Logic & the Workings of the Mind: The Logic of Ideas & Faculty Psychology in Early Modern Philosophy (North American Kant Society Studies in Philosophy)

LOGIC AND THE WORKINGS OF THE MIND: The Logic of Ideas and Faculty Psychology in Early Modern Philosophy Edited by Patricia A. Easton

VolumeS North American Kant Society Studies in Philosophy

Ridgeview Publishing Company

Atascadero, California

Preface The papers collected in this volume address two closely related themes: the faculty psychology and the logic of the early modern period. The themes are related because, firstly, early modern logic-especially the early modern "logic of ideas" was explicitly psychologistic. It dealt with "concepts" rather than terms, "judgments" rather than propositions, and "reasoning" rather than arguments, and it sawall of these fundamental explanatory categories as grounded in contents or operations of the nlind. And secondly, the lines of influence ran in the other direction as well. The higher cognitive faculties identified by early modern (and, indeed, by medieval and ancient) psychology were determined by logical and even granlmatical considerations. Each cognitive faculty was understood relative to the notion that reasoning consists of arguments and that judgments assert relations between concepts. The intellect was understood as the faculty for abstracting universal concepts from the deliverances of sense~ judgment, as the faculty for conlpounding and dividing concepts or as the faculty for inventing the middle term for a syllogism; and finally, reasoning was understood as the faculty for drawing inferences from previously made judgnlents. Faculty psychology cannot, therefore, be completely understood independently of traditional logic, and early modern logic certainly cannot be understood independently of faculty psychology. For most of this century both of these themes have been neglected by philosophers and historians of logic, philosophy, and psychology. The explanatory categories of traditional faculty psychology now seem naive and illfounded. And the notion that a normative discipline like logic might be grounded on purely descriptive facts of our psychology, or on the arbitrary and conventional features of the grammar of a particular natural language, is rejected as an instance of the naturalistic fallacy. The early modern period has accordingly been judged to be the dark age of logic-a time when the advances of the Middle Ages were forgotten and the entire discipline was turned down the wrong path. But, as Fred Michael observes in one of the introductory essays to this volume, although early modern logic· made virtually no contribution to the history of logic, it was a central part of early nlodern epistemology and metaphysics. One does not have to look far into the standard early modern logic textbook, with its four-part treatment of ideas or concepts, judgments, reasoning, and method, to find themes of crucial importance to early modern philosophy. It was obligatory that a textbook of early modern logic discuss the notions of conceptual clarity, distinctness and adequacy-notions that played a key role in the epistemology of Descartes, Locke, Leibniz, and Wolff, to name but a few. And in early modern logic, a discussion of general terms could no more be separated from the issues of abstraction and abstract ideas-issues that

ii LORNE FALKENSTEINIPATRlCIA EASTON were to become of central importance for later British empiricism-than a medieval treatment of the same topic could be separated from the issue of the nature of universals. Similarly, the early modern logic of propositions, because it could not be separated from the operation ofjudgment, dealt not just with the concept of relation, but with the act of relating, and referred crucially to the basis of that act in the (rationalist) analysis of concepts and the (empiricist) evidence of experience. Again, syllogistic reasoning, based as it is on categorical propositions (out of which the paradigmatic syllogistic forms are constructed), carried with it an implicit ontology of substance and property (the subject and the predicate of the categorical proposition)-an ontology that continued to dominate early modern metaphysics and epistemology long after substantial forms and real qualities had been banished from early modern philosophy of nature. Furthermore, such popular principles of early modern ontology as the notion that whatever is conceivable is a possible object of experience, are obviously parasitic on notions of logical and real possibility. And the analytic and synthetic methods discussed in the fourth part of most early logic textbooks have an obvious relation to the opposed Cartesian and Newtonian paradigms for scientific research. Given all of these avenues of possible interaction, and given that logic formed a basic part of the educational curriculum in the early modern period, it is natural to wonder whether the logics the early modern philosophers were brought up on did not influence their thought-or, alternatively, whether important aspects of their thought are not best understood as explicit reactions to those logics. But the relations go beyond those of influence between distinct disciplines. The fact is that what are today recognized as works of theoretical philosophy were regarded as "logics" in the early modern period. Locke's Essay was taught as a logic, alongside the Port Royal Logic. Hume, in the Abstract to the Treatise, billed his work as a new inductive logic, written to repair the omissions noted by Leibniz in the standard "logic" textbooks, among which Leibniz had included Locke's Essay and Malebranche's Recherche, as well as the Port Royal Logic. And Kant's Critique of Pure Reason-with its Analytic of Concepts, Analytic of Principles, Dialectic of Reason, and Doctrine of Method-is explicitly laid out on the pattern of the table of contents for a logic textbook. The relation goes the other way as well. Just as what are today regarded as works of theoretical philosophy were recognized as logics in the early modern period, so works that explicitly billed themselves as logics in the early modern period were tailored to specific positions in theoretical philosophy. This is the case with the Port Royal logic, and with the logics of Hobbes and Condi1lac, to mention a few. The point that has just been made about early modern logic can be nlade as well about its companion discipline, faculty psychology. Just as there are no clear boundary lines separating logic from epistemology or metaphysics in the early nlodern period, so there is no clear separation between any of these

Preface iii disciplines and faculty psychology. But, as Gary Hatfield argues in the second introductory essay included in this volume, this does not mean that early nlodern philosophy and logic can be regarded as "psychologistic"-as properly normative disciplines that were illegitimately grounded in a naturalistic account of the workings of the mind. There is no "naturalistic fallacy" in early modern logic or epistenlology, Hatfield observes, because, with few exceptions early modern philosophers from Descartes through to Reid had an antecedent conlmitment to the notion that the higher cognitive faculties are truthgenerating and truth-preserving. Accordingly, for them, "naturalistic" accounts of the origin of an item of knowledge in a particular cognitive faculty can also serve to validate that item. And the converse is true as well. Because early modern philosophers had an antecedent commitment to the notion that we are so constituted as to be able to discover the truth, they could base their accounts of the cognitive faculties, not on an empirical study of the workings of the mind, but on considerations of the sorts of operations that logic dictates that the mind must perform in order to discover the truth. Since logic examines argunlents, argulnents consist of propositions, propositions consist of terms, and most terms are general terms that name classes of objects of experience, the identification of the "higher" cognitive faculties of reasoning, judgnlent, and conceptualization lay ready to hand. If early modern logic and epistemology are "psychologistic," then by the same token early modern psychology is "logistic" and rests on a "normativistic fallacy." If we accept that logic, faculty psychology, and theoretical philosophy formed nlutually interdependent parts of a single enterprise in the early modern period, then the importance of paying careful attention to the former two disciplines becomes evident. To properly understand the work of the past philosophers, we need to understand the background presuppositions that influenced them and against which they reacted. Yet the background supplied to all early modern philosophers by their juvenile training in logic and their common employment of distinctions between lower (sensory) and higher (conceptualizing, judging, and reasoning) activities has been largely ignored. The purpose of the essays collected in this volume is to take some few steps to repair this omission. They demonstrate that, be it by way of unconscious influence or be it as the target of an explicit reaction, the logic and the faculty psychology of the early modern period exercised a pervasive and multi-faceted influence on the thought of the period, and that an attention to early modern logic and faculty psychology can help us better understand the nlotives and intentions of early modern philosophers. The papers have been collected into three parts. The first, introductory part contains two papers, one by Fred Michael on the logic of ideas and one by Gary Hatfield on faculty psychology. They are particularly broad-ranging and programmatic in nature, and serve to give the rationale and the justification for the entire project of this volume. The remaining papers constitute a battery of

iv LORNE FALKENSTEINIPATRICIA EASTON additional case studies that illustrate the applicability of Michael's and Hatfield's claims. The papers in Part II investigate the influence of early modern logic on, and reactions to early modern logic in, early modern philosophy. Part IIa contains papers dealing with the logic of ideas and with particular instances of the relation between that logic and early modern epistemology. Jennifer Ashworth explores the influence of the Scholastic tradition on many developnlents in early modern philosophy, reminding us that the reformation of logic was not a development based solely in the humanist movement. In pal1icular, Ashworth examines the writings of Petrus Fonseca (1528-1599) which she identifies as a significant source for the intermingling of logic and the philosophy of mind that was typical of the period. Elmar Kremer traces Arnauld:s account of the nature of ideas from the important Port Royal Logic through to a later polemical work against Malebranche, On True and False Ideas. Kremer argues that the often puzzling theme running through both works is a methodological one-one wherein the account of the nature of ideas comes to bear on issues of logic, knowledge, and theodicy. Emily Michael identifies the sources responsible for the transmission of the logic of ideas into the Scottish universities, identifying John Loudon's logic compend and a standard logic text that was developed, but never used, at St. Andrews as important ancestors to Hutcheson's popular logic textbook. Part lIb deals with judgment. A chief, if not the chief role of judgment was taken to be the assertion of relations between concepts, and it is the logic of relations that is the focus of Fred Wilson's paper. Wilson argues for the importance of distinguishing between the dominant "logic of ideas" of the early modern period and a rival "Ramist" account of logic. He shows that the dominant texts were Aristotelian not only in their logic, but also in their ontology, and that the Aristotelian substance/predicate ontology was unsuited to accommodate relations, which Aristotelian logicians tried to reduce to purely ideal phenomena-mental acts of comparison of the monadic predicates of substances. Seen fronl this perspective, the development of alternative, "bundle theories" of objects by Berkeley and Hume might be seen as opening the way for the modern, Russellian account of relations, but Wilson shows that the Ramist logic of invention already contained an account that treated the predication relation on the same level as other relations, such, as causal and part/whole relations-and that it is likely that Berkeley received instruction from Ramist logicians. Jill Buroker's paper explores another case of complementary, shifting paradigms in logic and epistemology, focusing once again on the faculty of judgment. According to Buroker, the central, revolutionary figure is Kant, who claimed that all the acts of the understanding may be reduced to judgments. Buroker argues that this is a breach with Cartesian philosophy of nlind, as reflected in logic texts such as the Port Royal Logic. These texts treated concepts, rather than judgments, as fundamental. Buroker sees Kant's

Preface v assertion of the primacy of judgment as an important step on the way to an externalist account of language. Part lIe collects papers focusing principally on reasoning and inference. Charles Echelbarger distinguishes between scholastic and modern (Cartesian and Lockean) treatments of logic and investigates which traditions can plausibly be supposed to have influenced Hume, and at what stages in his career. He argues that Hume's own view of reasoning was an explicit reaction to both scholastic and modern traditions, and grew out of a more rigorous application of new theories of the workings of the cognitive faculties to the subject matter of logic than had previously been the case. David Owen addresses Hume' s treatment of demonstration and deduction and warns against the tendency to assimilate Hume's demonstrative/probable contrast with the contemporary contrast of deductive/inductive. Finally, Patricia Kitcher's paper deals directly with the relation between faculty psychology and logic, providing an interpretation of Kant's account of self-consciousness that helps explain how logical inference occurs. The papers in Part lId deal with treatments of necessity, possibility, and impossibility as they appear in the logic and the fundamental philosophical presuppositions of early modern philosophers. Fran90is Duchesneau explores Leibniz's notion of contingent truth. In addressing the problems that arise for Leibniz's account of contingent truths under the analytic model, Duchesneau develops a solution that does not appeal to a Kantian shift in meaning. Phillip Cummins examines Hume's treatment of possible objects or states of affairs, and identifies "perspicuous" ideas as the basis for Hume' s account of psychological and ontological possibility. Cunlmins argues that Hume's methodological hostility to language-based ontology, as evidenced in his denial of the possibility of substance, for example, is one that is best explained by Hunle's reliance on the criteria for forming a perspicuous idea. As Cumnlins points out, the idea-first method that Hume adopted, while conservative, is not without its problems or metaphysical assumptions. Finally, Manfred Kuehn's paper exanlines the Wolffian notion of the proof of the possibility of a concept, and argues that this notion illuminates Kant's notion of a transcendental deduction-that Kant's Transcendental Deduction in fact sets out to provide a principium probandi possibiltatem for the categories. Kuehn defends this reading against alternative approaches to the Deduction, notably Henrich's claim that the Deduction is modeled on legal demonstrations of entitlement. Part III contains papers investigating the influence of early modern faculty psychology on early modern philosophy in general, and on logic in particular. Catherine Wilson's paper is a wide-ranging survey of thought about mental health and the proper employment of the faculties from Descartes to Kant. It investigates the degree to which the mind and its operations came to be construed in materialistic terms in the early modern period, and what this meant for conceptions of logic as a regimen for inlproving mental health and

vi LORNE FALKENSTEINIPATRlCIA EASTON the functioning of the reasoning capacity. A particular instance of this same theme is picked up by Robert Butts, who isolates a quasi-physiological account of the causes of error in Kant's remarks on the role of the sensory and intellectual faculties in generating the antinomies. Eric Palmer presents the thesis that Descartes's Rules for the Direction ofthe Mind is a treatise on logic that enlploys a decidedly naturalistic epistemology, unlike that found in his later writings. Palmer emphasizes Descartes's focus on sensation and brain physiology in his treatment of method and rules for the direction of the mind. Finally, Louis Loeb argues that Hume's formulation of the problem of induction was not intended to result in the sceptical conclusion that causal inference is not justified. Leaving aside worries about the naturalistic fallacy, Loeb argues that if we assume that Hume viewed inference as a psychological process of association, we can better search for Hunle' s theory of justification in the operations of the mind. As Hatfield points out in his introductory essay, scholars have all too often been tempted to ignore or reinterpret whatever they find naive or implausible in the works of past philosophers in accord with the principle of charity. Since early nlodern logic and faculty psychology appear fallacious or naive to us, these elements have accordingly been read out of the history of the period by "charitable" interpreters. But the principle of charity can be abused. Its proper role is to rectify minor oversights and trivial mistakes, or to interpret obscure and difficult passages in the light of clearer pronouncements made elsewhere. But when it is taken to entail that the great minds of the past cannot legitimately be supposed to have had an incorrect or ill-founded thought, or must at all costs be seen to have had some valuable contribution to make to currently raging debates, then it can do more to obscure than to reveal their actual motives and intentions. This is especially the case when what nlotivates the "charitable" omission or revision is a view special to our own time and not shared by the philosophers we are studying. Early modern logic and faculty psychology only seem fallacious or naive to us because we view them fronl a perspective that defines the purposes of the disciplines, and draws the distinction between the naturalistic and the normative in a quite different way than was done by early modern philosophers. If we accept that the purpose of the history of philosophy is not merely to comb the works of past philosophers for something that might possibly be of relevance for current concerns, but is rather to tell a story of the development and influence of ideas, and so to, as Hatfield puts it, "gain the sort of understanding that comes from uncovering the formation of our current problem space, and seeing its contingencies"-as well as get at the facts of what past philosophers really thought that lie behind the mask of "charitable" readingsthen the logic and the faculty psychology of the early modern period have to be taken seriously. This is something that has up to now not been done in any

Preface vii

systematic fashion, and it is an omission the papers in this volume aim to rectify. Lorne Falkenstein, University of Western Ontario Patricia A. Easton, The Claremont Graduate School

Why Logic Became Epistemology: Gassendi, Port Royal and the Reformation in Logic FREDERICK S. MICHAEL

I. Introduction It is quite obvious that epistemology permeates most of the logic texts written from a period beginning in the late seventeenth century and continuing into the beginning of the contemporary era in logic at the end of the nineteenth century. The model of this kind of logic appears to be the Port Royal Logic. Since this is a work suffused throughout with Cartesian doctrine, it is natural to conclude that this kind of logic is of Cartesian inspiration. Even though Descartes himself did not think of logic in this way, indeed he appears to have viewed logic, and abstract thought generally, with suspicion, the epistemological approach to logic taken in the Port Royal Logic can be seen to be a natural outgrowth of Cartesian philosophy. The problem with this judgment is that there had been an earlier logic of this same type and its author, Pierre Gassendi, not only was not Cartesian, but was Descartes's principal rival among the moderns. His Institutio Logica, published not as a separate work, but as part of the Syntagma Philosophica, which itself is available only as the first two volumes of Gassendi's posthumous Opera Omnia, was, as I will try to show, both conceptually and structurally, the Port Royal Logic's principal nlodel. Inasmuch as each of these logics has as its foundation a theory of ideas, it seems appropriate to call this kind of logic, the logic of ideas. Historians of logic do not look with much favour upon this kind of logic. In the introduction to his English translation of Gassendi's Institutio Logica, Howard Jones states that this work is "not a revolutionary logic which rejects all that the logical tradition has to offer, but a logic which Gassendi renders contemporary by selecting from that tradition only what is appropriate to seventeenth century needs."} Wilhelm Risse's assessment of the Port Royal Logic is similar. He says of this work, that it is historically one of the high points of logic, conlparable in influence to that of Aristotle, Peter of Spain, Ramus and Wolff. But he adds: "This logic is certainly not original. Its extraordinary success is due to its elegance and its pedagogically effective manner of presentation.,,2 With respect to logic after the medieval period, which includes the humanist logics of the Renaissance period in addition to the logic of ideas, William and Martha Kneale in their The Development of Logic remark that "from the 400 years between the middle of the fifteenth and the middle of the nineteenth century we have...scores of textbooks but few works that contain anything at once new and good.,,3 The logic of this same era is called by I.M. Bochenski, "classical logic" and is characterized by him a~~~~~~~t_~~~g_gll}!~}l_~w .}\l'hic_h ---

2 FREDERICK S. MICHAEL held the field in hundreds of books for nearly four hundred years,,4 but while he sees it as new, he certainly does not see it as good. This is his assessment: "Poor in content, devoid of all deep problems, permeated with a whole lot of non-logical philosophical ideas, psychologist in the worst sense-that is how we have to sum up the "classical" logics. s While I don't think that this attitude is wholly wrong, I would contend that the logic of ideas lvas revolutionary. More specifically, it was the completion of a revolution that took two hundred years to accomplish, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century. This was the era of the religious reforn1ation, and it would be as appropriate to speak of a philosophical and scientific reformation in this era as well. It was a period of intense intellectual fernlent and upheaval, in which the medieval world view was abandoned and replaced by the modern world view. It began with an attack on medieval logic. This at first sight seems odd inasmuch as if there is one area of medieval philosophy which those involved with the history of philosophy do not think was in need of reformation, it is logic. That is no doubt at least part of the reason why the reformed logics are viewed today with so little enthusiasm. The reform of logic occurred in two phases. The first phase was largely reactive. Medieval logic was discredited by the humanists and largely abandoned. The humanists hoped to convert logic from the formal and theoretical discipline of the medieval period into a practical study, which they hoped would be an improved instrument for argumentation and disputation, and so for the discovery of truth. There was however no consensus about how this was to be accomplished. The second phase in the reformation of logic began in the early seventeenth century, with the abandonment of the view that the way to truth is via argumentation and disputation. Disputation does not lead to truth, it was held, rather the road to truth is by the way of ideas. The logic of this era is, as Bochenski says, something new. It is an important development in the history of logic. But is it also something good? Were the humanists responsible for an advance in logic? Was the epistemological turn which the logic of ideas brought about, the right turn for logic? For the most part, I would have to answer no. These developments were on the whole not good for logic~ certainly they were not good for formal logic. In the four hundred years from the end of the medieval era to the beginning of the era of contemporary logic, while there was some development in informal logic, forn1al logic was largely neglected. It was a reform of logic, a revolutionary change. But revolutions aren't always good and this one was not good for formal logic. Contemporary logicians and historians of logic have reason to be dismayed by its results. On the other hand, the situation could hardly have been more favourable for the development of epistemology, and of the theory of ideas in particular. Logic was typically the first subject in a course of university studies; and in the logic of ideas, the theory of ideas was the subject matter to which the student was

Why Logic Became Epistemology 3 first exposed. The chief focus in the logic of ideas was not on form but on content, principally on epistemological content. Yet it really was a form of logic, as I hope to make clear and the conception of logic it enlbodies is legitimate. My principal purpose in this paper is to examine the logic of ideas as it is found in Gassendi's Institutio Logica and in the Port Royal Logic, to compare these two works and to explain how this form of logic came about. But I do not think that this form of logic can be understood except in its broad intellectual context. Accordingly, it is with this that I begin.

II. From Medieval to Humanist Disputation In the twelfth century, logic was characterized as a scientia sermocinalis, a science of language, or more literally, of speech or significant utterance. This is the view of logic taken by Abelard~ it is also found in the very popular textbook of Hugh of St. Victor, the Didiscalicon. 6 But while it was formulated during the twelfth century, this conception of logic persisted throughout the Medieval period, although it was more often tacitly accepted than explicitly endorsed. But of what kind of language is logic the science? This is a question which seems not to have been explicitly addressed until the fourteenth century, although it is clear enough in practice that the grammatical rules of natural languages are not the concern of logic. Logic was rather seen to be concerned with inferential relations. The aim of logic was to develop a system of rules, distinctions and techniques which are theoretically adequate in the sense that on the basis of these one would be able to determine what follows and what does not follow from a given proposition or set of propositions expressed in a natural language such as Latin. It would also suffice for the analysis of sophisms, enabling one to lay bare the deceptive nature of these arguments. These practical developments preceded any explicit theoretical elaboration. This was finally to be given by Ockhanl. Ockham in his Summa Logicae, distinguishes between vocal and mental terms, which are the terms respectively of a vocal or mental language. Mental terms are natural signs of things~ written or spoken terms are conventional.. There are grammatical features of ternlS which belong only to spoken and written language-Ockham mentions gender and declension. These do not occur in mental propositions and logic is not concerned with them~ for logic, he argues, is not the science of written or spoken terms, but only the science of mental terms.? Now this mental language of which Ockham speaks, his language of natural signs, is a universal language, inasmuch as it is a language free of the idiosyncratic grammatical features which distinguish one natural language from another. This makes logic the science of a universal mental language. In practice, however, propositions supposed to be in this universal mental language are expressed in an idealized form of Latin. This is not good

4 FREDERICK S. MICHAEL grammatical Latin, but rather a form of Latin in which the grammatical features which are held to belong only to written or spoken Latin are either omitted or ignored, a Latin for propositions of Logic, logically perfect Latin, for short.. These refinements of Ockham were to be generally accepted. They may seem to represent an important step forward. But in retrospect it is possible to see that for the fate of medieval logic, it was an unfortunate development. It provided the Humanists with their best grounds for attacking this logic. Medieval logic proved to be vulnerable to attack for two reasons. First, the use of logically perfect Latin frequently had counterintuitive results which were easy to ridicule. For example, although "some virgins were whores," seenlS like complete nonsense, it turns out to be true in logically perfect Latin, since by the rules of ampliation it means the sanle as "Some who were virgins were (after that) whores."g This form of Latin was explicitly attacked by the Spanish humanist, Juan Luis Vives. Vives explicitly accepts the medieval conception of logic as being linguistic in nature, but differs from those he attacks in several respects. First, he sees only natural languages, such as French and Latin, as legitinlate; second, he sees logic as being language relative. So there is a logic of Spanish, a logic of Latin and of each other natural language and these are the only kinds of logics with any claim to legitimacy. The rules of grammar, logic and rhetoric, Vives argues, do not determine what is right or wrong in a language, but only reflect what really is right or wrong in the usage of that language. 9 Second, much of medieval logic developed was devised to address highly theoretical problems with no very obvious application to the practice of argumentation, and which could therefore be attacked as being useless. Such problems had to be confronted so long as logic was seen as a science or theoretical discipline, which is supposed to be applicable to all logical propositions. Thus it turns out that enormous amounts of subtlety and ingenuity had to be expended on the analysis of propositions of a kind never seen anywhere else but in a treatise on logic. As a result of humanist attack, the medieval approach to logic was largely abandoned during the sixteenth century. Between 1520 and 1540, the humanist approach to logic became the dominant approach, replacing the medieval. 10 The hunlanists had no interest in logic as a science, or theoretical discipline. They saw it instead as an art, an instrumental or practical discipline. It was seen to have an important but limited function. It is to be studied as a means of acquiring skill in disputation and practical argumentation. Whereas medieval logics are highly formal, in humanist logics the stress is on informal aspects of reasoning. Informal logic is the principal field of development during the humanist period in the history of logic. Humanist logics look very different from medieval logics. In humanist logics there is no concern with sophisms, there are no systems of subtle distinctions, no strategies for translating propositions into logically correct form. Most of them retain nothing from

Why Logic Became Epistemology 5 scholastic logic at all. Whereas there had been broad general agreement, and little debate, during the medieval period, about the nature and structure of logic, there is no such agreement among the humanists. Questions about the definition of logic, about its nature and structure, are important areas of dispute among the humanists. The humanists, in their conception of logic and their account of its variety and structure, follow a variety of models. There is no one kind of humanist logic; I can distinguish at least four kinds. Many humanist logics are no more than simplified paraphrases of Aristotle's Organon. Nothing will be said of these, as they are of no intrinsic interest. Others follow Cicero and others still, Averroes. Although a consensus among humanists about the nature of logic seemed to be developing during the seventeenth century, it was a development cut short by the emergence of a new kind of logic, the logic of ideas, the principal focus of my interest in this paper. Despite the dramatic change from medieval to humanist logic, there nlay be less to this change than meets the eye. For there is no change in fundanlental conception. Logic is still understood as a linguistic discipline. Those humanists, who like Ramus follow Cicero, define logic or dialectic as ars bene disserendi, the art of discoursing well, or as ars bene ratiocinandi, the art of reasoning well, since they see reasoning as the essential part of discoursing. 11 Philip Melanchthon defines logic or dialectic rather as ars recte, ordine et precipue docendi, the art of correct, orderly and perspicuous teaching. I2 In Melanchthon's view any transmission of truth is teaching. Teaching is a form of discourse in which the author's goal is to transmit to his audience things which, in the author's judgment, are true. Jacopo Zabarella, who follows Averroes in his conception of logic, defines logic in his highly influential De Natura Logicae in this manner. Est logica disciplina instrumentalis, quibus in omni re verum cognoscatur et a fa/so discernatur, that is, logic is an instrumental discipline by which in every thing the true is known and distinguished from the false. I3 Since an instrumental discipline is an art (as opposed to a theoretical discipline, or science), this amounts to saying that logic is the art of getting to the truth. Since this is done by argumentation, debate or discussion, in a word, discursively, logic is still conceived as a discursive or linguistic discipline. Bartholomew Keckermann complains of Zabarella's definition that it is no more true that logic is instrumental by nature than that a man is by nature a servant. This is true enough, but· nlisses Zabarella's point. Zabarella logic is instrumental not because logic functions by means of instruments, but rather because he nlaintains as do most of the other humanists, that logic is an art, not a theoretical discipline or science. Keckermann himself gives two different definitions of logic. In the first, he characterizes logic as ars dirigens mentem in cognitione rerum, the art which directs the mind in the cognition of things~ in the second, as ars recte de rebus cogitandi, the art of thinking rightly about things. I4 These two definitions, and especially the second, suggest a change in the conception of logic, from a linguistic to an

FREDERICK S. MICHAEL epistemological conception. But that is questionable. Keckermann's two definitions seem to be motivated rather by a somewhat broader view of the goal of logic, which he sees as being sonlething more than just the discovery of truth as will be explained below. Still, it is central to Keckermann's conception of logic that its principal purpose, though not its only one, is the discovery of truth and for Keckermann, as for the other humanists, truth is discovered by argumentative or discursive means. Logic, for Keckermann, as for the other hunlanists, is a discursive art and his logic turns out to be just a later stage in the development of the humanist program for logic. In the whole humanist period, there is no clear break from the conception of logic as a linguistic discipline. There is then general agreement among the humanists about the nature of logic, all seeing it as being in one way or another a discursive art or ars disserendi. They agree also in rejecting the common medieval view that logic is a science or theoretical discipline, holding instead that it is an instrunlental discipline or art. But humanists do not all agree about the goal of logic, and they have widely divergent views about the structure of logic. The early Ciceronian hunlanists see the goal of logic as being to enable us to argue, as Cicero's puts it, "with probability on either side of a question," where arguing with probability seems to amount to nothing more than arguing persuasively.Is So the goal of logic is to enable us to argue persuasively any side of any issue. Since logic is not seen as enabling us to determine on which side of a question truth lies, it is proper to characterize this approach to logic rhetorical. Ramus, on the other hand, sees logic as the means of determining truth and so does not share the rhetorical conception of logic held by his humanist predecessors. I6 Melanchthon is in general agreement with this, seeing the goal of logic as the transmission of truth, while Zabarella, following Averroes, views logic, as we have seen, as an instrument for distinguishing the true from the false with scientific knowledge as its goal. Keckernlann however denies that logic has a single goal. Logic he insists has three principal functions: to explicate, to prove and to order. I7 Its goal is not only to give us the means of proof so that we may distinguish the true from the false, but to clarify what is obscure and to order correctly. Still of these only the early Ciceronian humanists really appear to deny that truth is the principal goal of logic. Truth is reached by argumentation or disputation, it was believed. Aristotle, at the beginning of the Topics, had said that dialectic or logic is a skill which enables us to dispute on both sides of an issue and so more easily perceive the true and the false on each side and that it is the way to all the arts. That was the view of the humanists as well. Logic enables us to dispute effectively and it is by disputation that truth will be found, not scholastic disputation in an artificial language, but humanist disputation conducted in some ordinary natural language. With respect to the structure of logic, however, humanists are in disagreement. Ciceronian humanists divide logic into two parts, invention and 6

Why Logic Became Epistemology 7 judgment, as did Cicero himself. Cicero deals with invention in his Topica; he intended to write a book on judgment but never did. Invention was concerned with finding reasons to support or oppose any thesis. Such reasons were to be found by consulting the places of invention or common places. The places are a series of highly general notions which it is useful to consider when one looks for reasons to support or oppose any thesis. Cause, effect, subject, attribute, each of which have numerous subdivisions, are examples of the places. In the logic of the Ciceronian humanists, the account of invention takes the place of the Aristotelian doctrine of terms, which is concerned largely with an exposition of the predicables (genus, species and the like) and the categories or predicaments. The account of the places given in humanist logics incorporate the predicables, but not the categories, which were held to belong not to logic but to metaphysics. In the logic of the Ciceronian humanists, the emphasis was always on invention rather than judgment and the early Ciceronian humanists, Lorenzo Valla and Rudolf Agricola, give no account of judgment at all. Ramus was the first humanist logician in the Ciceronian tradition to give an account ofjudgment as well as invention and so the first to deal with the whole of logic as Cicero understood it. This is perhaps why his logic was so influential. The first version of Ramus's logic appeared in 1543 and underwent a number of revisions, attaining its mature form in the Dialectique of 1555, revised in 1576, and in the Latin Dialecticae Libri of 1556, revised in 1572. Despite variations in text, organization and terminology, the mature versions present essentially the same doctrines. Ramus holds that judgment, also known as disposition, consists of certain rules which are to enable us to judge well of things. Disposition is essentially putting things in order. There are three kinds of disposition: enunciation, syllogism and method. When ternlS are so ordered, or disposed, that one is affirmed or denied of another we have an enunciation or proposition. Syllogism is an order among propositions so that one can be seen to derive from others. The only noteworthy thing about Ramist accounts of propositional and syllogistic judgment is that it is brief and simple. There is no account of the demonstrative syllogism. Method is an order among subjects to facilitate conlprehension; this is done by proceeding always fronl what by nature is most clear and evident to what is less so. Method is disposition in its largest sense. For Ramus, there is essentially only one method, which proceeds from what is more to what is less general. Melanchthon shares the Ciceronian humanists's view with respect to the importance of the places. Melanchthon's logic appeared first in 1520 in a short handbook, the Compendaria Dialectices. This work was to be revised and amplified frequently, reaching its final state in the Erotemata Dialecticum of 1547. Although in practice, Melanchthon appears to accept the humanist division of logic into invention and judgment, his comments show that he is not comfortable about the role of invention in logic. He at first argues against the 18

8 FREDERICK S. MICHAEL view of those who claim that invention belongs to rhetoric, not to logic, but gradually comes to accept that position, calling the division of logic into invention and judgnlent, the old division. 19 But whatever his qualms about this division, he never effectively gives it up; and even when he has concluded that invention is not really part of logic, he says that invention ought to be our first concern. Nonetheless in all versions of his logic, he treats judgment first. 20 Melanchthon's logic combines the emphasis on places of the Ciceronian humanists with Aristotle. Melanchthon's logic is divided into four books. The first three books are devoted to judgment; the last book to invention. Melanchthon's treatment of judgment is largely Aristotelian. The first book deals with simple questions, questions concerning terms, such as "What is a conlet?"; complex questions, such as "Is a comet a star"; questions concerning propositions are dealt within the second and third books, the second book dealing with propositions simply, the third book dealing with the confirmation or refutation of propositions by other propositions, that is, with argument. The inquiry in the first book into simple questions, such as the question of what a thing is, proceeds by definition and division, using the categories, also known as predicaments, and the predicables, known also as antepredicaments. It also uses what Melanchthon calls nlethod, which is a short list of places, ten in all, derived from the four questions which, according to Aristotle, can be asked about anything: "Is it?"; "What is it?"; "What facts are there about it?"; and, "For what reason is it?,,21 Accordingly, in Melanchthon's logic, there are two lists of places, a prelinlinary list under the heading "method" and a much more extensive and systematically developed one in Book IV. The places, in the fourth book, are said to be the means by which propositions are confirmed or refuted. The places are held to apply to all arguments, including the demonstrative and the fallacious. So Book IV contains an account of fallacious reasoning and a brief treatment of demonstrative arguments. Probably the most distinctive feature of Melanchthon's logic is its two lists of places. They are evidence of Melanchthon's efforts to combine Aristotle and Cicero. For Melanchthon, judgment is more important than invention, but the places of invention still playa prominent role in his logic. Zabarella follows Averroes in dividing logic into universal and particular logic. 22 Universal logic is that part of logic which applies to any subject matter; in particular logic, universal logic is applied to particular kinds of subject matter. Universal and particular logic canle to be known as formal and material logic respectively. The studies of terms, propositions and fornlal argument all belong to universal logic. Particular logic deals with demonstrative arguments, dialectical arguments, and arguments that are sophistical or fallacious. In addition, Zabarella claims, following Averroes, particular logic also includes rhetorical and poetic arguments; they are part of logic, Zabarella argues, because they are applications of universal logic to a particular kind of subject matter. 23

Why Logic Became Epistemology 9 In Keckernlann's Systema Logica of 1503, Melanchthon is combined with elements taken from Zabarella. Logic is divided according to the acts of the mind, a division which is not original with Keckermann, but which goes back to Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas. Many humanist logics use it. The first act is apprehension of simple terms, that is, the formation of simple concepts. However there is no account of the formation of concepts to be found in this or any other humanist logic. The second act is the formation of whole propositions and sentences; and the third is discursus, or discursive reasoning, which is the act of the human nlind advancing from known to unknown by putting propositions together in an appropriate manner. Discursus is of two kinds, inference and order. 24 Although Keckermann shares the views of the Ciceronian humanists on the importance of the places, he is sharply critical of Ramus, accusing him of plagiarisnl, taking his criticisms of Aristotle from the writings of J. L. Vives. 25 The accusation is probably unjust, as the criticisnls in question are of a sort quite typical of humanists of that period. With respect to the places, it is Melanchthon that Keckermann follows. As in Melanchthon's logic, there are two lists of places. The first is in Book I, devoted to simple terms, following the treatment of predicables and categories. The other is in Book III, in connection with Keckermann's account of what he calls the notional or topical syllogism. In Book III, concerned with argumentation and with order, Keckermann divides the syllogism, but not the whole of logic, into the general and the particular. 26 After discussing the form of the syllogism in general, he identifies three particular kinds of syllogism, the notional or topical syllogism, the demonstrative syllogism and the sophistical or fallacious syllogism. He believes the notional syllogism to be most general in its application and so treats it first. In his account of demonstration and the importance of demonstrative reasoning, Keckermann in large measure follows Zabarella. Keckermann's logic is an early example of a sort of humanist logic which became quite common during the seventeenth century, one incorporating a great deal of traditional Aristotelian logic, with the stress on places of the Ciceronian humanists and with a Zabarella inspired treatment of demonstrative reasoning. It is also a logic which is in some respects similar to Gassendi's logic. The structure of humanist logics was becoming more conlplex, but this process was stopped by succeeding developments.

III. Gassendi, Port Royal and the Logic of Ideas In 1624, Pierre Gassendi published the first book of his Paradoxical Exercises Against the Aristotelians. There were to be seven books in all, but only one other was written. Book II was concerned with logic. It was written at about the same time as Book I, but published only posthumously in Gassendi's Opera Omnia of 1658. He contends that artificial logic, !o~~_a~ ~ ~1!bie~~ ~f~tugy, ]s__

10 FREDERICK S. MICHAEL as a whole useless?? It is useless for providing definitions expressing the true nature of things; for no truth about the nature of things is known by us. It is useless for finding an appropriate division of a subject matter into parts; for that one needs a knowledge of the subject matter in question. For instance, it takes a knowledge of geolnetry, to know how the subject matter of geometry ought to be divided. It is useless for distinguishing the true from the false; to know what is true and what is false in geometry, it is geometry which one must know, not logic or dialectic. Considering in turn each of the functions which Cicero says that logic performs, Gassendi argues that logic is useless or unnecessary for performing that function. It appears that he intends this to apply not only to Aristotelian logic, but to Ciceronian logic as well, the logic of the humanists as much as that of the medieval period. Gassendi later takes back this view that logic is useless, not in my view because he thinks that any of the logics with which he is fanliliar do lead to truth, but because he has discovered in the opinions of the ancient philosopher Epicurus, the principles of a logic that would lead to truth, for Gassendi did share the view of most of the humanists, that the goal of logic is in fact truth. 28 In the period since humanist logic had become dominant, it had become painfully obvious that humanist disputation was no more a sure road to truth than scholastic disputation had been. In his writing against the Aristotelians, Gassendi was writing as a sceptic, for whom real truth about the nature of things cannot be obtained. But others, who were not sceptics shared Gassendi's scepticism about the powers of disputation, whether scholastic or humanist. Descartes certainly did not think that disputation was the way to discover truth, and, as is well known, he proposed a road to truth of his own. Hobbes was contemptuous of disputation and, in later years, Locke would be so as well. Gassendi, in claiming that logic was useless as a road to truth was addressing a large and receptive audience. If logic was to be of use in the discovery of truth, it would have to be in some way other than as the result of argumentation or disputation. If logic was to be made into a useful subject of study, further reform would be needed. If truth is the goal of logic, and disputation or argunlentation does not lead to truth, how may it be reached? Gassendi's response is that truth is known by a sign. 29 A sign is something perceptible by sense, by perception of which what is hidden fronl sense may be known. Of course, we have no guarantee that things grasped in this way are as we suppose them to be. Knowledge by signs is not infallible, but, Gassendi believes, this is the only kind of knowledge we have. There are two kinds of signs. There are empirical signs, which are signs of things temporarily hidden, and in this way, smoke is a sign of fire. There are also indicative signs, which make known to us things naturally hidden, and it is by an indicative sign, perspiration, that we know of pores in the skin. It is also by indicative signs that we know of atoms, the void, and other things not directly perceptible by sense, if perceptible at all. Ideas, insofar as they are

Why Logic Became Epistemology 11 capable of leading us to truth, are indicative signs. Truth, insofar as it can be attained, can only be reached, by way of ideas. The principles on which Gassendi based his logic come from his reconstruction of the Epicurean canonic. The canonic is a series of rules derived from Epicurus, and other ancient sources, concerned with knowledge, nleaning and truth. 30 The first set of canons or rules, as represented by Gassendi, are the canons of sense. According to these, sense is never mistaken, inasmuch as mistake is only possible when something is affirmed or denied, and the testimony of the senses is no more than a report; it does not affirm or deny anything. An opinion is sonlething added to sense which is capable of truth and falsity. An opinion is true if supported directly or indirectly by sense, and false, if directly or indirectly opposed by sense. So all our knowledge of truth derives ultimately from the senses. What has been perceived by sense produces an image in the mind. These images provide a conceptual framework for the apprehension of future perceptions, for which reason they may be called anticipations of perception or prenotions. Epicurus calls them prolepses. Even in antiquity, prolepses were called ideas and this is the way in which Gassendi interprets them. "Idea" is the term I will use here. There is a group of four canons concerned with ideas. The first asserts that ideas are images which are derived directly from sense impression, or else are formed by increase or dinlinution, as we acquire the idea of a giant or pygmy, or by composition, as we obtain the idea of a golden nl0untain, or by analogy, as we form the idea of a town we have never seen from one we have. The second holds that the idea is the very notion of a thing, fundamental to its definition and that without an idea, we cannot inquire about, think about or even name anything. The last two canons concerning ideas spell out the connection of ideas with logic. The third asserts that the idea is what is fundamental in all reasoning, and so in logic. It is what we consider when we infer that one thing is the same as another or different, joined to another or separated from it. Finally, the fourth canon affirms that what is not directly evident to sense, must be demonstrated from the idea of something which is evident to sense, as the observation of perspiration on the skin enables us to infer the existence of pores. The logic, which Gassendi constructs using these principles, is the Institutio Logica, a late work, first published in the posthunl0us Opera Omnia of 1658. In this work, Gassendi defines logic as ars bene cogitandi, the art of thinking well. 31 Thinking well involves the following four skills: imagining well, that is, forming correct images or ideas of things; posing propositions well, that is, advancing propositions that are correct; inferring well; and ordering well. (PGI, 91; Jones, 1-2) Accordingly, logic is divided into four parts: the first concerns simple apprehension by nleans of images or ideas; the second, propositions; the third, syllogism; and the fourth, method. Each of the parts of Gassendi's logic is directed at pronloting the acquisition of certain skills. Part I is c~J!~1"n-~g __

12 FREDERICK S. MICHAEL with the skill of acquiring concepts and of judging those that have been acquired~ forming propositions and judging them is the concern of Parts II~ Part III is concerned with the skills of forming and judging arguments~ and Part IV is concerned with the skill by which propositions are effectively ordered. Each part consists of a series of canons or rules, each of which is followed with some commentary. The rules do not always take the form of precepts or injunctions~ often, as Gassendi himself points out, they are in the form of statements or theses proposed for our consideration and are called rules just because they are intended to be used by the mind as a guide to thinking well. Gassendi's definition of logic as ars bene cogitandi recalls Keckermann's ars recte de rebus cogitandi. Also the four parts into which he divides logic appear to come from the division of logic according to the three acts of the mind, except that argumentation and method, which are both forms of discursus, the third act of the mind, in Keckermann and other similar logics, are seen as separate parts of logic by Gassendi. But when we conlpare the parts of Gassendi' s logic with those of humanist logics, particularly the first part, dramatic differences become apparent. Humanist logics sometimes begin with a treatment of the predicables and categories, sometimes with an account of the places of invention and sometimes with both. In Gassendi's logic there is no account of the categories, none of the predicables and there is no consideration of the places of invention until the end of the Part II. The content of Part I of Gassendi's logic is entirely different from that of any humanist logic. Humanist logics begin by considering what kinds of things, or conceptions of things, there are, or by giving a more or less systematically arranged list of conceptions which it may be useful to consider when one is looking for reasons to support or oppose a thesis. Gassendi begins instead with an account of how ideas may be acquired and how to determine whether we have proper ideas of things, skills with respect to which previous logics have nothing to say. Logic is no longer conceived principally as a linguistic art or science, as it had been in medieval and humanist logics~ it is conceived epistenlologically. What we have in Gassendi is a new conception of logic, and in consequence of this, a new form of logic as well, the logic of ideas. This same conception and form of logic was soon to be adopted also by Arnauld and Nicole in their extremely influential Port Royal Logic. This form, the logic of ideas, was to become the dominant form of logic for the next two hundred years. The authors of the Port Royal Logic agree with Gassendi that the source of all knowledge is perception, that the theory of ideas is fundamental to logic and agree with him on the structure that logic should have. But they agree with him on little else. The title of the Port Royal Logic is Logic, or the Art of Thinking. In the second discourse, which is not in the first edition of the logic, the authors explain that they chose not to call logic the art of thinking well, as Gassendi had, because it takes no art to think badly. But the art of thinking well (I 'art de bien penser) is what they had originally called logic in the earliest version of ------------------------ -

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Why Logic Became Epistemology 13 their work, which exists in manuscript only.32 The Port Royal Logic is divided into four parts: conception, judgment, reasoning and method. Conception is the simple view of things, without making any judgment about them. Judgment is the joining together of ideas. Reasoning forms one judgment from a plurality of others; and method is concerned with the ordering of thoughts. These are the same divisions that Gassendi recognizes, although in somewhat different terminology; and the description of the divisions is pluch the same. 33 Also, as in Gassendi, little attention is given to the categories or places of invention. There is a brief treatment of the categories in Part I and the subject is said to be of little use. The places are not discussed until part III and they are said to be of little value as well. Part I, as in Gassendi, is devoted to the theory of ideas. The account of ideas in the Port Royal Logic, although similar in structure to that in Gassendi's logic is in general opposed to it in content. Whereas the principles of the treatment of ideas in Gassendi's logic come from Epicurus, the principles of the treatment of ideas in the Port Royal Logic come from Descartes. The positions taken with respect to the nature of ideas in the Port Royal Logic often are in direct contradiction to that found in the Institutio Logica. This is not coincidental. Much in the Port Royal Logic is polemical in character, Arnauld was a major controversialist and Gassendi was one of the favourite targets of his invective. The authors of the Port Royal Logic sought not only to defend a Cartesian conception of knowledge and ideas, but also to discredit what Arnauld saw as the ridiculous, impious, and dangerous doctrines of Gassendi, particularly the doctrines that ideas are corporeal and that all knowledge derives from sensation. There is one other contrast between the Institutio Logica and the Port Royal Logic which it would be useful to recognize. Gassendi's objective is to compose a logic that is pure; pure, of course, according to Gassendi' s conception of what the nature of logic is. As a result it is concise and alnl0st austere, at least by comparison with the Port Royal Logic. This latter logic makes no attempt to remain true to its basic conception. In addition to the material that would be found in a pure logic of ideas, the Port Royal Logic incorporates large quantities of traditional logic. Moreover later editions of the logic include considerable material taken from the Port Royal Grammar of Arnauld and Lancelot. It also contains some writings on geometry by Pascal and Arnauld and even some of Arnauld's theological opinions. It is a very rich work, one which provides a good picture of seventeenth century thought in philosophy and other fields; and so apart from its value as logic, it is useful as an introduction t6 seventeenth century thought and to Cartesian thought in particular. This was a major reason for its success. Part I of the Institutio Logica consists of a group of 18 canons and has the following structure. The first three are concerned with the nature, origin and the formation of particular ideas, the next three with general ideas. There is then a set of four concerned with the perfection of ideas, then four concerned

