Hegel: Lectures on the Philosophy of World History, Volume I: Manuscripts of the Introduction and the Lectures of 1822-1823 (Hegel Lectures: Lectures on the History of Philosophy)

LECTURES

on the PHILOSOPHY o f

W O R L D HISTORY

Volume 1 : Manuscripts of the Introduction and The Lectures of 1822-3

G E O R G W I L H E L M FR1EDRICH HEGEl.

L E C T U R E S O NT H E PHILOSOPHY O F W O R L D HISTORY VOLUME 1

MANUSCRIPTS O F T H E I N T R O D U C T I O N AND T H E L E C T U R E S O F 1822-3

Edited and Translated by

Robert F. Brown and Peter C . Hodgson

w i t h the assistance o t

William G . Geuss

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PREFACE W i t h this book an entirely new vCrs.on of Kegel s Lectures on the P h ^ phy of World History is made available t o the English-reading public. Earlier editions, in both German a n d English, amalgamated various manuscript and lecture sources i n t o an editorially constructed text that obscured Hegel s distinctive presentation i n each of the five series o f lectures he < W . « ™ d ° " this topic. T h e present edition, based on German critical editions, publishes Hegel's surviving manuscripts of his Introduct.on t o the lectures a n d t h e n presents the full transcription of the first series o f ' ^ f ' f ^ r h ^ of L o n d , later volume w i l l publish the trar.script.on of the last series t h a t of 1 8 3 0 - 1 together w i t h selections from intervening years. The E d i t o n a l i n t r o d u c t i o n surveys the history of the texts and provides an analytic sumL y of t h e m , enabling the structure of Hegel's presentation t o s u n d ou, d e a r l y a n d editorial footnotes introduce readers t o Hegel's many sources f u s i o n s . The volume o m ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ T ^ ^ Z 2 first rime an e d i t i o n is made available that permits cntical scholarly study. Presented in this way, the Weltgescbrchte becomes more accessible

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PREFACE

The editors, Robert F. Brown and Peter C. Hodgson, are deeply indebted

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CONTENTS

Editorial Introduction The Lectures on the Philosophy of World History Manuscripts o l the Introduction

1 1 2

The Transcriptions of the Lectures

5

Previous Editions and This Kdition

6

Analytic Summary of the Texts Manuscript: Introductory fragment, 1822, 1828 Manuscript: I n t r o d u c t i o n , 1830-1 Transcription of the Lectures of 1822-3 Introduction: The Concept of World History The Course of W o r l d History

1 1 1 1 12 20 20 31

The Oriental World

31

T h e Greek W o r l d The Roman W o r l d The Germanic W o r l d

43 SO 55

M A N U S C R I P T S OF T H E

INTRODUCTION

Introductory Fragment, 1822, 1828

67

Introduction, 1830-1 A. T h e General Concept of World History H. Mr- Actualization of Spirit in History a. T h e General Definition of Spirit as Intrinsically Free

78 79 86 87

b. The Means of Spirit's Actualization: Passions, Interests, Ideals C T h e Material of Spirit's Actualization: the State d. T h e t ionstitution C. The Course of W o r l d History

89 100 104 107

CONTENTS

CONTENTS

a. The Principle of Development h. The Stages of Development c. The Beginning of W o r l d History d . The Course of Development of World History Loose Sheets Also Spectacles of Endless Complexities C. Course [of W o r l d History]

107 110

Religion

251

11 ! 118 127 128

T H E L E C T U R E S O F 1822-3 I N T R O D U C T I O N : T H E CONCEPT OF W O R L D HISTORY

243 243

A r t

133

251 The Principle of India The Region of India The Castes Civil Legislation The Religious Sphere The State and its History Astronomy and A r t

^ _ „ ^ ^

The Types of Treatment o f History

133

India in the Framework of W o r l d History

Original History Reflective History Philosophical W o r l d History

133 136 140

Buddhism and Lamaism

The Idea of H u m a n Freedom The Fabric of W o r l d History The Concept of Spirit

146 146 147

The Principle of the Persian Empire

The Beginning of History The Progress of History The End of History

152 155 166

The Religion of l ight

169 177

The Medes and the Chaldeans

177 I SI

The Founding of the Persian Empire by Cyrus

^

Features of the Persian Empire

^

Human Passions and the Divine Idea The Nature of the State The State and the Actualization of Freedom The Constitution of the State The State and Religion, A r t , Science, and Culture The State and Geography The Division of World History

184 191 205

T H E COURSE OF W O R L D HISTORY

211

The O r i e n t a l W o r l d

211

China

2]]

The Historical Records of China

211

TheShu-Jing

2js

The M a i n Elements i n Chinese History

21**

Characteristics of the Chinese State

p_> ;

The M o r a l Sphere, Subjective Freedom, and their Violation

232

Ethical Customs

2^7

Fhe Sciences

2î„ viii

^ 304 ^

Persia The Geography of Ancient Persia

^

The Zend People, Language, and Books

^

Assyria and Babylonia Sources for Persia and the Persian Empire

Phoenicia

^

3^1

The Religion of Astarte and Adonis T he lewish Religion

^ 334

Hgypt The 1 and of Enigmatic Marvels Egyptian History Features or the Land and Life of Egypt Religion and the Cycle of Nature Animal Worship H o w the Egyptians Envisaged Spirit Art and Architecture The Dead and I m m o r t a l i t y Private or Particular Purpose Transition to Greece

ix

i

3

4

^ 339 ^ ^ »55 357 ^9 . ^ ? f j

CONTENTS

CONTENTS

The Greek W o r l d

371

The Periods of Greek H i s t o r y

372

The Origins of The Greek F o l k Spirit

373

W h o Are the Greeks?

373

The First Social and Political Organization

377

Greek Culture and A r t

382

Greek Religion

387

The Constitution of Greece

399

The M a t u r i t y of The Greek Spirit

404

The Persian Wars

405

Athens versus Sparta

407

Decline A n d Fall

413

The Peloponnesian W a t

414

The Emergence o i T h o u g h t

415

The End of Greek L i f e and the Age of Alexander the Great

420

The Roman W o r l d

426

T h e Roman Spirit Introduction

426 426

The Origins o f Rome Marriage and the Social Order

427 428

Roman Religion, Utility, and the Aristocracy T h e Periods of R o m a n H i s t o r y T h e Formation o f Roman Power

433 436 437

Early Kings, Patricians, a n d Plebeians Expansion and Conquest T h e W o r l d - D o m i n i o n of Rome

437 441 442

Rome's Place on the W o r l d Stage The Emperors: One W i l l Dominates A l l The A r r i v a l of Christianity

442 445 447

The T r u t h of the Idea The Appearance of the Idea Consequences of Christianity for Life and the State The D o w n f a l l of Rome The Germanic W o r l d Introduction

The T r i u m p h of Particularity The Abstract U n i t y of Islam and its Challenge t o Europe The M i d d l e Ages The Empire of Charlemagne Medieval Christianity Political Developments: Relations between Church and State The Quest f o r the Presence of Christ i n the Church The Crusades T h e T u r n t o the External W o r l d and N a t u r e The Transition To M o d e r n i t y . _ Art The C o r r u p t i o n of the Church The R e f o r m a t i o n The Constellations of Europe after the Reformation

4

7

3

474

4

7

482 488 ^ 494 *00 50U ~ 50/

The T u r n t o Concrete A c t u a l i t y : The Enlightenment

517

Conclusion 523 GLOSSARY BIBLIOGRAPHY NAME INDEX SUBJECT INDEX

461 461 464

9

514

457 460

The Beginning of Europe: Three Groups of Nations

9

6

The F o r m a l Universality of Thought: The N a t u r a l Sciences

447

461

^

4

4

The H i s t o r y o f M o d e r n i t y T h e W o r l d l y Existence of the M o d e m C h u r c h : Wars of Religion 509

450

The Idea and Historical Particularity The Periods of The History of The Germanic W o r l d

The Preparation o f T h e Early M i d d l e Ages C o m m o n a l i t y and Individuality

467

xi

EDITORIAL

INTRODUCTION T H E LECTURES O N T H E PHILOSOPHY OF W O R L D HISTORY Hegel lectured o n the philosophy o f w o r l d history for the first time i n the winter semester o f 1 8 2 2 - 3 i n B e r l i n . The lectures were repeated o n four occasions, i n 1 8 2 4 - 5 , 1 8 2 6 - 7 , 1 8 2 8 - 9 , and 1 8 3 0 - 1 . W o r l d history was the last discipline o f Hegel's system t o become the topic of lectures, w i t h the exception of those o n the proofs o f the existence of G o d , but thereafter they bad a secure place i n the two-year cycle of his lectures. These were also a m o n g the most popular of his lectures, for they served as an introduction to his thought and addressed other parts of his system as w e l l , such as the philosophy of right, the philosophy of spirit, the philosophy o f a r t , and the philosophy o f religion. Prior t o 1822-3, Hegel treated w o r l d history i n the context o f his lectures o n the philosophy of right, where i t comprised the t h i r d and final section o f his discussion of the state. These lectures were published as a textbook in 1 8 2 0 - l , a n d thereafter Hegel developed philoso p h y of w o r l d history i n t o a f u l l topic i n its o w n right. Hegel's other major historical w o r k , his lectures o n the history of philosophy, also attained their final f o r m d u r i n g the Berlin p e r i o d . 1

2

3

1. information for this first section is derived from the 'Edkoriscber rterkhr" in Georg Wifhelm F r i r ^ c h Hegd, V o r ^ w s s m a ^ xviii (Hamburg: Felix Meiner VerJag, 1995), 377-87; and from the 'Vorbemeriung* and 'Anhang* in Voriesungen Uber die Pbilosopbie der Wettgeschichte (Berlin 1822/1823), ed. Karl Heinz Iking, Karl Brcfimer, and Hoo Nam Seelmaan, VorUsungen: AusgewUhke Nachschriften ttnd Mamtskripu, n i (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag, 1996), pp. vu-x, 527-36. Our transJadoos are from these two edns. 2. Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W. Wood, tt H . B. Nisbet (Cambridge; Cambridge University Press, 1992); see §{ 341-60 on world history. 3. Lectures on the History of Philosophy, 1825-6, 3 vols., ed. Robert F. Brown, fx R. F. Brown and J. M . Stewart (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2006, 2009; a 1st edn. of vol. iii was published by t i e University of California Press in 1990). Hegel first lectured on the fuawry of 1

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

Auditors' transcriptions (Nacbschriften) exist f o r all of Hegel's lectures on w o r l d history, b u t his o w n manuscripts survive for only a fragment o f the Introduction, used i n 1822 and 1828, and for most o f the I n t r o d u c t i o n i n 1 8 3 0 - 1 . The present edition, as explained more fully below, translates the manuscript materials and the transcription of the first lectures ( 1 8 2 2 - 3 ) i n this first volume, w h i l e a second volume w i l l contain the transcription of the last lectures (1830-1) and selections from intervening years.

The Manuscript of 1 8 3 0 - 1 T h i s manuscript has been i n the Hegel Collection o f the Staatsbibliothek since the end o f the nineteenth century. It contains the date of the beginning o f the lectures, 8 November 1830. The manuscript is very carefully prepared a n d evidences a great deal of editing and revision, so that i t almost has the quality of a fair copy. I n terms o f both diction and care of composition it was apparently intended t o serve as the preliminary stage of a publication, even though reports are lacking o f a plan f o r publication such as exist for the proofs o f the existence o f G o d . Despite its highly edited condition, the manuscript is n o t complete. A comparison of the manuscript w i t h transcriptions of the lectures o f 1 8 3 0 - 1 shows that at several significant places (marked as such i n o u r translation), Hegel presented shorter or longer passages in the lectures that drew on earlier preparatory materials and for w h i c h today there is no extant manuscript. A t other places the manuscript has passages t h a t are n o t used for the lectures at a l l , and passages that differ f r o m parallels i n the lectures. T o w a r d the end o f the Introduction there is a diminishing agreement between the manuscript and the transcriptions, u n t i l i n the last section (on 'the course of w o r l d history') they diverge completely. Hegel's announced topic for the winter semester o f 1 8 3 0 - 1 was not, as i t h a d been previously, Philosophiam historiae universalis, but Pbilosophiae histortae universalis partem priorem. Thus he intended t o lecture on only the first part o f the philosophy o f w o r l d hisrory, and by this he i n all likelihood meant the I n t r o d u c t i o n that preceded the historical presentation. Hegel apparently intended t o reverse the tendency o f the more recent lectures, w h i c h his son K a r l Hegel described as reducing the philosophical and abstract aspects, expanding the historical material, and popularizing the w h o l e . However, Hegel i n fact d i d not f o l l o w through w i t h this plan and again lectured o n the whole o f the Weltgeschichte. We can only assume that he d i d not proceed as quickly as expected w i t h the revision of the Introducr i o n , and thus i t was n o t possible f o r him t o devote the entire course t o introductory and conceptual matters. Hegel's Berlin rectorate fell during the s

