India's 2009 Elections: Coalition Politics, Party Competition and Congress Continuity

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Author: Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy (Editors)

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List of Tables and Figures

India’s 2009 Elections

i

ii



India’s 2009 Elections Coalition Politics, Party Competition, and Congress Continuity

Edited by

Paul Wallace Ramashray Roy

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Copyright © Paul Wallace and Ramashray 2011 iv India lections ’s 2009 ERoy, All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. First published in 2011 by Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd B1/I-1 Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area Mathura Road, New Delhi 110 044, India www.sagepub.in Sage Publications Inc 2455 Teller Road Thousand Oaks, California 91320, USA Sage Publications Ltd 1 Oliver’s Yard, 55 City Road London EC1Y 1SP, United Kingdom Sage Publications Asia-Pacific Pte Ltd 33 Pekin Street #02-01 Far East Square Singapore 048763 Published by Vivek Mehra for Sage Publications India Pvt Ltd, typeset in 11/13 pt Adobe Garamond by Star Compugraphics Private Limited, Delhi and printed at Chaman Enterprises, New Delhi. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data India’s 2009 elections: coalition politics, party competition, and Congress continuity/edited by Paul Wallace, Ramashray Roy. â•…â•…â•‡ p. cm. â•… Includes bibliographical references and index. â•… 1. Elections—India. 2. India. Parliament. Lok Sabha—Elections, 2009. 3. India—Politics and government—1977–â•… I. Wallace, Paul, 1931–â•… II. Roy, Ramashray. JQ292.I588â•…â•…â•…â•‡ 324.954'0532—dc22â•…â•…â•…â•‡ 2011â•…â•…â•…â•‡ 2011008746 ISBN:â•‡ 978-81-321-0583-1 (HB) The Sage Team:â•‡ Elina Majumdar, Arpita Dasgupta, Vijay Sah and Deepti Saxena


N. Gerald ( Jerry) Barrier passed away on June 6, 2010 shortly before his 70th birthday. A major scholar in Punjab and Sikh studies in the Department of History at the University of Missouri in Columbia, Jerry also promoted books and bibliography about India through South Asia Books in the United States. We deeply miss our dear friend and colleague.

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Contents

List of Tables and Figures List of Abbreviations Preface

ix xiii xvii

PART I: Thematic Studies 1. Introduction: Political Stability and Governance Coherence Paul Wallace 2. Regional Base and National Dream: Alliance Formation, 2009 National Elections Ramashray Roy 3. Coalition Politics: Withering of National–Regional Ideological Positions? Pramod Kumar 4. Region, Representation, and National Cohesion: Public Space in India Jyotirindra Dasgupta 5. Federalism, Party System, and Structural Changes in India Maneesha Roy 6. Gender Discourse in Elections: Constructing a Constituency? Rainuka Dagar 7. The BSP in 2009: Still Making Progress, But Only as a Dalit Party Christophe Jaffrelot

3

21

42

64 94 110

140

Part II: Analytical State Studies A.â•‡ One Favored (dominant) Party System 8. Gujarat Goebbel’s Propaganda and Governance: The 2009 Lok Sabha Elections in Gujarat Ghanshyam Shah

167

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â•‡ 9. West Bengal Mapping a Political Challenge: West Bengal 2009 Amiya K. Chaudhuri

192

B.â•‡Alternating Two-party Systems 10. Rajasthan Silent Tsunami in Rajasthan: BJP Bastion Busted in 2009 Bhawani Singh and Vibhuti Singh Shekhawat 11. Kerala The LDF’s Debacle: Kerala Votes for National Stability G. Gopa Kumar 12. Maharashtra Maharashtra: Still a Bipolar System, But Turmoil Ahead Raghavendra Keshavarao Hebsur 13. Karnataka The Surge of Saffron: Some Genuine and Some Imitation? Raghavendra Keshavarao Hebsur 14. Andhra Pradesh Political Mobilization, Competitive Populism, and Changing Party Dynamics in Andhra Pradesh Karli Srinivasulu

217

234

252

270

286

C. Multi-party States 15. Bihar Identity Politics Recycled: 2009 Lok Sabha Election in Bihar 311 Binoy Shanker Prasad 16. Jammu and Kashmir Ethnic–Religious Crisis and Electoral Democracy: Jammu and Kashmir Elections, 2008 and 2009 335 Praveen Krishna Swami 17. Northeast India Democracy, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Competitive Politics: The Case of States in Northeast India 355 Rajesh Dev About the Editors and Contributors Index

394 400


ix

List of Tables and Figures Tables 1.1 2009 Elections: Lok Sabha Party Results 1.2 2009 Elections: Coalition and Party Results 1.3 2009 Elections: National and State Recognized Political Parties and Symbols 1.4 Support for the UPA Government in the 15th Lok Sabha 1.5 Leading Party Seats and Vote Percentages 1984–2009 1.6 State Results Lok Sabha Election 2009 1.7 Number of Regular and Reserved Seats in the Lok Sabha by State, 2009 3.1 Performance of National and Regional Parties 3.2 Transfer from Center to States as Percentage of Gross Revenue Receipts of the Center: Finance Commission Period Average 3.3 Trends in Expenditure to GDP Ratio 3.4 Caste-wise Candidate Summary: Lok Sabha Elections, 1971–2009 6.1 Gender-wise Breakdown of Voters, Contestants, and Elected Candidates in India for 1957–2009 6.2 Party-wise Female Candidates and Female Office Bearers in 2009 6.3 Perception of Teachers from Northern India on Women Issues Raised by Political Parties in 2009 7.1 BSP Vote Percentage in Seven General Elections 7.2 BSP Vote by State in 2009/2004 (Where It Has Crossed the 5 Percent Mark) 7.3 The BSP Candidates and MLAs in 2007 (2002) in Uttar Pradesh

4 5 6 13 14 15 16 45 53 54 55 112 122 124 143 144 145

x


7.4 Voting Pattern of the UP Castes and Communities in 2002 and 2007 7.5 Caste and Community of the BSP Candidates in Uttar Pradesh: 2009 Lok Sabha Elections 7.6 Caste and Community of BSP Candidates in Maharashtra: 2009 Lok Sabha Elections 7.7 Anti-incumbency Factor in UP 7.8 Satisfaction with Performance of UPA and BSP Governments among UP Voters 7.9 Vote of the Congress/BSP by Caste and Community 7.10 Caste and Community of Mayawati’s Government in 2007 7.11 The Dalit Vote for the BSP in Seven States 7.12 Congress Percent Lead over the BSP in Different Categories of Dalits 7.13 The BSP Vote in UP by Caste and Community 7.14 Vote of the Congress/BSP by Locality 7.15 Vote of the Congress/BSP by Class 8.1 Whose Performance Was Considered while Voting for the Lok Sabha: State or Central Government? 8.2 Perception of the People Regarding Improvement or Otherwise in Gujarat between 2002–07 8.3 Percent Preference of 2009 Voters for the Prime Minister after Elections 8.4 Vote by Class in the 2007 and 2009 Elections 9.1 Percent of Votes Polled by Different Parties in Parliamentary Election 2009 in West Bengal 9.2 Constituency-wise Percentage Points of Valid Votes Polled by Political Parties in Parliamentary Election 2009 in Districts of West Bengal 9.3 Human Development Indices of Districts in West Bengal 9.4 Percentage of SC, ST, and Muslims of the Total Population of West Bengal and Each District of West Bengal

145 149 150 151 151 152 154 156 156 157 157 158 185 186 187 188 198 199 202 207


10.1 Party Results 1991–2009 10.2 Comparative Voting Turnouts in 2008 Assembly and 2009 Parliamentary Elections 10.3 Party and Poll Percentage 2009

xi

223 224 226

11.1 A Framework of Alliances and Parties on the Eve of 2009 Elections 11.2 Vote Share and Seats of Major Alliances 11.3 Vote Share of Major Parties 11.4 Caste–Religion Wise Preference of Parties 11.5 Voter’s Views on SNC Lavalin Case 11.6 Have You Heard about the Corruption Charges against Pinarayi Vijayan in the Lavlyn Scam? 11.7 Approval Rating on LDF’s Alliance with Abdul Nassir Maudani 11.8 Who Should Lead the UDF in Kerala? 11.9 A Non-coalition View on Voter’s Party Preferences 11.10 Who Should Lead the LDF in Kerala: V.S. Achutanandan or Pinarayi Vijayan?

249

12.1 Rank Order Correlations between Party Votes and Size of Linguistic Groups: Bombay Municipal Elections, 1985 12.2 Seats Contested, Won, and Share Votes of Parties 12.3 Seats Contested and Won by Regions 12.4 Share Votes of Parties by Social Background

256 262 264 265

238 239 240 244 246 246 247 248 248

13.1 Karnataka Lok Sabha Elections (2004 and 2009): Seats Won and Share of Votes by Parties 13.2 Karnataka Lok Sabha Elections 2009: Seats Won Contested and Won by Administrative/Political Regions 13.3 Votes of the Political Parties by Social Background of the Voters

280

14.1 Parliamentary Electoral Profile of Parties in AP: 1984–2009 14.2 2009 Assembly Elections: Regional Break-up 14.3 Who Voted for Whom in Andhra Pradesh

296 297 298

279 280

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Figures 6.1 Party-wise Female Candidates and Member of Parliament in 2009

123

7.1 Percentage of Votes Polled by BSP Candidates 7.2 Votes Polled by the Candidates of the BSP

141 142

8.1 BJP and Congress Votes in Lok Sabha Elections (1991–2009) 8.2 BJP and Congress Votes in Assembly Elections (1990–2007) 8.3 Level of Satisfaction among Voters with the Congress-led UPA Government

187

16.1 Voter Participation in Jammu and Kashmir Assembly Elections by District: 1996–2008

336

168 168


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List of Abbreviations AAS AC ADA AFSPA AGP AIADMK AICC AIIMS AP APHC AUDF BAMCEF

Association for Asian Studies Arunachal Congress Arunachal Democratic Alliance Armed Forces Special Powers Act Assam Gana Parishad All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam All India Congress Committee All India Institute of Medical Sciences Andhra Pradesh All Party Hurriyat Conference Asom United Democratic Front Backward and Minority Communities Employee’s Federation BC Backward Class BJD Biju Janata Dal BJP Bhartiya Janata Party BKU Bhartiya Kisan Union BPL Below Poverty Line BPPF Bodoland People’s Progressive Front BSP Bahujan Samaj Party CDP Community Development Programme CM Chief Minister CNG Compressed Natural Gas CPI Communist Party of India CPI(M) Communist Party of India (Marxist) CPI(ML) Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) CPI(ML)(L) Communist Party of India (Marxist-Leninist) (Liberation) CPM Communist Party Marxist CSDS Centre for Study of Developing Societies DAN Democratic Alliance of Nagaland

xiv


DIC(K) Democratic Indira Congress (Karunakaran) DK Dakshina Kazhagam DMK Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam DUDA Department of Underdeveloped Areas DWCRA Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas EBC Extreme Backward Caste FB Forward Bloc GSPC Gujarat State Petrochemical HSPDP Hill State People’s Democratic Party ICMR Indian Council of Medical Research IFDP Indian Federation Democratic Party INC Indian National Congress INLD Indian National Lok Dal INPT Indigenous Nationalist Party of Tripura IOU Index of Opposition Unity IPFT Indigenous Peoples Front of Tripura ISC Inter-state Council IT Information Technlogy IUML Indian Union Muslim League J&K Jammu and Kashmir JD(S) Janata Dal (Secular) JD(U) Janata Dal (United) JMM Jhakhand Mukti Morcha JNURP Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Programme JSM Jammu State Morcha KC(J) Kerala Congress (Joseph) KC(M) Kerala Congress (Mani) KCR K.C. Rao KPCC Kerala Pradesh Congress Committee KYKL Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup LDF Left Democratic Front LF Left Front LJP Lok Janshakti Party LS Lok Satta MDMK Manumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam MIM Majlis Ittehad-ul Muslimeen MLA Member of Legislative Assembly

MNF MNS MP MPA MPC MPP MRPS MUF NC NCP NCW NDA NDC NES NGO NLFT NLHP NNC NPF NREG NREGS NSCN-IM NSCN-K NTR OBC PDA PDP PDS PM PMK POTA PPP PRI PRP RJD RPI RSP

List List of of Tables Abbreviations and Figures

xv

Mizo National Front Maharashtra Navnirman Sena Member of Parliament Meghalaya Progressive Alliance Mizoram People’s Conference Manipur People’s Party Madiga Reservation Porata Samithi Muslim United Front National Conference Nationalist Congress Party National Commission for Women National Democratic Alliance National Development Council National Election Study Non-governmental Organization National Liberation Front of Tripura National Loktantrik Hind Party Naga National Council Nagaland People’s Front National Rural Employment Guarantee National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) N.T. Rama Rao Other Backward Caste People’s Democratic Alliance People’s Democratic Party Public Distribution System Prime Minister Pattali Makkal Katchi Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act Public–Private Partnership Panchayat Raj Institution Praja Rajyam Party Rashtriya Janata Dal Republican Party of India Revolutionary Socialist Party

xvi

RSS SAD SAIR SASB SC SEZ SFI SHG SIT SJD SP SS ST SUC TDP TMC TRS TUJS UDF UDP UK ULB ULFA UN UNICEF UP UPA US VHP VIP WHO YMA YSR


Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh Shiromani Akali Dal South Asian Intelligence Review Shri Amarnath Shrine Board Scheduled Caste Special Economic Zone Students Federation of India Self Help Group Special Investigative Team Samajwadi Janata Dal Samajwadi Party Shiv Sena Scheduled Tribe Socialist Unity Center Telugu Desam Party Trinamul Congress Telangana Rashtra Samithi Tripura Upajati Juba Samity United Democratic Front United Democratic Party United Kingdom United Left Bloc United Liberation Front of Asom United Nations United Nations Children’s Fund Uttar Pradesh United Progressive Alliance United States Vishwa Hindu Parishad Very Important Person World Health Organization Young Mizo Association Y. Rajasekhar Reddy


xvii

Preface Indian democracy and politics are intertwined and complex. Elections provide a window into the process and the basis for important political judgments. In this—our fourth successive election volume with Sage Publications—we continue our national and state level presentations by outstanding analysts of Indian politics. Each volume examines a limited number of national concerns and selected state studies. The present volume on the 2009 elections continues this tradition. Together, the four volumes—beginning with the 1998 elections—provide an extended presentation and analysis of national and state politics in scope and depth that is without parallel in Indian scholarship. Our appreciation for the success of this, as well as preceding volumes, is first and foremost to the authors of our chapters. They include personnel from two research organizations, the Institute of Development and Communications in Chandigarh (IDC) and the Centre National de la Recherché Scientifique (CNRS) in France. The Hindu, a leading Indian daily newspaper and Frontline, its nationallyprominent news weekly, provides us with one of India’s leading journalist. An exceptional group of distinguished scholars rounds out our list of contributors. Once again, Sage Publications India provided professional support. Dr Sugata Ghosh, Vice President Commissioning, met with the co-editors in New Delhi to review the initial plan and provide the go-ahead for the project. Elina Majumdar, now Commissioning Editor, managed the bulk of the editorial work assisted by Arpita Dasgupta, Editor and Neelakshi Chakraborty, Editorial Assistant. We are grateful for their assistance. A number of institutions, in addition to Sage Publications, cooperated in making this volume possible. Once again, the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in Delhi graciously allowed the use of its invaluable data from the Center’s election surveys. Official data

xviii


from the national Election Commission of India, as well as its state branches provide detailed results in a wide variety of useful formats. Appreciation also is extended to the university and research institutions represented by our contributors. Many individuals also contributed with valuable suggestions, critiques, and information. Each of the contributors could compile a lengthy list. All of us have endeavored to be accurate. Finally, as this book goes to press, non-violent, Gandhian-type revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt raise basic issues pertaining to democracy and elections. They suggest a comparison with India. During the 20-month Emergency in India from 1975–77, promulgated by then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, India became an authoritarian system. Opposition leaders representing a broad spectrum from the left to the right, secular and religious, were imprisoned. They were released and fair elections were held. The freed opposition leaders joined in a new umbrella political grouping, the Janata Party, which decisively defeated Indira Gandhi’s Congress Party and then returned India to democracy. Contributors to this volume are proud of India’s record with democracy and elections despite its well-publicized problems. India’s model may be appropriate to countries such as Egypt. Differences of substance will change. An anti-Mubarak consensus united Egypt’s population in February 2011 until he resigned on the 11th. That allowed for the establishment of procedures and the existence of public space that could offer an opportunity for effective representation in a democratic system. What the emerging leaders and the people make of their system and the evolving role of the military will differ from time to time. Questions of effective representative and public policy will remain, but people power provides a critical foundation. People power won out in Tunisia and Egypt. Earlier, it triumphed in the Philippines against dictator Ferdinand Marcos, and in the Velvet Revolution led by Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia. Empowerment of the people has to be continually validated through elections and other forms of public participation as in India. Paul Wallace Ramashray Roy


part I

Thematic Studies

1

2



3

chapter 1

Introduction: Political Stability and Governance Coherence Paul Wallace

India’s electorate emphasized political stability and governance coherence in the 15th national elections in 2009. Predictions of a fragmented electorate and party system emboldened small groups to envision obtaining power in third and fourth fronts emphasizing regional, caste, ideological, and personality considerations. Instead, the Congress Party gambled successfully on a minimum rather than a maximum winning coalition.1 The Congress initially allied with a few partners in its minimal winning coalition, so as to highlight the Congress Party rather than the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition label. This successful strategic gamble provided more coherence, clearer messages, and a revitalizing leadership. Lacking only 10 seats for a majority, the UPA coalition quickly attracted other parties for a comfortable majority2 (see Table 1.1 for Lok Sabha results by party, Table 1.2 for coalition formations, and 1.3 for party symbols). Prime Minister Manmohan Singh signifies integrity, continuity, and competence in the 2009 campaign, which contrasts sharply with contestants burdened by criminal charge sheets. More than one-quarter of the elected Members of Parliament (MPs) fall into this category. And that does not include major criminal/political figures failing to win seats.3 Party and Alliance leader Sonia Gandhi, in addition, represents dynastic continuity. It now is a long chain stemming from Motilal Nehru to his son Jawaharlal Nehru, to Jawaharlal’s daughter Indira Gandhi, to her son Rajiv Gandhi, and now to Rajiv’s wife Sonia Gandhi.

4

Paul Wallace Table 1.1 2009 Elections: Lok Sabha Party Results

Party Bahujan Samaj Party Bharatiya Janata Party Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (Marxist) Indian National Congress Nationalist Congress Party Rashtriya Janata Dal All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam All India Forward Bloc All India Trinamool Congress Asom Gana Parishad Assam United Democratic Front Biju Janata Dal Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Jammu & Kashmir National Conference Janata Dal (Secular) Janata Dal (United) Jharkhand Mukti Morcha Kerala Congress (M) Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Muslim League Kerala State Committee Nagaland Peoples Front Revolutionary Socialist Party Samajwadi Party Shiromani Akali Dal Shivsena Sikkim Democratic Front Telangana Rashtra Samithi Telugu Desam All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul Muslimeen Bahujan Vikas Aaghadi Bodaland Peoples Front Haryana Janhit Congress (BL) Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik) Rashtriya Lok Dal Swabhimani Paksha Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katch Independent

Winners/No. of seats

Party type

21 116 4 16 206 9 4 9 2 19 1 1 14 18 3 3 20 2 1 1 2 1 2 23 4 11 1 2 6 1 1 1 1 1 5 1 1 9

National National National National National National National State State State State State State State State State State State State State State State State State State State State State State Unrecognized Unrecognized Unrecognized Unrecognized Unrecognized Unrecognized Unrecognized Unrecognized Independents

Source: Election Commission of India, General Elections 2009. Data on July 3, 2009. Available online at: http://eci.nic.in/results/FrmPartyWiseTrendsAndResults.aspx.

Introduction

5

Table 1.2 2009 Elections: Coalition and Party Results United Progressive Alliance: 262 Indian National Congress Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam Nationalist Congress Party Jharkhand Mukti Morcha All India Trinamool Congress Jammu & Kashmir National Conference Assam United Democratic Front Kerala Congress (M) Muslim League Kerala State Committee All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul Muslimeen Republican Party of India (Athvale)

206 18 9 2 19 3 1 1 2 1 0

National Democratic Alliance: 158 Bharatiya Janata Party Janata Dal (United) Shiv Sena Shiromani Akali Dal Asom Gana Parishad Rashtriya Lok Dal Nagaland People’s Front Indian National Lok Dal

116 20 11 4 1 5 1 0

Third Front: 76 Communist Party of India Communist Party of India (Marxist) Revolutionary Socialist Party All India Forward Bloc Bahujan Samaj Party All India Anna DMK Biju Janata Dal Telugu Desam Party Telangana Rashtra Samithi

4 16 2 2 21 9 14 6 2

Fourth Front: 27 Samajwadi Party Rashtriya Janata Dal Lok Jan Shakti Party Praja Rajyam Party

23 4 0 0

Other Parties & Independents Haryana Janahit Party Janata Dal (Secular) Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam

1 3 1 (Continued )

6

Paul Wallace

(Continued ) Sikkim Democratic Front Bahujan Vikas Aaghadi Bodoland Peoples Front Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik) Swabhimani Paksha Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katch Independent Janhit Congress Party Pattali Makkal Katchi

1 1 1 1 1 1 9 0 0

Source: Party data from the Election Commission July 3, 2009. Alliance information from the media.

Table 1.3 2009 Elections: National and State Recognized Political Parties and Symbols National Seven parties are recognized as national parties. They are listed by name, together with acronym, year of formation, and the party leader. Symbol

Flag

Name

Acronym

Year

Party leader

Bahujan Samaj Party

BSP

1995

Mayawati

Bharatiya Janata Party

BJP

1980

Nitin Gadkari

Communist Party of India

CPI

1925[B]

A.B. Bardhan

Communist Party of India (Marxist)

CPI (M)

1964

Prakash Karat

Indian National Congress

INC

1885

Sonia Gandhi

Nationalist Congress Party

NCP

1999

Sharad Pawar

Rashtriya Janata Dal

RJD

1997

Lalu Prasad Yadav (Continued )

7

Introduction (Continued )

State If a party is recognized as a state party by the Election Commission, it can reserve a symbol for its exclusive use in the state. The following are a list of recognized state parties as of April 2009. Symbol

Name Acronym Year[3] Party leader All India Anna Dravida Munnetra AIADMK 1972 J. Jayalalitha Kazhagam Social Unsecure SUPI 2010 Neeraj Udaiya Helicopter Party of India

— —

Tamil Nadu, Puducherry Rajasthan, Jaipur

All India Forward Bloc

AIFB

1939 Debabrata Biswas West Bengal

All India Trinamool Congress

AITC

2004 Mamta Banerjee

Meghalaya, West Bengal

Arunachal Congress

AC

1996 Kamen Ringu

Arunachal Pradesh

Asom Gana AGP Parishad Assam United AUDF Democratic Front

Prafulla Kumar Mahanta Badruddin 2004 Ajmal

Biju Janata Dal

1997 Naveen Patnaik

Orissa

1949 M Karunanidhi

Tamil Nadu, Puducherry

BJD

Dravida Munnetra DMK Kazhagam —

States

Indian Federal Democratic Party[5] Indian National Lok Dal Jammu and Kashmir National Conference Jammu and Kashmir National Panthers Party Jammu and Kashmir People’s Democratic Party

1985

Assam Assam

IFDP

—

M.P. George

Kerala

INLD

1999

Om Prakash Chautala

Haryana

JKNC

1932 Omar Abdullah

JKNPP

PDP

Jammu and Kashmir

NA[D] Bhim Singh

Jammu and Kashmir

Mufti 1998 Mohammed Sayeed

Jammu and Kashmir

(Continued )

8

Paul Wallace

(Continued ) Symbol

Name

Acronym

Janata Dal (Secular)

JD (S)

1999

JD (U)

1999 Nitish Kumar

JMM

1972 Shibu Soren

Kerala Congress

KEC

1964 P.J. Joseph

Kerala

Kerala Congress (Mani)

KEC (M)

1979 C.F. Thomas

Kerala

Lok Jan Shakti Party

LJSP

2000

Ram Vilas Paswan

Bihar

Maharashtrawadi Gomantak Party

MAG

1963

Shashikala Kakodkar

Goa

Manipur People’s Party

MPP

1968 O. Joy Singh

Manipur

Marumalarchi Dravida Munnetra MDMK Kazhagam

1993 Vaiko

Tamil Nadu

Mizo National Front

MDF

1959

Pu Zoramthanga

Mizoram

Mizoram People’s Conference

MPC

1972

Pu Lalhmingthanga

Mizoram

Muslim League Kerala State Committee

MUL

1948

G.M. Banatwalla

Kerala

Janata Dal (United) Jharkhand Mukti Morcha

—

—

Year[3] Party leader H.D. Deve Gowda

States Karnataka, Kerala Bihar, Jharkhand Jharkhand, Orissa

Nagaland People’s NPF Front

2002 Neiphiu Rio

Nagaland

Pattali Makkal Katchi

PMK

1989 G. K. Mani

Tamil Nadu, Puducherry

Pudhucherry Munnetra Congress

PMC

2005 P. Kannan

Puducherry

(Continued )

9

Introduction (Continued ) Symbol

—

Name

Acronym

Revolutionary Socialist Party

RSP

Year[3] Party leader

States

1940

T.J. West Bengal Chandrachoodan

Samajwadi Party

SP

1992

Mulayam Singh Yadav

Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, Uttarakhand

Save Goa Front

SGF

NA

Churchill Alemao

Goa

Shiromani Akali Dal

SAD

1920

Parkash Singh Badal

Punjab

Shiv Sena

SHS

1966

Uddhav Thackeray[C]

Maharashtra

Sikkim SDF Democratic Front

1993

Pawan Kumar Chamling

Sikkim

Telangana Rashtra TRS Samithi

2001

K. Chandrashekar Andhra Rao Pradesh

Telugu Desam Party

TDP

1982

N. Chandrababu Andhra Naidu Pradesh

United Democratic Party

UDP

NA

Donkupar Roy

Meghalaya

Uttarakhand Kranti Dal

UKKD

1979

Bipin Chandra Tripathi

Uttarakhand

Zoram Nationalist ZNP Party

1997 Lalduhoma

Mizoram

Source: GOI. Election Commission of India.

Sonia Gandhi’s son, Rahul Gandhi,4 who was 38 years old then, clearly won his credentials as the heir apparent with his tireless and effective campaigning throughout the country. Rebounding from an almost hopeless electoral position in the key state of Uttar Pradesh (UP) is a particular Rahul triumph. The Congress, more than doubled its Lok Sabha representation from 9 to 21, once again becoming a significant political contestant in India’s most populous state.

10

Paul Wallace

Nationally, it won 206 MPs out of 543 in the Lok Sabha in contrast to 145 in 2004, and only 114 in 1999 for a positive swing of approximately 4 percent (see Table 1.4). Rahul Gandhi appears to be implementing a longer-range strategy using the Youth Congress as a wedge to energize and rebuild the Congress Party into a more democratic institution.5 India Today quotes Rahul as stating: “What I am trying to do is to create through the youth wings thousands of Obamas. It is a question of channeling them, moving them into the political system and giving them more power.”6 Moreover, the major institutional leadership following the 2009 elections continues a steady post-independence trend, emphasizing India’s diversity as evidenced in the following list: UPA Coalition leader: Sonia Gandhi, Catholic and woman originally from Italy. l Prime Minister: Manmohan Singh, male Sikh. l Speaker of Lok Sabha: Meira Kumar, Dalit woman (see Table 1.7 for number of regular and reserved seats in the Lok Sabha by state). l President: Pratibha Patil, Hindu woman. l Vice President of India: Mohammad Hamid Ansari, Muslim male. l Chief Minister of UP, India’s most populous state: Mayawati, Dalit woman. l

Does this Congress Party electoral triumph provide evidence for a trend that indicates India is returning to the earlier periods of Congress domination? Can the top-down, leader-led Congress Party change into a more grassroots organization or will Rajiv Gandhi’s unsuccessful efforts be duplicated during Rahul’s era? Does the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) decline from 182 seats in 1999, to 138 seats in 204, and now to 116 in 2009 indicate a continuing slide to its becoming a minor party? Is the Communist Party Marxist (CPM) that brazenly left and then challenged the UPA as a fourth front now in a permanent decline, nationally and in its core states of West Bengal and Kerala? Statistics, of course, can be read in different ways and trends can be reversed—nonetheless, these are important questions that are raised by the 2009 elections and will carry over to succeeding decades.

Introduction

11

Regional parties in the north like Mulayam Singh’s Samajwadi Party (SP) and Lalu Prasad Yadav’s Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) did poorly. Neither did Mayawati’s Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) provide the national alternative she had anticipated. Nonetheless, regional parties continue to be major players at the state level. The Biju Janata Dal (BJD) in Orissa became the ruling party on its own after it opted out of a coalition with the BJP. Nitish Kumar’s Janata Dal (United) [JD(U)] maintained its alliance with the BJP as the dominant partner and did well in Bihar. The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) in Tamil Nadu and Jayalitha’s All India Anna DMK continue their alternating fortunes in Tamil Nadu, while the Shiv Sena and Sharad Pawar’s National Congress Party (NCP) are significant parties in Maharashtra. The Akali Dal continues to be the ruling or major opposition party in Punjab. The prognosis, based on the 2009 elections and preceding elections, is the waxing and waning of particular regional parties, but continuance of their major importance at the state level. Coalition politics also make them national players. There is at least one other primary question raised by the 2009 elections, as well as the now long history of democratic elections in independent India. What is the nature of India’s federal system and, in particular, its center–state relations? A somewhat new concept may be in the process of replacing that of the older nation-state. Reversing this either/or notion of federalism and replacing it with a state–nation concept provides a new window into understanding contemporary India. The older nation-state notion of a strong center and weak states, or vice versa, can now be conceptualized as a state– nation with a strong center and strong states. A strong ruling party embedded in and leading a functioning national coalition also is dependent on strong, even assertive states.7 At this point in India’s political history, it seems to have achieved a notable balance between the center and the states. Part I of this volume is thematic, looking at India as a whole, while Part II is state focused. Four analysts from various backgrounds join in emphasizing the coherence and continuity, as well as positive changes of India’s federalism from differing perspectives. Ramashray Roy’s emphasis is on the strength and importance of regional parties within the larger coalitions. Consequently, he states, “political cleavages in

12

Paul Wallace

the state and the political calculations of state leaders have assumed centrality in determining national electoral outcomes.” Federalism, however, is reinforced by the diversity of India’s states and regional parties so that “political ascendance does not take place between the same parties in all the states.” Pramod Kumar, in the following chapter, views the changing federal political dynamic in a very quotable phrase: “… there is a regionalization of national political parties and nationalization of regional political parties.” On the whole, he views this development stemming from coalition politics as healthy for India as “regional groups have become strong, and the forces of regionalism have become weak.” Similarly, Jyotirindra Dasgupta in an extensive historical overview focuses on the integrative elements that result in India’s diversity becoming strengths rather than weaknesses. He looks at a limited set of issues associated with the processes of democratic representation involving regions and regionalism, primarily connected with electoral contestation and organized movements. His historical analysis deals with the development of India’s integration and national identity as opposed to secession, a number of cultural characteristics and includes three regional case studies: Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Punjab. He concludes that “the transformative effect of democratic interaction … among regions in the federal governmental system” is resulting in “interregional collaboration” as contrasted with “the grossly negative picture of regionalism offered in the 1950s.” Federalism, coalition politics, and structural changes in India over time are the themes of Maneesha Roy’s chapter. The changing contours of politics, reflect important changes in India’s socioeconomic reality, and impinge on the constitutionally sanctioned schema of distribution of power among various organs, including the role of the judiciary. Nonetheless, “the Indian political system is vibrant and dynamic” and “is capable of retaining the allegiance of the Indian people.” Rainuka Dagar deals in depth with women’s participation and issues in their relation to both society and politics. She provides somewhat paradoxical findings in women’s electoral participation in elected offices, as well as in voting patterns that have increased, but she says that “female leadership in state governance” continues to be low, and a women’s “vote bank” has not emerged. Promises by mainstream party leaders for the empowerment of women, she concludes, are

13

Introduction

“a casualty to the dominance of identity construed placement of women in the Indian polity.” Raucous debates over reservations for women in the Lok Sabha and state assemblies reflect the state of the continuing problem.8 The final chapter in Part I is Christophe Jaffrelot’s focus on the BSP and its ambitious leader Mayawati. Lok Sabha elections, he points out, can differ markedly from state assembly elections. Based on the preceding state elections in several states, especially Uttar Pradesh, it could be anticipated that the BSP could win about 50 Lok Sabha seats placing it in a “king maker” position. Mayawati’s expectations, which included the possibility of becoming Prime Minister, had two major contrary results as the BSP won 20 seats in UP—one fewer than the Congress—and one in Madhya Pradesh for a total of 21. First, instead of a leading role after the 2009 elections, the BSP joined the UPA coalition (see Table 1.4). Second, as Jaffrelot concludes, “the party is back to its Dalit roots.” Nonetheless, as he describes in detail, the BSP is “continuing its forward march” in terms of valid votes polled and seats won (see Table 1.5). With the decline of the Communist Party of Table 1.4 Support for the UPA Government in the 15th Lok Sabha Party/Alliance United Progressive Alliance Outside support Janata Dal (Secular) Independents and Other Parties Samajwadi Party Bahujan Samaj Party Rashtriya Janata Dal Total

Seats won

Seat %

262

48.3

3 9 23 21 4 322

0.6 1.7 4.2 3.9 0.7 59.4

Source: Government of India (GOI), Election Commission, and the Indian media. Note: President Pratibha Patil dissolved the 14th Lok Sabha with immediate effect on May 18. The President invited Manmohan Singh to form the new government on May 20. It was sworn in on May 22, 2009. Support for formation of UPA Government: The UPA needed 10 seats for a majority. Unconditional support came from the Janata Dal (Secular), the Rashtriya Janata Dal, the Bahujan Samaj Party, and the Samajwadi Party. The Nagaland, People’s Front, Sikkim Democratic Front, and Bodoland People’s Front, each with an MP, also decided to support the UPA government. Three independent candidates from Maharashtra extended support. On May 25, 2009, DMK decided to join the UPA government.

14

Paul Wallace Table 1.5 Leading Party Seats and Vote Percentages 1984–2009 2009

2004

1999

1998

1996

1991

1989

1984

Congress 206 28.55 Party Bharatiya 116 Janata Party 18.80 Bahujan 21 6.17 Samaj Party 16 Communist 5.33 Party Marxist Communist 4 1.43 Party India Rashtriya 4 Janata Dal 1.27 9 National 2.04 Congress Party

145 26.69 138 21.5 19 5.33 43 5.66

114 28.3 182 23.75 14 4.16 33 5.40

141 25.82 182 25.59 5 4.67 32 5.16

140 29.7 161 20.29

232 36.5 120 20.11

197 39.5 85 11.26

415 48.1 2 7.74

32 6.12

35 6.16

33 6.55

22 5.87

10 1.4 22 2.22 9 1.78

4 1.48 6 2.81 8 2.27

9 1.75 17 2.78

22

32 (then D)

Source: Compiled from past reports of the Election Commission, Government of India.

India (Marxist) [CPI(M)], the BSP has become India’s third largest party. Jaffrelot’s prognosis is more pessimistic as he notes the loss of BSP leaders, the formation of competing Bahujans and the inability to build a “collegial party structure.” Part II consists of individual state studies. Ghanshyam Shah and Amiya Chaudhuri provide chapters on two states, Gujarat and West Bengal that continue with dominant parties. Gujarat is the only state in India where the BJP has continuously secured over 50 percent of the total seats in the last six Lok Sabha elections. Shah focuses on Chief Minister Narendra Modi who has replaced L.K. Advani as the dominant figure at the state level, despite Advani being the BJP’s prime ministerial candidate. Congress had no comparable state leader to match Modi’s popularity, especially in regard to development and Hindu identity. As Shah describes in detail, Modi has almost become a cult leader. CPI(M) has controlled West Bengal since 1977, but its dominance has been challenged by the Lok Sabha elections 2009 in which it won only nine seats (see Table 1.6), while with its allies in the Left Front it won only 15 of the 42 seats. Chaudhuri also notes CPI(M)

15

Introduction Table 1.6 State Results Lok Sabha Election 2009 States/UTs (Seats) Andhra Pradesh â•¯â•¯(42/42) Arunachal Pradeshâ•¯(2/2) Assamâ•¯(14/14) Biharâ•¯(40/40) Chattisgarhâ•¯(11/11) Delhi (7/7) Goaâ•¯(2/2) Gujaratâ•¯(26/26) Haryanaâ•¯(10/10) Himachal Pradeshâ•¯(4/4) Jammu and Kashmirâ•¯(6/6) Jharkhandâ•¯(14/14) Karnatakaâ•¯(28/28) Keralaâ•¯(20/20) Madhya Pradeshâ•¯(28/29) Maharashtraâ•¯(48/48) Manipurâ•¯(2/2) Meghalayaâ•¯(2/2) Mizoramâ•¯(1/1) Nagalandâ•¯(1/1) Orissaâ•¯(21/21) Punjabâ•¯(13/13) Rajasthanâ•¯(25/25) Sikkimâ•¯(1/1) Tamil Naduâ•¯(39/39) Tripuraâ•¯(2/2) Uttar Pradeshâ•¯(80/80) Uttaranchal (5/5) West Bengalâ•¯(42/42) Union Territories Andaman and Nicobar (1/1) Chandigarhâ•¯(1/1) Dadra-Nagerhaveliâ•¯(1/1) Daman-Diuâ•¯(1/1) Lakshadweepâ•¯(1/1) Pondicherryâ•¯(1/1) Total Seats (543)

INC

BJP

Others

33 2 7 2 1 7 1 11 9 1 2 1 6 13 12 17 2 1 0 0 6 8 20 0 8 0 21 5 6

0 0 4 12 10 0 1 15 0 3 0 8 19 0 16 9 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 0 0 10 0 1

TRS (2),â•¯TDP (6),â•¯Others (1) 0 3 RJD (4),â•¯JD(U) (20),â•¯Others (2) 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 JMM (2),â•¯Others (3) JD(S) (3),â•¯Others (0) 7 BSP (1),â•¯Others (0) NCP (8),â•¯SS (11),â•¯Others (3) 0 NCP (1),â•¯Others (0) 1 0 CPI (1),â•¯BJD (14),â•¯Others (15) SAD (4),â•¯Others (0) 1 1 DMK (18),â•¯Others (13) 2 BSP (20),â•¯SP (23),â•¯Others (6) 0 TC (19),â•¯CPIM (9),â•¯Others (7)

0 0 0 0 0 1 203

0 0 0 0 0 0 113

1 1 1 1 1 0 237

Source: Election Commission, Government of India. Available online at http://www. indian-elections.com/statewise-results.html

16

Paul Wallace Table 1.7 Number of Regular and Reserved Seats in the Lok Sabha by State, 2009 Type of constituencies

Sl. No.

State/Union territory

â•‡ 1 â•‡ 2 â•‡ 3 â•‡ 4 â•‡ 5 â•‡ 6 â•‡ 7 â•‡ 8 â•‡ 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35

Andhra Pradesh Arunachal Pradesh Assam Bihar Jharkhand Goa Gujarat Haryana Himachal Pradesh Jammu and Kashmir Karnataka Kerala Madhya Pradesh Chhattisgarh* Maharashtra Manipur Meghalaya Mizoram Nagaland Orissa Punjab Rajasthan Sikkim Tamil Nadu Tripura Uttar Pradesh Uttaranchal* West Bengal Andaman and Nicobar Islands Chandigarh Dader and Nagerhaveli Daman and Diu Delhi Lakshadweep Pondicherry Total

General

SC

ST

Total

34 2 11 33 8 2 20 8 3 6 24 18 20 5 41 1 2 – 1 13 10 18 1 32 1 63 4 32 1 1 – 1 6 – 1 423

6 – 1 7 1 – 2 2 1 – 4 2 4 2 3 – – – – 3 3 4 – 7 – 17 1 8 – – – – 1 – – 79

2 – 2 – 5 – 4 – – – – – 5 4 4 1 – 1 – 5 – 3 – – 1 – – 2 – – 1 – – 1 – 41

42 2 14 40 14 2 26 10 4 6 28 20 29 11 48 2 2 1 1 21 13 25 1 39 2 80 5 42 1 1 1 1 7 1 1 543

Source: Election Commission of India, Government of India. Available online at http:// www.indian-elections.com/india-statistics.html Note: States were not formed. They were part of Madhya Pradesh, Bihar, and Uttar Pradesh respectively.

Introduction

17

losses in elections at other levels that indicate a trend that may end an “astonishingly stable [Left Front (LF)] coalition for 32 years.” He examines the various reasons for the decline including problems with the CPI(M)’s rural base, its policies including the use of violence in rural areas such as Nandigram and Singur, other law and order problems, poor economic performance, strategic mistakes such as leaving the UPA alliance, and the vigorous challenge from Mamata Banerjee and her Trinamool Congress Party. Five case studies involve alternating two-party systems: Rajasthan and Maharashtra in northern and western India, respectively, and Kerala, Karnataka, and Andhra Pradesh in the south. Congress and BJP alternate in Rajasthan, while Congress and Sharad Pawar’s NCP compete with the regional Shiv Sena allied with the BJP. Rajasthan’s BJP, according to Bhawani Singh and Vibhuti Singh Shekhawat, was “plagued by factional rivalry and a leadership schism.” These factors led to the BJP’s defeat in the 2008 assembly elections. Congress, under the leadership of Ashok Gehlot, took advantage of this situation. Caste differences between the Meenas and Gujjars became important, as did the perennial Jat, Rajput, and Brahmin rivalries. “Normal elections” took place in Maharashtra. Raghavendra Keshavarao Hebsur concludes that the “bipolar alliance system still holds good,” despite problems faced by all the contending parties. Hebsur also provides the chapter on Karnataka, explaining the “incremental” growth of the BJP from its entry into the state’s politics in 1983 to its “exponential” growth since 1999. Paradoxically, threefourths of the formerly anti-Brahmin Lingayat community now finds itself part of the BJP base, along with more than half of the forward castes, including Brahmins. By focusing on local, state issues, the BJP “bucked the national trend of the party’s nationwide decline.” Congress stays in contention with 38 percent of the vote and a stable support base. Congress’ projection as a “regional” party is attributed by Karli Srinivasulu as a major reason for its success in Andhra. Under Sonia Gandhi, the national Congress Party has allowed increased autonomy to the state party. Sonia Gandhi, the NCP has allowed increased autonomy to the state party. Caste identity along with a “focus[ing] on

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Paul Wallace

development and populist mobilization facilitated the electoral victory of the Congress.” Srinivasulu also emphasizes the marginalization of civil society initiatives. According to G. Gopa Kumar, anti-incumbency is one of the factors leading to the Congress’ success in Kerala. The Congress almost reversed the 2004 Left Democratic Front (LDF) landslide in which it won 18 of 20 seats, by winning 13 of the 20, and a total of 16 for the United Democratic Front in 2009. The CPI(M)’s “big brotherly attitude” and its “controversial alliance” with the People’s Democratic Party (PDP) damaged the LDF. By contrast, the Congress enjoyed “strong unity.” Bihar and Jammu and Kashmir are two states that can be considered multiparty states. Bihar, under the leadership of Nitish Kumar and his regional JD(U) Party, as the major partner in the NDA alliance with the BJP, also did not succumb to the anti-incumbency factor. A combination of developmental efforts, social engineering, and “a strategic positioning of candidates in redrawn parliamentary constituencies” led to the landslide NDA victory according to Binoy Shanker Prasad. Nitish Kumar provided a secular image, while his alliance partner the BJP “kept a low profile and did not use anti-Muslim rhetoric.” Kumar also undercut his opponent’s reliance on Other Backward Castes (OBCs) by fashioning “special privileges for Extreme Backward Castes,” about 28 percent of the total vote. Congress decided to contest alone, abandoning its former alliance with Lalu Prasad Yadav’s RJD. Praveen Swami points out that the 2008 Assembly elections in Jammu and Kashmir followed six weeks of protests, violence, and called for a 100 percent boycott, but turned out peacefully with a “record number of voters.” Lok Sabha elections in 2009 continued the success against secessionists, as well as the People’s Democratic Front in the Valley and the BJP in Jammu. The National Conference alliance with Congress dominated. Swami asks the obvious question. How did “mass uprising against Indian rule yield so quickly to competitive democratic politics?” He explains it in part by focusing on the Amarnath Shrine Yatra—what he terms the “Shrine War—of the the previous summer. “Electoral democracy,” Swami concludes, “guarantees no particular outcomes.” Politicians will have to “find the answers.” Northeast India is the final chapter in this volume. It consists of seven states involving an enormous diversity and a history of being

Introduction

19

peripheral to India. However, according to Rajesh Dev, the introduction of competitive democratic politics “has transformed the ‘traditional’ structures of power, redefined political practices and crafted novel political traditions.” He concludes that in all the states, “personalities and their kin-affiliations are politically more significant than ideologies and substantive issues.” Elections accordingly, serve primarily as “entry-points to a lucrative patronage network,” rather than “political accountability through competitive engagement.” Rajesh Dev does not directly deal with the political violence present since independence. Elections were successfully held in 2009, while total fatalities dropped from 1,054 in 2008 to 843 in 2009. “Dramatic reverses” against insurgent groups also have taken place.9 To what extent this is a trend, and what is the role of democratic elections in the northeast are major questions for continued analysis.

Notes 1. For the seminal book on maximum and minimum winning coalitions, see William H. Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962). Also see, William H. Riker’s online article in American Political Science Review, Vol. 76, December 1982, pp. 753–66. Available online at: http://www.jstor.org/cgibin/jstor/printpage/00030554/di961007/96p002q/0.pdf?userID=9803f96d@duke. edu/01cc99331a00503f125f&backcontext=results&config=jstor&dowhat=Acrobat &o.pdf 2. Detailed election tables by party, alliances, states, and other characteristics are included within this chapter. 3. India Today, “Taint: Criminal Lapses,” June 1, 2009, pp. 11–12. Data cited is from the Association for Democratic Research, National Elections Watch. 4. For a detailed laudatory article, see S. Prasannarajan with Subhash Mishra, “Newsmaker 2009, Rahul Gandhi The Catalyst,” India Today, January 4, 2010, pp. 10–20. 5. Private communications, November 2009. 6. India Today, note 4, p. 16. 7. I am indebted to Ashutosh Varshney, Professor of Politics at Brown University, for this insight. He is well along into a book manuscript that includes the state–nation concept for contemporary India in detail. Jyotirindra Dasgupta informed me that an early version of this concept in a comparative context is Alfred Stepan, Arguing Comparative Politics (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001). In particular, see p. 309. Stepan explores the concept further with Juan Linz and Yogendra

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Yadav, in Democracy in Multinational Societies: India and Other Polities (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, Forthcoming). 8. Following two days of near chaos, the Rajya Sabha passed a Bill on March 9, 2010 to amend the Constitution, so as to reserve one-third of the seats for women in the Lok Sabha and state assemblies. As in the past, it is highly questionable that the Lok Sabha and half of the state assemblies also will approve. The New York Times, March 9, 2010. 9. South Asian Intelligence Review (SAIR), Vol. 8, No. 29, January 25, 2010.


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chapter 2

Regional Base and National Dream: Alliance Formation, 2009 National Elections Ramashray Roy

The 2009 elections conducted in five waves have come and gone. In their wake, they have left everybody surprised, some of them even shocked since the media and other sources of information continued to inform the people up until the last that no party or any combination of parties, was expected to win a majority of parliamentary seats in order to be able to form the national government. Some commentators went to the length of even predicting that the current elections would most likely reproduce a stalemate like the 1996 situation where no political party was able to form a government on its own or survive for long in a large coalition. From all accounts then, the complexity of the party system and the unpredictability of election results emphasized the plethora of parties taking part in the 2009 elections and their inability to group themselves into viable governing alliance systems. The formation of four different fronts also clouded the likelihood of the emergence of two competing alliance systems. It is against this background that the question of the emergence of two national parties out of the crucible of the 2009 elections assumes importance. This is for two reasons. The first reason is theoretical. Students of party systems refer with respect to Maurice Duverger’s thesis that wherever the electoral system is based on single-member constituencies with a simple majority of votes deciding the winner, a two-party system is most likely to emerge.1 Barring a few Indian states, India does not conform to this theoretical observation. In these exceptional states, historical and sociological factors have helped

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Ramashray Roy

two-party systems to emerge. The question of why the party system in India has, at least at the national level, diverged sharply from Duverger’s theoretical observation is important, but this is not the theme of this chapter. The second reason is practical, involving the issue of efficient and effective functioning of the government at the national level. This issue has become all the more important in view of the fact that the last two decades have witnessed the twin phenomena of the progressive decline in the electoral strength of the two major parties, the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), on the one hand, and the phenomenal rise in the number and strength of state/regional parties, on the other. In addition, it is also to be noted that the influence of the latter in determining who rules at the center has also been increasing.2 Given the plurality of political parties, the forging of a winning coalition becomes a highly difficult process.3 Even when the ruling coalition somehow completes its five-year term, it does not have a comfortable existence and tends to frazzle and eventually disintegrate. Coalitions necessitate constant management and reformulation. This factor has a decisive influence on the effectiveness of the national government. The two aspects of the question—the theoretical and the practical— of the emergence of two principal parties nationally, competing with each other for controlling the power apparatus of the country need to be systematically explored. However, this is beyond the scope of this chapter. We do not propose to engage in a lengthy theoretical discussion about why a two-party system has not emerged in India, instead, the emphasis here is on the process of the forging of political alliances in order to highlight some of its crucial aspects. In particular, we are interested in those aspects that promise to provide a clue to an answer to the question of the bipolarity of the coalitional situation. As we shall see later, Mrs Sonia Gandhi, the president of the Congress Party, took personal initiatives and made strenuous efforts to forge a winning coalition against the BJP in 2004. However, she reversed her position and rebuffed attempts by some of the former UPA alliance partners to forge a fresh alliance in 2009. Thus it can be asked why coalition-making was so important in 2004, and why it was derailed in 2009. It is important to understand its effect on the formation of

Regional Base and National Dream

23

alliances, on the one hand, and on the formation of the government, on the other. In particular, we focus on three different aspects. First, we propose to take a brief look at the experience of coalition formation prior to the 2009 elections. This takes us on a short historical journey during which we will take account of the troubled process of forging, as well as the unraveling of alliances and their formation on the eve of the 2009 elections. Second, we focus on the process of alliance formation during the 2009 elections. What is distinctive about it is almost a fresh attempt to contrive new alliances after the disintegration of those assiduously crafted in 2004. Two aspects are of special interest, (a) calculations and strategy that distinguish the formation of alliances and (b) the composition and character of the different alliances that came into being. Finally, since the process of alliance formation failed to forge two well-matched competing alliances, the question of the formation of a winning coalition becomes especially important. Also, interesting in this regard is the question of the possibility of alliance formation in a situation of frozen likes and dislikes and mutual abhorrence, keeping several parties apart so that they are less likely to join in an alliance.

The Historical Background The fragmentation of the party space is not new in India. Even just after independence, when one-party dominance characterized the Indian party system, several minor parties existed and competed for influence, ascendance, and control. However, the immense power and prestige that the Congress Party enjoyed kept competing parties from effectively participating in the harsh game of politics. What is different now is that smaller parties, based mostly in single states or a limited region, have become quite powerful and are well entrenched in their home states where they define the terms of the game of politics. Due to the relative weakness of the two major national parties—the Congress and the BJP and their nation-wide networks—state/regional parties have acquired enough muscle power to influence the formation of

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Ramashray Roy

national government. Along with it, they also make inputs into and influence the formulation of policies and programs. To some extent, this transformation in the fortunes of political parties has been gradual, but not insignificant. It signifies not only a recurrent pattern of fluctuation in the fortunes of different parties, but also at times a radical shift in the pattern of power distribution. This has a great bearing on how the government is formed, what it aims at doing, and to what extent it succeeds. Three distinct phases of the evolution and change in the party system in post-independent India are reflected in the results of elections to the Parliament since 1952. The first phase in which the Congress party enjoyed the status of a dominant party lasted till 1967. This year happens to be the cut-off point between the initial phase of the oneparty dominance system and the subsequent phase of the decline and the struggle of the Congress party to hold on to its dominance or to regain it when it has been weakened. Note, for example, that till 1967 the Congress party continued to obtain about 45 percent of popular votes, the exception being 1957 when it polled 48 percent of votes. In terms of seats, its share was well above 70 percent. But, beginning with the 1967 Parliamentary elections, a marked fluctuation can be seen in its share both of votes and seats. Thus, 1967 marks the beginning of the second phase in two senses. First, in the 1967 elections, the Congress share of popular votes came down to 41 percent and secondly, the number of seats it won came down to 284. During the second phase from 1967 to 1984, electoral fortunes of the Congress had registered a very unstable pattern of gains and losses in terms both of popular votes and the number of seats.4 At this time, two notable developments mark the changes. One, non-Congress governments were formed in a few states and, two, the Congress saw violent fluctuations in its electoral results. It polled only 34.5 percent of votes and won only 154 seats in 1977, while in 1984 it won an unprecedented number of parliamentary seats, 415 out of the 517 seats it contested. However, after this, the Congress records a steady decline till it was reduced to a principal national party, but without the electoral energy to recapture its lost dominance. With it begins the third phase of the evolution of the party system in India.


25

The third phase of the evolution of the party system in India began after the collapse of the Congress party in 1989 as a principal party straddling the political space like a ruthless Colossus. Since then, no political party has been able to gain an electoral majority and form a government at the national level on its own. Two very prominent features characterize this phase. First, this phase saw the emergence of state and regional parties playing a very significant role in the formation of the government at the national level. This phase symbolizes what E. Sridharan calls “multiple bipolarity.” It means that the main contenders in all but eight states involve two state parties, which alternately control the power apparatus of the state. In addition, elections to state assemblies have assumed autonomy, as well as the capacity to shape the outcome of national elections.5 The debility of national parties and the autonomy of the state electoral process allow main political cleavages in the states to determine national electoral outcome. As such, “national politics is not the political arena of political choices; political preferences and loyalties at the national level derive from primary loyalties in state politics.”6 Thus, political cleavages in the state and the political calculations of state leaders have assumed centrality in determining national electoral outcomes. However, competition for political ascendance does not take place between the same parties in all the states. Different patterns of political alignments have given birth to what was referred to earlier as multiple bipolarity. The emergence of the state as the primary locale of national political choices, insofar as the formation of the national government is concerned, has a significant bearing on alliance formation. The continuation of the situation of bipolarity at the state level does not help the emergence of a two-party system at the national level. The reason for this lies in the fact that the state parties are primarily and at times exclusively oriented toward state-specific issues and problems. To extend a friendly hand across the state border becomes difficult because leaders from different states have little in common. This is a major factor in preventing heterogeneous parties to combine or coalesce into two competing national parties acting on common programs. The need for the polarization of political forces at the national level is frustrated by multiple polarities at the state level. It constitutes

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Ramashray Roy

a structural characteristic of state politics, and also has an important ramification for the motivation of state leaders and their strategy of action at the time of national elections. If by maintaining their separate existence, they can exercise influence disproportionate to their electoral strength, why should they surrender their autonomy? They have gained their autonomy by delinking themselves from the two major national parties, on the one hand, and by developing their support base in their own state. By merging into a larger political formation, where they might not be allowed to play a significant role, as such, they are likely to find their power resources greatly diminished. This consideration prompts them to opt for a strategy that promises to solidify, if not overly enhance their power position in their own state. Their power in their state can be reinforced by their alignment with a national party rather than a party in the neighborhood. This again can help them to extend it beyond the state boundaries. As this realization takes stronger roots, their dream of a more important role in national political affairs by becoming part of a national alliance also takes on dazzling colors. They become “bolder in their imaginings as kingmakers, even as kings and queens.”7 As a result, the fragmentation of the political space into myriad parties in contention for political power gets frozen. Thus, there occurs the growing debility of major national parties, i.e., the Congress and the BJP. States emerge as autonomous arenas that influence national electoral outcomes along with the phenomenon of multiple bipolarity, while state leaders display growing confidence and escalating ambition for playing an ever more effective role in national politics. These factors constitute important features of the third phase of the evolution of the party system in India. It is these features that have had a strong bearing on the formation of alliances and the constitution of the national government.

Making of Alliances: 2004–09 The failure of elections to throw up a party that wins a majority of parliamentary seats has been a recurrent feature in the past two decades. This failure has made the formation of alliances unavoidable. Different


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parties, both state and national, have to somehow arrange themselves in two groups to compete for capturing national power. It is true that the two major national parties, the Congress and the BJP, constitute the hub around which most state parties revolve. It is also true that somehow two competitive alliances emerge seeking control of the national government. Nevertheless, several factors account for the difficulty, the complexity, the uncertainty, and the unpredictability of alliance formation. “Nothing is more unpredictable in Indian politics,” as one commentator puts it, “than the nature of alliances between political groups and parties today.”8 The first factor responsible for it is the existence of multiple parties in the states. What complicates the process of alliance formation is the lack of homogeneity or similarity of perspective, either ideological or pragmatic, among different parties. This makes it difficult for them to combine or coalesce easily. Moreover, most of the parties, untouched as they are by ideology, are driven by power considerations. When the phenomenon of multiple bipolarities is added to it, the forging of alliance across state borders becomes a very difficult proposition. Also, by remaining autonomous actors, they enjoy greater bargaining power vis-à-vis any major national party. When the formation of the government depends largely, even exclusively, on the number of seats a party has or can mobilize, the support of state parties becomes necessary when either of the two national parties is unable to form government on its own. That is why these parties exert so much influence, which they would not otherwise. And the extent to which these parties successfully bargain with front-running national parties, is by strengthening and consolidating their base in their respective states. Moreover, the state party leaders are also likely to enhance their influence and visibility by becoming a member of the national ministry. Since quid pro quo plays a strategic role in the formation of alliances, it also becomes the instrument of the disintegration of alliances. By the same token, it also acts as a dampener on the possibility of the emergence of a working two-party system. Thus the phenomenon of multiple bipolarities is instrumental in engendering a systematic bias, not only against the durability of national alliances, but also against the rise of a two-party system. In addition, there is no firm ground for forging a reliable judgment about which party will join which alliance.

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One consideration is, of course, the divide due to ideological affinity or programmatic compatibility. However, this divide can easily be crossed, if by doing so the narrow interest of the party or its leader can be protected and promoted. The V.P. Singh government offers the best example. It became the national government in 1990, which was supported both by the BJP and the left parties, two parties diametrically opposed to each other. The alliance between the Telugu Desam Party (TDP) with the BJP in 1998 is another example. In short, state-based political parties have become key players deciding who wins in the strenuous struggle for power at the center. When state parties influence the national election outcome, they and their characteristics exercise a great deal of influence on how elections are fought and what outcomes they yield. Lines of political division in the states, the nature of socio-political cleavages, and the performance of the party in power, all these become important desiderata of national elections. As a result, there seems to have taken place a disjunction between issues and policies that shape political events in the states and those that bear upon the concerns of the national government. This disjunction allows state political leaders belonging to rival camps to retain their autonomy and have a decisive say, if not in the formulation and implementation of national policies, then, at least, in deciding the selection of who are to rule. There has thus developed a close linkage between the characteristics of state politics and national electoral outcome. As a consequence, the phenomenon of the aggregation of election results making the national election outcome means that state-specific issues have a great bearing on national elections. Two factors help in the continuation of this conjunction. In the first place, there has ostensibly been a lack of an important overarching theme that could excite people and stimulate political parties to take a definite policy and programmatic stance, and combine or coalesce in major political groupings aligning with one or the other major national party. In the second place, the absence of an overarching national issue is also coupled with the absence of powerful national leaders enjoying pan-Indian popularity and charisma. All these factors have conspired to make the state dimension of politics very important for national elections. As such, political conflicts at the state level loom large in national elections.


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Given the central importance of state-relevant political issues, conflicts and the characteristics of state leaders, it is not at all surprising that state leaders have grown very powerful for the purposes of national elections. This means that they would be more influenced in their dealings with national parties by their own considerations and prospects. Their first consideration is likely to be the consolidation of their base in their own state. One important source of doing this is to extract as many concessions and promises of benefits as possible from one of the major national parties for themselves and their state. The second consideration has to do with the calculation of which party or alliance is more likely to do so. This is important insofar as states depend for developmental works on finances from the center. Every state looks for ways and means of persuading the national government to be favorably inclined to help it in solving its problems by allocating to it more grants and other financial resources. The states own resources are meager and pressures on it for undertaking developmental and nondevelopmental works are very strong. This is why state leaders are so interested in acquiring leverage for influencing decisions of the national government. The difference between promise and performance on the part of the national government proves very deleterious for the durability of alliance. The compulsions of alliance formation lead the major party to make promises. However, there are also compulsions of governance, which may incapacitate the national government in fulfilling the promises it made. This breeds dissatisfaction and disaffection, which, in turn, paves the way for the disintegration of the alliance. This is however to be expected in a febrile pre-election moment, which lacks binding pre-poll alliances when every party wants to maximize its advantage, especially in a situation where outcomes are uncertain. This also accounts for the flexible stances of different parties precisely because their flexibility suits them perfectly. This is so for the reason that they savor the possibility of extracting rewards in the post-election scrabble. These factors are well reflected in the process of alliance formation during the period when quick turnover in the fortunes of ruling coalitions happened to be a dominant feature of national politics. The fluctuating fortunes of different national/state parties can be traced

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back to the demise of the Congress dominance coupled with the growing importance of the states, especially with regard to increased emphasis on economic development. Needless to say that while the central government plays the primary role in promoting and sustaining the process of economic development, it is the state governments that are the implementing institutions. The process of economic development strengthened the trend toward the diffusion of political power that began as early as 1967. Since the control of material resources, their generation, use, and distribution are located largely in the central government, it becomes necessary for state leaders and parties to seek a greater say and share in the authority and decision-making power at the national level. This is necessary because state leaders and parties try to get more resources from the center for the purposes of implementing state concerns. Also, as state leaders acquire more influence in national affairs, the national government finds it necessary to humor, placate, induce, and reward state leaders. While this has contributed to the scaling down of the separatist tendency that operated earlier in several parts of India, it has also modified the “strong center” framework by placing de facto curbs on the center’s sweeping powers of unilateral initiatives and intervention. It has also been responsible for the fluctuating electoral fortunes of different parties for reasons alluded to earlier. When the Congress dominance came to an end, there began a period of alliance formation and acute political bargaining leading frequently to political instability as a consequence of quick turnovers in the government. The highest watermark of Congress prominence was reached in 1984 when it won 415 parliamentary seats riding on the sympathy vote after Mrs Indira Gandhi’s assassination. But, it soon lost ground in the 1989 elections and its seat total came down sharply to 197. It however emerged as the largest single group. When the Congress declined to form a government when it was invited to do so, V.P. Singh formed the government under the banner of the National Front after he was assured outside support from such ideologically opposed parties as the BJP and the left parties. The V.P. Singh-led National Front was composed mainly by the leftover elements of the Janata Dal and consisted of autonomous


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state-based parties. The alliance was a makeshift arrangement and always in danger of being pulled down. Moreover, V.P. Singh was partial to left parties and usually ignored the BJP in running the government, consulting its leaders only when convenient. The BJP was, therefore, miffed and became alienated from the Singh government. A crisis occurred when V.P. Singh accepted the recommendations of the Mandal Commission. What added fuel to the fire of the widespread resentment caused by the hasty decision of the government were the repressive measures that the V.P. Singh government took to crush the ensuing political agitation. The BJP withdrew its support and the government fell. Soon after, the Janata Dal split and Chandrashekhar, the leader of one of the segments of the Samajwadi Janata Dal (SJD), the Janata Dal (Secular) [JD (S)] with 55 members, was installed as the Prime Minister. The Congress and a few Independent members supported him. However, his government could not last long and had to resign after the Congress withdrew its support. In the prevailing political situation, no party was in a position to form a government or continue in power for long, if it did somehow form a government. The Parliament was, therefore, dissolved and a fresh election was declared which took place in May–June 1991. The Congress party emerged as the largest single group winning 220 seats. It formed the government under the leadership of Narasimha Rao. However, in the next election in 1996, the Congress slipped down to second place gaining only 140 seats. The BJP with the single largest number of 161 seats formed the government under A.B. Vajpayee. However, it had to resign just after 13 days when it became clear that a vote of no confidence would be passed against the government. The reason lay in the fact that the BJP was considered to be a tainted party because of its role in the demolition of the Babri Masjid in December 1992. Vajpayee’s fall signaled the formation of one national front after another for the purposes of forming a government. Deve Gowda, leading an alliance of 13 parties, was the first to form the government. He enjoyed Congress support from outside. I.K. Gujral led the next government until the BJP returned to power following the 1998 elections. Vajpayee led a coalition government consisting of 12 disparate parties drawn from different states. These parties harbored

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aspirations of playing important roles in national affairs. The coalition, however, could not last long because the leader of the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), Jayalalitha, made demands, which were impossible to satisfy. The AIADMK withdrew its support and the government resigned on April 14, 1999.The elections that followed saw the formation of the NDA consisting of 22 parties, again parties that were largely state-based.

Alliances, 2004–09 The 22-party BJP-led alliance remained in power till the government announced fresh elections before its term ended. The premature opening of the electoral battle was prompted by over confidence. The BJP, enthused by its Assembly victory in Gujarat, was convinced of its victory at the national polls with increased strength. Its catchy slogan, “India Shining,” a symbol of its over confidence, failed to convince the voters and the BJP suffered heavy losses. It did well in its traditional strongholds, such as Madhya Pradesh (MP), Rajasthan, and Chhattisgarh. It also made substantial gains in Karnataka but slipped, along with its ally Shiv Sena, in Maharashtra. Its biggest losses, however, were in Uttar Pradesh (UP), Bihar, Jharkhand, Delhi, Haryana, and, of all states, Gujarat. However, three of the BJP’s close allies in key states, the AIADMK in Tamil Nadu, TDP in Andhra Pradesh (AP) and the Trinamul Congress (TMC) in West Bengal suffered a spectacular debacle. The dimming of India Shining had a very adverse consequence for the 22-party NDA alliance. It signaled its disintegration because some of its critical components were convinced that their participation in it had harmed them. In coming together, none of the components of any alliance surrender its autonomy completely; it remains committed to the promotion of its own interest. But, when it seems that it is not going to be benefited by its participation in the alliance, the process of the unraveling of the alliance begins. The disparate nature of the NDA is indicated by the fact that, as Paul Wallace notes, it represented “a broad catch-all spectrum of parties.”9 It included a


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left-oriented TDP with its base in AP, a Sikh-based Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD) in Punjab, a Muslim party, National Conference (NC) confined to Jammu and Kashmir (J&K), and a rabid Maharashtrian outfit, Shiv Sena, in Mumbai. Additionally, the NDA also included the DMK, the Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK), and Manumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK) from Tamil Nadu along with a few other state parties. The defeat of the BJP-led NDA led to its disintegration. The TDP left the alliance because Chandrababu Naidu, its leader, attributed the electoral rout of the TDP in the 2004 Assembly elections to his open alliance with the BJP at the national level. This association cost the TDP, he felt, 12–13 percent of minority vote. On top of this, the 2002 Godhra carnage in Gujarat was the last straw for Naidu. Similarly, the DMK, PMK, MDMK, Indian National Lok Dal (INLD), NC, and the Ram Vilas Paswan faction of JD(U) also left the alliance. If the communal face of the BJP and its commitment to Hindutva alienated the TDP in AP, it also had a significant role to play in Naveen Patnaik’s breaking away from the NDA in Orissa just before the 2009 elections. BJP and the BJD in Orissa have been partners in the NDA. They formed a coalition government at the state level, but fought municipal elections separately. However, while the BJD strength was increasing, that of the BJP was in decline. Two things happened to separate the two partners. First, the Municipal elections to Cuttack and Paripadain in the first week of February 2009 confirmed the trend. In Cuttack, the BJD won 37 seats with only two going to the BJP. The BJP had in the previous elections won a majority of the municipal seats, as well as the post of the Mayor. Baripada, traditionally a Congress stronghold, was wrested in the previous elections by the BJP and the Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM). However, in the 2009 elections, popular support swung away from them to the BJD. All this indicated unambiguously that the electoral fortune of the BJD was on the rise. This was enough of an indication to Patnaik to be sold on the idea of going solo in the 2009 elections. What seems to have firmed up this idea was the riot against Christians in Kandhamal. Patnaik, who considered himself to be a secularist, saw the riot as a danger to his own political survival.

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Negotiations for seat sharing with the BJP were never seriously begun. Finally on March 7, 2009 Patnaik announced his decision to leave the NDA. Despite all this, the BJP’s hope of coming to power was running high; it was confident of putting L.K. Advani on the prime ministerial throne. The atmosphere of unpredictability and its judgment of Manmohan Singh as a weak prime minister were reinforcing its hope of coming back to power by winning a majority or a better seat count in the 2009 elections. To increase its electoral prospects, and especially to attract voter support in the south, the BJP toned down its Hindutva zeal and put the Ram Mandir issue on the back burner. It also made a seat-sharing arrangement with the Assam Gana Parishad (AGP), Shiv Sena in Mumbai, and JD(U) in Bihar. Thus, the BJP entered the electoral fray in 2009 with high hopes. In contradistinction to the BJP, which had a longer experience of alliances, the Congress fought shy of alliance politics till 2004. The progressive decline of seat share of the Congress compelled it to engage in the painful process of soul searching. This process gathered speed when Mrs Sonia Gandhi became the president of the Congress in 1998. Two focal issues galvanized this process. In the first place, the Congress never reconciled itself to the loss of its dominance. Political circumstances forced it to recognize, that also very tardily, the need for forging a coalition in order to return to power. Nonetheless, it never fully shed its aspirations of once again enjoying political dominance. Second, despite the yearning for the revival of the past glory, political reality was pushing it toward alliance formation with, what the Congress leaders emphasized, “like-minded secular parties.” The stress on secularism as a binding force was necessitated for preventing the BJP, its rival, from getting an upper hand in the electoral battle. The Congress took pleasure in accusing it as the rabid champion of Hindutva and responsible both for the demolition of the Babri Masjid and the Godhra carnage. To come to power and to defeat the forces of communalism was thus the prime objective of the Congress. This, however, depended on the Congress’ willingness to align with other parties and share power with them if it formed the government. Perhaps the Congress may be successful in reviving its past glory by working through the alliance. And looking back, this seems to be a


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better explanation for the effort mounted by the Congress to win friends and influence people. The strategy that it adopted in 2009 also seems to be influenced by this same consideration. The birth of the UPA occurred during this process of soul searching. The seeds of the UPA were sown on January 16, 2003 when Mrs Gandhi invited a few “like-minded secular” leaders to dinner with the avowed purpose of coordinating in the Lok Sabha the actions of different parties in opposition on the Ayodhya issue.10 What speeded up the formation of the NDA was the defeat of the Congress in assembly elections in three states—MP, Chhattisgarh, and Rajasthan— in December 2003. Defeat in these states provided the needed impetus to the Congress to formalize the informal process of coordination into a formal alliance. It is thus that the UPA was born. It was this alliance that fought the 2004 elections and came out victorious at the polls, reducing the BJP to the second position with 138 seats in contrast to the Congress, which emerged as the single largest group winning 145 seats as against its seat share of 114 in 1999. Thus the Congress entered into an alliance for the first time in 2004 and this gambit delivered victory to it. Its share of seats increased by 31 and its vote share rose to 28.3 percent, which was higher than the BJP’s 23.8 percent. But what is more significant is that the alliance partners of the UPA also recorded a considerable rise in the share of their seats. For example, the seat total of its allies rose from 23 in 1999 to 77 in 2004, while their vote share increased from 5.7 percent in 1999 to 10.1 percent in 2004. This is a pointer to the fact that the major factor influencing the outcome of the 2004 elections was the political calculus working in different states independent of the political calculus operating in the entire country. This is symptomatic of the fact of small electoral results in different states producing the grand outcome at the national level. Given the importance of state politics, it was natural that NDA alliance partners expected rewards from the coalition. If these expectations were belied, alliance partners found it very difficult to stay with the alliance; they would rather pull out and seek new, greener pastures elsewhere. This is exactly what happened with the Congress-led UPA also. The first to pull out was Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS) in August 2006 because its expectation of a separate Telangana state

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was not fulfilled. In March 2007, the MDMK left the alliance accusing the UPA government of neglecting the interest of Tamil Nadu in interstate water disputes and of failing to implement many central schemes in the state. Next was Mufti Mohammad Syed’s PDP of J&K who left the Congress over the Amarnath Yatra row. He formally left the UPA in January 2009 after the Congress allied itself with the National Conference to form the state government. Then, the left parties that were supporting from the outside withdrew their support on the issue of the Indo-American Nuclear Treaty. Further depletions occurred in the UPA ranks caused by the resolution of the Congress Working Committee, taken on January 29, 2009, not to have a national alliance with any party. On the other hand, Congress needed coalition partners so as to broaden its support. It attempted to do both. The former flowed out of the latter inasmuch as the Congress was sold on Rahul Gandhi’s long-term plan to revive the party especially in what is known as the cow-belt in northern India. Earlier, in 2007 at the All India Congress Committee (AICC) session in New Delhi, Mrs Gandhi had given voice to the party’s intention by stating: “Coalitions mean positive support from all sides. But working in a coalition does not mean that we lose our political space.” She added further: “Such a coalition cannot be at the cost of the revival of the Congress, particularly in States where its base had eroded.”11 Four years earlier, she had said at a function: “Our main aim is to do all we can to strengthen the Congress so that we come to power on our own. But we do not have a closed mind to working with like-minded secular parties if and when necessary.”12 This is enough to suggest that the forging of an alliance for fighting national elections constituted, for the Congress, only an expediency measure taken with a view to gradually consolidate its power base for once again emerging as the ruling party on its own strength. But as long as it remained beyond the range of possibility, the party’s choice was to forge alliance with like-minded parties. Even this choice was preferable because it would be the Congress that remained the focal point of any alliance it chose to enter into because of its electoral strength, either as the first or the second largest group in the Parliament. But then what explains the refusal of the Congress to forge alliances even with its trusted friends at the national level? The question


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assumes added importance in view of the radical change in the behavior of Mrs Gandhi in 2004 and in 2009 insofar as the formation of alliances is concerned. In 2004, for instance, she went out of her way to woo new friends. She went to the extent of walking and driving to the houses of several leaders, including that of Mayawati of the BSP in Delhi, in mobilizing their support for the UPA. In contrast, in 2009 when the alliance partners showed their concern about the Congress’ resolution of not entering into a national alliance at the national level, the Congress issued no reconciliatory statement.13 While the Congress worked hard to strike up an alliance with the NCP in Maharashtra, the TMC in West Bengal, and JMM in Jharkhand, it showed no willingness to do so with the RJD, the Lok Janshakti Party (LJP) in Bihar, and the SP in UP—all formerly important members of the UPA and all from the cow-belt. Also, Mrs Gandhi kept Lalu Prasad Yadav waiting, who sought an interview with her, for two days and Yadav had to cancel his request because the call for the interview never came. The explanation lies in the unannounced but not well-concealed intention of the Congress party to make a bid for its long awaited revival, at least in the cow-belt. This bid was prompted by indications from several sources, which hinted that the Congress was favorably placed in the battle of the ballot. Note, for instance, that the Congress hired a private agency to carry out a survey to find what prospects awaited the Congress in the forthcoming electoral battle. The survey indicated that the Congress was sure to get at least 185 seats. Of course, some of its partners had not deserted the alliance then, which they did later. The AP Chief Minister had assured the party that it would capture at least 25 seats in the state. Reports from Gujarat led the party to expect 12 seats in that state. Similarly, reports from some other states were also very encouraging. All these various indications reinforced the resolve of the Congress to make a bid for recovering its past glory. And this bid could not have yielded good results if the party remained aligned with the RJD, LJP, and the SP. It is not, therefore, surprising that no seat-sharing arrangement could be made with these parties. The failure in arriving at seat-sharing arrangement with these parties led to the formation of the Fourth Front comprising the RJD,

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the LJP, and the SP. Also, the PMK in Tamil Nadu left the alliance and went over to the AIADMK. Another front, the Third Front consisted of the left parties, the BSP, the TDP, the AIADMK, and the [JD(S)]. The BJD also joined its rank. The impetus for forging the Third Front goes back to the decision of the left parties to vote on August 8, 2008 against the UPA government on the issue of the Indo-American Nuclear Treaty. They sought assistance from the then United Democratic Progressive Alliance. The idea of the Third Front took its birth then and after a lot of discussion, the Front was launched on March 12, 2009 at Timkur in Karnataka.14 However, it lacked a formal organization, which was to take place after the elections. In the meantime, each of its constituents were to engage in friendly contests with nonCongress and non-BJP parties.15 However, these friendly contests were beset with reciprocal animosity and unbridgeable gaps. Each partner was to fight the election on its own in its own state and was then to form a formal organization.16

Concluding Observations The results of the 2009 Parliamentary elections conclusively demonstrate that the Congress strategy of alliance formation paid it a rich dividend. It had state level alliances where it needed support, and abstained from it where it wanted to strengthen its position such as in the cow-belt states, UP and Bihar. As the results show, the Congress alliance won 262 seats, with the Congress alone getting 206 seats thus crossing the 200 mark for the first time since 1991. Also, its share of popular votes rose to 28.6 percent, an increase of 2.1 percent over 2004. Insofar as the cow-belt states are concerned, its gain was large in UP, with 12 seats as against nine in 2004. With the base of 262 seats, it was easy for the Congress to get a majority along with the promise of support from the RJD, the LJP, and the SP. On all accounts, then, the position of the Congress in the Parliament is impregnable. However, with victory achieved, the UPA had to deal with a new range of issues, which if left unresolved, may prove its undoing in the future.


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The question whether or not we are witnessing a revival and a steady march of the Congress toward its coveted goal of unchallenged dominance hinges mainly on two factors. The first factor is, of course, the ability of the Congress party-led alliance to resolve differences that arise in its ranks. The immediate problem that the UPA faced was the disposal of ministerial and cabinet ranks. Certain differences were already discernible in the drama that the DMK staged for getting ministerial posts for satisfying the aspirations of different members of Karunanidhi’s family. While it was resolved, intense lobbying for ministerial berths delayed the expected expansion and distribution of portfolios. The reason for this lies in the several issues involved in achieving a proper balance. These include young faces, good governance, merit, regional balance, and the representation of different states where the Congress did well. These issues proved a hard nut to crack, but they have now been resolved. And yet, as the saying goes, “there is many a slip between cup and lip.” There may yet develop pockets of discontent that may make the UPA-II stumble and fall between now and five years hence. Thus, the answer to the question whether the Congress is moving toward recovering its past glory or not, depends primarily on its performance as the leader of the ruling coalition. In the meantime, what is important to note is that in the 2009 elections, there was no overarching issue; the national electoral result was, if anything, the aggregation of state results. Political cleavages at the state level produced the national election outcome. It should also be noted that despite the fact that the Congress increased its seat share by 61 seats, its share of popular votes rose only by a mere two percentage points, a situation similar to 1999 when the NDA formed the government. It is against this background that the second factor becomes important in answering the question whether the Congress is moving toward reviving its past glory. This second factor concerns the ability of the Congress party to revive its electoral strength in especially major Indian states. In the northeastern states, the Congress is strong except in Tripura. However, electoral strength of the Congress in these states does not ensure its emergence as a national party that can win majority of parliamentary seats on its own. It has to win big in major Indian states for

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that. In the case of major states, the Congress polled between 40 to 49 percent of votes in eight states. However, in only two states does it faces weak opposition; in the rest of the six states, there exists almost a bipolar situation. In six of the states, it polled between 10 to 19 percent of votes and in five states between 30 to 39 percent. Here also, non-Congress parties or an alliance rules three states. These figures are revealing in the sense that the Congress has not done quite well even when there has been a small upsurge in its electoral fortunes. Thus the question boils down to the possibility of the merger of the state parties into the Congress or their decimation on the electoral battleground at the hands of the Congress. Both these possibilities are unlikely to become reality. If state parties are strong enough and have dug their roots deep in state politics, they will remain stronger and control power apparatus in their own state. In that case, they would not think of merger with any party. However, they can always enter into alliances with any party or parties. Here also it is not at all clear why they align themselves with the Congress when it has shown a strong tendency toward using them as stepping-stones for climbing up on the power ladder. As such, the revival of the past glory of the Congress party does not seem to be in the near future. As the Lokniti Team of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), Delhi, notes: [Its] recovery is still very partial, especially in States such as Uttar Pradesh and Bihar where the Congress has been unable to access the bottom of the social pyramid. Also, there are many states where the Congress is in no position to take on the BJP. The Congress cannot overgrow its allies in other parts of the country, at least not yet. But to say this is to imply that the party has not yet peaked. The Congress still has a lot of room to grow.17

Notes 1. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (New York: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1954). 2. It should be noted that the party space in India is cluttered with six national parties and more than 500 small and medium parties. 3. For instance, the UPA-led Congress consisted of 14 parties and the BJP-led NDA had 22 parties in it.


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â•‡ 4. For details, see Ramashray Roy, Democracy in India: Form and Substance (Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2005), pp. 192–94. â•‡ 5. See Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar, “Principal State Level Contests and Derivative National Choices,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 6, February 2009, p. 57. â•‡ 6. Ibid., p. 56. â•‡ 7. Vandita Mishra, “Small but Powerful,” The Indian Express (New Delhi) February 17, 2009. â•‡ 8. Pramod K. Kantha, “The BJP and Indian Democracy: Elections, Bombs, and Beyond,” in Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace (eds), Indian Politics and the 1998 Elections; Regionalism, Hindutva and State Politics (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999), p. 359. â•‡ 9. Paul Wallace, “Introduction: The New National Party System and State Politics,” in Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy (eds), India’s 1999 Elections and 20th Century Politics (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2003), p. 5. 10. The leaders who attended the dinner included Sharad Pawar of the NCP, who had not until then broken bread with Sonia Gandhi having left the Congress five years earlier on the issue of her foreign, Italian origin. Others included Mulayam Singh of the SP, Lalu Prasad Yadav of the RJD, and Ram Vilas Paswan of the LJP. 11. D.K. Singh, “Why the Congress is Going Solo,” The Sunday Indian Express (New Delhi) March 29, 2009. 12. Ibid. 13. Only in the case of Sharad Pawar did the Congress show some concern when he talked of exploring other avenues. Rahul Gandhi was sent to Pune to mollify Pawar. 14. For details, see T.A. Johnson, “The Third Front First Force,” The Indian Express (New Delhi) March 19, 2009. 15. These parties were: CPM, CPI, JD(S), TDP, TRS, AIADMK, and BSP. 16. See The Indian Express (New Delhi) March 16, 2009. 17. The Hindu, “How India Voted,” Supplement Section (New Delhi) May 26, 2009.

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chapter 3

Coalition Politics: Withering of National–Regional Ideological Positions? Pramod Kumar

Electoral politics in the 20th century has been mirrored by a nationbuilding project propelled by a one-party dominant system. Politics since 1989 redefined the role of national and regional political parties, as it transformed the content of electoral discourse and use of ideological filters as per convenience. In this chapter, an attempt has been made to capture the tensions between state politics, populist politics, and people’s politics. It also deals with the politics of “presence” and of “representation” in their interaction with democracy, federalism, and diversity as reflected in elections. To undertake this task, there is a need to capture the changing spectrum of interactive relationship between political parties, citizens, and the policymakers in formulating and setting the agenda for governance. These interactive relationships shape the nature and level of political participation of the citizens, regions, and their diversities. All of these considerations have vital implications for federalism, the electoral system, and social democracy in terms of the stakes of social cleavages in political decision-making, and the extent of social and economic inclusiveness. The shift from a command to market economy has redefined the role of the state. The mandate of governance changed from welfarism to fiscal management, public sector growth and employment to leveraging public resource for private growth, and retrenchment of jobs in the public sector and subsidies to the private sector for making provision for health and education, and imposition of user charges on the citizens. This shaped two divergent kinds of discourse, one emanating

Coalition Politics

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from the shift in the path of development manifesting in what has been termed as “state politics,” and another found articulation at the time of elections in the form of “populist politics.” It has been argued that the practice of democracy has a select domain restricted to those who govern and those who avail its governance. The two have entered into a collaborative relationship and emerged as custodians of the state shaping the terms of political discourse under the banner of “state politics.” People on the margins, outside the realm of democratic practice need doles for their survival that is provided by electoral politics, which becomes their mainstay, lending content to what is known as “populist politics.” This has provided dominant space in mainstream politics to a coalition of interests in negation to the participation of citizens, diversities, and regions in democratic governance. This tension has been reflected in the dichotomous relationship between populist politics and state politics. In populist politics, it emanates from an articulation of politics of representation as synonymous with the presence of citizens, diversities, and regions in exclusion of their stake building in state politics.1 The “politics of presence” has overtaken politics of ideas, values, and purpose. The outcome of this vacillation is that the ideological difference between political parties has got blurred while the difference between “populist” and “state politics” has become more manifest. Political transformations in a decade starting from 1967 were significant, insofar as one-party dominant system was concerned. It led to the polarization of the Indian party system into two blocks with anti-Congressism being the only unifying factor for the opposition parties. From 1989 onwards, the Congress party’s hegemony of being an umbrella party became questioned and the space thus vacated was appropriated by regional political parties. Examples include the BSP, JD(U), BJD, SP, DMK, and the AIADMK. A perusal of the electoral results shows that since 1989, the multiparty character of the party system is illustrated by the fact that the values of the Laakso-Taagepera Index (N) (of the effective number of parties) by votes/seats were 4.80/4.35, 5.10/3.70, 7.11/5.83, 6.91/5.28, 6.74/5.87, 7.6/6.5, and 7.6/5.0 in 1989, 1991, 1996, 1998, 1999, 2004, and 2009, respectively, whereas prior to 1989, the effective number of the parties by seats

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exceeded three only once (3.16 in 1967) and the effective number of parties by votes exceeded five only once (5.19 in 1967).2 Further, within the multiparty character of the party system, the space occupied by the regional political parties in terms of votes and the elected members has increased. For instance, the percentage share of votes of the national parties is on the decline. Their share of votes was around 78 percent in the 1984 parliamentary elections, which declined to 64 percent in the 2009 parliamentary elections. In comparision, the share of the regional parties increased from 12 percent to 31 percent during the same period. Further, the share of the national political parties in the elected members of parliament has decreased from 85 percent to 69 percent and that of the regional parties increased from 12 percent to 29 percent in the 1984 and 2009 elections, respectively (see Table 3.1). The change in the nature of party system from one-party dominance (with greater emphasis on the unitary aspects of Indian federation and the moderate level of political participation of the citizens, regions, and social cleavages) to the multiparty system (with higher participation of the people on the margins of society in the elections and greater presence of the diversities in legislatures) has unfolded the paradoxes of the Indian democracy. In political science literature, the first phase of the party system —up to the mid-1960s—has been characterized as a one-party dominance system.3 In this, the agenda of governance and of electoral discourse were in consonance with each other. This was the phase of one-party dominance in Indian politics. In this phase, it was assumed that there is a consensus on state-led capitalism, where state intervention was meant to create conditions of development in underdeveloped regions and groups. There was a broad understanding in politics about the strategy of state-led capitalism for moderating the uneven impact of development on regions, citizens, and social cleavages. For instance, there were conscious attempts to assign central dole to the public sector to take the economy to “commanding heights” and “build a socialistic pattern of society.” Election manifesto of the Congress party in 1962 declared that: [T]he public sector will increasingly expand and play a dominant role, both for the purpose of accelerating the speed of industrialisation and

Table 3.1

85.40 12.20 2.40 100.00

63.58 31.23 5.19 100.00

2009 62.89 32.87 4.25 100.00

2004

67.11 30.15 2.74 100.00

1999

Percentage votes

Source: Statistical Reports on General Elections from 1984 to 2004, Election Commission of India, New Delhi. Note: *For 2009, see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/results_of_the_2009_Indian_general_election_by_party

71.27 27.62 1.10 100.00

National parties Regional parties Independents Total

67.96 30.94 1.10 100.00

69.24 29.10 1.66 100.00

Party

67.03 32.04 0.92 100.00

Party-wise representation amongst elected members 2009* 2004 1999 1998 1984–85

Performance of National and Regional Parties

67.98 29.66 2.37 100.00

1998

77.86 12.73 9.41 100.00

1984–85


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yielding additional resources. Public, private and co-operative sectors should function in unison as parts of a single mechanism. Government should exercise effectively its powers of control and the use of appropriate fiscal measures.4

Public investment was made to create physical infrastructure, land reforms legislation was enacted, affirmative action for providing reservations in jobs for the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Tribes (STs) was taken, and the Community Development Programme (CDP) for creating rural infrastructure was also launched. The assumption was that the logic of development and broadening the base of democracy will lead to overall empowerment of the underprivileged sections and create conditions for the withering away of the primordial identities based on caste, region, and religion. The outcome of these initiatives, no doubt, blurred the divergence between economic policies under the banner of state capitalism and political mobilisation for building “socialistic pattern of society.” But the contradiction between the path of development, electoral promises, and social expectations became glaring. As a consequence, people’s politics found expression through various protest movements of the youth, the Naxalite movement, and unrest among the Dalits, peasantry, and public sector employees. In the sphere of electoral politics, people on the margins could see the importance of their votes and political leadership realized that electoral outcomes were dependent upon the garnering of votes from the poor. The Garibi Hatao slogan, nationalization of banks, and abolition of the privy purses were used as major planks to woo voters in the 1972 elections. Election manifesto of the Congress party in 1977 made promises with a tinge of apologetic welfarism. It assigned the private sector a national role and hoped to make the public sector efficient. In its 1977 election manifesto, Congress party declared, “To enlarge the role and efficiency of the public sector, to give proper scope to the private sector to play a national role without concentration of economic power, to control prices and ensure supplies of essential commodities.”5 These pronouncements were adequately reflected in the plan documents and government policies. These policies and programs provided content to these slogans by introducing a number of poverty alleviation programs. They sought

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to provide income to the poor, such as Food for Work and subsidies to agriculture. In this phase also, the attempt was to reflect electoral promises in the government programs and policies. However, the outcome of this phase was the emergence of regional politics as reflected in multiparty competition in the electoral domain and protest movements across the regions. In the political domain, the Congress party suffered a setback and a number of regional parties emerged at the state level. The strategy adopted was to vanquish dissent and negate regionalism, but to the contrary, the strategy strengthened the opposition parties. As a result, the then Prime Minister Indira Gandhi attempted to curb the opposition through divide and rule politics and an authoritarian mode, which reached its peak with the imposition of emergency rule in the country. However, her emergency could not be sustained as India’s multicultural ethos blended with political democracy required an institutional mechanism which could articulate the coalition of diverse regional, cultural, and class interests. A new political formation representing this diversity under the banner of the Janata Party, a replica of the earlier Nehru Congress Party, captured the political space and facilitated the return of political democracy. Political instability continued and the Janata regime was replaced by Indira Gandhi in 1980. The politics of populism was unleashed to woo the regional interests, religious and caste spectrum, and the poor for electoral competition. The arena of conflict shifted from eradication of poverty to issues relating to federalism including decentralization of power, autonomy for states and right to self-determination. Regional movements took the form of terrorism in Kashmir, Punjab, and in several parts of the north-eastern states. The political system failed to cope with these issues. Paradoxically, due to excessive centralization, the leaders became all powerful, but with a weak institutional base that rendered them powerless to mediate between the conflicting interests, conflicts, and to bring about social transformation. From 1989, the crisis in politics deepened coupled with economic reforms and the emergence of coalition politics. Electoral compulsions, which required the support of the people through their votes, unleashed a competitive politics of populism. Political parties

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and political leaders across the board sought to woo the people with sops… The number of promises made multiplied, but the number of promises kept dwindled.6

The state increasingly abdicated its governing role to market forces and in elections, political parties made promises which were in contradiction with the economic reforms agenda. For example, the Congress party in Punjab, caught between Assembly elections (2002) and Parliamentary elections (2004), became a victim of the paradox between electoral promises and government mandate. In the 2002 Assembly elections, its promise of free electricity to farmers contributed to its victory over its opponent the Akali Dal. After coming to power, at both the state and central levels, the party started implementing the government mandate to introduce economic reforms. At the state level, it imposed electricity tariff on agriculture and, consequently, it performed poorly in the 2004 national elections. The Congress party was quick to announce the implementation of sops like free electricity to the farmers in the wake of the next elections in 2007. This ambivalence between electoral compulsions and their commitment to implement an economic reforms agenda led to a tension between populist politics and state politics. Not only the national, but even the regional political parties also promised sops to the electorates at the time of elections. In the 2007 Assembly elections and 2009 Parliamentary elections, the SAD in Punjab promised free electricity to the farmers. But, in the wake of fiscal reforms in 2010, the SAD–BJP coalition government imposed electricity tariff on the farmers.7 Furthermore, the national and regional parties promised a number of other sops at the time of elections. For instance, the answer to the price rise was to subsidize atta–dal and this was used to spearhead their election campaigns. For example, the SAD manifesto read: Prices of wheat atta have gone up from `â•›6.50 per kg in 2002 to `â•›17 at present. Similarly, the price of ordinary pulses has also shot up from `â•›18 per kg in 2002 to `â•›65 at present. Diesel prices have gone up from `â•›14.50 per litre to `â•›32 per litre whereas a cooking gas cylinder which cost only `â•›210 in 2002 now costs `â•›375. The new government will provide atta at `â•›4 per kg and dal at `â•›20 per kg to the poor.8

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And in Tamil Nadu, the DMK election manifesto promised the sale of rice at the rate of `â•›2 per kg to the ration cardholders.9 Similarly, the Congress campaign took up this issue belatedly and their manifesto read: Strengthen Public Distribution System (PDS) in the state to ensure timely availability of sufficient foodgrains and cereals to the Dalits, economically weaker sections and BPL [Below Poverty Line] families at affordable prices. Ensure provision of 35 kg of wheat/Atta and 10 kg of rice @ `â•›2 per kg for the poorest of the poor (Antyodaya families). Ensure provision of dal up to 5 kg to the poorest of poor (Antyodaya families) @ `â•›20 per kg.10

Political parties have not cared to analyze the causes and ways to reduce the prices and raise the purchasing capacity of the poor, and are silent on formulating policies for ensuring food security. This situation led to a disconnect between the people, the political parties, and the government. In government, these political parties give subsidies as doles to the poor and as a right to the interest groups and stakeholders. However, during elections, subsidies are promised as rights to the poor. It is because of this reason that subsidies directed at the poor are termed as doles and subsidies directed to protect profits are described as rescue packages. The former is presented as populist and the latter a survival need. Coalition politics functioned more as coalition of interests between big business, land speculators, big farmers, and government contractors. As a leading political analyst, Alan Altshuler, commenting on the claims of political parties in the USA said: “Though their little favours went to little men, the big favours went to land speculators, public utility franchise holders, government contractors, illicit businessmen and, of course, the leading members of the machines themselves.”11 Within the party system, coalition politics functioned more as a “coalition of patronage for sharing spoils between the national and regional political parties.” The state was: ...increasingly unable to mediate between conflicting interests and competing demands resorted more and more to a politics of patronage. This patronage, which came to be extended in a bewildering variety of ways, was a means of sharing the spoils among the constituents of the ruling elite.12

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Consequently, in order to appease regional political parties so as to form a coalition government at the national level, national political parties shifted their stance in the electoral discourse in favor of greater autonomy for the regions, while regional political parties also amended their position from anti-centrism to cooperative federalism. In its 2009 election manifesto, the Congress Party claimed: It is only the Indian National Congress that has demonstrated its commitment to a strong Centre, to strong States, and to strong panchayats and nagarpalikas. India’s political system must have space for institutions at each of these three levels. Each has a vital and specific role to play.13

And the BJP in 2009 elections declared: “We will place Centre– State relations on an even keel through the process of consultation. The genuine grievances of States will be addressed in a comprehensive manner. The moribund National Development Council will be revived and made into an active body,”14 “…for devolution of more financial and administrative powers and functions to the States. We will take suitable steps to ensure harmonious Centre-State relations in the light of the recommendations of the Sarkaria Commission.”15 But, on the contrary, the BJP implemented policies which compromised autonomy of the states and reinforced the tendencies of centralization. In the political domain, the emphasis on mutually acceptable tradeoffs between the national and regional political parties was loud in accommodation and feeble in substance. It only meant reconciliation to achieve power equilibrium. The language of political discourse was strongly influenced to construct “coalition through patronage” across the ideological spectrum of political parties. Moreover, there is a regionalization of national political parties and nationalization of regional political parties. For instance, the Congress government in Punjab passed the Punjab Repealing Act of 2004 on the Satluj Yamuna Link (SYL) much to the annoyance of the central leadership of the Congress Party. In other words, the Congress in competition with a regional alliance started appropriating the anti-center constituency in the state. The BJP changed its position from a strong center to greater autonomy for states.16

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Similarly, the SAD shifted its position from anti-centrism to antiCongressism to co-operative federalism. The Akali Dal in its 1973 resolution proclaimed that “it would endeavor to have the Indian Constitution recast on real federal principles, with equal representation at the Center for all the states.” The same Akali Dal through its president Parkash Singh Badal, who was party to the 1973 resolution, asserted in the year 2000, that “Our constitutional framework was for more federal structure, but owing to the rule of the Congress government, both at the Centre and in the states, the powers of the states were slowly usurped and a unitary set-up was nearly established.” The shift in the Akali Dal’s position is mainly due to the emergence of coalition politics and the decline of one-party dominance. As a result, the thrust of the Akali Dal agenda changed from anti-centrism to co-operative federalism: The Akali-BJP government has opened a new chapter in Centre–State relations, ushering in the age of co-operative federalism in the country. The era of confrontation has been effectively ended and replaced with a forward looking thrust on working together for the overall good of the state and the nation.17

This position marks a radical shift from the anti-center stance as reflected in the 1973 autonomy resolution and in its later 1985 memorandum to the Sarkaria Commission. The shift was first made public on the occasion of the Hola Mohalla festival near Gurdwara Takht Keshgarh at Anandpur Sahib in a political conference. The resolution passed stated: Today’s conference demands of the centre that for the prosperity of the country, in favor of development of people, the centre-state relations should be redefined in the light of the Anandpur Sahib resolution. Setting up of a true federal structure in the country was the need of the hour.18

The issue of greater autonomy for the states was nurtured in a political climate marked by over centralization of power and one-party dominance since independence. This has worked in two ways: on the one hand, it has provided greater access to regional parties to share spoils of power reducing the alliance between the national and the

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regional political parties as “coalition for patronage” and, on the other hand, it has made the regional parties stand on redefining the center– state relations as ambivalent.19 Interestingly, in coalition politics, regional groups have become strong, and the forces of regionalism have become weak. It has, no doubt, created opportunities for the small regional opposition parties to have important ministerial berths as rewards, but the same has weakened the regional agenda and interests. Consequently, it has made Indian politics less federal and more centralized, extending adhoc benefits to those regions which are strategic partners in the coalition. A few illustrations to prove the point. In the center–state fiscal relationship, the statutory transfer of funds to the states have become secondary and the role of discretionary grants to finance the state plans by the center have become more prominent (see Table 3.2). This is especially noticeable between the eighth and ninth Finance Commission even when the total transfers had increased. Between the two components of transfers from the Finance Commission, the share of grants has substantially increased in the reform period, suggesting a declining access to the collective pool of national tax resources by the provinces, put differently greater access to revenue to the Central government.20

Further, the central government expenditure has declined and states’ expenditure share has multiplied (see Table 3.3). This acquires significance in view of the states’ declining access to resources. Not only this, in the centrally sponsored schemes, funding has increased in the social sector. In most of the cases, these schemes are not commensurate with the needs of the local people. This results in nonperformance of the states which adversely affects their claim to central resources. In other words, the apportionment of resources is to the disadvantage of the states irrespective of the fact that the regional parties have emerged as important players in the national politics. And, the national parties along with the regional parties have also promised to build a genuine federal structure in the electoral discourse, but the character of the state and the policy regime continue to be in favor of centralization.