14 FREDERICK S. MICHAEL with how to avoid being led into error and a final group of four concerned with definition and other matters. The Port Royal Logic adopts the main innovation of Gassendi which is to base logic on a theory of ideas and the presentation of the theory of ideas is structurally similar to that of Gassendi: there are analogues of Gassendi's account of singular ideas, general ideas, the perfection of ideas, the errors we can make with respect to ideas and of the conformity of definitions to our ideas. But the view taken of these subjects is in general very different from that of Gassendi. Part I of Gassendi's Institutio Logica is entitled, "Of the sinlp1e imagination ofthings.,,34 Simple imagination, Gassendi explains, is a form of simple appre.hension, the apprehension of a thing without anything affirmed or denied of the thing apprehended. Simple imagination is simple apprehension by means of corporeal images. As there can be falsehood only when sonlething is affirmed or denied, the simple imagination of things cannot be false. It is the simple imagination of a thing that Gassendi calls (in Canon I) its idea. The idea of a thing, Gassendi tells us is genuine, legitimate and true, when it confornls to the thing itself. This is not the thing as it really is in itself; fOI, Gassendi holds, its real nature is not known to us. What we want are ideas that will correctly represent things as our senses apprehend them. An idea is an image, because it is in the corporeal imagination and derives ultimately from sensations with which it may be compared, but it is at the same time a perceptible sign of something not itself perceptible, the thing as it is in itself. Also in order for our ideas to represent things correctly, we want them to be as clear and distinct as possible and the more frequent, recent and striking are the experiences we have of a thing, the more clear and distinct is the idea we form of it likely to be. A Cartesian clear and distinct idea guarantees that the idea we have of a thing represents that thing as it really is in itself; a Gassendist clear and distinct idea is obviously something quite different. The authors of the Port Royal Logic attack the view that ideas are images of things, claiming that there are ideas of things of which no image is possible, as, for example, the idea of a chiliagon. (PRL, Pt. I ch. I, 27-37) The correct view they clainl is that of Descartes, according to which ideas are what is in the nlind when we can truthfully say that we conceive of a thing, in whatever way we conceive it. They also reject the view that ideas are corporeal, going so far as to argue that no ideas, not even ideas of sensible things or qualities are corporeal and thus it is not necessary to have a body to feel the heat of hell. 35 Gassendi, following Epicurus, traces the origin of all of our ideas to sense. In Canons II and III, Gassendi incorporates in his logic the first of the Epicurean canons of the Anticipatio. Canon II holds that the original source of all our ideas is our senses. The mind is a tabula rasa on which nothing has been engraved or depicted, Gassendi says and those who hold that there are ideas that are naturally imprinted or innate, not acquired by sense, do not at all prove what they say. In support of the view that all our ideas originate in

Why Logic Became Epistemology 15 sensation, Gassendi offers the following inductive argument: blind men have no idea of colour and deaf men no idea of sound; so if there could be a person with no senses at all, that person would have no ideas either. (Jones, 4, 84-85; PG-I, 92b) Similar arguments are given by Locke, Hume and other empiricists. In addition to ideas acquired directly by sensation, ideas can be formed from ideas we already have by increase or diminution, as when from the idea of a person of normal size, we form the idea of a pygmy or giant; by composition, as when from the ideas of gold and a mountain, we form the idea of a golden mountain; and by analogy or similitude, as when by analogy with a city we have seen, we form the idea of one we have not seen. (Jones, 5, 85; PG-I, 92b93a) Ideas of incorporeals, such as God, according to Gassendi, are always analogical. Thus we form the idea of God from the image of some such thing as a grand old man or a blinding light. We do not of course believe that he is any of these things, only that in some respects he is like them. In the Port Royal Logic, Gassendi's view that all our ideas originate in sense and that ideas not directly derived from sense are formed by composition, increase and diminution and analogy are briefly described and then ridiculed. This is the way they argue: No proposition is more clear than "I think, therefore I am." This means that we must have clear ideas of thought and of being. But if Gassendi's position is true, these ideas must have been acquired by sense. But from what sense? And if they have been formed from ideas we already have, from what ideas have they been formed and how? If there is no answer, it is obvious that the theory advanced must be false. (PRL, 34-35) Yet at least with regard to being, Gassendi does have an answer; the idea of being is reached by abstraction. How abstraction works will be explained below. The Port Royal Logic not only denies that all of our ideas originate in sense, it inclines to the opposite extreme in suggesting that perhaps none of our ideas come from sense, sense supplying only the occasion for the mind to form ideas on its own. (PRL, 37) Also attacked is Gassendi's clainl that God, whom . we do not sense, can be represented analogically by the image of a grand old man, on the grounds that to conceive God in this way would nlake many of the beliefs we have about him false. (PRL, 35-36) Here having an idea of God as a grand old man appears to be misrepresented as the believing that God is a grand old man. What is perhaps the best known feature of the Port Royal Logic, its distinction between the extension and the comprehension of an idea, is actually developed from a distinction made by Gassendi. Gassendi is a nominalist. He holds that whatever exists is singular and consequently any idea derived directly from sense will be singular as well. The mind when it has many similar ideas can form general ideas from them in two ways, by collection and by abstraction. (Jones, 6, 86-87; PG-I, 93) The first way is by putting together the ideas of many sinlilar things and so forming the idea of the collection to which they belong; the second way is by abstraction, whereby we compare a group of

16 FREDERICK S. MICHAEL similar ideas, determine what features they have in common and, disregarding differences between them, construct a separate idea of the common features. The idea is general, since it represents the features which a group of singular ideas shares. Once general ideas have been formed, others still more general can be formed from these in the same two ways; and by proceeding in this manner, we ultimately reach the most general idea of all, that of being. Irrational aninlals, Gassendi believes, can form ideas of collections of things; they cannot, however, form general ideas by abstraction. In explaining general ideas, the authors of the Port Royal Logic, like Gassendi, observe that all that exists is singular, but there are general ideas formed by abstraction. They do not see abstraction as resulting from a comparison between similar ideas as Gassendi does; they see it instead as a matter of selective attention, the mind paying attention to some components of an idea, while disregarding others. So we can obtain the general idea of a triangle from an equilateral triangle, if we pay attention to its being a closed figure with three sides, while disregarding the equality of its sides. (PRL, 49f.) In his treatment of the formation of general ideas, Gassendi combines two conceptions of universals. One is an extreme nominalist conception which sees universals as being, or more properly, as signifying, nothing but a collection of singulars. The other is a more moderate nominalism which sees a universal as something constructed by the mind to apply generally to all the individuals in a particular collection. But what is in the mind is always something singular~ it only signifies universally. A general idea then is sonlething singular in the mind which signifies universally in two ways: by signifying a collection of singulars; and also by signifying the characteristics these singulars have in common. In the Port Royal Logic, the collection of singulars to which an idea applies is called its extension, and the group of characteristics in virtue of which it applies to these singulars is called its comprehension. (PRL, Pt.I, ch.V) In the Port Royal Logic, extension and comprehension are characterized as follows. The extension of an idea is the collection of things or species to which the idea applies; and its comprehension consists of its essential attributes together with all that these attributes imply. (pRL, 51) Extension and comprehension, the Port Royal Logic later shows, can be used in the clarification of propositions and logical relations. Thus although the source of the distinction is in Gassendi, it is in the Port Royal Logic that its logical significance was first developed and for that reason the Port Royal Logic deserves the principal credit for its introduction. Having completed his account of the acquisition and fornlation of ideas, Gassendi turns, in Canons VII through X, to the question of how to determine whether we have imagined well, that is, whether the ideas we have of things represent them properly. In general, Gassendi holds, the closer the idea of a thing conforms to the thing itself as we experience it, the more perfect it is. In

Why Logic Became Epistemology 17 place of the perfection of ideas, the Port Royal Logic considers its Cartesian counterpart, the clearness and distinctness of ideas. Ideas are said to be clear if and only if they are distinct. A clear idea of a thing is an idea of a thing as it actually is. Ideas of sensible qualities, since they are not of things as they really are, are obscure and confused. (PRL, 70-72) This means that none of what Gassendi considers ideas would be clear and distinct, since even the most perfect are of things as they are experienced, not of things as they actually are. The importance of having clear ideas is that clear ideas are always correct~ only ideas which are obscure and confused lead us into error. Gassendi of course denies that there are any ideas so clear as to ensure truth. Canons XI through XIV of Part I of the Institutio Logica concern the steps that must be taken to avoid error due to ideas which misrepresent things. (Jones, 12-14, 93-95~ PG-I, 96-97a) Though sense itself cannot be mistaken, it can deceive us. We avoid deception basically by being aware of the conditions under which sense deception commonly occurs and then take steps to determine if our perceptions are veridical. Thus, if a stick which appears bent when partly immersed in water, to determine if it is straight or bent we take it out of the water~ when a tower seen at a distance appears to be round, we determine if it is by going up to the tower~ and so on. Other common sources of error are temperament, passion, custom, prejudiced opinion, relying on the authority of unreliable witnesses, ambiguity and figurative language. Whenever an idea can lead us into error, this is always attributed, in the Port Royal Logic, to its being obscure and confused. Accordingly, to avoid error, we have to make sure to base our beliefs on ideas that are clear. But clear ideas need not be perfect, as the Port Royal Logic understands this. The idea we have of God, for instance, is clear, because it is correct as far as it goes, but it is imperfect because incolll..plete. (PRL, 71-72) The idea of a thing, Gassendi holds, determines our definition of it, as the second of the Epicurean canon concerned with ideas asserts, and also its division into species, parts and attributes. So the more perfect our ideas are, the more perfect our definitions and divisions will be. The idea of a thing, Gassendi adds, includes the relations it bears to other things. The authors of the Port Royal Logic accept all of this, but add a significant innovation, introducing the notion of real definitions (definition de chose), definitions which, unlike nominal definitions, can be false. (PRL, 8Off, 154ff.) In both of these logics, propositions are said to be concerned with the relation of ideas. What Gassendi says is that the mind, in attending to the various ideas it has, unites in an affirmation those that agree with one another and separates by negation those that do not agree~ the Port Royal Logic says sOInething very similar. Gassendi's account of argument begins with the claim that in a syllogism, the agreement or disagreement between the two ideas conjoined in its conclusion is shown by a thir~ ~~a~ ~~~e~s~
18 FREDERICK S. MICHAEL term of the two premises, which either agrees with the other two ideas or agrees with one and disagrees with the other. Key to the revolution in logic which Gassendi engineered, and to the logic of ideas in general, is a determination to base logic on concrete perceptions. Of course, the account of perception in the Port Royal Logic is very different from that given by Gassendi~ and the account of perception given by Leclerc in his logic is different again. In the two hundred years in which the logic of ideas was donlinant, it was in fact the theory of perception that was the principal focus of attention; it is this which was principally developed. And given the fact that philosophy was at the centre of the curriculum at most institutions of higher learning during this period and that a course of studies in philosophy usually began with logic, the theory of perception would be the first thing most students would learn. The extraordinary attention paid to the theory of perception during this period is thus easy to understand. But confining logic to concrete perceptions severely limited its prospects for development, just as insisting that all mathematicians confine themselves to purely finitary mathematics would be a serious impediment to development in mathematics. The humanist concentration on the informal aspects of logic was not harmful to the development of logic proper. It fulfilled a need. In the medieval period, informal aspects of logic had been largely neglected. It was the rigorous scientific ideal for logic that was pursued during this period. Formal and informal logic need not be seen as rivals, as they certainly were during the humanist period. Both types of logic are important; they complement one another. The logic of ideas, while not in itself illegitimate, was a barrier to development in logic. This was a revolution in logic that was not to the benefit of logic. But without it the momentous developments in epistemology of the next two centuries would probably not have taken place. NOTES 1. Howard Jones, Pierre Gassendi's Institutio Logica (1658) (Assen, The Netherlands: Van Gorcum, 1981) p. LXVII. This work will henceforward be referred to as "Jones," followed by page number(s). 2. Wilhelm Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit (Stuttgart-Bad Carstatt: Friedrich Frommann Verlag, 1964) vol II, p. 79. 3. William and Martha Kneale, The Development ofLogic (Oxford, 1962) p. 298. 4. 1. M. Bochenski, A History of Formal Logic, translation by Ivo Thomas (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1961) p. 254. 5. 1. M. Bochenski, A History of Formal Logic, translation by Ivo Thomas (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1961) p. 258. 6. See The Didiscalicon of Hugh of St. Victor, translated by Jerome Taylor (New York: Columbia University Press, 1961). 7. See Ockham's Summa Logicae, Pt. I, ch. 3. Part I of the Summa Logicae is translated by Michael 1. Loux as Ockham's Theory of Terms (Notre Dame, Indiana: Notre Dame University Press, 1974). See pp. 52-54.

Why Logic Became Epistemology

19

8. For a discussion of ampliation, see Alexander Broadie, The Circle of John Mair (Oxford, 1985) pp. 76-80. For the humanist view on this subject, see the letter of Thomas More to Martin Dorp, 166-181 in Juan Luis Vives, Against the PseudoDialecticians, translation by Rita Guerlac (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, n.d.). 9. See Juan Luis Vives, Against the Pseudo-Dialecticians, translation by Rita Guerlac (Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, n.d.). The whole of this work is devoted to the subject. But see in particular, pp. 55-57. 10. Until about 1520, most of the works published in logic are scholastic. After 1540, few editions of scholastic works in logic are published. Most are humanistic. This is documented in W. Risse Bibliographia Logica (Hildesheim: DIms, 1965) volume 1. 11. Cicero himself had said (in his Topica, ch II) only that logic or dialectic was a ratio disserendi, an account of discoursing. 12. Melanchthon, Erotemata Dialectices in his Opera Omnia (Halis-Saxonum, 1846) vol. XIII, p. 513. 13. Zabarella, Opera Logica (Cologne,1597) p. 32. 14. Keckennann, B., Opera Omnia (Geneva, 1614) pp. 549, 550. 15. Rudolf Agricola says this. See his De Inventione Dialectica, Libri Tres (1528) p. 155. See also W. Risse, Die Logik der Neuzeit (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 1964) vol.l, p. 17. This comprehensive work contains numerous selections from humanist logics, including selections from most of the logics considered here. 16. See P. Ramus, Dialectique (Paris, 1555) p. 2. 17. Keckennann, B., Opera Omnia (Geneva, 1614) p. 550. 18. CicerQ makes this division in his Topica, ch.2 19. Melanchthon, Erotemata Dialectices in his Opera Omnia (Halis-Saxonum, 1846) vol. XIII pp. 641-42. 20. In the first version of his logic (1520), Melanchthon barely sees a significant distinction between logic and rhetoric and he defines logic or dialectic as an artificium disserendi, a theory of discoursing. Its principle divisions are said to be finitio, divisio et argumentatio. By 1528, he characterizes logic as ars difiniendi,dividiendi et argumentandi and in considering whether invention should be considered part of logic or rhetoric, he concludes that either it is part of logic alone or of logic and rhetoric both. By 1534, he changes his mind about this, concluding that invention definitely is part of rhetoric but that it mayor may not be part of logic. Finally, while he does not address this question directly in 1547, he appears to dismiss the distinction between invention and judgment as the old division. Yet the structure of his book, in all of its versions, appears to reflect this division; and Melanchthon never ceases to think that the places are important, holding that they should be our first concern, useful as a guide both to what is to be investigated and to what is to be chosen. For this reason, he devotes the last book of his logic to a detailed consideration of the places, even when he does not consider them part of logic proper. The effect of this is to produce a logic which, at least in practice, incorporates both the Aristotelian and the Ciceronian conception of logic. 21. Melanchthon, Erotemata Dialectices in his Opera Omnia (Halis-Saxonum, 1846) vol. XIII, pp. 574-78. 22. Zabarella, Opera Logica (Cologne,1597) p.53. 23. Zabarella, Opera Logica (Cologne,1597) p. 65. 24. Keckennann, B., Opera Omnia (Geneva, 1614) p. 551. 25, Keckennann, B., Opera Omnia (Geneva, 1614) pp. 128-29. 26. Keckennann, B., Opera Omnia (Geneva, 1614) p. 737.

20

FREDERICK S. MICHAEL

27. See The Selected Words of Pierre Gassendi, edited and translated by Craig Brush (New York and London: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1972) pp. 30-42. There is a complete translation of the Paradoxical Exercises into French with the Latin text on facing pages. This is the Dissertations en Forme de Paradoxes Contre Les Aristoteliciens, translated by Bernard Rochot (Paris: Vrin, 1959). The Latin text is found in volume III of Gassendi's Opera Omnia (Lyons, 1658). 28. See P. Gassendi, The Selected Words ofPierre Gassendi, edited and translated by C. Brush (New York and London: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1972) p. 284. 29. See P. Gassendi, The Selected -fVords of Pierre Gassendi, edited and translated by C. Brush (New York and London: Johnson Reprint Corporation, 1972) pp. 326ff. 30. This set of rules can be found in Gassendi,s Opera Omnia, vol I, pp. 53-56. Volume I will in the future be referred to as "PG-I". The canons of sense are: 1. Sensus nunquam fallitur; ac proinde est omnis Sensio, omnisque Phantasia, seu apparentiae preceptio, vera. 2. Opinio est consequens sensum, sensionique super-addiecta, in quam veritas et falsitas cadit. 3. Opinio ilia vera est, cui vel sufJragatur, vel non refragatur sensus evidentia. 4. Opinio iUa falsa est, cui refragatur, vel non sufJragatur sensus evidentia. The canons of the anticipatio are: 1. Omnis, quae in mente est Anticipatio, seu Prenotio dependet a sensibus, idque vel incursione, vel proportione, vel similitudine, vel compositione. 2.Anticipatio est ipsa rei notio, et quasi definitio, sine qua quicquam quaerere,dubitare, opinari, imo et nominare non licet. 3. Est Anticipatio in omni ratiocinatione principium; quasi nempe id,ad quod attendentes, inferemus unum esse idem, aut diversum,' coniunctum aut disiunctum ab alio. 4. Quod inevidens est, ex rei evidentis anticipatione demonstrari debet. 31. See PG-I, p. 91 and Jones, p. 1. This reference is to Jones's edition of the Institutio Logica, not to his translation. There is a French translation of the Institutio Logica by Franvois Bernier; it occupies volume I of his Abrege de la Philosophie de Gassendi (Lyons, 1684). 32. See the critical edition of the Port-Royal Logic by H. Brekle (Stuttgart-Bad Canstatt, 1967), vol. ill, p. 12. This work is referred to in the future as "PRL". 33. PRL, pp. 23-25. This and all later citations are from the first edition first published in 1662, which resembles the Institutio Logica most closely in structure. In later editions, much new material was added and the original structure is somewhat altered. For instance, Part II in the first edition begins with a general discussion of propositions; in later editions, this is preceded by two chapters on grammatical topics, Part IV, in the first edition, begins with a chapter distinguishing two kinds of method; in later editions, this is preceded by a chapter on science in general. No revisions in text were made after the fifth edition (1683) and it is in this final fonn, that the Port-Royal Logic is best known. 34. For Pt.I of the Institutio Logica, see Jones, pp. 3-20 (Latin), pp. 80-101 (English); PG-I, pp. 92-99. 35. This is not in the first edition. In the fifth edition, it is in Part I, chapter IX (a revised version VITI of the first edition).

The Workings of the Intellect: Mind and Psychology* GARY HATFIELD

The narrative structures within which we describe the origin and development of early modern philosophy at the. same time reveal something about what we find interesting and valuable in that philosophy. In recent decades, the older trend of characterizing early modern philosophy as a triumphant "Age of Reason" has given way to the organizing theme of a skeptical crisis and the responses to it. According to the earlier story, in the seventeenth century Reason cast off the yoke of Church authority and Aristotelian orthodoxy; newly-freed thinkers revitalized philosophy, created the "new science," and pushed on toward Enlightenment.} Now, however, it is more popular to speak of a skeptical crisis in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, which set the philosophical task of "refuting the skeptic" for subsequent generations. Lacking a compelling response to skepticism, philosophers were forced to retreat, and they proposed ever narrower "limits to knowledge" until Kant took a last stand on the redoubt of transcendental idealism. 2 Both descriptive stories portray "epistemology" or theory of knowledge-often allied with a concern for method-as the defining preoccupation of early modern philosophers from Descartes through Kant. In describing this "epistemological turn," story tellers from Thomas Reid through Richard Rorty have given pride of place to the "theory of ideas,,,3 though others have properly recognized the role of metaphysical concepts, including the concepts of "substance" and of "necessary connections" between properties or events. 4 There can be no doubt that these elements-anti-Aristotelianism, skepticism, method, knowledge, substance, and necessity-must all be found in any account of early modern "metaphysics and epistemology," as we often, but anachronistically, label the theoretical (as opposed to practical) philosophy of the seventeenth century. I wish to show that they can be combined into yet a third narrative, one that begins by taking seriously seventeenth-century conceptions of the topics and methods central to the rise of a "new" philosophy. In this revisionist story, differing approaches to the central subject matter of early modern metaphysics-knowledge of substances through their essences and causal powers-arise as a result of disagreements about the powers of the human cognitive faculties. 5 Methodological writings are seen as attempts to direct readers in the proper use of their cognitive faculties. The early modern rejection of the Aristotelian theory of cognition ranks equally in importance with rejection of Aristotelian doctrines about nature. Skepticism is more often than not a tool to be used in teaching the reader the proper use of the cognitive faculties, or indeed in convincing the reader of the existence or inexistence of certain cognitive faculties or powers. Instead of early modern "epistemology" or "theory of knowledge," one speaks, along with seventeenth-century writers, of

22 GARY HATFIELD theories of the cognitive faculties or knowing power. The early modern rejection of Aristotelian logic can then be seen as reflecting a negative assessment of the fit between the syllogism and logic considered as an art of reasoning that refines the use of the cognitive faculties. References to "reason" and "the senses," which, in the traditional historiography, are typically understood as shorthand for "a priori propositions" and "empirical evidence," can now be seen as references to cognitive faculties. When described in its own terms, the development of philosophy from Descartes to Kant may be seen as a series of claims about the power of the intellect to know the essences of things, with resulting consequences for ontology and for the role of sensory cognition in natural philosophy. Thus, Descartes employed skepticism as an artifice in order to bring his readers to an awareness that (as he claimed) the faculty of the intellect, contrary to Aristotelian doctrine, can be exercised independently of sensory images and their content. Having revealed the power of the intellect to operate independently of the senses in grasping the "cogito" reasoning, he next exercises this power in contemplating God-without, of course, the aid of sensory content-and then in discerning the foundations for a new natural philosophy; only subsequently do the senses play an essential role in the investigation of nature. Spinoza and Leibniz each looked to pure intellect to achieve his own revised metaphysical picture. When Locke tried to follow, he became convinced that the power of the intellect or understanding is more· restricted than either the Aristotelians or Descartes had claimed: in particular, he found that the understanding cannot discover real essences within sensory experience, and also that it cannot achieve any content independently of sensory experience (or reflection thereupon). Berkeley nlounted a direct attack on the use of the intellect to know matter, denying the very intelligibility of material substance as understood in Cartesian metaphysics, but he affirmed the power of the intellect to know spiritual or immaterial substances. Hume continued Locke's inquiry into limits on the powers of the human understanding, arriving at the conclusion that it is unable to know the substances and causal powers of traditional metaphysics. Hume held that the operation of the understanding is limited to two separate domains: reasoning about relations of ideas, where intuitive and demonstrative knowledge can be obtained, but without thereby achieving any knowledge of facts, or reasoning about facts known through the senses, which provides no rational insight into the substances and causal connections of traditional metaphysics, with the consequence that the understanding is here limited to charting successions of sensory perceptions. Kant entered his critical period when he realized that human cognizers do not have available the "real use" of the intellect or understanding to know an intelligible world of substances; at the center of his critical (theoretical) philosophy was his new theory of the human understanding as a faculty limited to synthesizing the materials of sensory representation but unable to penetrate to things in themselves, with the

The Workings ofthe Intellect: Mind and Psychology 23 consequence that knowledge of necessary connections could be attained only within the bounds of transcendental idealism. 6 It is not my intention to put fonvard this revised narrative as a single nlaster story for early modern philosophy. Indeed, beyond the three narrative themes sketched so far, others might be suggested in which differing subsets of philosophers would play greater or lesser roles; these include the story of the changing relations among metaphysics, theology, religion, and science (here Malebranche would enter prominently), and the relation of metaphysics. and theory of mind to moral and political philosophy. My aim is to illustrate the· force of one particular revised narrative by using it in a comparison of three conceptions of the intellect, conceptions respectively held by sonle scholastic Aristotelians, Descartes, and Locke. These three examples are not intended to yield an exhaustive taxonomy of early modern theories of the intellect, nor have they been chosen for what they might contribute directly to a present-day theory of the intellect. Rather, discussion of these conceptions will demonstrate the central role played by the theory of the intellect (and other cognitive faculties) in three prominent theoretical philosophies of the early modern period, and it will clarify the point of some early modern disputes. It will also offer an opportunity to locate early modern discussions of the cognitive faculties with respect to recent understandings of psychology, epistemology, logic, mind, and their relations. The early modern discussions are not easily fit into the modern categories of epistemology and psychology. Reflection on this fact may help us see some problems in recent conceptions of naturalism as applied to philosophy and psychology. In this way, contextually sensitive historical reflection contributes directly to contemporary understanding.

1. Three Conceptions of Intellect Theories or conceptions of the intellect are indicators or even determiners of the scope and limits ascribed to theoretical philosophy by their holders. If one thinks that the intellect has access to eternal Forms or that it can discern the essences of things, one might well have great hopes for the discipline of metaphysics and related theoretical pursuits in natural philosophy. Conversely, if one holds that the power of the intellect is limited, that essences are hidden and unknowable, then one will, by traditional standards, have a nlodest conception of what can be done in metaphysics and natural philosophy, though one might also be led to revise the aims of those disciplines or to propose a new vision of the proper content of natural philosophy, as did Locke, Hume, and Kant. As the early modern period began, Aristotle's theory of intellect was predominant. His De anima analyzed the powers of psyche or soul, understood as an animating principle possessed of vegetative, sensitive, and (in humans) rational powers. It devoted greatest attention to the cogn!!i.y~jJ~F~~_~f_th~_

24 GARY HATFIELD soul, especially the senses and intellect. Aristotle's doctrine of the intellect had taken on a particular fascination for late antique and Arabic commentators, and parts of Book III, chs. 4-5-especially where he said that there is an element of thought that is capable of "making all things" and another capable of "becoming all things" 7-were extensively elaborated. Interpreters dubbed the first power the "active intellect" and the second the "patient" or "passive" intellect. They offered diverse theories of the natures of these intellectual powers, including the theory that there is one active intellect for all human beings. Although the latter position did have some adherents in the Latin West, the orthodox view attributed individual active and patient intellects to . individual human beings. 8 As a background to early modern philosophy, my interest here is in late scholastic Aristotelian theories of cognition, rather than in the interpretation of Aristotle per se. Much of the De anima is organized as a theory of cognitive faculties. Late scholastic Aristotelian theories (following Aristotle) strictly separated the sensitive and intellectual powers of the soul. According to such theories, the sensory power always relies on corporeal organs, but the intellect (it was usually held) does not, it being an in1material power of the forn1 of the human body. The primary function of the Aristotelian intellect is to abstract essences or COll1mon natures from the in1ages received by the senses. In accordance with the dictum that "there is nothing in the intellect that was not first in the senses," this act of abstraction depends on sensory images or "phantasms" for its operation. Central interpreters of Aristotle-from Thomas Aquinas to such late scholastics as Suarez, the Coimbra Commentators, Rubio, and the textbook author Eustace of St. Paul-all held that there is "no thought without an image," that is, that each act of intellection requires a material image drawn from the senses and actually present in the imagination or "phantasia."9 Aristotelian theories of cognition describe a chain of events starting from external objects and ultimately resulting in the reception of an "intelligible species" in the patient intellect. External objects produce "intentional species" in the medium between them and the cognizer~ an oak tree thus produces species of brown bark and green leaves. These species are received by the senses and conveyed to the imagination. Then the intellect, perhaps operating over several species received across time, abstracts the essence or common nature of the oak tree. Systematic knowledge, or scientia, is of the common nature or the universal, not of the particular. 10 Beyond this general description, a further and misleading tenet is often ascribed to late scholastic Aristotelian theories of cognition: viz., that the process by which the common nature is "abstracted" amounts to an "absorption" of the species from the senses and imagination into the intellect. On this interpretation, it is as if, as the term "abstraction" itself might suggest, the intellect simply received the "form" in the species separated from all material conditions. 11 Intellection would simply be a kind of dematerialization,

The Workings ofthe Intellect: Mind and Psychology 25 or an extraction of a form from the still-material representations of the senses and its transferral to the patient intellect as an intelligible species (a conception that is indeed suggested by the common turn of phrase that the active intellect "illuminates" the phantasm). There would be no need to explain how intelligible species are "created" by the active intellect~ the latter's agency would simply be that of preparing the form in the material phantasm ~or transfer to the patient intellect. None of the interpreters of Aristotle cited above held that the intellect absorbs a form from the imagination or phantasia. Consonant with the principle that a "lower being" such as matter cannot act on a "higher being" such as the immaterial intellect,12 these authors all affirmed that intelligible species are produced in the patient intellect by the causal power of the active intellect, which can "make all things"~ the material phantasm serves as a "material," "instrumental," or "partial" causal factor. "Abstraction," therefore, should not be equated with "extraction." Aquinas put the point as follows: Phantasms, since they are likenesses of individuals, and exist in corporeal organs, do not have the same mode of existence as does the human intellect (as is obvious from what has been said), and therefore are not able to make an impression on the patient intellect by their own power. This is done by the power of the active intellect, which, by turning toward the phantasms, produces in the patient intellect a certain likeness that represents, as regards specific nature only, that of which the phantasms are phantasms. And it is in this way that the intelligible species is said to be abstracted from the phantasms; not as though a fonn, numerically the same as the one that existed before in the phantasms, should subsequently come to be in the patient intellect, in the way a body is taken up from one place and transferred to another. 13

The position that the corporeal phantasm, being material, cannot of itself be received into or affect the immaterial intellect was accepted by each of the other authors. 14 More generally, these authors saw the active intellect's ability to "make all things" as playing an important explanatory role: it explains how the intellect can abstract common natures from imperfect sensory images. Without . adopting a doctrine of innate ideas, and while affirming that the patient intellect is a tabula rasa, these authors could hold that the active intellect brings something to the creation of intelligible species. 15 As Aquinas put it, the light of the human intellect is a "participating likeness" of the "uncreated" (divine) light that contains the eternal types. 16 Far from simply absorbing its content from "phantasms," the intellect has a dispositional capacity to create intelligible species that reflect the eternal types ~ but (so they argued, appealing to introspection, among other considerations), it cannot do so without the presence of an appropriate phantasm. The essential role assigned to corporeal phantasms in the operation of the intellect placed limits on the cognition of immaterial entities such as God and

26 GARY HATFIELD the soul. There are no sensible species, and hence no phantasms, of such entities. Consequently, those who accepted this account of the intellect held that in this life human beings can at best achieve a confused intellectual cognition of God or the SOUl, by reasoning fronl creation to creator or from the soul's bodily operations to its nature and powers. Francisco Toledo, whom Descartes would later remember from his school days, contended that an embodied intellect "cannot naturally possess clear and distinct cognition of immaterial substance" ~ Aquinas, the Coimbrans, Rubio, and Eustace said similar things. 17 Authors in this tradition developed elaborate analyses of how God and the immaterial soul can be known, given that their theory of intellection precluded clear and evident cognition of them. The doctrine of analogy is one instance of such analysis. According to a prominent form of Aristotelianism, then, systematic knowledge or scientia is of universals or common natures, cognized by means of intelligible species which themselves can be formed only with the aid of sensory images. The ability of the intellect to form representations of the essences of things cannot be explained by its simply "taking up" the content provided by the senses, or even by its sifting through and comparing sensory images. The intellect is an immaterial power that cannot be affected by the inherently corporeal activity of the senses, but which is able to make intelligible species with the cooperation of sensory images. This ability was taken to reflect a similarity between the human active intellect and the divine intellect, containing the eternal types. The things best known by the human intellect are the substantial forms or common natures of corporeal things. Immaterial entities are cognized only confusedly in this life. Descartes, who was well-schooled in this tradition, turned nearly every tenet of this theory of cognition on its head. In particular, he held that the intellect can operate independently of the senses and imagination, and that in so doing it can achieve "clear and distinct" cognition of God, the soul, and matter. Whereas sense and intellect were markedly distinct faculties for the Aristotelians, with the intellect depending on sense, for Descartes intellect was the only essential cognitive faculty, sense and imagination being "modes" of intellection, arising from mind-body union. I8 Intellect can operate independently of the senses-when it is known as "pure intellect"-but·· sense perception (in humans) is an operation of the intellect (broadly construed). Thus, beyond his notorious rejection of Aristotelian physics, Descartes also rejected the Aristotelian theory of cognition, including especially the view that intellectual cognition requires sensory images. I believe that this rejection was first consolidated in 1629 or 1630, simultaneous with Descartes's discovery of his mature metaphysics. I9 His new theory of cognition became an essential bridge to his metaphysics, in that he appealed to the deliverances of the intellect, given independently of the senses, to convince his readers of important new metaphysical doctrines, including his assertion that the essence_ of --------------------------------------------------------

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The Workings ofthe Intellect: Mind and Psychology 27 matter is extension Descartes's concern with method, which has often been linked to "epistemology," in fact reflects his efforts to train his audience in the proper use of their cognitive faculties. Descartes crafted the primary statement of his metaphysics, in the Meditations on First Philosophy, as a tool for bringing his readers to a discovery that the pure intellect is a faculty best exercised independently of sensory content. In adopting the meditational structure, Descartes chose to pattern his work after devotional literature or spiritual exercises, a literary genre that paradigmatically employed a theory of the faculties to order the meditator's search for God. 21 In Descartes's hands, the structure of this devotional genre was turned toward a cognitive end: that of attaining knowledge of first principles through proper use of the intellect. 22 In order to reach the cognitive states toward which Descartes was leading them, Aristotelians such as those canvassed earlier would have needed to be convinced that there can be thought without a phantasm, or at least they would have needed to be induced to have such thoughts. To this end, Descartes begins his meditations with a skeptical purging ofthe senses (and even the evident cognitions of arithmetic and geometry), resulting in the discovery that only the thinking "I" itself cannot be doubted. He then explores the nature of this "I," finding that it consists in thinking alone. In the midst of this exploration, Descartes has the meditator reflect on the prospect of using the faculty of imagination-a faculty essential to all human intellectual cognition according to the Aristotelians-to know the soul. Part way through the Second Meditation, while still contemplating the "I," the meditator has the following insight: 20

It would indeed be a case of fictitious invention if I used my imagination to establish that I was something or other; for imagining is simply contemplating the shape or image of a corporeal thing. Yet now I know for certain both that I exist and at the same time that all such images and, in general, everything relating to the nature of body, could be mere dreams. Once this point has been grasped, to say "I will use my imagination to get to know more distinctly what I am" would seem to be as silly as saying "1 am now awake, and see some truth; but since my vision is not yet clear enough, 1 will deliberately fall asleep so that my dreams may provide a truer and clearer representation." 1 thus realize that none of the things that the imagination enables me to grasp is at all relevant to this knowledge of myself which 1 possess, and that the mind must therefore be most carefully diverted from such things if it is to perceive its own nature as distinctly as possible. (CSM IT: 19, AT Vll: 28)

He then proceeds to list the activities of thought that belong to himself as a thing that thinks: doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, willing, and seeming to imagine and to sense. Notoriously, the meditator then notices that corporeal things still seem better known than "this puzzling 'I' which cannot be pictured in the imagination." (CSM II: 20, AT VII: 29) So he begins to contemplate wax as an instance of body, thereby discovering in himself a

28 GARY HATFIELD faculty distinct fronl the imagination and able to grasp the infinity of shapes that melted wax can take. The meditator then reflects that this faculty is implicated in every act of cognition, even those that are described as sinlple acts of seeing. In the Second Meditation he simply characterizes this faculty as "the mind alone," and its operation as a "purely mental scrutiny." (CSM II: 21, AT VII: 31) At the beginning of the Sixth Meditation he again distinguishes the faculty that can grasp many geometrical figures from the faculty of imagination. Here he puts a name to this faculty: it is "intellectio pura," i. e., the "pure intellect" (or "pure understanding," in the words of Cottinghanl et al.). (CSM II: 50-51, AT VII: 72-73) Pure intellect is, by Descartes's lights, one of two faculties essential to nlind (the other being will), and it is the faculty by which the essences of mind and matter are discerned, and by which God is • known. 23 Descartes's conception of the intellect, then, is absolutely central to his philosophy. Just as in the Aristotelian framework, the question arises of how Descartes could account for the intellect's ability to grasp the essences of things, and for him the question seems all the more pressing, since he alleged that the intellect can do so independently of sensory contact. This question is a correlate to one later posed by Kant, who asked how the understanding could ever cognize objects, as regards their substance and causal connections, independently of the senses (which, by themselves, he considered inadequate for the task). (CPR A85-941B118-127) Platonist philosophers had maintained that the human intellect attains knowledge of the essences of things via cognitive access to eternal Forms, or to archetypes in the mind God, or else to copies of those archetypes implanted in human n1inds. They posited a "preformation-system of pure reason," in Kant's words, among eternal Forms or essences, the things in the world that participate in them, and the objects of hunlan intellection. 24 Descartes, however, rejected this conception of the link between mind and world. In connection with his doctrine of the creation of the eternal truths, he forsook the claim that the so-called "eternal truths" pertaining to created things reflect the basic structure of the divine understanding. Rather, these truths are created, just as are the things. 25 The access that the human mind has to these created essences is still explained by a "pre-established harmony," enacted by God's will, between created substances and their essences as known by pure intellect. Descartes retains a divine role in explaining the functioning of pure intellect, without needing to claim that the human intellect, and the knowledge of natural things gained by it, reflect the divine understanding. 26 In this doctrine the relations among essences, minds, and things become tightly bound, and hence the theory of intellectual cognition itself beconles a part of metaphysics. In comparison with the Aristotelian and Cartesian conceptions, Locke attributed to the human mind a weak intellectual candle. Although showing signs of nostalgia for knowledge of real essences, Locke grudgingly admitted

The Workings ofthe Intellect: Mind and Psychology 29 that such knowledge is beyond our ken. He came to this conclusion in a work entitled An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, a title in which the word "understanding" is not a gerund referring to the activity of understanding, but a count noun referring to the faculty of understanding. 27 Yet curiously, despite this fact, and unlike our Aristotelians and Descartes, Locke does not layout in a systematic fashion his conception of this faculty and its relation to the other faculties. He uses the word "understanding" in Descartes's broad sense, to denote the "perceptive power" of the mind, as distinct from will. (E ILxxi.5-6) He does no more than list a number of faculties exhibiting this power, including perception, contemplation, memory, discerning, comparing, composition, enlarging, and abstraction (but no separate faculty of pure understanding, in Descartes's narrow sense). (E II.ix-xi) This lack of a systematic theory of the metaphysics of the faculties and their powers is perhaps consonant with Locke's belief that the power of the understanding itself is limited and so is not able to deternline its own nature-any more than it can, more generally, deternline the natures of mind or matter. (E ILxxiii) Thus, Locke's restriction of his inquiry to the "plain, Historical method," a method of observation based in experience, even though coming at the beginning of his Essay, reflects an important conclusion of that work: that human knowledge can be based only on experience, not on purely intellectual cognition of the sort claimed by Descartes. To that extent, his "empiricism" reflects a direct and substantive disagreement with both Descartes and the Aristotelians concerning the power of the hunlan intellect. A principal aim of Locke's Essay was to discern the bounds of the understanding's power, to learn the "Extent of its Tether." (E Li.4) Sonle of his most vigorously argued conclusions pertain to what the understanding can't do, or doesn't possess. Thus, he argues, contra Descartes and others, that the understanding possesses no innate ideas and knows no principles innately. (E I.ii) The content of thought must come from the senses or from reflection on the operation of the mind in connection with sensory materials: from either "external" or "internal" sensation. (E ILi.2-4) Human cognition is limited to sensory ideas, or images. 28 But, contrary to the Aristotelians, Locke does not find that the understanding, in operating upon sensory inlages, has the power to extract the "common natures" or essences of things. (Locke was in any case strongly dubious of the existence of Aristotelian "substantial forms," a notion that he found unintelligible-E III.vi.l0.) In the end, he decided that knowledge of real essences of substances is beyond us. (E IILvi.6, 9) In his view, "abstraction" yields general ideas that can denote many particulars, but we achieve general ideas only of what he termed simple or mixed nlodes, or nominal essences-general ideas either of a single type of simple sensory idea such as a color, or such as are produced through a combination of such simple ideas (E III.iii-vi)-but not of the real essences of substances. 29 Further, "intuitive" and "demonstrative" knowledge, to which Locke attributed the

30 GARY HATFIELD highest degree of certainty, are found only in clearly perceived relations among ideas. (E rVOiii.1-5) Since we have no idea of the real essences of substances, we are unable to achieve intuitive knowledge of the relation between property and essence-the best we can do is to achieve intuitive certainty with respect to "visible connections" among some of the primary qualities of things, such as the connection according to which figure presupposes extension. (E IV.iii.14) Locke's Essay is an intricate web of argument and assertion, comprising other factors besides the theory of the faculties, including ordinary appeals to cognitive virtues such as clarity (appeals that can be assessed for themselves without the need to draw upon a theory of the faculties). Still, appeals to the powers and limits of human cognitive faculties play an important role, even in those parts of the work that are not specifically directed toward an analysis of cognition itself. In particular, Locke repeatedly invokes limitations on "Our Faculties" in explaining the failure to know real essences. (E III.vi.9) There are at least three aspects of this failure. First, there is a failure to know the corpuscular constitution of things (on the assumption that the "real essences" of bodies are corpuscular),30 which may in part be due to remediable causes, such as lack of experiments, but in other cases is due to a lack of sensory acuity for perceiving the minute constitution of bodies, or (Locke speculates) perhaps even a lack of the appropriate kind of sense organ. (E IV.iii.23-25) Second, even if we could perceive the "real essence," we are very limited in our cognitive ability to grasp any connection between that essence and the properties that flow from it (E III.vi.19), as regards both primary and secondary qualities. (E IV.iii.12, 29) Third, "we may be convinced that the Ideas, we can attain to by our Faculties, are very disproportionate to Things themselves, when a positive clear distinct one of Substance it self, which is the Foundation of all the rest, is concealed from us." (E IV.iii.23) Having limited the contents of cognition to simple sensory ideas and their combination, and having restricted the cognitive powers to those that perceive, store, compare, and combine such ideas, Locke found that the human mind is incapable of grasping real essences, either of minds or of bodies. He did make one seemingly metaphysically ambitious claim, to demonstrate the existence of a supreme intelligence, creator of the world; but in this demonstration all cognitive access to God comes via inference from created things, reasoning by analogy with the actions and attributes of human minds. (E IV.x) Locke in effect held that the human intellect lacks the cognitive resources to succeed at the tasks of traditional metaphysics. This being the case, he, by contrast with the Aristotelians and Descartes, had no need to explain how the understanding can grasp the essences of things. Long before Kant, then, the Lockean intellect had already forsaken any bid to know the "things in themselves" (substances as they are in themselves). Kant presented a fuller range of arguments for a more definitive version of this conclusion, and he constructed an account of knowledge in which our

The Workings ofthe Intellect: Mind and Psychology 31 knowledge of nature meets the criterion of scientia as an organized body of necessary and universal propositions. Locke, by contrast, has the knower still trying to grasp the real essences of mind-independent objects, and simply coming up short. Although Kant admired Locke's analysis of the faculties of cognition, he felt that Locke had misunderstood the role of the faculties in metaphysical cognition, and had pursued the investigation incorrectly, by making it empirical. (CPR A86-87/B 119) Kant also limited the materials upon which the understanding can operate to the representations of sensibility, but he attributed a set of categories to the understanding that rendered such representations into cognition of a law-governed world of nature, ordered in space and time. He gave up claims to know the intelligible world of things in themselves, in order to gain title to knowing an ideal but comprehensible world of nature. 31 2.

