India - From Regional to World Power (India in the Modern World)

India – From Regional to World Power

This book examines the rise of India to the status of a world power capable of dealing with the full spectrum of international and regional issues in a critical part of the world. It traces the evolution of Indian diplomacy in the hands of key Indian practitioners, comparing Nehru, the founder of Indian diplomacy, with his successors, the Nehruvians, up to 1998 and, finally, Vajpayee, the leader of the BJP (1998–2004). Its main purposes are to explain the strategic and ideological context in which Indian diplomacy was framed, the character of India’s foreign policy problems, the nature and sources of its dilemmas and the paradigm shift that was orchestrated by the BJP government to reposition India in the international system and to bring it into the global strategic and economic mainstream. It shows how the approach laid down by Nehru, and followed by his successors (an approach that included nuclear self-restraint, the search for friendly relations with Pakistan and China, seeking the high ground in moral and diplomatic spheres and giving a lead to the non-aligned Third World), has been replaced by a new, more self-confident and assertive approach based on India’s growing economic strength and demonstrates a more strategic and pro-Western orientation. Overall, this book provides a meticulous account of many steps post-Nehruvian India has taken to make it a rising world influence and a mature, independent power. Ashok Kapur is Professor of Political Science at the University of Waterloo. He specializes in South Asian diplomatic and strategic issues, including nuclear weapons and missile proliferation as well as regional security structures in Asia. Born in Lahore, he grew up in Shimla and did his advanced graduate work in Washington, DC, and Ottawa.

India in the Modern World

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Privatisation in India Challenging economic orthodoxy T. T. Ram Mohan

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India – From Regional to World Power Ashok Kapur

India – From Regional to World Power

Ashok Kapur

First published 2006 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York, NY 10016 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group © 2006 Ashok Kapur This edition published in the Taylor & Francis e-Library, 2006. “To purchase your own copy of this or any of Taylor & Francis or Routledge’s collection of thousands of eBooks please go to www.eBookstore.tandf.co.uk.”

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data A catalog record for this book has been requested ISBN 0–415–32804–7 (Print Edition)

In memory of the late Professor M. L. Sondhi, 1933–2003, a master of diplomatic craft, he is missed.

Contents

Acknowledgements 1 Introduction: India as a catalyst

ix 1

2 Shifts in Indian diplomatic history

17

3 Strategic triangles and the Indian subcontinent

42

4 Indian strategic debates and dilemmas: analytical constructs

62

5 The nature of India’s foreign policy: utopia, compromise peace or engagement?

74

6 The build-up of the suzerain states’ system in the subcontinent, 1947–90s

84

7 The typology of threats to India and the Nehruvian record, 1964–98

97

8 Nehru’s innovations and their problems

115

9 Nehruvians and the rise of anti-India trends in foreign affairs

129

10 The external determinants of change in Indian foreign affairs, 1960s–90s

145

11 India’s antagonists re-group, 1971–80s

163

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Contents

12 Liberating India and its nuclear policy from the Nehruvian shackles

180

13 India’s rise as a major power, 1990s

197

14 The BJP’s geopolitics and building strategic triangularities

209

Epilogue Notes Index

224 233 245

Acknowledgements

This study was made possible by a research grant from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada. I thank the Council and the reviewers for their comments and support of the project. The award enabled me to do the fieldwork in India and to consult a number of experts in diplomatic and foreign affairs. I was fortunate to have access to many practitioners, including serving and retired officers in different branches of the Indian government. Discussions with academic experts in India and in North America also helped shape my study. The practitioners spoke on a non-attributable basis. To them I offer my sincere appreciation for sharing their time and their expertise with me in the complex world of Indian foreign and military affairs. None of them of course bears any responsibility for the approach I have taken. Apart from source materials cited in the book, I would like to acknowledge a particular source, Stratfor. It offers useful daily reports on world developments which provide good background for the study of the world today. I have freely drawn on my earlier writings which dealt with specific events such as the Indian nuclear tests, the 1971 war and so on. However, the argument and the organization of this book are new; it presents major themes that explain the evolution of Indian strategic affairs in a historical perspective in a dynamic and dangerous world. Finally, I must thank Peter Sowden, commissioning editor at Routledge, for encouraging me to write this book. His gentle nudges kept me on track, as did the critical comments of the anonymous reviewers.

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Introduction India as a catalyst

India has emerged as a catalyst of regional and international change in a volatile and dangerous strategic environment. It is an active and an internationalist force which is now able to convert dangers to its interests and its peoples into opportunities and capacities that effectively engage friends and foes. The modern Indian idea, expressed forcefully after 1998, is to develop strategies to unfreeze stalemated relationships vis-à-vis two immediate neighbours, Pakistan and China, with other distant powers – especially the US, Israel, Japan, Australia, Iran and its other immediate neighbour, Myanmar. Post-1998 Indian diplomatic, commercial and military policies have emphasized the importance of a ‘Look East’ policy that merits a stronger emphasis on the Southeast Asian region. This area was neglected by India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru. Since the late 1990s, the Indian subcontinent has been viewed as an important hub of international commerce and military strategy. The strategic interests of major Asian powers are engaged in the region on important issues such as terrorism, nuclear and missile proliferation, regional security, internal security and maritime security. Current Indian diplomatic and strategic behaviour has positioned Indian policies in the context of a resurgent Asia whose geographical limits extend from Central Asia to Japan. Indians now see themselves positioned at the crossroad of cultural, diplomatic, economic and strategic communications in the widened Asia. India’s location and its policies give it importance because the centre of gravity of international conflict has now moved away from Europe since the end of the Cold War towards the Southern Asian region. Asia is now the hub of terrorism, organized crime and nuclear proliferation, and it is also the hub of global economic change. The Indian aim, expressed forcefully after the 1998 nuclear tests, is to strengthen ties with its traditional foreign policy interlocutors such as Russia, France and the UK, and to build new strategic relationships with non-traditional ones in the Asian and the Middle Eastern spheres such as the US, Israel, Iran, Japan and Australia. The new orientation expresses a major change in Indian elite attitudes about the importance of military power, as well as the importance of building ties with non-traditional allies in the conduct of Indian diplomacy. It recognizes the central position of geopolitics rather than global utopianism as the basis of Indian policies. To restructure Indian military, economic and diplomatic policies to increase its manoeuvrability in a dangerous neighbourhood and in the international sphere,

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Introduction

post-1998 India turned against the policies of the Nehru era, the philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi and the ambivalence of Indira Gandhi and the Nehruvians. The year 1998 is an important turning point in liberating India from the stagnation of the policies of the age of Nehru and the Nehruvians. India is a turnaround story because it is transforming historical rivalries into cooperative relationships and is developing new patterns of engagement with forces which have not traditionally played a major role in subcontinental politics. India’s mobilization of the US, Israel, Iran, Australia and Japan (among others) is an example of the shift to broaden and to revise the pattern of strategic ties and to go beyond the Nehru fixation with non-alignment and relations with the great powers in the Cold War context. The defeat of the BJP coalition in the 2004 elections and its replacement by the Congress party-led minority coalition did not change India’s new diplomatic and strategic orientation because the key strategic changes – the decision to become a nuclear power, to push military modernization, to rely on naval power, to develop Indian coercive diplomacy vis-à-vis its rivals, to recognize the fundamental link between diplomacy and force, and between economic and military strength – are irreversible. Since 1998 Indian governments have followed the classical principles of statecraft but this was not the case in the 1947–98 period. Lattimore points out that the aim of policy is to alter the effects of negative circumstances; if something cannot be eliminated, it can be influenced, deflected or controlled.1 The book argues that India’s major foreign policy problems have historical roots. After 1947, problems were a result of two situations: (1) Pakistani, American and Chinese policies sought to contain India. (2) The Nehruvian state constrained Indian independence of action. The first one attempted to build up Pakistani diplomatic and military parity with India and to curb Indian nuclear and missile development and its diplomatic influence in the world. The establishment of global non-proliferation regimes after 1968 and the imposition of American sanctions against India after 1974 were two ways to pressurize India into a non-nuclear position. India had two choices: (1) to be a weak status quo country or (2) to be a strong status quo power. Nehru failed to check the development of the US–Pakistan–China coalition that sought to place India in the first category. Nehru’s successors, L. B. Shastri and Indira Gandhi, tried by military and nuclear action to push India into the second category but they failed. The pattern of Indian behaviour post-1998 followed the Lattimore script. First it escalated international and regional tensions by its vigorous nuclear and missile testing programme. The great powers were challenged in a public way. It established the Indian capacity to act independently, and then India sought negotiated restraints by opening up a strategic dialogue with the US involving the US Deputy Secretary of State and the Indian Foreign Minister.2 Here Indian military science, assertive political leadership and a skilled bureaucracy worked effectively against a strong international coalition that had in the past manipulated the regional as well as the international environments. The lesson is that objectionable policies of hostile powers are not easily eliminated, but they can be deflected, controlled and influenced.

Introduction 3 Post-1998 Indian behaviour revealed an embrace of two historical methods of modern strategy: ‘war’ and ‘diplomacy’. The capacity to first inflict harm and then to negotiate restraint is the defining element in the exercise of power politics. India became a catalyst when it first joined the US in a strategic dialogue after the Indian nuclear tests; in the process, the two recognized the triangular nature of the nuclear and the strategic relationship between India, China and Pakistan. The two were able to push the negotiation envelope because stalemated relationships of the Cold War became unsustainable after the 1998 Indian nuclear tests. These tests liberated India’s nuclear policy and American policy from the shackles of the Nehru era; and they induced a fundamental change in America’s India policy as well. The nuclear question was fenced off in the bilateral IndoAmerican discourse. With this change, it lost its salience in international conference diplomacy. Since 1998, India’s policy challenges were multi-faceted. First, there was a need to find a way to transform a difficult relationship (i.e. between India and America during the Cold War) into a cooperative one. Second, it was necessary to find a way to convert hostile relationships into a situation of competitive coexistence (i.e. between India and Pakistan and India and China). Third, it was important to develop a position of diplomatic, economic and military influence in India’s strategic flanks (i.e. in Afghanistan and Myanmar, the primary buffer zones in the region). Buffers play an important role in international politics, even now. Nehru recognized the role of a buffer in his policy about Nepal and the Himalayan kingdoms.3 Nehru and his successors were successful, but still neither Nehru nor his successors saw Myanmar (and the Bay of Bengal/Indian Ocean area) as an area of Sino-Indian competition like the Himalayan area. In the 1990s, Myanmar emerged as an area of Sino-Indian competition with the growth of Chinese presence in the area; this came in the form of Chinese migration and commerce from across Yunnan, Chinese road building in Myanmar and the development of a naval presence in the Bay of Bengal. Myanmar and the Bay of Bengal have thus emerged as a sub-regional centre of gravity in Indian thinking which was not the case under the Nehrus. India has joined China in the competition of building an Indian presence within Myanmar and by the build-up of the Andaman Islands as a major interservices base to oversee the region. The extension of India’s political, military and economic presence in the Bay of Bengal, in Myanmar as well as its areas of traditional concern, the Himalayan region and Afghanistan, indicate the growing importance of land power, air power and sea power in the subcontinent. This book examines the scope of India’s repositioning at three levels of contemporary strategic activity. First, internationally, in the context of a world of globalized multiplicity with one weak superpower (the US), India has developed a presence in the global economic and strategic mainstream. It now has a voice in the development of international economic and political arrangements such as the work of the World Trade Organisation and the G-20 grouping of nations. Its growing economic position makes it a pole of attraction in the global marketplace; and its strategic location and military capacities and policies give it a presence in a critical part of Asia. India is actively involved in the management of the problems

4 Introduction associated with the emergence of Pakistan as the hub of terrorism and the hub of global nuclear proliferation. India is a player in Afghanistan where its developmental projects give it a unique presence in practically all parts of Afghanistan.4 Second, post-Nehruvian India has repositioned itself at the second level, that of the Asian continent. For India ‘Asia’ is broadly defined. It includes sections of the Middle East as well as the Indian Ocean area. Asia is home to major powers – China, Japan, Russia and India, and other influential players – Israel, Iran, Vietnam, Taiwan, North Korea, Australia, Indonesia, Myanmar and Afghanistan. Asia is the centre of gravity of countervailing impulses in the modern world. The American impulse is to project its military power that passes through Europe and Central Asia to the Middle East, and through Afghanistan, into the Arabian sea, and conversely from the Pacific Ocean through the Indian Ocean into the Middle Eastern and Gulf regions. The first is the sphere of operation of the US Central Command; the second is that of the US Pacific Command. The second, the Islamic impulse, seeks to project the power of Jihad in the North Africa–Middle East–Afghanistan–Kashmir–Southeast Asian belt. The third, the impulse towards nuclear weapons and missile proliferation, has brought together North Korea, China, Pakistan, Iran and parts of the Middle East up to Libya (until the latter denounced its nuclear weapons programme in 2003–04) to form a nuclear supply chain. The A. Q. Khan affair revealed the existence of this chain.5 India is deeply involved in each impulse – as an opponent of the second and the third and as a partner of the US in the first. Finally, the third level of repositioning refers to India’s immediate neighbourhood. Traditionally, the ‘immediate’ referred to the seven South Asian (SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation)) countries (i.e. Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India and Maldives). Now the geographical limits of India’s immediate neighbours have expanded and they include Afghanistan and Myanmar. China is also India’s immediate neighbour because of the history of military conflict and geopolitical rivalry between the two, China’s physical proximity to India and the long undefined and disputed boundary, and because of China’s active involvement in South Asian international relations. This is evident from the Chinese support of insurgency in Indian north eastern border areas, its active support of Pakistan’s military and nuclear development, its ambition to contain India within the subcontinent by seeking an Indo-Pakistani balance of power and its assertion of a superior Chinese status in the subcontinent. These policies make China an immediate as well as long-term strategic threat to India. At the subcontinental level, Indian repositioning involves military, political–diplomatic and economic actions. Politically, in recent years, the Indian government has actively encouraged diverse Kashmiri political and military forces as well as insurgents in the Indian north eastern provinces to participate in political discourse. Although the evidence is mixed, there are signs that the appeal of the ballot is replacing that of the bullet in Indian regional politics. The challenge is a big one, because insurgency is good business for the arms dealers and the smugglers, for the drug dealers and their state supporters and for those in state and society who support armed liberation and revolutionary violence rather than

Introduction 5 peaceful social, political and economic change. An enhanced democratic process in India strengthens the Indian union as well as enhances India’s appeal as a political model in the world between the Mediterranean and the Indian subcontinent. At this level repositioning is based on a combination of diplomatic and military action in the region. The Indian government has opened up diplomatic discourse with its hostile neighbours, Pakistan, Bangladesh and China, and with countries that were indifferent towards India because of Nehru’s policy of neglect of Southeast Asian countries such as Myanmar and other Southeast Asian nations. The ‘Look East’ policy was advanced by Prime Minister Vajpayee as a major diplomatic move in the late 1990s. It sought to build commercial, strategic and diplomatic ties with a region that has commercial and strategic value. This policy has a naval dimension. India’s current naval policy is to project its naval presence in the Indian Ocean area up to the South China seas. Indian sea power has emerged as an instrument of influence in a number of ways. First, it positioned itself in military operations against Pakistan (e.g. 1971, 2000–02 crises) off Karachi. This conveyed the threat to Pakistani naval and industrial facilities in the region. (Karachi is Pakistan’s main commercial seaport and naval base.) Second, Indian submarines and naval ships serve as a platform for the development of a sea-based nuclear deterrent against China and Pakistan. On its western side, India has built new diplomatic and military ties with non-traditional allies like Israel, Turkey and Iran, and it has strengthened its diplomatic ties and its economic–political presence in post-2001 Afghanistan. Moreover, Indian regional economic diplomacy has projected a post-SAARC arrangement. Given the history of confrontational Indo-Pakistani politics in SAARC, India has developed a new regional economic grouping, BIMST-EC, that brings together Bangladesh, India, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand.6 In the last case, repositioning involves bilateral and multilateral discourse and policy development that goes beyond the approach of Nehru and the Nehruvians. Building a regional economic and strategic architecture is not easy because it depends on the ability of the rich nations (i.e. India) to pay for the loyalty of the poor ones. India’s repositioning was the result of unilateral military–political actions. In 1998, India’s leadership moved the country into a formal nuclear weapons status and its intercontinental missile programme as well as the space programme was given a boost. These decisions had multiple effects: on the international community and the great powers who were wedded to the non-proliferation regime and India’s containment; on India’s neighbours who thought India lacked staying power in the strategic sphere; on Asian countries who thought that India was not capable of pursuing a geopolitical rivalry with China and who saw China as the natural and the inevitable leader of Asia. The unilateral nuclear and missile actions also had an internal effect; it created synergy between Indian diplomacy and military power. The build-up of a national security framework integrated defence and foreign policy planning and broke down Nehru’s compartmentalization of the two vital spheres. Indian statecraft was pursued on the basis of practical geopolitical considerations rather than the idealism of Nehru’s peace policy. The coordinated use

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Introduction

of Indian diplomacy and Indian military force in regional crises with Pakistan during 1999–2003 became the basis of Indian statecraft. Indian actions in the nuclear and the missile spheres after 1998 were justified in geopolitical terms. Mrs Indira Gandhi had justified her nuclear test in 1974 as an engineering feat and a peaceful explosion. She de-linked it as a tool of Indian foreign policy and military strategy. She reiterated policies of the continued use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and a continued commitment to nuclear disarmament. The 1998 tests on the other hand made no such claims. They were presented as a strategic move and the results were predictable: there was international condemnation followed by a recognition of the new reality and a desire by most members of the world community to come to terms with India’s new strategic position. The diplomatic strategy behind India’s 1998 nuclear tests and the establishment of a sustained missile testing programme was validated by the establishment of sustained strategic dialogues with important international players: the US, Russia, European powers, Japan, Australia and India’s two major rivals, Pakistan and China. These relationships increased India’s political and negotiating space in the international sphere. The actions had psychological value. They signalled to India’s enemies that India was here to stay and it was capable of pursuing its interests through coercive diplomacy. Finally, India presented itself as an internationalist-minded country that sought to use military force in defence of its interests and did so in a measured manner; and it sought as well negotiated restraint as the basis of new relations with its erstwhile enemies. In short, India had arrived on the global strategic scene as a result of new policies that showed a commitment to alter its defensive and reactive style that has permeated Indian political and social thought since the 1500s.7 Note that the Indian repositioning took place at an important phase in world history. The qualifications of the great powers of the Cold War era – the US, the European powers and Russia – are in dispute. There is an element of downward mobility in the capacity, influence and prestige of the international powers in regional conflicts. Even the greatest power on earth today, America, is not able to act alone in international and regional crises. It needs help from its partners in initiating, managing and ending international conflicts. Historically, all great powers have had the capacity and the right to escalate the use of violence to maintain the standards of modern international society. However, under contemporary world conditions, their ability, alone or in concert, to exercise the right to initiate, sustain and to terminate conflict on their own terms is doubtful. The situation in Iraq (2003–04), Iran (2003– ) and North Korea (1994– ) show the limits of American military power and diplomatic influence. The controversy between America, its European allies and the United Nations on the Iraqi question (2002–present), and the continuing problem of terrorism after September 2001, reveals America’s inability to bring closure to the problem of Al Qaeda and militant transnational Islam. At the same time, the number of major and minor powers in Asia, and their importance, has grown. For instance, North Korea challenges America on the issues of nuclear and missile proliferation and East Asian security. Iran challenges America on the issues of nuclear and missile proliferation, and it competes with America as well as Middle Eastern

Introduction 7 countries like Israel and Turkey in the Middle Eastern and Central Asian areas. Iran has a presence in Afghanistan and Iraq, and through Hamas and Hizhbullah, it exercises leverage in Palestinian, Iraqi and Lebanese politics. These are examples of challenges to Western authority by new powers. The regional influence of transnational militant groups is considerable as is their ability to use modern communications and explosives technology and marry them to traditional religious beliefs that are supported by sympathizers within the existing states’ system.8 Their activities and their declarations challenge the primacy of the system of states and its role in the development of international society.9 By creating two competing centres of power – the state and the revolutionary force – and two competing philosophies about the role of war, state, stability or order and justice, contemporary Islamic terrorism builds on Tsarist and communist revolutionary traditions of secrecy, politically motivated use of violence and rejection of the existing state’s system as the basis of modern international society.10 The modern terrorist organization has access to arms and finance, it is involved in the arms and drug trade and it functions with outright or covert support of governments such as Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. This type of criminal globalization is here to stay in the Middle Eastern–Indian subcontinental–Southeast Asian region. Bozeman sees this as a struggle between Western authority and Islamic Jihad.11 Barber has examined this topic as a contention between ‘McWorld versus Jihad’.12 Our approach views the topic in regional terms, a contention between militant Arabized Islam with Saudi Arabia as its ideological base, and ‘Indian Islam’ which had its origins outside India in the last century but was subsequently indigenized in the Indian subcontinent. This book is based not on the proverbial Hindu–Muslim divide as it is on the less studied but more significant divide between Arabic (Wahabbi) Islam and Indian Islam, as well as the Shia–Sunni divide in the region.13

The diffusion of power and its proliferation of issues At the statist level since 1945, one observes a trend in the proliferation of regional great powers (Israel, Iran, China, India, Vietnam, Japan and Australia) and an increase in the number of local powers (North Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Myanmar, Pakistan and Afghanistan). During the same period, one observes a comparative decline in the number and influence of international powers (the US, the Europeans and Russia) in Asia–Middle Eastern–Indian Ocean sphere. Despite its enormous economic and military capacities in Asia, America is now required to engage a number of essential players (China, Japan, Russia, India, Vietnam, North Korea, Iran, along with Myanmar, Indonesia, Singapore and Philippines, in the pursuit of its anti-terrorism and non-proliferation policies. It cannot pursue its policy agendas alone. The diffusion is the result of changing international and regional circumstances (such as the end of the Cold War, Russia’s collapse and the 11 September, 2001 attacks on America) and growing international military problems (terrorism, regional tensions in the Middle East and Asia and nuclear proliferation). There are three trends to consider. First, there is the overextension of American power and

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Introduction

its inability to manage the world alone as the sole superpower. Second, there is the diffusion of international and regional power. A number of factors, that is, local ambitions and capacity to cause harm and to interfere with the great powers’ agenda and strategic location have enabled local powers to develop their autonomy. President Musharraf and the North Korean leader are prime examples of this point. Also, regional great powers like India, Iran, Israel and Japan have extended their strategic reach and influence beyond their respective neighbourhoods. The great powers, of course, are active in Asian and Middle Eastern affairs, but they are no longer effective in fundamentally altering the pattern of relationships and the distribution of power by unilateral action; and their capacity to club together with the other great powers to keep the peace is limited. The new Asia has issue(s)-driven centres of gravity. Each has a critical core of players. They interact with each other because of the high costs of inaction or wrong policy action. The movement of political ideas, military and economic power in the post Cold War world has an inter-regional character. They affect the pattern of international alignments as well as the diplomatic and strategic agendas of the major and the minor powers. Consider the following. 1

2

3

4

5

In the core issue of Islamic militancy, the cluster of players includes Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Taliban, Al Qaeda, India, Afghanistan, USA, Russia, Indonesia and Philippines among others. The players are tied together, on the one hand, by a commitment to liberate ‘occupied areas’ in the name of Islamic justice and holy war and, on the other hand, to fight terrorism to defend state rights and sovereignty as well as international security. In the core issue of nuclear and missile proliferation, the cluster of players includes North Korea, China, Pakistan, Iran, India, Israel, USA, Russia, Japan and the Europeans among others. The players are tied together, on the one hand, by a desire to promote national security through nuclear and missile proliferation and, on the other hand, to contain proliferation. In the core issue of global trade of drugs, illicit arms and human migration, the cluster of players includes Afghanistan, Myanmar, select Southeast Asian nations, the USA and others. These players are tied together, on the one hand, by the drug producing nations where the people depend on its production for their livelihood and to finance liberations movements and, on the other, side by players who seek to control these activities. In the core issue of economic development and international economic reforms, a large number of players from the developed and the developing worlds are involved in national, regional and international activities. They are tied together, on the one hand, by demands of economic equity and social justice and, on the other hand, by a concern to maintain the privileged position of Western industrial democracies. In the core issue of national security and the organization of multilateral strategic arrangements, a large number of Western and non-Western players are tied together in opposition to the fear of American unilateralism and concerns about the rise of imperial America.

Introduction 9

Why India’s diplomatic and military behaviour changed India’s domestic politics, its bureaucratic behaviour and the leadership’s approach to international politics changed in 1998 in response to the relentless effort by India’s enemies to threaten India’s independence of action and its international position. The change occurred after the ascendancy of the BJP-led coalition government in 1998. Under the Nehrus (J. L. Nehru, his daughter, Indira Gandhi, and his grandson, Rajiv Gandhi and a string of weak prime ministers up to 1997) a coalition of Indian civilian bureaucrats, prime ministerial advisers and a few foreign governments exercised an enormous influence in Indian decision making. Thus, Lord L. Mountbatten shaped India’s policies on Kashmir and Pakistan.14 British Fabians and their Indian students, and Indian leftists who were attached to Moscow’s words and policies, shaped India’s socialist economic policies; and they believed in statist intervention in Indian economic and political affairs. Since 1947–48, UK–US–UN policies constantly subjected India to international pressure to prevent the outbreak of war with Pakistan, to secure an immediate ceasefire when a war broke out, to ask for Indian concessions to Pakistan and generally to maintain a situation of manageable instability and Indo-Pakistani polarity. Historically, the great powers’ interventions in Indo-Pakistani affairs retarded the growth of Indo-Pakistani bilateral cooperation in economic, social and political spheres. Such interventions prolonged polarity and regional conflict and diminished the prospect of conflict resolution.15 The international environment that India faced in the 1990s had its origin in the British policy towards India before 1947 that stressed Muslim separateness and that became the basis of Hindu–Muslim and Indo-Pakistani polarity. After 1947, with the onset of the Cold War, the UK–US view was that Pakistan was a part of the inner circle of Western defence, non-aligned India was on the outside and it was up to India to make up with Pakistan and to secure Western favour in a bipolarized world system.16 The received wisdom was that India ought to make concessions to Pakistan on Kashmir if it wanted regional peace. Successive UK and US governments dealt with successive Indian governments on this basis. India was bigger than Pakistan but the latter was the challenger and to build parity, UK, US, China and much of the UN community (barring the Soviet bloc) invariably weighed in against India. By their diplomatic and military support, Pakistan’s great power supporters (UK, US and China) shaped an Indo-Pakistani balance of power. The military balance began to change with India’s military modernization in the 1960s, but this did not alter the pattern of UK–US–Chinese policies that stressed the desirability of an Indo-Pakistan balance as the basis of regional security. Indira Gandhi’s military action in 1971 and her decision to conduct a nuclear test in 1974 did not alter the belief in American and Chinese policy about the value of the Indo-Pakistani balance of power. The pressures on India came together in the late 1990s from two angles. 1

The anti-India coalition had grown in size. Starting with the link between British imperialism and Indian Muslims before 1947, it was joined by

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Introduction America in 1948 when the US policy on Kashmir and its pro-Pakistan bias was revealed at the UN. In 1954, America and Pakistan signed a military pact and modern American arms began to flow into Pakistan. This stimulated the Indo-Pakistani rivalry. China and Pakistan developed a special relationship in the early 1960s on an anti-India basis, and by 1971 China joined up with Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger to support Pakistan and to oppose India in Bangladesh. In the 1980s, Saudi Arabia joined the coalition as it sought Pakistan as its agency to promote the liberation of Afghanistan from Soviet hands and the introduction of Wahabbism and Arabized militancy into the politics of Afghanistan, Kashmir and other places like Chechnya. China saw value for itself in this coalition because Pakistan was important to tie up Indian forces on its Western front and to divide Indian military power between the two fronts, China and Pakistan; moreover, Pakistan, a moderate Muslim country, was a useful agency to open doors for China in the Middle East. Chinese military aid and nuclear as well as missile transfers to Pakistan, Iran, Syria, Saudi Arabia and Libya made strategic sense in Beijing’s drive to create a wedge between Pakistan and India on its Western flank; and it was important for Beijing to build its presence in the Middle East, Moscow’s under belly, and an area of vital interest to America because of oil and the Cold War. The policies of this coalition also increased India’s internal security problem because of the flow of foreign support for insurgency in Kashmir (disputed territory), and Indian Punjab and northeast (not disputed areas). Also, the evolution of international security policy revealed a global consensus against the growth of the nuclear and missile club beyond the five nuclear powers. The effect of restricting the nuclear club to the five permanent members of the Security Council was to join the nuclear club status to the Security Council veto. The indefinite extension of the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT) without a plan towards time-bound nuclear disarmament, and the finalisation of the comprehensive nuclear test ban again without a plan for nuclear disarmament of existing nuclear powers was, in part, meant to corner India and, in part, to create a formal global consensus against proliferation, but without a firm time-bound commitment to nuclear disarmament as was intended in Article 6 of the NPT.

By the 1990s, India’s isolation in the subcontinent as well as the international strategic sphere had increased, and its diplomatic as well as military options were in danger of shrinking to the point that it would have become a paper tiger in the subcontinent. These circumstances shaped Indian reactions in the later 1990s. Historically, Indian diplomatic and military behaviour were not affected by the distribution of international power and the nature of the international system. Debates about global bipolarity, multiplicity and unipolarity did not usually engage the minds or shape the agenda of Indian practitioners. Rather the nature of conflicts and the public/secret enmities that India faced have been important. Since 1947, regional multipolar alignments were important for India. During the Cold War,

Introduction 11 Indo-Pakistani polarity developed in relation to three external powers (the US, USSR and PR China). Each interacted with the other because its vital interests, power and prestige were at stake. None of the five players could detach itself from the policies of the players in sub continental politics. Nehru managed to play off the external powers against each other in the early 1950s, but once the great powers were able to engage in direct dialogue (America and Soviet Russia and America and communist China began bilateral negotiations on rapprochement involving critical issues during the Cold War) Indian practitioners realized that the capacity of a weaker country to play off the great powers against each other was less than the ability of the great powers to control India if the latter’s economic and military strength and its diplomatic strategy was ineffective. The 1971 war was a lesson in Asian geopolitics for India. It revealed that American, Chinese and Pakistani interests had converged against Indian interests despite the differences in the political systems and ideological principles of the players. The Nixon–Kissinger–Chou-en-Lai approach was to check Indian power and ambition, to maintain Indo-Pakistani polarity and to create a Sino-American condominium in the subcontinent.17 Even after the break-up of Pakistan in 1971, the American–Chinese–Pakistani policy did not change. While Pakistan intensified its efforts to balkanize India through Pakistani military-intelligence operations in Indian Kashmir, Indian Punjab and Indian north-eastern areas,18 UK–US–China tolerated Pakistani-sponsored insurgency in Indian provinces. Still, despite the provocations, up to 1998, Indian leaders remained in a reactive and a defensive mode. They talked ceaselessly about their problems rather than act in a way to offset the external pressures. While Pakistan started its pursuit of nuclear weapons and missiles in the 1970s and China was active in developing its programme, and the great powers sought Indian de-nuclearization, India continued its scientific work to develop its nuclear weapons option. But its policy continued against the exercise of its nuclear option; and it maintained its high moral pose to seek global nuclear disarmament. India did not try to adopt coercive diplomacy in managing the military pressures of Pakistan and China in its border areas. Three elements shaped the shift in Indian strategic behaviour in the late 1990s. First, India’s ability to play-off the great powers against each other had declined since the mid-1950s, because the great powers were engaging each other by diplomatic discussion as well as armed competition and India was no longer useful or necessary as a bridge-builder between the major powers. Moreover, in a world of power politics, the non-aligned countries had repeatedly failed to emerge as an effective third force. Second, the great powers’ ability to manage India increased in the aftermath of its military defeat in 1962 in the war with China. The external powers had options to increase the pressures on India. They supported or tolerated Pakistani challenges to India in Kashmir and other border areas. Internationally, the great powers kept the pressure on India by insisting on nonproliferation and Indian non-nuclearization. Third, while there was an incremental growth of Indian economic and military strength since the 1960s, the strength was kept in a state of disuse in a ‘made in India’ box. Indecisive Indian political

12

Introduction

leadership was preoccupied with its internal power struggles, and it lacked a strategic plan to engage its enemies forcefully. By its failure to develop a field of power with reference to its external enemies, it left India open to great power manipulations of Indian diplomatic and military affairs. The year 1998 was the time that the government of India abandoned the Nehru policy of seeking international influence by playing off the great powers against each other diplomatically from a position of military and economic weakness. The Nehru paradigm effectively made India a weak status quo country. After 1998, India sought a position as a strong status quo power. It adopted a policy to engage all major powers by using Indian military and economic strength and by creating situations that required the great powers to engage India on Indian terms and to build a sense of mutual interest. The shift from Nehru’s approach to the new Indian approach is irreversible. It is significant, because it shows the ability of a weaker power (in comparative terms) to manage conflict where the distribution of military power is asymmetrical. The changes in India’s diplomatic and military behaviour from 1998 onwards were turning points in India’s diplomatic and military history and contrasted with the policies of Nehru and the Nehruvians. India’s decision to use force against Pakistan in the 1965 war was the first Indian action to break the Nehru taboo against the use of war as a way to roll back Pakistani aggression and to raise the costs to Pakistan of its policy to force a Kashmir resolution on Pakistani terms. Despite Prime Minister Shastri’s audacity to attack Pakistan, his action was a reversible line in the sand because India accepted a ceasefire and reverted to the Nehru policy of no war with Pakistan and peace with Pakistan. This was the first example of Indian coercive diplomacy, but it lacked staying power because it did not change the framework of Indian policy or the pattern of relations with Pakistan. The decision to use force against Pakistan in 1971 was the second major use of coercive diplomacy. Compared to 1965, this action altered the region’s geopolitics by breaking up Pakistan. The 1971 action turned around a major aspect of Nehru’s policy, that is, to avoid general war with Pakistan. It was bold in the sense that it took on a coalition of two international powers (USA and China) and involved the third one, Soviet Russia, on India’s side. It was an example of India-managed power politics. India’s 1971 war had the character of great power behaviour. It was willing and able to escalate regional conflict. But still India’s military action in 1971 was a half step towards power politics. India’s military action was explained as a humanitarian intervention rather than an attack on the opportunistic Pakistani–American–Chinese alliance that was driven by subjectivity (i.e. personal animus of Nixon and Chou-en-Lai against ‘Indians’), American Republican/Democratic party politics and anti-India strategic considerations in US and Chinese policies. The role of power politics in Chinese, American and Pakistani behaviour contrasted with the Indian tendency to conduct its foreign affairs in moral terms. India’s right and ability to develop a sustainable war option against Pakistan was revealed, but it was still a half step in India’s halting adoption of power politics as the basis of managing its rivals. After 1971, the Indian government was not able to convert a major military victory into

Introduction 13 political closure of the Indo-Pakistani conflict. A peace process did not emerge. Under Indira Gandhi and the Nehrus, India did not have a political strategy to turn around Pakistan, China and America in its policies towards India. Without countervailing Indian pressure, the international coalition retained its motive and its space to pressure India on a number of fronts. Pakistan was determined to settle the Kashmir issue by force after 1971, to avenge its 1971 defeat, to balkanize India by supporting insurgency in Indian provinces including areas that were not in dispute as a result of Partition and to seek parity in the nuclear sphere as well. The American–Pakistani–Chinese coalition remained active in a number of significant ways. 1

2

3

America and Pakistan worked together, with Chinese support, to defeat Soviet forces in Afghanistan in the 1980s. This defeated the USSR but it created a power vacuum that was filled by the Taliban and its supporters in Pakistan’s military and intelligence services and in Saudi Arabia. The coalition facilitated the emergence of Islamic fundamentalists in the region by arming and training them to fight Soviet forces. This development was to have far reaching consequences in the entire region as well as for America in September 2001. China and North Korea aided Pakistan’s nuclear and missile development and the US tolerated this by turning a blind eye to nuclear and missile exchanges involving two strategically volatile regions. Precisely when the Cold War was ending, the subcontinent was emerging as a dangerous centre of gravity of competing ideological and strategic forces.

In other words, the 1971 Bangladesh campaign indicated a major change in India’s approach to regional problems, but India was not able to change the distribution of power and the pattern of relationships in the region. Indira Gandhi’s approach differed from her father’s. It showed a willingness to use military force to deal with a political problem but the fundamental parameters of the Nehru era remained in tact. Indira Gandhi maintained Nehru’s dedication to a socialist economy. She was committed in the belief that the Nehrus-led Indian Congress party was the political core of the Indian state, and a strong Indian state under the Nehrus was the basis of the Indian nation. Foreign policy was non-aligned with a pronounced tilt towards Moscow. India’s diplomatic posture was wedded to a belief in world peace and nuclear disarmament. Under the Nehrus, India accepted the existence of the American–Pakistani–Chinese coalition as the dominant force in subcontinental international relations even though it was working against Indian interest. They did not find ways to expose it or to undermine it. Indira Gandhi’s successors (Rajiv Gandhi, Narasimha Rao and short-term governments of V. P. Singh, D. Gowda and I. K. Gujral) too remained mired in the Nehru paradigm. They are the Nehruvians, because none of them could think or act outside the Nehru box of a socialist economy, a foreign policy based on nonalignment, peace and nuclear disarmament and a preoccupation with friendship with Pakistan and China.

14

Introduction

Turning point, 1998 What were the turning points that made India a regional catalyst? In 1998, India broke away from the Nehru policy; it exercised its nuclear weapons option and declared a willingness to assume the opportunity-costs and the obligations of a nuclear weapon power. The 1998 tests brought forth international condemnation as was expected but it had another important effect. It took India into the global strategic mainstream and secured the recognition that India’s policy had changed. The tests represented an important international event; it had consequences for India’s neighbours, including China, and for international security policy because of the attack on the widespread belief that nuclear proliferation could be contained by international measures. Under Nehru, India was a secret nuclear country looking from outside the nuclear tent of the powers. After 1998, it emerged as a public nuclear power that was looking at other nuclear powers from inside the tent and looking out as well. While China and Canada objected to international recognition of India’s new nuclear status, America, Japan, Russia, Australia and the European powers recognized the changed reality and sought strategic discourse with India. The lesson was that a weaker power that was locked into an asymmetrical conflict situation could increase its negotiating space and secure long-term gain if it was willing to act smartly and if it was willing to accept shortterm pain. Strategy is a mind game as practitioners often remind us. It is also an exercise in calculating risks and rewards of action versus risks and dangers of inaction. A prolonged dependence on the Nehru policy of inaction increased the danger to Indian independence because it locked India into a number of stalemated relationships of conflict with Pakistan, China and America. The 1998 test decision secured long-term gain and an increase in India’s negotiating space with the powers. The 1974 nuclear test on the other hand was the worst possible outcome because it showed an ability to test and then fear of international pressure. The year 1974 produced international sanctions and pressures and without any rewards Indian practitioners were not able to escape the Nehruvian box of ongoing utopian talk and strategic inaction after 1974. India’s declared nuclear status in 1998 did not change the global military balance but it altered the global smugness and overconfidence that India could be checked regionally by Pakistan and China, and internationally by American pressure and arms control regimes. The effect of Indian testing was psychological rather than material to the distribution of power. Within India, the tests settled the debate between the Nehru policy that highlighted the civilian and the moral basis of Indian nuclear power and the decision not to exercise the option militarily; and on the other hand, the power politics view of Indian nuclear weapons that emphasized the use of nuclear weapons diplomacy as a basis of national security. India had two constant nuclear policies up to May 1998. The first was to maintain its nuclear weapons option through vigorous scientific development. The second policy was not to exercise the option, thereby effectively cancelling the value of the nuclear option. Both policies changed in 1998. India became a catalyst because the 1998 nuclear test, and a pattern of vigorous testing of short and

Introduction 15 long-range missiles, shattered the widespread Western belief that the problem of nuclear and missile proliferation had been contained. The distribution of world power remained asymmetrical when one compares American and Indian power or Chinese and Indian power. Rather, the tests showed an Indian determination to increase international and regional tensions as a way to garner international attention to India’s security dilemma. Note the contrast with Nehru’s attempts to reduce international tensions and to claim for India a high moral ground as a peacemaker. In 1998, India played the China card in two ways. (1) The Indian defence minister asserted that China was India’s potential enemy no. 1. This formula was subsequently altered and replaced with the idea that ‘Sino-Indian differences’ existed. Nevertheless, despite the diplomatic nuancing, a public identification between Indian nuclear and missile development and the China question emerged. (2) India was now doing to America and to China what China had earlier done to America and the USSR, namely, to get it alone on the nuclear and missile front, assert an independent stance, demonstrate an ability to master the intricacies of modern high technology in the area of chemical and nuclear explosives and create a situation which required of America and China a new policy of negotiated restraint with India rather than its containment through diplomatic isolation and technological sanctions. ‘Escalate and negotiate’ was the new Indian mantra. It worked. While China and Canada passed UN Security Council resolutions insisting on Indian nuclear disarmament, America and India began a strategic dialogue that effectively fenced off the nuclear question from the bilateral relationship. Both sought to build economic and military ties to restructure the bilateral relationship, and they viewed the new approach as a way to reposition both countries in a dangerous strategic environment. India’s nuclear action in 1998 had conceptual and policy implications. The changed nuclear policy recognized the relationship between nuclear weapons and foreign policy. Stalemated relationships between India and America, India and China, India and Pakistan and others were unfrozen after the 1998 tests because India had created a new international and a regional situation that required a realistic response. A pattern of strategic dialogue, and in some cases strategic partnerships that had strong military and economic content, emerged with a number of traditional and non-traditional partners such as America, UK, Japan, Australia, France, Russia, China, Pakistan and Israel. This process took shape between 1998 and September 2001. September 2001 reinforced it. The theme of the book is that Indian passivity, and unwillingness to think outside the Nehru box, was instrumental in producing a pattern of stalemated relationships. By failing to militarily and economically engage the powers and to build opportunities that facilitated negotiated restraints in military issues, Nehrustyle Indian practitioners facilitated the great powers’ intervention in Indian strategic affairs; and they enabled the great powers, particularly America and China, to maintain a system of Indo-Pakistani, Sino-Indian and Indo-American polarities. The premise is that the great powers and the key players in the UN system are comfortable with a world of regional instabilities provided they are manageable.

16

Introduction

This is the norm of modern international relations, not a world of harmony and peace. Dangerous regional conflicts are opportunities for the great powers to maintain their access to unstable regions; and fear of uncontrolled regional conflicts fuel the desire for UN ceasefires and such measures to reduce the level of violence. The norm is to prevent the outbreak of unmanageable regional conflicts and to maintain regional polarities that enable the great powers to be involved as conflict managers. The foreign and military policy paradigm of the Nehrus was within the comfort level of the great powers, because the polarities involving India were entrenched, India and Pakistan and India and China cancelled each others’ power in the subcontinent and neither could change the military situation on the ground in a substantial way. Nehru had created a policy paradigm that limited the development and use of Indian military and nuclear power and by default enabled the great powers to act independently and with low opportunity-costs vis-à-vis India. This changed in 1998. Between 1998 and 2004, the BJP coalition escalated international and regional tensions by its nuclear and missile tests and by its willingness to go to war with Pakistan in 2001–02. The new approach showed that the great powers were limited in the exercise of their power if a regional great power possessed a diplomatic and a military strategy to alter the matrix of calculations or the variables in play in a regional conflict. Our theme is that the BJP coalition’s diplomatic and military policies during 1998–2004 reversed the Nehruvian policy framework. A new system emerged so that India, the regional great power, became a catalyst by changing its style and method of action against its enemies.

2

Shifts in Indian diplomatic history

India is not a natural leader in Asia. Its history reveals it to be a national object of external intervention and aggrandizement rather than an independent organizer of events or a builder of regional institutions and power arrangements. Historically, until recently, it has been the field of power politics of outside forces which dominated the diplomatic, administrative, economic and military life in India, and defined its characteristics. No doubt there is a history of Indian war and territorial expansion by Indian Kingdoms in ancient India, but there is no record of a sustained ability by an Indian Kingdom to organize the whole of India itself as a territorial and an administrative unit or to project the full weight of India outside its borders. It was historically a weak entity. The rise of India today is a story of a shift in its international position from a weak country in the 1947–90s to a strong power in the later 1990s. Until recently, nearing the end of the twentieth century, it lacked the means and a coherent diplomatic and military strategy to organize its strength and strategic purpose and to make the two work together to advance Indian interests and ideals outside its borders. The comparison is with the diplomatic and military histories of America, Russia, China and Japan where their political organization, diplomatic skill and military strategy explain the expansion of their international presence.1 There are three fundamental shifts in Indian diplomatic and military history. In 1400, India along with China and the Arab world dominated the global economy.2 Thereafter between 1526 and 1947 India saw the ascendancy of Mughal imperialism, followed by the ascendancy of the British India Empire. Thus India, home to a majority Hindu population and a land of wealth and privilege became a field of Mughal and later British power. According to Spear, an organic link between Muslim and British power emerged during this period. Both shared a negative attitude about the potential role of ‘political Hinduism’. Both sought to suppress it or to deflect its influence.3 Following India’s independence in 1947, Nehru’s ‘secularism’ dismissed politicized Hinduism as a factor in Indian politics. Under Nehru the new Indian State disconnected Indian nationalism from traditional Indian philosophy. Instead it sought a connection between a Nehru-centric, Congress party dominated Indian political system and the Indian nation. Nehru did not locate his diplomatic and military policies in the context of historical Indian political experiences. His ideas about the central role of a state-dominated

18

Shifts in Indian diplomatic history

socialist economy came from communist theory, the Soviet model of economic planning and British Fabian ideas. His view about non-alignment, a zone of peace and regionalism, came from a peace ideology. He rejected the importance of military strength in Indian history and politics. The central role of Indian peace diplomacy and non-alignment were presented as an important contribution by Nehru to the cause of world peace. The ideas had popular appeal because, in the context of India’s colonial history, it fed the sentiment that India ought to be independent of foreign power domination. Nehru often proclaimed that independence meant having the freedom of choice in external affairs. The rhetoric appealed to members of Indian political and administrative elites who gathered around Nehru and benefited from the patronage of the Nehru-dominated Indian state.4 Despite the rhetoric, ‘independent’ India actually became a field of Anglo-American and Pakistani power in 1947–48 when Kashmir became a military, political and an ideological issue in subcontinental and international politics. Because of India’s dependence on the Soviet veto at the United Nations on the Kashmir issue, India became as well a field of Soviet influence in Indian diplomatic, economic and military affairs. It also became a field of Chinese power in the early 1960s when China joined the Pakistani–Western coalition against India. Two patterns emerged: India developed a history of conflicted relationships with Pakistan, America and China; and second, Nehru’s policies in hindsight retarded India’s economic and military development. The influence of foreign powers in the formulation of crucial Indian diplomatic, economic and military policies was greater than that of the Indian Cabinet, the Parliament and the armed forces. Under Nehru, Indian capitalism was weak, the Indian military was weak and while Indian political nationalism was strong it was nonetheless a secondary and a reactive force in foreign affairs. Before 1947 Muslim and later British imperialism had functioned as the primary force in the subcontinent. After 1947, following the formal retreat of the two imperialisms from the new India, Indian nationalism became a strong political force in Indian diplomatic and political rhetoric, but in reality it was vulnerable to the great powers’ interventions in Indian strategic affairs. Nehru had voluntarily accepted the policy boundaries of the great powers. His diplomatic and military actions were shaped by the great powers’ interests and interventions. Moreover, the Indian state was subject to manipulation by a Nehru-centric and later a dynasty-centred decision-making system. The Nehru-type decision-making apparatus consisted of an inner group of participants, small in size, and secretive in its method of decision making. It was tightly managed by the Prime Minister and his/her office and by a few institutional forces such as the Planning Commission and later the Ministry of Finance. Under Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi the prime minister’s household gained political importance because of the access to the prime minister by unelected political advisers and influential business people. Since the Nehru days India has had a number of hubs of decision making. Routine decisions were taken by India’s extensive bureaucratic networks that extended from Delhi into provincial capitals and from there into the countryside.

Shifts in Indian diplomatic history 19 However, in relation to critical diplomatic and military issues the process has been secretive and compartmentalized. Decision-making power lies in the hands of practitioners who define the policy boundaries and allocate the resources. For example India’s atomic energy programme had two hubs of decision making. The atomic energy scientists set the research and programme boundaries and developed plans to create from scratch a nuclear weapons capability. But Nehru and his successors (1947–98) set the policy boundaries that had two political components: an emphasis on global and Indian nuclear disarmament and a policy committed to the non-exercise of the nuclear weapons option. The policy boundary was set by Nehru himself and was accepted by his followers until 1998.5 Take another example. The Indian national planning machinery had its hub in the Planning Commission. It was created and dominated by Nehru and his appointees. The planning process was generally immune to critical public scrutiny in the 1950s when the foundation of India’s socialist economic planning was laid.6 Similarly decision making about Indian diplomatic and military affairs were in the hands of Nehru and his followers. Nehru largely made the threat assessments. Cabinet and Parliamentary inputs were mostly irrelevant. Despite the military defeat in 1962 there was little institutionalized interaction between India’s diplomatic and military establishments relating to national security questions, the threat assessments and the proposed solutions.7 The Indian Parliament has rarely functioned as an arena of serious public discourse. It functions as a lawmaking body in response to executive branch initiatives. It is not a forum where ministers are accountable for their actions through the question period. The book argues that Nehru and his cohorts facilitated the penetration of Anglo-American and Chinese power in the subcontinent. Despite ritual shows of independence in the form of declarations about Indian non-alignment, the Nehru policy was to avoid war with Pakistan, avoid war preparations vis-à-vis China and Pakistan, assert peace and friendship as the cardinal principle of Indian policy, limit Indian diplomatic links primarily to the major powers and to neglect its smaller but important regional neighbours. A policy of war preparation and peace processes has been the heart of power politics in world history. It is based on the premise that neighbours are natural enemies and friendships are temporary. By asserting that the morality of peace had precedence over the role of power politics, Nehru and his cohorts denied a moral basis of power politics, that is, to protect the nation’s boundaries, and to promote the well-being of the people and the country’s values, it was necessary to have a war policy. Nehru’s policy boundaries were such that they left the Indian field open to the continuous insertion of AngloAmerican, Pakistani and Chinese power and interests in the subcontinent. The British rulers in India were smart power managers. They left the subcontinent realizing that they could no longer rule it directly, but they negotiated their exit by leaving behind an Indian political leadership in the form of Nehru and his leftist, British trained advisers. They were likely to follow British parliamentary norms and British strategic principles in relation to the subcontinent, that is, to accept the two-nation theory as the basis of Indo-Pakistani relations and Indian pacifism or non-militarization and non-nuclearization as the basis of Indian foreign

20

Shifts in Indian diplomatic history

policy. Consequently, Indian decision making was shaped by foreign strategic attitudes and interests; and other Indian leaders such as Sardar V. B. Patel, and potential decision makers such as the Indian military, were marginalized. In these circumstances, India’s influence in the Southern Asian region and in the international sphere shrank. Eminent Western practitioners have judged the Nehru era realistically. To quote Escott Reid, Canada’s High Commissioner to India (1952–57) –

–

in the first seven or eight years of independence, Indian diplomacy had suffered from the traditional defects of generous youth or gifted amateurs – reading lectures and self-righteous sermons to the world; offering simple solutions to difficult problems; dissipating one’s influence over too wide a field instead of conserving one’s influence for matters directly affecting the national interest; trying to do good in matters not of direct concern to one’s country, but of very direct concern to other countries. with every year that passes more and more Indians of the governing classes become more and more concerned with the possibility that their great northern neighbor, China, will soon outstrip them in the race for economic and social betterment. And the implications of that for India, for the other countries of Asia and for the world are enormous.8

Alastair Buchan, formerly the head of the International Institute for Strategic Studies expressed a negative view of India’s international position as follows. though India is Asia’s second largest state, she possesses little external influence there (except with her immediate neighbors); she is a static power in diplomatic terms at present, and the evolution of local relationships elsewhere in Asia is unlikely to be greatly affected by her conceptions or initiatives, even though her relations with China may become less hostile and those with the United States less sour. With the change in the American attitude to China, India is no longer seen as a great alternative society whose success and therefore whose magnetism for other Asian societies must be encouraged.9 Compare Nehru’s diplomatic and military strategy with Pakistan’s. It was weaker in size and material assets compared to India, but Pakistan used its strategic location, its political vision (a strong belief in the two-nation theory and the importance of a homeland for Indian Muslims) and its political skills to play on the psychological needs and the strategic ambitions of the great powers who had an interest in subcontinental power politics. Pakistan exploited the theme of Soviet and Hindu imperialism and the threat the two posed to the interests of Pakistan, America and China. It is to the credit of Pakistani diplomacy that it succeeded in bringing America and China to its side against India and Soviet Russia. It created linkages (alliances) and polarities (divisions) in regional and in international politics. Note that Pakistani diplomacy rested on the framework of British imperial politics and strategic policy in India. Before 1947 a segment of

Shifts in Indian diplomatic history 21 Indian Muslims led by M. A. Jinnah had mobilized the British political establishment to accept the idea of differences between the Hindu and Muslim religions and fear of Hindu/Congress party majorities as reasons to divide the subcontinent into two countries. Thereafter, after 1947, Pakistan was able to build an international coalition with America, China and Saudi Arabia to its side and it successfully secured a sustainable Indo-Pakistani polarity in the region. As a result Pakistan’s manoeuvrability increased in regional and international politics. Thus, the subcontinent’s diplomatic and military history is not a story of ‘India and her neighbors’. Indian political nationalism combined with Nehru’s peace policy made India the weaker and the secondary element in relation to the strategic triangles that dominated the subcontinent. The first triangle, the US and Pakistan vis-à-vis India came into play during the early 1950s following the establishment of a military pact between the US and Pakistan in 1954. The second triangle, Pakistan and China vis-à-vis India came into play in the early 1960s. Pakistan was the key in both triangles. Both triangles functioned in parallel fashion in the early 1960s, because the Kennedy and the Johnson administrations were opposed to the Pakistan’s link-up with China initially but later, by 1971, the two major strategic triangles converged and were in full play in the 1971 military campaign in Bangladesh. The triangles temporarily acquired a bipolar character in 1971 because the US–Pakistan–China were aligned against India–USSR in the 1971 war. But the normal pattern showed the existence of the two triangles with a pattern of enmity, convergent and divergent interests and policies to engage the other members of the triangles. Chapter 3 discusses the relevance of strategic triangles in the subcontinent. To recap, the first historical shift secured an organic link between Muslim and British strategic ideas before 1947. Here India became the field of power that was managed initially by Mughal emperors and later by British rulers of India. This became the basis of the second shift. Muslim and British ideas and the 1947 Partition became the basis of the new Pakistani state, and the ideas and the event became the basis of a permanent tension between India and Pakistan and between Muslims and Hindus. After 1947 the organic link between Muslim and British power continued in the form of the development of an Anglo-American alignment with Pakistan.10 Moreover, another significant organic link emerged in India’s strategic decision-making process. Indian policies about Kashmir and Pakistan and the limited role assigned to military power to settle political and ideological disputes was dominated by Nehru and Mountbatten and by Nehru and his cohorts in the Indian policy establishment. Mountbatten’s inputs shaped Nehru’s policies. Both committed India to a no war stance with Pakistan, an emphasis on friendship with it and the Kashmir issue was internationalized by its reference to the United Nations Security Council. These were Mountbatten’s inputs to Nehru. A policy of liberating Kashmir by force was rejected. So the Indian policy framework was skewed towards an Indian commitment to a peaceful settlement with Pakistan without a reciprocal obligation to a peaceful solution by Pakistan. Consider also the effect of Krishna Menon’s anti-war, pro-disarmament and antiIndian military attitudes on Nehru and the Indian policy establishment.11 They

22 Shifts in Indian diplomatic history sidelined the value of the Indian military as a source of input into strategic questions. They sidelined the importance of force and coercive diplomacy in world politics and world history as well as Indian history. This discussion indicates the existence of five organic links. The first was the voluntary tie-up in Muslim and British strategic thought that found common cause to contain ‘political Hinduism’ before 1947, and, after 1947, the cause was to contain ‘Hindu/Indian nationalism’. After 1947 this became an organic link between Muslim Pakistan and Anglo-American policy. Chapter 3 discusses this. The link was buttressed by the growth of the military alignment between Pakistan, China and the US between the 1950s and the 1970s. The second organic link, an involuntary one, was expressed by the polarity between India and Pakistan at the inter-state level. The two countries and their peoples were tied together by military and ideological conflict. The third link, an involuntary one, was expressed by the Hindu–Muslim divide in communal relations; the two communities could not avoid interacting with each other; this led to communal tensions and riots. The fourth tie-up, a voluntary one, was expressed by the convergence between Mountbatten’s policies and Nehru’s on vital questions like Kashmir, Indo-Pakistan relations and the role of military defence. The fifth tie-up was expressed by the emergence of a Nehruvian foreign policy community in India that dominated and distorted the formation of Indian economic, diplomatic and military power and appropriate strategies. The distortions delayed the entry of India into the global economic and strategic mainstream. Lattimore points out that retreating European empires in Asia created power vacuums which America and Soviet Russia were not able to fill.12 In our view India’s political capacity to shape its economic, diplomatic and defence policies was taken initially by Nehru and his advisers and by Lord Mountbatten, and subsequently the parameters of Indo-Pakistani strategic issues were shaped by the policies of the White House, the State Department and other departments such as the Pentagon and the CIA, by policies of the Chinese communists and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) and by the policies of the Pakistani military. These players occupied the Indian decision-making space between 1947 and 1998. But even though the Nehrus, their advisers and the foreign powers shaped Indian diplomatic and military affairs during this period, they were never totally dominant. There has been an ongoing power struggle in Indian foreign policies between those who sought Indian diplomatic influence without military strength and sought the high moral road to world peace, and those who sought to make the subcontinent the field of Indian power, and make India a player on the global economic and military mainstream. Nehru was an Indian czar in the areas of economic policy, diplomacy and in Indian politics. He projected the view that Indian diplomatic and economic policies, and Indian politics, belonged to the realm of morality. He did not project these areas as issues of power politics as they actually were. During the era of the Nehrus (1947–98) the fields of Indian politics and its external policies were centres of power struggles that involved Indian economic and political forces as well as foreign powers. The foreign affairs struggles were settled in 1998 by the decision to rely

Shifts in Indian diplomatic history 23 more on power politics and less on morality and unilateral restraint in the pursuit of Indian interests. Undoubtedly, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi took important initiatives to push India’s military modernization, to use force in 1971 to break up Pakistan and create a new state, Bangladesh, and to conduct the 1974 nuclear test. However, the decision to take on the US–Pakistan–China coalition heads on in 1971, and later in 1974 to undermine the international non-proliferation treaty by a nuclear test, were subject to vigorous countervailing international pressures. Facing them Mrs Gandhi retreated on the nuclear issue, calling it a peaceful test, announcing that India did not intend to develop nuclear weapons and calling for nuclear disarmament. Having lifted the curtain she closed it and then retreated to the Nehru formula, that is, to develop the nuclear option but announce an intention not to exercise it. Moreover, even though the American–Pakistani–Chinese coalition lost the 1971 military campaign, its policy to check India’s advance within the region and in the international sphere remained intact. So the post-Nehru period (1964–98) revealed an oscillation in Indian policies, a pattern of one step forward and one backward. As a result of external pressures and lack of self-confidence and planning to follow-up on its actions, Indian strategic decision making remained paralysed. Indian diplomacy remained wedded to the moral policy of peace rather than a show of a power political approach to strategic issues. During this period India’s domestic sphere remained a battlefield. The Indian Congress party’s populist socialist economy and secularism platforms competed with the advocacy that Indian private capitalism was the engine of economic development and military–political realism was the basis to take India into the global economic and military mainstream. The third shift took shape after 1998, but it is important to understand the context in which it occurred. In Nehru’s and Mahatma Gandhi’s India the morality of peace had precedence over the role of power politics in India’s external policies. In fairness to Nehru the latter approach was evident to a limited extent in his decisions to develop India’s nuclear weapons option and a modest Indian military capacity.13 But this was a secondary theme in Indian behaviour. Under Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi Indian policies revealed an ambivalent desire to use force to pressure Pakistan (e.g. 1971 campaign, 1974 nuclear test and Brasstack exercise in 1997) and to participate in Asian affairs by opening up to China. Rajiv Gandhi mounted an international campaign to promote his agenda for a nondiscriminatory nuclear non-proliferation treaty and global disarmament. But the Chinese refused to discuss disarmament with Rajiv Gandhi, because India did not possess nuclear weapons and the American–Pakistani–Chinese coalition continued its policy to isolate India because the Indian political leadership did not follow up on its 1971 and 1974 actions. This pattern indicated to the outside world that the Indian leadership lacked staying power. Thus efforts to create an Indian strategic presence in subcontinental, Asian and international affairs remained inconclusive under the Nehrus. In other words, a consideration to build Indian military and nuclear power existed since the Nehru era, but India’s public declarations and policies showed a

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lack of intent to exercise the nuclear option or to use the military machinery except as a reactive force to deal with military aggression when it became obvious and intolerable. That is, the military and diplomatic initiatives were in the enemy’s hands. Indian political thought during the age of the Nehruvians did not recognize the importance of coercive diplomacy and the relationship between military strategy and negotiated restraint in dealing with its enemies.

The Indian debates: precedence of morality or power politics and the process and model of policy change Nehru’s anti-war, pro-disarmament and anti-power politics attitudes are well known and we need not repeat them here. But its pervasive influence needs to be examined in the context of the major Indian strategic policy debates that emerged during the 1960s. This period is important because China’s defeat of India in 1962 and its nuclear test in 1964 triggered major Indian dilemmas. The debates showed the constant tension between the importance of morality and power politics in India’s external policies. They showed the powerful pull of the moral imperative in Indian diplomacy even as external military and diplomatic pressures on India were growing and the pattern of enmities was crystallizing. The debates emerged in a triple context. First, India was defeated militarily by China in 1962 and the Himalayan boundaries were in dispute. Second, Indian atomic energy officials believed in 1960 that China was likely to join the nuclear club in 1964, which it did. Third and final international negotiations were underway to establish a nuclear non-proliferation regime that was meant to inhibit nuclear weapons proliferation including India’s nuclear capacity, rather than to disarm the existing nuclear powers. External developments had two effects on Indian policy making. The 1962 defeat by China aroused Indian nationalism and created a clear public identification with the issue of border security and military defence and a rejection of the Nehru line on China. Nehru’s belief in the possibility of a peaceful relationship with China stood discredited. The combination of a major external blow and its arousal of Indian nationalism, not proactive Indian government thinking, produced the policy change. Two parameters changed in Nehru’s paradigm as a result of the 1962 war. His faith in peaceful coexistence stood rejected and his dismissive attitude about the role of military power in a world of enmities was shown to be ineffective and counterproductive. During 1947–62, Nehru had mobilized Indian nationalism to create public support for his policy of security through peace diplomacy and through the diplomatic involvement of India in bridge building between the major powers. Post-1962 India’s China policy showed the value of power politics over morality or peace diplomacy in Indian behaviour. This externally induced change was irreversible. It indicated a paradigm shift in the bilateral relationship (from peaceful coexistence to a relationship of conflict) and in India’s policy premise (from relying primarily on diplomacy before 1962 to relying primarily on military measures and to a lesser extent on routine diplomacy rather than prime ministerial summitry). The paradigm shifts occurred,

Shifts in Indian diplomatic history 25 because the externally induced major event (1962-war) created a clear public identification with China as a major threat to Indian territorial security. On the nuclear question however, the debate between the precedence of morality versus power politics remained unsettled from the early 1960s to 1998. Here two major external developments, China’s nuclear testing in 1964 and the development of the international non-proliferation regime (1964–), did not create a clear public identification that these developments constituted threats to Indian national security. Indian public opinion was polarized on the nuclear question as was India’s political leadership and the bureaucracy. Moreover, the Indian military did not weigh in on this issue as an institutional force as it did on the issue of Indian military modernization after 1962. The Indian government maintained Nehru’s twotrack nuclear policy, first, of building the nuclear weapons option and second, of not exercising it. This dual policy revealed a lack of strategic purpose and unity on the nuclear question within India. It enabled a build-up of international and domestic pressures on nuclear and missile questions. The decision to avoid entry into the nuclear club and to adopt a policy of nuclear ambivalence was a part of a larger pattern. It was to avoid the opportunities, risks and obligations of relying on power politics to advance Indian interests and to do so through a sustainable diplomatic and military strategy. For instance, in the 1965 war with Pakistan, Indian Prime Minister Shastri ordered military action against Pakistan but reverted to the old pattern of the great powers’ managed Indo-Pakistani ceasefires and bilateral normalization talks. There was no Indian attempt to make Pakistan a field of Indian power as Pakistan under M. A. Jinnah, (1947–48) and later Z. A. Bhutto (1965), made Kashmir a field of Pakistani power. In 1971 Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi ordered military action in East Pakistan but again, following the surrender of Pakistani army to Indian forces in Dhaka, India reverted to the pattern of a ceasefire with Pakistan on the western front. India’s Pakistan policy was also two tracked: there was reactive military action when the Pakistani pressure became intense, and Indian public opinion was aroused and then there was the shift to peace diplomacy when the threat had retreated. Indian behaviour oscillated between a policy of friendship (a moral imperative) and the use or threatened use of force when Pakistani military pressure became intolerable in the public mind (a power political imperative). But this oscillation revealed an ambivalence about power politics or geopolitics, because there was no apparent strategy to deal with the pattern of enmities that bore on Indian interests and not simply on its borders. The pull of Indian disarmers remained strong. It had a history. Krishna Menon, a powerful Nehru adviser since the Indian independence movement, had a fixation about the central role of disarmament and peace diplomacy in world politics. Menon’s was a strong input in Indian disarmament diplomacy. Even after India’s defeat in 1962, Menon (and many Indian officials in the Foreign Office) believed that India should stay the course, maintain the commitment to global nuclear disarmament and avoid an arms race with China. Even after India’s declaration in 1998 that it was a nuclear weapon power, and military as well as nuclear and missile modernization continues among the major military powers in the world, the Indian government continues to fixate on the importance of nuclear

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disarmament in the annual reports of its ministries of external affairs and defence.14 Our discussion reveals two persistent characteristics in Indian behaviour about the role of force in addressing military and political problems in a world of interstate rivalries. The characteristics are based on a distinction between Indian governmental behaviour in critical and sub-critical international situations that impact on Indian interests and Indian threat perceptions. The premise is that Indian policy change – whether it is about India’s China policy or economic reforms or its nuclear policy – is usually externally induced, that is, it is a result of external events; it is not usually based on proactive policy initiative by the Indian political leadership or India’s various bureaucratic organizations. The process indicates a linkage between an external event that stimulates an Indian public debate where ‘Indian nationalism’ is engaged and its pressure on the government to change its old policy is irresistible. In a crisis situation it cuts across political/ideological and regional lines, as in the case of the public reaction to the Chinese war with India in 1962. There was a sense of betrayal by China, a sense that Nehru was naïve, and this led to the rejection of Nehru’s peace policy with China and to support the build-up of Indian armed forces as the guardians of Indian borders and sovereignty. The external event is a necessary pre-requisite of Indian policy change but it is not sufficient. An external event becomes significant when it arouses Indian public opinion that must be addressed by meaningful policy change. In sub-critical situations the Indian public debate is often fragmented and stalemated, that is, divided on political party or ideological lines; and when a debate exists within the government it too is divided and stalemated. That is, opposing points of views exist in Indian public and policy discourse and prolonged polarization inhibits policy change until a new catalyst enters the picture. Thus the ambivalence and the oscillation depend on the balance of power between the contenders within government and Indian society. The key variables in our model are as follows. External variable: There was persistent external pressure to change Indian foreign policies, that is, to make concessions to Pakistan, abandon its nuclear and missile programmes or accept the great powers’ (American and Chinese) hegemony over Indian foreign and military affairs. Internal variable: Nehru’s foreign policy paradigm (socialist economy, Indian non-alignment; preference for a moral approach over geopolitics/power politics approach) dominated India’s political system from 1947 to 1998. Internal variable: Indian public opinion or nationalism was aggressively attached to particular issues such as India’s territorial sovereignty and Indian prestige, but its influence as a catalyst of policy change varied as follows. The hypothesis is that India’s external policy change is a consequence of debates at three different levels of analysis. The first consists of intra-governmental or in-house debate(s) that are secret, located at the bureaucratic level and the issue(s) attract minimum political intensity; they are categorized as ‘sub-critical’.

Shifts in Indian diplomatic history 27 India’s nuclear debate (1956–64) on whether or not to build the nuclear bomb was in-house. It was conducted in secrecy between members of India’s atomic energy department, select members of the Foreign Office and the Prime Minister. The debate developed three policy boundaries, one, to build the scientific and technological infrastructure for a weapons option, two, to press for global disarmament and three, not to exercise India’s nuclear weapon option. This debate remained stalemated between 1947 and 1998. There are other examples of inconclusive Indian strategic debates. The China and Tibet debate, whether China could be trusted, whether it was a good idea to offer unilateral concession to China on Tibet, whether peace diplomacy was sufficient, again reflected Nehru’s policy dominance. The Nehru–Patel exchange revealed major differences in assumptions and policy implications. Patel, widely known as the Iron Man because of his critical role in forging the Indian Union out of hundreds of princely states and who had ties with the British crown, favoured a power political approach to China and Pakistan. Nehru did not. But the political intensity was limited because Patel deferred to Nehru and the issue did not reach a crisis in Indian politics. Nehru prevailed not because of the soundness of his argument but by default.15 Likewise, India’s debate about Pakistan and Kashmir, whether or not India should liberate the Pakistani side of Kashmir by force or whether the issue should be handled by diplomatic means with Pakistan and through the United Nations, had limited political intensity within India because the decision-making was dominated by Nehru and his mentor, Mountbatten. Defence of the Indian side of Kashmir after the acceptance of the ceasefire under UN auspices became an issue of local defence against aggression. Moreover, Indian military policy, its machinery and its parameters, were subordinated to the dictates of maintaining the moral preference over considerations of geopolitics/power politics in Indo-Pakistani relations. In the case of India’s Pakistani and Kashmir policies, the internal debates were stalemated. They lacked movement towards policy change because the process in these cases generated limited political intensity; Nehru’s paradigm prevailed as long as the situation in each case remained ‘sub-critical’, that is, one of manageable instability within Indian politics. In India’s China policy the moral preference lay in Nehru’s policy of peaceful coexistence and the belief that India’s international influence could be secured by such a policy. In India’s nuclear policy the moral preference lay in Nehru’s and Krishna Menon’s belief that the moral high road lay in a policy of global disarmament and prevention of an arms race. In India’s Kashmir policy the moral preference lay in Nehru’s policy of seeking resolution through a fair minded United Nations with little recognition of the fact that the Security Council itself was the field of the great powers’ politics; and there was a moral preference to do the right thing for the Kashmiris. In India’s Pakistan policy the moral preference lay in the belief that friendship with Pakistan was possible and desirable even though Pakistan had come into being on the principle of Muslim separateness and the organic link between Muslim and British strategy and ideology required the Hindu–Muslim divide. Political ‘criticality’ within Indian politics was attained because the 1962 war aroused Indian nationalism followed by calls

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for the resignation of Menon if not Nehru. India’s China policy changed in this context. The other policies remained stalemated between Indian doves and hawks; and they remained an attractive field of international power politics where external pressures dominated and shaped Indian policy dilemmas. The second level of analysis refers to Indian public debates. There are two examples of the effect of such debates in achieving Indian policy change. Our first example is India’s China policy, post-1962, as discussed earlier. Our second example is India’s policy on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (1968), a major international event in the sense that it revealed the determination of the major powers, two capitalist (the UK and the US) and one communist (USSR) to put a lid on further nuclear proliferation. It was a major effort to create a two-tiered international nuclear system with two sets of rules and with two categories of states; those with obligations (the non-nuclear ones) and those with rights (the nuclear ones). The nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) issue attained criticality in Indian politics, because the demand to accept nuclear limitations would have required a rollback of India’s nuclear option. The first level secret Indian debate (1956–64) became a public Indian debate in the 1960s because of the effect of the third level of debate, the one conducted at the international level among the great powers and the non-nuclear nations as well as the world community. But note that India rejected the NPT, but it did not accept the advocacy of India’s pro-nuclear bomb lobby to join the nuclear club and to accept the rights and obligations of a nuclear power. Its internal debate on the nuclear weapons question remained stalemated as before. The NPT issue gained political criticality in 1967–68 because it achieved a strong public identification against a discriminatory international treaty. The issue gained political intensity, because it energized the political leadership, bureaucracy and public opinion to weigh in on the NPT issue. While the NPT issue gained criticality, the nuclear weapons issue remained subcritical in the Indian public debate (the second level of analysis) and in the internal debate (the first level of analysis). In sum, during this period India’s Kashmir, Pakistan, nuclear weapon and nuclear disarmament policies remained in a sub-critical mode and they lacked meaningful policy development. Indians had repudiated Nehru because of his China policy but Nehru-ism persisted after 1962 in the form of ambivalence between the moral preference of a policy or a power politics approach in dealing with hostile external powers; the power politics approach gained some ground but it remained subordinated to the moral approach. The traditional pattern of Indian strategic decision making remained intact after 1962. The style was reactive and defensive. The political leaders acted when they recognized two necessities: to satisfy a radicalized public opinion in India and to deal with external pressures that were likely to cut off Indian options. The results of this approach varied. They rested on a constant, that is, the governmental decision-making process was secretive, compartmentalized and centralized on strategic issues, a legacy of British colonial administrative practices. Whether or not Indian policies changed would depend on three variables: the existence of external pressures to corner India in vital areas; Indian capacity/incapacity to deal

Shifts in Indian diplomatic history 29 with such pressures; and the effect of external pressures on Indian public opinion, that is, whether or not it produced a demand for policy change. Change occurred with the emergence of a critical mass of intensity in the Indian public debate on an issue. It had to rise to a level that it could bring closure to governmental deliberations. To sum up, Indian policy change is a consequence of interactions at three levels of political discourse: international environment that concerns India; the public debate in India and the in-house governmental decision making. The dynamics and the results in terms of policy change vary. For example, India’s in-house governmental debate on nuclear arms in the early 1960s – whether or not India should adopt a nuclear weapons policy – had political intensity within governmental circles, but it did not possess the intensity in the public debate in mid1960s even though it possessed the intensity in the international debate on non-proliferation at the time. During the Nehru era the China, Tibet, Pakistan and Kashmir issues lacked a critical mass of debate within the Indian government, because Nehru knew it all and his authority was unchallenged within the government and within Indian society. Despite the lack of criticality prior to 1962, Indian public opinion was incensed with the Chinese military attack and with the Chinese leadership and with Nehru and his advisers. The result was a change in India’s relationship with China and a change in India’s approach to China with an emphasis on India’s military preparations to guard Indian sovereignty. But the change was China specific and it was limited in scope. The Indian governmental mindset was still to compartmentalize the India–China question in terms of China’s military attack (called a betrayal) and the legalities of the Himalayan border (even though the legal case was murky). Successive Indian governments or Indian scholars did not analyse Sino-Indian issues in the context of the direction of Chinese foreign policy at the international and the subcontinental levels. No systematic efforts were made to analyse China’s policy towards India in the context of its interests in Pakistan and America, and in India itself, or to assess China’s India policy in the context of Chinese ambitions in Asia, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean areas. The analyses and public statements out of New Delhi did not see China as a rival of India in Asian and World affairs. No assessments of a high level existed to show China’s policies in the context of the development of a hostile Pakistan–US–China coalition that was active in issues relating to Pakistan, Kashmir, nuclear weapons and regional security. The 1962 event did not lead to an introspective analysis of why Nehru and his cohorts had failed, whether a policy of emphasizing peaceful and good neighbourly relations with Pakistan and China made sense given their perspectives and interests and whether synergy between Indian diplomacy and military and economic capacities was necessary to ensure success. Because of the habit of compartmentalizing diplomatic and military issues and treating them with secrecy when they are in a sub-critical mode, the ability to anticipate strategic problems was diminished, as was the ability to engage in proactive policy change. Despite the war with China, despite indications that China was likely to become a nuclear weapon power in the mid-1960s, despite the existence of a

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strong Indian nuclear weapons capable programme and despite the rise of an international non-proliferation regime that sought to contain Indian nuclearization, the nuclear issue had different dynamics. There was no policy change during 1960–74. The 1974 nuclear test was explained as an engineering activity, a peaceful nuclear explosion to build canals, rather than a geopolitical event. The nuclear weapons question was embedded in a critical mass of stalemated opinions in the internal government debate in the 1960s. Also it had achieved criticality at the international level (the third level of analysis); a great powers’ consensus emerged to curb further nuclear weapons proliferation. The issues were technical and legalistic and they involved considerations of distribution power, the pattern of relationships and prestige of the powers. Such considerations, however, did not engage the attention of Indian public opinion as wars with China and Pakistan did. As an event the issue of Indian nuclear weapons (1960s–90s) did not have the salience of wars with China and Pakistan (or economic crises which affected the well being of Indian households). So our analysis indicates a distinction between external events that impact on Indian public opinion and events that do not. The importance of an external shock and its effect on Indian public opinion is evident when one compares the dynamics of policy change in India’s China and nuclear policies in the early 1960s. India’s nuclear debate remained mired at the first and third levels of analysis. Here countervailing pressures were at play between those who wanted to exercise the weapons option and others who did not, and they cancelled each other. In the first and third level of analysis the scientific and the political bureaucracies were mindful of their institutional and career interests, and they were sensitive about the political views of the Indian prime minister. In the absence of a catalytic external shock that radicalized public opinion which in turn was likely to affect Prime Ministerial decision making, one can hypothesize a prolonged process of debate of the first and the third levels of debate. Even if the third level of debate, that is, at the international level is settled by international agreement, it serves as an input for the first type of debate but it is not necessarily a turning point. This is why India’s nuclear weapons debate lasted for almost 35 years before a decision to turn to nuclear weapons for Indian security was taken in 1998. (Indira Gandhi’s nuclear test in 1974 was revoked by a claim that India did not intend to adopt nuclear arms; it was projected as a peaceful engineering feat rather than a step to weaponization.) The Indian debates on China, nuclear weapons and international arms control and disarmament were framed in terms of those who stressed moral imperatives and those who stressed the precedence of power politics. The power politics approach is concerned with the dynamic process of movement of military forces, economic forces and political ideas and beliefs in a country’s strategic neighbourhood. Our contention is that an ‘Indian Left versus an Indian Right’ divide exists in Indian politics, but Indian strategic debates are not driven primarily by ideological considerations as they are by the role of political personalities, their domestic coalitions and partnerships and their domestic enmities. Since 1947 the Indian Left versus Right Divide affected economic policy and party politics. The issues here were framed in terms of the merit of Nehru’s socialism versus BJP’s

Shifts in Indian diplomatic history 31 anti-socialism and pro-capitalism and the merit of Congress party’s ‘secularism’ versus BJP’s ‘Hindu fundamentalism’. In Indian foreign and military affairs the critical divide is between the preference for moral imperatives rather than the preference for power politics. Note that the leaders of the international Left – Russia and China during and after the Cold War era – and the leaders of the Western Right agreed on the importance of power politics in their dealings with their allies and their enemies. Nehru was the odd man out in the critical mass of major powers in the post-1945 world that favoured power politics. His policies showed that the moral imperatives had precedence over power politics in the content and the symbols of Indian policies. Against Nehru’s moralism and peace policy, America, Pakistan and China held the view that the subcontinent including India was a field of power and hence a legitimate arena for the outside great powers’ interventions. Indian protests against ‘great power interference’ were expressed in vain.

