,.
%
library of
EDITED BY J.
H.
MUIRHEAD,
M.A.
THE LIBRARY OF PHILOSOPHY. THE LIBRARY OF
PHILOSOPHY
is
in
the
first
in
While a contribution to the History of Thought. much has been done in England in tracing the course of evolu tion in nature, history, religion, and morality, comparatively little has been done in tracing the development of Thought the evolution of these and kindred subjects, and yet stance
"
upon
is part of the whole evolution." This Library will deal mainly with Modern Philosophy, has already had a fair partly because Ancient Philosophy share of attention in this country through the labours of Grote, Ferrier, and others, and more recently through translations from Zeller partly because the Library does not profess to give a complete history of thought. By the co-operation of different writers in carrying out this
opinion
;
plan, it is hoped that a completeness and thoroughness of treat ment otherwise unattainable will be secured. It is believed, also, that from writers mainly English and American fuller
consideration of English Philosophy than it has hitherto re ceived from the great German Histories of Philosophy may be looked for. In the departments of Ethics, Economics, and for instance, the contributions of
English writers to stock of theoretic discussion have been especially valuable, and these subjects will accordingly have special pro minence in this undertaking. Another feature in the plan of the Library is its arrange ment according to subjects rather than authors and dates, enabling the writers to follow out and exhibit in a way hitherto unattempted the results of the logical development of particular lines of thought. Politics,
the
common
The
historical
portion of the Library is divided into two first contains works upon the develop ment of particular schools of Philosophy, while the second ex hibits the history of theory in particular departments. The bird series contains original contributions to Philosophy, and the fourth translations of valuable foreign works. To these has been added, by way of Introduction to the whole Library, an English translation of Erdmann s History sections, of
which the
sophy,"
long since recognised in J. ii
H.
Germany
as the
MUIRHEAD, General Editor.
ALREAD Y PUBLISHED. By DR. JOHANN EDUARD ERDMANN.
THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY.
Edited by WlLLiSTON S. HOUGH, M.Ph., Professor of English Translation. Mental and Moral Philosophy and Logic in the University of Minnesota. In 3 vols., medium 8vo, cloth.
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Modern Philosophy, 15.? Third Edition. Modern Philosophy since Hegel, 12s. Third Edition. THE HISTORY OF ESTHETIC. By BERNARD BOSANQUET, M.A., LL.D., late Fellow of University College, Oxford. [SECOND SERIES. THE DEVELOPMENT OF RATIONAL THEOLOGY since Kant. By PROFESSOR OTTO PFLEIDERER, of Berlin. [SECOND SERIES. Second Edition. PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY IN SOME OF THEIR HISTORICAL RELATIONS. LL.D. M.A., BONAR, [SECOND SERIES. By JAMES APPEARANCE AND REALITY. By F. H. BRADLEY, M.A., Fellow of Merton College, Oxford. [THIRD SERIES. NATURAL RIGHTS. By DAVID G. RITCHIE, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of St. Andrews. [THIRD SERIES. Vol. II. Vol. III.
SIGWART
S
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LOGIC.
Translated by
HELEN DENDY.
OF WORKS
LIST
IN
.
2 vols.
.
[FOURTH SERIES.
PREPARATION.
FIRST SERIES. EARLY IDEALISM
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By W.
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COURTNEY, M.A., LL.D.
L.
(St.
Andrews), Fellow of New College, Oxford. GERMAN IDEALISTS Kant to Hegel. By WM. WALLACE, M.A., Whyte Professor of Moral Philosophy, University of Oxford. :
Leibnitz, Herbart, Lotze. By ANDREW SETH, M.A., Professor of Logic and English Literature, University of Edinburgh. SENSATIONALISTS: Locke to Mill. By W. S. HOUGH, M.Ph., Professor of Mental and Moral Philosophy, University of Minnesota, U.S.A. THE UTILITARIANS Hume to Contemporary Writers. By W. R. SORLEY, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, and Professor of Philosophy in University College, Cardiff. PRINCIPLE OF EVOLUTION IN ITS SCIENTIFIC AND PHILOSOPHICAL ASPECTS. By JOHN
MODK.RN REALISTS:
:
WATSON, LL.D.,
Professor
of
Moral Philosophy, University of Queen
s
College,
Kingston, Canada.
SECOND SERIES. THE HISTORY OF PSYCHOLOGY
:
Empirical and Rational.
By ROBERT ADAMSON, M.A.,
LL.D., Professor of Logic, University of Aberdeen.
THE HISTORY OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY.
By D. G.
RITCHIE, M.A., Professor of
Logic and Metaphysics in the University of St. Andrews, and J. II. MUIRHEAD, M.A., Lecturer in Philosophy, Royal Holloway College, Egham, and Bedford College,
London.
THE HISTORY OF THE PHILOSOPHICAL TENDENCIES OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY. ByJosiAH ROYCE,
Professor of Philosophy, Harvard University.
THIRD SERIES. FIRST PRINCIPLES OF PHILOSOPHY. By JOHN STUART MACKENZIE, M.A., Fellow of Trinity College. Cambridge. THE THEORY OF ETHICS. By EDWARD CAIRD, LL.D., Master of Balliol College, Oxford.
OR, THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE. By JAMES WARD, D.Sc., LL.D., Fellow and Lecturer of Trinity College, Cambridge. PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY. By G. F. STOUT, M.A., Fellow of St. John s College, {Shortly. Cambridge. PRK-JCIPLES OF INSTRUMENTAL LOGIC. By JOHN DEWEY, Ph.D., Professor of Philo
EPISTEMOLOGY
;
sophy, University of Michigan.
SWAN SONNENSCHEIN & MACMILLAN &
Co.,
Co.,
NEW
LONDON.
YORK.
LOGIC BY
DR.
CHRISTOPH SIGWART
Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tubingen
VOL.
I
THE JUDGMENT, CONCEPT, AND INFERENCE SECOND EDITION, REVISED AND ENLARGED
TRANSLATED BY HELEN BENDY
SWAN SONNENSCHEIN NEW YORK: MACMILLAN 1895
& CO. & CO.
BUTLER & TANNER,
THE SELWOOD PRINTING WORKS, FROME, AND LONDON.
AUTHOR S PREFACE TO THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION WHEN
was requested to give
I I
Logic,
complied
willingly,
an essential part of Francis
my
Bacon down
to Jevons, Bradley,
find in
one
s
own language
this
work
to English logicians
from
and Venn
;
thus I
may hope
of the task
it is
;
simple and current expressions which might
culties
own language and
that Miss
and avoid
and the
translator
double
manuscript from beginning to proofs,
so that
completely free as
I
may
safely
danger.
end, assure
I
and
Miss Dendy
of
text, or
have carefully revised
and co-operated the
exactly as possible the original text.
really faithful
beset
best to overcome these
reader
from misunderstandings, and that
hearty thanks to
is
impairing easy understanding.
Dendy has done her
this
I
feel
for the trouble
that it
in correcting
the
diffi
her the
translation
obliged to express
my
she has taken to give
C.
1894.
is
represents everywhere
reliable translation.
TUBINGEN, November,
is
sometimes impossible to
by the danger of either missing the precise meaning of the
I think
that
to translate a philosophical treatise
exactly correspond to the terms of the original,
straining his
my
not appear entirely as a foreigner.
will
difficulties
and achieving
in preparing
had been devoted
Whoever has himself attempted acquainted with the
consent to an English translation of
because
studies
my book
to English readers
my
SIGWART.
a
AUTHOR S PREFACE TO FIRST GERMAN EDITION THE
following attempt to reconstruct logic from
methodology, thus bringing
it
the
point of view of
into active relations with the scientific prob
lems of the present day, must be justified by the success with which carried out
;
this first
parts of the doctrine,
and
in
them
I
the traditional form of the science. to
which
I
have adhered as closely as possible to I
would only ask that the small extent
have referred to previous and contemporary treatments of the
subject as a whole, or to particular views on special points,
that to
commend
or dispute even the
of investigation
discussed
may it
not be
seemed
to
most important previous doctrines
would be an undue extension of the work course
much
In a science which has been so
taken amiss.
me
it is
volume contains the preliminary and fundamental
;
and
further
I
feared lest the
and exposition prescribed by my view of the
subject would be confused
if
I
made
a rule of discussing at every point
opinions which are to a large extent based upon presuppositions quite different
from
my
own.
I
to
what was indispensable
of
my own
doctrine.
I
have therefore thought
need hardly say that
been most frequently before me, and to
I
whom
Trendelenburg, Ueberweg and Mill
was being planned and carried out
;
I
and
justification
have made extensive use of
I
hoped here
to express
my
have died while the book
must also make special mention of
the assistance I have received from Prantl
fuly, 1873.
right to confine myself
Three of the men whose works have
both ancient and modern authors.
obligation
it
for the correct representation
s
great work.
AUTHOR S PREFACE TO SECOND GERMAN EDITION IN the
which have passed since
fifteen years
literature of logic
book
this
first
appeared the
has been enriched by a remarkable series of valuable
Important works have appeared by Lotze, Schuppe, Wundt and Bradley to name only the most eminent ; and all start from the concep That is, logic is grounded by them, tion which has guided this attempt. books.
not upon an effete tradition, but upon a is
actually
and
its
in
its
new
investigation of thought as
psychological foundations, in its significance for
actual operation in scientific methods.
again, have received
s
welcome elucidations from more
treatment
of
relational-concepts,
most nearly akin to has thus become incumbent upon
original treatise are It
the conclusions arrived at by
my
my me
knowledge
Particular points of logic,
and amongst these Windelband s studies on
Meinong
it
the
and
special investigations,
negative
Volkelt
s
judgment, acute
and
views. to test
fellow-workers,
anew my own views by to find more accurate
expression where misunderstanding might arise, and elsewhere to amplify and extend, or to fortify against adverse opinions. But for the reasons already stated in
corporating
more
my
first
preface, I have
extensively in the
been obliged
to refrain
from
in
work the considerations which deter
mined me to adhere to my conclusions, or from mentioning in detail all the critical observations which have been so abundantly bestowed. Where these criticisms were really applicable to what I had said, I have gratefully use of them ; where they were due merely to misunderstandings, I was loth to weary the reader with unfruitful discussions. In the same
made way
I
have been forced
to
abstain from
enriching the work by intro
ducing more freely investigations not included in
its
original design, even
might agree with them the subject is so inexhaustible that com pleteness is not attainable, and I would rather sacrifice the appearance of
though
I
;
completeness in treatment than obscure the clearness of the design. TUBINGEN,
October, 1888.
CONTENTS. PAGE
I
/ INTRODUCTION i. The Problem 2. 3.
^/
4.
PARTI.
Limits to the Problem
The The
CHAPTER
I.
6. 7.
8.
CHAPTER
II.
The
9.
10. II. 12. X
3-
14.
i
.
10
.
l T
The
Nature of Judgment and its Presuppositions Proposition as the Expression of the Judgment. Subject and Predicate .
The General Idea and Necessity of the Word
the
2?
....
Word
.
29
.
29
40
....... -...... .......
as Predicate
Simple Judgments
Denominative Judgments. Judgments of Attributes and Activities Impersonal Judgments and Allied Forms
Validity of the
cj
e? c-j
r?
58
Relational Judgments. Existential Propositions Judgments about Abstract Nouns
The Objective
Words
Judgment,
....
59 65 77
and the Principle of
Identity 15.
II.
III.
1
79 to
Time
in Narrative
Judgments
6.
.
.
.
...
The Act
Judgments Immediate and Mediated, Analytical and Synthetical Judgments The Process of the Synthetical Judgment 19. CHAPTER IV. The Negation 20. The Negation as Denial of the Judgment 21. The Different Kinds of Negative Judgments 22. Privation and Opposition as Ground of the Negation 1
8.
...... .
23. ,
*
.89-
Explicative Judgments of Judgment as expressed in . Language III. How Judgments arise, and the Distinction between Analytical and \S Synthetical
17.
CHAPTER
The Reference
24. 25.
The The The
^ 6
23
.
..........
Ideas as Elements of Judgments and their Relation to The Highest Categories of the Objects of Thought
Narrative Judgments
I.
t
Postulate of Logic Divisions of Logic
Analytical. 5.
.......
of Logic
Principle of Contradiction Principle of Twofold Negation Principle of the Excluded Middle
.
.
yO 93 IO2 102 112
IIy no, 123 .
127 i ->9
^8 .
CONTENTS
x ji
PAGE
CHAPTER
V.
Plural Judgments Positive Plural Judgments
I.
Positive Copulative
26.
The
27.
and Plural Judgments
57
1
Universal Affirmative Judgment
60
166
29.
Negative Plural Judgments
1
II.
III.
30.
The Negation
I? 2
CHAPTER I.
VI.
Possibility
of Plural Judgments
and Necessity
32.
The Necessity
34.
Possibility
CHAPTER
VII.
I.
35.
II.
36.
189
III.
37.
RESULTS
PART
II.
Different
203
Ways
in
213
which Propositions may be Combined, and .
.
.
.
.214
.
220
The Hypothetical Judgment The Disjunctive Judgment
228 232
...... ....... ....
The Concept Nature of the Logical Concept
I.
43.
Analysis of the Concept into Simple Elements. Super- and Subordination, Content and Extension of Concepts Division of Concepts
44.
Definition
41.
42.
.
The Truth of Immediate Judgments The Truth of Judgments about Concepts The Truth of Statements about Ourselves The Truth of Judgments of Perception
II.
45. 46.
47.
301
The
49.
52
-
53. 5455. 56. 5.7.
58.
59-
APPENDIX A APPENDIX B APPENDIX C
Different Sources of Hypothetical Inferences according to Formal
Major Premises
Logical
The The The The
.
-315 .
.
.
330
.
.
336 338 343
.
.
.
Inference of Subsumption Inference from Divisive Judgments
Disjunctive Syllogism Relation between the Truth of the Conclusion and the Truth of the Premises
*"
326 326
Laws
Inferences from Relations between Concepts The meaning of the Aristotelian Figures and Moods. The Value of the Syllogism
254
265 277 286
306
50.
III.
245 245
295
51.
48.
CHAPTER
237
239
295
Axioms and Postulates The Rules of Inference as the Ground for Mediated Judgments The Hypothetical Syllogism The Introduction of a Subject in the Hypothetical Syllogism
s>r>
,
196
38
CHAPTER
196
.
Hypothetical and Disjunctive Judgments
The
40.
y
.
Regulative The Conditions of Perfect Judgments 39.
CHAPTER
\/
Judgments
of Reality
their Logical Significance
^
176
Possible and Necessary as Predicates of Actual 33.
1
I?6
The so-called Modal Distinctions The Law of Sufficient Reason
31.
II.
,
57
:
157
-The Particular Affirmative Judgment
28.
!
349 357 367
368 371
373 ,-oj
>_
o^3 O
.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION IF
we
consider the nature of our Thought,
part of
in the
it is
engaged are certain and universally
when
of ascertaining the
the rules to be followed in
problem would place us
in
in
To
i.
it
frequently
Hence
It
is
logy.
Such a science we
different varieties,
true there
which we can
enough to
refer,
is
fails
do
to
this
this
problem object can be
solution of this
possession of a technical science of
in
at certain call
is
and universally
Logic.
general
other psychical activities, in what relations its
which
arises the
The
attainment.
determine what Thinking
what are
an important
accordance with those conditions
its
Thought, directing us how to arrive valid propositions.
find that
under which
conditions
and of determining
attained,
but that
valid,
to its natural development.
left
we
attempt to arrive at propositions
it
is,
how
it
differs
from
stands to these, and
primarily the business of Psycho
no generally accepted
Psychology to it will be
but for our present investigation
refer to our ordinary use of language.
By Thinking
in
we always mean an Ideational Activity i.e. an which in itself does not include that inner subjective ex activity citement which we call Feeling, nor yet give rise to an immediate widest sense
its
effect it
upon ourselves or others
signifies
is
that something
;
as in willing is
present
and
to
acting.
All that
consciousness as
its
must however be further distinguished from Perception object. and Intuition these express immediate reference to an object It
;
which s.
L,
is
given to the subjective activity independently of B
itself,
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
2
while Thinking denotes a purely inner activity of ideation, thus to be a spontaneous action proceeding from the energy
seeming
of the subject alone.
Its
thoughts
products
are therefore dis
the objects tinguished, as merely subjective, ideal images, from which are looked upon as real in Perception and Intuition. In this sense
language gives the name of Thinking to Recollection
bethinking oneself of something, and
to
Imagination, picturing
and consideration. something But when Perception and Thought refer to the same object, as in in
Thought, as well as to reflection
knowledge of the external world, we distinguish between the spontaneous selection, combination and elaboration of the elements given to Perception, elements. to
and
the immediate
the former which
It is
we regard
of those
presentation
as the factor belonging
Thought. 2.
If for
the present
we take Thinking
to
mean
all
that
we mean
our ordinary use of language, then it is certain that with the development of conscious life Thought arises involuntarily and
by
it
in
As
of necessity.
soon as the individual begins to reflect upon his
inner activity he finds that he
of
Thought
;
ginning nor of activities.
is already engaged in various kinds he can have no immediate knowledge of its be
development out of simpler and more primitive
its
Only by means of a difficult psychological analysis of we find it at work, can we discover its
Thought, as factors
and the
particular
faculties
idea of the laws of
Moreover the
its
which give
rise to
it,
and thus form some
unconscious growth.
involuntary
throughout our whole
life.
production It
is
of
thoughts
continues
absolutely impossible,
when
conscious and awake, to
check the inner activity which is in cessantly excited by the most varied motives to form a constant succession of ideas which
combines in different ways, and thus, without any intention on our part, maintains an inner world of thoughts present before us. 3-
But besides
this
it
involuntary Thought, there
is
a voluntary
GENERAL INTRODUCTION which
action, a will to think,
to
endeavour to rule the
thoughts and
losing
led
by
arise
of
formerly involuntary
sight
involuntarily this
some
and aims
definite interests
them towards a given end.
to direct
the thoughts which selection,
is
3
course
the
From amongst makes
activity
altogether and
of
retaining
its
and
developing others by means of attention, thus seeking for thoughts and pursuing them. We need not enter here upon the question as to whether the production of thoughts in
a direct way, or whether
we can only
The
result is practically the
ever really voluntary
indirectly bring about the
conditions necessary to the involuntary desired.
is
production of
same
thoughts which satisfy a definite interest
in
both cases
;
are produced
what
is
that
is,
by the
influence of the will. 1
But
this interest
is
of
two
kinds.
From one
point of view the
voluntary activity which we direct towards our Thought falls under the general law that the pleasant is sought after, the un
Now we may
pleasant avoided.
a double sense.
Firstly, in so
far
regard Thought as pleasant in as every natural activity gives
a feeling of satisfaction within certain limits of intensity in so far as the
;
secondly,
manifold content of our Thought affects us plea
santly or unpleasantly.
Taking this question of pleasure alone, we find within us both a general tendency to excite Thought, or let it be excited, as an entertainment and escape from tedium and also a tendency to direct it in such a way that what we think may be pleasing to us. ;
When we
linger over pleasant
them, when we make strive to
chase
recollections
projects and build
away disagreeable
and anxiety, then
it
is
this
and seek to intensify
castles in the air,
when we
recollections or to dispel
fear
motive which determines the influence
of the will upon our Thought. 1
Cf.
Windelband,
treatment contains
not seem to
me
conscious willing.
to
iiber
much
His und Nachdenken (PrdluJien, p. 176 sq.). and valuable on certain points, although he docs determined the relation between "unconscious" and
Denken
that
is
have rightly
true
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
4
The
which
satisfaction
its
such cases
of a completely
is
the particular subject refers only to
individual character; to
arises in
itself,
own peculiar nature and circumstances. As a rule, therefore, of this kind varies with each individual, nor could we
Thought wish 4. is
it
otherwise.
But
immediate pleasure from Thought of the two. By far the most important
this desire of obtaining
the subordinate interest
and
both in extent part of our mental activity,
more
in value, follows
serious aims.
In the
Thought
first
place, our
into
their
wants and the necessities of
service
and
set
consciously grasped and pursued.
being depend upon
before
its
Our existence and our
well-
This action does not
purpose with the ease and certainty of instinct
calls for attentive
and of
take
conscious action and upon our influencing
things around us to serve our purposes.
accomplish
life
aims which are
it
and
;
it
careful observation of the nature of things
their relations to us, as well
as for manifold calculations
and considerations as to the way in which they may serve for a means to the satisfaction of our wants. Human Thought attains its end the preservation of our well-being only when its know ledge of things enables
it
to predict the future
;
when, therefore,
anticipation coincides with the actual course of events as partly
conditioned by our interference.
But the desire seeks a right
knowledge which makes itself felt everywhere understanding of things and their relations even for
beyond the sphere of our
knowing and thus
it
urges
Thought
practical needs,
Solely for the sake of
to penetrate into the nature of things,
to reproduce in the totality of our subjective
knowledge
a faithful and complete picture of the Satisfac objective world. tion of the desire for knowledge must then include this aim of
Thought also. The immediate purpose which excites and determines its direction is Thought knowledge of that which practical
is.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
5
5. But the purposes towards which Thought is directed are far from being exhausted by this one interest the desire for know It is found to be just as active in a direction which cannot ledge.
be included
knowledge of that which
in the idea of
We
is.
find \
ourselves as a matter of fact under the dominion of certain laws
we
according to which
estimate the worth of
which we are willing to submit our
wills
and
human
deeds,
actions.
It
and to
matters
not for our present investigation whence these laws have their origin, for
nor by what motive that
Enough
us.
we
we
are led to recognise
are incessantly called upon to decide what
how we ought
to
act
if
we
are
to
which
unsullied.
No
avoid
its
end,
to
do and
with
by proving that our
accorded with the nature of
which
conflict
the
material result informs us whether or
not our Thought has attained culations
we ought
we acknowledge, and maintain honour and
principles,
conscience
at
as valid
of propriety, of morality, of justice and of duty, and
the rules
suit
them
are constantly endeavouring to observe
we aim
consists
things.
solely
in
Even
the
cal re-
thoughts, and the
thoughts which accuse or absolve or the us, recognition non-recognition by others and by our selves of the conformity of the particular action with the general
actual
results
also
are
the
rule. 6.
Let us consider more closely
this,
the most important part of
our practical Thought, as well as of our estimation of practical Before the Court of Conscience the only evidence we relations.
have as to whether the Thought which guides our action has
at
its purpose or not, is the inner consciousness of the neces our sity of Thought ; the certainty that the given mode of action the self-evidence which follows inevitably from the general rule
tained
;
was right and good to act so under the circum stances because the general principles of justice and morality
satisfies us that
it
demanded
Nor have we any
it.
external confirmation that
we
have attained our end except the assent of others, who, starting
/
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
6
from the same presuppositions, affirm the same consequences to be necessary.
Thought we must guard
In speaking of the necessity of our
against a confusion of meaning.
From
a psychological point ot
view everything which the individual thinks
may
be looked upon
activity which results in accordance with That just general laws from whatever conditions may be present. this, and not something else, is thought, is the necessary consequence
as necessary,
as an
i.e.
of the particular individual
s
range of ideas, disposition and char
and the stimulus of the moment.
acter,
of psychological causality there
from the contents and
object of
is
But besides
this necessity
another which springs entirely itself
Thought
;
which
is,
therefore,
grounded, not upon the variable subjective states of the individual, but upon the nature of the object thought of, and which may so far
be called It
objective.
in
is
consciousness then of
this
its
objective necessity and
universal validity that our find
Thought finds satisfaction, and we shall upon examination that the same characteristics express the
aim of our Thought Here, again, tional
in its search for
we can only
knowledge of that which is. define the end towards which our inten
strives
Thought
consciousness of
its
by saying that it aims at satisfaction necessity and universal validity.
in
the
true that
any one unbiassed by critical reflexion is impelled by a psychological necessity to objectify his sensations and the thoughts relating to them, and to picture to himself a world to which he ascribes an existence independent of his subjective It is
When
activity.
his desire for
hesitate to attempt to
thoughts
in
such a
Nevertheless
be achieved.
it
is
We
mediately, and in
something
know
way
knowledge
bestirs itself
this objective world,
that they
may
he does not
and to frame
his
conform to that which
is.
a question of dispute whether this purpose can cannot refute the critical assertion that im
the
first
instance,
for us, consisting in
all
our knowledge
a system of ideas.
is
only
That there
is
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
1
an Existent corresponding to this thought of ours and ance with
is
it,
either a blind belief, or
in
accord
must be
the certainty
grounded upon a refutation of the doubt it dispels upon the That is, it depends, on the one proof that doubt is impossible. hand, upon our finding that the assumption of an Existent in volves us in no unthinkable contradiction on the other hand, ;
upon the nature of our ideas being such as to force us
Thought
to
assume
In both cases the proof rests upon a necessity
this Existent.
in
be counted amongst the surest results of the
may
It
analysis of our
knowledge that every assumption of an external mediated by Thought, and in some way or another derived by unconscious mental processes from the subjective facts of world
is
Thus, except by Thought, we have no means of as we have really achieved our purpose of knowing the Existent the possibility of comparing our knowledge with sensation.
certaining whether ;
things as they exist apart from our knowledge
At
we must be
is
for ever closed
agreement and amongst the thoughts which presuppose an Existent just as we are fully satisfied in the region of outward action when our ideas and movements, together with their con to us.
the best
satisfied
to find
Absence of contradiction ;
sequences, are in
harmony amongst themselves and with
the ideas
of others.
Granted that there of
it
is
is
a knowable Existent, then a knowledge
unless
impossible
there
is
some
relation
Existent and our subjective action which
between the
governed by laws, and by virtue of which the thoughts necessitated by what is given in consciousness
correspond to the Existent.
a knowable, external Existence, then
ing and thinking subjects, and
think alike in reference to the
knows the Existent If,
as
is
is
all
same
it
is
Further,
the
who know object.
same
if
we grant know
for all
the Existent must
Thus Thought which
of necessity a universally valid Thought.
on the contrary, we deny the possibility of knowing anything
it is
in itself
if
the Existent
is
only a thought of our production
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
3
it still
remains true that the ideas to which we attribute object
ivity are those
The
which we produce with a consciousness of necessity.
we regard anything
fact that
as existing implies that all other
when only with the same neces
thinking creatures of like nature with ourselves (even hypothetically assumed) would also be forced sity to
it
regard
as existing.
then unhesitatingly say that
may
if all
we can
attain to
is
but necessary and universally valid Thought, then knowledge of the Existent of
is
included therein, and
knowing our immediate aim
(We
is
and universally valid Thought. Truth consists.
the essence of actual, or call
"
"
moral truths, the
true
that
is
it
is
when we think with the
object
nothing more than this necessary It is in
this
conception also that
When we speak of mathematical, common characteristic of all which we
thought necessarily and with universal
validity.
This view of the task undertaken by the Thought of which treats avoids the difficulties which beset Logic every system of 7.
a theory of knowledge.
The
Logic calling
itself
a system
must begin by showing whether and how far possible at all ; and in doing this, it not only passes
is
knowledge
that is
difficulty of
such
it
into the disputed regions of metaphysics, but
proofs and refutations that
it
presupposes
in its
necessity and universal validity
of
Thought from which the conviction of its objectivity is to proceed. In the same way we avoid the one-sidedness into which the
Logic which professes to be a that of theory of knowledge is apt to fall treating only of the thought which aids us in our knowledge of the purely theoretical, and forgetting the which serves to
Thought
guide our action.
same
in
Nevertheless the psychical activities are the both cases, and the two aims must be classed together.
By thus including all Thought which pursues the common aim of certainty of its own necessity and universal validity we can also 8.
complete jinally
in
its
psychological limitations.
All such Thought results
judgments, which are expressed inwardly and outwardly
GENERAL INTRODUCTION as propositions.
Every
all
;
in
knowledge consists
judgments.
way
for the
judgment.
Again, the
;
judgments
of,
\
;
come
and preparing
I
/
judgment can be an object
of scientific investigation only in so far as position
in
All other functions
into consideration only as being the condition
the
and means \
practical consideration of ends
terminates in judgments
every conviction ends
9
it is
only through the proposition can
in
expressed
become an
it
general consideration, and only as a proposition can
it
a pro
object of aspire to
universal validity.
Now we know
9.
from the
fact that error
our Thought frequently misses
its
aim
in
and dispute exist
Sometimes these judgments
actually forms.
that^j
the judgments which are relinquished
it j
by
I
the individual thinker himself under the conviction that they are invalid,
that
i.e.
it
is
necessary to think otherwise.
again, other thinkers refuse to accept necessity, affirm possibility
them
to be
inasmuch as they
them
:
it
j
they dispute their
mere conjecture, or even deny find
\
Sometimes,
their
necessary to judge differently
I
concerning the same matter. Since then actual Thought can and does miss
its
aim,
we have
teach us to avoid error and dispute,
need of a discipline which shall to conduct Thought in such a manner that the judgments
and
may
be true
that
is,
necessary and certain
that
is,
accompanied
by a consciousness of their necessity, and therefore universally valid.
Reference to this aim distinguishes the logical from the psychoThe latter is concerned with the logical treatment of Thought.
knowledge of Thought as it actually is, hence it seeks the laws according to which, under certain conditions, a certain thought ap pears in just one actual
and
Thought
as arising
instance, thus
way and no
other.
Its
task
is
to explain all
according to the general laws of psychical activity,
from the particular conditions of the individual dealing with all Thought alike, whether erroneous
and disputable, or true and generally accepted. /The
antithesis
j
!
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
I0
of true and false thesis
no more a psychological one than
is
of good and bad
The
logical treatment,
to think the truth
it
;
human
in
in that region
Starting with this aim before
it.
the conditions of
its
how
the end
may
it,
who
are
Thought which is and investigating
Thought which are due
to the
and universal validity on the other hand, to conduct the mental operations in such a way that
for necessity
direct us
of
attainment, Logic proposes, on the one hand,
to set forth those Criteria of true
demand
the anti
on the contrary, presupposes the desire
has no meaning except for those
conscious of this desire and
governed by
is
action.
to
;
In one aspect then Logic
be attained.
is
a critical
Thought which has already taken a technical discipline. But as criticism is
discipline having reference to
place
;
in the other,
of value only as a
and that
in
which
it is
means it
to the end, the principal task of
properly consists,
is
Logic
to be a technical discipline
or Art.
Logic as the Art of Thought cannot undertake to instruct us how, beginning at any given time, we is
entirely
and
absolutely true.
It
may attain
must
to
Thought which
restrict itself to
showing what are the general Conditions which, from the nature of our Thought, every proposition must satisfy in order to be necessary and universally valid, and under what conditions and to according
we can
what
rules
shall
be necessary and universally valid.
judgment
pass from given premises in a
as to the necessity
from which we
start at
any
manner which
It declines to give any and universal validity of the premises
time.
Thus observance
of logical
ensures merely the formal correctness of the procedure and not the material truth of the results. In this sense our doctrine is of necessity formal rules
Logic.
Instruction in an art which claims to ensure success for the activity to which it gives rules presupposes that this activity is I.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
n
completely free and voluntary. This implies, first, that I am able to bring about the conditions necessary to the activity whenever I choose
;
secondly, that
of the rules of
I
only need to be conscious of the aim and
attainment
its
in
order to
fulfil
every particular
operation in accordance with those rules, and so as to attain the
end
If there is to
in view.
be an Art ensuring the production of
necessary and universally valid Thought, by means of which we may know the Truth, we must assume that all the conditions lie within our grasp, and that at
This *
it
Methodus
It
to
any given time we are completely
our Thought accordance with its rules. was which Descartes had in view when he designed
free to control
in
recte
utendi ratione et veritatem in scientiis
his
investigandi"
was to put an end, once and for all, to all possibility of error, exclude all doubt, and to produce a series of thoughts which
one necessarily true and certain proposition and proceeding by infallible steps should contain none but absolutely His assumption was that, though we may not true propositions. starting from
be free to choose what ideas shall be present to is
and voluntary
a completely free
draw our assent with
full
act,
to every proposition
us, still judgment inasmuch as we can with
which we do not recognise
conviction to be true and certain.
by means of
Hence
presupposition involving danger of error, and to fresh start in the activity of
sumed
possible,
Thought.
In the
make an
are innate in us,
entirely
same way he
that the chief conditions of this activity
principles
it is
a thorough-going scepticism, to free oneself from every
as
concepts and
and that they are thus dependent
upon our self-consciousness alone.
Now .even
if
this latter
method would
assumption were as true as
it is
disputed,
complete application only in the of a and region only for those capable of making priori knowledge, and carrying out the resolution to free themselves from all presup the
positions.
But
it
at best find
is
absolutely impossible voluntarily to break the
continuity between past and present Thought, and to begin com-
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
I2
Voluntary Thought grows out of an involuntary it is continually fed, and we could
pletely ab ovo.
production of thoughts by which
make no
progress unless there were a supply of these thoughts
We need only forthcoming and a language representing them. see himself to in of the best inten turn to Descartes how, spite tions,
elements
of past
Thought will force their way into the Nor is it true that we can voluntarily refrain
newly started series.
from any judgment while we have no choice as to whether the it relates shall be present or not One reason for
ideas to which this
is
that a part of the presuppositions
we bring with
us are
judgments which inevitably involve others another, that our judg ments concerning the relations of ideas are predetermined by the ;
nature of those ideas, and
we
will affirm or
we
are not at liberty to choose whether
deny.
There can then be no method whatever by which we may begin Thought entirely anew. All that we can look for is a method of carrying it on from already existing data, which must always form the starting point for future Thought, even
when acknowledged
to
be uncertain. 2.
The
necessity
procedure of
of confining Logic to the
Thought makes
itself felt
regulation of the
more especially with
refer
ence to the Thought which aims at empirical knowledge of the
Such knowledge presupposes correct perceptions and in making observations which are to serve some end, we are depen dent not only upon the Thought which accompanies them, but also the conditions of upon sensation and the relation between our senses and the object. The art of correct observation is world.
;
only
partially included in
the art of right thinking it depends also the acuteness and training of the upon organs of sense, upon me chanical adroitness, and upon the art of bringing the object into the most favourable relations with our organs of sense and of ;
eliminating errors of observation. ent expedients
It must be guided in its differby the varying nature of the objects with which
GENERAL INTRODUCTION it
deals,
each class of these requiring
we were
its
13
particular
technology.
Thought and Judgment in the region of empirical knowledge until we could start from absolutely certain and necessary premises, empirical science would be altogether impos If
We
sible.
to suspend
should be forced to leave
in
suspense, together with the
and exactness of our perceptions, not merely the whole
validity
question as to the reality of the material world, but also the pos sibility of universally valid
laws of phenomena.
Moreover, the history of the development of our knowledge shows that the discovery of truth has often been indirectly attained by starting from erroneous and uncertain premises. In the course of scientific research dispute
is
frequently settled by pursuing false
propositions to their conclusions.
example of
Every apagogical proof
is
an
this procedure.
Finally, a large part
of the
Thought which aims
at universal
connected with premises which derive their validity validity from a Will, and which are so far purely arbitrary. To insist that Logic should establish the material truth of all propositions is
would be to exclude from
logical consideration all practical juris
prudence. 3.
Thus
all
that an Art of correct
Thought can
achieve, and
all
can propose to do, is to instruct us how we may proceed in Thought from given data in such a way that each step shall be
that
it
accompanied by the consciousness of necessity and universal/ to do us what we must think It does not teach validity. / that would be to comprehend if
we
think
this
the supply
data
we must
all
science.
of involuntary ideas
vations and general
It
teaches only that
think that, no matter
also
propositions
may
and
how
our
of particular obser
be constituted
in
other
respects. It
in
must be understood that by
any
direction
"
proceeding"
we mean
a progress
from grounds to consequences, as well as from
consequences to grounds, from general to particular, as well as the
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
14
Thus the
reverse.
art
must be applicable
to all
problems whatever
which present themselves to our Thought. is the sense in which we take Logic to be a formal 4. This then science
for the
;
sake of the generality and practical fulfilment of
I
Thought without
to construct
we cannot undertake
our task
we extend our
nor do volving any presuppositions,
the data from which gations to the validity of starts at any time, but only to the correctness of
logical investi
Thought actually
procedure from But by calling Logic formal, we do not mean that it
those data.
make
should
in
the vain attempt to regard
merely formal activity, which matter of Thought, and which
Nor do we mean
may is
its
Thought
in
general as a
be considered apart from
unaffected
by
all
differences of matter.
that logical investigation should entirely abstract
from and ignore the general nature of the matter and presupposi tions of actual Thought. itself in it
Of Thought developing entirely from we have no knowledge we know
the particular individual
;
only under the general relations and conditions, and with the
general
purposes of
human Thought.
neither from the particular
manner
Hence we can
abstract
which our Thought receives material and contents from sensations and forms them into ideas of things ,
;
nor yet from the
way
in
in
which
its
history has been
determined by the community of mankind. We abstract only from the particular nature of the occasions which at any given time give rise to a series of mental processes.
3-
The
possibility of determining the criteria
.and universally valid procedure in to distinguish objectively necessary
necessary, and this
we
find in the
and
rules of necessary
Logic depends upon our ability Thought from that which is not
immediate consciousness Q{ evident
which accompanies necessary Thought. J:ruth Experience of consciousness and belief in its trustworthiness form a
this~
Postulate,
beyond which we cannot
go.
GENERAL INTRODUCTION 1.
When we as
problem
we have
difficulty of finding
objectively
which
saw, misses
stated
an
it,
possible to solve the
is
it
the question resolves itself into the
infallible sign
by which we may distinguish
and universally valid Thought from that
necessary
differs
how
ask whether and
15
according to the person thinking, and thus, as
its
aim.
And
here there
is,
we
the last instance, no
in
answer but an appeal to our subjective experience of necessity, to the inwaird feeling of certainty by which some of our Thought is accompanied, to the consciousness that, starting from the given Belief in premises, we cannot think otherwise than we do think. the truth of this feeling and in
chorage of it
there 2.
is
all
certainty
for the
;
its
trustworthiness
man who
is
the last an
does not acknowledge
no knowledge
Certainty
nothing but accidental opinion. of the universal validity of our Thought
rests \
ultimately upon the consciousness of necessity, not the conscious
When we
ness of necessity upon certainty of universal validity.
assume a reason common
we think with
to
all
men we
are convinced that
what
a consciousness of inevitable necessity others will
same way. Our assumption that other people are bound by the same laws as ourselves, may indeed be strengthened by empirical confirmation when all agree but this also think in the
;
cannot supply the place of the immediate feeling of necessity, much less give rise to it. Habit, also, to which the empiricists appeal, and coincidence between experience and our calculations, affect
only the validity of the data from which
we
start
;
they can
neither produce nor modify the specific characteristic of mental
Here, then,
necessity.
we have
every logical system must to our
rest.
the fundamental fact upon which
Logic can do nothing but bring
knowledge the conditions under which this subjective feel
ing of necessity arises, and express
may be and
said that
this
matics
is
is
if
this
true in the
be
so,
then Logic
same sense
an empirical science.
them
in
which
in is it
a general form.
It
an empirical science, is
true that
Mathematics also
starts
mathe
from
facts
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
16
by which they are accompanied, from but both are distinguished merely empirical science in that they find in their facts the necessity which is wanting to accidental experience, and make this the basis of the certainty of their pro of consciousness and the necessity
positions.
4-
stating the problem in this
By
determined for
investigation
us.
way we find the course of our First we must consider the
nature of the function for which rules are to be found then
we
must lay down the conditions and laws of its normal action we must try to find rules for the process by which natural
;
finally,
Thought working with given presuppositions and expedients may pass from an imperfect into a perfect state. tion falls into three parts I.
Since
intentional
by a
it
;
has been shown
Thought
Thus our
analytical, normative and
fulfils its
i.
investiga
technical.
that the activity in which
8
purpose
is
all
Judgment we must begin >
right understanding of the nature of this function with the
we are concerned, and by recognising what elements and presuppositions are involved in it. This is all the correctness of which
more necessary because the judgment takes the same form whether Thought expressed by it be successful and universally valid or
the fail
to attain
its
purpose.
Only
in
judgments and finds, or seeks to can we have truth and error, in
so far as find, in
Thought takes shape them its final expression
certainty and doubt, agreement and
dispute.
carried
what
it
It is
out,
the
same function which
in the other
consists can
incorrectly
we give
;
is in
the one case correctly
and not
the rules for
its
until
we know
in
correct operation.
This knowledge can only be gained by an analysis of actual judgment, by considering what it is that we do when we judge,
and what other functions, if any, are presupposed in Judgment! We must also consider the process by which Judgment is formed from these other functions, and the general principles by which
GENERAL INTRODUCTION this process is naturally
for the present that
the
name
of
governed.
Meanwhile we must assume
we know what mental
Judgment language ;
17
acts are included under
will serve us here for a guide,
the immediate object of our investigation
may
and
be defined as
propositions which claim to be true and to be believed or
all
acknow
ledged as valid.
Of
the propositions enumerated by
put
present
aside
all
like
which,
Grammar, we
Imperatives
will for
the 1
or
Optatives,
1 No doubt the Imperative also includes the statement that the speaker wills the act which he commands ; while the Optative states that he wishes what he says. But the
statement
is
here contained in the fact of speech, not in what is said it is just as true A is the mere fact of speech involves the statement ;
that in every utterance of the form that the speaker thinks and believes
what he says. All speech alike is accompanied by such statements concerning the subjective state of the speaker, which are implied in the fact of his speech and are valid on condition of his veracity ; we cannot therefore found
The Imperative Silence is of course a the expression of the statement it is my will that you should be silent," but its purpose is not direct communication of this fact, but the determination of the will of the I have spoken of it as con person spoken to, it does not call for belief but obedience. any distinction amongst propositions on these.
way of varying
"
"
!
"
taining an intransferable element because the person addressed does not repeat the act of will of the person giving the command in the way in which he appropriates the thought
when he
of the speaker
No
believes a statement.
primary and usual meaning of the Imperative as
essential difference occurs in this
the expression of a particular individual will when it takes the form of a general law. When the legislator addresses an Imperative to the citizens of the State or members of
the religious community his relation to them is that of one individual to another. His purpose in speaking is not to communicate a truth which they are to believe, but to announce a command which they are to obey. It makes no difference whether the source of the command be an actual individual or a collective body, whether the assumed motive of obedience be submission to personal authority or an impersonal constitution the import of what is said is not the communication of a truth but the summons to do this, to leave that undone.
The form Thou shalt again, which appears in laws such as those of the Decalogue, has originally no other significance. Shall is the correlative of will. In delivering the command of master to servant we say "thou shalt do so and so ; it contained originally "
"
"
no more than the simple Imperative, the revelation of a law
to
one
whom
I
hold to be
subordinate to the will of another, either of a third person or myself. But this form does now contain a twofold meaning not to be found in the simple Shall (sollen = shall + ought) may also have the force of a proper Predi Imperative. "
"
meant to be true it signifies duty, obligation, and is thus a modal below 6. 3d) expressing the relation between the subjective individual
cate in a statement
;
Predicate (see will and an authoritative power, or an objective law. The original Imperative here passes over into the significance of a Predicate expressing the obligatory relation of a
command
to the will to
the statement that I also find
S. L.
am
which it applies and if we assume a legal or moral constitution, under an obligation may be true or false. In may again we
two meanings.
;
"
"You
may
"is
originally the expression of
"
momentary
C
per-
GENERAL INTRODUCTION.
8
X
contain an element peculiar to the individual and intransferable
All those again which while they refer to an assertion,
to others.
do not present
it
as true,
may
the time be disregarded
for
;
such
are questions, or propositions which express merely an opinion or
How
a subjective view.
far the latter
come
into consideration as
preliminary to the judgment, further investigation alone can show.
But
all
of
propositions
matter to what they
refer,
statement or declaration,
actual
must be investigated by
us.
In this
no
we
follow Aristotle, 1 and reject the distinction of the so-called logical
judgment from other statements, according
to
which Logic would
deal only with the subsumption of the particular under the general,
and exclude the mere communication of munications also aim at truth, and error
and dispute
well as
arise in reference
But such com
facts.
make claim to
to be believed
them and hence
;
they, as
judgments of subsumption, must have the conditions of
their validity investigated. 2 mission by which
I
The
desire to limit
Logic to judg-
liberate the will of another, disclaiming the determination of his
and declining to be a check upon his will. It expresses merely the The real import of the proposition subjective fact that I have no wish to prohibit. is On the other practical, and to this extent "you may" is akin to an Imperative. hand may may also be the Predicate of an actual statement expressing the fact that no authoritative prohibition is opposed to an action, that the existing order of things action or inaction,
"
"
permits
it.
Finally the same ambiguity extends to propositions which bear the grammatical form of a simple statement. That portion of the penal code which says that whoever acts in a certain way will incur a certain penalty, is not meant, like the formuloe of a natural law, as a
communication of what actually happens,
it conveys a command. But when the depicted as taking effect the same proposition contains an actual statement ; it states what regularly happens within a given state. Cf. here Zitelmann, Irrthum und Kechtsgeschaft, p. 222, sq. Bierling, zur Kritik der juristischen Grundbegriffe, ii.,
law
is
259, sq.
Thus the mere grammatical form statement.
A
statement
and of which we
/^^
is
no
infallible indication that
we have
nothing more than a proposition which can ask whether it be true or false. is
is
to
meant
do with a be true,
to
1
Aristotle constantly mentions as the characteristic which distinguishes the judgment, the dTrd^cwo-is, from other forms of speech, the fact that we can attribute truth or false
hood
to
inra.pxfi. 2
Cf.
it.
De
interpr. 4 (\6yos) diro0cu TiKds ov
Again,
De anima,
on the other hand
iii.
TTO.S,
dXX
iv
$
rb
dX^eiW
rj
ifsevSeaGai
6.
Ulrici, Comp. der Logik, ed. 2, 72, p. 266, 267. Hegel, judgment the determination of the concept by itself, says first {Logik, Werke, iv. 69) "A proposition has indeed Subject and Predicate in the grammatical sense, but is not therefore a judgment. For this it is necessary that the Predicate should
who
calls the
:
GENERAL INTRODUCTION,
19
ments of subsumption could have arisen only under the scholastic view of the nature of science, the view that Definition alone has
any
Where
scientific value.
are the basis
and
is
it
recognised that particular facts
of a great part of our knowledge, Logic
test
must also deal with those judgments which express particular facts. It also
forms a part of our plan of investigation to take up the
analysis of the
judgment
natural course of
at the point
Thought without
where
skill
it
takes shape in the
or reflection on the part of
the thinker. 2.
Our
investigation of
what takes place
in
Judgment completed,
we may then proceed
to enquire as to
judgment must
order to be perfect and answer fully to
In this
purpose.
in
fulfil
way we may
the conditions which a
set before
us an ideal, agreement
with which will be the end and object of our
we begin by asking and apply all
its
that
Thought
shall
this test to the function of
conditions and factors
;
its
Thought
That
is,
be necessary and universal,
judgment
after discovering
there then result certain laws to
which judgment must be submitted, and hence certain criteria by which we may distinguish between perfect and imperfect judg ment.
These
laws, so far as they fall within the scope of a logical
treatment in our view, First, the i.e.
may
be
summed up
two principal
in
points.
elements of the judgment must be completely determined,
fixed in concepts
proceed from
its
;
secondly, the act of judgment itself must
data in such a
way
as to be necessary.
Thus
stand to the Subject in the relation of conceptual determinations, that is, as general to Aristotle died in the 73rd year of his age, in the 4th year of the special or particular. But he adds decisively, H5th Olympiad, is a mere proposition, not a judgment." It would have something of the nature of the judgment only if one of the circumstances, the time of death or the age of the philosopher had been called in question and there Thus the communication, had been some ground for affirming the given number. "
.
N
.
.
a proposition, and would be a judgment only supposing it to be questioned whether he were really or merely apparently dead." So that Hegel also it is true agrees in calling every proposition a judgment, in so far as we can ask whether and -what are its grounds. Cf. also Franz Kern (die deutsche Satzlehre, 1883, p. 189), who errs only in directing his remarks against Logic instead of against a one-sided logical
my
friend
theory.
has died
is
j
;
;
GENERAL INTRODUCTION,
20 this part of
our treatment will contain the doctrine of concepts
and inferences as subject matter of the normal laws
for the
forma
tion of perfect judgments.
But knowledge of the nature of ideally perfect Thought does enable us to attain to this ideal state, nor even
3.
not necessarily
show us the way which leads at our disposal
upon human
by Nature,
thought,
Hence we have
to the goal.
consider how, starting from a given
state,
arid subject to the
we may reach
concerned here, therefore,
also to
with the means placed conditions imposed
logical perfection.
We
with the methods of obtaining
are
right
conceptions and hypotheses which will serve towards the formation This is the domain of the Art in of judgments and inferences. its
narrower sense, of the properly technical instruction to which
the two preceding parts form a necessary preliminary.
important
place in this technical instruction is
The most
taken by the Theory
method by which concepts be obtained from particular percep
of Induction as the doctrine of the
and general propositions
may
tions. 4.
our
We
believe that
by thus apprehending our task and arranging
investigation, the
different
views which have
made
their
appearance as Logic has been elaborated, are combined and justice done to each. One view has assigned to Logic the task of ex
pounding the natural forms of Thought and the natural laws which it necessarily follows, and we also recognise the necessity of stating the natural laws to which
all
Judgment
ing the principles applicable to .particular kind.
it
is
subject,
and of discover
as a conscious function of a
But we deny that
this completes the task of which aims at Logic, being not the Physics but the Ethics of Thought. Others, again, have defined Logic as the doctrine of
the normal laws of
we
human Thought
or
recognise this regulative character as
we deny
that
Knowing, and here again an essential feature. But
any knowledge of these laws can be attained that
is
not founded upon the study of the natural forces and functions to
GENERAL INTRODUCTION.
21
be regulated by them, and we deny also that a mere code of normal laws can by itself be productive or fulfil the purpose for the sake of which alone it is worth while to construct a logic.
Much
rather do
generally
made
we hold
it
necessary that Methodology, which
the special, final and chief aim of our science.
Methodology must have
for
its
principal
some extent those who endeavour
And
object
science from the natural data of knowledge, also to
is
to take a subordinate place, should be regarded as
since this
the growth of
we hope
to satisfy
to avoid the barrenness
and abstract character of the formal scholastic Logic by making it
include a Theory of
Knowledge
;
nevertheless
we exclude
all
questions relating to the metaphysical significance of the processes of Thought, and keep strictly to the prescribed limits within which
we regard Thought our claims upon limit
them
which,
it
as a subjective function.
so far as to
demand
We
do not extend
a knowledge of Being, but
and universal validity always and everywhere
to the sphere of that necessity
even
in
ordinary language, are
regarded as the distinguishing and essential characteristics of what is
logical.
PART
I
THE NATURE OF JUDGMENT AND PRESUPPOSITIONS
ITS
LOGIC PART
I
INTRODUCTION THE
Proposition in which something is stated about something, is the This originates as an active move
verbal expression of the Judgment.
ment of Thought, and always presupposes that there are present to the person forming and uttering the judgment, two ideas the Subject and Predicate ideas, which can at saying that the Subject that i.
which
is
is
first
is
stated, the Predicate
stated.
The judgment which we
appears in the tal activity.
be only superficially distinguished by
that of which something
find
in the
form of a spoken assertion
instance as a completed whole, a finished product of
first
As such
new combinations,
it is
men
capable of entering into
reproducible in
memory, by communication with others, and such But this objectivity and writing to all time.
transferable
it can be perpetuated in independent existence, which leads us to speak of
that
it
as stating, connecting
apparent only, and the expressions merely figurative ; rightly speaking, the judgment as such has real existence only in active or disconnecting,
is
judging, in that mental act of a thinking individual which takes place at a
given moment, and the only possible way in which
we can perpetuate
the
an active process in thought is by consciously repeating The judgment itself never attains to objective existence, but only
judgment
as
it.
its
material sign, the spoken or written proposition, which, by being externally present for others
and recognisable, announces
that a certain mental act has
taken place in active Thought.
Now
the proposition, as this outward sign, presents two aspects for our
consideration, which
must be
carefully distinguished
from the beginning.
INTRODUCTION
26
\
\\
On
the one hand
who
other hand
he
it
refers to
gives utterance to
is
called
addresses
it
it,
its
itself
source, the mental processes of the person
On the doing reveals his thoughts. to the hearer by whom it is to be understood ;
and
in so
to interpret the
upon
outward
and out of them
signs,
to re
But the functions of the
construct the thought expressed by the speaker.
person understanding the spoken words are not the same as those of the speaker; although if we assume complete understanding, the final result in the
mind of the hearer must coincide with
When
started.
my
I
recognise the familiar
what
I describe
from which the speaker "the castle is on
fire,"
In
the image of the burning castle.
is
starting point
and
that
express a perception in the words
I
this
image I form of the building, and the flames rising from it, saw by first separating these two elements, and then
The person who hears my proposition uniting them in the proposition. must begin by uniting the ideas which are excited in him by the two words, and which are
at first separate
;
only
when
this
is
done does he obtain the
idea from which the speaker set out.
Grammar and Hermeneutics, which
start
from the spoken or written
word, naturally tend mainly to the standpoint of the hearer ; they direct their attention to those functions which are active in understanding, and treat of them in the order in which occur in the hearer. But in they psychological analysis, where our aim in judging, the other side
portance
;
and
this the
necessarily the object of
to investigate the nature of thought
is
the action of the speaker
Thought which clothes
all
itself in
For us, then, the investigation of the nature of the a consideration of the mental act which takes place engaged
And
in judging,
and
is
more so because communication
to
of primary to others
is
im not
words.
judgment consists
when we
in
are actively
which we proceed to give expression in words~ judgment (whether mental or spoken) pre
since every repetition of a
supposes its original production, the cases with which we must deal are those in which our Thought produces a new judgment and provides it with its verbal expression (as, e.g., whenever we give utterance to a new observation).
The
2.
process which goes on
be described 1
thing.
for the present
when
/
*
\6yos
form and utter a judgment may something about some
There are always two elements present, the one is that which is the other one is that about which
stated, rl Karrjyopo^vov, the Predicate \
I
by saying that I state
Kara^ar^
shall consider later
on
1) (
d7ro0cm^ ? 12) the
;
6s /caret riris.
Aristotle s
view that judgments do not
all
Anal,
pr.
I.
I
have two elements.
We
INTR OD UCTION the statement
But
this
description
Statement
what
is
made, or
is
an
is
which
to
it
27
TO VTTOK^^VOV, the Subject.
refers,
merely superficial, and derived from language. of the organs of speech, and the question arises
is
activity
:
Thought when we
the mental process of
"
state
something about
"
something If
3.
?
we
from the spoken proposition we must begin by making There are some propositions in which we mean only the such to be Subject or Predicate, the words as these particular start
a distinction.
words
as
combinations of sounds.
a
is
Hebrew word, Contra
position refers to the
made about them which
Possibly remarks are
and have no reference
are purely grammatical
a preposition)
is
or
it
meaning (Samiel
may be
word or name, (Oxide
of a
meaning
;
to their
is
that the pro
a
compound
of
oxygen ; Alexandras is another name for Paris Jagsthausen is a village and castle on the Jagst *). We may for the present put aside these merely etymological and hermeneutic statements, and there then remain for our ;
which the words appear as signs of understood by both speaker and hearer, i.e.,
investigation only those propositions in ideas,
and are assumed
to be
be connected with the same definite ideas, so that the statement
to
not
is
concerned with the words themselves, but with the ideas connected with the words. 4.
Here
then,
if
the statement
is
Subject as well as Predicate, must be
At
consciousness.
first
sight,
appears to be that one which
which by
I
itself
consciousness
in
the subject of a judgment
it
;
may be
already
received
into
other ideas.
I
consciousness,
cannot say
familiar with the ideas blue 1
"
this
and
To
an object or an event.
are understood.
enabling us to retain and reproduce
object whatever
qualified to
It
is
should be taken from those of our ideas which are already
named by words which
it,
is
It
become
it is
added
essential that this
known
to us
and
must be an idea which has been
which
is
and which
blue, this
red,
Subject-idea/
the immediate intuition of a
the Predicate- idea.
in consciousness,
Any is
my
present to
generally, the
present to me.
is first
can retain independently
second
have any meaning, each element,
and speaking
particular thing, or an abstract idea,
as
to
some idea immediately
is
connected with a word is
distinguished from
red,"
unless
1
am
all
already
and can reproduce them with the
has been objected that the real meaning of this phrase is That which is called is a village, etc., hence that the proposition does not refer to a mere name. But for anyone as yet ignorant of the significance of the word, the only possible import of It
:
Jagsthausen
the proposition is to give him the meaning of a hitherto nect any idea with the subject.
unknown word
;
he cannot con
INTRODUCTION
28
Judgment is possible only where a number of such distinct ideas are and easily called into consciousness. Hence conscious judgment
word.
retained
presupposes that these ideas are already formed.
Now,
it
is
some Thought is already involved in the process by Whatever we may think of the functions by ideas of definite objects, or at any ideas which can serve
true that
which these ideas are formed. which we arrive for Predicates,
at
it
cannot be denied that
different sensations, to
it is
comprehend a
necessary to distinguish between
plurality as a
whole, to refer this
whole as a unity to its manifold content, and to retain in memory the pro duct so gained ; and these are all of them acts which we can only think of as analogous to conscious mental acts of the nature of judgment.
But
this
and independent ideas, precedes our con scious and intentional Thought, and is governed by laws of which we are unconscious. If we begin to reflect upon it we are conscious only of the activity
which
results in distinct
results of these processes in the
The
form of ideas already possessed of names.
processes themselves must have been originally guided
logical necessity,
human
beings
;
by a psycho same in all
since their course has been essentially the
or else they have
attained to such mechanical
become
facility,
certainty even within the conscious
so
much
a matter of habit, and
that they take place with unconscious life.
We
must further presuppose the
beginnings and appropriation of language, since conscious and volun tary Thought takes place almost entirely through its aid. Properly speaking, then, that Thought by which ideas are first produced does not first
come
within the scope of our enquiry, nor yet the investigation of the origin of language, and the appropriation of it by the individual, although we may
be obliged to touch upon these questions as our analysis proceeds.
Still it
is
necessary to take a survey of those ideas which are capable of entering as elements either as Subject or Predicate into our judgments, and to
determine the relation between the mental fact and
its
verbal expression.