Mind and Psychology

Philosophers of the early modern period, whether conceiving of themselves as metaphysicians or as inquirers into the grounds and limits of human knowledge, proffered theories of the cognitive faculties. These were theories of the senses, imagination, and intellect, among others. Viewed from the standpoint of the twentieth century-and especially that of our middle decades-this penchant for investigating the mind has seemed like an embarrassment to philosophy, like an early version of the fallacy of "psychologism."32 Consequently, many recent philosophers have deemed it best to ignore or minimize the allegedly outdated "faculty psychology" of the early moderns. This charge of psychologism provides an interesting lesson in the ironies of anachronism. The indictment of "psychologism" relies on an assimilation of early modern theories of cognition to recent conceptions of mind, psychology, epistemology, and their relations. It thereby misreads the substantive positions of the early modern authors, and then, on the grounds of this misreading, charges those same authors with errors they did not commit, while at the same tinle failing to detect their real mistakes, or at least our real differences with them. Psychologism is a species of the naturalistic fallacy. The alleged "fallacy" lies in the move from fact to norm, from descriptions of how things are-for exanlple, with patterns of human behavior, or with habits of hunlan thoughtto conclusions about how things ought to be. Thus, even if most people lie, that doesn't make lying morally correct. Moral philosophy and epistemology respectively speak to how we ought to behave or what constitutes good warrant for belief, in spite of what empirical study may show about actual behavior or belief formation. The contention that the psychologistic inference from actual pattern of thought to norm for thought is a "fallacy" assumes a particular philosophical position. It assumes that our innate patterns of thought do not in fact reflect and

32 GARY HATFIELD thereby manifest norms for good thinking. By the late nineteenth century this assumption may have possessed good philosophical warrant. Of interest here is the fact that the early modern authors discussed herein, including the Aristotelians, Descartes, and Locke, all rejected this assumption. According to the Aristotelians, the natural human faculties by themselves tend toward true cognition. Logic, in their view, was an artificial system for aiding and improving cognition. It systematized the norms jm_plicit in actual human reasoning, and provided aids for avoiding error. 33 Similarly, Descartes considered the deliverances of pure intellect to directly present the truth. He took the "impulses" of the will to affirm clear and distinct intellectual perceptions as the . sure sign of the truth of those perceptions. He held that the "natural" intellectthe intellect we have by nature-sets a· norm for good thinking, because its proper use cannot fail but to achieve truth. 34 Within such a framework, the move from mental fact to cognitive norm is warranted. Locke, too, accepted the workings of the "discerning faculties" as constitutive of right thinking, (E IV.i.2) though he made the weakest claims for the scope of the truth-discerning power of the human intellect. Perhaps because the Aristotelians and Descartes each made such strong claims for the power of the intellect, they both attempted to explain why the deliverances of the intellect could be trusted: Aquinas appealed to the "participation" of the hunlan intellect in the "uncreated light" of the divine intellect, and Descartes to God-installed innate ideas and faculties ofjudgment. Given that early modern authors investigated mental faculties in connection with method, metaphysics, and the theory of soul, shall we conclude that they were engaged in psychology? Was their investigation naturalistic, and if not, what was it? Supernaturalistic? And if we reject Descartes's claims for the intellect, is that because we think he was a bad psychologist, or is it because we have more substantive disagreements with him over the powers of human cognition, and the existence of substances constituted with intelligible essences? These questions, like the charge of psychologism, invite us to reflect on the fit between (on the one hand) our conceptions of the natural, the psychological, and the mental, and (on the other) the corresponding early modern conceptions. Let us begin with psychology. The name derives fronl the account of the soul, "logon peri tes psyches," as pursued by Aristotle~ in the Middle Ages this discipline was most known under the latinate label "de anima," but from the sixteenth century on it was sometimes latinized as "psychologia. ,,35 The subject matter of "de anima" psychology, determined as it was by the Aristotelian conception of soul, included the nutritive, motive, sensory, and rational faculties of animate or ensouled beings. Nonetheless, in the textbooks and De anima commentaries of the early modern period, as in Aristotle's own text, greater attention was given to the cognitive faculties, sensitive and rational, than to the others. The material conditions of the operations of the senses were charted,

The Workings o/the Intellect: Mind and Psychology

33

cerebral anatomy was discussed, and some mention was made of the cognitive division of labor among the external and internal senses, the estimative power, and the active and patient intellects. 36 Within the Aristotelian curriculum, the theory of the soul fell under the rubric of physics, or natural philosophy. The soul was considered part of nature. 37 Only in the discussion of the immaterial intellect was there a tendency to consider supranatural explanatory agencies, as in the doctrine of the unity of the active intellect. The Aristotelians discussed above rejected this doctrine, affirming that the active intellect is a natural, if immaterial, power of the human soul, where the latter is regarded as the form of a corporeal substance, the human being. Already we can tell that our categories "natural," "physical," and "psychological" do not easily map the Aristotelian position, in which an immaterial power is considered to be part of nature, and indeed, to form a portion of the subject matter of physics, understood as the science of all natural things. Perhaps even more seemingly odd, Antoine Le Grand, a dualist follower of Descartes, ranged the theory of mind or soul under the heading of physics. And, looking further ahead, the eighteenth-century systematist Christian Wolff placed the soul, considered as an inlnlaterial substance, within the natural world, and Kant put the discipline of psychology under the discipline of physics, or, in his terms, under "physiologia" (the logos of physis).38 If naturalism as applied to the mind is the doctrine that we should explain mental activity by appeal only to natural agencies, then by their own lights these Aristotelians and substance dualists both count as naturalists. Yet these same groups also regarded the "natural" mind as an instrument for discerning truth; hence, "naturalistic" description of that mind could at the same time serve as the basis for an analysis of the conditions for knowledge. Kant developed a sharp distinction between empirical psychology (part of physiologia) and the transcendental philosophical investigation of the knowing faculties. By the middle decades of our own century, it was usual to relegate psychology to the "logical space of causes," by contrast with that of "reasons." Scientific psychology, insofar as it concerned itself with the mental at all, came to be viewed as descriptive of the causal mechanisms of cognition, not of its norms. Yet the "common wisdom" that septic boundaries must be observed between epistemology and psychology on pain of psychologistic fallacy is now being challenged by some attempts to "naturalize" epistemology. Is naturalized epistemology a return to the early modern project of charting the cognitive faculties? The answer must be "yes and no." Both base the investigation of the faculties on experience, though the early moderns gave greater weight to ordinary first-person reports of cognitive experience than do today's experimentalists. Both consider the actual operating characteristics of the nlind to be relevant to determining the limits of human knowledge, as in a recent philosophical attempt to argue that with our cognitive resources it may be impossible for us to solve the mind-body problem. 39 But there is divergence

34 GARY HATFIELD over the central question of defining epistemic norms. As we have seen, early modern theorists held that well-functioning natural mental faculties exhibit norms for good thinking. Recent naturalists are split on this question. Some see our natural faculties as shaped by natural selection to track the truth, much as, in the earlier theories, God forged a harmony between the faculties and their objects. 40 The operation of our faculties can thus be expected to exhibit epistemic norms (though these are, of course, open to refinement). But others see a different, and more limited role for naturalistic explanation in epistemology. They take epistemic norms or standards as given by acknowledged cognitive achievements-say, those of the sciences-and endeavor to under41 stand naturalistically the processes by which such achievements occur. There is, then, an analogy between recent investigations of the role of cognitive faculties in human knowledge and the early modern investigations. Both look to the natural capacities of the mind for insight into human knowledge, which seenlS a reasonable strategy if it is not pursued with a predetermined conclusion (e. g., one of the reductionisms). But the commonalities between now and then turn out to be quite linlited, and these limitations can help us to see the need to consider again the framework within which we now discuss mind, cognition, and psychology. Our seventeenth-century authors placed great weight on the investigation of the cognitive faculties because they believed that the hunlan mind has a fixed cognitive structure, and that study of the noetic powers manifested within this structure reveals, in the case of metaphysical optimists such as the Aristotelians and Descartes, the possibility of the cognition of natural essences, or, in the case of pessimists such as Locke, the limits to our cognitive domain. In either event, the early moderns held that the very mechanisms of belief fixation are given with the architecture of the mind. The plausible boundaries of a "fixed cognitive architecture" are not as extensive today. Some cognitive capacities, especially sensory capacities, are relatively fixed: visual acuity, stereoscopic depth perception, perhaps even color similarity metrics. But this is not so for belief fixation. Even those who give great weight to evolution in shaping the mind must admit that a principal biological fact about human beings is that they possess general learning mechanisms capable of acquiring markedly distinct theoretical concepts and general conceptual schemes. The range of this diversity must be at least as broad as the historically actual diversity of human thought. Thus, whereas Descartes could hope to discover the fundamental concepts of physics through proper reflection on innate ideas, scientists today have no such hope. Belief fixation is highly sensitive to conceptual structure and background beliefs. Conceptual structure and background beliefs depend on culturally transmitted learning.. A physicist today who is seeking to determine the basic categories of physics brings to bear his or her understanding of post-Newtonian physics. Many of these concepts had not been envisioned during_the tiIl1~_~fJ?_~~~artes_.- __ -- -

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But if belief formation is deeply culturally conditioned, then basic cognition is deeply culturally conditioned. As post-Kantian developments in geometry reveal, what can at one time seem so patently manifest that one is tempted to say that it is constitutive of our cognitive faculties and hence must permanently limit the range of scientific theories, can later be recognized as a contingent and falsifiable hypothesis that has become deeply entrenched in a cultural tradition. If belief fixation is a central feature of human mentality, and if it is, to a significant extent, culturally constituted, then the human mind is a culturally constituted thing. Should it therefore be seen as at least partly standing outside nature? That depends on whether one posits a nature/culture demarcation. If culture is held to be naturally conditioned but itself not part of "human nature" (except for the necessity of having a culture!), then the culturally constituted part of mind stands outside nature. ("Natural" as applied to human beings is here narrowly construed to extend no further than to what is "biologically fixed.") By contrast, if "the natural" is given broad boundaries so as to include all that might be contrasted with "the supernatural," then nature includes human culture, and the mind is wholly part of nature. But if the mind as culturally constituted is part of nature, and if cognitive frameworks vary significantly across cultures, then naturalism cannot promise to achieve the same kind of generality that the seventeenth century wanted from its own "naturalism": insight into the permanent structure of cognition. Thus, under either the broad or narrow conception of nature, naturalism ultimately undermines any hope for the kind of finality with respect to human cognitive structure that had been the goal for Descartes and Locke. Historical reflection might then suggest that we rethink the rhetoric of epistemology and cognitive theory, and move beyond the early modern project of seeking to dissect the faculties of higher cognition once and for all. Reflection on the differences between our conception of psychology and Descartes's understanding of his project reveals that our major differences with him do not pertain to the relevance of psychology to epistemology and metaphysics. Rather, we disagree with his nletaphysics of intellect: we reject his attribution to the mind of "noetic powers" for grasping essences by pure intellect. The Aristotelian and Cartesian conceptions of intellect were laid to rest through the work of Locke, Hume, Kant, and others. As the a priori powers granted to the intellect were proscribed, the sharp distinction between empirical psychology as a descriptive discipline and epistemology as a normative discipline came into being, and with it first arose the framework for leveling the charge of "psychologisnl." As a consequence of these developments, it can now seenl that talk of cognitive faculties could not be anything but a misapplication of our kind of empirical psychology; by contrast, in Descartes's time "psychology" or the study of nlind might well have included investigation of the noetic powers. Philosophical progress is often reflected in changes in the

36 GARY HATFIELD problem space, and those very same changes may in fact serve to mask the developments that brought them about. 3. Historiography, Philosophy, and Interpretation The investigation of the cognitive faculties, their powers and limits, was a central focus of early modern theoretical philosophy. Not only Descartes and Locke, who are discussed here, but Hobbes, Berkeley, and Kant made the faculties central to their discussions of the possibility for and limits to human knowledge. In all of these discussions, the fortunes of metaphysics are directly linked to an investigation of the mind's powers. Descartes sought to open up a new metaphysics, whereas Locke and Kant were coming to grips with the failure to know the real essences of mind-independent substances. In either event, discussions of the mind's real capacities contributed to metaphysical work. In highlighting the theme of the cognitive faculties I have sought to draw attention to an important but relatively neglected factor in the history early modern philosophy. This theme is intended to complement, not to replace, other themes. Indeed, with respect to the two themes mentioned at the beginning of this essay, attending to the role of the cognitive faculties can deepen our understanding of the ways in which early modern philosophy was part of an "Age of Reason," or rose to meet a skeptical challenge: reason was conceived as a faculty of mind (or as an activity of the faculty of intellect), and skeptical writings typically were organized as challenges to the faculties of sense and intellect. Reflection on the latter fact may help interpreters to see more clearly the uses to which skeptical arguments were put by Descartes and others. More broadly, attention to controversies about the cognitive faculties can sharpen our understanding of a core substantive disagreement between "rationalist" and "empiricist": a disagreement about the power of the intellect to know the essences of things. If the cognitive faculties were so important, why have they been neglected in recent discussions? Curiously, much of what early modern writers took to be central to their work has been excised from it out of a "principle of charity." In the middle decades of this century, philosophical interpreters of past texts adopted the strategy of looking for what was "still of philosophical interest" in them, which meant what might still stand as a candidate solution to a philosophical problem of current interest. These same interpreters were wellsteeped in the notion of the "psychologistic fallacy." Further, they were far removed from the notion that the mind might possess special powers or capacities for perceiving essences. Hence, when they read the work of a Descartes or Locke or Kant, the immediate response was either to ignore talk of faculties and cognitive powers, or to translate it into something that seemed more respectable. A striking instance of this may be found in Strawson's

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Bounds of Sense, in which he sought to untangle "what remains fruitful and interesting" from "what no longer appears acceptable, or even promising," in Kant's work. He thus replaced the "imaginary subject of transcendental psychology"-including its reference to a "nlanifol~ of intuition'~ and its app~al to an activity of "synthesis" to explain the unIty of consciousness-wrth philosophical analysis of "ordinary reports of what we see, feel, hear, etc." and of the "rules etnbodied in concepts of objects" as exemplified in "the general coherence and consistency of our ordinary descriptions of what we see, hear, feel, etc.,,42 Here, talk in the "psychological idiom" is translated into the mid. twentieth century idiom of "philosophical analysis" in order to preserve what is "fruitful and interesting" in Kant. The spirit of this interpretive tack received an extreme expression in Donald Davidson's work on radical interpretation (though he cannot be held responsible for excesses in practice), in which Davidson concluded that our most effective strategy for making sense of others' utterances is that of interpreting them so that agreement is optimized. 43 In any event, under the principle of "charity," when Descartes and the others were talking about cognitive faculties, they either were talking isolated nonsense or were engaged in (allegedly bad) empirical psychology~ either way, those parts of the text can be treated as philosophically irrelevant in themselves. In contrast with the method of sifting through the detritus of past philosophy for salvage, in this paper I have adopted the strategy of starting from and working with the categories used by past authors, in order to achieve an understanding of their philosophical projects and of the (alleged) force of their philosophical argunlents and conclusions as they saw it. This means taking their claims at face value and seeking to understand whence they expected the force of the claims to come. In pursuing this strategy, one is of course "charitable" in that one avoids easy attributions of silly mistakes or blunders to past authors-though such attributions are not ruled out. In Descartes's case, beginning with his claims and conceptions nleans taking seriously his injunctions to "meditate with" him, and his assertion that he could intellectually perceive the extension of the geometers, or the idea of an infinitely perfect being. In tenth-grade geometry I was told to imagine planes without thickness and lines without width. I thought I was doing it, but now I believe not. I certainly am unable to find in myself the pure intellectual cognition of a triangle of determinate shape, untinged by sensory qualities. Further, though I know what it is to be intuitively certain of something, I don't believe that such certainties can of themselves reveal the contours of mind-independent reality, the essences of substances. I thus reject both Descartes's conception of the intellect's power and some of his assertions about its consciously accessible deliverances. The fact that I think Descartes was wrong does not seem a good reason to allege that he was really saying something else. In order to learn from-or even to learn about-the history of philosophy, we nlust come to understand the historical development of philosophy in its

38 GARY HATFIELD own terms. For the early modern period, this means acknowledging the centrality of the theory of the cognitive faculties in the philosophical work of the time. Rather than ignoring talk of the faculties in classical texts, we should come to understand the role the faculties played. If the role is one that we now reject, then we should seek the philosophical reasons that led us to reject it. In the course of doing this, we may learn the answers to (or at least learn to ask) questions such as the following: How have the relations among logic, mind, and psychology changed in the past three hundred years? How did philosophers come to adopt the notion of a "psychologistic fallacy"? What is the origin of our current notions of the relations between the natural and the mental? What can we say now about our ability to discern the truth? Is it a simple biological capacity, or, at least for truths as complex as those of the natural sciences, does this ability depend on cultural processes that are underdetermined biologically? If we interpret past authors so as to have them (as much as possible) say only things that we might consider saying now, we shall surely do little more than find our own reflection in their texts. We certainly won't gain the sort of understanding that comes from uncovering the formation of our current problem space and seeing its contingencies. Questions about the deep conceptual changes will go unasked, because the changes will be masked against the foreground of "charitable" renderings. But contextually guided study of early modern philosophy can help bring such questions to light. I am therefore suggesting that the philosophical works of the early modern period are of interest in their own right (sans a strong principle of charity) for what they can reveal to us about the structure of philosophy itself. The "principle of charity" turns out to be a stultifying principle of interpretation for the history of philosophy. I propose that we reject it, or at the least supplement it with the practice of reading texts in the intellectual context of their time, using that context to make interpretive sense of conceptions that are prima facie foreign to us now. In this way, we may truly come to learn about other philosophies, which is a necessary condition for learning from them. At the same time, we will come to see that there is much to be learned about the implicit and explicit conceptions of mind, cognition, and logic in the philosophical texts of the early modern period, and about the heritage of those conceptions in the philosophical common sense of today. NOTES *Thanks to Lanier Anderson, Alan Kors, Holly Pittman, and Alison Simmons for their comments on earlier versions of this paper. 1. The emphasis on the free use of reason arose early: Johann Jakob Brucker, Historia critica philosophiae, 4 vols. (Leipzig: Breitkopf, 1742-44) vol. IV. It structured Friederich Ueberweg, History of Philosophy, from Thales to the Present Time, George S. Morris, trans., 2 vols. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1880) vol. IT, though he

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incorporated the skeptical theme, as well, dividing early nlodern philosophy into three periods described as (1) "transition to independent investigation," (2) "empiricism, dogmatism, and skepticism," and (3) "criticism and speculation." It is reflected in Ernst Cassirer, Philosophy of the Enlightenment, Fritz C. A. Koeln and James P. Pettegrove, trans. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1951) ch. 1, sec. 1, and Peter A. Schouls, Descartes and the Enlightenment (Kingston and Montreal: McGill-Queens University Press, 1989). Alfred North Wllitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Macmillan, 1925) does not follow the theme of throwing off authority, but he characterizes the seventeenth century as a "Century of Genius" that yields eighteenth-century Enlightenment (chs. 3,4). 2. Richard H. Popkin, History of Scepticism from Erasmus to Spinoza (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1979) has made the skeptical theme prominent in recent years; Ueberweg's second period of modem philosophy ranked skepticism together with empiricism and dogmatism as "rival systems" to which "criticism" was a response (History, vol. II); Immanuel Kant, Critique ofPure Reason, Nonnan Kemp Smith, trans. (New York: St. Martin's, 1965) proposed a similar tripartite division (A761/B789) among other analyses of philosophy's history (A85256/B880-84); "A" and "B" refer to the pagination of the first and second editions, respectively, of Kant's Kritik der reinen Vernunft (Riga: Hartnoch, 1781, 1787) hereafter cited as "CPR" plus page numbers. E. M. Curley, Descartes against the Skeptics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1978) endorses a portion of this picture by maintaining that Descartes's mature philosophy was directly motivated by the threat of pyrrhonian skepticism (p. 38). 3. Thomas Reid, Inquiry into the Human Mind, ch. 1, secs. 3- 7, in his Works, William Hamilton, ed., 2 vols. (Edinburgh: James Thin, 1895) vol. I, pp. 99-103 (Reid of course did not use the term "epistemology," and his remarks on the theory of ideas were part of an analysis of knowledge of the human mind itself, and its cognitive capacities); Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978) who cites Reid, among others. The historiography of an epistemological turn, with central emphasis on the theory of ideas, is found in recent general histories of philosophy, e. g., Roger Scruton, From Descartes to Wittgenstein: A Short History of Modern Philosophy (New York: Harper Colophon, 1982); John Cottingham, The Rationalists (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) pp. 4-11; R. S. Woolhouse, The Empiricists (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988) ch. 1. 4. Louis E. Loeb, From Descartes to Hume: Continental Metaphysics and the Development ofModern Philosophy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1981). 5. I have sketched this story-line for the history of modem philosophy in my The Natural and the Normative: Theories of Spatial Perception from Kant to Helmholtz (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1990) chs. 2, 6. John W. Yolton, Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press) appreciates the significance of the faculties in early modem philosophy, but assimilates concern with the faculties directly to a present-day conception of "psychology" (pp. 16, 39,105). 6. Support for various descriptive claims made here may be found in my Natural and Normative, chs. 2-3. 7. Aristotle, De anima, in his Complete Works, Jonathan Barnes, ed., 2 vols. (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984) vol. I, 430a14-15.

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8. Giacomo Zabarella, Commentarii in III. Aristotelis libros De anima (Frankfurt am Main: Zetner, 1606) "Liber de mente agente," ch. 13 (cols. 935-7) held that God performs the function of the active intellect for all humans. The orthodox view was held by Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae (Cambridge: Blackfriars, 1964-81) 1.76.2; 79.45, hereafter "ST"; Aquinas, Questions on the Soul, J. H. Robb, trans. (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1984) qus. 3-5; John Duns Scotus, De anima, quo 13, in his Opera omnia, L. Wadding, ed., 26 vols. (Paris: Vives, 1891-95) vol. ill, p. 546; Francisco Toledo, Commentaria una cum quaestionibus in tres libros Aristotelis De anima (Kaln: Birckmann, 1594) n.l, quo 2 (fol. 40vb-48vb); Francisco Suarez, De anima (hereafter, "DA") IV.8.4-8, in his Opera omnia, M. Andre, ed., 26 vols. (Paris: Vives, 1856-78) vol. ill, pp. 741a-43b; Coimbra College, Commentarii in tres libros De anima (Kaln: Zetner, n.d., ca. 1600) ill.5, quo 1, art. 1-2 (pp. 369-374); Antonio Rubio, Commentarii in libros Aristotelis Stagyritae philosophorum principis, De anima (Lyon: Joannes Pillehotte, 1620) "Tractatus de natura, et ratione atque officio intellectus agens," quo 4 (pp. 652-53); works entitled "commentaries" on De anima will subsequently be referred to as "CDA." On Avicenna, Averroes, and the late Greek and Arabic background to the view that human intellection depends upon a single active intellect, see Herbert A. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect (New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992). 9. Aquinas, ST 1.84.6-7,1.87.1; Suarez, DA IV.7.3 (p. 739); Coimbra College, CDA ill.5, quo 3, art. 2, (pp. 383-4) ill.8, quo 8, art. 2 (pp. 453-5); Rubio, CDA, "Tractatus de intellectu agente," quo 2-3 (pp. 637-46) "Tractatus de natura, actu et obiecto intellectus possibilis," quo 7 (pp. 692-3); and Eustace of St. Paul, Summa philosophiae quadripartita, 4 parts (Kaln: Philip Albert, 1638) pt. ill, "Physica" (hereafter, "SP-P") m.4, disp. 2, qus. 4-5, 7, 10 (pp. 287-9,290-3, 298). 10. For a survey of late Aristotelian theories of sensory and intellectual cognition, see my "Cognitive Faculties," in the Cambridge History of Seventeenth Century Philosophy, Michael Ayers and Daniel Garber, eds. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, in press). Leen Spruit, Species Intelligibilis: From Perception to Knowledge, 2 vols. (Leiden, New York: E. J. Brill, 1994-95) vol. II, has just published a detailed study of intellectual cognition in later scholasticism. 11. Yolton, Perceptual Acquaintance, pp. 6-10, where "absorption" is used to characterize some scholastic accounts of sensory perception, but also fits his account of intellectual abstraction and the production of intelligible species. Also D. W. Hamlyn, Sensation and Perception: A History of the Philosophy of Perception (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961) p. 48; Brian E. O'Neil, Epistemological Direct Realism in Descartes's Philosophy (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1974) pp. 48-49. But others have avoided this reading, at least of Aquinas's position: Sheldon M. Cohen, "St. Thomas Aquinas on the Immaterial Reception of Sensible Forms," Philosophical Review 91 (1982) pp. 193-209, on p. 199; Paul Hoffman, "St. Thomas Aquinas on the Halfway State of Sensible Being," Philosophical Review 99 (1990) pp. 73-82, on p. 75 n8. 12. Aquinas cites this principle, attributing it to Aristotle himself: "Aristotle held that the intellect does have an operation in which the body does not communicate. Now, nothing corporeal can make an impression on an incorporeal thing. And therefore in I\order to cause an intellectual operation, according to Aristotle, the mere impression raused by sensible bodies does not suffice, but something more noble is required, for

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the active is superior to the passive, as he says himself." (ST 1.84.6; my revisions to the translation) The other authors cited in n. 9 also held this principle. Davidson, Alfarabi, Avicenna, and Averroes, on Intellect, discusses this and related principles in late Greek and Arabic commentators. 13. Aquinas, ST 1.85.1, ad 3, in which the final quoted sentence reads: "Et per hunc modum dicitur abstrahi species intelligibilis a phantasmatibus; non quod aliqua eadem numero forma quae prius fuit in phantasmatibus, postmodum fiat in intellectu possibili, ad modum quo corpus accipitur ab uno loco, et transfertur ad alterum." (Translation altered from Blackfriars; see also Aquinas, Summa Theologica, English Dominicans, trans., 19 vols., London: Thomas Baker/Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1911-22.) 14. While agreeing that a species conj oined with matter-even if conj oined nonstandardly, being a "form without matter"-cannot by itself affect the immaterial intellect, these authors characterized the causal role of corporeal phantasms in the production of intelligible species differently: Suarez maintained that the phantasm does not affect the possible intellect by "influx," but "materially" or by "exemplar," mediated by the fact that imagination and intellect are powers of the same soul (De anima, IV.2.10-12, vol. III, p. 719a-b); the Coimbran text discussed ways in which the active intellect might be taken as both a "partial" and an "instrumental" cause, and said that the phantasm "cooperates" to "excite" the active intellect to produce the species (CDA III. 5, quo 6, pp. 407-9); Rubio designated the phantasm an "instrumental" cause ("elevated" by another power) and the active intellect the "principal" or "primary" cause of the production of an immaterial intellectual species in the patient intellect (CDA III.4-5, "Tractatus de intellectu agente," quo 3, pp. 646-52); Eustace described the phantasm as a "material" or "dispositive" as opposed to "efficient" cause (SP-P m.4, disp. 2, quo 7, pp. 292-3). 15. Thomas Aquinas, ST 1.79.2; 84.3-5; Suarez, DA IV.2.7-18; 7.3; 8.7-8; Coimbra College, CDA m.4-5, quo 1, art. 2, "nuda tabula" (pp. 372, 374); Rubio, CDA m.4-5, "Tractatus de intellectu agente," qus. 1-3; Eustace of St. Paul, SP-P ill.4, disp. 2, quo 7, "tabula rasa" (p. 291); the active intellect "makes" (jabricare) intelligible species (pp. 291-2). 16. Thomas Aquinas, ST 1. 84.5: "Et sic necesse est dicere quod anima humana omnia cognoscat in rationibus aeternis, per quarum participationem omnia cognoscimus. Ipsum enim lumen intellectuale, quod est in nobis, nihil est aliud quam quaedam participata similitudo luminis increati, in quo continentur rationes aeternae"; he explicitly distinguishes this position from Platonism and other positions in which the eternal types are beheld by the human intellect independently of the senses, or are known innately. See also ST 1.79.3-4; Aquinas, Questions on the Soul, quo 5, resp. and ad 6; Aquinas, Truth, R. W. Mulligan, trans., 3 vols. (Chicago: Regnery, 1952-54) quo 10, art. 6. 17. Toledo, CDA III.7, quo 23, concl. 3: "Intellectus in corpore non potest habere naturaliter claram & distinctam cognitionem substantiae immaterialis" (fo1. 168ra); also, concl. 4: "Substantiae immateriales a nobis confusem in hoc statu cognoscuntur" (fol. 168rb). Aquinas, ST 1.87.3; 1.88; Coimbra College, CDA ill.5, quo 5, art. 2 (pp. 402-3); III. 8, quo 7, art. 2 (p. 449); quo 8, art. 2 (pp. 453-55); Rubio, CDA ill.4-5, "Tractatus de intellectu possibili," qus. 5-6 (pp. 680-89); and Eustace of St. Paul, SP-P m.4, disp. 2, qus. 4-5, 7 (pp. 287- 89,290-93).

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18. Descartes, Meditations on First Philosophy, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoft~ and Dugald Murdoch, trans., 2 vols. (Cambridge: Calnbridge University Press, 1984-85) II:51, 54; Principles of First Philosophy, pt. 1, art. 32 (1:204) where Descartes lists pure understanding (or pure intellection) imagination, and sense percepton as modes of "perception" or of the "operation of the intellect"; hereafter, vols. I and II of the Cottingham et al. translation is abbreviated "CSM" (plus volume and page number). 19. In 1630 Descartes wrote to Mersenne that he had worked on metaphysics intensely during his first nine months in the Netherlands (a period ending in 1629): to Mersenne, 16 April 1630, in his Oeuvres, Charles Adam and Paul Tannery, eds., rev. ed., 11 vols. (Paris: VrinlCNRS, 1964-1976) vol. I, p. 144 (hereafter, the Oeuvres are referred to as "AT," followed by volume and page numbers); translation in Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. ill, John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny, trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) p. 22; hereafter, vol. ill is abbreviated "CSMK." In 1637 he reported that "eight years ago" he had written "in Latin the beginnings of a treatise of metaphysics," in which, among other things, he argued for a soul-body distinction (to Mersenne, 27 February 1637, AT 1: 350; CSMK, p. 53). On Descartes's "metaphysical turn," see my "Reason, Nature, and God in Descartes," Essays on the Philosophy and Science o/Rene Descartes, Stephen Voss, ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1993) pp. 259-287, and the literature cited therein. 20. Descartes asserts that matter's essence is extension in the opening paragraphs of the Fifth Meditation; he draws a clear distinction between intellectual and imaginal cognition of extension at the start of the Sixth Meditation. (CSM II: pp. 44, 50- 51, AT VII: pp. 63, 72-3) 21. Ignatius of Loyola, The Spiritual Exercises, with the Directory to the Spiritual Exercises of his followers, W. H. Longridge, trans., 4th ed. (London: Mowbray, 1950) First Week, First Exercise, pp. 52-57, and Directory, ch. 14, sees. 2-3; Francis de Sales, An Introduction to a Devoute Life, 1. Yakesley, trans. (Douai: Heighman, 1613) pt. 2, pp. 138-143. 22. On Descartes's use of the meditative genre, see the first three essays in Essays on Descartes' Meditations, Amelie O. Rorty, ed. (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1986) and Berel Lang, Anatomy of Philosophical Style (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990) ch. 3. 23. In the Sixth Meditation, Descartes explains that the senses should not be used for making judgments "about the essential nature of the bodies located outside us"; rather, such judgments should be left to the "intellect," or the "mind alone," operating independently of the body (CSM II: pp. 57-58, AT VII: pp. 82-83). In Meditations Three, Five, and Six he uses the intellect (ostensibly) to know God and the essences of matter and mind. 24. Kant, CPR B167 (Kant here makes no mention of Platonism, but see also A31314fB370). On Platonist theories of cognition in the early modem period, see my "Cognitive FacuIties." The harmony is not "preformed" if it is established via the causal agency of the Forms themselves, being "seen" by the human intellect; it is preformed on a "reminiscence" reading of Plato. 25. Descartes, letters to Mersenne in the 1630s (CS:MK, pp. 23-26, AT I: pp. 145, 149-53); Fifth and Sixth Sets of Replies (CSM II: pp. 261, 291, 293-4; AT VII: pp. 380, 432, 435-6).

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26. For further discussion, see Emile Brehier, "The Creation of the Eternal Truths in Descartes's System," Descartes: A Collection of Critical Essays, Willis Doney, ed. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1968) pp. 192-208; and my "Reason, Nature, and God." 27. John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Peter H. Nidditch, ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1975) epistle, p. 6. Hereafter, the Essay will be cited as "E," followed by book, chapter, and section numbers. 28. On Locke as an "imagist," that is, as someone who took the content of thought to limited to sensory images and their combination (together with refections on the mind's own operations) see Michael Ayers, Locke, vol. 1: Epistemology (London and New York: Routledge, 1991) pt. I, ch. 5. 29. For a comparison of Locke's position to Aristotelian and Cartesian (among other) conceptions of substance and our cognitive grasp of it, see Ayers, Locke, vol. II: Ontology, p1. I, chs. 2, 6. 30. The relations among the concept of substance, that of real essence, and the corpuscular theory of matter in Locke's writing is a matter of some interpretive delicacy; for an overview, see Edwin McCann, "Locke's Philosophy of Body," Cambridge Companion to Locke, Vere Chappell, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994) pp. 56-88, especially sec. 4. 31. CPR, A256-57fB312-313; Kant, Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will Be Able to Come Forward as Science, Gary Hatfield, ed. and trans. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming) sec. 34. 32. Richard Rorty, in his Philosophy and the Mirror, reconstructs the history of modem philosophy as part of a narrative within which, from the time of Locke through Kant to the present day, philosophy's (alleged) claim to intellectual authority has rested on a confusion between epistemology and psychology, which he compares to the "naturalistic fallacy" in ethics (p. 141); hence, though he did not use the term "psychologism," his charge fits the classical meaning .of that term, according to which psychologism is the attempt to base epistemology on psychology. 1. E. Erdmann gave this meaning to the term in introducing it, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie, 2d ed., 2 vols. (Berlin: Hertz, 1870) vol. II, p. 636; see also John Dewey, "Psychologism," Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology, James Mark Baldwin, ed., 3 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1901-05) vol. II, p. 382. Rorty reviews earlier instances of this charge against early modem philosophy by T. H. Green and Wilfrid Sellars, Philosophy and the Mirror, pp. 140-43. 33. Francisco Toledo, Commentaria, una cum quaestionibus, in universam Aristotelis Logicam (Kaln: Birckmann, 1596) pref., quo 1 (pp. 3-7); Coimbra College, Commentarii collegii conimbricensis e soecietate iesu, in universam Dialecticam Aristotelis (Lyon: Horation Cardon, 1607) proem, quo 4, art. 2 (pp. 57-61); Antoniao Rubio, Logica mexicana, sive comentarii in universam Aristotelis Logicam, 2 parts (Kaln: Birckmann, 1605) proem, quo 1, p1. I (cols. 1-11); Eustace of S1. Paul, Summa philosophiae, p1. I, "Dialecticae sive logicae," proem, quo 4 (pp. 10-11). It was common to describe the operations of the "natural light" of the human intellect as instantiating "natural logic," by contrast with the "artificial logic" developed by Aristotle and others; Toledo declines to adopt this terminology, refusing to call these natural operations in themselves a "logic." (p. 5) 34. Descartes, Meditations, IV: "since my understanding comes from God, everything that I understand I understand correctly, and any error here is impossible"

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(CSM II: p. 40, AT VTI: p. 58); clear and distinct perceptions of the intellect produce a "great inclination in the will," and as long as one assents only to such clear and distinct intellectual perceptions, one will not fall into error. (CSM II: p. 41, AT VTI: p. 59) See also Principles, 1. pp. 30-42. 35. The earliest free-standing work entitled "psychology" was by RUdolph Goclenius, Psychologia: hoc est, de hominis perfectione, animo (Marburg: Paul Egenolph, 1594) which focused more on problems concerning the infusion of the soul into the embryo at conception than on the discussions of the cognitive faculties that characterized the De anima literature; the latter sort of discussion occurred in Johann Conrad Dannhauer, Collegium psychologicum, in quo maxime controversae quaest.iones, circa libros tres Aristotelis De anima, proponuntur, ventilantur, explicantur. (Argentoranti: Josias Staedel, 1630) On the origin of the tenns "psychologia" and "psychology," Francois H. Lapointe, "Who Originated the Term 'Psychology'?," Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences 8 (1972) pp. 328-35; on early psychology, Paul Mengal, "Naissances de la psychologie: la Nature et l'Esprit," Revue de Synthese, 115 (1994) pp. 355-373, and my "Psychology as a Natural Science in the Eighteenth Century," Revue de Synthese, 115 (1994) pp. 375-391. 36. Toledo, CDA, devoted fo1. 65rb-73vb to the vegetative soul, 73vb-129ra to the sensitive, 129ra-169ra to the intellect, and 169rb-179rb to appetite, will, and motion; Coimbra College, CDA, devoted pp. 148-61 to the vegetative soul, 160-361 to the sensitive, 360-469 to the intellect, 460-98 to appetite, will, and motion, with separate treatises on the separated soul (pp. 499-596) and on additional problems pertaining to the five senses (pp. 597-619); Rubio, CDA, devoted pp. 278-305 to the vegetative soul, 305-632 to the sensitive, 633-735 to the rational, and 735-57 to appetite, will, and motion, adding a treatise on the separated soul (758-94). The coverage was slightly more balanced in the textbooks: e. g., Eustace of St. Paul, SP-P ("Physica") devoted 197-228 to the vegetative soul, 228-77 to the sensitive, including motion, and 278-308 to the rational soul, including will. 37. Toledo, CDA, proem, quo 2 (fo1. 4) subsumed the soul in all of its operations under physics; Coimbra College, CDA, proem, quo 1, art. 2 (pp. 7-8) and Rubio, CDA, proem, quo 1 (pp. 10-11) subsumed the study of embodied souls under physics, and separated souls under metaphysics. Eustace of St. Paul, SP-P, treated "de anima" topics in the part entitled "Physica," per the norm. 38. Antoine Le Grand, Institutio philosophiae secundum principia de Renati Descartes (London: J. Martyn, 1678) praecognoscenda, art. 7, 15, 16. Christian Wolff, Psychologia rationalis (Frankfurt am Main and Leipzig: Libraria Rengeriana, 1640) sec. 69; Cosmologia generalis (Frankfurt am Main and Leipzig: Libraria Rengeriana, 1637) sec. 509; Wolffs follower Alexander Baumgarten, Metaphysica, 7th ed. (Halle: Hemmerde, 1779) sec. 351, 402, explicitly placed monads or simple substances, including spirits, within cosmology. Kant, CPR A846-47/B874-75; in the Prolegomena, sec. 15, Kant places psychology under "universal natural science." 39. Colin McGinn, "Can We Solve the Mind-Body Problem?" Mind 98 (1989) pp. 349-366. 40. W. V. O. Quine, "Natural Kinds," in his Ontological Relativity and Other Essays (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969) pp. 114-138, on pp. 125-28. 41. Miriam Solomon, "Scientific Rationality and Human Reasoning," Philosophy of Science 59 (1992) pp. 439-455, on pp. 442-43.

The Workings ofthe Intellect: Mind and Psychology 45 42. Strawson, The Bounds of Sense: An Essay on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason (London:~ethuen, 1966)pp. 16,32. 43. Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme," Proceedings and Addresses of the Americal Philosophical Association 47 (1974) pp. 5-20, on p. 19.

Petrus Fonseca on Objective Concepts and the Analogy of Being E. JENNIFER ASHWORTH

Petrus Fonseca was a Portuguese Jesuit who lived from 1528 to 1599. He was one of those responsible for drawing up the Jesuit Ratio Studiorum which set the curriculum for Jesuit schools across Europe, and he was also responsible for initiating the production of the Coimbra commentaries on Aristotle, or Conimbricenses, which served as texts for many schools and universities in the seventeenth century.l He was himself the author of two popular texts, an introduction to logic, and a commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics. 2 His logic text was one of two alternatives prescribed by the Ratio Studiorum of 1599, and may have been used at La Fleche;3 his Aletaphysics commentary was used at many Jesuit schools, and may also have been used at La Fleche. 4 In short, Fonseca was a leading figure in the Scholastic Aristotelian tradition of the late sixteenth century, a tradition which lies behind many of the developments in early modern philosophy, and which in many ways is more important than the humanist tradition represented by Petrus Ramus. 5 I have chosen to discuss Fonseca on objective concepts and the analogy of being both because an exanlination of these issues will help us to understand how logic came to be bound up with the philosophy of mind and because the history of how these issues were treated helps solve a small problem about Descartes's sources. My paper has four parts. I shall begin by giving a historical outline of treatments of analogy and their relevance to Descartes. 6 Secondly, I shall discuss late medieval theories of signification, particularly as they appear in Fonseca, in order to show how logicians turned away from spoken language to inner, nlentallanguage. Thirdly, I shall explain how it was that analogy, as a theory of one kind of language use, was particularly bound up with the discussion of concepts. Finally, I shall look at the distinctions Fonseca made while discussing the concepts associated with analogical terms. 1 Historical Outline: From Scotus to Descartes In Meditation 3, Descartes uses a distinction between formal and objective reality with respect to ideas in order to prove the existence of God. In the secondary literature this distinction is invariably linked with a distinction between fornlal and objective concepts found in Suarez, whose Metaphysical Disputations (published in 1597) was cited by Descartes on one occasion. 7 However, as the literature acknowledges, it is not clear where the distinction originated, or how Descartes came to know of it. The earliest paper I know of, published by Dalbiez in 1929, looked in two directions. 8 Dalbiez quite accurately traced the distinction back to Duns Scotus and his discussion of the kind of being creatures had in God's mind prior to creation,9 but Dalbiez

48 E. JENNIFER ASHWORTH thought it improbable that Descartes would have read Duns Scotus. He then suggested that the notion is more likely to have come from Suarez and another near-contemporary, Vasquez, both of whom used the notion in a theological dispute about the views of the fourteenth-century theologian Durandus of Saint Pour9ain (d. 1334) on the nature of truth. 10 Little new light has been shed since 1929. 11 In recent papers, Norman Wells still privileges both Suarez and the debate about Scotus on divine ideas. I2 In a paper entitled "Meaning and Objective Being: Descartes and His Sources," Calvin Normore first discusses Duns Scotus and William of Alnwick on objective being in the context of God's ideas; and he then shows how the notion was used by Peter Aureol, William Ockham, and Walter Chatton in a variety of contexts. However, Normore acknowledges that there is a gap between about 1340 and the beginning of the seventeenth century. In his conclusion, he writes that his examination "suggests a Descartes firmly rooted in a Scholastic tradition which is deeply in debt to Duns Scotus and closely allied with fourteenth-century developments in epistemology and in the theory of meaning. This makes the problem of Descartes' immediate sources and the question of his originality even more puzzling. ,,13 My own recent work on analogy as a theory of one kind of language use shows that at least one historical path between Scotus and the early seventeenth century can be traced through the Thomistic tradition, though we must renlember that late medieval and Renaissance Thomism enlbraced a variety of different approaches and doctrines. What Thomists had in common was a kind of moderate realism with respect to common natures that differentiated them from the nominalists on the one hand and the Scotists on the other. Nonetheless, Thomists embraced many theses put forward by nominalists, especially Pierre d'Ai1ly (d. 1420/1); and much of their agenda had been set by Duns Scotus rather than by Aquinas himself. I shall begin by mentioning two important early fourteenth-century sources. The distinction between formal and objective concepts is used in the discussion of analogical terms by Hervaeus Natalis (d. 1323) in his Quolibeta, and by Peter Aureol (d. 1322) in his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. I4 Aureol was widely read, and in the early fifteenth century Johannes Capreolus (d. 1444) in his Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis, made very heavy use of him. Long passages from Aureol, including his criticisms of Hervaeus, appear in the sections on analogy, and in these same sections Capreo1us makes important use of the distinction between formal and objective concepts. I5 Hervaeus Natalis was also well known. His works were widely disseminated in manuscript form, and his Quolibeta had more than one early printed edition. I6 The views of Aureol, Hervaeus, and Capreolus on analogy are reflected in varying degrees in the commentaries on the Metaphysics by Dominic of Flanders (d. 1479) and Paulus Barbo Soncinas (d. 1495), though only the latter used the distinction between formal and objective concepts. I7 In

Petrus Fonseca on Objective Concepts and the Analogy ofBeing 49 turn, material drawn from Capreolus, Soncinas, and possibly Dominic of Flanders, lies behind the short treatise On the Analogy of Names which Thomas de Vio, Cardinal Cajetan published in 1498 as a supplement to his commentary on Aristotle's Categories. I8 In this work, formal and objective concepts are discussed at length. In the sixteenth century, Domingo de Soto's commentary on the Categories cites Capreolus and Cajetan in the discussion of analogy.I9 At the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth century, all these authors and themes turn up in the treatments of analogy by Suarez in his Disputationes Metaphysicae,2o by Sebastian de Couto, the author of the Coimbra commentary on Aristotle's Organon,21 and by Antonius Rubius in a treatise on analogy he inserted into his commentary on Aristotle's Organon.22 Nor was Fonseca any exception. Scotus, Aureol, Hervaeus, Capreolus, Dominic of Flanders, Soncinas, Cajetan were all cited in his Metaphysics commentary,23 and the discussion of formal and objective concepts is firlnly tied to the discussion of analogy. There are of course other areas in which the distinction between formal and objective concepts was enlployed in logic texts belonging to the Thomistic tradition. One of these areas, which needs to be mentioned here because of its implications for the doctrine of analogy, was the discussion of the problem of universals. Logicians in the Thomistic tradition wanted to avoid nominalism by arguing that universal terms and concepts do have an objective (in the modern sense) basis in the world. At the same time, they also wanted to avoid both Platonisnl, the view that universal ternlS correspond to separate common natures, and Scotism, the view that universal terms correspond to common natures which have their own lesser existence and lesser unity within the real individuals which they in part constitute. Toletus, the other logician recornmended by the Ratio Studiorum of 1599, gave an account which is fairly standard. 24 He argued that a universal taken materially is a nature, while a universal taken formally (in formali) is a being of reason (ens rationis) because community and universality are the work of the intellect. They are not real properties of real individuals. A being of reason is something that exists objective in the intellect, but not everything that has esse obiective in the intellect is a being of reason, for anything, including real individuals, that is an object of cognition has esse obiective in the intellect. There are two groups of objects that have only esse obiective. Pure figments, such as chimeras, have esse obiective directly, while those beings of reason that are founded on real things and can be predicated of real things (as Fonseca added25 ), have esse obiective indirectly and as a consequent. Toletus then went on to introduce the fully fledged distinction between the formal and the objective intentio or conceptus, still in the context of his discussion of universals. Similar accounts can be found in the logic texts of Domingo de Soto and Sebastian de CoutO. 26 It is interesting to note that the scholastic authors that Descartes told Mersenne he remembered were the Coimbrans, Toletus, and Rubius. 27 Two of

50 E. JENNIFER ASHWORTH these discussed formal and objective concepts in the context of analogy, and the one exception, Toletus, made the distinction in his discussion of universals, as did the Coimbrans. Moreover, they are all authors more likely to be found in the classroom than Suarez. Fonseca is not in the list, but as I remarked at the beginning, he was closely associated with the Conimbricenses, and his views are explicitly discussed by the Coimbra Categories commentary and by Rubius. Thus there is a clear relationship between Descartes and the Thomistic textbook tradition. 2. Signification and Mental Language

So far as individual words were concerned, the central claim was that the spoken word is a sign, and the central semantic notion was that of signification. This notion of the spoken word as sign is linked with two traditions, the Augustinian tradition which was appealed to particularly by theologians, and the Aristotelian tradition found especially in logic and metaphysics. The two traditions meet in Fonseca. In his logic text he quotes Augustine's definition, "A sign is something which is itself sensed and which indicates to the mind something beyond the sign itself,"28 and he also refers to On interpretation 16a3-4, where Aristotle said that spoken words were signs of concepts?9 In his own main definition, "to signify is nothing other than to represent something to a cognitive power" ("significare nihil aliud est, quam potentiae cognoscenti, aliquid repraesentare"), he paraphrases the words of the popular fourteenthcentury nominalist, Pierre d' Ailly. 30 While these definitions are conlpatible with paying attention to the hearer's understanding in a particular context, the role of the speaker was nornlally privileged, and the significative power of utterances was seen as a function of the speaker's cognition without reference to the context. Thus in his Metaphysics commentary Fonseca emphasizes that the purpose of spoken language is to make known the concepts of the speaker. 31 One can relate this emphasis on the speaker's concepts to a big change which took place in the early part of the fourteenth century. Ockham insisted that the concept itself must be regarded as a sign. 32 This notion (while foreign to Augustine) was not new, but Ockham made it central, and in so doing, made mental language rather than spoken language the paradigm of signification. The doctrine that there is a language of thought that is naturally significant and common to all human beings is present at least from Augustine on, but it was only fully developed in the fourteenth century, first by Ockham and then by Pierre d' Ailly. Mental propositions were thought of as having syntactic stmcture33 and mental terms were thought of as having supposition, so that the notion of a language system was internalized, and the very way that thought was conceived of changed. As a corollary, the place of grammar in the study of logic and philosophy of language was devalued. By the later sixteenth century,

Petrus Fonseca on Objective Concepts and the Analogy ofBeing 51 interest in the structure of an inner language had disappeared, but the doctrine remained. Fonseca is no exception. In his discussion of whether dialectic is a linguistic science (scientia sermocinalis), he remarked that dialectic was primarily concerned with the sermo mentalis, and unlike grammar and rhetoric, which deal with conventional language, dialectic concerns itself with the naturally significant sermo. 34 Once the concept had come to be regarded as a sign, we find in some early sixteenth-century authors, especially Domingo de Soto, a careful classification of both signs and types of signification. 35 In relation to the speaker, spoken words were said to be instrunlental signs, because of their causal properties, and lllental terms were said to be formal signs, because they represented by their very nature. In relation to the things signified, spoken words were said to be conventional signs, and mental ternlS were said to be natural signs. Fonseca, of course, made the same distinctions. 36 The doctrine that spoken words and concepts are signs raises obvious questions about such logical terlllS as "all," and "none," about non-referring terms such as "chimera," and about supposed analogical terms such as "being." I shall ignore the first two cases, though I shall return to the third, and for the moment I shall confine myself to terms such as "cow" or "dog" which pick out ordinary physical objects belonging to natural kinds. There are three important areas of discussion here: the word-concept-thing relation, the word-signijicatum relation, and the question of whether words can signify in a way that concepts do not. The precise nature of the word-concept-thing relation was the focus of the long-standing debate whether spoken words signify concepts or things. 37 All the participants in the debate agreed that concepts play an essential role in the significative process, for we cannot refer to objects we do not know; and they also agreed that words are typically used to pick out things in the world. Fonseca reminds us that names are not imposed principally (praecipue) to signify concepts, but the thing itself. 38 If I say "Some dogs are running," what I say is true (if at all) of individual dogs and not of my concepts. What people disagreed on was how the role of concepts in the significative process was to be described. Some authors. held that words primarily signified or made known concepts and only secondarily signified things. Others, following Ockhanl, held that words signified things alone while being subordinated to concepts. Fonseca took up the issue in his Institutiones and argued that while concepts signified things immediately, with no intervening sign, words signified things only mediately, through the intervening concepts of which the words were the proximate signs. 39 He also pointed out that when one hears a word, one need not form two concepts, one of the concept of the thing, and the other of the thing signified, for the mind can go directly to the thing. This account was complicated by the doctrine of COlllmon natures which have somehow to be involved in the referential process. Whenever a general

52 E. JENNIFER ASHWORTH term is used, the mind must apprehend the particular thing referred to as belonging to a genus or species, but, for a moderate Thomist, the common nature is neither the universal concept nor a separate Platonic idea. It is at this point that we find discussion of a word's significatum. Fonseca said that a word has both an immediate significate and mediate significates, and the immediate significate is a common nature. 40 He discusses these distinctions in the context of supposition theory. In "Man is a species of animal," the word "man" is said to have simple supposition in that it stands for its immediate significate, the common nature man. In other contexts, such as "A man is running," the word has personal supposition, that is, it stands for its mediate significates, the individuals. In yet other contexts, such as "Man is animal," Fonseca postulated an intermediate kind of supposition, called absolute supposition, by virtue of which the subject stands for a common nature which is not thought of as abstracted and separate from individuals. 41 In his Metaphysics commentary Fonseca emphasizes that all univocal terms in normal contexts have a double supposition in that they stand both for individuals and for the common nature taken in the imprecise manner just described. 42 The last problem concerns the nature of conceptual representation: when a spoken term signifies a thing, how determinate does the intervening concept have to be? This issue was introduced for Fonseca by Scotus's argument that our words can signify more clearly than our concepts warrant,43 Fonseca takes it up in his Metaphysics commentary in a question about the word "God.,,44 Can this single word signify God simply, in the absence of a simple conception of the divine essence? Fonseca argued that we cannot separate the signification of words from the signification of concepts, for the significatio of a name is nothing other than the representation of the thing signified by means of a concept. If a word signifies simply then we have a concept which represents its object in a simple manner. He then claimed that because the word "God" is a simple term, we do have a sinlple concept of God, rather than a complex concept that essentially involves the operations of negating and relating. This does not mean that we grasp God's essence. Even though the concept signified by the word "God" is proper to God, in the sense of successfully picking out God rather than some other object, it does not represent him distinctly but confuse, in an undiscriminating manner, because we do not conceive the divine attributes through it, nor did we acquire it as a result of perceiving divine attributes. In some cases an ordinary undiscrinlinating concept can be replaced by a full concept. For instance, we can start with an undiscriminating concept of man, and later, when we come to grasp a quidditative definition, we can form a simple concept of the whole essence. However, only the blessed in heaven can know God by a simple concept through which all the divine perfections are known clare ac perspicue, and we cannot arrive at such a concept of God naturally. For those who wonder how we even begin to make successful reference to God, Fonseca explains that when we he3-~_~~~~~iptiye_

Petrus Fonseca on Objective Concepts and the Analogy ofBeing 53 phrases such as "simply infinite being" or "first cause," we can without any difficulty form a simple concept of the underlying substance (ipsius laten/is substantiae), or as we might say, the whatever it is that is being picked out by the speakers.