BJP coalition’s power politics, 1998–2004 The subcontinent was a field of power politics for the external powers for two reasons. First, in the context of the Cold War America sought to keep Russian and Chinese influence in check in the region, but in tune with the classical great power tradition it accepted de facto alignment with China to check Soviet and Indian aggressiveness in relation to their regional partner, Pakistan. From the early 1960s China developed a special military and a diplomatic relationship with Pakistan and the 1971 Bangladesh war showed that China, ostensibly an international revolutionary power, had joined the Anglo-American–Pakistani coalition to make the subcontinent a field of their power in opposition to India and Soviet Russia. China’s defection from its revolutionary principles, its warm embrace of the militaristic and genocidal policies of the Pakistani army in East Pakistan in 1970–71 and the collaboration with the Nixon–Kissinger regime against India showed the ascendancy of power politics over moral imperatives in the foreign policies of this coalition.16 The great powers’ quest to make the subcontinent a field of their power was in tune with their diplomatic experiences. Before 1949 America tried to make China an orbit of its influence to keep Russia out.17 America’s push into Japan during the Second World War was to make Japan a part of the American orbit and to keep Soviet Russia out rather than to share power with it in the region (unlike the situation in Europe in 1945). Likewise the ‘Indian’ subcontinent was meant to be a field of Anglo-American–Pakistani power to fill the power vacuum left by the retreating British Empire. Two imperatives were in play. The Cold War imperative required America to control the growth of Soviet influence in the region. Second, India had to be checked because of America’s concern that India had the ambition to be a regional great power (a regional hegemon), and it could challenge American authority in the international sphere through its advocacy of non-alignment. These imperatives dominated the thinking of the Anglo-American–Pakistani coalition ( joined by China in the 1960s) until the late 1990s.

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The third shift was orchestrated by the BJP-led minority coalition and it occurred in the context of our discussion. This government introduced a number of important changes while in power (1998–2004). ●

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The decision of the BJP minority government (1998– ) to make the subcontinent a field of Indian power politics rather than a playground for the AngloAmerican–Pakistani (and later Chinese) power politics was expressed in the forceful shift of India’s nuclear policy from a peaceful pose to a weapons stance. This was demonstrated by nuclear and missile tests (1998– ) and the use of Indian conventional arms with inter-service coordination in political– military crises in the region (1999, 2000–02). The attention to power politics in BJP’s strategic behaviour did not mean the end of a moral imperative. It meant, however, a decline in the weight Nehru and his cohorts had attached to the moral imperative and the minimal attention to the role of military force as a pillar of regional stability (or manageable instability) and a basis of negotiated political settlements with regional adversaries. The Vajpayee government’s approach was to formulate a combination of war and peaceprocess policies where India’s war behaviour was guided by a quest for a negotiated political settlement with Pakistan and China; and its search for viable peace processes was based on the possession of military means and military tactics that demonstrated a capacity to act independently and to initiate, manage and end military action. After a brief period of international criticism about India’s alleged violation of global non-proliferation norms (even though India did not break any of its treaty obligations), the US government shifted course and decided to engage India in a strategic dialogue. Indo-US relationships increased in scope and depth in economic, military and diplomatic affairs. The new relationship led to cooperation between the Indian and the American armed forces in joint military training exercises, in patrolling the sealanes in the Indian Ocean and by the transfer of modern American military technology to India. The process had started during the second Clinton administration. It was intensified by the Bush administration particularly after the September 2001 attacks. Heightened awareness about international terrorism that was rooted in the Afghanistan–Pakistan region increased the value, in American eyes, of India as a strategic flank in a dangerous neighbourhood. It now included Central Asia, Afghanistan, the Arabian Sea as well as the sealanes from South China Sea to the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. The enlarged areas became a field of American as well as Indian power (and power politics), often acting in concert or in a parallel way.18 Pakistan’s military government announced its decision in December 2003 to abandon its long-standing demand for Kashmiri plebiscite through the UN and to seek to negotiate settlement of the Kashmir issue and other IndoPakistani issues. The new Indo-Pakistani orientation, following Vajpayee’s peace initiative in mid-2003, was to explore the development of sustainable economic, social and political links that could lead to meaningful

Shifts in Indian diplomatic history 33

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interdependency between the two regional rivals. The change indicated that the Pakistani military, which has been the real centre of power in Pakistan despite its bouts of elections, had implicitly acknowledged the failure of its policy to make India (and Kashmir) a field of Pakistani power combined with the support of its Anglo-American and Chinese backers since the 1950s. If India and Pakistan were to secure a negotiated settlement on a variety of issues, including Kashmir, that would indicate a desire on the part of the Pakistani military to recognize the moral imperatives in the development of Pakistan’s economic, social and political life and to shift away from the moral imperative of Kashmir’s liberation by Pakistani intervention. There is irony in the shifts in Indian and Pakistani diplomatic and military strategies. India has increased the weight of power politics and the role of military power in it policies since 1998 while Pakistan appears to be open to Indian and Western persuasion to reduce its historical reliance on military interventions in the subcontinent and to take a turn towards peace and reconstruction. In our chronology, China is the laggard, a slow learner. It is beginning to recognize the scope and the rapid rate of change in regional developments and the implications of subtle U-turns in Indian, American and Pakistani policies for Chinese interests in the region. China is like a big ship that needs to turn around slowly. Nevertheless, the slow turns of a major power have lasting value and a multiplier effect in the region. Still China and India remain long-term strategic rivals. The visit of the Indian prime minister to China in 2003 indicated a willingness to adjust the bilateral relationship in the economic sphere and in border trade. But China has a cultural and a political problem with India. It sees itself as India’s superior in terms of international prestige (it, not India, has a permanent seat at the Security Council); in terms of its economic performance (although India’s economy is growing at a rapid pace); in terms of its defeat of India in 1962; and finally in terms of its ability to manipulate the field of power in the subcontinent since the 1960s. It has built strong defence relations with Pakistan and Bangladesh. It offers low risk military aid to insurgents in India’s northeastern region. It possesses a part of Kashmir. It demands Indian nuclear disarmament and does not recognize India’s nuclear weapons status. It has developed a naval presence in the Indian Ocean, particularly in two Indian strategic flanks, Myanmar and Pakistan. China has a major stake in Pakistan because the latter has been a line of military pressure against India and Indo-Pakistani polarity has served China’s interest. Pakistan is China’s strategic gateway to the Middle East. The moderate Muslim country gave political cover to China’s military and economic push into the Muslim world since the Cold War era. The pattern of development of road and rail communications in China’s silk route, Tibet, Pakistan and Central Asia suggests that Pakistan plays a crucial role for Chinese policies in the Middle Eastern, Persian Gulf, South Asian and Central Asian spheres.

In sum, India has emerged as a catalyst in regional and international diplomatic and military affairs in 1998–2004 despite the long history of foreign military

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interventions and despite Nehru’s ineffectiveness in Indian diplomatic and military affairs. The Indian subcontinent was ‘Indian’ in name only before 1947. It served as a field of power politics for foreign interventionalist forces, eleventh century onwards. Following periods of Mughal and British domination of India an organic link emerged between Mughal and British strategic ideas and political institutions. This was carried forward by the tie-up between Anglo-American and Pakistani strategic ideas and policies after 1947.

India’s foreign policy problems and the process of building India’s international position The book adopts a controversial view of the Nehrus in Indian foreign affairs and the role of external powers in relation to India. Nehru’s policies kept India and political Hindus on the defensive. He tried to build India’s international presence by a diplomacy of non-alignment and peace but his policies were wrong-headed and ineffective against Anglo-American, Pakistani and Chinese power politics in the subcontinent and in the Indian Ocean area. There are two stories to tell. First, that Nehru failed to increase Indian power and prestige or his own. Second, despite Nehru’s moral preference as the basis of India’s policy, despite his failure to manage the international opposition to India and despite the active pursuit of power politics by the Anglo-American, Pakistani and Chinese coalition (1950s–90s,) the ‘India Question’ remained unsettled; the Anglo-American–Pakistani–Chinese coalition was unable to lock India into a suzerain type of a states’ system. No power, alone or in combination, was able to dominate India after 1947 as the Mughals and the British had done earlier. The lesson of the past is that following de-colonization and the rise of the Nehru dynasty the Indian state and its internal institutions could be dominated temporarily but neither an international coalition nor the Nehru clan could dominate India or its external strategic space following the retreat of the Empire. There are two reasons for this assessment. First, at no point in Indian diplomatic and military history was it possible for an international coalition to emerge and dominate India: US–Soviet and Soviet–Chinese rivalries enabled India to secure Moscow’s support for its policies during the Cold War; this helped prevent India’s containment by a hostile international coalition. Fortunate international circumstances, that is, the great powers’ rivalry and the availability of Soviet support, helped India. Second, India has a durable pattern of competitive domestic power politics. Competing political players and institutional forces in the economic, political and the cultural realm have challenged and undermined the dominance of the Nehru family in Indian politics and its external affairs. Since Nehru’s death Indian electoral and party politics reveal a pattern of shifts in the internal balance of power, a trend away from single party dominance and a trend towards coalition politics. Between 1947 and 1998, Congress, ex-Congress leaders and their supporters dominated India’s political system. This was lost to the BJP-led coalition (1998–2004). After the May 2004 elections the BJP coalition was replaced by a Congress party-led minority coalition. Under Nehru and his successors for the

Shifts in Indian diplomatic history 35 most part Indian diplomatic and military policy-making space was occupied by Nehru, his unelected advisers, India’s civil servants and foreign embassies with access to the Prime Minister. The Indian military did not then shape external policy. Under the BJP-coalition era the diplomatic and military decision-making space was occupied by the Prime Minister, armed forces and intelligence services, and the Indian Foreign Office acquired a national security focus. A critical mass of national security oriented players had emerged within India after Nehru’s death, and they functioned according to the imperatives of power politics, not moral preferences as in the past. The power politics tradition has been in full play in internal politics of India, but its use by Indian practitioners in the international arena has varied since 1947. Mrs Gandhi made an effort in the 1970s to tilt towards power politics, but her actions in the 1971 war and the 1974 nuclear test were not decisive. They did not turn around the policies of the hostile international coalition that had formed during Nehru’s time and that continued to corner India in regional and international issues that were central to Indian interests. Mrs Gandhi’s actions failed as well to turn the Indian diplomatic machinery away from the Nehruvian approach or to build a synergy between its diplomacy and military capacity. Indian practitioners remained locked up in their respective boxes – created by the Nehruvian state. Nehru had set the boundaries in the atomic energy, military and diplomatic fields, and the Nehruvians were not able to cross the boundaries and to think outside their respective boxes, except temporarily in moments of external or internal crises. The decisive shifts came with the coming to power of the BJP-coalition in 1998. The expectation is that with the policy changes introduced by the BJP-coalition since 1998 the ascendancy of the power politics orientation in Indian foreign affairs is assured. The danger that the new government will revert to the Nehru paradigm (1947–64) or to the oscillation and ambivalence of the Nehruvians (1964–98) is limited to rhetorical declarations about non-alignment and multipolarity. The book portrays the post-Nehru era up to 1998 as a transition from Nehru’s global-utopian diplomacy to the systematic practice of coercive diplomacy with a moral face after 1998. The Nehruvians (1964–98) were ambivalent about the value of external power politics and hence oscillated between power politics and moral force in Indian diplomacy. India’s incremental military build-up after 1962, and Indian military actions thereafter, showed the attraction of regional power politics to the Indian strategic mind, but this was not a rejection of Nehruvian foreign policy. In 1965 the Indian political and military leadership under L. B. Shastri showed its capacity to unbalance the Pakistani military establishment even though the military campaign ended in a stalemate between the two countries. Lessons were learnt; first, that India’s leadership had to be able to initiate and to terminate the fight on its terms before international pressure was applied to secure a ceasefire. Second, synergy was needed between Indian political aims and military strategy. Third, and finally, cooperation between the three branches of the armed forces was necessary to secure military aims. Another round of military modernization and strategy development followed. By 1971, the Indian armed forces had emerged as a successful fighting force. It gained international recognition as a

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fighting force and recognition that the military along with the scientists were the heart of the Indian nation. But still, there was no effective Indian strategy to unbalance the hostile Pakistan–China–US coalition against India that had formed since the 1950s. To recap, India was the object of external pressures up to 1998. It was a field of international power politics that produced a system of competitive coexistence of Pakistani, American, Chinese and Russian influences in India. Under the Nehrus, Indian decision-making space concerning Indian diplomatic and military affairs shrank with the growth of influences in critical areas of Indian policy such as relations with Pakistan, China and India’s nuclear, missile activities and outer space. India’s position in the international sphere declined compared to its international influence in the early 1950s. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi made two unsuccessful attempts to alter the situation but the 1971 war, and the nuclear test in 1974, did not prevent the external powers from using India as their field of power politics. Indira Gandhi’s attempts at power politics lacked staying power because she was quick to reverse her nuclear course; Indian’s nuclear option was restored to its ambiguous and peaceful cover after 1974. Again, having defeated the Pakistan army in 1971, she failed to alter the course of American and Chinese policies towards India and Pakistan and India remained defensive in an asymmetrical situation. Indira Gandhi was not able to negotiate a political settlement with Pakistan. The year 1971 reinforced the determination of Pakistan, US and China to maintain its adversary position against India. The coalition developed several policies that pressured India. Its policy of international non-proliferation pressured India towards nuclear disarmament. Islamic militancy that involved Arab–Afghan–Pakistani and indigenous insurgents operating in the Indian border areas (Kashmir, Punjab and northeastern provinces) was tolerated and this kept India tied to internal security pressures. Chinese and North Korean missile and nuclear aid to Pakistan was accepted by America and this kept India tied to Pakistan’s military build-up. Thus American and Chinese policy remained tied to a preference of Indo-Pakistani polarity. So American, Chinese and Pakistani policies towards India remained in a hostile mode and, conversely, despite growing Indian military and economic strength and progress in defence science, Indian diplomatic and military actions failed to control, deflect or influence the policies and the motivations of the hostile coalition. The Nehruvian paradigm of relying on peaceful professions remained active even though it was ineffective after 1962. In sum, 1971 altered the geographical boundaries of Pakistan, but the event did not alter the pattern of relations among the key players. There was an incremental growth of Indian scientific, military and economic capacities, but this was not accompanied by significant changes in Indian policy parameters. In the economic sphere they remained wedded to the idea of a socialist economy. In the diplomatic sphere they remained wedded to the idea of peace diplomacy. In the military sphere they remained wedded to the idea of localized self-defence and border security. Missing from Indian thought processes at the time was the idea that to prepare for peace one needed to develop a policy of war; there was a tie-up between the two, that is, between coercive diplomacy that heightened regional and international

Shifts in Indian diplomatic history 37 tensions and a policy which sought engagement among strategic rivals with a view to motivate strategic rivals to embrace a policy of negotiated restraints. The story begins with 1947 when India and Pakistan were created on the basis of the two-nations theory. Pakistani leaders propagated it, the British imperialists nurtured and adopted it as the basis of Partition and Indian leaders eventually accepted it despite their earlier disapproval. At that time, absent the replacement of the British India empire by American or Soviet authority and given the widespread influence of nationalism in India, there was much, in Lattimore’s words, ‘unredistributed power’ in the subcontinent (and elsewhere in Asia, Middle East and Africa).19 Outside forces could not dominate the economic, military and the political life of India at the time of its independence. But British capitalism had economic influence in India and Pakistan; Indian capitalism was weak and it needed state protection to grow and to develop a competitive capacity with global forces, and the Anglo-Americans had the global strategic outlook, interest and opportunity to take advantage of regional rivalries and to promote their agendas with regional rivals. The opportunity for outside intervention was provided by Pakistan, the weaker challenger against India, and by Nehruvian India, a weak status quo country that appeared to lack the drive to become a strong status quo power in the region. The argument turns on the following suggestion. The Anglo-American–Pakistani coalition emerged in the early 1950s. It was joined by the People’s Republic of China (1960s) to check India’s (and USSR’s) position in the subcontinent, to maintain Indo-Pakistani polarity and to check the growth of India’s influence in the international sphere. In this ambitious venture the coalition failed clearly in 1998. But during the period the Nehruvians held power in India, the anti-India coalition successfully deflected the government of India away from a policy of overt nuclear and missile weaponization and the exercise of coercive diplomacy. It kept India away from a policy that relied on war and military threats to check Pakistan and Chinese interventionist and revisionist impulses towards India. The Anglo-American message to India was that it had an obligation to seek a peaceful discourse with Pakistan and to make some concessions to it as big brother. A policy of friendship with Pakistan was pressed even though the two-nation theory, the core value in Pakistani domestic and external affairs, ruled out the possibility of Indo-Pakistani or Hindu–Muslim harmony given the presumed animosity between the two sides in Pakistani social and political thought. In our story, Indian political nationalism was the positive archetype but it was a secondary element because it was dominated by Nehru’s collaboration with the paradigm of the Anglo-American–Pakistani coalition: that is, a policy of no war with Pakistan; a policy of friendship with Pakistan and China; and the Indian government’s rejection of power politics and denigration of the role of the Indian armed forces in its public policy. Nehru was the shadowy British and Soviet collaborator. He was a sympathizer of Fabian socialism. He promoted the Mountbatten diplomatic paradigm that sought a ‘no war with Pakistan’ policy. He was a secular leader and opposed religion including Hinduism in politics. He conducted himself with many masks: as an anti-imperialist independence leader, disciple of

38 Shifts in Indian diplomatic history Gandhi and non-violence, critic of the Indian rightists and capitalists and father of the moral imperative in Indian foreign affairs. The masks were exposed when Nehru’s economic socialism failed to alleviate the economic condition of the common masses and serve the common public good and when his globalism and peace policy was tested in war in 1962. In the early 1950s Nehru was successful in playing-off the great powers against each other to India’s advantage by securing aid and diplomatic support for Indian causes. But the policy did not have lasting value. As a result of détente between America and Soviet Russia, and China’s ability to place its interests on the superpowers’ table, the major powers established their strategic dialogue directly and made their own deals. India the East–West bridge builder lost its international value as a mediator. The idea that India (and the non-aligned nations) could function as an independent area of stabilization in Asia and the Middle East too lost its appeal since the third world was powerless against the great power intervention. At issue was whether the weaker countries could play-off the major powers more than the major powers could intervene in the affairs of the weaker countries. The early Nehru years (early 1950s) indicated the former; the later Nehru years (late 1950s onwards) indicated the latter. After Nehru’s death, the personal ambitions of Indian political leaders and ideological differences and inter-party interests came to the fore in what became a series of power struggles after 1964. Under the Nehruvians inter-personal power politics existed in internal Indian politics, but the realm of economic and external policy remained mired in the Nehruvian framework; the latter kept India outside the global economic and strategic mainstream. Foreign policy is an interaction of forces within a country and outside its borders. The forces and the interactions are dynamic; they are never in a state of equilibrium. Since independence Indian economic, military and diplomatic policies were shaped by Nehru. He was the centre of decision making. China’s war with India in 1962 brought down the Nehru mystique and induced a change in Indian policy and public thinking about the value of military power and the importance of national security vis-à-vis China, but at the same time, with the retreat of Nehru, the field of Indian power politics widened and power struggles between Indian leftists and rightists and among the leaders in different political parties dominated Indian politics. In foreign affairs, Nehru was dead but Nehruism continued to function. Within India, China emerged as a pole of attraction following its defeat of India in 1962 and its nuclear test in 1964. So India was internally divided and preoccupied precisely when China appeared to be internally organized and internationally assertive in the 1960s. In this context the international coalition of Pakistan, UK and America was joined by China, although initially the Kennedy and the Johnson administrations had opposed the relationship between the two, one an American ally and the other the object of American containment. The book addresses three major questions. First, what is the nature of the conflict or the pattern of international enmities (public and secret) that constitute India’s foreign policy problem? Second, what has been the method and style of India’s response to its foreign policy problem under the Nehru and the post-Nehru

Shifts in Indian diplomatic history 39 eras? Third, what is the order of importance in the Indian case of the four standard catalysts of change, namely, the proactive role of political leadership, the impact of external shocks, the role of the bureaucracies as agents of change and the role of a changing domestic structure or state form? Our analysis of changes in Indian foreign policy behaviour is based on these four variables. The general context of our discussion is that Indian history reveals an officious accommodation, an organic link, between Mughal India and British India, at the expense of the third side of the ideological and strategic triangle – a majority Hindu India. Historically, ‘political Hinduism’ had been defensive and reactive with respect to the domination of India by forces from outside India, first the Muslim invaders and Mughal emperors, and then the East India Company and the British controlled Government of India. Under the Nehru’s – from Jawaharlal Nehru to his daughter Indira Gandhi, to his grandson, Rajiv Gandhi, Indian policies functioned within the framework of the policies of the great powers. Nehruvian India continued to be defensive and reactive to international pressures and interventions even after Indian independence in 1947. Often this led to ambivalence and oscillation in diplomatic and military behaviour. Nehru often emphasized the importance of independence of thought and action in foreign affairs. However, we argue that in all important diplomatic and military issues – relations with Pakistan, the Kashmir question, policy towards China, Indian economic planning and socialism, peace diplomacy and rejection of military power as basis of national security – the Nehrus lacked independence of thought and action because they functioned completely within the framework of the policies of the great powers, the Anglo-American grouping and, on the other hand, the Soviet camp. Thus, India’s problems in terms of defence, foreign affairs and economic planning had two enduring characteristics. On the one hand there was a durable pattern of external enmities united in their opposition to Indian interests and ambitions. They were ‘made in Pakistan, America and China’ problems for India. Second, they were ‘made in India’ problems, because the policies chosen by Nehru and his successors up to 1998 were made by free will and ostensibly in a democratic framework. A major paradigm shift occurred in the external conduct of the Indian ruling political coalition after 1998. That marks the beginning of India’s emergence as a catalyst of change at both the regional and the international levels. What changed? In a nutshell the ruling coalition realized that peace talk and peace diplomacy were insufficient, that military power was needed to back up Indian diplomacy, that India needed to demonstrate a capacity to escalate international conflict, to create a situation where something was left to chance that required greater great powers’ attention to alleviate Indian concerns. Post-1998 Indian strategic behaviour revealed a duality and sophistication: a strong commitment to Indian conventional and nuclear armament with a credible delivery capability was accompanied by policies that sought negotiated restraint. In other words, like Western strategists, Indian practitioners acknowledged the importance of power politics and geopolitics; they recognized the intrinsic connection between a war or war preparation policy and a peace policy. Both were necessary but the one or the other alone was insufficient. Here lay Nehru’s fundamental conceptual error.

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Nehru, the student of world history, actually showed how little he understood that strategic action, often with the use of coercion or its threat, was the ruling law of the international drama. This was Aristotle’s wisdom that Nehru did not understand. The book is not a history of Indian diplomacy. It addresses the three questions with reference to three eras: Nehru, his successors up to 1998 and the BJP-led coalition from 1998 to 2004. The rise of the Congress-led minority coalition following the May 2004 Indian elections under the Sonia Gandhi–Manmohan Singh leadership is a hybrid of the BJP’s diplomatic and military policies, traditional Nehruvian/Congress party ideas and the views of the communist party of IndiaMarxist. Our concern is to specify and contrast the characteristics of each era with reference to our three questions. Chapter 3 offers theoretical guidance about the role of strategic triangles. Chapter 4 outlines the nature of the conflict or the enmities that India has faced since 1947. This constitutes the nub of India’s foreign policy problem. Subsequent chapters examine the response by Nehru and his cohorts to the external enmities. This era is important because it set India’s policy boundaries in foreign and military affairs; and it revealed a failure to engage the growing international opposition and to adapt to changing external circumstances. There was an attempt to engage a threatening regional and an international environment by Nehru’s successors. However, Indian diplomatic and military policies were marked by a pattern of oscillation and ambivalence and a reluctance to come to grips with the choices: between a policy based on moral preferences or one based on a determination to make India a participant in the field of international and regional power rather than an object of the great powers’ interventions. Thus it is argued that the era of Nehru’s successors, Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi and others up to 1998, indicated a response to changing international circumstances, but the debates between the nature of the enmities and an effective response, and between the moral and the power political preferences was not sorted out during this phase of evolution in Indian diplomatic and military behaviour. The book is not about ‘India and her South Asian Neighbours’. It shows how Pakistan, the weak challenger of India was able to craft an international coalition on the basis of its strategic location, its ability to make itself useful in the service of the great powers’ interests and its political skill and comprehension of the opportunity costs in building its international and regional position vis-à-vis India. But the strategy ultimately failed when the policy of the anti-India coalition of which Pakistan was an important part was challenged and exposed in the late 1990s and at the beginning of the twenty-first century. This is a book not mainly about India and Pakistan. It is more about India and China, India and America, India and numerous strategic and commercial partners in Europe and Asia. In a long range perspective, Pakistan is a sideshow in Indian external affairs, China is the long-term threat which is being engaged and it may shift from a position of conflict to cooperation. The choice before America is not between China or India as its preferred partner in Asia; in a multipolar world America must of necessity deal with all major and minor powers in Asia, because this continent is

Shifts in Indian diplomatic history 41 now the centre of gravity of international conflict; it is the centre of gravity of global economic change and finally the rate of international change in the economic and the military spheres and in cultural–diplomatic thinking it is the highest in Asia compared to other regions in the world. This is a book about IndoPakistani polarity and the role, ultimately unsuccessful, of the great powers in maintaining it rather than advancing regional conflict resolution. This is a book about asymmetrical conflicts, and the attempt by great powers to maintain a pattern of manageable instability in the subcontinent. It is meant to challenge the conventional wisdom and to provoke re-thinking among the students of Indian affairs. It is also about the distortions introduced in Indian strategic thinking and practices as a result of the use of a Nehruvian state apparatus that has been committed to the agenda of the Nehru dynasty rather than an agenda to engage effectively hostile external alignments.

3

Strategic triangles and the Indian subcontinent

Precisely when China was unifying itself under communist control after a prolonged history of weakness under Manchu rule and a civil war, India was breaking up under British auspices in 1947. India was the imperial base in the British Empire and its military organization, its administrative control and a strategic vision gave the subcontinent a unity which it had not enjoyed in its history. But precisely when the breakup of colonial empires and the growth of Asian nationalism suggested that international relations were becoming Asianized, a point made by Zimmer, Indian diplomatic practitioners embraced AngloAmerican strategic ideas. In the name of Indian non-alignment and peaceful coexistence, they delayed the Asianization or Indianization of the newly independent country’s policies. Following independence, the Indian government’s faith in moral imperatives reflected the ascendancy of Western utopian principles. Zimmer’s account of the Indian philosophy of success reveals the importance of strategy that was meant to advance the interests of the practitioners and their constituents; strategy was context-specific and it was dynamic. It required constant adaptation to changing circumstances.1 Nehru turned his back against practical power politics in Indian foreign affairs. His utopianism was rooted in European utopianism of the 1930s. He turned his back on historical Indian, Asian and Western strategic principles. Specifically, Nehru and his cohorts turned away from Western diplomatic theory of strategic triangles (e.g. Martin Wight’s work)2 and the Indian philosophy of success and the circle of states as detailed in Kautilya’s Arthasastra and in Indian beast fables.3 Thus Indian strategic dilemmas and debates after 1947 reflected a juxtaposition of two trends. The first was the Indian government’s enthusiastic embrace of utopianism as the basis of its external policies. The second was the Pakistani government’s reliance on traditional realpolitik to advance its strategic design by forcibly intervening in Kashmir affairs, by building external alliances and by building its military strength to check India-power and prestige. This chapter examines the context of post-1947 Indian foreign policy problems. The context is defined by a historical pattern of external enmities that faced India and challenged its fundamental interests. The context is explained in theoretical terms by reference to the study of strategic triangles rather than bilateral relationships. The devil lies in a lack of understanding of the triangular or multi-cornered framework

Strategic triangles and Indian subcontinent 43 of Indian foreign affairs and the point that success is measured by an ability to manage the multi-cornered strategic context to India’s advantage. Managing asymmetries, not eliminating them, is a benchmark of diplomatic and military success. The development of multi-cornered power relationships in the subcontinent effectively made India an object of foreign paramountcy after 1947. Wight distinguished between ‘states systems’ and ‘suzerain state system’ such as the British Raj.4 He examined diplomatic and military relationships in the context of strategic triangles (e.g. the US, Hitler’s Germany and Stalin’s Soviet Russia during the Second World War) and asked if strategic triangles became military duels and ended in a monopoly of power with the ascendancy of one power.5 The British Raj established a system of ‘suzerain states’ system in the Indian subcontinent that favoured the development of an organic link between ‘Indian Islam’ in the form of Muslim kingdoms aligned with British power and a beneficiary of its protection, and the two formed a partnership aligned against the majority Hindus. Spear explains the process in the late 1800s and early 1900s when Indian Islamic thinkers and political advocates determined that Islam had to come to terms with the West (Britain) and remain separate from Hinduism because of the enmity between the two.6 After Partition, Pakistan accepted a subordinate position in the Anglo-American, ‘suzerain states’ system. Despite its anti-imperial protestations, America embraced the idea of a subordinate system of states that responded to American direction. Having lost their empire, the British leaders were pleased to tutor America in the continuation of the suzerain system of states in the subcontinent after 1947. Meyer explains how this happened. Having first rebelled against Britain, the United States twice in the last century came to the old country’s rescue; it did much to undermine the empire by promoting self-determination and then, step by step, took up Britannia’s burdens in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Far East and not least along the legendary North-West Frontier as the strategic ally of Pakistan. The new and dependent relationship was already apparent in 1943 during the North American campaign, when the future Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan murmured these remarks to the Laborite Richard Crossman, who fortunately recorded them: ‘We, my dear Crossman, are Greeks in this American Empire. You will find the Americans much as the Greeks found the Romans – great big, vulgar, bustling people, more vigorous than we are and also more idle, with more unspoiled virtues but also more corrupt. We must run Allied Force Headquarters as the Greek slaves ran the operations of the Emperor Cladius’.7 Nehru, India’s first prime minister, reinforced the old pattern of subordinate relations. He promoted policies which disenabled India from altering the established structure of the dominant–subordinate states’ system in the subcontinent.

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Wight distinguished between closed and open states’ systems.8 A closed one has achieved its ‘maximum extension’ in terms of membership and size. It has well-defined limits. Before the rise of the Mughal and the British empires in India the history of foreign invasions (Mongols, Persians, Greeks and Aryans)9 made the subcontinent an open system; external powers moved into the area, kept its power politics dynamic, created a pattern of relationships and enlarged its geographical scope. Under British rule India became a closed system. An ideological as well as a strategic triangle emerged between ‘Indian Islam’ and British imperialism in opposition to Hinduism. This is an example of the strategic triangle Wight had in mind. It had all the attributes of modern power politics. Mughal and British tradition were joined by a policy to restrain the ‘hidden fire of religion’ (and later Indian nationalism), and there was an obligation to restrain conflict and anarchy to promote trade and rule India.10 Nehru rejected the idea of India as Hindu India, but his reliance on a leftist and a secular orientation in Indian politics and foreign affairs deflected India away from a policy that would alter India’s defensive position in the triangle with Indian Islamic belief (Pakistani) and Western (Anglo-American) power. By the early 1950s, Pakistan had opened up a closed regional states’ system to new members and increased its size. With the entry of America, Soviet Russia and China into subcontinental politics the closed system became a multi-cornered open system that Indian practitioners could not restrict or control. Nehru spoke often about the rise of the third world in the post-1945 international environment and about India as a potential world power. But this was rhetoric; it lacked a national strategy to achieve it. Wight explains the meaning of a third force or a third world. If a Third Force is not a great power, a Third World is not a power at all, not even a Third Force. A Third World appears when a dual, a bipolar system of power is modified by the presence of a group of small and weak states with some sense of common interest against the ascendancy of the two great powers. A Third World cannot be effective force, first because it lacks unity and direction, and second, because even with unity and direction it would lack a strength comparable to that of either great power. Its presence makes purely fictitious triangle.11 Nehru’s third world or third force lacked unity, direction and strength to modify either international bipolarity or subcontinental triangularity with a multicornered character. Rather, the ability to create unity, direction and strength lay in the policies of Pakistan, America and China. Their policies were driven by the dictates of their power political considerations rather than a concern with morality, justice or utopia. The international powers that were active in subcontinental politics after 1947 – America, Soviet Russia and China – possessed the six signs of a states’ system.12 Nehru’s India did not – as is evident by its inability to maintain by its own means the regional balance of power and to defend its interests during the 1950s and the 1960s. Nehru’s India was consistent with Spear’s characterization

Strategic triangles and Indian subcontinent 45 of India’s failure to develop the practice of a balance of power system. To quote Spear, There was never an Indian concept of the balance-of-power of stable states within the orbit of Indian culture. Instead there was a continuing tradition of empire and overlordship from the Chakravarti raja with his horse sacrifice as token of supremacy in ancient times to the great Mughals of the seventeenth century. India expected a strong central power and would always submit to a leader who could make good his claim to supremacy. In the eighteenth century the Mughal leaders had fallen. The political constituents of India had no idea of forming a ‘concert of India’. Instead, they either reached for empire themselves like the Marathas or sought to win as much as possible before a new supremacy arose like Oudh or the Nizam or prepared to attach themselves to the winning side like the Rajputs. There was no thought of unity and no thought of stability. Every promising leader thought of himself, as he had done while the Mughal empire was a-building, as a potential empire-builder. The Indian tradition of imperial unification and the absence of national feeling explain the lack of any sense of shame on the part of Indian rulers either to seek foreign help in defeating a local rival or to accept foreign overlordship when it was seen to be capable of enforcing it.13 The Nehru years and the Cold War era saw the emergence of two strategic triangles – a three-way rivalry with an amendment of Wight’s view.14 The first one involved the US, USSR and China at the international level. This also played itself out at the subcontinental level since the early 1950s. At both levels two powers could not combine completely against the third, and hence the relationship remained triangular. The second triangle involved Pakistan, the UK and the US against nonaligned India. Because of international competition between the US, USSR and China, American unipolarity or Soviet–American bipolarity did not dominate the subcontinent and the system of states maintained its multi-cornered character during the Cold War. Because of Nehru’s policies, the two triangles grew in strength; wars between Indian and Pakistan, and with China, did not alter the triangular context of subcontinental relationships. These triangles reinforced a pattern of suzerain states’ system. It developed in stages after 1947. In the early 1950s the UK–US–Pakistan versus India combination emerged. Its membership and size increased when China joined Pakistan against India in the 1960s and by 1971 the Pakistan–America–China combination was in full play in the Bangladesh campaign. Indian scholars did not recognize the pernicious nature of the external combination against Indian interests and Indian practitioners were attached to Nehru’s policies and slogans. As a result, the great powers’ paramountcy in Indian foreign and military affairs was maintained after 1947. That a US–China condominium over India did not occur was a result of the Soviet presence in subcontinental affairs. During the Cold War, Moscow’s rivalries with America and China induced its involvement in subcontinental affairs. India escaped US–China domination because of the availability of Soviet

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power as a check against the other two powers and not because India possessed economic and military strength to check the two powers or to alter the structure of the strategic triangles. To do so Indian practitioners would have had to alter the distribution of power and to take initiatives that altered the perceptions, the motives and the calculation of costs of the policies of the members of the two triangles. Triangles require common interests and common obligations. The UK–Pakistan–US–China practitioners had a common interest to check India’s power and ambition. They had common obligations to help strengthen Pakistani military capacity to resist India and to maintain a manageable level of regional instability and Indo-Pakistani polarity. The history of American and Chinese military and economic aid to Pakistan justifies this observation. But the evidence suggests a caveat. The UK–US–China combination had unity of purpose and policy direction to contain India, but this orientation was effective as long as the subcontinental relationships were in a sub-critical mode, that is, as long as Indian practitioners remained passive, defensive and reactive in their responses to ‘foreign interference’ and interventions. But whenever Indian practitioners took the initiative to shift subcontinental relations into a critical mode, the external coalition against India was revealed to have a common interest to contain India through sub-critical actions but not a common obligation to commit military force to enforce Indian compliance of the dictates of the coalition. In other words, these triangles were weaker in strength and purpose compared to the triangle involving Hitler’s Germany in the Second World War. Subcontinental triangles were strong as long as they remained in a sub-critical mode, and they remained so as long as Indian practitioners tolerated them. The suggestion is that India under the Nehrus tolerated them, but then with the rise of a nationalist political class in the late 1990s the cracks in the triangles emerged and their structure started to change.

Character of Indian subcontinental triangles Wight’s discussion of triangles is stimulating, but it requires amendment in relation to the history of subcontinental international relations. He argues that most triangles are temporary.15 Indian subcontinental triangles have a few distinctive characteristics. First, most have a long shelf life. The AngloAmerican–Pakistan versus India triangle (1947–) and its precursor, the Muslim–British versus political Hinduism triangle (pre-1947) have endured because of convergent ideologies and interests among members of the dominant coalition; and because of disunity in ideology, strategic purpose and political organization as well as weakness in military strength on the Indian side. Wars between India and Pakistan and between India and China, as well a succession of military crises with extensive great powers’ involvement, did not settle the controversies or dissolve the triangle. The reason is that the dominant players in the triangle possessed political skills and common interests, and Indians were divided. Their aim was to facilitate Indo-Pakistani polarity by policies of economic,

Strategic triangles and Indian subcontinent 47 military and diplomatic support for Pakistan, the weaker side but the committed challenger of India’s power and authority; this was in the great powers’ interest as well. Second, their policies have ensured that Pakistan did not suffer military defeat or state failure even though its economic and political record since 1947 indicates that Pakistan has the attributes of a failing state. Indo-Pakistani polarity was maintained in part by the use of the UN machinery to organize ceasefires when India escalated military tensions or went to war with Pakistan, as in 1965 and 1971: in part it was done by concerted action by the great powers to cut the supply of military spare parts during a crisis as in 1965. Great powers have frequently engaged in shuttle diplomacy to maintain a system of manageable instability between India and Pakistan. Conflict management, not conflict resolution, was the aim. The second characteristic is that the triangle was closed before 1947 but it grew in size and membership after 1947 and it opened up. Recall that the pre-1947 system was based on British paramountcy, separateness of Muslim identity from the Hindus and external protection of the Muslims by Western powers. This pattern continued after 1947 with adjustments in the composition of the players in the new suzerain states’ system. British paramountcy ceased to exist in a formal way after 1947 in the subcontinent; it was replaced by a strategy to build an AngloAmerican–Pakistani alignment that maintained the aim of suzerain states’ system as the desired norm in the subcontinent. The need to develop a Muslim identity that differed from the Hindus was asserted vigorously by successive Pakistani governments. Successive American governments saw value in promoting Pakistan’s Muslim identity as the basis of American policy towards India and Pakistan; and second, moderate, Muslim Pakistan was seen as an anchor to build American diplomatic and military alignments in the Middle East and the Muslim world. A critical element in broadening the size and membership of the South Asian suzerain states’ system was the American, and later the Chinese, interest in using Pakistan as a channel for the extension of the influence of the two powers into the Middle East although the reasons varied. For America, 1950s onwards, Pakistan was useful to stabilize American military and diplomatic ties in the Middle East vis-à-vis Soviet penetration. Islam was viewed as a barrier against the spread of communism. For China, 1960s onwards, Pakistan was the gateway to the Middle East as it could provide political cover for Chinese activities in competition with the two superpowers. In the 1980s Saudi Arabia, Iran and Muslim states in the Middle East joined this system and used Pakistan as the channel to promote Jihad against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and this Jihad was extended to Chechnya, Dagestan (in Central Asia), Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal in the late 1980s and Indian Kashmir since the 1980s. Pakistan was the nodal point in all these instances. America, China and Islamic Jihadis were tied together by a common cause, that is, to fight Soviet communism and Indian hegemony in the region. The early growth in size and membership of the subcontinental suzerain states’ system was driven by Indian history under the Mughals and the British, by British attitudes about Muslim separateness vis-à-vis Hindus in India, by Partition and

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the pattern of Indo-Pakistan polarity and by the growth of Pakistan’s alliances with America and China. The states’ system was dynamic as was evident by the growing intensity of interactions between the players: India–Pakistan; Pakistan–US; US–India; US–USSR–China in relation to subcontinental issues; India–China and those involving other ‘smaller’ subcontinental states. Still, its opening up and its increased dynamism did not alter its character as a suzerain states’ system. It was a system of ‘stable conflict’ in the sense that the parameters of war and conflict on the one hand and manageable instability (but not harmony and lack of friction) on the other hand were predictable. The style of the players was also predictable. Pakistan, America and China had proactive policies; Indian policies were reactive. No doubt the number of external players involved in subcontinental politics increased, from Britain alone in 1947 to UK, US, USSR and China thereafter; and the number of players internal to the subcontinent decreased, from hundreds of princely states during the British Raj to India and Pakistan. The form of paramountcy changed, from the formal British paramountcy to the informal Anglo-American role as the external political agent that was able to shape the policies of the local rulers, that is, the Pakistani and the Indian leaders. For the most part, chronologically, the system was in a sub-critical mode, with ritual confrontations and occasional deadly quarrels in the form of inter-state wars. Interstate diplomacy and military activity including arms racing and threat making too were generally in a sub-critical mode. Even the 1971 Bangladesh military campaign was in part sub-critical in nature because with hindsight and a reading of the diplomatic record it appears that despite the hype by American, Pakistani and Chinese practitioners there was never a danger that the regional conflict could become a global war that involved all the major powers. The war aims and scope of military operations was limited and politically controlled. This system of suzerain states was sustained by a short list of members who were geographically connected (Pakistan, China and India). It had geographical limits (India, Pakistan and Kashmir and the Sino-Indian Himalayan border areas). It was joined by common interests to develop a system of Anglo-American paramountcy and to maintain Indo-Pakistani polarity in regional and international affairs and thereby check India’s power and prestige and to maintain a regional structure of great powers-managed order or system of manageable instability. This system remained in a stable state during phases of war and normalcy. Despite the peaks and the valleys in India–Pakistan and India–China relations the system remained in a sub-critical mode. The issues that produced friction (e.g. Kashmir, Himalayan border) remained unsettled and stalemated. The distribution of military and economic power was constant, and periodic adjustments in the capacities of the players did not significantly alter the power distribution or change the pattern of relations. So the Pakistan–UK–US–PRC versus India triangle was not dissolved as a result of the victory of one power in war or by diplomatic settlement. It was durable and inconclusive. Once formed strategic and ideological triangles such as the one we are describing in the subcontinent are likely to last. The diplomatic and military activities of the players are to oil the machinery and to keep it functioning rather than to settle the controversies. Staying

Strategic triangles and Indian subcontinent 49 involved in the power game in a sub-critical mode is the aim rather than to settle the disputes and to promote public good. This kind of a system is long lasting rather than transient. The Cold War facilitated the development of multi-cornered diplomacy in the subcontinent. Indian and Pakistani independence coincided by a few months with the beginning of the Cold War and the rise of a unified China under communist control in 1949. Pakistan and UK were quick to bring America into play in subcontinental politics in the early 1950s. Developments in Iran, the USSR, the politics of oil and the US need to cultivate friendly Muslim countries in the Middle East made Pakistan an attractive partner of the UK and the US. Nehru’s India on the other hand brought Moscow into play on Kashmir to protect itself against Western pressures. He also brought Beijing into play to secure its goodwill in the Himalayan area and to build the China option in Indian diplomacy in relation to the superpowers. Without possessing economic and military strength Nehru tried to set up diplomatic triangular relations with Soviet Russia and China based on the rivalry and mistrust between the two communist leaders and diplomatic triangular relations with Soviet Russia and America based on their international rivalry. But did this mean that Nehru understood the value of strategic triangles in the subcontinent? Nehru’s biographer Dr S. Gopal has written extensively on the Nehru diplomatic record, but there is no evidence on Nehru’s part to engage the external powers either by preventing the development of their preferred strategic triangles or by seeking to develop strategic triangle(s) that promoted Indian interests. Nehru’s own writings do not show any understanding of the importance of strategic and ideological triangles in modern international relations. In a closed system Wight sees an end game where the triangle dissolves itself by one side’s victory (as occurred with Soviet Union’s defeat in the US–PRC–USSR triangle, 1972–90) or one side exhausts itself. In an open system, however, where membership can be added, even with the collapse of one side (i.e. Soviet Union following its defeat in Afghanistan and its collapse as a major contender in the Cold War (1990)), the system is likely to stay dynamic, and there is no end game, and the system can stay in a sub-critical mode provided all the participants remain engaged, they are committed to maintain the polarities in the regional conflict and the opportunity-costs of their policies remain manageable. To recap, the primary Indian subcontinental triangle had a prehistory that led to the development of a suzerain system of states and an accommodation between Muslim and British power that had a common interest: to contain political Hinduism and Indian nationalism. The triangle had a religious basis, that is, British authority and Pakistani leaders fostered Hindu–Muslim separateness and made it the basis of the decision to partition the subcontinent. After 1947, this became the basis of the UK–US alignment with Pakistan. The triangle also had a strategic basis, that is, the Pakistan–UK–US desire to contain Hindu/Indian and Soviet/communist expansion and imperialism. The triangle was formed before 1947. Following Britain’s departure from India, the link between Muslim and British aims remained in play. It was developed by the introduction of America into subcontinental politics in the regional context of Indo-Pakistani rivalry and

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the international context of the Cold War. The membership of the triangle grew, and it changed from a closed to an open system. As a result of the policies of its members – UK, US, Pakistan and later China – and by Nehru’s acceptance of the triangle’s framework, the post-1947 system retained its suzerain character. In the 1980s the geographical limits of this triangle increased as Afghanistan became a nodal point in the fight to evict the Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Its membership also increased with the addition of Saudi Arabia and to a lesser extent Iran and Egypt as Western partners to evict the atheistic communists from Islamic Afghanistan. America’s motive was strategic, that is, to create Moscow’s Vietnam in Afghanistan and to weaken it in the regional and the international spheres. The method was to promote the Islamic Jihad against Moscow and to engage in proxy warfare by Western, Middle Eastern and Chinese provision of material support for the Islamic warriors. The Afghanistan war experience increased the size of the triangle; it also broadened and deepened its strategic and ideological content. Between 1947 and 1980s the dominant members of the triangle projected several messages. 1 2

3

4

5

6

India and Pakistan were the two cores of the subcontinental states system; the system was bipolar. The Kashmir dispute was the core issue that explained the Indo-Pakistani conflict. (The role of religion in the formation of the new state of Pakistan, the role of Islam in the sustenance of Pakistani identity and the importance of conflict and separateness between Pakistan and India in the former’s thinking was ignored or underplayed.) UK–US–China sought a place for themselves as mediators in the IndoPakistan dispute. They wanted to be seen as a part of the solution. (Their role as a part of the problem was ignored.) Pakistan was a part of the inner circle of Western defence and it was up to India to make concessions to Pakistan if it wanted a satisfactory relationship with its neighbour. Pakistan was a frontline state to contain Soviet expansionism, and foreign arms were meant to strengthen it internally and to enable it to mobilize the Muslim world against communism. (The role of Pakistan as the hub of Islamic Jihad did not take into account its position as the exporter and state sponsor of terrorism in the region beyond Kashmir.) As a frontline state that was fighting Soviet communism in Afghanistan, Pakistani nuclearization was tolerable. This did not take into account its role as the hub of nuclear weapons proliferation in the region.

These messages went unchecked because Indian diplomacy and its information department lacked strategy to counter them. The Indian government did not have a plan to attack the enemy’s mind but India’s enemies had a plan to develop outside pressures against India. They showed unity, direction and strength to pursue their plan between 1947 and the 1980s. The UK–US and Pakistan were the

Strategic triangles and Indian subcontinent 51 key players in the pursuit of this triangle’s strategy. China entered the game in the 1960s by adapting itself to the strategic and ideological parameters of Pakistan–UK–US policies that suited Chinese interests vis-à-vis India. Note also America’s officious accommodation with ‘moderate Islam’ in the 1950s and with ‘radical Islam’ in the 1980s. America’s policy reflected pragmatism rather than conviction because the Jihadis were useful to America and Jihad was out there, far from American shores, and it did not affect American interests in the short term. Within the subcontinent however, the intensity of the ideological conflict and insurgency grew with the power of the Jihadis in the area from Kashmir to Afghanistan to Central Asia and from Kashmir to other Indian border areas. From the point of view of the outside powers, the Indo-Pakistani rivalry was manageable instability so long as Indo-Pakistani wars did not threaten to drag the outside powers into direct confrontation. The expansion of the list of legal (statist) and extra-legal participants in the system (terror groups, rogue nuclear weapons proliferators and arms and drug smuggling syndicates) indicated incremental, subtle and fundamental changes in the composition and character of the original triangle. Its original cast of players, British and Indian Muslims, remained in play and grew in importance along with the addition of new players, the US and China and then the Taliban and Saudi Arabia. Up to the 1980s, India remained largely passive. Neither Nehru nor his cohorts made a systematic attempt to destroy the triangle or control it, or to deflect or distract the players from their chosen policies. Indian practitioners instead sought solace in their rhetoric and forgot Aristotle’s dictum that action is the ruling law of the drama. The subcontinental drama was being played out by forces other than India although the latter was the bigger in size and with potential economic and military strength. But it was lacking in internal political unity and economic and military strength and it lacked policy direction to disrupt the enemy’s mind (the preferred strategy according to Sun Tzu) or to disrupt its alliances (the second preference in Sun Tzu’s work).

Attitudes of India and Pakistan to subcontinental triangles India’s position on the triangle during the 1950s and the 1960s may be assessed in terms of Lattimore’s view of Asian politics that the capacity of weaker powers in Asia to play off the great powers is greater than the capacity of the latter to control the former or use them as pawns.16 We apply this view to the study of strategic triangles and asymmetrical conflicts as follows. Under certain conditions (i.e. (i) the weaker side is ambitious, (ii) it possesses territorial and political unity, (iii) a sense of policy direction and strength of purpose and usable coercive capability and (iv) rivalries exist among the outside powers) the weaker country has the ability to play the outside forces to its advantage. In such cases, the ability of the weaker power to manipulate the great ones is greater than the ability of the great powers to control the weaker ones.

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But this approach offers temporary advantage to the weaker country. It is a strategy with diminishing returns unless the weaker power is able to grow in strength, unity and direction and can alter the regional and the global distribution of power and the pattern of relationships. Moreover, if the external powers are able to reduce their rivalries and they can club together, the opportunity to play off the great powers to one’s advantage is lost to the weaker power. Of the two, the first variable is within the weaker power’s control, but the second one is outside its control. When the second variable changes, but the first one does not, then the ability of the great powers to intervene in the lesser power’s affairs grows. Indian foreign affairs under the Nehrus showed the effectiveness of the first part of the equation in the early 1950s. With polarities in the relations between America and Soviet Russia, between Soviet Russia and China and between America and China, Nehru was able to play a middling role to India’s advantage. But the advantage was temporary; it was the result of fortunate external circumstances, that is, the existence of polarities among the three powers. When these polarities were reduced through the build-up of détente relations and strategic dialogues among the three, first between America and Soviet Russia and then between America and China, India’s temporary advantage vanished, its ability to grow modestly in economic and military strength did not alter the regional and world scene. With increasing internal divisions and political instability and weak strength, it was not able to break out of a pattern of stalemated relationships between India and the external powers. It was a weak status quo country under the Nehrus. By the late 1950s, America and Soviet Russia were establishing a détente relationship, Sino-Indian relations were edging towards a military confrontation, India’s economy was struggling, its military capacity was weak and its diplomatic space in the international arena shrunk. The Pakistan–America–China coalition was taking shape against Indian interests in the 1960s, and by 1971 it had the character of an informal military alliance with common interests to support ‘weaker’ Pakistan as the challenger of ‘bigger and hegemonic’ India; the policy aim was to strengthen Indo-Pakistani polarity and develop a system to manage regional instability by great power interventions. The triangle did not dissolve itself because Soviet support for India protected it against military defeat or diplomatic isolation. Wight notes that strategic triangles reveal alignments of conflict in some cases and convergent interests in others; they show a pattern of friction as well as engagement. Triangles are tied to considerations of the players to preserve their vital interests by balancing competing powers and their pressures. They are meant to defeat the prospect of unipolarity or hegemony, and when such a possibility exists then the triangular system emerges to check the danger. Pakistani diplomacy since 1947 was based on this calculation. First it mobilized America in 1947; by the early 1950s its strategy had succeeded and then by the early 1960s it succeeded in mobilizing China. The successful mobilizations reflected a convergence of the interests of the three players in relation to India and Soviet Russia. It is noteworthy that even as Pakistan built its external diplomatic

Strategic triangles and Indian subcontinent 53 alignments and its military strength against India, it still relied on a policy of proactive military actions: the tribal invasion of Kashmir in 1947–48, war in the Rann of Kutch and Kashmir in 1965, insurgency in Indian Punjab, Indian Kashmir and India’s northeastern provinces in the 1980s, build-up of the Taliban in Afghanistan in 1980s and the extension of Pakistani support for foreign militants in the region and the Kargil operation in 2000 followed by the attack on India’s Parliament in 2001. Nehru’s India on the other hand put its faith in the rhetoric of global disarmament, nonalignment, peace diplomacy, anti-military and anti-power politics and a policy to play on bilateral alignments with the international powers.

Triangles, debates and duels Strategic triangles emerge in the context of contentious inter-state interests. They express ideological differences and become military duels. When the pressures intensify, triangles, debates and duels are thus connected and must be so studied. In the Indian subcontinent the first military round was represented by the 1947–48 Indo-Pakistani war in Kashmir. This military duel emerged in the context of the Muslim–British (pre-1947) ideological and strategic link-up. The first Kashmir war was a military expression of the ideological debate between Hindu India and Muslim separateness. There was a recognition in British policy that Pakistan was a part of the inner circle of Western defence in the Cold War. The first Kashmir war set the parameters of the triangle – its ideological base, its point of friction and engagement (Kashmir, the United Nations Security Council, Washington and London) and its strategic alignments (Pakistan, UK and America, later joined by China) versus India joined by Soviet Russia. Nehru ignored the build-up of the anti-India strategic triangle that challenged Indian vital interests. By his enthusiasm for peaceful relations with Pakistan, and the use of military power only for the purpose of local self-defence, Nehru reduced India’s diplomatic as well as military options and surrendered the military initiative to Pakistan. His peace policy retarded the development of Indian military strength in comparison to its strategic needs. Thus, the timing and scope of military friction was defined by Pakistan and its allies and the character of the ideological debate and friction was defined by the Pakistan–America–UK coalition. Nehru’s policies did not develop a strategy to counter, deflect or control the ideological debate or the strategic triangle that affected Indian interests. By taking the Kashmir issue to the United Nations, Nehru made Kashmir an international issue and made it a part of the field of the great powers’ politics and he relinquished the power to control the agenda. As a result the great powers gained vital access to the Kashmiri political field, while Nehru’s India received the high moral ground by promising Kashmiri self-determination in deciding its future. Nehru played into British and American policy which was to maintain separateness between Hindu India and Muslim Pakistan, to maintain polarity between the two and to enable the two to cancel each other’s power. Here Pakistan’s decision to create a point of military friction with India was cast in the framework of the ideological link forged between Indian Muslims and

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British rulers in India. It became the basis of its effort to bring America into play in subcontinental politics recognizing that Britain was a spent force after the Second World War and recognizing the need to create a balancing arrangement against India. Thus the Pakistan–India military duel became the basis of triangle building. A triangle does not necessarily lead to a military duel, and the result of the duel does not necessarily lead to the dissolution of the triangle. The two can coexist for decades as the India–Pakistan case shows. That is, the first round does not necessarily lead to a semi-final or the final end game as Wight suggests.17 Pakistan, America, UK and China have been the key catalysts in the development of the strategic triangle. The influence of the external powers however, has varied over time. The Pakistan–American military pact (1954) converted a closed suzerain type states’ system into an open one that increased the friction between India and Pakistan and between India and America. American policy in the subcontinent was in the context of its interest vis-à-vis Soviet Russia, Middle East oil and Middle Eastern politics where America sought to promote Pakistan as a moderate leader of the Muslim world and allegedly a barrier against the spread of communism. Most subcontinental diplomatic and strategic studies highlight the role of America. This is satisfying for American academic and governmental practitioners and feeds into the themes of America’s superpower status and the central position of the US–USSR Cold War. Our script however, places a greater stress on China’s role as a catalyst for the following reasons. Despite its material weakness in comparison to America and Soviet Russia, Chinese strategy at the international level was to open up a closed Soviet–American bipolar system into an open triangular one that gave China a seat at the great powers’ table. By its activism China advanced its strategic interests and altered the nature of the strategic game. Despite the historical rivalry between Mao and Stalin and the mutual mistrust, China tilted first towards Moscow in 1949 with a friendship treaty and thereby reinforced friction between the communist and the Western blocs; and then it tilted towards Washington in the 1970s with the Shanghai communiqué (1972) and its partnership with America and Pakistan in the Bangladesh war (1971). China’s tilt first towards Moscow and then towards Washington were driven by its strategic interests rather than communist ideology; in both instances they converted bilateral relationships into triangular ones. The pattern of Chinese diplomatic and military actions reveals a quest for strategic triangularity. Its acceptance of a friendship treaty with Moscow and Soviet international authority was temporary in 1949. China moved into a triangular quest by engaging Moscow in an ideological controversy about communist leadership and principles in the 1950s and the 1960s. Then it involved Moscow in a military confrontation in the 1970s which China lost. Then it shifted its strategic alignment from Moscow to Washington in the early 1970s. Of the five foreign policy options available to a weaker power involved in asymmetrical power politics (do nothing, seek a role to reduce international tensions, build internal economic and military strength, play both sides to one’s advantage and escalate international tensions to secure a voice at the table) China choose the last three options. (Nehru’s India chose the second and the fourth option in the early 1950s and then belatedly moved towards the

Strategic triangles and Indian subcontinent 55 third in the 1960s following the 1962 war with China.) In other words, China was successful in converting global bipolarity into strategic triangularity with a pattern of engagement and friction that required the conversion of a closed bipolar system into a global strategic triangle. Despite its greater power, both America and Soviet Russia were compelled to join the China-induced strategic triangle. China did not create strategic triangularity in the subcontinent but it joined it and vigorously promoted it. It shifted from its advocacy of peaceful coexistence with India in 1954 to a hostile relationship in the late 1950s, and, by its strategic alignment with Pakistan in the 1960s and its diplomatic alignment with America in the 1971 Bangladesh campaign, it became an active member of the subcontinental triangle. These shifts pitted America and China against Soviet Russia at the international level in the 1970s and pitted America, China and Pakistan against India and Soviet Russia at the regional level during the 1960s–90s. Thus the international and the regional levels were joined. We judge China as a powerful catalyst, because it was no one’s ally and it has the option to tilt to the left or the right depending on its strategic interests and perspectives. The dominant members (the US, UK, China and Pakistan) of the triangle had several aims (1) to defeat India militarily in Kashmir and to make Pakistan a co-equal of India as a part of a British Raj type suzerain states’ system, with America and China as the new paramount powers, (2) to maintain a line of Pakistani and Chinese military pressures on Indian borders and American pressure on Indian strategic policies (i.e. modernization of conventional and nuclear armament) so that the Indian government could be influenced, deflected, distracted or controlled from exercising its various diplomatic and military options; and generally the aim was to keep India off balance in diplomatic and military affairs and (3) to balkanize India and break up the Indian Union into a collection of regions and city states as in the past. There is evidence to support each option but it is not conclusive. The communiqué between President Bill Clinton and the Chinese leadership provides support for the first option as does the published record of de-classified White House documents concerning the collusion between Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Yahya Khan and Chou-en-Lai in the Bangladesh campaign in 1971. Pakistani and Chinese military deployments on India’s borders, Chinese military, nuclear and missile aid to Pakistan since the 1960s, Chinese insistence on Indian nuclear disarmament, American insistence on Indian non-nuclearization between 1960s and 1998 and Pakistani willingness to make a de-nuclearization regional pact with India were meant to induce India not to exercise its available options. The third option is based on the allegations that Pakistani intelligence has been active in formenting the break-up of Kashmir, Punjab and northeastern provinces from the Indian Union. So our story runs as follows. There are ongoing military duels between India and Pakistan and ideological controversies about the policies and ideologies of the two countries; and second, policies of the external powers have helped maintain the strategic triangle in a sub-critical (or a manageable instability) mode of operation. The theme is that the diplomatic and the military record provide evidence of triangle-related activities, but they did not lead to an end-game

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or semi-finals between China and India and between Pakistan and India. India could neither win nor escape, being caught in the web of the triangle, because Nehru’s India did not have an effective strategy to engage the players. At the same time, Pakistan, America and China failed to defeat India militarily in part because of fortunate external circumstances, that is, the availability of Soviet intervention and, in part, because of bouts of Indian military initiatives as in the 1965 and the 1971 wars with Pakistan that reflected the pressure of Indian nationalism on the political leadership. Thus the first round (1947–2000) continued with bouts of war, intensified ideological debates and efforts at normalcy. During the Cold War the Pakistan–US–China versus India–USSR alignments shaped the Indo-Pakistani military duels in the following sense. Indians and Pakistanis did the fighting but the allies provided the military and economic aid and diplomatic support to fight, to maintain a situation of manageable instability and polarity and to keep India and Pakistan stalemated while the outside powers retained the right and the capacity to develop the strategic triangles and their influence at the global and regional levels. Note the pattern of support. America gave massive doses of modern arms to Pakistan and Soviet Russia followed suit with India in response. Later China and North Korea gave conventional armament, nuclear and missile aid to Pakistan, and through the agency of Dr A. Q. Khan, who functioned under Pakistani militancy auspices, Pakistan helped its East Asian and Middle Eastern strategic partners. India received valuable help in the development of its capacity in outer space and in the missile sphere from Soviet Russia, several European states and America. This pattern produced three results. First, the emergence of multi-cornered relationships in the subcontinent made nonsense of the idea of bilateralism, a core idea in Nehruvian Indian diplomacy, in subcontinental international relations. Second, the presence of a number of external powers in subcontinental relations with competitive interests meant that no single power was able to dominate the regional pattern of relations and to dissolve the multi-cornered alignments. These players were locked into the region because there were costs to abandoning the field even though there were also costs to following wrong headed policies. Third and, finally, the two regional powers, India and Pakistan had opportunities to develop their indigenous military and economic strength to the point that they could escape if they chose being cast as subordinate state actors, with the external powers as the promoters of a suzerain type of states’ system in the subcontinent. The latter argument turns on the capacity of India and Pakistan to initiate conflict, to escalate it and to end on its own terms and to expand its geographical sphere of influence. Our contention is that Pakistan and its allies had positioned themselves during the Cold War to decrease India’s space and to expand their space in the region. They failed not because of Nehru’s policies but despite them. When external pressures stimulated Indian nationalism to react as in the 1962, 1965 and 1971 wars, and in the Kargil campaign in 2000. Indian nationalism had three hearts – Indian business, Indian scientists, and the Indian military. In particular Indian defence scientists and the military establishment were stimulated in moments of crises, and they mobilized the political leadership and popular nationalism to act

Strategic triangles and Indian subcontinent 57 forcefully despite the injunctions of Nehruvian India. These points are discussed later in the book. To recap, the subcontinent had a number of multi-cornered alignments during 1947–90s. 1

2

3

UK–US and Pakistan versus India ( joined by Soviet Russia, 1950s–1980s). In both sets convergent but not identical interests were in play. This was an enduring alignment during the Cold War era. From 1960s onwards China was a part of the UK–US, Pakistan coalition. In the early 1960s the Kennedy administration opposed Pakistani alignment with China but by the late 1960s and the early 1970s President Nixon and his adviser Henry Kissinger saw value in the Pakistani–Chinese alignment as a way to get China on America’s side against Soviet Russia. By 1972 the global balance became triangular with America and China against Soviet Russia. The interests of the two were convergent, not identical, and they remained so until Soviet Russia’s collapse in the late 1980s. This triangle was in play during the 1971 Bangladesh campaign. The robust character of this set of alignment is measured by the economic and military aid Pakistan has received from its strategic partners, by their support to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue, by American tolerance of Pakistani nuclear and missile proliferation and its export of WMD technologies and materials to regions of conflict, by their support of Indo-Pakistani diplomatic and military parity and their common interest in Indian nuclear disarmament. Under President Ayub Khan and foreign minister Z. A. Bhutto the provision of Western military aid to India in the aftermath of the 1962 war between India and China led to Pakistani disappointment with America and a tilt towards China in opposition to America and Soviet Russia. The alignment had a short shelf life and was overtaken by the second alignment.

What were the competing and convergent interests in play in the history of these alignments? What was the distribution of power? What were the points of friction? What were the outcomes? The distribution of military power was changing, and the reader is referred to the military tables in the Military Balance published by the International Institute for Strategic Studies, UK. The points of friction refer to areas and issues in contention among the players, particularly India vis-à-vis the others. Friction existed at the ideological level in terms of Hindu–Muslim controversies, the role of militant Islam and the role of democracy, the defence of the state and the doctrine of the holy war. Friction existed in terms of territorial disputes between Pakistan and India and between China and India. Friction existed in terms of American policy of nuclear and missile nonproliferation and Indian nuclear policy. Friction was also evident in terms of international prestige where China and others sought to deny India a nuclear weapon status and a permanent seat at the United Nations Security Council. Friction existed in terms of the American and Chinese policies (with support of others) that favoured Indo-Pakistani parity and opposed to India’s rise as a

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regional great power. The alignments that appeared in the subcontinent since the 1950s reflected these issues. There were several major outcomes as a result of developments in the international and the subcontinental spheres. First, the primary global triangle, the US–USSR–China, was dissolved by the end of Soviet communism and Moscow’s defeat in the Cold War with America. As a result under Presidents Gorbochev and Yeltsin, Russia opted out of the power play in the subcontinent and choose instead to concentrate mainly on relations with the West and with China. With truncated borders and reduced international ambitions, Russia lost its primary position in the subcontinent. Its diplomatic, military and economic relationships with India continued but in a modified form that indicated a normal rather than a special kind of inter-state relationship. The change in Russia’s international position and power altered the character of subcontinental international relations and Indian foreign affairs along with the changes in Indian military policy, and its China policy following the defeat in 1962. The context should be noted to appreciate the central role of the Moscow connection in Indian foreign and economic affairs. Since the early 1950s Soviet Russia had played a critical role in supporting Nehruvian India’s faith in a socialist economy, Indian non-alignment and peace diplomacy. Moscow was on India’s side because of Nehruvian socialism and peace policy. America and China were on Pakistan’s side because of its support of American military and economic policies. Both superpowers were engaged in the subcontinent and saw it as an extension of their global competition and their competing strategic interests in the Asian and Middle Eastern regions. Moscow defended India’s position on Kashmir in firm opposition to America, Pakistan and China; the latter favoured Kashmiri self-determination which Moscow and Delhi did not. America, China and Pakistan favoured a diplomatic position that promoted Islam and married it to the principle of strategic parity between India and Pakistan. Thus ideological debates and strategic interests were interwoven in the policies of the external powers and the relationship between India and Pakistan. Moscow participated in the ideological debates, the Indo-Pakistani military duels and the region’s strategic triangles during the 1950s to the 1980s. Its role was effective and it was appreciated by Indian practitioners and the Indian public. Two contextual points merit attention. India’s military defeat in 1962 destroyed Nehru’s peace policy with China and brought out the value of military strength as the backbone of Indian diplomacy but it was a rejection of Nehru, not a complete rejection of the Nehruvian economic and diplomatic paradigm. Indians realized after 1962 that diplomacy without a capacity to defend was like walking on one leg, but Indian practitioners did not acknowledge the reality of a long-term competition with China. Nehru was discredited but his successors, sarcastically known as Nehru’s widows and orphans, maintained their commitment to a socialist economy and Indian non-alignment. The demands of military modernization against China and Pakistan and the continuing pressure by Pakistan, America and China on India on the Kashmir issue, and in terms of border security, required an increased Indian dependence on Moscow’s military and diplomatic support after

Strategic triangles and Indian subcontinent 59 1962. Although the UK and the US helped Indian military modernization between 1962 and 1965, the aid was conditional on Indian accommodation of Pakistani interests in Kashmir. Hence Moscow was deemed to be the more reliable Indian ally. In other words, in the aftermath of 1962, the relationship of conflict between India and Pakistan and between India and China intensified, the diplomatic and military alignment between India and Soviet Russia grew, and there was a modest re-alignment in Indian foreign and military affairs vis-à-vis the West. The polarity between Indian capitalism and statist socialist economy remained the basis of the economic policy of Nehruvians, including Nehru’s daughter Indira Gandhi and his grandson, Rajiv Gandhi, and others. The Soviet economic model remained an important basis of Indian economic planning and policy. And a peace policy and non-alignment was retained as the basis of Indian diplomacy. With Soviet Russia’s collapse as a communist state and as a world power the global strategic triangle lost its salience. The new equation was bipolarized between America and China, the strategic competitors. Furthermore, Moscow’s opting out of the subcontinental power politics changed the multi-cornered context of Indian diplomacy. Without an international protector to guard against American and Chinese pressures on India the importance of Indian military and economic strength increased. Second, the failure of Soviet communism and the loss of Soviet protection to India emboldened the Pakistan–America–China coalition to intensify efforts to corner India. The coalition’s pressures took shape in terms of American and Chinese tolerance of Pakistani supported revolts in Kashmir, Punjab and the northeast parts of India since the 1980s. The coalition conducted itself in a low risk, sub-rosa and a sub-critical strategic environment given that Indian diplomatic and military policies, following the Nehru tradition, were reactive and defensive; that is, they reacted to external events and pressures and sought to manage them rather than eliminate them and develop strategies to change the great powers’ agendas. The coalition also developed a line of pressure against Indian interests by promoting regional and global non-proliferation in the nuclear and the missile spheres. Finally, the coalition partners maintained and developed Pakistan as a line of pressure against India by tolerating Pakistani military and nuclear (including missile) development. A radically altered international context showed a change in the distribution of world power and the pattern of strategic relationships that highlighted the international position of America and China, Pakistan’s two strategic partners. Indian policy was locked in a pattern of ambivalence and oscillation between a peace policy and a power politics orientation; it lacked unity, direction and strength. On the other hand, Pakistani policy and that of its partners had unity, direction and strength to corner India. The strategic triangle was organized. It provided Pakistan with the military means and diplomatic support to conduct military duels with India. The ideological debate and division between ‘Hindu India’ and ‘Muslim Pakistan’ was a recognized basis of the great powers’ recognition of the realities of Indo-Pakistani affairs. Note, for example, that the transfer of the North Korean

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and Chinese missile parts and nuclear technology had its origins in the Cold War era, but the policy of transfers continued as did the policies of the coalition against India following the end of the Cold War and the break up of the special Indo-Soviet strategic and diplomatic alignment. The American and the Chinese view that they opposed India because of its affinity with Soviet Russia was in hindsight bogus given that the retreat of the Soviet Union from the subcontinental scene did not alter the structure of the coalition and its strategic agenda vis-à-vis India. Note also that the attempt to corner India in the nuclear sphere via the comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty and by the indefinite extension of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty without any meaningful disarmament by the five nuclear powers occurred in the aftermath of the end of the Cold War. The third outcome relates to the 1980s when the Soviet entry into Afghanistan made Pakistan into a frontline state in the policies of America and China. It created opportunities for the military regime in Islamabad to expand its strategic space by making Afghanistan, Kashmir and Central Asia a field of Pakistani and Saudi power; and to expand Pakistan’s political space in the international sphere by making the fight against the Soviet Union the primary issue rather than Islamic militancy and the export of Arabized Islamic militancy into the subcontinent, into Central Asia and elsewhere. The non-proliferation issue was also sidelined in the fight to make Afghanistan Moscow’s Vietnam. Pakistan’s strategic space grew in the 1980s and the 1990s as a result of its effectiveness in building the Taliban and Al Qaeda as the primary authority in the region. By the 1990s, Pakistan emerged as the hub of nuclear proliferation as well as Islamic militancy, two core issues of international security. The fourth outcome relates to shifts in Indian policy. Nehru’s peace policy relied on the ability of Indian diplomacy to play the great powers to India’s advantage. This worked during the early 1950s when the powers were involved in an intense Cold War with each other. But once they learnt to find points of limited convergence, they were able to adopt practices that were conducive for relationships of competitive coexistence. Nehru did not grasp the effect of the changing global context on India’s position, and he did not have a plan to reposition India in a changing strategic environment. So Nehru did not grasp the rise of the Pakistan–America–China coalition, the vital interests of the members in play, and their ability to harm Indian interests. He did not realize that the coalition’s capability and determination to intervene in Indian affairs was greater in the late 1950s and the 1960s. Conversely, India’s capacity to play the great powers against each other had declined because of changing power relationships among the three powers and because India was not developing military and nuclear strength to raise the costs of great powers’ interventions in the subcontinent. Following Nehru’s death the Nehruvians functioned as a half way house between India’s traditional peace policy and the world of power politics. There were shifts but they were reversible. Prime Minister L. B. Shastri (1965) ordered the Indian army to cross the Indo-Pakistani border in response to Pakistani aggression in Kashmir; this broke the Nehru taboo against a war with Pakistan and the policy to limit military operations to the Indian part of Kashmir. But this

Strategic triangles and Indian subcontinent 61 action lacked staying power, because it was followed by the assertion of a great power (Soviet) sponsored, US supported, UN debated ceasefire. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi’s decision to attack Pakistani forces in Bangladesh and to break up Pakistan was irreversible (1971–72) but it too lacked staying power in the sense that it was not followed by efforts to breakup the hostile coalition and to secure a permanent political settlement with Pakistan. It cut the tail of the snake without de-fanging it or smashing its head! The coalition maintained its determination to cut India to size, and as the diplomatic record of American–Chinese–Pakistani policies shows, the coalition pursued its old policies invigorated by the motive of revenge for the Indian success in outmanoeuvering three global strategists, Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger and Chou-en-Lai. Thus we see the period of the Nehruvians, post-Nehru to the rise of the BJP minority coalition, as a transition. An awareness about the importance of military and economic strength emerged after 1962 in Indian political and social thought but absent a strategic plan to engage and disrupt the hostile international coalition and changes in economic policy, the growing awareness about the role of power was insufficient in changing ground realities. It produced Indian debates about the nature of enmities and dilemmas they posed. The debates were not conducted in a systematic manner. There was confusion about the nature of the enmities or about the nature of India’s foreign policy problems and the ways to address them. The debates were partly conducted within government circles; hence they were conducted in secret with periodic leaks as one would expect in a democracy. In part they took place in the public domain by experts who had access to governmental practitioners. Invariably the debates were slow in deliberation and policy development and as noted earlier, they occurred in response to external developments and pressures. We now turn to a discussion of the Indian debates and the dilemmas.