MANUSCRIPTS

OF THE

INTRODUCTION

4

The Manuscript o f 1822, 1828 This manuscript consists of three sheets; the first sheet is i n the Hegel Collection of the Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz i n Berlin; the second t w o sheets are i n the Deutsches Literarurarchiv of the SchillerNationalmuseum in Marbach. The t w o sets of sheets are clearly connected and f o r m a unitary w h o l e , even though, through uncertain circumstances, they were separated and found their way t o different locations. A t the t o p of the first sheet Hegel wrote the date of the beginning o f his lectures in 1828,30 October 1828; and, adjacent t o this notation, the date o f the beginning of the lectures i n 1822, 31 October 1822. The t w o dates m i g h t suggest that Hegel wrote this manuscript for the earlier lectures and then at a later time revised it. But the order in w h i c h he wrote the dates, as well as differences i n the quality and color of the i n k , indicate that the extant sheets come f r o m the later lectures. T h e earlier date was most likely copied f r o m an earlier (and n o w lost) notebook, which served as a prototype f o r the preparation of the notes for 1828-9. Nonetheless, the manuscript agrees i n content with the beginning o f the lectures of 1822-3, except f o r marginal additions. It covers only the first t w o o f three rypes o f historiography, original and reflective history, before breaking off. In the I n t r o d u c t i o n t o the lectures other than those of 1822-3 and 1828-9, the varieties o f historiography are not d,scussed such, and the I n t r o d u c t i o n begins w i t h the philosophical concept of w o r l d history. a

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5. On possible motives for a publicaaon, see the Manuscript of 1830-1, n. 72. 6. For a detailed comparison of the manuscript with Karl Hegel's transcription ot the lectures see Walter Jaeschke, 'Das Geschnebene und das Gesprochene; Wilhelm und Kan Hegel über den Begriff der Philosophic der Weltgeschichte\ Hegel-Studien, 44 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag. 2009), 13-44. Jaeschke believes it is possible that the main source for the actual lectures was not the extant manuscript bul other now-lost materials. 7 See Karl Hegel's Preface to the 2nd German edn. of 1840, tr. John Sibree in 185 / as The Philosophy of History, with a new introduction by C. j . Friedrich (New York: Dover Publica¬ tions, 1956), pp. x i - x i i .

3

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

preceding year (1829-30), and his numerous publication plans—a new edition o f the Science of Logic, a revision of the Phenomenology of Spirit, a w o r k on the Proofs of the Existence of God— made it impossible to undertake a thorough revision o f the beginning of the philosophy of w o r l d history lectures. The w r i t i n g of the manuscript probably occurred o n l y i n the weeks immediately preceding the beginning of the w i n t e r semester, that is, i n October 1830; and, in place of the expansion of the I n t r o d u c t i o n t h a t Hegel intended, his version i n 1830-1 is shorter than that of 1822-3. Loose Sheets T w o sets of loose sheets relate to the philosophy of w o r l d history. The first of these, contained i n the Berlin Staatsbibliothek, beginning w i t h the words 'Also Spectacles of Endless Complexities', is written o n the back o f a single quarto sheet, w h i c h o n the front has a notice by Eduard Gans on the current state of the July Revolution in France, dated 5 August 1830. This fragment relates t o Hegel's preparation of his manuscript of the Introduction t o w o r l d history. I t represents a preliminary stage of the middle section o f the manuscript, in which Hegel discusses the means by w h i c h freedom is actualized in the w o r l d . Its themes are recognizable in corresponding passages of the manuscript. The m o t i f of struggle and of the mutual destruction of particular passions is, to be sure, not f o u n d in the existing manuscript. B u t compar ison w i t h the transcriptions of the lectures of 1830-1 shows that Hegel treated these themes, including his famous reference to the 'cunning o f reason', immediately following the discussion of world-historical individuals, notably Caesar. In o u r edition this occurs at the transition f r o m page 165 t o 166 of the German t e x t . Since the fragment is one o f several preliminary pieces t o the manuscript, i t is probable that Hegel w r o t e i t at the beginning of h«s preparation tor the lectures of 1 8 3 0 - 1 , namely i n September 1831). 8

• r° ^ ^ ' ° y ] ' ' ^ o w n e d by he Bibhoteca Naz,onale Centrale, Florence. I t is w r i t t e n on the back of a T

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THE

TRANSCRIPTIONS

LECTURES

The Lectures o f 1822-3 T w o excellent transcriptions exist of this first course of lectures: those prepared by K a r l Gustav Julius v o n Griesheim (located in the Berlin Staatsbibliothek) and by H e i n r i c h Gustav H o t h o (owned by the Bibliothèque de Sorbonne, Paris, the Victor Cousin Collection). Griesheim provides a caref u l , complete, and reliable fair copy of Hegel's lectures, while Hotho's transcription was w r i t t e n d o w n during the course of the lectures w i t h many abbreviations and some obscurities. According to the German editors o f the edition we have translated," H o t h o is better at providing the language a n d philosophical conceptuality of Hegel w i t h o u t interjecting his own point o f view, w h i l e Griesheim has fewer details and more summaries that reflect his o w n view. However, an astonishing amount of nearly verbatim agreement exists between Griesheim and H o t h o . H o t h o serves as the guiding text ( Leittext) for o u r edition, but the extensive agreement w i t h Griesheim makes i t possible to employ b o t h sources in the construcrion of a continuous, •integral' text, w h i c h approximates as closely as possible to what Hegel actually said. Where necessary, reference can be made to a t h i r d transcript i o n , that o f Friedrich Cart H e r m a n n Victor v o n Kehler (Staatsbibliothek), w h i c h is not complete and comprises only twenty-three quarto pages; Kehler also transcribed the 1824-5 lectures. In his first lectures o n the philosophy of w o r l d history, Hegel devoted considerable attention not only to the Introduction but also to the Oriental W o r l d (China, India, Persia, Egypt), w h i c h comprises nearly half the volume f o l l o w i n g the I n t r o d u c t i o n . He shared the g r o w i n g interest in Asia of the 1820s and studied much o f the available literature, acquiring a knowledge that he utilized also for lectures on the philosophies of art and religion and on the history o f philosophy. Toward the end of his lectures he ran out of time and as a consequence his treatment of the Germanic w o r l d was c o m pressed. This imbalance was redressed i n later lectures. From these lectures we learn that Hegel's treatment of geography (at least in 1822-3) is systematically anchored i n his discussion of the state as one o f its essential features, rather than the topic being treated separately or relegated to an appendix, as i n earlier editions. The state as the bearer of history has not only a spiritual-cultural aspect but also a natural aspect, and in this

9. VorUMgen »ber * !• See below, Manuscnpt of the Ititroducuon, 1830-1, n. 44.

OF THE

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the methods of the German editors, see pp. 532-6.

(see n. 1), 527-8,531. F o r d e d on

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

way ir is the unity o f spirit and nature. Historical events are objectifications of spirit in interaction with nature, yielding the history o f the consciousness of freedom. The latter, as we shall explain below, also constitutes a theodicy, for the progress o f freedom is the work o f God i n history.

by introducing materials f r o m earlier lecrures.

11

John Sibree translated Karl

Hegel's edition into English in 18S7. and it remained the only English source for over a hundred years. In 1917 Georg Lasson published a 4-volume edition of the Weltgeschicbte. The first volume of his edition, containing the Introduction (under the title Die Vernunft in der Geschicbte) was revised by Johannes Hoffmeister i n 1955, and the latter was translated by H . B. Nisbet in 1975. As the German editors o f the new edition point o u t , all these earlier editions obscure the conception o f the individual lectures and mask the changes Hegel introduced. They had the principal goal of producing an editorially constructed unitary text, o f m a k i n g 'a book out of lectures', rather t h a n of p r o v i d i n g a critical source f o r study of the Weltgeschtchte. u

The Lectures o f 1830-1 Hegel's last lectures on the philosophy of w o r l d history were completed onlv a few months before his death i n November 1831. A transcription by the philosopher's son, Karl Hegel, is i n the possession of the Hegel Archiv (Ruhr-Universität, Bochum), and it will serve as the basis for o u r second English volume when the transcription is published i n the Gesammelte Werke a tew years f r o m now, along w i t h selected materials f r o m intervening years. As we have indicated, these lectures provide a more balanced treatment of the tour ma,or "worlds' or 'realms' comprising w o r l d history (Oriental, Greek, Roman, and Germanic!. We could have elected t o hold our translation o f Hegel's manuscript of the Introduction t o the lectures o f 1830-1 for this second v o l u m e , where i t would appear along w i t h the transcription of these lectures. However, there are good reasons for presenting all the manuscript materials together in a single volume, as is the case w i t h the German critical edition {Gesammelte Werke vol. xvi,„. And the uncertainties involved in the delay led us t o proceed w i t h its publication now.

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According to his notes o n the composition of the text, Lasson published i n his first volume Hegel's 1830 manuscript of the Introduction. He interwove passages f r o m the manuscript w i t h parallel texts from the transcr.pt.ons, distinguishing the manuscript by larger type. For the transcriptions he used Griesheim as the source for the lectures of 1822-3, Kehler for the lectures ot 1824-5, and Stieve for 1 8 2 6 - 7 . Apparently unaware of K a r l Hegel's trans e c t i o n o f the lectures of 1 8 3 0 - 1 , he assumed that Hegel lectured only on 'Part One' in the final year. Where the lecture transcriptions available t o Lasson paralleled the printed text o f the second edition of the Werke, Lasson corrected the printed text i n light o f the transcriptions; but he found numerous sections i n the printed text for which no parallels existed in his transcriptions, and these he reproduced exactly as they appeared i n the published version. Thus Lasson's e d i t i o n , apart f r o m the manuscript, was an amalgam of diverse materials w i t h no identification o f sources and no distinction between lecture series. l

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I''" ^ t>™^"y ° " transcr.pt.ons of v those o f 1 8 i n _ i k , u i . , lecture manuscr.pt of 1 8 3 0 ^ 1 ^ t h A T "Vt annearedin lS4n A- A C \ , . ' < - Werke appeared m 1840, ed.ted by K a r l Hegel, who added t o w h a t Cans had done 0

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11 See Karl Hegel's Preface, The Philosophy of History, tr. Sibree, pp. x.-x.. ^ubdaumsoMf l e . l i m He pra,sed the lectures o. 1822-3 as he.ngtbe richest in ph.losoph«! concept, a i m . and he drew the Griesheun and 1 lo.ho t r a n s i t i o n s inlo h.s edt. P V o r / ™ ™ Uber du Philosoph* der Weltgeschichte (Lcpz«: Verlag von Fei« Me.net vLnlt m der dfnchle (2nd edn.. 1920; 3rd e d , . 1930,;,, Die onenta hsche Veit i n Die gnethische and du römische Veit. iv. Die germanische Veit 3 S Ä äer Geschieh,, ed. Johannes Hof (meiste r ^ a m b " ^ ^ ^ Meiner. 1955t. Lectures on the Philosoph ^ ^ J ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ Z it. I L B. N.sbe. w.,h an I n t r o d u c e * bv Duncan Forbes iCambndge: Press. 19751. The tema.n.ng vols, of .he Lasson edn.. no, translated. A „ ot ,he I n t r o d u c o n . based mamly onjhe kar Hege edn was p u R » Roben S. Hanman as Reason* H.slorv (New York: B d

S e n e S >

b u t

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" R e a l l y that of Karl Hegel tor 1830-1.

15. Reason in History, 221-6.

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

Hoffmeister made only minor changes to Lasson, although he recognized that the whole needed t o be re-edited. I n a d d i t i o n t o f o l l o w i n g Hegel's o w n subdivisions in the 1830 manuscript of the I n t r o d u c t i o n , he made use of the sheets containing what he called 'The Varieties of Historical W r i t i n g ' , realizing that this material constituted the beginning of the lectures i n 1822 and 1828. Consequently, Hoffmeister placed it at the beginning of the volume, designating i t the 'first draft' of the Introduction, f o l l o w e d by the 'second draft' of 1830. In both cases the manuscript materials were printed in italic, and they were interwoven w i t h passages f r o m the transcriptions i n r o m a n type. The 'geographical basis of w o r l d history' and the 'division of w o r l d history' remained in the appendix. As indicated, it is this edition that was translated by Nisbet in 1975; and until now it has remained the best source for Hegel's Introduction i n English.

Considerable agreement exists between Walter Jaeschke's edition of the manuscripts of the I n t r o d u c t i o n i n volume xviii of the Gesammelte Werke and the earlier w o r k of U s s o n and Hoffmeister on these materials. Consequently we have been helped by H . B. Nisbet s translation of the manuscripts in Reason in History. However, o u r translation differs from his in many ways, large a n d small, and we always f o l l o w Jaeschke's critical text and annotations. For the transcription of the lectures of 1822-3 in volume xu of the Voriesungen, there is no precedent i n English, although parallel passages are found in the Sibree translation of the second Werke edition.

