have been converted into cruise missile and SOF-support submarines (SSGNs);16 accelerating acquisition of the P-8 multi-mission aircraft (MMA), the Navy‘s intended successor to the P-3 maritime patrol aircraft; accelerating acquisition of certain unmanned systems, including:  the Navy Unmanned Combat Air System (N-UCAS—an unmanned aircraft that is to be flown form Navy aircraft carriers);  a sea-based, medium-range unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV);  the small tactical unmanned aerial system (STUAS); expanding the Navy‘s sea-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) capabilities;17 and expanding the Navy‘s cyberwarfare operations force.

A separate list of Navy budgetary areas of emphasis for IW includes the following:  

ships and aircraft; persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities;

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unmanned systems; language skills, regional expertise, and cultural awareness (LREC); operations to build partnerships with other countries and to expand partner capacities; cybersecurity; and tools for fusing information from various sources.

In addition, the Navy states that with regard to rapidly fielding IW new capabilities, specific current items of focus include the following: 

 

  





the Center for IW and Armed Groups (CIWAG)—an 18-month pilot project at the Naval War College in Newport, RI, whose current grant funding expires in June 2010; a large-diameter unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) for ISR operations; Saber Focus—a land-based unmanned air system (UAS) that would be established in an overseas location and used for ISR to support IW operations; the use of ship-based Scan Eagle UAVs on converted Trident SSGNs for ISR operations; a surface ship- or submarine-based Maritime UAS that would be used for ISR operations and possibly signals intelligence operations; a naval intelligence fusion tool (NIFT) that is to integrate national and tactical ISR sensors so as to create real-time, actionable intelligence and targeting recommendations; a ship-based system called real time regional gateway (RTRG) for improved exploitation of signals intelligence to support IW operations; and an expansion in the size of helicopter squadrons that directly support special operations forces (SOF).

Navy Counterterrorism (CT) Operations Navy CT operations include the following: 

Tomahawk cruise missile attacks on suspected terrorist training camps and facilities, such as those reportedly conducted in Somalia on

Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background...125

  



 

 



March 3 and May 1, 2008,18 and those conducted in 1998 in response to the 1998 terrorist bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa;19 operations by Navy special operations forces, known as SEALs, that are directed against terrorists;20 surveillance by Navy ships and aircraft of suspected terrorists overseas; maritime intercept operations (MIO) aimed at identifying and intercepting terrorists or weapons of mass destruction at sea, or potentially threatening ships or aircraft that are in or approaching U.S. territorial waters—an activity that includes Navy participation in the multilateral Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI);21 working with the Coast Guard to build maritime domain awareness (MDA)—a real-time understanding of activities on the world‘s oceans; assisting the Coast Guard in port-security operations;22 protection of forward-deployed Navy ships, an activity that was intensified following the terrorist attack on the Navy Aegis destroyer Cole (DDG-67) in October 2000 in the port of Aden, Yemen;23 protection of domestic and overseas Navy bases and facilities; developing Global Maritime Intelligence Integration (GMII) as part of Joint Force Maritime Component Command (JFMCC) and Maritime Domain Awareness (MDA); and engaging with the U.S. Coast Guard to use the National Strategy for Maritime Security to more rapidly develop capabilities for Homeland Security, particularly in the area of MDA.

The Department of the Navy stated in early 2010 that: While forward, acting as the lead element of our defense-in-depth, naval forces will be positioned for increased roles in combating terrorism.... Expanded Maritime Interdiction Operations (EMIO) are authorized by the President and directed by the Secretary of Defense to intercept vessels identified to be transporting terrorists and/or terrorist-related materiel that poses an imminent threat to the United States and its allies.24

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Navy IW and CT Initiatives The Navy in recent years has implemented a number of initiatives intended to increase its IW and CT capabilities and activities, including those discussed below.

