Making Sense of Social Movements

Making sense of social movements

Nick Crossley

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Open University Press Buckingham . Philadelphia

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Blumer assessed

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I will begin my evaluation of Blumer by considering the weaknesses of his approach. These stem mostly from his almost exclusively social psycholo­ gical focus. Although this focus is important it does nor extend to a proper consideration of the structural conditions in which movement activity takes shape. I mean two things by this. First, Blumer pays no attention to the various factors in the environment of social agents which would either con­ strain or facilitate movement formation. He focuses upon what agents do with only a minimal consideration of the contexts in which they do it and the various forms of resources and power that can be mobilized both to support and to impede their actions. Related to this, he offers no reflection upon the systems or fields out of which struggles emerge (i.e. the systems or social contexts in which strains take shape), or those in which movement activists must conduct their struggles ( i.e. the various 'arenas of struggle' in which movement members wage their wars). Having said this, it is impor­ tant to note that his treatment of 'strains' is more sophisticated than the stTJW model of collective behaviour which, as I noted in the Introduction, has heen c ri r i c i zcd in rhe literature. Strain is not simply l I hjl'l'liVl' world or Ihe

38

Making sense of social movements

movement. We can undoubtedly improve upon Blumer's position i n this respect, but he provides an extremely important point of departure. Finally, Blumer's account is important because it emphasizes that move­ ments are made by the agents who are involved in them. They are products of the creative actions o f social agents. Blumer is not naive in his under­ standing of this. He recognizes that agents behave differently i n movement contexts and periods of social unrest than during times of social stability and he attempts to theorize this. Furthermore, and importantly, he recognizes that by making social movements, agents effectively remake themselves, forging new identities and habits. In contrast to certain other accounts, however, including the one we will examine next, he does not succumb to a mechanistic or reductionist account of this transformation. Agents remain agents in Blumer's account.

chapter three

Smel ser's value-added app roach

Summary and conclusion In this chapter I have discussed a version of the collective behaviour ap­ proach: that of Herbert Blumer. Within Blumer's work we have found a strong conception of social agency and a robust account of the interaction processes and mechanisms by way of which social agents construct social movements. We have also identified mechanisms which lend movements the solidarity and organization they need to survive. Blumer offers an inter­ esting and promising account of movement cultures and conceptualizes clearly the role of identities, emotions and embodiment in the life of move­ ments. On the negative side, however, he has relative!y little to say about the societal environment in which movements and other forms of coll ective behaviour take shape.

Further reading Blumer's key essay, 'Collective behaviour' ( L969), is relatively accessible and not too long; Blumer himself provides a reasonable overview of the work of Mead, in his Symbolic lnteractiol1ism (1986). I find Joa5's ( 1 985) C.H. Mead much closer to the mark, however. My own reflcccions on Mead can be found in lntersu!Jjectivity (Crossley 1996, esp. 49-72 ), The Social Body (Crossley 20013, esp. '144-50) and Crossley (2001c).

Blumer's account is only one of many ordinarily associated with the 'collect­ ive behaviour' approach, albeit one of rhe most persuasive and important. In this chapter I focus upon another, that of Neil Smelser ( 1 962). Like Blumer'S, Smelser's account is problematic in irnponant respects and I intend to explore its problems. As with Blumer, however, there is also much of value in Smelser's work. Interestingly the strengths are very different to those I noted in Blumer, and it is for this reason that I have elected to examine both in the book. Smelser has an important contribution to make to modern movement theorizing which is complementary ro but different from that of Blumer and it is my intention, i n this chapter, to draw it out. In some instances this will involve me arguing that Smelser was wrong, but instruct­ ive. In particular I believe that his aCCOllnts of both social systems and emotions are poor, but 1 believe that they constitute a possible starting place for a reflection upon these issues, which have been lost in more recent theorizing. In other cases I will suggest that Smelser has a stronger grasp on specific issues than his critics. His value-added model of movement formation (see below) i s the most obvious example of this and was my chief reason for devoting a chapter to him. J return to this model at a number points in the book and argue, in the final chapter, that, in reconstructed form, it is the best framework from which to approach movement analysis. I begin the chapter with a few brief paragraphs of necessary background informa­ rion concerning Smelser's model, followed by a note on the differences hetween his model and the critics' caricature. This leads to a more detailed exposition of his model. Finally I offer an assessment and critique of the I l lodei.

40

Smelser's value-added approach

Making sense of social movements

41

Smelser is concerne d to e xp la i n social movements and other forms of col­

i nto spe ci fic gu id el i nes for action. At the lower level, underneath 'organiza­ tion', are what he calls 'situational facilities'. This refers to the variolls forms of competence and know-how which social agents d raw upon in their

lective behaviour as they take sha pe within social systems sllch as schools,

interactions, which enable them to function within a role or organization.