CHAPTER
I
IDEAS AS ELEMENTS OF THE JUDGMENT, AND THEIR RELA TION TO WORDS
we examine
IF
the contents of our Thought, that which can enter into our
judgments
as Subject or Predicate, or as part of Subject or Predicate,
find that
consists of:
it
THINGS, their Attributes and Activities, and Modifications of RELATIONS OF THINGS and of their Attributes and Activities.
I.
II.
These may be 1.
Language
Spatial
and Temporal, Logical, Causal or Modal. its classification of words, seems to give us the
it
clue which was certainly
Thought a ;
use of by Aristotle in his enumeration of the Categories as the highest
classes of that
an
these.
itself in
clue to the different kinds of objects of
made
we
which
infallible one.
develops
its
is
It is
thought and that which
different forms vary in their functions.
not coined for every
new kind
morphologically equivalent
of idea
organs
essentially different physiologically, so
as Substantives, Verbs, Adjectives. sarily
;
but as
in
is
not
A
special form
the organic
is
kingdom
can discharge functions which are it is also with classes of words, such
Different kinds of words
do not neces
correspond to differences of meaning in such a way that we can be
guided entirely by these external characteristics, of the indications given by language,
nature
But the clue
is.
the peculiarity of the structure of language that as
of the
objects
we must take
of Thought, which alone
While
still
keeping sight
a general survey of the will
show us how
far
differences in forms of speech correspond to differences of mental content.
The most
universal possession of humanity consists in that series of ideas which constitutes the world of the Existent, and though as a matter 2.
of fact this series
think of
it
language.
is
generally accompanied by language,
To
this series
we
are forced to
even without the co-operation of besides the idea of self, the idea of our belongs,
as possible to every individual,
IDEAS AS ELEMENTS OF THE JUDGMENT
3
whole empirically known surroundings, as well as the idea of everything
which we think of as existing in the same way as ourselves and the objects of immediate perception.
Ideas of particular Things form the material from which this world is and the words by which they are denoted are concrete Substan built up,
These Things we think of as supporting Attributes which find their and as developing with the course of time expression in Adjectives,
tives.
Activities
and
falling into conditions
which are expressed by Verbs. 1
This distinction between the ideas of Things
and the ideas of Attributes
which they are engaged, must be which inhere in them, and of fact Thought. That part of our judgment regarded as a fundamental can and be which is conscious guided by reflection and here alone can Activities in
there be any logic
presupposes both this distinction and the necessity
which obliges us to refer the different kinds of ideas to each other,
and
to
regard every thinkable and independent object as the unity of a Thing with No doubt the impressions from which we its Attributes and Activities.
The
1
generality of the process by which the affections of sense are referred to Things, no way prejudiced by the fact that such reference may be uncertain in particular cases, and that a thing perceived in a certain phenomenon may be apprehended in various is
in
Night, shadow, rainbow, wind, ways. the word concrete and particular. It
etc., is
are originally things in the fullest sense of which first deprives them of
scientific reflexion
and causes us
to look upon them as merely the results of certain relations in this con substance Hence, also, we avoid using the expression for it is an expression which implies that a scientific reflexion, and a criticism of nection those ideas which arise immediately and naturally, have already taken place. Not every thing which the ordinary consciousness led by the analogy of its own mental processes apprehends as a thing, is for that reason substance in the strict sense, or will permit of
this solidity,
"
amongst things.
"
;
the conscious application of this category. need not enter here upon the difficult question as to whether the present verbal form, in all its applications, is founded upon one definite common conception, nor what
We
that conception
may
be.
To me
it
appears certain that according to the original dis
between noun and verb, the expressing of temporal action (in its widest sense) be longs to the latter ; and the thought of movement and change which proceeds from, and arises in, the Thing, and which can, moreover, extend its influence to other things, forms tinction
the nucleus of that group of ideas which the verb serves to denote. In proportion as our imagination looks upon things as alive, even persisting states, such as lying, standing, the result of a resistance to change which etc., seem to be reflective actions and almost volitional. Or at least it is looked upon, as is evident in the Greek 0T77Ka, Kd8rifj.ai, as the result of an activity. It seems to me, then, more correct to regard the concept of action as original, and to subordinate to it the concept of state, than to reverse the relation, as Wundt does. That according to our present treatment many verbs seem to have the value of Adjectival Predicates, in no way alters the original dis tinction. The same state of a Thing may be regarded either as its inactive Attribute, or
remaining, is
as
active
its
continuous Activity
holding one
s
peace, etc.
as, for
example, at
rest
and
resting, ruber
and rubeo,
silent
and
IDEAS AS ELEMENTS OF THE JUDGMENT gain the idea of light
and
31
that of the light-giving object, or the ideas of
hardness and coldness, and those of hard and cold Things, are the same in
each case
but we cannot in conscious Thought force ourselves back to a any more than we can talk in the roots from
:
point prior to the distinction,
which the forms of Verb and
Noun have
What
developed.
forms of Substantive, Verb and Adjective imply
is
the linguistic
just this unity in differ
Every Verb implies a Subject, every Adjective a Substantive, and are thus supplemented can Thought come to rest in a
ence.
only when they
complete
relatively
act,
having attained a whole which
thinkable inde
is
In this process the part of the Substantive is to pendently and by itself. denote more especially the unity, a unity, however, which tends constantly to develop itself into
its
the Adjective and
elements
Verb
exhibit these
elements as abstracted from, but always striving back to unity. Thus wher ever we find our ideas denoted by various forms of speech such as Substan tives,
Adjectives and Verbs, there Thought has been busy, distinguishing to the categories of Thing, Attribute and Activity
and unifying according
;
governed by our habit of bringing everything under Only in a few onomatopoetic words at the most such as
our way of speaking these categories.
is
can we reproduce an impression which has not yet been seized
pop, splash
upon by categorizing Thought. The antithesis between Verb and etymologically.
actually
and Substantive claims
Even
original signification are of the nature of verbs,
that quick
excite the
movement and
activity
accompanying sound more
upon which
all
that
names were
first
this
easily,
not that the idea of activity in
Movement, the fundamental
general preceded the idea of the agent. tuition
and
in their
would prove no more than exercise the strongest stimulus, and
changes and movements,
given to events,
both
priority,
were true that roots
if it
in
ideas of external activity are grounded, cannot be
perceived without a localization of the moving object and
its
background,
and a comparison which presupposes that stationary images have been seen and retained by memory. 1 It is just in movement that the identity ot the agent in its activity, as the distinction of the permanent Thing from the in beginning temporary event, is most easily grasped it is more difficult ;
and ceasing adjective distinct
1
in
when
it
change of
attributes.
For the
attribute expressed
has a purely sensuous signification
from the idea of the Subject,
it is
permanent
e.g.
like
This agrees with what Steinthal says, Abriss der Sprachwiss.
colour
it,
,
by the is
not
and what we
1,396 sq.
IDEAS AS ELEMENTS OF THE
32
perceive of the thing their different
just its Attribute.
is
JUDGMENT
It is the plurality
of Attributes,
combinations in different Things, and their changeableness
in one continuously intuited object, which first impels us to disengage them from one another, and makes us able to think of each independently ; and it is the repetition of action which first impels us to express its permanent
ground by an Adjective. Thus there arise the two classes of Adjectives ; those which partake more of the nature of Nouns, and those which approach more nearly to Verbs. While the ideas of Thing and Activity are so bound together that an action or attribute must always be the action or attribute of some Thing,
and a Thing must always be thought of as having a
we
Activity,
Attribute or Activity by
In
Thing.
this
itself,
way they
isolation
artificial
they are also raised to universality to
and
by the distinction to think of an and disengage it from reference to any par
are thought of as abstract, i.e., withheld in from the unity towards which they naturally tend. In abstraction not only are they cut off from unity with definite Things,
ticular
this
definite Attribute
are nevertheless enabled
and find them
cesses
;
i.e.,
it
becomes possible to refer them J These two pro
any number of particular instances.
in
that of resolving a given
complex idea into the
different elements
of Attributes and Activities, and that of forming from these elements ab stract
and general ideas are mutually dependent, or rather we should say one and the same process, and that their result presents
that they are
different aspects.
In
my
intuition of a stone as a round, white Thing, the
ideas of round shape and white colour disengage themselves from this par ticular combination, and thus it becomes possible for them to enter into or
be recognised
By
in
any other combination.
the distinction of Attributes and Activities
from Things we are
enabled to think of the same Attributes and the same Activity as belong ing to different Things ; and a basis is also given for the comparison of similar Activities
differences
mode.
and Attributes
in different Things,
and the recognition of
between them, which we think of as variations in degree or
And
just as
in
Things are distinguished by their Activities and
Attributes, so the similar Activities
distinguished by degrees
name
of Modifications.
and Attributes of particular Things are and modes which we may comprehend under the Here we have a new distinction and a new unity
which finds expression in language in the relation in which Adverbs stand to Adjectives and Verbs. The etymological form of the Adverb also
announces
it
to be a
dependent element which must be united
to the idea
IDEAS AS ELEMENTS OF THE JUDGMENT of an Attribute or Activity with such an idea as
So
its
as Abstract
far
;
incomprehensible except in connection
more accurate determination. ideas can be retained independently,
centre to which other ideas
form
is
it
33
may
attach, language gives
and form a
them a
substantival
they are Abstract Substantives, and their meaning consists in ideas of Attributes and Activities. This form implies that they are comparable ;
with Things, in so far as their relations to Adjectives to those of
Concrete Substantives.
and the unity between them and Adjectives or Verbs,
is
and Verbs
But they are not therefore their determinations,
are similar
really
Things,
as expressed in
not that unity of inherence or action through which
they themselves, as abstract, indicate a something which supports them.
Except where Relations are involved, only the differentiation of a
common
element, the modification of the Attribute or Activity, can be thought of in connection with that Attribute and referred to it in a manner analogous to that in
which
itself referred
it is
two relations have in
common is
to a Thing.
where we have a substantival
in the sense that
the distinguishing characteristics which
an independent position their unity with
it
ball
is
round
chief point which the
is
contained a unification
idea, its determinations
offers for
in consciousness,
(The
it.
The
that in both there
and
and
comparison both occupy
at the
same time maintain
the ball moves
movement
the
is
the rapidity increases).
rapid
The one
common to the ideas of Things and their which we have been considering is, that in all there is an immediately intuitable element, which is determined by the function of one or more of our senses, or by inner perception. This characteristic
and
Attributes
Activities
intuitable content never constitutes
upon by Thought which gives
by
itself
the whole of the idea
;
it is
form, and it is then retained as the idea of the Attribute or Activity of a Thing to which it is referred as to a seized
permanent
unity.
of sense intuition
;
it
This unity is as much a part of our idea as the element but while the categories of Thing, Attribute and Activity
are always the same, the product of sense-intuition, or of imitative imagin constitutes the real essence of the idea,
ation,
and
gives to
it its
distin
guishing content. It
3.
their
is
this
Attributes
RELATION. the other
element which distinguishes the ideas of Things and Activities from the second main class IDEAS OF
and
In these the ideas of Things are always presupposed ; while on their content is the result of a relating Activity, and indues
hand
them from the
first
with a generality which
the idea of the particular by s.
L.
means
makes
it
impossible to excite
of the corresponding words.
D
LOGIC
34
The relations which are first and most easily comprehended, (a) of Things and their because already implicitly contained in our intuition SPACE. Right and left, above and below, and TIME of those are Activities, are ideas which, as consciously distinguished elements of before and after,
our ideal world, are due entirely to a subjective Activity, passing to and fro which are already intuited in spatial and temporal exten between
Things
sion
;
their content consists in the
this Activity as
it
consciousness of the determination of
and Time, and
passes through Space
is
therefore inde
It is true that these relations are all pendent of any particular reference. ideas of Things as spatially extended and implicitly contained in our before us in spatial and enduring in time in the manifold which extends
temporal order, but they do not as yet come into consciousness independ We have an idea of a spatial object in which there is right and left, ently.
above and below, and our intuition moves through space in these various directions in order to grasp the spatial image as a unity ; but this does not
we
necessarily imply that
At
directions. figure
and
meaning
its
we
first
are conscious of the
movement and
of
its
different
are conscious of the result only, of the definite
situation with reference to others.
for us until this Activity of
movement
Relational words have no to
and
fro itself
comes
into
we
distinguish one direction from another, the further movement of they presuppose reaching sight or hand from the shorter
consciousness, until
:
a spontaneous
movement
given material,
of Thought supervening
upon the immediately and being thus disengaged from any particular sensuous
affection they possess a generality peculiar to themselves.
"Movement"
must always be thought of in the last instance as movement of something, however faint the sensuous image of that something may be but direction "
"
:
presupposes only that scious of
its
we
ourselves describe a line in space
determinations.
Space and Time, and
these,
These
and are con
by Adverbs of denote relations thought of as
relations are expressed
when used
to
connected with the objects to which they refer, become prepositions or case-suffixes, or blend as prefixes with Adjectives and Verbs; in other words, again, such as
a spatial or temporal relation is "follow," blended with the meaning of the word, and finds no separate expression. The relation of Whole and Part is also derived from spatial relations. "fall,"
Intuition begins by a process of limitation and distinction which disengages what we perceive as a single Thing from the surroundings by which it is
accompanied images of
in
immediate sensation.
men and
animals,
their
way that we obtain movement compelling us to
It is in this
power of
IDEAS AS ELEMENTS OF THE JUDGMENT them from
distinguish their
shape
their
facilitates
background, and for
complete limitation
But within
and
35
reason also, because
this
distinction,
we regard
and stones
as
differences,
and we can describe new boundaries, and thus there
unities.
this original unity there
subordinate spatial unities within the circumference of the relatively
or animal
appear new arise
Their
first.
independent power of movement causes the limbs of the human body to appear as such unities, and when we break a stone the
separate pieces are perceived as distinct by the
present in
is still
trees
what we have
its
merely a
at first is
The
limitations to.
same
intuition to
which
it
Now, when we thus break up a whole, plurality of new unities, new things to fix
original shape.
fact that
we have an
idea of the head as well as of the
whole body, of the finger as well as of the hand, does not necessarily make us think of the head as part of the body, or of the finger as part of the
Immediate
hand.
intuition or reproduction
that of the
hand
to
com
finger
by
but not until we are conscious of the relation between
;
and the
the subordinate unity
and
may even proceed
head by that of the body, the idea of the
plete the idea of the
higher, not until
two processes
we
reunite what
we have
each other, does the head appear as part of the body, the finger as part of the hand. No doubt the idea of the separated,
relation,
refer the
of belonging to a whole,
to
more intimately connected with the we always perceive as
is
idea of such things as the limbs of the body, which parts,
and never
objects which
wholes
(e.g.
as isolated wholes (hand, arm, limb, etc.) than
may be
indifferently presented as parts or as
it is
with
independent
flower as a whole, blossom as a part).
This relational idea
is
thus presupposed in every idea of magnitude.
B
B
A
a part of A, or can be regarded (by means of contact, superposition, etc.) as a part of A. All comparison of
is
large in comparison with
magnitudes and
all
true
if
is
measurement
is
grounded upon the observation or
establishment of the relation of parts to a whole, and the "
the whole
u great."
is
greater than the
part,"
is
(Such words as great and high
or Attributes after
we
really first
first
principle,
an interpretation of the idea
appear as absolute predicates
are familiar with a definite standard of measurement.)
Again, the idea of the whole as a Thing with Attributes and Activities is not without influence upon the idea of the parts. The parts do not stand in external juxtaposition, the whole does not side side merely by
merely surround them as a frame
;
a causal relation
embraces the parts, holds them together and has them. after.
is
implied, the whole
More
of this here
-
LOGIC
36
The same differentiation takes place in the region of Time. The word breaks up into syllables, the melody into single phrases ; and here also the ideas of temporal magnitudes, of longer and shorter, are developed in proportion as the temporal relations obtain
an independent position
in
consciousness. their origin in the relating Activity
These ideas have
(b}
in
Space and Time, and
their content consists in the intuitive
movement through Space and Time.
of the
also the co-operation of functions of relating
other ideas of relation resulting from idea of Difference
is
of several distinct objects
them
but at
;
first
consciousness, that
it
is
is
it
But their completion requires Thought, which gives rise to
is
In our consciousness
given.
certainly presupposed that
is
we
the result only of the function which
distinguish
comes
into
the co-existence of several objects, each of which
The
independently perceived.
The
is
idea of Difference, of likeness or unlikeness,
does not develop until distinction takes place consciously, and panied by reflection.
The
and comparison.
distinction
not something which
which moves consciousness
is
accom
idea of Identity does not presuppose merely
same object was present for some time, or repeatedly ; it arises through negation of difference in the contents of two or more ideas
that the first
which succeed each other
in time,
and
it
this
is
Activity which forms
its
Only in so far as it presents conditions and ground for this Activity can identity be ascribed to an object. Difference, Identity and Similarity are never to be regarded as mere abstractions from the intuited content.
content, which can give nothing
of which
we have become
Number
content.
when
beyond itself; they are mental processes and it is this that gives them their
conscious,
also has
its
origin in such mental processes,
similar contents are spatially or temporally differentiated,
tinguishable repetition of the
same
intuition
such, while each step of the repetition
hended
is
comes
retained in
and
arises
and the
dis
into consciousness as
memory and compre
new
in a
The fact that I see three unity with the preceding series. things, and that the impression made by them differs from the impression made by two and difference
is
one,
is
not sufficient to give
not perceived by
me
as
sciously perform the act of proceeding from (c)
The
third
main
me
one of number
class consists of the
the idea three.
until I
one unity
count
:
i.e.
The con
to another.
CAUSAL RELATIONS.
These
all
contain, in infinitely varied modifications, the idea of Efficient Action, that of action which is directed is, upon some other thing (transitive verbs). Any explanation of the origin of the causal and even the
conception,
IDEAS AS ELEMENTS OF THE JUDGMENT question of
we must This
is
exact meaning,
its
reserved for later enquiry
is
indicate the position occupied by
;
nevertheless
in the totality of
it
37
our ideas.
not easy inasmuch as the close connection between efficiency and
action impels us to regard the latter as a relation because the former
and
is
one,
doing we are in danger of representing the position of the agent
in so
towards his action as mere relation, and the action of the Subject as other
than himself, an independent something of his creation.
more
liable to regard the position of a
Thing towards
its
We
are all the
varying actions as
a relation, inasmuch as the identity of a Thing throughout
its changes cannot be thought except by a unifying synthesis, so that as a matter of
fact
we
are forced to distinguish between the changes
The
and the Thing.
impossibility of drawing any fixed line of distinction seems to find confirm
When
ation in two ways.
a
man
walks he moves his legs
;
that which from
one point of view is mere action, appears from another as an effect upon his limbs, which are relatively independent things ; and it is the same in all cases where there is room for doubt as to what is a single thing, and what must be regarded as a complex of different things. Even the inactive relation of the whole to its parts appears as an influence exerted by the whole upon the holds
parts, or
the parts, binds
The whole
by the parts upon the whole.
them
into unity
by
has
influence, the parts
its
"
i.e.
form
"
Again, in view of the fact that what we ordinarily look upon as such as colour, smell, etc., has been resolved by the progress of Attribute, into an effect upon our sense-organs, much can be said for the knowledge
the whole.
proposition that efficacy
Substance
is
causal
in
and Attribute pass over into each other, and that Thus Inherence and Causality Attributes.
its
different ways of regarding one and the same relation. But these considerations merely show the difficulty of deciding where the determinations of Attribute, Action and Efficiency can be applied with
become merely
they do not obliterate the distinction between the concepts of Attribute, Action and Efficiency as distinct elements in our ideas. We may come to think that what we used to regard as an Attribute objective validity;
inhering in a Thing, such as colour, does not really inhere in the Thing, but is its effect upon our sensibility ; nevertheless it takes effect because
of
some
which we must conclude
attribute,
to
the effect, that
not directly cognizable through the senses the structure of
And
before
it
its
surface
can take
upon a change of
and
effect
state, or
its it
some
power of
reflecting
must, before sort of
be there, even though
all,
movement.
be
is,
is
it
due
is
to
and absorbing light. active, it must enter
The
fact
still
remains
LOGIC
38 that
if
we
think of a definite Thing
Attributes which inhere in
it,
we must
and constitute
its
think of
it
as possessing
particular nature,
and can
It is the same with be predicated of it without reference to anything else. Action. Our world would be a chaos, presenting no clear distinctions for
we
our recognition, unless ;
,
Things, each having this
think of
it
as a plurality of particular individual
definite nature,
and
nature in Time, or changes and alters
affects
active in so far as
moves or grows.
it
asserts
Of
course
is
it
Efficiency cannot even be expressed without distinguishing The antithesis is that between causa immanent and causa
question here.
from Action.
That which proceeds from the former
transient.
idea of the Subject, a latter
it,
both determined by other Things which affect it, and other Things and determines their action, but that is not the
in this action
[t
its
mode
of
its
being
;
is
inseparable from the
which proceeds from the something else. We cannot
that
cannot be thought except in relation to
therefore obliterate the distinction that the idea of Efficiency belongs to the ideas of Relations between different Things, while that of Action
an inherent portion of the idea of the particular Thing by and involves itself, only the Relations of space and time without which no particular Thing can ever be thought. It is for this reason also that the constitutes
idea of efficiency
is
never intuitable, since the passing over of Causality is an addition of the which connects
from one thing to another only the Action
itself,
Thought
;
the change in the Things which are entering into
Relation with each other, can be intuited.
The many forms briefly
indicated.
in It
which is
this Relation finds expression can only be most accurately and appropriately denoted by
transitive verbs ; but when these are regarded as proceeding from a perma nent ground, adjectives are developed which indicate that a Thing is capable of producing an effect, is constantly doing so, and always prepared to clo so. And when the idea of efficiency is joined in Thought to the
Thing
itself,
and the Thing takes its name from the effect which numerous substantives which denote
duces, then there arise the
according to their results
Causal Relation alone.
From
an
this
there
it
pro
Things
naturally
incongruity between the substantival form, which indicates permanence and independent existence, and the fortuitousness and change the Relation, and the possibility arises of confusing between what is true only of the Relation, and what is true of the This to the thing.
expression effect,
and
"cause"
at the
itself.
moment
A in
applies
Thing is a Cause only in so far as it takes which it takes effect but on the other hand ;
IDEAS AS ELEMENTS OF THE JUDGMENT we
name
give the
of Cause to a
Thing having a permanent
Now
with reference to the Relation
there
is
no
no Cause
effect there is
is
it
existence.
quite correct to say that where
but
;
39
incorrect to extend the
is
it
proposition to Things which might become causes under certain circum This is true again stances, or are causes from some other point of view.
and object
in reference to the Relation of subject
object without a
"no
subject."
Relation by virtue of which the
when
only
name
But
myself, or,
indeed, everything which
I
under certain circumstances all
is
famous proposition
conferred upon a Thing
when
and the Relation
ceases.
We
I fall asleep.
my Thought, because me and then it is
be presented to
may
it
everything existing externally to other than
is
the things ever presented to
subject withdraws
vanish myself
in the
the word Object merely the
of object
may mean by Object
a truism.
not true that
mean by
actually presented, then the proposition becomes merely
is
it
If I
do not
me If
it
;
vanish so soon as the
were so
must needs
I
hesitate to say
"
I
have been
denotes a subject which is conscious of itself, conscious asleep," I is meant the cannot sleep if by ness disappears in sleep, hence no the to it is conscious of itself. in far as so theory According subject but
"
"I
"
"
"
/"
"
object without a
but
is
if I
I
subject"
must cease
an absurd contradiction,
"
foot
mean men who
if
is
subject
walk
true in the
be during sleep.
same sense
"Cavalry
on
cavalry means only men on horseback
serve in a cavalry regiment, then
course that they sometimes walk. "
to
;
a matter of
no object without a
The
proposition
that
the proposition
"
is
it
"
a rider cannot
"
is
true.
The relation between ourselves as the subjects of psychical activity, (d) and the objects of our subjective action of our intuition and thought as cannot be compared with any other. An well as of our desire and will Thought or Will, contains in itself as such all we have been considering it is Thing, Attribute, Activity But under which category shall we class seeing, hearing,
object or definite content of the categories or Efficacy.
;
these functions in thinking, willing, etc., when we consider reference to their objects, and not merely as manifestations of activity on Do seeing, hearing, and thinking, belong to the the part of the subject ? intuiting,
Causal Relations
?
are not
They
other than the subject
;
mere
action, for they refer to
but neither are they
efficient,
for
something
they neither
Only that which never exists but in Thought comes under the Causal Relation of and fancies) imaginations (such in so far as we may be justified this and and creation, only production
produce nor as
alter a
Thing.
LOGIC
40
or a dream as a Thing." regarding a thought think of as in any way existing is not produced by our
But what we can
"
in
to the real
no difference
Thought
Thing when we think about
it
;
it
makes
nevertheless
;
an object of Thought, and as standing in relation to we may call this class it. By an extension of the Kantian phraseology which exist between relations all the it will contain of Relations MODAL of and desire, wish for, and them, and ourselves when we think
we regard
as
it
;
objects
Thus
estimate them according to their value for us.
include not
will
it
an ideational activity with reference to an only all the verbs which express and adverbs, such as true" and false," which object, but also adjectives "
"
express the relation between
my
and the Thing
idea
to
which
it
refers, or
and "good," which express the reference of a thing to a "beautiful" standard of value, and therefore express an attribute belonging to the Thing as such only indirectly and when this standard is absolutely fixed. Finally
it
includes such substantives as
"
sign,"
or
"
purpose."
7.
Every object of which we form an idea
We may
think
of
is
thought of
as having particular existence
it
in
one
of
two ways.
existing as a
(i.e.,
particular Thing, or as an Attribute, activity or relation of particular things)
or as subject to the conditions of particular existence (as with the images
produced by imagination). its
particular existence,
sented
it
may
Or we may think of
and as general
it
without attending to
in the sense that as
enter into the thought of any
number of
mentally repre
things or instances.
This mental representation finds its expression in the Word as such. But when words are appropriated from existing language and employed to express the natural thought of the individual, their
the individual
The
and are
meanings
differ
with
liable to great transformations.
ideas which have preceded the act of
judgment in a judging by means of the words that denote them. Now there is no doubt that what language aims at is that a word should have the same meaning for every one but in actual life this is far from i.
subject are generally indicated
;
being the case.
It is
words have different meanings same person at different times. 1 Hence of actual judgment we must never start by assuming that
for different people,
in the analysis
a
more
and
true to say that
for the
word has a generally accepted meaning without further investigation; 1
Cf.
Paul, Principien
tier
Sprachgeschichte, ed. 2, p. 83.
1DEAS AS ELEMENTS OF THE JUDGMENT we must always regard the word as being merely the present to the individual who is making the judgment.
The
2.
denotes
is
41
sign of the idea
between the verbal expression and the idea which it Some words (such as nouns and verbs)
relation
not always the same.
are connected with a definite ideal content, which constitutes their
mean
understood by the individual. Others such as pronouns and demonstratives denote nothing definite by themselves or by the mere sound of the word all they serve for is to express a reference to the ing as
;
thinking and speaking Subject (or to that of which he speaks), and they do
not therefore become the sign of a definite idea until this reference
is
understood by means of actual intuition. I and you, this and that, here and there, do not express by their sound the idea of a definite person, thing or place, although they are used to denote definite things or places.
As the circumstances differ,
in which,
and the people by
whom
they are used
they denote different objects, and these objects must be supplied
from some other source. 3.
But words which are
significant in themselves are all of them, so far
and
primary and immediate meaning, no more than
as understood,
in their
and can be reproduced by Whether a word be a proper name or quite general in meaning it can never be of use until it has become capable of calling into con sciousness a definite ideal-content, by the mere sound alone, and without signs of ideas which are present to the mind,
memory.
help from present intuition.
and
On
the other
firm possession of an idea, or use
it
hand we cannot have
by which to denote it when the word is wanting to as a want, and have a difficulty in grasping the idea ;
it
and difference from guarding
it
others, in reproducing
from confusion.
As
certain
we have a word an idea we always feel
in thought, unless
it
in its individuality
with any certainty, and in
a matter of fact the process of psychical
aided by language and greatly influenced by it, and it becomes a new mental possession, seeks a word to every ideal-content, as This is why we are always so anxious to know names, and are denote it.
development always
is
content to be answered by a to the question
"what
is
name we have never heard Here we easily lend
that?"
before, in answer
ourselves to the
knowledge of this plant that from knowing really gain nothing directly things, Still we have gained a is called Aristolochia and that one Clematis.
names adds
to our
means of recurring more easily to these things, of memory, and of afterwards extending our knowledge.
fixing
delusion of thinking that the learning of
though we
them
Hence
all
in
our
progress
Wv -
*^
42 in
accompanied by a change and extension of
is
knowledge
scientific
terminology.
Let us
4.
now
consider the nature of the ideas which
accompany our
most important here to remember that the thought we are in the particular individual in the dealing with is that which takes place natural course of his mental development and the idea as it is connected words.
It is
;
by the individual with one and the same word passes through stages of development which cannot be explained either by philology,, which aims merely at determining the generally accepted meaning of the word, or by the ordinary logical treatment of the word.
Words
5.
Concept
are generally held to be the signs of
the logical sense
in
is
a work of
elaboration of our ideas in which definition fixed,
and
it is
the
its
work of
CONCEPTS.
But a
produced by a conscious characteristics are analysed and its art,
logic to help us to attain to the ideal
which words represent such Concepts. As a matter of fact most of our words only approximate to this state, and when we are treating of state in
the beginning of judgment in the first appropriation of the simplest elements of language, it can only lead to confusion if we call every mental If we counterpart to a word a Concept, without further discrimination.
we should have to follow Herbart s example, and give a much wider meaning than the ordinary one to the expression Concept." 6. We seem able here to distinguish a twofold relation J?t ween the idea did this
"
and the
Some
word.
immediate intuition help of language
;
of our ideas
those,
that
is,
which
rest
upon
form themselves up to a certain point without the
and these
ideas,
developing independently in
every
individual, are the conditions under
Here speech
is
added
amongst our ideas,
to
e.g.,
which speech first becomes possible. an image which is already formed. But others all those belonging to the region ot the non-
sensuous, are aroused in us by tradition, and the formation of these
is
occasioned and determined by the range of the Thought of the Com munity as expressed in the language we hear. The word comes first, and
becomes only gradually
richer
and more
as the individual enters into the
between the two cases
definite in
Thought
of the
meaning
in proportion
Community.
The con
merely apparent. We never understand a word except by connecting it with our own ideas, and its contents consist in just those elements which the individual has really trast
is,
however,
consciously grasped and retained.
the child
is
guided
at
Even the immediate sense-intuition of an early stage by language and on the other hand, ;
IDEAS AS ELEMENTS OF THE JUDGMENT the most abstract terms are no
more than empty sounds
43
Con
until their
Thought. independently reproduced always a discovery when a thought of our own is found to agree with the meaning of a word as accepted in common language, and all our explanation of words aims tent
in
is
at bringing
must
them
difference
It
is
about the conditions under which the ideas corresponding to be produced according to psychological laws. The real
merely that
is
in
the natural development the sensuous ideas
come first and are all formed number of elements involved
in
more or the
in
less
same way, while the
the
higher and more abstract
increases the variety of ways in which they are formed, differences of the
products become more
general process by which idea and word individual
is
essentially the
ideas
and the individual
difficult to
But the
expound.
become wedded
together for the
same throughout. We connect the word with at one time or another have been self-
an ideal-content which must produced, and
it
then passes through a series of developments becomes enriched and modified.
the
in
process of which this content
Look how
7.
the child obtains the almost exclusively sensuous ideas,
which belong to its first words, and enable it to make its first judgments. It always starts from the particular intuition of a thing or an event which is
named But
in
to
it
words are
;
proportion as
it
first
is little
understood in reference to particular cases. practised in apprehension
and
scantily pre
pared by a previous store of ideas, the intuitive image which enters into memory, and is afterwards reproduced with the word, falls short of being a faithful taining
the
man
object,
and exhaustive copy of the thing presented which might have been perceived in the
all
unless a practised observer
what he receives
and
in intuition
actually
to sense,
in
sees
stores in his
and of con
Even what
object.
the
memory,
Hence when we
presented
is
generally
begin to speak the traces which remain of the particular object seen can be no more than a quite inadequate to the object
itself.
rough and faded copy of the thing, in which, as
first
in a hasty sketch,
only
more prominent features appear. Generally speaking then, we can have no idea of what image the child really connects at any time with the words which it hears. When an intuition occurs similar to those already retained in memory none of the conditions are present which would enable the
it
to perceive
a difference between the present
fusion takes place immediately
object
name
is
called
and
is
and former
objects
;
expressed by the fact that the
by the name already learned.
Children
the
new
will give the
same
or
some
to things only remotely similar so long as they agree in
all
LOGIC
44
of those characteristics which have been securely apprehended, and this
Here we may find it possible for them to get on with few words. the explanation, both of the wit which so often surprises us in childlanguage, and of the numerous confusions into which, as we think, they makes
does not consist in subsuming something new
Progress, for them,
fall.
ideas, but
under familiar distinguish
more
to
in learning
apprehend more completely and
1
exactly.
We may
8.
say, then, that in the earlier stages of the Thought of the meaning of every word is connected with a particular in and there is here no difference whatever between particular and
individual the tuition,
The memory image which remains from our first imperfect is not retained by the mind as a fixed im reproduction is always the result of a new activity, and
general ideas.
apprehension of an object Its
pression.
instead of speaking of images
and ideas
we ought
as in a store-house,
as of solid
things lying in the
speak of having gained habits and capabilities of reproducing ideas, such as do not exclude
memory
really to
changes of more or hence in the product
less
a house, or landscape
an absence of some time, we find that its This quite different from our recollection of it.
actual appearance
of
uncertainty
is
the
importance in every act of reproduction, and
How
itself.
it
when
seeing a familiar object
and the general
memory-image,
expressed by Beneke as the
needed to unify
often
after
"attraction
of the
new images, and
with a series of
The process of continually ourselves for the present to substantives
function of a general idea. to confine
hand
to fix the
prominent features
keep the image fluid
and
common
shifting, so that
to
now
all,
one,
can come to the fore and determine new associations. th-at in
the natural course of
their sphere
;
their
law appropriately are
similar,"
is
the
and on the other
now
to
another, feature
It is for this
all
and admit new ideas of the same kind.
it
naming new things serves on the one
words have a tendency boundaries are indefinite, and always ready
Thought
that
all
so to give
This extension
is
reason
to
widen
to
open
continually
favoured by the fact that in
new objects we always notice and apprehend those characteristics which coincide with an outline already easily familiar to us ; we cover things, as it were, with our ready made images, and so conceal any new and distinctive features they may possess. But side by side with this As we gain process there runs another. most
1
p.
Cf. the very appropriate remarks of Steinthal, Abriss der Sprachwissenschaft, 148 sq., 401 sq., and Paul, Princ. d. Sprachgeschichte, ed. 2, p. 75 sq.
i.,
IDEAS AS ELEMENTS OF THE JUDGMENT we observe not only
practice in apprehension
but also those which are less prominent.
more defined and
new
to
and
richer in content,
objects diminishes, their
more
the
this
striking features,
way our images become
in proportion as their application
number and our power of
But
between them increases.
In
45
in distinction
of
this
distinguishing
kind wholes are
compared with wholes we do not begin by taking account of the differ ences in detail, and consciously sorting out the characteristics which agree :
and
We
differ.
constantly and unhesitatingly distinguish between persons
whom we know and do
not know, without being conscious exactly how an unanalysed total impression, as immediate in its they nature as feeling itself, which makes us recognise the familiar as such, and judge that the unfamiliar is not known. differ.
It is
It is
much
not so
the individual
frequency of observation as interest, which determines
and the accuracy of
attention
s
The
his apprehension.
images of objects which rejoice or terrify him, or which are connected with his needs and inclinations, impress themselves upon his all
their details
;
memory
in
but where objects are indifferent to him, he does not
and hence they leave only
trouble himself with accurate apprehension,
only the more striking
faded impressions which contain
characteristics
and can fuse with similar impressions over a wide range. In this way in his
we may
explain
how
mind and connected with
rich in content, others less defined
He may which all
give special
troublesome
is
other varieties are
Nor
kinds.
finiteness "
names
that
is
all
is
to the
in his
it
happens that of the images stored some are well defined and
his words,
and more
hen which
it is
a
in
and he cares nothing about the
he conscious that the idea
the specific kinds
not a bird,
change
meaning.
garden, the stork which builds upon his roof
"birds,"
ing things the less defined
liable to
lays eggs for him, the sparrow
hen."
;
"bird"
includes in
;
different its
inde-
we may hear others than children say Where there is no interest in distinguish
and poorer image, which is derived only from and flight, is sufficient, and this
the two principal characteristics of form
extends to flying beetles and butterflies. The history of language shows a similar development.
Its roots_are were fixed very general in meaning, not because the most general features upon from the first by a comprehensive process of abstraction, but because few distinctions were made, and only those phenomena retained and
apprehended and especially prominent. Particu the things are generally named after some one of these phenomena
named which were lar
easily
;
-
LOGIC
46 from
river
its
movement, the cock from
different aspects are arise the
and there
in different series
its
crowing, and so on. receive
apprehended in the things they numerous synonyms which cause them
to
Then
as
new names, be
classified
Further specialization does not
of similar phenomena.
and words originally take place until, as language develops, derivates arise, to different specific classes of things and events synonymous are applied with the special. Contrary the more general meaning continuing side by side to the common doctrine of the formation of general ideas, general precedes ;
individual as in language, as certainly as the incomplete and special in the the complete idea in which careful distinction is indefinite idea
precedes
presupposed.
A
and place with regard to ideas of qualities most of the general kind, Here, again, apprehension is at first
similar process takes
activities.
and deals only with considerable and easily distinguished characteristics. With the child as with language the first ideas of colours are few and uncertain in their differentiation,
together
movement
in
;
it
stage are the manifold differences observed
movement
this
are denoted by such a
Assuming
9.
word
intuition
going
or
word
"
running."
arises originally in
first
meaning of the word,
and
we can
see in what sense Generality attaches to such an idea.
That any idea may be general, lar ideas, is
upon
its
soon as
involved in
*>.,
applicable to any
number of
particu
nature as reproducible, and in no way depends
its
As having been formed from a number of such particular ideas. has disengaged itself from the original intuition with its spatial
it
and temporal connections, and reproduced,
it
is
is
a mental image which can be freely
capable also of fusing with a
and of appearing
number
of fresh intuitions
judgment. If we con our attention to the contents of the idea this kind of generality belongs
or ideas, fine
"
"
of a particular object, the incomplete
shifting image of which constitutes the
now
How many kinds
and denoted. as
that the idea connected with a
way from the
practised
to all similar forms, only at a later
hended and unconditionally extended of
is
which were formerly indiscriminately classed is the most familiar forms which are appre
differences
to distinguish
only gradually that sight
it is
as their Predicate in a
not only to images such as those of the sun or the moon, but also to the As often as the sun rises in the sky, or the images of particular persons.
moon becomes with the idea
visible
left
we have a new
particular intuition,
by a previous intuition.
identity of all these suns
and moons
The
which
is
unified
recognition of the material
follows later, and,
where continuity
IDEAS AS ELEMENTS OF THE JUDGMENT intuition
-of
is
reflection of a
no means of
absent, by
person
with the memory-image,
In a similar way the
necessity.
in a mirror, or his portrait,
is
47
immediately identified
and here again our knowledge
that these are
merely images, and that the name belongs properly to one individual, comes later, and checks our attempt to treat the idea as general, in the widest sense
chance that
Thus
so
;
far,
indeed, as concerns the idea
not the special content of the idea, nor yet
it is
determines whether or not that the idea
assumed
is
it
a matter of
its
origin,
which
general in the ordinary sense, but the fact
is
actually applied
to
a plurality of particular intuitions
to be copies of a real plurality of things,
this plurality as
we being conscious
of
the Singular must extend to a Plural.
such
This plurality
10.
itself, it is
not really general.
it is
is
at first
merely numerical.
When
a
number of
like
or indistinguishably similar things present themselves contemporaneously
or successively in intuition, not only
memory-image, but the time makes
it
each one identified with the
is
fact that the content of the idea
or temporal difference with the sameness of the image. antithesis
between singularity and plurality
As a
11.
rule,
when we
refer
mean
the
however,
it
is
first
same each
It is
here that the
appears.
is
we What we
not this numerical generality to which
say that words are general in their signification.
that their generality
is
is
necessary to count in order to reconcile the external spatial
such that they include different objects,
which are distinguishable and are actually distinguished by their contents. In this sense the idea tree is said to be general with respect to oak, beech, fir,
etc.,
the idea colour with respect to red, blue, and green.
Here we must be idea
careful to distinguish
and the generality of the word.
So
far
between the generality of the as the actual meaning of words
for the individual is
derived from particular images, the very indefiniteness
of an idea renders
applicable to things which
it
and temporally, but
also in their
content.
A
differ,
not merely spatially
visible thing
may be
repre
sented by copies of every degree of resemblance, from the few lines with
which schoolboys draw horses and
men
in their books,
to the perfect
photograph, and in the same way we may have a series of ideas, represent ing the same object with a gradually increasing definiteness, all continuing to exist side
application.
by side. The more indefinite the idea, the easier it is of But until we become conscious of the difference between
the various objects to which an idea once formed that idea
is
of the
same kind
is
constantly being applied,
as the idea of the sun, or an idea having
LOGIC
48
When
merely numerical generality.
the
word grass brings
mind only
to
a group of green, narrow, pointed leaves, and we disregard the differences between particular kinds of grass, then we merely see grass and all is grass
each apprehension becomes more definite and we notice between things which at first sight all coincided with a given idea, then, while the common name still remains, new ones are formed In course of time these crowd out for the more fully determined ideas. alike; but as
distinctions
the
more
which becomes too vague
indefinite idea,
botanist has
him there would be
no
arises set
down
To such
two eyes. is
things,
made
vivid.
The ;
as alike
by a
like that in the field of vision
word
be
to
image corresponding to the word grass or tree for a rivalry between differently determined forms which
ideal
general in
ideas there its
less
when is
a rivalry
practised apprehension
different in
nothing
images are presented to the common but the word. The
so far as
signification in
it comprehends different and denotes a number of distinguishable images by elements which
are alike in
common
It
all.
element
is
we
here that
in difference
;
are
to
i.e.
first
called
upon
to
realize the
form by abstraction the concept in
the ordinary sense of the word.
The same also, as
more
process goes on with the
more
fully
apprehension becomes more acute and
faithful,
determined
memory for
Here
ideas.
small differences
the originally single image resolves itself into many.
But
language cannot keep pace in its derivatives, combinations and qualitative determinations with this process of specialization also fails to ;
be equally retentive of vividness to
all
all
So that
images.
group of distinguishable not, however, all
particulars for
ideas, all of
memory
and imagination every word there
which
it
is
specially
finally
an equal remains a
serves to denote.
bear the same relation to the word
definite than the others,
to lend
connected with
it,
;
They do
one image, more
as the centre of the
group round which the others gather. In a neighbourhood where fir grow the image of the fir is that which a man primarily connects with the word tree ; any other varieties he know are trees
may
and
fall
into
the background.
The word
"red"
less distinct
is
most immediately distinguished from
connected with an especially striking impression, easily others as it becomes extended in application to further modifications Df the colour it ceases to denote anything definite, and calls to mind now
all
;
this shade,
possible.
now that, amongst a number which occur The word has become general its
and reproducing a
series
to us as
definite
equally
by losing meaning of shades which is not at first distinctly limited.
IDEAS AS ELEMENTS OF THE JUDGMENT Each of these shades
a general idea, in so far as
is
it is
itself
49
applicable
a plurality of particular intuitions, but their names (blood-red, rose-red, etc.) serve to remind us of the original process by which words derive to
meanings from particular intuitions. Essentially different from this natural development of the relations between word and idea is another process which is conditioned by the fact their
12.
naming we are always under the influence of a language which is The language in use hinders combinations which would already there. take To naturally place, and forces upon us others which would not. that in
declare the
common
one word
a very different matter from declaring what things any given
is
element in
all
the things which language denotes by
individual subsumes under the idea which he considers they resemble.
Many words
are for the individual
of the ideas which
and
first
mere homonyms, the
essential similarity
caused them to be named alike escapes his notice is language which first makes us conscious of many ;
same way it similarities which would never have been discovered by one man carrying on his comparisons independently. On the other hand the language in in the
use prohibits and destroys
many
similarities,
and
forces
upon us
distinc
tions which might never have occurred to the individual thinker. latter case the idea is forced into fuller determination,
In the
but in the former
how many
really disconnected ideas may correspond In Etymology we aim rightly at tracing the most remote connections, but our task then is quite different from what it
it is
to
is
impossible to say
one and the same word.
when we endeavour
to realise the actual process of thought in the indi
vidual.
For the individual the meaning of a word is determined, not by its etymology, but by the thought of those objects to which it is applied in ordinary language.
We
never think, until we have been taught, that there to the cock on the barrel, the cocking of the
may be something common trigger,
and the cock
in
same name
called by the
the poultry yard, which led to their ;
for us the three
connected, the words have become mere homonyms. the
original
dis
In the same way
;
metaphorical force of words such as concept, judgment, conclusion. If the
13. tent,
being
meaning of the words by which we denote most of the is completely lost to us no one feels now the figura
psychical activities tive,
all
meanings are completely
which
words which we use are only signs of a definite ideal con detachment from present intuition has gained an in
in its
dependent existence in that s. L.
it
is
capable of mental reproduction at E
will,
5o
then it follows that by themselves, by their mere sound, they can never In order denote the particular as such, and as it is presented to intuition. that a word may be understood to apply to a definite particular object we
have to make use of special expedients, such as possessive or demonstra or else we must be able to assume that though tive adjectives or gestures ;
is unspoken, it will be correctly by the hearer. But when a particular thing is denoted by means of a word it is always because it is recognised as agreeing with the
the reference to a definite particular thing
carried out
general idea expressed by the word; I can denote
me
as this book, or
word book
is
It is true
This
is
my
the thing lying before book, only because the general meaning of the
applicable to that
one
it.
class
1
of words denotes particular things as such.
either because the thing corresponding to the idea
is
be
actually to
found only once in the world, as in the case of sun and moon, sky and earth, or because a name has been given by express agreement to the particular thing as such,
on purpose
objects, as with the proper
the meaning of these
to distinguish
it
from other similar
names of people, towns, mountains,
is still
recognisable
it
may be
etc.
Where
traced back to general
Mont Blanc, Neustadt, Erlenbach but this meaning, words, which explains the giving of the name, is in most cases forgotten, and the idea aroused by the now meaningless name is only that of a definite as
in
;
Nor can they fulfil the function of comprehensible way unless the object has been intuited and remem The import of the name is related to the momentary intuition of
particular
object.
words even in bered.
this
the person or mountain, as the general
word
to the particular thing
;
it
cannot be applied to anything present to sense unless the identity of the present intuition with the mental image is recognised. The proper name is
distinguished from the general
word only by the consciousness which is a particular thing and
that the corresponding reality the same in fact. always
accompanies
it
Finally, there are also certain relational
words of general content, which apply only to a single thing; reference to a single object forms part of their meaning, as with all true In so far superlatives, or ordinal numbers. as only their context can tell us like 1
demonstrative
adjectives,
what is compared or counted they are which also can express their particular
In reference to this Mill s analysis is superficial (Logic, bk. L, ch. 2), when he classi the adjectives, white, heavy, and even the demonstrative adjective "this," as names of things. Cf. also Paul, Princ. d. Sprachg., ed. 2, p. 66 sq fies
IDEAS AS ELEMENTS OF THE JUDGMENT object only by day, but
it is
means
The first of January 1871 is a single we assume a definite system of enumeration
of a Relation.
only
definite
51
if
;
Russian calendar and for ours, and the meaning of the expression depends further upon the idea of a series of days and years which is nothing more than an object of Thought. it
differs for the
The peculiar function of words makes it indispensable to the completion of the judgment that the predicate should be expressed in them; the subject, if not general, can dispense with the verbal expression. i
It follows
.
from what has been said of the nature of words that we must
be careful to distinguish whether a word signifies merely the ideal content immediately denoted, or whether it is being used to denote a definite par ticular thing
which
not indicated as such by the meaning, but which
is
represents that meaning and can therefore be
named by the word. depends the essential difference of the way in which words are related to the subject and predicate of a judgment. When,
Upon
that
a statement does not refer to the content of the subject term as
is,
such
this distinction
as in definition
sary that
a significant word. "this
tive a
is
but to a definite particular thing, it is quite unneces or even be able to denote, the subject idea by
we should denote,
red,"
mere
"that
We may is
falling
";
merely use a demonstrative
and we may
is
ice,"
demonstra
gesture, or even give utterance to the predicate without anything
the mental process will
further,
"this
substitute for this
still
be a judgment
which a statement
in
made about something.
is
We
see this most clearly in the judgments in which
all
human judgment
begins, those in which definite objects of sense-intuition are recognised
The
and named. its
child
makes a judgment when
it
names the animals
the exclamations elicited by a startling sight (father
!
fire
!
the cranes of
judgments ; it is only the verbal expression which not the mental process. 1 incomplete, Ibycus
1
in
picture-book by pointing to them and pronouncing their names, and
!)
are proper
is
The first step is the sight of the Herbart, Psychologic (sammtliche Werke), iv. 169. the idea immediately given by this arouses the previous idea, which fuses with it. ; immediate perception gives the subject, it is the fusion which would be denoted
thing
The
by the copula
;
the place of the predicate
is
taken by the previous idea, which
is
aroused
and fuses with the perception. Paul (I.e., p. 104) takes sentences in which what is said and hearer, the situation being the predicate kt Some one :
is
the subject for both speaker example, that a child
sees, for
LOGIC
52
On
2.
the other
hand
it is
essential to the
(e.g.]
an object
completion of the judgment there may be cases where
It is true
that the predicate should be spoken.
recognised for which the approximate word
is
is
wanting,
mental process can find no expression ; but for as an immature this very reason we regard the process as incomplete to be complete in which alone that consider and judgment production,
and where,
therefore, the
the predicate appears, denoted by a word. predicate that the idea belonging to
It
is
indeed essential to the
should be none other than the
it
meaning of the word, the ideal content which is connected with the word and has thus become ours. It is no matter whether this idea is
as such
general in the ordinary sense, or whether "This
Socrates
is
"
the
is
to-day
"
is
as
much
of January
first
neither Socrates nor the
first
is
in
danger
the idea of a particular thing.
as
much
as
"Socrates
"
to-day
ideas which can
at all
then he merely calls to the person in charge of
;
is
a
is
cold
man";
"
;
although
of January are general ideas in content. 1
enough that they are ideas and with the spoken word. is
"
it is
a judgment as
it
It
be reproduced by
the child.
This only
indicates the object to which attention is to be directed, that is the logical subject ; that which the person addressed sees when she obeys this direction of her attention gives her
But here, I think, we must distinguish between two things. The ex an imperative, not a statement ; and it can only be understood as an imperative. For the judgment really passed by the person speaking "the child is the
predicate."
clamation in
is,
in intention,
"
danger
finds no place in the words of the exclamation ; at the most it makes the anxious tone of voice. The object is to direct attention to the thing With this view it is simply named ; thus the full expression of the thought
itself felt in
named. would run
"
thus,
take care of the
child."
and the word of cry of alarm, "Fire of which fire is the predicate ; the latter
It is
a distinction similar to that between the
Fire." The former is a judgment, an imperative. Fire is the object, not the of the incomplete imperative and the case is the same with "child" in the preceding example. By merely exclaiming "the child" all that I can communicate to (subject, any one as the object of his and my belief and assent, is that what I see or think of is tlie child. But then the word is predicate. In like manner the exclamation, "the "
!
command,
"
"
"
is
;
or Daniel, a second Daniel," contains the judgment that the person thought a rascal, or a second Daniel ; and on this is based the indignation or joy which is manifest in the tone of the exclamation. 1 Volkelt holds (Erfahning und Denken, 319) that in This is propositions such as my father, this is the moon," the predicate indicates the common characteristics of that which I denote as my father, etc., hence not the individual as such. It is true rascal,"
of
"a
is
"
certainly
that the relation between a proper name which is used as a predicate (according to p. 42) is similar to the relation between a general idea and
and its subject an idea compre
hended under
it. It is similar, that is, in so far as the proper name (particularly in the case of changeable things) does not indicate a momentary state, but that which is identical through all states, or that which might with less be called the common element.
It
does not, however, follow from this that
meant.
it
accuracy is not the individual as such which
is
CHAPTER
II.
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS BY
JUDGMENT we mean one
in which the subject may be regarded does not include a plurality of independent objects, therefore be represented as singular the statement made con
a SIMPLE
as a single idea
and may cerning
;
it
;
must be distinguished of these simple judgments subject
is
Two
subject takes place in one act of judgment.
this
thought of as having a particular existence
NARRATIVE JUDGMENTS
;
classes
those in which the
:
is
(this
and those of which the subject idea
meaning of a word, nothing being stated about any these are EXPLICATIVE JUDGMENTS.
is
white)
the general
definite particular
thing
i.
NARRATIVE JUDGMENTS. 9-
The simplest and most elementary form of judgment is that in which we name particular objects of intuition. The subject-idea is given im mediately to intuition as a unity, the predicate-idea with
its
appropriate word, and the
by which the two ideas are consciously unified iv OVTCOI/, Aristot., de i.
anima^ III.
It is easy to explain the
a sentence as
"
this
is
6.
mentally reproduced
vo^^dr^v oxnrep
(o-vvOccns
4303, 27).
inward process which corresponds to such
Socrates,"
the abbreviated exclamations
is
act of judging consists in the thought
is
"this "
"
fire,"
the
stork,"
The
the expression of immediate recognition.
"this
snow,"
when
is
blood";
or to
these appear as
object before us awakens
by some former impression, and connected with the word, and the two are. unified. That which I am looking at is, according to an idea
its
left
content, one with that which I have in
this unity,
and
proposition. processes.
it
is
By In the
this
this first
my
idea
consciousness to which
the judgment
place
it is
is
I
;
I
am
conscious of
give utterance in the
distinguished
from the kindred
distinguished from what has been called
LOGIC
54
we
unconscious fusion
I
not here discuss whether the expression
will
Here the of an actual process. appropriate and descriptive in ideas such a with once at to unite previous
is
new image is way that the
supposed of the previous idea at the product of the union is merely a repetition nor of new is no and there most more vivid ; holding apart distinguishing old, of that
ference
to
which this
conscious act
is
is
present and that which
Herbart
right in pointing
is
possible only
ideas are held in suspense,
when such
and
that
it
is
remembered.
With
re
out that a judgment as a
fusion
is
therefore has
delayed and the two its
most characteristic
form when a question or a doubt has intervened. As a rule, however, it is true that attention is chiefly claimed by the present, and only its utter
ance reveals that the idea already in our possession has become active, particularly in the case of the mere exclamation which accompanies re 1
cognition.
In the second place, the judgment
is
from the merely involun
distinct
tary reproduction of a previous image which might co-exist with the
without
being unified with
seeing a
fire
I
for instance,
It
might happen, should remember other occasions of it.
fire,
that
first
on
but that each
image being accompanied by its distinguishing circumstances, they should be prevented from combining into one, and being thus retained in their From the Denominative Judgments described above, in which the object presented is (according to his view) compared with others previously known and called by their name, 1
Stumpf (Tonpsychologie, vol. i., p. 5) distinguishes yet another kind of judgment the Judgment of Habit. It often happens entirely as a matter of habit that a phenomenon when seen or rieard reproduces in consciousness both the appropriate name and the which case the previously perceived object judgment x is red, x is the note "
A"
;
"in
does not enter into consciousness at all, much less is compared with the present object." I cannot however find sufficient reason for this distinction. On the one hand it is
not, generally speaking, the case that in denominative judgments as I understand them a present object is compared with previous objects in the sense that the latter are present to thought as differentiated particulars and their name transferred to the new object.
That which is reproduced by the present object is only the general idea connected with the word, and there is no need of any express comparison in order to be aware of its coincidence with what is present. On the other hand it is clearly too much to say that what was previously perceived "does not enter into consciousness at all "how else should a recognition take place differentiated that
it
? Only so much is true that it is not necessarily as conies into consciousness. The process goes on so rapidly that I am :
not aware of each particular step which is necessary before I can
;
when I meet an acquaintance the memory-image him pales in contrast with my present percep in consciousness. Thus it becomes impossible to
recognise
but
must have taken effect between judgments of habit and those which are not of habit all that we ; can allow is that when we are dealing with familiar ideas which are well known and often applied, the process, which is always essentially the same, takes more tion,
draw a
it
line
place
rapidly.
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS
55
number of similar images. The union can when no such hindrance occurs either because all the
individuality present merely a
only take place
accompanying circumstances are the same, or because the content of the idea is already isolated and raised into generality.
When
2.
this simplest
know
and most immediate form of judgment
ing in its original sense of recognising
presupposed that both ideas are undivided wholes, not consciously resolved into their Immediate unification is thus distinguished from the particular elements. takes place,
it is
other case in which a series of intermediate acts of thought
and predicate
in order that subject "
"
blood
maybe
When
unified.
is
necessary
"snow
"or
denotes a scientific concept, the distinguishing characteristics of
which are present in memory, we do not form a judgment at first sight, but investigate the object in order to ascertain whether all the charac of the concept are appropriate to
teristics
we place
of a process of inference that that
we
attribute to
it
It is
it.
only upon the ground
the object under the concept
;
i.e.,
the whole complex of qualities universally accepted
snow or blood. This judgment, then, is mani mediated in it is foldly repeated several times the process which takes at in once the coincidence of two images through the unanalysable place act by which they are brought together. Between these two extremes as contained in the term ;
may be connected with the predi and corresponding to it a graduated series of mediation of the judgment. But what the judgment always states is, that the idea of the there lies a whole series of ideas which
cate terms,
predicate agrees with that of the subject in such a
way
that the predicate,
one with the subject. It might also be held that there is a process of inference in the numerous cases where the predicate contains more than can be offered by the first in as a whole,
which gives rise to the judgment. When a child sees an apple and then the predicate-idea includes also its taste and its quality as
tuition
names edible
is
it,
;
and
in the
"
judgment
this
an apple
is
"
we might suspect an
ference from the visible image to the presence of the other attributes.
previous experiences have
made
the association of the other attributes with
the visible image so firm that there
them
;
in
But
is
no conscious
distinction
between
the visible image at once awakens recollection of the other attributes,
with this enriched intuition that the predicate-idea is connected. this looks like an apple, there make the inference
and
it is
The
child does not
fore
we can
eat
"
"
it
reproduce the idea
;
but the sight of "
"
apple
it
and lead
gives rise to desire, to
its
and both together
being named.