3 Analogy and Concepts After this overview, it is time at last to turn to analogical terms, which were not thought to function in the same way as the terms "rnan" and "ox." l~ogicians and theologians together had developed a theory whereby words could be divided into three sorts, independently of context. 45 Some were univocal (always used with the same sense), some were purely equivocal (used with totally different senses), and some were analogical (used with related senses). These divisions have thirteenth-century roots, and were produced in response to three problems. In logic, there is the problem of Aristotle's distinction between equivocal and univocal terms at the beginning of the Categories. Equivocal terms (e. g., "bank") are those which can be used in two quite different senses, and it seems natural to extend the notion of an equivocal term to cover those terms that are used in different but related senses. In metaphysics, there is the problem of how to speak of being (ens), given that the being of a substance is so different from the being of an accident. In theology, there is the problem of religious language. How can words normally used of humans, such as "just" or "good," be meaningfully used of God, when God is so different from human beings? In each context, analogy seemed to provide an answer, and "ens" soon became the main example of an analogical term in all three contexts, with the result that we find considerable overlap between discussions in logic, in metaphysics, and in theology. Fonseca himself pays attention to the theological problem in his commentary on the Metaphysics, and I have already noted that his views were taken up in two later commentaries on Aristotle's logic. The term "analogy" itself had two senses. In the original, Greek, sense, it involved a comparison of two proportions. Thus "principle" was said to be an analogical term when said of a point and of a spring of water because a point is to a line as a spring is to a river. This type of analogy caIne to be called the analogy of proportion, proportionality, or (in the hands of Cajetan), proper proportionality. In the second sense, it involved a relation between two things (or one pair of things and a third), of which one thing is secondary and the other primary. Thus "healthy" was said to be an analogical term when said of a dog and its food because while the dog has health directly, its food is healthy only as contributing to or causing the health of the dog. This second type of analogy became known as the analogy of attribution. One of the main subjects of debate was how to classify types of analogy, and how to apply the various types to the different metaphysical and theological cases. Although in one of his writings (De veritate 2.11) Aquinas said that

E. JENNIFER ASHWORTH religious language must be interpreted by means of the analogy of proportionality, in other writings he appealed to the analogy of attribution. During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries most logicians and theologians, including Capreolus, appealed to the analogy of attribution (if they discussed the topic at all). At the end of the fifteenth century, however, Cajetan argued that the analogy of proportionality was the only true analogy, and that whereas the analogy of attribution only involved extrinsic properties, the analogy of proper proportionality involved intrinsic properties. Cajetan's view was not always accepted, but there was much discussion of the issue in later scholastics, including Soto and Suarez. Fonseca presented a complex theory, for while he fully recognized the legitimacy of the analogy of proportionality, he also argued that it could be combined with the analogy of attribution. 46 Some terms are analogical by the analogy of proportionality alone, as in the case of "principium." This term is not applied to subordinate principles by virtue of their relationship to some one chief principle, and the relevant form is intrinsic to all analogates. Other terms are analogical by the analogy of attribution alone, and here the form referred to is intrinsic to the principal analogate alone. There are, however, terms which combine the two types of analogy. These include metaphorical terms. Thus "ridere" as said of fields and fortunes picks out a similarity of proportions but it also implies a reference to a smiling face as a principal analogate, because imitation, and hence some attribution, is involved. Indeed, an intrinsic form is also involved, for laughing does in some sense (suo modo) inhere in the flowering field,47 just as "pedalitas" inheres in the foot of a cOUCh. 48 However, Fonseca's chief example of the corrlbination of two types of analogy is "ens." On the one hand, it is clear that the form of entitas is intrinsic to all analogates, God and creatures, substance and accidents, and that each is related to its own esse as the others are. On the other hand, it is also clear that attribution is involved. What belongs to God through his essence and to creatures through participation, involves attribution, and since creatures are entia only through participation, "ens" must be said of them through attribution to God. There is no implication, as there was with Cajetan, that two different senses of "ens" must be involved. Finally he argues that the analogy of attribution precedes the analogy of proportionality, for the proportionality between God and creatures with respect to being is founded on God's having bestowed being on creatures. While Fonseca does not explicitly reject Cajetan's use of the analogy of proper proportionality, it plays very little part in his own doctrine. It is there, but only as an appendage to the analogy of attribution, which is fundamental. The other main subject of debate in treatments of analogy was very closely related to philosophy of mind, and it springs mainly from the work of early fourteenth-century philosophers, particularly Duns Scotus. In the Categories, Aristotle (in Latin translation) had said that the difference between a univocal term and an equivocal term was that the latter was subordinated to more than 54

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Petrus Fonseca on Objective Concepts and the Analogy ofBeing 55 one ratio substantiae. 49 In the early fourteenth century the ratio substantiae soon came to be identified with a concept, and the question then was, how many concepts are involved when an analogical term is used? There were three vie~s among those logicians and theologians who accepted analogy. 50 The nominalists held that analogical terms were straightfonvardly equivocal terms subordinated to two distinct concepts but the Thomists were split. Analogical terms could be viewed as subordinated to an ordered cluster of concepts (possibly but not necessarily described as a disjunction of concepts) ~ or they could be subordinated to a single concept which represents in a prior and a posterior manner (per prius et posterius). Scotus rejected all these possibilities, arguing that "ens" was a univocal term subordinated to a single univocal concept. Even for those within the Thonlistic tradition, Scotus's arguments about the univocity of "ens" had to be taken seriously. On the one hand, the word does not seem to be straightfonvardly equivocal, in the sense of being subordinated to more than one concept, for we at least have the illusion of being able to grasp "ens" as a general term. As Scotus pointed out, in an argument reproduced by all who considered the issue, we can grasp that something is a being while doubting whether it is a substance or an accident, and this surely involves having a relatively simple concept of being at our disposal. 51 On the other hand, there does not seem to be any common nature involved, and in the absence of a common nature, Thomists thought that to call the term "univocal" was inappropriate. What was needed was a way of allowing the concept to enjoy some kind of unity, while allowing the word to have a significate that was not a simple common nature. For many thinkers from the early fourteenth century onward, the distinction between formal and objective concepts provided the answer. Before going any further, we should consider the word "conceptus." It is the past participle of the verb "concipere," and as such, it obviously has a dual meaning. It can refer to the result of mental conceiving, i. e., to whatever it,is that is formed in the mind, or it can refer to the object conceived, by picking out one of its passive modes. 52 In this second sense, the conceptus, the thing conceived, need not be a mental item, and it is for this reason that authors often specified that they were speaking of the conceptus mentis or conceptus mentalis, phrases which sound strange to the modern ear. 53 In the light of the distinction between two ways of taking "conceptus," we can look at the formal and objective concept. In Fonseca's definitions, which were perfectly standard, the conceptus formalis is said to be an actual similitude of the thing understood, produced by the intellect. 54 Here we should note that the notion of similitude is not that of a pictorial likeness (though it can be). Any kind of sharing of form will count. The conceptus obiectivus is the thing which is understood according to the form or nature conceived by the formal concept, 55

56 E. JENNIFER ASHWORTH or the thing which is understood, insofar as it is represented by the formal concept. 56 The obvious question then was, what is the object represented, and does it have only objective being or the being of being thought (esse objective or esse cognitum), or does it have some kind of real being as well? Fonseca's answer is related to his theory of conlmon natures as general objects whose communitas exists only obiective in intellectu, though they are truly said of real things. 57 In the case of "ens," for which there is no common nature, he introduces a theory of simple entities (entitates simplices) which include God (in whonl, we should renlember, there is no difference between abstract and concrete, essence and .existence), the supreme genera, differentiae, matter, and substantial form. 58 In his discussion of these entities, he appeals to his doctrine of absolute supposition. If I say "Substantia est ens," there is a double reference: in one way, I am speaking of being as such without any connotation of separation or abstraction, but at the same time, I am speaking of the secondary significates, substance, quantity and so on. 59 4 Fonseca on Formal and Objective Concepts We are now ready to look at Fonseca's distinctions more closely. He began by arguing that the formal concept of being can be one of three types: fully distinct (distinctus), fully undiscriminating (confusus) , or partly undiscriminating, partly distinct. 60 A fully distinct concept of being is one which represents all simple entities "determinate et expresse," and only God can have such a concept. A fully undiscriminating concept is one which represents all simple entities of this sort "confuse et indeterminate," and an example is provided by the subject and predicate terms in the mental proposition "Ens est id quod est." The concept of substance as a supreme genus is an example of the third type since it represents being by virtue of representing substance clearly and distinctly (expresse et determinate) and the other categories implicitly and indeterminately (implicite et indeterminate), as all having some relation (proportio) to substance. He mentioned that the same distinctions can be applied to an objective concept viewed as the immediate significate of a formal concept. Fonseca then introduces a further distinction between two ways of being one, and two ways of being distinct. 61 These ways were in re, that is, in reality, when viewed as a thing, and in ratione, which might be translated here as "with respect to content" or "with respect to understanding." The formal concept of man is one in re because it is one quality of the nlind~ it is also one in ratione because it directly (prorsus) represents one human nature, which is multiplied in individuals. The corresponding objective concept is one in ratione but not one in re, given that there is no Platonic Idea or common man. Similar distinctions can be applied to ways of being separate (praecisus).62 A formal

Petrus Fonseca on Objective Concepts and the Analogy ofBeing 57 concept is separate in re when it is a separate quality of mind, in the way that our concept of man is separate from our concepts of Plato and of Socrates. Plato took the objective concept of man also to be separate in this way, but Fonseca does not, since common natures cannot exist apart from individuals. A concept is separate in ratione when it has been abstracted, that is, when it includes nothing proper to the concepts from which it was separated. Thus the formal concept of man is separate because it represents nothing proper or peculiar to any given individual, and the objective concept or quiddity of man is separate because it contains nothing proper or peculiar to any actual individual. In the light of these distinctions, Fonseca set out to answer the main questions that arose in the context of analogical concepts, whether formal or objective. These were first, whether such concepts could be viewed as truly one, and second, whether they could be viewed as separate (praecisum) fronl the proper concepts of their dividing members. 63 In his discussion of the formal concept of being, Fonseca concluded that while a fully distinct formal concept of being could not be one quality, presumably since each part would constitute a single concept, any partly or wholly undiscriminating formal concept is one in re, for it can be the subject of a mental proposition. 64 The fully undiscriminating concept of being is also separate in re, i. e., separate from the concepts of the dividing menlbers, for any concept which gives a precise representation of what is undiscriminatingly represented here will be a separate quality of the nlind. However, Fonseca goes on, even if a fully undiscriminating concept of being is simply one and separate from other concepts, it cannot be called one concept in a simple sense, for it is one only in the way that an equivocal name is one word. 65 The notion of being one concept carries with it reference to separateness in ratione, which is equivalent to abstraction, and the concept of ens is not abstracted from its dividing members. The formal concept of being cannot be either one or separate in ratione, that is with respect to its content, what it is of or about, unless it is so merely secundum quid. Strictly speaking, it is an ambiguous or multiple concept (conceptus multiplex). Fonseca did not enlarge on this point, but it is a body blow for any theory that thought constitutes an ideal language in the sense of being perfectly clear and precise. Fonseca's conclusion that the formal concept of being is a multiple concept followed directly from his belief that what it represents, the objective concept of being, is not truly one or separate either in re or in ratione. 66 As in the univocal case, the objective analogical concept can be neither one nor separate in re, for that would be Platonism. Moreover, even the wholly undiscriminating concept can be called one and separate in. ratione only secundum quid, or in a relative sense, for otherwise it would be univocal. To be separate in ratione is to be abstracted, and only common natures can be abstracted. While anything proper to Socrates and Plato can be excluded from the essence of man, the sanle is not true of substance "and other simple entitates" where ens is concerned. There is always implicit inclusion of these dividing members.

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E. JENNIFER ASHWORTH At this point, while denying that the objective concept of being is truly separate from its members, Fonseca differentiated himself from those who denied that the objective concept was separate on the grounds that it is one only by the unity of a disjunction, and hence was constituted by a sequence of objective concepts. 67 Disjunction, said Fonseca, is not in the things but in the indeterminacy of the intellect, and when we say that sonlething is a being using an undiscriminating formal concept we do not think of it as a substance or as a quality or as any particular entity. Since we cannot conceive a disjunction without conceiving its parts, disjunction cannot be a feature of what is represented. Fonseca also explicitly rejected the view that the objective concept is both one and separate in ratione, but is not univocal because it is unequally participated, being said in a prior and a posterior way of God and creatures, substance and accidents. 68 If one asks how unequal participation might occur, it turns out that there are four possibilities, none of which is viable. First, one could appeal to unequal participation according to the ratio (or nature in a loose sense) participated in. This leads to inconsistency, because one will have to explain the unequal participation in one ratio by saying that God has one ratio insofar as he is being, substance has another and so on, with the result that there is no one ratio. Second, one could appeal to unequal participation according to the esse of the participators. This would lead us to say that a genus is analogical because it has unequally perfect existence in the different species, but a genus is not analogical. Third, one could appeal to unequal participation according to degree, but this would produce the absurd result that such ordinary terms as "white" were analogical. Finally, one could appeal to unequal participation according to diverse nl0des of predication, for instance, accidental and essential predication. However, this kind of inequality is irrelevant because ens is not merely intrinsic but essential to all. Conclusion I don't want to claim that I can point to precise passages in Fonseca which have influenced Descartes, or Mersenne, or Arnauld, or any other early modern philosopher. On the other hand, I do want to claim that this is the style of discussion, and these are the types of distinctions, with which early modern philosophers, at least up to and including Locke, would have been familiar through the scholastic texts by which they were educated. NOTES 1. On Fonseca's life and works, see Charles H. Lohr, Latin Aristotle Commentaries: II. Renaissance Authors (Florence: Olschki, 1988), pp. 150-51; and John P. Doyle,

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"Peter Fonseca,"Routledge Encyclopedia of Philosophy, E. 1. Craig, ed. (Routledge: forthcoming). 2. Pedro da Fonseca, Institui90es Dialecticas. Instilutionum Dialecticarum Libri Octo, 2 volumes, Joaquim Ferreira Gomes, ed. and trans. (Coimbra: Universidade de Coimbra, 1964), cited as Instil. Dial.; Petrus Fonseca, Commentariorvm In Metaphysicorvm Aristotelis Stagiritae Libros (2 volumes), (Cologne, 1615; reprinted Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1964), cited as In Met. Volume 1 contains Tomus I-II and has numbered columns; volume 2 contains Tomus ill-IV, and has numbered pages. 3. Timothy 1. Cronin, Objective Being in Descartes and in Suarez (Roma: Gregorian University Press, 1966), p. 34 4. Cronin suggests, pp. 32-33, that Fonseca's commentary was normally used in Jesuit schools. 5. Useful background is provided by Peter Dear, Mersenne and the Learning of the Schools (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1988). However, Dear overemphasizes the influence of Ramist-style humanism on Fonseca's logic: see pp. 19-21. For an alternative assessment of Fonseca, see E. 1. Ashworth, "Changes in Logic Textbooks from 1500 to 1650: The New Aristotelianism," Aristoteli~mus und Renaissance: In Memoriam Charles B. Schmitt, Eckhard Kessler, Charles H. Lohr and Walter Spam, eds. (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1988), pp. 82-84. 6. Jean-Luc Marion, Sur la theologie blanche de Descartes (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1981), devotes much of his book to the theme of Descartes's reaction to Suarez's doctrine of the analogy of being. In his discussion, he notes the relation between the analogy of being and objective concepts (e. g., p. 119), and he also mentions Fonseca briefly (p. 123). However, the nature and scope of our investigations is quite different. 7. Descartes, Replies IV, AT VII 235. For discussion see Roger Ariew, "Descartes and scholasticism: the intellectual background to Descartes' thought," The Cambridge Companion to Descartes, John Cottingham, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), pp. 58-90, esp. p. 79. 8. R. Dalbiez, "Les sources scolastiques de la theorie cartesienne de l'etre objectif it propos du 'Descartes' de M. Gilson," Revue d'histoire de la philosophie 3 (1929), pp. 464-472. 9. For Fonseca on God's ideas, including reference to fonnal and objective concepts, see In Met., III, pp. 280b-296b, esp. 286a-288b (Lib. VII, cap. VIII, q. 2). 10. Dalbiez, pp. 468-470. 11. Cronin, p. 206, opts for Scotus and Suarez as Descartes's sources. One useful source is Gabriel Nuchelmans, Judgment and Proposition from Descartes to Kant (Amsterdam, Oxford, New York: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1983). He traces the early history of the phrases "esse obiective" and "conceptus obiectivus" in Hervaeus, Aureol, and Durandus, pp. 17-26. In discussing Descartes, he says (p. 41), "it remains difficult to single out any individual sources. His debt is of a very general nature and could have come from any work belonging to a certain climate of thought. There can be little doubt, however, that one of the main detenninants of this climate was the objective-existence theory as it had been developed by such thinkers as Durandus and Aureolus." 12. Nonnan 1. Wells, "Objective Reality of Ideas in Descartes, Caterus, and Suarez," Journal ofthe History ofPhilosophy 28 (1990), pp. 33-61, esp. pp. 49-50. See also Nonnan 1. Wells, "Objective Being: Descartes and His Sources," The Modern

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Schoolman 45 (1967), pp. 49-61; id., "Objective Reality of Ideas in Arnauld, Descartes, and Suarez," The Great Arnauld and Some ofHis Philosophical Correspondents, Elmar 1. Kremer, ed. (Toronto, Buffalo, London: University of Toronto Press, 1994), pp. 138183. 13. Calvin Normore, "Meaning and Objective Being: Descartes and His Sources," Essays on Descartes' "Meditations," Amelie Oksenberg Rorty, ed. (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 1986), pp. 223-241, esp. p. 240. 14. Hervaeus Natalis, Quolibeta (Venetiis, 1513; reprinted Ridgewood, N.J.: Gregg Press, 1966), ff. 43ra-46vb, esp. f. 43rb; Peter Aureol, Scnptum Super Pn'mum Sententiarum,2 vols., Eligius M. Buytaert, ed. (St.Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute; Louvain, Belgium: E. Nauwelaerts; Paderbom, Germany: F. Schoningh, 1956), pp. 471-523, esp. p. 483. For a fuller discussion of these authors, see E. J. Ashworth, "Analogical Concepts: The Fourteenth-Century Background to Cajetan," Dialogue 31 (1992), pp. 399-413. 15. Johannes Capreolus, Defensiones theologiae divi Thomae Aquinatis. Vol. I, Ceslai Paban and Thomas Pegues, eds. (Turonibus: A. Cattier 1900-1908; reprinted, FrankfurtJMain: Minerva GmbH, 1967), pp. 117a-144a. 16. For more infonnation, see Michael Tavuzzi, "Hervaeus Natalis and the Philosophical Logic of the Thomism of the Renaissance," Doctor Communis 45/2 (1992),pp.132-152. . 17. Dominic of Flanders, Quaestiones super XII Libros Methaphysicorum (Venice, 1499; reprinted, Frankfurt: Minerva G.M.B.H., 1967), sigs. h 6 vb-i 8 vb; Paulus Soncinas, Quaestiones Metaphysicales Acutissimae (Venice, 1588; reprinted, Frankfurt: Minerva G.M.B.H., 1967), pp. la-l1a, esp. p. 2b. Dominic of Flanders refers explicitly to Hervaeus, e. g., sig. i 7ra, and Soncinas quotes Aureol, e. g., p. 2a. For a fuller discussion of these authors, see E. J. Ashworth, "Suarez on the Analogy of Being: Some Historical Background," Vivarium 33 (1995), pp. 50-75; and Michael Tavuzzi, "Some Renaissance Thomist Divisions of Analogy," Angelicum 70 (1993), pp. 93-122. 18. See Bruno Pinchard, Metaphysique et semantique. Autour de Cajetan. Etude [texteJ et traduction du tiDe Nominum Analogia" (Paris: J. Vrin, 1987). 19. Dorningo de Soto, Liber Praedicamentorum in In Porphyrii Isagogen, Aristotelis Categorias, librosque de Demonstratione Absolutissima Commentaria (Venice, 1587; reprinted Frankfurt: Minerva, 1967), pp. 112a-121a, 129a-136a. For references to Capreolus and Cajetan, see, e. g., p. 130b. For discussion, see E. 1. Ashworth, "Domingo de Soto (1494-1560) on Analogy and Equivocation," Proceedings of the Third Pamplona Conference on the History of Logic, Ignacio Angelelli and Maria Cerezo, eds. (New York, Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1996) pp. 117-131. 20. Francisco Suarez, Disputationes Metaphysicae in Opera Omnia, vols. 25 and 26 (Paris, 1866; reprinted Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1965), see especially disputations 2, 28, and 32. For instance, d.2.9 (v.25, p. 68a) includes references to Cajetan, Capreolus, Dominic of Flanders, Fonseca, Hervaeus, Scotus, Soncinas, and Soto. 21. [Sebastian de Couto], Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societate Jesu. In universam dialecticam Aristotelis (Cologne, 1607; reprinted HildesheimlNew York: Georg Olms, 1976), cols.305-327. For instance, Cajetan, Fonseca, Soto, and Suarez are cited in col. 320 and Hervaeus in col. 321. 22. Antonius Rubius, Tractatus de Nominum Analogia in Commentarii in Universam Aristotelis Dialecticam (Coloniae Agrippinae, 1609), pp. 148-183. Cajetan,

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Fonseca and Soto are cited on p. 158a, Capreolus, Dominic of Flanders and Soncinas on p. 160b, Aureol on p. 167a and Suarez on p. 173b. 23. Fonseca, In Met. I, cols. 689-736 (Lib.4, cap. 2, qq. 1,2). See, e. g., col. 713 for Capreolus, Cajetan, Dominic of Flanders, Hervaeus and Soncinas, and col. 727 for Aureol. 24. Franciscus Toletus, Introductio in universam Aristotelis logicam in Opera omnia philosophica I (Cologne, 1615/16; reprinted Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1985), pp. 23a-33b, especially p. 28a-b (on the universal as an ens rationis), pp. 30b-31a (on esse obiective in intellectu), p. 32a-b (on formal and objective concepts). 25. Fonseca, In Met. II, cols. 1036-1037. Cf. [Sebastian de Couto], col. 141. For the full discussion of universals, see Fonseca, In Met. II, cols. 947-1050 (Lib. 5, cap. 28, qq. 1-10). For entia rationis, see Fonseca, In Met. II, cols. 462-469 (Lib. 5, cap. 7, q.6). 26. Soto, Liber Praedicabilium in In Porphyrii Isagogen, etc., pp. 28a-45a, especially p. 30b (formal and objective concepts), p. 39a (entia rationis); [Sebastian de Couto], cols. 77-161, especially cols. 151 and 155-158 (entia rationis) and cols. 140141 (concepts). The phrase "conceptus obiectivus" is not used. On cols. 151-152 there is a discussion of whether entia rationis need an efficient cause. 27. Descartes, AT ill 185. 28. Fonseca, Instil. Dial., p. 36. The editor gives a reference to the definition in Augustine's De dialectica rather than to De Doctrina Christiana 2.1, the more usual source. 29. Fonseca, Instil. Dial., p. 32. 30. Fonseca, Instil. Dial., p. 34. For Pierre d'Ailly, see Paul Vincent Spade, Peter of Ailly: Concepts and Insolubles. An Annotated Translation (Dordrecht, Boston, London: Reidel, 1980), p. 16. 31. Fonseca, In Met., I, col. 408 (Lib. 2, cap. 1, q.2): "quia ea de caussa sunt nomina rebus imposita, ut homines suos conceptus sibi mutuo aperirent, & communicarent." 32. See in particular Joel Biard, Logique et theorie du signe au XIVe siecle (Paris: 1. Vrin, 1989). 33. See E. J. Ashworth, "The Structure of Mental Language: Some Problems Discussed by Early Sixteenth Century Logicians," Vivarium 20 (1982), pp. 59-83; reprinted in ead., Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics (London: Variorum Reprints, 1985). 34. Fonseca, In Met., I, col. 492 (Lib. 2, cap. 3, q. 1): "Quia igitur Dialectica de sermone agit, primo quidem de mentali, quo quisque secum quasi loquitur: secundaria vero ratione de vocali & scripto, non in realibus, sed in sermocinalibus numeranda erit. quanquam etiam dicitur rationalis, non quia de ente rationis agat (isto enim modo potius dicendae essent rationales, Grammatica et Rhetorica, quae agunt de solo sennone significativo ex instituto, quam Dialectica, quae primo agit de sennone significativo naturaliter) sed quia dirigit operationes intellectus nostri, qui propter naturalem discurrendi facultatem ratio appellatur." 35. See E. 1. Ashworth, "Domingo de Soto (1494-1560) and the Doctrine of Signs," De Ortu Grammaticae. Studies in medieval grammar and linguistic theory in memory of Jan Pinborg, G.L. Bursill-Hall, Sten Ebbesen and Konrad Koerner, eds. (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 1990), pp. 35-48; and ead., "The Doctrine of Signs in Some Early Sixteenth-Century Spanish Logicians," Estudios de Historia de la Logica. Actas del II Simposio de Historia de la Logica: Universidad de Navarra Pamplona 25-27 de Mayo

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de 1987, Ignacio Angelelli and Angel d'Ors, eds. (Pamplona: Ediciones EUNATE, 1990) pp. 13-38. 36. Fonseca, Instil. Dial., pp. 34-38. 37. E. J. Ashworth, "'Do \Vords Signify Ideas or Things?' The Scholastic Sources of Locke's Theory of Language," Journal of the History ofPhilosophy 19 (1981), pp. 299326; ead., "Locke on Language," Canadian Journal ofPhilosophy 14 (1984), pp. 45-73; ead., "Jacobus Naveros (fl. ca. 1533) on the Question: 'Do Spoken Words Signify Concepts or Things?'," Logos and Pragma: Essays on the Philosophy of Language in Honour ofProfessor Gabriel Nuchelmans, L. M. de Rijk and H. A. G. Braakhuis, eds. (Artistarium Supplementa 3. Nijmegen: Ingenium Publishers, 1987), pp. 189-214. The first two papers are reprinted in ead., Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics. 38. Fonseca, In Met., I, col. 409 (Lib. 2, cap. 1, q. 2). 39. Fonseca, Instil. Dial., pp. 38-40. 40. Fonseca, Instil. Dial., pp. 690-696. 41. For discussion, see E. J. Ashworth, Language and Logic in the Post-Medieval Period (Dordrecht, Boston: Reidel, 1974), pp. 87-88. 42. Fonseca, In Met., I, col. 722 (Lib. 4, cap. 2, q. 2). 43. For discussion, see E. J. Ashworth, '''Can I speak more clearly than I understand?' A problem of religious language in Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus and Ockham," Historiographia Linguistica 7 (1980), pp. 29-38. 44. Fonseca, In Met., I, cols. 407-411 (Lib. 2, cap. 1, q. 2, sect. 4). 45. For discussion and references, see E. J. Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Context," Mediaeval Studies 54 (1992), pp. 94135; ead., "Equivocation and Analogy in Fourteenth Century Logic: ockham, Burley and Buridan," Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi: Studien zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Burkhard Mojsisch and Olaf Pluta, eds. (Amsterdam, Philadelphia: B. R. Gruner, 1991), vol. 1, pp.23-43. 46. Fonseca, In Met., I, cols. 701-710. 47. Fonseca, In Met., I, col. 703. 48. Fonseca, In Met., I, col. 708. 49. "Aequivoca dicuntur quorum nomen solum commune est, secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa, ut animal homo et quod pingitur. Univoca vero dicuntur quorum et nomen commune est et secundum nomen eadem substantiae ratio, ut animal homo atque bos..." Aristotle, Categories (1 a1-2) in Aristoteles Latinus I 1-5. Categoriae vel Praedicamenta, L. Minio-Paluello, ed. (Bruges, Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1961), p.5. 50. See Ashworth, "Analogical Concepts: The Fourteenth-Century Background to Cajetan," and ead., "Suarez on the Analogy of Being: Some Historical Background." 51. John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio I d.3 pars 1 q. 1-2, 27-29, in Opera Omnia (Vatican City: 1950-), Vol. ill, pp. 18-19. Fonseca reproduces the argument, In Met., I, col. 691. 52. Nuchelmans, p. 22, cites a passage from Aureol: "conceptus autem obiectivus non est aliud quam res apparens obiective per actuffi intellectus; qui dicitur conceptus, quia intrinsece includit ipsum concipi passivum." 53. See Hervaeus Natalis, f. 43 va; [Sebastian de Couto], col. 322; Cajetan, p. 123 par. 36. 54. Fonseca, In Met., I, col. 710: "Conceptus fonnalis nihil est aliud, quam actualis similitudo rei, quae intelligitur, ab intellectu ad earn exprimendam producta...Est et alia

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ratio, cur dicatur fonnalis: nempe, quia repraesentat rem sub ea fonna seu natura secundum quam intelligitur." 55. Fonseca, In Met., I, col. 711: "Conceptus obiectivus est res, quae intelligitur, secundum earn fonnam, naturamve quae per formalem concipitur." 56. Fonseca, In Alet., I, col. 712: "... conceptus obiectivus respondet conceptui fonnali, cum sit nihil aliud, quam res quae intelligitur, quatenus per formalem repraesentatur..." 57. Fonseca, In Met., II, cols. 1037-1038 (Lib. 5, cap. 28, q. 9). 58. Fonseca, In Met., I, cols. 714-715,724. 59. Fonseca, In Met., I, col. 722. 60. Fonseca, In Met., I, cols. 714-715. He admits that he is drawing on material from Caj etan, but says that he hopes to present it in a more understandable manner. [Sebastian de Couto], col. 322, compares Fonseca and Cajetan. 61. Fonseca, In Met., I, col. 715. 62. See Fonseca, In Met., I, cols. 715-716. 63. See Fonseca, In Met., I, cols. 711-714, for the posing of the questions and an outline of the three main positions. 64. Fonseca, In Met., I, cols. 718-720. 65. It is on this point that Fonseca differentiates himself from holders of the "common view" (col. 711), and aligns himself with Cajetan (col. 714). 66. Fonseca, In Met., I, cols. 716-718. 67. He refers to Hervaeus Natalis, Dominic of Flanders, and Soncinas in stating the view, col. 713. He refutes it cols. 725-726. 6S. The view is stated Fonseca, In Met., I, cols. 712-713 and refuted cols. 724-725.

Arnauld on the Nature of Ideas as a Topic in Logic: The Port-Royal Logic and On True and False Ideas ELMAR J. KREMER

Antoine Arnauld's treatment of the nature of ideas in On True and False Ideas has long puzzled philosophers in two ways. First, with this treatise Arnauld began his attack on Malebranche in an unexpected way, for what he had promised was a criticism of Malebranche's Treatise of Nature and Grace, and it seemed odd to his contemporaries that he should begin by attacking the account of ideas given by Malebranche in the Search after Truth. Thus when Arnauld sent a draft of Ideas to his old friend and collaborator Pierre Nicole for comnlent, Nicole counselled against beginning his attack on Malebranche in this way: ...although I admired almost everything in the treatise, I am not entirely in agreenlent with the idea of making it a preliminary to your dispute with the Reverend Father. I do not find in it any principles necessary in order to destroy the foundations of the Treatise of Nature and Grace. Your subject lllatter has a small audience and can easily become confused. Why not begin with a subject more worthy of you, more theological, more popular, and one with a large audience?l

Malebranche hinlself complained that Ideas had no more connection with the Treatise ofNature and Grace than the Turkish war in Hungary.2 He had earlier complained that Arnauld had acted deviously, attempting to discredit his theodicy and his views on the distribution of grace by means of a hostile attack on an abstruse topic, 3 and there may be some truth in this complaint, for Arnauld says in a letter to Quesnel: In the meantime, it [Ideas] will be useful, if I am not mistaken, to

diminish the inflated opinion which many have of the reliability of our friend's mind: and people might expect him to have been mistaken in the matter of grace, if it can be shown that he wandered strangely astray in the questions of metaphysics, which he has always claimed as his strong point. 4

However, Arnauld never withdrew his claim that their disagreement about the nature of ideas had a bearing on their theological differences. 5 Yet commentators continue to be puzzled as to exactly what that bearing is. Thus Steven Nadler raises the question, "What binds together the mainly [sic] philosophical issues...dealt with in VFI [On True and False Ideas] and the Recherche, with those problems treated in Malebranche's Traite [de fa nature et de la grace] and Arnauld's Reflexions?" He says, "I can here only make several suggestions, since neither thinker really tells us what the connection might be." His isuggestions are that both sets of issues have to do with orthodoxy, understood 'las agreement with the views of the Fathers of the ~~u!~h~ !~a! fO! j\.!~~u!d~ 111 _

66 ELMAR J. KREMER least, both debates "can be seen as parts of a disagreement about how best to dignify and do justice to the true conception of God," and, thirdly, that Arnauld 6 thought his position on both issues best fosters piety and avoids pride. Nadler is looking for what On True and False Ideas and Arnauld's criticisms of Malebranche's theodicy "have in common.,,7 In contrast, I shall argue that the connection between the two projects is not doctrinal but rather methodological, that Arnauld intended what he says about the nature of ideas to forearm his readers against n1isguided ways of thinking that led Malebranche into theological error. The content of Arnauld's position on the nature of ideas has been no less puzzling. Indeed, Nadler notes that "Arnauld's...theory of ideas...has been subject to misunderstanding ever since the publication of VFI in 1683.,,8 Thomas Reid, in his survey of positions on the nature of ideas, says that Arnauld does not have a consistent position but rather wavers between the position that ideas are, quite simply, perceptions, and the "common," or Cartesian, position, according to which ideas are a sort of intermediate between perceptions and their real objects. 9 Early in the twentieth century A. O. Lovejoy, Morris Ginsberg and R. W. Church engaged in a debate about whether Arnauld, in Ideas, was a "direct realist" or a "representationalist" with regard to the perception of material things. 10 More recent commentators include John Yolton, who argues that Arnauld's account is an important step toward the "deontologizing of ideas";11 Nadler, who claims that Arnauld, in addition to attempting to refute Malebranche's theory, offers a solution to "the problem intentionality";12 and Richard Watson, who says that Arnauld's theory is a failed attempt to give an ontological explanation, in terms of a metaphysical system, of how we know objects by way of ideas. 13 This disagreement about the point of Arnauld's account of ideas is obviously connected to the first puzzle, about why he began his attack on Malebranche's theodicy by criticising his account of the nature of ideas. My proposal is that we can go a long way to clearing up both questions by considering Ideas as a continuation of the discussion in Chapter One of the Port-Royal Logic, which bears the title "Ideas according to their Nature and Origin." Let me first give a brief outline of my proposal, and then develop each of its steps in more detail. One of the main purposes of logic, according to the authors of the Port-Royal Logic, is "to discover and explain more easily the error or defect that can occur in the operations of our mind." (Logique, 38)14 The opening chapter of the work provides an account of the nature of ideas and then uses it to forearm its readers against two philosophical errors. Against this background, it would be natural for Arnauld, faced with what he took to be important errors in Malebranche' s theodicy, to initiate his attack with a "logical" investigation of the nature of ideas. My hypothesis is that Arnauld indeed thought of the main topic of Ideas in this way.15 I shall attempt to confirm this hypothesis by showing that the points about the nature of ideas

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which he emphasizes are precisely what he would need to forearnl his readers against what he took to be the central mistakes of Malebranche's theodicy. What Arnauld emphasizes in his discussion of the nature of ideas is, in brief, that our mental operations are "essentially representative" of their objects. (Ideas, 20; OA, Vol. XXXVIII, 199)16 Arnauld took this to imply that our cognitive acts ("perceptions" in Arnauld's use of the term) determine not only what objects they represent or exhibit to the mind, but also what properties the objects are represented as having. He emphasized this point because he thought it would forearm his readers against the mistake which he says lies at the origin of Malebranche's theodicy, the mistake of transgressing the limits of human knowledge of God. I: The Nature of Ideas in the Port-Royal Logic17 For Arnauld and Nicole, "Logic is the art of using one's reason well in the knowledge of things, both in order to learn for oneself and in order to instruct others." (Logique, 37) Logic cannot teach us to think; that we are able to do naturally. But the logician can carry out reflections on what we are enabled by nature to do, reflections which enable us to do well what we can do naturally without them. Such reflections are of use in three ways: First, to be sure that we are using our reason well, because the consideration of the rule redoubles our attention. Second, to discover and explain more easily the error or defect that can occur in the operations of our mind... Third, to make us know the nature of our mind better by reflection upon its operations. This is something more excellent in itself, if it were considered only as a matter of speculation, than the knowledge of all corporeal things, which are infinitely lower than spiritual ones. (Logique, 38)

But knowledge of our mental operations, in so far as it is part of logic, is not a matter of speculation. Rather it is practical knowledge of mental operations, knowledge sought for the sake of the first two uses. Reflection upon the nature of the mind, as the study of an immaterial thing, could also be part of the science of metaphysics. Thus, in "Discours II" at the beginning of the Logic, we read that the work contains a good deal of material from other sciences, including metaphysics. Among the metaphysical topics that also appear as parts of logic are "the origin of ideas" and "the separation of spiritual ideas from bodily images." (Logique, 39)18 r-rhe discussion of the nature of ideas in Book I, Chapter I of the Logic begins with a refutation of the clainl that ideas are the same thing as "images painted in our brain." (Logique, 40) This position is rejected on several grounds: that we can think of shapes we cannot imagine, that we can think of our thinking but cannot imagine it, and that the difference between affirmative and negative judgments does not correspond to any difference in images. The

68 ELMAR J. KREMER authors then present their own account of the nature of ideas: "Thus when we speak of ideas, we are not referring to images painted in the imagination, but to anything that is in our mind when we can truthfully say that we conceive a thing, in whatever manner we conceive it." (Logique, 41) The authors assume that, given this account of the nature of ideas, it is obvious that if a person uses words understanding what he is saying, then he has ideas corresponding to what the words signify. Using this assumption, they give two examples of errors, both taken from Hobbes,. that we are armed against by a correct understanding of the nature of ideas: first, the mistake of thinking that we have no idea of God because we have no image of God, and, second, the theory that reasoning is merely a manipulation of words, and that, consequently, "our soul is nothing other than a motion in certain parts of the organic body." (Logique, 42) The last part of this discussion illustrates the second of the ways in which logic was said to be useful. But uncovering particular errors in judgment is not the only way in which reflection on ideas is supposed to contribute to the improvement of our mental operations and to the avoidance of error. On the contrary, "Since we cannot have any knowledge of what is outside us except by means of ideas that are in us, the reflections we are able to make on our ideas are perhaps the most important part of Logic, because they are the foundation of all the rest." (Logique, 39) The proposition that we have ideas without any corresponding images in the brain is foundational, for example, to the clainl, in the opening chapter of Part IV, "On Method," that what is known by the mind is more certain than what is known by the senses. The title of the chapter lays down two principles: "That the things we know by the mind are more certain than what we know by the senses; that there are things that the human mind is incapable of knowing." (Logique, 291) The second principle gives rise to a limitation on human knowledge that the authors consider particularly important: "The greatest limitation on the extent of the sciences is not to seek anything that is above us and that we cannot reasonably hope to comprehend. Of this sort are all questions about the power of God, which it is ridiculous to attempt to enclose in the narrow bounds of our mind..." (Logique, 295) These two principles mark out "the limits of our mind [les bornes de notre esprit]": larger than Hobbes would allow, smaller than would be claimed by anyone who thought he could understand the extraordinary effects of God's power. It is worth noting that what the Logic has to say about the nature of ideas is quite thin, and would be disappointing to anyone who looked there for a systematic metaphysical or epistemological discussion of ideas. But it is not the purpose of the Logic to provide such a discussion. Its purpose is rather practical, and it says no nlore about the nature of ideas than is needed for its practical purposes of the work: to help us use our cognitive faculties well and to avoid error. The sanle, I shall argue, is true of On True and False Ideas.

