Moral psychology and community (Philosophy of Rawls, Volume 4)

The Philosophy of Rawls A Collection of Essays

Series Editors

HenryS. Richardson Georgetown University Paul J. Weithman University of Notre Dame

A

GARLAND SERIES READINGS IN PHILOSOPHY ROBERT

N OZICK,

ADVISOR

HARVARD UNIVERSITY

Contents of the Series 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Development and Main Outlines of Rawls's Theory of Justice The Two Principles and Their Justification Opponents and Implications of A Theory of Justice Moral Psychology and Community Reasonable Pluralism

Moral Psychology and Community

Edited with an introduction by

Paul J. Weithman University of Notre Dame

GARLAND PUBLISHING, INC. A

MEMBER OF THE TAYLOR

New York & London 1999

&

FRANCIS GROUP

Introductions copyright C 1999 Paul J. Weithman. All rights reserved.

Ubrary of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Moral psychology and community I edited with an introduction by PaulJ. Weithman. p. em.- (The philosophy of Rawls; 4) ·A Garland series, readings in philosophy." Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-8153-2928-8 (alk. paper) l. Self-esteem. 2. Community. 3. Rawls, John 1921Contributions in political science. I. Weithman, Paul J., 1959- II. Series. HM106l.M67 1999 155.2-dc21

Printed on add-free, 250-year-life paper Manufactured in the United States of America

99-048609

Contents

vii ix

Series Introduction Volume Introduction MORAL PSYCHOLOGY

Self·Eateem and Self·Reapect

l

Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique John Veigh

22

How to Distinguish Self-Respect from Self-Esteem David Sachs

37

Rawlsian Self-Respect and the Black Consciousness Movement Larry L. Thomas

Moral Development and a Senae of Juatlce

50

The Claim to Moral Adequacy of a Highest Stage of Moral Judgment

67

The Motivation to Be Just

85

Human Evolution and the Sense of Justice

Lawrence Koh/berg Stanley Bates Allan Gibbard Moral Paychology, Stability and the Support they Provide for "Juatlce a• Falrneaa"

102

Reason and Agreement in Social Contract Views Samuel Freeman

139

Justice and the Problem of Stability Edward F. McClennen

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CONTENTS

167

The Stability Problem in Political Liberalism

187

Moral Independence and the Original Position

Thomas E. Hill, Jr. Samuel Scheffler COMMUNITY Group Identity •nd the Communlt•rl•n Critique

195

Rawls on the Individual and the Social

217

The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self

Wayne Proudfoot Michael J. Sandel Defen.. of R•wlsl•n Llber•ll•m

234

Rawls and Individualism

246

Communitarian Critics of Liberalism

261

Rawls, Hegel, and Communitarianism

C.F. Delaney

Amy Gutmann Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach

295

Rawls's Communitarianism

321

The Individual, the State, and the Common Good

Roberto Alejandro John Haldane

343

Acknowledgments

Series Introduction

John Rawls is the pre-eminent political philosopher of our time. His 1971 masterpiece, A Theory of Justice, permanently changed the landscape of moral and political theory, revitalizing the normative study of social issues and taking stands about justice, ethics, rationality, and philosophical method that continue to draw followers and critics today. His Political Liberalism (rev. ed., 1996) squarely faced the fundamental challenges posed by cultural, religious, and philosophical pluralism. It should be no surprise, then, that turn-of-the-century searches of the periodical indices in philosophy, economics, law, the humanities, and related fields turn up almost three thousand articles devoted to a critical discussion of Rawls's theory. In these Volumes we reprint a wide-ranging selection of the most influential and insightful articles on Rawls. While it was impossible, even in a collection of this size, to reprint all of the important material, the selection here should provide the student and scholar with a route into all of the significant controversies that have surrounded Rawls's theories since he first began enunciating them in the nineteen-fifties- issues that the Introductions to each Volume of this series delineate. Eight criteria guided our selection. First, these volumes form part of a series devoted to secondary literature. We reprint no articles by Rawls: most of these have just appeared together for the first time in his Collected Papers. 1 Second, we reprint only self-contained articles published in English, rather than selections from books or articles in other languages. Third, the articles reprinted here are all about Rawls's view, as opposed to being original reflections inspired by Rawls's work. Fourth, we aimed for a broad coverage of controversies and of the main features of Rawls's theory that they surround. Since the Volumes are organized in terms of these controversies, we include very few overall assessments or book reviews. Some central elements of Rawls's theory, while relatively novel and well-articulated, have not been controversial enough to draw critical fire in the secondary literature. The Volume Introductions mention many of these features. Fifth, we aimed to include the most influential articles that have appeared. In identifying these, we used a systematic search of the citation indices to supplement our own judgment. Naturally, we also took special notice of pieces cited by Rawls himself. Sixth, we sought to reprint articles by a large number of authors representing the widest possible range of points of view. In some cases, this meant refraining from reprinting a certain article because its author was already well represented in the selections. Seventh, we have sought to exhibit through

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our selections the broadly interdisciplinary influence of Rawls's writings. We ha~e included articles by political theorists, economists, lawyers, religious thinkers, and soaal scientists as well as by philosophers. Eighth, we have favored including articles that are now relatively hard to find. For this reason, with the exception of H.L.A. Hart's exceptionally influential essay, we refrained from including any of the fine articles that were reprinted in Norman Daniels's 197 5 collection, Readins Rawls, 2 which the reader interested in the early reception of Rawls's views should consult. Utilizing all of these selection criteria did not leave us without painful choices. The secondary literature on Rawls is so deep that another set of five volumes could cover all the main issues with a completely non-overlapping set of fine articles. Some articles unfortunately had to be cut because of their sheer length: dropping one of them allowed us to include two or three others. Others, more arbitrarily, fell victim to the high permissions costs set by their initial publishers. We particularly regret that it proved impossible to find a short enough, self-contained essay by Raben Nozick that would have represented his trenchant libertarian critique of Rawls. While we do include (in Vol. 3) some of the secondary literature that responds to and picks up on Nozick's influential arguments, one should consult Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia ( 197 4) to appreciate their richness, subtlety, and power. 1 The five volumes are arranged in roughly chronological order. The first volume includes articles on Rawls's early statements of his view and on its central contractarian ideas. Volume 2 covers the two principles of justice as fairness and Rawls's most general ideas about their justification. Volume 3 focuses on the concrete implications of Rawls's view and on the debates between Rawls and his utilitarian, perfectionist, libertarian, conservative, radical. and feminist critics. Volume 4 treats of Rawls's moral psychology and his attempt to accommodate the value of community. Volume 5, on Rawls's most recent work, is entitled MReasonable Pluralism." The serious student of Rawls's initial impact is greatly assisted by John Rawls and His Critics: An Annotated Bibliosraphy, put together by J.H. Wellbank, Denis Snook, and David T. Mason, which catalogues and provides abstracts for most of the secondary literature in English prior to 1982.4 While this work was of great help with that earlier period, completing the onerous task of collecting and sorting through the voluminous secondary literature, which has since continued to balloon, would not have been possible without the able and thorough research assistance of Rachael Yocum. We are grateful to the Dean of Georgetown College and to the Graduate School of Georgetown University for their generosity in supporting this research assistance. HenryS. Richardson Paul J. Weithman

Notes ' John Rawls, Colltt:ted Papm ed sam 1 F ( . • Nonnan Daniels ed Re--';:., ~--·ts (uNeY ~n Cambndge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999). , . ' ·• ""--.. .,..,.., • .: BaSic Books, 1975). Roben Nouck, Nlarchy. State, tmd Utqpia (N.Y.: Basic Books 1974) 4 JHWeDbank,Dni · ' • . . e s Snook, and DaVId T. Mason. John Rawls and His Critics· An Annotated B'bl" .... (New York: Garland. 1982). · 1 1ograp..,

Volume Introduction

One of the most important pieces of Rawls's theory of justice is the moral psychology it incorporates. Rawls gives an account of the moral and psychological capacities citizens are presumed to have, and of the moral development and motives of citizens in a just society. Elements of this account bear great weight at pivotal steps in the arguments of A Theory of Justice 1 and Political Liberalism. 2 Rawls developed and connected those elements with an eye to the burdens he intended to place upon them. A good deal of attention has been devoted to determining exactly what burdens he intended them to bear, whether they are able to bear them and whether the arguments they are intended to support establish what Rawls thinks they do. The account that Rawls produced is also of intrinsic philosophical, psychological and political interest. Some of the commentary it has received therefore pays scant attention to the roles it plays in arguments for justice as fairness. Instead it is viewed as a sophisticated contribution to the studies of emotion and moral development, worthy of careful examination in its own right. Rawls's treatment of moral psychology also supplies premises crucial to his argument that a society that conformed to his two principles would enjoy the goods of community. Challenges to this claim sparked one of the most important debates in political philosophy during the 1980s, the liberal-communitarian debate. The articles in the present volume are among the most probing pieces of critical literature on Rawls's discussions of moral psychology and community. Their content, range and influence demonstrate both how important these topics are to Rawls's work and how far-reaching their implications are taken to be. Since the articles depart from such different questions and range over so wide an area, it will prove useful to map the terrain, plot their connections and show where they venture into territory covered in other volumes. One indication of how central Rawls's moral psychology is to his theory is the connection between it and the distinctive features of the original position, which are designed to model the moral powers Rawls attributes to citizens. While there is some intimation of this in TJ (seep. 18), Rawls could fully articulate the connection between the moral powers and the original position only after having given a richer and more Kantian conception of persons in response to H.L.A. Hart's criticisms (see PL, pp. 299, 304ff.: also the introduction to Volume 2). Because essays in other volumes treat of the original position (Volume 1), Rawls's response to Hart (Volume 2) and the increasingly

X

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Kantian conception of the person present in Rawls:s wo~k from ~he Dewey ~:~~~:~ onward (Volume 2), these matters are not pursued~~ arucles repnnted here. to the indication of moral psychology's central role is the Importance Rawl~ ~ttaches rima ood of self-respect, which he equates with self-esteem. This IS, Raw~s ~ays, ~he m~t ~portant of the primary goods (TJ, p. 440). The fact that Rawls's two ~nnoples would support citizens' self-respect by publicly proclaiming society's commitment to treating them as ends in themselves is decisive in the argument for them over average utilitarianism (TJ, pp. 178ff.) and over "mixed conceptions". 1 Rawls's explanation of why self-respect or self-esteem is the most i~po~ant prirt)Clry good, and hence is suited to play this role in the argument for the two pnnaples. depends upon the moral and psychological discussions of TJ, part m. There Rawls argues that a conception of justice cannot be fully justified until it is shown to be stable ~ until, that is, it is shown to be capable of generating its own moral support when It regulates basic institutions (d. TJ, p. 6; PL, p. xix). In the third part of TJ Rawls th~ref~re attempts to show that justice as fairness would be stable. This is an extraordmanly ambitious undertaking. It requires Rawls to address one of the most difficult problems in moral philosophy: that of showing that it is good to be just or, as he says, that of showing that a sense of justice informed by the two principles is "congruent" with a person's good (TJ, p. 513). This, in tum, requires him to develop both a general account of the good, which he calls •goodness as rationality, • and an account of the good as it applies to persons. Only with this last account in hand can he explain what it is for persons to have a sense of their own goodness or worth, why it is good for them to have it and how the sense of self-respect would be supported by a just society. Someone has self-respect, Rawls says, when she is secure in the sense that her plan of life is worth executing, and when she is confident that she has the resources, abilities and excellences of character needed to carry out her intentions (TJ, p. 440). Its possession depends upon affirmation by those with whom one associates, upon public respect for citizens' ends and upon the just adjudication of their claims. All these conditions, Rawls says, would be satisfied in the well-ordered society of justice as fairness (TJ, p. 442). Conversely, when someone fails to exhibit the virtues necessary to execute his plan of life, he experiences the diminution of self-esteem Rawls associates with shame (TJ, pp. 444-45). Since justice is one of those virtues and knowledge of its possession engenders a sense of self-worth, acts of injustice give rise to shame. This connection between shame, self-esteem and regulative principles of right, Rawls implies, supports the Kantian interpretation of justice as fairness (TJ, pp. 256, 445). John Deigh's article in this volume challenges the connection Rawls asserts between shame and a loss of self-esteem. He ultimately locates the problem in Rawls's conception of the worth or good of persons, according to which persons have worth depending upon how they live or direct their lives. This conception of worth is, he says, "the wrong one for explaining the sense of worth that makes one liable to shame." Deigh draws a conclusion about a Rawlsian account of the emotions. He does not draw out the implications of his conclusion for the Kantian interpretation. If the arguments in his paper are sound, however, one of the arguments Rawls uses to support that interpretation will have to be recast. David Sachs argues that self-respect and self-esteem are different but related ideas, a point Rawls has since conceded to him (PL, p. 404,

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note 39). This difference points to a question Sachs himself does not raise: if self-respect and self-esteem are different, which if either should be included among the primary goods? Larry L. Thomas, like Sachs, seizes on the distinction between self-respect and self-esteem and criticizes Rawls for ignoring it. What part III of TJ relies upon, he says, are the conditions of self-esteem. The conditions required by self-respect, he argues, are quite different. Securing the conditions of African-American self-respect, he continues, was the goal of the Black Consciousness Movement. His discussion suggests that he, at least, would think self-respect and not self-esteem is the most important of the primary goods. The argument that justice as fairness would be stable depends, not just upon an account of the goodness of persons, but also upon an argument that persons growing up under institutions which conformed to the two principles would develop an effective, corresponding sense of justice. As part of his argument that they would, Rawls sketches an account of moral development according to which persons pass through three stages, which he calls "the morality of authority," "the morality of association," and "the morality of principles" (TJ, pp. 462-79). This account of moral development has been disputed by feminist psychologists who allege that it unjustifiably elevates a distinctively male form of moral reasoning. 4 In his article, Lawrence Kohl berg, to whose work Rawls says he is indebted (TJ, p. 460, note 6), defends Rawls's claim that the morality of principles is the most advanced state of moral development. Stanley Bates's article is an early appreciation of Rawls's discussion of the development of a sense of justice and its debt to Kant. Reading it gives some indication of how Rawls's moral psychology was received at the time it was published; it remains the best introduction to Part III of TJ. Progression through the developmental stages Rawls identifies depends upon the operation of three psychological laws (TJ, pp. 463, 470, 473-4). These laws are laws of redprodty. They assert that human beings will respond in kind to benefits shown them by persons and associations, and will develop allegiance to institutions which operate for their good. This is not the place to survey and systematize the many ways in which reciprocity surfaces in Rawls's work. What is dear is that for Rawls, the tendency to reciprocate is a "deep psychological fact" about our species which makes it possible for human beings to cooperate on fair terms (TJ, pp. 494-95). It is therefore the psychological basis of the sense of justice. This tendency, Rawls conjectures, has an evolutionary basis: reciprocity has survival value for creatures of our kind (TJ, p. 503). Allan Gibbard, who says he learned from Rawls the centrality of reciprocity to human moral experience, s attempts to substantiate this conjecture in the article reprinted in this volume. The surprising upshot of his argument, Gibbard thinks, is non-cognitivism about justice. Samuel Freeman's very rich article contrasts Rawls's version of contractualism with that of David Gauthier and argues for the superiority of the former. His argument turns on claims about the moral capacities that Rawls attributes to citizens, including the capacity for reciprocity. As noted earlier, Rawls thinks it necessary to show that justice as fairness would be a stable conception of justice, capable of generating its own support. Rawls frames his stability arguments with two audiences in mind: parties in the original position, and readers of his work. Parties in the original position ask whether various conceptions of justice under consideration would be stable and know enough about

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the rinciples of moral learning to make an informed judgment ~~J. p. 138). R::;

fairn~ss

th~ rea~ons ~uz~~s :~~!;le

arg!s that the likely stability of justice as and of h. h to support it are among the reasons the parties adopt lt rat er t an e . average utilit~ (TJ, p. 177). For their part, readers of Rawls's work mus~ de term me ~ l:d conception of justice can be put into reflective equilibrium with theu own consi er. judgments. The stability arguments Rawls offers- including his ar~~m~nt.that parties in the original position would prefer justice as fairness to average ut.llnanamsm becaus: it can better generate its own support - are intended to convmce readers of th superiority of justice as fairness to competing conceptions. This presupposes, of course, that the function of the original position is not merely to represent the moral powers of citizens, but that It also has some justificatory force. Edward McClenne~, however, is sufficiently worried about choice under conditions of extreme u~~ertamt~ .that h.e raises the possibility of arguing for justice as fairness without the ongmal posi~Ion. His article reformulates the stability argument for the superiority of justice as fairness to average utilitarianism without relying on it. Rawls's later work has famously taken a political turn, officially announced in his article •Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical. "6 and cemented in place with the publication of PL. Rawls says that he first considered revising justice as fairness in 1977, when Samuel Scheffler sent him a copy of the paper included in this volume (PL. p. xxxiv). The explidtly political tum, he says. was motivated by his own growing recognition that the treatment of stability in TJ had been inadequate. In the introduction to PL. he says: The fact of a plurality of reasonable but incompatible comprehensive doctrines -the fact of reasonable pluralism -shows that, as used in Theory, the idea of a well-ordered society of justice as fairness is unrealistic. This is because it is inconsistent with realizing its own prindples under the best of foreseeable conditions. The account of the stability of a well-ordered society in part III is therefore also unrealistic and must be recast. (PL. p. xix) The stability argument in TJpresupposed, Rawls thinks. that everyone in a well-ordered society of justice as fairness would agree on what he now calls •comprehensive philosophical doctrine." It presupposed, for example, that everyone would accept Rawls's account of the good in general and the good for persons. Once it is recognized that reasonable persons will disagree on fundamental questions about the good life, the presupposition is seen to be false. Since this disagreement implies that dtizens may have different grounds for assessing their own worth and since the account of self-respect is vital to the stability argument of TJ, discarding the presupposition required Rawls to revise the stability argument for justice as fairness. He now argues that justice as fairness would be the object of an •overlapping consensus• of reasonable philosophical and religious views. Though this argument departs significantly from the stability arguments in part m of TJ, it like them turns on theses in moral psychology (PL, pp. 141, 163). Claims in moral psychology therefore remain crucial to Rawls's defense of justice as fairness. The notions Rawls relied upon to effect his political turn, the notions of a

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comprehensive doctrine, an overlapping consensus and reasonable pluralism, are examined in some of the essays included Volume 5. What matters for present purposes is what the new argument for stability is intended to prove. Is it supposed to show that an overlapping consensus on justice as fairness is likely under favorable conditions? Rawls's remark that his earlier idea of well-ordered society of justice as fairness is "unrealistic" might suggest this. In an article reprinted here, however, Thomas Hill maintains that Rawls wanted only to argue that a stable overlapping consensus is possible under reasonably favorable circumstances. That it is possible for a conception of justice to win stable allegiance tells in its favor, Hill thinks, quite apart from whether it is likely to do so. Though Hill does not say so, his imputation of this lesser aspiration to Rawls fits well with other remarks Rawls himself makes. Near the end of the "Introduction to the Paperback Edition" of PL, Rawls writes that the Holocaust and the wars of the twentieth century "raise in an acute way the question whether political relations must be governed by power and coercion alone." He continues "[i]f a reasonably just society that subordinates power to its aims is not possible and people are largely amoral. if not incurably cynical and self-centered, one might ask with Kant whether it is worthwhile for human beings to live on the earth?" (PL. p. lxii). A great deal therefore depends upon showing that a just society is possible. If this possibility cannot be vindicated, it would be reasonable for human beings to acquiesce in cynicism and despair. The task Rawls assigns political philosophy is precisely that of vindicating the possibility. It does so by showing how a just society could win stable allegiance, given reasonable psychological assumptions like the laws appealed to in part III of TJ and in the discussion of an overlapping consensus (PL. pp. 101, 172). Rawls argues that a well-ordered society of justice as fairness would realize the goods of community because it would be composed of social unions in which members esteem one another's pursuits and excellences. It would also be a "social union of social unions" in which "the successful carrying out of just institutions is the shared final end of all the members of society, and these institutional forms are prized as good in themselves" (TJ, p. 527). The argument for these claims depends upon a psychological principle Rawls calls "the Aristotelian principle" and upon his analysis of the conditions of self-respect. These arguments have not convinced everyone. From the beginning, Rawls was said to have built his theory around the moral psychology of autonomous individuals, a fact clearest, it was said, from the construction of the original position. 7 Critics contended that a theory like Rawls's, which seems to be individualist in basis and to privilege autonomy, is more contentious, and less even-handed, than Rawls took his theory to be. Some have also argued that a society which privileges autonomy either cannot enjoy the goods of community at all or can enjoy them in only an attenuated way. The essay in this volume by Wayne Proudfoot is an early, but clear and concise, statement of these criticisms. Published in 1974, it anticipated many of the so-called "commmunitarian critiques" of liberalism which were so prominent in the 1980s. The best known communitarian criticism of Rawls's work is Michael Sandel's Liberalism and the Limits ofJustice. 8 This volume reprints an essay by Sandel that distills and recapitulates the more extended critique of Rawlsian liberalism found in Sandel's book. Responses to communitarian criticisms were not long in coming. Cornelius

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Delaney argues in his paper that justice as fairness is an individualistic conception of justice only in an innocuous sense. The form of individualism Delaney finds in TJ does not, he contends, have the damaging implications critics have claimed. Amy Gutmann's article contains relatively little explicit discussion of Rawls. It is reprinted here because it is the locus classicus of the liberal response to communitarian criticisms and is clearly intended as a defense of Rawlsian liberalism. In a bold and strikingly original piece, Sibyl Schwarzenbach argues that while Hegel is often the inspiration for Rawls's communitarian critics, Rawls's political philosophy bears important similarities with Hegel's. Failure to appreciate these similarities, she concludes, has led to a corresponding failure to appreciate the resources Rawls has to respond to his critics. Roberto Alejandro explicitly takes on Sandel's criticisms of Rawls. He argues that the individualist conception of persons that Sandel finds in Rawls's work rests upon a misreading. Like Schwarzenbach, Alejandro believes Rawls has the resources to reply to his critics, though he cautions that there are costs to drawing on them. The last essay in the volume is by John Haldane. Its relatively recent date of authorship afforded Haldane the benefit of a studied distance from the liberalcommunitarian debate. Haldane argues, in effect, that that debate depends upon a false dichotomy, at least if the liberalism at issue is the Rawlsian liberalism of PL. The most appropriate form of stability for a modern liberal democracy, Haldane maintains, is provided neither by a robust sense of community nor by an overlapping consensus. Rather, it is provided by what Rawls would call a stable modus vivendi (for this notion, see PL, p. 146f.). The extent to which a society held together by a modus vivendi can be stable, establish justice or realize the goods of community depends upon political culture and so varies from society to society. Haldane writes that political philosophers should take their tasks and problems, as well as their bearings, from the political cultures of the societies they address. This makes of political philosophy a piecemeal enterprise without the synthetic or systematic aspirations of Rawls's liberalism. Paul J. Weithman Notes John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harv d u · · b . ar mversny Press, 1971 ). References to this work will hereafter , e lilY~~ par~nthetically in the body ofthe text, with the title abbreviated 'TJ.' John Rawls, Pollt1cal LiberaliSm (Columbia University Press 1996) R f · · b · • · e erences to th1s work w1ll hereaf· I J h C ther e IIJVen parenthetically in the body of the text, with the title abbreviated •PL • • os ua . ~ en, "Democratic Equality." Ethics 99 ( 1989): 727-51. . Carol G~lhgan. In a Differmt Voice (Harvard University Press 1982) ' Allan Gibbard Wist Choices A t " 1· · ' · ' • P ree '"IP (Harvard Umversity Press 1990) · 'John Rawls. "Justice as Faimess· Political N M h . • . ' 'p. IX. 'Thomas Nagel. "Rawls on Justice • Philosoothi;~p ~leal. Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985 ): 223-51. • Michael Sandel. Liberalism and P .Rtvi~ 82 (1973): 220-34. Lllluts of Justtct (Cambridge University Press. 1982).

1

the . .

Shame and Self-Esteem: A Critique* John Deigh Twenty-five years ago the psychoanalyst Gerhan Piers offered what remains the most influential way of distinguishing shame from guilt. Reformulated without terms special to psychoanalytic theory, Piers's distinction is that shame is occasioned when one fails to achieve a goal or an ideal that is integral to one's self-conception whereas guilt is occasioned when one transgresses a boundary or limit on one's conduct set by an authority under whose governance one lives. Succinctly, shame goes to failure, guilt to transgression. Shame is felt over shortcomings, guilt over wrongdoings.• More recently, writers who have addressed themselves to the way shame differs from guilt, notably, among philosophers, John Rawls, have characterized shame as an emotion one feels upon loss of self-esteem and have analyzed self-esteem and its loss in a way that bears out Piers's influence.' Rawls plainly is in Piers's debt. He explains self-esteem in terms of the goals and ideals one incorporates into one's life plans, and he makes this explanation central to his account of our moral personality, in particular, our capacity to feel shame. A characterization of shame like Rawls's, when set in the context of distinguishing shame from guilt, we are likely to find intuitively appealing. And we may feel a further pull in its direction when we think of shame in comparison with other emotions to which it is thought similar-for instance, embarrassment. For we associate both shame and embarrassment with an experience of discomfiture, a sudden shock that short-circuits one's composure and self-possession; yet we would agree, I think, that • I am indebted to Herbert Morris for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this article. 1. Gerhan Piers and Milton B. Singer, Shame and Guilt: A Psychoanalytic and a Cultural Study (Springfield, Ill.: Charles C. Thomas, 1953), pp. 11-12. 2. John Rawls, A Tluoryofjwtice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 440-46. For similar views see Helen Merrell Lynd, On Shame and the Smrt:h fur ldnatitJ (New York: Harcoun Brace&: Co., 1958), pp. 23--24; Roben W. White, "Competence and the Psychosexual Stages of Development," in Nebraslla Symposium on Motivation/960, ed. Marshall Jones (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1960), pp. 125-27; and David A. J. Richards, A Theory of RIIQSons fur Action (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), pp. 250-59.

Ethics 93 (january 1983): 225-245 C 1983 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. 0014-1704/83/9302-0001$01.00

1

Ethics January 1983 embarrassment is an experience of discomfiture that, unlike sha~e, do~~ not include a diminishment in one's sense of worth. An expenence be shame, by contrast, strikes at one's sense of worth. Here we may reminded of times when things were going ~ell and we were somew~at inflated by the good opinion we had of ourselve~, when suddenly • qmte unexpectedly, we did something that gave the he to our favorable ~If­ assessment, and we were shocked to see ourselves in fa~ ~ess fiat~enng light. Such are the circumstances for sham~, and the pos1t1ve sel~-1mage that disappears in these circumstances and 1s replaced by a negat1ve one spells loss of self-esteem. These contrasts between shame and guilt and shame and em~arrassment present the bare outlines of a charact~rization ~f sham.e, w~tch, when filled out, appears rather attractive. It ts the top1c of th1s arude. My thesis is that this characterization, though att~ctive at firs~ appearance, is unsatisfactory. It represents, I contend, a dubtous concepuon of shame. In particular, 1 mean to call into question its central idea that shame signifies loss of self-esteem. The paper is divided into three parts. In the first I lay out what. 1 shall call the Rawlsian characterization of shame, Rawlsian in that I retam the controlling thesis and overall structure of Rawls's account but do not concern myself with its specifics, an exact rendering of Rawls being unnecessary for my purposes. Though my approach here is largely uncritical, my aim is to set up a well-defined target for subsequent criticism. In the second, then, I begin that criticism. I set forth a case of loss of self-esteem and some cases of shame that pose problems for the characterization. By themselves these cases stand as counterexamples to it, but my hope is that they will have a more illuminating effect, that they will produce a sense or spark an intuition that its central idea is problematic. Accordingly, in the third part I complete the criticism. I draw from the cases two lessons about shame intended to give definition to the intuition I hope will already have been sparked. Each lesson points to a key feature of shame that the characterization leaves out or misrepresents, its central idea being implicated as the source of these failures. Thus, while the criticism of this third part is aimed at the target set up in the first, the force of the criticism should lead us to consider rejecting the idea at the target's center.

22 6

I

We need_ at the start to fix our understanding of self-esteem, since the concept u at the base of the Rawlsian characterization. To this end 1 shall p~nt some considerations leading up to a definition of self-esteem, f~om wh1ch an ex~la~ation of its loss will follow directly. This will then ?"eld the charactenzauon of shame we seek. Let us begin with the general 1dea that self-esteem relates to what one makes of oneself or does with one's life. One has self~teem if one's spirits are high because one believes that one has made or wall make something of oneself, that one has been

2

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or will be successful in one's life pursuits. Conversely, one lacks selfesteem if one is downcast because of a judgment that one has failed to make or never will make something of oneself, that one doesn't or won't ever amount to much. Something of this idea is suggested in William James's equation that sets self-esteem equal to the ratio of one's successes to one's pretensions. 5 The first thing to note in this general idea is that self-esteem connects up with the condition of one's spirits. We speak of vicissitudes of selfesteem: highs and lows. One's self-esteem can plummet. It can also be boosted or bolstered. Indolence and languishing in doldrums are signs that one's self-esteem is at a low ebb. Enthusiasm for and vigorous engagement in activities in which one chooses to participate are signs of an opposite condition. We also describe persons in these conditions as having or lacking self-esteem. And though subtle differences may exist between a person's having self-esteem and his self-esteem's being high and between his lacking self-esteem and his self-esteem's being low, I shall treat the two in each pair as equivalent. A second point of note, which is corollary to the first, is that selfesteem goes with activity. But to assert that having self-esteem requires that one be active would be an overstatement. We should allow that the esteem a person has for himself is relative to that period in his life with which he identifies for the purpose of self-assessment. Thus, a person may retain his self-esteem after having retired from active life if he looks back on his endeavors and accomplishments with pride while content to take it easy. He maintains a high opinion of himself while leading a rather leisurely and unproductive life because his self-assessment proceeds from recollections of an earlier period when he was active and successful. Or, to take the viewpoint of a youth looking forward in time, he may have esteem for himself in view of the life he aspires to lead if he believes in the accuracy of the picture he has of his future. He identifies, for the purpose of self-assessment, with the person he believes he will become, his present self having little bearing. Consequently, he may even at the time be leading an altogether easygoing and frivolous life while exuding self-esteem. I mention these possibilities only to set them aside. We simplify our task of explaining self-esteem if we restrict the discussion to selfesteem had in view of one's current doings and development. Besides this simplifying restriction, we must also add a qualification to the statement that being active is a condition of having self-esteem. As a third point, then, one's actions, if they are signs of self-esteem, must have direction. They must be channeled into pursuits or projects and reflect one's goals and ideals. A wayward vagabond does not present a picture of someone who has self-esteem. Nor do we ascribe self-esteem to someone who, having no settled conception of himself, tries on this 3. William James, Tlu Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (1890; reprinted., New York: Dover Publications, 1950), vol. 1, p. 310.

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and that trait of personality, as he would sunglasses of differe~lt styles, to see which gives him the most comfortable look. Self-esteem •.s had by persons whose lives have a fairly definite direction an~ some falTly welldefined shape, which is to say that self-esteem reqmres that one have values and organize one's life around them. One's values translate into one's aims and ideals, and a settled constellation of these is necessary for self-esteem. Specifically, we may take this as a precondition of self-esteem. For, argua~ly, ~omeone who had no aims or ideals in life, whose life lacked the darectaon and cohere~ce that such aims and ideals would bring, would be neither an appropna~e object of our esteem nor of our disesteem. We would understand ~as behavior as the product of primitive urges and desires that impelled ham at the time of action. Having given no order or design to his life, he would act more or less at random or for short-lived purposes. We should recognize in him a figure who frequents recent philosophic literature on human freedom: the man assailed by a battery of desires and urges, who is helpless to overpower them because he lacks a clear definition of himsel£. 4 Such a man is impelled in many directions at once but moves in no particular one for any great distance. Frustrated and disoriented by inner turmoil, he lapses into nonaction. He would, were we ever to encounter his like, properly evoke in us pathos indicating abeyance of judgment rather than scorn indicating low esteem for him. By contrast, when a person has aims and ideals that give order and direction to his life, counterpoint between primitive forces that impel him and his wanting to fulfill those aims and ideals becomes possible. Thus, at those times when he acts in conflict with his aims and ideals, he may declare that he was caught in the grip of some emotion or was overpowered by some urge or desire. He would then convey the idea that he had bee1_1 acted upon or compelled to act as opposed to doing the .act or choo~mg to act. Undeniably, the emotion, urge, or desire is attnbutable to htm; but by such declaration he disowns it and so disclaims aut~orship of th~ act it pro~p~ed. Authorship, not ownership, is the key nouon here, that IS, a~thorshtp m the general sense of being the originator or creator of somethmg. When one has a settled constellation of aims and ideals, then one distinguishes between the acts of which one is the au~or and those in which one serves as an instrument of alien forces.!\ Wtthout any such constellation, one is never the author of one's actions thouh · th" · forces that act on one, triggered' g many times e mstrument of aben by external events. 4. See joel Feinberg, "The Idea of a Free Man" in Ed·---'-'--']-·-' .p · of Education • _..,...,.. u&gmmts. ap"s an F kfi '~.James Doyle (London: Roudedge lie Kegan Paul, 1973), PP· PlailoJ ' 68rry ra~ un, F~om of the Will and the Concept of a Person," Journal of ~1971). !i-20; Wngb~ Neely, "Freedom and Desire;• Plailosophical Rroinu 8~ ( 1974 ~ !l:h~~ ~':!w':~:~tson, Free Agency," jtJUTnal of Philosoph' 72 (1975): 205-20. 1~ of Ptrwru ed Am~t'':c, any Frankfurt, ~lde~tification and Externality," in Tlu ' · te ny (Berkeley: Umvemty of California Press, 1976), pp. 239 _3 1.

1M PlailoJfi/1A

14~49·

ul

ot:"'

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It is in view of this contrast that I suggest we take one's having a settled constellation of aims and ideals as a precondition of self-esteem: when one is the author of one's actions, one is an appropriate object for esteem or disesteem; when one is only an instrument of alien forces, one is not. We can then look to this precondition for the defining conditions of self-esteem. So while we would have said, loosely speaking, that selfesteem came from one's having a good opinion of oneself, we may now say more strictly that it comes from a good opinion of oneself as the author of one's actions, more generally, one's life. Accordingly, this opinion comprises a favorable regard for one's aims and ideals in life and a favorable assessment of one's suitability for pursuing them. Lacking selfesteem, one would either regard one's aims and ideals as shoddy or believe that one hadn't the talent, ability, or other attributes necessary for achieving them. Either would mean that one lacked the good opinion of oneself that makes for self-esteem, and either would explain the dispirited condition that goes with one's lacking self-esteem. These considerations then yield an understanding of self-esteem as requiring that two conditions jointly obtain. This we can formulate as a definition. Specifically, one has self-esteem if, first, one regards one's aims and ideals as worthy and, second, one believes that one is well suited to pursue them. 6 With reference to the first we say one has a sense that one's life has meaning. With reference to the second we speak of a confidence one has in the excellence of one's person. And this combination of a sense that one's life has meaning and a confidence in one's ability to achieve one's ends gives one impetus to go forward. Turning then to loss of self-esteem and, in particular, the sudden loss taken on the Rawlsian characterization to be explicative of shame, we obtain immediately from the foregoing definition an account of this experience. One loses self-esteem if, because of a change in either one's regard for the worthiness of one's aims and ideals or one's belief in one's ability to achieve them, a once favorable self-assessment is overturned and supplanted by an unfavorable one. The loss here is the loss of a certain view of oneself. One had self-esteem and correspondingly a good opinion of oneself: one viewed oneself as having the attributes necessary for successfully pursuing worthy ends around which one had organized one's life. The change in judgment about the worthiness of one's ends or the excellence of one's person destroys that view. One's good opinion of oneself gives way to a poor one. This constitutes loss of self-esteem. The Rawlsian characterization has it that shame is the emotion one feels when such loss occurs. Moreover, shame is to be understood as signifying such loss. Shame on this characterization is the shock to our sense of worth that comes either from realizing that our values are shoddy or from discovering that we are deficient in a way that had added to the confidence we had in our excellenc;e. Either is a discovery of something 6. The definition matches Rawls's (see p. 440).

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Ethics January 1983 230 d such self-discovery false in the good opinion we had o f ourse1ves, an spells loss of self-esteem. . · e Of coune self-discovery of this sort does not figure m ev~ry expenenc of shame for 'a person who has a poor opinion of himself IS nonetheless liable to feel shame when the very defect that is his re~son for the poor opinion is brought to his notice. Thus, as a last pomt, we .mut s:y something about shame felt by someone whose self-esteem IS a rea Y low. While a schoolboy, Philip Car~y, in Maug_ham's novel?/ Hu~: Bondage, feels shame innumerable ttmes over h1s dubf~t. H1s feehn~n do not involve loss of self-esteem, since his self-esteem IS low t~ begt with, nor, obviously, do they reflect any act of self-discovery. But 1t would be uncharitable to object to the Rawlsian characterization on the grou~d that it does not cover such cases, for they can be treated on analogy Wit~ cases it does cover. Philip does not always have his crippled foot on h1s mind; there are plenty of times when he is forgetful of it .. o~ these occasions, especially when he is comfortable with himself, he IS hable to feel shame when made conscious of his "freakish" condition, when, as it were, he rediscovers it. Then, while he does not lose any self-esteem, his being comfortable with himself is certainly lost to him. 11 In this section I shall set forth a case of loss of self-esteem and some cases of shame that present real problems for the Rawlsian characterization. I begin with the former. The case itself is quite straightforward. We have only to think of someone who suddenly loses self-esteem because he discovers that he lacks the ability to achieve some aim he has set for himself, who is crestfallen, dispirited, and deeply disappointed with himself, but owing to circumstances or a philosophical temperament, does not feel shame. And such a case is not hard to construct.' Imagine, for example, some youth who is indisputably the best tennis player in his community. He defeats all challengers; he wins every local tournament; and he has recently led his high school team to a first-place finish in a league consisting of teams from the high schools of his and the neighboring towns. His coach rates him the most promising player to co~e al~ng in a deca~e, and he is highly touted by other tennis enth~stas~ m the ar~~· Qmte naturally, he comes to have a high opinion of hts ab1hty and V1s1ons of winning tournaments on the professional tour._ At some point early in his high school years, he makes professional tenms a career goal and devotes much time to improving his game. In trut_h: though, the gro~nds for his high opinion of his ability and for his deosa~n to ~ake tenm~ a career are shaky. The competition in his and the netghbonng towns lS rather poor, these being rural and isolated from urban centers. And the aging coach's hopes have distorted his judgment 7· ~plcs similar to this fint case were suggested to me by Herben Morris and

Rogers Albntton.

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of his star player's talents. Thus, when this young player enters his first state tournament, he quickly discovers that his skills are below those of the top seeded players. His first defeat need not be humiliating, just convincing. And though he will surely lose some self-esteem, we need not suppose that he feels any shame. One explanation of his losing self-esteem but not feeling shame is this. The first defeat is sufficiently convincing that it alters his view of himself as a tennis player, and given his aims, this means loss of selfesteem. But just as others dose to him would respond that his defeat is nothing to be ashamed of, so his own attitude toward it may reflect such judgment. Accordingly, he would be deeply disappointed with himself but not ashamed. This possibility becomes even more vivid if we suppose that he has gone to the tournament alone or with friends who, unlike him, have only a passing rather than an abiding interest in tennis. For then he does not find himself having to face someone like his coach before whom feeling some shame would be natural, though even here the presence of the coach does not necessitate the emotion. This case thus broaches the question what distinguishes those cases of loss of selfesteem whose subjects feel shame from those whose subjects feel disappointment but no shame. The inability of the Rawlsian characterization to answer this question implies that the understanding of shame it gives is, at best, incomplete. Let us next take up cases of shame. The first comes from an observation, made by several writers, that shame is commonly felt over trivial things. One writer instances experiences of shame had on account of "one's accent, one's ignorance, one's clothes, one's legs or teeth."8 Another, to illustrate the same point, mentions shame felt over "an awkward gesture, a gaucherie in dress or table manners, ... a mispronounced word."9 To be sure, none of these examples poses a threat to the Rawlsian characterization, since each of the things mentioned could be for someone a shortcoming the apprehension of which would undercut the confidence he had in the excellence of his person. This would certainly be true of someone who consciously subscribed to ideals the achievement of which required that he not have the shortcoming. For then, though others would disparage these ideals as superficial or vulgar and accordingly think the shortcoming trivial, to him it would still appear as a serious Haw in himself. Naturally, the more interesting case is that in which the subject also thinks the shortcoming trivial and is surprised at having felt shame on its account. This case too can be understood as coming under the Rawlsian characterization. For one need not fully realize the extent to which one places value on certain things, and one may even deceive oneself about one's not being attached to certain ideals. We need, then, 8. Stanley Cavell, Mwt We Mean What We Say7 (Cambridge: Cambridge University

Press, 1976), p. 286. 9. Lynd, p. 40.

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Ethics January 1983 232 to distinguish between, on the one hand, wh~t one would ~edare. were one's aims and ideals and would list as one's tmportant attnbutes tf ~ne were asked to describe oneself and, on the other, one's self-concepu.o~ as it is reflected by one's behavior apart from or in additio~ to any e~pbClt self-description. By one's self-conception I mean th~ atms an~ 1deals around which one has organized one's life together w1th the behe~s one has about one's ability to pursue them. And what we u_nder~tand IS th~t these aims, ideals, and beliefs can guide one's behav1or without one s being conscious of having subscribed to them. Consequently. a person who feels shame over crooked teeth or the slurping of soup. though he would have thought himself unconcerned with appearance and proper form, shows by his emotion that a pleasant-looking face or good ~able manners are important to him, that he subscribes to ideals of c~me.bn~ss or social grace. Hence, we can easily understand his shame as s1gmfymg loss of self-esteem. At the same time, such examples invite us to look for things over which someone might feel shame though he did not believe they made him ill suited to pursue his ends. Shame one feels over something one could not believe affected one's excellence, say, because one could not regard it as a fault in oneself, would present a problem for the Rawlsian characterization. Thus, consider shame felt over a humorous surname. The example comes from Gide. He describes to us the experience of a young French girl on her first day of school, who had been sheltered at home for the first ten years of her life, and in whose name, Mile Peterat, something ridiculous is connoted, which might be rendered in English by calling her Miss Fartwell. "Arnica Peterat-guileless and helplesshad never until that moment suspected that there might be anything laughable in her name; on her first day at school its ridicule came upon her as a sudden revelation; she bowed her head, like some sluggish waterweed, to the jeers that flowed over her; she turned red; she turned pale; she wept."•o . With this e~mple.we move from attributes that one can regard as ~mor Raws an~ ~ns1gmficant defects to things about a person that leave h1m open to nd1cule, though they do not add to or detract from his excellence. The morphemes of one's surname do not make one better or worse suited for pursuing the aims and ideals around which one has organiz~d one's li~e. Hence, shame in this example, because it is felt over somet~mg that bes outside its subject's self-conception opposes the Rawlstan characterization. ' . T!'e s~on~ case_ of shame is cousin to the first. One finds oneself 10 a Sltuauo~ m wh1ch others scorn or ridicule one or express some d~precatory J';'dgment of one, and apprehending this one feels shame. Given only thiS general description, such a case presen~ no real problem 10. Andrt Gide Laf'adio's Ad~ Knopf 19SS) p 100' Th d . u, trans. Dorothy Buuy (New York: Alfred A. • • · · e ren enng of her name in English is suggested by the translator.

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for the Rawlsian characterization. It serves to remind us that one's selfesteem depends to some extent on the esteem others accord one-certain others, anyway-and the greater that dependency the more readily one will feel shame in response to any deprecatory judgments they express. This can be understood by way of the amount of confidence one has in one's own independent judgments about the worthiness of one's aims and one's ability to fulfill them, for this, we might say, varies inversely with the strength of the dependency of one's self-esteem on the esteem of others. That is, the greater that dependency, the less one's confidence will be in independent judgments one makes about oneself and, concomitantly, the more accepting one will be of the judgments others make about one. Consequently, given a strong enough dependency, if they criticize or ridicule one for some fault, one accepts their criticism and thus makes the same judgment about oneself, where before one did not notice the fault or it did not much matter ~o one. This arouses shame inasmuch as the judgment issues in an unfavorable self-assessment that replaces a favorable one, that is, in loss of self-esteem. We have then an account of the case that is fully in line with the Rawlsian characterization. But we must also admit cases of shame felt in response to another's criticism or ridicule in which the subjects do not accept the other person's judgment of them and so do not make the same judgment of themselves. And these cases do present a problem for the Rawlsian characterization. Consider Crito and his great concern for what the good citizens of Athens will think of him for failing to deter Socrates from meeting his demise. "I am ashamed," he says in vainly trying to argue Socrates out of accepting his fate, "both on your account and on ours your friends'; it will look as though we had played something like a coward's part all through this affair ofyours." 11 And though Crito is in the end convinced that Socrates' course is the right one and knows all along that he has done everything one can expect of a friend, we still have, I think, no trouble picturing this good-hearted but thoroughly conventional man feeling ashamed when before some respectable Athenian, who reproaches him for what he believes was cowardice on Crito's part. Examples like this one demonstrate that shame is often more, when it is not exclusively, a response to the evident deprecatory opinion others have of one than an emotion aroused upon judgment that one's aims are shoddy or that one is deficient in talent or ability necessary to achieve them. The third problematic case of shame is this. We commonly ascribe shame to small children. Shaming is a familiar practice in their upbringing; "Shame on you" and "You ought to be ashamed of yourself" are familiar admonishments. And, setting aside the question of the advisability of such responses to a child's misdemeanors, we do not think them nonsensical II. Plato, Crito 45d-e. Quoted from the Hugh Trednick translation, The Collected Dialogws of Plato, ed. Edith Hamilton and Huntington Cairns (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1961), p. 30.