16

This Edition The underlying principle of the critical edition of Hegel's lectures is that the transcriptions must be treated separately and published as independent units. Obviously, it is impractical t o edit and translate transcriptions of a l l five of Hegel's series of lectures on Weltgeschichte. A selection must be made, and here the principal criterion is the reliability and intrinsic value o f the sources. The r w o best transcriptions are those by Griesheim and Hotho of the first series, 1822-3; and the possibility of constructing an integral text based on both sources makes this an obvious choice. K a r l Hegel's transcription of the lectures of 1830-1 is also reliable, and its inclusion w i l l make i t possible for the critical edition to publish the first and the last lecture series, w i t h selections from intervening years. A d d e d to this is the fact that the manuscripts ot the Introduction are from the first and the last series. 18

O u r translation is a collaborative effort. The w o r k of each of us has been read and corrected by the other t w o . The German editors of the lectures of 1822-3 provide detailed annotations for the sections on China, India, and Persia, but very few f o r the remainder of the w o r k where (they claim) Hegel draws upon w e l l - k n o w n sources. We have extensively supplemented the annotations f o r these other sections and have provided additional annotations for C h i n a , I n d i a , and Persia. The German editors of both the manuscripts and the transcriptions include a detailed apparatus on the construction of the text. We have not translated the apparatus except at a few places where there is a significant bearing on meaning or where we prefer an alternative reading of the main text. We have held bracketed insertions t o a m i n i m u m , n o t reproducing the many brackets used by the editors of the transcription t o complete sentences grammatically. In the manuscripts we indicate Hegel's frequent use of emphasis by means of italics; elsewhere italics are f o u n d sparingly. We have provided the subheadings for the 1 8 2 2 - 3 lectures. Pagination of the German texts is i n the margins, w i t h the page breaks marked by vertical slashes. 19

O u r translation principles f o l l o w those originally worked out for the Lectures on the Philosophy of Religion. These principles are in brief: (1) t o achieve u n i f o r m i t y i n the translation of key terms, we have worked f r o m a 10

16. Usson did not have access to the manuscript fragments of 1822 and 1828 for his 1st edn ut onlv to mdicaimns from the Werke edns. and from the transection of 182 3 t b roducnon had begund.fferently i n this yea. He provided an edited v e r s i J o f V n ^ r Ï t h

t

^"script- When the 1822 and 1828 fragments became available, he added them as -addenda" 17- Reason m History, 5-9

^

^

^

and a third pan-volume may conta.n selections from other lecture series. Hegel s ^ senpts have been published ,n vol. xv„i of uSe Gesammelte Werke ,see above, ^ M * ~ - J upon vol. xvni of the Gesammelte Werke and vol. « I of the Vorlesungen, we are able to proceed now with the translation of the first vol. of our English edn. 19. For , h , purpose we have rehed in pan on The Oxford C M Denary N . G. ,.. H a m L n a n d H . H . Scullatd | Oxford: Oxford Umvetsitv Press, £ New Colmdw Encyclopedia, ed. William H . Harris and Judrth S. Lew (NewJfrfc-d London: C o t _ M . University Press. 1975). We also have drawn on t e ^ s t o m .hr ^ S

^

and J. M . Stewart, 3 vols. (Oxford Oarendon Press, 2007), i . 52-8. Onpnally publ. b> the Universrt of California Press, 1984-7.

t

9

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

EDITORIAL IN TRODUCTION

glossary, which is modified f r o m that used for the Philosophy of Religion and the History of Philosophy, and is printed at the back of the volume; (2) we have not sacrificed precision for the sake of fluency and believe that the more precisely Hegel's thought is rendered the more intelligible it generally becomes; (3) we have attempted to preserve a sense of the spoken w o r d and of Hegel's oral delivery; (4) we have used a ' d o w n ' f o r m a t a n d have avoided capitalizing common Hegelian terms such as 'idea' and ' s p i r i t ' ; (5) we have employed gender-inclusive references to human beings and wherever possible to G o d .

A N A L Y T I C S U M M A R Y OF T H E T E X T S

We conclude these preliminary remarks by noting that what f o l l o w s after the Introduction is not a history i n the sense of a chronological account of events but rather a cultural and political portrayal o f various ' w o r l d s ' , a portrait' of what is distinctive about each of several great civilizations (Chinese, Indian, Persian, Egyptian, Greek, Roman, and Germanic or European |, a n d w h y Hegel thinks they constitute a meaningful progression in the development of spirit, t r u t h , and freedom, viewed on a large scale. For the purpose of philosophical portraiture, the medium of o r a l lectures is ideally suited. Duncan Forbes claims, in his Introduction to Reason in History, that Hegel's philosophy 'is best approached i n rhe spirit of Plato's, as something that is in danger of being destroyed or distorted i f i t is w r i t t e n down'. Forbes points out that Hegel was i n fact reluctant to publish, and that only four of his books were published during his lifetime. To give these publications a defimm e priority over his spoken lectures, with which h e w a i almost exclusively occupied during the last decade in Berlin, is t o treat his philosophy as a closed book, whereas it was an attempt t o ' t h i n k life', dialectically yet concretely, holistically yet w i t h shrewd insight i n t o d e t a i l — and it is precisely the details that occupy most of the Wettgeschichte. The only way to appreciate this k i n d of thinking, says Forbes, is t o ' w a t c h it at w o r k ' on the podium. Once it ceases t o be thinking and becomes thought, once i t stops speaking and is reduced to an editorial amalgam (as w i t h older editions of the lectures), « ceases to be a living process and becomes a system. The p n n c p a l goal of Hegel's ph.losophy is t o permit thinking to remain open, fluid, and continuous. 11

Our analysis of the texts attempts to honor that i n t e n t i o n . I n this analysis, references to footnotes are to those belonging to the texts of the

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INTRODUCTORY

FRAGMENT,

1822,

1828

By way of indicating w h a t is distinctive about a philosophical history of the w o r l d , Hegel begins his lectures in 1822 and 1828 by surveying three varieties of historiography: original history, reflective history, and philosophical history. Original history is w r i t t e n by historians such as Herodotus and Thucydides w h o have themselves witnessed, experienced, and lived through some of the events they describe. They transposed things that merely happened and existed externally {res gesta) i n t o the realm of intellectual representation by constructing narrative and p o e t i c accounts {htstoria). It is the historian who does this, w h o fashions a whole out of w h a t has passed away, thereby investing it w i t h i m m o r t a l i t y , giving i t 'a more exalted and better soil than that transient soil i n w h i c h it grew'. Original historians, however, do this only w i t h events that for the most part are contemporaneous w i t h them and that belong to their o w n w o r l d , the w o r l d i n w h i c h they themselves are participants, leaders, authors. Such historians are immersed in the material and do not rise above i t t o reflect on i t . They have written the 'bibles' of their peoples," and through them the material comes to us, fresh and alive. 12

21

4

Reflective history goes beyond w h a t is present simply to the author; it depicts w h a t was present n o t only i n time but also i n the life of spirit. It includes everything w r i t t e n by those w h o m we customarily call historians. 25

22. The German .s ursprünglich, which can also be translated 'primeval- or 'pritnordUT For analyses of Hegel's discussion ol the varieties of historiography, see George Dennis O Bnen, Hegel or. Reason and History (Ch.cago: Un.vers.iy ofClncago Press, 1975); and Burle.gh Taylor Wilkins, Hegel's Philosophy of History (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1974). 23. While Hegel claims that poetry, legends, and folksongs do not belong to original history because thev are the product of an obscure' consciousness, it is clear thai he uses epic poetry such as the Mahabharata and Homer to help construct the worldsof India and Greece. He even savs that Homer is ihe Grundbuch of Greece. 24. The Holv Bible of Jews and Christians is an example of such an original history. Peoples invest such histories w.th divine inspiration, which is a way of recognizing their archetypal importance in consntunng identity. . . . • 25. Reflecuve h.story \refekl,erende Geschichte) is lo be d.st.nguished bom speculative history, which is in fact philosophical history. The subtypes of reflective h.story are umversal pragmatic, critical, and specialized (for the latter two, see the beginning of the Lectures ot 1822-3). Hon Nam Seelmann argues thai the three mam types of rus.ory (original reflecuve, ph.losnrh.cal) correspond .o Hegel s underlying logical structure: original or _ separaten or reflection, and re-establ^hed uni.y on a higher, mediated level See WeltgeMte als Idee der menschlichen Freiheit: Hegels GeschichtsphlosophU m der Vorlesung i-on l B W (doctoral dissertation. University of Saarland; Saarbrücken, 19861, 7 14. etext.Gather

V

^ a f i h e t u e ^ ^ of Religion.

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23

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

the popular view, held by Schelling and Schlegel and others o f his t i m e , based on the biblical story and other creation myths, t h a t the original c o n d i t i o n was one o f beautiful innocence and pure knowledge. T h e assumption here, he notes, ts that humanity could n o t have developed f r o m ' a n i m a l stupor'. This assumption is correct, b u t humanity could w e l l have developed f r o m human stupor, and that is just w h a t we find at the beginning. Spirit is already imprinted on the h u m a n , but it must develop; i t is an infinite energeia and entelecheta that discovers itself i n its labor, brings f o r t h its concept, and this production comes last, not first. (From a p o s t - D a r w i n i a n perspective, o f course the 'development' of spirit starts much earlier than Hegel t h o u g h t , in the long transmon between ' a n i m a l ' and ' h u m a n ' . Hegel is vague about when human beings first appeared, but his view does n o t entail a theory o f special creation.)

everything is dissolved a n d existent being is superseded. For this reason

Second, the progress or progression (Fortgang) of history occurs i n time. 1 he quality of the negative is intrinsic to time because things come i n t o being and pass away. 'The abstract contemplation of being a n d nonbeing is time' (see note 29). Here we enter into a consideration o f change o r alteration. Whereas i n nature n o t h i n g changes, for nature instead constitutes a hierarchy o f levels, spirit constantly changes a n d climbs a l a d d e r o f stages'. B u t because the peoples as spiritual configurations are also creatures o f nature, some of the shapes that we see i n history as a succession i n time also stand perennially alongs,de one another i n space. Thus today w e find three major, h ^ - e x i s n n g configurations: the principle of the Far East (nature), the pnnc ple o f the Islamic w o r l d (absolute antithesis), a n d the principle of Christian Western Europe (spirit's knowledge of its o w n depths). But other peoples, such as the Greeks, Romans, and Germanic tribes, have l o n g disIZZ ° ° otherwise necessary process. V

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emergence of new forms of determinacy, the universal is becoming increasingly concrete. A previous particularity, such as being merely a citizen of Athens, 'melts under the l i g h t of thought, as snow melts under the sun'. When a new w o r k is at h a n d , w o r l d history makes the transition t o a new Gestalt,

f o r no people can be epoch-making more t h a n once. Such is the

'tribunal of h i s t o r y ' , as each age in succession is judged by and appropriated into the h a r d project of freedom's actualization (see note 32). Finally, there must be an end of history: if only new principles constantly emerged, w o r l d history w o u l d have no purpose leading t o a goal. But religion and reason recognize a goal because they are seeking what is genuinely true, w h a t subsists i n and for itself and is not merely transient The religious final end is expressed as follows: 'that human beings should attain eternal peace, t h a t they should be sanctified'. This goal is proper for the i n d i v i d u a l , b u t it does not concern us i n the here and n o w because i t represents a f u t u r e , o t h e r w o r l d l y end. Thus Hegel continues: 'What constitutes the way to the goal is no mere means but directly the absolute thingthat-history-is-about, the absolute history in w h i c h individuals are only

single moments'. T h e thing-that-history->s-about, expressed religiously, is 'the glorification and h o n o r o f God*. Spirit's absolute is the absolute of everything, the divine being. Spirit's purpose, its absolute drive, is thus to gain a consciousness of this being such that it is known as the one and only actual and true being through which everything happens and proceeds-to know that everything must be arranged, and is actually arranged, in accord with it, and therefore that it is the r * w e r that guided and gm^^^ world history, the power that rules and has ruled i t . . . . The individual spint hasM* glory i n glorifying God. This is not its particular honor; rather Ks honor comes from knowing that its self-feeling is the substantial consciousness of God, that .ts action i to theTonor and glory of God, the absolute. I n this knowledge the individual spuit has attained its truth and freedom. Thus the end is achieved not i n some timeless eternity or chronological

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future, b u t i n every t e m p o r a l now w h e n spirit comes t o this recognitionirt G o d . H o w it is t h a t the divine power guides and rules the w o r l d ,s addressed in the final subsection o f this part of the Introduction. H u m a n passions are the instrument for the rule, power and d o m . m o m i the divine idea. Passions are w h a t make each person what he or she is, and m history we have before us a ' c o l o r f u l d m ' of passions. The connecnon between the idea a n d the passions has t w o aspects: first, . t is t o u n

e

25

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

intrinsically i n the concept, in the idea itself; second, the question concerns its actual workings. As for the idea itself, we recall w h a t has been said about the Trinity. Initially, the idea is w h a t posits itself as over against itself and makes this ideal object its o w n : this is the eternal life o f G o d w i t h i n itself, before the creation of the w o r l d ; it is the logical nexus and does n o t yet have the mode of reality. Then the idea goes f o r t h f r o m itself i n t o antithesis, positing distinctions on their o w n account, positing the finite other, whose extremity o f freedom reflects the divine freedom.