2 22.39 20.25 21.37 21.40 20.93

Share in Central taxes

3 1.96 2.52 3.42 2.34 5.20

Grants 4 24.35 22.77 22.79 23.75 26.13

5 12.11 13.56 14.48 10.57 10.39

Total transfer through Grants through finance commission (2+3) planning commission

Finance Commission Transfers

Source: 11th Finance Commission Report, Government of India.

1 VII FC VIII FC IX FC X FC XI FC (first two years)

Year

Table 3.2

6 1.66 1.54 1.06 0.63 0.82

Nonplan grants (non-statutory)

Other Transfers

7 13.77 15.10 15.54 11.19 11.21

Other transfers (5+6)

Total

8 38.11 37.86 40.33 35.79 37.20

Total transfers (4+7)

Transfer from Center to States as Percentage of Gross Revenue Receipts of the Center: Finance Commission Period Average


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Pramod Kumar Table 3.3 Trends in Expenditure to GDP Ratio

1990–91 1991–92 1992–93 1993–94 1994–95 1995–96 1996–97 1997–98 1998–99 1999–00 2000–01 2001–02

Combined (%)

Center (%)

States (%)

26.83 26.3 26.11 25.89 25.03 24.2 23.38 24.16 25.19 26.26 26.1 28.1

17.74 16.52 16.37 16.49 15.27 14.66 14.13 13.64 14.27 14.79 14.5 15.2

14.3 14.84 14.43 14.21 14.37 13.78 13.46 13.76 14.06 14.95 14.8 15.8

Source: Indian Public Finance Statistics (IIPFS), various issues.

In practice, the emphasis of politics has shifted from ideology of representation of the regions in governance to the distribution of patronage to the regional parties and interest groups. Similarly, in the case of common citizens and social cleavages, the focus has been to “privilege political presence over common interests.” In the dominant discourse, the arguments are advanced to make voting compulsory or provide reservation of seats in the legislature on the basis of gender, social cleavages, and minorities or the apportionment of the state resources on the basis of target groups. The politics of presence was practiced not only to co-opt regions, but also the citizens and social cleavages based on caste and religion. The test of democratic participation is seen through voters turnout, number of contestants, and the representation of common people in the legislatures rather than the outcomes in terms of mainstreaming the poor and disadvantaged and also to achieve a more just and equitable society. A study of voters turnover shows an increase from 58.07 percent in the 2004 elections to 58.43 percent in the 2009 elections. The number of contestants has also increased from 5435 in 2004 to 8070 in the 2009 elections (see Table 3.4). In addition, the representation of people from low social origins has also multiplied. For instance, the number of SC candidates increased from 10 percent

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(630) in 1989 to 24 percent (1933) in the 2009 parliamentary elections. Similarly, the number of ST candidates increased from 4 percent (224) in 1989 to 7 percent (565) in 2009 elections (see Table 3.4). But the basic issue remains—how far has the increase in participation in elections benefited people with low social origins in the decisionmaking process and created conducive conditions for equity? Not only this, it is worth analyzing the shift in political discourse from, to use Benedict Anderson, categories “unbound serialities” and “bound serialities.” In electoral politics in the earlier phase, the language of politics referred to nation-building, citizen rights, equality for all religion, castes, and ethnicity largely remained within the domain of “unbound serialities.”21 Table 3.4 Caste-wise Candidate Summary: Lok Sabha Elections, 1971–2009 Year 1971 1977 1980 1984–85 1989 1991–92 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009

All India % from Total All India % from Total All India % from Total All India % from Total All India % from Total All India % from Total All India % from Total All India % from Total All India % from Total All India % from Total All India % from Total

General

SC

ST

Total

2,263 81.73 2,026 83.07 3,913 84.53 4,661 84.85 5,306 86.14 7,508 85.82 12,123 86.89 3,936 82.86 3,816 82.10 3,674 67.60 5,572 69.05

343 12.39 291 11.93 502 10.84 592 10.78 630 10.23 899 10.28 1,356 9.72 571 12.02 602 12.95 1,372 25.24 1,933 23.95

163 5.89 122 5.00 214 4.62 240 4.37 224 3.64 342 3.91 473 3.39 243 5.12 230 4.95 389 7.16 565 7.00

2,769 100 2,439 100 4,629 100 5,493 100 6,160 100 8,749 100 13,952 100 4,750 100 4,648 100 5,435 100 8,070 100.00

Source: Statistical Reports on General Elections, Election Commission of India, New Delhi.

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In 1962, the Congress party in its election manifesto declared it would build: a social order based on justice and offering equal opportunity to every citizen … The social services and, more especially, education and health should be expanded, greater attention being paid to economically and educationally backward people. The test of giving particular attention should be that of economic backwardness. Thus, low income groups, irrespective of castes and communities should receive special consideration.22

In the 1977 elections, the Congress party promised “to safeguard the interests of the minorities and weaker sections, to end privy purses and other such privileges, to provide the basic requirements of the people, speedily through dynamic rural programmes, to provide new employment avenues.”23 However, after the mid-1980s, sectional interests based on caste and religion were articulated in the elections and the slogan of “justice for all” was replaced by “justice for backward castes, Dalits, and minorities.” These exclusive category usages for “inclusive governance” led to polarization in the elections. For example, in the 2009 parliamentary elections, the projection of Mayawati, a Dalit leader, as the prime ministerial candidate by the Third Front led by Communist Parties, may have polarized the middle class non-Dalit votes to the advantage of the Congress party. This can be seen from the increase in the urban votes in favor of the Congress party. The main thrust of the argument is that in the post-economic reforms, competition for the scarce resources is being shaped around sectional interests and identities. The tension between economics of the market, i.e., state politics and populist politics, led to the inclusion of sectional interests based on religion and caste. This became a major factor for electoral mobilizations by the competing political parties. For instance, the Mandal Commission has promised job opportunities to the Backward Castes in an environment where jobs opportunities in the public sector are shrinking. This also acknowledges that politics of populism can only promise hope. It is not at all our contention that by offering a few thousand jobs to the OBC candidates we shall be able to make 52 per cent of the Indian

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population as forward, but we must recognize that an essential part of the battle against the social backwardness is to be fought in the minds of backward people, when a backward class candidate becomes a Collector or a Superintendent of Police, the material benefits accruing from his position are limited to the members of his family only. But the psychological spin-off of this phenomenon is tremendous, the entire community of that backward class candidate feels socially elevated.24

The state has abdicated its responsibility to build a secular society through affirmative action, where caste shall not be the basis of dispensation of justice, and religious identities shall not be the basis of entitlement of national resources. On the contrary, it consolidated the hold of regional, communal, and caste-based parties in elections. Most of the regional parties have provided impetus to the “sons of the soil” and articulated these concerns in their electoral discourse. For example, in Maharashtra, it has been reported that the Congress party benefited in the 2009 parliamentary and state assembly elections due to the radical assertions of Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (MNS) Chief Raj Thackeray. These assertions brought about a division in the vote bank of Shiv Sena. MNS Chief Raj Thackeray attempted to involve “sons of the soil” parochialism when he asserted that: Nashik was facing an influx of north India. They are earning here and sending the money to their native place … I am not against them, but they should have some affection for Maharashtra … He warned that north Indians who did not speak Marathi and did not respect Marathi culture would be driven away,25

The Congress government in Maharashtra has made their support to the MNS agenda explicit in announcing it would strictly implement the eligibility criteria for a taxi driving permit, which stipulated that a person must be a resident of Maharashtra for a minimum 15 years and can read, write, and speak Marathi.26 These articulations acquire significance in the backdrop of the political parties mobilizing support for elections on the basis of region, caste, and religious group affiliations. A perusal of the election manifestos of the political parties clearly shows that the parties promised subsidies, social security, and safety nets to the electorates based on social cleavages.27

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In the 2009 elections, the Congress party asserted that “The empowerment of the weaker sections of society—scheduled castes (SCs), scheduled tribes (STs), OBCs, minorities, and women—has been an article of faith with the Indian National Congress. This will be carried forward with emphasis on education, particularly skill-based and professional education.”28 For instance, communalism has been used to even present problems like unemployment as affecting the Hindus or the Muslims or the Sikhs. Articulation of the findings relating to backwardness of Muslims in the Sachar Commission Report, reservation of jobs for backward castes, and social and economic backwardness of Dalits have been used as vote catching devices. The logical outcome of this approach is the feeling of a deep sense of discrimination amongst those who are either denied access to employment opportunities or who remained on the margins of the employment market. “Coalition of presence” became rather the norm to co-opt social cleavages and offer doles to the common citizens under the banner of citizen-centric governance. But a majority of the women representatives in the local bodies, as per a pre-election survey conducted in 2008, were dissatisfied as they were promised at the time of election that the “politics of presence” shall provide answers to their claims to equity, access, and accountable governance.29 But these political parties, while in government pursued an agenda of downsizing the public sector and have, in fact, leveraged public sector resources to the private sector with a claim to provide efficient and accountable governance to the people. People have been reduced to “consumers with the ability to choose and complain (although) not the ability to proactively shape services.”30 Results in developing countries especially have shown that the interests of the powerless, the hardcore poor, the ethnic minority and the aged have been sidelined while the existing democratic institutions (the representative democracy) have been hijacked by the rich and the lobbyists and continued to function as a platform for the vested interests and not that of the poor. This has mirrored the regulatory dimension of the ‘state politics’ and the abdication syndrome ingrained into the practice of politics.31

The postcolonial state has failed to transform the status of people from colonial subjects to citizens. It has been very aptly described by

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Nicholas Dirks when he termed the colonial states as ethnographic states.32 In other words, the states do not seek participation of the citizens in decision-making, but claim to provide for the welfare of population. This made governance less a matter of politics and more of administrative policy. The foremost ingredient of this has been mistrust in the subjects or populace. It can be exemplified in a number of ways, but the most visible is the filing of affidavits for almost every interaction with the government. These affidavits are required in support of the facts given by the applicants for various services provided by the government. In other words, these are affirmations by the applicants in some cases supported by third parties. These affidavits in most of the cases are given on legal papers sworn before a Magistrate or public notary. For instance, affidavits are even required for public utilities such as new connections for electricity, sewerage, and water supply. Besides resulting in citizen’s harassment and corruption, it has perpetuated the dichotomy between the state and the nation. Instead of providing universal representation for the citizens as expected, these elections contribute nothing, but “plundering rotating government … in many of these countries, multi-party elections are but a vehicle to legitimise an existing political economy and perpetuate an equation of patron/client dependency relationship in a society.”33 A major casualty of this is citizen-centric democratic governance. If the citizens are treated as population and targets of governance, rather than participatory stakeholders guiding the democratic processes, democracy becomes redundant and citizens’ backlash is built up even against the right kind of intervention.

Conclusion Coalition politics in pre and postelection 2009 has shown that it is the politics of presence that played a predominant role in shaping issues relating to citizenship, federalism, and multiculturalism. Political parties have formed coalitions in contradiction to their professed electoral ideological pronouncements. While in partnership with each other, they nurtured coalitions for patronage rather than articulation

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of their professed political agenda. For example, most of the regional political parties bargained for the ministries of their choice rather than the restructuring of the policies which govern center–state relations.34 The regionalization of the national political parties and nationalization of the regional political parties as reflected in the electoral discourse melts down in the power-sharing coalition matrix. It is not only the economic meltdown, but the political meltdown in the coalition era which should merit the attention of political analysis. It is a coalition of bargaining through which stability of the tenure of government is ensured. The coincidence between ideological flux and dichotomous relationship between populist politics and state politics with an emphasis on privileging presence over representative stakeholding of the regions, social cleavages, and citizens is not accidental through patronage. There are heterogeneous needs which defy any general formula and its solutions are situational, strategic, and historical-specific. How far a coalition of interests and coalition through patronage shall be able to balance the needs to transform entitlements of regions, diversities, and citizens particularly living on the margins into rights is a moot question?

Notes 1. This distinction between politics of representation and politics of presence has been very aptly described by Zoya Hasan who argued that politics of presence blurs the under-representation and the representation of interests of the constituents, specifically vulnerable sections. Zoya Hasan, Constitutional Equality and the Politics of Representation in India (London, Thousand Oaks, CA, and New Delhi: Sage, 2006). 2. E. Sridharan, “Coalition Strategies and The BJP’s Expansion, 1989–2004,” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 43, No. 2, July 2005, pp. 194–221. For 2009, the data was gathered from the Institute for the Development and Communication (IDC) Unit. 3. The distinction between one-party dominance system and one-party system has been described by Rajni Kothari. He noted that one-party dominance system is competitive-party system, but one in which the competing parties play rather dissimilar roles. It consists of a party of consensus and parties of pressure. See for details, Rajni Kothari, “The Congress System in India,” Asian Survey, Vol. 4, No. 12, 1964, pp. 1161–73.

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â•‡ 4. Lok Sabha Elections 1962: Manifesto of The Indian National Congress. â•‡ 5. Lok Sabha Elections 1977: Manifesto of The Indian National Congress. â•‡ 6. Deepak Nayyar, “Economic Development and Political Democracy: Interaction of Economics and Politics in Independent India,” in Niraja Gopal Jayal (ed.), Democracy in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 381. â•‡ 7. The Hindustan Times. 2010. “Cabinet Yes to Tax Punjab”, The Hindustan Times (Chandigarh) January 23. Available online at [email protected] â•‡ 8. Assembly Elections 2007: Manifesto of The Shiromani Akali Dal (Badal). â•‡ 9. Assembly Elections 2007: Manifesto of The DMK. 10. Assembly Elections 2007: Manifesto of The Indian National Congress. 11. Quoted in Michael Parenti, Democracy for the Few (New York: St. Martin Press, 1974), p. 141. 12. Nayyar, “Economic Development and Political Democracy,” p. 381. 13. Lok Sabha Elections 2009: Manifesto of The Indian National Congress. 14. Lok Sabha Elections 2009: Manifesto of The Bhartiya Janata Party. 15. Lok Sabha Elections 1999: Manifesto of The National Democratic Alliance. 16. The BJP in its 1962 election manifesto declared that:

The present Constitution which, by calling the Centre as ‘Union’ and provinces as ‘States’, has recognized a separate and somewhat sovereign status of the constituents, is also a hindrance to national unity. The Bharatiya Jana Sangh will amend the Constitution and declare India a Unitary State, with provision for decentralisation of power to the lowest levels.

The Congress Party manifesto was more explicit on issues relating to national integration and unity in diversity. The issue of center–state relationship did not find any expression in its 1962 manifesto. 17. Lok Sabha Elections 1998: Manifesto of The Shiroman Akali Dal. 18. Staff Correspondent. 1997. “Redefine Centre-State Relations: SAD,” The Hindu (Delhi) March 24. 19. For instance, the Akali Dal in Punjab in its 1973 autonomy resolution and, later in its 1985 memorandum to the Sarkaria Commission, asked for apportionment of financial resources within the framework of command economy. In the 1973 resolution, the Akali Dal demanded, “Complete nationalisation of the trade in food grains and, as such, shall endeavour to nationalize the wholesale trade in food grains through the establishment of state agencies.” It further stated that “the SAD shall try to fix the prices of the agricultural produce on the basis of the returns of the middle class farmers. Such prices would be notified well before the sowing season and only the State governments would be empowered to fix such prices.” However, in its 2007 election manifesto these issues were not raised. 20. For detailed analysis of this aspect, please see Atul Sood, “Deepening Disparities and Divides: Whose Growth is it Anyway,” in Social Watch India (Delhi: Sage, 2007), pp. 89–94.

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21. Partha Chatterjee has very perceptively reflected on Anderson’s categorization of bound and unbound serialities and has observed that for each category of classification any individual can count only as one on zero, never as a fraction, which in turn means that all partial or mixed affiliations to a category are ruled out. For limited purpose, in this chapter these categories have been used with a qualification that the identity perceptions are real and that which of the elements of ethnic identity like caste, religion, language, etc., shall acquire dominant manifestation is history-specific and contextually-based. Partha Chatterjee, The Politics of the Governed (Delhi: Permanent Black, 2006), p. 6. Also, Benedict Anderson, The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, South-East Asia, and the World (London: Verso, 1998). 22. Lok Sabha Elections 1962: Manifesto of The Indian National Congress. 23. Lok Sabha Elections 1977: Manifesto of The Indian National Congress. 24. B.P. Mandal, Report of the Backward Classes Commission (Government of India, 1980), Vol. 1, Chapter XIII, Recommendations, pp. 57–60. 25. “Raj Thackeray booked for his speech,” March 22, 2009. Available online at http://www.rediff.com/election/2009/apr/27slde1-raj-thackeray-attracts-crowdseverywhere.htm. 26. Ketaki Ghoge, “Marathi must for cab drivers,” The Hindustan Times (Chandigarh) January 21, 2010. Subsequently, the Congress government in Maharashtra moderated its statement in response to adverse reactions from north-Indian states. 27. The Congress commits itself to amending the Constitution to establish a Commission for Minority Educational Institutions to provide direct affiliation for minority professional institutions to central universities. Special steps will be taken to spread modern and technical education among women in minority communities particularly. (Lok Sabha Elections 2004: Manifesto of the Indian National Congress. A comprehensive national program for minor irrigation of all lands owned by Dalits and adivasis will be introduced. Landless families will be endowed with some land through the proper implementation of land ceiling and land redistribution legislation. (Ibid.) 28. Lok Sabha Elections 2009: Manifesto of The Indian National Congress. 29. The study indicated that women representatives were assigned the task to look into social engagements such as marriage alliances, information on birth, health, and household activities in the domain of gender segregated roles. See for details, Rainuka Dagar, Authority Systems and Construction of Masculinities (Chandigarh: Institute for Development and Communication, 2008). 30. M. Adil Khan, “Engaged Governance”: A Strategy for Mainstreaming Citizens into the Public Policy Processes (New York: United Nations, 2005), p. 13. 31. M. Adil Khan, Ibid., p. 13. 32. For an elaborate analysis of this aspect, please refer to Chatterjee, The Politics of the Governed. 33. Khan, “Engaged Governance,” pp. 8–9.

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34. In post-2009 elections, DMK, the key ally of the Congress, demanded an increase in its ministerial berths as compared to 2004. It also made a determined pitch for lucrative ministries like Telecom, Information Technology, Surface Transport, and Shipping. On the other hand, Trinamool Congress smoothly bargained for the Ministry of Railways and five Ministers of States. It also demanded the imposition of President’s Rule in West Bengal, in contradiction to the demand of the regional parties for the imposition of Central rule in any state only in extreme circumstances. Anita Katyal, “Allies Bargain Hard for Berths, Karuna to Give Outside Support, DMK, Didi Keep UP on Ties,” The Tribune (Chandigarh) May 22, 2009.

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chapter 4

Region, Representation, and National Cohesion: Public Space in India Jyotirindra Dasgupta

Parliamentary elections in India provide an opportunity for exploring connections between popular preferences and prospects of political coherence at the national level. It is not unusual for national level elections in the country to be preceded by fears of regional concerns and organizations negatively affecting national priorities or even national cohesion. The 15th general election was also expected to significantly increase the importance of regional political organizations and their allies in the national contention for power.1 While predicting the gains of the regional organizations and the losses of their national rivals, the media icons tried to scare the country with ominous inferences. They offered foreboding images of “regional eruption,” “revenge of the regions,” and “provincial pachyderms” out to create “so many little Indias” in a distressingly “fragmented polity” to warn the electorate just in time.2 What was the impending crisis about? Why was the prospect of a “thriving multiplicity” of political parties so dangerous for a country that had clearly sustained many decades of democratic and federal political development?3 What was the record of regions in contributing to this process of democratic becoming in such a multicultural developing country? How should one read the impact of cultural, social, economic, and other differences among the regions in terms of their centrifugal or centripetal consequences on interunit coherence in the larger national public space? How are we supposed to make sense of the burden of theorizing in the discourses on both democracy and nationalism that clearly celebrates cultural homogeneity,

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denying any strong case for multicultural democracies?4 Why should cultural or regional differences impede either democratic or national institutional development? Does democratic choice necessarily accelerate propensities to promote implacable difference, distance, and discord among cultural or regional formations? Or could democratic articulation, representation, and mobilization be pragmatically compatible if not strategically compelling for collaborative gains on interregional or national scale? In other words, are there ways of recognizing some positive consequences of trans-regional enterprise for common political action across lines of cleavage that may be discerned as dividends of difference?5 This chapter examines the relevance and reasonableness of some of the questions mentioned above. I will briefly explore the connections between the concepts of region, regionalism, and their bearing on regional organizations in India. My major intention is to focus on the implications of particularist presumptions regarding the alleged regionalist turn in politics and the centrifugal, i.e., disintegrating anxieties attached to it. In order to read these implications in the context of recent political history, I will analyze the regional claims, their modes of contention, negotiation, collaboration, or confrontation. I will call special attention to a limited set of issues associated with the processes of democratic representation, primarily connected with electoral contestation and organized movements. The basic idea is to indicate the importance of mediating relations and processes that regional representatives normally recognize more in practice than in rhetoric. The compulsion of political processing of regional claims in democratic public space in India offers a number of transformational opportunities.6 I will examine selective regional contexts of such evolving opportunities to show how civic engagement of regional representatives in recent decades has explored such possibilities. The notions of regional identity, affinity, or regionalist ideology, when examined in a dynamic context of political contestation, may reveal unusually diverse implications. It is important to see how frozen notions of regionalist particularism tend to melt under the heat of electoral competition giving way to fluid prospects of unanticipated combinations. What kind of centripetal intimations have

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such combination conveyed to the country? Did they help dispel major apprehensions regarding regionalist danger? A brief discussion of the concepts of region, regionalism, and regionalist particularism is necessary at this stage in order to set the context of our analysis.

Regional Claims and Regionalist Variations Region, as a political category used in recent discussions regarding India, refers to specified areas of assumed collective affinity usually tied to language, culture, or other sources of identification.7 These areas normally, but not necessarily, carry territorial referents. The boundaries of a region, however, may shift, depending on how the collective voices are authorized, articulated, and translated in practice. How the voices emerge and the maps of the regions unfold in history raise complex questions of deliberate initiatives, strategic interactions, and other contextual issues that challenge many essentialist notions of regional core or identity. The notion of an inflexible core of a region is understandably dear to advocates—and feared by opponents—of regionalist ideologues because it serves to recruit and mobilize support favoring their cause. In fact, the participants of the regional cultural communities normally make much less of their collective affinity than what outside observers often imply or ascribe. It is more often the outsider, Indian or otherwise, who tend to impute a more stable form, than what most insiders might recognize.8 A select set of leaders from inside may also help promote cases, causes, or even ideological platforms to make claims on behalf of a larger passive population. Whether that attempt to speak for collectivity, merits justification or not is, of course, another story. When regional leaders seek to convey the impression of representing the voice of their constituent populace, they usually offer a sense of implied authorization.9 In a modern democratic setting, such authorization may be recognizable in electoral processes. Even in a democracy, authorization processes are partial at best, and problematic in many ways. Obviously, the problems of authorization and


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authenticity of regional claims and creeds in nondemocratic contexts are likely to be more serious in view of the capricious scope for misrepresentation of the voices of the community concerned. At this stage, it is important to reiterate that a dynamic view of regional coherence, culture, or identity should imply a flexible idea of group consistent with internal divisions, dissentions, and tensions that may also disturb many cherished lines of boundary. For some multiculturalists such potentially contested foundations and group boundaries may be conceptually uncomfortable.10 However, this notion of shifting centers of groups, often contending with their presumed peripheries, sets the proper context for understanding plural political possibilities that may be associated with the same regional or cultural structure of unity. This will enable us to draw analytical lines to separate narratives of regions from those of regionalism and regionalist leaders. How will these analytical lines of distinction aid our understanding of the contrasting and interacting discourse of regionalism, nationalism, and democracy in contemporary India?

Region, Identity, and Political Affinity Regional divisions in a continental country like India can be enumerated in different ways, including geophysical, historical, linguistic, cultural, or along other dimensions.11 For our purpose, the relevant dimension concerns politically valued markers of identification that may utilize one or more evocative symbols, derived from elastic repertories comprising language, culture, or other sources. There is a growing literature on the emergence of enduring patterns of regional identification associated with considerable political significance that may be traced from the end of the 9th century.12 It has been suggested that by this time the southern part of the country witnessed— initially in the case of the Kannada area—a significant process of vernacularization, leading to crucial transition toward the rise of regional political communication and conviction. The rise of the Kannada language and consequent decline of Sanskrit assured the prospect of regional culture, literature, and political order growing together.13

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Within the span of a few more centuries, roughly similar processes led to impressive strides of regionalization of cultural and political space in proximate areas. Prominent examples were, with some variation in transition, Telugu, Tamil, and Marathi language areas.14 Innovative literary projects promoting regional language or their politically powerful royal sponsors, however, never really assured that their desired boundaries of regional extension or closure necessarily concurred with popular acceptance or support. This is understandable because the expansion of domain or even domination of a language in a territory need not necessarily imply a commensurate extension of identity sentiments. Sharing a language as an efficient means of communication may or may not produce emotional bonds of solidarity. Persuasive studies of Telugu regionalism concerned with pre-modern as well as later periods, for instance, leave little doubt about the lack of necessary linkage between language use and regional identity claims or boundaries.15 Regional histories in other areas of India and elsewhere may offer many persuasive instances that would reject any facile association between language allegiance and political loyalty. The history of Punjabi and Bengali language areas in undivided India, to take selected examples, clearly shows how religious bond can deeply cut into language community. Similarly, the history of the division of Pakistan and formation of Bangladesh can demonstrate how the passionate gain of Bengali language movement could still leave the two Bengals politically separated in the same sub-continent.16 There was no primordial or essential social compulsion, inexorably dictated by religion, language, or culture that could offer convincing explanation of regional closure and its necessary congruence with political perspective or formation. Regions in South Asian history thus can be more reasonably analyzed as being less unitary or coherent, and considerably more contingent compositions of multiple material and contested narratives than what many ideologues and intellectuals normally presume. Insiders of any region know what divides them and how many voices can legitimately contend to speak for them. How many subregional fragments or divisions reaching lower layers may seek to reserve their voices without necessarily letting them aggregate for common cause or action


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is too complex a question to deserve simplistic answers. Such simplistic notions, unfortunately, have tended to play a prominent part in unfairly equating regional claims and regionalist politics with dangerously disintegrative implication and destabilizing enterprise. It is no wonder that even after six decades of inter regional collaboration sustaining the country’s democratic federal governance, India’s Prime Minister Manmohan Singh considered it appropriate to warn the citizens of the evils of factors like “regionalism and linguism.”17 In doing so, he was quoting the warning uttered by Jawaharlal Nehru, the first Prime Minister in the founding moments of Indian democracy. Such negative sentiments were also expressed in campaigns before the 15th general elections. The anxiety concerning regionalism stems from an unfortunate convergence of selective perspectives associated with some cosmopolitan national leaders and many commentators from abroad carrying mixed messages for new nations. In general, nationalist leaders in India, with some exceptions like Nehru, had a hard time ignoring the fact that their support base was regional, moderately trans-regional and in times of overriding collective need, super regional. The Indian National Congress began as a federated platform of regional associations.18 Its subsequent history reads like a narrative of conciliation involving trans-regional institutional construction across lines of divisions and differences based on cultural, social, economic, or other alignments.19 At the same time, there was also a layer of impatient leadership that enjoyed people’s support, but distrusted their emotional discipline or direction, especially as their gaze turned from the center of the urban nation to the rural periphery.20 Leaders like Nehru, tirelessly reminded their colleagues and followers that “ . . . India is more than the little corner of India that we represent” and that the regional views tainted with traces of localism, “parochialism,” or “separatism” tend to disrupt “the larger considerations” of India.21 A rationalist anxiety regarding regionalist threats to the larger interests of the nation pervaded those of elitist calling devoted to mentoring apparently misguided masses.22 The didactic mission of such leaders was blissfully timed to generally coincide with a strong suspicion of regionalism delivered in impressive social scientific packaging from the Western centers of modernity.23

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Relevant academic works on modernization and economic development that dominated the intellectual marketplace during the initial decade of Indian democracy confidently condemned regional claims as signals of danger for civility, integration of nation, democracy, and development. The specter of dark forces jointly driven by poverty and primordiality haunted the Western discourse of modernity addressed to the issues of stability, civility, and immunity from communist infection in the developing countries. Sociologists, anthropologists, economists, journalists, and others intellectual notables were alarmed.24 Many of them were deeply disturbed by the vast scale of “deep-seated centrifugal forces” unleashed by “militant group awareness” in the “uniquely compartmentalized Indian social setting” that could spell disaster.25 They theorized that “regional chauvinism” and other parochial forces would attain greater unity and militancy as “competition for the spoils of a new time of progress … will impart a tenseness … which will be aggravated, in India’s case … by the strength of her ancient and rigid rivalries.”26 Grave misgivings of the early decades, as expressed by Indian elitist leaders and anxious Western scholars proved to be significantly misplaced. The expected “convulsive” derangements or national dissolution did not take place as a result of regional scramble for spoils, either propelled by poverty or compelled by rivalry. In fact, the collaboration of regions in a federated democratic developmental system instead unfolded constructive decades that world history has rarely witnessed. But the contagion of anxiety was not easily arrested, probably due to the trained incapacity of the experts who insisted on using an improper frame of reference that was grossly out of place.27 Highly favored myths in the West predicted vicious circles of poverty, population bombs, growing misery, and rising frustration of mounting expectations. Equally misleading was a widely shared bias of scholars, in regard to developing countries that an erasure of differentiated regional claims should count as a compelling criterion of national consolidation and durability.28 Nearly 50 years later, even when the probable virtues of multicultural nationalism cultivated notably in Canadian soil attained some Western respect, the delayed gaze was scarcely turned to the pluralist precursors in poorer Asia.29


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Region, Representation, and Differentiation in Public Space For a proper understanding of the reason of region in the history of national engagement in India, one may begin with a general analysis of the relational nature of regional structure. When exactly regional social group is perceptibly formed is a matter of internal conjecture or external inference. Unlike associations, such groups are rarely, if ever “explicitly constituted.”30 As one theorist puts it in a general context, “they emerge from the way people interact.”31 For social groups based on perceived cultural similarity in language, for instance, the members come to value expressive facility and communicative efficacy. Relational notion of group implies the possibility of various degrees of social differences within its structure. Members of cultural groups are not always confident about the implication of cultural norms or requirements of belonging. Internal differences are frequently muted but not erased by external interactive practices or compulsions. Emphasis on common elements or shared identity usually tends to exaggerate the importance of the selective voices, interpretations or norms of some prominent members, while marginalizing or muting those of others. Frequently, the conflict among cultural groups is based less on cultural factors than, for example, on rivalry over land, employment, or other resources. Thus, a regional group based on cultural affinity is likely to be composed of complex webs of relationship among members, and in many cases with outsiders. It is not intelligible by a simple analysis of identity, recognition or other comparable political perspectives.32 A relational view of a region, however, will make it immensely difficult to make facile inferences about what political directions, regionalist ideologies, or political actions may follow.33 This is why holistic views that enable observers to attribute to regional collectivities a coherent and undifferentiated totality, seem to be particularly seductive to those who tend to deprecate regionalism as a destructive force. However, the differentiated nature of regional groups and their multiple political possibilities become increasingly transparent when they participate in a public space such as elections. Historically,

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assurance of democratic representation in a federated institutional system in India made a critical difference for the operation of regional groups in many significant ways. For instance, the design of the constitutional system left respectable room for regions.34 Also, rules remained flexible, with respect to relative boundary markers and autonomy provisions, consistent with the logic of systemic coherence.35 More than the rules, it was the long and fortunate lineage of institutional experience of representation that was inherited by the political leaders and actors that made the systemic assurance credible.36 Central leaders, even of Nehru’s stature, could be held accountable by moderate insurgent modes mobilized by regional publics through either their own party or social movements outside.37 The processes of negotiation seeking to enable the participant publics to use the democratic system proceeded considerably beyond the normally expected limits of access implied in voting, interest aggregation, or formal constitutional legal methods included in conventional liberal theory of democracy.38 The pre-independence legacy of the contested public space, offering wide scope for conspicuous representation and organized action beyond the state, was an enviable resource for democratization in India. A long list of social, political, educational, and constructive economic movements highlighted a rare density of organizational networks that strengthened the institutional and procedural culture of democratization many decades before the advent of independence.39 But the transition to freedom and the building of the new political order after 1947 was marked by many disquieting developments. The catastrophic flames of violence accompanying the partition, however, did not consume all the components of democratic lineage, although the developing legacy of the pre-independence civil society suffered a big loss.40 The rush to gain state power to control violence at the time of independence put a premium on national statists like Jawaharlal Nehru. This contingency, unfortunately, relegated the major architects and practitioners of civic resources outside the state like Mahatma Gandhi to a secondary role.41 No wonder when the Congress organization rushed for a secure, though divided, nation after partition, the case for a centralizing bias for stability was significantly privileged with patriotic values.42


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Equally privileged was the norm of national unity for the anxious leaders, who were afraid that populist “heat and passion” would gravely endanger their mission of constructing “an organic nation.”43 These leaders, apparently, never paused to ponder over what exactly entitled them to claim a clearly superior reason of nation and to deprecate the people who allegedly fail to consider “the whole picture” because their “mind is clouded.”44 More specifically, such negative reference was almost always directed to the supporters of regional claims or language rights of citizens. This rhetoric of a pressing national unity, as articulated by the excited new leaders of the federal state, even seemed to question the multicultural and multiregional foundations of their own nationalist movement. Yet, these foundations unmistakably imparted rare strength and general acceptability to the constitutional system across regional and cultural differences. What really made the statist leaders, at the outset of democratic governance, discredit regional claims or voice of dissent? What justified their resentment of the very notion of differentiated bases of unity and national coherence that had served the democratic movements and processes before independence reasonably well? What or who authorized them in the new democratic representation system to assume a privileged role to set the terms of discourse relating to autonomy, unity, and accountability? At the same time, exactly the same questions of representation can also be addressed to the leaders and activists connected with regional claims or regionalist ideologies, as well as movements. What does the democratic representation system offer to the regional individuals, groups, or mobilizing organizations in terms of intra and intergroup interaction processes? What transregional promises do they carry in terms of their implications on national or federal coherence?

Representation, Mediation, and Differentiated Cohesion There are many ways of exploring the issues raised concerning authorization, accountability, autonomy, and differentiation, as opposed to unitary notions of political cohesion. Our selective emphasis on

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representation may enable us to investigate some complex connections among political actors located in public space. For our purpose, the most productive way of analyzing the role of representation in the Indian context would be to consider it as a “differentiated relationship between constituents and representative” where connection and disconnection are issues that demand patient understanding over time and space.45 No easy evaluation of the movements of authorization and accountability is possible, unless one conveniently seeks to rely on some simplistic assumptions regarding a common will of a constituency or its facile transmission, as a mandate to a representative agent or institution. Conventional discussions of the relative autonomy of the representatives with respect to mandate tend to ignore many important issues.46 How mandates evolve, particularly in a developing democracy bearing visible traces of authoritarian past, through participatory and deliberative processes in public space over time, may be more informative than the question of relative location of authority. Major issues in contention or the terms of conflict affecting the deliberative processes may set the context of how a representative can persuade other representatives of the merits of her case. Prudent and flexible persuasiveness rather than an artless pursuit of the mandate is required for reaching just decisions to serve both the norms of authority and accountability.47 This emphasis on process, amenability to amendments, or even transformation through debates and discussions of the original intimation makes the system of representation so important for a democratic politics of difference. If the issue of representing the constituents impels us to recognize the importance of a plurality of voices that need to be organized through a number of mediating processes that may never yield prescripted consequences, then it should prepare us for some additional possibilities of politics of difference. In a vast public space like that of India or even her component regions and subregions, representation is unavoidable for communicating popular voice. But the very multiplicity of cultures, positions in the social and economic structure, interests, ideologies, and affiliations raise the question of how democracy in such a perplexing setting can specially utilize relevant processes of “... pluralizing the modes and sites of representation.”48


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Young calls attention to “three general modes through which a person can be represented: according to interest, opinion, and perspective.”49 Within each mode, again, there may be several ways in which a person may be represented. One can add other aspects to this list. However, these three aspects have the merit of reasonably covering the major problem areas of individual and group representation in a democratic system. The fact that they are logically independent may significantly aid differentiated possibilities of representation.50 It is precisely these kinds of pluralized representational possibilities that remain obliterated in the intellectual or political propensity to criticize or reject regionalist claims and movements after independ-ence in India. For example, alarming pictures of regionalism were based on an unwarranted assumption regarding a rigid sense of collective identity allegedly shared by all the participants in a regional culture. Independent India’s first major regionalist movement demanding the formation of an Andhra state, based on the unity of Telugu language areas within the national federal system, may offer an interesting example of external critics’ denial of differentiation in the regional group.51 This denial extended to the insiders’ relations among themselves and with others located outside the group. The participants or supporters of the Telugu movement widely differed in terms of their economic classes, political ideologies, and perspectives associated with religion, culture, or oppressed status groups like Dalits or tribals. One issue or movement can only reflect a moment of claim in public space, without reference to the internal differences and the external linkages of the Telugu people. The legitimacy of the demand to bring all the Telugu-speaking people, who were divided in a number of administrative areas carved out for colonial convenience, was never seriously challenged by the nationalist leaders. From 1920, the general principle of language-based autonomy was conceded by the Congress organization. During the following decades, and particularly after 1927 when Andhra’s claim for autonomy was endorsed by the Congress organization, there was little compelling drive either for radicalizing the respective regional movement or to mobilize large mass support in its favor. However, the ruling central Congress party leaders after Independence tried to soft-pedal the process of formation of the new Andhra state.52

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Centralist leaders like Nehru, while deprecating the reasonable movement, in fact, supplied it with a new strength. Instead of treating the movement as a subnational threat to unity and stability, the new leaders of the country could easily negotiate with its leaders recognizing that they were indeed authorized to represent a legitimate set of economic, regional, and cultural perspectives. Such a spirit of acknowledgement could enhance the inclusionary appeal of both the national ruling party, as well as the new democratic system. But the statist bias of the centralist leaders encouraged them to ignore the popular autonomy demands. Their arrogance of power, appropriating the exclusive right to speak for the nation, in fact, helped unite the political voices across the heterogeneous components of the Andhra region in an unprecedented manner. The fertile coastal belt and the dry uplands of Rayalaseema were parts of the colonial Madras Presidency province, while Telangana was under the rule of princely state of Hyderabad until 1948. The Telugu speaking people of these three areas were “characterized by cultural discontinuities, economic imbalances, and political rivalries.”53 The dominance of the leaders from the coastal areas over the movement for autonomy reflected their pervasive prominence in the domains of language, economy, and polity. For the Telugu speakers of Telangana, which is the most disadvantaged area of the region, the term “Andhra” evokes substantially less positive passion than it does for the coastal area notables.54 This was evident in the early phase of the movement and more so later when many of them were even prepared to turn separatist and break away from the region. When the coastal leaders and followers appropriated the voice of the dissenters within their region, they were sure that the outsiders, including the national leaders, would conveniently ignore the lines of differentiation. The centralist leaders were, of course, not eager to negotiate a solution until a dramatic event forced them to concede Andhra state. What a democratic movement supported by a wide spectrum of political forces was unable to obtain from some obstinate national leaders, ironically, was accomplished by a Gandhian activist’s fast to death in 1952. It is interesting that Potti Sriramula had a long record of involvement in Gandhian activism including at least four episodes of public fast for what he believed to be pressing issues. Most of them


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were related to struggles for justice for the most disadvantaged caste groups and none related to language issues.55 His death had a major public impact, as well as a tremendous effect on leaders like Nehru in large part because of his well-earned Gandhian credentials. However, his admittedly crucial role also reminds us what the Andhra regionalist movement lacked in terms of large-scale mass mobilization, depth of community involvement, or support across three subregions. The sporadic events of violence that followed his death were, as later investigations seem to have established, probably not integrally related to the regionalist movement.56 The alarming picture of regionalist movements as militant platforms of mass action creating convulsive disorder, as painted by centralist leaders and western scholars, probably appears to be more politically accusatory than empirically persuasive, particularly when the Andhra movement is considered. The fact that the Communist Party supported the Andhra movement raised a note of alarm in many quarters. Again, the outside observers were soon proved wrong. There was an apprehension that the new state of Andhra would witness the major success of the Communist Party in the forthcoming elections. In fact, both in the 1955 mid-term elections for Andhra and in the 1957 elections in the larger Andhra Pradesh (following the inclusion of Telangana in 1956), it was the Congress party that scored a decisive victory.57 Rather than harming the nation, here then was the case of democratically accommodated regionalist claim leading to a consolidation of a national party’s strength in the new state. Moreover, the Congress organization in the state was also able to mobilize extensive support from the cultivating peasant castes after the abolition of the intermediary tenures.58 The Communists had led the struggles for these peasant groups but due to policy success the Congress administration was able to grab the political dividend. These democratic, as well as socioeconomic gains, of the new recognized state, could hardly be anticipated from the assorted negative accounts of regionalism that we have noted before. Probably, the most important positive effect was reflected in the national impact on the reorganization of states that followed. From 1956, following the Report of the States Reorganization Commission, and allowing for the normal hesitation of the national leaders, new adjustment of state boundaries took place on a massive

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scale.59 The effect, in most cases was regionally pleasing and nationally constructive.

The Gifts of Public Space: Dividends of Difference If the Andhra case showed the way to make region and nation go together, it also raised a number of questions pertaining to its future possibilities, and comparability with other Indian cases. The initial success of the Congress party in the new state based on the appeals of language and cultural consolidation obviously needed something more than emotional capital or sentimental solidarity. Emotional mandate needed to be strategically supplemented by durable bases of social and economic sector support from agricultural, industrial, and other influential segments of society. Despite early success in mobilizing support from the cultivating peasant castes, gradually, strategies of balancing castes and classes became increasingly unproductive. The decline of the populist accommodation system scared various support groups including business, the educated middle classes, and the youth.60 If emotions helped the Congress party to win power by the late 1970s, economic interests were poised to pull it down. Moreover, with strong opinion resenting the central Congress and government leadership of Indira Gandhi, and the perspective of the Muslim constituents increasingly turning negative to the ruling leadership of the state, another turning point was about to begin. The crisis of the Congress system in Andhra presented a great opportunity to a charismatic hero of the region’s movie world to play a savior’s role. N.T. Rama Rao (NTR), who played god in Telugu movies, decided to transfer his script to the real world of politics. His TDP scored a dramatic victory in the 1983 legislative assembly elections and registered an impressive presence in the national parliament. His combination of the emotional issues of Telugu community’s dignity and economic welfare of the poorer members of the society, worked well enough to earn him four terms of power.61 NTR’S


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successor, N. Chandrababu Naidu, gaining power in 1995 tried to depart from the populist tradition initiated by the TDP. His preference for liberalization and penchant for global connections eventually cost him dearly. He lost power in 2004 and was unable to restore it in 2009.62 On both occasions, the Congress party scored impressive victories under a leader, Y. Rajasekhar Reddy (YSR), whose ability to reach the poor people set him apart as a model to emulate in any region.63 His accidental death in September 2009 became an occasion of national mourning. The most important theme that cuts across all these different styles and modes of representation of the Andhra regional community is the national sensitivity and connectivity that unmistakably shines through their concern for regional dignity. When NTR talked about Telugu Desam (country), he also mentioned Bharat Desam to show his national concern. Chandrababu Naidu played a critically important national role in a difficult time of coalition problems at the central level. When the 1998 parliamentary elections failed to return a majority for any political party, it was the TDP that played a crucial role to assist democracy at the central level. YSR’s second term in 2009 was marked by a rare prominence among all the Congress Chief Ministers (CMs) because of the striking record of his first term, as well as his impressive contribution to the national Congress leadership in terms of an increase of Lok Sabha seats (33 out of 42) scored in his state. He openly claimed that he was “planning to make Andhra Pradesh the mainstay of the Congress.”64 No wonder, he was also successful in securing a large share of federal resources and “made sure of its effective use.”65 His confident grip on electoral support encouraged him to favor reservation policies for Muslims and Christians that was not exactly expected to excite many leaders of the majority Hindu community.66 All this should tell us something different from what one normally hears about the regionalist propensity to contribute to centrifugal tendencies. YSR’s success in his state and his striking ability to connect the Telugu country with the nation may be largely explained by his eagerness to focus on the politics and economics of positional difference as compared to the politics of cultural difference.67 As argued above, it is an important property of public space that its constant

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encouragement of communication and contestation tends to bring out and publicize the pressing issues of the public role to redress injustice and compensate for lack of capability. Emphasis on culture, frequently forces issues of the underprivileged to retreat. Democratic competition in Andhra offered a signal opportunity to YSR to specially focus on the rural constituents without neglecting the needs of rapid industrial development. His administration succeeded in giving farmers small scale loans at a nominal interest rate, free electricity to farmers for several hours a day, large scale waiver of farmer loans, impressive housing and health insurance projects for low income families and rural areas, pension systems for women, and liberalized public distribution of food and other facilities.68 Major investments in projects connected with justice and development, however, frequently require financial linkages with the federal government. The gains of coordination on this front may not be unimportant for centripetal engagement and federal coherence.

Regional Springs and Centripetal Sentiments I am using the term centripetal to designate a number of tendencies to move inward within the national public space, and not necessarily to a limited process of inclining toward or relating to the central government in India. One can think of a wider notion of centers that hold together, progressively more extensive entities, like a constitutional order, a political system including civil society, or a composite pluralized national culture of cosmopolitan orientation. The context of my actual political reference will make the specific implications clear. There is no normative intention here to privilege the notion of the center. Neither is there an assumption that centripetal engagements have to be consciously intended by the units in the unity, as for example, the states in the Indian federation. In fact, I am especially interested in the cases of unintended contribution to centripetal sentiments or engagements, on the part of units like regions, subregions, or other fragments.


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While YSR succeeded in cultivating the central leaders’ and government’s affection, his hard line against the disaffected leaders of the Telangana subregion of his own state might have posed a somewhat disturbing question. Time and again, the demand for a separate state for Telangana, based on a shifting combination of grievances has been expressed as a strong representation of resentment against the ruling leaders of the region. At times, the anger is directed to the coastal leaders and notables. On other occasions, like more recent ones, the target is mainly the party in power. The participants in the movement make use of political association for cultural education, and party organizations of moderate as well as radical ideological persuasion.69 For electoral purposes, their recent taste for alliance has included eclectic party assortments that seem to care more for power than principle. But, the 2009 elections disappointed both the separatist TRS and its allies.70 Once again, the representative claims of speaking for the constituents did not electorally authorize the disaffected cultural community. On the other hand, if the TRS and its allies can gain the mandate of the community to proceed to a negotiated statehood, it would nevertheless become a part of the national federal system. In fact, a good part of the craving for separation from a region is frequently motivated by a desire for direct access by a group to a federal club of wealth and power. India’s constitutional system can be used by separatist groups to seek revised boundaries by utilizing popular votes, as well as movements for peaceful representation in public space.71 However, when separatist groups are less secure about their mass support they understandably turn to coercive tactics. Separatism is a misunderstood term. Most of the regional movements to reorganize boundaries after independence were constructive attempts to correct an old colonial practice serving imperialist objectives. Carving, large states based on a reasonable cultural collectivity, as in the cases of Maharashtra or Gujarat for example, involved delay mainly due to the intransigence of the central leadership. The mass movements that led to the formation of these states were actually supported by almost all the national parties of different ideological colors. The success of these collaborative popular movements, that also energized significant segments of cultural associations, imparted

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a necessary element of strength to the developing democratic system. If these are cases of system-compliant separatism, there are also some system-defiant cases that merit closer attention.72 In fact, it is the latter that dominate the negative literature on regionalism to the almost total neglect of the compliant variants. Some movements begin with a hard line of defiance only to change to moderate tracks when wider appeal demands more representative connections with the constituent publics. Thus, the Dravidian movement that began with a secessionist voice of the Dakshina Kazhagam (DK), even before independence, gradually gave way to popular campaigns under the leadership of the DMK that tremendously enriched the public space in southern India.73 The DK’s dream of a common Dravidian regional community did not materialize. However, its more democratic successors, in the form of DMK and AIADMK, have contributed many stable institutional contributions to the public space in Tamil Nadu that can be counted as much more than a regional political resource.74 On more than one occasion, the DMK has rendered critical assistance to national governmental stability proving that regions may often nurture the nation better than its own guardians of “larger interest.”75 In the 2009 survey of overall accomplishments in social, economic, and other developments in the 20 largest states, Tamil Nadu is ranked third and among the large southern states, it is ranked number one.76 Such records also suggest a long story of coordination between the region and the nation, despite all the differences and tensions between the two respective governments. A state like Punjab, with a memory of violent system-defiance from 1980–93 and a long lineage of regional movements for autonomy, nevertheless, consistently maintains the top position in the list of large states published for the last seven years, as of 2009.77 In most economic lists going back to at least 1950s, the rank was not very different. How does a region with a political reputation for insurgent turmoil, deliver such enviable resources for the nation? Unlike some other states suffering from a high incidence of violence, however, Punjab with its relatively small size has earned a disproportionately prominent share of national role and leadership in food production, defense of the country, eminence in sports, movies, and popular music. With


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only 1.5 percent of the land of India, by 2009 this state takes care of 40 percent of rice and more than 40 percent of wheat procured by public agencies for the country. But the central government “decides on its own prices of agricultural products …” leaving no choice to the states.78 The increasing land and water constraints of Punjab agriculture calls for better responsiveness from the national leaders at the center. The interdependence between the center and the state in this case is critical. A legitimate confidence of having an eminent place in the country was probably an important reason why the people of Punjab were able to overcome one of the most explosive episodes of militant insurgency in the world in their state. After 1947, the Sikh community comprised 33 percent of new Punjab’s population. A language movement for Punjabi speakers’ autonomy helped reconstitute a Punjab with a 61 percent Sikh and 37 percent Hindu population in 1966.79 This composition provided a springboard for a separatist movement based on Sikh religious identity. However, a public space puts a premium on exposure of differentiation within and among communities. Democratic communication involved in electoral contestation encourages strategic fashioning of connections cutting across caste, class, occupation, and other categoric divisions. The Akali Dal, speaking for the Sikh religious community was unsure about its credential to represent it because the Dal could at best claim the mandate of the upper caste Jat Sikhs, but not of the non-Jat Sikh lower caste groups.80 Even that mandate was clouded, particularly in the 1980s, by internal factional and doctrinal struggles.81 The lower caste and deviant sect Sikhs, had apparently more to gain from secular inclusionary political aggregations across the lines held sacred by the separatists concerned with panthic (Sikh religious community) purity. No wonder, the inclusionary secular banner of the Congress party, as well as its taste for taking advantage of factionalism on the other side, helped it win the highest percentage of votes in all of the five state assembly elections before 1985.82 What the separatists lost in the open test of representation in public space became replaced by sophisticated firepower. A vicious circle of violence engulfed Punjab following federal military action

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in 1984. However, it did not turn out to be a simple federal versus Sikh or bipolar ethnic battle. It became a three-way struggle among the moderate Akali, armed Separatists, and Congress party leaders at state and federal levels, whose manipulative games did not always accord with their professed secular principles. For over a decade violence claimed thousands of civilian lives.83 Militant brutality was confronted with large scale military and police mobilization. Extensive Sikh participation in the federal and state-level armed action prevented the impression of religious war that the secessionists eagerly wanted to convey to the world.84 In fact, it has been suggested that “…the creation of the elite Punjab police commandos helped channel a sense of Sikh nationalism and pride back into service for the state instead of into the insurgent movement.”85 By 1992, the voice of the public space was resumed; vertical differences caught up and cut through the veil of religious solidarity. Democratic competition among parties and productive linkages with the federal system returned. Both the Akali Dal and the Congress party remained active on the scene. Following the 2009 elections, the Akali Dal remained in power at the state level but the Congress won eight out of the 13 Lok Sabha seats. The renewal of the public space seems to have encouraged the expressive freedom of those underprivileged groups whose voices were marginalized by the combative issues of religious war (dharma yudh), Sikh separatism or secessionism. A militant privileging of such issues tend to suppress the structural or positional inequalities suffered by the lower caste, class, gender, or other deprived segments within the holistic identity category called the Sikh community. Lower caste Sikh groups have increasingly organized themselves around religious institutions called deras offering their own gurdwaras for religious services.86 Most of the major villages in Punjab now have two gurdwaras, one for upper caste Jat Sikhs and another for lower caste Sikhs. The Vienna episode in May 2009, when two dera leaders were killed, created extensive and violent reactions from dera followers in Punjab to the extent that the army had to be deployed in several cities.87 In fact, several dera episodes in recent times have shown how the lower caste Sikhs are becoming aware and organized, to affirm their dignity and power of numbers in the public space.


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One report is aptly indicative: “… come election time, leaders of all political parties flock to dera chiefs for committed vote banks.”88 This is one indication of how the democratic politics of difference promoted by open interactions in public space can challenge unwarranted claims of group, community, or regional solidarity. As we have seen before, both the leaders of identity communities, or observers from outside, tend to exaggerate the inflexible rigidity of the composition and the structure of such groups. To know how participants in places of worship—even in egalitarian religions—can be stratified, is to realize how calls for religious wars may not be equally evocative for all strata of members of an identity community. This will also indicate who will go for a politics of difference and who will call for its obliteration.

Conclusion The logic of representation in open public space clearly brings out the issue of relative legitimacy of those who claim to speak for their own people. By focusing on mediation in practice, we come to know how even democratic representation can consistently misuse mandates. This is why our attention to the movements and oppositional civil societies allowed us, as in the case of Andhra Pradesh, to go beyond conventional liberal theory. The transformative effect of democratic interaction both in public space and through connections among regions in the federal governmental system has enabled a story of interregional collaboration, as for example, in the YSR case that was sadly unanticipated in the grossly negative picture of regionalism offered in the 1950s. However, even the most careful account of regional politics may fairly raise some issues that are not easy to answer. How should regionalists deal with subregional or even smaller unit demands for autonomy and justice? From Andhra to Jharkhand, why do the poorest agricultural workers get so deeply disaffected? What degree of discontent may force lower caste and class into desperate transition from democratic to violent insurgency? Armed Dalit and tribal groups led by Maoist militants have challenged regional governments of Congress,

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Communist, and other persuasions.89 Regional governments now need much more than their own resources to counter the armed rebels. The new contingency calls for wider interstate collaboration, as well as deeper attention to the issues of equity and mobility. On a different level, state–center collaboration to counter ethnic violence has been frequently used in cases discussed above, and also notably in the northeastern and other areas. It is not difficult to see that a system of differentiated cohesion, linking different regional interests, opinions, and perspectives together seems to have worked reasonably well. Democratic representation has enabled processes and institutions to acknowledge the importance of respecting and not erasing differences. Extensive networks of education, communication, arts, and entertainment have contributed to the socialization of many Indians to appreciate the values of dwelling together in a context of multiple cultures. A child in an Indian school knows how to be appreciative of region and nation at the same time.90 As of 2009, most of the large states historically associated with regional movements have also been top performers in terms of composite indices of development.91 Small states, such as Mizoram and Nagaland, with a history of militant regionalism, score close to those of larger states in the top 10 grouping. The 2009 General Elections helped dispel many apprehensions concerning “regional eruption.” The results ensured a reasonable mandate for a national party and its regional allies. Congress party and its allies won 261 out of 543 seats, a gain of 44 over the tally for 2004.92 The incumbent government was reelected. Voters in the regions favored the national alliance over strictly regional parties and another alliance led by a largely region-based party (BJP). Six months later, the Congress party and its regional ally confidently won a consecutive third term in the Assembly elections in Maharashtra and gained power also in two other states. The victory in Maharashtra was particularly reassuring for the Congress party. It got many more seats in 2009, 82 compared to its 69 seats in 2004, and the strident regionalist party, Shiv Sena, suffered a big loss, 44 seats compared to 62 in 2004. The BJP, Shiv Sena’s ally, also performed poorly, 46 seats against 54 in 2004.93 Democratic representation has not failed to promote a system in India that is at the same time regionally pleasing and nationally coherent.


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Notes â•‡ 1. See the “Cover Story: Opinion Poll,” reporting the results of a survey commissioned by India Today, April 13, 2009, pp. 22–31, esp. p. 25 (Indian edition). â•‡ 2. Prabhu Chawla, “The Great Prime Minister Bazaar,” Opinion Poll essay, India Today, Ibid., p. 21. â•‡ 3. See Ibid., p. 21. â•‡ 4. For a good discussion of how important theorists contributed to such bias in the fields of representative democracy and nationalism ranging from John Stuart Mill to Ernest Gellner see, for example, Alfred Stepan, “Modern Multinational Democracies: Transcending a Gellnerian Oxymoron,” in John A. Hall (ed.), The State of the Nation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), esp. pp. 219–23. â•‡ 5. The literature on the politics of difference and its implication on multicultural political systems is vast and growing. For a balanced treatment, see Iris Marion Young, “Structural Injustice and the Politics of Difference,” in Anthony Simon Laden and David Owen, (eds.), Multiculturalism and Political Theory (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), pp. 60–88. â•‡ 6. The notion of public space as a field of promise for processing claims in multicultural contexts is discussed in, for e.g., Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 18–22. â•‡ 7. For a general discussion of relevant concepts and historical analysis see Paul Wallace (ed.), Region and Nation in India (New Delhi: Oxford and IBH Publishing, 1985), esp. chapter 12, Ramashray Roy, “Region and Nation: A Heretical View,” pp. 269–86. â•‡ 8. For a discussion of distinction between the viewpoints of the observer and the participant that has aided our analysis, Benhabib, The Claims of Culture, p. 5. â•‡ 9. The concept of authorization in the context of issues of representation is elaborated in Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 128 ff. Her analysis builds on Hanna Pitkin’s classic, The Concepts of Representation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1971). 10. See, for example, Seyla Benhabib’s critique of Will Kymlicka’s “holistic” notion of societal cultures in The Claims of Culture, op. cit., pp. 59–61. For Kymlicka’s concept of societal cultures see his Multicultural Citizenship (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995), p. 76. 11. See Chandra Pal Singh (ed.), Readings in Political Geography (New Delhi: Heritage Publishers, 1994). 12. Probably, the best account and analysis of this period and later with reference to the emergence of regional cultural and political processes is Sheldon Pollock, The Language of the Gods in the World of Men, Sanskrit Culture, and Power in Premodern India (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006), esp. pp. 330ff.

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13. Ibid., p. 337. 14. Ibid., p. 380–410 and passim. 15. A critical study offering insightful analysis of language and identity in the relevant phases of the Telugu language and regional development is contained in Lisa Mitchell, Language, Emotion, and Politics in South India (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), esp. pp. 45–49. 16. In fact, the story is more complex. The reference is to the Partition of India in 1947 when the larger part of Punjab became part of Pakistan and the other remained in India. Bengal’s larger part became East Pakistan in 1947 and the other part remained in India. In 1971, the Bengali speakers of Pakistan seceded to form the state of Bangladesh. Across the border, however, the political identification of Bengali speakers in India did not change since 1947. For a brief background of the 1947 partition, see Judith M. Brown, Modern India, The Origins of Indian Democracy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 331ff. For the 1971 partition of Pakistan, see Jyotirindra Dasgupta, “Language, National Unity, and Shared Development in South Asia,” in William R. Beer and James E. Jacob (eds.), Language Policy and National Unity, (Totowa, N. J.: Rowman and Allanheld, 1985), pp. 201–05. 17. See The Forty-third Report of the Commission of Linguistic Minorities in India. (New Delhi: Government of India, 2006). Available online at: http://nelm.nic. in/shred/linkimages/36.report%20english, (last date of access: August 26, 2009, p. 20). 18. See B.B. Majumdar and B.P. Majumdar, Congress and Congressmen in the Pre-Gandhian Era, 1885–1917 (Calcutta: Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1967), pp. 5, 44–45, and passim. 19. For details, see Bipan Chandra, India’s Struggle for Independence (New Delhi: Penguin, 1989), pp. 75 and passim. 20. A concise description of perspective variations is offered by T.N. Madan, “Linguistic Diversity and National Unity: Dimensions of a Debate,” in C.H. Hanumanthan Rao and P.C. Joshi (eds.), Reflections on Economic Development and Social Change (New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1979), esp. pp. 395–99. 21. See Lok Sabha Debates on the Report of the States Reorganization Commission (14th December–23rd December, 1955), Vol. 1 (New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat, February 1956), p. 864. 22. The rationalism component, its link with faith in science, and deep resentment of “pre-rational” political issues such as language, as parts of Nehru’s “almost theological” “passionate conviction” are discussed in Robert D. King, Nehru and the Language Politics of India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp.168–71. 23. Many of the influential works were the products of American investment in research on new nations, their vulnerabilities, and their prospects in terms of contribution to world order and susceptibility to communist control. Scholars from other settings also did their share but probably with less enchantment with the cold war issues.


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24. For example, Edward Shils, “Primordial, Personal, Sacred and Civil Ties,” British Journal of Sociology, June 1957, pp.130–45; Clifford Geertz, “The Integrative Revolution, Primordial Sentiments and Civil Politics in the New States,” in his edited volume Old Societies and New States (Glencoe: Free Press, 1963), esp. p. 109; Selig S. Harrison, India, The Most Dangerous Decades (Madras: Oxford University Press, 1960), Indian edition, pp. 3–5, passim. 25. Selig S. Harrison, Ibid., pp. 5–6. 26. Ibid., pp. 5–7 and passim. 27. See Harold A. Gould, “On the Apperception of Doom in Indian Political Analysis,” in Paul Wallace (ed.), Region and Nation in India, op.cit., pp. 287–99. Regarding the problems of incompatible frame of reference, see Richard Rorty, Achieving Our Country (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1998), p. 29. 28. The homogenizing bias is discussed in Charles Taylor, “Nationalism and Modernity,” in J. A. Hall (ed.), The State of the Nation, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), pp. 191–218. 29. For example, probably the most cited work in this area of multiculturalism by Kymlicka. See (Kymlicka 1995) cited earlier in note 10, contains only one entry in the text. Other works of more recent period are not very different. See the 2007 publication, Multiculturalism and Political Theory, cited in note 5. 30. Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 90. 31. Ibid., p. 90. 32. Ibid., pp. 90–108 for a useful and innovative analysis of some of the ideas discussed here and also a relevant critique of literature including a concise appraisal of Charles Taylor’s theory of the politics of recognition. See also Patchen Markell, Bound by Recognition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), esp. pp. 154–76. 33. This is because, following Young, in this view, a regional collectivity is likely to include different interpretations or even notions of regional culture, networks of position, powers, privileges, and subregional variations. See Young, Inclusion and Democracy, esp. pp. 90–91. 34. See J. Dasgupta, “India’s Federal Design and Multicultural National Construction,” in Atul Kohli (ed.), The Success of India’s Democracy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 49–77. 35. Ibid., p. 58 for a discussion of the relevant provisions of the Constitution of India. 36. Ibid., pp. 50–51. 37. Insurgent democracy refers to an expanded role of democratic action, and corresponding theoretical analysis, that can challenge the established power structures and go considerably beyond legalistic limits of liberal theory. It respects the oppositional components of civil society. See John S. Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), esp. pp. 2, 85, and passim. 38. See Ibid., for an analysis of the limits of liberal notions of democracy, esp. pp. 9–30.

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39. For a concise account of movements, associations, organizations, and other resources extending to various fields allied to the INC and other political organizations before independence see, for example, Bipan Chandra, India’s Struggle for Independence, 1857–1947 (New Delhi: Penguin, 1989). This is a useful survey including valuable sections on constructive work with interesting civil and political implications described, for instance, in pp. 245–46, 512, and passim. 40. For a brief history of the partition, see Mushirul Hasan (ed.), India’s Partition: Process, Strategy, and Mobilization (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994), pp. 1–43. 41. By national statists, I refer to leaders with relatively higher preferences for the authority of the modern state and its association with the notions of rationalism, science, and central planning as revealed, for example, in the writings, speeches, and actions of Nehru. See, for instance, Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches, Vol. 3, March 1953–August 1957, (New Delhi: The Publications Division, Government of India, 1958), esp. pp. 56–89, 137–144. 42. The role of leaders like Nehru in rushing for power, even at the cost of a catastrophic partition has been debated for a long time. A renewed media debate over Jaswant Singh’s new work may offer some interesting observations. See, for instance, Ayesha Jalal, “Masters of Mutilation,” (pp. 34–36), and M.G.S. Narayanan, “The Third Accused,” (pp. 37–39) in India Today, August 31, 2009. It is interesting that Singh (former BJP senior leader and minister), his work, and expulsion became post-election issues in 2009. 43. See Jawaharlal Nehru’s Speeches, Vol. 1, September 1946–May 1949, (New Delhi: The Publications Division, Government of India, 1949), pp. 36, 39, 41. For example, note his notion that many “clouded” minds missing the “long perspective” may impair the task of “building up an organic nation.” 44. Ibid., p. 36. 45. Young, Inclusion and Democracy, p. 129. Her careful conceptualization, and especially, sensitivity to the role of representation in multicultural contexts makes her work particularly valuable for analyzing the politics of difference in India. 46. For an interesting analysis of some relevant issues and recent literature see Andrew W. Rehfeld, “Representation Rethought: On Trustees, Delegates, and Gyroscopes in the study of Political Representation and Democracy,” American Political Science Review, Vol.103, No.2, May 2009, pp. 214–230, esp. pp. 215–16. 47. Iris Marion Young, Inclusion and Democracy, op.cit., p. 131. 48. Ibid., pp.133–134 for a general theoretical analysis with practical implications for a wide range of democratic countries. 49. Ibid., p. 133. 50. Ibid., p. 140. 51. For an excellent analysis of differences within the Andhra region, see Mitchell, Language, Emotion, and Politics in South India, pp. 39ff. 52. For the reorganization process, see Bipan Chandra, India After Independence (New Delhi: Viking, 1999), pp. 98–130.


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53. G. Ram Reddy, “The Politics of Accommodation: Caste, Class, and Dominance in Andhra Pradesh,” in Francine R. Frankel and M.S.A. Rao (eds), Dominance and State Power in Modern India, Vol.1, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), p. 266. 54. See Mitchell, Language, Emotion, and Politics in South India, pp. 42–48 for a perceptive treatment of why the Andhra region and Telugu Language need not be considered as necessarily co-extensive (esp. p. 47). 55. For details see Ibid., p. 205; also King, Nehru and the Language Politics of India, p. 112. 56. See Lisa Mitchell, Language, Emotion, and Politics in South India, op.cit., p. 205ff. 57. See Reddy, “The Politics of Accommodation,” p. 280. The reference is to Legislative Assembly elections. 58. Ibid., p. 281. 59. See the Report of the States Reorganization Commission, 1955, Government of India, (Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1955); and for an account of the modifications of the Indian map, King, Nehru and the Language Politics of India, p. 120ff. 60. Reddy, “The Politics of Accommodation,” p. 287. 61. For a brief account see Paranjoy Guha Thakurta and Shankar Raghuraman, A Time of Coalitions, (New Delhi: Sage, 2004), pp. 221ff. 62. See Karli Srinivasulu, “Political Articulation and Policy Discourse in the 2004 Elections in Andhra Pradesh,” in Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace (eds), India’s 2004 Eelections (New Delhi; Sage, 2007), pp. 180–205. 63. Sreenivas Janyala, “A Village in Mourning,” Indian Express (North American Edition), September 11, 2009, pp. 7–8. See also Amarnath K. Menon, “The Man of Action,” India Today, (Indian edition), September 14, 2009, pp. 44–46. 64. Menon, “The Man of Action,” p. 45. 65. Ibid., p. 45. 66. The reference is to his case for 4 Percent reservation for Muslims and Christians among Dalits respectively. His own Christian background, probably, did not make such choices politically easy. See Ibid., p. 45. 67. See Iris Marion Young’s insightful distinctions of types of difference in her “Structural Injustice and the Politics of Difference,” in Laden and Owen (eds), Multiculturalism and Political Theory,” pp. 64ff. 68. For details see S. Janyala, “A Village in Mourning,” Indian Express, September 11, 2009, p. 8.; and Amarnath K. Menon, “The Man of Action,” India Today, September 14, op.cit., p. 45, and “The Second Coming,” India Today, May 25, 2009, pp. 34–38. 69. See Karli Srinivasulu, “Political Articulation and Policy Discourse in the 2004 Elections in Andhra Pradesh,,” in India’s 2004 Elections, pp. 194–195 and 204; also in the same book see Ramashray Roy, “The Text and Context of the 2004 Lok Sabha Elections in India,” esp. p. 32 for a story about the formation of the

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Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS), narrating how a former TDP leader, K.C. Rao (KCR), quit the party because he was denied a cabinet position and formed the TSR in 2001; pp. 23 and 32. 70. In the Andhra Pradesh Assembly elections of 2009, the TRS won (out of 294) 10 seats (compared to its 26 in 2004), Menon, “The Second Coming,” p. 34. 71. See, for example, a discussion of the relevant reorganizing powers in Durga Das Basu, Introduction to the Constitution of India, 19th edition, reprint 2007, (New Delhi: Wadhwa, 2007), pp. 70–73. 72. By system-compliance, I mean that the object of reference is much wider than the bureaucratic state. Similarly, system-defiance may go to the extent of challenging the entire political system and not just its state or government components. 73. For the early phase see Arun Swamy, “Parties, Political Identities and the Absence of Mass Political Violence in South India,” in Amrita Basu and Atul Kohli, (eds)., Community Conflicts and the State in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), p. 114. 74. See Ibid., pp.146–147; especially notable is the record of the two-party competitive process “for 70 years” including the pre-independence phase, p. 147. 75. The reference is to the role played in the late 1960s and 1999 to maintain stability. 76. See Shankar Aiyar, “India’s Best and Worst States,” and “State of the States,” special number, India Today, (Indian edition), September 28, 2009, pp. 22 and 35. 77. Ibid., p. 21. 78. Ibid., September 28, 2009, p.49; statement by Chief Minister Prakash Singh Badal. He might as well remind his audience that Punjab’s agricultural yield of 4,017 kg per hectare compares rather well with Maharashtra’s of 940 kg per hectare, “India in Numbers,” Ibid., p. 44. 79. See Chandra, India After Independence, pp. 325–328. 80. How the caste system affects different religious communities including the Sikhs in Punjab is analyzed in a contemporary empirical report in Paramjit S. Judge and Gurpreet Bal, “Understanding the Paradox of Changes Among Dalits in Punjab,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIII, No. 41, October 11, 2008, pp. 49–55. Dalits account for nearly 29 percent of the population of Punjab. 81. For an account of Akali factionalism, see Jugdep S. Chima, “ Back to the future in 2002? A model of Sikh Separatism in Punjab,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol. 25, No. 1, January–February 2002, esp., pp. 27ff. 82. See Paul Wallace, “Religious and Ethnic Politics: Political Mobilization in Punjab,” in Frankel and Rao (eds)., Dominance, Vol. 2, pp. 416–81. 83. See B. Chandra, India After Independence, op. cit., pp. 328–38 for details. This work notes that of the nearly 12,000 people killed by the militants during 1981–93, “more than 61 percent were Sikhs.” p. 338. 84. For details of Sikh participation in Punjab’s anti-insurgency operation, see Jugdep S. Chima, “Controlling the Sunni Insurgency in Iraq: ‘Political’ and ‘Military’


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Strategies from Successful Counterinsurgency in Punjab, India,” Small Wars and Insurgencies, Vol.18, No. 4, December 2007, pp. 615–37. 85. Ibid., p. 630. 86. See Judge and Bal, “ Understanding the Paradox of Changes Among Dalits in Punjab,” p. 52 for a description of different kinds of gurdwaras in contemporary Punjab. 87. For accounts of firing in a Vienna dera and its impact in different parts of Punjab immediately after, see Vipin Pubby, “Firing in Vienna, Fires in Punjab,” Indian Express, (North American Edition), June 5, 2009, p. 7. There is also a report of violent mass reactions on the same page. The particular dera connected with the leaders killed was Dera Sachkhand. 88. Ibid., p.7. 89. See Abhijit Dasgupta, “The Last Gasps,” and M. G. Radhakrishnan, “The Lost Slogan” in India Today, November 2, 2009, pp. 19–25. 90. See Veronique Benei, Schooling Passions (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008), pp. 80–82. 91. See Shankar Aiyar, in India Today, September 23, 2009, p. 21. Out of 21 large states, nine out of the top 10, to be precise. 92. Prabhu Chawla, “The Comeback Couple,” India Today, May 25, 2009, pp. 19–23. 93. Swati Mathur, Jhilmil Motihar and Malini Bhupta, “The Third Coming,” India Today, November 2, 2009, pp. 32–35.

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chapter 5

Federalism, Party System, and Structural Changes in India Maneesha Roy

No political arrangement, even if it is sanctioned by a constitution, remains unchanged over time. It is generally expected that the constitution shapes political processes and events without being affected by the changing character of politics. And yet the fact remains that political processes and events also have a great impact on how political institutional arrangements work and change over time. This is also true of India where a dominant party administered the federal constitution in the initial years of the functioning of the Indian Constitution. However, changes have gradually occurred to adversely affect the destiny of the Congress party, a party that enjoyed unchallenged dominance since the days of the freedom movement. With the decline in Congress dominance, the federal arrangement has also undergone some vital changes. Coalition politics has now become the dominant pattern in Indian politics, especially at the national level. India’s 2009 parliamentary elections highlight the continuance of coalition politics. For over a decade, no single party has been able to gain an electoral majority, nor does it seem likely that coalition politics will cease to operate in the foreseeable future. Indian politics has undergone a three-phase evolution in the last six decades. Starting with a one-party dominance system, it saw the rise of an incipient two-party competition, which gave way subsequently to a multiparty system, making coalition governments at the center necessary. Given the fact that the Indian Constitution provides for a very strong union government, the structural changes overtaking

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politics in India has meant the rise of state leaders as important players in the game of politics at the national level. This has further meant a disjunction between state election outcomes and national election results. This situation has certain ramifications for the working of the federal principle and the distribution of power and influence between the union and the states. It also has certain consequences for coalition formation and the working of coalition government. This chapter explores some important aspects of the question of the relationship between the federal structure of Indian politics and coalition politics.

Federalism: Background No system of governance can be properly understood without a reference to the socioeconomic and political context in which it was born and consolidated. India’s rise as a free nation following the 1947 transfer of power is thus historically conditioned and textured. While explaining its distinctive features, one is inexorably drawn to her immediate colonial past. Not merely the colonial structure that arose after independence, but the path of development that India preferred, was largely the outcome of a dialectical interaction between the political system and the socioeconomic milieu; this had a direct bearing on the growth of the nation-state. Given the complex and peculiar circumstances in which the nation became independent in 1947, it is not difficult to grasp the arguments defending a centralized government. It is also obvious that in view of India’s well-entrenched multicultural character, federalism was considered to be the best possible structure. The 1950 Constitution of India represents two contradictory tendencies. While the Constitution retained the centralized structure, there was also a diametrically opposite tendency, which sought to justify federal governance as integral to India’s multicultural character. The net result was the articulation of a semi-hegemonic federal structure that drew largely upon the 1935 Government of India Act, even as the federal system that supported centralization of power appeared to be the most suitable alternative for nation-building. However, the

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situation changed radically following the articulation of new demands by hitherto peripheral sociopolitical groups. The Indian federal system has been dynamic in accommodating political and societal changes and keeping the country together since its constitutional blueprint was drawn in 1950. However, there has been a fundamental transformation of the operative principles of federalism since the 1990s. The rhythm and the beat of the political system, and the federal system within it, have changed on account of a variety of socio-economic and political factors. However, this is primarily due to the disarray of the party system, neo-liberal economic policies, and judicial decisions. The centralizing thrust of the earlier years has yielded to some kind of a “confederal” operation of the political system, making the formulation and implementation of public policies a “consociational” exercise between political elites at the two levels of government, central and provincial. However, with the passage of time, a third level has now emerged. It consists of local institutions of self-governance, now constitutionally entrenched and waiting in the wings. My attempt in this chapter is to trace the trajectory of the Indian federal system and to grasp the processes that contributed to its metamorphosis.

Historical Background During the British rule of nearly 200 years, a strong colonial authority at the center contained conflicts among regional kingdoms on the subcontinent. The British rulers, as well as Indian elites considered the federal system necessary when the transfer of power became inevitable in 1947. Even before the 1950 Constitution was made, the British Raj had already attempted a federal experiment under the government of India Act, 1935. However, this experiment remained abortive at the federal level due to the reluctance of the princely states to join the proposed union. Thus, only the provincial component of the 1935 Act was implemented, while the central government still worked under the 1919 Act. The pre-1935 British Raj was a unitary system of administration. Thus the center preceded the units in the case of the British Indian provinces. But the notionally independent princely states under the


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paramountcy of the British crown preceded the Federation. At the time of Independence, the princely states were given the right to selfdetermination whereby they could opt to remain independent or join one of the two newly created states of India and Pakistan. However, the right of self-determination was modified to the extent that various pressures forced them to accede to either India or Pakistan. By and large, the institutions established at the center influenced the institutions established in the states. The choice of parliamentary federal constitution for India is thus determined by the historical experience of the country. It is frequently said that India suffered from foreign aggression and colonization due to the weakness of the central authority. Hence, a strong parliamentary center was considered necessary, but at the same time, India’s unity in diversity also demanded a reasonable allowance for federal mode of integration with regional autonomy.

The Federal Architecture Both the Indian Constitution and the political system were traditionally described as “quasi-federal,”1 emphasizing centralization to the extent that it signified the possible withering away of federalism. This interpretation was based on the federal design in the Constitution that provided for: (a) single citizenship, (b) an extensive Union and Concurrent List, (c) power of the Parliament to reorganize state boundaries, (d ) a common integrated hierarchy of courts, (e) a unique cadre of All-India Services, ( f ) a federal second chamber formed on the basis of a state’s population rather than equality of states qua states, ( g) a centrally appointed Planning Commission as the creature of the Union executive, and (h) the early predominance of the INC both at the Union and the State levels. However, over the years, particularly since the 1990s, the Indian political system has significantly moved toward greater federalization. The Constitution is primarily federal, and federalism is not merely an inconsequential appendage. This is so, not only for the essentially plural and federal character of Indian society, but also because of the nature of the constitutional text. Despite overriding powers of the Union over the state governments in normal and emergency

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situations, the powers of the federated states are derived from a written constitution, the lengthiest in the world, which is subject to final interpretation by the federal judiciary. Indications of the growing federalization of the polity and the economy are evident both in the civil society and the state. The transformation of the Indian party system to a regionalized multiparty configuration, as Douglas Verney points out, has encouraged the transition of the Indian political system from a “quasi-federation” to “quasi-confederacy.”2

The Federal Arrangement in India: The Initial Decades Indian politics in the first two decades after the gaining of independence in 1947 was built on a kind of consensus based primarily on elite accommodation. The system passed uncontested “because of its nearness to the mobilization of the national movement and the relationship of implicit trust between the leadership and the masses.” It was a consensus of “discourse rather than ideological positions.”3 Soon after Nehru’s demise, the system began to break down—a process that became evident especially from 1969 onwards, when Nehru’s successor, Indira Gandhi faced with increasing opposition strength, rejected the principle of consensus in favor of the majoritarian principle. Since she carried the masses with her, she ignored the party, which had lost its democratic mainspring. Centralization, which was once considered as “an instrument of purposive intervention by a cohesive and disciplined elite” soon turned out to be “suicidal for the prevalent party system and the federal structure and the wider affiliations that were built through them.”4 The de-institutionalization of the Congress party by dismantling the party’s federal structure contributed immensely to the erosion of India’s federal system. This decay led to massive concentration of power in the central leadership. During the 1969–77 period, center– state relations were practically reduced to a state of near nonexistence and centralization of power triumphed under the aegis of a strong state whose power was controlled by a ruling party, which relied exclusively on its leader for its survival. The 1975–77 emergency was probably the most serious affront to federalism since it led to the consolidation of a powerful center


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presiding over a federation of thoroughly enfeebled states. During the brief interlude of the Janata regime (1977–80), no serious attempt was made to counter the centripetal tendencies that had, by then, taken firm roots in Indian politics. Indira Gandhi’s style of functioning completely destroyed internal democracy within the Congress party. With the disintegration of provincial Congress organizations, the state leaders became mere clients of the central organ of the party.

Regional Demands The federalizing process has, in fact, been long in the making. It was under mounting regional pressures that Indira Gandhi, in 1983, appointed a constitutional commission on center–state relations, chaired by justice Sarkaria. In 1987–88, the Commission submitted its monumental two-volume report,5 which has become the most frequently invoked document in the federal discourse. Besides suggesting a federal reorientation of attitudes and styles of functioning by functionaries, including Governors, the Sarkaria panel recommended constitutional entrenchment of the National Development Council (NDC) and the Planning Commission. Both were created in the early 1950s under cabinet resolutions and continue to be nonstatutory. It also proposed the setting up of the Inter-State Council (ISC) under Article 263 of the Constitution. This was done in 1990. The Sarkaria Commission also proposed that the Finance Commission— appointed by the center at five-year intervals under Article 280 of the Constitution to recommend the pattern of revenue sharing between the center and states—be made a permanent body. Though this has not happened yet, the Finance Commission Reports still enjoy a good deal of legitimacy between the two tiers of government. In contrast to Indira Gandhi’s rigid centralist orientation, Rajiv Gandhi adopted a more contextually specific, accommodative approach to regional ethnic demands and movements. In quick succession, the center reached regional accords with ethnic movements and parties in Punjab and Assam in 1985, Mizoram in 1986, and Tripura in 1988.6 The Punjab Accord with the Akali Dal sought to resolve the territorial and interstate river water disputes between Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan. It promised an all-India Gurdwara Act by

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the Parliament and referred to the Anandpur Sahib Resolution of the Akali Dal for “redefining” center–state relations for consideration to the Sarkaria Commission. The Sakaria Commission also assured a judicial inquiry into the massacre of Sikhs in Delhi in 1984.7 Expect for some debatable success on the last two points, the rest of the issues still largely remain unresolved. The Assam Accord signed in August 1985 provided for: (a) the detection and deletion of the names of Bangladeshi migrants entering Assam prior to January 1966, (b)the disenfranchisement for 10 years of the migrants entering between January 1966 and March 24, 1971; and (c) the detection and deportation of those coming on or after March 25, 1971. The Mizoram and Tripura Accords severally sought to restore normalcy by cessation of insurgency and rehabilitation of the armed underground elements. While these peace efforts have not been fully successful in terminating the cycle of insurgency, democratic process has been somewhat restored. Administrative dislocations of regional identities have led to demands for the separation and the formation of new states. Many of these demands have been conceded, the most recent being Jharkhand (2000), Uttaranchal (2000), and Chhattisgarh (2000). Presently, the Indian federation consists of 28 states and 7 union territories. Yet there are 31 more demands for statehood, which have to be disposed off for ensuring the smooth functioning of the federal system.