In such cases
LOGIC
56
also, then,
we
still
have the simple coincidence between the present intui from idea, and they are to be distinguished
and the remembered
tion
cases in which further attributes only occur to us in
consequence of the
name.
and a reproduced image Complete coincidence between a present 3. does not take place only when we recognise one and the same object as which identifies the ideas, such; when, that is, we may add to the judgment a consciousness of the material identity of the things which is not itself in It
cluded in the judgment.
occurs also whenever there
is
no conscious
ness of difference between subject- and predicate-ideas, so that what is ap and consciously noticed in the object exactly coincides with the
prehended
This
predicate-idea.
same
of the
snow
this
is
of an object
comes
a sheep
is
always be the case where particular phenomena is only distinguishable by special attention (this this is a poplar) ; or, again, when the apprehension
will
sort are
determined by a preconceived idea, and that part of it which is exhausted by the predicate-idea; here the
into consciousness
predicate-idea itself
is
not absolutely fixed, but
is
often
unconsciously
by the subject which happens to be present. To these must be added other cases, in which we are conscious of
affected 4.
but are not led by it to an express judgment. Such are the judgments which merely make a comparison or note a similarity, and which difference,
as in fanciful or
frequently
humorous comparisons take exactly the same judgments most of the metaphors of lan
external form as denominative
:
guage also depend upon this process. Such, again, are the judgments in which the subject-idea is richer and more fully determined than the predi cate-idea, but only that part of it is noticeable which coincides with the predicate-idea
judgments, that
;
and more general idea than the by
This
it.
is
particularly evident
of the idea coinciding with
the special
to
it
which the predicate is a less definite which we know is not exhausted
my
when
object,
I
for
in
fully
determined.
Not
thought, which
is
image
until
there any interest in subsuming under the
its
special
name be
to
the natural course of thought the predicate-idea
easily connects itself with every
and most
ideas at
do not know the
and am therefore obliged
its
name;
which most
in
more general name (this is a bird, a tree, a fluid); or when name is not so familiar to me as the more frequently used
content with
general
is,
subject,
is
that
scientific
which
is
most
like
thought begins
is
most general ideas ordinary concerned with the particular, clings to the most concrete
command.
;
(For logical purposes ideas which are expressed in
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS
57
language by the more exact attributival determinations of a substantive, such as black horse," round leaf" are just as much one as those which "
"
can be expressed by one word.
Their comprehension into one whole has
when they appear as predicate.) In naming we naturally think first of the ideal content as a 5. unity, but in the process of thought the predicate-idea becomes connected with the idea of plurality wherever we have the numerical generality of many already taken place
vaguely remembered individuals, or wherever the meaning of a word con a number of slightly different ideas. When a word denotes a sharply defined individual image, this is accompanied by a number of individual
sists in
images amongst which the new object ranks itself as another (this finds this is a tree when the meaning of the word has expression in the form ; "
")
not this individual determination the generality of the predicate appears in our consciousness of other ideas which are nearly akin to the one which
happens
to
be before us
Herbart
this is ("
paper and wine stand is
for a
paper,"
number
"this
is
wine
";
here the words
of slightly different ideas).
right in saying (Introduction to Philosophy,
i.
So
far
92) that the con
cept which serves as predicate always loses part of its meaning in that cap acity, only so much of it enters into thought as can be connected with the
Of all the many ideas comprehended by the which coincides with the subject. pre-eminent These denominative judgments 1 have always ^preceded, when the
subject which word,, that 6.
one
it
determines.
is
concerning which the judgment is being made is denoted, not merely by a demonstrative, but by a significant word. This flower definite object
"
is
a rose
"
includes a twofold denominative judgment
by the less definite
word
;
first,
there
is
the
which has taken place previously,
naming flower, and of which only the result appears in the verbal expression of the subject then the more exact naming in which the judgment itself consists.
\
1 I choose this expression in order that I may have one denotation to cover statements which elsewhere are sometimes treated as judgments of subsumption (when the predicate is a more general idea), sometimes as judgments of identity (when the predicate completely coincides with the subject). In the simplest cases there is no clear line between the two in both the process is essentially the same, i.e. we are conscious that what is presented is in its totality one with a previously known idea. Schuppe (Erk. Logik, p. 375 sq.), in his thorough and appropriate treatment of the subject, calls this process pure identifica tion ; but since it is seldom a question of absolute identity between the ideas of subject and predicate, I should prefer to avoid the expression. In the same way I avoid using ;
the expression subsumption ; for this, when applied in its strict sense, does not represent the general idea which is connected with the term in its popular use, but a logically deter mined generic concept under which we place a particular thing or a specific concept.
!/,*
LOGIC
58
The
7.
and processes to things is so strong, which denominative judg
habit of referring attributes
that there are comparatively few instances in
ments about them do not also include a judgment of attribute or
activity.
our power of abstraction enables us by means of "that" and "This to denote even the mere attribute or activity as such. Still
"
walking, but running which are spoken of
There
is
"this
is
dark-blue, not
but colours and activities apart from things.
here,,
however always the tendency
to the thing.
black,"
not
is
not things
is
it
"this"
from the attribute or activity
to pass
u.
Cf.
10.
When is i.
judgment concerning a specified particular thing
the predicate of a
a verb or an adjective, then the judgment contains a twofold synthesis.
The
synthesis which unifies the thing
and
its activity,
attributes, in the subject-idea itself; 2. the synthesis
vity or attribute contained in the
the thing
which
and
its
unifies the acti
thought of the subject with the activity
or attribute denoted by the predicate-word, that
is,
names
by the predi
it
cate word.
In uttering a judgment, such as
i. hot"
iron
"the
a subject with
of the words
;
glows"
"
:
horse
cloud
this
runs,"
we
is
first
red
"
"
the stove
is
express the unity of
being indicated by the form we then name the attribute or activity which we have per its
ceived by unifying "run."
"the
activity or attribute, this
it
That which
with the general idea
is
given to perception
is
"red,"
"hot"
"glow"
or
the red cloud, the hot stove,
the glowing iron, the running horse ; but we analyse the originally undivided whole of perception by distinguishing and separating the attribute and from the idea of the We have and activity subject. by its
shape
recognised
position that what
we
see
is
a cloud,
and
this recognition
expressed in
is
it by the definite subject-word cloud we are struck by its colour, and hence this is easily disengaged from the whole. It is this colour which
calling
we
;
call red,
thing which
ment,
it is
and ascribe is
to the cloud as its attribute.
running to
running, but
we
under other circumstances ticular
be a horse
;
We
as presented to us
recognise the it
is
in
move
distinguish this incident from the subject which is
known
kind of movement which
we
to us as standing
still.
express as running.
It is this
We
par
have thus
distinguished two constituent parts in the total-image, the thing and its in each of them we find ; again an idea already familiar to us, and by uniting these two elements in our statement we express just what we
activity
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS
59
have seen as a unity of a thing with its attribute or judgment presupposes an analysis, whilst its own work different elements.
By
Thus the
to synthesize the
twofold synthesis the judgments which state attributes and acti
this
it
is
1
from the simple denominative judgments
vities are distinguished
latter
activity.
the subject of an undivided whole which
is
is
in the
;
unified with the
predicate.
We
have spoken of the generality of substantives when treating of the and what we then said applies also to the relation between ;
ideas of things
the generality of the predicate-idea and that element in the subject-idea
which corresponds
we
to
Such a
it.
relation
may
vary from the case in which
are conscious of a complete coincidence (as, "
this lichen is
colours,
cate-word activity
denote the
too indefinite to
is
down
"),
of the subject, and can only be
means of
e.g.,
with sharply denned
to cases in
fully
which the predi
determined attribute or
made
to agree with the idea by and other distinguishing words. opposed to that which would force even
further determination with adverbs
The view we
2.
sulphur-yellow
here take
is
such judgments as these into the conception of a simple subsumption of the subject under the more general predicate. But the predicate which expresses an attribute
general only with reference to the attribute of the
is
The predicate which expresses an subject, never to the subject itself. is with reference to its activity. We must distinguish activity general only attributes
and
activities in the
verbal predicates to them. "
What
is
this ?
But
"
question must be,
"
adjectival or
the answer to the question,
we
"
is
a judgment presupposes, therefore, that action or attribute
we can apply
Simple naming are to answer with an adjective or verb, the Such the quality of this ? What does it do ? is
if
What
subject before
and the
we have
distinguished between the
thing. ii.
In judgments which express the attribute or action of a thing, the move ment of thought is not always the same that which first comes into con ;
sometimes the thing (the grammatical subject), sometimes the In the former case the attribute or activity (the grammatical predicate). sciousness
is
attribute or activity
then
named;
is
first
in the latter
distinguished as a part of the total idea, and
it is
perceived
first
by
itself
and named, and then
referred to a thing. :
Cf.
Wundt, Logik,
i.
136
schr.fiir iviss. Philos., 1880,
sq. iv.
Also
458
sq.
my
treatment of the question in the Vierteljahrs-
LOGIC
6o This
(
1 and
last act
reference to a thing
is,
under certain conditions, omitted,
omission we find the explanation of the so-called impersonals. impersonal propositions are those only from which all
in this
Strictly speaking,
those in which a subject-thing is thought of a subject-thing is excluded, not 1 and indicated but expressed. only vaguely implied, i. When the statement which ascribes an attribute or activity to a thing starts
from immediate perception, two things
from the
first
this total
the thing with
idea,
and form
is
action, state
;
or I
may
I
may happen.
and
may
perceive
attribute, so that I analyse
out of
my judgment
iron glows, the balloon rises
which
its
it
:
perceive at
the leaf
is
faded, the
only that element
first
expressed by the adjective or verb, a colour, a flash of light, a it is not until afterwards, by a second act, that I
movement; and then
recognise the definite subject of the attribute or activity, "there
runs
Rhine,"
a
"
hare";
there
a dead
flies
leaf";
and can name
"there
sparkles
it
:
the
etc
In the latter case the synthesis which
first
takes place
is
that
which
names the given phenomenon of shining, sparkling, movement ; the refer ence of the attribute or action to its thing is not added until afterwards. In such cases language will also naturally begin with that which
is
first
The Hebrew custom immediate expression of a mode of
present in consciousness, with the adjective or verb.
of putting the predicate
first
the
is
thought which moves pre-eminently in sense-perception as particular languages continue to
pression of the active
movement
;
and
be the immediate and
is
furthest
ex
of ideas, they have retained their freedom
of beginning either with the predicate or with the subject. determines the position of the word entirely according to character,
in proportion
unartificial
removed from
French, which its
grammatical
this original flexibility. 2
1
Cf. with this F. Miklosich, Subject lose Satze, 2nd ed., Vienna, 1883 ; Schuppe in the Zeitschrift fur Volkerpsychologie und Sprachwissensch. , vol. xvi. 3, 1886; essay, die Impersonalien, Freiburg, 1888, and Steinthal s review, Zeitsch. filr Vblkerps., xviii.
W.
my
170. It might be maintained that we must always regard that which sciousness as the logical subject, because it is the given point with
ment
is
connected.
But
first
enters into con
which a further
ele
would be a doubtful proceeding to ground the distinction between subject and predicate only upon the chance priority of the elements of the judgment as they might happen to succeed each other in the individual, instead of upon the contents of the ideas themselves. The relation between the ideas which we denote by verbs and adjectives on the one hand, and by substantives on the other, necessarily involves the thought that the objective foundation and presupposition of that which is expressed in the verbal form is that which the substantive denotes. When we apprehend motion,
etc.,
we
it
are led by
its
similarity to other cases to think of
it
as something depen-
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS These two
2.
the reference of
acts, the its
naming of a perceived
thing, are sometimes
and more widely and ob
attribute or activity,
still
All that
viously distinct. is
to
it
61
denoted from
is immediately perceived is an impression, which resemblance to previous cases, by an adjective or verb
its
;
being added in thought only through association and on the ground of former experience. This takes place especially with sen the thing belonging to
it
That
and smelling.
sations of hearing
of a visible and tangible object
due
I
can predicate a sound or a smell
an act of combination by means of which the sensation of the ear or the nose is referred to the object which
makes
is
to
known at the same time to the eye and the hand. We cannot how this combination comes about but in all ordinary so much a matter of habit, the visible signs of the origin of the
itself
here investigate cases
it is
;
sound are so familiar
and
(as with crying
mer and the stamping of the
foot) that
talking, the
we
knocking of a
think the sound
is
perceived by us as the activity of a definite visible thing.
ham
immediately
But when a
noise strikes the ear without our being able to see the thing which pro
duces it, this thing must be added in thought our judgment does not the appear as the result of the analysis of a given complex, as when I say, leaf is yellow," but as the result of a synthesis by which the thought of a ;
"
thing belonging to
very
many
is
it
scarcely conscious of familiar idea of the it
represents
ing,"
added
to the
cases this association
it
in
it.
dog
is
is
When
I
hear
my dog
there as soon as the
the act of barking,
may be regarded
sound which was given alone. In and certain, and we are
perfectly easy
and
my
barking at the door, the is heard ; my idea of
sound
"
judgment,
the
dog
as the analysis of the idea of the barking
is
bark
dog which
has thus been put together by association. But it is different if the associa tion is not certain, if I hear unusual or imperfectly defined noises, such Now there intervenes the as the cry of an unknown animal in the wood.
and I am unable to put together any from the analogy of my former experience, definite image. I certain, a from that the sound proceeds thing, but I cannot get any definite idea "
question,
What
is
that crying ?
"
am
;
the synthesis referring the sound to a thing remains uncompleted, and the dent, something which presupposes and demands a reference to a thing. By^pur .choice of the adjective or verbal form, we indicate that there is a subject, of which the verb and
Grammar is right, therefore, in retaining adjective are to be regarded as determinations. the substantive as subject, even when the concept of the verb is the first in the psycho fundamental presup logical series of which we are clearly conscious ; it contradicts the positions of our thought, to predicate a thing of an attribute or activity. is subject to apparent exceptions will be discussed hereafter.
How
far this rule
LOGIC
62
"
can only be denoted by a
thing
"
something
which
is
quite indefi
nite.
It
we
accords with this that
are apt to look
upon the sounds which we
hear as independent objects, and to abstract from the things producing them. Having a longer or shorter duration in time, and definite limits, they are apprehended as distinct
phenomena
and substantives
;
like
thun
point to a thing,
waver between being abstract nouns, which and concrete subjects which denote independent objects,
and of which, in where there
is
der, shot, whistle, call,
etc.,
their turn, verbs
may be
predicated
a call resounds,
:
person who calls. The same thing Coldness and warmth are on the occurs in the region of the other senses.
e.g.,
no reference
to the
one hand names of the attributes of a thing on the other they appear as independent existences, the question of the subject to which they belong remaining in the background. Here, again, the synthesis by which thought adds a thing to every sensation (which can at first be expressed only by an adjective or a verb)
not complete
is
or, at
least
does not find complete
expression. 3.
By
recognising the twofold synthesis in
actions or attributes to a subject-thing,
all
propositions which ascribe
we obtain
the key to the solution of
the difficult and much-discussed question as to the logical nature of the ]
so-called Impersonals
more
;
correctly speaking, of impersonal proposi
tions.
Amongst
the statements which contain a predicate
verb or the verb
"to
be"
without any expressed
which are
ojnly
denoted subject,
or definitely
distinguish two classes;
whether a simple
combined with an adjective or substantive, it
is
important to
apparently
those which are really impersonals, and so.
ReaMm personals
those
are those in which the
thought of the thing to which
the predicate would apply is entirely we cannot even ask what the thing is. The others are propositions in which a subject, though not named, is nevertheless implied, although the idea may be indefinite and denoted only by the neuter
wanting, in which
pronoun or the terminal hungert,"
"hungert
mich
"pudet,"
goes/
"it
diirstet
there
is
no room
German
say in for
the
question
"
mich what
any more than a substantive can be added as subject to or "pcenitet." But when I say is beginning," "there it "
;
"it
is
"
over,"
series of events either
battle;
When we
inflection. "
"mich
and
I
it is
finished,"
I
always
expected or going on
:
mean something
definite, a
a play, a piece of music, or a
assume that the person who hears
me
has his attention
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS same
directed toward the necessary. brevity,
Here
thing, so that
any more accurate denotation is un is only chosen for the sake of
a real pronoun, which
would be
I say,
difficult to
is
mean
is
"
is
it
name a
indefinite extension of that
the subject
I
superfluous, or
to the nature of the thing meant, too circumstantial.
same way when
the
is
because the express denotation of what
perhaps owing
it
"
"it
63
slippery, dusty,
is
I
mean
In
the roads
;
subject in words, because of the
definite
which
wet,"
slippery or wet;
on the other hand,
already indicated definitely enough by the nature of the
When we
predicates belonging to them.
we
"
it is
say
shady,
it is
full,"
can only mean a certain space when we say it thaws snow and ice. It is true that an imperceptible transition from one class to the other "
"
;
often takes place
;
and we cannot
whether or not the pronoun still
why
"
"
it
tell
from the mere grammatical form
or the personal ending of old languages
indicates a subject-thing to which the predicate applies.
This explains the two classes of so-called impersonals are often confused, although
extreme cases they are definitely distinguished. It explains also why it all impersonal forms we must be able to find a
in
has been thought that for
subject in the sense of a thing to which the attribute or activity,
though
all
that could
be
predicate
finally
belongs as
its )
found to serve as such
a subject was an indefinite idea of the totality cf being, an idea which no
one
really thinks of in
When
speaking of a particular perception.
real impersonal propositions serve to express
accessible to immediate outer perception,
we nor
start
from a simple sense-impression
memory
supplies a subject.
hear a carriage
rattle
When,
it
something which is it lightens, then
thunders,
which neither perception
to
for instance, I see
a rocket
itself
rise or
over the pavement, the action immediately added to
the sound or sight which was given alone
naming, the unification of the This naming may take place by means of uninflected, onomatopoetic words, which merely reiterate the is
present impression with a familiar idea.
special
thunder, that leave
it
of the
or by substantives (that is concrete and abstract, between lightning) which, wavering undetermined in what direction thought will proceed to follow out characteristics
the event.
impression
;
is
But language, guided by experience of
similar cases, offers
verbs for the temporal event, and the present perception
means of the customary
inflections, the justification
is
expressed by
of this being
that
the personal ending of the third person was without doubt originally a If a substantive were added, it would interpret what was thus indicated, and would determine it more exactly as the
demonstrative adjective.
\
LOGIC
64
But
thundering thing.
if this
reference which the verb implies cannot be
the impression itself remains as the subject actually carried out, then only
and the termination can indicate nothing but the present The reference to a subject-thing which is contained in the
of the statement, impression.
is then an empty customary form ; we pronoun of modern languages in it the ? and answer sense of a what lightens cannot ask thing, "
however the
All that the impersonal proposition can
indefinite.
phenomenon
"
"
"
present at the
the particular flash of light
moment
;
the subject
is
do
to
is
name
nothing more than
itself.
This limitation becomes very clear in cases where we know quite well what the thing is which flashes or makes a noise, but omit any expression of it in language as a matter of course, because we are interested merely in
what
is
seen or heard.
German, when we What we sound.
meaning "
way
there
;
es brennt
is
which
is
stress
lays is
something burning, is
Es
"
lautet,"
are interested in
no object
"
course something
Nor
"
"
es
pfeift,"
es
klopft,"
we
say in
are quite certain as to the nature of the cause of the is
the signal
who makes
in saying
upon the
fact that
we have heard and the signal.
a
fire
has broken out
burning, but the tacit subject of the verb it is
merely the
fire itself
its
In the same ;
of
not this
is
as perceived by us.
there any doubt that this limitation of the statement to the state
perceived or
felt,
applies also to the
express subjective states of feeling
mir schwindelt, ekelt,
graut,"
etc.
"
Mich
numerous impersonals which
hungert, diirstet, mir
ist heiss,
permit of absolutely no reference of
these verbs to a subject of which they are the activity. Nothing is given but the present feeling itself, and this contains no reference to a thing giving rise to
Again, we
it.
which express in the passive form, and without any reference to an agent, an activity which has been perceived es wird gespielt," etc. Here again, all that we do is to name the event find also statements
:
"
perceived without proceeding further to the denotation of the subject in
which
it
takes place.
mentioned
For further examples
I
may
refer to
my
above-
treatise.
The way is already prepared for this separation of the synthesis of naming from the synthesis which refers the named phenomenon to a subject-thing, by the distinction between the verbal forms of substantive, adjective and From verbs and adjectives we can abstract substantives which enable that which generally appears as dependent upon a thing to be thought of by itself; we can make use of infinitives (I hear
verb.
talking, ringing,
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS
65
which are quite impersonal; and in the same \vaya statement is possible of which the logical subject is nothing more than the event or state
etc.),
perceived at the moment.
These propositions are that a subject-thing
"without
a
only in the narrower sense
subject"
wanting; they are no exception to the general nature
is
of the proposition which expresses a judgment.
known
of a
general idea with a present
phenomenon which ending with
is
They contain
phenomenon
the subject, and which
is
;
the synthesis
and
this
is
it
indicated by the personal
originally demonstrative significance.
its
just because they name something which is present, such proposi tions also contain an implicit statement of the actuality of the event named
But
for is
;
always immediately assumed that the particular object of perception This does not, however, make them existential something actual. it is
judgments
jmean
when we say
in the ordinary sense;
lightens
"it
!"
we do
not
to predicate actuality of the lightning, but to predicate lightening of
something actual. The naming of the present impression is the funda mental act, without which the proposition, as the expression of present When we say it lightens, it perception, could never come about. "
we must have seen a flash in the sky and recognised it as light but must have had a sensation of sound and called it thunder we ning, all that we directly say is that what we have seen is lightning, and what thunders,"
;
we have
heard, thunder.
It is true that
the hearer goes through the same
He
process as with an existential judgment. of lightning from the word, and by the flash of lightning as particular
must add those
who
its
receives the general idea
first
inflexion
and present
is
;
called
upon
to think of
to this general
word he So
thought the corresponding particular phenomenon.
in
with the completed proposition and explain
start
cally are justified in
emphasizing
declares the actuality of the
this view,
lightning.
it
far
grammati
according to which the judgment In some cases of propositions
derived from the original form this declaration of existence comes to the fore for the person speaking as well
based upon
memory
propositions.
occurs
it
"It
is
application of
when,
for instance, his information
is
often
rains
in
the
Alps"
means
"raining
often
the two-sidedness of the original form which makes this
"
;
;
or hearsay, and also in the future tense and in general
it
possible. 12-
Those judgments which predicate a contain a manifold synthesis. s.
L.
relation of a definite particular thing
The connection which
is
brought about by F
LOGIC
66
the relational idea itself takes the place of the unity of the thing
and
its
10 are upon which the judgments treated of in Every relational idea presupposes at least two points of
attribute or activity
grounded.
reference which are thought of as independent
;
these
it
connects by an act
Thus
of mental reference, though not coalescing with either.
a
judgment
between given things, names the given relation
stating a definite relation
by a general relational idea, and
same time
at the
unifies the necessary
points of reference with definite objects.
Logically considered Existential of view as Relational
Judgments
;
Judgments come under the same point what they express in the first instance is
the relation in which an object of thought stands to me, the subject think ing and intuiting this
mere
it,
but the meaning of their predicate extends beyond
relation.
Judgments which
i.
state relations
greater than B, to the right of etc.)
,
(A
is
J3, different
from B,
earlier, later
than B,
equal to
to the left of
B,
contain a synthesis of another kind from that contained by statements
which ascribe attributes and
activities
to a
These predicates
subject.
remain distinct from the subject-idea no inward unification can take place between them. Their predicates never belong to the subject when thought ;
of alone as
particular definite thing
this
denied of the subject nothing
For my thought the sun the left of me, whether
do not "
is
just
it
is
affect the idea of the
the sun
"
is blood-red,"
or attributes
and
activities,
first
place
of relation that
The
itself,
as
moves,"
when "the
I say,
"
the sun
sun stands
is
pale,"
The
pre
must pass beyond the idea of the subject, and something else, and then realize what kind
in relation to
it is.
peculiarity of relational ideas consists just in this at least
still."
whether predicates of denominative judgments, form a part of the subject-idea. But in order to
state a relational predicate I
must
whether they are affirmed or
visible or invisible; the different predicates
sun
the sun
dicates considered hitherto,
;
changed in the idea of the subject itself. the same sun whether it is to the right or
is
two
which are
that they pre
in the first place
thought of as sepa rate and independent of each other our ideas of these must be already ; there before a relation can be stated of them. Thus the unity which binds
suppose
objects,
together the elements of relational judgments is of quite another kind from the unity of the constituent parts of a particular object which can be
thought of alone this therefore lies
it is contained only in the relational idea itself, and in the ground of the peculiar synthesis now before us.
;
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS follows further from the nature of
It
relational ideas
every relation
the connection between these and the points of reference presupposed by them, that between two objects A and B can be apprehended and
expressed in two ways, according as
The
A.
kinds
reference
they
;
A
may be
A
or
,
B
A
we
to B, or from to pass from always mutual, but the relations are of different
is
the same, whatever the direction, or they may be the A beside B, beside A, equal to B, equal below A, B, smaller than A. greater than B,
B
opposite of each other to
67
B
upon
B
A
A
B
B
depends upon the movement of thought in connecting A and relation how a given reference shall be apprehended or expressed. It
every relational judgment implies in
its
by the
Thus, nature a second equivalent one,
every relational concept has its correlative concept. 2. If we look for the psychological ground of the synthesis brought
about by relations, we shall find are
immediately intuitable.
we can never and from these we have to
spatial things ings,
intuition
itself,
that
most
it
It
belongs to the nature
that
all
is
We
whole.
house
and attend
cular things are
we combine
to us as
comprehended
are able to isolate a particular object to
it
alone,
movable favours
and the
fact that a great
this isolation
the ;
in a larger
this tree, this
number
of parti
by enabling us to think of
from any given surroundings.
as disengaged
our idea of
perceptible around us into a spatial image
and thus every particular thing appears spatial
of
perceive them apart from their surround In separate them as particular things.
before any conscious reflection takes place,
particular parts of
them
easily in spatial relations, as these
But wherever we may
perceive them they always stand amongst others in one continuous space. As soon as we pass beyond the intuition of the particular thing, we find
occupying a definite position. We distinguish and the directions in which we thus pass beyond one
others already there
become conscious of Thing
combine
to
reference to our
it
own
above and below
with
others
directions which
standpoint, such as right
and
and
left,
originally
all
have
before and behind,
we analyse the complex picture pre by means of general relational concepts which represent the particular kind of unity in which the spatial whole contains sented to
its
us,
;
so doing
in
and express
it
parts.
When ment first
is
I
"
say
the house
is
on the
road,"
the starting-point of
a complex image of the house with
the building, and call
bourhood, and
call
what
it
I
a house
;
I
its
surroundings.
look further and notice
see here a road.
The
my
judg
I
notice
its
neigh
position in which the
LOGIC
68
my image
two parts of
stand to each other "
denote
by the preposition
it
its
nest,"
which
is is
immediate contiguity, and I used to name this kind of
In the same way the propositions,
spatial co-existence. "
on,"
The dog
under the
is
whole, and which
to
it
what
is
way the
may be
expressed,
stork
it
does the relational
a given, which expresses unification into
needed by the hearer to enable him to unify
is
we must have
in
is
presuppose the same analysis of and their particular kind of spatial
parts presented to him.
definite
The
table,"
a given complex image into its parts, It is the preposition, containing as co-existence. idea and applying
"
In order then that the
a threefold
naming of the
in a
judgment
particular parts,
besides the unity contained in the thought expressed by the relational word. One of these namings preceded the judgment and appears in the
word by which we denote the subject; the other syntheses are expressed by the judgment itself. Now these various syntheses may be combined in various ways, and 3. This
take place in different orders.
When
possibly stand.
is
mainly because
we
are accustomed
every object the thought of relations in which
to connect with
two objects,
A
A
and B, are presented
to
may
it
me
side by
but since every object stands in spatial proximity to others, the idea of something next to it presents itself, and I On the other hand proceed to make this second point of reference clear. I
may
look at
may
I
side,
first;
from B, connect the relation
start
with
first
it,
and then
attribute
second point A as subject. Finally, I may look at These different both together and determine their relation to each other. to the
this relation
ways of proceeding are expressed as A next to This is most obvious next to each other.
B
B
which "
start
;
next to B,
A A
and
;
in those spatial relations
A judgment such as from myself as point of reference. which comprehends an intuition here proceeds from "
Socrates
is
Socrates and myself in one and the
same
space.
Now
in every intuitable
idea of a space, the place which I occupy and a space surrounding posited,
and
this
idea,
"
pressed by it.
here,"
is
which always accompanies
added
me
Socrates.
is
Thus our
natural
first
predicate
first.
Socrates occupies the vacant position of the
way of describing such
my own
conscious of
(To the
relations as these, in
position as point of reference, right
is
is
ex
now
general possibility of something else, and in the present instance this
thing else
it
is
given and unified with must have something in it ; it is the
to the intuition
But the space surrounding
me and which
A, to the
left
is
some
"here."
which
I
am
to place the local
B, before C, behind
Z>.)
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS On
the other hand,
the objects
it is
it
may happen
that
recognised as Socrates.
69
what we
first
But with
this idea, as
observe
is
one of
with that
of every other spatial thing, we can at once connect the idea of a sur rounding, of the proximity of other things. Socrates is somewhere ; and this indefinite reference is now unified with the definite one ; the space here." surrounding him is unified with my space, with In this case also, "
Socrates is here then, a judgment such as on the one hand, in answer to the question, "
"
may "
take place in two ways
Who
:
on the other,
is here?"
answer to the question, Where is Socrates ? There are many predicates, primarily expressive of states and move ments, with which relational ideas may be connected to determine them in
"
more
"
The dog
exactly.
ent positions of
stands, sits, lies, denotes, in the first place, differ But the verbs body, which have reference to it alone.
its
themselves contain a further reference to that upon which or its definite place, and the relational idea connects as
predicate "
follow
hence
and
"
is
What
more exact determination.
"
fall,"
also
is
the
sits,
with
the
part of their
is
synthesis of the
combined with the
stands or
itself
In other verbs, such as
a relation to something else
such statements
in
activity
its
it
thing with
meaning
its
state
;
of
relation.
true of space-relations applies equally to time-relations.
Here
again, from the nature of our apprehension, every particular object appears to us in temporal connection with others, and as a member of a temporal series 4.
running parallel to other temporal series. The relational ideas denoted by like, different,
intuitable.
intuition
Here
itself,
the reference to something else
but
added by our thought, which
is
gether the most remote objects for
similar, etc., are less
is
not given with the
can, at
will,
bring to
purposes of comparison. Two things which are alike or different do not, apart from my reflection, form a the unity single whole, which can be resolved into its constituent parts its
;
which they are placed by the relational judgment arises from my con sciousness of mental activities having reference to the content of the objects in
of thought.
The immediate and
hend and recognise is
apt to
make
us look
thing sense-given, and
we become conscious
and
of
them
as if they
were some
the particular functions through which
functions which always presuppose that
and compared
when taken
we appre
similarity in the simplest cases,
upon these determinations to overlook
several objects are presented
the relational ideas,
evident certainty with which
likeness, difference
as to their nature.
Here
also
alone, are quite without significance
;
it
7
LOGIC
o
would be meaningless to say ent are really predicates
A
only
is
like,
A
Like and
is different.
when combined with a
differ
definite point of
reference.
reason also that mathematical equations, of the form
It is for this
B are i
j
A and
"
cannot be looked upon as judgments which state the same equal," and are ten feet long"; for they of two subjects, such as
B
"A
predicate
cannot be resolved into the two judgments, "A is equal," and If we start from both subjects then the full expression is,
"
B
A
"
is
and
equal."
B are equal to each is equal B?
other,"
to
\
"
"B
equal to
A
to
A
and here we have the two judgments, "
;
thus the real predicates are
"
"A
is
equal
equal to
E"
A."
mathematical object again naturally
calls forth
the question,
"
What
is
and has a reference beyond itself to something else. In the same way comparisons between larger and smaller things are always forcing B or A according as one or the other then themselves upon us equal to
"
it
?
5.
The
is first
B
;
magnitude
noted.
causal relations, which are expressed by propositions containing
transitive verbs
and
close connection
their objects, are
between
"
"action
with a definite intuition, which
is
difficult to
and
to
analyse because of the
Let us
"
efficiency."
start
be narrated by the judgment,
Then
intuition of a bull butting against a tree.
at
again
e.g.
the
any moment that which
immediately given together with the idea of the subject is its action, which we can think of by itself as a definite form of movement. Butting,
is
hurling, grasping, etc., all contain
striking,
the idea of definite forms of
movement, which can be thought of without any reference to a particular object, and can therefore be referred to the subject simply as its action. But the judgment,
bull
"the
does not completely exhaust the
butts,"
accompanied by the tree that which happens must somehow be expressed as a relation between the two. This may be done by merely determining the general form of the movement by its image, in which the bull
is
;
by adverbs of direction (the bull butts against local significance of the case and the preposition). So far the
direction, as, for instance,
the tree
"
"
only relation contained in the judgment
nature of the
movement
in
is
that necessitated
which the action consists,
as determined in the particular case.
By
if it is
spatial
specifying a definite object
merely determine the predicate-idea more exactly ; the idea purely relational predicate, it only includes an action which
complete by a relational idea.
by the
to be expressed
itself is is
we
not a
made more
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS But
if
we look
to the result
71
upon the object of the
activity of the subject,
the shaking and bruising of the tree, then to this extent the causal relation
This result
appears.
no longer confined
is
to the action of the subject in
extends to that which takes place in the object ; the effect,, as The general idea denoted by such, lies outside of the efficient agent. it
itself,
"
"
butting
no longer contains merely a form of movement which needs a movement which has the effect of shaking or crushing some When we look upon what takes place as conforming to the
subject, but a
thing else.
idea of butting in this sense,
we must determine and
reference to a definite object, reference to the subject
annihilation, destruction, etc.,
upon various
itself;
"
produced or destroyed.
activity expressed
;
it is
the
;
to signify an effect, production,
the causal relation it
particular objects,
equivalent expressions
two syntheses
the third.
is
In the case of verbs, whose nature
meaning of the word
more exactly by
the idea
this gives us the first
To
is
and
it
necessitates a something
and
cause,"
"
cause
to
the idea of an object, which
in the verb,
be found in the
to
the generalization of definite effects
is
which
something,"
is
is
are
affected by the
and with which the given object
is
partially
The definitely connected with the verb itself. unified, is more of the second of idea also the reference, includes point meaning of the word or less
the source of the
meaning food
;
is
just
and with
effect,
the same whether
this the
subject
say, I eat, I
I
identified.
is
something, or
eat
The I
eat
whether named or not, the two points of reference are given with the the idea of point to notice is that now the process is reversed included in that of causation, and the syntheses brought about
The
verb.
action
is
in the category of action. by the relation are accompanied by the syntheses We may see how these syntheses may succeed each other from the ques tions,
"Who
The
6.
of the active
When
causes
What does
"
The
i.e.
cause
?
itself
What in the
A
is
doing?"
interchangeableness
stone
is thrown,"
idea of which this
the event
is
not expressed as
it first
as action of the stone (the stone
flies).
Instead of this
substituted the
more
distant relation,
immediate statement there
which denotes
whence of
A
and passive forms by which the same event can be expressed.
I say,
appears to us, first
B?
nature of this relation shows
is
this action as the effect of
something
else,
and with the
connected definitely or indefinitely the thought of the Thus predicate-ideas which are denoted by passive effect. is
verbs cannot be subsumed under that form of unification which has for less than its ground the category of action ; they are neither more nor
LOGIC
?2
relational predicates, although they include
an action having reference to
the subject alone. It is true that
these simple
and
different
fundamental relations are
fre
forms and disguises of
varied
verbal quently concealed by infinitely as are far from The forms of language ordinarily understood, expression. coinciding exactly with the distinctions of the idea.
"To
suffer"
is itself
an active verb, and we generally forget that as such it represents the subject as a rule we think of it in the activity of endurance or of feeling pain ;
only in opposition to efficacy, as the relation to some efficient agent. The predicate u to be," in the so-called Existential Propositions, must 7. also be regarded as a relation
that
a
is
modal
relation
though
it
occupies
a unique position. In the
first
place, there can
be no doubt that in their external form
these propositions exhibit exactly the tions,
same structure as any other proposi
Being is stated of that which is denoted by and thought of under the subject-term, and a definite brought about between the subject and the general concept of
whatever their verb.
"
"
the subject-term, is
unity
In these judgments, therefore, as
Being.
of distinguishable thoughts takes place.
much
as in any others, a synthesis
Nor can
the question,
"
does
A
be understood except as expressing the doubt whether actual ex istence can be declared of the we are thinking of, whether it is in accordance with truth to connect the thought of existence with it. 1 "
exist
?
A
1
Brentano (Psychologic vom empirischen Standpunkte, vol. I, 1874, p. 266 sq.) disputes the ordinary doctrine that a connection or separation of two elements takes _place in every judgment.
According
to
him, the essential characteristic of judgment
is
acknowledgment
or rejection, which refers to the object of an idea ; in acknowledgment and rejection con sciousness is related to an object quite otherwise than when But framing an idea of it. in acknowledging and rejecting we are concerned sometimes with connections between ideas,
sometimes with isolated objects. In the the object of our proposition "A is not the connection between a characteristic "existence" and A but is,"
acknowledgment
A
itself.
It is
undoubtedly true that judgment does not consist merely in a subjective connecting we shall deal more fully with this below ( 14). But that there is a kind of judgment which contains no connection of ideas at all, that in addition to judgments having two terms there are to be found judgments having one only, and that these judg ments of one term are none other than existential this I cannot of ideas, and
When I form the idea
of an
"
"object
allow. propositions conscious of it as an idea, as something that of being the object of which I form an idea.
A,
thought ; its primary relation to me is In so far as I actually have an idea of acknowledge it, then all I could
I
am
first
I cannot reject it and should I wish to it, acknowledge would be that I actually have an idea of it. This "acknowledgment," however, would not be the statement of its existence. The very point in question is whether, in addition to my having an idea of it, it is further implied that the object forms a part of the actual world surrounding me, can be perceived ;
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS About the meaning from
start
its
it
"
is
"JBeing
but
is
to
"
"
is
it,
no doubt,
if
we
appears before critical and philo
I think of
it,
is not merely produced by my mental activity and remains the same whether I am thinking of it
to
Being belongs
me, as
it
;
independent of
or not.
as
though indeed we cannot define the concept of Being, from other concepts, but can only contrast it with its opposite. opposed to that which is merely an idea, a thought, animagina-
That which
jion.
of the predicate also there can be
popular meaning
sophical reflection
nor derive
73
it
in the
same sense
as to myself;
as something independent of
my
it
is
opposed
thought, something
not made by me, but only recognised in its independent exist But although the chief meaning is this independence of the existent,
which
is
ence.
the judgment also includes an open or concealed reference to myself, as the subject which is thinking the existent and which can be actually affected by it.
The attempt
to derive the thought
of being from anything else
is
as
vain as the attempt to find an explanation of self-consciousness in the
unconscious. often as
we
It is "
say
I
included in self-consciousness from the beginning "
it is
present in thought, although not expressly
;
as
empha
In the same way it is from the first inseparable from the objects of our intuition and thought, for we never find ourselves conscious without being surrounded by a world of objects which are, in just the same way sized.
that
we
and
is,
No fr6m
are.
as
We know
opposed
occasion presents this original
ourselves only together with something else which
to other things
which are not ourselves.
for disengaging the idea of Being connection with the consciousness of ourselves and of itself at
first
the objects before us, or for expressly declaring Being of ourselves
the external world.
This
is
and of
because the thought never arises that
it
is
by me, and can take
If I wish to maintain the effect upon myself and other things. existence of the object, I must connect this last thought with the mere idea. When I the tower of Babel these words are in the first place a sign that begin a proposition "
"
have the idea of the tower of Babel as it is aroused by the story in Genesis, and this same idea is excited within any one who hears me. So far the idea is simply there, and as such it can neither be But now the rejected nor does it call for any acknowledgment. I
"What is the meaning of this idea?" If I complete the proposition by tower of Babel exists," then I pass beyond the mere idea and state that the If I say it does not exist, thing denoted by the words may be perceived in some place. then what I have rejected is not the idea of the tower of Babel, but the thought that
question arises,
saying
"the
the idea of a visible and tangible thing. Thus what is acknowledged or rejected by not the idea of the tower of Babel, but the thought that the given idea corre On this whole question cf. my die sponds to an actual thing that is, a connection.
it is
me
is
Impersonalien, p. 50 sq.
LOGIC
74
me
possible for
not to be, or that the whole external world might not be to assert that I am, when neither I myself nor any
it is
quite superfluous
one
else
doubts
Only
it.
in
;
an advanced state of reflection can we attain
to an express consciousness of our own being ; at first my being is indisimmediate consciousness of myself; the only tinguishably included in the
question
is,
in
what
do
state or activity
I
find myself.
Immediate sense-perception does for external things what this immediate If we reflect, and consider what it is self-consciousness does for myself. that induces us to
find that
we
acknowledge the being of particular external things, we That which we touch and see is there, and when
sensation.
it is
what we mean by Being, we find that we connect with
try to realize
the idea of being perceived, capability of taking effect is
and of the
upon the sense-organs of a
not Being
it
possibility of being perceived, the
feeling subject.
But
and consequence
its
it is
; itself, only sign Being does not begin with being perceived, nor does it cease when being That which is perceptible must be in order that it may perceived ceases.
being perceived
be perceived, and the perception of a thing irrefutable proof that
When we
attribute
it
is
only the most direct and
exists.
Being to insensible or supersensible things, as in the
ontological proof of the existence of
God, or
in
the conception of things
per se, we have always a difficulty in freeing ourselves entirely from the spatial ideas which accompany the thought of being in the world of sense. We say that there is a God," and when we try to impart greater reality to the thought, we can only do so by including in it an effect upon a per "
ceptible world, in
and through which there is an effect upon us by means But this itself and may be known.
of which the non-sensuous reveals is
efficacy
quence of agent
not the origin of the thought it,
"
Being,"
it
is
merely a conse
and hence the ground of our knowledge that the
Here we brings with
see clearly the peculiar difficulty which this concept of Being it.
On
the one hand,
it
cannot be spoken of
at
presupposing a relation to me, the person who thinks of it. idea of the object because it has entered into some relation to is, is
efficient
is.
my
thought.
and declare
But by
this very
that the existent
thinking creature
is,
thought
apart from
I set
its
aside this
reference to
I
me
mere
me
without
all
have an ;
that
it
relativity
or any other
that its being does not ; wholly consist in the relation of being thought as an object of my consciousness. The Herbartian formula of absolute position in its double meaning combines these two aspects, with-
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS out however solving the difficulty
made of
clear what it
difficulties,
If
we wish
it is
but
;
75
has at least the merit of having
it
that our natural thought really
means when,
careless
predicates Being.
to analyse
and understand
we must
existential propositions,
meaning which they have in common use, before they have been critically approached ; and then the question arises what do we think when we say A exists, and in what sense do we declare the unity of start
from
this
:
the subject
and predicate
?
we must
In order to answer this question, presupposition which gives
rise to the
see what
first
A
"
judgment
exists,"
is
the general
as a
judgment
concerning a particular thing in the ordinary course of our thought. Evidently this presupposition is, that some doubt has been or may be
and
raised as to the existence of the subject;
which the subject-word originally which appears in consciousness either that
given by the
cannot ask whether
I
which
it
only possible
when
merely an
idea, something form of memory or as occa Concerning that which is immedi
signifies in the
sioned by communication from others. ately present,
this is is
exists
certainty of
;
But
its
existence
is
learn from
my experience have previously seen in definite places, and from my experience of being deceived by others, that not everything of which I form an idea is also to be found in actual per in
intuited.
way and vanishing of it is
of the passing
ception.
which
Thus
I
am
I
things which
I
driven to distinguish between
the intuition of that
present and the mere idea, to which there is no corresponding intuition present. When I have lost anything, when I fail to find what I formerly possessed or knew, then, though I have the image of the thing in is
my memory,
the present intuition
coming, not to be found. in
my
It is
is
wanting
;
consciousness as subject idea, and to this
Only
perception.
question as to that of
which
Thus
its
I
such an idea
in reference to
existence,
have an idea
in every existential
is
it
not there, not forth
only the idea of the thing which I is
it
present
possible to raise the
and the meaning of the question still
is
seek the corresponding
is
whether
forms a part of the perceptible world.
judgment the
subject- word
becomes a
sign of
something which is merely an idea, from the very fact that the thought of its existence is withdrawn from it in order that it may for the first time be expressly attributed to
wanting,
i.e.
as soon as
it.
I
This happens as soon as I have found what was have experienced the corresponding perception,
or have convinced myself through
information from other people that
some process
it is still
of inference or through
perceptible somewhere.
Thus
\
LOGIC
?6
of the empirical world rest upon judgments within the sphere idea (of memory or of fancy) and the distinction between the merely inner is the what they assert identity of that which is perception and existential
all
present
;
mere idea which perceived and the
named
especially clear
is
to
me
from other people.
the idea of a Hercules or a Theseus, of the
me
create in
as subject.
idea of the object whose existence
when my been communicated question has only
This in
is
or of the magnetic mountain
is
They
Tower of
Babel,
thus the question arises whether these have
;
connected with the words are ideas of existed, whether therefore the ideas real beings or are mere imaginations, whether the information is based
upon perception or
fiction.
This throws light again upon the proposition so strongly emphasized by Kant that the predicate to be adds nothing whatever to the content of "
"
:
Whether
the idea as such. just the
same
more nor by me. dicate,"
;
I
"
say
A
"
is
Kant says;
as
my
faculty
to the fact that I
my
not,"
"
is
being
of
knowledge.
may be
The
A
is
that neither
synthesis, then,
A
thought
"real
A
pre
which
which
is
is
judgment referring to the empirical, idea and an object as intuited it is ;
conscious of the same contents in two forms,
The thought
of
immediately connected with the intuited object.
far existential
ments.
thought of
demands
form of the mere idea and in the form of intuition.
"
So
is
merely expresses the relation of the
it
the identity between an object as
in the
A
be present in the actual world than just the Thus "being" forms no part of the subject-idea, no
primarily contained in the existential
due
"
less shall
thought to
is
or
the meaning of the statement itself
judgments reverse the process of denominative judg is given as intuited, and is therefore thought
In the latter the object
of from the
first
as actual
;
to
and the agreement of the two
it is
is
added an idea which was known
before,
declared in the denominative judgment.
In the existential judgment it is the mere idea which precedes, and it is then said to agree with a particular object of intuition. But while this relation the agreement of the idea of a thing with a possible perception "
to exist
relation
"
to
is its
chief significance, the
extends further.
me
That which
exists
meaning of the predicate does not stand
alone, but to everything else which
is
;
it
in
this_
occupies space
between other objects, it exists at a definite time before and after other and it stands in causal relations to the rest of the world hence even ;
things,
of the perceptible
we may assert an existence which is merely inferred. Herbart finds in the concept of Being complete unconditionedness and
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS
77
absence of relations, and against
this
think of in the concept of Being
just this fact of standing in relations.
From around
is
Lotze rightly shows that what we
of view the ever-present thought of an actual world
this point
me
is
presupposed
in every existential
judgment
merely supplies a definite subject for some place in It is
existent.
the question
which
This
is
train
last
such a judgment of the
always assumed that there is something external to me ; whether the object of my thought is to be found in that
given, or whether something actual falls
is
;
this totality
under a certain concept.
of our thought leads to those statements in which the
expression of being stands
first,
and which are thus akin to the impersonals.
extent also they assume the outer form of impersonal propositions these phrases first indicate something which there is, es gibt
To some
_
o- T i 5
exists,
which
is, is
order to denote
it
proposition, then, is
is
which
when the question we are dealing with we think of as definite and par
present which
is
because we knew
it
before) but whether a thing exists
under a given concept and can only be denoted as
falls
Those
definitely afterwards.
the natural one,
not whether a thing
ticular (perhaps
by the world which is presented, in This form of the existential
there, is offered to us
more
"
an
1 A."
judgments concerning particulars in which the subjects are and the predicates, adjectival or verbal, cannot be brought
abstract nouns
The first synthesis under the categories of thing, attribute and activity. in the unity of the found either be is to which are upon they grounded attribute or activity with its modification, or in that view of a thing which it
merely because of some given attribute, activity
and, to
an undeveloped thought, the natural way of
attributes a predicate to
or relation. i.
The
first,
regarding perceived events, express everything which
of particular things
;
is
is
to refer
and happens
them
there are few propositions in
subjects are not particular persons or things.
comes
to distinguish
we have any occasion particular
done
concrete things, and to
to
as attribute, activity
It
Homer is
only
and
relation
of which the
when thought
more accurately and compare more extensively to
employ the
things as independent subjects of a statement.
either with the intention of distinguishing 1
Cf.
my
that
attributes, activities or relations of
Impersonalien, p. 65 sq.
This
may be
and determining more
LOGIC
3
7
or in order to refer a causal relation to exactly an event or attribute,
element of a thing.
definite
In judgments such as
2. is
a
one
hop,"
there
is
"
this
red
"
is
bright,"
the gait of this animal
presupposed the judgment of attribute or activity which
The breaks up the presentation into a thing and its determinations. in consists the of attribute the the of partly synthesis judgment synthesis or activity with P- 3 2
3.
its
modification, partly in the
naming of the
latter (cf.
6, 2,
sq.)-
Before an attribute or activity can be the subject of a causal relation
the general idea of an efficient agent which
is
originally
connected with a
must have been more exactly determined by a process of
thing as cause
comparison so that a thing is regarded as taking effect only by virtue of one of its attributes, or only in so far as it is engaged in a certain activity. ;
When we
say that friction
warms, and weight
subjects belonging to the verbs are the
is
the true
oppressive,
body by which the
friction
is
pro
duced and the heavy thing these alone are capable of causing an effect. But by comparison our thought distinguishes that element in the body in ;
virtue of
which
noun, because
gives rise to the effect,
it
in this
way
and expresses
it
by an abstract
the event can be presented as the expression of
a general law. 4.
Relational ideas also
same way appear
When
effect.
such as distance, difference,
the attraction of two bodies
the words in which the change relation
as
that this
is
if it
in the
is
is
stated attribute an efficacy to a spatial
were a substantial cause.
But there
is
no need
to
prove
a mere abbreviation.
We know
from general laws, which include both the
and the conditions of follow
can
etc.
which express an diminished by their distance
as the subjects of adjectives or verbs
its
upon the change
of the change
fact of the efficacy
modifications, that a certain result will necessarily in
distance,
and
this
result
is
stated as the effect
The higher
the abstractions in which our thought and unsuited to them do the original meanings of
itself.
knowledge move the more words and constructions become.
Without our perceiving
it,
language,
by the aid of abstract nouns, abbreviates and leaves unexpressed that which mental habits lead us to understand as a matter of course. chiefly
The complex
relations of scientific
cular event depends
of
expression in
insignificant in
upon many
such
a
laws,
according to which the parti
conditions, are forced into simple forms
way
that
the
efficient
cause
itself
appears
comparison with the varying circumstances under which
it
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS The
takes effect.
idea of efficacy
original
is
79
attenuated into the uniform
interdependence of different movements, and this
is adequately expressed a can mathematical but be formula, only represented in words by the by
aid of figures of speech
and metaphors which we have ceased
to feel
as such.
Tlie unification of different ideas does not exhaust the nature of judg
ment
every complete judgment as such includes also the consciousness
;
of the objective validity of this unification.
But objective
validity
does not, as might be supposed,
rest
immediately
the fact that the subjective connection corresponds to the relations of
upon
the corresponding existent
This necessity has
its
;
it
rests
upon
the necessity of the unification.
|
/
/
and this again but these logical principles can,give)not
root in the principle of agreement,,
presupposes stability in our ideas
;
assurance of the real identity of things.
Those
1.
definitions of the
judgment which
limit
it
to the merely sub-
^
jective connection of ideas or concepts, overlook the fact that the import
of a statement mo.men1: 2
form
is
never merely to assert the subjective fact that I, at the On the contrary, the judgment, by the a connection.
make such
assumes, claims that the connection
it
and
is
true of the objects them-
S
must be acknowledged by every one. It is this which distinguishes the judgment from the merely subjective combinations of ingenious and witty comparisons which assume the outward selves,
that just for this reason
it
form of the proposition, but do not aim, objectively valid statement.
like the
In the same
way
judgment, at making an
the judgment differs from /
mere conjecture, opinions and probabilities. 1 2. But objective validity has more than one meaning. In the first place we must distinguish a verbal, nominal validity, from a material, real validity.
When
I
"
say
this is
red
"
the
first
question which
may be raised
is,
whether
what every one else calls red. Then the objective validity, which may be denied of my judgment, refers to the general use of language, which is opposed as an objective rule, or general law, to sub
what
I
call
red
jective caprice.
is
All verbal disputes turn
upon the question of
this validity
;
such disputes are possible partly because the subjective meaning of words for the individual differs from that which is generally recognised, partly 1 Ueberweg, for instance, 67, gives a correct definition from this point of view, whenV he says the judgment is our consciousness concerning the objective validity of a subjec- j :
tive
connection of ideas.
LOGIC
So because language
is
not absolutely fixed even in
its
general use, and be
are fluctuating. cause the boundaries of particular words l But when the nominal correctness which is implied in every judg 3. be to meant and understood, is present, inasmuch as it is spoken
ment,
when
the speaker connects the
same ideas with
his
words which every one
else connects with them, then the point to observe
of ideas
is
stated as
so that every one
is
way about the same
is
that the connection
the spoken proposition as true, objectively valid, and it and to judge in the same believe to called upon subject.
determine the meaning of this material validity is not so simple as that the same connection must exist between might appear when it is said the corresponding objective elements as between the elements of the
To
judgment;
or,
that
what
is
thought must actually happen.
when
peculiarity of our thought,
with the existent to which they
judgments
so far
considered
:
judging, that refer.
its
For
it
is
the
processes are incongruent
Let us confine ourselves to the
those which ascribe attributes and activities
by a name. In the first place we which agrees with the predicate-idea in
to particular things, or denote things (
find that there
is
nothing existent
something which agrees with the subject-idea is from its nature general and does not refer directly to any particular thing which is thought of as having a All words (with the exception of proper names) are_ particular existence.
the same sense as there I
for the
is
;
predicate-idea, as such,
the immediate signs of ideas which, though formed from intuitions of the
Marty has made the following objections to the view that every judgment contains the implicit statement that its terms are correctly used ( Vierteljahrsschr. fur wiss. Phil. This is snow, it "When, in good faith, I state the proposition, 1884, VIII., I p. 85). 1
,
no doubt, presupposed that I believe what I call snow to be called snow by every one But we cannot say that this judgment concerning language is implicitly contained in the statement." But suppose I say to some one, That is crimson," and he replies, No, it is scarlet," does he mean to say that I am wrong as to the colour itself, and see a different colour from that which the object really has ? or does he not rather mean that I am mistaken in my denotation, that I am calling crimson what, in the ordinary use of
is,
else.
"
"
language,
is
called scarlet
?
Thus the judgment,
ment
"
That
is crimson,"
contains the state
that I not only see the colour rightly, but also give it its right name latter part only did the apply. Marty goes on to say that there is "
No
;
for to this
"
no need
for
the judgment as to language (the agreement of my use of language with the ordinary use) to be present to consciousness in any form when I utter the proposition in question. "It is enough that it has previously been there, and that a habit of speech, which can now act by itself, has been formed on the ground of ozir confident assumption of Thus, it."
according to Marty himself, my judgment includes a confident assumption ; all that he main tains is that it need not But what does this always come into express consciousness. mean, if not that it is implicitly contained in the statement ?
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS existent^
do not represent
_given_ cases.
particular,
nor as
exists
it
in particular
Again, the judgment presupposes the mental separation of
and predicate
subject
as
it
Si
;
it
takes place in the recognition of the unity of
two ideal elements which, for our consciousness, had formerly a divided existence. There is no such separation in the existent to which our refers. The thing exists only with its attribute, the attribute with the In the same way only thing ; the two form an undivided unity. a body exists only as at rest or as moved, its state is not separable from it
judgment
L-
Thus the general and the particular, predicate and subject, with their preliminary separation and act of unification, find no counter
in reality.
part whatever in
the
the existent
we cannot
;
say that the connection between
elements of the judgment corresponds to a connection between
analogous objective elements. Only when, by the act of judging itself,]. we do away with the subjective separation between subject and predicated
and thus think of the two
do we
as united,
the existent, which
revert to
remains an undivided unity and never undergoes an actual separation There has been no distinctio corresponding to our mere distinction.
itself
"
corresponding to
realis"
essential characteristic of
kind,
its
the
"distinctio
judgment
to
objective validity must have
rationis"
then,
If,
it
the
is
be a function of a merely subjective
some other meaning than
that of the
agreement between the connection in the judgment and an objective connection ; a meaning which can only be understood when we take into consideration the peculiar nature of our predicate-ideas.
The simplest judgments are those which are merely denominative4. judgments, declaring the immediate coincidence of images, unmediated by subsumptive inferences.
Presupposing
nominal
it
correctness,
is
necessary to the validity of such a judgment, as ordinarily understood, that intuition It is
and idea should coincide
also necessary that the
a relation which
is
purely mental.
subjective intuition, which claims to be the
copy of an objective thing, should really correspond to this; i.e., that the subjective image which is present should be that which, according to the general laws of our sensual intuition, would necessarily be aroused in
everybody by the same object. objectively valid when that which "
is
"
This
is
snow,"
is
seen coincides with the idea called
by every one, and when, moreover, it is seen distinctly by an eye normal condition. Objective validity then reduces itself to this that
snow
in a
The judgment,
"
:
both the process of forming the intuition and the act of judgment take When there is agreement as to place in a way which is universally valid. s.
L.
G
-
LOGIC
82
now meaning of the predicate, any dispute which may
the
arise
can only
refer to the question as to whether the person giving utterance to the is snow," sees correctly; i.e., sees in the same way as "This
judgment, every one
and under the conditions of correct knowledge. In par is purely a qucestio facti which differs with the individual,
else,
ticular cases this
and cannot be determined according to any general rule. But the general we have for referring our ideas to real question as to what authority objects,
we
and
an existence independent of ourselves
for attributing
perceive, does not belong to
all
is
ordinary thought
logic.
grounded, that
affirmed in the realistic sense
;
or
it
may have
its
what
meaning so changed
the idealistic sense that Being merely denotes something which
of necessarily and by every one in the
to
The presupposition, upon which we know an existent, may be
same way.