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II: The Nature of Ideas in On True and False Ideas The doctrine on the nature of ideas presented in On True and False Ideas is consistent with what was said in the Logic: that an idea is anything that is in our mind when we conceive a thing, in whatever way we conceive it. What is new is an account of how what we "conceive" is "in our mind." In order to specify how this takes place, Arnauld recalls the notion of the objective being of the thing known in the mental act through which it is known: "I say that a thing is objectively in my mind when I conceive of it." (Ideas, 19~ OA, Vol. XXXVIII, 198) As far as I know this notion, which occurs frequently in Ideas and in later items in the controversy with Malebranche, does not appear in any of Arnauld's writings between the Fourth Objections (in 1641) and Ideas (in 1683). Arnauld's return to this notion pinpoints both his central disagreement with Malebranche, and his central, new claim about the nature of ideas. In his reply to Ideas, Malebranche says that the main issue between himself and Arnauld regarding "the nature of ideas" is whether our cognitive acts are "essentially representative of their objects," and Arnauld seems to accept this description of their disagreement. 19 Whereas Arnauld held that our perceptions, or, as I shall say, our cognitive acts, are essentially representative of their objects, Malebranche says that what represents material things to the mind is the divine idea of bodies, and what represents God to the mind is God himself. We can begin to see what this issue amounts to if we recall that in seventeenthcentury philosophical French, the verb "representer" was used to translate both the Latin verbs "exhibeo" and "repraesento,,,20 and rephrase the issue as follows: Whether our cognitive acts essentially exhibit their objects to us, or whether they are exhibited to us by something else. We will not be far from the thought of Arnauld and Malebranche if we think that to exhibit (represent) an object to the mind is to hold the object up before the mind, or, as Arnauld and Malebranche say, to make the object "present to" the nlind. Arnauld, then, maintains that all our cognitive acts exhibit their objects to us. Malebranche, by contrast, nlaintains that whenever the object of cognition is something other than mind and mental acts, the object is exhibited to us by something distinct from ourselves and our mental acts: a divine idea if the object is a body or bodies, and God himself if the object is God. As Malebranche would put it, material things are represented to us by the divine idea of material things, and God is represented to us by God Himself. To this picture, we need to add an important qualification. The proposition that a mental act, or an item of some other sort, exhibits an object to us, nlust not be understood as ascribing efficient causality to whatever does the exhibiting. Arnauld puts this point by saying that to represent an object to the mind is not a case of efficient causation, but rather of formal causation, and Malebranche eventually accepted this clarification. Arnauld's position can be put as follows: That person S has a cognition of object 0 is in every case a fact

70 ELMARJ. KREMER about person Sand S' s cognitive acts alone, and not about anything existing apart from S. In other words, representing a given object to the mind" is, according to Arnauld, an intrinsic property of a cognitive act?1 It is also an essential property of a mental act A cognitive act could not have a different object while remaining the same act. By contrast, according to Malebranche, where 0 is something other than mind and its acts, that S has a cognition of 0 is a fact about S, S's mental acts and an independently existing item I, which contains the perfection of 0 formally or eminently, and exhibits 0 to S. To repeat a point made above, if 0 is a body or bodies, I is the divine idea of bodies, while if 0 is God, I is God himself. Arnauld points out that Malebranche is not consistent in the way he describes our cognition of God: Malebranche often speaks of our "idea of God" even though it is his official position· that we should speak of an idea of X only if the X is exhibited to us by something distinct from X, and hence that there is no idea of God. Arnauld emphasizes that he uses "idea" and "perception" to refer to the same thing, which is a mental act. But he adds that "idea" refers to a mental act considered precisely as having something exist in it objectively. (Ideas, 19-21; OA, Vol. XXXVIII, 198-200) In fact he speaks of both perceptions and ideas as representations of objects and as items in which things exist objectively. He says that an idea not only represents or makes known its object, but it also represents various properties of its object. These can be represented as connected with the object in several different ways: A property may be represented in an idea as the essence or part of the essence of the idea's object (such as the property of being extended or the property of engaging in thought), or again it may be represented as a property that it is possible that the object may have because of its essence (such as the property of having such and such a shape, or the property of thinking about geometry), or again it may be represented as a property common to the object and to other objects that are essentially different from it (such as the property of being created). In all such cases, the property is represented as "compatible with the object (qui peut convenir a cet objet)." (Ideas, 129; OA, Vol. XXXVIII, 306) Because our ideas contain some of the properties of the things they represent, Arnauld says, we can discover how those properties are related to one another by reflecting upon the ideas. 22 Arnauld emphasizes that it is in the modes of our own mind that we can discover the connections among properties of things: .. .in addition to the reflection which can be called virtual and which is found in all our perceptions, there is another, more explicit, in which we examine our perception by another perception, as everyone can easily verify. This occurs especially in the sciences which are formed only by the reflections that men make upon their own perceptions, as when a geometer, having conceived a triangle as a figure bounded by three straight lines, has found, by examining

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his perception of that figure, that it had to have three angles and that the three angles had to be equal to two right angles... ...WE ALSO SEE how we ought to interpret the statement that it is in the idea of each thing that we see its properties. Surely nothing is more useless for that purpose than the representative being, distinct from perceptions, which our soul is supposed [by Malebranche] to need in order to conceive of numbers and extension. (Ideas, 25-26, 28; OA, Vol. XXXVIII, 204-205, 207)

lIe emphasizes the same point in a letter to Leibniz: ...from the obscurity and difficulty of knowing how things are in God's knowledge, and what sort of connection obtains among them there, whether it is an intrinsic or extrinsic connection, so to speak, all I want to conclude is that it is not in God, who, as far as we are concerned, dwells in an inaccessible light, that we ought to seek the true notions, individual or specific, of the things we know, but rather in the ideas of them that we find in ourselves. 23

This conclusion supports and underscores the doctrine of the limits of human knowledge which had been presented in the Logic. Arnauld applies the doctrine to the idea of God, and the application is inlportant for his criticism of Malebranche's theodicy. In the controversy with Malebranche, the Defense de Mr. Arnauld contre la Reponse au livre Des vrayes et des fausses idees, published in 1684, Arnauld says that by reflecting on our idea of God "we recognize...what He is, insofar as the feebleness of our nature permits." (OA Vol. XXXVIII, 543) In this way he thinks that we can "see that he is eternal, all knowing, omnipotent, the source of all truth and beauty, creator of all things..." Yet our idea of God is abstract. 24 In particular, although our idea of God includes the property of being all knowing and the property of having a will that cannot be resisted, these properties are present only abstractly in our idea. We cannot understand, we have no idea, of how, specifically, it is that God knows or wills. Arnauld's clearest statement of the last point, that we have no specific idea of how it is that God knows or wills, occurs in his letter to Leibniz of May 13, 1686: What do we know at present [in this life] about God's knowledge? We know that he knows all things, and that he knows them all by a single and entirely simple act, which is his essence. When I say we know this, I mean that we are sure that it must be so. But do we comprehend it? Ought we not recognize that, however sure we are that it is so, it is impossible for us to conceive how it can be so? Can we conceive that God's knowledge is his very essence, which is entirely necessary and immutable, and yet that he has knowledge of an infinity of things which he might not have had, because the things might not have been? It is the same with respect to his will, which is also his very essence, in which there is nothing that is not

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ELMARJ. KREMER necessary. And yet he wills and has willed from all eternity things that he might not have willed. 25

Arnauld, of course, held that we do have specific, clear and distinct ideas of our own cognition and volition. These ideas are of two types: First, there are ideas of knowing and willing which are not distinct from the knowing and willing themselves. Arnauld held that every mental act is conscia sui, and as such can be called an idea of itself as well as of its original object. (Ideas, 25~ OA, Vol. XXXVIII, 204) Every act of mind, in addition to exhibiting some26 thing other than itself to the mind, also exhibits itself to the mind. Second, there are the ideas of our mental acts which arise when "we examine our perception by another perception." (Ideas, 26-8~ OA, Vol. XXXVIII, 204-7) The content of both sorts of ideas is the same. But how is their content related to the idea of God, which also contains the property of having knowledge and will? Arnauld's position seems to be that our ideas of God's knowing and willing are abstract versions of our ideas of human knowing and willing. God's cognition, like that of human beings, can be said to consist of perceptions in which things exist objectively. (Ideas, 66-67~ OA, Vol. XXXVIII, 145-46) Again, within God, as within human beings, Arnauld distinguishes between willing to permit X to happen, and willing that X happen?7 However, knowing and willing can correctly be attributed to God only if we abstract from everything in human knowing and willing that implies finitude or imperfection. As Arnauld's letter to Leibniz, cited just above, indicates, this means that when God has cognition of a contingent occurrence outside of himself, this does not involve an act of cognition within God distinct from his essence. Again, when God efficaciously wills that something occur in the created order, he does not bring about the effect by eliciting an act of volition distinct from his essence. Arnauld thought that Malebranche fell into confusion about God's knowledge and volition, that he attempted to exceed the limits to theological knowledge set by our idea of God, and in the process fell into a grossly anthropomorphic account of God's knowledge and volition. This confusion, in Arnauld's view, contributed mightily to the mistakes in his theodicy. My hypothesis is that he thought that the careful reader of Ideas would be forearmed against this confusion and these mistakes by gaining a firm grasp on several important principles: (1) that any object of our cognition is represented to us by our own perceptions (that is, by our own ideas); (2) that it is by reflecting on our own ideas that we should attempt to discover the modal connections among the properties of things~ and (3) that if we reflect on the idea of God we will find that although it contains the properties of omniscience and having an all-powerful will, these properties are contained there only in an abstract way. Before turning to Arnauld's attack on Malebranche's theodicy, let me point out that Ideas resembles the Logic in that what it has to say about the nature of ideas is quite thin. Although Arnauld returns, in Ideas, to the notion of object-

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ive existence, he says very little about its relation to other sorts of existence. Again, he does not discuss the relation between his claim that objects exist objectively in the nlind, and the claim that the properties of objects exist objectively in the mind. Similarly, the entire work assumes some sort of mindbody dualism, but he does not explain his dualism or offer any argument in its favor. These are a few of the points one might have expected to see discussed if one assumed that Arnauld's purpose was to develop a metaphysical or epistemological theory. But he does not take them up. Nor does he argue extensively in favor of his own chief claims about the nature of ideas. Instead he says that they should be obvious to anyone who takes the trouble to reflect on his own mind. His attitude is intelligible if we see him as assembling points about the nature of ideas which he thinks will help his readers avoid mistakes in thinking about other topics, but not if we see him as attempting to develop a systematic position on a theoretical problem of metaphysics or epistemology. III: Arnauld's Critique of Malebranche's Theodicy of Nature and Grace28 The main purpose of Malebranche's theodicy is to reconcile the proposition that not all men are saved, with the proposition, "God wills that all men be saved." (First Epistle to Timothy, 2,4)29 There were at least two such reconciliations already in the field: The Augustinian view that "all men" in the text from I Timothy means "men of all nations and races," the point of the text being to emphasize the universalist view of Christianity as against Judaisnl;30 and the Thomistic position that the text refers only to God's "antecedent will" as contrasted with his "consequent will.,,31 The Augustinian position had been taken up by Jansen, and defended by Arnauld. 32 Malebranche rejected it out of hand. 33 He accepted something like the Thomistic position, but wanted to show that the will whereby God wills that all men be saved was a "sincere will," and not, as Aquinas would have it, a nlere "velleity.,,34 To this end, Malebranche thought he needed, and could provide, an explanation of why God did not save all men, even though he sincerely wanted to. The core of Malebranche's explanation, as Arnauld sees it,35 is a claim about God's volitions: that with the rare exception of miracles, God's wisdom pernlits him to act with regard to creatures only by general volitions and not by particular volitions. This means, to begin with, that everything that happens in the created world is covered by a general law. (In the material world everything that happens is covered by the basic laws of nlotion, of which Malebranche thought there were just two.) But the principle that God acts only by general, and not by particular volitions also nleans, at least according to Arnauld, that the content of God's volition-what God wills-·does not by itself determine any particular effect of the volition. Arnauld expounds the point as follows: We can say, according to the new system, that [in the material world] God does not will anything properly, positively and directly, except that all motion takes place or tends to take place in a

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ELMARJ. KREMER straight line, and that in collisions the motion is communicated (les mouvements se communiquent) in proportion to the colliding bodies. 6 (Traite,243i

We can say that God wills the particular effects that take place in the created world-but only indirectly. That is, he has general volitions .like those just mentioned, and these issue in particular effects upon the occurrence of antecedent, created occasional causes. Thus Malebranche says, "In order that the general cause act by laws or general volitions, and that his action be regular [reglee], constant and uniform, it is absolutely necessary that there be some occasional cause which determines the efficacy of the laws..." (Traite, 67)37 All disorders and evils in the natural order and in the order of grace are the direct responsibility of occasional causes, and can be attributed only improperly and indirectly to God. Applying these principles to the distribution of grace, Malebranche argues that the occasional cause of the distribution of grace is the intercession of Jesus Christ, acting in his human nature. So the general volition by which God distributes grace is the volition that people are to receive exactly such grace as Jesus, acting in his human nature, requests for them. The fact that not all people receive the grace that would bring about their salvation is explained by the fact that Jesus requests grace for people only on the basis of his limited knowledge of their inner lives and their need for grace. 38 Arnauld thought that the views about Jesus to which Malebranche was led by his "system" were heretical, and that he had been led into them by a mistaken philosophy: Recall the time when you had not fallen into that new philosophy, that the universal cause ought not act by particular volitions, either in the order of nature or in the order of grace. Judge for yourself what you would have said at that time about the strange thoughts into which you have been thrown by that false principle, if someone else had proposed them to you.. .! limit myself to two...

One is that the soul of Jesus Christ, although personally united to the Word, is so little dependent on it that it has no power other than that of an occasional cause, and that it exercises that power only by...desires that it has from itself, without the Word forming any of them in it and determining it to have them. The other is, that the same soul, although wholly united to the eternal wisdom, is so little enlightened thereby that it does not know the secrets of hearts, no matter how much it needs to know them, according to you, in order to act wisely in the distribution of grace. (Reflexions, 844-45)39 This is not the place to go into the many and varied arguments that Arnauld mounted against both the philosophical and theological parts of Malebranche' s position. But in addition to these arguments, he gives an account of the genesis of Malebranche's position. Part of this account is contained in the above passage: that Malebranche was led into novel theological views he would otherwise have rejected,40 by the philosophical principle mentioned at the

Arnauld on Ideas as a Topic in Logic 75 beginning of the passage. The rest of the account is that Malebranche espoused the philosophical principle on the basis of no more than "comparisons [of God] \vith men, which on the one hand prove quite the contrary of what he claims, and which on the other cannot prove anything about God~ and popular thoughts, unworthy, it seems to me, of a philosopher, which reduce the vast extent of the plans of God...to a single end." (Reflexions, 188) Arnauld singles out, in the First Discourse of Malebranche's Traite, five "reasons" for the philosophical principle that is basic to his entire system. The first two are comparisons of God's actions with those of human beings, which Arnauld thinks are improper because they attribute to God the imperfections of human ways of acting~ the other three are popular notions that ignore the complexity of the ends for which God brings things about in the created order. The first reason begins with the observation that "An excellent workman proportions his action to his work: he does not accomplish in complex ways what he could carry out by simpler ways~ he never acts without a goal, and he never expends useless efforts." It continues with the claim that "God finds in the infinite treasures of his wisdom an infinity of possible worlds...which he could establish," and concludes that God "is determined to create the one that could be produced and conserved by the simplest laws, or which would be the most perfect in relation to the simplicity of the ways needed for its production and conservation." (Quoted by Arnauld, in Reflexions, 188, from Traite, Premier Discours, # 13.) Arnauld says that this does not establish Malebranche's principle for two reasons: First, even for a human workman, wisdom dictates that he first decide on what he wants to make and then consider the simplest way to accomplish it. Second, the only "vay that consideration of the means to achieve a goal enters into the choice of a goal by a wise human workman is that such a workman limits his goals to those he has the means to carry it out. But no such consideration could affect God's choice. Hence, says Arnauld, "these comparisons of earthly workmen with the infinite and all powerful Workman prove nothing..." (Reflexions, 190) The second reason is "once again a comparison with men." (Reflexions, 190) It begins with the claim that someone who first makes something and then destroys it, thereby shows a lack of intelligence or of constancy: "He who builds a house and then tears down a wing in order to rebuild it, shows his ignorance~ he who plants a vine and tears· it out as soon as it has taken root, shows his fickleness (legerete)~ because he who wills and then no longer wills lacks either intelligence or strength of mind." But God cannot act "by caprice or ignorance." Hence, when fruit that is nearly ripe is destroyed by hail, God does not bring this about "by particular volitions," but rather by general volitions or general laws. (Quoted from Traite, Premier Discours, #19, at Reflexions, 190.) Once again, Arnauld says that what Malebranche claims does not hold true in general even for human beings, who often enough build something for temporary use and then tear it down, without thereby showing

76 ELMARJ. KREMER any deficiency in intelligence or any fickleness. But it is even more obviously false in the case of God. For if a fruit is killed by hail before it is ripe, then evidently God, by one particular volition, willed that the fruit should attain a particular degree of maturity, and, by another particular volition, willed that it should killed by hail, and there is not the slightest indication of contradiction here, no sign that God "wills and then no longer wills." The third reason begins \vith the claim that each seed of a plant contains in miniature the full blown plant, and hence that it is clear that God wills in a very true sense (veut en un sens tres-veritable) that every seed should develop into a mature plant. 41 Yet many seeds are prevented from developing by "hail or some other untoward accident which is a necessary consequence· of the laws of nature." (Quoted from Traite, Premier Discours, #23, at Rejlexions, 197.) This would never happen, says Malebranche, if "God were not a general cause who must not act by particular volitions." His thought seems to be that the volitions by which God actually causes things to happen in the created order, what he elsewhere calls God's "practical volitions," are a subset of God's "true volitions,"42 and that God's true volitions can be frustrated by the laws of nature only if God's practical volitions are necessarily general and not particular. 43 Arnauld's basic response to this argument is that there is no reason to think that God truly wants every seed to develop into a mature plant. On the contrary, God evidently makes seeds to serve a variety of purposes, including that of nourishing animals. Thus Malebranche's argument is nothing but a popular consideration, which ignores the multiplicity of ends that may be served by something God brings about. The fourth reason begins with the claim that God could without doubt have made the world more perfect than it is; he could have done this, for example, by making the rain fall more often on ploughed fields and less often in the sea. But in order to make the world more perfect, Malebranche concludes, God would have had to change "the simplicity of his ways," that is, he would either have had to act by particular volitions or by a larger number of general volitions. 44 To this Arnauld responds in part as he had to the third reason: "Rain is useful for many other things than to make the earth fruitful." But he adds, "We do not even need that reply, because there is an infinity of things, as the Author must agree, that God has nlade...without our being able to discern his plan in making them." (Rejlexions, 201) The fifth and last reason has to do with "monsters," that is, malformed animals. Malebranche claims that God, "in a true sense would like [souhaite] all of his creatures to be perfect. ..he does not love monsters." Hence "if he could,by ways just as simple, make and conserve a more perfect world, he would not have established laws of which so many. monsters are necessary consequences." (Quoted from Traite, Premier Discours, #22, at Rejlexions, 202.) By "ways just as simple," he seems to mean "by general volitions that are just as few in number." It is strange, says Arnauld, that Malebranche did not -------------- -

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Arnauld on Ideas as a Topic in Logic 77 realize that he undercuts his own argument by his very next statement: "But it would have been unworthy of his wisdom, to multiply his volitions in order to avoid certain particular deformities, WHICH INDEED PRODUCE A SORT OF BEAUTY IN THE UNIVERSE." (Arnauld's emphasis) Arnauld's point is the Augustinian one, that the beauty and good order of the world as a whole is a sufficient explanation of the existence of monsters and other things that we find hideous. Hence the existence of monsters is no evidence for Malebranche's claim that God must produce the world by a small number of general volitions or general laws. Arnauld's criticism of the five "reasons" is not so much a cool and respectful refutation of an argument as an attempt to show that Malebranche's "new system" is based on a mass of confusion. Clearly Arnauld thinks that Malebranche's theodicy is not just wrong, but wrongheaded. 45 My hypothesis is that Arnauld thought Malebranche fell into this confusion, though he knew enough to have avoided it, because he refused to limit his philosophical claims about God to those that he could square with the content of his own idea of God; and that he was led to transgress the limits of human theological knowledge in this way by his failure to recognize that God is represented or exhibited to him by his own finite idea of God. If he had recognized this, then, in Arnauld's view, he would have avoided the sort of crude anthropomorphic speculation about God that led him to his philosophical principle and beyond it to a novel and mistaken theology. I must admit that there is little direct textual evidence to support my hypothesis. But perhaps there is at least one bit of textual support. At the outset of On True and False Ideas, Arnauld ties the work together with his anticipated critique of Malebranche's theodicy as follows: Our friend warned us, in the second edition of his Treatise ofNature and Grace, that in order to understand it well it would be a propos to know what principles are set forth in the book The Search after Truth. He emphasized in particular his doctrine on the nature of ideas, i. e., his opinion that we see all things in God. Therefore I set about studying that doctrine, and after careful consideration found so little appearance of truth, to put it mildly, in everything that our friend teaches on the subj ect, that I thought I could do no better than to begin by showing him that there is more reason than he thinks to distrust the heap of speculations which seemed certain to him, so that by this lesson he would be disposed to seek an understanding of the mysteries of grace in the light of the saints rather than in his own thoughts. (Ideas, 2; OA, Vol. XXXVllI, 180)

The "heap of speculations" to which Arnauld here refers is, of course, Malebranche's account of ideas in Book III, Part II of the Search. We have now seen that Arnauld also thought that Malebranche's account of grace was a heap of misguided speculations. It is not, I think, a very great leap to the conclusion that Arnauld thought the heap of speculations about grace was a result of the

78 ELMAR J. KREMER heap of speculations about ideas, and that the way to avoid both was by developing a correct account of the nature of ideas. NOTES 1. Nicole aArnauld, 2 juin 1682. Reproduced by Andre Robinet in Correspondance acts et documents, 1638-1689, recueillis et presentes par Andre Robinet, volume xvm of Oeuvres Completes de Malebranche (Paris: 1. Vrin) p. 238. These Oeuvres were published between 1958 and 1969 under Robinet's direction, and will be cited hereinafter as OC. Volume xvrn will be cited as Documents. All translations in this paper are my own. 2. " ... son livre des vraies et des fausses idees n'ayant effectivement pas plus de rapport au Traite de la Nature et de la Grace que la guerre du Turc en Hongrie ..." (Troisieme lettre contre Defense de M..Arnauld, #5, OC, vol. VI) 3. Reponse au livre de Mr. Arnaud, Des Vrayes et des fausses idees, OC, vol. VI, p. 18. 4. Arnauld to Quesnel, 18 October, 1682, in Documents, OC, vol. XVIII, 241-42. 5. See Arnauld's impassioned conunents about the importance of the questions about ideas if we are to speak worthily of God, at the beginning of the eighth of his 1685 Lettres de Monsieur Arnauld au Reverend Pere Malebranche sur les idees generales, la grace & retendue intelligible, Oeuvres de Messire Antoine Arnauld, edited by G. Du Pac De Bellegarde and 1. Hautefage, 43 volumes (Paris-Lausanne: Sigismond D'Arnay et Cie, 1775-1783) vol. XXXIX, p. 119. This set will be cited hereinafter as OA. See also the list of Arnauld's main disagreements with Malebranche at the end of Quatres lettres de Monsieur Arnauld au Pere Malebranche, written in 1694, the year of Arnauld's death, OA, vol. XL, pp. 108-9. 6. Steven Nadler, Arnauld and the Cartesian Philosophy of Ideas (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1989) pp. 182-83. Hereinafter cited as Nadler. 7. Nadler, p. 179. 8. Nadler, p. 101. 9. Thomas Reid, Essays on the Intellectual Powers ofMan , in Philosophical Works, with notes and supplementary discussion by Sir William Hamilton, 2 vols. (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1967) vol. I, p. 297. 10. The debate is summarized in Monte Cook, "Arnauld's Alleged Representationalism," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 12(1974) pp. 53-64, and more recently in Nadler, p. 104ff. 11. Perceptual Acquaintance from Descartes to Reid (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1984) p. 221. 12. Nadler, p. 143. 13. Richard A. Watson, "Arnauld, Malebranche, and the Ontology of Idea," The Great Arnauld and Some of His Philosophical Correspondents, Elmar 1. Kremer, ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) pp. 129-137. 14. Antoine Arnauld et Pierre Nicole, La Logique ou 1~rt de Penser, Edition critique par Pierre Clair et Fran90is Girbal, Seconde edition revue (Paris: 1. Vrin, 1993). All references to La Logique are to this edition and will be given in parentheses in the main text.

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15. Ideas, like Chapter One of the Logic, also provides a discussion of the origin of ideas, but Arnauld makes it clear that this topic is less important for his attack on Malebranche than that of the nature of ideas. 16. Throughout this paper I quote Antoine Arnauld, On True and False Ideas, New Objections to Descartes's Meditations and Descartes's Replies, translated, with an introduction by Elrnar 1. Kremer (Lewiston: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1990). References to the page numbers of this translation, followed by those in volume 38 of the Oeuvres de Messire Antoine Arnauld will be given in parentheses in the main text. 17. Regarding the authorship of the Logic, I accept the judgment of the editors of the critical edition: "On ne sait pas d'une maniere certaine ce qui revient a Arnauld et a Nicole dans la composition de I 'Art de Penser." (Logic, note 1, p. 335) I shall assume that Arnauld shares the views expressed in the work. Indeed, he quotes the work as if it were his own in his Defense... contre la Reponse au Livre des vraies et des fausses Idees, OA, vol. XXXvm:, p. 367. (The historical and critical preface to volume XLI of OA misidentifies the location of this text.) I would add, however, that Nicole seems to have been responsible for the additions to the later editions of the work. This point is made by Racine, and confirmed by the editors OA. (Racine's comment is cited by Clair & Girbal in note 1 of their edition. See also OA, vol. 41, p. iv.) This may help to explain the fact that the doctrine about the nature of ideas emphasized by Arnauld in Ideas-that an idea is a cognitive act considered as that in which the thing known exists objectively-does not appear in the Logic. Not only was the material added to the Logic in 1683 most likely the work of Nicole rather than Arnauld, but, as we have seen, Nicole had counselled Arnauld not to begin his attack on Malebranche by discussing the nature of ideas. It is not, then, entirely surprising that the doctrine Arnauld worked out for the first time in Ideas does not show up in the 1683 edition of the Logic. 18. Hence the fact that Arnauld elsewhere characterizes the questions dealt with in On True and False Ideas as "metaphysical" (note 4 above), does not count against rny proposal to consider it as a treatise in logic. Nor does the fact that Arnauld's attack on Malebranche's theodicy is primarily theological count against my hypothesis, for the authors of the Port-Royal Logic, from the very beginning, thought it would be useful in theology as well as philosophy. The point is underscored in the fifth edition, which appeared in 1683, the same year as Ideas: The "Avertissement sur cette nouvelle edition" points out although that the 1683 additions have to do largely with theological difficulties raised by certain Protestant Ministers regarding the eucharist, "they are no less proper and natural to Logic." (p. 12) 19. See Malebranche, Reponse au livre de Mr. Arnauld, Des vrayes et des fausses idees, in OC, vol. V, p. 50, and Arnauld, Defense... contre la Reponse au Livre des vraies & des fausses Idees, OA, vol. XXXVIII, p. 381 ff. Nadler (p. 82) comments on this point. 20. See for example the thirteenth paragraph of the Third Meditation, which includes an interplay of "repraesento" and "exhibeo." Here is a literal translation: To be sure, in so far as those ideas are only certain modes of thinking, I do not recognize any inequality among them and they all seem to proceed from me in the same way; but, in so far as one represents (repraesentat) one thing, and another another it seems that they are quite different from one another. For without doubt those which exhibit (exhibent) substance to me are something greater, and, so to speak, contain in then1selves more objective

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reality, than those which represent (repraesentant) only modes, or accidents; and on the other hand that [idea] through which I understand a supreme God, eternal, infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, and creator of all things outside of himself, has more objective reality in itself, that those through which finite substances are exhibited (exhibenter)." (Adam & Tannery, vol. Vll, p. 40. Emphasis mine). The two occurrences of "exhibeo" as well as the two of "repraesento" were translated by "representer" in the 1647 French translation by the Duc de Luynes. Similarly, the new English translation by Cottingham, et al., like that of Haldane & Ross, translates both "exhibeo" and "repraesento" by the English "to represent." Michelle Beyssade, in her recent French translation of the original Latin text, translates "repraesento" by "representer" and "exhibeo" by "donner a voir" (Descartes, Meditations metaphysiques, Texte Latin et traduction du Duc du Luynes; Presentation et traduction de Michelle Beyssade (Librairie Generale Francaise, 1990) pp. 100-3). It may be wondered whether Descartes is using the two tenns to draw a technical distinction, whether "repraesento" goes with accidents and "exhibeo" with substance. But other texts in the Meditations seem to rule this out. I take it that Descartes is using the two different words to express the same concept. 21. Cf. Ideas, p. 21; OA, vol. XXXVIII, p. 200. 22. In order to discover how the properties are related we must make sure not to confuse one idea with another or one property with another in a single idea. It seems to be Arnauld's view that confused ideas are always the product of precipitous judgments. On this point see Alan Nelson, "The Falsity in Sensory Ideas: Descartes and Arnauld," in: Interpreting Arnauld, Elmar 1. Kremer, ed., (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996). 23. Arnauld to Leibniz, 13 May 1686, in Leibniz, Discours de Metaphysique et Correspondance avec Arnauld, edited by Georges Le Roy (Paris: 1. Vrin, 1957) p. 99. The Amauld-Leibniz correspondence took place while Arnauld was in the midst of his controversy with Malebranche, and there are many echoes of that controversy in this letter to Leibniz. 24. " .. .in this life the mind knows God only abstractly..." Humanae Libertatis Notio, in Causa Arnaldina, edited by P. Quesnel (1699, apud Hoyoux, Leodici Eburonium) p. 104. A French translation of this work by Quesnel is contained in OA, 10, and the above quotations found on p. 618. 25. This passage occurs one page earlier than that quoted at note 23 above. 26. "I know myself then, in knowing other things." (Ideas, p. 6; OA, vol. XXXVIII, p. 184.) 27. See for example, OA, XXXIX, p. 281. 28. Arnauld criticizes Malebranche's theodicy primarily in the Reflexions philosophiques et theologiques sur Ie nouveau systeme de la nature et de la grace, published in two instalments, in 1685 and 1686, and I shall be concerned mainly with this work. But the picture is in fact more con1plicated on both sides. The work in which Malebranche first developed his theodicy, and which Arnauld pron1ised to criticize, was the Traite de fa nature et de la grace, first published in 1680. But Malebranche had anticipated some of the themes of that work in the fifteenth Eclaircissement to the Recherche de la verite, published in the third edition, in 1678, and expounded his theodicy again in the Meditations Chretiennes et metaphysiques, first published in

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1683. Arnauld, on the other hand, began his direct criticism of this theodicy in 1685 with his Dissertation sur les miracles de I'ancienne loi, a work followed shortly by the first volume of the Reflexions. The Reflexions are found in volume XXXIX of OA, and will be cited hereafter by page numbers given in parentheses in the main text. 29. I translate Malebranche's French, "Dieu veut que tous les hommes soient sauvez." See Malebranche, Traite de la Nature et de la grace, Troisieme Eclaircissement, #21, OC, vol. V. All further references to the Traite are to this edition and will be given in the main text in parentheses. 30. This interpretation receives some support from the fact that Paul goes on to say, "For this I was appointed a preacher and apostle...a teacher of the Gentiles in faith and truth." (I Timothy, 2, 7) 31. On these two traditions see Jean Laporte, La Doctrine de Port-Royal, Les Verites sur la grace (Paris: Vrin, 1923) pp. 250-51. 32. The fifth of the five condemned Jansenist propositions is "It is Semipelagian to say that Christ died or shed his blood for each and every man [Christum pro omnibus omnino hominibus mortuum esse aut sanguinem fudisse]." The text can be found in Hem. Denzinger & Carolus Rahner, Enchiridion Symbolorum (Rome: Herder, 1960) p. 361. 33. The introduction to the edition of the Traite in volume V of OC reproduces a passage from Malebranche's biographer, P. Andre, in which a letter is quoted as follows: "If people in this century did not so obstinately maintain that God does not have a sincere will to save all men, it would not be so necessary to establish the principles which serve to destroy that unhappy opinion.. .I protest before God that that was the principal motive that made me [qui m'a presse] to write" [the Traite] (p. xliv). 34. See Arnauld's comments on this point in Reflexions, p. 198. 35. I set aside the question of whether Arnauld's account of Malebranche's position is fair and accurate. On this question, see two long and excellent introductions to the Traite: one by Ginette Dreyfus, to a presentation of the original, 1680, version of the Traite (Paris, 1958)-not to be confused with volume V of the Ouevres Completes de Malebranche, also edited by Drefus-and one by Patrick Riley, to his English translation, Treatise on Nature and Grace (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992). 36. The reference to willing "properly, positively and directly" is taken from Meditations Chretiennes, VII, which can be found in OC, volume X. 37. Cf. Traite, Premier Eclaircissement, #4, "When we see that an effect is produced immediately after the action of an occasional cause, we should judge that the effect was produced by the efficacy of a general will." (p. 149) 38. See the brief "abrege" of Malebranche's "new system regarding grace" given by Arnauld in Reflexions, pp. 673-74. 39. Arnauld held to the traditional view that Jesus, in his human nature, had habitual knowledge of everything known to God. He cites Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Part ill, Question 9. 40. Arnauld says repeatedly that Malebranche violates his own principle, "that in matters of theology, novelty is a sign of error, and it is right to discount [mepriser] opinions for the sole reason that they are new and without foundation in the tradition." (Reflexions, p. 171) In the very title of the work, and repeatedly in the text, he refers to Malebranche's position on nature and grace as "Ie nouveau systeme," and the complaint rehearsed at the end of each of the three books into which the work is divided. (Reflexions, pp. 414, 643, 848)

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41. Malebranche, like Leibniz, held the "homunculus" theory of plant and animal reproduction. 42. For the expression "practical volitions," see the Troisieme Eclaircissement to the Traite, # 5 and 6, pp. 179-80. 43. Arnauld makes some interesting conunents about what Malebranche might have meant by "willing in a very true sense," comparing Malebranche's terminology to the Thomistic distinction between God's antecedent and consequent will. 44. The fourth "reason" (Reflexions, p. 199) is taken from the Traite, Premier Discours, # 14. But the source of the quoted matter is not identified by Arnauld, who says, instead, "Voyez 1. Discours, Partie I. art. 2. art. 38 & dans l'Eclaircissement art. 7. 15.16.17." 45. Arnauld's account of Malebranche's five "reasons" resembles Chapter IV of On True and False Ideas, in which he tries to show "that what the author of The Search after Truth says about the nature of ideas.. .is based on fantasies which we retain from the prejudices of childhood." (12~ OA, vol. XXXVllI, p. 190)

Francis Hutcheson's Logicae Compendium and the Glasgolv School of Logic l EMILY MICHAEL

1. Introduction I wish to show that a distinctive epistemological logic, a particular strain of a modern logic tradition, here called the logic of ideas, took root at the University of Glasgow during the late seventeenth century, culminating in Francis Hutcheson's popular Logicae Compendium. 2 Hutcheson's logic text was published posthumously in 1756, completing thereby a set of textbooks by Hutcheson for two years of the arts curriculum regularly taught at the Scottish universities. Hutcheson's logic text was used in the logic course of Glasgow professor James Clow for the next thirty years,3 and after Clow, it was used by his successor as professor of logic, George Jardin, at least during the early years of his tenure. Hutcheson's text, thereby, shaped and crystallized, with its publication, the distinctive epistemological approach to logic of the school of Glasgow that I have characterized as a strain of the modern logic of ideas. In the early seventeenth century, the curriculum at the Scottish Universities (i. e., at the Universities of Glasgow, Edinburgh, Aberdeen, and St.Andrews) was a four-year course: humanities (Latin and Greek) in the first year~ and three years of philosophy courses, logic, metaphysics, moral philosophy, and natural philosophy.4 Human cognition, during this period, was discussed in the natural philosophy course as a subject of psychology, i. e., the science of the vital and cognitive operations of living things, a study shaped, in particular, by Aristotle's De Anima and Parva Naturalia. At this time, nletaphysics, concerned, in particular, with ontology, had Aristotle's Metaphysics as its chief source~ and logic, with Aristotle's Organon as its chief source, was viewed as a linguistic study of terms and their logical relations. The place of human cognition in the Scottish curriculum changed over the seventeenth century. 5 In the early eighteenth century, cognition remained, as previously, a subject in the natural philosophy course. But this course was viewed as the study of the nature of bodies (somatology), and examined the fundamental principles, structure, and activities of bodies, inanimate bodies and living things, and in this context considered the human soul's cognitive powers and the corporeal organs empowered by the soul. In addition, the metaphysics course changed its character with the addition to it of a study of the nature of spiritual substances (pneumatology), considering, in particular, God and the human mind~ metaphysics, thereby, examined the contents and activities of the human mind, and so too examined human cognition. Finally, the logic course also changed its character. The Scottish schools, influenced by humanistic and early modern developments, claimed a new interest in teaching students to think clearly and

84 EMILY MICHAEL write effectively. At the University of Glasgow, this promoted the development of a distinctive epistemological approach to logic. Logic was viewed as the study of the nature, origin, and logical relations of ideas, and so involved, once again, a study of human cognition. Hutcheson's logic, and with this, the Glaswegian strain of what is called above the logic of ideas developed in this context. The follo\ving is a study of the source and nature of Hutcheson's logic of ideas. But first, it nlight well be asked: what is a logic of ideas? At St. Andre\vs professor William Barron, in his lectures on logic which were published posthumously in 1806,6 develops what is here called a logic of ideas. Barron explains: As the object of logic is to teach the best use of our rational faculty, both in investigating and in communicating truth, the theory of it and the materials of which that theory consists, are deduced from this end. That theory, accordingly, consists of two parts; the nature of ideas, which are the materials on which we reason, and the nature of the faculties or operations of the mind which are concerned in reasoning. Before we can reason, we must have ideas, and before we can reason right, we must understand what kind of operation reasoning is. The explication of both comprehends the whole of logic, which is of any use. (B 367)

Barron is committed to the view that the whole of logic consists in the explication of "the nature of ideas, and the operations employed about them." (B 367) He claims three operations are relevant to the investigation of truth, viz., perception by which ideas are obtained, judgement of in particular "the agreement or disagreement of any two ideas," and reasoning, the comparing of two ideas by means of one or more intermediate ideas. Here we can identify as a fundamental thesis indicative of a logic of ideas: Tl: Logic consists in the explication of the nature of ideas and the operations fundamental to acquiring and effectively employing them. The goal of this logic is the practical one of directing thought to acquire knowledge, and this is seen as involving a study of the elements and the nature of reasoned thought, in particular, of its ideas and intellective operations. Barron's late eighteenth century analysis is clearly and quite exclusively influenced by Locke's theory of ideas. But this is not true of Hutcheson's account; here Locke's imprint is unquestionable, but there are non-Lockean elements as well. Comnlentators have commonly but mistakenly assumed that Hutcheson's theory of perception is that of Locke, and this has led to confusion in interpretation of his moral and aesthetic sense theories. An aim of the following study is to explain the rationale and nature of non-Lockean elements in Hutcheson's Logicae Compendium. In what follows, I will examine the original source of the logic of ideas, and the proximate source and distinctive nature of Hutcheson's logic!~~~_£~3J~}_

Hutcheson's Logicae Compendium and the Glasgow School 85 will illustrate Hutcheson's divergence from Locke's account of ideas by considering several representative issues.

2. The Origin of the Logic of Ideas Henry Aldrich, whose Artis Logicae Compendium was published in 1691,7 shows no knowledge of Locke's recently published Essay On Human Understanding. But Aldrich, in some concluding remarks about logic traditions, vetus et nova, distinguishes, based he says on Gassendi's De Origine & Varietate Logicae, a new and recent logic tradition from the more traditional approach that Aldrich himself takes (and that he claims to share with, for example, Sanderson and Keckermann).8 Candidates for progenitor of this recent logic tradition are Descartes and Bacon, discussed by Gassendi, and Gassendi himself. But Descartes, Aldrich states, has no logic~ and Bacon deals exclusively with experimental methods, not logic proper. This leaves Gassendi's Institutio Logica as the source of the recent modern logic, and Aldrich further explains that the subsequent Ars Cogitandi is the Cartesian version of this modern logic. 9 In both of these seminal texts, consistent with Tl, a logic is built upon a discussion of the nature of ideas ("the materials on which we reason"), and deals essentially with "the operations employed about them." Gassendi, seeking to explain the logic implicit in Epicurus' s account, maintains that, for Epicurus, sense ideas are the basis of all reasoning and therefore oflogic. 1o He thereby develops an empiricist logic, in which all ideas, indeed all thought, has its origin in sense experience. Gassendi defines logic as ars bene cogitandi, the art of thinking well,ll and he sees the goal of logic as the practical one of directing thought to acquire knowledge. For Gassendi, thinking well involves four skills: imagining well, that is, forming correct images or ideas of things~ posing propositions well, that is, advancing propositions that are correct~ inferring well; and ordering welt and accordingly, Gassendi's logic is divided into four parts, considering in turn, imagination, judgement, reasoning and method. In the Port Royal Logic, which appeared four years after Gassendi's Institutio Logicae, logic was defined as the art of thinking. The Port Royal Logic has the same structure as Gassendi's logic, dividing logic into essentially the same four parts, but the theory of ideas in this logic is Cartesian and antiempiricist. As a result of the influence of the Port Royal Logic, and to a lesser extent, of Gassendi's logic as well, a new genre of logic emerged, one in which the theory of ideas was of central concern. Accordingly, when Locke's Essay appeared, it was seen by himself and others as a contribution to logic. Locke's Essay was built on the theory of ideas in Gassendi's logic, and in Hutcheson's logic text we find a logic of this genre. 12 We turn now to the proximate source of Hutcheson's Logicae Compendium.

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3. The Context and Nature of Hutcheson's Logicae Compendium

The late seventeenth century was an unsettled time in the history of logic, and we find in Scotland the variety of logics noted by Aldrich, traditional Aristotelian and humanist logics and syncretist combinations of these, along with the new logic of ideas. I3 A dramatic turning point in Scottish university education occurred in 1695, when a Parliamentary Commission was appointed by the new Presbyterian government to investigate the curriculum of the Scottish universities and to make recommendations for their improvemen1. 14 The Commission mandated that Scottish regents compose common philosophy texts for the four Scottish universities, an aim of which, our evidence suggests, was to guarantee that teachers did not lead their very young charges astray.IS S1. Andrews was responsible for the logic text,16 and an epistemological approach to logic introduced in the St. Andrews text culminated in the logic of ideas of Hutcheson's influential Logicae Compendium. In both works, as was usual in logics of ideas, we find, to explain the logical relations among ideas, such traditional topics as predicables, contrary and contradictory propositions, the figures, moods and basic rules of syllogistic. But in these two Scottish works, we also find a comnl0n, distinctive account of ideas, as will be shown below. Here Hutcheson does not present such original Hutchesonian features as reflex sensation and concomitant ideas found in the discussion of ideas in his metaphysics compend. 17 His account of ideas in his logic compend instead closely corresponds, in structure, content, even terminology, to that of the S1. Andrews text. But the evidence seems to indicate that the original manuscript for the St. Andrews text, a handwritten work, currently in the University of Edinburgh archive collection, was circulated to the Scottish universities at the time,18 but that it was never published, and never actually used in teaching. But then how did the S1. Andrews account of ideas come to Hutcheson, who in 1695 was one year old? In fact, the account of ideas found in the S1. Andrews logic text is found at the University of Glasgow in lectures of John Loudon,19 who taught at St. Andrews when their logic text was written. The common view among contemporary commentators is that Hutcheson was Gershom Carmichael's student,20 but I have argued in a recent paper21 that there is considerable and convincing evidence that Francis Hutcheson was John Loudon's student in logic at the University of Glasgow in 1711-1712, and Loudon's logic lectures of that year are available as a handwritten logic compend. 22 The epistemological logic here presented is strikingly similar to the S1. Andrews logic text and, in turn, is even more similar, e. g., in its terminology, to Hutcheson's logic text. 23 From extant notes, it seems probable that Loudon's logic lectures changed little throughout his fifty-one years of teaching at Glasgow (1699-1750), and I believe that Hutcheson, in his logic, builds on

Hutcheson's Logicae Compendium and the Glasgow School 87 this existing precedent. But why did Hutcheson write this derivative Latin logic text? When the Foulis brothers, Hutcheson's proteges, started a printing firm in Glasgow in 1741, "the state of printing was low...in Scotland,,24 and textbooks were largely unavailable. 25 Hutcheson's Latin moral and metaphysics compends, published in 1742, filled a gap in these subjects, and a year later the Foulis brothers were appointed printers for the University of Glasgow. Perhaps this motivated Hutcheson to compose a logic book to thereby provide the sorely needed texts for two complete years of Glasgow university courses as then taught. 26 Texts were later composed for the other two years (for the beginning year on Humanities, which was the study of Latin and sonle Greek grammar and literature, and for the final year of natural philosophy), and all these texts saw numerous editions. His logic text enabled Hutcheson to foster the continued learning of Latin, one of his stated goals, and also to propagate the distinctive logic of ideas he was taught in his own student days at Glasgow. But why was the latter important to him? I would suggest that the St. Andrews regents and Loudon had, in their logics, an agenda of their own, that was shared by Hutcheson. The distinctive role of Scottish logic is laid out by 8t. Andrews regents in 1695: Man's greatest concern is that of his beatitude, but it is easy to err; it is in our greatest interest to attend diligently so as to observe the causes by which we are seduced into error and to find the remedies of error. This is presented in fine works of ingenious philosophers, who have collected observations and precepts, which can at all moments help us; these are called the observations and rules of a system of logic. 27

The logic of ideas was perceived as a way of learning to think clearly and avoid error, a principal aim of which, among the Scottish Calvinists, was salvation; and the 1695 Commission was concerned to sanitize Scottish education with this aim in mind?8 But, as Locke's new logic was seized upon as a useful analysis of ideas, it was also attacked as way of seducing the unsuspecting into error. Locke separated logic, i. e., the investigation of ideas simpliciter, from psychology and nletaphysics, from considerations about the nature of the mind; but critics of Locke complained that this leads Locke to omit consideration of pure activities of the human mind, activities that do not depend upon the body and that are essential for the mind's immortality. That this consideration was important to Hutcheson is clearly indicated in the arguments for human immortality in his· metaphysics compend, a text based on his own course.29 Locke's approach to ideas can lead to the view that all ideas depend upon corporeal activities, that bodies think and that minds are corporeal and mortal. To avoid this problenl, the Scots considered, in their logic compends, the nature of the faculties of the mind and the mind's purely intellective activities, considerations only lightly touched upon by the Port Royal Logicians, treated

88 EMILY MICHAEL by Gassendi only in his natural philosophy, and not considered by Locke at all. All three Scottish logics, in their discussion of simple apprehension, distinguish the powers of sensation and imagination, which depend upon the body, and the mind's purely intellective powers, which employ no corporeal organ and permit an immortal nlind, correcting thereby this Lockean omission. 30 The introduction into logic of these psychological considerations was a further step in the gradual process of developing, starting from Gassendi' s initial logic of ideas, a more thoroughgoing epistemological logic. In what follovvs, I will examine the common account, in the three Scottish logic compends, of the corporeal and the purely intellective faculties of human cognition. In conclusion, I seek to show that this common Scottish approach inspired differences, on several basic points, in Hutcheson's and Locke's accounts. 4. Corporeal and Purely Intellective Faculties of Cognition All three Scottish works claim, as Barron later does, that logic has the practical role of directing the operations of the mind in acquiring knowledge or investigating truth. All take apprehension, judgement, and discursus to be the mental operations that logic directs. Hutcheson adds an alternative distinction between apprehension and two kinds of judgement, noetic, comparing two ideas, and dianoetic, comparing two ideas by means of a third, as does Loudon. His text is divided into four nlajor sections, entitled On Apprehension, On Noetic Judgement, On Discursus (which is dianoetic judgement), and, finally, On Method, added, as by Loudon, as a appendix?l All three texts describe judgement as passing sentence (ferens sententiam) on two ideas compared with each other,32 and all three, after laying out like rules for deduction, examine seriatim dilemma, enthymeme, induction, example, sorites, and epichirema. We will focus upon the first and fundamental cognitive activity, viz., apprehension, also called by all three, idea or perception. All three works identify apprehension as a simple and bare perception or representation of a thing, without any mental judgement, without affirming or denying anything of it. There are three sorts of ideas, three kinds of perceptions or apprehensions, those of sensation, imagination, and pure intellection. The former two are corporeal perceptions or corporeal ideas. The St. Andrews text explains the first sort of corporeal idea as "a perception of a material thing caused by the occasion of a change which a thing present at this time induces in our body, e. g., as when...a part of the body is moved or agitated, the mind, by that motion, then perceives a thought which is said to be a sensation..." (St. A 25) In the words of both Loudon and Hutcheson, "the perception of a corporeal (material) thing affecting corporeal organs" is a sensation. (L 1.1; H I.I.i) A sensation is corporeal in three ways: 1) A present corporeal object is the exciting cause of a sensation, which itself being twofold, consists of 2) a corporeal impression; and 3) a corporeal image.