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or incongruous in view of the child's emotional capacities. Furthermore, close observers of small children do not hesitate to ascribe shame to ~~em. Erik Erikson, writing about human development, observed that chtl ~en acquired a sense of shame at the stage when they ~gan .t? deve muscular control and coordination.1 2 Charles Darwm, wnung ab f blushing, noted that small children began to blush ar?und the age 0 three and later remarked that he had "noticed on occas10ns that shyness or shamefacedness and real shame are exhibited in the eyes of young children before they have acquired the power of blushing."'! But it would certainly be a precocious child who at the age of four or five had a well-defined self-conception, who organized his life around the pursuit of certain discrete and relatively stable aims a~d ideals and measured himself by standards of what is necessary to achteve them. In other words, a child at this age, though capable of feeling shame,_ d~s not have self-esteem. Hence, the shame he experiences does not stgmfy loss of self-esteem. Finally, a fourth problematic case of shame emerges once we juxta~ the orientation of an aristocratic ethic and that of an achievement ethtc. The Rawlsian characterization with its emphasis on making something of oneself, being successful in one's life pursuits, is tied to the latter. The experiences of shame it describes are at home in a meritocratic society • one in which social mobility is widespread, or, at any rate, the belief that it is constitutes a major article of faith. On the other hand, some experiences of shame reflect an aristocratic ethic; one feels shame over conduct unbecoming a person of one's rank or station. The experiences are better suited to a society with a rigidly stratified social structure like a caste society. And, as we shall see, they stand in marked contrast to experiences the Rawlsian characterization is designed to fit. The contrast is this. With shame reflective of an achievement ethic, the subject is concerned with achieving his life's aims and ideals, and he measures himself against standards of excellence he believes he must meet to achieve them. So long as he regards his aims and ideals as worthy, th~y define for him a successful life, and accordingly he uses the standards to judge whether he has the excellence in ability or of character necessary for success. He is then liable to shame if he realizes that some of his aims and ~deals are shoddy or that he has a defect portending failure where preVlo~sly he ~ad ascri~d to himself an excellence indicating success. And thlS fits mce~y the tdea that shame signifies loss of self-esteem. On the othe~ ha~d, WI~ s~a~e reflective of an aristocratic ethic, the subject's ~ncern ~ ~th ~~g the deportment of his class and not necessarily ~th achtevm~ atms and tdeals that define success in life. He is concerned wtth conformmg to the norms of propriety distinctive of his class, and

:!

PP· ;:i-~~ Erikson, Clailllhood a7Itl Soriety, 2d ed. (New York: W. W. Norton &: Co.• 196!1), cd

.,

g;.Kago: Char~ ~~· Tlat Eztwaritm of 1M EIIIDiimu mMar& a7It1 mvenaty Chicago Presa, 1965), p. S!U. of

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conformity to these is neither a mark of achievement nor an excellence that forecasts achievement. In the usual case one is born into one's class and conforms to its norms as a matter of course. Failure to conform that is, failure to deport oneself as becomes a member of one's class: invites comparison to persons of lower classes on whom the members of one's class look down. Thus, someone from a social class beneath which there are other classes may be liable to shame over such failure: someone wellborn may be liable to shame if he behaves )ike the vulgar. And such shame does not fit the Rawlsian characterization. For the subject neither realizes that his aims and ideals are shoddy nor discovers a defect in himself that makes him ill suited to pursue them. In other words, given the analysis we have laid out, he does not lose self-esteem. But, one might ask, can't we say of someone who feels shame over conduct unbecoming a member of his class that he too has ideals that regulate his actions and emotions? After all, with his class we associate a way of life, and this implies an ideal or set of ideals. To feel constrained to act as becomes a member of one's class is to feel pressed to conform to its ideals, and conduct unbecoming a member is, in other words, conduct that falls short of an ideal. Granted, one doesn't so much achieve these ideals as conform to them, which shows perhaps that the conception of self-esteem on which the Rawlsian characterization is built must be modified. But supposing we make whatever modification is needed, isn't it sufficient to bring the experience under the Rawlsian characterization that we can redescribe it as shame felt over one's falling short of an ideal? Something, however, gets lost in this redescription. When we redescribe the experience as shame felt over falling short of ideals around which one's life is organized, our focus shifts from who one is to how one conducts one's life. The subject's identity as a member of a certain class recedes into the background. We see it as the source of his ideals but do not assign it any further part. This, I think, is a mistake. In this experience the subject has a sense of having disgraced himself, which means he has an acute sense of who he is. We do not have an understanding of shame otherwise. It is revealing that on the Rawlsian characterization this shift in focus does not register. For the characterization recognizes no distinction between questions of identity and questions of life pursuits, between who one is and how one conducts one's life. From its viewpoint, a person says who he is by telling what his aims in life are and what ideals guide him through life. 14 This makes it an attractive characterization of the shame felt by persons who are relatively free of constraints on their choice of life pursuits owing to class, race, ethnic origins, and the l~ke .. For su~h perso.ns tend more to regard their aims and ideals as con~tlt.utmg the1r 1dent1ty and their ancestry, race, class, and so forth as extnns1c facts a~ut th~m­ selves. So the characterization explains the shame they feel as mcludmg 14. See Rawls, p. 408.

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Ethics January 1983 an acute sense of who they are. But because it restricts a_ perso.n's ident~y to his aims and ideals in life, it fails to explain as includmg thas sens~t e shame someone, living in a rigidly stratified society, feels when ?~ ~s not act as befits a member of his class or the shame someone .. hvmg m a multiethnic society, feels when he acts beneath the dignity of has p~ople. Granted, such a person recognizes that his conduct falls short of ~deal: members of his class or culture are expected to follow, but these adeal do not constitute his identity. Another, a pretender for instance, could have the same ideals as he but not the same identity, just as a to~boy has the ideals of a boy but not the identity of one. Hence, we faal. to account for such shame if we describe it as being felt over one's havmg fallen short of ideals that regulate one's life. Thus, about the following experience, which Earl Mills, a Mas~p~e Indian, relates, a defender of the Rawlsian characterization will msast that sometime during the episode Mills must have embraced the i~eals of an Indian way of life or, alternatively, that he must have reabz~d, though he nowhere suggests this, that the ideals he was then pursumg were shoddy. But ignoring the Rawlsian characterization, we can explai~ Mills's feeling shame without importing either of these assumptions: has having, in the circumstances he describes, to acknowledge his ignorance of Mashpee traditions disgraced him as an Indian, made him betray, as it were, his Indian identity, and this aroused shame. This explanation accepted, his experience directly opposes the Rawlsian characterization, for it suggests that, despite the aims and ideals around which a man organizes his life, circumstances may arise that make him, because of an identity he has that is independent of those aims and ideals, liable to experience shame.

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When I was a kid, I and the young fellows I ran around with couldn't ~ave cared less ~bout our Ind~an background. We never participated m any of t~e tnbal ceremomes, we didn't know how to dance, and we wouldn t have been caught .dead in regalia. We thought anyone who made a fuss about our hentage was old-fashioned, and we even used to make f~n of the people who did. Well, when I came back from the Army m 1948, I had a different outlook on such matters. Yo':' ~ee, there happened to be two other Indians in my basictrammg company at Fort Dix. One of them was an Iroquois from Upper ~ew York State, and the other was a Chippewa from Montana. I w~ nmetee~ years old, away from Mashpee for the first time in my bfe! and, lake most soldiers, I was lonely. Then one night the ~r,.uo::,.fellow got up and did an Indian dance in f;ont of everyone 10 t e rrac~. ~e Chippewa got up and joined him, and when I had to admat I d1dn't know how, 1 felt terribly ashamed.l5 15. Paul Brodeur, "A Reponer at Lar.-· Th M h .. 6, 1978): 62-150, p. lOS. ·.,-. e as pees, New YorAer 54 (November

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III Before drawing any lessons about shame from the discussion of Part II, I should say something to allay doubts about the import of the cases of shame presented there. Such doubts naturally arise because one might think that some, if not all, of those cases exemplify experiences of the emotion the subjects of which one could criticize for being irrational or unreasonable. That is, while agreeing that many persons are liable to such experiences, one might wonder whether they ought to be so liable and then note that a case's force as a counterexample lessens if it only describes an experience of irrational or unreasonable emotion. The first and last cases of shame are especially in point. To feel shame over one's surname and because of conduct unbecoming a person of one's class seem good examples of shame one ought not to experience. For one is not responsible for one's parentage and thus ought not to judge oneself according to facts wholly determined by it. Inasmuch as shame in these cases reflects such judgment, they exemplify experiences to which one ought not to be liable. These doubts arise under the assumption that, in giving a characterization of an emotion, one specifies those conditions in which the emotion is experienced reasonably or rationally. Such an approach to characterizing an emotion requires that one regard as its standard cases those in which the subjects are fully rational individuals and not at the time of the experience in any irrational frame of mind. But we ought to question this requirement. Why should we restrict the class of standard cases to these? While there is, for instance, something absurd in the familiar picture of an elephant terrified at the sight of a mouse, why should this absurdity lead us to regard the elephant's terror as any less important a case to be considered in characterizing that emotion than the terror a lynch mob strikes in the person on whom it takes revenge? To be sure, the elephant is not a creature capable of bringing its emotions under rational control, whereas a human being, if sufficiently mature, is. And for this reason there is a point in criticizing the emotional experiences of human beings, whereas making similar criticisms of an elephant's emotional experiences is altogether idle. But this provides no reason to regard the class of rational or reasonable experiences of a given emotion as privileged for the purposes of conceptual inquiry. To have brought one's emotions under rational control means that the range of one's emotional experiences has been modified through development of one's rational capacities: one no longer responds with, say fear, to certain sensory stimuli that before the development provoked fear, and conversely. But far from instructing us to discount the elephant's or the toddler's emotions in our conceptual inquiries, this bids us to examine emotional experiences had in response to sensory stimuli unmediated by rational thought as well as experiences the occurrence of which we explain by reference to rational thought.

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Ethics January 198J Similar points then apply to characterizing shame. To fo:cus _pri~arily on cases the subjects of which one would not criticize for bemg •r~au~nal or unreasonable is to risk introducing distortion into the characte~•za~~h Indeed, one might be well advised to examine closely those ca~es 10 w ~re such criticism is forthcoming on the grounds that they may d1splay ~ prominently than others certain characteristic features of the em~uonf Thus one might be well advised to examine closely the shame ~yplcal ~ homo hierarchicus, even though one thought that rigid, hierarchtcal sooal structures lacked rational foundations (i.e., even though one thought that the emotion indicated an irrational attachment to social ~lass), on the grounds that in such shame one sees more dearly than m sh_am~ typical of persons living in an egalitarian society those parts _of the subject s self-conception in virtue of which he is liable to the emouon. M~reover, though the resultant characterization rendered shame an emouon that, from the perspective of an egalitarian or meritocratic ethic, one. ne~er had good reason to feel, this would not in itself show the charactenzauon to be faulty: no more than that gentlefolk like the Amish, because of certain theistic beliefs, regard resentment as an emotion one never has good reason to feel shows that they harbor misconceptions about resentment. Since we are capable of bringing our emotions under rational control, we may regard our feeling a specific emotion as incompatible with our moral principles and so try to make ourselves no longer liable to it. Alternatively, we may regard this emotion as essential to our humanity and so revise our principles. The conftict makes evident the importance of having a correct understanding of such emotions; at the same time we should see that altering the understanding one has in order simply to avoid such conftict or the criticism of irrationality would be misguided. Turning then to lessons that come out of our discussion of the problematic cases, I shall draw two. The first is that a satisfactory characterization must include in a central role one's concern for the opinions of others. This is really a lesson in recall. From Aristotle onward, discussions of shame have focused attention on the subject's concern for the opinions o~ers have ~f him: 16 Aqu~~as, Descartes, and Spinoza each incorporated this concer~ mto h•_s defimuon of shame.n And latter-day writers, Darwin and Sartre m parucular, took the experience of shame before another as ke~ to an understanding of the emotion. Is Thus, we should not be surpnsed to find that the Rawlsian characterization founders, since it regards sll:ch concern as not internally related to shame. Its £allure, ~owever,_ is not due to neglect. The characterization, through emphasts on the dependency of one's self-esteem on the esteem of others, can accord the concern an important role in an overall un-

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16. For Aristotle's view see RAdoric, bk. 2, chap. 6. I 7. For Aquinas's definition see s - TMolo..VU 1a2ae 41 4 ., De · J tiN Soul 2 . .., , . ror scartes•s sec ...... • "" IWIIIft.f., • pt. • article~- For Spinoza's see TM Ethics, pt. S, definition Sl.

H~I8E.~~~ ~;! ~r~~~~~ ~ is found in Beiftg and Notlampus, trans. ·

pn.wu Library, Inc., 1956), pp. 252-502.

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derstanding of shame. 19 But this makes the concern part of a mechanism that induces shame rather than part of our conception of shame. A mechanism exists which, when put into operation, transforms high selfesteem into low; part of that mechanism is the concern one has for the opinion of others; and one way in which the mechanism gets going is when others on whose good opinion one's self-esteem depends deprecate one and one apprehends this. In this way, the characterization gives one's concern for the opinion of others an important role. But it is only a supporting role and not the central one I think it deserves. And this is one reason for its failure. Each of the first three problematic cases bears out this last point. It is evident in the second and third cases, where the subjects feel shame but do not lose self-esteem. In the third case shame is felt directly in response to another's scorn or reproach. Thus, an expressed low opinion of the subject induces in him shame without affecting his self-esteem. In other words, the mechanism is not engaged, though the subject's concern for the opinion of another is clearly operative. In the second, Mile Peterat, even apart from the context in which she feels shame, jeering classmates, feels the emotion because of something about herself that is laughable. It invites deprecatory responses. Thus, she may feel ashamed because of it, even though it is not a deficiency. It is not a ground for reassessing her excellence, though, of course, the whole experience could cause her to think less of herself. Here, too, there is shame reflecting a concern for the opinion of others without the mechanism's being engaged. We can also mine the first case to bring out the point that the Rawlsian characterization has misconstrued the role one's concern for the opinion of others has in shame. Consider again our young tennis phenom. In the circumstances described, he loses self-esteem, is disappointed with himself, but does not feel shame. On the other hand, as we noted, if the circumstances had been different, if he had had, say, to face his coach after the defeat, then his feeling shame would have well been imaginable. There would then have been someone at courtside whose look he could not meet. He would have averted his eyes, lowered his head, gulped to fight back tears. That the coach's presence could spell the difference between disappointment and shame cannot be explained by reference to the player's losing self-esteem, for the loss occurs in either case. The mechanism would be in operation whether or not the subject felt shame, so it would not account for the role his concern for the coach's opinion would have had in his experiencing shame. We can thus conclude from these three cases that one's concern for the opinion of others has a role in shame apart from the way in which their opinion can support or bring down one's self-esteem. 19. Sec:, c:.g., Rawls's discussion of the: companion effect to the: Aristotelian principle, pp. 440-41.

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. f worth The Rawlsian charThe second lesson ts about our sense o ' . f worth according acterization yields an understanding of a person s sense ~ . that he has · th person's conviCtiOn to which it has two sources. 0 nelS e h h . his own given meaning to his life. The other is the con~dence d~n a~i~naims and excellence as a person. The first comes fro~ hts ~~g::/ lthat he is well ideals in life as worthy. The second comes rom IS . 1e acterization, suited to pursue them. Thus, according to the Rawls1an ~ha~ or. ideals shame, since it is felt either upon a jud~ent t~at ~ne s alm~at makes are shoddy or upon a judgment that one 1s defic1ent m a way t . nse one ill suited to pursue them, is aptly described as a shock to one shs~ ce . . .h . ' sense of wort sm a d tmmts ment m one s fid Of worth. One experiences . . . ' 1"£ 's con ence either one's sense of havmg gtven meamng to ones lle or one in one's excellence has been struck down. . t" n There is difficulty in this, however, because, while the descn~ 1~ of shame as a shock to one's sense of worth is apt, the account 0 ~he various ways in which the sense gets shocked is, at best, too meager. ~ reason for this is that the characterization omits important sources 0 our sense of worth. The point is directly evident in our last two c~ses. The child of four who feels shame over some misdemeanor has not g 1ven meaning to his life and does not have confidence in his excellence as a person. Hence, he has a sense of worth the source of which th~ characterization does not acknowledge. Similarly, we recognize in an anst~t who feels shame over behaving like a plebian or in an American lndlan who feels shame over betraying his Indian identity a sense of wo~th the source of which is neither a conviction about the worthiness of hts ends nor a belief about his suitability to pursue them. A sense of worth that comes from knowledge that one is a member of the upper cla_ss ~r a noble people also lies beyond the sight of the Rawlsian charactenzau~n. To put the point generally, the Rawlsian characterization fails to recogmze aspects of our identity that contribute to our sense of worth independently of the aims and ideals around which we organize our lives. We should note here the structural, as well as the substantive, difference between the sense of worth the Rawlsian characterization recognizes and the one it excludes. We can get at this structural difference by looking at the theory of worth that underlies the characterization. That theory is based on a conception of us as the authors of our actions. We are authors in the sense discussed in Part I, that is, in virtue of having a constellation of aims and ideals according to which we live our lives. We have worth on this theory in accordance with the value of our lives, such as they are and such as they promise to be. An author has worth in view of his work, completed or in progress, and our lives, so to speak, are our work. This analogy can be pressed. Our work has value to the degree that it is the kind of thing that when well made has value and is itself well made: So we have wo~ to the degree that we produce such things or have dire~ed our energtes toward producing them and possess the talents and skills that augur successful production. Our lives, conceived

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as our work, thus have value to the degree that the ends that give them order and direction define a kind of life that has value and those ends have been realized. And we have worth as authors of our lives to the degree that we live lives of value or have directed our energies toward living such lives and possess the attributes that promise success. In capsule form, what might be called the auteur theory of worth is that what a person does with his life, how well he directs it, determines his worth. On this theory, then, we attribute d~fferent degrees of worth to someone depending on how valuable we deem the kind of life he lives and how successful we think he has been in living it or how suitable we think he is for it. In other words, we attribute to him more or less worth according to how well or badly he conducts his life. Contrast this with attributions of worth made because of one's class or culture. Judging from these attributions, we might say that a person's worth is determined by his status in the context of some social hierarchy. The salient feature here is that one's status, and so one's worth, is fixed independently of one's conduct. To be sure, one can change classes through marriage or cultures through immigration, but short of this the general conduct of one's life, that is, however well or badly one conducts it, does not increase or decrease the worth that is attributed to one because of one's status. And pretty much the same holds of worth that is attributed to human beings because of their species or to persons because of the kind of beings they are conceived to be: rational ones, say, spiritual ones, or autonomous ones. That is, worth attributed to one because of one's essential nature is, like worth attributed to one because of one's status, fixed independently of how one conducts one's life. Consequently, the dynamics of the sense of worth that comes from knowing the worth that goes with one's status or essential nature, that is, the understanding we give to augmentations and diminishments in that sense, are altogether different from those of the sense of worth the auteur theory recognizes. Statically, both kinds of sense correspond to the degree of worth one attributes to oneself. But an augmentation in one's sense of worth, as is experienced in pride, or a diminishment in it, as is experienced in shame, is not, if this sense originates in a recognition of one's status or essential nature, to be understood in terms of an attribution to oneself of greater or lesser worth than one attributed to oneself before the experience. 20 A college boy who wears his fraternity pin with pride does not regard himself as having greater worth for having worn it, and a man who feels ashamed of having eaten like a pig does not regard himself as having Jess worth than is attributed to human beings as such. This contrasts with the way the auteur theory would have us understand augmentations and diminishments in one's sense of worth. In particular, it would have us understand a diminishment in one's sense 20. Of course thrre arr rxcrptions to this, r.g., thr whitr supremrcist who discovers he has a black ancestor.

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242 Ethics January 1983 of worth as is experienced in shame, as amounting to loss of self-estee: and so c~rresponding to an assessment of oneself as having les~ worte·~ On the auteur theory, a sense of w~rth reflects concern ":1th on of real worth, and one takes one's conduct and appearance as evtdence or more strongly as the grounds for attributing to oneself that worth. · ' tatus or ' ' By contrast, a sense of worth that comes from knowmg one s, s essential nature reflects concern with the congruency between one s conduct or appearance and one's real worth. Here, we could say, one's c~nc~rn is with the relation between appearance and reality. If one's sta~us lS htg~ relative to that of others or one's nature is noble, then behavtor that lS congruent with one's worth and so displays it is occasion for pride, and behavior that is at variance with it and so gives appearance of lesser worth is occasion for shame. This model better accommodates the idea that to have a sensibility to shame means that one is prepared to restrain oneself when one verges on the shameful and to cover up the shameful when it comes into the open. We speak in this regard of having shame as opposed to having no shame, and we connect this with modesty, particularly sexual mode~ty • which involves a sensibility to shame in matters of decorum. Havmg shame, that is, having a sensibility to shame, can be understood here as self-control that works to restrain one from giving the appearance of lesser wonh and self-respect that works to cover up shameful things that, having come to light, give one such appearance. 21 This suggests that we should conceive shame, not as a reaction to a loss, but as a reaction to a threat, specifically, the threat of demeaning treatment one would invite in giving the appearance of someone of lesser w~rth. Its analogues then are, not grief and sorrow, but fear and shyneSS-22 uke fear, shame serves to protect one against and save one from unwanted exposure. Both are in this way self-protective emotions. Fear is selfprotec~ve in that it moves one to protect oneself against the danger one senses ts present or approaching. From fear one draws back, shields one~lf, or ~ees. Of course, it may also render one immobile, thereby putung one m greater danger, so the point does not hold without qual21. On these points, see Carl D. Schneider, Shtzme, &c;osure and Privacy (Boston: Beacon Press, 1977), pp. 24-27. . 22. W~ether to p~ttern shame after grief and sorrow or after fear and shyness is an •ssue .a. revteW of the literature reveals. One often finds in the writings of those offering usc · · defimuons of shame . . of one or the oth er o£ th ese emouons as analogues, someumes e;:an as a senmc emo~n of which shame is defined as a specific type. For definitions of ty.; 0~ or sorrow see Hobbes (Ltviathan chap. 6) and Descanes (pt. 3, ) (t oug t ~ ?assage is equivocal since he also says there that shame is a species r od oPla~m • Eulll aty). For defimuon of shame as a type of"aear see Aqumas; · · ·IS also suggestcU ._ ... m · tt 1 oods ~ros~~~In connection with this issue see Havelock Ellis's "The Evolution or M esty, m ,.....,. mt1u1 p_.holo -r 0 of 5ex, 2 vols. 3d ed. (New York· Random House. 1942 _~2.v~~).1 • P· 36• n. 1· Ellis himself appean to hold that shame is a ki~d of fear (see PP·

:n:; ;;,;

s:r

36

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ification. 211 Still, the general idea is dear. Shame, too, is self-protective in that it moves one to protect one's worth. 24 Here the general idea is not so dear, though a trope may be useful. Shame inhibits one from doing things that would tarnish one's worth, and it moves one to cover up that which through continued exposure would tarnish one's worth. Less figuratively, we might say that the doing or exposure of something that makes one appear to have less worth than one has leaves one open to treatment appropriate only to persons or things that lack the worth one has, and shame in inhibiting one from doing such things and in moving one to cover them up thus protects one from appearing to be an unworthy creature and so from the degrading treatment such appearance would invite. This idea that shame is a self-protective emotion brings together and explains two important features: first, that a liability to shame regulates conduct in that it inhibits one from doing certain things and, second, that experiences of shame are expressed by acts of concealment. The second is crucial. Covering one's face, covering up what one thinks is shameful, and hiding from others are, along with blushing, the most characteristic expressions of shame. Students of shame commonly note them. A quote from Darwin is representative, "Under a keen sense of shame there is a strong desire for concealment."25 Moreover, etymology reinforces the point. According to many etymologists, a pre-Teutonic word meaning 'to cover' is the root of our word shame. 26 Now the Rawlsian characterization, since it conceives shame as a reaction to a loss, can explain, on the model of fear of loss, how one's liability to shame regulates one's conduct. Where it has trouble is in explaining shame's moving one to cover up and hide. For it does not have in itself the materials needed to construct such an explanation. Because it conceives shame as a reaction to the loss of something one prizes, it yields an account of the emotion as at first giving way to low spirits and dejection and eventually moving one to attempt to recover what one lost, that is, to regain through self-improvement one's good opinion of oneself and so one's self-esteem. 27 Acts of concealment, however, are nowhere implicated in this account. Hence, if one adheres to the characterization, one must make use of supplementary materials to explain them. One must go outside the characterization by, say, citing certain fears associated with shame: fear of ridicule or rejection by those upon 23. I owe this point to John T. MacCurdy, "The Biological Significance of Blushing and Shame," Brituhjour'IIIJl of Psychology 21 {1930): 174-82. __ 24. The idea is one of the central themes of Max Scheler's essay "Uber Scham und Schamgefiihl," in Gesammelte Werke, ed. Maria Scheler and M.S. Frings, 11 vols. {Berne: Franke Verlag, 1954), vol. 10, pp. 65-154. 25. Darwin, p. 320. 26. See Oxford Engluh Dictio'IIIJry, s.v. "shame"; also Ernest Klein, A Comprehensive Etymological Dictio'IIIJry of the Engluh lAnguage {Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1967). 27. See Rawls, p. 484; Lynd, pp. 50-51; and Richards, p. 256.

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244 Ethics January 1983 whose good opinion of one one's self-esteem depends.za But s~h an explanation would not be adequate, for it fails to explain acts of_conce f ~ent . h d · ~t, th se as expresstons o .ears as expressions of s arne. 1nstea , 1t ta :es e associated with shame. And the same objection would hold for any explanation one constructed from materials found outside the cha~cter­ ization. The characterization, in other words, is unable to explam •. as expressions of shame, these acts. And this should tell us that somethmg has gone wrong. be The adherent to the Rawlsian characterization thus appears to. in an untenable position. We would dismiss any suggestion that ~ovenng up and hiding were not really among shame's natural expresston~. ~e­ Rection on shame, particularly shame concerning sexual tmprop~et~es, alone suffices to rule this out. And we should reject any charactenzauon of an emotion that misrepresents its natural expressions. Faced with th~se objections, the adherent might retreat to a weaker thesis by proposmg that the characterization gives an adequate account of some, but not all, experiences of shame. But this thesis is no more defensible than the original. For our adherent, as we saw from the first problematic ~~ of Pan 11, has the burden of showing how the emotion the charactenzauon describes is distinguishable from disappointment with oneself. Since he admits on this weaker thesis that some experiences of shame elude the characterization, he has, in other words, the burden of showing that the experiences of emotion the characterization captures are classifiable with these as shame. What reason could he give to show this? That they h~ve the same feeling-tone is itself questionable, insistence on the point bem~ question begging. That they involve a shock to one's sense of worth IS insufficient. For the characterization identifies this shock with one's suffering loss of self-esteem, and this by itself does not qualify an c:xperience as one of shame. The trouble with this proposal, I think, is that it would, in effect, divide shame into disparate kinds, one kind having fear as its analogue, the other grief. That is, we should suspect of any conception of shame the proposal spawned that it covered a mismatched set of experiences. . . We can trace the characterization's problems back to the understanding 1t gtves to the sense of worth that makes one liable to shame and ultimately to the auteur theol)' of worth, which grounds that understanding. On that. th~ory one attnbutes ~oneself worth according to how one conductS ones hfe, and so perceptions of that conduct determine one's sense of worth. Shame then, since it is felt upon discovery of shortcomings in oneself that falsify the ~onh one thought one had, includes a sense that one lacks worth..And thiS proves problematic because it leaves unexplained how sham~ mou~ates acts of concealment. By contrast, when we conceive shame as mcludmg a sense that one has worth, we can readily explain . 28. Sec Pie~ and Sin&u. P· 16; and Rawla, p. 445. White, however, expresses mcnrations agamst connectmg shame to such fean (pp. t2S-27).

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its motivating such acts: one covers up because one senses that the worth one has is threatened. This speaks in favor of the understanding of the sense of worth the idea that shame is a self-protective emotion entails, which understanding is grounded on a conception of worth that opposes the one the auteur theory yields. Consequently, we should suspect that the conception of worth the auteur theory yields is the wrong one for explaining the sense of wonh that makes one liable to shame, and, because the Rawlsian characterization presupposes that conception, we should give up the view of the emotion it represents.

DAVID SACHS

How to Distinguish Self-Respect from Self-Esteem

If you tell someone that he should respect a certain person you may or may not be telling him that he should esteem that person. If you

tell someone that he should respect everybody you surely will not be telling him that he should esteem everybody. These facts suffice to show what, in any case, ought to be obvious: that respecting persons and esteeming them are not the same. Perhaps the principal or even the sole reason for supposing they are the same is that frequentl! "respecting someone" has the sense of "esteeming someone." Thus, if you say you respect so-and-so greatly, you are saying you hold him in high esteem, that you regard him as indeed praiseworthy; that you are saying anything else is indeed doubtful. Parallel remarks would often apply were you to say you have little respect for so-and-so; often, that is, you would be saying you hold him in low esteem or regard him unfavorably. Moreover your saying this would be compatible with your adding that, of course, you respect him as you respect-or en· deavor to respect-persons generally, including many whom you bold in much higher esteem. The situation is similar with self-respect and self-esteem. That is, although at times "self-~spect" and "self-esteem" are used interchangeably, self-respect and self-esteem are not identical. Thus if you complain that someone is lacking in self-respect you may not be deploring any lack of self-esteem on his part. It is not unheard-of for persons to esteem themselves highly and for others who are fully aware of that fact to complain of them that they are notably deficient © xg81 by Princeton University Press Philosophy & Public AffaiTs 10, no. 4 0048·39IS/8I/040J46-IS$oo.75/l

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How to Distinguish Self-Respect from Self-Esteem

in self-respect. Respect and esteem, then, are different, whether it is a matter of others or of oneself. But how do they differ? There also can be little doubt that they are importantly related to each other. What are some of the main relations between them? In the following I try to answer these questions chiefly as regards self-respect and selfesteem; however, I shall incidentally make some observations about differences and connections between respecting others and esteeming them. I

Often it is thought of individuals that they have too much self-esteem, and there is no difficulty in understanding the thought. But it is not often thought-indeed it seems a hard saying-that a person has too much self-respect. 1 That a person esteems himself overmuch is easy to grasp regardless of whether he esteems himself too highly in general or in some particular connection or connections. But that an individual respects himself too highly in general or in some specific way is a puzzling notion. There is, it should be noted, nothing problematic about the notions of someone's having either too little selfesteem or too little self-respect. The perplexing thought, again, is that of an excess of self-respect. Yet counsels of self-preservation and self-advancement, advice relating to the security and flourishing of those dependent upon one, recommendations as to what would enable a cause one supportsadvice on these and other matters may include, in certain situations, one's being urged to sacrifice a measure of one's self-respect. Through others' counsel, one's own deliberation, or in other ways, one may come to think that certain situations warrant the sacrifice or surrender of some of one's self-respect. Just conceivably one might proceed from that reflection to another: perhaps one can have too much self1. To say of a man, not that he has too much self-respect, but instead that he has too much self-respect to do or submit to such-and-such is not to attribute to him an excess of self-respect. To criticize a man for having too much selfrespect to do or submit to such-and-such is to complain of his loftiness or stuffiness or of some kindred pretension; such uses of "too much self-respect" are sarcasms.

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respect for one's own good-or the good of one's family or the promotion of a cause, and so on. And from such thoughts it may be no large step to supposing there can be such a thing as too much self-respect. But to what would that supposition amount here? It would amount to supposing that there are .circumstances when one should not b.e averse to other persons disregarding, without good reason, ones wishes, cases when one ought not be inclined to take exception to the flouting of one's rights, situations when one should not resent or _find shameful being used or degraded, or manipulated or explo1ted. Clearly, there is a confusion involved in this sequence of thoug~t. Judging a measure of self-respect excessive and dispensable, that 15 • an encumbrance, is confused with judging it something that may more or less painfully have to be sacrificed. . Certainly it is plausible that a variety of situations can occur m which a person may reluctantly have to sacrifice a measure of his selfrespect. (To be sure, Kant, the moralist of the pride of self-respect, speaks with conviction against one's ever doing so.) But if one concedes that situations occur when it is at least arguable that a person should do so, there is no argument or consideration thereby offered to the effect that he ought not be averse to it, resent it, find it shameful. Or to the effect that he ought not to hope and strive for social and personal circumstances in which sacrifices of his self-respect will neither be nor appear necessary. In light of the foregoing, one can see that it is not just that the notion of an excess of self-esteem is easily comprehended, while that of an excess of self-respect is perplexing. What may have appeared a conceivable and even faintly plausible way of understanding the notion of too much self-respect turns out to be nothing of the kind. Instead, what emerges is the notion of possibly having to make a more or less painful sacrifice of some of one's self-respect-a sacrifice of part of what is, in its entirety, valuable. Clearly, this is not a conception of anything excessive. In contrast, consider an excess of selfesteem. Whereas, again, there may well be no such thing as unwarranted self-respect, there is, of course, such a thing as unwarranted self-este~m. If a person is disabused of an unduly high estimate he has of h1mself, he gets rld, perhaps at some cost in dismay or chagrin, of a misconception of himself; and this is likely desirable. But pain-

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fully surrendering some of one's self-respect is not being disabused of any misconception or falsehood. One is subjecting oneself, with reluctance and resentment, to an abuse or abuses. I have not, it should be noted, claimed that the notion of an excess of self-respect is unintelligible. I have repeatedly claimed it is problematic. In effect I have contended that, within the framework of the notions of self-respect and self-esteem which we understand and apply to ourselves and others, what may just seem a plausible way of making sense of the idea of an excess of self-respect does not bear scrutiny. So far as I am able to tell, there is no other even faintly plausible way of making sense of the notion within that framework. Stepping outside of that framework-outside of what proves to be the structure of our pre-analytic comprehension of, and concern for, selfrespect and self-esteem-may, however, yield a sense for the notion of too much self-respect. 2 Thus from a cynical standpoint, or possibly from one or another utilitarian perspective, it could be argued that some such notion is intelligible. To sketch an argument to that effect would not, however, serve any of my purposes here. Here I want merely to observe that, if such a conclusion follows from any doctrine whatever, it appears that this would show that the doctrine involves a deformation of our understanding of and concern for self-respect.

II I tum now to a systematic difference-the range of possible divergences-between self-respect and self-esteem. If one takes pride in something, one is, to some extent or other, proud of it; moreover, one will probably feel proud of it in the sense of experiencing feelings of pride and related feelings in connection with it. Conversely, to be proud of something is to take some pride in it, and so, again, one is likely to experience feelings of pride and related feelings in connection with it. These claims seem unquestionable, whether or not what one takes pride in or is proud of is something upon which one prides oneself. Imagine, now, a man who is not proud of anything. There is 2. In speaking of our pre-analytic concern for self-respect I emphatically do not mean concern for merely conventional respectability.

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. he takes pn"de. He d oes not perceive himnothing whatever in which self as a person of any accomplishments or advantages-there ;re none at any rate of which be is proud. He is not to be thought 0 . as ' ' · occasions experiencing feelings of pride; there are, as he sees It, no "d for him to do so; not even perhaps, occasions to. take_ or feel P~ 0~ vicariously. Although the man takes no pride in-Is neither prou nor feels pride about-anything whatever, it could conceivably be f~lse · "Are you With-d to claim of him that he bas no pride. To the question, out pride?" it is possible that be could truly answer no; that he coul protest as undeserved the reproach, "Have you no pride?" Rightly protest it on the ground that be has his pride, and sincerely add that th~t is nothing of which to be proud, let alone a matter of being proud. Tbts is to claim that it could be categorically true of a person both_ that. he takes no pride in anything whatever, and yet that he has his pr?de. This is a real, however remote or lamentable, possibility because m _a well-understood sense of "pride," what is required for one to have ~IS pride, not to lack it, is to possess one's self-respect. To do so, agam. carries no implication about being proud. It is compatible with very little self-esteem, compatible indeed with self-disesteem on all counts but one-one which can be psychologically, and of course morally. of great importance: the possession of self-respect. To continue with the man I am imagining: he disesteems himself generally with the exception-the absence-of one ground for disesteem, that is, that he has allowed or even has bad to allow inroads upon his self-respect. But he does not regard retaining one's self-respect as worthy of esteem; he neither esteems himself nor expects others to esteem or admire him for it. Conceivably, he may view as grounds for self-esteem cases of either of the following kinds: first, keeping one's self-respect in the face of sore urgency or severe temptation to sacrifice a measure of it; second, after having unhappily surrendered it to some extent, making earnest efforts to restore it. But he knows that neither of these has been the case with him. And he believes that neither of them has been the case with great numbers of persons. The man I am imagining thinks of himself as a normally rational and ordinarily effective, self-respecting agent; one, moreover, who has not been so beset by temptation or driven by exigency that be has sacrificed, or even seriously considered sacrificing, his self-respect to any

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important extent. In this or some equivalent way he characterizes himself, and he extends the same characterization to much of mankind. But again, by way of accomplishments and natural and social advantages, he judges himself to be distinctly and generally inferior or, at best, mediocre. There may be no one who, for all or even most of his adult life, satisfies the description of my imaginary man. But I believe that approximations to the type exist. At the least it is likely that some actual persons, in more or less protracted phases of their lives, have seen themselves quite in the way I have pictured him as seeing himself. Although the strong contention-that there are people very similar to the man I have imagined-is, I think, true, a weaker contention-that he represents a psychologically possible type-will suffice. It will suffice, that is, for one extreme of the possible divergences between selfesteem and self-respect: self-esteem wholly or almost wholly missing, together with self-respect, to put it as it is sometimes put, intact. I shall try now to sketch the other extreme of possible divergence between self-esteem and self-respect. Toward the outset I noted that some persons are thought of as esteeming themselves highly but also as notably lacking in self-respect. Why not imagine, among possible types of persons, a man whose self-esteem knows no limits apart from those set by sanity-a man, moreover, to whom the description "wholly lacking in self-respect" would be applicable? There are, however, difficulties with any such conception. First, the idea of sane, unqualified self-esteem is troublesomely vague. a Next, to imagine a total absence of self-respect is more difficult than may be thought. What limits does sanity impose upon self-esteem? Certainly, being sane allows for extravagant conceit and inordinate vanity. In allowing for extravagant conceit, being sane allows for somewhat illusory beliefs about the magnitude of one's advantages or accomplishments, about the magnitude, for example, of one's intelligence, social standing, or role in an enterprise. And in allowing for inordinate vanity, 3· As I trust will be clear, I am leaving aside lunatic self-esteem, for example, delusions of grandeur. Throughout I take no account of deranged or mentally defective humans. To them too, of course, considerations of respect and esteem and also and importantly, self-respect and self-esteem, regularly pertam.

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being sane also allows for absurd exaggerations of the importan~e. of one's advantages and accomplishments, allows, indeed, for pnzmg them to an irrational degree. The extent to which sanity co~nte· nances either the illusory beliefs connected with conceit or the lrra· tional prizing that typifies vanity is, evidently, very uncertain .. Some instances of self-esteem that involve illusion or irrationality or mcon· sistency or more than one of these will be compatible with sanity • and other instances not, while yet other instances may be undecidable. Thus, as I said, the matter is troublesomely vague. I turn now to the second difficulty, that of imagining a person who wholly lacks self-respect. In regard to the total absence of self-respect, two somewhat con· nected thoughts may present themselves. First, a point of fact: when persons are said to lack self-respect utterly, those who say it of tb~m, if there is any truth at all in what they say, are likely to be making wild overstatements, indeed, resorting to abusive hyperbole. Second, however, it may be thought that there could be a person of whom what they say would literally, without any exaggeration, be true. But could there be; could anyone wholly lack self-respect? To imagine someone could, I am taking it, is to imagine a socialized, rational human, not an imbecile, who is without any self-respect whatever. Were there to be such a person, he would not find it reason for re· sentment that persons ignore, capriciously or even blankly ignore, what they know to be his wishes. He would not be inclined to object to any impositions; not, that is, because they were impositions. Nor would he be averse to submitting to anything on the ground that it was degrading. Also be would not resent or be indignant about the flouting of any rights he possessed; not, that is, for the reason that rights of his were being flouted. To be sure, he could dislike, be an· gered by, or resist treatment of any of those kinds, but not in that they were of those kinds. (Nor, it should be added, would he find it shame· ful or con~mptible that he was quite prone to self-deception or weak· ness of will; of course he could regret being quite prone to either of them.) What, it may be asked with some bafflement, is so difficult about imagining such a person? Does not history show that multitudes of people have existed in circumstances which have reduced them to-

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or never permitted them to rise from-the condition of total absence of self-respect? That is, does not history and many a contemporary chronicle show that there have been multitudes of socialized, rational humans to whom the characterizations in the foregoing paragraph categorically apply? What history suggests about this matter can, I believe, be helpfully thought about as follows. First, there very likely have been societies whose codes of conduct did not include the notion of a right.~ If it is claimed that, even so, members of those societies had "natural" rights, presumably they could not avail themselves of appeals to them, resent or be indignant about violations of them, and so on. A fundamental social provision for-and one of the bases of our conception of-self-respect would be missing. Members of those societies could be said to have a relatively impoverished conception of self-respect. They would not suffer losses of self-respect due to their being unable to resist violations of their rights; for of these, again, they would have little or no notion. Second, institutions of slavery and caste, and multifarious social and legal practices that make for inferior degrees of citizenship or communal membership also involve the absence of certain provisions for self-respect. But usually, if indeed not always, slaves, the lowest castes, and lesser-status citizens are conceived of and conceive of themselves as possessing some rights, however few and pitiable they may be. If such unfortunate persons did not resent violations of those rights, and if they did not regard voluntary submission to abuses of them as more or less shameful, they would thereby show a lack of selfrespect. But here it may again be urged that the life-circumstances of many such persons have been so marked by deprivation that they have been unable to attain, let alone preserve, any self-respect. And, it may be said, when one notes among the historical inhumanities of men to men the perhaps distinctive contributions made, for example, in the four centuries of the Inquisition or in our century, how can it be doubted that there are and have been persons wholly without selfrespect? The mistake involved in this line of thought is that it neglects to consider the possibility that, no matter how deprived or degraded a 4· See H.L.A. Hart, "Are There Any Natural Rights?" Philosophical Review 64, no. 3 (April 1955): 175-91, esp. 176-77·

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person may be, he yet may have or be imagined as having equa!~ peers-in deprivation and degradation. There is always at least possibility, and often the actuality, of the prese~ce of o~hers who: wretchedness any particular wretched person will perceive as co parable to his own. If, then, he were utterly to lack self-r~spe~t, h: would relate to any of his real or possible equals in degradation m ~h ways mentioned earlier: he would not resent their arbitrarily i~onn~ his wishes; he would not regard any impositions of theirs as Impositions; he would not find anything whatever they might ask or compel of him degrading. There would be-there could be-no one to whom he would respond in any of these ways if he literally wholly lacke~ ~elf­ respect. It is indeed difficult, I submit, to imagine a rational, sociahzed human of whom all this would be true. In trying to set forth the extremes of possible divergence between self-respect and self-esteem the following position has been reached. On the one hand, persons who are without, or virtually without, selfesteem but whose self-respect is intact are clearly conceivable. On the other hand, persons who wholly lack self-respect are bard to imagine, if not in fact unimaginable. It is plausible, therefore, to assume that everyone has some measure, however pathetically little it may be, of self-respect. The question now is, How much self-esteem-vaguely limited by sanity-is compatible with a minimum of self-respect? In answering this qestion one ought not focus solely on persons whose deficiency in self-respect is due, at least in part, to social conditions of coercive and extreme degradation. One ought also think of relatively free persons who are yet slavishly, and more or less generally, dependent upon others. To suppose a minimum of self-respect is to suppose some sensitivity, however slight, to considerations of self-respect-few and restricted as they will be. But that, in tum, is to suppose the possibility of a perceived occasion or occasions of loss of self-respect. And, should such occasions occur. they will tend to affect self-esteem adversely. Losses of sel.f-respect, then, may somewhat qualify a person·s selfesteem even If he has only a minimum of self-respect, a minimum of concern for a ~inil~1um of considerations of self-respect. But apart from t~at qualificat1~ and, again, within the vague limits imposed by samty, an othelWlse boundless self-esteem seems compatible with

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a minimum of self-respect. This, then, will be the other extreme of possible divergence between self-respect and self-esteem. Obviously, there is much room for divergences between the possible extremes, divergences that are less great. III

Let us return to the man who does not view his having maintained his self-respect as deserving of any esteem. He would be a man who does not pride himself upon having his pride. And again, apart from what he may think of as exceptional cases, he does not accord esteem or admiration to others for their having maintained their self-respect. Characterizing a man in this way, together with the further characterization that he views himself as generally inferior in terms of advantages and attainments, provided one of the possible extremes of divergence between self-respect and self-esteem. In fact, actual persons who maintain their self-respect will generally account themselves deserving of esteem for doing so; moreover it may be presumed that they would regard it as a ground for self-esteem whether or not they supposed it exceptional. It is, after all, not a requirement for something's being a ground or reason for self-esteem, or for esteeming others, that it be unusual or extraordinary. However, my imaginary man thinks it is a requirement, and one or another psychological condition, such as a pervasive feeling of inferiority, may have to be invoked to accommodate his thinking it is one. (Incidentally, it does seem to be a requirement for admiration; and there are, unhappily, persons who live by standards such that they do not esteem themselves in any connection in which they judge themselves less than admirable.) The point to be stressed, however, is that in the case of this imaginary man the possession of self-respect still constitutes a ground or reason for self-esteem; that it fails to serve as one for him does not mean-in his case or in any case w~atever-that the retaining of one's self-respect is not a ground for self-esteem. The possession of one's self-respect, I am taking it, then, is in every case a ground for self-esteem, and, in the usual case, contributes to it; in the usual case, that is, a man who has his self-respect will pride himself upon it. The pride taken in it can, of course, vary 31

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Wl'dely-from

some self-contentment to an attitude of fiercely jealous . . ·f 't · thus independence. ContrariWise, any lessenmg of self-respect, 1 1 lS 'f · · not so perceived will occasion a loss of self-esteem; and even 1 1t IS · (As IS · on1Y to be ex· perceived,' furnish a ground for some loss of 1t. bear ~n pected ' self-deception thrives in the area of matters that . d that IS losses of self-respect.) If a loss of self-respect is recogmze · . ' · 't d m· if a person sees himself as having allowed, perhaps even mv1 e • · · · t ed and cursions upon his self-respect, indeed, sees that he has m1t1a pursued a course that entails some loss of it, then his feelings of self· disesteem will be experienced as shame and, more particularly • selfcontempt. Analogously, a person who enjoys his self-respect, when ~e finds other persons lacking in it, may well not simply bold th~m m disesteem. He is likely to feel some contempt for them and, 1f ap· propriately related to them, to experience some feelings of shame. I have stressed that, in every case, retaining one's self-respect supplies a ground or reason for self-esteem; and that any loss or lack ~f self-respect is a ground for self-disesteem. In doing so I have agam relied on our pre-analytic comprehension of and concern for se~­ respect; first, on the fact that, in general, persons who retain theli self-respect esteem themselves to some extent on that account, taking it that there is no question but that they are right to do so, and that they likewise disesteem themselves for what they view as their lapses or failures of self-respect; second, on the fact that they esteem and disesteem others for the corresponding reasons and in corresponding ways. Earlier, when discussing the problematic notion of excessive self-respect, it appeared that the idea of an excess of self-respect involves a deformation of our common understanding of self-respect. Similarly, it seems that a distortion of that common understanding would be effected by the idea that a lack or loss of self-respect provides no ground for self-disesteem. (The man I imagined earlier would also see it thus; but he would not count his having fully retained his self· respect a ground for self-esteem.) If this is well taken, it points to a further and fundamental difference between self-esteem and self· respect. For neither a lowering of one's self-esteem nor aiiY enhancement of it furnishes any ground or reason whatever for one to come to. pos.sess less ~ more self:respect. Thus if a man no longer takes pnde m somethmg upon which he had once esteemed himself-realiz32

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ing he was not, for example, quite the gymnast or algebraist he once thought he was-his later lower estimate does not in itself constitute a ground for any lessening of self-respect. So far as his lower selfestimate goes, he is warranted in expecting his wishes-barring, as always, reasonable objections-to be honored as much as before,n in expecting his rights to be acknowledged as fully as ever, and in resisting and resenting, as always, any attempts to use or manipulate, exploit, or degrade him. Similarly, in whatever ways a person's selfesteem may be augmented, none of them affords a reason or ground for greater self-respect. For it is not to be forgotten that, although one certainly can have too little self-respect it is surely doubtful that one can have too much; that there can be an excess of it. If that is true, it is true regardless of any lessening or heightening of one's selfesteem.