But
is
in
thought
in either case the
subjective functions, which are active in judgment, remain the same.
Concerning the metaphysical validity which we attribute to ideas, our Logic need come to no conclusion at present ; it investigates thought as a subjective function, and can therefore decide nothing as to the signifi cance of
that
differ,
But when an
intuitions.
we cannot allow
man
one
ideas as like
;
that
for
we
it
is
intuition
possible for
and a predicate-idea are
there,
the inward act of unification to
should posit like ideas as unlike, another different immediate certainty of the necessity of
find within us
our unification and the impossibility of the contrary, and should thus be forced to exclude from the arrive at a different result. validity for us because 1
It
it is
community of thought any one who should In other words, the judgment has objective
1 necessary to unify ideas which coincide.
might be argued by one conversant with objective logic that after all the judg This is snow," is intended to state something concerning the nature and constitu
"
ment,
and that the question as to its objective validity depends upon whether or not. This would remind us of the question of the clever critic, How do the astronomers know that the star which they call Uranus is really Uranus ? It is a necessary condition of all use of words that at any given stage of our knowledge
tion of a thing, this is really
snow
"
"
snow shall, by general agreement, denote some definite idea, and that when we give names we shall be guarded from confusion by the fact that the distinctions in that which is presented are not more numerous than those of the ideas named. This being presupposed, then, however we may turn and twist the statement, that this is really snow, the question as to its objective validity still demands the answer given above. Instead of an idea like the above, which was sufficiently characterised by sense-intuition, "
"
I
might take as the ground of
attributes.
Then
characteristics of
60;
it
the
snow
becomes water
my
statement ;
at
it
is
statement an exact concept with accurately determined This is snow," would mean, "This has all the "
white,
it
whose angles of contact are But this brings me no further beyond the statements (i) That at the moment consists of crystals
a temperature of o
with the question of objective validity
degrees."
:
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS
83
We might be tempted to recognise the fundamental principle just 5. found as that known in the traditional Logic as the PRINCIPLE OF IDENTITY; for this principle of identity
is
there regarded as the ground of validity in
judgments attributing a predicate mental law of our thought.
all
to a subject,
and hence as a funda
1
Unfortunately, the word identity has in the course
many meanings, and
of time received
made
the so-called law of identity has been
use of
in very different senses.
my
perception is correct, my senses do not deceive me and convey impressions to me from those which the same object at other times gives to me and to other
different
That the elements which
I distinguish in this image exactly correspond in with which I am thoroughly con white, crystals, melt, etc. are denoted by me as by every one else by these words the total
people
;
detail
with the ideas
(2)
versant, and which idea thus corresponding perfectly to what I Further, I am certain, in the first place, that
means
am I
accustomed to think of as "snow." have not forgotten what white," etc., "
and, secondly, that I do not identify blue or red when seen with my idea of white, that, on the contrary, it is necessary that I should unify my perception with the idea. There is no other objective truth and subjective certainty for this ;
proposition,
nor can there be so long as the universal as such has its existence only in my mind, and only the particular in reality. Again, it might be said that the proposition, "This is snow," means that the thing present
is
and that
like or similar to other particular things which I have previously perceived, it is this material likeness of existing things which forms the contents of
my
But though
contained in the judgment, it is so only in so far as these particular things are also stated to be snow ; the judgment would only be multiplied by this explanation. But then, it may be asked, does all error in this department consist in verbal mistakes
judgment.
and
in denotation
false
this is indirectly
perception
?
May
there not also be false subsumption of the
particular under the universal in such a way that in the synthesis of two ideas unlike things may be held to be like ? This certainly happens, inasmuch as in no stage of our judgment have we a sufficiency of ideas which are fixed in meaning, clearly distinguished
and named, TrewtpavTai
to the manifoldness of the particular. To, yap ovb^ara. rb rwv \6ywv TrA^os, ret be irpdy/J-aTa rbv api.6fj.bv iLireipd. tanv (Arist., de It is the difficult task of science to establish a complete system of predicate-
to correspond
fj,fi>
/cat
Soph., el. i). ideas which shall be clearly distinguished and unambiguously named, and which shall make any error of subsumption impossible. So long as this ideal is not attained both in general and by each individual, there will always be particular ideas which cannot find
amongst those which are known and familiar to us and an immediate unification is not possible, will seek their names by inferences. If these inferences are hasty, and are guided merely by analogy in extending the use of but it will in the first instance be a nominal error, antici names, there will be errors pating the formation of concepts in a direction in which it will not follow, and it does not refute the principle given above, which is valid only where the general idea which their corresponding general idea
;
these, as
;
corresponds to the particular is already formed. Only so far, again, is perfect certainty When we reach the predicate by means of mere inferences of the ordinary possible. sort, we may indeed state it in words, but we cannot attain to the certainty of the necessity of the act of judgment. 1 Cf. with what follows my article in the Vierteljahrsschr.fiir wiss. Philos.,
iv., p.
482
sq.
LOGIC
84 In the
first
under the formula
place,
ing that every object of thought
thought as just
this
and no
is
A
is
A,
it
was interpreted as affirm itself, that it must be
identical with
other.
Then, as the principle of
affirmative judgments,
all
that subject and predicate must stand
in
it
was said to
the relation of identity
state if
the
judgment were to be possible or valid; possible, when the principle was to which we always do think ; valid, presented as a natural law according when it was presented as a normal law according to which we ought to In the latter case it was the criterion of valid judgments. think. Finally
received a metaphysical significance,
it
stating that everything
that
which
exists
is
and was interpreted as itself, and
absolutely identical with
Being can therefore be attributed only to that which is absolutely itself, hence only to the unchangeable which contains no
identical with
sort of plurality.
We may begin which
its
etymology
determine that meaning of the term identity,
to
by trying
points to as the
connection with this logical question,
what
most is
means
different
names, or in different connections,
one and the same object
thought of
is
at
different
in
Here, then,
times,
or under
nevertheless not two,j3iit of twice. The term cannot merely thought
it is
;
be applied to an idea which
and which, except
generally accepted.
identity
that
original,
is
is
quite simple
and occurs only once
;
like
I cannot requires two points of reference. even recognise the identity of something which remains absolutely the same unless I am aware that I have thought of it at different times and compare
every relational concept,
it
the recurring ideas.
Now when we say that something which is thought of twice is the same, we may mean one of two things we may mean either a real or a logical A real identity is stated when two ideas, two perceptions, two identity. accounts, two names or other denominations are referred to the same ;
person, thing or event.
Seneca in
is
Olympia
sanias
It is in this
sense that
identical with the philosopher is
identical with the
who met me
such a place.
by Thales, is on May
;
the
is
the
same
whom
I
25, 585; that the saw years ago in such and
This real identity does not exclude difference in the object the tree, which I have formerly seen in foliage, is now
at different times leafless
to-day
Hermes found
mentioned by Pauthe same which took
place, according to astronomical reckoning,
person
;
that the tragedian
that the
statue of Praxiteles,
that the solar eclipse, predicted
;
I state
Seneca
man
;
is
now
grey
whom
I
knew
in his youth.
But where we
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS
85
are not concerned with the reference of our ideas to particular things or events in space or time, the identity must be logical, i.e, it must refer to the contents of the idea as such. We saylhat ideas which we have at different times
and on
different occasions
the same as to their contents
;
;
only according to their contents,
different things
we can even
and compare them
say the colour of one material
same
the
is
but are absolutely
differ,
words or expressions denote formulae the same number. In so far,
same concept different then, as we abstract the attributes of the
do not
thus, different
second
;
as that of another, the length of one rod the same as that of a but the materials and rods are not therefore identical ; they are
In the same way, we speak in diplomatic for, when the contents of the notes are the
only alike in the given respect.
language of identical notes
;
same, we disregard the plurality of the documents. This is the extent to which we can apply the word identity, and, indeed, any definite meaning
meaning
this, it follows that identity is
either
is
to
if its
original
be preserved.
From
complete or not at
all
;
that identity
has no degrees, and that the expressions relative partial identity," if meant to denote kinds or degrees of contain a contraidentity," identity, "
dictio in adjecto.
Europe and
To
A
We
can speak of an identitas partium
(e.g.,
of parts of
parts of the Russian Empire), but not of an identitas partialis.
return to our Principle of Identity.
A
"
In
its first
meaning, the formula
all thought and thought nor judgment is possible, except when particular ideal-objects can be retained, and reproduced and recognised as the same; is
certainly expresses a necessary presupposition of
judgment.
for
no
No
definite relation could
be established between ideas which were
always wavering and shifting. Thus, all thought depends upon the stability of our particular ideal-contents as its condition. In so far as the stability is always realized to a certain extent, in the sense that
it
we may speak
expresses a fundamental fact
;
of a principle of stability so far as
as the condition of all true judgment, the formula
precept, which
But
it is
recognised
contains also a
must always be satisfied if our thought is to be perfect. which refers only to the stability of each idea in itself,
this principle,
cannot serve also as a ground in the
A =A
judgment.
for the
union of the subject and predicate
For judgments which are meant only
to state the identity
No
of an object of thought with itself are quite barren. stating that a circle
is
a circle, and that this
hand
is
this
propositions which apparently correspond to the formula subject
and
predicate-terms
really
refer
to
different
one thinks of
hand
A
things.
is
;
and
in
A, the In
the
,
LOGIC
86 children are
"
proposition
children,"
characteristic of childhood
age
which are connected with to say that
when once a
it.
the
subject-term
By
connected with
other qualities war,"
we mean
we need not -be
surprised
the proposition
state of warfare has arisen,
means only the
the
the predicate-term
;
"
war
is
appear also thus, the to the meaning in which the subject new determinations adds predicate was first taken. that all the consequences usually
But
in the case of
it
;
simple denominative judgments,
we cannot speak of
represented by the subject and predicate terms. In a judgment concerning a particular thing the predicateidea is generally the more indefinite, and does not exhaust all the speciality the strictly logical identity of that which
of the subject-idea find again in
my
particular thing
more
we can only speak of the agreement
of the two.
subject-idea the thought denoted
I
by the predicate the idea. Thus, it would be ;
image of my ground of these judgments the Principle of the necessity that there should be agreement of
like the general
to call the
correct
Agreement;
is
;
is
it
states
between what we connect as subject and predicate ; that the consciousness of this agreement should be expressed in the judgment. It implies, moreover, that no thinker can be mistaken as to whether there is ideal content
agreement between the ideas present to him as subject and predicate, in so far as
they are present.
Thus, the principle states the immediate and
infallible certainty of the
consciousness of agreement, both as a fundamental psychological fact and as a necessary presupposition of judgment.
When
the predicate of a denominative
any verbal expression which by
its
judgment is a proper name, or sound gives rise to the idea of a single
existing thing as such,
and
watch
the judgment
is
mine), and
if
is
used as a sign of the thing (this is Socrates, this is based upon immediate knowledge,
then, in this case also, the agreement of the two ideas
the intuition
and the
memory- image is presupposed. But here again it is not necessary that there should be absolute I recognise an identity of the ideal contents. acquaintance even in a new dress, or when he looks paler than usual. this
agreement
But
accompanied by the consciousness of the real identity of the subject with the particular This real thing denoted by the predicate. is
identity of the thing corresponding to the two ideas which different times, and which are both ideas of the same thing,
have arisen is
at
again funda
mentally different from the agreement and stability of ideas ; it refers to a determination of being as opposed to being thought. We can, however, formulate a principle from this point of view also, viz. that in the concept
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS of the particular thing itself there identity with
is
included both
which alone gives a meaning
itself,
and permanency of the thing
;
its
singularity
that
so that the very concept of a thing includes
far as to state the Eleatic or
But
and immutability thing is what it is."
"every
in saying this,
we
Herbartian principle of absolute
indistinguishability, or of the identity
(for instance) the formula
and
to the idea of the duration
the assumption of things identical with themselves.
do not go so
87
of the
On
what
in
the contrary,
our conviction of the real identity of particular things with themselves
permanence during change of action, their duration under we constantly refer ideas having a partially different
refers to their
different appearances
;
content to one and the same thing.
In the judgment
"
this is
we
Socrates"
really identical with the definite individual
say that the person present
known
as Socrates.
is
Here again
the statement refers to the objective validity of this identity, for in making it
are conscious of the necessity of referring the two ideas to one and
we
To
the same thing.
its
question
objective validity would be to say that
subject and the thing referred to as predicate
the
thing referred to as
may
be, or are, two different things,
The law
them.
of agreement
and
among
it
is
not necessary to unify
our ideas
is
not sufficient to prove
that
the necessity of referring two ideas to a single real thing, for this law only
guarantees the agreement of their contents ; it is here that assumptions con cerning the nature of the existent and the distinguishing characteristics of real identity
not
itself
become important, and Such
give us.
is
these the function of judgment does
the assumption that
kinds, can be confidently distinguished,
be mistaken
alike that they can It is
on
known
for
and
one another
if
no two objects so
we examine them
closely.
example, that our conviction rests of the identity of persons
to us.
When
our recollection of the outward form
we have recourse
knowledge of the arrangement of
ward things
it
is
penetrability that
their marriage
is
bed
;
its
as
but with out
and the principle of im
finally establish their identity.
lieving in real identity
to give
when she examined Odysseus
their spatial determinations
by
we
fails
to the identity of consciousness with
individual peculiarities, as Penelope did
arise
individuals, of certain
this, for
us certainty,
to his
all
that there are
The
necessity of be
the result of presuppositions such as these, which
from our knowledge of the nature of things.
To
these statements con
cerning real identity, which are supported by considerations obtained from
another source, we
may add
the judgments which express the coincidence
of a certain subject with a given
member
of a series, or with any other
LOGIC
88 particular thing is
the 6.
first
which
is
of the Caesars
determined by a relational predicate Aristotle is the teacher of Alexander.
Augustus
;
With regard to the objective validity of the judgments which pre and activities, everything which has been said with refer
dicate attributes
ence to naming is, from one point of view, true of these also, because of The attribute or activity the twofold synthesis which takes place in them. which is thought of in the subject must agree with the general predicateidea.
On
the other hand, their objective validity can be maintained only
upon the assumption activity,
is
attributes,
that the unity of thing
a real relation, hence that
and
to look
we
upon a change
and
are able to
in
and
attribute, of thing
know
a thing by
our idea as an alteration in
This relation of the thing to its attributes and under the concept of identity, though here again an ascribed to the term which does not really belong to it.
activities has also
it.
been brought has been
elasticity
The
its
thing
is
only
permanent support of its attributes, as the subject remains one with itself; it is not identical with its attri
identical with itself as the
which in activity butes, nor with its identical with
its
it is
activities,
not the same as these.
redness, nor the sun with
its
Cinnabar is red," by which the judgments, justified, cannot be the principle of identity. "
thought which fact
is,
which
and
that
exists
that the
we can we
lay
down,
and
it
shining "
;
Cinnabar
not
are to be
the sun shines/
The
is
and the principle
only general law of
expresses also a fundamental
and recognise anything by means of these categories of inherence and action alone ; are able to distinguish, retain,
Being of a thing
is
also the
Being of
its
attributes
and
activi
ties.
But even when we is
the existent,
all
start
from
we can mean
this is
law and hold that what we judge about which we
that the existent concerning
of thought by which we distin and then unify them again. The general ideas of things which we use as predicates of denomi 7. native judgments, are, to some extent, accompanied at every further de
judge
necessitates this particular
guish between
it
and
its
movement
attribute,
velopment of thought by those judgments of attributes and activities, of which they have been the subjects. Snow, for example, may signify not an unanalysed image, but a white, loose, cold thing ; the general name has become a summary of attributes. To this extent the relations of
thus
inherence
and action are
implicitly
contained even
in
judgments, as belonging to that meaning of the word which consciousness.
When
there
is
added the
denominative is
real identity of things
present to
which
fall
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS under
steam
different ideas (water, ice,
serve merely to denote a
may
89
boy, man, old man), a substantive
complex of
different temporal states of a particular
attributes
which express the
kind of subject.
Everything which exists as a particular thing is given to us in time, it occupies a definite position in time, and is intuited as lasting during a period of time, as developing varying activities in time, and possibly as changing its attributes. Thus a REFERENCE TO TIME is necessarily con nected with all our judgments "concerning the existence, attributes, activities, and relations of particular things, and all such judgments can claim to be valid for a definite time only. 1
While
.
this proposition is self-evident for activities the reference to
time seems wanting in some of the attributive-predicates, inasmuch as they are regarded as invariable
But while there
is
and given with the existence of the subject
always the general possibility that attributes
found only
in
judgment by
exceptional cases
changeable,
exclude
all
at the
itself;
attaching to the
meaning
etc.).
it
;
most
it
to
be
not contained in the form of the
is
found in the secondary relations
of the predicate, or in the predicate itself (un
Only when we call a thing by a proper name do we and by the nature of our predicate refer to
reference to time,
judgments admit of far as in
is
is
the subject, irrespective of temporal relations.
minent
may change
of the identity of the subject, this relation of permanence
in spite
itself.
All other denominative
this limitation of their validity to a certain time, in so
naming the predication of attributes and activities becomes pro end of 14), and the same thing may thus be called first by
(v.
one name, then by another.
Thus
2.
the narrative-judgment
is
never completely expressed unless
it
contains a statement of the time for which the unity of predicate and sub is
ject
objectively valid
The
future tense.
;
it
must be expressed
temporal relations in predications It
is
only
absorbed it is
ness
to the
;
becomes
the
present,
is
one measure of their
past
or
logical perfection.
disconnected thought of the child,
in the interest of the
present
in
extent to which languages are capable of expressing
moment,
that everything
the power of distinguishing times clearer
and more methodical.
which
is
quite
which occurs to
grows as self-conscious
LOGIC
90
EXPLICATIVE JUDGMENTS.
II.
1
The judgments we have so
far
6.
make
considered
statements about par
from these are judgments of which ticular things. Essentially the subject-word, which do not refer of in the the subject consists meaning different
named by
to the definite existence of particular things
the subject-word,
nature of the idea, frequently presupposed by the though this existence Their objec is it derived. which from source the of or, as a consequence, is
tive
validity
general idea,
which
independent of time. As explaining the contents of a_ of a rule they may be regarded as the indirect expression is
refers to the existent. "
1.
Blood
is
red and snow
is white,"
such judgments do not speak
of this or that particular thing, nor give
present at the is
express
that
expression to any perception
Since the subject- word
moment.
which constitutes
its
meaning
;
is
and
absolute, all that this
meaning
is
it
can
an ideal
content of indefinite generality which has been disengaged from the idea of
any particular existing thing, and which in its indefiniteness cannot be said to exist. Hence all that the statement blood is red can tell us must refer "
"
to this ideal content, is
and
it
nothing more than that the predicate
signifies
thought of in connection with the subject.
What
sort of unity there is
between subject and predicate depends upon the nature of the ideas con If both belong to the same category, then the simple coincidence nected. of the ideas
is
attributes
and
the thing
itself.
It is in
stated
is
We
which
predicated of
a similar sense that
where the subject-idea
dog
that
;
activities
is
is it
thought as a concrete thing has which are contained in the idea of
we make use of
the article, particularly
the idea of a thing having an individual form (the
a quadruped).
must also include
in the class of explicative
seem, by means of the so-called indefinite
judgments those which
article,
to
make
a statement
concerning a particular individual, a particular state, etc. ; such propositions as a fir-tree is a conifer, an ague is accompanied by high fever," do not "
any definite particular thing what they mean is, that that which a conifer, and this statement can only be based upon the relation between the general ideas fir-tree and conifer, not upon knowledge
refer to is
a
;
fir-tree is
of the particular. 2.
The
objective validity of these judgments has immediate reference
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS
91
onlyjo the sphere of ideas ; all that they tell us is, that when the subject (presupposing nominal correctness) is thought, it will be thought together with the predicate
that
;
thought of as red.
what
I
and every one
else think of as
"
blood
"
when we
only secondarily, pass from the of the word to the actual contained under generality things it, that the is
It
is
judgment refers to the Being of these things also; and states concerning them the rule that when there is a thing which is denoted by the subject the predicate belongs to
it.
According to one view, such judgments are from the first general judg-j ments gained from experience by induction, having for subjects particular; things thought of as indefinite in number. But here it is forgotten that the first
essential for such an induction
according to which so
we may name
naming
this
;
in
we should have some standard same word and
judgment common to all. Such a standard we the meaning of the words we bring to our process of
comprehend them
can find only
that
is
particular things by the
in a
meaning must be already
to
some
extent fixed before there
can be any question of judgments of induction. It is perfectly true that under the influence of progressive experience, which is always adding something to our ideas, these ideas remodel themselves, and that it is
common
generally a matter of chance where
boundaries of
fixes the
its
thought comes to a halt and
words.
The meaning of the word blood, for example, is formed in the from the intuition of human blood and that of mammals and birds may, and
in ordinary language,
contents
but by an extension of
;
first ;
place
hence
does, include the colour red amongst its
original
meaning
it
its
might also be
it
applied to the whiteish fluid in other kinds of animal organisms.
At some
stage of formation, however, the meanings of words are a necessary prelimi
nary to the judgment of the individual; stop this fixed meaning
is
whatever the stage at which they
preliminary to naming and to the possibility of
judgments of experience gained by induction. Thus if blood is the fluid in the veins of mammals and birds, then red forms a part of its meaning, "
"
and when we take
it
as fixed in this
way we cannot use
it
to
name
fluids of
another colour.
Thus before we can
give utterance to a
a judgment of experience including later),
a simple
judgment must have preceded
single idea denoted by a given word is,
judgment having the meaning of cases (of which we shall speak
many
in the first instance, a rule
of
;
to unfold the contents of the
the general rule to be found herein
naming which forbids us
to call
anything
/I!
LOGIC
92
blood which
is
The
not red.
inductive judgment
discovered common
first
appears
when anew
which are denoted by the attribute is with the attributes is connected that we same name, when invariably say idea not of the the contents which make up A, subject having been pre A. with in thought viously connected to all the things
B
B
Such an explicative judgment can contain the statement of a rule con cerning things themselves only in so far as the idea of a permanent and lasting thing, together with the possibility of variable attributes,
denomination
in the substantival
;
and the rule
is
is
contained
that the predicate always
and constantly belongs to the things which fall under the denomination, and is invariably connected with their other attributes. When the judg
ment extends to everything
to reality
it
is
this invariability of the
which can be called
"
blood
"
to
which
red colour belonging it
really refers.
Verbs occupy a peculiar position here, Strictly speaking, the only 3. case in which a verb can be the predicate of a general subject is when we are speaking of an activity which is continuous, and which lasts as long as
comprehended under the subject-idea (fire burns, the wind blows); when, on the contrary, the verb expresses a variable activity, begin ning and ending in time, it is only as a figure of speech that it can be the
thing
used as predicate (the sheep should really denote
which the 4.
we
activity
horse neighs) ; what the expression a merely faculty or a habit, i.e. an attribute from
is
may
bleats, the
proceed, and not the activity
When we compare
this class of
itself.
judgments with those
first
are chiefly struck by the fact that their validity does not
considered,
depend upon
the existence here or there, at this time or the other, of a thing correspond Hence they are not valid for some given time, ing to the subject-idea. but can claim unconditional to ideas. refer validity just because
On
the other hand,
all
merely they merely narrative judgments are temporarily valid.
Here there appears a characteristic difference in the meaning of the .5. Present tense, according as it is used for the statement of unconditionally valid judgments or of those amongst temporarily valid judgments which refer to the present.
When we
having a particular existence
think of a thing
as
we have thereby assigned to time which embraces everything, and is the same for all
presented and as it its
;
by
place in that its
existence
stands amongst other things which are contemporaneous, or precede or follow it; and by its which our is it
it
quality, concerning made, judgment occupies a definite point of time and thus stands in a definite temporal relation to the moment of our judgment.
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS But when the subject of our judgment
meaning of the word, this idea
Removed from
plex.
present, in
the idea which constitutes the
is
disengaged from the temporal com
is
the changes of time,
which there
is
no
93
it
stands before us in a mental
and
distinction of yesterday
which the consciousness that our idea
will
be the same
to-day, but in
at every repetition
annuls
all temporal distinctions between the particular occasions upon which we actively think of it. When thought in this way the subject has predicates which belong to it independently of time, which belong to it as
often as
it is
state of the
thought
The
of.
sky at the present moment, and
really in the present tense; but
ment,
different
meaning
object of
my
my
is
In
always blue.
The
is
blue
is
denotes the
as a narrative
thus,
judg
also have the completely
may
this case
validity of the
"
and
it,
as the fixed
no past nor
judgment
future
is
not estimated
is
perception of the object in a given momentary state, but by the
which
invariability of the ideal content
the
it
the sky
that the sky as I generally think of
thought,
contrasted with the present.
by
"
proposition
word
an invariability which
I
am
connecting once
the condition of
is
all
my
for all with
speech or
thought.
III.
THE ACT OF JUDGMENT
AS EXPRESSED IN LANGUAGE.
17-
The
verbal expression of the unification of subject
takes place in the judgment
be found
and predicate which
developed languages in the form of inflection of the verb, which has itself arisen out of what was originally a is
to
in
mere juxtaposition. Even where the verb be "appears as the link between a substantival or adjectival predicate and the subject, the act of judgment is "to
expressed by the verbal ending alone
;
the verb
"
to
be
"
forms a part of
the predicate. i.
Less developed languages, and, in simple cases, even advanced ones,
are content to express such a unification as takes place in the
judgment by
the mere juxtaposition of the two words which stand for subject and predi cate.
This juxtaposition must not only indicate that the corresponding
ideas are at the
moment
unified
by the speaker,
it
must also express the
Accentuation alone can distinguish the statement from the question, or from any other mode of connection, such as the attributive which expresses a unity of two ideas which is already objective validity of the judgments.
present.
When, on the
contrary, the
development of the
linguistic forms has
LOGIC
94 followed
the logical distinctions, then in the case of verbal predicates
all
the meaning of the personal ending (which blends the pronominal equiva lent of the subject immediately with the stem of the verb, thus making it
agree in person,
number and gender)
is
denote the connection of sub
to
and the indicative mood, combined with and predicate in judgment the emphasis and arrangement which distinguishes the statement from the
ject
;
question, states this connection as objectively valid. indicates the time for which the
judgment
is
to
be
The
tense, again,
valid.
would denote by the expression copula, that element can combine words into a proposition, and so into the of language which
That which
logicians
expression of a statement,
lies in
The meaning
in this alone.
the personal ending of the indicative, and
of the unity of subject and predicate which
is
expressed by this terminal inflection differs according to the nature of the ideas connected. 2.
Judgments
in
which the predicate
is expressed by an adjective or mere juxtaposition (as ino /xei//?i o9 to be is employed. But this is not
substantive are not generally formed by /fyaxv?,
fj
8e
ri^y-ifi {jLaKprf)
virtue of
its
the verb
;
"
"
meaning the element which expresses the formation of the
by judgment; the function of judgment is contained in the form of inflection alone. The verb to be is the means by which we give the form of a "
"
verb to the predicate, and thus enable
it to take the ending which is the outward sign of its predicative relation to the subject. In the judgment cinnabar is red," nothing is added by the meaning of the verb to be which is not already contained in as an adjective it involves red," for "
"
"
"
reference to a subject of which
ness is
"
"and
red-being"
it is
the attribute.
As
abstract nouns,
would have just the same meaning; the verb
"
red
"to be"
is not merely used to express the fact that thought of as independent In this way the verb abstract, but is predicated of a definite subject. "red"
and "
to
be
"
certainly serves to facilitate the expression of this use of the word to show that it is a red," predicate, as contrasted with the merely attributive relation which might be expressed by juxtaposition ; but in so
and
"
doing it is a mere vehicle for the copula, not the copula itself; it does not constitute the judgment, but merely prepares the way for it. This function of to be," to denote the in which a word is to be "
meaning
still
more
tives,
by
its
that
used, appears
clearly in the case of substantives.
These do
not, like adjec
carry in their form a reference to something else, yet their meaning, nature, enables
meaning
is
them
to
a general one
fulfil
the function of a predicate, whenever
and only appropriated
to a definite particular
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS by means
of a denominative judgment.
nite individual, although in
its
meaning
;
Man
"
is
name
at all,
name
into the
man
of a definite
contrary, converts
it
;
included
and
it
word
article converts the
the use of the verb
into a predicate,
of a defi
is
but the sign of a definite ideal-con
Only the demonstrative adjective or the
tent.
name
not the
the idea of the figure of an individual
not a
it is
"
95
"
to
be,"
on the
cannot be a name before
it
has
been a predicate. Thus Mensch," as a general idea awaiting its refer ence to some definite individual, and Menschsein have the same mean "
"
"
ing
;
the verb
"
sein
"
serves only as the outward sign of the function of
the idea as predicate, which might also be
Thus
tuation.
function
its
is
shown by
its
position
and accen
that of a formal element of language
but
it
not that formal element which expresses the act of judgment and merits the name of copula. is
But how does
3.
it
that
happen
be"
as
an independent verb, when
function, which
just the verb
it is
use in this way? and what connection it
be"
which we "
has in connection with adjectives and substantives?
it
In the fourth chapter of the
book of
first
attention to the ambiguity contained in the it is
"to
there between the meaning of to stands alone as predicate, and this
is
his Logic, J. S. Mill
word
"is,"
draws
inasmuch as when
used as the so-called copula, it certainly does not state that the subject but only denotes the relation of predication. Such a sentence as
exists, "
A
centaur
centaur
is
;
is
a fiction of the poets
and he
looked by almost
is
"
directly denies the statement that a
surprised that this ambiguity should have been over authors, although existing in
all
modern
as well as in
ancient languages. little attention to Herbart as to other German philoso 1 Herbart, following in the footsteps of Fichte, has shown, with his
Mill has paid as phers.
53), that the judgment A is B, and do not contain the statement (which, though
usual acuteness (Einl. in die Phil., the question
commonly whatever
There
is
is
is
A Bt
certainly
attributed to them, said about
A
by
no doubt that
been disputed. 2
A
is
itself,
this
really quite alien) that
nor of
remark
its
is
correct,
judgment of the form
A
is,
for
nothing
existence or validity.
"A
and should never have
is
B"
can never, by the
1
I, a passage of which I have Grundlage der gesammten Wissenschaflslehre, part i. been reminded by Bergmann (Reine Logik, i. p. 235). 2 It is urged against this (cf. Ueberweg, p. 162) that God is propositions such as the soul is immortal," "true friends are to be valued," must involve the state just," "
"
ment
that there are such things as
contained in the indicative
mood
;
God, a soul, true friends that this presupposition is that any one unwilling to accept the presupposition ;
I
LOGIC
96
mere
fact that the subject
and predicate are connected by
the statement of the judgment would have "
to
in case there
when
"A
exists."
The
"
is,"
function of this
include "is"
is
add clauses to those propositions which should make them hypothetical Such a clause, it is said, can be dispensed with only is a God," etc. :
the context (as in a romance), or the recognised meaning of a word (such as Zeus, is merely feigned, or that the statement is Chimsera), shows that the reality
Sphinx, This objection is so far true that the reality of the a name. merely the explanation of those who speak or hear such judgments; otherwise subject is generally presupposed by But this is quite another thing there would be no motive present for uttering them. from saying that the judgment itself, as it stands, involves the statement of the reality of the subject, i.e. that this is necessarily stated by the words of the judgment, and more If it were so, it would be incomprehensible how mood. especially by the indicative there should be any exception to the rule, for if the indicative of the categorical judg
ment containing
"is"
has the force of stating the reality of the subject, then
it
must
The exceptions which Ueberweg have this force always and under all circumstances. admits themselves prove that it does not depend upon the form of the judgment, but attach to the meaning of the subject- words, without upon the ideas we unconsciously utterance in the judgment, whether or not the presupposition of their existence their finding as a rule
And, indeed, what meaning can the statement of existence accepted. have when the subject does not denote individual beings as such as in the proposition but is of a universal form ? When true friends are to be valued or God is "
is
"
"
"
"
just,"
what sense does
judgment involve the statement that snow exists ? Certainly not in the sense indicated by the present tense of the indicative when used of definite things having a particular existence, for then the statement would But the judgment, "snow is white," is true be that snow exists now at this moment. in summer and winter alike; and yet it is not held that the judgment tells us that snow always exists. Again, if the statement is said to be, that such bodies as those of which I think when I say snow, have actually existed somewhere and at some time, it can be is meant. This alone can be stated, nor only the existence of definite "snows" which But the judgment, snow is white," can it be said of snow in general that it exists. does apply to snow in general and not only to this or that snow. Still it is true, that the recollection of actually perceived snow is always connected with the idea which we attach to the word "snow," and for this reason, because of the way in which I have attained to the meaning of the word, it is presupposed that we are I say, "snow is
white,"
in
this
"
But suppose I take the analogous judgment, dealing with something which exists. is as firmly connected with the idea which I "Pegasus is winged," the idea of wings So far, however, I attach to the word Pegasus as that of white colour with snow. have never seen an existing Pegasus indeed, I know that it is a creation of fancy, and for this reason the existence of Pegasus is not presupposed. But the judgment itself tells me neither that Pegasus exists, nor that he does not exist ; only how the idea is Take the judgment, constituted which I connect with the word. The branches of the hyperbola are infinite," it is undoubtedly a valid judgment, although it can have nothing to do with the existence of the branches of this or that particular hyperbola. The infinite branches of the hyperbola exist in exactly the same way as all other subjects of ;
"
judgment, that is, they exist as objects of my thought, of which I assume that every one else thinks alike. \V. Jordan has treated this question more carefully in his treatise, iiberdie Zweideutigkeit der Copula bet Stuart Mill (Stuttgarter It is true that on Gymnasialprogramm, 1870). The is certainly includes the concept of existence." But he gives a page 13 he says,
my
"
much wider scope than Ueberweg
to this
concept of existence,
when on page 14 he
says,
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS exactly the
97
same whether we are talking of existing or of non-existing
things,
of subjects which are thought of as particular, or of subjects which are
thought of as general
(to
general, particular existence cannot
these, as
Whenever the thinking
subject finds something present which is independent of his of thought, whether it is in the material or spiritual world, Logic will permit the If we take this explanation literally, it is certainly true that every act use of the is. "
act
"
it presupposes, and does not create, the subject of the judgment recognises something which is independent of this act of thought, and this something the idea denoted by the subject-word. Such a reality of ideas is presupposed whenever
of judgment is
so far as
a judgment finds expression in language, and it is presupposed moreover that it is common Thus the question would disappear if such were the reality many individuals.
to
is would be justified wherever the subject-word, and therefore the intended, and the But just for this reason the judgment would have nothing judgment, had any meaning. whatever to do with the statement of the actual existence of the thought denoted by the "
"
subject-word, in the ordinary sense of existing. However, this is not what is meant. Jordan attempts in opposition to Herbart and the meaning of real existence. This he does in the first Mill to preserve for "is"
place by saying that the reality in question belongs to the predicate, but not to the moderation is difficult," In such propositions as "self-defence is forbidden," subject. there is no doubt that the existence of the subject-idea is left undecided, while in the "
predicate,
whole
is
on the contrary,
allusion
is
made
to
an existential proposition in disguise,
forbid self-defence,
circumstances which
begin to paraphrase like
this,
we
something which actually i.e.
exists.
The
which we once
there are laws, or grounds,
make moderation
shall find at last that
But
difficult.
if
even the proposition, square there are logical laws which make "a
an existential proposition ; a square circle impossible." This, however, is to abandon the ground of dispute, for We are far from denying the question was, whether the reality of the subject is stated? circle is unthinkable,"
"
is
every statement, just because it claims objectivity, contains the recognition of and laws but we do deny that for this reason the existence is ; objective grounds stated of a thing (or attribute or event) which corresponds to the subject-idea. Jordan s Such a other distinction, which he applies to Mill s example of the centaur, is better.
that
"
"
"
"
"the centaur is a fiction of the poets approximates to a definition. amongst definitions Jordan distinguishes a particular class which he calls "recti and these are the definitions which deny the idea which the subject stands for, fying," and replace it by another. The proposition says, "the centaur does not exist in the "
proposition as
Now
word of actually being, but the idea of the centaur is a fiction." number of such predicates which di-gradc the subject-won! into the sign of a merely mental thing, when, by its customary meaning, it might be taken to denote an existing thing. But we must not forget that at the head of these predicates to exist. there stands the verb to be Whenever I expressly state of a subject that it exists, the and my predicate states that subject- word is, for me, the sign of an idea sense indicated by the
No
doubt
there- arc
a
;
an actual thing corresponds to this idea. The view that the meaning of the word "to be is always the same has lately received determined support from Fr. Kern {Die deulsche Satzlehre, p. 64 sq. ), who pronounces In the propositions wooden iron is non against distinguishing two meanings in it. a square circle is a contradiction, the existence of the wooden iron and of the sense, "
"
square circle is stated with just as much clearness and emphasis as the existence of the the boy exists But while boy in the proposition the boy is in the garden. outside my thought as well as within the iron and the circle exist only in my idea. They exist, moreover, in connection with the property of being nonsense or a .
.
S.
L.
.
.
.
.
H
LOGIC
98
of predicates which can belong to an existing thing, or of predi cates which deny existence by their meaning. In each case its one function
belong)
put the predicate into such a form that
to
is
and
;
to enable
can be used
it
The nature
to take the personal ending.
it
in the
judgment,
of the subject
and
predicate-ideas alone determine the sense in which subject and predicate are unified, and whether the existence of the subject is presupposed, left uncertain, or denied. logical identity,
"
is
"this
The square
is
my
real identity
watch,"
a regular, tour-angled figure is "gold
;
a
"
means
metal,"
sub-
sumption under a more general idea ; "gold is yellow," the unity of thing and attribute ; A is a mile away from B" a relation ; the movement is "
"
slow,"
the unity between a general idea
and so on.
"Socrates
because Socrates
and
"
"
is
ill
"
is
winged
not
is
the
Pegasus in
more exact determination,
its
presupposes the existence of the subject,
of an individual
who
is
thought of as existing, "
leaves the existence of Pegasus uncertain for any one the
"
being.
ill,"
name
and
a condition thought of as actual at a given time.
know whether
subject;
is
is
name
is
an actual or of a merely
that of
a mythological fiction
every instance
"
Pegasus
who does fictitious
denies the existence of the
our information
is
obtained only from the
meaning of the terms, either of subject or predicate. With reference
4.
two
to the predicates
we may here
distinguish between
classes.
which property I have recognised and stated ; and thus they cannot pos be found in any reality which is independent of me." But the ambiguity of the word is immediately granted by this distinction between a which exists in a reality external to me, and one which exists subject only in my idea. contradiction,
sibly
For when the word
"
"
is
stands alone in the sense of
subject does not exist only in "
God
my my
"
exist
idea, but independently of
"
what
it.
it
states is that the
In such a proposition as
but only in idea" the clause directly denies the meaning in which we impelled to understand the words "God exists." But it is not even true that a circle exists in my idea," for who could square imagine one ? The contradictory is im possible in my thoughts, as well as in the What the reality which is independent of me. a contradiction" predicate really tells us is, that I cannot think of anything corre sponding to the -words square circle it denies existence in thought as well as in reality. In p. 74, it is brought forward as an instance, that to any one who doubts it we say with emphasis A is the person who did this emphasized is being meant to lay stress upon the existence of A as the person who did it. But it is obvious that the existence of was never called into question, hence that there is no reason to stress are, at
exists
first,
"
"is
"
";
"
it,"
A
lay special
upon
It was the action of A, and not his existence, which was disputed, and the question whether we had any right to predicate of A (whose existence is undisputed) that he is the person who did it. If this is not so, then the A is not the person who proposition did it must be meant to of but the existence of A. deny not merely the it.
"
"
quality
Concerning Bergmann
s
wiss. Philos.y v. 113 sq.
objections (Reine Logik,
i.
p.
agency,
235
sq.), cf. Vierteljahrsschrift fiir
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS
99
All modal relational-predicates, which express a relation to my know ledge (with the exception of those appertaining to the senses, such as visible, or tangible), by their meaning make the subject-term the of sign
a mere idea which does not involve real existence
whether the predicates themselves affirm or deny
When
undecided. etc., is
of anything,
I
I
use the predicates true,
denote that
to give information concerning
its
this is the case
existence, or leave
its
false,
it
credible, incredible,
only an idea, and that the predicate
is
it
and
;
relation to
me
and
to
my
subjective
u Such propositions as "Tail s apple-shooting is a the Trojan war is an historical event," "atoms are bodies which actually if and are could by themselves state exist," would be impossible
thought.
fact,"
"
"
"
"is
the existence of the subject.
But the verb is
of the subject
word
"to
modal
a
itself
it
be,"
when used
absolutely
and
as
meaning
"to
exist,"
expressly stating the existence
determines the question whether that which the subject-
denotes merely as an idea
first
By
relational-predicate.
also
is
an actual
Cf. above,
thing.
12, 7, p. 72.
But with other predicates everything depends upon what the subject is in which it is used ; and this cannot be seen from the mere
and the sense
external form of the judgment
and the use of the word
"is."
If the
used as general and is not introduced as the name of one or more definite things, then the predicate which is formed by means of the subject-term
verb
"to
is
be"
can state nothing but the contents of
nothing whatever "
is yellow"
gold
this
subject-idea,
is
said as to the existence of the subject.
or
"atoms
are
indivisible,"
do not declare the existence of
and
I
say
the being yellow or indivisible
appertains to the idea which I denote by the subject-word positions
When
particular things.
;
but the pro I
must learn
from some other source whether or not the subject-term is applicable to such things. Bat if the subject-term appears from the first as the name of things which have a particular existence yellow,"
word
"this "
"
however, but
is
5.
This
but to
all
attributes,
horse
is black"
"ambiguity
is
this
piece of gold
is
presupposed; not in the
"
in
this."
of the
copula"
applies not only to the verb to be,
predicates which can by themselves denote real states and inasmuch as they sometimes state that which actually takes
place in a particular case
and sometimes
or activity to the subject-idea.
tense
then existence
"
e.g.
which
is
ambiguous
;
that
which belongs as attribute
Strictly speaking,
for this
it
is
only the present
sometimes expresses the empirical,
LOGIC
TOO
The pro
the general necessity of thought. temporal present, sometimes position
"great
though
this
souls
pardon
offences"
moment
great souls are at this
pardoning. a great soul he must pardon offences.
is
speaks,"
states the existence of Socrates in "
"Socrates is ill
;
we can speak
nor that some
the act of pardoning
in
presupposed
is
states neither that great souls exist
of
All
tells
it
us
is,
that
if
man
a
But the proposition, "Socrates the same way as the proposition
him only
in so
just
far as
he
exists,
because the word Socrates denotes an individual having a particular exist ence,
and any
his existence. /
attributes or actions
which are ascribed to him must involve
1
to which is the ex happen that the verb a formal function assumes actual of existence, whereby it loses pression it? The remarkable to contradict seems even its meaning thing is nay, not that the ambiguity in this respect has been so little noticed, but rather
But how does
6.
that all
"
it
be,"
known languages agree in containing it. As Ueberweg (p. 162) rightly notices,
difficult.
sized
above
(p.
95
which we speak not interested to
it is
sq.) t
exist
;
is
explanation
and, as
not
we have empha
as a rule taken for granted that the things of
there
know
The
no need of any express assertion ; we are what and how they are. When
is
that things are, but
now, it is desired, not merely to express predication by mere juxtaposition, but to give the form of the verb to the predicate, the verb to be offers "
"
itself just
because
always presupposed
it
;
is
know, we need to have "being
thus";
exactly as
"
so general and has by itself no contents.
It is
we may know what we wish to determined more exactly as "being and
but in order that it
just as
being here
"
this"
the statement of existence
and
The
"
being
now."
is
determined more "
predicate
red,"
which
by its form already denotes something appertaining to something else which exists, now appears as a modification of Being, being red.
Now as the present tense denotes on the one hand the empirical, sensual present, and on the other the timeless present of our thoughts ; so the meaning of being in this connection is also extended. The attribute has the same relation to the thing which is thought, and to the thing which in its existence is perceptible to sense ; as the presupposition of
Being was only implied before, of
my
this 1
and being-thus remain so The
it
can
thought, things do not alter
;
now be their
far as I retain
theory according to which the judgment in order to get the inevitable copula
speaking."
abstracted from.
being
them "A
"is,"
may
As
objects
cease, their being-
in thought.
speaks"
may be
is
altered to
held to be obsolete.
"A
is
SIMPLE JUDGMENTS Nevertheless the verb has kept a part of
its
101
original
meaning, and the
most important part. The verb to be originally implies That which exists holds good independently of "
"
my
real existence.
thought,
and holds
This objectivity of the connection to which my judgment gives utterance is an essential factor of the judgment itself. This it is, and not the existence of the subject, which forms a of the
good
for
every one.
part
statement; and for this
By this
extension of
"
its
"
Being is a very suitable expression. fundamental meaning it strengthens the assertion
of objectivity, of universal validity, already contained in the inflexional form.
CHAPTER
III.
ARISE, AND THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN ANALYTICAL AND SYNTHETICAL JUDGMENTS.
HOW JUDGMENTS
18.
/
IMMEDIATE JUDGMENTS are those which presuppose nothing but the ideas connected in them, in order that these ideas may be united as subject and ; MEDIATE, or MEDIATED JUDG which some further element is necessary in addition to
predicate with a consciousness of validity
MENTS
are those in
these ideas.
Kant
s
distinction of analytical
and synthetical judgments and the concept which
the relation between the predicate
and assumed
the subject-term
as given.
those judgments in which the subject
is
It
is
refers only to
denoted by
is
not applied by Kant to
a particular, intuitable idea.
All
must be regarded as synthetical from the Kantian point of view, even when based upon the analysis of a complex
relational judgments, moreover,
presentation.
When,
i.
ment
after analysing the functions
takes place,
we ask about the
concerned with the origin of the ideas united by the judgment
through which the simple judg we are not
origin of the judgment,
whether subject or predicate
speaking merely of the analysis of the act of The question concerns only the judging we assume these to be given. that of the genesis of the act of judging itself, and this has two aspects ;
in
:
connection or unification of subject and predicate, and that of the con sciousness of the objective validity of this connection.
This genesis
when nothing
is
may be
ideas connected in
it,
of objective validity. addition of
either
immediate or mediate.
It
is
immediate
presupposed in the judgment but the subject and predicate in order that It
is
it
may
mediate when
some other elements.
It
take place with a consciousness can take place only by the
this
may be
that without
some mediation
the subject and predicate cannot even be referred to each other in such a
way
that their union in a
judgment might be thought of; or
it
may be
PIOW JUDGMENTS ARISE
103
that at least the consciousness of the objective validity of such unity
be obtained elsewhere.
Let us for the present
must
that which brings
call
about the unification of subject and predicate the Ground of the judgment. Then the immediate judgment is one, the ground of which lies in the con nected ideas themselves, apart from anything else ; the mediate judgment is one which has its ground in these ideas only when taken together with the mediation may at first merely relate subject and predicate to ; each other by raising the question whether AisB; or it may at the same time settle the question and guarantee the certainty of the validity of the others
judgment If the
A
is
B.
ground
lie
entirely in the ideas themselves
which are connected
by the judgment, then, according to what we have said above, their relation must be such that the unity expressed in the judgment can be immediately In a denominative judgment
recognised.
I
am
conscious, without further
mediation, of the coincidence between the idea which
which "
that
is
is
general idea of the activities the idea
idea.
I
is
present and that
reproduced and denoted by the predicate-term ; when I say a fir-tree," I find in present intuition just what agrees with the of attributes and
In immediate judgments
fir-tree.
corresponding to the predicate
is
a part of the subject-
analyse the latter and emphasize a certain element,
e.g.
colour,
and
this I recognise as agreeing with a colour already known. Here, again, nothing beyond the complex idea given as subject is needed in order that I may discover in it the element which corresponds to the predicate.
In the case of relational judgments,
it
is
true that an
analysis of the
subject-idea by itself cannot yield the element which agrees with the predi I may turn and twist as I will the idea of the lamp which stands cate.
before me, left
I
can discover in
plex intuition containing this into its
elements
I
it
But
of the writing desk.
nothing which
tells
in this instance that
me
that
which
is
it
stands to the
given
is
a
com
two objects and their relation and by analysing obtain the judgment, for which no more is needed
than the ideas connected for the statement that the
;
in
it.
The complex
lamp stands to the
presentation left
is
the ground
of the writing desk.
Thus all immediate judgments are of necessity analytical, if those judg ments are analytical which only re-unite the elements obtained by analysis of a presentation, judgments, that is, in which either the contents of the predicate are already presented in the subject, as in those of naming, attributes or of activities ; or in which subject and predicate, together with the relation between them, form parts of a complex presentation, as in
rf 104
f
I
I
then synthetical judgments must be need some other ground lying which and those
If this
relational judgments.
those which are inferred,
is
so,
of the outside the ideas given, in order that the synthesis
judgment may
take place.
immediate judgments should be analytical in this sense contradicts the essence of the judgment, which is to be a
That
2.
no way
all
For the analysis or decomposition
vowdTw.
is
only the preparation for the
work of judgment
act of judgment, not that act itself; the
is
union between the elements which have been thus distinguished
to restore (cf.
81).
to use the terms analytical and synthetical simply in this sense
Still,
3.
forbidden by the use of them introduced by Kant.
is
in
rwv dpxuv el
inroXafJ-pdvet.?
Tjfuv
6
avrifidafus,
rrjs
r]
r6
TrctJ/Tes
elvai elirtiv TO
\eyw
do^a eli/at
/u.rj
/cat
n
/cat
rg
ravrrj
a$tiva.Tov a/J.a
TaJ evavrlas
.
/J.T]
e^Sexerat
elwdora) VTroXa/j-jSaveiv rbv avrbv dieij/evfffj.evos 5oai>
:
elvai avOpwirov (cf. also 3>v
a/j,a
TO,
-rrpoTdffet.
l>,
fj.7)
Trpos
\yeiv Hpd/cAetroj
5
ra^r^v dvdyovcnv e(rx_a.Tt}v TT&VTWV. OVK apa e^5^x era 4 1006 33
/cat
a
dovvaTOv yap
.
.
56^as 6
els
5e a7ro5et/crt/cds rdr KOivds 56^as,
dduvarov
UTrdpxetj/
/xrj
aV, ecrroi jrpoa di.opiafj.ei
Kaddirep Tives oiovTon.
etVai,
(Jir)
u.e#
/3e/3atordr77
yap dvayKdlov, arts \eyet, raura irrdpx*w T$ ai/rui rdvavria (TrpocrStw/Jtcr^w 5 OVK
impossible that the same
(pv
3"
r)
Here Aristotle makes use a7ro0dj at, /cat dovvarov a/j.a elvai /cat fj.ri etvat). of the phrase that contrary attributes (evavrio.) cannot belong to one subject both together, and he seems to employ it as a proof that one and the same person cannot di>ai.
T)
But he must not, of course, believe that anything both is and is not at the same time. be understood as intending to lay down a principle higher than, or independent of, the he not only denies this in the same passage, but refers again principle of contradiction ;
e?ret 5 dduvarov rty afterwards (Metaph., iv. 6. ion d\r)6eveaQaL 15) &IJ.a Kara rov avrov, (f>avepbv OTL ovde TavavTia a/u.a virdpxew ev5ex.Tai ry ai ry ; here the other stating that the principle of contradiction is the original principle upon which
to
it
depends.
:
l>,
The above proof should
the Aristotelian sense
;
i.e.
,
di>Tl<pa(reL rj
^eixreraC
dXX oure
This passage has received various interpre tations ; its meaning is there is no intermediate between the members of a contradiction ; This is obvious as soon as everything must be either affirmed or denied of everything. we define what true and false mean. To say that the existent is not, or that the non H.T)
elvcu,
f)
elvai, oi/Ve
TO
/ATJ
ov.
:
existent true.
is,
is
false
;
while to say that the existent
Thus when we
say that this
(i.e.
some
is
and that the non-existent is not, is which is either existent or
definite thing
THE NEGATION
151
is shown by the even Aristotle gives formulae containing both, while Leibnitz exincludes them both in the formula A proposition is either true jDressly or false." i But the either-or conceals an ambiguity in an apparently
Its close
connection with the principle of contradiction
fact that
"
:
"
"
simple expression, and the dependence of the derivative proposition sight
It
of.
is
more
therefore
is
lost
natural to give the principle of excluded
middle a special place as a corollary to those principles which immediately but it is incorrect to rank it beside ;
unfold the meaning of the negation
upon which
the principle of contradiction
immediate, especially as
its
application
depends, as
it
is
if it
were equally
easy and evident than
less
that
of the fundamental principle. 3.
It is
owing to the weakness of the mere negation, and the incom
pleteness of the information which
seem
denial, that difficulties
meaning of
gives us as to the
it
its
excluded
to arise in applying the principle of
middle.
The more
familiar difficulties,
arising
from continuous transitions and
When
the many-sidedness of the subjects, are indeed easily solved. is rising,
may be
two propositions
either of the
true,
"it
has
according as we apply the term
the horizon of the upper or lower edge.
It
"
risen
may
"
"
or
risen"
it
the sun
has not risen
to the elevation
"
above
be said that in the moment
non-existent) is or is not, we speak either truth or falsehood. But if we suppose a middle statement between affirmation and negation, it tells us neither that the existent, nor that the non-existent, either is not or is; for if any one of these statements were made, it
would be an affirmation or a negation, and
either true or false.
The middle statement
could say nothing either of the existent or of the non-existent, nor could it therefore be But that which is neither true nor false is no statement at all, for it either true or false. a part of the nature of a statement to be either true or false (wore oiire d\rjdev
O
on
ov
oiov Tras
Ka.0dA.ou,
corn rts
ouSets aV0pa)7ros AeuKos
?,
Ka@6\ov
AevKos
avOpwiros
ov ?ru9
This
A.et>K09.
ai/$pa)7ros
falsified by the thoughtless perfectly correct, and has not yet been some for ou TTUS and ris. 1 habit of substituting the plural
formula
is
"
"
But
3.
1
it is
The ordinary
correct only so long as
doctrine
is
that there
Contradictory opposition between,
is
All
and between,
s
are
Some A
s
No A
B
is
These two
latter propositions
Of the judgments
"some
A
B
are not
s
are
B
s
are
No A
s
are B.
cannot both be
true,
B
A
s
are
some
B
B
A
All
contrary opposition between,
passing from uncondition-
:
A
Some A
And
we avoid
s
but
may both
are not
be
false.
Aristotle rightly says aVrimrcu fj,6vov because the ,"
(Anal, pr., II. 15, 63 b, 27) TO TLVI ry ov nvl /caret, TTJV \ei;iv subjects are quite different. To these judgments modern terminology has given the absurd name of sub- contrary ; both, it is said, may be true, but both cannot be false. (If we "
"
A
B
A
B
the subjects are s are not some "some s are the same, the denotation alone being indefinite, then the propositions would naturally s are meant.) be contradictorily opposed but the expression leaves it undecided which lead us bears witness to the difficulty into which the ordinary doctrine seems to
assume that
in the proposition
"
A
;
A
justice of our
view as given above
;
viz., that
the contradiction between universal and par "
as the all judgments of opposed quality is the simple consequence of regarding As an instance of this difficulty, the two propositions "light is matter light predicate. is not matter are contradictorily opposed and one is necessarily true ; while the equiva no light is matter" are said to be in contrary lent propositions all light is matter The difficulty is solved when we opposition only, and may therefore both be false. notice that in the second pair of judgments an entirely new subject is introduced, which "
ticular
"
"
we are speaking of light, not according to its unity but From this it follows that the proposition "all light is according to its differences. matter is after all an inadequate and not completely equivalent expression for "light is involves the assumption that "
matter."
,
LOGIC
74
ally valid
judgments which are empirically valid and
to
judgments
vice
vers&.
The
universal
intended by means of the more intuitable universality when affirmative, the necessary connection of subject and predicate
judgment, which to state,
directed against an unconditionally
may be
negation
is
;
exclusion of the predicate from the subject. negative, the necessary In this case it can deny only what was meant, and says that in the first
when case
not necessary, in the second that
it is
But
to the subject. predicate to belong
to
must not be taken
belong to one or some
mean
to
actual
As
;
not
or does not
would be quite inadmissible
it
The statement
that
is
it
to apply
false that all
are sinners (in the sense of the sinfulness inherent in their nature) does tell
some men
us that
judgment sinned."
"all
If
men
it is
are
false that
some were
On
and the empirical because all have true,
are actually not sinners
sinners"
no man
negation of an impossibility, or
which has nothing have been enumer
B belongs
that the predicate
the relation of contradiction here.
men
not impossible, for the
is
with the presupposition that particular subjects
do
ated,
it
this negation,
it
might is
still
be
entirely bad,
;
"
in
the sense of the
would not on that account be true that one
in reality entirely bad.
the other hand, the negation of an empirically valid particular judg
ment can never be
the ground of an unconditionally universal, but only of
an empirically universal judgment. If it is false that there is anything living which has not had its origin from something living, then the propo sition omne vivum ex vivo is true in the sense that everything living which is
known
to us has
had
its
origin from
something living. (Bu^whether it an absolute necessity, is still that there are men who live over 200 years,
follows from this that the proposition states
disputed.
It
may be
false
but this gives no ground for the judgment in the sense that
it
would be impossible
to
"
no man be a
over 200 years
lives
man and
still
to be
"
more
than 200 years old. It is characteristic of the inferences of empirical science that
they pass
from empirically valid judgments to universal judgments which are un But their justification for so doing can be found conditionally valid. neither in the doctrine of the contradictory opposition of universal particular judgments, nor yet in the ambiguity of the
the difficult task of a theory of induction to ditions the transition
which
is
may be made from an
universally valid.
"
"
all
;
and
and it
is
determine under what con empirical judgment to one
PL URAL JUDGMENTS
1 7
5
The real import, then, of the universal and particular judgment with 4. which Aristotle and the traditional logic were concerned, and to which they attributed so "
viz.,
much
importance, was not that of the ordinary theory, whole extension or to a part of the
that a predicate belongs to the
extension of a subject
is
concept,"
but that the connection of a predicate with the The whole interest attaching to the
necessary or possible.
absence of an exception
lies in its
indication of a binding law
interest of the exception in the fact that
it
;
the whole
points to a plurality of possi
bilities.