4

Indian strategic debates and dilemmas Analytical constructs

According to the dictionary a dilemma is a situation requiring a choice between undesirable alternatives. It is a problem or a perplexing situation. Two different types of dilemmas have defined the Indian situation. The first comprised dilemmas that it faced as a result of policies of the external powers that affected Indian interests. But as foreign policy is an interaction of forces within a country and forces outside the borders, the second source of dilemma came from India’s divided political structure (leadership, bureaucracy and domestic politics) and its limited institutional capacity and economic and military strength to anticipate, manage, control, deflect or influence the international environment that affects its interests. The argument is that Indian dilemmas were the greatest in the era of Nehru and the Nehruvians when the Indian government lacked unity, strength and direction in its external policies. There was more talk and noise in the foreign policy establishment at a time that a hostile external coalition was taking shape against India; the ratio of noise to action was skewed against the latter and consequently the ability to effectively engage the external opposition was limited. Sun Tzu, the Chinese strategist, asserted the importance of two strategic principles of effective strategy.1 First and foremost it is important to disrupt the enemy’s mind. Nehru and the Nehruvians did no such thing; instead they allowed the enemies to coordinate their energies and capabilities against Indian interests between the 1950s and the 1990s. Second, it is important according to Sun Tzu to disrupt the enemies’ alliances. Again, Nehru and the Nehruvians did no such thing. It is noteworthy that Indian scholarship on diplomacy and strategic affairs by Indian academic institutions such as the Jawaharlal Nehru University, the Centre of Policy Research, the Institute for Defense Studies and Analyses and major Indian universities and other think tanks are tied to Nehruvian ideas and ideals. They have failed to understand and to utilize the power political tradition and the theory of strategic triangles to develop explanations about the problem and the situation in the subcontinent. It is remarkable that the Nehruvians have successfully managed to build a Nehru-centric political and an intellectual system based on patronage by the Nehrus, and they have done so by cutting the Indian thought process off Western and Asian conceptions of geopolitics (such as Kautilya’s circle of states) and power politics. A reading list of Indian scholarly publications

Indian strategic debates and dilemmas 63 since 1947 shows the fixation with Nehru’s policy framework and laziness in investigating alternative paradigms. The laziness is evident by the failure to learn from the policies of India’s two immediate neighbours. In the early 1950s Pakistan enlarged the India–Pakistan ideological and military duel by making itself available to America in the context of its strategic needs vis-à-vis Soviet Russia, Middle Eastern oil and Middle Eastern politics. China enlarged the America–Soviet Russia duel by joining the nuclear club in 1964, by developing and publicizing a relationship of conflict with both America and Soviet Russia and by tilting first towards Moscow and then later towards Washington. Its policies created a bipolar duel into an enlarged strategic triangle with a place for China in it; a backward country had converted itself into a comparable power. Neither Indian scholars nor Indian governmental practitioners had a comparable strategy to effectively shape the strategic environment to India’s advantage. India was able to enlarge the cast of players by bringing Soviet Russia to its side but that simply locked India into a bipolarized structure in the subcontinent: with America–Pakistan–China as the one pole and India–Soviet Russia as the second one. During 1947–98, the two poles cancelled each other’s power and stalemated India. It was not able to emerge as a power comparable to other powers in the international system. Under Nehru and the Nehruvians, India was a weak status quo country, not a strong status quo power. Indian dilemmas and debates are investigated by setting up a series of oppositions or analytical constructs as the basis to assess the evolution of Indian dilemmas, the debates to address them and to reformulate policy. The series of oppositions are the parameters that shape Indian governmental responses to external events and challenges. Also they point to the direction of change and the level of unity (disunity) in internal debates on crucial external policy issues. The oppositions include the following. Ideological versus pragmatic approaches: Nehru and the Nehruvians (Nehru’s successors up to 1998 and the new Congress party-led minority government of Sonia Gandhi/Manmohan Singh) promoted a foreign policy based on the ideology of nonalignment and a zone of peace and peaceful coexistence among nations including India’s two hostile neighbours, Pakistan and China. On the other hand, the Bharatiya Janatha Party (BJP) minority coalition pursued practical power politics and abandoned non-alignment and peace diplomacy as the basis of Indian diplomacy and military strategy. Indian global utopianism versus regional and global geopolitics and power politics: Nehru and the Nehruvians cast Indian diplomacy and military strategy in terms of the need for global disarmament, a North–South economic and political dialogue, reform of the United Nations system, a reduction of East–West tensions and a commitment to a world of norms rather than a world of powers. Nehru in particular had an anti-power politics and an anti-Indian military position that reflected mistrust of both the realpolitik tradition in India and in Asia. The Indian military establishment was mistrusted as a professional and a security and modernizing agency in post-colonial India.2 Nehru had a general idea about the value

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of regionalism in Asia that was expressed in terms of a desire to form an Asiatic federation, it assumed Sino-Indian cooperation.3 The reality of Sino-Indian rivalry as a long-term condition of Asian politics was not considered even though there was a deep policy disagreement between Nehru and his Deputy Prime Minister, V. B. Patel. Patel warned him clearly on China: The danger from the north and north-east, therefore, becomes both communist and imperialist. While our western and north-western threat to security is still as prominent as before, a new threat has developed from the north and northeast. Thus, for the first time, after centuries, India’s defence has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously. Our defence measures have so far been based on the calculations of a superiority over Pakistan. In our calculations we shall now have to reckon with Communist China in the north and in the north-east, a Communist China which has definite ambitions and aims and which does not, in any way, seem friendly disposed towards us.4 To this Nehru provided two answers: 1

2

I think that it is exceedingly unlikely that we may face any real military invasion from the Chinese side, whether in peace or in war, in the foreseeable future. I base this conclusion on a consideration of various world factors.5 These arguments lead to the conclusion that while we should be prepared, to the best of our ability, for all contingencies, the real protection that we should seek is some kind of understanding of China. If we have not got that, then both our present and our future are imperiled and no distant power can save us. I think on the whole that China desires this too for obvious reasons. If this is so, then we should fashion our present policy accordingly.6

Moreover, Nehru’s Ambassador to China, Panikkar, seemed to act as a free agent. When instructed to link withdrawal of Indian garrisons in Tibet to China’s acceptance of the MacMohan Line, Panikkar ignored the instructions.7 Nehru was under Menon’s influence who did not think China has ‘expansionist ideas’.8 Panikkar thought the border issue was closed.9 Nor did Nehru and the Nehruvians consider the possibility to build a regional strategic system where the hostile neighbours bid for India’s support and India could be in a position to shape the pattern of regional engagement by its actions rather than being tied in a defensive and a reactive way to the actions of its hostile neighbours. On the other hand the BJP coalition (1998–2004) developed a pragmatic approach that was couched in recognition of the value of regionalized power relationships. This was done by building diplomatic as well as military and economic ties with a neighbourhood that had emerged as the hub of Islamic terror and a hub of nuclear and missile proliferation. These developments had their origins in the policies of Pakistan, America and China during the Nehruvian era. But the faith

Indian strategic debates and dilemmas 65 in global utopianism came from Nehru himself and from the development of a political culture in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs that could not shake the Nehru ideals;10 intellectual laziness and careerism precluded serious intraministry or inter-ministry (e.g. ministries of defence, external affairs and home affairs) debates about defence and foreign policy. The BJP-led minority government expressed vigorously a pro-power politics position that saw the subcontinent as the centre of gravity of Indian strategic and diplomatic concerns. Its nuclear, missile and diplomatic actions shed the inhibition against the use of force to settle political and ideological issues; it shed the inhibition against initiating war or threats; and it shed the inhibition against taking coercive or provocative actions that revealed a risk-taking and a power politics attitude and that engaged the attention of the principal regional players, that is, Pakistan, China and America, and influenced a large body of attentive and relevant policy audience, that is, countries in Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Japan, Australia, Europe, Russia, the UK and the Middle East including Israel. Nuclear ambivalence versus nuclear commitment: The shift on this issue was the most dramatic and the most significant shift from the ambivalence of Nehru and the Nehruvians and the decisiveness of the BJP leadership. The BJP decision crossed several policy boundaries in international as well as in Indian affairs. 1

2

3

The 1998 nuclear tests flouted the international non-proliferation regime and the comprehensive ban on nuclear testing. Also the development of a vigorous missile testing programme that had been initiated by BJP’s predecessors but conducted in a haphazard manner before 1998 undermined the philosophy of the missile technology control regime. The tests signalled that the problem of nuclear and missile proliferation had not been laid to rest, that India was willing to take the risk to emerge as the sixth overt nuclear weapon power (Israel is the sixth but it is covert) and pave the way for other aspirants should they decide to follow the path as a result of their respective national security calculations. The contrast with Nehru and the Nehruvians was striking. Although Nehru and his successors had initiated the build-up of Indian nuclear power and nuclear weapons capability, Nehru had boxed it in by establishing policy boundaries against Indian nuclear weaponization and in favour of global and Indian nuclear disarmament. Indira Gandhi temporarily took India out of the nuclear box in 1974 but then quickly retreated into the box in response to international pressures; she described the 1974 test as a peaceful experiment and reiterated a peaceful policy. The 1998 nuclear tests on the other hand crossed the Nehru/Nehruvian policy boundary irrevocably. Under Nehru and the Nehruvians there was a failure to recognize the connection between nuclear weapons and foreign policy and the connection between the doctrines of defence and deterrence in the modern world. There was a failure to appreciate the important role that nuclear weapons played in the diplomatic affairs and the international prestige of the five nuclear

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Indian strategic debates and dilemmas weapons powers. Nuclear weapons were not only legal in international law, they were powerful instruments of diplomacy and power politics because they provided the means to escalate and initiate coercion and thus required attention and caution on the part of a country’s enemies. The psychological element in play was the role of fear and threat of punishment if the enemy acted in a manner that injured the other country’s vital interests. Nuclear weapons have worked in the modern world as a country’s insurance policy in peacetime and as a tool of war should one break out. And like any insurance policy the premium must be paid to keep it valid. Thus the nuclear question is a pivotal one in considering the relationship between diplomacy and force and between defence and deterrence. By breaking through the Nehru/Nehruvian policy injunction against Indian nuclearization, the BJP decision altered as well the internal balance of power. Under Nehru and the Nehruvians international security questions as well as Indian military questions relating to Pakistan, China and the Indian Ocean were dealt with by the Prime Minister’s office (civilian) and by the ministries of defence and external affairs. They were dominated by a civilian administrative service and by political ministers who lacked military expertise (with a few exceptions) and who were loathe to seek military inputs into strategic questions. It was surprising that questions about nuclear disarmament were dealt with by Indian diplomats, without the assistance of Indian military experts in international conferences when most delegations of the major powers to disarmament conferences relied on military advisers and technical expertise. Indian diplomats had no formal training in military issues and moreover, spoke in terms of the Nehru and Menon philosophy of the moral imperative in the pursuit of global disarmament. The connection between disarmament and Indian security has never been explained by Indian practitioners and in Indian official records such as the annual reports of the ministries of defence and external affairs. And yet it has been the mantra since the Nehru years. The decision to declare an overt nuclear stance required development of nuclear command and control structures and procedures; it required a continuous interface between India’s political leaders and the military command. These changes increased the weight of the Indian armed forces in strategic decision-making after 1998. The shift to an overt nuclear stance created a new and possibly a dangerous regional and an international situation that brought India into the global mainstream. Why? It increased the attentiveness of the major powers, including three major rivals of India, Pakistan, China and America, to heed Indian security needs and to enter into a dialogue to facilitate a process of negotiated restraint. Note the contrast here between Nehru and the Nehruvians and the BJP government. The former projected a moral preference for unilateral restraint. Their actions kept India on the margin of global power politics and at the centre of international pressures to disarm India or to prevent its nuclearization. The BJP’s nuclear action brought India into the global strategic mainstream, in Asia, and in international diplomacy. It removed the

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6

opportunity to exert international pressure when it became clear that the shift to overt nuclear stance was irreversible. Finally, the settlement of the Indian nuclear question in 1998 following years of ambivalence by Nehru and the Nehruvians, and the recognition of India’s new international status, created a clear public identification within India about the importance of nuclear weapons in Indian security and the importance of nuclear power in repositioning India in the international arena on the basis of power rather than a moral preference.

Restructuring alignments: from traditional to traditional and non-traditional ones Nehru and the Nehruvians relied primarily on an ideologically and politically rigid set of alignments. (1) Prior to India’s independence the Congress Party developed a fascination with ‘Palestinian rights’ and this led to a pattern of alignment with the Arab states and opposition to Israel and American policies in the Middle East that tilted towards Israel and against the Palestinians. Even though India had recognized Israel after its independence, the Arab factor was important because of India’s dependence on Middle Eastern oil, the importance of Arab votes in the nonaligned movement, the anti-colonial and anti-Western orientation of many Arab states (and most members of the non-aligned movement) and the belief that Arab secularism converged with Indian secularism and the Indian position on Kashmir. The two were an antidote to the Pakistani belief about a homeland that was based on religion. (2) Despite the commonality between Indian and American democracies, divergent policies of the two countries produced a climate of mutual mistrust and strategic polarities on several issues: Kashmir, IndoPakistani relations, Indo-Pakistani parity, Indian ‘hegemony’, role of military alliances in the subcontinent, India’s nuclear programme, India’s socialist economy, India’s call for global nuclear disarmament, Indian policies on recognition of China and Korean war and the Indian alignment with Soviet Russia. So Nehru and the Nehruvians functioned in a framework of deep mistrust that produced a rigid polarity and stalemated political and military relationships that had an ideological colouring. Nehru and Nehruvians had an anti-US orientation and the Congress party bias was enhanced by the anti-Western orientation of Indian communists. The latter movement shifted from a dominant Stalinist position in the 1950s to a Maoist position in the 1960s. Either way the existence of a visible Indian communist movement in regional politics and in the Indian Parliament reinforced the Congress bias against America. (3) Nehru and the Nehruvians had a China-fixation (along with a Pakistan and America fixations) that played up China’s central position in a world of four powers according to Nehru: America, Soviet Russia, China and India. The Nehru doctrine of peaceful coexistence with China was seen as the way to create an overarching diplomatic bridge in Asia that would increase the weight of Asia in world affairs. Japan, Taiwan, the two Koreas, the Southeast Asian states from Thailand to the Philippines were largely dealt with in a condescending way as were countries in India’s immediate neighbourhood

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other than Burma (now Myanmar). Nehru and the Nehruvians saw India and China as two victims of Western imperial policies; and Indian academic and diplomatic practitioners paid no attention to China’s worldview as the premier Asian power that would not accept India as a co-equal in the diplomatic and the military sphere or in terms of international prestige in conference diplomacy. The theme of Sino-Indian rivalry as the driving element in Chinese foreign policy relating to India and Pakistan was not considered by Indian practitioners, hence the surprise and the sense of betrayal when China attacked India militarily in 1962. But even as peaceful co-existence was replaced by a relationship of conflict between the two, China remained the dominant Asian power in Indian diplomatic thinking. There was no public evaluation of China’s internal and external compulsions such as the problem of developing China’s countryside and the polarity between the city and the countryside, the shakiness of China’s control and authority on the Tibet and Taiwan questions, China’s historical rivalry with Japan and Vietnam in the economic, military and diplomatic spheres, China’s military constraints as a result of its disagreements with Soviet Russia and America and the problem of a centrally and rigidly controlled China when the wave of the future was to move towards pluralism in the political arrangements of a modern system of states. Indian academic and official practitioners tended to play up China’s strengths and play up India’s weaknesses rather than to establish a realistic scorecard of the two countries’strengths and weaknesses and the balance of advantages and disadvantages and strategies to manage them. These biases were not simply the result of practical circumstances. India had to tilt towards Moscow because of the dependence on Soviet support in the Kashmir question and the need to counter Pakistani, American and Chinese policies in the region. India had to court the Arabs because of the dependence on Middle Eastern oil and because of the belief that the Arab factor could strengthen the Congress Party’s mobilization of Indian Muslim minority vote. But then there were instances where policy choices existed, but the policies chosen reflected the ideological fixations rather than the pressure of circumstances. Nehru’s India was accommodating where firmness was required in relation to Pakistan. By talking constantly about friendship with Pakistan when Pakistani ideology and military policy made that an improbability and by giving up the war option against Pakistan, India’s Pakistan policy became a victim of the Nehru–Mountbatten ideology and policy preference. By talking constantly about peaceful coexistence with China when Chinese ideology, history and military policy made that an improbability and by giving up the option of active preparation for war with China when the latter’s policies in Tibet and the Himalayan region in the early 1950s showed an intent to extend China’s presence at the expense of Indian interests, India’s China policy became a victim of the ideology and policy preference of Nehru and Indian leftists (like Krishna Menon and K. M. Pannikar). By tilting primarily towards the Arabs with Palestinian rights and opposition to colonialism as the flagships of Indian diplomacy, India alienated the US, Israel and Iran and gave up the option to exploit the differences between Israel and the Arabs, between the Arabs and Iranians and between secular and fundamentalist Arab

Indian strategic debates and dilemmas 69 countries. India’s Middle Eastern policy became a victim of Nehruvian and Congress party policy preference to support the Palestinian struggle and not to balance it by support of Israel’s right to survival and security. Indian diplomacy suggested a higher moral preference for the Palestinian struggle over the Israeli struggle for a secure homeland. The option was to adopt a balanced position on two homelands rather than adopt a bias against Israel because of injustice to the Palestinians as a result of British policy of dividing Palestine. A strategic view of Middle Eastern politics in the context of practical Indian interests would have produced a balanced policy but the policy was skewed, because it was driven by abstract ideological consideration rather than practical strategic calculations. Another example of Indian ideology in play existed in India’s emphasis on the struggle against apartheid in South Africa. This emphasis projected a moral preference against racialism, a fine academic point that was devoid of practical strategic value to India because no Indian interest was served by the dismantling of the apartheid regime in South Africa and by the rise of a new state under the African National Congress. Nelson Mandela, the new leader in South Africa, for instance led the non-aligned countries to adopt the Western and Chinese agenda to extend the nuclear non-proliferation treaty indefinitely and to adopt the comprehensive nuclear test ban. These were two regimes that were meant to corner India in an area of vital strategic interest. The diplomatic alignments of India under Nehru and the Nehruvians were, therefore, based on ideological considerations and to a limited extent on practical ones. The former were ‘made in India’ ideologies and provided little or no value in advancing Indian vital interests. They projected particular moral preferences but it is debatable if they were actually moral in the sense that the highest moral task of a state is to protect the physical security of a country, the economic, political and cultural values of its peoples and the country’s vital interests. So ideology is not necessarily moral unless it is validated by reference to vital interests. Our contention is that only a select number of Indian diplomatic alignments served the country’s vital interests and the pattern of alignments (negative and positive ones) distorted the Indian capacity to advance the country’s interests and to achieve a balance between ends and means. Although Prime Ministers L. B. Shastri and Indira Gandhi broke away from Nehru’s anti-war policy in 1965 and 1971, the Nehruvians up to 1998 were not able to think and function outside the Nehru pattern of diplomatic alignments relating to Pakistan, Soviet Russia, China, America and the Arab and the African world of Palestinian rights, anti-apartheid, non-alignment and third world zones of peace and disarmament philosophies. India had diplomatic relations with practically all countries in the world but with pronounced ideological biases that revealed a pattern of alignments that did not necessarily serve Indian interests. The BJP minority government on the other hand was able to balance and realign India by developing a set of alignments with traditional and non-traditional partners. By doing so they pursued Indian diplomacy on the basis of practical calculations that were driven by Indian interests rather than Nehruvian ideological principles. We now turn to a brief discussion of the shifts.

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The shifts under the BJP-led coalition government (1998–2004) were significant. Following the 1998 nuclear tests, India developed positive strategic discourses with non-traditional partners especially the US, Israel, Japan, Australia, France, Germany, Taiwan and Iran. These involved defence cooperation including transfers of modern military technology and institutionalized discussions about the international and regional strategic environment. The campaign against Islamic terrorism played a role in the build-up of links between India and non-traditional partners as did the interest of these players in defence cooperation. At the same time economic, diplomatic and military links with traditional partners like Russia, France and UK were maintained. Finally, strategic dialogues were opened up with traditional rivals, Pakistan and China; and the effort was to find negotiating space in a system of Indo-Pakistani and India–China conflicts and thus to loosen stalemated relationships. The development of a process to build alignments with non-traditional partners was meant to enlarge the geographical limits of the subcontinental states’ system where the power relationships were weighed down by the dominance of three systems of conflicts – India/US, India/China and India/Pakistan. In each India was at a disadvantage; as well, India’s declining international influence during the era of Nehru and the Nehruvians showed that India was on a downward slope. By building a network of non-traditional partners India enabled itself to increase its diplomatic and military weight in dealing with the points of friction in its strategic neighbourhood and to increase the uncertainties and costs of wrong policies of its traditional rivals. This network also enabled India to enlarge its geographical sphere of interest and operation. A geopolitical view of foreign policy, and developments in the region following the end of the Cold War, enabled India to focus on Central Asia, the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Ocean (with a focus on the Persian Gulf and the South China seas), in addition to its traditional concerns with its border security vis-à-vis its immediate neighbours.

Enlarging the inventory of Indian policy tools to exert influence and to engage the opposition The traditional Nehruvian method of action in the international sphere was to talk about international questions and to project global norms, to urge peaceful resolution of disputes with Pakistan and China, to use limited military force when compelled by external and domestic circumstances but to do so in a reactive and defensive way, to build military capacity (including nuclear and missile capability) in a sub-rosa fashion and with a policy rationale that highlighted its peaceful rather than its military applications (or both). Under Nehru and the Nehruvians the Indian government eschewed the skilled use of coercive diplomacy. Had the stranglehold of the Nehruvian approach not existed, it made sense to adopt the aims and methods of coercive diplomacy, that is, to tie Indian political objectives, moral values and coercion to secure a negotiated outcome that was mutually beneficial; or if the rival was not willing to negotiate, to secure a military outcome that served Indian objectives. We see the origin of Indian coercive diplomacy when Prime Ministers L. B. Shastri ordered military action against Pakistan in

Indian strategic debates and dilemmas 71 1965 to relieve Pakistan’s military pressure in Kashmir. Shastri did not accept the Pakistani view that use of force to liberate Kashmir, a disputed territory, was legal, moral and politically acceptable but India’s use of force against Pakistan was not. Shastri’s military initiative against Pakistan caused alarm in Pakistan because the Indian action broke the Nehru taboo against a general war with Pakistan; and it placed in doubt the widespread belief that Hindus were talkers and not movers in the strategic sphere. But this experiment with coercive diplomacy was short lived because the result of this initiative was still the time honoured method of a great powers’ sponsored Indo-Pakistani ceasefire through the UN; and the Indian government reverted to the old pattern of responding to aggression at a time of the enemy’s choice. A philosophy of defence of India, and not deterrence, remained the dominant Indian norm under the Nehruvians. Moreover, the 1965 war was mainly an exercise in land power; it did not involve the use of the Indian Navy to threaten Pakistani targets and the Pakistani mind. Here the package of Indian policy tools consisted of the use of the Indian military and air force against Pakistan followed by the use of Indian diplomatic machinery to secure the ceasefire and then to prepare for the next military round – rather than a peace settlement. Another origin of Indian coercive diplomacy was the Indian campaign against Pakistan in 1971. The war broke the Indian government’s taboo of the Nehru–Mountbatten era against general war against Pakistan. As well it destroyed the Nehruvian and Indian social preference for moral, Gandhian-type political philosophy rather than the Kautilyan, Maoist and Clausewitzian philosophies that stressed the strong connection between military force and political purpose. In a departure from the Nehruvian past, this military campaign showed a larger political purpose. The Indira Gandhi government supported the struggle for East Pakistani autonomy within the framework of a united Pakistan and failing that to secure a new state by military means. Bangladesh was the first example of a successful creation of a new state by force in the post-1945 international system. Indian actions were significant because they broke the convention that colonial territorial borders were the foundation of the modern states’ system even though the colonial borders were formed as a result of colonial policies and interests rather than the requirements of economic geography and cultural identity of the peoples involved. This war involved a number of Indian policy tools: 1

2

Political diplomacy was employed to highlight the humanitarian disaster that was the result of Pakistani military policies and the support extended to Pakistan by America and China. Indian diplomacy prepared international public opinion effectively so that Indian military intervention was justifiable under international law. Indian military action involved land power, airpower and sea power (the Indian Navy was deployed off Karachi) and the 1971 campaign is an example of an integrated use of all services in a major military campaign that produced a solution made in India and made for India. The military planning was based

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Indian strategic debates and dilemmas on the political premise that the world community led by Pakistan’s two international allies (America and China) would take two weeks to pressure Indian military activity via a UN sponsored ceasefire and hence India’s window of military–political opportunity consisted of two weeks. Unlike 1965, the Indian armed forces secured the defeat of the Pakistani army in East Pakistan and the defeat of the Pakistan–US–China coalition in a short time. The point is that Indian diplomatic and military action worked in concert, and it settled a point of friction in India’s neighbourhood to India’s advantage. Both diplomatic and military methods were in play in first escalating and then settling the point of friction at a time and place of India’s choice. This is the central point about coercive diplomacy. Here Indian forces and decisionmakers did not wait to be attacked by Pakistan; they acted preemptively but carefully shaped international opinion to support India’s strategic and political needs. The coordination between India’s political diplomacy and the armed forces and the coordinated use of all military and intelligence tools (land power, air power, sea power and intelligence services who were engaged with Pakistan and its allies) were a departure from the Nehru era’s approach.

Still, despite Prime Minister Gandhi’s impressive victory, the defeat of the Pakistani Army was not followed by an Indo-Pakistani political settlement because Indian diplomacy did not have a post-1971 political strategy to do so. The pre-1971 pattern of polarity and alignments in the subcontinent continued to develop after 1972. These experiments with coercive diplomacy are assessed here as a transitional phase rather than a decisive shift in Indian behaviour. They are significant because they indicate a growing weight of Indian military power in Indian foreign affairs and they are significant in another sense. The Nehruvians could not bring themselves to acknowledge the central importance of coercive diplomacy as the way to challenge the system of conflict created by Pakistan and its allies. The Indian diplomatic emphasis on bilateralism diverted attention from the reality of strategic triangles and multi-cornered ideological and strategic alignments that formed the context in which India could either allow itself to be cornered by the international community or alternatively to control, influence or deflect international pressures. The strategic actions of the BJP-led coalition government enabled India to reposition itself in the region and in the international system. Note the driving elements: 1

2

The 1998 tests undermined the international non-proliferation regime and India emerged both as a point of international friction as well as a point of international discourse on the issue of regional and global security. By emphasizing the importance of liberalization of the Indian economy along with changes in its nuclear policy, India joined the economic and military questions and projected the importance of economic and military weight rather than political diplomacy as the basis of the new India and as the

Indian strategic debates and dilemmas 73 basis of Indian power in the international system. Build Indian strength, escalate and negotiate became the new Indian mantra, and it found a resonance in a system of states that was tied to considerations of power politics and vital states’ interests rather than abstract global norms. Note that coercive diplomacy was in use in the Kargil operation in 1999 (land power, airpower and sea power were used) and in the subsequent confrontation between India and Pakistan during 2001–02. The peace processes with Pakistan and China, and the new, post-1998 strategic links between India and its non-traditional and traditional partners reflect the connection between coercive diplomacy and peace process and the pattern of military and diplomatic engagement which the two foster. In this sense the decisive shift in Indian strategic affairs occurred under the BJP’s leadership during 1998–2004 rather than the transitional actions of the Nehruvians (1964–98). The shifts occurred because the policies of Nehru and the Nehruvians were not able to cope with the dilemmas the external powers and Nehru’s policies created for the advancement of Indian vital interests. The external powers and the world community pursued their interests by their support of the strategic and ideological triangles organized by the external powers as discussed earlier. Nehru’s policies facilitated the interests of the external powers, because Nehru’s frame of reference was driven by the parameters of policies and interests of external powers and external ideologies that were not to India’s advantage. The Nehruvians were not able to discard the Nehru policy baggage in part because of bureaucratic inertia and intellectual laziness of Indian scholars and practitioners, in part, because the means to challenge external policies were deficient as a result of the policy boundaries created by Nehru and his cohorts and in part because of the extensive capacity of the external powers to pressure successive Indian prime ministers and to create pockets of influence within the Indian government and in Indian media and scholarly circles. The next chapter explains the inadequacies of Nehru’s diplomatic thinking and policies and the dilemmas they created for Indian security and prestige.

5

The nature of India’s foreign policy Utopia, compromise peace or engagement?

The importance of interactions and challenging asymmetries Foreign policy is an interaction of forces within a country and outside its borders. The interaction is dynamic and constant and often there is a pattern with a mix of polarities and friendly alignments between a country and its external environment. The external polarities and alignments often change over time along a spectrum of hostility, competitive coexistence, neutrality, indifference or cooperative coexistence. The challenge for the practitioners is to mute a hostile relationship and to seek a cooperative one, but the general aim is to secure the best relationship possible under the circumstances rather than necessarily a peaceful one if satisfactory conditions of peace are unavailable. Thus a student of foreign policy should estimate the interaction between domestic and external forces by examining a matrix of internal as well as external polarities (enmities) and alignments (friendships). They represent the parameters of a country’s foreign policy system. They indicate the constraints in decision making and indicate the availability of political space for a leader in taking decisions in foreign affairs. There are two basic types of patterns of foreign policy. Both exist in a context of asymmetrical distribution of power and asymmetrical strategic relationships. Countries endeavour either to maintain an advantageous asymmetrical position in their favour or to turn around an unfavourable situation by its military and diplomatic action. The first type of interaction occurs in a suzerain states’ system where dominant–subordinate relationships exist and asymmetry is the established framework of action among its members. The suzerain type of states’ system was the dominant form of states’ system in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, the Americas and the Caribbean area during the colonial era (1500s–1900s). Following their independence many ex-colonial countries were still internally weak with limited organizational, economic and military capacities and with limited experience in managing the affairs of state; the political experiences of their leaders had been mainly to organize independence movements rather than to run governments. Thus, following the end of the Second World War, international economic and military power and diplomatic prowess crystallized in the hands of a small band of powers such as America and Soviet Russia and the blocs they

Nature of India’s foreign policy 75 formed. With asymmetries against them, and with limited administrative and strategic experience on their side, the ex-colonial states either became allies and a part of the superpower-led suzerain states’ system or they ended up as strategic playgrounds for the great powers. The great powers were able to project their power into regions of conflict and intervene at will. In other words, the suzerain type of states’ system retained its salience in the post-colonial world except in countries that sought a fundamental change in the pattern of asymmetry by force. The second type of interaction occurs in a revolutionary situation that is both volatile and violent. There are challenges by the weak to radically alter the asymmetrical and unjust relationships and to advance their position and their cause. Of course, the established managers of asymmetrical relations have an interest to maintain them by force or by persuasion, but this may not be possible if the revolutionary opponent is stronger and is not inclined to cooperate. Radical change is often the result of a prolonged struggle as in the case of China which endured a bloody civil war during the 1930s, war with Japan, the foremost Asian power of the time before 1945 and the Korean War in the early 1950s against the foremost military power in the world, America. The Bolshevik revolution is another example of revolutionary change that brought down the Tsarist regime and established a new political, economic and a social order in a backward country. Vietnam is the third example of revolutionary change where a weak country in military terms was able to defeat French colonialism and American power. Radical change implies fundamental shifts in the internal political, economic and military structure of the new state and a consequent restructuring of external relationships. Soviet Russia, China and Vietnam were able to change their relations with the West by aggressive political and military means and to gain comparative advantage for themselves even though the distribution of economic and military power, locally and globally, was asymmetrical from their perspective in comparison to the West. They did so by increasing their internal unity and organization, by developing clear policy direction and by developing and using their strength against their enemies in a manner that served their interests. In India’s case, Indian independence was a radical change for British imperial authority because of the prominent place India had in the British imperial system in relation to Asia, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean areas. Britain’s retreat from India shrunk Britain’s international influence and power. But Indian independence did not alter the pattern of India’s position as a member of a suzerain type of states’ system, that is, as a subordinate element in a system where outside forces held a dominant position. Undoubtedly there were changes: (1) India was formally independent, it held state sovereignty and the formal attributes of independence and Nehru projected a posture that stressed the moral imperative of non-alignment and political independence in modern international relations. (2) The cast of players that made the list of dominant players in the Indian subcontinent changed. In the Mughal days, the Mughals managed a suzerain states’ system that provided protection to weaker allies and subordinated others by war; in this system the Hindus were subordinated in both state and society. Under the British Raj the Indian princes (Muslim and Hindu) were organized by treaty

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arrangements into a suzerain states’ system whereby the Raj provided the external protection to the princely states in return for their loyalty to the Crown. Following the departure of the Raj from the subcontinent the new suzerain states’ system in the subcontinent was organized by Britain and Pakistan and America joined it in the early 1950s to become its key manager. With Chinese entry into a friendly strategic relationship with Pakistan in the 1960s, Britain, America and China became the co-managers of a new suzertain type of a states’ system in the subcontinent that functioned well because of a lack of opposition to this system by Nehru and the Nehruvians. The elements that led to the emergence of a suzerain states’ system after Indian independence in 1947 and Nehru’s role in facilitating it are discussed later in the book.

Typology of foreign policy methods and India’s approach under Nehru Foreign policy interactions are of three types. This typology helps us differentiate between interactions which are effective and ones with a high ‘noise’ to ‘action’ ratio: 1

2

3

The parties seek to adjust conflicting interests by negotiations and/or war or employ other tools of policy such as economic inducement or economic pressure, psychological warfare or intervention short of war. This is based on a prior awareness that vital interests of the parties are in contention and their protection requires immediate action. The policy aim is to set up situations which are either military encounters that lead to negotiated results or diplomatic interactions are set-up to produce the desired results. Here dilemmas are anticipated and dealt with by coercive or persuasive means. This type of interaction or engagement is the opposite of escapism that emphasizes nonvital issues at the expense of vital ones. Here policies are made to build internal strength, to weaken enemy alliances, to build alliances in one’s favour, to disorient the enemy’s mind so that it loses clarity of purpose, policy direction and a sense of purpose, to set up diplomatic and military situations that engage the enemy and generally to seek comparable power and comparable advantage in asymmetrical situations. Surrender to the demands of a superior force either by acknowledging permanent defeat or by accepting a compromise peace or a tactical retreat to permit re-grouping for a new encounter. Surrender implies that asymmetry is deemed to be inevitable and the likelihood of a satellite status is high. Escapism that is neither forceful engagement (the first type) nor tactical retreat with an expectation of a return to the field of power in due course (the second type). According to the dictionary, to escape means to avoid reality, to keep away from danger, to use skill or slyness to baffle or foil or to avoid the reach of something. To escape is not meant to opt out of the opportunities and obligations of the system of states because sovereign states have automatic membership in the states’ system, and one cannot opt out or join into the system. Rather escape artists are activists whose work masks their

Nature of India’s foreign policy 77 actions and who create illusions. Their work is meant to distract or confuse the opposition. Kautilya’s Arthasastra and the Indian beast fables point to the role of illusion in statecraft.1 But there is a difference between a state actor who purposely creates illusions as against a state actor who becomes a victim of delusion, that is, holds false beliefs that are contrary to reason and fact. Nehru’s foreign policy fell into the third type of interaction. The argument is that Indian foreign affairs have moved incrementally from the third type of behaviour, that is, escapism (1947–64), to the second type of behaviour, that is, acceptance of a policy of compromise peace but not an acknowledgement of permanent defeat (1965–98), and eventually it embraced the first type of behaviour, that is, a policy of active and forceful engagement and management of conflict was adopted (1998–2004). We argue that Indian strategic dilemmas had their origin in the Nehru years; thereafter they were addressed in a half-hearted way by the Nehruvians, but because Indian actions were half-hearted and the international opposition was strong, the dilemmas persisted. India did not acquire the comparable power, the skill and the strategy to manage the pressures of a closed and a conflicted system of conflict in the subcontinent that was dominated by the policies of Pakistan, America and China. The shift to the first type of behaviour happened in 1998 when a radical change in India’s nuclear stance, and the decision to employ coercive diplomacy against Pakistan in the 1999–2002 period, liberated the Indian government as well as India’s relations with America, Pakistan and China from the self-inflicted dilemma of the Nehru and the Nehruvian eras. Thus, as the Indian government moved from the third type of behaviour (Nehru’s escapism) to the second type of behaviour (the compromise peace and preparations for the next encounter of the Nehruvians) to the third type (the use of coercive diplomacy and nuclearization of India by the BJP-led government), Indian dilemmas were reduced in number and significance in India’s external relations with Pakistan, America and China, the world community at large, and in India’s foreign policy decision making. The argument is that Nehru’s foreign policy facilitated the policies of the Pakistan–America–China coalition against Indian strategic interests. The buildup of the coalition and its robust nature from the 1950s to the 1990s was a consequence of the rhetoric and diplomatic actions of Nehru and the Nehruvians and their hesitation to adapt the theory and practice of realpolitik to Indian strategic condition. Nehru’s successors were not only trapped in the Nehru diplomatic box. They lacked the confidence and the experience to change the approach. The circumstances were also unfavourable. There was heightened instability in Indian party politics and a growing intensity of highly personalized power struggles within India. India then was facing economic crises and the economic model was not delivering results. The international situation was undergoing rapid change but the Nehruvians were trapped in Nehru’s views. So even though Indian military strength had increased since 1962, it did not give India comparable power and advantage vis-à-vis its external rivals. Indian power was growing but it was still stalemated in the subcontinental context, partly because of the nature of

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policies of external powers towards India and partly because India’s diplomatic machinery was paralysed by the Nehru paradigm. India’s foreign affairs show a pattern of prolonged and incremental development, that is, improvement over time of its position in the Asian–Middle Eastern region and in the international system. There is a paradigm shift away from Nehru’s escapism (the first type of policy during 1947–64) to ambivalent efforts by Nehru’s daughter and others (1964–98) to get out of the Nehru box. The Nehruvians adopted a hybrid policy that lacked the force of the first type of policy and yet it sought to avoid the escapism of the third type of policy. Under the Nehruvians Indian economic and military capacities were growing incrementally but the policy paradigm was still cast in Nehru’s terms. During this period there were military and diplomatic encounters with outside powers as in the 1971 war and in the 1974 nuclear test but they did not lead to negotiated results or growth of India’s comparative advantage. The interactions between India and the outside forces, and within India, produced a variety of demands: surrender to the demands of a superior force was the demand of the external powers; buy time rather than acknowledge defeat was the demand of the Nehruvians; adopt forceful measures to weaken enemy’s alliances and to rebuild Indian alignments with non-traditional partners was the demand of the critics of the Indian government and the dominant Congress party. During this period the international coalition of Pakistan–America–China grew stronger against India while India became internally divided with a loss of clarity of purpose, with ambivalent policy direction and absence of strong political leadership with a strategic plan to engage hostile forces, the incremental growth of Indian military power and nuclear capability could not be converted into usable power. Our story is that Nehru and the Nehruvians accepted the pattern of interaction of a weak player in a suzerain type of states’ system but the diplomatic rhetoric was embroidered by a moralistic rhetoric about war/peace, China, nuclear disarmament, peacekeeping, apartheid and Palestine issues. Nehru and Nehruvians failed to grasp the emergence of India as a secondary zone of international and regional conflict where the interests of Pakistan, America, China and Russia were at odds with Indian interests; and India had become a field of their power politics. India’s moralistic rhetoric was escapism, because it avoided meaningful engagement with opposing forces, and the rhetoric did not give India a comparative power or advantage vis-à-vis its enemies. Our criticism of the Nehru/Nehruvian foreign policy approach rests on the premise that asymmetrical power situations do not necessarily lead to suzerain type of relations. Asymmetry in the distribution of power is not necessarily deterministic as the example of the Chinese civil war shows. A suzerain type of relationship emerges as a result of two circumstances: when a determined external opposition exists and threats are not dealt with in a timely manner. Escapism avoids a build-up of internal military and economic strength and it resists change from a peace policy to a war policy that could be used to attack the enemy alliances, its thinking and its armed forces. Without such challenges to a situation of asymmetry, and with the existence of a determined enemy coalition, escapism produces closed and conflicted relationships in a country’s environment.

Nature of India’s foreign policy 79 Under Nehru and the Nehruvians Indian domestic politics and foreign affairs were conflicted, closed and stalemated. Internally there was a polarity between the Indian ‘Left’ who opposed economic liberalization, and wanted a socialist economy, who wanted India to maintain its traditional peace policy, who opposed coercive diplomacy in dealing with a world of powers and opposed India’s alignment with rightist and capitalist forces; the Indian ‘Right’ on the other hand argued against the Indian Left whose political symbol was Nehru and later Indira Gandhi.2 Externally, India’s relations with Pakistan, China and America were also closed, conflicted and stalemated. This handcuffed India, but this was the intended result of the policies of the external powers. Their strategy was effective because India’s size and nationalism precluded the possibility of permanent defeat of India but, at the same time, external pressures and internal polarity could ensure that the Indian government could be deflected or distracted from making effective plans for a new encounter that could increase India’s advantage. Maintaining polarity within India, and between India and the powers, thus became the norm of the great powers’ politics in India. Tying India’s diplomatic and military future to the policies of Pakistan, America and China made eminent sense for the latter three powers because it left the strategic initiative in their hands and took it away from Indian hands. The three held the power to initiate a military duel (Pakistan and China did this in 1947–48, 1962, 1965), to strengthen ties among themselves (1960s onwards), to demand a ceasefire when fighting broke out between India and Pakistan and to mobilize the world community against India (and Pakistan) through the UN whenever India chose to go to war or to develop its nuclear weapons. When relations are closed and conflicted and diplomatic–military initiatives rest in the hands of the enemy coalition then the choices before a practitioner in an asymmetrical situation are stark; they bring out the dilemmas. One strategy is to do nothing different and thus remain locked into stalemated relationships of conflict while the enemy coalition builds its strength and strategy to corner a country like India. This was the choice of Nehru and the Nehruvians. Another choice is for the weaker player to try to play all the great powers against each other to one’s advantage by diplomatic means. This was Nehru’s primary choice but not that of the Nehruvians who recognized the limits of this approach when the great powers had established cooperative ties with each other. The third choice was to try to ingratiate India with the great powers by playing the role of a helpful fixer, hoping that the high moral road would be recognized and rewarded. This again was Nehru’s choice but the rewards in the form of prestige for Nehru and India were meagre and indicated that prestige was associated with power or else it was a transient halo. This became India’s position; from the mid-1950s the halo began to disappear. The fourth choice was to escalate international and regional tensions, as China did during the Cold War in its dealings with America and Soviet Russia, to build military strength to do so and to develop a diplomatic–military strategy to mess up the enemy’s mind, its alliances and its military forces even in a situation of asymmetry as in the Korean war. India chose the fourth option belatedly in 1998 when it entered the nuclear and missile club and adopted coercive diplomacy and

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a war policy (2000–04) as the basis of its relations with Pakistan and China and it flouted the strategic norms of America concerning international and regional security. In doing so the BJP minority coalition recognized that the problem lay not in the existence of asymmetry but it was in the nature of India’s foreign policy framework that relied on Nehru’s policy boundaries. The post-Nehru/Nehruvian strategy restructured India’s foreign policy paradigm. It changed the policy boundaries and altered the pattern of interaction between India and competing outside forces and their effects on Indian foreign affairs. By adopting a geopolitical view of foreign policy, by creating synergy between diplomacy and military and economic power, by building links with non-traditional partners in addition to traditional ones, by seeking negotiated restraints rather than unilateral ones that were based on the false notion of the value of the high moral road, by using a war policy as the basis of a peace process to turn enmities around in an incremental way, the BJP minority government’s foreign policy managed a successful effort to move India away from a subordinate status in the great powers’ managed subcontinental suzerain system of states. The change was revolutionary compared to the standards of pre-1947 Indian history and post-1947 Nehru/Nehruvianism. It was revolutionary in the sense that it was a sudden, complete and radical change; it was irreversible. The changes gave India a comparable advantage in regional and international relations and they induced the great powers to limit their competition with India, to reform their outlook about India’s future and to accommodate Indian security and prestige requirements. The changes have also reduced India’s external dilemmas. They had been on the increase under Nehru and the Nehruvians, because India was locked into the third and second types of policies, and consequently it had become the field of great powers’ politics in India; India’s capacity for independent decision making had declined during this period. Ironically, despite the international condemnation of India’s nuclear tests in 1998, India’s negotiating space grew thereafter. Chairman Mao was right: power comes from the barrel of a gun.

The core arguments The chapter will now try to establish the core arguments: 1

2

Power asymmetries have been a constant feature of world history. They are inevitable in the modern world. The issue is not to expect the end of asymmetries; it is to manage their consequences by an ability to exploit contradictions in the enemy’s position and to manage the dilemmas through effective leadership and policies that create comparative advantage and comparative power for the country concerned. Despite India’s size, and its ambition to be taken seriously as a major power, until recently India was cast as the weaker part of a suzerain type of states’ system in the subcontinent. This was the result of policies adopted by Pakistan, UK, America and China that sought to extend the principles of the British Raj to the subcontinent after 1947. These policies were facilitated by

Nature of India’s foreign policy 81

3

Nehru’s carelessness, naiveté, egoism and escapism in strategic affairs. He failed to grasp the strategic nature of the policies of the external powers and their respective interests. He was simplistic in his belief that India’s peaceful diplomacy was sufficient to protect India, or that the rivalries among the three major powers sufficed to guarantee Indian security and prestige. Escapism was inherent in the dominance of utopian thinking in Indian political and social thought under Nehru in particular and to an extent under the Nehruvians. It is argued that Indian dilemmas had two sources: they were made abroad and made in India by the Nehrus. Several key elements were in play in the drive to form a suzerain type of states’ system. i

ii

iii

iv

v

4

The prehistory (1500s–1947) indicated the formation of an organic link between Mughal and British strategic principles and policies and this became the foundation of the policies of Pakistan and its allies. Pakistan emerged on the principle of Muslim separateness and this required a policy and an ideology of confrontation and a search for parity with India; Islamic religion and military intervention in the neighbourhood became the basis of Pakistani international relations. The nature of America’s Cold War policy, Pakistan’s strategic location and its political orientation towards UK and America, cemented the alliance between these countries. The common interest was to check Soviet and Indian ambitions and influence in the region and in the international sphere. China’s strategy adopted the Pakistani–American policy framework because of its interest to check India’s position in the subcontinent and in world affairs. The nature of Indian political history before and after 1947 showed the pattern of defensiveness and reactivity on the part of ‘political Hinduism’ in dealing with pressures from Muslim and British rulers. The absence of effective Indian leadership in strategic affairs, the pervasiveness of divisive internal debates between Indian utopians and realists (Nehru and Menon represented the former, Sardar Patel represented the latter about Pakistan and China policy), and Nehru’s tie up with the strategic principles of the Muslim-Western conquerors of India facilitated India’s position as a subordinate force in a suzerain type of states’ system.

Despite the earlier discussion, we argue that a suzerain type of states’ system failed to materialize. Along with the external powers, Nehru was the primary domestic villain. His diplomatic and military policies made the subcontinent a field of external pressures rather than Indian power; and made India ineffective in the global arena. But there was a hidden side to Nehru as well that became the basis of India’s resurgence following the failure of Nehru as an effective diplomatic or a military practitioner. Despite his anti-Indian military and his pro-nuclear disarmament stance, despite his anti-power politics rhetoric and policy, despite his preference for peace diplomacy and unwillingness to

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Nature of India’s foreign policy adopt a regional geopolitical approach that included India’s northern borders as well as the oceanic environment, Nehru laid the foundation of India’s nuclear programme and its defence machinery. His support for the former was fulsome but secretive although his political policy on the nuclear question cancelled his support for the scientific development of the nuclear option.3 His support for conventional armaments was half-hearted and inadequate; it showed his ambivalence between his moral preference for peace and the internal and external pressures to deal with defence issues. But Nehru had a defence policy and supported the development of military machinery.4 The criticism is that he retarded the development of India’s defence mechanism as was clear in India’s pathetic performance in the 1962 war with China. This was a turning point in India’s policy because even as China was said to have betrayed India, Nehru revealed that his inattention to the external environment had let down the India people who had trusted him repeatedly at the polls. As well Nehru retarded the development of India’s nuclear bomb policy at a time that India was ahead of China in the area. But still, he deserves credit for authorizing the nuclear and defence projects and this enabled his successors to build on these foundations.

The suzerain states’ system did not materialize for three different reasons: 1

2

3

The Cold War between America and Soviet Russia was a fortunate international circumstance for India because it enabled Delhi and Moscow to come together for different reasons. Moscow did not wish to abandon the subcontinent as a field of power to American and Chinese influence and it was willing to build leverage with India by exercising vetoes on its behalf on the Kashmir issue at the United Nations and by developing economic and military links with India. When external military threats created a clear public identification against China as in 1962, Indian nationalism, rather than imaginative and courageous Indian government’s strategic policies pushed the government to alter its policies to respond to the crisis. Nehru had authorized and legitimized the foundation of an Indian nuclear and defence capability and these two core tools were driven to their logical development by Indian nationalist impulses.

In sum, Nehru was both a part of the problem and a part of the solution. His diplomatic policies created policy boundaries that helped the anti-India coalition develop its pressures against Indian interests. His approval to build a defence capability became the basis of a new policy when a critical external event (such as the 1962 attack on Indian sovereignty) aroused Indian nationalism and pushed the Indian leadership to respond with radical changes. The book argues that the paradigm shift in Indian foreign affairs was the result of forces that Nehru disapproved. He was against militant nationalism and assertive ‘political Hinduism’ which has emerged as a subterranean force in Indian politics since the 1990s.

Nature of India’s foreign policy 83 He was against a central position for the Indian armed forces in national affairs; and he was interested in Indian nuclear science as a tool of Indian development rather than Indian power. The paradigm shift occurred when the Indian armed forces and Indian nuclear and missile scientists emerged as the builders of chemical and nuclear explosives, and in the cocoon of militant Indian nationalism they, along with Indian business entrepreneurs in information technology, not the Nehru family and their cohorts, emerged as the heart of the Indian nation. The failure of the suzerain states’ system in the subcontinent is a tremendous development that is fundamental and subtle; it is significant if not obvious because there was an audacious effort by several external powers with Indian help to make it succeed. Chapter 6 explains the parameters of the suzerain states’ system that had three drivers. To this discussion we now turn.

6

The build-up of the suzerain states’ system in the subcontinent, 1947–90s

Indian history is a recurring story of successful external interventions in subcontinental military, economic and political affairs. From India’s political and military weakness, the prospect of material gain for the foreign invaders and later the Europeans enabled a number of external forces (Afghan, Persian, Mughal and European) to convert the subcontinent into a field of externally dominated power politics. This prehistory showed the vitality of the classical realpolitik tradition, that is, the value of intervention, balance of power and, when possible, imperialism, in the conduct of external powers in their relationship to India. A significant development that shaped the pattern of international relations of the subcontinent after 1947 occurred in the pre-1947 period. The link between Indian Muslims and Britain reflected a common cause to contain the rise of the Hindu majority and India itself as a dominant force. This connection is historic because it was the elemental force, the basis of Pakistani, Anglo-American and Chinese diplomatic strategy in relation to India after 1947. The foundation of the Hindu–Muslim and Indo-Pakistani rivalry was established before 1947 and the policies of Pakistan’s external allies helped institutionalize and prolong it after 1947. The result was the development of a pattern of strategic and ideological triangles or multi-cornered relationships. The second element that favoured the formation of a suzerain type of states’ system after 1947 lay in the ambition of the Pakistani leadership to create a homeland on the basis of Muslim separateness and to seek parity with the Hindus and India. It recognized that the days of Muslim glory were over and the best bargain available was to place Pakistan at the service of the Anglo-Americans and to secure their help in Pakistan’s quest of parity with India. Jinnah’s conversation with American diplomats in the summer of 1947 made this pitch stressing a common approach against Hindu (and Soviet) imperialism.1 Pakistani strategic calculations recognized the problem of Indo-Pakistani asymmetry and used Pakistan’s strategic value to the Anglo-American bloc to build a strategic and ideological triangle with three players: UK–US, Pakistan and India. The Cold War and Pakistan’s strategic location was Pakistan’s opportunity. During the Cold War, it was standard practice for the Anglo-American world to think in terms of dominant–subordinate or great power–small states or suzerain type of states’ system that reflected asymmetries in the distribution of world power. Pakistan was a willing participant in the development of a suzerain states’ system led by the Anglo-American powers,

Suzerain states’ system in the subcontinent 85 because it was through such a system that Pakistani civilian and military elites could pursue their dream to make Pakistan India’s co-equal. In Pakistan’s case as in India’s, foreign policy was an interaction of forces within the country and outside it. The interactions were shaped by the interests in play, the history of Partition and the internal situation. Pakistan’s internal economic situation was weak and it was exacerbated by Indian economic pressures; external aid was required and this meant a turn towards the US. Although the UK was victorious in 1945, it was depleted economically as a result of the war effort and the loss of its empire. The history of Partition, and the organic link between Muslims and Western strategic principles, required policies that relied on religion as a basis of separateness from the Hindu majority in India. As well, Pakistani fears of Hindu domination required Pakistani defence preparations. The fear was irrational because Indian history is a story of Muslim domination over Hindus, not the opposite, but then politics is based on subjective perceptions. Religion and strategy combined with the opportunity of the Cold War and Pakistan’s strategic location on the edge of the communist and the Middle Eastern worlds to make Pakistan a junior partner in the Anglo-American strategy in the East–West confrontation. As a member of the triangle of Pakistan, India and the UK–US in the subcontinent, Pakistan was an active promoter of the Anglo-American preference for a suzerain type of states’ system; it was through such a system that Pakistan could maintain its distinct Muslim identity vis-à-vis India’s Hindu majority and achieve diplomatic as well as strategic parity with India to guard against Indian pressures. The third element refers to the nature of Anglo-American policies towards India and Pakistan during the Cold War. They attempted to develop a suzerain type of states’ system that was meant to accommodate Pakistani ambitions and interests, to corner India into a position of co-equality with Pakistan as well as to secure Indian subordination to the Anglo-American combination. While India and Pakistan were obvious strategic and ideological rivals since 1947, the major external players played a critical role to sustain the Indo-Pakistani polarity, to institutionalize the conflict and to prolong it by policies that inhibited bilateral strategic discourse and bilateralized conflict-resolution. This element points to the role of third parties in the Indo-Pakistani confrontation. It is not simply a two-party conflict. That is, IndoPakistani polarity is necessary to sustain conflict in the region but external forces have played a crucial role in sustaining this polarity. Their conduct in the past avoided two extremities: uncontrolled tensions and bilateralized conflict-resolution between India and Pakistan. Instead they preferred a relationship of manageable instability and manageable polarity between the two regional powers. Several Western specialists explain the British use of religion in its politics and diplomacy concerning Indo-Pakistani and Hindu–Muslim affairs, the robust character of the British–Muslim links and the development of a subsidiary alliance system as the basis of imperial politics and the strategic organization of the subcontinent. Although the UK itself was secular in its internal political arrangements during the days of Empire, it effectively used religion, in this case Islam, to encourage divisions within local communities and to rule on the basis of manipulation of internal divisions or in Marxist language ‘contradictions’. The imperial aim was not to foster unity in the subcontinent; it was the opposite, that

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is, to foster disunity, because it was a requirement to build a strategic and an ideological triangle, whereby the weaker side (Indian Muslims) could be offered protection by the stronger power (UK) against Hindu imperialism or expansionism. The first part of the model was formed before 1947 where the formula of weaker minority (Muslims) ⫹ stronger power (Britain) levelled the playing field in relation to the potentially stronger political force (‘political Hinduism’ or Hindu nationalism represented by Gokhale and Tilak in the 1800s). The latter movement was deflected and diffused by the encouragement of the Mahatma Gandhi and Motilal/Jawaharlal Nehru combination as the basis of Indian nationalism. They were the negotiators who (reluctantly) agreed to Partition based on the religious principle. The formula was based on the classical British balance of power principle in European affairs that required a British tilt towards the weaker power where the margin of strength in the strategic triangle and the option to shift sides lay with Britain. It found in subcontinental religious division an opportunity to marry religious politics to balance of power politics. The second part of the model was an extension of the pre-1947 principle and practice where the formula of weaker country (Pakistan) ⫹ stronger power (the US with British guidance) levelled the playing field in relation to the potentially stronger political force, India, and Indian nationalism with a Hindu-component which formed a subterranean element in Indian society and politics: 1

Percival Spear explains the British–Mughal organic link that formed the prehistorical basis of post-1947 international relations of the subcontinent. To quote, The Mughal and British periods have been taken together because much misunderstanding has been caused in the past by their separate treatment. A concentration on the British period presents Indian regimes and institutions only in decay, leading easily to the assumption that this was the state that they were always in. Placing the Mughal period beside the British reveals to the reader that India had its going political concerns as viable as that of the British in India. In addition to this consideration, there is an organic connection between the two . . . British India was deeply indebted to Mughal India on one hand, and Mughal India was a characteristic Indian entity on the other in a way not realised by any other regime during the previous thousands of years. In many ways British India saw the development of trends already existing in Mughal India and it is certain that British India would have been a very different place had the Mughals never ruled before them.2

2

Karl E. Meyer comments on the development of the suzerain states’ system in India. To quote, Building on a practice pioneered by their Mogul [Mughal] predecessors, the makers of British India evolved what became known as the subsidiary alliance system. Native rulers could only keep their thrones as long as they contributed taxes and soldiers to the Raj and discreetly heeded the British Residents posted to their courts.3

Suzerain states’ system in the subcontinent 87 3

Meyer goes on to note the close link between British and American strategy. To quote, Having first rebelled against Britain, the United States twice in the last century came to the old country’s rescue; it did much to undermine the empire by promoting self-determination and then, step by step, took up Britannia’s burdens in the Balkans, the Middle East, the Far East and not least along the legendary North-West frontier as the strategic ally of Pakistan. The new and dependent relationship was already apparent in 1943 during the North African campaign, when the future Conservative Prime Minister Harold Macmillan murmured these remarks to the Laborite Richard Crossman, who fortunately recorded them: ‘We, my dear Crossman, are Greeks in this American empire. You will find the Americans much as the Greeks found the Romans – great big, vulgar, bustling people, more vigorous than we are and also more idle, with more unspoiled virtues but also more corrupt. We must run Allied Force Headquartered as the Greek slaves ran the operations of the Emperor Cladius.4 Meyer also brings out the value of divide and rule in British strategic thinking and policy. The reasoning in 1905 when Lord Curzon, India’s Viceroy divided Bengal was as follows: ‘Bengal united is a power’ one of them counselled. ‘Bengal divided will pull several ways. That is what the Congress leaders feel; their apprehensions are perfectly correct and they form one of the great merits of the scheme. . . . One of our main objects is to split up and thereby weaken a solid body of opponents to our rule’.5 The divide and rule policy was effective. As Nirad Chaudhuri pointed out, from 1906 ‘Bengali Hindus believed the Muslims were coming over quite openly in favour of partition and on the side of the British’.6 Sir Olaf Caroe, the last British Governor of the North West Frontier province, was influential in his advocacy of Pakistan’s importance in Anglo-American strategy vis-à-vis Soviet Russia and India.7 In other words, at the time of Partition and declaration of independence of India and Pakistan from British rule in 1947, the British ⫹ Pakistani Muslim versus India triangle was firmly entrenched; it became the context of the future of Pakistani and Indian foreign affairs.

4

Owen Lattimore delivers his judgement about the importance of the use of religion by British imperialism before and after 1947. To quote, The fact that Pakistan separated from India on the issue of religious politics reveals one of the effects of British rule that nationalism has not yet been able to submerge. Encouragement of political organisation within the framework of religion had, after the First World War, become the principle British device for splitting the onslaught of a united nationalism.

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Suzerain states’ system in the subcontinent British official and semi-official literature persisted in referring to a supposed Hindu Congress long after the All-India Congress had made it a major policy to stress the union in nationalism of people of different religious faiths. Mohammed Ali Jinnah developed the momentum of his political career by turning this British policy to his own advantage.8

5

Geoffrey Fairbairns explains the British use of contradictions in India as the basis of its divide and rule policy. To quote, Though it is probably true to say that the Europeans began to install themselves in Asia by proving their superiority in military violence and weapons of war, this would not in the least be an adequate explanation of the persistence of their rule. They also brought to bear upon the scene two particular skills that were lacking: vastly superior modes of organisation and equally superior skills in what today in revolutionary guerrilla circles would be called ‘the exploitation of contradictions’.9

6

Karl Marx and Frederich Engels point out that by 1849 the Anglo-Indian Empire came into being and it meant a large scale extension of the ‘subsidiary system’. They point out that once the British decided to stay in India and to hold it ‘there remained no alternative but to break the power of the native princes by force or by intrigue’. As a result ‘the native States then virtually ceased to exist from the moment they became subsidiary to or protected by the [East India] Company [and later by the British Crown]. Britain’s impact on India was enormous. To quote, England had broken down the entire framework of Indian society, without any symptoms of reconstitution yet appearing . . . [it] separates Hindustan, ruled by Britain, from all its ancient traditions, and from the whole of its past history. The aims of the British Empire were twofold: plunder and development of order that served British imperial ends.10

Marx and Engels make a connection between the character of the British conquest of India and the Indian condition. It is argued that Indian history was one of war and conquest by outside forces. It was a history of ‘successive intruders who founded their empires on the passive basis of that unresisting and unchanging [Indian] society. The question, therefore, is not whether the English had a right to conquer India but whether we prefer India conquered by the Turk, by the Persian, by the Russian, to India conquered by the Briton’. This passivity of the general population when combined with the antagonism of various princes, races, castes and creeds and the use by Britain of the Roman rule of ‘divide et impera’ enabled Britain to retain its India empire. Thus the Indian social condition (passivity and ambition and antagonism among different sectors of society) and the British policy of divide and rule by force and intrigue enabled Britain to maintain its supremacy in the area.11

Suzerain states’ system in the subcontinent 89 These views about the links between Indian prehistory and the pattern of developments after 1947 suggest several conclusions. First, the British practice of divide and rule and the exploitation of contradictions in India was a valuable lesson for its successor, America, to the British imperial idea in India. Second, in terms of the study and practice of Indian foreign affairs, 1947 is assumed to be the great divide or a turning point in Indian political history. Two events are the basis of this assumption: (1) India gained independence and Nehru declared that India had a tryst with destiny. (2) The Cold War began and it bipolarized American–Soviet relations and the competition was carried into many ex-colonial areas. Our analysis, however, treats the two events as obvious but not significant because the pattern of subcontinental strategic relationships had been formed before 1947 and it was to continue thereafter. India, and the powers with an interest in Indian affairs, inherited a framework of subordinate or subsidiary type of states’ system that led to an expectation of great powers dominance and subordination of India after 1947. This pattern of thought and strategic behaviour had been formed in Indian history and it was to continue after 1947 despite the embroidery of Indian independence and the symbols of state sovereignty. America inherited the British mantle of asserting Western authority because Britain could no longer maintain its empire in Asia or elsewhere; but it showed the way and thus remained important as America’s mentor. Britain had shown how to disorient Indian society and, by a policy of divide and rule it broke the links between Indian political leaders and Indian history and its philosophical traditions. Britain learnt that it could not prevent the growth of Indian nationalism in the 1800s onwards but it could divide and dissipate its effect, and deflect its political force. It did so by using religion as a point of division and friction between the two major Indian communities, Hindus and Muslims. It also encouraged the rise of a pro-Western Indian political class led by the Nehrus and supported by Mahatma Gandhi. The Nehrus and the Gandhis could be counted upon to build a new Indian state based on British ideas and interests – parliamentary democracy, fabian socialism and a foreign policy that lacked the means to alter the historical pattern of a subsidiary type of states’ system in the ‘Indian’ subcontinent. Since the days of the East India Company, the British India Empire was built on a unique combination. Superior British military power, superior organization skills, ability to engage in political intrigue, Indian population’s passivity about foreign rule, emergence of a pro-British political class in India, existence of animosity among Indian races, communities and castes and the opportunity given by Indians to outside forces to exploit Indian rulers’ ambitions and resentments. Britain left India in 1947 because it was no longer able to sustain its position in the area and India was no longer profitable; it was cost-ineffective. However, note that Britain lost its formal power in India, but it did not lose its sense of purpose and capacity to use intrigue for strategic ends in the Indian subcontinent. Britain deflected the development of Indian political nationalism that reflected India’s ancient traditions and political principles. By building up Gandhi and the Nehrus (Motilal and Jawaharlal), by marginalizing Tilak and Gokhale, and others, who

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had roots in Indian history and traditions, Britain created a network of a new Indian political class that hijacked the new Indian state. Independent India had two entrenched polarities. The coalition between the Nehrus, Indian Leftists, the state planners and the modernizers on the one hand, and Indian nationalists with values that reflected historical Indian traditions and statecraft on the other hand. Nehru’s secularism and modernism became a code word to marginalize traditional Indian social and political thought that relied on Indian nationalism and principles of war and realpolitik strategy. In the late 1940s and the early 1950s three forces, that is, Pakistan, the UK–US and Nehru’s India built the expectation that India could be managed in a subsidiary type of states’ system. China joined this system later and it is ironic that despite its revolutionary credentials it embraced the strategic principles of Pakistan, the UK and the US vis-à-vis India. America was the first to join forces with Pakistan, the revisionist state in the subcontinent that wanted to change the territorial status quo between India and Pakistan by taking all of Kashmir into Pakistan. America made common cause with Pakistan because it was allegedly the weaker challenger of India’s alleged hegemonic ambitions in the region. In reality Pakistan was the challenger and it was not weaker than India because Pakistan used force via a tribal invasion in 1947–48 to take a third of Kashmir, it successfully brought America to its side through a military agreement and by its alliance it achieved near parity with India in the 1950s in the diplomatic and the military arenas. Later Pakistan brought China to its side with a military agreement and diplomatic support. The alignment with China was more important to Pakistan because it provided nuclear and missile aid to Pakistan to engage India in the military and diplomatic sphere and China was seen as a reliable ally unlike the US. Nehru’s policies on the other hand, shunned regional realpolitik. By taking the Kashmir issue to the United Nations Security Council, Nehru internationalized the issue and enabled the external powers to introduce their politics and strategic considerations into Indo-Pakistani and Kashmiri affairs. The convergence of Pakistani and American interests in the early 1950s and later of Pakistani, American and Chinese interests against India in the 1960s through the 1990s coincided with the Cold War era but the Cold War was context not the cause. As we will see later, the international coalition against India formed during the Cold War era continued to function even when the Cold War ended, and after the special Indo-Soviet relationship was no longer in play during the Gorbochov and Yeltsin eras. America saw in India a potential regional hegemon that had to be contained. This attitude was independent of American preoccupations during the Cold War. Britain played an important role in the build-up of the Pakistan–US alignment. The natural affinity between Britain and Indian Muslim leaders was maintained after Britain’s departure from the subcontinent. The diplomatic record in the form of de-classified US government materials (discussed in a following section) shows British activism in Indo-Pakistani and Kashmir affairs and America’s preference to appear to take a ‘balanced’ position between India and Pakistan while favouring a special Pakistan–Britain relationship that enabled America to work through Britain in relation to Pakistan.

Suzerain states’ system in the subcontinent 91 India’s Nehru was the third force. He offered America and Britain the opportunity to get involved in Kashmiri and Indo-Pakistani strategic affairs by referring the issue to the Security Council under the advice of Lord Louis Mountbatten, India’s first Governor-General. Mountbatten was a key figure in the British political and strategic establishment, a senior military commander in the Southeast Asian and Indian Ocean theatre during the Second World War and knowledgeable about Indian politics and Indian personalities. As the head of the Indian Defence Council, Mountbatten provided the key inputs into Indo-Pakistani and Kashmiri war and peace questions. Nehru was prime minister, but he had neither a military background nor a keen understanding of military issues and the relationship between armed strength and diplomacy; indeed he held a strong bias against the Indian military. He repeatedly projected a bias in favour of ‘friendly relations’ with Pakistan rather than the best possible ones under the circumstances given Pakistani antipathy with the Hindus and the Congress party. As one of the three drivers in the process to move India into a suzerain type of relationship, Nehru’s role is significant because he commanded respect within his party and the Indian people in internal and foreign affairs. Yet it was under Nehru that India’s China and military policies collapsed like a house of cards. Indian economic socialism did nothing to alleviate Indian poverty, and state planning and a mixed economy did not facilitate economic development. Furthermore, he facilitated the entry and entrenchment of outside influences into Indian national security decision-making process. Collectively these forces formed the framework that shaped the policy interactions among the external players vis-à-vis Indian interests. The system had geographical limits (the India–Pakistan–Kashmir land theatre). It had policy boundaries that centred around a no general war policy of India towards Pakistan and UK–US policy via the United Nations to secure a Indo-Pakistani ceasefire when wars broke out. Another policy boundary lay in US–UK policy to arm the weaker challenger, Pakistan, and a policy of Indo-Pakistani parity. (In response, India turned to Moscow.) The operative norm was to maintain a situation of manageable instability in the region by acting against uncontrolled Indo-Pakistani military escalation and by providing military aid to both countries so that they could fight. The policy parameters avoided meaningful measures that facilitated regional conflictresolution other than to urge Indian concessions to Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. This an Indian government could not do because it rewarded Pakistani aggression and recognized that religion was the basis of political arrangements in the region. In effect the system prolonged and institutionalized the ideological and the strategic bases of the Indo-Pakistan conflict. The conflict was institutionalized and stable because well defined policy boundaries existed. The term ‘system of conflict’ is appropriate because the players understood the boundaries. This system was favoured by the external players because it enabled them to form a continuous line of military, diplomatic and psychological pressure on the Indian political establishment, and it kept India tied to Pakistan, while Pakistan remained tied to America, China and its Muslim allies. Except in times of Indo-Pakistani wars, the system had a sub-critical character.

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In this form the system served the vital interests of the dominant managers of the system (America, Pakistan and China) and the subordinate player, Nehru’s India. In other words, Nehru’s policies towards Pakistan, Kashmir and China and on the general issue of war and war preparations made him a cooperative or a manageable part of this system. The scope and pace of change within the policy boundaries of this system of conflict was set by the external players. They declared that Kashmir was the core issue in Indo-Pakistani affairs and this view held sway in international capitals. They held that it was up to India to deal with Pakistan by making a concession on Kashmir and this view was popular as well in international capitals. They held that Pakistan was a part of the inner circle of Western defence during the Cold War and this was widely accepted in international capitals. As long as the outside players were proactive in defining the policy agenda and the Indian government was defensive and reactive, the system remained ideologically and militarily closed and conflicted. The suggestion (discussed later) is that only when India acted in a proactive manner in the strategic sphere in the late 1990s did it liberate itself from the shackles of the Nehru paradigm. Indian proactivity in the nuclear and military spheres in 1998–2002 changed stalemated and conflicted relationships and produced incentives for a turnaround in three major systems of conflict that had stifled India: Indo-Pakistani, Sino-Indian and Indo-American. The process to form a subsidiary type of states’ system was facilitated by three major elements. First, the pattern of ‘divide and rule’ behaviour that emerged among the dominant players in Indian history and politics before 1947 fostered an Indian habit of defensive and reactive behaviour vis-à-vis aggressive foreign forces that were in play in India. This habit was reinforced by the rise of an Indian political class that sympathized and cooperated with the policies of the major powers. Second, the advent of the Cold War in 1947, in the year of independence of India and Pakistan, provided an opportunity to the players to push their respective strategic agendas in the region. Pakistan used the Cold War to forge an alignment with the Anglo-American bloc emphasizing Pakistan’s value to Western interests in a secondary zone of international conflict and as well to build Pakistani defences against Soviet and Indian expansionism. The Cold War facilitated the development of an aggressive Pakistani diplomatic and military strategy in the region that built on the prehistorical base. Soviet Russia’s atomic testing and Iranian nationalism and oil politics under Mossadeq made Pakistan a pivotal player in Anglo-American policy. American preoccupations in the Middle East (oil’s importance, search for moderate Muslim allies, repression of Indian and Arab nationalism and containment of Soviet Russia) converged with Pakistani interests. Pakistan emerged as a part of the inner perimeter and India was on the outside. Olaf Caroe’s advocacy captured the thinking. At the heart of Pakistan’s strategy was the push to develop Muslim separateness towards, and parity with, India. The prehistory tied Pakistani politics and external strategy to Indian affairs, as well as the West. It was tied to the core belief that Hindu–Muslim rivalry was inevitable and that it was in Pakistan’s interest to mobilize the international environment to give Pakistan a comparative advantage

Suzerain states’ system in the subcontinent 93 vis-à-vis India. The Cold War was also an opportunity for the Anglo-American grouping to bring Pakistan to its side in the Cold War in contrast to the attitude of the non-aligned countries. This was done by drawing Pakistan into the inner circle of Western defence. Thus post-1947 Anglo-American policies in the area reinforced the fracture between India and Pakistan that was inherent in the prehistory. The international coalition against India grew in the 1970s with the addition of new players and this increased as well its geographical scope. America and China joined hands in the early 1970s in their opposition to Indian policies in the region; both played up the Pakistani theme of the danger of Indian hegemony over smaller regional states. This partnership was cemented by American and Chinese opposition to both Soviet Russia and India and following Moscow’s military intervention in Afghanistan it was reinforced further. In the 1980s, another player entered the strategic scene. With the build-up of the Jihadi forces under the auspices of Pakistani intelligence and military services against the communists in Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia provided funds and moral support that was motivated by a desire to Arabize the Islamic forces in the region that included Afghanistan, Kashmir and Central Asia. China’s interest was to build Pakistan into a line of military and diplomatic pressure against India, which was an important element in China’s military rivalry with India after 1962. As well Pakistan served as China’s gateway to the Middle East and the Indian Ocean in the sense that China’s economic and military links with ‘moderate’ Pakistan gave it cover to build similar ties with other Middle Eastern countries. In parallel fashion China built its commercial and military links with the military regime in Myanmar after the 1980s, thus confirming a policy to build two channels of strategic access into the Indian Ocean area, that is, through Pakistan and Myanmar. They could outflank India and create a wedge between India and the Middle East and India and Southeast Asia. Finally, the third element was provided by the character of Nehru’s diplomatic and military policies. Nehru opposed the militarization of the subcontinent as a result of the Pakistan–America military pact of 1954 and Western military aid and diplomatic support to Pakistan. He emphasized the value of non-alignment and peace diplomacy as the way to reduce international tensions. Our view is that Nehru’s embrace of the Mountbatten approach to Kashmir and Indo-Pakistani affairs and Nehru’s constant projection of utopian principles into global diplomacy facilitated the growth of the Pakistan–UK–US combination against India, while India lacked effective diplomacy or effective military means to counter the opposing coalition. Even though the distribution of military power between India and Pakistan began to change in India’s favour in the 1960s, American and Chinese military aid to Pakistan was able to maintain Pakistan’s comparable advantage with India. India and Soviet Russia could balance the America–China–Pakistan alignment in a crisis but the problem was that the power and the initiative to manipulate the pattern of regional conflict lay with forces outside India’s borders. Indian policies under Nehru precluded the possibility of altering its parameters even though India’s military capacity to fight was growing, albeit, in a hesitant way.

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In other words, the ‘Indian’ subcontinent became a field of Anglo-American and Pakistani power politics and Indian strategic choices were riddled with dilemmas that reflected the pressure of the external powers on India as well as selfimposed constraints of the Nehru government. Whether or not Nehru intended to freeze India into a subordinate status in the region and as a point of ceaseless opposition by the external coalition, his policies had the result because India lacked the internal economic and military strength and unity of strategic purpose and policy direction to effectively engage and deflect the development of the international opposition in India’s strategic neighbourhood. Nehru’s statements revealed his ambition to make India a great power along with America, Soviet Russia, China and India, but the declarations set up India for the fall because it did not have the capacity or the policy to back up its ambitions. Hence Nehru’s diplomatic ambitions aroused international suspicion but India’s internal weakness in terms of strength and purpose made it an object of revulsion in AngloAmerican and Pakistan, and later in Chinese, strategic thought and behaviour towards India. In the Nehru years Pakistan, UK–US and China were the catalysts of change in the ‘Indian’ subcontinent. Their attitudes are discussed in the following section. The general expectation of the major powers was that India’s power and influence could be checked; and Indian ideas and influences were not likely to alter the distribution of regional or world power as the pattern of international relationships and the pattern of conflicted and debilitated South Asian international relations was likely to persist. In this view, the emerging suzerain type of states’ system was likely to prevail; the model was viable under the prevailing Indian conditions. As Sisir Gupta pointed out There was also a highly biased and distorted image of India and its problems in the United States. Partly because of the British propaganda before the Independence and partly because of the experiences of the individual Americans based on superficial observation of the Indian scene, the United States had begun to regard India as incapable of asserting its rightful status. There was a viable American confidence in Pakistan which was greatly strengthened after the army came to power . . . In the case of China . . . , its geo-political stakes in preventing India from becoming a major Power were so high that it began to perceive a great deal of interest in the ability of Pakistan to act as a check on India.12 The anti-India coalition was an alignment among strange bedfellows: a democracy, a military dictatorship and a communist power. The pattern of thought and strategic behaviour of the coalition merits assessment in a historical perspective, because there are continuities between the past and the present, between pre-1947 and post-1947 eras, between the Cold War and the post-Cold War eras. In this context we will examine the turns in Indian strategic behaviour after 1998 and its consequences for the fortune of the coalition. But first one must understand the ideological and strategic scope and depth of the convergent interests that brought the three bedfellows together between the 1950s and the 1990s, and how, along

Suzerain states’ system in the subcontinent 95 with Nehru’s policies, they created and fostered a pattern of regional conflict that has not been resolved yet and that forms the core of India’s foreign policy problems. Two sides of the problem, that is, the policies of Pakistan and those of the three external powers (UK, US and China) are beyond India’s control but the third one, that is, Nehru’s policies, were within Indian control. The following section deals with the thought and behaviour of the external forces and Chapter 7 brings out Nehru’s role in the making of India’s foreign policy problem and the responses of the Nehruvians, and later the post-Nehruvians, to the dilemmas posed by the three aspects of India’s foreign policy problems. According to US government documents, American policy had several distinctive features. First, Pakistan was favoured because it was ‘one of the most strategic areas in the world’ according to Secretary of State George C. Marshall. Second, by 1951 Washington had adopted a clear anti-India position. The agreed conclusions and recommendations of American missions in South Asia took the view that We should suggest to Governments associated with us in the North Atlantic Pact and the Hemisphere Defence Pact that they instruct their diplomatic and consular representatives in South Asia and elsewhere, and their representatives to the United Nations, to point out on every appropriate occasion to the officials of the Governments of Middle Eastern and Asian countries the fallacious basis of the present foreign policies of India, and the dangers to Asia and to world peace inherent in those policies. Third, Pakistan merited American support, because it could lead a Muslim bloc to counter ‘Hindu imperialism’ and to provide a balance of power in Asia. Indian policies were read to indicate ‘national traits which in time, if not controlled, could make India Japan’s successor in Asiatic imperialism’. Fourth, Islam was seen as a positive force in American policy. Finally, the official statements appreciated UK’s primary role in the subcontinent and this was deemed to be in the American interest. ‘America wished close and friendly UK–Pakistan ties and to avoid actions to weaken them.’13 Note that Anglo-American and Pakistani strategic calculations, not democratic values, defined their aggressive stance towards India. The theme of American opposition to Indian imperialism was striking because it hid the reality that India had been occupied and exploited by Muslim and British rulers and India lacked the capacity to build and to sustain empires even within the subcontinent. Moreover, the Anglo-American bloc and Pakistan were asserting the danger of Indian imperialism precisely when Nehru had accepted Mountbatten’s strategic concept of no war with Pakistan and Nehru had abandoned the field of power politics to outside forces. The attempt to place India in a subsidiary system led by outside forces gained strength with China’s entry into the system. Precisely when India and China were publicly proclaiming peacefulness and friendship with each other in the mid1950s, the Sino-Pakistan strategic dialogue commenced with a Chinese message

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to Pakistan. It stated that Beijing did not see a conflict of interests with Pakistan but one was likely between China and India. A strong diplomatic and a military relationship emerged on this basis and it was symbolized by the building of the Karakoram highway. The Kennedy administration opposed this relationship in the early 1960s but with the passage of time, and as American interest against Soviet Russia in the late 1960s required a China tilt, Pakistan became a gateway for America to China, just as Pakistan was an existing gateway for America against India and it was a gateway for China against India and an opening to build China’s influence in the Middle East. This multi-cornered relationship had its origins in the 1960s, but it achieved its full expression in the 1971 Indo-Pakistani war over East Pakistan (Bangladesh). How did Nehru and the Nehruvians deal with India’s foreign policy problems? Chapter 7 addresses these questions.