IV Some additional complexities about self-respect and self-esteem will emerge in what I shall now, by way of conclusion, try to do: to undercut misgivings to the effect that I am not doing justice to the interdependence of self-respect and self-esteem. In this connection it may be worth examining a specious difficulty about self-respect. Consider the following remark: "For example, if a man says 'I could never respect myself again if I did X,' and then he does X, we think he ought to lose his self-respect."o This remark ends on a jarring note; that jarring note may help to point up a complication in our use of "self-respect." It is, of course, possible for a man to do something such that he will thereafter not be able to respect himself; and other persons, on learning what he has done, may correctly

s. To honor a person's wishes, unless there is good cause not to do so, is basic to respecting him, whereas to honor a person is to express esteem and admiration for him or to hold him in honor and accord him adntiration. Hon~ring undertakings 'and debts at least strongly suggests respecting such obligations; indeed, I believe it constitutes part of what it is to respect other persons; in any case, it carries no suggestion of esteem. Honoring one's parents, as Scripture enjoins, seems to involve special concern as regards respecting them. 6. R. S. Downie and E. Telfer, Respect for Persons (London: Allen and UnWin, lgSg), p. 84. 33

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conclude that he will, as a result, have lost his self-respe~t. Howe~e:~ it is also clear that, if a man is no longer able to respect hlmsel~ or fol· lost his self-respect because of something he has done, nothmg lows as to how concerned or relatively unconcerned he will then be or ought to be about matters that bear on his self-respect. Among other possibilities, he may be steadfast in withstanding any fur~her threats to it and staunch in the face of temptations that would mvolve any further lessening of it. So the apparent difficulty is: if he is unabl~ t~ respect himself, if he has irretrievably lost his self-respect, bow lS lt possible for him to be resolute, even zealous, in guarding it? By now it should be obvious that this difficulty is a verbal one; and that, to resolve it, one need only recognize that in various contexts the phrases "self-respect" and "respect oneself" are used to signify self-esteem or esteeming oneself insofar as that is grounded upon self-respect; ~d that, accordingly '1oss of self-respect" sometimes signifies self-disesteem insofar as a ground or grounds for it are losses or failings of self-respect. To be sure, a man may disesteem himself for the re· mainder of his days because of some grievously shameful loss or failure of self-respect. To suppose it could not be true of him both that he had forever lost his self-respect and that he thereafter unyieldingly maintained it would be to mistake for a contradiction a play upon uses of "self-respect." Toward the beginning I observed that "self-respect" and "self· esteem" are at times used interchangeably; to that observation I have here added that sometimes "self-respect" signifies self-esteem insofar as it is predicated upon self-respect; and a parallel observation about ioss of self-respect" and self-disesteem, namely, that "loss of self· respect" sometimes signifies loss of self-esteem insofar as that is predicated upon a loss or failing in self-respect. To turn now to a more substantial question about the interdepend· ence of self-respect and self-esteem, one relating to fairly familiar phenomena: changes of manner and conduct that seem to evince in· creased self-respect subsequent to an enhancement of self-esteem, and changes in attitude and conduct that seem to express diminished self-respect following upon a loss of self-esteem. These phenomena may suggest that the psychology of some persons is such that to some degree their self-respect-their "inner worth," to deploy Kant's phrase

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-varies for them with their self-esteem. For them, having one's pride appears to depend in some measure on how deserving of esteem they take themselves to be in connections other than those that constitute having one's pride. Further, some of the persons who appear to exhibit these phenomena, whose psychology seems to be of this kind, tend to think that what warrants changes in self-esteem is to at least some extent good reason for parallel changes in self-respect. Consistent with this, their respect for other persons may seem to vary somewhat in accord with what they take to be good reason for its varying: that they rightly enough esteem certain persons more than others, and the same persons more at some times than at other times. In sum, within a range of self-respect and similarly as regards respect for others, some individuals seem not only to subordinate respect to esteem, but also to regard that subordination as reasonable. They think it good reason for more or less respecting oneself or another that there is good reason for more or less esteeming oneself or another. The phenomena of the apparent subordination, in some measure, of self-respect to self-esteem, together with the opinion that reasons for self-esteem provide reasons for self-respect, may appear to call into question the claim I made earlier-the claim that neither an increase nor a decrease in self-esteem supplies any ground or reason for one to come to possess more or less self-respect. The suggestion is that there may be a greater interdependence between self-respect and self-esteem than that claim allows. To begin with the phenomena. First, they are far from universal. Second, concerning many instances of them, it is doubtful that selfrespect is actually increased or diminished, appearances notwithstanding. For if a person's enhanced self-esteem were really to carry in its train an increase of self-respect on his part, then for example, he would come to regard being servile as shameful, and as no less shameful in the past, when he did not esteem himself so highly. He Would come to regard others' attempts to get him to be servile as attempts to be resisted and resented, and equally to have been resisted and resented earlier. Otherwise his change in manner and conduct will not signify increased self-respect. Instead, it will signify the decorum and conduct that he thinks suits ·a person as deserving of esteem as the one he has become. It will be a matter, so to say, of status rather

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than self; of the manners and deeds he thinks appropriate to one who has what he now has to be proud of, and not of his coming, in any greater degree, to have his pride. Usually it is this kind of change, a merely specious increase in self-respect, that occurs when it seems that enhanced self-esteem has led to increased self-respect. Finally, in cases of seeming decline in self-respect subsequent upon a loss in self-esteem, the change again is usually one in self-esteem alone. Self-respect is much more likely to be revealed as having been less than it was thought to have been, and not to have actually diminished. Thus the matters canvassed in this last section serve only to clarify and confirm the distinctness of self-respect from self-esteem. I am grateful to Gerald Barnes for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this essay.

RAWLSIAN SELF-RESPECT AND THE BLACK CONSCIOUSNESS MOVEMENT LARRY L. THOMAS

One of the most important effects of what is called the Black Consciousness Movement is thought to be the enhancement of the self-respect of blacks. But surprisingly enough, the analysis of self-respect which we find in John Rawls' book, A Theory of Justice, cannot account for the fact that this is so.• And consider the case of the famed black educator Booker T. Washington. Although it is undoubtedly true that few blacks of his time ever attained his prominence, it is not, however, a foregone conclusion that he was not an uncle tom, and so that he failed to have self-respect. 2 But according to the Rawlsian analysis of self-respect, we could have no reason to suppose that Washington lacked self-respect, given his prominence. As these brief remarks would suggest, I think that Rawls' analysis of selfrespect is defective. And as I hope to show, this is so because Rawls has failed to distinguish between self-respect and self-esteem. Now the distinction between self-respect and self-esteem, while often overlooked by philosophers, is one which psychologists frequently make and which, to some extent, is reflected in ordinary discourse. 3 For instance, the distinguishing characteristic of an uncle tom, or servile persons generally, is said to be a lack of self-respect, and not self-esteem. And we do not say "No self-esteeming person would do such-and-such," but rather "No self-respecting person would do such-and-such." To be noted, also, is that we can esteem persons only for (what we take to be) their accomplishments or abilities. There is no such thing as esteeming a person just because he or she is a person. But we can respect persons just because they are persons. There seems to be a sense in which we can respect all persons equally - the rich, the poor, the talented, and so on. At any rate, I suspect that one reason why the distinction between 303

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self-respect and self-esteem often escapes us is that both concepts have to do with a person's sense of worth: a person with self-respect has a sense of worth, and so has a person with self-esteem. What is the nature ~f the difference between these two senses of worth'? l hope to provtde a satisfactory answer to this question as 1 attempt to show that what we have in A Theory of Justice is not an account of self-respect, but self-esteem instead. Rawls defines self-respect (self-esteem) as having the conviction that one's plan of life is worthwhile (178, 440). And according to Rawls, one comes to have this conviction in two ways: (1) by having a rational plan of life which satisfies the Aristotelian Principle, and (2) by finding one's person and deeds appreciated and confirmed by people whose association one enjoys and who are likewise esteemed (440). A rational plan of life is to be understood in the way that rational planning is traditionally thought of. For Rawls remarks that it is " ... the plan that would be decided upon as the outcome of careful reflection in which the agent reviewed, in the light of all the relevant facts, what it would be like to carry out these plans and thereby ascertained the course of action that would best realize his more fundamental desires" (417). The Aristotelian Principle reads as follows: other things equal, human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized ~apacities (their innate or trained abilities), and this enjoyment mcrease s the more the capacity is realized or the greater its ' complexity (426). And the ~rist~telian Principle has what Rawls refers to as the companion effect whtch 1s that A_s we witness. the exercise of well-trained abilities of others, these dtsplays are ~n]oyed by us and arouse a desire that we should be able to do the ~arne things ourselves. We want to be like those persons who can exercJse the abilities that we find latent in nature (428).

th:~; ~~~e~~:~=~t i!~~:s to bear in mind r~garding Rawls'

(so-called) Rather, (2) holds true of a t (1) and 1979 by D. Reidel Publishing Co., Dordrecht, Holland, and Boston, U.S.A.

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Thus Parfit's argument, described very generally, is that utilitarianism seems more plausible on a Complex View of personal identity than it does on a Simple View, and that what may loosely be called 'Kantian' normative theories seem more plausible on a Simple View than they do on a Complex View. As Parfit himself recognizes, however, this argument, if correct, in no way forecloses the possibility that Kantian theories may still be more plausible than utilitarian theories, even on a Complex View. Nevertheless, his argument raises the interesting question of whether Kantian normative theories are in fact compatible with a Complex View of personal identity. 2 In the course of a general attempt to show "the independence of moral theory", John Rawls comments on Parfit 's paper. 3 Rawls wishes to defend the view that "the conclusions of the philosophy of mind regarding the question of personal identity do not provide grounds for accepting one of the leading moral conceptions rather than another" .4 He begins by identifying the ways in which Kantian theories and utilitarian theories must each make use of some criterion of personal identity. And he concedes that although both types of theory observe certain shared constraints on any adequate criterion of personal identity (which constraints include an agreement that "any criterion of personal identity is based ultimately on empirical regulari· ties and connections" 5 ), nevertheless within those constraints "the utili· tarian conception has less need for a criterion of identity than a Kantian view; or perhaps better, it can get by with a weaker criterion of identity". 6 In con· trast, "a Kantian view is more dependent on personal identities; it relies, so to speak, on a stronger criterion". 7 Kantians "must conceive of identities as stretching over much longer intervals". 8 Rawls then interprets Parfit as maintaining that the "shifting and some· times short-term character of mental connections" 9 gives support to utili· tarianism, with its 'weaker' criterion of identity. In response, Rawls argues that "no degree of connectedness... is natural or fixed", 10 and that the actual continuities that bind the lives of persons depend on what moral con· ceptions have been realized in the societies in which they live. Thus, he main· ~ai~s, if a society that fosters strong intrapersonal identifications is feasible, It 15 no count against Kantianism that such identifications might not be present in a society ordered by a different moral· conception. Since facts about the connections that hold within lives are always "relative to the social· ly &_chieved moral conception",11 then so long as a moral conception can be realtzed in society, there is no way that facts about the connectedness of lives

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can give any reason to accept or reject that conception. Thus in response to the question whether Kantianism is compatible with a Complex View of personal identity, Rawls suggests that it is, provided it is possible to foster strong empirical connections within lives. Although I have reservations about the adequacy of Rawls' argument as a response to Parfit, I wish to focus here on a different feature of that argument. If no one degree of connectedness is natural, and if a 'Kantian society' and a 'utilitarian society' 12 are equally feasible, then Rawls' own argument against utilitarianism in A Theory of Justice 13 appears to be undermined. There he maintains that ''utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons" .14 That it does not is alleged to be important in choosing prin· ciples of justice that will regulate social institutions (and through them, the conduct of individuals), because "the correct regulative principle for any thing depends on the nature of that thing". 15 Hence, he says, if we assume that "the plurality of distinct persons with separate systems of ends is an essential feature of human societies, we should not expect the principles ofsocial choice to be utilitarian". 16 And indeed, he argues, utilitarianism would not be chosen by the parties in the original position, for they know that each of them has some rational plan of life, plus a long-term interest in striving to carry out that plan and in maintaining self-respect. And they are persuaded that utilitarianism does not sufficiently safeguard these interests. But if Rawls' argument in 'The Independence of Moral Theory' is correct, it does not seem that people in the original position can know that they have long-tenn life plans and interests, which they must know if this argument against utilitarianism is to succeed. For, ex hypothesi, people in the original position "do not know the particular circumstances of their own society" . 1 7 And so, if Rawls' argument in response to Parfit is correct, they presumably don't know if their society has fostered strong, Kantian identifications in them, or only weak, utilitarian identifications. 18 They don't know if they are Kantian persons or utilitarian persons; they might be either. Moreover, they do know that they might be either, if that argument is correct. For the argument is based on the purported general principle of social psychology that societies ordered by different moral conceptions will create different kinds of continuities and interests within persons. 19 And since people in the original position know the general laws of human psychology ,20 they presumably know this law too. They know that "no degree of connectedness ... is natural or fixed". They know that they may or may not have long-term

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interests in the fulfillment of a rational life plan. In A Theory of Justice, Rawls argues that utilitarian principles ignore the distinctions among people with long-term interests in the fulfillment of a rational plan of life (Kantian people). But in 'The Independence of Moral Theory', he concedes that there can be other kinds of people. It is not unnatural for a person not to be a Kantian person. One can just as easily lack a long-term interest in the fulfillment of a rational plan of life as have such an interest. So if people in the original position are to choose principles to regulate human conduct in society, and if "the correct regulative principle for any thing depends on the nature of that thing", and if people have no unique nature, how can a rational choice of principles in the original position ever be made? 2 1

II

I see two ways in which Rawls might try to resolve the conflict to which I have called attention (there may be other ways). The first involves resisting the idea that the connectedness oflives is altogether socially relative, and thus striving to retain the argument against utilitarianism while surrendering the argument for moral independence in its present form. The second involves generally conceding the relativity of intrapersonal connections, and considerably modifying claims about what the argument against utilitarianism is supposed to show. The first attempt at resolution might proceed along the following lines. It certainly does appear to be the case that the degree of empirical connectedness within individual lives can vary from society to society, depending at least in part on variations in the socially dominant institutions, traditions, ideologies, mores, and so o~Jt would be hard to deny that the degree to which people are concerned with planning their own individual futures and reflecting on their own personal pasts is culture~ependent. It would be idle to pretend that there was no difference, in this connection, between growing up in Scarsdale and growing up in Shanghai. Nevertheless, it also appears to be the case that in every society we know of, certain kinds of empirical con· nectedness- of memory, intention, character, and the like- hold to at least some greater degree within most individual lives than they do among different li~es: ~is suggests that Certain kinds of distinctive empirical continUitieS Within hves are resistant to the types of social variation with which we are most familiar.

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So long as some facts about the connectedness within lives appear to be independent of these familiar cultural variations, one might try to argue that these facts are relevant to the choice of a moral conception intended to re· gulate the conduct of people in the wide range of societies where the facts hold. Rawls might try in particular to show that these facts support the adoption of his two principles of justice in the original position over the adoption of utilitarianism. To do this, however, he would have to say some· thing about the relation between the facts in question and the supposition that the parties in the original position each know that they have some ratio· nal plan of life. In particular, he would have to show that these facts render that supposition plausible rather than merely question-begging, and it is not clear how easy it would be to show this. For someone might argue that while the distinctive empirical connections within individual lives make it plausible to suppose that persons in a wide range of societies distinguish between the self and others in certain contexts, it remains an open question whether that distinction plays a central role in determining the ends they pursue and the ways in which they allocate their energies. Indeed, one might argue that it is precisely at this point that the social variations alluded to by Rawls in 'The Independence of Moral Theory' become crucial. If that is right, then it might plausibly be maintained that, despite the distinctive empirical connections within lives, the argument in A Theory of Justice, with its assumption of in· dividual life plans, shows nothing more decisive than that Kantian people, preferring to live in a Kantian society, would choose Kantian principles of justice. The second imagined resolution would be appropriate if it proved impos· sible to resist the idea that the connections within lives are substantially variable. Rawls might then retain the argument for moral independence, and concede both that the parties in the original position must be conceived as knowing that they have long-term plans (that they are Kantian people), and that this knowledge is, in view of the variability of intrapersonal connections, highly substantive and prejudicial of the parties' eventual choice of principles. While he would then have to concede that an argument against utilitarianism that takes the form of showing that Kantian persons would choose Kantianism over utilitarianism is philosophically indecisive, he might nonetheless argue that it retains some interest. But the remaining interest of the original position construction would be as a model highlighting certain basic features and presuppositions of an ideal

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of the person and of justice which has great intuitive appeal and coheres with many of our deepest convictions. And the remaining (not inconsiderable) interest of the argument against utilitarianism in the original position would be as an explanation of why a commitment to those basic features and pre· suppositions is incompatible with utilitarianism. The original position construction, on this view, would no longer be claimed to have independent justi· ficatory force. In other words, Rawls could retain that construction, but only by conceding what many of his critics have urged on other grounds: "that the presumptions of the contract method Rawls employs are rather strong, and that the original position therefore offers less independent support to his con· elusions than at first appears". 22 This concession will seem less damaging if one believes that "over the long term this book will achieve its permanent place in the literature of political theory because of the substantive doctrine that it develops so eloquently and persuasively". 23 I do not of course know whether either of the two kinds of resolution I have imagined would be acceptable to Rawls, but I think that there is a genuine problem posed by the conflict between his two arguments, and that !orne resolution is required.

University of Olli[ornia, Berkeley

NOTES 1

Parfit's article is contained in: Philosophy and Personal Relations, ed. by Alan Monte·

~o.re (Roupedg~a~d~egan Paul, London, 1973), pp. 137- 169. For Parfit's precise deli·

~ltttns of continutty and 'connectedness',' see pp. 139-140. . . ~m grateful to Derek Parfit for correcting some of my earlier misinterpretations of hts VIews on these topics. 1 'depen denee of moral theory', Proceedings and Addresses of the Amenc ·an Ph" lnTh~ Jn Association XLVIII (1975), pp. 5-22. Referred to hereafter as !MT. 4 ;;~phtc1al ,p. 5 . 5 IMT, p.19. 6 IMT, p. 19. IMT, p.19. IMT, p. 19

' IMT,p.19: 10 IMT, p. 20. II IMT, p. 20. 12 IMT, p. 20. 13

Harvard University Press, Cambn'dge, 1971. Referred to hereafter as TJ.

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IS 16 17

403

TJ, p. 27. TJ, p. 29. TJ, p. 29. TJ, p. 137.

11 Simply giving the parties this bit of information would of course appear to prejudice their choice of principles of justice. Toward the end of the paper, I discuss the implication of giving them this information even so. 19 In IMT, Rawls imagines a 'utilitarian society' as one in which the people are 'hedonistic and individualistic'. (p. 20) This is a bit odd, since it is Rawls himself who tells us in TJ that, despite what is usually thought, "utilitarianism is not individualistic, at least when arrived at by the more natural course of reflection, in that, by conflating aU systems of desires, it applies to society the principle of choice for one man". (p. 29) If utilitarianism is not individualistic, why would people in a society where utilitarianism was the socially achieved moral conception be individualistic? 20 TJ, p. 137. 21 Rawls himself uses this kind of argument to rebut the claim that it is inappropriate for principles of justice to be at all contingent on the kinds of general facts about society that the parties in the original position are said to know. Denying them this knowledge, he says, "amounts to supposing that the persons in the original position know nothing at aU about themselves or their world. How, then, can they possibly make a decision?" (TJ, p. 159) This is precisely the kind of problem I am calling attention to in connection with personal identity. If intrapersonal connections vary from society to society, and if the parties in the original position don't know what sort of people they are, how can they make any decision about principles of justice? But, on the other hand, how can they be given this knowledge without prejudicing their choice of principles? (The second half of this dilemma supposedly does not arise in the case of the general knowledge of society that the parties are said to have, for that knowledge is alleged to be "true and suitably general". (TJ, p. 160)) 22 T. Nagel, 'Rawls on justice', in: Reading Rawls, ed. by N. Daniels (Basic Books, New York), p. 15. 23 Ibid, p. 15.

193

RAWLS ON THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE SOCIAL Wayne Proudfoot ABSTRACT Three models suggested by Rawls (1971) for conceiving the relation between individual and society are described and critically evaluated. Special attention is given to Rawls's analogies of the problem of mapping the moral sentiments with the problem of mapping linguistic competence and of a social union with participation in a game. Similarities are noted between the theory of justice as fairness and traditional religious conceptions. Both aim to transcend particular interests and both embody perfectionist ideals.

1. Introduction The contract theory as developed by Rawls (1971) in his analysis of the original position, the veil of ignorance, and the constraints which are placed on ethical choice in that position is one which emphasizes the voluntary decision of the individual, uncontaminated by altruism, envy or any interest in the choices or values of others. It is an attempt to treat problems of social choice in terms of the choices of mutually disinterested individuals under certain carefully specified conditions. The aim of the theory is to state questions of social ethics in such a way ttlat they can be resolved into questions of prudential choice for the self-interested individual. It is to substitute for an ethical judgment a judgment of rational prudence (44). t. The characterization of Rawls's theory as one which resolves questions of social ethics into questions of individual choice is not one with which he would disagree. It is the project which is addressed by the tradition of the social JRE 212 f1974), 107-128

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contract as well as by game theory and welfare economics. The social contract tradition employs a myth which portrays the basic institutions of society as the result of a contract between rational, autonomous, self-interested and mutually consenting individuals. The theory of games consists of attempts to discover the best strategy for each of the several players in a game which has been carefully specified according to rules of play and the initial positions of the players. Rawls announces that he is providing a version of the social contract theory, he draws heavily on the literature of game theory and welfare economics, and his choice of the word "fairness" to characterize his theory further suggests the game imagery. The basic model is that of institutions which can be clearly resolved into autonomous, mutually disinterested players for whom the initial positions and the rules of play can be carefully specified. Recently the libetal tradition, emphasizing free and autonomous individuals, has come under critical review from several quarters for not possessing sufficient resources to account for the values of community. If the basic units of society are autonomous individuals with no affective or social ties, how is it possible to account for, or to generate from such a basis, the values of community? The answer given in a number of variations by representatives of the liberal tradition has been that individuals find it in their own self-interest to affirm certain communal values. That is, upon rational reflection on their own interests, they voluntarily choose to enter into communal relations. Consequently, the rise of voluntary associations has been widely hailed by liberal theorists. The simple constituents with which liberal theory begins are autonomous individuals. From these constitutents, the institutions of society are built up by mutual consent in the form of voluntary associations. There is reason to doubt, however, that basic communal ties can be accounted for or justified solely by reference to the voluntary choices of individuals. Similar attempts to reduce language to a voluntaristic foundation, to ostensive definition and the voluntary establishment of social convention, have led investigators back to the social basis for the autonomous individual and for the possibility of rational choice. The clearest statement of Rawls's concern to account for the values of community on the basis of an individualistic conception appears in his discussion of the Kantian interpretation of justice as fairness. The present essay maY be read as an extended comment on this statement. The essential idea is that we want to account for the social values, for the intrinsic good of institutional community and associative activities, by a conception of justice that in its theoretical basis is individualistic. For reasons of clarit~, among others, we do not want to rely on an undefined concept of comm~n 1_tv. or to suppose that society is an organic whole with a life of its ~n distinct from and superior to that of all its members in their relations wtth one another • Th us the contractual conceptton . of the ongtnal . . · · ,·s posttton ~rked out first. It is relatively simple and the problem of rational choice that It _Poses is relatively precise. From this conception, however individualistic it mtght seem • we must even t ua 11v explam · the value of commun1ty. · Ot h erwt·se the theory of justice cannot succeed. (264-2651.

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At another point Rawls states that the individualistic basis and the postulate of mutual disinterest in the original position are "meant to incorporate widely shared and yet weak conditions" (129). He wants to assume as little as possible for the foundation on which to build his theory. In this essay the notion that the individualistic basis with its mutually disinterested individuals is a weak condition will be questioned. Such a condition is weak only from the perspective of the tradition in liberal philosophical ethics which begins with the isolated individual. From the perspective of descriptions of the genesis of affective and communal ties, the autonomous individual is a sophisticated and complex construction which presupposes an entire social and cultural fabric. 2. Three Models of the Relation Between the Individual and Society At least three models for conceiving the relation between individual and society are considered and discussed by Rawls. The first is identified with classical utilitarianism and is rejected, but serves as the primary foil over against which he establishes his own position. The second is the model represented by justice as fairness, and is imaginatively portrayed in the description of the original position and in the constraints on ethical choice which are imposed by that description. The third is the idea of a social union which is developed in the third part of the book as an initial step toward the construction of a theory of the good, with particular emphasis on the values of community and on shared social ends.

2. 1. Utilitarianism The first model is Rawls's presentation of the position of classical utilitarianism. His most telling argument against the utilitarian position is that it conflates the system of desires of all individuals and arrives at the good for a society by treating it as one large individual choice. It is a summing up over the field of individual desires. Utilitarianism has often been described as individualistic, but Rawls argues convincingly that the classical utilitarian Position does not take seriously the plurality and distinctness of individuals (27-29). It applies to society the principle of choice for one man. Rawls also observes that the notion of the ideal observer or the impartial sympathetic spectator is closely bound up with this classical utilitarian position. It is only from the perspective of some such hypothetical sympathetic ideal person that the various individual interests can be summed over an entire society (27, 184). The paradigm presented here, and rejected by Rawls, is one in which the interests of society are considered as the interests of one person. Plurality is ignored, and the desires of individuals are conflated. The tension between individual and society is resolved by subordinating the individual to the social sum. The social order is conceived as a unity. The principles of individual choice, derived from the experience of the self as a unity, are applied to society as a Whole. Rawls rightly rejects this position as being unable to account for justice, except perhaps by some administrative decision that it is desirable for the whole

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to give individuals some minimum level of liberty and happiness. But individual persons do not enter into the theoretical position. They are merely sources or directions from which desires are drawn. This position leads to a monism in which the sum of utilities over the whole society is the only relevant consideration. Particular individuals and their desires or rights have no prima facie claim to justice apart from their possible value in augmenting the total sum. Such a sum is not specific to social systems. A degenerate society of one member could be handled by this position as well as a society of n members. There is no respect for persons which is given priority to the summing of accounts. As Raw!s (1958) notes, most utilitarian ethicists have opposed slavery, but they have opposed it by summing up advantages to the slaveholder and advantages to the slaves and judging it to be an inefficient system which allows for a lesser sum of total good than that of a free society. Rawls, on the other hand, would not allow the benefits to the slaveholder to figure in such a list, because the institution of slavery is recognized as unfair in a system in which liberty takes precedence over all other goods. Rawls's own theory gives priority to liberty. He says at several points that his theory is susceptible of a Kantian interpretation. It gives a high prioritY to respect for persons and to the treatment of each individual as an end in himself. A basic respect for the autonomy or freedom of the other is built into the foundation of the theory.

2.2. Justice as Fairness The second paradigm is that which characterizes the original position. It has already been suggested that this is a picture of an aggregate of individuals, mutually disinterested, conceived primarily as will. While not necessarily egoistic, their interests are each of their own choosing. They have their own life ~la~s. They coexist on the same geographical territory and they have rou~ly Similar needs and interests so that mutually advantageous cooperation among them is possible. 1 shall emphasize this aspect of the circumstances of justice by assuming that

:~ farties take no interest in one another's interest .... Thus, one can say, in

•e • that the circumstances of justice obtain whenever mutually disinterested persons PLit forward conflicting claims to the division of social advantages under conditions of moderate scarcity (126-1281.

Here the tension between individual and society is resolved in favor of pluralitY. of an aggregate of mutually disinterested individuals occupying the same space at the. same f lme. 1t •IS resolved in favor of the plural while giving up anY soCI·al umty h" h · ' · · al . . w IC might obtain. The classical utilitarian model and the ort9l~ PDSitton. as sketched by Rawls provide paradigms for two polar ways in which th~ tenston between the plurality of individuals and the unity of social structure mtght ~ resolved. One resolution favors unity and the other favors pluralitY· · · . . emphasizes a view of the pe rson as Thts conception of the ongmal pos1t1on

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agent. Reason functions primarily as a capacity for prudential calculus. It is used to calculate consequences. The veil of ignorance erases any differences in reasoning power and any particular desires or affections. A consequence of the separation of the choosing will from the affections and from specific knowledge of one's goals and plans is that the doctrine of the self which results is that of a solitary will. This is a view of the person which is widespread in contemporary treatments of ethical questions. In different forms, it can be seen in existentialism, behaviorism, in some forms of utilitarianism, and in the focus on intention and action in contemporary analytical philosophy. The chief virtue of man as pure unfettered will is freedom or Jiberty. 2 If men and women are considered primarily as choosing individuals, the manner in which they are brought together in order to form some communal or social order is through voluntary association. Hence the social contract. Following the classical contractarians, Rawls describes the conditions of justice in such a way as to make clear that some sort of voluntary association is called for on the basis of rational prudence. A number of individuals are together on the same land at the same time, and resources are moderately scarce. The available resources are insufficient to satisfy .everyone's individual pleasures without producing conflict. Clearly some kind of association is indicated. Rawls is obliged to construct a justification of the fundamental bonds of human community on voluntary foundations. It is not clear that this is an adequate justification. A case in point is that of self·respect. Rawls understands that self-respect is a primary good, that it is a necessary precondition for the ability of an individual ·to carry out any plan of life whatever. He also acknowledges that self-respect cannot be formed in isolation. One cannot have self-respect if he or she does not have the respect of anyone else. Here Rawls acknowledges that the individualistic basis of morality must be qualified. Though he sees that self-respect is a condition of carrying out any life plan, or even of having a life plan, Rawls is obliged to try to root self-respect in voluntary choice. He speaks of the duty of mutual respect. Now the reason why this duty would be acknowledged is that although the panies in the original position take no interest in each other's interests, they know that in society· they need to be assured by the esteem of their associates. Their self-respect and their confidence in the value of their own system of ends cannot withstand the indifference much less the contempt of others. Everyone benefits then from living in a society where the duty of mutual rBSpect is honored. The cost to self-interest is minor in comparison with the support for the sense of one's own worth (338).

The treatment of mutual respect as a duty is a clear example of Rawls' attempt to rest fundamental ties on a voluntary foundation. The voluntarism enters at two points. The first is the model of the original position in which the Principles of natural duty are chosen.3 The justification of the principles has a voluntaristic foundation. The second point is the description of mutual respect as a duty which is to be acknowledged as such and safeguarded by the

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institutions and obligations of the society. The translation of mutual respect into terms of prudence and acknowledged duties is not convincing. Respect is at least partly a matter of discovering a person or an end to be admirable. It cannot be accounted for exclusively in voluntaristic terms. The description of the original position as one of autonomous and mutually disinterested choosers leads Rawls to emphasize rational choice at the expense of affective response and the variety of interests which motivate persons. Rawls suggests that such interests are included in each individual's conception of the good which is obscured by the veil of ignorance and does not enter into the choice of the principles of justice. But the chief primary good, a sine qua non for the pursuit of any conception of the good, is self-respect which is based on mutual respect. The conditions for this primary good cannot be exhaustively described in terms of rational choice. The study of artificial intelligence has produced impressive results in the ability to simulate certain cognitive processes with complex computer programming. A computer can evaluate relevant information and make choices that are rational in terms of its overall plan or program. Many of the choices put to individuals in the original position could be processed by such a computer. But a computer could not achieve or understand the value of self-respect. 4 The issue of self-respect is one that cannot be translated without remainder into the language of pure choice and of rational plans. Why does Rawls set himself the task of accounting for such goods as self-respect on a theoretical basis that is essentially individualistic? At various points he says that the condition of mutual disinterest is an attempt to keep his assumptions weak and mimimal. The postulate of mutual disinterest in the original position is made to insure that the principles of justice do not depend upon strong assumptions. Recall that the original position is meant to incorporate widely shared and yet weak conditions. A conception of justice should not presuppose, then, extensive ties of natural sentiment. At the basis of the theory one tries to assume as little as possible. (129). '

But how does one decide what assumptions are weak simple and widely shared? Rawls begins with the notion of an aggregate of p:rsons, defined primarilY ~s choosers, with their own independent interests. Given this starting point, he IS concerned to keep the assumptions weak and minimal. Thus he refrains fro~ assuming altruistic ties of benevolence, envy or of any other sort. But the baSIC portrayal of the person ·m the original position remains uncnt1c•ze · · · d · The assumpti_ons are weak only if this basic portrayal is taken as given. From another perspective, they might be judged to be very strong indeed.

2 .3. The Idea of a Social Union . The . third par ad'•gm ·IS ·mcluded under Rawls's discussion of the con gruence of JUStice and goodness, and of the problem of stability. It is described as a good.

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as an end in itself which is a shared end. This paradigm is distinct both from the conflated application to the entire society of the principle of choice for one person and from the conception of society as an aggregate of mutually disinterested individuals. The idea of a social union is described in contrast to the idea of a private society. A private society is essentially the second model as realized in the actual world. It stems from a consideration of the conditions of the original position as descriptive of a social order. Thus we are led to the notion of a private society. Its chief features are first that the persons comprising it, whether they are human individuals or associations, have their own private ends which are either competing or independent, but not in any case complementary. And second, institutions are not thought to have any value in themselves, the activity of engaging in them not being counted as a good but if anything as a burden. Thus each person assesses social arrangements solely as a means to his private aims. No one takes account of the good of others, or of what they possess; rather everyone prefers the most efficient scheme ~hat gives him the largest share of assets 1521).

Over against this notion of private society, Rawls proposes his idea of a social union. It is one in which final ends are shared and communal institutes are valued. The social order of mankind is best seen by contrast with the conception of a private society. Thus human beings have in fact shared final ends and they value their own common institutions and activities as good in themselves. We need one another as partners in ways of life that are engaged in for their own sake, and the successes and enjoyments of others are necessary for and complementary to our own good (522-523).

While Rawls speaks of shared ends, these ends might be shared for private reasons. The fact that persons need one another as partners, that they all have different and complementary abilities and skills, that they take pleasure in the successes and enjoyments of others, does not necessarily mean that we have left the realm of private ends. It may mean that there are certain materials, in this case persons, which are necessary in order for us to reach our ends.

Rawls invokes the image of the game, an image which plays a major role in the notion of justice as fairness. Fairness is interpreted as fair play and the theory is conceived as describable in terms of impersonal rules which apply equally to all persons, and a precise description of the initial position of each. Rawls not~s that many forms of life possess the characteristics of social union. As examples he lists science art family relationships, and friendships, but he suggests tha; all of these ca~ be' dealt with by thinking through the simpler instances of games ( 5251 . It is important to note here that he is _Pr~posing ~hat the analysis of games can serve for the analysis of complex soc•al mteractlons

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and forms of life, including those involved in aesthetic relations, in family interaction, and in friendships. Rawls distinguishes several sorts of ends that might be involved in playing a game, the last and most important of which is "the shared end, the common desire of all players that there should be a good play of the game" (525). This common end can be realized only if all play fairly according to the rules, if the sides are more or less evenly matched, and if the players all have the sense that they are playing well. This description has strong overtones of the description of the original position. When a game is played in this manner, everyone takes pleasure in the game itself. It is an example of a shared end. "A good play of the game is, so to speak, a collective achievement requiring the cooperation of all" (526). Rawls has offered a paradigm in which the condition of mutual disinterest is transcended, not by some sort of benevolence or altruism, but by common or shared ends. The essential thing is that there be a shared final end and accepted ways of advancing it which allow for the public recognition of the attainments of everyone. When this end is achieved, all find satisfaction in the very same thing; and this fact together with the complementarity of the good of individuals affirms the tie of community (526).

The burden of this move is to avoid the resolution of the tension between individual and society by collapsing all into the social unity, as in utilitarianism, or by disregarding the unity and considering each individual as disinterested in the interests of others, as in the description of the original position as realized in the private society. A satisfying and fair play of the game becomes the paradigm for the sharing of social ends. . . tY .IS Rawls elaborates on this somewhat by declaring that a well ordered socle itself a social union. "Indeed, it is a social union of social unions" (527). ThiS is reminiscent of Josiah Royce's ( 1914) notion of the highest good as "loyaltY to loyalty," which was also an attempt to develop the value of community out of an essentially voluntaristic notion of the individual. Royce, however, had an advantage in that his epistemological work on the notion of a communitY of in t erpretatlon · prov1ded · an essentially social philosophical structure on wh"ICh he could build. The idea of sharing ends is itself a shared end The condition of mutual d" · · · h"rd lsmterest IS no longer applicable, and the idea of a social union serves as at 1. paradigm. It is a paradigm in which the relation of the individual to the social whole is not dissolved at the expense of one or the other. It is neither an undiff_erentiated u.nity nor an aggregate of individuals. Rather, the individuals~:~ conceived as sharmg certain ends or goals which bind them together and wh. presumably enter into their sense of themselves as individuals. This third par~digm, however, rests on the image of the game, and particularly on the not1on of game wh · h · . . f ames. The IC 1s associated w1th contemporary theory o g

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analogy between such games and complex social interaction will be examined more fully in the next section. Three models of the relation between individual and society have been described. The first is explicitly rejected by Rawls, the second is fundamental to his theory of justice as fairness, and the third is employed in his outline of a corresponding theory of the good. Rawls is clearly aware of the issues involved in providing an adequate paradigm for conceiving the relation betw~n individuals and society. It is important, however, to lift these paradigms out of the volume and to examine the ways in which they are interrelated. Of the three models, the first two are proposals for understanding constraints on the choice of principles in the initial situation. The third is quite different. It is an object of choice. The idea of a social union is a good which Rawls expects would be preferred by most persons. On the basis of a principle of motivation which he postulates and labels the Aristotelian Principle, Rawls concludes that persons choose to participate in cooperative endeavors. Other things equal, persons enjoy the exercise of their capacities, and this enjoyment increases with the realization of more complex capacities (426). Thus persons would more readily welcome a transformation of society as the result of complex social interdependence and cooperation than aslhe result of divine fiat or the benevolence of a despot. There is enjoyment to be had in the playing of a game, or in the participation in a communal effort, which will cause it to be chosen over less complex activities. The idea of a social union belongs to the theory of the good. It describes a shared goal. It is in this manner that Rawls proposes to account for social and communal values. . Rawls is not introducing a social model at the foundation of his theory. He •s not providing a social analysis of the original position. He is introducing social activity as a good which one might expect to be chosen within the context of justice as fairness. In this sense, shared social ends are contingent and not necessary to the theory. The idea of social union is considered in the discussion of the stability of the theory of justice and of the congruence between justice as fairness and a theory of the good. The Aristotelian Principle suggests that the theory of justice as fairness will lead to the creation of a society in which shared ends and communal values will be sought by individuals.5 Rawls considers social relations both as descriptive of human life and as an ideal that would be chosen as part of the good of each individual. The descriptive point, that social life is a presupposition of thinking, acting and valuing, he considers to be trivial for the purposes with which he is concerned (522). Such a statement is also true of pure egoists and of persons who view their relations instrumentally; it possesses no discriminatory power. The second PDint at which the social character of human life enters is in the conception of the ideal of a social union. Neitber of these considerations affects the basic model of the theory which is the description of the original position. The trivial character of human 'sociality is presupposed, but need not be considered. The value of community and social cooperation must be justified on the basis of

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choices made by individuals after the principles have been chosen. Thus the original position remains individualistic and assumes mutual disinterest on the part of the parties involved.

3. Two Analogies Two analogies employed by Rawls at crucial points will be discussed in this section. The first is his analogy between the problem of mapping the moral sentiments and the problem of mapping linguistic competence. The second is his use of the theory of games to describe social and communal interaction. 3.1. Language and Morals While some difficulties may be presented by this analogy (for instance, the linguist is attempting to describe the speech of native speakers, while the ethicist may come to conclusions which suggest the reform of moral intuition). it illumines the model of the original position. Justice as fairness is proposed as a theory of the moral sentiments which can be compared in its complexity with the description of the sense of gramaticalness of a native speaker (47). If the analogy between theories of language and moral theories is pressed (beyond Rawls's employment of it), it would seem that the characterization of the original position is similar to a situation in which grammatical structure is accounted for by an hypothetical situation in which mutually disinterested individuals are portrayed as coming together in order to agree on conventions and rules to form a language. Each has needs, inner thoughts, points to express, and they need only agree on conventions by which to negotiate and communicate. The model is a nominalistic one. It is reminiscent of discussions of ostensive definition and of conventions explicitly agreed upon. We know, of .. I course, t hat such a situation never actually occurs, any more than the ongma situation of choice which Rawls describes could actually occur. Both are hypothetical situations imagined in such a way as to provide appropriate constraints in order to develop a theory of language or morals. The issue is not whether such a situation might have occurred but the adequacy of such a ~~~.