Navy Irregular Warfare Office The Navy in July 2008 established the Navy Irregular Warfare Office, which is intended, in the Navy‘s words, to ―institutionalize current ad hoc efforts in IW missions of counterterrorism and counterinsurgency and the supporting missions of information operations, intelligence operations, foreign internal defense and unconventional warfare as they apply to [CT] and [counterinsurgency].‖ The office works closely with U.S. Special Operations Command, and reports to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for information, plans, and strategy.25 Global Maritime Partnership The Global Maritime Partnership, initially known as the 1,000-ship Navy concept, is a U.S. Navy initiative to achieve an enhanced degree of cooperation between the U.S. Navy and foreign navies, coast guards, and maritime police forces, for the purpose of ensuring global maritime security against common threats. The Navy states that There is no one nation that can provide a solution to maritime security problems alone. A global maritime partnership is required that unites maritime forces, port operators, commercial shippers, and international, governmental and nongovernmental agencies to address our mutual concerns. This partnership increases all of our maritime capabilities, such as response time, agility and adaptability, and is purely voluntary, with no legal or encumbering ties. It is a free-form, self-organizing network of maritime partners – good neighbors interested in using the power of the sea to unite, rather than to divide.26

Partnership Stations The Southern Partnership Station (SPS) and the Africa Partnership Station (APS) are Navy ships, such as amphibious ships or high-speed sealift ships, that have deployed to the Caribbean and to waters off Africa, respectively, to support U.S. Navy engagement with countries in those regions, particularly for purposes of building security partnerships with those countries, and for

Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background...127 increasing the capabilities of those countries for performing maritime-security operations. The SPS and APS can be viewed as specific measures for promoting the above-discussed global maritime partnership.

Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) The Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC), headquartered at Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA, was established informally in October 2005 and formally on January 13, 2006. The creation of NECC consolidated and facilitated the expansion of a number of Navy organizations that have a role in IW operations. Navy functions supported by NECC include the following:            

riverine warfare; maritime civil affairs; expeditionary training; explosive ordnance disposal (EOD); expeditionary intelligence; naval construction (i.e., the naval construction brigades, aka CBs or ―Seabee‖); maritime expeditionary security; expeditionary diving; combat camera; expeditionary logistics; guard battalion; and expeditionary combat readiness.

The Department of the Navy stated in early 2010 that: Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) is a global force provider of expeditionary combat service support and force protection capabilities to joint warfighting commanders, centrally managing the current and future readiness, resources, manning, training, and equipping of a scalable, selfsustaining and integrated expeditionary force of active and reserve sailors. Expeditionary sailors are deployed from around the globe in support of the new ―Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower.‖ NECC forces and capabilities are integral to executing the maritime strategy which is based on expanded core capabilities of maritime power: forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection, maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. To enable these, NECC provides a full spectrum of operations, including effective waterborne and ashore anti-

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Ronald O‘Rourke terrorism force protection; theater security cooperation and engagement; and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. NECC is also a key element of the Navy‘s operational Irregular Warfare (IW) efforts in the area of operational support to the Navy forces in OIF and OEF. In the FY 2011 budget, NECC funding is increased to address increased requirements for NECC Global Force Management (GFM) presence, operational plans surge, and equipment life cycle sustainment. NECC provides integrated active and reserve forces, highlighted by the seamlessly integrated operational forces of naval construction (Seabees), maritime expeditionary security (formerly coastal warfare), navy expeditionary logistics (Cargo Handling Battalions), and the remaining mission capabilities throughout the command. NECC is not a standalone or combat force, but rather a force protection and combat service force of rapidly deployable mission specialists that fill the gaps in the joint battle space and compliment joint and coalition capabilities.27

The Department of the Navy also stated that: The Reserve Component expeditionary forces are integrated with the Active Component forces to provide a continuum of capabilities unique to the maritime environment within Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC). Blending the AC and RC brings strength to the force and is an important part of the Navy‘s ability to carry out the Naval Maritime Strategy from blue water into green and brown water and in direct support of the Joint Force. The Navy Reserve trains and equips 51% of Sailors supporting NECC missions, including Naval construction and explosive ordnance disposal in the CENTCOM AOR as emphasis shifts from Iraq to Afghanistan, as well as maritime expeditionary security, expeditionary logistics (cargo handling battalions), maritime civil affairs, expeditionary intelligence, and other mission capabilities seamlessly integrated with operational forces around the world.28

Riverine Force The riverine force is intended to supplement the riverine capabilities of the Navy‘s SEALs (the Navy‘s Sea-Air-Land special operations forces) and relieve Marines who had been conducting maritime security operations in ports and waterways in Iraq. The riverine force currently consists of three active-duty squadrons of 12 boats each, and includes a total of about 900 sailors. The Navy established Riverine Group 1 (which oversees the three

Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background...129 squadrons) at the Naval Amphibious Base, Little Creek, VA, in May 2006. The three current riverine squadrons were established in 2006-2007. As mentioned earlier, the Department of the Navy‘s proposed FY2011 budget requests funding for ―the establishment of a new RC [reserve component] riverine training squadron which will compliment the three existing AC [active component] riverine squadrons. The fourth riverine squadron will increase the riverine capacity to conduct brown water training and partnership activities in order to meet COCOM demands.‖29 The Navy states that the creation of the fourth riverine squadron is to involve the realignment of 238 Full Time Support and Selected Reservist billets, and that the new squadron is to be the first-ever reserve component riverine training squadron within NECC.30

Other Initiatives Other Navy initiatives in recent years for supporting IW and CT operations include establishing a reserve civil affairs battalion, a Navy Foreign Area Officer (FAO) community consisting of officers with specialized knowledge of foreign countries and regions, a maritime interception operation (MIO) intelligence exploitation pilot program, and an intelligence data-mining capability at the National Maritime Intelligence Center (NMIC).

POTENTIAL OVERSIGHT ISSUES FOR CONGRESS Definition of Navy IW Activities Potential oversight questions for Congress regarding the definition of Navy IW activities include the following: 





Should security force assistance operations, civic assistance operations, disaster relief operations, and counter-piracy operations be included in the definition of Navy IW operations? Should operations to build partnerships, and to build partner capacities for conducting maritime security operations, be included in the definition of Navy IW operations? Has the Navy included the kinds of operations listed in the two previous points in its definition of Navy IW operations in part to satisfy a perceived requirement from the Office of the Secretary of

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

Defense (OSD) to show that the Navy is devoting a certain portion of its personnel and budgets to irregular warfare? Should the Navy‘s CT operations be considered a part of its IW operations? What is the relationship between IW operations and CT operations?

Navy IW Budget Priorities Potential oversight questions for Congress regarding Navy IW budget priorities include the following: 





Is the Navy‘s list of IW budget items sufficiently organized and prioritized to support congressional understanding and oversight, or to permit Congress to know where any additional dollars available for Navy IW operations might best be added? Should items such as expanding Navy sea-based BMD capabilities, procuring DDG-51 destroyers, and Navy cyber security operations be included in a list of Navy IW budgetary initiatives? Are the Navy‘s current IW-oriented UAV/UAS programs sufficiently coordinated?

Degree of Emphasis on IW and CT in Future Navy Budgets A third oversight issue for Congress—an issue related to, but more general than the previous one—is how much emphasis to place on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets. Supporters of placing increased emphasis on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets could argue that the experience of recent years, including U.S. operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, suggests that the United States in coming years will likely need to be able to conduct IW and CT operations, that the Navy has certain specialized or unique IW and CT capabilities that need to be supported as part of an effective overall U.S. IW or CT effort, and that there are programs relating to Navy IW and CT activities that could be funded at higher levels, if additional funding were made available. Opponents of placing an increased emphasis on IW and CT activities in future Navy budgets could argue that these activities already receive adequate

Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background...131 emphasis on Navy budgets, and that placing an increased emphasis on these activities could reduce the amount of funding available to the Navy for programs that support the Navy‘s role in acting, along with the Air Force, as a strategic reserve for the United States in potential conventional inter-state conflicts. Potential oversight questions for Congress include the following:  



To what degree can or should Navy IW and CT activities be used to reduce the burden on other services for conducting such activities? Are the Navy‘s steps to increase its role in IW and CT partly motivated by concerns about its perceived relevance, or by a desire to secure a portion of IW and CT funding? Is the Navy striking an appropriate balance between IW and CT activities and other Navy concerns, such as preparing for a potential future challenge from improved Chinese maritime military forces?31

Additional Oversight Questions In addition to the issues discussed above, the Navy‘s IW and CT activities pose some additional potential oversight issues for Congress, including the following: 

  



How many Navy personnel globally are involved in IW and CT activities, and where are they located? How much funding is the Navy expending each year on such activities? Is the Navy adequately managing its individual augmentee (IA) program?32 Is the Navy devoting sufficient attention and resources to riverine warfare?33 Aside from the establishment of the riverine force and a reserve civil affairs battalion, what implications might an expanded Navy role in IW and CT have for Navy force-structure requirements (i.e., the required size and composition of the Navy)? Is the Navy adequately coordinating its IW and CT activities and initiatives with other organizations, such as the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) and the Coast Guard?