The Nature of the State World history is the history of states, not of individuals. A r t , religion, scientific knowledge, and other cultural products are comprehended w i t h i n the state. The nature of the state is that i n i t freedom becomes objective t o itself and does n o t simply remain subjective free w i l l . The state is an ethical whole, n o t an abstraction over against individuals but that in which individuals live; it is an organism in w h i c h everything is end and means simulta-

This is the point at w h i c h the passions come i n t o p l a y ; they are the means by which the idea is actualized. Individuals w h o achieve h a r m o n y and reconciliation with the idea are called 'happy'. But ' w o r l d history is n o t a soil of happmess; , history the periods o f happiness are blank pages, for the ob,ect of history , at least, change". I n history there may be s a t i s f a c t i o n tne satisfaction of universal purposes t h a t transcend i n d i v i d u a l desires—but not happiness, at least not for world-historical individuals. T h u s w o r l d history is pnncipally a realm of conflict, a n d this conflict is embodied by the great histoncal figures, the 'heroes', w h o grasp the n e w umversal that is coming on the scene and turn it to their purposes. They are perspicacious, ahead of their rimes, perceiving the new t h i n g that needs t o be done. 'They desire and do what ,s correct and right, although w h a t they do appears to be their o w n passion, their o w n free w i l l because others d o not yet k n o w

neously. I n a f o r m u l a t i o n subject t o misinterpretation, Hegel says that the

h L I ' ° ° " l y t h r o u g h the passion of histoncal human^beings. Because the great figures 'are driven unresistingly

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of St Peter's, the most splendid church i n Christendom. Hegel reminds us that the Athenians used funds f r o m the Delian League to build the Parthenon. 'Just as this was the misfortune of Athens, so too this structure, St Peter's, w h i c h Michelangelo adorned w i t h the image of the Last Judgment, became the last j u d g m e n t o n this proudest and grandest structure of the church—a last judgment o n the church itself i n its corruption.' In describing the R e f o r m a t i o n , Hegel reaches the narrative climax of the Weltgeschichte. In Germany there emerged a simple monk who was conscious that the this is to be found in the deepest recesses of the heart, in the absolute ideality of inwardness.... Luther's simple teaching is that consciousness o f the this in the present is nothing sensible but something actual and spiritual; it is consciousness of an actual presence, not in the sensible realm but in faith and partaking. Faith here does n o t mean a belief i n something that has already taken place or is i n the past; rather i t is subjective certainty about the eternal, about the truth that subsists i n a n d for itself, and it is produced and given only by the H o l y Spirit. The content of this faith is n o t its o w n subjectivity but the objective t r u t h o f the c h u r c h : Christ, Spirit, the Trinity, the absolute being of G o d . I n faith the absolute being becomes the being of subjective spirit, and subjective spirit becomes free i n relating t o i t because it is thereby relaongto its very being and t r u t h . T h e ontological

The Transition t o Modernity

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namely, the indulgences. Indulgences were sold t o support the construction

but i t makes this salvation i n t o a merely external means,

participation of faith in God, the

communication of spirit w i t h spirit, of finite spirit w i t h mfihite spirit, and vice versa, is the key insight f o r Luther and for Hegel. This is how Christian freedom is a c t u a l i z e d - b y participating i n the true content and making this content its o w n . Faith and freedom ate not merely forensic categories, as neo-Kantian interpreters o f L u t h e r have insisted. As p r o o f t h a t we have arrived at the narrative climax, read the foUowwg w o r d s : 'This is the new and ultimate banner around which peoples gatber^ the flag of freedom, o f the t r u e s p i r i t . . . . The ages p r i o r t o our age have^cea but one labor, have had but one task, and that has been t o

60

torm

freedom, o f universality.' But, w h i l e the climax has been reached, t h e p l o t fully disclosed, history itself goes on and w o r k remains t o be done, a l l , the w o r k o f actualization remains: the reconciliation implicitly i n religious faith must take on concrete existence in the « ™ » " " of modern life, a n d i t must be universalized so as to encompass the w o r T h i s ,s a t a l l order, and Hegel's relative o p t i m u m about

60. On this transibonaj secron, vx n- 47.

•^JP™"™}

principle i n t o actuality, thereby achieving f o r this principle the

^ccomPl«bment

has become vastly m o r e complicated i n our o w n time, we say 61

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

EDITORIAL INTRODUCTION

optimism, because Hegel's brief account of the history of modernity recog-

abstract identity that lacks distinctions. For i t , 'the finite is not infinite', and

nizes deep ambiguities and difficulties.

that is that.

The History o f Modernity

It produces insight i n t o the universal purposes of the state, which take

The first development of modernity (see note 61) requires that the 'new church' (the Protestant church) should create a w o r l d l y existence for itself. This was not a simple task, for the ' o l d church' retained a considerable basis in power and did not surrender its hegemony easily. I n fact w h a t happened is that religious wars endured for many years, Germany was severely damaged, the Turks invaded Europe, and no true religious a c c o m m o d a t i o n was ever achieved. In addition to the Catholic-Protestant (or Romance-Germanic) divide i n Western Europe, there was a t h i r d large constellation, the 'Slavic nature', which persisted in its 'initial solidity' despite Russia's approach to the West. The Protestant church did achieve a legally secure existence, but Europe was far from unified, and deep divisions persisted t h r o u g h o u t the rest of the w o r l d .

precedence over privileges and private rights. Wars and revolutions are

When thought turns to the state, however, it has a more beneficial effect.

now fought on constitutional grounds, not religious ones. Such wars attempt to change governments through force f r o m below, in the interest of freedom of the w i l l and self-determination. 'Freedom of the will is freedom of the spirit in action', and it emerges directly f r o m the principle of the Protestant church. 'The freedom o f w i l l that is in and for itself is the freedom of G o d w i t h i n itself; it is the freedom of spirit, not of a particular spirit but of the universal spirit as such, i n accord w i t h its essential being. Revolutions, then, have proceeded f r o m thought. This thought has had to do w i t h actuality and has turned f o r c i b l y against the established order.' Such revolutions have already occurred in Protestant

states, w h i c h n o w are at peace, but i n

Romance countries the revolutions have been strictly political and are not

The second development of modernity is that of the scientific investigation of nature, representing w h a t Hegel calls 'the f o r m a l universality of thought'. True culture now essentially becomes that o f science and is aligned with the state, not the church. The church does not assume the lead in advancing either freedom or the sciences. The sciences o f the understanding, claiming to honor b o t h humanity and G o d , were w i d e l y accepted as valid, although the Catholic Church d i d not concede that science honors G o d . The church is correct in the sense that the sciences could lead to materialism and atheism, for nature and its laws are n o w taken t o be something u l t i m a t e and universal. One could indeed add that G o d created the w o r l d , but empirical science has no way of recognizing G o d . T h e understanding recognizes only itself i n the universality of its laws.

yet accompanied by a change i n religion. Religion must change for there t o

The third development of modernity is that the f o r m a l universality of thought turns to the practical, to actuality. The understanding w i t h its laws turns itself as 'enlightenment' against the spiritually concrete, the religious sphere. Its principles, derived f r o m nature, are logical consistency, identity, and coherence. It recognizes a natural sense of i m m o r t a l i t y , sympathy, and so on, but R is intrinsically antireligious. 'For the very principle o f religion is that the natural is precisely w h a t is negative and needs t o be s u b l a t e d . . . . Religion is speculative . . . and thus is inconsistent w i t h the abstract consistency of the understanding.' Reason (Vernunft) grasps distinctions w i t h i n itselt as a unity, whereas the understanding (Verstand) h o l d s fast to an

God's w o r k . '

62

be genuine political change. Conclusion This is where Hegel leaves the s t o r y — i n a state of irresolution and inconclusiveness (forced u p o n h i m , perhaps, by his having r u n out of time). He offers only brief summary remarks about the whole of history being nothing other than the actualization o f spirit. W h a t is true in thought must also be present i n actuality, and vice versa. 'Thus it is spirit that bears witness t o spint, and in this way it is present t o itself and free. What is important to discern is that spirit can find freedom a n d satisfaction only i n history and the present—and that what is happening a n d has happened does not just come f r o m God but i s

63

MANUSCRIPTS OF THE INTRODUCTION

I N T R O D U C T O R Y F R A G M E N T , 1822,

1828

121

1

Gentlemen! The subject of these lectures is the philosophical history of the world. Our concern is t o w o r k our w a y through universal w o r l d history as such. I t is not w i t h general reflections abstracted f r o m i t and illustrated by examples, but rather w i t h the content of w o r l d history itself. I have no textbook t o use as a basis. However, at the end of m y Grundlinien der Philosophie des Rechts, §§ 3 4 1 - 6 0 , I have already indicated the more precise conception of world history as well as the principles and periods i n t o which our consideration of it is d i v i d e d . ( I t w i l l enable y o u t o at least become acquainted w i t h the abstract shape of the elements that we shall be discussing.) 2

By way of an introduction to our philosophical history of the world, I will begin by p r o v i d i n g an indication, both general and s r ^ i f i c , | of what constitutes a philosophical history of the world. I w i l l go over a n d describe other ways t o expound and treat history by distinguishing—[in] a survey that has n o t h i n g philosophical about it—three different modes of w r i t i n g history: a. o r i g i n a l history 0. reflected history 3

y. philosophical history (a) A s t o the first mode, the mention o f a few names should give a more specific picture of w h a t I have i n mind—e.g., Herodotus, Thucydides* and other historians w h o have themselves witnessed, experienced, and lived through the events, deeds, and circumstances they describe, w h o have themselves participated i n these events and their spirit, and w h o have compiled a report of these events and deeds. I n this way they transposed things that merely happened and existed externally into the realm of intellectual representation and elaborated them in its terms. First, [there wasj sxnnethuig

1- Next to the heading m the margin, designating the dates the lectures began in 1822 and 1828: 31/10 22 30/10 28 2. Hegel, Grtvtdlmien der Philosophie des Rechts (Berlin, 1821). See Elements of the Philosophy of Right, ed. Allen W Wood, te H . B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1991), 372-80. 3. The manuscript here reads refUctirte ('reflected'} but at the beginning of of the second mode, reflectirende ('reflective'i. 4. Editions oi Herodotus' The History and Thucydide*' The Pelopoeotesxan War we« in Hegel's library: Herodotus, Htstoriarum libri IX (Paris, 1592), and Uhn novem (Cologne, 1562); Tbucydides, De beMo Petopomesiaco Uhn Vlll (Frankfurt, 1594).

the matmcm

61

122

I N T R O D U C T O R Y F R A G M E N T , 1 822,

MANUSCRIPTS OF T H E I N T R O D U C T I O N

existent—now something intellectual and representational. T h a t is how, for example, the poet elaborates the material t h a t he has i n bis feeling, i n his 123

inner and | outer soul, into a sensible representation. A d m i t t e d l y , the narratives and reports of others were also an ingredient f o r these historians, but they are merely the more scattered, less important, fortuitous, subjective, and transitory o f their materials (just as the poet owes m u c h t o the shape of his language and the structured i n f o r m a t i o n he receives). But it is the historian w h o fashions a whole out of w h a t i n actuality has already passed away and is scattered about i n subjective, f o r t u i t o u s m e m o r y o r indeed preserved [only] in fleeting memory, and sets i t u p in the temple of Mnemosyne, thereby investing i t w i t h immortality. The historian transplants [the past], gives it a more exalted and better soil t h a n that transient soil i n which it grew—transplants i t i n t o the realm of the departed and n o w eternal spirits, as the ancients described the Elysium in w h i c h their heroes d o perpetually what in their lives they d i d only once. From such original history I exclude all legends, folksongs,

124

traditions,

and

even poems; f o r such | legends and traditions are b u t obscure methods [of recording events], and therefore methods of peoples—or parts t h e r e o f — whose consciousness is still obscure. I shall r e t u r n l a t e r t o the m a t t e r of the relationship of history to a people. Peoples w i t h an obscure consciousness, or the obscure history [of such peoples], is not our t o p i c — a t least not the topic of the philosophical universal history o f the w o r l d , whose end is t o attain knowledge of the idea i n history. [Its object is] the spirits of those peoples who have brought their principle t o consciousness and w h o k n o w what they are and what they do. 5

6

125

Such original historians, then, shape the events, deeds, and situations that are contemporaneous to them i n t o a work of representation f o r representation. It follows f r o m this: («a) T h e content of such historical narratives cannot therefore be of great extent. Their essential material consists i n what is vital for humans i n their o w n experience a n d current interests, what is present and alive i n their environment. | [These historians] describe events i n which they have shared t o a greater or 'esser extent, or at least of w h i c h they have been contemporaries. [They describe] brief periods of time, individual configurations o f persons and

Deik"S^T"'^ ^ b Í .

d

e X a m m t d

U t e r

e

r

V

e

l

O

P

m

a

t

- hiSt0™> ° ^

r t s

™

f

*

esta

* ^

o

^ v e history proper of a

b

«

^

arrived at a culture n

*>• The devdopenem of tius «fea b „ « found « the exta.r n^nusenpe fragment.