,

Accounts of the structure of language which involved the analysis ~f language into simples, the ostensive definition of the simple components 10 terms of atomic facts in the world, and the articulation of rules for combining these simples were given by the early work of Russell and Wittgenstein, among others. They were also concerned to provide an account of complex social relatio~s (of the grammar of human language) on a foundation which was theoretically individualistic. The simple building blocks were atomic facts and names. Names provided the basic units out of which language was constructed and they mirrored individual atomic facts in the world. These philosophers were also · assumptions . . . concerned to kee P th e1r weak simple and w1dely sh ared · TheY d1d not w t t · k • · oke ~n ~ mvo e the fabric of language as Rawls does not want to mv any orgamc not1on of society.

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The names which make up language were connected to the facts which make up the world and to each other by the invocation of will or choice. It was through naming, through ostensive definition and the choice of conventions, that words were linked with one another and with the world. There is here an analogy with the way in which Rawls invokes choice or will as the basis for association and community. In order to keep their assumptions weak, the logical atomists did not want to assume connections between denotations, connotations, and various levels of meaning and use of language. They hoped eventually to explain such connections on the basis of the simple paraphernalia with which they began. From our present vantage point it is possible to see that the assumptions of the logical atomists were neither simple nor weak, though they may have been widely shared among members of the Vienna Circle. To assume that language and the world are composed of mutually independent simples is to make a strong assumption. Most contemporary students of language would claim that the theory which results from such an assumption is unable to account adequately for linguistic competence. It is not clear that names and ostensive definitions are primitive elements of which language is composed. They function in certain sectors of linguistic usage, but are narrowly restricted and rather sophisticated uses. They are not primitive, and they shed relatively little light on the structure or acquisition of language. Similarly, it might be the case that Rawls's assumption of mutually disinterested individuals in the original position of choice may be a strong, rather than a weak, assumption. It might have the appearance of being weak because it assumes that the initial situation is composed of simples. It might rather be the case that the ability to choose rests on a fabric of shared associations, affections, interests, skills, rules and rituals rather than that such rituals rest on a foundation of individual choices. The analogy between the analysis of language into simples which mirror the world and out of which more complex constructions are built, and the analysis of complex social forms into contracts between individuals who form v"luntary associations is not a new one. Both find an early and clear articulation in the work of John Locke. Locke, as epistemologist, gave an account of language beginning with the tabula rasa and the reception of simple impressions from the world. Locke, the liberal theorist, provided the statement of contractarian theory on which Rawls draws. Both were attempts to account for complex social Phenomena by analyzing them, without remainder, into their simple and mutually independent constituents. Much of the later work of Wittgenstein was concerned to show that the atomists had been misguided in the assumption that analysis of language into simple components would lead to fundamental and weak assumptions on which a theory of language might be built. A certain vagueness, imprecision or inability to provide rules may not be a deficiency but part of the structure of language. linguistic competence may not be vague or imprecise at all, but may appear to be only when measured against some standard which has been imported from

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outside linguistic usage or from some parochial corner of that usage. Often the attempt to provide clear models in which the use of language is analyzed into simple components leads to the loss of what is distinctive about that use. Wittgenstein argued that many such distinctions did not illumine, but obscured, the forms of life which are embedded in grammar. The point here is not that Rawls subscribes to Locke's theory of language or that he would countenance an atomistic or nominalistic interpretation of linguistic usage. It is quite clear that he would not. In comparing the problem of describing the sense of grammaticalness of a native speaker with the problem of describing and systematizing moral sentiments, Rawls appeals to Chomsky's work on syntactical structures (47n). Given this analogy with Chomsky's attempt to provide a structural model that will systematize the intuitions of the native speaker, the model offered by Rawls is individualistic and nominalistic in a manner which appears to have its counterpart in earlier approaches to the study of language and not in transformational grammar. The comparison is offered only in order to dramatize the individualistic character of Rawls's portrayal of the initial situation.

3.2. Games In the opening lines of his consideration of the idea of a social union, Rawls questions whether, given the individualistic features of justice as fairness, the contract doctrine is "a satisfactory framework for understanding the values of community, and for choosing among social arrangements to realize them" (520). He argues that a private society, in which interests are not shared, is not entailed by the contract view. Rather we are led to the idea of a social union. While many forms of life possess the characteristics of social union, Rawls suggests that it will be sufficient to think through the simpler instance of games (525). At this point the similarity between the paradigm of the original position and the analyses of game theory and of welfare economics becomes crucial. 1 have argued that the original position is nominalistic and individualistic and that i~ shares these characteristics with the theory of games. At several points Rawls Cites the Prisoner's Dilemma as a classic instance of a simple game (269n, 5J7l. In the theory of games, the rules are clearly stated, the initial positions for all ~la~ers are described, the players are assumed to be mutually disinterested, and It . IS po.ssible to calculate the most rational strategy for each player. The Pn~oner s Dilemma presents a case in which self-interested decisions from the pomt of view of each lead to a situation in which both are w::>rse off. Thus, from the perspective of the goo d o f each, some sort of cooperation . ·IS 10 · d"1ca ted in

or~er

to achieve stability. The parameters are clear and the situation can be rationally analysed in ord t h , Th . er 0 5 ow that cooperation is the best strategy. ere IS, however, another sense of the word "game" in contemporary u~ which is les · es " s restncted and formal. Wittgenstein refers to "language gam ' litical others speak of g h . . . ames t at charactenze certain personal interactiOnS or po relationships 1 th' b · tV of · n IS roader sense of the word, "game" can refer to a vane

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social relationships. One can speak of the games engaged in by philosophers, or by parents and children, or by men and women. In each case we understand what is meant. The notion of game can be taken as a shorthand way of referring to patterns in social relationships. But we would not say, in this context, that game theory could be applied in each of these cases or that the Prisoner's Dilemma is a simplified representation of all games. It is one very specialized kind of game in the same way in which ostensive definition is one very special ·use of language. Neither can stand for games or linguistic usage as a whole. Rawls seems to trade on the broader sense of the word "game" when he suggests that the idea of social unions such as families, friendships and other groups can be analyzed by thinking through the simpler instance of games. Then he returns to the notion of game which is dominant thoughout the work, and to the theory of games. The broader connotation is ordinarily used to designate social relationships, while the narrower one is individualistic. This sliP.page in the meaning of the word "game" aids him in his attempt to account for social and communal values on a foundation which is theoretically individualistic. 6 In the theory of games, each individual rationally calculates the most prudential plan to adopt from his or her position. The game consists primarily of a number of decisions or choices. It requires of the players only rational calculation and choices between clear alternatives. This is in contrast, for instance, to the games children play when they "play house," or even to the game of basketball. In the latter cases, creativity and imagination are required in order even to pose choices which might be made. Decisions are continually involved, but they are certainly not the salient aspects of the game of playing house. The Prisoner's Dilemma, however, and similar examples are the types of games which form the paradigms for the contemporary theory of games, employed extensively by welfare economists and by some social psychologists. By way of contrast, consider Wittgenstein's discussion of games in the Investigations. Wittgenstein sees no possibility of giving an exact definition of a game, or of clearly specifying the conditions of one. It is in the attempt to articulate similarities between games that he arrives at his notion of a family resemblance. There may be no feature which is common to all games, but they may resemble one another as do members of a family. For how is the concept of a game bounded? What still co;.~nts as a game and what no longer does? Can you give the boundary? No. You can draw one; for none has so far been drawn. (But that never troubled you before when you used the word "game.") · · · "But then the use of the word is unregulated, the 'game' we play With 1t IS unregulated." -It is not everywhere circumscribed by rules; but no more are there any rules for how high one throws the ball in tennis, or how hard; yet tennis is a game for all that and has rules too IWittgenstein, 1953: 1• § 68).

Wittgenstein focuses on the differenc~s between games. We know what games are, but they cannot be specified in terms of common features. He suggests that

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although we might say that all games have rules, some of these rules are only tacit, are not set out in any list of rules, and perhaps could not be so set out. Some games, language games, forms of life, depend upon ritual action, tacit knowledge and patterns of activity that are not matters of conscious attention. Such rules as exist are neither explicit, public or fixed. The Prisoner's Dilemma would be no game at all in the context of the theory of games if there were an added rule that the players could make up rules as they went along. Yet Wittgenstein suggests that some games allow, and even demand, just that. The point is that the notion of game is imprecise. For his analysis of decision, Rawls draws on the game of game theory. Explicit public rules, mutual disinterest, and the possibility of rational prudential calculation as well as self-interested cooperation are marks of the theory of justice as fairness as well as of the Prisoner's Dilemma. When he employs the notion of game as an example of a social union, however, he is able to trade on a less precise notion of game and on the recent use by Wittgenstein and others of the analogy of game with various complex forms of social affiliation and cooperation. In the model represented by the theory of games, each player is an isolated agent. Mutual disinterest is a condition of the game. Benevolence and envy are eliminated. Each player is bound by no ties to the other players, except those ties which are explicitly articulated in the public rules of the game. Wittgenstein's conception of game, however, extends to many areas of life in which there are no publicly articulated rules. His well-known list near the beginning of the Investigations suggests a variety of language games, including giving orders and obeying them, making a joke and telling it, asking, thanking, cursing, greeting and praying (Wittgenstein, 1953: 1, § 23). Many of these are examples of forms of life and action which are governed by rituals that are tacit, not clearly bounded and seldom conscious. Such a view of the variety of games suggests numerous associative bonds on the personal, social and cultural levels. One must know how to speak the language, what praying involves, how to act wi~hin a particular ritual context. The knowledge required cannot be clearly articulated in a list of rules or strategies. It is a matter of belonging to a community, of learning a way of life, or participating in a linguistic and so~ial order which provides the context for these rituals and games. Ostensive ?efinition, though it appears to be primitive, presupposes a social context before It can be understood. Wittgenstein's notion of game demands a conception of persons related to one another by many and varied social tissues and rituals, while the Prisoner's Dilemma suggests a game which is voluntarily entered by agents with the power of rational calculation. It is impossible to conceive of a person standing outside of all games, understood in the broader sense, and then voluntarily deciding to enter the realm of games. To become human, to develop from neonate to person, is t~ ma_ture within the realm of various games, actions rules and conventions. It IS qu1te · ' 's . conceivable, though, that a person could exist outside of the Prisoner Dilemma, and voluntarily enter the realm of such a game. The first notion of

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game enters into the definition of a person, while the second presupposes the existence of the person prior to the beginning of the game. The games and forms of life in which one is involved provide the criteria for what a person is taken to be. If Rawls actually employed the Wittgensteinian notion of game, it would strongly qualify the individualistic bias that is present in his description of the original position. He describes that position in such a way, however, that it portrays individual agents who come together in order to cooperate to achieve ends which are shared, but which are still individual ends. Man remains an isolated individual agent. Wittgenstein's discussion of games and forms of life suggests that rather than viewing social institutions through the contractarian paradigm of simple mutually disinterested individuals choosing cooperative strategies, it is important to recognize that it is the theory which creates the individual, and which furnishes the criteria within which individuals are isolated as choosers, agents and wills. Then the individual agent is taken to be a fundamental simple entity out of which a contractarian notion of social justice can be built. The theory enters into a description of what an individual is at least as much as the individual provides a starting point for the development of the theory. When Wittgenstein suggests that there are games in which the players make up rules or change the rules as they go along, he is pointing to the element of imagination, interpretation and creativity which is involved in linguistic usage and social interaction. Interpretation presupposes community, creativity and improvisation, and precludes a final deductive solution. Intelligence and imagination may be involved in articulating the maximin strategy in welfare economics, but it is the solution of a game where all the constraints are given. The rational solution can be shown to be such, within the constraints of the game. Rawls understands the theory of justice to be of this type, so that it has a rational solution which can, in time, be translated into a purely deductive solution arrived at by prudential calculation, as the game of tic-tac-toe, or the Prisoner's Dilemma, has a solution which is final for each of the players, for each condition from which one starts. One should note also that the acceptance of these principles is not conjectured as a psychological law or probability. Ideally anyway, I should like to show that their acknowledgement is the only choice consistent with the full description of the original position. The argument aims to be strictly deductive (1211.

This aim demands a notion of game or a description of the original position which can be precisely and finally articulated, exactly the notion of game and social interaction which is rejected by Wittgenstein and by others who have attempted to describe complex social activity. 4. The Right and the Good Rawls is developing a notion of justice as fairness, and we have seen that

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fairness is closely correlated with fair play in the theory of games. While he carefully sets the boundaries of his task, he suggests at several points that the theory of justice as fairness' can be expanded into a theory of rightness as fairness, and that the resulting ethical position is one in which the concept of right is prior to that of the good ( 17 ,111,196). It will be argued in the next section that the model of the original position includes elements of a conception of the good, or of a particular perfectionist ideal. It is sometimes unclear how much scope Rawls is claiming for the theory. Justice as fairness is not a complete contract theory. For it is clear that the contractarian idea can be extended to the choice of more or less an entire ethical system, that is, to a system including principles for all the virtues and not only for justice (17).

The considerations adduced above suggest that the contract notion may be adequate to a rather more narrowly conceived conception of justice and may describe the concern for fair play which is one aspect of the moral sense, but cannot serve as a paradigf)'l for mapping the moral sentiments more generally. The analogy with theories of language may be helpful here. Ostensive definition and clearly articulated rules are characteristic of some subsystems of linguistic usage such as the coining of new terms in a technical discipline or the agreement upon rules in a formal game. Each of these subsystems, however, presupposes a larger realm of linguistic usage. It should not be claimed that the hypothetical voluntaristic paradigm is adequate for a comprehensive account of either linguistic usage or ethical justification. Certain situations, such as the distribution of an indivisible benefit by means of a lottery, the establishment of laws that do not discriminate between individuals, and the fair opportunity for everyone to enter each position in society are central to the theory and may be proper analogues to the paradigms of game theory. But Rawls has said that the theory of justice as fairness cannot succeed if it cannot explain the value of community. Why is th'is the case? If Rawls were concerned only to provide an account of the sense of justice more narrowly conceived, why should he be responsible for an account of the value of community? In the section on the idea of the social union he claims, as we have 'I seen, to understand the values of art, science, friendships and other shared socl~ ends. by .a.nalogy with an analysis of games and of rational choice. Self·respect IS also JUStified by appeal to rational ~If-interest. Arguments have been adduced earlier to show that Rawls's theorY as presented in the descr·1pt'1on of t h e ongmal . . . . pos1t1on cannot accou nt for the . vallles of commun'lt d h . . I0 ped With Y an t at the 1dea of a social union IS deve reference to the f . . . . If in the . . ramework of the ongmal position The ind1v1dual se ted ongmal p051·r · •on presupposes associations and values which are not accoun f or by the theory 1n50f . . he theorY • • • ar as these soc1al supports are dealt w•th by t they are J t'f'ed are us 1 1 on the basis of voluntary choice. In fact, however, theY presupposed by the possibility of voluntary choice.

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Rawls considers the social context needed to develop and to maintain the moral personality which is presupposed by the original position. But these concerns are considered under the rubric of the conditions necessary for the stability of the sense of justice. They are not addressed in the theory proper, but as part of the furnishings that are required in order to provide for the applicability of the theory. Under the rubric of stability, they appear to be morally neutral. In fact these conditions are not neutral, but reflect the premium on autonomy, liberty and mutual independence which is characteristic of the liberal tradition. While I believe these values to be worthy of their position in the theory, they are exemplified by the theory rather than derived from it. 7 Again, presuppositions which Rawls takes to be weak conditions may in fact be strong ones. According to Rawls, a just society is one that approximates a social structure which would result from the rational choices of the individuals who compose it. But a certain social context of mutual respect, linguistic patterns, rituals, supporting institutions and affiliative ties is a necessary condition for an individual capabl~ of rational choice. 8 It might be argued that Rawls has provided an hypothetical construction of the original position and thus is not responsible, within the theory itself, for a genetic account of the conditions of social existence. The issue is not whether Rawls is aware of the social genesis of the individual, but whether or not contractarian theory contains sufficient resources to enable him to accomplish his task. Of course, the description of the original position is hypothetical. The linguistic paradigms provided by the atomists were also hypothetical. It was not suggested that language had actually developed by explicit voluntary consent. The paradigm was rejected not because it could not account for the historical development of language, but because it was shown to be inadequate for a description of the complexities of linguistic usage. Claims for the analysis of language into simples and for the assumption of weak conditions were later discovered to obscure rather strong conditions and controversial assumptions contained in the paradigm.

5. Religion and the Contract Theory Three points at which the study of religion may be relevant for an appraisal of the theory of justice as fairness merit comment. They are ( 1) the social character of the self as observed in the symbolic and ritualistic activity of religion, (2) the affinity of the attempt to discover a neutral Archimedean point in the original position with religious understandings of transcendence, especially in theistic traditions, and (3) the "perfectionist" character of most religious visions. One of the reasons for the success with which Rawls's enterprise has been greeted is that he brings together systematically two diverse traditions of conceiving of the individual self in society. The first is that of recent Anglo-American philosophy and particularly philosophical ethics. While a conception of the self as individual agent understood primarily as will has

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predominated in this tradition, especially in analytic and existentialist ethics, the need for a social conception has been recognized. Analysis of the nuances of linguistic usage is itself a form of attention to the rituals and institutions of social life, but a social conception of the self has not been characteristic of this tradition. The second tradition is that of pragmatism in this country and of sociology and social psychology in Europe. Durkheim and Weber initiated a tradition of sociological theory which has been influential in contemporary ethics and which emphasizes social facts and structures as primary. Dewey. Mead and others in the pragmatist tradition emphasized the social character of all knowledge and action and described the development of the autonomous choosing individual from less differentiated forms. In this tradition, individual symbols and actions are understood by considering the social and cultural context and the variety of resources which are available to the individual. From this perspective, the isolated individual is not conceived as a simple entity from which the social order is constructed, but is described as differentiating himself from his environment. Excessive isolation is characterized as alienation, and there is 8 longing for community, and for the integration of the social order through shared cultural values. Attempts to provide general theoretical accounts of religion have seldom met with widespread agreement. It is difficult to provide criteria which are at once specific enough to be meaningful, and general enough to embrace all of the phenomena which most of us would describe as religious. But the study of religion reveals shared symbols, goals, visions of the admirable and the worshipful, and conceptions of that which makes a person worthy of respect, which are prior to and more fundmental than the autonomous self or the notion of~ contractual relationship between persons. Religious experience, symbols and actions all express the recognition that the individual cannot be conceived solelY as a rational ego and will. Forms of religious life may be ascetic, anti·social or ecs.tatic, but all express ad~iration~ worship, conceptions.of th~ sacred, in te:: whJch are communal. Fulfallment 1s conceived as the umty wath nature or cosmos, overcoming illusory boundaries, building a new society or kingdom of God, the reunion of all persons in the land of the dreaming, and often su_ch visions are dramatized in the systems of symbols and action which characteraze religious life. As the rituals of human language are social, so religion ex~ressesa context of values, goals and actions in which the individual is situated an sorne broader and more fundamental context. · Even within the rational puritanism of Kant the comprehensive context 10 which the individual is set is provided by the id~als of pure reason and bY the postulates of the second Critique. When Kant describes and advocates the mov~ from an eth"1ca1 state of nature to an ethical commonwealth, he cpnce ivesdthhe15 commonwealth as the concept of a people of God under ethical laws, an_. describes religion within the limits of reason as serving the function of unit·'"~ persons under a common lawgiver. Kant draws the notion of the ethiCS

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commonwealth from Rousseau and the social contract tradition, but he places it in the context of his critique of religion. The commonwealth is one of individual agents u·nited in the idea of a people of God which can only be realized in human organization through some form of religious institution. A feature which differentiates the theory of justice as fairness from the ethical theories of pragmatism and of many who have emphasized the social character of the self is its claim to have discovered an Archimedean point, a neutral ground from which principles might be evaluated and chosen. The pragmatists considered the construction of good to be the resultant of conflicts between various interests in the society. They rejected any possibility. of transcending that field of conflict in order to discover some neutral point from which the field could be surveyed. The original position provides such a transcendent point from which to generate principles that can be used in the resolution of social conflicts and in the reform of institutions. This is part of the Kantian legacy in thedoctrine of justice as fairness. The function of the original position as one which provides a point of transcendence in the theory is similar to that of the notion of God in theistic traditions. By imaginatively adopting the perspective of the original position, one. can adopt the moral point of view, or a point of view which transcends those of individual self-interests. The similar attempt to achieve a transcendent perspective by the eighteenth century notion of the disinterested sympathetic spectator has often been closely related to theistic thought (see Reynolds, 1970). One of the functions of doctrines of God has been to affirm this kind of transcendence. Doctrines of God attempt to achieve a transcendence of parochial interests, but they also reflect a conception of what is thought to be admirable or worshipful. They include an element of what Rawls calls "perfectionism," the characterization of a particular sort of human excellence as good or admirable. God is transcendent, but is not neutral with respect to human ideals or perfections. Doctrines of God have served not only to provide transcendence, but have also embodied conceptions of the supremely good or worthy. Even attempts to avoid any such reflection of human ideals by defining God as "wholly other" in neo-orthodox writings meant that the perfections of freedom and autonomy, surety human ideals themselves, were glorified and taken to be most worthy of our admiration. Freedom was a perfection that was dramatized in the doctrine of God's utter transcendence. Rawls notes that different interpretations of the initial situation yield different conceptions of justice. He conjectures that each traditional conception of justice may be correlated with an interpretation of the initial situation (121). This correlation may be due not only to the process of calculation of the principles which would be chosen under different conditions, but to the fact that each interpretation embodies different ideals or values which are taken to be of unquestioned worth. The distinctive character of the original position, for instance, in contrast to the theory. of the ideal observer is the priority it gives to

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liberty and to the autonomy of each individual. The interpretation of the original position in the theory of justice as fairness is not a neutral one. It contains certain ideals or images of what a person is or should be. Rawls notes that the theory, as an ideal-regarding theory, occupies an intermediate position between perfectionism and utilitarianism (327). It shares with perfectionism the characteristic that a certain ideal is built into the theory. In the case of justice as fairness, this ideal is that of the autonomous individual. While it is certainly a worthy ideal, it must be recognized as such. It may be more admirable but is not necessarily a weaker or less perfectionistic assumption than would be some organic notion of society. The conditions of the original position could be described in such a way as to eliminate the postulate of mutual disinterest. Such an interpretation would be more complicated in the sense that the procedures of simple game theory would not be as readily applicable as in the present case, but it is not clear that an organic conception of society would involve stronger assumptions than that of mutual disinterest. It would involve different assumptions, and a different conception of what is admirable. Both the assumption of mutual disinterest with the priority of liberty and the assumption of an organic model with intertwining interests incorporate certain ideals or notions of perfection. Rawls has chosen the former and has provided good reasons for his choice, but it is misleading to suggest that he has remained neutral, rejecting perfectionism and keeping his assumptions weak. The original position can be seen as the dramatization of a particular human ideal. Religious traditions each contain conceptions of the good and idea.ls of perfection. For many traditions, the liberty and autonomy of the individual has not been a central part of such conceptions. In many cultures in the past, individual liberty was not held essential for self-respect and may, in some cases, have been inimical to it. It may well be, and I would suspect, that in the modern world the priority of liberty cannot be disregarded without the destruction of self-respect. But the conception of a person as an autonomous individual for ~hom liberty is primary and essential to his self-respect is a statement of an Ide~'·. of what is admirable in human life. The interpretation of the original position in justice as fairness functions both to achieve transcendence of the parochial and to embody a perfectionist ideal.

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1Page references in the text refer to Rawls, 1971, unless otherwise designated. 2 For a critique of this image of the person, see Murdoch, 1970:9ff. 3 Rawls distinguishes between duties and obligations (114, 333ff.). Obligations rest upon actual voluntary acts of consent, but duties apply to us without regard to voluntary .acts. Both duties and obligations, however, are derived from the contractarian point of view. They are principles that would be chosen in the original position, though it is not necessary that they be actually chosen in a particular society. 4 The example of artificial intelligence is not as irrelevant as it might seem in this context. In introducing the notion of rational plan which is central to his conception of rational choice, Rawls refers to Miller, Galanter and Pribram, 1960, for a discussion of plans. This volume has been influential in cognitive psychology for its attempt to describe human planning and behavior by analogy to computer programs. For a consideration of the limitations of some of this WQrk, see Dreyfus, 1972. 5The Aristotelian Principle, postulated by Rawls as a basic principle of motivation must, of course, be justified empirically. Rawls appeals to our sense that "it seems to be borne out by many facts of everyday life, and by the behavior of children and some of the higher animals" (431). The principle seems intuitively sound, but he does not cite any specific data in support of it. 6 For a classification of different kinds of games and a differentiation between formal and informal intelligent activities, see Dreyfus, 1972:204-208. Dreyfus notes that many complex human activities are regular but not rule-governed. 7Thomas Nagel has made a similar point: "I have attempted to argue that the presumptions of the contract method Rawls employs are rather strong, and that the original position therefore offers less independent support to his conclusions than at first appears. The egalitarian liberalism which he develops and the conception of good on which it depends are extremely persuasive, but the original position serves to model rather than to justify them" (1973:233). 8 Stuart Hampshire makes a similar point when he refers to "the psychology of moral sentiments, which suggests that guilt or shame about injustice and unfairness, and natural .respect for their opposites, extends to more primitive relations between people than are imagined by his [Rawls's) hypothesis of a rational choice of an unbiased social order" (Hampshire, 1972:38).

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Dreyfus, Hubert L. 1972 What Computers Can't Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason. New York: Harper and Row. Hampshire, Stuart 1972 "A new philosophy of the just society." The New York Review of Books 18 (February 24):34-39. Miller, George; Galanter, Eugene; and Pribram, Karl H. 1960 Plans and the Structure of Behavior. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston. Murdoch, Iris 1970 The Sovereignty of Good. New York: Schock en Books. Nagel, Thomas 1973 "Rawls on justice." The Philosophical Review 82 (April): 200-234. Rawls, John 1958 "Justice as fairness." The Philosophical Review 61 (April): 164-194. 1971 A Theory of Justice. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Reynolds, Charles H. 1970 "A proposal for understanding the place of reason in Christian ethics." The Journal of Religion 50 (April):155-168. Royce, Josiah 1914 The Philosophy of Loyalty. New York: The Macmillan Company. Wittgenstein, Ludwig Philosophical Investigations. Anscombe, tr. New York: The 1953 Macmillan Company.

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THE PROCEDURAL REPUBLIC AND THE UNENCUMBERED SELF MICHAELJ. SANDEL Harvard University

OLITICAL PHILOSOPHY seems often to reside at a distance from the world. Principles are one thing, politics another, and even our best efforts to "live up" to our ideals typically founder on the gap between theory and practice. 1 But if political philosophy is unrealizable in one sense, it is unavoidable in another. This is the sense in which philosophy inhabits the world from the start; our practices and institutions are embodiments of theory. To engage in a political practice is already to stand in relation to theory. 2 For all our uncertainties about ultimate questions of political philosophy-of justice and value and the nature of the good life-the one thing we know is that we live some answer all the time. In this essay I will try to explore the answer we live now, in contemporary America. What is the political philosophy implicit in our practices and institutions? How does it stand, as philosophy? And how do tensions in the philosophy find expression in our present political condition? It may be objected that it is a mistake to look for a single philosophy, that we live no "answer," only answers. But a plurality of answers is itself a kind of answer. And the political theory that affirms this plurality is the theory I propose to explore.

AUTHOR"S NOTE: An earlier version of this arricle was presented to the Political Philosophy Colloquium at Princeton University. and to the Legal Theory Workshop at ColumbiQ Law School. I am grateful to the participants. and also to the Editor, William Co1111o/ly. for helpful comments and criticisms. I would also like to thank the Ford Foundlluo, for support ofa larger project of which this essay is a first installment.

P0LrriCAL THEORY, Vol. 12. No. I, February 1984 81-96 0 1984 Sqe Publications, Inc.

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THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD

We might begin by considering a certain moral and political vision. It is a liberal vision, and like most liberal visions gives pride of place to justice, fairness, and individual rights. Its core thesis is this: a just society seeks not to promote any particular ends, but enables its citizens to pursue their own ends, consistent with a similar liberty for all; it therefore must govern by principles that do not presuppose any particular conception of the good. What justifies these regulative principles above all is not that they maximize the general welfare, or cultivate virtue, or otherwise promote the good, but rather that they conform to the concept of right, a moral category given prior to the good, and independent of it. This liberalism says, in other words, that what makes the just society just is not the telos or purpose or end at which it aims, but precisely its refusal to choose in advance among competing purposes and ends. In its constitution and its laws, the just society seeks to provide a framework within which its citizens can pursue their own values and ends, consistent with a similar liberty for others. The ideal I've described might be summed up in the claim that the right is prior to the good, and in two senses: The priority of the right means first, that individual rights cannot be sacrificed for the sake ofthe general good (in this it opposes utilitarianism), and second, that the principles of justice that specify these rights cannot be premised on any particular vision of the good life. (In this it opposes teleological conceptions in general.) !his is the liberalism of much contemporary moral and politi~al philosophy, most fully elaborated by Rawls, and indebted to Kant for tts philosophical foundations. 3 But I am concerned here less with the lineage of this vision than with what seem to me three striking facts about it. First, it has a deep and powerful philosophical appeal. Second, despite its philosophical force, the claim for the priority of the righ~ over th~ g~od ultimately fails. And third, despite its philosophical fatl~re, thts bberal vision is the one by which we live. For us in late twentt~tb ~entury America, it is our vision, the theory most thoroughly embodted In the practices and institutions most central to our public life. And seeing how it goes wrong as philosophy may help us to diagnose 0~ present political condition. So first its philosophical power; second, tU · • ~hilosophical fatlure; and third, however briefly, its uneasy embod'tment 1n the world.

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But before taking up these three claims, it is worth pointing out a central theme that connects them. And that is a certain conception of the person, of what it is to be a moral agent. Like all political theories, the liberal theory I have described is something more than a set of regulative principles. It is also a view about the way the world is, and the way we move within it. At the heart of this ethic lies a vision of the person that both inspires and undoes it. As I will try to argue now, what make this ethic so compelling, but also, finally, vulnerable, are the promise and the failure of the unencumbered self.

KANT/AN FOUNDATIONS

. The . liberal ethic asserts the priority of right, and seeks principles of.

JUStice that do not presuppose any particular conception of the good. This is what Kant means by the supremacy of the moral law, and what Rawls means when he writes that "justice is the first virtue of social institutions .•.s Justice is more than just another value. It provides the framework that regulates the play of competing values and ends; it must therefore have a sanction independent of those ends. But it is not obvious where such a sanction could be found. Theories ofjustice, and for that matter, ethics, have typically founded their claims on one or another conception of human purposes and ends. Thus Aristotle said the measure of a polis is the good at which it aims, and even J .S. Mill, who in the nineteenth century called "justice the chief part, and incomparably the most binding part of all morality," made justice an instrument of utilitarian ends. 6 This is the solution Kant's ethic rejects. Different persons typically have different desires and ends, and so any principle derived from them can only be contingent. But the moral Jaw needs a categorical foundation, not a contingent one. Even so universal a desire as happiness will not do. People still differ in what happiness consists of, and to install any particular conception as regulative would impose on some the conceptions of others, and so deny at least to some the freedom to choose their own conceptions. In any case, to govern ourselves in conformity with desires and inclinations, given as they are by nature or circumstance, is not really to be self-governing at all. It is rather a refusal of freedom, a capitulation to determinations given outside us. According to Kant, the right is "derived entirely from the concept of freedom in the external relationships of human beings, and has nothing

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to do with the end which all men have by nature [i.e., the aim of achieving happiness] or with the recognized means of attaining this end ..J As such, it must have a basis prior to all empirical ends. Only when I am governed by principles that do not presuppose any particular ends am I free to pursue my own ends consistent with a similar freedom for all. But this still leaves the question of what the basis of the right could possibly be. If it must be a basis prior to all purposes and ends, unconditioned even by what Kant calls "the special circumstances of human nature,,. where could such a basis conceivably be found? Given the stringent demands of the Kantian ethic, the moral law would seem almost to require a foundation in nothing, for any empirical precondition would undermine its priority. "Duty!" asks Kant at his most lyrical, "What origin is there worthy of thee, and where is to be found the root of thy noble descent which proudly rejects all kinship with the inclinations?"' His answer is that the basis of the moral law is to be found in the subject, not the object of practical reason, a subject capable of an autonomous will. No empirical end, but rather "a subject of ends, namely a rational being himself, must be made the ground for all maxims of action. " 10 Nothing other than what Kant calls "the subject of all possible ends himself" can give rise to the right, for only this subject is also the subject of an autonomous will. Only this subject could be that "something which elevates man above himself as part of the world of sense" and enables him to participate in an ideal, unconditioned realm wholly independent of our social and psychological inclinations. And only this thoroughgoing independence can afford us the detachment we need if we are ever freely to choose for ourselves, unconditioned by the vagaries of circumstance. 11 Who or what exactly is this subject? It is, in a certain sense, us. ~e moral law, afterall, is a law we give ourselves; we don 'tfindit, we willtt. That is how it (and we) escape the reign of nature and circumstance and merely empirical ends. But what is important to see is that the "we"who do the willing are not "we"qua particular persons, you and me, each for ours~l~es-the moral law is not up to us as individuals-but "we" q~a ~art1c1~ants in what Kant calls "pure practical reason," "we" qua parUctpants 10 a transcendental subject. N ~~ what is to guarantee that I am a subject of this kind, capa~le of exerctsmg pure practical reason? Well, strictly speaking, there .rs. no guar~t~; the transcendental subject is only a possibility. But tt 18 a posslblltty I ·must presuppose if I am to think of myself as a free moral agent. Were I wholly an empirical being, I would not be capable of 220

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freedom, for every exercise of will would be conditioned by the desire for some object. All choice would be heteronomous choice, governed by the pursuit of some end. My will could never be a first cause, only the effect of some prior cause, the instrument of one or another impulse or inclination. "When we think of ourselves as free," writes Kant, "we transfer ourselves into the intelligible world as members and recognize the autonomy of the will. " 12 And so the notion of a subject prior to and independent of experience, such as the Kantian ethic requires, appears not only possible but indispensible, a necessary presupposition of the possibility of freedom. How does all of this come back to politics? As the subject is prior to its ends, so the right is prior to the good. Society is best arranged when it is governed by principles that do not presuppose any particular conception of the good, for any other arrangement would fail to respect persons as being capable of choice; it would treat them as objects rather than subjects, as means rather than ends in themselves. We can see in this way how Kant's notion of the subject is bound up with the claim for the priority of right. But for those in the AngloAmerican tradition, the transcendental subject will seem a strange foundation for a familiar ethic. Surely, one may think, we can take rights seriously and affirm the primacy of justice without embracing the Critique of Pure Reason. This, in any case, is the project of Rawls. He wants to save the priority of right from the obscurity of the transcendental subject. Kant's idealist metaphysic, for all its moral and political advantage, cedes too much to the transcendent, and wins for justice its primacy only by denying it its human situation. "To develop a viable Kantian conception of justice," Rawls writes, "the force and content of Kant's doctrine must be detached from its background in transcendental idealism" and recast within the "canons of a reasonable empiricism. " 13 And so Rawls' project is to preserve Kant's moral and political teaching by replacing Germanic obscurities with a domesticated metaphysic more congenial to the Anglo-American temper. This is the role of the original position.

FROM TRANSCENDENTAL SUBJECT TO UNENCUMBERED SELF

The original position tries to provide what Kant's transcendental argument cannot-a foundation for the right that is prior to the good,

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but still situated in the world. Sparing all but essentials, the original position works like this: It invites us to imagine the principles we would choose to govern our society if we were to choose them in advance, before we knew the particular persons we would be-whether rich or poor, strong or weak, lucky or unlucky-before we knew even our interests or aims or conceptions of the good. These principles-the ones we would choose in that imaginary situation-are the principles of justice. What is more, if it works, they are principles that do not presuppose any particular ends. What they do presuppose is a certain picture of the person, of the way we must be if we are beings for whom justice is the first virtue. This is the picture of the unencumbered self, a self understood as prior to and independent of purposes and ends. Now the unencumbered self describes first of all the way we stand toward the things we have, or want, or seek. It means there is always a distinction between the values I have and the person I am. To identify any characteristics as my aims, ambitions, desires, and so on, is always to imply some subject .. me" standing behind them, at a certain distance, and the shape of this ••me" must be given prior to any of the aims or attributes I bear. One consequences of this distance is to put the self itselfbeyond the reach of its experience, to secure its identity once and for all. Or to put the point another way, it rules out the possibility of what we might call constitutive ends. No role or commitment could define me so completely that I could not understand myself without it. No p~oject could be so essential that turning away from it would call into question the person I am. For the unencumbered self, what matters above all, what is most essential to our personhood, are not the ends we choose but our capacity to c~o~se them. T~e original position sums up this central claim about us. It Is not our aJms that primarily reveal our nature," writes Rawls, .. but rather the principles that we would acknowledge to govern the background conditions under which these aims are to be formed··· We should therefore reverse the relation between the right and the good propose~ by teleo~ogical doctrines and view the right as prior. " 14 On_ly 1f the self IS prior to its ends can the right be prior to the good. Only if my identity is never tied to the aims and interests I may have at any moment can I think of myself as a free and independent agent, capable of choice. · This n0 f 10n of mdependence carries consequences for the k'1nd of

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commumty of which we are capable. Understood as unencumbere

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selves, we are of course free to join in voluntary association with others, and so are capable of community in the cooperative sense. What is denied to the unencumbered self is the possibility of membership in any community bound by moral ties antecedent to choice; he cannot belong to any community where the self itself could be at stake. Such a community-call it constitutive as against merely cooperative-would engage the identity as well as the interests of the participants, and so implicate its members in a citizenship more thoroughgoing than the unencumbered self can know. For justice to be primary, then, we must be creatures of a certain kind, related to human circumstance in a certain way. We must stand to our circumstance always at a certain distance, whether as transcendental subject in the case of Kant, or as unencumbered selves in the case of Rawls. Only in this way can we view ourselves as subjects as well as objects of experience, as agents and not just instruments of the purposes we pursue. The unencumbered self and the ethic it inspires, taken together, hold out a liberating vision. Freed from the dicates of nature and the sanction of social roles, the human subject is installed as sovereign, cast as the author of the only moral meanings there are. As participants in pure practical reason, .or as parties to the original position, we are free to construct principles of justice unconstrained by an order of value antecedently given. And as actual, individual selves, we are free to choose our purposes and ends unbound by such an order, or by custom or tradition or inherited status. So lorig as they are not unjust, our conceptions of the good carry weight, whatever they are, simply in virtue of our having chosen them. We are, in Rawls' words, "self-originating sources of valid claims."15 This is an exhilarating promise, and the liberalism it animates is perhaps the fullest expression of the Enlightenment's quest for the self-defining subject. But is it true? Can we make sense of our moral and political life by the light of the self-image it requires? I do not think we can, and I will try to show why not by arguing first within the liberal project, then beyond it.

JUSTICE AND COMMUNITY

We have focused so far on the foundations of the liberal vision, on the Way it derives the principles it defends. Let us turn briefly now to the

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substance of those principles, using Rawls as our example. Sparing all but essentials once again, Rawls 'two principles of justice are these: first, equal basic liberties for all, and second, only those social and economic inequalities that benefit the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle). In arguing for these principles, Rawls argues against two familiar alternatives-utilitarianism and libertarianism. He argues against utili· tarianism that it fails to take seriously the distinction between persons. In seeking to maximize the general welfare, the utilitarian treats society as whole as if it were a single person; it conflates our many, diverse desires into a single system of desires, and tries to maximize. It is indifferent to the distribution of satisfactions among persons, except insofar as this may affect the overall sum. But this fails to respect our plurality and distinctness. It uses some as means to the happiness of all, and so fails to respect each as an end in himself. While utilitarians may sometimes defend individual rights, their defense must rest on the calculation that respecting those rights will serve utility in the long run. But this calculation is contingent and uncertain. So long as utility is what Mill said it is, "the ultimate appeal on all ethical questions,"16 individual rights can never be secure. To avoid the danger that their life prospects might one day be sacrificed for the greater good of others, the parties to the original position therefore insist on certain basic liberties for all, and make those liberties prior. If utilitarians fail to take seriously the distinctness of persons, libertarians go wrong by failing to acknowledge the arbitrariness of fortune. They define as just whatever distribution results from an efficient market economy, and oppose all redistribution on the grounds that people are entitled to whatever they get, so long as they do not cheat or steal or otherwise violate someone's rights in getting it. Rawls opposes this principle on the ground that the distribution of talents an~ ass~ts and even efforts by which some get more and others get less 15 ~blt~ary from a moral point of view, a matter of good luck. To dlstnbute the good things in life on the basis of these differences is not to do ~usti~, but simply to carry over into human arrangements !~ arbltranness of social and natural contingency. We deserve, as indtVl· duals, neither the talents our good fortune may have brought, nor the benefits that flow from them. We should therefore regard these talents · · sof· ascommon assets, and regard one another as common benefictane

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the rewards they bring. "Those who have been favored by nature, whoever they are, may gain from their good fortune only on terms that improve the situation of those who have lost out ... In justice as fairness, men agree to share one another's fate. " 17 This is the reasoning that leads to the difference principle. Notice how it reveals, in yet another guise, the logic of the unencumbered self. I cannot be said to deserve the benefits that flow fro~. say, my fine physique and good looks, because they are only accidental, not essential facts about me. They describe attributes I have, not the person I am, and so cannot give rise to a claim of desert. Being an unencumbered self, this is true of everything about me. And so I cannot, as an individual, deserve anything at all. However jarring to our ordinary understandings this argument may be, the picture so far remains intact; the priority of right, the denial of desert, and the unencumbered self all hang impressively together. But the difference principle requires more, and it is here that the argument comes undone. The difference principle begins with the thought, congenial to the unencumbered self, that the assets I have are only accidentally mine. But it ends by assuming that these assets are therefore common assets and that society has a prior claim on the fruits of their exercise. But this assumption is without warrant. Simply because I, as an individual, do not have a privileged claim on the assets accidentally residing "here," it does not follow that everyone in the world collectively does. For there is no reason to think that their location in society's province or, for that matter, within the province of humankind, is any less arbitrary from a moral point of view. And if their arbitrariness within me makes them ineligible to serve my ends, there seems no obvious reason why their arbitrariness within any partiuclar society should not make them ineligible to serve that society's ends as well. To put the point another way, the difference principle, like utilitarianism, is a principle of sharing. As such, it must presuppose some prior moral tie among those whose assets it would deploy and whose efforts it would enlist in a common endeavor. Otherwise, it is simply a ~ormula for using some as means to others ends, a formula this liberalism is committed to reject. But on the cooperative vision of community alone, it is unclear what the moral basis for this sharing could be. Short of the constitutive

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conception, deploying an individual's assets for the sake of the common good would seem an offense against the "plurality and distinctness" of individuals this liberalism seeks above all to secure. If those whose fate I am required to share really are, morally speaking, others. rather than fellow participants in a way of life with which my identity is bound, the difference principle falls prey to the same objections as utilitarianism. Its claim on me is not the claim of a constitutive community whose attachments I acknowledge, but rather the claim of a concatenated collectivity whose entanglements I confront. What the difference principle requires, but cannot provide, is some way of identifying those among whom the assets I bear are properly regarded as common, some way of seeing ourselves as mutually indebted and morally engaged to begin with. But as we have seen, the constitutive aims and attachments that would save and situate the difference principle are precisely the ones denied to the liberal self; the moral encumbrances and antecedent obligations they imply would undercut the priority of right. What, then, of those encumbrances? The point so far is that we cannot be persons for whom justice is primary, and also be persons for whom the difference principle is a principle of justice. But which must give way? Can we view ourselves as independent selves, independent in the sense that our identity is never tied to our aims and attachments? I do not think we can, at least not without cost to those loyalties and convictions whose moral force consists partly in the fact that living by them is inseparable from understanding ourselves as the particular persons we are-as members of this family or community or nation or people, as bearers ofthat history, as citizens ofthis republic. Allegiances such .as t~ese are more than values I happen to have, and to hold, at a certam d1stance. They go beyond the obligations I voluntarily incur and the "natural duties" I owe to human beings as such. They allow that to some I owe more than justice requires or even permits, not by reason of agreements I have made but instead in virtue of those more or less enduring attachments and commitments that, taken together, partlY define the person I am. To imagine a person incapable of constitutive attachments such as these is not to conceive an ideally free and rational agent, but to imagine a person wholly without character, without moral depth. For to have character is to know that I move in a history 1 neither summon nor command, which carries consequences nonetheless for my choices an~ conduct. It draws me closer to some and more distant from others; 1t

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makes some aims more appropriate, others less so. As a self-interpreting being, I am able to reflect on my history and in this sense to distance myself from it, but the distance is always precarious and provisional, the point of reflection never finally secured outside the history itself. But the liberal ethic puts the self beyond the reach of its experience, beyond deliberation and reflection. Denied the expansive self-understandings that could shape a common life, the liberal self is left to lurch between detachment on the one hand, and entanglement on the other. Such is the fate of the unencumbered self, and its liberating promise.