Movements and systems

factories and wider society itself. To this end he begin s his theory with a n

accollnt of the main components of such systems. Following Parsons ( 1 95 "1 ), he understands social systems as institutionalized patterns of interaction, characterized by four discrete and hierarchically arranged levels of integration (see Figure 3 . 1 ) . It is easiest to approach this hierarchical model from the middle, with norms and organization, All interaction within social systems, Smelser argues, is oriented to social norms, that is, mutual expectations about appropriate forms of conduct which stipulate how agents should and should not behave. Many social systems have a set of formal and codified rules or laws but unwritten and informal rules can perform thc samc func­ tion, that is, the coordination and legitimation of specific patterns of (illter)action. Norms are not speci fi c e no ugh actually to a ccou nt for and explain the particularities and dynami cs of systems, in Smelser's view, how­ ever, so he adds a second layer to this, which he va riousl y refers to as 'motiva­ tion' or 'orga n iza ti on . This level includes the specifi c 'roles' that actors within any system might o ccu p y the hierarchies ;]nd i nte rco n necti o ns between those roles, which organize them into a system, and the various arrangements of punishment and reward which motivate agents to act appropriately. For example, i f we were interested in the medical system of a pa r ticu la r society we would not simply look at the formal rules of medical practice or its legal framework (its norms), but eq ua l ly at the various inter­ acting roles it involves (e.g. doctor, nurse, patient, etc.), the mechanisms by which those roles are coordinated and the various incentives and sanctions which encourage role conformity. Doctor s, we might observe, are well paid and enjoy a high status but they can lose this if they deviate significantly from fole or normative expectations; thus they have an incentive to con form. 'Above' norms, in this hierarchy of components, Smelser locates the valucs to which norms appeal. Laws or norms regard i n g racial and sexual discrimination, for e xam p le, arc based upon the value of 'equality'. They function both to make that value m ore speci fi c and concrete, and to turn i t '

,

The notion that these comp onents

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re h iera rc h ic a l l y arran ge d i s based

upon two considerations. First, th;]t each is s uccess i ve ly less abstract and more specific and co ncr ete as we move down the hierarchy. Norms, for e xa m pl e , are based upon general values which they translate i nto specific rules. But they themselves require more concrete forms of organization and motivation if they are to be realized, And these fo rm s of organization, in turn, depend upon the very concrete skills and dispositions of interacting agents if they are to be successfully 'pulled off'. Second, it follows from this that elements ;]t the lower end of the hierarchy can be altered, without necessitating change at the higher end, while change at the higher end will explicitly require changes at the lower end. If the values of society were to cha nge, for ex am p l e , this would necessitate a change in the norms (e.g. laws) which translate them into concrete rules. But this, i n turn, wou l d requi re ch an ge s in the form s of organization which support and enforce the norm, and consequently different skills and dispositi on s would be demanded of actors at the grassroots. A ch an ge in norms, by contrast, though it would still require changes i n org;]niz;]tion and d is posi tio ns , would not require a ch a nge in val ues . The same values can he rcalized through ;] whole variety of different types of norm or rule and the norm can only depart from values if the v;]lues upon which it is based are themselves changed. Similarly with motivation or organization: changes at this level would demand ;] change in dispositions but not in norms, since di fferent forms of organi zati on can implement the same norms and would only require a change in norms i f already based upon a different system of norms, ,

Movements, strains and the value-added model Smelser understands collective behaviour, which we have yet to defi ne , as a response to p ro b le ms or 'strains' within these systems, wh ich a i ms to cor­ rect them. Tn contrast to the collective behaviouf caricature, which posits

strain as a necessary, sufficient and immediate cause of protest, however, he Values Norms Motivation I Organization Situational Facilities

Figure 3 . 1

Smelser's hierarchy of system components

qualifies this claim on three grounds. First, he argues that collective beha­ viour and structural strain are not n ecess aril y unusual or statistically devi­ :lilt. I f Smelser portrays social systems as smooth running and perfectly fun cti on i ng this is only for the heuristic purpose of bringing to l ight the 1I1:1l1y ways in which real systems and societies fall short of that. Second, like Bl1l111er he argues that stTucturJI strain mllst be defined relat� ivt: t o t he sl lhjl:c t i ve :lnd i n t er�llhjec t i v e e x p ecl:'u io n s uf �lgerHS and groups. \Xlh,lt l'VLT � t r : l i l l'" l i n d prC lhklll ... 1 I 1 ,ly Ill' I I I: l l l i r.... ... t wi t h i n : 1 "ystt'rll : l re t l llly