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132 

Are the Navy‘s recent IW and CT organizational changes appropriate? What other Navy organizational changes might be needed?

LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY FOR FY2011 FY2011 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 5136/S. 3454) House The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-491 of May 21, 2010) on the FY2011 defense authorization bill (H.R. 5136), recommends increasing the Navy‘s FY2011 request for operation and maintenance funding by $38.9 million for NECC integrated logistics overhaul and equipment reset. (Page 226, line 170) The report states: Like the Army, the Navy‘s next-to-deploy forces are reporting high levels of readiness, but this also comes at the expense of the non-deployed forces that experience fewer training opportunities as resources are prioritized toward meeting Global Force Management demands. Navy requirements to support non-standard missions and requests for individual augmentees continue to grow, reducing opportunities for Navy sailors and officers to train for core missions with a full complement of personnel. (Page 220)

The report also states: The committee commends the Secretary of Defense for proposing to increase the authorized end strength of the active duty Army to 569,400 in the fiscal year 2011 budget request. The committee believes this effort will continue to assist the Army with managing of the force, increasing readiness and dwell time for soldiers. The committee also recognizes the Secretary‘s efforts to support an increase in the Air Force end strength in order to support its growth in Nuclear Enterprise, Irregular Warfare/Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, aircraft maintenance, acquisition, cyber warfare and medical fields, as well as the Navy‘s additional manpower requirements for 4,400 personnel to fill individual augmentees assigned to overseas contingency operations to execute non-traditional Navy missions, such as provisional reconstruction teams, detainee operations, civil affairs training, counter IED and combat support functions. However, the committee remains concerned that these increases may not be sufficient to meet both the

Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background...133 increased operational tempo and the increasing support requirements that are being generated by a nation that has been at war for over eight years. (page 278)

Section 343 of H.R. 5136 as reported would extend by two years (from September 30, 2010, to September 30, 2012) authority to reimburse expenses for certain Navy mess operations. Regarding Section 343, the committee‘s report states: Section 343—Extension of Authority To Reimburse Expenses for Certain Navy Mess Operations This section would amend section 1014 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110–417) by extending until September 30, 2012, the authority of the Navy to purchase meals on behalf of embarked members of non-governmental organizations, host and partner nations, joint services, and U.S. Government agencies and foreign national patients treated on Navy ships and their escorts during the Navy‘s execution of humanitarian and civic assistance missions. (Pages 274275)

Senate The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-201 of June 4, 2010) on the FY2011 defense authorization bill (S. 3454), states, in a discussion of amphibious ships, that Marine air-ground task forces are in high demand for certain missions, including, among others, irregular warfare, maritime security, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief, and security cooperation (page 38). The report states that the Navy‘s current 313-ship force structure plan is based on a 2005 Force Structure Assessment and a new Force Structure Assessment is required to address expanded requirements identified in the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review for irregular warfare support, ballistic missile defense, intratheater lift, and humanitarian missions. The committee encourages the Navy to complete this review as expeditiously as possible so the results can be incorporated in the next Long-Range Plan. (Page 40)

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134 The report also states:

Mobile intelligence and tracking systems The budget request included $117.9 million in PE 63114N [i.e., a line item in the Navy‘s research and development account] for advanced technologies for power projection. The Navy has a science and technology objective to develop data fusion and analysis technologies for actionable intelligence generation to defeat adaptive irregular threats in complex environments. In support of that objective, the committee recommends an increase of $2.0 million for research on data processing and fusion technologies to support multiple simultaneous detections, tracking, identification, and targeting of asymmetric and mobile threats in combat operations. (Page 60)