Hutcheson's Logicae Compendium and the Glasgow School 89 The view of all three Scottish logics is that a present corporeal object raises a sense idea by affecting, in tum, an external sense organ, nerves and brain. This physical event results in a brain trace, a corporeal impression, and a concomitant sense idea, which is itself a representation or image of the external exciting cause. The St. Andrews text explains the second sort of corporeal idea or perception: "The perception of a material thing, which image is said be an image remaining in the brain, as distinguished from sensation, as e. g., when at night we think of the sun~ when we represent a man, a house, a clock first seen by our senses, now not affecting them, this thought is said to be imagination." . (St. A 25-26) And Loudon and Hutcheson both say, in the same words, "the idea of a corporeal (material) thing while it affects no organ" is imagination. (L 1.1 ~ H Ll.i) Loudon elaborates: "If we are said to perceive a corporeal thing, let us say a cube, and we understand this to be produced by an act, where this thing affects no sense organ...and makes no impression on the body, but if its origin...will be the perception of a corporeal thing by sensation, of which this is an imitation, we say it is by imagination...as an absent friend." (L 1.1) This sort of idea, we are told, is corporeal as the perception of a corporeal object associated with a remaining brain trace~ as such, it is a weaker idea of a previous vivid sense perception. So Loudon, characterizing imagination, explains that "...a preceding sensation...will be a vivid impression in a corporeal organ, and, with the repetition of these same objects of sensation, there will be a/aint trace in the organ, which will be depicted in the brain as an image of the object. .." (L 1.1) And I-Iutcheson sinlilarly says, "Imagination recalls weak ideas of things previously perceived by sensation. Nor is the mind able to form images, except those where all the elements were perceived by sensation." (H Ll.ii) We might see here common ground with Hume's distinction between impressions and ideas. But unlike Locke and Hume, the three texts we are examining distinguish a noncorporeal sort of idea or perception. So the St. Andrews text explains: "Pure intellection is the perception of a thing which is without any material impression." (St.A 26) And Loudon similarly says: "Pure intellection is said to be perception of an object without simulacra, images or corporeal impressions~" (L 1.1) as does Hutcheson: "a pure intellection is 'an idea acquired or understood without the power of any corporeal sense'." (H Ll.i) All three claim that ideas of the brain nlust be imagistic. And these imagistic ideas are perceptions that are initially raised by and that represent particular present or absent external corporeal objects. But human beings also have ideas that are not imagistic and that represent no individual corporeal object, and such non-imagistic ideas cannot be associated with any particular physical impression or brain trace. These non-imagistic ideas or perceptions, Cartesians and Gassendists agree, are acts of an incorporeal entity, the human

EMILY MICHAEL mind itself, and, associated with no present external exciting cause, no brain trace, no image, these ideas are purely intellective. So Loudon, distinguishing two sorts of pure intellections, first, spiritual entities, and, second, all universals, says that "we can perceive...that which cannot be produced by the power of sensation or imagination, as God, the human mind, ideas of all universals~ all these nl0des of perception are said to be pure intellection." (L 1. 1) The St. Andrews text similarly explains that only by intellection, can "we conceive God, angels, the human mind, virtue, truth and so forth." (St. A 26) In these Scottish logic texts, pure intellection supplements a variety of conceptions, inherited from Locke, such as sensation and reflection, 'primary and secondary qualities, simple and complex ideas. I will illustrate this by considering Hutcheson's account of each of these. (1) Hutcheson on Sensation and Reflection: Hutcheson, as Locke, claims that all our ideas have their source in sensation and reflection, but Hutcheson distinguishes reflection of two sorts. First, he explains: "The sensation is also internal that provides purely intellectual perceptions; which power is called consciousness or reflection. This is aware of all actions, passions or modes of the soul; to wit, judging, reasoning, certainty, doubt, joy, sorrow, desire, aversion, love and hate, virtue, vice." (H I.I.iii) This reflective awareness of what my own mind does and undergoes, by means of which I directly apprehend my inferring, doubting, .desiring, fearing, hoping, loving, is like Locke's conception of reflection. But Hutcheson, unlike Locke, analyzes these internal sense perceptions as ideas, which, involving no corporeal impression, no corporeal image, no corporeal exciting cause, are purely intellectual. Second, Hutcheson also sees reflection as the mind's power to call up and to review ideas it already has. By internal sensation, the mind apprehends its activities, its passions, and its external and internal sense ideas. This latter perception, i. e., my internal sense awareness of my ideas, may, in turn, become an object of reflection~ and these internal sense ideas may be compared and contrasted, and other ideas may be fornled on this basis. This is a power by which we can form, in addition to ideas we get from external and internal sensation, ideas of these ideas, that is, higher order ideas, the universal concepts formed by abstraction. By external sensation, I can perceive blue and red, and by internal sensation I can perceive my perceiving; but only by abstractive reflection can I apprehend the universal ideas of color, of sensible quality, of vision, of sense perception, of mind, of spiritual entity. Here reflection, a distinctive power of the immaterial human intellect, is, as in Gassendi's view, the power by which we form abstract general ideas, all of which are purely intellective. Further, Hutcheson takes the view that from my corporeal and intellective ideas, I can, by inference, formulate additional ideas of pure intellection, e. g., ideas of theoretical entities and of such spiritual objects as God and angels. 90

Hutcheson's Logicae Compendium and the Glasgow School 91 Finally, in his metaphysics compend, and elsewhere, Hutcheson adds anothe sort of reflection, fundamental to the awareness of relational qualities that are the objects of aesthetic and moral perception, but consideration of this is beyond the scope of the present project. 33 (2) Hutcheson on Primary and Secondary Qualities: Hutcheson, as Locke, distinguishes, among ideas of external sensation, those of primary and of secondary qualities. He explains, as do the 81. Andrews text and Loudon, that the power in bodies to excite ideas of color, sound, odor, taste, heat and cold are called secondary qualities, each of which is the proper sensible of but one sense. Further, primary qualities are primary in the sense that they, in combination, "have the power of exciting ideas of secondary qualities, to which there is nothing similar in the body itself." (H I.l.i) Only primary qualities are real or true. But while Hutcheson says that primary qualities, extension, figure, situation, nl0tion and rest, number, and duration, are perceived by many senses, he also tells us that accurate ideas of primary qualities are not sensible ideas. He says: "Also referred to pure intellection are accurate and abstract ideas of primary qualities." (H I.1.iii) Accurate ideas of primary qualities have their source in sense experience, but they are in fact abstract ideas of pure intellection. This claim can be better understood through a passage from a 1727 letter of Hutcheson: "Figure and bounded color are not to me the same. Figure accompanies bounded color, but the same or perfectly like idea may arise by touch, without any idea of color, along with the ideas of hard, cold, smooth.,,34 Hutcheson here claims that the real quality of squareness is not like a visible square or a tactile square. We can form a more accurate idea of squareness common to both sensations. This common idea is an idea of pure intellection. Hutcheson, in his letter of 1727, employs this non-Lockean analysis of primary qualities to counter Locke's response to the Molyneux problem: Mssrs. Locke and Molyneux are both wrong about the cube and sphere proposed to a blind man restored to sight. He would not at first view know the sphere from a shaded plain surface by a view from above~ but a side view would discover the equal unifonn round relievo in one, and the cubic in the other. We can all by touch, with our eyes shut, judge what the visible extension of a body felt shall be when we shall open our eyes; but cannot by feeling judge what the colour shall be when we shall see it; which shews visible and tangible extension to be really the same idea, or to have one idea common, viz., the extension; though the purely tangible and visible perceptions are quite disparate. 35

Hutcheson therefore, unlike Locke, claims that no sensible ideas are adequate ideas of objective qualities, but we are able to abstract from them intellectual ideas that are a true or correct understanding of those objective qualities. (3) Hutcheson on Simple and Complex Ideas: Hutcheson first presents what Loudon calls the old notion of simple and complex. Loudon explains that an -------------------------------

92 EMILY MICHAEL apprehension is incomplex (or simple) when we perceive things, however man there may be, without any order or relation to one another, as when we conceive a glass and water. Apprehension is complex when we instead perceive them in relation to each other, as when we perceive water contained in a glass. Hutcheson similarly says that apprehension "is either inconlplex, as, calamus (pen), or complex as, calamus in manu (pen in hand)." (H 1.1.i) In Hutcheson's account oftlie new modern notion of simple and complex, a simple idea is unifornl, and not composed of dissimilar parts; a complex idea is composed of dissimilar parts into which it can be resolved. Here an experienced secondary quality, as, for example, the idea of blue or smooth, is said, as by Locke, to be simple. But, Hutcheson also claims: "The idea of being is the most simple." (H 1.2.iii) Loudon explains this claim further. A simple idea, he says, is analyzed by some as a single uniform perception of a thing divisible into no parts, and from this viewpoint such sensibilia as blue and smooth are simple ideas. But the preferable analysis is: a simple idea is one that does not involve other simpler ideas into which it can be resolved as if into parts. Loudon here distinguishes two senses of simple that are compounded in Hutcheson's account, viz., uniform; and not resolvable into parts. From Loudon's viewpoint, the ideas of sensation are not completely simple. Loudon says that in comparing a color and a taste, there is something in which they agree and something in which they differ, and this shows that each is resolvable into simpler ideas. So, for example, if \tve compare blue with sweet, we find these are alike as sensible qualities, but they also differ for one is a color, the other a savor. Blue is therefore resolvable into the simpler ideas of color and sensible quality. Loudon, as Hutcheson, here asserts that being, which is not further resolvable into simpler parts, is the simplest idea. Resolvability, as here understood by Loudon and Hutcheson, requires further explanation. Hutcheson explains that the complexity of an idea is relative to its conlprehension, which he defines as "the collection of all simple ideas conjoined in the complex, as in animal; body, living, sensitive." (H 1.3.i) The comprehension of idea X is the set of all simpler ideas into which X can be resolved as if into parts. 36 That is, it is all the ideas that can be abstracted fronl X, by comparison and contrast of X with other ideas. This presumes a particular view of abstraction as a matter of perceiving the sinlilarities and differences between ideas, and this view of abstraction is indeed explicitly proposed by both Loudon and Hutcheson. 37 From this viewpoint, once again a departure from Locke, such abstract ideas of pure intellection as being, power, thought, will always be simpler than any idea of a sensible quale. To conclude, Hutcheson's logic text introduces epistemological considerations in the first and foundational section on simple apprehension. That Hutcheson's moral and aesthetic theories were influential is well-known, but virtually unknown is Hutcheson's seminal role in the epistemological logic

Hutcheson's Logicae Compendium and the Glasgow School 93 tradition that developed during the Scottish enlightenment. Hutcheson's logic text continued and integrated a distinctive logic of ideas tradition at the University of Glasgow, and, further, was a principle instrument in the persistence of this tradition well into the eighteenth century. As such, it seems appropriate to conclude that Hutcheson's Logicae Compendium, though largely neglected, merits, as much as his influential aesthetic and moral theories, recognition and further attention. NOTES 1. Research for this paper was partially funded by a grant from the Research Foundation of the City University of New York. All translations are my own unless otherwise noted. 2. Francis Hutcheson's Logicae Compendium (Glasgow: R.& A. Foulis, 1756) was published by his son. (Hereafter noted as H). Hutcheson never taught logic at the University of Glasgow, but his name lent prestige to the posthumously published text. Why or when he wrote the text is not clear. 3. For a transcription of Clow's English lectures on Hutcheson's Latin logic book, see A System of Logic by James Clow A. M., Professor of Logic in the University of Glasgow, transcribed by John Campbell (Glasgow, 1773), University of Edinburgh Library (EUL). 4. A professorial system, in which each year of the curriculum was taught by a professor of Humanities, Logic, Moral Philosophy, and Natural Philosophy respectively, was introduced at Edinburgh in 1708, at Glasgow in 1727, at St. Andrews in 1747, at Aberdeen, Marischal College in 1753, and at Aberdeen, King's College in 1799. Before this, Scottish regents carried a single group of students through all three years of the philosophy classes. Most schools appointed professors of Humanities and Mathematics prior to the above dates. 5. Evidence of the teachings of Scottish regents is provided in published philosophical theses, written by the regent of the graduating class, and in manuscript copies of student lecture notes. Scottish regents of this period dictated lectures to their students. 6. William Barron, Lectures on Belles Lettres and Logic (London, 1806). (Hereafter noted as B) William Barron was professor at St. Andrews from 1778 till 1803. 7. He~ry Aldrich, Artis Logicae Compendium (Oxford, 1691). 8. Aldrich, (Artis Logicae Compendium, "Conclusio," p. 52) says: "Summam ejus exhibet Gassendus cap. 8. De Origine & Varietate Logicae..." He also here mentions "Keckermannus tract. 2. Praecog. Log. c. 2 & 39." See p. 54ff. for his discussion of the new logics of Gassendi and the Ars Cogitandi. 9. See in Collection of papers illustrative of the history and constitution of the University ofEdinburgh, 1611-1742 (2 vols., Dc. 1. 4 (2), EUL, p. 13) in remarks by regents of the University of Edinburgh, the mention of use of both the Ars Cogitandi and Gassendi. See, for example, note 16. 10. See Canon 7 of the Epicurean Canonic in Pierre Gassendi, Opera Omnia (Lyons, 1658), vol. I, p. 55. It begins: Est Anticipatio in omni Ratiocinatione principium. Anticipations (of perception) are interpreted by Gassendi as images. 11. Gassendi, vol. I, p. 91.

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12. For discussion of the influence of Gassendi's logic on Locke's theory of ideas, see E. & F. Michael, "The Theory of Ideas in Gassendi and Locke," Journal of the History ofIdeas, 51 (1990), pp. 379-399. 13. Indeed, logics of ideas appeared in Scotland as early as 1679 in lectures of, for example, Alexander Cockburn of St, Andrews, (Df. 9. 138 (3), EUL); and thereafter. Andrew Massie of Edinburgh (e. g., La. III. 154, EUL, 1680-81), and John Law of Glasgow (e. g., Dc. 8. 18, EUL, 1692). 14. Prior Commissions of the General Assembly of 1642, 1664, 1672, and 1683 had also recommended uniform printed courses, but these reconunendations had little influence until 1695. (See Evidence oral and documentary taken and received by the Commissioners appointed by His Majesty George IV, July 23, 1826.. for Visiting the Universities of Scotland, 4 vols. on Edinburgh, Glasgow, 8t. Andrews, and Aberdeen respectively'(London, 1837)). 15. See report (Evidence, vol. ill, p. 215) dated on April 24 th, 1695, "The which day, it being represented to the Committee for visiting the University of 8t. Andrews, that there are dangerous and pernicious tenets treated in the Dictates and Theses of some of the Masters of this University, which do much tend to Atheism, to the everting of all natural Religion, and consequently to the ruining of the Christian Religion, as likewise to Pyrrhonisme," that the rector investigate theses and dictates for evidence of "whatever error or dangerous principles are taught. " 16. The 8t. Andrews logic text exists as a manuscript in Edinburgh University Library (shelf mark: Dc. 5. 17). (It is hereafter noted as St. A). That this manuscript is the logic contributed by 8t. Andrews to the project of preparing a uniform course in philosophy for the four Scottish universities is convincingly shown by Christine King in the last few (unnumbered) pages of her dissertation, Philosophy and Science in the Arts Curriculum of the Scottish Universities in the 17th Century (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh, 1974). For example, passages cited in discussion of the St. Andrews text found in University of Edinburgh records correspond exactly to passages in this manuscript, page by page. The criticisms presented by the University of Edinburgh can be found in Edinburgh University Papers, Dc. 1. 4 (2), EUL, p. 13, Feb. 1697. Here we find such criticisms as: In the introduction, the three ordinary figures of syllogism are omitted and only Gassendi's figure is presented; "the definitions of genus and species given by Ars Cogitandi need not be so positively approved seeing they are liable to some considerable difficultys." 17. F. Hutcheson, Synopsis Metaphysicae, Ontologiam et Pneumatologiam Complectens, 1742, part IT, ch. 1, sec. iii. 18. The 1695 commission mandated that copies of the 8t. Andrews logic be transmitted to the other universities for their correction, and then be used by all regents the following year. (Collection ofPapers, Dc. 1.4 (2), EUL, p. 119). 19. John Loudon was a regent at the University of Glasgow, 1699-1726, and Professor of Logic from the inception of this position in 1727 until his death in 1750. 20. Carmichael was appointed regent at the University of Glasgow in 1694 and then Professor of Moral Philosophy at Glasgow at the inception of the professorial system in 1727. He died in 1729, and Hutcheson was appointed to replace hinl. Carmichael, in lectures on pneumatology (the study of spriritual substances), develops an account of human cognition that is like the accounts of Loudon and Hutcheson here presented. But Carmichael, in his Breviuscula Introductio ad Logicam (1720), claims that logic is not the correct locus for discussion of the psychological faculties involved in apprehension

Hutcheson's Logicae Compendium and the Glasgow School

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(i. e., sensation, imagination, and pure intellection), and so, in this logic text, he does not adopt the distinctive Scottish logic of ideas approach that we are here examining. Still, Carmichael's logic text is in the modem logic of ideas tradition. lIe states, in a report to the 1695 parliamentary visitation commission (Glasgow University Archives, 43170), that he uses the Port Royal logic in teaching his logic course. Further, in his Breviuscula, Carmichael divides his text into the same four parts as his contemporaries, and defines in much the same way the mental operations of apprehension, judgement, reasoning, and method. In addition, Carmichael develops such Port Royal notions as extension and comprehension, which are also presented in Hutcheson's text. See also Carmichael's logic lectures of 1697 (National Library of Scotland, Ms. 2741) and of 1708 (Glasgow University Library (GUL), Ms. Mu. 67; Ms. Gen. 255). 21. "Francis Hutcheson's Confusing University Career," Notes and Queries, New Series 42 (1995), pp. 56-59. 22. These lectures of John Loudon survive in a notebook in Glasgow University Library, Ms. Gen. 406. (hereafter noted as L) Loudon, in his introductory comments, objects to the dangers of Descartes's skepticism, and sides with Gassendi and with De Vries, who follows Gassendi in his attack on Descartes. 23. For a similar logic of ideas approach, see also, for example, S1. Andrews regent Colin Vilant, "Course on Logic," S1. Andrews (St. Salvatore), 1724, (Dc. 7. 91, EUL). Vilant's handwritten "Course on Logic" is said, on the title page, to be "after the same plan with Mr. Taylor's." Thomas Taylor taught at St. Leonard's, S1. Andrews when the St. Andrews text was written. Student notes of Taylor's lectures of 1698-99 (transcribed by James Goodsire; LF. 1117. c. 99 (1475), 81. Andrews U. Library) are very similar to the 1712 logic lectures of Glasgow regent John Loudon. 24. "A Slight Sketch of the Origin of the Glasgow Press and Academy of the Fine Arts" (EUL, Ms. 363). 25. That is, textbooks were unavailable for the basic university courses, viz., a year of humanities (i. e., Greek and Latin), and three years of philosophy, logic, metaphysics, ethics, and natural philosophy. 26. Another possibility is that Hutcheson originally composed a logic text early in his career, when he taught a logic course as head of a dissenting academy in Dublin. 27. St. Andrews logic text, Preface. 28. John Tran (regent at Glasgow), in a statement for the 1695 Commissioners, entitled "Method of Teaching in the Philosophy Class," says: "After the Public Examination, I begin with them their course of Logic, and finding no presented course I could ever yet satisfy myself .with, some of them being altogether out of the road of the philosophy now most valued; others of a later date industriously stuffed with doctrines of a very dangerous tendency (such as what Le Clerk teaches De Scientia Fide et Opinione in se collatis) and examples, apt enough to make a bad impression on the minds of youth, I dictate to them a short system much the same with what was ordered by the visitation, with some remarks on what I think may be improved or amended." (Glasgow University Archives, Ms. 43228). Gershom Carmichael reports of his teaching of logic at the University of Glasgow, that he first dictates a short compend, and then uses the Ars Cogitandi: "The places of that book that favour Popery are already noticed, and shortly are judiciously obviated.. .in notes that are printed with the book; besides I took further notice of some of them, in my marginal animadversions." (Glasgow University Archives, 43170). See also Munimenta Alme Universitatis Glasguensis, ed. C. lImes, 4 vols. (Glasgow, 1854), in the common statement of Scottish masters (vol. 2,

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p. 530): "Nor when we have seriously perpended the severall courses of philosophy which ar extant can we find any that wee can recomend as sufficient to be taught, for many of then1 ar wryte by popish professors and therein they cunningly insinuate the heretical tenets mixing them with their philosophy which ar not so easyly discerneable by the youth. Nor are the courses of philosophy wryte and calculate to be taught the youth..." 29. Hutcheson, Synopsis Metaphysicae, Pt. IT, ch. 3 and 4. 30. Following Gassendi's strategy, these Scots presume that purely intellective activities require an incorporeal mind, and that the mind, as incorporeal, must be immortal. 31. G. Carmichael, in lectures of 1708 (Ms. Mu. 67, GUL), adopting a similar approach towards the standard fourfold division of logic, distinguishes two maj or divisions in logic, apprehension and judgement. Discursus is treated as a part of the major section on judgement; and method is treated as an appendix. 32. See Jardine: "Judgement is called passing sentence...for in the compend [it is] expressed thus Ferens Sententiam, taken from a law court." He explains that as in a law court, there are three parties, defender, pursuer and judge, and it is the office of the judge to consider the sentence of both parties, and so to weigh them both in his mind, so this is the office of judgement. "For in judgement, the mind compares the subject with the predicate and judges of their agreement or disagreement." (GUL, Ms. Gen. 166, 1783, p. 33). (The compend referred to here is Hutcheson's Logicae Compendium). 33. For a discussion of this sort of reflection, see my paper "Francis Hutcheson on Aesthetic Perception and Aesthetic Pleasure," British Journal ofAesthetics, 24 (1984), pp.241-255. 34. This letter (dated 6 September 1727, from Hutcheson to Mr. William Mace) appeared in 1788 in the European Magazine and London Review, pp. 158-160. It is reprinted in part (with an introductory discussion by David Bennan). ("Francis Hutcheson on Berkeley and the Molyneux Problem," Proceedings of the . R . oyal Irish Academy, 74, p. 264) 35. Bennan, p.264. 36. Comprehension and extension are discussed in Scottish lectures in logic beginning in the late eighteenth century. See, for example, Herbert Kennedy (Dc. 8. 132, 1687, EUL); John Law (Dc. 8. 18, 1691, EUL). Gershom Carmichael, in his Breviuscula provides a lengthy discussion of comprehension and extension. He similarly states that a simple idea is one that cannot be resolved into different ideas, e. g., being, power, thought; a complex idea con1prehends several different ideas into which it can be resolved, as spirit, which is a thing capable of thinking. 37. Hutcheson, for example, says: "Postquam varias res, complexas excitantes ideas, mens observavit, easque vidit sibi invicem in quibusdam qualitatibus similes, in aliis dissimiles; abstrahendo se ab iis quibus differunt, retinendo vero ideas earum qualitatum in quibus sunt similes, easque nomine quodam signato denotando, facit ideam universalem." (H 1.3. i)

The Priority of Thought to Language in Cartesian Philosophy JILL VANCE BUROKER

Among its many successes, 20 th-century philosophy can count overturning the classical view of the relation between thought and language. The tradition lasting from the Greeks up to the 20 th-century took thought to be prior to language, and language to be incidental to the thinking process. This view is now known as "internalism." Beginning with Frege and Wittgenstein, however, the order of priority is reversed. In the recent model, called "externalism," language is essential to human thought in the strong sense that cognitive thoughts are partly constituted by linguistic practices. 1 As one would expect, these two models present rather different accounts of the thinking process and the way language signifies. In this paper I want to explore the Cartesian view of thought and language. In addition to Descartes's works, I shall draw from the Port-Royal Logic of Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, since it contains the most developed account of language and logic in the nlodern period. First I shall discuss the way Descartes's dualism informs the POI1-Royal view of the priority of thought to language. Then I shall mention the major difficulties in this theory. Finally, I shall make a few comments about Kant's role in the shift to externalism, and close with some remarks on the way externalism attempts to resolve the difficulties in the internalist view. 1. Cartesian dualism and the nature of thought

The modern account of thought and language has its basis in Descartes's dualistic metaphysics, according to which lllinds and bodies are really distinct substances. Despite the independence of minds from bodies, a human being is the exceptional case in which a mind and a body are connected to form a composite substance. One hallmark of substance dualisnl is the contrast between the public nature of bodies and the private nature of minds. Since bodies are extended in space they are in principle perceivable by the senses, and so they are public objects. Minds, of course, share none of these features. Not being spatially extended, minds cannot come under the purview of the senses. In consequence, they are not open to inspection by others, and so the only mind each of us can know directly is our own. Given this dualism, thinking is necessarily non-corporeal. Although humans have sensory states such as sensations, appetites and emotions, these experiences arise only by virtue of the connection between the mind and the body. In these cases the process culminating in the sensory state has a physiological basis: either contact with a body external to the perceiver's body, or, as in appetites and emotions, some process within the perceiver's own body.

98 JILL VANCE BUROKER Minds that have no connection to a body would presumably never enjoy or suffer from such sensory experiences. The key to Descartes's notion of thought is his theory of ideas, and his distinction between the formal and objective reality of an idea. The formal reality of an idea is its existence as a state of a mind. But it is also essential to an idea that it represent something or present some content to the mind. Descartes calls this aspect the objective reality of the idea. The primary function of Cartesian ideas is cognitive: to enable the thinker to know the truth. Knowing occurs when the thinker's grasp of this objective content corresponds in appropriate ways to a real state of affairs. The key point for us is that the representation relation between ideas and reality is a natural and intrinsic feature of the idea. It depends not at all on what thinkers do with these ideas, or even whether they are properly understood. To understand the Cartesian view of the relation between thought and language, we need to note four main features of this storehouse of ideas. First, this collection of ideas is fixed and non-subjective: there is only one such storehouse of cognitive contents, and it is not dependent on whether or how it is grasped by thinkers. I believe that for Descartes, the objective content of ideas is derived from the true and immutable natures of things. 2 Second, this storehouse is intersubjectively accessible. Because God is not a deceiver, he has given all minds the same innate capacity to apprehend these natures and their interrelations. 3 Third, the veridical grasp of these ideas is purely intellectual. As readers of Descartes are aware, one of his revolutionary views was to deny that sense experience yields more than an obscure and confused picture of reality.4 An accurate representation of reality requires a "clear and distinct" apprehension by the intellect alone. Fourth and finally, this intellectual grasp is intuitive or direct-it is not nlediated by anything. It does not depend on having a body, or on one's relations to other minds or bodies, or on any use to which one may put these ideas. Most important, of course, it does not depend on having or using language. 5 Descartes was representative of thinkers of his time in classifying mental operations into four kinds. These operations, arranged in order of increasing complexity, are conceiving, judging, reasoning, and ordering. This classification scheme provides the organization of topics in the Port-Royal Logic. Conceiving is the simplest operation, and consists in a passive, instantaneous grasp of an idea. When the perception is clear and distinct, it is the act of intellectual intuition described above. Despite the instantaneous nature of conception, the content of the thought is always complex. In fact, in Descartes's account there is no clear separation between a complex idea and a proposition: for example, apprehending the nature of a right triangle includes recognizing that it has "the properties which license the inference that its three angles equal no more than two right angles."6 Descartes drew a sharp line, theoretically, between conceiving and judging, since judging includes, in addition to the

The Priority of Thought to Language in Cartesian Philosophy 99 conception, an act of the will in which the thinker affirms or denies that the conceived proposition is true. In general, however, it is possible to grasp a proposition without judging its truth, and so conceiving is logically prior to judging. And despite Descartes's stated view that only judgments are formally true or false, it appears that the propositional ideas being judged are really the bearers of truth values. At least this is implied by Descartes's notion that in clear and distinct perception one can apprehend the truth of a proposition, since this intuitive apprehension is logically independent ofjudgment. In Descartes's model of the mind, successive thinking does not enter the picture until the third stage, that of reasoning or deduction. Descartes defines deduction at Rule Three in the Rules for the Direction of the Mind as "the inference of something as following necessarily from some other propositions which are known with certainty." In deducing "we are aware of a movement or a sort of sequence...and.. .immediate self-evidence is not required for deduction, as it is for intuition... ,,7 Deduction is not as certain as intuition because it depends on memory. But even here Descartes does not make a sharp separation, since in principle deductions can be reduced to intuitions, with the right amount of practice (see Rule 11). In spite of the complexity of the intuited idea, then, our most certain grasp of it is instantaneous. Put another way, Descartes's model of judgment makes no room for the notion of constructed or synthetic thought. Now this is one place where the authors of the Port-Royal Logic differ from Descartes. While agreeing that judging involves an act of the will, Arnauld and Nicole maintain that this act just is identical to forming the proposition judged: "After conceiving things by our ideas, we compare these ideas and, finding that some belong together and others do not, we unite or separate them. This is called affirming or denying, and in general judging."8 The part of a judgment that represents the act of willing is the copula, expressed linguistically by the verb. The copula has two functions in judgment: it connects the subject and the predicate, and it signifies affirmation or denial. So although Arnauld and Nicole make it impossible to distinguish merely apprehending a proposition from judging it, they recognize that propositional thought is successive or constructed. Since forming a proposition requires one to compare ideas, merely apprehending a proposition cannot be instantaneous as it is for Descartes.

II. The Dependence of Language on Thought Descartes's dualism leads directly to the traditional view that language depends on thought. As opposed to the purely mental nature of thought, language is inherently physical: "Words," say Arnauld and Nicole, "are distinct and articulated sounds that people have made into signs to indicate what takes place in the mind.,,9 This is a succinct statenlent of the classical conception of language. First, words are taken to be sounds, so language is essentially

100 JILL VANCE BUROKER corporeal. Second, the fundamental use of these sounds is to express interior thoughts to others. And third, words express thought by being conventional signs of ideas. Let us now look at each of these features in turn. 1) Words are articulated sounds. As I remarked earlier, the Cartesians analyzed sensations as mental states caused by bodies coming into contact with the perceiver's body. Now insofar as language is identified with sound, beings who communicate linguistically must have the appropriate physical organs. A disembodied Cartesian mind could think, but it would have no way to express itself or communicate with other minds. Of course, not just any sound emitted by a human being counts as a word. A word is an articulated sound, that is, a discrete unit which, when combined with others in appropriate ways, produces a sentence. Furthermore, the words of natural languages allow an infinity of possible combinations: there is in principle no upper bound to the con1plexity of the resulting expressions. In part V of the Discourse on the Method Descartes recognizes that although we can devise machines to produce sounds resembling words, these sounds are not part of a language precisely because the possible combinations in response to a situation are limited by rn.echanical constraints. Nor, says Descartes, should we think that "the beasts speak, although we do not understand their language. For if that were true, then since they have many organs that correspond to ours, they could make themselves understood by us as well as by their fellows."lo In other words, every natural language is in principle translatable into every other natural language. This is undoubtedly because language expresses ideas, and there is only one storehouse of meaningful ideas. The unit of linguistic meaning for Cartesians, then, is the word, which is an element of speech and is essentially corporeal. 2) Language expresses antecedent thought. Since nlinds can think independently of relations to bodies or other minds, language is merely an external vehicle for making public one's private thought. And since thinking is non-corporeal and language is corporeal in the way described above, thought must itself be non-linguistic. Descartes does admit in the Principles that once we have learned to speak, we may not be conscious of non-verbal thinking: ... because of the use of language, we tie all our concepts to the words used to express them; and when we store the concepts in our memory we always simultaneously store the corresponding words. Later on we find the words easier to recall than the things; and because of this it is very seldom that our concept of a thing is so distinct that we can separate it totally from our concept of the words involved. ll (Principles I, art. 74)

Similarly, Arnauld and Nicole explain that a logic text must be concerned with language "because we can make our thoughts known to others only by accompanying them with external signs..." And they remark that "this habit is so strong that even when we think to ourselves, things are presented to the mind only in the words in which we usually clothe them in speaking to others... ,,12 So although we think linguistically in practice, words are only the external

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"clothing" of thoughts. The thought is intrinsically heterogeneous from its verbal expression. 3) Language is a conventional sign of thought. Like their predecessors, the Cartesians explain how language works in terms of conventional signification. This account is part of a more general theory which recognized three kinds of signs: natural, conventional, and divine. In all three cases, the sign exists insofar as it causes or prompts an idea in the mind of the person recognizing its significance. In chapter 4 of Part I of the Logic, Arnauld and Nicole explain that signs are perceivable objects that signify other things by exciting an idea of the signified thing in the mind of the observer. Hence the signification relation is a causal-psychological relation between an object and an associated idea: something is a sign only if it triggers the appropriate idea in the perceiver. 13 For natural signs the relation has four parts. To cite a standard example, smoke is a sign of fire when the person who perceives the smoke is immediately brought to think of the fire causing it. First there is the thing being signified, in this case the fire. Next is the sign, the object doing the signifying, here the smoke. The last two elements are mental states of the person for whom the sign has significance. For the perceiver must first perceive the sign itself as an object, and this perception must then prompt in the perceiver a second idea of the thing being signified. For linguistic signification the model is slightly more complex, because, strictly speaking, language signifies the speaker's ideas. Thus the model for linguistic signification has five parts. First is the speaker's idea, which is expressed by, second, the words, which, third, the listener perceives under normal conditions. This perception then prompts the listener to form, fourth, the appropriate idea associated with the sound. And this idea, of course, represents, fifth, the same things represented in the speaker's mind. In the narrow sense, words signify ideas in the speaker's mind. But Port-Royal uses "signify" more widely since they often say the words signify the things one thinks of. In the traditional account of language, the relation between words and things was generally construed as a form of naming. 14 Now it is clear from this model that communicating can succeed only if the speaker and hearer associate the same sound with the same idea. Thus linguistic communities are defined by the mental dictionaries they share. Speakers who want to express a thought must first consult their dictionaries. Hearers must do the same to decode the sounds. Neither Descartes nor Arnauld and Nicole explain how we learn these associations, but presumably it would be through usage, as we develop our linguistic abilities. In this theory of meaning the connection between words and ideas is arbitrary. That is, the association is not natural or logical, but is subject to our will. This explains why different natural languages associate the same thoughts with different sounds, and why, within a language, speakers can invent new words and change the meanings of sounds already in use. This freedom is possible only because sounds are in themselves indifferent to the ideas they are

102 JILL VANCE BUROKER used to express. But as Arnauld and Nicole point out, we should be careful about exactly what feature of language is arbitrary. What is arbitrary about words is how they are associated with thoughts, not the content of the thoughts they express .15 The conventional nature of this connection between thought and language leads to a particular account of a word's sense. Since words and ideas are heterogeneous items, words have neither a natural nor a logical relation to the ideas they signify. The sound, as we saw earlier, merely prompts the idea based on a given association. On this view, the relation between words and ideas is opaque rather than transparent. Hence language can in no sense be said to constitute thought. But in spite of the external connection between words and ideas, language can signify thought because both are articulated systenls. Ideas have a natural order and structure independent of their linguistic expression. So the syntax of the sentence must bear some correlation to the relations among ideas. But this correlation is at best an isomorphism, since speech and ideas are heterogeneous items. III. Difficulties and Solutions Now as contemporary philosophy has shown, this traditional view of thought and language is beset by serious problems. Here I will briefly mention five of them and then sketch Kant's role in the developments leading to the externalist view of thought and language. 16 These are the main problems with the classical view that thought is prior to language: First, there is no plausible account of autonomous cognitive thought or, as it has been dubbed in contemporary literature, "mentalese." Even worse, it is not clear what such an account would be like. Given the constraints on the Cartesian theory, mentalese can neither consist of sensory images nor be dependent on language, since both require that the mind be connected to a body. There is in fact no good candidate for purely mental activities detached from linguistic or other behavioral practices. This leads directly to the second problem: since we do not know what "mentalese" consists of, surely we cannot know what it means to grasp it. Recall that for the Cartesians this grasp is in principle both instantaneous and complex. One symptom of this problem is Descartes's recourse to the visual metaphors of "clear and distinct" perception and "the natural light of reason." In a way intellectual intuition resembles a mystical experience. Another symptom of the problem is the nunlber of debates in the modern period over whether in fact we even have ideas of certain things: consider Berkeley on the idea of matter, and Hume on the "fictitious" ideas of power and the mind. It has always struck me as bizarre that although the contents of consciousness are supposed to be transparent to the subject, it is possible to disagree about whether in fact one has a certain idea. Once we give up the notion that thought

The Priority of Thought to Language in Cartesian Philosophy 103 is autonomous and fundamental, however, this second problem will disappear along with the first. Third, the traditional theory cannot explain how ideas are "about" the world or the connection between thought and truth. As we have seen, the representational nature of mental states is just a primitive, intrinsic feature. For Descartes the guarantor of this connection is, of course, God. Now perhaps it has always seemed plausible that there is such a thing as mentalese about the world, because of the analogy with sensations. Sensations, of course, both have a presentational content and are caused by objects in the world. But that model cannot work for the relation between pure thought and reality, since real natures cannot cause our thoughts in any direct sense. The fourth problem concerns the connections between thought, truth, and judgment. For Descartes judging is an act of the will in which one commits oneself to the truth or falsity of the proposition apprehended. Now as has been pointed out, this amounts to a transitive model in which judging consists of the judger, the act, and the thought being judged. 17 On this view, to judge the proposition p one must apprehend not only p, but also that p is true or false. The problem is how to classify one's apprehension of the truth value ofp. This thought, that p is true (or false), cannot be merely apprehended; one must commit oneself to its truth. So one must both apprehend and judge that p is true or false before one can judge p, which results in an infinite regress. 18 This problem follows from two related views, namely that the thought is grasped independently of being judged, and second, that truth-values attach to the thought rather than to its assertion. The last problem concerns the idea of the mental dictionary, both the possibility of one in general, as well as an account of how thinkers acquire it. The most important developnlent on this topic was Wittgenstein's private language argument, which showed that the associationist model of meaning cannot give a coherent account of the right association between language and independently existing thoughts. 19 Since we have no means of identifying thoughts independently of linguistic acts or other activities, the whole notion of a set of associations between thoughts and words collapses. The process of ostensive definition cannot solve the problem either, since at best it directly associates words with existing things. And as Wittgenstein argued, for any object pointed at there are too nlany possibilities to determine the thought to be associated with the thing. The externalist response to these difficulties has been to reject the view that cognitive thought is independent of language. While Frege undoubtedly took the first major step in this direction, Kant's theory of judgment in the Critique ofPure Reason prepared the ground for this shift. Of course Kant is still in the Cartesian tradition of taking thought to be fundamental, and in fact he has almost nothing to say about language. But in spite of his traditional stance, Kant's Critical theory makes it possible to reverse the priority.

104 JILL VANCE BUROKER In The Critique of Pure Reason Kant simultaneously rejects two basic features of the classical view: first, that the intellect can instantaneously grasp complex representations, and second, that conceiving is prior to judging. Human intuition is passive for Kant, but it is possible only through the sensibility. In contrast to this sensible receptivity, the understanding acts to connect the data given through the senses. Understanding is a synthetic activity in which one constructs a complex unified representation using concepts. }~0\X/ it is an axiom of Kant's theory of synthesis that we grasp as complex only what we have combined: Combination does not. ..1ie in the objects, and cannot be borrowed from them, and so, through perception, first taken up into the understanding. On the contrary, it is an affair of the understanding alone, which itself is nothing but the faculty of combining a priori, and of bringing the manifold of given representations under the unity of apperception. 20 (B134-35)

This conceptual activity of the understanding, which I(ant calls "synthesis," just is the act of judging. Kant says explicitly: "Now we can reduce all acts of the understanding to judgments, and the understanding may therefore be represented as a faculty ofjudgment." (A69fB94) Whereas Descartes sharply divided the passive intuition of the intellect from the voluntary act of judging, Kant declares that the understanding has one and only one function, which is to judge. In a key move that paves the way for Frege's context principle-"It is only in the context of a proposition that words have any meaning,,21-Kant analyzes concepts as "predicates of possible judgments." (A69/B94) Conceiving is not independent of judging, and concepts are not prior in the order of explanation. In short, Kant has reversed the relation between concept and judgnlent: for him all conceptualizing is judging. Once thinking is construed as the synthetic activity of judging, we are only one step from reversing the priority of thought and language. All that remains is to identify judging with the speech act of assertion. On the externalist view, the unit of significance is the entire speech act. Speech acts are utterances in which a speaker performs some act in a social context, against a background of conventional rules, including linguistic rules. 22 The utterance typically consists of some propositional content expressed in a certain way. 'The way the content is expressed is called the illocutionary force of the act. So, for example, assertions have one kind of i110cutionary force, questions another, promises a third, and so on. In this model the thought or the proposition cannot be grasped independently of performing sonle speech act. Now this does not mean that one cannot merely apprehend a thought. But rather than being a pre-requisite of asserting, considering a proposition has a different illocutionary force from asserting or judging. In sharp contrast to the Cartesians, speech act theorists take the unit of significance to be the entire utterance, not any bit of language. Despite the dependence of thought on language, however, externalism does not reject the possibility of interior monologue or unexpressed thought. It is just

The Priority of Thought to Language in Cartesian Philosophy 105 that such "private" thinking depends on having mastered the conventions of public language. It should be fairly clear how this model solves some of the problems left to us by Cartesians. Since articulated and cognitive thinking depends on speaking, the "form of thought" is language. Grasping the thought just consists in performing and recognizing speech acts. The relations of thought to the world and of thought to truth are also less problematic on this view. Thinking is about the world insofar as we refer to objects and say things about them. Similarly, if truth-values are features of utterances rather than propositions, then the relation between thought and truth becomes less mysterious. To think of the truth value of a proposition is really to abstract from the general truth-conditions of the entire act of assertion. And finally, the problem of the association between meanings and words disappears once we do away with independent mental entities. We learn the meanings of words by learning how to use them, by learning how to perform various speech acts. Although language is essential to thought for adult humans, there is no reason thought could not take other forms. Animals and infants do not use language, so their thinking must be non-linguistic. What this consists of is anyone's guess, although obviously it would be closely connected to perceptual, affective and motor states. But even their sense perceptions of objects would have to fall short of the full-blown judgnlental forms Kant argues for in the transcendental deduction. 23 What the failure of Cartesianisnl has taught us is the impossibility of cognitive thought without some form of embodiment.

NOTES 1. Undoubtedly the first major paper arguing for this approach is Hilary Putnam's "The Meaning of 'Meaning,'" reprinted in Philosophical Papers: Mind, Language and Reality, vol. IT (Cambridge: Canlbridge University Press, 1975) pp. 215-271. A second major work contributing to the development of externalism is Saul Kripke's Naming and Necessity (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1972). 2. Briefly, this is because for Descartes all knowledge concerns existing things, which are either minds or bodies, or common notions and eternal truths. The latter group includes such propositions as "nothing comes from nothing," "two things equal to a third are equal to each other," and "nothingness possesses no attributes." These propositions function roughly as axioms and rules of inference in his system. The simple natures are ideas of things and their properties. In this group Descartes distinguishes between the real natures-thinking and extension-and the common (or transcendental) natures, which include substance or existence, duration, order, and number. See Rule 12 of Rules for the Direction of the Mind, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, Dugald Murdoch, and Anthony Kenny, 3 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985-91) vol. I, pp. 44-45~ and arts. 48-49 and 52 of Part I of Principles ofPhilosophy, in Philosophical Writings, vol. I, pp. 208-210.

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3. This does not imply that all thinkers can grasp these truths with the same ease, or that human minds, being finite, are capable of fonning an adequate idea of the nature of God, an infinite being. 4. I explain my view of Descartes's rationale for labelling sensory states as obscure and confused in "Descartes on Sensible Qualities," Journal ofthe History ofPhilosophy 29 (1 991) pp. 585-611. 5. As I shall show below, for the Cartesians language requires having a body. 6. Fifth Meditation, in Philosophical Writings, vol. II, p. 47. 7. Philosophical Writings, vol. I, p. 15. 8. Antoine Arnauld and Pierre Nicole, Logic or the Art of Thinking: the Port-Royal Logic, translated and edited by Jill Vance Buroker (Carubridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996) Part II, chap. 3, p. 82. 9. Arnauld and Nicole, Part II, chap. 1, p. 74. 10. Discourse on the Method, in Philosophical Writings, vol. I, p. 141. 11. Principles ofPhilosophy, in Philosophical Writings, vol. I, p. 220. 12. Arnauld and Nicole, from the introduction to Part I, pp. 23-24. 13. Moreover, as the authors make clear further on in this same chapter, the sign must signify sonlething other than itself, or itself in another state: "Although something in a given state cannot be a sign of itself in the same state, since every sign requires a distinction between the thing representing and the thing represented, it is certainly possible for something in a given state to represent itself in another state, just as it is possible for someone in his room to represent himself preaching. Hence the mere difference in state is enough to distinguish the symbol from the thing symbolized. In other words, the same thing can in a particular state be the symbol and in another state be the thing symbolized." (Logic, p. 36) Although the reason is not stated, I assume that the thing being signified must differ in some way from the sign to avoid trivializing the notion of signification: otherwise everything would be a sign of itself. On this analysis, ideas would not themselves be signs, contrary to the treatment by such thinkers as Locke. 14. For a more detailed view of the Port-Royal theory of language, see my "The Port-Royal Semantics of Tenns," Synthese 96 (1993) pp. 455-475; and "Judgment and Predication in the Port-Royal Logic," in The Great Arnauld and Some of His Philosophical Correspondents, Elmar 1. Kremer, ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994) pp. 3-27. 15. See Part I, chap. 1 ofArnauld and Nicole, p. 28. 16. These problems are suggested by Michael DUffiL~ett's discussion of Frege's theory of sense in "Frege's Myth of the Third Realm," in Frege and Other Philosophers (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991) pp. 249-262. 17. See David Bell, Frege's Theory ofJudgement (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979) p. 121. 18. Here's another way to see the regress: To judge p is to recognize first that p is true; let "p is true" = q; so before one can judge p one must judge q. But then to judge q one must recognize first that q is true; let "q is true" = r. So before judging q one must judge r, and so on. This regress was suggested to me by Bell's argument that thoughts naturally occur assertively in Frege 's Theory ofJudgement, pp. 127-128. 19. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, translated by G. E. M. Anscombe (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1958). See especially sections 243-315. 20. Immanuel Kant, The Critique of Pure Reason, translated by Norman Kemp Smith (London: S1. Martin's Press, 1970) p. 154. As is customary, passages are identified by the standard AlB pagination, referring to their location in the 1781 and 1787 editions.

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21. Gottlob Frege, The Foundations ofArithmetic, translated by 1. L. Austin Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1959) p. 73 e . 22. An excellent introduction to speech act theory is available in John R. Searle, Speech Acts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969). 23. For Kant, all perceptual states involve synthesis, but they are not all governed by concepts of the understanding. Kant believes that animals and infants lack intellectual capacities. Thus, in contrast to adult human sense perceptions, their sensory states would not incorporate judgments. A helpful discussion of Kant's view is Steve Naragon's "Kant on Descartes and the Brutes," Kantstudien 81 (1990) pp. 1-23.

Berkeley's Metaphysics and Ramist Logic FRED WILSON

"What is truth?" asked Pilate and did not wait for an answer. Aristotle would have told hinl that "To say of what is that it is not, or of what is not that it is, is false, while to say of what is that it is, and of what is not that it is not, is true..." (Metaphysics, lOllb 27-9)1 But Aquinas tells us that: ...a house is said to be true that expresses the likeness of the fonn in the architect's mind; and words are said to be true so far as they are the signs of truth in the intellect. In the same way natural things are said to be true in so far as they express the likeness of the species that are in the divine mind. For a stone is called true, which possesses the nature proper to a stone, according to the preconception in the divine intellect. Thus, then, truth resides primarily in the intellect, and secondarily in things according as they are related to the intellect as their principle. 2

Saying of what is, that it is, is a rather complicated thing, in other words, in spite of its apparent simplicity. For, what is, depends upon one's ontology. According to Aquinas, the truth of a thing is a standard to which the thing bears a likeness. This standard is the form or species of the thing in the divine intellect. The person who knows abstracts the species or standard of its truth from the thing judged about, and compares the object to this standard. When... [the mind] judges that a thing corresponds to the fonn which it apprehends about that thing, then first it knows and expresses truth. This it does by composing and dividing: for in every proposition it either applies to, or removes from the thing signified by the subject, some fonn signified by the predicate...(ST, FP, Q 16, Art. 2)

When the mind is thus judging the thing, the form of the thing known is in the mind. ... since everything is true according as it has the fonn proper to its nature, the intellect, in so far as it is knowing, must be true, so far as it has the likeness of the thing known, this being its fonn, as knowing. For this reason truth is defined by the confonnity of intellect and thing; and hence to know this confonnity is to know truth. (ST, FP, Q 16, Art. 2)

As for the individual of which forms are predicated, this, e. g., this man ".. .is said to be a suppositum, because he underlies [supponitur] whatever belongs to man and receives its predication. (ST, TP, Q2, Art. 3) This subject is made actual by virtue of its having accidents predicated of it: "...a subject is compared to its accidents as potentiality to actuality~ for a subject is in some sense made actual by its accidents. (ST, FP, Q3, Art. 6) The substance is, however, an individual thing that is distinct from those properties or accidents:

110

FRED WILSON Although the universal and particular exist in every genus, nevertheless' in a certain special way, the individual belongs to the genus of substance. For substance is individualized by itself~ whereas the accidents are individualized by the subject, which is the substance; since this particular whiteness is called "this," because it exists in this particular subject. (ST, FP, Q 29, Art. 1)

The unity of the individual derives from the substance. The collection of properties or accidents which characterize the individual are unified into the set of characteristics of a particular individual precisely because each of them inheres in the substance. The unity of any ordinary thing, e. g., a die, derives from the substance in which all the properties of the thing inhere. As for Pilate's question, What is truth?, in order to answer that we must lay out our ontology. In the case of the traditional Aristotelian ontology that we have been looking at, a substance is true, true to its own self if you wish, provided that the properties or accidents that make the substance actual are those required, or of the sorts required by the species or fornl of the substance. This doctrine of truth depends upon each substance having a certain form or nature or essence, or, what is the same, from the side of mind, exhibiting an intelligible species. In the 17th century a different ontology developed, one that rejected the intelligible species of Aristotle and Aquinas. It retained, however, the doctrine of substance. This entailed a rejection of the traditional doctrine in which a substance was said to be true to the extent that it conformed to the intelligible species that defined its essence and gave it being. But the retention of the doctrine of substance still tied truth to the substance ontology. To speak the truth is to say of what is, that it is. And to say of what is, that it is, is to predicate a property of a substance. Now, what this means is that the relation of predication occupies a special place in any account of logic and language prior at least to the early 20 th century, and is contrasted to other, "ordinary" if you wish, relations. Logic and grammar as accounts of language deal with propositions. These are either true or false, as Aristotle said. When we say of what is that it is, when we say, for example, that "0 is S" then what we are saying, on the traditional view, is that the substance, referred to by the subject ternl "0", has the property referred to by the predicate term "S." If a is in fact S, then we are saying of what is, that it is, or, in other words, we are saying what is true. And if 0 is after all not S, then we are saying of what is not that it is, or, in other words, we are saying what is false. On the view that substances are the basic entities in one's ontology, as Aquinas, following Aristotle, indicates, then all other, "ordinary," relations are among the properties that are predicates of substances. This view is standard enough to constitute the pattern laid out in the comnlon logic texts of the age. Let us look, to take one example, at the Monilio Logica of Franco Burgersdijck, a widely used text in the early modern period. Burgersdijck was professor of philosophy at Leyden, and his Monilio Logica was republished in

Berkeley's Metaphysics and Ramist Logic 111 his native Holland several times, as well as being published in England, including a translation of 1697. 3 In spite of its condemnation by Locke, it continued to be used. Anlong other things it discusses relations, presenting a view that was uncontroversial in the early modern period, putting them in a context of an ontology of substances. Burgersdijck in fact discusses relations in two contexts. One is in the context of the categories or predicaments and the other is in the context of the . 4 tOPICS.