Federal Politics in the Era of Coalition Governments Besides the structure of the Constitution, the working of the legislative and executive Government in the Indian federation is significantly influenced by the nature of the electoral system, party, and judicial behavior. Contrary to the Duverger–Riker hypothesis about the plurality of the electoral system giving rise to a two-party system,8 the Indian experience suggests that this kind of electoral law that operates in a socially and regionally diverse federal system may lead to fragmentation of the party system, ultimately leading to a multipartisan configuration. Reasons for this are not difficult to seek. Note, for example, that state leaders evince statist orientations even though they and their states,


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are tremendously influenced by the center in many important ways. This is further reinforced by the economic and political problems each of the states face. Moreover, two other factors favor statist orientations: one, the need to spend central funds in the states, and two, highly competitive political stratospheres. For these reasons, state leaders have gained much strength in national politics. This is reflected in the fact that it is the electoral outcomes in different states that determines the composition of the ruling and opposing coalitions. This divergence between state and national election outcomes has strengthened the hands of state leaders, who can now bargain and often bargain successfully with national leaders. The Duverger–Riker hypothesis is valid only for countries endowed with a relatively homogenous political culture; for example, the United Kingdom and Australia among parliamentary federal systems and the United States as a Presidential federal system. Besides India, Canada emerges as another counter illustration of the Duverger-Riker hypothesis. India and Canada both historically enveloped phases of one-party dominance at the national level, but subsequently turned to multiparty systems with increasing politicization and assertion of regional and ethnic identities. Party system is perhaps the most important intervening variable that significantly influences the working of the federal political system. As mentioned earlier, India began with a one-party dominant system, but since 1989 it has become a multiparty system. The centralized phase of the Indian federation, that spanned the Nehru and Indira Gandhi phases, by and large was associated with one-party Congress dominance. This feature of the party system was clearly evident in the working of all the organs of the government. After an initial dispute about the interpretation of the powers of the President raised by Dr Rajendra Prasad, the first President of India, the question was settled in favor of a nominal head of State in the British parliamentary tradition. The cabinet during this phase started with the Nehru–Patel duumvirate. However, after Patel’s death in December 1950, the cabinet system virtually turned into a prime ministerial system under Nehru. One party control of the legislature facilitated the emergence of a strong prime ministerial Cabinet. Autonomy of the federating

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units was somewhat overshadowed by the rule of the same party in New Delhi, as well as practically all states; yet state governments were not as powerless as they were to become under Indira Gandhi. During her regime that followed after a brief interlude under Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, the political system became considerably more centralized than in the past. The one-party control of the Parliament, Prime Ministerial domination of the cabinet system, and the Central hegemony over Congress-ruled state governments in particular, and Opposition-ruled state governments in general, became further accentuated. Central intervention in state governments under Article 356 was frequently used to topple legitimately elected governments in the states. This overly centralized union government was challenged by an extra-parliamentary mass movement, popularly called the J.P. movement, on the issue of authoritarianism and corruption in the government. This confrontation led directly to the imposition of internal Emergency by Indira Gandhi and a wholesale arrest of the opposition leaders. The 1977 elections routed the Emergency regime and voted the newly formed centrist Janata party to power at the center. The Janata interlude of nearly two and a half years was followed by the restoration of the Congress Party led by Indira Gandhi in 1980. Mrs Gandhi was somewhat chastened by the Emergency imbroglio. Her second regime was “patrimonial” for its fixation on dynasty building.9 During this period, the Gandhi household selected chief ministers of virtually all the Congress-ruled states. Given that it was easier for Mrs Gandhi to maintain her patrimonial regime if the state leadership was in constant flux, she not only kept chief ministers on probation, but also made sure that none among them emerged strong enough to dispense with her intervention and protection. After her assassination in 1984, her son, Rajiv Gandhi, succeeded her. During this phase, the functioning of institutions came again to be marked by centralization, though to a somewhat lesser degree than in the 1970s. Unlike his mother, Rajiv resisted the temptation of toppling nonCongress state governments (11 in 1988). Non-Congress parties controlled several state governments during this phase. The Rajiv Gandhi government brought a somewhat fresh approach to regional problems, especially in relation to non-Congress states that were


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marked by agitational movements. As mentioned earlier, he signed a series of peace accords with major regional parties in Punjab, Assam, Mizoram, and Tripura. Rajiv Gandhi also built bridges of understanding with the National Conference CM of Jammu and Kashmir, Farooq Abdullah. The 1990s witnessed a new federal fervor in the Indian political landscape. After the collapse of the Congress party in 1989, a qualitatively new phase in Indian politics was ushered in with the advent of the multiparty system, which has continued ever since. The decline of Congress created a vacuum in which no political party has been able to gain a majority and form a government at the national level on its own. This phase saw the definitive emergence of state and regional parties, which have played a very critical role in the formation of the government at the national level. This phase symbolizes what E. Sridharan calls “multiple bipolarity.” This means that the main contention in several Indian states involves two state parties, expect in a few instances (eight states to be precise), which alternatively control the power apparatus of the state. In addition, elections to state assemblies have acquired autonomy, as well as the capacity to shape the outcome of national elections.10 The debility of national parties in the last two decades and the autonomy of the state electoral processes allow main political cleavages in the states to determine the national electoral outcome. As such, national politics is not the political arena, which impinges on political choices; political preferences and loyalties at the national level derive from primary loyalties in state politics.11 Thus political cleavages in the states and political leanings of state leaders have assumed centrality in determining national electoral outcomes and through it, they have acquired a decisive say in determining who rules at the center and with what effect. However, competition for political ascendance does not take place between the same parties in all the states. Different patterns of political alignments have given birth to what was earlier referred to as multiple bipolarity. The emergence of the state as the primary locale of national political choices, insofar as the formation of the national government is concerned, has a significant bearing on alliance formation, as well as the functioning of the coalition government.

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State-based political parties have become key players, who decide the winners of the strenuous struggle for power at the center. Lines of political division in the states, the nature of sociopolitical cleavages, and the performance of the party in power, all these become important desiderata of national elections. As a result, there seems to have taken place a disjunction between issues and policies that shape political events in the states and those that bear upon the concerns of the national government. This disjunction allows state leaders belonging to rival camps to retain their autonomy. Thus, given the central importance of state-relevant political issues, conflicts, and the characteristics of state leaders, it is not at all surprising that they have grown very powerful for the purposes of national elections. This complex set of changes brought on by coalition and minority governments, as well as the crucial role played by some major regional parties has brought about a sea change in the political system. The prime ministerial system has metamorphosed into a kind of cabinet system that has been transformed beyond recognition, in comparison to the Westminster system based on collective responsibility of the Cabinet, to the popular chamber of the Parliament. The Indian cabinet system today is in reality fragmented into segments nominated and controlled by participating parties, some of which are led by powerful CMs. Legally, the Prime Minister is still the kingpin of the system in the sense that ultimate power rests in his/her hands, but the ministers are imposed upon him by coalition partners and withdrawn from the cabinet, sometimes against his will. One can recall the Congress DMK Cabinet birth deadlock, which held up government formation in May 2009. As a matter of fact, coalition partners can hold the government to ransom in order to get state-or-party-specific concerns and demands not only recognized but also incorporated into the overall policy and programmatic perspective of the national coalition government. The inclusion of certain nominees of coalition partners in the ministry is just one of the ways in which this can be done. There are other ways of getting a particular concern of a coalition partner attended to by the government. Another way is obtaining preference for the state in the allocation of central funding. The corollary of this expresses itself in two different ways. First, the smallest of the coalition member


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enjoys, in certain situations, more power proportionate to its size and can have its way if its continued support is vital for the survival of the coalition government. Second, toleration of unsatisfactory performance, even inefficiency, of a constituent coalition partner constitutes the hallmark of the ruling coalition. This is well illustrated by the inability of the UPAII, following the 2009 elections, to check the runaway prices of food items. The Congress party, as the major partner of UPA-II, urged the government to curb the rising prices. However, it did not produce any effective action from the Ministry of Agriculture presided over by Sharad Pawar, a powerful partner of UPA-II. Commenting on this situation, Janardan Dwivedy, Congress General Secretary, remarked, “it is a coalition government and not a full fledged Congress government … Congress is the largest in coalition, but it is the first among the equals.”12 The inference is clear: it cannot force its partners to act in a particular manner if the partner is not willing or able to act. It is in this sense that coalition governments prove to be consociational in the sense that Lipjhart13 uses it. Thus, it is not surprising that the principle of collective responsibility is considerably strained insofar as regional party bosses exert their influence and power. This is perhaps inevitable in federal coalition cabinets, but is alien to the Westminster system. With the decline of Prime Ministerial power, the presidential role has acquired some more elbowroom, though this does not really amount to an independent role for the President. However, recent Presidents have shown greater initiative and drive under coalition situations, particularly in formation of governments and dissolution of the Lok Sabha in cases of uncertain majorities, than in the past. The phase of coalition governments has also increased the autonomy of the Parliament, as well as that of state governments than was ever the case, under one-party majority governments. The role of the Rajya Sabha as a federal second chamber was not found to be particularly notable by Morris-Jones in his classical study of the Indian Parliament in the 1950s. In his assessment, it was no more likely to be a forum for the articulation of a state’s right any more than the Lok Sabha. Both the Houses were more or less similar in terms of party affiliations and economic background of the members.

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However, with the transformation of the party system by the 1990s, the Rajya Sabha has emerged as a federal second chamber as it reflects a different party configuration than that of the Lok Sabha. The differential oppositional majority in the Rajya Sabha is attributable to a different party configuration in the states whose legislatures form the Electoral College for the federal second chamber. Thus, the governmental majority in the Lok Sabha now must make an inter-house legislative understanding with the Rajya Sabha to facilitate the passage of legislation and constitutional amendments. A deadlock between the two Houses is resolved only at a joint session. In a joint session, the Lok Sabha with its larger number is more likely to emerge successful. But no government would like to make joint sessions a regular feature of the parliamentary process. The Rajya Sabha can in any case block a constitutional amendment. Federal representative character of the Rajya Sabha is clearly reflected in the fact that among the elected Rajya Sabha members between 1952 and 2002, 59 percent of the incumbents before their election to the House were active in state politics. In addition to the electoral and party systems, judicial behavior is another factor that affects the working of legislative and executive governance in the Indian federation. Despite its common integrated structure, courts have generally been protective of the federal structure of the constitution, especially in the more recent decades. The courts have done this at least in three ways. First, as early as in Hargovind Pant vs. Raghukul Tilak & Others (1979), the Supreme Court gave an essentially federal as distinguished from central, interpretation of the role of the Governor. It observed that the Governors’ “is an independent constitutional office which is not subject to the control of the Government of India.” Second, in S.R. Bommai & Others vs. Union of India & Others (1994),14 the Supreme Court reversed its earlier decision on a number of cases previously decided, wherein it had consistently maintained that the determination under Article 356 of the Constitution, i.e. whether the constitutional machinery in a state has broken down or not was a “political thicket” best left in the hands of the Union executive. The Court now maintained that the satisfaction of the President in the matter was “subjective” but “not entirely absolute”


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and must be exercised on some palpable material or evidence in the public domain. The Court, thus made this power of the Union executive, subject to judicial review for the first time. This considerably reduced the greatest threat to the autonomy of state governments from the arbitrary exercise of the executive power of the Union. Third, in the foregoing judgment as well as in the Keshvananda Bharti vs. Union of India (1973)15 and Minerva Mills vs. Union of India (1980),16 the Supreme Court established the doctrine of the un-amenability of the “basic structure of the Constitution,” of which federalism is illustratively declared to be a part.17 By all available indicators, the current trend of greater federalization of the political system is likely to continue. The 2004 Lok Sabha elections produced a hung Parliament. However, the NDA lost power to the UPA. Left-of-center coalition replaced the erstwhile rightof-center coalition. Coalition politics is now coming of age. This was reflected in greater stability of the 22-party BJP-led NDA alliance that managed to remain in power till the government announced fresh elections shortly before its term ended. In contrast to the BJP, the Congress continued to fight shy of alliance politics. However, the political reality of declining seat share pushed it toward alliance formation with like-minded secular parties. The stress of secularism as a binding force was necessitated for preventing the BJP, its rival, from getting an upper hand in the electoral battle. The seeds of UPA were sown on January 16th, when Sonia Gandhi invited a few “like-minded secular” leaders to dinner with the avowed purpose of coordinating in the Lok Sabha the actions of different parties in opposition on the Ayodhya issue. Defeat in three Assembly elections in MP, Chhattisgarh, and Rajasthan provided the much-needed impetus to formalize the process of alliance formation. Thus, the UPA was born. It not only won the 2004 national elections, it also increased its seat share by 31 seats and its vote share rose to 28.3 and went on to complete its full term. The UPA again won a spectacular victory in 2009. The UPA won 262 seats with the Congress alone getting 206 seats thus crossing the 200 mark for the first time since its earlier decline. Also, its share of popular votes rose to 28.6 percent, an increase of 2.1 percent over 2004.

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Concluding Observations The preceding discussion clearly brings out the changes that have taken over the Indian political system in the last six decades. These changes refer to the fact that the relationship between different organs of the government never remains static; the changing contour of politics, reflecting some important changes in socioeconomic reality, impinges on the constitutionally sanctioned schema of distribution of power among various organs. The Constitution itself changes because of these changes; if it does not change, it indicates rigidity, verging almost on passivity that refuses to take note of the ongoing changes in its sociopolitical environment. In this situation, the Constitution could invite its own termination. But the fact that changes occur and these changes bring about corresponding essential changes in the conduct of the government testifies to the fact that the Indian political system is vibrant and dynamic. It is by virtue of this that the Indian political system is capable of retaining the allegiance of the Indian people.

Notes 1. K.C. Wheare, Federal Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), Fourth Edition. 2. Douglas Verney, “From Quasi-federation to Quasi-confederacy? The Transformation of India’s Party System,” Publius, Vol. 33, No. 4, Fall 2003), p. 171. 3. Francine Frankel, “Decline of a Social Order,” in Francine Frankel and M.S.A. Rao (eds), Dominance and State Power in Modern India: Decline of a Social Order, Vol. 2 (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990), p. 502. 4. Rajni Kothari, State Against Democracy: In Search of Humane Governance (Delhi: Ajanta, 1988), p. 30. 5. Sarkaria Commission on Centre–State Relations Report, Parts I and II, Vol. I. (Nasik: Government of India Press, 1987–88). 6. The text of these accords is compiled in P.S. Dutta, Ethnic Peace Accords in India (Delhi: Vikas, 1995). 7. For a discussion of the political situation in Punjab preceding this Accord, see Robin Jeffery, What’s Happening to India? Punjab, Ethnic Conflicts, Mrs. Gandhi’s Death, and the Test for Federalism (New York: Holmes and Meir, 1986), Chapters 2 and 3.


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â•‡ 8. See William Riker, The Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962) and “The Party System and Duverger’s Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 76, No. 4, December 1982, pp. 753–66. See also Bernard Grofman and Arendt Liphart, (eds), Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences (New York: Agathon Press, 1986). â•‡ 9. B.D. Dua, “Federalism or Patrimonialism: The Making and Unmaking of Chief Ministers in India,” Asian Survey, Vol. 25, No. 8, August 1985, pp.793–04. 10. See Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar, “Principal State Level Contests and Derivative National Choices,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 6, February 2009, p. 57. 11. Ibid., p. 56. 12. The Times of India (Delhi) November 28, 2009. 13. For a detailed analysis see, Arend Lijphart, “The Puzzle of Indian Democracy: A Consociational Interpretation,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 90, 1996, pp. 258–68. 14. S.R. Bommai & Others vs. Union of India, Supreme Court Cases, Judgment Today, 1994. 15. Keshvananda Bharti vs. State of Kerala, AIR, 1973, Supreme Court. 16. Minerva Mills Ltd. vs. Union of India, AIR, 1980, Supreme Court. 17. Wheare, Federal Government. Verney, “From Quasi-federation to Quasiconfederacy.”

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chapter 6

Gender Discourse in Elections: Constructing a Constituency? Rainuka Dagar

In the struggle for electoral numbers in coalition politics within an identity sensitive society, gender interests have been taken as synonymous with women’s reservation in Parliament. The connectivity between women’s electoral performance and development outcomes remains to be established. Yet, the clamor for increasing women’s political presence continues in the rarefied well of the Indian Parliament. No doubt, the national political leadership postindependence has evolved with a select strand of women, but why do political parties want more women to stand for elections now? Is it because women will better utilize public resources for women’s interests? Has the electorate become partial to women candidates? Or does women’s presence increase a party’s secular and diverse credentials? Are women leaders more judicious in allocation of resources, protection of citizen rights, or the promotion of development? It is in the backdrop of parliamentary elections that this article will explore the linkages between the Indian democratic polity with representation of women, and that of the electoral discourse on gender with women’s development and gender justice. The gender discourse in Indian electoral politics can be traced to two broad themes: of inclusion and social equity. Both concerns relate to the protection and promotion of women as a vulnerable group. While the substantive content of inclusion remains unchanged, the changing sociopolitical context from pre-independence to the 21st century shifted the stance on women’s representation within

Gender Discourse in Elections

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decision-making bodies. The issue of social equity, on the other hand, evolved as the concepts of gender rights and equity in governance evolved globally. By its logic, it amalgamated the representation of numbers to the representation of interests and the promotion of diversity within the identity-strong multicultural ethos of the Indian polity. In the first section, women’s representation in electoral politics is mapped with a focus on 2009 elections. Thereafter, the article explores the social equity issues as raised by political parties. Within this context, it locates the impact of electoral politics on the scope and limits of gender rights and justice. It traces the party commitment to gender rights and its engagement to mobilize the electorate to shape state resources for women’s development. Has the electoral dialogue on gender issues made politics more gender sensitive? The last section compiles the emerging concerns for gendering the Indian democracy. Based on the inquiry into electoral discourse, it raises issues for strengthening and gendering the democratic structures.

Political Representation of Women: A Challenge to Democratic Claims? Women’s presence in proclaiming the democratic process in India has been consistent, if their voting numbers are a criterion. In each election since 1962, more than 45 percent of eligible women voters have cast their preference for Indian leadership. Their number continued to be marginally less than male participation in elections until the present elections when women voters outnumbered the male voters forming 54.17 percent of the total voters in 2009 (see Table 6.1). The turn-out in percentage of women participation and share of total voters has also been increasing. In 1962, 41.38 percent of women voted. By the 21st century, this rose to 59 percent. Male participation of total eligible males was much higher at 70 percent, but the female presence in the electoral process has increased significantly.1 As a vote bank, women are in a position to influence the selection of the party governing the country. Massive participation of women has put to rest the contentious history of women’s right to vote in the country.

Year

1984–85

1980

1977

1971

1967

1962

1957*

Table 6.1

65,802,050 (58.62) 86,460,437 (56.61) 87,382,907 (57.66) 109,609,940 (56.42) 115,357,604 (56.90) 142,339,839

Male

Female

46,440,421 (41.38) 66,264,048 (43.39) 64,153,895 (42.34) 84,653,975 (43.58) 87,395,289 (43.10) 113,955,124

Total voters 1,473 (97.04)/2.11 1,919 (96.68)/2.75 2,302 (97.17)/3.30 2,686 (97.00)/3.85 2,369 (97.13)/3.40 4,487 (96.93)/6.44 5,320

Male 45 (2.96)/1.39 66 (3.32)/2.04 67 (2.83)/2.07 83 (3.00)/2.56 70 (2.87)/2.16 142 (3.07)/4.38 173

Female

Contesting candidates 467 (94.53)/6.75 463 (93.72)/6.70 491 (94.42)/7.10 494 (95.37)/7.14 523 (96.49)/7.56 501 (94.71)/7.25 498

Male

27 (5.47)/5.37 31 (6.28)/6.16 29 (5.58)/5.77 24 (4.63)/4.77 19 (3.51)/3.78 28 (5.29)/5.57 43

Female

Elected candidates

Gender-wise Breakdown of Voters, Contestants, and Elected Candidates in India for 1957–2009

112 India’s 2009 Elections

(44.46) 135,759,697

(43.93) 122,723,928 (42.93) 151,028,333 (43.99) 166,844,924 (44.44) 164,539,004 (44.27) 172,714,226 (44.36) 225,765,026 (54.17) 1,602,237,890 (44.99)

(55.54) 173,290,798

(56.07) 163,132,537 (57.07) 192,279,757 (56.01) 208,596,815 (55.56) 207,130,100 (55.73) 216,628,138 (55.64) 191,028,997 (45.83) 19,59,039,919 (55.01)

(96.79)/8.55 8,420 (96.24)/12.08 13,353 (95.71)/19.15 4,476 (94.23)/6.42 4,364 (93.89)/6.26 5,080 (93.47)/7.29 7,514 (93.11)/10.78 69,725 (95.56)/100.00

(96.85)/7.63 5,962 (3.21)/6.11 329 (3.76)/10.15 599 (4.29)/18.48 274 (5.77)/8.45 284 (6.11)/8.76 355 (6.53)/10.95 556 (6.89)/17.16 3,241 (4.44)/100.00

(3.15)/5.34 198 (94.53)/7.25 495 (92.70)/7.16 495 (92.52)/7.16 505 (92.15)/7.30 497 (91.03)/7.19 500 (92.08)/7.23 484 (89.13)/7.00 6,914 (93.22)/100.00

(92.05)/7.20 501

(5.47)/5.77 39 (7.30)/7.75 40 (7.48)/7.95 43 (7.85)/8.55 49 (8.97)/9.74 43 (7.92)/8.55 59 (10.87)/11.73 503 (6.78)/100.00

(7.95)/8.55 29

Source: Election commission of India. Note: *For 1957 data is taken from Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace (eds), India’s 2004 Elections: Grass-roots and National Perspectives (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2007), pp., 17, 36 and 37. Percentages in Parenthesis are from Row (same year). Percentages in Italics are from Column (all year’s total).

Total

2009

2004

1999

1998

1996

1991–92

1989


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Under the British colonial government, women were first granted the right to vote on “wifehood qualification” in 1927. The women’s movement won women’s right to adult franchise from wifehood and literacy constrains in 1950 when the Indian Constitution came into existence.2 In 2009, women’s representation as potential leaders and candidates of political parties has been on the rise. This is observed, both in the proportion of total candidates standing for elections and an increase in number of women candidates in subsequent elections. However, women’s share in terms of leadership has been poor accounting for only 3.32 percent of the total candidates in 1962, with a rise to 6.89 percent in 2009. Women constituted less than 4 percent of the total candidates till 1992. From the 1996 elections, women’s share of candidature rose to 4.29 percent and attained its highest proportion of 6.89 percent in 2009. It was in the 1996 elections campaign that all major political parties proclaimed one-third reservation of women in Parliament as part of their manifestos. If a democratic polity constitutes a proportional number of representatives to their population, then women’s representation has a long way to go. In the 2009 elections, women make up 48.7 percent of the Indian citizens eligible to vote, but party tickets included less than 7 percent of women candidates and less than 11 percent of the Parliament’s representation is female (see Table 6.1). The leadership potential of women has been credited differentially across the states. At the level of state analysis, women leadership in terms of candidates standing for election was the highest from Delhi. Here, 11.25 percent of the total candidates were women in contrast to the all-India average of 6.89 percent. Uttrakhand (9.21 percent), Rajasthan (8.96 percent), Chhattisgarh (8.43 percent), West Bengal (7.88 percent), and Gujarat (7.24 percent) had a higher contribution of women candidates.3 Women in 2009 with 59 members, have the largest ever representation in the Indian Parliament (see Table 6.1). This presence has, however, been inconsistently provided from the states. Interestingly, states with a higher number of female candidates did not send a higher percentage of women to Parliament. The success rate of female candidates was highest in Punjab with nearly 31 percent. This was followed


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by West Bengal (24.14 percent), Madhya Pradesh (20.6 percent), and Assam (18.18 percent).4 Subsequently, women from these states had a higher representation in the Parliament. The numbers reveal a lopsided engagement of women with Indian electoral politics. They are active in the supportive role of democracy with high participation in casting of votes, but are on the margins of public life. Further, leadership spaces are taken as role extensions of familial and identity hegemony in politics. In South and South East Asia, the dynastic succession of women leaders has characterized their entry into the political fray.5 Scholars note that within Indian politics, women have gained access to the most important political posts “because of familial ties to prominent male politicians.”6 Largely, the selection of women candidature is guided by their affiliation to the party hierarchy via family connections or their own elite standing. In 2009, 61 percent of elected female representatives belonged to political families or were themselves from an elite polity. This is in contrast to the male MPs who ranged at 25 percent.7 Of the elected female candidates, the largest number could draw upon family lineage to carve out their constituencies. The second claim for leadership was from elite standing such as film stars, erstwhile royals, or from creative arts. The emergence of leadership through the transfer of the “cultural hero” particularly of popular film stars in South India has been successfully catapulted into populist politics.8 Thus, women leadership included the blue blood of political lineage at the national level, lead by the Nehru–Gandhi family, where both daughter-in-laws of Indira Gandhi were elected to Parliament—Sonia Gandhi as leader of the ruling UPA coalition and Maneka Gandhi as an opposition BJP bencher. Women from the Scindia royalty of Gwalior are also many times Parliamentarians. Of the two Scindia sisters in politics, Yashodhare Raje won her parliamentary election. A number of women candidates from families dominating state level politics also were also elected. Shruti Chaudhry as a first-time candidate was selected by the electorate on the laurels of her grandfather Bansi Lal, a former Chief Minister of Haryana. Supriya Sule was voted into power with the stature of her father Sharad Pawar in Maharashtra. Harsimrat Kaur is Prakash Singh Badal’s (CM of Punjab) daughterin-law and wife of Akali President Sukhbir Singh Badal. Jayalalitha

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is no longer the shadow of her political mentor N.T. Rama Rao, but is a leader in her own right. Women candidates’ interaction with the electorate followed the avenue of selection. Affiliation to the top hierarchy of party neutralized gender connotations with leadership becoming the overarching identity. Sonia Gandhi, Mamata Banerjee, Jayalalitha, and Mayawati on the national scene, and Jayapradha, Selja, and Mehbooba Mufti at regional levels are “viewed as leaders” with capacity to deliver to the electorate. “She has got a bridge made in our constituency and responds to our needs;” “She always meets us and gets our work done” is the common refrain of voters in response to these female leaders. Women candidates who were a symbol of political families were further removed from the gender lens as they remained insulated through the hegemonic leadership status of the family and at the level of conduct epitomized the typed gender standing. Head covered, respectful in appropriate appeal of daughter-in-law, or daughter and reflecting the ideal of the Indian women—to voters and media as the case may be. The symbolic capital of gender is encashed by leaders, “reinforcing and legitimising stereotypes in exchange of political power.”9 The stand-alone glamor of women candidates however was open to scrutiny. The most derogatory campaign was initiated by Akhilesh Das Gupta in Lucknow against the candidature of Nafisa Ali Sodhi, a part-time Bollywood actress and socialite, without a political lineage. The body politics resorted to was condemned.10 The complaint made to the Election Commission resulted in a notice being issued to A.D. Gupta and a subsequent censure. A case was also registered under a false statement in connection to an election dealing with personal character or conduct of a candidate.11 While maligning of female character received few complaints (four from Uttar Pradesh, one each from Gujarat and Madhya Pradesh),12 their incidence highlights the gender connotations underpinning women in the election fray. Currency, however, continued to be drawn from gender symbolism. Among the most reported exchange was BJP leader Narendra Modi’s dismissive comment on the opposition Congress Party as Budhiya (old woman)—symbolic for a redundant liability.13 When this was objected to, by raising the issue of young blood within the Congress by a female leader, he retorted to the party being a Gudiya (doll)—superfluous and


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glamorous without content.14 Reference to women found a ready link to demeaning gendered imagery. Sanjay Dutt’s gimmick to cash in the popularity of his blockbuster movie on the Bollywood version of Gandhian activism to turn the other cheek became entangled in sexist conduct. His campaigning style to label Uttar Pradesh CM Mayawati as a corrupt, exploitative, and nonperforming politician and by wanting to act out his movie performance of giving a hug and a kiss to reform her, found him being accused as sexist. A polity so steeped in sex role placements are seen as a transgression of male–female conduct to be projected for electoral benefits. The gender underpinnings remained typed and femininity oriented. The media remained largely blanketed on gender, but responded to the color and glamor of women. Vivid dresses of women voters splashed color, as did constituency woes depicting urban and rural women in long lines of colorful attire filling water. And, candidature coverage fell back to draw upon the rich storyline of political lineage. Issues of domestic violence, dowry, caste and honor killings did not find attention in the electoral speeches or as issues raised by the free press of democratic India. Property rights, feminization of poverty or the missing number of the Indian girl child could not capture the attention of either the leadership or guardians of democracy—the media, thereby depicting people’s disinterest in gender justice.

Party Commitments to Gender Women’s claim to development benefits was, however, registered in the manifestos of national political parties. Women’s concerns were addressed as part of political parties campaign to promote social justice, either as part of special groups or more specifically to empower women. The CPI located issues pertaining to women under its commitment to peoples’ rights and social justice. The Congress Party placed womenidentified needs along with the weaker sections. The JD(S) clubbed women and youth as groups that need to be empowered. The BJP signaled women’s empowerment as an imperative for inclusive development. The BSP also chalked a women-specific “appeal.” The

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emphasis was on provision of economic support, followed by protection against atrocities and support for political participation. Political parties raised the issue of women’s social security in terms of income generation for women. According to its manifesto, the National Congress “endeavours to ensure that at least half of the country’s rural women population will be enrolled as members of selfhelp groups linked with banks … ” “to reserve one-third of all central government jobs for women.”15 The BJP went further “to adopt a national policy on women’s economic empowerment to ensure every woman has access to livelihood and to enhance the income of all categories of working women.”16 The CPI(M) promised to “ensure equal remuneration for women workers in all areas of work ... health insurance of women workers in the unorganised sector.”17 The centrality to women’s economic empowerment has been a relatively recent focus of mainstream political parties. The Left parties were, however, always geared to addressing the working class women’s rights. Historically, manifestos of national parties have focused on three aspects relating to women. The first being access to basic needs of education and health, and has been a consistent theme since independence. Second being provision of economic and civil participation through income support and political representation. And third, promotion of equal rights for women which has ranged from personal laws, working conditions and laws on atrocities against women. Social equity has thus grappled with the promotion of women’s rights, but has not yet expanded to gender justice. The gamut of rights continues to include equal rights with men in terms of access to resources— employment, education, and property. The scope of rights became enlarged from the welfare measures and protections of women— nutrition, child care, legal rights against violent practices—and special needs of female gender, to more recently the inclusion in the development agenda. Women-specific rights of maternal benefits and reproductive health were addressed first by the Left parties, followed by the BJP and the Congress.18 Within this broad agreement across party manifestos to provide women developmental access to services and facilities within an increasingly rights-based agenda, political parties continue to screen women issues in accordance to their political compulsions. First,


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electoral issues raised are in conjunction to legislation and executive policy, responsive to the global mandate on gender and the women’s movement. Second, identity politics remains the largest filter for addressing gender issues. Third, gender remains a low priority particularly in its strength to woo the electorate. Leaders’ speeches did not address established normative gender unjust practices. Also, political parties drew a distinction in the manifesto claims and issues they referred to in public. In other words, electoral politics is reflective of the people’s pulse where gender is concerned. The 2009 manifestos of all mainstream parties commit to check atrocities against women, ranging from laws to check female feticide, domestic violence, and sexual harassment. While the BJP listed a number of laws, other parties were restricted to protective legislation in accordance to their positioning. The Left mentioned laws for sexual harassment at the workplace, while the Congress applauded itself on its achievement of Domestic Violence Act passed in its leadership. Laws protecting women from violence have been a response to women’s movement and public articulations against brutality.19 Protection of women from dowry abuse was consistently raised in the manifesto of the BJP party and sporadically so in the Congress Party. These laws were, however, raised in the political party agendas after social uprisings and even state enactments against dowry had been undertaken.20 The concern for female feticide was raised by the mainstream parties, largely under the girl child rights in 2009. This was first reflected by the BJP in 1989 and later by Congress in1991 and other parties. However, state governments such as Maharashtra had already introduced a bill to regulate the use of scientific technology for sex selection in 1988. This was an acknowledgment to the public furor and social awareness campaigns against the misuse of technology for deselecting the girl child.21 The Domestic Violence Bill hailed as an achievement by the Congress manifesto (2008) passed in 2007, was first raised in the manifesto of the BJP in 1996. The party was responding to the National Perspective Plan for Women 2000 that demanded a protective legislation. The National Commission for Women in 1992 set up a statutory body to review the constitutional and legal safeguards for women. The Lawyers’ Collective (a women NGO) drafted and circulated a bill

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on Domestic Violence in 1992 and National Commission for Women (NCW) came with the draft bill on Domestic Violence in 1994. It was only after the policy initiative to review laws and increasing research on violence against women that led the BJP to acknowledge the need for supportive legislation. Wife beating remained outside the preview of other parties. The electoral party discourse on gender has been largely policydriven rather than political parties mobilizing the electorate for a policy change. It is only after the report Towards Equality compiled in the backdrop of the international initiative on gender that attention to women came into the political ambit.22 Prior to the International Year of the Women in 1975, political manifestos were limited to promises for equal pay for equal work, maternity benefits, health, and education facilities for women. “Special steps to remove social, educational and economic disabilities of women, so that they may fully discharge the responsibilities to the family, society and nation”;23 equal pay for equal work;24 “adequate financial allocation and extra facilities for education of women.”25 The Indian political establishment responded to the “first wave of official feminism” post the UN declaration of International Year for Women in 1975 with a shift from welfare to development.26 The international development agenda started being reflected in the gender policy of the government post the Sixth Five-Year Plan from 1980. It extended women’s welfare and assistance in performing “women roles” to economic independence. The shift from welfare and protectionism to participation in the development process was notable.27 In the Seventh Plan, a separate department for woman and child was introduced. It largely monitored 27 beneficiary-oriented schemes for women. By the Ninth Plan, women were recognized as agents of social growth and kept pace with the international strategies and civil society mobilizations to promote women’s development. The enlarged plan ranging from the education and health sectors to participation in income generation activities started reflecting in the manifestos of the national parties. For instance, there were special schemes for female headed households in rural areas and increasing employment opportunities for women (CPI,1998); provision of


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working women hostels (BJP,1991; Congress, 2004); setting up of cooperative societies in rural and urban areas to be managed by women for the benefits of women entrepreneurs, self-employment schemes (BJP,1991). Issues raised in the manifestos of parties may not necessarily be brought to the notice of the electorate. The Congress party claimed its protective stance toward women in its manifesto and “has passed the Domestic Violence Bill, providing property laws to women.” However, its leadership has not ventured into voicing these claims in their electoral speeches, for instance, in the social domain wife-beating is considered a prerogative of the husband, and property rights is the sole claim of males in a male dominated society. The BJP provides a larger space to women issues in its manifestos. Both the lead parties, however, demarcate the concerns to be raised in the manifesto and the speeches of its leaders for wooing the electorate. Further, both the manifestos and speeches ignore aspects of social practice that are grossly gender unjust, with acknowledgement of this injustice likely to impinge on their vote gathering prowess. The politics of diversity has added an identity-based advantage to the win-ability of candidates. Women’s quota has provided grounds for some regional parties to extend their caste support base by demanding allocations for Other Backward Castes (OBC) within the quota for women’s reservation. Raising the banner for OBC, these parties argue that without a sub-quota, OBC women will not be selected as candidates. Inspite of the numbers in Parliament, the bill continues to be retabled, awaiting a political consensus. By overruling the insignificant numerical minority, parties will nevertheless accede an edge to the parties claiming OBC interests and thus want a consensus. Historically, women’s movement has traversed a long way from political equality to affirmative action.28 This shift can be located in the state’s sustained approach of affirmative policy for promoting vulnerable groups. In a society that has been historically unequal, the political representation of diversity is a legitimate, even if not a sufficient factor in representation of interests. The visible placement of member representatives of marginalized groups within the decisionmaking forum is expected to provide a psychological spin-off effect by

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registering the breaking of historical barriers and the hope of availing equal opportunities.29 Yet, if political parties are hoping to register women as active citizens in decision-making bodies, it is expected that they will provide women’s active presence through organizational posts in their own organizations. Parties can also decree that a third of their party candidatures, along with party positions within respective organizations, be reserved for women. In fact, party selection and financial support to women candidates has been identified as crucial to women’s occupation of political office.30 The traditional authority systems are male-based networks, constraining women’s capacity to translate social capital into political capital,31 making party networks and institutional support more relevant. However, no party has committed itself to gender rights with this devotion. Women representation in the party organizational structure and party selection of candidatures remains below 15 percent (see Table 6.2). While, Left parties and the Congress reflect a larger women presence, the BJP follows closely with a large gap reflected by the BSP—a woman-headed party. In fact, of the major political parties, the Trinamool Congress fielded the highest percentage of women candidates in the 2009 elections and has claim to the highest percentage of women MPs (see Figure 6.1). Clearly, for political parties gendering the Parliament is delinked from gendering their own party platforms. Table 6.2 Party-wise Female Candidates and Female Office Bearers in 2009 S. No. Party 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Biju Janta Dal (BJD) Bhartiya Janata Party (BJP) Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) Indian National Congress (INC) Jammu and Kashmir National Conference (JKN) Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD) Telugu Desham Party (TDP) Communist Party of India (M)

Source: Party Offices, New Delhi.

Manifesto promising Female Female office one-third reservation in parliament candidates bearers 0.00 7.91 5.04 7.73 0.00

13.04 8.70 4.00 11.86 7.40

No Yes No Yes No

0.36 0.36 11.84

11.11 15.38 6.67

Yes Yes Yes


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Figure 6.1 Party-wise Female Candidates and Member of Parliament in 2009

Source: Election Commission of India.

Gender: A Personal Agenda of Candidates In the 2009 elections, women issues were raised across the election process from two voices. National level leadership from mainstream parties namely the Congress and the BJP and individual candidates, for whom gender was a personal agenda. The leaders referred to gender issues largely under the all encompassing term “women’s empowerment.” It, however, translated to be a third allocation in income and development schemes for women, promotion of self-help groups and women’s education. Violence against women was sporadically mentioned in the form of female feticide by L.K. Advani and Manmohan Singh and in passing of the Domestic Violence Act by Sonia Gandhi. These were contextualized as a party’s concern for vulnerable groups and did not form a comprehensive gender campaign. Perceptions of women issues raised by political parties was taken from a sample of teachers across the northern region. Seventy-eight percent of these educated voters mentioned that no party raised any women related issues. According to them, women related concerns, if raised, were confined to reservation of women (16 percent) and girl child education (6 percent) (see Table 6.3).

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Raising issue of reservation

Girl child education

None

15.63

6.25

78.13

Source: Institute for Development and Communication (IDC), Chandigarh, Field survey 2009.

A more consistent voice on gender was raised by individual candidates and was more in line with the personal agenda rather than a party proclamation. For instance, the issue of female feticide became a campaign agenda for Harsimrat Kaur, Akali Dal MP and daughterin-law of Prakash Singh Badal, the CM of Punjab. Punjab has among the worst child sex ratios in the world since the past century. It is perhaps the most relevant gender concern in the region. It took the personal capacity of the elite Badal family member to raise a battle cry against this form of violence. But, the Akali Dal only raised the issue in its 2004 manifesto, even though its ally, the BJP, has been raising it in its manifestoes since 1991. In sum, the 2009 elections marks the political parties appropriation of the term women’s empowerment, but without the corresponding commitment to unravel and undermine the social reality that thrives on gender differentiating hierarchies.

Emerging Issues The 2009 electoral discourse throws up a number of imperatives for political parties committed to a gender nuanced approach. Three overarching concerns emerge. One, political parties need to address gender rather than women. The doctrine of dismantling institutionalized discrimination and gender differentiating structures is a well-accepted and necessary directive toward gender justice. It underscores a distributive share of familial inheritance of assets, skills, status; of castereligious social capital, of producer–reproducer relations with associated changes in roles, social processes, and institutions. Yet, the political canvass limits its scope to women, without placing the gender


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differentiating relations historically evolved into the social ethos and identity construed India polity, at the center of a gender discourse. Like the SCs, who cannot be purged of the historical psyche, identity and now capital, by placing doles for individual consumption, the gender identity needs to be delinked from the hegemony of collective identity. Cultural markers defining gender through family, caste, or religion need to be shed for the enjoyment of gender rights. Second, the momentum on gender raised by the international development agenda, women’s movement, and the women entity as a coalition to secular credentials has been ruptured to accommodate vote bank identity politics. The perspective on gender issues can be placed in a context of social equity, distributive justice, or gender justice as the standpoint of specific parties, rather than an instrument to placate and gather identity based ballots. Third, the reservation fervor, unless promoted as part of a systematical and holistic gender policy may only extend the politics of patronage through female agency. Reservation in decision-making bodies needs to be stacked with policy initiatives, civil society proactivism, political mobilization for gender interest aggregation, and monitored accountability to the principals of gender equity.

Women, Rather Than Gender Thrust The 2009 elections have registered women issues as an entitlement claim, but gender is yet to be promoted as a right. The electoral manifestos are replete with the pledge to empower women. Leaders promise women a share of development benefits and the electoral process gears up to safeguard women’s rights. Yet the electoral discourse addresses gender as synonymous with women. It divests the historical constructed structures of gender hierarchy to a votive offering of benefits and protectionisms to women. No doubt, women are the predominant victims of the practice of gender differentiation facing the brunt of dowry exchange, domestic violence, female de-selection, sexual harassment, unequal pay, disproportionate dropouts from the education system, and feminization of poverty, among other discriminations. The remedy is prescribed through the filters of dole-oriented

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politics. Thus, dowry or domestic violence are viewed as undesirable social practices that can be rooted out through strict legislation. Women can be educated by opening more schools and women can be provided economic independence through self-help groups, and by loaning paltry amounts of money. By allocating a third of income generating scheme, women’s independence and poverty can be alleviated. What is the outcome of these initiatives? A female has the least chance of being born in India. According to United Nation’s Children’s Fund (UNICEF), every single day 7,000 girls in India are unable to take birth.32 The female’s checkered existence continues in her life span. In spite of systematic commitment of national parties to women’s health and maternal mortality, every seven minutes a woman dies from complications related to pregnancy and child birth.33 Along with malnutrition and anemia, morbidity and differential access to basic social services,34 women suffer violence throughout their life cycle. More girls than boys drop out of school. Only 14 of the 100 girls who enroll pass out of twelfth class and even with universal free education up to 14 years, only 60 of these girls will reach primary level fifth class.35 Women continue to have negligible access to agricultural land, credit, irrigation, and infrastructure. Access and inclusion of women in executive and legislative office has not translated into equity outcomes, particularly in developing countries. Hassim notes that state intervention in social democracies of the Scandinavian polity collaborated with a widespread women’s movement to strategize the promotion of female leadership along with gender interests in policy-making, to effect change.36 Thus, in the Indian context, can legal rights become a standard without political mobilization or policy support against social markers of the Indian cultural identity? The law on Domestic Violence has been passed, but lacks adequate budgetary provisions, institutional intergration, and even political mobilization. No party is campaigning on the streets against familial subjugation of a daughter-in-law or ill-treatment of a wife. Can policy allocations be utilized without civil society creating a demand for their value? Can a female’s right to life be celebrated when her share in familial resources is begrudged?


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The isolated approach to provide women basic needs and developmental benefits is unable to change women’s marginalized status. While representative democracy in terms of female participation in elections and as elected leaders in Parliament continues to rise, so does the gender gap in women’s survival rates, atrocities, and poverty.37 Win-ability of women candidates is a function of family standing or clout of party hierarchy rather than a women vote bank. Gender mainstreaming in the electoral process continues to be wanting. The Election Commission does not refer to a gender sensitive conduct, in fact it trains police officials with conduct of elections, but there is no gender-specific training or sensitization in any materials of the Commission.38 Even the language of Representation of People Act continues, along with its amendments as late as 2002, to refer to candidates as masculine maintaining the imagery of masculine leadership,39 a clear reflection of the adhoc interventions for gendering the electoral process. The electoral discourse, moreover, does not link the life cycle of denial, discrimination, and atrocities accruing differentially across different social placements. Patriarchy is a social phenomenon, rather than a women-specific problem and, it is intermeshed with pervasive primordial collectivity identities. The redistribution of social and familial resources needs to be de-legitimated from the hegemony of religious, caste, and familial control over gender roles, norms, and practice.

Gender as a Leverage in Identity Politics Female leadership’s access to power is legitimized for a mandate and policy prescriptions to power a women’s agenda. By occupying formal positions to articulate and reorganize the exercise to transform women’s placement is itself a challenge. According to certain scholars, the Indian female MPs powers are limited to the confines of party lines which they are expected to follow. And, the party priority on gender is low.40 The logic that women leadership is required in the decision-making halls of the Parliament underlines that women will be promoting women interests and development. The argument presumes that the interests of all women are the same and can be promoted

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by a group of individual women. It also ignores that citizens can be representatives of two or more identities and women have placements across castes, class, religion, and locale which may be different and even conflicting. The universalizing arguments do not hold under the pressure of multiple identities. Inequalities of caste, religion, and class identities in India polity intersect to hierarchize gender differentially.41 The mobility of women leadership is further contained with the multiple identity of a multicultural reality. What happens when women’s interests clash with her caste group, state, or religious affinity? The most infamous example of such a clash of interest is the Shah Bano Case, an example of an individual’s right in conflict with collective identity.42 The practice of personal law, symbolically proclaims a group’s distinct identity. Muslim collectivity was supported by an act of Parliament and Shah Bano became relegated to a gender unjust verdict of the Muslim clergy. The personification of women as group identity is eulogized and reflected by political parties appropriating the identity such as the BJP at the heights of Ram Rajya movement.43 The identity driven populist politics in India is “fragmenting and destabilises the political agenda.”44 Yet, female leadership is expected to overcome the religion and identity-cultivated vote banks of their political parties and forge a gender just agenda. The fracturing of a fragile gendered polity is perhaps best reflected in the present context by the issue of women’s reservation in Parliament.45 Not only do the national parties, but a majority of regional parties promise to provide reservation for women in their 2009 manifestos. In spite of the relevant number in Parliament to pass this act since 1996, the bill still awaits a democratic consensus. Like the pre-independence reservation for women seats under minority community allocation, some regional parties want an OBC quota within the women reserved constituencies. The argument that women from the backward class will be marginalized by the general category women seems misplaced given the SC and OBC representation of women in open constituencies. Thirty-eight percent of total SC women candidates in 2009 fought elections in nonreserved constituencies accounting for 10 percent of the total women candidates.46 In Haryana, in the past decade, OBC women candidates formed 40 percent of the elected representatives. In state assembly elections in Punjab, women leaders


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from the OBCs constituted 23 percent of the elected female leaders in this decade. These numbers are more than the representative OBC population in the states.47 The elite women leadership in politics is certainly not caste defined. Yet the ready acceptance of mainstream parties to accommodate posturing of caste politics relegates women as a nonentity in the political fray, at all layers—as vote banks, as leaders, and in the relevance of gender interests to political parties. The assertive vote for caste is further revealed in context of the honor killings sanctioned by caste institutions. The CPI in the party manifesto calls for laws relating to honor killings48 and the Congress “reiterates its unflinching resolve to combat communalism of all kinds and deal ruthlessly with those perpetuating atrocities on weaker sections like Dalits and women” without mentioning caste violence against gender.49 In Haryana and western Uttar Pradesh, rules of brotherhood disallow marriage within the same patrilineal class. Exercise of individual rights in preference to marriage partners have led to violation of the caste code and a matter of honor resulting in violent penalties of the involved, in accordance to caste decree.50 Yet party voices have remained silent and leadership in the region sensitive to the ire of the caste panchayats. As a vote bank they hold the electoral fortunes of candidates and even parties. Violation of gender rights, including physical annihilation can be ignored, without a ripple being felt. In an identity fractured polity, competitive politics asserts the privilege of identity over citizen or other identities. Not only is gender reconstructed in accordance to the identity values, but gender rights become subordinated to that of the group identity.

Women’s Representation: Gendering Democratic Institutions to Promote Gender Rights The under representation of gender in political decision-making bodies and positions of governance has been argued from perspectives of social justice, socially constructed skills, and styles of management

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of populations in the margins, to essentialist conceptions of women leadership. Biological leadership capacities of natural nurturance and peaceful inclinations remain outside the mainstream.51 And, female leadership in India has been found to be no less autocratic or more equal than male leaders.52 The dominant thrust for women’s inclusion in decision-making bodies remains the gender mainstreaming in resource allocation by reshaping political priorities.53 One-third reservations of women is expected to provide the critical push to gender interests being advocated. Women neither exist in a social vacuum nor have a biological propensity for overcoming the norms, values, and practices of a gender differentiating system. Women are as likely as men to prefer male children, demand dowry, discriminate against girl children in terms of health, education, property, employment, and be party to familial violence, accept female honor to be that of family’s, concede that women’s primary role is that of nurturer and caretaker while that of the men is to earn, lead, and protect women. Certainly, the female gender is no filter for patriarchy. Representation within the framework of existing normative standards which are the markers of masculinity may not result in better utilization of public resources for gender interests. One, at the leadership level, elected women “act as agents on behalf of their male relations and exercise power in their interests.”54 Second, the institutions are not gender responsive. The strategy of increased access to promote women’s development “tends to assume that the necessary institutions can be created relatively easily through political forces, underestimating the impact of weak and fragile institutions.” The corresponding relevance of traditional social capital, outside the formal sphere undermines the endeavors for gender equality.55 To illustrate, representation in panchayats—introduced almost three decades ago—could not build women’s leadership profile as reflective of authority, socially valued attributes of power, and political– cultural hegemony.56 Panchayat members continue to be identified as those who possess measures of control ranging from influence, threat, use of force, and in local parlance raub, dabka, leadri. It is expected that the panchayat leader shall perform multifarious functions. To quote:


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One has to answer calls at all times of the night—if a fight breaks out immediate attention is needed—one has to gather a number of people to intervene—difficult enough for a man, impossible for a woman—if a woman is a panch/sarpanch then these duties are carried out by her husband or a son—people respond to one who has the capacity to undertake their work—so a female remains a titleholder only—a privilege deemed by the government, she has no money of her own, no standing of her own in the community, no physical or social might to intervene and control incidents of violence.57

Since the standards of leadership are masculine characteristics at the panchayat level, women representation is seen either as supportive to male leadership or are represented through proxy variable. Classic instances of visitors being directed to a sarpanch’s house, the epitome of a leader, owner of a large landholding, affluent, huge house with a ready crowd of hanger-ons, eventually leads to the information that the post of sarpanch is actually held by a wife or servant (often a Dalit) in the household. Such an established pattern, while making a mockery of reservation highlights the situational requirements dictated by informal management that resides in caste and gender structures. Women’s representation is further restricted by the predominant value of protectionism toward the weak. This continues to be the male domain and women representation is seen as legitimate to the extent it promotes masculine norms, condones values, and abides by the codes of conduct of restrictive mobility. In this framework, representation becomes symbolic without reflecting the cultural ethos where violence is seen as a legitimate instrument of resolution of conflicts. Local leadership is further characterized as capable in terms of providing hospitality and timely patronage. Being a panch is an expensive and time consuming proposition. The kitchen must continually respond to the streams of people visiting for grievances, show of solidarity or for establishing contact—petrol has to be burnt to run around for peoples work.58

Another important aspect of value of protection is dispensation of justice in the case of conflict and violence, land encroachment, water distribution, and domestic disputes. At the micro level of governance, i.e., village panchayats, land related disputes and water

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distribution fall within the domain of male arbitration, whereas domestic disputes are assigned to women. In this also, negotiations are done by male panchayat leaders and the lady panch is involved in counseling the parents and womenfolk. The conduct of conflict negotiations bring out three aspects: first, women representatives are involved in private domain on issues relating to domestic violence; second, women leadership is only confined to interpersonal gender domain; and third, the male leadership continues to be involved in the business of conflict resolution and interest management. These gender cultural predispositions incapacitate women to perform the required role. My wife is sarpanch and the work is handled by me. I don’t like that girls of Jat Sikh family should go to the BDO Office and chat with him or go to police stations to get cases sorted out. These men have to be handled in different manners and at times their hands have to be greased. Women do not understand such things and if women start doing such work what respect will be left for them.59

Not only are the domains gender segregated but the dealings in panchayats are through masculine concepts—use of tacit or implicit force, use of public influence, money, mobility across time and group, protectionism, exercise of control over group affiliates, inspiring reverence and awe, entertaining, and hosting officials. In a gender defined society, leadership is sought and provided on the basis of gender values and subjectivities. Irrespective of the formal position, the political positioning is that of the social structure. Further, the symbolic prestige and positional aura is codified in symbols such as the pagri (head gear), brandishing a sword, forceful voice, and visible authority. National leaders like Sonia Gandhi to local leaders like Shruti Chaudhary (grasping the mantle of her grandfather legacy), were publicly presented pagris—a symbol of family head reserved for men, endorsing their leadership. Swords were also accepted by women leaders—a typically masculine symbol of power. Gender then remained a tool to be divested or used according to the need. Where public leadership demanded masculine gestures and symbolism, these were used by women candidates. Simultaneously cultural sensibilities


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of gender norms and conduct were cultivated through codes of conduct, style, and dress. There is no doubt that social institutions of decision-making, governance, implementation of justice, and enforcement of law have customarily been constructed and historically mainstreamed in accordance to male norms. It has been suggested that structural resistance to gender entitlements is now being dealt by entry of a critical mass of women to promote redistribution of resources in the failure of exclusive agendas.60 The quota representation continues to be promoted as a mode for pursuing legislative and policy change. The issue remains whether a gender specific agenda can be sustained in the face of institutionalized mechanisms of gender conduct codified in patterns of exchange and leadership values. “Institutionalisation of hegemonic masculine behaviour as the behavioural norms” has led to suggestions that female leadership absorb these masculine organizational norms.61 Such organizational mechanisms and norms may make women relevant leaders, but without gendering the political culture.62 Further, women’s representation at the grassroots level faces different hurdles, as compared to those at the national level. The leadership profile and conduct of business operative at the grassroots level may not be the same as that at the state or national level, but operative gender norms are similar. A review of women’s representation in elected bodies at the grassroots level, the state assembly level and that at the national parliament reveals a different gender discourse at each level. At the grassroots level, women representation is within the domain of the stereotyped gender roles. Women leaders are an extension of family representation and that of the collectivity. To that extent the norms of conduct, practices of engagement and leadership is defined by the dominant local gender functioning. At the state legislative level, women graduate to be the symbol of party, largely through their membership within the elite. Their role of leadership reinforces the social reality at the grassroots level since the nature of issues requiring decisions and allocation of budgets remains in the boundary of the normative gender functioning. However, at the national parliament level, women are representatives of their party and draw on the party positioning within the electorate, national discourse on democracy, justice, and rights.

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Conclusion To sum up, the 2009 elections have shown following distinct trends with key findings: 1. Women candidature in Parliament elections has increased along with the number of elected representatives. Yet, they provided a contrasting presence. Female participation in the democratic process was supportive with its large turnout of female voters, but even with increased numbers, the female leadership in state governance was low. 2. Gender issues were sprinkled by political leaders in their electoral campaign. Political parties continued to be more doleoriented and protectionist in their promise for women rights. Party leadership of mainstream parties occasionally referred to promote women’s empowerment, education, and income generation in their appeal to populations on the margins. However, women issues were a casualty to the dominance of identity construed placement of women in the Indian polity. 3. Electoral discourse was gender discriminatory at the micro level, whereas at the macro level the Election Commission, media and political parties took exceptions to sexist articulations selectively. Symbolic capital from gender stereotypes continued to add flavor to the electoral discourse. 4. Women participation in elections as voters has increased, but has shown no signs of its becoming a vote bank. Women electorate is not roused on women rights nor do political parties cultivate a gender support base. Raising of women right issues remains the personal agenda of candidates. Further, in a context of diversity, politics and global standards of social equity, women are a wild card entry into politics. Public office is sought by leveraging gender entitlements, to safeguard and extend family constituencies, and for gaining party credentials to diversity. 5. The electoral discourse established gender as an entitlement claim within the Indian polity. However, enabling these


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entitlements for the practice of rights remain unfettered. Women have poor representation in leadership—as candidates in party positions—institutionalized mechanisms for implementing laws are lacking, as is the universal access to basic facilities and resources and public mobilization to realize these rights remain unaddressed. Social reorganization of gender identity with the inter-sectionality of family, caste, or religious identity was accepted to promote the subordination of gender rights. There is a notable delink of the electoral discourse on women with the political discourse on gender in the country.

Notes 1. Government of India, Statistical Report on General Elections to the 15th Lok Sabha, Vol. I (New Delhi: Election Commission, 2009). 2. Under the Government of India Act, 1935, wifehood qualifications were the main criterion of women’s enfranchisement and six million women and 29 million men became eligible to vote. Kamaladevi Chattopadhyaya, Awakening of Indian Women (Madras: Everyman’s Press, 1939). 3. Only larger states with more than 10 seats have been analyzed. Election Commission of India, 2009. 4. Ibid. 5. Linda K. Richter, “Exploring Theories of Female Leadership in South and SouthEast Asia,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 63, No. 4, Winter 1990–91, pp. 524–40. 6. Ibid. 7. Data collated on the basis of Political Background which includes Relations by Blood or Marriage and Elite Class which includes Excellence associated with Superior Social Groups by Institute for Development and Communication, Chandigarh, 2009. Women linkages to male relatives (61 percent) was reported by Outlook, June 8, 2009. p. 8. 8. Henry. C. Hart, “Political Leadership in India: Dimensions and Limits,” in India’s Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State-Society Relations, ed. Atul Kohli (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 18–61. Also see, M.S.S. Pandian, The Image Trap: M.G. Ramachandran in Film and Politics (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1992). Mukulika Banerjee, “Populist Leadership in West Bengal and Tamil Nadu: Mamta and Jayalalitha Compared,” in Regional Reflections: Comparing Politics Across Indian States, ed. Rob Jenkins (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004), pp. 285–308. 9. Carole Spary, “Female Political Leadership in India,” Commonwealth and Comparative Politics, Vol. 45, No. 3, (2007), pp. 253–77.

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10. Atiq Khan. 2009. “The SP Protests Remarks Against Nafisa,” The Hindu, April 19. 11. Election Commission of India, Statement Showing the Complaint Regarding Statements Made Against Women during General Election to Lok Sabha, (New Delhi, 2009). 12. Ibid. 13. Indian Express, “Vote for Naujawan BJP, not Budhiya Cong.: Modi in UP,” April 11, 2009. 14. Indian Express, “For Modi Congress is now ‘Gudia Congress,” April 12, 2009. 15. The Indian National Congress: Lok Sabha Election Manifesto, 2009. 16. The Bhartiya Janata Party: Lok Sabha Election Manifesto, 2009. 17. The Communist Party of India (M): Lok Sabha Election Manifesto, 2009. 18. While issues of women’s development and access to services and facilities has been responsive to the global mandate on gender, the promulgation of protective laws particularly in relation to atrocities against women has been more in response to the women’s movement within the country. 19. The notorious Mathura Rape Case in which a 16 year old tribal girl was raped in a police station with a judgment vindicating the policemen caused a public outrage and provided the impetus for an amendment of law. Subsequent incidence involving rape by police personnel maintained the issue in public domain and intolerance of sexual abuse of women by the Indian public was strongly registered. 20. Government of India, The Dowry Prohibition Act (Act No. 28 of 1961) with State Amendments of Haryana Act 38 of 1976, Bihar Act of 1976, Himachal Pradesh Act 25 of 1976, Punjab Act 26 of 1976, and West Bengal Act 35 of 1975 (New Delhi: Ministry of Law and Justice, 1961). 21. Forum against sex determination and pre-selection was formed in 1984 in Mumbai, Maharashtra. In 1986, number of campaigns which involved picketing in front of clinics conducting sex determination tests had taken place. The misuse of sex determination tests for abortion of female fetus was noted by the AllIndian Institute of Medical Sciences (AIIMS) in 1975. Subsequently, the Indian Council of Medical Research (ICMR) halted these tests in 1976, but by 1979 the technology had spread into private hands. By 1982, women organizations in Delhi had condemned its misuse and recommended strict enforcement against its use. The Ministry of Social Welfare sought the Union Health Minister’s intervention to deal with the issue. 22. United Nations, The United Nations and the Advancement of Women 1945–1996, Vol. 6 (New York: The United Nations Blue Book Series, 1996). 23. The Bhartiya Janata Party: Lok Sabha Election Manifesto, 1957. 24. The Bhartiya Janata Party: Lok Sabha Election Manifesto, 1957; and The Communist Party of India: Lok Sabha Election Manifesto, 1962. 25. The Communist Party of India: Lok Sabha Election Manifesto, 1962. 26. Vibhuti Patel, “Gender Budgeting in India,” Paper presented at national workshop on Gender Budgeting—An Effective Tool for Achieving Women’s Empowerment,” by Equity Foundation, (Patna, 2007).


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27. Zoya Hasan, Gender, Religion, and Democratic Politics in India (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2009). 28. Pre-independence, as the Indian Constitution makers finalized the terms of Indian democracy, women’s reservation was rejected by women leaders on grounds of political equality. Kumud Sharma, “Power and Representation for Women in India,” Asian Journal of Women’s Studies, Vol. 6, No. 1, (2000), pp. 47–87. According to Sarojini Naidu, a Congress Party President, “The demand for granting preferential treatment to women is an admission on her part of her inferiority and there has been no need for such a thing in India as the women have always been by the side of men in council and in the fields of battle …” Sarojini Naidu, “Proceedings of the Fourth Session of the AIWC,” Presidential address to the All India Women’s Conference, unpublished, (Bombay: All Indian Women’s Conference, 1930). 29. Government of India, Mandal Commission Report of the Backward Classes Commission, Vol. 1, Chapter XIII (New Delhi, 1980). 30. Pippa Norris, “Conclusions: Comparing Legislative Recrutiment,” in Gender and Party Politics, eds Joni Lovenduski and Pippa Norris (London: Sage Publications, 1993), pp. 309–30. Susheela Kaushik, A Study of Women Candidates for the Eleventh Lok Sabha 1996 (New Delhi: National Commission for Women, 1996). 31. Spary, “Female Political Leadership in India,” pp. 253–77. 32. United Nations Fund for Children, The State of the World’s Children, Women and Children: The Double Dividend of Gender Equality (New York, USA, 2007). 33. UNICEF, The State of World Children, Maternal and New Born Health (New York, USA, 2009). 34. Committee of Feminist Economist, Towards Inclusive Growth: The Gender Dimension (New Delhi: Planning Commission, 2007). 35. United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation, Education for All, Global Monitoring Report: Early Childhood Care and Education. France: UNESCO, 2007. 36. Shireen Hassim, Rethinking Gender Politics in a Liberal Age: Institution, Constitutencies and Equality in Comparative Perspectives (Geneva, Switzerland: UNRISD, 2009). 37. Women are facing increasing atrocities and lower life chances with increasing female feticide. Government of India, Crime in India, National Crime Records Bureau New Delhi: Ministry of Home Affairs, 1997 and 2007). Crime against women in 10 years from 1997 to 2007 increased by 68.06 percent according to Crime in India. Also, child sex ratio (0–6 years) has decreased by 42 points i.e., 969 (1961) to 927 (2001) according to Census of India. GOI (1961 and 2001), Socio-cultural Tables, Volume I, Part II-C(i) and C-Series, Census of India, Office of Registrar General, New Delhi. 38. Government of India, Training of Police Officials Associated with Conduct of Election, No. 464/INST/2009-EPS, dated 9 January, (New Delhi: Election Commission, 2009).

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39. Government of India, The Representation of the People (Amendment) Ordinance Act, (New Delhi: Ministry of Law and Justice, 2002). 40. Amrita Basu, “Women, Political Parties and Social Movements in South Asia,” Occasional Papers 5, July, (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2005), p. 31. 41. Sunita Bose, Manisha Desai, Bandana Purkayastha, and Mangal Subramanium, The Study of Gender in India: A Partial Review, Gender and Society, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2003, pp. 503–24. 42. Shah Bano, as a divorced woman, had the right to demand maintenance under Indian Civil Law, which the Muslim Personal Law did not provide. Resorting to the Indian Civil Law was perceived by certain sections of Muslims as interference in undermining the Muslim identity. 43. The demand for uniform civil code by the BJP is claimed as necessary for gender justice. In 1967, their manifesto mentioned “A uniform civil code will be enacted to govern the laws on marriage, adoption, inheritance etc. of all Indian citizens. By 1996, it had specified a Uniform Civil Code (UCC), that will give women property rights, ensure women’s rights to adoption, guarantee women equal guardianship rights, remove discriminatory clauses in divorce law and put an end to polygamy.” Parties projecting a secular image or outright seeking Muslim votes denounce the uniform civil code as undermining the rights of minority groups. In fact, the Congress denouncing a UCC like other parties such as AIADMK, but have been proposing “legal equality for women in all spheres,” “effective implementation of social legislation,” yet the wording and engagement with religious groups portrays a prior religious claim according to religious protectionism in accordance to the political positioning of the parties. Manifesto of BJP, AIADMK, and Congress for Lok Sabha election for the year 2004. 44. John Hariss, Populism, Tamil Style: Is it Really a Success? (London School of Economics: Development Studies Institute Working Paper Series, No. 15, 2001). Available online at http://www.lse.ac.uk/collection/destic/pdg/wpis.pdf (last date of access: November 20, 2006). 45. Even state creation and maintenance of identities, in terms of reservation quotas, religious protectionism, and social reform have intruded to fragment the construction of a women category. Zoya Hasan, The Gender, Religion and Democratic Politics in India (Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Research Institute for Social Development, 2009). 46. Government of India, 2009: Election Commission, New Delhi. 47. According to NSSO, 62nd (2005–06) round OBC population of Punjab and Haryana is 20 percent and 24.41 percent, respectively. 48. CPI Manifesto. 49. INC: Lok Sabha Election Manifesto 2009. 50. Prem Chaudhry, Contentious Marriages, Eloping Couples, Gender, Caste, and Patriarchy in Northern (India: Oxford University Press, 2007). 51. Spary, “Female Political Leadership in India, pp. 253–77.


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52. Rajanayagam D. Hellmann, The Quick and the Dead: The Pioneer: TheWeeping Window (Project Discussion Paper No. 8, 2004). Available online at http:// uni-duisburg.de/Institute/OAWI/SS/institut/mitarbeifer/dynasties/publications. htm (last date of access: November 28, 2006). 53. The Beijing Platform for action states “women in political and decision-making positions in governments and legislative bodies contribute to redefining political priorities, placing new items on the political agenda that reflect and address women’s gender-specific concerns, values and experiences and provide new perspectives on mainstream political issues.” Platform for Action (PFA), 1995: 110.United Nations, The Beijing Declaration and its Platform for Action: The Fourth United Nation’s Conference on Women on Action of Equality, Development and Peace (Beijing, China, 1995). 54. Spary, “Female Political Leadership in India,” pp. 253–77. 55. Hassim, Rethinking Gender Politics in a Liberal Age. 56. Rainuka Dagar, Authority Systems and Construction of Masculinities in Punjab Chandigarh: Institute for Development and Communication, 2008). 57. Ibid. 58. Ibid. 59. Ibid. 60. Hassim, Rethinking Gender Politics in a Liberal Age. 61. Rhoda Reddock, “Women’s Liberation and National Liberation,” in Mies Maria and Rhoda Reddock (ed.), National Liberation and Women’s Liberalism (The Hague: Institute of Social Studies, 1982), pp. 9–13. 62. Spary, “Female Political Leadership in India,” pp. 253–77.

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Chapter 7

The BSP in 2009: Still Making Progress, But Only as a Dalit Party Christophe Jaffrelot

Mayawati’s BSP has been classified among the losers in most of the post-elections press reports. This is fair enough given its expectations based on its performances in the 2007 and 2008 state elections. In 2007, the BSP won 206 seats with 30.46â•¯percent of valid votes in Uttar Pradesh and in 2008, it won important by-elections in Uttar Pradesh (UP)1 and made inroads in three of the states which went to polls. In Madhya Pradesh, it jumped from 7.26â•¯percent of the votes in 2003 to 11â•¯percent and from two to seven seats. In Delhi it grew even more dramatically, from 5.76â•¯percent to 12â•¯percent and from none to two seats. Even in Rajasthan and Chhattisgarh the party crossed the 5â•¯percent mark with respectively 8â•¯percent and six seats and 6.5â•¯percent and two seats.2 Converted into Lok Sabha seats, these achievements meant that in 2009, the BSP was in a position to win about 50 seats and might be the king maker. The party got only 21. The party leaders emphasize, and rightly so, that such a figure still represents progress compared to the previous Lok Sabha elections. But these elections may still mark a turning point in terms of strategy since the party is back to its Dalit roots.

What Setback? If we compare the performances of the BSP during the 2009 Lok Sabha elections to previous general elections, which is the only fair way to analyze electoral results, we come to an unambiguous

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Figure 7.1 Percentage of Votes Polled by BSP Candidates

Source: F Durand- Dastès, Base Map: M. Colin and M. de France.

conclusion: the BSP is continuing its forward march. Since 1999, over the last 10 years, the party has made steady, significant progress. The 1991 and the 1999 elections were setbacks in terms of valid votes and seats, the 2009 one is not, in none of these respects. In fact, the BSP has become the third largest party, thanks to its own progress and the decline of the Communist Party of India (Marxist) [CPI(M)], which may be a milestone in itself. The 2009 elections may be a turning point in the history of the BSP and Indian politics at large not only because the party has dislodged the CPI(M) from the third position, but because it has acquired a

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Christophe Jaffrelot Figure 7.2 Votes Polled by the Candidates of the BSP

Source: F Durand-Dastès, Base Map: M. Colin and M. de France.

national stand. For the first time, the BSP has crossed the 5â•¯percent mark in about half a dozen states. Uttar Pradesh (UP) remains the party’s stronghold, where it continues to make progress jumping from 24.6â•¯percent of the valid votes in 2004 to 27.4â•¯percent in 2009. Except in Awadh, where it declined by 2.5â•¯percentage points, the party made progress in every region of UP, including a 6â•¯percent jump in the west where it got 31.4â•¯percent of the votes (as much as in the East).3 The BSP was the runner-up in 46 seats, among which it lost

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The BSP in 2009 Table 7.1 BSP Vote Percentage in Seven General Elections Year

Candidates

1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004 2009

246 231 117 251 N.A. 435 500

Winning candidates 3 2 11 5 14 19 21

% of valid votes 2.07 1.61 3.64 4.7 4.2 5.33 6.17

Sources: Election Commission of India, Report on the Ninth General Elections to the House of the People in India, 1989, (New Delhi: Government of India Press, 1990), p. 7; Election Commission of India, Report on the Tenth General Elections to the House of the People in India, 1998, (New Delhi: Government of India Press, [n.d.]), p. 9; Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Elections, 1996 to the Eleventh Lok Sabha, Vol. 1 (New Delhi, 1996); G.V.L. Narasimha Rao and K. Balakrishnan, Indian Elections: The Nineties (Delhi: Har-Â�Anand, 1999); Y. Yadav and S.Kumar, “Interpreting the Mandate,” Frontline (November 5, 1999), p. 120–26; and Y. Yadav and S. Palshikar, “Between Fortuna and Virtu: Explaining the Congress’ Ambiguous Victory in 2009,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 39 (September 26, 2009), p. 33.

three by a margin of less than 10,000 votes and three others by less than 20,000 votes. Neighboring states also have become important places. In Uttarakhand and Haryana, the BSP multiplied its performance by about three to cross the 15â•¯percent mark. In four other states, Punjab (the only state where the party is in decline), Delhi, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra, the BSP got about 5â•¯percent of the valid votes. These figures need to be disaggregated. In Madhya Pradesh, the BSP received 12â•¯percent of the valid votes in Vindhya Pradesh, a region adjacent to UP where the BSP has been strong for almost two decades. In fact, this is the place where the party had its first Member of Parliament (MP) elected and once again this is the place where it got its only non-UP-based MP elected. Similarly, the BSP won 11.4â•¯percent of the valid votes in eastern Vidarbha, a region which used to be a stronghold of the Republic Party of India (RPI), a party the BSP has eclipsed in Maharashtra. BSP also won about 6â•¯percent of the valid votes in western Vidarbha and Marathwada.4

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Even in states where the party is far from the 5â•¯percent mark, the BSP is carving out sub-regional niches for itself. In Rajasthan, for example, where the party received only 3.37â•¯percent of the votes against 7.6â•¯percent during the previous state elections, the party got 6.7â•¯percent of the valid votes in the western region.5

What Strategy? If the election results do no represent a setback for the BSP as a party, it may be one for its strategy. The 2007 UP elections had been the testing ground of a strategy initiated by Kanshi Ram himself in the late 1990s consisting in opening up, not only to non-Dalit people—something he had always done, right from the creation of the Backward and Minority Communities Employees’ Federation (BAMCEF), as evident from the name of the organisation itself—but also to non-Bahujans, i.e., to upper castes, provided they were not given a share of power that would be superior to their share of the population. As a result, Kanshi Ram nominated an increasing number of upper caste candidates in the 1999 elections, in proportion of theirâ•¯percentage in the population.6 Kanshi Ram left the scene in 2003 after he was incapacitated by a stroke, but Mayawati pursued the same agenda. She simply adapted it to the conditions of UP where a Dalit-dominated party like Table 7.2 BSP Vote by State in 2009/2004 (Where it has Crossed the 5 Percent Mark) States Uttarakhand Uttar Pradesh Punjab Haryana Delhi Maharashtra Madhya Pradesh

% of valid votes 15.3/6.8 27.4/24.6 5.75/7.67 15.7/4.9 5.3/2.4 4.8/3.1 5.85/4.75

Source: “Appendix IV,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 39, (September 26, 2009), pp. 204–05.

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The BSP in 2009

the BSP was in a better position to attract Brahmins and Vaishyas. These two groups had more interests in common with the Dalits than the Rajputs. Their common enemy was the nexus formed by the dominant Other Backward Castes (OBCs)—including the Yadavs— and the Rajputs, both landed groups which attempted to rule village life and which they considered as responsible for the declining law and order situation. This strategy culminated in the kind of ticket distribution Mayawati made in 2007. Table 7.3 The BSP Candidates and MLAs in 2007 (2002) in Uttar Pradesh

Tickets Elected

OBC

Dalits

110(122) 51

93 62

Brahmins Muslims Vaishyas Rajputs Kayasth Total 86(37) 39

61(85) 24

14(6) 12

38(36) 18

1(3) 0

402 206

Source: The Hindu, March 14, 2007 for the candidates, interview with Suresh Mane, Mumbai, June 8, 2009, for the MLAs.

This strategy produced good results. The BSP could rely on its Dalit supporters in such a way that it could ask them to vote for upper caste, Muslim, or OBC candidates who brought with them additional suffrages from their own community. The BSP’s transferable vote bank and this “plus vote” explained the 2007 success. Table 7.4 Voting Pattern of the UP Castes and Communities in 2002 and 2007 Caste and community 2002 2007

Dalits

OBC (Non-Yadavs)

Muslims

Upper castes

69 77

20 27

10 17

5 16

Source: CSDS Data unit.

Among the upper caste BSP new supporters, the Brahmins were in the largest numbers.The “plus vote” strategy was still successful in 2008 when the BSP fielded three Brahmin candidates, out of five, in by-elections where the party was fully successful (see Note 1). Mayawati’s discourse, therefore, had shifted from caste to class and from a bahujan-centered repertoire to a more open one as early as the

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mid-2000s. She made it clear as early as April 2006 in an interview she gave to The Hindu: The majority of the people in our country are poor. Even among the higher castes, it is a smallâ•¯percentage that is privileged, the rest are poor and have the same wants of roti, kapda, aur makan (food, clothes and shelter). […] We are for an equal social order. Social inequality and discrimination result in economic inequality, if opportunities were truly equal, there would be no economic inequality. Our aim is to establish a samata muluk samaj (a society based on equality). […] I am still against manuwad. What is manuwad? It is division of society into four varnas. The BSP wants to end this discriminatory order, and we have succeeded to quite an extent. As upper castes integrate with Dalits, mutual suspicion and hatred will end. This is samajik parivartan (social change).7

After becoming Chief Minister (CM) she made it clear that she would support any move by the center to amend the Constitution in order to allow reservations for the religious minorities and the upper caste poor, which implied, among other things, that the 50â•¯percent cutoff fixed by the Supreme Court should be removed.8 As CM of UP, she initiated an ambitious reservation program in the framework of her “New economic policy” which relied to a great extent on publicprivate partnerships, something Mayawati’s close lieutenant, Shashank Shekhar Singh was particularly keen to expand.9 In each Public-Private Partnership (PPP) project—where the government’s share could not be less than 11â•¯percent and more than 49â•¯percent—10â•¯percent of the posts would be reserved to the Scheduled Castes (SCs), 10â•¯percent to the OBCs and religious minorities, and 10â•¯percent to the upper caste poor.10 Henceforth, wherever she spoke in India, one of the promises she made regarding reservations, was to have them implemented not on the basis of caste, but on an economic basis. In Mumbai, for instance, she held a mammoth meeting in Shivaji Park in November 2007 where she said: The day we come to power at the Centre, we will introduce reservations based on economic criteria even before you demand them […] If you want this in your state, elect the BSP to power. For this, the backwards will have to come together with the upper castes. Our party works for

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all communities on the principles of Sarvajan Hitaya, Sarvajan Sukhaya (Welfare of all community and happiness of all community).11

Introducing reservations on an economic basis (arthik adhar par) has been one of the items of the Bhartiya Janata Party’s (BJP’s) program, right from the early 1990s. In order to hammer her point, Mayawati not only held meetings like the Mumbai one all over India, but more specific ones aimed at the upper castes before the Lok Sabha elections. These “upper caste conventions” had been initiated in 2005 in UP.12 The man in charge of them was Satish Chandra Mishra, a Brahmin lawyer who had been chairman of the Bar Council of Uttar Pradesh in 1998–99 and then Advocate General of UP in 2002–03 before joining politics. He became All India General Secretary of the BSP in 2004 and was elected to the Rajya Sabha in July of the same year.13 After the 2007 elections, Mishra became chairman of the UP Advisory Council and, as a result, one of the close lieutenants of Mayawati. Mishra focussed on his caste, fellow-Brahmins. He organized Brahmin mahasammelans (Brahmin congregations) at the districtlevel in 2005 and Mayawati was able to address the first state-level Brahmin mahasammelan on June 9, 2005. Similar meetings were organized focussing on the Vaishyas,14 the Kshatriyas and even the Yadavs. But the Brahmins remained the primary targets, as evident from the Bhaichara Banao Samitis (Brotherhood Building Committees) that Mayawati set up in all the 403 assembly constituencies of UP. As Smita Gupta puts it, “Each samiti, structured down to booth level, had 300 brahmins and 100 Dalits, with a Brahmin chairman and a Dalit general secretary. Each assembly area was divided into 25–30 sectors, with each sector responsible for eight to 10 booths.”15 While they were rather successful in UP where the state apparatus could be mobilized in their favor, the turn out has been rather disappointing for the organizers in Madhya Pradesh.16 The BSP adopted the same strategy in states where it was still embryonic. In Karnataka, for instance, where the party made a point to field candidates in all the constituencies for the 2008 assembly elections, its state president, Marasandra Muniyappa, a former Janata

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Dal minister,17 announced in a quasi Gandhian vein: “We are trying to bring in an understanding between the ‘upper’ and the ‘lower’ castes.”18 As a result, the BSP announced that it would field 10â•¯percent Brahmins, 30â•¯percent Lingayats and Vokkaligas, 37â•¯percent OBCs, 23â•¯percent Dalits, and 12â•¯percent Muslims, i.e., 112â•¯percent, since obviously 100â•¯percent was not sufficient to accommodate everybody.19 Mayawati continued the same strategy during the 2009 election campaign and pursued it all over India. She made clear that she was now aiming at reaching power at the center by starting a national campaign on the 21st of March in Thiruvananthapuram (formerly called Trivandrum) and by using two complementary slogans, “…ab Dilli ki bari hai!” and “Sarvjan Hitay, Sarvjan Sukhay,” a jingle which echoed another one, explicitly phrased in caste terms: “haathi nahi Ganesh hai, Brahma Vishnu Mahesh” [Not elephant but Ganesh; Brahma, Vishnu, Mahesh (Gods identified with the upper castes)]. In order to become the spoke person of the whole of society, she emphasized that, as Prime Minister of India, she would grant reservations to the poor of the upper castes too. Hinting at the negative impact of the boosting of the private sector at the expense of the public one, she declared: “These parties which favour the rich are creating laws to gradually end reservation for the Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes and Other Backward Classes in [one] form or the other. The BSP promises to provide reservations even for the poor among the upper castes.”20 Besides the upper castes, the BSP continued to aim at the Muslims, one of its oldest targets. In 2006, Mayawati had criticized the way one of Mulayam Singh’s Yadav’s Muslim ministers, Yakib Qureshi, had offered a reward for the death of the Danish cartoonist who had depicted Prophet Mohammed in a disrespectful manner by saying that Muslims had a “preference” for fundamentalist leaders and hardliners (kattarpanthis). The United Democratic Front, a Muslim party that has become especially strong in Assam had then called the BSP Muslim Members of Legislative Assembly (MLAs) and MPs to leave their party and the Samajwadi Party (SP) youth wing had burnt Mayawati effigies. As CM, she made a point to defend the cause of the Muslims. In July 2008, she opposed the India/United States (US) nuclear deal with

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The BSP in 2009

an eye on the Muslim community which was supposed to be against it because of anti-Americanism.21 In October 2008, she demanded a judicial probe into the Batla House encounter, sent the Azamgarh DM and the police chief of Sanjarpur village to the families of the Muslim boys who had been killed in the Batla House to reassure them that no raids by the Delhi or Mumbai police would be conducted without the assistance of the Azamgarh police. More importantly, during the election campaign, she took a strong stand against a famous BJP candidate, Varun Gandhi the son of Sanjay Gandhi, who during an election speech in Pilibhit constituency, where he was contesting, made derogatory remarks against Muslims. She immediately invoked the National Security Act and Varun Gandhi was put behind bars. Table 7.5 Caste and Community of the BSP Candidates in Uttar Pradesh: 2009 Lok Sabha Elections Caste and community Upper castes Brahmins Rajputs Banyas Khatris Other Backward Classes Yadav Gujar Mali Lodhi Pal Nonya Kewat Kurmi Rajbhar Other Scheduled Castes Chamar/Jatav Pasi Other Muslims Unidentified Total

Number (%) 29 20 5 3 1 15 3 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 18 11 5 1 14 2 80

Source: Mrayayug, April 2009, p. 15 and interviews at the BSP Central Office (New Delhi, June 10, 2009).

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Christophe Jaffrelot Table 7.6 Caste and Community of BSP Candidates in Maharashtra: 2009 Lok Sabha Elections

Caste and community Upper castes Brahmin Khatri Other Intermediate castes Maratha Other Backward Classes Kunbi Mali Teli Kalar Scheduled Castes Buddhists Scheduled Tribes Muslim Unidentified Total

Number (%) 7 5 1 1 5 5 5 1 1 2 1 12 12 6 8 1 45

Source: Interview with Suresh Mane, Mumbai, June 8, 2009.

The BSP did not give as many tickets as before to Muslim candidates, but they were still almost as numerous as the OBCs in UP and second only to the Dalits in Maharashtra. The BSP strategy did not bear much fruit. Certainly, at an all India level the proportion of upper castes voters who supported the party increased by twoâ•¯percentage points and that of the Muslims by three, but these figures fell short of the expectations of the party leaders. This setback can be explained in many different ways: 1. The logic of general elections is different from that of state elections. The BSP has almost always done better in state elections than in general elections, especially among upper castes and Muslim voters. In 2009, one could have expected an antiincumbency factor in UP, but there was nothing of that kind if we go by the Center for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) figures.

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The BSP in 2009 Table 7.7 Anti-incumbency Factor in UP Parties and leaders

BSP (%)

BJP (%)

SP (%)

Congress (%)

Which party can best curb 27 22 19 16 corruption? 27 19 16 22 Which party can best maintain law and order in UP? Who is the best personality Mayawati Rajnath Singh Mulayam Singh Rahul Gandhi for Chief ministership? 28 12 27 4 Source: Mirza Asmer Beg and Suhir Kumar, “Uttar Pradesh: Signs of a Congress Revival?” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 39 (September 26, 2009), p. 190.

Table 7.8 Satisfaction with Performance of UPA and BSP Governments among UP Voters UPA government at the center Fully Satisfied Somewhat Satisfied Somewhat Dissatisfied Fully Dissatisfied No Opinion/Don’t Know

23 42 6 10 19

BSP government in UP 22 33 11 22 12

Source: Mirza Asmer Beg and Suhir Kumar, “Uttar Pradesh: Signs of a Congress Revival?” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 39 (September 26, 2009), p. 193.

â•… At the same time, the UP voters were rather happy with the UPA government at the center. In fact, a majority of them were “fully” or “somewhat” satisfied with the UPA government in Delhi and the BSP government in UP. â•… In such a context, Mayawati could not compete with Manmohan Singh for getting the upper castes’ vote. More generally speaking, nontraditional supporters of the BSP might have not found in her a leader of a national standing. Besides, 54â•¯percent of the interviewees in UP responded that they were willing to give the UPA government another chance.22 2. The Muslims have their own reasons for returning to the Congress instead of supporting the BSP, or remaining with the SP whose chief, Mulayam Singh Yadav in fact betrayed them by inducting Kalyan Singh in the list of his party candidates in

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order to consolidate the OBC vote behind him. Yet, 30â•¯percent of the Muslims voted for the SP against 46â•¯percent in 2007. Many Muslim voters might have believed in the promises of the UPA regarding the implementation of the Sachar Committee Report and have had doubts regarding the reliability of the BSP’s commitments to secularism. Rumors were circulated among Muslim voters that, in case of a hung parliament, the BSP might join hands with BJP as it had done before in UP. â•… These considerations partly explain why the Muslim voters were more numerous on the Congress side than on the BSP side (25â•¯percent, i.e., + 11â•¯percentage points compared to 2007, against 18â•¯percent, i.e., a modest + 1â•¯percentage point) and, more importantly, why the upper caste deserted the BSP: only 9â•¯percent Brahmins voted for the party (against 16â•¯percent in 2007) and only 7â•¯percent Rajputs (against 12â•¯percent in 2007). In UP as elsewhere, the BSP was left with its Dalit support base, but an expanding one.

A Dalit Party First, but Which Dalits? BSP remained a Dalit party more than anything else, in spite of a slight diminution of oneâ•¯percentage point of its share of the Dalit vote. While the party was still lagging behind the Congress, it could compete with it so far as the Dalit vote was concerned. Table 7.9 Vote of the Congress/BSP by Caste and Community Caste and community Dalit OBC Brahmins Muslim Rajput Banya Bhumihar Source: CSDS Data Unit.

Cabinet minister (%) 8 4 4 1 1 1 1

Independent charge (%) 11 7 4 4 4 – –

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The BSP’s ability to attract Dalit voters was even more obvious at the state level. In the northern states where the party is flirting with the 5â•¯percent mark, it now gets between 21–27â•¯percent of the Dalit votes, except in Haryana where it received 57â•¯percent of the Dalit vote. This achievement has probably much to do with the polarisation of the electorate along caste lines. The Congress made a special effort to woo the Jats and, indeed, the party got 42â•¯percent of their votes (+17â•¯percent). This might have been one of the reasons why the Dalits, who often have been oppressed by Jats in the countryside, deserted the ruling party. Only 34â•¯percent cast their vote in its favor, i.e. a decline of 35â•¯percentage points.23 This shift away from Congress, perceived as the party of the Jats, in favor of the BSP was certainly not unrelated to the tussle between Mayawati and Tikait, the Jat leader of the Bhartiya Kisan Union (BKU), who had had made a very derogatory reference to the “Chamar” Chief Minister at a farmers’ rally in Bijnor in April 2008. A case was filed under the SC/STs (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and Tikait was arrested. The fact that the BSP has been able to attract a larger section of the Dalit vote might be questionable, given the fact that in many states, it was really popular among one jati only. The Jatavs of Madhya Pradesh are a case in point here. But this objection needs to be qualified from two points of view: 1. To gain the support of a Dalit jati is quite an achievement when the jati in question plays an eminent role in the public sphere. This is obviously the case, not only of the Jatavs of the Hindi belt, but also of the Buddhists of Maharashtra who are by far the most educated Dalits of the state. The fact that the BSP now gets 37â•¯percent of their vote, as against 30â•¯percent to the UPA, suggests that the party has conquered the core of the Ambedkarite movement in its very birthplace. 2. The BSP is not the party of one jati only in at least one state, the most important one, UP. Here, the BSP can be called a Dalit party because it did not only attract 85â•¯percent of the Jatavs, but also 64â•¯percent of the second largest Dalit jati, the Pasis (or Dusadhs), and 61â•¯percent of the other Dalit jatis.

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As a whole, the Dalit support for the BSP registered an 8â•¯percent increase in UP. This is a new development in a state where non-Jatav Dalit groups used to vote massively for the Congress and even the BJP (e.g., the Balmikis). This qualitative change probably resulted from the Dalit politics of the Mayawati government, but also from its policies. â•… In terms of politics, she formed a government where Dalits were in large numbers, though she made a point to accommodate other groups as evident from Table 7.10. Table 7.10 Caste and Community of Mayawati’s Government in 2007 Caste and community Dalit OBC Brahmins Muslim Rajput Banya Bhumihar

Cabinet minister

Independent charge

8 4 4 1 1 1 1

11 7 4 4 4 – –

Source: Interview with Suresh Mane, Mumbai, June 8, 2009.

In terms of policies, the BSP government paid more attention to the Dalits than to any other social group. As soon as she took over as Chief Minister, Mayawati issued a government order to clear the backlog quota of SCs, STs, and OBCs on May 31, 2007. As Sohini Guha puts it on the basis of her fieldwork in UP, including among the Lucknow bureaucrats, the BSP has “accomplished the fullest implementation of quotas ever achieved in the state.”24 In July of the same year she increased the daily agriculturalist wage from 58 to `â•›100—a measure benefiting mostly Dalits—and decided to implement new reservations among police officers in favor of the SCs/ STs (23â•¯percent quota) and the OBCs (27â•¯percent) as well as the Muslims. A few months later she dismissed about 22,000 policemen for corruption and maladministration, mostly Yadavs who had been appointed by Mulayam Singh. Finally, in October, she initiated a better promotional policy for SC/STs government employees.

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155

In addition, the Mayawati government relaunched the Ambedkar Village Scheme, which represented one-tenth of the UP budget in 2007, i.e., `â•›10,000 crore, which has resulted in the construction of roads, schools, and wells in many localities with an high proportion of Dalits. It has also redistributed some land to landless peasants, who are generally Dalits even though the availability of land was limited. Last but not least, the government returned to a strict implementation of the SCs and STs (Prevention of Atrocities) Act by making the administration, including the police,25 more responsive to the Dalits. This last move has been resented by the upper and dominant castes who are realising that not only the Dalits were asserting themselves economically, but even more psychologically under Mayawati. The BSP identified itself with the Dalits even more explicitly when Mayawati declared in 2007 that a Chamar would take over from her at the helm of the party, one day. While the BSP is more a Dalit party than anything else after the 2009 elections, this designation needs to be qualified. All Dalits are not supporting the party to the same extent. Certainly, caste remains a line of cleavage with the Jatavs and the Buddhist Mahars forming the core group of the BSP’s supporters. But class also plays an increasingly important role. Among the Jatavs, for instance, the richer the voters are, the more favorably inclined they are toward the Congress. Not only class makes a difference, but also the location. Even though this class-based differentiation is observed in the rural as well as in the urban part of India, in the villages even the rich Jatavs do not vote more for the Congress than for the BSP. If the rural Jatavs are the only ones supporting the BSP more than the Congress, or as much the BSP as the Congress, whatever their social class, the class element is evident from the voting pattern of all the Dalit jatis: Dalits, be they in the countryside or in an urban setting are almost systematically more favorably inclined toward the BSP the poorer they are. It means that the party has in a sense unified the Dalits irrespective of their caste on a class base. The party can therefore claim to be a Dalit party—and not a Jatav party—more than ever before because of its capacity to attract the poor Dalits. Ambedkar used to say “the caste system is not only a division of labor, it is also a division of the laborers.” It is not as true as it used to be at his time, at least in terms of political identification.

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Christophe Jaffrelot Table 7.11 The Dalit Vote for the BSP in Seven States

States

% of dalit votes

Chhattisgarh Delhi Haryana Madhya Pradesh Maharashtra Punjab Uttar Pradesh

27 23 57 Jatavs: 27, Other Dalits: 6 Mahars: 15, Buddhist Dalits: 37, Other Dalits: 9 21 Jatavs: 85, Pasis: 64, Other Dalits: 61

Source: CSDS Data Unit.

Table 7.12 Congress Percent Lead over the BSP in Different Categories of Dalits

Castes and classes Rural upper class Rural middle class Rural lower class Urban upper class Urban middle class Urban lower class Total Number

Jatavs, Charmkars and Madigas

Large Dalit jatis*

Small Dalit jatis

Congress/ BSP re: All Dalits

–2 0 –22 35 1 –21 –7 2,026

21 28 3 23 22 12 16 2,291

25 23 13 45 28 15 21 1,144

31/19 32/18 20/24 39/7 31/14 26/19 27/21 N.A.

Source: Rahul Verma, “Dalit voting patterns,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 39 (September 26, 2009), p. 95–96.

Conclusion The 2009 elections have been a setback for the BSP only because of the expectations that had arisen from the 2007 and 2008 state elections, especially in UP with the party shifting from the Bahujan to the Sarvajan “magic formula.” But the logic of general elections is different from that of state elections and the policies Mayawati implemented in UP anyway showed that she worked primarily for the Dalits. Indeed, if the BSP has lost some of the non-Dalit support it had got during the recent state elections, it gained additional supporters among the Dalits. It is more a Dalit party than ever before

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The BSP in 2009 Table 7.13 The BSP Vote in UP by Caste and Community Caste and community Brahmin Rajput Other upper castes Yadav Kurmi/Koeri Other OBCs Jatav Other SCs Muslims Others All

% of valid votes

Gain/loss compared to the 2007 state elections

9 7 11 5 18 19 84 64 18 23 27

–8 –5 –1 –3 –5 –9 –1 +8 +1 –5 –3

Source: Mirza Asmer Beg and Suhir Kumar, “Uttar Pradesh: signs of a Congress revival,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 39 (September 26, 2009), p. 192.