The report also states: Autonomous unmanned surface vehicle The budget request included $45.9 million in PE 64755N [i.e., a line item in the Navy‘s research and development account] for ship self defense (detect and control) projects, but included no funding for the autonomous unmanned surface vehicle (AUSV) program. The AUSV program supports the U.S. Navy‘s anti-terrorism, force protection, and homeland defense missions. The AUSV can protect commercial harbors, coastal facilities such as commercial and military airports and nuclear power plants, inland waterways, and large lakes. The vessel will utilize a variety of advanced sensing and perimeter monitoring equipment for surveillance and detection of targets of interest. The committee recommends an increase of $5.7 million to continue this development. (Page 69)

The report also states: West Africa maritime security initiative The budget request includes $1,131.0 million for the Department of Defense‘s drug interdiction and counterdrug activities, of which more than $200.0 million will fund training activities for U.S. counternarcotics partners around the globe. The committee directs the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics and Global Threats and U.S. Africa Command to develop a West Africa maritime security initiative to include: (1) training in maritime domain awareness; (2) increasing the capacity of partners to patrol and enforce sovereignty in their own maritime space; and (3) improving the sustainability of their respective organizations with responsibility for maritime law enforcement. (Pages 199-200)

Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background...135 Section 1011 of H.R. 5136 as reported would extend by five years (from September 30, 2010, to September 30, 2015) and clarify authority to reimburse expenses for certain Navy mess operations. Regarding Section 1011, the committee‘s report states: Extension of authority for reimbursement of expenses for certain Navy mess operations (sec. 1011) The committee recommends a provision that would extend section 1014 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110–417), which authorizes the Department of Defense to fund from Navy operations and maintenance accounts the cost of meals on United States naval and naval auxiliary vessels for nonmilitary personnel, through September 30, 2015, and would establish an annual limit of no more than $1.0 million. In fiscal year 2009, the Department expended approximately $400,000 for meals sold to authorized personnel during U.S. civil-military operations, including Continuing Promise 2008/2009, African Partnership Station 2009, and Pacific Partnership Station 2009. The committee expects the Department‘s expenditures under this authority will increase in fiscal year 2010 due to Operation Unified Response/Joint Task Force-Haiti. The committee recognizes the value of recent civil-military operations and humanitarian relief missions—executed by the USNS Comfort, USNS Mercy, and other vessels—and acknowledges the importance of building partnerships and fostering the positive image of America worldwide. The committee also understands that the participation of nongovernmental organizations and host and partner nations is vital to the successful execution of these missions. (Pages 187-188)

End Notes 1

Unless otherwise indicated, information in this section is taken from a Navy briefing to CRS on July 31, 2009, on Navy IW activities and capabilities. 2 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, pp. 2-3 and 2-4. 3 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, pp. 2-1 to 2-3. 4 For more on counter-piracy operations, see CRS Report R40528, Piracy off the Horn of Africa, by Lauren Ploch et al. 5 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 1-10. 6 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 1-1.

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Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 4-24. 8 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 5-1. 9 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 5-2. 10 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, pp. 1-8, 5-11 11 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 5-14. 12 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 5-31. 13 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, pp. 2-4 and 2-5. 14 For more on the LCS program, see CRS Report RL33741, Navy Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) Program: Background, Issues, and Options for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 15 For more on the ending of DDG-1000 procurement and the restart of DDG-51 procurement, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 16 For more on the converted Trident submarines, see CRS Report RS21007, Navy Trident Submarine Conversion (SSGN) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 17 For more on the Navy‘s sea-based BMD capabilities, see CRS Report RL33745, Navy Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 18 Edmund Sanders, ―U.S. Missile Strike in Somalia Kills 6,‖ Los Angeles Times, March 4, 2008; Stephanie McCrummen and Karen DeYoung, ―U.S. Airstrike Kills Somali Accused of Links to Al-Qaeda,‖ Washington Post, May 2, 2008: A12; Eric Schmitt and Jeffrey Gettleman, ―Qaeda Leader Reported Killed In Somalia,‖ New York Times, May 2, 2008. 19 For a recent article on the 1998 strikes, see Pamela Hess, ―Report: 1998 Strike Built bin LadenTaliban Tie,‖ NavyTimes.com (Associated Press), August 22, 2008. 20 SEAL is an acronym that stands for Sea, Air, and Land. For further discussion of the SEALs, see CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress, by Andrew Feickert. 21 For more on the PSI, see CRS Report RL34327, Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI), by Mary Beth Nikitin. 22 See, for example, Emelie Rutherford, ―Navy‘s Maritime Domain Awareness System ‗Up And Running‘,‖ Defense Daily, September 4, 2008; and Dan Taylor, ―New Network Allows Navy To Track Thousands of Ships Worldwide,‖ Inside the Navy, September 8, 2008. For more on the Coast Guard and port security, see CRS Report RL33383, Terminal Operators and Their Role in U.S. Port and Maritime Security, by John Frittelli and Jennifer E. Lake, and CRS Report RL33787, Maritime Security: Potential Terrorist Attacks and Protection Priorities, by Paul W. Parfomak and John Frittelli. 23 For a discussion of the attack on the Cole, see CRS Report RS20721, Terrorist Attack on USS Cole: Background and Issues for Congress, by Raphael F. Perl and Ronald O'Rourke. 24 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 2-2. 25 Zachary M. Peterson, ―New Navy Irregular Warfare Office Works to Address ISR Shortfall,‖ Inside the Navy, September 1, 2008. 26 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 1-5. 27 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, pp. 4-14 and 4-15.