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The typology of threats to India and the Nehruvian record, 1964–98

The Nehru period was eventful. India’s strategic situation deteriorated as a result of its military defeat by China and the blow to its self-confidence. India’s strategic situation was shaped by forces outside India’s borders and lacked internal unity, political direction and military and economic strength to cope with the external pressures. 1

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China conducted its first nuclear test, and its entry into the nuclear club triggered a divisive nuclear debate in India; it showed the polarities between the pro-bomb lobby, the nuclear disarmers and the fence sitters who oscillated between nuclear security versus economic development or between ‘guns versus butter’. The Indian armed forces stayed on the sidelines preferring an investment in conventional armament over nuclear armament. India remained tied to Pakistan over Kashmir, to America as Pakistan’s military ally and as an unreliable builder of Indian defences against China, and to the USSR as a reliable supporter of Indian military build-up against its hostile neighbours. India’s economic performance lagged the growth patterns of major Asian countries, for example, Japan and China. Internally, the frame of reference of India’s diplomacy and military policy remained tied to Nehru’s policy boundaries even though Nehru was dead and had fallen from grace because of his failed policies. The post-Nehru power struggles among Indian leaders inhibited policy development in the strategic sphere.

There were a few signs of Indian strategic initiatives to engage its neighbours, but, by and large, the period did not see a trend that indicated growth of internal strength, strategic purpose and the effective application of diplomatic and military measures to ensure success for Indian aims. During this period India remained a field of power politics of Pakistan, America and China, even as Nehru’s successors abandoned his no-war with Pakistan policy and took the military to fight Pakistan in 1965 and in 1971. The significant change was in India’s military behaviour. In 1965, Prime Minister L. B. Shastri ordered the Indian Army to cross the Pakistani international border to relieve Pakistan’s military pressure

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in Kashmir. This broke the Nehru–Mountbatten taboo against no general war with Pakistan, and it challenged the Pakistani–Western idea that Kashmir was a legitimate target for Pakistan and its allies because it was ‘disputed territory’. This decision was radical from the point of view of Indian diplomatic history and politics but its result was inconclusive, that is, the war ended with a UN sponsored ceasefire. Furthermore, Soviet mediation at Tashkent confirmed the right of a great power to mediate Indo-Pakistani disputes and the right of the UN Security Council to manage Kashmir as a threat to international peace and security. In this case Moscow acted in concert with Washington and confirmed the reality of a superpower détente in subcontinental strategic affairs. The subtle message of the Tashkent mediation by the USSR in January 1966 was that India could fight a war in response to Pakistan aggression, but it was up to the great powers to intervene and to end it on great powers’ terms. In other words, India was slated to function as a weak status quo state rather than a strong status quo power. This was the framework of Nehru’s India and this legacy persisted throughout the 1960s. Indira Gandhi’s war in 1971 against Pakistan in Bangladesh was a major Indian strategic initiative but despite the change it brought to regional geopolitics, it did not alter the pattern of enmities arrayed against India, the thought processes of Pakistan, the US and China, the pattern of India’s external relationships and the dilemmas in Indian diplomatic and military affairs. This era threw up a number of undistinguished Indian prime ministers1 whose hangers-on constantly advertised the ‘historical breakthroughs’ and leadership of their political masters but the actual record tells a different story. Dilemmas dominated Indian diplomatic and military affairs. There were many inconclusive and prolonged Indian debates on a number of important topics such as the definition of the enemy, the nature of enmities, the desired pattern of external relationships and strategic partners and the role of military and economic strength in addressing recurring Indian foreign policy problems. In general, the options were (1) to look inwards and develop Indian political institutions and the economy, (2) acquire limited land and air power for the purpose of territorial defence including that of Kashmir, then a non-negotiable topic between India and Pakistan. (3) There was a vague Indian option to develop an outward strategy that looked upon the Indian Ocean as an area that offered strategic depth to India. This option required a buildup of Indian naval power. K. M. Panikkar, an experienced practitioner who had served Indian princely states and went on to become a Nehru confidante and ambassador to China, was the author of several well regarded books that recognized the importance of sea power and the Indian Ocean for India.2 But Nehru remained wedded to the concept of land power with Pakistan as the source of pressure in Kashmir and China as the source of pressure in the Himalayan region. Nehru failed to appreciate that the British empire in India was built on the back of the British navy and its ability to extend British power through the seas into India and other overseas colonies. Nehru also failed to recognize that Britain had cut off India’s links with other important contiguous areas such as Burma and Ceylon before breaking up India into two states. British imperial diplomacy had recognized the value of maintaining British presence by military and diplomatic means, by

Threats to India and the Nehruvian record 99 pursuing subsidiary and interventionist type of relationships with the tribal chiefs in Afghanistan, with the Tibetans and with the kingdom of Nepal and other Himalayan protectorates (Bhutan and Sikkim).3 Nehru carried on with the British frontier policy in the Himalayan areas but relied primarily on diplomacy rather than forceful measures. Under Nehru and the Nehruvians, the Indian navy remained the weakest Indian military service because, following wars with Pakistan and China, the priority was to modernize the Indian military and the Indian air force. This period is riddled with many dilemmas that debilitated the Indian decisionmaking process, that inhibited the development of internal political purpose and strength to interact effectively with a dangerous external environment and to define the nature of the enmities and threats.

Debates and dilemmas, 1964–98 Since 1947, the Indian state and society has undergone a number of philosophical and policy debates: 1

The ‘morality versus force’ debate brought together Indian Gandhians and Western utopians, both sought non-violence as the method and the aim of India. The Nehru government marginally rejected this approach by allowing the establishment of a modest Indian defence machine. But it did not accept the necessity of a strong defence machinery and maintained that Indian peace diplomacy and Indian economic development was the basis of Indian security. Nehru emphasized that a strong defence machinery was not necessary because a b c d e

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India was protected by the international environment, no one would dare attack a big country like India, security came from internal economic and political development, attack from India’s neighbours was not imminent even though rivalries existed and military alliance politics would involve India in Cold War politics and moral force was superior to physical force.

This debate was settled by Nehru at the policy level by having a diplomatic posture that highlighted non-alignment, peaceful coexistence, disarmament and peace diplomacy as the mantras in his diplomacy; and by having a military capacity that was sufficient for limited military defence in the Kashmir theatre. The Indian foreign ministry bought into the Nehru agenda, because he kept a firm grip on the foreign office while he was prime minister, and he was the acknowledged political guru in foreign affairs. This way Indian societal (Gandhian) (Nehruvian) and policy impulses were accommodated till the war with China in 1962 brought out the tension between Indian pacifism and external realpolitik. This attitude to defence questions was tied to the second debate – between ‘guns and butter’. The financial costs of military development were highlighted

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Threats to India and the Nehruvian record by Indian economists and government officials particularly from the Finance ministry. ‘Butter’ symbolized the Indian modernization drive and ‘guns’ symbolized the militaristic impulse in world politics. Here the economic issue (‘can we afford a costly defence’?, not ‘can we afford not to invest in national defence’?) linked with the Gandhian impulse in Indian society and with the Nehruvian diplomatic posture as noted earlier. This debate too was settled by the 1962 war. Thereafter the slogan was ‘guns and butter’ not ‘guns or butter’. The new approach after 1962 was framed on a different premise than the Nehruvian one. In the new thinking military and economic security went hand in hand, because China’s aims were not to conquer India but to unbalance it by making it lose its self-confidence, hurt its international prestige and reduce its leadership status in the non-aligned world and within the subcontinent, make it insecure in the border areas, and divert it from its efforts to build a modern India that possessed both economic and military strength and political legitimacy of a democracy. The third debate concerned the public identification of India’s most dangerous enemy, the nature of the enmity and whether it was public or secret? Nehru and Nehruvians were unable to settle this debate and other Indian political leaders did not have a single mind about the cluster of threats and the relevant solution(s). For Krishna Menon, Nehru’s confidante and a prominent Indian leftist, Pakistan was the enemy; he downplayed China and overplayed Pakistan. Nehru on the other hand saw Pakistan as a nuisance and not a longterm threat to India’s well-being. India’s Deputy Prime Minister V. B. Patel saw both Pakistan and China as India’s long-term security problems and urged strong military and diplomatic measures to counter them. Nehru however did not buy into Patel’s two-front thesis and downplayed both. The two-front thesis gained ground in Indian social and political thought after 1962, but the identity of the most dangerous enemy and the nature of the enmity remained unsettled during Nehru’s time and under the Nehruvians, as did the issue of how to respond most effectively.

Who is the most dangerous enemy and what is the nature of the enmity are two important questions that are tied to the proposed solutions. To answer them one must realize that threats are not simply military threats and as such strategy is not simply a military question. One must also distinguish between threats and disputes. Threats emerge from cultural and strategic conflicts that relate to divergent and often non-negotiable core interests and values among the powers; and disputes emerge from particular, tangible and often negotiable grievances. The premise is that the former are multifaceted and involve tangible as well as intangible issues while the latter deal with specific or tangible issues. Implicit also is the premise that the former are harder to address than the latter because the former are harder to break down into functional parts that may be dealt with in a compartmentalized manner. The era of Nehru and the Nehruvians saw a proliferation in the typology of threats and there was also a proliferation of competing schools of Indian

Threats to India and the Nehruvian record 101 thought about the identity of the enemy(enemies) and the nature of the enmity. In rational decision making the definition of the problem precedes the quest for solutions. In the Indian case there were prolonged debates, some secret, within the inner councils of the government, and others carried out publicly, but they were settled not by the development of an internal consensus during peacetime or when Indian foreign and military affairs were in a sub-critical stage. Rather they were settled as reactions to dangerous external developments, that is, they were settled under duress. Even radical decisions by Indian leaders such as the military action against Pakistan in 1965 and in 1971 were driven by external shocks and in circumstances that left Indian diplomatic and military affairs in a critical mode. The following section outlines the typology of threats and the pattern of proliferating and competing schools of Indian thought about the problems. This is followed by a discussion of Nehru’s diplomatic record and the pattern of oscillation and ambivalence in Indian decision-making that emerged in relation to India’s dangerous strategic environment under the Nehruvians. While India’s strategic environment was becoming more dangerous during 1964–98, and a hostile international coalition of Pakistan, the US, China and Saudi Arabia was gaining strength against India, the Indian habit of argumentative discourse and inconclusive policy results revealed a pattern of decision making with two sides. (1) External shocks intensified external (between India and forces beyond its borders) and internal (among competing Indian political players) interactions about diplomatic and military affairs. In these circumstances, decisions were made to tide over the crisis. (2) But when the danger passed the pattern of inconclusive and prolonged debates returned. That is, in India’s diplomatic history, a crisis settles some debate(s), but following the passage of the crisis other debates continued in an inconclusive manner.

Typology of threats facing India and their source(s) Since 1947 India has faced six types of threats. 1

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Systemic threats – where international arrangements threatened India’s interests and prestige in the hierarchy of powers in the international system. International arrangements are threats if they curtail Indian options and independence of action in economic, diplomatic and military affairs and if they create one set of rights and obligations for one set of countries and another set of rights and obligations for another set of countries. Cultural or ideological threats – when concepts of rights and wrongs, historical memories, grievances and core values are in conflict and they generate social and military conflict. In the Indian case social and political schools of thought and practices about Hindu greatness, Muslim greatness, Islam in danger, Hinduism in danger, Sikh homeland, Kashmiri independence and other regional autonomies are examples where identity and ideological issues have driven domestic and external politics of India’s neighbours and India.

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Threats to India and the Nehruvian record Specific territorial and resource disputes – where issues about disputed territory (e.g. Kashmir) and border disputes (e.g. the Sino-Indian Himalayan border, Indo-Pakistani dispute about Siachin) and water disputes between India and Bangladesh and between India and Pakistan, create strains and danger of armed conflict. Such disputes often are tied to consideration of regional power politics and prestige of the players and they have an ideological characteristics. International policy disputes – where issues of trade policy and international economic arrangements and controversies between developed and developing countries affect the economic security and social policies of a country like India. Social threats – where transnational criminal activities as in the drug and arms trade and illegal smuggling and migration of peoples impact negatively on the social, economic and politic fabric of a country. In India’s case, the neighbourhood is an international centre of drug and arms trade (i.e. Afghanistan, Myanmar, Bay of Bengal and Sri Lanka), and there is illegal migration on a large and continuous scale from Bangladesh into northeast Indian provinces. In part, the 1971 Bangladesh War was driven by an Indian concern about the negative social and economic impact of the mass migration of East Pakistani refugees into India. In such cases, regional geopolitics are tied to social threats; the two interact. Finally, internal ethnic, religious and political dissatisfactions have increased political violence in many India’s northeastern provinces, as well as in Kashmir and Punjab. These are primarily internal disputes, but external players are involved as sources of material and moral support. Internal conflicts within India give outside powers a platform to intervene in Indian affairs and to pursue their regional ambitions.

These types of threats are not of equal importance and urgency. (1) Some became military crises that require crisis decision making involving the use of force so that an anticipated ‘bad and imminent outcome’ is prevented. For example, India reacted forcefully to an externally produced military danger (e.g. 1965 and 1971 wars, Kargil operation (2000) and the 2001–02 Indo-Pakistani confrontation after the attack on the Indian Parliament). (2) Others required patient and prolonged engagement with hostile forces where social and military conflict is manageable. Here something has to be done to prevent a deterioration of an unstable situation. Both political and military actions are required to turn around the thinking and behaviour of antagonistic forces. For example, the dialogue between the Indian government and Kashmiri militants and separatists, the dialogues with Pakistan and China require prolonged military and political engagement to induce policy change in enemy’s thinking and conduct. The strategy behind patient and prolonged engagement is to get inside the opponent’s mind, and to change it, that is, attack the enemy’s mind; to discover its domestic and international alliances and to weaken or change the pattern of alignments, that is, attack enemy’s alliances and use compromise and compensation to secure

Threats to India and the Nehruvian record 103 restraint and finally to prepare to fight as a last resort. Often a combination of fighting and negotiating are in play. The use of the one or the other depends on the level of restraint shown by the other side. This approach depends on the ability of the two sides to prolong the dialogue process but the dialogue is at two levels: military and political. They represent the twin tracks for the political train to run. What are the sources of threats in our typology? 1

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Since 1947 Pakistan has been an ideological and a territorial security threat against India. This view is based on the premise that India is a territorial status quo country, it seeks to expand India’s influence outside its borders but it is not interested in territorial expansion. Pakistan on the other hand is committed to take Kashmir (or Srinagar and the Kashmir valley) by force or by coercive diplomacy and there are political and social forces within Pakistan who seek India’s balkanization.4 Pakistan’s threat is ideological, because Pakistan claims to be the guardian of Islam in the subcontinent. It seeks to liberate Muslim areas from Indian ‘occupation’ and domination. So Pakistan is the revisionist state albeit, weaker than India, with an interventionist policy. As instigator of Indo-Pakistani wars and crises in the subcontinent since 1947, as the hub of Talibanized terrorism in Afghanistan and Kashmir and as the hub of nuclear and missile proliferation in the region, Pakistan has shown its dangerous interventionist capabilities. The 1971 war in Bangladesh was the exception because India escalated the 1970–71 crisis in East Pakistan and broke up Pakistan. China on the other hand is a territorial as well as a systemic threat against India. It is more dangerous to India than Pakistan because its actions are masked by professions of peace towards India. But it has pursued a policy that sustains Chinese pressures against Indian interest in the region. China is also Pakistan’s mentor and supplier of conventional, nuclear and missile armaments. The aid helped Pakistan maintain its pressures against India. China’s anti-India policy was formed during the Nehru years and it has been conducted with vigour since then with Nehru’s successors. A factor in China’s opposition to India was the concern with special Indo-Soviet ties and their implications for Sino-Soviet controversies during the Cold War. However, China’s opposition to India continued following the end of the Cold War. China’s India policy challenges India’s position as one of three Asian leaders (China, Japan and India), as a player in a multi-polar Asia. It underlines China’s desire to emerge as the sole Asian superpower. Its determination to balance and contain India within the subcontinent and not to recognize it as an Indian Ocean power or an international force suggests an attitude of strategic rivalry with India. In this sense the Sino-Indian boundary issue is secondary to the systemic dimensions of the Sino-Indian rivalry. The boundary issue is a dispute; the broader rivalry is the basis of a system of conflict between two major power centres with conflicting values and policy aims. In our scheme India seeks multi-polarity in Asian and world affairs; China seeks uni-polarity in Asia that centres on its pre-eminence and global

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Threats to India and the Nehruvian record multi-polarity elsewhere. China seeks to develop a permanent hierarchy between itself and India in regional and international affairs. It seeks a position for itself as the manager of South Asian, not simply Indo-Pakistani relationships. For this reason it maintains active relationships with India’s neighbours that include defence ties (i.e. with Pakistan and Bangladesh) and material and moral support for others, that is, insurgents in India’s northeast and the Himalayan areas. China’s policy seeks a pre-eminent position for itself in two strategic flanks of India, that is, Pakistan (since the 1960s) and Myanmar (since the 1980s). Like American policy towards India in the past, China prefers Indo-Pakistani rivalry that is managed by tying India into a two-front engagement with Pakistan and China. Moreover, there is pressure on India to accept policies which marginalize its interests and influence outside its borders and which leaves it in a position of permanent military and diplomatic inferiority vis-à-vis other powers.5 Compared to Pakistan and China, America has never been a territorial threat to India; it has no territorial ambitions in India. But like Pakistan and China it was until recently a dangerous systemic threat to India. Like Pakistan and China it promoted the idea of Indo-Pakistani diplomatic and military parity between the 1950s and the 1990s. No doubt Washington tried in the late 1940s to build Nehru and India up as a successful anti-communist role model in Asia. But after 1949, the Nehru–Washington relationship soured on a number of issues: India’s non-alignment, policy differences over Korea, China and the USSR. By the early 1950s America had joined the revisionist and militaristic forces in Pakistan with a policy to cut Nehru and India down to size. Moreover, India’s usefulness as an anti-communist model in America’s Asian diplomacy was useful so long as the Sino-American Cold War endured and as long as India had international diplomatic influence in East–West, Cold War diplomacy. Indian diplomatic influence started to wane with the rise of Chinese premier Chou-en-Lai in international conference diplomacy starting with the Bandung meeting (1955). By 1962, India’s prestige was in tatters as a result of the military humiliation in the Himalayas. Following India’s 1962 defeat and the evolving thaw in Sino-American Cold War, the two argued over America’s fear of communist expansion in Asia and the Chinese fear of American imperialism, but they were not fighting as in the Korean War. The changing circumstances reduced India’s appeal and increased China’s appeal in American policy. At the same time America’s preference for Indo-Pakistani parity and promotion of policies that placed India in a position of permanent inferiority in international diplomatic and arrangements, such as the NPT, took shape. The development of robust Anglo-American military and economic aid to Pakistan balanced India and reduced the asymmetries between India and Pakistan, while Sino-Indian military and economic asymmetries increased as did Chinese pressures on India. At the same time Anglo-American policy was to restrain India from going to war with Pakistan, to force it to accept international mediation in case a war occurred, to maintain the issue of Kashmiri self-determination in the

Threats to India and the Nehruvian record 105 international fora, to urge India to make concessions to Pakistan for the sake of regional peace, to discourage Indian nuclear weapons development, to urge Indian acceptance of discriminatory international non-proliferation arrangements that created a situation of permanent legal and military inferiority for India, to minimize links with Soviet Russia and to concentrate on internal economic rather than military and economic development. The threats had an ideological character because America located its India policy in the context of its bipolarized view of world politics as a fight between American capitalism and Soviet communism. At the same time, America’s policy had a strategic and a systemic character because it affected vital Indian interests within the subcontinent and the world beyond its borders. ‘Sources of threats’ thus require an unsentimental and a realistic assessment of ‘who’ is confronting ‘whom’ and ‘what’ is in contention. A distinction should be made between the topics and the underlying threats. An evaluation of the nature of the enmity, and the comparative power or imbalance of competing forces, is important in separating the topics from the underlying, at times, unstated threats; and in separating topics that are negotiable and the ones that are not. In China’s case the nature of the enmity with India is driven by systemic considerations, by China’s image of itself as the pre-eminent Asian and a potential world power and its image that India is weak, internally divisive, lacks staying power and not in the same league as China. In China’s view, it is an essential actor in Asia, and the world, and in south Asia and the Indian Ocean area. India is a secondary actor. For China Pakistan is an essential actor, because it serves two functions in its diplomacy and military strategy: it is a line of diplomatic and military pressure against India, and it is a gateway for the flow of Chinese power and influence into the Arabian sea (hence the development of Gwador port by China) and for the flow of Chinese military and commerce into critical parts of the Middle East (Iran, Syria, Egypt and Libya). In this instance, India remains an object of Chinese containment while Pakistan remains an object of alignment and partnership with convergent strategic interests between the two countries. The discussion indicates that the controversy over the Sino-Indian border dispute is not the core issue but the future of the Sino-Indian strategic (systemic) rivalry is. The latter indicates that Chinese commitments to Pakistan should be studied in the context of Chinese strategic aims in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean area. Systemic, ideological and territorial threats dominated Indian diplomatic and military agendas under Nehru and the Nehruvians. What was Nehru’s record in dealing with these constant threats? What were the competing schools of thought within India about ways to address these threats during this period? We turn now to discuss these questions.

Nehru’s foreign policy record: limited success and major failures This section argues that Nehru’s diplomatic successes were tactical, circumstantial and temporary, but his failures were monumental and they created systemic

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problems for India. He shaped the structure of the Indian state and its diplomatic and military orientation, but it could not cope with the intensity of external diplomatic and military pressures placed on India by Pakistan, America and China. Nehru and his colleagues made India into a functioning electoral democracy, but this was an incomplete democracy because it lacked the habit of sustained discourse in general about public policies that concerned the common good of the Indian people. Moreover, under Nehru and the Nehruvians it lacked co-ordinated and united diplomatic and military machinery that could interact on a sustained basis with hostile international forces. It did not form mutually satisfactory external relationships that controlled or reduced or deflected external pressures. India thus faced two kinds of systemic threats during the Nehru era. The first, as discussed earlier, was the result of external policies and pressures. The second as discussed later was the result of Nehru’s policies which weakened Indian institutions internally, inhibited their evolution and weakened India’s international position as well. The modern world has two essential institutions: the state and the marketplace. A strong state is meant to secure internal political order and stability by consent of the ruled. The marketplace is meant to facilitate the well-being of the individual citizen as well as the collective well-being of the country in global economic and political arrangements. Modernization requires the development of internal policies and leadership that produces internal order and economic growth. In the West there is an expectation that modernization will inevitably lead to Westernization in the form of economic and political liberalization in a country’s internal and external policies. Most of independent India’s history has been under Congress party rule but during this time the power of the Nehru dynasty grew, while conditions of internal political order deteriorated, external pressures on India remained intense and until 1991 Indian ability to engage the global marketplace was marginal. In this sense, Nehru was the source of an internal systemic problem to the extent that his policies of choice skewed the prospects of internal order and economic as well as military development that was required to bring India into the global strategic and economic mainstream. Under Nehru India was neither modernized nor westernized nor Indianized. It remained a hybrid system of Nehru-ism, Soviet style Indian socialism and a play for temporary diplomatic advantage vis-à-vis the major powers. In the early 1950s, India’s international influence depended on their whims and circumstances rather than catalytic Indian actions. We argue that the interaction between persistent external pressures on India and Nehruvian dynamics explains Nehru’s record of limited success and extensive failures. Nehru and his advisers skewed the development of the Indian state into a hybrid mixture of British colonial administration and procedures, albeit under Indian political masters, socialist economic planning principles and secretive decision making that kept public policy issues away from public scrutiny and debate; finally, there was the hype about Nehruvian secularism and the identification of the Congress party as the core of the Indian nation. The Nehruvian Indian state was highly personalized, it was Nehru-centric, secretive in its methods of operation and ideological in nature. It was not based on Indian history or Indian philosophy. It had a brown mask in the form of Nehru but by and large

Threats to India and the Nehruvian record 107 foreign ideas and influences shaped Indian economic, military and diplomatic policies. We argue that the combination of intense, constant and increasing external pressures since 1947 and the Nehruvian state system produced the failures in India’s external affairs and its economic and military position in the Nehru years. What was the character of the Nehruvian state in India? Did its personalized, secretive and ideological character explain the internal differences between China, Japan and India and the difference between the advancement of China, Japan and Southeast countries like Singapore and Malaysia compared to India’s laggard performance during the years of Nehru and the Nehruvians? Like India these countries too were exposed to intense external pressures during the colonial era but after independence their internal and institutional responses to external pressures varied during the last fifty years. These countries were able to achieve autonomy in the international sphere and a capacity to develop internal unity, strength and policy direction. This was the case of China and Japan. Having achieved internal unity and strength both countries became a source of military pressure on their neighbours; Japan’s diplomatic, military and economic history between the late 1800s and the mid-1900s and China’s diplomatic, military and economic history after 1949 tell a similar story about the relationship between internal strength and unity and capacity to organize external relationships and pressures. India’s story, on the other hand, shows a pattern of growing external pressures on it following its independence and a weakening of its internal strength and policy direction in the Nehruvian state. Our theme is that Nehru’s foreign policy was an expression of the character of the Nehruvian state. Sunil Khilnani sees Nehru as the father of Indian democracy, an advocate of modernity and secularism who challenged Asia’s authoritarian tradition.6 Our take on Nehru is different. Indian democracy was a Nehru-centric political process and his foreign and military policies reflected a Nehru-centred alliance that blended ideological, bureaucratic and international forces. The alliance consisted of Nehru and his inner circle of advisers from Kashmir, Indian leftists like Krishna Menon and K. M. Panikkar, members of the Indian administrative and foreign services and intelligence agencies and foreign advisers and mentors like Lord Louis Mountbatten. In the heady days of Indian independence and India’s tryst with destiny, the Indian people identified themselves with Nehru and the Congress party and repeatedly voted him and his party into power. In Indian diplomatic and military affairs the decision-making process was Nehrucentric. He held the foreign office portfolio along with that of atomic energy and he supervised the intelligence agencies. Except on Pakistan and Kashmir where Mountbatten’s inputs were decisive Indian institutional forces that would normally be expected to shape national policy were not in play. The role of the armed forces even on the military aspect of the Kashmir issue was marginal other than to execute Nehru’s orders. This was in contrast to the British vice regal decisionmaking process where the Viceroy’s Council gave a prominent and an institutional voice to the Military Member who was the chief military adviser to the Viceroy.7 Nehru controlled the foreign office himself from 1947 to his death in 1964. While Nehru made the formal diplomatic decisions other influences were in play as for instance, that of Mountbatten on Indo-Pakistani and Kashmiri policy during

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1947–48, the influence of Krishna Menon on disarmament policy, the influence of Dr S. Radhakrishnan on Russia policy and that of K. M. Panikkar on China policy.8 But Nehru functioned as the primary decision-maker under these influences. In nuclear policy his control was total in setting the policy boundary of India’s policies but the Indian atomic energy organization led by Dr Homi J. Bhabha set the boundary of scientific work and its organizational framework. Nehru’s attitudes about military defence and the role of the Indian military officers’ corps was shaped by his personal biases. He set the boundaries of India’s defence posture and policy. Nehru and the Congress party dominated India’s political space following the retreat of the Empire while Nehru and his advisers and his chosen appointees dominated the decision-making space in diplomatic and military affairs. The Indian Parliament was not a source of independent judgement in diplomatic and military affairs at the time (it still is not) and the Cabinet lacked the culture and the strength to provide internal checks and balances once the old stalwarts like V. B. Patel, Rajendra Prasad, G. B. Pant and Maulana Azad who were Nehru’s peers in the independence movement, died or voluntarily surrendered their decision-making influence to Nehru. Thus Nehru became the acknowledged Indian leader in diplomatic and military affairs. Note that none of India’s independence leaders possessed military and diplomatic experience or training as did Mao Tse-Tung and Chou-en-Lai in China. Those who did were outside the Nehru inner circle. Nehru’s state and nation building was based on the organizational framework and the administrative culture of British India and the British created ‘Government of India’ and its complex set of rules and regulations. His singular change was to move away from the British India tradition of practising power politics within India in relations with the princely states and the native subjects, and of using India as the geo-political base of British diplomatic and military activities in the Middle East, Tibet, Afghanistan, and in relations with Russia and China; and in the employment of Indian manpower and resources in defence of imperial interests in Asia and the Middle East during the First and the Second World Wars. The classical approach of power politics and geopolitics was replaced by Nehru’s theory of non-alignment and peace diplomacy as the basis of Indian security. Khilnani maintains that this enabled Nehru to ‘secure India’s sovereignty’ in the international sphere and to assert the rise of Asia in the global sphere.9 Nehru scholars such as Escott Reid, the Canadian High Commissioner to India and a self-styled friend of Nehru’s India, Alastair Buchan, the influential head of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London and Nehru’s biographer, Dr S. Gopal, who headed the Historical Division in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs under Nehru, however, speak of the loss of Nehru’s international appeal from the mid-1950s onwards.10 It is hard to accept Khilnani’s view of Nehru for several reasons: 1 2

Indian sovereignty was lost in the 1962 war with China. Nehru’s economic policies were based on socialist principles; neither advanced the good of the common people in India nor took India into the global economic mainstream.

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4

The strategic link between China and Pakistan, and the external pressure it created on India, was formed from 1955–62 when Nehru was totally committed in his advocacy of nonalignment and peace, in general, and Sino-Indian peaceful coexistence in particular. The well-known strategic link between America and Pakistan, and the external pressure it created on India, was formed from the early 1950s onwards. Indian sovereignty was sacrificed in the sense that the term means a capacity to act independently against external pressures and to turn them around. By taking Kashmir issue to the United Nations Security Council, Nehru made India’s Pakistan and Kashmir policy a field of Anglo-American power politics. He also made Indian non-alignment a field of power politics of Soviet and Indian leftists because the situation in Kashmir and Pakistan required a dependence on the Soviet veto. Western aid to Pakistan required countervailing Soviet military aid and Soviet economic aid for the Indian economic model of socialist economy owed its inspiration to Soviet planning. Thus Indian independence of diplomatic and military action and options was handcuffed by Nehru’s policies.

International and Indian leftist forces and ideological principles shaped the Nehruvian state and its diplomatic and military policies and they reveal a complexity and subtlety in Nehru’s diplomacy. On the one hand he rejected publicly the classical approach to war and conflict as set out in the Kautilyan tradition and in Western realpolitik approach. Both set the problem of war and conflict as the central issue in politics along with expansion of a country’s power and influence. Nehru’s public posture gave primacy to Western and Indian global and utopian principles that emphasized peace and harmony among nations. Nehru’s utopianism and globalism and its emphasis on peace diplomacy did not have its roots in mainstream Indian history and politics. Nehru’s focus on peace was close to Buddhism and Gandhi-ism but the latter was not the dominant ideology in the spectrum of Indian social and political thought. It is hard to connect Nehru to the ‘idea of India’, because there are four major ‘ideas of India’ and Nehru’s idea of India was dissimilar to each such idea. The first idea of India was outlined by British practitioners like John Strachey and Lord Curzon who maintained that there was no such thing as ‘India’; it was an administrative creation established by the 1899 British Act of Parliament that refers to ‘India’. Curzon thought that India was not a nation on the basis of race, language, religion, shared history and a common sense of destiny that overrode the internal divisions. Historically, ‘India’ consisted of village communities and regional and feuding empires (Marathas, Sikhs, Mughal, Vijaynagar and others), but it was British rule that made India into a territorial and a political unit and gave it an international personality.11 The second idea of India refers to the historical Indian tradition of cultural pluralism and its tolerance and at times a drive to achieve synthesis among diverse strands of cultural diversity as was sought by Emperor Akbar and by the Greeks and the Persians in their contact with ‘India’.12 Nehru’s secularism relates to this cultural tradition, but the affinity is not a pure one because it was

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joined with the Nehruvian idea of progress through a series of Indian five-year economic plans that presumably were meant to provide for the common development of all Indians and not simply the well-being of Congress leaders and their coalition partners who managed the Nehruvian state and its agendas. The third idea of India is expressed by Max Mueller13 who looks upon India as a philosophy with myths and legends that are tied to the search of eternal truth and a social order that is based on caste system that is functional. This ‘India’ had a cultural appeal that extends beyond the geographical limits of what we know as India (past and present). This Indian idea is present in the cultures of Iran, Indonesia and Greece. Nehru had no use for this India and its Vedic base. The fourth ‘India’ is that of autonomous village communities with a sense of right and wrong, with a decisionmaking process that relied on consensus among the village elders.14 It possessed a sense of territoriality that was limited to the village boundaries; there was a consciousness about neighbouring villages, but not about the whole of India. This ‘India’ was subject to the pressures of regional empires that would extract revenue and plunder and there was no reciprocal obligation to provide for the common development of the people. This idea of village India was a part of the Nehruvian state and the Congress party. It offered a large pool of voters and there was the belief that the Congress party was committed to the common development of the majority of India’s poor who live in the countryside. The decision-making apparatus was elitist under Nehru but the rhetoric had a populist ring to it. Leftist ideological principles and practical diplomatic and military problems led Nehru and his inner circle to adopt Marxian globalism (not Stalin’s realism) as the attitude towards Indian politics and economic development. By the late 1940s and the early 1950s, at about the time that Pakistan and America were coming together, and India and America were coming apart following Nehru’s disastrous visit to Washington in 194915, India and Soviet Russia started a dialogue. It led to an Indian tilt towards Moscow in the diplomatic sphere, and a convergence between the internal ideological tilt towards the Left in the attitude of Nehru and his inner circle of advisers like Krishna Menon, and the diplomatic tilt towards Moscow. The latter reflected a compulsion created by the situation in Kashmir, the difficulties in Indo-Pakistani and Indo-US relations and the looming Pakistani–American alignment. Nehru’s admiration for the Bolshevik revolution and the Soviet experiment is recorded in his Glimpses of World History.16 Nehru was not a Stalinist; he abhorred his terrorist methods. But Nehru was reinforced intellectually by his advisers like Menon who had their formative intellectual and political experiences as theoretical communists and who were schooled in Marx and in Fabianism. Note that Marx was a globalist as K. J. Holsti points out.17 As historians, Marx and Engels had an enormous influence in shaping Indian attitudes about the ‘India Question’ and many members of the Indian political class in the Nehruvian state had been trained in England in the 1930s and the 1940s in the socialist tradition.18 Our sense is that Marxian globalism and Indian economic history under British colonialism were the elemental impulses in the thinking of Nehru and his advisers rather than Indian political and military history and

Threats to India and the Nehruvian record 111 cultural values of the past except for the affinity with the general idea of tolerating differences and pluralism. So in the context of (i) Marxian global ideals (with its emphasis on radically improving the human condition through internal reforms and external peace-making/harmonious utopia), (ii) Indian history (with its emphasis on war and material gain, as well as a caste based social order and search for cultural synthesis), (iii) the external pressures on India in the diplomatic and military sphere in Kashmir, Pakistan and Tibet and (iv) the rivalry with his Deputy Prime Minister Patel and the Indian right wing, Nehru opted to join his economic policy, his diplomacy and military policy to the left. Krishna Menon’s biographer explains Nehru’s embrace of socialism (not Stalinist totalitarianism) and the central position of the international Left in Nehru’s diplomatic policies.19 Nehru’s biographer, Dr S. Gopal, the head of the Historical Division in the Indian Ministry of External Affairs under Nehru and a respected historian who was a fellow at St Antony’s College in Oxford, says that ‘what Jawaharlal [Nehru] hoped to do was to lead his party and the Indian middle class generally to socialism without their knowing it’.20 Nehru’s fascination with Soviet economic model and planning is well known. Less known but more compelling in terms of impact in the diplomatic sphere was the tilt towards Moscow and Moscow’s tilt towards Delhi. This tilt transformed Soviet and Indian diplomatic policies. Nehru’s other major initiative, the development of India’s nuclear option under the guise of peaceful development of the atom, did not transform Indian strategy, but it established the nuclear infrastructure that came into play in the late 1990s. To appreciate these initiatives it is necessary to view them in the context of four major aspects of Nehru’s external policies: 1 2 3

4

that produced innovative diplomatic policy development, influence and engagement by India of the international sphere, that produced a policy failure and showed an inability to dealing with external pressures as a result of wrong headed policies, that produced limited innovative policy development as well as complexities because indecisive policy action fostered institutional ambivalence and created opportunities for outside pressures to increase in India and finally policies that led to neglect of Indian interests because the framework of thinking and policy was skewed to particular ends of the Nehruvian state and its diplomacy. We now turn to a discussion of these aspects.

Nehru was the main spokesman on foreign affairs for the Indian Congress party before 1947 and it was inevitable that he should assume the position as Foreign Minister after Indian independence. The Congress party had a strong interest in foreign affairs and Nehru was the architect of the foreign policy cell of the party.21 His mental outlook was based on his assessments of world history, and international politics of the inter-war era, and his views about India’s needs as a developing country and views of great power relationships and India’s position in a multi-polar world. His mental world was vaguely Fabian and the emotive reference points indicated opposition to British racialism and colonialism

112 Threats to India and the Nehruvian record tempered by acknowledgement of the vitality of British parliamentary democracy as a model for India and skewed by his sympathy for the Bolshevik revolution that indicated a similarity between two subject nations. Nehru and his admirers project Nehru as a great democrat because of his emphasis on secularism. Nehru’s enthusiasm for democracy was mainly in form; Indian parliamentary arrangements followed British lines. But he ignored the Indian conception of democracy where individualism, diversity and decision-making that was based on consensus was cherished in Indian village societies and in Indian Vedic norms and traditions. Nehru ran a one-man Foreign Office. K. P. S. Menon, a senior Indian ambassador to Soviet Russia and Foreign Secretary described Nehru as follows: ‘foreign policy therefore necessarily rested on the intuition of one man, who was Foreign Minister as well as Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru’.22 He was the chief decision-maker and he set the policy boundaries with limited inputs by an inner circle of advisers who dare not contradict him for fear of losing their access to him and the patronage he provided to their careers. There is no public evidence of significant feedback from Indian missions abroad or from Cabinet or parliamentary debates that contradicted Nehru’s policy lines. Indian foreign office files are not open to scrutiny except to favoured scholars on a restricted basis (e.g. Gopal). So based on available evidence, Nehru fashioned Indian democracy on British lines but the set-up lacked the British habit of continuous discourse about policy issues and principles because Nehru knew it all and there was no one in the Indian Cabinet or the Indian press or the Indian Parliament to question the bases of his policies and ideas. Thus Nehru’s approach to Indian politics was based on second hand, alien and at times un-Indian conceptions which were sustained for years by the Nehru government because of his stature in India until 1962 and in the world until the mid-1950s. He lacked an effective opposition within the Cabinet or the Parliament or in Indian media and scholarly circles and the Indian public was preoccupied with considerations concerning their survival rather than Indian foreign affairs. In sum Nehru was multifaceted and adopted contradictory and ambivalent impulses. He was not original except in the two instances to be discussed in the next chapter. At best, he was an effective synthesizer up to a point. 1

2

3

He opposed British colonialism and rejected racialism, but as Prime Minister he looked down on fellow South and Southeast Asian nations; he was patronizing in his attitude and it was resented by peoples in India’s neighbourhood. He adopted Soviet socialism as the basis of India’s statist economy and adopted socialistic directive principles in India’s Constitution, but the Nehru era is not known for producing common development of India’s poor. Nehru preached the value of pluralism, the common good and security of the Indian people and the prestige of India in the international sphere. However, there are no significant achievements in these areas. His rule is known for laying the foundation of the Nehru dynasty, for developing the domination of the bureaucracy on India’s economic and political life, for making the Foreign Office a one-man dominated affair and for policy failures in dealing with a militant China and resentful neighbours.

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While Nehru had a posture of Indian independence and freedom to act, his actions showed a preference for neo-colonial arrangements with Western ‘imperialists’. Both sides kept up the act.

While most Western powers objected to Nehru’s policies (e.g. on non-alignment in general and specific issues like Soviet intervention in Eastern Europe during the first phase of the Cold War and India’s tilt towards Soviet policies in the Korean conflict), several influential Western countries, including UK and Canada, considered him as one of their own who had an affinity for Western principles and whose policies initially were pro-Western and anti-Soviet.23 ‘Neocolonialism’ suggests an integration of economies and elites in the ‘centre’ and the ‘periphery’. While Nehru was overtly nationalistic and anti-Western in several ways he fashioned relationships which produced dependence on foreign powers in economic, diplomatic and military affairs and which tied India to foreign solutions to Indian problems. That is, Nehru’s rhetoric and his actions tell two different stories: the first suggests a commitment to real independence; the second suggests a pattern of actions that effectively produced dependence on the goodwill of external powers. Where did Nehru fail and what are the successes of his era? The following pages specify his failures (many), his successes (few and significant) and a legacy of neo-colonial links that opened India up to increased external pressures and reduced its capacity to develop Indian solutions for Indian problems. Nehru’s obvious big failure lay in his China policy and the personal assumptions or intuitions that shaped this policy; there is no evidence of a serious high level internal debate on China other than the Nehru–Patel correspondence where Patel indicated a disagreement with Nehru’s optimistic view of China (and Pakistan) and urged a stronger military and a diplomatic posture towards the two. But Patel did not press his point and deferred to Nehru, India’s natural leader in foreign and military affairs. Nehru was right in recognizing that cracks existed in the SinoSoviet relationship as a result of competing nationalisms and a history of mistrust between the Soviet and the Chinese leadership and this became a basis of the development of the Delhi–Moscow special relationship (see Chapter 8). But he built a policy of building bridges with China, urging world capitals not to isolate China, making its case for admission to the UN and he articulated a view of China and India as Asian powers which would shape Asian unity. Nehru felt that India was so big that no outside power would dare attack it. He avoided an early diplomatic confrontation with China on the border issue, he did not recognize that Chinese and Indian strategic interests were sharply varied because China saw itself, not India, as the natural leader in Asia, and China had no inhibition in building ties with India’s arch enemy Pakistan, so that China and Pakistan could create a two-front pressure on India. There is no evidence of serious staff work within the Indian government to validate his optimistic assumptions about China. Rather Nehru’s actions indicate escapism on both counts. Nehru’s promotion of China’s case in the world community showed Nehru’s globalism and utopianism, but his neglect of Indian strategic interests and diplomatic prestige showed that

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his grasp of military and diplomatic strategy in relation to Indian national interests was weak. Nehru had obviously learnt nothing from ancient Indian diplomatic and military theories (e.g. Kautilya’s work), from the practices of the East India Company and the British India government; nor did he learn much from world’s diplomatic and military history. Except in two areas which we discuss later, Nehru’s peace diplomacy was a dream and a pose that showed an inclination to escape from the necessity to craft durable power relationships with immediate neighbours (i.e. protect the walls of the household) and to deflect, control or influence hostile external influence. In hindsight Nehru was not a fighter, but it is an arguable point whether he was more a dreamer than a schemer. He was a dreamer if we take his enthusiasm for global reforms seriously; he was more a schemer if we see his policies as motivated by his interest in the development of the Nehru dynasty and its dominance of a Nehruvian state structure. The second major failure concerned Nehru’s policy actions about Pakistan and their basis. Under Lord Louis Mountbatten’s guidance (he was India’s first Governor General and head of the Indian Defence Council) Nehru made a number of crucial decisions which set the policy boundaries of India’s diplomacy and military strategy towards Pakistan: 1

2

3

4

India eschewed general war with Pakistan and sought instead friendship with it (not the best possible relationships under the circumstances of Pakistani belief in liberation of Kashmir by force and the achievement of parity with India). Kashmir was referred to the UN Security Council under Article 37 of the Charter (a threat to international peace and security) thus the issue was internationalized and Kashmir became a part of the field of great powers politics as a result of its place in the Security Council agenda. Nehru and his inner circle of foreign (Mountbatten) and Kashmiri advisers made the policy on Kashmir and it lacked a national consensus that was backed up by a public debate about the rationale of the policy and its underlying premises. The option pressed by the Indian military to use force to liberate Kashmir in 1947–48 and to recover the Pakistan-held segment of Kashmir was rejected by Nehru in favour of the transfer of the issue and control over it to the Security Council.

Nehru and his advisers had the naïve belief that the Security Council would act in favour of India’s view about Pakistani aggression against India when AngloAmerican strategic interests favoured an alliance relationship with Pakistan. Nehru did not understand that America and the UK were more interested in co-opting Pakistan as a junior partner in the Anglo-American strategy to contain Soviet Russia, contain Iranian nationalism, safeguard Anglo-American oil interests in the Persian Gulf and the Middle Eastern region and to promote Pakistan as a moderate Muslim country and a leader in the Middle East. The mobilization of Pakistani-type Islam and likeminded moderate Muslim states in the Middle East allied to the West were seen as tool in the fight against Soviet communism.

8

Nehru’s innovations and their problems

Nehru was innovative in two important areas. These innovations must be judged in the context of his failures outlined earlier in a number of critical domestic and external areas. The innovations indicate that there was a subtext of geopolitical and strategic calculation in the policies of Nehru and his advisors. The innovations enabled Nehru and his successors to build two foundations which emerged as the core of India’s geopolitical strategy. The first, the build-up of the Delhi–Moscow connection, became the core of Indian alignments in the 1950s. It tied India and Soviet Russia together and also the other major powers because they had rivalries with each other and with India. The second, the development of India’s nuclear option became the core symbol of India’s scientific and military power (along with the development of modern conventional armaments) in the late 1990s. The exercise of the nuclear weapons option in 1998, and the build-up of Indian missile strength, facilitated the rise of Indian coercive diplomacy in regional crises: that is, an interface between Indian nuclear arms, conventional arms and diplomatic strategy emerged as a result. The foundation of this strategy was laid by Nehru in the late 1940s. In building a robust bridge to Moscow India mobilized Soviet Russia, a great power, to counter external pressures on India in relation to Pakistan and to check the policy of the Anglo-American bloc in Kashmir affairs. Here creative Indian thinking and diplomatic skill, not Indian military or economic strength, enabled Stalin to change and broaden the frame of reference of his diplomatic and military strategy beyond a preoccupation with America and China. Nehru and his advisers convinced Stalin, who initially thought of Indians as ‘running dogs of imperialism’ with Lord Mountbatten, India’s first Governor General, as the symbol of imperialism after 1947, that there were opportunities for the growth of Moscow’s international influence beyond the confrontation with the West if they saw the world as a three-way enterprise. The first was the West, the second was the Soviet East and China and the third was the non-aligned world, a peace zone that was a potential partner of Soviet Russia. The appeal was that Indo-Soviet alignment could help open up opportunities for Moscow to acquire an international presence in the third world, to gain influence in the third world, to build an international constituency against American Cold War policy and to do this Moscow had to think beyond its direct confrontation with its traditional rival the

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West. In other words, bipolarity was not to be taken as the permanent or even the short-term frame of reference of Soviet and Indian policies. This innovation took shape in the 1949–52 period. The details are discussed later in the chapter. Its effect on subcontinental international politics, the policies of the major powers and India was immediately evident in the Security Council debate on Kashmir in 1952. The effect was also evident in the shift in Indian policies relating to the West in general and the Far East, Indo-China and global disarmament affairs in particular. Nehru’s vacillation in condemning Soviet interventions in Hungary and Poland in the mid-1950s reflected the importance of the Soviet factor in Indian thinking. The second innovation, authorized and supported by Nehru, was to tie the development of Indian nuclear energy to a policy that sought freedom from international controls and second, to tie it to India’s internal development. The public emphasis was on the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Nehru and his advisers were able to build important political and scientific ties with Canada that led to transfer of critical bomb making technology under a peaceful guise. America tried hard to dissuade the Canadians from such a relationship and America wanted to control Indian fissile materials like thorium so that American nuclear monopoly could be retained in relationship to communist and other nuclear aspirants. Nehru’s nuclear policy had three faces. The first sought scientific development of peaceful and potential military uses of nuclear energy via the dual use route. There was recognition in private among key government insiders that peaceful uses had a build-in defence use as well, if circumstances required a change. The second face was a public policy of unilateral Indian nuclear restraint against the exercise of the nuclear weapons option. This negated the first aspect. Finally, there was an emphasis on global and, implicitly, Indian nuclear disarmament; this showed India’s high moral stance in world affairs. Here Nehru was showing his cleverness in dealing with three different if not opposite ideas at the same time. The first aspect was pursued in a leisurely manner in contrast with China’s pursuit of nuclear weaponry on a crash basis. Consequently, the second and the third aspects did not generate military and diplomatic leverage in favour of India’s position with the major powers. It did not give India a positive political or military effect in its dealings with the powers. Indeed India’s non-weapons stance opened it up to continuous and growing international pressure to either not to develop the nuclear weapons option or to keep it hidden by its continued nonexercise. Still, the first aspect gave India a sound scientific and organizational nuclear infrastructure and a weapons capability. It was first revealed in the 1974 nuclear test and later in the 1998 tests. In both cases India exercised the weapons option but it was only in 1998 that it abandoned the peaceful road to nuclear energy and its traditional policy of unilateral self-restraint in the nuclear sphere. These innovations were full of complexities that showed the character of the important player (in this case Nehru and his advisers) and an Indian problem that is not simply Nehru-centric. The problem stems from a political Indian culture that constantly expressed opposite ideas at the same time because of a lack of confidence among Indian leaders and decision-makers. It reflected a desire to

Nehru’s innovations and their problems 117 please different domestic and external constituents with competing personal, political and strategic agendas and visions of Indian political leaders and their advisers. The presence and articulation of opposite ideas in Indian policy debates for a prolonged period gave them an institutional character. They cancelled each other from the point of view of Indian policy development. They left India’s policy process mired in endless and fruitless debate where the views of the argumentative and opinionated Indian political class flourished. Still, a combination of fortunate international and domestic circumstances enabled India to land on its feet in a crisis but the costs were high because of the existence of contradictions in Indian policy debates and at times in the thinking of a key decision-maker, that is, Nehru. The context and the consequences of the two innovations merit a brief review. Nehru rejected the traditional geopolitical and power politics approach to Indian diplomatic and military affairs. Instead he promoted Indian non-alignment and peace diplomacy. He argued against the dangers of Cold War tensions and rejected bipolarity as the basis of management of world affairs. He opposed the Pakistan–America military pact because it introduced the Cold War into the Indian subcontinent. Along with other leaders in the third world, non-alignment created an image of three worlds: (1) the Western one with its emphasis on military and economic strength, military alliance relations, East–West contention and containment of communism, particularly Soviet communism, (2) the communist world with its emphasis on ideological conviction, military strength, communist political organization, contention with the West and communist rivals and containment of Western influence and expansion of communism in the world and (3) finally, the third world with its emphasis on anti-colonialism, peaceful development of new nations, international peace diplomacy and reform of the international system that rejected power politics and stressed development and justice. In foreign affairs the third world policies varied between Burmese style neutralism to Thai and Filipino style alignment with the West, to Chinese play on its developmental status and its build-up as a third power in the global system, to an Indian shift from equidistance with the great powers to a position of proximity with all major powers of the Nehru era and eventually a tilt towards Soviet Russia. Among third world nations the framework of bipolarity was rejected because it required a choice between two opposite social and economic systems and conflicting diplomatic and military orientations. The philosophy that ‘you are either with us or against us’ was rejected in favour of the third way that was based on individual national interests. Nehru expressed a profound faith in the third way but he sought this without building India into an economic and a military power. However, the consequences of Nehru’s policy rested not in his public posture but in the effect his actions had on the pattern of relationships and the regional clusters which they created. Nehru’s build-up of the Moscow connection altered the character of Indian and Soviet external policies at the global level. The ‘three camps plus’ (West, Soviet, Chinese and non-aligned) thesis multi-lateralized international affairs in Asia and the Middle East, the two major centres of gravity of international diplomatic and

118 Nehru’s innovations and their problems military action, while Europe and the Far East remained bipolarized. The Moscow connection was used to check Anglo-American and later Chinese pressures against India on Pakistan and Kashmir affairs, but the irony was that having rejected global bipolarity as the basis of contemporary international relations, Nehru bipolarized subcontinental politics. By inducing the flow of Soviet diplomatic and military power into India to check the flow of Anglo-American and Chinese power into Pakistan, Nehru handcuffed India into a pattern of regional bipolarity whose future depended on the actions of outside forces inside the subcontinent. He surrendered the diplomatic and military initiative to outside forces even as he was innovative at the level of diplomatic philosophy by questioning the bipolar premise of the Cold War. The second innovation was in the nuclear sphere.1 The history of India’s nuclear programme and policy positions is well known and requires no repetition. Its character and its consequences however, require discussion. The decision to secure advanced nuclear technology through Canada, in opposition to American policy, came in the context of two contradictory Nehru attitudes. The first highlighted that India was a peaceful country, it sought the peaceful atom for national development having missed the fruits of the industrial revolution; and globally India sought nuclear disarmament as the basis of world security. The second attitude, indicated in secret deliberations between Nehru and his atomic advisers, was that Canada–India nuclear technology development had a built-in defence use. The innovation lay in the second attitude and in the development of dual use nuclear technology that on the one hand created a basis for plausible political denial of military intent but on the other hand created a basis for military use should strategic circumstances so require. In hindsight, and given the pattern of development of Indian nuclear science since 1947, the second attitude was the constant element in Indian policy, and the first attitude appears to be the variable element, but the relationship between the two changed over time. Under Nehru and the Nehruvians the first attitude was the most apparent and the dominant one in Indian nuclear policy and political diplomacy. It, however, was of diminishing value; it was on the slippery slope downwards after the first Indian nuclear test in 1974. By 1998, following India’s declaration that it was a nuclear weapon state, the first attitude became irrelevant. Of the two innovations, the development of the Moscow link had practical value in India’s subcontinental and international diplomacy in the 1950s and in Indian military strategy in the 1960s in relation to Pakistan and China. The second innovation, the nuclear build-up with Canadian help as well as British and later American assistance, lacked practical value before 1998 because it was not a policy tool that was used to alter the distribution of power and the pattern of relationships in India’s favour as China was to demonstrate in 1964. The Moscow link multi-lateralized Indian diplomacy internationally by tying India closely to Moscow in world affairs relating to the third world, Korean affairs, the work of the International Control Commission in Indo-China and in world disarmament issues. As well, India tied Moscow closely to vital Indian interests in relation to Kashmir, Pakistan, the US and China. Because America, UK and China were tied

Nehru’s innovations and their problems 119 to Pakistan as a result of their policies in relation to Moscow and Delhi, and India and Pakistan were tied together by their bilateral diplomatic and military rivalry and the Hindu–Muslim divide, and China and Soviet Russia, and China and America, and Soviet Russia and America were tied to each other as a result of their respective Cold Wars and rivalries, the Delhi–Moscow connection created a dense, unpredictable and a dangerous regional cluster. This was a regional subsystem in every meaning of the term because each member of this cluster had to pay attention to the policies of other members. The interactions were constant and the sub-system had geographical limits and systemic characteristics. It revealed several major systems of conflicts, that is, India–Pakistan, Sino-Indian, SinoSoviet, Sino-US and US–Soviet Russia. Each conflictual pair faced limits in the exercise of power in the regional subsystem. Each country was an essential member of the sub-system. Each member was a prisoner of its past. No player possessed the attitude, the courage and the imagination to either change the frame of reference of its policy in the subcontinent or to be able to create a diplomatic or a military channel to effect a significant change in the distribution of power and the pattern of relations in the region. The rate of change became significant when India altered the frame of reference of its policy in the late 1990s, when it exercised its nuclear option and built new non-traditional strategic partnerships in contrast with the stalemated pattern of relations and the distribution of military and economic power in the region under the Nehrus. The Moscow connection had its greatest practical value to Delhi in the context of Nehru’s peace and non-aligned policy. The dominant characteristic of this period was the inadequacy of Indian military preparations to prevent aggression and to win wars in 1962 and 1965. The importance of the Moscow link for Indian security diminished as India gained in military strength (in part because of Soviet military aid) and economic growth and its political leadership showed a will to secure India’s place in regional and global strategic and economic affairs. The Moscow connection could not alter or defeat the build-up of a hostile external coalition of Pakistan, America and China but it could help manage its adverse consequences in moments of crisis. On the other hand the nuclear factor created much joy among Indian scientists who acquired the freedom to promote their scientific experiments and to engage in cutting edge work but Nehru controlled the policy boundaries. They required the development of the nuclear weapons option, the non-exercise of the nuclear option and a firm commitment to advocate nuclear disarmament. In these circumstances India’s peaceful atom was a useless policy tool against the build-up of a hostile international coalition in India’s neighborhood. Michael Brecher, a serious scholar of the Nehru era, emphasized Nehru’s indecisiveness in decision-making.2 Eric Stokes, another Nehru scholar, pointed to his contradictory impulses.3 Both judgements require an assessment in terms of Nehru’s Moscow and nuclear policies. His statements on Indian nuclear affairs showed four elements: the value of secrecy, his preference for the peaceful atom, its potential for ‘other uses if compelled’ and the need to stay abreast of modern technology. Nehru was closer to Stokes’ view than Brecher’s on the nuclear question. The norms he asserted in a semi-transparent way revealed a frame of

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reference that indicated on the one hand the desire to promote global and utopian (with false expectations) theme of peace and nuclear disarmament and on the other hand, a desire to protect Indian nuclear option and interests that indicated realism. Nehru’s legacy on the nuclear question was a bitter one. He left unsettled debates about nuclear policy. The expression of contradictory views and ambiguous ones that held opposite implications (India could go either towards nuclear disarmament or the maintenance of a secret nuclear weapons option or to adopt eventually a nuclear weapons position) created opportunities for the development of external and internal pressures for and against the nuclear weapons option. But Nehru was neither indecisive nor held contradictory impulses in building the Moscow link. He was innovative and acted on the basis of practical circumstances rather than false expectations. His approach to Moscow was based on an awareness of the great powers’ rivalries in the international system of the time and on the other hand the desire to reduce East–West tensions that reflected ideals of peace-making. The build-up of the Delhi–Moscow link occurred precisely when the Pakistan–Anglo-American military pact was under consideration during 1951–54. Precisely when Jinnah and his successors like Ghulam Mohamed and General Ayub Khan were seeking to tilt towards Washington, Nehru and his advisers were seeking to tilt towards Moscow. Nehru’s secret breakthrough and linkup with Moscow occurred before the formal announcement of the US–Pakistan military pact in 1954. The breakthrough was effected with Stalin and publicized later in the high profile visit to India by Stalin’s successors Khrushchev and Bulganin in 1955. It is remarkable that Stalin’s government had on the one hand characterized Indians as the running dogs of imperialism but saw fit to significantly broaden the frame of reference of Soviet foreign policy and to give a bigger scope and depth to the Indo-Soviet relationship.

The story of the Moscow connection, 1949–52 A concern with domestic as well as international politics shaped the Nehru quest for the Moscow link. A number of circumstances and motives guided Nehru’s Moscow diplomacy; they are listed not in any order of importance: 1 2

3

4

Nehru’s egoistical desire to be taken seriously as a world statesman in the major international capitals. His desire to place India on the world’s map and to secure regular access to all the major capitals and to have an opportunity to play the India card as an East–West bridge builder and a peace maker in the tense period of the Cold War. Nehru’s leftist orientation, his sympathy for the Bolshevik revolution and declared socialist aims of Russia (but not Stalin’s harsh methods) indicated an ideological affinity with Moscow. Nehru’s socialist leanings were reflected in the character of the Nehruvian state with its concern with social and economic issues and domestic reforms

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5

6

7

and promotion of the common good of the Indian people; so the Moscow link strengthened the legitimacy of the Nehruvian state. But Nehru’s socialism reflected contradictory impulses. On the one hand Nehru mistrusted the Indian communists because of their commitment to revolutionary change which was contrary to the Nehru–Gandhi line of peaceful change. Nehru did not want a class war but on the other hand economic collectivism and state planning on a large scale in different aspects of Indian economic and political life was pushed; and coercion under certain conditions was acceptable.4 Because of his mistrust of Indian Leftists the Moscow link facilitated a triangular relationship between the Nehru and Congress party-dominated Indian state, Soviet Russia and the Indian Leftists. Here the importance of external diplomacy in Delhi and Moscow induced Moscow to restrain the revolutionary impulses of the Indian Communists, and to reinforce the dominance of the Nehru-led Congress party in Indian politics. In other words, contradictory impulses and ambiguities were present in Nehru’s socialism but this was not the case with his foreign policy in relation to Moscow. The Moscow link also enabled India to secure Soviet support on Kashmir and to check Anglo-American policies in the Security Council where India was isolated on the Kashmir question. Soviet protection through the veto was essential to prevent UN intervention in Kashmir at India’s expense. Finally, Anglo-American power politics in the subcontinent and American confidence in its containment and military policies in the world to check the spread of communism led Nehru to look favourably towards Moscow as a check against Western expansion in the post-war world. The history of Western imperialism and India’s experience with it coloured Nehru’s unfavourable view of the West. Soviet Russia emerged as a pole of attraction in Indian diplomacy while America became a pole of mistrust and revulsion in Nehru’s thinking.5

Nehru’s goal, to secure strong Indo-Soviet links, and the method and argument his ambassador used to secure the breakthrough, were both innovative. They reveal an important point about the process and method of international change and change in the pattern of relationships in asymmetrical power situations. The conventional view is that great powers co-opt weaker countries into their alliance networks or by their dominance and that the major powers set the policy boundaries or the frame of reference of policies and procedures. This is often but not always the case. The Pakistan–US and India–Soviet cases indicate that lesser powers, despite their material weakness can develop opportunities to co-opt the great powers into their strategic designs if they possess political or diplomatic skills and knowledge of the other side’s compulsions. In other words, there is no necessary connection between military and economic strength on the one hand and strategy and political or diplomatic skills on the other in securing desired change. The latter set of skills are necessary. Our emphasis is on the importance of the tactical argument that reshapes and broadens the mental outlook and the

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frame of reference of a country’s foreign policy. We turn now to the role played by Nehru’s ambassador in Moscow (1949–52) Dr S. Radhakrishanan (Professor of Philosophy at Oxford University) as recorded by his historian son Dr S. Gopal.6 According to the available diplomatic record, Radhakrishnan’s arguments with Stalin and the Soviet foreign office, Krishna Menon’s support of Radhakrishnan’s ideas and Nehru’s endorsement of them altered irrevocably the pattern of IndoSoviet relations and the framework of Soviet and Indian foreign policies. The story indicates the role of several variables. 1

2

There was a Soviet misperception about the nature of India’s independence and relations with the West and the internal character of the Indian state and society and its political class. During the Second World War Indian troops had moved around in different military theatres under British command, and Stalin saw them as mercenaries, not independence fighters, and India as a British colony. The year 1947 did not change Stalin’s view of India. With Lord Mountbatten, last Viceroy turned around as first Indian Governor General, he was seen as the reigning imperial deity of India. The destruction during the Partition left the impression that independence of the two may be short-lived. Gandhi was seen in class terms. Nehru’s sister, India’s first ambassador in Moscow and a socialite, found Moscow irksome and the Soviet leadership and bureaucracy inaccessible and uncommunicative and with the approval of the Indian foreign office, she kept very close contact with the American embassy in Moscow; this confirmed the Soviet view of India as a Western appendage. This was reinforced by the view that the Indian foreign office bureaucracy was mainly pro-Western, India turned to UK and USA for aid and diplomatic contact and Nehru himself had strong proWestern attitudes and policy. The Soviet press reflected the official view of India as imperialist lackeys and running dogs of imperialism. This reflected Moscow’s reliance on political inputs from Indian communists rather than members of the Indian government at the time of India’s independence. Stalin was preoccupied with foreign policy and strategic problems with the West and his concern was to avoid war with America. Despite the development of Soviet atomic weapons, China’s communist revolution and consolidation of Soviet control over Eastern Europe, Stalin recognized American military strength.7 Soviet diplomatic thought during the Stalin era revealed an inner leadership debate between those who thought in terms of the inevitability of war between the two camps and militarized bipolarity and those who argued for peaceful coexistence as an alternative.8 At the time, the first part of the 1950s, Moscow was engaged in a dangerous Cold War confrontation with the West in Europe and in the Far East. This showed the prominence of the ‘two camps, war is inevitable’ thesis. But at the same time there was an important crack in Stalin’s mental outlook; there was a willingness to consider the possibility of peaceful coexistence between Soviet Russia and the West if a way could be found to reduce American bellicosity. Stalin was cautious in the Korean War and Soviet Forces had a limited role

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3

as combatants in war compared to North Korea and Chinese combatants. In the Western front Stalin was careful not to cross the line beyond East Europe and generally respected the principles of the Yalta accord with Churchill and Roosevelt. The third variable concerns the ability of a few leading Indian practitioners to discover cracks in the international system. Their assessments provided an opportunity for lesser powers to turn around the mental outlook of the big powers or at least the USSR, a key member of the club. This variable shows the possibility that an intelligent third party could intervene in great powers’ quarrels and it could take initiatives to make things better for others and for itself, that is, it could develop diplomatic tactics that loosened stalemated conflicts and reduced international tensions. The Radhakrishnan–Nehru innovation lay in the recognition that there were two cracks in the international system, the first was the public Cold War between America and Soviet Russia and the second was the secret rivalry between Soviet Russia and China; here were two communist giants with a nationalistic rivalry that went back to the Stalin–Mao relationship since 1927. Indian diplomatic tactics and arguments were in play on these internationally significant fissures. Indian practitioners recognized the need to exploit them to India’s advantage.9

What did Nehru do and what did Radhakrishnan say that was new to the Cold War system of international conflict, that brought India into the diplomatic mainstream at the time and that altered the pattern of Indo-Soviet relations and Indian relations with the US and China in subsequent years? Nehru’s role in the story was important. Following the failure of the mission of his sister, Mrs Vijayalakshmi Pandit, as the ambassador to Moscow, he decided to replace her with a philosopher of international repute who could deal with the Soviet mind in a psychological manner. The idea was to make India a point of contact with both Cold War power blocs. Philosophers were respected in the communist world then and Nehru thought that Radhakrishnan would fit the Moscow scene. The idea was to convince the Soviet leadership that India wanted peace between the two power blocs and that India had an independent policy to deal with issues on their merits; India, Nehru felt, had its own ways of thought and action which sought modernization but it had its cultural roots. But how was Delhi to convince Moscow that India was not a Western carbon copy? Radhakrishnan set out to present his ideas in a number of ways. Effort was made to convince Soviet interlocutors that the Indian republic was inspired by the Soviet experience and by Stalin’s leadership, a man of iron will. Nehru’s socialist leanings, his attitude to the Spanish civil war, India’s embrace of socialist economic planning and humanistic values (that were similar to Soviet commitment to community minded internal reforms) in the Indian constitution and in Indian cultural thought were emphasized. It was pointed out that since Soviet Russia was truly a predominantly Asian power, it was in her interest to encourage the Eastern orientation in foreign affairs and India in the East could be a strong influence if it was encouraged and cultivated by Moscow. A distinction was made between

124 Nehru’s innovations and their problems American military policy and its bellicosity that was seen as a major problem in the Cold War and the Soviet desire for peaceful coexistence. Third party involvement (e.g. India’s and others) was seen as a way to fix the problem of Cold War tensions and the danger of a new world conflict. The value of the ‘knowledge solution’ rather than a ‘power solution’ that relied on military pressures was emphasized with the suggestion that India had accepted the first approach. By tilting against America as the provocateur in the Cold War with Soviet Russia, and by indicating that the blame was not entirely on one side, emphasis was placed on the possibility of finding common ground and building mutual confidence and peaceful coexistence. Radhakrishnan also expressed a desire to learn from the Soviet experience in the search for progress. The Indian themes were to impress on Moscow the need to seek détente in big power relations and to recognize India as an important and an independent player with socialist leanings in foreign affairs and in its domestic economic and political arrangements.10 Stalin and the Soviet foreign office were intrigued but not convinced by Radhakrishnan’s argument; they needed evidence of deeds to prove Indian good faith. The gift that sealed the Delhi–Moscow bargain came over the Korean War issue. When the Korean War broke out in June 1950 the Indian government accepted two US sponsored-resolutions labelling North Korea as aggressor and seeking help from all UN members in South Korea’s defence. This surprised Moscow. Radhakrishnan and Menon objected to the resolution and Indian support because it was the decision of one bloc. Nehru however, was of two minds on the Soviet question. Generally, he was concerned about Soviet expansionism and about Moscow’s encouragement of trouble by communists in India.11 In contrast, Radhakrishnan’s aims and tactics differed from Nehru’s and that of the senior bureaucrats in the Indian foreign office. He did not want to place all Indian eggs in the American basket, he wanted India to show its independence by pushing for the return of the Soviet delegate to the Security Council in the Korean debate, he urged the admission of China to the UN and sought a linkage between these proposals and rollback of North Korean aggression.12 Radhakrishnan’s public statements made clear that he saw American bellicosity as a part of the problem of the Cold War, Soviet fear of foreign intervention was the basis of its aggressiveness and America’s opposition to Soviet Russia rather than ideology was a basis of the confrontation. His view was that Stalin sought peaceful coexistence and he ought to be tested. Note that Nehru’s and Radhakrishnan’s views converged in general about the need to examine both sides of the Cold War and to find common ground to reduce mistrust, but on the crucial Korean question, there was a sharp disagreement on diplomatic tactics between the two. Radhakrishnan and Krishna Menon put the brakes on Nehru’s pro-American stance. This issue brought Delhi and Moscow closer and created a gulf between Delhi and Washington. Both developments coloured the pattern of alignments – friendly in the first case, and antagonistic in the second case, for the duration of the Cold War. The Korean War was important in shaping a triangular diplomatic relationship between Delhi–Moscow, Delhi–Washington and Moscow–Washington. It made India a point of contact between the two power centres. The themes expressed by

Nehru’s innovations and their problems 125 Radhakrishnan became the basis of Indian diplomacy for the duration of the Cold War and India remained a point of contact in another regional conflict, in Indo-China. So India’s diplomacy in the Korean question was extended to the Indo-China question.13 India’s diplomatic actions are often studied as products of Nehru’s non-aligned policy but the narrative in this chapter indicates that often, on crucial international questions, Nehru was in two minds and the pressures of his advisers helped him make-up his mind. Nehru was the official decision-maker because he was the prime minister and the foreign minister, but others mattered in shaping the inner dynamics of the decision. The pattern of Nehru’s duality and Radhakrishnan’s clarity was revealed also in relation to Kashmir question, a vital issue for India. Gopal’s account tells the story. In 1951 the Anglo-American bloc proposed a resolution which was not acceptable to India. Gopal explains: The fact was that Nehru was in two minds. He would have liked Soviet support on Kashmir, but was concerned that such support would worsen the Kashmir issue by making it part of the conflict between the great powers. He was also probably wary that a request for Soviet support might encourage Moscow to seek India’s commitment to the Soviet position in other matters. Dependence on the Soviet veto in the Security Council on such a vital matter to India as Kashmir would place a heavy tilt on non-alignment. In the event, as the years passed, American policy left India no option. Radhakrishnan saw, much earlier than most people in the ministry of external affairs, that this anti-India trend in the outlook of the state department would not change.14 So he impressed on the Soviet leadership that ‘the Soviet Union should be concerned about the future of Kashmir, if only because it was to her a borderland’.15 In January 1952 the Soviet Union intervened in the Security Council debate, supported India’s position and cast a veto. The Council had thus far been a field of Anglo-American power on the Kashmir issue; now it became a field of Soviet power politics as well. Radhakrishnan’s reference to Kashmir as Soviet borderland indicated a geopolitical theme. This idea came from him, not Nehru who had neither the courage nor the imagination to think along these lines and to take this up with Moscow. The Soviet veto embarrassed Nehru according to Gopal16 (even though it was in India’s vital interest) but it gave Indian non-alignment the tilt and the linkage between Indian and Soviet diplomacy on a number of international questions thereafter in international diplomacy relating to Korea, Indo-China, disarmament and Eastern Europe.

Conclusion The chapter indicates that Ambassador Radhakrishnan had independence of action in Moscow and with Krishna Menon’s support on the Korean and China questions he was able to reorient Indian diplomacy. These actions gave scope and

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depth to Indo-Soviet relations, they changed the Soviet mental outlook about the role of third parties such as India in Asian and world affairs and they crystallized the pattern of relationships between Delhi and Washington and Delhi and Moscow. Philosophical and diplomatic discourse was the method to arouse Stalin’s curiosity that led to an important shift in attitude and policy towards India. At critical junctures Nehru is shown to be of ‘two minds’ which could in a loose way support Brecher’s view of Nehru’s indecisiveness and Stokes’ view of him as subject to contradictory impulses. The chapter however, suggests that Nehru was neither indecisive nor in an oscillatory or ambivalent mode when he was confronted with firm advice of his convinced and trusted advisers. When pushed he responded and acted decisively. He was innovative in this sense. Nehru mattered because he held the relevant portfolios, as prime minister, foreign minister and minister for atomic energy, but others in his inner circle mattered more in shaping the policy dynamics and the irreversible shifts. Two fortunate circumstances, that is, first, the availability of Soviet support in an adverse situation with American and Pakistani opposition to Indian policies in the region and the world and second, the presence and diplomatic tactics and arguments of key players like Radhakrishnan and Menon in the issues discussed here, produced the shifts in Indian policy and in the relationships with the powers. Nehru was innovative in the sense that he allowed the adaptation of Indian policies to changing circumstances and pressures even as he maintained the façade of India’s detachment from power politics and the need to avoid a permanent tilt towards one or the other bloc. The chapter shows that the tilt towards Moscow was unmistakable since the early 1950s and it was irreversible till the collapse of the USSR. The Nehru–Stalin breakthrough stabilized India’s diplomatic position on Kashmir in the UN and it helped Nehru’s position in Indian party politics because Moscow was able to restrain the Indian communists. Instead of encouraging them to organize a mass movement and revolution in India to oppose the Indian ‘reactionaries’, it was now encouraging cooperation with the Nehru government. The breakthrough also became the basis of India’s economic and military build-up in subsequent years when the Soviet Union was forthcoming in its assistance to India in critical areas of India’s economic and military life. But this connection on the other hand reinforced the political and subjective prejudices of American political leaders and the diplomatic and military establishment towards India. It impeded the development of friendly relations between the two democracies until 1998. Nehru’s diplomacy thus revealed him to be both a problem maker and a problem solver and he had a choice in both instances. He was a problem maker because he internationalized the Kashmir dispute by referring it to the UN and he made it an object in the field of Anglo-American power politics in the region. At the same time by rejecting the military option to settle the Kashmir issue by force as his military advisers wanted, Nehru abandoned India’s strategic interests in a vital area. Note a critical contrast here; Nehru was committed to developing India’s nuclear capacity in 1947 when there was no pressing need to do so, but he showed no interest in developing a military option even though Kashmir politics

Nehru’s innovations and their problems 127 and the policies of the Anglo-American bloc and Pakistan warranted such an option. Nehru did not engage in cost-effective analysis. He did not figure out either intuitively as was his approach to foreign affairs, or by competent staff work as is expected of a professional government, that the cost to the AngloAmerican bloc of intervening in Kashmir and Indo-Pakistani affairs was low, and the risk–reward ratio of Pakistani intervention in Kashmir was favourable for Pakistan, but the cost of military inaction and diplomatic defensiveness in Kashmir affairs left India in a high cost-low reward position. The decision to tilt towards Moscow in 1952 enabled Nehru to emerge as a problem-solver. Here he made two choices: not to tilt towards Washington and tilt instead towards Moscow. The cost of the Moscow tilt was low for Nehru and the gains to Nehru and to India were high because Moscow offered vital economic and later military aid as well as immediate diplomatic cover for India’s and Nehru’s weak position in Kashmir affairs. The Moscow link also meant that there was a Kremlin investment in the Nehru family and in Indian and Congress party politics because Indian communists became Nehru and Congress party allies in the process of peaceful change of India’s economic and political life. Nehru’s Moscow and nuclear innovations reveal two subtle sides of Indian diplomacy under Nehru. The tilt towards Canada in atomic affairs in the early 1950s and towards Moscow in global and Kashmir affairs in parallel manner had a common anti-US thrust. At the time Canada’s CANDU plutonium based and heavy water based technology was in competition with America’s enriched uranium technology. Canada and India shared a common interest in the 1950s to showcase the Canada Deuterium–Uranium (CANDU) through its use in India. The Moscow tilt had an obvious anti-US slant because of the Cold War rivalry, because Moscow gained access to the Indian subcontinent which the US did not like. As a result of the Indian tilt and the convergence of Soviet and Indian interests and attitudes about global peace and the Cold War, the Indian subcontinent became a field of Soviet power vis-à-vis America, China, Pakistan and India. Through Delhi Moscow gained a voice in many third world capitals where Delhi had a voice and the two could in parallel undermine America’s and China’s international and regional authority and prestige. Both innovations occurred in a sub-critical mode. The decisions were not taken in a moment of crisis. The tilts show the important role political leaders can play in adapting and fundamentally changing a country’s foreign policy in response to opportunities and challenges in the international and regional situations. The innovations indicate that the theory of democratic peace had no validity in Indian and American foreign affairs because of the mutual mistrust; conversely trust could be gained among ideologically dissimilar political classes when new ideas could be injected to alter the inter-subjective perceptions of the countries concerned. But note a distinction. India failed utterly to change the American mind set in the early 1950s because of American confidence that it was the strongest power on earth. Moscow became a pole of attraction to Delhi’s political leadership because it was a strong no. 2 in world politics and it possessed the capacity to check the no.1 world power. India’s Moscow connection was an innovation

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because it triangularized Indo-Soviet–Western diplomacy globally, and in the Indian subcontinent. India, despite its material weaknesses, became a point of contact between the East and the West and it found opportunities to play a role in secondary regional conflicts (Korea, Indo-China and Suez) where the great powers were engaged. The connection was secured at a moment of high international tension in Korea and China, which opened Stalin to Indian advice. High Soviet mistrust of India’s independence gave India an incentive to favour Soviet diplomatic aims in Korea and later, elsewhere, and to prove that it could be mutually beneficial to have India on Moscow’s side. This connection showed the capacity of the two radically different political regimes to bridge a political and an ideological divide by cooperating in practical international politics. The cooperation was based on the strength of ideas, diplomatic aims and diplomatic tactics rather than military and economic strength.