Table 7.14 Vote of the Congress/BSP by Locality Locality All rural All urban Metros Towns All

Vote share in 2009 29/7 29/5 30/4 29/5 29/6

Change from 2004 3/–1 0/2 –5/–1 1/2 3/1

Source: Y. Yadav and S. Palshikar, “Between Fortuna and Virtu: Explaining the Congress’ Ambiguous Victory in 2009,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 39 (September 26, 2009), p. 39.

in the sense that it has been able to attract voters from many more different Dalit jatis than before on a pro-poor agenda. The BSP, therefore, is not back to square one. In fact, this class element may help the party to evolve a new strategy. Ambedkar had always oscillated between class and caste so far as his political parties were concerned. In the 1930s, the Independent Labour Party was supposed to be the party of the workers,26 in the 1940s, the SCs Federation was intended to be the party of the Dalits and in the 1950s, the Republican Party of India was again aiming at a less caste-based, restrictive constituency. The BSP is back to its

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Christophe Jaffrelot Table 7.15 Vote of the Congress/BSP by Class

Class Rich Middle Lower Poor Very poor All

Vote share in 2009 30/5 29/5 30/6 27/8 25/9 29/6

Change from 2004 5/2 –1/3 4/2 2/1 –2/2 3/1

Source: Y. Yadav and S. Palshikar, “Between Fortuna and Virtu: Explaining the Congress’ Ambiguous Victory in 2009,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 39 (September 26, 2009), p. 40.

Dalit core-group. After the 2009 elections, Mayawati focuses more on the poor of this category. She made a symbolic gesture by ordering that henceforth top police officers should visit areas where atrocities are committed against Dalits on the same day27 and she relaunched the transfer of village lands to the Dalits. But she may also concentrate more on the poor of the other caste groups which are bound to become more and more differentiated in socioeconomic terms while reforms are unfolding their impact. The BSP may have a window of opportunity if the Congress is looked at as “pro-rich” because of this reform process. The party already made more progress, electorally, among the rich than among the poor between 2004 and 2009 (see Table 7.14). However, the BSP will succeed in implementing this strategy, and possibly any strategy, if and only if it builds a robust party structure. After the 2009 elections, which caused her some strong disappointment, Mayawati blamed the administration. She shifted 34 IPS officers, mostly from places where the BSP lost the elections,28 and sacked all the chairpersons and members of all state corporations, except the Chairperson of the State Women Commission, Abha Agnihotri, the sister of Satish Chandra Mishra.29 She could also have blamed herself for some obvious mistakes, not so much regarding the statues she has built to her honor all over UP,30 which is a relevant strategy to impose the footprint of the Dalits over the public space, but regarding the way she distributed the party tickets this time. She

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has probably made a mistake in three cases, so far as the party-building process is concerned: 1. When the nomination went to non-party cadres whose only asset was financial, like Deepak Bhardwaj, the richest candidate from Delhi. 2. When the candidate was a well-known criminal, like Aruna Shankar Shukla, the former SP MLC (Member of Legislative Council) who joined the BSP to contest from Unnao in UP. 3. When old party cadres were sidelined—often at the last minute—to accommodate new comers for which, as a result of this move, the party workers would not canvass enthusiastically. These mistakes are often the symptom of a nonfunctioning party apparatus. Dalit parties have always suffered from this weakness. Ambedkar was never able to build a party structure and cultivated the bad habit of holding party meetings where he was and when he wanted. In the case of the BSP, the intense personalization of power not only resulted in wrong decisions, as the one regarding ticket distribution, but also in the expulsion or sidelining of all those who expressed reservations vis-à-vis one aspect of Mayawati’s policy or another. As a result, the number of the former BSP leaders who are now out of the party and have often founded their own is now quite significant. Sone Lal Patel, the former BSP leader is at the helm of the UP Apna Dal. Om Prakash Rajbhar, a former lieutenant of Mayawati has created the Bhartiya Samaj Party which polled 3.5â•¯percent of the valid votes in the 2007 assembly elections. R.K. Chaudhary, a former minister in Mayawati’s government, has started the BS4 which now has seven MLAs. Masood, another former minister in Mayawati’s government has launched the National Loktantrik Hind Party (NLHP), and Raja Ram Pal, former BSP president has started the Bharatiya Sarvodaya Party. These parties have formed an alliance along with the Adhikar Manch, the Vanchit Party, and the Lokpriya Samaj Party. Such a division of the Bahujans recalls the trajectory of the RPI, which the BSP may follow if it does not build a more collegial party structure.

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Notes â•‡ 1. In April 2008, one year before the general elections, BSP won all five UP by-elections. It retained the Azamgarh and Khalilabad Lok Sabha seat. It also retained the Bilgram Assembly seat and won the Karnailganj and Muradnagar Assembly seats. Incidentally, three of the five winners were Brahmins and one was a Muslim. â•‡ 2. For more details, see A.K. Verma, “Bahujan Samaj Party: Beyond Uttar Pradesh,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No.7, (February 14, 2009), pp. 19–22. â•‡ 3. Mirza Asmer Beg and Suhir Kumar, “Uttar Pradesh: Signs of a Congress Revival?” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 39, (September 26, 2009), p. 191. â•‡ 4. R. Deshpande and N. Birmal, “Maharashtra: Congress-NCP Manages Victory,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No.39, (September 26, 2009), p. 137. â•‡ 5. S. Lodha, “Rajasthan: Performance and Campaigning Pay Dividends,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No.39, (September 26, 2009), p. 187. â•‡ 6. See S. Pai, “BSP’s new electoral strategy pays off,” Economic and political weekly, (October 30, 1999), p. 3100. â•‡ 7. “Mayawati: ‘No Promises, No Manifesto, Only Performance’,” The Hindu, April 12, 2006, http://www.hindu.com/2006/04/12/stories/2006041206071100. htm (last date of access: April 13, 2006). â•‡ 8. As early as May 2007 she declared: “If the Centre brings an amendment (to the law) providing for reservation for poor among the upper castes and the religious minorities we will welcome it. If not, then we will take our own measures to help these weaker sections in Uttar Pradesh”. The Hindu, May 14, 2007, http://www. hindu.com/2007/05/14/stories/2007051410210700.htm (last date of access: May 15, 2007). She requested Manmohan Singh to take the lead on this front in 2008, suggesting that an amendment should be included in the Ninth Schedule for making the arrangement permanent as already has been done for Tamil Nadu where the quotas represent 69â•¯percent. The Hindu, February 2, 2008. http://www.hindu.com/2006/04/12/stories/2006041206071100.htm (last date of access: February 3, 2008). â•‡ 9. A former pilot turned bureaucrat who became cabinet secretary under Mayawati in 2007, Singh behaved like a working CM implementing policies when Mayawati was concentrating more on politics. 10. Atiq Khan, “Quota System for PPP Areas in U.P.: Mayawati,” The Hindu, December 25, 2007, http://www.hindu.com/2007/12/25/stories/20071225548 50500.htm (last date of access: December 26, 2007). 11. Cited in “Eye on Centre, Maya for more Quota,” The Indian Express, November 26, 2007, p. 2. 12. C. Jaffrelot, “The BSP in Uttar Pradesh. Whose Party is It?” in S.M. Michael (ed.), Dalits in Modern India, (Delhi: Sage, 2007), pp. 260–86.

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13. For details see, http://bspindia.org/satish_chandra_mishra.php (last date of access: April 5, 2009). 14. “Bania Sammelans” were organized in half a dozen UP cities and were rather successful before the 2007 elections, apparently because the trading community, which was the first victim of kidnapping and extortion—both often going together—attributed the degradation of the law and order situation to the nexus between the Mulayam Singh Yadav government and the Rajput and Yadav Mafiosi. 15. Smita Gupta, “BSP at the Crossroads,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 26 and 27, (June 27, 2009), p. 21. 16. See, for instance, “BSP’s ‘Brahmin sammelan’ turns Damp Squib,” Central Chronicle, November 27, 2007 (last date of access: November 28, 2007). 17. In Karnataka, the BSP benefited from a collective of former Janata Dal (Secular) [JD(S)] leaders, especially those of the Surendra Mohan faction who joined the party together. Among the 34 JD(S) cadres who made this decision, the most prominent ones were Trishulpani Patel, the son of former Chief Minister J.H. Patel and P.R.G. Sindhia, a former minister. 18. The Hindu, April 9, 2008, http://www.hindu.com/2008/04/22/stories/ 2008040952550100.htm (last date of access: April 10, 2008). 16. Ibid. 20. K.V. Prasad, “Mayawati Promises Quota for Upper Caste Poor,” The Hindu, April 22, 2009, http://www.hindu.com/2009/04/22/stories/2009042258050500. htm (last date of access: April 24, 2009). 21. The Shia cleric and Imam-e-Juma of the historic Asafi Masjid in Lucknow, Maulana Kalbe Jawwad—a member of the All India Muslim Personal Law Board—called on Mayawati at her residence in order to thank her for opposing the nuclear deal (Atiq Khan, “Mayawati reaches out to Muslims,” The Hindu, July 9, 2008, http://www.hindu.com/2008/07/09/stories/2008070961111400. htm (last date of access: July 10, 2008). 22. Beg and Kumar, “Uttar Pradesh: Signs of a Congress Revival?” p. 193. 23. K. Pal and P. Rai, “Haryana: Congress retains its Electoral Supremacy,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 39, (26 September 2009), p. 179. 24. S. Guha, “‘Asymmetric Representation’ and the BSP in UP,” Seminar, No. 571, http://www.india-seminar.com/2007/571/571_sohini_guha_htm (Accessed on June 11, 2009). 25. As Shivam Vij noticed while touring UP in late 2007â•¯: “Yadavs have been removed from the post of SHO in police stations across the state and Dalits have often replaced them—something the SP objected to in the Vidhan Sabha” (Shivam Vij, “The Life and Times of Sarvajan Samaj,” [email protected] (last date of access: September 3, 2007). 26. In fact, the word “caste” appeared only once in its 1936 manifesto. C. Jaffrelot, Dr. Ambedkar and Untouchability. Analysing and Fighting Caste, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2005), p. 75.

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27. “Justice for Dalit Victims on the Same Day: Mayawati,” The Hindu, May 27, 2009, http://www.hindu.com/2009/05/27/stories/2009052752751180300.htm (last date of access: May 28, 2009). 28. Atiq Khan, “Mayawati shuffles Top Police Officers after Elections,” The Hindu, May 23, 2009, http://www.hindu.com/2006/04/12/stories/2006041206071100. htm (last date of access: May 24, 2009). 29. “Heads Roll after BSP’s Poor Show in U.P.,” The Hindu, May 19, 2009, http:// www.hindu.com/2009/05/19/stories/2009054430500.htm (last date of access: May 20, 2009). 30. On April 14, 2008, Mayawati became the first Chief Minister to unveil her own statue in the state capital, Lucknow. This life-size statue was placed next to that of Kanshi Ram, both of them facing the statue of Ambedkar and his first wife Ramabai, which Mayawati unveiled at the same time on the occasion of Ambedkar Jayanti (Birthday).


Part II

Analytical State Studies

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Chapter 8

Gujarat Goebbel’s Propaganda and Governance: The 2009 Lok Sabha Elections in Gujarat1 Ghanshyam Shah

Gujarat is the only state in India where the BJP has continuously secured over 50â•¯percent of the total seats in the last six Lok Sabha elections. It secured 20 out of 25 seats from Gujarat in 1991, the 10th Lok Sabha polls. The sweeping victory paved its way to secure power in the state in 1995 by capturing 121 of the 182 seats in the Assembly. However, its shares in votes declined from 50â•¯percent in the Parliament to 43â•¯percent in the Assembly polls. The polling reversed in 2007 and 2009. In the Assembly, the party secured 127 seats and 49.85â•¯percent votes and in the Parliament, it captured 15 out of 26 seats with 46.53â•¯percent votes. The gap in votes between BJP and the Congress is just 3.15â•¯percent as against 21.38â•¯percent in 1991, the lowest since 1991 (see Figures 8.1 and 8.2). L.K. Advani was the hero in 1991. He led a Rath Yatra from Somnath to Ayodhya. Following the yatra, he contested from Gujarat for the first time, and thereafter continues to fight from Gandhinagar Parliament constituency. But his position had changed in 2009 despite being the party’s prime ministerial candidature. He was not the charioteer in Gujarat. Narendra Modi was in full command. 20 years back, Modi was considered to be a protégé of Advani. He worked as an organizer for the Rath Yatra in 1989. This time while inaugurating

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Ghanshyam Shah Figure 8.1 BJP and Congress Votes in Lok Sabha Elections (1991–2009)

Source: “Statistical Report on General Election” for different elections, Election Commission of India, New Delhi. Available online at http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/ index.asp?lang=eng

Figure 8.2 BJP and Congress Votes in Assembly Elections (1990–2007)

Source: “Statistical Report on General Election” for different elections, Election Commission of India, New Delhi. Available online at http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/ index.asp?lang=eng

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the party’s Lok Sabha election campaign, Advani showered praises on Modi’s leadership and his “achievements in a relatively short time.” After the impressive victory in the 2007 Vidhan Sabha elections, speculations floated in political circles that Modi was trying to carve out a national role for himself. In early 2008, hoardings appeared with a picture of Modi waving his arm along with the slogan: “Maru swapana: Hariyalu Bharat” (My Dream: Green India). Below the picture it stated that Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) stations had been set up across Gujarat,2 indicating his dream to replicate Gujarat in India. Later, in January 2009, several important business tycoons including Anil Ambani, Sunil Mittal, and Ratan Tata hailed Modi as “the future prime minister.” Ambani said that the way he had transformed Gujarat, he could change the complexion of the country. “[A] person like him should be the next leader of the country,” Mittal asserted.3 BJP leaders like Arun Shourie and Jaitley also lauded him. A vernacular newspaper stated in April: “Because of the pressure from RSS Advani expressed his desire not to contest. Narendra Modi will fight elections from Gandhinagar constituency for Lok Sabha.”4 More importantly, a majority of the BJP voters in Gujarat, according to the National Election Study (NES) carried out by CSDS, preferred Narendra Modi rather than Advani as the “the next Prime Minister of India” (see Table 8.3). Thus, it was a Modi focused elections in Gujarat. His spirit and confidence were very high and he expected to do better in the Lok Sabha polls than the December 2007 Assembly elections. This paper explores the possible reasons for the BJP’s victory from Gujarat, in reference to the earlier polls and especially the role of Narendra Modi. The survey data presented here is based on NES 2009 and 2007.

Modi’s Mission Modi was the star campaigner of the BJP in the 2009 elections. Among his fans and the party cadre he enjoys an image of an expert in “personality development and party image building.”5 When he became the Chief Minister (CM) in October 2001 by ousting Keshubhai Patel, he lacked a social base in Gujarat. At that time the party was in

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disarray as it lost power in most of the local governments, and was also defeated in two by-elections. After resuming office, he won elections from Rajkot with a thin margin, a traditional stronghold of the party and Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS). His strength increased after a few months due to the emotive issue of Hindutva coupled with the large scale 2002 carnage. Fear psychosis with a catchy question that he raised, “Apanu kon” (who is ours—who will protect us?) inflamed emotions. He won Assembly elections with a thumping majority. But within 18 months, emotions began to subside. The party’s performance in the 2004 elections in Gujarat was not as good as the previous Vidhan Sabha and the 1999 Lok Sabha polls (see Figures 8.1 and 8.2). The Congress regained its support in the intensely riot affected constituencies.6 Moreover BJP lost power in the center. By this time, as a shrewd politician committed to Hindutva politics, Modi might have realized the constraints of the CM’s office to translate Hindutva ideology into the democratic system. Hindutva rhetoric of the 1990s had diminishing return. RSS, Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP), Bajrang Dal could be effective in raising an emotional pitch but less useful to sustain people’s support. To nurture Hindutva, “development” had to be embraced. It may be noted that the BJP won power in Gujarat in 1995 not only with Hindutva plank but also with a promise to establish “bhaya, bhukh, and bhastachar mukta” (free from fear, hunger, and corruption) Gujarat.7 The ideologues—Golwalkar, Sudarshan, etâ•¯al.—have repeatedly asserted that the present era was the period of transformation based on Hindutva philosophy. Modi shares their faith that Hindutva would lead the world in the 21st century. Though the concept of Hindutva remains ambiguous, except the dominance of Hindus, economic policy of the BJP has changed to be in tune with capitalism.8 His upbringing in the Shakha culture makes him a self styled moralist, with a holier than thou syndrome. He seems to believe that most of the party members were interested in goodies and personal power. Therefore they had to be under surveillance for “good governance.” He was determinant “to run the organization in his own way, direction and style.”9 Like Sarsanchalk of RSS, his agenda was to have trusted and disciplined loyalists. Moreover, after winning the


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2002 elections his increased confidence led him to believe he could expand his base in civil society and also directly relate with the people at large. To reduce his dependence on and “interference” of the party workers, he leaned on the government machinery. For him, the bureaucrats were more dependable and obedient than the party and Sangh Parivar activists for governance. In the process, he discarded dissenters and competitors. Eventually BJP in Gujarat became synonymous with Modi: “BJP is Modi and Modi is BJP.” The state party president emphasized, “We have Narendra Modi, he is the symbol of Gujarati asmita (pride) and he is our mascot. When you have a leader like Modiji, why do you need anything else?”

Conquering Civil Society During the 2002 carnage, a major and dominant segment of the Gujarat civil society—journalists and columnists, litterateurs, philanthropists, and social workers maintained more or less silence. A few of them were disturbed by violence and blamed mobs of religious fanatics for the “riots.” These Samaritans without assigning responsibility for the violence, appealed for peace and harmony. Most of them however did not believe that the violence was “large scale” and continuous. They did not consider it to be the state’s responsibility to control the situation. For them, the incidents were isolated, sporadic, and an aberration in “non-violent peace loving Gujarat.” Media, particularly of English language, allegedly exaggerated it so as to defame Gujarat. “This was all political for votes and we are not interested in politics,” concluded a number of commentators. At the same time a number of these civil society actors were of a view that all that happened after Godhara was “inevitable” and “good” so as to put “others” in their place in society. According to them, “Hindus have now gained confidence.” “Muslims were taught a good lesson,” a well-known poet said.10 Most NGO activists also shared these beliefs. Like litterateurs, they also declared that they were away from politics. Or, “we are concerned with our ‘constructive’ work; and we have to get grants

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from the government.”11 Without taking a political position, a few NGOs got involved in providing “relief” to the victims. There were of course, isolated individuals who protested against the carnage, and blamed the state for not controlling the situation and saving the victims. Such voices were on the fringes of the civil society. Modi with his experience as pracharak and an activist during the Navnirman and anti-emergency movements knows the terrain well. He interacted directly or indirectly with the mainstream civil society actors, and therefore was aware of their vulnerability. Pravin Sheth, Modi’s former teacher in Political Science informs us in 2002, “Narendra Modi was extremely alert in order to build his own image.”12 Several media persons with whom I talked confirm this. At the time when he resumed office, his image among those who were close to BJP was of an organizer at best and manipulator at worse. He was “politically exiled from the state in 1998,”13 and was not allowed to dabble with the affairs of the Gujarat BJP. Yet, he successfully orchestrated the ousting of Keshubhai Patel and became the CM. A similar game was being played at the BJP’s Goa meeting, when Vajpayee wanted Modi to resign after the 2002 mayhem. After coming to power, first of all he managed to carve out his image as Hindu Hriday Samrat, the King of Hindu hearts. During the 2002 communal pogrom and the subsequent elections, he repeatedly talked about Hindutva, Hindu ethos, tolerance, and magnanimity of Hindus and their glorious past. Simultaneously, he not only ridiculed Muslims as “backward” but also accused them of an agenda to increase their population so as to become a majority. According to him, Islam and Christianity are the “real roots” of terrorism in India.14 With such assertions and slogans, he established himself as the champion of Hindus. To reinforce the image, the public relations officer of the Government of Gujarat (GOG) projected him as a “God with a beard.” A senior journalist gave heading to his article on Modi, “woman likes strong husband and people like masculine leader.”15 On the eve of the Assembly elections, Modi was portrayed as charioteer Krishna, carrying Sudarshan Chakra, and guiding State Energy Minister Saurbha Patel shown as Arjun. The sloka (stanza) “Yada Yada Hi Dharmasya … ” was painted just above Modi, showing him as the savior of Dharma.16


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In December 2003, Gujarat, the mouth-organ of the state government, brought out a special issue titled Satya Samachar (True News) on the eve of Modi’s one year rule. The editor invited Dr Gunvant Shah, a former professor and a popular columnist known as Chitank, a philosopher to write on that occasion. He wrote that in one-year’s period “Narendra Modi has done his best. His inner strength and will power are extremely useful factors for the State.” Shah also advised him, “It is necessary to take solid steps in order to assure Gujarat’s Muslims that they are safe and totally secured.” Though like Vajpayee, the author did not ask him to perform his Raj Dharma; he however underscores that “such a point of criticism was published in Government’s own magazine.” Later, Modi went to meet him at his residence. The columnist wrote that on Ram Navmi day in 2005, Modi came to his home. They talked for 56 minutes. “After the meeting was over, I was convinced that Gujarat is bound to forge ahead under the regime of this workaholic Chief Minister. A citizen may doubt about his secularism, but regarding his competence, even his enemies may not doubt.” He continues: “people of Gujarat have realized that this man is totally different. He is neither humble nor ego less. Competent rulers are not humble.”17 Noted litterateur and journalist Bhagavtikumar Sharma appreciates Modi’s “no-nonsense” attitude, his non-corrupt image, dynamism in his working that has enthused in the governance. Another litterateur Chandrakant Baxi wrote that for the first time one who is sitting on the CM’s chair “has given an aura of dignity.”18 Modi’s often repeated pronouncement: “Hau Khato nathi and Khava deto nathi (I am not taking bribe and do not allow others to take)” has impressed these civil society actors. They believed that the man with the “chappen kee chati” (56 inch chest)—strong and courageous— would end the evil. On the other hand, they abused all critics of Modi’s leadership as pseudo secularists who were “always fanatics, antiHindus, and pro-Muslims”, and responsible for communalism.19 In April 2007, Modi’s collection of poems Aankh a Dhanya Chhe (Blessed are these Eyes) was launched in Mumbai. The audience featured influential literary personalities. While launching the book, a well-known poet Suresh Dalal said, “Modi is a sensitive person belonging to the realm of heart and politics. One can see ‘kalpvriksha’

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[blesses one with what is desired] in his one eye, and ‘samkalapviksha’ [strong determination] in the other. And that yields him fruits of abundance and achievement.”20 The Chief Minister was lauded as the country’s representative to the world in the global context.

Gujarat Asmita (Pride) Modi embodied Gujarati asmita; though the Jan Sangh kept a distance from the movement for the formation of Gujarat in the 1950s. Chiman Patel, CM in the late 1980s, reinvented regional identity politics with a slogan “naya [new] Gujarat.” Patel skillfully mobilized the middle class on the Narmada dam issue and aggressively attacked all those who opposed the project as “enemy” of Gujarat and its “development.” Modi followed his footsteps and made a cocktail combining Hindutva and the dam as “development.” The 2002 election campaign was launched with “Gujarat Gaurva [honor]” yatra (journey of pride in Gujarat), covering 5000 km throughout the state. The starting point of the yatra was Phagvek, the holy place of Kshatriyas who constitute a sizable majority in central Gujarat. The legend associated with Phagvel is that over two centuries ago, a Hindu warrior, Bhatiji, had waged a battle against Muslims to protect a herd of cows. Bhatiji, in whose memory a temple had been built, is believed to have died fighting. The purpose of the yatra, Modi said was to instill in the people of Gujarat pride and self-confidence, which they lost after the sectarian violence. When the opposition parties denigrate Gujarat as “Godse’s Gujarat,” the need for restoring Gujarat’s gaurva is all the more important, Advani asserted. In other words, it was an exercise to justify the carnage and to take pride in it. Civil society actors kept mum. In 2002, Modi coined a slogan, “Aapanu [our] Gujarat, Aagavu [distinct] Gujarat.” Next year, 2003, Modi celebrated Gujarat foundation day as “Gaurva Day.” Now, every year this celebration is being organized in different cities. The first was in Vadodara. In order to manage the programs, the government roped in civil society organizations, including schools and colleges. Various saffron organizations


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became actively involved in the celebration. For instance in Vadodara, the Gujarat Asmita Sangh (Organization of Gujarat Pride), an offshoot of the VHP, organized a mahayagna ‘‘to ward off evil spirits from Gujarat … for the honour, culture and all-round progress of the state.’’ The Sursagar Lake Deepotsav, (Lighting in the lake) and bhajans were organized by the Satyam Shivam Sundaram Samiti, sponsored by a BJP leader. The government then popularized slogans such as “Vibrant Gujarat,” “Nirmal [clean] Gujarat.” In 2007, the government had brought out glossy colorful stickers, with the slogan “I love my Gujarat” on the front of the sticker and a list of the government’s achievement on back of it. Along with the slogan, the sticker carries a photograph of Modi facing a large gathering of people. In 2009, the slogan was “Swarnim [Golden] Gujarat” with the CM’s picture prominently displayed. He repeatedly said that he was obsessed with Gujarat. One of the advertisements with Modi’s picture says: “Body is dedicated. Mind is dedicated. For your sake this life is dedicated. Oh God—Give me that strength so that my life—is dedicated to Gujarat.” His notion of “Gujarati asmita” is synonymous with “Hindu identity” as conceived by Savarkar.21 The Congress had no critic for this conceptualization. A few litterateurs, columnists, and social scientists openly interrogated and challenged the formulation. 22 But a large segment of Gujarati intelligentsia either shares Modi’s articulation or wishes to remain silent on this issue because they consider themselves as “non-political.” Modi skillfully depicted all the criticisms against him for the carnage, intolerance, anti-Muslim attitude, and injustice to victims as adverse comments on the five crore population of Gujarat. He repeatedly accused his critics, particularly non-Gujarati English speaking intelligentsia, as “Gujarat haters” and jealous of Gujarat’s development. Chandrakant Bakshi went to the extent to say that the English speaking intelligentsia at large was the “Anti-Gujarat, Secular Taliban.” Another writer, S.K. Modi says: What drives these English language men and women? Why do they enjoy putting down their own: Their own country. Their own society. What kind of complex are they suffering from? … The reporting by the English

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language media has been so full of bias, so vengeful towards the Hindu community and so full of hate for the Gujarati society at large.23

In this scenario, Modi and his admirers never missed any opportunity to strike out at those who indulged in bashing Gujaratis about the 2002 carnage, with sweeping generalizations on Gujarati society as “intolerant” “communal.”24 Such comments also were directed to, not only those who were on the fence, but also critics of Modi. Pro-Modi columnists emphasized “Gujarati asmita” and labeled the critics as “fundamentalist secularists.” After the NDA’s defeat in 2004, Modi raised the bogey of injustice to Gujarat by the central government. In his poll campaign, the issue was hammered by twisting facts and figures. It was alleged that the union government has a step-motherly attitude toward Gujarat. The question was asked: “How long we should suffer from injustice?” Answer to such an insult was “to vote for BJP.” The Congress party countered Modi’s figures and interpretation through advertisements during the election campaign. Dissidents of the civil society, a very tiny segment have very limited space. Such columnists had been told by the proprietors of Gujarati newspapers to be careful in writing against Modi. And if some were to write critical comments, the editors used their authority not to publish them. Dissident NGOs often experience harassment in their activities. A few of them, particularly working among the Dalits and Adivasis were often asked to prove their credential, especially that they were not involved in conversion. Those in academic institutions, their work was under constant surveillance, regarding what they write and say on public issues.

Politics of De-politicization: “Development” When Modi began his inning in 2001, Congress was regaining its ground in local governments with its social engineering formula— alliance of deprived castes and classes. To counter this, within 15 days of resuming office, Modi introduced samaras, i.e., social assimilation village schemes to discourage village panchayat elections. The Congress


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could not oppose the scheme as the party initially formed it when it was in office in 1991, though with a different nomenclature.25 The samaras villages were assumed to have, “no discussions, no disputes but unanimous decisions taken harmoniously.” These villages were offered a “motivation grant” of `â•›60,000 to `â•›1,00,000 depending upon their size. After five years, the grant was increased to 1.5 lakh. Besides financial incentives, the government used the administrative machinery to build pressure on villages to become samaras. Pro-BJP NGOs were also “roped in to spread the samaras message and help achieve the ‘targets’.”26 With all these efforts, 26â•¯percent of the villages opted to be samaras in 2001. The number increased to 29â•¯percent in 2006. Though socioeconomic and political conflict continues to simmer not only in the non samaras but also the samaras villages; the message for apolitical development gets reiterated. The 2009 election advertisement of BJP was: “No discussion, vikas [development] is the mantra of BJP. Rastravad is BJP’s mahamantra.” Even the BJP MLAs were instructed what to ask and what not to ask in the state assembly during the question hours. Intra-party debate had been eliminated. Bureaucrats were asked to follow orders and not to raise queries. During the 70 months of his first tenure, there had been 2.5 days sitting per month of the state Assembly, the lowest number in the history of Gujarat Assembly.27 No state Planning Board had been formed. Autonomy of the state funded cultural and literary organizations had been considerably abridged. The dominant segment of civil society had no dispute with an apolitical notion of “development.” They found that a “new Modi”— the “vikas purush”—man for development had emerged. According to them, Modi was transformed from “saffron to software brand.” His “power point” presentations, video-conferences, “e-governance,” “broadband telephoney,” and “karmyoga” impressed them. But, for Modi: Hindutva and development are not contradictory. How can Ram Rajya be anti-development? Ram Rajya is all about providing opportunity for those who need help. What should be on the nation’s top drawer is the resolve to redeem Gandhiji’s pledge to wipe out every tear from every eye. And that is Ram Rajya. Only pseudo secularists argue that Hindutva and development cannot coexist. It only exposes their perverted thinking.28

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Development Hype and Governance It has to be emphasized that Modi became CM of a state dominated by entrepreneurs. Mercantile and industrial capitalism has grown since the mid-19th century. Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) has gone up from 3.32â•¯percent in 1960s to 4.88â•¯percent in the 1980s, and 5.53â•¯percent in the 1990s. Various infrastructure facilities have been built gradually to attract investment from within and outside the country.29 As early as 1965, the GOG formed the Gujarat Export Corporation Ltd to assist and foster the development of export trade. In the early 1990s, on the eve of structural change in India’s economy, it ranked next to Maharashtra in industrial growth. In the 1980s, the state aspired to become a mini Japan. It was the first in 1990 in announcing its new industrial policy. Therefore Gujarat has benefited from reforms “much more than other states.”30 The industrial sector has performed consistently well and has accelerated further in the 1990s. 2000–01 was an exception as the state experienced both earthquake and draught. It returned to 9.5â•¯percent growth rate in 2002–03 when Modi formed the government. Soon after taking reign, Modi announced the goal of attaining growth rate of 10.2â•¯percent over the next five years. The growth strategy he announced was: “Panchamrut” yojana gyan shakti [power of knowledge], jal shakti [power of water resources], urja shakti [power of energy resources], jan shakti [power of human resources], and raksha shakti [power of defense].31 While highlighting the concept of “Gujarat Unlimited,” the CM reiterated that his government was “firmly committed to economic reforms.” NRI Gujaratis were appealed to “revolutionize” Gujarat with their investment.32 Later in 2003, the Vibrant Gujarat global investor conference was organized with lots of publicity to attract foreign investment. This has become a regular feature every two years. Besides, transparent deals and no pending files, the investors had been offered infrastructure facilities at cheap rates, and more subsidiaries and tax holidays than earlier. Investments increased with many more incentives, the development of Industrial Parks and Special Economic Zones. Some industrialists stated that Gujarat was becoming a “truly world class


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state.” They wanted Modi to be India’s PM. People were promised that industrial growth would provide more employment and unlimited opportunities to prosper. Middle class became jubilant. Jyotigram Scheme introduced in the late 2004 was another effort to win popular support in rural areas. Though 97â•¯percent of the villages in Gujarat were electrified by 2002, electric supply was erratic in some parts of the state. Three-phase electricity declined from 18–20 hours in the 1980s to 10–12 hours by the end of the 1990s. Hence, “power supply to agriculture became the key issue in Gujarat’s mass politics.” During 2001–02, the government was considering the proposal to gradually raise tariff and regularize power supply. The state was then “in the midst of major power sector restructuring exercise with a loan from the Asian Development Bank.” Modi quickly not only endorsed the proposed scheme with certain changes but saw its speedy implementation. Rural households have been provided 24 hours electric power for domestic use and 8–10 hours for agriculture. While doing this, he also increased power tariff, which was an unpopular step and opposed by a section of farmers. But the decision also reinforced his image as a man of action and “good governance” even though some small and marginal farmers and landless were adversely affected. The scheme was indeed an “astute political management of intervention in an arena surcharged with animated mass politics.”33 Construction of the controversial Narmada Dam was conceived and planned in the 1960s to enhance irrigation and provide drinking water. The first phase was completed in 2000. During the draught in 2001, Modi’s predecessor government decided to pump water directly from Narmada and distribute it through a 2700 km long pipeline to the needy villages and towns. Completion of the project did not take place by the target date in 2006 and only 21.2â•¯percent was operative in 2007. However it did ease the drinking water problem in some parts and provided hope to others.34 Modi took credit for the Narmada Dam and projected himself as upholder of “good governance.” In Kutch, he told a large gathering, “For the last 50 years, people were being fooled with empty talk. Your dream were realized only when we brought Narmada water to your doorstep.”35

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Along with such steps, he also sold many dreams. In 2005, the government released water from the dam into the dry Saraswati River in north Gujarat. He called it mahasangam (grand union) of two holy rivers. More than a thousand sadhus were brought to the function at state expense. The CM announced, “The resurrection of Sarswati will enrich the people of region.” But within a few months, “Narmada water … turned into a drainage line with sewage and waste being dumped on the bed by the municipality.”36 The flow of water discontinued because the municipality could not pay `â•›50 lakh per month for the pumping of the water. Similarly, when gas was found in a well drilled by the state-owned Gujarat State Petrochemical (GSPC) in the Krishna–Godavari basin, Modi went on to proclaim that the discovery was a mammoth 20 trillion cubic feet and would transform Gujarat. He told a gathering of farmers in North Gujarat that “very soon their farms will have oil wells, and every morning tankers would line up outside to collect crude!”37 One finds similar hype stories on “Niramal Gujarat” or “Sujalam Sufalam” projects, on campaigns for “girls’ education” or “Dikari bachao” (Save daughters) and other campaigns. In 2005, while facing revolt within the party, he announced in a public meeting, “What has not been done in the last forty-five years, we will do in the next forty-five months.”38 Later, on the eve of the Assembly elections he asserted, “It is our misfortune that … after Gujarat came into existence in 1960, no one thought about the basic infrastructure for development. Much of my effort has gone into filling up that gap… I have tried to bring in real democracy.”39 In 2004, India Today awarded Modi as “No. 1 Chief Minister,” and Rajiv Gandhi Foundation ranked Gujarat No.1 in the Economic Freedom Index. The government, business houses, and pro-Modi NGOs placed hoardings with Modi’s picture throughout the state congratulating him for the achievement. The government printed his picture in newspaper advertisements, placards and government broachers, as well as food relief packets, mid-day meal packets, and even condoms. A government advertisement with Gandhi and Modi’s photographs reads: “On the footsteps of Mahatma, Gujarat grows every movement.”


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Gujarat No.1 was the central thrust of the Assembly as well as the parliament elections. A tiny section of civil society actors questioned the nature of development which favored the rich and urban middle class. A few highlighted Gujarat’s low rank in health and education. It was demonstrated that the investments in industries had not increased employment. The condition of the workers in unorganized sector had been worsening. But majority of the middle class intelligentsia was not interested in such dimensions of development. The Congress refuted Modi’s claims and accused him of twisting the figures. The party alleged that he had created “false impression about safe, good education, employment for youth, twenty four hours electricity and prosperity of farmers. These are illusions. In fact there is a fire, anger among people because of atrocities on women, suicide of farmers, loss of business, unemployment, poverty …”40 But the assertion was not the core of the campaign. More important, the party did not present an alternative vision of development that could improve their economic conditions. The Gujarat Congress had no agenda to attract the vocal middle class mesmerized by the Government’s tall claims of No. 1.

Election Organization and Strategy The final say on the selection of the BJP’s candidates for all elections in the state from panchayats to parliament was with Narendra Modi. After a setback in the 2004 Lok Sabha elections and rising opposition in the party, he concentrated on municipal elections to wipe out inner party opposition. He began with a “no repeat” theory in nominating candidates to meet the anti-incumbency factor, and also to prevent consolidation of power with any local leader. He cultivated direct rapport with people and told party workers that he would not tolerate anyone who is “inefficient” and “non-loyal.” In the inaugural election campaign in Gondal Municipal elections, Modi told the people: I am not here to beg your votes for the election but I have come here to express my apologies. Five years back you trusted the BJP and elected us with thumping majority. But we have failed to meet your expectations.

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I know that our sitting councilors have made this place hell. You have all rights to punish us in this election. I have dropped them and have not given ticket. But now you have to pardon BJP and give one chance to us.41

“No repeat” theory with a few exceptions was applied to all the seven municipal corporation elections. People were told that those who had not worked for them were punished by the party and a new team was offered. The strategy had an electric effect. The BJP won all of the Municipal Corporations with absolute majority. In the State Assembly elections, 43â•¯percent of the sitting MLAs were given tickets. All of them were his loyalists. For the Parliament, out of 16 sitting BJP MPs, three were repeated—Advani, Hiren Pathak, former Minister and Rajendra Sinh Rana, former BJP State president. In choosing the candidates, Modi had taken into account a combination of factors: loyalty, caste identity, and financial power. Individual character and record of work in the party were not the major considerations. Among the 26 candidates for the parliament, two were not members of the party on the day of selection. The Congress also had no other criteria for the selection of the candidates. Moreover, intra-party faction fights dominated its selection process. Each faction pressured the High Command to select their nominees. This was more so during the Assembly elections because each of the faction leaders aspired to be the CM. Therefore, they recommended tickets for those who supported their candidature. Decisions also related to campaign strategy and operations— including daily press notes, banners, and media advertisements— were meticulously planned and supervised by Modi.42 In a figurative and real sense, Modi’s mask dominated the campaigns of the Assembly and parliament elections. Well before the state Assembly elections, we learn that he collected and compiled information regarding caste composition, influential elite in different spheres, party workers, and local issues for each constituency. Congress lacked such advance planning. Moreover Modi gave lessons to the party workers regarding booth management, public relations, emphasizing which questions to be raised about the earlier governments of Gujarat and UPA rule, and asked them to highlight achievements of his government.43 He warned the disgruntled leaders who failed in


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getting party tickets that they would have to face disciplinary actions if they worked against the party. Whether such threats worked or not is a different issue. But there was fear and accountability in the party. The Congressmen lacked such accountability. Both the parties promoted conferences of various castes at the state and district levels to solicit support. Party leaders belonging to certain castes were deputed to address the meetings where their caste-fellows were in large numbers. BJP also had an advantage of social networking of the Sangh Parivar and religious sect organizations. Congress did not have such organizations at the ground level for voter mobilization. In the Lok Sabha as well as the Vidhan Sabha and local government elections, though the main focus of Modi’s campaign was development, his Hindutva plank was also well entrenched. In the 2002 elections, his anti-Muslim posture was blatant in his phases, idioms, and illustrations. In the election campaign for the Ahmedabad Municipal Corporation in 2005, Modi equated the sitting Congress mayor, a Muslim woman to a Mughal period begum. He announced, “We have decided to free the people of Karnavati [Ahmedabad] from the shackles of Mughal rule where begum Sahebas and Badshahs are in control.” He asked the voters “to free the people of Ahmedabad from Mughal rule.” In his first campaign speech for the Vidhan Sabha polls, Modi said that the design of the new two-rupee coin has been changed, replacing the map of India with a cross, a veiled reference to Sonia Gandhi’s religious background. Modi referred to the Central government as the Delhi Sultanate or Delhi durbar. He frequently accused the Congress of playing vote bank politics by appeasing minorities, particularly Muslims. BJP’s advertisements were: “[Congress] will sell country for votes? … Reservation on religious basis for votes … Removed POTA [Prevention of Terrorist Activities Act] for votes, protect terrorism for votes, protecting mafias for vote … BJP has disclosed this hypocrisy … BJP will win.” During the Assembly elections, Modi countered aggressively when Sonia Gandhi the Congress president accused him as a “maut ka sodagar” (Merchant of Death). He criticized her for protecting terrorists. Terrorism and security was another issue which Modi and Advani frequently raised during the Lok Sabha poll. They asserted

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that Gujarat was the safest state in India with the lowest crime rate, implying that is due to Modi’s rule. “Terrorist could not target Gujarat.” When the Supreme Court asked the Gujarat Special Investigative Team (SIT) to investigate role of 68 officers and political leaders including Gujarat Chief Minister Narendra Modi in the post Godhra carnage, he alleged “this is the Congress’ conspiracy to send me behind bars.” On the day of polling, the BJP advertisement was a “picture of a woman who is tying rakhi [holy thread] to Modi. Below it was the sentence: ‘Our Narendrabhai in jail? Do you accept this? Uproot the Congress today by voting BJP. Defeat all those who are against Gujarat.’”44 BJP asserted that Manmohan Singh was a weak and indecisive Prime Minister whereas Advani, the PM in waiting was strong. The people were asked to vote BJP for the strong leader who could take firm decisions. Congress had no comparable local leader who enjoyed widespread respect in all parts of the state, not to speak of matching Modi’s popularity. In the parliament elections, all the Congress literature carried pictures of Sonia Gandhi, Manmohan Singh, and sometimes of Rahul Gandhi. One advertisement was issued in the name of Madhvasingh Solanki, the former CM, an almost forgotten figure in public memory. On the whole, its campaign was low key and sober, though the party repeatedly exposed Modi’s claims and highlighted the central government’s contribution in various projects in Gujarat. The Congress appealed to “Samaju [prudent] Gujaratis.”45 The Congress did not often mention development done by the UPA government in the previous five years in the country, but it certainly asserted its contribution and role in the development of Gujarat. The main thrust of the Congress campaign featured its concern for aam adami, i.e., the common man, and it emphasized progress rather than development.

People’s Perception During the Lok Sabha election campaign, Modi often declared that the Gujarat development formula would be implemented in the country if the BJP-led NDA was voted to power at the center.46 Other BJP

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leaders also gave the same message in different parts of the country. On the polling day, April 30, 2009, the BJP advertisement reads: Gujaratna Gauravvanta [For whom Gujarat is proud of] CM Narendra Modi appeals to the people of Gujarat, Gujarat’s uninterrupted (avirat) path for development with the clearly laid down policy of my government has continued with a mantra, ‘For the vikas of Bharat, Vikas of Gujarat’ 1st May is the foundation day of Gujarat and when Gujarat is celebrating ‘swarnim’ [Golden] jubilee, let us pray homage to our martyrs and pledge that on this occasion the Prime Minister of the country [Advani] is also from Gujarat.47

Such messages had gone well, though not to the extent of Modi’s expectation in Gujarat. Voting survey shows (see Table 8.1) that for one-third of the Gujarati voters state performance rather than the central government was the main consideration in their voting preference in the Parliament elections. Moreover, performance of the state, as well as the center government guided 22â•¯percent respondents to decide on their vote. If we club them together, a majority of the Gujarat voters were guided by their opinion about the performance of the state government in the Parliament elections. On the other hand, 27â•¯percent of the voters gave importance to the performance of the central government in exercising their franchise in 2009. As expected, a majority who voted for the BJP preferred the state government’s performance and vice versa for the Congress voters. Table 8.1 Whose Performance Was Considered While Voting for the Lok Sabha: State or Central Government? Voted for Lok Sabha 2009 Consider the performance Central Government in Delhi State Government Both the Governments Interested in Neither Don’t Know/Not Available Total Source: NES, 2009.

Congress

BJP

Others

Total

43 15 21 3 18 100

11 46 23 3 17 100

30 16 16 16 22 100

27 29 22 5 17 100

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The pre-poll survey of the NES in December 2007 shows that a majority (52â•¯percent), though not an overwhelming number, believed that during the five years of Modi’s rule “development of Gujarat has improved” (see Table 8.2). This is more so in the condition of roads, water, and electricity. Only one-third believed that the situation regarding irrigation had improved. Employment, in their perception, was more or less the same or worse than the past. It is important to note that as many as 67â•¯percent of the respondents, cutting across castes, classes, and also parties, felt that the condition of the poor had either remained the same or deteriorated during Modi’s regime. Table 8.2 Perception of the People Regarding Improvement or Otherwise in Gujarat between 2002–07

Item

Improved (%)

Remained the same (%)

Overall Development of Gujarat Roads Water Electricity Government Hospitals Public Transport Government Schools Employment Irrigation

52 55 52 54 39 40 44 29 33

22 25 25 27 33 26 28 25 27

Don’t know/ Deteriorated not available (%) (%) 8 14 16 11 13 17 11 23 15

18 6 7 8 15 17 16 24 26

Source: NES, 2007. Note: Total Number of Respondents = 3779.

At the same time, vast majority (75â•¯percent) of the voters in Gujarat expressed their satisfaction with the performance of the UPA government (see Figure 8.3). Interestingly nearly 60â•¯percent of the BJP voters also fall in this category. This perception reflects their preference for the Prime Minister after the elections. Among the voters, nearly one-fourth had no opinion or did not want to answer the question (see Table 8.3) regarding their preference for the Prime Ministerial candidature. Of the remaining, L.K. Advani was the least preferred Prime Minister among Sonia Gandhi, Narendra Modi and

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Goebbel’s Propaganda and Governance Figure 8.3 Level of Satisfaction among Voters with the Congress-led UPA Government

Source: NES, 2009.

Table 8.3 Percent Preference of 2009 Voters for the Prime Minister after Elections Leader Sonia Gandhi Manmohan Singh Rahul Gandhi L.K. Advani Narendra Modi Others Cannot say/Don’t Know Refused to answer Total

Congress (%)

BJP (%)

Others (%) All voters (%)

29 24 13 0 3 7 24

10 6 2 24 32 5 21

19 6 3 0 6 30 36

19 14 7 11 17 8 24

100

100

100

100

Source: NES, 2009.

Manmohan Singh. Modi scored lower than Sonia in their preference. Among the BJP voters, a majority preferred Modi rather than Advani to be the PM. Positive opinion for UPA’s performance had not correspondingly translated into votes. Gujarat’s electorates were guided more by their perception about the performance of the state government, thanks to Modi’s magic rather than the central government’s achievements. On the whole, Modi continued to enjoy his charisma, though fractured, to win votes for BJP in Gujarat. This was more so among the rich

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and the middle class, particularly the upper social strata, though the BJP had also not improved its position in these strata.48 It appears that they had no grudge against Congress’ economic policy as in the 1980s. Therefore, they appreciated the performance of the UPA government. But regional considerations—Modi’s flamboyant style coupled with Hindutva—led them to continue to vote for the BJP. The Congress, however, significantly improved its support from 43â•¯percent to 53â•¯percent, and from 40â•¯percent to 56â•¯percent of the poor and very poor strata, respectively (see Table 8.4). The party’s projection that it stood for aam adami, and Modi government’s failure in providing employment, education, and health care to a majority of the population seems to have benefited the Congress among the poor. Table 8.4 Vote by Class in the 2007 and 2009 Elections Congress (%) Class* Rich Middle Lower Poor Very poor

BJP (%)

Others (%)

Total (N)

2009

2007

2009

2007

2009

2007

2009

2007

32 38 46 53 56

30 38 43 43 40

58 53 40 38 42

59 52 41 45 43

10 9 14 9 2

11 10 16 12 16

117 337 250 144 108

335 1,120 345 598 255

Source: Lokniti Team, “National Election Study 2009: A Methodological Note,” EPW, Vol. 44, No. 39, (September 26–October 2, 2009), pp. 196–202. Note: *Computed combing family’s monthly income and assets.

Conclusion The 2009 Lok Sabha elections in Gujarat was mainly Modi-centric. He had mastery over publicity propaganda idioms and techniques to project that he was the only savior of Gujarat. His message is that all that the state has achieved is because of his commitments and unique approach to good governance. In contrast, his predecessors, including the earlier BJP governments, were responsible for all the shortfalls and problems. His skill in selling dreams and slogans to mesmerize the people is unparalleled in contemporary Indian politics. During his


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rule in the last seven years, he has very skillfully dominated his party and civil society, which articulates public opinion in general and of the middle class in particular. At present he and the mainstream civil society are in hand in glove. The Congress also shares a neoliberal paradigm of development that according to them is apolitical in nature and simply reflects the “value free” principles uncovered by “positive economics.” In the last elections, Modi scored over Congress in his majoritarian ideology and projected “good governance.” His aura may now have begun to fade as the downward trend in BJP’s share in votes in Gujarat suggests. This may not be on ideological grounds. It may be because of the exposure of his tall promises and his inability to resolve contradictions of his governance. Pro-poor image of the Congress still works. Gujarat BJP is becoming a regional party under Modi’s leadership. The regional identity and issues that he articulated during the last five years had given the BJP an edge over the Congress in the last elections. Most of the voters who were satisfied with the performance of the UPA government, nevertheless voted for the BJP in the 2009 parliamentary elections because of the perceived performance of the Modi government. At present, the Gujarat Congress is not able to match Modi’s electoral strategies and planning. The party is faction ridden, lacks alternative vision, and commitment to deliver good governance in favor of the vast majority.

Notes 1. I thank Lokniti, CSDS for providing National Election Study data. 2. As of 1st August, there were 110 CNG stations in Gujarat; nearly 80â•¯percent are in three districts: Surat, Vadodara, and Ahmedabad. Available online at: www. gspcgas.com/cng_about.php (last date of access: October 31, 2009). 3. Times of India, (Ahmedabad), January 15, 2009. 4. Gujarat Smachar, (Ahmedabad), April 1, 2009. 5. Recently, he gave lessons to the ministers of Karnataka government. The Indian Express, September 29, 2009. 6. Ghanshyam Shah, “Gujarat after Godhra,” in Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace (eds), India’s 2004 Elections: Grass-roots and National Perspectives (Delhi: Sage Publications, 2007), pp. 151–79.

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â•‡ 7. Ghanshyam Shah, “BJP’s Rise to power,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 31, Nos. 2 and 3, (January 13–30, 1996), pp. 165–170. â•‡ 8. Thomas Blom Hansen, “The Ethics of Hindutva and the spirit of Capitalism,” in Thomas Blom Hansen and Christophe Jaffrelot (eds), The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998), pp. 243–66. â•‡ 9. Ajay Umat, “Swapna nu marketing karine Modi jiti shakae chhe [Modi can win by marketing dreams],” Divya Bhaskar, (Ahmedabad), December 15, 2005. 10. One of them was Rajendra Shah, Jnanpith award winner. See Panna Naik, “Gujarat violence in literature,” paper presented at the Association for Asian Studies (AAS) conference, San Diego, July 4, 2004. 11. Personal interviews. 12. Sheth Pravin, Images of Transformation: Gujarat and Narendra Modi (Ahmedabad: Team spirit, 2007), p. 60. 13. Ibid., pp. 55 and 59. 14. The Indian Express (Ahmedabad), November 5, 2008. 15. Ajay Umat, op. cit. 16. The Indian Express (Ahmedabad), August 30, 2007. 17. “Forward” in Images of Transformation. Sheth. 18. Ibid., p. 221. 19. Saurbh Shah, “Narendra Modi,” Aarpar, March 12, 2007. 20. Sheth Images of Transformation. p. 222. 21. V.D. Savarkar, Hindutva (Mumbai: Swatantryaveer Savarkar Rashtiya Smarak. 1999). 22. Tridip Suhrud, “Modi and Gujarati ‘Asmita’,” EPW, Vol. 43, No. 1, (January 5, 2008), pp. 11–13. See also the collection of 77 articles with most of them contesting Modi’s concept of “Gujarat Asmita,” in Uttam Parmar, ed., Gujaratni Ashmita: Mari Najare (Kim: Kim Education Society, 2008). 23. Rita Kothari, “Diffusing Polarization: Language and Translation at the Time of the Gujarat Riots.” Available online at: http://translate.eipcp.net/ transversal/1107/kothari/en (last date of access: November 2009). 24. For e.g., see Ganesh Devy, “Hating Muslims is a Natural Thing in Gujarat,” Tehelka (Delhi), May 20, 2006 and Ashis Nandy, “Blame the Middle Class,” Times of India (Ahmedabad), January 8, 2008. 25. Dr Hedgewar, who coined this term, stresses the inclusion of brotherhood among all Hindus. See Ghanshyam Shah, “The BJP and Backward Castes in Gujarat,” South Asia Bulletin, Vol. 14, No.1, 1994, pp. 57–65. 26. Persis Ginwalla, Samaras Scheme and Democratic Processes: An Analytical Study (Ahmedabad: Mahila Swaraj Abhiyan, 2009). 27. Rahul Mangaonkar, “Narendra D Modi: D for Democracy or Dictator,” Times of India, (Ahmedabad), August 4, 2007. 28. The Economic Times, April 23, 2008. 29. Assema Sinha, The Regional Roots of Developmental Politics in India: A Divided Leviathan (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), pp. 136–37.


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30. Ravindra H. Dholakia, “Sources of Economic Growth and Acceleration in Gujarat,” EPW Vol. 42, No. 9, (March 3, 2007), pp. 770–78. 31. The Financial Express, June 9, 2003. 32. See, Rajeev Bhattacharyya, “Modi invites investment in Gujarat.” Available online at: http://www.expressindia.com/news/fullstory.php?newsid=18327 (last date of access: April 5, 2009). 33. Tushar Shah and Shilp Verma, “Co-Management of Electricity and Groundwater: An Assessment of Gujarat’s Jyotigram Scheme,” EPW, Vol. 43, No. 7, (February 16, 2008), pp. 59–66. 34. Indira Hirway and Subhrangsu Goswami, “Functioning of the Drinking Water Component of the Narmada Pipeline Project in Gujarat,” EPW Vol. 43, no. 9, (March 1, 2008), pp. 51–59. 35. The Indian Express (Ahmedabad), April 25, 2005. 36. The Indian Express (Ahmedabad), June 19, 2007. 37. Virendra Kumar, “A Modi-cum of Strategy,” The Indian Express, (Ahmedabad) December 21, 2005. 38. Divya Bhaskar, March 7, 2005. 39. The Indian Express, (Ahmedabad), Interview with N.K. Singh. November 1, 2007. 40. Gujarat Samachar, April 30, 2009. 41. Ajay Umat, “No repeat theory vaprine Modi ae bulldozer fervyou [Modi bulldozed by uasing no-repeat theory], Diyva Bhaskar, December 18, 2005. 42. See Parlay Kanungo and Adan Farooqui, “Tracking Moditva: An Analysis of the 2007 Gujarat Elections Campaign,” Contemporary Perspectives, Vol. 2, No. 2, July–December 2008, pp. 222–45. 43. Ajay Umat “No repeat theory vaprine Modi ae bulldozer fervyou.” 44. Gujarat Samachar, April 30, 2009. 45. Divya Bhaskar, April 24, 2009. 46. India News Politics, April 13, 2009. 47. Fulchab (Rajkot), April 30, 2009. 48. Mahashweta Jani, “Gujarat: BJP Scrapes Through,” EPW, Vol. 44, No. 39, (September 26–October 2, 2009), pp. 133–36. For its social support base in the earlier elections, see Ghanshyam Shah, (2007) op cit; also Priyavadan Patel, “Gujarat: Signs of Anti-incumbency,” in S. Shastri, K. Suri and Y. Yadav (eds), Electoral Politics in Indian States: Lok Sabha Elections in 2004 and Beyond, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 148–175.

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Chapter 9

West Bengal Mapping a Political Challenge: West Bengal 2009 Amiya K. Chaudhuri

State Politics under the Left Front A stable LF government survived in West Bengal since 1977 despite a nation-wide anti-incumbency factor. Its near demolition in the 2009 parliamentary election, winning only 15 seats out of 42, was a rude shock. Protest movements against the fertile land acquisition actions by the government are a major reason for the election debacle. Civil society groups supported the popular movements. This chapter will examine left politics in the state as also its differences with other Indian states, and the electoral dynamics of a communist system in a liberal democratic framework. The LF led by the CPI(M) government not only did poorly in the 2009 parliamentary election, but subsequently in 2010 by-elections where the CPI(M) lost 15 parliamentary and five Assembly seats, respectively. A series of defeats in panchayat and two Assembly elections in 2008, and other elections including local and municipal bodies during the previous one and half years indicated a crisis for what had been an astonishingly stable LF coalition for 32 years. In West Bengal, Marxist parties pursued a dual strategy toward the central government. On the one hand, they asserted that West Bengal was discriminated against politically and economically by the central

Mapping a Political Challenge

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government. However, in the case of a friendly but seemingly weak center, they made demands for the autonomy of regional parties1 and met with some success. In July 2008, the LF with its 61 MPs withdrew support from the Congress-led UPA government opposing the Indo–US nuclear deal. It was uncharitable for the highest leadership of the CPI(M) to say, “the UPA coalition government survives on the LF’s support. Therefore, if we want them to stand up or sit down they must do that.”2 At that juncture, the CPI(M) thought it prudent to distance the LF from the UPA, in view of their future course of action against the Congress and the TMC in state politics. Rather, they did everything possible to keep the Congress and the TMC at loggerheads with each other. But this time, the mainstay of the social coalition that had long provided support, appeared to turn their back against the LF. They include the middle class, several groups of civil society, refugees still living in the colonies, Muslims, and the SCs and STs. The LF’s support base had already begun to erode because of its contradictory positions—a pragmatic support for the Congress at the center and throwing, at the same time, electoral challenges to the party in West Bengal. Some of the left leaders thought that the LF should have withdrawn support much earlier to tidy up the home turf in West Bengal. Its failure to do so is amply reflected in the 2009 election result (see Table 9.2). The middle-class people, possibly for reasons of their past history, are in the habit of thinking that they are uncompromisingly radical.3 The communists and their band of supporters considered themselves to be a superior species because of their ideologically congruent sociopolitical and economic perspective. They believed to think that their politics was guided by a superior political objective as compared to other political parties in different states of India. The LF claimed that the caste and communal divides that are paramount in other Indian states are absent in West Bengal. However, this is a myth as confirmed by their mode of selecting candidates at all the levels. Instead of perceiving society in terms of caste and communal distinctions, the left would like to divide it into two classes—bhadralok (elite)4 and chhotolok (subaltern). They take it for granted that the subaltern or the chhotolok can, with subtle electoral engineering and

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Amiya K. Chaudhuri

political manipulations, be brainwashed. Howver, it is possible that they ignore the rise of the chhotolok class in economic terms. To the upper- and middle-class elites, Mamata Banerjee and her party appeared to represent the rural subalterns. The TMC leader Mamata Banerjee began mobilizing the rural masses on the basis of their fear against the government’s land acquisition and their veiled policy of creating Special Economic Zone (SEZ) industrial growth. Unchallenged for such a long period of time in electoral politics, CM Bhattacharjee was encouraged to obliterate the democratic distinction between the party and the administration. He proceeded to think in terms of total equation between the party run state and the civil society. According to a perceptive author,5 this government put party interest above the people. As he says, “Given this record of failed reforms, non-reforms, and regressive policies, the question remains as to how such a singularly unsuccessful government was able to achieve the world record for being the longest ruling democratically elected Communist government in history.”6 And, finally, the LF’s focused tirades against the central government’s allegedly discriminatory attitude and actions have been habitual. The fact of the matter is that the CPI(M)’s organizational dominance in Bengal, particularly in the rural hinterland, for the last three decades has alienated even its important partners, the Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP) and the Forward Bloc (FB). The question then arises as to why the partners of the LF, still cling together. The answer possibly may be: It is simple electoral arithmetic and to a great extent of certain politicoelectoral compulsion. If any of the major partners comes out of the left fold the result would be disastrous not only for any individual partner but the LF as a whole. The CPI (M) would also suffer a political paralysis for years to come.7

A long history of law and order problems contributed to the LF image. The Sain Brothers murder in 1970, the brutal Marichjhapi murder of the refugees, the Bijon Setu (the Ballygunj Station Flyover) murders of 17 sanyasis (including a woman) by the CPI(M) left indelible dark spots on the history of the first phase of the LF government in West Bengal.8 These were meticulously documented


195

by several private individuals.9 The Bantala incident of the rape and murder of two World Health Organization (WHO) woman officers at South 24 Parganas was gruesome; however, the CM Jyoti Babu took no serious note of it and commented: “These are nothing extraordinary; occasionally it may happen.”10 All this raised the question whether the people of West Bengal had reconciled themselves to the atrocities caused by the LF supporters and activists. Another gruesome incident, which occurred at Khandua, Arambag in Howrah, involved the CPI(M) resorting to its semi fascist method of politically controlling the entire western belt of rural West Bengal. It was political cleansing atrocities like these that paved the way for the overwhelming victory of the LF in elections, particularly since 1987.11 Actually the objectives of the CPI(M) were to gag the voices of the opposition in rural Bengal. In the 1991 elections, a group of villagers voted for the Congress candidate. After the result was out, the CPI(M) activists attacked the villages, burnt some of the houses and allegedly chopped off the hands of voters.12 On July 21, 1993, the police barricaded a Youth Congress procession led by its president Mamata Banerjee to symbolically encircle the Writers’ Building. The police fired mercilessly without heeding the police manual. Thirteen people were killed on the spot and many more injured. Thereafter, the police fired at the procession of the Socialist Unity Center (SUC) near Curzon Park. One person was killed and a few others suffered heavy injuries. Mamata Banerjee, when still a Youth Congress leader was mercilessly beaten near Hazra Road by the CPI(M) cadres, while protesting against a bundh called by the CPI(M). She had to be hospitalized with serious head and abdominal injuries for quite a long time. Such attacks on Ms Banerjee were mounted frequently even while she was in the Congress as also a central minister. She formed her own party TMC in 1997 after a hitch with the state Congress leadership. The panchayat system, as spearheaded by the LF to spread its tentacles to the remotest part of the rural areas, became all “political panchayats,”13 and totally centralized, politically and administratively. Scholars from abroad, who studied the functioning of panchayat bodies under the LF front government, eulogized the LF government for its good work in rural areas.14 However, only D. Bandyapadhyay and

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Amiya K. Chaudhuri

Nirmal Mukerji15 and Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mukherjee16 were down to earth in their assessments. What had helped the CPI(M) maintain its hegemonic dominance almost all over the state was the policy of terrorization in most of the rural hinterlands and distribution of largesse to the aspirant elite sections including government employees, trade unionists, rich peasants, and teachers of all categories. High-ranking government officials and police personnel were happy and tension free for the reason17 that the opposition was too emasculated to challenge the CPI(M)-led regime. In the popular perception, Mamata was the only major uncompromising opposition political leader to challenge the “social fascist party, the CPI (M)”18 and the “misrule of the LF government.”19 CM Jyoti Basu refused to meet Ms Banerjee, a central minister at that time, when she sought justice for a deaf victim who was raped by the CPI(M) cadres. The police forcibly arrested her and then released her late at night without any protection en route to her way home. Such behavior of the police officers became a regular feature in the 33 years of LF rule. Ms Banerjee began her fight for “Maa, Mati, Manush” (mother, earth, and men) during the Singur (Hooghly) land acquisition incident. It was a slogan that helped the underprivileged SCs, STs, and the Muslim community to rally around the TMC. Ms Banerjee was prepared to stake her life to fight against the “undemocratic fascist regime of the CPI (M).”20 She fasted for 26 days against the acquisition of the multi-cropped 997 acres of agricultural land. Meanwhile, brutal killings took place at Nandigram by the police and the CPI(M)’s hired killers in police uniforms. State Governor Gopal Gandhi was pained to characterize the incident as “spine-chilling violence.”21 Very important civil society groups played an extremely important role in exposing the “fascist method of the Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee regime.”22 After these two serious incidents, people shed their fear and came out in the open to seek a “change.”23 It was against the backdrop of the explosion of the desire for change that 2009 parliamentary elections were held. The results of the election were absolutely “demoralizing for the CPI (M) after years of its control in all aspects of life in the state.”24 The social coalition that created the LF, was crumbling. The CPI(M) had expressed its


197

superiority as a party with progressive vision. The Marxists claimed that their understanding of the “nature of Indian State”25 could not be faulted. Only they were able to pursue a political economy of development.26

LF’s Electoral Challenge Fighting against the Congress in the state and giving support to the Congress at the center was sheer “political duplicity.”27 The Congress party in the state was also gradually losing its electoral credibility while the TMC was coming out as the most successful and uncompromisingly opposition party to the CPI(M)’s one-party “misrule.”28 It was clear to the discerning public, as well as to ordinary voters that the CPI(M)’s single agenda was to cling to power by repeatedly raising their voice against “the menace [of the] communal BJP.”29 The result, in fact, became counter-productive. The results of the 2009 parliamentary election (see Table 9.1) are a rude shock to the CPI(M). In 2004, the CPI(M) alone in West Bengal had won 26 seats and CPI, RSP, and FB had three seats each for a total of 35 seats. Getting a total of six seats—from Darjeeling (1), South Dinajpur (1), Malda (1), and three from Murshidabad, the Congress party was reduced to a regional party of the north and a part of the east. The TMC had a poor parliamentary presence with a single seat of Ms Banerjee from south Kolkata. In terms of vote share, the CPI(M) received 38.56â•¯percent, CPI 4.01â•¯percent, RSP 4.49â•¯percent, FB 3.66â•¯percent, Congress 14.56â•¯percent, TMC 21.04â•¯percent, BJP 8.06â•¯percent, Independent, Janata, and other minor parties 5.62â•¯percent. Thus, the poor showing by the LF in 2009 was not so shocking to the other partners like the CPI, RSP, and FB as it was for the CPI(M). The CPI general secretary openly criticized the “big brother” for the electoral debacle30 (see Table 9.2). This is also what happened in the panchayat (2008), parliamentary (2009), and then recently in the 16 Municipal elections (2009). In the Municipal elections, the LF was able to retain only three boards, losing nine. The LF retained the Siliguri Mahakuma Parishad (Sub-divisional Board), with a margin

33.10 (9)

Vote Share Seat

3.60 (2)

CPI

3.56 (2)

RSP 3.04 (2)

FB 13.45 (6)

INC 31.18 (19)

TMC 1.65 (1)

SUC 6.14 (1)

BJP

Source: Reports (provisional) Election Commission of India. Note: Figures in parenthesis indicate number of seats. Total number of seats is 42.

CPI(M)

Party

Table 9.1

0.(1) –

SP 0.26 –

JMM

0.09 –

NCP

Percent of Votes Polled By Different Parties in Parliamentary Election 2009 in West Bengal

1.002 –

BSP

0.07 –

MUL

2.70 –

IND + Others

BSP

2.04 1.51 1.43 0.52 0.84 1.59 0.77 0.70 – 0.90 0.75 1.02 1.68 1.60 1.07 0.92 1.79 0.73 1.00 0.49 0.47 0.42

CPM / CPI

Cooch Behar – Alipurduars Jalpaiguri *45.51 Darjeeling 25.28 Raiganj 38.57 Balurghat – Malda Uttar 41.25 Malda Dakshin 37.02 Jangipur 40.52 Baharampur – Murshidabad 43.81 Krishnanagar 35.02 Ranaghat 41.25 Bongaon 42.29 Barrackpore 42.83 Dum Dum 44.94 Barasat -Basirhat 40.30 Jay Nagar -Mathurapur 41.55 Diamond Harbor 39.17 Jadavpur 44.65

District

Table 9.2

*44.66 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 38.96 – – – – –

AIFB 0.30 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

RPI

RSP

– – – *41.22 36.98 – 19.43 – *50.28 – – *44.37 *47.77 – *53.45 – *54.23 – *56.91 37.27 *47.20 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – 42.86 – – – – – –

INC – – – 0.27 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

IPFB 0.57 – 0.55 0.38 – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

AMB 41.65 29.13 – – – 43.79 – – – – – *42.42 *50.12 *50.94 *49.27 *49.80 *50.95 *46.18 -*53.94 *53.56 *49.83

AITC

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – *48.71 – – –

– – –

SUCI 5.82 21.40 9.15 *51.49 4.19 6.82 6.67 5.30 2.33 2.90 4.02 16.76 5.04 3.97 3.55 5.70 5.39 6.55 2.68 2.61 3.56 2.33

BJP – – – – 0.87 – 0.79 – – 0.32 – – – – – – – – 0.71 0.19 – –

RDMP – – – 0.39 0.48 – – – – – – 1.38 – – 0.58 – – – – – – –

(Continued )

4.93 5.68 3.27 2.19 4.45 1.56 2.71 2.81 0.87 0.96 3.53 – 1.89 0.70 2.66 0.83 1.40 1.34 2.14 1.19 1.58 1.65

CPI(ML) Independent (L) & others

Constituency-wise Percentage Points of Valid Votes Polled by Political Parties in Parliamentary Election 2009 in Districts of West Bengal

0.66 0.64 0.57 0.76 0.66 0.85 2.12 0.72 0.51 1.03 0.83 1.17 2.26 1.12 0.83 0.80 0.84

1.62 1.03 1.31

*48.69 *49.90 41.77

BSP

35.39 40.04 44.27 41.12 39.99 42.36 *54.17 42.47 40.47 *53.50 *56.89 *47.29 -*47.65 *51.32 *47.31 *50.51

CPM / CPI

– – –

– – – – – – – – – – – – *44.13 – – – –

AIFB

– – –

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

RPI

– 38.14 –

– – – – – – 36.85 – – – 26.35 – 42.00 36.70 – – 40.98

INC

– – –

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

RSP

– – –

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

IPFB

– – –

– – – – – – – – – – – – 0.32 – – – –

AMB

40.52 – *47.81

*57.19 *52.50 *48.03 *50.91 *52.68 *49.37 – *53.95 *55.53 40.92 – 42.68 – – 39.05 42.02 –

AITC

Note: *indicated the name of the winning political party.

Source: Election Commission of India (data supplied by the office of the CEO, West Bengal).

Kolkata Dakshin Kolkata Uttar Howrah Uluberia Srirampur Hooghly Arambagh Kanthi Tamluk Ghatal Jhargram Medinipur Purulia Bankura Bishnupur Bardhaman Purba Bardhaman Durgapur Asansol Bolpur Birbhum

District

Table 9.2 (Continued )

– – –

– – – – – – – – – – – – – – – – –

SUCI

5.55 6.49 4.62

4.02 4.22 3.79 4.20 3.55 3.42 4.97 2.84 1.79 2.99 4.73 4.99 2.37 4.33 3.97 6.37 4.41

BJP

– – –

– – – 0.33 – – – – – 0.30 – 0.38 – 0.40 – – 0.46

RDMP

– – –

– – – – – 1.03 – – – – – – – 0.81 – 0.74 –

2.46 2.44 –

2.06 2.19 2.32 1.54 1.99 1.46 – – 0.77 – 6.12 2.48 4.50 5.08 2.75 – 1.17

CPI(ML) Independent (L) & others


201

of one seat only. Because of local factionalism in the Congress, the TMC–Congress coalition did not work well in this case. Over the years, voter turnout has been very high with an average of 79.5â•¯percent. To the Marxists, this abnormal voter turn out was due “to the ideological contribution of Marxist parties in educating the rural people in the state.”31 Others argued that the abnormally high turnout was due to the absence of a viable political alternative, and more importantly to the organizational machinery and electoral management of the CPI(M). Even in this era of coalition making, the Index of Opposition Unity (IOU) was found to be low. Before the recent elections, the upper and middle classes, and the poorer sections could not trust the opposition parties warring with one another. By showing muscle power and parading motor bike riding hired goons with AK-47 rifles, a fear psychosis was instilled in the minds of the rural people by the CPI(M). The LF has, over the years, entrenched itself in rural Bengal. Through the village, block and district level panchayat bodies, left parties won acceptability among the people. But all this continued only up to 1987. Thereafter the system of governance in West Bengal began to show a downward slide (see Table 9.3). There are important comparisons between Table 9.2 and Table 9.3. The more underdeveloped the districts are, in respect of health, literacy, income, and education, the more the LF won in election after election. It appears that the CPI(M) claiming to be the party of the toiling masses was adept enough to electorally dominate the docile poor by various means. Over the years, the CPI(M) resorted to political cleansing in the rural areas of the north Bengal districts and in the entire western part of Bengal. These western districts account for more than 70 Assembly seats. Arambag at Hooghly, Keshpur, Garbeta, Ghatal, and Jhargram at West Midnapore were out of bounds for the opposition parties. Even during the 2009 parliamentary election, when there was a tornado of change sweeping over Bengal, the CPI(M) cadres did not allow civil society groups to enter their electoral territories in these places.32 One opposition TMC supporter, who hoisted a flag on a tree in Keshpur, was murdered33 for ignoring the diktat of the CPI(M).

202

Amiya K. Chaudhuri Table 9.3 Human Development Indices of Districts in West Bengal

Districts Darjeeling Jalpaiguri Koch Bihar (Cooch Bihar) Dinajpur Malda Murshidabad Birbhum Bardhaman (Burdwan) Nadia North 24-Parganas Hugli (Hooghly) Bankura Purulia Medinipur (Midnapore— east and west together) Haora (Howrah) Kolkata South 24-Parganas West Bengal

Human Education development index (HDI) index

Health index

Income index

0.73 0.61 0.50 0.62 0.49 0.57 0.53 0.74 0.65 0.72 0.77 0.67 0.61 0.68

0.49 0.38 0.41 0.39 0.36 0.29 0.27 0.47 0.41 0.49 0.46 0.26 0.18 0.45

0.72 0.60 0.65 0.53 0.48 0.52 0.61 0.71 0.66 0.76 0.67 0.62 0.55 0.74

0.65 0.53 0.52 0.51 0.44 0.46 0.47 0.64 0.57 0.66 0.63 0.52 0.45 0.62

0.77 0.82 0.71 0.70

0.58 0.73 0.40 0.41

0.75 0.80 0.68 0.69

0.68 0.78 0.60 0.61

HDI rank 4 10 11 13 17 15 14 5 9 3 6 11 16 7 2 1 8 8*

Source: West Bengal Human Development Report 2004, Government of West Bengal, Kolkata.

Almost a repeat electoral performance by the LF was seen in 2006. The LF won 235 seats polling 50.12â•¯percent of votes. The single majority party in the LF, CPI(M) alone won 176 seats. The CPI(M) tried to electorally emasculate their Front partners but did not dare discard them. The opposition, as a whole, secured 49.88â•¯percent of votes. The TMC won 30 seats, the Congress 23, SUC 2, and Others 5 only. Disunity among opposition parties was, therefore, a positive gain for the LF. The attitude of the administration under the political control of the CPI(M) failed to instill confidence and trust in the minds of the voters and the ordinary public. The panchayat elections in 2008 were, however, held in a context of massive popular protests and movements, as the apogee of social churning since 1977. The seats won by the LF in each of the elections


203

before 2008 were overwhelming in all the three tiers of panchayats, acquiring more than 55â•¯percent of votes.34 But this time, the vote share for the LF was 52â•¯percent in Zilla Parishad and 46â•¯percent in Panchayat Samitis and Gram Panchayats taken together.35 This indicated a danger signal for the LF. Another ominous sign for the CPI(M), just before the 2009 election, lay in the loss of two seats with a largest ever vote margin. The results reflected the adverse mood of the people, a phenomenon unthinkable before. A genuine challenge was faced by the CPI(M) this time with civil society groups encountering the “fascist face of the LF.”36 They vigorously campaigned against the CPI(M)’s use of the administration, police forces, and electoral machinery. Civil society groups had frequently appealed about atrocities against the peasants at Singur in Hooghly, Nandigram at east Midnapore, and Lalgarh in west Midnapore to the state Election Commissioner, but to no avail. The CPI(M) mounted severe verbal attacks against important personalities of civil society groups and resorted to character assassination of the protestors. But all this became counter-productive. In the process, the ordinary rural people overcame the fear psychosis they had been suffering from because of “ferocious” 37 presence of the CPI(M)’s organizational network and state terror in rural hinterlands. The 2009 election results (see Table 9.1) reflect the mood of the majority of the people. Each of the partners of the LF, FB, RSP, and CPI lost one seat each against the three seats they had each won in the 2004 election. The greatest loser was the CPI(M); it won only nine seats. The decline in theâ•¯percentage share of its votes was shattering for the party. Even when the CPI(M) had contested the Assembly election alone in 1971, it received more than 35â•¯percent of total valid votes cast. Its vote shares increased over the years crossing sometimes 39â•¯percent. But this time it received a humiliating 33.10â•¯percent. Despite the continued political dominance of the LF in each of the several elections in the past, economic development in the state has been low as compared to many other Indian states; industrial and unemployment situations have worsened since 1991.38 More than 55,000 medium and small industries have been shut down since the mid-1980s. During the last several years, the state of the political

204

Amiya K. Chaudhuri

economy was bleak and the state fiscal deficit stood at a staggering 165,000 crores. Strangely people remained complacent during elections. Many language newspaper reporters smelled something abnormal in the election observer, Afzal Amanulla’s secret report39 to the Central Election Commission, which failed it public. In the 2009 election, the LF was able to retain its electoral superiority in the districts of North Bengal and the western belt of the state from Purulia down to West Midnapore. In these areas, the CPI(M)’s organizational clout and oft-used method of electoral management did not fail them. As Table 9.2 indicates, the FB won the Cooch Bihar seat with 44.66â•¯percent votes because the BJP’s share of votes (5.52â•¯percent) cut into the vote share of the main opponent. In North Bengal, the LF won three seats from Cooch Bihar, Alipurduars in Jalpaiguri, and Balurghat in South Dinajpur. Even in the 2009 election, when the LF had to face a severe challenge from the Congress and TMC (+) coalition’s seat adjustment, the CPI(M) was able to retain its earlier hold but with reducedâ•¯percentage of votes (see Table 9.2). In most of the constituencies, the margin of victory for the CPI(M) was alarmingly reduced (see Table 9.2). Is the LF decline due to the fact that the CPI(M) functions in a parliamentary system? Or is it simply using the political forum of the legislature as a weapon to achieve a socialist revolution? The hardcore leaders still attempt to dish out publicly the same version of their thesis of a socialist revolution in a different language. It does not matter whether the party sympathizers, cadres, promoters, contractors, and other clients,40 enjoying benefits from the LF government helped it in the manner it wanted. Like the unalloyed older generation of the Marxists, Buddhadeb Bhattacharya, and Nirupam Sen—the minister in charge of Industry—like to propagate that socialism and socialistic development cannot be achieved immediately. The development of capitalism is the need of the day; socialism is to wait till the development of capitalism is complete. This is a new formulation for the CM and minister of Industry.41 The Marxist CM and Industry minister, Nirupam Sen, did not mince words about their theoretical position focusing on rapid industrialization to be achieved at any cost. In his hour-long interview with the author, Jyoti Basu the former CM and the senior most


205

member of the Politburo of the CPI(M), simply smiled away the question about establishing “socialism” in a bourgeois parliamentary democracy. He did not even think of a “parliamentary communism.”42 He took a pragmatic view of supporting the party’s “confused theoretical stance.”43 Surprisingly, the opposition parties, particularly the main opposition TMC and the Congress Party began gaining substantially in subsequent elections after panchayat elections in the first quarter of 2008. After 32 years in the guardian constituencies of the School Managing Committee in different districts, the LF candidates were demoralized and defeated. In colleges, the Student Federation of India (SFI), the student front of the CPI(M), found it tough to confront opposition candidates. The exercise of unbridled power using power brokers, promoters, contractors, and land mafias in the rural areas resulted in rampant corruption in the party. Leaders from top-down began to be a demoralized lot.44 It was difficult to cope with or overcome the emergent situation without antagonizing land mafias, contractors, promoters, and other middle class clienteles. The State Committee Secretary of the CPI(M), Biman Basu,45 mildly agreed with this same characterization of the CPI(M). The CM himself said, “Money is flowing around. From this springs wrongdoing and sin.”46 When the land scam at Rajarhat in North 24 Parganas for the construction of Vedic Village, a luxury health resort, and New Township project came out in public, a commentator wrote: “The present chief minister is paying the price for the greed and sins of Jyoti Basu and Pramode Dasgupta.”47 In fact, never before in the history of the state had such a land grabbing fraud taken place. Siliguri in the north is popularly regarded as the second capital of Bengal. It is the gateway to foreign countries on the north and southeast on the one hand, and south Bengal through the “chicken neck,” on the other. That is why the area is strategically very important and sensitive. It is the business hub of the entire Northeastern region of the country. The Gorkhaland issue, created by the shortsightedness of the CPI(M) in the mid-1980s, is still unresolved. In 2009, the BJP candidate, Jaswant Singh, won the seat. The opposition Congress and Trinamool coalition was trying to encash on the LF government’s land policy. The LF failed to take into

206

Amiya K. Chaudhuri

account the serious problems of hunger and starvation among the tea garden workers.48 These tracts of tea growing land forcibly acquired by the government were given to promoters to build shopping malls, multiplexes, and housing complexes.49 The people of Siliguri retaliated through the ballot against this policy of the LF in the Corporation election immediately after the parliamentary election. The Siliguri Corporation’s election in all the 47 wards is a moral and electoral booster for the opposition Congress and TMC coalition. It won 30 seats, Congress 15, TMC 14, and one supported by both the parties. The LF managed to get only 17 seats, CPI(M) 15, RSP one, and FB one. It is really an electoral debacle for the CPI(M). This means that seat adjustment between the Congress and the TMC proved effective. If it continues until the 2011 Assembly election, the CPI(M) may confront the biggest ever challenge to its earlier electoral superiority. The opposition coalition replaced the LF from the seat of power by getting nearly 2â•¯percent more votes than the LF. Elections showed the mood of the people for a change. Their silent but decisive action swept the southern, eastern, and three other districts.

2009 Election: Fall Out The leaders of the CPI(M) still believe in a dignified come back in the next major election. The CPI(M) and the LF constituents convincingly won the Assembly election in 2006. The LF had garnered 50.12â•¯percent votes winning 235 seats; whereas the divided opposition parties had received 49.88â•¯percent of valid votes cast. They won only 59 seats, TMC 30, Congress 23, SUC 2 and others 3. The difference of vote share between the LF and the opposition parties fighting separately was only 0.24â•¯percent. It is not, therefore, the electoral calculus but the changing political chemistry from time to time that determines the voters’ preference. During these last 32 years, opposition parties in West Bengal remained, as they were when the first LF formed an invincible coalition government. The LF had been enjoying the fruits of the social coalitions of the upper class, middle class, the SCs, STs,, and above all the Muslims (see Table 9.4) besides, teachers, professionals, service

80,176,197 6,895,514 3,015,422 3,192,695 9,610,788 4,273,099 5,041,976 8,934,286 6,906,689 4,572,876 4,604,827 5,866,569 2,441,794 1,503,178 3,290,468 3,401,173 1,609,172 2,479,155 2,536,516

Total population 18,437,555 1,860,754 889,894 997,408 1,576,337 658,707 1,188,881 1,840,397 2,218,376 274,835 1,365,985 703,786 676,582 432,660 554,165 1,233,577 258,881 1,242,374 463,956

SC 4,406,794 441,832 203,127 330,783 798,684 19,168 212,062 198,936 84,766 9,810 113,891 75,953 124,865 242,317 227,047 641,688 204,167 14,246 463,452

ST

Source: Economic Review 2004–05, Govt. of WB and Census Report of India 2001.

West Bengal Burdwan Birbhum Bankura Midnapore Howrah Hooghly 24-Parganas (N) 24-Parganas (S) Kolkata Nadia Murshidabad Uttar Dinajpur Dakshin Dinajpur Malda Jalpaiguri Darjeeling Cooch Behar Purulia

Area

Table 9.4

20,241,541 1,364,133 1,057,861 239,722 1,088,999 1,044,383 763,471 2,164,058 2,295,967 926,769 1,170,899 3,735,380 1,156,503 361,047 1,636,171 369,195 85,378 600,911 180,694

Muslims 23.02 26.98 29.51 31.24 16.40 15.42 23.58 20.60 32.12 6.01 29.66 12.00 27.71 28.78 16.84 36.27 16.09 50.11 18.29

% SC 5.50 6.41 6.74 10.36 8.31 0.45 4.21 2.23 1.23 0.21 2.47 1.29 5.11 16.12 6.90 18.87 12.69 0.57 18.27

% ST

Percentage of SC, ST, and Muslims of the Total Population of West Bengal and Each District of West Bengal

25.25 19.78 35.08 7.51 11.33 24.44 15.14 24.22 33.24 20.27 25.43 63.67 47.36 24.02 49.72 10.85 5.31 24.24 7.12

% muslims


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Amiya K. Chaudhuri

holders, and business and small time industrial communities. The SCs, STs, and the Muslim voters have been particularly important. Their combined strength, as Table 9.4 shows, is 53.77â•¯percent—SC 23.02â•¯percent, ST 5.50â•¯percent, and Muslims 25.25â•¯percent. They constitute a majority in the state. Until the mid-1990s, the LF manipulated this social coalition in their favor. This social coalition began cracking during the mid-1990s. However, major opposition parties, for one reason or the other, failed to exploit this situation. The first UPA government at the center had to depend on the LF. Immediately after the 2006 Assembly election, Mamata Banerjee seriously began distancing herself and her party from the BJP, both at the national and the state levels. After its final split from the Congress in 1998, the TMC ultimately emerged as the major opposition party in the state for its uncompromising political opposition against the CPI(M). Other peripheral left parties like the Progressive Democratic Socialist (PDS), SUC—a faction of the CPI(ML)—and 15 other social groups with political objectives, were localized but collectively became a tangible force when they allied with the TMC during the land grabbing measures of the CPI(M) in Bhangar, Singur, and Nandigram. The 2009 parliamentary election was really a watershed in the post 1977 electoral history of West Bengal. The TMC and Congress coalition made electoral history for this time period as the opposition won 27 seats including one seat for the BJP. Congress failed to provide an effective challenge to the LF before a differently oriented Mamata Banerjee and her TMC stepped into the scene. This signaled the beginning of the decline of the CPI(M). The remarkable political stability of the LF coalition began crashing when “saving agricultural land and life movement”50 at Singur and Nandigram gathered strength in the middle of 2006. Actually, Singur was the flash point of the ongoing politics of the opposition. The “genocide”51 perpetrated by the CPI(M) at Nandigram took 14 lives. Under the protection of the police, CPI(M)’s armed cadres “in police uniform” on March 14, 2007 raped a number of women. The victims were mostly from Muslim and SC communities. During the Singur and Nandigram days, the important leaders of the CPI(M) continuously made unconstitutional and uncharitable remarks against the Governor, Gopal Krishna Gandhi. Moreover, the top CPI(M)


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leader’s “indecent utterances” against the main opposition leader Mamata Banerjee and the members of civil society groups like Medha Patekar, Anuradha Talwar, Mahasveta Devi, Aparna Sen, Saoli Mitra, and others, were not taken kindly by the people. The land grabbing actions of the LF affected mostly poor Muslim peasants, Scheduled Caste groups, Tribals, marginal peasants, and day laborers. Until then, the CM and his party did not realize that they were in trouble. The TMC was seeking to forge a broad-based coalition with the Krishi Bachao and Jiban O Jibika Raksha Committee, other smaller parties and a number of sociopolitical groups. This move supported by an overwhelming number of Muslims and caste based communities coalesced against the LF. It also sent a signal to the state Congress Party about their future electoral survival in the state. At last, with an understanding unlike that of 2001, the TMC and Congress coalition came into force. The results were electrifying for this anti CPI(M) coalition. The law and order system has been deteriorating since the parliamentary elections. The CPI(M) monolith begins splitting in the country side. The leadership crisis in the party is palpable. The front partners have been seen resisting many of the politico-administrating moves of the major partner though without parting company. The future of the LF has been hedged with an element of uncertainty.

Conclusion The overwhelming electoral victory in the Assembly election in 2006 under the leadership of Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee made him “dizzy.”52 Without giving much thought to the land problems in the state, Buddhadeb babu invited various investors to build modern industry in West Bengal. The Salem Group of Indonesia, Prasun Mukherjee, Ratan Tata, and Jindal group were invited. While a huge amount of land was necessary for the purposes, no land map was available with the ministries of land reforms. It was initially decided, without even consulting the LF committee and the core group of ministers that a total of 41, 000 acres of land would be given to the Salem group.53 This group would use 120 acres for a health

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Amiya K. Chaudhuri

and knowledge city. For a Satellite Township, it would invest at the following places: Kukrahati (5,000 acres), Baruipur (3,750 acres), and Bhangar (1,250 acres). Other investments included a Chemical Hub at Haldia with 10,000 acres, a SEZ of 12,500 acres, and others with 825 acres. But the government proposals had to be put into cold storage because of the political turmoil. Most of the selected investors appeared to be realtors rather than industrialists. The idea of modern factories working with the latest technology, promising thousands of jobs to the younger people of peasant families was unreal. Tata too wanted to build the Singur workshop as a center for car assembling purposes. He allotted more than 350 acres of land to the owners of the producers of car ancillaries. This infuriated the local peasants, small agricultural land holders, and daily and marginal land laborers. Opposition parties, like the TMC, the other smaller parties and civil society groups, took up the cause of the farmers. It appeared that after the Nandigram carnage, the CPI(M)-led LF lost its credibility. A large number of organizations and people stood against the government of the day. Other economic factors disillusioned the poorer sections of the people. A look at the Human Development Index shown in Table 9.3 substantiates this observation. The central government declared 200 districts as underdeveloped. Among them, 10 districts in West Bengal covering 4,612 villages were earmarked for special development efforts. But the government did almost nothing during the last five years. These earmarked villages are located mostly in north Bengal and the western part (see Table 9.2). Paradoxically, the LF had won most seats in the panchayat (2008) and parliamentary elections (2009) from these areas. With the help of its organizational strength and instilling fear about social boycott and political victimization in the minds of the poor, the CPI(M) won election after election. The amount the LF received from the central government in different heads, like National Rural Employment Guarantee (NREG) schemes or 100 days work, rural electrification programs, Indira Abas Yojona, Jawaharlal Nehru Urban Renewal Programme (JNURP), could not be properly utilized. Large amounts of central funds were partially spent with some being allegedly siphoned away by the CPI(M) leaders. As compared with other large states, West Bengal’s show in the management of the political economy of development was poor.


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This reflected laziness, inefficiency, lack of a sense of priority, and rampant corruption at different levels of politics and administration.54 It is legitimate to expect a certain level of good governance in a state that has the unique credit of political stability for more than three decades. Transparency in the system of communist rule is a will of the wisp. West Bengal is only a half-baked system within a liberal democratic framework and the element of good governance is conspicuously absent. In the light of what has happened in Singur at Hooghly, Nandigram, and Lalgarh, the latest example of the CPI(M)’s mismanagement of development strategy, people’s movement backed by the Maoists grew from strength to strength. In the context of the cross fire between the joint force and the Maoists at Lalgarh at West Midnapore the Indian Social Development Report questions the development perspective and deteriorating law and order situation in the state. The investment situation is bleak. The state is placed at 18th position among 28 states and seven union territories and primary education stands at the 11th place. Development of infrastructure and marketing stands at 13th and 14th places, respectively, with micro economy at the 13th place. All this does not augur well in a politically stabilized democratic system. In West Bengal, unlike its Keralan counterpart, there is some mismatch between occasional democratic change and the thrust of real politics to debar change by exercising organizational muscle. And lastly the CPI(M) monolith began cracking. Factionalism in the CPI(M) as never before has been growing unabated. A large number of its members and supporters began leaving the sinking ship. The future depends on the way the Congress and TMC (+) coalition plays the political games that the CPI(M) has been playing for the last several years.

Notes 1. Interview, Jyoti Basu, August 4, 2004. This author interviewed him in connection with the UPIASI project on “Coalition Politics in West Bengal.” 2. During a few LF rallies in the Kolkata Maidan after the UPA coalition came into power at the center, the CM made this comment. The Statesman, (Kolkata), July 12, 2008.