THE PROCEDURAL REPUBLIC But before my case can be complete, I need to consider one powerful reply. While it comes from a liberal direction, its spirit is more practical than philosophical. It says, in short, that I am asking too much. It is one thing to seek constitutive attachments in our private lives; among families and friends, and certain tightly knit groups, there may be found a common good that makes justice and rights less pressing. But with public life-at least today, and probably always-it is different. So long as the nation-state is the primary form of political association, talk of constitutive community too easily suggests a darker politics rather than a brighter one; amid echoes of the moral majority, the priority of right, for all its philosophical faults, still seems the safer hope. This is a challenging rejoinder, and no account of political community in the twentieth century can fail to take it seriously. It is challenging not least because it calls into question the status of political philosophy and its relation to the world. For if my argument is correct, if the liberal vision we have considered is not morally self-sufficient but parasitic on a notion of community it officially rejects, then we should expect to find that the political practice that embodies this vision is not practically self-sufficient either-that it must draw on a sense of community it cannot supply and may even undermine. But is that so far from the circumstance we face today? Could it be that through the original position darkly, on the far side of the veil of ignorance, we may glimpse an intimation of our predicament, a refracted vision of ourselves? How does the liberal vision-and its failure-help us make sense of our public life and its predicament? Consider, to begin, the following

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paradox in the citizen's relation to the modern welfare state. In many ways, we in the 1980s stand near the completion of a liberal project that has run its course from the New Deal through the Great Society and into the present. But notwithstanding the extension of the franchise and the expansion on individual rights and entitlements in recent decades, there is a widespread sense that, individually and collectively, our control over the forces that govern our lives is receding rather than increasing. This sense is deepened by what appear simultaneously as the power and the powerlessness of the nation-state. One the one hand, increasing numbers of citizens view the state as an overly intrusive presence, more likely to frustrate their purposes than advance them. And yet, despite its unprecedented role in the economy and society, the modern state seems itself disempowered, unable effectively to control the domestic economy, to respond to persisting social ills, or to work America's will in the world. This is a paradox that has fed the appeals of recent politicians (including Carter and Reagan), even as it has frustrated their attempts to govern. To sort it out, we need to identify the public philosophy implicit in our political practice, and to reconstruct its arrival. We need to trace the advent of the procedural republic, by which I mean a public life animated by the liberal vision and self-image we've considered. The story of the procedural republic goes back in some ways to the founding of the republic, but is central drama begins to unfold arou~d the turn of the century. As national markets and large-scale enterpnse displaced a decentralized economy, the decentralized political forms of the early republic became outmoded as well. If democracy was to s~~ive, the concentration of economic power would have to be met by a Similar concentration of political power. But the Progressives understood, or some of them did, that the success of democracy required more !h~ the centralization of government; it also required the nationalIZation of politics. The primary form of political community had to be a ~ec~t on.~ national scale. For Herbert Croly, writing in 1909, ~be natiO.nalizmg of American political, economic, and sociallife"was an essentially formative and enlightening political transformation." We wo~ld bec~m~ mor~ ~f a democracy only as we became "more of a natio~ · .. m Ideas, m mstitutions, and in spirit. "19 This nationalizing project would be consummated in the New Deal, but for the democratic tradition in America the embrace of the nation was d · · · ' of a ec•s~ve depa~ure. From Jefferson to the populists, the ~artY democracy •n Amencan political debate had been, roughly speakmg, tbe

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party of the provinces, of decentralized power, of small-town and smallscale America. And against them had stood the party of the nationlint Federalists, then Whigs, then the Republicans of Lincoln-a party that spoke for the consolidation of the union. It was thus the historic achievement of the New Deal to unite, in a single party and political program, what Samuel Beer has called ••Jiberalism and the national idea."20 What matters for our purpose is that, in the twentieth century, liberalism made its peace with concentrated power. But it was understood at the start that the terms of this peace required a strong sense of national community, morally and politically to underwrite the extended involvements of a modern industrial order. If a virtuous republic of small-scale, democratic communities was no longer a possibility, a national republic seemed democracy's next best hope. This was still, in principle at least, a politics of the common good. It looked to the nation, not as a neutral framework for the play of competing interests, but rather as a formative community, concerned to shape a common life suited to the scale of modern social and economic forms. But this project failed. By the mid- or late twentieth century, the national republic had run its course. Except for extraordinary moments, such as war, the nation proved too vast a scale across which to cultivate the shared self-understandings necessary to community in the formative, or constitutive sense. And so the gradual shift, in our practices and institutions, from a public philosophy of common purposes to one of fair procedures, from a politics of good to a politics of right, from the national republic to the procedural republic.

OUR PRESENT PREDICAMENT A full account of this transition would take a detailed look at the changing shape of political institutions, constitutional interpretation, and the terms of political discourse in the broadest sense. But I suspect we would find in the practice of the procedural republic two broad tendencies foreshadowed by its philosophy: first, a tendency to crowd out democratic possibilities; second, a tendency to undercut the kind of community on which it nontheless depends. . Where liberty in the early republic was understood as a function of democratic institutions and dispersed power, 21 1iberty in the procedural

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republic is defined in opposition to democracy, as an individual's guarantee against what the majority might will. I _am free insofar as I am the bearer of rights, where rights are trumps. 22 Unlike the liberty of the early republic, the modern version permits-in fact even requiresconcentrated power. This has to do with the universalizing logic of rights. Insofar as I have a right, whether to free speech or a minimum income, its provision cannot be left to the vagaries of local preferences but must be assured at the most comprehensive level of political association. It cannot be one thing in New York and another in Alabama. As rights and entitlements expand, politics is therefore displaced from smaller forms of association and relocated at the most universal form-in our case, the nation. And even as politics flows to the nation, power shifts away from democratic institutions (such as legislatures and political parties) and toward institutions designed to be insulated from democratic pressures, and hence better equipped to dispense and defend individual rights (notably the judiciary and bureaucracy). These institutional developments may begin to account for the sense of powerlessness that the welfare state fails to address and in some ways doubtless deepens. But it seems to me a further clue to our condition recalls even more directly the predicament of the unencumbered selflurching, as we left it, between detachment on the one hand, the ent~glement on the other. For it is a striking feature of the welfare state that 1t offers a powerful promise of individual rights, and also demands of its citizens a high measure of mutual engagement. But the self-iJDaF that attends the rights cannot sustain the engagement. As bearers of rights, where rights are trumps, we think of ourselves as f~ly choosing, individual selves, unbound by obligations antecedent to nghts, or to the agreements we make. And yet, as citizens of tb;e proced~ral r~pu~lic that secures these rights, we find ourselves i~pli· cate~ wllly-mlly m a formidable array of dependencies and expectauons we dld not choose and increasingly reject. In our public life, we are more entangled but less attached, thaD ~ver befor~. It is as though the unencumbered self presupposed by tbe hberal eth1c had begun to come true-less liberated than disempowered• e~tangled in a network of obligations and involvements unassocia~ Wlt~ any act of will, and yet unmediated by those common identifi-cabons or expansive self-definitions that would make them tolerable. AJ the scale of social and political organization has become JDOIC comprehensive, the terms of our collective identity have become more

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fragmented, and the forms of political life have outrun the common purpose needed to sustain them. Something like this, it seems to me, has been unfolding in America for the past ~alf-century or so. I hope I have said at least enough to suggest the shape a fuller story might take. And I hope in any case to have conveyed a certain view about politics and philosophy and the relation between them-that our practices and institutions are themselves embodiments of theory, and to unravel their predicament is, at least in part, to seek after the self-image of the age.

NOTES l. An excellent example of this view can be found in Samuel Huntington, American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1981 ). See especially his discussion of the "ideals versus institutions" gap, pp. 10-12, 39-41, 61-84, 221-262. 2. Sec, for example, the conceptions of a "practice"advanced by Alasdair Macintyre and Charles Taylor. Macintyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 175-209. Taylor, "Interpretation and the Sciences of Man," Review of Metaphysics 25, (1971) pp. 3-Sl. 3. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971). Immanuel Kant, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, trans. H. J. Paton. (1785; New York: Harper and Row,l956). Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith ( 1781, 1787; London: Macmillan, 1929). Kant, Critique of Practical Reason. trans. L. W. Beck (1788; Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1956). Kant, "On the Common Saying: 'This May Be True in Theory, But It Does Not Apply in Practice,'" in Hans Reiss, ed., Kant's Political Writings. (1793; Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970). Other recent versions of the claim for the priority of the right over good can be found in Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974); Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977); Bruce Ackerman, Social Jwtice in the Uberal State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980). 4. This section, and the two that follow, summarize arguments developed more fully in Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982). S. Rawls (1971), p. 3. . 6. John Stuart Mill Utilitarianism, in The Utilitarians (1893; Garden C1ty: Doubleday, 1973), p. 46S. Mill, On Liberty, in The Utilitarians, p. 485 (Originally published 1849). 1. Kant (1793), p. 73. 8. Kant (1785), p. 92. 9. Kant (1788), p. 89. 10. Kant (1785), p. lOS. II. Kant (1788), p. 89.

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12. 13. (1977), 14. 15. (1980),

Kant (178S), p. 121. Rawls, "The Basic Structure as Subject," American Philosophical Quarrerly p. 165. Rawls (1971), p. 560. Rawls, "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory," Journal of Philosophy 11 p. 543. 16. Mill (1849), p. 485. 17. Rawls (1971), pp. 101-102. 18. The account that follows is a tentative formulation of themes requiring more detailed elaboration and support. 19. Croly, The Promise of American life (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), pp. 270-273. 20. Beer, "Liberalism and the National Idea," The Public Interest, Fall (1966), PP· 70-82. 21. Sec, for example, Laurence Tribe, American Constitutional lAw (Mineola: The Foundation Press, 1978), pp. 2-3. 22. See Ronald Dworkin, "Liberalism," in Stuart Hampshire, ed., Public and Private Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 136.

Michael J. Sandel is Associate Professor of Government at Harvard University. He

is the author of Liberalism and the Limits of Justice.

Rawls and Individualism C. P.

DE L AN E Y ,

Chairntlln,

Department of Philosophy, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana 46556. The most characteristic strand of Rawls' A Theory of Justice is his strategy of justifying certain principles of justice by way of hypothetical choices made by self-interested individuals behind a veil of ignorance. Critics from both the right (Aristotelians) and the left (Marxists) have focused on this feature of his theory in mounting arguments to the effect that Rawls' account of justice is simply the narrow individualism ~f t~e modern liberal tradition in contemporary dress. The pivotal notion m the multi-faceted polemic is "individualism." In this paper I want to explore the extent to which Rawls' position is and is not individuali~tic prior to examining what can be said for and against the individualism his position actually embodies. I.

Rawls' critics from both the right and the left share an argument form that calls for closer scrutiny. Allowing for a certain degree ?f simplification, the same form can be seen to be embodied in two dif· ferent lines of attack: A. Rawls' view of society is narrowly individualistic because on his account the people in the decisive choice situation are characterized &socially and ahistorically; B. Rawls' view of persons is narrowly individualistic because on his account the people in the decisive choice situation are characterized as having no interest in one another's interests.

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As an additional complication, in most discussions these arguments are not kept distinct and are often run together as if they were making the same point. The first observation to be made about these generalized arguments is that they bear on two quite different senses of "individualism." Argument A bears on metaphysical individualism (atomism) which in this case is the view that social wholes are simple aggregates of their component individuals; whereas argument B bears on ethical individualism (egoism), in this case the view that human action is/ought to be guided solely by self-interest. This being accurate, the thrust of argument A is that Rawls' position is vitiated by a metaphysically "abstract" view of persons while the thrust of argument B is that Rawls' position is vitiated by an ethically "empoverished" view of persons. It should be apparent that these are two quite different senses of "individualism"; and, however they may be related historically or even conceptually, they should be kept distinct. The second observation to be made about both of these generalized arguments is considerably more tendentious; I think they both involve the same fundamental mistake, a mistake which completely undermines them as arguments against Rawls' position. In the examination of any argued position one must clearly distinguish between the substantive conclusions of the position and the justification strategies employed in recommending those conclusions. This is not to say that these two ftatures of a total account are unrelated; but however closely related they are, it is surely still an error to move directly from characteristics of arguments for a position to characteristics of the position itself. The general character of this fundamental error can be appreciated by considering other domains. Does a probabilistic justification of a set of epistemic principles thereby commit you to only probabilistic epistemic Principles? Does a historical defense of certain moral principles thereby commit you to merely historical moral principles? And, does a prudential justification of certain political principles thereby commit you to only prudential political principles? I would submit that the answer to each in this series of questions is "no" because characteristics of the way in which a position is justified do not automatically translate into characteristics of the substantive content of the position as justified. If in a given case, there is a positive transition to be made, a specific argwnent to that effect has to be adduced. Nothing in the general form of argument licenses the inference. Arguments A and B above embody just such an unjustified transition. Both presume that because individuals in the initial choice situation are characterized abstractly and/or self-interestedly, then it must be the case that a society informed by Rawlsian substantive principles would be a~oznistic and/or egoistic. As it stands, this line of. objection in_volves a sunple misunderstanding of Rawls' position, a m1sunderstanding that seems to be without excuse given Rawls' explicit attempt to set the matter straight:

Notes and Discussion 113

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The fact that in the original position the parties are characterized as not interested in one another's concerns does not entail that persons in ordinary life that hold the ·principles that would be agreed to are similarly disinterested in one another.... The motiva· tion of the persons in the original position must not be confused with the motivations of persons in everyday life that accept the principles that would be chosen and have the corresponding sense of justice (p. 148).1 Rawls here explicitly anticipates and rejects the lines of argument expressed in A and B. Again, at the very end of his book, he explicitly responds to the objection that the contract view embodies a narrowly individualistic doctrine for the above reasons with the comment that "once the point of the assumption of mutual disinterest is understood, the objection seems misplaced" (p. 584). How then does one explain this basic misconstrual of Rawls, a mis· construal that revolves around the role of "the people in the original position"? It is my contention that the misunderstanding grows out of a false concretization of his "people in the original position." Concretely, there simply are no people in the initial choice situation. This is simply a figurative way of talking about constraints that Rawls maintains are reasonable to put on any argument for one view of justice over another: To say that a certain conception of justice would be chosen in the original position is equivalent to saying that rational delibera· tion satisfying certain conditions and restrictions would reach a certain conclusion. If necessary, the argument to this result co~d be set out more formally. I shall, however, speak throughout. 111 terms of the notion of the original position. It is more economical and suggestive (p. 138). All ~e talk about people in the original position could easily be rephraSed m terms of a rubric like, "In this discussion we will restrict our arguments to thes~ kinds of premises for these reasons." And, of course, there may be many reasons for restricting arguments for a social arrangem~nt to ,tho_se of a certain kind, which reasons may have nothing to d~ Wlth one s vxews about the relations of real individuals to society or abou what motivates real individuals. Rawls is, after all, attempting to construct a theory of justice ~d the ge~eral canons of theory construction may well urge that cert~ con~t~ts be put on the kinds of premises employed. Moreover, ~ additional constraints on the premises. The aim is not simply to prese~t ~~~ect ac~o~t of the matter but to present it in such a way tha~~s convmcmg as opposed to other accounts of the matter and

(~~~ Rawls,

A Theory of Justice ndge: Harvard University Press,

1971). All the page references in

paper are to this book.

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thiS

function as an effective guide for action in the public forum. Given these various considerations, then, there would seem to be more to a good argument in political philosophy than that the premises be true and that the conclusions follow from them. For theoretical reasons we would want the premises to be as minimal as possible and for practical reasons we would want them to be acceptable to those to whom the argument is directed. So, even from a theoretical point of view there is much to recommend that arguments for an altruistic conclusion not be based on altruistic premises, and from a practical point of view there is much to recommend that arguments directed against utilitarians assume no more than self-interest in the premises. These concerns for theoretical power and practical effectiveness come together to recommend minimal· istic assumptions. It would be a mistake to infer from this that Rawls' conclusions must be similarly minimalistic. The whole strategy is to the opposite effect. Furthermore, the inference from these restrictions on the premises of his argument (that is, his characterization of the people in the original position) to claims about what must be his views on the nature of society and the motivations of persons seems doubly gratuitous in the face of Rawls' suggestion that he could derive the same conclusions from social and altruistic premises: The combination of mutual disinterest and the veil of ignorance achieves the same purpose as benevolence. . . . Furthermore, this pair of assumptions has enormous advantages over benevolence plus knowledge. As I have noted, the latter is so complex that no definite theory at all can be worked out. . . . The combination of mutual disinterest plus the veil of ignorance has the merits of simplicity and clarity while at the same time ensuring the effects of what are at first sight morally more attractive assumptions. And if it is asked why should one not postulate benevolence with the veil of ignorance, the answer is that there is no need for such a strong condition. Moreover, it would defeat the purpose of grounding a theory of justice on weak stipulations (pp. 148-49). Here Rawls suggests that it is not even necessary that he characterize the initial choice situation in an "individualistic" manner to get his conclusions. The conclusions would follow from a characterization in terms of either "knowledge and altruism," or "ignorance and altruism," or "ignorance and self-interest." But the first characterization would be unwieldy and the second unnecessarily strong. So for both theoretical and practical reasons it ' is methodologically preferable to characterize the initial choice situation in the third manner. It is clear that this is a methodological stipulation made with good reason rather than _the expression of substantive beliefs about social reality or human motivato tion. In fact, one might say that the whole p.oint of !he ~roject show that even from such "individualistic" premzses one IS driven to non·

!s

Notes and Discussion

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individualistic" conclusions. Hence, to point to his individualistic premises and to infer from these that he must therefore have individualistic conclusions is to condemn the project without a hearing and a fortiori without an argument. II. Of course, it does not follow from the unacceptability of arguments A and B that Rawls' substantive position is not individualistic in the two relevant senses. The question is still open as to whether or not it em· bodies an atomistic conception of society and/or an egoistic conception of human motivation. I would like to argue in this section that in fact the position is not individualistic in either of these senses in that the structures and values of community are important ingredients in his view. That it is Rawls' intention to provide a central place for these dimen· sions of community in his account he makes quite explicit:

Justice as fairness has a central place for the value of communi~. . . . The essential idea is that we want to account for the soctal values, for the intrinsic good of institutional, community, ~d associative activities, by a conception of justice that in its theorett~ basis is individualistic. . . . From this conception, however indi· vidualistic it might seem, we must eventually explain the value of community. Otherwise the theory of justice cannot succeed (pp. 264-65). Far from ignoring the social nature of man and the altruistic features ~~m~ motivation, the intention seems clearly to be to prov~de a JUsbftcatlOn for these that does not beg the crucial questions at 15.sue: But: of ~ourse, there may be many slips between intention and execu~100 ' so lt ,mtght still be argued that in spite of these expressed int~n~o~s, Rawls substantive view may in fact remain narrowly individualistic 10 o~e or both senses. In my opinion a careful consideration of the text wtll not support this interpretation. With regard to the charge of atomism not only does Rawls take cognizance of the social and historical natu're of man but he finds the co~munitarian claims made in reference to these features of human existence totally uncontroversial:

?f

The socia · I system shapes the wants and aspirations that tts · ci"tizens come to have. It determines in part the sort of persons they w~t to be as well as the sort of persons they are. Thus an eco~o~uc system is not only an institutional device for satisfying extst~g wants and needs but a way of creating and fashioning wants ~ the. future. How men work together now to satisfy their ~rese:f desires affects the desires they will have later on, the kinds tlY persons they will be. These matters are, of course, prefec

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obvious and have always been recognized. They are stressed by economists as different as Marshall and Marx (p. 259). Rawls thinks that most theories of justice accept as obvious any general statement of the socio-historical nature of man. One of the points of his project is to show that his theory (as opposed to other accounts of justice) takes these features of man and society seriously and develops them in a thoroughgoing manner. He begins by distinguishing between instrumental and essential construals of the sociability of human beings, construals which result in what we might term shallow and deep communitarianism respectively: Now the sociability of human beings is not to be understood in a trivial fashion. It does not imply merely that society is necessary for human life, or that by living in a community men acquire needs and interests that prompt them to work together for mutual advantage in certain specific ways allowed for and encouraged by their institutions. Nor is it expressed by the truism that social life is a condition for our developing the ability to speak and think, and to take part in the common activities of society and culture. No doubt even the concepts we use to describe our plans and situation, and even to give voice to our personal wants and purposes, often presuppose a social setting as well as a system of belief and thought that is the outcome of the collective efforts of a long tradition. These facts are certainly not trivial ; but to use them to characterize our ties to one another is to give a trivial interpretation to human sociability. For all these things are equally true of persons who view their relations purely instrumentally (p. 522). The contention here is that on his account the social nature of man is taken essentialJy and deeply in that the common institutions and activities are valued as goods in themselves and not merely as instrumentalities for the increase of more basic individual goods. From Rawls' perspective "we need one another as partners in ways of life that are engaged in1 for their own sake, and the successes and enjoyments of others are necessary for and complimentary to our own good• (pp. 522-23). The historical nature of man is taken as seriously as the social: Our predecessors in achieving certain things leave it up to us to pursue them further; their accomplishments affect our choice of endeavors and define a wider background against which our aims can be understood. To say that man is a historical being is to say that the realizations of the powers of human individuals living at any one time takes the cooperation of many generations (or even societies) over a long period of time. It also impli~s that this cooperation is guided at any moment by an understan~mg of ~~at has been done in the past as it is interpreted by soc1al trad1tion (pp. 524-25).

Notes and Discussion

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Man is seen as essentially an historical being whose very potentialities are fashioned by the historical process. Rawls draws an interesting contrast here between men and lower animals, tying the potentialities of the former to history in ways that those of the latter are not linked. The range of realized abilities of individual men is very much a function of historical development whereas that of lower animals appears relatively impervious to the passage of time. Finally, Rawls underlines the point that this historicity of man is not to be construed merely instrumental but is to be seen as an essential feature of human nature. It is precisely this deep interpretation of the socio-historical nature of man that Rawls' contract theory is designed to take into account. The question of egoism Rawls discusses in much greater detail. Returning to the question of the difference between the motivation of the hypothetical persons in the original position and that which would actually follow from the acceptance of his two principles, Rawls draws the distinction sharply: Clearly the two principles of justice and the principles of obliga· tion and natural duty require us to consider the rights and claims of others. And the sense of justice is a normally effective desire to comply with these restrictions. The motivations of persons in the original position must not be confused with the motivations of persons in everyday life who accept the principles that would be chosen and who have the corresponding sense of justice. In practical affairs an individual does have a ·knowledge of his situation and he can, if he wishes, exploit contingencies to his advantage. Should his sense of justice move him to act on the principles of right that would be adopted in the original position, his desires and aims are surely not egoistic. He voltmtarily takes on the limitations expressed by this interpretation of the moral point of view {p. 148).

~e ~otiv~tion of actual persons in a society informed by Rawls' two ~nctples . IS clearly not that of the hypothetical contractors. In ~e tual SOCiety people would be motivated by the sense of justice whi~ would be the embodiment of the two principles and in virtue of this sensef' · ' ·n . 0 JUStice the people would have "ties of sentiment and affectio and. wo~d want to advance the interests of others and see their en~s attamed (p. 129). Far from being egoistic then individuals with thiS sense 0 f'JUStice · would be motivated in a decidedly ' ' altruistic way. In f act Rawls sees th' f . . · a1 I'deal of f ' . Is sense o JUStice as embodying the classtc ~atermtr to the degree that one can reasonably expect between members a S~Iety. at large (compare p. 106). th This pomt is further driven home in Rawls' explicit treatment off e psychology of mot' t' . . . truals o justice, Rawls mainUW:va~on .. ?oite contrary to eg01st1c co:at people could onl ~ at 1f It were a psychological fact an n . Y pursue theu own interests they would never develop e ective sense of justice. Accordingly he takes it upon himself to shoW 118

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how one could learn to adopt an altruistic perspective as a condition for the stability of his sense of justice. Toward this end he articulates an account of moral development that involves the three stage sequence of the morality of authority, the morality of association, and the morality of principles. In brief, after the introduction to precepts in the caring environment of the family, the child gradually learns to take the point of view of others and to see things from their perspective. Against this background the development of a genuine sense of justice can be understood: Once the attitudes of love and trust and of friendly feeling and mutual confidence have been generated in accordance with the two preceding psychological laws, then the recognition that we and those for whom we care are the beneficiaries of an established and enduring just institution tends to engender in us the corresponding sense of justice. We develop a desire to apply and to act upon the principles of justice once we realize how social arrangements answering to them have promoted our good and that of those with whom we are affiliated. In due course we come to appreciate the ideal of just human cooperation (pp. 473-74 ). In this way the virtue of justice takes form and it is this virtue which then informs our actions. Another consideration that weighs heavily against any egoistic interpretation of Rawls is his treatment of the moralities of supererogation. He views these not as fundamentally different orientations from that of justice but as continuous with it: Thus the moralities of supererogation, those of the saint and the hero, do not contradict the norms of right and justice; they are ma.,ked by the willing adoption by the self of aims continuous with these principles but extending beyond what they enjoin (p. 479). If the concern for justice were merely a matter of self-interest, then the moralities of supererogation would have to be seen as a totally different matter. But Rawls does not see supererogation this way; it is simply a matter of the concern for others being carried to a further stage. The picture of Rawls has of a society informed by the principles of justice is certainly not the picture of an accidental union of competing self-interested individuals. It is the picture of a genuine community: Thus we may say following Humboldt that it is through social union founded upon the needs and potentialities of its members that each person can participate in the total sum of the realized natural assets of the others. We are led to the notion of the community of humankind the members of which enjoy one another's excellences and individuality elicited by free institutions, and they recognize the

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good of each as an element in the complete activity the whole scheme of which is consented to and gives pleasure to all (p. 523). It is in the system of justice as fairness as he construes it that "persons

will develop a secure sense of their own worth that forms the basis of the love of human kind" (p. SOl).

III. Having argued, first, that the standard arguments for the view that Rawls' position is individualistic in one or both of the pejorative senses of that term are fallacious, and, secondly, that his position is not in fact individualistic in these senses, I now want to conclude by articulat· ing some senses in which hie; position is individualistic-and defensibly so. There is a minimal sense in which the theory could be viewed as methodologically individualistic, and two further senses in which it could be seen to be substantively individualistic. There is a modest kind of methodological individualism embodied in the constraints Rawls puts on his arguments for his theory of justice; namely, his general adoption of the contract model and, more specifically, his minimalist characterization of the people in the initial choice situa· tion. However, on my reading of Rawls this does not commit him .at all to a full-blown methodological individualism (the view that all social phenomena are to be explained in terms of facts about individuals) but can be construed simply as the adoption of the most effective strategy for mounting an argument against utilitarianism. It may or may ~ot be ~ffective base for arguing against perfectionist or Marxist tbeones of ~ustice, but this is beside the point. Utilitarianism is the only fullY articulated theory of justice in the field and thus Rawls is rightly con· cerned to focus his presentation so as to 'provide a genuine and attractive alternative to the view that will otherwise bold sway by default. We should take seriously his stated aim for the argument of the book:

:m

And while, of course, it is not a fully satisfactory theory, it offers, 1 believe, an alternative to the utilitarian view which bas for so lo?g held the pre-eminent place in our moral philosophy. I b~ve tned to present the theory of justice as a viable systematic doctnne so that the idea of maximizing the good does not hold sw~Y by default. '!'he criticism of teleological theories cannot fruit~~ proceed Piecemeal. We must attempt to construct another · . 0 ~ view which has the same virtues of clarity and system bu~ ~~I.ch Yields a more discriminating interpretation of our moral sensibihttes (p. 587).

ov~raU .thrust of the book is to show that a finally adequate theo~ ~f JUSt~ce (If such exists) will look more like justice as fairness th d hke utilitaria · G'Iven thts . aim, . t . . . msm. the general contract stra.tegy .anaThe.

he mmtmahst characterization of the people in the initial choice sdU

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tion seem to be constraints on argument forms ideally suited to the project. They need not be read as involving any general commitment even to methodological individualism. There are at least two senses in which Rawls' theory can be seen to be substantively individualistic. In the first place, the theory is an attempt to give an account of the just state that accommodates the possibly different conceptions of human fulfillment of its individual members rather than an account that prescribes one overall ideal of human fulfillment. Many . see this ·kind of substantive pluralism as individualistic, and it may well be; but it seems to me to be a !kind of individualism that is perfectly defensible on both theoretical and practical grounds. People are different; they have different life projects and different kinds and degrees of satisfaction. The structure of society should acknowledge rather than ignore this fact of life. Moreover, the recognition of this fact does not involve the relativistic view that all conceptions of human fulfillment are equally good but simply the acknowledgment that given the kinds of beings we are there is a range of plausible ideals of human fulfillment and that it is part of the common respect and concern we owe each other to foster self-determination rather than prescribe conformity with regard to overall life projects. But even if the case were otherwise, that is, if there was but one rather specific ideal of human fulfillment that was philosophically defensible, the individualism under discussion here would still be recommended on practical grounds. We do in fact live in a pluralistic society; so our account of justice, if it is to be an effective force in this society, should address itself to this reality. We should, of course, simultaneously engage the more basic moral questions that may underlie this issue; but all reflection on justice need not wait upon the resolution of these deeper problems. This being the case, should we want our philosophical reflection on justice to play an active role in the improvement of the human condition rather than be merely idle speculation, then our philosophical theories at this level should speak to the pluralistic realities of our concrete situation. Not only do I see this kind of individualism as defensible, but I am inclined to think that the only serious objection in this area is to the effect that in this regard Rawls is not individualistic enough. It has been objected that the minimal list of primary goods is not neutral vis-avis alternative life projects but rather implicitly prescribes a single ideal of human excellence. Specifically, the charge is that in its focus on liberty (particularly political liberty) and in its employment of what might be termed the acquisitive principle (one would prefer more rather than less) Rawls' theory comes up short of genuine pluralism and involves the prescription of one ideal of human excellence. This objection has to be taken seriously, but I think that there is on balance an adequate Rawlsian reply. The list of primary goods can be plausibly defended as providing simply the necessary conditions for the realization of any Philosophically defensible ideal of human excellence and the operation on them (more rather than less) regarded as the most reasonable attitude Notes and Discussion

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to adopt "in the original position"; and, as we have seen, this in no way involves the recommendation of acquisitiveness. as a virtue in the real world. Again, it can be defended on methodological rather than substantive grounds. There is a second sense in which Rawls' account is substantively individualistic, namely, the sense in which any "rights theory" will defend the moral inviolability of the individual person against all collectivist conceptions of the just society whether they be of the classical perfec· tionist, utilitarian, or Marxist variety. Rights theories are individualistic in the sense that they maintain there can be no justifiable trade-offs of the life prospects of some just so others can be better off. Far from being an objection, however, this seems to me to be an endorsement. Surely the fundamental objection to all "common-good" doctrines of whatever variety has been their disenfranchisement of the individual as over against the totality, whether that totality be a matter of the "numbers" in democracies or of "vision" in the various perfection· ist ideologies. Rawls' project is an attempt to articulate a conception of justice that takes into account the dimension of social responsibility without violating the dimension of moral autonomy. Again I am inclined to think that the only serious objection in this area is one to the effect that Rawls' is not individualistic enough. The locus of complaint is the difference principle, and the specific concern is that Rawls' suggestion that we think of individual talents as common holdings of the society drags him back into the collectivism of his 0 P' ponents. I believe that this concern can be allayed, however, by a closer scrutiny of the text. What Rawls says is that "the difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of na~ral talents as a common asset and to share in the benefits of this distnbu· tion ~~t~ver it turns out to be" (p. 101 ). Rawls is not here claiming that mdtVIdual natural talents are common assets but simply that one way of thinking about the difference principle is in terms of "an agreement to regard" natural talents as a common asset. It is still the indivi~ual who autonomously agrees to so regard them, and his agreement Is a manifestation of the conviction that individual rights are n~t ~restricted but must be tempered so as not to undermine the ~as~~ r~ghts 0~ others. Rawls' whole program is an attempt to balance mdi· VIdual nghts and social responsibility An . . 'tical overall evaluatiOn of Rawls' project would involve the en . evaluation of numerous facets of the theory not even mentioned in thi~ pa~er.. What I hope to have shown, however, is that many of the standatn ~bJ~ctlons to it are ~d~entally misguided. Objections which draW 0 rwsm~ ~bout the socio-htstorical nature of man and/or about the povertY of egmstic motivational theories can, I believe, be blocked in the. waY: 1 have suggested here. This is not to say of course that there IS no some profounder ob JectiOn · · even m . thts . very' neighborhood. . ' Bu t w· order h Dlore for the 0 b · · s 'fi Jectton to be relevant it will have to be made muc pect c-and thereby much more contentious.

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AMY GUTMANN

Communitarian Critics of Liberal ism

We are witnessing a revival of communitarian criticisms of liberal political theory. Like the critics of the I g6os, those of the I g8os fault liberalism for being mistakenly and irreparably individualistic. But the new wave of criticism is not a mere repetition of the old. Whereas the earlier critics were inspired by Marx, the recent critics are inspired by Aristotle and Hegel. The Aristotelian idea that justice is rooted in "a community whose primary bond is a shared understanding both of the good for man an~ the good of that community" explicitly informs Alasdair Macintyre in hiS criticism of John Rawls and Robert Nozick for their neglect of desert;• and Charles Taylor in his attack on "atomistic" liberals who "try to defend · · · the priority of the individual and his rights over society.,,. The_ ~e­ gelian conception of man as a historically conditioned being iinplicidY informs both Roberto Unger's and Michael Sandel's rejection of the liberal view of man as a free and rational being. 3 . · d l LiberaliSfll Thts revtew essay concentrates on the arguments presented in Michael San e • orali

and the Limits ofJustice (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982); Sandel, "M tY and the_ Liberalldeal," The New Republic, May 7 . 1 ga4 , pp. IS-I7; Alasdair Mac.~~s~: Af!e~ Vrrtu~ (No~ Dam~: Notre Dame University Press, 1981); and Macintyre.' y, triottsm a Virtue? The Lrndley Lecture (University of Kansas: Department of PhiloSO~. Man:h. 2.6, 1984). -~ther works to which I refer are Benjamin Barber, Strong l)emOCT ); Parhcrpatory Polrtrcs for a New Age (Berkeley: University of California PreSS, 1g84 s ~harles Taylor, "Atomism," in Alkis Kontos, ed., Powers, Possessions and Freedoms: E~ 111 Honor of C. B. Macpherson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1979), PP· 3 ard and "The Diversity of Goods," in Utilitarianism and Beyond, ed. Amartya Sen and Be~ Williams (New York: Cambridge University Press, Ig82.), pp. 12.9-44; Roberto Manga s Unger,_Knowledge and Politics (New York: Free Press, 1 975); and Michael Walzer, spJaert of Justrce (New York: Basic Books, 1 ga3). 1 · Macintyre, After Virtue, pp. 23 :~.- 33 . 2. "Atomism," p. 39. J. Knowledge and Politics, pp. 85, 191-231; Limits, pp. 17g-8o.

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The political implications of the new communitarian criticisms are correspondingly more conservative. Whereas the good society of the old critics was one of collective property ownership and equal political power, the good society of the new critics is one of settled traditions and established identities. For many of the old critics, the role of women. within the family was symptomatic of their social and economic oppression; for Sandel, the family serves as a model of community and evidence of a good greater than justice.4 For the old critics, patriotism was an irrational sentiment that stood in the way of world peace; for Macintyre, the particularistic demands of patriotism are no less rational than the universalistic demands of justice.s The old critics were inclined to defend deviations from majoritarian morality in the name of nonrepression; the new critics are inclined to defend the efforts of local majorities to ban offensive activities in the name of preserving their community's "way of life and the values that sustain it. "6 The subject of the new and the old criticism also differs. The new critics recognize that Rawls's work has altered the premises and principles of contemporary liberal theory. Contemporary liberals do not assume that people are possessive individualists; the source of their individualism lies at a deeper, more metaphysical level. According to Sandel, the problem is that liberalism has faulty foundations: in order to achieve absolute priority for principles of justice, liberals must hold a set of implausible metaphysical views about the self. They cannot admit, for example, that our personal identities are partly defined by our communal attachments. 1 According to Macintyre, the problem is that liberalism lacks any foundations at all. It cannot be rooted in the only kind of social life that provides a basis for moral judgments, one which "views man as having an essence which defines his true end. "8 Liberals are therefore bound either to claim a false certainty for their principles or to admit that morality is merely a matter of individual opinion, that is, is no morality at all. The critics claim that many serious problems originate in the foundational faults of liberalism. Perhaps the most troubling for liberals is 4· Sandel, Limits, pp. 3-31, 33-34. 16g. 5· "Is Patriotism a Virtue?" pp. 15-18 and passim. 6. Sandel, "Morality and the Liberal Ideal," p. 17. 1· Limits, pp. 64-65, 1~73· 8. After Virtue, p. 52.

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their alleged inability to defend the basic principle that "individual rights cannot be sacrificed for the sake of the general good. "g Because Sandel and Macintyre make the most detailed and, if true, devastating cases against believing in a liberal politics of rights, I shall focus for the rest of this review on their arguments. The central argument of Sandel's book is that liberalism rests on a series of mistaken metaphysical and metaethical views: for example, that the claims of justice are absolute and universal; that we cannot know each other well enough to share common ends; and that we can define our personal identity independently of socially given ends. Because its foundations are necessarily Hawed, Sandel suggests in a subsequent article that we should give up the "politics of rights" for a "politics of the common good. "10 Macintyre begins his book with an even more "disquieting suggestion": that our entire moral vocabulary, of rights and the common good, is in such "grave disorder" that "we have-very largely, if not entirely-lost our comprehension, both theoretical and practical, of morality. "11 To account for how "we" have unknowingly arrived at this unenviable social condition, Macintyre takes us on an intriguing tour of moral history, from Homeric Greece to the present. By the end of the tour, we learn that the internal incoherence of liberalism forces us to choose "Nietzsche or Aristotle," a politics of the will to power or one of communally defined virtue. 13 THE LIMITS OF COMMUNITARIAN CRITICISM

Do the critiques succeed in undermining liberal politics? If the onlY foundations available to liberal politics are faulty, then perhaps one need not establish a positive case for communitarian politics to establish ~e ~laim that liberal politics is philosophically indefensible. 13 Althou~ thiS Is the logic of Sandel's claim concerning the limits of liberal jusuce, be · . al ng · bts gives no general argument to support his conclusion that tiber g. S~del, "Morahty and the Liberal Ideal," p. 16. 10. Ib1d., p. 17. 11. After Virtue, pp. 1_ 5_ 12. Ibid., pp. 49, 103-13, 23~45 . andel s~3· 1 say "perhaps" ~ause if defensibility ts relative to our alternatives, then~~ th would have to establish the positive case for communttarian politics before c at the faulty foundations of liberal politics render it indefensible.

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are indefensible. 1 4 He reaches this conclusion instead on the basis of an interpretation and criticism of Rawls's theory, which he reasonably assumes to be the best theory liberalism has yet to offer. Sandel argues that despite Rawls's efforts to distance himself from Kantian metaphysics, he fails. Sandel attributes Rawls's failure to his acceptance of the "centtal claim" of deontology, "the core conviction Rawls seeks above aU to defend. It is the claim that 'justice is the first virtue of social institutions.' "1 s As Rawls presents it, the "primacy of justice" describes a moral requirement applicable to institutions. Sandel interprets Rawls as also making a metaethical claim: that the foundations of justice must be independent of all social and historical contingencies Without being transcendental. 16 Why saddle Rawls's moral argument for the primacy of justice with this meaning? To be sure, Rawls himself argues that "embedded in the Principles of justice ... is an ideal of the person that provides an Archimedean point for judging the basic structure of society. "1 ' But to translate this passage into a claim that the grounds of justice can be noncontingent 14. The general argument that can be constructed from Sandel's work (using his conceptual framework) is, I think, the following: ( 1) To accept a politics based on rights entails believing that justice should have absolute priority over all our particular ends (our conception of the good); (2) To accept the priority of justice over our conception of the good entails believing that our identities can be established prior to the good (otherwise our conception of the good will enter into our conception of justice); (3) Since our identities are constituted by our conception of the good, justice cannot be prior. Therefore we cannot consistently believe In the politics of rights. But each of the steps in this argument are suspect: (1) We may accept the politics of rights not because justice is prior to the good, but because our search for the good requires society to protect our right to certain basic freedoms and welfare goods; (2) Justice may be prior to the good not because we are "antecedently individuated," but because giving priority to justice may be the fairest way of sharing the goods of citizenship with people who do not accept our conception of the good; (3) Our identities are probably not constituted, at least not exclusively, by our con· ception of the good. If they were, one could not intelligibly ask: "What kind of person do I want to become?" Yet the question reflects an important part (although not necessarily the whole) of our search for identity. If, however, we assume by definition that our identities are constituted by our good, then we must consider our sense of justice to be part of our identities. My commitment to treating other people as equals, and therefore to respecting their freedom of religion, is just as elemental a part of my identity (on this understanding) as my being Jewish, and therefore celebrating Passover with my family and friends. 15. Limits, p. 15. Emphasis added. See A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 3-4, 586. 16. Limits, pp. 16-17. Rawls must, in Sandel's words, "ftnd a standpoint neither compromised by its implication in the world nor dissociated and so disqualified by detachment." 17. Rawls, A Theory of Justice, p. 584; see also pp. 26o-62.

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ignores most of what Rawls says to explain his Archimedean point, the nature of justification, and Kantian constructivism.' 8 "Justice as fairness is not at the mercy, so to speak, of existing wants and interests. It sets up an Archirnedean point ... without invoking a priori considerations. "' 9 By requiring us to abstract from our particular but not our shared inter· ests, the original position with its "veil of ignorance" and "thin theory of the good" avoids reliance on both existing preferences and a priori con· siderations in reasoning about justice. The resulting principles of justice, then, clearly rely on certain contingent facts: that we share some interests (in primary goods such as income and self-respect), but not others (in a particular religion or form of family life); that we value the freedom to choose a good life or at least the freedom from having one imposed upon us by political authority. If we do not, then we will not accept the con· straints of the original position. Rawls's remarks on justification and Kantian constructivism make ex· plicit the contingency of his principles of justice. The design of the orig· inal position must be revised if the resulting principles do not "accom· modate our firmest convictions. "~o Justification is not a matter of deduction from certain premises, but rather "a matter of the mutual support of many considerations, of everything fitting together into one coherent view."2 ' Since Rawls accords the view "that justice is the first virtue of social institutions" the status of a "common sense conviction,'~2 this view is part of what his theory must coherently combine. Rawls therefore does not, nor need he, claim more for justice as fairness th~ that "given our history and the traditions embedded in our public life, It 1 8: In int~~g Rawls, I rely (as does Sandel) on passages from both A Theo:¥rt JustiCe and Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures 1g8o. 1 Journal ofPhiloso~h.y 17, no. 9 (September 1g8o), pp. 515-72. Someone might reaso:!! argue that n~ u~til 'The Dewey Lectures" does Rawls consistently and clear!~ ~~fe onl ~tion on JUstification that I attribute to him. Had Sandel directed his cnttci.SIII agamst A Theory of Justict, his interpretation would have been more credible. But he 5 could not have sustained his central claim that Rawls's principles and liberalism more generally must rest on Implausible metaethical grounds. ,. es . 19· A Theory of Justict, p. 261. Emphasis added. See also "The Dewey Lectures, p pp. 564-67. 20 · A Theory of Justice, p. 20. The reasoning is circular, but not viciously 50• sin.~~ must also be prepared to revise our weaker judgments when principles match our conSl convtctio_ns, until we reach "reflective equilibrium." 21. lb1d., pp. 2 1 , 579. 22. Ibid., p. 5ss.