9

Nehruvians and the rise of anti-India trends in foreign affairs

On 14th August 1947 Nehru, India’s first prime minister made a pledge. To quote him: ‘Long years ago we made a tryst with destiny, and now the time comes when we shall redeem our pledge, not wholly or in full measure, but very substantially. At the stroke of the midnight hour, when the world sleeps, India will awake to life and freedom. A moment comes, which comes but rarely in history, when we step out from the old to the new, when an age ends, and when the soul of a nation, suppressed, finds utterance. It is fitting that at this solemn moment we take the pledge of dedication to the service of India and her people and to the still larger cause of humanity.’1

This chapter argues that Nehru betrayed his pledges in part because his external policies depended on an anti-power politics and anti-geopolitical orientation, in part because hostile external forces pursued policies and created circumstances which were beyond Nehru’s control and which Nehru did not fully comprehend, and in part because there was a historical difference between Indian (and Hindu) and Western political cultures and behaviour in moments of crisis. Faced with a crisis the British authorities tended to unify while the Indians tended to divide and change sides or act in a defensive manner.2 Nehru did not realize that militant Islam in the Indian subcontinent had come to terms with the Western powers and in the process ‘Indian Islam’ asserted its difference with Hinduism3; and British imperial authority understood the difference and its political value to British interests. Nehru did not grasp the significance of the fact that the West had also come to terms with ‘Indian Islam’ as a counter to Hindu influence.4 The West through the agency of Britain recognized that religion in the Indian subcontinent was a potential volcano that ought to be contained.5 Nehru had a choice. He could have chosen to take a power politics and a geopolitical approach to foreign affairs in a broad way and to recognize the relationship between diplomatic strategy and military strength. But he lacked a real understanding of the anti-Indian trends in Muslim and British politics. He did not formulate a strategy that was based on courage and imagination to engage the dominant trends that challenged Indian foreign affairs. R. Kipling describes the qualities of a good ruler: wise, inscrutable, saying little in public while countering in private with humility and craft the schemes of

130 Nehruvians and the rise of anti-India trends foreign powers.6 Nehru’s diplomatic and military conduct did not meet Kipling’s standards. Nehru talked a lot in public and regrettably the record did not reveal an ability to counter the machinations of Pakistan, America and China in the Indian subcontinent. Radhakrishnan and Nehru understood the anti-India and anti-Soviet trends in American policy. Both used the Delhi–Moscow diplomatic build-up to balance these trends. This became the dominant frame of reference of Nehruvian diplomacy. But in this frame Nehru and his advisers failed to weigh in the anti-India trends in Pakistani and Chinese policies which made nonsense of the expectation that India and Pakistan and India and China could be friends and disputes could be settled through peaceful discourse. Indian practitioners failed to appreciate the difference between disputes and conflicts. Kashmir was a territorial dispute as was the Himalayan boundary question but in the first case the territorial question existed in the framework of Pakistan’s policy of separateness and challenge to Hindu India where accommodation was not expected or desirable; and in the second case China was interested in asserting its ambition to be taken seriously as the third force in world politics in relation to America and Soviet Russia while rejecting Indian ambition to form a world of four powers, America, Soviet Russia, China and India. The low point in Nehru’s policy was established in the early part of independent India’s diplomatic and military history. During the British Raj Hinduism and ‘Indian Islam’ were in a static pattern7 with Hindu discontent and defensiveness as the basis of its passivity and with Muslim fear of Hindu domination as the basis of its distance towards the political potential of Hinduism. Pakistan thus entered the regional and the world stage with three attitudes: (1) It had come to terms with the Anglo-American bloc in the realm of ideas and strategy. (2) Its political philosophy was to assert the separateness of Muslims from the Hindus and Pakistan’s separateness and sense of vulnerability from India. (3) Finally, recalling the era of Muslim greatness and domination over the Hindus during the days of the Great Mughals (1526–1857), a greatness achieved primarily by the sword, Pakistan launched a tribal invasion into Kashmir in 1947–48 and converted the political dispute over Kashmir’s future into a territorial and a military dispute between Pakistan and India. Acting on the basis of his instincts and the strategic advice of his mentor Mountbatten, and rejecting the advice of his military advisers who sought permission to push the aggressors from all of Kashmir, Nehru relied on a false expectation that the Kashmir dispute could be resolved to India’s satisfaction through the UN because India’s case was a just one. He did not show any understanding about the machination of foreign forces who were hostile to Indian interests and who had an agenda to support Pakistan and to keep the controversy over Kashmir at the level of a manageable conflict. Nehru took the Kashmir dispute to the UN and thereby internationalized it, since the reference was based on the Charter provision that dealt with threats to international peace and security; by this action Nehru made Kashmir a field of international power politics and lost control over the agenda. An Indian question or an Indo-Pakistani bilateral issue became an international question of peace and security. The reference to the UN was accompanied by the decision to have the issue settled by a plebiscite. The

Nehruvians and the rise of anti-India trends 131 subtext here was that Nehru would be seen by humanity and the Kashmiris as a democrat. Mountbatten’s massaging of Nehru’s ego on this point was a service to Nehru’s prestige. Nehru’s reference of the Kashmir issue to the UN was a gift of the issue to the Anglo-American bloc. This was service to the dominant powers of the Security Council at the time but it did not serve either short-term or longterm Indian interests. Moreover, the Kashmir issue validated the contrast between Anglo-American and Indian crisis behaviour. The first Kashmir war (1947–48) divided the Indian political class with the Nehru wing, the dominant part of the Indian government, seeking foreign help to resolve India’s problem with Pakistani aggressiveness. On the other hand the Deputy Prime Minister V. B. Patel saw the anti-India trend in Pakistani and great power policies and urged firm action against Pakistan but this view was not taken by Nehru; hence the policy on Kashmir and Indo-Pakistani affairs and the role of the Anglo-American lacked a crafty response by Nehru and his inner circle. India remained a house divided on these questions between the Nehruvians who followed the Mountbatten line; and on the other hand those who argued for a military solution for a military problem created by a militarized Pakistan that was supported by a superpower that relied on a militarized approach to foreign affairs in its history and in the Cold War. Nehru choose instead to deal with a military problem by political means without realizing the importance of military force in Pakistani, American and later Chinese policies. If Nehru’s Kashmir and Pakistan policy was the low point in Nehru’s strategy, the 1952 breakthrough between Delhi and Moscow was the highpoint. Here Nehru and Radhakrishnan met Kipling’s expectations of a good ruler. By bringing Stalin’s Moscow on India’s side in the diplomatic and economic spheres (and later as a valued supplier of arms to India when the West and China was arming Pakistan) Delhi countered with skill the machinations of four foreign powers, Pakistan, the UK, the US and later China. Getting Moscow on India’s side in the Kashmir issue at the UN was Nehru’s and Radhakrishnan’s service to Indian interests as per Nehru’s ‘tryst with destiny’ speech; and checking American actions in Korea, Indo-China and in atomic affairs was in a way service to humanity and to India’s international influence. But Nehru and Nehruvians failed to check the scope and the depth of the diplomatic, military and ideological components of the relationship between Pakistan and the Anglo-American bloc; and the role of religion as a point of attraction between Islamic Pakistan and the West in the Indian subcontinent and religion as a point of mistrust between ‘political Hinduism’ and the Indian Congress party as a Hindu organization in Anglo-American thinking. Nehruvian pacifism was not an answer to Pakistani militaristic and interventionist impulses in Kashmir and in the challenge Pakistan posed to Indian interests and prestige. American policy towards the Cold War era in general was also militaristic with a heightened emphasis on military preparations, military alliances and anti-Sovietism. Because of its strategic location and willingness to align its policies to American interests, Pakistan under military rule was an ally of the AngloAmerican bloc. The alignment had a military character because of the use of Pakistani bases against the USSR by the US government and it had an ideological

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character because moderate Muslim Pakistan was seen as a platform to promote American interests among the Muslim countries Middle East; and Islamic Pakistan was seen as a barrier against the spread of Soviet communism in the region. When India emerged as a friend of Moscow it became a point of opposition in American diplomatic strategy because it was on the other side of the Cold War globally; and Hindu India was a political volcano in the context of the officious accommodation between Pakistani Islam and the Anglo-American bloc. At the ideological level the emphasis in Anglo-American thinking was on the positive view of Pakistani Islam as a moderating force in the Middle East where Arab nationalism and Arab socialism was in play; and America was aligned with conservative and monarchical regimes which had emerged under British auspices following the breakup of the Ottomon empire at the end of the First World War. Pakistan’s location in proximity to Soviet Russia and to the pro-American Iranian and Saudi regimes at the time made it an ideological and a strategic partner of the West, a part of the inner circle of Western defence as Sir Olaf Caroe, the last Governor of the North West Frontier province argued convincingly with the State Department. Caroe was emphatic and the State Department agreed that India was on the outside of the Western defence circle and it was therefore incumbent on India to make peace with Pakistan while it was a Western imperative to build Pakistan as a base of Western defence in the Middle Eastern and the South Asian regions. This line of thinking was dominant in the US and Pakistani policies up to 1990s. This convergence in strategic thinking between Pakistan, the UK and the US left India out in the cold. This trend was beyond Nehru’s control but our criticism is that he did not prepare against it. Instead he remained preoccupied continuously and publicly in his service to humanity in the form of advocating the importance of East–West détente, reduction of superpowers’ tensions and the admission of China into the UN. When the détente process took shape between Washington and Moscow in the late 1950s, and when a similar process emerged between Washington and Beijing in the late 1960s, India’s ability to manoeuver among the major powers was reduced; it was less able to play the three sides to India’s advantage as in the early 1950s. With the emphasis on Indian non-alignment and an anti-power politics and an anti-geopolitical position, Nehru’s India remained dependent on international goodwill and fortunate international circumstances as the basis of India’s defence rather than an indigenous capacity to protect its borders and its interests against foreign pressures. So when the affinity between Pakistan and the West grew in the military, diplomatic and ideological spheres, and the opportunity arose for China to join the Pakistani–Western alignment, while Nehru and Nehruvians complained bitterly about the machinations of foreign powers, little was done in private to change the attitude, the policy and the capacity of aggressive foreign powers. Nor did Nehru and the Nehruvians alter the historical structure of Indian political culture. As Spear explained Indian history, India had a cultural problem as follows. 1 2

There was a tendency to fall apart in a crisis and to set off on one’s own. There were chronic internal divisions based on racial and political differences.

Nehruvians and the rise of anti-India trends 133 3

4

5

There was no Indian tradition to apply and rely on the principles of balance of power in a sustained manner in Indian diplomatic and military history (although Kautliya’s Arthasastra outlines the theory of the circle of states). Indian nationalism was absent in Indian history because of the prominence of horizontal divisions based on caste lines and vertical divisions based on religious lines. Indians were familiar with the tradition of imperialism and patronage and there was a lack of shame in seeking foreign help to defeat a local rival.8

Apart from the growth of Indian political nationalism in the independence movement and the claim that Indian and other third world non-alignment movements represented indigenous nationalism, the Nehruvian state and Nehruvian foreign policy had all the characteristics which Spear outlined. Nehru’s policies relating to China, Pakistan and the Cold War issues revealed a preoccupation with a desire to serve humanity rather than to serve Indian interests. The two were assumed to be convergent in Nehru’s India but this was more fiction than fact. Nehru and his inner circle of advisers including Radhakrishnan and Krishna Menon had lobbied ceaselessly for China’s admission to the UN since 1950. At Bandung (1955), Nehru was enthusiastically promoting China before an influential third world audience and the majority of non-aligned nations.9 This was service to China’s cause which ironically occurred at about the time that Beijing was telling Pakistan, India’s arch rival, that it did not see a conflict of interest between Pakistan and China but it saw one with India.10 Obviously Nehru’s trusted advisers, Radhakrishnan, Menon and ambassador to China Panikkar did not read the China tea leaves carefully. They dismissed misgivings about China’s intentions that were expressed by Patel, deputy prime minister, a known rightist and thus an ideological opponent of Nehru and his inner circle of advisers. The Nehruvians did not anticipate the anti-India trend in China’s India policy, its strategic basis and its negative consequences for India. On China the Nehruvians did not publicly complain about Chinese machinations as they did about Pakistani and American ones. In retrospect Chinese machinations hurt India more than Pakistani and American ones because China defeated India in 1962 and hurt its self-confidence and its standing in the non-aligned world; and China’s extensive military, nuclear and missile aid to Pakistan created a major military problem for India in subsequent years. Note that, Pakistan alone, or with American help, was not able to defeat India in war. America had no territorial ambitions against India despite the animosity of the likes of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger and it never confronted India directly in war. But on the other hand, China did. After 1962, it became the main catalyst in subcontinental affairs, because it held the option to increase its military aid to Pakistan and to create a two front military threat to India. China adopted this path for three decades after 1962. In contrast serving humanity was the most public part of Nehru’s diplomacy up to 1962. He constantly emphasized the importance of reducing international tensions, promoting peaceful coexistence, building the peace constituency and

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reducing the role of military power in international politics and securing reform of the international system by encouraging the growth of international development rather than a world of powers and a world of power politics. Nehru’s public statements highlighted the following themes: ●

●

● ●

there was a need to transform the psychological atmosphere of world politics, from hostility and suspicion and fear to rational discourse, friendship and cooperation; peaceful economic, social and political change was the essential goal of Indian politics and foreign policy; India’s size precluded a military attack and conquest of India; Indian non-alignment was inherent in the ‘past thinking of India’ and ‘the conditioning of the Indian mind’.11

The themes showed a commitment to internationalist ideals rather than a connection between ideals and Indian interests. His ideals were to support the norms of the UN system and the Charter rather than the norms that reflected militarization of international relations as a result of the central position of the Cold War. Another ideal was to the highlight the importance of Asia in world politics in opposition to the secondary position assigned to Asia in American diplomacy and military policy. Yet another ideal was to highlight the importance of Asian development but to project it as an exercise in economic, political and social modernization; military modernization was not highlighted. Nehru advocated the importance of nationalism in the third world precisely when it was judged to be narrow in Western policy thinking and political thought. He urged the value of non-alignment and peace politics precisely when they were judged to be unrealistic in a world of Cold War tensions and dangers. He urged nuclear disarmament as the basis of world security when nuclear deterrence and nuclear weapons were deemed to be the basis of Western and communist security. These ideals are behind the claims that Nehru was serving humanity; that they helped build India’s international influence in the early 1950s when the Cold War tensions were intense and third parties could function as facilitators of East–West dialogue in the context of dangerous controversies between America and Soviet Russia and between America and communist China. India had a presence in international conference diplomacy in matters relating to Korean armistice, Indo-China conferences, Suez peacekeeping, international atomic and disarmament diplomacy. India also had a presence in the Arab world as a result of its support of Palestinian rights – a theme which was at the very origin of Congress party’s introduction to foreign affairs before India gained its independence. With Nasser and Tito, Nehru led the non-aligned movement and encouraged the development of Arab nationalism and Arab socialism as a major theme of post-1945 third world politics. These postures clearly gave Nehru and India an international presence in the early 1950s. But did these activities matter in shaping the distribution of military and economic power in the international system or regional politics of the Indian

Nehruvians and the rise of anti-India trends 135 subcontinent? Did they affect the pattern of relationships among the major and the minor powers in the post-1945 world? Did they help India become a regional great power or a world power? Did they help cope with the emerging anti-India trends in the policies of Pakistan, America and China? Did they change India’s historical political culture which was to scatter against opposing forces in a crisis and seek foreign support? The answer to these questions lies in a definition of the character of the problem and the options available to each member of the subcontinental system of states, and second, it lies in a definition of the character of the player involved in the Indian subcontinent. The following section outlines the rivalries of interests among the players precisely when Nehru was talking in terms of peace and harmony.

Character of problems and players of the Nehruvian period The following sketches of each player’s view of the diplomatic and strategic issues are meant to show that the rise of anti-India trends in the policies of Pakistan, America and China established the external character of India’s diplomatic and strategic problem while the character of Nehru’s policies defined the internal character of India’s problem. Nehru and his advisers were the main Indian foreign policy players. They acted as if the anti-India threats did not exist, or if they did, they were not a serious threat to Indian security and prestige. By implying that a rivalry of interests did not exist, Nehru and his advisers relied on escapism in dealing with the issues. Nehru relied on the goodwill of a sychophantic Indian bureaucracy and Indian intellectuals, and passive Indian public opinion. This combination offered Nehru an uncritical environment at home which gave him unparalleled freedom to function freely on the world stage. His political and diplomatic influence lasted as long as the rivalry of interests was in a sub-critical mode, but when it led to open conflict as in the 1962 war with China, and the crisis smoked out Nehru’s flawed policy assumptions and the lack of serious strategic planning, the Nehru game was exposed and the great prime minister of India was revealed to have feet of clay in the hard world of power politics. But the game was still not over when Nehru died in 1964 because there were elements in Nehru’s policies (such as the decision to keep India weak in the military and the nuclear sphere, and to keep India tangled up in the bureaucratic nightmare of a socialist economy), that were attractive for those who favoured a noisy and an ineffective India. It was their interest to deflect India away from the adoption of the mainstream norms of power politics and economic globalization. Hence their enthusiasm for Nehruism even after Nehru died. Ironically, the Chinese and American leaders were critics of Nehru when he was prime minister but they became supporters of the Nehru dynasty and the Nehruvian approach to foreign and military affairs after Nehru’s death. Within India the Nehruvian sympathizers sing the praise of Nehru as a secular leader and the leader of non-alignment but they are not able to critically evaluate his legacy in the fields of Indian diplomatic, military and economic endeavours. Because India’s progress took off

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after the fundamental principles of the Nehruvian state – a socialist economic model, a non-military state which made India a weak status quo state rather than a strong status quo power, were abandoned, it can be argued that India took off despite Nehru, not because of him. The anti-India trend lay in the structure of the policies of the three external powers. For the US, the priorities in its approach to the subcontinent were: contain Soviet influence in the region and its spread into Asia and the Middle East; contain India and the rise of nationalism in the third world especially the Arab world; bring Pakistan to America’s side in relation to American interests in the Middle East and the subcontinent; minimize damage to American relations with India as a result of its Pakistan policies; promote India as a democratic model in Asia in the context of the Sino-American cold war. Strategic and tactical diplomatic and military considerations rather than concern with democratic ideology or democratic peace defined the American approach to the subcontinent which was deemed to be a secondary zone of conflict in comparison to Europe and the Far East. For the Soviet Union, the priorities in its approach to the subcontinent were: to pursue its rivalry of interests with America in the international sphere and in the third world; to enable the third world countries to exploit the existence of Soviet Russia as a point of opposition to Western influence; to challenge Western influence in Asia and the Middle East and to make Moscow a pole of attraction to the third world nations because Western colonialism made it a pole of revulsion in Asian thinking.12 For America and Soviet Russia the Cold War was the frame of reference in their approach to India and Pakistan. Both shared a similarity of interest, that is, to maintain their primary position in world affairs and to maintain a bipolar structure of the international system. The similarity is revealed by their joint interest in the development of détente and arms control as core values in their bilateral relations in the 1960s; both also had a shared interest to avoid general war that could become nuclear. But at the same time both had a rivalry of interests in the major zones of international conflict in Europe, Asia and the Middle East. They competed for influence in the third world and by the late 1960s both were competing to bring China to their side and to secure the establishment of a strategic triangle between the three (US and Soviet Russia against China, 1950s and US and China against Soviet Russia, 1970s). But as great powers and nuclear weapon states they did not have the option to escalate international conflict because of the fear of mutual destruction, and they had a limited option to play the third party, China, to their advantage as long as all three powers were competing against each other. China and Pakistan were both weak powers in comparison to the superpowers and India respectively, but both had options to develop their ambitions. Pakistan had an anti-hegemony policy against India and its option was to jump on the American bandwagon to balance the asymmetry in the distribution of IndoPakistani power. The US–Pakistan military pact of 1954 secured this option. Another option was to build the theme of anti-Sovietism (initially anti-communism during the 1950s) in Pakistani foreign affairs. In both cases there was a similarity

Nehruvians and the rise of anti-India trends 137 of interests between Pakistan and America whereas there was a rivalry of interests between India and America (on both sides) and between America and Soviet Russia in Indian affairs. The character of American policy, and the character of Pakistani and American practitioners with the definition of their respective national interests and their ideological preferences in a turbulent world situation, shaped the similarity of interests between the two. On the other hand, the character of American and Indian policies, with the character of Indian and American practitioners, and the definition of their respective national interests and ideological preferences in a turbulent world situation, shaped the rivalry of interests between the two. China too had options. Lattimore described them in the following way: ‘the best that a weak country like China could do was to try to play great powers against each other’.13 It had some success in playing America and Soviet Russia against each other, and in building China’s position in the global arena. China’s leaders could play on the rivalry of interests between America and Soviet Russia. However, at the same time, it also faced severe limitations at the global level because of its relative inexperience with Western diplomatic practices, its limited capacity to project military power on a global scale and its limited capacity until the 1980s to affect global economic forces. China’s imperial past, its image as the modern successor to the Middle Kingdom of the past, its revolutionary rhetoric under Chairman Mao Tsetung and its ambition to be taken seriously as the natural leader of Asia raised fears about the danger of Chinese hegemony among its neighbours, from Japan to the Indian subcontinent. The Indian subcontinent became China’s playground where it was able to develop an impressive list of policy options because of the character of the Nehruvian Indian state and its foreign policy that minimized the value of military and economic strength and emphasized instead the value of the moral high road to peaceful relations. The political situation in the subcontinent favoured a build-up of Chinese options towards the area. Precisely when a disunited China was being unified under central and communist control in the late 1940s, the mighty Indian subcontinent, the anchor of the British empire, was being carved into different political units: Burma, Ceylon, India and Pakistan; and the strategic as well as the ideological unity of the subcontinent was broken into competing weak and insecure political units that could be expected to share a concern about domination by the largest country in the region, India. In this context after 1949 China developed a strong list of options in relation to the subcontinent: to consolidate its military position in Tibet and to eliminate it as a buffer zone between India and China and between Soviet Russia and China; to adopt a policy of friendship with India in the early 1950s and to replace it with a policy of war and conflict in the 1960s; to promote Pakistani militarism in the region and foster the rivalry of interests between China and Pakistan vis-à-vis India; to build anti-India alignments among India’s smaller neighbours; to promote revolutionary movements and dissent in India’s volatile border areas and to keep India off balance in its effort to promote peaceful development and political accommodation of competing political forces in India’s frontier zone and to build up Pakistan and later

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Myanmar, both being Indian strategic flanks, as channels of Chinese commercial and military influence and gateways to the Indian Ocean. The anti-India trends in China’s India policy emerged in a situation that China had access to an open and pluralistic system of India, as well as physical access from the plateau of Tibet into the Indian plains, whereas India lacked political and social access into Chinese society and state, and the geographical terrain made it difficult, if not impossible, for the Indian armed forces to attack or enter Chinese territory. (Comparatively Indian practitioners and non-governmental forces have access into the open US political system, and they have access as well into Pakistani state and society as a result of cultural and social links and familiarity with each other’s diplomatic and military policies and attitudes.) Our discussion turns not on the level of military and economic strength of the subcontinental players but on the character of their policies and the interplay between the limits and options each enjoyed since the late 1940s. The argument is that each player had limitations, some as a result of external pressures and some as a result of self-inflicted limits. The character of the Nehruvian state and diplomacy limited the list of Indian options. Under Nehru, India could not liberate Kashmir by force despite the advice of Nehru’s military commanders, a general war with Pakistan was ruled out because of a policy of Indo-Pakistani friendship on the Indian side, power politics was eschewed by Nehru because of his insistence on peace diplomacy, friendship with China was pushed along with the drive to bring China into the UN and as a leader in the third world and China’s claim to Tibet was recognized unilaterally without any Chinese concessions. No attempt was made to convert the secret nuclear option into a weapons programme under the Nehru regime. Nehru’s India was practicising unilateral self-restraint, and the ability to create a situation that could produce negotiated restraints by warring states was lost. While China was building its options against India, India had curtailed its main options against China. Nehru was serving Chinese interests and his personal ambition as a world leader while China was serving its national interests as a powerful player in the subcontinental region, at that time China’s gateway to a critical zone where all major international influences were in play. All the players faced limitations and the discussion turns on (1) who could increase its options in the face of limitations, (2) who accepted the limitations and made no effort to alter the parameters of policy or their frame of reference, (3) who faced the limitations but adapted to them by altering the pattern of its alignments without altering the frame of its reference and (4) who recognized the negative value of the limitations and chose to develop new policies to override them. We turn now to a discussion of these aspects. Pakistan and China represent the first case. Nehru’s India represents the second case. America represents the third case and post-Nehruvian India after 1998 represents the fourth case. Each external player discovered that there were opportunities to make the Indian subcontinent a field of their power but the pattern of interactions among the external powers in the subcontinent revealed the limits of power in each case. America was the strongest power on earth but Soviet Russia had staying power in the international system despite America’s belief in its material and moral

Nehruvians and the rise of anti-India trends 139 superiority. Consequently, America could at best check the spread of Soviet influence in the subcontinent; it could not eliminate it. Furthermore, as the Cold War international system moved from intense Cold War in the late 1940s to a relaxed détente type of Cold War, as the superpowers’ bilateral relationship moved from hostility to competitive coexistence in the later 1950s onwards, America came to accept the reality of Soviet influence in India. It adapted its diplomatic conduct in the subcontinent in relation to its co-superpower as it related to American interests with India. Following the time honoured principle ‘if you cannot beat them, join them’, the US joined hands with Soviet Russia to work jointly or in parallel manner to prevent dangerous escalation in Indo-Pakistani tensions, to push for a UN ceasefire when war broke out (as in 1965), to secure conflict management by great power mediation (Soviet mediation at Tashkant in 1966 had American support) and to work collectively to promote global nuclear nonproliferation that required Indian nuclear non-weaponization and non-exercise of the weapons option. America discovered as well the limits in its ability to check Chinese power in Asia. It found that the strongest power on earth had no answer to Chinese human wave tactics in the Korean war and China could not be defeated; it was there to stay in the Far East and in the Vietnam conflict America learnt about the value of avoiding military engagement with China and to appreciate its ability to aid the Northern Vietnamese. The anti-communism theme was prominent in American diplomacy in South Asia and in the Middle East. The US–Pakistan pact of 1954 and the military pacts in the Middle East and Southeast Asia (CENTO, Central Treaty Organisation and SEATO, Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation) had a specific anti-communist rationale. But as in the case of US policy of competitive coexistence with Moscow in the 1960s, practical considerations led America to recognize the value of a policy of competitive coexistence with China in the 1970s. It was a friend of Pakistan, enemy of India and the enemy of my enemy was a tactical friend was the reasoning of the Nixon–Kissinger White House. Having opposed Pakistan’s shift towards China in the early 1960s, and after providing India with military aid following the 1962 war, America joined the anti-India trend in Pakistani and Chinese policies towards India. America’s frame of reference in its policy remained constant: to maintain Indo-Pakistani polarity and balance of power; to keep Pakistan as a member of the inner circle of American defence in the Gulf and the Middle Eastern region; to check the danger of Indian hegemony and to check the spread of Indian nationalism and diplomatic influence in the third world. America remained wedded to its belief in the military approach to world politics, that is, a faith in military power and military alliances as the method to deal with political and developmental issues in the ex-colonial world; and to extol the virtue of free market capitalism even in countries in Asia and the Middle East who had missed the pain as well as the fruits of the industrial revolution. But in hindsight, the US position in the subcontinent since 1947 is one of failed power. It is ironic that the strongest power on earth in the twentieth century should have a record of failed policies in the subcontinent. It failed to secure IndoPakistani bipolarity and balance of power between the two despite massive amounts of aid to Pakistan and despite its diplomatic support to the Pakistani case

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on Kashmir. America failed too in its aim to prevent the emergence of India as a regional great power and its rise as a nuclear weapon power.14 It failed to prevent the breakup of Pakistan. One cannot imagine a bigger gap between its massive power and the lack of achievements in terms of its declared aims. America had conviction about its subcontinental policies, it engaged in actions in pursuit of its goals, but the actions were either ineffective or counterproductive between 1947 and 1998. India, on the other hand, had ambition but no power and no strategy under Nehru to engage the forces outside the subcontinent that were bearing in. India was an outsider in the field of power politics of the subcontinent although it was physically a part of the subcontinent. Instead of functioning as an insider of the subcontinent with power and influence in the subcontinent, Nehru and his admirers functioned as members of a system of suzerain or subsidiary states’ system as in the British Raj and its successor, the Anglo-American Raj. Nehru had created a number of policy boundaries that inhibited the development and the exercise of Indian power within the Indian subcontinent. An important policy boundary was that the military liberation of Kashmir was not an Indian option, nor was general war with Pakistan an option; a policy of friendship with Pakistan and peaceful settlement of Kashmir issue was preferred, or as in the Nehru era, the existence of a Kashmir dispute was denied, just as the existence of a boundary dispute with China was denied by Nehru until China made the issue public in 1962. Escapism was the preferred strategy or option. Another policy boundary of Nehru was to take the high moral road against power politics, against the development of the Indian military and against Indian nuclear weapon development and testing; peacekeeping and peaceful coexistence diplomacy were the preferred options. Nehru’s ambition was to make India into one of the four poles of power along with America, Russia and China or to make India, a non-aligned state, into a major international force or in questions relating to international development and international security. Under Nehru there were expressions of conviction and ambition and there were many diplomatic actions at the international level but they turned out to be unwanted initiatives that were ineffective and counterproductive with reference to Indian interests or global peace and security. The pattern of options and limitations in the conduct of the subcontinent’s major and minor players – India and Pakistan and the three external powers – was a product of changing nuances and zealotry (passion and rigidity in thinking) rather than a story of good versus evil between one or the other. (This point is made by Le Carre, the renowned novelist in Absolute Friends, 2004, in a different context but we find that the distinction is relevant in the study of subcontinental international relations.) The US saw itself as the model leader of the world after the Second World War; it saw itself as a benign force in international relations, a force for goodness as a result of its generosity as an aid giver and a protector of its allies. But America repelled both Indian and Pakistani public opinion and the political classes in the two countries. Pakistan was less repelled by America and vice versa because the US recognized that Pakistan had real interests in contention with India, and by subordinating itself to Anglo-American

Nehruvians and the rise of anti-India trends 141 diplomatic and military interests in Korea, the Middle East and against Moscow, Pakistan could be managed as India could not. But the Pakistani tilt towards the Anglo-American policies was one of tactics and bargaining to secure American military and economic aid and diplomatic support against India. Pakistan was not a client state of the US or the UK. It was obviously a lesser power which had independent interests, that is, it had a strategy and capacity to mobilize the international environment in support of its cause against Indian and Hindu hegemony and to maintain its freedom to manoeuver vis-à-vis all three external powers irrespective of their ideologies so that Pakistani interests were served. Note that Pakistan’s tilt towards Beijing in the early 1960s reflected Pakistani sense of vulnerability towards India and a sense that America was an unreliable ally against India when America gave military aid to India following its defeat at Chinese hands in 1962. Pakistani public opinion has a strong current of anti-Americanism. In other words, Pakistan was both attracted and repelled by the US. The balance between the two conditions shifted according to the nature of the bilateral relationship between Pakistan and America vis-à-vis India. When America tilted towards Pakistan there was attraction; when it tilted towards India there was repulsion and insecurity in Pakistani political and social thought. In comparison, Nehru’s India was repelled by the American political style and its overemphasis and overconfidence in its military and economic power. During Nehru’s visit to America in 1949 both sides were repelled by each other. American leaders thought that Nehru was naïve and egoistical and Nehru thought of Americans as immature and brash.15 Moscow by comparison attracted India because it recognized that India had independent interests of its own, there was a rivalry between America and Soviet Russia, between Soviet Russia and China and between India and China, and these rivalries provided Moscow with a framework for its policy in India. Indian government’s refusal to subordinate itself to the interests of the Anglo-American bloc even though Indian capitalism and significant sections of the Indian bureaucracy favoured the West in foreign and military affairs, gave Moscow a sign about Indian government’s independence of thought that could be enhanced by Soviet support for Indian interests and a build-up of Indian economic and military capacities. China attracted India following the success of its revolution in 1949 but the basis of this attraction is unclear. Indian political writings by Nehru, K. M. Panikkar (Ambassador to China), Krishna Menon and S. Radhakrishnan, (Ambassador to Soviet Russia) reveal the importance of China in India’s global diplomacy. As noted earlier, the thinking of Sardar V. B. Patel, on the other hand, revealed a deep suspicion of Chinese motives towards India and the Himalayan area. But these were sidelined in Indian diplomacy. So the real basis of India’s attraction to China is unclear other than in idealistic terms but there is no evidence in Chinese diplomatic thought that Beijing acknowledged that India had independent interests of its own that merited Chinese support of Indian interests. That India was unwilling to subordinate itself to the Anglo-American bloc and its willingness to promote China’s cause in world affairs did not impress China.

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Chinese writings and Western views of Chinese thinking about India reveal a contempt for India.16 In other words, India was attracted to China, not China to India. Much as India sought peaceful coexistence with China, its hatred of Indians particularly Nehru, the lack of Chinese curiosity about Indian conditions and developments and the fear that India was a plaything of the Anglo-American bloc and the Russians in their cold war policies towards China made India a point of opposition and revulsion in Chinese thinking. While India saw itself as holding a central position in the Indian Ocean area as a result of its strategic location at the crossroads of global cultural and diplomatic communications between the Middle East, Asia and the Indian ocean area, China saw itself as holding a central position in relation to America and Soviet Russia; and Russia saw itself as holding a central position in Eurasia and as a point of attraction to the third world. Pakistan was attracted to China because it was repelled by Delhi–Moscow links and the unreliable nature of Pakistani–American links and the rise of links between Washington and Delhi in the economic sphere in the 1950s and in the military sphere after 1962. In this context China recognized that Pakistan had a real rivalry of strategic interests with India and the Soviet Union. Pakistan realized by the mid-1950s that China had a real interest in rivalry with India, Soviet Russia and America and in building up Pakistan as a strategic gateway for the spread of Chinese influence to the Middle East and the Indian Ocean area, as well as a line of military and diplomatic pressure on India via Pakistan. From Pakistani point of view China was the most reliable strategic partner and a point of attraction despite the differences between a communist and an Islamic state. In this context China and Pakistan held the maximum number of diplomatic and military options in the subcontinent, from 1949 onwards. These are defined by their attitude towards each other and the other players in the subcontinent, and by their capacity to act. Pakistani options were to militarize the Kashmir dispute (rather than to maintain it as a political issue); to build Indo-Pakistani ideological and strategic polarity and to mobilize a pattern of alignments with America and China and Muslim countries with a view to check India’s power and influence; and to build Pakistan as a platform to build American and Chinese pressure against Indian interests rather than to attempt peaceful settlement of the Kashmir issue with India; and to encourage the development of Pakistan as a country that was available to serve Anglo-American strategic interests in the Middle East–Soviet regions and thus function in the context of American view of the Cold War that assigned blame to Soviet aggressiveness rather than American bellicosity in the international sphere. Pakistan could have opted to stay out of America’s international military alliances in the Middle East and Southeast Asia. China’s options on the other hand were to support the Pakistani view of Kashmiri self-determination or liberation by political pressure and armed struggle rather than to avoid interference in the internal affairs of the two subcontinental states; to escalate Sino-Indian tensions in the Himalayan border in the late 1950s into a full blown war rather than to maintain a situation of manageable instability in the area and to answer Nehru’s ‘provocations’ in 1962 with Chinese restraint knowing that Indian forces lacked the capacity to defeat Chinese forces; to join the

Nehruvians and the rise of anti-India trends 143 Anglo-American bloc game to encourage Indo-Pakistani polarity by giving aid and comfort to Pakistani challenge of India in regional and global affairs rather than to avoid such provocative conduct towards India; by giving nuclear and missile aid to Pakistan including nuclear test data which facilitated an arms race in the region and increased Indian concerns about Chinese strategic intentions towards India rather than to observe the letter and spirit of the international nuclear and missile non-proliferation agreements and to take steps to make Pakistan and later Myanmar as the gateways for the movement of Chinese commerce and military power into the Indian ocean area rather than to arouse concern about Chinese intentions in two areas that made India’s strategic flanks. During the Nehru era there were few limits, mostly in terms of its concerns about the future pattern of China’s relations with the superpowers, on China’s ability to manoeuver in the subcontinent and to take advantage of the IndoPakistani rivalry and the superpowers’ rivalry.17 But the other players had limits. America had defined interests in the subcontinent, that is, to maintain IndoPakistani polarity, to keep Pakistan on its side in Middle Eastern and subcontinental affairs, to keep Soviet influence in the region in check and to maintain a balance between American support of Pakistan as an ally and its support of India as a democratic model in Asia in contrast to China. Because of its self-imposed policy parameters, America’s range of manoeuvrability in subcontinental politics was limited and it was riddled with dilemmas. When America started to arm India after 1962 because of the India-China war, and when the US and the USSR cut off military aid to both India and Pakistan and brought the 1965 war to a halt because of shortage of military spares on both sides and forced a ceasefire on the warring parties, the loss of its influence in Pakistan was an opportunity for China. It stepped forward to rebuild the Pakistani military and later its nuclear and missile capacity and its self-confidence. Moreover, China’s hard stand on the SinoIndian land frontier had a political effect on India as well as Pakistan and on much of the third world countries. They realized that the Indian political class led by Nehru had feet of clay when it came to national defence. The 1962 defeat of India sent a message to the major powers as well as the non-aligned countries. China’s military action had a political effect on India and the Asian world because it showed Chinese capacity to alter the regional balance of power; it showed that Asia was a field of Chinese military power whereas India was not capable of challenging the regional balance. The year 1962 showed that India was a weak status quo state while China was a strong anti-status quo power in the subcontinent. Comparatively Pakistani military actions against India in the wars in 1947–48 and 1962 had a limited political effect on India and on other players, because Pakistan could not upset the regional balance of power and its land frontier with India was mostly demarcated including the Kashmir region which was ‘disputed’ but still defined by the Line of Control between the Indian and the Pakistani Kashmirs. For India, Pakistan was a nuisance but China was dangerous because it had the capacity to escalate and it acquired the reputation of doing so as in the Korean War and in the war with India. Pakistan’s political effect on India was limited because it reflected American and Chinese policies towards the India–Pakistan

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question. Without their support Pakistan lacked independent capacity to act against India and alone it could function at best as a nuisance and a sideshow in Indian foreign affairs. Pakistani options to escalate conflict with India depended on the level of foreign support for its actions. When it was high as in the 1950s because of American aid and diplomatic support, and in the 1960s–90s because of Chinese aid and diplomatic support, Pakistani ability to create regional space for its policies increased, but when the support was reduced or withdrawn, Pakistani autonomy in regional politics decreased. The rivalry of interests and the capacity as well as the incentives of the major and minor players in sub-continental politics to escalate the level and the intensity of the rivalry were the two main determinants that shaped the political effects of the players. The effects were of three types. The first, authored by the British rulers of India shaped the basis and pattern of Indo-Pakistani polarity in their exit strategy from the Indian subcontinent in 1947. The second, authored by Nehru shaped the basis of a Nehruvian state and a Nehruvian foreign policy and military strategy that was a hybrid of foreign ideas and a colonial system that were managed by Indians with foreign support. Although the ‘independent’ Indian state and its ‘independent policy of peace’ was framed in the language of Indian political nationalism, the policies were national in form, not in content, as we argue in Chapter 10. The third, authored initially by the Anglo-American bloc and later embraced by Chinese communists, projected the parameters and premises of the first type and produced a pattern of Pakistani-led but China-supported and America-tolerated intervention and escalation of conflict against Indian interests. The effect of the first and the second types have been subtle and long lasting, while the effect of the third type was contained and reversed by the diplomatic and military policies of the ‘nationalistic’ BJP minority government (1998–2004). Chapter 10 examines the evolution of the three types of political effects and the process of fundamental and subtle change that is currently under way in Indian and subcontinental diplomatic and strategic affairs.

10 The external determinants of change in Indian foreign affairs, 1960s–90s

Lattimore points out that nationalism is the bedrock of a country’s political structure and a sound foreign policy.1 Under the Nehrus the Indian political structure was a hybrid of a colonial administrative system and electoral democracy, a socialist, state-driven economy and the two were managed by Indians with extensive foreign economic and diplomatic support since Indian gained its independence in 1947. The aid came in the form of food aid, developmental grants and loans and limited military aid and training following India’s military conflict with China in 1962. As noted earlier, Indian foreign policy under Nehru embraced foreign strategic ideas; for example, no war with Pakistan and friendship with it that reflected Lord Mountbatten’s ideas; global pacifism and nuclear disarmament that reflected the ideas of the Indian and the Soviet leftists; and anti-Americanism in India’s policies on Korea, China and the USSR, that reflected Soviet and Chinese sensitivities; and a socialist economy that reflected Soviet faith in state planning and its inputs into the Indian planning process. Nehruvian foreign policy and the Nehru-centric and the Congress party-centric state was wrapped up in the mantle of Indian political nationalism. In hindsight this was mostly Indian in form rather than substance in the economic, military and the diplomatic spheres. Nehruvian and Indian Congress party nationalism was aligned to the memory of the Indian independence movement (1880s–1947) and the prominent role played by the Nehrus and the Gandhis among other Indian political leaders. But this was not nationalism in the traditional meanings of the term. Nationalism is meant to reflect shared history, a sense of destiny, a common consciousness in terms of race, religion, language, political ideas and ideals about power and politics, a sense of identity and a sense of nationality and territoriality.2 India’s political, social and military history, however, indicated the presence of major internal social and political divisions that reflected differences in race, caste, class, language, religion, regions and political ambitions of the rulers. India’s crisis behaviour as noted earlier showed a historical pattern of scattering of Indian forces in the face of adversity, an openness about seeking foreign help against local rivals and the lack of a single set of Indian political ideas that suggested an inclination to share and balance power rather than to seek imperial pursuits. India’s independence movement did not alter the divisiveness in Indian political, social and military history; and it is a mistake to assume that India’s independence

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movement under the Congress party reformed the historical divisive impulses in Indian state and society and that it represented the establishment of Indian nationalism. The success of Indian Congress party leaders and their build-up by the British authorities was a part of British exit from India policy; it was because of British policy and not despite it and it was not solely the result of the work by Indian leaders during the independence movement. The British exit policy was to divide the subcontinent on the basis of religion, to create a structure of IndoPakistani polarity and conflict, to fragment the force of ‘Indian political nationalism’ by the achievement of Hindu–Muslim and Indo-Pakistani polarity. The British rulers left India in the hands of two pacifists – Nehru and Gandhi – who were not likely to build-up India’s military and economic strength given their attachment to foreign ideas and pacifist principles and given the likelihood of their dependence on foreign support and inputs. The chapter argues as follows: 1

Nehruvian foreign policy’s general principle about Indian non-alignment had general public support but since the tactics and policy actions in the diplomatic and the military spheres were conducted in secrecy one cannot assume that broad national support actually existed except in the general sense indicated. The record of Indian diplomatic memoirs published by Indian officials indicated support of a sycophantic bureaucracy because to them only Nehru mattered. There was as well, extensive foreign support for Nehru’s policies especially in the early 1950s. Nehru owed his position in foreign affairs to foreign inputs more than Indian ones. The Indian ones showed a lack of consensus about the nature of the threats facing India, the role of power in dealing with them and the nature of Indian power required to manage external enmities. With a focus on bilateral relations, Indian practitioners did not articulate the emergence of dangerous anti-Indian trends from outside India’s borders that pressured Indian interests and undermined its reputation in the diplomatic sphere. Note that Nehru had cut himself off from many Indian roots: Indian cultural nationalism (Vedas and Indian philosophy); Indian military nationalism that stressed the value of military power and military strategy (e.g. Kautilya, history of wars by the Maharattas, Sikhs, the importance of sea power and the Indian Ocean as expressed by K. M. Panikkar and the importance of defence that was stressed by Indian nationalists like Tilak during the freedom struggle); economic nationalism that required development of real Indian economic self-reliance and growth rather than actual dependence on foreign aid and finally, political nationalism that reflected Indian interests rather than ‘service to humanity’ that pandered to great powers’ interests (e.g. China’s regarding its admission to the UN and its international recognition) and abstract principles of globalism. The bedrock of Nehruvian foreign policy was the Nehruvian colonial-administrative state structure that was wrapped in a veneer of nationalism, non-alignment, democracy, secularism and tolerance. These veneers (with the exception of democracy) could not withstand the pressures of the rise of anti-Indian trends

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2

in the policies of Pakistan, America and China up to the beginning of the twenty-first century. The veneers also lacked broad and deep societal support since they had little resonance in a country that was mired with the problems of survival and class, caste, religious and political divisions. Nehru’s foreign policy was a luxury in a divided society. When the anti-Indian trends in foreign and military affairs gained ground and threatened Indian territorial integrity and prestige as a result of wars and social conflict (1962, 1965 and 1971), Nehru’s foreign policy was amended in response to the assertiveness of Indian nationalism and the external threats that required an Indian military response; but it was not discarded. That is, Nehru’s approach to foreign affairs coexisted with the growth of the anti-India trends during the 1950s as long as the latter were in a sub-critical mode. But the tipping point was the emergence of a crisis for India as a result of anti-India trends and then something had to give in the Nehruvian policy. In 1962, three lines of thought emerged: (a) Nehru’s apologists urged a return to Nehruvian principles. Thus Krishna Menon maintained his faith in nuclear disarmament and friendship with China (but not with Pakistan) even after the Chinese military attack on India in 1962 and the development of its nuclear bomb programme.3 (b) Others urged a reform of Indian foreign policy and military policy by shedding Nehru’s globalism and by building a capacity to fight foreign threats.4 (c) Others feared that Indian military development could derail India’s economic progress, and here defence issues remained a prisoner to the economic question; the ambivalence between ‘guns and butter’ remained.5 The debates were opened up as a result of the 1962 China war but they were on-going ones and they were prolonged by the presence of numerous Indian voices. The history of post-1947 Indian strategic debates points to the inefficient manner of developing public policy but on the other in a democracy it is essential to secure legitimacy in policy formation.

The argument highlights the effect of external shocks in opening up Indian strategic debates and in stimulating Indian popular nationalism which in turn impacts on the leadership and the bureaucracy. Our view is that India’s involvement in wars and foreign threats after 1947 shaped the Indian learning curve and the lessons learnt in each crisis incrementally increased the weight and the importance of military and economic strength in Indian policy formation post-Nehru. But the learning process was slow and retarded by internal intra-governmental and Indian public debates. The learning curve took shape in the context of three lines of thinking and change as noted earlier: (a) the Nehruvian principles of the Nehruvian state; (b) the demands of economic and military (and later cultural) nationalism and (c) the ambivalent ones who dithered between butter and guns. But each external crisis – in the form of war, or threat to accept the rules of an international regime or economic pressure – contributed to the learning process. With the lessons learnt and the new military and economic capacity that was gained following each crisis, India’s crisis behaviour also began to change compared to the historical pattern as described by Spear. In our narrative

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the crises shaped by the anti-India forces played a critical role in Indian policy formation. They are the triggers that force or induce change on the Indian side. The Nehruvian state and diplomatic machinery, and the Congress party which had dominated Indian political life since 1947 (with the exception of the BJP’s rule), had a defensive and reactive political culture. Without the foreign triggers the Nehruvian state remained in a sub-critical and hence in a defensive and a reactive mode. Our ‘cultural’ checklist is helpful in measuring the change in Indian diplomatic and military strategy post-Nehru. ‘Culture’ has several meanings: (a) The first refers to Nehru’s diplomatic culture that favoured vacillation and ambivalence on many international issues. (b) The second refers to the pre-1947 Indian culture of scattering forces in the face of adversity, seeking help of foreign forces against local rivals and relying on imperial ventures rather than balanced and shared power as the basis of Indian power politics. (c) The third refers to the culture of slow learning as a result of crises that were the result of intolerable foreign pressures either on Indian borders or on India’s international interests in the international sphere. (d) The fourth refers to the culture of tilting away from the Nehruvian diplomatic principles and adopting new diplomatic and military strategies that required a resort to coercive measures so that India could escalate and then negotiate with its rivals and enemies. This is the new Indian diplomatic and military culture that is closer to the Western and communist mainstream; it places a premium on proactive rather than defensive and reactive action. The fourth culture rejects ambivalence and oscillation of the Nehru era that relied on the belief that Indian culture required an attitude of two or more opposing positions on the same question. This is why Nehru was often of ‘two minds’ on the same question and had to be nudged by his advisers to commit to a position. Our third and fourth cultures indicate the development of commitments beyond Nehru’s policy boundaries as a result of external crises triggered by members of the anti-India coalition. Wars play an important role in eroding Nehru’s diplomatic culture but the structure of the Nehruvian state and Nehruvian foreign and economic policy was so entrenched that no single event in India’s strategic environment provided the external shock that triggered a massive restructuring in its diplomatic and military affairs. In our narrative the Nehruvian state is a constant feature of Indian political life and Nehruvian diplomacy is the variable as a result of the effects of external crises. Each successive war or diplomatic or economic crisis has corroded Nehru’s policy boundaries as well as the position of the Nehruvians but the process is evolutionary and incremental. Following the 1962 war Nehru’s China policy was in tatters but not the broad principles of his advocacy relating to world peace and nuclear disarmament. During the 1965 war with Pakistan that occurred after Nehru’s death, his successor L. B. Shastri abandoned the Nehru (and Mountbatten) injunction against a general war with Pakistan. Shastri ordered the Indian army to go across the international Indo-Pakistani border to relieve the Pakistani military pressure in Kashmir. But this policy change could not be sustained because the bedrock of Indian diplomacy at the time was the level of

External determinants of change 149 foreign (American, British and Soviet) support which did not exist in favour of India’s military action; the interests of the great powers favoured an Indo-Pakistani ceasefire and a return to the status quo. This was achieved by a debate at the UN Security Council and by Soviet mediation in Tashkant that had American support. The Shastri action lacked staying power because both the Indian and the Pakistani militaries were dependent on spare parts of their patrons, USSR and America. During the war both superpowers decided to cut off the supply of spare parts and this effectively brought the two military machines to a halt. At this time India lacked the military capacity to escalate the conflict, to win the war and to negotiate thereafter. Shastri showed a capacity to escalate the conflict by unleashing the Indian army against the Pakistani heartland but his political decision was not matched by an ability to terminate the fight on Indian terms. The duration and the termination of the Indo-Pakistani fight were in the hands of the major powers. So 1965 represented an inconclusive change in Indian diplomacy towards Pakistan. Shastri revealed a new, post-Nehru political will to fight, to militarily engage Pakistan, but he did not have the capacity to sustain the military engagement and bring it to a successful conclusion. This remained in foreign hands. Following the 1966 ceasefire, Shastri died of a mysterious heart attack in Tashkant, Indira Gandhi succeeded Shastri as prime minister and entered a period of prolonged internal power politics against ‘Indian rightists’.6 Indian foreign affairs returned to the sub-critical mode and Nehruvian principles retained their salience in the Indira Gandhi regime. Her priorities were to secure her position in Indian politics and to maintain her access and dependence on foreign support. During the Indira Gandhi years the traditional pattern of Indian political culture (scattering internal forces in the face of crisis, seeking external allies to fight local rivals and avoiding the development of Indian balance of power theory and practice in relation to external enemies) persisted; and the anti-India trends in Pakistani, American and Chinese policies continued to grow in a sub-critical mode between 1966 and 1970–71 when the East Pakistan crisis erupted and threatened Indian interests. Intense Indian political rivalries, disagreements on economic policies and weakness in India’s economic and political fabric dominated the Indira Gandhi era. Indian nationalism was aroused in 1962 when China attacked India, and then again in 1965 when Pakistani irregulars attacked Kashmir, but when these crises abated and Indian politics and economics took centre stage, Indian nationalism was divided and mired in local controversies. The old pattern of Indian political culture remained dominant after 1966. Under Indira Gandhi, India was a field of internal power politics involving rivalries among Indian political leaders. As well India remained a field of power politics of external powers within the Indian subcontinent, the anti-India trends remained unchecked because Indian diplomacy lacked the military means to engage hostile forces through sustained military action and they lacked the vision and the strategy to get outside the Nehruvian diplomatic boundaries which had boxed India into an anti-power politics frame of mind. The post-Nehru period however is important because the arousal of Indian nationalism following the 1962 and 1965 wars and the growth of terrorism and political militancy in India’s border areas created a

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strong public identification against Chinese and Pakistani threats to India’s integrity. This was in contrast to Nehru’s effort to create a public identification within India about the utility and prospect of peaceful coexistence with China and about the importance of friendly relations with Pakistan. It is ironic that Nehru did so precisely when the two were building an anti-India coalition with American help. The point is that external circumstances, not Nehruvian policies changed the Indian public’s identification with China and Pakistan as military and diplomatic threats to Indian interests. Nonetheless, the Indian public’s identification concerned China’s betrayal after the 1962 war, not Nehru’s betrayal of Indian interests as a result of wrong policies that opened the subcontinent up as a field of power politics of the great powers and minimized India’s position in the subcontinent as a result. The Indian public being largely poor and preoccupied with questions relating to survival, and with the Nehruvian bureaucracy running an interference against the development of critical public thinking concerning the nature of the foreign policy problem(s) and the solutions, the Indian public could not have realized the value of military and nuclear strength in dealing with a challenging strategic environment. There was little understanding among Indian intellectuals and political leaders about the pressure on India that was inherent in the Maoist principle that power came from the barrel of a gun; and second, from Chinese history that placed it as the Middle Kingdom and defined political relationships in terms of superior and inferior players. The 1962 war had a political effect in intensifying the internal Indian bureaucratic and public debate about the relative value of guns and butter. The agents of the Nehruvian state (the bureaucrats and the state’s economists) still lobbied hard in favour of the Nehruvian theory that power came from economic development and not from economic and military strength. On border security and military questions the military and nuclear stakeholders in India were kept marginalized about decisions to use military and nuclear strength to control the anti-India trends in the policies of Pakistan, America and China. Even after the 1962 and 1965 military conflicts, the Indian prime minister and the civilian bureaucracy set the policy boundaries of Indian military and nuclear policies and the nature of civil–military relations were such that the Indian military adapted itself to the Nehruvian tradition of following orders and not speaking on military affairs unless it was asked for military advice. There was no institutionalized process at the time for the Indian military as an institution to provide military advice that shaped the parameters of Indian strategic planning. Note the contrast with the British vice-regal system where the military member of the Viceroy’s council had a seat at the policy table and was expected to provide the military advice. Figures 10.1a, 10.1b and 10.2 show the effects of external crises on Indian policies and actions. The external shocks stimulated change in the Indian government’s decisionmaking and gradually increased the awareness about the importance of military power in managing external crises; and conversely increased awareness about the limitations of a peace policy that relied on foreign goodwill and foreign support

External determinants of change 151 Nehru’s peace diplomacy and policies - peaceful coexistence with China, 1949–62 - friendship with Pakistan, no war policy - limited Indian military development - active development of Indian dual use nuclear power, the late1940s - active development of Indian socialist economy

Nehru’s antipower politics policy marginalized Indian armed services in policy-making Indian civilians dominated bureaucratic politics

Nehru’s pronuclear policy was a core value in Indian atoms for peace diplomacy but India's nuclear weapon option is secret and subject to bureaucratic debate and control

- Sino-Pakistani alignment, 1960s - Sino-Indian border disagreements, 1950 to war, 1962 - Sino-Pakistan talks, 1955– - Indo-US polarity on US-Pakistan military pact, 1954 - Indo-Pakistani polarity - Hindu-1947 Muslim polarity, pre-1947, post-1947

Peaceful diplomacy and peaceful economic and political change was promoted by political, administrative and economic elites of India

Anti-Indian diplomatic and military coalition emerged during Nehru era

Figure 10.1a Nehru era, 1947–64, sub-critical phase. Notes 1 Bargaining space in international politics was limited to negotiating (a) ties with the USSR (b) ties with Canada (nuclear and diplomatic issues) and (c) UK–USA on food and economic aid. (a) and (c) increased Indian dependence on foreign, support and goodwill. Bargaining space was occupied by international players and Nehruvians. 2 There is no bargaining between Nehru’s peace diplomacy and military stake-holders because Nehru had institutional control over both as head of Nehruvian state. No internal debate disturbed the policy-making capacity of the Nehruvian state. Indian public opinion was passive about economic and foreign policies. It was not a factor in decision-making.

rather than Indian capacity and initiative. External crises brought Indian public opinion into focus as a factor in a government that functioned normally, when it was in a sub-critical mode, according to the rigidities of the official Secrets Act. Government secrecy meant that the parameters of Indian public policy concerning military, diplomatic and scientific affairs were kept away from public scrutiny. Indian public opinion brought secret Indian diplomatic and military issues out into the public realm. The dominant coalition of Nehru and his advisers were not able to control the public debate and the public pressure to act decisively against an external threat. Thus, external crises radicalized Indian public opinion and it called for Indian government action. But being reactive and defensive in its style, and being dependent on foreign support, the Indian government acted with caution and deliberation. Its options to act were limited as a result of its

Nehru’s policy boundaries in the diplomatic sphere were maintained by the Nehruvian state except for abandonment of peaceful policy with China after 1962 (see characteristics in Figure 10.1a)

- There was public identification with philosophy of Indian defence and role of armed forces (Note 2) - But policy making remained dominated by civilians with no knowledge of war and who continued to think inside the box of Nehruvian state and Nehruvian policies

Nehru’s pro- nuclear, policy continues (see Figure 10.1a)

The polarities of the past were institutionalized in India’s strategic neighbourhood; but the Sino-Indian polarity was militarized (see Figure 10.1a)

India’s political boundaries shifted from peaceful diplomacy and peaceful economic and political change to importance of ‘guns and butter’

Anti-India trends in policies of Pakistan, the US and China continued to grow

Figure 10.1b Nehru era, 1947–64, critical phase. Notes 1 Bargaining space in international politics was limited to negotiating (a) ties with the USSR (b) ties with Canada (nuclear and diplomatic issues) and (c) UK–USA on food and economic aid. (a) and (c) increased Indian dependence on foreign, support and goodwill. Bargaining space was occupied by international players and Nehruvians. 2 Indian nationalism was aroused over ‘China’s betrayal’ and ‘territorial aggression’, and public opinion increased weight of Indian armed forces, and eroded peace policy with China. 3 India’s nuclear debate opened up within the government and the public domain as a result of 1962 War and China’s first atomic test in 1964. Polarity in nuclear debate emerged but there was no policy change. Nehru’s policy boundaries – ((a) nuclear development – yes (b) Indian nuclear weapons – no and (c) advocacy of nuclear disarmament – global and Indian – yes) remained unchanged. 4 The Indian government and the Indian public opinion did not visualize the pattern of development of the anti-India trends in policies of Pakistan, the US and China and their negative implications for India.

Nehruvian foreign policies Nehru’s policy boundaries in the diplomatic sphere were maintained by the Nehruvian state except that (a) peace policy with China was undermined after 1962 and (b) Shastri’s decision to attack Pakistan undermined Nehru's/ Mountbatten’s no war with Pakistan policy

There was public identification with philosophy of Indian defence and role of armed forces vis-à-vis Pakistan and China. But Indian military policy-making remained dominated by Indian civilians who lack parctical knowledge of war and who continue to think inside the box of Nehruvian Policies and the state

Nehru’s pro-nuclear, pro-disarmament and non-weapon policies continued

The polarities of the past were strengthened in India’s strategic neighbourhood. The diplomatic animosities, pre-1962, were militarized in the case of China–India and Pakistan–India

India’s pursuit of ‘guns and butter’ strategy was reinforced

Anti-India external coalition

Figure 10.2 The Shastri era, 1964–January 1966, critical phase (the 1965 war with Pakistan). Notes 1 Bargaining space in international politics was limited to negotiating (a) ties with the USSR (b) ties with Canada (nuclear and diplomatic issues) and (c) UK–USA on food and economic aid. (a) and (c) increased Indian dependence on foreign, support and goodwill. Bargaining space was occupied by international players and Nehruvians. Soviet mediation (Tashkant, 1966) reinforced Indian dependence on foreign support. India lacked capacity to sustain a prolonged military fight and to end it on Indian terms. 2 Indian nationalism was aroused by Pakistani military aggressiveness in Kashmir and supported Shastri’s decision to attack Pakistan. Territoriality was reinforced as the basis of Indian nationalism. 3 1965 War had no effect on India’s nuclear debate. 4 The Indian government and the Indian public opinion did not visualize the pattern of development of the anti-India trends in policies of Pakistan, the US and China and their negative implications for India.

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dependence on foreign support and its openness to foreign pressures; and yet it could not publicly acknowledge the extent of its dependence on foreign powers. Our analysis indicates a slow and hesitant learning curve during each crisis and following each crisis after 1962. The learning curve reflected two types of changes: first, the awareness that Nehru’s policy boundaries required adjustment and even radical change; and second, the awareness that the weight of military power and military strategy had to increase to address the anti-India trends in the policies of Pakistan, America and China.

The 1971 war: Indira Gandhi cuts the tails This war is an important milestone in the evolution of Indian political and military policy. It was a far cry from Nehru’s no war with Pakistan policy. It built on the Shastri decision to engage Pakistan militarily in 1965. It was more daring than the 1965 operation because it required Indian diplomatic and military action against three fronts: West and East Pakistan, the long border with China and the threat posed by American naval pressure in the Indian Ocean. Moreover India was isolated at the UN where the campaign for a ceasefire between India and Pakistan left India with little support. Moreover, the anti-India coalition revealed a number of dangerous tendencies in world politics of the time. One side of the coalition consisted of Pakistan which was at the time a militaristic, fascist and a genocidal entity that spawned hatred for the Indians and had a murderous attitude about fellow Muslims in Bangladesh. The other side of the coalition consisted of China which had a hostile relationship with India, a friendly one with Pakistan and an emerging one with America; but China too had contempt for ‘the Indians’ as is evident in the de-classified documents of the White House. American political leadership in the White House had a pathological view of Indians and Indian policy which is revealed by President Richard Nixon’s and Henry Kissinger’s remarks which are discussed later. Indian military action in 1971 successfully engineered the defeat of the Pakistani military and its formal surrender to India put the seal on the fact that Pakistan has never won a military campaign against India in a straight fight; and thus its favoured method was to engage in psychological warfare and indirect warfare through promotion of subversion and insurrection in Indian border areas and lately in other Indian places such as Bangalore. How did India lance the emerging Pakistan–China–America boil that was ripe for a prick and what was the aftermath of Indian military action in terms of the development of the anti-India coalition after 1972? The chapter lays the basis for three stories in the evolution of India’s diplomatic and military strategy after 1965. First, how India successfully defeated the anti-Indian coalition on the battlefield. Second, how the anti-India coalition accepted its nuclearization and made Pakistan and China, with American concurrence, the spearheads of nuclear pressure on India. This story shows the secondary importance of nuclear non-proliferation in the Indian subcontinent in comparison to the priority of maintaining the viability of the anti-Indian coalition; it is a story about the American policy of selective non-proliferation (against India) and selective

External determinants of change 155 tolerance of nuclear and missile proliferation of Pakistan in American and Chinese policy. Third and finally, how Pakistan adopted the path of Islamic Jihad as the way to undermine the Indian Union and the political and the economic model it represented and how this was not resisted or exposed by its strategic allies, China and America, until after Pakistan’s position as a supporter of the Taliban was exposed post-September 2001. The 1971 Bangladesh crisis is important because it brought the anti-India trends in Pakistani, Chinese and American policies to a boil and Indian military escalation of the political crisis was able to prick the boil and validate the importance of military strength and military intervention rather than peaceful (Nehruvian style) political diplomacy as a catalyst of change in regional geopolitics. This validation was meaningful compared to the Shastri decision in 1965 to fight Pakistan in the sense that in 1971 India demonstrated a capacity to start, manage and terminate the war on its own terms; and the great powers’ interventions were unsuccessful. Indian military planners had learnt the lesson from the 1965 campaign which was to avoid dependence on foreign military spare parts and on foreign diplomatic interventions as at Tashkant under Soviet auspices. At Tashkant the solution was another Indo-Pakistani ceasefire that did not constitute a political settlement and was generally a pause to regroup and to fight again. The period 1970–71 was different. Indira Gandhi showed the capacity to motivate the country to fight and provided the Indian military with the means to fight and her diplomatic and military team had the political skills to engage international powers and regional rivals. With the 1971 campaign the Indian military irrevocably crossed the Nehru policy boundary against war as an instrument of state policy and thereby altered a key parameter of Nehru’s policy. By increasing the weight of the military organization in Indian decision-making, 1971 confirmed the trend towards militarization of Indian foreign affairs as well as the regional environment. Indian crisis behaviour in 1971 also revealed a capacity to reverse the historical pattern in Indian political culture, that is, to scatter and run in the face of a crisis and to rely on foreign support to fight local rivals. In 1971 Indira Gandhi’s military and diplomatic team showed staying power in an international crisis. It showed that despite a pattern of Indo-Pakistani polarity, and the intensity of the anti-India trend was growing in the policies of Pakistan, China and America, the Indian government held the option (if the political leadership was strong and the military preparations were sufficient) to escalate a regional crisis while the international opposition was unable to escalate at will. The prime minister, the armed forces and popular nationalism became the bases of military success. The crisis validated two points. 1

When India escalated militarily it could take advantage of the compulsions and limits of the international opposition but to do so it needed a political will to fight and motivate its armed forces, the forces needed resources, training and intelligence to conduct successful military operations, the prime minister needed sound diplomatic intelligence and knowledge of the parameters of policy and thinking of its opposition and there had to be effective public

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2

External determinants of change diplomacy to motivate domestic and international public opinion to accept the Indian case for military escalation. In this case China was preoccupied with its Cultural Revolution, it was unsure of the military capacity and political skill of its ally Pakistan and of American commitment to defeat India militarily. China blinked in this crisis even as it continued with bellicose statements to the end. Messrs Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger hoped to ride on China’s coattails assuming that it would open a second front to relieve the pressure on Pakistan.7 America had the military power to engage India but its policy and its frame of reference relating to Indian aggression was unconvincing in its internal bureaucratic politics and in the international sphere.8 The point was that the international coalition worked best against India in a sub-critical mode but it was ineffective when India created a new military situation which required the anti-India forces to escalate and manage the crisis. Two great powers, America and China, could not handle the escalation of the crisis by a middling power like India. The crisis validated another point. When the Indian government adopted a credible crisis position against external threats it could mobilize Indian popular nationalism to its cause and override, temporarily at least, the divisiveness of Indian political and personal politics. That is, India could act like a regional catalyst and when it did so it could secure two aims. First, it could mess with the mind and the agenda of its international opposition. Second, it could sideline temporarily India’s political character that was prone to internal divisiveness and a tendency to seek foreign links against local rivals. But in a sub-critical or a post-crisis situation Indian foreign affairs are bedevilled by rivalries of interests at both the international and the domestic planes.

The 1971 war and the outcome restructured the Nehruvian approach to foreign affairs. But on the other hand while the international coalition did not win the 1971 campaign, the Indo-Pakistani polarity and the Pakistan–US–PRC versus India–USSR polarity remained in place in part because of Cold War politics and in part because Indian military action was deemed to be ‘aggression’ in the thinking of the international coalition. The parameters or the structure of thought and policy that lay behind the actions of Pakistan, America and China during the 1971 crisis continued to shape their attitudes and policies towards the subcontinent after 1971 up to the late 1990s, that is, after the Cold War had ended along with the special Indo-Soviet relationship. So we now turn to a discussion of the structure of thought and policy that lay behind the 1971 crisis and its persistence thereafter. The thinking of the players and their alignments leading to the 1971 war make an important case study because they reveal an interplay between anti-Indian animus in Pakistani, American and Chinese policies (or that of their leaders) and Indian opposition and engagement in a world of conflicting worldviews and subjective but highly charged perceptions (misperceptions) and obviously conflicting calculations about competing interests. The US government documents show that

External determinants of change 157 India’s opponents had a wrong headed approach to the regional crisis. The US and China saw it in terms of their rivalry with Soviet Russia and India rather than as a social conflict between Pakistani and Bengali Muslims that had been militarized by the policies of Pakistani Army. India was able to exploit the contradictions in Pakistani politics as well as in the calculations of Pakistan’s international allies, and by bringing Moscow to its side during the crisis, India was able to play on the rivalries between the great powers. But having won the war India was not able to alter the pattern of subcontinental power relationships and the distribution of power. The polarities persisted as before 1971 as did the rivalries of interests within India that made it politically unstable, along with the weakness in the Indian economy because it was tied to Nehruvian socialist norms and was not liberated into a free capitalist economy. The 1971 crisis and war should be studied for a number of reasons: 1 The radicalization of Bengali politics in East Pakistan, its emergence in Pakistani electoral politics, the negative view of Pakistan’s political class led by Z. A. Bhutto and of the Pakistan military of the prospect of East Pakistani dominance over Western Pakistani elites, and the failure of Pakistani leaders (civil and military) to find a political solution for a political problem rather than a military one, undermined the Pakistani theory of two nations. The Hindus and the Muslims were the two nations when the subcontinent was divided. The year 1971 revealed that Western Pakistanis and East Pakistanis, both believers in the Muslim faith, were also two distinct nations that could not coexist. India exploited this contradiction in Pakistani politics but it did not create it. The division was latent in Pakistani politics since the mid-1960s when the East Pakistanis made their demand for provincial autonomy in the Pakistani federation. 2 The build-up of developments during 1970–71 that led to the December 1971 war makes an interesting case study of American bureaucratic politics concerning subcontinental politics and the inability of the American political establishment to handle two major developments: seeking an opening to China in the context of the rivalries between America and Soviet Russia and China and Soviet Russia (a strategic triangle), and, on the other, maintaining Indo-Pakistani polarity and balance in the face of Indian pressure to develop asymmetry in the subcontinent and to redefine the pattern of relationships that placed more emphasis on Indian interests and less on those of the Pakistan–America–China combination. This crisis revealed a major tilt by President Nixon towards Pakistan (despite its genocidal conduct with the Bengalis), an animus towards India that existed in the 1960s and which came to a boil in 1971, and it showed that Kissinger’s work in the White House was driven by the China rather than the India imperative and his threatening statements concerning ‘Indian aggression’ and ‘grave consequences’ for India and Soviet Russia were bluff, ineffective and counterproductive. Still there were important elements in the American political system especially in the US Congress, influential sections of the State Department and the US media that showed the value of good political judgement and ethical conduct in Asian affairs. The crisis revealed that White House authority was diminished when its actions were not deemed to be appropriate in a crisis; checks and balances existed in

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internal American debates even though the policy decisions reflected the biases. The American media9 showed Nixon’s animus towards India and the tilt towards Pakistan. It showed a major problem in American crisis management machinery and it showed that a determined third party like India could mess with the American strategic mind at the highest level in a crisis if it possessed the political skills to manage the American political system and if it used its military skills to shape the situation on the ground. The crisis also revealed that America had treaty obligations to come to Pakistan’s aid in case of Indian aggression,10 the US claimed at the UN that India was the aggressor11 and yet its treaty obligations to Pakistan were not invoked because the US wished to retain its influence in India where it had a number of interests: it did not want to leave the India field open to preponderant Soviet and Chinese influence, it had a cooperative intelligence operation against China and Tibet based on India and America saw India as a long-term ‘major Asian power’.12 American diplomatic assessments about the regional situation and the interests of the players were generally sophisticated. To quote at length, India will be the most important. By training and equipping a relatively small Bengali resistance force, India can help keep active resistance alive and increase the changes of a prolonged guerrilla war. From all indications, the Indians intend to follow such a course. They could also make it difficult for Yahya to negotiate a political transition in East Pakistan by recognizing a Bengali government. They seem more cautious on this. The US will be an important factor from outside the area: (a) We still have influence in West Pakistan and remain important to India. (b) US economic support – multiplied by US leadership in the World Bank consortium of aid donors – remains crucial to West Pakistan. Neither Moscow nor Peking can duplicate this assistance. (c) Our military supply, while relatively small and unlikely to affect the outcome of the fighting, is an important symbolic element in our posture. The USSR is concerned that instability will work to China’s advantage and has shown perhaps more inclination in recent years than the US toward trying to settle disputes in the subcontinent. In the short run, Soviet interests seem to parallel out own, although they would certainly like to use this situation to undercut our position in India. Communist China could (a) be West Pakistan’s main ally in threatening India with diversionary military moves and (b) eventually enter the contest with India for control of the East Pakistani resistance movement. For the moment, the Chinese seem to have cast their lot with the West Pakistanis.13 The outcome of the 1971 crisis validated India’s importance as a driving force in the development and resolution of the crisis. However, the US had overestimated China’s capacity and motive to make a diversionary military move against India (past experience of 1965 should have been a pointer when China made noises but made no military move on the Himalayan border) and while America recognized

External determinants of change 159 that Soviet interests were parallel to American ones, the diplomatic strategy was to seek convergence with China and polarity with Soviet Russia despite the presumed parallelism. Furthermore, America utterly failed to appreciate the implication of their assessment that instability [in East Pakistan] would work to China’s advantage. This was a Soviet concern but even more so for the Indian planners, because a Vietnam type prolonged guerrilla warfare in the area would likely have destabilized the entire Indian northeast. Prolonged instability in the area, or an outright break up of the Indian Union, was in China’s and Pakistan’s interest, not India’s or Soviet Union’s. Indian ‘provocations’ brought into the open a number of hidden characteristics in America’s claim that it sought a balanced policy in its relations with India and Pakistan. As in the past, America’s aim was to avoid open Indo-Pakistani conflict and to avoid humiliation of Pakistan14 but given the history of US policy this implied a policy of maintaining Indo-Pakistani polarity as a result of Partition rather than resolving it. The point is that practitioners have to apply their mind to a new situation and under stress their emotions and policy preferences come to the surface in policy discourse. Their views offer good intelligence about the thought processes of the practitioners. To quote Nixon, Turning to the political part of the problem, he [President Nixon] could not emphasize his position too strongly. India’s interest, some Indians think, would be served by war. Some Pakistanis would be willing to have a war. The USSR – I don’t know what they want. The interests of the US would not be served by a war. The new China relationship would be imperilled, probably beyond repair, and we would have a ‘very sticky problem’ with the USSR. ‘Now let me be very blunt.’ He had been going to India since 1953. Every Ambassador who goes to India falls in love with India. Some have the same experience with Pakistan – though not as many because the Pakistanis are a different breed. The Pakistanis are straightforward – and sometimes extremely stupid. The Indians are more devious, sometimes so smart that we fall for their line. He ‘holds no brief’ for what President Yahya has done. The US ‘must not – cannot – allow’ India to use the refugees as a pretext for breaking up Pakistan. The President said with a great deal of emphasis that he is ‘convinced’ that this is what India wants to do. That is what he might want to do if he were in New Delhi.15 In addition, America’s conduct was not simply to issue demarches to India and the Soviet Union threatening ‘grave consequences’ and to make speeches at the UN. Washington was proactive in several ways: (1) It allowed Jordan, Turkey and Iran, two US allies and friends of Pakistan, and members of the CENTO fraternity to transfer US supplied armament to Pakistan because US law forbade direct transfers to Pakistan of military materials after the embargo in 1965. (2) US allies were warned about the dangers of Indian and Soviet aggression and this was a continuation of the policy of the 1950s where NATO countries and their friends

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in the UN were encouraged to express themselves about the dangers of Soviet and Indian imperialism. (3) American naval movement was organized as a part of the campaign to create maximum pressure on Indians and to an extent on Soviet Russia, and seek pressure for a ceasefire.16 (4) Finally in a direct plea to Chou he asked for ‘Chinese military help’ and was looking for practical proposals for parallel action and indicated ‘US approval of Chinese support to Pakistan including diversionary troop movement’.17 Kissinger and Nixon were relying on indirect strategies while maintaining the façade of a balanced policy between India and Pakistan, and at the same time America had its eye on the long-term picture to visualize India as a major Asian power and to avoid Soviet or Chinese preponderant influence in the subcontinent. 3 The crisis revealed limits of Chinese diplomatic and military support for Pakistan in a crisis with India and Soviet Russia. Even though China maintained a special relationship with Pakistan since the 1960s and worked very closely with American decision-makers at the highest level during the crisis, the three players were not able to coordinate their strategies in the military arena but did so at the UN. Chinese premier Chou told Henry Kissinger that ‘India is committing aggression against Pakistan’, and if the Indians are ‘bent on provoking such a situation, we cannot sit idly by’. He indicated that ‘Pakistan would never provoke a disturbance against India because in all military fields Pakistan is in a weaker position than India. [However] ‘there is still one special characteristic in this situation: the morale and fighting capacity of Pakistan is greater than India.’18 By November 1971 in Kissinger’s view, there was more caution and less passion and commitment to Pakistan by Chou compared to his position in July 1971.19 In Bhutto’s visit to China in November 1971, China did not promise aid in event of a war’.20 Indians read the signals from China correctly and in preparation for war it moved several military divisions from the China border to East Pakistan, indicating a confidence that China would sit out this crisis.21 In hindsight, Chinese assessment of the fighting capacities of Pakistani and Indian armed forces was completely wrong, the reality was the reverse of the Chinese assessment. This raises a question about the quality of Chinese military and diplomatic intelligence and whether the Beijing leaders believed what they want to rather than rely on evidence. This crisis also revealed a deep insecurity in China’s strategic mind about its encirclement by India and Soviet Russia. It is striking that on the one hand Indians were viewed with contempt, Indians were deemed to be weaker than the Pakistani military and prone to Gandhian non-violence, but on the other hand it was seen as engaged in machination with Soviet Russia to encircle China.22 Bangladesh was seen as Manchukuo. To quote Ambassador Huang, It shows what the majority of the people in the world support what they oppose. Because if India, with the aid of the Soviet Union, would be able to have its own way in the subcontinent then there would be no more security to speak of for a lot of other countries and no peace to speak of. Because that

External determinants of change 161 would mean the dismemberment and the splitting up of a sovereign country and the creation of a new edition of Manchukuo, the Bangladesh. It would also mean aggression by military force and the annexation of sovereign territory.23 Kissinger added fuel to the Chinese fire by viewing India as a threat to all people, an ‘immediate threat to China’ and held that Pakistan was being punished because it was a friend to China and America.24 White House assessment on the other hand about Pakistan’s future was sound. On 22 February 1971, the view was that little was left of Pakistani unity but the division of Pakistan would not serve American interests.25 Still the Presidential directive in April 1971 was in Nixon’s handwriting: ‘To all hands, don’t squeeze Yahya at this time’.26 In other words, the existence of military and diplomatic cooperation during a sub-critical phase of a bilateral relationship is not a guarantee that effective support by the international power is available to its local ally in a military crisis. China’s conduct was significant because this was the second time, after 1965 Indo-Pakistan war, that China had shown prudence in its military policy towards India and chose caution on the ground even as it argued publicly about ‘turmoil in heaven’ and that China would not stand idly by in case of Indian aggression. China’s bark was bigger than the bite in 1965 and in 1971. Its chosen method of pressure on India was through subtle pressure and sub-critical support to its local allies rather than an open opposition. Moreover the White House record shows that Chou expected that the US and Soviet Russia ‘would not allow India to start a war’ and if it broke out the US would come to Pakistan’s aid.27 This reflected Chinese adoption of the traditional idea of nineteenth century diplomatic and military thought and practice that the great powers were the managers of international conflict; the autonomy of regional great powers or middling powers was not recognized by Beijing thinkers. Second, it put more faith in America’s military commitment to Pakistani defence, presumably based on treaty obligations of the past rather than an acknowledgement that China had to support its special ally. The pattern of Chinese conduct during the crisis showed a lack of confidence in its ability to come to Pakistan’s aid and defeat India as in the past. Despite its public rivalry and contempt for India that became obvious during the 1971 war, the diplomatic and the military record shows that China was fierce on the outside but showed inner restraint. China had an opportunity to develop a second military front against India. Kissinger repeatedly encouraged China to do so. It did not take the bait. It showed independence of thinking and acting neither on Pakistani nor on American expectations. The villains in our story are Nixon and Kissinger not Chou-en-Lai although it is disappointing that the Chinese thought process about Indians was based on superficial readings of Nehru’s Discovery of India, Neville Maxwell’s India’s China War and vague notions on Mao’s part about Gandhi and Indian non-violence.28 Chinese leaders all had military backgrounds

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and none apparently knew about the history of war in the subcontinent and assumed erroneously that Indian independence meant the replacement of British rule by Soviet domination. 4 Lastly the crisis showed a difference of opinion between Chinese and American diplomatic strategy at the UN. China thought that the US position was weak because it was working to accommodate India’s interests. America on the other hand was thinking about the subcontinent in post 1971 terms and also with a view to build its triangular relationship with China and Soviet Russia in global and regional terms. In other words, public alignments create impressions of friendship which hide sub-textual differences and thus one must consider the evolution of Indian foreign affairs in the context of great powers’ actions and interests in the subcontinent after 1972. What was resolved by India in the 1971 campaign and what emerged as unfinished business? We turn to this aspect in Chapter 11.