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â•‡ 3. Marcus F. Franda, Radical Politics in West Bengal (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1971). Atul Kohli, ed., India’s Democracy: An Analysis of Changing State Society Relations (Princeton, N.J,: Princeton University Press, 1988). â•‡ 4. John. Broomfield, Elite Conflict in a Plural Society (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968). â•‡ 5. Ross Mallick, Development Policy of a Communist Government: West Bengal Since 1977 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993). â•‡ 6. Ibid., p. 214. â•‡ 7. Kshiti Goswami, PWD Minister of the LF government told the author in a television interview on May 16, 2009, DD (Kolkata center). â•‡ 8. Jagadish Chandra Mondal, Marichjhapi: Naishabder Antarale (Gana hatyar ek Kalo Itihas) (Kolkata: Bengali People’s Book Society, 2002). â•‡ 9. Udayan Nambudri, Bengal’s Night Without End (New Delhi: India First Foundation, 2006). See also Amitva Ghosh, The Hungry Tid (New Delhi: Ravi Dayal Publisher, 2004). 10. The Statesman, (Calcutta), May 18, 1990. 11. Barun Sen Gupta, ed. Bartaman Patrika, a Bengali language daily wrote extensively about the electoral malpractices of the CPI(M) after most of the Assembly and parliamentary elections in West Bengal, particularly since 1987. See also Prabir Ghosal, CPIM-er rigging (Bengali), (Kolkata: Mukherjee Publishing, 2005). 12. Ibid., pp. 27–35. 13. D. Bandyapadhyay and N. Mukerji, New Horizon for West Bengal Panchayats 1993, a report that the government of West Bengal commissioned in 1992, but the published report was withheld from circulation. 14. Glyn Williams, “Rethinking West Bengal’s Stability: From Party Organization to Local Practices of Politics,” in John Zavos, Andrew Wyat, and Vernon Hewit eds, The Politics of Cultural Mobilization in India (Kolkata: Oxford University Press, 2004); Arild Engelsen Ruud, Poetics of Village Politics: The Making of West Bengal Rural Communism (New Delhi: OUP, 2003); Neil Webster, Panchayati Raj and the Decentralization of Development Planning in West Bengal (Calcutta: KP Bagchi & Co, 1992); O.K. Lieten, Development, Devolution, and Democracy: Village Discourse in West Bengal (New Delhi: Sage Publications,1996); and Nossiter, Marxist State Government in India: Politics, Economics, and Society (London: Printer Publishers,1988). 15. Bandyapadhyay and Mukerji, New Horizon for West Bengal Panchayats 1993. 16. Pranab Bardhan and Dilip Mukherjee, “Political Economy of Land Reforms in West Bengal,” Available online at: People.bw.edu/dilipm/wkpap/wbpelref17.pdf (last date of access: March 5, 2006). 17. Interview with Jawhar Sarkar who joined as the Secretary of Industry being transferred from the post of the CEO of West Bengal, November 6, 2001. 18. Debabrata Bandyapadhyay, the present state General Secretary of the RSP, used the same term while the CPI(M) led by Jyoti Basu took away the panchayat portfolio from him and his party after the1987 Assembly election in West Bengal.


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19. Mahasweta Devi, Dainik Statesman (the Bengali edition of The Statesman, Kolkata), July 20, 2009. 20. Interviews with Mamta Bannerjee (January 29, February 20, March 12 and 28, 2009) and another on May 20, 2009 at Salt Lake, Kolkata, after the TMC led by Ms Bannerjee won 19 Parliamentary seats and SUC, TMC’s coalition partner, won one seat. 21. Governor Gopal Gandhi issued the statement on March 14 and published in all the leading newspapers. 22. Dainik Statesman, (Kolkata). Reports from the beginning of the Nandigram incident on March 14, 2007. 23. Just before the 2009 General Election in India, hoardings conceptualized by Shuvaprasanna, the renowned Bengali artist. Several faces of eminent Bengali intellectuals were seen in several different places in each of the 42 parliamentary constituencies. The theme “We want Change” appeared as a surrealistic painting. There were only a dozen faces on the hoarding, but on the faces and the ambience created on the canvas one can imagine more than five crore voters who might desire change after a span of 32 years. 24. Interviews with several leaders, including University teachers, one holding the post of Vice-Chancellor, of the CPI(M), on July 20, 22, and 25, 2009. 25. Quoting the much earlier document, Gene D. Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, Communism in India (Bombay: The Perennial Press, 1960). 26. Dainik Statesman, (Kolkata), August 12, 2009. 27. Survey Findings (July 2004) undertaken for writing a chapter on “Coalition Politics in West Bengal” for UPIASI, New Delhi, to be published by OUP. 28. Survey Findings, (July, 2008), Ibid. A large sample (3800) was chosen with a structured questionnaire and an interesting feedback was recorded. 29. Field Survey, Ibid. 30. A. B. Bardhan, The Statesman Kolkata, July 7, 2009. 31. Shyamal Chakraborty, Vice-President CITU, August 4, 2006. 32. Dainik Statesman, Kolkata, May 2–May 5, 2005. 33. Interview, D. Bandyapadhyay, May 4, 2009; Shree D. Bandyapadhyay (retd IAS), Professor Sunanda Sanyal and others from theater and culture as to what happened in Keshpur, Garbeta, and other places. 34. Ibid. 35. The State Election Commission, West Bengal data were incomplete. Therefore, the data in the text had to be compiled from different newspapers and news magazines. 36. Aparna Sen, Saoli Mitra, Bratya Basu, Shuvaprasanna, Shirsendu Mukhapadhyay, and others on what happened at Nandigram on March 14, and November 10, 2007. 37. Dainik Statesman, (Kolkata), March 16, 2006. 38. Council for Social Development, India Social Development Report (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2008).

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39. Manas Ghosh wrote a series of reports based on the Observer’s Afzal Amanulla’s report in the Statesman Kolkata, May–June, 2004. 40. Partha Chatterjee, Dwaipayan Bhattacharya, Surajit Mukherjee, and Pranab Das, Strengthening Decentralization, a Report, (Kolkata: Centre for the Studies in Social Sciences, 2006). 41. Immediately after winning the election in 2006, Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee and Nirupam Sen took up the position that they were to go “from capitalism to socialism.” 42. K.S. Subramaniam, Parliamentary Communism: Crisis in the Indian Communist Movement (Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1989). 43. Singur: ekti unnayan Santras, Samiksha, May 1, 2009 (Kolkata). This was a lecture regarding the unleashing of state terror by the LF government to carry on an agenda of Development at Singur in the district of Hooghly. It was delivered in Bengali by Amit Bhaduri published by Aneek, Kolkata, 2007 on social movements led by peasants whose rich agricultural lands were taken over by the LF government to hand over the same to Ratan Tata to build up his small Nano Car Factory. Also interview with Jyoti Basu, August 4, 2004 and July 6, 2006. 44. Rezzak Molla, “Land Reforms and Revenue Minister, LF government—A Comment,” Dainik Statesman, (Kolkata), September 17, 2009. Mr Molla expressed the same opinion to the displeasure of his CM and the Minister for Industry earlier also during the land grabbing operation at Bhangar, South 24 Parganas and Rajarhat at North 24 Parganas. 45. Arindam Ghosh-dostidar, by-line news report, The Statesman, Kolkata, September 14, 2009. 46. Buddhadeb Bhattacharjee, September 3, 2009 as quoted by Arindam Ghoshdostidar, in The Statesman, editorial page, Ibid. 47. Dipak Kumar Ghosh, “A monster takes on its creator,” The Statesman, Kolkata, August 27, 2009. 48. Saoli Mitra, Anyaya Je kore Ar Anyaya Je Sahe (Kolkata: Ubudosh, 2009). 49. Ibid. 50. Amit Bhattacharyya, Singur to Lalgarh via Nandigram: Rising Flames of People’s Anger against Displacement, Destitution, and State Terror, (Ranchi, Jharkhand: Bisthapan Virodhi Jan Vikass Andolan, 2009). 51. The Statesman Kolkata, Bartaman, (Kolkata), and Sambad Pratidin (Kolkata) continuously brought out the news items after March 14, 2007. 52. Manoj Bhattacharya, RSP, former MP (Rajya Sabha), September 2, 2009. 53. Sajal Rai Chaudhuri and Anup Bandyapadhyay, Singur Theke Nandigra: A Survey, (Ganaudyog, Kolkata: 2009). 54. Bibek Debroy and Laveesh Bhandari, Transforming West Bengal: Changing the Agenda for an Agenda for Change, (New Delhi: Indicus White Paper, 2009).


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B.â•‡ Alternating Two-party Systems

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Chapter 10

Rajasthan Silent Tsunami in Rajasthan: BJP Bastion Busted in 2009 Bhawani Singh and Vibhuti Singh Shekhawat

The state of Rajasthan remains perpetually in transition. Being a conglomerate of old princely states up to 1947, Rajasthan witnessed new political germination when it switched from a feudal to a democratic political system. The transition was peaceful with little turmoil, which helped the state in catching up with the more advanced and developed states of India. In terms of development indices, no other state except Haryana and Punjab can equal her in north India. Territorially the largest in India, Rajasthan is a political minnow in population; therefore it sends only 25 representatives to India’s lower chamber of Parliament. The December 2008 Assembly election led to a change of guards, with the Congress replacing the BJP to form the government. Ashok Gehlot, a placid and suave individual, became the CM. Unlike his high profile BJP predecessor, Vasundhara Raje, he always kept a low profile, but he also is credited with having a sound and steady approach to statecraft and political governance. The 2009 Lok Sabha contest promised to be a repeat performance of the 2008 Assembly election, with political gladiators on both sides sharpening their weapons to settle scores with their adversaries. The advantage with the new CM Ashok Gehlot was that he was not impetuous, dogged, or too rigid in his ideological fixations and could change quickly, take U turns,

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and indulge in strategic retreats and ideological turnabouts to suit the political exigencies. As against this, the BJP took a lot of time to come to terms with the changed realities of their electoral defeat in 2008 and put its house in order. It was still plagued by factional rivalry and a leadership schism. It faced the 2009 Lok Sabha poll as a house divided against itself. Dissidents, taking clandestine clues from the fallen patriarch Bhairon Singh Shekhawat, were completely faction-ridden and operated to the disadvantage and detriment of the Vasundhara Raje group. Reeling under the electoral blows of 2008 in Rajasthan, it also became affected by subsequent election setbacks to the BJP in other states. In West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee, an erstwhile NDA partner decided to ally with the Congress-led UPA, while in Orissa, Navin Patnaik, an old political ally of the BJP, parted company with the BJP. Though these developments did not directly impact the Rajasthan BJP, they did add to the prevailing gloom. Likewise, the attitude of BJP’s old ally Shiv Sena in Maharashtra, in drawing close to Sharad Pawar, leader of the NCP further added to the BJP’s political woes. The vertical split in the BJP between party President Rajnath Singh and Arun Jaitley also cast its ominous shadow in Rajasthan. In Bihar too, CM Nitish Kumar on whose back it was piggy riding to sail through as a marginalized political player, clipped the BJP’s wings. In nearby Delhi, its position was anything but worth emulating. It should be emphasized that BJP’s growth soared in 1999 with the Ram Temple issue, but this time it failed to couple the emotionality of the temple issue with the political engineering of a coalitional culture. Belatedly it decided to take the help of G.V.L. Narasimha Rao, a pollster, to assess its fortunes in the 2009 Lok Sabha polls, thereby exhibiting its dependence more on the mathematics of seats to be predicted by professional pollsters than on demography, i.e., the electorate or people of India. A party that has ruled in Rajasthan with the support of the people became so insecure that it had to take the help of questionable advisors in seeking the illusory hope of victory. It adopted a new slogan, “governance, security, and development,”1 which failed to enthuse the Rajasthan voters because it lost the governance in the 2008 Assembly poll and hence could assure neither security nor development.

Silent Tsunami in Rajasthan

219

It began its electoral journey in Rajasthan following the 2008 electoral disaster warily, encompassing within its bosom some outmoded moral imperatives resting on a garbled history that began and ended with the period of Hindu dominance, ignoring the Muslim and British periods. The BJP’s orthodox vision and its pathological obsession with the pure blood of only Hindus rendered the Muslims and Christians as untouchables owing to the myopic perception of Hindu zealots. The converted Muslims and Christians were looked upon and depicted as ethnic hybrids, as the children born of the marital union of Muslims and British males to Hindu women. Small wonder, the expelled BJP leader Jaswant Singh likened the BJP to an Indian version of the American Ku Klux Klan, and another leader Arun Shourie called it “An Alice in Blunderland.”2 Thus its ideological fixation rested on violent purities and ethnic hybrids that created a sterile anti-minority obsession in her rank and file, though lip service continued to be paid to “real secularism” and by way of cosmetics and tokenism, some seats were allotted to minorities at the state and also at the all India level. In reality, BJP was guided by reflexive anti-Muslim phobia and remained frozen in a cultural tableaux of religious unilateralism. Operating under the competing pressure of the RSS parivar (family) and the overweening ambition of second-generation leaders and their political allies, it attempted to display the swagger of confidence that was its hallmark in 2000, but appeared effete and weak in 2009.

Pre-poll Politics The state of Rajasthan has always been afflicted by caste war. Earlier it was between the Jats and the Rajputs and now it was between Meenas and Gujjars. The Meenas belong to the ST category and the Gujjars are included in OBC. The Meenas owing to their ST status seek upward mobility and the Gujjars aspire to join them. This was not acceptable to the Meenas who did not want to share their predominant position in the ST category and the privileges that accrue to that category with the Gujjars. In the 2008 Assembly poll, pacification of Gujjars cost BJP its dominance. In the 2009 Lok Sabha poll, the Gujjars launched

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the defeat Meena plan. This plan envisaged, supporting non-Meena tribal candidates in ST constituencies. In 2008 assembly election, two non-Meena candidates belonging to the Dhanka Adivasi group had won. They were Anju Dhanka who won as an independent candidate from Bassi and Surajbhan, a Samajwadi party candidate from Rajgarh. These victories came as a shot in the arm of Gujjars, who decided to support non-Meena candidates in Dausa, Banswara, and Udaipur where they continued to be in sizeable numbers.

Candidate Selection and Politics of Catchment Area This is a major problem for any party. In choosing a candidate, it has to ascertain and affirm that the law of proportionality is not violated and every segment of public opinion is adjusted according to its relative strength, be it caste, religious affiliation, or gender. But above all, it is the win-ability factor that is taken into consideration. Together with win-ability, sometimes a different yardstick is also adopted. Every political party has some dissidents and to eliminate them, they are put in a constituency where their defeat is certain. In respect of Badmer constituency, which after delimitation became heavily Jat dominated, the BJP’s dominant group led by ex-CM Vasundhara Raje, fielded Manvendra Singh, a Rajput. The plan was obvious. Manvendra Singh was the current BJP MP and being the son of Jaswant Singh, the dissident leader, was the best bet for this strategy of dealing with dissents. Vasundhara Raje wanted to kill two birds in one shot. Being an ex-MP, Manvendra Singh was accommodated and being a dissident, he was put in a constituency acceptable to him, but where his defeat was certain. The BJP could have put up a better fight by putting a Jat candidate in this constituency, but this was not done. The idea was to eliminate a dissident and not to win a seat. The same strategy took place in the Congress. The Congress fielded one Jyoti Mirdha, granddaughter of the late Nathuram Mirdha from Nagaur constituency, which has traditionally been a Jat stronghold.


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Here two rival Mirdhas, late Nathuram Mirdha and Ram Niwas Mirdha, competed for electoral gains since 1952. After the death of Nathu Ram Mirdha, Harendra Mirdha son of Ram Niwas Mirdha staked his claims to the Chief Ministership on the plea of being a peasant. He was a potential candidate for Chief Ministership but he lost the Assembly seat and thereby lost his claim to the Chief Ministership. Obviously, this paved the way for Gehlot’s ascendance to this pre-eminent position. Gehlot’s other potential rivals were Bhanwarlal Sharma, Narain Singh Jat, C.P. Joshi, B.D. Kalla, and C.S. Vaid. All lost in the Assembly election. By giving a ticket to Jyoti Mirdha, Gehlot tried to cut Harendra Mirdha to size. It was an oblique hint to him that he was dispensable in Nagaur being a political reject and Congress could bank upon the rival Mirdha family to bolster the support of the Jat community. Jat votes could be garnered through the help of another Mirdha clan. Whereas Ram Niwas Mirdha chose to remain a Congress loyalist throughout, Nathu Ram joined the opposition ranks in 1980 and never rejoined Congress. By giving a ticket to his grand daughter, Ashok Gehlot showed his dexterity at electoral management. It was a subtle message to Harendra Mirdha that having been rejected by the people in the Assembly election, he no longer wielded great clout and his rival Jat family now was ungrudgingly supporting Congress. Similarly, the Bhilwara seat was allotted to C.P. Joshi who lost the Nathdwara Assembly seat by just one vote to BJP’s Kalyan Singh. The game plan was that if Joshi won the Lok Sabha seat, he would shift his politics to the center. A defeat in Lok Sabha poll would marginalize him completely in state politics. He won the Lok Sabha seat and is a minister at the center.

Splinter Explosion Party split is not new to India; usually, the cause of split is defection of people elected on one party symbol joining another party. The anti-defection law stipulates party split, if one-third of the elected members decide to form another group or merge in another formation.

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On April 4, 2009, six legislators of the Rajasthan Legislative Assembly elected on BSP tickets of the Dalit czarina Mayawati, decided to enmasse walk into the Congress fold, thereby giving a rude shock to her prime ministerial ambitions. This step by six legislators proved how tenuous was her hold on legislators outside UP. In states dominated either by Congress or BJP, the BSP has always been a catchment area for the two big formations that could successfully woo the BSP legislators. They are the prized catches. The six defecting members were Rajkumar Sharma, Giriraj Singh, Ramesh Meena, Murari Lal Meena, Ramkesh Meena, and Rajendra Singh Gudha. What made these samaritans change sides remains a mystery. None of them were inducted into the ministry. Perhaps they realized that it would pay in the long run to be with a leading political formation like Congress, and since BJP being out of power and faction-ridden looked like a sinking ship, they decided to throw in their lot with the Congress, the ruling party. To be with the ruling party was a better political option than to be with a waning opposition. The Congress party came clean in this business. By denying them ministerial positions, it can boast that it did not provide them with any allurement to join it.

The Fateful 4.5 Percent Share of Rajasthan In the House of the People consisting of 545 members, Rajasthan’s share of just 4.5â•¯percent may seem woefully small. But since Rajasthan is politically speaking a bipolar state where MPs have traditionally belonged to only two parties—the Congress or the BJP—their number becomes crucial in government formation at the center. When we look at the electoral share of these parties in Rajasthan, their importance becomes abundantly clear as shown in Table 10.1. Table 10.1 affirms the importance of the party position in 2009 as in previous elections. Once again the two major political formations accessed nearly all the 25 seats with the Congress drubbing the BJP by winning 20 seats. The BJP won 4 seats and an Independent, Kirori Lal Meena, annexed the one seat of Dausa.

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Silent Tsunami in Rajasthan Table 10.1 Party Results 1991–2009 Year

Name of party

Number of seats won

1991

BJP Congress

12 13

1996

BJP Congress Others

12 12 1

1998

BJP Congress Others

5 18 2

1999

BJP Congress

16 9

2004

BJP Congress

21 4

2009

Congress BJP Independent

20 4 1

Source: Times of India, New Delhi, April 8, 2009, p. 4.

The Die is Cast Voting day came on May 7, 2009 for Rajasthan. It was a low turnout largely because of voter apathy and/or fatigue. Scorching heat, an absence of real political issues, and an auspicious day for weddings, the 7th May, turnout was fairly disappointing. It was 16â•¯percent less3 than the turn out in the 2008 Assembly election. Results are shown in Table 10.2: The overall voteâ•¯percentage in the entire state for the 2008 Assembly election was 48.35.4 Table 10.2 has depressing participation results. It shows that in 15 constituencies, the voting figure was less than 50â•¯percent. Dausa recorded the highestâ•¯percentage of 64.07 and the lowest percentage was at Jalore which was 37.96. As stated earlier, it could be either due to public apathy or the effect of mercury hovering over 40°C in most parts of the state, which proved to be a great dampener for a large number of voters to come and exercise their franchise in this scorching heat.

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Bhawani Singh and Vibhuti Singh Shekhawat Table 10.2

Comparative Voting Turnouts in 2008 Assembly and 2009 Parliamentary Elections

No.

Name of district

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25.

Ganganagar Churu Bikaner Jodhpur Badmer Jalore Pali Nagaur Rajsamand Jaipur Jaipur Rural Jhunjhunu Sikar Ajmer Bhilwara Chittorgarh Udaipur Kota Jhalawar Baran Karoli-Dholpur Bharatpur Alwar Banswara Dausa Tonk, Sawaimadhopur

Voting percentage in assembly election 2008 60.95 52.53 41.16 45.14 54.42 37.96 42.86 41.22 39.67 48.26 47.95 42.62 48.31 53.07 50.54 49.59 46.37 45.45 60.26 37.39 39.00 55.90 52.67 64.07 52.99

Voting percentage in parliamentary election 2009 39 40 40 41 42 41 41 41 39 39 39 39 39 40 42 41 39 42 41 42 39 40 42 40 42

Source: Rajasthan Patrika (Jaipur) May 8, 2009, p.1 and Dainik Bhaskar, (Jaipur), April 9, 2009, p. 6.

Some cases of rigging were reported from Surajpura in Dausa constituency where theâ•¯percentage of voting was 60+â•¯percent and the miscreants wanted to raise it to 90 or 95â•¯percent.5 It was to be a noise free, smooth, and silent operation so as to prevent another repoll.6 In villages dominated by either Meena or Gujjar communities, this type of rigging was the order of the day. In Gujjar dominated Bhandarej and Meena dominated Gothada, rigging was a planned afair.7 In Shyamawal school polling booth, the presiding officer


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was beaten black and blue by miscreants who were indulging in fake voting, voter intimidation, and booth jamming. In Olwada, a Meena dominated village, one person died owing to police firing on stone pelting mob of Gujjars.8 Repoll was ordered in 60 polling booths which showed the extent of rigging, fake voting, and acts of intimidation in which rival caste groups indulged.

High Decibel Campaign and Repoll Violence During repoll, Gothada village in Dausa again became the epicenter of poll violence. Polling was suspended again due to large scale rigging. When poll observer Rajesh Kumar Misra, arrived at the scene, he was aghast to see fake voting being indulged in due to the connivance of polling party in favor of independent candidate Kirori Lal Meena. He suspended four officials on the spot, which irked the Meena community. He was attacked by the irate mob. The police resorted to firing in which one 18 years old Jaikishan Meena was killed.9 Village Gothada had a third repoll on May 14, 2009. Only Meenas numbering 234 exercised their franchise. The result was a resounding win for Kirori Lal Meena the Independent candidate. He was the only independent to win. For the rest, it was a complete rout of BJP which was reduced to just four seats. Congress by wide margins annexed the remaining 20 seats.

Post Mortem Analysis The election results announced on May 16, 2009 showed a landslide in favor of Congress. The voteâ•¯percentage of various parties is given in Table No. 10.3. The election threw up 14 new faces. They are Sachin Pilot (Ajmer), Devji Patel (Jalore–BJP), Jitendra Singh (Alwar), Harish Choudhary

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Bhawani Singh and Vibhuti Singh Shekhawat Table 10.3 Party and Poll Percentage 2009

Name of party Congress BJP BSP Marxist CPI Independents and Others

Poll percentage 36.82 34.27 7.60 1.63 0.22 14.97

Source: Rajasthan Patrika (Jaipur) May 17, 2009, p. 2.

(Badmer), Lal Chand Kataria (Jaipur Rural), Mahesh Joshi (Jaipur City), Raghuveer Singh Meena (Udaipur), Mahadev Singh Khandela (Sikar), Arjun Ram Meghwal (Bikaner–BJP), Khilari Lal Bairwa (Karauli-Dholpur), Ileyraj Singh (Kota), Badri Ram Jhakhad (Pali), Gopal Singh (Rajsamand), and Jyoti Mirdha (Nagore). All new faces, barring two, belonged to Congress. The two BJP new faces were Devji Patel from Jalore and Arjun Ram Meghwal from Bikaner. The victory margin was over one lakh in the case of 11 candidates.10 The lowest victory margin of 317 votes was that of Namonarain Meena of Congress, which was not only the lowest for Rajasthan, but for the entire country.11 The lone Independent winner Kirorilal Meena was also among those who won by over one lakh votes. BSP did not put many competitive candidates, but in 14 seats it placed at number three position.12 10 sitting BJP MPs lost their seats. They included Manvendra Singh, V.P. Singh, Subhash Meharia, Nihal Chand, Pusp Jain, Rasa Singh Rawat, Mahavir Bhagora, Srichand Kriplani, Jaswant Bishnoi, and Kiran Maheshwari. The Congress increased its vote share in 159 assembly segments in 20 Lok Sabha constituencies. They include Sriganganagar, Jhunjhunu, Sikar, Jaipur city, Jaipur Rural, Alwar, Bharatpur, Karoli, Ajmer, Tonk-Sawai Madhopur, Nagore, Pali, Jodhpur, Badmer, Udaipur, Banswara, Chittorgarh, Rajsamand, Bhilwara, and Kota.13 The BJP increased its vote share only in 18 assembly segments in the four Lok Sabha constituencies of Bikaner, Churu, Jhalawar-Baran, and Jalore.14 BJP lost decisively in this election to the Congress party.


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Education Index of Members In terms of education, among the MPs elected, two are M.B.B.S., three M.A., four M.B.A., three Ph.D., two LL.B., one B.Sc., one B.Com, one B.A., one B.E., one B.A., one undergraduate, and five did not indicate their qualifications except stating that they were school educated,15 which is a euphemism for school drop-outs.

Age Index The age index of members elected is equally interesting. Only one member, Sheesh Ram Ola was 82 years old. Among the rest, seven were below 70, eight were below 60, three were below 50, and six were either 40 or below.16 Perhaps this explains the appeal of Rahul Gandhi and his youth brigade of the Congress party.

Representation of Erstwhile Royalty India lives in an age of postcolonial egalitarianism, where the feudals and bluebloods are officially denied the pompous and boastful prefixes of Raja, Maharaja, and Nawab to mark them from the deglamorized hoi polloi. Nonetheless, in practice traditional elitism continues and references to their royal honorifics still persist and linger in public memory and conversation. These lineages still have political utility that sets then apart as nobles in the social hierarchy. Electoral value remains attached to their royal backgrounds and hence both the Congress and the BJP made liberal use of such bluebloods. The BJP’s chief leader, ex-CM Vasundhara Raje is an ex-princess of Gwalior state and the Maharani (queen) of Dholpur state. She had put up the royal scion of Dholpur—her son Dushyant Singh—from Jhalawar constituency on a BJP ticket. As a matching response, the Congress gave tickets to three ex-royals—Princess Chandresh Kumari of Jodhpur, Prince Bhanwar Jitendra Singh of Alwar, and Prince

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Ileyaraj Singh of Kota. All four erstwhile royals won handsomely with good margins. Four royals out of 25 winners is not a mean achievement.

Caste Representation and the Rahul Factor Though officially denied, yet caste continues to be a winning factor in constituencies dominated by some major castes. The Congress made a selective use of caste groups and gave seven seats to Jats, four to Rajputs, and three to Brahmins. The result of this caste arithmetic was fantastic. It won 20 out of 25 parliamentary seats, which covered 159 assembly segments where it received the majority of votes in 159 out of 200 assembly segments. This is a big quantum jump from 2008, when in the Assembly election Congress won 96 out of 200 seats. The Congress Party ascribes this victory to better Congress rule and the Rahul factor. Rahul Gandhi, the Congress general secretary held rallies in eight constituencies and his party won in seven of them. His magic worked in seven constituencies and failed only in one constituency, Jhalawar. Other leaders like L.K. Advani and Narendra Modi from the BJP, and Sonia Gandhi from the Congress, also made selective appearances but they did not register a perceptible impact on the electorate. Rahul being a youth icon made a big difference to the electoral fortunes of the Congress party. Senior leaders from both parties did not make a big impression with the electorate. They appeared to be faded icons. As against this, the caste wise representation given by the BJP was Rajputs four, Jats four, Brahmins two, Vaishyas two, and others like Rawat, Sindhi, Gujjar, and Jadav—one each.

Women Representation Three women—Girija Vyas, Jyoti Mirdha, and Chandresh Kumari won their electoral contests. They were all from Congress. The BJP


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women failed in their effort to reach New Delhi. They lost both Nagaur and Jalore seats. Women did not play a stellar role in Rajasthan politics. Only one woman, Vasundhara Raje, became the CM for five years ever since 1952. Some women were always given cabinet berths but this seemed to be tokenism. By and large, women have not played a very significant role in Rajasthan politics. This is largely owing to the absence of charismatic women in this conservative and tradition bound state. The sole exception was Vasundhara Raje—who got to the top post—not because of her charisma and popularity, but because she was the choice of BJP patriarch Bhairon Singh Shekhawat. He wanted to edge out his political rivals in the BJP such as Lalit Kishore Chaturvedi and Hari Shankar Bhabhara.

Elimination of Sitting Ducks Political parties were not averse to fielding seasoned campaigners and old warhorses in the election, but without much success. Three sitting members of the Legislative Assembly—Ghanshyam Tiwari, Kiran Maheshwari, and Rao Rajendra Singh—all from the BJP lost. The lone CPM member Amra Ram also lost. But an independent, Kirori Lal Meena, was victorious from Dausa. Previously, he served as the MLA from Toda Bhim.

Reflection This election indicates the sharp reversal of electoral fortunes. In 2004, the BJP was victorious in 21 out of 25 Parliamentary segments. In 2009, the situation reversed as the BJP won only four seats as against 20 Congress wins. One Independent Kirori Lal Meena won from Dausa. What accounts for this electoral somersault? Since Rajasthan has a tradition of bi-party political alternation and domination at different time intervals, one may look into the crucial causal factors of BJP’s debacle and Congress’ landslide. These could be both national, as well as local. One can first turn to broader national causes.

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Varun Venom However much the BJP talked about soft Hindutva, the atavistic emotions raised by Varun Gandhi with his fire spitting communal hate speech, “Chop off their hands/sterilise the Muslims,” was rabid enough to torpedo the best laid plans of BJP. This was sufficient, not only to scare Muslims but also a large section of Hindu secularists, who found in Varun’s speech toxic products offloaded by the BJP. It triggered the death knell of a shifting political matrix in which BJP apparatchiks failed to salvage the damage done to the unity of an amorphous NDA. The resulting slide in the electoral turf war was toward the Congress. It is important to note that following the communal carnage of Muslims in Gujarat in 2002, the BJP was not inclined to accommodate Muslims in Rajasthan. It could bank upon the alienation of Jats and state government employees from the Congress. The excesses against Muslims in Gujarat did not impact the 2003 state election in Rajasthan because of the Godhra episode involving the burning of railway coaches of the Sabarmati Express. That in turn triggered off revenge excesses against the Muslims. The alleged Muslim atrocities of Godhara were fresh in the minds of the Hindus in Rajasthan in 2003.

BJP: A Party with a Difference Became a Party of Differences For long, BJP boasted of its ideological loftiness and commitment to a cause. Little did it realize that it was soon to become a house divided against itself, where its members would be jockeying for leadership positions, more than showing a strong commitment to ideology. It became a leaderless rump and a rudderless ship. The party with a difference became a party of differences. For once, it was not clear what Hindutva meant except perhaps, minority bashing. The utterances of Varun became an albatross around its neck. It looked like it was once again trying to revive the Hindu card, which neither the vast majority of Hindus, nor the sadhus and saints of Ayodhya


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were prepared to accept, given the track record of BJP in office during their period of rule leading the NDA alliance. It steadfastly refused to wreck the coalition for Ram Temple at Ayodhya’s disputed sight and chose to remain ensconced in power on the alibi that it did not have complete majority to up the ante in favor of constructing the temple. The Hindu-based effort made a minor splash but failed to jolt the masses into supporting the BJP. With such an unenviable track record in office, and an ensuing open war between Arun Jaitley and Rajnath Singh, Murli Manohar Joshi and L.K. Advani at the center and Vasundhara Raje and Bhairon Singh Shekhawat and his acolytes in Rajasthan, BJP was ill-equipped to give a fight to a fully united and organizationally galvanized Congress in Rajasthan. With Atal Behari Vajpayee taking a self exile, Pramod Mahajan gunned down, and Bhairon Singh Shekhawat sidelined, the theatre of the absurd was complete. Their inherent dualism of playing to the Hindu gallery and trying to mislead the Muslims in the name of nationalism backfired and did not yield desired results. The people were fed up with BJP’s double time. Imagine a victim of Jinnah’s communal politics of 1947, the post partition Sindhi refugee from Pakistan, L.K. Advani giving a certificate of secularism to M.A. Jinnah 50 years after partition, thereby indirectly admitting that BJP’s earlier stance toward the Muslim League and its leaders was misplaced and incorrect. One may now turn to local causes.

Deglamorized Queen Goes Berserk Having been beaten and battered by Congress in Assembly election 2008, the BJP was badly mauled again in 2009 and its deglamorized queen Vasundhara Raje had to eat humble pie. The impression she gave during election campaigning was that she was resigned to the cruel fate of an impending defeat and hence concentrated more on the one seat of Jhalawar where from her son Dushyant Singh was contesting than on the rest of Rajasthan. It was one seat versus the rest. The only way she could defend her honor was by salvaging this one seat. The result was a foregone conclusion. She could retrieve and retain this

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one seat and bagged three more but lost the rest of the 21 seats in the state. In her anxiety to help her son, she forgot Rajasthan. In the year 2004, she had won 21 out of 25 seats. This time the wheel had taken a full circle, paving the way for the ascendance of Congress.

Sulking Saffron Brigade Paralyzed The absence of a third front in Rajasthan resulted in a two-way fight between the BJP and the Congress. There was no credible BSP or LF. The fight was between two alternating parties in which the winner took all. This time the winner was Congress. Success has many patrons and followers but defeat has none. The BJP scurried for cover, seeking scapegoats for the party’s most debilitating defeat. Its leader Vasundhara Raje proved to be a drawing room strategist, who compared the old guard to fossilized ruins, but she herself failed to deliver. She could walk on the ramp of fashion shows in Jaipur, but could do no tight rope walking in the electoral arena and caved in meekly before the determined onslaughts of a rejuvenated Congress, under the leadership of an underestimated Ashok Gehlot. He led the party to a splendid victory thereby proving once again within six months his family credentials of being a magic performer. His father, the late Laxman Singh Gehlot was a professional magician. His son decided to forsake his family profession and join politics. Being down and out for five years, his victory was no less phenomenal and magical. Verily, he played political magic to resurrect his position.

The Endgame The BJP was truly reduced to a heap of rubble. Said Prabhu Chawla, the editor of India Today, “The BJP is now a party without slogan, without a leader and without an ideology.”17 M.J. Akbar aptly observed, “Votes go to those who sell the future, not to those who rebrand the past.”18 As of today, the BJP has become a prisoner of the


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past and its lost beatitudes. It is not a pilgrim of the future. It represents a fibreless diet of past projections concerning old time Hindu glory with nothing for the near future. It needs to invest some credible propulsion of political boosters to survive and progress. Instead of projecting a new ideology, its leaders exhibit only ego-clashes clothed in high sounding rhetoric. What is worse is that despite the bad political drubbing it has received in the elections, its leaders are out of sync with reality, without an honest post-mortem of its electoral defeat. Its old and haggard leaders are still not willing to pass the baton to the next generation and walk into the sunset. To quote Umbreto Eco, “The earth is round, so if you go too much to the left, you end up on the right and vice versa.”19 This is the tragedy of BJP, which neither accepts the world as more equal and accessible, nor does it realize that mild tectonic shifts in political landscape can cause extraordinary upheavals. BJP has yet to learn fire fighting mechanism and damage control devices. This is its tragedy and predicament.

Notes â•‡ 1. Outlook (Delhi) March 23, 2009, p. 32. â•‡ 2. Times of India (New Delhi) March 21, 2009. â•‡ 3. Rajasthan Patrika (Jaipur) May 8, 2009. â•‡ 4. Dainik Bhaskar, May 9, 2009, p. 1. â•‡ 5. Times of India (Jaipur) May 8, 2009, p. 1. â•‡ 6. Ibid. â•‡ 7. Ibid. â•‡ 8. Ibid. â•‡ 9. Times of India (Jaipur) May 11, 2009, p. 1. 10. Rajasthan Patrika (Jaipur) May 17, 2009, p. 10. 11. Times of India (Jaipur) May 18, 2009, p. 1. 12. Rajasthan Patrika, op. cit., p. 10. 13. Dainik Bhaskar (Jaipur) May 18, 2009, p. 7. 14. Ibid. 15. Rajasthan Patrika, p. 9. 16. Ibid. 17. India Today, June 29, 2009, p. 5. 18. Times of India (New Delhi) August 30, 2009, p. 12. 19. Ibid., p. 8.

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Chapter 11

Kerala The LDF’s Debacle: Kerala Votes for National Stability G. Gopa Kumar

The resounding victory of Congress-led United Democratic Front (UDF) in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections did not surprise pollsters but the mandate was significant in several respects. The INC following of ruling India for decades had been on a decline since 1989. Congress generally saw south Indian states as areas of consistent support. Kerala’s national poll trends until 1996 showed, with few exceptions, a general trend for supporting Congress to produce stable governments at the center. Between 1996 and 2004, this pattern from the Kerala electorate lost its appeal and therefore it was crucial for the Congress to revive the trend in the state. Second, the electoral contest was an acid test for the ruling LDF who gained 18 out of 20 Lok Sabha seats in 2004, 99 out of 140 seats in the Assembly poll in 2006 and nearly 60â•¯percent of the seats in the 2005 Panchayat Raj Institution (PRI) elections. With the election to the local bodies due in May 2010 and Assembly poll in May 2011, the mandate became equally crucial for the LDF. Another important factor that was tested in the contest was the credibility of the CPI(M)-led LDF. It was in the limelight for its allegedly big-brotherly attitude toward its allies and for the controversial alliance it made with the PDP, led by Abdul Nasser Maudani. Strategically, it sought to make inroads into the Muslim

The LDF’s Debacle

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vote bank and thereby weaken the Muslim League, a middle sized party in state politics. In contrast, the Congress (I) in Kerala also had several issues and policy positions to be tested before the electorate. Firstly, the return of senior leader K. Karunakaran to the Congress fold after 28 months had to be evaluated in terms of electoral dividends. Indeed, the NCP, before the arrival of Karunakaran faction [called the Democratic Indira Congress (Karunakaran){DIC(K)}], was not a major factor in state politics. But with the merger of DIC(K) in 2007, the NCP gained attention and a potential alliance with the LDF would have made things difficult for the Congress (I). It did not happen because of the resistance from the constituents of LDF, although a section of the leadership in the CPI(M) was so inclined. The NCP State President K. Muraleedharan, son of K. Karunakaran, and his ranks refused to accept the decision of K. Karunakaran to join the Congress (I) and the NCP stood independent of the two major electoral fronts—the UDF and the LDF. Paradoxically, the NCP State President K. Muraleedharan voluntarily resigned his President ship on July 31, 2009 and sought membership in the Congress (I). The immediate reaction of the Kerala Pradesh Congress Committee (KPCC) Executive Committee was negative. Second, factionalism in the KPCC between three groups led by Oommen Chandy, Ramesh Chennithala, and Vayalar Ravi demanded a ceasefire so as to project a unified party before the electorate. The KPCC had to bargain for more seats from her allies or at least contest in 85â•¯percent of seats as it did in all the previous elections since 1984. The demand of Muslim League for two seats and Kerala Congress (Mani) [KC(M)] for one seat was understandable, but in the meantime smaller parties in UDF also began demanding seats. Unless the UDF consolidated itself, it could not compete with the strong LDF and expose the latter for its political and administrative failures during the last three years. Nonetheless, the UDF had several positions that it could and did convert to its advantage. 1. Being a national election, the CPM/LDF chances of forming a government were bleak.

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G. Gopa Kumar

2. The Congress party and its allies had to be elected from Kerala so as to resist the BJP’s rise to power, an especially attractive issue in Kerala with a nearly 45â•¯percent minority population. 3. Highlight and expose the setbacks of an LDF government already plague by intra and interparty disputes. 4. Intensify the anti-incumbency element in the minds of the electorate as the LDF did in the 2004 election. All these demanded a collective effort on the part of the Congress and UDF to oil its machinery and provide morale and confidence to the ranks of the party. Viewed from these angles, the contest became crucial for the Congress (I), although the media in Kerala often focused on the CPI(M) as its prestige contest. The contest was also crucial to the Muslim League because in 2004 it lost its prestigious Manjeri seat. With the CPM’s new appeal to the Muslim community, the League was put into a defensive posture so regaining its support base became very crucial and prestigious. The relevance of the BJP and its front, the NDA, did not attract much public attention. The situation had changed markedly from 2004. In 2004, the NDA polled 12.5â•¯percent votes and won the Moovattupuzha seat by the Indian Federal Democratic Party (IFDP) led by former Kerala Congress leader P.C. Thomas from the KC (M) in a triangular contest. BJP also did well in Thiruvananthapuram, Palghat, and Kasargode constituencies. The situation in 2009 had completely changed. More over, unlike in 2004, the NDA faced elections in 2009 sitting in Opposition and plunged into numerous controversies. The hatred speech of Varun Gandhi against Muslims during the campaign trail in UP brought a negative image for the BJP and the Kerala scenario was not different. The stalwarts of the state BJP leaders refused to contest, probably anticipating the negative swing among the voters. The electoral result reflected this change as the NDA declined in its vote share to 6.5â•¯percent in 2009 compared to 12.5â•¯percent in the 2004 elections. The landslide victory of the UDF in 2009 by winning 16 out of 20 seats was a remarkable achievement for the Congress and her allies. At the national level, the share from Kerala, although not a great number, was very important besides boosting the morale.

The LDF’s Debacle

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The Congress won 13 out of 17 seats contested, while the Muslim League won its allotted two seats and the KC(M) one seat. For both the Muslim League and the KC(M), the victory was prestigious as both regained seats they lost in 2004 besides increasing their respective vote shares. The Muslim League actively galvanized its cadres since it faced two kinds of opposition. One was the CPM, which since 2004 had been wooing the Muslim community by attacking the extreme position of the BJP as well as attracting a section of dissident Muslim League activists to its fold. Second, the alliance within the LDF of the CPM and PDP led by Maudani was raising potential challenges to the Muslim League. Maudani attracted huge crowds in Malappuram and Calicut districts, which are considered to be Muslim League strongholds. Moreover, on the eve of the election, the CPM State Secretary Pinarai Vijayan predicted that the Muslim League would not have any representation in Parliament following the election. This message sent shock waves to the leaders of the League. For the KC(M), regaining the prestige it lost in 2004 became very essential. The merger of IFDP with the rival Kerala Conress (Joseph) [KC(J)] and its entry into the LDF made things somewhat easier for the KC(M). The contest became bipolar and that too in its heartland, Kottayam. Clearly, the anti-incumbency factor faced by the LDF government significantly helped the KC(M). Therefore, unlike the Muslim League, the KC(M) did not face severe obstacles on its home turf. The BSP, though not a force in Kerala, also tried to field candidates in all the 20 constituencies. On the eve of election, some sections of the media reported a possible understanding between LDF and BSP but no progress actually was made in this direction. Especially in the Thiruvananthapuram Lok Sabha seat, the BSP candidate Neelalohitadasan Nadar was attracting some of the vote banks of UDF and LDF candidates simultaneously. However, the BSP candidates was not able to make a powerful presence, even in Thiruvananthapuram, where it finished in a poor third position. Bi-polar politics has become deeply entrenched in Kerala and other parties could not make their presence easily felt (see Table 11.1).

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G. Gopa Kumar Table 11.1 A Framework of Alliances and Parties on the Eve of 2009 Elections

No. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

UDF

LDF

Other forces

Congress (I) Muslim League Kerala Congress (M) Kerala Congress ( Jacob) Janadhpathya Samrakshana Samiti CMP Kerala Congress (B) RSP (B) – – – –

CPI(M) CPI RSP Kerala Congress (Joseph) Congress (S)

BJP JD(U) BSP NCP INL

JD(S) – – – – – –

PDP SUCI CPI(ML) DMK AIADMK SP KDP

Source: Compiled from Mathubhumi (Trivandrum) and Malayala Manorama (Trivandum).

The Thiruvananthapuram Lok Sabha seat attracted national and international attention due to the presence of noted writer and former Under Secretary General of UN Dr Shashi Tharoor, as the Congress candidate. The seat was held by CPI in the LDF. Although, both the Congress and CPI won the seat in the past elections, the contest in 2009 became prestigious. Local critics blamed Dr Tharoor for his lack of political background or contacts in the constituency. But his impressive victory by one lakh votes surprised his critics and friends alike. Undoubtedly, the results indicate a clear trend in favor of bipolar politics (see Table 11.2). The combined vote share of UDF and LDF came to 89.6â•¯percent leaving little scope for three other national parties—the BJP, the BSP, and NCP—who are deprived of any strong constituent in their alliance to help them. Altogether, BJP, the BSP, the NCP, and the rebel leftist candidates could not make any impact in the electoral outcome. The NCP fielded five candidates and lost in all the seats contested. Similarly, the BSP which fielded candidates in all the 20 seats failed to make any impact. The BSP candidate, A. Neelalohita Dasan Nadar polled 86,233 votes in Thiruvananthapuram constituency, but his presence did not seem to affect the prospects of UDF or LDF. Similarly, the NCP state president K. Muraleedharan

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The LDF’s Debacle Table 11.2 Vote Share and Seats of Major Alliances No.

Alliance

1. 2. 3.

UDF LDF BJP

Seats won 16 4 –

2009 (%) 47.7 41.9 6.4

Seats won 1 18 1

2004 (%) Difference (%) 38.4 46.1 12.10

+9.3 –4.2 –5.6

Source: Available online at: http://eciresults.nic.in/frmPercentVotesPartyWiseChart. aspx and http://eciresults.nic.in/frmPcWiseResult.aspx. (last date of access: December 15, 2010).

polled 99,663 votes from Wayanad constituency, but did not in any way affect the prospects of the Congress candidate. Significantly, the share of the BJP votes fell by almost half in 2009. It polled 6.2â•¯percent of the votes compared to its10.4â•¯percent and 12.10â•¯percent (including an ally) in 2004. Except in Kasaragod, where it polled 1,25,482 votes, the performance of BJP was very poor in 2009. On the whole, before the Kerala electorate, the BJP had been expected to strengthen the UPA government in Delhi or to extend moral support to the LDF government in Kerala and thereby give more strength to the Left Front–Third Front political leadership at the national level. The results showed not only that the electorate preferred the Congress-led UDF to win 16 out of 20 seats but also inflicted a heavy loss to LDF in most of the constituencies. The LDF, which won 18 out of 20 seats in 2004, was reduced to just four seats. In terms of vote share, the UDF increased by 9.3â•¯percent while the LDF lost 4.2â•¯percent in 2009 compared to 2004. The biggest winner in the elections was the Congress (I) which phenomenally increased its seats from zero in 2004 to 13 in 2009 and an increase in vote share by 8â•¯percent (see Table 11.3). In terms of vote share this was the highest for the party since 1977. The Congress won the Alappuzha, Chalakudy, Ernakulam, Idukki, Kannur, Kollam, Kozhikode, Mavelikara, Pathanamthitta, Thiruvananthapuram, Thrissur, Vadakara, and Wayanad seats. The four seats it lost was to its arch rival the CPI(M) who bagged these four seats only. The victory of the Congress party was spectacular in Alappuzha, Vadakara, Wayanad, Chalakudy, Kannur, Kollam, and Mavelikara—all CPM constituencies previously.

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G. Gopa Kumar Table 11.3 Vote Share of Major Parties

No.

Party

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7.

Congress Muslim League KC(M) CPI(M) CPI KC(J) BJP

Seats won 13 2 1 4 – – –

2009 (%) 40.10 5.07 2.53 30.50 7.44 2.08 6.20

Seats won – 1 – 13 4 1 1

2004 (%) 32.10 4.87 1.39 31.50 7.89 2.35 10.40

Difference (%) +8.00 +1.20 +1.14 –1.00 –.45 –.27 –4.20

Source: Available online at: http://eciresults.nic.in/frmPercentVotesPartyWiseChart.aspx and http://eciresults.nic.in/frmPcWiseResult.aspx. (last date of access: December 15, 2010).

From the CPI, it took Pathanamthitta, Thiruvananthapuram, and Thrissur. It won Idukki from the KC(J). The victory of Dr Shashi Tharoor in Thiruvananthapuram seat by a margin of 99,998 votes attracted national attention. The Congress’ victory in Calicut was by a small margin, but it was a prestigious contest against CPM. Similarly, in Ernakulam, it wrested the seat from CPM by a margin of 11,790 votes. The UDF allies, the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) and Kerala Congress also made impressive victories. Much against the attempt to marginalize IUML in Kerala politics through penetrating into minority votes by CPM, besides the controversial alliance with Abdul Nazir Maudani on the eve of elections, the League came back successfully. It wrested the prestigious Ponnani seat from the CPM– LDF backed an independent candidate Dr Hussain Randathani, while retained the Malappuram seat by a big margin. It also increased its vote share by 1.20â•¯percent and rebuked the CPI(M) claim that League will have no representation in Parliament this time. On the whole, the Muslim League candidates’ victory was impressive. Similarly, the KC(M) candidate Jose K. Mani won his seat with a huge margin and defeated the CPI(M) candidate Suresh Kurup who won the seat in 2004. The vote share of KC(M) also increased by 1.14â•¯percent. Thus, unlike the setback, the KC(M) candidate received in the prestigious Muvattupuzha seat in 2004, to its arch rival and

The LDF’s Debacle

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NDA-backed IFDP candidate, P.C. Thomas, the party could gain the equally prestigious seat, Kottayam. Thus, the electoral performance of the UDF candidates was impressive except for the four seats it lost—Kasaragod, Alathur, Attingal, and Palghat—although the loss in Palghat was by a small margin of 1,820 votes. The victory in the Calicut seat was also by a small margin of 838 votes. On the whole, all the three major constituents of UDF—the Congress (I), the Muslim League, and KC(M)— had increased its vote share by a total of 10.34â•¯percent from its vote share of 2004 which make the electoral trend very clear. On the contrary, the three partners of the LDF lost the election by a huge margin except in the Kozhikode seat. The CPI(M) lost Alappuzha, Chalakudy, Ernakulam, Kannur, Kollam, Kozhikode, Pathanamthitta, and Vadakara to the Congress candidates, Malappuram to Muslim League, and Kottayam to the KC(M). Especially, the loss of Kannur and Vadakara by big margins was a great set back. Similarly, by snatching the sitting seat of JD(S), the CPI(M) fielded its candidate in Calicut but eventually lost. The issue became very live on the campaign phase resulting in the practical withdrawal of support by JD(S) leadership. As events showed later, the JD(S) faction was accepted as a new constituent of the UDF in the post-election phase. Nevertheless, the CPM won the Kasargod and Alathur seats with huge margins, besides Attingal and Palghat. The CPI lost all the four seats it contested. It lost heavily in Wayanad, Thiruvananthapuram, and Mavelikara, besides Thrissur. None of its candidates raised any hope of victory during the campaign. The war of statements between CPI(M) and CPI over seat sharing on the eve of elections also affected the prospects of its party candidates. The lone KC(J) candidate Francis George who earned good reputation for nursing the Idukki constituency also lost the election by a sizeable margin. The victory of the Congress candidate in Idukki reflected the overall electoral trend of the state.1 Compared to 2004, the LDF lost 4.2â•¯percent of its vote share. In terms of individual party strength, the loss of CPI(M) was huge. Unlike in 2004, when it contested in 13 seats and polled 31.50â•¯percent votes, the party contested 14 seats but polled only 30.50â•¯percent votes in 2009 (see Table 11.3). In 2004, it bagged all the 13 seats contested

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G. Gopa Kumar

but this time it could win four seats only. Interestingly, loss of vote share for CPI was less than 1â•¯percent (0.45â•¯percent) but it lost all the four seats this time in contrast to winning four seats in 2004. Again, the KC(J) lost the seat it held in 2004 and its vote share declined from 2.35â•¯percent to 2.08â•¯percent.

Explaining the Verdict: Regional Issues or National Appeal? It has been found in the state’s electoral politics that voters resort to a kind of ticket splitting process. This means that voters clearly distinguish between elections to State Legislature and Parliament and redistribute their choices. While the UDF and LDF alternate in coming to power in Kerala, the voting behavior has been different for Parliament elections. A consensus seems to exist in favor of a stable government, which often favored the Congress party. This trend started declining particularly since 1996 and reached its peak in 2004. But once the Congress-led UPA demonstrated its ability to provide a secular and stable government, the Kerala electorate turned in favor of the Congress-led UDF for the Lok Sabha election. Especially in the backdrop of rising communalism and terrorism, there emerged a consensus that Congress (I) is far more accountable than other party, in addressing the grave challenges of contemporary India. The post-poll survey conducted by CSDS in Kerala also supports this observation. Moreover, the major national opposition party, the BJP, did not make any worthwhile impact in Kerala politics. The social demography and the history and impact of social movements in Kerala together offer a major obstruction to the BJP for making inroads in the electorate. Again, the CPI(M)-led LDF, though strong in Kerala, did not assure any prospects for its Third Front alliance to come to power in India. All these factors provided an early advantage for the Congress party in this election. But this provided only one side of the picture. The performance of the LDF government which came to power exactly three years before was certainly put to test in the election. Although, the leadership of

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the LDF distanced itself from this argument, neither the UDF sitting in the Opposition nor the powerful media spared the LDF from the government performance issue. Ever since the V.S. Achutanandan government came to power on May 18, 2006, numerous problems haunted the government. These included the issue of self-financing policy in the education sector, failure of the government in providing adequate support in the health sector, shortage of safe drinking water, ineffective role of Public Works Department (PWD) in improving roads and bridges, rising prices of essential commodities, corruption charges against ministers, depletion of agricultural sector and crisis faced by farmers, disunity and lack of coordination among ministers, war of statements by ministers and party leaders against communal interest groups, etc. All these aspects considerably damaged the prospects of the LDF. Added to this were the three major issues that became highlighted on the eve of elections. 1. The SNC Lavalin controversy against the CPI(M) Party Secretary, Pinarayi Vijayan. 2. The issue of aligning with the PDP led by Abdul Nazir Maudani. 3. The disunity that emerged between the CPI(M) on one side and its constituent allies, viz., the JD(S), the CPI, and RSP. Needless to say, the print and electronic media highlighted these problems before the electorate and discredited the government. Thus, the anti-incumbency element reached its peak on the eve of elections. At the same time, the performance of the government on the welfare sector needed to be debated. The government was able to distribute most of the welfare benefits to the poor people which partly explain the LDF’s creditable vote share of nearly 42â•¯percent. Even at the peak of the anti-incumbency element, the CPI(M) was able to win four seats although none of its partners were able to secure any seat. The electoral verdict clearly demonstrates the disenchantment of the major social groups—the Christians, the Muslims, and the Nair communities, although for different seasons. The CSDS survey results show that the UDF gained significantly among Christians in comparison to 2004 (see Table 11.4); while the LDF lost substantially

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G. Gopa Kumar

among Nairs as well as Christians. The study shows that LDF lost support across almost all sections, though not in equal measure. The LDF retained its traditional base among Ezhavas and Dalits. However, its popularity among the Scheduled Tribes (STs) is declining compared to its appeal among the Scheduled Castes (SCs) (see Table 11.4). Probably one explanation for this new phenomenon is due to the LDF’s controversial policy on the tribal land question. The land struggles of the tribal community led by C.K. Janu and others in Malabar and Chengara had led to the marginalization of LDF’s support base. The LDF’s attempt to garner fresh Muslim votes through a controversial tie up with PDP led by Maudani boomeranged.2 A majority of the respondents in Kerala disapproved this tie up.3 Similar were the attitude of CPI, RSP, and a section of CPI(M) led by the Chief Minister V.S. Achutanandan. As a matter of fact, the PDP is considered as an extreme communal force compared to the moderate role played by the Muslim League. The CSDS study found that LDF is more popular among poor (52â•¯percent), equally popular among lower middle income group (45â•¯percent) but not among middle income (39â•¯percent) and high income groups (32â•¯percent). The comparative figures of UDF are 38â•¯percent, 45â•¯percent, 41â•¯percent, and 53â•¯percent, respectively.4 Table 11.4 Caste–Religion Wise Preference of Parties Party Voted for Lok Sabha 2009 No.

Categories

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Nairs Other Upper Caste Ezhavas Other OBC SC ST Muslim Christian Others Total

UDF (%) 32.9 37.5 26.8 22.0 15.4 60.0 68.2 68.2 55.6 44.8

Source: CSDS Post Poll Survey, 2009.

LDF (%) 27.1 45.8 57.0 46.3 69.2 40.0 26.4 31.8 44.4 41.8

BJP (%) 28.6 16.7 7.4 12.2 3.1 – – – – 6.5

Others (%) 11.4 – 8.7 19.5 12.3 – 5.4 – – 69.6

The LDF’s Debacle

245

Significantly, 70â•¯percent of the sample mentioned V.S. Achutanandan as their preferred CM.5 This result further substantiates the claim of the media that the CM enjoyed popularity among the people for his commitment to corrupt free administration and principled politics at a time when the CPI(M) and its key leaders, including few ministers, lost their credibility among the people. The CSDS data highlights that V.S. Achutanandan should lead the LDF (with a popular rating of 69â•¯percent; see Table 11.10). As events proved, the factional tussle in CPI(M) reached its peak on the eve of elections and damaged the party severely. The CM V.S. Achutanandan lost his membership in the party’s highest-level body, the Politburo, soon after the verdict. The Lavalin controversy6 also damaged the CPI(M) at a time when the CM resorted to distance himself from the allegation and demanded judicial probe. The consistent position of the CPI(M) Secretary Pinarayi Vijayan in denying the allegation and at the same time refusing to cooperate for a judicial probe raised doubts in the public mind. Significantly, three weeks after the verdict, on June 7, 2009, the Governor initiated legal steps for prosecuting the alleged leaders and officials. Many of the constituent allies of the LDF also demanded a judicial probe that added substance and credibility to the allegation. The position of CPI(M) General Secretary Prakash Karat in defending his colleague was also not appealing. He argued that Pinarayi Vijayan held the position of Electricity Minister when the controversy arose in 1999 and he would have resigned for facing a probe had he held a post in the current government. His position as Party Secretary therefore does not warrant a resignation. This argument did not convince the voters. Altogether, the Lavalin controversy dominated the discourse in the campaign. The CSDS survey also supports this argument. Only12â•¯percent believed that the charges are baseless, while 32â•¯percent held that Pinarayi Vijayan’s role in the scam cannot be denied (see Tables 11.5 and 11.6). Similarly, the attempt of the CPI(M) to attract Muslim voters by aligning with the PDP and its leader Abdul Nazir Maudani also reacted negatively in the public mind. Maudani, who was imprisoned for nine-and-a-half years allegedly for being involved in the Coimbatore

246

G. Gopa Kumar Table 11.5 Voter’s Views on SNC Lavalin Case

No.

Response

Validâ•¯percent

1. 2. 3. 4.

Charges are baseless Role in scam can not be denied No opinion/Don’t Know N.A Total

11.9 32.4 25.2 30.4 100.0


Table 11.6 Have You Heard about the Corruption Charges against Pinarayi Vijayan in the Lavlyn Scam? No.

Response

1. 2.

Yes No Total

Validâ•¯percent 69.6 30.4 100.0


Bomb Blast in 1998, was released in 2008 when the prosecution failed to prove the charges against him. The LDF seized the opportunity by courting with his party, as they did in the 2006 Manjeri experiment that paid dividends then. The Muslim League lost the prestigious Manjeri seat in 2004, but since then the League effectively prevented the CPI(M) inroads into their base. Moreover, the constituents of the LDF, the CPI, RSP, and Janata Dal, were opposed to the last minute tie up with the PDP, fearing reactions from the civil society. The CSDS data also support this assumption. According to their survey, 71â•¯percent have heard about the LDF’s controversial alliance with Abdul Nazir Maudani. Only 7.5â•¯percent in the sample fully approve of this alliance in contrast to 34â•¯percent who fully disapproved (see Table 11.7). In reality, this had occurred and, in turn, the League was able to stage a comeback. The League leadership commented that the PDP–CPI(M) alliance had put on risk peace and secularism but the people rejected the Ponnani experiment.7 Another issue was the problem related to the government policy on self-financing of the education sector. The Christian-run educational

247

The LDF’s Debacle Table 11.7 Approval Rating on LDF’s Alliance with Abdul Nassir Maudani No.

Response

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Fully approves Somewhat approves Somewhat disapproves Fully disapproves No opinion/Don’t Know N.A Total

Validâ•¯percent 7.5 9.6 4.6 34.4 18.2 25.6 100.0


agencies derived additional benefits in starting now professional colleges in the previous UDF government but found itself locked up with the LDF government. Eventually, this led to a war of statements between various Christian groups on the one side and M.A. Baby, the Minister for Education on the other side. In all the three years, the controversy thrived and no rational policy choice was in sight. The problem led to polarization pushing most of the Christian Church groups to issue pastoral letters to defeat the LDF. The media observed a Christian wave against the LDF. The high margin of victory by the UDF candidates in Pathanamthitta, Idukki, Kottayam, Chalakudy, Alappuzha, and Mavelikara further substantiates the effectiveness of Christian consolidation against the LDF. The setback also affected KC(J) in Idukki. Although it was expected to serve as a link between the Church and the LDF, nothing productive was achieved. The disunity among the partners of the LDF was another factor that affected their prospects. Ever since 2006, the CPI was quick to react against the big brotherly attitude of CPI(M). There were many occasions when the CPI State Secretary Veliyam Bhargavan made open statements against the domination of CPI(M) in the LDF. This also led to a poor chemistry in the unity of ministers in the Cabinet. Once the electoral scenario emerged, the non-CPI(M) parties of LDF came out with complaints that the CPI(M) is entering into their electoral space. For instance, the CPI was asked to leave its claim on Ponnani seat and be content with three seats and support an independent LDF candidate in Ponnani. After significant dispute,

248

G. Gopa Kumar Table 11.8 Who Should Lead the UDF in Kerala?

No.

Name

Validâ•¯percent

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

Oommen Chandy A.K. Anthony K. Karunakaran None of the Three Others No opinion/Don’t Know Total

34.3 35.7 9.6 2.2 1.5 16.6 100.0


Table 11.9 A Non-coalition View on Voter’s Party Preferences No.

Party

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

Congress BJP CPI CPI(M) BSP NCP SP TDP Praja Rajyam CPI(ML) IUML JSS(UDF) Any other small ally Independent Don’t Know Blank/Refused Total

Valid percent 26.0 4.2 2.9 25.3 0.5 0.5 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 5.7 0.1 0.1 1.1 1.1 32.0 100.0


CPI was allotted the unsafe seat in Wayanad and the rift temporarily ended up there. Another complaint emerged from RSP who wanted to regain its Kollam seat. The CPI(M) denied the seat but RSP did not make any further claim [the Kollam seat was subsequently captured by Congress (I) in a sharp electoral battle with the CPI(M)]. The major issue of disunity emerged in LDF when the JD(S) was denied its sitting seat in Kozhikode. Earlier, the rift between

249

The LDF’s Debacle Table 11.10

Who Should Lead the LDF in Kerala: V.S. Achutanandan or Pinarayi Vijayan? No.

Name

Validâ•¯percent

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6.

V.S. Achutanandan Pinarayi Vijayan None of the Two Others No opinion/Don’t Know Total

69.1 8.8 5.1 2.0 15.1 100.0


the JD(S)’s President MP Veerendra Kumar and CPI(M) came into the open in 2006. The popular newspaper, Mathrubhoomi, edited by MP Veerendra Kumar came up with a clear anti-CPI(M) stand that continued since 2006 and played a critical role in highlighting the Lavalin Case. Once the Kozhikode seat was denied, the JD(S) declared its intention to adopt an anti-CPI(M) position. The JD(S) extended tactical support to the UDF candidates in Kozhikode, Vadakara, Palghat, and Kannur constituencies. The victory of UDF candidates in three out of these four seats also can be attributed to the support extended by JD(S). Soon after the debacle, the LDF dropped the JD(S) faction led by MP Veerendra Kumar from LDF. Eventually, this faction joined the UDF in the post-electoral scenario. A small section of JD(S), rival to the MP Veerendra Kumar faction, continued in the LDF.

Conclusion On the whole, the resounding victory of UDF in capturing 16 out of 20 seats compared to just one out of 20 seats in 2004 can be attributed to two strong factors: 1. The preference to the Kerala electorate to vote for Congress in Lok Sabha elections, especially charged with a situation of rising communal tempo and terrorism, which could offer national stability and governance, and,

250

G. Gopa Kumar

2. the strong wave of anti-incumbency element against the LDF government in Kerala, which was marred with charges of corruption, poor governance, and disunity in the alliance. Both the fronts moved in opposite directions compared to the 2006 Assembly election. Strong unity developed in the Congress, especially with the return of the Karunakaran faction to the party, after a gap of more than three years. In fact, there was no conflict in regard to the popularity of UDF’s leadership. According to the CSDS survey, both Oommen Chandy and A.K. Antony enjoyed co-equal preference among voters on the question of the leadership roll in UDF (see Table 11.8). Other constituents displayed unity and waited for the opportunity to cash in. The results also show the UDF gaining back substantial minority votes compared with the 2004 and 2006 elections. The LDF and CPI(M) were marred with interparty and intraparty quarrels, exactly the way UDF and Congress faced the Lok Sabha elections in 2004 and Assembly elections in 2006. Since, coalition politics has come of age in Kerala and bipolar politics had strongly settled in, the individual strength of each party has become difficult to measure except through empirical surveys. Indeed, almost all governments in Kerala were coalition governments. The Kerala model of coalition politics emerged out of expediency produced by a variety of factors.8 In this context, it will be interesting to compare the relative strength of political parties in the event they contest independently, eschewing alliances of whatever kind. A Non-coalition View on voter’s party preference, according to a CSDS 2009 survey suggests the following data—the Congress garnering 26â•¯percent, CPI(M) 25.3â•¯percent, IUML 5.7â•¯percent, BJP 4.2â•¯percent, CPI 2.9â•¯percent, BSP and NCP 0.5percent (see Table 11.8). However, the electoral performances of these parties within their respective coalitions present a different picture. For instance, Congress received 40.10â•¯percent, CPI(M) 30.50â•¯percent, IUML 5.07â•¯percent, BJP 6.2â•¯percent, CPI 7.44â•¯percent, etc. Thus, there exists a considerable difference in a party’s strength in two different situations. With the civic polls coming closer in 2010 and Assembly election due in 2011, it would be interesting to watch the changing dynamics

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251

of state politics. Already, the CPI(M) had started internal cleansing program in the party which would lead to further political developments. The morale of Congress and UDF is very high now with a record number of representatives in the Union Ministry resulting from the Lok Sabha poll. The entry of JD(S) faction led by MP Veerendra Kumar also brings additional strength to the UDF in this situation. However, it is always interesting to watch Kerala politics, because one cannot anticipate what is in store in the next moment of political development.

Notes 1. C. Gouridasan Nair, “Time for Introspection, Hard Decision,” The Hindu, May 17, 2009, p. 4. 2. “The UDF’s Turn this Time, How India Voted: Verdict 2009,” The Hindu (Supplement), May 26, 2009, p. 4. 3. Ibid. 4. Ibid. 5. Ibid. 6. The `â•›300 crore SNC Lavalin scam raised a huge controversy in the 2009 elections because of the alleged involvement of CPI(M) Secretary Pinarai Vijayan. He has been charged by the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI) with conspiracy and indulging in corruption. He was accused of wrongly awarding a contract to the Canadian company SNC Lavalyn for renovation and modernization of hydel power projects at Pallivasal, Shengulam, and Panniar in late 1990s, when he was a Minister in the LDF government. According to the CPI(M), the LDF preferred a deal with the Canadian company because it could help find funds for Malabar Cancer Centre, a cancer research center and hospital at Tellicherry in Kannur District. The deal was finalized after the SNC Lavalyn promised to arrange USD40 million from Canadian funding agencies as grant. But the Canadian government later informed the Kerala government that funds of that magnitude would not be possible. The LDF accused the UDF and Congress-led government (2001–06) responsible for this scam. 7. The Hindu, May 17, 2009, p. 5. 8. G. Gopa Kumar, “A Verdict Against Non-performance and Factionalism,” in Sandeep Shastri, K.C. Suri and Yogendra Yadav (eds), Kerala: Electoral Politics in Indian States: Lok Sabha Elections in 2004 and Beyond (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 95.

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Chapter 12

Maharashtra Maharashtra: Still a Bipolar System, but Turmoil Ahead Raghavendra Keshavarao Hebsur

Congress and NCP did not have a pre-electoral alliance for the 1999 Lok Sabha or Assembly elections, resulting in their disappointing performance. In 2004, they entered into a pre-electoral alliance, not only between themselves, but also with JD(S)] and three factions of the RPI. In terms of the share of votes and seats won, the honors were almost even between the Congress–NCP alliance and the BJP and Shiv Sena (SS) combine. On the eve of the 2009 elections, it was difficult to hazard a guess. Almost everyone had written off Raj Thackeray’s MNS. But the Congress–NCP alliance won five seats more and about 4â•¯percent votes more than the rival combine. In comparison with their performance in 2004, the Congress–NCP alliance got three seats more in 2009. But their share of votes fell by about 3â•¯percent. The BJP–SS alliance not only lost five seats, but also their share of votes declined by about 7â•¯percent. In 2009, both the alliances seethed with tremendous internal tensions. The Congress–NCP alliance was rocked by the flip-flop tactics of Sharad Pawar, the founder of the NCP and also described as the “Maratha Strong Man,” who has been nursing Prime Ministerial ambitions. The tensions in the BJP–SS alliance stemmed from the SS being torn between its nativist regard for Pawar and its willingness to even break the alliance in order to see Pawar as Prime Minister.

Still a Bipolar System, but Turmoil Ahead

253

Over the years the Congress has become weaker, and it is now being compelled to share the same shrinking base with NCP. BJP–SS also has been poaching on the same base. A brief historical perspective is necessary to understand how various social forces developed and broke into, and are breaking into the political arena.

Sociopolitical Forces in Maharashtra The last quarter of the 19th century saw the beginning of a social churning in Maharashtra. The emergence of enlightenment in the Mumbai–Pune area produced many movements and stirrings for social equality, and rejection of the social and ritualistic hegemony of the Brahmins. Jotirao Phule established the Satya Shodhak Samaj (Truth Seeking Society) in 1873 to liberate the Shudras and ati-Shudras from the exploitation of the Brahmins. He not only campaigned against prevailing evil social practices like child marriages, widows not being encouraged to remarry, but also rejected the Vedas, idolatry, etc. He fought against the Brahmin hegemony in education as well. Shahu Maharaj of the Kolhapur Princely State and Ambedkar carried on his legacy. While Shahu Maharaj’s leadership ultimately generated mainly the Maratha consciousness and identity, that of Ambedkar led to the formation of the Mahar, a major SC identity and its assertion. It is noteworthy that similar non-Brahmin movements emerged in the Tamil areas of the Madras Presidency and Princely Mysore. Both were led by non-Brahmin landed gentry castes. But the element of social reform and upliftment of the Dalits was absent in south India.1 In Maharashtra, the movement for social reform gathered momentum, but gradually petered out by the middle of the 20th century and the contours of caste politics started emerging. In the 1930s and 1940s, the Marathas entered Congress and began to displace the Brahmins. Also, the Shivaji cult, which the Maharashtrian Hindus have been cultivating and celebrating with gusto, contains a strong element of Hindutva. While the unilingual states of Telugu, Tamil, Malayalam, and Kannada speakers were formed in 1956, the bilingual state of Bombay

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Raghavendra Keshavarao Hebsur

comprising Marathi- and Gujarati-speaking areas was also formed. The formation of unilingual Maharashtra required an extraordinary political movement. The struggle of the Maharashtrians, led by the Samyukta Maharashtra Samiti (United Maharashtra Committee), which was waged between 1956 and 1960, was more protracted and bitter than even the struggle for the formation of Andhra Pradesh, the Telugu-speaking state. Nearly 105 persons were killed in the agitation. The struggle received support from all parties and openly from within the Congress. Finally, Maharashtra state was formed in 1960. The struggle contained the seeds of Maharashtrian ownership of Mumbai and Marathi nativism.2 The creation in 1960 of the new state released the energies of the Marathas. The first CM, Y.B. Chavan, who was above casteism and a follower of M.N. Roy, energetically pushed through the Panchayati Raj system. At the district levels, new power centers of the Marathas emerged. Constituting about 40â•¯percent of the population, the Marathas lorded it over the major social, political, and economic resources. Sugar, other cooperative societies, and cooperative banks became their resources of power, subsequently followed by educational institutions. They have been the major beneficiaries of irrigation. Sugarcane is now grown on 2â•¯percent of the irrigated land, but consumes about 60â•¯percent of the water. A new cumulation of inequalities emerged. A highly integrated and almost impregnable system of patronage, hierarchy, and clientelism came to be established under Maratha dominance.3 But unlike the dominant castes of Lingayats and Vokkaligas of Karnataka, the Marathas did not want to get themselves included among the OBCs. Probably, in the beginning this could have been due to the Maratha amour propre. They have woken up 40 years later! The Maharashtra OBC list was drawn along the strict constructionist interpretation of the Constitutional phrase “socially and educationally backward.” Ambedkar’s Dalit movement, actually Mahar, dates back to the pre-independence days. He founded the All India Scheduled Caste Federation in 1942, which failed to take off for several years. His Mahar-based movement gathered momentum after 1950 and culminated in 1956 when Ambedkar and thousands of other Mahars converted to Buddhism. He had also mooted the idea of a RPI,


255

which was founded in 1956. But, the party is now fragmented into many splinters. The other Dalit castes do not always join the Mahars. In terms of numbers, the Dalits are about 13â•¯percent of the state’s population, but they are always socially and politically divided. The social reformers of Maharashtra tried to root out evil Hindu practices. But, the reality at the ground level could not be altered. The landowners are mostly Marathas and many Dalits work as laborers on their land. Founded by Bal Thackeray in 1966, SS received a good deal of overt and covert support from the Congress leaders. Earlier, his Marathi weekly, Marmik, used to make some noise about the merger of Belgaum and Karwar with Maharashtra. After 1966, it developed the following program: 1. 2. 3. 4.

the issue of Maharashtrians being deprived of jobs, a stance against south Indians and other non-Maharashtrians, a pro-Hindu attitude, and, anti-communism.4

The SS entered trade union movements, women’s and students’ wings, and local committees to keep an eye on the recruitments of jobs.5 In the process, it weakened or ousted the trade unions affiliated not only to the communist parties, but to the erstwhile Praja Socialist Party. In the beginning, it received enthusiastic support from the lower and middle class Maharashtrian Hindus in the MumbaiThane areas and across all castes including OBCs. Many Congress leaders and CMs were sympathetic to SS, and took its help to weaken the communists. But the fortunes of the SS declined between 1977 and 1984. Then SS sought to revive itself, and became a strong and strident supporter of Hindutva. Around 1984, the party began to attract other linguistic groups in Bombay, and started wooing back the Marathi speakers.6 In 1987, the Marmik gave itself a new and clearer motto: “The only magazine which fights for the just rights of the Marathi speaking people and for the protection of Hindutva.” In the 1985 elections to the Mumbai Municipal Corporation, it won 74 seats out of the 139 it contested. Hebsur, etâ•¯al.7 have calculated the rank order correlations

256


between population percentages of the different linguistic groups in 11 zones of Mumbai and the percentages of the votes of different political parties in 1985. The correlation values for BJP/SS are: for Hindi, +0.74; Gujarati, +0.58; Marathi, +0.97; Urdu, –0.14; South Indian languages, +0.10; other languages, +0.43 (see Table 12.1). The Hindutva agenda of SS found support, in varying degrees, from almost all the linguistic groups in Mumbai. In 1989, the party’s Marathi daily, Saamna was launched. During the aftermath of the 1977 Lok Sabha elections, Sharad Pawar quit Congress and founded his own party, Congress (S). When he returned after a gap of about eight years to Congress in 1986, he left behind a Congress (S) party structure. This created political space, which the SS then occupied.8 Pawar left Congress for the second time in 1999, ostensibly on the issue of Sonia Gandhi’s Italian origin, and founded the NCP. Hansen9 further argues that industrialization and commercialization of Maharashtra’s rural economy weakened the Maratha dominated clientele structure. Also, Table 12.1 Rank Order Correlations between Party Votes and Size of Linguistic Groups: Bombay Municipal Elections, 1985*

Party

Hindi

Gujarati

Marathi

Urdu

Congress (I) and (S) BJP/SS Janata Party Muslim League

+0.68 +0.74 +0.93 +0.41

+0.58 +0.58 +0.86 +0.68

+0.96 +0.97 +0.68 –0.05

+0.03 –0.14 +0.44 +0.71

South indian Other languages languages +0.06 +0.10 +0.75 +0.45

+0.56 +0.43 +0.90 +0.89

Source: R.K. Hebsur, Jacob A. Aikara, Chandan Sengupta, S. Siva Raju, Factors Contributing to the Bombay Riots and Violence, 1992–93. A Report submitted to the (Justice B.N. Srikrishna) Commission of Inquiry (Mumbai: Tata Institute of Social Sciences, 1995), p. 71. Note: *After, and including the 1971 Census, the Census ward wise breakdowns of linguistic and religious groups for Mumbai have not been reported. Hence, Hebsur etâ•¯al. (1995) had to use projections of these groups for the 11 census wards/zones on the basis of the 1961 figures for deriving the 1981 estimates. They also tried to derive the correlations between the estimated sizes of the religious groups and votes for the parties. But, the correlations did not give a correct fit. Hence, only the correlations between the linguistic groups and party votes have been presented.


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SS’s employment of warrior idioms appealed to the younger Marathas and even the OBCs. Hemmed in by the two Maratha-led Congress parties and the two Hindutva parties, the OBCs of Maharashtra could not emerge as an autonomous political force.

Between 2004 and 2009 Narayan Rane, who began his political career with SS, rose to become the CM of Maharashtra in February 1999. He held the post for about nine months. Driven by a burning ambition to lead the SS and chafing at the rise of Uddhav Thackeray, a son of the SS supremo Bal Thackeray, he left the party, joined Congress and was made a minister. His outburst against Ashok Chavan being made the CM in December 2008 led to his suspension from the Congress. He soon learnt his lessons about the Congress culture, relented, was taken back into the party and again made a minister. In 2009, he got his son elected on a Congress ticket to the Lok Sabha. Rane’s leaving the SS is one of the factors that have weakened the party in the coastal strip of Konkan. Resenting the senior Thackeray’s choice of Uddhav as his successor, Raj Thackeray, a nephew of Bal Thackeray, left the SS in March 2006. But, most of the leaders of SS were comfortable with Uddhav’s gentle posturing and collegial approach. Having toured Maharashtra, Raj Thackeray announced the formation of MNS and revived the nativist agenda of Marathi manoos (“the Marathi common man.”) He announced the following program: 1. Raising the status of Maharashtrians and restoring the glory of Maharashtra. 2. Striving for the cultural and material prosperity of the state. 3. Bringing the people of Maharashtra together regardless of caste, religion10 or class under its flag. 4. Protecting the interest of Marathi manoos. 5. Engaging all centers of power in a constructive way, but not shying away from conflict. 6. Making Marathi compulsory in schools.

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He defined Marathi manoos as the person living in the state and born to Marathi parents, or one, though of a different linguistic origin, speaks Marathi and loves Maharashtra.11 Raj Thackeray’s followers have adopted what Palshikar12 has called the SS strategy of oversimplifying reality and resorting now and then to spontaneous direct action. Raj Thackeray’s virulent speeches provoked MNS members to attack North Indians in Mumbai and Nashik in February 2008. Actually, the SS had started such attacks earlier. The party’s cadres in 2004 attacked north Indian candidates who came to Mumbai for railway jobs. Raj Thackeray criticized the Hindi cinema superstar Amitabh Bachchan for the latter’s alleged lack of loyalty to Maharashtra. Bachchan is supposed to have said that he had lived in Delhi, Calcutta, and Bombay, but he is recognized as a man from the banks of the Ganga. Sudheendra Kulkarni, till recently a BJP ideologue, wrote to Raj Thackeray an open letter, which contained, among others, the following points: (a) Raj Thackeray is doing good work of imparting technical training to the Maharashtrian youth. (b) All persons should be proud of their regional culture without being parochial. (c) If Raj opposes the Bihari festival of Chhaat Pooja, what about Ganesh Chaturthi outside Maharashtra? (d) His anti-North Indian campaign is ill advised and condemnable. And, (e) Maharashtrian youth should be trained in entrepreneurship. Raj Thackeray’s response was spontaneous and acerbic. He responded: (a) The stir against north Indians is not unconstitutional. Maharashtrians participate in Gujarati Garba and Bengali Navaratri. (b) The Chhat Pooja is not a religious festival, but a show of strength by the Bihari ruffians. (c) Every political party has indulged in political violence at some time or the other. The political history learnt by him tells him that breaking laws, braving lathis and getting arrested are symbols of practical agitations.13 In the elections to the Mumbai Municipal Corporation in 2007, the MNS had won only seven seats. In the beginning, the SS leaders used to dismiss Raj’s speeches and actions as “a fly buzzing about the tiger’s head.” Now, they realize that MNS is a party to reckon with. The Presidential elections of July 2007 constituted the first incident to jolt the alliance between SS and BJP. The BJP-led NDA put up Bhairon Singh Shekhawat against the Congress-led UPA’s


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Pratibha Patil, a domiciled Maharashtrian although the family is Rajasthani Rajput. Despite BJP pleadings, SS directed its MLAs and Lok Sabha members to vote for Mrs Patil. Between November 2006 and March 2007, elections were held to the Municipal Councils, Corporations, Zilla Parishads, and Panchayat Samitis. SS and BJP had an alliance, but Congress and NCP contested separately. Congress was the biggest winner of the total number of seats.14 But, SS–BJP managed to retain control of Mumbai (a hat-trick), Nagpur, and Thane Municipal Corporations with their rich resources. In Pune, NCP and SS joined hands after the election and elected an NCP mayor and SS deputy mayor! It was evident that Congress and NCP were holding each other back for various reasons. Mumbai is the financial and commercial heart of India. A substantial proportion of central government taxes is generated in Mumbai. According to the city’s business and industrial leaders, peace and security of Mumbai facilitates the growth of business and investments, both domestic and foreign. When the communal riots of 1992–93 did not subside, the city’s industrial and business magnates called on the CM urging him to bring the situation under control. The city has been a target of terrorist attacks since the communal riots of 1992–93. Between 2004 and 2009, there were two such major attacks. In July 2006, bombs went off in suburban trains. On November 26, 2008, ten terrorists came by sea from Pakistan, went to six select places in the city and killed people indiscriminately. Congress feared that this attack would give BJP an opportunity to raise the question of security of India and cost the party many votes. Soon after, Vilasrao Deshmukh, the CM of Maharashtra, was replaced.

Run-up to the Elections When the Congress declared in March 2009 that incumbent Manmohan Singh would be the PM designated for the coming elections, the Maratha strong man Pawar shot back saying Manmohan Singh was the candidate of the Congress, and not the UPA. Having lost to Narasimha Rao in 1991, he obviously had not given up. He kept

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channels open to almost all the non-Congress parties. His followers too, kept on repeating the claim that Pawar was the right choice for PM and SS had declared that the party would prefer Pawar to Advani. But, to console the BJP, the SS would say that they would do so, only if Advani was unable to get sufficient support. BJP asserted that if Pawar could not handle the agriculture portfolio well, how he could become the Prime Minister. Bal Thackeray is reported to have said, “… [A] Marathi PM is my idea. At a Sena conclave held years ago, which Pawar attended, we had said that he should set his eyes on Delhi [Prime Ministership], while the Sena can take care of Maharashtra.”15 Both Advani and Uddhav Thackeray addressed a joint rally of SS and BJP in Mumbai on March 4, 2009. Uddhav kept quiet on the issue of Advani as PM. During March–April 2009, Pawar continued to run with the hare and hunt with the hounds. He had planned to go to Bhubaneshwar in early March 2009 to take part in the meetings and rallies organized by the Third Front. The ostensible reason was that his NCP had put up a few candidates in Orissa. Only after a stern warning from the Congress, he dropped the idea of the trip. But, he addressed the gathering through his cell phone. He praised the earlier LF for having solidly supported the UPA government and thus providing a stable government for four-and-a-half years. He occasionally praised Manmohan Singh also. Maharashtra has adhered to a strict constructionist definition of “socially, educationally backward classes” for the purpose of drawing a list of the OBCs. Following the 73rd and 74th Amendments, Maharashtra enacted laws to provide for reservations in the local self government institutions. This began to erode the power base of the Marathas. The community started demanding their inclusion in the OBC list. This would enable them to have their share of the reservation pie in the local self-government bodies. The government then invented a backward caste of “Kunbi-Marathas.”16 Deshpande further 17 says, “The invented identity of a KunbiMaratha caste can be seen as a desperate attempt on the part of the Marathas to retain their political dominance.” The Maharashtra Backward Classes Commission had not accepted in 2008 the inclusion of the Marathas among the OBCs. But, Ashok Chavan, the most


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recent CM said that the question will be examined afresh.18 Pawar also joined the debate. He promised to extend the reservation quota to beyond the existing 52â•¯percent to include the economically backward. Though he specifically referred to the Dhanagars (shepherds) who constitute a sizeable proportion of his new constituency, he hinted that the Marathas might be covered as well. He gave the examples of states like Kerala and Tamil Nadu, which have exceeded the Supreme Court mandated ceiling of 50â•¯percent.19 But, classifying the Maratha as backward will further alienate the already weak OBCs. Mayawati’s BSP had put up its candidates in 47 constituencies. She addressed a huge rally in Mumbai, and also promised reservations for the economically backward classes. She complained that her representation in this regard to the government of India is still awaiting its consideration.20 After the elections, but before the results, the state Congress chief complained that some partners of the Democratic Front had let the party down, i.e., the ruling coalition of partners of Congress and NCF, and independents/unrecognized parties. He cited the example of a junior non-Congress minister fielding candidates from Latur and Nanded, and also supporting the MNS candidate in Mumbai South. Also, the Home Minister belonging to NCP made a surprise visit to Raj Thackeray. In general, the troubles and tensions within the two alliances made bolder headlines and were more talked about than the issues of farmers’ suicides in Vidarbha, power cuts and load shedding, deteriorating quality of life, Mumbai’s security, inequalities of access to irrigation, and other problems. As Sainath says,” The level of the campaign and the debate has not unduly taxed the intellect.”21

Results The elections were held on April 16, 23, and 30 of 2009. Compared with the turnout of 54.37â•¯percent in the 2004 elections, the turnout in 2009 was only 50.70â•¯percent (see Table 12.2). Congress–NCP alliance improved its tally in 2004 by three seats; but Congress gained four seats and NCP lost one. On the other hand,

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Raghavendra Keshavarao Hebsur Table 12.2 Seats Contested, Won, and Share Votes of Parties 2004 turnout 54.7%

Parties Congress NCP BJP SS Others Total Source: Notes:

Contested 26 18 26 22 320b 412

Won 13 9 13 12 1c 48

% Share of votes 23.8 18.3 22.6 20.1 15.2 100.0

2009 turnout 50.9% Contested 25 21 25 22a 602d 695

Won 17 8 9 11 3e 48

% Share of votes 19.6 19.3 18.2 17.0 25.9 100.0

Collated from: http:/www.indian-electionaffairs.com and other websites. a.â•‡ BJP–SS alliance withdrew its candidate from Sangli; b.â•‡ includes four candidates from JD(S), and three factions of RPI; c.â•‡ RPI (Athavale); d.â•‡ includes MNS, all other parties, and independents; and e.â•‡includes two unrecognized state parties—Bahujan Vikas Aghadi, Swabhiman Paksha, and an independent.

the vote share of the Congress declined by about 4â•¯percent and that of NCP increased by 1â•¯percent. BJP–SS alliance lost five seats from 2004. The vote share of BJP came down by 4.4â•¯percent and that of SS by about 3â•¯percent. The RPI candidates of both the factions lost. On the contrary, candidates from two unrecognized state parties and one independent won. NCP received a big jolt losing two seats in the Kolhapur area. The MNS administered a severe shock to the BJP–SS alliance by contesting 11 seats and winning 4â•¯percent of the votes. In eight out of nine constituencies (total 10), which MNS contested in the extended Mumbai region,22 it polled more votes than the difference between the votes of the Congress–NCP alliance and the BJP– SS alliance. The only exception was Priya Dutt’s constituency of Mumbai North-Central, where her lead was larger than the votes polled by the MNS candidate. In Nashik and Pune also, the MNS polled more constituencies than the difference between Congress– NCP and BJP–SS. Actually in Mumbai South and Nashik, MNS was the first runner-up. Dhawale argues, “The MNS helped the INC (i.e., Congress)–NCP in two ways—firstly by eating into the BJP–SS


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votes and, secondly by driving the beleaguered non-Maharashtrians into the INC–NCP combine.”23 As seen from Table 12.3, BJP–SS suffered its most humiliating defeat in the extended Mumbai area. The alliance won only one of the 10 seats. In western Maharashtra, supposed to be the citadel of NCP, the Congress–NCP got two seats more than BJP–SS, but NCP was jolted by the rebels. The tally was even in Vidarbha. As expected, BJP–SS won two seats more than the Congress–NCP in Marathwada. The gains of BJP–SS were more in Northern Maharashtra. The BSP contested 47 out of 48 constituencies and did not win any seats. It got about 5â•¯percent of the votes. But, in 13 constituencies it was the second or third runner-up. Assuming BSP had not contested and about 70â•¯percent of its votes would have gone to Congress–NCP combine, the party spoiled the chances of victory of the alliance in about eight constituencies. In a couple of constituencies, the Congress–NCP combine became jittery due to BSP. Competition turned out to be very close when considering Assembly segments of the Lok Sabha votes. Congress–NCP alliance won 130 segments, BJP–SS alliance 130, and others 28. If this pattern is repeated, the Assembly elections are going to be keenly contested. Table 12.4 reveals that that the BJP–SS alliance obtained substantially more votes from the Marathas, Kunbis, and the OBCs. This generally shows that the alliance has done well in the rural areas. Also, the OBCs who were among the earliest groups to support SS continue to stand by the party. It is likely that the Congress’ toying with the idea of reservations for the Marathas might have consolidated many OBCs behind the BJP–SS. As expected, the Congress–NCP continues to get the support of the Dalits and Muslims. The rich and the poor are equally divided between the alliances. At the grassroots level, the BJP–SS alliance receives substantial support from the overlapping categories of Marathas and Kunbis, and rich and poor (but not very poor), which constitutes a solid power base. But, the Congress–NCP base of the overlapping categories of Dalits, very poor, and Muslims is equally sound. Congress, more than NCP, is likely to have won more support from the Dalits, Muslims, and the “very poor.” Therefore, the Congress’ share of the joint base is probably much larger than that of NCP.

5 5 – 5 4 6 25

– 1 – 4 2 2 9

Won

SS 5 6 2 1 4 4 22

Contested 1 3 1 – 3 3 11

Won

NCP 3 8 – 4 4 2 21

Contested

Source: Collated from: http://www.indian-electionaffairs.com and other websites.

Extended Mumbai Western Maharashtra Konkan Northern Mahrashtra Marathawada Vidarbha Total

BJP

Contested

Table 12.3

2 3 – 1 1 1 8

Won

Seats Contested and Won by Regions

7 3 2 2 4 7 25

6 3 1 1 2 4 17

Won

Congress Contested

Others 1 2 – – – – 3

Won only

10 12 2 6 8 10 48

Total seats

264 India’s 2009 Elections

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Still a Bipolar System, but Turmoil Ahead Table 12.4 Share Votes of Parties by Social Background Social background Marathas and Kunbis OBCs Dalits Rich Poor Very poor Muslims Alliance Average

Congress–NCP (%)

BJP–SS (%)

35 36 55 37 39 47 69 39.9a

49 45 28 37 39 26 9 35.2

Source: The Hindu, May 26, 2009. Note: aThe share of votes of Congress–NCP alliance as reported in The Hindu is higher by 1â•¯percentage point than the one calculated by the author.

Conclusions The Maratha corporatist identity received a big boost after the formation of the unilingual Maharashtra in 1960. Their leaders in the countryside converted their traditional social power and the new political—Congress party and government—resources into modern economic resources. They wove a fine tuned network of clientelism and patronage. But, beginning in 1990s, their base began to erode under the impact of diversification of the rural economy, entry into politics of new groups and younger contenders, and the spread of Hindutva through BJP and SS. The Congress–NCP alliance won three seats more in 2009 than in 2004. But, their share of votes declined by about 3â•¯percent. The Congress contested one seat less, and NCP three seats more. But, the share of the Congress votes declined by about 4â•¯percent, and that of the NCP increased by 1â•¯percent. This could be due to the phenomenon of winning or losing narrowly, or winning or losing by huge margins, as well as the number of seats contested. On the whole, the Congress–NCP alliance won five seats more in 2009 and got about 4â•¯percent votes more than the BJP–SS alliance. But the NCP winning only three out of the eight seats it contested in western Maharashtra— particularly its losing two seats in the Kolhapur area—reveals that the Maratha dominance is getting weaker. A leader of the sugar factory workers won one of the Kolhapur seats.