Navy Irregular Warfare and Counterterrorism Operations: Background...137 28

Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 4-24. 29 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 4-24. 30 Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2011 Budget, February 2010, p. 3-7. 31 For additional discussion of this issue, see CRS Report RL33153, China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. 32 For a discussion of the Navy‘s management of the IA program, see Andrew Scutro, ―Fleet Forces Takes Charge of IA Program,‖ NavyTimes.com, July 7, 2008. 33 For an article that discusses this question from a critical perspective, see Daniel A. Hancock, ―The Navy‘s Not Serious About Riverine Warfare,‖ U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 2008: 14-19.

CHAPTER SOURCES The following chapters have been previously published: Chapter 1 – This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report Order Code RL32665, dated April 9, 2010. Chapter 2 – This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report Order Code RS22478, dated April 13, 2010. Chapter 3 – This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report Order Code RS20643, dated June 10, 2010. Chapter 4 – This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report Order Code RL32418, dated April 8, 2010. Chapter 5 – This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report Order Code RS22454, dated June 10, 2010. Chapter 6 – This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report Order Code RS22595, dated June 10, 2010. Chapter 7 – This is an edited, excerpted and augmented edition of a United States Congressional Research Service publication, Report Order Code RS22373, dated June 10, 2010.

INDEX A accelerometers, 77 adaptability, 126 Aegis, v, ix, 16, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 123, 125, 136 Afghanistan, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 128, 130 Africa, 123, 125, 126, 134, 135 agencies, 16, 126, 133 aggression, 117 agility, 119, 126 Air Force, 28, 131, 132 annual rate, 40, 70 appropriations, 33, 83, 92, 98, 122 armed forces, vii, 92 assault, 2, 3, 5, 6, 18, 20, 23, 106 assessment, vii, 1, 2, 5, 11, 45, 50, 52, 61, 120 assets, 81, 93, 94, 98 atrophy, 72 authorities, 97

B Bahrain, 120 ballistic missiles, 66 bank financing, 94 Boat, 43, 70, 76, 80, 87 breakdown, viii, 19, 22, 81

C campaigns, 121 candidates, 75, 110 capacity building, 121 Caribbean, 126 Chad, 120 chain of command, 21 challenges, 121 China, 17, 82, 88, 137 City, 28 civil rights, 23 Coast Guard, 117, 125, 131, 136 Cold War, 13, 14, 67, 68, 69, 86, 88 Colombia, 120 communism, 28 community, 79, 129 competition, 52, 86, 101, 111 compilation, 16 complement, 119, 132 complexity, 56 composition, 3, 4, 5, 131 concurrency, 56, 62 conference, 16, 41, 42, 45, 63, 98, 99 configuration, 68 Congressional Budget Office, 2, 3, 9, 11, 17, 42, 63, 64, 73, 112 Constitution, 20, 30, 31, 32 contingency, 116, 117, 120, 122, 132 correlation, 46, 54 corruption, viii, 19, 22 cost effectiveness, 97

142

Index

cost-benefit analysis, 45 counterterrorism, vii, ix, 115, 116, 126 criminal gangs, 117 criminals, 118 critical infrastructure, 116 cruise missiles, 67, 68 Cuba, 120 cybersecurity, 124