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is the most reasonable doctrine for us. We can find no better charter for our social world. "2 3 Rawls could be wrong about our firmest convictions or what is most reasonable for us. But instead of trying to demonstrate this, Sandel argues that Rawls must show that the content and claims of justice are independent of all historical and social particularities. 2 4 If this is what constitutes deontological metaphysics, then it is a metaphysics that Rawls explicitly and consistently denies. What metaphysics must Rawlsian liberalism then embrace? Several commentators, along with Rawls himself, have argued that liberalism does not presuppose metaphysics. 2 s The major aim of liberal justice is to find principles appropriate for a society in which people disagree fundamentally over many questions, including such metaphysical questions as the nature of personal identity. Liberal justice therefore does not proVide us with a comprehensive morality; it regulates our social institutions, not our entire lives. It makes claims on us "not because it expresses our deepest self-understandings," but because it represents the fairest possible modus vivendi for a pluralistic society. 26 The characterization of liberalism as nonmetaphysical can be misleading however. Although Rawlsian justice does not presuppose only one metaphysical view, it is not compatible with all such Views. Sandel is correct in claiming that the Kantian conception of people as free and equal is incompatible with the metaphysical conception of the self as "radically situated" such that "the good of community ... (is) so thoroughgoing as to reach beyond the motivations to the subject of motivations. "2 7 Sandel seems to mean that communally given ends can so totally constitute people's identities that they cannot appreciate the value of justice. Such an understanding of human identity would (according to 23. "The Dewey Lectures," p. 519. Cf. Sandel, Limits, p. JO. 24. Limits, p. 30. Sometimes Sandel comes close to making a more lim1ted but potentially

more plausible argument-that Rawls derives his principles of justice from the wrong set of historical and social particulaiities: from (for example) our identification with all free and rational beings rather than with particular communities. Such an argument, if successful, would establish different limits, and limits of only Rawlsian liberalism. 25. See Rawls, "The Independence of Moral Theory," Proceedings and Addresses oftlu! American Philosophical Association 48 ( 1975), pp. 5-22.. 26. Charles Larmore, "Review of Liberalism and the Limits of justice," Tlu! Journal of Philosophy 8 1 , no. 6 (June 1 ga4 ): 338. See also Rawls, "The Dewey Lectures," p. 542. 27. Sandel, Limits, pp. 2o-21,' 149.

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constructivist standards of verification) undermine the two principles. 28 To be justified as the political ideals most consistent with the "public culture of a democratic society,"2 9 Rawlsian principles therefore have to express some (though not all) of our deepest self-understandings. Rawls must admit this much metaphysics-that we are not radically situated selves-if justification is to depend not on "being true to an order antecedent to and given to us, but ... [on] congruence with our deeper understanding of ourselves and our aspirations. "Jo If this, rather than Kantian dualism, is the metaphysics that liberal justice must admit, Sandel's critique collapses. Rawls need not (and he does not) claim that "justice is the first virtue of social institutions" in aU societies to show that the priority of justice obtains absolutely in those societies in which people disagree about the good life and consider their· freedom to choose a good life an important good.J' Nor need Rawls assume that human identity is ever totally independent of ends and relations to others to conclude that justice must always command our moral allegiance unless love and benevolence make it unnecessary.J 2 Deontological justice thus can recognize the conditional priority of justice without embracing "deontological metaethics" or collapsing into teleology. Sandel has failed therefore to show that the foundations of rights are mistaken. MISSING FOUNDATIONS?

Macintyre argues that the foundations are missing: The best reason for asserting so bluntly that there are no such rights is indeed of precisely the same type as the best reason which we possess for asserting that there are no witches . . . : every attempt to give good reasons for believing there are such rights has failed.JJ The analogy, properly drawn, does not support Macintyre's position. The be~t reason that people can give for believing in witches is that the eXIstence of witches explains (supposedly) observed physical pbenom·

s:,s. .~wls, "The Dewey Lectures," pp. 534-35 564-67. See also A TheoTIJ of justiCe; ~mi~s ~ theory of justice does, indeed, presup~se a theory of the good, but within ~., this does not PreJudge the choice of the sort of persons that men want mphasis added.) 29· ~wls, ''The Dewey Lectures," p. 51 s. 30 . Ibid., p. 519· 3~· id., pp. 516-24. Cf. Sandel, Limits, pp. 2 g_40 . 3 · ARftawls, ~ Theory of Justice, pp. s6o-n Cf. Sandel, Limits, pp. 47-65. JJ. er Vtrtue, p. a7.

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ena. Belief in witches therefore directly competes with belief in physics, and loses out in the competition. The best reason for taking rights seriously is of a different order: believing in rights is one way of regulating and constraining our behavior toward one another in a desirable manner. This reason does not compete with physics; it does not require us to believe that rights "exist" in any sense that is incompatible with the "laws of nature" as established by modern science.J4 Macintyre offers another, more historical argument for giving up our belief in rights. "Why," he asks, "should we think about our modern uses of good, right, and obligatory in any different way from that in which we think about late eighteenth-century Polynesian uses oftaboo?"Js Like the Polynesians who used taboo without any understanding of what it meant beyond "prohibited," we use human right without understanding its meaning beyond "moral trump." If the analogy holds, we cannot use the idea correctly because we have irretrievably lost the social context in which its proper use is possible. But on a contextualist view, it is reasonable for us to believe in human rights: many of the most widely accepted practices of our society-equality of educational opportunity, careers open to talent, punishment conditional on intent-treat people as relatively autonomous moral agents. Insofar as we are committed to maintaining these practices, we are also committed to defending human rights.J6 This argument parallels MacIntyre's contextualist defense of Aristotelian virtue: that the established practices of heroic societies supported the Aristotelian idea that every human life has a socially determined telos. Each person had a "given role and status within a well-defined and highly determinate system of roles and statuses," which fully defined his identity: "a man who tried to withdraw himself from his given position ... would be engaged in the enterprise of trying to make himself disappear. "37 If moral beliefs depend upon supporting social practices for their validity, then we have more reason to believe in a liberal politics of rights than in an Aristotelian politics of the common good. In our society, it does not logically follow that: "I am someone's son or daughter, someone 34· I am grateful to Thomas Scanlon for suggesting this reply. 35· After Virtue, p. 107. 36. We need not be committed to a thoroughly deontological moral apparatus. Sophisticated consequentialist theories justify these same practices and are consistent with believing in rights. 37- After Virtue, pp. JJ7. ug.

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else's cousin or uncle; I am a citizen of this or that city, a member of this or that guild or profession; I belong to this clan, that tribe, this nation[,] hence what is good for me has to be THE good for one who inhabits these roles. "J8 One reason it does not follow is that none of these roles carries with it only one socially given good. What follows from "what is good for me has to be the good for someone who was born female, into a first-generation American, working-class Italian, Catholic family"? Had Geraldine Ferraro asked, following Sandel, "Who am I?" instead of"What ends should I choose?" an answer would not have been any easier to come by.J9 The Aristotelian method of discovering the good by inquiring into the social meaning of roles is of little help in a society in which most roles are not attached to a single good. Even if there is a single good attached to some social roles (as caring for the sick is to the role of a nurse, or searching for political wisdom to the function of political phi· losophers, let us suppose), we cannot accurately say that our roles de· termine our good without adding that we often choose our roles because of the good that is attached to them. The unencumbered self is, in this sense, the encumbrance of our modem social condition. But the existence of supporting social practices is certainly not a suf· ficient condition, arguably not even a necessary one, for believing in liberal rights rather thari Aristotelian virtue. The practices that support liberal rights may be unacceptable to us for reasons that carry more moral weight than the practices themselves; we may discover moral reasons (even within our current social understandings) for establishing ne~ practices that support a politics of the common good. My point here 15 not that a politics of rights is the only, or the best, possible politics for our society, but that neither Macintyre's nor Sandel's critique succeeds in undennining liberal rights because neither gives an accurate accou~t 0~ _their foundations. Macintyre mistakenly denies liberalism th~ posst· bility of foundations; Sandel ascribes to liberalism foundations 1t need not have. THE TYRANNY OF DUALISMS

The critics' interpretive method is also mistaken. It invites us to see the moral universe in dualistic terms: either our identities are independent 38· Ibid., pp.

17Q.

204-S

(emphasis added). Sandel makes a very similar point in Limits, P·

39· Limits, pp. sS-sg.

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of our ends, leaving us totally free to choose our life plans, or they are constituted by community, leaving us totally encumbered by socially given ends; either justice takes absolute priority over the good or the good takes the place of justice; either justice must be independent of all historical and social particularities or virtue must depend completely on the particular social practices of each society; and so on. The critics thereby do a disservice to not only liberal but communitarian values, since the same method that reduces liberalism to an extreme metaphysical vision also renders communitarian theories unacceptable. By interpreting Rawls's conception of community as describing "just a feeling," for example, Sandel invites us to interpret Aristotle's as describing a fully constituted identity. The same mode of interpretation that permits Sandel to criticize Rawls for betraying "incompatible commitments" by uneasily combining into one theory "intersubjective and individualistic images" would permit us to criticize Sandel for suggesting that community is "a mode of self-understanding partly constitutive" of our identity. 4o Neither Sandel's interpretation nor his critique is accurate. Macintyre's mode of interpreting modern philosophy similarly divides the moral world into a series of dualisms. The doomed project of modern philosophy, according to Macintyre, has been to convert naturally egoistical men into altruists. "On the traditional Aristotelian view such problems do not arise. For what education in the virtues teaches me is that my good as a man is one and the same as the good of those others with whom I am bound up in human community."4 1 But the real, and recognized, dilemma of modern liberalism, as we have seen, is not that people are naturally egoistical, but that they disagree about the nature of the good life. And such problems also arise on any (sophisticated) Aristotelian view, as Macintyre himself recognizes in the context of distinguishing Aristotelianism from Burkean conservatism: "when a tradition is in good order it is always partially constituted by an argument about the goods the pursuit of which gives to that tradition its particular point and purpose."4>~

The dualistic vision thus tyrannizes over our common sense, which rightly rejects all "easy combinations"-the individualism Macintyre at40. Ibid., p. 1 so. When Sandel characterizes his own preferred "strong" vtew of community, it is one in which people conceive their identity "as defined to some extent by the community of which they are a part." (Emphases added.) 41. After Virtue, pp. 212-13. 42. Ibid., p. 2o6.

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tributes to Sartre and Goffman "according to which the self is detachable from its social and historical roles and statuses" such that it "can have no history,"43 as well as the communitarian vision Macintyre occasionally seems to share with Roberto Unger according to which the "conflict between the demands of individuality and sociability would disappear."44 Because the critics misinterpret the metaphysics of liberalism, they also miss the appeal of liberal politics for reconciling rather than repressing most competing conceptions of the good life. BEYOND METAPHYsics: CoMMUNITARIAN Pouncs Even if liberalism has adequate metaphysical foundations and considerable moral appeal, communitarian politics might be morally better. But Macintyre and Sandel say almost nothing in their books to defend communitarian politics directly. Sandel makes a brief positive case for its comparative advantage over liberalism in a subsequent article. "Where libertarian liberals defend the private economy and egalitarian liberals defend the welfare state," Sandel comments, "communitarians worry about the concentration of power in both the corporate economy and the bureaucratic state, and the erosion of those intermediate forms of community that have at times sustained a more vital public life." But these worries surely do not distinguish communitarians from most contemporary liberals, unless (as Sandel implies) communitarians therefore oppose, or refuse to defend, the market or the welfare state. 45 Sandel makes explicit only one policy difference: "communitarians would be more likelY than liberals to allow a town to ban pornographic bookstores, on the grounds that pornography offends its way of life and the values ~at sustain it." His answer to the obvious liberal worry that such a policY opens the door to intolerance in the name of communal standards is that "intolerance flourishes most where forms of life are dislocated, roots unsettled, traditions undone." He urges us therefore "to revitalize those civic republican possibilities implicit in our tradition but fading in our time."46 What exactly does Sandel mean to imply by the sort of civic republi43 · Ibid., p. 205· See also Sandel, Limits, pp. 40, 150. Cf. p. J8o. 44· ~nowledge and Politics, p. 220• 45. Morality and the Liberal Ideal " p 17 46. Ibid. ' . .

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canism "implicit within our tradition"? Surely not the mainstream of our n:adition that excluded women and minorities, and repressed most sigruficant deviations from white, Protestant morality in ttie name of the common good. We have little reason to doubt that a liberal politics of rights is morally better than that kind of republicanism. But if Sandel is arguing that when members of a society have settled roots and established traditions, they will tolerate the speech, religion, sexual, and associational preferences of ~orities, then history simply does not support his optimism. A great deal of intolerance has come from societies of selves so "confidently situated" that they were sure repression would seiVe a higher cause. 47 The common good of the Puritans of seventeenth-century Salem commanded them to hunt witches; the common good of the Moral Majority of the twentieth century commands them not to tolerate homosexuals. The enforcement of liberal rights, not the absence of settled community, stands between the Moral Majority and the contemporary equivalent of witch hunting. The communitarian critics want us to live in Salem, but not to believe in witches. Or human rights. Perhaps the Moral Majority would cease to be a threat were the United States a communitarian society; benevolence and fraternity might take the place of justice. Almost anything is possible, but it does not make moral sense to leave liberal politics behind on the strengths of such speculations. 48 Nor does it make theoretical sense to assume away the conflicts among competing ends-such as the conflict between communal standards of sexual morality and individual sexual preference-that give rise to the characteristic liberal concern for rights. In so doing, the critics avoid discussing how morally to resolve our conflicts and therefore fail to pro47- Sandel may be correct in claiming that more intolerance has come-in the fonn of fascism-from societies of "atomized, dislocated, frustrated selves." But the truth of this claim does not establish the case for communitarian over liberal politics unless our only choice is to support a society of totally "atomized" or one of totally "settled" selves. This dualistic interpretation of our alternatives seems to lead Sandel to overlook the moral value of establishing some balance between individualism and community, and to underestimate the theoretical difficulty of determining where the proper balance lies. 48. Sandel might want to argue that societies like Salem were not "settled." Perfectly settled communities would not be repressive because every individual's identity would be fully constituted by the community or completely compatible with the community's understanding of the common good. This argument, however, is a truism: a perfectly settled SOCiety would not be repressive, because perfect settlement would leave no dissent to repress.

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vide us with a political theory relevant to our world. They also may overlook the extent to which some of their own moral commitments presuppose the defense of liberal rights. CONSTRUCTIVE POTENTIAL

Even if the communitarian critics have not given good reasons for abandoning liberalism, they have challenged its defenders. One should welcome their work if for no other reason than this. But there is another reason. Communitarianism has the potential for helping us discover a politics that combines community with a commitment to basic liberal values. The critics' failure to undermine liberalism suggests not that there are no communitarian values but that they are properly viewed as supplementing rather than supplanting basic liberal values. We can see the extent to which our moral vision already relies on communitarian values by imagining a society in which no one does more or less than respect everyone else's liberal rights. People do not form ties oflove and friendship (or they do so only insofar as necessary to developing the kind of character that respects liberal rights). They do not join neighborhood association~, political parties, trade unions, civic groups, synagogues, or churches. This might be a perfectly liberal, arguably even a just society, but it is certainl.Y not the best society to which we can aspire. The potential of commurotarianism lies, I think, in indicating the ways in which we can strive to realize not only justice but community through the many social unions of which the liberal state is the super social union. What might some of those ways be? Sandel suggests one possibility: states might "enact laws regulating plant closings, to protect their co~­ munities from the disruptive effects of capital mobility and sudden mdustrial change. "49 This policy is compatible with the priority Rawls gives to liberty and may even be dictated by the best interpretation of the difference principle. But the explicit concern for preventing the disrup~on of local communities is an important contribution of communitariaJllSID to liberalism. We should also, as Sandel suggests, be "troubled by~~ tendency of liberal programs to displace politics from smaller forms assoc~atton · · to more comprehensive ones." But we should not therefore 49· "Morality and the Liberal Ideal," p. 17.

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oppose all programs that limit-or support all those that expand-the jurisdiction of local governments. We may be able to discover ways in which local communities and democracy can be vitalized without violating individual rights. We can respect .the right of free speech by opposing local efforts to ban pornographic bookstores, for example, but still respect the values of community and democratic participation by supporting local (democratic) efforts to regulate the location and manner in which pornographic bookstores display their wares. Attuned to the dangers of dualism, we can appreciate the way such a stand combinesuneasily-liberal and communitarian commitments. Some ways of fostering communal values--1 suspect some of the best way~ntail creating new political institutions rather than increasing the power of existing institutions or reviving old ones. By restoring "those intermediate forms of community that have at times sustained a more vital public life," we are unlikely to control "the concentration of power in both the corporate economy and the bureaucratic state" that rightly worries both communitarians and liberals.so If large corporations and bureaucracies are here to stay, we need to create new institutions to prevent them from imposing (in the name of either efficiency or expertise) their values on those of potentially more democratic communities. Realizing the relatively old idea of workplace democracy would require the creation of radically new economic institutions.s' Recently mandated citizen review boards in areas such as health care, education, and community development have increased interest in democratic participation. Wholehearted political support of such refonns and others yet untried is probably necessary before we can effectively control bureaucratic power.s2 Although the political implications of the communitarian criticisms of liberalism are conservative, the constructive potential of communitarian values is not. Had they developed the constructive potential of communitarian values, the critics might have moved further toward discovering both the

so. Ibid. 51. For a communitarian defense of economic democracy that is not based on a rejection of liberal values see Michael Walzer, Spheres of Justice, PP· 161 and 291-3°3· 52. For a su~gestive agenda of democratic refonns, see Benjamin Barber, Strong ~­ mocracy, pp. 2 6 1_ 307. Although Barber attacks liberal theory as fundament_all,! flaw~ m the first nine chapters, the aim of his agenda for reform in the last ~hapter 1s to re~~ent liberal democracy toward civic engagement and political commuruty, not to raze It (p. 3o8).

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limits of Rawlsian liberalism and a better charter for our social world. Instead, Macintyre concludes that we should be "waiting not for a Godot, but for another-doubtless very different-St. Benedict."sJ The critics tend to look toward the future with nostalgia. We would be better off, by both Aristotelian and liberal democratic standards, if we tried to shape it according to our present moral understandings. At the end of his book, Sandel urges us to remember "the possibility that when politics goes well, we can know a good in common that we cannot know alone." But he has neglected the possibility that the only common good worth striving for is one that is not "an unsettling presence for justice. "54 justice need not be the only virtue of social institutions for it to be better than anything we are capable of putting in its place. The worthy challenge posed by the comrnunitarian critics therefore is not to replace liberal justice, but to improve it. 53· Ibid., p. 245. Roberto Unger similarly concludes Knowledge and Politics waiting for God to speak (p. 235). 54· cr. Sandel, Limits, p. I8J. I am grateful to Robert Amdur, Michael Doyle, Steven Lukes, Susan Moller Okin, Judith Shklar, Dennis Thompson, Michael Walzer, Susan Wolf, and the Editors of Philosophy & Public Affairs for their helpful suggestions.

RAWLS, HEGEL, AND COMMUNITARIANISM SIBYL A. SCHWARZENBACH Baruch College, City University ofNew York

FROM ITS ORIGINS in Moore and Russell's revolt against the British idealists McTaggart and F. H. Bradley, analytic philosophy has defined itself in opposition to the Hegelian speculative and metaphysical tradition. By "analytic philosophy" is meant that twentieth-century philosophical movement which may be characterized (roughly) by a number of salient features: by an emphasis on the analysis of language and meaning; by the employment of mathematical logic as a tool or method or as the method of philosophy; and by the fact that many of its practitioners have held a set of broadly empiricist assumptions, while viewing science (especially physics) as a paradigm of human knowledge.' Moreover, it is a relatively uncontroversial fact that this new philosophy had its origins, at least in part, in Moore and Russell's so-called refutation of central British Hegelian positions: in their wholesale rejection, for example, of the doctrine of "internal relations" and of "organic wholes," of knowledge considered as "synthesis" or dialectic, and of reality conceived as fundamentally monistic, one and absolute. Moore and RusselJ, for their part, simply argued for the opposed positions.2 As we approach the end of the twentieth century, however, it is not altogether clear who has won this debate. Ample evidence exists that despite more than fourscore years of disparagement and ridicule, the influence of Hegel (and many of the idealist positions) has not only not died but may even be gaining in strength.3 In particular, I hope to reveal Hegel's influence in an AUTHOR'S NOTE: Th.is research was supported in part by a grant from the City University of New York PSC-CUNY Resetueh Award Program. I would aLro like to thank the reviewers of Political Theory, Professor G. Doppelt, fiiUl audiences at the University of Zurich, where parts ofthis arlide were presented, for numerous /r,elpful comments and suggestions. A simiiGr article, entitled "Zuge der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie in der Theorie VOtJ Rawls" will be appearing in G special volume ofHegel-Studien (VoL 26) devoud to a discussion ofHegel~ Philosophy of RighL POLmCAL 11fEORY, \til. 19 No. 4, November 1991 .539-.571 C I 991 Saae Publications, Inc.

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area where one might not yet have suspected it: in the thought of the paradigmatic theorist of justice in the Anglo-American world John Rawls. At first sight, this claim seems preposterous. Rawls's thought is generally regarded as the epitome of contemporary, game-theoretic contract theory, firmly grounded in the Anglo-American tradition, with its essentially anti· metaphysical intentions and (some believe) its fundamental, atomistic individualism. Hegel's metaphysical system, on the other hand, still represents the paradigm of pretentious Continental system building, with its abstruse language, its speculative talk of one "world spirit" realizing itself through history and its claims to "absolute knowledge," while in the political domain (our primary focus in this discussion), Hegel was not only an ardent critic of social contract doctrine but the inspiration of modem communitarianism. So how, one might justifiably ask, could two thinkers stand further apart? I hope to show, however, that there is an important sense in which one can apply, without significant distortion, the term "Hegelian" to important aspects of Rawls's theory.4 An exposition of the close links between Rawl's thought and that of Hegel serves several purposes. For one, it serves the purely historical interest of vindicating Hegel in the face of much unjustified vilification in the Anglo world, assuming, of course, one believes that A Theory of Justice deserves its present high regard. More important, the exposition should work to dispel something of the aura of unacceptable "individualism" surrounding Rawls:s wo.rk, while simultaneously revealing the flawed nature of recent commun_t· tanan accounts (those of C. Taylor, Sandel, Macintyre, and Walzer, 10 particular). Such accounts are, in my view, sympathetic but fundamentally ~ague and misguided attacks offering a paucity of clear-cut viable altema· hves. Should it emerge that Rawls in fact sides with the communitarian Hegel ?n numerous counts, the ground of contemporary debate should shift signif· tcantly. I hope to show that the true conflict cannot be conceived in terms of a simplistic dichotomy between "liberals" and "communitarians"; rather, the important issue regards the kind of community we seek. Finally, the followin~ study su~gests that an adequate conception of "community"- of what u~ll· mately bt~ds a just society together- may just be possible in a Rawl~tan language: tn a political language, that is, without a full-blown metaph~stCS· . Allow me to address one last preliminary point. In the subsequent dtscus:, StOn,..I assume the legitimacy of Rawls's distinction between "moral theo~ and m?ral philosophy." By "moral theory" Rawls intends the systematiC companson of h'ts tonca · ll Y promment . . . moral concepttons, whereas "moral phJlosophy" ( h' h · . .. w lC mcludes moral theory) has as its major issue the probletn of justtftcation ·5 In what "lO IIows, I shall pnmanly . . be concerned wt'th rnoral

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~heory. Rawls has made a plausible case for provisionally setting aside the Important questions of the truth or falsity, or even the reasonableness or unreasonableness, of various moral and political conceptions in order to proceed first with a systemati~ and comparative study of them. Only after we have clarified the nature of "Hegelianism," that is, its relation to Rawls's ~heory, and the consequences to be drawn for contemporary debates, are we an a position to ask which view is "best justified."

POLITICAL, NOT METAPHYSICAL I shall begin my comparison of the political thought of Rawls and that of Hegel by stressing what remains, no doubt, the fundamental difference between them: their respective stances in regard to metaphysics in general. My thesis shall be, in broadest outlines, thatA Theory ofJustice retains much of the fundamental structure of Hegel's political theory while detaching this structure from its background metaphysics of absolute idealism- from Hegel's monism and his talk of "world spirit," from the doctrines of absolute knowledge and concrete universals, from the concept of the self as alienation and return, and so on. Many will here surely object that such a reading will result in but an evisceration of Hegel. In defense of my project, however, I shall try to show that Rawls nonetheless retains the import of many of the most significant strands of Hegel's metaphysics; Rawls does this, however, in what he now takes to be a practical, and no longer metaphysical, form. I do not mean to minimize the profound differences between the two thinkers. It is well known, for example, that Hegel viewed his political philosophy as but one subpart of his more comprehensive metaphysical system, as set forth (in skeletal form) in his Enzylclopaedie (1830). Although scholars dispute the sense in which Hegel claims his Philosophy ofRight can actually be "deduced" from the more general system, agreement does exist that some form of "necessary connection" is being propounded between the general metaphysics and the political theory. 6 More recently, of course, scholars have begun to question whether any such necessary connection de facto exists, but this was clearly not Hegel's problem. 7 Hard core "Hegelians," moreover, continue to stress Hegel's uncompromising holism; on the Continent, at least, it is considered improper to study Hegel's political thought without first spending semesters, if not years, on the Science of Logic.1 The Hegelian horse pill, it seems, must be swaJiowed whole or not at all.

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John Rawls, on the other hand, posits an explicit separation between his political philosophy and any comprehensive, "metaphysical" system. 9 1n this respect, Rawls is decidedly "un-Hegelian"; he stands closer here to the positivist, or more accurately, to the American pragmatist tradition. For Rawls's claim is not so much that metaphysical systems ultimately reduce to "nonsense" (that metaphysical claims are without purpose or meaning), but rather that such systems generally underdetermine (they may support, but they do not entail) one's substantive position in ethics or political philosophy. In regard to his own theory, Rawls writes, If metaphysical presuppositions are involved, ... they are so general that they would not distinguish between the distinctive metaphysical views- Cartesian, Leibnizian, or Kantian; realist, idealist or materialist-with which [modem] philosophy traditionally has been concerned. In this case, they would not appear to be relevant for the structure and content of a political conception of justice one way or the other. (PNM, 240)

Rawls's insigh~ although not altogether novel, 10 is important, for it acknowledges that one might well be an ontological materialist (as was Hobbes) or an absolute idealist (as was Hegel) and yet still be a political monarchist rather than a democrat in both cases. Moreover, there appears to be no inconsistency involved. By taking such a normative, "practical" approach to the study of political issues, the metaphysical similarities or differences between any two theorists will be minimized for the express purpose of focusing on the structure and content of their substantive, ethical positions. In rejecting Hegel's extreme holism, however, and in claiming that moral theory retains a certain "independence" from further questions of metaphys· ics, o?tology, or semantics, Rawls denies a major tenet of Hegelianism.~~ ~e question thus remains as to the respect in which (if any) his theory is similar to Hegel's. I propose to identify three areas in which Rawls's position may be considered typically "Hegelian." By this I mean that in each case, the move originally introduced by Hegel and accepted by Rawls differs marked~Y. not ?nly fro~ positions held within the Anglo-American, predominantly utihtar~ tan traditiOn but from positions held by Kant. The three areas I assembl unde~ th~ .headings of the task of political philosophy (including its method and JUS~Ification), the conception of the political person, and finally, the conception ofhuman community and the state. Ifl am correct, Rawls'stbeo~ may appropriately be labeled "Hegelian" in these important areas, once w have granted, that is, the possible separation of political theory from 8 full-blown metaphysics.

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THE TASK OF PHILOSOPHY: DIALECTIC AND REFLECTIVE EQUILIBRIUM For Hegel, the task of philosophy in general is "reconciliation" (Versoehnung); it is a reconciliation of the individual, by means of reason, not to that which "merely exists" but to the real and the "actual" (das Wirkliche). 12 From the 1801 Differenzschrift onward, Hegel stresses that the need for philosophy begins in "bifurcation" or "conflict" (Entzweiung); its aim is to surmount and to comprehend such fundamental dichotomies as the one and the many, the finite and the infinite, subject-object, or mind-body (to name but a few).n Political philosophy, for Hegel, is no exception; it too aims at a comprehension and resolution of the deepest cultural conflicts and aspirations of its time. In our time, Hegel believes, the conflict is one between the claims of an ancient communal ethical life (Sittlichlceit), on one hand, and that of the modem principle of individual freedom, on the other. 14 His Philosophy ofRight defends the position that only in the modern state- with its rational rule of law and its system of individual rights- is such a reconciliation between apparently diverse interests possible. Although Rawls views philosophy as the attempt ultimately to "render coherent" our considered moral judgments (TJ, 21), I believe it does his thought no injustice to stress that it too aims at a "reconciliation by reason"in fact, Rawls uses this exact phrase numerous times. 1s In Hegelian fashion, political philosophy not only begins in conflict for Rawls but "justice as fairness" takes as its starting point a historically specific conflict: what Rawls calls the "impasse'' reached in the modem period between the claims of freedom (in the tradition of Locke and Mill), on one hand, and those of greater equality (as represented by Rousseau or Marx), on the other}6 The task, as Rawls sees it, is to fonnulate "a deeper underlying basis of agreement" not only regarding the values of freedom and equality but of "fraternity" as well, and it is for this purpose that the two principles of justice are designed (TJ, 105). It thus turns out that A Theory of Justice- essentially a theory of the modern state- attempts to reconcile the conflicting tendencies of nothing less than what Hegel calls the animating principles of the modern epoch: the principles of liberty, equality, and fraternity for all men. Interestingly enough, this is also expressly how Hegel conceives his own task; for both, philosophy is "its own time apprehended in thoughts" (PR, "Preface," 11 ). The similarities, however, run far deeper. Even though Hegel is, strictly speaking, a "moral realist" and Rawls only a "constructivist" in ethics (I shall

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return to this point in a moment 17), both perceive the fundamental moral principles of the modern epoch as, to a large extent, already "embodied" (implicitly or explicitly) in contemporary political institutions and social practices as well as in the "traditions of their interpretation"; they are already embodied, that is, in what Hegel calls "objedive spirit" and what Rawls terms "our public political culture." 18 Whereas for Rawls, philosophy aims for a "reflective equilibrium" between our most deeply held moral principles and a theory which purports to generate them (TJ, 48ff.), Hegel's philosophical method- the political employment of the infamous "dialedic"- may simi· larly be so described. Hegel writes, for instance, in the preface to the Philosophy of Right: After an, the truth about Right, Ethics, and the state is as old as its public recognition and formulation in the law of the land, in the morality of everyday life, and in religion. What more docs this truly require- since the thinking mind is not content to possess it in this ready fashion? It requires to be grasped in thought as well. (P. 3)

According to both thinkers, what is needed is not some radical new beginning for ethics but rather that the moral principles and values latent in our everyday practices be "grasped in thought" as well- be made conscious and explicit, rendered consistent with each other, and their implicit rationality (or irrationality) grasped. For both thinkers, the reconciliation of principle and value is to be achieved by means of"reason"- not by the inexorable march of faith or by class struggle or violent revolution. the two major tendencies within ethical writing, it is thus clear into whtch camp both Hegel and Rawls fall. The first tendency attempts to tell us what we should do; it claims we need a radical reconstruction of our first-o~der duties.' Both utilitarianism (with its principle of utility)_ and at least some mterpretattons of Kantianism (with its categorical imperative) call for such a radical revision of our morality. Hegel and Rawls, on the other hand, (together with Aristotle) fall into the second camp; moral philosophy is the attempt to clarify and systematize what we have "all along" been doing. In Raw!sian language, moral philosophy is "Socratic" (TJ, 49); in idealist !ermtnology, it aims at ethical "self-knowledge." For both, there remains an Important contrast with, say physics. To take an extreme example, if pre· sented, with an accurate account of the motions of the heavenly bodies that we do not find appealing, we cannot change that motion to conform to a more attractive theory (TJ, 49). In the case of theories about ourselves, by contrast, we _may well wish to alter our views, actions, even who we desire to be, once their underlying regulative principles have been brought to light.

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Noting similarities between Hegel and Rawls in regard to the selfconception of political philosophy sheds light on what I shall now caH "the first communitarian criticism" of Rawls. This criticism runs roughly as follows: Rawls's theory purports to present us with a universal, ahistorical account of justice supplied by the notion of pure rationality itself. 19 Such a notion, however, is an illusion; all reasoning is in fact "situated," dependent on various empirical assumptions, perceptions, and cultural practices of definite historical periods, or (as Macintyre stresses) on particular cultural "traditions." Not only is A Theory ofJustice's claim to "objectivity" a sham, but the work furthers the illusion that mankind itself is to be conceived on the model of modern Western bourgeois individualism and its instrumental, market rationality. A central concern of communitarians here is that by ignoring the cultural variation between concrete, historical human communities -by ignoring their alternative conceptions of personality, say, or of reason, or their subtle use of "thick" ethical concepts that tend to bind people together- resources or potentials for community are lost. Although this criticism is not restricted to those who call themselves "communitarians," some version of it does unite them as a group. 20 As we have just seen, however, and as Rawls's later works make abundantly clear, "justice as fairness" is intended to resolve an impasse reached in the modern Western tradition. A Theory of Justice is already explicit in maintaining that the method of reflective equilibrium begins with the data from common sense and "our moral tradition," that the two principles of justice are to be judged against the leading contenders of this tradition, that they are "contingent" in the sense of being subject to revision in light of new empirical facts, and so on (TJ, 578). Already in A Theory ofJustice, that is, practical reason and its conclusions are conceived as "empirically conditioned" (a rather "unKantian" move). The real issue between Rawls and Macintyre or Walzer is not whether practical reason is conditioned by time and space in its origins and functioning; Rawls never denies this. The real issue is whether practical reason is thereby rendered "relative" and stripped of all "transcendent" critical function: a position Walzer, until recently at least, has tried to hold. 21 Once again, a comparison with Hegel is helpful, for Hegel was the first to argue seriously not only that our ideas are historically conditioned but that this fact does not rob reason of its "objectivity"; in its "dialectical'' operation, at least, reason can perform both an immanent and a critical transcendent function (see The Philosophy of History, "Introduction"). I believe it can be shown that Rawls, with the method of"reflective equilibrium," attributes to practical reason a similar, if mitigated function. 22

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Reflective equilibrium is that process whereby reflection seeks a "mutual adjustment" between particular considered judgments (formed through concrete observation and practice) and general moral principles until a satisfactory "fit" is reached- first within one's own moral position (narrow reflective equilibrium) and then between one's own view and that of an ever widening circle of others (wide reflective equilibrium; TJ, 46ff.). It is thus a method which, like the Hegelian dialectic, not only essentially entails the movement of thought "back and forth" between concrete particular judgment and general principle (Hegel would say it aims at the "concrete universalj, but importantly, is a conception of thought whereby a novel awareness develops through the emergence of conflict or contradiction and the overcoming of such conflict. In this respect, reflective equilibrium, like the Hegelian dialectic, may be compared with the idea of a metalanguage.23 Briefly, a metalanguage is one in which we can say things about some other language (an object language) that cannot be said in that object language itself.24 1n this way, we might draw an analogy between a hierarchy of ever richer languages (object-language, metalanguage, meta-metalanguage, and so on) and what Hegel terms different "stages" of the dialectic; the "higher" stage will be a richer metalanguage in which problems posed in terms of the previous object-language (problems the object-language itself could not solve) are "resolved" ( versoehnt), while the insights of the previous stage "preserved" (aufgehoben). 2:s If we focus on a number of Hegel's own examples, the analogy (although limited) is apt enough. Hegel argues, for instance, that the Ancient Greek world lacked the language as well as the political institutions of individual subjective right~; the Athenian way of life rested on the secure foundation of a shared pubhc religion and century-old filial duties. Hence when Athens was confronted with Socrates' criticism, the city responded in accord with the only options open to it-either silence Socrates or be destroyed itself. 26 By contrast, the m~de~n _state exp~ess~y h~s at its disposal this conceptually enriche~ ~hem~ ?f 1_n~IVIdual subJecllve nghts. In acknowledging the universal pnnc•ple 0 10 ~ 1 ~ 1 d~al conscience, for instance, the state has expressly incorporated ~lthm Itself or "reconciled" a domain of conflicting perspectives on the good !lfe_ ~ithout its own unity being threatened. Further, the recognition of mdl~ldualliberty of conscience, according to Hegel, is a sign of the modem st_at~ s_ moral s_uperiority: increased tolerance, a greater universality, and 3 dlrnlmshment m the severity of punishment of critics (PR, para. tOOA). 1.do not mea~ to imply that there are not important disanalogies between the Ide~ of a senes of metalanguages and the Hegelian dialectic. For one, t~e former Idea (unlike the latter) carries with it no requirement that the conflict

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resolution proceed in only one way nor that the series culminate in "absolute knowledge" (a full awareness of the whole process) rather than proceed to infinity. 27 The issue for the moment is whether reflective equilibrium too may productively be viewed as a process whereby we achieve an ever richer or more comprehensive ethical "overview," and I believe it can. Rawls claims, for instance, that any adequate account of justice will be one that reconciles by "a higher principle" what he caJJs our "common sense precepts of justice" (TJ, 305ff.). Such ordinary-language precepts (Rawls mentions five) will inevitably conflict when measured against each other. For instance, the precept "to each according to his ability" (elevated to a first principle by many libertarians) conflicts with "to each according to his need" (stressed in turn by Marxists); giving someone what they need is hardly identical to rewarding ability. Both precepts, in turn, conflict with "to each according to his effort" and so on. For Rawls, any adequate theory of justice wiJI not elevate one commonsense precept at the expense of all others (in effect, ignoring or suppressing the conflict) but will be capable of "preserving" the basic insights behind each. Thus we find that in Rawls'swell-ordered society, the two principles of justice will be interpreted by four branches of government, each of which recognizes, as its special responsibility, one of the commonsense precepts (TJ, 275ff.). A balancing of the precepts and a "reconciliation" here occurs at the level of (and in the language of) the modern state. Only the scheme taken as a whole, writes Rawls, comes close to preserving the insight behind our most basic moral belief that justice requires "giving to each his due" (TJ, 313). At this point one may be tempted to ask what determines, in Rawls's theory, the weighing of these precepts within the state, given not only that common sense is undecided and may be systematically distorted but that mutually incompatible overarching accounts would seem possible? To come to grips with this problem, Hegel presents us with a rather thick, univocal theory of the "cunning of reason": his metaphysical philosophy of history. Rawls nowhere, of course, attempts any such theory and presumably again eschews all such attempts. Nonetheless, I believe Rawls's answer to this problem retains critical aspects of Hegel's stance. That is to say, while jettisoning all talk of one world spirit, of the inexorable march of reason or of the end of history, Rawls's theory nonetheless retains certain simila~ but far weaker assumptions: that there is such a thing as moral progress in history (since the days of slave~), that~ st~dy of man discloses a strong desire for freedom and for the e~erc1se of ~~s h1~e~t powers (Rawls's Aristotelian principle) and that our SOCial and pohttcal mstJtutions indeed reveal a minimal rationality and coherence. In Rawls's theory

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also, that is, how we weigh the wisdom of the ages and balance the precepts of common sense (deciding which to reject and so forth), is essentially tied to a larger (if still partial) systematic conception, not only of the kind of beings we have historically been but of the kind of persons (consistent with this history) that we aspire to be. For Rawls, as for the German idealist tradition in general, the normative conception of the person plays a fundamental role in determining the content of the principles of justice ("DL," 559). Before turning to Rawls's conception of the person, however, (merely another target of communitarian criticism), allow me to consolidate the position adopted thus far. My excursion into the dialectic and reflective equilibrium was meant to show how practical reason, working on the material of a particular historical tradition, can yet achieve a certain "objectivity." Not merely for Hegel but for Rawls too (in explicit contrast to the position attributed to him by his critics), the historically conditioned nature of prac· tical reason is acknowledged, while our capacities for reflection and self· criticism are affirmed. In Rawls's view, if a theory exhibits an internal coherence of a high order, if it better than its competitors matches our normative judgments in reflective equilibrium, and if, importantly, it exhibits a greater "adequacy" or "comprehensiveness" (if it can account for its competitor's position and not vice versa)/8 then together these criteria work to make one conception of justice, if not unequivocally true, at least "more reasonable" for us to hold than another (TJ, 577ft'.). Finally, if this mitigated holistic and "idealist" conception of justification is acknowledged as Rawls's own, the import of the first communitarian criticism vanishes; "justice as fairness" can claim greater "objectivity"- in the sense of fulfilling the above crite~ia-without loss of historical specificity. And Rawls, in light of !he restncted practical aim he has set for himself (the practical aim of reachmg moral. a~reement on principles regulating the basic structure of a modem plurahshc democracy), needs claim nothing more. . To be sure, emphasizing the similarities between Hegel and Rawls tn regard to philosophical reason as "reconciliation" is not to overlook what 1 ~ave called their fundamental difference: their respective stances in general 1 ~ regard to a full-blown metaphysics or ontology. For Hegel, recall, the dtalectic is not only a doctrine of "rational necessity" culminating in "absOlute knowledge" but is conceived as an ontological category; presuma~ly eve?. th~ngs in nature operate "dialectically" (Phen, "Preface"). Reflectave equahbrium, by contrast, is an open process of fallible, aU-too-human thought. So too, for Hegel, the principles of freedom equality and fraternity to be .• d ' ' .......Jf reconca e. ~re u~timately the ideas of one "world spirit" instantiating •~ through fanate mands and coming to know itself in history (PR, 34tff.).11te

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principles are conceived as universal and absolute; in an important sense, they are "discovered" by us. ~awls, on the other hand, refrains from making such further, strong cla1ms. Whether his two principles of justice are in fact universal, for instance, remains as much a matter for future empirical investigation to decide as for reflection to ponder (TJ, 578). It is not even clear that his two principles de facto underlie our tradition; they may well be nothing more than the "best interpretation" yet, a ''construct" out of the pool of deeply held and widely shared moral and political considered convictions (see note 17). By taking this "constructivist" position, however, Rawls is not denying that there may be such a thing as a growing worldwide consciousness and recognition of individual freedom, as well as the possibility of absolute moral truths. It is only that a conception of political justice in his view (one appropriate for a modern, pluralistic democracy) cannot rest on the truth or falsity of such strong theses and must even be compatible with a number of conflicting positions concerning them. Hence for Rawls, unlike for Hegel, political philosophy must be set free from the anchor of a metaphysical foundationalism; in self-conception, its task comes closer now to the revamping of Neurath 's ship cast out on the open sea. In regard to some of the most ancient debates in philosophy, "justice as fairness" wishes to remain "agnostic."