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Compared to 2004, the BJP–SS alliance got five seats fewer, and their share of votes declined by about 7â•¯percent. This is largely due to the MNS factor. The alliance suffered its worst defeats in the extended Mumbai region, winning only one of the 10 seats it contested. It has significantly recouped its losses in the Mumbai area by holding on to its bases in the non-Mumbai areas. The alliance continues to occupy the political space vacated by Pawar’s homecoming to Congress in 1986. The spirit of Maratha valor still gets translated into Hindutva, but, it appears in retrospect that SS has not been able to blend smoothly its original nativist stance post the 1985 Hindutva ideology. In the recent years, the SS supremo’s nativism came to the fore only when Pawar’s ambitions for Prime Ministership and Mrs Patibha Patil’s candidature for the Presidentship were publicly debated. This may have created scope for Raj Thackeray and his MNS to penetrate the urban areas. Despite the Herculean efforts of Ambedkar, the Maharashtrian Dalits have emerged into politics divided and their leadership remains divided. Although more than half of the Dalits have voted for the Congress–NCP alliance, no candidate of any faction of the Republican Party has won. On the contrary, Mayawati’s BSP has done rather well in Maharashtra, although it did not win a single seat. But, she is unlikely to repeat in Maharashtra her success in Uttar Pradesh as there are no big names among her followers in Maharashtra. The 2009 Lok Sabha elections in Maharashtra are noteworthy for one peculiar development. The internal tensions within either alliance were organically linked. The moment Pawar hinted at keeping all options open, the SS egged him on, much to the consternation of BJP. Both BJP and Congress were literally pleading with their respective partners to continue their alliances. As the Assembly elections of October 2009 approach, the tensions within either alliance are likely to be rekindled. Already, there is a talk of a secret understanding between NCP and SS. Dismissed as a disgruntled cousin and ignored as having only a nuisance value, Raj Thackeray and his MNS dealt a stunning blow to BJP and SS in the extended Mumbai area, and Pune and Nashik constituencies. The MNS divided the Marathi voters. A close examination of Raj Thackeray’s agenda reveals that he defines Marathi manoos rather inclusively. He includes all those who are proud of


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Maharashtra, regardless of religion or community, but they must speak Marathi. This is a clear departure from the stand of Bal Thackeray. In plain words, abandoning Hindutva, Raj Thackeray seeks to appeal to the Muslims as well. Probably, he wants to shape MNS like TDP of Andhra Pradesh and the two Dravidian parties of Tamil Nadu. A feeling of wounded Telugu pride was the basis for the formation of TDP. The development of intense Tamil cultural sub-nationalism is at the root of the emergence of the Dravidian parties. But, none of these factors are present in Maharashtra. Nativism in Maharashtra is confined to the major cities. Inheriting the thoughts and ideologies of Phule, Gokhale, Tilak, Shahu Maharaj, Ambedkar, and others, Maharashtra has not produced a Marathi cultural sub-nationalism. One wonders whether the MNS ideology will help the party to enter the countryside. Also with its new inclusive ideology, MNS may look like a pale imitation of Congress–NCP. An analysis of voting for the alliances by castes, religion, and economic classes reveals a faint fault line of economic classes along the lines of party alliances. An overwhelming majority of the Muslims and Dalits are likely to be poor. Congress–NCP alliance gets the support of sizeable sections of these groups and also of the “very poor.” Historically, BJP has been considered as a Brahmin–Bania (merchants) party. During the last couple of decades, it has been trying to grow beyond this image and enlist the support of the backward classes. To some extent it has succeeded, depending on the regions of India, but it still has an upper class image. But, SS started in Maharashtra as the voice of the urban lower middle classes and those in the unorganized sector. Some of the backward castes were its earliest supporters. It now seems that the party is acquiring an upper class and forward caste hue. Neither the gains of the Congress–NCP nor the losses of the BJP–SS combine in the Lok Sabha Elections of 2009 was spectacular or sweeping. These were listless elections, and probably because of the listlessness, they were normal elections. The bipolar alliance system still holds good. But the internal feuds at the national level of BJP may weaken the state party’s power to bargain with SS. Also, owing to the troubled relations between Congress and NCP and the emergence of MNS, the party system in Maharashtra may face an uncertain phase.

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Notes â•‡ 1. R.K. Hebsur, Reactions to the Reservations for Other Backward Classes: A Comparative Study of Four States, Vol. 4, A Report submitted to the (Mr B.P. Mandal) Backward Classes Commission, (Government of India, Delhi: Controller of Publications, 1980). â•‡ 2. Thomas Blom Hansen, “The Vernacularisation of Hindutva: The BJP and Shiv Sena in Rural Maharashtra,” Contribution to Indian Sociology, Vol. 30, No. 2 (July–December, 1996), pp, 177–214. â•‡ 3. Anthony T. Carter, Elite Politics in Rural India: Political Stratification and Political Alliance in Rural Maharashtra (Delhi: Vikas, 1974). See also, Jayant Lele, Elite Pluralism and Class Rule: Political Development in Maharashtra. (Bombay: Popular, 1982). â•‡ 4. Dipankar Gupta, Nativism in a Metropolis: Shiv Sena in Bombay (Delhi: Manohar, 1982). â•‡ 5. Suhas Palshikar, “Shiv Sena: A Tiger with Many Faces?” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 39, Nos. 14–15 (April, 3–10 and 11–16, 2004), pp. 1497–1507. â•‡ 6. C., I. “Unlearnt Lessons of 1970,” EPW, 9, Nos 21 and 22 (May 19–26, 1984), pp. 826–30. â•‡ 7. R.K. Hebsur, Jacob A. Aikara, Chandan Sengupta, S. Siva Raju, Factors Contributing to the Bombay Riots and Violence, 1992–93, A Report submitted to the (Justice B.N. Srikrishna) Commission of Inquiry (Mumbai: Tata Institute of Social Sciences, 1995). â•‡ 8. Hansen, “Vernacularisation of Hindutva;” Palshikar, “Shiv Sena: A Tiger with Many Faces,” p. 1499. â•‡ 9. Hansen, Ibid. 10. Available online at: www.manase.com. (last date of access: July 10, 2009)The inclusion of the phrase “regardless of religion” is significant (author’s emphasis). 11. Available online at: www.manase.com (last date of access: July 10, 2009). 12. Palshikar, “Shiv Sena: A Tiger with Many Faces.” 13. Available online at: www.indianexpress.com/news (last date of access: February 24, 2008). 14. Ashok Dhawale, “Maharashtra Local Bodies Elections,” People’s Democracy, Vol. 31, No. 14, April 8, 2007, pp 1–4. Available online at: “pd.cpim.org/2007”) (last date of access: August 4, 2009). 15. The Times of India, April 8, 2009. 16. Rajeshwari Deshpande, “Kunbi-Maratha as OBC: Backward Journey of a Caste,” EPW, Vol. 39, No. 4 (April 3–10, 2004). 17. Ibid., pp. 1448–49. 18. The Hindu, February12, 2009. 19. DNA, April 5, 2009. 20. When it comes to the question of OBC reservations, generally no party would like to lag behind. The Supreme Court has never upheld reservations based solely


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on economic criteria, i.e., poverty or income. But, it has said that income can be one of the criteria for social backwardness. Similarly, no OBC reservation can be made only on the basis of caste. If some states have exceeded the ceiling, it is because their acts have been pushed into the 9th Schedule of the Constitution. Both Pawar and Mayawati know this. 21. P. Sainath, “Maharashtra: the Last Lap”. Available online at: www.india-together (last date of access: July 14, 2009). 22. The author, in view of the delimitation, has included the following constituencies in the “Extended Mumbai” area: (a) Mumbai South, (b) Mumbai South Central, (c) Mumbai North Central, (d ) Mumbai North, (e) Mumbai North East, (f ) Mumbai North West, (g) Thane, (h) Kalyan, (i) Bhiwandi, and (j) Palghar. 23. Ashok Dhawale, “Maharashtra: What Lok Sabha Results Show,” People’s Democracy (May 10, 2009), pp 1–16. Available online at: “pd.cpim.org/2009” (last date of access: July 1, 2009).

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Chapter 13

Karnataka The Surge of Saffron: Some Genuine and Some Imitation? Raghavendra Keshavarao Hebsur

BJP’s impressive performance in Karnataka in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections was a foregone conclusion. It won 19 out of 28 Lok Sabha seats in Karnataka, two-thirds of the total seats. BJP’s victory is almost a replication of its Lok Sabha performance in 2004. The victory also provided a ray of good news to the BJP national leaders, distressed by BJP’s electoral performance in the rest of the country. In the 2004 Assembly elections, Karnataka voters had given a fractured mandate. Although BJP had emerged as the largest party with 79 seats, it was way short of a simple majority of 113. Its position improved markedly in 2008. The electorate gave the party a near majority of 110 seats in the mid-term general elections to the Assembly in May 2008. The BJP wave was there, and between 2004 and 2009, and especially between October 2007 and April 2009, it became considerably strengthened.

Sociopolitical Forces After the formation of Karnataka state in 1956, the duumvirate of the Lingayats and Vokkaligas emerged with the former as senior partners. They constitute about 16 and 13â•¯percent of the population,

The Surge of Saffron

271

respectively (The Karnataka Third Backward Classes Commission, 1990, Vol. II: 5).1 The statewide proportions do not give an accurate picture. The Lingayats are concentrated in the northern districts and the Vokkaligas in the major parts of the southern districts. In the central districts, their proportions are fairly balanced. Before the reorganization of the state, the Lingayats in the old Mysore area had accepted the dominance of the Vokkaligas. Those in the Mumbai– Karnataka area, formerly a part of the trilingual Bombay state, chafed at the dominance of Gujaratis and Maharashtrians. They were more vocal about a unified Karnataka state.2 The first four CMs of the reorganized Karnataka were Lingayats. The backward classes did not have a major role or representation. Land reforms—ostensibly making the tiller of the soil the owner and lowering the land ceiling—were diluted. Every effort was made to declare the Lingayats as a backward caste. Both the dominant castes, more so the Lingayats, arrogated to themselves modern resources like Agriculture Produce Marketing Committees, aided or unaided educational institutions, and sugar cooperatives.3 The Congress split in 1969 helped the OBCs to burst into the corridors of power very forcefully under the able leadership of Devaraj Urs in 1972. With shrewdness and persistence, he assembled a coalition of peasant, artisan, and similar OBCs, minorities, and sections of Lingayats and Vokkaligas. He introduced land reforms— though it was a bit too late—and announced a new list of OBCs for the purposes of reservations in jobs and educational seats, which kept out a large section of the Lingayats. The OBC list was amended many times later on, but the basics have not changed in the subsequent years. He overthrew the prevailing paradigm of politics based on the dominant castes and replaced it by his own. Although S.M. Krishna, a Vokkaliga, was made the CM between 1999 and 2004, the Congress still continues to rely on the coalition that Urs built. The party calculated that making a backward caste person or a Brahmin as CM was necessary to secure power. It installed CMs like Gundu Rao (a Brahmin), Bangarappa, Moily, and Dharam Singh (all OBCs). After the elections of 2009, the party has selected Siddaramaiah, an OBC, as the leader of the Congress Assembly legislature party.

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The Urs strategies alienated both dominant castes: Lingayats, and Vokkaligas. Capitalizing on this and the failures of the Gundu Rao administration, and cultivating Lingayats, and some other sections, Ramakrishna Hegde led the Janata Party (JP) to a near majority victory in 1983 and an absolute majority in 1985.4 As the CM, he reclassified the state OBC list to include all the sub-castes of Lingayats. He did not accept the report of the Second Karnataka (Venkataswamy) Backward Classes Commission, 1987, because it did not recognize all the Lingayat sects as OBCs. More importantly, with the assistance of his rural development minister, Abdul Nazir Sab, Hegde introduced a three-tier Panchayati Raj system, along with a good deal of devolution of power. The Panchayati Raj system of Hegde helped him to nurture loyal JP leaders (later Janata Dal–JD) at the village, taluka, and district levels. Between them, the Congress and JD left hardly any scope for the BJP to expand.5 But his feud with Deve Gowda, an erstwhile junior colleague and a bitter rival, festered and Hegde was thrown out of the party in 1996. His Lok Shakti and later JD(U) did not take off.6 The BJP started dictating terms to JD(U). After the formal split in the JD, Deve Gowda’s faction called itself JD(S). The alienation of most of the Lingayats dates back to the humiliation of Nijalingappa, a Lingayat, the first CM of Karnataka, at the hands of Indira Gandhi during the Congress split of 1969. The alienation deepened during the Urs and Gundu Rao administrations. Again, the arbitrary dismissal of the JD government of Bommai, a Lingayat, in April 1989 and removal of the Congress CM Veerendra Patil, a Lingayat, in October 1990 further aggravated the alienation. Most Lingayats did not take to Deve Gowda. The BJP had made a small beginning in 1983 with 18 Assembly seats, nine seats in the coastal districts alone. In fact, the party lent support from outside to the first Hegde government in 1983. The split in the JD in 1999 gave the BJP a fine opportunity. Most of the Lingayats continued to be in disarray since the marginalisation of Hegde in 1996. They were disinclined to support Deve Gowda, nor were they willing to risk joining Hegde’s JD(U). Hegde passed away in 2004. The Lingayats flocked to Yeddyurappa, himself a Lingayat, and began supporting the steadily growing BJP. The BJP may have considered Karnataka


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as a gateway to south India. But its Karnataka victories in the 2008 mid-term Assembly elections and 2009 Lok Sabha elections pose an enigma. The party has found it difficult to enter the states that have: 1. Witnessed strong regional movements and parties: Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.7 2. Maintain strong communist movements and parties: Kerala and West Bengal. 3. Strong backward class and non-Brahmin movements: Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, and Kerala. Basaveshwara, the 12th century founder of the Lingayat sect, rebelled against Sanskrit, Brahmanical rituals, Sanskaras, varna, and the caste system. In fact, till 1961, some Lingayats used to claim that they are not Hindus, and that Census of India should classify them as a separate religion like Jains, Buddhists, and Sikhs. Karnataka has witnessed a two-stage backward class movement—from the early 1910s, a non-Brahmin movement began in both the princely Mysore state and in the Bombay–Karnataka areas, and from the early 1970s, a movement of OBCs began.8 Thus, it is a very peculiar phenomenon that the BJP could emerge in a big way on the Karnataka political scene in 2004. The following are the possible alternative or overlapping tentative explanations: 1. The Lingayats are a powerful community.9 With most of the space in Congress being occupied by OBCs, and in JD(S) by Vokkaligas, particularly Deve Gowda and his sons, BJP proved to be the only shelter. 2. The Lingayats and sections of other castes find some kind of Hindutva appealing.

Between 2004 and 2009 The Karnataka assembly elections of 2004 produced a fractured mandate—BJP 79, Congress 65, JD(U) 5, and JD(S) 58. The simultaneously held Lok Sabha elections gave BJP 18, Congress 8 and JD(S)

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2 seats. To keep the “communal” BJP at bay, Congress allied with JD(S) and formed a coalition government with Dharam Singh—an OBC Congress member—as the CM and Siddaramaiah—also an OBC member of JD(S)—as the Deputy CM. But, as Balram analyzes, “… [F]or 20 months Deve Gowda virtually ran the government.”10 A hemmed-in Congress tried to break the JD(S). Quite a few of Hegde’s disciples had stayed with the JD(S), and Congress targeted them. Siddaramaiah resented the continual interference of Deve Gowda in his administration. Meanwhile, some of the Congress OBC leaders had started an outfit called AHIND in June 2005. It is a Kannada acronym for “minorities, backwards and Dalits.” During June–October 2005, the rallies of AHIND were held in various cities, and attracted huge crowds. Siddaramaiah inaugurated one such rally and attended a couple of others. While the Congress leaders criticized the style of Deve Gowda’s functioning at these rallies, Siddaramaiah studiously avoided mentioning him. In August 2005, CM Dharam Singh received a letter from the state JD(S) chief—obviously at the instance of Deve Gowda—that Siddaramaiah and two other ministers should be dropped, and MP Prakash, a senior JD(S) leader and a Lingayat, should be inducted as the Deputy CM. In order to save his government, Dharam Singh obliged. AHIND condemned the dismissal and went on a rampage. Meanwhile, Siddaramaiah floated his own outfit, the All India Progressive Janata Dal. He openly supported Congress in the local body elections. Congress won 14 Zilla Parishads out of 29, and JD(S) two. The rest had no clear majority. Siddaramaiah bided his time, met Congress leaders in Delhi, resigned his Assembly seat and joined Congress. According to his supporters, he had become a stumbling block in the way of Kumaraswamy, son of Deve Gowda. Siddaramaiah contested again in December 2006 from his constituency and defeated his JD(S) opponent, supported by BJP, by a slender margin of 257 votes. The margin was slender because JD(U) had put up a candidate belonging to the same caste as the JD(S)’s, with the intention of defeating the JD(S) candidate. That was also the end of any pretence of an alliance between BJP and JD(U). Siddaramaiah’s contribution to the realignment of social bases is quite significant.


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Soon after, Deve Gowda upped the ante and met Sonia Gandhi in January 2006. As a price for his continued support for the Dharam Singh government, he is reported to have asked for Chief Ministership of Karnataka for his son Kumaraswamy, Vice-Presidentship for himself, and a Union cabinet berth for Revanna, his other son. Obviously, these extraordinary demands were rejected. He also met Vajpayee. Soon after, he withdrew JD(S) support from the Dharam Singh government. In February 2006, a coalition government of JD(S)–BJP was sworn in with Kumaraswamy as the CM and Yeddyurappa as the Deputy CM. The main agreement between the two parties was that Kumaraswamy would hold the Chief Ministership for 20 months, i.e., till October 2007 and then Yeddyurappa would take over. As CM, Kumaraswamy was popular and pro-active. But when October 2007 approached, Deve Gowda was reluctant to hand over the Chief Ministership to Yeddyurappa. Finally, he agreed and Yeddyurappa was sworn in as CM in November 2007. But, when Deve Gowda reneged on his promise, Yeddyurappa resigned. His first Chief Ministership lasted barely eight days. This act of Deve Gowda evoked dismay and revulsion in the entire state and generated a huge wave of sympathy for the BJP, which still lingers on. In the mid-term general elections to the Assembly in May 2008, BJP achieved a near majority of 110 and with the help of five independents formed the government. Vasavi11 suggests BJP drew support also from the Lingayat mutts, “which run parallel governments in terms of education, health and judicial service.” But BJP and Yeddyurappa still did not feel secure. They started “Operation Lotus.” It focused on poaching the MLAs of Congress and JD(S), which continued till the Lok Sabha elections of 2009. Yeddyurappa persuaded three Congress and two JD(S) MLAs to resign their seats, join BJP, and contest again on the BJP ticket. They won and were rewarded with ministerships. The BJP government became stable. These MLAs were political heavyweights and could have won on the ticket of any party. But, they also realized how the wind was blowing. The electoral delimitation order was promulgated in March 2008. The SC Lok Sabha seats increased from four to five, and two new seats were reserved for the STs for the first time. The boundaries of

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some Lok Sabha constituencies were redrawn. BJP gloated over the additional Bangalore Central seat. The Congress thought that, on the basis of caste calculus, redrawing of the coastal and upghat (i.e., literally, across a pass in hills) constituencies would work in its favor.

Religious Turmoil in the Coastal Districts In September 2008, the members of a couple of Hindu fringe groups attacked churches in the coastal district of Dakshina Kannada. These groups alleged that a few Christian priests had made derogatory references about Hinduism. Close on the heels of these incidents came attacks on women going to pubs, organized mainly by these extremist fringe elements. A Hindu convention in March 2009 led to communal clashes in the coastal districts of Uttara Kannada, Dakshina Kannada, and Udipi. This intensified the communal polarization and competitive communal mobilization in Dakshina Kannada, which went on till the Lok Sabha elections. The constituency recorded a turnout of 73â•¯percent in the Lok Sabha elections. The opposition non-BJP parties, and some magazines, sought to capitalize on these incidents. One lady Union Minister called these attacks “Talibanisation under BJP.”

Run-up to the Elections 2009 BJP closed its ranks. The infighting between Ananth Kumar, an MP from Bangalore, and Yeddyurappa was placed on hold and the party started campaigning. Operation Lotus was intensified and entered its second stage. Yeddyurappa enticed into BJP, not only Lingayat heavyweights like Nagamarpally (lost Bidar in 2009) and his son (also lost the Assembly by-election, 2009), but also prominent Vokkaliga leaders like Shivrame Gowda (lost Mandya) and Chandre Gowda12 (won Bangalore North). He poached both Congress and JD(S) politicians. Some leaders who had been in Congress for nearly


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40 years switched to BJP. Congress and JD(S) also resorted to poaching, but they attracted only small fry or those discredited by the BJP for defying the party whip. Congress welcomed back Bangarappa. This attests to the fact that many hard-headed leaders sensed the BJP wave. Also, the party hopping shows the hollowness of the labels “secular” and “communal.”

The Third Front Smarting under the discomfiture of defeat in the Lok Sabha on the Indo–US nuclear treaty issue, the LF sought to forge a Third Front at the national level. Due to the local compulsions and calculations of electoral alliances, BJD of Orissa, AIADMK of Tamil Nadu, and the TDP of Andhra Pradesh spurned BJP and were sympathetic to the idea of a Third Front. Deve Gowda, probably recollecting his elevation as Prime Minister in 1996, thinking that the opportunity might knock again, and hoping at least to equal the performance of the undivided JD in 1996, promptly hosted a convention of the Third Front on March 12, 2009, at a place 40 miles from Bangalore. Prakash Karat, A.P. Bardhan, and Chandrababu Naidu attended. BSP and AIADMK sent delegates. Deve Gowda literally held the center stage.

Ticket Distribution Following the Urs paradigm, Congress gave tickets to five Lingayats, five Vokkaliga/Bunts, six OBCs, five minorities, five SCs, and two STs. BJP’s ticket allocation was as follows: nine Lingayats, six Vokkaliga/Bunts, three Brahmins, three OBCs, five SCs, and two STs. The JD(S) contested only 20 seats, the ticket distribution being: five Vokkaliga/Bunts, three Lingayats, two Brahmins, two OBCs, five SCs, one ST, and two Muslims. It did not contest three seats.13 The party left two seats to their Third Front allies, CPI and CPM. Its candidates withdrew from three constituencies, allegedly without consulting Deve Gowda, but actually to help Congress.

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Very clearly, JD(S) did not contest Shimoga, where Yeddyurappa’s son Raghavendra was pitted against the stalwart Bangarappa, who had the reputation of having won Shimoga regardless of his party affiliation. The JD(S) leaders openly accompanied Bangarappa when the latter went to file his nomination papers. In Bellary also, the party workers openly supported the Congress candidate. The mining magnates of Bellary, who are with BJP, have been on Deve Gowda’s hit list. The state CPI, CPM, and FB leaders complained to him that the JD(S) workers were not cooperating in Udipi and Dakshina Kannada. Deve Gowda obviously kept the door ajar for adjustments with the Congress in the post-poll scenario. The JD(U) gave tickets to eight candidates, who could fight on the strength of their own local prestige, following, and financial resources.

Election Issues The elections were held on April 23 and 30, 2009. Many of the expected issues included BJP being “communal,” “Talibanization under BJP,” moral policing, attack on the churches, the assertions that Manmohan Singh was a weak Prime Minister, country’s security, Karnataka’s perennial power crisis, inflation, raising the poverty line, terrorists attack on Mumbai—but, none of these became election issues. Deve Gowda, not keeping his word in 2007 of handing over power to BJP, and letting down BJP and Yeddyurappa, were uppermost in the minds of the electorate. Also, by the time of the 2009 elections, Yeddyurappa had completed only 11 months in office. Hence, the honeymoon continued. And, ultimately caste became the major issue. There were grumblings among the Panchamsali sect—traditionally agriculturists—of Lingayats that Yeddyurappa was favoring the dominant Banajigas, traditionally merchants. For this reason, many Panchamsali Lingayats were not inclined to vote for BJP. But it is reported that the sect leaders and the swamijis of some Lingayat mutts persuaded the Panchamsalis not to divide the Lingayat votes.14 The leading Congress leaders Moily, Kharge, Dharam Singh were busy in their constituencies. Others like S.M. Krishna and Siddaramaiah were mostly in Bangalore.

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Results The voting turnout was 63.3â•¯percent, not much lower than the 64.9â•¯percent recorded in 2004. BJP increased its tally of seats by one to 19. The Congress tally went down by two to six seats. The JD(S) won three, an increase of one seat (see Table 13.1). A further analysis might show that BJP also did well in constituencies where the Lingayats and Vokkaligas are present in approximately equal proportions. As seen from Table 13.1, the share of votes of BJP went up by about 7â•¯percent. JD(U) put up eight candidates. Most of these candidates were relegated to the last, or almost the last positions. A detailed analysis should show whether the rise in BJP’s share of votes is due to its losing some constituencies by a narrow margin, or winning some by a huge margin, or both. The share of votes of the Congress went up by 1â•¯percent, although its tally of seats came down by two. JD(S) share of votes came down by 7â•¯percent. As Table 13.2 reveals, BJP won about half the seats (eight out of 15) in old Mysore. It won all the six seats in Mumbai Karnataka, and two out of four in Hyderabad Karnataka. It won all the three seats in the coastal Karnataka. (After the delimitation, Udipi-Chikmagalur constituency has jutted quite further into the old Mysore areas.) Table 13.1 Karnataka Lok Sabha Elections (2004 and 2009): Seats Won and Share of Votes by Parties 2004 turnout 64.92 Party BJP Congress JD(S) Others Total

Contested

Won

% share of votes

24a 28 28 92 172

18 8 2 – 28

34.77 36.82 20.45 7.96 100.00

2009 turnout 63.3 Contested

Won

% share of votes

28 28 20b 351 427

19 6 3 – 28

41.63 37.65 13.57 7.15 100.00

Source: Various websites like “Indian-electionaffairs.com”. Notes: a In alliance with BJP, JD(U) contested four seats. b JD(S) did not contest three constituencies—Chikodi, Bellary, and Shimoga; its candidates withdrew in Dharwad, Bagalkot, and Davangere; one each was left for CPI (Udipi–Chikmagalur) and CPM (Dakshina Kannada).

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Raghavendra Keshavarao Hebsur Table 13.2 Karnataka Lok Sabha Elections 2009: Seats Won Contested and Won by Administrative/Political Regions Congress

Regions of Karnataka

BJP

Contested Won

Old Mysore Mumbai Karnataka Hyderabad Karnataka Coastal Total

JDS

Contested

Won

Contested Won

Total seats won

15 6

4 –

15 6

8 6

12 3

3 –

15 6

4

2

4

2

4

–

4

3 28

– 6

3 28

3 19

1 19

– 3

3 28

Note: The results of the coastal constituencies need to be interpreted with caution. Before the delimitation of 2008, the erstwhile Mangalore Lok Sabha constituency included two upghat assembly segments in Kodagu. Now, renamed as Dakshina Kannada, it does not. The Uttara Kannada constituency remains the same, with two assembly segments from the neighboring Belgaum district, which are culturally and commercially different from those in Uttara Kannada district proper. The redrawn Udipi–Chikmagalur constituency includes segments in upghat Chikmagalur district.

Table 13.3 Votes of the Political Parties by Social Background of the Voters Social background

BJP (%)

Congress (%)

JD(S) (%)

Upper castes Lingayats Vokkligas OBCs Scheduled Castes Scheduled Tribes Muslims

55 74 38 44 38 42 11

23 17 28 40 56 45 65

16 5 30 9 4 10 14

Source: The Hindu, May 26, 2009.

Table 13.3 shows the share of votes of the parties by the social background of the voters. As expected, three-fourths of Lingayats have voted for BJP, followed by more than half of the upper castes. OBC votes have been shared mostly by Congress and BJP, while only 9â•¯percent voted for JD(S). This could be due to the exit of Siddaramaiah from JD(S). Without the support of an overwhelming majority of the aggrieved Lingayat community, the BJP could not have done so well. Some of the


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reasons or tentative explanations were raised earlier. The charismatic personality of Yeddyurappa who espoused many popular and peasant causes is one of the explanations. U.R. Ananthamurthy, a Kannada litterateur and Gyanpeeth Award winner, wrote about the BJP victory in the 2008 Assembly elections, “It is Mr Yeddyurappa’s personal victory and not an ideological victory of Hindutva of the kind one finds in Gujarat.” He adds, “Mr Deve Gowda’s crooked politics alienated them [the Lingayats].”15 The above explanation can be extended and modified. Congress, since Devaraj Urs, has been mainly dominated by the OBCs. JD(S) is dominated by Deve Gowda, his family, and other Vokkaligas. Hegde’s JD(U) is moribund and almost defunct. Hence, the only political shelter most Lingayats could find is BJP. A few journalists and politicians the author met add another powerful argument in support of the Lingayats’ new shelter. Between 1984 and 1988, Hegde had built around his Panchayati Raj system, a new structure of a three-tier leadership—village, taluka, and district. The structure struck roots and he groomed the leaders. BJP has latched on to this free-floating JD structure. One veteran politician went on to add that but for Deve Gowda, even the JD(S) seats would have gone to BJP. He added, “The real Hindutva BJP—i.e., the Ananth Kumar BJP—is confined to 40 to 45 Assembly and 5 to 6 Lok Sabha seats. The rest is the legacy of Hegde.” He further said that if Congress groomed a Lingayat leader, like M.P. Prakash,16 the party would win back the Lingayat community votes. But, sometimes people come to like their temporary shelter. Similarly, now that the non- or anti-Brahmin days have all but disappeared, the Lingayats and other communities also may be getting attracted to “soft” Hindutva. Also, it will take quite some time for Congress to groom Lingayat leaders acceptable all over Karnataka.

Conclusions By imaginatively mobilizing a string of OBCs, dalits, minorities, and poorer sections among the dominant castes, and by adopting bold policy innovations like land reforms, and reservations in government

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jobs and educational seats, Devaraj Urs, the 5th CM of Karnataka (1972–80) redefined the state’s politics. Even till today, the main features of his coalition have continued. Ramakrishna Hegde, another visionary politician and the 7th CM of Karnataka (1983–1988) emerged as the leader of the Lingayats and also of sections of other castes. He restored the Lingayat primacy. Through his Panchayati Raj system, his party, JD, entrenched itself in the countryside. Hegde’s coalition has also continued till today, in some form or the other. But, within the JD, the rivalry between Hegde and his junior colleague, Deve Gowda, worsened, which was the beginning of the downfall of both; Hegde’s in the short run and Deve Gowda’s in the long run. After he became the Prime Minister in 1996, Deve Gowda had Hegde thrown out of the party; a costly and self destructive revenge. Little did Deve Gowda realize at that time that he was decimating the base of the JD. The BJP made a quiet entry into the Karnataka party system in 1983. At that time, no one anticipated that the party would emerge, after a quarter of a century or so, as the ruling party of the state and elect two-thirds of the state’s members of the Lok Sabha. In the beginning, its number of MLAs and MPs grew incrementally, and also erratically. But after 1999, the increase has been exponential. The Karnataka Assembly elections of 2004 did not throw up a clear winner. During the post election scenario, Congress and JD(S) formed a coalition government. Deve Gowda sidelined Congress CM, Dharam Singh and his own party’s Deputy CM, Siddaramaiah. The latter joined Congress and bounced back. Then the JD(S) pulled down the Dharam Sigh government and struck a deal with BJP that the chief ministership would be transferred to Yeddyurappa after 20 months. But in October 2007, Deve Gowda did not, on some pretext or another, hand over the chief ministership to Yeddyurappa. This was a disastrous, but a decisive moment in the history of Karnataka politics, and Indian democracy. Through the epics of the Ramayana and the Mahabharata and other sources, the Indian people have imbibed many beliefs, including, “One should keep one’s word.” Yeddyurappa emerged as the martyr and Deve Gowda as the villain. The net result was the pro-BJP and a pro-Yeddyurappa wave. Historically, the Lingayats have been in the forefront of the antiBrahmin movement. Eliminating the Brahmins from the public sphere


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had become one of their goals. It is a paradox that such a community should take shelter in a party with distinct Brahmanical hue and close association with the RSS. The powerful community had no option. They did not have much room in Congress. Their distrust of Deve Gowda had deepened by October 2007. The days of anti-Brahmanism are almost over. Hence, they turned to BJP. Yeddyurappa is not a run of the mill RSS worker. He has led many pro-poor and pro-peasant movements. This also helped. The 2009 Lok Sabha elections can be described as reinforcing elections. An analysis of votes for the parties by the social background of the voters reveals that almost three-fourths of the Lingayats have voted for BJP, followed by more than half of the forward castes (mainly Brahmins). More Vokkaligas and OBCs have also voted for the party. Yeddyurappa’s poaching the legislators and politicians [including Vokkaligas of the Congress and JD(S)] through Operation Lotus helped. It is very probable that even the Vokkaliga voters are deserting Deve Gowda. BJP has succeeded in constituting a broadbased coalition. The BJP’s victory could be attributed to the overwhelming support of the Lingayats, substantial support of others, and also the attraction of Hindutva. This looks like a new version of Hegde’s coalition, except for the lack of support of the Muslims. Also, the support of only one-third of the SCs is noteworthy. Congress has maintained its share of 38â•¯percent of the votes. Also, its support base comprises sizeable sections of the OBCs and STs, and a bulk of the SCs and Muslims. About one-third of the Vokkaligas have voted for the JD(S). The bases of Congress and JD(S) are generally consistent with their images. It is not very surprising that BJP in Karnataka has bucked the national trend of the party’s nation-wide decline. The voters of Karnataka were not much concerned with the national issues like, Advani as a strong man, security of the country, money in Swiss banks, and the like. The 2009 elections were held within one year of the State Assembly elections of 2008. The popular honeymoon with the Yeddyurappa government had continued. Deve Gowda was seen as a person who wrecked a smooth sailing coalition government. The sympathy wave for Yeddyurappa had become strong. The Operation Lotus itself added to the strong BJP wave. Also the swamijis of the Lingayat mutts played a major role.

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The current feud in the highest echelons of the party is not likely to affect the short term prospects of the party in the state. Yeddyurappa’s former rival and critic, Ananth Kumar (a Brahmin, and MP from Bangalore South) is a member of the BJP inner circle, but not a powerful one. The top BJP leaders—the elderly or the young—know very well that Ananth Kumar cannot sway many voters outside Bangalore or the coastal constituencies. In fact, not many people in Karnataka have heard his name. His capability to play mischief in Karnataka is very limited. And, no faction of BJP can dare it. Opposition to Yeddyurappa, if any, is more likely to come from the mine owing Reddy brothers of Bellary, or Jagdish Shettar (a Lingayat of North Karnataka), who has reluctantly accepted the Speakership of the Assembly. The predicament of the JD(S), i.e., Deve Gowda, is unenviable. The party’s shrunken base in the Vokkaliga heartland of old Mysore area is still good. In the five by-elections to the state Assembly held in August 2009 (four in the old Mysore and one in Hyderabad Karnataka), the JD(S) won two—both in old Mysore; BJP two, and Congress one. Only on the basis of the victory in the Vokkaliga heartland, the party cannot aspire to regain the glory of the JD of 1994–96. The Congress andJD (S) need each other. An alliance between them will be, to some extent, complementary. But, Siddaramiah, a bête noire of Deve Gowda, has already been appointed as the leader of the Congress legislature party, i.e., the future CM, if Congress wins a majority. Also, Deve Gowda may have to accept unpalatable conditions, if he wants to ally himself with Congress. Then, there is the AHIND17 group, now a silent volcano. But, in politics, situations change. For some time to come, it will be a competition between the two paradigms of mobilization and coalition: Hegde’s (i.e., BJP’s) and Urs’.

Notes 1. Government of Karnataka, Report of the (Mr Justice O. Chinnappa Reddy) Karnataka Third Backward Classes Commission, Vol. II, 1990. 2. For the purposes of this article, the Lingayats and Vokkaligas are referred to as the dominant castes. Whether both of them were, or have been recognized, as OBCs, or only some sub-castes have been, is not taken into account.


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â•‡ 3. R.K. Hebsur, “Karnataka,” Seminar, No. 224, (April, 1978), pp. 21–28; Also see, R.K. Hebsur, Reactions to Reservations for Other Backward Classes: A Comparative Study of Four States, Vol. IV, Backward Classes (Mr B.P. Mandal) Commission Report, (Delhi: Controller of Publications, 1980). â•‡ 4. A shaivite Brahmin, Hedge, along with Veerendra Patil, a Lingayat, was the general secretary of the state (undivided) Congress party at a fairly young age. Both of them were instrumental in the reinstatement of Nijalingappa as CM. Although he emerged as the leader of the Lingayats, Hegde had supporters in other castes, too. Moreover, his flair for Kannada literature made him acceptable to all the parts of Karnataka. â•‡ 5. K.S. Dakshina Murthy, “Hegde and Gowda Paved the Way,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 24 (July 14–20, 2008), pp. 11–12. â•‡ 6. Sandeep Shastri, “Lok Shakti in Karnataka: Regional Party in a Bipolar Alliance System,” EPW, Vol. 39, Nos 14–15, (2004), pp. 1491–96. â•‡ 7. Assam (AGP), Punjab (Akali Dal), Maharashtra (SS), Orissa (BJD) have regional parties. SS has an ideological affinity with BJP. In Punjab, historically both Akali Dal and BJP are the adversaries of Congress. In Assam and Orissa, the alliances with BJP were based purely on electoral arithmetic. â•‡ 8. Hebsur, “Karnataka.” â•‡ 9. The Karnatak Lingayat Education Society runs more than 200 colleges, including engineering. Their Belgaum Medical College has been recognized as a Deemed University. There are other Lingayat managed schools and colleges. In central and north Karnataka, they dominate not only agriculture, but also commerce. Their mutts (headquarters of the swamijis) provide free boarding and lodging facilities for the poor students. This has helped generations of Lingayats to rise in life. 10. H.S. Balram, “Southern Surprise: Gowda Stirs up Poll Potpourri,” Times of India, March 16, 2009. 11. A.R. Vasavi, “Caste, Capital, and Captaincy in Karnataka,” EPW, Vol. 43, No. 24 (June 14–20, 2008), pp. 10–11. 12. Chandre Gowda had vacated in 1978 his Chikmaglur Lok Sabha seat for Indira Gandhi. 13. Adapted from Deccan Herald, 8 April 2009. 14. Interview with Mr Sarjoo Katkar, Senior Correspondent, The New Indian Express, in Belgaum, May 29, 2009. 15. U.R. Ananthamuthy’s blog, Rujuvatu, June 3, 2008. 16. A Lingayat, who left JD(S) during the critical period of Deve Gowda’s October 2007 coup and joined Congress. 17. AHIND is an acronym constructed from a Kannada phrase: Alpasankhyakaru, (the minorities, i.e., Muslims), HINdulidavru (the backward castes), and Dalitaru (the Scheduled Castes).

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Chapter 14

Andhra Pradesh Political Mobilization, Competitive Populism, and Changing Party Dynamics in Andhra Pradesh Karli Srinivasulu

The performance of the Congress in the 2009 elections in AP, held simultaneously to the state assembly and national parliament, has proved that the Congress still retains its vitality. This, despite the fact that these elections were keenly fought between three principal political contestants—the Congress, the TDP and its allies (the CPI, CPM, the TRS), and the newly formed Praja Rajyam Party (PRP) led by a popular film actor, Chiranjeevi. All of them attracted huge public responses to their election meetings. This made predictions about election results very difficult indeed. In Indian politics since the 1980s, many states have seen a routine rejection of the incumbents. The re-election of the Congress stands out as an almost unique achievement. The newly formed PRP was expected to do what the TDP, founded by NTR—a cine actor of an earlier generation—had done in 1983. NTR was voted to power in 1983 altering the configuration of social forces in the state. The TDP’s rise posed a challenge to the Reddy caste dominance and signaled the political rise of the economically prosperous Kammas. The emergence of the PRP is seen as a challenge to both the Congress and the TDP identified with the Reddys and Kammas, respectively. Alternatively, the PRP is identified with the political ambition of the

Political Mobilization and Competitive Populism

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Kapu peasant caste, thereby challenging the dominance of both the Congress and TDP. As the election results show, this did not occur in 2009. What then accounts for the retaining of political power by the Congress? What social forces, policy framework, or electoral strategy made this possible? What does the Congress victory signify in terms of national–regional party dynamics? What does the electoral outcome in the state signify in terms of caste dynamics and identity politics? Further, how is it that the TDP, with its strong organizational structure and allies, on the one hand, and the PRP, in spite of it evoking huge popular response, on the other, could not unseat the Congress? This chapter attempts to examine the changing dynamics of party politics, the character of political contestation, social bases, electoral campaign, and performance through an analysis of the 2009 elections. The analysis here is presented in four sections. The first section maps the nature of political contestation in the state by examining the configuration of political forces and electoral alliances in the 2009 elections. The second section discusses the nature of electoral campaigns and strategies. The third section analyzes the electoral performance of political parties and shifting social forces. The fourth section, examines their implications for the party system in the state.

Electoral Contestation: Issues and Alliances The discourse in this election was centered on the following three issues: 1. The issue of separate statehood to Telangana championed by the TRS; 2. Congress’ emphasis on development as a solution to the problems facing the state including that of the Telangana demand and CPI(ML) issue; and, 3. The question of samajika nyayam (social justice) emphasized in the elections by the PRP.

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The Telangana issue has dominated the political discourse in the state since the formation of the TRS in 2001. It was one of the principal issues, along with focus on rural economic crisis and farmers’ distress that facilitated the Congress’ return to power in the 2004 elections. The Congress alliance, with the TRS on the one hand and with the Left on the other, was based on the promises of forming a Telangana state and addressing the crisis in the agrarian and rural sectors, respectively.1 The non-fulfillment by the Congress party of the promise made to the TRS about Telangana led to the latter’s withdrawal of support to Congress governments both at the state and the center. The Telangana issue dominated the political debate and activity in the state so much so that it affected the entire party system. The TRS succeeded in causing a sense of insecurity among the leaders coming from Telangana region across political parties. They were pressed to take a clear stand on it. The Congress party too experienced an intense factional activity during this period. What further intensified factional fights was the absence of approval from and YSR’s successful persuasion of the High Command to dither in deciding the issue of Telangana state. The Telangana demand involves a set of complex issues—the status of Hyderabad city being one of them: should Hyderabad be declared a union territory, if Telangana state occurs as it involves substantial interests of migrants from Andhra and Rayalaseema regions? Another crucial issue is the apprehension of the Muslims of Telangana that a separate state would lead to their further marginalization and increase the communal tensions because of the historical fact of this region being part of the erstwhile Muslim princely state of Hyderabad. As such, the Congress leadership vacillated in its stand on Telangana, insisting on the need for evolving a consensus. This could prove to be detrimental to the Congress in the long run. The TDP also saw the rallying of influential leaders from the Telangana region pressuring the party to favor the Telangana demand. This is a major development as the TDP’s basic ideological position is that the Telugus constitute one linguistic community that cannot be safeguarded by a Congress party dominated by north Indian leadership. Despite the pro-Andhra dispensation and Kamma


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dominance, the TDP leadership—given the electoral compulsions — had to take a stand in favor of the Telangana demand. The BJP also wavered. In spite of its stand in favour of Telangana state demand, the BJP could not decide on the matter when it created the three states of Uttarakhand, Jharkhand and Chattisgarh. This was attributed to the compulsions of coalition politics. The CPI, a minor party in the state, also took a stand in favor of the demand. The CPI(M) unwaveringly adhered to its stand on linguistic states. The most important move in this election is the success of the TDP in forging a mahakutami, a grand alliance with the TRS, CPI, and CPM. It constituted an alliance of parties that were united rather by their common opposition to the ruling Congress than by any common program. The TRS, CPI, and CPM were part of the Congress alliance in the 2004 elections. They fell out with the Congress for their own reasons—the TRS because of Congress’ indecision on the Telangana demand and the Left because of the Indo–US nuclear agreement issue. The pro-Telangana stand taken by the TDP opened the way for the TRS to join the TDP-led alliance. The Left had no great reasons to ally with the TDP except its opposition to the Congress. The Congress thus, was left to contest on its own. It is indicative of the close electoral contest in the state since the emergence of the TDP that compels the main political parties to enter into alliances. While the TDP since the mid-1980s had an electoral alliance with the Left, in the 1990s there is a greater realization of this on the part of the Congress, both at the center and in the state. The TDP’s support to the BJP after 1999 and their alliance in 2004 elections provided scope for an alliance of the Congress with the Left in the state. The Congress in alliance with the TRS and Left came to power in 2004 against the TDP–BJP alliance by focusing on the issues of agriculture and rural development which were neglected during the decade long TDP rule, 1995–2004. The TDP regime with its excessive focus on urban concerns and Information Technology (IT) industry neglected the rural sector. Large scale suicides among the weavers and farmers were symptomatic of the gravity of the situation. The Congress succeeded in highlighting this crisis through YSR’s famous padayatra through the state before the 2004 elections, and articulated it in its election campaign.2

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Accordingly, the state Congress government implemented an elaborate agrarian and welfare policy regime. A loan waver scheme for distressed farmers, free electricity and input subsidies for agriculture, and construction of major irrigation projects being important components of the policy package for the farming sector. It extended loan facility to the Self Help Groups (SHGs) at an interest rate of 25 paisa. In addition, it implemented an elaborate welfare package consisting of the `â•›2 kilo rice for the Below Poverty Line (BPL) families, Old Age Pension Scheme, National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS), and Indiramma, housing for the poor. A medical scheme included an ambulance service, providing emergency mobile medical attention, for both urban and rural areas3 and the Rajiv Arogyasree scheme for private corporate hospital treatment to the poor. Further, fee reimbursement for socially and economically backward class students in the professional colleges since 2008 gained huge popularity. The PDS rice, pension, and housing schemes were not new, but the latter two involving medical care and fee reimbursement were the creation of the Congress regime. They are provided at a time when health care and professional education have become unaffordable to the poor. These provisions gave an image to the Congress of being caring and pro-poor. What marks a major change in 2009 is the entry of the PRP. Led by one of the most popular actors in the Telugu film industry, it attracted unparalleled attention from the media as well as the public. It aroused great interest among the Kapus, the peasant caste to which Chiranjeevi belongs. In comparison to the other dominant castes, i.e., Reddys and Kammas, Kapus are not only more numerous, but also have a wider geographical presence. Moreover, PRP’s leadership is not restricted to Kapus alone. With an ideological plank of social justice defined in the tradition of Mahatma Phule and B.R. Ambedkar, the PRP sought to inject freshness into the political scene. It sought to highlight the marginalization of the backward and Dalit castes in the state politics. This ideological stance evoked a good response from those associated with these movements. AP had seen a vibrant Dalit movement in the 1980s and early 1990s,4 which gradually transformed into caste


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specific movements—the Madiga Dandora and the Mala Mahanadu— focusing almost exclusively on reservations. These developments have rendered the leaders of the earlier phase of the Dalit movement that treated social justice as a central principle as redundant. These leaders along with some ideologically oriented backward caste leaders found the echoes of their politics in the PRP. Thus, the PRP with a new ideological thrust posed a challenge to the Congress and the TDP.

Populist Promises and Mobilization Strategies The 2009 election was fiercely fought with the campaign rhetoric reaching to a level verging on mutual slander. It also featured cinema stars on a scale hitherto unheard, lending their glamor to the campaign, largely due to Chiranjeevi’s entry into politics. The first to respond his challenge was TDP president Chandrababu Naidu. He brought in the actor members of his father-in-law, NTR’s family, a couple of whom have significant fan followings. YSR did not lag behind in his efforts though, unfortunately for him the film field has never been the Congress’ forte, but some stars did show up for the Congress. The predominant means of campaign consisted of road shows and door-to-door contacts. Restrictions on election campaigns and expenditures forced political parties to tone down their efforts. Despite the restrictions, the expenditure in this election surpassed all earlier limits with an abundance of liquor and distribution of money.5 This time, there was a conspicuous absence of carnival-type grandeur as in earlier elections.6 Television provided partial compensation. TV networks in the state have greatly expanded during the last decade. At present, five exclusive news channels, 11 channels providing entertainment, and two bakthi channels dedicated to devotional themes are in existence. The core of the electoral campaign centered on three planks—first, development and welfarism vs. separatism; second, corruption vs. good governance; third, social justice vs. social and economic dominance. The Congress campaign, projecting its five years in power as one for development, focused on it as the key issue as described previously. It

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is also argued that it is possible to resolve the Telangana issue, on the one hand and to address extremism, on the other through development. It further highlighted its achievements on the welfare front related to increases in revenue resulting from economic expansion.7 The Congress government in AP stands out as an important case of an expanded welfare regime. Popular schemes of the earlier period were expanded to cover all eligible persons, while new ones brought new benefits. The campaign of the TDP and its allies’ was quite predictable. They banked on the anti-corruption plank. The Congress government led by YSR is alleged to be one of the most corrupt regimes in the country. There have been serious allegations of corruption in almost every program and scheme. The most maligned are the irrigation projects, but even the Arogyasree scheme is said to involve bribes in dealings with corporate hospitals. Corruption has long been a major electoral campaign issue. Even Congress made it a major issue against the TDP government in the 2004 elections. Corruption charges against the TDP regime in 2004, added to other issues, contributed to its defeat. The TDP’s strategy in the 2009 election presented a sense of déjà vu. The TDP tried to repeat what the Congress had done to it in 2004. The TDP basically banked on a strategy of bringing together the opposition so that the non-Congress vote would not split. By and large the TDP alliance took to a negative campaign, emphasizing corruption and misrule. In the middle of the electoral campaign, it conjured up the Cash Transfer Scheme, according to which a fixed amount depending on the economic status of the family would be transferred into its account every month. The poorest of the poor would get `â•›2,000, the poor `â•›1,500 and the lower middle classes `â•›1,000. It also promised to supply color TVs to the poor “TV-less” families free of cost and a comprehensive health scheme for the poor. These promises largely failed to impress the electorate due to the antipopulist image of the earlier Naidu government. In fact, the TDP failed to offer any credible alternative political agenda. The PRP’s performance was not commensurate with the popular response it received. Massive turnouts at public meetings, the migration of fairly senior people from other parties into the PRP and the immense interest of the youth in the party were not properly channelized. It did


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not however lag behind other parties in terms of populist promises. Besides a monthly grocery plank of `â•›100 for poor families, the PRP promised Old Age and Widow Pensions, an unemployment dole, and free and compulsory education up to standard X for all. The main weakness of the PRP was manifest on the organizational front. Chiranjeevi is undoubtedly a cine star with a large and committed fan following with a wide network of fan associations.8 They had campaigned for more than a year for his entry into politics. When the PRP was founded, they actively participated in its activities. Thus, he had a huge popular response and the political plank of social justice to differentiate his party from others. The failure of the actor is conspicuous in his inability to transform this enthusiasm and channelize these energies into a proper political organizational structure. All the major parties went in for detailed pre-election surveys by well known organizations at different stages.9 The campaign issues and candidate selection did not follow conventional methods, but used detailed information gathered from these surveys. Congress and the TDP used this massive information resource base in their selection of candidates. Apart from the popularity of candidates, another major consideration was their financial capacity. The 2009 election is without exaggeration, the most expensive one in the electoral history of the state. The conservative estimate is that a MLA candidate had to minimally spend two crores and the MP candidate five crores.10 The upper limit varied, depending on factors like the intensity of competition, party strength, the perception of the candidate about his vulnerability, popularity and spending capacity of the rival candidates, etc. What is also noteworthy about this election—cutting across party lines—there had been a general preference for wealthy candidates. As a result, among the contestants, the proportion of those from the class of contractors, real estate brokers, and other classes of neo-rich has seen a significant rise. While the Congress and TDP exercised some judicious balance between the political background and financial capacity of their candidates, the PRP came in for large scale criticism on this count. There was an open talk, not only about the PRP leadership allocating tickets on the basis of the candidates’ financial strength, but also collecting

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extensive funding for the party from the aspirants. The ruling Congress banked on huge resources at its disposal, while the TDP as usual, displayed its well known organizational strength, despite losing some of its leaders to the PRP. The PRP with the charisma of its leader and initial popularity nonetheless displayed a major weakness in organizational terms. Added to this, a series of allegations of financial misappropriation and allocation of tickets to undeserved aspirants damaged its electoral prospects. In ideological terms, the PRP’s slogan of social justice was a novel electoral issue. It made sense in view of the strong Dalit movement and political awareness among the backward castes. Further, it was in tune with the fact that the mass fan following of Chiranjeevi has been among the lower castes and classes. This slogan also assumed a certain degree of practical significance in view of YSR regime’s blatant Reddy bias in the selection of MLAs, formation of cabinet, and other political appointments. Perhaps, no other Congress government in the state was perceived to be so blatantly casteist.11 Public criticism on this count did not bring about any change. In correspondence with its social justice slogan, the PRP allotted 100 seats to Backward Classes (BC) candidates, thus distinguishing itself from other parties. Despite this, it failed on the organizational and political fronts. As a Dalit activist in coastal Andhra noted, the PRP “began with a bright promise but lost even before it could made its mark.”12

Social Configuration and Electoral Outcome Winning 157 seats in an assembly of 294, the Congress clearly demonstrated its victory in the 2009 elections. The performance of the Congress has been spectacular in the parliamentary elections in terms of seats and votes. By bagging 33 out of 42 seats, four seats more than that in 2004 with a 38.95â•¯percent vote, the Congress proved to be far more secure. In the assembly, the Congress’ popular vote of 37.42â•¯percent was far ahead of the TDP poll of 29.66â•¯percent. Thus, the Congress could largely retain its vote base despite a keen three-cornered contest. The regional break up (see Table 14.2) does reveal that the Congress performance in Telangana compared to the


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other two regions was not impressive because of the impact of the Telangana issue.13 The TDP won 92 assembly and six parliamentary seats and came second. The PRP’s performance with just 18 seats in the assembly and none in the parliamentary elections was disappointing. The major losers in this election are the allies of the TDP. The CPI could win four seats and the CPM just one seat in the assembly. While they won two seats each in the last parliamentary election, their dismal performance in 2009 is symptomatic of their declining base. In contrast, the performance of the Hyderabad based Majlis Ittehad-ul Muslimeen (MIM), which had a tacit understanding with the Congress, with seven MLAs and one MP to its credit was spectacular. PRP made a greater dent into the vote base of the TDP than that of the Congress. It got 17.71â•¯percent of the popular vote but failed to translate it into seats with only 18 seats in the assembly. In terms of votes and seats, the PRP is relatively stronger in coastal Andhra, wining 13 seats and 22â•¯percent of the popular vote (see Table 14.2). A spoiler to the TDP’s election prospects is the Lok Satta (LS), a NGO)-turned-political party. In as many as 22 assembly constituencies, the Congress margins over the TDP alliance were smaller than the votes polled by the LS. LS split the votes of the TDP rather than that of the Congress. Further, in as many as 44 assembly constituencies, there was a close contest as the winning margin was less than 2,000 votes. In these seats, the Congress with 25 seats, topped the list followed by the TDP with 11, the PRP with four, and the TRS with two.14 Thus the PRP and the LS harmed the TDP alliance more than the Congress.15 There is a significant difference in the performance of parties in the assembly and parliamentary elections in terms of seats and popular vote. The TDP polled 4.73â•¯percent less than what it received in the assembly elections. The other major contender, the PRP as well polled 2â•¯percent less vote in the parliamentary election than in the assembly election. The differential performance of the parties in the assembly and parliamentary elections and the decisive edge the Congress demonstrated over regional parties like the TDP, PRP, and the TRS points to the fact that the electorate showed a greater preference for a national party in the parliamentary elections. The continuous threat of

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instability of the coalition governments at the center, and the tendency of the smaller coalitional partners to threaten to pull out at their own convenience may have contributed to a shift in the perception of the place of regional parties in national politics. The significant difference in the voteâ•¯percentages between the parliamentary and assembly elections points to this trend. Further, the pro-poor performance of UPA government, in comparison to the NDA, acted as a significant factor influencing the popular preference for the Congress. The withdrawal of the Left’s support to the UPA on the nuclear issue in fact had an adverse impact on the image of the Left in the state. Further the Left’s alliance with the TDP was seen in a poor light. The Left’s trenchant criticism of the TDP during its second tenure in power (1999–2004) and its volte face just prior to the recent election did not make a convincing case in the popular perception.16 In fact, one could see the opportunistic alliance with the TDP contributing to the decline in the Left’s credibility as reflected in its electoral performance (see Table 14.1 and 14.2). Table 14.1 Parliamentary Electoral Profile of Parties in AP: 1984–2009 Congress

TDP

Left

BJP S

Others

Year

S

V

S

V

S

V

1984 1989 1991 1996 1998 1999 2004

6 39 25 22 22 5 29

41.8 51.0 45.6 39.7 38.5 42.8 41.54

30 2 13 16 12 29 5

44.8 34.5 32.3 32.6 32.0 40.7 33.11

1 – 2 3 2 – 2

1.9 4.4 4.3 5.3 5.5 2.8 2.38

NA NA – 2.0 1 9.5 – 5.7 4 18.3 7 9.1 0 8.40

V

2009

33

38.95

6

24.93

0

2.85

0

3.75

S

V

5 11.5 1 8.1 1 8.3 1 16.7 2 5.7 1 4.6 5 6.83 (TRS) 1 7.73 (others) 2 6.14 (TRS) 0 15.76 (PRP) 1 7.62 (others)

Sources: Adapted from K. Srinivasulu and P.C. Sarangi, “Political Realignments in PostNTR Andhra Pradesh,” Economic and Political Weekly (EPW), Vol. XXXIV, Nos. 34 and 35, (August 21–28, 1999), Table 1 and 3; CSDS Team, “A Triumph of Alliance Arithmetic,” Frontline, (November 6–11, 1999); NES 2009. “How India Voted,” The Hindu, May 26, 2009. Note: Total Number of Seats: 42.


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Table 14.2 2009 Assembly Elections: Regional Break-up Cong Telangana (119) Coastal Andhra (123) Rayalaseema (52) State (294)

TDP

TRS

Left

PRP

BJP

Others

51 (33.06%) 74 (36.94%)

39 10 (20.65%) (9.43%) 36 – (30.84%)

5 2 2 10 4.93 % (12.32%) (5.3%) (14.31%) 0 13 0 0 (1.41%) (21.91%) (1.21%) (7.69%)

32 (42.72) 157 (37.42%)

17 – (36.32%) 92 10 (29.66%) (2.36%)

0 3 (0.81%) (14.7%) 5 18 (2.14%) (17.71%)

0 0 (1.2%) (4.25%) 2 10 (2.23%) (8.48%)

Source: Andhra Jyothi (Telugu daily, Hyderabad) May 17, 2009 and May 18, 2009; Sakshi (Telugu daily, Hyderabad), May 17, 2009.

Shifting Support Bases Given the shifts in the political alliances and emergence of new parties, a comparison of the shifting social support base of parties needs to be done cautiously. There have been a number of assumptions about the social bases of parties. One of them is that the TDP continues to enjoy strong support among women. In the 1980s, when NTR founded the TDP, he voiced the rhetoric of empowerment of adapaduchulu (sisters). Policy measures like share to the daughters in the patrimony and women reservations in the local bodies, apart from the rhetoric in favor of the enhancement of women’s status were instrumental in the consolidation of the support base of the TDP among women. Chandrababu Naidu who seized power in the mid-1990s tried to consolidate women’s support through the Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA) groups. These groups, which were dormant earlier, were activated and large funds were allocated to them. The DWCRA program was highlighted as one of the flagship programs of the Naidu government. 50.3â•¯percent of the female respondents in the 1996 NES17 as against only 40.6â•¯percent of the male respondents favored the TDP alliance clearly show the support of women. In contrast, the Congress enjoyed major support from the men voters with 49â•¯percent, while women comprised around 43â•¯percent. This clearly began shifting from 2004 onwards. As the 2004 NES data shows, women’s support to the TDP came down to

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41â•¯percent, with the Congress alliance support among women reaching 55â•¯percent. Male supports remained at 48â•¯percent. The articulation of the crisis in rural economy, which affected men and women in equal measure, through a policy package discussed earlier and promises like low interest loans to DWCRA groups, seem to have influenced women’s electoral preference for the Congress. In the 2009 elections, according to the NES 2009, there is a significant decline of the support among men and women to both the Congress and TDP alliance. This is because Chiranjeevis’s PRP gained 13.5â•¯percent and 11.5â•¯percent among women and men respectively (see Table 14.3). Table 14.3 Who Voted for Whom in Andhra Pradesh 2009

INC (%)

TDPN + Left (%)

TDPLP + JD (%)

Others (%)

INC (%)

TDP + Left + TRS (%)

PRP (%)

TDP + BJP (%)

2004 INC and Allies (%)

1996

Gender Male Female

49.0 42.9

40.6 50.3

5.7 2.6

4.7 4.2

48 55

42 41

44.9 41.3

33.3 37.2

11.5 13.5

Economic class Very poor Poor Lower Middle Upper

34.4 49.0 – 50.0 53.1

59.7 40.7 – 41.3 37.0

3.8 8.3 – 2.5 –

2.2 2.1 – 6.3 9.9

48 56 – 50 49

42 38 – 46 46

45.5 42.9 43.6 42.2 43.0

41.2 39.6 38.1 33.2 27.8

8.6 12.6 12.3 14.0 10.9

Caste–community Upper castes OBCs 44.5 Malas – Madigas – SCs 55.8 Scheduled 32.3 Tribes Muslims 56.7

46.5 – – 40.3 57.3

4.3 – – 1.3 9.4

4.7 – – 2.6 1.0

34 47 – – 67 59

48 47 – – 25 36

38.2 38.3 51.0 47.7 49.35 54.3

33.7 4.5 37.7 15.5 28.8 13.5 46.1 4.7 37.45 9.1 33.3 7.2

36.7

1.7

5.0

63

35

50.7

24.8

6.9

Source: NES 1996, Post-poll survey, CSDS Data Unit, EPW, August 21–28, 1999; NES 2004, CSDS Data Unit, EPW, December 18, 2004; NES 2009, ‘How India Voted’, The Hindu, May 26, 2009.


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Since its emergence in the 1980s, the TDP had carved out a strong base among the poor through welfare schemes like `â•›2 a kilo rice, housing for the poor, janata dhoti, and sarees. Earlier, Indira Gandhi through her populist garibi hatao and anti-poverty programs created a niche for herself among the lower classes. This was turned upside down by the TDP during its first term in power, which coincided with the post-Indira phase in Indian politics. Congress came back to power in 1989 on populist promises, but soon in tune with the liberalization process initiated by the Congress government at the center in the early 1990s; it introduced economic reforms and reduced welfare programs. This made the Congress unpopular, paving the way for the TDP’s come back in the 1994 elections. Once in power, the TDP again put an elaborate populist agenda in place. Naidu continued some of these schemes till the 1999 elections though with some modifications. It is this which made the TDP popular among the lower classes as evident in the 1996 survey. By 2004 this has changed significantly. Naidu regime’s neoliberal development dispensation and move away from welfares policies led to its unpopularity from the subaltern caste classes. Despite its populist promises and alliance with the Left, as NES 2009 shows, the TDP could not regain support among the lower classes and support from the upper sections declined significantly. Its pro-Telangana stand and alliance with the TRS is seen as an obstacle to speculative enterprises like the real estate business which have risen since the 1990s and increased further during Congress rule. The beneficiaries of the speculative boom, upper classes, and sections of the middle class were not in favor of the changed TDP stand. One of the crucial questions in this election is the role of caste and religious identities. It has been suggested that there is “a shift in political fundamentals”18 from caste-based identity politics to good governance and development. Contrarily, polarization along caste lines has become quite explicit with the entry of the PRP. The three dominant peasant castes of Reddy, Kamma, and Kapu have been identified with the Congress, TDP, and PRP respectively. The PRP’s entry has further sharpened this polarization. Caste remained, as the NES 2009 indicates, a major consideration in the candidate selection, electoral appeal, and voters’ preference.

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According to the NES 2009, 65.9â•¯percent Reddys and 63.7â•¯percent Kammas had preferred the Congress and TDP, respectively. Their preference for the TDP and Congress in contrast was around just 20â•¯percent. Despite its organizational weaknesses and failure to infuse confidence, the identity of the Kapus with the PRP was quite high at 53â•¯percent.19 This is not to deny the fact that issues like governance and development did gain some prominence. Historically, the TDP’s consolidation is identified with the political rise of the Kammas and backward classes in the state. The policy of reservations to the backward classes in local bodies, educational institutions and employment, and preference to the BCs in the allocation of party positions and selection of candidates for elected bodies has been an important factor in consolidating BC support. This pattern can be seen changing from the 2004 election with the TDP advantage changing in favor of the Congress. Dalits have historically shown a preference for the Congress all through the country and AP is no exception. The TDP identified with Kammas and OBCs could not make any dent into the Dalit vote bank. In fact, the rise of the TDP in the 1980s stimulated a series of attacks on the Dalits in the Kamma dominant villages. This only widened the gap between them.20 In the 1990s, with the rise of the Madiga reservation movement, a political division along the Madiga–Mala caste lines developed. With the TDP supporting the Madiga Dandora movement, spearheaded by the Madiga Reservation Porata Samithi (MRPS), the Madigas moved toward the TDP. This helped TDP to gain electorally from Madigas, but further cemented the Malas’ relation to Congress. The Madigas’ support to the TDP as quid pro quo to the latter’s support to the reservation issue has been up and down. However Mala’s support to Congress has been stable.21 Muslim electoral behavior has also seen an interesting trajectory, especially since the early 1990s. The Babri Masjid demolition is a major event that made the Muslims move away from the Congress and break the tacit understanding the party had with the Hyderabad based MIM. Muslim support to the TDP has never been very significant. In the post-Babri period, the community disenchanted with the Congress moved closer to the TDP. This turned out to be a short lived relation. As the TDP moved closer to the BJP, entered into an alliance with it and supported the NDA government at the center, since the late 1990s, the Muslim swung away from it. As the survey data also


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clearly shows, Congress in both the 2004 and 2009 elections received overwhelming support from Muslims. In terms of popular support, Congress and the TDP have remained the main contenders, and the PRP’s challenge is only limited to spoiling the chances of either of them, but not adequate enough to displace them.

Changing Party Dynamics in AP At one level, the electoral outcome is a reflection of the shifting support base and at another of the changing party structure in the state. The two major parties, the Congress and the TDP, between whom power has circulated since the 1980s, have undergone changes in terms of organizational structure and ideological character and policy orientation. The electoral outcome also reflects the people’s verdict on new parties which have emerged in the recent past. The Congress party in AP, dominated as it is by the Reddy community, has evolved a strategy based on what is called “politics of accommodation”22 by facilitating representation to different castes and communities. This principle had been blatantly violated by the YSR regime in concentrating power in one community. Concentration of power in the hands of YSR and his caste coterie and highhandedness in dealing with matters related to both party and government did attract a certain degree of dissidence, but this was quickly controlled.23 YSR’s concentration of power relates to the changed role of the central Congress Party. The Congress under Sonia Gandhi contrasts with the centralization of decision-making under Indira Gandhi as well as Rajiv Gandhi. They frequently intervened in the functioning of provincial parties and governments including frequent changes of CMs leading to factionalism. Under Sonia Gandhi’s leadership, the provincial Congress committees have been allowed to function more on their own, under the guidance of a general secretary in change of the state party. The absence of blatant intervention and the discouragement to dissidents has considerably restrained factionalism in the states. A significant fallout of this strategy is concentration of power in one center in the provincial party and reduction of access to multiple channels of information, which may prove to be detrimental to the party in the long run.

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Using this to his advantage, YSR could easily marginalize and suppress the opposition to his leadership from caste and region-based dissidence. The provincial Congress, freed from the strict regulation of the High Command in fact has increasingly functioned like a “regional” party with a fair degree of autonomy in decision-making.24 It is no exaggeration to suggest that YSR had emerged as the most powerful Congress CM of Andhra after K. Brahmanada Reddy, who was the CM during the 1960s.25 The Congress regime has banked on a two pronged strategy that combined development with mass welfare populism. The developmentalist thrust of the regime is seen to be evident in the massive investments in irrigation projects, roads, bridges, flyovers in the urban centers, and SEZs. Networks involving contractors, builders, real estate developers, corporate operators, and racketeers of various hues are part of the regime’s support structure. The nexus with these groups is seen by its critics as institutionalizing corruption. This has been the standard allegation made against the YSR regime by the TDP, TRS, the Left, PRP, and a section of the media. If the developmental works created networks of support among the rich and powerful, then, the welfare programs strengthened the Congress social base among the poor, and marginalized. The clue to the Congress’ electoral success in the 2009 elections lies in its effort at keeping its promises and establishing an elaborate welfare mechanism. The popular schemes include subsidized rice, free power to agriculture, a pension scheme, Arogyasree, and fee reimbursement. Their undisrupted continuity added to the credibility of the regime. In contrast to the TDP, no dramatic shift took place in Congress policies in its five year rule. It acquired an image of being pro-poor, pro-farmer, and pro-backward classes, while at the same time catering to the interests of the rich. The continuity in the Congress’ strategy combined development with welfare. In its two and half decades of history, the TDP could be seen passing through three major phases. In the first phase which was during the tenure of NTR, the emphasis was on Telugu self-respect and populist schemes. There was a major policy shift toward liberalization of the state economy in the TDP regime during the mid-1990s with its leader N. Chandrababu Naidu. One of the significant aspects of


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this change was the move away from agriculture to an emphasis on the new economy. As a result, the agrarian sector and related economic activity suffered neglect leading to a rural crisis. But this period saw a perceptible growth of the IT sector leading to an expansion of employment opportunities to urban youth. The regime evoked contrasting images. On the one hand, it acquired the image of being an IT savvy regime, while on the other as notoriously nonresponsive to the suicides of farmers and weavers. In the 2009 assembly election, the unfolding of the third phase in the history of the TDP is reminiscent of its first phase of populism. In this election, the TDP made promises like free color TV to poor families, Cash Transfer Scheme, etc. This was a major departure from the image the TDP under Naidu leadership has acquired and this volte face was not convincing to the electorate as is clear from the electoral outcome. The major weakness of the TDP in this election was its failure to formulate a political agenda that could weave the populist promises into a convincing alternative to the Congress. In its eight years of existence, the TRS carved out a space for itself as the only party that has consistently advocated the Telangana demand for a separate state. It has displayed three limitations: first strategic, second spatial, and third sociological. Strategically, the party has largely confined itself to elections and lobbying in the corridors of power for the realization of the Telangana demand without much effort at building a mass movement. In spatial terms, its growth has been limited to the northern Telangana districts and could not expand in the southern Telangana districts. In sociological terms though its social base includes different sections of society like youth, students, middle classes, and peasantry, the leadership has been identified with the dominant peasant castes of Velama and Reddy. The TRS had an alliance with the Congress in the 2004 elections and won five MP and 26 MLA seats with 16.9â•¯percent popular vote in Telangana. The resignation of Kalwakunta Chandrasekhar Rao (KCR) to his MP position in 2006 and his re-election with a majority of two lakh votes was shown as a demonstration of the popular aspiration for the Telangana State and the TRS as its organizational expression. The TRS sought to repeat it in 2008 by making the entire contingent of TRS MPs and MLAs to resign and recontest. This was designed as a prelude to the 2009 general election. But it boomeranged. In the

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by-election, in the place of 16 MLAs and four MPs,26 the TRS could retain only seven MLA and two MP seats as the Congress and TDP won five and four MLA seats and one MP seat each respectively. A major shock to the TRS in this election was the reduction of the party president KCR victory margin to a mere 15,000 vote. In electoral terms, the TRS’ performance in 2009 is poor compared to its performance in 2004.27 This time it won only 10 assembly seats out of 45 it contested and won only 9.43â•¯percent of the popular vote. In 2004, the TRS had its electoral presence in almost all the northern Telangana district; Adilabad (3), Karimnagar (5), Nizamabad (3), Medak (4), Warangal (6), and Hyderabad (2). In the 2009 assembly election, it won from Adilabad and Karimnagar, three and four seats, respectively and one each from Nizamabad, Medak, and Warangal districts. The reduction in the electoral importance of the TRS is seen as the achievement of the YSR regime in marginalizing the Telangana demand in state politics.28 The PRP’s position in the state politics provides an opportunity to reflect on the dynamics of caste politics dominated by the Reddys and Kammas, on the one hand, and the relationship between politics and cinema on the other. Earlier NTR, emerging from the Telugu cinema field founded the TDP with the Kammas as the core social base and came to power. Apparently inspired by the NTR phenomenon, Chiranjeevi drew up a political agenda which was to forge an alliance of social forces consisting of the Kapus as the core constituency and including the numerous BCs. The political slogan of samajika nyayam (social justice) is seen as the ideological plank that would bring together all these communities who have been subjected to the domination of the Reddy and Kamma communities on a common political platform. The PRP’s failure to make a decisive impact on the electoral process is seen more as the failure of the party on the organization front than its ideological failure.29 The principal obstacle the PRP faced is related to the polarization of the political space between the Congress and TDP. This is in sharp contrast to the scene in the 1980s when NTR founded the TDP. Then, the Congress was in bad shape due to factionalism and low morale. In 2009, the Congress led by YSR was not only in a secure position but quite high in terms of popularity. The TDP retained its organizational strength and its enthusiastic cadre


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was hopeful of a come-back. In contrast, the PRP displayed all the weaknesses of a novice and absence of acumen to translate the goodwill and fan-following into organizational and electoral strength. The Left in its two decades of alliance politics with the TDP and later with the Congress has become an appendage of either of them alternatively or so it is popularly perceived. The Left after the state formation gradually declined in organizational and electoral terms but continued as a credible politico-ideological force. Its alliance with the TDP marked a decisive shift. Moving away from any serious political mobilization on social and economic issues and absorbed comprehensively in the electoral politics, the Left has lost its politicoideological identity.

Conclusion In a larger sense, the 2009 elections in AP point to a major inadequacy revolving around an ideological vacuity. The most visible characteristic is the reduction of the political process into a purely electoral numbers game. As a result of this obsession with elections, the core principles that could provide a meaningful political focus were not adequately recognized. In the absence of a viable alternative political agenda, the TDP’s electoral promises looked like a pale shadow of the Congress and therefore failed to evince popular acceptance. In spite of its social justice plank, civil society response and overwhelming popular reception, the PRP failed to evolve as a major player in state politics mainly due to its organizational inadequacies and ideological articulation. To cover it up it also resorted to populist appeals which only exposed its desperateness. The competitive populism engaged by the major contestants, the Congress, TDP, and PRP clearly demonstrate the political vacuity of these promises as well as desperateness emanating from a sense of electoral insecurity.30 An unfortunate development seen in this election is the marginalization of civil society initiatives. AP has a strong presence of civil society. Since the 1980s, civil society organizations have shown a concern and also played a visible role in the electoral process.31 In the 2004 elections, they played a key role in bringing the agrarian crisis onto the electoral agenda, building a critique of the TDP regime’s

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liberalization policies, and thus influencing the electoral outcome. The 2009 elections in this respect represent a disturbing deviation. Moreover, all those voices identified as authentic civil society ones have been co-opted and subsumed by political parties, the most visible dimension being the joining of the Dalit and backward caste activists in the PRP. Further, the media, print and electronic, with their widespread network and powerful presence, were so sharply divided along party lines that the sense of objectivity they were supposed to display was absent, and the allegations of financial and political links deprived the media of their credibility. The reconfiguration of the civil society, media, and political party relationship has led to the weakening of democratic checks. They made the Election Commission, which is a branch of the government, look like the exclusive and all pervasive guardian of the democratic electoral process. It is suggested that the 2009 elections are marked by a shift from identity politics to development and good governance. But the experience of AP clearly shows that to counter-pose development to identity as the driving force of politics in AP is misplaced. The 2009 election, partly due to the contextual change brought about by the PRP, has seen an active and competitive mobilization on the basis of caste identity. Caste identity along with enhanced expenditure on development and welfare, thanks to the increased state revenue, played a key role in the Congress strategy. An important change observed in this election pertains to the changing party dynamics. While the TDP and PRP are regional parties, even a national party like Congress projected a “regionalist” character with YSR acting as its supremo. This factor undoubtedly played a key role in the party’s electoral performance. Thus the increased autonomy of the state Congress, which allowed it to evolve a regionally distinct mode of articulation of politics of identity, focusing on development and populist mobilization, facilitated the electoral victory of the Congress.

Notes 1. For an analysis of the discourses in the 2004 election, see K. Srinivasulu, “Political Articulation and Policy Discourse in Elections, Andhra Pradesh, 2004,” Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. XXXIX, No. 34, August 21, 2004.


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â•‡ 2. Ibid. â•‡ 3. This is managed by the Emergency Management Research Institute (EMRI), launched at the initiative of Ramalinga Raju of Satyam Computers on the model of public–private partnership, with 95â•¯percent of the cost met by the state government. The immense popularity of this project is evident from the fact the EMRI now runs 108 ambulance services in nine states. With the fall of Satyam Computers, it has been taken over by GVK group. â•‡ 4. K. Srinivasulu, Caste, Class, and Social Articulation in Andhra Pradesh, India: Mapping Differential Regional Trajectories (London: Overseas Development Institute, 2002). â•‡ 5. All newspapers reported this phenomenon of unrestrained electoral spending. It is also an election when candidates who have made big money in speculative enterprises have entered into elections. See, for instance a front page report that in the first phase of polling there was “an expenditure of `â•›10 crores in some constituencies and `â•›5 crores in 50 constituencies,” in “Dabbu to the power of dabbu” (Money to the power of Money), Andhra Jyothi (Hyderabad), (Telugu daily), April 18, 2009. â•‡ 6. Walter Hauser, and Wendy Singer, “The Democratic Rite: Celebration and Participation in the Indian Elections,” Asian Survey, Vol. 26, No. 9, September 1986. â•‡ 7. According to the AP Human Development Report 2007, AP’s tax revenue asâ•¯percentage of GSDP has increased from 5.2â•¯percent in 1995–96 to 10.1â•¯percent in 2007–08 (Revised Estimate or RE). AP’s total revenue (including central transfers) has increased from 12 to 14â•¯percent of GSDP during 1995–96 to 2004–05 to 18â•¯percent of GSDP in 2007–1998 (RE). See, Andhra Pradesh Human Development Report 2007, (Hyderabad: CESS, 2008) p. 43. â•‡ 8. S.V. Srinivas, Megastar: Chiranjeevi and Telugu Cinema after NT Rama Rao (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009). â•‡ 9. Interview with Tankasala Ashok, editor, Telugu daily Vaartha and with journalists in various places. It is said that even some candidates sponsored surveys in their constituencies to know the pulse of the people and program their campaign on the basis of the survey findings (Field notes). 10. Various news reports in Andhra Jyothi, Eenadu, and Vaartha (Hyderabad editions). 11. The preponderance of the members of this community in the ministry and nominated positions is emphasized in “Agrakulala Guppitlo Adhikaram” (Power in Grip of the Upper Castes), Bahujana Keratalu (A Telugu monthly magazine), April, 2009. Also, interviews with K. Kondal Rao, B.C. Mitrulu, June 14, 2009 at Hyderabad. 12. Field notes, Ponnur, Guntur, May, 2009. 13. Andhra Jyothi (Telugu daily, Hyderabad) May 17, 2009. 14. Indian Express (Hyderabad) May 18, 2009. 15. Andhra Jyothi (Telugu Daily, Hyderabad) May 17 and 18, 2009. 16. Interviews with CPI(M) activists, Field notes, June, 2009. 17. CSDS, Delhi, as part of its NES has been conducting election surveys at the national and state levels since 1996.

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18. The Hindu. “How India Voted,” The Hindu (Hyderabad) May 26, 2009, p. 2. 19. Ibid., p. 4. 20. For analysis of this phenomenon, refer to, K. Srinivasulu, Note 4. 21. K. Srinivasulu, 2007. “SC Reservation, Dalit Movement and the Policy Questions;” Presented at the National Seminar on Future of Reservation Policy in India in Indian Institute of Public Administration (IIPA), New Delhi, July 13–14. 22. Writing about the Congress rule in the state, G. Ram Reddy thus characterized the Congress strategy; see Ram Reddy. “The Politics of Accommodation: Class, Class and Dominance in Andhra Pradesh,” in Francine R. Frankel and M.S.A. Rao (eds), Dominance and State Power in Modern India, Vol. I (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 279–86. 23. There is an overwhelming consensus on this interpretation of the regime. Interviews with BC, SC activists, and journalists. Field notes, May–June, 2009. 24. Similar patterns of regionalized behavior could be observed in other national parties as well. For an interesting case of the regionalization of the Hindutva agenda in the context of Rajasthan, see Rob Jenkins, “Rajput Hindutva, Caste Politics, Regional identity and Hindu Nationalism in Contemporary Rajasthan,” in Thomas Blom Hansen and Christopher Jaffrelot (eds), The BJP and the Compulsions of Politics in India (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998). 25. This may, however, change because of the possibility of intensification of factionalism in the aftermath of the untimely death of YSR in a helicopter crash in September 2009. 26. Out of the 26 MLAs and five MPs who won on TRS tickets, 10 MLAs and one MP became rebels and therefore they did not resign. 27. The only challenge that the TRS could have faced was from the Nava Telangana party, which like TRS earlier was formed by a break away group from the TDP at the time of the 2009 election, but just before the 2009 elections merged in the PRP. 28. The dominant tendency to interpret popular support to the Telangana movement in terms of the electoral performance of the TRS is erroneous. There are a wide variety of civil society associations and cultural organizations also articulating the issue, some of which differ with and are in fact positioned against the TRS. It is instructive to maintain a distinction between the politics of movement and electoral politics. Therefore, the electoral decline of the TRS in the 2009 elections should not be described as the marginalization of the Telangana issue. 29. This is the view of the Dalit bahujan activists and intellectuals. Field notes, Hyderabad, Ponnur, and Vijayawada, May–July, 2009. 30. Even committed TDP activists admit that their populist promises were seen to be desperate attempts to woo the electorate but were not driven by genuine public motives. The popular apprehension of the TDP is grounded in its earlier track record. 31. The most well-known case is their role in setting the pro-prohibition agenda in the 1994 assembly elections.


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Chapter 15

Bihar Identity Politics Recycled: 2009 Lok Sabha Election in Bihar Binoy Shanker Prasad

The 2009 Lok Sabha election in Bihar turned out to be a referendum on the four-year old ruling coalition government. Voters were generally not enthusiastic about the alliance forged on election eve between Lalu Yadav of the RJD and Ram Vilas Paswan of the LJP. Thus Nitish Kumar, the provincial CM, skillfully steered the NDA of the JD(U) and the BJP to a resounding electoral success. A combination of speedy developmental effort, social engineering, and a strategic positioning of candidates in redrawn parliamentary constituencies of Bihar were responsible for the landslide NDA victory.1 The election results of 2009 indicated a remarkable trend in the politics of Bihar: the voters could not always be couched into voting along caste lines. It could also not be asserted with certainty that the state was hopelessly ungovernable. Essential elements of the socioeconomic structure remained intact in Bihar, as well as signs of change on the horizon.

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Realignment of Political Forces and Personalities The JD(U)–BJP Alliance and Placement of Candidates The political partnership in Bihar between the JD(U) and the BJP held steady in its fourth year and reflected well on the stability of the state government. By tradition, nominations of candidates for elections are decided by party leaders in the capital cities and not by members of the parties in the parliamentary constituencies. Near absence of inner-party democracy was a given fact and party operatives managed any dissension very skillfully, mostly in favor of their party bosses. There were, thus, relatively fewer resignations, defections, and realignments after the battle lines were drawn. On the NDA side, the JD(U) contested 24 seats and the BJP ran in the remaining 16 constituencies.

Skirmishes within the RJD and the JD(U) Ranks The caste composition of the OBCs, the support base of the two main rival parties, the RJD and the JD(U), has been the same. However, within the OBCs, the two parties were identified with the castes of their respective leaders: the Yadavs (Lalu Yadav) and the Kurmis (Nitish Kumar). Criss-crossing of ranks and file between the two parties was, therefore, very convenient. George Fernandes, one-time patriarch of the earlier versions of the JD(U) and a former convener of the NDA and Digvijay Singh, a former union minister and MP were not given JD(U) tickets from Muzaffarpur and Banka, respectively. Fernandes was denied a ticket because the party leaders decided he was too sick to be a viable candidate and Digvijay was not given a ticket from Banka because he was a sitting JD(U) member of the Rajya Sabha from Jharkhand. According to Sharad Yadav, the party president, the caste profile of Banka had also changed.2 George Fernandes and Digvijay Singh, however, went against their party’s decision and contested as independent candidates. Kailash Baitha, whose Bagaha

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reserved seat had been declared as an open category seat, also lost his own nomination bid. Lalan Paswan, a JD(U) MLA quit his party and that of the Assembly to accept nomination from the RJD. Lalu fielded him against the Congress nominee in Sasaram, Meira Kumar. Paswan, resigned from the JD(U) along with two ministers from Nitish Kumar’s cabinet: Nitish Mishra and Nagmani. They protested the manner in which party tickets were distributed. Nagmani, who belonged to the CM’s twin caste, Kushwaha (Koeri) wanted a party ticket from Ujiarpur, a newly created constituency dominated by his own caste.3 Ram Badan Roy was another leader of the JD(U) who quit the party before the nomination and joined the RJD. The RJD rewarded him by nominating him as its candidate in Munger. There were defections from the RJD to JD(U) as well. Jai Narayan Nishad, a former union minister, quit the RJD to become a JD(U) candidate from Muzaffarpur. Mangani Lal Mandal, another RJD member of the Rajya Sabha quit the party and joined the JD(U) because he was not given a Lok Sabha ticket. These cases of defection represented the superficiality of political parties and their “top-down system” of recruitment. In the absence of inner-party democracy, both the candidates and the leaders were not accountable to their constituents. This malady, however, is not limited to identity-based regional parties alone.

Rift in the UPA: The RJD–LJP Alliance and Placement of Candidates Lalu Yadav and Ram Vilas Paswan, the founder leaders of the RJD and the LJP were members of the UPA headed by the Congress party president Sonia Gandhi. Both Lalu Yadav and Ram Vilas Paswan were ministers in the UPA cabinet headed by Manmohan Singh. At the center, the two leaders from Bihar were always at logger-heads. But, following the announcement of elections, the two leaders entered into a quick adjustment of seats without taking the Congress into confidence. They set aside only three seats for the Congress. The Congress was obviously displeased with what its rank and file viewed as a backroom manipulation to marginalize the Congress.

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Congress, at the initiative of Rahul and Sonia Gandhi, eventually decided to do it alone in Bihar and fielded its candidates in almost all constituencies. Without breaking the UPA formally, the three parties became rivals in Bihar. The RJD fielded its candidates in 28 constituencies and left 12 for the LJP. The RJD–LJP alliance decided to put up candidates in all the three seats held by the Congress in the previous Lok Sabha. In 2004, the RJD had contested 22 seats and left eight seats to the LJP and four to the Congress. One seat was allotted each to the NCP of Sharad Pawar and the CPI(M). The three Congress MPs who represented Bihar in 2004 were Meira Kumar, Sasaram (SC), Shakeel Ahmed, Madhubani, and Nikhil Kumar, Aurangabad. Against them, Lalu fielded Lalan Paswan, Abdul Bari Siddiqui, and Shakeel Ahmed Khan.4

Constituencies Shared between the RJD and the LJP After the RJD and the LJP had placed their nominees, their candidates in the field looked as follows:5 In Siwan, Hena Shahab, wife of the former RJD MP, Mohammed Shahabuddin, represented the RJD. In Munger, Ram Badan Roy replaced Jay Prakash Narayan Yadav. Patna Sahib, a new constituency, earlier represented by Ram Kripal Yadav (RJD) went to RJD’s Vijay Kumar. He had to contest against a BJP VIP Shatrughan Sinha, a former movie-star, a union minister and a Rajya Sabha member. Madhepura, where Lalu himself was a candidate in 2004 and lost to JD(U)’s Sharad Yadav, was given to Professor Ravindra Charan Yadav. In Maharajganj, the RJD replaced its 2004 candidate with a Rajput, Uma Shankar Singh to take on Prabhunath Singh of the JD(U). RJD’s list also included loyalists who had been given ministerial positions in Manmohan Singh’s cabinet. They were: Taslimuddin (Kishanganj), Raghuvansh Prasad Singh (Vaishali), Akhilesh Prasad Singh (Purvi Champaran), Kanti Singh (Karakat), Raghunath Jha (Valmikinagar), and M.A.A. Fatmi (Darbhanga). Jai Prakash Narayan Yadav, a 2004 winner from Munger was moved to Banka. The incumbent Lok Sabha members of the RJD re-nominated were Sitaram Singh (Sheohar), Sitaram Yadav (Sitamarhi), Devendra Prasad Yadav


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(Jhanjharpur), Alok Kumar Mehta (Ujiarpur), R.K. Rana (Khagaria), and Ramjee Manjhi (Gaya, SC). Lalu himself chose Saran as one of the two constituencies (including Patliputra) to contest from. According to caste-wise analysis, out of 28 seats Lalu apportioned to his party, two were reserved (Gaya and Sasaram) for SCs. From the remaining 26 open seats, Lalu retained as many as a dozen for his own caste men, five were given to Muslims, and three to Rajputs. A mix of others (Brahmin, Bhumihar, and EBC) claimed the rest. Allocation of almost 65â•¯percent seats to Yadavs and Muslims qualified the RJD once again to be the guarantor of the Muslim–Yadav interest in Bihar. In Ram Vilas Paswan’s share of 12 seats fell two reserved constituencies for SCs. He took Hajipur himself and his brother, Ram Chandra Paswan had Samastipur. The rest went to a mix of castes including Brahmin (Paschim Champaran and Purnea), Muslim (Araria and Katihar), Yadav (Supaul), and EBC (Muzaffarpur). Arrah, Begusarai, Nalanda, and Nawada were the other four constituencies where the LJP fielded its candidates. A movie personality, Prakash Jha was fielded from Paschim Champaran. Prakash Jha had made outstanding movies exposing the crimes and the mafia connections of Lalu’s administration. By a coincidence, he ended up on the side of the political coalition co-headed by Lalu. In 2009, the NCP and the Communist Parties were not partners of either Lalu Yadav or Ram Vilas Paswan. There were two women, Hena Shahab in Siwan and Kanti Singh in Karakat, and one Veena Devi in Nawada in the lists of Lalu and Ram Vilas Paswan. Similarly, there were two women Meena Singh in Arrah and Ashwamedh Devi in Ujiarpur, and one Rama Devi in Sheohar in the lists of the JD(U) and BJP, respectively. Women were not adequately represented in any political party.

The Outcome The caste-wise and Muslim result of the winners was as follows:6 Upper Caste: Rajput (9), Bhumihar (4), Brahman (1), and Kayastha (1)

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Backward Caste: Yadav (7), Bania (2), Kurmi (1), Koeri (1) EBC (5) Muslims (3) SC (6)

The Parties’ Performance in Bihar Against the UPA National Momentum: A Land Slide Mandate for the NDA Nationally, the Congress party, under the joint leadership of Sonia Gandhi, Rahul Gandhi, and PM Manmohan Singh scored its best performance in 25 years. The contribution to its tally from Bihar, however, was only two—Kishanganj and Sasaram (SC)—one short of what it had in 2004. However, its share of votes increased from 4â•¯percent to 11â•¯percent. By comparison, in UP, the Congress seats went from 8 to 21. Whereas the Congress rejoiced at the decision of not having any adjustments with the RJD in Bihar, Lalu admitted that it was “a mistake.” Even after the election, the UPA was not formally dissolved and Lalu and Ram Vilas, in principle, retained their alliance with the Congress. The other coalition, the NDA, with a total of 162 seats in the last Lok Sabha, did not do well nationally. However, two of its constituents the BJP and the JD(U) won 32 out of 40 seats in Bihar. The JD(U) won in 20 out of 24 constituencies and the BJP won in 12 out of 16 seats they contested. They registered a success rate of 83 and 75â•¯percent, respectively. Two seats, Banka and Siwan, went to the rebel independents. Bihar had no contribution to the Third Front, mainly the Left parties, and the Fourth Front of local parties. In the 2004 elections in Bihar, the NDA had won only 11 seats, five by the BJP and six by the JD(U). The RJD had contested 26 seats and won 22. Its UPA partners, LJP and the Congress, as mentioned, contested eight and four seats, respectively, and bagged four and three. In 2009, the RJD almost met the fate of the CPI(M) in West Bengal whereas Nitish Kumar rivaled Orissa’s Naveen Patnaik in terms of transforming the nature of state politics.