D data processing, 134 DCA, 62 defense appropriations act, 86 Denmark, 101 Department of Defense, ix, 4, 20, 25, 46, 50, 51, 64, 79, 88, 91, 93, 98, 115, 116, 134, 135 deployments, 74, 75 deterrence, 127 diesel engines, 86 disaster, 119, 127, 129, 133 disaster relief, 119, 127, 129, 133 displacement, 86 distortions, 17, 18

E economies of scale, 70 economy, 117 electromagnetic, 47, 48, 56, 77 elementary school, 25 employment, 32, 97 engineering, 47, 57, 71, 72, 82, 85, 117, 118 equipment, 34, 44, 47, 49, 92, 94, 95, 101, 104, 107, 108, 110, 111, 116, 118, 121, 122, 128, 132, 134 execution, 122, 133, 135 exercise, 119 expenditures, 135 expertise, 52, 124 exploitation, 124, 129 extremist movements, 118 extremists, 118, 119

F fabrication, 45, 49 fixed costs, 43, 70 fluctuations, 84 Ford, v, viii, 6, 12, 25, 26, 27, 33, 35, 36, 38, 42, 44, 45, 51, 52, 53, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 63, 64, 87 foreign language, 123 forward presence, 117, 127 frequencies, 53 funding, viii, 1, 3, 4, 16, 35, 36, 38, 39, 43, 44, 47, 50, 51, 53, 55, 62, 63, 65, 66, 78, 82, 83, 84, 85, 88, 89, 94, 96, 98, 104, 105, 107, 108, 111, 112, 121, 122, 124, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 134 fusion, 124, 134

G Germany, 120 governance, 61 Great Depression, 31 guidelines, 94 Gulf Coast, 7

H Haiti, 120, 135 harbors, 134 headquarters, 122 heroism, 21 Honduras, 120 host, 133, 135 hybrid, 121

I impacts, 52, 53, 54, 55, 92, 99 Independence, 23, 34 inflation, 40, 42, 45, 47, 53, 54, 55, 63 inspections, 120, 122 integration, 62 intelligence, 17, 67, 79, 81, 86, 118, 122, 123, 124, 126, 127, 128, 129, 134 international terrorism, 118

Index Intervals, 43, 51, 64 intervention, 86 Iraq, 23, 116, 118, 119, 120, 122, 128, 130 issues, vii, ix, 11, 13, 36, 37, 42, 57, 62, 63, 103, 104, 113, 115, 116, 131 Italy, 120

J justification, 92, 100

K Kuwait, 118, 120

L language skills, 124 law enforcement, 134 leadership, 61 learning, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 54, 59, 70, 110 lease payments, 94 legislation, 20, 21, 25, 31, 32, 101 Liberia, 120 Lockheed Martin, 106 logistics, 4, 9, 10, 117, 118, 121, 127, 128, 132 LTC, 101

M majority, 53, 116 management, 57, 59, 61, 62, 137 manpower, 121, 132 manufacturing, 60, 61 Marine Corps, 4, 20, 21, 26, 27, 29, 30, 34, 57, 116, 117, 120 maritime security, 117, 118, 119, 121, 126, 127, 128, 129, 133, 134 Mediterranean, 30 military, ix, 13, 20, 24, 28, 51, 58, 68, 79, 80, 81, 82, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 109, 118, 119, 121, 131, 134, 135 militia, 117

143

missions, 13, 14, 62, 67, 69, 79, 81, 101, 105, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 126, 128, 132, 133, 134, 135 MMA, 123 modernization, ix, 12, 88, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 109, 111, 112, 113

N naming, viii, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 30, 33, 34 National Defense Authorization Act, 52, 58, 133, 135 national security, 97 NATO, 13 Navy cruisers, 110 networking, 13 next generation, 56, 58, 62 nuclear power, 86, 89, 134 nuclear weapons, 86

O oceans, 125 Office of Management and Budget, 92, 94 oil, 117, 118 oil platform, 117 Operation Enduring Freedom, 122 opportunities, 79, 132 outreach, 32 overhead costs, 42, 43, 45, 49, 71 oversight, ix, 11, 36, 37, 42, 43, 47, 57, 61, 62, 103, 104, 115, 116, 117, 129, 130, 131