This brings us naturally to
and the possible with reference
the closer investigation of the necessary to judgments.
CHAPTER VI. POSSIBILITY AND NECESSITY. to necessary for our immediate guidance, and before proceeding and the the to necessary, to treat of the logical questions referring possible
IT
is
lay
down a fundamental
possible or necessary
is
The statement
distinction.
that a
not the same as the statement that
possibility or necessity of
what
is
assertorial
Aristotelian
proposition
avay/o/s inrdp^fLV
:
;
stated in the judgment.
The Kantian which they
or apodeictic, applies to the former; the
Tracra
Zamv
TrpoTCKrts
rov ei/Se^eo-^at virap-^av
rj
to the
the latter to the objective
distinction of the differing modality of judgments, according to
are problematical,
is
possible or
The former refers
necessary for a predicate to belong to a subject. subjective possibility or necessity of judgment
judgment
it is
v)
(Anal
rov vTrap^eiV pr.,
I,
2,
77
rov
e
24^, 31) to the
latter.
I.
THE
SO-CALLED
MODAL
DISTINCTIONS.
31-
The
so-called
A is perhaps B]
PROBLEMATIC JUDGMENT in so far as the
"
A
may be
B
"
(meaning that
consciousness of objective validity
is
absent,
cannot properly be called a judgment i.e., it is not a judgment concerning that which is denoted by the subject of the proposition. It is a judgment ;
only in so far as
it
states that the
speaker
The so-called ASSERTORIAL JUDGMENT
is
not differ essentially from the apodeictic judgment that
A
is
when we its
in if
B)
;
for
every judgment of which
give utterance to
utterance.
it,
A is B. A is B} does
uncertain as to whether
(the simple statement
we
(it is
necessary to affirm
are completely conscious
includes the affirmation of the necessity of
judgments differ with respect to the way which the certainty is attained, whether it is immediate or mediate; but we were to ground the distinction between assertorial and apodeictic It is
true that the
this difference, then the apodeictic subordinate place, as having only a derivative certainty.
judgments upon
would take the
POSSIBILITY The
AND NECESSITY
177
between a statement which is merely possible and one does not appear in the case of immediate judgments necessary, where subject and predicate are found to agree without further mediation. 1.
which
distinction
is
Such judgments are formed according to the principle of Agreement with a confidence which is not the result of reflection. But it is different with mediated (synthetical) judgment such as takes place
when we form not
ideas of syntheses between definite subjects and definite predicates
These ideas may be due yet contained in the subject-idea before us. either to external stimulus, the questions or statements of other people, or they
may
arise
But
from psychological combinations.
internally
in
may be no ground capable of yielding a consciousness of objective validity in the synthesis, and then what we have is merely the idea of a synthesis which remains in suspense as a question or conjecture,
either case there
and awaits some decisive
Here the judgment necessary at the
is
certainty to confirm or
and
thought of as possible
moment
deny the predicate. means that it is not
this
person thinking about
for the
it
either to affirm
Such a judgment (A is 2?) which is merely thought of as possible and not yet affirmed, may be briefly denoted as the hypothesis A is and the simplest expression of this stage between synthesis and /?,
or to deny
it.
judgment is the question. This is genuine only when expecting yes or no for its decision when asked by one who has already made up his mind ;
for
the
one
sake of testing some
else,
it
not a question, properly
is
But while the question expresses the first seeks confirmation or rejection, it is which the of hypothesis conception if neither is found followed by the consciousness of indecision which is speaking, but an imperative..
n
expressed in the formula
formula so often used
"
A
"A
may
expresses both the objective
This form of statement, then,
(The perhaps B, A is perhaps not B. is ambiguous and misleading, for it be
is
B
"can"
"
(Svvacr&ai)
and subjective
hesitation.)
from the question only by expressing While the question to decide the question. differs
our consciousness of inability contains the wish for decision, this form denotes the resignation which
Both really express the same is obliged to remain in uncertainty. thought that of a synthesis concerning the validity of which we are undecided. 2.
This expression of uncertainty
is
generally called a Problematical
Judgment, and Assertorial and Apodeictic Judgments are opposed to expressing different degrees of certainty. 1
Cf. e.g. S. L-
Ueberweg, Logik,
ed. 3,
1
Kant
it
as
himself, indeed, gives a
69, p. 164 sq., ed. 5, p. 207; Drobisch,
61,
N
62.
i
LOGIC
8
7
somewhat
meaning to the problematical judgment.
different
He
tells
us
to the contents of (Kritik d. r. V., 9. 4) that modality contributes nothing which value the copula has with the but is concerned the judgment, only for
Problematical judgments are those in which
thought in general.
we
accept the affirmation or negation as merely possible (a matter of choice). Assertorial judgments, those
which
in
it
is
regarded as actual (true).
The Apodeictical judgments those in which we look upon it as necessary. Kant to of the extends problematical judgment arbitrary acceptation judgments which are obviously false they have a problematical signifi cance if it is thought that some one might perhaps for a moment accept such ;
a
On
proposition.
ment
to
when
its
the
mean one
1
every judgment
vTrofocris,
moment
not at the
is
validity
which compares the problematical judg
this view,
Aristotelian
we must
of two things, between which
is
problematical
But
expressly stated. distinguish.
this
The
may
reason
is stated concerning the validity of a judgment in Thought be that can be stated, because the speaker has not yet come may nothing to a decision; or it may be that the speaker will not state anything
why nothing
its
concerning
validity,
being to treat a valid
On
certain.
ulterior
purpose leading him for the time
as invalid,
judgment
or an uncertain judgment as
point the traditional Logic has not followed Kant, and
this
Kant himself
some
in his
Logic (Intr.
ix.)
means by the problematical judgment
nothing more than an uncertain acquiescence. But the custom of denoting the proposition 3.
"
"A
is
perhaps
a problematical judgment, threatens to destroy the concept of the
as
judgment
The be
and
itself,
to fall
into
essence of the judgment
and
true,
and leaves If every
it
An
calls for belief.
open
judgment
is
contradiction with
all
other teachings.
to present a statement
which claims to
utterance therefore which states nothing
for the opposite to is
be
true, is
not a kind of judgment.
either the affirmation or the negation of a question,
then an utterance which neither affirms nor denies cannot be a judgment ; for to leave the question undecided is no decision, and to be uncertain not a degree of certainty.
is
1
According
thing which
is
be certain, and
Programm p. 2.
A
:
to Aristotle, the
or it
is
not
;
virbde
reminds us of the doubt, it proceeds with circum
while the assertorial judgment makes straight for
when the judgment is an inferred one that the asser torial form expresses more complete confidence than the apodeictical, which seerns to challenge us to test the proof. Thus the former is always mark.
its
the
It is just
more
certainty
;
natural,
because the more direct expression of apodeictical
even logic states the conclusions of
its
syllogisms in the asser
torial form. It
might be objected to
this that
the speaker troubling himself but
This
is
true,
as true as
it
is
many
little
that
refute the proposition that the act
statements are
made
at
random,
as to the necessity of his statement.
many
lies
are told.
But
it
does not
of which the sober statement
is
the
adequate expression involves the declaration of the necessity of the judg ment, and that it is in this way that every one understands the statement. Else would speech be without thought, using words without meaning; or burdened with falsehood and presenting as certain that of which the speaker is not certain. It has nothing to do with logic that many falsehoods are thus spoken in the
strife of interests and party ; for logic presupposes the desire of speaking, as well as of thinking, in accordance with truth.
We
AND NECESSITY
POSSIBILITY grant also that
of
its
it is
only gradually that this desire of speaking and thinking
becomes conscious
the truth
But before
aim.
this
;
at first
;
judgment owes
its
merely an impulse unconscious is clear the speaker knows not
there, but
is
not free and conscious
it is
manifested in the certainty of par-
distinctive character in the last instance
Every particular judgment may be
the unity of self-consciousness.
to
is
it
consciousness
what he is doing judgment is indeed and has not yet come to full maturity. The necessity of thought which 8. ticular acts of
187
repeated with the consciousness of the identity of subject and predicate as well as of the act of judgment ; starting from the same data it is always the
same
exist
synthesis which takes place,
and our self-consciousness cannot
Thus our judging
apart from this invariability.
ego, with
its
un
as a universal,
particular acts of
is opposed to judgment same and the permanent which binds together the different and With the confidence of the move temporally separated acts of thought.
varying activity,
as the
ment
in
connected the consciousness of unvarying same point. In this constancy, which presents
each particular case
repetition, of return to the
a general
judgment
is
we
are conscious of
as something withdrawn from the sphere in
which we have a
law in contrast with the particular
act,
we are conscious subjective choice and are free to bring about alterations of it in the same way as when it maintains itself in some particular act ;
Because
against contradiction. is
this identity
the condition of our consciousness as one
final
and fundamental in
consciousness, there
as in
its
basis
and constancy of our action and undivided,
upon which we can
fall
completeness and comprehensiveness,
immature childhood
is
it
back.
also the
While
this
not
yet
is
so long the psychological conditions of
judgment are not yet fully developed. The case is the same in dreams, where only a few trains of imperfectly coherent ideas are aroused.
From
this
it
follows
meaning, to necessary
that each single act of
and universally valid laws
judgment ;
by its which are
points,
laws, that
is,,
universally valid both for the single subject in his temporally different
moments, and
for the various thinking subjects with
community of thought; laws which, at
first
whom we
stand in one
unconscious, serve only to bring
about the certainty of the judgment, but which, when raised into conscious ness, give us our fundamental intuition of something which is necessary. 9.
The
necessity of thought, which
tainty of the particular act of tion, is
first
becomes apparent
judgment and the
something essentially positive
;
it
is
invariability of
in the cer its
repeti
the immediate expression of
/
1
LOGIC
88
intelligence, the
consciousness
form of self-consciousness
it is
much an immediate
as
For
ego, or of being.
this reason,
it
is
and when brought
itself,
into
intuition as the thought of the
measure of the further
also the
In the sphere of judgment the concepts of possibility and impossibility. possible is that which it is not necessary either to affirm or to deny ; it is the suggestion, the attempt of a judgment, which
never decided and
is
completed, and cannot be taken into the unity of self-consciousness, or
woven
Mere
into the lasting
possibility
two meanings
;
is
fabric
which
The
a privation.
which
that
thought, at the most
it
is
as
impossible to
is
might be spoken thought corresponding to the words "the what Aristotle means when he says that it
same thing
certain as
my own
existence.
impossible, on the other hand, has
it
in
think,
words.
circle is
is
would never be
There can be no square,"
and
this is
impossible to think of the
for it is not same time being and not being On the other hand we have necessary to accept what we say as the possible which must necessarily be denied, the hypothesis which is quite feasible when taken by itself, but the affirmation of which would
as at the
"
true."
conflict with itself.
a valid proposition, and so place thought at variance with is to be found only in the sphere of the mediated
This impossible
judgment; the predicate may be thought of
as compatible with the subject because their incompatibility is not known analytically, and thus the pro position may be temporarily accepted so long as the truth opposed to it escapes consciousness only a thorough comparison between all our judg ;
ments brings about the negation of the possible. It is in this sense only that Leibnitz s distinction is correct, when he says that the negation of necessary truths
is
impossible, that of truths of matter of fact possible.
We may
attempt to state them, but our experience refuses to confirm, and forces us to deny them. 10.
From what we have
negation validity
i.e.
is
said,
a judgment which
it
follows that an actual affirmation or
we
only possible for those to
utter
with a consciousness
whom
it
is
necessary;
of
its
as far as
the
judgment itself is concerned possibility and necessity coincide. On hand the hypothesis is possible if and so long as it is not As the necessary, and therefore impossible, either to affirm or deny it. the other
expression of a subjective state of indetermination it may certainly be said to take a third place beside affirmation and negation ; but just for that reason it is not a
judgment.
AND NECESSITY
POSSIBILITY
189
32.
The
so-called
LAW OF SUFFICIENT REASON,
not a logical law at
is
Leibnitz,
as originally conceived
by
but a metaphysical axiom, which
all,
is
applicable to a part only of our judgments.
Inasmuch
we may has not is
as every
down
lay
judgment presupposes the certainty of
its
validity,
the proposition that no judgment finds utterance which
some psychological ground for its certainty and inasmuch as it only when it is logically necessary, every judgment claims to ;
justified
have a logical ground which makes it necessary for all who think. But it does not do more than raise a claim, the justice of which it falls to logic to investigate.
The nature of necessity in thought is expressed by when the ground is affirmed its consequences are also
the proposition that necessarily affirmed,
when the consequences are denied the ground This principle of Ground and Consequence corresponds to
and
that
also
is
denied.
the principle of
contradiction as a fundamental law of the operation of thought.
The
1.
paragraph seem to find their natural
results of the preceding
expression in the proposition that judgment cannot take place without a
mean
ground, for by the ground we
Thus an
necessary.
just
that
which makes a judgment judgment framed and
analysis of the import of every
spoken would give us the fourth of the so-called laws of thought; it would express the characteristic common to all judgment whatever i.e., that belief in the validity of the
But the law of
2.
to
it,
and
Leibnitz was the
thought.
judgment involves belief in its necessity. Reason has had various meanings assigned
has shared the fate of the other so-called laws
this
in
Sufficient
first
to give
the law of contradiction.
principle with
"
Our
Nos raisonnements
1
Frinc. phi!., 31 sq. ; Erdm. 707: principes, celui de la contradiction
du quel nous considerons qu aucun
it
a co-ordinate place as a
.
.
fait
.
et celui
de
inferences,"
he
of
first 1
says,
sont fondes sur deux grands en vertu
la raison suffisante,
ne saurait se trouver vrai ou existant, aucune
enontiation veritable, sans qu il-y-ait vine raison suffisante pourquoi il en soit ainsi et non pas autrement, quoique ces raisons le plus souvent ne puissent point nous etre connues.
In the de Scientia Universali (Erdm., follows
Omnis
:
veritatis (quse
p.
same principle as reddi posse rationem,
83), Leibnitz formulated the
immediata sive identica non
est)
vel expresse vel implicite proedicati semper notioni sui subjecti evident, therefore, that the principle as he understood it here was a are not identical are true purely logical one, according to which all propositions which On the other hand, there are only in so far as their necessity is syllogistically proved. in the Theod., 44 places in which he emphasizes only the metaphysical aspect, e.g. 1 autre (Erdm., p. 515) principe est celui de la raison determinante, c .est
hoc
est,
inesse.
notionem
It
is
:
.
.
.
i
LOGIC
9o
and based upon two great principles, that of contradiction that of the ratio suffidens, by virtue of which we assume that no fact is .
"are
this
is
it
true, unless there is a sufficient
no proposition
true or actual,
and not something
may be unknown
to
else,
not
It is
us."
although difficult
.
.
reason
why
most cases these reasons
in
here to distinguish the two
sides of the question, and to see that he is speaking partly of the actual existence of real things and events, partly of the truth of propositions. But
we must remember
that Leibnitz intends this principle as the
truths of matter of fact alone,
a
that with
Then
it
him the ultimate
becomes evident
real
world
and the
thing,
;
upon
state facts is
dependent upon
actual event or thing.
regarding
this
But
The
reality of those
that in
truth of
facts, their
the reality of the fact stated
and
this
so that in giving the real ground of a
the cause which has given rise to the
this just
shows how
little
we
are justified in
an absolutely universal logical
as
principle
;
name
I
fact,
and
of every real
must have a cause.
based upon the
the sufficient cause
of matter of
truth
contradiction;
always the Divine Will.
that the existence
is,
reality of every event,
truth being thus
is
no other than the principle of causation
is
the principle, that
propositions which
reality
ratio suffidens
ground for which state
that this distinction signifies nothing,
the principle of Leibnitz the
for the truth of propositions
while necessary truths rest upon the principle of
fact,
and
i.e.
law,
which
should rank beside the law of contradiction as valid in reference to the
same
propositions, or in trying to find in the Leibnitzian proposition a
ground
logical
distinct
from the real cause.
Such an interpretation
indeed excluded by the repeated remark that the ratio suffidens This is true only of real causes. frequently be unknown to us.
is
may
A
ground which we do not know is, strictly speaking, a contradic tion for it only becomes a ground Unless we through our knowing it. believe in the fiction that a judgment can be true apart from any intelli logical ;
gence by which
it is
we cannot
thought,
independent existence of
believe that
its
ground has an
own.
its
que jamais rien n arrive, sans qu il-y-ait une cause ou du moins une raison determinante, c est-a-dire quelque chose qui puisse servir a rendre raison a priori, pourquoi cela est existant plutot que non, et de telle Ce grand principe plutot que de toute autre fa9on. a lieu dans tous les evenements
Pr. de la Nature
et de la Grace, 7 (Erdm., p. a Mr. Clark (Erdm., p. 751). While yet again in the fifth letter to Clark, 125 (Erdm., p. 778) we find the full formula Ce principe est celui du besoin d une raison suffisante, pour qu une chose existe, qu un evenement arrive, qu une verite ait lieu.
716)
:
rienne se
:
fait
.
.
.
sans raison suffisante.
Cf.
Trots, ccrit
AND NECESSITY
POSSIBILITY If therefore
we
it
lay
down as a logical law that nothing should be we must certainly mean something quite
thought
without a ground,
different
from what Leibnitz meant.
3.
we
If
191
distinguish between the Real Cause
and the Ground of the
Judgment, between what makes it necessary for an existing thing or event to be actual in a given way, and that upon which the judgment is based as an act of thought, there still remain two very different meanings in which the word
From one
"
"
ground
may be
taken.
point of view every judgment, as an
actual
psychological
be regarded as something existent, and the conception of the causal relation and its fundamental principle is so far applicable that every event must have its sufficient cause. The cause of an act of judgment must be sought, in the first place, event in a thinking individual,
amongst psychological the
is
sum
gether with
its
total
The
act of judgment.
thus the
is
possible unless certain
psychological cause of a
of the necessary conditions of this particular
principal cause
is
the judging subject
itself,
to
and the laws which govern the manifes further consists in those states and preced
;
and
it
ing acts out of which this given
following conditions
The
;
faculty of thought,
tations of this faculty
a.
itself
no judgment
for
facts,
present to consciousness
ideas are
judgment
may
judgment
arises.
Amongst
these are the
:
ideas both of subject
and predicate must have been present
in
consciousness ; (this presence in consciousness implies causes which are still further removed, and which we may call the causa remotiores of the interest judgment, one of the most important being the will, as led by some in its desire to know and to think about an object). b.
A
must have taken place between the ideas of subject and because of an agreement which has led the activity of
synthesis
predicate, either
thought, in accordance with
its
synthesis was suggested by the
laws, to connect
manner
them, or because their
of their entrance into consciousness,
which gave rise to the thought of their possible connection. In the latter case something must have occurred to bring about a c. decision
either affirmative or negative, and,
includes the consciousness of tion of the certainty as
its
an actual
inasmuch as every judgment
validity, to afford a psychological explana
state of mind.
must be made amongst immediate mere ideas and those which con which connect those between judgments With immediate judgments of the first tain a reference to the existent.
From
this point of view a distinction
,
LOGIC
92
kind the principle of agreement (as expressing a law of motion for thought) sufficient to explain both the synthesis and the certainty attaching to it ;
is
while statements which refer to the existent, as tion
lightens
(it
which in
feelings,
into
a
this iron is hot)
Their occasion
suppositions.
me
;
position in which
ment the sum
a momentary feeling, or complex of number of causes which have brought
is
turn points to a
its
an actual matter of
e.g. judgments of percep depend upon more complicated pre
fact,
senses
my
we must
total of all
may be
thus affected.
But, besides
include amongst the causes of the judg
the psychological forces which are incessantly
re-creating the ideas of actual things and their attributes out of sensations, and bring about in each particular case the certainty that we perceive and
The principle of agreement explains only the way in the existent. which we identify present perception with a former idea ; it can never explain the general conviction of the material reality of things, nor the know
we say at the moment is a true judgment concerning While then the merely explicative judgment is sufficiently explained by the causes which give rise to the ideas and our consciousness conviction that what
matter of
fact.
of them, together with the principle of agreement, the other judgments call for special
explanations of our belief in the reality of things.
see the Kantian distinction between analytical
and
Here we
synthetical judgments
and the meaning of the question how synthetical judgments becomes obvious. It is clear also that
reappear,
(in the Kantian sense) are possible
recognition of the existing causes which give rise to our belief in reality,
and
the actual validity of our judgments of perception, can
in
to the correctness of this
nothing as
existing causes that sun
belief;
and moon appear
it
is
tell
us
due, for instance, to
larger to all of us
when
rising
than when in the meridian.
In mediated judgments, however, the mediation which brings about a decision need not consist solely in premises which can themselves be stated in the
form of judgments;
it
may
also consist in unconscious habits of
combination, and in the influence of authority which
is
rooted in un
analysable impressions. totality of psychological conditions we may now dis the occasion, which brings subject and predicate into con
Amongst the tinguish
i.
:
sciousness,
question
;
thus giving 2.
rise, in
the case of mediated judgments, to the
the ground of decision
which
enables
us
to
affirm
the
judgment, and to state the subjective synthesis as objectively valid, and which is therefore the ground also of the subjective certainty of the judg-
POSSIBILITY The change
ment.
AND NECESSITY
in the objects
193
concerning which we judge depends
occasion, which may, so far as the content of thought
upon the
cerned, be quite a matter of chance, and
come
entirely
con
is
from without
;
but
the ground of the decision always brings us back, in the last instance, to
a psychical force working in accordance with laws, and any particular psychological event can only be called the ground in so far as it introduces
Thus in all immediate the judgment by virtue of a constant connection. analytical judgment the ground upon which we attribute the predicate is the subject-idea, but only inasmuch
as, in
accordance with the principle of
agreement, the presence of subjects and predicates which agree necessitates their synthesis.
Of
5.
this psychological
ground of certainty the law holds good
that
no judgment can be made without a ground, i.e. unless the conscious ness of its validity has in one way or another been produced and thus without
violence to veracity no proposition can be stated which
is
not
accompanied by the consciousness of the validity of the judgment. This is involved in the nature of the judgment itself, as maintaining the validity of a synthesis,
and
in the
fact
that a purely arbitrary act, a sic volo, sic
iubeo; could not produce that consciousness of validity which implies that We do not, however, mean by this that we the synthesis is not arbitrary.
are
always conscious of the ground as
soon as we have uttered the
judgment. But the necessity asserted by every judgment stated with a full 6. understanding of its meaning is not this psychological necessity, but objective
affirmed
truth
with
;
it,
and the ground of is not one peculiar
its
to
certainty,
which
is
implicitly
the individual, but a universal
for every one, and can themselves as such, since these only and not the This alone is the individual frame of mind, etc., can be common to all.
ground which must make the judgment necessary lie
only in the ideas
logical ground, the certainty.
ground of truth as distinguished from the ground of and strife are due in the last instance to a difference
All error
between the psychological ground of certainty and the ground of truth to momentary belief may err, and the temporary feeling ;
the possibility that
of certainty deceive us.
So
far the
law holds good that no proposition
is
ground but just for this reason the investigation of what is a logical ground, and what the conditions are which justify us in affirming The object of our analysis of a proposition, falls beyond our present task. true without a
;
the judgment was only to s. L.
show
that every statement claims
by
its
meaning o
LOGIC
194 to have a logical ground,
and that
also involves the
this
problem of how
the ground may be known.
A
7.
further distinction
in thought
we always
is
start
called for here, which arises from the fact that
from data which have arisen involuntarily and
Absolute necessity would belong only to judgments of judgments as such, both necessarily developed in every being capable itself and the connection connected ideas the being inevitable ; and this is without reflection.
what
is
which is based upon innate ideas (in innate truths. and The ground of these original sense) reason itself, and so far as they are concerned there can be no
presupposed
the older
judgments difference
in every theory
and is
between
logical
and psychological ground.
have only a hypothetical necessity,
i.e.
it
is
But other judgments
logically necessary to maintain
them on the presupposition that something else has preceded in con sciousness. So far, then, as it depends upon external conditions what ideas arise in a subject and come together in thought, the judgment A is B is
B
indeed necessary so soon as we are conscious of A and as agreeing ; but it should come into at all is not thought universally and absolutely
that
Only when we assume an ideal thought, comprehending
necessary.
truth, is the logical necessity
For the individual whose voluntary thought aims is moral and conditioned by his ability.
thought.
all
a material necessity also, giving rise to actual at this ideal,
the necessity
From one
point of view, then,
truest sense only that
another
we can accept
which must
itself
we may look upon every
as a
ground
actual premise as a
that a further
in its fullest
of necessity be thought.
results
from
ground so
and
But from far as
we
with logical necessity.
acknowledge judgment We may indeed go a step further and find a relation of ground and consequence between propositions which we think of only as hypotheses,
and
in reference to
certainty.
To
which therefore there
say that a hypothesis
hypothesis means, that
if
the former
is
it
not
even a psychological
is
a ground with respect to another
is
accepted as
true,
then the
latter
must also be accepted as true. Thus in the first case ground signifies that which compels us to complete a judgment so soon as it has actually
come
into conscious thought ; here it means the hypothesis which, when accepted as valid, forces us to maintain the validity of another hypothesis. It is of the ground in this latter sense that the law holds good which was formulated by Aristotle, 1 and which in later times has ranked only as
1
Aristotle, Anal., ?r. II., 4, 57
b.
I
:
"Orav
5to ?xy OVTU irpfa &\\T)\a wcrre Sartpov
AND NECESSITY
POSSIBILITY
the principle of hypothetical inferences is
ground is is
affirmed the consequence
denied the ground
the negation if
of
is
the law, that
;
also affirmed,
All that
logical
is
that
is,
when
A
is
involves that of
when
the
the consequence
expressed by this formula as the nature of
necessity, just
expressed by the principle of contradiction.
the proposition
A
also denied.
is
and meaning of
nature
the
is
195
It tells
us that
recognised as the ground of B, then the affirmation
B
also, the
negation of
B that of A
This law
also.
alone deserves to rank beside the principle of contradiction, for, like it, it applies to a fundamental form in which thought moves, a progress accord
But
ing to necessary connections.
just as the principle of contradiction
undecided which of the opposed statements holds good, so also law leaves it undecided whether either ground or consequence is
leaves this
it
true.
Material causality must in no way be confused with the
S.
relation of
The
ground and consequence.
logical
proposition that every thing,
or every change, has its cause, stands in just the same relation to the logical necessity of our judgments as every other general proposition which serves as a ground for extending our statements, or enables us to pass with logical necessity "ground"
earth
is
from one proposition to another.
If
we use
the expression
of material causality also, and say that the attraction of the
the ground of the falling of bodies,
all
that
we
are immediately told
one produces the other realiter. But so far as the causal is, by relation when recognised enables and forces us to infer from the fact that the
this
that the cause takes place that the
recognition
effect
also takes
place, so far that
and only by assuming the causal relation of one fact to that of another distinct from
a logical ground
is
;
can we pass from the truth Thus the propositions which state causal relations play an important it. but it is far from being true that every part amongst our logical grounds ;
logical
way in
in
ground is based upon a causal relation, and still which our judgments depend upon each other at
which material causality takes
The
effect.
less true that all
distinction
still
between the ground of knowledge and the material ground, and obvious whenever an effect leads to recognition of the cause. Finally,
9.
probability.
of which &VTOS
e
we must
we have
dvdyKrjs
flvai ddrepov.
eii/cu
it
remains
becomes
and grounds of one of several hypotheses, none affirming ; and this they do by
distinguish between logical grounds
These give the preference sufficient
ground
ddrepov, TOUTOV
fj.rj
to
for
the
resembles that
6Vroj ptv ov5
ddrepov &TTCU, 6vros 5 owe
LOGIC
196
that this intensifying the expectation their value
Thus
one
sometimes a practical significance
when
e.g.,
;
is,
and
prove to be,
will
valid.
only psychological, but they have
in the first instance
is
it is
necessary,
upon
practical
absence of certainty. The have for the growth of knowledge cannot be in which they significance third part of the book. vestigated until the grounds, to
come
to
some decision even
in the
POSSIBLE AND NECESSARY AS PREDICATES OF ACTUAL
II.
JUDGMENTS. 33-
In
"
"
its
objective sense,
dicate of that which
a thing
or that
is,
is
it
expressed
in
This necessity
the nature of the thing, or external
govern the particular ditionally universal
While the
It is
last
instance a pre
necessary either that
is
and due
either internal to causality.
and due
to
In either case
knowable only in the form of general rules, which while, on the other hand, it is the aim of uncon
It is
hypothetical.
i.
always in the
a judgment.
has certain attributes, or exerts certain activities, or
stands in certain relations.
it is
is
necessary
;
judgments
assertorial
to express this necessity.
judgment
is
separated from the apodeictical
by no essential, inherent difference, the statement that something must be or must happen
differs in its
contents from the statement that
it is
or
happens when these statements extend beyond the sphere of our ideas to No doubt, wherever the the existent, and refer to a material necessity. "
must
as
"
"
all
what
and the
"
necessity
"appear
bodies are necessarily is
meant
is
in
merely explicative judgments such and an effect must have a cause
"
"
extended,"
the logical necessity contained in the fixed meanings
of our words which compels us to connect a predicate idea with a subject idea,
and hence
can be applied.
to predicate the former of everything to
The judgment
"
bodies are extended
"
which the
latter
makes the same
statement as the judgment "bodies must be extended"; the only differ ence is that the latter expressly reminds any one who may be in danger of it of the meaning of the words. But when we are speaking of the existent
forgetting
as such, then our statements
necessity refer to something which
is binding upon the and not merely upon our judgment. Necessary then becomes a significant predicate which is affirmed or denied in just the same way as any other predicates of actual judgments.
concerning existent
its
"
itself,
"
POSSIBILITY It is true that
of things as such necessity in
used as a predicate is
a necessary
AND NECESSITY
;
"the
Being,"
proper sense cannot be
not an attributive word.
it is
pression of our thought
its
197
\
world
Such phrases as "God ex necessary," are no adequate
not
is
what we mean
is,
that
God
Just as Set or oportet require a proposition to follow, called auxiliary verb, so also
only what
it is
is
necessarily exists.
and
"
must
"
is
a so-
stated in a proposition
its possession of a quality, its development of an which can be predicated as necessary. Only to abstract nouns which take the place of a proposition can necessary be attributed as a
the existence of a thing, activity
"
"
predicate
;
judgment
the existence of
e.g.,
no exception
is
God
to this
;
is
necessary that
thinking being, should judge thus.) This introduces a new class of statements is
that
which
is
stated in a
attribute
itself,
as in
credible, logically necessary).
false,
can only speak of material necessity in so its
those in which the subject
judgment (not the judgment
case of the predicates true,
the thing with
(The necessity of the I, and that every
necessary.
is
it
and
activity,
far as
the
Thus we
a material unity, that of
corresponds to the synthesis of
the judgment. 2.
What
is
which connects existence with an object of thought, an
it
attribute or activity with a definite existing subject, or different things in
one relation?
assume
If
we
disregard for the present necessity of existence and
that certain things are, there remains for investigation their kind
of being and their
mode
This appears to us primarily as merely
of action.
matter of fact and empirical, and what since
necessary,
thus
The ground
thought.
ment which
alone can
;
to see that
are investigating here
bond
nor do we seek a is
that
is
it
is
also
not the origin of
of necessity in the world,
the knowledge that something
It
is
matter of fact in our knowledge must be found
What we
the attempt to find such a
beyond so it must be
we want
be understood and penetrated by
of the subjective necessity of that part of our judg
refers to the
in material necessity.
it
the
is
and happens,
and
metaphysical justification is
there
to attain,
to the insight that for
this
and governs our
enough attempt popular as well as our scientific thought, so that the problem arises of
assumption.
establishing
its
meaning.
Here we must begin by guides
all
distinguishing between the presupposition which
our thought, that there
is
necessity in the world,
and the ground
of the statement that this or that particular thing necessarily is. Necessity the is knowable only where there is an invariability of connection in
i
LOGIC
98
existent like that
which governs the connection between thoughts in the
when therefore the particular event results in sphere of logic ( 31. 8); infallible certainty from what has preceded it, as the with and variably
when the same data are present judgment always recurs in the same way and when therefore a complete coincidence of material with logical ne In such invariability alone do we find the ground of cessity is possible. ;
That which
the necessity that something
is.
must have the
and universal
invariability
it must be universal as opposed logical ground and invariable as opposed to mutability in time. ;
means
necessary always
which
is
know
to
constant and universal.
see the necessity of that which
parable
with
anything
to the particular case,
To know something as consequence of something reason it is that we can never
as the
it
For is
be a material ground which belongs to the
to
is
validity
this
purely individual,
and
as such
incom
even though we may believe that
else,
it
is
necessary.
We
3,
as
regard the necessity which binds together subject and predicate
sometimes
internal,
sometimes external
of that between analytical
make
in itself sufficient to
necessity as internal rise to It
its
;
for us it is
distinction reminds us
when something we look upon
else it
must supervene
spirit
body moves when
it
is
is
in order to give
is
self-conscious
and
In the
first
pushed.
instance the attribute
and the
alone so soon as
there, in the latter case not until
it is
a subject
as external.
an internal necessity that the
external that a
When
determinations necessary, we look upon the
a determination,
is
thinks
;
and the
;
and synthetical judgments.
activity result of themselves
from the subject
something else
is
there also. 4.
When we
speak of internal necessity, we contrast the unity of the
thing with the plurality of
former as
the
its
which makes the attribute or a fixed order of change.
and
activities,
and regard the distinctions,
activity necessary, either as constant
In so
necessity of certain attributes thing,
attributes
permanent ground, unaffected by temporal
or in
far as the unity of the thing involves the
it is
called the essence (the nature) of the
and everything which proceeds from In no philosophical conception has
its
essence alone
is
essential
thought played a more important part than in the doctrine of Leibnitz that there is none but to
it.
internal necessity, activities
from
its
ticular individual
and
that each particular
own
inner nature alone.
is
this
monad
develops
Here the nature
the sole ground of necessity,
its
series of
of the par
and the whole course of
POSSIBILITY its
existence
AND NECESSITY
only the unfolding of this nature.
is
It is
199
recognisable partly
in immutable attributes and permanent activities, partly in the law of rise to another. development which prescribes that one activity shall give
a
idea of a permanent ground governing the manifestations of the thought of a thing as being identical with itself and yet which thing in If we want activities culminates. having changeable attributes and varying It is this
to establish the full identity of the thing, actuality at
any
Here we
given time.
we must look deeper than
find change;
are not external to the thing, the thing being what
and since it
is
its
attributes
through
its attri
itself seems in danger of disappearing butes, the identity of the thing
there
is
no
basis
permanent
in
change and giving
rise to that
if
very change.
only
the unity and identity implied in a thing can be represented in thought in the same if one and the same ideal content, which recurs always
way,
may be
And
taken as the counterpart of a real existence identical with
itself.
This same thought of the nature of the thing as the permanent, timeless
ground of
its
affords varying, temporal actuality,
an objective
justification
The comprehension of spatially
for our primarily subjective general ideas.
and temporally different things under one general idea, and their denota sub tion by one and the same word, is an arbitrary act guided only by to the grounds of expediency, unless there belongs in all beyond something really common to all and identical
jective caprice or
various things
the similarity which appears to us. the distinguishable ties,
and
particular
and must be found
in
But
this
common
lies
behind
their individual peculiari
phenomena, with
the fact that a
element
common
nature necessitates
and that variations are looked uniformity in attributes and activities, as due to external causes, as accidental, and not essential. 5.
External necessity
is
opposed
to internal,
upon
and determination by
cir
cumstances to the development of nature. Every particular phenomenon takes is this because another is that ; every change in a particular thing because a certain change has taken place in another thing. Things place
of have the power of mutually prescribing each other s action. The order the to one other, from the world consists in this necessity which passes and which is causal necessity in the narrower meaning of cause as causa transient.
The knowledge
that something
is
what
and happens
it is,
as
it
the general
is made up of two elements happens, from external necessity, is neces law and the particular datum to which this law is applicable. It our sun round the knowledge of to move in for the
sary
planets
ellipses
:
LOGIC
200 this rests
on the one hand upon our knowledge of the general principles hand upon our knowledge of the actual mass
of mechanics, on the other
of the sun and the planets and of the relation between tangential velocity
and
attraction
We
a different relation would give rise to different orbits.
;
cannot get rid of
this purely empirical
element, and for this reason our
knowledge of the necessity as such is expressed in hypothetical forms which state that if this or that occurs something else necessarily
only,
The occurrence
occurs.
causes
;
empirical
and so on ad
fact,
Thus the
to be necessary,
causes present, which
The
again necessary from
is
di/ay/o;
e
phenomenon
uTrotfeVetos.
But
if
logical
and
never more than a
is
When
hypothetical necessity of the existent due to
live
may
we look more and causal
willing being
something is said results from the
it
called necessary. 1
cause seems distinct from necessity due to the end. order that he
other further
infinitum.
not the cause, but the fact that
is
it
is
we always come upon some
necessity of each particular
conditioned necessity, an
6.
former
of the
but in explanation of these
;
nature and
its
must breathe
in
its
Man
peace we must be prepared for war. teleological necessity may be analysed into
to maintain
closely, this
Only as the thought of an
necessity.
actual, thinking
the end something actual which can be a ground of
is
something which is thought of as in the future and willed, which is intended, though, according to the causal order of nature, which connects every given result with given causes, it can be realized only by means of given causes. Hence whoever wills the end It is
necessity.
and the
realization of
assuming that we will a definite end, it is neces means. The connection between the thought ot the end and the thought of the means as objects of our will is logical; but the necessity of thought rests upon our knowledge of the causal necessity
must also
will the
sary that
we
The
of being. thai the
end
means
is
facts
infer with logical necessity the
be willed
upon
presupposed in the final cause are on the one hand on the other that efficient causes are present which changed or multiplied. From our knowledge of these
willed,
cannot be arbitrarily
we may
;
will definite
if
the end
results as
is
willed.
But
in
means for a given end, which must our interpretation of nature we look
ends even where there
thinking subject and
its
realization,
is no reference to the will of any because the end here serves as the
point of connection for a plurality of causes
;
and hence
arises the
ance of a special kind of necessity, distinct from that which 1
These concepts
will
be more
fully
explained in Part III.
is
appear
logical or
AND NECESSITY
POSSIBILITY
201
Man must breathe in order that he may live" this expresses nothing more than our recognition of the fact that the order of nature has connected death inevitably with the cessation of breathing, and that breath "
causal.
ing cannot be replaced by any existing contrivance.
must
as an end, breathing
also
be willed
as a
Should
life
be willed
means.
Suppose again that the thought were in itself creative then it would not be an end, needing the means for its realization it would be simply a ;
;
cause having the power to produce a material
would be no
there
The same There
which
so that here again
considerations apply to what has been called moral necessity.
are certain normal laws which a rational being with a will
to recognise as principles valid for his will,
bound
reality,
teleological necessity.
;
and by which he
and the recognition of such obligation
is
forced
is
feels
himself
a necessity of his nature
is
regarded as an essential characteristic of the rational subject.
If
these normal laws are actually willed and accepted as a highest end, then it
becomes
logically necessary to apply
But
the obligation to particular cases.
the light of a necessity because
them
to the particular, to transfer
to regard
the obligation itself in
a feeling of constraint, is to confuse our conceptions and to conceal the cleft which divides the it
brings with
it
recognition of obligation and actual willing. 7.
When
the necessity refers to existence
itself,
then, from the point of
view of external causality, it is obvious that in affirming the existence of any particular thing to be necessary we assume a creative power which produces
We
it
may,
explaining existence
some
either from blind necessity or for the sake of
for instance, it
try to
self-manifestation of
as the
actual end.
understand the existence of the world by
God
;
in so doing,
from a higher cause, and thus attribute to
it
a
we
derive
its
conditional
necessity.
But suppose
it
is
maintained that something has of
existence, as in the ontological proof
the essence of God,
being thus
made
and
to
where existence
necessary
proceed necessarily therefrom, an attempt into absolute necessity ; then
had thrown upon the thought of
necessity,
bond of connection between
thought or of being.
s
own
self-consciousness
and which had shown distinguishable
to
be
data, either
of
it
bond which breaks away as soon as we attempt with a mere concept, a concept, moreover, which
It is a
to connect the existent
belongs to no one
itself
said to belong to
to convert hypothetical
the light leaves us which the experience of our
merely a
is
thought
;
and
if
the idea
is
that something already
LOGIC
2 o2
of
undertakes the superfluous task
existent
itself
making
necessarily
existent (although existence is already presupposed in such necessity), then Just as we cannot speak there is nothing left for the bond to connect.
without presupposing an existing, comprehensibly of logical necessity it is to nature whose think, so also an ultimate and thinking subject is
simple being
always presupposed in necessity of existence.
member
in the first
God
of our series
;
that
we
causa sui and has the grounds of His being in Himself,
is
1
ourselves to be misled by words into stating
and lead
to
formulae,
is
Somewhere
or other
world which
of the
allow
the fictitious
empty nowhere more obvious than when they are taken seriously the metaphysical myth of a ground distinct from God Him
value of which
self.
In the rest
we must have necessity even and when we accept the answer that
we imagine
lessness of our questioning,
we must end
confines
That view
with simple being.
to the cycle of
itself
finite
causes must
whole complex of mutually conditioned beings as something if we would understand the world as necessary,
regard the
simply existent; while,
we make all
it
dependent upon God, where it is even more certain that between being and necessary being absolutely fails us.
distinction
Mathematical necessity
8.
what we
call necessity.
it
often taken as the most perfect type of
Spinoza
s
standing illustration of the material
the production of an effect by
necessity in as
is
follows from
the
nature of the
its
cause
triangle that
"
is
its
in the
same way
angles are equal
two right angles." This is not the place to investigate the nature of mathematical knowledge, or to determine the question whether its necessity is logical or material. It is, however, clear from what has been said that
to
involves that constancy and in which they are always presented in the same way,
the very nature of mathematical objects virtue of
by and because of which every variability
may be repeated material objects we are that
it
in
particular has the significance of a general in
the
forced
same way
in actual intuition
to seek for a constant
;
while in
element and dis
from casual and varying connections. Space and plurality, our and counting, are all no doubt given in the first instance ; but they are given in such a way that we are certain of their absolute engage
it
intuition of space
immutability. 9.
Now
it
is
none other than
universal judgments are
meant
this
objective
necessity which our
to express; the necessity, that
is,
of the
union between the subject and definite attributes, or of the connection 1
Cf.
Arnauld
s
criticism of Descartes in the Objectiones Quartcc.
POSSIBILITY between definite activities,
and
and
attributes, activities,
"
is heavy,"
that which
matter
is
be
to the nature of matter to
judgment
whenever the subject
ject
;
it.
The judgments
is
thing
the universal judgment
;
working according such a judgment
When
said that the subject
is
necessarily all
tells
it
heavy,"
all
belongs
The connection
equivalent.
predicate
is
actually
thrown body describes a
when thrown necessarily describes a forces
"
l(
necessary from the nature of the sub
exists, its
"every
attributes,
this necessity is
The judgments
justified.
are
heavy,"
of the predicate with the subject
203
and other
relations,
Only when we are convinced of
relations.
the unconditionally universal
matter
AND NECESSITY
parabola,"
combined with
parabola,"
again state
"a
the
body same
us nothing but the causal necessity of
to fixed laws.
denied, then the necessity
is
the traditional doctrine by the particular
is
denied
This
might be without the predicate. "
judgment
is
;
and
it is
expressed in
some matter
is
not
heavy."
10.
When
universal judgments express the essential predicates of things,
they coincide with explicative judgments, and the logical necessity of the
judgment with the objective necessity which finds utterance in it. The explicative judgment, while it states the contents of an idea, has also re gard to the things corresponding to the idea, and thus
it
gains an objective
significance whenever the idea comprehends the permanent and invariable
elements necessarily involved in the existence of a given subject or sub
when, therefore, the idea corresponds to the essence of the things. water is fluid explicative judgment expresses only the contents of
jects,
The
"
"
the idea of a thing which has been noticed in certain casual states.
It
does not represent the essential nature or the kind of matter which we
call
water, for this
a part of
its
is
also
oxygen and hydrogen tial
found
in a solid or
essential nature.
nature of water.
"
is
vaporous state ; fluidity is not water is a compound of
The judgment
"
both explicative and an expression of the essen
It is the
attempt to bring the two into perfect har
mony which guides the problem of
definition.
34-
That alone
is
possible
in
the
completely objective sense which
removed from the sphere of necessity
is
as the manifestation of free subjects.
Within the sphere of necessity we can speak of possibility only under two Either we must think of things as removed from the suppositions. temporal course of their actual existence and thus isolated from the con-
LOGIC
204
we may represent as grounded which in their permanent nature predicates really belong to them only must isolate in thought a part of we else when co-existing with others or ditions of their actual being, in order that
;
the conditions
When
depends.
actuality of
upon which the
in the latter case
we
what
is
stated in a proposition
are ignorant of the conditions, the
judgment passes from objective possibility into the subjective conjecture, and thus into the expression of uncertainty.
The judgment
"it
is
possible that
opposition to the judgment
"it
is
A
is
stands in contradictory
B"
A
necessary that
possibility of
not
is
B"
1. In investigating the many meanings of the expression possible," we of will first distinguish between the possibility being something which is "
and the
stated of a subject
in the
finds expression
possibility of its
propositions
the latter in the propositions
"A
is
may be sometimes
judgments, again,
"A
mere
is
possible,
2.
ment
If
meaning
;
such, have the
as
it
and
relations of
are thought as universal.
can or may, we
make
a state
connected with a presupposition from which alone
full
its
JS"
The former
be."
activities,
sometimes of subjects which
;
state of a particular thing that
originally
derives
which,
we
may
former
be
stated of the particular as such, their
subjects being definite things (or attributes, definite things)
A may
possibly B,
A
The
existence.
the
that
presupposition,
power of acting
is,
it
of free subjects
in different ways,
but which
power only at the command of the will and upon the ground of a choice between doing and not doing, doing this and doing something exert this
else.
We
have
which
is
the thought of different activities which the will alone
first
able to realize
which of them
;
when
wanting to the is
cut
off,
is
depends upon a decision
will realize
neither externally necessary, nor yet a necessary consequence
of former activity. inability,
it
Opposed
we have on
to this freedom,
the one
hand
the material causality which could realize the thought will
;
on the other hand there
is
and necessity prescribes the path of
the
"
must,"
action.
however, inability proves to be only another form of necessity of not-doing.
tion,
On "
is
when choice
closer inspec
must
"
;
it is
the
The position of a free subject towards the activities between which has a choice, strikingly resembles the position of the judging subject towards different hypotheses, neither of which it finds itself forced to 3.
it
affirm or deny.
actually realized
In both cases an act ;
in
is planned in thought, but not yet both cases the question arises, what should I do ? "
"
AND NECESSITY
POSSIBILITY
205
But affirmation or negation can enter only when necessity appears, and is removed from the sphere of free action while in the other case it is the undetermined and arbitrary act which realizes one of the the matter
;
We are not dealing thoughts and thereby refuses reality to the other. here with the metaphysical truth of this view, but with the presuppositions which determine the thought of the possible in this direction. While in the one case the different hypotheses cannot become actual judgments,
and so long as the choice remains the judgment is impossible, in the other the power of realization lies in the will, and stands in the same with regard to either alternative, thus causing them to appear Thus we speak of the real possibility of a scheme or
position
as really possible. plan,
when we have convinced
realization lie in our power,
ourselves that
and that
the conditions
all
this realization
of
its
depends upon our
will alone.
The results
therefore,
opposite,
of the
materially
is
necessary,
not without reason that language has combined the ideas of "
can
"
which
that
from freedom; here alone we find the absence of necessity.
in the
meaning of the word
"
It "
will
is
and
"
may."
But the idea of the possible extends even to that which is not This also may be regarded in such a way as to make it comparable free. Even the thing which is not free acts in different ways with the free. 4.
in so far as
same thing
it
is
at
changeable, and all
is
between them. ;
The sun
will
look to
is
a
number of
aroused of a choice
and be concealed by
shine
alternately
future
its
and the thought
different predicates lie before us,
clouds
not constrained to be and to do the
When we
times.
the brook will at one time freeze, at another be dried up
;
our
But thought in picturing the future wavers between different predicates. it does not depend upon the decision of the thing itself which of these predicates shall actually appear at a given time necessity.
The
may be merely
necessity
;
that of
this its
is
own
prescribes a certain development through different stages, it
must become
all
that
it
can become
;
and
it
is
determined by nature, which
and
in
which makes us speak of the future, not as something which
something merely possible.
Or
the necessity
this
case
only a distinction of time
may
is,
but as
appertain to both the
and when we are ignorant of the manifold combinations of circumstances and their changing course,
nature of the thing and
or,
disregarding them,
its
circumstances
comprehend
successive, then the thing
is
to
in
;
one thought that which in time is being of whose future
us like a free
LOGIC
2 o6
we
decisions
arbitrary will
are ignorant,
and
actual states appear to issue from
its
its
caprice.
the former
It is in
and
way
that
we regard
the totality of the universe so far
It contains the whole ground of apart from freedom. will be and happen, but which is not in future the which everything yet This is full possibility, potentia in its most significant mean actual.
as
we
think of
it
ing.
We
regard in the second
way the
particular things or events which take
their place in the order of the world,
and which are both determined and
hindered by circumstances in their natural development. In so far as the contains the of that which will be, there partial ground particular thing belongs to
it
the mere possibility of future states.
Thus
the seed contains
the possibility of becoming a plant.
But
this
when we
"can"
circumstances,
because
of predicates
series
rule
has a perfectly objective and material significance only
are certain that the predicate will actually appear under certain
we
depends upon the nature of the subject what assume under different circumstances. As a
gather our knowledge of that which a thing
experience of the past ledge
it
will
it
when we
;
but
say that the
we mean it moon can be
may be from our know
as a statement of certain eclipsed.
This meaning of can is particularly obvious when we make water may freeze or general statements concerning our subjects "iron can be melted is soluble in water," etc. evaporate cooking-salt Here we have perfectly definite and positive statements, referring to an "
"
5.
"
:
"
"
;
attribute of the subject.
"
;
Indeed, there
is
no way of making general
state-
tTients
concerning changeable attributes except by passing beyond the subject to the conditions and causes which determine its varying states.
When I isolate the idea of a thing and disengage it in thought from the conditions of existence under which the actual always stands, retaining it by itself, then there remains to which cannot be separated from
first nothing but those attributes because they are essential. But as thought surveys the cycle of changes which must and will be introduced it
at
it
by varying relations and refers them merely thing, it makes use of expressions such as
to the general thought of the "can,"
"faculty,"
"capability,"
turn the subject into a permanent ground for the changeable. This ground, however, is not in itself sufficient to bring about actuality; it must be supplemented by circumstances. But in as all knowetc., to
proportion able attributes of things resolve themselves into relations with other things
POSSIBILITY
AND NECESSITY
207
we are able
to express their unchangeable nature only as that which they under be varying circumstances. may Judgments of possibility, which state the further determinations that a
general idea admits
That which in the of, are analogous with these. asunder into the temporal series of successive states here breaks up into the plurality of ideas which contain a common element needing further determination before it can agree with any definite
previous case
falls
A
triangle may be acute, thing or can even be thought as particular. intuitable No contains or obtuse. figure only the properties right-angled,
which
I
think under the
some
one,
word
the general idea presents
colour
definite
Before
and angles
I
is
can form the image of necessary
try different determinations or recall
it I
constructing
No
triangle.
definite relation of sides
me
;
and when
in
them from memory,
with a choice of various closer determinations.
necessarily connected with those attributes of an
is
animal which constitute the contents of the idea horse.
be black, white, brown,
etc.
So
far as
The
concerns the content of
horse can
my
idea,
these judgments are perfectly definite statements concerning the plurality
So
of differences.
far as
existent, they express in
they are intended to apply to the nature of the the
same way a material
which con
possibility
nects variation of colour with the organization of a certain animal.
when applied
to a definite particular thing
itself
the problematical significance of ignorance.
thing
is
that
when
I
know
is
it
is
a horse, I cannot state of
only that something
is
Only
does the judgment take upon
When
that
it
a triangle,
I
it
is
all I
know
of a
black or white
do not know whether
it
right-angled or not.
When we "
judgment
A
are dealing with
can be
B"
subjects thought of as general, then
etc., is
the
the adequate expression of the so-called
particular judgment. It follows
6.
from the meaning of the judgments so
far
considered that
even when they apply to the particular they are intended as universally Possibility and valid, and their validity is not limited to any given time.
when we speak of a particular instance, it what may be and happen here and to-day. When we say, come answer the can be invalid the freeze saved," may may to-night, then our thought does not weigh the future by isolating its sub to-day,"
"
can
and
"
take on another meaning
"
state
;
ject
"
"
on the contrary, it reviews the present circumstances and undertakes But such certain prediction is pro from them the result.
to calculate
hibited by our want of knowledge, whether of
all
the circumstances, or of
LOGIC
208
the exact laws according to which they take effect.
ments mean
is,
man
the sick
be saved
will
if
All that the judg
the right cure
Thus some
etc.
is
applied,
if
of the conditions
no unexpected disturbance appears, are known, and form the ground of upon which the actual result depends known and certain conditions in the in the judgment and estimating we enter upon the calculation uncertain and comparison with the unknown call Still it is our ignorance which we that possible. of the probability of ;
alone that makes
and thus these judgments lead im
possible for us;
it
which merely state the subjective impossibility of a perceptibly to those While they appear to be concerned with things, they are really decision. measure of our knowledge of things ; and they are only concerned with the This is proved the expression of the resignation of our limited knowledge. exists or
is
When
past.
are used of that which already
same expressions
fact that exactly the
by the
the historian attempts to clear up a fact from
the judge in taking evidence fragmentary or contradictory information, or what has happened, then differ clues from endeavours to discover exactly ent combinations offer themselves
then
may
it
also have
may have happened This may or
it
;
happened
expression of subjective indecision
;
and
its
significance
way, but
this
"
"
that way.
"
can
"
is
the
lies in its refusal
be decisively established. When it is in spite of weighty evidence, this innocent be said that the accused may is not sufficient to prove the guilt; that the means only that the evidence to allow the opposite alternative to
judgment "he is guilty there is no question as to
"is
it is
in the objective sense, since objectively
already absolutely determined whether affirmation or negation
But
But
not necessary, nor, therefore, possible.
"can"
the statement that such
and such a thing
is
possible
is
true.
becomes the
more empty and insignificant according as the extent of our ignorance is and we have fewer positive grounds to give as a reason why our
greater,
conjecture should tion
is
come
possible, this
possible.
But
all
is
When we
to pass.
true in so far as
say that spontaneous genera
we cannot prove
that
it
the grounds contained in the order of nature as
to us speak against
it,
and
it is
a possibility which
lies
is
im
known
only in the dark
which our knowledge has not yet penetrated. in this subjective sphere does it hold good that everything is 7. Only which contains no contradiction, nor leads to any. Every hypo possible regions into
thesis
accepted as possible breaks
down
with a proposition recognised as valid
long as we do not find
it
to
;
at
once
hence
if it falls it
into contradiction
can be assumed only so
be contradictory to a valid
truth,
i.e.
so long as
AND NECESSITY
POSSIBILITY
But
opposite remains unproved.
its
209
absence of contradiction has
this
nothing whatever to do with the question as to what may happen in reality.
made
Nevertheless the attempt has been
8.
to find, in the absence of
contradiction, a criterion of possibility in the other sense also, particularly where the question is not as to the possibility of being this or being that,
This
but as to the possibility of being in general. stood by the possible. it
It is
contains no contradiction
;
which
that
and
it
that the proof of the possibility of
But
istence.
established what
one and the same
is
contradictory
and what
thing,
nitz has to secure a relation to
not
is
it.
nothing prevents
1
what Leibnitz under
should precede that of His ex is
meaningless unless
when thought of (
22, p.
demands
127
is
it
to
be that Kant
directed,
which
s
and
will therefore
forced transition from the it is
possible
criticism (Postulate des empir. Denizens iiberhaupt)
by the formal con But Kant himself allows too much scope to the
limits the conception of the possible
ditions of experience.
concept, inasmuch as he would
same sense
first
determination by
merely conceivable to something of which we can state that for
be
Moreover, Leib
sq.).
existence,
It is against this
it
as the determination of
reality for this abstract
postulating that everything possible exist if
God
absence of contradiction
this
is
thinkable (conceivable) because was in this sense that he demanded is
still
use
it
as a predicate of things, in the
Against his view we must here again
as Leibnitz.
insist that
can only be stated of that which finds utterance in the judgment,
possibility
hence that
all possibility,
as well as
all
necessity,
is
hypothetical,
and pre
supposes an existent. The statement that it is possible for something to be has no meaning, if it lays claim to material validity, unless it points out some power which can produce the thing and shows that the existing order of the universe raises no conclusive objection against
it.
This alone
distinguishes the possible thing from the possible idea or possible concept.
A
bare possibility
The
9.
is
possible
self-contradictory.
stands
in a
somewhat
special relation towards the
negation. It
that
would seem to be a matter of course that when we
A
is
B we
include the possibility that
A
is
not
B
state the possibility ;
for the opposition
between the merely possible and the necessary just in the fact that it But on closer inspection it becomes may not be as well as may be. A necessary to impose important limitations on the proposition that every lies
1
S. L.
De
Verit. Primit.,
Erdm.,
p. 99.
Cf. Princ. Phil.,
45,
Erdm.,
p. 708.
P
LOGIC
2IO potest esse
that
is,
B
is
accompanied by an equally valid
we would
A
potest non esse
B
;
if,
deal with significant propositions, and not with empty
formulae.
For instance, our thought,
in its function of
of the different phases of that which
is
comprehension, predicates
changeable, capable of development
Then the or of being determined from without, that they are possible. statement that the negation is also possible either has no meaning, or when to the original
opposed
judgment
an attribute "
it is
proposition
possible that cooking-salt
is
the
alters
may be dissolved What then is of cooking-salt
"cooking-salt
in
meaning of
water
"
is
The
this.
intended to state
the meaning of the proposition
The
"
not dissolved in water
?
proposition
mice may have millions of descendants in a few years is meant as an estimate of their power of increase, and hence as the statement of an
that a pair of
organic law
;
but what about the proposition that the pair
have these descendants its
?
When
may
also not
the positive statement expressly isolates
subject from varying conditions, there
is
no sense
in returning to these
and suddenly resuming the standpoint of the multiplicity of actual events.