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A Contingent of State Legislators Win for the JD(U) and the BJP Fifteen members of the 243 seat Bihar Legislative Assembly became elected to the Lok Sabha. That accounted for 37.5â•¯percent of the total Lok Sabha seats from Bihar, a record believed to be unprecedented. The JD(U) sent 14 of its state legislators to contest the election out of which 11 made it to the Lok Sabha. Also, all the three MLAs fielded by the BJP came out victorious. The RJD put up eight MLAs in the race but only one, Jagadanand Singh (Buxar), could win. The Congress fielded two MLAs and the LJP one, but all of them lost. In all 29 sitting legislators (including one member of the Legislative Council, the upper chamber) were in the race.

Constituencies Where Nitish Kumar and JD(U) had to Face a Show Down Brishen Patel and Damodar Raut were the two ministers of Nitish Kumar who were fielded from Siwan and Banka, but they could not make it. Also, among the unsuccessful was Vijay Kumar Shukla alias Munna Shukla, a JD(U) MLA from Vaishali. Shukla had the image of being a criminal politician, but not convicted, under the patronage of Nitish. In Siwan and Banka, the JD(U)’s official candidates faced challenge from two rebels, Om Prakash Yadav and Digvijay Singh. Both of them won. Maharajganj had been a formidable fortress of Prabhunath Singh, a tough JD(U) candidate with criminal antecedents. A fraternal Rajput candidate put up by Lalu trounced him.

The Ignominious Defeat of the RJD–LJP Alliance A Verdict on the Incumbent UPA Ministers from Bihar Except for Lalu Yadav and Raghuvansh Prasad Singh, the voters rejected every minister from Bihar in the out-going cabinet of

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Manmohan Singh. Lalu lost from one of the two constituencies he contested, Raghuvansh Singh scraped through by a little over 20, 000 votes. Kanti Singh and M.A.A. Fatmi could not win from Karakat and Darbhanga, respectively. In Valmiki Nagar, the RJD minister Raghunath Jha secured a humiliating fourth position. Ram Sundar Das, a former CM, defeated Ram Vilas Paswan of the LJP. Ram Vilas once was in the Guinness book of world records for his margin of victory. The Congress Party minister from Madhubani, Dr Shakeel Ahmad, was also routed. Meira Kumar from Sasaram was the only Congress candidate who was helped by the national momentum in favor of the UPA. A former member of parliament from a Delhi constituency and a daughter of the Congress leader, Jagjivan Ram, Meira Kumar became Speaker in the new Lok Sabha.

The Waning Stardom of Lalu among the Yadavs: Patliputra The waning political stardom of Lalu Yadav was evident from many angles. In 2004, he had won from the two constituencies of Chapra and Madhepura. This time around, on April 17, 2009, a day after the first round of elections in which Lalu had contested from Saran, he filed his nomination election papers in Patliputra. For his next choice, he did not go back to Madhepura where he might have had to face his bête noire, Sharad Yadav, the chief of the JD(U). In 2004, Lalu had convincingly defeated Sharad Yadav in Madhepura by 70,000 votes. A contrary situation in 2009 presented itself, i.e. the Yadavs would enthusiastically vote for a candidate of their own caste, if available, against Lalu’s nominees. Lalu could no longer claim monopoly over the Yadav votes. In Patliputra, the JD(U) fielded a former RJD MP, Ranjan Prasad Yadav, who trounced his old friend Lalu by over 23,000 votes. The race for Patliputra turned somewhat bizarre when the Congress, in a late move, opposed Lalu with his friend and former RJD MP, Vijay Singh Yadav. Earlier, he ironically was the first to announce that Lalu would be the RJD candidate from Patliputra and had begun campaigning for him.


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RJD Turns into “Rajput Janata Dal”: Buxar and Maharajganj It also turned out that, except for Lalu himself, all the other three winners from the RJD were Rajputs. It was an unintended outcome of the RJD’s electioneering. The party which stood for the backwards, especially the Yadavs and the Muslims, had mostly upper caste Rajputs as its MPs. Of the four seats the RJD secured, Vaishali and Saran were retained by the RJD. The other two, Buxur and Maharajganj, were taken away from the BJP and JD(U), respectively. In Buxur, the sitting BJP MP, Lal Muni Choubey lost by a narrow margin of 2,238 votes. The spoilers were two other candidates, one from the BSP and the other an independent. Buxur was a unique case where all the top four candidates, with votes in six figures, were within the margin of 9,639 votes. In Maharajganj, the RJD was able to humble a very strong JD(U) incumbent, Prabhu Nath Singh, by a margin of only 2,797 votes, despite the fact that the Congress candidate sliced off more than 80,000 votes. In a triangular contest, all the three candidates were Rajputs by caste. The RJD had the advantage of getting a faction of the Rajput votes and the rest.

Split in the UPA Proved Costly: Sitamarhi and Madhubani In Sitamarhi, Sitaram Yadav, the RJD winner of 2004, was relegated to the third place just as in Madhubani, Dr Shakeel Ahmad, the 2004 Congress winner was pushed to third position. In Sitamarhi, a relatively less known Congress candidate, Samir Kumar Mahaseth scored the second position and in Madhubani, the RJD nominee and the state party chief, Abdulbari Siddiqi, came second. If the RJD and the Congress had closed their ranks and maintained the UPA intact, they might have done better. In Sitamarhi, it appeared that the Yadavs had deserted a Yadav candidate sponsored by Lalu and preferred a Yadav fielded by the JD(U). In Madhubani, on the other hand, Muslim votes seemed to have been shared by the two Muslim candidates fielded by the RJD and the Congress.

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Left Politics For the first time, three major Communist parties in Bihar—CPI, CPI(M) and CPI(ML)(L)—formed a joint front called United Left Bloc (ULB) and contested 32 constituencies. In the past, the CPI had allied with the Congress and RJD. The result under the new “left unity” was very discouraging. Out of 31 constituencies where they put up a joint candidate, they could gather votes in six figures only in Arrah and Begusarai. In Arrah, Arun Singh, a CPI(ML)(L) candidate came third with 115,966 votes and Shatrughan Prasad Singh, a former CPI MP, was the runner up in Begusarai with 164,843 votes. In Patliputra and Siwan also, the CPI(ML)(L) ranked third but with far less votes. It registered fourth in Jahanabad, Karakat, Katihar, and Patna Sahib. The CPI stood fourth in Madhepura and Madhubani. The CPI(M) was at the fourth position in Paschim Champaran. The CPI(ML)(L), a former radical party with Maoist (Naxalite) leanings, recently renounced its policy of boycotting elections and was relatively new to electoral politics. Impressively, this party performed better than its two partners, the CPI and the CPI(M). The CPI and the CPI(M) have been older communist parties and did not share the violent methods of the Maoists. CPI(M)’s leadership, in its post-election assessment, admitted that the voters did not perceive the Third Front as a “credible and viable alternative.”7 The CPI(M), earlier a part of the UPA, was instrumental in getting certain progressive legislation passed by the central government. But, it suffered a serious setback in its core territory, West Bengal, at the hands of the regional TMC led by Mamata Banerjee who campaigned on the “issue of violence” and exposing the “Marxist goondas.”8 The image of the Left parties had apparently changed from being reform oriented progressive parties to power seeking status quo parties. Even the Naxalite parties, which had educated and ideologically committed cadre in the 1960s, now had the reputation of being kidnappers and extortionists.9 The CPI(M), entrenched in power in West Bengal since 1977 did not have much of an impact in Bihar, but the Maoists enjoyed some following in pockets of Bihar and Jharkhand.


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The CPI(ML)(L) broke ranks with its more radical Naxalite partners which boycotted elections and operated violently in many parts of India. As a consequence, the CPI(ML)(L) has been a target of attacks and periodically lost its cadres in the bloody fight for influence. In 2008, the Maoist communist party in Nepal temporarily rode to power through the ballot. It is important to note that Maoists on the two sides of their joint border influenced the politics of each other and aimed at creating a “red corridor” extending to Andhra Pradesh in south India.10

The BSP as an Emerging Player The BSP, led by Mayawati Devi the CM of UP has its main supportbase among Dalits. But it also extends its influence among other castes through a share in ticket distribution. Mayawati, Lalu Yadav, and Ram Vilas Paswan in the preceding years looked upon themselves as potential prime ministerial candidates. Their ambition was based on their regional strength coming from identity politics. Mayawati and Ram Vilas vied with each other to claim the leadership of the Dalits. In 2009, Mayawati fielded candidates in almost all constituencies of Bihar. Tickets were given to all sections—Dalits, backwards, Muslims, women, and to upper castes as she had done in Uttar Pradesh. However, her party could not win a single seat. In one constituency, Sheohar, its Muslim candidate Anwarul Haque secured the second position but had less than half the votes of the winner. In six places, the BSP candidates came third. In as many as eight constituencies, it finished fourth. Among six reserved constituencies for the SCs, the BSP finished third at one place (Gopalganj) and fourth at two. Biharis who voted for the BSP did so because they felt connected to local candidates and not because they considered Mayawati as their national leader. As a rival of Ram Vilas and Lalu, Mayawati was an outsider who could not rally much support with the local voters. In future, however, the BSP seems to have considerable potential as a significant player in alliance politics in Bihar. As its numbers suggest, it did much better than the established Left parties.

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Territories of Politicians with Criminal Records The Saga of Criminals’ Integration in Electoral Politics of Bihar In electoral politics, Bihar would have a unique record where many criminal elements first got into politics, participated successfully in races for a period, and then were tossed off by the voters. The rise and decline of the criminal gangsters in Bihar politics has been a subject of independent research and analysis. Awareness among voters, persistent exposure of the criminal elements by the media and the willingness of the state organs, especially the judiciary and the election commission, to play by the book had a tremendous impact on the 2009 election results. Generally, the total number of tainted MPs increased from 128 in the 14th Lok Sabha to 150 in 2009. In 2004, there were 55 legislators with serious criminal records; in 2009, the number jumped to 72.11 UP topped the list of states sending MPs with criminal history, followed by Maharashtra, and Bihar being the third. Among political parties, the BJP had the maximum number of representatives with criminal records. Out of 116 BJP members elected, 42 were booked at one time under criminal charges. The party next to the BJP in carrying this distinction was the Congress. Out of 205 of its MPs, 41 carried some kind of criminal history. The JD(U) came 5th with seven tainted MPs. In Bihar, reputed criminals had joined the ranks of politicians.12 They could run for political positions because they were not convicted by a court of law. They first intimidated voters and engaged in criminal activities. Later on, they threatened the elites of Bihar including high administrative officials, some of whom were even murdered by the political mafia. The increasing lawlessness of the 15-year period of Lalu–Rabri regime came to be known as the Jungle Raj. When the “criminalization of politics” got out of hand, the Election Commission became pro-active and began close scrutiny of candidates. It referred suspected criminal candidates to judicial courts to get clearance. The government of Nitish Kumar also confronted the challenge of


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criminals’ participation in politics while tackling the law and order situation in the province. It put cases against criminal politicians on a faster track and obtained timely results. About a dozen politicians, including MPs and legislators, who had been convicted and sentenced by the designated “fast track” courts in Bihar after 2005, were rendered ineligible. According to election laws, anyone convicted of a crime and sentenced to more than a two-year-long jail term was barred from contesting elections for six years after completion of the sentence.

JD(U)-sponsored Tainted Candidates In spite of this, many candidates with criminal records, not clearly convicted, still continued to contest. Even Nitish’s party allegedly gave tickets to tainted characters. Prabhunath Singh (Maharajganj), Vijay Kumar also known as Munna Shukla (Vaishali), and Jagdish Sharma (Jahanabad) were the leading names in the JD(U) list with criminal records. In Vaishali, Munna Shukla, a JD(U) legislator who unsuccessfully challenged Raghuvansh Prasad Singh, was accused of murdering a former Gopalganj district magistrate, G. Krishnaiah. He also was an alleged complicit in the murder of a former minister, Brij Bihari Prasad. However, Munna Shukla could not match the resources of the RJD candidate who happened to be an incumbent MP and a minister in the UPA government. Munna won an impressive 262,049 votes as against 283,454, a difference of only 21,405. Jagdish Sharma, another JD(U) legislator from Jehanabad was said to be involved in a multi-million-rupee fodder scam and several criminal cases. But compared to his RJD rival, he seems to be a junior player in his alleged criminal activities. He was locked in a fight with Surendra Prasad Yadav, an RJD legislator who had more than a dozen criminal cases against him. He was reputed as the Magadh Samrat (emperor) for his terror in the Maoist-affected Magadh division. Nonetheless, his loss to Jagdish Sharma (213,442 to 234,769) had only a tiny 21,327 votes separating them. Here, the presence of a Congress candidate walking away with 48,487 votes did make a difference for the RJD. If there had been an alliance between the RJD and the Congress, Surendra Yadav might have closed the gap. The candidate fielded by the CPI(ML)(L) came fourth with 35,496 votes.

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Convicted Politicians Sponsor their Wives as Proxy Candidates Mohammad Shahabuddin, Anand Mohan, Surajbhan Singh, and Rajiv Ranjan also known as Pappu Yadav, following their conviction and sentence to life imprisonment moved the court for permission to contest elections, but were disallowed. All four of them managed to field their wives as candidates from different parties. That all the four women lost is a testimony to the awareness of the Bihari voters.13 Let us survey the four constituencies briefly: Siwan: Mohammad Shahabuddin was reported to have supervised the campaign of his wife, Hena Shahab, from prison. In a special show of support, Lalu Yadav escorted Hena to the office where she filed her nomination papers. Despite having an astounding tally of 172,764 votes, Hena was defeated by a JD(U) rebel candidate.  Sheohar: Lovely Anand, wife of a former JD(U) MP, Anand Mohan, ran as a nominee of the Congress party. Voters of Sheohar relegated her to the 4th position with 81,479 only. A BJP candidate, Rama Devi, defeated her.  Nawada: Veena Devi, wife of Surajbhan Singh, a convicted MP of the LJP, was a candidate from Nawada where she came second with 95,691 votes. The BJP’s Bhola Singh who had 130,608 votes trounced her.  Supaul: Pappu Yadav, another criminal-politician and a former RJD MP from Purnia put up his wife Ranjeeta Ranjan, an LJP MP in the last Lok Sabha. On the eve of election, she quit the LJP and joined the Congress. She came second with 147,602 votes, far ahead of her LJP competitor. The JD(U) winner, Vishwa Mohan Kumar got more than twice the votes secured by Ranjeeta. Pappu Yadav also fielded his mother Shanti Priya from his own former constituency, Purnia. She came second with 176,725 votes as a Congress party-supported independent candidate. It is important to note that the vast number of votes secured by candidates sponsored by criminals confirmed the level of influence they had in the constituencies. 


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Under the leadership of Sonia and Rahul Gandhi, the Congress party expected to be revived in Bihar. But the party apparatus apparently took short-cuts and extended support to tainted elements. To add to the list, the Congress nomination for Paschim Champaran went to Anirudh Prasad also known as Sadhu Yadav, the brother-in-law of Lalu Yadav. Sadhu Yadav, it may be recalled, was one of the chief beneficiaries of the Lalu–Rabri regime and although not convicted, he was alleged to be involved in many criminal cases. He was also an accused in the Bihar flood scam. Other Congress candidates with criminal backgrounds were Tarkeshwar Singh (Maharajganj) and Shamim Akhtar (Valmikinagar). Among the RJD candidates, M.A.A. Fatmi (Darbhanga) and Mohammad Taslimuddin (Kishanganj), the two central ministers in the outgoing government faced serious criminal charges. The LJP, on its part, fielded Rama Singh from Arrah who had criminal charges against him. Zakir Anwar, the LJP candidate from Araria, was also alleged to have been involved in criminal cases. Even the CPI(ML) was not free from criminal elements. In Katihar, it put up its former legislator Mahboob Alam, an ex-fugitive.

The Strategies at Play Nitish Kumar’s Strategy Over the four years of his administration in Bihar, Nitish Kumar came to acquire the image of a relatively mild-mannered, result-oriented CM. People contrasted him with the image and rhetoric of Lalu Yadav. He was rightly credited with the victory of the NDA in Bihar. Unlike Naveen Patnaik of Orissa, he did not renounce his party’s alliance with the BJP. However, Nitish maintained a safe distance from the communal nationalistic platform of the BJP, criticized the anti-Muslim rhetoric of Varun Gandhi, and did not invite Narendra Modi, the CM of Gujarat, to campaign in Bihar.14 Nitish also did not endorse the BJP’s agenda of resurrecting the Ram Mandir issue. The strategy worked for the alliance. The Muslim population amounting

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to 16.5â•¯percent in Bihar accepted the JD(U)’s credential as a secular party. The BJP played a subservient role. The BJP leaders kept a low profile and did not use anti-Muslim rhetoric.

Developmental Strategies Combined with Social Engineering Ever since the formation of the NDA government in 2005, voters had noticed changes in Bihar. The image of politics and administration had improved. Within a short period, Nitish launched elaborate development cum reform programs. As a result, attendance in government offices increased, educational institutions resumed their functions, and law and order appeared to be improving. The election results of 2009, therefore, could be interpreted as an endorsement of Nitish’s administration even though members of parliament were elected to make laws at the center. By the end of 2010 when provincial elections were due, voters would have a chance to give their verdict on the performance of the state government. One key aspect of Nitish’s strategy was to maintain the message of development, and also secure the divisive caste or communal polarization in his favor. In the 15 years of the Lalu–Rabri regime, Lalu had given the impression that slogan shouting for developments or even developmental works as such did not get votes. In fact, in Lalu’s estimation, any discourse on development had the potential of giving rise to a “revolution of rising expectations,” that could prove electorally counter-productive. Therefore, Lalu always harped on the restoration of izzat (prestige) and perpetuated alliance-based identity politics he had so successfully built up over the years.15 When the RJD was defeated in the Vidhan Sabha election of 2005, the media characterized the result as a verdict against the anarchic Lalu–Rabri regime and a vote for developmental aspirations. Nitish strategically stayed on that message and worked hard to live up to the media image.16 Although development remained the major plank of his administration, he was nonetheless aware that development alone would not sustain his power base. He began to refashion new social alliances. Lalu and Ram Vilas had relied essentially on elite castes among the backwards and the Dalits. Also, by pushing aside


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the Congress party, the Lalu–Ram Vilas team had further distanced themselves from upper caste voters. In sharp contrast to their strategies, Nitish, by nurturing the alliance with the BJP, courted urban and upper caste voters. Nitish Kumar, a former associate of Lalu, must have concluded that Lalu lost in Bihar, not just because of bad governance, but also for under-valuing the importance of wider caste alliances. Lalu’s excessive reliance on the Muslim–Yadav alliance and his uninterrupted success at the power game had made him somewhat smug and complacent. In the process, he seemed to have abandoned “the policy of accommodation of the less assertive and less privileged caste groups.”17 Having gauged the political space, Nitish diligently embarked on his social engineering at three levels. Level I: Reinventing EBCs as a Sub-category Nitish Kumar devised an electoral strategy to beat Lalu at his own game of identity politics. He had the support base of his own caste, the Kurmis, a relatively prosperous backward cultivator caste group like the Yadavs. But, that was not enough. The Kurmis were not as dominant in number as Yadavs. Even upper caste support from the BJP was not sufficient to counter Lalu in Bihar politics. Nitish adopted a formula devised in the 1960s and 1970s by Karpoori Thakur, a former CM and mentor of both Lalu and Nitish, calling for special privileges for EBCs. The EBCs, according to an estimate, consisted of about 100 small and scattered castes and together with the Mahadalits (the lowest of the former untouchables) constituted 28–29â•¯percent of the total vote. Except for token representation, the EBCs were largely ignored in the Lalu–Rabri scheme of power sharing. Nitish mobilized EBCs by assuring them of 20â•¯percent reservations in jobs and panchayat bodies. Out of 25 seats contested by the JD(U), the party allocated tickets to four EBCs. The EBC’s enthusiasm, lying dormant after Karpoori’s death, was energized in NDA’s favor. Once accused of being anti-EBC by his opponents, Nitish had now emerged as their champion. Nitish also increased reservation for women in the panchayat bodies from 33 to 50â•¯percent. This policy package broke the Yadav stranglehold in rural areas.

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Level II: Creation of Mahadalit as a Sub-category Just as he brought about a division within the backward castes by propping up the EBCs, Nitish’s politics also sought to split the Dalits as a vote bank. He set up a Mahadalit Commission, so as to identify and extend special benefits to the most underprivileged among the Dalits. Chamars—who once owed allegiance to Jagjivan Ram and now arguably claimed by his daughter Meira Kumar, and the Paswans, another Dalit caste—owing allegiance to Ram Vilas Paswan were excluded from the Mahadalit community. There was a sense of disaffection among a large section of the Dalit community against Chamars and Paswans because these two influential castes allegedly appropriated all political patronage. Nitish cashed in on that discontent. He got 18 Dalit sub-castes grouped under the Mahadalit category and transferred resources and opportunities to them. Earlier, in a state mid-term election (Fatuha reserved seat), Nitish gave his party nomination to a Mahadalit in preference to a Paswan. Thus, the hitherto marginalized and neglected Mahadalit group felt empowered. Level III: Creation of Fault Lines between Muslims Nitish’s even bigger masterstroke was to split Muslims along “forward and backward” lines. He realized that given the large number of Muslims in almost every Lok Sabha constituency, he needed to split the Muslim vote bank.18 Nitish successfully exploited their differences. Pashmanda Muslims had been carrying on a campaign for recognition as a backward caste insisting that upper caste Muslims usurped all the spoils coming out of the Muslims’ association with the ruling RJD party. Backward Muslims had unsuccessfully been lobbying Lalu to improve their lot by accommodating them in the power structure. But Lalu operated on the calculation that if he could keep the powerful “forward” Muslims happy, he could continue to count on unquestioned support from Muslims in general. Nitish seized on this chasm and extended open support to the cause of the backward caste Muslims. He sent Ali Anwar and Dr Izaj Ali, leaders of the Pashmanda Muslim forum to the Rajya Sabha. In the


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process, Nitish incurred the displeasure of some of his upper caste Muslim supporters who were nursing their own political ambition. But, targeting a larger constituency, Nitish clearly weaned the backward Muslims away from Lalu Yadav and Ram Vilas Paswan. Additionally, among many other policies the Nitish government pursued to win over the hearts and minds of the Muslims was to provide compensation to the victims of the 1989 Bhagalpur riots. The sweeping success Nitish registered in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, therefore, owed a great deal to the combination of developmental effort and identity politics. Nitish’s development plank alone would have secured him a respectable number, but his landslide victory had much to do with his skilful intervention in the caste politics as well.

Conclusion Toward the end of the uninterrupted Lalu–Rabri regime from 1990–2005, Bihar had notoriously slipped into “the dark ages.” Because of scarcity and maladministration, people felt suffocated and depressed. Many Biharis migrated to other states. There was an aura of hopelessness. The situation did not improve even after a large contingent of RJD MPs led by Lalu had joined the central government in 2004. In fact, the RJD component of the UPA government was looked upon as a pressure group bent on extracting political concessions from the government. Lalu’s credibility suffered. His jester-like speeches did evoke laughter but people attended his rallies for entertainment and he could not energize the voters on his side. His claim to be a representative of the common man had begun to fade. In general, the public also had the impression that as a Central Minister Lalu had milked the Indian railways, the largest government sector. Aided by a section of the media, Lalu, however, projected himself to be a very profitable and efficient minister. Close to election time, Lalu and his colleagues did try to bring some developmental works in their constituencies.19 With the federal resources, the RJD looked forward to winning over a majority of the Lok Sabha seats in 2009 and dislodging the Nitish state government in 2010.

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The welcome change in the state administration after 2005 had breathed new life into Bihar politics. Although the vice of corruption in public life and financial pilferage did not show any sign of abatement, the law and order situation had drastically improved. The police had been relatively insulated from political influence, hospitals slowly resumed their function, teachers reported to the schools, roads were constructed, and developmental projects restarted. Above all, the CM worked his office hours and restored accountability to bureaucracy. All these elements were almost absent during the Lalu–Rabri period. Therefore, the 2009 Lok Sabha election in Bihar turned out to be a referendum on the performance of the government headed by Nitish. The confidence the voters had posed in the NDA government did not waver in four years, i.e., the anti-incumbency was not a factor. A very important contributory factor was that the majority of voters seemed to fear the prospect of a return of Lalu–Rabri’s dominance and, therefore, lowered their expectations of the state government. A case in point was the politics of the Mithila region in the aftermath of the Kosi river flood of August 2008. As many as eight Lok Sabha constituencies were badly affected by the flood. However, the flood victims as usual did not take out their anger against the state government. Contrasted with the Lalu–Rabri administration, the response of the NDA government to the calamity, people acknowledged, were satisfactory. Since the Nitish government was perceived as serious about developmental efforts in general, people seemed to be ready to give them an endorsement at the Lok Sabha election. NDA swept the Kosi region and the RJD–LJP alliance did not have any success.20

Did Opportunistic Defection Pay? All Depended on Who Had the Momentum Surveying the 2009 election results, it may be noticed that voters did not always punish the defectors. They spared the ones who were on the side of the winning coalition. For example, Ram Badan Rai, a Yadav and a JD(U) member of the state legislative council quit the party just before the elections to join and be rewarded with the RJD nomination from Munger. But the voters rejected him. Ramai Ram, who left RJD and joined the Congress, lost in Gopalganj and Dr Ashok Kumar


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of the same party was defeated in Samastipur. LJP’s Rama Singh lost from Arrah. But, on the other hand, Mangani Lal Mandal, an RJD Rajya Sabha member, quit the party and crossed over to the JD(U). Mangani won handily. The parties with an electoral wave in their favor could sweep unpopular candidates to victory. Based on past history, however, it can be prophesied that the politics of Bihar could easily take a sudden and unexpected turn. The familiar caste factor can very well shake the foundation of any social alliance and developmental effort. The 2009 Lok Sabha result was in contrast to what happened in 2004 when Lalu led the alliance with the LJP and the Congress and secured 29 out of 40 seats without accomplishing much development. In that round of elections, even the NDA’s star campaigner Nitish Kumar lost from Barh, a Lok Sabha constituency so well nurtured by him. The alliance of Lalu and Ram Vilas, with the aid of other social groups, could potentially stage a comeback in the future. A few subsequent bye-elections pointed the trend in that direction.

Fair System of Election In the end, an examination of the election process must help us understand their legitimacy. Massive election machinery is pressed into service to complete the process. The introduction of Electronic Voting Machines has reduced malpractices. The voters’ participation, even if it hovers below 50â•¯percent, is huge. However, by following the “First Past the Post” election method, the citizens of Bihar, like the rest of India, end up returning representatives who do not have the mandate of an absolute majority. The veracity of the representative system, therefore, comes into question. In the 12th Lok Sabha, as many as 41 of 54 candidates who won the Lok Sabha seats from Bihar had less than the combined votes of their next two opponents— the “B + C > A” factor.21 In 2009, the B + C > A factor was present in 23 out of a total of 40 seats. In 10 other cases, the combined votes of the next three candidates were greater than the winner’s, i.e., B + C + D > A. Only seven candidates had the distinction of securing votes more than the combined votes of the next three contestants, i.e., A > B + C + D.

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Seven winners fall into this category. A few examples underscore the unrepresentative nature of the winners. In Buxur, Jagadanand Singh of the RJD secured about 22â•¯percent of the total votes polled and won the election. In a multi-cornered contest, there were about 448,424 votes polled against Jagadanand Singh, a disapproval rate of 78â•¯percent. In Arrah, Meena Singh of the JD(U) had 212,726 (40â•¯percent) votes leaving the LJP and the CPI(ML)(L) to the second and third places with a combined vote of 253, 972. Likewise in Banka, Digvijay Singh with 185,762 votes registered a lead of 28,716 votes over his closest rival. But he secured only 29â•¯percent of the total votes polled and 451,520 votes against him were divided among nine of his opponents. In a different category, the number of votes polled by Sushil Kumar Singh, the winner (A) from Aurangabad, was greater than the combined votes of the next two candidates (B + C). However, if the votes of the third candidate (D) were added, the winner would drop far behind. Moreover, Sushil Kumar Singh had only 47â•¯percent of the votes polled as against 53â•¯percent polled by all his opponents combined. In a participatory majoritarian democracy, it can be argued that the winner must have 50â•¯percent and more of the total votes polled.22 The 2009 election results show that in more than 80â•¯percent of the constituencies in Bihar, the elected candidates did not have the endorsement of a vast majority of the voters. This is a problem endemic to many democracies around the world. In Canada, all such voters who are part of the majority and yet not the ones who voted for the winner are called “orphan voters”.23 The best course suggested is to have a run off between the two leading candidates following an open election. Election legitimacy would thereby be enhanced.

Notes 1. Constituencies in Bihar had a partial delimitation along the lines of redistricting in western democracies. Motihari constituency split into Purvi (East) Champaran and Paschim (West) Champaran, Patna into Patliputra and Patna Saheb. New constituencies are Valimikinagar, Saran, Ujiyarpur, Karakat, Supaul, and Jamui (SC).


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Besides Motihari and Patna, therefore, the constituencies that ceased to exist were Bagaha (SC), Balia, Barh, Bikramganj, Chapra, Rosera (SC), and Saharsa. Bihar has a total of 40 Lok Sabha seats including six reserved for the SCs. After the bifurcation of Bihar in 2000, the largely tribal south went to the state of Jharkhand. 2. Bihartimes.com, March 21, 2009. 3. Nitish Mishra, son of Jagannath Mishra, a former CM, and Nagmani, a leader belonging to the Koeri caste were reportedly relieved from their ministerial positions because of their incompetence. Bihartimes.com, March 22, 2009. 4. Bihartimes.com, March 25, 2009. 5. In the past, Lalu and Ram Vilas had benefited in state elections when they joined hands. They suffered in 2005 when they did not. See “How Bihar Voted: Assembly Elections 2005,” The Hindu, March 10, 2006. 6. Soroor Ahmed, “RJD and LJP Losing Stranglehold over Old Social Constituency,” Bihartimes.com, May 18, 2009. The Election Commission of India website, www.eci.gov.in has been the source of the numerical data used in this essay. 7. “Third Front Implodes,” Statesman Weekly (Kolkata), May 23, 2009. 8. “Left Ouster is Mamata Priority,” Statesman Weekly, May 23, 2009. 9. Sudip Mazumdar, “Captors of the Liberated Zone,” Newsweek (New York), May 11–18, pp. 42–43. Also see Sumanta Banerjee, “On the Naxalite Movement: A Report with a Difference,” Economic and Political Weekly, (May 24, 2008), pp. 10–12. Sumanta Banerjee’s In the Wake of Naxalbari: A History of the Naxalite Movement in India (1980) is a seminal work on the Naxalite movement. 10. For a detailed treatment of this subject, see Binoy Shanker Prasad, “Caste, Regionalism, and Political Violence: Maoist Violence in Nepal and Bihar.” Available online at: http://cpsa-acsp.ca/papers2005/Prasad.pdf 11. “More Tainted Legislators Make It to House,” Statesman Weekly, May 23, 2009. 12. N.R. Mohanty, “Lalu-Paswan-Nitish and Their Nexus with Criminals,” Available online at: http://sangharshindia.wordpress.com/2009/04/24/lalu-paswan-nitishand-their-nexus with criminals/ (last date of access: April 25, 2009). 13. “Wives of Criminal-turned-politicians Lose in Bihar,” Bihartimes.com, May 16, 2009. 14. BJP’s popularity suffered in most states. Jharkhand and Karnataka are exceptions. It did not do better in states where it was in power although the performance of its government was as good as Nitish’s. For example, in Gujarat the BJP vote percentage declined by 0.9â•¯percent. In Jharkhand, the BJP barely managed to hold on because it did not face a serious and concerted challenge from mainstream secularist parties like the Congress or the regional tribal parties. See Bihartimes.com, May 19, 2009. 15. “The Bihari Enlightenment,” The Economist (London), January 30, 2010, p. 12. 16. The story of economic recovery under Nitish’s government found its way to the international media as well. See “On the Move,” The Economist, January 30, 2010, pp 47–48.

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17. N.R. Mohanty, “Nitish Owes His Success to Developmental Plank as Well as Identity Politics.” Available online at: http://sangharshindia.wordpress. com/2009/04/24/ (last date of access: April 24, 2009). 18. For the strategy of bloc voting of Muslims in particular constituencies so as to change the outcome of Lok Sabha elections, see Binoy Shanker Prasad, “Split the Votes and Win the Election: An Analysis of the 12th Lok Sabha Election in Bihar,” in Ramashray Roy and Paul Wallace (eds), Indian Politics and the 1998 Election: Regionalism, Hindutva, and State Politics (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1999) pp. 129–58. 19. During my visit to Bihar, December 2–16, 2008, I noticed a series of inaugurations of new Railway projects in that region by Lalu Yadav. Lalu got a railway engine construction plant approved for Madhepura. 20. Soroor Ahmad, “Why Lalu, Ram Vilas cast(e) away by Bihar voters?” Bihartimes. com, May 16, 2009. 21. See Prasad, “Split the Votes, and Win the Elections.” Other reforms often talked about such as changing into the presidential system of government, proportional system of representation or the introduction of compulsory voting probably would not work in the specific context of Indian democracy. See G. Bingham Powell Jr., “Voting Turnout in Thirty Democracies: Partisan, Legal, and Socio-economic Influences,” in Richard Rose (ed.), Electoral Participation: A Comparative Analysis (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, 1980). 22. Enlightened and educated voters agreed. Dialog with a “focus group” at Laheria Sarai (Darbhanga, Bihar) on July 11, 2009. 23. “5 Reasons to Reject FPTP.” Available online at: www.electoralreformcanada.ca/ (last date of access: May 15, 2009). “Are you an Orphan Voter?” Available online at: www.orphanvoters.ca/ (last date of access: May16, 2009). The demand for electoral reforms in both Canada and India was subdued but necessary. See Binoy Shanker Prasad, “Crying for Election Reform: A Theme of Political Discourse in Canada and India.” Available online at http://www.cpsa-acsp. ca/papers-2009/Prasad.pdf


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Chapter 16

Jammu and Kashmir Ethnic–Religious Crisis and Electoral Democracy: Jammu and Kashmir Elections, 2008 and 2009 Praveen Krishna Swami

Islamist political flags fluttered from atop the clock tower in Srinagar’s historic Lal Chowk tower on August 15, 2008, the anniversary of India’s independence. Even during the worst days of the long jihad in J&K, Indian forces in Srinagar had ensured that the national flag flew from the Lal Chowk tower. As usual, security force personnel had hoisted India’s flag at Lal Chowk that morning. But later that afternoon, Islamist protestors marched on Lal Chowk. With strict orders not to use force on the unarmed protestors, police stationed at Lal Chowk brought down the flag and withdrew.1 Elsewhere in Srinagar, mobs destroyed police and CRPF posts, attacked police stations, and burned down the offices of pro-India politicians.2 What a two-decade jihad in J&K had not achieved, six weeks of protests had succeeded in bringing about. The Indian state appeared to be in retreat—and this, just weeks before elections to the J&K Legislative Assembly were scheduled to be held. Late in 2008, few believed that an election in J&K was even possible. Mirwaiz Umer Farooq, Chairman of the secessionist All Parties Hurriyat Conference, had insisted that “we are sure there will be 100â•¯percent poll boycott.”3 In an October 31 article, commentator

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Hassan Zainagiri reported in Greater Kashmir that Kashmir’s “people are quite jubilantly supporting the boycott schedule of the Coordination Committee.”4 The eminent scholar, journalist, and author Prem Shankar Jha even prophesied that “the Government will be lucky if they get more than 10â•¯percent of people to come out and vote.”5 Most major political parties were less than enthused at the prospect of facing the electorate; India’s Election Commission was also concerned.6 Then, the apparently inexplicable happened: J&K saw record numbers of voters participating in a peaceful election (see Figure 16.1). Figure 16.1 Voter Participation in Jammu and Kashmir Assembly Elections by District: 1996–2008

Source: Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, Jammu and Kashmir. Available online at http://ceojammukashmir.nic.in/pdf/Winning-Candidates-08.pdf Note: This figure shows inâ•¯percentage the total votes polled.

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Later, in the 2009 Lok Sabha elections, the two parties which rode to power in the 2008 Assembly elections—the NC and the Congress— consolidated their position.7 In the Kashmir valley, the NC won all three Lok Sabha seats, brushing aside challenges from the PDP and north Kashmir secessionist politician Sajjad Gani Lone. For its part, the Congress won the Jammu and Udhampur seats, brushing off competition from the BJP. Ladakh alone saw an independent, Ghulam Hassan Khan, defeat the official NC–Congress alliance candidate, P. Namgyal—but the victor was, in fact, an old NC hand who remains affiliated to the party. In essence, the alliance between the NC and Congress had allowed both parties to emerge as dominant forces in their principal regions of influence, respectively, Kashmir and Jammu. Far from yielding an embittered, fissured polity, the dramatic mass mobilizations of 2008 seemed to have had the paradoxical outcome of driving the emergence of a new democratic political alliance. How did the NC and Congress, proclaimed to be rendered marginalized and irrelevant by ethnic and religious-chauvinist competitors, so suddenly rise to a position of apparently, unchallengeable dominance in the Legislative Assembly elections of 2008, and the Lok Sabha elections of 2009? And how did what appeared to be mass uprising against Indian rule yield so quickly to competitive democratic politics? In this chapter, I shall argue that the summer’s Shrine War was driven by ethnic-religious anxieties which remain unresolved. All parties attempted to profit from these anxieties; none, however, were able to leverage them in order to become the sole spokesperson of the state’s warring ethnic-religious communities.

The Shrine War and Kashmir Politics Back in the summer of 2004, J&K’s Chief Minister Mufti Mohammad Saeed, and the state’s union government-appointed governor, S.K. Sinha, had locked horns over the management of the Amarnath Yatra—an annual pilgrimage to a cave-temple in the mountains above Pahalgam. Saeed shot down Sinha’s decision to extend the pilgrimage to eight weeks from four. Five cabinet ministers from the Jammu region—all members of Saeed’s coalition partners, the Congress, and

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all Hindus—submitted their resignations in protest.8 It was an early round in a series of skirmishes that would lead to the eventual collapse of the Congress–PDP alliance. Amidst this feud, the J&K High Court ordered the government to give the Shri Amarnath Shrine Board (SASB), which manages the pilgrimage, the right to use forest land to provide shelter and sanitation for pilgrims. It took another two years of legal wrangling, though, before the SASB was given permission to raise “pre-fabricated structures only for camping purposes of pilgrims without going in for construction of permanent structures.” The government order granting permission made clear that that the “proprietary status of [the] forest land shall remain unchanged.”9 Kashmir’s Islamist patriarch, Syed Ali Shah Geelani, saw political opportunity in the decision. He claimed the order stated it was part of a conspiracy to settle Hindus in the region so as to increase the Hindu percentage of the population. At one press conference, he warned that Sinha had been working “on an agenda of changing the demography of the state.”10 “I caution my nation,” he warned “that if we don’t wake up in time, India and it stooges will succeed and we will be displaced.” Later, he asserted that the land-use rights granted to the SASB were part of a covert enterprise code-named Operation Yatra, which was “devised on the lines of Israel’s strategy of settlement in Palestine.”11 The SASB, he went on, was “pursuing the similar method to settle Hindus here.” He was later to hold out dark hints that genocide of Kashmiri Muslims, modeled on the Partition of India pogroms, was being planned.12 Geelani’s position stemmed from his long-standing belief that Islam and Hinduism were locked in an irreducible civilizational opposition. At an October 26 rally in Srinagar, Geelani had made clear this position, saying that “the people of state should, as their religious duty, raise voice against India’s aggression [my emphasis].”13 This duty, he argued, stemmed from the fact that to “practice Islam completely under the subjugation of India is impossible because human beings in practice worship those whose rules they abide by.”14 Geelani had long located the legitimacy of the secessionist movement in J&K in the supposed oppositional dualities of Hindus and Muslims. In matters of faith, belief, and customs, he argued in his prison diaries,


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Hindus and Muslims are set irrevocably apart, as they are divided by such matters as food, clothing, and lifestyles. He described it as being as difficult for Muslims to live in a Hindu milieu as “for a fish to stay alive in a desert.” Muslims, he argued: … cannot live harmoniously with a Hindu majority without their own religion and traditions coming under a grave threat, one major factor being Hinduism’s capacity to assimilate other religions. For Islam to be preserved and promoted in Kashmir, it is necessary for it to be separated from India.15

Matters came to a head when Saeed’s PDP, whose ministers had supported the land-use orders in the state cabinet, reversed their position so as follow Islamist calls for them to be revoked. PDP leaders were driven by the fact that a significant part of their constituency was affiliated with Kashmir’s religious right. However, their Congress coalition partners were unable to meet their demand, afraid it would undermine their position amongst their core constituency of Jammu Hindus. Sinha’s successor as governor, N.N. Vohra, in his capacity as head of the shrine board, attempted to resolve the stalemate. He offered to surrender the land-use rights if the state government itself would provide all facilities to pilgrims, as it had been doing since 1979. Hoping to avert a showdown with the PDP, CM Ghulam Nabi Azad agreed. Later, under pressure from the party’s central leadership in New Delhi to save the Congress’ alliance with the PDP, Azad revoked the land-use order altogether. However, the PDP pulled out of government days before a deadline it had set to resolve the crisis.16 Now, a second phase of the crisis began. Hindu-chauvinist groups in Jammu now began an agitation demanding the land back. Elements among them threatened to blockade traffic to Kashmir. It is unclear that there was, in fact, a significant blockade.17 But the threat itself provided leverage to Geelani, and Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, a Srinagarbased cleric who chairs a rival secessionist formation, the All Parties Hurriyat Conference. Acting on a call from the Pakistan-based United Jihad Council, both groups organized a march across the Line of Control, which divides Indian-adminsitered and Pakistan-administered Kashmir,

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saying the economic blockade necessitated the opening of traffic from Srinagar to Muzaffarabad.18 India had, in fact, been calling for free trade along the route, a demand Pakistan had rejected. However, the defiance of the Line of Control was an act the state simply could not countenance. To no-one’s surprise, force was used to stop the marchers: three people were killed, including a mid-ranking All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC) leader. Over 20 other people died in subsequent clashes between police or soldiers and the protestors, often a consequence of attacks on the bunkers of police and army personnel by enraged mobs.19 Ever since 2002, when levels of jihadist violence in Jammu and Kashmir began to decline, Indian policy makers had assumed that the anti-India movement in the region would also slowly disappear. It was a seismic error of judgment. Faith and xenophobia became the twin poles of a long-running and powerful effective Islamist campaign that began in 2005, after it became evident to Islamists that the jihad on which their political position had been predicated was in terminal decline. Economic change and the social dislocation it had brought about provided the firmament for their revival. Islamists began to make the wider case that the secularization of culture in Kashmir—in turn the consequence of economic growth—constituted a civilizational threat. In an article published in May, 2006, Islamist leader Asiya Andrabi wondered what would happen if “Muhammad (S.A.W.) will come to know that the Muslim youth of Kashmir are busy in vulgarity, obscenity, waywardness?” She attacked “young Muslim girls who have lost their identity of Islam and are presenting the look of a Bollywood actress but not Fatima and Aisha (R.A.) [respectively, Muhammad’s sister and wife].” Later, Islamists leveraged the uncovering of a prostitution racket in Srinagar to argue that secularism and modernity were responsible for and an Indian conspiracy to undermine J&K’s Islamic character. Pro-Islamist scholar Hameeda Nayeem even claimed the scandal pointed “unequivocally toward a policy-based state patronage [of prostitution].”20 Significantly, the prostitution protests saw the first large scale Islamist mob violence that went unchecked by the state. Geelani’s supporters were allowed to gather at the home of alleged Srinagar prostitution-ring madam Sabina Bulla, and raze it to the


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ground. Mobs also attacked the homes of politicians charged with having used her services.21 In the summer the summer of 2007, the rape-murder of a north Kashmiri teenager Tabinda Gani was used to initiate a xenophobic campaign against the presence of migrant workers in the state. Addressing a June 24, 2007, rally at the town of Langate, Geelani said that “hundreds of thousands of non-state subjects had been pushed into Kashmir under a long-term plan to crush the Kashmiris.”22 He claims that “the majority of these non-state subjects are professional criminals and should be driven out of Kashmir in a civilised way [sic.].” Geelani’s political ally, Hilal War, claimed that migrant workers’ slums were “centres of all kinds of illegal business.”23 Language like this inspired a series of terrorist attacks on migrants, the last of which was the bombing of a bus carrying workers from Srinagar just as the shrine board protests began.24 From these events, Islamists learned that the objective conditions existed for xenophobic politics to succeed. Even on the eve of the shrine board protests, Islamists mobilized against a career counsellor who, they claimed, had been despatched to Srinagar schools to seduce students into a career of vice. An Anantnag school teacher also came under attack, after a video surfaced showing that a group of his students had danced to pop film music on a holiday in Anantnag.25 Part of the reason for Geelani’s success was the absence of secular voices—either in political life or amongst public intellectuals— challenging his contentions. No political grouping condemned his actions. Indeed, elements in the Congress made opportunistic use of his mobilization. PDP politicians, too, sought to appropriate Geelani’s rhetoric, in an effort to draw the electoral endorsement of his supporters. So, too, did the NC. Across the Pir Panjal mountains in Jammu, a near-identical chauvinist mobilization was underway—one that was even more invisible to analysts and the government than its Islamist counterpart. In the build-up to the 2002 elections, the BJP found itself discredited by its failure to contain terrorism. Much of the Hindutva movement’s cadre turned to a new grouping, the Jammu State Morcha (JSM). JSM leaders wanted a new, Hindu-majority state carved out of J&K. In the event, both the JSM and the BJP were wiped out in the elections, winning just one seat each.

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A new generation of Hindutva leaders then took control of Hindu neo-conservative politics in Jammu. Soon after the Congress–PDP government came to power, this new Hindutva leadership unleashed its first mass mobilizations. PDP leader and former CM Mufti Mohammad Saeed’s calls for demilitarization and self-rule, Hindutva leaders argued, pointing to the expulsion of Pandits from Kashmir at the outset of the jihad. Hindutva leaders claimed that Saeed was now preparing the ground for the expulsion of Hindus—and Hinduism—from Jammu. From 2003, Hindutva groups sought to forge these anxieties into a concrete political mobilization around the issue of cattle-slaughter. Hindutva cadre would interdict trucks carrying cattle, and then use their capture to stage protests. It was not as if the anti-cow-slaughter movement had stumbled on a great secret. For decades, cow-owning farmers—in the main Hindus—had sold old livestock, which no longer earned them an income, to traders from Punjab and Rajasthan. In turn, the traders sold their herds to cattle traffickers on India’s eastern border, who fed the demand for meat among the poor of Bangladesh. But Hindutva groups understood that the cow was a potent—and politically profitable—metaphor. In December 2007, for example, VHP and Bajrang Dal cadre organized large-scale protests against the reported sacrificial slaughter of cows at the villages of Bali Charna, in the Satwari area of Jammu, and Chilog, near Kathua District’s Bani town.26 Riots had also taken place in the villages around Jammu’s Pargwal area in March 2005, after Hindutva activists made bizarre claims that a cow had been raped.27 It should be noted, however, that these mobilizations, though built around religious themes, were led by politicians—not clerics. For example, south Kashmir-based Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadis neo-fundamentalist activist Maqbool Akhrani mobilized against migrant workers in 2006. They were part of a campaign by India’s intelligence services to “divert attention from real issues and that is why new things like country made liquor are pushed into the valley.”28 As I have noted earlier, similar xenophobic claims informed the shrine war. However, Akhrani and the Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadis, although they participated in the anti-shrine land mobilization, were at best marginal to the course of subsequent events. Indeed, senior Ahl-e-Hadith leaders continued to engage


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with the J&K government to build a denominational university, and refused to condemn governor S.K. Sinha.29 Kashmir’s quasiofficial Grand Mufti, Maulvi Mohammad Bashir-ud-Din, also made interventions in the course of the shrine war.30 However, it bears note that—like the Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadis leadership—Bashir-ud-Din did not address a single rally of consequence. That task was left to leaders of the Tehreek-i-Hurriyat and APHC, none of whom bar Mirwaiz Farooq was a religious leader—and even in this one case, a religious leader with influence only in a small part of Srinagar. Hindu religious leaders like Swami Dinesh Bharati, who played roles in the Hindu-chauvinist agitation there, were also leaders of obscure denominations and temples, with no real clerical authority.31 No figure associated with major temples, like the priests of the Mata Vaishno Devi or Raghunath Mandir, appear to have participated in the protests. Despite the centrality of religion to the Shrine War, therefore, two points are relevant: First, conventional political actors—whether Islamists like Geelani, opposed to India, or Unionist political parties like the PDP, NC, Congress, and the BJP—both initiated its crisis and shaped its course. Neither religious institutions nor clerics had any significant role in the movement. As such, the Shrine War did not mark a breakdown of competitive democratic politics, as some believed, but rather led to its intensification to dangerous levels, but not levels which could not be contained by the political system. Second, a welter of democratic parties played no small role in the grassroots mobilization of what was marketed as a purely Islamistled or Hindutva-led movement. These twin facts are of great significance in understanding why the Shrine War did not derail the democratic system.

Unexpected Outcomes: The 2008 Results Most conventional mappings of J&K’s political map holds that its political geography consists of three major ethnic-religious blocks— Hindu majority in Jammu, Buddhist majority in Ladakh, and Muslim majority in Kashmir. Ethnic-religious competition within and between

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these regions, it is argued, has shaped the course of its political life and electoral engagements. There is more than a small element of truth in this conventional wisdom. However, the 2008 elections to the J&K Legislative Assembly appear to have broken the mould. The chauvinist mobilizations that provided the overall context to the elections ought to have manifested themselves in results polarized along ethnic-religious fault lines—but did not. Instead, the two major political parties of the Kashmir valley—the NC and the PDP—each demonstrated primacy in particular subregional zones. The Congress and the BJP, in turn, showed that they have particular subregional constituencies in Jammu. In north Kashmir, the NC won seven seats to the PDP’s five, with an independent linked to the secessionist People’s Conference and the Congress each picking up one seat.32 In central Kashmir—the agglomeration of 15 seats between Kangan and Ganderbal on the one side, to Khansahib and Chrar-e-Sharif on the other, with urban Srinagar at its core—the NC has reigned supreme. Here, the PDP could take just three seats, those of Chadoora, Khasahib, and Beerwah. NC leaders succeeded in beating off competition in the region’s rural constituencies—competition which had cost now-CM Omar Abdullah the Ganderbal assembly seat in 2002.33 But in start contrast, the PDP has dominated southern Kashmir, losing just four of the region’s 16 seats—two to the Congress and one each to the NC and CPI(M).34 South of the Pir Panjal mountains, voters in the Hindu majority Jammu region also demonstrated that no one party could claim to speak for the entire region or its religious communities. Of the 11 seats in the Doda-Udhampur belt, the NC and Panthers Party took two seats each, while the BJP won one.35 However, the Congress has profited from former CM Ghulam Nabi Azad’s developmental record in the area, picking up seven seats. In the 19-seat cluster from Bani to Naushera, with urban Jammu at its center, the BJP has picked up 10 seats.36 However, its opponents have also done well, with the Congress taking four seats, the NC and independent candidates two each, and the Panthers Party one. Finally, the six seats of the Rajouri-Poonch belt—often the site of tense Hindu–Muslim relations—the PDP, Congress, and the NC have each won two seats.37


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What lessons ought politicians be learning from these results? Perhaps the most important is that competitive ethnic and religious chauvinism, of the kind that threatened to rip J&K apart this summer, does not pay. The case of the PDP is instructive. Ever since its birth in 1999, the party had worked hard to win over Islamists in its south Kashmir heartlands. By 2002, the party had achieved some success in building bridges with the Jamaat-e-Islami and the jihadist group it helped give birth to, the Hizb-ul-Mujahideen. Even though it was evident that the electoral gains were limited, the party increasingly used religious themes and motifs to appeal to Islamist voters.38 In 2008, this kind of rhetoric succeeded in securing the PDP the undisguised support of the Jamaat-e-Islami’s cadre, even though the Islamist party formally called on them to boycott the elections.39 Despite securing the backing of the Jamaat-e-Islami’s rank-and file, the PDP failed to emerge as the principal voice of the Kashmir valley. The party has succeeded, it is true, in winning 21 seats, up from 16 in 2002. However, this increase is less remarkable than it might at first seem. In the 2004 Lok Sabha elections, after all, the PDP registered wins in 25 Kashmir valley assembly segments, compared to the 21 that were won by the NC.40 Despite the apparently dramatic improvement in the BJP’s fortunes—which have taken it from just one seat in 2002 to 11 in 2008—Hindu chauvinism did not pay off. Claims that the BJP has ridden a communal tide in Jammu are empirically unsustainable. First, the ultra-right JSM had broken from the BJP on the eve of the 2002 elections. Had this division of votes not taken place, simple arithmetic shows that the BJP would have won eight seats then.41 More important, most of the BJP’s victories came in areas where the Amarnath Shrine movement remained at a low ebb. The BJP’s efforts to capitalize on the movement have, for the most part, ended in failure. Kirti Verma—the wife of a protestor who dramatically committed suicide—has been defeated in Vijaypur; the BJP’s chief, Nirmal Singh also suffered defeat in Samba, which saw some of the most intense violence in Jammu during the summer.42 Most of the BJP’s victories came in areas which saw relatively little violence in the summer, but where voters were dissatisfied with the developmental record of incumbents rather than their commitment to

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religious causes—a lesson the party would do well to comprehend if it wishes to expand its state-wide reach in the future. What lessons do the election results hold out? First, the age of coalition governments, which arrived seven years ago in J&K, seems set for an extended stay. Back in 2002, contrary to popular perception, the NC was not decisively defeated. The party remained the largest in both the Kashmir valley and in the state as a whole, polling 28.18â•¯percent of the vote in all of the state’s 87 seats together.43 By contrast, the PDP took 14.64â•¯percent of the vote in the seats it contested, and just 9.28â•¯percent state-wide. For its part, the Congress won 24.24â•¯percent of the votes in the seats where it contested, and 24.24â•¯percent state-wide. It took the combined forces of the PDP and the Congress to dethrone the NC. Most of the new government’s Jammu region seats were won by the Congress, as they had been in 1987. In the Kashmir valley, however, the PDP rose as the principal challengers to the NC hegemony.44 As such, these elections marked a coming together of different oppositional forces from the two regions—a forced cooperation across ethnic-religious lines, in the common interests of power. The same happened again in 2008. For a state with a long history of the use of religion for political profit, the outcome of the 2008 elections—and the alliances it has compelled—are likely good news. They are also a break with history. Back in March 1977, Indira Gandhi withdrew the Emergency and called General Elections. She was defeated. The coming to power of the Janata Party, a coalition spanning socialists, centrists, and Hindu chauvinists, provoked a crisis within the J&K Assembly, and elections had to be called early. Having emerged more or less unscathed from the Emergency, and wearing, moreover, the halo of political martyrdom, the Jamaat-eIslami sought to capitalize on the new situation. It allied itself with the Janata Party both at the national level, and in J&K. Sheikh Abdullah responded to the threat with unconcealed appeals to communal sentiment. A vote for the Jamaat-e-Islami, Sheikh Abdullah claimed, was a vote for the Jana Sangh, a Hindu-chauvinist constituent of the Janata Party whose “hands were still red with the blood of Muslims.”45 Islam, NC leaders insisted, would be in danger if the Jamaat-Janata alliance took power.


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Mirza Afzal Beg, Abdullah’s key lieutenant, went one step further. At rally after rally, he would produce a green handkerchief with Pakistani rock-salt—as opposed to Indian sea-salt—contained in it, signalling support for that country to his audience.46 NC cadre administered oaths on the Quran to potential voters, through which they pledged their commitment to the party. Clerics were imported from UP and Bihar to campaign in Muslim majority areas of Jammu. Sheikh Abdullah, wary of the consequences of pushing New Delhi too hard, was carefully to assert that “Kashmir was a part of India and Kashmiris were Indians,” but added that “if we are not assured of a place of honour and dignity in India, we shall not hesitate to secede.”47 Sheikh Abdullah’s incendiary campaign paid off—the NC won 47 of 75 seats in the J&K Assembly, a decisive majority. Moreover, the NC secured over 46â•¯percent of the popular votes, an exceptionally high proportion in Indian elections. By contrast, the Jamaat-e-Islami could secure just one of the 19 seats it contested, and received only 3.59â•¯percent of the state-wide vote.48 Religion was also the central axis along with the Muslim United Front (MUF)—a coalition on which the PDP modelled itself, and from which it drew its electoral emblem—was formed. From the outset, the MUF campaign focused on Islamic issues—the proliferation of bars in Srinagar was, for example, a major target, on the grounds that this was part of a larger onslaught on Muslim religious practices and culture. For MUF’s major constituents, the acquisition of state power was a precursor to these ends. At a March 4, 1987, rally in Srinagar, MUF candidates, clad in the white robes of the Muslim pious, declared variously that Islam could not survive under the authority of a secular state and that Farooq Abdullah was an agent of Hindu imperialism.49 For the Jamaat-e-Islami leaders, this platform was not new. The organization had long argued that faith made imperative the Nizame-Mustafa, the state as the Prophet Mohammad had envisaged it. In a broader sense, the Jamaat-e-Islami saw its politics as emerging from the ideological belief that “Kashmiri Muslims need to be converted afresh for accommodating Islamic beliefs in the local framework.” As the scholar Mohammad Ishaq Khan has noted, this also was not new;

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popular religious identity and culture had long been challenged “by the Shariat-oriented culture as generally represented by the Ahl-e-Hadith and the Jamaat.”50 MUF succeeded in harvesting enough votes to panic the NC and Congress into rigging the 1987 elections, one factor which contributed to the rise of jihadist violence a year later. Now, though, efforts to build political fortunes on piety have failed—neither the PDP nor the BJP profited from the shrine board war they initiated. Where might J&K politics now head? Some signs, of course, are evident from the results of the 2009 Lok Sabha elections. Although full statistical analysis of the results is yet to be made available by the Election Commission of India, it seems apparent that the NC–Congress alliance is, for the present, an almost unbeatable political force. The Anantnag Lok Sabha seat, made up of the Assembly segments of southern Kashmir, has long been considered a stronghold of the PDP. Even in the December 2008 Assembly elections, the PDP won 12 of 16 seats in the region. This time, however, the combined forces of the NC and Congress allowed the NC candidate Mirza Mehbooba Baig to defeat the PDP’s Peer Mohammad Hussain by more than 5,000 votes. The Baramulla seat of northern Kashmir, similarly, saw the NC’s Sharif-ud-Din Shariq win 203,022 votes to the 138,208 polled by the PDP’s Mohammad Dilawar Mir, and the 65,403 pulled in by Sajjad Gani Lone. The latter is the son of a prominent secessionist leader, Abdul Gani Lone, who was assassinated by jihadists in 2001 for his pursuit of dialogue with the Government of India. It should be emphasized that the Congress–NC alliance polled more votes than the two most prominent rivals, combined. Finally, NC patron and former CM Farooq Abdullah won the Srinagar Lok Sabha seat by a margin of over 32,000 votes, underlining the PDP’s failure to develop a significant constituency in the city by eating into the base of Islamistled secessionists, as it had succeeded in doing in southern Kashmir. The BJP fared even worse than the PDP. In Jammu, the Congress’ Madan Lal Sharma defeated Leela Karan Sharma, leader of the Shrine war. Sharma’s victory is a clear sign that the apparent religious frenzy unleashed during the summer of 2008 had less-than-durable political foundations. The BJP also failed to wrest the Udhampur seat from the Congress. In both areas, the support gained by the Congress


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from the NC supporters in Muslim majority segments of Jammu appears to have been important in beating back the BJP challenge. For the time being, then, J&K politics appears to have reconfigured itself much like pan India politics—no one party can credibly lay claim to power. For now, the NC–Congress alliance is unbeatable. Its defeat will only come about if the alliance partners fall apart—as the PDP and Congress did—or if an alternate system of trans-regional alliances develops. In the long term, one may even see a realization of the inconceivable—the alliance of one of the Kashmir valley-based parties with the Hindu nationalist BJP. The prospect is not as bizarre as it may first seem. After all, the Jamaat-e-Islami and the MUF had a none-too-discreet alliance with the Hindu right-wing in 1987, in their common purpose of beating back the NC–Congress alliance of Farooq Abdullah and former PM Rajiv Gandhi.

Democracy and the “Kashmir Problem”: Some Conclusions Elements of Kashmir’s civil society have long been concerned about their future in a Hindu-majority India. During a visit to New Delhi soon after Independence, Sheikh Mohammad Abdullah candidly underlined the relationship between politics in Kashmir and Indian communalism. “There isn’t a single Muslim in Kapurthala, Alwar or Bharatpur,” Abdullah said, noting that “some of these had been Muslim-majority states.” Kashmiri Muslims, he concluded, “are afraid that the same fate lies ahead for them as well.” In Jammu, religious chauvinists have long raised fears of the subjugation of the region’s Hindus by Kashmir’s Muslims. Fears like these underpinned the summer’s violence, on either side of the Pir Panjal Mountains. They were not, outside of the principal urban bases of the secessionist movement, separatist in their content or intent. On the ground, a bewildering array of parties participated in the Shrine movement. Jamaat-e-Islami activist Nisar Ahmad Ganai, for example, led a 600 strong peasant gathering at Watergam on June 27. Two days later, Jamaat-linked activists Mushtaq Ahmad Wani and Fayaz Ahmad

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led the protests in Baramulla’s Khanpora area. Elsewhere in Baramulla, though, pro-India parties drove the protests. A 5,000-strong gathering at Sheeri-Baramulla on June 30, for example, was led by local NC activist Abdul Qayoom and PDP dissident Ghulam Mohideen. Hasan Rather, another PDP dissident, also played an important role in organizing protests. Similarly, in Anantnag, both the APHC and Syed Ali Shah Geelani’s Tehreek-i-Hurriyat played an important role in organizing protests. Tehreek leader Hafizullah Mir, for example, organized an 800 strong rally at Anantnag’s Lal Chowk on June 25, while APHC-linked Fayyaz Ahmad Sodagar and Zahid Hakim led a similar crowd at the same venue the next day. Local Congress leaders burned effigies of PDP patron Mufti Mohammed Sayeed at Wandi-Valgam on June 30, while NC activists were the principal leaders of protests in Paibugh. Of the 20 protests in the district of Ganderbal—the scene of a dramatic NC–PDP confrontation that saw former Union Minister of State for External Affairs Omar Abdullah lose his seat last year—half were led by National Conference cadre. In the village of Chatterhama, NC activists even helped build a shrine to two Pakistani Lashkar-e-Taiba terrorists killed in the course of the protests.51 Similar patterns of mobilization have been seen in several postelection mobilizations characterized as secessionist, notably the protests against the alleged rape and murder of two women in the south Kashmir town of Shopian. Power struggles between NC and PDP played a key role in giving momentum to what later transformed into an Islamist-led agitation.52 Part of the reason for the incomprehension of the elections of 2008 is a discourse that a priori casts Kashmiri secessionism as the authentic sentiment of the people of the state. The high turnout in the 1996 and 2002 elections was widely attributed to coercive pressure from Indian troops, rather than the political influence of the candidates. Without dispute, the Army did ask rural residents to vote in both 1996 and 2002—actions which must be read in the context of jihadi groups threatening them with death if they chose to do so, and killing dozens of political activists to demonstrate their seriousness of purpose. However, a careful study of voting patterns demonstrates that there was no demonstrable relationship between


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this persuasive activity and turnout. Zero voting took place in some areas where the troops were reported to have pushed voters; some areas which saw no coercion at all, conversely, reported a high turnout.53 Kashmir secessionists, it is rarely understood, represent specific social classes—not a generalized, free-floating “sentiment.” Most major secessionist leaders were members of the MUF, a political coalition that represented an alliance between the urban petty bourgeoisie and the rural orchard-owning elite.54 Both classes saw their pre-independence influence decline through years of the National Conference rule—a rule founded on an alliance between the small peasant, on the one hand, and a new elite of contractors and capitalists, on the other. Islam, for the classes which backed the MUF, was an instrument to legitimize the protest of a threatened social order against a modernity which threatened to obliterate it. In Srinagar and other urban centers, this coalition succeeded in securing the support of disenfranchized youth—the children of the city’s traditional bourgeoisie, who are witnessing the inevitable death of the artisanal and trading occupations of their parents but have neither the skills nor resources to compete in the new world emerging around them. Kashmir’s Islamists-led secessionist movement became a medium for their rage at being denied entry through the gates of the earthly paradise before them—a phenomenon which formed the most visible part of the street protests during the Shrine Board movement. Democracy in J&K has shown it can survive the strains imposed on it by the state’s volatile ethnic-religious politics. Can it find the resources needed to draw those now disenfranchized by the modernity? Electoral democracy is merely a system; it guarantees no particular outcomes. For their survival and growth, however, politicians will have to find answers to this problem.

Notes 1. Avijit Ghosh, “Tricolour at 8 a.m., Flags of Separatists at 4.00 p.m.,” The Times of India (Mumbai), August 16, 2008. Also available online at: http:// timesofindia.indiatimes.com/JK_Tricolour_at_8am_separatist_flags_at_4pm/ articleshow/3369371.cms

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â•‡ 2. Hakeem Irfan, “Angry Mobs Storm CRPF Bunkers, Police Stations,” Rising Kashmir (Srinagar), August 14, 2008. Also available online at: http://www.risingkashmir. com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=5879&Itemid=1 â•‡ 3. “We’ll Carry on Anti-poll Campaign: Mirwaiz Umar,” Greater Kashmir (Srinagar), November 22, 2008. Also available online at: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/ full_story.asp?Date=22_11_2008&ItemID=72&cat=1 â•‡ 4. Hassan Zainagiri, “Engineering Elections,” Greater Kashmir (Srinagar), October 31, 2008. Also available online at: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/ full_story.asp?Date=31_10_2008&ItemID=27&cat=11 â•‡ 5. “Voting Begins in Indian Kashmir,” Alwahy News (Online), November 17, 2008. Available online at: http://alwahy.com/news/article/asiapacific/5661/1/print/ â•‡ 6. Muzamil Jaleel, “Kashmir ’02 Kashmir ’08,” The Indian Express (New Delhi), November 16, 2009. Also available Online at: http://www.indianexpress.com/ story-print/386152/ â•‡ 7. “NC–Cong Sweep J&K; Lone Loses,” Rediff.com (Online), May 16, 2009. Available online at: http://election.rediff.com/report/2009/may/16/loksabhapollnc-cong-sweep-jk-lone-loses.htm â•‡ 8. Luv Puri, “Amarnath Yatra: Court Vests Authority with Shrine Board,” The Hindu (Chennai), April 17, 2005. Also available Online at: http://www.hindu. com/2005/04/17/stories/2005041706750700.htm â•‡ 9. Praveen Swami, “Anatomy of the Shrine Board Crisis,” The Hindu (Chennai), June 30, 2008. Also available Online at: http://www.hindu.com/2008/06/30/ stories/2008063059891300.htm 10. Zulfikar Majid, “I Caution My Nation: Wake up Geelani,” Greater Kashmir (Srinagar), June 24, 2008. Also available online at: http://www.greaterkashmir. com/full_story.asp?Date=24_6_2008&ItemID=61&cat=1 11. Hakeem Irfan, “Operation Yatra Devised on Israeli Lines: Geelani,” Rising Kashmir (Srinagar), June 13, 2008. Also available online at: http://www.risingkashmir. com/?option=com_content&task=view&id=4330 12. Ahmad Ali Fayyaz, “Stronger Geelani’s New Slogan: Ham Pakistani hain,” Daily Excelsior (Jammu), August 19, 2008, p. 1. 13. A.M. Dar, “Geelani Slams Mainstream Politicians,” Greater Kashmir (Srinagar), October 27, 2007. Also available online at: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/ full_story.asp?Date=27_10_2007&ItemID=35&cat=1 14. Ibid. 15. Yoginder Sikand, “For Islam and Kashmir: The Prison Diaries of Sayyed Ali Gilani of the Jama’at-i-Islami of Jammu and Kashmir,” in The Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs (New Delhi), Vol. 18, No. 2, (1998), p. 243. 16. Chander Suta Dogra, “Echoes In Hell,” Outlook (New Delhi), August 18, 2008. Also available online at: http://www.outlookindia.com/fullprint.asp?choice=1& fodname=20080818&fname=Jammu+Main+%28F%29&sid=1 17. “Centre: No Economic Blockade of Valley, Pak Cashing In on Turmoil,” The Indian Express (New Delhi), August 17, 2008. Also available online at: http:// www.indianexpress.com/printerFriendly/349694.html. Also see Harmeet Singh,


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“Army Controls Highway, Traffic Restored,” Greater Kashmir (Srinagar), August 4, 2008. Also available online at: http://www.greaterkashmir.com/full_story. asp?Date=4_8_2008&ItemID=45&cat=1 18. “March Towards Muzaffarabad: UJC,” Rising Kashmir (Srinagar), August 7, 2008. 19. Ahmad Ali Fayyaz, “Toll Reaches 21 as One More Killed in CRPF Firing,” The Daily Excelsior (Jammu), August 15, 2008, p. 1. 20. Hameeda Nayeem, “Unite, in Humanity,” The Indian Express (New Delhi), May 11, 2006, p. 6. 21. For a full account, see Praveen Swami, “Righteousness, Religion and Rightwing Politics,” The Hindu (Chennai), May 15, 2008. http://www.hindu. com/2006/05/15/stories/2006051504021000.htm 22. “Non-Kashmiris Should Be Seen Off: Geelani,” Greater Kashmir (Srinagar), July 25, 2007, p. 3. 23. “Construction Works to Be Hit by Labourers Exodus,” Daily Excelsior (Jammu), August 4, 2007, p. 1. 24. Praveen Swami, “Bombing in Srinagar: A Response to Islamist Calls,” The Hindu (Chennai), July 25, 2008. Also available online at: http://www.hindu. com/2008/07/25/stories/2008072556861500.htm 25. Praveen Swami, “Kashmir: The War for Hearts and Minds,” The Hindu (Chennai), June 4, 2008. Also available online at: http://www.hindu.com/2008/06/04/ stories/2008060455311000.htm 26. “Tension over Cow Sacrifice,” The Daily Telegraph (Kolkata), December 23, 2008. Also available Online at: http://www.telegraphindia.com/1071223/jsp/ nation/story_8700385.jsp 27. “‘Unnatural Act’ with Cow Leads to Protests in Akhnoor,” Expressindia.com (Online), March 28, 2005. Available online at: http://www.expressindia.com/ news/fullstory.php?newsid=44002 28. Hilal Bhat, “Bihari Labourers Producing Desi Liquor in South Kashmir,” Greater Kashmir (Srinagar), June 29, 2006, p. 3. 29. Praveen Swami, “Islamic University Falls Victim to Kashmir’s Shrine War,” The Hindu (Chennai), August 21, 2008. Also available online at: http://www.hindu. com/2008/08/21/stories/2008082155121100.htm 30. “Lift Blockade Or We Lift Durbar,” Rising Kashmir (Srinagar), August 3, 2008. Also available online at: http://www.risingkashmir.com/?option=com_content &task=view&id=5616 31. “Dinesh Bharti’s Detention under PSA Ordered,” The Daily Excelsior (Jammu), August 26, 2008, p. 1. 32. Derived from Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, Jammu and Kashmir, Available online at: http://ceojammukashmir.nic.in/pdf/Winning-Candidates08.pdf. North Kashmir consists of constituencies 1–14. 33. Ibid., constituencies 15–30. 34. Ibid., constituencies 31–46. 35. Ibid., constituencies 51–61. 36. Ibid., p. 63–81.

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37. Ibid., constituencies 82–871–61. 38. Praveen Swami, “A Bend in the Road,” Frontline (Chennai), May 16, 2006. Also Available Online at: http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2309/stories/20 060519004912600.htm 39. Muzammil Jaleel, “Despite Boycott Call, Jamaat Cadres Come Out in Support of PDP,” The Indian Express (New Delhi), December 23, 2009. Also Available Online at: http://www.indianexpress.com/news/despite-boycott-call-jamaatcadres-come-out-in-support-of-pdp/401699/0 40. Praveen Swami, “Democracy without Freedom,” South Asia Intelligence Review, Available Online at: http://www.satp.org/satporgtp/sair/Archives/2_44.htm (last date of access: on May 17, 2004). 41. Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Election, 2002, to the Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir (New Delhi: Election Commission of India, 2002). 42. Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, Jammu and Kashmir, Available Online at: http://ceojammukashmir.nic.in/pdf/Winning-Candidates-08.pdf. 43. Election Commission of India, Statistical Report on General Election, 2002, to the Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir (New Delhi: Election Commission of India, 2002), p. 8. 44. Ibid., pp. 5–6. 45. Navnita Chadha Behera, State, Identity, and Violence: Jammu, Kashmir, and Ladakh (New Delhi: Manohar, 2000), p. 143. 46. Victoria Schofield, Kashmir in Conflict: India, Pakistan, and the Unending War (London: IB Tauris, 2003), p. 125. 47. Cited in Behera, State, Identity, and Violence p. 140. 48. Election Commission of India, Key Highlights of General Election, 1977, to the Legislative Assembly of Jammu and Kashmir (New Delhi: Election Commission of India, undated), p. 8. 49. P.S. Verma, Jammu and Kashmir at the Political Crossroad (New Delhi: Vikas, 1994), p. 159. 50. Mohammad Ishaq Khan, “Six Centuries of Islamisation in Kashmir: Retrospect and Prospects,” in Balraj Puri (ed.), 5000 Years of Kashmir (New Delhi: Ajanta, 1997). 51. Praveen Swami, “Hubris and downfall,” Frontline (Chennai), August 1, 2008. Also Available Online at: http://www.hinduonnet.com/fline/fl2515/stories/ 20080801251502800.htm 52. Praveen Swami, “Politicians Preying on Shopian Tragedy,” The Hindu (Chennai), June 14, 2009. Also available Online at: http://www.hindu.com/2009/06/14/ stories/2009061459700800.htm 53. Praveen Swami, “A Surprise in Kashmir: The Myth of Coercion at Large,” Frontline (Chennai) June 14, 1996. Also see Aarti Dhar, “A Vote for Peace,” The Hindu (Chennai) June 9, 1996. 54. P.S. Verma, “Muslim United Front,” in S. Bhatnagar and Pradeep Kumar (eds), Regional Political Parties in India (New Delhi: Ess Publications, 1988), p. 191.


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Chapter 17

Northeast India Democracy, Ethnic Fractionalization, and Competitive Politics: The Case of States in Northeast India Rajesh Dev

The Region and its Politics If South Asia is the largest “democratic region”1 of the world, India’s contribution to that estimation is indeed significant. This is because, in comparison to her South Asian neighbors, India’s “democratic adventure” has not only demonstrated an adaptable resilience,2 but through its own peculiar modes, affected a deepening of democratic norms3 and procedures. While it may be true that such deepening of democratic norms and procedures must be manifested in more substantive essentials than in the periodic ritual of elections, an election is commonly seen as the “ultimate” democratic device that validates the democratic personality of this nation. In this minimalist procedural sense of democracy, elections are said to constitute the “crucial sites for the production and reproduction of the political.”4 It is not simply the stable regularity and sanctity of elections that are critical to Indian democracy. Elections have come to form the obligatory conduit for intragroup political contestation and competition and an effective means through which social pluralism is politically articulated and expressed. The wide profusion of political parties in every part of India manifesting the interests and claims of

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the newly empowered social groups is not only a sign of the deepening of the democratic experience,5 but is also seen as the institutionalized expression of entrenched social pluralism. India’s “democratic adventure” has also been deeply affected by the “shift in [the nature and pattern of] democratic politics.”6 This shift is apparently discernible in the “rise of state politics as an autonomous domain” that transformed Indian states into “principal” sites of political contestation where effective political choices are made. Though some see this as “progressive ruralization”7 or “fragmentation and regionalization of political power,”8 others have argued that it only indicates a shift in the “locale of politics.”9 This “ruralization” has also produced a popular anxiety about the content of democratic politics in India. There is a despondent generalization that democratic norms are being compromised by excessive localism and fluid political coalitions, attributed to the gratuitous rise of regional parties and their gaining control of the political “center.” Political theorists have termed this shift in the “locale,” and possibly also the content of the democratic game, as an attribute of the “third electoral system”10 in the Indian democratic passage. A growing mood among analysts is, therefore, to examine the political impact of the provincial, state level actors, forces, and issues11 on the construction of the “national” political agenda, which is now considered a “derivative”12 of the former. This reversal of the customary perspective of understanding Indian politics through the prism of “national” politics, possibly allows us to integrate the “micro foundations” and “lived experiences” with our collective democratic adventure. Such an understanding of the “local,” social, and political realities is significant as it essentially provides a more substantive transparency to the Indian democratic experience by appreciating how the “sub-national” diversities constitutes, what Ashis Nandy states as “a culturally viable national political style.”13 It is in following this mood that we attempt to unravel the nature of political competition and the pattern of expression of political choices made in states constituting the “northeast” region of India. The “northeast” of India, traditionally constituted by seven states, till the recent times occupied a “peripheral” fringe in the Indian political imagination. The institutional and political exclusions initiated during

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colonialism as a political strategy have been rationalized as political recognition of cultural difference in the post-independent period. The region apparently manifests a “notional” integration with a “national” consciousness and continues to express a collective unease with the “idea of India.” It is this limited depth of national integration that continues to polarize political theorizing and practice on and in the region. The discourse on political integration in the region is, therefore, being articulated through a genre of contentious politics that manifests a widely held social posture that people from the region are part of India but are not Indians. Such a political sensibility often has its enervated counter, in assertions that “the future of Northeast [India] lies in its political integration with India and economic integration with southeast Asia.”14 What is important is that this unusual sentiment on political integration perhaps expresses an inchoate desire to be a part of the political community without sharing the standardized political sameness or even consciousness. A growing dissonance, over the terms of political relationship with India, expressed by ethnic communities of the region, not only reflects a substantively frail political bond, but also establishes a contingent, plagiaristic level of identification and loyalty with India. The region shares, what Kymlicka states as a “provisional form of togetherness”15 which coexists with a corresponding and perpetual interrogation of the nature and rules of the [political] relationship, with India. The political negotiations underway between the Nagas and the Indian state is only one such example that attempts to redefine the federal architecture and redefine political relations between the centre and the constituents. This frame may however, give us two false impressions. One, that the region by itself shares an internal social and political coherence and thus is a collective regional solidarity. And second, that as a consequence, the “region” is positioned in a polarizing dichotomy with the “nation.” However we must admit that the perceived internal regional coherence is often an inference of essentialist designs and the ostensible external regional antipathy an outcome of unproblematized conceptualization of the relations between a “center” and its constituent “federal” units.

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Indeed, if we care to analyze the persuasion of competitive democratic politics on the nature of social change in India, the “northeast” cannot consider itself an exile—even if in provincial discourses, competitive democratic politics is considered circuitous alleyways for legitimating “Indian rule” that causes “Indianization.” Introduction of competitive democratic politics has transformed the “traditional” structures of power, redefined political practices, and crafted novel political traditions. Though subliminal feelings of cynicism about electoral democracy and its “corrupting influence” on the tribal ethos and forms of governance are expressed by “traditional elites,” many of these actors consider elections to state assemblies and parliament as a higher-level of politics to be generally aspired for. These actors though vocal about the transgressions of competitive politics oddly regard elections as a tool for integrating into a wider and privileged network of social and political patronage. Therefore, even if participation in competitive politics manifests a coarse form of political integration of the region with the “idea of India,” it has nonetheless, assisted in the formalization of an institutional political culture that the region shares with India. There is also a broad popular political reading that the region’s share in political power is restricted by its negligible representation in parliament. With only 10 representatives in a house of 542, six of the seven states constituting the region command an ineffectual political authority in the parliament. Except Assam, none of the states have more than two representatives to parliament. This lack of political weight in the federal legislature apparently reduces their legitimacy among the electorate as effective political actors who could articulate regional and local interests and needs. Sometimes, such perceptions of inadequate representation often make it obligatory for groups and states to arrive at a provisional intra-regional and inter-ethnic consensus during parliamentary elections. It contrasts the political agenda and arithmetic at the local levels, which otherwise usually manifests an intrepid form of ethnic fission and contest. While attempting to understand the context of competitive politics in the region, it may also be indicative to preface that the “capacity and opportunities” accorded by competitive democratic politics in the region is restrained by a violent social grid. This violence, though

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an outcome of the varied forms of layered exclusions has, to a large extent depoliticized the political space limiting the capacity of the electorate. Yet, it is ironically a pervading violent culture that possibly offers the requisite political opening for increased participation in democratic politics and expression of political preferences through competitive elections. Even if transformation of rebels into democratic stakeholders stimulated an expansion in federal institutional linkages, it has resulted in the diffusion of political conflict and only provisionally neutralized the proclivity for violent expression of dissent and difference. In almost all the six states under review in this chapter, “violent application of opinions”16 continue to form the distinctive backdrop to institutionalized political competition and efforts at political control. Electoral competitions in the region seem like a “second-order” preference in the selection of strategies for claims-making and negotiating differences. Violent contention, naively blanketed as insurgencies, is often the “first-order” preference for groups, as the dominant tool in the repertoire of convincing strategies for mobilizing social and political resentment as well as reformulating redistributive claims for power and resources. Efforts intended to democratize ethnic group claims and relations resulted in altering political structures that assured greater political autonomy to ethnic groups. Yet, in a social site of politicized ethnic identities and claims which are yet to be channelized through more formal politics, it has only exacerbated ethnic-security dilemmas resulting in armed resistance. Ironically therefore, it is the degree of political violence generated by a large array of non-state actors who seem more effective in aggregating public preferences in the region. A popular version of this discourse is apparent in the view among a large number of indigenous intellectuals that it is only after the Assam agitation or the rise of the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA) in Assam or similar assertions by other groups, that the “center” began changing its “security-model” of dealing with the region. The non-state actors, they argue, play a more important role in defining the political discourse than political representatives. Thus, violence has become an accepted strategy for expressing political discontent and securing access to and control of institutions. Besides, the linkages between insurgencies,

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political parties,17 and the political processes provide a typical regional variation of institutionalized democratic politics and an influential assortment of armed non-state actors. The typicality lies in the fact that a large number of these democratic actors18 provide patronage to non-state and armed actors as imbursement for abetting political efforts at mobilization and realignment of inter-ethnic relations. In almost all the states of the region such insurgent groups—surrendered, active or under temporary secession of armed hostilities—have come to increasingly play intermediary roles between the state and society. Though there may not be a direct fit between the increasing nexus of elected representatives and insurgent outfits at the local level with electoral outcomes to parliament, the relationship does reflect the nature and pattern of political mobilization and competition at all levels. The “infrastructural powers” of the state in large parts of the region, therefore, seem like “juridical artefacts,” fragile in its capacity to penetrate and manage the society. The formal voting equality granted to citizens does not seem to bridge the inequities released by the structure of society–state relations in the region. The federalizing strategies of ethnic autonomy seem to have only assisted in the institutionalization of ethnic clientelist networks. This inhibits attempts to embed liberal democratic political culture and consciousness on a group of people, more deeply rooted in political dispositions of ethnic nepotism. Moreover, in some states, cessations of political autonomy by central impositions inhibit an adequate entrenching of democratic continuity. These democratic aberrations have also assisted in augmenting a political consciousness and culture that stresses the mutual suspicion between these regional units and the “center” and introduces what Yadav calls a disconnect between “what people vote for and what they get.”19 The parallel existence of a high degree of political violence along with a respectable degree of electoral participation, probably reveals the complex personality of the democratic matrix in the region. It manifests the inadequacy of the available democratic resources as adequate tools for negotiating social and political incompatibilities. The winner takes all; first-past-the-post system allows political

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mobilization along group differences. But popular claims for postelection group-consensus emasculate the unique group claims. It is also argued that the broad rules of democratic politics does not permit alternative proposals for structuring the demos as it needs to be operated, principally by the limits defined by the dominant consensual idea of nation-state. A democratic structure that makes attempts at democratic inclusion through the legitimization of group mobilization fails to adequately accommodate complex ethnic claims in a deeply plural social context. It is clear that the societies of the region are formatted along cleavages, primarily related to ethnic identity and the politicization of those cleavages forms an important focus for understanding the nature of political competition in the region. The differences between ethnic groups that control institutions20 and groups that do not have such institutional control, and also indigenous versus outsiders differences pattern the structure of competition. Political equality attempted voting seldom produces results, where popular control of democratic politics is diluted by the strong majoritarian predisposition of the institutions. The terms of the sociopolitical discourse are being crafted in the “arena[s] located in the interstices of state and society”21 by primary groups whose political relevance and power is derived essentially from a sense of shared ethnic allegiance, exclusive collective goals, and need for political control. The consultative patterns of democratic politics are, therefore, largely defined by “local subjectivities” that essentially privilege dominant, gendered, monoethnic voices. Such a priming of ethnic identity also moulds the degree of relative regionalist posturing and often distorts the ideological distinction between “national” and “regional” parties. The politics of ethnic differentiation and fission being expressed essentially through armed resistance, often gives way to ephemeral regional political formations that craft strategic political alliances and coalitions with “national” parties. The result, however, has mostly been fluid political conditions and increasing political disenchantment. The play of ideological alternatives—so essential for the effective expression of democratic choices—is fairly negligible in the six states of the region reviewed in this chapter.

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That the region pursues a political trajectory of its own is suggested, not only in its brand of contentious politics and social exceptions, but also in the apparently unique features of its political history that defies “national” trends and waves.22 Such an indigenous political trajectory of the region that emphasizes the rhetorical force of “difference” is also exhibited recurrently in the political imagery of the region. These are expressed in narratives of a “failed partition”23 noticeable in the politics regarding “immigrants” and “foreign nationals.” They include persistent ethno-political violence that seriously challenge the “democratic norms, and the character of state power,”24 issues of territorial homelands and gladiatorial positioning of ethnic groups and issues of state-repression through counter insurgency measures and operation of laws like Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). These issues influence the structure of political discourse, but rarely define the ideological distance between political parties or become unguarded issues of inter-party debates. This shared imagery may not adequately reveal the intra-regional diversity and plurality of political claims or, in some cases, even the differences in the “grammar of claims-making.” A broad regional desire for expressing “politics in the vernacular”25 is punctuated by similar intra-regional expressions that question this standardized regional imagery. Therefore the suggestion that “the starting point of making sense of politics in the northeast is to recognise its internal diversity”26 provides a novel opening through which we may appreciate the distinct social and political realities of the states and social groups. Yet, attempts at understanding the intensity of political competition must appreciate the caution that “political and electoral mobilisation has never been crystallized along party political line.”27 Political competition in many states of the region operates within what Yadav terms as “systemless competition” where politicization of ethnic and sub-ethnic antagonisms forms the bases for political mobilization and contestations. This politicization of ethnic differences is reconfiguring “ethnic demography” and realignment of ethnic forces and often evokes explanations about the development of clumsy democratic culture in the region. The politicization of ethnic identities has nevertheless allowed a loosening of the political space, hitherto controlled by broader ethnic categories, but has territorialized fluid

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ethnic spaces making it more contested. Such politicization has not yet coalesced into entrenched party bases and boundaries. Party loyalties are effectively fluid and tenuous. The presence of a large number of candidates and parties, in most of the states and constituencies does not reflect a highly competitive political space. In most cases, competition is often restricted between two or three individuals and parties. Besides, the dominance of the social discourse and political agenda by social majorities sets the margins of democratic politics in all states. Yet these do not necessarily suggest a “fixed regional culture” that is normally evoked by many governing narratives on the region. In the general elections to parliament in 2009, the Congress had an edge over the regional and other national parties. In the six states under consideration, the Congress party secured six of the total 10 seats. The CPI won two and the remaining two went to the NCP and the Nagaland People’s Front (NPF), respectively. Though this may seem as a reflection of the national trend favoring the Congress, in this region it is more significantly the result of the continuation of the politics of shifting political loyalties and the wholesale merger of regional political parties with the Congress. This merger at the state level limited the space for political competition and made political opposition a virtually fictional encounter. For the Congress, it is only a refinement of the policies adopted in the early 1970s to encroach into hitherto “regional” spaces, where the Congress is often perceived largely as an outsider and a party of the “plains.”28 The paradox, however, is that while the Congress in most of the hill regions is perceived as a party that passively pursues an integrative agenda, it still is able to expand its social base. The BJP has also been making some inroads in the hill states, especially since the 1990s, parallel to its phenomenal rise in national politics. Nonetheless, it is the Congress that has attained a substantial presence in these hill states and has consolidated this presence in recent years. A continuing trend for the Congress has been provided through “induced defections” from regional parties. Chaube stated that the trends of politics and the nature of political competition in the region were largely established by the diversities in political culture and behavior between the hills and the plains. It is this difference

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between the hills and the plains that often shapes the support bases of the regional and national parties, and as a logical manifestation, it is perceived as a difference between the “indigenous/local” and “outsiders/migrants” political preferences. Before the 2009 elections, the splintered and ideologically brittle anti-Congress regional forces attempted to resist the Congress through the formation of a political forum, both at the regional level and in some individual states. The established forum was largely an outcome of the efforts by P.A. Sangma, the inexorable former speaker of the Lok Sabha. It comprised the AGP, Asom United Democratic Front (AUDF), the Bodoland People’s Progressive Front (BPPF), the NPF, the Manipur People’s Party (MPP), and the CPI, besides the BJP. This suggests that the nature of political competition manifests, what Yadav suggests is a “Congress vs. Opposition Scenario.” It is essentially a bi-polar contest between the Congress and a regional party, despite the presence of a wide array of political forces. The composition of the forum suggests that ideological connectedness along a policy dimension had not been one of its criterions. It was rather a provisional and strategic antipathy to the Congress. In fact the support extended by the AUDF (now called the All India United Democratic Forum) and the NPF, including the so called “Sangma faction” of the NCP, to the Congress-led UPA government at the center establishes character of the forum. Such a candid illustration of what is oddly termed as “ideological convergence”29 and perceived as an attribute of the “third electoral system” in large parts of the country, has always been a defining feature of competitive politics in northeast India.

The States and its Politics Meghalaya Elections for the two parliamentary seats in the state of Meghalaya were held in the backdrop of political instability30 and President’s rule in the state. Though it had been the first time that the state had parliamentary elections under President’s rule, it did not have any

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direct impact on the outcome of the elections, despite perceptions that the governor being a political appointee was biased,31 in favor of the Congress. Indeed, political instability has been a recurrently stable political experience in the state since its elevation to full statehood on January 21, 1972. The 91st Amendment Act to the constitution that restricts the total number of cabinet members has made political instability and shifting of political loyalties more acute in the state. The CMs are on record requesting the central government to introduce exceptions to the Act for some of the northeastern states with small legislatures, reflecting the instrumental need for political maneuverability and political stability through disbursement of political bursaries. The appreciation of this backdrop of political instability that flows from chronic political realignments of forces is important in order to be able to understand the pattern of political competition in Meghalaya, where politics is largely a short-term measure for access to resources, political coalitions, and loyalties that are extremely fluid and transitory. “Power politics” of alliances and provisional coalitions have usurped the value of legitimate ideologically coherent politics. In Meghalaya, political ideologies are often irreconcilable with personal aspiration and provincial loyalties. To a large extent, this influences political outcomes at the state-level assembly elections and also structures political alignments and preferences for parliamentary seats. The diversity of the social structure is patterned along perceived power differentials between the three dominant tribes, intra-ethnic cleavages contoured along religious differences between indigenous faith and Christianity, clan-loyalties, denominational devotions characterized through Catholic or Presbyterian loyalties, and insider/ outsider images. These cleavages define and influence political preferences and mobilizations. The social base of the Congress reflects its centrist political positioning with a rather “coded ethnic card,”32 defining the finer nuances of the electoral arithmetic. The relative positioning of the Congress and the regional parties with regard to regional aspirations and claims, forms an elemental feature of inter-party competition in the states. Regional parties seek to aggregate and articulate the typically regional and “indigenous” interests and political claims.