«8 F

1828

events. They w o r k from intuitions d r a w n f r o m their own experiences and lives, assembling individual and unreflected elements into a [composite] picture i n order t o give to posterity a representation as specific as that f o u n d i n [their o w n ] intuition o r i n the intuitive narrative they have before them [ f r o m someone else]. (0/3) W i t h such historians the development of the author and the development of the events o n w h i c h his w o r k is based, o r the spirit of the author and the general spirit o f the actions he relates, are one and the same. Thus initially the author brings no reflections to bear, for he is immersed in the spirit o f the historical material (der Geist der Sache) and does not rise above it t o reflect o n i t . This unity [of author and material] also means m a t in an age i n w h i c h a greater differentiation between classes occurs, and i n w h i c h the culture and maxims o f each individual are related t o his class—the historian must belong t o the class of statesmen, generals, etc., whose aims, intentions, and deeds are part of the same political w o r l d that he describes. W h e n the spirit of the material is itself cultivated, i t becomes aware of itself. A major aspect of its life and activity is i t s consciousness o f its purposes and interests a n d of the principles that underlie them. | One aspect of its actions is the w a y i n w h i c h it explains itself to others, acts on their imagination, and manipulates their w i l l . The author, then, does not explain and portray this consciousness i n terms of his own reflections; rather he allows the persons and peoples themselves t o express their aspirations and their knowledge o f their aspirations. H e does not put into their mouths alien words of his o w n devising; and even if he elaborates on w h a t they said, the substance, culture, and consciousness of this elaboration are identical w i t h the substance and consciousness of those whom he has speak in this fashion. Thus i n Thucydides, for example, we read the speeches of Pericles, the most 7

3

9

7. At this point the transition occurs fron, the first sheet of " f ^ ^ f ^ ^ ^ in the Berlin Staatsbibliothek Preußischer Kulturbesitz, to the second and ^ d s h e e t s , looted in the Deutsches Literarorarchiv of the Schiller-Nationalmuseum ir, MarbachThe stnooth trans^ don indicates that the sheets, though subsequently separated, ongmally formed a siigle

TtLr^

J^^S!!

o Hnes lover): Words are Ä - a m o n g h ^ n W * * ~ P and effects anions. But words of a people, or between people, or » are, factions, an essential object of history, especially ancient hstory. A t o U i « b e « o persons w h o * utterances have been taken amiss often saying that ^ [ ^ ^ ^ imered was ^ word^Uütey are thev must be pronounced .nnocent Unschuldig), for such words are ^ T ltW

chatter, which has the sole advantage ^ ' ^ f r S d 9. In the nsargn, iahove the previous ^ ^ ^ ^ J ^ o Z motives (and feelings) in his own name or to bring them into his particular 69

to explain

e

T

I N T R O D U C T O R Y F R A G M E N T . 18 2 2 . 1 828

M A N U S C R I P T S OF T H E I N T R O D U C T I O N

profoundly orators,

cultured,

the truest and

envoys of {various]

noblest etc.

peoples,

of

sciousness of their political condition

and

con-

accounts of m i l i t a r y and other events that are simple, ingenious, and specific,

spiritual

and that compare favorably w i t h Caesar's commentaries; because of their

and

[personal]

reflections, and what he lets [his characters] express is n o t an alien consciousness lent to them but their own culture and

himself

in such

{original]

must linger w i t h them, and indeed i t is impossible to linger t o o

historians,

long with them. Through them the history of a people o r a government comes t o us fresh, alive, and at first hand. Anyone w h o does not desire to but rather to enjoy history

become a learned historian

can l i m i t himself

almost entirely t o such authors alone. From them [we must] distinguish [i.e. identify] the bibles of peoples; every people has a basic bible [Grundbibel),

a

Homer. Such [authors] are, after a l l , not so c o m m o n as frequently supposed. Such historians include Herodotus, the father or originator o f history and moreover the greatest of historians, and T h u c y d i d e s — [ b o t h are] to be admired for their naivete. Xenophon's equally original b o o k ;

Polybius;

11

Retreat of the Ten T h o u s a n d is an the Commentaries

12

of

are

Caesar

13

likewise masterpieces of simplicity by a m i g h t y spirit. To have such historians, it is necessary not only that the culture of a people 128

have attained

a | high level, but also that i t not be limited t o the priesthood

and

to

scholars

but rather be shared by leaders of the state a n d military. Naive chroniclers such as monks were certainly f o u n d in the M i d d l e Ages, but they were not statesmen. To be sure, there were also learned bishops

w h o stood at the

center of commerce and the affairs of state, and were thus also statesmen, but in other respects [their] polit,cal consciousness was not

accounts.

developed,

nowever, [such works] are characteristic not only of antiquity. In

modern

I n modernity we have excellent

w e a l t h of content and specific declaration of means and conditions, they are even more informative. W o r k s of this k i n d include numerous French memoirs. M a n y of them are cleverly w r i t t e n [accounts] of trivialities

consciousness.

Anyone who seeks to study substantial history, the s p i r i t of nations, to live and have lived i n and w i t h i t , must immerse

i n t o representational

transforms

all events

that underlie t h e i r purposes

conduct. The historian has left himself little or no r o o m for

times, all this has changed. Our culture immediately grasps and

men

the

personality,

| a n d o f their ethical

condition and nature, and the principles

other

I n their speeches these

10

express the maxims of their people and of their own \ZT

and of

statesman,

content on narrow grounds.

and anecdotes, often w i t h a narrow

Others, however, are the product of an able

ingenuity [set] o n a larger and more interesting scale. The Mémoires Cardinal

de Retz [are] a m a s t e r w o r k .

14

I n Germany

similar

of

masterpieces

by persons w h o themselves participated in the events are rare, although the Histoire

de mon temps by Frederick I I

is a great and notable exception.

1 5

I t is

[not] enough [for an author] to have been a contemporary of such events or even t o have witnessed them at first hand and obtained reliable i n f o r m a t i o n about t h e m . A n author must be of the same class, circle, attitude, mentality, and culture as those whose actions he describes—[the same rank] as those on whom

I the authority

of the state and the power of the government

rests.

O n l y f r o m an elevated position does one have a proper overview of the subject and see everything i n its context—not when one looks up f r o m below, peering t h r o u g h some limited moral lens or other bit of wisdom.

In

o u r time i t is a l l the more necessary [to free ourselves] from the limited point of view of the classes t h a t are more or less excluded f r o m direct politica activity and r e f l e c t i o n - f r o m the life of the state. They bask m moral principles by w h i c h they are consoled and k n o w themselves superior to the upper classes—in short, they do not stand w i t h i n that sphere. d

l t b n

e

p

™ £ J} *J* ™ «w«n h=gan , „ 5 3 4 " '» «. (1.53.21 (Luce, pp. 19-20, «,1-21. ^s^ ^ ^ " f < > " ' H l a t 1.102(2.23.1», 1.104 (2.24.1), W

fc 9 3

n

2

D

3

H

l a

74

/

^

^

^

n

Ranke's Die serb.sche Revolution:

»

^

m

fa

In the MorgenbLttt (Ur dte gebddeten S*nfe * UonwiUStheremark/ashallowrnan-lB^nerS^^JSlS (Hamburg, 1956), 697-8).

i

%

*

U e b e r

k

^

to^^

Aus serbtschen Pap.eren und Mmhe.lungen

1829) were in Hegel's library. , 26. It not known wuh which of Walter ^ ^ ^ S » ^ Scott is net found in his lectures on aeschencs (at ^ ^ ^ J , later fragment on aesthetics. Hege! owned a German edn. ol: S c o n , j o * * , l

f • Uvy, HtstorZLn ^t^oossi^u,,^ ^.58.3)(l^ ,p .

universal

interest, [depicted] i n their specific character.

a n d

(Hambu g,

A reference to «*»•> * * das Uben und ta

Johannes Hoff.ne.ster

INTRODUCTORY

tlU

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

___

MANUSCRIPTS OF T H E I N T R O D U C T I O N Th,s [is] h e o b i e a and * n 1 * . —

-

t

(ßß) The first variety of reflective history leads directly to the second. | This is pragmatic history, or [it] remains nameless [because] it is the kind that historians i n general serve u p — a developed a n d purer [portrayal of) the past. [If we] do not have [individuals] and their l i v e s such a totality—before us, and have no living expenence of them—(aa) but rather are dealing w i t h a reflected w o r l d , i.e. a past—its spirit, its interests, its culture...

« "

-

-

^

*

' ^

«

v

[Then we have] in general a rational (verständige) history, (aa) A totality of interests—such as the totality of a state, the epoch-making event o f a w a r or even of an individual—is the object. (f!|3) Here t o o the object is a present interest, b u t w i t h o u t it being the presence of tone, of feeling, of external vividness \Anschaulichkeit) i n circumstantial details and the fortunes of single individuals as such. The need for a present exists, [but] it [is] not [ t o be found] i n history. Such presence (is created by] the insight of the understanding, the activity and effort o f spirit. The external [aspect of events is] pale and grey. Their purpose a n d rationality (Verstand), the state and fatherland, their inner continuity, the universal aspect of their inner relationships, are what endure, [for these aspects are] as valid and present now as in the past and forever. The first step is a primitive, enveloped people, [not] as such, but insofar as it reaches the p o i n t o f becoming a state. Subjection to a state, a rational whole i n itself, is a universal end o f reason. | Every state is an e n d for itself. Its external preservation, its inner development and formation, f o l l o w a necessary progression whereby rationality, justice, and the consolidation of freedom gradually emerge. [It is] a system of institutions - (aa) as a system [ i t is] the consequence and (0) the content of the same [rationality, justice, freedom], the means by which true interests are brought to consciousness and struggle to obtain actuality. I n every objective advance [there is] not merely an external consistency and necessary continuity but also a necessity i n the thing [at work in history], i n the concept (in der Sache - im Begriff). This [is] the true thing, [present] for example in the state (German, R o m a n ) , o r in si/igie great events [such as] the French Revolution, or in any great necessity.

us) how it was). . ^i„ estine and enlivening Whether such reflections ate i n fact m t e w w * an 28

tpr

the author's own spirit¬ . .

.

| u J e

29. The manuscript ends here and does ^

aV

reflective history (critical and specialize^ o sophical history.

a n u t e u r

" "' - l h-stonan | likew.se a compiler, and. wneti he aw»kcM Horn his weary rarnbbngs, events and mdivtduak are occasionally felled with amoral fa* attack bv means of edify.ng C W , a r , d cher reflections-! by! tossing .n an eddying reflecnon, a hortatory proclamation or doctrine and the Uke d n V

g

e f f e c t i v e

S u £ h

a

i s

ao

77 76

h

a

d i s c u s s l o n

mclud^ ^

l n

hLiT ^

„ , „ individuals like Napoleon only

28. In the margin: Empires [ofj great md.vidua.s - other md-vd momentary - in essentials, ^ P ^ T of the rema.ning w b t y p o o l

27. This paragraph u written in the margin adjacent to the present paragraph: l|i> Historiography general- The worst kind ol pragmatic [historian is one who takes up| T^iquesoons " Pathologist. The momes of the subiect (are] denved not from U * concept but from particular inclinations and passions, vnstead ot regarding the thtng nseli l a s l

depends on

^

^

w n t ] n g

,

p

W

o

INTRODUCTION,

INTRODUCTION, 1830-1

1830-1

history and treats history according t o them, that I wish t o discuss i n the

1

I n other w o r d s , we must first obtain a general definition

introduction. the philosophy

Gentlemen!

of world

of

history, and then consider the immediate implica-

tions that are connected w i t h i t . Then the relationship between thoughts

The subject of these lectures is the philosophy of w o r l d history. A b o u t

and events w i l l of its o w n accord be correctly posed. For this reason, and

what history or w o r l d history is, I need t o say n o t h i n g ; the general impres-

since in this introduction I do not wish t o become too copious—for a wealth of

sion of it is sufficient and we can perhaps agree o n it. But t h a t we shall be

material lies before us i n w o r l d history—there is no need for me t o spend time

considering a philosophy of w o r l d history, that w e intend to treat history

refuting and correcting the endlessly many misguided misrepresentations and

philosophically—this is what is striking about the title of these lectures a n d

reflections that are ongoing or perpetually reinvented about the perspectives,

appears to require a discussion or, even more, a justification.

principles, and views I on the aims and interests of the treatment of history,

However, the philosophy of w o r l d history is n o t h i n g other t h a n the contemplation of it by means of thinking. never cease, for humans are thinking

T h i n k i n g is something w e can

140

and especially on the relationship of the concept and of philosophy t o historical matters. I can omit them ennrely or just mention them in passing. 3

beings, and in this respect they are

distinguished from animals. [In] everything that is human—feeling,

knowl-

edge and cognition, instincts and volition—insofar as it is h u m a n and n o t

A.