THE CONCEPTION OF THE PERSON

Perhaps the leading criticism which the German idealists have leveled at the utilitarians is that the latter operate with an inadequate conception of the person and of human dignity; utilitarianism conceives of the person as little more than a container of homogeneous desires bent on maximization.29 Rawls, of course, reiterates a version of this critique: Utilitarians operate with a "consumer person," underestimate the possibility of a rational restructuring of desire and motivation itself, and fail properly to acknowledge the "distinctions between persons" (TJ, 23ff., t85ff.). Ironically, Rawls's own notion of the person has come under attack by communitarians, most notably, by M. Sandel.30 Once again, such criticism at least appears to echo Hegel's famous attack on the individualism of Kant. 31 Sandel argues that Rawls presents us with a "hyper-Kantian," "~enude~," or "abstract" conception of the person, conceived as an agent of chmc~, wh1ch is "prior to" and separate from its particular ends, attnbute~, commltmen.ts, and even concrete character (LU, t5ff.). Since Rawls conce1ves the plurality and separateness of individuals as ontologically "prior to their unity," his 271

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position leaves no room for communal values or social commitments in the "constitution" of the individual's identity and self-understanding (LU, 147ff.). Rawls operates with a fundamentally "thin" and flawed notion of the person and with an inadequate understanding of man's social nature. Sandel accuses Rawls, in short, of a metaphysical "atomism." As Rawls's later writings have clarified, however, the basic mistake ofthe preceding criticism is that his use of the term "person" is intended not as a comprehensive account of personality but as a "political conception," that is, as an appropriate conception of the person for the limited purpose of deciding on principles of justice for the basic structure of society ("PNM," 23lff.). What I wish to show here is how close in fact this "political conception" of the person is to Hegel's account of the person in part 1 of Philosophy ofRight, entitled "Abstract Right." (No one accuses Hegel of atomism.) Of further significance is how similar Rawls's original position and Hegel's abstract right are in general. Rawls's A Theory of Justice stands squarely in the tradition of the German Rechtslehre. Hegel's concern in part 1 of Philosophy of Right, in the section titled "Abstract Right," may be stated thus: What are the content and limits of relations among persons respecting and treating one another according to the single norm that each is a person? This concern reveals Hegel's continuity with the natural rights tradition; the section is a form of methodological abstraction from the immediate and concrete social bonds between persons similar to that in state-of-nature methodologies. 32 Unlike the latter, however, Heg~l. is explicit that he seeks the principles of personhood underlying the specifically modern period (PR, paras. 40A, 57R). His use of the terrn :·person" is. thus narrower than that of his natural right predecessors, who use It to refer e1ther to the universal individual in the state of nature (Hobbes and Locke) or to the individual conceived as moral subject (Kant). For Hegel, by con~rast, the term "person" refers to the individual qua his capacity to be the subJe~t of m~~ern political rights; it is only in the modern state that the capacny for Citizenship, in principle at least is extended to all men (PR, para. 40R). Further, Hegel considers such perso~hood only the "first condition" for f~eedom and human flourishing (PR, paras. 1, 33). For a more compre· he~slve good, the individual must be able to conceive of himself, not only as a nghts-bearing legal person but as an autonomous moral subject and as a parti~ipating member of a rational community as well. 33 1 It IS of interest to note that on each of these counts, Rawls follows Hege (rat~er than Kant or other social contract theorists). Part 1 of A Theory of ~ustLce, for ~nstance, sets forth the original position, clearly a form of methodological abstraction" from the richer and more concrete social bonds

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bet~een persons. This abstraction, however, is from our"post-Reformational pubhc culture," and its aim is to arrive at substantive political principles expressing men's respect for each other (TJ, sec. 40). Similarly, part 1 gives us only a "thin theory of the good" (TJ, 396); it is not until part 3 that we receive a fuller conception, as well as, finally, an account of man's social nature (TJ, 520ff.). My point is that for neither Hegel nor Rawls is any claim being made about the ontological "priority" of the individual to the group. Instead, modem political personhood (entailing the individual rights of conscience, free speech, various political liberties, the right to contract, to hold at least personal property, and so on) is claimed by both thinkers to be a necessary condition for human flourishing in post-Reformational circumstances, never a sufficient condition as Sandel's critique implies. If one looks more closely still, it emerges further that for both Hegel and Rawls, modem political personhood presupposes two minimum "moral powers," capacities, or competencies of individuals (TJ, 505; "DL," 525). In Hegel, personhood entails, first, what he caJis the capacity for"self-conscious universality" (PR, para. 35). The human subject is unique insofar as it can recognize itself as "universal"- in the first instance, as "indifferent to particularity" (PR, para. 37). Hegel here refers to the ego's ability to negate or distance itself from anything in particular- its own determinate thoughts and desires included (i.e., it can revise, reject them, and so forth). This "unrestricted capacity" for abstraction, Hegel believes, is presupposed not only in the person's ability to perceive its likeness to the ego of others (abstracting from particular differences) but for its ability to grasp, and to determine itself to act in the world from, universal rules and principles (PR, para. 258R). Man alone, Hegel stresses, can consciously sacrifice everything particular, his own aims and life included; this capacity will be tested particularly in times of war. The capacity for "self-conscious universality" in Hegel corresponds quite clearly, I believe, to Rawls's first moral power of personality: to what Rawls calls "an effective sense of justice" and which he describes as "the capacity to understand, to apply and to act from (and not merely in accordance with) the principles of justice" ("DL," 525). (In Rawlsian terminology, this capacity refers to the "reasonable" in us, in contrast to the merely instrumental and self-interested "rational" part.) But, so too, Rawls's second moral power, "the capacity to form, to revise and rationally to pursue a particular conception of the good" ("DL," 525), may be seen to correspond to what Hegel caiJs the ego's second fundamental capacity for "self-determination" (PR, pa~a. 6). The claim of both thinkers here is that fundamental to the modern not10n of free personality is the ability not simply to follow rules nor merely to negate

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or choose between de facto given alternatives (Willlcuer) but to form plans, posit particular goals, and in general "express" a self-conception or a plan of life in an external, publicly recognized sphere (PR, para. 6). At this point, we arrive at Hegel's important concept of "expression" (Entaeusserung). I hope to show that the concept is also central to Rawls's account. As C. Taylor has rightly pointed out, Hegel was influenced by the German "expressivist" movement of the 1770s, whose members revived the old Aristotelian notion of the good life as the expression of purpose or the realization of "form."34 Hegel, for example, praises Aristotle's view of the soul as "self-organizing form" inseparable from a particular organic body (Enzy, para. 378 and LHP, II, 180ff.), and he, like Aristotle, imbues personality with the motive force of bringing its distinctively human capacities to fruition. Nonetheless, Hegel explicitly departs from Aristotle when it comes to questions of political personality. Unlike for the Ancients who, according to Hegel, viewed the form of an individual's life as fixed "by nature" or independent of the subject who receives it, the purpose of a subject's life must be given to it by itself, it must be its own conception. This Hegel calls the "principle of subjective freedom," and he considers it to be the distinguishing. mark of modernity; in the modem state, this principle has been acknowledged for the first in the universal right of free personality (PR, paras. 182A, 185R). Hegel's concept of ••expression" is of further interest because it signals an important aspect of his departure from Kant. With this concept, Hegel clearly attempts to overcome the rigid Kantian dualities between mind and body, reason and desire, and so on. Hegel is, in the end, a monist; it is of the essence of mind (Geist) that it express itself in space and time. So, too, imbuing personality with this motive force entails for Hegel (unlike for Kant) that sensuous desire and impulse be considered "intrinsic to freedom" (PR, para. 6)· Thus .in cont~st to Kant's view, where the physical, mechanical world forev~r remams a fotl to our transcendental freedom the sensuous material world JJI Hegel (including our own sensuous desir~) is viewed as the necessary medium in which our freedom is embodied and revealed. A number of important subtheses follow from this altered conception. For one, politically speaking, Hegel now attributes to the right of modern personality what may be called a material content; free personality, and the development of human powers, is impossible severed from an adequate . {! r matenal substratum (PR, para~ 41). Thus we find in Hegel's theory, 0 example, that the state will play a far more extensive welfare role than under traditional liberalism; the .. public authority" should provide education, ove~­ see public utilities (e.g., street lighting and bridge building), care for public

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health, price ?,aily necessities, and alleviate poverty among other things (PR, para. 236ff.). Second, for any individual to exist qua person, for him to embody his plans and express a self-conception in an objective public sphere, it is essential that others be able to recognize him as well as acknowledge his desires and aims as such (PR, para. 71). This presupposes, in Hegel's view, not just a material substratum but a social background of shared understandings, expectations, and the "reciprocal recognitions" entailed by his notion of Geist.36 Without such a prior cultural formation (without, in contemporary language, an understanding of the "form of life"), the individual could never adequately express his intentions or even come to know them. The minimal knowledge of such expectations Hegel terms Bildung (culture or education) and he describes it as our "second nature" (PR, para. 3). The important point is that for a person to obtain "substantive freedom" in Hegel (and not just Willlruer or choice), it is not enough simply to overcome the alien and compelling character of the natural physical world (achieved through labor and property), nor is it enough to bring order to the chaotic inner world of one's desires (achieved primarily through moral reflection); one must also overcome the compulsory nature of human, communal life. The latter is achieved, in Hegel's view, through educating oneself to an awareness of universal ends as well as by participating in the construction of the rational character of public social life (PR, paras. 149, 260). "Substantive freedom" can only be fully instantiated, he claims, with a community wide "reciprocal recognition" of freedom as "lived social practice." The latter Hegel terms Sinlichkeit or "rational ethical life." I have emphasized Hegel's notion of personality as "expression," for I believe the thrust of his departure here from Kant is fully accepted by Rawls. Rawls, too, views his own thought as an attempt to overcome the many dualisms of Kantian philosophy ("DL," 516). So too, in A Theory ofJustice, Rawls explicitly criticizes Kant's theory of the person for lacking "the concept of expression" (TJ, 255). Further, like Hegel, he revives an essentially Aristotelian notion of the good life as the realization of purpose or "a plan of life" (which must now be given to the individual by himself); the minimal motivation attributed to persons in Rawls's theory is the "Aristotelian principle," which claims that other things being equal, humans enjoy the exercise of their distinctive capacities, and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is realized or the greater its complexity (TJ, 426). As a consequence, Rawls, again like Hegel, stresses those minimal background condi· tions (both material and social) necessary for the realization of the powers of personality: Rawls's Jist of "primary goods" ("DL," S2Sff.). 37 And impor-

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tantly, among these goods, Rawls includes the "social basis of self-respec~" a prerequisite for which is that the individual participate in "social union" (TJ, 441 ). As we shall see in the next section, with Rawls's idea of a "social union," critical aspects of Hegel's notion of Geist reemerge in contemporary political theory. For the moment, however, it suffices to note that Rawls, too, distinguishes between "rational" and "full autonomy"; the latter, he writes, can be "realized only by citizens of a well-ordered society in the course of their daily lives" (TJ, 528). If the preceding analysis is correct, we can see how wide of the mark is Sandel's criticism of Rawls's "thin" and "denuded" conception of the self or person. In the original position, Rawls is not giving us an account of the "self' or "subject" at all but is (as is Hegel's abstract right) presenting us with the minimal conditions for modern, political personhood or citizenship. In em· phasizing the moment of individual choice, moreover, Rawls is merely articulating, in political terms, an insight already won during the Reforma· tion: that the good the individual seeks should ideally be obtained via that individual's own choice, consciousness, and will, not imposed from without by the dominant religion or the state or even by "the majority."38 Here, Rawls simply sides with the communitarian Hegel for whom the political "princi~le of subjective freedom" remains the distinguishing mark of modernity. Agam, neither thinker is claiming that such political personhood is a sufficient condition for human flourishing, only that it is a necessary one given post· Reformational circumstances. Sandel's "communitarian" account (and I be· lieve Walzer's, too, as well as Macintyre's critique of the notion of individual rights) misses this crucial point completely. 39 One might attempt to defend Sandel by claiming that, in criticizing R~wls, ~e h~s something closer to the Marxist critique of bourgeois individual n.g~ts 10 mtnd and not Hegel's position after all. Yet 1 believe Sandel's postuon would also be a misreading of the Marxist stance. 40 Nor am I denying that both. Hegel and Rawls operate with an impoverished notion of the person, that _as, of the political person or citizen.41 1 have only tried to stress that the partt~ul~r critique of the Rawlsian person made by Sandel (and other corn· mumtanans) takes us back to pre-Reformational thinking. Finally, not only are Hegel's and Rawls's conceptions of the political person significantly similar but it is clear that both are employing the concept " . person " not as a natural kind term but as a sociopolitical construct.42 That IS, for both thinkers, a conception of man's individual liberty and rights. as "metaphysically" given (by God say or Nature) misses their distinctive aspect ' ' ·"and . . .as hard-won human achievements; universal "free personahty "mdtvJdua1 ng · hts" are cultural products, not starting points, of a 1ong and

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arduous historical struggle. Moreover, it is only if one views them as such -as presupposing this larger cultural effort- that their full significance is recognized and the responsibility for maintaining them in existence acknowledged. Thus it is that one finds in the works of Hegel and Rawls the conception of the person embedded in a further account of those particular background social, economic, and political institutions which alone allow free personality to flourish.

SIITLICHKEIT, SOCIAL UNION, AND THE WELL-ORDERED SOC/ElY Whether one is reading Hegel's Philosophy of Right or Rawls's A Theory of Justice, the movement is from "abstract to concrete," from the minimal moral requirements of political personality (set forth in abstract right and the original position) to an account of those background economic and political institutions supporting such a conception until both works end, finally, with a reading of man's "social nature" (part S3). This fact is repeatedly overlooked, however, in communitarian criticisms of Rawls. Sandel argues, for instance, that given Rawls's "denuded" conception of the person, his theory cannot justify the strong other-directed tendencies of its own difference principle.43 Such a justification would require the notion of a "group" or "community subject" (an idea often attributed to Hegel). 44 C. Taylor's concern also focuses on the notion of community rights and he, like Sandel, faults Rawls for neglecting "background" considerations (specifically, considerations of the human good) in relation to which all questions of distributive justice and of individual "desert" must be situated.45 This last criticism of Taylor's is particularly surprising, given that Rawls from the beginning has insisted that his two principles of justice are to apply to the background "basic structure" of society and not to individual actions; Rawls is well aware that there is no "context independent" notion of desert. 46 Again, I believe such communitarian criticisms are wide of their mark, but in spirit at least, they do revert back to Hegel: to Hegel's basic stance that social contract theory is an inadequate approach for an understanding not only of human community but of the modern state. Allow me to turn to this last point first. Why, according to Hegel, is the ideal of the social contract inadequate to an understanding of the modern state? It is important to realize that Hegel distinguishes three different senses of the term "state" (der Staat). 41 Hegel

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distinguishes between, first, the political state in the narrow or "strict" sense. This refers to the state qua its "internal organization": whether it is a democracy, a monarchy, etc., as determined by its political constitution and explicit laws (PR, para. 274). Second, there is "the external state," which refers to the organization of the judiciary and the police, including the concrete physical manifestations of government, such as the courthouse and jails (PR, para. 183ff.). Finally, Hegel refers to the "state proper" (PR, para. 267ff.), which encompasses both of the previous senses as well as something more; the state proper includes the customs, manners, and moral consciousness of a people historically united together in a tradition. The strictly political state, in Hegel's view, is thus conceived of as the expression (the legal articulation or the making explicit and consistent) of a people's prior ethical practices. Granted, this is a rather broad conception of the state, but it is no broader, we might note, than what is being encompassed under Rawls's notion of "the well-ordered society" (in which government imple· ments the two principles of justice) or, for that matter, under R. Dworkin's notion of "law"; in each case, the domain of the state, of justice, or of ''the law" includes the tradition's underlying moral principles.48 Keeping these different senses in mind t it becomes clearer why for Hegel• the modern political state could never be traced back to an original "histoncal" contract between individuals in the state of nature. The strictly political state is the legal expression or articulation of a people's historically prior ethical practices. But so, too, the ideal of the state as nothing more than 8 contract between individuals- a mere modus vivendi, as it were- is also ~nadeq~a~e in Hegel's view. This is the case, he argues, because all cont~act· mg actiVIty must take place against a background of shared assumptions, trust, and social practice, which themselves cannot be the subject of contract; it is impossible that everything be open to contract at once.49 Again, no act of ~ntract (social or otherwise) can generate the conditions of its. oWJl v~hdlty, ~ut presupposes background norms, rules, or principles, compbance With which confers legitimacy on the contractual transaction. This back· groun~ of ~bared moral assumptions Hegel terms Sittlichkeit (ethical ~ustom or social hfe) and is that element which the model of the state conceived as a mere self-interested "compact" fails properly to acknowledge. . This criticism of the contract model has become commonplace (althO~ It ~as ~~t. so, of course, in Hegel's time). The issue here is the extent to which !h•s cnhc•sm touches on Rawls's social contract theory. Interestingly eno~ It does n~ toucb ~Rawls's theory at all; Rawls fully acknowledg~s the potll Early 10 the Philosophy ofRight, Hegel sets forth three essenbal features of the modem notion of contract:

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1. The contract must arise from the "arbitrary will" (Wil/Ailer), i.e., from the free initiative or private contracting panies (and not from some higher public authority, say). 2. A common will (or shared purpose of the panicular wills) is brought into existence by their mutual consent or agreemenL 3. The object(s) with regard to which the contract is made, must be single "external" lhing(s). (The modem practice of contract presupposes non-alienability of personhood and its essential characteristics.) (PR, para. ?S)

Hegel's general point is that the contractarian tradition has confused such norms brought into being and having binding validity within the sphere of private transactions with those norms governing the public rights of political bodies, such as the state (PR, para. 75). It is of the essence of modem individual rights, for instance, that .they are not, properly speaking, private property (unlike various rights in the medieval period); modem political rights cannot be alienated to others at will but are universally secured by the impersonal and general norms of the rule of law. Hence the realm of private contract could never lead to, or account for, the public, universal character of the modem state but instead must presuppose it. What is of interest here, however, is that (in contrast to the social compact in Hobbes or Locke) the agreement in Rawls's original position clearly vio/Qtes Hegel's first condition for the existence of a modem contract: that the contract be the result of the "private" arbitrary will. The veil of ignorance expressly excludes parties from the possibility of acting on such a private will insofar as it excludes all particular knowledge to them; the veil forces the parties instead to focus on common and universally shared characteristics (TJ, 136ff.). So, too, as a direct consequence of this veil, the parties in the original position "agree" that certain types of primary goods (the basic liberties and equal opportunities) are, in effect, to be withdrawn from the scope of future contract and universally granted to all."' What transpires in Rawls's original position is thus no ordinary contractual agreement. It is in fact an agreement which (to use Hegelian language) "transcends the standpoint of contract" itself; it acknowledges a far more substantive union between persons and political institutions.'• The original position, which serves as a "means of public reflection and self-clarification" ("PNM," 236), concentrates as much on those aspects "beyond contract" as it does on the moment of contracting itself. Again, part 1 Qf A Theory ofJustice may be seen to perform a function similar to Hegel's abstract right. In Rawls's original position, "the rational" (each person's legitimate rational advantage as represented by the parties) is acknowledged and granted a certain legitimacy, but it is ultimately framed and subordinated to "the reasonable": to the fair background terms of a

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system of free and equal cooperation as a whole and to the capacity of individuals to honor such terms ("DL," 529ff.). The central difference between Hegel and Rawls in this respect lies, I believe, in the fact that, whereas Hegel envisions the fair cooperative terms to be those in accordance with the universal principle of substantive freedom, Rawls attempts to make this principle more specific; the well-ordered society entails realizing the difference principle as well. The fact that "justice as fairness" does not conceive of our political life (or the state) on the model of a social contact but rather acknowledges (as does Hegel) a realm of private contractual transactions as an essential aspect within the modern state is even clearer in part 3 of A Theory ofJustice, where Rawls speaks of the well-ordered society (one in which his two principles of justice are implemented by government) as a "social union of social unions" (TJ, 527). In this third part, Rawls proffers his account of man's "social nature" as well as his account of the "good of community" (TJ, 395). It is important to understand what he here has in mind, consi~ering his many communitarian critics. In claiming that man's nature is fundamentally "social," Rawls is not merely claiming that society is necessary for human life or that social life is a condition for the individual to develop speech and language and to acquire certain sorts of needs, interests, and so on (TJ, 522ff.). Nor is his point merely the Wittgensteinian one (repeatedly stressed by Taylor, for instance) that only in a community of speakers are certain conditions met whose satisfaction is necessary for us to hold justified beliefs or even to express our individual beliefs and thoughts in the first place. 52 These facts are not trivial, but to characterize our social ties to one another by reference to these facts alone is to "trivialize" our sociability (TJ, 522). Why? Because all these things are equally true of persons who view their relations to one another in instrumental terms. They are all true of a group of egoists, say, who could not have developed language, voiced their egotistical needs, or justified their selfish desires without a prior social life, and so forth. Rawls's point is stronger (as is Hegel's): Only by actively cooperating with other humans and by sharing important, moral ends with them can certain of the individual's distinctively human powers reach fruition. Furthermore, only by doing so can the individual participate in many of the realized capacities of others (TJ, 525ff.). Rawls defines a "social union" as that form of cooperative activity whereby individuals share final ends, participate in common activities valued for their own sake (a version of Aristotle's notion of praxis), and agree on a scheme of conduct leading to a complementary good for all (TJ, 525). Rawls contrasts this notion with that

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of a "private society," where individuals not only have independent or conflicting conceptions of the good but where they regard their social institutions in purely instrumental terms. "Private society," Rawls explicitly notes, corresponds to Hegel's notion of "civil society," and the idea's natural habitat, he claims, is economic theory (TJ, 521ff.). A paradigm of social union, by contrast, is that of musicians playing together in an orchestra; a requisite in this case for the individual to develop his capacities is that others also develop theirs and that certain rules and principles are accepted by all from the start (TJ, 524). In a successful play of the music, the distinction between personal and communal well-being, at least temporarily, collapses. Insofar as individual players identify with the ends of the group (its goals have become their goals), each player not only shares in the responsibility of the group activity but is eligible for pride or shame with regard to it. I am thus eligible for pride or shame with regards to how you, another member, play. Unlike in private society, that is, in social union, members win or lose together; social union is not a zero-sum game. It is important to stress, however, that for individual players to "identify" with the group does not entail that they share all ends with other members of the orchestra (this would be an altogether illiberal model). As Dworkin has recently emphasized, a good performance of the music does not entail that members share all cultural aims nor that they all believe in one God nor that they all participate in a common sex life.53 In order to "identify" with the group here, it is only necessary that individuals share the end of the union in question. Establishing the fact that Rawls views the well-ordered society on the model of a "social union of social unions" with justice as a defining aim (and not on the model of a modus vivendi) is important for a number of reasons. 54 For one, the idea affords a way of attributing a certain "primacy" to group activity without committing ourselves ontologically to the notion of a "group subject" (or to Bradley's idea, say, of a "moral organism"). An established orchestra can be, and legally is, treated as a "unit of agency" in its own right; it has an internal organization and interests peculiar to it, decisions made in its name, schedules to meet, and so forth. Such a scheme is not only "temporally prior" to any new member entering in but "conceptually prior"; the new individual's activities will gain their significance against this background scheme. Further, such agency is not adequately comprehensible in terms of a "mere sum" of isolated actions; it expressly concerns the manner or way in which these actions are weighted and organized. An "integrated orchestra" or a "community between members" seem genuine enough, everyday phenomena. Nonetheless, one may stiil wish to maintain that this

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"group spirit" or "way of life" is created by, and resident in, certain human attitudes and practices and nothing more. Second, the introduction of the idea of social union means that Rawls's conception of the political state (which implements the two principles of justice in the well-ordered society) not only explicitly departs from Kant's position but is far closer to Hegel's view than is commonly recognized. 55 Kant, that is, continued to view the state on the model of a modus vivendi: as a nonmoral consensus founded on the convergence of self-interest.56 As we have seen, however, Hegel conceives of the political state as the deeper articulation of a people's moral practices; the state is conceived on the model of Geist or Sittlichkeit. In pointing to the similarities between Hegel and Rawls in this respect, I am not, of course, attributing to Rawls Hegel's particular views on such topics as democracy, nationalism, war, or civil disobedience.57 I simply wish to emphasize that for both thinkers- unlike for the "Hobbesian strand" of liberal thought-the state is not conceived as a mere neutral "umpire" between competing interests; it plays a fundamental role in the articulation and education of shared moral interests.58 Finally, the fact that Rawls views crucial aspects of the political life of a people on the model of a social union means that he too recognizes the important "good of community": that people lead better lives when they do not draw a sharp distinction between their own welfare and that of the community to which they belong. 59 Although, for Rawls, citizens no longer share comprehensive religious or moral conceptions of the good life, they do share important ends in common; they share a desire for justice and they value their political institutions and activities as goods in themselves (TJ, 522). At least in the well-ordered society, citizens are viewed as identifying with the political community and hence eligible for praise or blame regarding its actions. At this point, I must admit that I find this notion of "liberal community" (although an advance over traditional liberalism) inadequate after all. I wish to emphasize, however, that it is not for the reasons that Sandel, Macintyre, or Taylor cite. Uberal community is not inadequate because persons no longer hold comprehensive conceptions of the good life in common. Given the diversity of religious and ethnic backgrounds which together make up the modem state today, shared conceptions of the good life must inevitably, it seems, be partial in the future. Nor is it necessary that members of the modem state share a common ethnic culture or racial characteristics; any suggestion to the contrary should strike us as reactionary and even dangerous. In my view, it is the fundamental flaw of recent communitarian accounts that, although rightfully stressing identification with one's society's fundamental

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institutions as an important good, they so little concern themselves with which institutions and ends are worthy of our allegiance. This mistake neither Hegel nor Rawls makes. My own view is that the thinness of Rawls's conception of liberal community lies not in his rejection of comprehensive conceptions of the good or of religious, racial, or particular cultural features of humans as bases for founding community today; this is, in fact, liberalism's strong point. The thinness of liberal community lies, rather, in its continuing to look away from important, shared moral ends we in fact hold in common, namely, economic, and I would also argue, "reproductive" ones. In Rawls's theory, that is, "social union" never enters into the economic sphere, at least on the day-to-day level.60 Social union is defined in explicit contrast to the idea of private society, whose proper home, Rawls claims, is the economic domain. Similarly, when Rawls enumerates examples of social unions (he mentions families, games, the arts, science, sexual love, friendships, and the wellordered society itself), the work relation, and any mention of the firm or productive relation, is conspicuously absent (TJ, 525ff.).61 Finally, when he gives his account of the learning of the social virtues as well as of the important "art of perceiving the person" (the art of discerning their beliefs, intentions, and feelings), Rawls actually seems to relegate such learning to extra economic activities- to the family, games, school, friendships, and so on (TJ, 465ff.). It is at this point, I believe, that the "thi?nes~". of liberal community is revealed. Eight hours of the average person s day IS spent at "work" or in the domain of so-called private society; social institutio~s an~ relations are viewed instrumentally, and other persons are seen as havmg, If not competing, then at least independent ends. . Elsewhere 1 have argued that Rawls's theory, indeed, has not liberated itself from th~ model (reaching back to Locke and Ad~m Smith) of a priva~e appropriating individual bent on maximization when 1t comes to the domatn of labor, despite strongly opposed other tendencies of his thought.6z And I am in fact suggesting that this model must be rejected for much ~e ~m6~ reason that Rawls rejects it elsewhere: It is simply beneath hum.an. dagmty. Finally, one way of deflating the power that this private appropnatave ~od~l holds over us is to take seriously the alternative form of labo~ em~daed •: the traditional activity of women outside the mark~t.(in famdy, chdd, an_ home care).64 Such "reproductive" activity (in exphcat contrast to the.cate . d ction of particular gory of "productive" labor) aims duectly at the repro but retains hurnan relationships· it is not only essentially "other darected . ·· ' · 't' and act1ons perCnhcal features of social union, such as shared acuvaaes. ch fo f Ari t0 d 's praxtS) So, too, su rrned for their own sake (a version o s e ·

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reproductive activity and work fundamentally entails, develops, and exer· cises what Rawls calls the "art of perceiving the person." For the present, however, it is enough to note that what I am considering the "legitimate" criticism of Rawls's theory is not the contemporary communitarian criticism at all but a new version of the old socialist one. The greatest (moral) threat to "community" does not lie in our religious, cultural, or racial diversity; the peril lies in that expanding, commodified market relations threaten us all. In concluding this section, it is important to note that Hegel conceived of numerous institutions that were to foster communal values and keep the atomizing tendencies of the market and modem civil society in check. Hegel mentions in this regard the family (with its caring relations), the state (with its imposition of universal rights and duties), the institution of primogeniture (which was to keep all land from alienability, a suggestion Marx rightly mocks), and finally and importantly, the economic "corporations," which organize isolated workers into powerful economic communities, thus forming an intermediate community between private individual and universal state (PR, paras. 231-56). Many of these options, however, are not open to Rawls. Rawls cannot appeal to older feudal institutions, which run contrary to principles of the market (even if this were helpful); the United States, at least, never had such institutions. So, too, Rawls's theory has no equivalent to Hegel's notion of the economic corporation- no intermediate form of community between individual and state as might be found, for instance, in the idea of workplace democracy- and for this Rawls has been criticized.65 Finally, even the family (that presumed haven in a heartless world) is undergoing a transformation as never before. With the twentieth-century movement of women into the market, those strong filial and caring bonds between family members, rather than remaining a check to instrumental market relations, are in danger of being invaded by them. So the threat to "community"- the threat to the possibility of a genuine identification of the critical interests of the individual with any larger, significant community, much less with the political community of the stateseems real enough. As I have been suggesting, however, the solution does not lie in a yearning for the past.

THE OWL OF MINERVA We have seen that Rawls's theory is not so far from the original mouthpiece of modem communitarianism as is commonly believed. In regard to

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political philosophy's aim as conflict resolution or reconciliation, its method as the attempt to "bring order" and to gain an "overview" of our moral life 1ts "expressive" conception of the political person with two minimal moral' powers, and its vision of the welJ-ordered society as a "social union of social unions," Rawls's theory (like Hegel's) has greatly distanced itself from the Hobbesian strand of liberalism. In the reading presented here, Rawls and Hegel even share a common weakness: Both still allow the Hobbesian strand too unbridled a rein in the economic realm- in "private" or "civil society." This brings me to a final similarity between the two. In Hegel's view, the owl of Minerva-philosophy-spreads her wings only at dusk; only when an action has already been completed or a way of life grown old is it possible to grasp it fulJy in thought (PR, "Preface''). This conception of philosophy as a "looking backwards" holds, with some qualification, for Rawls's theory as well.66 That is, just as Marx criticized Hegel for failing to recognize, at the beginning of the nineteenth century in Germany, the movement toward democracy in the political domain, so I believe Rawls's theory has not taken seriously the call for democracy in the economic domain in this century.67 Certainly, the radical implications of the women's movement have yet to capture his attention.68 And I believe in both cases, the reason is the same: Similar to the political employment of Hegel's dialectic, reflective equilibrium starts from the data of our philosophical tradition and "public political culture" (seep. 543 above). Although Rawls here intends to highlight our shared political tradition (in contrast to the individualistic economic domain), examining this tradition alone would appear insufficient; radical new developments may emerge elsewhere first, for example, within the workplace. Or again, examining our philosophical tradition and public political culture, although necessary and important, cannot be sufficient; the realm until recently bas been composed entirely of males. This suggests that· for a more "adequate" account of the well-ordered SOCiety, reflective equilibrium must be "radicalized" and extended into new (in particular, into the so·called private) domains. 69 My own view is that if we are to think deeply about community (about ~hat it is that holds a just society together), we can no ~~nger overlook the Important communal activities which women have tradrhonally performed Within the private sphere, for instance, interpreting and rc:s~nding to the concrete needs of others, an activity that goes far toward bmdmg peo~l~ to one another. Further as women move into the public sphere (and as femmrsts have begun to argu~) a new demand emerges that our political institutions hen~eforth acknowledge this activity. A conceptio~ of_th_e "modem state," for mstance, traditionally conceived in terms of mamtarnrng law and order,

.

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a military prepared for war, and a policing of citizenry and competition, could give way to a different conception whereby the state is fundamentally conceived as a flexible provider of services, an educator and satisfier of need. In conclusion, I believe much of the contemporary "communitarian" attack on Rawls is a red herring; either the attack is misconceived or Rawls from the start acknowledged the point. Perhaps this much the comparison of his thought with Hegel's has clarified. But so, too, my comparison has hopefully suggested that, particularly in the area of moral and political philosophy, many of the slandered Hegelian notions appear to have a certain appropriateness; the tradition of analytic philosophy, in discarding all of Hegel, threw out the baby with the bathwater. The doctrine of "internal relations," for instance, far from proclaiming its legitimacy across the board, has a definite appeal when dealing with relations between persons. 70 When I hear of a child abused next door, the death of a loved one, or of a peoples' rights being systematically violated, I am (or at least I should be) altered. Similarly, the idea of"dialectic" or "synthesis," that knowledge ofthe person is to be attained not simply by reflection (as in Descartes) nor by mere empirical observation (as for Hume) nor by the direct intuition of some mysterious faculty (Moore) but rather (like reflective equilibrium) is mediated and indirect, the hard-earned result of concrete experience, subtle reflection, and the interaction between a variety of particular, historically situated selves-this complex approach leads away, in my view, from the smug self-certainty that accompanies all dogmatism. Finally, the fact that the focus is again on the person, not on the person conceived as an isolated organism (as in, !lay, a biological reading) but on the person considered as a political and "cultural" being, as one whose desires and actions have an essential connection to the background institutions and social conditions amid which it was schooled; that the focus is again on the person -not merely in the sense of focusing on what kind of beings we are but on what kind of persons we aspire and ought to be- this is only a part of the legacy of Hegel which remains alive and well in the thought of Rawls.

NOTES 1. Admittedly, this is only a rough, working sketch. For a more extended discussion, see P. Hylton's Russel~ Idealism and the Emergence of Aflfllytic Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1990), 440". 2. Moore and Russell argued for a doctrine of "external relations," for a conception of the whole as "reducible to the sum of its parts," for a philosophical method as "aoalysis," for

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kno":Je~ge as immediate or "by acquaintance," and for a view of reality as fundamentally atomtsttc. See Moore, "Refutation ofldealism" (1903), "External and Internal Relations" (1919) and Hylton (1990). ' 3. The works of J. N. Findlay, C. Taylor, A. Danto, N. Goodman, and the later Putnam are only a few of those in the Anglo tradition that reveal strong idealist tendencies. There is, m~reov~r, a gro~ing interest in such themes as "holistic justification," and Bradley's thought is wnnessmg a revtval, at least in England. See the ~cent collection of essays The Philosophy of F. H. Bradley, edited by Manser and Stockton (Oxford: Oarendon, 1986). 4. The actual historical influence of Hegel's philosophy on Rawls will not be a topic of this essay. Rawls clearly read Hegel'sPhilosoplryofRightalready in the 1960s (cf. references to Hegel's work in A Theory ofJustice); however, much of Hegel's influence on Rawls seems to be more "indirect"- by way of the ethics of F. H. Bradley, for example, and the work of J. Dewey. S. Sec "Kantian Constructivism in Moral Theory: The Dewey Lectures 1980," Joun141 of Philosophy, September 1980, SS4 (hereafter "DL"). For a further, secondary discussion, see A. Davidson, "Is Rawls a Kantian?" Pacific Philosophical Q~~t~rterly 66 (1985): 49. 6. See Hegel :S Philosophy of Right, translated by T. M. Knox (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977), para. 2. All further referena:s to this text will be indicated by PR followed by the paragraph number. "R" after a paragraph number refers to Hegel's remarks immediately following the main paragraph,"A"to later additions culled from notes taken at Hegel's lectures. 7. Professor U. Steinforth, for instance, recently defended such a separation between Hegel's metaphysical doctrines and his political theory (lecture at Columbia University, Spring 1987). 8. Wusenschaft der Logilc (Berlin, 1812). This work espouses what the Anglo-American world would call Hegel's "metaphysics." 9. And this is the case, Rawls intends, for any of the standard meanings of the term "metaphysics." See "Justice as Fairness: Political not Metaphysical," Philosophy and Public Affairs 14, no. 3 (Summer 1985): 223-51 (hereafter "PNM"). 10. Wiugenstein, for instana:, makes a similar point: "But the idealist will wish to teach his children the word 'chair, • after all, for of course be wants to teach them to do this and that, e.g. to fetch a chair. Where then will the difference lie between how the idealist-educated children speak and the realist ones? Won't the difference only be one of battle cry7" (Zettel, para. 414, translation mine). Whereas Wittgenstein's is a pragmatic point, Rawls's theory may be viewed as extending this insight into the normative domain. 11. See "The Jndependcna: of Moral Theory," Proceedings anJ Addresses ofthe American Philosophica1Associati011 48 (1974-75): 5-22, where Rawls argues that moral theory (the study of structures, as these relate to our moral sensibilities and natural altitudes) is independent of the theory of meaning, epistemology and philosophy of mind. 12. "Preface," in Philosophy of Righi, 10-12. For Hegel, "the actual" (das W&rkliche) is not the same category as "the existing" (dtls Dasein); the former is essentially .. rational" (verfllumftig), whereas the latter frequently is not. This distinction is crucial to Hegel's famous claim that"wbat is rational is actual and what is actual is rational," which does not mean that whatever now exists is rational. In this famous line, Hegel instead stresses the "power" of reason: that it has the ability to have Wirkung (effect or actuality) in the world. 13. See Hegel, Tlte Difference Between Fichte's and Schelling:S System of Philosophy, translated by Harris and Cerf (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1977), 89. 14. This theme isalrcady explicit in Hegel's early Essay 011 Natura/Law (1802-3), translated by T. M. Knox (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1975). . . 1S. See, for instance, Rawls,A 'TIIeory ofJuke (cambridge, MA: Harvard Untvers•ty Press, 1971), :S80(hereafter TJ), or "PNM,'' 226.

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16. See "01..," 517, or "PNM," 225. The historically specific nature of Rawls's theory continues, almost miraculously, to escape the notice of his critics. 17. By "moral realist" I intend the position that moral claims arc granted cognitive status and that at least some moral statements are true by virtue of their reflecting the true "nature of things"; some version of this position Hegel surely holds given that the ultimate reality is absolute spirit (Geist). Rawls, on the other hand, has replaced the traditional epistemological search for moral truth with an essentially political, "practical task" of reaching agreement on principles of justice in accordance with a particular democratic, moral conception of ourselves ("DL," 517ff.). This "constructivist" approach will entail a "suitably constructed social point of view" that all can accept and in terms of which "moral objectivity" will now be conceived. Thus Rawls, unlike Hegel, makes no claims as to the ultimate nature of "moral facts" or to whether, strictly speaking, there even arc such. 18. See Hegel, Enzyklopaedie, paras. 469-487ff. and Rawls, "PNM," 225ff. A detailed discussion of the practical similarities and differences between these two concepts would lead us too far afield. Allow me, however, to mention that in Hegel's political thought, "objektivcr Geist" refers to the world of amcrcte political institutions, customs, and social laws, in which a people's "spirit" (their fundamental moral principles and ethical self-conception) is publicly embodied or "objectified." Rawls's idea of a "public political culture" similarly refers to a people's shared moral conceptions, including "the basic intuitive ideas that arc embedded in the political institutions and the public traditions of their interpretation" ("PNM," 225). As I shall argue, Rawls assumes, as in Hegel's case, that the core of these institutions arc, at least minimally, "rational" and "coherent." The two conceptions thus reveal important similarities. The differences between them will again have to do with the strong metaphysical and ontological implications of Hegel's "objektivcr Geist" which Rawls's idea docs not entail. 19. See, for instance, A. Macintyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), 20, where the author includes Rawls among those who attempt to show "that the notion of rationality itself supplies morality with a basis"; C. Taylor, "The Nature and Scope of Distributive Justice" (Philosophy and the Human Sciences, 1985, 303) and "Justice after Virtue" (presented at Princeton, April 1988) 25, where Taylor interprets Rawls's view as purporting to be a "timeless, context-free theory"; M. Walzer, Spheres of Justice (New York: Basic Books, 1983), 4ff., where Rawls is accused of resisting the "displays of history" and ignoring the "particularism of history, culture, and membership," as well as the more recent "A Critique of Philosophical Conversation" (The Philosophical Forum, Vol. 21, nos. 1-2, Fall-Winter, 198990), where Walzer faults Rawls's construction of the original position for being in "asocial space," for thinking itself presuppositionlcss and so on. 20. See previous note. For a similar criticism of Rawls by a thinker not usually considered "communitarian," sec V. Held, Rights and Goods (1984), chap. 4. B. Williams has also voiced similar concerns, although the author now (Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy, 1985, chap. 5) exempts Rawls's theory from his attack. 21. See Walzer, Spheres of Justice, where the author clearly holds the "relativity" thesis. More recently, however, Walzer has distanced himself from this earlier stance and admits to what he calls a "minimal universalism" across cultures in a paper presented at the New York University law and Philosophy Colloquium, Fall 1988. 22. There arc many points of contact between Hegel's dialectic and Rawls's method of reflective equilibrium, as well as important differences; to pursue these similarities and differences would entail an essay in itself. I wish to note here, however, that both the dialectic and the reflective equilibrium are proffered as alternative philosophical approaches to the modem methodological dichotomy of "rationalism," on one hand, and "empiricism," on the other. This point alone makes them worthy of comparison. Uke Hegel (PR, para. 2). Rawls's method rejects

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any form of "Cartesian" appeal to intuition and to the self-evidena: of first principles, on one hand, and to mere empirical generalization, on the other (cf. TJ, 578ff., also "Outline of a Decision Procedure for Ethics" (1951]). For both, the practical goal is a form of ethical ~If-knowledge, conceived as necessarily "mediated," indirect, and so forth. The primary d~fferenccs between the two methods will pertain, again, to what I have called the "fundamenlal difference" in regard to their background stances on ontology and melaphysics. 23. See J. N. Findlay, Hegel: A Re-examinlltion, (Nav York: Oxford University Press, 1959), chap. 3, and M. J.. Inwood, Hegel (London: Roudedge &: Kegan Paul, 1983), part 2, chap. 5, where both authors compare the Hegelian dialectic with the idea of a metalanguage. 24. According to Copi, the term "metalanguage" originates with Russell who writes in 1922: "These difficulties suggest to my mind some such possibility as this: that every language has, as Mr. Wittgenstein says, a structure concerning which, in the langJUJge, nothing can be said, but that there may be another language dealing with the structure of the first language, and having itself a new structure, and that to this hierarchy of languages there may be no limits" (quoted in I. M. Copi T~ T~ory of Logical7Ypes (London: Routledge&: Kegan Paul, 1971) 107-8). The idea of a metalanguage, however, has come to have both a "technical" sense (as used by Tarski) and an "intuitive" one. By the "intuitive" sense (the comparison with which is alii attempt to defend here), I have something closer to the later Wittgenstein's notion or an Uebersicht (comprehensive "overview'') in mind. 25. See Hegel, Enzyklopaedie, part 1, paras. 79-83. 26. Hege~ Lectures m the History ofPhiiDsophy, translated by Haldane (London: Routledge &: Kegan Paul, 1982), 426ff. (hereafter LHP). 27. Unlike the idea of a hierarchy of melalanguages, the slages or the dialectic culminate in a full awareness of the whole process- in a language, as it were, in which we can speak about the whole hierarchy of languages- and this is the stage of "absolute knowledge" as set forth in the Science of Logic (see Phen, 479ft'.). So, too, it is not the case with the idea of a series of melalanguages that there is only one metalanguage in which we can speak about a given object-language; a given object-language may have two melalanguages with respect to it-in principle, even numerous incompatible ones. Hegel's dialectic, by contrast, (see introduction to Science of Logic) is meant to generate a unique series of categories; the resolution of "contradiction" proceeds according 10 "rational necessity" or in one way only. Significantly, these last two aspects of the Hegelian dialectic (aspects whereby it diverges from the idea of a series of metalanguages) also tend to be the aspects which Hegelian sympathizers find among the most difficult to swallow. (See Inwood, Hegel, 128ft'.). 28. That the criterion of greater comprehensiveness is central to the superiority of Rawl~'s position in his own eyes can be seen as well from the fact that in A Theory ofJustice the maJor ethical alternatives are paraded before the parties in the original position and ultimately revealed as inadequate, including "justice 15 fairness" •5 chief competitor, utilitariani~ (TJ, 122f~.). Hence one way offormulating the claim of Rawls's book is to state that whereas h1s contractanan position can account for the utilitarian insight, the reverse is not the case. 29. For Hegel's criticism of utilitarianism, see Enzyldopatdie, paras. 473-82, and PR, paras. 18-21; for Kant's, see his GfOUIIdwork. chap. 2. . . . 30. See Sandel Liberalism and 1~ Limils of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge UniVersity Press, 1982; bcrea&r LLl). For a similar criticism by Taylor, see "Virtue after Justia:" (1988), 21. 31. See PR, paras. 133-40. . . 32. See S. Benhabib, "Natural Right and Hegel," (Ph.D. diss., Yale UntveiSity, 1975~. . 33. These are the three increasingly rich and concrete modes of. self-chara~ten~tion corresponding to the three sections of Hegel's work: abstract right, moraltty, and ethtcal life. 34. Taylor, Hegel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 13ff.

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35. The public authority has the duty to alleviate poveny, in Hegel's view, because the family was originally the basic economic unit. His~rically, however, civil society "tears the individual from [the soil and inorganic resources] and family ties," forcing the person to become dependent on civil society. For this reason, it is the duty today of the public authority to "protect its members" by providing subsistence, job training, accident insurance and the like (PR para. 238). 36. Hegel's paradigm of Geist (mind, spirit) minimally entails two consciousnesses acknowledging common characteristics and shared ends, including the "reciprocal recognition" of this acknowledgement. Cf. Phenomenology of Spirit, translated by A. V. Miller (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1979), 111 ff. Depending on the specific nature of the relationship, of course (whether the relationship is between two contracting panics, two friends, marriage partners, citizens, and so on), the ends shared and the characteristics acknowledged will vary. 37. The Rawlsian idea of "primary goods" can itself be traced back to Aristotle's notion of choregitJ or "props" for the good life. See my On Civic Friendship (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, forthcoming), chap. 2. 38. By contrast, Sandel, at times, seems to hold a simple "majoritarian" view on questions of morality (see "Morality and the Uberal Ideal," New Republic, 7 May 1984, 17). Perhaps R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Har\rard University Press, 1979), Law3 Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), cba?t. bas argued most carefully against the altogether unsatisfactory nature of such a position. 39. E. Baker, "Sandel on Rawls," University ofPennsylvania Law Review 134(Apri1198S): 895ft', and A. Gutmann, "Communitarian Critics of liberalism," Philosophy and Public Affairs 17(Fall 1985): 308-22, make related criticisms of Sandel's and Macintyre's positions. 40. That Sandel's position cannot be the Marxist one (but in fact seems to reven back to Aristotle on political personality) can be intimated by the following: Even Karl Marx in On the Jewish Question explicitly claims that modem individual rights "certainly represent[] a great progress," in Marx-Engel.s Reader, edited by Tucker, 35. Marx's argument is not that individual rights (with the exception of the right to private property in the means of production) are unimportant or even unnecessary at this stage of history but merely that they are not sufficient for "true human emancipation." Even as late as his Critique of "The Gotha Program" (1875), Marx argues that political rights will become "superfluous" in the last stages of socialism, not that they can be discarded now (inMan:-Engels Reader, 531ff.). 41. I in fact believe that both Hegel and Rawls do operate with an impoverished notion of the political person (or citizen), but for none of the reasons contemporary communitarians cite. See my "Are There Only Two Moral Powers? Ambiguities in Rawls's Concept of the Person," in An~~lyse &: Kritik, (forthcoming 1992), where the author argues that even modem citizenship requires a third "emotional" power overlooked by Rawls (and Hegel); cf. also author's forthcoming On Civic Friendship, chap. 3. 42. Rawls notes that the term "person" derives from the Latin persona, which originally referred to the mask worn by actors in Greek tragedy; since ancient times "a person" refers primarily to those capable of playing a public, political role ("PNM," 233). 43. See Sandel, UJ, 66, 70-78, 101-3. 44. The attribution of a personified "group subject" to Hegel was abetted, I believe, by Bradley's notion of a "moral organism" (see Ethical Studies, 1876). Hegel indeed uses the term "organism" in reference to the state at numerous points in the Philosop#ly ofRight (e.g., paras. 267, 271), but his usage appears largely metaphorical; elsewhere, he repeatedly stresses that the notion of a biological organism is an inadequate model for ratioaal mind or Geist (see esp. EnzyiloptJedie). It is on the paradigm of Geist, of course, that Hegel models the state. 45. See Taylor, "The Nature and Scope," 291ff., and "Justice after Vutue" (1988), 21, 25.