When, however, we
are speaking of the particular case in temporally judgments, then the possibility of not-being accompanies that of being, and has the same significance. The answer may come to-day, but it may also not come till to-morrow, or not at all ; it may freeze to-night, but valid
then again the frost
may keep
presupposition that, besides the the result, there first
off. The ground of the negation is the known relations which would bring about
may be others also to counteract or prevent it; in the may be delay on the part of the writer or the messenger,
instance there
in the
second the introduction of a warmer current of
This relation
air.
between causes which bring about a result and causes which counteract and prevent it, is presupposed when the possibilities of being and of notBut its ground is being are opposed as equally justifiable propositions. only our ignorance as to whether the causes actually present and taking effect are favourable or counteracting.
The
case
is
the
same when we
state the
relation
between a generic
concept and its mutually exclusive specific determinations. may be equilateral or not equilateral. If all I know that it "is
I
have no ground
for either affirming or
denying that
it
is
A is
triangle
a triangle,
equilateral
;
the
general idea leaves both possibilities open. 10.
The
negation
necessity to possibility.
of possibility leads to necessity, the negation of
AND NECESSITY
POSSIBILITY a.
b.
It is possible that
B contradicts A is B, and this
is
It is
not possible that
It is
necessary that
A
is
It is
necessary that
A
is
It is
not necessary that
It is possible that
Thus
A
there
arises
the
A
is
equivalent to
is
not B.
B A
contradicts
B, and
is
this
equivalent to
is
not B.
twofold
contradictory
parallel to the contradictory opposition
particular negative,
211
opposition
which runs
of the universal affirmative and
and the universal negative and
particular affirmative
judgments.
But
in
both cases we can only avoid running into absurdities
careful to interpret the formulae always in the
same
These formulae hold good when possible and necessary subjective sense of a hypothesis
;
if
we
are
sense.
are used in the
when necessary necessity of some deter
they hold good also
and possible are uniformly used of the essential minations and of the material possibility of others which are opposed to each other; they hold good, finally, when possibility and necessity are stated of ii.
some
On
particular case in temporally valid judgments.
reviewing
all
the questions to which the concepts of the possible us, we see that the function of judgment has
and the necessary have led
undergone a further development
in
two
directions.
On
the one hand, the
judgment which were traversed by the immediate judgment with one step have been definitely separated by the questionthe mediated judgment. The mere attempt at a judgment
different stages in the formation of the
has appeared upon the scene, and has led us to reflect concerning the relation of the judging subject to this question ; and by means of the
between the question and the decision, NECESSITY, the innermost and essential meaning of all judgment, has been brought to light. On
antithesis
the other hand, judgment has advanced a step further in that particular or a number of these, have been replaced by the statement
simple subjects,
the material unity of subject and predicate, which has become the subject of new predicates, primarily of the necessary and possible. In this way new categories have become manifest which rank above those first discovered, inasmuch as they are founded upon the
of the judgment
itself,
ones and place them in relation to each other, thereby enabling us to know not only particular phenomena, but also their connection.
earlier
Thus they
afford a positive counterpart to the
mere negation, which,
them, has reference to the synthesis of judgment.
like
LOGIC
212
we thus look upon the progress of thought as pressing onward from the mere attempt, the hypothesis, and the possible to the necessary, we If
can give their natural significance to the special forms which are generally co-ordinated with the judgment which states or denies a definite predicate of a subject, that
former
is
is,
to the hypothetical
and disjunctive judgments.
the simple expression of necessity,
pression of mutually exclusive possibilities.
connection between possibility
possibilities,
by necessity
;
the latter
and is
The
the latter the complete ex
The former shows
in this
way
limits
a necessary
the sphere of
the preliminary step towards establish
ing the necessity of one possibility by the denial of certain others.
CHAPTER
VII.
HYPOTHETICAL AND DISJUNCTIVE JUDGMENTS. FROM
the point of view of what
classifies judgments as (if
A
is,
B
is),
called relation,
is
and DISJUNCTIVE (A
is
modern
logic generally
B A not B], HYPOTHETICAL either B or C}. But this not in ac
CATEGORICAL {A
is
;
is
is
nor are there any grounds for regarding 1 it as an exhaustive division of the forms of judgment. It often happens that, so far as concerns the matter of the statement, categorical and hypothetical,
cordance with the Aristotelian
or
hypothetical
logic,
and disjunctive propositions express the same thought
with a difference which
merely grammatical. If, on the other hand, it we look, then the hypothetical and dis with the categorical form of judgment, cannot be co-ordinate forms junctive since this is contained in both of them. If, again, the ground of distinction is
the verbal expression to which
is
and composite judgments, which are ex complex propositions, are opposed to those which are simple,
sought in
is
pressed in
this circumstance,
then we shall find that there are
many other complex propositions besides and disjunctive judgments, and there will be no apparent hypothetical reason for excluding them from logical treatment. As
a matter of
the Stoics
in
fact,
logicians did for a long time follow the
distinguishing
example of from the simple composite judgment
the
judgment which is expressed in a single proposition; and this custom, which had fallen out of use more particularly since Kant s time, has been lately revived
(e.g.
by Ueberweg).
In an investigation of which the chief aim
is
to analyse actual
judgment,
and which must therefore begin by investigating the expression of that judgment in language, we must begin by reconsidering this former custom. This is the more necessary because a number of misconceptions concern ing the hypothetical judgment have arisen owing to insufficient reflection
on the 1
logical significance of the forms of language.
With what follows
cf.
my Programm
:
Beitrage zur Lehre
(Laupp, Tubingen), 1870. 213
vom
hypothetischen Urtheil
LOGIC
2i 4
I.
THE DIFFERENT WAYS
IN WHICH PROPOSITIONS MAY BE COMBINED AND THEIR LOGICAL SIGNIFICANCE.
35-.
There are certain forms of speech
in
which different propositions are
connected by particles, conjunctions, and relative pronouns. This con nection may be such as to express a relation between complete propositions,
which it
judgments and are comprehensible by themselves ; or one proposition is essential to the completion of
state definite
may show
that the
the other.
In the
first
sitions; or
it
case the relation
may
may be merely
verbal, as in relative
propo
express a subjective relation of the propositions peculiar
to the individual speaker
;
or
it
may be
equivalent to another judgment,
between the syntheses expressed by the propositions, or the relation between the facts stated in
having
for its predicate either the logical relation
the propositions (states, events, etc.).
In the second case relational predicates
or
we may
either
make
a statement by
means of modal
concerning the grammatically dependent judgment,
we may make a statement concerning the
fact expressed in that
judg
ment. i.
The
simplest complex propositions, and the most easy to analyse,
are those in which two propositions, each comprehensible
expressing an independently valid judgment, are placed
by in
itself,
and
such a re
more is expressed by the two together than by the The verbal forms simple utterance of the one proposition after the other.
lation to each other that
expressing this relation are the particles, and
we must .
it is
of their significance that
speak.
We
have already seen
(p.
equivalent expressions, can do no are, at the
moment
and since
that the particle
157)
more than
tell
"and,"
and
all
us that the two judgments
of speaking, both present in the consciousness of the
already established by the utter ance of both propositions by the same person, such mere links have in them
speaker
selves
;
this subjective fact is
no objective
indicating
significance, though they may assume the function of a corresponding connection in the objects of thought (e.g.
temporal succession when some event
is
being narrated).
These
particles
therefore are not equivalent to a judgment. b.
Nor can
the adversative particles be taken as the signs of a definite
objective statement.
It is true that in
conversation they are often directed
HYPOTHETICAL AND DISJUNCTIVE JUDGMENTS some spoken
against
proposition, which they confront with an objection,
limitation, or contradiction. it
Still
they have not the force of a negation, for
just as often that they only repudiate
happens
215
what might have been
conjectured or inferred from the proposition by means of some combina
When
tion.
hand
used by one person speaking alone they serve on the one in this way against some looked-for statement, and on the
contend
to
some
other merely to introduce
an affirmative proposition
as
Thus,
while
the
contrasting or unexpected element, such
after a negative, or
denies a definitely
negation
an unexpected predicate. uttered
statement,
the
adversative particles often anticipate tacit combinations merely assumed as possible
;
the negation, therefore, which these express,
is
indefinite,
and
cannot take the form of a proper judgment. It
c.
is
when we come
different
Where
particles of inference.
judgments connected, they
to the so-called causal particles
that the
state
ground (or consequence) of the other
;
but
one judgment is the logical they are meant to express
when
the relation between the facts stated in the judgment, they fact stated in the
one judgment
Thus
fact stated in the other.
the relation they express
of a proper definite judgment.
cold the
;
is
"it
we have
here
;
"It
is
getting cold; the thermometer
is
"it
change d. With the causal
all
is
the force
thermometer
the thermometer
in
the cause of the
us that the
that of a logical,
have
getting cold, for the
therefore
getting cold,
is
to that extent they
;
is
all
and
each case three complete judgments the thermometer is falling the former proposition
latter";
tell
the real ground (or consequence) of the
is
or material, necessary connection
is falling";
and
these express the logical relation of the
is
falling";
"
it
:
is
is
getting
inferred from
falling; the
former
latter."
particles expressing real necessity may be classed determinations which express real relations between the states, events,
spoken of
etc.,
in the propositions, such,
relations in a narrative
tions of place.
These
for instance,
as the temporal
contemporaneousness, succession, etc.
and
rela
also stand in place of definite relational judgments,
by which they might be expressed. e. Under the name of exponible judgments, the older logic has included judgments which, while apparently making only one statement,
really contain several. restrictive
Chief amongst these are the judgments containing
"only,"
man is happy man who is not
wise the
words
"
tells
wise
is
"none
us
first
but,"
etc.
The proposition "only man is happy, then
that the wise
not happy, or that
all
the happy are wise.
the that
LOGIC
2l6
Grammar
2.
corresponds form,
is
it
no
to true,
form
but in this general
;
distinction
essential
seems to
the co-ordinate and subordinate
between
distinguishes
of propositions
connection
in
thought.
signify that the speaker
the
distinction
The grammatical mainly concerned
is
statement of the principal proposition, for the sake of which
with the
alone the dependent propositions are introduced
;
that
is,
the speaker has
in stating the
dependent propositions except for the sake of But language as actually used has not retained the distinction between co-ordinate and subordinate
no object
reminding us that they are accepted truths.
propositions in
all
particles in the
same
its
it
strictness;
sense,
uses conjunctions and
co-ordinating
and the utmost distinction made
difference in the subjective emphasis
laid
is
a slight
the propositions
upon
con
nected by them a difference which has no objective significance with The particles "for "and "because respect to the matter of the statement.
"
are
used to denote one and the same relation "
pressed by
The
same time
at the
significance
manifold gradation. already fully
of
"
may
relative
When
determined as
and the
;
be announced by
connection
relative it
also
is
ex
relation
"
whilst."
especially susceptible
follow a term
pronouns
which
of is
stands, they serve merely to enable us to
make a further statement concerning some portion of The relative pronoun, whilst obviating the express
a given statement. repetition
of
the
gives more prominence to the identity of the two elements than would be attained by mere juxtaposition but the relations definite denotation,
;
between the two propositions thus connected may vary greatly. The most decided subordination takes place when the proposition introduced
by the tion
relative enables us to recognise
more
one element of the main proposi we already know and
easily by reminding us of something
in this case the statement introduced has
but
is
more
There relative
is
in the nature of
an attributive adjective, or an apposition.
complete equality of position, on the other hand, when the
proposition
new and independent statement
introduces a
happens most frequently
But here the
in Latin).
the place of a proper judgment.
It tells
stated in the two propositions connected
verbal
that of establishing the identity
The
proposition
and
A
A
is
;
no independent value whatever,
C";
"A,
all
which
that
it
of the one proposition
is
is
does the
,
is
is
C"
us nothing which
and
A
is
not already
function
is merely by it, between the verbal denotations.
tells
to leave
same
(this
does not take
relative
us no
its
more than
no room
for
"A is B, doubt that the
as that of the other.
HYPOTHETICAL AND DISJUNCTIVE JUDGMENTS
when an element of
Relative propositions have quite another function the proposition
which
subject or predicate, that
they are
sphere
;
live in
cold climates need
is,
receives through
as a part
They then appear and limit a more
determination.
first
in itself indefinite
is
217
them
its
of the denotation of
general denotation to a definite
In the proposition
determining.
more nourishment than
"
men who
the subject
others,"
is
incomplete without the relative proposition, which plays the same part as elastic bodies are resilient." a determining adjective in other cases e.g. "
In this way simple denotation by a definite word may be paraphrased by a relative proposition; the phrase "parallelograms, which are right-angled
and
"
synonym for squares." Here we must also add the indefinite relatives equilateral,"
thing
is
a
6 crris av,
that,"
quisquis),
of which the one predicate
is
which
tell
("
any one
who,"
"any
us nothing but that subjects
The
true have the other predicate also.
then equivalent to a universal judgment, and, like it, may expression have either an empirical or an unconditional universality; while, again, is
is mortal";
mean
all
mortal,"
"all
men
are
mortal";
absolutely the
The
in this form.
any universal judgment may be expressed "man
"anything
which
propositions is
a
man
is
the necessary connection
same thing
between humanity and mortality. The only difference is that in the form of naming, which has already anything which is a man is mortal the act and it is left, all men," now takes place before our eyes in taken "
"
"
place
;
moreover, an open question as to what particular thing, if any, can be so men are mortal," on the contrary, although it named. The formula "all
does not actually state that subjects are forthcoming,
them
if
we understand the words
Much
same may be said of when (wenn) and "where" (wo) as The use of when to denote one definite time and place. "
"
relatives of
point of time in the past, while
there
presupposes
the
"
"
German
still
in their ordinary sense.
Here
language.
often
attaches to
it it
still
retained in English,
is
lost to
the
used principally of the future, and hence a kind of indefiniteness and uncertainty as is
come to pass and this may be, although intention of ex perhaps in a very slight degree, even where there is no will happen at the same time pressing anything more than that one event
to
whether the future
as another
(when
it
will really
;
year will begin ; when Where, again, it stands as a general
strikes twelve o clock,
the
new
is ended, we shall return). (whenever = as often as), its only direct meaning is the universality of the co-existence of two states or events ; this universality being either
the war
relative
LOGIC
218
merely empirical, as expressing a perception to which there has been no
(when it grows dusk, the bats begin to two events will happen together in the
exception, or absolutely universal
But we cannot
fly).
future,
nor that they
state that will
always and unconditionally take place together,
some necessary connection between them. To this extent, therefore, the meaning of what was originally no more than a temporal particle comes to include this necessary connection, and thus to serve as unless there
is
we
the conditional conjunction in the hypothetical judgment, of which shall
have to speak
later.
"
Where
"
(wo) in
its
general significance passes
through the same process. From connections such as these we must distinguish others in which 3. a proposition as such forms part of another proposition, either as subject,
The
or as part of a relative predicate (object).
may
proposition
then
represent either the judgment as a subjective thought or utterance, or the fact expressed in the judgment ; and this again may be sometimes merely thought or assumed, sometimes objectively valid as matter of fact.
Those statements
a.
in
judgments have propositions that a
judgment
is
which modal relational predicates for their
component
true, false, credible, doubtful,
parts.
The
refer
or necessary
possible,
the statements that I believe, repudiate, dispute, or doubt something
these have reference to a hypothesis which
and they in
state
how
the hypothesis
All final
general.
is
propositions
is
anything in order that something else
;
all
expressed in a proposition,
my
related to
belong
to
statements
to
thought or to thought
this
may happen,
class.
When
the purpose
I
do
makes
appearance as rny thought and the statement refers to the relation between a result as expressed in the form of judgment and my thought and will, with the action to which it leads. its first
;
Since every judgment as such must stand in definite modal relations, these
may
always be predicated.
or necessary
say that
I
To
say that the judgment
means no more than the simple statement
maintain, I know, I
am
certain that
A
is
"
"
A is B A is
"
is
B"
true
To
B, only gives special
emphasis to the certainty already contained in the fact of the statement "A is But in such a rendering the proposition "A is B" becomes the expression of a merely conceived judgment or hypothesis; the com ."
pletion of the
judgment
is
transferred to the
modal predicate.
Statements of which the component parts are states or events ex pressed in the form of propositions differ only verbally from those which b.
contain adjectival or verbal abstract substantives amongst their elements.
HYPOTHETICAL AND DISJUNCTIVE JUDGMENTS The thought remains the same whether I say, summer is due to the higher position of the summer
is
warmer
is
due
"
219
the greater warmth of the "
or,
sun,"
the fact that the
sun stands higher ; all that that fresh predications can be made
to the fact that the
is necessary to such a statement is concerning what is originally expressed
in a
"
judgment.
survey lays no claim to completeness, it may at least suffice to show that the manifold grammatical forms in which propositions are connected together are no ground for special kinds of function 4.
in
Although
this brief
judgment, which are not forthcoming
in
simple judgments.
y
The mean
ing of such forms can always be expressed by the predicates of simple
statements, and logical theory has therefore been fully justified in leaving such connections as those of time and place to grammar, which treats of the
expression of thought in language.
The
"
expression
"
compound judgment
misleading and inappropriate; that which is composed of judgments may be a combination of judgments, but we cannot therefore say that this
is
The fact is that when the component is itself a judgment. judgment are propositions these propositions are not themselves
combination parts of a
judgments
;
that
is,
they are not at the
moment
intended as statements
:
new judgments, either as hypotheses, or as the results of of what is meant in the previous judgment, and therefore as an indication
they enter into
judgment. 5.
Amongst
all
the different combinations of propositions conventional
logic has distinguished only
what are called hypothetical and disjunctive
that judgments, and in so doing has rightly judged
varied only with definite statements, however
of definite predicates to definite subjects.
have to deal with such statements direct
importance
for
;
that
But
concerning
the final aim of
all
other forms deal
all
is,
in these
two forms we
hypotheses
thought
\J
with the attribution
as
are of
progress from the
and there to the necessary subjective to the objective, from the possible con Reflection statement. of kinds fore of universal importance for all is always necessary where cerning the value and significance of hypotheses we cannot straightway form a definite judgment, but must endeavour to
Thus hypothetical by way of a preliminary experiment. is a the with and disjunctive judgments rank negation, which, like them, that to both stage apply judgment concerning a tentative judgment ; they arrive at truth
of thought
which
lies
between the question and decision.
\.
LOGIC
220
THE HYPOTHETICAL JUDGMENT.
II.
36.
The HYPOTHETICAL JUDGMENT states that two hypotheses are related NECESSARY its predicate is to each other as GROUND and CONSEQUENCE "
;
"
CONSEQUENCE."
A
If
is
the necessary consequence of
is
The
r.
which form
its
"if
"
is
true,"
means, therefore,
B
A."
ordinary expression of the hypothetical judgment, and that in
is
most obvious,
is
meaning
A
B
then
true,
C is
B, then
of propositions,
"
if
A
is
D"
true,
is
a combination of propositions of the
More
then
B
briefly,
is
A and B as
and taking
signs
true."
In grammar such propositions are generally called conditional, and them this name we take what seems to be the most natural view,
2.
in giving
that the point in question
is the validity of the This consequent. cannot be directly stated, but presupposes the validity of the ante cedent, the whole being thus a conditional statement of the consequent, hence a statement concerning the subject of the consequent. 1 But the i.e.
validity
consequent
not to be stated until the antecedent has been confirmed,
is
and a conditional proposition
is
therefore an expression of uncertainty with
and consequent. Both, as the expression goes, are problematically stated, or, as we should say, express mere hypo theses. So far as concerns the two propositions themselves, therefore, there reference to both antecedent
really
that
seems which
is,
to is
be no judgment at
all
in
the proper sense, no utterance,
and necessary
stated as true
;
and
this
view
is
confirmed by
the fact that conditional propositions are sometimes stated with the falsity of both antecedent
consciousness of the
and consequent
avowed
(si tacuisses,
philosophus mansisses). 3.
Nevertheless such a combination of propositions does contain a state is a judgment in the proper sense of the word, and this the
ment which
Stoics 2 were the
first
that antecedent
consequence
to recognise definitely.
and consequent are related
(p. 195), that to
accept the consequent,
and
accept the antecedent makes
1
This
is
Cf.
p.
It
is
this relation
the hypothetical judgment in his Logik.
See
is infallibly
of necessary
p. 12.
3
J. S. Mill, Logic, bk.
I,
and
my Programm
23 sq.
my Programs,
us
necessary to
the true predicate of the hypothetical judgment, 3
how Wolff defines
mentioned above, 2
is
it
tells
ground and
to each other as
that the validity of the consequent
connected with that of the antecedent.
consequence which
Such a combination
ch. 4,
3.
HYPOTHETICAL AND DISJUNCTIVE JUDGMENTS
221
the two points of reference for the relation are antecedent and consequent. So far as concerns the statement of this necessary connection, the question as to the validity of the antecedent
probability, improbability,
or
and our conjectures as are of no importance,
falsity,
to its
truth,
just as in a
simple judgment concerning some object of thought it is quite immaterial whether we regard the object as existing, as possible, or as merely fictitious. In this way we may explain how it is that judgments beginning with (wemi) seem sometimes to express uncertainty alone, and at other times 1 to be the expression of sequence amongst actual phenomena. This necessity, which in hypothetical judgments refers to propositions "if"
which are merely assumed, is also stated with reference to valid judgments is true because A is by the so-called causal connection of propositions.
B
true,
a
judgment which may
or to the material ground.
the thermometer 4.
The
is
rising
ground of our knowledge warmer because the thermometer is rising
refer either to the
(It is
because
;
it is
warmer.)
nature of the statement remains, of course, the same whether the
judgments which appear as antecedent and consequent be affirmative or or explicative. negative, universal or particular, narrative
The attempts
to
are based
find differences of quantity, etc., in the hypothetical
judgment upon a confusion between hypothetical judgments and statements concern and casual coincidence. ing mere time-relations or some purely empirical
No twelve
one would maintain that judgments such as
some one
dies"
The
are hypothetical.
"whenever it
confusion
is
strikes
especially
apparent in the judgments which have been called particular hypothetical If the connection "when it is fine the barometer generally stands high." :
cannot be necessary, and such judgments can never casual coincidence in a relatively greater or express more than empirical or sometimes when a triangle The instances. of smaller number proposition
is
not invariable,
it
"
is
right-angled
it
has two equal angles
"
tells
us only that the
attribute
be found together with, and does not exclude, right-angled sometimes when two of the remaining angles. The phrase equality does not connect ground and consequence it only states the coincidence of attributes or events in the same or different things, the statement being is
occasionally to
"
"
;
as to the ground of the coincidence. merely empirical, and saying nothing v. i, p. 109 sq.) and Vierteljahrsschr.f. unss. Phil. (Cf. my Programm^ p. 45, 5.
The
co-ordination
of the
hypothetical
with the categorical as a
the difference of special kind of judgment, distinguished by 1
See Appendix B.
its
logical
LOGIC
222
may be
function,
In the categorical judgment, he
said to date from Kant.
are subordinated to each other as predicate to subject, in the says, ideas
hypothetical 1
as
The
06).
consequence to ground (Krit. der of in
necessary sequence thought
r.
V.,
corresponds to the copula in categorical judgments
:
function of the hypothetical
judgment
Hart., p.
;
that which unifies
it is
Thus the category which corresponds
the different ideas.
3
9.
hypothetical judgments,
to the logical
that of causality.
is
But the classification is throughout superficial and inadequate, because the ideas which are related as subject and predicate are,
if
only
in the
Kantian phraseology, concepts, while the ideas which are related as Kant s distinction gave rise to ground and consequence are judgments.
which
the further doctrine
he, however, did not himself teach
that cate
are the expression of the relation of inherence, hypo gorical judgments thetical judgments of the relation of causality, a doctrine which is quite
untenable
the expressions hypothetical
if
their ordinary is
certainly categorical
causal relation
it
relational
and categorical
God
"if
the soul
is
But
judgments
included at
in all,
are taken
in
the cause of the world
is
it
material,
it
"
expresses
extended," is
(as,
When, again, and distinguish between judgments of quality we may find some justifi e.g., Drobisch does),
cation for the division, so far as concerns the
ments.
is
treats entirely of relations of inherence.
disregard the verbal form
and
"
the ordinary sense, nevertheless
in
the judgment
;
hypothetical, yet
we
The judgment
meaning.
classification the
this
and only by
meaning of
definite state
judgment is not be subsumed under
true hypothetical
straining a point can
it
those relational judgments which are statements of real relations between things.
The
6.
exact meaning of the hypothetical judgment differs according
by it as ground and consequence. two propositions, which standing alone would express unconditional if the statement is merely that if we then," validity, are connected by
to the nature of the propositions related
When
"
accept the one,
then "
if
it is
God
we must
extended is
propositions
"
"
;
also accept the other. if
the soul
almighty and good to
make
is
If the soul
"
simple, then
all,
it
then the world
the truth of the consequent
depend
is
corporeal,
indestructible
is is
"
;
such
"
perfect
as necessary
con
sequence upon the truth of the antecedent, and state that whoever accepts the one must also accept the other. The ground of this necessity is not apparent in the hypothetical judgment. relations of the ideas (corporeal
It
may
and extended) by
consist in
the
simple
virtue of which predica-
HYPOTHETICAL AND DISJUNCTIVE JUDGMENTS one involves predication of the other
tion of the
or
;
assumptions concerning the nature of things, such as of certain causes
view we
may draw
such a way
in
But
us which.
tell
that the generally recognised
contained in the
is
meanings of the words
enable us to infer the one from the other, then the judgment if
in
is
of action
the distinction between analytical
second proposition
If the
and synthetical judgments. first
mode
the hypothetical judgment does not
;
this point of
consist in
the simple
or in assumptions concerning the necessary
destructible,"
From
may
it
"
223
is
analytical.
the connection must be mediated by a ground of necessity derived
from some other source, then tinction
it
is
This, however,
synthetical.
which cannot be more exactly denned
We
doctrine of inferences.
a dis the
to
find instances of a similar nature in applica
tions of a general rule to a particular case
death be the penalty of
"
if
:
murder, then this murderer must be punished by the logical necessity by which
tions express
is
we come
until
Such proposi
death."
the particular
instance
is
contained in the general rule. When antecedent and consequent refer to the particular and are 7. statements having a temporal validity only, there are two cases
Here, again,
distinguished.
contained in the
we may
and follows from
first,
it
by virtue of the
predicates, these being invariably connected
Or
irresponsible."
;
necessity of connection
are not contained in the antecedent. will freeze
to-night,"
if
this
meaning
man
drunk, he
is
is
of the is
may be due to the special and inferable from it according to
the necessary sequence
circumstances of the case before us, certain laws
"
:
be
to
second synthesis
the
that
find
we presuppose
sary sequence depends
is
found here
When we
but
also, "
say,
if
the given temperature,
upon the laws of the
its
conditions
the sky clears, etc.
;
it
the neces
radiation of heat, but these
not produce the result except at the given temperature.
will 8.
There
is
a special application of the hypothetical judgment in which
the propositions connected by
themselves are
left
it
The subjects when they are indefinite, when
have no definite subjects.
indefinite; either absolutely indefinite,
denoted by some such word as "something," or partially If anything is corporeal, they are denoted only by a general term. is he to one extended"; every one his due"; gives just, any "
triangle
of
is
equilateral,
it is equiangular,"
a given statement
being given
;
we
it is
"if
"if
left
are also
in suspenso,
left
etc. its
Here not only
it
a
the validity
necessary consequence alone
uncertain whether there
longing to the predicates, or where
is
may be
found.
any subject be But as it is stated
is
LOGIC
224 that any subject in
other as well,
it is
which the one predicate
essential that
is
found must contain the
and
these judgments the antecedent
in
in meaning, if not in words. the same subject consequent should have u if a triangle has equal angles, its sides are equal," there In the judgment no doubt, two grammatical subjects ; but the second refers by means of are,
the possessive
ment "
is
really
pronoun to the made.
and
first,
They are then precisely equivalent he who is just gives to every one his
it
the
is
of which the state
first
to universal relatival propositions due";
"every
triangle
which
is
:
equi
Propositions such as these state the identity
lateral is also equiangular."
of the subjects to which the two predicates belong, but they can do so is necessarily connected with the first ; only because the second predicate this necessity shows itself in the fact that the two predicates are always
and without exception found
The clear.
same
in the
subject.
course of thought presupposed by these
We
find
them where
particular things,
time assumed, are being characterized. the antecedent in our minds,
modes
With the
we look abroad
of expression
whose existence
definite predicate of
into the manifold;
expectation that the predicate will be somewhere applicable, if it is,
9.
we
and
tell
us absolutely nothing which
is
in the
state that
then the other predicate must be necessarily connected with
But these judgments
is
for the
is
it.
not contained
"All bodies are judgment. does not refer to any limited and definite number; it merely if anything is a whatever is a body is extended," or that states that
in the unconditionally universal categorical extended"
"
"
it is extended." The word by which the subject of the statement denoted contains by implication the antecedent of a hypothetical
body is
Such a proposition,
judgment. of himself
duced
as
is
last"
"
a
therefore,
as truly hypothetical as
good man
"
as if
"the
the
with a view to leaving
good man
thinks
subject were it
intro
an open question
whether and where such a subject is to be found though not when it is merely the incomplete denotation of a definite subject. (The distinction
may be seen from emperor was a
the examples,
"an
emperor must die standing
"an ";
Stoic.")
is the answer to the much-disputed question as to the rela between hypothetical and categorical judgments. All categorical judgments which are unconditionally universal are exactly equivalent in
This, then,
tion
meaning
to hypothetical judgments, for (see
nothing whatever but that subject
27, p.
162 sq.) they state
and predicate necessarily belong
to
HYPOTHETICAL AND DISJUNCTIVE JUDGMENTS
225
each other, so that to predicate the subject of a particular thing neces sarily involves the predication of the predicate.
Inasmuch, indeed, as the ambiguous, and may introduce either a judgment which is em universal, or one which is unconditionally universal, the hypo
is
"all"
pirically
thetical
form
the
is
more accurate and adequate
in
hand, judgments
which
definite
On
expression.
them
particular subjects naturally resist the attempt to convert
The
hypothetical form.
the other
predicates are attributed to definite into the
moreover, has a wider
hypothetical judgment,
meaning and application than can be naturally expressed
in the categorical
form. It is different
10.
activities, "
"
When when
and the
when
the antecedent predicates changeable attributes,
which
relations of a subject
temperature of water
only indefinitely denoted.
is
below
falls
a body projected with a given velocity
becomes
it
zero,
"
"
;
illumination
is
strongest
when
:
subject to the action of
is
a force which varies as the inverse square of the distance,
conic section
"
solid
describes a
it
the rays of light
fall
per
such statements may refer either to repeated pendicularly on a surface instances in which the subject remains the same, or to instances where the "
subjects are different
;
and
for this reason they
would be inadequately ex
pressed by a universal categorical judgment. necessity as unconditional universality,
here the
that
every time
"
relatival phrases
that,"
"as
hypothetical judgment
Changes must take place
at
definite
definite time for the validity of the
are,
we
are to
often is
as";
also
moment immediately
before or
express the
of the general
and from to
subject
this
follows
it
time-relations.
points of time, and to limit the
antecedent to a definite period of time
validity of the
the
If
we must make use
after.
It
is
either the
consequent is
to
appoint a
same
time, or
these judgments which
from the nature of the case, based upon causal relations whenever be found amongst real things; for when change in
their subjects are to
one thing involves a second change be due to causal connection. 11.
must
Amongst
variables.
The
equation in the ordinary sense or figures are equal states only that
belonging to s. L.
it
same
(or another) thing,
it
must
hypothetical propositions having indefinite subjects
also include those equations
which contain
in the
if
of analytical geometry
equation of the parabola i.e.
2
y =px
is
not an
a judgment that two lines, numbers,
because of the indefinite value of the variable. the abscissa has any definite value,
has a value which
we
and mechanics
is
determined by
its
It
then the ordinate arithmetical rela-
Q
LOGIC
226
In the same way
tion to the constant.
ing general symbols a(b
may be
algebraical formulae contain
all
translated into hypothetical judgments,
e.g.
+ c} = ab + be.
Passing to hypothetical judgments containing negations, we find A is, is not," represents the negation of a proposition that the form 12.
B
"if
consequence of an affirmation, thus affirming that the This incompatibility may be due are incompatible. and
as the necessary
hypotheses
A
B
either to the incompatibility of certain predicates, or to the real relations of
The relation is always mutual. If the from the affirmation of A, then (according necessarily follows
hindering or counteracting causes.
negation Q{
B
ground and consequence) the negation of A follows necessarily from the affirmation (i.e. the denial of the negation) of B and this is true to the law of
;
A
whether
B
and
represent universally and unconditionally valid judg
ments or temporally valid judgments concerning the particular, or whether their subjects are indefinite (when the sky is clouded no dew falls; when
dew
the sky
falls
To
not clouded).
is
such a hypothetical judgment there
corresponds the categorical judgment, which
The
"
proposition
no right-angled
statement as the proposition
if
;
universal
a triangle
is
and negative.
makes the same
equilateral
right-angled,
the negation of the predicate equilateral
"
lateral
"
is
"
is
triangle
it
is
not equi
stated as the neces
is
1 sary consequence of the determination right-angled.
When tion
(if
a negation appears as the necessary consequence of another nega
A
is
not,
B
is
connection between
not) the
ground of the relation must be the necessary This is the sole
the corresponding affirmatives.
condition upon which the negation of the one can have the negation of
the other for
its
from which to sequence of B. unless I
am
consequence.
The
I
A is when A
invalidity of
infer the invalidity of
B only
is
cannot say that when the sky
certain that
when dew
falls
is
an
infallible
ground
the necessary con
not clear no
the sky must be clear
;
dew only
falls if it
1 The difficulty raised by Twesten (Logic, 64) against the view that the hypothetical judgment with a negative consequent is affirmative is easily removed. If the categorical no equilateral triangle is right-angled is negative, how, he asks, can the judgment "
"
corresponding hypothetical tive? It certainly could not
a triangle is equilateral, it is not right-angled," be affirma if the hypothetical judgment were a statement about the
"if
equilateral triangle, and not about the necessity of a consequence ; but why should we be unable to affirm that a negative proposition is a necessary consequence ? The very possibility of the unconditional negative "no A is B depends upon our knowing that "
A
B
and the determinations contained in the thought of necessitate the negation of ; this, which is the meaning of a universal negation, the hypothetical judgment expresses by affirmation of
this necessity.
HYPOTHETICAL AND DISJUNCTIVE JUDGMENTS is
true that every equiangular triangle
triangle
A A
B
is,
is
not equilateral,
is
we may always deduce
is,"
From
not,"
of the
meaning
it
be said that
the principle, that
B
"
if
is
not,
not,
is,
which expresses
consequence stated by the hypothetical
necessary
the judgment
is
a
"if
of the consequent
judgment. When an affirmation appears as the consequence of a negation
B
if
the proposition
the other proposition
according to the principle that the denial
involves the denial of the ground
the
equilateral can
is
not equiangular.
it is
227
if
A
is
always immediately or mediately grounded
is
upon the position that of different possible hypotheses which are mutually exclusive one must necessarily be valid the position, that is, which finds ;
utterance in the disjunctive
ment
A
"if
A
"either
is
not,
or
is
B
B
is"
But
judgment is,
as
it
is
it
not true that the judg the disjunctive
stands, equivalent to
1 is."
The negation of a hypothetical judgment can take place only 13. through the denial of its predicate that is, of the necessary consequence stated by is
The
it.
the proposition
A
B
i.e.
;
is
contradictory opposite of the judgment "
B
not true because
A
is
(even
if
A
is,
In the same way the negation of the statement
A
because
B
"
is
A
B
is,
is,"
leads to the
"
judgment
if
A
nevertheless "
it
is,
B
is
a not)."
does not follow that
B
is."
A is, and B is, and C is, Hypothetical judgments of the form should not be called copulative hypothetical judgments; they "if
14.
D
then
is,
"if
not the necessary consequence of the proposition
is
do not
is"
state of different relations that they are all necessary
as in the
"
judgment
judgment of several
is
both when
A
is
and when
B
is,
copulative, but the former gives only one
conditions,
and therefore
it
C
consequences,
is."
The
latter
ground consisting
cannot be resolved into several
hypothetical judgments. 15.
The
possibility of the
of the ground, but only
consequence can be connected with each part this possibility as having
when we understand
reference to the partial ground
"
(
34, p. 208).
When
the
moon
is
moon
in
The proposition "when the centre of Vide my Programm, p. 54 sq. not in the plane of the ecliptic it forms a triangle with the centres of the sun and the earth does not mean the same as the proposition "either the centre of the moon is in the plane of the ecliptic or it forms a triangle with the two other central points." For i may also form a triangle when it is in the plane of the ecliptic, but the node does not fall upon the straight line passing through the centres of the sun and the earth. the
1
is
"
2
This shows also the logical position of the so-called concessive propositions, their consists in their rejection of some immediate or mediate consequence which
meaning
might be inferred from the antecedent.
LOGIC
228
same time the lunar node is in a conjunction or opposition, and at the line with the sun and earth, then there must be eclipses," the proposition
may be
resolved into the two judgments
may be
tion or opposition there in a line with the
same
"may"
"when
and
eclipses,"
"
sun and the earth there may be
when the antecedent expresses the
which would annul the consequent does not diminish, organic
"
if
;
moon
when
in
is
conjunc
the lunar node
eclipses."
We
invalidity of a
is
find the
judgment
the radiation of heat from the sun
may have an
life
the
unlimited duration upon the
earth."
THE DISJUNCTIVE JUDGMENT.
III.
37-
The DISJUNCTIVE JUDGMENT exclusive hypotheses one the two it
members
necessarily true.
is
number of mutually
states that of a definite
When
it
does not refer to
of an antiphasis as in the principle of excluded middle,
a simple judgment upon which the different and which, by its contents, determines and limits Most frequently it happens that either the possibilities.
presupposes
always
hypotheses are based, the range of
subject or the predicate admits of a closed series of mutually exclusive
determinations, and these are enumerated by the divisive judgment.
The
i.
is
way of expressing
simplest
to say that neither
its
that a hypothesis
affirmation nor
confronted by an undecided alternative. is
true the negation
false the
But
negation
it is
is
false,
true
is
and
and
A
is
B
is
uncertain
negation can be asserted ; I am But I know that if the affirmation
its
vice versa
;
and
that
if
the affirmation
is
vice versa.
not only between affirmation and negation that such a choice
different hypotheses
amongst be possible
may be
in reference to the
perhaps D.
Where
presented.
same subject
A
Various hypotheses is
perhaps
B>
may
perhaps C,
D, are quite independent of between the hypotheses (thus I might say of Queen Semiramis that she was perhaps tall, perhaps blackeyed, etc.) but if the one predicate necessarily involves the other, then each other there
is
these predicates B^ C,
no
further relation
;
there arises the hypothetical judgment. to accept the
by
one predicate
irreconcilable
is
If again they are incompatible,
to exclude the others,
propositions,
each of which by
and
I
itself
am
confronted
is
a possible
hypothesis.
When
irreconcilable
propositions such as these are both equally un-
HYPOTHETICAL AND DISJUNCTIVE JUDGMENTS
229
V
Such hypotheses are they are connected by the particle not necessarily predicates of one and the same subject, but may be any "
)
or."
certain,
assumptions whatever which for some reason are mutually exclusive, and the relation between which can therefore be expressed in a hypothetical
judgment connecting the affirmation of one with the negation of the other. Thus the particle or contains two statements that the propositions are "
"
uncertain, that
A
2.
is
A
and
that they are mutually exclusive.
perhaps B, perhaps
C
;
if it is
B,
is
"A
C
not
it is
similar juxtaposition of predicates occurs in
;
B or
if it is
C,
C"
means
it is
not B.
judgments which state solid and vaporous
The judgments water can be liquid, a possibility. man can wake and sleep may also be expressed, when any one point of water is liquid, solid or vaporous man time is referred to, in the form "
"
"
sleeps or
We
wakes."
further determinations
"
find the "
:
or"
again
the triangle
when
rectilinear figure has three, or four, or five angles, is
denoted only by a general term there
by means of mutually exclusive thing
is
that
it
is
determinations, any of which 3.
When we
say of a
to
true, the statement implies that
know and
all I
it.
of such hypotheses that one
all
say of a
and incompatible
different
many
may belong
number
further determination
for
When
a plane
Whenever anything
etc."
room
is
predicates.
a triangle, there are
a general idea admits of
plain or spherical, etc.
is
is
necessarily
the mutually exclusive predicates which
are subjectively or objectively possible are included in the enumeration. or C is is Then we have the disjunctive proposition: either either
B or C or
D.
Thus
in stating a disjunctive
in view the necessary validity of
D A
B
A
is
;
judgment we have
one out of a given number of possible
and incompatible hypotheses. 4.
The
simplest case of such a disjunction
far as tradictory opposition of judgments, so
excluded middle.
Of
is
the other false.
necessarily true,
the two propositions
But
A
is
to be
is
is
B, and
just
found
in
con
subject to the law of
it
because
A
is
not B, one
this disjunction
is
The so self-evident it is of little value (see 25, p. 154). with junctions are those which limit our choice amongst positive judgments important dis
definite predicates. state the limited amongst these are the disjunctions which be a number of mutually exclusive attributes by which general idea may is either a crooked triangle A line is either straight or further determined. 5.
First
;
right-angled or oblique-angled
water
is
;
a
human
either fluid, solid or vaporous.
being
The
is
either
male or female
;
kind of possibility possessed
LOGIC
23o
by the single members of the disjunction
The meaning
206-7.
of the disjunction
as falling under the general idea
A
the various attributes possible in
A.
these
if
;
Here then
anything
there
is
a
to
me
only
must have some one or another of This meaning full
is
most obvious
in
force of disjunctions such
either a straight line or a crooked.
is
it
line,
34, 5, p.
known
that a thing
the hypothetical expression, which gives the as
that discussed in
is
is
presupposed both a judgment ascribing a general
is
and the knowledge of a closed series of mutually exclusive determinations which are possible to that predicate. predicate to the subject,
When we
6.
be
have in our minds
all
the particular subjects which
this relation
may be
expressed also in what
JUDGMENT.
"Lines
are
"
human
beings are
some
them
of
some of them
"
is
water
is
sometimes
called the DIVISIVE
straight, the
in the
others
crooked";
female."
When we
same thing the corresponding
sometimes
liquid,
may be
male, the others
review a complete series of changes
form
may
A, thus thinking of the different determinations as actual,
included in
solid,
sometimes
vaporous."
Here we must notice that the relation between divisive and disjunctive
When our knowledge judgments varies according to circumstances. is derived from experience alone, the disjunctive judgment is grounded upon the
divisive
;
since
is
it
a matter of fact that
all
human
beings
be divided into males and females, we infer that a third kind sible;
and upon
human being
this inference
is
we ground
man
either a
or a
woman."
comes
other hand, the disjunctive judgment that a triangle
we is
is
the disjunctive
first;
either parallel to
"
only after the judgment
or not
one generating
when we know
that
it
line or
is
It
complete.
a plane which intersects a right cone
the base, or not
the generating lines,
only
"every
In mathematics, on the
certain that our enumeration of the kinds of triangle
parallel to
judgment
may
impos
either right-angled, or acute-angled, or obtuse-angled, are
the same with the judgment
all
is
all
;
;
if
and
not."
exhausts
not parallel,
all
it
is
either intersects
in the latter case
it
This judgment comes the possibilities do
we
is
either
first,
and
obtain the
division of conic sections into circles, ellipses, parabolas, and hyperbolas. The divisive judgment may also be in the form of a "
judgment tions,"
and
expressed copulative the circle, ellipse, parabola and hyperbola are the conic sec
the definite article indicating the identity of extension of subject
predicate.
The need
of expressing the completeness of the enumeration more than some has led to the divisive judgment definitely by the use of 7.
"
"
HYPOTHETICAL AND DISJUNCTIVE JUDGMENTS being expressed in the form of a disjunction or crooked
"
"
;
of expression "all
lines are
is
human
ambiguous. straight
"all
:
beings are either male or
all
The judgments
231
lines are either straight
But
female."
mode
this
said to be disjunct are not
lines are crooked"; as,
the
for instance, in
judgment "the human race is descended from one pair or from several," where the disjunction is between the propositions "the human race is descended
from one
pair,"
and
"
the
human
race
is
descended from
In the former instance the disjunction applies to each particular line; so that here again, if we would avoid ambiguity, we must make use of the hypothetical form "anything which is a line, is
several
pairs."
either straight or
crooked."
These disjunctions have for their members the more exact determin ations of the subject, and may therefore be reduced to divisive judgments which divide the subject-concept into its species. From them we must 8.
distinguish judgments which unfold the different possibilities in the predi cate of a given subject. 1 When we say that the planets either shine by their
own
light or derive their light
from the sun, we do not mean that
the fact of being a planet includes both possibilities, and that
by their own really
do
is
light,
to start
some shine
while others are illuminated by the sun.
from the judgment
tigate the exact nature of their light
planets
"the
shine,"
What we
and
to inves
the possibility of finding an
and
Take
explanation amongst the given circumstances.
the proposition
world has either existed from eternity, or has had a beginning
;
"the
and
its
In the
beginning was due either to a free cause or to blind necessity." disjunction we start from the existence of the world as datum, and
first
enquire as to the duration of this existence
;
in the second, our
datum
is
the beginning of the world from a cause, and our enquiry concerns the different kinds of causes. When we say he is either a hypocrite or a "
presupposed that he behaves unreasonably, and the question is, as to the source of this behaviour. A further distinction may be made
fool,"
it is
according as the closer determinations of the predicate form a part of its meaning, or are gained from a consideration of the concrete possibilities of the particular instance.
1 Trendelenburg s doctrine that the disjunctive judgment is a statement of the exten sion of the subject concept applies only to those disjunctive judgments which are based upon a division of the subject concept. It is not applicable when the disjunction refers to changeable states, and it is not applicable in this sense when the concept of which the
possible determinations are developed
is
predicate.
Cf.
my
Prograrnrn, pp. 60, 61.
LOGIC
232
Judgments such as
9.
no divine
justice,"
"
either the
wicked
will
be punished, or there
upon hypothetical judgments, and
are grounded
is
are
denial of the consequent involves the governed by the principle that the denial of the ground, taken together with the principle of excluded If there
middle.
is
a divine justice the wicked will be punished
the wicked will be punished or not
either
supposed ground of
not, the
if
their
punishment cannot exist. It is of course true that the disjunctive judgment "A is either,/? 10. or may be resolved into two hypothetical if A is not J3, it is C" "
C,"
and
"if
A
disjunctive
is
B,
it
is
not
but
C";
it
does not follow from
judgment has no importance of
this that the
own independently
its
of the
We
cannot state a negation as the ground of an The affirmation, unless the disjunction has already been established. judgment that if light is not matter it is motion, cannot precede the know hypothetical judgment.
ledge that light 11.
It
disjunctive
A may
is
follows
either matter or motion.
from the nature of the statement contained in the
judgment that the
be either
B
or
C A
propositions
"A
must be either
is
B or
either C,"
are
B
or
all
C
exactly
equivalent.
38.
RESULTS.
THE FUNCTION OF JUDGMENT
is
always the same in so far as
states categorically that a predicate belongs to a subject.
The
it
always
differences
which we find depend partly upon whether the synthesis between subject is simple, as in the denominative judgment; or complex as
and predicate in ju.lgments
Partly,
or
is
governed by the categories of attribute, activity and relation. again, upon whether the subject of a judgment is a simple idea,
itself
a synthesis of the nature of judgment, or a combination of
such syntheses of which we
may
predicate that
it
is
false,
possible,
necessary, etc.
The and real
made are based upon differences of predicates and not upon differences in the function of judgment ; any variations in function are to be found in one class alone, that of distinctions generally
subjects,
categorical judgments.
For
this
reason the importance of the predicates presupposed in
judgment becomes more evident;
to recognise
these
as
all
remaining the
HYPOTHETICAL AND DISJUNCTIVE JUDGMENTS same throughout
changing subjects
the
is
essential
233
characteristic
of
judgment.
So
1.
far
our investigation has shown that the customary classification which has been established mainly by the authority of
of judgments,
Kant,
is
The is
inadequate.
and presupposition of all judgment is the judgment which immediate, simple and positive; and this consists in the synthesis of basis
a subject and predicate accompanied by the consciousness of objective The meaning of this synthesis and of its objective validity validity.
depends upon the nature of the ideas connected in the judgment ; it is simple when the act is merely one of denomination, complex when it is That grounded upon the categories of attribute, activity and relation. which takes place in judgment is always the recognition of the agreement between an idea previously known and one element of the subject and, ;
meaning of
according to the original
"
to
know,"
every judgment
is
the
is already cognition and recognition of something in the subject which known. But it does not follow that every judgment consists only in this knowledge, and is nothing more than the statement of a subsumption.
one
In
class of
judgments
it
is
just as indispensable that there
between attribute or
also be present the consciousness of unity
and
thing, or the consciousness of relation
between two things
;
should activity
and sub-
sumption cannot take place in judgments concerning attributes, activities, and relations without the differentiation and synthesis of different elements in a presentation.
Even
the judgments which have numerical
predicates show no
the numerical judgment that
ments
;
determinations
essentially different function. it
every judgment which
It
is
for
their
not peculiar to
must have been preceded by other judg and names it by
refers to the particular,
All that is peculiar the subject-term presupposes a previous judgment. to numerical predicates is the nature of the preliminary operations which necessitate preliminary they necessitate, just as other relational predicates nature to their equality and inequality e.g. peculiar operations appropriate
presuppose measurement
;
the
number given
is
compared with a number
previously known. 2.
But the course of thought extends beyond immediate knowledge, from to think of judgments which might take place as distinct
and leads us
actual judgments.
Then new judgments
arise
having reference to these
ideas of judgments or to the relations between them.
LOGIC
234
Every statement contains the judgment that the synthesis expressed by necessary or true, and in the negation this judgment is contradicted by the statement that the synthesis is false. Besides this affirmative or negative decision, we find on the one hand the judgment that a hypothesis it is
is
deny
it
;
that
i.e.
possible
on the
is
it
not subjectively necessary either to affirm or to
other, the judgment that
it is
the necessary consequence of
another hypothesis, or that amongst a number of given hypotheses one
must necessarily be true. These judgments all resemble simple judgments in that they state simple modal predicates concerning a subject; their peculiarity lies, therefore, not in the synthesis, but in the nature of their subjects and predicates. Since, however, these subjects form an essential element of the function of
judgment, and since the predicates refer to just that characteristic of the function which expresses its relation to the final aim of all serious thought, such judgments are in an eminent degree logical. Indeed, there could be no conscious judgment at all unless some account were taken of this re
between the originally subjective combination of subject and predi
lation
cate
We
and these modal determinations.
special attention to negative, hypothetical
are therefore justified in giving
and disjunctive judgments; not
because they are special kinds of the judgment, but because they have reference to hypotheses
Thus
there
is
and
really only
to their logical value
one
sort of
and
significance.
judgment, the categorical statement
If any distinction at all is made and FORM the MATTER of the judgment, then by form we must mean that mode of activity in thought through which a judgment as that a predicate belongs to a subject.
between the
such
formed
is
same.
The
;
and
this
diversity
forms of judgment
is
mode
which
is
of activity
is
in all cases essentially the
generally represented as attaching to the
really a diversity of matter,
nature of subjects or predicates.
As
this
and depends upon the
nature varies, we certainly find a
modification, sometimes in the movement of thought which precedes the judgment, sometimes in the meaning of the predication that is, in the meaning of that unity between subject and predicate which is the thought
present in "
forms
"
all
to the verbal
reason
judgments.
The conventional
doctrine
of the
different
of judgment (due in part to the importance generally attached
why we
expression) loses sight of the one idea which give the
All judgment,
number of
name
therefore,
of judgment to
presupposes
predicate-ideas which
may be
all
first
is
the sole
the different kinds.
of
all
the
presence of a
recognised in the subjects.
It
HYPOTHETICAL AND DISJUNCTIVE JUDGMENTS requires, moreover, that
we should have
235
ideas of different kinds of synthesis
between subject and predicate these differences being determined by the nature of the subjects and predicates, and constituting the meaning of the ;
simple statement that the predicate belongs to the subject. to denote the resulting kinds of synthesis If, however, we still continue "
as
"forms
of judgment,
it is
after all a question as to the use of language.
doing we must guard against thinking that the name "judgment" denotes a number of originally different and co-ordinate acts of thought, a mistake which is constantly made when affirmative and negative judg
But
in so
ments are distinguished as opposite forms. Unless we do so we are in danger of losing sight of the one concept which should correspond to the term,
and the term
itself
becomes a mere homonym.
PART
II.
REGULATIVE.
INTRODUCTION. 39-
IN order that the function of judgment may actually succeed to certain
and universally
valid judgments,
before
is
it
all
in attaining
necessary that
the certainty of the particular judgment in question should be invariable, and accompanied by the consciousness of its universal validity. Two
conditions are essential to
this.
In the
place the person judging must
first
be conscious of the logical ground of his judgment and secondly, the elements of the judgment itself must be completely determined and con ;
stant,
and thought by every one
For the
latter
of our iudgments, perfect concepts
be grounded
in
in the
same way.
condition to be fulfilled
;
and more
it is
necessary that the elements
be logically especially their predicates, should
for the former, that the judgments themselves should accordance with universally valid and necessary laws of
thought. 1.
In Part
we have taken thought
I.
analyzed the function of judgment in which
aiming
at
and universal
truth
validity.
we
as it
actually find
We
necessary and therefore valid for
We
must now
which judgment
test
attains
this its
claim,
end.
all
and have
itself
when
have sought to show the its relations, and we have
meaning and significance of the judgment in all found that one essential element of every statement i.e.
it,
always manifests
is its
claim to be true,
thinking beings.
and investigate the conditions under The conditions, that is, under which the
involves momentary certainty which accompanies every actual judgment which under and no delusion, but is the expression of objective necessity ;
the universal validity of the individual act of 2.
In order that a judgment
place that
it
may be
judgment
perfect,
it is
should remain unaltered for the person
should always repeat
it
in just the
is
guaranteed. necessary in the
who judges;
same way whenever
the
first
that
he
same subjects
and predicates recur and that its certainty should therefore If the same synthesis were for him at one time variable.
also be in
;
certain,
at
LOGIC
24 o
same way within the
in the
connected
same subjects and predicates were not always limits of one and the same con
the
if
anothei uncertain;
thought it possible that, starting from the same data I then the act of judg in the future than I now do otherwise might judge success its involves confidence in the irre for have must ment failed,
sciousness
if I
;
the judgment. fragable validity of But the certainty that a judgment
permanent, that the synthesis is this certainty can only be
is
irrevocable, that I shall always say the same,
it is known to depend, not upon momentary psycho, which vary as time goes on, but upon something which is logical motives, immutably the same every time I think and is unaffected by any change.
forthcoming when
This something
is,
on the one hand,
am
my
self-consciousness
the cer
itself,
same person who now thinks and who thought I, who thinks both one thing and another. On the other hand, it is
tainty that
before,
that about
I
which
content, which
the
I
dependent of the state of
The
my
judge,
itself as far as
thought
recognise as identical each time,
I
certainty that
mind
its
un variable is
quite in
of the individual thinker.
am and
I
regards
and which
think
is
final
and fundamental, the con
Here there can be none thought and all certainty whatever. but immediate and self-evident certainty we cannot even say that it is In the same way the certainty necessary, for it is prior to all necessity.
dition of
all
;
of my consciousness that it is
I
think this or that
inextricably interwoven with
my
is
immediate and self-evident; the one involves ;
self-consciousness
the other.
now we can
say that there is a necessity which obliges me to judge of one particular way so soon as I am aware of it if I can know that as surely as I am I, I must connect subject and predicate in this way, for no other reason than that I have thought of them, then my discernment If
an idea
in
;
of this necessity stitutes
is
the ground of certainty for every judgment.
consciousness of
my
its
logical
established between the judgment and
my
that so surely as I myself continue the
same
ment
in the
judging must
What
A
I
consciousness
is
itself; I
thus
know
must always repeat the judg
is
the
first
condition
:
for a judgment
to be perfect the
person
be conscious of its logical ground.
conditions must be fulfilled in order that
consciousness If an
self
same way.
This then
3.
This con
ground, and a connection
we may
attain to this
?
of which I
am
conscious
is
to
be the ground which makes a
INTRODUCTION judgment
B logically
necessary, then this necessity must rest
is
in so far is
upon a con
B
A
always and invariably follows from the necessity knowable; the presence of however
stant law, according to
and only
241
which
A
pure matter of fact, without which the necessity cannot take effect. the consciousness of the ground resolves itself into consciousness of
Thus
the law according to which
B
follows from
premises, and consciousness
its
of these premises.
may be
It
that these premises are not themselves judgments, but objects
which nothing more is known than such as sensations, reproduced ideas
of consciousness of another kind, of that they are at the
of
all
moment
present
;
which are present to consciousness. Thus so far necessity we have arrived at an ultimate fact which
kinds, or concepts
as concerns logical
must be regarded as pure matter of necessary consequence?
equal
is
intuition
based upon our concept of a
which gave
rise to
it,
in
my
consciousness at
;
circle
and
its
to
is
:
what
all,
is its
concept however, or the
this geometrical
No
image should
either from intuition of external objects,
Every judgment of perception
premises the immediate consciousness of a sensation,
this again is purely
be raised as
this
;
shown why
or as the result of inventive construction.
includes amongst
we can ask
all
that the diameters of a circle are
in the last instance matter of fact.
is
universal logical necessity can be
appear
fact
The judgment
whether
matter of its
fact.
It
true that the question
is
may
conditions are normal, and whether, therefore,
judgment concerning the existent i.e. it maybe asked what and universally valid inference can be drawn from the simple necessary But that the sensation is there has nothing act of a subjective sensation.
it
to
justifies a
do with
a simple
logical necessity,
we know
it
by our immediate consciousness of
fact.
When, on the other hand,
the premises are themselves judgments, then itself into the consciousness of the
the consciousness of necessity resolves
laws according to which from certain judgments other judgments follow the rules of inference), and the consciousness of the validity of the (i.e. premises.