42

Making sense of social movements

effective i n mobilizing action insofar as they depart from the expectations of those within it. A strain must also be a shock or a ffront: Before we can classify any event or situation as a source of strain, we must assess this event or situation with reference to cultural stand­ ards and personal expectations . . . [Strain] always expresses a rela­ tion between an event or situation and certain cultural and individual standards. (Smelser 1 962: 5 1 ) An interesting i l lustration of this is provided by Thompson's (1 993) study of protest and collective action in eighteenth-century England. The lower classes were prepared to accept a range of hardships, Thompson notes, often quite devastating i n their consequences, i f those hardships were expected and deemed just. An informal code specifying just and unjust hardship existed. But they would tolerate no departure from their shared definitions of just hardship or, indeed, of reasonable and appropriate behaviour. A lord or seller who attempted to con or exploit them, beyond the bounds defined by their traditions, would be subject to immediate and often brutal arrack. Thompson refers to this as the 'moral economy of the crowd'. Sim­ ilar supporting evidence can be found in the work of Jasper ( 1 997). He has shown, with respect to a number of case studies, the importance of 'moral shock' in precipitating social movement activity in the contemporary USA. What he means by 'moral shock' is precisely the effect generated by an experience which deviates from deeply held taken-for-granted assumptions about the world. In making this point Smelser, like Blumer, departs from the caricature of the collective behaviour approach and places his theory beyond the remit of much of the empirical work which has been used to cast doubt upon it. His theory cannot be falsified by reference to studies which focus upon the relationship between protest and objective indicators of hardship because such studies take no account of expectations and (inter)subjective defini­ tions. To test Smelser's theory we would have to investigate the lifeworld of the agents we are interested in: their expectations about and definitions of their world, their interests and priorities. This is exactly what Thompson and Jasper do, and their findings are supportive of the general thrust of Smelser's position, as outlined so far. This is not the only or even the largest departure that Smelser makes from the cause-effect straw model, however. His third qualification is that structural strain is Olle of six factors which must combine, in 'value-added fashion', if collective behaviour i s to follow. The notion of a 'value-added' model is one which Smelser borrows from economics. It identifies the manner in which the various stages of a production process c ontrib u te s Olllc r h i ng different to i t and thereby add value to the final product. Raw rllat' erials must be extracted, then melred down, next m o u ld ed , j·i m .:d together ; 1 1 1(.1

Smelser's value-added approach

43

finally painted. Each of these stages is necessary to the end result and failure 3[ any one stage brings the process itself to a halt. So it is, Smelser argues, with collective behaviour. He outlines six factors which affect both whether

collective behaviour will occur a11d, if so, what sort of collective behaviour it will be. I will explore some of these components in depth shortly, but first we require a brief overview of each: 1 Structural conduciveness. Social systems inhibit or facilitate and aid col­ lective behaviour through the constraints and opportunities for action which they afford. Furthermore, the specific configuration of opportun­ ities and constraints they involve shapes the types of collective behaviour which emerge, 2 Structural strahl. Agents must experience the system as problematic and stressful in some way. 3 Growth and spread of generalized belief Agents must 'diagnose' the problems they face and propose 'remedies'. I f they do not, there will be no collective behaviour. What sort of collective behaviour emerges de­ pends upon what sort of beliefs emerge. 4 Precipitating factors. That is, '[rigger events'. Whatever strains may be acting upon interaction situations they must be expressed in some form of concrete event or series of events i f agents are to mobilize around them. S Mobilization of participants (or action. This involves the emergence of communication networks and, in some cases, leaders and organizations. All action involves coordination and organization. (, Operation of social control. Social control agencies, such as the police and media, can play a preventative role, smoothing over strains and problems before movements emerge, and their response to collective be­ haviour, when it does begin, can be a very important factor in determin­ ing what happens next. Repressive policing may be sufficient to quash an uprising, but i f it is 'insufficiently repressive' it may have the opposite effect, causing moral outrage and mobilizing many more agents who might not otherwise have got involved. Similarly, the media can play a central role, 'amplifying' the process of movement formation by publiciz­ ing it (e.g. Crossley 1999b). Each of these elements is analytic, for Smelser. The same concrete action t)1' event may play more than one role. Sometimes police activities might "iJl1ultaneousiy fulfil the role of strain, trigger and the operation of social ('ontrol, for example. Moreover, the elements may emerge in any order and IIlay each help to define the other. The emergence of a generalized set of hd icfs or even a structural strain, for example, may generate a retrospective i l l l L:rprct::1tion of a specific event, leading to that event becoming a 'trigger l'vl'llf for ll1ohiliz advocates, but it is not yet fully recognized as an end i n itself. The NSM p a ra d i g m is as much of a challenge to RM and PP approaches as to Marxism in this respect, whatever conces­

othe r key theo rists , nota bly Tou rain e and \1 J eluc ci, and unli ke them he has Ilot en gaged in any systematic empir ical a n a ly s is of these movements, with

,

I·he exce pti on of an ea r ly study of the stud ent mov eme nt ( 1 9 8 9b). I t is my view, h owev er , that Hab erm as's account of the stru ctur al transformation

which has give n rise to the N S M s is the clearest and most robust to be roun d i n the li tera tu re . I hav e man y d is