THE

GENERAL

CONCEPT

OF WORLD

HISTORY

4

animal, thinking is involved. [Thinking] is involved in all historical studies. However, this | appeal to the participation of t h i n k i n g i n a l l h u m a n activ-

'The first t h i n g I wish t o say about the provisional concept of the philosophy

ities, including history, might appear to be unsatisfactory because it c o u l d be

of w o r l d history is this. As I have already remarked, the main oD ect.on

argued that thinking is subordinate t o what exists, the given, that it is based

brought against philosophy is that it approaches history, and reflects on it,

on and guided by it. Philosophy by contrast is assumed t o have its

w i t h thoughts o r conceptions [Gedanken).

own

(

However, the sole concepnon

thoughts, produced by speculation f r o m out o f itself w i t h o u t reference t o

that it brings w i t h it is the simple conception of reason - t h e

what is. W i t h such thoughts it supposedly approaches history as a m a t e r i a l

that reason governs the w o r l d , and that therefore w o r l d history is a rational

to be treated; it does not leave it as it is but arranges i t in accord w i t h t h o u g h t

process. F r o m the point of v i e w of history as such, this conv.ct.on and

and constructs a history a p r i o r i . History [so i t is said] just has t o grasp i n

insight is a presupposition.

unalloyed fashion what is, what has been—events and deeds. It gains i n

t i o n : by means of speculative cognition it is proved that reasoned

veracity the more strictly that it confines itself t o the given, and—since w h a t

adopt this expression for the moment w i t h o u t discussing more precisely its

is given is not so immediately evident and requires m a n i f o l d investigations

connection and relationship to G o d ~ . s substance and inhmte power. [It »)

2

conception

W i t h i n philosophy itself this ,s no presupposiwe can

7

that are bound op w i t h t h i n k i n g - t h e more that its a i m is to discover s i m p l y what happened. This aim appears to contradict the impulse of philosophy; and i t is t h i s contradiction, and the accusation that philosophy imports its thoughts i n t o

3.

l n

the margin: The preface to every new history-and then again the mtroducuon » the

reviews of such histories—[brings] a new theory

Note Heeeft

4. The sect.cn headings are editorial but reflect Hegel's own intended dmsions. Note HegeB further subdivisions of this section as indicated m the margms. 5. In the margin:

who l

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f

i

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e

d

b y

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b - agaias, johann Goitheb Fichte,

ia) General Concept 10) Determínale \yi Mode of Development 6. In the margin: (a) Reason „ ,„ ,ht lectures on the proofs of the -. The references to "proof and 'God' might call attention t o * . ^ r u r e s P m

' « p p . 4 - f i V w i * V

^expenence a. identifying the concept of an epoch

t

i

f

m

existence of God, which Hegel wrote and delivered , n l o n themes and vear before he wrote this mtroduct.cn. The two pro,ec« J a r e s o m ^ . concerns. The proofs establish, among other things, * a t ^ • ^ ^ power, and inhnite form (or subject). See Lectures on the Proofs of fte taastence O

Phibsopfe c l ^ Z Z

t b a l

° ^ f

o b s e r V M

o f

a»d humanity begms. The

y

f

?8

79

(

INTRODUCTION,

M A N U S C R I P T S OF T H E I N T R O D U C T I O N

itself the infinite material of all natural and spiritual life and the infinite form that activates this its content. [It is] the substance whereby and wherein all actuality has its being and subsistence. [ I t is] infinite power, f o r reason is not so impotent as t o yield only an ideal | or a m o r a l ought, and only outside the bounds of actuality, or w h o knows where—perhaps merely as something particular that exists in the heads of a few individuals. [It is] the infinite content, all essentiality and truth, itself constituting the material on w h i c h i t operates by its o w n activity. Unlike finite action, i t does n o t require the limiting factors of external materials or a given medium f r o m w h i c h to derive its sustenance and the objects of its activity. I t feeds u p o n itself, i t is itself the material that it labors on. Just as it is itself its o w n presupposition, its own end, the absolute final end, so it is itself the activation and the bringing f o n h , out of inwardness into appearance, i n t o w o r l d history, n o t only of the natural universe but also of the spiritual realm. T h a t o n l y this idea is the true, the eternal, the almighty, that i t reveals itself i n the w o r l d , and that nothing is revealed i n the w o r l d except i t , its glory a n d h o n o r — t h i s is, as I have said, what is proved i n philosophy, and so i t may here be presupposed as demonstrated. To those of y o u gentlemen w h o are not yet acquainted w i t h philosophy, I could perhaps appeal that you approach these lectures o n w o r l d history with a faith i n reason, w i t h a desire and thirst f o r knowledge o f i t . A n d we must surely assume that a desire for rational insight and knowledge, a n d not just a collection of information, is the subjective need [that drives] the study of the scientific disciplines. I n fact, however, I d o n o t have t o a d o p t such a faith in advance. What I have said i n a preliminary w a y and have still to say is not—and n o t just w i t h reference t o our science—to be regarded as a presupposition ) but instead as an overview of the whole, as the result of the inquiry that we have i n i t i a t e d - a result that is k n o w n t o me because I am already familiar w i t h the whole. W h a t therefore remains t o be seen, a n d w i l l make itself evident from the consideration of w o r l d history itself, is t h a t a rational process has been taking place in i t , that w o r l d history is the rational and necessary course of w o r l d spirit. W o r l d spirit is spirit as such, the substance of htstory, the one spirit whose nature [is] one a n d the same and

1830-1

that explicates its one nature i n the existence of the w o r l d . This, as we have said, must be the result of history itself. History, however, must be taken as it is; we must proceed in a historical, empirical f a s h i o n . For example, we must not allow ourselves to be misled by the professional historians; for at least among the German historians leven leading authorities w h o are experts i n the so-called study of sources) there are those w h o do w h a t they reproach the philosophers for doing, namely for introducing a priori fictions i n t o history. Thus, to take one example, i t is a widely accepted fiction that there was an original, primeval people, directly instructed by G o d , living i n perfect insight and w i s d o m , and possessing a thorough knowledge of all natural laws and spiritual t r u t h ; or else that i t was f r o m one or another priestly people—or, by a more specific assumption, f r o m a Roman epic—that the Roman historians have produced their ancient h i s t o r y ; and so o n . Let us leave such a priori inventions t o the ingenious professional historians, w h o in Germany commonly make use of them. I 9

1

11

W e can therefore declare as o u r first condition that we must apprehend the historical accurately. But general expressions such as 'accuracy' and 'apprehension' contain an ambiguity. Even the ordinary, average historian, who believes and professes that his attitude is entirely receptive, that he devotes himself only t o the given, is not passive i n his thinking a n d introduces his o w n categories as medium through w h i c h t o view the available evidence. The t r u t h does not lie on the superficial plane of the senses; m regard t o everything that aims t o be scientific, reason may not slumber and must employ meditative t h i n k i n g (Hachdenken). Whoever looks at the w o r l d r a t i o n a l l y sees ir as rational too; the t w o exist i n a reciprocal relationship. But i t is not our task t o discuss here the different modes of meditative t h i n k i n g o r the various perspectives for judging w h a t is significant and insignificant in the immense amount of matenal that lies before us, and the most suitable categories t o use in doing so. • L , 2

l i

I w i l l mention only t w o points concerning the genera conv.ct.on that

reason has governed and continues t o govern the w o r l d , and thus also w o r l d

rnvthclogy; see e.g. j Gorres, Mythengeschichte der astattschen Welt, 2 vols- (Heidelberg,

8. In the margin;

V l . Hegel could be alluding here to die reference to a primeval people , „ Barthold G ~ r Niebuht, Rom.scbe Gesch.chte, 2 vols. (Berlin, 1811-12),.. 112 H. 12. i n the margin: (5) Apprehend accurately 13. In the margin: (t) Two Points - Anaxagorat.

Faith, survey, result. 80

SI

g

I N T R O D U C T I O N , 1 830-1

M A N U S C R I P T S OF T H E I N T R O D U C T I O N

history; for they provide an occasion to examine more closely the main point, which constitutes the difficulty, and to indicate what w e must discuss more fully. | One is the historical point that the Greek Anaxagoras that nous—understanding

was the first t o say

in general o r reason—rules the w o r l d .

1 4

This is

not an intelligence in the sense o l self-conscious reason, not a spirit as such; the t w o must be clearly distinguished. The movement of the solar system follows unalterable laws; these laws are its reason, b u t neither the sun n o r the planets that revolve according t o these laws are conscious of t h e m . I t is human beings w h o derive these laws from existence and k n o w t h e m . Perhaps the only thing striking to us about the conception that reason exists in nature, that nature is ruled by irrevocable laws, is that Anaxagoras initially restricted i t t o nature. We are accustomed t o such conceptions and

only w i t h external causes, such as air, aether, water, and the like, instead of reason.' We see that what Socrates found to be unsatisfactory in ihe principle of Anaxagoras is not the principle itself but his failure t o apply it t o concrete nature—the fact that nature is not understood and conceived in terms o f this principle; that i n general this principle remains abstract;

more specifically

that nature is not grasped as a development of this principle, as an organizat i o n produced by reason as its cause. I w i s h f r o m the outset to call attention to this distinction between whether a d e f i n i t i o n , principle, or t r u t h is just held t o abstractly, or is advanced t o a more precise determination and concrete development. This distinction is decisive, and i n addressing other issues we shall come back [to) this circumstance especially.

18

A b o v e a l l , however, I have referred to the first instance of the conception

do not make much of them. I have mentioned this historical circumsrance

that reason rules the w o r l d and also discussed its inadequacy

to point out that history teaches that conceptions of this sort that may

complete application of this conception has assumed another shape,

appear trivial t o us d i d not always exist i n the w o r l d , t h a t rather

such

we k n o w full w e l l as our o w n conviction—namely the form of the religious

conceptions are epoch-making in the history of the human spirit. A r i s t o t l e

t r u t h t h a t the w o r l d is not given over t o chance and external, contingent

says of Anaxagoras, as the originator of this conception, t h a t he appeared as

causes, but is ruled by providence.

a sober man among d r u n k a r d s .

to presume on your faith in the indicated principle. I might, however, have

15

This conception was taken over f r o m Anaxagoras by Socrates, a n d — w i t h the exception

of Epicurus, w h o attributed everything t o

chance —it 16

became the ruling principle above all i n philosophy; we shall see i n due course in what further religions and peoples [it came t o prominence]. Plato makes Socrates (say] of this discovery \Phaedo, Stephanus e d i t i o n , v o l . 1 . pp. 9 7 - 8 ) ' : ' I was delighted w i t h it and | hoped I had found a teacher w h o 1

w o u l d explain nature t o me rationally, w h o w o u l d e x h i b i t the particular purpose i n particular things and the universal purpose in the w h o l e — t h e good, the final purpose. 1 was not at all eager t o relinquish this hope. But how very disappointed I was,' continues Socrates, 'when I t u r n e d f u l l of anncipation t o the writings of Anaxagoras himself. I discovered that he dealt

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30. The manuscript adds the w o r d , no longer * « * « three-quarters uf a pa*e blank. Tms appears to be a ™ / T * ^ „ conscriptions manuscript. u * d bv Hegel in the actual P ^ " " ^ ' / ^ Tmanuscc.pc Hegel disco**, the contain materia) at this point ihai is not found in the iretu ^ subsiamialm idea of freedom as .he subsiannahry of spml. drawing a parallel to -eign, of matter 87

i e c n l

152

INTRODUCTION,

M A N U S C R I P T S OF T H E I N T R O D U C T I O N

latter. Thus not only d i d the Greeks have slaves, u p o n w h o m their life and the continued existence o f their beautiful freedom depended; but also their freedom itself was o n the one hand o n l y a contingent, transient, incomplete flowering of limited scope, and o n the other hand a harsh servitude [imposed] o n [some] human beings, o n [their] humanity. | The Germanic nations were the first t o come t o the consciousness, t h r o u g h Christianity, that the human being as human is free, that the freedom o f spirit constitutes humanity's truly inherent nature. This consciousness first arose in religion, i n the innermost region o f spirit; but t o incorporate this principle into secular existence was a further task whose solution and application would require a long and arduous labor on the part of culture. For example, slavery did not immediately [cease] w i t h the adoption of the C h r i s t i a n religion; still less d i d freedom immediately come to prevail i n political states, nor did governments and political institutions become rationally organized and founded upon the principle of freedom. The application

of this principle

to actuality, the penetration and transformation o f w o r l d l y conditions by the principle of freedom, is the long process that is history itself. I have already drawn attention t o this distinction such and its application, that is, its introduction

between the principle

into and its

as

accomplishment

i n the actuality of spirit and life; and we shall r e t u r n t o i t again shortly. I t is one of the basic aspects of our discipline, and we must keep it ever in m i n d . The distinction applies not only to the Christian

principle o f the self-con-

sciousness o f freedom, which I have mentioned here i n a p r e l i m i n a r y w a y ,