11 India’s antagonists re-group, 1971–80s

India’s military victory over Pakistani armed forces was symbolized by a formal and public surrender but this was a step in an unfolding strategic drama. It was not a turning point that restructured the pattern of relations and the distribution of power. Major re-alignments followed within Pakistani politics and policies after 1972 and an internal power struggle between Z. A. Bhutto and Pakistani military culminated in the Zia-ul-Haq coup against Bhutto, 1977–79. Bhutto launched a decision to build the Pakistani nuclear bomb in January 1972, his most important decision following Pakistan’s military defeat.1 The defeat launched a quest for revenge against India. Two faces of Pakistani psychology were revealed. In his conversations with US political figures, Bhutto had expressed a desire to find rapprochement with India, and to abandon his policy of confrontation with India, which had been a hallmark of Bhutto’s politics and rhetoric.2 But then later he told Ambassador Bush [Bhutto] placed current hostilities in historical context of India’s (read ‘Hindu’) subservience to Moguls and later British. Current fight simply another chapter but war could lead to the destruction of Pakistan. This is not way to solve problems. India has opportunity, even now, to open a new chapter in relations with Pakistan or remain implacable enemies. He noted he has advocated in recent years changes of policy towards India and he will so state should he give speech at UN but he will be careful not to give impression that Pak[istan] ready for capitulation. Pak[istan] is not on its knees. Admittedly Pakistan had made terrible mistakes, there had been awful blood letting but why should Pakistan be dismembered because of its mistakes. India’s interference was a negation of all UN precepts and principles. ‘India has no right to exploit our mistakes in the way she is doing.’ India is riding high. India has never settled any boundary problems and is very ‘territory conscious’. Indian leaders ‘want to be conquerors’, current phase ‘has gone to their heads’ and ‘I suppose they will bash around a lot in the region and must be cut down to size’.3 Pakistani Foreign Secretary Sultan M. Khan saw the Indian victory as a military and a psychological blow because Muslims had ruled the subcontinent for

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hundreds of years.4 In other words, Pakistani history and a sense of destiny to rule the subcontinent were driving its rivalry with India. So did the players learn real lessons from the Bangladesh campaign? We think not because none of the following lessons were learnt. 1

2

3

That India succeeded because it had planned well in the military and diplomatic spheres, it had anticipated issues and problems and it acted proactively in a dangerous neighbourhood with many experienced players like Nixon, Kissinger and Chou. That US policy was based on wrong-headed thinking, false expectations and assumptions; the White House believed what it wanted to and the Nixon–Kissinger team suffered from groupthink.5 That China acted according to its own calculations in pursuing its rivalry with USSR and India and its fear of encirclement of China by the two was a primary concern. Chinese insecurity, not overconfidence about its superior position, was the driving element in its policy. China’s moves in Pakistan and Indian affairs were meant to keep India off balance and to check the growth of Soviet and US influences in the region, but China’s approach worked best in a sub-critical mode; the 1965 and 1971 crises revealed the limits of China’s policy and influence in the region. After the war lessons were still not learnt. This became clear from the conclusions drawn by Nixon and Bhutto. They saw that the US–Pakistan and China were working for regional stability while Soviet Russia and India had an appetite for aggression. To quote, Mr Bhutto stated that the strategic significance of events in South Asia was of importance to the entire world. In effect what was occurring was that one nation was trying to turn the internal difficulties of a neighbor and rectify the situation through the use of armed force. More importantly, however, Mr Bhutto stated, the real significance of recent event was the fact that the Soviet Union was able to neutralize Chinese flexibility and to vastly improve its influence in the area at the expense of Communist China. This would mean that India appetites for further aggression would be whetted. President Nixon replied that this was his view as Mr Bhutto knew. Mr Bhutto again thanked President Nixon for his personal leadership and support for the Government of Pakistan at that critical time and added that he looked forward to improve relations with the United States despite his reputation for being less friendly in the past. Those problems he noted were the results of U.S. policies at the time. Now the situation had changed and it was essential that the United States, China and Pakistan all work together to insure stability in the area. This he stated was a problem of worldwide interest and importance and not purely a local continental problem.6 China too had a superficial view of India. The White House documents revealed a contempt of India and an inability to distinguish between Chou’s

India’s antagonists re-group, 1971–80s 165

4

disdain of Nehru and his policies, and on the other hand, the Indian people and society in general. The record shows that the Chinese leaders – Mao, Chou and Chen Yi – knew about India only through their experiences with Nehru’s policies and reading of a book by Nehru. There is no sign of a serious study of Indian philosophy or Indian history, politics and foreign relations and attitude to military affairs. China’s communist rulers showed no curiosity about its rival in Asia and dealt with it on the basis of contempt rather than knowledge and on the basis of their experience with the 1962 war and the boundary question. But, on the other hand, the pattern of Chinese behaviour during the 1971 crisis showed that while Chinese statements were threatening, the high tone had low content and commitment. China showed realism about Indian power, the danger of a Soviet attack against Chinese military involvement during the crisis and Pakistan’s weakness as the crisis unfolded from mid-1971. Still the wrong headed assessment of Indian policies persisted after the war. The point to be drawn is that the Chinese too were victims of groupthink. It was curbed during the crisis in part because of Beijing’s preoccupation with the Cultural Revolution, fear of a Soviet attack and the certainty of Indian military victory, but it was revived after the crisis ended. That is, groupthink in China (and elsewhere) flourished in sub-critical foreign policy situations relating the subcontinent but it was controlled during the crisis. The fourth lesson was that the Pakistani military used excessive force to deal with a political problem that required a humanistic and a psychological approach. Yahya’s personality and ineptness exacerbated the problem in 1970–71; he was both a poor leader and a poor general. But the problem was structural and inherent in Pakistan – whose political history since 1947 has been dominated by military rule.

Groupthink remained a problem in American and Chinese foreign affairs relating to India after 1971. The US view was that USSR was using India to encircle China.7 China’s view was that Pakistan should be strengthened militarily as a power rival of China, India’s great opponent in the subcontinent. It was in this context, and the US cut off military aid to Pakistan after 1965 war (US Congress restricted it), that Pakistan appreciated Chinese military aid (aircraft and tanks) and later nuclear and missile aid from China and North Korea.8 As well China felt guilty about letting down Pakistan.9

What were the political effects of 1971 war? The White House assessments were candid and detailed but they do not provide accurate benchmarks of the pattern of Chinese and Pakistani behaviour after 1971. It is instructive to review the White House thought processes and assessments because they were the focus of friction with India after 1971. Because modern strategy is a mind game, one must grasp the Chinese, American and the Pakistani frames of references that were the bases of their diplomatic and military

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moves. They deserve a lengthy review: ●

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Peking clearly has suffered a psychological and political defeat as its share of the Bangladesh episode. Psychologically, it suffers for not having done more for Pakistan, and politically, it is now faced with a situation where Soviet Union has extended its influences even further in sensitive areas adjacent to China. India, too, emerges strengthened and more of a force for Chinese policy to contend with. However, another casualty of the war, the displacement of Yahya Khan, is probably not unwelcome in Peking. On the one hand, the Chinese leadership had personal bonds with him. On the other hand, the conservative general must have been an ideological embarrassment to the Maoists. Chou told Bhutto, who had always been pro-Chinese, he could now accept the invitation to visit Pakistan since Bhutto (who is pushing social reform and nationalization of industries) is a ‘man of the people’. Indeed, now that Pakistan has been split, the Chinese can have the best of both worlds. Having supported West Pakistan during the conflict, China can now move to increase its influence among the more radical elements in Bangladesh. Whereas U.S. and Chinese interests were parallel during the 1971 crisis China will presumably have an interest now in increasing Bengali radicalism in the hope that it will spill over into West Bengal and weaken India. The US, on the other hand, will have an interest in greater stability in Bangladesh – as far as internal developments are concerned, our interests run even more parallel with India. The Chinese attitude toward the U.S. in this situation is one of guarded approval. They have appreciated the way that we have stood by Pakistan as a matter of principle regardless of public pressures, and they can see that the U.S. and the PRC have parallel interests in coping with expanded Soviet influence in the subcontinent. We kept Peking meticulously informed from July onwards of all our moves regarding the subcontinent, including our pressure on Moscow to halt Indian attacks. Thus Chou En-lai spoke approvingly to Bhutto of a U.S. ‘ultimatum’ to the Soviets having been responsible for preventing Indian from launching a full attack on West Pakistan. South Asia is one region we believe that the PRC and the US have some similar interests. We are prepared to continue our policy of exchanging views with you on this area. [Notations handwritten by President Nixon in reverse of page 4: ‘Moscow seeks dominant role in India. U.S. help to India would blunt this role.’10

The state Department Briefing Book (February 1971) made additional points as follows. While worried about Indian intentions, particularly in the afterglow of military success against Pakistan, Peking’s main concerns, like ours, is with the Soviet Union’s expanded influence in South Asia.

India’s antagonists re-group, 1971–80s 167 South Asia is another major arena for the display of Sino-Soviet ideological differences and state power rivalry. Recent events may feed Peking’s obsession with alliances and military encirclement. Peking may fear the Soviets will try to instigate Indian trouble-making on the frontier with Tibet. More broadly, Peking is concerned that the USSR will line up with New Delhi to undercut Chinese pretensions to represent third world in international forums, especially United Nations. Some analyses have suggested that Peking, in order to counter Soviet gains, may ultimately abandon the pursuit of normal state relations with India, and attempt to bring about the ‘balkanization’ of South Asia. At present, anti-Indian propaganda in the Chinese media has largely subsided, and Peking’s broadcasts praising Indian insurgent groups, and direct military assistance to the Nagas and Mizos has ended. Peking will not forego all aid to separatist movements, even though a policy stressing support for such movement has some inherent drawbacks for Peking. It runs directly counter to the PRC’s current world-wide emphasis on building traditional state-to-state relations, and undermines the credibility of its efforts, in Africa and elsewhere, to blunt long-standing suspicion of the PRC’s motives. The Chinese probably also hope that India will not abandon its non-aligned stance or its interest in improving relations with China. Although Peking was in no hurry to respond to Indian overtures last summer and fall, there is evidence that it had, in fact, decided to make some friendly gestures toward New Delhi. When Pakistanis expressed their unhappiness over the prospect that Indian feelers would be well received by the Chinese, PRC officials coolly responded that nothing would be done to harm Pakistan’s interests. We do not oppose China’s legitimate interest in South Asia. Our primary concern is that no external power achieves a position of dominance. We believe that India, having failed to respond adequately to our proposals for a political solution to the crisis, bears a heavy responsibility for broadening hostilities.11 These views revealed several important themes or stream of diplomatic thought. 1

2

While US/PRC interests were parallel during the 1971 crisis, US/India interests were parallel after the crisis12 – rivalries are not permanent, they are situational. Anti-Sovietism was a major part in US-thinking because of the view that Moscow sought to encircle China through the subcontinent.13 So the talking point was that US wanted to improve relations with India so as not to leave the field alone to Soviet influence. The policy premise was that Moscow sought a dominant role in India; there was no recognition of Indian resistance to any outside force dominating India and that nationalism in India was a factor in its policies.

168 3

India’s antagonists re-group, 1971–80s US viewed Chinese policy in the subcontinent in a benign way. It had legitimate interest in South Asia.14 There were important sub-themes in US thinking about China in the Nixon mindset. a

b c

That the US and China shared an interest in stability in the subcontinent. There was no recognition that China and the US were promoting IndoPakistani polarity – which was stimulating an arms race and contention between India – USSR versus Pakistan – China – US. That is, the permanent instability of the 1947 Partition had been institutionalized by the US and Chinese tilts towards Pakistan. The US and Chinese policy towards India was based on personal dislikes and subjectivity, a dangerous way to conduct foreign policy. China had a fear of being circled by major neighbours – USSR, India, Japan and the US. Nixon tried to assure Chinese leaders that US–Japan military links were in China’s interest. To quote Nixon, For example, I hope to talk with the Prime Minister and later with the Chairman about issues like Taiwan, Vietnam and Korea. I also want to talk about – and this is very sensitive – the future of Japan, the future of the subcontinent, and what India’s role will be; and on the broader world scene, the future of US–Soviet relations. Because only if we see the whole picture of the world and the great forces that move the world will we be able to make the right decisions about the immediate and urgent problems that always completely dominate our vision. Is it better – here I know we have disagreements – is it better for Japan to be neutral, totally defenseless, or is it better for a time for Japan to have some relations with the United States?15

These were the parameters of Nixon policy, and they persisted in successive US administrations up to the first Clinton administration. US policy in the subcontinent was framed in terms of fear of Soviet domination – a founding principle of the US Cold War and containment policy. But this view ignored the view of USSR as the weaker and reactive force in international politics since 1945. They were also framed according to a belief that India was aggressive, when the historical record was the exact opposite: that India was the object of Mughal and British imperialism and independent India held no territorial design. Indo-Pakistani ceasefires usually involved return of territory and Indian occupation of Pakistani territory was eschewed even for bargaining purposes. The Nixon–Mao/Chou conversations left India outside of the loop. However Nixon and Kissinger were keeping China ‘fully informed’16 about their views of the global situation and they were co-ordinating tactics if not policies toward USSR, India and Pakistan. Nixon’s and China’s orientation towards India and the forms – of convergence and divergence – were revealed by the 1972 Shanghai Communique. The Shanghai

India’s antagonists re-group, 1971–80s 169 Communique (28 February 1972) showed a difference between US and PRC philosophy and approach. China’s tilt toward Pakistan and its interference in the Indo-Pakistani dispute over Kashmir was pronounced. The following quote showed their agendas and the differences: The US side: ‘Consistent with the United States Security Council Resolution of December 21, 1972, the United States favours the continuation of the ceasefire between Indian and Pakistan and the withdrawal of all military forces to within their own territories and to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir; the United States supports the right of the peoples of South Asia to shape their own future in peace, free of military threat, and without having the area become the subject of great power rivalry.’ The Chinese side: ‘It firmly maintains that India and Pakistan should in accordance with the United Nations on the India–Pakistan question, immediately withdraw all their forces to their respective territories to their own sides of the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir and firmly supports the Pakistan Government and people in their struggle to preserve their independence and sovereignty and the people of Jammu and Kashmir in their struggle for the right of self-determination’.17 What was the orientation of Pakistan, China and the US towards India? The State Department noted changes in Bhutto’s foreign policies after he assumed power in Pakistan in 1972. To quote, Bhutto’s objectives in all this seem fairly clear. He has already taken steps to strengthen his security relationship with China. He now seeks to add a closer security association with us. He may feel the prospects are fairly good because of our expressed concern over Soviet policy toward India and our developing relations with China. He has been skeptical about Soviet policies toward Pakistan, although doing what he can to rebuild closer relations with the USSR. What is not clear is how these overtures to us relate to Bhutto’s longer range intentions toward India. On the whole, Bhutto’s hardliner past on India has been subdued since he took power and there has been some evidence that he recognizes the need for a basic reorientation of past Pakistani policies toward India. It is clear, given the major change in the South Asian equation after the December War, that we could not and should not seek to build up Pakistan as any kind of strategic counterweight to India. As we see it our basic policy objective in South Asia should now be to encourage movement toward a broad political settlement which would replace the sharp political–military confrontation that has plagued the subcontinent for more than 20 years.18 The White House, however, continued to support Bhutto’s Pakistan on the same lines as before 1971. According to a White House paper, the US demonstrated its

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support for Pakistani security as follows: Our overall strategy toward Pakistan combines three approaches: ●

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We will help Pakistan bilaterally in every way we can, recognizing that we work under some constraints (e.g., Congressional attitudes, low appropriations, grain shortages). We will help strengthen (Iran) and encourage (PRC) Pakistan’s friends in the area to strengthen Pakistan. We will make clear to Pakistan’s potential enemies (India, USSR) that we would regard any outside threat to Pakistan’s integrity as a very serious matter. We also view Pakistan’s other relationships – particularly its close ties with China and Iran – as important elements of its security. We have talked with both about helping to strengthen Pakistan and to deter its enemies. We will eventually want to tie Turkey more firmly into this context. We regard CENTO as important to Pakistan. It provides an additional indication to other countries of US ties to Pakistan, and serves as a framework for support from other countries.19

The White House noted, Bhutto’s two main foreign policy objectives since taking office have been (1) to solidify Pakistan’s international support, particularly in the Middle East, the US and China, (2) to put Pakistan’s relationship with India on a more normal footing. Bhutto’s main preoccupation is with India. Despite the Indo-Pakistani agreements hammered out in 1972 and last month, mutual suspicions remain strong. The uneasy relationship with India has been a major factor in Pakistan’s wary attitude toward the Soviet Union. This Pakistani view of the Soviets is also involved in Pakistani suspicions of neighboring Afghanistan, which is a long-time recipient of large-scale Soviet aid and has a new President with a history both as a friend of the Soviet Union and as a supporter of autonomist groups in Pakistan’s border provinces. The Soviets have been trying to improve their relations with Pakistan with only limited success. Islamabad’s uneasiness concerning New Delhi and Moscow have enhanced its interest in maintaining close ties with China, with the United States, and with the Muslim nations of West Asia, particularly Iran. Both Bhutto and the Shah have claimed that the Soviets, in collusion with Iraq, Afghanistan, and India, have encouraged and assisted separatist elements in the frontier areas of both Pakistan and Iran. Solid evidence of this is difficult for us to see, but Bhutto is concerned nevertheless.20 It was explained to Bhutto that US interest in rebuilding US relations with India ‘will be in the context of our mutual interest in limiting Soviet influence in the area’.21 India was still viewed as a field of US–USSR Cold War politics.

India’s antagonists re-group, 1971–80s 171 That is, the US did not have an India policy that was independent of its interests in Pakistan, the US–USSR Cold War and China’s role against USSR and India. The US didn’t take India seriously on its own terms. US–Pakistan–China conversations and linkages continued to develop during the 1970s and 1980s on the basis of assumptions that reflected their subjective bias on the one hand and absence of effective Indian countermeasures that attacked the strategic minds in Washington, Beijing and Islamabad, and/or attacked their alliances. In 1971 India attacked Pakistan’s armed force and defeated it. But this military victory was not enough to undermine the strategic minds and their alliances. Of the three adversaries, Pakistan remained a ‘cornerstone of US policy’ in the words of the White House.22 The White House view of India was negative. To quote, Pakistan: India is facing a situation with many contradictions. Pakistan wishes India no ill, but it is obvious that India, while claiming to be a big power, faces severe economic and political problems. Also, the forces set loose by the Bangladesh secession will pose a problem for India. India seems disillusioned with what happened in Bangladesh. If Pakistan has responded to the many requests over the years from dissidents in India for support India would have suffered several ‘Bangladeshes’ itself, but Pakistan refused to do that. India is building a huge military machine, but its economic legs are hollow. In contrast, Pakistan is potentially the most viable unit in South Asia. Nevertheless, Pakistan shares with the US a community of outlook about India. The more US influence that exists there, the more Pakistan is benefited. Pakistan wants good relations with India. Pakistan is determined to have good relations because the government of Pakistan has promised a better life to its people and it cannot go on in a state of tension. But living in peace with India does not mean Indian hegemony in South Asia.23 The negativity extended to Mao/Kissinger views about Indian philosophy and its political independence. To quote, There is a sentimental love affair between Western intellectuals and India based on a complete misreading of the Indian philosophy of life. Indian philosophy was never meant to have a practical application. CHAIRMAN MAO: It’s just a bunch of empty words. THE SECRETARY: For Gandhi, nonviolence wasn’t a philosophic principle, but because he thought the British were too moralistic and sentimental to use violence against. They are non-sentimental people. For Gandhi it was a revolutionary tactic, not an ethical principle. CHAIRMAN MAO: And he himself would spin his own wool and drink goat’s milk. THE SECRETARY: But it was essentially a tactical device for him. CHAIRMAN MAO: And the influence of Gandhi’s doctrine on the Indian people was to induce them into non-violence. THE SECRETARY: Partly, but also given the character and diversity of the English people, it was only a way to conduct the struggle against the British. So I THE SECRETARY:

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think Gandhi deserves the credit of having won independence against the British. CHAIRMAN MAO: India did not win independence. If it did not attach itself to Britain, it attaches itself to the Soviet Union. And more than one half of their economy depends on you. Did you not mention during your briefings that India owes ten billion dollars in debt to the US or was that all debts?24 Kissinger and Chou saw India’s policy on Southeast Asia as a pursuit of hegemony – that is, India wanted to reduce all neighbouring countries to the status of Bhutan. Chinese leaders agreed.25 The US and Pakistan had a fixation about ‘Indian hegemony’. The US and China had a fixation about the Soviet threat and to build their India and Pakistan policies on that basis. Mao and Kissinger agreed to contain Soviet expansion by using the crescent of Turkey, Iran and Pakistan and ‘barriers’.

Pakistan, China and the US re-build their space in the subcontinent and India is still on the defensive The post-1971 period showed that India was still in a reactive mode because its strategic thinking was to respond to a looming threat, and following the passing of a crisis the Indian government reverted to the old Nehruvian ways, that is, to seek friendly relations with Pakistan, the US and China rather than to attack the thinking and the alliance of the three. India’s decision to go to war in 1971 was, however, a new element in Indian behaviour and it was anti-Nehruvian. But 1971 followed the third preference in Sun Tzu’s Art of War, that is, attack the army, and ignored his first rule – attack the enemy’s mind – and the second rule – attack the enemy’s alliances. The US, China and Pakistan adapted a clear position to attack India’s ally – the USSR – but India had no diplomatic strategy or an effective one to attack Pakistan’s allies – the US and China – and the US–PRC alliance. Absent an effective counterstrategy by India, and with on-going internal political power struggles between Indira Gandhi and her opponents, and with a weak socialist economy, India remained a field of power politics where outside forces had a greater impact on India than Indian did on the external environment after 1971. After 1971, Pakistan spearheaded the coalition’s attack on the Indian mind, its alliance with Soviet Russia and its interests and policies. Following its military defeat, here is a list of actions taken by Pakistan, the US and China in the context of their frame of reference outlined in Chapter 10. In 1972 Bhutto authorized the development of Pakistan’s nuclear bomb programme. The decision was meant to enhance Pakistani security and reduce asymmetry vis-à-vis India. Between 1972–77 Bhutto tried to create a Bhutto-centric Pakistani political system and to strengthen its international links with China, America and like-minded Middle Eastern countries like Iran, Jordan and Turkey. This was along the lines prescribed by the White House in the deliberations with Bhutto in the 1970s. But Bhutto’s actions had four political effects: (1) His internal policies were a threat to the power and prestige of the Pakistani Army, and it caused internal opposition that

India’s antagonists re-group, 1971–80s 173 culminated in the Zia-ul-Haq coup against Bhutto in 1977 and his hanging in 1979. (2) His nuclear bomb policy collided with the US non-proliferation efforts and led to US pressure by Washington to rollback its nuclear programme. (3) Chinese military aid to Pakistan continued in the Bhutto era – reflecting Bhutto’s proChina stance and China’s policy to use Pakistan as a line of pressure against India. (4) With India, the relationship was uneventful but mutual mistrust remained the basis of this relationship. Bhutto made no effort to abandon his well-known policy stance to liberate Kashmir, but he made no effort to actually mount a liberation campaign in Kashmir or against India (as Zia-ul-Haq was to do later) and as Bhutto did in 1965 after the failure of previous attempts. Rather his political energies were devoted to building his political position in Pakistan on an anti-military basis, with the slogan that he wanted to create an Islamic socialist society and polity in Pakistan; his main effort in the security field was to authorize the nuclear bomb programme, but this meant that a lot of money changed hands but by the time he was hanged in 1979, Pakistan did not have the Bomb. Rather it was eating grass because of its isolation from the West and its animosity with India and yet there was no Bomb. (Bhutto had promised the Bomb even if Pakistanis had to eat grass). Bhutto’s Bomb programme was picked up by the Pakistani military with the entry of Dr A. Q. Khan into the nuclear politics of Pakistan in the mid-1970s. The China connection remained the bedrock of Pakistani foreign and military relations, while the US–Pakistani relationship was problematic because of the nuclear controversy.26 In its political and military history Pakistan had an inventory of options against India: 1

2

3 4

Building international pressure against India through international coalition politics so that borrowed US and Chinese support could secure parity with India and keep it off-balance. Attacking the Indian political mind and its motivation by pushing the view that India was against Kashmir Muslims, that Muslims were oppressed by Hindu rule and that India was a threat to Pakistani security and identity, as well as the security of India’s other neighbours. Attacking India’s alliance with USSR on the ground that both were aggressive and dangerous to the region and the world. Attacking the build-up of India’s military strength and nuclear programme on the grounds that it would change the regional (Indo-Pakistani, not Sino-Pakistani versus India) balance of power.

Because of the preoccupation with internal power struggle and his secretive nuclear bomb policy, the Bhutto era did not affect the region’s power politics overtly, but rather it was a transitional phase between the 1971 crisis and the revisions in Pakistani policies after the rise of Zia-ul-Haq, in 1977–87. The Zia era is significant for two reasons: (1) It worked around the reality that Pakistan could not win a war with India, that is, it did not pay to attack India’s armed forces directly. So working around that reality led to a set of different

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policies that sought to attack India’s power and prestige by a method of sub-rosa, low risk and high return action to stimulate Islamic militancy in Kashmir (a disputed area), Punjab (not a disputed area but a strategic province and a potential buffer) and border areas in India’s northeast. Zia and his chosen agent, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), also played on the theme that Bangladeshi nationalism could be radicalized against India along with Nepalese concerns about India’s big brother attitude and policy. (2) The Soviet attack on Afghanistan in 1979 was an opportunity for Zia to change US policy towards Pakistan. It re-emerged as a frontline state in the fight against communist expansionism, which was the bedrock of US–Pakistan relations since the early 1950s. The Carter and the Reagan administrations sidelined the issue of Pakistani nuclear proliferation in the fight in Afghanistan and thus we see the growth of two major trajectories in Pakistani strategic affairs: (1) The changed regional context militarized and nuclearized the Pakistan–US–China coalition. Starting with the Zia era China not only continued to provide modern conventional arms to Pakistan but it shared its nuclear weapons technology and facilitated the transfer of North Korean missiles technology to Pakistan. Pakistan had emerged as the hub of nuclear and missile proliferation that formed a chain between North Korea, China, Pakistan, Iran and Libya along with suppliers of nuclear technology and parts in Europe. This was the result of China’s supply policy and the US policy of selective tolerance of Pakistani nuclear weapons proliferation because of US–Soviet–Afghan politics after 1980. The US–China–Pakistan coalition now was no longer a diplomatic and military alignment. It had become nuclearized as well. While Moscow’s policy remained tied to the nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) principles, India’s nuclear weapons capability was mothballed as a result of Nehru’s pro-disarmament and non-nuclear weapons stance and by international pressures against Indian nuclearization in the 1980s and 1990s. (2) The second Pakistani trajectory was to see an opportunity to intensify its support of anti-India insurgency operations under the cover of its nuclear programme. The belief was that India could not escalate or fight back Pakistan’s ‘moral’ support of Kashmiri freedom fighters because of fear of nuclear war and international pressure. Note that the two options, nuclear and unconventional warfare, became parallel tracks in Pakistani strategy. Their origin was in the Zia era, but the policies continued under Benazir Bhutto where Pakistani’s policy had a democratic mask but the parameters of national policy were set by its military and intelligence services. These parameters continued to dominate Pakistan’s activities up to 2002 under Musharraf. So precisely at the time India was seeking peace and normalization with Pakistan – when the Indian government was represented by Nehru’s grandson, Rajiv Gandhi, and dominated by the Nehruvians, the Pakistani government was represented by an internal coalition of Army and the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), and it was supported by an external coalition of China, USA and radical Muslim countries like Saudi Arabia, Libya and Iran. The embrace of radical Muslim regimes by Zia and his successors, and radical communist regimes like China and North Korea, was a big change from the 1950s when Pakistan’s affinity was with moderate Muslim countries like Iran under the Shah, and Jordan and Turkey, two US allies

India’s antagonists re-group, 1971–80s 175 and moderates. The supply relations with China and North Korea were also significant because they were contrary to the letter and spirit of international non-proliferation regimes. The two Pakistani trajectories were built up during the 1980s and the 1990s. India responded in a limited way but they were not strong enough to turn around the thinking and practices of the external players – Pakistan, China, the US and their Muslim partners. The end of the Cold War, the break-up of the USSR and the end of special Indo-Soviet ties enhanced the temptation to increase pressures on India because it was seen as isolated without its great power patron. To a discussion of these aspects I now turn. Pakistan saw two advantages in seeking a nuclear weapons capability. First, if Pakistan had nuclear arms and India did not, then war with Pakistan would no longer be an option for India. This could produce increased Indian political irresolution vis-à-vis Pakistan and it could increase the margin of safety for Pakistan to conduct a proxy war in Punjab and Kashmir. Second, news of a Pakistani bomb could push or panic India into overt nuclearization, which would reduce Western pressure on Pakistan and increase Western pressure on India to disarm and to avoid a dangerous regional arms race. Furthermore, an overt Indian nuclear weapons programme was likely to legitimize Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear activities, and Western attention would probably shift away from its focus on Pakistan, in the context of US legislation, towards India. The premise here is that the only thing that worried Pakistan was Western diplomatic pressure; if this could be diluted or diverted to India on the nuclear issue, then it would be a gain for Pakistani diplomacy on the nuclear and Kashmiri questions. The period 1989–90 also revealed a new Pakistani strategy on Kashmir and confidence that it was a winnable strategy. In essence Pakistani thinking at that time was based on several calculations. First, war was not really an option for India – Indian elites and public opinion did not want it. The break-up of Pakistan was likely to increase India’s responsibilities. For example, who would run Sind if India won? In a war India would be bloodied even if Pakistan were defeated. Second, the Pakistani military could not survive an open-ended war with India and for this reason a majority of Pakistani generals did not want war. Third, given the above, it made sense to push India into a war situation by escalating Pakistani intervention in Indian Punjab and Kashmir. This would raise the costs of Indian defence. Hence a low-cost proxy war in Punjab and Kashmir made sense to the Pakistani military and intelligence community for several reasons. It would be sweet revenge for Pakistan’s 1971 defeat in Bangladesh. It would lead to the recovery of Indian Kashmir, which should have gone to Pakistan in 1947–48. It would keep India on edge and it would foster Indian political and military irresolution in relation to Pakistan. Pakistan’s aim was to develop a low-cost proxy war to force India to think about peace at any cost to India. Pakistan’s army chief, Aslam Beg, clearly spelled out his assessment and the Pakistani strategy. He emphasized that Pakistan had failed in earlier wars (1948, 1965 and 1971) because of a lack of strategic vision and because of inadequate preparation of the people. In 1947–48, knowing that the Kashmiri people were not

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entirely on Pakistan’s side, it led the attack with irregular forces to create chaos and make it difficult for India to defend Kashmir. Pakistan almost won, but the Pakistani irregulars failed to gain Srinagar. Nonetheless Pakistan gained a political advantage by making Kashmir a disputed issue and it gained a military advantage by securing parts of the old Jammu and Kashmir kingdoms. The 1965 Pakistani campaign in Kashmir (carried out by Pakistani-backed guerillas) and the 1965 Indo-Pakistani war revealed that the Kashmiris were not at one with Pakistan. Pakistan gained no additional political or military advantage. Indeed, the 1965 war gave Pakistan a bad name and it produced disadvantages for President Ayub Khan and the Pakistani army’s political reputation and social status in Pakistan was negatively affected because of growing evidence that it could not win a war with India. Moreover, Pakistani society became divided about the utility of high defence spending on its armed forces when the population in Pakistan’s heartland – Lahore and Sialkot, and its soft underbelly, Sind – were open to Indian military intervention and encirclement. The Shastri decision to order the Indian army to attack the heartland in 1965 was thus an attack on the West Pakistani strategic mind which the 1971 campaign in the East was not. Following 1965, many Pakistanis wondered if the Pakistani army was truly the guardian of Pakistan’s territory and identity and whether India could be defeated by Pakistani forces. In sum, according to Aslam Beg, Pakistan failed in 1948 and 1965 because the people were not ready for insurrection, they were politically ill-prepared and the irregular forces were undisciplined. The solution to this was to prepare the people for war by setting up two low-cost proxy war theatres – Indian Punjab and Indian Kashmir. This was a new element in Pakistani strategic planning after 1984; another was that Pakistan’s nuclear activity and Indo-Pakistani normalization talks provided a political cover for Pakistan’s preparation for these low-cost proxy wars.27 India reacted in a number of ways to the build-up in Pakistan’s strategy in the nuclear and unconventional warfare spheres, but its emphasis was on Pakistani actions, not on the strategic minds and policies of the players – (a) Pakistani army generals and ISI, (b) Chinese governmental suppliers and facilitators of arms, nuclear and missile aid to Pakistan and Chinese supporters of insurgents in Indian border areas and (c) The US governmental departments (White House, State Department and the CIA) who watched and tolerated Pakistan’s emergence as a premier hub of nuclear proliferation in the world, and as the hub of Taliban/ Al Qaeda type of terrorism that was spreading its tentacles into the Asia-Pacific world – from Central Asia and Chechnya to North Africa – to the Indian subcontinent and select parts of Southeast Asia (Philippines and Indonesia). There is compelling evidence about US tolerance, even complicity, with Pakistani nuclear proliferation and terrorist activities starting with the US’s cosy relationship with Zia-ul-Haq. George Friedman notes – the US’s active role in building an alliance to wage a covert campaign in Afghanistan (1980s): A three-way alliance was created. The United States would provide training, coordination, and strategic intelligence. The Saudis would provide money and recruitment of mujahideen. The Pakistanis would provide their territory

India’s antagonists re-group, 1971–80s 177 plus their intelligence service, the ISI, to provide the liaison with Afghan forces resisting the Soviet invasion. Jimmy Carter presided over the creation of this fateful alliance. Ronald Reagan developed it: Two intelligence services had close links with US intelligence. The two keys were the Pakistani ISI and Saudi Arabia’s General Intelligence Department. Both of these organizations had been intimately involved in creating the mujahideen movement in Afghanistan and maintained their contacts long after the war ended. The services had a wide reach. For instance, In the Russian view, the main problem in Chechnya was ‘Wahabi outsiders’, shorthand for Islamist Saudis. The Russians also regard the Wahabis as behind the Taliban regime. They viewed Osama bin Laden as a Saudi agent with multiple motives, including keeping Central Asian energy and pipelines off the market, thereby improving the competitive position of the Saudis. The Russians had been warning the United States for several years about the threat. The United States downplayed the threat, preferring instead to focus on human-rights violations by the Russians in Chechnya, where the Russians claimed the Wahabis were operating. Clinton’s core strategy toward the Islamist threat recognized that there was a threat from Al Qaeda, but he did not want to put the United States in the position of being in broad opposition to Islamist movements. The U.S. intervention in the Balkans was on the side of Muslim communities, and it was hoped that this would buy the United States some velvet among the Islamists.28 Peter L. Bergen comments on the role of the CIA in the following way. The US was not culpable in the Jihad even though the US trained the Jihaddis but the ‘CIA certainly made tactical errors during the war’. In Bergen’s words, The Carter Administration quickly put together a plan to ratchet up support for the mujahideen. The most important element of the plan was ‘plausible deniability’. The CIA used Saudi and American funds to purchase weapons from China and Egypt so that no support could be traced to the United States. No one wanted to hand the Soviets the propaganda victory of trumpeting the United States’ deep involvement in supporting the mujahideen. The United States wanted to be able to deny that the CIA was funding the Afghan war, so its support was funneled through Pakistan’s military intelligence agency, Inter Services Intelligence agency (ISI). ISI in turn made the decisions about which Afghan factions to arm and train, tending to favor the most Islamist and pro-Pakistan.29

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Note the emergence of an alliance of Pakistan, China, the US, North Korea and Saudi Arabia during the 1980s. It had a function – to build up Pakistan as the spearhead of the US–China–Saudi campaign against Soviet and Indian expansion and as a liberation force in Kashmir, Afghanistan and Chechnya. There was a division of labour in this de facto, secret alliance. Pakistan provided the organization and the logistics. China and the US facilitated the flow of arms into Pakistan to defeat Soviet forces in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia provided the financial aid and the motivation to the Jihadis to fight. North Korea provided the missiles and China provided the nuclear aid to Pakistan and to other Middle East countries. A. Q. Khan working under Pakistan military auspices created and managed the nuclear network. The evidence was revealed after September 2001 following the Al Qaeda attack on the US, and it comes from American sources after the US policy towards Pakistan changed and required U-turns in Pakistani policies on terrorism and nuclear weapons proliferation. Indian scholars, journalists and government practitioners did not understand and analyse the characteristics of the de facto, secret alliance that had emerged in the 1980s and that was detrimental to Indian security. India reacted to the build-up of the gathering storm outside its borders but it was typically defensive about not naming China, the US and Saudi Arabia as key players in the emerging isolation of India in regional and world affairs. The culture and thinking of Indian practitioners is that to name a rival is to create an enemy. So it chose to identify the dragon’s tail (Pakistan) as the enemy rather than the three vital parts of the dragon’s head (China, North Korea, the US, Saudi Arabia and Taliban/Al Qaeda). There was no public debate or understanding that Indira Gandhi’s 1971 war had only shortened the dragon’s tail but it was capable of growing again as Pakistan’s nuclear build-up in the 1980s and 1990s, and its commitment to liberate Kashmir and Indian Punjab, showed. And there was a reluctance to acknowledge and challenge publicly the nature of the dragons’ head and the stimulation it offered to the tail. Indian reactions to the dragon’s tail were multifaceted: ●

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India fought insurgency in Kashmir and the Indian Punjab through military and police action while it complained to the US and others about Pakistani terrorism but to no avail. The dragon’s head was not listening because it was complicit itself. Through a major military exercise called Brasstacks in 1987 the Indian government demonstrated its capacity to mount an armoured attack that was capable of cutting the North–South lines of Pakistani military communications and to detach Sind including Pakistan’s sole seaport Karachi from the main body of Pakistan. This had the potential to make Pakistan into a smaller land-locked state. India’s military modernization continued with ongoing international criticism of India’s defence priorities compared to its developmental needs. India’s nuclear weapons option remained moth-balled and Nehru’s injunction against the exercise of the weapons option remained in place. But nuclear

India’s antagonists re-group, 1971–80s 179 weapons work continued; the scientific work never ceased since its start in the 1950s. But the international pressure to close the weapons option increased with Zia-ul-Haq’s offer of Indo-Pakistani nuclear disarmament. India had no effective answer to Zia-ul-Haq’s challenge because it did not then articulate a view about China as a security threat. If India did not plan to exercise its nuclear option – as was evident by its behaviour on the issue from the 1950s to 1998 (the 1974 test was a peaceful device to test engineering possibilities the Indira Gandhi government claimed), and if Pakistan was its main problem, then why not de-nuclearize both rivals? So in the 1980s and 1990s the pressure on the nuclear front to disarm came from the great powers who supported the nuclear non-proliferations treaty, from Pakistan in relations to its bilateral disarmament proposal, and from the Third World capitals that accepted Chinese nuclear arms but had doubts about India’s leadership ambitions. However, India broadened its space programme by moving into the development of long-range missiles under the auspices of the Indian Defence and Research Organization. The Agni missile project was headed by Dr A. Kalam, currently India’s president, but as a sign of Indian ambivalence and lack of confidence it was called a ‘technology demonstrator’, the missile version of the 1974 ‘peaceful test’. Still, the 1980s was important in several small but significant ways. As disclosed by India’s Cabinet Secretary (1986–89) and Principal Secretary to the Indian Prime Minister (1989–90) B. G. Deshmukh pointed out in 1994 the following. 1 2

3 4

‘[India] did not have nuclear weapons of any kind then. We do not now.’ Indian military chiefs had advocated development of nuclear weapons from the mid-1970s onwards but Rajiv Gandhi the Prime Minister was firm about keeping the option and not exercising it; the Nehru line held firm. ‘The American government fully knew that Pakistan was taking steps to build an atomic bomb and yet closed their eyes to this.’ Then came a clear signal to Pakistan. To quote, ‘In case Pakistan actually, in a moment of foolhardiness, drops an atomic bomb on any part of India, the clear mandate to the Indian Army will be to dismember Pakistan for good.’30

Clearly Indian practitioners were re-thinking their strategy but, slowly, in typical reactive and defensive Indian style. It was clear however, that Indian reactions were not directly attacking the enemies’ strategic minds and their alliances, or that they were even willing to act proactively, create a public debate and a public identification about the nature of external threats, the sources and Indian options that would lead to a turnaround in the behaviour of its international rivals. The changes occurred with the rise of the BJP as the new government in 1998. The parameters of Indian policies towards the world and the region changed, and we now turn to a discussion of the pattern of change.

12 Liberating India and its nuclear policy from the Nehruvian shackles

India’s decision to conduct nuclear tests in 1998 and to commit itself to a nuclear weapons position was in sharp contrast to Nehru’s three nuclear policies: (1) Develop the organizational and scientific base of a nuclear weapons option. (2) Have a firm policy line against its exercise except as last resort – whose trigger was undefined. (3) Plead continually for global disarmament. The first and the second policies cancelled each other during 1950s–1998. India’s nuclear weapons potential was a dead asset in Indian diplomacy and military strategy; it could not be used as a lever to deter enemy’s military pressure. The policy of unilateral self-restraint was viewed by the world community as a sign of hesitation and confusion and it was, therefore, a sign that India was open to persuasion by pressure. Indian practitioners thought that it gave India a high moral vantage point but this was a false expectation in a world of power politics, a sign of weakness. Thus Indian self-image of moral superiority in nuclear affairs was at variance with the image of India in the perception of the major powers, especially Pakistan, China and the US – the three countries who mattered in Indian nuclear affairs. When China joined the nuclear club in 1964 its international prestige was enhanced in the thinking of the developed and the developing worlds. India’s international status had declined following its defeat in 1962 and as a result of its ongoing internal power politics and economic weakness. Combined with its nuclear inhibition, these elements created the image of an India which could not significantly change the distribution of world power and the pattern of relationships. Its socialist economy, its stalemated international relationships and the ongoing build-up of the Pakistan–US–China coalition placed India on a downward curve precisely when China was on an upward curve in the international sphere and the China–Pakistan coalition was growing in strength within the region. India’s nuclear signals during 1960s–90s were mixed – conveying an ability to build the bomb – which was demonstrated in 1974 and an inability to make a decision to do so except as a last resort reaction to external events and pressures. The 1998 test decision occurred in a curious juxtaposition. Since the 1960s India’s nuclear policy showed a lack of confidence and conviction about the relationship between nuclear weapons and foreign policy. During this time, a number of non-proliferation regimes emerged to seek control of nuclear weapons proliferation, to form nuclear exports restrictions, and missile controls, and

Liberating India and its nuclear policy 181 economic sanctions against countries like India and Pakistan who disobeyed the non-nuclear norms were also developed. India was paying a diplomatic and a technological price as a result of the sanctions; there was a negative payoff for its policy of not exercising its nuclear weapons option. The noose of international legal rule making to check India (and others) continued to tighten and even though the rule making was cast in global terms, it was India-specific. Two events in the late 1990s broke the Indian back. (1) The nuclear non-proliferation treaty was extended indefinitely even though a key provision – Article 6 relating to disarmament by the nuclear weapons states – was unfulfilled since 1968. (2) Comprehensive nuclear test ban in 1997 was announced – even though the negotiating process required a consensus at the Geneva disarmament conference and this was not secured because of India’s attitude. India was isolated and the world community was confident that India was now cornered. With the development of an indefinite nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) system India’s political space vanished because the likes of Nelson Mandela and others in the third world, along with the developed world, agreed that the NPT and the CTBT were valuable international instruments even without nuclear disarmament of the nuclear powers. So we see a juxtaposition between an Indian policy that was lacking in confidence and a Western policy that was brimming with overconfidence that India was isolated and cornered in the nuclear sphere. The Western strategy was a mistake. By cornering India the West took away India’s space in the nuclear field and triggered an Indian response to ditch Nehru’s second and third policies and to shift towards a weapons position on the basis of his first policy. The hope of global nuclear disarmament in the NPT Review meetings had been the political cover for the Indian advocates of a non-nuclear India. By pushing for the indefinite extension of the NPT and the CTBT, the West made nonsense of the fiction that nuclear disarmament of the nuclear powers was possible because the indefinite NPT extension made Article 6 (that nuclear powers will eventually move towards disarmament) redundant. By repeating its pleas for global nuclear disarmament including India’s, the government of India had maintained the Western charade of the utopia of a disarmed world. Since 1964, India had harped on the theme that it could not sign the NPT because it was discriminatory but the real Indian concern was that India was outside the nuclear tent looking in. It was against negative discrimination, that is, against itself. It does not mind positive discrimination, that is, if it is allowed inside the nuclear and the great powers’ UN Security Council tent. This did not happen because Western and Chinese policies were discriminatory and wanted to keep the nuclear club small. In part India’s hesitation in not exercising its nuclear weapons option between 1960s–98 indicated that its anti-NPT objection was rhetorical and it was geared to keeping the option open, rather than to exercise it. The two policies remained compartmentalized up to 1998. India’s decision to test and break away from Nehru’s policy boundary against its exercise reflected the style of the new BJP government. It showed the impact of two events – the NPT’s indefinite extension and the agreement about the

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CTBT. As in the past external pressure was the catalyst of change in Indian policy and as well a new nationalist leadership became the tipping points. The decision to test and declare a weapons status showed the vitality of a coalition of BJP leadership, Indian military and Indian nuclear establishment. It reflected the marginalization of the nuclear disarmers in the sections of the Indian media, think tanks and segments of civilian bureaucracy which was more interested in attending international conferences on nuclear disarmament (where disarmers held forth) than in the development of nuclear arms (where civilian administrators lacked expertise). With the 1998 nuclear tests the internal dynamics and the weights of the decision-making units changed. The 1998 tests and the parallel development of Agni missiles (with their promotion from the deniable and hesitant status of ‘technology demonstrator’ to a missile for military use), were important catalysts that re-calibrated two policy areas and increased India’s confidence in itself. Hesitation and talking with three different and opposite options or points of view on the nuclear question was replaced by confidence that came from a decision and a commitment. Nehru and Nehruvians had wanted India to be taken seriously but a desire without a decision and a commitment is just talk. Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee showed how to gain the serious attention of the powers by taking the risk in making a commitment. The three-pronged Nehruvian policies of development of nuclear weapons capability, non-exercise of the option and repeated advocacy of nuclear disarmament were re-calibrated in terms of the adoption of weapons policy and the muting of the disarmament advocacy. The new nuclear stakeholders were the Indian armed forces and Indian nuclear and defense scientists. The loser was the foreign office that had control of the nuclear disarmament file. The overconfidence of the West and China in their ability to corner India internationally by mobilizing the world community was shaken by the 1998 tests. We turn now to a discussion of the political effects of India’s lancing of the anti-proliferation bubble of the ‘world community’.

Lancing the non-proliferation bubble Sun Tzu’s classical advice was first to attack the enemy’s mind and then its alliances. Attacking the enemy’s army and its cities were the last choices. India’s 1998 nuclear tests and the declaration that India was a nuclear weapon state attacked several minds and several alliances. Within India the tests eliminated the Nehruvian hesitation about crossing the nuclear threshold; the internal balance of power shifted irrevocably towards the bomb lobby and against those who favoured nuclear ambivalence and nuclear disarmament. Nehru’s three-pronged nuclear policies had fragmented the Indian political and strategic mind and paved the way for a stalemated pattern of domestic alignment between the advocates of global and Indian nuclear disarmament, or at the least keeping the nuclear option under a wrap (the Indian diplomats), and advocates of ongoing development of India’s nuclear and missile capability (many Indian scientists). The 1998 tests

Liberating India and its nuclear policy 183 created a new situation within India, by establishing a public identification between nuclear weapons and Indian foreign affairs, and an identification between Indian nuclear weapons and the threats to Indian security interests as a result of the Pakistan–China–US coalition. The importance of the tests was less in the technical details of India’s nuclear weapons capability which were already known. They lay more in the sign of decision and commitment to a nuclear weapons position which the Nehruvians had avoided and which Prime Minister Vajpayee took. When Pokhran II occurred (May 1998) it was seen as a major international, regional and a domestic event. Internationally, it was a setback to nuclear nonproliferation. It undermined the widespread belief that the nuclear and missile proliferation issue had been laid to rest by the development of international agreements by a majority of states in the world and by the development of export controls against countries like India. The Indo-Pakistani tests enlarged the nuclear club and renewed world attention to the nuclear question. Regionally the tests gave India a presence in the Asia Pacific area and it increased interest among Southeast Asian and North Asian states in the new directions of India’s strategic activities. This was signalled by India’s determination not to be marginalized or cornered by India’s enemies, that is, China, Pakistan and some Western states such as the US. Before May 1998 the belief was widespread that a moderate level of stability existed in Asia Pacific through a combination of American military superiority, American led security alliances with Japan, South Korea and Australia and defence arrangements with some Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) states. There was also the development of a proposition that China was the natural Asian leader (not Japan or India or Russia) and that the US and China could form a bilateral bargain and stabilize the Asian continent on the basis of a partnership between the two. In this scheme India’s position was defined by the US, China and Pakistan as that of a difficult regional bully which had to be contained by the development of an Indo-Pakistani balance. This is why Pakistan is to China as Israel is to the US. The US did not object to Chinese nuclear and missile help to Pakistan since all three felt that containing India was more important than curbing Pakistani nuclear proliferation. The Indian tests in 1998 had a major effect within India. Up to May 1998 the Nehruvians had relied on diplomatic talk about international non-discriminatory arms control arrangements and about the importance of nuclear disarmament. But the Nehru line also kept India out of the nuclear club because of the Government’s policy of unilateral self-restraint. The Nehru line had a deep negative impact on Indian interests because it exposed India to continuous international pressure to roll back its nuclear programme since it did not intend to exercise its nuclear option. So the policy of not exercising the option, of talking about nuclear disarmament and of developing Indian nuclear science showed considerable confusion. The policy also lacked transparency – a much cherished value in a democracy – because India’s nuclear policy was developed in secrecy. The Nehru line on Indian nuclear policy as well as in defence affairs in general delayed the

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settlement of a major Indian strategic debate which has been going on for almost a century. There were three main lines of thinking in this debate: 1 2 3

Those who insisted that India’s non-violence philosophy, not armed struggle, was the way to deal with aggressive foreigners (M. K. Gandhi). Those who felt that armed struggle was essential to settle important political and strategic questions if diplomacy failed (G. B. Tilak). Those who believed in diplomatic dialogue as the way to settle strategic questions. This was the Nehru–Nehruvian approach and this dominated India’s approach since 1947 towards the nuclear question, as well as Kashmir, Indo-Pakistani and India-China issues. This was the Congress Party line which was rejected by Pokhran II and the public declaration that India now believed in the importance of nuclear weapons for national security. In the Congress Party approach the Government did not recognize the importance of a well thought out and coordinated plan and a sequence of diplomatic tactics, psychological warfare strategy and military plans that put pressure on the enemies and that advanced Indian interests by a changed strategy.

The Nehru–Nehruvian stance led to a major debate between Indian physicists and the Delhi political class. The Indian political class includes thinkers in Mumbai, Pune, Bangalore, Chennai and Calcutta but the Delhi political class has hijacked the Indian political debate by marginalizing non-Delhi participants. In the former were scientific giants like Dr Homi Bhabha and Dr P. K. Iyengar, among others. In the latter were Nehru, Krishna Menon (who as Defence Minister was more interested in Indian disarmament than Indian defence) and several members of the Ministries of Finance and External Affairs who thought that butter was more important than guns and after 1962 that conventional arms were more important than nuclear ones. The question which the Indian physicists posed was a simple and a powerful one: can India truly have an independent foreign policy and political independence as Nehru and Indian leaders claimed to seek without possessing the cutting edge of chemicals and nuclear explosive capacity in a demonstrated form? The Nehru–Nehruvian practitioners avoided answering the question directly and instead developed a policy of big talk, high moral ground and a low armed capacity to engage the international opposition. They created the situation which enabled international influences to define the parameters of Indian decision-making concerning strategic affairs. The practical consequences of this approach were serious: 1

It kept the inputs of the Indian armed forces out of the deliberations concerning the nuclear questions even though the nuclear issue is a military one in addition to being a political question. Instead the Delhi political class consisting of leftists, rightists, politicians, civilian bureaucrats, journalists and professors none of whom had any professional expertise about the military uses of nuclear energy and about the role of force in international affairs fell in line with the Nehru approach (1947–May 1998). The Nehru approach was

Liberating India and its nuclear policy 185

2

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temporarily shattered by Indira Gandhi in May 1974 (Pokhran I) and then it was restored when she declared that the test was peaceful and India did not seek nuclear arms. When Indian scientists were given a free hand to develop the scientific agenda in the approach formulated by Dr Homi Bhabha, Dr Sarabhai and his colleagues, at the same time the Nehru–Nehruvian approach to the nuclear question encouraged the development of a political approach by the scientists. For instance, after May 1998 some scientists developed positions advocating that no further nuclear testing was required or that the existing levels of tests were adequate. The political advocacy of scientists merits attention. The first kind of advocacy was prominent during the period up to May 1998 when the Indian atomic energy establishment was divided between those who believed in the exercise of the Indian nuclear option and the development of Indian nuclear weapons, and those who opposed it. The second type of advocacy emerged after May 1998 when the Indian atomic energy establishment argued that no further testing was required and India could sign CTBT. Whether or not India signed the CTBT was a political question and a military question and it required inputs from the military about their assessments of the strategic situation and strategic threat perception in the coming decade or two. It also required an assessment of the impact of the CTBT on Indian scientific and missile capabilities given that the CTBT was meant to freeze India’s capacities at current levels and create a permanent gap between Chinese and Indian capabilities. Because of the nature of the China–Pakistan relationship it would also create a gap between China–Pakistan and Indian nuclear and missile capabilities.1 The lead time to conduct a nuclear test was controlled by successive prime ministers from Jawaharlal Nehru onwards. Nehru felt a lead time of 18 months was adequate. This was a big gift to the international system, that is, a promise that there would be 18 months advance notice about Indian nuclear testing. This was a clear invitation to foreign powers to pressurize India during the 18 months window of opportunity. Shastri had cut it down to a three months lead time but Shastri’s death was followed by a revival of the old practice of 18 months lead time. Here Indian prime ministerial political behaviour effectively handcuffed the Indian nuclear establishment. This is an example of unilateral self-restraint at work which did not in hindsight advance any Indian interest other than to make Nehru–Nehruvians liked by major powers while the Indian Government at the same time appeared to be weak willed and indecisive in strategic matters. Under Nehru–Nehruvians the Government of India projected an image that it was devoted to high principles and to the cause of global nuclear disarmament. The Ministry of External Affairs and the Prime Minister’s Office were the guardians of this image and its projection. After 50 years it was clearly a failed policy but the mantra has not been discarded. Notice that the four points show that during the era of Nehru and the Nehruvians India’s strategic decision-making activity and space was dominated

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Liberating India and its nuclear policy by a Delhi-centered political class which had an anti-military and an anti-nuclear weapons ideology and a pro-Nehru thought process. Nehru was the guru and he seemed to know everything about foreign and defence affairs. In addition, the decision-making space was occupied by politicized Indian scientists who were taking policy decisions on political and military questions which were actually outside their sphere of competence and responsibility. At the same time, the Indian military as an institution did not have a place at the table even though the nuclear question had military implications. And finally, the Indian decision-making space was influenced by outside powers whose aim was not to promote Indian interest but their own interest. This habit of keeping the Indian military out of such questions and listening instead to outside forces has been a legacy of the Nehru era. For instance, Nehru was listening to Lord Mountbatten in formulating his approach to the Kashmir question and in referring the issue to the United Nations, and also in deciding on a policy of friendship and dialogue with Pakistan even though Pakistan had come into being on the basis of hostility to ‘Hindu India’. Nehru not only ignored the advice of Sardar Patel on Kashmir and Pakistan affairs as well as China affairs, but he also ignored the advice of General Kulwant Singh who had wanted some more time to recover Kashmir completely. Had Nehru listened to General Kulwant Singh and Sardar Patel instead of Lord Mountbatten Indian could have avoided its present dilemmas in Kashmir and with Pakistan.

The May 1998 nuclear test was a turning point in Indian decision-making process because Prime Minister Vajpayee did in the nuclear sphere what Prime Minister Shastri did in the 1965 war. Both broke two Nehru–Nehruvian taboos and showed political courage and independent capacity to think through a problem and to deal with it in a way which had an impact on the enemy’s behaviour and motivation. The 1965 war was a military stalemate but it was a psychological breakthrough because Shastri’s answer to Pakistani military pressure in Kashmir was to create a counter military pressure in the Lahore and Sialkot areas across the international boundary. Shastri linked the two elements which Nehru had failed to appreciate. Vajpayee also answered the nuclear questions in the following way. In response to the evidence of China’s and Pakistan’s brazen nuclear activities, and America’s continuous pressure on India, Vajpayee rejected the Nehru approach of unilateral self-restraint and crossed into the nuclear club. In response to the question of Indian scientists, he signalled that nuclear weapons capability was a requirement (along with economic and military strength, good intelligence about the enemy’s capacity and motivation and one’s own political will) for an independent policy. Nehru had talked about an independent policy; the BJP led coalition was practising it. The Indian tests had an impact on thinking at the global level because they triggered considerable confusion in international strategic assessments about India’s strategic motives and the implications of the tests for the global non-proliferation regimes and regional relationships in the subcontinent. No consensus existed

Liberating India and its nuclear policy 187 about the aims and methods by which to address the new reality that has been created by overt India nuclear weaponization. The Indian tests reflected a considered response to a pattern of Pakistani, Chinese and American provocations in the strategic sphere; and they indicated that the problem of nuclear proliferation could not be laid to rest in the Asian–Pacific region in which Chinese and Indian strategic interests and ambitions ran counter to each other. In these circumstances, a non-binding nuclear non-proliferation regime did not provide an answer to the Indian security problem or the problem of stability in the Asian–Pacific region. The new situation pointed to a need to bargain restraints in the nuclear sphere with India and Pakistan, India and the Peoples’ Republic of China (PRC) as well as Indian and the US as the obvious bargaining partners.

Limitations of a non-binding non-proliferation regime in Asia The Indo-Pakistani nuclear tests of 1998 were not ad hoc actions by their ruling regimes but represented the culmination of a long history of inter-state diplomatic rivalries and military conflicts between China and India as well as India and Pakistan. The Indian tests were a deliberate response to the provocative behaviour by the PRC and the Clinton administration with regard to their nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament policies as they related to the strategic situation in the Indian subcontinent. While the PRC supplied nuclear and missile aid to Pakistan in violation of its non-proliferation commitments,2 the Clinton administration repeatedly refused to accept the evidence of the CIA on these issues. Moreover, both insisted that the issue of their own nuclear disarmament lay within the province of the nuclear powers only. Before the tests of May 1998, there was a widespread belief in international policy circles and in Western scholarship that nuclear proliferation was not inevitable and that a line in the sand could be drawn against further nuclear and missile proliferation. There was a belief that effective anti-proliferation arrangements could be developed; that the international system was increasingly embracing the non-proliferation norm and that potential proliferators could be isolated and marginalized in regional and world affairs. There was, thus, a belief that a discriminatory or hierarchical world of nuclear-haves and their allies (the satisfied powers) on the one hand, and potential regional/middle powers (who were dissatisfied about arrangements concerning their security and prestige and were dubbed the ‘rogue’ or ‘intransigent’ states) on the other hand, could be created and maintained. These beliefs revealed a smugness and overconfidence about the centrality and durability of non-proliferation in international security affairs. The smugness lay in the belief that a stable set of strategic relationships could be developed solely on the basis of bargains between the P-5 (or nuclear) states. There was also overconfidence that while the Indians and Pakistanis talked repeatedly about unequal international and strategic arrangements and their security interests, they were unlikely to challenge the ‘global’ non-proliferation ‘regime’, that is, they lacked the staying power as distinct from a capacity to engage in Hindu-style discourse without closure.

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The Indo-Pakistani tests shattered this smugness and overconfidence that, in hindsight, reflected limited success with the smoke and mirrors of non-proliferation activity since the NPT was approved by the US and USSR in 1968. It is obvious that the non-proliferation Regime worked best where it was needed the least, and it did not work in regions where it was needed the most, that is in regions of conflict in South Asia, the Middle East and the Korean peninsula. The Regime looked good on paper. Over the years, it acquired many institutional faces: export control lists that were negotiated by the Zangger Committee in 1970 and revised periodically; the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) set up in 1987 by the seven leading industrialized nations which is a norm or an inter-state agreement but not an internationally negotiated treaty (as is the NPT); regional nuclear weapons free zones in South America and the South Pacific; the treaties that imposed chemical, bacteriological and radiological weapons bans and the CTBT finalized in 1996. But parallel to the rise of the anti-proliferation norm was the growth of activities of the NPT parties (including the P-5 nuclear powers) that indicated a preference for what Madeleine Albright, US Secretary of State, called ‘different stokes for different folks’. In the nuclear world, this meant that the internationally proclaimed non-proliferators followed three different but related policies. One, among the P-5 NPT/nuclear powers, it meant a commitment to the modernization of their nuclear forces, to nuclear deterrence and to nuclear trade, viewing them as acceptable, beneficial and necessary. Two, between the nuclear powers and their temporary/regional allies, nuclear proliferation was also acceptable; indeed it was aided or tolerated. British and European companies supplied sensitive technologies to Iraq, the US helped Israel, the Europeans and China helped Pakistan, while the US looked the other way. Russia and China helped Iran and India (China sold India heavy water when India had a shortage). We call this selective proliferation with regional allies. Three, in contrast, with regional hegemons and regional rivals, the preferred and standard practice was to insist on non-proliferation. This was the basis for American and Chinese demands that India disarm itself in the nuclear and missile spheres. According to traditional US policy in Asia, since 1949, regional hegemons who were perceived as ‘unfriendly to the US’, amongst which India was viewed as one, were sought to be contained.3 Here the strategic imperative in US policy overrode the democratic imperative that ideally ought to have brought them together. Compared to the second set of policies, this was selective non-proliferation.

Western reactions to the Indo-Pakistani nuclear tests This is the background against which Western reactions to the Indo-Pakistani tests must be understood. The emphasis in the discussion later is especially on the Indian tests because India’s nuclear behaviour has been seen as the stimulus for the Pakistani tests. This section reviews the analytical merit and factual basis of different types of Western assessments. The sampling of Western reactions is not comprehensive but is representative of the main parameters of the Western debate and is done to illustrate the argument.

Liberating India and its nuclear policy 189 Official Western reactions to the Indo-Pakistani tests were generally condemnatory. Statements by the P-5, G-8 and other international groupings of states showed a mixture of emotion, a self-serving preoccupation with Western strategic interests, hype about non-proliferation and ethnocentric judgements about Indian and Pakistani strategic and political behaviour. In contrast, the assessments of certain American thinkers and peace researchers showed clarity, balance and a forward-looking problem-solving approach. Simultaneously, the actions of various Western governments revealed a split amongst themselves in their responses. The US, Canada and Japan all slapped on sanctions and opposed World Bank loans to India and Pakistan, while the Europeans sought engagement rather than containment of the two states. However, even this division was not free of ambiguities. For instance, the US was soon following a two-track policy: along with the sanctions which were mandatory under US law, the US initiated a high level dialogue between Strobe Talbot, Deputy Secretary of State, and Jaswant Singh, Vice Chair of the Indian Planning Commission. We now turn to a discussion of an important sample of Western judgements and actions and their analytical merit and factual basis. The Canadian government judged India’s tests, in the words of its Foreign Minister, Lloyd Axworthy, in the following way: a

b

Let me begin today by stating my firm belief that India’s recent nuclear tests constitute a clear and fundamental threat to the international security regime and thus, to Canada’s security. India has publicly justified its nuclear tests primarily on the basis of regional security concerns. But, it is not evident that any significant change in regional security took place in the period leading up to the test and, until recently, India’s relationship with China and Pakistan were improving. India’s recent action clearly worsens its own regional security situation and the global security equilibrium.4

The reasoning in the Canadian policy statement rested on the premise that non-proliferation equalled international security and Canadian security; and conversely a threat to the non-proliferation regime was a threat to Canada. The Axworthy statement was both intellectually dishonest and illogical. While Minister Axworthy railed against the new nuclear politik, he conveniently ignored the fact that the government of Canada is an active and enthusiastic member of the old nuclear politik. Canada is a member of the North American Air Defence (NORAD) and NATO, two military organizations which subscribe to the nuclear deterrence doctrine and which rely on the legitimacy of nuclear weapons for national defence. In effect, Canada enjoys the US nuclear umbrella, so that Canada’s security depends in part on nuclear weapons. The idea that Indian nuclear tests and missiles posed a threat to Canada’s physical security was utter nonsense because happily, there is no conflict of interest that creates a military necessity for India to attack Canada. Axworthy’s comments on India’s regional security concerns betrayed a lack of understanding about the persistence of traditional inter-state security threats in

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India’s strategic neighbourhood; and indeed in Northeast Asia including the Taiwan Straits, the South China Sea and the Middle East. India’s relationship with China could not be described as ‘improving’ in 1998 when Indian practitioners have continuously, during the 1980s and the 1990s, expressed strong concerns about China’s missile and nuclear supplies to Pakistan, contrary to PRC’s obligations under the NPT and the MTCR. So the Axworthy statement did not have a sound factual or analytical basis. Another example of Western reaction was expressed by Harold Müller. He made two broad generalizations and a critique of American policy: a

b

The events in South Asia have changed the parameters of world politics, and in particular those of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament, fundamentally. They are as significant as the fall of the Berlin Wall nine years ago. Unfortunately, they point us in the opposite direction: away from cooperation, arms control and disarmament, towards confrontation, arms racing and, eventually nuclear war. The world community must make its utmost efforts to stem this fateful tide. It is essential to seek the trigger to the events in the fundamentally changed character of the present Indian government – a precarious coalition headed by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). These nuclear weapons are not for security, status, or prestige in the first place, as is all too often assumed. They are instruments for political power, for dominating the subcontinent and achieving equality with China. They are instruments for increasing tensions with Pakistan, so that the more radical elements within the BJP can enhance their influence within the party and in India at large. To expand the electoral basis beyond the tiny 26 percent of the last ballot, the BJP needs increased hostility with Pakistan. For this reason, a nuclear arms race is inevitable as long as this government prevails.5

Müller’s criticism of the US’s opportunistic policy was as follows: At the top, the lone superpower, the US is oscillating between a pragmatic continuation of past (pro-arms control) policies and the attitudes of Congressional conservatives (with some followers in the Pentagon and the Labs) that are the moral equivalent of rogue state views: contempt for multilateralism and international organizations, an opportunistic attitude to international law that is (ab)used when it is convenient, and refused if it demands compromise, a complete reliance on unilateral military strength, and the relentless pursuit of the national interest – egocentrically defined – without regard to the claims and interests of others.6 Müller’s statement reflected the perception that the Indo-Pakistani tests were an important international event in the sense that the number of declared nuclear powers increased from 5 to 7 and opened the door to further proliferation.

Liberating India and its nuclear policy 191 However, it could only be seen as such in the context of the widespread but erroneous belief that the old P-5 states could build a Berlin wall to keep new nuclear powers out. Clearly, the Indo-Pakistani tests shattered this belief and changed the parameters of non-proliferation policy (of drawing a line against further proliferation and protecting the international nuclear status of the P-5 powers). The US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, opposed the recognition of India and Pakistan as nuclear weapons states because it undermined the exclusivity of the P-5 nuclear club and the NPT philosophy. But the US position was unrealistic, because unless the reality of Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapon status is formally recognized, and they are asked to join the NPT as nuclear weapon states, they cannot accept the legal obligations or responsibility of acting with restraint as nuclear weapon powers. The parameters also changed in another way. With over one hundred hours of high level official talks in the period following the tests, the Indo-US strategic dialogue had developed two parameters: Indian security interests concerning two unfriendly neighbours with whom India has fought wars and with whom there is a historical agenda of unsettled business on the one hand had to be taken into account; and effort was needed to protect (or appear to do so) US non-proliferation policy on the other hand. Finding common ground or an area of negotiation so that conflicting interests and strategic concepts could be adjusted was the challenge before American and Indian practitioners. Müller was right to point to the effects of the tests on the parameters, but he was wrong to emphasize the danger of a nuclear arms race and war between India and Pakistan as also India and China. Why should the subcontinental practitioners be seen as irresponsible political actors and why should the domestic politics of the BJP be seen as the culprit when the BJP had to secure consensus with its coalition partners? India has a system of checks and balances as the basis of its strategic decision-making. Indeed, a sign of the vitality of Indian democracy is that, on the one hand, there is an inter-party and public consensus that opposes a discriminatory nuclear regime, but on the other hand, there is also a well-organized and vocal anti-nuclear movement in Indian politics and society. In the West, the nuclear weapon is a political and a psychological weapon: it is meant to deter the enemy. It is now the same in the Indian subcontinent. To insinuate recklessness on the part of Indian or BJP practitioners had the smell of racism and ethnocentricity. A peace researcher, Marcus Raskin, made this point forcefully. To quote him, By the 1960s there were clearly many nuclear genies jumping out of national bottles. In the United States there was fear that ‘Nasser might get a bomb’ in Egypt, just as later fears gripped American planners that ‘Saddam might get the bomb’ or ‘Quaddafi might get the bomb’. One did not have to look too deeply to see that beneath these claimed fear was barely disguised racism. One did not hear the same concerns regarding Israeli, French, or British nukes. In fact, racist fear was an important element in creating support among the nuclear states to use the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 as a substitute for an actual end to nuclear testing and serious disarmament.7

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Statements by Indian and Pakistani practitioners confirmed that the deterrent value of nuclear weapons was well understood in the subcontinent and the prospect of war was fear-mongering by Western experts. Nuclear accidents can happen and do happen, but in the history of nuclear disaster the finger should point more to Ukraine and Russia for Chernobyl, to threats by the US to use nuclear weapons in the Korean and Vietnam conflicts, and to the actual use of US nuclear weapons against Japan in 1945, than to the Indian subcontinent. In sum, Müller overstated the role of BJP’s domestic politics and understated the role of security and restraint as well as deliberation in Indian nuclear decisionmaking. External as well as internal considerations drove national decisions in India, as they do elsewhere. A third sort of reaction came from a Washington think tank. It reflected recognition of the new nuclear realities following the Indo-Pakistani tests. Cathleen Fisher of the H. L. Stimson Centre in Washington, DC, made the following points: a

b

c

Only months after the Indian and Pakistani underground nuclear tests, the world shows every sign of adjusting to the new reality of seven, rather than five, admitted nuclear-weapon States (with Israel waiting silently, at least for now, in the wings). The cornerstone of the non-proliferations regime – the NPT – lacks two essential requirements for a stable, effective and robust cooperative security regime: Inclusiveness and legitimacy . . . the fault-lines in the NPT and non-proliferation regime have become more evident in recent months, but their existence predated the May nuclear explosions. The non-proliferation norm has been challenged – but also reaffirmed. While the May nuclear explosions overturned the nuclear status quo, they did not invalidate the non-proliferation norm, which has evolved over decades and is unlikely to be easily destroyed . . . although steps are now being taken to adapt to the new nuclear realities in South Asia, these actions have been undertaken within the context of the normative obligations created by the NPT. Negotiations with India and Pakistan seem intended to appeal to the sense of responsibility that de facto Nuclear Weapon States now share with the declared nuclear powers; this approach stands in stark contrast with that used to deal with North Korea and Iraq, both of which are viewed as unabashedly rejecting non-proliferation norms.8

A fourth sample of Western reactions reflected the forward thinking of a peace researcher, Marcus Raskin. Raskin is critical of US policy and the ‘do as I say, not as I do’ approach. He points out the double standards as well as the contradictions and ambiguities in US policies, as follows: The Clinton Administration’s general position is one that borders on foolishness unless the US changes its own nuclear stance. That is to say, the inherent asymmetry and discrimination embodied in the current US position are in

Liberating India and its nuclear policy 193 fact a negotiating non-starter, because they are based on the US view that it should not have to get rid of its own weapons.9 The US called on India and Pakistan to, ●

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‘stop all further tests, adhere to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty immediately and unconditionally’ (the US has yet to do this); ‘refrain from the manufacture of nuclear warheads and bombs or attaching them to ballistic missiles’ (the US excuses itself from this admonition); ‘halt the production of fissile material and participate constructively in negotiations on fissile material cut-off in Geneva’ (the US has no clear policy for itself on fissile materials or their recycling); ‘confirm policies not to export equipment, material or technology relevant to missiles or weapons of mass destruction and enter into ironclad commitments in that regard’ (the US considers the export of nuclear, computer equipment and military assistance and sales on a case by case basis. It seeks to dominate the market in that regard); ‘refrain from threatening military movements or violations across the borders’ (while the US itself carries out extra-territorial military movements in its own foreign and military activities as, e.g. in Mexico, Columbia, etc.) ‘And particularly the line of control [in Kashmir] or any other provocative acts or statements’ (US representatives are careful to be sure that their language is diplomatic, but provocative acts in terms of covert operations in many parts of the world continue unabated); ‘and reestablish direct communications between India and Pakistan with a view to addressing the basic cause of the tension between those countries, including the issues of Kashmir’ (the General Assembly has taken a resolution about Kashmir that should open the way to external mediation. It should be noted that India considers Kashmir a domestic problem).

Raskin’s moral reference point is Mahatma Gandhi’s view, expressed after the US dropped atomic bombs against Japan, that the US had won the war but ‘we will see whether it’s to [sic, it has] lost its soul’. Raskin makes a compelling case against the NPT. It is discriminatory and the ‘wrong course’. He concludes with a practical suggestion: The present stance of the United States, that India and Pakistan must sign the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states, must be reversed to acknowledge the reality of their new nuclear status, but in the context of a general disarmament program and renewed commitment of all nuclear states, new and old, to those commitments.10 This comparative sample of ‘Western’ reactions is not comprehensive but is meant to illustrate a point: the Indo-Pakistani tests opened up several channels of public discourse and discussion of new forward-looking strategies about nuclear

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proliferation, non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament and American policies from the Kennedy to the Clinton era. Scholars need to go beyond the official scripts to identify the new parameters of public discourse and to challenge the orthodox wisdom about the definition of the ‘public international good’ as distinct from the ‘private national good’. My random sample of ‘attentive governments and publics’ reveals a surprising asymmetry in the distribution of blame and the action required of the players. Minister Axworthy and Madeleine Albright assign blame exclusively to India and Pakistan (India more than Pakistan because Pakistan was seen as reacting to India’s tests). They assign no blame to their own shortsighted policies. The actions they require entail significant Indian concession, but none by the US and Canada. The fundamental problem with the discriminatory basis of the NPT was not acknowledged in the statements by the two North American states. Here Axworthy and the arms controllers in the Canadian Department of Foreign Affairs were maintaining in public a complete alignment with US nuclear and arms control policies. The only significant difference was that the US immediately engaged in a strategic dialogue with India based on two parameters (Indian security and non-proliferation) but Canada shunned ministerial contact with the Indian government until 2003. The Müller approach had an element of finger-pointing against India–Pakistan (as in the US–Canada approach) but it also shared a growing concern with Raskin’s analysis about the US’s wrong and opportunistic course; but then Müller digressed highlighting the role of the BJP and domestic politics. Müller lamented the lack of progress in the disarmament field but fails to recognize that the NPT was always intended to establish a two-tiered nuclear system. The policies of the P-5 states in the NPT system favour ‘arms reduction’ and modernization of their nuclear forces, but not the elimination of P-5 nuclear weapons. Thus, the promise of nuclear disarmament in Article 6 of the NPT amounts to insincere rhetoric. The US cannot disarm in the conventional and the nuclear fields in the foreseeable future if it is to maintain its hegemony in world affairs. From the other side of the spectrum of views, Raskin assigns blame to the US but also proposed an alternative approach. In a similar vein, Fisher sought to secure a balance between the two worlds of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. Both analysts offered creative, forward-looking ideas, which seem to have escaped the thinking of governmental arms controllers in Washington and Ottawa.