For the mediaevals, the entities about which one could talk were divided into the categories. These categories or predicaments are those of substance, quality, quantity, relation, action, etc. Burgersdijck gives the traditional list which derives, of course, like most everything else in logic both mediaeval and modern, from Aristotle. A sentence or proposition makes a predication of an entity in a category when it attributes a certain property to it. A predication is legitimate, or, as we would say, "well formed," no matter the category to which the subject of predication belonged, provided that the property predicated of that subject fell vvithin one of the predicables: relative to the subject, it had to be a genus, species, difference, property or accident. The list of predicables defines the various sorts of judgment that can be made, and that can enter into discourse and into the reasoning that appears in syllogisms. In Burgersdijck the discussion of the predicables follows immediately upon the discussion of the predicaments or categories. This discussion is immediately followed by a discussion of the various topics, that is, the places fronl which arguments nlay be drawn for use as premises in disputations and arguments. These places include those of property and accident, whole and part, cause and effect (which includes matter and form, efficient cause, and end), subject and adjunct, similarity (what Burgersdijck calls "convenience"), difference ("diversity or distinction"), opposition, and order. In fact, as the text proposes, there is no real separation of the predicables from the topics, so that the various predicables themselves become topical places, or, what in effect amounts to the same, the topics come to define different sorts of legitimate predication. Once this is recognized, we see that Burgersdijck has in effect extended, whether he knew it or not, the list of legitimate forms of predication. Bringing predicates together as cause and effect, as in "fire causes heat" for example, becomes one form of predication, alongside the predications allowed by the predicables, for example, that of a genus as in "man is animal." For Burgersdijck, then, the list of legitimate forms of judgments has been extended beyond that of the mediaevals: the forms of legitimate judgment now include not only that defined by the relation of copulation, but also those defined by such relations as cause and effect, whole and part, similarity or resemblance, and difference. Here we find a difference between Burgersdijck's treatment of relations and that deriving from Aristotle. For the latter, relations are one of the categories~ they are among the things predicated of substances. But in Burgersdijck~!~~-__

112 FRED WILSON tions are discussed in two ways, once in the context of the list of categories, and once in the list of topics. Relations are at once in a special category of entity and are also ways of relating such entities to each other in judgments. Burgersdijck describes the category of relation in this way-which of course goes all the way back to the first chapter of Aristotle's Categories: "Those things are said to be related, which in Respect of what they are, are said to be others, that is, of others or in any other Manner or Respect are referred to another." (ML19) According to Burgersdijck every relation involves two entities, that from which the relation originates and that in which it terminates. "In every Relation," he tells us, "are required Subject and Ternl...That is called the Subject to which the Relation is attributed; or that which is referred to some, other thing...That, the Term to which the Subject is referred." (I\1L21) The subject is the relate and the term the correlate. Relational predications thus presuppose qualities in both the subject and the term. The quality may either be a property, that is, a quality had universally by subjects of the relevant sort, or an accident, that is, a property that is not present universally. In the latter case Burgersdijck speaks of the relation having a foundation. "Some Relations are supposed, supposing the Subject and Term: Others besides these do require a Foundation...And a Foundation is that by whose Means the Relation acrews to the Subject." (ML22) He gives the following examples: When an Egg is said to be like an Egg, the Similitude between these two Eggs arises in each as soon as they begin to exist; nor is there any thing required towards their Relation, besides the Existence of two Eggs. But the Relation of Servant does not presently arise in the Subject so soon as the Tenn exists; but it behoves that something else also do intercede upon which this Relation is founded: For a Servant is therefore the Servant of one, because by him he has been either saved or purchased, &c. (ML22)

The distinction between property and accident was to become increasingly unimportant, so for the sake of convenience let us speak of those qualities in a thing by which the relation "acrews to the subject" as the foundation. Now, in the basic instance the subjects and terms of relations are substances. The substances are related to each other by virtue of the foundations that are present in them. As the examples make clear, the qualities that are the foundations of the relation are themselves non-relational. Moreover, each of the substances that are the subject and the term is, as Burgersdijck puts it, following the ancient formula, "a Being subsisting of it self, and subject to Accidents." (ML8) Unlike accidents, substances do not depend for their existence on something else: "To subsist by it self is nothing else but not to be in any thing as a Subject. .." (ML8) Now, an accident is "a being inherent in a Substance"; it "cannot exist without a Subject;" nor can it "pass from one Subject to another." (MLIO) Thus, an accident cannot exist apart from the substance in which it is present. So substances can exist apart from other substances. If a substance ceases to exist, so do its accidents; but since substan~e~

_

Berkeley's Metaphysics and Ramist Logic 113 subsist by themselves, a substance can exist unchanged, that is, remain the same in its being, even if other substances were to cease to exist. Since it is not predicated of other things, the non-existence of other things does not affect its existence or being. What is distinctive of relation, then, is not that it introduces an entity over and above substances and the qualities that are present in them as properties and accidents. What is important about relation is that by virtue of the qualities in them one substance is referred to another. In a relational judgment, that is, one of the judgemental forms given in the list of topical relations, one substance becomes the subject of the judgments, another the term. Here, the substance that is the subject becomes so through a non-relational quality that has been picked out as the foundation of the judgement in that substance~ and the substance that is the term becomes so through a non-relational quality that has been picked out as the foundation of the judgment in that substance. Thus, substances become subjects and terms, and qualities become foundations, through the fact that they appear in a relational judgment. Relations do not constitute an ontological union among substances; such union as occurs is a union in the judgment. We find this view of relations repeated in Locke, but in the context of a systenlatic account of the operations of the mind. 5 Thus he tells us that: The nature therefore of Relation, consists in the referring, or comparing two things, one to another; from which comparison, one or both comes to be denominated. And if either of those things be removed, or cease to be, the Relation ceases, and the Denomination consequent to it, though the other receive in it self no alteration at all, v. g. Cajus, whom I consider to say as a Father, ceases to be so to morrow, only by the death of his Son, without any alteration made in himself. (Essay, II, xxv, 5)

A little later Locke adds that, "...there can be no Relation, but betwixt two Things, considered as two Things. There must always be in relation two Ideas, or Things, either in themselves really separate, or considered as distinct, and then a ground or occasion for their comparison. (Essay, II, xxv, 6) Here we have the same doctrine of relations that one finds in Burgersdijck: relational judgments are about facts that are essentially non-relational, facts in which a non-relational quality is present in a substance, while the bringing together of these two into a unity of the subject and term is provided by the mind referring the one to the other in a mental act ofcomparison. This view can be represented as follows. 6 Consider the relational statement that (@) aisRtob On the Lockean account, such a statement has a two-fold analysis. On the one hand, there are the objective truth conditions, the objective facts concerning a and b that determine whether the statement is (objectively) true or false. On the other hand, there is the subjective mental state that the use of the relational

114 FRED WILSON statement expresses. As for the former, the objective facts represented by (@) are non-relational: (#) a is rl and b is r2 The non-relational properties rl and r2 are the (objective) foundations of the relation. Both (+) a is rl and (++) b is r2 will be true. What must be noted is that a and b are independent of each other in the sense that, even if one ceases to exist, this will not affect the being of the other. Thus, for example, if a were to cease to exist, the relational fact (#) would no longer obtain. Moreover, (+) would also cease to obtain. Nonetheless, the being of b would be unaffected. For, (++) would still be true: the nonexistence of a will imply that (+) could no longer be true, but this does not affect the predications that would continue to be made of b, including the predication represented by (++). As for the subjective state that the use of (@) expresses, this is ajudgement of comparison. The two substances a and bare entities capable of subsisting by themselves on this account of relations. On the usual account, with which we are more familiar, deriving from Russell, this is not so. On this latter account, (@) will be represented by a primitive relational predicate: (*)

R(a, b)

This in turn means that we will have both (&) a is (R to b) (&&) b is (R-ed by a) However, if a ceases to exist, then not only will (*) cease to be true, and not only will (&) cease to be true, but in addition (&&) will also cease to be true. In other words, upon Russell's ontology of relations, if one of the relata in a relational fact were to cease to exist, the being of the other relatum would change. Upon Russell's account, then, the two relata are not independent of each other as they are upon the traditional account for relations defended alike by Burgersdijck and Locke. Locke locates this traditional account of relations in the context of his more general account of thought and language. Human beings are sociable animals, and language is the nledium by which they communicate. Articulate sounds express our ideas, and enable us to communicate those ideas to others. (Essay, III, i, 1-2) Various complex ideas, such as the mixed modes, consist of complex ideas whose unity is not a matter of objective connection but of the mind putting them together. Nobody can doubt but that these ideas of mixed modes are made by a voluntary collection of ideas put together in the mind, independent from any original patterns in nature, who will but reflect that this sort of complex ideas may be made, abstracted, and have names

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given them, and so a species be constituted, before anyone individual of that species ever existed. (Essay, III, v, 5)

The examples that he gives are the relations of sacrilege and adultery; he could equally have used sons or fathers. There are three aspects to the creation of these ideas, and their representation in language, according to Locke: ...we must consider wherein this making of these complex ideas consists; and that is not in the making any new idea, but putting together those which the mind had before. Wherein the mind does these three things: First, it chooses a certain number: Secondly, it gives them cOlmexion, and makes them into one idea: Thirdly, it ties them together by a name. If we examine how the mind proceeds in these, and what liberty it takes in them, we shall easily observe how these essences of the species of mixed modes are the workmanship of the mind; and consequently, that the species themselves are of men's making. (Essay, III, v, 4)

Indeed, it is the habit formed by the word that provides the cement as it were that keeps the parts of the idea together over time in a single, unchanging complex. (Essay, III, v, 10) In any case, the point is that the unity of the complex is a unity that derives from an act of the mind. The word that we use not only expresses the idea but expresses, too, the act of unifying that binds the simple ideas together in the mixed mode or other abstract idea. Communication thus consists in grasping not only the simple ideas that make up our complex ideas, but in also grasping the· act of the mind that unifies these ideas into wholes. The relational acts in my mind must correspond to the relational acts in your mind, if our communication is to be successful. There is one exception, one case where the unity of the complex derives from an objective ontological basis, and not simply from the act of mind that unifies the ideas into a whole. That, of course, is the unity that is observed in perception and derives from a substance. Whatever ideas we have, the agreement we find they have with others, will still be knowledge. If those ideas be abstract, it will be general knowledge. But, to nlake it real concerning substances, the ideas must be taken from the real existence of things. Whatever simple ideas have been found to co-exist in any substance, these we may with confidence join together again, and so make abstract ideas of substances. For whatever have once had an union in nature, may be united again. (Essay, IV, iv, 12)

The Lockean account of language and relations is thus very much of a piece with that found in Burgersdijck. What we find in Berkeley, however, is a radical change: so far as material things are concerned, substance disappears: As to what philosophers say of subject and mode, that seems very groundless and unintelligible. For instance, in this proposition "a die is hard, extended, and square," they will have it that the word die denotes a subject or substance, distinct from the hardness, extension, and figure which are predicated of it, and in which they exist.

116

FRED WILSON This I cannot comprehend: to me a die seems to be nothing distinct from those things which are tenned its modes or accidents. And, to say a die is hard, extended, and square is not to attribute those qualities to a subject distinct from and supporting them, but only an explication of the meaning of the word die. 7

We have here a new ontology, in which predication no longer represents the relation between a property and a substance but rather the relation between a property and a whole of which it is a part. To say of what is, that it is, is to attribute a property to a whole of which it is indeed a part~ while to say of what is not, that it is, is to attribute a property to a whole of which it is not a part. It is the origins of this radical new ontology that I wish to explore in this essay. In fact, of course, there are several things that are in the background to this amazing innovation in the history of philosophy. What I want to argue is that we can see in the logic of Petrus Ramus one of the things that we can reasonably suppose to have contributed to showing Berkeley the way to this breakthrough. The immediate background is of course Locke. Locke retains a substance ontology for ordinary things. Berkeley exorcises substances in this context. What leads him to see that he can do this? What leads him to see that one need not give predication a special place in accounting for the structure of the world? What I want to suggest is that there is in the logic of Ramus a view of logic and of language, a view of discourse, that carefully avoids tying logic and language to an ontology of substances. Berkeley himself, of course, places his new account of the nature of predication within the context of a view of the world in which properties are the basic characters or words of a natural language, the language of God: Hence it is evident, that those things which, under the notion of a cause co-operating or concurring to the production of effects, are altogether inexplicable, and run us into great absurdities, may be very naturally explained, and have a proper and obvious use assigned them, when they are considered only as marks or signs for our information. And it is the searching after, and endeavouring to understand those signs (this language, if I may so call it) instituted by the author of nature, that ought to be the employment of the natural philosopher, and not the pretending to explain things by corporeal causes; which doctrine seems to have too much estranged the minds of men from that active principle, that supreme and wise spirit, "in whom we live, move, and have our being. (PP66)

Winkler has argued that Berkeley "transforms the natural world from a system of bodies with powers and operations into a system of inert signs-a text-with no existence apart from the spirits who transmit and receive it."g As he puts it a little later, "...experience is a text, authored by God in the language of ideas for the sake of our well-being."9 There is an important sense in which Winkler's characterization of Berkeley's world as a text is true and important.

Berkeley's Metaphysics and Ramist Logic 117 Berkeley's metaphysics did indeed involve a radical re-conceptualization of the universe. But Winkler nonetheless has not got it exactly right either. Already the new science had given up much of Aristotle's metaphysics. In particular, it had given up the unanalysable powers that provided the explanations of ordinary events. Thus, Robert Boyle, in his A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Receiv'd Notion of Nature, 10 attacked specifically the appeal to natures or forms as something that at once was no more than an appeal to ignorance-the sceptical arguments made acceptance of any such metaphysical entities unreasonable-and at the same time something that interfered with the progress of experimental science. The "Nature...is so dark and odd a thing, that 'tis hard to know what to make of it, it being scarce, if at all, intelligibly propos'd, by them that lay the most weight upon it." (FE129) At the same time, Boyle "observe[s] divers Phaenomena, which do not agree with the Notion or Representation of Nature..." (FE136) Boyle cites the phenomenon of a vacuum as contrary to many of the things that people have said about Nature as a causal and explanatory force. That is, when one appeals to such an entity, one not only settles for explanations that are bad because they are obscure but settles for explanations that are in fact wrong, misdescribing the phenomena in question. He also cites (FE145-50) the alleged explanations of motions in terms of the qualities gravity and levity. Bodies of the former sort, that is, with that sort of "Innate Appetite," (FE147) move in straight lines towards the centre of the Earth, while bodies of the other sort move in straight lines away from the centre and towards the heavens. Boyle points out how this doctrine makes very little sense with regard to the motion of a pendulum. (FE148-l49) Boyle also argues in detail (sect. viii) that various propositions that are supposed to be established in regard to the notion of "nature," e. g., "nature does nothing in vain," either explain too much or too little, and in fact in general can be understood, when taken as scientific and referring to patterns of behaviour of objects in the world of sense experience, as making assertions compatible with the mechanical philosophy. 11 Or, to take another example, E. Halley argues against those who would explain gravity in terms of "a certain Sympathetical attraction between the Earth and its Parts, whereby they have, as it were, a desire to be united..." This, he says, ".. .is so far from explaining the Modus, that it is little more, than to tell us in other terms, that heavy bodies descend, because they descend. I2 In this respect Winkler is incorrect: the world had lost its active dispositions. The world had becolue inert. However, if the world had lost active forms, and all these features of the traditional Aristotelian metaphysics, it continued to be a world of substances. The new science had not (yet) attacked the substance nletaphysics. Thus, while Locke provided the metaphysical/epistemological framework in which the empirical methodology of the new science was put to work, he nonetheless retains substances as entities that we must hypothesize, though we know not

118 FRED WILSON what they are in themselves. They are simply those things, "we know not what," that underlie and support qualities: "...our idea of substance is...obscure...It is but a supposed I know not what, to support those ideas we call accidents." (Essay, II, xxiii, 15) Although the idea is obscure, we can use it to think about substances as the support of qualities, and to judge that the latter exist is to judge that they are supported by a substance. This much of the traditional doctrine of substance remains. However, if there are substances, what we in fact perceive are collections of qualities: The mind being, as I have declared, furnished with a great number of the simple ideas, conveyed in by the senses, as they are found in exterior things, or by reflection on its own operations, takes notice also, that a certain number of these simple ideas go constantly together; which being presunled to belong to one thing, and words being suited to common apprehensions, and made use of for quick dispatch, are called, so united in one subject, by one name: Which, by inadvertency, we are apt afterward to talk of, and consider as one simple idea, which indeed is a complication of many ideas together; because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist, and from which they do result, which therefore we call substance. (Essay, II, xxiii, 1)

Accidents may well be predicated of an "I know not what" but so far as perception is concerned, what is given to us is simply a collection. For Locke, events are in principle connected by the relation of causality. But in fact we do not know this relation: ...whatever change is observed, the mind must collect a power somewhere able to make that change, as well as a possibility in the thing itself to receive it. But yet, if we will consider it attentively, bodies, by our senses, do not afford us so clear and distinct an idea of active power, as we have from reflection on the operations of our minds. (Essay, II, xxi, 4)

For most qualities of things, there simply are no forms that could provide a connection any stronger than matter-of-fact regularity: the necessary connections are not given to us in ordinary experience; we therefore have no· idea of such connections; and in the absence of such an idea, such necessary connections are simply inconceivable. The reason why the one ["primary qualities"] are ordinarily taken for real qualities, and the other only for bare powers, seems to be, because the ideas we have of distinct colours, sounds, &c. containing nothing at all in them of bulk, figure, or motion, we are not apt to think them the effects of these primary qualities, which appear not, to our senses, to operate in their production; and with which they have not any apparent congruity, or conceivable connexion. (Essay, II, viii, 25)

Berkeley's Metaphysics and Ramist Logic 119 Or, as he puts it elsewhere, the complex idea we have of any substance, "...cannot be the real essence...for then the properties we discover in that body would depend on that complex idea, and be deducible from it, and their necessary connexion with it be known." (Essay, II, viii, 25) There are no perceivable necessary connections among the properties that things are presented as having in the world of ordinary experience. Words that philosophers use that purport to refer to real essences are in fact meaningless; sounds without referents: ...when I am told that some thing besides the figure, size, and posture of the solid parts of that body, is its essence, some thing called substantial form, of that I confess, I have no idea at all, but only of the sound form, which is far enough from an idea of its real essence, or constitution. (Essay, IT, xxxi, 6)

In the absence of real essences, Aristotelian forms or necessary connections, we are reduced to regularity. But this is, after all, all that we need for our practical purposes in our ordinary life in our ordinary world: we seem able to get on in life with just fine with just regularity: Tell a country gentlewoman that the wind is south-west, and the weather lowering, and like to rain, and she will easily understand it is not safe for her to go abroad thin clad, in such a day, after a fever: She clearly sees the probable connexion of all these, viz. south-west wind, and clouds, rain, wetting, taking cold, relapse, and danger of death, without tying them together in those artificial and cumbersome fetters of several syllogisms, that clog and hinder the mind, which proceeds from one part to another quicker and clearer without them; and the probability which she easily perceives in things thus in their native state would be quite lost, if this argument were managed learnedly, and proposed in mode and figure. (Essay, IV, xvii, 4)

So, for the most part, what we have are not casual relations but merely constant conjunctions. In these constant conjunctions, some qualities are in effect signs for other qualities. For Locke there are the metaphysical relations on the one hand-the relations of substance to quality, and of causation-and, on the other hand, there is what we perceive-collections and constant conjunctions. What Berkeley did was reject the doctrine that the world of ordinary things is a world of inert substances. The world of ordinary things is, rather, a world of qualities tied together by various relations. Ordinary things are qualities tied together by the part-whole relation, and predication is a matter of a quality being predicated of the whole of which it is a part. The whole, so far as it is perceived, is a conjunction of qualities. As he put it in his Commonplace Book,13 with specific reference to the relations of space and extension which were supposed by the Cartesians to constitute the essences of things, uniting them into wholes: "We think by the meer act of vision we perceive distance from us, yet we do not, also that we perceive solids yet we do not, also [planes],

120 FRED WILSON yet we do not. Why may I not add? We think we see extension by meer vision, yet we do not." (PC#215) Or, as he puts it right at the beginning of the Principles: It is evident to anyone who takes a survey of the objects of human

knowledge, that they are either ideas actually imprinted on the senses, or else such as are perceived by attending to the passions and operations of the mind, or lastly, ideas formed by help of memory and imagination, either compounding, dividing, or barely representing those originally perceived in the aforesaid ways...And as several of these are observed to accompany each other, they come to be marked by one name, and so to be reputed as one thing. Thus, for example, a certain colour, taste, smell, figure, and consistence having been observed to go together, are accounted one distinct thing, signified by the name apple. Other collections of ideas constitute a stone, a tree, a book, and the like sensible things...(PPl)

Ordinary things are tied together by the relation of causality. But these causal relations are conjunctions. As Locke argued, so did Berkeley: we are not acquainted with necessary connections: All our ideas, sensations, or the things which we perceive, by whatsoever names they may be distinguished, are visibly inactive; there is nothing of power or agency included in them. So that one idea or object of thought camlot produce, or make any alteration in another. To be satisfied of the truth of this, there is nothing else requisite but a bare observation of our ideas. For since they and every part of them exist only in the mind, it follows that there is nothing in them but what is perceived. But whoever shall attend to his ideas, whether of sense or reflection, will not perceive in them any power or activity; there is therefore no such thing contained in them. (PP25)

SO far as concerns the world of ordinary things, causation is constant conjunction: There are certain general laws that run through the whole chain of natural effects: these are learned by the observation and study of nature, and are by men applied as well to the framing artificial things for the use and ornament of life, as to the explaining the various phenomena: which explication consists only in showing the conformity any particular phenomenon hath to the general laws of nature, or which is the same thing, in discovering the uniformity there is in the production of natural effects; as will be evident to whoever shall attend to the several instances, wherein philosophers pretend to account for appearances. (PP62)

For Locke, words are signs of ideas, which are in turn the representatives of entities. For Berkeley, in contrast, words are directly the signs of entities. These entities in turn are the signs of other entities. The connection between words and ideas-as in Locke-or-as in Berkeley-words and entities is conventional~ the connection is not intrinsic but rather is established by human artifice.

Berkeley's Metaphysics and Ramist Logic 121 For Berkeley the same holds for the way in which entities are signs of other entities. There is no intrinsic connection: there are simply conjunctions. The connection is, however, established by artifice: the artifice of the Great Artificer, God. The structure of the world is established by the activity of spirits: We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There is therefore some cause of these ideas whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination of ideas, is clear from the preceding section. It must therefore be a substance; but it has been shown that there is no corporeal or material substance: it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or spirit. (PP26)

What holds for causal relations also holds for the relations that bind qualities into ordinary things, and, indeed, all other relations. Relations as such are not perceived by sense. As Berkeley put it, "we know and have a notion of relations between things or ideas, which relations are distinct from the ideas or things related, inasmuch as the latter may be perceived by us without our perceiving the former." (FP, 89) Relations are not perceived by sense because they involve activity: "...all relations including an act of the mind, we cannot so properly be said to have an idea, but rather a notion of the relations or habitudes between things." (FP, 142) The structures of the world, including the structures of qualities that constitute ordinary things, are thus a matter of the relating activities of active substances. 14 Qualities are the words of the language of God, and the conjunctions that we perceive and learn are the syntax of God's language. This syntax is of course the relational structure of the world. Thus, the structure of the world is provided by the activity of the deity, or, sometimes, by the activity oflesser spirits. In Burgersdijck's logic, there is a double account of relations, one of relations considered objectively, and one of relations considered as forms of judgment. The former takes them to be predicated of substances. The latter takes them to be forms of mental activity. What Berkeley does with regard to ordinary ("material") things, the objects of ordinary perceptual experience, is radically alter the ontology by eliminating the substance. The role of substance in accounting for the unity of ordinary perceptual objects is replaced by the part-whole relation. Now, this relation, that of part to whole, is one of the relational forms of judgment, alongside causation, etc., that Burgersdijck considers among the topics where arguments are to be found. Thus, in Berkeley, predication is assimilated to the other relations, and loses the special status that it had in Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes, Locke, Burgersdijck, etc. In Berkeley, predication reflects an act of the mind that has no objective basis in ordinary perceptual objects, or, at least, no more objective basis than any other relation, e. g., the relation of causality;15 predication is, rather, an act of the

122 FRED WILSON mind that unifies sense qualities into wholes. Except, of course, there is in a wayan objective basis for this relation, as for the other structural relations among the sense contents of the world, e. g., the relation of causation: the objective basis is the structuring activities of God. Berkeley in this way as it were re-animates the world. Where Descartes and Locke, and, in general, the new ·science, had removed activity from the world, Berkeley restored it. Berkeley's world as a linguistic text has become once again, as it was for Aristotle, a world that is filled with and moved by activity, the primitive unanalysable activity of substances. But if Berkeley has succeeded in re-filling the world with activity, he has done so only by giving up the substance analysis of ordinary perceptual objects. In this respect he has broken away from the tradition in a 'Nay in which neither Descartes nor Locke nor the scientists of the Royal Society were able to break away from the tradition. One understands the language of God, the natural language of sense contents, provided that the acts in one's own mind mirror the acts by which God structures his language. I get it right, for example, if the acts by which I join up ideas into causal sequences correspond to the way in which God structures the regular connections among sense contents. And I get it right if the acts of unification by which I join the simple sense contents that I receive into things correspond to the acts by which God unifies those ideas. There are no doubt many strands to the story of how Berkeley was able to achieve this break. What I hope to do, as I have said, is trace what I think is one of these strands. It is an important strand, however, because it led to later developments of attempts to account for structure. The strand that I want to exanrine lies in a logical tradition different from that of Burgersdijck. In this other logical tradition, the role of substance is not central. I refer to the account of logic developed by Petrus Ramus, Pierre de la Ramee. Ramus developed certain ideas that had already been presented by Rudolphus Agricola. 16 This was the re-orientation of the traditional doctrine of topical places. In the earlier tradition of logic, one that would be more familiar to us from our own texts of formal logic, one proceeded from concepts through judgments to syllogisms. The discussion of concepts included the discussion of the categories and the predicables, as well as the different sorts of supposition of terms. The discussion then passed on to judgnlents or propositions, which included such things as affirmative and negative, universal and particular and what we call the immediate inferences. The discussion then turned to reasoning, which emphasized the categorical syllogisms of Aristotle, but included hypothetical and disjunctive syllogisms, together with sorites, induction, example, and enthymeme taken as special cases of syllogism. Scientific nlethod as we know it, that is, the method of empirical science, of course had no place here. What followed the discussion of the traditional forms of argument was their use, on the one hand, in science in the sense of scientia, that is, demonstrative science where the premises are self-evident, allA1h~_!lS~---

Berkeley's Metaphysics and Ramist Logic 123 of the forms of argument, on the other hand, in ordinary arguments with only probable premises. It was in the latter context that the doctrine of topical places was located: the places were storehouses for different sorts of premises that could be used in the sorts of discourse that was relevant in legal and political contexts. This organization of the traditional logic can be found, for example, in Robert Sanderson's Logicae Artis Compendium. 17 Sanderson had been appointed Reader in logic at Lincoln College, Oxford in 1608. He was also Regius Professor of Theology prior to the deposition of Charles I. A royalist, he was removed from the chair during the interregnum, only to be reinstated after the restoration. He career ended with a brief episcopate at Lincoln. Sanderson first published his logic in 1618. It is an excellent text, and reasonably proved very popular, subsequently going through many editions. We would recognize most of the questions discussed by Sanderson. What we do not find in our own logics is the orientation towards the standard substance metaphysics deriving form Aristotle. In our own logic texts we would not find a discussion of the categories or predicaments. Nor would we find an orientation of the reference of terms to the members of the first of these categories, substance, which Sanderson defines in the usual way: "Substantia est Ens per se subsistens." (Logicae, 17) Nor would we find the other categories listed, e. g., quality, about which Sanderson asserts that, "Qualitas est forma accidentalis, a qua Substantia denominatur Qualis: ut Albedo. Quale est, quod a Qualitate denonlinative dicitur: ut Album." (Logicae, 21) Nor, finally, would we find these things discussed in a context where it has been laid down that the legitimate forms of predication for the entities in any category are defined by the list of predicables. Then there are relations. We would of course find these discussed in our own logics, but not in the way that Sanderson does, nanlely, in conformity with the Aristotelian metaphysics in which substances and properties are the only entities. Relations are properties in the other categories that are referred one to another: "Veteres Logici Relata definienbant esse, ea, quae altgerius esse dicuntur, aut alio quopian modo ad aliud referentur: ut Scientia et Scibilie." (Logicae, 24) Sanderson classifies relations in much the same way that Burgersdijck does. Where Sanderson differs from Burgersdijck is where he locates the topics. Sanderson locates them in the context of probable, or non-demonstrative syllogisms. They are places where we store premises for arguments for use in legal and political oratory and for sermons. If we wish to advance an argument in the context of such oratory, then we turn to our places and search for an argument that will fulfil our purposes. For Sanderson, the topics have nothing to do with demonstrative syllogisms. Burgersdijck locates the topics much earlier in his discussion, treating them as in effect forms of relational judgment, as we have seen. Burgersdijck retains

124 FRED WILSON the distinction between the topics, on the one hand, where arguments are to be found, and, on the other hand, the categories and predicables, which define the various forms of judgnlent. But at the same time he blurs them, as Sanderson does not for Burgersdijck, the categories and the predicables, while logically different from the topical places, are also, like the topics, places, that is, places where arguments are to be located. Burgersdijck is in effect trying to have it both ways. He wants to defend a logic, which is, like that of Sanderson, Aristotelian in the strong sense of reflecting the Aristotelian ontology of substances as independent entities, and accidents as non-relational entities dependent upon substances. But he also wants a logic that will be practical in its orientation, helping students not only to evaluate propositions for well-formedness and argunlents for validity but to find arguments that they can use in their own discourses. For the latter, the difference between topical places, on the one hand, and the categories and predicables, on the other, tends to disappear, as indeed we have seen happen in Burgersdijck. It is the logic of Ramus that is pulling the resisting Burgersdijck in this direction, away from the Aristotelian logic like that of Sanderson. The logic of Ramus in one way or another incorporates much of the traditional doctrine. But this material is covered only in the context of a logic that is oriented towards its practical uses in the discourse of politics and law. He takes up Agricola's distinction between invention and judgment, but where Agricola dealt only with the subject of invention, Ramus goes on to write a logic that incorporates both aspects. I8 The result is a logic that must have been like a breath of fresh air. Not only does the logic have a clear appeal to practical purposes, compared to a logic such as that of Sanderson, it has the sort of appeal that informal logic has in our own day. But it is also remarkably well-written, with examples that have a wide literary appeal. Sanderson's book is reasonably well-written, but like most logic texts in our own day is rather dull reading. If there are any examples, they are pedestrian. Burgersdijck is even worse: it is not even well-written. Ramus's Dialectique is well-organized for its purposes, well-written, and filled with lively and interesting literary examples that provide useful samples for the poet and orator. For our purposes, however, the important point is that it separates logic from its former role as a language that reflects perspicuously the ontological structure of the world as determined by the substance metaphysics deriving from Aristotle. Ramus aims to give to students a presentation of logic that will be useful for the purposes of legal and political oratory and for sermons. For these purposes, the doctrine of substances need play little role. Thus, when Ramus provides examples of cause, and, in particular, final cause, he cites as explanatory of certain events, first, the end of marriage, and second, the end of taking up arms against Caesar in civil war. In neither case does the subject of the discourse seenl to be a substance. (Dialectique, 64-65) This orator's logic allows for judgments in which we have connections among things that are not substance~__ }Jlp.S-,_ In

_

Berkeley's Metaphysics and Ramist Logic 125 Ramus's logic we are no longer committed to the view that when we say of what is, that it is, that what we are doing is attributing a property to a substance. Ramus, in other words, provides a logic in which discourse is no longer tied to an Aristotelian account of the world. The point of the logic is not to fit an ontology that is no longer substantialist; it is to provide a logic that will be useful to orators. But in producing the latter sort of logic, the result is an account of logic and language that has little place for the traditional doctrine of substance. So the result is in effect an account of logic and language that will fit a world that, like Berkeley's, argues against construing ordinary things as substances. We know that Hume did read Berkeley. Did Berkeley read Ramus? This I do not know. I know of no reference in Berkeley to Ramus. It is clear, however, that Ramus's logic was widely known, as is clear from the history given in Walter 1. Ong's Ramus and Talon Inventory.!9 Logic as a two part art was first clearly laid out in the Dialectique published in Paris in 1555. This was followed by several other editions, including of course the Latin. 20 The first English language edition of Ramus was The Logicke of..Pfeter} Ramus, translated by Rolland M'Kilwien, published in London, 1574?! There was also 1. Piscator's commentary on Ramus, In P. Rami Dialecticam animadversiones (London: H. Bynneman, 1581). William Temple made his name as a Ramist with his P. Rami dialecticae libri duo (Cambridge: Thomas Thomas, 1584). Ong notes that "there seem to be more English translations of Ramus' Dialectica than translations in any other language.,,22 These include editions of 1656, 1658, 1685, and 1699. There were also Latin editions published in England. Thus, there was John Seton's popular Dialectica (annotated by Peter Carter, London, 1611). There was published at Cambridge in 1672 a P. Rami dialecticae libra duo with commentary by Guilielmi Amesii. George Downame's scholastic elaboration of Ramus's logic was published at Cambridge in 1699. But this is not yet to connect Berkeley with Ramus. We know that Oliver Goldsmith attended Trinity College Dublin, and complained of the "cold logic of Burgersdiscius" and of "the dreary subtleties of Smiglecius." Burgersdijck we know about; it was indeed a logic that was influenced by Ramus, though it still retained the crucial Aristotelian notions of substance, categories, and predicables. The Logica of Martin Smiglecki (1638), was essentially Aristotelian, being distinguished only by its mode of presentation, which was in the form of disputations. So Smiglecki and Burgersdijck were used to teach logic at Trinity College Dublin about the time Berkeley was a student. 23 Provost Narcissus Marsh published his Institutiones logicae (Dublin: S. Helsharn, 1681), and this, referred to as the "Provost's logic," was well known at Trinity College Dublin. It is not, however, a Ramist text. It gives the older division of logic into terms, propositions and arguments. In this section there is a discussion of the predicables followed by the usual Aristotelian categories, beginning with substance, which is defined to be "Ens per se Existens."

126 FRED WILSON (Institutiones logicae, 39) In the context of propositions, Marsh includes a section on supposition. The section on argumentation includes a section on demonstration. This is restricted to scientia: "certa et evidens rei cognitio." (Institutiones logicae, 205) It is in this context that Marsh discusses causes. He then turns to dialectical syllogisms, and here he includes the traditional material on the topics. This is decidedly not Ramist. At the time of Berkeley, then, there seems to be little official use of Ramus, and no clearly Ramist text, despite the fact, to which the publication record testifies, of the continued popularity of Ramist texts in English. There is, however, one text that TI1USt be mentioned in this context. This is the already-mentioned annotated edition of Ramus's Dialectica published in 1584 by William Temple. Temple was a tutor in logic at King's College, Cambridge, and made a name for himself as a defender of Ramus against the latter's critics. He responded to criticisms of Ramus by Oxford's Everard Digby (Temple's reply, 1580) and Johannes Piscator (from Strassbourg). The latter (1581) was appended to a second reply to Digby, and was thought to be of sufficient merit that it was reprinted at Frankfurt in 1584. Meanwhile, in 1582 he had written a second reply to Piscator. The point of this discussion of Temple is simply that this logician became fourth Provost of Trinity College Dublin in 1609, and retained the position until his death in 1627. He was an able administrator and left a deep imprint on Trinity College. It is hard to believe that the work of such a vigorous and able defender of Ramus would not have been remembered in the College of which he had been an impressive Provost. Other Provosts were also Ramist, including the seventh, William Chappell. 24 It is more than likely, then, that Ran1ist views were well known at Trinity College Dublin when Berkeley was a student there. None of this is proof that Berkeley ever read or heard of Ramus while at Trinity College Dublin, but leads me to suspect that he did. However, there is one more fact that is relevant. 25 Berkeley was a student at Kilkenny College before going up to Trinity College Dublin, and there is considerable circumstantial evidence that the headmaster at the time, Edward Hinton, was a Ramist. Again, this is no proof that Berkeley had ever encountered Ramus's views on logic and language. But it is hard to conceive that it is not so: the circumstantial evidence from Kilkenny College and Trinity College Dublin seems strongly in its favour. What, however, is in Ramus's logic? The Dialectique begins by defining logic as "art de bien disputer." (61) Its practical orientation is thus established immediately. But Ramus intends this in full generality. Disputes are resolved by discovering the truth. Logic or dialectic is thus the means to discover and display the truth; it is the root of all knowledge: "devons-nous apprendre la Dialectique pour bien disputer a cause qu'elle nous declaire la verite..." (61) Logic does this whether we are considering matters that are scientific, or matters that are contingent, or, what is the same, matters of opinion. Dialectic or logic is "rart de cognoistre, c'est-a-

Berkeley's Metaphysics and Ramist Logic 127 dire Dialectique ou Logique, est une et mesme doctrine pur apercevoir toutes choses." (62) Ramus, following Agricola, divides logic into two parts. The parts of dialectic, or logic, according to Ramus, are invention and judgment. Of these he says that "La premiere declaire les parties separees dont toute sentence est composee. La deuxiesme monstre les manieres et especes de les disposer..." (Dialectique, 63) The first part is described by Ramus as "la doctrine des lieux Topiques," (Dialectique, 63) but insofar as it gives the parts of sentences that are to be admitted into the discourse of reason, of logic, it also covers what would be for the traditional logic the various categories. Indeed, Ramus makes this connection himself. (63) Inartificial arguments derive their worth from authority; the places for inartificial arguments are such things as the law and testimony. (968) But it is the places for artificial arguments that interests us. These are arguments that logic alone helps us construct. What we begin with is a concept. We then wish to discover concepts that can be related to it in propositions which will subsequently be used in syllogisms to bring out in discourse the truth of things. The concept from which we begin and the concept discovered in the topical place will be united to form a proposition. The list of topics therefore gives a list of acceptable sentence forms, the list, in other words, of "well formed" sentences. Although these places occupy in logic the role of Aristotelian categories, together with the predicables, it turns out that neither the traditional categories nor the predicables appear in Ramus's list. What he gives instead are four quite different species of categories (which are themselves subdivided as the discussion proceeds). These are: Causes et Effectz; Subjectz et Adjoinctz; Opposez; Comparez. (64) For our purposes we should note, first, that the list contains only relations. These relations are the forms of acceptable sentences. These relations may be either necessary or contingent; if the former, then we have demonstrative science, and if the latter then we have probabilities. .Ramus indicates that his opposition of subject and adjoint is the same as that of Aristotle who "en plusieurs lieux oppose Ie subjet et I' accident," (Dialectique, 74) though he is also careful to distinguish essential attributes of the subject, where the connection is necessary; and mere accidents, where the connection is contingent. (74) We should therefore note, second, that, where the Aristotelian logic gives a special place to the relation of predication, contrasting it to other relations, Ramus instead includes the relation of subject and adjoint parallel to other relations, including the relation of cause to effect. In this respect, Ramist logic separates itself from all other logics in divorcing itself from the substance metaphysics. At the same time, it provides the form that a logic might reasonably take if predication is to be a relation alongside other relations such as cause and effect, similarity and difference.

128 FRED WILSON Finally, we should note that the apparatus of species and genus also loses its special place in logic and is re-located in the topical place "comparez." (Dialectique, 80) Ramus first discusses "comparison de quantite," (80) and under this head refers to the relations of equal, (80) more, (82) and less. (83) He then turns to "comparison de qualite," (85) and the allocation of things to species and genera is made a matter of the relations of similarity (85) and dissimilarity. (87) In this respect, Ramist logic separates itself from other logics of the age in divorcing itself from a metaphysics in which the relations of species and genus provide the necessary connections among the terms of scientific syllogisms. The Cartesians, especially in the Port Royal Logic, were to make a similar break with the traditional Aristotelian reliance upon species and genus, and in this they were followed by Locke. This leads to similarities between the accounts of inference that we find in Ramus, on the one hand, and in the Cartesians and Locke on the other. At the same time, however, it must be emphasized that both the Cartesians and Locke retained the core of the substance metaphysics: the basic entities are substances. This means that the accounts of logic found in the Cartesians and Locke do not yet make the radical break with the tradition that marks both Ramus's logic and Berkeley's metaphysics. To see this latter point more clearly, we must tum to Ramus's discussion of argumentation or inference. This occurs in the second part of logic. This second part is called "judgment," and is contrasted to invention. Judgment "...monstre les voyes et moyens de bien juger par certain regles de disposition..." (Dialectique, 115) Judgment in tum has three sub-divisions: "Enonciation, Syllogisme, et Method." (115) The traditional logics had three parts, term, proposition and syllogism. "Enonciation" covers roughly the same material as was covered in the traditional logics under the heading of proposition, while "syllogisme" covers the inferences in the traditional way, omitting, however, much of the material of mood and figure and all of the traditional rules. Ramus's view seemed to be that one would pick up the relevant norms more quickly by studying effective examples than by internalizing a set of formal rules whose use depends upon a rather artificial categorization in terms of mood and figure. This disdain for the traditional apparatus was to find itself repeated in the Cartesians and in Locke. "Enonciations" or propositions are divided into simple or complex. The latter include disjunctive, conjunctive and conditional propositions. As examples of simple propositions, Ramus gives (Dialectique, 115): "Le feu brule" "Le feu est chault" "Le feu n'est eau." The first derives from the topical place cause and effect, the second from subject and adjoint, and the third from opposition. Thus, if we have, for example, burning as the object of our interest, then we can locate an argument to be joined to it in a proposition in the topical place cause. This argument is fire, and we form the proposition, "fire bums."