P Pacific, 31, 33, 82, 87, 135 Pakistan, 120 Panama, 120 penalties, 70 Pentagon, 28, 88 performance, 48, 57, 60, 61, 62 permission, iv, 88 permit, 74, 85, 91, 92, 99, 107, 109, 130 Peru, 120 Philippines, 120

144

Index

piracy, 119, 123, 129, 135 police, 119, 126 procurement, vii, viii, 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, 16, 24, 33, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 50, 51, 53, 54, 63, 65, 66, 68, 69, 71, 72, 75, 78, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 89, 104, 108, 109, 111, 112, 123, 136 profit, 110 profit margin, 110 project, 59, 72, 124 proposition, 7 prototype, 56, 60 public policy, 14, 15

Q Qatar, 120

R radar, 48, 49, 50 recognition, 29, 30 recommendations, iv, 21, 36, 37, 39, 41, 61, 62, 63, 85, 124 reconstruction, 117, 118, 120, 122, 132 relatives, 20, 25 relevance, 58, 131 reliability, 48, 60 relief, 128, 135 Reorganization Act, 28 repair, 31, 87, 96, 106, 121 replacement, vii, 1, 2, 5, 6, 11, 38, 95, 109, 121 replacement rate, 6 Republican Party, 28 requirements, 13, 14, 15, 44, 46, 55, 59, 68, 74, 77, 79, 80, 81, 82, 87, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 105, 116, 119, 120, 122, 128, 131, 132, 133 research facilities, 71 resolution, 27 resources, 7, 95, 121, 122, 127, 131, 132 respect, 52, 98 response time, 126 retirement, 4, 28 Russia, 13

S sanctuaries, 119 Secretary of Defense, 33, 36, 37, 39, 41, 43, 44, 45, 51, 52, 61, 63, 88, 120, 125, 130, 132, 134 Senate, 28, 33, 34, 51, 64, 88, 89, 91, 92, 97, 98, 99, 100, 111, 112, 133 sensing, 134 sensors, 77, 105, 124 sequencing, 44 service life, 6, 17, 75 shipbuilding, vii, 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 34, 43, 47, 50, 51, 55, 58, 59, 75, 76, 92, 93, 98, 99, 110, 112, 121 signals, 118, 124 signs, 22, 63 software, 48, 77, 105, 107 software code, 77 Somalia, 124, 136 South Dakota, 27 South Korea, 94, 101 sovereignty, 134 Soviet Union, 86 space, vii, 128, 134 Spain, 120 specialists, 128 strategy, 7, 51, 52, 62, 70, 73, 81, 103, 104, 126, 127 submarines, vii, viii, 1, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, 17, 19, 22, 33, 43, 44, 46, 53, 65, 66, 67, 68, 70, 71, 75, 77, 79, 81, 86, 89, 123, 136 Sudan, 120 surveillance, 17, 63, 67, 81, 86, 122, 123, 125, 134 survival, 71 sustainability, 134

T Taliban, 117, 136 terrorism, 125, 128, 134 terrorist attacks, ix, 115, 116 terrorist organization, 13

Index terrorists, 125 testing, 48, 56, 58, 60, 61, 62, 77, 106 thoughts, 22 threats, 13, 121, 126, 134 time frame, 79 training, vii, 44, 45, 53, 55, 117, 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 127, 129, 132, 134 traits, 20, 23 transportation, 34, 101, 122 trends, 13, 15, 85, 122 Trinidad and Tobago, 120

U UK, 72 underwater vehicles, 79 unit cost, 55 United Arab Emirates, 120 United Kingdom, 77 United States, 139 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles, 121 USS Cole, 136

V vehicles, 13, 34

145

velocity, 77 vessels, 33, 51, 94, 95, 96, 99, 101, 112, 125, 135 Vietnam, 34 vision, 103, 104, 109 VLS, 68

W waiver, 38 War on Terror, 96 Warsaw Pact, 13 waterways, 117, 118, 128, 134 weapons, 13, 86, 105, 125 weapons of mass destruction, 125 West Africa, 134 witnesses, 57, 58 workload, 7, 46, 53, 54, 55 World War I, 20, 21, 23, 24, 28, 29, 33, 34

Y Yemen, 125

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