The Indian nuclear elephant becomes a tiger once it learnt to escalate and negotiate The 1998 tests had three immediate political effects apart from the outrage they triggered within the ‘world community’. First, it placed enormous pressure on neighbouring Pakistan, India’s arch rival, to follow suit, which it did in a matter of days despite intense American pressure. The Pakistani tit for tat was welcomed by India because it brought out into the open the reality of Pakistan’s clandestine nuclear programme, the tests revealed the scientific basis of the country’s programme, that is, its scope and limitations and the scale of outside help it had

Liberating India and its nuclear policy 195 received from European companies, China and North Korea; and yet the Pakistani tests did not alter the asymmetrical distribution of military and economic power between the two countries and the conflictual pattern of relations. At the same time having a nuclear armed neighbour created a political cover to develop and to maintain the Indian nuclear deterrent against two neighbourly rivals. Second, the nuclear tests of the two countries created an international identification with a dangerous nexus between the danger of war as a result of a dangerous situation in Kashmir and the danger of escalation of a conventional conflict and an insurgency into a nuclear conflict that would likely have international ramifications. Having created a new situation that was irreversible, and by offering to negotiate restraints with all concerned parties (especially the US and Pakistan and later China), India opened up channels of external discourse and liberated itself from the problem of stalemated relationships within India and between India and the major powers that defined the situation before 1998. As a result of hesitation by the Nehruvians in exercising the nuclear weapons option, Indian politics and foreign affairs had become a field of polarized and inconclusive debates along the three lines outlined earlier. The result was a stalemate on a critical national security question; and this stalemate suited those who did not want India to establish a nuclear weapons programme and policy. As such we argue that the 1998 tests on the one hand liberated India from a stalemated situation, and as well it liberated Indo-American relations from the issue of nuclear weapons as a point of friction between the two countries. The third political effect was on China. Until 1998 India had hesitated to exercise its nuclear option and, it had hesitated to link its nuclear weapons policy to the reality of a nuclear China that was using India’s hesitations in both areas to arm Pakistan with conventional and nuclear weapons capabilities and to tighten the screws on India in regional as well as international affairs (by supporting international non-proliferation regime and the comprehensive nuclear test ban). China was playing a double game, facilitating Pakistani nuclear and missile proliferation as a special ally against India and on the other hand selectively arguing for international non-proliferation policies. China was getting two free rides: (1) It was the secret facilitator of Pakistani nuclear and missile development because the US and the international atomic energy and disarmament community was not willing to call China’s bluff because of the usefulness of Chinese votes on international issues; and the Western world did not mind a situation that pressured the Indians to disarm. (2) China was using its cooperation in the UN system and in its relations with US administrations (since the US–PRC strategic discourse began in the late 1960s with Henry Kissinger’s several trips to China) to advance its image as a responsible international player. The 1998 tests signalled that India had not bought into the American (State Department’s) argument that there was ‘no conclusive evidence’ about Chinese and North Korean aid in nuclear and missile spheres to Pakistan; and second, India believed that China and Pakistan together posed a problem for Indian security and hence merited a response. In these ways, the 1998 tests should be seen as a much delayed Indian response to Pakistan, Chinese and American provocations with the complicity of the likes of South Africa’s Nelson Mandela

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and much of the third world nations at the UN who had sympathy for the Pakistani and Chinese positions on Indian intransigence in relation to Kashmir, Pakistan and nuclear affairs. The emergence of strategic dialogues between India and the major powers including America, China and Pakistan indicated that the tests and their political effects had a positive result: they had opened up channels of discourse and recognized the importance of strategic triangularities (e.g. India, Pakistan and China) that shaped the politics of the region. Moreover, India’s nuclear position had acquired a staying power after 1998 because it was based on the bedrock of Indian nuclear science and development, on a recognition among the key players in Indian strategic affairs – the defence scientists, the armed forces and the strategic minds in the Prime Minister’s Office, that India could not expect to develop an independent foreign policy – a fond dream of Nehru, without demonstrating a policy to use chemical explosives capacity for conventional armament production and the country’s economic modernization, and by demonstrating a policy to use nuclear explosives capability for military purposes. These were the sub-textual messages of the 1998 tests.

13 India’s rise as a major power, 1990s

To be taken seriously a country must have the capacity to deal with a full agenda of regional and international issues on a continuous basis and in an effective manner, that is, as measured by international recognition of its value and impact. As Martin Wight has emphasized powers have general interests about their spheres of interests and a capacity to act alone or a capacity to raise the costs of international conflict; they must possess a capacity to escalate the level or the scale of violence and they must have the capacity as well to negotiate political settlements with its rivals. Other powers bid for their support in peace time, according to Wight, and other powers recognize that they are not able to manage the costs of attracting or opposing another power.1 Even though disparities exist in the distribution of world power, disparity of itself is not a decisive element if a rival power has the capacity to act, to escalate conflict and to form negotiating processes. India’s rise to power on the regional and the international stage has followed a difficult path. During the Nehru years, it did not have the capacity to deal with its internal economic issues or build its military strength, or use its strategic position and resources so that in Wight’s terms, the great powers bid for its support. Instead, because of its weak position against Pakistan and on the Kashmir issue at the war, India was constantly bidding for Soviet protection and US understanding; and the US and China were bidding for Pakistan’s support in pursuit of their respective interests in the region and with other powers. By their policies towards India and Pakistan, the US, Pakistan and China were able to raise the costs of Indian defences and maintain the high costs to Indian diplomacy as a result of its weak international position on Kashmir and in its confrontation with China in the Himalayas. Moreover, because of Nehru’s and the Congress party’s interest in maintaining the support of the Muslim minority for the Congress party in Indian politics, and for Indian policies in Kashmir, and Pakistan and its faith in nonalignment, Indian diplomacy in the Middle East favoured Arab causes (anti-Israel and Arab socialism and secularism) at the expense of its interests in Israel and Iran. Domestic politics and political diplomacy trumped military strategy. Under Nehru, India showed a capacity to speak on a full plate of regional and international issues (Korea, disarmament and atomic energy, Indo-China, Suez, non-alignment and Third World development and the North–South dialogue) but

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it lacked the concentration of political, economic and military power that would enable it to shape and lead a politically divided region like the subcontinent in a way that others bid for India’s support, instead of others pursuing policies to pressure India in the military, economic and diplomatic spheres. Under Nehru and the Nehruvians, the management style was to convey a sense of Indian entitlement of a great power status without paying the price to earn such a recognition. Without the concentration of power, and a continuous demonstration of an ability to lead and to manage ground realities, and without an effective management style, Indian power was lacking in all three key areas of demonstrated power, that is, an ability to move people and governments with ideas and philosophy, to organize the flow of military power and to organize international economic exchanges. India talked the talk under Nehru, but it could not walk the walk effectively. It lacked adequate power and what it had was not used effectively. Its immediate strategic neighbourhood remained politically divided. India’s rise to power was part of a long drawn process that developed several trajectories. It accumulated military strength in the context of challenges from Pakistan and China and military pressures in its border areas – from Kashmir to the Himalayan areas. It did so as a reaction to outside pressures. This process started in the mid-1950s as a reaction to the flow of modern arms to Pakistan by the US. Following its military defeat by China in 1962, Indian military modernization efforts gained traction. Such modernization was tied to threat assessments relating to hostile neighbours but it was constrained by the military supply policies of Moscow and Washington, among others, by limitations in India’s weak domestic defence industry which Nehru had ignored and by competing demands for resources for Indian development and Indian security. India’s defence build-up from the mid-1960s was reactive and incremental, it sought to place India in the forefront of modern nuclear and space technology, but it was an uncoordinated accumulation of military strength among India’s compartmentalized military, air and naval services and coordination between external strategic intelligence service and its military intelligence service was lacking;2 that is, poor internal policy-making coordination was a made in India problem that indicated a political culture that did not value team work to actively engage the external opposition, and to control and deflect its impact. The process indicated an incremental accumulation of military power but it did not produce a concentration of power in comparison to the growing military strength of the rival coalition of Pakistan, China and the US. Despite the growth of Indian military power, the external rivals possessed the political motivation and the capacity to raise the costs of Indian defences and its economy, and India was required to bid for military support of its traditional partner (the USSR) and to bid for restraint by its external rivals (Pakistan, China and the US). Barring Shastri’s war action in 1965, and Indira Gandhi’s 1971 Bangladesh campaign, Indian practitioners did not possess a strategic culture to inflict costs on its enemies and instead were driven by a political culture that urged the great powers to adopt the philosophy of non-intervention vis-à-vis the subcontinent. The Nehruvian belief that hostile powers could be restrained by political and moral lectures ignored the lessons of Indian and world

India’s rise as a major power, 1990s 199 history. It ignored the point that it was the nature of a great power to intervene, and if India expected to deal with a full plate of regional and international issues, it had to have a capacity and an attitude to intervene by raising the costs on a great powers’ coalition that sought to attack Indian interests. The benchmark for India was not to unify continents, to rule the seas or to control global markets. The benchmark was to be taken seriously as a player who could inflict unacceptable military and diplomatic costs if it attacked Indian interests. Accumulation of conventional military strength by India between the mid-1950s and the 1990s was sufficient to avoid military defeat by the opposing coalition but it was not sufficient to attack the enemies’ motivation to challenge Indian interests and to attack its opposing alliance. The incremental growth of Indian military power enabled it to stay in the subcontinental military and diplomatic game but it was not enough to alter the underlying motivations and the pattern of polarized relationships that required India to bid for outside support despite its size and strategic location. Note that Pakistani practitioners were overconfident about their coercive capacity, while Indian practitioners were lacking in confidence. According to the official report of the Kargil Review Committee set-up by the Government of India, It is evident from Pakistani pronouncements and the writings of those with access to the highest decision-making levels, that at least from 1987 onwards, when Dr. A. Q. Khan conveyed a nuclear threat to India in a press interview to an Indian journalist, Pakistan was convinced that its nuclear weapons capability would deter India’s superior conventional forces. Written accounts of foreign observers have highlighted that since 1980, the Pakistani military establishment had entertained ideas of deterring Indian nuclear and conventional capabilities with its nuclear weapons and of carrying out a brash, bold strike to liberate Kashmir which would go unchallenged if the Indian leadership was weak or indecisive. 13.10 Successive Indian Chiefs of Army Staff and Director Generals of Military Operations told the Committee that bringing to bear India’s assumed conventional superiority was not a serious option in the last ten years for a variety of reasons; commitments in Sri Lanka, subsequent deployments in Punjab, the North-East and Kashmir, and a drastic reduction in defence outlay. Pakistani writings over the years have highlighted the Indian Army’s involvement in counter-insurgency in Kashmir and its perceived degradation as an effective fighting force.3 The accumulation of Indian military power was necessary to a successful strategy but the critical element lay in the growth of confidence among Indian political and military practitioners to use power to win and to change the enemy’s mind. The second trajectory concerned the subtle and fundamental changes that occurred in India’s domestic decision-making culture. This was the result of the effects of external and internal pressures which over time realigned the weight,

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the influence and the balance of power among internal institutional forces. This section argues that Indian national security decision-making since 1947 showed two competing tendencies. The first was a sensitivity to international and domestic pressures in the fields of the diplomacy and military policy. Here Indian policies were tied to sensitivities of foreign powers and their policies and were not autonomous. The second sought Indian autonomy. In the first case, international influences and pressures shaped domestic controversies and international lobbying was internalized in internal Indian politics. India’s strategic choices as in the Nehru days were shaped in a ‘top down’ manner, that is, from the power centres in the international system to India’s decision-makers. Here Indian self-help was limited because Indian decisionmaking was circumscribed by international inputs and pressures. The Indian government was vulnerable to such inputs and pressures because its internal strength and political organization was not cohesive and concentrated enough to act against the opposing coalition of Pakistan, China and the US. Three examples validate the assertion. In the 1965 War, self-help was attempted by L. B. Shastri when he ordered the Indian army to attack Pakistan but it failed in part because (i) India did not possess adequate military strength, and (ii) in the face of international pressure to accept a ceasefire and international mediation the Shastri government lacked the self-confidence to resist. In the second example, the 1971 War in Bangladesh, India had accumulated the military power to fight and win but it lacked the strategy to attack the enemy’s motivation to pressure India and to keep it on the defensive against a stronger alliance, India won the military battle but it was unable to win the psychological war and to attack the unity of opposing alliance. In the third example, the 1974 Indian nuclear test, India showed its nuclear capacity to explode a device but here again it lacked a strategy and the will to attack the enemy’s motivation to build international controls of India’s bomb programme; and the enemy’s alliance sought instead to legitimize great power’s possession of nuclear weapons and de-legitimize Indian nuclear arms. In 1974, India’s political leadership was unable to go beyond a policy of conventional military defence to a policy of nuclear deterrence. With the imposition of international sanctions against the 1974 Indian test, the cost of India’s defence grew, and its diplomacy remained circumscribed. So despite its actions in 1965, 1971 and 1974, outside pressures continued to exist, they raised the costs of Indian defence and diplomacy, they played on India’s political culture of defensiveness and reactive behaviour, and they left India in a position that it was required to bid for outside support to escape military defeat or diplomatic isolation. As India’s political leaders were unschooled in strategic affairs unlike American, Russian, Chinese, Pakistani and Israeli leaders who believed that power came from the barrel of a gun and who understood Sun Tzu’s strategic principles, the Indian political class reacted to external and internal pressures, in different ways at different times. Their responses depended on the balance of power within India’s decision-making apparatus. Under the Nehruvians the

India’s rise as a major power, 1990s 201 tendency to accommodate international pressures was dominant. But with the intensification of interaction among competing forces – within India and between India and the opposing external coalition in the 1990s – the pressure increased within India to act and to exercise India’s options, to change India’s policies irrevocably and to create a new situation or a new political effect on the world community so that it was required to bid for India’s cooperation to secure negotiated restraint. The internal pressures to act grew because intensifying international pressures on Indian security interests heightened the sensitivity of India’s armed forces and Indian defence scientists about the negative consequences of the ambivalent Nehruvian approach. The changing internal balance of power was the basis of the policies of the BJP/Vajpayee era (1998–2004). The nuclear option was exercised and India’s nuclear weapon status was asserted. The political effect followed the Western script that arms and threats create influence. The US bid for India’s cooperation even though India’s 1998 tests and missile development broke the non-proliferation rules and US laws. India fought and won in Kargil, 1999. India threatened nuclear war with Pakistan in 2001–02. Its willingness to escalate tensions tested US, Chinese and Pakistani policies and showed India’s option to escalate, and the limits in China’s and the US’s support of Pakistani adventurism. Furthermore, by seeking ties with non-traditional partners like Israel, Iran, Japan and Australia while maintaining traditional links, India joined the global strategic and economic mainstream and increased the weight of realpolotik and geopolitics in its external affairs and in its internal politics. By engaging China in its strategic flanks, Myanmar, Pakistan and the Himalayan region, it secured a positive political effect in Southeast Asian (e.g. Singapore) minds which bid for Indian support to balance China’s presence in the region. This way India also helped widen the geographical limits of its strategic neighbourhood beyond the traditional limits of South Asia that traditionally meant India, Pakistan and other South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries. By turning a difficult relationship with the US into a constructive strategic partnership that projected India as a mature force in a volatile Asian–Indian Ocean region, India facilitated the rise of strategic triangularities (e.g. India–US–Pakistan, India–US–China and India–US–Israel) that created a new set of alignments in the twenty-first century. By turning relations with Pakistan and China into strategic dialogues and peace processes, hostile relations were being turned into a process of competitive coexistence rather than inevitable or predictable confrontation and war. Finally, by accelerating military and nuclear modernization as the base of India’s political diplomacy, by embracing deterrence and defence as two pillars of military strategy, India showed a capacity to deal with a fuller plate of regional and international issues in contrast with the range and scope of India’s power and influence in the Nehru days. These changes produced paradigm shifts in Indian foreign affairs. The importance of the shifts lies in an assessment about their durability. Do they show staying power or are they reversible?

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The third trajectory was a product of two developments in the subcontinent in the 1998–2002 period. First, the Indo-Pakistani nuclear tests ended the policy stalemate in India’s nuclear policy as a result of Nehru’s ‘nuclear option but no nuclear weapons’ stance. Vajpayee’s decision to cross the nuclear threshold irrevocably in 1998 was in contrast with Indira Gandhi’s hesitation to do so in 1974. The incoherence of not integrating nuclear weapons into a national security strategy came to an end and liberated both India and Indo-US relations from stalemated diplomatic positions before 1998 that had caused friction and left no possibility of a resolution by war or by diplomacy. The development of an Indian nuclear doctrine, of a command control system and a nuclear force, produced an accumulation of conventional and nuclear strength. India’s new geopolitical position in relation to the major powers (especially China and America, the two important members of the international coalition that had pressured India in the past), on the one hand removed the barrier against accumulation and use of more power in the future, and on the other hand forced the external powers to recognize India’s security needs vis-à-vis Pakistan and China, and to find negotiated solutions to difficult issues. The old adage, ‘stay close to friends, and closer with enemies’ appeared to be in play in US–India, PRC–India and Pakistan–India relations. The pre-1998 US–China–Pakistan policy to pressure India on the non-proliferation and Kashmir insurgency fronts had failed, and now the imperatives were to bid for India’s support to ensure the great powers’ access to the region, and to limit India’s tilt towards one of the other great power. Thus, China sought to build its India links for fear that a US–India strategic partnership could become a basis of the encirclement of China by the two as well as Japan; and the US sought the India link because of its fear that China was a challenge to America’s pre-eminence in Asia. India’s 1998 tests changed the enemy’s motivation and its alignments. ‘Engagement’ replaced ‘containment’ and the policy of building up India’s regional rivals in the subcontinent to divert India from its goal of a rising major power was abandoned because India’s South Asian neighbours along with China and America had failed to defeat India. Second, this process of re-structuring was already underway when September 11, 2001 occurred and the event shifted the centre of gravity of international conflict towards the Indian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean area. The US’s forceful response to Al Qaeda and Taliban in Afghanistan, and its action to turn armed Pakistan from its position as the hub of terrorism and nuclear proliferation into a frontline state, created an opportunity for Indian practitioners to play the card of ‘nuclear war danger with Pakistan’ (2001–), and American practitioners got the chance to play the India card in checking Pakistani nuclear activities and capacities (for fear it could fall into hands of terrorists). Having spent much energy and resources under Nehru and the Nehruvians to manage the diplomatic and military consequences of external alliances that helped Pakistan and its allies to pressure India, the new situation enabled India to secure US defence technology and materials to increase its power vis-à-vis both China and Pakistan, and the means to accumulate it by beneficial arrangements of technology transfers with diverse suppliers like Israel, the US, Russia and others. The new situation does not

India’s rise as a major power, 1990s 203 represent a permanent tilt towards the US by India because different imperatives drive the two countries. The US needs allies when its military resources are stretched even though it has military bases that enable the flow of its power from the Caucasus to the Arabian Sea and beyond. It needs allies as it faces a complex situation in the Korean peninsula, in Taiwan and the Taiwan Straits and in relation to Iran, Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Afghanistan; and China is a wild card with regard to its military ambitions in Asia and its military relations with Japan and the US. So America’s ambition to remain the global hegemon is constant, but its capacity at the moment to pursue its interests alone is uncertain. For its part, India has avoided dependence on a single power and even when it was tied to Moscow during the Cold War, it sought to maintain ties with the major powers and it sought to accumulate strength to gain autonomy. Moreover, America’s diplomatic and military record with Pakistan, Afghanistan and India, and with its allies elsewhere indicates that it is an unreliable partner because its political culture – at home and abroad – seeks temporary coalitions around its interests which vary with the issues(s) of the moment. In other words, the third trajectory threw up the importance of India and the US as catalysts but their policies, while convergent, had different imperatives. For India, the 1998 decision reflected a frustration that its diplomatic stance without military strength since 1947 (and its socialist economy) left it crippled as a status quo country. But its ambition was to be a status quo power without territorial ambitions but with the ambition to deal with a full plate of regional and international issues that gave it a global presence and recognition. For America, its policy responses to India’s 1998 tests and India’s threat to escalate the conflict with Pakistan in 2001–02, indicated that India had arrived as a serious military player who was likely to use proactive tactics to pursue its goal to function as a status quo and international power. The three trajectories – the growth of Indian military and nuclear strength and the use of coercion in dangerous situations, the change in India’s decision-making and political culture, and the opportunity which the post-2001 international situation presented to Indian practitioners, enabled India to shape a number of triangular strategic relationship involving a number of traditional as well as non-traditional powers. Weak, disunited and reactive ‘India’ or ‘Hindu India’ had been the object or victim of strategic triangles as we have discussed in earlier chapters. Modern India after 1998 embraced a geopolitical view of foreign affairs that was driven by calculations of its national interests and accepted a soft type of Hinduism as the basis of its diplomacy and military strategy. The contrasts are several: 1

2

While India remained committed to its internal democratic institutions and processes, promotion of democracy in India’s neighbourhood (Pakistan, Myanmar and Nepal) took a back seat to other interests and calculations. Nehru’s and Congress party’s secular ideals took the back seat to efforts to form constructive relationships with soft Islamists (as distinct from Islamic fanatics) who controlled political and military forces on the ground and had

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India’s rise as a major power, 1990s constituencies. Co-option of ‘Taliban light’ in Afghan politics and of moderate Islamists in Iraq fits the pattern of Indian government’s political accommodation of moderates in Kashmir and in internal conflicts in the northeast. Note that it was a ‘secular’ Congress party under Indira Gandhi that intervened in Kashmir’s state elections and alienated the local population and it was a ‘Hindu fundamentalist BJP leader Vajpayee’ who sought political accommodation with the Kashmiri moderates and with Pakistan’s military leader Musharraf, a moderate Islamist. Significantly, ‘soft fundamentalists’ with political and military power, not secularists who have slogans and no constituents, have emerged as negotiating partners in Indian foreign affairs. Regional and international geopolitics and Hindu/Indian nationalism is now the bedrock of Indian foreign affairs which has given birth to strategic triangularities, as distinct from Nehru’s focus on bilateralism and non-alignment.

To a discussion of these aspects we now turn.

The convergence of geopolitics and Hindu/Indian nationalism4 Nehru’s diplomatic ideology had several distinct features. 1

2 3

4

It projected the image of India’s democratic experiment and its commitment to the secular principle as the basis of organization of the Indian state and society and as a basis of a modern multicultural international society. It projected India as an anti-war, peace-loving country that abhorred violence in international relations and that sought global reform along this line. It projected the view that the Congress party and the Nehrus were the guardians of Indian nationalism and the two were inseparable. This exclusive ownership was the basis of the slogan of Indira Gandhi’s government that ‘Indira’ is India and support of Indian interests required support of Indira Gandhi and the Nehru dynasty. Finally, India was projected by the Nehruvians as a non-aligned country that was not tied to one or the other Cold War bloc.

Each projection distorted realities and retarded India’s rise as a major power. The first reflected a high ideal but it hid the reality that Indian politics were driven by internal caste, class, regional and religious divisions and Indian history, pre-1947 and post-1974, validated this point. Secularism lacked effect in the formation of India’s (and other major powers’) political organization and policy actions; secularism was not a guiding principle of state policy after 1947. The incidence of political violence in inter-state and intra-state/society relations in the Indian subcontinent suggested the absence of tolerance in the conduct of nations. Thus, secularism rhetoric misled rather than explained the basis of Indian foreign affairs. Furthermore, Indian decision-making since 1947 was a small group and secret activity that revolved around the attitudes and interests of the

India’s rise as a major power, 1990s 205 Prime Minister and his/her inner circle of advisers during peacetime or when policies were formed in sub-critical situations. (As we have discussed earlier, small group and secret decision-making was exposed and revised during a crisis because of resurgence of Indian nationalism.) Diplomatic and military decisions thus were shaped by secretive group dynamics within Indian rather than by the secularism principle and by open, transparent and democratic foreign policy process. The ideal of tolerance in international relations was at odds with the history – the contemporary realities of modern international relations because the distribution of military and economic power and the ambitions and skills of the major and minor powers, not the rhetoric and pleas of the weak shaped global economic exchanges, the flows of military power and the philosophy of ideas and ideals that determined the motivation or beliefs of the strategic and economic players on the world stage. The second view, projection of India as peace-loving and anti-war country, was counter-historical with reference to world history as well as Indian history. India was the site of repeated wars and the absence of peace since recorded history; it attracted foreign intervention because it lacked local traditions to deter foreign pressures and war. The lesson of the past was that if India was deemed to be militarily weak and economically attractive, it could not escape forcible intervention; and it was in the interest of foreign powers to promote Indian military and political weakness so as to maintain a favourable balance of opportunity and costs of foreign intervention – by war and/or by political intervention. A peace-loving foreign and military policy by Nehru became an invitation to foreign pressure to induce India to stay on the peaceful path (i.e. build development projects for peace, not its war machinery, build the nuclear option for peace, not for war on deterrence) and to deflect or control its development as a major power. The third view wrapped the mantle of Indian nationalism in the context of India’s Independence movement that was led by Gandhi and his chosen heir, Nehru. (Other Indian leaders of the Independence movement have largely been turned out from the Indian political and diplomatic literature; and the Indian state favoured write-ups on the Nehrus and his close advisers rather than other Indian leaders.) ‘Hindu nationalism’ was opposed by the state, the Congress party apparatus and leftist Indian intellectuals, because it was deemed to be a reactionary expression of the Hindu right wing that was contrary to the secular principle of the Indian constitution and political conventions. The fourth view, of India as truly non-aligned country, hid the reality that India was heavily aligned with Moscow during the Cold War period, and the two bid for each other’s support on a number of issues, for example, Kashmir and foreign aid (which was India’s concern), global disarmament and the peace movement (it was Moscow’s interest to promote this through the World Peace Council) and regional security questions (e.g. Korea, Eastern Europe and Indo-China) where Indian and Soviet diplomacy converged and opposed western interests. India’s tilt towards the Arabs distorted its relations with Jewish Israel and Persian Iran, and the Moscow tilt brought China to Pakistan’s side, India’s main regional rival.

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In other words, Nehru’s India was neither truly non-aligned, nor was its foreign policy effective in advancing India’s international position. Rather India’s influence was stalemated within the subcontinent and in the international sphere, and there were policy stalemates in core issues such as nuclear and naval policies, and other policies relating to Pakistan, China, the US, Israel and the Indian Ocean (the latter required sea power) as the vehicle for projecting India’s presence. India’s rise as a major power in the late 1990s was the result of an abandonment of the Nehruvian diplomatic baggage in terms of attitudes and policies. The drive to accumulate and organize Indian power and new diplomatic and military strategies was based on the principles of geopolitics. This drive brought Hindu political consciousness into the open. It also re-shaped the meaning – the scope and substance – of Indian nationalism. At issue are two terms: Hinduvta and Indian-ness. In its vulgar political sense Hinduvta’s expressions are in the form of anti-Muslim riots in Gujarat and elsewhere where ‘Hindu’ government like Gujarat’s Modi government was widely seen to have allegedly encouraged political violence in 2002. This type of hard ‘Hinduvta’ is also commonly associated with the policies of Maharastra’s Shiv Sena movement and the ideology of the Rashtria Svayam Sevak Sang (RSS). But there are also, on the other hand, several expressions of a ‘soft’ Hinduvta that is relevant for the study of Indian politics as well as its external policies after the fall from grace of the Nehruvians. Indian foreign affairs at the start of the twenty-first century are an interplay between the remnants of (i) Nehru-ism (secularism) as reflected in the thinking of Indian Congress party leaders (ii) Hinduvta as reflected in the thinking of the BJP under A. B. Vajpayee, the former Prime Minister of India (the soft variant) and hard Hinduvta as reflected in the thinking of the former Deputy Prime Minister of India, L. K. Advani and the RSS and (iii) Indian leftists, Naxalites and Maoists who seek on the one hand a parliamentary road to power, and on the other hand, they seek fundamental changes through armed struggle of Indian political and economic arrangements. No single approach is dominant and the polarities suggest the presence of three or more interactive and competitive tendencies in India’s internal ideological battlefield. Indian minority governments – for example, the BJP-led minority coalition government in 1998–2004 and the present Congress minority coalition government, 2004 to the time of writing (June 2005) reflect these tendencies. There is no sign of a trend line that points to the ascendancy of any of the three ideologies. As a result, there is pragmatism in a slow pace of economic reforms because ideological differences create vetoes against rapid economic reforms (e.g. labour reforms and accelerated privatization of state controlled enterprises). Here ideological stalemates produce policy stalemates in India’s economic policy. But the impact of competitive ideologies in Indian foreign affairs is marginal because the soft form of Hinduvta or ‘Hindu consciousness’ gained ground with the ascendancy of the BJP in 1998 and by the embrace of geopolitics and the reversal of Nehru’s foreign policies. In diplomatic and strategic affairs, the changes are irreversible because Vajpayee’s external policies brought together soft

India’s rise as a major power, 1990s 207 Hinduvta, the institutional interests and attitudes of India’s economic modernizers and its armed forces and defence scientists; and the new internal alliance was supported by partnership with like-minded external allies such as the US, Israel, Japan, Australia, Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) nations and Germany as well as traditional partners like Russia, France, the UK and Canada. Soft Hinduvta has broad appeal in India only to the extent that it promotes the attitudes and interests of the military, naval, nuclear and economic modernizers who believe that India can and should join the global strategic and economic mainstream and that it ought to carve a niche for itself in the global sphere, and to make the globe a field of Indian power instead of allowing the subcontinent to be the field of foreign power politics. Here the idea of India is not the Nehru vision of secular India. Rather the idea of India is that of an effective internationalist force that can protect itself physically, increase the prosperity of its people and deal with a full plate of regional and international issues by a mixture of coercive and persuasive methods. Indian and international reactions to the Gujarat violence braked the rise of hard Hinduvta but it did not discredit the soft version of Hindu nationalism. This nationalism gained ground with the rise of the BJP in 1998 as a parliamentary and electoral force and as one of the two parties that is capable of organizing minority government. This new element in Indian foreign affairs and its domestic politics shows the frustration with Nehruvian India’s inability to gain recognition for India’s national interests and its global power position in the region and in the global sphere. The frustration was expressed by a widespread perception that the majority Hindus were functioning as a defensive minority in their own land while many minority Muslims within India had attached themselves and their identify to the cause of Pakistani, Kashmiri, Muslim and Sikh separateness and IndoPakistani polarity; and they had attached themselves to the electoral politics of the Congress party and Indian foreign and military policy stalemates that had emerged as a result of Nehruvian policies. Thus, the US–PRC-Pakistan policy of encouraging Indo-Pakistani polarity, and the inability of the Nehruvians to alter the effect of the policies of the international coalition, stimulated the growth of Hindu nationalism in the 1990s and its assertiveness in foreign affairs. The rise of Hindu nationalism was not an organized intellectual response to the pattern of Indian history and defensiveness before and after 1947 but it reflected a growing belief that Indians either had to use or lose their assets and their prestige. Hindu nationalism thus was stimulated as a response to Islamic fanaticism that came from Pakistan, Kashmir, (Saudi) Wahabbism and Bangladesh; and it was a response as well against powers (the US and China) who were seen to support the growth of Islamic fanaticism in the subcontinent since the Afghanistan campaign in the 1980s. The growth of Hindu nationalism was therefore a reaction to the spread of Islamic terror in India’s neighbourhood and a reaction to Nehru’s policies; here international politics had a major impact in building Hindu nationalism as an ideological base of Indian foreign and military affairs in the late 1990s. This was a new ideology and along with a concern with geopolitics, the two came together and altered India’s external orientation.

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Hindu nationalism is not a rejection of Hindu–Muslim polarity in the international or intra-state sphere. It is an acknowledgement of its vitality in modern international relations. Nehru had accepted this polarity as the basis of partition in 1947, and even as he sought to bridge Hindu–Muslim and Indo-Pakistani differences, he did not develop effective policies to do so. The BJP in 1998–2004 accepted Indo-Pakistani and Hindu-Islamic Jihadi polarity as the basic nature of the problem that required forceful and constructive responses to address the problem and to find solutions.

14 The BJP’s geopolitics and building strategic triangularities

Under Nehru, the idea of India was tied to the notion of a socialist economic and developmental model, a democratic polity and a peaceful and a non-aligned India that had a destiny as a major power. The Nehru model showed the influence of dreamers and schemers rather than builders of a strong India. Nehruvian foreign and military policies did not represent a strategic plan to deal with challenging contingencies and to shape India’s future in the face of complex and competitive domestic and international forces that formed India’s ideological and strategic environments. The singular achievement of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) under A. B. Vajpayee in 1998–2004 was that the minority government motivated Hindu nationalism to join the ideological battle against Islamic Jihad that emanated from the Pakistan–Afghanistan–Saudi–Kashmir fronts and was spreading into the subcontinental region; and second, to join the strategic battle against the critical mass of external opposition and threats to Indian interests that came from Pakistan and its supporters, America and China. The chapter argues that the Vajpayee government created a paradigm shift that altered the frame of reference of Indian political (nationalism) and strategic (diplomatic and military) thought and behaviour. The new paradigm brought together Indian (Hindu) nationalism and geopolitics by positioning India in a pattern of strategic global and regional triangulaities that were meant to shape the interactions among three competitive ideological and strategic forces, that is, Islamic Jihad or holy war that sought liberation of Muslim areas, Chinese (Han) nationalism that sought to secure China’s presence and eventual domination of critical parts of the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean area and Indian/Hindu nationalism that sought to enlarge India’s strategic space in the subcontinent. The first two parts of the triangle had territorial ambitions – Pakistan wanted Kashmir and Punjab through Khalistan, and China wanted Aksai Chin, Arunachal Pradesh and a dominant position in Bangladesh, Myanmar and unquestioned access into the Indian Ocean area because of its growing energy and military needs. Before 1998, America supported Pakistani and Chinese goals and methods because of a common cause – to contain ‘Indian hegemony’ but the US held no territorial ambitions in the subcontinent. Thus the nature of India’s strategic problem with USA had a policy character, while the nature of the problem with Pakistan and China involved territorial claims and competing world views about greatness of Muslim and

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Chinese empires and their global futures, and regional ambitions. That is, the post-1998 Indian view saw a difference between US ambitions and those of Pakistan and China. The US was an established international power and its status as the Number one power in the world in a comparative sense – as measured by its military and economic capacity, its primacy at seas and in space and its leadership in international institutions – was obvious. China was a rising power but it was vulnerable to checks and balances by its neighbours who feared its dominance and China’s internal economic and social stability was not a given. Pakistan has had the ambition to be taken seriously as a rising power but its capacity is inhibited by weaknesses in its internal political and social institutions and its military and diplomatic capacities depended on the level of the material and moral support it has received from its external patrons. So uncertainties existed about the capacities of China and Pakistan to deal with their internal and external pressures. In other words, their status as rising powers depended on the weaknesses in economic and military power, political organization and strategic skills of their enemies and not simply on the basis of their ambitions and strengths. To rise as powers, China and Pakistan needed fortunate external circumstances; and their ability to raise the level of international and regional conflicts was circumscribed by the presence and policies of competing forces in the Asian land mass and the sealanes. What was the basis of the BJP/Vajpayee paradigm shift in its foreign affairs? The premise was that the intensity of China’s and Pakistan’s competition with India could be controlled or managed by the development of countervailing pressures against Pakistan and China. This was to be achieved by increasing the weight of Indian military power and its use within the subcontinent to cope with Pakistani and Chinese pressures. By broadening the military and the diplomatic geographical sphere of competition between China, India and Pakistan from the subcontinent to Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean up to the South China Seas, India could signal to its neighbours that it wanted a balance between Chinese and Indian influence in critical areas like Myanmar and Southeast Asia; and that it was in the interest of China’s neighbours to have some sense of China–India balance that could be aided as well by American, Japanese and Australian military and diplomatic activities in China’s neighbourhood. By bringing into play Israel, the US in relation to Pakistan and its patron, China, Vajpayee’s India showed a determination to compete with arms rather than accept Chinese suzerainty of the subcontinent. The premise was that Pakistan and China were unlikely to voluntarily abandon Islamic militancy and a worldview of Muslim greatness (in Pakistan’s case) and the Chinese sense of superiority as Asia’s sole superpower that had legitimate interests in the Indian subcontinent and the Indian Ocean area. By building a strategic alignment with America before September 11, 2001 and with key players like Israel in the Middle East, and Japan, Australia and Singapore in Asia, and by showing its military and economic strength Vajpayee’s India sought to detach the Bush administration from several beliefs of the Nixon, Kissinger and the Clinton (first term) eras: that China had legitimate interests in the subcontinent; that America and China were strategic partners in Asia; that marginalization of Russia

BJP’s geopolitics 211 in Asia by American and Chinese actions after the Shanghai declaration in 1972 was the basis of stability in Asia and the world; and finally, that the US–Japan alliance that assigned Tokyo a junior role was in China’s own interest. These were the beliefs expressed by the Nixon–Kissinger–Clinton diplomacy since the 1970s. The Bush administration did not share these beliefs, and the Vajpayee administration rode the wave of Bush administration’s suspicion of Chinese strategic motives in Asia, and following September 11, 2001, of Pakistani motives in promoting Islamic Jihad in the subcontinent. India and the US became parts of two strategic triangles: the US–Pakistan–India in relation to the issue of Islamic terror in the region; and the US–China–India in relation to the issue of the danger of Chinese hegemony in Asia. With a changing basket of strategic issues, and with a new set of threat-perceptions, the US sidelined the problem of Indian nuclear weapons and recognized ‘the importance of the US–India relationship in building stability and security in Asia and beyond’.1 Instead the US and Indian focus was to de-hyphenate India and Pakistan in US diplomacy but at the same time follow the classical principle that one must get close to friends and get even closer to enemies. The US–Indian strategy was two fold: (1) To use the threat of an Indo-Pakistani nuclear confrontation as an opportunity to press for an Indo-Pakistani strategic dialogue, that is, highlight the sense of danger and then negotiate. (2) To redesign a new pattern of strategic alignments that created an Indo-US network of common allies: Israel, Japan, Australia and Singapore, among others. Both exercises worked around Nehru’s frame of reference. The first strategy brought coercive diplomacy into play in a dangerous neighbourhood and it required imagination as well as courage. The second required a willingness to think geopolitically and to craft issue and interest driven coalitions with the sole superpower and rising powers that sought the territorial status quo and stability rather than either Islamic liberation or leftist revolutionary change that was inspired by China, the main guardian of communism following USSR’s collapse. Both required attention to policies that were meant to stabilize the volatile subcontinental region – a hub of terrorism as well as nuclear proliferation that involved both Pakistan and China, and a nuclear network that reached into the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

The late 1990s: India’s dilemmas and the responses In comparison to its immediate neighbours with the subcontinent India was a regional great power by size, military and economic capacity and ambition. But this comparison is misleading because the membership of the region was not limited to the seven South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) countries; the policies of the US, China and Russia in varying degrees in relation to India, Pakistan and other South Asian states had enlarged the membership of the regional system and its geographical size. Moreover, precisely when the external powers were exerting their pressures on India (since the 1950s) and were building their regional ties and influence with states who feared Indian domination (real or imagined), Nehru and his advisers were interested in dealing with a full

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plate of international issues such as world peace, global disarmament, North–South economic reforms, non-alignment, reduction of Cold War tensions, the Korean War, UN peace keeping and so on. They underestimated the serious consequences to India, the growing involvement of extra-regional powers in subcontinental strategic affairs and the absence of countervailing Indian pressures. The Nehruvians overplayed the international aspects of Indian diplomacy and under-played the need to form effective Indian strategic responses to the gathering storms in the region, that is, in India’s backyard. Indian practitioners of the Nehru vintage were trying to join the governing board of the global country club without tending to the broken fences in their own backyard. While Nehru and his diplomatic advisers were dancing on the world stage, India’s enemies were coming together with a view to alter the distribution of power and the pattern of relationships in the region. Thereby they changed the ground realities in their inter-state relations. India remained big, defensive and reactive to extreme pressures and international perceptions recognized China as a rising regional and international star and Pakistan as an effective challenger of India’s power and authority and skilled in alliance building with democratic America, Communist China and theocratic Saudi Arabia as well as moderate Muslim countries like Jordan, Turkey and monarchial Iran. The Vajpayee government reversed the mismatch between Nehru’s active internationalist stance and inactivity in dealing with regional dangers, between the problem and the solution. The Vajpayee government concentrated on the immediate problems and recognized that strategy was a mind game that could be developed effectively by (i) breaking up the problem of a hostile international coalition against India into manageable parts and (ii) by creating a process of manageable coercive and negotiating moves that would address the immediate problems, that is, relieve the pressures and at the same time, recalibrate international links to India’s advantage. The new strategy was to exercise available options, and to build new ones. The approach was that Nehru-ism represented the ‘Indian bottom’ (to use the market analogy) with a bunch of stalemated external relationships (with America, Pakistan and China), and it was up to India to accumulate economic and military power, to use it in a concentrated form and to develop strategies with paradigm shift(s) and new situations that liberated India from the debilitating effect of stalemated strategic relationships. Pakistan had enlarged the geographical size of the subcontinental strategic system by its alliance-building activities. The weak challenger, Pakistan, was the mover of regional international relations because it created opportunities for America, China and other minor powers (e.g. North Korea, Saudi Arabia, Sri Lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh) to join hands in the quest to contain India. The Pakistani game had flourished between the early 1950s to the late 1990s with the connivance of America, China and select Middle Eastern states. Pakistan and its allies were able to run circles around the Nehruvians because they lacked the imagination and the courage to break away from a Nehru-centric thought process and world views that had roots in the idealism of the 1930s. They lacked an ability to grow and adapt to changing regional, international and domestic circumstances.

BJP’s geopolitics 213 They could not engage and win; rather they avoided the battles with their real enemies and sought comfort by acting on the work stage. They talked about India as a major power, but their actions did not demonstrate that India was a major power. The exercise of India’s nuclear options was the first major act of the Vajpayee government as discussed earlier. It was a paradigm shift away from Nehru’s three-pronged nuclear policies (no nuclear weapons, promote nuclear disarmament and keep up nuclear option-development) that did not help India accumulate and exercise power. Nuclear weapons capability in storage was a dead asset in the hands of India’s politicized nuclear scientists who liked to develop the bomb, but not test it or transfer control of the weaponry to military hands. The exercise of the nuclear option liberated India from Nehru’s policy; it liberated India from the continuous US and international pressures to not exercise the weapons option and to disarm and liberated India from a stalemated internal debate between the disarmers and the builders of a nuclear India. The decision to test had an important psychological effect on America and China, the two powers that counted the most in the region (as sources of pressure against India) and internationally because of the US’s enormous influence in international conference diplomacy relating to nuclear and disarmament questions. The 1998 tests also had a regional fallout. It stimulated Pakistani weaponization as was expected. In hindsight, this eliminated the uncertainty about the nature and size of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal, its command and control and it brought out into the open the reality of Chinese nuclear aid to Pakistan rather than the previous situation where Pakistan, China and the US maintained a position of plausible denial as long as Pakistan’s programme and Chinese nuclear aid was covert. Pakistani declaration of a nuclear weapons status also created a clear public identification within India that Pakistan was not simply a terrorist problem it was also a nuclear problem for India. The nuclear file had historically belonged to the Prime Minister’s office, and the Indian Atomic Energy establishment, and the Ministry of External Affairs on the question of nuclear disarmament. Since Nehru’s days Indian political leaders kept the armed forces out of the decisionmaking loop. After 1998, the Prime Minister’s office and armed forces became the principals because issues of nuclear command and control and the nuclear requirements of national security required the active involvement of defence scientists and the armed forces. India’s disarmers within Indian government and society were the losers of the 1998 tests. The 1998 nuclear test thus was a shot that produced several kills, in India’s foreign affairs and its domestic and bureaucratic politics. The nuclear policies of the Nehruvians as well as that of Pakistan, China and America had created a dilemma for India. The non-exercise of the nuclear option was costly because it produced international sanctions and diplomatic pressures against Indian nuclear weapons. Yet the fear of further international pressures induced its nonexercise. Either way, it was a lose-lose proposition. The Vajpayee government’s action was to turn this around into a win/win situation with the expectation that US practitioners were realists and once they were convinced that India’s nuclear decision was irreversible, they would seek negotiated restraints and see India as a

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friendly nuclear power. This is actually the way in which the situation evolved. The Clinton administration opened up a strategic dialogue at a high level involving the Deputy Secretary of State and India’s Foreign Minister. The point of this dialogue was to have a strategic engagement and to fence off the nuclear controversy.2

The Israeli option The exercise of the Israeli option was the second major BJP action that produced a paradigm shift. Although various Congress party governments had secret contact with Israel, the link was left secret and downplayed for fear that it could jeopardize India’s relations with the Arab World. India depended on Middle East oil, about three million Indian workers in the Middle East were a source of foreign remittances, India’s pro-Arab tilt was deemed to have a positive resonance with Indian Muslim voters and there was a hope that the pro-Arab tilt – with an emphasis on Palestinian rights, Arab socialism and non-alignment – along with the pro-Soviet tilt in Indian foreign affairs would help bring the Arab countries to India’s side on several issues: Kashmir, non-alignment, socialism, secularism and third world development, and it would position India and the Arab states as a check against the US and Israel. The latter was viewed as an extension of the US in the Middle East, its cats paw in the region just as Pakistan was seen as an American cats paw in the subcontinent. So Nehruvian diplomacy formed a diplomatic triangle between the USSR, Arabs and India vis-à-vis the US and Israel. India got Middle East oil, and the foreign exchange remittances from its migrant workers in the Middle East, and the Arabs massaged Indian egos with their ritualistic statements about non-alignment, socialism and social justice, ‘Zionist imperialism’ and ‘Palestinian rights’ but Arab states did not support India’s position on Kashmir, and Pakistani diplomacy had an edge over India in the inner councils of the Islamic states. In the 1965 and 1971 wars, Jordan, Turkey and Iran under US guidance and approval transferred military aircraft to help Pakistan. The Islamic conferences played up the issue of Kashmir’s self-determination and made a distinction between terrorists and freedom fighters. India’s pro-Arab tilt under the Nehrus did not produce a positive effect and Indian diplomacy developed a rigid pro-Arab character because there were over 20 Indian embassies in the Muslim world, and none in Israel until 1992, the Muslim world had a strong representation in New Delhi, while the Israeli consulate was confined to Bombay (Mumbai) and the Congress party mindset was attached to Congress party’s pre-independence resolutions about Palestinian rights that were authored by the head of the Foreign Policy cell, Jawaharlal Nehru. Natwar Singh, India’s current foreign minister (2004–), a Nehru protégé, and the Congress party manifests on foreign affairs (2004), played up the issue of Palestinian rights and said nothing about Israel. This is an example of government of India’s and Congress party’s fascination with its slogans that are redundant and misleading. Clearly, India’s public diplomacy requires modernization. But there is a story beyond the ritualistic statements and the pro-Arab tilt that shows the power of non-government inputs, the role of political leadership in altering foreign policy in response to crises and changing external circumstances

BJP’s geopolitics 215 and the role of India’s intelligence and military services in producing policy change. The authors of India’s pro-Arab policy were Nehru and the diplomatic professionals in the Indian Foreign Office. The authors of the tilt towards Israel were Nehru’s successors at the governmental level. Indira Gandhi authorized the development of a secret channel of contact and security assistance with Israel in the late 1960s. The Morarji and Rajiv Gandhi governments kept them going. Prime Minister Narasimha Rao approved full diplomatic ties with Israel in 1992. This trajectory had its origin in BJP’s (then Jan Sangh) non-governmental contacts with Israelis at the level of Moshe Dayan, and it was Vajpayee’s government in 1998–2004 that brought into the open the strategic scope of the Indo–Israeli relationship. While much of India-Israeli security intelligence ties are secret, the public side pointed to a recognition of the importance of public diplomacy to re-calibrate enemy minds and public opinion of the attentive publics in India, in the sub-continent, in the Middle East and in the thinking of the major powers. What was the significance of BJP’s Israel policy? It made several fundamental changes in the Nehru/Congress party/Indian Foreign Office approach to Israel. 1 2

3 4

5

Criticism of Israel on the Palestine question was muted. India’s support of Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was downgraded. Counter-terrorism cooperation was developed to deal with the issue of Islamic terror in Kashmir. The theme was that the two regional powers had a natural and common interest to defeat Islamic terror as a regional and an international threat to democracies. In the vast area between the Mediterranean and the Indian subcontinental worlds, Israel and India were the only functioning democracies with a similar type of terrorist threat. Israel was an important political and a psychological platform for India because of its enormous influence in US politics and strategic affairs. Israeli defence industry valued the Indian military market and India valued Israeli world class military technology that was complementary to Russian military supplies. (Israelis had developed capacity to upgrade Russian equipment.) India–Israel military trade went from almost zero in the 1960s to over $10 billion in the 1990s and the supplies included air early warning and control system platforms, surveillance equipment to fight terrorism in Kashmir, anti-ship missiles for naval ships, upgrading of Russian T-72 tanks and Phalcon radar supply that would give India AWACS (an early warning airborne command system) capacity to monitor its strategic environment. The BJP government and India’s armed forces viewed Israel (and Russia) as reliable arms suppliers (the US is valuable but it is deemed to be unreliable). Intelligence sharing between India and Israel recognized Pakistan as a hub of terror groups and nuclear proliferation activities where both sides possessed valuable human intelligence assets relating to Kashmir, Pakistan, Afghanistan and groups functioning in the Middle East.

The visit by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon, the first visit by an Israeli Prime Minister, in September 2003 with a 150 member strong delegation of defence,

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industry and governmental and business officials signalled that India had brought its Israel card out of the closet. The hesitation of the Congress governments had been replaced by a public commitment. This was a sea change in Indian public diplomacy and its strategic planning and world views. It collapsed the artificial division between the Middle East and the subcontinent that existed in the organizational charts of many foreign offices. Terrorism and nuclear and missile proliferation showed the unity of the two sub-regions as a single operational theatre for those who wanted terrorism and proliferation, and those who sought to check it. The two sub-regions also became the objects of a single drive to promote democracy in a region populated by monarchical and authoritarian regimes. India’s exercise of the Israel option (and Israel’s exercise of the India option) had significant effects: (1) it led India to alter its Middle East policies, (2) it changed the balance of power in the region by creating a new strategic alignment – India, Israel and the US in opposition to Pakistan and China and (3) it created a new perception in the ‘Islamic World’ that a ‘Zionist–Hindu–Christian Crusader’ alignment had emerged that would carry the fight at the ideological and strategic levels. This indicated that Indians, Israelis and Americans were messing with Middle East minds because well timed events were giving substance to the perceptions. For example, precisely when Prime Minister Sharon was visiting Delhi in September 2003, Indian and US forces were conducting joint military exercises in Northern Kashmir.3 The exercise of the Israeli option showed the importance of strategic considerations by widening the circle of friends, at least temporary allies who were tied by at least two common causes (Islamic terrorism and nuclear proliferation) and three common perceptions: (1) that Israel and India were friendly nuclear powers was the US view, (2) that both had the policy and the capacity to seek regional stability and (3) democratic peace was a desirable goal in the volatile Middle East – Asia Pacific (including Central Asia) region. The BJP’s exercise of the Israeli option was irreversible. The Congress party manifesto and Indian leftists had expressed unhappiness with the BJP’s tilt towards Israel. They vowed to adjust India’s Israel policy and restore the balance in favour of Palestinian rights. However, common sense and a sense of national interest had thus far prevailed over government and party rhetoric.

Turning Pakistan around Vajpayee’s policy towards Pakistan was innovative and proactive in the sense that he took the initiatives to create a diplomatic opening to Pakistan by three attempts to develop a peace process; two of them, the Lahore bus diplomacy failed because Nawaz Sharif ’s army chief was engineering the planned takeover of Kargil in 1999 while Vajpayee was visiting Sharif, and the second attempt, the summit at Agra between Prime Minister Vajpayee and President Pervez Musharraf failed to secure a breakthrough. The current Indo-Pakistani peace process is based on Vajpayee’s third and final attempt (he said) to develop a strategic dialogue with all aspects of Indo-Pakistan relations.

BJP’s geopolitics 217 Vajpayee’s approach to Pakistan showed a subtle and a fundamental shift in Indian thought processes about Pakistan. Many Indian prime ministers since Nehru’s time had talked about the value of friendship with Pakistan, the importance of bilateralism and a peaceful resolution based on existing realities and the Simla Agreement had been signed in 1972 outlining these ideas. But these ideas had been overtaken by several other realities. Pakistani armed forces and intelligence services were determined to liberate Kashmir by force – a policy initiated by Zia-ul-Haq, developed by Generals Aslam Beg, Hamid Gul and Pervez Musharraf and supported by Saudi money and motivated recruits, supported by Chinese arms and US support to Pakistan’s claim that India needed to make concessions to Pakistan to settle the Kashmir issue. As the leader of the world community, the US remained willing to mediate the Kashmir dispute or facilitate its resolution. Pakistan had acquired a nuclear cover as a result of the efforts of Dr A. Q. Khan, and the nuclear test data China provided and missile supplies by North Korea.4 This emboldened it to think that it had a strong option to push low cost, low risk insurgency in Kashmir because Pakistani nuclear weapons would likely deter Indian military action for fear that it would escalate into a nuclear war and bring the world community out against India. We judge Vajpayee to be the architect of the policy to turn around Pakistan and its relationship with India because he created a structure of assumptions and expectations in Kashmir, Pakistan, the US and the UK about the basis of a new relationship. As he moved on the stage in Islamabad and Washington, he simultaneously dealt with a power struggle within the BJP that had a hard line lobby (L. K. Advani – also a prime minister in waiting – and Sushma Swaraj were the key hardliners) and an ambivalent line by Indian fence sitters (Foreign Minister Jaswant Singh, another prime minister in waiting). Vajpayee’s was a solo and a class act because he was able to chart a pathway to a peace process through an internal (intra-party, intra-coalition and intra-bureaucratic) and international minefield. China was least interested in Indo-Pakistani reconciliation because its access to the subcontinent relied on Indo-Pakistani polarity. Washington wanted access to the subcontinent but it was realistic enough to see it was futile to maintain a balance of power between India and Pakistan, and instead after September 11, 2001, the policy was to roll back the Pakistan based terror and nuclear networks and to prevent the distraction of a nasty Indo-Pakistani military conflict. What was Vajpayee’s architecture to turn Pakistan around? (1) It was made clear by early 2003 that Indian armed forces would stand up for Indian security against any kind of a Pakistani threat; that Indian armed forces were there to stay and to fight Pakistan in Kashmir, in Kargil and elsewhere. It was made clear that Pakistan did not possess a realistic war option; diplomacy was the only way to a peaceful settlement between India and Pakistan. The future of Kashmir thus became the responsibility of the Indian army chief, and not simply an issue for the Prime Minister or Kashmiri politicians. With the responsibility came a military voice about security requirements in relation to Pakistan and a policy to strengthen Indian capacities. A trilateral partnership between India, Israel and Russia on airborne warning and control system, sensors and surveillance

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activities and intelligence sharing about terror groups enabled the Prime Minister and his military staff to first build an alliance network beyond the subcontinent that could interact and manage hostile forces within the subcontinent. The message was that India had no illusions about Pakistan and Musharraf’s motive to curb the Islamic radicals who enjoyed strong support among Pakistani intelligence and military services and that India would take on the radical Islamists itself. Self-help rather than pleas to the world community became the norm, and it conveyed a self confidence that the real helpers were Russia and Israel, rather than the talkers in the West. (In this context, it may be noted that no Western theory about regional conflict-resolution is relevant for the Indo-Pakistani case.) (2) Vajpayee’s second point was that India would not accept empty assurances from the world community that it would use its leverage over Pakistan for securing substantial change. This was the view of the Council of Foreign Relations in New York (e.g. Radha Kumar’s view from the Council).5 It was recognized that Washington could clearly bring pressure on the Pakistani generals to curb terrorism and build peaceful bridges but that the personalities (e.g. General Colin Powell, Secretary of State) and institutional histories (State Department’s and CIA’s historical policy of containing India, seeking an Indo-Pakistani balance and curbing nuclear proliferation) inhibited the US executive branch from using its leverage. But on the other hand, the White House and the Pentagon, and Indiaminded US Congressional forces saw the growing importance of India in relation to China and the Indian Ocean area; and consequently Indian self-help was required to create situations that would help concentrate Washington minds on Indian security interests. The escalation by India in 2001–03 against Pakistan was a new situation that enabled the White House and the Pentagon to weigh in to curb Musharraf ’s and Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI)’s interventionist impulses; and Musharraf himself realized the danger of pursuing the terrorism option.6 Historically, since the early 1950s, Washington’s advice was that India ought to make concessions to Pakistan because the latter was a part of America’s inner circle of defence. Following the end of the Cold War and the growth of Kashmiri separatist insurgency, it was Washington’s advice that it should give up its policy of isolating Pakistan and the Kashmiri separatists and to come to terms with them. Vajpayee didn’t buy this idea, and the idea that the future of Kashmir lay in a three- or four-way deal between Pakistan, India, Kashmiri separatists and the US. Vajpayee’s peace process was a two-party game that required isolation of Kashmiri separatists, isolation of US advocates of American mediation or facilitation of settlement and isolation of Pakistani claims that Kashmir issue was one of ‘freedom struggle’ not terrorism. But isolation of Kashmiri separatists also required the opening up of the Kashmiri political process, by having timely and fair elections. Vajpayee moved in this direction in 2003 and thus reversed the Indira Gandhi practice of interfering in state elections. Vajpayee’s emphasis on a bilateralized peace process in one sense used the US and in another sense discarded it. After September 11, 2001, the US and India had a common interest to force Musharraf to control Islamic militants and both also had a common interest in Pakistan’s stability. Pakistani democracy became a

BJP’s geopolitics 219 non-issue and support of Musharraf was important because the military was the real power centre in Pakistan, it could be turned around to curb terrorism in the region, to make a deal with India (Vajpayee had a diplomatic option on Musharraf even during the 2001–03 military confrontation) and to keep Pakistan on a steady political course. He was the potential negotiator and the political stabilizer, not Nawaz Sharif or Benazir Bhutto or the Islamist political parties. In its dealings with Musharraf, the State Department used its India card to pressure Musharraf. ‘Control terrorism and we will urge India not to go to war’ was the Washington line. Pakistani practitioners were uncomfortable in a situation that subjected them to pressure from both the US and India which Chinese military and nuclear aid, North Korean missiles and Saudi financing of terrorists could not relieve. So the imperative in moving towards a bilateral peace process was that India did not want to be in a subordinate position to the US on the Pakistan and Kashmir issues as it had been since the 1950s, and Pakistan did not want to be subject to dual pressure from the US and India, which its strategic partners could not relieve. The 2001–03 military confrontation indicated that India’s nuclear threat was important in India’s policy towards Pakistan and as well it was an important tool in America’s Pakistan diplomacy. Having exercised its nuclear weapons option, Indian practitioners discovered its diplomatic utility in its troubled neighbourhood.7 The Indo-Pakistani peace process has continued under the new government that came to power in May 2004 following BJP’s defeat in the national elections. The faces changed but the paradigm shift by Vajpayee remained in tact. Hence, our emphasis on Vajpayee’s critical role in making India the catalyst in turning around Pakistan’s Musharraf albeit with US support in a volatile regional environment. In our story, the nuclear and military cards were important in the context of a new pattern of India’s alignment with Israel (a non-traditional security partner), Russia (a traditional strategic partner) and the US, a nontraditional strategic partner; the latter is a key defector from the anti-India alignment of Pakistan – China and the US in the days of Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger.

Looking east: the emergence of the India, US, China triangle Under Vajpayee’s coalition government the rivalry with China came out in the open and the public awareness of China as a strategic rival became a critical factor in the drive to build a cooperative and a long-term strategic relationship with the US that centred on a mutual awareness that China’s military expansion was potentially a long-term strategic problem for Asian countries who feared Chinese hegemony, and that India was a friendly power and a US partner in the Asia–Indian Ocean sphere. But in its dealings with China, in the 1990s Indian practitioners were of two minds: (1) Was China so far ahead in its military capacity, economic modernization and diplomatic skill that its world power status was unquestioned; and India had no choice but to accept a sub-regional status (along with Pakistan, and as a Chinese suzerain) because India could not expect to catch

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up with China? (2) Or did Chinese internal modernization and acceptance of world trading rules and democratic norms create internal pressures combined with the military build-up vis-à-vis China by Japan, India, Australia and Southeast Asian countries (e.g. Singapore) and the US? Following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of Soviet Russia and India’s isolation in the international sphere, Indian practitioners and intellectuals had ignored these questions, and other than a fixation with the boundary issue, the study of China’s internal and external situation and its implications for India remained a black hole in Indian analyses. Even after Indian Defence Minister, George Fernandes declared publicly that China was India’s potential number one problem and Vajpayee, the Prime Minister wrote to President Clinton along this line, Indian intellectuals and think tanks were shy of assessing China’s capabilities, intentions and policies in India’s strategic neighbourhood. The capacity and the confidence to think about China in realistic terms were lacking. The two-mindedness of Indian policy-makers showed up in Indian policy actions. The dominance of the first mind produced a China policy by India of hesitation in openly questioning China on its motives for nuclearizing Pakistan, and the inability of a Communist dictatorship to settle a long standing border question although often China proclaimed a desire for peace and cooperation with its neighbours. However, the presence of the second mind in a sub-rosa way was based on an awareness particularly in Indian intelligence and military circles of China’s territorial designs in the Indian northeast and the use of Bangladesh and Pakistan as proxies. Thus precisely when Nixon and Kissinger announced that China was a force for stability in Asia, and India was the aggressor in the subcontinent, the reality was that India had no territorial ambitions in the region, while China and Pakistan did; and the Nixon–Kissinger propaganda made the Indian white into black and the Sino-Pakistani black into white. After 1998, the balance of power between the ‘two Indian minds’ began to shift towards the second view but it was a tug of war between the two rather than a clear tilt towards the second view. One argument is that the BJP minority coalition opened up the debate between the two minds, it did not resolve it, but it gradually increased awareness about the dangerous results of the first view and the importance of the second. This debate and the change in tone of policy, and the growing weight of military and intelligence inputs, came from the direction and motivation of Vajpayee’s leadership primarily, because generally India’s political and business class was of two minds with a bias towards the first view at the turn of the century. China’s official behaviour was cast in terms of the first view which implied Chinese disdain of India’s achievement and potential, it expressed an attitude of indifference and a confidence that China was the natural leader of Asia. In bilateral contacts with the Indian government since 1962, China made it clear that it was not ready to negotiate a border settlement with India, that it would maintain and intensify its military, nuclear and naval support of Pakistan and it would be content with its current stance – of speaking softly about peace and maintaining its occupation of Indian lands and a military presence in the Himalayas which requires a costly Indian defence because geography favours China’s ability to

BJP’s geopolitics 221 mobilize its forces quickly across the border; and it was following its old policy of gradual penetration of its influence in India’s northeast, Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, and eventually, the Indian Ocean through Chinese access to naval bases in Coco Islands (Bay of Bengal) and Gwador (Pakistan). The late 1990s saw the rise of two different frames of reference. For China, the policy was to pursue, as before, the traditional balance of power approach to India – to contain its influence within the region as a sub-regional power, to build Chinese ties with India’s regional neighbours and to push for Indian acceptance of Chinese terms of a subordinate relationship. As Mohan Malik points out, China expected India not to talk about China’s threat, not to support Tibet and Taiwan, not to object to Sino-Pakistani strategic ties, not to align with the US and Japan to contain China and not to project India as an equal of China.8 This was Communist China using Sun Tzu’s first principle, that is, disorient the Indian mind and the second principle, that is, disorient US alliances. But just as the Western World and China were smug and overconfident in their views that problem of nuclear proliferation had been contained in the Asia–Middle Eastern sphere, China miscalculated its capacity to lull the Indian practitioners among the BJP with sweet talk and economic blandishments. China’s markers of ‘don’t’s’ became Indian strategic agenda items for the BJP with the exception of the Tibet question where India had already unilaterally conceded to China’s claim under Nehru and there was no realistic way to change course. China’s policy was to strengthen its military control over Tibet, wait for the present Dalai Lama to die and to use Nepal to reduce the flow of Tibetan dissidents into India through Nepal. By acknowledging again China’s Tibet policy, India expected and received a minor Chinese concession to Vajpayee. In June 2003, China agreed to open border trade with Sikkim as an Indian trading post, and implicitly a part of India. Under Vajpayee’s direction, new elements emerged in India’s China policy: (1) The 1998 nuclear tests were justified as a response to China’s looming threat and nuclear build-up of Pakistan. (2) US–India strategic cooperation led to joint US–India military exercises in India’s northeast and in the Kashmir area close to China’s border. The location of military exercises and the joint training in jungle and unconventional warfare conveyed subtle political signals to the military players in Beijing and Islamabad. (3) Intelligence sharing and naval cooperation relating to sealane security between the Bay of Bengal and the Malacca Straits signalled that the area was a sphere of naval competition where China was not likely to have a free hand. Vajpayee’s ‘Look East’ policy built on Narasimha Rao’s policy but the new element was the extension of Indian naval presence up to the South China Seas; the movement of Indian naval ships on goodwill missions and training exercises signalled the new orientation. As well, the advancement of Agni missile tests and the incorporation of the long range missiles into India’s arsenals indicated the development of capacity to threaten Beijing, Shanghai and Hong Kong. Moreover, Vajpayee’s India was among the first few countries to express an interest in President Bush’s missile defence proposal, and following September 11, 2001, India was among the first

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few to offer the use of Indian military bases for US use. Vajpayee’s moves attracted Chinese attention and suspicion. Beijing’s old policy of indifference and disdain of Indians and their capabilities was no longer sustainable. Its strategists realized that two new variables had emerged: (1) Vajpayee’s strategic moves despite the existence of two minds in India were driven by military and geopolitical considerations, even though India’s political diplomacy was mired in old slogans about cooperation, peace and the primacy of the border issue. (2) Vaypayee’s India was moving closer to America in a framework that revealed support for the Bush administration view of China as a strategic rival in Asia. Is China’s India policy building bridges with India? In the early 1970s, China’s view of India had been conditioned by its Middle Kingdom view of its superior geopolitical position in Asia, its negative view of Indian politics and capacity to modernize and by its negotiating style that is reluctant to make concessions. But the changing regional and global context since the 1990s has forced China to adapt itself to new situations. The Bush administration identifies its policies with three problems: terrorism, nuclear proliferation and China’s military potential. China’s declared aim is to oppose hegemonism (read the US), to fight splittism (read Tibet and Taiwan), to fight extremism and terrorism in its border areas and to lead the developing world. By developing a strategic partnership with Russia, China has freed itself to deal with Taiwan, India, Japan and the US but its military build-up and negotiating style has stimulated nationalism and opposition to its stance. China is in one way a point of attraction in the economic sphere, but on the other hand it is emerging as a point of opposition in the military sphere. China’s relationship with India since the 1990s is a story of mixed signals. In 1993, the two countries signed a Border Peace and Tranquility agreement but the border remains un-demarcated, and even an exchange of maps is problematic. On an average, there are about 90–120 border incidents according to information published by the Indian Ministry of Defence. While China continues to give nuclear aid to Pakistan, it still insists that India abide by UN resolution 1172 of 6 June 1998 that requires Indian nuclear disarmament. India’s negotiating style with China is indirect and differential; it has not blown the whistle against Chinese proliferation activity in Pakistan, its promotion of arms race between India and Pakistan and India and China and its promotion of Islamic radicalism by Bangladeshis. China is re-thinking its India policy because the India–US strategic dialogue has triangularized the context. As Deputy Defence Secretary, Paul Wolfowitz pointed out to a conference of defence ministers in Singapore (31 May–2 June 2003): I think the relationship between them [India and China], and between them and the rest of us, is going to perhaps be the single greatest factor shaping the future in this region. And in that regard I would say on the whole I remain relatively optimistic that China is going to continue with a focus on internal modernization. That process of modernization I think is going to increase the internal pressures in China to maintain a peaceful orientation toward the rest of the region.9

BJP’s geopolitics 223 As well, India’s economic and military modernization and its alliance building activities in Asia have created a new situation where China’s interest lies in preventing the Indo-US relationship from blossoming. It tries to do so by sending high level leaders to conduct a charm offensive in India, to give away some manufacturing activities to India and to encourage Indian leftists and Maoists to convince Sonia Gandhi and the Congress party about the value of multi-polarity.10 The recent visit (9–12 April 2005) of the Chinese premier to India took place along these lines. But China has yet to think through a realistic strategy vis-à-vis the powers in Asia, the US, Japan and India. It is still functioning in terms of the Nixon–Kissinger–Chou era when the US and China worked together to contain the USSR. Today, with that history and mindset, Chinese strategists dream to displace Tokyo and now New Delhi (among others) as US allies and to induce the US to sacrifice Taiwan and Taiwan Straits to Chinese goodwill. But on the other hand ironically, Beijing today has abandoned the option to settle the Sino-Indian boundary issue along the lines proposed by Chou-en-Lai in 1961 to Nehru – which was to accept the ground realities and the status quo. Its negotiating position on the border has hardened. Then Nehru was the spoiler; now it is China because Pakistani generals do not want an India–China settlement. Now the Pakistani tail is controlling the dragon’s head in Beijing. As the main supplier of modern arms including missiles to Pakistan and Bangladesh, Beijing has come out on the side of Islamic Jihadis and nuclear proliferators in Pakistan aimed at India. In the subcontinent, Beijing today is playing sub-regional games with regional allies who can annoy India but can’t win a war against it, or defeat it or unbalance it by economic, military or covert means. At the same time by surrendering its policies to the interests of the Pakistani generals and the Islamists in the subcontinent, it casts doubts on its declared aim to curb terrorism and nuclear proliferation and it creates an incentive for India and the US to come together and to increase Beijing’s insecurity about the rise of an Asian alignment against Chinese hegemony. China needs to reform its internal thought process around, the India and Asia questions, and to revisit its old policies that failed in 1971, if it is to hope that Sino-Indian relations will reach the status of peace and tranquility. For India, competition with China is an opportunity to modernize the economy and its military capacities where rivalry provides a stimulus to grow stronger and to move in the trajectory of a rising world power that is a force for mutual gain among internationalist powers.