Berkeley's Metaphysics and Ramist Logic

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Similarly, if we have fire as the object of interest, then we can locate an argument with which to join it in the place adjoint; this argument is hot, and yields the proposition, "fire is hot." The connection may be necessary or contingent. Ramus has pointed out, in his peroration to the discussion in the first of judgment, (Dialectique, 123) that scientific propositions are self-evident. In this case the connection between the terms the proposition will be necessary. Judgnlents that are contingent and not necessary are called "opinion." (124) In this case the connection between the terms of the judgment will only be probable. In general, the places where probable arguments are to be located are those of inartificial arguments, that is, law or testimony divine or human. In the case of necessary judgments, the places to be searched are those of artificial arguments, that is, those of: Causes et Effectz, Subjectz et Adjoinctz, Opposez, Comparez. The justification for asserting the proposition is, in the case of inartificial arguments, the authority, and, in the case of artificial arguments, self-evidence. It should be noted, however, that one can continue to use the loci or places of artificial arguments even if not all connections are necessary or self-evident. It can be held both that causal connections are contingent, and that terms are connected to each other by these relations. The authority will be that of experience, and the tie that will lead the mind from one ternl to another located in the topical place will not be a necessary connection but a psychological habit created by the experience that is the authority that testifies to the truth of the connection. Ranlus next passes on to syllogism: "Syllogisme est disposition par laquelle la question disposee avecques 1'argument est necessariement conclue..." (Dialectique,125) We need a syllogism when we have an "enonciation doubteuse" and "...pour la preuve d'icelle, est besoin de quelque moyen et tiers..." (125) This notion that syllogisms involve the interpolation of third terms between extremes in order to justify the linking of those extremes is commonplace. The extremes in the syllogism All M is P AllSisM All S is P are the subject and predicate of the conclusion. For the Aristotelians, in a scientific syllogism, these are respectively the species and genus, and the middle that links them is the specific difference. In other words, for the Aristotelians, the syllogism exhibits the real definition of the subject. Since understanding a thing involves the grasp of its real definition, to grasp a scientific syllogism and to understand a thing amount to the same: syllogism provides insight into the ontological structure of reality. Once logic is released from the ontology of forms understood in species-genus terms, inference can be based on other relations than these traditional connections. In particular, for

130 FRED WILSON example, as Ramus points out, (Dialectique, 129) Aristotle never treats an argument such as: Octave est heriter de Cesar Je suis Octave Je suis donques heriter de Cesar as a syllogism-science does not deal with singulars. It was called instead an "exposition." (129) But for Ramus, this form is one among the several forms of syllogism. No longer bound by the ontology of forms, relations other than those of genera and species can yield valid arguments. Ramus's point was later taken up by other philosophers. Thus, Descartes distinguishes his own method from that of the "dialecticians": ...when they expound the fonns of the syllogisms, they presuppose that the terms or subject-matter of the syllogisms are known; similarly, we are making it a prerequisite here that the problem under investigation is perfectly understood. But we do not distinguish, as they do, a middle term and two extreme terms. 26 To be sure, his method is like that of the dialecticians in proceeding in terms of self-evident inferences. As he puts it in his Rule Five: The whole method consists entirely in the ordering and arranging of the objects on which we must concentrate our mind's eye if we are to discover some truth. We shall be following this method exactly if we first reduce complicated and obscure propositions step by step to simpler ones, and then, starting with the intuition of the simplest ones of all, try to ascend through the same steps to a knowledge of all the rest. (CSM I: 20) In fact, these inferences are based on relations among ideas: This common idea is carried over from one subject to the other solely by means of a simple comparison, which enables us to state that the thing we are seeking is in this or that respect similar to, or identical with, or equal to, some given thing. Accordingly, in all reasoning it is only by means of comparison that we attain an exact knowledge of the truth. Consider, for example, the inference: all A is B, all B is C, therefore all A is C. In this case the thing sought and the thing given, A and C, are compared with respect to their both being B, etc. But, as we have frequently insisted, the syllogistic forms are of no help in grasping the truth of things. (CSM I: 57) There are relations other than those of species and difference that validate inferences, including the relations that justify A == B, B == C, :. A == C As Descartes puts it, inference rests on a comparison of our ideas, and the discovery therein of relations that connect those ideas. We must: think of all knowledge whatever-save knowledge obtained through simple and pure intuition of a single, solitary thing-as resulting from a comparison between two or more things. In fact the business of human reason consists almost entirely in preparing for this opera-

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tion. For when the operation is straightforward and simple, we have no need of a technique to help us intuit the truth which the . comparison yields; all we need is the light of nature. (CSM I: 57)

Inferences of the sort just indicated are based on judgments of comparison. These judgments, when linked systematically, yield knowledge of connections among essences or notions or forms. It is the inferences that are essential to knowledge~ the claim that kno"vledge is not obtained until the argument has been put in strict syllogistic form is sinlply not true. What the defenders of syllogistic do, that is, the dialecticians, is take the inferential knowledge and rearrange it into syllogistic form. But that form does nothing to help us to discover what the links are in the chain that leads to the solution of the research problem that we have posed to ourselves: .. ,on the basis of their method, dialecticians are unable to fonnulate a syllogism with a true conclusion unless they are already in possession of the substance of the conclusion, i. e., unless they have previous knowledge of the very truth deduced in the syllogism. ~t is obvious therefore that they themselves can learn nothing new from such forms of reasoning, and hence that ordinary dialectic is of no use whatever to those who wish to investigate the truth of things. Its sole advantage is that it sometimes enables us to explain to others arguments which are already known. It should therefore be transferred from philosophy to rhetoric. (CSM 1: 36-37)

As the Port Royal Logic puts the point,27 "we must discover the content of an argument before we can arrange its prenlises." (Pt. III, ch. 17)28 Locke makes much the same point. The "original way of knowledge" is "by the visible agreement of ideas." (Essay, IV, xvii, 4) "To infer is nothing but, by virtue of one proposition laid down as true, to draw in another as true, i. e., to see or suppose such a connexion of the two ideas of the inferred proposition..." (Essay, IV, xvii, 4) Syllogism presupposes that we have grasped the inferential structure, the connections among our ideas, rather than itself being essential to such knowledge. As we have already noted, any country gentlewoman: ... clearly sees the probable connexion of all [her ideas regarding the weather] ...without tying them together in those artificial and cumbersome fetters of several syllogisms, that clog and hinder the mind, which proceeds from one part to another quicker and clearer without them; and the probability which she easily perceives in things thus in their native state would be quite lost, if this argument were managed learnedly, and proposed in mode and figure. For it very often confounds the connexion: And, I think, every one will perceive in mathematical demonstrations, that the knowledge gained thereby comes shortest and clearest without syllogism. (Essay, IV, xvii, 4)

Ramus is thus followed by Descartes and Locke in giving up the idea that the only relations that can legitimate inferences, syllogisms if you wish, are

132 FRED WILSON those of species and genera. However, while Descartes and Locke abandon the insistence that only species-genera relations give scientific inferences, their notions of logic and language are still bound up with a substance metaphysics. It is precisely this that is also given up by Ramus: connections of qualities to the things of which they are predicated, that is, the relations of adjoints to subjects, do not hold a special place but. are simply relations among relations alongside those of, say, causation. Walter 1. Ong has been highly critical of Ramus's logic,z9 We must distinguish, according to Ong, reasoning, which is "the drawing of consequences from one or more propositions,"3o from understanding. Reasoning is where formal logic has its home. Formal logic constructs its rules with regard to the extensions of terms, but even this abstraction from content is not a total abstraction from matter: its nlovement reflects, and therefore presupposes, an ontological structure in the reality that it aims to illuminate. "Logic is a study of the reflection of [the] material world-the world with which man is directly confronted-in the structures of the mind.,,31 Thus, "the presence of discursive reason in the human intellectual apparatus is due to the material component in man's cognitional make-up and in the make-up of the reality he is faced with.,,32 Reason brings to reality the light of the intellect,. but its role is as it were the transmission of light from one part of reality to another. It cannot do this task of transmitting light unless it has ready for use some already illuminated piece of reality. It is the understanding that provides this initial light. Any knowledge that we have by way of logic, then, presupposes knowledge by way of understanding. The upshot of logical inference is understanding, but that is an understanding that logic can achieve only by taking for granted that understanding has already been achieved. And so, as Ong points out, "Aquinas takes a rather dim view of discursive reason or ratiocination as compared to sheer understanding, which in its pure state would be intuitive.,,33 With this, it is unlikely that anyone would disagree: the inferences of logic transmit truth, they do not justify their premises as true. There must therefore be something, call it the "understanding" if you will, by which we come to know the truth of our premises. Ramus, in particular, would not disagree. Inference is located within the part of logic called judgment, the second part of logic. The premises are, in contrast, discovered by reference to the topical places, which occur in the first part of logic, the part called invention. Ong, however, criticizes Ramus and Ramists for their ".. .insistence that it is reasoning or ratiocination, not understanding, which differentiates men from animals, and on the insistence...that God prescribes 'method', which is conceived of as a kind of protracted ratiocinative process... ,,34 According to Ong, then, Ramus must omit from logic whatever it is that is required if we are to recognize the role of understanding in logic. Since the understanding yields prenlises, that which RanlUS omits when he ignores the understanding must be onlitted from the list of topics. Whatever Ramus puts

Berkeley's Metaphysics and Ramist Logic 133 into his list of topics or categories, it does not include a list of those things that must be there if we are to recognize correctly the role of understanding in grasping the ontological structure of reality. But what is missing? As we have seen, it is precisely the traditional Aristotelian categories and predicables, precisely those things that make the traditional logic of Sanderson or Burgersdijck or Aquinas fit so neatly a world the ontology of which is given by the metaphysics of substances and intelligible forms. Ong's criticism of Ramist logic, then, amounts to a statement that this logic is inappropriate to a world whose ontology is that of the Aristotelian nletaphysics of forms and substances. However, this statement is a criticism only if the ontology of the world is indeed of that sort. Since Ong does not defend his statement, his running stream of contemptuous dismissals of Ramus is little more than a begging of the ontological question. His complaint about Ramus and the "decay of dialogue" is really a complaint with regard to the decay of the Aristotelian metaphysics. But he offers no defence of that metaphysics. In fact, in many respects, the criticism that Ong makes of Ramus applies also to Descartes, Arnauld and Locke, all of whom insist that, while syllogism is the interpolation of middle terms, the logical structure of the relations does not have to be that of real definitions, in terms of species and genus, and, moreover, for Locke, not even a necessary connection. Nonetheless, there remains for Descartes, Arnauld and Locke, the substance metaphysics. Thus, while the Port Royal Logic rejects the apparatus of predicables and real definitions, and most of the traditional categories, it nonetheless includes a categorial scheme based on the Cartesian metaphysics, and therefore presupposes an ontology of substances and properties. That is, it presupposes an ontology in which the relation of predication occupies a special place, different from that of all other relations. It is in precisely this respect that RanlUS develops a view of language that is similar indeed to that of Berkeley. It is a view of language and logic in which predication is treated as the relation of causation is treated rather than given a special place. Given that we take causation to be a relation that is, on the one side, regularity, but, on the other side, a connection established by the activity of the mind, then we should say that same thing about subjects and adjoints. There will be, on the one side, a collection of properties including the adjoint, and, on the other side, a connection of these into a unified whole established by the activity of the mind. The structure of contents into things will parallel the structure of things into causal sequences. But this, of course, is precisely what Berkeley argues. The question that I raised was what enabled Berkeley to nlake the important breakthrough that permitted philosophers for the first tinle to conceive of things as collections of qualities rather than as substances with properties. There are probably many strands that met to account for this radical change in the way of conceptualizing things in one's ontology. But what I anl suggesting is that

134 FRED WILSON Ramus'ss logic is one such strand. Unlike the traditional logic, Ramus did not wed his to the ontology of substances. At the same time he clearly put predication as a relation among relations, and permitted philosophers for the first time to think of predication in ways that differed from the tradition. In particular, predication could be assimilated to the ways in which one thought about causation, or fatherhood, or sacrilege. Berkeley could therefore take Locke's account of the latter relations and apply it to the relation that unified sense contents into things. The result is the new account of predication, the new ontology of things. What I have argued, then, is that the structure of Ramus's logic can reasonably be seen as one of the strands that enabled Berkeley to come to his rejection of the old substance metaphysics. I have little doubt that the influence of Ramus was so pervasive, even where he was rejected, as in Burgersdijck, that it was in fact a contributing factor for Berkeley's great achievement in ending the hegemony of the old Aristotelian ontology that insisted that ordinary things are substances: thanks to Berkeley, but behind him thanks to Ramus, things could now be conceived as bundles of properties. NOTES 1. Aristotle, The Complete Works, revised Oxford translation, ed. 1. Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). 2. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, trans. by the Fathers of the Dominican Province (London: Benziger Bros., 1947). References are to "ST" to the First Part (FP) or First Part of the Second Part (FS) or Third Part (TP), by Question (Q), Article (A), Objection (Obj) by number, and, where appropriate, Reply to Objection by number. Present reference is at (ST, First Part, Q 16, Art. 1) 3. Franco Burgersdijck, Monilio Logica, or An Abstract and translation of Burgersdiscius His Logick, by a Gentleman (London: Richard Cumberland, 1697). Hereafter abbreviated as "ML" followed by page number(s). 4. I discuss this in greater detail in F. Wilson, "The History of Relations from Burgersdijck to Bradley," forthcoming in a volume on the ontology of relations, edited by K. Barber. 5. John Locke, Essay concerning Human Understanding, Fourth Edition, ed. A. C. Fraser (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1894; reprinted New York: Dover, 1959). References are to book, chapter and section in the form "Essay II, xxv,S" to refer to Book II, Chapter 25, Section 5. 6. For a clear exposition of the history of this doctrine of relations from the preSocratics through to Peirce, see 1. Weinberg, Abstraction, Relation and Induction (Madison, Wise.: University of Wisconsin Press, 1964). 7. G. Berkeley, The Principles ofPhilosophy, in his Works, vol. II, ed. A. A. Luce and T. E. Jessop (Edinburgh: Nelson, 1947). References are abbreviated by "PP" followed by numbered paragraph. Present reference is to PP49. 8. Kenneth Winkler, Berkeley: An Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 1.

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9. K. Winkler, Berkeley: An Interpretation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989) p.231. 10. Robert Boyle, A Free Enquiry into the Vulgarly Receiv'd Notion of Nature (London, 1686). Abbreviated by FE, followed by page number(s). 11. Boyle does not exclude the use of final causes in science. Indeed, in his Disquisition about the Final Causes of Natural Things (1688), he allows that the best explanation for certain phenomena is to be found in terms of the final causes for which the Creator intended them. But the teleology here is external, rather than internal, by reference to metaphysical natures. On Boyle's view, the hypothesis of God is an hypothesis about the causes of natural phenomena, and God is a scientific entity alongside atoms and other minute parts and mechanisms to which our experiments and observations enable us to make inferences. 12. E. Halley, "A Discourse concerning Gravity," Philosophical Transactions of the Royal So'ciety, Jan., Feb., 1686, p. 5. 13. Berkeley, Philosophical Commentaries, in his Works, vol. I. References are abbreviated to "PC" followed by numbered entry. 14. I have explored some other aspects of this account of Berkeley on the structure of the world in F. Wilson, "On the Hausmans' 'A New Approach'," in Robert Muehlmann, ed., Berkeley's Metaphysics: Structural, Interpretative, and Critical Essays (University Park, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1995) pp. 67-89. 15. Except for the structuring activities of God. 16. Rudolphus Agricola, De inventione dialectica libri tres (Tubingen: M. Niemeyer, 1992). 17. Robert Sanderson's Logicae Artis Compendium, (abbreviated by Logicae, followed by page number(s)), in vol. VI of Robert Sanderson, The Works, ed. William Jacobson, in 6 volumes (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1854). 18. References will be to Pierre de la Ramee, Dialectique (1555), Edition critique avec introduction, notes et commentaires de Michel Dassonville (Geneve: Librairie Droz, 1964). 19. Walter 1. Ong, Ramus and Talon Inventory (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958). 20. W. 1. Ong, Ramus and Talon Inventory, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958) pp.179-186. 21. W. 1. Ong, Ramus and Talon Inventory, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958) p. 182. 22. W. 1. Ong, Ramus and Talon Inventory, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958) p. 184. 23. See Constantia Maxwell, A History of Trinity College Dublin, 1591-1892 (Dublin: Trinity College University Press, 1946) p. 149. 24. See 1. W. Stubbs, The History of the University of Dublin (Dublin: Hodges, Figgis & Co., 1889), p. 146. 25. Professor Steven Daniel has informed me of this fact. 26. R. Descartes, Rules for the Direction ofthe Mind, in vol. I of The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 2 vols. Abbreviated references refer to "CSM" followed by volume number and page number(s). Present reference is to CSM vol. I, page 51 (CSM I: 51).

136

FRED WILSON

27. Antoine Arnauld, Art of Thinking, trans. J. Dickoff and P. James (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1964); La Logique de Port-Royal (Paris: Hachette, 1854). 28. 11 est "necessaire que la matiere soit trouvee pour la disposer..." (p. 210) 29. W. J. Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Logic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958). 30. W. J. Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Logic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958) p. 74. 31. W. J. Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Logic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958) p. 74. 32. W. J. Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Logic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958) pp. 73-74. 33. Ong refers to 1. Peghaire, Intellectus et Ratio selon S. Thomas D 'Aquin (Ottawa: Inst. d'Etudes Medievales, 1936). See his Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Logic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958) p. 74. 34. W. 1. Ong, Ramus, Method, and the Decay of Logic (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958) p. 74.

Burne and the Logicians CHARLES ECHELBARGER

Part I Due to the luedieval universities' requirement of courses on logic, nearly everyone who received a higher education (until the Renaissance interregnum in logic) absorbed a certain psychological theory of human intellectual powers which was presented in the context of those courses. Aristotle's definition of man as the rational animal came to have a specific connotation due to the familiarity of the psychological theory presupposed in standard logic texts. The human intellect was pictured therein as structured specifically for the task of syllogistic deductive reasoning and as having specific powers corresponding to the main ingredients of syllogistic reasoning. Syllogistic reasoning, accordingly, depends on a specific act of reason, the deducing of a proposition from others. Propositions depend on another sort of act, the act ofjudgment by which simple terms or concepts are combined as subject and predicate. The intellectual faculty directly related to simple concepts was referred to as "the understanding." This psychological theory can be traced back to ancient origins, but the principal figure among these sources is Aristotle. Aristotle conceived of logic as the instrunlent of theoretical science, the perfection of which is scientific demonstration or, to use the scholastic term, scientia. (See Posterior Analytics, Book I, chapters 1-13) Scientific knowledge, according to Aristotle, is of necessarily true propositions concerning that which exists independently of the knower. Since nlany true propositions are not evident to our senses, attempts to establish them as scientific knowledge must be justified by the strongest possible type of reasoning: deductive reasoning from necessarily true premises~ otherwise, the conclusion might be no more than contingently true. In or~er that the chain of reasoning which justifies conclusions be not infinite, there must be some premises which serve as first principles, i. e., those which express real definitions of the species with which the science is concerned. These principles need not be and cannot be justified by any reasoning. Each of the special sciences rests on its own set of first principles. Since only individual substances are presented to sense perception, it is by an intellectual operation that universals come to be in the soul. There must be an intellectual operation by which first principles are conceived through definitions of universals and there nlust be an intellectual operation by which conclusions may be drawn from first principles serving as premises. Each syllogism must contain exactly three terms, one occurring twice in the premises and referring to the cause of the conclusion's truth. The intellect is potentially capable of such a perfect performance. Hence, it must be naturally endowed with powers

138 CHARLES ECHELBARGER by which it can be achieved. Logic itself might be, as Aristotle said, an art rather than a science, but the intellectual powers of the soul on which this art depends can be inferred from its achievements and its errors. We are capable of thinking as well as of perceiving and imagining. We are capable of thinking true as well as false propositions. We are capable of supporting true opinions by means of good reasoning as well as by means of poor reasoning; of syllogistic reasoning in general (valid or invalid) as well as of scientific demonstration and scientific knowledge, which is the full actualization of the intellective soul's potentiality. The intellect must be so constituted as to be capable of these acts. When scholastic logic came under attack by such reformers as the Renaissance humanists, by Bacon and by Descartes, what was called for by most philosophers was not an elimination of logic from the curriculum of higher education but an improvement of its role as an instrument in matters of probability and experimental inquiry. Neither Bacon nor Descartes nor Locke denied the achievements of scholastic logicians in the area of deductive logic, and they conceded the value of syllogistic reasoning for explaining or communicating what one already knows. They hoped for a logic of discovery, which syllogistic logic by itself cannot be. It is significant that perhaps the most widely admired early modern logic textbook, The Art of Thinking l by Pierre Nicole and Antoine Arnauld, continues with nluch the same division of logic in accordance with the old scholastic distinction of three intellectual faculties. It has been shown by Ashworth, 2 that conservatism in the teaching of logic prevailed in English universities well into the seventeenth century, particularly at Oxford. Virulent critic of scholastic logic that he was, even Locke was thoroughly familiar with contemporary neoscholastic logic manuals and even assigned them to be mastered by his own students. Ashworth has also established (Ashworth, 1984) that much of Locke's Essay Concerning Human Understanding is far more intelligible when we read it as, in part, designed to compete with traditional logic books. Indeed, the Essay was often adopted as a logic text in some universities even before Locke's death. Often, it was either assigned instead of or together with The Art of Thinking. Nevertheless, these changes in the way logic was taught and in the texts used for teaching it hardly affected associated presentations of traditional psychological theories concerning the nature of the intellect. Indeed, loyalty to the Aristotelian conception of scientific knowledge and the allied conceptions of the intellect continued well into the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in Britain. Glanville, in his The Vanity of Dogmatizing, asserted in 1661 that deduction from "foundation propositions" is "the very essentials of our rationality.,,3 In 1696, in his Method to Science, Sergeant claimed that "the deducing evidently new knowledges out of antecedent ones" is part of "our very essence and Rational Nature.,,4 Sergeant also wrote that "...our notions being clear'd, First Principles established, the true form of a syllogism manifested, p~£~E1i~dle_t~r!!1~ fO!l:rrd~ ~lld__

Hume and the Logicians 139 the necessity of the consequence evidenced, all those conclusions may be d.educed with Demonstrative Evidence... ,,5 In recent years, some philosophers6 have compared book I of Rume's Treatise of Human Nature 7 with the Port-Royal Logic, as The Art of Thinking came to be called. Most of these comparisons focus on what there may have been in the Port-Royal treatment of inductive reasoning or its treatment of ideas which influenced Runle. Recent studies of Rume's correspondence during these years indicate that Hume clainled to have had the basic plan 9f the Treatise in mind well before he began to write it. I have done some investigations in the hope of learning what works on logic, other than the Port-Royal Logic, may have influenced Runle's thinking as he wrote the Treatise, especially book I. Since Hume mentions no other logic books in any of his writings, one must be content with circumstantial evidence. Unfortunately, my investigations have not led to results that give nle any confidence as to which specific logic texts (other than the Port-Royal Logic) nlay have directly influenced the young Hume. In the second part of this paper I will explain why, for now, I do not have a persuasive answer this question. That is not to say that I am doubtful as to whether he had any familiarity with any of them. We know that Hume was an academically outstanding student. It would be highly implausible to suppose that he did not even consult library copies of the most widely used and respected neoscholastic logic texts when he studied for the logic course he took as an undergraduate. Anyone who has read the Treatise is familiar with the contenlptuous references Hunle makes to "schoolmen" and "the schools" and "peripatetics" and "school metaphysics." I cannot believe that he based these references or this contempt entirely on hearsay, having had no significant firsthand acquaintance with any of the standard popular neoscholastic logic texts. I am confident, in light of my investigations, that there are some features of Rume's theory of the understanding which are evidently reactions to standard doctrine in logic texts. In the third part of my paper, I will analyze these features and I will try to explain why they are of major importance to Hume. II Two lines of investigation suggest themselves. (1) What were the most popular logic texts in Britain in the eighteenth century? (2) Which logic texts were most commonly used by lecturers on logic at Edinburgh when Hume was an undergraduate there? Attempts to answer these questions are complicated by the fact that the sorts of logic texts assigned were not of a single type, as they had been in earlier centuries. This diversity was directly related to the fact that Scottish universities at this time were revising their curricula. This was especially true at the University of Edinburgh. The main reasons for revision were the relatively recent events of the scientific revolution, the "New Philo-

140 CHARLES ECI-IELBARGER sophy" that was emerging and political events associated with changes in religious climate, especially the ascent of Protestant religion in Britain, specifically Presbyterianism in Scotland. These led to large-scale reforms in university curricula, including the nature of the instruction and type of text to be used in logic courses. Hume had the unusual experience of attending university at a time when debates among faculty, university officials and government officials had caused the nature of the courses, including logic, to be in flux. Some faculty continued to use distinctly Aristotelian scholastic texts. In most cases, they were texts written by contemporary scholars who attempted some awareness of the "new philosophy" and were stylistically somewhat superior to the manuals that originated in the Middle Ages. Switching to one or another of the "modern" logics was also popular. Parts of Locke's Essay were often adopted as a logic text. Others adopted the PortRoyal Logic. Still others may have used Jean Le Clerc's Logica sive Ars Ratiocinandi,8 a text which blends traditional approaches with modern, especially Lockean, epistemological themes. Some used a conlbination of traditional and new approaches. This diversity of instructional approaches was due to the fact that university and government officials simply could not agree, even after years of discussion aimed at creating a uniform set of new courses, on which works on logic ought to be assigned. Thanks to the research of Mossner and other biographers, it is reasonably certain that young David Hume heard lectures on logic in 1723 in the required Semi course on logic and metaphysics at the University of Edinburgh. These lectures were given, in Latin, by a Professor Colin Drummond who also taught Greek and classical literature. I have found and studied some student dictates on the course which were made in the very year that Hume was enrolled in it and the lecturer referred to in the dictates was Professor Drummond. 9 Professor David Fate Norton has also provided me with a copy of the compendium of lecture notes, Compendium Logicae, (dated 1725) from Drummond's logic course of that year. These dictates and this compendium provide good evidence that Hume was not ignorant of the traditional scholastic treatment of logic. Drummond's lectures were typical scholastic treatments of logic. They present standard explanations of such nlatters as the distinction between the three operations of the mind, types of signs, simple and complex terms, concrete and abstract terms, the various types of propositions, species, genera, categories and predicables. I have tried compiling circumstantial evidence as to formative influences on Hume's views on the nature of logic by comparing Drummond's lectures with widely popular neoscholastic texts from this period. The most conspicuous of these were by the Dutch neoscholastic Franco Burgersdijk (1590-1635).10

Hume and the Logicians 141 Hume may have been familiar with texts like Burgersdijk's, but my examination of some of these has not, so far, provided any strong evidence that he would have gained this familiarity through any assignments made by Drummond in such texts in conjunction with his course on logic. Although the overall perspective on the nature and contents of logic in Burgersdijk's text, for example, are similar to those of Drummond's lectures, the style, organization and manner of explanation found in Burgersdijk's text are obviously different from what one finds in Drummond's lectures. One might conlment reproachfully that this result is exactly what one might have expected. One might say that, even if Hume was in the environs of such traditional influences, they must have been minor in comparison to those of Cartesian and Lockean presentations of logic. This line of reproach may seem even more powerful in view of the fact that reforms made in the organization and curriculunl of the University of Edinburgh in 1708 gave powerful impetus to the teaching of such modern authors as Descartes, Newton and Locke. Hume attached great importance to these thinkers and, in his own work, Hume seems to ignore almost completely the subject of traditional logic. Moreover, Hume was a contributing member of a new library which had been founded in 1724 by Janles Steuart, Professor at Edinburgh, and was called the Physiological Library.l1 One had to contribute books or an annual fee in order to be a borrowing member. Besides a list of members, there is a record of the holdings of the Steuart Library during the time that Hume was a member. As one would expect, the record shows that a large part of the holdings were scientific works by such authors as Newton, Huygens and Boyle but there were also some works on logic. On the list, there is of course, the Port-Royal Logic but there is also Isaac Watts's Logick, or The Right Use of Reason (first published in London, 1724). Of the nlodern logic texts which were widely used in eighteenth century Britain, Watts's book had few more popular competitors. Another modern logic text which should be mentioned in this context is 1. P. de Crousasz's A New Treatise of the Art of Thinking. 12 This book was first published in French in 1712. It was so appealing to British readers that it was translated into English and published in 1724. Hume was still an Edinburgh student at that time. Crousasz's book was an attempt to improve upon the PortRoyal Logic by responding to new themes in the works of Locke and Malebranche and by incorporating themes on allied subjects such as epistemology and semantics into logic. Peter Jones argues cogently that Crousasz's book was quite likely known either by Hume or by others with whom Hunle was closely associated. 13 Hume gives no hint in any of his writings that he knew Crousasz's A New Treatise of the Art of Thinking but anyone who was already familiar, as Hume may have been, with the Port-Royal Logic, would have found it readily accessible and very useful. When one compares the contents of Book I of the Treatise with Crousasz's treatments of perceptions, ideas, the acts of the understanding, the imagination, the passions and skepticism, it is

142 CHARLES ECHELBARGER difficult t.o doubt that Hume knew this work, even if his own views on these subjects are often different from those of Crousasz. 14 These facts strongly support the contention that modern logic texts greatly influenced Hume. But these facts must be set beside others. Hume did not begin actually to compose the Treatise until more than ten years after his 1723 undergraduate logic course with Drummond. It is reasonable to assume that he at least knew of the Port-Royal Logic while he was an undergraduate, but there is no clear evidence that he studied it during those years. The university reforms of 1708 had been in the works for a number of years. Before the end of the seventeenth century, a Parliamentary commission was created by the Scottish government to recommend the contents and structures of uniform courses which would be required of all undergraduates. Many texts were vigorously rejected on all sides and the Port-Royal Logic was one of the rejects. There is also considerable evidence that, while Hume was an undergraduate, traditional approaches to logic were still firmly in place in most Scottish Universities. In his letters and journals of 1654, Robert Baillie, principal of the University of Glasgow, writes that the works of Keckerman, Burgersdijk and Scheibler are used in the Scottish universities. He wrote this to the Dutch scholar, Gisbert Voel. As late as 1717, at Glasgow, records show that John Law began logic by teaching Burgersdijk. Library acquisitions lists through the end of the seventeenth century at Edinburgh show that copies of neoscholastic logic texts were still purchased. 15 Students rarely purchased copies of textbooks, relying heavily instead on library holdings for their studies. In light of these facts, it becomes even more understandable that courses such as Drummond's 1723 logic course would have still been scholastic in tone. The tide in logic books and logic instruction during the eighteenth century at Edinburgh may have been turning from Aristotle to Locke via Descartes, but it did not turn all at once. III Two pieces of textual evidence concerning Hume's early acquaintance with works on logic are from Hume's own writings. The first is the footnote in the section of book I of the Treatise dealing with belief. This evidence will be dealt with at length after I have considered the second. The second is what he says in the Abstract about logic and about book I of the Treatise. In his anonymously published piece of self-advertising, An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature,16 Hume tried to convey to the public a general sense of the contents of the Treatise by pointing out some similarities between the Treatise and other recently published works that dealt with subjects discussed in the Treatise. According to the author of the Abstract, Book I of the Treatise contains "the Logic of this author." One should note what Hume says in the same place about other contemporary works specifically on logic, works to which he wanted

Hume and the Logicians 143 Book I of the Treatise to be compared. I will quote at length from the Abstract, since the point at issue is crucial. Besides the satisfaction of being acquainted with what most nearly concerns us, it may be safely affinned that almost all the sciences are comprehended in the science of human nature and are dependent on it. The sole end uf logic is to explain the principles and operations of our reasoning faculty, and the nature of ideas; morals and criticism regard our tastes and sentiments; and politics consider men as united in society, and dependent on each other. This treatise, therefore, of human nature seems intended for a system of the sciences. The author has fInished what regards logic and has laid the foundation of the other parts in his account of the passions.

The celebrated Monsieur Leibniz has observed it to be a defect in the common systems of logic that they are very copious when they explain the operations of the understanding in forming demonstrations, but are too concise when they treat of probabilities and those other measures of evidence on which life and action intirely (sic) depend and which are our guides even in most of our philosophical speculations. In this censure, he comprehends the Essay on Human Understanding, Le (sic) Recherche de la Verite (sic) and L'Art de Penser. The author of the Treatise of Human Nature seems to have been sensible of this defect in these philosophers and has endeavored, as much as he can, to supply it. (T646-647) I think we may safely infer that, by the time he began to write the Treatise, Hume had a substantial acquaintance with the "common systems of Logic." From a reading of Book I of the Treatise, it is also clear that he did not believe the only defect of the common systems of logic was that they lacked an adequate treatment of probabilities and other measures of evidence. His footnote to the section on belief straightforwardly attacks all previous systems of logic as having radically misconceived the nature of the understanding itself, as having misconceived its "principles and operations of reasoning." Book I of the Treatise is about the understanding. In this book, there are also discussions of judgment and reasoning. The latter acts do not receive separate treatment outside the book on the understanding. Hume's long footnote to book I's section on belief explains this arrangement: We may here take occasion to observe a very remarkable error, which, being frequently inculcated in the schools, has become a kind of established maxim, and is universally received by all logicians. This error consists of the vulgar division of the acts of the understanding into conception, judgement, and reasoning and in the defInitions we give of them. Conception is defmed to be the simple survey of one or more ideas; Judgement to be the separating or uniting of different ideas; Reasoning to be the separating or uniting of different ideas by the interposition of others which show the relation they bear to each other. But these distinctions and defmitions are faulty in very considerable articles. For, fIrst, 'tis far from

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CHARLES ECHELBARGER being true that in every judgement which we form we unite two different ideas: since in that proposition God is, or indeed any other which regards existence, the idea of existence is no distinct idea which we unite with that of the object and is capable of forming a compound idea by the union. Secondly, as we can thus form a proposition which contains only one idea, so we may exert our reasoning without employing more than two ideas and without having recourse to a third to serve as a medium betwixt them. We infer a cause immediately from its effect; and this inference is not only a true species of reasoning but the strongest of all others and more convincing than when we interpose another idea to connect the two extremes. What we may in general affirm concerning these three acts of the understanding is that, taking them in a proper light, they all resolve themselves into the first and are nothing but particular ways of conceiving our objects. Whether we consider a single object or several; whether we dwell on these objects or run from them to others; and in whatever form or order we survey them, the act of the mind exceeds not a simple conception; and the only renlarkable difference which occurs on this occasion is when we join belief to the conception, and are perswaded of the truth of what we conceive. (T96-7, n.l, my emphasis)

Note, first, Hume's apparent inlplication that treatments of the understanding by modern logicians are just as guilty of the "remarkable error" as are those of the scholastics who first inculcated it. In fact, one finds such texts as those by Arnauld and Watts treating the understanding in exactly the way that Hume refers to as a "renlarkable error." But one must also compare what is said on this same topic by authors of traditional approaches to logic such as Burgersdijk. In the Monitio Logica, we find Burgersdijk saying such things as the following: Logic is the art of making instruments and therewith directing the understanding in the Knowledge of Things...A Theme is whatsoever may be propos'd to the Understanding to be known...Themes Simple are those which are understood without a Composition or Complexion on Notions, as Man, runs, etc. Compos'd such as are understood by two or more Notions by an Affirmation or Negation join'd together, as Man runs...The judgment of the Mind is said to be true when it composes those things which really are conjoyn'd or divides those things which really are diverse. 17

In the aforementioned student dictate made for Drummond's 1723 logic course at Edinburgh, we read: And now we talk about systematic logic which henceforth can be defined as the art or practical science directing the operation of the mind to truth. Three operations of the mind are laid out. Apprehension, judgment and discursive reasoning. Apprehension is the naked mental representation of something without affirming or denying, as when we consider the sun, or anything else you may wish...but only by contemplating and as if by intuiting.

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Judgment is the assertion of the mind about its own ideas compared among themselves as when the mind compares the earth with the· idea of round and either affinns or denies that the earth is round. Discursive reasoning is the operation of the mind by which we elicit one judgment from another, as when we judge that which is best is above all things, loving God is best, and hence we infer that loving God is above all things. 18

Compare these with the corresponding part of Watt's Logick: The Object of Perception is that which is represented in the Idea, that which is the Archetype or Pattern according to which the idea is formed: and thus Judgements, Propositions, Reasonings, and long discourses may all become the objects of perception. Every object of our ideas is called a Theme, whether it be a Being or Not Being...When the mind has got acquaintance with things by framing ideas of them it proceeds to the next Operation, and that is, to compare these ideas together and to join them by Affirmation, or to disj oin them by Negation, according as we find them to agree or disagree. This act of Mind is called Judgment. 19

Then, consider this from the introduction to the Port-Royal Logic: Logic is the art of directing Reason to a knowledge of things for the instruction of both ourselves and others. This art consists in man's reflecting on the mind's four principal operations-conceiving, judging, reasoning and ordering. To conceive a thing is simply to view that thing as it presents itself to the mind...To judge is to join two ideas, affirming or denying the one of the other...To reason is to form one judgment from several others. (PRL 29-30)

Examples of this sort could be multiplied at great length by way of illustrating the point that Runle was quite accurate in taking all logicians, the moderns and those of the Schools as the target of his criticism insofar as he was concerned with the way that their texts portray the faculties and operations of the mind's "purely rational" aspect. The moderns may have rightly turned their attention to giving better treatments of inductive reasoning and probability but, on the fundanlental operations involved in one of the most conceptually basic types of thought and reasoning, syllogistic deduction, they had made little or no change. I take I-Iume to be arguing that, far from being of no great importance in the era of modern logic and the new philosophy, it is precisely in the area of syllogistic deduction where drastic change is most seriously required. Even the best texts of the time leave in place an unexamined, apparently ad hoc, metaphysical picture of the mind as having one part that is specialized for deductive reasoning and another that is specialized for inductive reasoning. If traditional logicians failed to adequately treat probabilistic reasoning, modern logicians as well as traditionalists have failed to accurately portray the workings of the mind where deduction in concerned. I believe Hume concluded that what is called for is a unified conception of the mind's (deductive and

146 CHARLES ECHELBARGER inductive) reasoning capacities and, I believe, that conception is one of the main goals of Hume's new science of Human Nature. In a publication of a few years ago, I have attempted to reconstruct what I believe to be Hunle's theory of the psychological realities of categorical syllogistic reasoning which would be consistent with the agendas of a radically empiricist and naturalistic conception of the mind. 20 If Hume finds the standard tripartite division of conception, judgment and reasoning to be remarkably erroneous, we may find his remedy for the error to be equally remarkable, even if not necessarily erroneous. It involves what at first seems to be his using the same definition of the understanding typical of both traditional scholastic logic and modern logic books. The understanding, he says, is the faculty of conception. But Hume also makes the understanding take over the roles of judgment and reasoning, a change in characterization of the understanding that would have been repugnant to both traditional and modern logicians. What does seenl clear, then, is that, though Hunle retained the old functional characterization of the understanding, he expanded the Understanding's function, thereby simplifying its nature. But there is also a simplification in the nature of the objects of the understanding in Hume's new approach. The object of the understanding whether in simple conception, judgment or reasoning is just one or more ideas, "surveyed" in some "form or order." Ideas qua objects distinct from propositional contexts, ideas qua propositions, and ideas qua arguments are to be thought of as being essentially the same sort of object. In fact, Hume's argument that there are single-idea propositions, propositions not consisting of at least two distinct ideas joined together, suggests that he may have thought that all ideas, even ideas of substances are propositional. We cannot sinlply think of God or of a tree without thinking of theexistence-of-God or of a-tree's-existing. To think of any thing (object or state of affairs) is, as he says, to think of it as existing. Hume says: There is no impression nor idea of any kind of which we have any consciousness or memory that is not conceiv' d as existent;... [therefore] the idea of existence must either be deriv' d from a distinct impression, conjoin'd with every perception or object of our thought, or must be the very same with the idea of perception or object. [There are no] two distinct impressions, which are inseparably conjoin'd. (T66) ...Whoever opposes this, must necessarily point out that distinct impression, from which the idea of entity is deriv' d, and must prove, that this idea is inseparable from every perception we believe to be existent. (T67)

Nor, he says, will it "serve us in any stead" to claim that a distinction of reason may be made here as in other cases where there is no real difference.

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That kind of distinction is founded in the different resemblances which the same simple idea may have to several different ideas. But no object can be presented resembling some object with respect to its existence and different from others in the same particular, since every object, that is presented, must necessarily be existent. (T67)

He also argues in the Appendix to the Treatise that, if there were a simple idea such as that of reality or existence, then it could be conjoined to the simple conception of an object and the result of that annexation would be a belief concerning that simple conception. That suggestion he finds absurd since it would mean that "it would be in a man's power to believe what he pleas'd." (T624)

So, while many propositions may contain at least two terms united together by the understanding, the psychologically and epistemologically simplest of propositions will be single ideas of the existence of some kind of individual object and these will not have to be formed by any act of uniting ideas other than the ideas composing the idea of the object itself. Once one has formed the complex idea of an object, one need do nothing more to have an existential proposition in mind. Moreover, it seenlS obvious that another reason why Hume found the traditional notion of judgment erroneous is that, typically, it is said (in both modern and traditional texts) to be either the act of affirming one idea of another or of denying one idea of another, depending on whether the proposition is affirmative or negative in quality. It seen1S to me that one clear reason why Hume protested against the traditional characterization of the understanding in the part of the Treatise that deals with the nature of belief is that the traditional view of judgment makes judgment tantamount to belief or disbelief. Hume's point is probably that believing and disbelieving are mental states having objects or contents which have a definite truth-value. So, the joining or separating of ideas cannot itself be what constitutes believing or disbelieving. Granted, the uniting and separating of ideas are real and indispensable functions of the understanding, but they are not the same as affirmation or denial. One would have to (dis)believe something before there was anything to (dis)believe. The plain fact is that we understand many things that we neither believe nor disbelieve. This point is obvious in the case of propositions which are about matters with which we are not well acquainted. I neither believe nor disbelieve that all senators from Georgia are at least six feet tall, but in order to believe, disbelieve or suspend judgment about the matter, I must at least understand the proposition in question. Insofar as logicians fail to preselVe this point, their conception of the nature of the understanding is erroneous. The standard view of judgment to which Hume refers confuses believing with merely predicating. Indeed, Hume's argument that there are single-idea propositions also implies that propositions do not even have to involve predicating one idea of another distinct idea. Hume's insight into the. nature of the understanding, I submit, is

148 CHARLES ECHELBARGER that the act of the understanding is to form and use that which is capable of bearing a truth-value, i. e., propositions. But, insofar as one does that, one is only conceiving something which is itself either true or false, not judging something to be either true or false. Judgnlent or belief, presupposes both the act of the understanding and the object of the understanding. What the logicians call simple apprehension, judgment and reason are different ways in which the understanding functions either to form or manipulate propositions. Treating arguments as a type of compound idea is not a difficult suggestion. Something sinlilar is quite familiar to contemporary logicians. Every argument may be treated as a conditional proposition formed by conjoining the premises as the antecedent and putting the conclusion as the consequent. In whatever sense a conditional proposition is a single idea, so mayan argument be considered a single idea. In this sense, treating a deductive argument as a proposition also fits well with Hume's related remarks on belief and with what is involved in the appraisal of an argument as valid or invalid. Much as we saw in the case of fornling propositions, we ought not to describe the formation of an argunlent as consisting either of the assertion of the premises or of the conclusion as true. To simply form an argument, we need not believe or assert the premises or the conclusion to be true. We are "simply surveying" two ideas as in a "form" and "order" such that, if the one is true, the other must also be true. To infer a proposition from other propositions, to draw a proposition from others as a conclusion, is a different sort of act which goes beyond the proper business of the understanding. Inferring or concluding is more than mere formation or survey of propositions and their purely logical relations (i. e., as "relations of ideas"). Inferring or concluding, Hume would maintain, involves belief, and thus, the passionate side of our nature. In an earlier work, (see Echelbarger, 1988) I have tried to show how Hume's theory of the understanding enables him to deal with the psychological reality of syllogistic reasoning. His theory of the understanding contrasts sharply with both the traditional and modern logicians's reliance on a theory which represents the intellect as essentially structured with three distinct po\vers, naturally disposed to three distinct types of act. Hume' s alternative to this traditional psychological theory provides him with what he thought necessary to explain how human beings are capable of acquiring the ability for syllogistic reasoning rather than having it in their very nature. A theory of the understanding, for Hume, is not to be identified with a theory of how human beings think syllogistically. It nlust be broad enough and flexible enough to also provide the foundations of an account of how the ability for such thinking as well as a wide variety of other cognitive abilities, including, of course, abilities for inductive and causal reasoning, are acquired by human beings. Since there is only one fundamental act of the understanding, according to Hume, namely conception, the way is clear to develop a psychological theory of the understanding which explains the capacity for syllogistic and other kinds of

Hume and the Logicians 149 reasoning as acquired~ a theory which shows how abilities for conceiving increasingly complex types of propositions develop gradually as experience molds us and the growing records of memory allow the imagination to construct increasingly complex representations of the past, the future and presently unobserved places or objects~ a theory which treats the process of acquiring deductive reasoning capacities in such a way that it nlight plausibly be claimed to take place only in conjunction with the acquisition of language and with socialization. I suspect that it is exactly this sort of theory which the epistemological works of modern philosophers like Hobbes and Locke had encouraged Hume to believe in. Neither traditional nor modern logicians provided a conception of human intellectual faculties and operations which was consistent with this sort of theory.21 Perhaps the authors of standard logic texts, sincerely wanting to satisfy the pedagogical concerns of the academic community, could not have provided anything that would have satisfied Hume, given the kinds of ontological commitments concerning the intellectual and sensitive parts of the soul to which most modernists and traditionalists were still loyal in Hume's day. If I am right, Hume rejected the psychological theory implicit in both traditional and modern logic texts because he had, even as a student, rejected this distinction of intellectual versus sensitive parts of the soul as marking something original in human nature, and his reason for rejecting this ontological commitment was that it is incompatible with his naturalistic agenda for a new science of human nature. NOTES 1. All references to this work are to the Dickoff and James translation, A. Arnauld, and P. Nicole, The Art of Thinking; trans. 1. Dickoff, P. James (Indianapolis, BobbsMerrill, 1964). Abbreviated as "PRL" followed by page number(s). 2. E. 1. Ashworth, "Locke On Language," Canadian Journal of Philosophy, vol. XIV, no. 1, 1984. Abbreviated (Ashworth, 1984). 3. Joseph Glanvill, The Vanity of Dogmatizing (London, 1661; reprinted Sussex: Harvester, Hove 1970, ed. by S. Medcalf) pp. 97-98. 4. John Sergeant, The Method To Science (London, 1696) preface. 5.1. Sergeant, The Method To Science (London, 1696) preface. 6. See Hendel's introductory essay in A. Arnauld and P. Nicole, The Art of Thinking; trans. 1. Dickoff, P. James (Indianapolis, Babbs-Merrill, 1964). 7. All references to Hume's Treatise are to David Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge. 2nd edition text revised and variant readings by P. H. Nidditch (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978). Abbreviated hereafer as T followed by page number(s). 8. An edition of LeClerc's Logic was published in London in 1692.

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CHARLES ECHELBARGER

9. Student dictates on Professor Colin Drummond's Latin lectures on logic, Institutiones Logicae, Ms 3938, National Library of Scotland. Abbreviated in the text as Institutiones Logicae. 10. See especially Franco Burgersdijk, Monitio Logica or, An Abstract... of Logic, trans. by a Gentleman [from the Latin of 1626] (London, 1697). Burgersdijk's texts are not the only examples of popular neoscholastic texts in late seventeenth- and early eighteenth-century British universities. Some others whose works ran into many editions during this period were Phillipe Du Trieu (1614-1748), Bartholomeo Keckermann (1599-1641), Christopher Scheibler (1611-1685) and Martin Smiglecius (1618-1658). See Ashworth (1984) for references on these. Like Burgersdijk, these men were "modem" Aristotelians, meaning that they tried to keep the essentials of Aristotelian logic, ethics, and metaphysics without Aristotelian natural philosophy. They were also Protestants, which made them attractive as textbook authors in late seventeenth and early eighteenth century Scotland. Still another widely used neoscholastic logic text was Robert Sanderson's Artis Logicae Compendium. This text went through many editions. One was published at Oxford in 1696. 11. See Edinburgh University manuscript Ms. De.10. 127. 12.1. -Po de Crousasz, A New Treatise ofthe Art of Thinking (London, 1724). 13. Peter Jones, Hume's Sentiments, Their Ciceronian and French Context (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1982). 14. When Hume resided in La Fleche and had begun to write the Treatise, he obtained privileges to borrow books from the library of the Jesuit College there. Given the Cartesian tone of Crousasz's A New Treatise of the Art of Thinking and its evident similarity to the Port-Royal Logic, it is reasonable to assume that the College library would have had a copy of Crousasz's work. If Hume already knew the book in its English translation, study of the French version would have been a useful way of sharpening his skills in French, as task which, he told a friend in correspondence, required some efforts on his part once he settled in France. Another reason Hume would have found the book attractive is that, in it, Crousasz constantly quotes Cicero, one of Hume's favorite authors. 15. See Christine Shepherd-King, Logic Teaching in Seventeenth Century Scottish Universities. Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, University of Edinburgh, (1974), page 105 and passim. Also, see, John Veitch, "Philosophy In the Scottish Universities," Mind 2 (1877), pp. 74-91. Veitch notes that, even though texts on logic were actually written at the directions of the commissioners by various Scottish universities, the attempt at putting a uniform curriculum into place failed: "After 1701, nothing more is heard of the project; and it had no practical effect on the course of philosophical teaching in the universities." (Veitch, p. 91). In any event, the text on logic" Veitch says, was "based chiefly on the Logic of Port-Royal." (p. 91) Shepherd-King thinks it was more likely to have been patterned after Burgersdijk but it was never used. 16. David Hume, An Abstract oj a Treatise ojHuman Nature, ed. by 1. M. Keynes and P. Sraffa (Hamden: Archon Books, 1965). 17. Franco Burgersdijk, Monitio Logica or, An Abstract... oj Logic, trans. by a Gentleman [from the Latin of 1626] (London, 1697) p. 1. 18. Student dictates on Professor Colin Drummond's Latin lectures on logic, Proemium, Institutiones Logicae, Ms 3938, National Library of Scotland, pp. 3-5. My translation. I have omitted the phrase "nihil deiis determinante" from the original since it seems to make no sense in the context. Some of the words in the original seem to have been

Hume and the Logicians 151 omitted or abbreviated. Some ungrammatical features of the original may be due to haste or imperfect grammatical skill of the author. The actual text reads as follows: "Et horam systenla dicitur Logica quae perinde potest. Ars seu scientia practica mentis operationes. Aprehensio, Judicum et Discursis. Apprehensio est nuda rei alicujus in mente representatione affirmatio aut negatione ut consideramus solem aut aliud quod vis nihil deiis detnninante sed tantum contemplante & quasiintuente. Judicum est sententia mentis de suis ideis inter se comparatis ut cum mens habet idea terreis afffinnat vel negat terreim esse rotundam. Discursis est mentis Operatio qua unum judicum ex allis elicimus ut· cum judicamus id quod optimum est esse supra omnia amandum Deum esse optimum & inde inferimus Deum esse supra omnia amandum." 19. Isaac Watts, Logick or The Right Use ofReason. (London, 1726; reprinted, New York: Garland, 1964) pp. 142-144. 20. Charles Echelbarger, "Hume On Deduction," Philosophy Research Archives, vol. XIII, 1987-88. Abbreviated (Echelbarger, 1988) 21. A possible exception to this generalization is Hobbes. Hobbes might, in some sense, be considered a logician. In his Logica Sive Computatio, he develops a theory of how capacities for reasoning are developed in human beings as a function of experience, socialization and language acquisition. Almost all of Hobbes's psychological theory on this matter is concerned with syllogistic reasoning. In know of no evidence that Hume was directly influenced by Hobbes's views on logic. It is, in any case, implausible to classify Hobbes as a logician in the sense that, say, Burgersdijk or Watts were considered to be logicians. To my knowledge, Hobbes's Logica was never used in any university as a textbook.

Burne on Demonstration DAVID OWEN

I. Introduction It is very conlmon to take Hume's use of the term "demonstration" and its cognates as meaning "deduction." For instance, one recent author takes Hume's contrast of causal inference with demonstration to "prejudge the question of whether causal inference can be recast as sound deductive argument."l Such a reading of "demonstrative" as "deductive" of course does no harm if nothing is meant by "deductive" other than some unspecified mode of reasoning. 2 But ordinarily, I would hazard, when interpreters of I-Iunle talk about "demonstration" as "deduction" they have in mind the standard view of deduction as a forulally valid argument, according to the rules either of syllogism or propositional or predicate logic. So Hume's "demonstrative/probable" contrast becomes our "deductive/inductive" contrast. I have argued elsewhere against the assimilation of the former contrast to the latter and here want only to concentrate on special problems with respect to Hume on demonstration. 3 Let us suppose that when Hume's use of "demonstrative" is glossed as "deductive," those giving this gloss really mean "deductive" in the sense of "formally valid according to the rules of syllogism or lllodern logic." A consequence of this view is that when Hume says, as he frequently does, 4 that there are no demonstrative argunlents with conclusions that are possibly false, he means there are no deductively valid arguments with contingent conclusions. It appears, then, that those who interpret Hume this way "impute to him an error unbelievably gross and often repeated."s In order to avoid saddling Hume with this apparent disastrous Inistake, Stove plausibly suggests that what Hume really meant by "demonstrative arguments" was not "deductively valid arguments simpliciter" but rather "deductively valid arguments with necessarily true (or a priori) true premises." It follows, of course, that such arguments will have necessarily true conclusions. Let us call Hume's claim that if a proposition is possibly false, it is non-demonstrable, criterion 1) of non-demonstrability. On the view of demonstrations as deductively valid arguments with necessarily true conclusions, criterion 1) is saved fronl obvious falsehood. Stove's characterization of demonstrative arguments seems to have beconle the standard view of those unhappy with simply equating demonstration with deduction. 6 It has much to be said for it in general, as it seenlS to be the nlodern equivalent of the scholastic notion of demonstration as a syllogistic argument from axioms, first principles or maxims. Though this interpretation saves Hume's criterion 1) from falsehood, it does not, apparently, save it from triviality.7 Hume states and use~_~~i_s_ ~~~t~~~