1830-1

Spirit's consciousness of its freedom (and along w i t h i t for the first time the actuality o f its freedom)

has been declared t o be the reason of spirit in its

determinacy. The latter is the destiny of the spiritual w o r l d , and (since the substantial, physical w o r l d is subordinated to the spiritual, or in the speculative sense has no t r u t h over against it) it is the final end of the w o r l d in general. But that this freedom, as accounted above, is itself still indeterminate, t h a t freedom is a term of unlimited ambiguity, that since freedom is the highest [concept] i t is subject to no end of misunderstandings, confusions, and errors, including every possible a b e r r a t i o n - a l l this has never been k n o w n a n d experienced so fully as i n the present age; but we must be satisfied for the moment w i t h this general definition. We have also taken note o f the importance of the immense difference between the principle as it is intrinsically

or in itself and what i t is i n actuality. A t the same time i t is

precisely freedom w i t h i n itself that contains the infinite necessity w i t h i n itself t o b r i n g itself t o consciousness and t o a c t u a l i t y - f o r its very concept is t o k n o w itself. Freedom is itself the end or purpose of its o w n operation, the sole end o f spirit. The immediate question | must be: W h a t means does i t employ? This is the second point that we have to consider here. b

The Means o f Spirit's Actualization: Passions, Interests, I d e a l s

32

The question about the means by w h i c h freedom brings f o r t h a w o r l d for itself leads us t o the p h e n o m e n o n

33

o f history proper. Whereas freedom as

such is p r i m a r i l y an internal concept, the means i t employs is something

but also t o the principle of freedom i n general. W o r l d history is the progress

external and phenomenal that confronts us directly in history. A n initial

o f the consciousness of freedom —a progress whose necessity w e have t o recognize. |

proceed f r o m their needs, passions, and interests, f r o m the representanons

31

These general remarks on the different degrees o f the k n o w l e d g e o f freedom-namely,

that the Orientals only k n e w that one is free, that in the

Greek and Roman w o r l d some are free, and that we by contrast k n o w t h a t ail human bangs are intrinsically free, that the human being as human

is

t r e e - s u p p l y us w i t h the divisions that we shall make in w o r l d history a n d by wfnch we shall treat i t . But these are only preliminary remarks made i n passing; several other concepts must first be explained

inspection

of history, however, indicates that the actions of human beings

and purposes t o w h i c h these give rise, and f r o m their character and t a l e n t s indeed i n such a w a y that i n this spectacle of activity these needs, passions, interests, etc., seem to be the sole driving

force.

Individuals d o at o n e s

pursue more general purposes such as goodness,

but . n such a w a y that

this goodness is itself limited in character, for example

a noble love o f

country, o f a country that plays an insignificant role i n the w o r l d and the genera purposes of the w o r l d ; or a love for one's f a m i l y one s friends, and one's moraUectitude in g e n e r a . - i n a w o r d , all virtues. We may well « : the dictates o f reason actualized in these subjects themselves and i n the sphere of their efficacy; but these are only isolated individuals w h o make up but a

-

the History of P i n l o s o p h y Z ^ ' ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ opny, eo. ana t t Robert F. Brown etal. (Oxford, 2009), j . 181, 195. i

o

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to

32. The manuscript reads: {&> 33. The manuscript adds: (oil 89

155

M A N U S C R I P T S OF T H E

INTRODUCTION,

INTRODUCTION

small minority of the vast human race over against all the other individuals, | and the effective range of their virtues is correspondingly small. But in many cases passions, private interests, a n d the satisfaction of selfish impulses are the most powerful force. What makes them p o w e r f u l is that they do not heed any of the limitations that justice and m o r a l i t y seek to impose on them; and the natural force of passion has a more immediate h o l d on human beings than the artificial and laboriously acquired discipline o f order and moderation, of justice and morality. When we contemplate this spectacle of the passions and the consequences of the violence and irrationality that are associated w i t h them, a n d even more so w i t h good intentions and worthy aims; when we have before our eyes i n history the evil, the wickedness, the destruction of the noblest constructs of peoples and states, the downfall of the most flourishing empires that the h u m a n spirit has produced; and when we [observe] w i t h p r o f o u n d compassion the u n t o l d miseries of individual human beings—we can only end w i t h sorrow at the transience of everything. And since this downfall is n o t a w o r k of nature merely but of the will of human beings, we can all the more end up w i t h moral s o r r o w and with the good spirit (if such is in us) repulsed by such a spectacle. Without rhetorical exaggeration

we need o n l y compile an accurate

account of the misfortunes that have been suffered by even the finest creations of peoples and states, and of private virtues or innocence, t o raise u p a most frightful picture—a picture | by w h i c h our feelings are intensified t o the deepest and most helpless sorrow w i t h no reconciling outcome to counterbalance i t . We can perhaps fortify ourselves against this s o r r o w o r escape brom i t by the thought that this is h o w things have happened, that it is a matter of fate, that nothing about it can be changed. A n d then we react against the lassitude into w h i c h our sorrowful reflections are able t o plunge us and return t o our [normall outlook o n life,

the aims and interests of the

to

present, w h i c h are not a sorrow over the past b u t return us t o o u r o w n actuahty, even to that selfish complacency that stands o n the calmer shore 7 « . Hegel tuayfon the connection between Daseyn (here translated 'determmare evs.ence,

t 0

90

the same thing) the true result of world history. We have f r o m the very

- n s t r o u s sacrifices been made?

^ S P C C t a d e

« "is

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n

d

1830-1

91

159

INTRODUCTION,

M A N U S C R I P T S OF T H E I N T R O D U C T I O N

of freedom —that the subject itself m u s t be satisfied i n [ c a r r y i n g o u t ] an 38

activity or task. A n d if persons are t o be interested in something, they must be able to be actively engaged in i t ; that is, they require an interest of their own, they wish to identify themselves w i t h i t , and they find t h e i r o w n selfesteem confirmed by it. But we must avoid a misunderstanding here: people find fault and justifiably say, i n a misguided sense, o f an i n d i v i d u a l t h a t he is an interested party, that he seeks only his personal advantage—that is, seeks his personal advantage

without regard to the general purpose on the

19

occasion he seeks that advantage, even [acting] c o n t r a r y t o the purpose by curtailing, damaging, or sacrificing i t . But whoever is active o n behalf o f a cause is not merely interested i n general but is interested i n it.

Language

the w o r l d without

passion.

1830-1

Passion is the subjective, and in this respect the

f o r m a l , aspect of the energv o f volition and activity, irrespective o f its content or aim. Just as w i t h my o w n conviction, insight, and conscience the specific content of my conviction matters, so also does the specific aim of my p a s s i o n - w h e t h e r

| one a i m or another is of a truer nature. But con-

versely, i f it is the truer nature, then i t is inevitable that i t should come into existence and be actual as that element o f the subjective w i l l that includes all such factors as needs, drives, passions, as well as one's o w n views, opinions, convictions.

,.

F r o m this discussion o f the second essential element of historical actuality o f a purpose as such, it is e v i d e n t - i f in what has been said we consider the

accurately expresses this distinction. N o t h i n g happens o r is b r o u g h t t o

state-that

completion unless the individuals w h o are active i n i t are s a t i s f i e d

p o w e r f u l i f the private interest of its citizens coincides w i t h the general

40

too—

they who are particular [individuals] and w h o have needs, drives, and interests that are specific, are their o w n , although others have t h e m t o o , and that m their c o n t e x t - f o r example, m y c o a t - a r e n o t | distinct f r o m those o f the others. Included among these [interests] are n o t o n l y one's o w n needs and volitions but also one's o w n insights a n d convictions, or at least one s o w n estimation

and o p i n i o n - a s s u m i n g t h a t the need f o r argument,

understanding, reason is otherwise already awakened. W h e n people

are

acnve on behalf o f a cause, they expect t h a t the cause w i l l appeal to them as such, that they should enter into i t o n the basis o f their o w n o p i n i o n a n d conviction regarding the goodness of the cause, its justice, usefulness, advanc e for themselves, etc. This element i n particular is i m p o r t a n t f o r o u r o w n A" T ^1

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in this aspect a state w i l l be well-constituted and internally

end of the state, each finding m the other Us satisfaction and actualizauon. This is

a

most i m p o r t a n t proposition. But for the state t o achieve this unity,

numerous institutions must be established and appropnate

mechanisms

invented. This involves a lengthy struggle of the understandmg to become aware o f w h a t is appropriate, as

well as a struggle w i t h particu

and passions, w h i c h m u s t be subjected t o a protractedandd.fficult discipline before this unity ,s achieved. The point i n time at w h i c h the state anains such a u n i t y marks the period in its history when it flourishes, the period of its virtue strength, and success. B u t world

history does not begin w i t h som* sort of conscious purpose

do the particular

as

spheres of human b e i n g , The simple

c o m m o n life already has as its conscious purpose the « c u n n g o f l i f e a n d property, and once such a c o m m o n life has come i n t o being; these p u l s e s are S e t

defined, such as upholding the c t y of Athens or

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nions, subjective i m o r e s s i o n s - i s present o n ,ts o w n account

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activities constitutes the instruments m

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accomplishes its p u r p o s e - r a i s i n g it to consciousness and mak-ng

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H O F F M E I S * R WoHd H £ ™ I «««- ^ctures or, the Phdosophy D World Hrtory: IntroducUon: Reason ,„ ffetorv, tr. H . B. Nisbet (Cambridge, 1975), 89).

96

46

This is the hallmark of the lofty and absolute vocation o f human beings, that they know w h a t good is and what evil is and that vohtton itself -s w i l l i n g either good or e v i l - i n short, that they are capable of responsibility w i t h respect not onlv to evil but also t o good; they are responsible not simply 4 7

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d i v i n e . T h i s is m o r a l i t y , ethical life, religious piety. Something already mentioned about the activation of rational ends by individuals is that their subjective aspect—their interest as a whole and that of their needs and drives, their opinions and views (as only a f o r m a l aspect)—does, however, have an infinite right t o be satisfied. When we speak o f a means, we represent i t principally as something that is only external to the end and plays no part i n i t . But i n fact natural things generally, even the commonest inanimate things, w h e n they are used as means, must already be of such a character as t o be suitable to their end and have something about them that has affinity w i t h i t . A n d the relationship of human beings to rational ends is least of a l l that of a means i n t h i s w h o l l y external sense. For i n fulfilling rational ends, they n o t only simultaneously fulfill their own particular ends (whose content is quite different f r o m that [of the universal end]) but also participate i n that rational end itself, and are thereby ends in themselves. [They are] ends in themselves not only in a f o r m a l sense, as are all living beings—see K a n t — w h o s e individual lives are by their very nature already subordinate to human life and are rightly used as means; I individual human beings are also ends in themselves by virtue of what their ends involve. A n d under this heading falls everything that we w o u l d exempt f r o m the category of means, namely, morality, ethical life, religious piety. H u m a n beings are ends i n themselves only in virtue of the divine pnnciple w i t h i n them that we have referred to all along as reason and, insofar as i t is i n w a r d l y active and self-determining, as freedom. And we assert (without being able to develop the point more fully here) that indeed religious piety, ethical life, etc., have their soil and source i n this principle and therefore are intrinsically elevated above external necessity and contingency. (But i t must not be forgotten that we are concerned w i t h these factors only insofar as they exist w i t h i n individuals, that is, insofar as they are left to individual freedom; i n this regard, the responsibility for religious and ethical weakness, c o r r u p t i o n , o r loss falls upon individuals themselves.)

p r o C

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,

1830-1

o,

: * : i i ^ ^

human beings as the final end of nature. See Immanuel Kan^ CrU.k ^ LibaO790U83(diebeg,nnm^ (Oxford, 1952), ii. 92. 47. Hegel is alluding to Gen. 3: 5. 97

J£\

^

INTRODUCTION,

M A N U S C R I P T S OF T H E I N T R O D U C T I O N

168

for this or that or for everything that is around them a n d i n them, b u t also for the good and evil that are inherent i n their i n d i v i d u a l freedom. O n l y the animal is truly and totally innocent. But t o prevent or remove all the misunderstandings t o w h i c h this claim usually gives rise ( w h e n , for instance, the very ignorance of evil, which gets called 'innocence', is hereby debased and devalued) would require an extensive discussion, | a discussion no less extensive than a complete treatise on freedom itself. B u t when we consider the fate that overtakes v i r t u e , ethical life, and religious piety in history, we must not fall i n t o a litany o f lamentations t o the effect that the good and the pious often or indeed most of the time fare badly in the w o r l d , while the evil and the w i c k e d prosper. P r o s p e r i t y ' is commonly understood in many different ways, such as w e a l t h , o u t w a r d honor, and the like. But when we are discussing an end that subsists in and f o r itself, the so-called prosperity or misfortune of particular single individuals cannot and ought not t o be regarded as an element of the rational w o r l d order. There is more justification for expecting of the w o r l d purpose that good, ethical, and just purposes should seek their fulfillment a n d guarantee under its auspices and i n i t than t o expect that simply f o r the happiness and good fortune of individuals. W h a t makes humans morally dissatisfied (and they may take a certain pride in this dissatisfaction) is that they find a discrepancy between the present and their conceptions, principles, and opinion concerning ends of a more universal content, w h a t they consider to be right and good (nowadays ideals o f political institutions i n p a r t i c u l a r ) ; they find a discrepancy between the present and their predilection for devising ideals on w h i c h to lavish enthusiasm. They contrast [present] existence w i t h their view of h o w things r i g h t l y ought t o be. I n this case it is not particular interests and passions t h a t demand satisfaction b u t reasonjustice, and freedom; under this banner, such demands assert themselves a n d not only are readily dissatisfied w i t h the condition a n d events of the w o r l d but rebel against them. To | appreciate such feelings a n d views, we should have to undertake an investigation of the stated demands themselves, of verv emphatically expressed judgments and views. I n no other time than o u r o w n have such general propositions and conceptions been advanced w i t h more forceful claims. Whereas history customarilv seems t o present itself as a 4 8