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Thus, while the Congress expressed the need for “peace, development, and education,”33 the regional parties expressed their mandate for protecting the rights of tribals.34 This apparent difference in their political positions did not dissuade the Congress candidate from stating that votes from minority “non-tribals” are not “so important” for any Congress victory. This endorsed a coded message for the dominant tribes, obliquely disavowing the censure of being a party for the “plains people,” yet retaining its base among the non tribes. Regional leaders accommodated into national politics often become strong advocates35 of national parties and many of them perceive the Congress as an important political stepladder for upward mobility into a domain larger than that accorded by the regional parties. Such transient political loyalties and ideological depth does not allow for political cohesion among regional forces. The durable factionalism within the regional parties and the local organizational depth of the Congress thus assisted the Congress to make inroads into the social bases of regional parties. Vincent Pala, elected to represent the Shillong parliamentary constituency on a Congress ticket, was considered to be a political greenhorn in electoral politics. He was, however, never far away from politics even when he had been an engineer in a Public Works Department. His influence on political outcomes36 at the state level, even while being a government functionary is seen as a reason for his being offered the party nomination, instead of P.R. Kyndiah who had been a veteran and a minister in the Union Cabinet. Though delimitation had affected the social composition of the constituencies, the impact of any realignment of social forces during these elections was negligible as the broader boundaries of parliamentary constituencies remained unaltered in the state with only two seats. Congress secured a majority in 29 of the 36 assembly constituencies under the Shillong parliamentary seat, while the UDP and the Hill State People’s Democratic Party (HSPDP) candidates secured a majority in the remaining seven. Pala, a Jaintia, won all the seven constituencies in the Jaintia Hills districts and 22 in the Khasi hills districts. His immediate rival won in two constituencies, while the HSPDP candidate won in five constituencies of west Khasi hills district, considered to be the traditional political stronghold of the regional party. A cursory analysis of the assembly constituencies

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reveals that the Congress has made inroads into traditional regional party constituencies, especially in the Khasi Hills districts. It does not reveal the fact that the contest between a composite regional bloc and the Congress was much keener than what such a cursory glance of the election results suggests. Though the Congress received 44.84â•¯percent of the votes polled, there has been a decline of 0.71â•¯percent in its vote share in the state, especially in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills districts. Yet the Congress candidate won by a margin of 1,07,868 votes over his nearest UDP rival, while the regional parties along with the two independent candidates together polled 9,037 votes more than the Congress candidate. To give the Congress its due, it may be stressed that the Congress candidate still received 1,309 votes more than the combined votes polled by three regional party candidates from the UDP, the HSPDP, and the splinter group of the UDP, the Meghalaya Democratic Party. Yet, this small margin indicates the possible potential strength of a common regional candidate and a combined regional bloc. Though the regional parties were in an existing political coalition called the Meghalaya Progressive Alliance (MPA) along with the NCP running the state government before the imposition of President’s rule, the regional parties failed to agree on support for a common candidate. The NCP, an important political force in the state preferred to support the UDP candidate for the Shillong constituency as a reciprocal measure for its support to the NCP candidate for the Tura constituency, because of its limited social base in the Khasi and Jaintia Hills districts. It is also important that in these districts the NCP is viewed as a “Garo” party, while the Khasi and Jaintia Hill-based regional parties do not have enough political grounding in the Garo Hills districts. Tura constituency is considered as the political fief of Purno Agitok Sangma, who had been a representative from this constituency eight times. In fact, the Congress nominee stated that the contest is essentially between her37 and Sangma, implying that Agatha Sangma was merely a political surrogate for her father. Personalities rather than parties became the major feature of the election. Though there were three candidates, the contest had been between Agatha Sangma and Deborah Marak, with the former winning by a

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margin of 17, 945 votes. These elections in Tura have been significant for Congress as it increased its pre-eminence to eight assembly constituencies compared to only three during the 2004 elections, while in 15 other constituencies it came a close second. Therefore, the win of the NCP is not seen as politically significant for the expansion of the Congress bases. The vote share of the NCP was merely 18.78â•¯percent of the total votes polled, and signals the erosion of Sangma’s political base. The NCP could consolidate its vote base in east and south Garo Hills, while Congress manifested its dominance in its traditional base of west Garo hills.38 This waning political influence of Sangma is attributed to his recent political eccentricities in aligning with the BJP in the center and supporting the regional parties in the state, and then seeking to form a government in the state with the Congress.39 The nature and direction of political competition is perceived to be determined by these processes of perpetual political realignments of state politics. The Congress’ pre-eminence is visible in largely “religious minority” dominated areas of Garo Hills, where Purno Sangma’s pro-BJP bias is viewed with skepticism. In the Rajabala and Phulbari unreserved constituencies, with a large religious minority population, the Congress candidate defeated the NCP candidate by a large margin. A significant difference is that, while at least for the parliamentary elections, the party seems relatively more important for the electorate in the Khasi and the Jaintia Hills, in the Garo hills, it is the person who is accorded qualified primacy. An assessment of the broader political history of Meghalaya will make it manifest that the contests between the regional parties themselves, and sometimes regional party dissidents, have made the task of the Congress easier and made its win more likely, especially in the Khasi–Jaintia dominated districts. Ever since the splintering of the regional forces in 1976, regional parties have engaged in a tug of war for political space and political identity among themselves. Yet, due to the convergence of their ideological moorings and policy orientations, parties have often engaged in what can be referred to as “political collusion”40 or cartelization for governance. In Meghalaya, such collusion is revealed in state-level coalitions provisionally formed between regional political formations—and also between regional

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formations and the Congress—while concurrently contesting for analogous social base and political space during elections. This incestuous competition introduces political cynicism amongst the electorate and emasculates substantive democratic engagement by the people curtailing effective political competition. In such a condition, political choices and competition largely are determined by strategic political aims and other forms of patronage linkages obtained in embedded social relations and not by party loyalties or policy choices. Democratic competition in the state is also hemmed in by “traditional institutions” that often control local boroughs through customary methods like social exclusion for voting against collective directives. In a number of constituencies, especially in rural areas, such instances were reported during these elections. Such a system of patronage and fostering of political capital has been mastered by the Congress and is generated through a well lubricated tiered system. The arrest of Congress supporters with prohibited amounts of cash41 and the defrayment of election expenditures for 20 candidates during elections to the Jaintia Hills District Council,42 by the Congress sponsor, are apparent indications. In Meghalaya, the emergence of a small but immensely rich class constituted by the coal lobby as also an urban neo-rich class who largely derive their economic clout from a systematic pilferage of public resources, increasingly define the state’s political agenda. The “briefcase politics”43 that Kochanek referred to also exists where the “money bags” of this amorphous class often gets converted into political influence.44 Meghalaya today is no stranger to the allegations of “selling” of patronage by elected representatives to their cronies and “buying” of votes during elections. This is seen essentially as a forte of the Congress, only because the regional parties often fail to match the selling and buying capacity of the Congress. Such mercenary aims often take away the political innocence attributed to the politics and political actors of hill-tribal states.

Manipur Manipur is currently being referred to as a “failed state” attributed to the pervading crisis of governance. Elected governments are unable

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to secure citizens their democratic rights because of their increasing powerlessness to counter the growing influence of non-state actors in defining and structuring the social and political lives of the citizens. The estheticization of violence is most acutely manifested in the society and political culture of the state where an elected government and 40 insurgent groups45 compete for political legitimacy and social control. Insurgent groups like the Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL) challenge the institutions and legitimacy of the state through effective control of some of the basic services lawfully accorded to the government. In this contest, democratic institutions and structures decline, resulting in the “loss of party base, rise of money, muscle power and ‘gun culture’.”46 There is a consequent rise in a personality cult girded by corrupt networks of patronage. The ephemeral optimism engendered by electoral democracy nurtured in a politics of provisional coalitions and political ambiguity has alienated the people along with the debasement of all political values significant for democratic politics. Manipur thus confronts what an author describes, as many problems “that could possibly appear in the discourse of [any] collective conflict.”47 Yet, Manipur had been one of the princely states to have had a constitutional monarchy obtained through universal adult franchise after the British withdrawal from India.48 But contemporarily, it is not the lessons derived from such a distinctive democratic experiment, but rather the negative specter of identity politics and its splintering effects on the idea of a cohesive political community that is challenging a coherent democratic intent. With more than 32 ethnic groups and subgroups maneuvering for self-rule or secession, electoral politics are largely perceived as a tool for legitimizing the political control49 by a cohort of elites drawn from the diverse society. Yet this perception about the depth of popular engagement in the democratic processes may be challenged by a 77.16â•¯percent turnout in the recently concluded parliamentary elections. The two seats to the parliament are defined as Inner Manipur constituency and Outer Manipur constituency. The former with 91â•¯percent of the state’s land area is predominantly inhabited by the Naga and Kuki-Chin-Mizo tribes, while the valley with 65â•¯percent of the total population of the state is inhabited predominantly by

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the Meiteis, though a few valley constituencies are also included in the Outer Manipur constituency. At a macro level, it would seem that the broad divisions between the hills and the valley primarily shape the political agenda and discourse in the state. However, the internal fractures between the tribes and the triangular contest for political space between the tribes and the foremost ethnic group in the state, the Meiteis, define the configuration of the political choices. The demand for a “greater Nagalim” has also configured interethnic equations in the state, and has also influenced the nature of electoral politics. During the 2009 elections there was no “grand electoral theme or issue.”50 The foremost issues that emerged included the repeal of AFSPA, protecting the territorial integrity51 of Manipur, and preventing vivisection of “Naga-dominated” districts in the hills. Yet, the hollowness of the campaign issues is revealed by a commentator while stating that when all candidates speak of repeal of AFSPA, they conveniently forget that the Act is related to the Army, though the maximum number of rights violations in counterinsurgency operations is being committed by the state commandos.52 The vacuity of the political discourse also becomes apparent in the absence of any debate over substantive issues of livelihood and socioeconomic development. Law and order and peace, debased governance and corruption, substituted as the other cautious exploratory agendas for the elections. The defeat of the sitting Outer Manipur constituency MP Mani Charenamai by the Congress nominee Thangso Baite is attributed to the changing political dynamics influenced partially by a reconfiguration in interethnic relations. Baite, polledâ•¯3,44,517 votes to defeat the sitting MP, Mani Charenamei byâ•¯1,19,798 votes in this Outer Manipur constituency. Outer Manipur constituency consists of the Nagas, the Kuki-Chin-Mizo tribes, the Meiteis in the Valley segment of the constituency, and some other minor tribes. Indeed, the 32 tribes in the hill districts and their clan and tribe lineages often form a significant source of political groupings, claims, and social base of parties in this constituency. As one author states, in the hill districts a “tight-rope-walk pleasing the civil societies and insurgent organisations are of utmost importance”53 for candidates.

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It is in the interstices of these social fissures and intertribal divides that voting patterns and political choices are defined, as what happened during the 2009 elections. The changing ethnic equations and kin linkages politicized by competition over development and distribution of the resource pie became factors that defined voting patterns, more than party loyalties. Every political party derived benefits relative to their degree of divergence or convergence with the dominant ethnic configurations and the voting pattern reflects a sort of ethnic veto over issues and individuals who are suspected to harm ethnic equations. The unyielding competition among Naga groups for control of the “Naga cause” has polarized the tribes constituting the Nagas and has also deepened the suspicion and anxiety among the other tribes in this constituency. As a consequence of this competition, there has also been a split among the Naga insurgent groups. Therefore, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) (NSCN-IM), the Naga National Council (NNC), National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) (NSCN-K), and other splinter groups extended their political support to different candidates and their version of support for the “Naga cause.” Despite an open campaign for Charenamai by groups54 supporting the integration of the Naga inhabited areas of Manipur, Charenamai failed to receive the backing of NSCN-IM as he did in 2004. The split between the Naga tribes was politically consolidated by sections of Naga intellectuals55 who canvassed against the Congress and provided support to the BJP candidate. There was also the alienation of a large section of cross-ethnic voters who may have voted for Charenamai during the 2004 elections. This alienation was buttressed in favor of the Congress candidate significantly by the ceasefire agreement between Kuki insurgents and the government. Charenamai and the People’s Democratic Alliance (PDA) also proposed tribal land reforms in the hill districts that produced a strong insecurity among the large number of tribal groups initiating a polarization among the hill tribes. The Congress candidate had the support of the Meiteis from the valley segment of this constituency, as he is a member of a smaller tribe of the Kuki-chin family and thus strategically more acceptable.

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The Inner Manipur seat composed of 32 assembly segments is a cosmopolitan and urban middle class constituency. Though ethnic and kin loyalties have marginal influence on political outcomes in this constituency, the issue of integration of Naga-contiguous areas received its urban-based political opposition articulately from this constituency. Thokchom Meinya, the sitting MP of the Congress secured 230,876 votes to defeat his rival M. Nara of the CPI by a margin of 30,960 votes in this constituency. Therefore, it is the centrist ideological posturing and middle class centric politics that led voters in this constituency toward the Congress. Congress and its allies in the SPF government are also politically dominant in most of the assembly segments in this constituency. Appeals for repeal of the AFSPA were made along with an emphasis on the need to provide security for peace and development. The promise to implement the 6th Pay Commission recommendations is another contributory factor for Congress support from this middle class constituency. Indeed, the enduring political fortitude of Congress in Manipur may be attributed to its patronage by the middle class. Regional parties like the MPP openly expressed their inability to communicate with the people as a reason for their defeat, which affirms the loss of social base by the oldest regional party among the electorate. This lack of communication can be attributed to the organizational weakness of the regional parties, as well as their inability to cultivate patronage networks that the Congress so effectively has in every state of the region. One of the most secular forms of such patronage is revealingly apparent in the corrupt public life 56 and culture of Manipur. The domination of the Congress in the state and parliamentary elections thus reflects the emasculated condition of the regional parties. Like others states of the region, regional parties in the state are struggling to retain their social bases. It seems that in a condition of social and political chaos, patronage linkages forms the most affective form of social and political survival. The shrinking social base and political clout of the MPP that had formed the first government in the state after the granting of statehood is one such clear example. The MPP, the oldest regional party in the state, received only 7.6â•¯percent of the votes polled with the PDA, receiving 16.78â•¯percent of the

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votes polled in the hill districts. By contrast, the Congress polled 42.96â•¯percent of the total votes polled in the state. Like all small states, the relentless shifting of political loyalties by members of the regional parties to the Congress, the splintering of the Congress into “factional” regional parties and the violent social grid to a large extent affects the quality of democracy in the state.

Mizoram Peace is the dominant social and political idiom in the state that has traversed from being the Lushai (Mizo) Hills District of Assam, to a union territory, and then elevated to full statehood in 1987. As violence delivers its spinoff advantages for states like Manipur, peace too ensures its dividends. Thus, Mizoram was granted a peace package for being able to sustain its peace in a region girded by turmoil. In the extreme corner of India’s map, Mizoram is bordered by Myanmar on the east and the south, and by Bangladesh on the west. An insight into the political history of Mizoram reveals that opposition to the institution of “feudal-chieftainships” resulted in the mobilization of a nascent educated middle class into the “Mizo Union” that asserted their pro-integrationist inclinations.57 The Chieftainships were subsequently abolished in 1953.58 The Mizo Union is the political platform that demanded the establishment of a District Council and undertook political strategies to compel the government of Assam to introduce it at the earliest. It subsequently splintered with one group supporting the newly formed regional party—the Mizo National Front (MNF)—in 1961 and the other splinter group “merged” with the Congress in 1974.59 Conventional narratives view the Mizo insurgency largely as the product of the Mautam,60 yet a closer attention to the political dynamics of the time reveal that it essentially resulted from the competition between the regional forces to embed their social base and secure political dividends. It was certainly precipitated by the famine. And as Chaube states, the “gains of the Mizo crisis went to the Congress while the Mizo Union was the loser.”61 The “political settlement” of the Mizo crisis also modified the nature of competition in Mizoram and craftily expanded the political base of the Congress

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and assisted it in utilizing “the ethnic and cultural differences among the people for partisan purposes.”62 The Mizos are a part of the Kuki-Chin-Mizo groups and are comprised of several tribes like the Raltes, Lakhers, Paites, Luseis, Thado, and others. There are other ethnic groups like the Kukis, Chakmas, and Brus or Reangs in Mizoram. The dominant religion of the state is Christianity with minority groups like Chakmas following Buddhism and the Brus or Reang, Hinduism. The church has always played a dominant role63 in influencing the political dynamics of the state. Indeed, in the political tussle between the Mizo Union and the MNF during mid-1960s, the church had sided with the Mizo Union64 and declared opposition to the armed rebellion by the MNF. The Mizo Presbyterian Church influences Mizoram’s social and political life, routinely issuing strictures and implementation of the “moral code of conduct” to be adhered to by candidates and electors. There is an expression of disdain for the “Bihar, UP-type goondagiri”65 politics by members of NGOs supported by the church. The church and members of the Young Mizo Association (YMA) enforce political discipline among political parties and moderate political debates through common political platforms. Restrictions on political enthusiasm are so impressive that a former Chief Election Commissioner of India quipped that this was the easiest state to conduct elections.66 The extent and role of the church in influencing actual “public policy-making” remains a grey area of conjecture. The 2009 parliamentary election was held in the backdrop of the political conditions created by the sweep of the Congress in the 2008 state assembly elections. The MNF which ran the state since 1998, lost the state elections. Key issues that sealed the fate of the MNF were the increasing corruption and misappropriation of central funds.67 The strong anti-incumbency factor along with the popular perceptions of misgovernance assisted the Congress. The shift in political allegiance between parties in Mizoram, like other small states in the region, also depends on the changes in the party-in-power at the center. Because of their dependence on central assistance and patronage, many of the small states that lack adequate resources of their own prefer to be in a political alliance, however unsteady, with the party in power at the center.

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Congress veteran C.L. Ruala won the elections securing 65.58â•¯percent of the total votes polled. The main opposition party, the MNF, candidate H. Lallungmuana was also supported by the Mizoram People’s Conference (MPC). The other two candidates were from the NCP, Lalawmpuia Chhangte and Rualpawla of a hardly known state party called Israel National Front. The political opening provided by the assembly elections and buttressed by the necessity for party convergence at the state and the center is seen as factors favoring the Congress. In Mizoram, a politically conscious but sedate electorate appears to pursue a decadal cycle of political change whereby political alternation is effected, especially in the state legislature. Also, a change in party configuration of the state does influence the outcome of the parliamentary elections.

Nagaland The Naga people began their political tryst with institutional politics through the boycott of the first general elections held in 1952. It was, however, Phizo’s “election” to the presidency of the NNC by one vote68 that changed the direction of the Naga claim for self-determination. An attempt to formally induct the Nagas into electoral politics was made in 1957, but it was only with the inauguration of the state of Nagaland in 1963 and the first elections to the Assembly that democratic politics was institutionalized. Some scholars argue that it was with the first successful elections in Nagaland in 196469 that a gradual marginalization of forces opposed to political integration with India became manifest. Yet, a complete separation between the armed groups and the democratic actors has been difficult to obtain. Therefore, it is the relationship between the “legally constituted” political representatives elected by the people and the “ideologically constituted” nonstate representatives of the armed groups that sets the boundaries and norms for electoral engagement and defines the nature of democratic politics in Nagaland. It is this intimate association between apparent competitors that has resulted in a caution about the democratic intentions of political parties in the state. Thus, the then governor of Nagaland insisted that Vizol of the UDF pledge his allegiance to the constitution of

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India and his constitutional duty to uphold its territorial integrity.70 This suspicion is essentially acute for the state’s regional parties even now. National parties like the Congress, playing by the same rules, does not ironically evoke any such political suspicion. The political ambiguity of political parties concerning the “Naga issue” is evidenced in the fact that while some parties publicly pledge the “integration of all contiguous Naga areas” others like the Congress innocuously call for “Naga integration.”71 The political project of Nagalim72 in its many avatars is thus a common guarantee by political parties seeking to influence political choices in Nagaland. Ironically while the Congress in Nagaland pledges itself to integrating Nagas in the neighboring state, it concurrently pledges to “safeguard the territorial integrity of Manipur.” Such efforts of the Congress to maintain its “all-India” personality along with manifesting the regional aspirations of constituent states weakens its political credibility. It, however seems to offset this weakness through leveraging its control of the central government and local disbursement of patronage. It is the subtle, yet politically significant claim of “integration” that has immense influence in defining the political choices of the Nagas and political position of the parties. Surprisingly, in 2000, the Congress party under S.C. Jamir attempted to question this in a pamphlet, “Bedrock of Naga Society”73 and suffered consequences in the 2003 Assembly elections. It succeeded in augmenting the fractures among the Nagas further along tribal allegiances, thereby “domesticating” the secessionist sting of insurgent groups. The political price of such an attempt was paid by Congress during the elections, when the electorate favored an incongruent set of political formations to dominate the state assembly. The shared space between the “armed” and “democratic” groups in Naga politics allow both sets of actors to draw upon the resources of each other. The “elected” representatives derive ideological legitimacy from the underground elements by asserting that the present state and its institutions are a stop-gap arrangement,74 pending a “final solution.” The armed groups utilize their “lethal power” to influence political outcomes by providing subtle assistance to their chosen political formations as well as the structures of the state to embellish their

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moral and political legitimacy over the “Naga cause.” This apparent fraternal bond, however, masks the nuanced competition that takes place between the armed groups to expand their popular base and control over the “Naga cause” and often reflected in the ambiguities of Naga politics. Traditionally, the NSCN-K led by a Nemi Naga and supported by the Aos and the Angamis, is perceived as having influenced the prospects of “Jamir’s INC;”75 while the NSCN-IM led by a Thankul and a Sema Naga from Manipur is opposed to the Congress. The NPF76 is popularly perceived as being close to the NSCN-IM, while the NSCN-K is seen as a political instrument of “Jamir’s congress.”77 In Nagaland, the agenda for political discourse is thus broadly patterned by the decades-old Naga claim for self-determination. But the micro-foundations of this agenda are constituted by the intertribal animosity and hostilities between the fluidly fused Naga tribes.78 In Nagaland, like some other states constituting the region, parties hardly ever serve as ideological “carriers” and often play a marginal role in defining electoral outcomes and competing actors. Tribal affiliations, tribal elders, and affiliation to armed groups play crucial roles in deciding “who gets what, when, and how.” However, in a modern Nagaland, it is also the three “Ms”—Money, Muscle, and Madhu79 that are acquiring decisive influence in determining political choices. The social relevance and politicization of tribal affiliations is demonstrable in the fact that both nonstate and state actors draw upon these divisions for legitimacy and political sustenance. In a sense, the formation of the NSCN-IM, NSCM-K or even the NNC are all organized reflections of the entrenched intertribal splits and contestations. Its political institutionalization has been achieved in the structures of the state and democratic processes. The Ao tribe are perceived to have dominance over the state bureaucracy, with the Angamis, Semas, Chakhesangs, and Lothas being the other major players in the political theatre of the state. A Naga commentator observes that these divisions are so entrenched and influential that government policies and political decisions are implemented only by paying due consideration to the interests of the different Naga tribes and effectively recognizing the different tribes as formal political units.80

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An assessment of the social profile of the candidates for state-level elections to the assembly will establish the perception that the Semas have a respectable edge over other tribes in the overall result tally followed by the Aos, Angamis, Chakhesangs, and the others tribes.81 Open proclamation of support by tribes for their own candidates82 illustrates how tribal loyalties determine political choices. This neat pattern, however, does not follow for the parliamentary elections where intertribal coalition and party loyalties does influence voters’ choices, primarily because the space for political maneuvers is restricted by the number of seats in the parliament. Indeed the degree of empathy shown by parties to the “Naga cause” also shapes the scale of their support base. The NPF which had suggested that “statehood was not the final solution to the Naga Problem”83 continued to politically assert the distinctiveness of the “Naga cause” and act as a poised envoy of the Nagas. The election of C.M.Chang of the NPF in 2009, reflects the varying bases that motivate political choices to the state assembly and the parliament. He defeated two-time Congress MP, K. Asungba Sangtam by over 4 lakh votes, receiving 69.96â•¯percent share of the votes polled; the Congress receiving only 29.36â•¯percent. The NPF candidate won comprehensively in 53 assembly segments of the state. NPF also won by-elections in four assembly constituencies along with the parliamentary seat. Congress attempted to use the various forms of available cleavages84 to influence voters’ choices, but it failed to obtain any advantage due to other factors including its own organizational weaknesses. Observers85 attribute the NPF candidate’s win to a number of causes, particularly the leadership vacuum within the Congress after the exit of veteran S.C. Jamir from state politics. The disunity in the Congress revived the competition for control by “factional leaders,” fragmenting its organization and alienating its traditional electoral base. The NPF under Rio has been able to rework the power arrangements in the state and cultivate a new politics of ethnic attrition and political action by building a new coalition of ethnic forces under the nomenclature of “Eastern Nagas.”86 They comprise the Chang, Konyak, Sangtam, Phom, Yimchinger, Khiamnuigan, and other tribes who are spread way beyond the territorial limits of present Nagaland. It is this

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ethnic coalition that forms the new social base of the NPF and has generously assisted the recent political outcomes of the NPF. They constitute the political counter to the Ao, Angami, Lotha dominated Congress support base, which is evidenced in the continuous election of candidates87 from eastern Nagaland to parliament, since the formation of the Democratic Alliance of Nagaland (DAN) government. The presence of these tribes beyond Nagaland also allows the NPF to provide a wider political base to the claim for the integration of the Naga contiguous areas into a single Nagalim. The recent transformation of the “Nagaland” Peoples Front (NPF) into the “Naga” People’s Front and its interest to contest the state assembly elections in Arunachal Pradesh with substantial Naga tribes bordering Nagaland is evidence of the astute political move. The areas comprising “Eastern Nagaland” have 20 representatives to the Nagaland Assembly and form a substantial social base for the state’s regional alliance. The emergence of Neiphiu Rio, the CM and the chief architect of the NPF, as an unfeigned voice for the regional forces in the state has eroded the two-decades of Congress dominance in Nagaland. Rio bolstered by his dominance in the assembly since 2003, followed it with some progressive policies in education and other social sectors ostensibly by sublimating the polarizing principles in Naga politics. His nuanced ethnic approach to political action through the creation of a Department of Underdeveloped Areas (DUDA) for the “development” of the underdeveloped tribes and regions, not only reinforces his “regional” loyalties, but also reconfigures ethnic demography and its consequent politics in the state. The policies and performance of the DAN government led by the NPF has been perceived as improving the fortunes of all sections of the people. Importantly, the NPF and the DAN are seen as being more “pro-Naga” than its forerunners. The issue of the “integration of Naga-dominated areas” of the region into a single territorial unit has been the aspiration of Naga insurgents, which is provided political legitimacy by the NPF. This has assisted in the growth of a social coalition that provisionally integrates diverse Naga tribes especially in the case of parliamentary elections. The collective consensus resulting from such a coalition is reflected in the ability of the NPF to obtain the confidence88 of the dominant Naga voices and Naga “civil

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society” groups like the various tribal Naga Hohos (tribal councils), the student groups, the church, and importantly the educated youth. Yet, the impasse toward a “comprehensive solution” may have stressed the extent of political choices available, thereby also limiting the space for competitive politics.

Tripura Tripura is what Yadav describes as the “Two-Plus”89 competitive format, where the two main political formations—in this case the Congress or the Left Front (CPM, CPI, and Forward Bloc)—had to align with a third formation. Political competition in the state has often been between the CPM-led Left front and the Congress which had provisional alignments with regional parties like the Tripura Upajati Juba Samity (TUJS), the Indigenous Nationalist Party of Tripura (INPT) or the Indigenous Peoples Front of Tripura (IPFT).90 The polarization of the society is reflected in the democratic and also armed confrontation between social forces and political formations representing the interests and claims of the tribes and non tribes. Ethnic polarization in Tripura structures the dynamics of democratic politics like elsewhere in the region. Its institutionalized form began in 1967 with the formation of the TUJS, which many would like to regard as the tribal “wing”91 of the Congress. The Congress, organizationally weak in the tribal belts of the region, had a traditional alignment with tribal political formations like the TUJS or the INPT. Moreover, the Congress like in other states of the region was earlier not “patronised by the hill people.”92 Initially, Congress had been the preferred party of “refugees,”93 while communists with rural bases94 were dominant mostly among the tribes and Muslim minorities.95 In attempting to explain the political dependency of Congress on tribal political formations, observers state that it may have been difficult for Congress to retain its nontribal base and simultaneously nurture a tribal constituency. Thus, it provided support for the formation of a tribal front. Such a political relationship with a tribal formation allowed it to also provisionally attempt the crafting of an imperfect coalition of social forces in its favor. The later formation of indigenous parties in Tripura manifested the inability of “national”

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parties like the Congress and the left parties to adequately articulate the issues96 of the indigenous tribals. Yet none of these tribal political formations like the TUJS, IPFT, and the INPT could affect any significant polarization of tribal votes. Congress, in recent years, seems to have expanded its base among the indigenous tribals of Tripura97 and closely trails the left parties. Left parties drawing its political legacy from the JanamangalJanasiksha Samiti98 were supposed to traditionally have had a strong organizational base in the tribal and rural areas. In a recent survey,99 the CPM is seen as having regained support among the tribal groups that it had lost in the 1990s. This period also coincided with emergence tribal insurgency often backed100 politically by the Congress and the indigenous tribal parties. The link between armed nonstate groups and democratic actors was institutionalized in 2000 when a tribal insurgent group like the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) intimidated101 electors against the CPM during elections to the Tribal Autonomous Councils. Tribal political parties could not consolidate their political power and entrench their support base due to a number of factors. The decrease102 in their support was inversely proportionate to the increase in support for armed ethnic insurgents since 1990s. Later the intense rivalry between leaders after their democratic control of the Autonomous Councils meant for tribal self-governance produced a politics of attrition. The competition for control of the party and the resource disbursing Councils, between over-ground political actors and surrendered militant leaders, eroded any ideological cohesion and political principles, and curtailed their political existence. On the contrary tribal organizations of the CPM like the Tripura Upajati Gana Mukti Parishad had greater organizational depth and political control. The ethnic geography of the state and the social bases of the parties underwent continuous modifications since the mid-1960s when armed tribal groups were allegedly used by the Congress103 to erode the CPM bases in tribal dominated areas. The increasing politicization and militarization of indigenous claims and their subsequent transformation into an armed insurgency apparently representing autochthons’ interests continue to format the social bases of

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parties. This along with other social and political developments has since altered the political dynamics and consequently reordered the traditional bases of parties in the state. Congress has had a steady political relationship with the indigenous parties despite the apparent contesting political loyalties of their respective social bases. Moreover, unlike other states of the region, in Tripura we can perceive a high degree of party identification among the electorate and as such political polarization is embedded. CPM candidates won both parliamentary seats in 2009. Its candidates, Khagen Das for Tripura west general constituency and Baju Ban Riyan from the Tripura Scheduled Tribes (STs) reserved constituency, were re-elected securing almost two-third of the polled vote. The former was elected for the third consecutive time. The latter won it for the 7th term. Of the 15 times elections for the parliamentary seats were held in the state the communists won the west Tripura (unreserved) constituency eight times while it won the east Tripura (tribal reserved) constituency 11 times. The voting pattern of the constituencies reveals widespread support for the CPM among a cross-section of the electorate along with an increase in the support from tribal areas. The Congress comes a poor second in all the areas despite being buoyed from the tribal parties and its apparent support among the Scheduled Castes (SCs) and Other Backward Castes (OBCs).104 Even in the SC constituencies, the CPM candidates secured a substantially higher share105 of the votes cast despite a fall in its overall vote-share. The result does not indicate any significant split in the votes despite the presence of a number of other candidates. The contest remained a bipolar one between the Congress and the CPM. In some constituencies the CPM was ahead of its Congress rival by 10,000 votes. The BJP came third in a number of constituencies and trailed the Congress in a number of tribal dominated constituencies. CPM controls 46 of the total 60 assembly constituencies consolidating its political dominance in the state through the 2009 parliamentary elections. This consolidation can be attributed to a number of positive socioeconomic developments as also the broad dominance of sub-state level institutions like the panchayats and the Autonomous Councils by the CPM and its allies. The disenchantment

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with armed violent groups and its political hosts has widened the space for democratic consensus. The ability of the CPM to expand its dominance can be largely credited to the unconcealed manifestation of factionalism in the state Congress that undermined its role to become an effective opposition. Indeed the Congress in Tripura had been pervasively confronted with factional competition that limited its ability to obtain and retain political power ever since the creation of the state. The formation of the Krishak Samaj, or the Tripura Congress, or Tripura Rajya Congress was all the product of inter-factional competition resulting in an unreliable and wavering social base.

Arunachal Pradesh There is a suggestion that the emergence of political parties is linked to the level of political modernization. Such connect is demonstrated in the fact that the Bardoloi subcommittee106 suggested the denial of franchize to people in the area allegedly due to a lack of political consciousness.107 Party politics was introduced in the state in an oblique manner when two members were appointed to the Governor’s Advisory Council in 1972. The people were represented in the Lok Sabha and later the Rajya Sabha through a nominated representative until 1977.108 The state has come a long way since its transition from a frontier agency to a union territory and finally a state. Yet the lack of a disciplined party system, as in other states of the region, has affected the degree of political contestation and effective expression of political choices. The Congress has remained the dominant party often contesting with its own factional splinters that make failed attempts to develop into parties. The fracture, merger, and revival of parties in the state have thus followed the rise and fall of political personalities. It is these actors, rather than ideologies, that structures political choices in the state. Political competition is made inadequate by the role of these “personalities’” whose charisma, augmented through patronage linkages, forms the political capital that determines choices. Besides the perception that the electoral dynamics are deeply

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influenced by the ruling administration and its role in electoral outcomes, restricts the expansion of political competition. The tenuous dimensions of political contestations in the state during elections to the parliament in 2009 have been centered around claims of autonomy109 by tribes in the Mon region and the Naga tribe dominated Tirap and Changlang (patkai) region; politics over claims by China over these regions and the “disputed” status of Arunachal Pradesh. The growing divide between followers of Christianity and indigenous religions along with issues of “development” like better roads and communications also are important. Emerging social polarization can be glimpsed from the emergence of the BJP as a political force during the last few years. This possibly follows the growing divide between followers of indigenous religions and converts to Christianity. Indeed the overwhelming support for the BJP among the Adi tribe110 and also the Nyishi tribes is an indicative possibility of such a polarization along which political contestation may be more effectively structured in the future. Identity claims by a number of tribal groups in the state is being effectively politicized through democratic politics and the political contestation of such claims could make democratic politics more discordant. One such contestation is visible in the Changlang and Tirap districts which are Naga-inhabited areas and are being claimed as a part of “greater Nagalim.”111 Though primarily claimed by the armed Naga groups, recent attempts by the NPF to represent these areas in the Arunachal Assembly are an indication of its mainstreaming as a broader electoral agenda. The issue of proper political recognition and rehabilitation for the Chakma and Hajong refugees112 also continues as a festering wound in the body politic. Yet as we have stated for other states, such social fractures are inchoately manifested in the outcome of parliamentary results where more macro-level issues assisted by micro-level networks determine political choices. In 2009 there were eight candidates for two seats to parliament, although the contest was mainly restricted between the BJP, which was attempting to retain the two seats, and the Congress. The endeavor by minor political forces113 to constitute a broad non-Congress, non-BJP coalition called the Arunachal Democratic Alliance (ADA) did not provide much political depth as a potential alternative.

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For the western parliamentary constituency, the sitting BJP Member, Kiren Rijiju, who had received the best parliamentarian award during his last tenure, contested against the erstwhile student leader and former minister, Takam Sanjay. Perceived by keen observers as a “clear winner,” Rijiju lost the elections to Sanjay by only 1, 314 votes receiving 48.6â•¯percent of the popular vote. A political leader this writer spoke to revealed under conditions of anonymity that Rijiju is morally still considered a winner as the elections were strongly influenced by the “ruling administration.” Ironically, shifting loyalties influenced by political opportunities is not only a habit among the electorate but also party loyalists like Rijiju, who joined the Congress soon after losing the elections. The eastern Arunachal constituency that also comprises Tirap and Changlang districts returned the Congress nominee Ninong Ering who defeated the sitting BJP member Tapir Gao. The Arunachal Congress (AC) candidate, supported by the ADA, Lowangcha Wanglat, was essentially a Congress rebel who was nominated after being denied the Congress ticket. His strong presence among the Naga tribes in the Tirap and Changlang was established in the fact that he received overwhelming support among them. In this constituency the biggest factor was the role of the dominant Naga tribes and their political contest with the Adis who identify strongly with the vision of a united Arunachal Pradesh and oppose any vivisection of the state to fulfil the demands of a greater Nagalim. The split in the Adi votes aided the Congress as a substantial share of votes from the Naga tribes went to Wanglat.

In Conclusion We may conclude by stating that dominant democratic theories view political competition as an ideal principle so very essential to the consolidation of democracy. Nevertheless, a perfect competitive system—especially in sociopolitical contexts as those prevailing in the northeast India—may not only be difficult to obtain but in the short run seems counter-productive to democratic engagements.

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The presence of various forms of embedded networks in the region restricts the aggregation of individual political choices that are necessary for democratic political outcomes in an ideal competitive political milieu. In all the states, personalities, and their kin-affiliations are politically more significant than ideologies and substantive issues. Therefore, elections are increasingly being perceived as “entrypoints” to a lucrative patronage network rather than as instruments to enhance political accountability through competitive engagement. As substantiated in the case of Meghalaya, modern politics opens up a new realm of power for actors of traditional institutions that assist in their attempts to consolidate traditional power bases and broaden clientelist networks. Therefore the institutional architecture related to the politicized embedded networks and loyalties results in a variety of ethnic politics that manifest a messy democratic moment in the region. Apparently such architecture has provided marginalized ethnic groups an indigenous political voice and control over redistribution of resources hitherto controlled by dominant ethnocultural groups. But the institutional logic of such architecture has empowered only specific groups and a very limited dispersal of resources. It has only allowed some actors to capture state resources that allow them to embed clientelist networks and construct political outcomes that eventually favor their rent-seeking abilities. Such architecture thus increased the political relevance of ethnic identity and introduced political opportunities that make ethnic identity the basis for political participation and making political choices in all the states we have discussed in this chapter. It is apparent that ethnic nepotism and patronage forms the core base of political support in the region. Such patronage networks has paradoxically also assisted in the incorporation of radical militant members and groups into the democratic political system by manifesting its political “opportunities.” Democratic conciliation may thus seem to be moderately triumphing over violent armed rebellions, because it accords “separatist” leaders a new space for articulation and aggregation of their distinct political interests. Yet the simultaneous presence and equally convincing apology for armed groups and appreciation of institutionalized politics

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imperils effective party-competition and an institutionalized expression of political preferences and choices in the region. The antinomies of these dual loyalties reflect the tenuous quality of democratic values and processes in the region. This is visible in the politics of armed movements and their sublimation through democratic engagement in Mizoram and may soon be seen in Nagaland. Moreover the democratic empowering of specific groups institutionally and politically fragments ethnic groups and limit the possibilities for interethnic coalition building and political consensus. It has provided an institutional means for the consolidation of political power by recognized ethnic groups who attempt to politically marginalize other minor ethnic groups, thereby intensifying intra and interethnic contestation that necessarily does not converse with democratic norms. The recurrent instances of resistance by newer ethnic groups suggest that there are limits to political access and participation placed on minor ethnic groups. The pervading culture of violence and attempts to redesign the contours of the body politic of the region, which also results from a lack of confidence in democratic institutions and governance, frustrates all possibilities of interethnic negotiation through institutionalized democratic engagement. Indeed the characteristic duality that some scholars observe in working of Indian democracy where competitive mobilization of insular identities precedes political coalitions by such social groups are manifested in its unique ways in the region. For, on the one hand, there is the lack of a procedural consensus for the resolution of interethnic disagreements through the political medium of competition in the region. On the other hand, political competition seems to have at least provisionally incorporated groups into a democratic political process. Besides, a violent social grid is tempered by occasional democratic diffusion and armed groups coexist with legitimate democratic actors. In all the states of the region, party politics also often plays secondfiddle to various forms of “movement politics” that largely define the structure and content of politics. Though it is currently being argued that parties necessarily have no determining role in the consolidation of democracy, a stable party system still remains an important process through which a customary pattern of political interactions could be institutionalized in enhancing the quality of democracy.

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Notes â•‡ 1. Christian Wagner, “Democracy and State in South Asia: Between Fragmentation and Consolidation?” Asian Survey, Vol. 39, No. 6 (November–December 1999), pp. 908–25. â•‡ 2. Zoya Hasan (ed.), Parties and Party Politics in India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 1. â•‡ 3. See Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar, “Ten Theses on State Politics in India,” Seminar, Vol. 591 (November 2008), pp. 14–22. â•‡ 4. Jonathan Spencer, Anthropology, Politics, and the State: Democracy and Violence in South Asia (New Delhi: Cambridge University Press, 2007), p. 78. â•‡ 5. Hasan, Parties and Party Politics in India, p. 1. â•‡ 6. Sandeep Shastri, K.C. Suri, and Yogendra Yadav (eds), Electoral Politics in Indian States: Lok Sabha Elections in 2004 and Beyond (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2009), p. 401. â•‡ 7. Stuart Corbridge and John Harriss, Reinventing India: Liberalization, Hindu Nationalism, and Popular Democracy (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. xxvi. â•‡ 8. Such a view is expressed in the book by Andrew Wyatt and John Zavos (eds), Decentring the Indian Nation (London and Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass/ISBS, 2003), p. 2. â•‡ 9. Yogendra Yadav and Suhas Palshikar, “Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002: From Hegemony to Convergence,” in Peter Ronald deSouza and E. Sridharan (eds), India’s Political Parties (New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2006). 10. Yadav and Palshikar, “Ten Theses on State Politics in India.” 11. Tejbir Singh, “The Problem,” Seminar, Vol. 591 (November 2008), pp. 12–13. 12. Yadav and Palshikar, “Party System and Electoral Politics in India,” p. 401. 13. Ashis Nandy, “The Culture of Indian Politics: A Stock Taking,” The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 30, No. 1 (November 1970), pp. 57–79. 14. Jairam Ramesh, “Northeast India in a New Asia,” Seminar, Vol. 550, (June 2005). 15. Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular: Nationalism, Multiculturalism, and Citizenship (New York: Oxford University Press, 2001), p. 94. 16. Ramesh C. Thakur, “The Fate of India’s Parliamentary Democracy,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Summer, 1976), pp. 263–93. 17. “ULFA to Support Congress-I,” The Hindu (Chennai), September 11, 1999. 18. “Mohilary Paid us `â•›50 Lakh: NDFB,” The Telegraph (Kolkata), July 7, 2009. Available online at: http://telegraphindia.com/1090707/jsp/northeast/story_ 11202721.jsp 19. Yadav and Palshikar, “Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States,” p. 407. 20. See Rajesh Dev, “Institutional Designs and Ethnopolitical Conflict Transformation: Assessing Peace-building Initiatives in North-East India,” in Prasenjit Biswas and C. Joshua Thomas (eds), Peace in India’s North-East: Meaning, Metaphor, and Method (New Delhi: Regency Publications, 2006), pp. 189–207.

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21. Patrick Heller, “Degrees of Democracy: Some Comparative Lessons from India,” World Politics, Vol. 52, No. 4 (July 2000), pp. 484–519. 22. The 1977 “Janata Wave”, for instance, had no impact on electoral outcomes in the region. Similarly despite the above-average voter turnout in democratic, the political integration of the region is being challenged by a large number of armed groups. 23. Sanjib Baruah, “Assam: Confronting a failed partition,” Seminar, Vol. 591, (November 2008), pp. 33–37. 24. Shastri, Suri, and Yadav, Electoral Politics in Indian States, p. 61. 25. The term is from Will Kymlicka, Politics in the Vernacular, op. cit. 26. Yogendra Yadav, “Northeasts of India,” Indian Express, Available Online at: www.indianexpress.com/news/northeasts-of-india/280367/ (last date of access: March 5, 2008). 27. Yadav and Palshikar, “Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States, 1952–2002”, p. 84. 28. See S.K. Chaube, Electoral Politics in Northeast India (Madras: Universities Press, 1985), p. 7. 29. Shastri, Suri, and Yadav, Electoral Politics in Indian States, p. 400. 30. Rajesh Dev, “Political Morality, Alliances, & Governance,” The Statesman (Kolkata), March 10, 2008. 31. Patricia Mukhim, “Web of Runaway Politics,” The Telegraph (Kolkata), April 6, 2009. 32. Kanchan Chandra, “The Transformation of Ethnic Politics in India: The Decline of Congress and the Rise of the Bahujan Samaj Party in Hoshiarpur,” in The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 59, No. 1 (February 2000), pp. 26–61. 33. “Businessman-turned Politician Spells Out Priorities,” Shillong Times, April 1, 2009. 34. “Rev Basaiawmoit to Fight for Tribal Rights,” The Shillong Times, April 2, 2009. 35. For an indication of this trend see Chaube, Electoral Politics in Northeast India. 36. Patricia Mukhim, “The Winner Takes it All,” The Shillong Times, May 22, 2009. 37. “Fight is between me and Purno: Deborah,” The Shillong Times, April 2, 2009. 38. Andrew W. Lyngdoh, “So, the Best Man and Woman are…,” The Shillong Times, May 21, 2009. 39. Rajesh Dev, “D-Day for ‘DD’,” The Shillong Times, May 14, 2009. 40. Ian Marsh (ed.), Political Parties in Transition? (Sydney: Federation Press, 2006), p. 116. 41. “Police Arrest Two Cong Supporters,” The Shillong Times, April 17, 2009. 42. “Business Man-turned Politician Spells Out Priorities,” The Shillong Times, April 1, 2009. 43. Stanley A. Kochanek, “Briefcase Politics in India: The Congress Party and the Business Elite,” in Asian Survey, Vol. 27, No. 12 (December 1987), pp. 1278–1301. 44. See “Another Probe into Shillong Jailbreak,” The Telegraph (Kolkata), July 24, 2009.

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45. For information on terrorist insurgent groups in Manipur, see http://www.satp. org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/manipur/terrorist_outfits/index.html 46. Oinam Bhagat, “Electoral Politics in Manipur: A Study,” in Apurba Baruah and Rajesh Dev (eds), Ethnic Identities and Democracy: Electoral Politics in Northeast India (New Delhi: Regency Publications, 2006), p. 104. 47. Oinam Bhagat, “Patterns of Ethnic Conflict in the North-East: A Study on Manipur,” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. 38, No. 21 (May 24–30, 2003), pp. 2031–37. 48. Bimol Akoijam, “How History Repeats Itself,” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. 36, No. 30 (July 28–August 3, 2001), pp. 2807–12. 49. This idea of elections as a “means of ensuring political control” is drawn from B. Ginsberg, The Consequences of Consent (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1982). 50. “AFSPA and the Elections,” Editorial, Imphal Free Press (Imphal) April 6, 2009. 51. “Integrity Icing in Brief Speech,” The Telegraph (Kolkata) April 3, 2009. 52. Chitra Ahanthem, “Sounds of Silence,” Imphal Free Press (Imphal) April 11, 2009. 53. Bhagat, “Electoral Politics in Manipur,” p. 125. 54. “Delhi Students Team Campaign for PDA Candidate at Tamenglong,” Imphal Free Press (Imphal) April 11, 2009. 55. “Congress Creating Problems Everywhere, says Prof. Gangmumei,” Imphal Free Press (Imphal) April 12, 2009. 56. See Noorul Hooda, “Rampant Insurgency in Manipur,” in People’s Democracy, Vol. 33, No. 12 (March 29, 2009). 57. S.K. Chaube, Hill Politics in Northeast India (Hyderabad: Orient Longman, 1999 reprint), pp. 176–77. 58. Chaube, “Electoral Politics in Northeast India,” p. 195. 59. Ibid., p. 197. 60. See Sajal Nag, Contesting Marginality: Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Sub-nationalism in North-East India (Delhi: Manohar, 2002), pp. 217–18. 61. Chaube, Hill Politics in Northeast India, p. 182. 62. Chaube, Electoral Politics in Northeast India, p. 194. 63. “Pastor Politics,” Tehelka Magazine, Vol. 5, No. 46 (November 22, 2008). 64. Chaube, Hill Politics in Northeast India, p. 181. 65. “Why Mizoram is Lyngdoh’s Favourite State,” Available Online at: http://in.rediff. com/election/2003/nov/14spec.htm (last date of access: November 14, 2003). 66. Ibid. 67. “Sonia Promises Corruption-free Government,” Available Online at: http://www. morungexpress.com/regional/8738.html (last date of access: November 29, 2008). 68. Chaube, Hill Politics in Northeast India, p. 158. 69. Udayon Misra, The Periphery Strikes Back: Challenges to the Nation-State in Assam and Nagaland (Shimla: IIAS, 2000), p. 46. 70. Chaube, Electoral Politics in Northeast India, p. 165. 71. Cited in Rajesh Dev, “Ethnic Self-determination and Electoral Politics in Nagaland,” in Apurba K. Baruah and Rajesh Dev (eds), Ethnic Identities

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and Democracy: Electoral Politics in North East India (New Delhi: Regency Publication, 2006), p. 77. Also see “Cong Chants Unity Mantra,” The Telegraph (Kolkata), April 15, 2009. 72. Nagalim is an “imagined” state of Nagaland where Nagas settled in different states and countries would settle in their own lebensraum. 73. Nagaland Pradesh Congress Committee, “Bedrock of Naga Society,” (Kohima: NPCC-I, 2000). 74. See “NPF Leaders Upbeat on Polls,” Eastern Mirror (Kohima), February 5, 2003. 75. See “Legislators Warned to Keep Off,” Eastern Mirror (Kohima), March 4, 2003. 76. It has since changed its name to Naga People’s Front, as a part of its political strategy to extend its social base to neighboring states where Nagas reside. This exacerbated the interethnic, inter-state conflicts in the region. 77. See Rajesh Dev, “Ethnic Self-determination and Electoral Politics in Nagaland,” in A.K. Baruah and Rajesh Dev (eds), Ethnic Identities and Democracy: Electoral Politics in North East India (New Delhi: Regency Publications, 2006), p. 88. 78. There are varied estimates about the number of tribes constituting the “Naga,” though there is a standard consensus about 16 tribes. 79. Unlike the Mandir, Mandal, and Market, the three “Ms” have a different significance in Nagaland. Madhu being Nagamese (a pidgin of Assamese and Hindi) for liquor. See Samir K. Purkayastha, “Naga Candidates Dial M for Votes,” The Telegraph (Kolkata), March 3, 2009. 80. Aselie Pusa, “Politics in Naga Society-The Inter-tribal Relations,” unpublished Ph. D. thesis, Northeastern Hills University, 1996, p. 123. 81. See Dev, “Ethnic Self-determination and Electoral Politics in Nagaland,” p. 85. 82. “Chakhesang Community Declares Support,” Eastern Mirror (Kohima), February 15, 2003. 83. See “NPF Leaders’ Upbeat On Polls,” Eastern Mirror (Kohima), February 5, 2003. 84. For instance, Congress sought to influence voters in this Christian-dominated state by terming the NPF as “anti-Christian” for aligning with the BJP as also the anti-Christian conduct of the NPF candidate for being “polygamous.” The Telegraph, April 15, 2009. 85. A large number of social commentators the author spoke to made almost similar observations. The author would like to acknowledge the efforts of Apam Muivah in facilitating these interactions. 86. “DUDA Created for Development: Rio,” The Nagaland Post (Kohima), June 8, 2009. 87. Also see Amongla N. Jamir, “Nagaland: Behind the Curtain,” Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. XLIV, No. 39 (September 26, 2009), p. 170. 88. For information on terrorist insurgent groups in Manipur, see http://www.satp. org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/manipur/terrorist_outfits/index.html 89. Yadav and Palshikar, “Party System and Electoral Politics in the Indian States,” p. 86. 90. N.C. Debbarma, a retired government official, recently revived the IPFT. He is considered to be the influence behind all the political fronts of the indigenous people.

â•…â•…â•…


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â•‡ 91. Chaube, Electoral Politics in Northeast India, p. 181. â•‡ 92. Chaube, Hill Politics in Northeast India, p. 208. â•‡ 93. Chaube, Electoral Politics in Northeast India, p. 176. â•‡ 94. Ibid. â•‡ 95. Chaube, Hill Politics in Northeast India, p. 173. â•‡ 96. Chaube, Electoral Politics in Northeast India, p. 189. â•‡ 97. Center for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS) Post Poll Data, 2009. â•‡ 98. Ranjit Kumar De, Socio-political Movements in India (New Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1998), p. 153. â•‡ 99. CSDS Post Poll Data, 2009. 100. See Kalyan Chaudhuri, “A Verdict against Insurgency,” in Frontline, Vol. 19, No. 6, (March 16–29), 2002. 101. Ibid. Also see “Militants Step Up Violence on Poll Eve in Tripura,” Available Online at: www.nenanews.com, April 22–May 6, 2000. 102. Manas Paul and Rajesh, “Ethnic Groups, Electoral Politics, and Democratic Consensus in Tripura,” in Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. XXXVIII, No. 15, April 12, 2003. 103. See “A Verdict against Insurgency,” Chaudhuri. 104. CSDS Post Poll Data, 2009. 105. Preliminary detailed data released by the Tripura Election Department. 106. The Bardoloi Sub-committee was appointed by the Constituent Assembly to consider the administrative patterns for areas termed as North-East Frontier Agency, comprising the Balipara and Tirap Frontier Tracts, the Abor and Mishmi Hills Districts, together with the Naga Tribal Area. See. Chaube, Hill Politics in Northeast India p. 188. 107. Ibid., p. 193. 108. Chaube, Electoral Politics in Northeast India p. 192. 109. See Special Correspondent, “Arunachal Districts Bordering China Press for Autonomy,” The Hindu (Chennai), October 20, 2008. 110. There is a growing effort by religious organizations to provide an indigenous religious identity, Doni Polo (the sun and the moon) an institutionalized religious structure along the lines of the Hindu pantheon. The Adis are also the most dominant tribe in the state. 111. The NSCN claims Tirap and Changlang districts as part of their greater Nagalim project. For details, see http://www.angelfire.com/mo/Nagaland/Background. html 112. Chakmas and Hajongs are denied their rightful place in Arunachal Pradesh. For more details, see http://www.hrdc.net/sahrdc/hrfeatures/HRF42.htm 113. These marginal political players included the NCP, the People’s Party of Arunachal Pradesh, the Arunachal Congress, the Janata Dal (U), the Lok Bharati Party and the Lok Janashakti Party.

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About the Editors and Contributors Editors Paul Wallace is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of Missouri, Columbia. He has been a consultant on South Asia to members of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the US Attorney General’s Office, defense lawyers, and other agencies in North America and has received five Smithsonian funded awards for national election studies in India. In September 2003, Prof. Wallace served as the expert witness on Sikh violence at the Air India trial in Vancouver, Canada. He lectures throughout India, almost on an annual basis. In January 2009, he served as a major participant in celebrating the 15th Anniversary of the Institute of Development and Communications in Chandigarh, India. His research in India also includes a Senior Fulbright Research Award, and funding from the Ford Foundation, the American institute of Indian Studies, and various government and non-government groups in India. Professor Wallace is the author or editor of seven books and more than 40 book chapters and articles. His last book, with Ramashray Roy, was India’s 2004 Elections: Grass-roots and National Perspectives (2007). His most notable chapter publication is “Counterterrorism in India: Khalistan & Kashmir” in the 2007 book titled Democracy and Counterterrorism: Lessons from the Past. A forthcoming publication is “Sikh Militancy and Non-violence,” in Pashaura Singh’s edited book Sikhism in Global Context. Ramashray Roy is a founding member and former director (1976–82) of the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies (CSDS), Delhi. He has recently served as a visiting Fellow at the G.B. Pant Institute of Social Sciences, Allahabad. During a long and distinguished career, Professor Roy has taught at several prestigious universities including the University of Texas, Austin; the University of California at both

About the Editors and Contributors

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Los Angeles and Berkeley; and the University of Missouri, Columbia. A recipient of Woodrow Wilson and Ford Foundation Fellowships, Professor Roy has also been a National Professor of the University Grants Commission (UGC) in 1987 and a National Fellow of the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR) from 1994 to 1996. His areas of interest include political parties, bureaucracy, electoral behavior, Indian politics, development, Gandhian thought, and political philosophy. His most recent of over 20 books is Democracy in India: Form and Substance (2005).

Contributors Amiya K. Chaudhuri taught political science in Calcutta and Vidyasagar before his present position as a Fellow in Maulana Azad Institute of Asian Studies, Ministry of Culture, Government of India, Kolkata. His latest publication is Contemporary Politics and Changing Economy of Bihar (2010). In addition, he has authored several books, book chapters, and more than two-dozen journal articles. He continues to add to his total of more than 200 newspaper articles. Rainuka Dagar is Director (Research), Gender Studies Unit, at the Institute for Development and Communication (IDC). Her work focuses on two separate research fields—gender and justice, and democratic governance. In the domain of gender, her engagement is with the study of the politics of gender constructs, gender positioning in multicultural societies, and gender in conflict dynamics with an application of culturally sensitive methodologies. Her recent publications include Rethinking Female Foeticide: Perspective and Issues (2007) and Mapping Criminal Justice Delivery in India (2009), which is co-authored. Jyotirindra Dasgupta is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. His work has focused on development politics, language planning, ethnic mobilization, and socioeconomic development in India and in comparative perspective. His publications include Language Conflict and National

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Development: Group Politics and National Language Policy in India (1968) and Authority, Priority, and Human Development (1981). Recent publications deal with different aspects of multicultural democratization and federal development processes. Rajesh Dev is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Delhi University. Prior to this, he was a faculty member in the Department of Political Science at Women’s College, Shillong, and visiting faculty in Political Science in the Department of Law, North Eastern Hill University, Shillong. His research interests are in areas of political ethnography, identity politics and democratic discourse, and human rights. His co-edited books include Ethnonarratives, Identity and Experience in Northeast India and Ethnic Identities and Democracy (2006). He has also authored numerous articles and chapters. He serves as Executive Secretary of argueIndia, a research group based in Shillong. Raghavendra Keshavarao Hebsur is former Professor of Social Sciences and a Deputy Director of Tata Institute of Social Sciences (TISS), Mumbai. His work includes Reactions to the Reservations for Other Backward Classes: A Comparative Study of Four States, Vol. 4 (1980). He has co-authored with three colleagues, Factors Contributing to the Bombay Riots and Violence, 1992–93, published in 1995. Christophe Jaffrelot has been Director of CERI (Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Internationales) at Sciences Po (Paris) between 2000 and 2008. He is Research Director at the CNRS (Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique) and teaches South Asian politics and history at Sciences Po. His most significant publications are The Hindu Nationalist Movement and Indian Politics: 1925 to the 1990s (1996), India’s Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Lower Castes in North India (2003), and Dr Ambedkar and Untouchability: Analysing and Fighting Caste (2005). He has also edited Pakistan: Nationalism Without a Nation? (2002) and co-edited with P. Van der Veer, Patterns of Middle Class Consumption in China and India (2008); with S. Kumar, Rise of the Plebeians? The Changing Face of Indian Legislative Assemblies (2009), and with L. Gayer, Militias of South Asia (2010).


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G. Gopa Kumar is Head of the Department of Political Science and Dean of Social Sciences, University of Kerala, and Director General of the Institute of Parliamentary Affairs, Government of Kerala. He served as the Kerala State Coordinator for the CSDS election studies during 1996–2008. He has authored seven books and over 120 research articles. His awards include a Fulbright, Indo-Shastri, Indo-French Cultural Exchange, and Australia–India Council. He also served as Visiting Professor in the USA and Canada. His major publications include Congress Party and State Politics (1984), Regional Parties and State Politics (1986), and Future of Parliamentary Democracy in India (2007). Pramod Kumar is Director, Institute for Development and Communication (IDC), Chandigarh and Chair, Punjab Governance Reforms Commission (PGRC). His work focuses on three interrelated themes of politics of development, violence, and governance; politics of conflict management; and resolution and practice of democracy through empirical methodologies and analysis of public policy and peoples movements. He is a recipient of the prestigious Homi Bhabha Award for the year 1988–90 for his work on ‘Causation and Forms of Ethnic Conflicts and Interâ•‚ethnic Coâ•‚operation in India’. His publications are Polluting Sacred Faith; Punjab Crisis: Context and Trends; Victims of Militancy in Punjab (co-authored); Towards Understanding Communalism (edited); and Mapping Criminal Justice Delivery in India (co-authored). Binoy Shanker Prasad holds a PhD in political science from the University of Missouri-Columbia, USA. A former Fulbright scholar, his teaching and research career extends from Delhi University, Jawaharlal Nehru University, and Mithila University in India to Centennial College and Ryerson University in Canada. He has been an analyst of the politics of Bihar, his native state, for 30 years. His recent book is Violence Against Minorities: Riots and the State in the United States and India (2010). Maneesha Roy is a faculty member in the Department of Political Science at Sri Guru Nanak Dev Khalsa College, Delhi University.

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She has completed her PhD, MPhil, and MA degrees from Delhi University. She is a recipient of the ICSSR Doctoral Fellowship in 2002 and UGC’s Junior Research Fellowship in 1999. Her research interests include Indian politics, particularly religious and caste mobilization and electoral politics in India. She has authored several articles and a number of chapters. Ghanshyam Shah, retired professor from JNU, is at present National Fellow, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla. He has authored more than 12 books in the field of political science and sociology, that includes Social Movements in India (2004), Caste and Democratic Politics in India (2004), and Dalit Identity and Politics (2001). At present, he is working on “Globalisation, Civil Society and Governance.” Bhawani Singh retired as Professor and Head of the Department of Political Science, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur. He has written ten books including Confessional Terror: The Dateline to Death (2007), co-authored with Vibhuti Singh Shekhawat, Mizoram: The Politics of Tribal Homeland (2009), and Nagaland: The Politics of Alternate Discourse (2009). In addition to this, he has also edited 10 books. Vibhuti Singh Shekhawat is Associate Professor at Humanities and Social Sciences Department in Malaviya National Institute of Technology Jaipur. He is MA, MPhil, and PhD (Political Science), MA (Sociology), and also holds a MBA degree. He has contributed a dozen articles and has written seven books including: Supreme Court and Judicial Independence (1996), Confessional Terror: The Dateline to Death (2007), and Shri Lanka: The Politics of Tamil Eelam, co-authored with Bhawani Singh (2009). Karli Srinivasulu is Professor of Political Science at Osmania University, Hyderabad, India. He has been Visiting Fellow at University of Oxford and Senior Fellow of the Indian Council of Social Science Research (ICSSR). His interests include political theory, agrarian and Dalit movements, and public policy. He is presently doing a research on the Politics of Special Economic Zones (SEZs)


399

and State and Business relations in India. His forthcoming book is Karamchedu, Chunduru and Beyond Dalit Movement in Andhra Pradesh. He authored the chapters on Andhra Pradesh for the Wallace–Roy volumes on the 1999 and 2004 elections. Praveen Krishna Swami is Associate Editor of The Hindu, and is based in New Delhi. He reports on security and intelligence issues.

400


Index Advani, L. K., 14, 34, 123, 167, 169, 174, 182–187, 228, 231, 260, 283 AHIND, 274, 284 Ahmad, Dr Shakeel, 318, 319 Akali Dal, 11, 33, 48, 51, 61n 19, 83–84, 99–100, 124 Akhrani, Maqbool, 342 Akhtar, Shamim, 325 alliance formation background, 23–26 birth of UPA, 35–36 Chandrashekhar-led government, 31 compulsions of, 29 Congress prominence, 30 considerations and prospects, 29 Deve Gowda-led government, 31 difficulty, complexity, uncertainty, and unpredictability factors, 27–28 Gujral-led government, 31 and multiple bipolarities, 27 NDA-led, 32–33 and process of economic development, 30 reasons, 21–22, 26 state-based political parties, role of, 28–29 Third Front, 38 Vajpayee-led government, 31–32 V.P. Singh-led National Front, 30–31 All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, 4–5 All India Congress Committee (AICC), 36 All India Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIDMK), 11, 32

All India Forward Bloc, 4–5, 7 All India Majlis-E-Ittehadul Muslimeen, 4–5 All India Trinamool Congress, 4–5 Ambani, Anil, 169 Anand, Lovely, 324 Andhra Pradesh 2009 assembly elections, regional break-up, 297 BJP status, 289 caste identity, 306 changing party structure in, 301–305 civil society organizations, 305 Congress government, 290 Congress performance in 2009 elections, 286 Congress-TSR alliance, 288, 303 CPI(M) status, 289 Development of Women and Children in Rural Areas (DWCRA) program, 297 election promises and mobilization strategies, 291–294 electoral alliances, 287–290, 298 Kamma community, 300, 304–305 Madiga–Mala caste lines, 300 Muslim electoral behavior, 300 Naidu regime’s, 297–298, 299, 303 PRP’s leadership, 290, 291, 293–295, 304 Reddy community, 304 shifting of social support base of parties, 297–301 social configuration and electoral outcome, 294–297 status of Hyderabad city, 288 TDP-led alliance, 289, 297

Index

TDP regime, 289, 305 TDP’s election strategy, 291, 294, 295, 299, 300 Telangana issue, 288, 292, 295 welfare schemes implemented by Congress government, 290, 292, 302, 303 YSR’s padayatra, 289 YSR’s regime, 301, 302, 304, 306 Ansari, Vice President Mohammad Hamid, 10 anti-Congressism, 43 Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA), 362, 371 Arunachal Democratic Alliance (ADA), 385 Arunachal Pradesh, 384–386 Assam Gana Parishad (AGP), 4–5, 34 Assam United Democratic Front (AUDF), 4–5, 364 Azad, Ghulam Nabi, 339 Babri Masjid demolition, 300 Bachchan, Amitabh, 258 Backward and Minority Communities Employees’ Federation (BAMCEF), 144 Badal, Parkash Singh, 51, 115, 124 Badal, Sukhbir Singh, 115 Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), 4–5, 11 and anti-incumbency factor in UP, 151 in Bihar, 321 as a Dalit party, 152–156 introduction of reservations on an economic basis, 146–147 Kerala, 237 2009 Lok Sabha elections, 140–144 and Mayawati’s strategy, 145–148 and Muslim community, 148–149 national campaign, 148 performance, 151 progress in elections, 141

401

in Punjab, Delhi, Madhya Pradesh, and Maharashtra, 143 reason for setback, 150–153 by State in 2009/2004, 144 strategy initiated by Kanshi Ram, 144–152 transferable vote bank and this “plus vote,” 145 in UP, 142 and upper caste conventions, 147 in Uttarakhand and Haryana, 143 in Vidarbha and Marathwada, 143 vote percentage in seven general elections, 143 votes polled by the candidates, 141–142 voting Pattern by class, 158 voting Pattern by locality, 157 voting Pattern of UP castes and communities, 145, 149–150, 157 Bahujan Vikas Aaghadi, 4, 6 Bairwa, Khilari Lal, 226 Baitha, Kailash, 312 Bandyapadhyay, D., 195 Banerjee, Mamata, 17, 116, 194–195, 208, 209, 218, 320 Bantala incident, 195 Bardhan, A.P., 277 Basaveshwara, 272 Bashir-ud-Din, Maulvi Mohammad, 343 Basu, Biman, 205 Basu, Jyoti, 196 Batla House encounter, 149 Bhagora, Mahavir, 226 Bharati, Swami Dinesh, 343 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 4–5, 10, 31 Akali-BJP government, 51 Andhra Pradesh, 289 BJP’ recommendations, 2009 elections, 50

402


BJP-SS alliance, Maharashtra, 252, 258–259, 263–264 decline of, reasons, 33–34 federal structure, of Indian politics, 107 Gujarat Assembly Elections (1990– 2007), 168 Gujarat Lok Sabha Elections (1991– 2009), 167, 169 JD(S)-BJP, Karnataka, 275 JD(U)-BJP alliance, Bihar, 312–313, 317 Karnataka, 274, 276 Kerala, 236, 239 Rajasthan, 218, 230–233 vote percentages 1984–2009, 14 vs Congress, 2009 election, 34–35 vs Congress Party, 2009 election, 34–35 Bhartiya Kisan Union (BKU), 153 Bihar politics BSP, 321 caste-wise, 315–316 Communist parties, 320–321 criminal history, 322–323 Dalits vs Chamars, 328 election process, 331–332 JD(U)–BJP alliance, 312–313, 317 JD(U)–sponsored tainted characters, 323 Kurmis community, 312 Lalu–Rabri regime, 322, 325–326 Mahadalit Commission, 328 Maoists (Naxalite), 320–321 mobilization of EBCs, 327 Muslim vote bank, 328–329 NDA victory, 316 Nitish Kumar’s strategy, 325–329 people’s perception and voting behaviour, 330–331 Rajputs, 319 RJD–LJP alliance, 313–315, 317–318 RJD’s electioneering, 319

seat sharing, 314–315 UPA momentum, 316 UPA split in Sitamarhi and Madhubani, 319 waning political stardom of Lalu Yadav, 318 wives as proxy candidates, 324–325 Yadavs community, 312 Biju Janata Dal, 4–5 Biju Janata Dal (BJD), 11 Bishnoi, Jaswant, 226 BJD, 33 Bodoland Peoples Front, 4, 6 Bodoland People’s Progressive Front (BPPF), 364 Bulla, Sabina, 340 Chand, Nihal, 226 Chandy, Oommen, 235 Chang, C.M., 379 Chaudhary, Shruti, 132 Chaudhry, Shruti, 115 Chavan, Ashok, 257, 260 Chennithala, Ramesh, 235 Choubey, Lal Muni, 319 Choudhary, Harish, 225 Communist Party Marxist (CPM), 4–5, 10. See also LF government, of West Bengal Andhra Pradesh, 288 CPI-CPI (M) rift, Kerala, 247–248 Kerala, 241–244 losses in elections, 17 PDP-CPI(M) alliance, Kerala, 243, 245–246 vote percentages 1984–2009, 14 Communist Party of India (CPI), 4–5. See also LF government, of West Bengal in Northeast, 363–364 vote percentages 1984–2009, 14 Community Development Programme (CDP), 46 Congress Party, 3

Index Andhra Pradesh, 286, 290 Congress-NCP alliance, Maharashtra politics, 252, 261–264 Congress-PDP alliance, Jammu and Kashmir, 338 Congress-TSR alliance, Andhra Pradesh, 288, 303 election manifesto, 44–46, 49, 56 federal structure, of Indian politics, 107 Gujarat Assembly Elections (1990–2007), 168 Gujarat Lok Sabha Elections (1991–2009), 167 Kerala politics, 235, 239 Manipur, 373–374 in Meghalaya, 365–366, 368–369 in Nagaland, 377 NC-Congress alliance, Jammu and Kashmir, 337 in Northeast, 363–364 prominence in alliance formation, 30 Rajasthan, 220–221, 226, 232 vote percentages 1984–2009, 14 vs Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), 2009 election, 34–35 vs Modi, Narendra, 183 welfare schemes in Andhra Pradesh, 290, 292, 302–303

Dagar, Rainuka, 12 Dakshina Kazhagam (DK), 82 Das, Khagen, 383 Dasgupta, Jyotirindra, 12 Democratic Alliance of Nagaland (DAN), 380 democratic public space, political processing in case of Andhra state, 75–80 case of Kannada area, 67–68 centripetal sentiments, 80–85 cultural affinity, 71

403

differentiated relationship between constituents and representative, 73–78 gifts of, 78–80 importance of a plurality of voices, 74–75 inter-regional collaboration, 69 literary projects promoting regional language, 68 patterns of regional identification, 67–68 pre-independence legacy of contested public space, 72 regional associations of Indian National Congress, 69–70 regional chauvinism, 70 regional cultural communities, 66–67 regional histories, 68 regional norm of national unity, 73 regions in South Asian history, 68 relational view of a region, 71–73 Sikh religious identity, 83–84 Devi, Ashwamedh, 315 Devi, Veena, 315, 324 Dirks, Nicholas, 59 Domestic Violence Act, 119, 123 Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, 4–5 Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK), 11 Duverger, Maurice, 21–22 Duverger-Riker hypothesis, 100–101 Farooq, Mirwaiz Umer, 335, 339 Fatmi, M.A.A., 314, 318, 325 federalism, 11–12 federal structure, of Indian politics architecture, 97–98 background, 95–97 BJP vs Congress, 107 and coalition government, 100–107 Duverger-Riker hypothesis, 100–101

404


first two decades, post-independence, 98–99 J.P. movement, 102 judicial behavior, 106 multiple bipolarity, 103 one-party dominant system, 101 political cleavages, 103 principle of collective responsibility, 105 Rajiv Gandhi government, 102–103 Rajya Sabha, 105–106 regional demands, 99–100 in relation to non-Congress states, 102–103 and state electoral processes, 103–104 trend of, 107 UPA-II, 2009 elections, 105 Fernandes, George, 312 Forward Bloc (FB), 194 Fourth Front, 5 Gandhi, Gopal Krishna, 208 Gandhi, Prime Minister Indira, 47, 102 Gandhi, Rahul, 9–10, 314, 316 Gandhi, Rajiv, 3, 102 Gandhi, Sanjay, 149 Gandhi, Sonia, 3, 10, 22, 132, 314, 316 Gandhi, Varun, 149, 325 Gao, Tapir, 386 Garibi Hatao slogan, 46 Geelani, Syed Ali Shah, 338 Gehlot, Ashok, 17, 217, 232 gender discourse, in Indian electoral politics access and inclusion of women in executive and legislative office, 125–127 breakdown of voters, 1957–2009, 112–113 contesting candidates, 1957–2009, 112–113

elected candidates, 1957–2009, 112–113 elite women leadership, 129 emerging issues, 124–125 female leadership’s as a leverage in identity politics, 127–129 incidence of maligning of female character, 116–117 leadership potential of women, 114 media role, 117 at the micro level, 130–133 perceptions of women issues raised by political parties, 123–124 in political decision-making, 129–133 and political lineage, 115 Scindia royalty of Gwalior, 115 selection of women candidature, 115 wifehood qualification, 1927, 114 win-ability of women candidates, 127 women as candidates, 1996 elections, 114 women as candidates, state-wise, 114–115 women as potential leaders and candidates, 2009, 114 women candidates’ and avenue of selection, 116 women’s electoral performance, 110–111 women’s empowerment as an imperative for inclusive development, 117–123 women’s reservation in Parliament, 128–129 George, Francis, 241 Godhra carnage, 34, 184, 230 Godhra carnage, 2002, 33 Gowda, Chandre, 276 Gowda, Deve, 31, 272–275, 277–78, 281–84 Gowda, Shivrame, 276

Index

Gudha, Rajendra Singh, 222 Gujarat and 2009 Lok Sabha election BJP and Congress votes in Assembly Elections (1990–2007), 168 BJP and Congress votes in Lok Sabha Elections (1991–2009), 167 BJP voters, 169 development and governance, 178–181 election strategies, 181–184 Gujarat civil society, 171–174 Gujarati asmita, 174–176 Modi, Narendra, 167, 169–171 people’s perception of Modi’s regime, 184–187 people’s perception of UPA’s performance, 186–188 preference of 2009 Voters for Prime Minister, 187 Rath Yatra, 167 social engineering formula, 176–177 vote by class, 188 Gujarat Export Corporation Ltd, 178 Gujaratna Gauravvanta, 185 Gupta, Akhilesh Das, 116 Hargovind Pant vs. Raghukul Tilak & Others, 106 Haryana Janahit Party, 5 Haryana Janhit Congress (BL), 4 Hill State People’s Democratic Party (HSPDP), 366 Hindutva, 34 Hola Mohalla festival, 51 Independent, 4, 6 Index of Opposition Unity (IOU), 201 Indian National Congress, 4–5 Indian National Lok Dal, 5 Indian National Lok Dal (INLD), 33 “India Shining,” 32 India Today, 10

405

Indigenous Nationalist Party of Tripura (INPT), 381 Indigenous Peoples Front of Tripura (IPFT), 381 Indo-American Nuclear Treaty, 36 institutional leadership, 2009 elections, 10 Jain, Pusp, 226 Jaitley, Arun, 218, 231 Jamir, S.C., 379 Jammu and Kashmir Elections, 2008 and 2009 All Party Hurriyat Conference (APHC), 340, 343, 350 Congress–PDP alliance, 338 Geelani’s position, 338–339, 341 Hilal War, 341 Hindu-chauvinist groups, 339 Hindutva movement, 341–342 Jamiat Ahl-e-Hadis, 342 and jihadist violence, 340 J&K’s Islamic character, 340–341 Kashmiri secessionism, 349–351 Kashmir secularization culture, 340 2008 Legislative Assembly, 343–349 NC–Congress alliance, 337 oppositional dualities of Hindus and Muslims, 338–339 Pakistan-administered Kashmir, 339–340 Saeed’s coalition partners, 337–338 Saeed’s PDP, 339 Shopian incident, 350 Shrine war, 337–343 Tabinda Gani incident, 341 Tehreek-i-Hurriyat, 343, 350 voter participation, 336 Jammu & Kashmir National Conference, 4–5 Janata Dal (Secular), 4–5 Janata Dal (United), 4–5

406


Janata Dal (United) (JD(U)), 11 Janhit Congress Party, 6 Jat, Narain Singh, 221 Jayalalitha, 32, 115 Jayalalitha, 11 Jha, Raghunath, 314, 318 Jhakhad, Badri Ram, 226 Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), 4–5, 33 Jharkhand Vikas Morcha (Prajatantrik), 4, 6 Jiban O Jibika Raksha Committee, 209 Joshi, C.P., 221 Joshi, Mahesh, 226 Joshi, Murli Manohar, 231 Jungle Raj, 322 Kalla, B. D., 221 Kandhamal riot, 33 Karat, CPI(M) General Secretary Prakash, 245, 277 Karnataka politics assembly by-election, 2009, 276–277 assembly elections of 2004, 273–274 BJP government, 275 BJP’s ticket allocation, 277 coalition government of JD(S)– BJP, 2006, 275 dominance of Vokkaligas, 271 2009 election issues, 278 Lingayat community, 272, 280–282 Lok Sabha Elections (2004 and 2009), 279 regional turmoil in coastal districts, 276 socio-political forces, 270–273 Third Front, 277 Urs, Devaraj, 271 Kataria, Lal Chand, 226

Kaur, Harsimrat, 115 Kerala Congress (M), 4–5 Kerala politics alliances and parties on the eve of 2009 elections, 238 anti-incumbency element, 243 bi-polar politics, 237 BSP, 237 Christian wave against LDF, 246–247 Congress (I), issues with, 235 Congress (I), victory in 2009 elections, 239 CPI, 241–242 CPI–CPI (M) rift, 247–248 CPI(M), 241 CPI(M)-led LDF, 242–244 issue of disunity in LDF, 248–249 JD(S), 248–249 KC(J), 241, 247 Kerala Congress (Mani), 235, 237, 240–241 Manjeri seat, 236, 246 Muslim League, 235–237 national poll trends, 234 NDA’s Moovattupuzha seat, 236 non coalition view on voter’s party preferences, 248 PDP–CPI(M) alliance, 243, 245–246 performance of BJP, 236, 239 Ponnani seat, 247 problem related to policy on selffinancing of education sector, 246–247 seat bargaining, 235 SNC Lavalin controversy, 243, 245, 251n6 ticket splitting process, 242 UDF advantages, 235–236 UDF allies in 2009 elections, 240 vote share of major parties, 240 V.S. Achutanandan government, 243–245

Index

Wayanad constituency, 238–239 Keshvananda Bharti vs. Union of India, 107 Khandela, Mahadev Singh, 226 Kharge, 278 Khasi and Jaintia Hill-based regional parties, 367 Kriplani, Srichand, 226 Krishi Bachao, 209 Krishna, S. M., 271, 278 Kuki-Chin-Mizo groups, 375 Ku Klux Klan, 219 Kulkarni, Sudheendra, 258 Kumar, Ananth, 276 Kumar, Meira, 10, 313–314, 318 Kumar, MP Veerendra, 249 Kumar, Nikhil, 314 Kumar, Nitish, 11, 316 Kumar, Pramod, 12 Kumaraswamy, 274–275 Kumari, Chandresh, 228 Kurup, Suresh, 240 Kyndiah, P. R., 366 Laakso-Taagepera Index (N), 43 Lallungmuana, H., 376 LF government, of West Bengal, 192–197 atrocities during, 194–195 attacks on Ms Banerjee, 195 behavior of police officers, 196 in 2010 by-elections, 192 caste and communal distinctions, 193–194 challenges with civil society groups, 203, 209 dual strategy of, 192–193 2004 election, 197 2009 election, 206–209 electoral challenges, 197–206 “genocide”at Nandigram, 208 human development, 202 land grabbing frauds, 196, 205–206

407

panchayat elections, 2008, 202–203 panchayat system, 195, 201 2009 parliamentary election, 198–200, 203–204, 206–209 Singur (Hooghly) land acquisition incident, 196 supremacy of, 193 and UPA coalition government, 193 vs TMC, 201–202, 205, 209 Lok Janshakti Party (LJP), 5, 37 Lok Sabha Party results, 2009, 4 Madhubani, 314 Maharashtra Navnirman Sena (MNS), 57 Maharashtra politics backward caste politics, 260–261 BJP–SS alliance, 252, 258–259, 263–264 Congress–NCP alliance, 252, 261–264 2009 election results, 261–264 formation of MNS, 257–258 at micro level, 259 MNS victory in 2009 election, 262 Mumbai, growth of, 259 Pawar politics, 259–260 seats contested and won by regions in 2009 election, 263 socio-political forces in, 253–257 stir against north Indians, 258 Third Front, 260 Mahaseth, Samir Kumar, 319 Maheshwari, Kiran, 226, 229 Majlis Ittehad-ul Muslimeen (MIM), 295 Mandal Commission, 31, 56 Mani, Jose K., 240 Manipur, 369–374 Baite, Thangso, 371 Charenamei, Mani, 371–372 domination of the Congress, 373–374

408


Inner Manipur seat, 373 Jaintia Hills District Council, 369 Kanglei Yawol Kanna Lup (KYKL), 370 Kuki-Chin-Mizo tribes, 371 Meinya, Thokchom, 373 Meiteis, 371 Naga and Kuki-Chin-Mizo tribes, 370–371 Naga insurgent groups, 372 People’s Democratic Alliance (PDA), 372 Manipur People’s Party (MPP), 364 Manjhi, Ramjee, 315 Manumalarchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK), 4–5, 33, 36 Marak, Deborah, 367 Maudani, Abdul Nasser, 234, 237, 240, 244–247 Mayawati, 10, 56, 117, 222, 321 Meena, Kirori Lal, 222, 225, 229 Meena, Murari Lal, 222 Meena, Raghuveer Singh, 226 Meena, Ramesh, 222 Meena, Ramkesh, 222 Meghalaya, 364–369 Meghalaya Progressive Alliance (MPA), 367 Meghwal, Arjun Ram, 226 Meharia, Subhash, 226 Mehta, Alok Kumar, 315 Minerva Mills vs. Union of India, 107 Mirdha, Harendra, 221 Mirdha, Jyoti, 220, 226, 228 Mirdha, Nathuram, 220–221 Mishra, Nitish, 313 Mishra, Satish Chandra, 147 Mittal, Sunil, 169 Mizo Presbyterian Church, 375 Mizoram, 374–376 Mizo Union, 374 Modi, Narendra, 325 anti-Muslim posture, 183 collection of poems, 173–174

conquering of civil society, 171–174 construction of Narmada Dam, 179–180 election strategy, 181–184 on Gaurva Day, 174 growth strategy, 178 Gujarat Export Corporation Ltd, 178 Gujarat Gaurva (honor) yatra, 174 Gujarati asmita, 174–176 on Gujarati society, 176 Gujarat State Petrochemical (GSPC), 180 Gujarat under, 180–181 as Hindu Hriday Samrat, 172 on Islam and Christianity, 172 Jyotigram Scheme, 179 mission, 169–171 “no-nonsense” attitude, 173 people’s perception of Modi’s regime, 184–187 post Godhara carnage, 184 preference for, 169 as a protégé of Advani, 167, 169 regularization of power supply, 179 RSS Shakha culture, 170 slogans, 174–175 social engineering formula, 176–177 in state Assembly elections, 182 vs Congress, 183 Modi, S. K., 175 Mohan, Anand, 324 Moily, 278 Mukerji, Nirmal, 196 Mukherjee, Dilip, 196 Muniyappa, Marasandra, 147 Muraleedharan, K., 235, 238 Muslim League Kerala State Committee, 4–5 Nadar, A. Neelalohita Dasan, 238 Naga, Nemi, 378

Index

Naga, Sema, 378 Naga, Thankul, 378 Nagaland, 376–381 Nagaland People’s Front (NPF), 4–5, 363, 380 Naga National Council (NNC), 372 Nagmani, 313 Naidu, Chandrababu, 33, 79, 277 National Congress Party (NCP), 4–5, 11, 368 Congress–NCP alliance, Maharashtra, 252, 261–264 vote percentages 1984–2009, 14 National Democratic Alliance, 2009 elections, 5 National Development Council, 50 National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT), 382 national–regional political parties, in coalition politics Akali-BJP government, 51 BJP’ recommendations, 2009 elections, 50 caste-wise candidature, 55 citizen-centric governance, 58–59 as coalition of interests, 49 and economics of market, 56 election sops, 48–49, 56 filing of affidavits, 59 interactive relationships, 42 issue of autonomy, 51–52 mandate of governance, 42–43 multi-party characteristics, 44 paradox between electoral promises and government mandate, 48 patronage politics, 50, 54 performance of, 45 populist politics, 43, 46–47, 56–57 slogans and manifesto, 46–47 and “sons of the soil” parochialism, 57 statutory transfer of funds, 52–53 trends in expenditure to GDP ratio, 54

409

voters turnover, 54–55 women representatives, 58 National Security Act, 149 National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak-Muivah) (NSCN-IM), 372 National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Khaplang) (NSCN-K), 372 Nayeem, Hameeda, 340 Nehru, Jawaharlal, 3 Nehru, Motilal, 3 Nishad, Jai Narayan, 313 Northeast India Arunachal Pradesh, 384–386 Manipur, 369–374 Meghalaya, 364–369 Mizoram, 374–376 Nagaland, 376–381 region and parties, 355–364 Tripura, 381–384 NPF, 364 one-party dominance, 44 Pakistan-based United Jihad Council, 339 Pala, Vincent, 366 Paswan, Lalan, 313 Paswan, Ram Vilas, 311, 313, 315, 318 Patel, Brishen, 317 Patel, Devji, 225–226 Patil, President Pratibha, 10 Patnaik, Biju, 33–34 Patnaik, Navin, 218, 325 Pattali Makkal Katchi (PMK), 6, 33 Pawar, Sharad, 11, 115 Phule, Jotirao, 253 Pilot, Sachin, 225 populist politics, 43 Praja Rajyam Party, 5 Prasad, Brij Bihari, 323 Priya, Shanti, 324 Progressive Democratic Socialist (PDS), 208 Punjab Repealing Act of 2004, 50

410


Rajasthan politics age index of members elected, 227 Badmer constituency, 220 Bhilwara seat, 221 BJP’s dualism, 231 BJP’s growth, 218, 230–231 candidate selection, 220–221 Congress Lok Sabha constituencies, 226 Congress strategy, 220–221 Congress under Ghelot, 232 Dausa constituency, 222–223 decline of BJP, 232–233 education index of members elected, 227 election result of 2009 elections, 225–226 Gehlot’s strategy, 220–221 Jats vs Rajputs, 219 Meenas vs Gujjars, 219–220 Muslims, role of, 230 Nagaur constituency, 220–221 party position in 2009 election, 223 party split and game plan, 221–222 4.5 percent share, 222 poll violence, 225 Rahul factor, 228 Raje, Vasundhara, 231–232 representation of royal backgrounds, 227–228 Varun factor, 230 voters turnout in 2009 elections, 223–225 women candidature, 228–229 Raje, Vasundhara, 217–218, 231 Raje, Yoshadhra, 115 Rana, R.K., 315 Rane, Narayan, 257 Ranjan, Rajiv (Pappu Yadav), 324 Ranjan, Ranjeeta, 324 Rao, G.V.L. Narasimha, 218

Rao, N. T. Rama (NTR), 78 Rao, Narasimha, 31 Rashtriya Janata Dal, 4–5 vote percentages 1984–2009, 14 Rashtriya Janata Dal (RJD), 11 Rashtriya Lok Dal, 4–5 Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), 170 Raut, Damodar, 317 Ravi, Vayalar, 235 Rawat, Rasa Singh, 226 Reddy, Y. Rajasekhar (YSR), 79 Report of the States Reorganization Commission, 77 Republican Party of India (Athvale), 5 Revolutionary Socialist Party, 4–5 Revolutionary Socialist Party (RSP), 194 Rijiju, Kiren, 386 Roy, Maneesha, 12 Roy, Ram Badan, 313–314 Ruala, C.L., 376 Sachar Commission Report, 58 SAD manifesto, 48 Sain Brothers murder, 194 Samajwadi Party, 4–5 Samajwadi Party (SP), 11 Sangma, Agatha, 368 Sangtam, K. Asungb, 379 Sarkaria Commission, 50–51 Sasaram (SC), 314 Satluj Yamuna Link (SYL), 50 SC/Scheduled Tribes (STs) (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 153 Sen, Nirupam, 204 separatism, 69, 81–82, 84, 291 Shah, Dr Gunvant, 173 Shahab, Hena, 315, 324 Shahabuddin, Mohammad, 324 Shah Bano Case, 128 Sharma, Bhanwarlal, 221

Index

Sharma, Rajkumar, 222 Shastri, Lal Bahadur, 102 Shekhawat, Bhairon Singh, 231 Shiromani Akali Dal (SAD), 4–5, 33 Shiv Sena, 5, 11, 34, 218 Shivsena, 4 Shourie, Arun, 169, 219 Shukla, Munna, 323 Shukla, Vijay Kumar, 317 Siddaramaiah, 273 Siddiqi, Abdulbari, 319 Sikkim Democratic Front, 4, 6 Singh, Akhilesh Prasad, 314 Singh, Arun, 320 Singh, Dharam, 278 Singh, Digvijay, 312 Singh, Dushyant, 231 Singh, Giriraj, 222 Singh, Gopal, 226 Singh, Ileyraj, 226 Singh, Jagadanand, 317 Singh, Jaswant, 219 Singh, Jitendra, 225 Singh, Kanti, 314–315 Singh, Manvendra, 220, 226 Singh, Meena, 315 Singh, Mulayam, 11 Singh, Prabhu Nath, 319 Singh, Prabhunath, 317 Singh, President Rajnath, 218 Singh, Prime Minister Manmohan, 3, 10, 277 Singh, Raghuvansh Prasad, 314, 317, 323 Singh, Rajnath, 231 Singh, Rao Rajendra, 229 Singh, Sitaram, 314 Singh, Surajbhan, 324 Singh, Tarkeshwar, 325 Singh, Uma Shankar, 314 Singh, V.P., 28, 30–31, 226 Singur (Hooghly) land acquisition incident, 196 Sinha, Shatrughan, 314

411

Sinha, S.K., 337 Socialist Unity Center (SUC), 195, 202, 206, 208 Sodagar, Fayyaz Ahmad, 350 Sodhi, Nafisa Ali, 116 S.R. Bommai & Others vs. Union of India & Others, 106 91st Amendment Act, 365 state results, lok sabha election 2009, 15 Sule, Supriya, 115 Swabhimani Paksha, 4, 6 Syed, Mufti Mohammad, 36 symbols, of national and state recognized political parties, 6–9 Taslimuddin, 314 Tata, Ratan, 169 Telangana Rashtra Samithi, 4–5 Telangana Rashtra Samithi (TRS), 35 Telugu Desam, 4 Thackeray, Bal, 257 Thackeray, Raj, 57, 257–258, 261 Thackeray, Uddhav, 257 Thakur, Karpoori, 327 Tharoor, Shashi, 238 Third Front, 5, 260 Thomas, P.C., 236 three-phase evolution, of Indian politics, 94 Tiwari, Ghanshyam, 229 Tripura, 381–384 Tripura Upajati Juba Samity (TUJS), 381 United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), 359 United Nation’s Children’s Fund (UNICEF), 126 United Progressive Alliance, 2009 elections, 5, 13 United Progressive Alliance (UPA) coalition, 3

412


UPA, birth of, 107 Mayawati of BSP, 37 resolution of Congress Working Committee, 36 seat-sharing arrangement, 37–38 Vaid, C. S., 221 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari, 31, 231, 275 Viduthalai Chiruthaigal Katch, 4, 6 Vienna episode, 84 Vijayan, CPM State Secretary Pinarai, 237 Vohra, N.N., 339 Vyas, Girija, 228

Westminster system, 104–105 Yadav, Devendra Prasad, 314 Yadav, Jai Prakash Narayan, 314 Yadav, Lalu Prasad, 11, 37, 311, 313, 317 Yadav, Ravindra Charan, 314 Yadav, Sadhu, 325 Yadav, Sharad, 312, 318 Yadav, Sitaram, 314 Yeddyurappa, 274–275, 277

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