Here again the same conditions apply
of the grounds of these judgments.
conditions unless their certainty as
immediate matter of
fact,
no
is
;
we must be conscious
No
judgments are exempt from these so self-evident that it must be regarded
less
than the
"
I
think,"
or the presence of
definite ideas; the certainty of these judgments cannot be further analysed by a consciousness of their necessity. To them we must add the judg
ments whose contents constitute the fundamental laws of s. L.
all
necessity,
R
LOGIC
242
the validity of which there according to which anything is necessary, and from some other judgment, but follow fore cannot be seen to necessarily
judgments, that is, which are as necessary as the a certainty which itself, or which can be shown to have
can only be recognised "
proposition is
am
I
"
of this proposition. necessarily involved in the certainty rules for thought is possible unless down is to which Thus no logic lay
such ultimate laws can be known by tain
and
Our
self-evident.
us,
task
first
and shown to be absolutely cer is
not to trace the inexhaustible
phenomena of matter of fact and of individual experience which constitute the given premises of our judgments in particular cases, but to lay
down
the laws according to which certain ideas necessary, and
and judgments make other
constitute a
ground for their certainty. judgments logically This involves what we have already claimed as a postulate in the Intro duction,
3
:
that
we
are able to distinguish objectively necessary thought
by the evident certainty with which
it
manifests
itself,
and by analysing the
Our success
conditions of this certainty to discover such universal laws.
out this task must show whether or not there
in carrying
is
any ground
for the postulate. 4.
In order that a judgment
may be always
and immutably cer
valid
tain, other conditions must be fulfilled which apply to an earlier stage in
and are not fulfilled in its natural course. The ideas denoted by and predicate terms must be constant and completely determined. subject thought,
The
of the identity of a judgment attaches in the
consciousness
verbal expression, to the fact that the
first
same statement
instance to
its
made about
the same thing in words, and the predicate must always have
this verbal
expression, the subject
at least
in explicative
is
and universal
Unless every word always keeps exactly the same meaning, judgments. the meaning being thus perfectly definite and fixed, we cannot possibly be certain that the repetition of the
the
same proposition
is
also the repetition of
same judgment, and the meaning of the judgment
uncertain.
Indeed, the very act of
itself
becomes
judgment tends to bring about this
confusion by a sort of shifting amongst our predicate ideas, for on ordinary
we are often guided by what is no more than a vague similarity between the new and the familiar (see 7, 8, p. 44). When the Marco-
occasions
manni mistook the
lions
which were
let
loose
upon them by Marcus
Aurelius for dogs, and slew them without ceremony, their judgment are dogs
animals
"
meant only
known
to
that the lions were
them.
more
Even while they were
like
"
these
dogs than any other
judging, their idea of the
INTRODUCTION
243
dog and the meaning of the word was changed, and a new image com prised in
it.
Again, although the necessity of judgments their universal validity, this only
same premises must synthesize
means
in the
a sufficient guarantee for
is
one who
that every
same way.
But
if
starts
from the
the primary data,
the ideal elements between which the synthesis takes place, were different
and absolutely incommensurable, so that every one connected a different meaning with a given word, then, however small the difference, our judgments would never actually attain to universal validity, for every individual
they would at the most approximate thereto.
That community of thought which, we endeavour to reach by means of language, and which is the condition of higher mental development, more especially of all science, would never be
We
saw, in
fully realized. 7,
that in the natural course of thought the ideas of the
individual are not constant nor completely determined,
do
individuals
On
words. of
and
that different
same ideas nor denote them by the same
not have the
the contrary, the very laws which govern the natural formation
both their variability in the individual and their different individuals, thus prohibiting a completely fixed
necessitate
ideas
difference
in
verbal signification.
Hence we cannot speak nor of
seems
its
to
be the same
really the
is
And
subject.
valid
in
of the complete logical certainty of a judgment we assume that whenever a judgment
invariable validity unless
same
;
before
concrete*,
as another,
that the
we can
therefore,
because clothed in the same language,
same statement
is
say that any given judgment
is
comprehensible and convincing
must assume that the ideas contained
in
it
common
are
it
the same
made about
universally
we
for all
to all
and the
of natural thought
is
completely excluded by
the ideal of perfect thought, and a logic which
is
to contain the rules of
same
for
all.
The anarchy
are the conditions perfect thought must begin by determining what fulfilled 5.
to
be
by ideas themselves as elements of the judgment.
This brings us to the two main problems of
this
part of our
work. that
are possible are, (a) The conditions upon which perfect judgments the ideas which enter into the judgment as subject or predicate should be
absolutely constant, completely determined, the
denoted by unambiguous terms.
we
call a
An
same
idea which
concept in the logical sense of the word.
for every one,
fulfils
One
and
these conditions part of our task,
LOGIC
244 therefore, will
ideas (b)
may The
ments
is
therefore
be to investigate the conditions necessary
condition of the logical necessity and universal validity of judg have a ground. second investigation must
A
that they should
discover the
necessarily from
One
its
rules
according
to
which a
judgment follows
premises.
part of this investigation will be concerned with the laws according immediate judgments find their ground in the ideas of which
to which
are
in order that our
be logical concepts.
composed
they
;
the other part with the laws according to which mediated
judgments are grounded upon other judgments.
CHAPTER
I.
THE CONCEPT. 40.
THE
LOGICAL CONCEPT
differs
from the general idea which has developed and is denoted by a word, in its constancy,
in the natural course of thought, in
and immutability of its determination, and in the It differs will employ the same term to denote it.
the completeness
certainty that every from"
one
the concept in
metaphysical meaning as the adequate thought its only aim is the complete determina
its
of the essence of an object in that tion of our predicate ideas,
and
this
aim has no
direct connection with
the question as to whether the concept corresponds to any real object, The quality of or whether it adequately represents such an object. It is the fact that it is with every idea. generality it has in common which defined, and clearly distinguished from all other ideas, strictly
forms the distinguishing characteristic of the concept, and in the construc tion of logical concepts our aim is to establish one mode of arranging thinking beings, and so to com without conscious purpose plete systematically the process which begins their
manifold ideal contents for
all
in language,
we must distinguish three meanings of In speaking of concepts," It may denote a natural psychological production, and here the word. "
i.
as used in ordinary natural term the simple correlative of the it has become a mental where It is the idea at the stage language. "
"
it
is
possession,
and has gained the generality explained
to every idea as such.
It
is
now
judgment, more especially a predicate. seen,
in
7,
which belongs
become an element of the Such ideas, as we have already
qualified to
are different for different people,
and are
still
in the process of
so that a word formation; even for the individual himself they change, same person. the for even same the does not always keep meaning Strictly
speaking,
it
is
only by
a
fiction
which
neglects
individual
LOGIC
246 peculiarities that
we can speak
of the concepts denoted by the terms
used in ordinary language. In contrast with this empirical meaning the concept may be 2. viewed as an ideal it is then the mark at which we aim in our endeavour :
we seek to find in it an adequate The concept in this sense must enable us
to attain knowledge, for
copy of the essence
of things.
to penetrate into
the very heart of the thing, to understand it ; i.e., to see that its particular determinations as connected in it are the necessary consequence of its
The concept
nature as a unity.
stone to physiology
;
of
life,
in this sense,
would be the key
and physics that of this direction would be
that of matter, to chemistry
;
psychology ; and all knowledge in complete when we could exhibit a system of concepts comprising the true When we try to think of an absolute counterpart of every existing thing. mind,
to
and divine knowledge, we define it by saying that in the absolute intelli In this sense we may indeed speak gence, concept and being are one. of the truth of our concepts
they are true
;
when they are in themselves The true concept of
the exhaustive expression of the nature of things.
God would comprise in its of God in all its aspects. 3.
determinations the thought of the real nature
Between these two meanings of the word, which may be called the
empirical and the metaphysical, there lies the logical^ which alone concerns
us here.
This has
its
origin in
the
universal validity in our judgments.
logical
All that
demand is
for
required
should be absolutely fixed and determined, and that
certainty
all
and
that our ideas
is,
who make
use
same system of denotation should have the same ideas. In what relation our thought stands to the existent, and whether there is absolute of the
agreement or not, is not determined here must indeed suppose that as knowledge
or at least not directly. is
always growing, less
tained in our ideas at any given time than in the existent
;
is
We con
at the best
our ideas are representations which correspond to the existent so far as If our judgments could never be they go, they are never exhaustive. universally
valid
unless
metaphysical sense, and differences
it
and indefiniteness
inadequacy to the
elements were perfect concepts
their if
existent,
were as in
difficult to
our ideas as
then
it
in
the
get rid of individual is
to
overcome
their
we should be debarred even from
approximating to the goal of knowledge by the gradual progress of science, for science always It
is
presupposes uniformity in the construction of concepts. the formal sufficiency
necessary, therefore, to distinguish between
THE CONCEPT of concepts
adequacy
;
for
former before the 4.
the
of
purpose
and we must assume
Finally,
latter
we must
judgment,
that
it
is
247
and
their
metaphysical
at least possible to attain the
has been reached. distinguish
between the
logical perfection of the
concept and the appropriateness of its construction to some end, the latter being connected with the problems of classification within some given sphere of things (objects, actions, crimes,
A
etc.).
concept
may be
completely determined, and hence logically perfect, and yet not so well For the adapted as some other to meet the requirements of science. is to attain, by means of concepts and the terms which denote them, the greatest possible simplicity and brevity in our know How must our concepts be formed to and it therefore asks, ledge
aim of science
"
;
most important and
to the
enable us to give the simplest expression
By this aim we must be guided comprehensive universal judgments ? in methodology, which has its origin in the problems arising out of the "
nature of the conditions of our knowledge.
On
the other hand,
we
if
are really to attain logical perfection in our
judgments, it is necessary that we should always have a sufficient supply of logically perfect concepts to enable us to express and determine every In judging we do not thing which becomes subject to our judgment.
merely repeat what is already known ; we are constantly appropriating something new. In this sense the possibility of perfect judgments is determined by the extent to which the raw material of all human ideas
We must always be prepared has taken permanent form in concepts. with concepts in which to express our knowledge ; or we must at least be sure of
being able to create
conceptually determined.
them from elements which are already
We may
compare
this
ideal with that of a
universal alphabet which comprises generally accepted signs for all the of speech. distinguishable simple sounds possible to the human organs universalis the characteristica of s idea of view Leibnitz From this point for that at which we should aim in the was a most
appropriate expression
1 logical construction of concepts. 1
Cf.
Histor.
Ueber Leibnizens Entwurf einer allgemeinen Charakteristik." Trendelenburg B eitrage zur Phil, iii. p. i sq. And Descartes, Ep., I, in, where a similar "
:
is developed Ejusmodi linguse inventio a vera Fhilosophia pendet. Absque enim impossibile est omnes hominum cogitationes enumerare, aut ordine digerere Et si quis clare imo neque illas distinguere, ita ut perspicuse sint et simplices "
thought
:
ilia
;
.
explicuisset, quales sint et
ideas
illoe
simplices,
ex quibus componitur quidquid
receptum, auderem
demum
illi
quae in
cogitant,
sperare linguam aliquam
hominum
essetque
.
.
imaginatione versantur,
hoc per universum orbem
universalem," etc.
LOGIC
248
The
5.
essential characteristic of the concept
generality 1
by
abstraction,
i.e.,
is
generally said to be
this is the doctrine that
Connected with
by a process which separates the
its
concepts are gained
common
characteris
of particular objects from those by which they are distinguished from each other, and gathers together the former into a unity. But the sup tics
porters of this view forget that, in order to resolve an object of thought into
its
particular characteristics,
judgments are necessary which have
their predicates general ideas (or, as they are
and
as these concepts
make
commonly
for
called, concepts),
the process of abstraction possible, they must
have been originally obtained in some other way.
They
moreover,
forget,
that the process presupposes that the series of objects to be
compared is made of some
some way determined, and a tacit assumption is motive by reason of which we group together just these objects, and seek their common elements. If we are guided by any motive, and not by already in
mere
2
caprice,
from the
common
it
must be found ultimately
in the fact that the objects are
recognised as similar, because containing certain elements to all ; that is, a general idea is already there, by means of which first
these objects are selected from amongst all others. There is only one connection in which the doctrine of the construction of concepts by com
parison and abstraction
is
at all appropriate,
and
that
is
when we
elucidate
meaning of a word by enumerating the common characteristics of the things which, as a matter of fact, are always denoted by the
the actual
word. 1
In explaining the concept of animal, gas,
See Kant in the Transcendental Aesthetic,
of as an idea which
contained in an infinite
2, 4.
theft,
etc.,
we might
Every concept must be thought
number
of different possible ideas (as the element common to all), and therefore as comprising these ideas under it. 2 Drobisch is quite consistent in admitting that this selection is arbitrary (Logik, edn. It is in itself a 18, p. 20). 3, completely arbitrary matter what objects we choose to is
compare with each other we may compare a raspberry cane with a bramble, but we may compare it with a penknife or a turtle. When, however, the Linnean system, which classifies together widely different plants, is cited as an example of this "far-fetched comparisons," it is overlooked that the concepts by which the Linnean classes are deter mined are not due to this simple and direct method of In this method it is comparison. the common element of objects which are chosen at random which is selected, while the Linnean classes, on the contrary, are the result of an endeavour to find simple distin ;
also
guishing characteristics whereby to divide into definite groups the incalculable varieties of plants. First it was seen that plants differ in the number of stamens, etc. ; then followed the methodical grouping Of together of those which agree on these points. course, this distinction was itself based upon a comparison in the wider sense, but it was first employed to discover differences, and not the common element, of the com objects
pared. (The last edn. 5, p. 21.)
two sentences
refer to the contrary
view expressed by Drobisch,
THE CONCEPT attempt to select the rally
called
"animals,"
of
characteristics
the
all
all
bodies called
the
gene
things or of
"gas,"
all
the
Whether or not we should succeed, whether
theft."
it
a recipe for the construction of a concept possible to carry out such that
if
of
or
l
"
actions called is
common
249
is
another question.
we could assume
to
call
animal, gas,
concept we
way
is
that there
There might be some chance of success is never any do.ubt as to what we ought
etc.
theft,
But
are seeking.
we
possessed
the this
we
to look for the spectacles
that
form a concept by abstraction in
if,
;
to
is,
already
are wearing by the aid of the spec
tacles themselves. 6.
Nevertheless, there
is
some
truth in this doctrine.
cerns the generality of the concept,
we may
find
it first
So
far as
con
in the fact that as
a rule logical concepts merely complete ideas which have arisen naturally;
they do not supersede them ; we cannot change the nature of ideation, and the concept as a work of art must always be preceded by the idea as
Now
a natural development.
every idea naturally possesses generality,
detached from the original particular intuition or par ticular function, and has been made our own as a reproducible object nor can any arbitrary action on our part deprive the idea of this natural
inasmuch as
it
is
;
But
generality.
no way depends upon whether an idea
this generality in
has been formed from one intuition, or from intuitions
(
7)
;
all
guardedly expresses
it
we
that is
learn from
contained in an
it
many
is,
infinite
similar or dissimilar
that the idea
number
as
Kant
of possible ideas.
The Socratic method of determining concepts is in the main the same as this. It always starts by assuming that definite concepts correspond to the current meanings of words, and it proceeds to find the right explanation of the word by comparing particular examples of that which it denotes, and contrasting with these examples of that which it 1
does not denote.
The
only difference
is
that Socrates does not
aim
at
surveying every
To the present day the particular thing, but contents himself with a few examples. doctrine of the concept is really based upon this Socratic method of always presupposing must be concepts corresponding to words ; and to this method is due the of general failure to distinguish between the concept of psychology and the concept The method finds its justification and importance in the fact that in language as logic. learnt tradition we find it already established what concrete things and events are that there
by
a word, customarily named by certain words, and as we come gradually to understand the idea of a number of particular objects is connected with it before we are conscious of answer of its general meaning as such. typical instance of this is to be found in the Children and Theaetetus to the question: What is eTrto-r??/*?? ? it is mathematics, etc. those without scientific training will always answer by giving an instance instead of a the Socratic method was that it pointed out service rendered definition. The
A
by
primary
the meaning of the are based.
word
as such, that
meaning upon which
particular acts of
naming
LOGIC
25o
Whether or not
it is
contained in
many
nature of the idea or concept, and
actual ideas,
makes no
it
been derived from one or from many. But we may find a further justification
for the
the generality of the concept in the fact that separation
of the
immaterial to the it
has
importance attached to necessitates a complete
it
meaning of the word from
is
difference whether
particular intuitions, thus
securing for the judgment a clear and definite meaning, and substituting for a vague comparison a real statement of unity between subject and predicate.
When we
see a
palm
for the first time,
and
call
it
a tree,
we
do so
are led to
and beeches, which we know, and the images of which are connected with the word although we may not by
its
general similarity to the
firs
"
tree,"
have noticed exactly wherein the similarity consists. "The palm is a tree is not strictly justified as a proper judgment unless the word "tree raeans nothing but what the palm has in common with firs, beeches, etc., "
"
then only can
we
take the judgment in
its
strict
palm everything which is contained instead of the vague and inaccurate meaning, in the
in "
and proper
common
the selection
which
to the objects is
I
call
all
which
tree,"
tree."
the characteris
But the chief object of
trees.
not to find a general idea comprising the particular
to obtain a firm grasp of the general idea
I find
thought of the The palm is like a
my
This process certainly involves a conscious selection of tics
"
sense,
is
;
it
is
already indefinitely and
confusedly contained in the thought of the particular, and, by sharply it, to give a definite meaning to the judgment, thus completing a
defining
The involuntary action of process which always begins unconsciously. psychological laws is sufficient to give rise to generic images formed from manifold similar intuitions, the differences of the particular images being lost sight of,
Thus we
do,
and leaving shifting schemata to correspond to our words. no doubt, drop the distinguishing elements, and retain those
which are common, but the process
is
incomplete because
it
is
not
grounded upon any conscious comparison and distinction of the parti cular characteristics. To supplement this process is the aim of conscious comparisons
(7, n,
p. 47).
formation of our ideas
we
It is
find
the abstraction which separates.
true again
that
in
the
involuntary
what alone should be called abstraction, It is
by means of
this that
we break up
the undivided whole of intuition into thing, attribute, and activity, and that by detaching them from this unity we form those abstract ideas
which enable us to compare different things, finding them alike in some respects, different in others, and which alone can supply predicates for the
THE CONCEPT
251
judgments in which conscious comparison and distinction take place. is true, also,
It
that a comparison of partially resembling objects taking place
may become new concepts.
more
under these conditions
the
for the formation of
If visible objects always presented the
or less fortuitous occasion
same combination of colour and form, we should have much more that is, in difficulty in constructing separate ideas of colour and form abstracting
them from the given whole
;
but a conscious comparison of red
only possible after such an abstraction has
things as to their colour
is
taken place,
simultaneously with
or,
horse, the dog,
at
least,
and the
of four-footed animal,
lizard,
may perchance
we happen
if
to
A
it.
comparison of the
lead us to form the concept
be struck by their
similarity in
having four feet (though more probably we should proceed by differentia
quadrupeds differed from men and birds, beetles and on the one hand, and from snakes and snails on the other) and many generalizations arise in this way. But the processes, when thus
tion, finding that flies,
;
carried out, are not the result of intentional
skill,
nor
is
their
product such
The characteristics found upon com always subject, when selected in this casual way, to
as to satisfy logical requirements.
parison to agree are
that natural indefiniteness elasticity of
selves
and absence of
limitation which arises from the
our ideas and their tendency to annex what
and place
it
lacks a solid basis
under the same denotation
;
is
similar to
them
and the whole process
the characteristics which form the predicates of
when
judgments of comparison are not themselves perfectly definite and deter mined by every one in the same way. It is one of the chief failures of the
ordinary
doctrine
of the
concept
that
it
proceeds
as
if
these
characteristics were given ready made, and such as to need no further elaboration. Really, the enormous difficulty of passing beyond the in natural state which every one speaks his own language consists much less
the processes of comparison
in
itself
than in establishing accurate
the difficulty is to and generally accepted standards of comparison ; determine conceptually the attributes which are to be used as charac />.,
teristics. 7.
The
developed naturally and in
it
is distinguished from the idea which has the basis of ordinary speech by the fact that of ideas to expand in the process of formation
logically perfect idea is
the natural tendency
has been counteracted by an activity which negates and limits, and thus form and consistency. If we disregard for the moment the demand gives
that ideas should be the
same
for all,
we may
charsay that the essential
LOGIC
252
concept is the constancy and complete distinction of the which is denoted by any given term.
acteristic of the
ideal content
This constancy presupposes that a definite ideal content and its appro priate verbal sign have been consciously fixed by us in order that we may always be able to reproduce of
its
strict
identity.
it
as the same,
Complete
survey, in the first place, of those objects
and are most
liable to confusion,
possible objects of our ideas.
and be conscious every time
requires a comprehensive which most resemble each other
distinction
and
further of the whole range of the
depends also upon conscious acts by which we become aware of the differences between the ideas A, C, D, etc., retaining as clear an idea of the intervals between them as of the It
B>
determinations
conscious
of
This
themselves.
act,
which
first
makes us expressly
same content by
identity of the
the
its
negation
of a
and completes the determination of our ideas, 1 while same time we are enabled to arrange them according to the degrees
different one, aids at the
of difference. 8.
Suppose that
all
become elements
the ideas which
and manipulate
thought to consider
we have occasion
as units,
of judgments, were capable of being produced
indivisible act, either of intuition or of relating
that the objects of
in the course ot
and which are destined
to
by an
thought suppose, further, which we form ideas were limited in number and easily
surveyed, with such
marked
differences between
;
them
we should be
that
as
conscious of the transition in passing from one to the other as in passing 1
The view
that an idea
owes
its
first
determination to distinction overlooks the fact
only possible when different ideas are present, and that dis tinction does not therefore create the contents which are different. Ulrici, for instance Red is the particular colour we call red (Compendium der Logik, edn. 2, p. 60), says,
that distinction itself
is
"
without only because, being red, it cannot also be blue, yellow, etc. in general, an blue, etc., it would be quite indefinite, mere colour
its
difference from
absolutely indeter have shown, we are
minate quality of which we should know nothing because, as we aware of colour as colour only by means of distinctions in colour." This I cannot allow. The sensation of red more accurately, of a particular shade of red is a positive datum with a content peculiar to itself, and it would continue to be so even though it should be
accompanied by the sensations of fewer colours than are perceived by all normal eyes. Colour sensations are not less definitely determined for any one because it may happen that many colours have never been seen by him at all, The variety of his colour sen sations would be the smaller, and he would have a poorer supply of ideas, but that would be all no doubt to any one feeling red only, red would mean the same as colour in general, but this is only equivalent to saying that the idea colour would comprise no plurality of distinguishable qualities, not that it would be absolutely indefinite. The con ditions which enable us to retain a plurality of sensations in consciousness are not those upon which the definiteness of particular sensations depends on the contrary, this de;
;
finiteness
is
rather presupposed
by such
ability.
Cf. Lotze, Logik, edn. 2, p. 26.
THE CONCEPT
253
from one to two, from two to three, then the logical task of constructing concepts would come to an end with the functions we have mentioned
and with the establishment of a generally accepted system of names no more would be needed but a memory able to retain what had been gained ;
from the general survey.
If,
for instance, our
world of ideas were limited
to the twelve simple notes of the octave, then everything necessary to give
the definiteness of concepts to our ideas would be that
member each
particular
sufficient certainty to
note and distinguish
it
The
guard against confusion.
we should
re
from the others with ideas of the particular
notes and the consciousness of their differences would yield us the whole material for our concepts arranged in a fixed order.
But both assumptions are incorrect. The first, because the ideas which treat as units and denote by one term can generally be resolved into a plurality of distinguishable elements they prove to be products com
we
;
pounded from simpler ideas which the mind can grasp by themselves. This makes them more difficult to retain in thought, for in a compound idea both the particular elements and the
must be retained
manner of
their
composition
on the other hand, the difficulties of distinguishing are greater and more special in nature, inasmuch as a compound idea may resemble another in some of its elements and differ from it in others.
When, can do
;
while,
for instance, I try to it
keep before
it
the idea of a horse, I
manner when, again, I wish to distinguish from some other idea, such as that of the donkey, I find that while agrees with it in most respects it is distinctly different only in a
parts of the figure in a given it
my mind
only by a process of mental construction, piecing together the ;
few.
The second assumption is also incorrect. memory we come upon numbers
collected in
which obliterate the marked intervals give definite form to
our ideas.
for
Throughout the materials of imperceptible differences
which we look when trying
to
This continuity, moreover, applies to
the simpler elements of our ideas as well as to
compound
images.
In the
sphere of colours, red passes by imperceptible degrees through violet into blue, through orange into yellow, through pink into white, through dark
red into brown.
A
similar continuity
magnitudes and forms, and hence there of scarcely distinguishable objects that
and
to retain
them
things themselves.
is
it is
in their differences.
in the sphere of spatial such an unlimited number
found
arises
impossible to differentiate them It is the same with intuitable
Intermediate terms intervene everywhere as know-
LOGIC
254
ledge extends between objects which were at first sharply distinguished ; snow and hail, tree and shrub, horse and ass, negro and
between
European.
41-
Since the greater number of our ideas are composite origin in
we cannot determine
distinguishable acts
by a conscious determination of
and of
ponent ideas)
their
their
manner of
have their
elements (characteristics, or com Thus the conceptual synthesis.
determination of the content of an idea presupposes into simpler
i.e.,
their content except
first
of
all its
analysis
and unanalysable elements, the same analysis determining
also the form of their synthesis.
This analysis could not be completely carried out unless based upon a perfect knowledge of the laws which govern the formation of ideas^ and such a knowledge alone could assure us that the elements were the same But our analysis can never arrive at elements all thinking beings.
for
which are completely isolated as products of independent functions ; it always ends in a system of connected functions which are related to each other, and which comprise the various forms in which the manifold The functions by which we think the logical categories synthesized.
is
difference) are connected with the spatial
(unity, identity,
forms of intuition
and when
;
referring to
existing both are connected with activity, relation)
;
and
all
which
that
the real categories
is
and temporal thought of as
(thing,
attribute,
are again connected with the intuitively given
contents of immediate inner or sense perception.
The
perfection of our
ideas as concepts presupposes a complete system of these elements.
As we have
an unlimited multiplicity of ideas which are separated by imperceptible differences, our conceptual determination of them must be limited to establishing definite boundaries within the gradual in intuition
fusion of differences. i.
The problem
to
which the
first
the composite nature of ideal objects
of the facts mentioned in gives rise
was
40, 8
familiar to the tradi
tional logic.
Here we
a single idea
and denoted by one term must be defined by its charac a concept must be resolved into its component ideas or
teristics,
concepts.
that
are taught that the thought which
These are thought
in the
concept and form
the characteristics heavy, yellow, bright, metallic,
its
is
contained in
content.
Thus
etc., are thought in the
THE CONCEPT concept gold
the attributes bounded, four-sided, equilateral, rectangular,
;
plane surface in the concept illegal,,
255
square
and
;
intentional, deliberate slaughter of a
represented as the
sum
the
in
human
concept murder the This content is
being.
or product of the particular characteristics.
It is
generally held, moreover, that this analysis into characteristics solves also
the further problem of distinction, these characteristics constituting just that
whereby
The
different ideas are distinguished. 1
how
question as to
teristics in
is
it
the totality of an idea
possible to distinguish different charac is
generally treated as
and were evident from the examples
settled,
repeatedly called
by Trendelenburg
especially
if it
were already
Attention has been
cited.
the need of a
to
exact determination of the relation between the characteristics.
homogeneous? and
all
if
how do
not,
more
Are they
they differ? are they indifferent to
each other, or are they mutually dependent ? and finally, in what relation do the component parts stand to the whole ? For in borrowing terms
from spatial or temporal relations, and speaking of concepts or ideas as
component that the
parts,
we
component
are only using figurative language.
We
do not mean
ideas are ideas of the parts of a whole (as head, neck,
trunk, are ideas of parts of
an animal), standing in the same relation to to the whole we mean that they
the idea of the whole as the parts do are elements of the idea in the
;
same way
that the particular attributes are
of a thing.
We
2.
unless
it
cannot analyse a given idea into
has been in the
first
its
parts
or characteristics
instance developed by means of distinguish
able functions out of different elements.
If the idea
was originally simple
and produced without a succession of acts, it would show no joints into which the analysis could penetrate, nor would there be any justification for such an analysis
;
it
would
at best
be no more than an arbitrary breaking
up of the idea.
As
a matter of fact the ideas which most naturally occur to us in this
connection, the ideas of intuitable things, have
conscious synthesis. plete as wholes
;
When we become
arisen
through
an un
conscious of them they are
com
but psychological analysis gives irresistible evidence of
by which the whole has been developed from particular The image of an apple does not penetrate through the doors of
the processes
elements.
the senses to the tablet 1
Ueberweg,
such of
its
e.g., writes,
upon which our ideas are depicted 49, p. 103:
elements as distinguish
it
"The
from other
characteristics of "
objects.
at
one
flash, as
an object consist
in
LOGIC
256
conveyed by a kind of enchantment, or by the mechanism of a psychical photography. Analysis of sense-perception shows how the sensation of
if
movements of the eye in following the must be combined with others, and view outline; how one perspective
colour must be connected with the
these again with particular tactile sensations of the hand, mentally grouped into the form of a stereometrical
image
;
how one
psychical function must
construct from the sensations the idea of an external object, assign to this object
of the visible taste,
its
position
and tangible thing
in space. is
It
shows, again,
and another
how
the idea
enriched by sensations of smell and
the reference of these to the visible
and tangible object presuppos
ing fresh functions appropriate to the combinations of the impressions of different senses.
Finally,
shows how such impressions when
it
partially
repeated are continually supplemented by reproductive imagination,
become
associated with the
word
apple, in connection with
which we
reproduce a kind of mental abbreviation of these processes takes place so rapidly
and unhesitatingly
and
;
and
easily
all this
that the result appears in the
mind without our being conscious of the
steps
by which
has been
it
formed. 3.
That which
is
true of ideas of things applies also to the ideas of at
tributes, activities,
and
presupposes,
the apprehension of the particular sides
first,
relations.
recognition of a line as a side
is
Equilateral
we need
a composite idea, for
and
a relational idea
it
for the
and then a
measurement of the
In the sides and the judgment that they are equal. same way the idea of movement, the simplest activity, requires the ap prehension of different positions and of the transition from one to the other.
The
idea of murder
is
a relational idea, and includes in addition
two points of reference the murderer and his victim a whole series of determinations, such as the conscious and deliberate intention of the
to
its
one, his action, and its effect in destroying the life of the other ; so that the idea as a whole can only be produced by a series of acts. This is doubly true of ideas which contain the thought of a plurality of independent objects connected by one or in the widest sense 4.
So
far as
:
an idea
sciously attending to
more relations, the
so-called collective concepts
people, family, etc.
its
is
composite we can only determine
particular elements
and
their
it
manner of
by con
synthesis.
Thus the formation of concepts always presupposes, on the one hand, analysis into
simple, indecomposable elements
constructive synthesis of these elements.
;
and, on the other, a re
Here the form of the
synthesis
THE CONCEPT may
itself
257
be called an element and characteristic of the concept in the
wider sense of the term, and we shall in future denote
The concept conscious
thus
related
is
construction of an
involuntary formation
;
it
to
the
object
presupposes
is
it
as such.
naturally developed idea as the
related
to
we
that
unconscious and
its
are
able to bring
consciousness the complete process of the formation of the idea. takes place by
into
This
means of judgments, which assign particular characteristics its predicates, and the concept therefore presupposes these
to the object as
predicates
the ideas of the characteristics
i.e.
which must themselves be
We thus find conceptually determined if the composite idea is to be so. that we need a number of simple characteristics, i.e. of ideal elements which cannot be further analysed, but which are nevertheless perfectly definite, fixed,
and
distinct.
But the concept must
5.
fulfil
yet another condition
as to serve for universally valid judgments.
That
is,
;
it
must be such
every one who shares
community of thought must connect the same ideas with the same words, and be able therefore to analyse them in the same way, and reduce them to the same simple elements. We can communicate a composite concept by enumerating its elements, and the manner of their synthesis in the
;
but these elements must be the same for every one, and be combined in the same way if our concepts are to agree. There is presupposed, there fore,
laws
a store of ideas formed by every one according to exactly the same and we can be certain that our concepts agree only to the extent in
;
which we are certain that our ideas are formed according to laws which are the same for all. Thus completeness and perfection in the formation of our concepts depends
upon our having complete
insight into the pro
cesses by which our ideas are formed,
and upon our consequent ability to arouse the same idea in every one else. If we could assume that all our ideas are innate and possessed by every one alike, as was assumed by a former theory of knowledge, at any rate with reference to a part of our concepts ; or if we could assume that the same world when presented always produced the same system of ideas, with a mechanical certainty like that with which equally tense strings give out the same note when struck
then the assumption of the traditional logic that the char ; concepts present themselves, as it were, spontaneously might But in proportion as the process by which our ideas are formed
with equal force acteristics of
be is
justified.
complicated and dependent both upon external conditions which must
differ
with the individual, and upon internal laws,
s. L.
it
becomes more
difficult s
LOGIC
258
and
to recognise
same
exactly the
down
lay
ideas,
the conditions
and
upon which every one
will
form
what elements agree or differ in The difficulty, which is often great, of as
to recognise
the ideas of different people.
same thing by the same word, is due to the difficulty of finding ideas which are the same for every one and are called by the same name. the certaining whether two people understand exactly
we
Since
6.
are only laying
down
in the logical formation of concepts,
the conditions of an ideal perfection
we cannot undertake
to present a
com
Such a theory belongs to the of our investigation so far show that
plete theory of the formation of our ideas.
work of the
future. 1
But the
results
the problem of resolving a given idea into simple characteristics which are the
same
every one
for
istics
a b
c d,
much more complicated than would appear
is
from the formulae which
tell
us that a concept
and that these are
its
A
kind of mechanical or chemical compound of isolated,
different,
and of equal importance,
syllable, to take the
example given
contains the character
As
constituent ideas.
in
familiar
the
in the Thesetetus,
if
A
elements,
same way a
is
were a all
that a
compound
of
letters.
The
7.
first
question which arises, then,
is
whether we may assume
any such simple ideas as isolated elements, which, like the letters of the If we return to alphabet, might each be expressed and retained by itself. our fiction of a world of ideas consisting solely of twelve notes, which only
need
to
be
fixed, distinguished
determined, then
But
various chords.
simple note
is
it
really simple,
it
no other way can is
in order to
as one, it
homogeneous and incapable of being
A
with self;
therefore
have the idea of any given note as such, we identical with itself and differing from others ; in
enter into consciousness at
it
is
further
To
all,
for consciousness itself
inconceivable without a plurality of distinct objects.
the note
be conceptually
say that composite ideas correspond to the was a fiction even to assume that the idea of a
resolved or differentiated.
must think of
and named
we might
The thought
of
inseparable from the idea of unity and of identity
involves moreover the idea of difference from others, and hence
of a plurality of these others.
All this points to functions
by which we
think of something as one, identical with itself and different from others
thus thinking also of plurality as distinct from and related to unity. clear consciousness, therefore, of all that 1
is
involved in forming the idea of
Here our views coincide with those enunciated by E.
Antrittsrede.
;
A
Zeller
in
his
Berliner
THE CONCEPT A
shows us
addition to the audible note,
that, in
determinations
;
and the idea proves
259 it
comprises these various
to be already
complex as
it
comes
into consciousness. 1
We
cannot, however, regard these determinations
difference cannot be thought in absolute independence.
and
impossible to think of identity without unity
it
are inseparably interwoven
terminations
and negation
we attempt
as the
identity
Not only for these
is
de
but they necessitate also the
thought of a something to which the unity, identity
Nay, so soon as
and
unity, identity
difference, on the one hand, and the sense-given note on the other ultimate and isolated elements for which we are looking. Unity,
and
difference belong,
to think of these determinations each
by itself can these themselves we only keep concepts story repeats before the mind by placing them under the determinations of unity, identity and difference. Thus our analysis never arrives at the absolutely simple,
same
the
itself
inasmuch simplest,
as
it
finds
certain elements included in
which are due
any judgment
is
to
be
;
to the
mere
fact
made concerning
that it.
it is
every idea, even the
thought at
all,
and
that
These elements are therefore
the necessary and constantly recurring products of the various functions means of which we are able to grasp an idea and to turn it to account
by
as the subject or predicate of a judgment.
Thus, instead of the isolated
complex of functions, dependent upon, and and manifesting their activity in what each other, conditioning, mutually we may briefly call the FORMAL LOGICAL CATEGORIES. They are related
we sought, we
letters
in the
same way
find a
to all objects of thought, being the conditions
upon which
2
any idea can be consciously retained in the mind. 8. But more yet lies hidden in the note of our hypothesis. 1
We
can-
Cf. Lotze, Logik, ed. 2, p. 26.
these formal categories, without which nothing whatever can be retained in include also member, in the sense that these most general conditions of That is, they involve is based. thought involve the functions upon which all counting to the positing and distinguishing of unities, the consciousness of progress from one unity these steps. another, and from that to a third, and the unity of the consciousness of allow that further development of counting, and the more complicated operations of arithmetic are due to the relations of intuitable things in space and time, and that frac of a whole which is originally found in space that tions 2
Amongst
thought,
we
We
divisibility especially presuppose or time only ; but it does not follow from this that number is altogether dependent upon stands in no other relation to time than that the conditions of intuition. Counting 1 which all our activities stand, that is, a succession of them can take place only in time ; we should be aware of time. The idea of essential that in but is in no
m
it
time Cf.
is
counting way even dependent upon the idea of number, of a plurality of distinguishable
6, 3
/,,
p.
36.
acts.
\/
LOGIC
2 6o
not have an idea of a note or of a number of notes, except as in time just as
we cannot have an
sciousness,
therefore, of
idea of a colour except as in space.
what
is
present to our minds
idea of a note includes the idea of time.
And,
again,
when we form
try to set
we
find that
We
must combine
with the idea of something in time, something, moreover, which
and manifold
\
we must
just as
and
isolated
;
we can indeed find More
distinct, but they always involve each other.
elements which are
is
it
various
the nature of our ideas will not admit
of our finding the absolutely simple
over, the relation in
is
think of space in connection with different
Thus here again
things in space.
the
when we
aside time as a simple element, not to be further analysed,
we can form no idea of time as absolutely isolated.
;
Full con
which time and space stand to their intuitable contents from that in which identity, etc., stand to their
essentially different
objects.
Hence we
get fundamentally different syntheses of the different
we may express this difference, and time as FORMS OF INTUITION, in
Kant
elements of an idea, and
as
speaking of space
contrast with the
did,
by
formal categories.
When
9.
far as
the concepts
we think
of
it
we
are forming refer to the existing, then, in so
as actually or
new
possibly existing, there appear
elements again. Our only idea of the existent is of a thing with attributes and and activities, we can have no idea of particular existence which is not at the very least it must be related to us as our ; our ideas of the existent, or possibly existent, include
related to something else object.
Thus
all
this cycle of inseparable determinations,
isolated characteristics,
manifold, that of the thing with
elements the
which refuse
and which involve a its
attributes
be resolved into
and
activities.
We
call these
REAL CATEGORIES.
Traditional Logic generally chooses for things,
to
third kind of synthesis of the
and then the
characteristics
examples the concepts of
characteristics of the concepts are attributes
of the concept
But in addition to these, there characteristics
its
(e.g.
the
are heavy, yellow, shining, etc.). a distinct kind of synthesis among the
"gold"
is
that of attributes in a thing.
This synthesis
is
essentially
meaning from that between the characteristics of a compo concept of attributes or activities, and it differs again from the syn
different in site
thesis
whole by means of the definite relations can only lead to confusion if we express everything dark red, rotatory motion, yellow body, a kernel sur
of particular things to a
connecting them.
It
three-sided figure,
rounded by a
shell, etc.
all
without distinction by the same formula
A=
THE CONCEPT if this
abcd;w?>
nection which If
is
261
juxtaposition were the expression of a
mode
of con
always the same.
these real categories are indubitably elements of our ideas of the
then it follows that in conceptual determination we must, first determine these categories themselves as concepts. The popular
existent,
of
all,
between thing, attribute and
distinctions
the forms of words, and vaguely
veloped into clearness. refers
the
to
existent
activity,
guided as they are by applied, must be de
and waveringly
Thus the determination
of any concept which a recognised theory concerning the presupposes
nature of these categories.
It
is
logically
in so far as this
complete only
hold good only to the extent in which logically theory And the possibility of such a theory depends it is generally accepted. of the again upon the possibility of producing generally accepted concepts It depends, therefore, upon an analysis of our themselves. complete, and
is
will
categories
mental processes which shall make us conscious of what it is which every one must think in accordance with necessary laws, when thinking of any thing as existent.
The
10.
as universality of such elements of our ideas
we have noticed
functions which always ultimately due to their derivation from recur in the same manner, however varied the matter of thought or in The nature of our spatial and temporal tuition to which they refer.
so far
ideas
is
is
or time
the same, whatever the particular objects thought of as in space No matter how varied the ways in which our senses are be.
may
affected,
and the
particular affections
combined amongst themselves, the activities things with attributes and
to process of referring the sense-given remains the same. The possibility of presenting a complete system of
these elements depends entirely a priori, as
forms which
lie
discoverable by a complete analysis affections
Kant assumes, they are given ready in the mind, and are therefore
upon whether,
;
as
or whether the nature of our sensuous
themselves determines what formal elements
are developed.
affec In the former case an organized and unalterable system meets the
tions of the senses as they successively appear
;
in the latter, the categories
kind would be the result of a development determined by the particular alter these mention possible and order of our sensations. We need only natives to
show
that the final determination of our concepts depends
upon
a clear insight into the genesis of our ideas themselves. elements which Different from these elements of our ideas are the ii.
are given in intuition by immediate sensation or inner perception.
From
LOGIC
262
the subjective psychological point of view there
is
no doubt that we have
something simple and ultimate, really elementary, in particular colours, notes, odours; and again in the immediate consciousness of inner events
The
of pleasure, pain, desire.
white of this paper, the black of these
cannot be further analysed
letters,
of our sense-organs.
forms
spatial
recurs
It
;
given immediately by the affection
it is
in
the
most varied combinations and
always the same and cannot be resolved into sim Here, then, it seems easy to set forth elementary charac
but
;
pler elements.
it is
which cannot indeed be thought of as isolated colour is never but can at least be easily retained in the mind as
teristics,
without space, and so on distinct
from
their
from notes.
named and not alphabet
;
form and from each other if
Here,
and
;
odours from colours, colours
anywhere, we have something which can only be
something analogous to the letters of the could be shown that all our ideas were formed from
explained,
if it
these elements given in immediate intuition, from the forms of intuition,
and from the
and formal
real
then
categories,
would be complete. But here we come upon the second of the
the circle
of ultimate
characteristics
simple and elementary sensations
is
difficulties
noticed in
sensation, every particular feeling of pain,
definite
Every
;
infinite.
but the
It
is
number of
is
40, 8.
something
these distinguishable simple
absolutely impossible that every particular
degree of light and warmth, each of which comes into consciousness as a simple presentation, should be fixed in others
;
memory and kept
by no expedient could language be made
multiplicity.
Language takes advantage of the
distinct
from
all
to suffice for all this
fact that similar sensa
by imperceptible differences, and denotes a whole of approximating degrees by one word. But similarity by itself is
tions are separated series
of no use for conceptual determination, for
indefinite,
it
difference
without
is
stating
its
degree.
The
it
implies
only way of attaining the
is to start from a comprehensive survey of by these imperceptible differences, and in this continuum to draw boundaries within which a given name shall hold good.
definiteness of a concept here
the whole series formed
Thus we
get what
we have
called the generality of the
word
in distinction
from the generality of the idea ( 7). The names of the colours, for example, are not conceptually determined until the whole series of shades has been exhibited, and green, red,
must be
etc., shall
left for
it
apply.
Part III.
has been settled within what limits the names
Our means
Here
it is
of carrying out this determination
sufficient to point out that
"
red
"
is
THE CONCEPT
263
not general in respect to dark-red and rose-red, in the same sense as "
extended
"
is
red in different
general in respect to different bodies.
each sensation
element which
From
this
odour,
note,
general idea
It
not the same
is
combinations which we think of in dark-red and rose-red is is
absolutely simple, and
the same in
we may
all
and one which
learn also what
is
;
cannot be resolved into one is
different. 1
the import of such words as colour,
According to the ordinary theory, as colour is the corresponding to red, blue, and yellow, the concept of
etc.
colour should be one element of the concepts red,
But
etc.
red, blue,
and we cannot say what colour is except by an enumera If the word colour is to have over and of the particular colours.
yellow, are simple, tion
enumeration any definite conceptual meaning, it must be in the by grouping together a whole series of ideas it presents them as marked off from others which are incomparable with them, such as clearly But if we try to express the common element of these notes and odour.
above
this
fact that
we can do so only by means of a relation, which does not directly denote the ideal content, but only a reference which red, blue, yellow, all contain, and by which they are distinguished from other simple sensations
ideas,
reference, that
is,
and
to sight
to the eye.
In such relations alone
is
a
common
element to be found, but these relations are not elements of the This distinction between words which are merely ideas themselves. common names of simple characteristics, and words which really denote simple ideal elements, must be constantly borne in 1
Cf.
Werner Luthe, Beitrdge zur Logik,
shade of red that element which sq.) there
is
common
is
p.
2
"
:
to all
mind
;
otherwise, the
We
cannot distinguish in any given In Lotze (Logik, ed. 2, p. 27 said above. True, he says at first
red."
only apparent contradiction to what is distinct impressions there is something
(p. 28), that in several
common
to all
which
is
conceivable apart from their differences, and to which (p. 29) the differences peculiar to the But he recognises that particular members of a series attach (light-blue, dark-blue, etc.). the general blue cannot be realized in the same way as the elements of other concepts and he adds that the presence of a from known
which we compound
particular ideas, or experienced, that the
common element does not form the content of a third idea of a like nature and species with those compared, and that it cannot be independently intuited. of This is what we wished to express above, and it would be more correct not to speak This im a common element at all, but only of an unanalysable impression of similarity. and guided by it, we arrange our simple pression is present in very different degrees,
common
element can only be
felt
limits in the series sensations in a series of diminishing similarity, so that we may fix It is different with differ within which to apply a definite denotation (red, yellow, etc. ). we can form an ences of intensity, e.g., of warmth, or of notes of the same pitch; here the excitation of idea of the common element, because the differences are based upon feeling,
and are not differences of an
ideal content.
LOGIC
264
doctrine of the characteristics of concepts, together with the
ing doctrine of their subordination to each other, will Nevertheless, even
common names
such as these
fall
may be looked upon
common
the signs of characteristics inasmuch as they indicate a
which
the ground of the reference which they
is
and
Intensity of sensation
concepts
;
in
contain.
which accompanies the
same way, although the objective
the
differ.
What we have
12.
all
as
element
however, are true general
differences,
for they refer to the excitation of feeling
and which changes
sensation,
elements
its
accompany
into confusion.
said of sensuous qualities
seems
to
be true also
of forms and movements, since these, too, appear as immediately intuit-
Here again we have infinite here again we seem to
able.
of difference
;
multiplicity start
and imperceptible degrees
from the particular sense-intuition,
and the general idea (form or motion) appears to possess a generality of the alone. But it only appears to be so. The idea of a given form
word
a triangle, square or circle directly as the
necessitates
is
far
from being given so immediately and Perception of form
sensation of a sound or a smell.
movement of
the eye or of the
returning into itself and thus limiting a is
really
body
hand
in
;
space
and in
this
movement,
a definite manner,
from one point of view, as this kind of action, the same in every from another point of view it is differently modified ;
perception of form
according to the course
movement.
The
it
takes.
It is the
process by which
it is
positions, recognition of their difference sition
from one to the other,
are variously modified.
is
same with the idea of objective
perceived, the comparison of two
and the idea of continuous tran
always the same
Movement and form
;
but the path, velocity,
etc.,
are true general concepts
;
colour and sound (as the expressions of something immediately given, not in the physical sense) are general words or common names. For this
reason one example suffices to show what
movement
is,
but not so with
This explains also why every theory which starts from sensations as the only primitive elements of our ideas must tend to regard all gene rality as only that of common names ; and why it extends this view to all colour.
things which
it
regards as sense-given, ignoring the processes by which
form ideas of them. each other.
we
Sensationalism and nominalism always accompany
THE CONCEPT
265
42.
The
analysis of objects into their final elements gives rise to series of
concepts in which each successive member is determined by a new distin guishing characteristic, and thus has a fuller intension than the preceding
The
member.
analysis of a single object
may form
as
good a ground
for
such a series as comparison between different analysed objects. The poorer concept with fewer determinations, which is included in the thought of the subsequent concept,
concept
;
is
called the super-ordinate, higher, or generic
the richer concept, with more determinations,
dinate, lower, or specific concept
The
;
their relation
is
is
that of
called the subor
SUBORDINATION.
between concepts of the same which determines the sense in which category ; for it is the category and their characteristics are synthesized, through it alone they are com relation of subordination exists only
parable.
The
extension of a concept
subordinated to extension
is
it.
is
the sum-total of lower concepts which are
Within the same
greater as
the intension
series of is
less,
subordinated concepts the
and
vice versa.
We
must
distinguish between the logical extension of a concept and its empirical extension ; and again between the empirical extension of the concept and
the extension of the name.
We can speak of essential and unessential characteristics only
in reference
to objects in their relation to a given concept. i
.
nation
Let us suppose that the most important part of conceptual determi has been of characteristics in their different classes the
survey carried out in accordance with a complete and universally valid theory of the formation of ideas ; let us suppose further that we have thus discovered
and are dependent upon others (e.g. colour and that a extended surface, point which is generally overlooked), upon we are also clear as to which terms denote definite ideal contents, and
what
characteristics presuppose
which are only
common
Then
names.
the question arises
how our
uni
verse of concepts will shape itself under these conditions. ideas which are conceptual determination we have to work upon first task is to reconstruct and determine our and as material, already given and these. Moreover, the constant supply of ideas which arise naturally
In
all
without reflection always constantly called predicates.
For
its
origin in the
particular,
and we are
to form judgments determining the particular by reason our explanation of the further relations of our
upon this
has
LOGIC
266 concepts
some
will
be
facilitated if
we begin by the conceptual determination of
idea excited by a particular thing.
When we
2.
wish to retain the idea gained from any particular thing
committed to memory, and recog is, when we wish it to be securely the merely involuntary function of nised as the same when reproduced This function, which we find aimlessly reproduction is not sufficient. that
active in,
dreams, and upon which, in the earlier stages of judgment,
e.g.,
our denominative judgments are generally based, simply repeats an image as a whole ; this involves no consciousness of the particular elements of the idea, and, therefore, no consciousness of
nected with its
it,
and
it is
its
identity
is
necessarily con
danger of being confused with others.
in
exactly identical repetition,
necessary above
it is
all
To
secure
that the idea should
be decomposed into its particular elements, and this decomposition is again the condition which enables us to distinguish a thing from all others. It consists in going back to absolutely simple and perfectly definite char
and the condition most
acteristics,
differences should be fixed
;
essential
to this
differences of colour
e.g.,
is
that fluctuating
must be
fixed by a
generally accepted denotation, of magnitude by a fixed standard.
The
result of
such an attempt
junctive judgment.
I
orbicular, circular thing,
and smooth
red, light,
is
a description as
it
might describe the wafer before
;
two centimetres that
is,
in diameter,
should describe
I
predicates perceived through the different senses,
bining them into one whole
;
takes place in a con
me by saying it is an one millimetre thick,
by enumerating all the and consciously recom-
it
the import of the synthesis
is
stated by the
category of the thing, and the nature of the characteristics red, smooth, etc.,
determines their dependence upon the spatial characteristics.
Any
one hearing such a description is called upon to carry out, step by step, the synthesis which in intuition was involuntary and, until completed, uncon scious
;
it is
supposed that the hearer thus obtains the same idea from the I had myself, always assuming that he thinks each
description which
characteristic in just the
But
it is
not what
same way.
obvious that when
I
intended
;
it is
I describe something in this way the result is seldom that the description is equivalent to the
an cannot replace intuition itself. The words constitute a formula in general expres orbicular, circular, smooth thing sions j to the hearer it is like a riddle to be guessed, a problem for his particular image,
and
"
it
"
imagination
;
how may he form an image
conditions of the problem?
of a thing which shall satisfy the
It is true that
every additional characteristic
THE CONCEPT istinguishes
my
idea from others which share the remaining characteristics,
by the nature of the predicates
at
form the idea
267
left
it is
open
to each individual to
Predicates such as red,
in different ways.
light,
smooth,
etc.,
even when accurately limited in meaning (e.g. light denned as of less of difference, amongst specific gravity than water), admit of many degrees which the hearer must choose before he can form his intuitable image. description gives us a sketch which fits not only an indefinite number of things which are exactly alike, but also many distinguishable things ; it is. therefore, a formula having a generality which is not merely numerical,
The
but also generic.
We
see further that this generality does not result merely from the
breadth
of particular
of meaning
frequently happens
that the
determinations, such as red,
enumerated
characteristics
the attributes either directly perceived or inferable of
my
object.
it
etc.,
do not exhaust
all
As the
nor the attributes dependent upon well a round as to it would piece of cardboard or a red it, apply just In this case the incompleteness of the description is easily counter.
above formula does not
corrected
state the material
but the same deficiency
;
may occur where differences
are present
which are unrevealed to our knowledge, or such as we cannot recognise. The most exact description of the germinal cell of a mammal would apply without further modification to those of are
bound
to
selves in the
any
many
other animals, although
we
assume that there are hidden differences which manifest them
Xor again can the description of it may not possibly apply in which nevertheless differs in some way
course of development. 1
real thing claim to
every respect to
be so exhaustive that
some other
thing,
not known.
In a formula thus reduced to characteristics we have, then, not the expression of a thing, but what expressing the idea
is
full
in the first place a subjective creation,
we have formed from
the intuition of a thing so far as
which every one determines in the same but It is a rule for the formation of the idea which we must observe, way. wide the to Its generality is due partly observe in various ways.
we can
retain
it
in characteristics
may
to the possibility of adding particular characteristics, partly new characteristics to those already given. It matters little for the present n it whether or not ordinary language has a special term for such ar idea ;
meaning of the
were worth while, one could be made. 1 We shall speak in Tart III. of the necessity to which this gives our determination of concepts characteristics based upon relations.
rise of
employing
in
LOGIC
268 If our description
were
less
complete
if,
for instance,
it
omitted to state
a difference would be neglected which distinguishes this object
the size
from others which are larger and smaller ; the formula would be applicable to many other objects, inasmuch as we could complete it by supplying any If
possible magnitude.
it
were more
definite,
if,
e.g.,
rose-red were sub
then a number of distinguishable objects which were We should, however, previously comprehended would now be excluded. still have a formula expressing a synthesis of characteristics to which others stituted
for
red,
may be added a formula which the hearer can supplement in many ways. It may thus happen that even the analysis of the idea of a single 3. object may give rise to a series of formulas, including successively more and more
As each
characteristics.
becomes more
definite,
characteristic
is
added the idea
and by each additional
to be
formed
characteristic objects are
excluded to which the previous ones by themselves applied. From each we may obtain the preceding one by omitting, the subse
of these formulae
The
quent one by adding, a characteristic.
fewer the characteristics
com
prehended, the greater the number of different objects of which the formula can be predicated if we assume the possible differences to be actual, and vice versa.
The
concepts.
Even
more and
less
general in so
far
formulae are related to each other as the
most specialized
is
still
general as
its
admit of a certain width of interpretation; only if all the characteristics were perfectly definite would the generality of the concept characteristics
be merely numerical centimetre
"
"
(e.g.,
a cube of pure gold having sides measuring one
a perfectly definite concept).
is
is expressed by saying that we ascend from a given concept one more general by abstraction, i.e., by omission of characteristics and that we descend to one more special by determination, i.e., by the addition
This process
to
;
of characteristics.
tension
Abstraction diminishes the intension, but widens the ex
determination increases the intension, but narrows the extension. Intension and extension stand in inverse relation. The more general ;
concept is called the higher or wider ; the more special the lower or narrower ; the relation between them is that of subordination.
We object,
are
should reach the same result but from several
common
;
if
we were
to start, not
from one single
the problem being to state what characteristics
to various objects.
The
greater the
number of
different
objects to be comprehended, the fewer will be the characteristics they have in
common, and
the smaller the intension of the concept
objects, the greater the intension.
;
the fewer the
THE CONCEPT
269
These propositions, simple and obvious as they appear, nevertheless 4. conceal several questions and difficulties which do not generally receive
These
sufficient attention.
and
refer partly to the processes of abstraction
determination, partly to the relation between intension and extension.
In the
place, the omission
and addition of
characteristics is by no would appear from these propositions. Amongst the characteristics there is always one which determines the nature of the synthesis by giving the category should this be omitted, the first
means so much a matter of choice
as
;
remaining characteristics would lose their ing of their synthesis would be uncertain.
common It is
and the mean
support,
only concepts within the
and to speak of ; such a concept as red as super-ordinate to rose, or reasonable as the superordinate concept to man, or intentional as the super-ordinate concept to same category which can be subordinated
murder,
is
to each other
only confusing.
Moreover, the characteristics are not
all
independent of one another
;
to
some extent they presuppose each other. It would be useless to omit the the latter presupposes the former. characteristic extended and retain red ;
Thus the course of generalizing abstraction
is
prescribed to
it
within certain
limits. It is
the
same with determination.
In the
first
place,
it
a matter of
is
course that incompatible characteristics cannot be added without giving rise to contradiction.
But by what
is
the determination to be guided
twofold ground for the determination here presents
itself.
If the
?
A
given
concept-formula contains characteristics which naturally admit of a further series of distinctions as red admits of a series of shades, circular of all possible magnitudes of the diameter, etc.
then the addition of one of these
distinctions naturally presents itself as the next step in determination, finds
its
justification in the given
concept
itself.
some of
take care that other characteristics do not exclude characteristics
and thus
bounded by three
figure
limit the determination.
and
But even here we must these possible
The concept
straight lines contains nothing
of a plane
about the magnitude
of the figure, nor about the magnitude of the straight lines and their relation to each other.
Some magnitude
in the concept, but not,
however,
fix
it is
left for
of the straight lines
is
necessarily implied
the determination to settle which.
upon any determination
I like for
each
can
I
straight line
;
my
limited by the law that any two sides taken together must be character greater than the third, this law being prescribed by the remaining
choice
istics
is
and the nature of the synthesis demanded.