Epilogue

The book examines the transformation of Indian foreign affairs comparing the policies of Nehru, Nehruvians and the Vajpayee government. In May 2004 the Bharatia Janata Party (BJP) minority government coalition lost the election and it was replaced by another minority government led by the Congress party. The new coalition enjoyed the support of Indian communists and it was expected to make significant changes in Indian foreign affairs. The new Indian foreign minister, Natwar Singh, was an intellectual lightweight but he was a Nehru protégé and an ideologue with a fixation for Palestinian rights and non-alignment. He and his party were expected to tone down India’s significant defence and diplomatic ties with Israel which the BJP government had cultivated openly. The new government was also committed in its manifesto to tilt Indian foreign affairs towards traditional ties with Russia, China and Europe and to tone down the special emphasis that the Vajpayee government gave to development of military relations with the Pentagon and the White House. The section on foreign policy in the manifesto of the United Progressive Alliance (the language showed the leftist influence) outlined the guidelines for foreign affairs of the Manmohan Singh government. It was full of Nehruvian rhetoric because the affinity of the Congress party was with the Nehrus. The word ‘strategic’ was dropped as a point of importance of the military and economic drivers of Indo-US relations since 1998. Deepening ties with Russia and Europe became a part of the UPA’s (United Progressive Alliance) new mantra. The Bush–Vajpayee focus was to build ties with several significant points of convergence: strengthening the links between the two largest democracies, promoting commerce in the context of the rise of China and India as the new economic giants in the global economy, protecting the sealanes in the Indian Ocean area that could affect the movement of oil and commerce between Japan and the Persian Gulf and fighting terrorism and creating a stable Asia, which was a code word for a concern about the future direction of China. These were the core issues in the ‘National Security Strategy of the United States of America’ (September 2002) released by President George Bush. They served as the basis of significant institutionalized cooperation between branches of the American and the Indian governments and the two economies. On the other hand, the Congress party platform of 2004 showed Nehruvian and Indian leftist impulses. The ‘highest priority’ was to build regional,

Epilogue 225 South Asian, political, economic and other ties including ‘dialogue’ with Pakistan (not breakthrough agreements) and support of Sri Lanka peace talks (a diplomatic dead-end). Such talk reflected the pedestrian thinking of Congress party, Indian communist leaders and the former foreign secretary, Mani Dixit, who was to take the position of National Security Adviser in the Prime Minister’s Office. Expansion of economic ties and more border talks with China (which have been going on since the mid-1980s) were promised. The party platform on foreign affairs revealed a time warp and a lack of imagination in moving India’s strategic and economic agendas forward in a rapidly changing international environment. Objectively this required the highest priority for strengthening links with the main catalyst in world affairs since the end of the Cold War and since September 11, 2001, that is, the US. Building regional ties with a bunch of failing states who had problems of identity that required them to constantly assume anti-India poses for domestic purposes was hardly a promising exercise. The Middle Eastern Islamic nations were promised a ‘fresh thrust’. The Central Committee of the Communist Party of India (Marxist), the main leftist partner of the Sonia Gandhi-led Congress party, had about 60 members of parliament from its ranks and it was a powerful voice in the politics of the new minority government. It issued a statement following its meeting 16–17 May 2004: ‘The verdict of the people is against the communal platform assiduously propagated by the RSS–BJP combine, its brazen pursuit of pro-rich, pro-business economic policies and its abject capitulation to the US hegemonic designs.’ The Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)) rhetoric has a resonance with the poor rural voter, it impedes internal economic reforms that involve privatization and labour policy reforms and its foreign policy positions raise doubts about its judgement and intellectual integrity. The Indian left had taken an ambivalent position on the 1962 India–China war and the present coalition partner of the Congress party has a pronounced tilt towards China. This shows up in their policy preferences on core Indian issues. They oppose Indian defence modernization and closer Indo-US strategic ties; they favour unilateral India’s nuclear disarmament; and they are silent about the consequences of Chinese nuclear and missile aid to Pakistan for Indian security and global nuclear non-proliferation. Given the similarity between the policy preferences in China’s India policy and those of the Indian communists the question arises: whose side are they on? On the core issue of China’s role in Asia, will China be a part of the solution of stabilizing Asian relationships by negotiations or will it be a part of the problem as a result of hegemonic behaviour? The international security debate in the global strategic mainstream – among American, Japanese, Indian, European, Singaporean and Australian participants for instance, is based on an awareness of China’s potential as an expansionist force as a result of its rapid military modernization which needs to be deflected by engaging the Chinese political class in a dialogue about economic, social and political reforms, and bridge-building in international affairs. Is the issue to be framed in terms of either American sole hegemony in the world or Chinese sole hegemony in Asia? Japan, Taiwan, India and many Southeast Asian countries are unwilling to accept China as the sole hegemon in Asia. There are doubts about

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China’s economic vitality and stunning growth figures in the coming years and there is an issue if China is willing to share power with fellow Asians or whether China sees itself as the sole Asian power in the prestigious setting of the United Nations Security Council. Indian communists do not provide an open discussion of such questions. They prefer instead to stick to their ritual mantra about the danger of American hegemony at a time that the Indian and the global mainstream is concerned about building the internal economic and military strength of Asian societies with a view to build relationships on a pattern of either cooperative or competitive coexistence with each other. The contemporary issue in world politics is not ‘who shall rule the world?’ If the choice was between American or Chinese hegemony many Asians would opt for American hegemony because the US is difficult but it does not have territorial designs, it is overall a benign internationalist force and it is open to persuasion; moreover, as a result of its exaggerated claims about Iraqi capabilities and intentions, its credibility is damaged and the limits of its power are evident. Chinese hegemony in Asia on the other hand is an untested and an unpredictable phenomenon which does not appeal to many Asian countries; they see themselves as rising economic and military powers with a confidence in their political and cultural identity. As well Asian powers are confident in their ability to negotiate attractive strategic and economic bargains with the sole superpower and other powers. Contemporary America too has a similar attitude and policy because it is not able to pursue its strategic and economic interests unaided and it needs allies. In contrast to the ideological baggage of the Nehruvian past that weighed down the party manifesto of the Congress party in 2004, the Congress minority government led by Dr Manmohan Singh has taken a pragmatic path in foreign affairs. Singh, an Oxford trained economist and schooled by his experience in the World Bank, was a leader in Indian economic reforms that took off in 1991 and became the basis of further improvements by the Vajpayee government. The Singh government did not implement the proposed foreign policy changes sought in the common minimum programme of the Congress party and did not succumb to the pressures and ideological dictates of the Indian communists in foreign affairs. Instead, the combination of Singh’s internationalism and nationalism and the vitality of experienced Indian officials – among the military services, the community of defence scientists, intelligence services and diplomats, ensured that a national security constituency of Indian stakeholders had emerged and they held the national consensus. The fundamental changes introduced in Indian military and diplomatic orientation by the Vajpayee government held its place against pressures from the Congress and the communist parties as well as the ideological musings of the Indian foreign minister. The Singh government kept faith with the Vajpayee government’s paradigm change that recognized the relationship between military strength and the quest for negotiated political settlements with Pakistan and China. Under Singh the key planks in the common minimum programme have not been implemented. Indo-Israeli defence, economic and intelligence ties are growing while Palestinian rights are a matter between Israelis, Palestinians and Americans. Anti-terrorism remains a key issue that still

Epilogue 227 brings together Israel, India, Russia and America against their respective enemies. Russia is still attractive as a source of modern military technology in select areas such as satellite communications. It cannot replace America as a source of high technology military supplies but it offers political insurance to India given that America has been an unreliable supplier in crisis situations in the past dealings with India. The peace process initiated by Vajpayee government remains on track with the on-going Singh–Musharraf dialogue as well as institutionalized exchanges between the two governments in the military, economic and social spheres. The Singh government was energetic and successful in launching a bus service between the Pakistani and Indian Kashmirs and this had a positive effect among Pakistanis and Indian publics. Talks for the establishment of an Iran–Pakistan–India pipeline linkup had started with the Vajpayee government and reached a conclusion under the Singh government. This issue was driven by the Indian desire for enhanced energy security and it was another way to commit Pakistan to the peace process by giving it an economic stake in cooperation with India and Iran. Despite the desire to give the ‘highest priority’ to India’s smaller neighbours, relations with Nepal and Bangladesh remained mired in controversies concerning internal stability and democracy in Nepal, and Indo-Nepalese border security, border security and illegal migration between Bangladesh and India; and Sri Lanka remained on the sidelines of Indian politics and foreign affairs. Both the Vajpayee and the Singh governments recognized the value of restructuring Indian foreign and military affairs on the basis of an assessment of the character of the problem and the character of the players involved in the subcontinent. The Nehruvian and the Indian communists’ approach to foreign affairs was flawed from the point of view of Indian interests because it was tied excessively to the border issue with China and the Kashmir issue with Pakistan; it made India a hostage to single issues and both issues became points of friction and stalemate rather than meaningful engagement. Military preparation in peacetime and military escalation in crisis situations followed by political negotiation was the way to build a pattern of competitive coexistence between India, Pakistan and China. It was India’s interest to do so because the region has several candidates as failing states (Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal and Myanmar are the obvious ones) and with porous borders negative fallouts on Indian military security and social stability were likely. At the same time, despite the hype about Sino-Indian strategic partnership, China was determined to deepen its nuclear and missile links with Pakistan, secure deep water facilities in Gwador for its submarines along with naval access to the Coco islands in the Bay of Bengal and to increase its strategic and economic presence in Nepal following a build-up of rail and road links in Tibet; and to build defence ties with Bangladesh that affect security of India’s northeast. Thus, the subcontinent was a centre of gravity of military preparations for Chinese nuclear and naval planners even though the border area indicated military stability because both sides were entrenched in the Himalayan area. The strategic competition was in India’s flanks – Pakistan and Myanmar. China’s Nepal policies since the breakdown of democracy in Nepal in 2004–05,

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the assumption of extra-constitutional powers by King Gyandendra and the intensification of Maoist insurgency in the area – in Nepal, Indian northeast and India’s southern provinces, widened the frontlines in the Sino-Indian competition within the subcontinent. The character of the problem and the character of the players are tied together and the basic distinction is between those who seek division and stalemate, and those who seek stability and growth in relations, and the difference in the rate of likely change in the two approaches. India and America and India and Israel for instance have options to enlarge and deepen the scope of their economic and strategic ties and these players are inclined to do so. This was not always the case. For instance, in the Clinton administration there was recognition of India’s importance following the 1998 Indian tests and a growing awareness of India’s economic potential, but the Clinton administration was mired in old policies and Cold War attitudes; the baggage of the past was significant. There was much diplomatic talk, some action in the economic sphere and stalemate in the strategic side with little chance of change and movement. During the first Bush administration there was much diplomatic talk, a significant push in the quest for deepened economic links and a desire to promote Indo-Pakistani peace process on American terms (with America as a third party mediator or facilitator). But Secretary of State Colin Powell could not avoid the pedestrianism of balancing India and Pakistan. The unimaginative political general in the State Department slowed the rate of change in building Indo-American strategic ties and he was helped by the Cold War orientation of the India and Pakistan hands, and the hostility to India by anti-nuclear ayatollahs at the State Department. It took the ouster of Colin Powell and his replacement by the forward looking strategic thinker Condolezza Rice, the new Secretary of State, for the White House under the second Bush administration to deepen the strategic links with India which the Pentagon, the Commerce department and the White House had pushed during the first Bush administration. Comparatively speaking, the character of players in China and Pakistan are still tied to old histories and conceptions of China’s and Pakistan’s destiny. They no doubt are adapting their policies to better manage changing realities in American and Indian strategic affairs, but it is doubtful if the rate of change in their policies reflects a learning process that represent a paradigm shift in their policies. The rate of change and its character is significant in Indo-American, Indo-UK and Indo-Israeli relations while the pace, the width and depth of change and its nature between India and China and India and Pakistan is hemmed in by calculations that indicate wariness on both sides. A constant negative element is the special military relationship between China and Pakistan which casts a shadow on bilateral relationships between India and her two neighbours; and it places limits on the pace and the character of normalization activities of the three players. So at the beginning of the twenty-first century the balance of probabilities indicates growing and robust affinities between India and America (and India and Britain along with other major European powers), while the balance of probabilities indicates ongoing normalization activity combined with polarities between India

Epilogue 229 and her two difficult neighbours. Between India and the West the likely pattern indicates a drive towards cooperative coexistence and partnerships that are cemented by sectoral and institutional linkages among the military, economic, intelligence, diplomatic and social forces. Between India and China there are no social links and the sectoral and institutional links between the armed services and the commercial elites are driven by a push towards competitive coexistence. This is the likely pattern as well between India and Pakistan although the cultural links between Indians and Pakistanis are strong as a result of linguistic, racial and ancestral affinities. India’s international standing is enhanced by links with the West because of the mutual interests in strategic and economic affairs and with shared democratic values; and as a result of the growing importance of Asia as the centre of gravity of international conflict in the foreseeable future and the area with the highest probable rate of significant change in the economic and the strategic spheres. Between the Mediterranean area and Kuwait the Middle Eastern sphere is important as a centre of instability as well as the source of oil. But on the other hand Al Qaeda’s ability to defeat American power has waned and there is a prospect of a negotiated settlement between America and Iran if both sides play their cards well and organize a political bargain that leads to power sharing between the Iranian Shias, the Iraqi Sunnis and the Kurds in Iraq; in this context the Iranian nuclear issue is negotiable and manageable. The hub of international conflict and significant change lies between Afghanistan–Pakistan and Japan and the diverse areas in between, along with the Indian Ocean. This area – which is almost half the world in space and population, contains many sub-regional centres of gravity and conflict such as Iran, Afghanistan–Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Nepal, Bangladesh, Myanmar, parts of India, Taiwan and the Korean peninsula along with the sealanes and offshore areas that possess oil and other resources. The future of the Indo-Pacific world depends on the evolution of a nexus of complex transnational forces at work. (1) Ongoing economic globalization indicates the rise of an Indo-Pacific economic world with the growth of two new major centres of economic strength, China and India, along with the inherent strength of the American, Japanese, South Korean and many Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) economies. (2) The entrenchment of criminal or subrose globalization involves a nexus of terrorism (where Pakistan’s Kashmir, Afghanistan and Saudi Arabia are the financial and organizational hubs), illegal and massive migration (from Bangladesh into the Indian northeast) illicit arms smuggling (from Sri Lankan, Bay of Bengal and northern Myanmarese areas into India’s northeast), sub-regional insurgencies in Nepal, India’s northeast and southern areas, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan and Kashmir and drug trade from Afghanistan and Myanmar. (3) The evolution of American foreign policy indicates a return to Asian strategic issues. Before September 11, 2001 the US government stressed that China was a likely strategic problem. After September 11, 2001 American policy attention shifted to Afghanistan and later to Iraq. With manageable instability in the region and as a result of the growth of a political process in Afghan and Iraqi politics, and the possibility of negotiated or manageable

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North Korean and Iranian nuclear controversies, American strategic attention has turned back to the long-term China question. This question has been a constant one for Indian strategic minds after the failure of Nehru’s China policy. China’s strategic orientation towards India and Pakistan is the context in which India’s Pakistan policy since 1998 has been framed because by itself Pakistan is a side show in Indian foreign affairs. Today Pakistan’s military, naval and nuclear development depends heavily on Chinese aid and advice. So India’s Pakistan question is tied to its China question. During the Nehru–Menon era Indian policy was heavily Kashmir and Pakistan-centred, but now it has a wider Asian frame of reference that looks at India’s power and standing in the subcontinent and the Indian Ocean area with reference to Chinese policies and the interests of other Asian countries. The character of Asian problems and the likely rate of change in the future depend on the growth of two kinds of stimuli. The first is to encourage a turnaround in the conduct of nations where the relationship is hostile, difficult and dangerous and to do so not by military confrontation but through prolonged engagement and encouragement. America and India have set an example by adopting this approach in their bilateral relationship since 1998. Here the aim is to stabilize a difficult relationship and to create a platform for future growth. Since 1998 India has taken this approach with Pakistan and with China as well. The growth of Indo-US strategic cooperation is meant as well to turn around Pakistani irredentism and to turn Pakistan away from its recent status as the hub of terrorism and nuclear proliferation to a position of nuclear transparency and anti-terrorism. This is the collective aim of Indo-American diplomacy which has had some positive results. The flow of insurgents into Indian Kashmir has declined since 2002 but the terror network in Pakistani Kashmir still functions (as measured by the intercepts of radio messages from Pakistani Kashmir to insurgents in Indian Kashmir and by the flow of funds for the insurgents); and Pakistan’s intelligence service remains a supporter of the Taliban in Afghanistan and the Pakistan–Afghanistan border areas. On the nuclear issue the infrastructure and the policy that facilitated the development of Dr A. Q. Khan’s extensive network is still opaque, and Chinese nuclear aid to Pakistan continues. In the Korean peninsula America and China are taking the lead to turn around North Korea’s government on the nuclear question and to use economic aid and security assurances to weave a fabric of interdependency between the two Koreas and their negotiating partners in the six nations talks. In the Indian subcontinent China is not a negotiating partner of America and India in nuclear affairs because its policy is to promote Pakistan’s nuclear and military build-up as a counter to India’s nuclear and military growth. On the other hand America and India have adopted the path of constructive engagement with China in the belief that agreements to settle territorial disputes by peaceful means, trade deals and diplomatic and strategic dialogues can reduce points of friction and dangerous situations can be converted into manageable instabilities and difficulties. The second kind of stimuli reflects a belief in revolutionary change by coercive means. Since 1949 the People’s Republic of China has played a double game in

Epilogue 231 world politics. During the Maoist era it openly advocated revolutionary change but since Mao’s death its statist diplomacy projects China as a responsible member of the world community that is pursuing an independent policy of peace; but on the other hand it follows the classic revolutionary principle to exploit contradictions in the enemy’s camp. In the Indian subcontinent China is currently allied with countries who oppose ‘Indian hegemony’ and ‘American hegemony’ while denying that China itself engaged in hegemonic behaviour in its relations with say, Vietnam. China has friendly relations with irredentist players like the governments of Pakistan and Bangladesh and the three are still united by their policy to contain Indian influence within the region and in the international sphere. China has the political skill to relate to the revolutionary aspirations of the Islamic Jihadis, leftist revolutionaries in Nepal and in Indian northeastern and southern provinces and the Tamil Tigers provided they function at a distance from Chinese border provinces. This kind of stimuli is meant to build pressure and friction with the enemy state and the approach is often paralleled by diplomacy of charm and deception. This kind of stimuli by China in regional affairs including the Indian Ocean area is a point of friction with Indian and American strategic minds. It shamelessly transferred nuclear capability and its test data to Pakistan which ended up in Libyan hands. It was disclosed by the Libyan government when it decided to abandon its nuclear programme in 2004. While China carries on a charm offensive with India with minor border concessions (Sikkim is now Indian territory according to Chinese official maps), trade blandishments and promise of a strategic partnership, the aim is to deflect India away from a policy of strategic cooperation with America. At the same time it had deepened its military ties with Pakistan and Bangladesh and promises to build nuclear plants, naval frigates and a submarine port at Gwador, near the Persian Gulf. Pakistan has offered access to Chinese submarines to this strategic port in a military contingency. As a signatory of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty it had an obligation not to export nuclear technology and materials to non-nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) countries but did precisely that since the 1980s. So China now has developed several gateways into India. Pakistan is its gateway in India’s west; Bangladesh is its gateway to India’s northeast and Myanmar is the gateway to the Bay of Bengal and to India’s east. It is building roads and rail links in Tibet to make Nepal a gateway of Chinese influence to India’s north. These developments reveal the underlying divergence between Chinese and Indian strategic perspectives and the emergence of two competing alignments with two sets of competing interests: one is represented by the alignment of America, Japan, Taiwan, Australia and India (among others) and the other is represented by the alignment of China, Myanmar, Pakistan, Bangladesh and lately Nepal. From an Indian subcontinental perspective the Asian scene has two different futures. The first indicates a process to build a pattern of cooperative coexistence between India and America and India and Israel and with likeminded powers in Asia such as Australia, Japan, Vietnam and Singapore. These alignments represent radical changes in relationships between sets of non-traditional partners. They are

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remarkable because of the polarities that divided them during the Cold War era. The second one points to a future at best of competitive coexistence between India and China and between India and Pakistan. From war to competitive coexistence is no doubt a radical change given the past histories of relations between these pairs. But competitive coexistence is less significant than cooperative coexistence, because in the latter instance in the Indian case the rate of change and its military and economic scope proceeded from a relationship of polarity and difficulty to a relationship of partnership and mutual strategic and economic gain in the context of problematic Asian international relations. During the Cold War the American frame of reference was to look at India in the context of its Pakistan policy; now it is to look at India in the context of its Asian and international interests. (The rate of change and its scope in India–China and India–Pakistan relations on the other hand is limited to border security and trade activity.) The July 2005 Bush–Singh meeting among other items produced an agreement, subject to US Congressional approval, to relax the nuclear sanctions which were mandated by American law. The British government has adopted a similar stance. These changes indicate a willingness of the US and the UK, two trend setters in world politics today, to abandon the traditional belief that the nonproliferation treaty was the cornerstone of international security. Now it appears that Asian geopolitics rather than the requirement of a global regime dictate the utility of building bilateral links between strong like-minded countries with common interests and values. Building a forward looking platform for stability in Asia requires continuous attention to the calculations of Chinese leaders by China’s watchful neighbours.

Notes

1 Introduction: India as a catalyst 1 Owen Lattimore, The Situation in Asia, Boston, MA, Little Brown, 1949, p. 220. 2 See Strobe Talbot, Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy and the Bomb, Washington, DC, Brookings Institute, 2004. He acknowledged that Indian diplomacy got the better of American diplomats. See Interview, India Abroad, Toronto, 17 September 2004, pp. 18–19. 3 Martin Wight, Power Politics, eds, Hedley Bull and Carsten Holbraad, New York, Penguin, 1979 edn, notes: ‘A buffer zone is a region occupied by one or more weaker powers between two or more stronger powers. . . . Each stronger power will generally have a vital interest in preventing the other from controlling the buffer zone . . . ’, p. 160. According to Nehru’s biographer ‘Nehru had always intended to make it clear that India’s strategic frontier lay on the northern side of Nepal . . . ’. See S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1979, p. 68. 4 See Afghans First: India At Work In Afghanistan, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, New Delhi, March 2004, 62 pp. 5 W. J. Broad, D. E. Sanger and R. Bonner, ‘A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Build His Network’, New York Times, 12 February 2004. ‘The Merchant of Menace’, Time, 14 February 2005. V. Burnett, ‘Nuclear Officials Involved in Sale of Secrets, Musharraf says,’ Globe & Mail (Toronto), 24 January 2004, p. A16. 6 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, Annual Report, 2002–03, p. 103. 7 See P. Spear, A History of India, vol. 2, London, Penguin, 1965, p. 21 about the defensive Hindu society in the face of Islam. 8 For detailed accounts, see Ahmed Rashid, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, New Haven, Yale University Press, 2001 edn. George Friedman, America’s Secret War, New York, Doubleday, 2004. Peter L. Bergen, Holy War Inc., London, Phoenix edn, 2002. 9 Martin Wight, Systems of States, Leicester, Leicester University Press, 1977, makes the distinction between just and holy war, introduction especially, p. 18. 10 For the Russian origins of revolutionary violence, see G. Andrew and V. Mitrokhin, The Mitrokhin Archive, London, Penguin, 1999. 11 A. B. Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History, New Brunswick (USA), Transaction Publishers, 1994 edn, pp. XIX–XXVI. 12 Benjamin R. Barber, ‘Jihad vs McWorld’, in R. K. Betts, ed., Conflict After the Cold War, 2nd edn, New York, Longman, 2002, pp. 558–567. 13 B. Raman, a retired senior Indian intelligence official pointed out that ‘one cannot blame Islam . . . for the spread of jihadi bloodshed. . . . What one has to blame is a particular interpretation of Islam . . . emanating from Saudi Arabia and Pakistan’. [The Wahabbi – Deobandi School]. See his statement, Committee on International

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Relations, US House of Representatives, Washington, DC, 29 October 2003. http://wwwa.house.gov/international_relations/108/rama1029.htm For Mountbatten’s enormous influence in shaping Nehru’s policies on Kashmir and Pakistan, see H. V. Hodson, The Great Divide, New York, Oxford University Press, 1969, 1985, ch. 25. See K. Arif, ed., American–Pakistan Relations; Documents, vols 1 and 2, Lahore, Vanguard Books, 1984. Olaf Caroe, Wells of Power, Westport, CT, Hyperion Press, 1979; published originally by Macmillan, London, 1951. See conversations between President Richard Nixon, Henry Kissinger and Chou-en-Lai in de-classified US government documents in F. S. Aijazuddin, ed., The White House and Pakistan, 1969–74, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002. For a US assessment of China’s policy towards India, see ‘Extract From State Department Briefing Book’, February 1972 that refers to China’s attempt to balkanize South Asia. Ibid., p. 502. For example, see Memorandum of Conversation Between President Nixon and Premier Chou-en-Lai, 24 February 1972. Ibid., pp. 541–542; also their Conversation, 23 February 1972, Ibid., pp. 526; also pp. 291, 632–633 and 629.

2 Shifts in Indian diplomatic history 1 For an overview of different facets of India see ‘India’, The New Encyclopaedia Britannica, vol. 21, 15th edn, Chicago, Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1993, pp. 80–121; Francis Watson, A Concise History of India, London, Thames & Hudson, paperback edn, 1979. For study of India as a field of power by outside forces, see Bamber Gascoigne, The Great Moghuls, London, Robinson, paperback edn, 2002; Philip Mason, The Men Who Ruled India, Abridged edn, London, Jonathan Cape, 1985, 1987. 2 Robert B. Marks, The Origins of the Modern World, Oxford, Rowman & Littlefield, 2002, ch. 2. 3 For the organic link, see Percival Spear, A History of India, vol. 2, New York, Penguin, 1987, pp. 13, 51. For the basic Hindu–Muslim antagonism, ibid., p. 159 and ch. 18. Also Karl E. Meyer, The Dust of Empire, New York, Century Foundation Book, 2003, pp. 18–19. 4 For Nehru’s ability to talk about a full range of international and regional issues, see S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru: A Biography, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1979. For the lack of precision and vagueness and grand hopes in foreign affairs, see p. 43. Gopal calls him the ‘prime decision maker’, p. 54. For his pre-eminent position in Indian party and administration, see p. 309. For Nehru’s lack of collegial advice and his lack of access to quality information, see the account of the organization of the Prime Minister’s office, pp. 311–312. 5 See my chapter, ‘India: The Nuclear, Scientists and the State, the Nehru and PostNehru Years in Etel Solingen’, ed. Scientists and the State, Ann Arbor, MI, The University of Michigan Press, 1994, ch. 9. 6 Nehru’s biographer, Gopal, op. cit., calls the policy ‘planning for socialism’, p. 305. Nehru saw planning as ‘a socialist revolution by consent’ and gave science a prominent place in national development, see pp. 306–307. Indian planning was the result of a combined push by Indian capitalist leaders and the Indian state for rapid industrialization under the state. This was in 1944. This became the basis of ‘capitalism for the rich and socialism for the poor’! See Gurcharan Das, India Unbound, New Delhi, Penguin, revised and updated edn 2002, ch. 7. 7 For Nehru’s dominance over foreign affairs, see Gopal, op. cit., p. 54. 8 Escott Reid, Envoy to Nehru, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1981, pp. 219 and 190. 9 Alastair Buchan, The End of the Postwar Era: A New Balance of World Power, London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1974, p. 294.

Notes 235 10 Karl E. Meyer, The Dust of Empire, New York, Century Foundation Book, 2003, see Prologue and ch. 1. 11 For Mountbatten’s enormous influence on Nehru’s external policies, see H. V. Hodson, The Great Divide, New York, Oxford University Press, 1969, 1985, ch. 25. For Menon’s influence, see V. K. Madhavan Kutty, V. K. Krishna Menon, Builders of Modern India, Government of India (Publications Division) New Delhi, 1988, chapters IX–XIV. 12 Owen Lattimore, The Situation in Asia, Boston, MA, Little Brown, 1949, pp. 36, 44–45. 13 L. J. Kavic, India’s Quest for Security, Defence Policies 1947–65, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1967 shows the existence of an Indian defence policy with a limited scope, even though the ‘Indian formula’ according to Kavic stressed the importance of moral force in world affairs. See introduction, p. 2. 14 For example, the Annual Report 2002–03, of the Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, highlights ‘India’s commitment to non-discriminatory and universal nuclear disarmament’, p. 93. However, India’s claim that it is a nuclear weapon power and its expectation of international recognition of its changed status, requires positive discrimination in India’s favour. 15 See Gopal, op. cit., for Nehru–Patel differences on ideological and administrative issues, as well as relations with Pakistan and Muslims, pp. 36–41, 78–80, 86. For Nehru–Patel differences in China and Tibet policy, see pp. 106–109. 16 Memorandum from Dr Henry Kissinger to President Nixon, 8 February 1972 notes China’s attitude as follows. ‘PRC relations with Pakistan have been exceptionally close for almost a decade. Peking has wanted to strengthen Pakistan as a power rival to China’s great opponent in the subcontinent, India. It seeks to thwart Moscow’s design of encircling the PRC with unfriendly states.’ The White House & Pakistan, op. cit., p. 494. 17 Lattimore notes: ‘Ever since the defeat of Japan, American discussion of the fate of China has harped on the idea that China is a field of power which should be “preventively” occupied by the United States in order to keep Russia out.’ Op. cit., p. 42. 18 President Bill Clinton notes the development of a ‘new chapter’ in Indo-US ties following the end of the Cold War. My Life, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 2004, p. 597. Indian nuclear tests, 1998, ‘set back my [Clinton’s] policy of improving Indo-US relations’, p. 786. The transformation of Indo-US relations occurred between the Bush administration and the BJP’s government led by Vajpayee after the 1998 tests. From 2002 onwards, the US Government publicly declared India as a strategic partner in Asia. In April 2005, the US declared that it would support India’s development as a world power. 19 Lattimore, op. cit., p. 36. 3 Strategic triangles and the Indian subcontinent 1 H. Zimmer, ‘Philosophies of India’, Bollingen series XXVI, New York, Pantheon Books, 1951, p. 139. 2 See Martin Wight, Systems of States, Leicester University Press, 1977, ch. 7. 3 For a discussion of Kautilya’s Arthasastra and his geopolitical circle of states, see A. B. Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1960, pp. 121–124. Also, Zimmer, op. cit., ‘The Philosophy of Success’, ch. 1. 4 Wight, op. cit., introduction, p. 17. 5 Ibid., p. 174. 6 Percival Spear, A History of India, vol. 2, New York, Penguin, 1965, 1970, pp. 224–225. 7 Karl E. Meyer, The Dust of Empire, New York, A Century Foundation Book, 2003, pp. XVII–XVIII.

236 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

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Notes

Wight, Systems of States, Leicester University Press, 1977, p. 175. See Spear, op. cit., ch. 1. Ibid., pp. 51, 120–121. Wight, op. cit., p. 177. Ibid., p. 16. The six signs of a states’ system are: states are sovereign, there is mutual recognition, great powers exist, means of regular communications exist, there is international law and common interests are defended by a balance of power. Spear, op. cit., pp. 110–111. Wight, op. cit., p. 174 has three features of a triangle: (1) There is a states’ system, a diplomatic community. (2) There are three great powers. (3) There is tension, suspicion and hostility among the three which makes it ‘impossible’ for any two to combine ‘even temporarily’ against the third. Our analysis in the case of the subcontinent makes it possible for two powers to temporarily combine against the third. Wight is emphatic. ‘Most examples of political triangle that we examine will reveal this transient, temporary and relative character’; and ‘triangles . . . are resolved by war’, p. 179. Owen Lattimore, The Situation in Asia, Boston, MA, Little Brown, 1949, p. 231. Wight uses the analogy of a tournament with semi-finals and a final as the end game in a closed system, see p. 179–186 and 190–191.

4 Indian strategic debates and dilemmas: analytical constructs 1 Samuel B. Griffith, Sun Tzu, The Art of War, Oxford, Oxford University Press, paperback edn 1971, ch. 5. 2 For the biases in the attitudes and policies of Nehru, the Congress party and civil administrators of India, see L. J. Kavic, India’s Quest for Security, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1967, ch. 9. 3 See Sisir Gupta, India and Regional Integration in Asia, Bombay, Asia Publishing House, 1964. 4 D. Das, ed., Sardar Patel’s Correspondence, 1945–50, vol. 5, Ahmedabad, Navajivan Publishing House, 1974, p. 338. 5 Ibid., p. 344. 6 Ibid., p. 346. 7 S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. 2, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1979, pp. 177–178, and 181. 8 Ibid., p. 194. 9 Ibid., p. 179. 10 Jagah Mehta, former Indian Foreign Secretary, titled his paper ‘Panditji Knows Best: The Abdication of Advice and Dissent By the Bureaucracy’, delivered at the conference on the First Ten Years of Indian Independence, University of Texas, 7–8 December 1990. 5 The nature of India’s foreign policy: utopia, compromise peace or engagement? 1 See A. B. Bozeman, Politics and Culture in International History, Princeton, NJ, Princeton University Press, 1960, p. 123 for the role of illusion in foreign affairs in Kautilya’s Arthasastra. 2 Percival Spear, A History of India, vol. 2, London, Penguin, 1965, 1970, pp. 239 and 245 notes Nehru’s position as a symbol of Congress party’s left wing. 3 For Nehru’s nuclear policies, see Ashok Kapur, India’s Nuclear Option, New York, Praeger, 1974. 4 For details, see L. J. Kavic, India’s Quest for Security, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1967.

Notes 237 6 The build-up of the suzerain states’ system in the subcontinent, 1947–90s 1 According to a US government document, see US Embassy, New Delhi to US Secretary of State, 2 May 1947, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, Washington, 1972, III, pp. 154–155. On May 1[1947] Mohammed Ali Jinnah, Leader of the Muslim League, received two American visitors at his Bombay residence. They were Raymond A. Hare, Head of the Division of South Asian Affairs, Department of State and Thomas E. Weil, Second Secretary of the US Embassy in India. Jinnah asserted that under no circumstances would he accept the concept of an Indian Union since the Muslim League was determined to establish Pakistan. He sought to impress on his visitors that the emergence of an independent, sovereign Pakistan would be in consonance with American interests. Pakistan would be a Muslim country, Muslim countries would stand together against Russian aggression. In that endeavour they would look to the United States for assistance, he added. Jinnah coupled the danger of ‘Russian aggression’ with another menace that Muslim nations might confront. That was ‘Hindu imperialism’. The establishment of Pakistan was essential to prevent the expansion of Hindu imperialism into the Middle East, he emphasised. 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13

P. Spear, A History of India, vol. 2, London, Penguin Books, 1970, p. 13. Karl E. Meyer, The Dust of Empire, New York, Century Foundation Book, 2003, p. 17. Ibid., pp. xvii–xviii. Ibid., pp. 89–90. Ibid., p. 90. Ibid., p. 107. O. Lattimore, The Situation in Asia, Boston, MA, Little Brown, 1949, p. 184. Geoffrey Fairbairn, Revolutionary Guerrilla Warfare, Middlesex, Penguin, 1974, pp. 47, 51 and 57. K. Marx and F. Engels, On Colonialism, Moscow, Progress Publishers, 1978 edn, pp. 49, 71 and 37. Ibid., pp. 81 and 130. In M. S. Rajan and S. Ganguly, eds, Sisir Gupta, India and the International System, New Delhi, Vikas, pp. 188–189. K. Arif, ed., America–Pakistan Relations: Documents, vol. 1, Lahore, Vanguard Books, 1984, pp. 3, 15–16, 23–24, 30–31, 25, 38, 10 and 61.

7 The typology of threats to India and the Nehruvian record, 1964–98 1 The list is as follows. Prime Minister 1 J. L. Nehru 2 G. L. Nanda 3 L. B. Shastri 4 G. L. Nanda 5 Indira Gandhi 6 Morarji Desai 7 Charan Singh 8 Indira Gandhi 9 Rajiv Gandhi 10 V. P. Singh 11 Chandrasekhar 12 P. V. Narasimha Rao

From 15 August 1947 27 May 1964 9 June 1964 11 January 1966 24 January 1966 24 March 1977 28 July 1979 14 January 1980 31 October 1984 2 December 1989 10 November 1990 21 June 1991

To 27 May 1964 9 June 1964 11 January 1966 24 January 1966 24 March 1977 28 July 1979 14 January 1980 31 October 1984 1 December 1989 10 November 1990 21 June 1991 16 May 1996

238 13 14 15

Notes A. B. Vajpayee H. D. Deve Gowda I. K. Gujral

16 May 1996 1 June 1996 21 April 1998

1 June 1996 21 April 1997 18 March 1998

2 K. M. Panikkar, India and the Indian Ocean, London, Allen & Unwin, 1945. 3 Alastair Lamb, Asian Frontiers, New York, Praeger, 1968. 4 B. Raman, Statement, Committee on International Relations, US House of Representatives, 29 October 2003 explained the aims of terrorism were to keep India destabilized, to keep the religious divide between Hindus and Muslims, to hamper economic development and annex Jammu and Kashmir. 5 For a thoughtful analysis, see Mohan Malik, ‘India–China Relations: Giants Stir, Cooperate and Compete’, Asia–Pacific Centre for Security Studies, Honolulu, June 2004. 6 Sunil Khilnani, The Idea of India, New Delhi, Penguin, 1997, pp. 86–89. 7 S. P. Cohen, Indian Army, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1971. For Nehru’s rejection of the Indian military, see pages 104–107. For a discussion of the position of the military member of the Viceroy’s Council, see pp. 22–28. 8 S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. 1, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, chapters 3 and 9. 9 Khilnani, op. cit., p. 39. 10 Gopal, op. cit., ch. 9. 11 Lord Curzon’s and John Strachey’s views are in Khilnani, op. cit., pp. 154–155. 12 See Arthur Lall, The Emergence of Modern India, New York, Columbia University Press, 1981, ch. 1. 13 F. Max Mueller, India: What Can It Teach Us?, New Delhi, Rupa, 2002. 14 Ibid. 15 Gopal, op. cit., p. 60. 16 J. L. Nehru, Discovery of India, New York, Day Co., 1946 and Glimpses of World History, London, Drummond, 1945. 17 K. J. Holsti, The Dividing Discipline, London, Unwin Hyman, 1985. 18 See Marx and Engels, On Colonialism, Moscow, Progress Publication, 1978 edn. 19 See V. K. Madhavan Kutty, V. K. Krishna Menon, New Delhi, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1988, ch. XI. 20 Gopal, op. cit., ch. 15, pp. 232–238, and 245–248 for Nehru’s leftist internationalism and Indian socialism. 21 T. A. Keenleyside, ‘Origins of Indian Foreign Policy: A Study of Indian Nationalist, Attitudes to Foreign Affairs 1927–39’, unpublished PhD thesis, University of London, 1955. 22 K. P. S. Menon, Many Worlds, London, Oxford University Press, 1965, p. 271. 23 See for Escott Reid, Envoy to Nehru, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1981. Reid notes that Nehru correctly estimated the nationalistic tensions between the USSR and China and indicated a need to exploit this to the advantage of India and the West, pp. 12, 57, and 247–248. 8 Nehru’s innovations and their problems 1 For the history of India’s nuclear behaviour, see my book Pokhran and Beyond, 2nd edn, New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 2003. 2 Michael Brecher, Nehru, A Political Biography, London, Oxford University Press, 1959, p. 627. 3 Eric Stokes, ‘Jawaharlal Nehru in the Making’ (review), Modern Asian Studies, II, 2, 1977, p. 295. 4 See S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, vol. 2, 1979, pp. 63–64, 253, 44 and 70–71.

Notes 239 5 Earlier as per Gopal, ibid., Ch. 3, Nehru had a ‘marked leaning towards the Western powers’, pp. 55–59. For his wary attitudes and coolness towards the USSR, pp. 63–64. For his belief that China should be encouraged to break away from Moscow’s orbit, and ‘cautious friendliness’ towards China, p. 65. 6 See S. Gopal, Radhakrishnan, London, Unwin Hyman, 1989, ch. 10, ‘The Moscow Embassy’. 7 According to de-classified USSR government documents ‘Avoiding military confrontation with the United States remained the Soviet leader’s foremost concern [in the Korean War]’. See ‘New Russian documents on the Korean War’, The Cold War in Asia, Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, Washington DC, Winter 1995/1996, p. 31. 8 Stalin raised the possibility of ‘peaceful co-existence’ in 1925, and the ‘two camps’ theory was articulated by Andrei Zhdanov, Stalin’s spokesman in 1947. See Joseph L. Nogee and Robert H. Donaldson, Soviet Foreign Policy, 2nd edn, 1984, pp. 1 and 24. 9 Nehru’s policy of cautious friendly attitude towards China to wean it away from a dependence on the USSR was appreciated in Ottawa. See Escott Reid, Envoy to Nehru, Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1981, p. 22. Reid notes that Nehru was ahead of others in ‘hoping for’ and ‘foreseeing, a break between China and the Soviet Union and the importance he attached to this break’, p. 56. 10 Gopal, Radhakrishnan, op. cit., pp. 223, 225–226. 11 Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, op. cit. See note 5. 12 On the Korean War, the difference between Nehru and Radhakrishnan (and Krishna Menon) is in Gopal, Radhakrishnan, op. cit., pp. 229–231. 13 For India’s role on Indo-China, see Escott Reid, op. cit., ch. 6. However, this became an irritant in India’s relationship with the West. 14 Gopal, Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 247. 15 Ibid., p. 248. 16 Ibid. 9 Nehruvians and the rise of anti-India trends in foreign affairs 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10

Percival Spear, A History of India, vol. 2, London, Penguin, 1987, p. 237. Ibid., pp. 107, 111 and 21. Ibid., pp. 225, 226, 229 and 231. Ibid., p. 178. Ibid., pp. 120 and 116. Ibid., p. 154. Ibid., p. 145. Ibid., p. 1. J. L. Nehru, Speeches, Asian–African Conference, Government of India, 1955. Following on the Bandung Conference, when the nations of Asia, under the lead of China, by whom India was momentarily overshadowed, drew up a charter of peaceful co-existence amidst scenes of wild enthusiasm and speeches of brotherly amity, Karachi received – as I have been assured on unimpeachable authority – a private message from Peking. The Chinese People’s Government assured the Government of Pakistan that there was no conceivable clash of interests between the two countries which could imperil their friendly relations: but that this position did not apply to Indo-Chinese relations, in which a definite conflict of interests could be expected in the near future. No more cynical expression of realpolitik can be imagined. The source is L. F. Rushbrook Williams, in The State of Pakistan, London, Faber and Faber, 1962, p. 120.

240

Notes

11 See Willard Range, Jawaharlal Nehru’s World View, Athens, University of Georgia Press, 1961; and A. Appadorai and M. S. Rajan, India’s Foreign Policy and Relations, New Delhi, South Asian Publishers, 1985, ch. 1. 12 Owen Lattimore, The Situation in Asia, Boston, MA, Little Brown, 1949, p. 33. 13 Ibid., p. 32. 14 I have discussed this in ‘Imperial America and the Indian Subcontinent’, Journal of Military and Strategic Studies, University of Calgary and the Canadian Defence and Foreign Affairs Institute, Summer 2004. 15 S. Gopal, Jawaharlal Nehru, vol. 2, Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1979, outlines Dean Acheson’s view of Nehru as ‘one of the most difficult men with whom I have ever had to deal’, p. 6; and Nehru said that ‘American are either very naïve or singularly lacking in intelligence’, p. 63. 16 The conversations between President Nixon, Henry Kissinger, Chou-en-Lai and Mao reveal the contempt for ‘Indians’. See the record of conversations in F. S. Aijazuddin, ed., The White House and Pakistan, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, pp. 526–539. 17 Lattimore, op. cit., 167. 10 The external determinants of change in Indian foreign affairs, 1960s–90s 1 Owen Lattimore, The Situation in Asia, Boston, MA, Little Brown, 1949, p. 180. 2 For standard definitions of a nation, see Martin Wight, Power Politics, New York, Penguin, 1979 edn, pp. 27–28. In Indian history based on race, language and political unity, nationalism was absent except briefly in the case of the Marathas that was defined by territoriality, common language, opposition to Islamic rule and sense of independence. See Percival Spear, A History of India, vol. 2, New York, Penguin, 1987 edn, pp. 110–111 and 158–159. Political freedom became basis of ‘Indian nationalism’ as a reaction to European rule, pp. 166–168; but its scope was limited to a Westernized middle class, p. 174. 3 For example, see Krishna Menon’s views in Michael Brecher, India and World Politics: Krishna Menon’s View of the World, New York, Praeger, 1968. 4 See Dr Raj Krishna, a well known economist, an exponent of an fundamental change in India’s nuclear and foreign policy, ‘India and the Bomb’, India Quarterly, New Delhi, April–June 1965. 5 M. J. Desai argued against an arms race with China as it would retard India’s economic and social development and weaken India internally, and in Asia. ‘India and Nuclear Weapons’, Disarmament and Arms Control, Autumn 1965. 6 For an overview of Indian politics, see Craig Baxter, Yogendra K. Malik, Charles H. Kennedy and Robert C. Oberst Government and Politics in South Asia, 5th edn, Boulder, CO, Westview, 2002, ch. 4. 7 Henry Kissinger hoped for, and solicited Chinese military help for Pakistan including ‘diversionary troop movements’, see White House and Pakistan, declassified documents, F. S. Aijazuddin, ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, White House memorandum from Kissinger to President Nixon 10 December 1971, p. 455; and Kissinger–Chou-en-Lai conversation, Memorandum, 20 June 1972. See also pages 586 and 600, 438–439 record US–China conversations on 10 December 1971 on this point. 8 For internal bureaucratic politics and lack of US Congressional support for Nixon–Kissinger policy towards Indian and Pakistan in 1971, see ibid., pp. 398 and 614 for Kissinger’s complaint about bureaucratic resistance to Nixon’s decisions. 9 Jack Anderson (with G. Clifford), The Andersen Papers, New York, Random House, 1973, pp. 205–269. See also Aijazuddin op. cit., p. 398 regarding the leak to Jack Anderson.

Notes 241 10 For US treaty obligations to Pakistan ‘in the event of aggression from India’, see ‘Memo on US Defence Commitments to Pakistan’, 8 December 1971, ibid., pp. 413–417. 11 US labelled Indian military action as aggression at the UN in December 1971, ibid., p. 425. Kissinger too complained to USSR about ‘Soviets support of Indian aggression’, p. 442. China told Kissinger that if India commits aggression, we will support Pakistan, 11 July 1971, p. 205, and ‘we cannot sit idly by’, p. 202. The US and China agreed that India was committing aggression against Pakistan, p. 201. 12 For US–India intelligence cooperation against China, see ibid., pp. 325–326; ‘we recognize India as a major Asian power’, Kissinger memo to Nixon, 3 November 1971, p. 316. 13 Kissinger memo to Nixon, 28 April 1971, ibid., pp. 243–244. 14 Memo, Nixon meeting with Senior Review Group, 11 August 1971, ibid., p. 258. See also, p. 269. 15 Ibid., pp. 259–260. 16 Ibid., p. 446. 17 Ibid., see pages 438–439, and see also note 7. 18 Memo, Kissinger–Chou-en-Lai conversation, ibid., 10 July 1971, p. 202. 19 Kissinger memo to Nixon, 11 November 1971, ibid., p. 287. 20 See White House memo to Kissinger, 15 November 1971, ibid., p. 353, 355 and 357 and telegram from Farland to Secretary of State, 7 December 1971, ibid., p. 432. 21 Kissinger noted this with the Chinese, 23 November 1971, ibid., p. 380. 22 Memo, Nixon–-Chou-en-Lai conversation, 23 February 1971, ibid., p. 536. 23 Memo, Kissinger-Amb. Huang Hua conversation, 10 December 1971, ibid., p. 447. 24 Ibid., p. 449. 25 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, 22 February 1971, ibid., p. 232. 26 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, 28 April 1971, ibid., p. 247. 27 For a record of Chou-en-Lai’s views, 5 November 1971, ibid., pp. 313 and 384. 28 Ibid., pp. 534 and 542. 11 India’s antagonists re-group, 1971–80s 1 S. Weissman and H. Krosney, The Islamic Bomb, New York, Times books, 1980. 2 Telegram, Amb. Farland to Secretary of State, 15 June 1971, F. S. Aijazuddin, ed., The White House and Pakistan, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2002, shows the new face of Bhutto, p. 254. 3 Amb. Bush telegram to State, 10 December 1971, ibid., pp. 456–457. 4 Ibid., p. 473. 5 Irving Janis, Groupthink, 2nd ed., London, Houghton & Mifflin, 1982. 6 Aijazuddin, op.cit., memo, Nixon–Bhutto meeting, 18 December 1971, pp. 484–485. 7 Ibid., p. 493. 8 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, 17 September 1973, ibid., p. 588. 9 Mao’s view is noted in memo, Kissinger to Nixon, 8 February 1972, ibid., p. 495. 10 Ibid., pp. 496–499. 11 State Department Briefing Book, 2 February 1972, ibid., pp. 502–503, my emphasis. 12 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, 8 February 1972, ibid., p. 496. 13 Ibid., p. 497. 14 State Department Briefing Book, February 1972, ibid., p. 501. 15 Memo of conversation, Mao, Nixon, Chou-en-Lai, Kissinger, 21 February 1972, ibid., pp. 508–509. 16 Memo, Nixon–Chou-en-Lai conversation, 22 February 1972, ibid., p. 525. 17 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, 20 March 1972, ibid., p. 551. 18 Memo, Secretary of State to Nixon, 17 March 1972, ibid., p. 553. 19 White House memo (Kissinger), 18 September 1973, ibid., pp. 585–586. 20 Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, 17 September, 1973, ibid., p. 588.

242 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

Notes

Memo, Kissinger to Nixon, 17 September, 1973, ibid., p. 590. Memo, National Security Council, 1 October 1973, ibid., p. 611. Ibid., pp. 612–613. Memo of conversation, Mao, Chou-en-Lai, Kissinger, et al., 12 November 1973, ibid., pp. 619–620. Memo, Kissinger–Deng Ziaping conversation, 26 November 1974, ibid., p. 629; also p. 631. For Pakistan’s nuclear history, see Ashok Kapur, Pakistan’s Nuclear Development, London, Croom Helm, 1987. This section draws on the discussion in Ashok Kapur with A. J. Wilson, The Foreign Policy of India and Her Neighbours, London, Macmillan, 1996, pp. 146–147. These quotes are from George Friedman, America’s Secret War, New York, Doubleday, pp. 13, 40, 142–143 and 155. These quotes are from Peter L. Bergen, Holy War Inc., London, Phoenix paperback, revised and updated, 2003, pp. 66–67 and 71. India Today, 28 February 1994, pp. 36–37.

12 Liberating India and its nuclear policy from the Nehruvian shackles 1 Confidential interviews, New Delhi and Mumbai, 1999–2002. 2 For details of Chinese proliferation activities, see my chapter, ‘Pokhran II and After’, in Amita Shastri and A. J. Wilson, eds, The Post-Colonial States of South Asia, London, Curzon, pp. 345–346; also Mohan Malik, ‘A. G. Khan’s China Connection’, China Brief, Jamestown Foundation, IV, 9, 29 April 2004. 3 ‘The Position of the United States With Respect to Asia’, NSC 48/1, 23 December 1949, top secret, in J. H. Etzold and J. L. Gaddis, Containment: Documents on American Policy and Strategy, 1945–50, New York, Columbia University Press, 1978, pp. 252–253. 4 L. Axworthy ‘India’s Nuclear Testing’, Cancaps Bulletin, 18, August 1998, p. 10. 5 Harold N. Mueller, ‘The Death of Arms Control?’, Disarmament Diplomacy, London, 29, August/September 1998, pp. 2, 4. 6 Marcus Raskin, ‘The US and the South Asian Nukes’, Testing the Limits: The India–Pakistan Nuclear Gambit, Amsterdam: Transnational Institute and Washington Institute of Policy Studies, August 1998, p. 40. 7 Cathleen S. Fisher, ‘Parallel Nuclear Realities’, Disarmament Diplomacy, London, 30, September 1998, pp. 7–9. My emphasis. 8 Marcus Raskin, op.cit., p. 42. 9 Ibid. 10 Ibid., p. 43. 13 India’s rise as a major power, 1990s 1 Martin Wight, Power Politics, New York, Penguin, 1979 edn, p. 65. 2 For a detailed account of Indian intelligence failures in the Kargil Operation, May–July 1999, see From Surprise to Reckoning, The Kargil Review Committee Report, New Delhi, Sage, 2000, especially chapters 6–8. 3 Ibid., pp. 225–226. 4 For a general discussion of Hinduism as a social and a political force in India, see Craig Baxter, Yogendra K. Malik, Charles H. Kennedy and Robert C. Oberst. Government and Politics in South Asia, 5th edn, Boulder, CO, Westview, 2002, ch. 2, pp. 44–45. 14 The BJP’s geopolitics and building strategic triangularities 1 Joint statement of India–US Defence Policy Group, Washington DC, 23 May 2002. The measures included naval patrols in the Malacca Straits; special forces

Notes 243

2 3

4

5 6 7 8 9 10

exercises; participating in a joint workshop on missile defence; defence trade and agreement to facilitate cooperation in defence technology. Confidential interviews, Washington, DC, 2003–2004. For the background Indo-Israeli strategic cooperation, see Martin Sherman and M. L. Sondhi, ‘Indo-Israeli Strategic Cooperation As a US National Interest’, Ariel Centre for Policy Research, Policy Papers no. 89, August 1999. See also ‘Geopolitical Diary’, Stratfor, 8 September 2003, for an assessment of the Sharon visit to India; and ‘High-Level Israeli Defence Delegation visiting India’, Times of India, 19 July 2004. According to an informed analysis, the CIA actually knew about Pakistani nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadeer Khan’s activities, physically tracking him back in the 1990s. And ‘Washington did not believe that Khan was acting alone’. See ‘Geopolitical Diary’, Stratfor, 9 February 2004. Also see William J. Broad, David E. Sanger and Raymond Bonner. ‘A Tale of Nuclear Proliferation: How Pakistani Build His Network’, New York Times, 12 February 2004. The reports indicated a link between North Korean missiles supply to Pakistan, Pakistani nuclear technology (of Chinese origin) to North Korea, and use of American supplied C-130 planes. See ‘US Builds Proliferation Case Against Pakistan’, Stratfor, 1 April 2003. For Radha Kumar’s, ‘Setting Terms for Kashmir Talks’, Times of India, 30 January 2003. Confidential interviews, New Delhi, 1999–2002. Amy Waldman, ‘After Bombing, Kashmir Talks Gathered Speed’, New York Times, 8 January 2004. Confidential interviews, New Delhi, 2002. Mohan Malik, ‘India–China Relations: Giants Stir, Cooperate and Compete’, Asia–Pacific Centre for Security Studies, Honolulu, June 2004. Deputy Secretary [Paul] Wolfowitz Q&A. Following IISS Asia Security Conference, Defence Link, US Department of Defense, News Transcript, 31 May–1 June 2003 Conference. Chinese experts speak of a ‘cooperative partnership between China and India’, and notes that ‘problems will be solved gradually. See Zhang Chengming and Cheng Xizhong, ‘Establishment of New Type Sino-Indian Relations and Its Perspective’, International Strategic Studies, China Institute for International Strategic Studies, 4, October 2003, pp. 24–29. See also ‘Declaration on Principles for Relations and Comprehensive Cooperation Between the Republic of India and the People’s Republic of China, following visit of Prime Minister Vajpayee to Beijing’, 2003, pp. 22–27. Also, Pramit Mitra and Drew Thompson, ‘China and India: Rivals or Partners?’, Far Eastern Economic Review, April 2005.

Index

Advani, L. K. 206, 217 Afghanistan: American–Saudi–Pakistan alliance to wage covert campaign in 176–177; as buffer zone 3; build-up of Taliban 53, 103; defeat of Soviet forces in 13; Indian developmental projects 4; Indian diplomatic ties post-2001 5; nexus of terrorism and drug trade 8, 229; Pakistani suspicions of 170; projection of American military power through 4; promotion of jihad in 47, 50, 93; Soviet invasion 60, 174 African National Congress 69 Agni missile project 179, 182, 221 Albright, Madeleine 188, 191, 194 Anglo-American, Pakistani and Chinese coalition 18, 19, 48, 57, 76; and ascendancy of power politics 31; common interests and obligations 46, 55; expansion of geographical limits 50; inability to dominate India 34; Indian response during Nehru’s era 51 Anglo-American, Pakistani coalition 57, 76; characteristics 46–47; development of 45, 49, 84, 94–95; and Kashmir issue 53; military character of 131–132 anti-Muslim riots: Gujarat (India) 206, 207 anti-terrorism 226–227 apartheid: India’s policy against 69, 78 Arab world: India’s dependence on 67, 68, 214; India’s policy 68–69, 134, 197, 205, 214–215, 216, 225; policy towards India 214 Asia: growth of major and minor powers in 6–7; issue(s)-driven centres of gravity 8 asymmetrical strategic relationships 74, 75

Axworthy, Lloyd 189–190, 194 Azad, Maulana 108 Bangladesh 13, 21, 23, 45, 48, 54, 55, 57, 61, 71, 155–156, 164, 198 Barber, R. 7 Beg, Aslam 175, 176, 217 Bergen, Peter L. 177 Bhabha, Homi J. 108, 184, 185 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) 30–31 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)-led coalition government (1998–2004) 34; adoption of coercive diplomacy 72–73, 79–80; China policy 220, 221–222; defeat in 2004 elections 2, 224; diplomatic and military decision-making under 35, 186–187, 201, 202; Israeli policy 214–216; Müller’s views 190, 191, 192, 194; nuclear policy 65, 66–67, 181–182, 213–214, 219; Pakistan policy 216–219; power politics 32–34, 35, 39, 65; shift in India’s diplomatic and military policy 9, 16, 64, 69–70, 144, 203–204, 206–208, 209–210, 212, 226 Bhutto, Benazir 174, 219 Bhutto, Z. A. 57, 157, 164, 166; foreign policy 169, 170; India policy 173; and Kashmir issue 25, 173; nuclear policy 163, 172, 173; political effects of Bhutto’s policies 172–173; visit to China (1971) 160 BIMST-EC 5 BJP see Bharatiya Janata Party Bolshevik revolution 75, 110, 112, 120 Border Peace and Tranquility Agreement (India and China) 222 Bozeman, B. 7 Brecher, Michael 119, 126

246

Index

Britain: character of British conquest and Indian conditions 88–90; effective use of religion in Indian subcontinent 85–86, 87–88; exit from India 75; role in build-up of US-Pakistan alignment 90; US to the rescue of 43, 87 Buchan, Alastair 20, 108 buffer zones 233 n.3; for India 3; Tibet as 137 bus diplomacy 216, 227 Bush, George H. 163 Bush, George H. W. 32, 210, 211, 221, 222, 224, 228, 232 Canada 207; nuclear aid to India 116, 118, 127; objection to recognition of India’s nuclear status 14, 15; pro-Nehru 113; reactions to Indian nuclear tests 189–190, 194 Canada Deuterium–Uranium (CANDU) 127 CANDU see Canada Deuterium–Uranium Caroe, Olaf 87, 92, 132 Carter, Jimmy 174, 177 Central Intelligence Agency see CIA Chaudhuri, Nirad 87 Chen Yi 165 China 107; and 1971 war 156, 160–162, 164, 165, 166; civil war 42, 75, 78; contempt for India 141–142, 164–165; current foreign policy 231; effect of 1998 Indian nuclear tests 14, 15, 194–195; fear of Soviet expanded influence in South Asia 166–167; India policy 133, 220–221, 222–223, 227; military and nuclear aid to Pakistan 56, 90, 93, 104, 141, 143, 173, 174, 187, 195, 230; Nehru’s policy towards 64, 67–68, 91, 133; Nepal policy 227–228; Pakistan relationship 95–96; policy options regarding Indian subcontinent 137–138, 142–143; relations with US during 1971 war 166; as rising power 210; role in Asia 225–226; shift in India’s policy towards 24–25, 28, 29–30, 113, 221; strategic interests in Pakistan 10, 33, 47, 93; and strategic triangles 47, 51, 54–55, 58–59; threat to India 4, 33, 38, 40, 64, 103–104, 143, 219–220; Tibet policy 221; US views of Chinese policy towards South Asia 166–168; see also Sino-India war (1962) Chinese (Han) nationalism 209

Chou-en-Lai 11, 12, 55, 61, 104, 108, 160, 161, 164–165, 166, 168, 172, 223 CIA (Central Intelligence Agency) (US) 22, 176, 177, 187, 218 civil war: China 42, 75, 78; Spanish 123 Clinton, Bill (William) 32, 55, 168, 177, 187, 192–193, 210–211, 214, 220, 228 closed states’ systems 44, 49 coercive diplomacy 37–38, 211; embracement by India 12; sidelined by Nehru and cohorts 21, 70; use by BJP-led coalition 72–73, 77, 79–80, 203; use by Mrs Gandhi 71–72; use by Shastri 70–71 Cold War 89, 123, 136, 139; Anglo-American policies towards India and Pakistan during 85, 91; and development of multi-cornered diplomacy 49, 90; and facilitation of Pakistani diplomatic and military strategy 92–93; and India 82; India as field of power politics 31; and Indo-Pakistani polarity 10–11; and third party involvement 124 Communist Party of India (Marxist) 40, 225 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 181–182, 185, 188, 193 conflict, system of 91–92 Congress party (India) 13, 17, 21, 23, 110, 121, 127, 131, 146, 148, 184, 197, 204, 205; anti-US orientation 67; domination of Indian domestic scene 106, 107, 108; foreign policy in pre-independent period 111; Israeli and Arab policy 67, 69, 214, 216 Congress party-led minority coalition 2, 39, 40, 206, 223, 224–225, 226–227 criminal globalization 7 Crossman, Richard 43, 87 CTBT see Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty cultural/ideological threats 101; of Pakistan 103; of US 105 Cultural Revolution (China) 156, 165 culture 148 Curzon, Lord 87, 109 decision-making 74, 200–201; during BJP-led coalition 35, 186–187, 201, 202; during Nehruvians’ era 34–35, 36, 200–201; indecisiveness and contradictory impulses of Nehru’s 119–120, 126; in Nehru’s period 18–19, 20, 21, 22, 107–108, 200, 204–205

Index 247 defence policy see diplomacy and military policy democracy: Indian 106, 107, 191; and Nehru 112; promotion in India’s neighbourhood 203 Deshmukh, B. G. 179 détente 52, 132, 139 diplomacy and military policy, Indian: development of synergy between the two 5–6; during Nehruvians’ era 23–24; history 17–20, 21; policy changes post-Nehru 148; policy of ambivalence 40; reasons for behavioural changes 9–13; tension between morality and power politics 24–26, 30–31, 99 diplomacy and military policy, Pakistani 20–21; role of Cold War in facilitating 92–93 divide and rule policy 85–86, 87–88, 89, 92, 146 Dixit, Mani 225 domestic politics, Indian: Nehru’s domination 19, 108, 112; under Nehru and Nehruvians 79, 89–90 dominant–subordinate relationships 43, 74, 84 drugs trade 3; Afghanistan 8, 229; Indian neighbourhood 102 economic development 8; Nehru’s adoption of Marxian globalism for 110 electoral and party politics: India 34–35 Engels, Frederich 88, 110 escapism 76–77, 78, 81, 113, 135, 140 Fairbairns, Geoffrey 88 Fernandes, George 220 Fisher, Cathleen 192, 194 foreign policy 74; character of problems 135–136, 227, 228; characters of players in the subcontinent 138–139, 142, 227, 228; patterns of 74–75; political effects of players in the subcontinent 143–144; role of political leaders 127 foreign policy, Indian 40–41; China and Tibet debate 27, 29, 221; development of buffers 3; dilemmas and debates 1964–98 98, 99–101; dilemmas and debates 62–63, 73, 81, 147; dilemmas and debates in late 1990s 211; effect of external crises 147–148, 150–154;

financial imperatives 99–100; global utopianism versus regional and global geopolitics and power politics 63–65; historical roots of problems 2; ideological versus pragmatic approaches 63; impact of declaring Indian nuclear weapon status on 5–6, 14; importance of Moscow connection 119, 127–128, 131; international debate 28, 29, 30; intra-governmental debate 26–28; new ties with non-traditional allies 5, 70, 80, 231–232; opening of strategic dialogues with traditional rivals 70; opening up of strategic dialogues with US 2–3, 32; post-1971 172; problems 2, 34, 38–39, 61, 95; prolonged and incremental development 77, 78; public debate 28, 29; repositioning of contemporary strategic activity 3–6; shift in policy 24, 28–29, 35, 38–39, 54, 60, 73, 77, 79–80; strategic behaviour and interests post-1998 1–3, 39; and strategic triangles 52–53; tilt towards US 202–203, 210, 221–222, 230; turning point, 1998 14–16 foreign policy, Pakistani: 1950s 63; abandonment of Kashmiri plebiscite demand 32–33; active promotion of suzerain state system 84–85, 90; in Bhutto period (1972–77) 169, 173; India policy 40, 173, 212; options regarding India 142, 143–144, 173; priorities 136; proxy war in Kashmir and Punjab 175, 176; and strategic triangles 21, 50, 52–53; and US 140–141; in Zia era 173–174 foreign policy tools/methods: 1971 war 71–72; Nehruvian era 70–71; typology 76–77 France 1, 15, 70, 207 Friedman, George 176 G-20 3 Gandhi, Indira 2, 9, 39, 40, 59, 69, 79, 178, 198, 204, 218; and 1971 war 25, 61, 98, 155; establishment of contacts with Israel 215; importance of prime minister’s household 18; nuclear policy 23, 202; nuclear test (1974) 6, 30, 65, 185, 200; power politics 35, 36, 172; priorities on assumption of power 149; willingness to use military force 13, 71–72

248

Index

Gandhi, M. K. 2, 23, 38, 86, 89, 122, 184, 193, 205 Gandhi, Rajiv 9, 39, 40, 174, 179; and disarmament 23; importance of prime minister’s household 18 Gandhi, Sonia 40, 63, 223, 225 geopolitics 232; 1971 war lesson for India in Asian geopolitics 11; convergence of Indian nationalism and 206–208; global utopianism versus regional and global geopolitics and power politics 63–65; post-1998 210–211 Gopal, S. 49, 108, 111, 122, 125 Gul, Hamid 217 Gupta, Sisir 94 Hindu fundamentalism 31 Hindu nationalism (Hinduvta) 206–208, 209; growth 207; see also Indian nationalism Holsti, K. J. 110 Huang Hua 160 India: aid 145; Anglo-American policies towards India during Cold War 85; Asian scene from perspective of 231–232; attraction to Soviet Union 141; break-up of British India 137; character of British conquest and Indian conditions 88–90; competitive coexistence 232; contempt of China 141–142, 164–165; cultural problems of 132–133; declaration of nuclear weapon status 5–6, 14; development of suzerain state system in 86; encouragement of insurgents’ participation in political process 4–5; field of power politics for external powers 17, 18, 31, 33–34, 36, 94; foreign invasions 84; ‘idea of India’ 109–110; impact of external forces on strategic situation in 97; importance and urgency of threats 102–103; independence 42, 75, 145–146; internal security pressures 36; international enmities faced since 1947 40; international standing 229; involvement of external forces in internal disputes 102; Pakistan’s nuclear threat 199; political situation post-Nehru period 23; rise as major power 197–199, 206; sources of threats to 103–105; typology of threats facing 101–102 ‘Indian Islam’ 7, 43, 129

Indian nationalism 17, 18, 26, 133; and 1962 war 24, 27, 82; and British Raj 89; convergence of geopolitics and 206–208; during Mrs Gandhi’s rule 149; impact of external pressures on 56–57; impact on leadership and bureaucracy 147; and Nehru 204, 205 India–United States–China triangle: emergence of 219–223 Indo-Pacific region 229 Indo-Pakistani polarity: China’s role 143; great powers’ role in 9–11, 25, 41, 46–47, 58, 85, 143; US’s interests in maintaining 139, 159 Indo-Pakistan war (1947–48) 53, 130, 131, 175–176 Indo-Pakistan war (1965) 12, 35, 53, 56, 60–61, 70–71, 97–98, 148–149, 155, 176, 186, 198, 200, 214 Indo-Pakistan war (1971) 12, 61, 71–72, 98, 103, 154–156; American bureaucratic politics 157–160; lesson for India in Asian geopolitics 11; lessons from 164–165; limits of Chinese diplomatic and military support for Pakistan 160–162; outcomes 156; political effects 165–166; thinking of players and alignments behind 156–157 insurgency in India 4–5; Chinese military aid 33; Pakistan sponsored 11, 174, 178; reduction in flow of insurgents 230 intelligence: Indo-Israeli 215 international policy disputes 102 Inter-Services Intelligence see ISI Iran 6–7, 47, 49, 50, 68, 70, 92, 105, 110, 159, 170, 172, 174, 188, 197, 201, 203, 205, 212, 214, 227, 229, 230 Iran–Pakistan–India pipeline linkup 227 Iraq 6, 7, 170, 188, 192, 203, 204, 226, 229 ISI (Inter-Services Intelligence) (Pakistan) 174, 176, 177, 218 Islamic militancy 4, 7, 8, 36, 57, 70, 210; and BJP-led coalition 209; in Indian subcontinent 129; promotion 47, 50, 93; promotion by Pakistan in India 155, 174, 218; promotion in Afghanistan 50; and Soviet Union 177; useful tool for US 51, 95; US involvement 177; US suspicions of 211 Israel 228; Indian policy during Nehruvian era 1, 2, 5, 67, 69, 197, 206; Indian policy under BJP-led coalition 201, 214–216, 207, 210;

Index 249 nuclear status 191, 192; trilateral relationship on surveillance and intelligence 217–218; US aid 188 Iyengar, P. K. 184 Japan 1, 17, 31, 68, 107, 168, 192, 193, 211, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224 Jawaharlal Nehru University 62 jihad see Islamic militancy Jinnah, M. A. 21, 25, 84, 88, 120 Johnson, Lyndon 21, 38 Kalam, A. 179 Kargil Review Committee 199 Kargil war (2000) 53, 56, 73, 102, 201 Kashmir issue 13, 217, 218; and Bhutto 173; core issue in Indo-Pakistan affairs 92; internationalization 21, 53, 98, 114; and Nehru 130–131, 138; Pakistani abandonment of Kashmiri plebiscite demand 32–33; Pakistani campaigns 175–176; Pakistan’s new strategy in 1989–90 175; reduction of insurgents in Kashmir 230; role of Mountbatten 91, 186; Shastri’s use of military power 96–97, 148–149; tension between morality and power politics 27 Kennedy, J. F. 21, 38, 57, 96 Khan, A. Q. 4, 56, 173, 178, 199, 217, 230, 243 n.4 Khan, Ayub 57, 120, 176 Khan, Sultan M. 163 Khan, Yahya 55, 166 Khilnani, Sunil 107, 108 Kipling, R. 129–130, 131 Kissinger, Henry 10, 11, 31, 55, 57, 61, 133, 139, 154, 156, 157, 160, 161, 164, 168, 171–172, 195, 210–211, 219, 220, 223 Korean War 67, 75, 79, 104, 122, 124–125, 139, 143, 212 Lattimore, Owen 2, 22, 37, 51, 87–88, 137, 145 ‘Look East policy’ 1, 5, 221 Macmillan, Harold 43, 87 Malik, Mohan 221 Mandela, Nelson 69, 181, 195 Mao Tse-tung 54, 80, 108, 137, 161, 165, 168, 171–172 marketplace 106 Marshall, George C. 95 Marxian globalism 110–111

Marx, Karl 88, 110 Menon, Krishna 21, 25, 27, 64, 66, 68, 81, 100, 107, 108, 110, 111, 122, 124, 125, 126, 133, 141, 147, 184 Meyer, Karl E. 43, 86–87 Middle East see Arab world military aid: cut off to both India and Pakistan 143, 149; to India 145; to Pakistan 56, 90, 93, 104, 141, 143, 173, 174 military exercises 221; Brasstacks 23, 178; Indo-American 32, 216 military, Indian: emergence as successful fighting force 35–36, 71–72, 155; emergence of importance of 61; incremental growth 198–199, 203; marginal role under Nehru and cohorts 21–22, 107, 126–127, 213; modernization 2, 9, 25, 58–59, 178, 198; modernization by Mrs Gandhi 23, 35; post-Nehru 150; under BJP-led coalition 217–218 military pacts 139; Pakistan–American (1954) 54, 117, 136 military policy see diplomacy and military policy military trade: Indo-Israeli 215 missile projects: India 179, 182, 221 Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) 65, 188, 190 Modi, Narendra 206 Mohamed, Ghulam 120 Mountbatten, Louis 68, 95, 115, 122; influence on Nehru 21, 22, 91, 93, 107, 114, 130, 131, 145, 186; role in shaping of India’s Kashmiri policy 27, 91, 186 MTCR see Missile Technology Control Regime Mueller, Max 110 Mughal imperialism 17, 45 Mughal India 75; and British India 86 Müller, Harold 190–191, 192, 194 Musharraf, Pervez 8, 174, 204, 216, 217, 218–219, 227 Muslim identity: promotion in Pakistan 47, 85 Muslims, Indian 207 Myanmar 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 33, 93, 102, 104, 138, 143, 201, 209, 210, 221, 227, 229, 231 nationalism 145; and Nehru 134, 146 national security 8 nation building: under Nehru 108

250

Index

NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 159, 189 naval policy: India’s current policies 5; neglect by Nehru 98–99 negotiations 76 Nehru, Jawaharlal: and anti-India trends 147; anti-US orientation 67, 141; breakaway from 12, 16, 206; cardinal principles 19; as cause for India’s foreign policy problems 2, 34, 38–39, 95, 98, 105–110, 126–127; China policy 64, 67–68, 91, 113, 133; compartmentalisation of defence and foreign policy 5, 19, 29; critique 19–20, 22, 26, 38, 62–63, 78, 80–83, 129, 132, 133, 198–199; decision-making 22, 34–35, 36, 107–108, 119–120, 126, 200, 204–205; defence policy 82; diplomatic and military policies 17–18; domination of planning machinery 19; escapism 77, 78, 80–81, 113, 135, 140; failure to check the development of US–Pakistan–Chinese coalition 2, 60; failure to identify most dangerous threat 100; foreign policy 3, 34, 42, 146–147; and great powers 11, 12, 16, 18, 39, 46, 52, 73, 77, 79, 93–94; ‘idea of India’ 109–110; ideological basis of foreign policy 69, 93, 133–134, 145, 204–206; influence of Mountbatten 21, 22, 91, 107, 114, 131, 186; influences on 107–108; innovation 115, 126–128; lack of qualities of good ruler 129–130; loss of international appeal 108–109; major aspects of foreign policy 111; Middle-Eastern policy 68–69; moral imperatives precedence over power politics 31, 99, 117, 140; and Moscow connection 110, 111, 115–116, 117–119, 120–121, 123, 127–128; nation building 108; neglect of naval power 98–99; nuclear policy 14, 19, 25, 65, 82, 115, 116, 119–120, 180, 182, 183–184, 185, 213; overlooking Southeast Asian region 1, 112; overplay of international aspects 211–212; Pakistan policy 114; and Patel 27, 100, 108, 186; policy of neglect of Myanmar 3, 5; proliferation of typologies of threats 100–101; pro-Western ideas 89, 113; record of limited success and major failures 105–106, 113–114, 131; reinforcement of subordinate

relations 43; rejection of Nehru’s policy on China 24; response to external enmities 40; state system under 106–107; and strategic triangles 42, 47, 53; towards India’s neighbourhood 4, 67–68; utopianism 42, 63, 64, 108 Nehruvians 13; acceptance of American–Pakistani–Chinese coalition 13; ambivalence between power politics and morality 35, 69, 78; and China policy 133; coercive diplomacy 70–72, 79; critique 78; dilemmas in foreign policy 98; economic policies 59; Israeli policy 215; proliferation of typologies of threats 100–101 Nepal 3, 4, 99, 174, 203, 212, 221, 227–228, 229, 231 Nixon, Richard 10, 11, 12, 31, 55, 57, 61, 133, 139, 154, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 164, 166, 168, 210–211, 219, 220, 223 non-alignment movement 2, 11, 18, 19, 26, 31, 34, 35, 42, 58, 59, 75, 93, 99, 104,108, 109, 117, 125, 132, 133, 134, 146, 204, 205, 214, 224 NORAD see North American Air Defence North American Air Defence (NORAD) 189 North Atlantic Treaty Organization see NATO North Korea 4, 7, 8, 13, 36, 56, 59, 123, 124, 165, 174, 175, 178, 192, 195, 212, 217, 219, 230 NPT see nuclear non-proliferation treaty nuclear accidents 192 nuclear disarmament 6, 10, 13, 15, 19, 25–26, 33, 55, 65, 66, 133, 181, 185, 194 nuclear non-proliferation regimes 2, 24, 25, 30, 65, 72, 154, 180, 182; limitations of 188 nuclear non-proliferation treaty (NPT) 10, 28, 104, 174, 180, 188, 191, 193, 194 nuclear policy, American: critique of double standards 192–193 nuclear policy, Indian 14–15; ambivalence versus commitment 65–67, 184; between 1960–98 178–179, 180–181, 185–186; BJP-led coalition’s 181–182, 186, 202, 213–214, 219; character and consequences 118; debate between morality and power politics 25–26, 30; foundation 82, 115; intra-governmental debate on building nuclear bomb 27; lack of policy change during

Index 251 1960–74 29–30; Mrs Gandhi’s 23, 185; Nehru’s 14, 19, 25, 65, 116, 119–120, 180, 182, 183–184, 185, 213; proactivity 92; public debate 28 nuclear policy, Pakistani 175, 213; Bhutto’s 163, 172, 173 nuclear proliferation 8, 187, 188 nuclear supply chain 4, 174, 175 nuclear tests, Chinese: 1964 25, 97 nuclear tests, Indian: 1974 6, 9, 14, 23, 30, 116, 200; 1998 3, 6, 32, 65, 70, 72, 116, 180, 182–183, 187; Canadian reactions 189–190, 194; effect of 1998 tests at global level 14–15, 186–187; effect of 1998 tests within India 183–184; lead time for 185; Müller’s views 190; political effects of 1998 tests 194–196, 213; significance of 1998 tests 183, 186; US reactions 192; Western reactions 188–189, 193–194 nuclear tests, Pakistani 194–195; US reactions 192; Western reactions 188–189, 191, 193–194 open states’ systems 44, 49 P-5 (nuclear) states 187, 188, 189, 191, 194 Pakistan: advantages in nuclear weapons capability 175; Anglo-American policies during Cold War 85, 91; attitudes 130; BJP-led coalition’s policy towards 216–219; division between East and West Pakistanis 157; effect of 1998 Indian nuclear tests 194–195; India’s policy towards 230; India’s twotracked policy towards 25; jihad policy 155; limits of Chinese military and diplomatic support during 1971 war 160–162; military and nuclear aid 56, 90, 93, 104, 141, 173, 174, 187, 195, 230; political effects of Bhutto’s policies 172–173; pressures from US and India 219; promotion of Muslim identity by US 47; quest for parity with India 84; as rising power 210; strategic interests of great powers in 9–10, 47, 93, 132, 140–141; threat to India 103, 105, 199; US support 169–171 Pakistan–American military pact (1954) 54, 136, 139; Nehru’s opposition to 117 Palestine 67, 69, 134, 214, 215, 224, 226 Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) 215

Pandit, Vijayalakshmi 123 Panikkar, K. M. 64, 98, 107, 108, 133, 141, 146 Pant, G. B. 108 Patel, Sardar V. B. 20, 27, 64, 81, 100, 108, 111, 113, 131, 133, 141, 186 peace diplomacy: 1971 Indian resumption of 36; advocacy by Menon 25; of Nehru 23, 53, 60, 81, 108, 114, 204, 205; rejection of 58 philosophy, Indian: Mao/Kissinger views 171 planning: during Nehru era 19 PLO see Palestinian Liberation Organization Pokhran tests see nuclear tests, Indian policy development, Indian 116–117 ‘political Hinduism’ 17, 22, 39, 47, 81, 82, 86, 131 Powell, Colin 218, 228 power asymmetries 14, 15, 54, 74–75, 80, 84–85; and change in pattern of relationships 121; and suzerain type of relations 78 power politics 3; BJP-led coalition’s 32–34; diffusion of power 7–8; India’s adoption of 12–13, 35; and morality in India’s external policies 24; Nehru’s rejection of 117; tension between morality and 24–26, 30–31, 99 Prasad, Rajendra 108 public opinion, Indian: and Chinese attack 29, 82; effect of external pressures 26, 29, 30, 149–150, 151; and nuclear issue 25, 28, 30 Al Qaeda 6, 8, 60, 176, 177, 178, 202, 229 Radhakrishnan, S. 108, 126, 130, 141; and Kashmir issue 125; lobby for Chinese admission into UN 133; role in creating Delhi-Moscow link 122, 123–125, 131 Rao, Narasimha 13, 215, 221 Rashtria Svayam Sevak Sang (RSS) 206, 225 Raskin, Marcus 191, 192–193, 194 Reagan, Ronald 174, 177 regional powers: proliferation 7 Reid, Escott 20, 108 religion: as basis of Pakistani homeland 67; effective use by Britain 85–86, 87–88; West’s grasp of significance of 129

252

Index

revolutionary changes 75; by coercive means 230–231; India 80 Rice, Condolezza 228 SAARC see South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation Sarabhai, Dr 185 Saudi Arabia 7, 10, 13, 21, 47, 50, 51, 93, 101, 174, 177, 178, 203, 212, 229 secularism 17, 30–31, 90, 106, 109, 112, 146, 204, 205 September 2001 (9/11) attack 6, 7, 13, 15, 32, 178, 202, 218 Shanghai communiqué 54, 168–169, 211 Sharif, Nawaz 216, 219 Sharon, Ariel 215, 216 Shastri, L. B. 2, 12, 25, 35, 60, 69, 70–71, 97, 148–149, 153, 154, 155, 176, 185, 186, 198, 200 Shiv Sena 206 Simla Agreement (1972) 217 Singh, Jaswant 189, 217 Singh, Kulwant 186 Singh, Manmohan 40, 63, 224, 226–227, 232 Singh, Natwar 214, 224 Singh, V. P. 13 Sino-India war (1962) 24–25, 27, 29–30, 38, 56, 57, 100, 104, 133, 135, 143, 147, 150 social threats 102 South Africa 69 South Asian Association of Regional Cooperation (SAARC) 4, 5, 201, 211 Soviet Union: attraction to India 141; change in international position and power 58, 59; détente with US 52, 132; entry into Afghanistan 60, 93; foreign policy under Stalin 122–123; importance of Moscow help to India 119, 127–128, 131; Indian mobilization of Moscow’s help 115–116, 117–119, 120–121; and Islamic militancy 177; mediation in Kashmir issue 98, 149; priorities in Indian subcontinent 136; Radhakrishnan’s role in Delhi–Moscow link 122–125; revolutionary changes 75; state systems 44; support to India during Cold War 34, 45–46, 49, 56, 58–59, 68, 82 space programme, Indian 179 Spear, Percival 17, 43, 44–45, 86, 132, 133, 147

Stalin, Josef 43, 54, 115, 120, 122–123, 124, 126, 128 states’ system 44 state, the 106; character of Nehruvian state in India 107–108 Stokes, Eric 119, 126 Strachey, John 109 strategic triangles 21, 40, 57; attitude of India and Pakistan to 51–53; characteristics 46–51; common interests and obligations 46; debates and duels 53–56, 61; emergence 45; Muslim–British versus Hinduism triangle (pre-1947) 46, 49, 53, 84, 85–86; and Nehru 42, 49; significance 42–43 Sun Tzu 51, 62, 172, 182, 200, 221 suzerain states’ system 43, 47–48, 50, 54, 74–75; active promotion by Pakistan 84–85, 90; Anglo-American policies to develop 85–86; development of suzerain state system in 86; Nehru’s and Nehruvians’s role 76, 78, 81, 84, 91, 140; reasons for failure in India 82, 83; under British Raj 75–76; under Mughals 75 systemic threats 101; China 103–104; of US 105 Talbot, Strobe 189 Taliban 8, 13, 51, 53, 60, 103, 155, 176, 177, 178, 202, 204, 230 territorial and resource disputes 102, 209; China and India 104; Kashmir 130 Tibet 27, 29, 221 Turkey 7, 159, 170, 172, 174, 212, 214 two-nations theory 19, 20, 37 United Kingdom see Britain United Nations (UN) 15, 21, 90, 98, 109, 114, 126, 130, 149 United States (US): and 1971 war 156, 157–160, 162; check on Indian nuclear development 2; critique of US double standards in nuclear policy 192–193; détente relationship with Soviet Union 52, 132; distorted and biased image of India 94; embracement of suzerain state system 44; failure in Indian subcontinent 139–140; fear of Soviet expanded influence in South Asia 166, 167, 168; inability of unilateral action 7–8; initial opposition to Sino-Pakistani relations 96; limitations of military

Index 253 power and diplomatic influence 6, 138–139, 143; military aid to Pakistan 10, 104; Müller’s criticism of US opportunistic policy 190, 194; policy towards Asia 31, 40–41; policy towards Pakistan 90, 95, 169–171; pressures on Pakistan 219; priorities in Indian subcontinent 136; promotion of jihad in Afghanistan 50, 177; relations with China during 1971 war 166; as source of threat to India 104–105; strategic interests in Indian subcontinent 54, 132; strategic interests in Pakistan 47, 140–141; to the rescue of Britain 43, 87; tilt towards India 202–203, 211, 228, 230; tolerance of Pakistani nuclear proliferation 174, 176, 187; tolerance of Pakistani terrorist activities 176; views on Chinese policy towards South Asia 166–168 United States–Pakistan–China coalition 11–13, 154; common interests 94–95; development 45, 52, 90, 93, 96; development of policies to pressurize India 36, 39, 59–60, 152; duels and debates 56; during Nehruvians’ era 78, 79; failure to dominate India 56, 61; and India’s adoption of coercive diplomacy 79–80; lack of effective Indian strategy to unbalance 36;

and Mrs Gandhi’s 23; Nehru’s failure to check 2, 60; and Nehru’s foreign policy 77–78, 79, 93–94 United States–Pakistan–China–North Korea–Saudi Arabia coalition 178; India’s response to 178–179 United States–Soviet Union–China coalition 58, 63 Vajpayee, A. B. 204, 206, 209, 210, 224; Indo-Pakistani 2003 peace initiative 32; ‘Look East’ policy of 5, 221; nuclear policy 182, 183, 186, 201, 202; Pakistan policy 216–219 Vietnam 4, 7, 50, 60, 68, 75, 139, 159, 192, 231 war, policy of 36, 76; adoption by Shastri 96–97, 148–149, 200; Indian embracement of 3, 12, 71–72, 79–80 Wight, Martin 43, 44, 45, 46, 49, 52, 54, 197 Wolfowitz, Paul 222 World Trade Organisation (WTO) 3 World War II 31, 43, 46, 54, 74, 91, 108, 122, 140 Zangger Committee (1970) 188 Zia-ul-Haq 163, 173–174, 176, 179, 217 Zimmer, H. 42

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