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46. For the confusions surrounding Sandel and Taylor's criticism of Rawls's notion of "desert," see Baker, "Sandel on Rawls," 907ff. The author argues that Rawls's theory presupposes no "pre institutional" basis for determining desert. What people "deserve" is precisely the problem or justice to be solved. .47. See Z. A. Pelczynski, "The Hegelian Conception of the State," in Hegel's Political Phtlosophy, edited by Pelczynski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971), 1-29. 48. See Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1979), 47, and Law:S Empire (1986), chap. 1. It shoul~ also be noted here that whereas Hegel uses the term "justice" (Gerechtigkeil) in a narrow, techmcal sense (cf. PR, para. 99), Rawls normally uses the term in the wider sense of the German Recht. 49. See S. Benhabib, "Obligation, Contract and Exchange: On the Significance of Hegel's Abstract Right.,. in The State and Civil Society, edited by Pelc:zynski (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 159. 50. This is the case, at least, under what Rawls calls the "special conception of justice," which (in contrast to the "general conception" in which the difference principle applies to all the primary goods) pertains only as "social conditions improve" or to our specifically modem epoch (TJ, 83). 51· Hegel speaks of "transcending the standpoint of contract" (PR, 163R) in referring to the marriage agreement, which he (in contrast to Kant) denies is simply one contract among others. In Hegel's view, although the modem (bourgeois) marriage agreement"begins" with a decision of the arbitrary will (and although Hegel acknowledges the right of divorce due to practical difficulties), the agreement has as its basis the recognition of shared moral principles and the "surrendering of the arbitrary will in a substantive union"; marriage's aim in principle is to be "inherently indissoluble" (para. t63R). A similar reasoning holds for our relation to the state conceived now as an even more fundamental form of "rational social life"; in the stale proper, ~ 1 is even more difficult for an individual to "opt out." As we shall see, in Rawls's view, political Institutions arc also not conceived on the model of contract but on that of a "social union." 52. Cf. Taylor, Human Agency and Language (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), chap. 3. 53. See Dworkin, "Liberal Community," California Law Review 77(1989): 479-504." 54. See "The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus," Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 7.ii (1987): 5ff., where Rawls explicitly denies that our political life can adequately be conce1ved on the model of a modus vivendi (hereafter "JOC"). . . 55. Both Gutmann, "Communitarian Critics," for instance, and Larmore 10 a recent rev1cw of Sandel, Journal of Philosophy 81, no. 6 (1984): 338, continue to interpret Rawls's view of the state on the model of a "modus vivendi." 56. See Kant's "Perpetual Peace" (1796). According to Rawls, Kant here remains within the "Hobbesian strand" of liberalism which conceives of "ordered liberty [as) best achieved by skillful constitutional design framed to guide self· (family-) and group-interests to work for social purposes by the use of various devices such as balance of powers and the like" ("IOC'p. 2). Rawls's central criticism of this Hobbesian conception of the state is that such a self-interested consensus is "inevitably fragile" and temporary-that it could never achieve the stability and SOCial unity which marks a well-ordered political regime (ibid.). 57. Hegel, for instance, in his later years was not a democrat. For his view on democracy, see PR, paras. 27JR, 279R. 58. In Hegelian language the state must further the education of its cilizcns to an aware~ess of "universality" or sha~ ends (PR, para. J87R). In Rawlsian lan~age, g~vemmcnt, by ~mplementing the two principles of justice, helps mainta~n or construct 1f not un1vcrsal shared Interests, then at least an "overlapping consensus" regardmg them.

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59. This formulation is Dworkin's in "Liberal Community." 60. This claim needs some qualification. Economic "social union" applies to Rawls's wellordered society as a whole insofar as the society realizes the difference principle- that principle which specifies that no one shall institutionally gain unless all are benefited (including the worst oft). In Rawls's theory, however, this principle is implemented from the "top down" by the various branches of government (TJ, 247ff.); it is thus not a principle which holds within the firm, say, or at the day-to-day level in the realm of work, where individuals may still live in "private society." See my "Rawls and Ownership: The Forgotten Category of Reproductive Labor," Canadian Jourt141 of Philosophy, Supp., 13 (1988): 139-67; also G. Doppelt, "Rawls's System of Justice: A Critique from the Left," Nous 15(September 1981): 259-307. 61. At first sight, it looks as if Rawls exempts the work relation because it is believed to presuppose an element of "compulsion," whereas social union is described (at one point) as something all can "freely participate" in (TJ, 529). On closer observation, however, whether or not an arrangement constitutes a social union for Rawls cannot rest on the presence or absence of all "necessity" in the type of activity, for the fact that man must eat and labor in any particular way is no more "forced" than that he must live in families or in society, and yet the latter two are among the class of social unions. The answer as to why Rawls exempts economic activity from the list of social unions must lie elsewhere; my own view is that Rawls simply accepts a major tenet of neoclassical theories of production and continues to operate with the model of a privately appropriating individual in the realm of labor. See my "Towards a New Conception of Ownership," Ph.D. diss., Harvard, 1985, chap. 3: ttOff. 62. See Schwarzenbach, "Rawls and Ownership." 63. G. Doppelt, "Rawls's System of Justice," cf. ft. 61, taking a more standard Marxist line, also criticizes Rawls for restricting "community" to the political domain and for leaving "no room" in his theory for "the model of dignity through self-affirming labor in community with others" (p. 277). 64. Women have been "mixing their labor," after all, for centuries in the domestic realm, whatever else they have been doing. To distinguish this form of activity clearly from the model of "productive" labor, I have called the form "reproductive" labor. Reproductive activity aims not, in the first instance, at the production of physical objects, exchange value, or even "human services" but at the "reproduction" of a set of concrete human relationships- in the best case, on my analysis, specific relationships of friendship or philia. See Schwarzenbach, "Rawls and Ownership." Moreover, with women moving en masse into the marketplace in this century, the time would seem ripe to retain aspects of reproductive labor in the public sphere. See the author's On Civic Friendship (forthcoming). 65. Most recently again by Gutmann, "Communitarian Critics," 321. 66. I believe it holds generally, although one finds such "utopian" or forward-looking passages in Rawls as "until we bring ourselves to conceive how this [a public understanding of mutual respect) could happen, it can't happen" ("PNM," 231). 67. This is not to say that certain "left-wing Rawlsians" have not made such a call; I include the work of J. Cohen and J. Rogers, On Democracy (New York: Penguin Books, 1983), chap. 6, Doppelt (1981), and myself (1988) in this category. 68. I might here add that the women's movement of the past century, and all the gains women have thereby won, lends renewed credence to Hegel's view of history as the struggle for "the realization of freedom." It may just be that Rawls's theory, although implicitly operating with certain assumptions about the nature of historical progre55, needs to elaborate such assumptions more fully to better ground his own position. 69. Why, for instance, should our common "shared" precepts about family life, the treatment of children, animals, principles of friendships, trust, and so on not be elaborated and critically

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relevant for our public political life? An approach developing such a reflective equilibrium of the private realm, as well as its implications for our public life, is developed in the author's forthcoming On Civic Friendship. 70. Things arc "internally related" to each other if (as Bradley typic:aUy expresses it) the terms arc "altered necessarily" by the relations into which they enter. Again, if it is necessary of me that I stand in a certain relation to a certain object, so that I would not be what I am if I did not, then this relation is "internal" to me. See Hylton, Russell, Idealism, 44ff.

Sibyl A. Schwarzenbach is Assistant Professor of Philosophy at Barut:/1. CoUege of 1M City University of New York. She obtained her fllltlergraduate deg~e ill philosophy /rom Cornell University, was a Fulbright Scholar and spent two years at tile University of Heidelberg in Gernumy, and received her Ph.D. from Harvard under John Rllwls in socitll and politiCGI philosophy. She has published a review and IUUfteroru articles in moral and political theory ill Ethics, Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Social Theory and Practice, Metaphilosophy, and New York Uaivcrsity Review of Law and Social Change. She is presently at work on a book entitled On avic Fricadsbip (Univenity ofMichigan Press, fonhcoming).

CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY Volume 23, Number I, March 1993, pp. 75- 100

Rawls's Communitarianism ROBERTO ALEJANDRO

University of Massachusetts, Amherst Amherst, MA 01003 USA

~os~ di~ussions of Rawls's philosophy tend to neglect the strong comliburutanan strand of his theory: so much so that in the debate between erals and communitarians Rawls's account of community has been for the most part intriguingly absent. 1 This article is an attempt to fill in the g~p by_ offering a discussion of the Rawlsian understanding of commu~ty as It w~s pres:ented in A Theory ofJustice and its poss_ible im~lications or a pluralist SOCiety. 2 At the same time, I want to take tssue wtth one of the most influential critiques leveled against Rawls's conception of the ~If: namely, Sandel's critique of the 'individuated subject' that, in his VIew, underlies justice as fairness. Rawls's constructions, so Sandel argues, rest on an unencumbered self that is individuated in advance and whose identity is fixed once and for all.

Gerald Doppelt argues that 'Rawls's framework can be understood as a "communitarian liberalism"' (281), but his focus is different from mine. See his 'Beyond Liberalism and Comrnunitarianism: Towards a Critical Theory of Social Justice,' Philosophy and Socilll Criticism 14 (1988) 271-92. Susan Moller Okin discusses the role of feeling in Rawls's account of justice, but she does not add~ ~w~'s vision of COmmunity. See her 'Reason and Feeling in Thinking about Justice, Ethtes 99 (1989) 229-49. James W. Nickel concentrates on Rawls's view of political community. See his 'Rawls on Political Community and Principles of Justice,' Law and Philosophy 9

(1990) 205-16.

2 Though Rawls's articles after A Theory of Justice include important de~elopmen~ and, in some cases, modifications of his previous arguments, I do not think that his account of community has been substantially altered.

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76 Roberto Alejandro

Sandel's critique has largely gone unchallenged. Some liberals seem to accept it;3 others attempt to improve on Rawls's formulation;4 and still others simply ignore it.5 Actually, the thrust of liberal arguments against Sandel is consistent in avoiding a critical examination of Sandel's attack on the Rawlsian self, while confusin~, in Charles Taylor's words, issues of ontology and issues of advocacy. Those arguments tend to concentrate on Sandel's vision of community, which is, in my view, the weakest part of his analysis. My goal here is to examine Rawls's text to argue that another reading of the Rawlsian self is possible. Needless to say, I follow here the hermeneutic principle that a text goes beyond its author's intentions, and so I attempt to reconstruct Rawls's argument along lines that, to the best of my knowledge, have been unexplored. I begin by discussing Rawls's comrnunitarianism (sections I-IV), then I present Michael Sandel's critique of Rawls's notion of community (section V), and conclude with some remarks about what I take to be the disturbing uniformity that emerges from a Rawlsian community (section VI). I will suggest that some central assumptions of Rawls's theory of justice are either contradicted or completely abandoned in his communitarianism. If my argument is correct, the first casualty of a Rawlsian community may come as a surprise. Yet it is the case that one of his central assumptions, the priority of the self over its ends, is either denied or substantially modified.

I

Rawls's account of community is anchored in the goals of cooperation, stability, harmony, and transparency. Cooperation entails mutuality and reciprocity, which means that members of a Rawlsian community are going to share in the distribution of benefits.' Stability implies that the members' cooperation with one another is expected to be one over a

3 William Galston, 'Pluralism and Social Unity,' Ethics 99 (1989) 711-26 4 Will Kymlicka, 'liberalism and Communitarianism,' Canadian Journal of Philosophy 18 (1988) 181-204 5 Amy Gutmann, 'Communitarian Critics of Liberalism; Philosophy and Public Affairs 14 (1985) 308-22 6 ·~ross-:Purposes: The Li~ral-Communitarian Debate,' in Nancy L. Rosenblum, ed., LzberaliSm and the Moral Lifo (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1989) 159-82 7

John Rawls, A Theory of Justia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1971), ~- Subsequent references will be integrated into the text.

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complete life. Harmony and transparency mean that individual plans are complementary (563) and, more importantly, the individual is transparent to himself to the extent that his ends cohere with each other 8 and he is transparent to others to the extent that his plan of life is pa~ of a larger social plan just as individuals, through their institutions, are part of 'a social union of social unions' (527). 9 These goals inform Rawls's vision of community which possesses what seems to be a neglected feature of Rawls's philosophy; that is, his communitarianism does not depend upon the original position and its parties: it relies on his understanding of associations, institutions, and moral psychology. In all these areas, justice is the principle that, like a red thread, orders and regulates both the Rawlsian individual and the Rawlsian community. I will address these issues in tum. Rawls conceives of associations as institutional settings that comply with the precepts of justice and provide a space for mutual recognition ~d appreciation of the person's abilities. Associations socialize indi~Iduals into the principles of trust and friendship, strengthen the mdividual's self-esteem, and provide a 'secure basis' for the worth of their members (442). Associations thus occupy a central place in the Rawlsian universe since self-esteem, in Rawls's theory, is 'the most important primary good' (440). Or to put it differently, since the good of self-esteem requires that our person and deeds be appreciated by others; and since 'associative ties' strengthen this aspect and 'tend to reduce the likelihood of failure and to provide support against the sense of self-doubt when mishaps occur ... ' (441), the individual's me:"'bership in associations is not an attribute, but a substantial trait of his/her character. What is important is that in his descriptions of associative ties, Ra~ls not only presents a picture of moral personality which is far from bemg the unencumbered self so often ascribed to his theory, but also, and more importantly his reasoning undermines the priority of the self over its ends (560), ~hich seems to be one of the core elements of his conception

8

Th The Dewey t.ectures 1980 ' The ]. Rawls, 'Kantian Constructivism in Moral eory: , '~, Journal of Philosophy" (1980) 512-72, at 529; hereafter quoted as Dewey ·

9 The

Rawlsian community is a space of

J=

and transparency which assumes ony . . ars as a natural

harm

that men have a n~~tural inclination toward ~~· ~~insists, a 'stable capacity, a built-in mechanism for human soaa~ility, . and fellow feeling conception of justice ... elicits men's natural sen~~ts of wu~hat he says when .. .' (502). It is thus possible to apply to Rawls 5 P~~ wants is that there describing John Stuart Mill's theory: '[o)ne of a~~Jlow citizeN' (502). should be harmony between his feelings and those 0

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78 Roberto Alejandro

of justice. Let us explore why. In Rawls's account, there are three principles which I will call the principle of mutual" recognition, the principle of external confirmation, and the principle of dependence. Mutual confirmation means that the conviction of the worthiness of the individual's endeavors is placed, not in an unencumbered subject of possession, but in a historical individual who is guided by social standards of judgment. '[U]nless our endeavors are appreciated by our associates,' he says, 'it is impossible for us to maintain the conviction that they are worthwhile ... ' (441). External confirmation means that the person's endeavors need to be confirmed by his/her associates in a community of shared interests: 'what is necessary is that there should be for each person at least one community of shared interests to which he belongs and where he finds his endeavors confirmed by his associates' (442, my emphasis). It is the principle of dependence, however, that is central to understanding the implications of Rawls's communitarianism. In his view of associative ties, the individual has to obey the norms regulating his/her group. If the individual acts wrongly, Rawls argues, 'he has failed to achieve the good of self-command, and he has been found unworthy of his associates upon whom he depends to confirm his sense ofhis own worth' (445, my emphasis). 10 I suggest that the principle of mutual recognition, the external confirmation individuals need for their endeavors, and the dependence the individual has on others to confirm his /her own worth deny the priority of the self over its ends. There are two reasons to explain why this is so. First, if our endeavors, and for instance the ends they pursue and the identity they shape need to be appreciated by others, and if it is this social appreciation that determines the worth of our endeavors and ends, we are no longer prior in any meaningful sense to our ends. Those ends are determined in important ways by social (principles accepted by society) and communal (principles recognized by a 'community of shared interests') standards of worthiness. Second, if the standards to confirm the individual's endeavors are provided, not by himself as an unencum-

10 Along the same lines, he also argues, that the 'soundness of our convictions' depends upon a 'common perspective.' 'The acceptance of the principles of right and justice forges the bonds of civic friendship and establishes the basis of comity amidst the disparities that persist. ... But unless there existed a common perspective, the assumpti~n of which narrowed differences of opinion, reasoning and argument would be pomtless and we would have no rational grounds for believing in the soundness of our convictions' (517-18, my emphasis). This assertion suggests that th~gh the ~ry is individualistic, the conception of rationality informing it is soaa~. TI_'at ~· the soundness of our convictions' depends upon a 'common perspective, which turns out to be a set of beliefs accepted by a community. This is another instance of Rawls's communitarianism.

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bered self, but by a 'community of shared interests' (a claim that Rawlsian liberals tend to neglect), 11 and if the individual confirms his/her own worth, not by standards he/she has created, but by norms and criteria accepted by his/her associates, then, the Rawlsian self is not so prior to its ends, after all. Its self-esteem is not anchored in values the self derives from itself, but in values that its associates accept. But if the ends that my plan of life pursues require the approval of my peers to confirm my sense of worth, namely, if I consider as my primary concern the approval my ends may receive from my associates, I am no longer prior to my ends. In an important way, the ends I choose are determined by others' approval. 12

11 See, for example, Will Kymlicka, 'Liberalism and Communitarianism.'

12 This tum of Rawls's communitarianism shows how mistaken is the attempt to present the liberal communitarian debate as a conflict between society and the individual's judgment. For this misconstruction, see Will Kymlicka, 'Liberalism ~d Communitarianism.' It could be argued, however, that the .self is s~ prior to 115 ends in the sense that it can revise them. Rawls himself clalffis that free personsh . of themselves as beings who can revise · and a1 ter therr · fin aI endsandw o concetve · t· · · th · lib rty · these matters' ('Reply.to Alexander giVe liSt pnority to preservmg eu e m . and Musgrave,' Quarterly Journal of Economics 88 (1974), 641). Kymlicka uses thisls' . . · · portant feature of Raw s VIew to present the principle of reexanunation as an liD 1991 1 liberalism (Liberalism, Community, and Culture [Oxford: Clarendon P.ress adin ' 15-17).1 think that Kymlicka's interpretationreliesonanextremely ~lect~ve~wls'~ of Rawls's texts, which fails to explore several important .tenstons. mth Rawlka' v1ew· one IS e arguments. There are two grounds that dispute Kymlic 5 . . · . In Rawls's sian view of a rational plan; the other is Raw~'s comm=a:::d together. . rtantly he theory, a rational plan and the person's conception of the g M · his ood' (408) ore IIDpo ' 'Th e rational plan for a person determmes g · f tiona! subject ' !if h 0 le the activities o one ra goes on, We are to see our e as one w ' . t different parts of spread out in time .... The intrinsic importance that we ~tgn~uld depend upon our life should be the same at every moment of t~me ..Theses~~~: not be affected by the the whole plan itself as far as we can detenrune Jt and . ) This claim is certainly contm_gencies of our present perspective' ~ my e~~IS~wls's own claim that at vanance with the principle of reexanuna~on. an nds R wls's conception of a free persons have an interest in revising theu ~ ~t ·dis~utes the principle of community of shared interests is the other groun 'on of the good require a reexamination. For Rawls, seU-esteem ~d ~~ concepti nns his own worth. Since community of shared interests where the mdivtdual conf ust also be part of his this is so, the individual's membership in that comm~tys:ndards his associates conception of the good. This individual de~nds on e and complete his own accept to confirm his own worth, dev.elop his ex~.Uent':~xamine his conception nature. Accordingly, he is not one who IS alw~ys w~ t a conception of the good, of the good. That reexamination may lead him to a ~psu port. But if he loses the which his associates may not accept and thus lose~ he would be losing the support of his associates, he is not only losing some ·

42°:

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80 Roberto Alejandro

Rawls's view of associative ties thus suggests that the Rawlsian individual is not the autonomous self that, in Dworkin's description, leads his life from the inside13 and that, in Kateb's account, seems to be suspicious of social standards. 14 It is rather an individual whose very capacity for judgment may be compromised by his membership in a community of shared interests. 15 Better still, this individual may be unwilling to revise his ends in order to maintain his associates' approval and, for instance, his self-esteem.16 If the individual comes to disapprove of the values of his associates, and there is no other association to which he may belong, he might prefer to go along with his peers, thereby avoiding any damage to his self-esteem. 'He is apprehensive lest they reject him and find him contemptible, an object of ridicule' (445). This conception of the self shows how misleading are the fixed boundaries that are often found in liberal arguments against communitarian discourses. In open contrast to those arguments, the Rawlsian individual appears as one who needs a community of shared interests which provides standards of worthiness and allows him to preserve his self-esteem: associations and communities provide 'a secure basis for the sense of worth of their members' (442). It may be argued, however, that though Rawls's communitarianism emphasizes mutual recognition and communal standards of worthiness, he still provides enough room for the individual's judgment by insisting that, 'for the purposes of justice,' citizens are to 'avoid any assessment of the relative value of one another's way of life' (442). But this argument

external source of his self-esteem. A Millian or an Emersonian self would be willing to stand up for its moral independence regardless of what a community of shared interests may do. But it is not clear that a Rawlsian self is equally willing to risk its self-esteem in order to preserve its moral independence. Rawls's arguments, then, suggest a tension between the self's moral independence and its self-esteem, and the latter, after all, is the most important good. K ymlicka's analysis does not explore these tensions in the Rawlsian construction of the self.

13 Ronald Dworkin, 'In Defense of Equality,' Socilll Philosophy and Policy 1 (1983) 24-40 14 George I-Aristotelian-cum-Thomistic one-is certainly opposed to both of these. Indeed, it is because I believe in an objective moral order !a "moral law" even}, and in its rele,·ance for the conduct of political life, that I find what many liberals have to say on such issues as abortion, blasphemy, education, the public celebration of "alternative sexualities," pornography, and the provision of social services, for example, to be troublesome. Yet just as the morally neutral state seems an illusion, so the extensively morally committed state seems an impossibility. Communitarians are correct, I shall argue, in some of t."1e criticisms they make of philosophical liberalism. They are WTong, however, to the extent :; See !1.1ichael Oakeshott. "The Concept of a Philosophy of Politics," in Oakeshott, Reli· gion, Po!if..:s. and the J.br.i Ii_ff, ed. Timothy Fuller (Xew Haven: Yale t:niversity Press, 1993); and Roger Scruton, Tne Mtllning o1 Conservtltism (Harmondsworth: Penguin; l980). "Conservatism mar rarely announce itself in maxims, formulae or aims. Its essence is inarticulate, and its expression. when compelled, sceptical. But it is capable of expression ... " (Scruton, The Mtllnir.g of Conservtltism, p. 11). 4 G. K. Chesterton. "The Revival of Philosophy- Why?" in Chesterton, The Common Man (London: Sheed anc! \\'ard, 1950), p. 176. Regrettably, Chesterton's writings have hardly been appreciated by social philosophers. See, for example, Chesterton, What'5 Wrong U.'ith the World (London: Cassell, 1910; San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994). 5 See, for exampie. Richard Rorty, "The Contingencv of Communitv," in Rom•, Contingency, lron!l, and Solidtlri:y (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); and ROft)•, "The Priority of Democracy to Philosoph)'," in Reading Rorty, ed. Alan Malachowski (Oxford: Blackwell, 1990).

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61

that th~y think that moral community-in the precise sense that Au_gustme~ for example, has in mind when he speaks of "a gathering of ratio~l bemgs united in fellowship by their agreement about the objects

of thell' love" 6 (and, one might add, of their aversion) -can be a general model for the legitimation of the modern nation-state. Here, indeed, I find myself in qualified sympathy with Rawls when he writes that "the hope o~ poiitical community must indeed be abandoned, if by such a commu~Ity we mean a political society united in affirming the same comprehenSIVe doctrine" 7 (the nature of the qualification ·will become apparent). In the remaining sections, then, I shall be arguing for the following ~ai~~· First, the project of liberal political theory, of the neutralist and md1v1dualist sort pursued by Rawls, fails and does so for foundational and structural reasons. Second, an important but still neglected notion in social philosophy is that of the common good-Aquinas's "bonum commune." Third, while communitarian conceptions of social life may include a nonreducible common good, it is certainly questionable whether the conditions necessarv for the establishment of communitarian states generally exist. In these'circumstances we should be grateful for the possibilities for moral development offered by various other forms of community- for which, following Augustine, I propose the term "fellowship·" The acknowledgment that acceptance of a transcendent justification of the political order and its essential operations is not likely to come about (not: that such a justification is altogether impossible) suggests that the_ ap~ro­ priate attitude toward the state is a blend of long-term moral asprrahon, and short- to middle-term practical participation in ~ted political goals. Contrary to the position of Rawls, this latter element mvolv~s a ~efense of a form of political arrangement that probably is a modus _m:endz. However, the proportions of this blend, as indeed the need of ~t. are matters of sodohistorical contingency; it is not inconceivable, theretore, t~at the~ may change over time, or differ geopolitically, as between the C.S. ~n the U.K. for example. Indeed, I end with the thought that Enghshlanguage political philosophy suffers from a condition related to that noted by Oscar Wilde when he wrote of "two nations separated by a common language."

II. RAwts

AND THE UxAVOIDABILITY oF CoMPREHE="iSIVE DocTRINES

. . ft lonl7-awaited. and since Th e vear 1993 saw the pubhcat10n o wo o . . '. f nd prescnpttons. name1v, much -discussed works on issues o va1ues a . - 1 d ·" John Rawls's Political Liberalism and ~ope !ohn Paul I1~~::ri~~~::e ~ ::~Thus far I have not seen these exammed tn tandem, g " ;\ . . . . Lo b 1960) Book XLX. ch. 26. ~ · ugustme, De avrtate der (London: e • ' . L' ·versitv Press. !993), p. 146 . . John Rawls, Political Libemlism (New York: Columbl~ c";hoiM: Truth Society, 1993)• ~John Paul II. Veritatis Splendor (London: lncorpor~t~is ~-statement of tundamen· .o wh1ch may be added a second much-heralded-an h l~ndon: Chapman. 1994). tal Catholic doctrine: the Cat«hism of the CatlloliC Churc t

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JOHN HALDAl\'E

tainly scope for comparing and contrasting them. That is not my aim_on this occasion; but I shall discuss a difficulty for Rawls's position arismg from the existence of a work such as this encyclical addressed to the Roman Catholic Bishops- an encyclical directing them, in their teaching of the nine hundred million faithful, to uphold the unconditional and unlimited character of fundamental moral requirements. First, however, recall the basic enterprise pursued in Rawls's recent work. His concern has been to give an account of how political institu· tions governed by principles of justice can be warranted in circumstances in which they are required to regulate the lives of people who may, indeed do, pursue different conceptions of their own good. Early on, Rawls presents this issue as a question: "[H]ow is it possible for there to exist over time a just and stable society of free and equal citizens, who remain profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?" 9 Although this form suggests a Kantian enquiry into the a priori conditions of the possibility of justice, the content of the que~ tion looks to be socioempirical; and certainly Rawls repeatedly emphasizes the nonmetaphysical character of his investigation and of its conclusions. Already, however, that suggests a problem. To the extent that principles of justice carry normative force, they must appeal to considerations that can serve as justifying reasons and not mere psychological motives for those to whom they are addressed; but in order to do that they must ha\·e, if not a priori universal validity, at least some element of necessity or rational inescapability. Otherwise it will be too easY for the claims of justice to be evaded by those who fail to acquire, o; choose to divest themselves of, the relevant desires. One possibility here would be to follow Aquinas (at least as I read him) and Aristotle (as he is traditionally read)10 and argue that while prescriptions generated by practical reason are not categorical in Kant's sense, nonetheless in appealing to an agent's strivings they need not be void on account of the contingency of desire.11 For the strivings in question may be ones the agent cannot fail to have inasmuch. as they are partly constitutive of a normal (i.e., norma· tive) human nature. Such "assertoric hypotheticals" (to stay with Kantian termino1ogy) 12 rooted in an animate essence mllY be available to those who reject the pure practical reason of the categorical imperative, but they remain too Rawls, Politialllibmllism, p. 4. a recent and influential departure from this tradition, see John McDowell, "Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?" Proceedings of tire Aristotelian SociLty, supplementary volume 52 (1978), pp. 13-29; and McDowell, "The Role of Eudaimonia in Aristotle's Ethics," in £5511ys on Aristotle's Ethics, ed. Amelie Oksenberg Rorty (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980). u For Aquinas, see, for_ example, his Summa Tht.ologilu (1265-1273}, trans. Thomas Gilby (London: Eyre and Spotaswoode, 1976), Ia, Dae, q. 1, a. 6. 12 See Tht Moral lAw; Kant's Grvundworlc of the Mdaphysics of Morals, ed. and trans. H. J. Paton (I..Dndon: Hutchinson, 1976), ch. 2, p. 18. 9

10 For

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nfE INDIVJDI.JAL, THE STATE, AND THE COMMON GOOD

63

d.e~pl~ stained in the hue of metaphysics for Rawls's purpose. His oppo-

Sition

not to the possibility of a philosophical justification of practical Though this disclaimer sometimes seems unconvincing,u he ~~s~s t~at his objection is not an expression of skepticism, but rather an smpbcation of the concern to provide principles which can be drawn upon to regulate the lives of those who hold competing philosophical doctrines: "the conception of justice should be, as far as possible, independent of ~e opposing and conflicting philosophical and religious doctrines that citIZens affirm." 14 The avoidance of metaphysical theory is a consequence of the application of the principle of toleration to philosophy itself. However, and setting aside the doubt about an underlying moral skepticism on Rawls's part, the question remains of how, having disavowed philosophical justifications, what results can be anything other than an appeal to contingent preferences. A Rawlsian response to such an objection is likely to draw upon discussions offered in Political Liberalism under the headings ''The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus" and "The Idea of Public Reason" (Lectures IV and VI respectively). To begin with, however, we are required to grant a distinction between two branches or spheres of practical reasoning, that associated with ethical and that concerned with politiazl deliberation. The latter is the site of Rawls's contractualist construction "the political con· ception of justice," while the former is the arena within which are to be found "general and comprehensive doctrines." In these terms "general~ty" is a matter of range of application-to few, many, most, or all subJects (i.e., agents)-and "comprehensiveness" concerns aspects or departments of life. Thus a "fullv comprehensive and entirely general moral conception" would,identuY values and prescribe ~ves for all persons in all aspects of their lives. Ex hypothesi, and asswrung ~ o~a­ nized social context, such a conception will include an account .of JU~tice and other political virtues-as do the general and comprehens~ve vtews drawn upon in Veritatis Splendor and the Catechism of the Cat~o~IC Church. In contrast to comprehensive doctrines which present pohtical values · . a th 'd of a "freeas mstances of more general prinoples, Rawls ouers e 1 ea standing" political conception: IS

~ea~on.

[One that] is neither presented as, nor (i]s derived from, such a doc· . f 'ety as if this structure were trine applied to the basic structure 0 500 . ' li d I assume simply another subject to which that doctnne app e · · · · See . . l..iberriJ · • "[T)his reasonable pluralitY of ~g . , for example, Rawls, PolitiCAl JSm, tristic ric of~ reason owe tune and mconunensurable doctrines is seen as the _cluJmd • ~ of reasonable religioUS. phil· under enduring free institutions"; "w_e also VH!W t~ di~~tyas a ~t feature ot their osophical, and moral doctrines found in democratthtc S:e~tv of reasonable religiouS. philpublic_ culture"; and "(a)S always, We assume ~t e. ~~I a~ feature of the~ ~phical and moral doctrines found in ~~tiC sodetie5 :wav"' ( p. 135, 136, 216-17; my lie culture and not a mere historical condsnon soon ~0 ~ ~ ·~I reasons? emphases). Whv "characteristic" and "pennanent un ess or 14 Ibid., p. 9.• tJ

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all citizens to affirm a comprehensive doctrine to which the political conception they accept is in some way related. But a distinguishing feature of a political conception is that it is presented as freestanding and expounded apart from, or without reference to, any such wider background.... [l)t tries to elaborate a reasonable conception for the basic structure [of political society] alone and inYolves, so far as possible, no \dder commitment to any other doctrine. 15 Additionalh·. we are to consider a threefold distinction among a comprehensive dOctrine, a political conception of justice, and a modus vivendi. For these purposes, the last is to be thought of as an agreement or treaty adhered to because the participants regard it as being to their individual benefit. Such a convergence of interest is contingent, and therefore any appearance of political unity among the parties is illusory; all that exists is a precarious arrangement sustained by self-interest. It is against the background of this tripartite division that the claims of political liberalism are elaborated. In answer to the question of how, given a pluralism of comprehensiYe doctrines, there can nevertheless be a iust and stable socien- and not merely a modus t•ivendi, Rawls offers the idea of an overlapp~g consensus o~ a political conception of justice-that is, a principled agreement on Yalues and norms whose content and justification are independent of any distinctive comprehensive doctrine, but are compatible with many, most, or all such doctrines_ Unlike a modus vivendi, such a condition does express and sustain genuine social unity, but compatible with Rawls's requirement that liberalism be neutral behveen competing conceptions of the good, it is not the expression of one, as against another, comprehensive doctrine. Such is the claim, but the problems seem resistant to this form of solution. First, the initial separation of practical reasoning into ethical and political spheres is not innocuous-if it were, it would hardlY serve Rawls's argument, which requires a degree of independence of the political from the moral. There are several traditions, including the AristotelianThomistic and the Kantian ones, which would deny that a political conception can be "freestanding," precisely because they assert the unity and continuity of practical reasoning. Put in terms of Thomism, for example, the counterassertion would be that there can be no account of a political "right" that does not derive from a theory of the good, and that this latter is the general presupposition of all individual and social action. A related claim is expressed by John Paul II in a section of Veritatis Splendor where he is considering objections to traditional natural-law moral theology:

:s See ibid., pp. U-13; see also ibid., Lecture V, "The Prioritv of the Right over the Good." ·

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THE I:'-.TIJ'\1D!JAL, THE STATE, AND TilE COMMO:-.i GOOD

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The separation which some have posited between the freedom of individuals and the nature which all have in common, as it emerges from certain philosophical theories which are highly influential in present-day culture, obscures the perception of the universality of the moral law on the part of reason. But inasmuch as the natural law expresses the dignity of the human person and lays the foundation for his fundamental rights and duties, it is universal in its precepts and its authority extends to all mankind.I 6 It is·important to see that concerning the issue of the duality of practical reason and the further critical points that follow, Rawls may be in some difficulty even if Thomist, Kantian, and other theories are themselves defective, since it is central to his approach that it not rely on contentious philosophical doctrines. Thus, if it is controversial whether the moral and the polltical stand in the required relation, this fact alone undermines the possibility of advancing the political conception as the ~bj~t of an overlapping consensus. Certainly one might argue directly tor It, but to do so would be to violate the requirement of political autonomy· Perhaps, however., that requirement is not absolute but a~ts .of degree. Certainlv Rawls sometimes suggests this. Earlier I quotea hun writing that "th~ conception of justice should be, as far as pos.si~le, indep~ndent of the opposing and conflicting philosophical ~d rehgiOus.doctrines that citizens aifinn" (mv emphasis), and at one pomt he c~nsiders directly the possicility of opposition to his political conception n:o~ ~ advocate of a comorehensive religious doctrine. What he says 15 \ er; revealing and it fac~. I believe. a serious objection. In order to show both points I need to quote at some length: [B]y avoidino- comprehensive doctrines we try to bypass religion an~

philosophy'~ profoundest controversie~ so as to have some hope 01 uncoverino- a basis of a stable overlappmg consensus. . . . ... Nev~rtheless in affirming a political conception of JUStice \~e may eventuallY ha~e to assert at least certain aspects of our O\\ n comprehensiv~ religious or philosophical doctrine (by no means necessarilv fulh· comprehensive). This will happen whfendever sotmaletohna~ . , . . ti s are so un amen rns~sts, for example, that certain que~ 0 ~. . il strife .... At this to rnsure their being rightlv settled JUStifies av . . 1 , ;ts point we mav have no alternative but to ~eny this, ~ ~ lrr;;ppe~ ',0 denial and h~nce· to maintain·- the kind ot thmg we a 1 ' avoid. . r b r vers who contend that To consider this, imagine rationa tst e te bl' h d bv reason (unth ese beI'1efs are open to and can be fullv- esta e believers . . IS the sim· common thouo-h this vie\'\' might be). In thts case :>

I& John

Paul II, ~~m:z,::,; Splendor, section 51, P· 80 ·

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ply deny \\'hat we have called "the fact of reasonable pluralism." So we say of the rationalist believers that they are mistaken in denying that fact; but we need not say that their religious beliefs are not true, since to deny that religious beliefs can be publicly and fully established by reason is not to say that they are not true .... [W]e do not put fonvard more of our comprehensive view than we think needed or useful for the political aim of consensusP First. then, it is conceded that the method of avoidance may fail and that when it does so it may be necessary, and is permissible, to defend the political conception against challenges from a comprehensive conception by im·oking a rival-one's own-religious or philosophical doctrine. Second, however, it is supposed that in the imagined example of believers who deny the (purported) fact of "reasonable pluralism," one's doctrinal counter only challenges their epistemological claim and not the content of their own comprehensive conception. The point of this second obsen·ation is to emphasize the limited character of the departure from universal toleration. Against this, however, one should observe that any lapse from strict neutrality undermines the claim that a political conception can be founded on an overlapping consensus only and need not rest upon a distincth·e comprehensive doctrine. Further still, the departure may not be as limited as Rawls supposes, since it rrtight be part of the rationalist belie\·ers' doctrinal commitment that pluralism with regard to fundamental claims is not reasonable. In short, epistemological claims may fall within essential doctrine. Consider, for example, another papal d(A."11II\ent-Pope Pius Xll's encyclical Humani Generis (False Trends in Modern TeJUhing): :-.:otoriously, the Church makes much of human reason, in the following connexions: when we establish beyond doubt the existence of one God, who is a personal Being; when we establish irrefutably, by proofs divinely ·granted to us, the basic facts on which the Christian faith itself rests; when we give just expression to the natural law which the Creator has implanted in men's hearts.ts Here Pius is reiterating long-standing Catholic doctrines, the fi,rst of which is the provability of the existence of God- it being contrary to faith (not merely theological tradition) to deny that there can be such a proof. Earlier, having made similar claims, Pius asks why there should be disagreement over such matters and in response cites "the impact of the t; See Rawls, PoliticAl Libmalism, pp. 1S2-53. •~ Fflise T~ i~ Modem Teaching: E.ncycliazl Lettrr CHumani GtnnisJ of Pius XII Conaming Certain false Opinums, trans. Ronald A. Knox (London: Catholic Truth Society, 1950), Part U, "The Field of Philosophy," para. 29, section 1, p. 16.

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senses and the imagination, [and] disordered appetites which are the consequences of the fall." 19 The interpretation of papal encyclicals is a fine ~rt that phil~sophers now rarely practice,20 but it is difficult to escape the tdea that so tar as Pius is concerned, pluralism with regard to the primary precepts of natural Jaw (for example), though explicable, is not reasonable. In asserting otherwise, therefore, Rawls would be saying that the rationalist believers' religious beliefs are false. . Here my point is not that there can be no argument on behalf of a politIcal conception against the claims of those who would pursue their creed to the point of unsettling civil peace.2t On the contrary, I believe that one can and should fashion robust defenses of law and social order against, for example, those anti-abortionists who would murder clinic staff-or those who would assassinate blasphemers. As Rawls reluctantly concedes, however, the possibility of doing so depends upon bringing into ~he political domain a distinctive comprehensive moral doctrine. The to~e m _which he writes of this need suggests a socially regrettable necessity akin to the use of force to expel a drunk and boorish gu~~ fro~ a p~; but the problem reveals faults in the very structure of political liberalism. By Rawls's own account, even though the political conception may not be. the object of an overlapping consensus, it should non~theless_ be affinned (and upheld) because it is implied by a favored philosophical perspective. In connection with this objection, consider what Rawls has to say ~bout public reason. He asks: "How can it be either reasonable or ra~onal, when basic matters are at stake for citizens to appeal only to a public con. ' 't?" 22 The ceptton of justice and not to the whole truth as they see I · . answer elaborates interpretations of ideas that are supposed to be av~­ able and acceptable to all, and concludes with t~e. de~and that we.live together politicallv on the basis of claimS and justifications that everyone can reasonablv be. expected to endorse. As before, however. these form~· 1ations fail to ·withstand the test of real examp1Ies. 0 e,arlv · almost . even· · . Rawls wntes· th mg turns on the interpretation of "reasonab eness. · . a£ u1 of public reason are The only comprehensive doctnnes that run of olitical values. those that cannot support a reasonable balance .P uld be hard . . a footnote whose :-portance 1t wo [A nd he contmues, m .... to exaggerate:}

°

19 lbid . , p. 3. ;w For ~ distinguished exception, however,

. M I tvre "How C.m We Learn

~ ~ • ac ~ · .'lil-95. I discUSS phil·

What ~entatis Splendor Has to Teach?" The ThomiSt, vol. '~ (l994 '~~ack .-\gain: On Vt~?:"hs ~~phtc~. ~spects of Veritatis Splendor i~ "From Law to_ v~::ld: IJni\-ersity of Sheffield

~·tndor,

In rne Use of the Bible in Ethrcs, ed. M. DaviS ( ess, 1995) . · · 5....,.;,.1 Issue 't · · " 5 nthtsis Phrlosopt~IDJ. ~• l offer such an argument in "Religious Tolerahon. Y on Joleration, vol. 9 (1994), pp. 21-26. Rawls, Political Liberalism, p. 216.

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As an illustration consider the troubled question of abortion. Suppose first that the society in question is well-ordered and that we are dealing with the normal case of mature adult women .... Suppose further that we consider the question in terms of these three important political ,·alues: the due respect for human life, the ordered reproduction of political society over time, including the family in some form, and fin~lly the equality of women as equal citizens .... !\ow I believe anv reasonable balance of these three values will give a woman a duly qtialified right to end her pregnancy during the first trimester. The reason for this is that at this early stage of pregnancy the political value of the equality of women is overriding and this right is required to give it substance and force .... [A]ny comprehensive doctrine that leads to a balance of political values excluding that duly qualified right in the first trimester is to that extent unreasonable. 23 Without entering into the abortion debate, it should be clear that any notion of reasonableness that renders an opinion contrary to that presented by Rawls ''unreasonable" is almost certain to be (reasonably) contentious and thus not fitted to occupy a central role in a conception of justice that purports to apply the principle of toleration to philosophy itself-thereby "to bypass religion and philosophy's profoundest problems." In this connection consider again a view presented by an authoritative Roman document, this time an "Instruction" on abortion (Donum Vitae) issued by the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith: The inalienable rights of the person must be recognised and respected by civil society and the political authority. These human rights depend neither on single individuals nor on parents; nor do they represent a concession made by society and the state .... Among such fundamental rights one should mention in this regard every human being's right to life and physical integrity from the moment of conception .... As a consequence of the respect and protection which must be ensured for the unborn child from the moment of conception, the law must provide appropriate legal sanctions for every deliberate violation of the child's rights.24 In the face of a dear conflict of views of the sort which this example makes \'ivid, Rawls's true position reveals itself to be far from neutral: try for an overlapping consensus, but where it is not available and where important issues are at stake, affirm your own comprehensive doctrine. The whole raison d'etre of Politiall Liberalism, however, was to offer a way 23 Ibid.,

pp. 243-44. Viw (1987J, as quoted in the Catechism of tht Catholic Church (supra note 8), Part

24 Donum

3, section 2, paragraph 2273, p. 490.

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forward that possesses the principles lacked by a mere modus vivendi, yet does not rely upon appeal to distinctive doctrines. It is apparent from the foregoing, therefore, that whatever its other merits this defense of liberalism fails in its own declared aim. Ill.

THE CoMMON

Gooo

~e way of presenting some of the problems that Rawls runs into is by saymg, as above, that he tries, unsuccessfully, to secure a political rightthat of justice- without deriving it from any distinctive account of the good. This is a criticism that is increasingly voiced, in one form or another, Particularly by advocates of "perfectionist" liberalism.25 It might also be noted, though it rarely is, that although the notion of the right Rawls seeks is a commonly shared one, he conspicuously eschews any th~ry of the common good. So far as I am aware, he only mentions th_e Id~a once and that is in a passage characterizing views that contrast With his own account of justice as fairness:

[W]hatever these religious and philosophical doctrines may be, I assume thev all contain a conception of the right and the g~od that includes a ~onception of justice that can be understood as m some way advancing the common good. 26

This, then, brings me to the issue of the role \\ithin political and ~al philosophv of the idea of the cmr.mon good. The body of anti-Rawlsian ·. . · al .....m>t