Thus determination
2
LOGIC
yo
cannot proceed from one characteristic alone, but only from the whole complex. But determination of this kind
new and independent
is
accompanied by another, which adds no special connection with
characteristics having
Matter, for instance, may be determined anything in the given concept. and heavy substance ; but at our present stage of knowledge we cannot regard the specific attributes of particular materials as in any as extended
way modifications of extension and
In such cases, however, we weight. guided by our purely empirical knowledge of under the concept of matter ; we add those characteristics
find that determination
objects which
fall
is
which, in our experience,
Only
if
we had
full
we
find
combined with the more general
ones.
insight into the nature of things could this determina
by the contents of our ideas. Because there are these two modes of determination
tion be guided 5.
it
is
uncertain
what we are to understand by the extension of a concept. The logical point of view, where the first demand is for conceptually determined predicates,
is
concerned only with the ideas with which we approach actual the relation of subordination can never be found except
Hence
things.
between concepts, and the generality of the concept consists in its being contained in the thought of a number of ideas distinguished conceptually,
by different characteristics according to their intension. The mere numerical generality, through which the same idea is found in an indefi nite number of particular intuited things, has nothing to do with the i.e.,
nature of the concept in
all
the instances,
hundred
;
it
is
one and the same concept which is thought it can be predicated of one or of a
and whether
things, its nature is the same.
Hence
the
extension of a concept can never
empirical number
of similar things which
fall
to the principium idenlitatis indiscernibilium,
under
be measured by the it,
if,
we recognise
in
opposition
the possibility
of objects which for our knowledge are not distinguished by their attri butes, but only by difference in time or space. On the contrary, it must be laid down that a concept which does not
admit of further determination has no longer any extension ; it represents the point, even though that which cor responds to it may be empirically forthcoming in millions of instances. the final limitation of extension
be the same, then a cast-iron
ball having a such a concept. There are certain characteristics which can be conceptually determined
Assuming
all
cast-iron
to
diameter of 10 centimetres
is
THE CONCEPT
271
only by fixing limits within a continuum of imperceptibly small differences. is it true that even the lowest conceptually has an extension, which, however, cannot be
In connection with these alone determined formula further
still
broken up into discrete concepts.
question of singular concepts partakes of this difficulty. A concept can never be called singular because there happens to be only one thing
The
corresponding to
it
in empirical reality
of the concept would be affected
if
;
any more than the
there were
logical nature
no object whatever cor
Only concepts whose characteristics involve the unique ness of the corresponding object can be called singular; in this sense the The question, on centre of the material universe is a singular concept.
responding to
it.
the other hand, as to whether
all
individuals which actually
fall
under a
given concept are distinguished otherwise than spatially and temporally,
and whether only one, or whether prehended logic,
in a
but belongs to the science of
For
this
particular things can be
several,
com
concept of the smallest extension, has nothing to do with
reason also
it
is
reality.
when
purely a matter of chance
the
same
under two concepts of different intension. Hence as concepts they must not be called equivalent or interchangeable ideas, but only in so far as, when used as names, they denote things which are
number
the
of things
fall
same within the range of our knowledge.
They
are really different,
logically considered they have a different extension. feathered animal is a different concept from that of man
Two-footed un-
and
as
names do they denote the same
between the
logical extension
We
beings.
;
only
when used
must, then, distinguish
of the concept and the empirical extension of
the name.
At most there "equilateral
ferent.
room
is
triangle"
They
for
and
differ in the
doubt as
"equiangular
formula
;
to
whether such concepts as
triangle"
are identical or dif
but as the characteristic equilateral,
taken together with those comprehended by the word contains the characteristic equiangular, and equivalent. tain that
Only by
triangle, necessarily
versa, they are absolutely
upon the verbal expression can we main and in that case we must also say that an
insisting
they are different
equilateral rectangle
-vice
;
and a rectangular rhombus are
different concepts.
which are only the extensions of subordinated concepts We cannot compare the extensions of concepts which directly comparable. Again,
it
is
are independent of each other, except in so far as every concept which admits of many additional determinations may be generally called wider,
LOGIC
272
while those which admit of few
may be
There can, how
called narrower.
ever, be no definite and universal standard of measurement for the exten
sion of concepts.
There
is
a further distinction
The
extension of a concept.
between the
logical
and the empirical
logical extension consists in
all
the concepts
which are gained by the further determination of its characteristics when But we this determination is involved in the characteristics themselves. merely by our knowledge of actually existing work out any series of determinations or com things, binations of characteristics because no empirical occasion presents itself When this is the case, because we do not see any necessity for so doing. in our task
may be guided
and thus
fail
for selecting these,
to
and only these determinations, we can only speak of No one could infer from the concept of metal
an empirical extension.
many and no more
that there are just so
even discover the number by attempting characteristics
concepts
;
different metals, nor
for us the extension of the
of the metals
we know.
Just
could we
the possible combinations of
all
in the
concept metal consists for
this
the
reason, however,
empirical extension of a concept can never be regarded as complete. 6.
The
expressions
Genus and Species
are often used with reference to
the relation of subordination between ideas lower, species to a higher concept.
Of
;
each concept
these terms
it
is
is
genus to a
again true that
Red
they have no fixed meaning except within the same category.
the generic concept of rose, but only of the various shades of red. highest genera, the Trpomx
common
element
is
highest
are therefore the categories;
and
not
The their
again nothing but the relation which consists in being
objects of thought.
many
yeV?/,
is
Unless we accept
genera
as
this limitation, there
there are independent
would be as
characteristics
of any
kind.
We
must of course distinguish between the generic concept and the its concrete sense as the sum-total of all the things falling under genus a generic concept, between the generic concept human being and the in
"
human
"
race or genus.
When
a concept contains different characteristics which are inde pendent of each other, the higher concepts to which we may pass are various. From the concept of the square we may ascend to that of the 7.
equilateral quadrangle, or the equiangular quadrangle or the regular figure,
according as we omit one or the other of the independent characteristics equiangular, equilateral, four-sided.
All these higher concepts are equally
THE CONCEPT related as generic concepts to that
273
of the square.
In like manner the
may take place in different order, according as one or the other of a number of independent characteristics is first to be added. We determination
may proceed from
the concept plane figure
order figura plana
the
aquiangula rectilinea
;
bounded by
quadrilatera
we may
cequiangula
rectilinea
-figura
:
rectilinea
plana
cequian^ula,
figura plana rectilinea aquiangula, aquilatera, quadrilatera, every concept containing characteristics find a place in different series all
lines in
straight
figura plana
figura plana rectilinea quadrilatera, czquilatera, also proceed in this order figura plana
quadrilatera aquilatera
but
rectilinea
aquilatera etc.
Thus
independent of each other
may
of subordinated concepts, and to exhaust
would need an arithmetical calculation of combina
possible variations
tions.
There
is
no order of succession
therefore
sarily given by the nature of the concepts
which
in ;
the subordination neces
there
is
no
settled order of
precedence according concepts which have a logical possibility and justification may be arranged in one way. Just because concepts, as we understand them, are subjective creations, formulae whose chief pur to
pose
is
merely to
fix
all
our ideas and mould them into
commonly accepted
and unambiguous predicates, they are capable of unlimited 1 many ways in which they may be combined.
As
8.
the primary function of concepts
we cannot regard
is
variation by the
to serve as predicates in
our
an imperfection that, generally in than the concrete and fully determinations are they poorer speaking, determined subjects of which they are predicated, and that they are more manifold judgments,
or less deficient things and
own
as
when compared with the intuitable The fact that no one can eat
events.
only apples, pears, its
it
reality of particular
"fruit"
etc.,
individual size
Nor
in general, but
each, moreover, of an absolutely definite kind, with
and shape,
in
no way diminishes the value of the
any the less because no one can have a clock in general, but only a clock with a pen-
concept
1
The
branch
"fruit."
is
the value of the concept
"
clock
"
idea of an arrangement of concepts such that the more specialized concepts numbers from one point, the concept of the 6v or something, is vicious. It that there must be a much smaller number of higher
off in increasing
thoroughly
presupposes
but if we regard concepts as being com generic concepts than of the more specialized binations of a limited number of characteristics it depends entirely upon their inter 1 lie relations whether combinations of greater or less generality are the most numerous. necessity of any fixed order, and hence this imaginary pyramid of concepts, can be the view which regards the higher concept as the real grounded only ;
upon metaphysical cause of producing the lower. S. L.
T
LOGIC
274
It is a necessary part of the purpose and dulum, or a clock with a spring. For it should thus differ from the real thing.
function of the concept that this reason,
when
logical theory
aims at supplying a supposed deficiency
by making the statement or condition that the concept of a thing should contain its essential characteristics, it fails to understand the most impor
and universal purpose of the formation of concepts. Moreover, ac cording to this theory, that which is left undetermined by the concept is Now, apart from the fact that represented as unessential, as accidental. tant
a complete knowledge of the whole universe would be necessary before*we know what are the essential characteristics of a thing and what not,
could
this view,
when taken
would lead nature of
in
connection with the subordination of concepts, only one essential
to the pantheistic conclusion that there is
all things,
their ultimate
and
that all differences are merely accidental, having
ground only
in the subjective
view of things.
There
no
is
absolute and fixed line to be drawn between differences which must be
neglected in our determination of concepts, unless these are to be multi plied to an indefinite extent,
and the differences which are fixed and
for
mulated in concepts. Hence there is as much reason for saying that the differences between the last species are accidental in respect to the genus as for saying that the merely individual differences of a thing
under a lowest concept are accidental always related to
its
species in the
which
falls
and, finally, since a higher genus
;
same way as the most
specialized idea
is is
related to distinguishable individuals, the essential nature, properly speak
can only be expressed by the highest concept. This is, in fact, the origin of Spinoza s doctrine, that there is only one substance, and that all ing,
differences are merely modifications of this.
The
between essential and unessential characteristics
distinction
first
:
obtains a meaning
When we
and
justification
when we come
desire something actual as
means
generally so constituted as to possess also a
to
to concepts of purpose.
an end, these means are of attributes which are
number
not desired, and therefore not determined by the end they are accidental.
The
;
with reference to
it
necessity of guarding against the cold gives rise
concept of a covering which will prevent the loss of heat ; and which is to serve the purpose shall be
to the
this necessitates that the material
flexible
many
and a bad conductor of
heat.
But any available material has
other attributes besides those of being flexible and a bad conductor
of heat, and these other attributes contribute nothing towards the. purpose.
With reference
to
the concept of clothing, they are accidental.
In the
THE CONCEPT
275
same way the concept of a clock is originally a concept of purpose the So far concept of an apparatus which measures time by spatial changes. as concerns the concept of the clock,
accidental so long as
it
fulfils
its
the
mode
purpose.
of
construction
its
is
Here then the subjective
It concept with its characteristics does actually precede the reality. follows from the nature of the things which must be used as means that
we cannot concept
realize those determinations alone
;
when nature
which are included
in
species are determined by the variety of the means.
its
the
Only
placed under the concept of purpose, and regarded as of certain ideas or forms which, like human at the realization aiming itself is
purposes, take the shape of indeterminate and varying thoughts, in
any meaning
distinguishing
characteristics in the idea of an
between the
essential
existing thing.
there
is
and unessential
If nature
is
concerned
merely with creating the form, structure, an organization of a horse, and if colour has nothing to do with her purpose, then it is an unessential characteristic
which
The
colour.
similar
is
from the
is
fact that
only present because the horse must have some such characteristics vary in individuals otherwise
then taken as a sign that they are immaterial.
Nevertheless,
view the colour of the white or of the black
scientific point of
horse follows as necessarily from the constitution of the particular indi vidual as the structure of
Thus
we compare an tained,
its
skeleton and muscles.
the distinction of essential and unessential
and
is
always found when
idea with a previously given concept in which
try to find in
sets forth certain
it
it
is
con
The penal law
the realization of the concept.
concepts of crimes, and the judge endeavours to find in by the law ; for
particular concrete actions the characteristics determined
the subsumption of the crime, and the meting out of punishment, these are essential, while the special circumstances of the deed which are un
provided for are unessential.
If
one
man
has killed another,
it is
essential
to know whether he did it intentionally or unintentionally, with or without deliberation ; it is unessential whether he did it with a round or a conical bullet.
The
distinction recurs again
when
the problem before us
ceptual determination to the meaning of
some word
is
to give
in ordinary use
;
con here
the unessential characteristics are those which belong, not to the general
meaning, but only to the particular things included by specialized ideas.
house whether
it
is
In this sense
it
roofed with
tiles
is
it,
or to the
more
unessential to the concept of the or straw, but
it
is
essential
that
it
LOGIC
27 6
The
should have some roof.
meaning of the word
actual
"
house
"
includes the characteristic of having a roof, but does not specify the material.
This logical treatment of the difference between the essential and unessential characteristics of a thing must be carefully distinguished from 9.
the question as to what belongs to the real nature of a thing, what is essen tial to it or not (cf. may be called upon to form our 33, 4, p. 198).
We
concepts of things in such a
way
shall express the
that they
essential
nature of things, i.e. those determinations which belong to them indepen dently of all other things, and proceed entirely from their own nature. Then the characteristics of the concept must include the essential deter
minations of the things, and
must
fall
all
same
things having the
But
under the same concept.
is
it
essential nature
clear that unless
we
are to
condition can only be
fulfilled
it is inapplicable to any higher concept. by the infinite species same way it is clear that these essential concepts, if attainable at
In the
in with the pantheistic tendency,
fall
this
;
all,
can
form but a small part of the concepts of which we have need. Knowledge is concerned not only with the essential nature of. things, which always remains one and the same, but also with the
mena and
effects
due
to this nature
;
and
many for
manifestations, also
this
pheno
judgments are
needed which have concepts for their predicates. From one point of view there is certainly a difference between the per manent and lasting states or attributes of a thing and those which change
and
tinction
meant
the difference which Descartes
vary,
between attributa and modi.
to denote
by his dis must be a constant As the concept
and the concept of a thing means something enduring in time, only that which belongs permanently to the thing can be contained in the
idea,
conc ept of
Thus
it.
its
changing aspects are unessential with respect to
the thing, but only because they cannot be included in the concept, not as having
no reference
to the real nature of the thing.
these changes that the real nature unfolds
the real nature of a thing,
ground of
its
itself,
we must include
and
if
For
it
we wish
is
just
in
to express
concept the permanent changeable aspects, under some such name as faculty, or in the
power.
The
10.
which
distinction
in reference to
between
essential
and unessential
the concept as such
is
characteristics,
meaningless, must not be
confused with the distinction between fundamental and derivative charac teristics.
When
from a combination of elementary characteristics other
THE CONCEPT
277
predicates necessarily follow, then the former are called fundamental, the latter derivative. 1
parallel sides
and
It is a
diagonals.
It is
a fundamental attribute of the rectangle to have
right angles,
it
is
a derivative attribute to have equal
fundamental characteristic of an odd number that when
divided by two there
is
a remainder one
;
derivative, that
it is
not divisible
by even numbers, and so on. But here again we must guard against We must not look upon the confusing the logical and the metaphysical. fundamental characteristics as constituting the real essence of a thing in many cases nothing is known about this. All we can say is, that accord ;
ing to the way in which we consider the attributes to be dependent upon each other, these fundamental characteristics constitute the concept as a fully determined idea. ii. It follows from our doctrine of the negation that negative deter minations can never be original elements in the idea, and therefore that they cannot be characteristics in the proper sense. Every negative deter
mination presupposes a negative judgment, and the subject of this judg ment must be capable of being distinctly thought before the negation which is founded upon it. How far negative determinations may nevertheless be necessary to enable us to arrange our concepts will appear from what follows.
43-
We
must not confuse the distinction of simple characteristics and the
resulting
distinction of composite concepts
with
the difference of
the
which the concept is contained. Different concepts which are contained in, and can be predicated of, the same object, are called com Different concepts which are patible ; they are generally cross concepts. objects in
incompatible cannot be contained in the same things
;
their extensions are
mutually exclusive.
The
determination of a generic concept by incompatible characteristics its differentiation into disjunct co-ordinate concepts, and a
gives rise to
a DIVI complete enumeration of disjunct co-ordinate concepts constitutes
SION.
Division
may proceed
either
by a development of
characteristics already
A
characteristic is depen Derivative are not the same as dependent characteristics. we cannot think of it without presupposing another, as colour presupposes of other extension; it is derivative when it is also the necessary consequence 1
dent when
characteristics.
LOGIC
278
given in the concept, or by the addition of new ones ; in the latter case sometimes by negative determinations. In division we are justified in in
cluding negative characteristics of the form regarding non-^
non-^
in a concept, but not in
an independent concept. so-called contradictory and contrary opposi between distinction The when tion, rightly understood, coincides with the distinction between a itself as
division having two terms
The members
and one which has more than two.
of a division
may be complete
either in a merely empirical,
or in a logical sense.
The
i.
between the various characteristics must find
distinction
which
expression in the negation,
(21,
i
us that
A
is
not B, not C,
its
etc.
Conceptual determination can only be complete so and indisputable, and is not made
22, 6).
;
tells
long as this negation remains obvious
uncertain by the indefiniteness of ordinary language
when
dealing with
gradual transitions.
The same identical,
i.e.,
is
true of all composite concepts,
equivalent syntheses of the
sarily differ in their contents, istics,
and
this difference is
tells
us that
which tion
is
A
is
same
which are not absolutely
They neces
characteristics.
according to the difference of their character
again expressed by the negation of identity, The only object of the nega not the same as B.
to confirm the fixed
and immutable
which
rule according to
ent words signify different things, and which,
if
we
differ
are concerned merely
with the contents of concepts denoted by different words, holds good even
when
the predicate denotes a concept to which the subject
square
is
is
subordinated
The attempt
has been
made
to
express a
maximum
of difference
speaking of disparate or incomparable concepts, which have istic
:
not parallelogram.
whatever in
common
(such are understanding and table,
various simple characteristics themselves, red and sweet, distinguished from concepts
more characteristics
in
by no character
etc.).
and the These are
which are comparable, which have one or
common
(hence, according to the ordinary doctrine,
same higher concept) and differ only in the remaining But this distinction is only relative. Nothing whatever is
are included in the characteristics.
absolutely incomparable, to the
extent at least
that the formal
determinations apply to everything which enters into thought. disregard
this
fact
amongst concepts
is
then the most fundamental that
which causes
difference
to
their characteristics to
sized in a different way, the difference of their categories.
To
logical
But
if
we
be found
be synthe this extent
THE CONCEPT it is
279
correct to speak of concepts which belong to different categories as
fundamentally different (e.g. man and virtue, man and movement) of those which stand within the same category as relatively different. But funda ;
mentally different ideas
though they have them
and
living,
and yet not
may
still
fall
We
must be careful
iron
and
under the same higher concept
sense, since subordination has 2.
have many characteristics
in a different way, as with
in
common,
man
metallic,
in the ordinary
no meaning except within the same category. between the difference of concepts
to distinguish
themselves according to their content, and difference of the objects in which they are contained, and of which they can therefore be predicated.
Composite concepts would be impossible unless we could think of different of one and the same idea, whatever the
characteristics as determinations
form of their synthesis
may be
;
and our
form ideas of the incal
ability to
culable
number
sibility
of combining
thing.
Every concept which admits of further determination by
characteristics
cepts
;
of different things
is
is
especially
dependent upon the pos
different attributes as determinations of the
same
different
included by the addition of these in various other con hand many higher concepts may be included in
while on the other
one and the same lower concept. Characteristics which can be combined
in
one concept, and concepts
which can be thought as parts of one concept, are called compatible. When one species is comprehended under different generic concepts, these are called cross concepts, inasmuch as they have at least a part of their
common ; when they are represented figuratively (say, as boundaries of their extensions intersect and include a portion
extensions in circles) the
which
is
overlap. arises
common
to
all.
It is clear that
Thus
in the square,
from the combination of characteristics
which thus appear
as
quadrangle and regular figure
the concept in which two higher concepts overlap in
mutual determinations.
a bg overlap in the concept a beg, and mination of a b c by g, or of a b g by c.
this
which these two
The
may be
differ,
two concepts a b
c
and and
regarded as the deter
compatible characteristics are those which are irrecon These cannot be cilable or incompatible (cf. 22, 8-13, p. 131 sq.). 3.
Opposed
to
as deter thought together in the same concept, but are mutually exclusive would be which characteristic is no There minations of the same thing.
incompatible with
all
others;
formal logical determinations.
all
must
at
least
be compatible with the
But incompatibility
involved in the nature of our ideas
(cf.
itself,
22, 8, p. 131 sq.).
when
logical, is
LOGIC
2 8o
Upon the fact that may yet be all
4.
entiation of concepts,
When and
a concept
A
and is
which are incompatible among is based the differ
characteristics
themselves
compatible with another,
l
their
complete development (Division). determined by two incompatible characteristics b
these are called specific differences,
and the
resulting concepts are they cannot both be thought as parts of the same lower concept, nor both be predicated of it (no Ab is Ac, no Ac is Ab). Hence their extensions are absolutely distinct, and all the more specialized c,
themselves incompatible;
i.e.,
concepts which are developed out of them are also incompatible, each of these extensions, meanwhile, forming a part of the extension of the higher concept (right-angled and acute-angled quadrangle, red and yellow rose, Such concepts are called disjunct, and when their relation of subor etc.). dination to a higher concept
When
a concept
sive determinations
A
is
the same, disjunct-co-ordinate concepts.
admits of only a limited number of mutually exclu
bed, there
concepts, whose
arises a series of disjunct
when
extension covers the extension of the concept A, so that
loped into
all
the differences possible to
it,
A
is
deve
each lower concept must
The concept A is said be divided into the concepts Ab, Ac, Ad, and these are called the
possess one or the other of these determinations. to
members of the
The
division.
division itself
is
represented by a divisive judgment
Of every
Ab, partly Ac, partly Ad. the disjunctive 37>
judgment
is
particular thing
true that
it
is
either
Ab
which
Ac
or
:
A
falls
is
partly
under
or Ad.
A
(See
6, 7.)
5.
mined
Every differentiation presupposes that a concept is still undeter in one or more of its characteristics and admits of additional and
mutually exclusive differences
;
or that the synthesis of
its
characteristics
incomplete and leaves room for more characteristics.
is
presupposes that the total
Every division number of possible determinations is limited and
The prevailing logical terminology is inconvenient in that it employs the same ex pressions to denote two processes so different as the analysis of a concept into its cha racteristics and the development of opposed concepts from one higher concept ; these 1
expressions being derived from the act of dividing and signifying sometimes the division of the content into its elements, at others the division of its extension into mutually ex clusive extensions. To this is due the paradox that by dividing a concept we do not get parts of the concept, but concepts which each contain the whole divided concept as a If we keep consistently to the content of the part. concept we are concerned with nothing but a development of the characteristics contained in it. The term division (Aristotelian Sicu peo-ij) is
cept
;
this
more applicable
sum
is
to the
sum
of the particular objects which
fall
under the con
regarded as a whole to be broken up into different groups.
THE CONCEPT The concept
completely known.
mined
of the rectilineal plane figure
several points, both as to the
in
281
number
is
undeter
of the sides and their
magnitude, and as to their relative as well as their absolute magnitude
and again
as to the relative
tude of these
is
;
magnitudes of the angles (the absolute magni
not a completely independent characteristic, but depends upon the number of sides). According as determina
within certain limits tions
added on one or the other of such
are
developed
concept of
fluidity is as yet
the concept is In the same way the
points,
in different directions into its differences.
undetermined with respect
to
its
transparency
or capacity of reflecting light, with respect to its smell, taste, etc. Smell, taste, and colour are not differences in one of the characteristics forming the concept of fluidity
because concept
;
but they can be added to the other characteristics
their general possibility
involved in the characteristics of the
is
fluidity.
Strictly speaking, only the
development
or explication.
form of differentiation can be called
first
If
we
call that characteristic
which
differ
is
entiated the ground of division (fundamentum divisionis), then the ground
of division here
in the given concept
is
itself,
and
consists in the fact that
a characteristic admits of mutually exclusive determinations.
concept of the line lines.
The
is
developed
into the concepts of straight
Thus
the
and curved
idea of the line involves movement, and this cannot be thought
\yithout direction; direction
direction which
is
which remains the same forms the
constantly changing the curved.
straight line,
The concept
of the
curved line develops into the concepts of those which return into them selves and are thus closed, and those which may be continued to infinity, for
constant change of direction includes both possibilities.
The second form of differentiation adds determinations from without. The ground of division is in the first place nothing but the indefinite possibility of a further characteristic
present,
or
which
is
independent of those already
the possibility of various irreconcilable
characteristics
;
the
asked whether there are any more characteristics which are recon The cilable with Ab, and such determination might be called synthetic.
question
is
concept of
fluidity
upon sensations of
contains no characteristics but those which are founded sight
and touch, only the mere possibility of taste and of it they must be added as new elements.
differences of taste are given with
;
here then that there arises the possibility of negative distinguishing We divide the concept of characteristics, which express mere privation. It is
organic being into feeling and
not feeling, of flowers into scented and
LOGIC
282 scentless, of fluids into colourless
which
and coloured
;
the absence of a character
compatible with the remaining characteristics, but is not In necessarily connected with them, forms here a specific difference. such cases the negative formula loses its indefiniteness it has for its istic
is
;
content the possibility of the positive characteristic which
is
the general concept and realized in one of
Its
its
species.
not the independent expression of some content ; a distinction and to fix the order of the concepts.
We must carefully means of tained
in
is
the
and those in which the negative expression ot only an indirect statement of the positive differences con straight, or
a
definite
When
characteristic.
men
into white
positive
I
divide lines
into
and not white, the negative
meaning
it
signifies
those character
which are excluded from the negated difference on the ground of the
same fundamentum is
is
mark
distinguish between these privative characteristics as
same general
and not
expression has istics
function
serves merely to
differentiation,
characteristics
straight
it
included in
The negation
divisionis.
limited to a definite area
grounded upon a disjunction
and thus
of the possible determination
states
something positive;
(straight or crooked, white or coloured,
again white or yellow or red or brown or black).
member
The
it
is
and
negation of one
of the disjunction contains the assertion of the others.
This negative formula finds a double application. In the first place it comprehend a number of co-ordinate disjunct members into one
serves to
expression,
because they are alike in some other respect in which they
from the concept excluded by the formula. The meaning of divid ing men into white and coloured (i.e., not white) lies in the fact that in all coloured people the capacity for higher culture possessed by the white is differ
wanting.
Otherwise,
if
colour alone were taken into consideration, the
between black and red, or red and yellow, is as great as that between yellow and white ; there would be no ground for expressing this series of equivalent differences by the negation of one alone. difference
The second
application
is
where one amongst an
infinite
series
of
possible differences can be conceptually determined, this being impossible
or less easy with the others because of their endless
number
;
they can be
conceptually determined only by limiting them with reference to the one. Each of the latter has This is the case with regular and irregular figures. itself
a definite relation between sides and angles, but opposed to the
simple characteristic of having equal sides and equal angles there is an endless number of other relations, none of which can be reduced to so
THE CONCEPT simple an expression, and which
it
is
283
absolutely impossible to determine
one by one. Here, then, in connection with the division of concepts, we find the
6.
value and significance of negative expressions, to which we were obliged 22, n, p. 134 sq.) to deny any justification when put forward as in dependent symbols of ideas, by themselves and without reference to the We can see now also in what sense the distinction question before us. (
between the so-called contrary and contradictory oppositions is justified. to the relation between disjunct If we limit the expression opposition "
"
co-ordinate concepts, then disjunct
members
we
between the
find contradictory opposition
of a division having two members, contrary opposition
between the disjunct members of a division having more than two. In the former case, one member can always be quite definitely and unam which consti biguously denoted by the negation of the determination the former case, In case. tutes the other member ; not so in the latter if
Ab and Ac
Ac
is
same
the
members, Ac formula
A
non-, 7.
speak
are the disjunct members, as
A
non-
;
in the
Ab
latter
is
the
case,
indeed included in the formula
is
comprehends
both Ac and Ad,
it
same if
A
as
Ab, Ac,
A
non-r,
Ad
non-, but
should
be
and
are the as this
expressed
as
c.
When
the
number
of differences
is
by nature unlimited, we cannot
but only of the development of ; Thus series of disjunct lower concepts.
of a division in the proper sense
a higher concept into an infinite
the concept of the polygon
may be developed
quadrangle, pentagon, and so on in infinitum. 8. Our attention is drawn by this example a characteristic taken by as the characteristic
itself
into the species triangle,
to another point.
When
implies a series of disjunct differences, numbers, and colour the particular
plurality implies
characteristics depends upon the nature of the remaining with the combined be can determinations different of these whether any All numbers occur as disjunct charac concept, or only certain of them.
colours,
teristics
then
it
of the concept of the spherical polygon ; but the characteristics the number 2, and those of a figure exclude
of the rectilineal
plane
the numbers body bounded by plane surfaces exclude
2
and
3.
characteristic This choice amongst the various determinations of a does not becomes of special importance when the process of division
thus take place by the development of the contents of a given concept, extension. starts from its empirical circumscribing its logical extension, but
LOGIC
284
Then
manner
the problem arises of dividing a concept in such a
the different
that all
The
determinations may be empirically forthcoming.
fact
that the human body is not transparent involves its having some colour ; and if we were to develop the concept from this characteristic alone, we
should have to introduce
all
the colours as
members
the division.
of
and leaving other considerations out of much bound to assume a species of blue or green
Starting from this characteristic
the question,
men
we
are as
as of black
In reality
or white.
many
of the colours are wanting,
and when we divide the concept man on the ground of colour, we enumerate only those colours which are actually forthcoming, regarding the division as complete
But there quite
distinct
number of closely,
when
no doubt
is
problems
is
includes
there
:
particular beings,
and there
it
these actual variations.
all
that in this limitation
and
this
we
generally confuse two
problem of
the
is
we
classifying
shall afterwards
a
given
examine more
the problem of presenting a system of concepts to
serve for our knowledge of the particular by
means of Predicates which
have a perfect logical determination. If it were merely a matter of chance that only some colours are actually found within the range of our
human skin, men would be no division of the concept, we could never say actually given men
experience as the colour of the
then the so-called division
of
but merely a classification
of
;
exhaustively divided the concept. disjunct species
meaning If,
;
just as
to say that
indeed,
in
It
chemistry
that
we had
in
this
way
would be a mere enumeration of
we enumerate
the metals without
no more new kinds can be discovered.
we can regard
the fact that
as a sign that a blue or green
no other complexions are
forth
excluded by the other characteristics of the human being, then, and then only, would it be possible to accept the empirical classification of men as an exhaustive
coming
division of the concept in experience
is
man.
complexion
That a mere
frequently substituted
is
classification of
what
for the division of the
the logical extension being thus confused with the empirical
is
given
concept is
quite in
accordance with the habit of neglecting to consider the concept according to its intension, and with the more popular and intuitable method of always starting from the empirical extension.
must always be remembered that
logical
In consideration of
completeness of division
is
this
it
never
guaranteed by the fact that the extensions of certain members of a division are together equal to the empirical extension of the concept divided. 9.
When
the division has been carried out,
it
brings to light a dis-
THE CONCEPT
285
amongst the characteristics which has not yet been noticed the Some of distinction between the notes communes and the notce prop rice.
tinction
;
the characteristics, that
which are otherwise
is,
may be common
different
;
and thus
bination of other characteristics,
from
its
all
higher
or
co-ordinate
number
of concepts
Thus the
can occur only
possessing only plane right angles is a nota propria of the right-angled quadrangle. also belong to a generic concept,
characteristic
the quadrangle
in
hence characteristics which
may
belong
notes propricz. only to an infima species are called specific
found they distinguish one concept from
and they are then called distinguishing characteristics. The same concept may be divided according to 10.
and because the
all
Where others,
different grounds,
are called cross resulting concepts generally overlap, these
Thus
divisions.
;
But such a nota
propria
such characteristics are
com
distinguish a given concept
concepts. "
it
to a great
while others presuppose a definite
the
division
oblique-angled crosses their
of
parallelograms
into
division into equilateral
rectangular
and
and unequilateral
;
phanerogams and cryptogams crosses their land and water plants. Such a combination of grounds is & of plants into
the division division into
means of breaking up a concept subordinated. 1
immediately
into a
number
The number
of
of others which are not
members
resulting
fron
which by itself would yield a, b, c\\ these numbers. of the to is product equal etc., members, We can imagine a logical system containing all the most simple 11. combinations of characteristics which can be thought as independent and several independent divisions, each of
isolated concepts, in
by division
on
which these combinations should again be developed and according to all grounds into the most specific
sides
all
We should then have a systematic synopsis of all the concepts possible. their relations of subordination could we possibly construct; both concepts and their differences would be fully determined, and we should be able to The
others.
and opposed to all given idea was subordinated ideal of a perfect analysis of our ideas would then be
how any
see at once
logical
and we should have moreover a system of Predicates appropriate in the most to all particular objects, and a means of classifying them under fall only one For though every object would then varied ways. other all from objects lowest concept, so that it would be distinguished
attained,
which did 1
There
process
is
is
not
agree
with
it
in
every
characteristic,
still
its
various
for the no ground for any special treatment of what is called sub-division, same whether we divide a higher or a lower generic concept.
exactly the
LOGIC
286
subsume
aspects would enable us to
under
it
different series of
higher
concepts. 44-
A
DEFINITION
is
a judgment which states the meaning of a term denot
This
ing a concept.
it
concept broken up into its
do, either by an expression which exhibits the
may its
and gives a complete account of it, and the specific differ
characteristics,
content, or by stating the genus next above
ence, thus indicating
position in the ordered system of concepts.
its
All logical definitions are nominal definitions.
The demand
for a real
from the confusion between metaphysical and logical
arises
definition
problems. Definitions are analytical or explicative
which
when they
refer to
already formed and denoted by a recognised term
is
synthetical or determinative
when by
new
they present us with a
a concept ;
they are
synthesizing determinate characteristics
concept, and introduce a term for
it.
We
must distinguish between definition proper and the attempt to dis cover the concepts upon which our ordinary use of language is grounded. i. (
Suppose our
moreover,
its
logical ideal to
be attained, and every concept
:
the problem of stating mere repetition of the analysis and synthesis through which
we should only have
a concept, and
moment
realize the
its
make
to
sure that
became
it first
we could
at
any
word by unfolding the elementary the concept denoted by it, and that we could
meaning
characteristics contained in
recognise
to have,
and unambiguous denotation in language then the contents of a concept would be solved by the
established
of such a
position as subordinate
and
disjunct.
The
first is
done by a
formula stating the particular characteristics, from the synthesis of which the concept arises ; the second by a formula naming the genus proximum
and the
differentia specifica,
division.
(Since the
order of determination
The
second answer. rectangle, etc.
when
;
i.e.,
exhibiting the concept as
same concept may have
may
square
vary, there is
may be
member
different genera,
of a
and the
different formulae for the
a quadrilateral regular figure, an equilateral
differ only apparently, and cease to differ continued, and these higher concepts are also resolved
such formulae
the analysis
is
into their characteristics.)
We may
call the
statement of
all
the characteristics of a concept, or of
its
genus proximum and differentia
in
such definition we cannot be concerned with the explanation of a con-
specifica, definition,
and
it is
evident that
THE CONCEPT cept, but that, so far as there is
idea
is
what itself,
not a concept unless
any explanation,
it is
clear,
contained in our thought of
is
not something different.
with the concept
is
external
It
and
is
i.e.,
it
;
unless
287 it is
we
that of a term.
An
are fully conscious of
thus the definition
is
the concept
only the term, which in comparison
fortuitous,
which secretes the wealth of a
one sound, and which, indeed, is frequently used like x and y thought in algebra, as a mere symbol of which we fail to realize the meaning at every step it is the word which, because its external form fails to show in
;
relation to the
its
words which stand
for
higher or lower concepts, as a
chemical formula shows composition from elements, needs to be explained and to have its content constantly brought to mind. Such explanation is
taken from popular language with when we have formed, or wish to form, a fluctuating boundaries, and
especially
its
needed when the word
is
constant and unambiguous symbol, from one which was uncertain and If we were to carry out Leibniz ideal of a characteristica
ambiguous.
with every
symbol indissolubly connected in thought and would enable us to see concept would also be its definition, universalis, then the
tion to
all
its
rela
others.
Definition in this sense, then, can never be anything definition, stating the
meaning
of the
word
;
it
more than nominal
can be a
l
real definition
to confuse different
a definition should be real in any other sense is cannot say whether any actual object corresponds to a concept of com until we have our concept and can subsume under it the objects plete logical definition We cannot say whether the characteristics of a concept represent the essential given. the real causes of these nature of the things which fall under it, or whether they include but this knowledge itself of the objects a have we until knowledge perfect things, Lotze (Logik, cannot be called a definition. This applies also to the example given by 1
To
insist that
problems.
We
;
2nd
"
ed., p. 202)
:
When we
of call the soul the subject of consciousness, of ideation,
be appropriately called a nominal definition. The real defini feeling and will, this may either that the subject of conscious tion of the soul could be established only by proving and indivisib but a be ness and
its
manifold phenomena could
nothing
supersensuous
be nothing but a complete system of material elements, being, or that it could in our concept of the being which we have first determined nature the of knowledge 01 it merely establishes the dependence no is definition, the subject of consciousness others which are not yet included in the concept. of
toyids,
vir60e<Tis
"
:
with our faculty of knowledge. But a theoretical proposition though it
der practischen Vernunft a postulate is not demonstrable as such inasmuch as it is in
in the Kritik is
We
find separably dependent upon an a priori practical law of unconditional validity. the same discrepancy in Kant s Logic. I have given a wider meaning to the second definition in the text. 1
In his distinction between the mathematical and dynamical use of the synthesis of
the pure concepts of the understanding.
THE TRUTH OF IMMEDIATE JUDGMENTS
319
mation of concepts, and axioms referring to the knowledge of a particular existing thing.
We
have laid
it
down
that the possibility of a logically perfect formation
of our concepts depends upon our being able to state
according to which
our ideas are formed.
all
perfect concepts are
conscious synthesis
;
necessary laws
certain that logically
It is
no natural product, but have to be obtained by a and it is as certain that this synthesis must be
governed by rules which are obviously necessary, but which constitute primarily a ground only for the form of our concepts and the mutual reference of their elements, not for the assertion that a particular thing
Thus
exists.
real
the proposition that
we cannot
without presupposing a thing to which
think of any attribute as it
attaches
is
a rule which
determines the construction of our ideas and the relation between their elements. All propositions, again, concerning the incompatibility of certain char acteristics are
axioms
for the construction of concepts.
nature of our thought
bined
in
one
itself
and
idea,
by the
It is fixed
that certain determinations cannot be
this impossibility
can be certain
for us
com
only in the
same way
as the principle of agreement is certain. (Essentially different from these are propositions concerning incompatibility which are only
empirically inferred
;
as, for instance, that
a gaseous state
is
incompatible
with great specific weight.)
Mathematical axioms are to be classed with these axioms struction
of
concepts (when, that
is,
they
not
are
for the
merely
con
analytical
propositions, such as the principle that two magnitudes which are both
equal to a third are equal to one another, which follows analytically from the concept of equality).
For inasmuch as
all
geometrical figures pre
are governed by the nature of our idea of space, such but the manner of synthesis which is necessitated
suppose space and axioms express nothing
by our idea of space. It is upon the inevitable rules of this idea axiom two straight lines cannot enclose a space is based.
that the
"
"
From one
point of view
all
these axioms
may be
treated as analytical
though not derived is, from the concepts of the grammatical subjects, they are involved in the
propositions
;
when, that
we look
to the
fact that
nature of the ideas presupposed in these subjects
(
18, 5, p.
1
10
sq.).
That
be synthetical is due only to their being relational judg they appear which must have been preceded by a synthesis in the ideas without ments, which there would have been no relation. They are based upon the to
LOGIC
320 fact that the different
elements of our ideas are not independent of one
another.
Such axioms there are also in reference to all we think of as existent ; they hold good, however, only when it is the concept of being which is in ques tion, and not with reference to any assertion that this or that particular Spinoza s axiom otnnia quce sunt, vel in se vel in alio sunt is thing is. one of these and it refers to the fact that nothing but substance with :
accident can be thought of as existing.
But these axioms are not meant to serve as grounds for the judgment The one last quoted, for instance, particular thing is.
that this or that
leaves
it
quite undetermined to what
we
are to apply the concept of being
something else (independent and dependent being). Other axioms, however, are needed for our judgments concerning the axioms upon which we may base the assertion that a particular existent in
itself,
and being
in
;
certain particular thing it
in a certain way, or
And
is
it
just
this
must be thought
which constitutes
The axiom
the former axioms.
to exist because
we form an
because another particular thing either
is
says
that
move
to
in
one moment, it body the next in the same direction and with the same if
a given
from
their characteristic difference
of causality, for instance, as formulated in
the law of inertia, says nothing about the necessary idea of motion is
idea of
or has been.
actually
moves
at
;
what
it
continue
will
velocity,
and
motion another body is there which has influenced it. changes if I perceive a Thus the general formula of such axioms is sometimes it exists"; sometimes some under conditions, particular thing given that
its
if it
"
"if
particular thing
is,
then some other
the process, by which
We
my
is
also."
In
this
need only attend to what always takes place
ideas to
way they
regulate
ideas of the particular are interpreted as reality.
become conscious of
in the formation of
our
The
the necessity of the former axioms.
necessity of the latter, just because they refer to the existent, cannot be
derived from the necessity of thought so simply, except in so far as we
assume
as our highest
The
axiom
that thought
and being correspond.
how vain is the belief that 4. we can ground the statement that a given thing is, and is this or that, upon simple and immediate axioms, or that the universe of the particular can be derived from them as necessary consequence. Neither the principle non datur vacuum" nor the axiom that a a can take effect where it history of science proves irresistibly
"
thing
is,"
that
neither the assertion that "
"
like
only
only effects like/ nor the statement
the effect does not continue without the
cause,"
have been of any
THE TRUTH OF IMMEDIATE JUDGMENTS and the
avail,
criterion of inability to think otherwise has
321
been constantly
misconstrued as the psychological impossibility due to habit, instead of 1
logical necessity.
Even Kant
s splendid attempt to exhibit the synthetical judgments a which are the ground of all experience, has really only resulted in shewing that such synthetical judgments a priori must hold if
priori,
good
experi
be possible as science. He starts by assuming that there is a science of experience, and working back from this he seeks the conditions ence
of in
is
to
it, guided by the principle that all cognitions must admit of being united one consciousness. But neither his derivation of the from
categories
the forms of
in the traditional
Logic and supplemented by himself, nor yet the synthetical principles obtained from this basis and their proofs, have succeeded in convincing his readers that they have here
judgment given
propositions which are absolutely necessary and self-evident, whose contra dictory cannot possibly be thought,
and which are contained a priori in our understanding. On the other hand, again, the proof that our sensa tions as they occur must necessarily submit themselves to the categories
and a priori
principles leaves
Schopenhauer abandoned
much room
for question.
the extensive fortress of the twelve categories
he might maintain more strongly the citadel of causality ; is very instructive, it cannot take
in order that
but although his simplification of Kant
the place of the Kantian pure forms of the understanding and synthetical principles a priori.
Even
if
he aimed
at
nothing more than psychological
explanation of the process by which every one
and think of them
spatial intuitions
We
insufficient.
may,
indeed, infer
other than myself as the cause of scious of having produced this
cause
them
necessarily in space,
is
is
forced to objectify his
as external, the principle of causality
from
my
is
must assume something sense affections, since I am not con
myself.
nor that
that I
it
But it
tion itself considered as an existing thing.
it
does not follow either that
consists in the object of intui
No
doubt
scientific reflection
upon our sense perceptions, which begins by assuming that they are occasioned by external objects, finds itself confirmed in this assumption by the fact that
it
is
thus enabled to explain our sensations, and
reason that Schopenhauer it is
after all
s
it is
But
it
was intended to explain.
evident that the general principle of causality contains no 1
S. L.
for this
convincing only after we have already tacitly presupposed the
existence of objects, the assumption of which
When once
it is
theory has been approved by Helmholtz.
Cf. Mill s Logic, bk. 2, ch. 7,
and bk.
5,
ch. 3.
Y
LOGIC
322
information as to the nature of the cause of a given
from
possibility of inferring
There are
still
more
it
and
Even
we
if
caused
my
affections," is
I
be valid
allow that
as a
holds good as a uni
it
it
axiom
application involves the
which
see the im
cannot be the ground of our inference of I am not aware of having myself Thus a proof that I am really not their cause.
self-evident axiom,
external objects unless the proposition
its
we
when regarded
serious defects in this principle
principle of objective truth. versal
effect,
the existence of any definite cause.
"
that I
am
not the cause of anything
do not produce consciously an axiom which no one will assert a priori. Nor could it be a principle of objective truth unless ;
to it
were to guarantee that everything thus objectified by the individual were but the conditions It may be a natural law of our thought eo facto valid. ;
under which
Thus the
it
may become
a normal law are
principle of causality also
fails
still
to enable us to assert that this
or that particular thing necessarily corresponds to
my
like
idea of
for
it;
by
itself it
tells
be discovered. 1
to
my
perception, and
is
us nothing of the nature of the
cause. It
cannot be allowed, then, that the general propositions which guarantee
the objective validity of our judgments of perception, are obvious as simple, self-evident truths
;
nor that we find them in a form which, by
itself,
makes
the reference of our perceptions to an existing thing, and of certain per
ceptions to a certain thing, a priori certain.
But
still
it
remains open to
us to acknowledge the existence of an external world which all,
not
as a postulate of our search for science
avoid
believing, although
we
is
the same for
and knowledge which we can
recognise that
it
is
not
self-evident. 2
1 I agree with Windelband (p. 76 loc. cit.} that it is a first principle of knowledge more accurately of our attainment of knowledge which makes us seek a cause for every phenomenon but then this law is not sufficient to show the sufficient ground for Such a law, however, would be necessary as a ground for our judg every phenomenon. ments of perception. Cf. the criticism of this theory of causality in the work of Spir, Denken und Wirklichkeit, p. 121 sq. ;
2
Baumann s proof of to much the same
comes
Zeller s investigation
welt
"
(Vortragc
realism (Philosophic als Orient ierung iiber die Welt, p. 248 sq.) as this, so far as I can see.
"
iiber die
Griinde unseres Glaubens an die Realitat der Aussendritte Sammlung, p. 225 sq.), which is a model of
und Abhandlungen,
and caution, leads to practically the same result, although he attempts to dispose of the argument that I myself am the only real being which exists by a refutation to which he attributes the importance of a proof. The proof, however, is only derived by him from clearness
the fact that such an assumption would render the contents of consciousness inexplicable, and thus it presupposes the necessity not only of explanation but of causal explanation. But this necessity is in the first instance subjective, a necessity imposed by our desire to
know.
That the conviction of the
reality of
an external world
is
justified
by the necessity
THE TRUTH OF IMMEDIATE JUDGMENTS
323
This postulate being granted, the question arises What are the universal conditions required by the nature of our perceptions, if they are to be :
and
referred to an external existence,
are to be is,
made thoroughly
then, the aim,
consistent
and not the
our guiding clue in
the judgments resulting from
if
To
?
starting point of science.
we must
them
discover these presuppositions
Nevertheless for
back upon a principle whose likeness to the principle of contradiction may impose upon us, but which is really only a particular application of that i.e. it is principle impossible this
discovery
fall
;
same thing should both be and not be, and not be A. The principle of contradiction
that the
thought states that
it is
and deny the same nitely
If
system which
fixed conceptual
ideal consciousness,
and the same
it
as a
should both be
A
natural law of our
we should consciously both affirm we assume that there is a defi
impossible that
proposition.
that
present without variation to an
is
for all thinking beings,
then
all
concep
judgments are established by the principle of agreement. Hence it follows also from the principle of contradiction that all judgments contra dicting these are false, whether they are direct negations, or judgments tual
When
predicating incompatible characteristics. "
the
same cannot be both
B and not
concept, the definite contents of
my
B"
this is the
we mean by
sense in which
the same, the same
idea.
But when we are forming judgments about the existent, this principle prohibits us in the first place from thinking that the same thing both
and is not. If then we can infer from the assumptions we have made about the existent one conclusion, that a particular object of thought is, and another conclusion that the same particular object of thought is not is
the two propositions cannot both be true, and there must be something false in
Since
And
our assumptions.
same
that the
it is
particular
A
both
same way it is not B.
in the is
is
impossible to think
B and
part of the concept of being, that
think, so that true judgments about the
it
is
the
same
same thing must
for all
who
agree, whoever
We cannot accept it as an of explanation and understanding is true only as a postulate. axiom that nothing incomprehensible can exist indeed a complete understanding of all that is presented to us can never be more than a problem set before us which we shall the theory solve. never Though, therefore, I completely agree with him that ;
completely
which regards our ideas as only the products of the conscious subject is untenable, still of the reality of an I regard the final presupposition upon which is based our conviction This however is quite sufficient to en external world as nothing more than a postulate. the causes of able me to accept the statement of the problem as formulated on p. 263 of consciousness which we call perceptions must be determined in a those :
phenomena
way which
will
correspond to the
facts.
LOGIC
324 forms them,
it
and the same
when inferred by cannot be true of one
follows that contradictory judgments, even
different people
on the ground of
existing
thing.
their perceptions,
It is
true that this
argument
is
ultimately
based upon our concept of being, and that we cannot go beyond But there is no other scientific knowledge than the knowledge which us that
if
we would think
of anything as existing,
we must
this.
tells
necessarily think
we could suppose it possible for contradiction to be repugnant to our thought only, and to be admissible in the existent, all our efforts to know the existent would be rendered fruitless. In the third part, I hope to show how the nature of the problems to be solved, and the conditions under which we attain our knowledge, have
of
it
in a given way.
If
necessarily given rise to that process in our experiential is
knowledge which
exhibited by the history of the actual development of science.
show, that
is,
that the
whole task has consisted
I shall
affirming an existent
in
accordance with the postulate that something is, and upon the ground of our perception, and in making our hypotheses about it in such a way that in
our statements concerning it may be free from contradiction. The history of science shows us a continual process of re-construction and correction in
our ideas of the existent, a process which enters upon a
new
stage
whenever our hypotheses lead to contradictions. There is no other confir mation of our belief that any given thing is, than the complete con sistency of
our judgments with reference to the existent; the return of
all
the circle into
we accept with that the be such immediately certain, finally of perception, which was the starting point of the whole All the general propositions which
itself.
must
respect to the existent
the subjective fact process,
may
in its turn
be a necessary consequence of them.
the immediate assumption from which qualities are
accepting
it
immediate attributes of the
we were
we always
In
set out, that
existent, has
led to contradictory conclusions.
been
this
way
sensible
rectified
;
by-
In this way the
axioms of physics, the principle of the permanence of substance, etc., have been discovered. Kant, in his Antinomies, chose this same way to show that space
and time are only subjective forms of intuition, and that every is only phenomenal to assume that they are real in the
thing therein
;
ordinary sense leads in his opinion to contradiction. The principle of causality, at any rate in the form in which alone applied, enters into this process of building It enters, that is, as i.e.
it
can be
up knowledge from experience.
the postulate that the existent
is
knowable
determined according to universally valid laws.
as necessary,
For not even the
THE TRUTH OF IMMEDIATE JUDGMENTS firmest conviction that everything has
confidently
the
existence
of a
its
325
cause could enable us to assert
particular
thing,
if
causes
worked
by
chance. 1 1
In order to avoid repetition
causality to Part III.
I
postpone a complete exposition of the principle of
CHAPTER
III.
THE RULES OF INFERENCE AS THE GROUND FOR MEDIATED JUDGMENTS. IT has been shown in the previous section that judgments which
we were
immediate from the point of view of natural thought, must nevertheless admit of being presented as necessary consequences of obliged to regard as
when we have
a general law
to ask for the ground of their certainty. to follow from the principle of agree must be shown Analytical judgments ment judgments of perception from the laws, according to which we de ;
from our subjective affections the conviction that there are material And since these general laws can be known only in the form of things.
rive
judgments, the contents of the previous chapter are to a large extent dealt with under this one only the highest and ultimate laws, together with the ;
immediate utterances of self-consciousness, are excluded, as incapable of 1 being reduced to more remote principles. 49-
The most
general formula according to which we derive one judgment
from another
is
the
HYPOTHETICAL SYLLOGISM.
This
may be
either the sim
ple application of the proposition that the affirmation of the ground involves that of the consequence, the denial of the (in
which case
it is
called the
called Pure Hypothetical Syllogism)
the consequence of the consequence,
The
i.
consequence that of the ground
Mixed Hypothetical Syllogism) it
;
or (as the so-
may be based upon the principle that
is
the consequence of the ground.
process of drawing a conclusion or inference takes place psycho
whenever we are led
to believe in the truth of a judgment by our one or more other judgments, and not immediately by the ideas of the subject and predicate connected in it. There are many logically
belief in the truth of
ways
in
114
p. 1
which
sq.)
;
this belief
and
it
often
may be brought about psychologically ( 19, 3-4, happens that we are not even clearly conscious of
For some appropriate remarks on the Schuppe s Erk. Logik, p. 12454.
relation
between judgment and inference,
cf.
THE RULES OF INFERENCE. the process of mediation by which
we
327
derive the certainty of one judgment
from that of another.
This mediation depends frequently upon habits of association and combination which are governed, as a matter of fact, by fixed rules of which we are not expressly conscious. Every expectation of a future event
is
based upon an inference which extends beyond what is given ; is to be found in previous experi
but the ground of our expectation, which ences,
is
not expressly present in consciousness in the form of a universal
we expect
proposition every time
that an unsupported
body
will fall to the
ground, that eating will satisfy hunger, or that
stood of those
who
what we say will be under without conscious mediation from the pass
We
hear.
certainty of the given event to the certainty that a future one
will also
take
place.
But
logical theory
which inference
is
has to enquire as to what are the conditions under
That
valid.
is
to say, since every inference involves the
one judgment (the conclusion or inferred proposition) is true, because one or more other judgments (the premises) are true, we have to belief that
investigate the logical necessity of this belief that the premises are sufficient
ground
a
for the conclusion.
The
2.
another,
question as to how one judgment may be grounded upon may be regarded from two points of view. We may either start
from a given judgment which is accepted as valid, and ask what further judgment can be grounded upon this or we may start from a question, from the tentative suggestion of a mediated judgment, and ask how can this ;
"
judgment be grounded, and under what conditions? in order that
it
may be
valid
What must
be certain
"
?
It is evident that, given a valid judgment A, another and a different 3. cannot be safely grounded upon it unless there is an uncon judgment ditional and universally valid proposition A is true, is true." All
X
"If
that
is
expressed by this hypothetical judgment
is,
that
X X
is
the necessary
consequence of A, and that any one who accepts A must also accept X. Without such a rule there would be no logical justification for an inference
;
if
A
might be true without
X being true,
the certainty of the former would
be no ground for the certainty of the latter. Thus the objective validity of an inference from A to must always be dependent upon the validity of
X
this hypothetical rule.
Hence
the most general, logical scheme for
mixed hypothetical syllogism 1
Cf.
Kanl
s
Logik (Hartenst.,
all
inference
is
the so-called
1 :
i,
p.
453
57)
:
"The
general principle upon which
LOGIC
328
A If
A
is
Therefore
The order
X
then
X
A
If
is true.
true,
is
true
is
A
is
then true
Therefore
true.
is
true,
;
of the premises depends
X
is
true.
;
X
is
true.
upon what the movement of thought
judgment A represents the matter-ofhappens to be. element in the ground, the datum from which the inference is made, while the hypothetical judgment is the law which contains the necessity, the If the validity of the
fact
rule according to
other
may come
which the inference
is
made, then either the one or the But in logical ter
in the actual course of thought.
first
minology the rule according to which we infer is always called the major premise (G. Obersatz), the datum from which we infer the minor premise (G. Untersatz) or assumption. If
4.
which
A
tells
the rule which rule
"
:
A
Is
itself
presents
us that is
true,
if
A
is
applied
if
A
if
X
is
is
is
also true ?
X because of A
true,
i.e.,
"
But
"
present, the question
first
and
In the latter case the rule
be applied
X
is there a judgment on the contrary, it is if, whether we can apply the
the question arises
first,
true
is
"
?
It may capable of a two-fold application. as certain but it may also be recognised
is is
;
not true, according to the law that the denial of the con
sequence involves the denial of the ground. In this way there arises the inference If
A
is
true,
Xis not Therefore
A
Xis
:
true,
true; is
not true.
All the ways in which we can make an inference of a simple 5. statement must admit of being reduced to one of these two forms, which
are generally
known
as the
hypothetical syllogism,
1
modus ponens and modus
tollens of the
since by inference in this sense
mixed
we cannot under
stand anything else but that one judgment necessarily follows from the other.
We
may, then,
lay
following formula in
down
as certain that the validity of a
judgment can
made by reason may be definitely expressed in the under the condition of a rule falls under the rule This proposition contains just that view of the nature of inference which is given
depends the validity of itself."
it
all
inference
that
which
modus
tollens
:
falls
what follows. 1
The
so-called
always infer from the judgment is not true, A is not true."
may "if
itself
A
is
be reduced to the modus ponens,
true, then
X
is
true,"
for
we can
the other judgment
"
if
X
THE RULES OF INFERENCE
329
never be inferred from one single judgment, but that two premises at least are always essential.
One judgment of the premises
is
can be inferred from others only upon condition that one an unconditionally valid judgment, the expression of a
necessary connection.
premise which really carries us from one certainty to the other, for our progress is the law that the affirmation of the (hypo
It is this
and the ground
thetical) ground involves that of the consequence, the denial of the conse quence that of the ground. 1
The
6.
hypothetical judgment which mediates a conclusion, indeed the proposition that is a
be mediated and inferred
consequence of
A
is
consequence of A.
The
principle
known
If
then
If
A
If
Mis
If
A
is
is
M
upon which
is
true
is
true
X
is
itself
necessary
a consequence of a
;
;
then
follows that
it
is true.
this syllogism
may be
it
if
may
true that
it is
true, X true, X
;
be necessary
to
is true,
concept of consequence
consequence
X
:
grounded follows from the
is
formulated
the consequence of the
"
the consequence of the
2 ground."
1 Another proof that this form of hypothetical inference is the natural and general for mula for all inference is its universal appearance in the phrases which we generally em since because hence ploy to state our conclusions. Such conjunctive forms as etc. are nothing more than verbal abbreviations of the schema, for these particles have a "
for,"
,
double import
; they express the validity of both propositions, antecedent as well as con sequent, and they also express the necessity of the connection between them, thus pointing to a hypothetical judgment.
2
The
principle that denial of the consequence involves denial of the ground
applied in two ways
may be
:
I.
If
A
is
true,
B
is
true.
C is true, B is not true. If A is true, C is not true. If C is true, A is not true.
If
therefore
/.