4

169

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1830-1

conflict of passions, i n the present age—although the passions are not absent—it appears, on the one hand, primarily as a conflict of conceptions striving t o justify themselves to one another, and on the other hand as a conflict of passions and subjective interests, but essentially under the banner of such higher justifications. These rights, demanded in the name of w h a t we have described as the vocation of reason—as the absolute end and as selfconscious freedom—are thereby legitimated as absolute ends just like relig i o n , ethical life, and morality. We shall t u r n in a moment to the s t a t e , t o which all such demands are directed. But as for the curtailment, harm, and ruin of religious, ethical, and m o r a l purposes and affairs in general, it must at least be said—although we offer a more precise judgment regarding this matter l a t e r ' — t h a t such spiritual powers are absolutely justified; nevertheless, although their inward and universal aspect is infinite, their shapes, content, and development into actuality are more limited, thus meshing externally w i t h the natural order and being subject t o contingency. I n this respect they also are transient, subject t o curtailment and harm. Precisely as inwardly universal essences, religion and ethics have the feature, in conformity w i t h their concept, of being truly present in the individual soul, even if this feature is not fully cultivated there and not applied to | a network of relationships. The religious piety and ethical life of a restricted sphere of life (e.g. that of a shepherd o r a farmer), i n their concentrated inwardness and their limitation t o a few quite simple situations of life, have an iiifinite value—the same value as the religious piety and ethical life that accompany a high degree of knowledge and a life that is rich i n the extent of its relations and actions. 50

5

This inner center, this simple region of the right of subjective freedom, the seat of volition, decision, and action, the abstract content of conscience, that in which the responsibility and value of individuals and their eternal judgment are contained—all of this remains untouched by the noisy clamor of w o r l d history, untouched n o t only by external and temporal changes but also by the changes brought about by the absolute necessity of the concept of freedom itself. But in general the following may be established: that whatever in the world cani ,u»h/ claim nobility and splendor is subject t o something even higher than itself. 1 he right of the w o r l d spirit transcends all particular rights; it imparts itself to them

50. See below, pp. 100-7. The beginning of the section on the sure ^ ^ S ^ t l 51. An exposition as indicated here of the opposinon between « ^ J t e ^ ^ l a spiritual powers and the,r historical variabdity is not to be found u n available sources somewhat altered perspective Hegel returns to this theme at pp. 1 1 » - ' ? 52. In the margin: Ethical life in its genuine shape - in the state 99

I N T R O D U C T I O N , 1 830-1

M A N U S C R I P T S OF T H E I N T R O D U C T I O N

but only conditionally, insofar as they indeed belong to its substance but at the same time are burdened by particularity. These remarks may suffice in respect to the means that the w o r l d spirit employs for the realization of its concept. I n simple and abstract terms, the means it employs is the activity of subjects i n which reason is present as their inherendy subsisting substantial essence; but this g r o u n d is as yet indistinct and concealed from them. The matter becomes more complex a n d difficult, however, when we consider individuals not merely as active | o r i n terms of particular purposes limited t o only this individual, but rather in terms of a more concrete and determinate content related to religion and ethical life; for this content partakes of reason and hence also of its absolute rights. N o w the relationship of a mere means to an end disappears [ f r o m view], and the major aspects that arise i n regard to the absolute end of spirit have been briefly considered. c. The Material of Spirit's Actualization: the S t a t e

53

The third point concerns the end or purpose that is carried out by this means, that is, the shape i t assumes i n actuality. We have spoken o f means, and w i t h the carrying out of a subjective and finite end we also have the element of a material that is available or that must be procured in order that the end may be actualized. So the question becomes: What is the material i n which the rational final end is earned out? [This is a] spiritual [end]. Here humanity [is]: (a) the subject of w h a t is substantial its reason | and drive; (/3) means; ( ) consciousness, a knowing and willing intelligence. [Its] specific end is a spiritual nature. - . . . r

54

5 5

The living power of the state i n individuals is w h a t w e have called ethical hfe. The state, its laws and institutions, are theirs, are their right; so also are .1.1. the manuscript reads; y

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The state itself is an abstraction, which itself has only a universal reality in its citizens; but i t is actual, and its merely universal existence must become specific in the f o r m of individual volition and activity. The need arises for some sort of government and political a d m i n i s t r a t i o n ; there is a need for selecnng and singling out those t o be heavily occupied w i t h the affairs of state, t o make decisions and determine how they are t o be executed, and to instruct the citizens w h o are t o put them into practice. If, for example, i n a democracy a people chooses [to go to] war, a general must still be put in command to conduct the war. The state as an abstraction comes t o life and actuality i n the first instance by means of the constitution; but as it does so a difference anses between ruler and ruled, between command and obedience. | Obedience, however, seems t o be incompatible w i t h freedom; and command seems to do the very opposite of w h a t is required by the foundation of the state, by the concept of freedom. If sometimes the distinction between command and obedience is necessary because the maner could not be < * « i w i s e - « i d * » appears t o be a necessity that is merely external to freedom, abstractly denned and indeed i n conflict w i t h i t - t h e arrangement at least must be such that the m i n i m u m o f obedience is required of citizens, and the m i n i m u m of arbitranness is allowed t o those i n command. The content of what i t is c o m m a n d should be the m a m thing that is determined and decided by the people i n accord w i t h the w i l l of many or of all i n d i v i d u a l s - a l m o u g h the state as an actuality, as an individual unity, must have vigor and 65

The foremost feature is the distinction between ruler and ruled, and constitutions have rightly been class-fied on the whole as " ^ " " ^ racy, a n d democracy. It should be noted, however, («1 that i n a o i t i n c t i o n must be made between despotism and ^ ( f l that i n all classifications derived f r o m the concept only * ^ ™ * l u r e is emphasized. This does not mean that this very shape, anety o k i n d is said t o be exhausted in its concrete application, but tather that n

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INTRODUCTION,

M A N U S C R I P T S OF T H E I N T R O D U C T I O N

180

admits of a number of particular modifications, not o n l y i n terms of general arrangements i n themselves as such, but also of the sort that blend several of these essential arrangements, but which are accordingly amorphous, unsustainable, and inconsistent configurations. This clash of features raises the question, therefore, as to which is the best constitution, that is, by w h i c h arrangement, organization, or mechanism o f political power the purpose of I the state can be most securely attained. This purpose can certainly be understood i n different ways, for example, as the peaceful enjoyment of civic life or as universal happiness. Such purposes have given rise to the so-called ideal o f political regimes, especially the ideal of the education of princes (Fénelon), or of rulers generally, the anstocracy (Plato).* Here the chief concern ,s w i t h the character of those who govern the state, and no thought at a l l is given to the ideal f o r m of the organic insmunons of the state. The quesrion about the best c o n s t i t u t i o n is often treated as though not only the theory about i t a matter of s u b j e c t s and treedehberation, but also the actual introduction o f w h a t is recognized b m a ) 2TJ11" * a consequence of such a w h o l l y a T h o n ^ ' T ^ 5 ° « > ™ i o n could be a matter of 6

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in a monarchical f o r m o f government, for example Lafayene,* have not contradicted such a v i e w o r have subscribed t o i t . But they have seen that such a constitution, even though it may be the best, in actuality cannot be introduced everywhere, a n d that, because humans are what they are, one must make d o w i t h a lesser degree of freedom. As a consequence, under these I circumstances and i n light of the m o r a l condition of the people, the monarchical c o n s t i t u t i o n m a y be the wiosi workable one. From this perspective the necessity of a specific constitution is made to depend on conditions that are merely external and contingent. A representation of this kind is based on h o w the reflective understanding (Verstandes-Refiexion) separates concept and reality because it holds only to an abstract and therefore untrue concept and does not grasp the idea, or, w h a t amounts to the same thing i n content if not i n f o r m , does n o t have a concrete intuition of a people and a state. I t has alreadv been r e m a r k e d that the constitution of a people forms one substance and one spirit w i t h its religion, w i t h its art and philosophy, or at least w i t h the representations and conceptions of its culture generally—not to mention a d d i t i o n a l external factors such as its climate, its neighbors, and its position i n the w o r l d at large. A state is an individual totality from which a particular aspect, even a highly important one such as a constitution, may not be abstracted a n d isolated, considered solely for itself on its o w n terms. N o t only is the c o n s t . t u t . o n i n w a r d l y connected w i t h and dependent on the other spiritual powers, but also the specific f o r m of the entire spiritual individuality [of a state] w i t h a l l of its powers is merely one moment i n the history o l the whole.Thecour e[ofworldhistoryasawhole]predeternuneswhatg.vestoa 15

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C. THE COURSE a

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1830-1

OF WORLD

HISTORY

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I N T R O D U C T I O N , 1 830-1

M A N U S C R I P T S OF T H E I N T R O D U C T I O N

condition. Changes in nature, no matter h o w | diverse they are, exhibit only an eternally recurring cycle. In nature there is n o t h i n g new under the sun, and in this respect the manifold play o f its shapes carries on in wearisome fashion. Something new emerges o n l y through the changes that take

unchangeable principle, f r o m a simple essence whose existence as a germ is at first likewise simple but then brings distinctions forth from itself into determinate being. These distinctive features engage w i t h other things and thereby undergo a process of change; but this is a process that continuously

place in the spiritual realm. Purely natural things have one and the same

reverts t o its opposite and instead maintains the organic principle and its

quality, an always stable character, i n t o w h i c h all changes r e t u r n and w i t h i n

configurations intact. Thus the organic individual produces itself; it makes

which they are subject to it. The phenomenon o f the spiritual as it appears in

itself i n t o w h a t i t is i n itself. Spirit t o o is simply what makes itself; it makes

humans shows an altogether different character—an

actual capacity for

itself i n t o w h a t i t is inherently. But the development of the organic individual

change, indeed, as has been said, a change i n the direction of completion,

is such t h a t i t produces itself i n an immediate, unopposed, and unhindered

an impulse of perfectibility.

fashion; n o t h i n g can intrude between the concept and its realization

This principle, w h i c h makes change itself i n t o a

[basic] precept, has been grievously attacked by religions such as the Catho-

between the i m p l i c i t l y determined nature of the germ and the adequacy of

lic and also by states that claim i t to be their true right t o be static or at least

its existence t o its nature.

stable. While mutability is generally acknowledged w i t h regard t o w o r l d l y

W i t h spirit, however, it is otherwise. The transition of its I determinate

things such as states, an exception is made i n the case o f r e l i g i o n , as the

nature i n t o its actual existence is mediated by consciousness and w i l l . The

religion of truth. Moreover, it is possible t o ascribe changes, revolutions, and

latter are at first immersed i n their immediate natural life; their object and

the destruction o f legitimate rights panly t o contingencies and misfortunes

purpose are at first their natural determination as such. Because i t is spirit

but pnncipally to the frivolity, c o r r u p t i o n , and evil passions o f human

that animates t h e m , consciousness and w i l l [consist] of infinite demands,

beings. Perfectibility is i n fact something almost as indeterminate as change

strength, and w e a l t h . So spirit i n itself is opposed to itself; i t has t o overcome

itself; it is without aim and end; that t o w a r d w h i c h i t supposedly tends, the

itself as the genuine and hostile hindrance to its purpose. Development,

better and the perfect, is completely unspecified.

w h i c h as such is a peaceful procedure because i n its expression i t remains

The principle of development

has a further aspect: there is at its basis an

mner determ.nauon, an implicit

presupposition, that it brings i n t o exis-

tence. | This forma) determination is an essential one: the spirit whose meater, property, and field of actualization is w o r l d history is n o t one that onrts about ir.the external play of contingencies bur i s r a t h e r a s p i n t t h a t is in iteelr the absolutely determining [power]; its o w n distinctive determinan t * stands firmly against contingencies, w h i c h it makes use of and governs Uor its o w n purposes]. But natural organisms are also capable o f development Their existence is not simply an immediate one that can be altered only by external

influences;

rather it proceeds f r o m

its o w n inner

simultaneously equivalent t o and w i t h i n itself, is, w i t h i n spirit, i n a hard and ceaseless conflict w i t h itself. Spirit wants t o attain t o its o w n concept, but it conceals itself f r o m it and is proud and full of satisfaction i n its alienation ^ [ S p i r i t u a l ] development, therefore, is n o . just a

and a»nflicj free

process of e m e r g e n c e , a s i n o ^ directed t o itself; moreover, it involves not merely the formal aspect of developing as such but rather the producnon of a purpose or end w . d i a specific « » « 0 * . We have established f r o m the beginning

^

•s spirit, a n d indeed spirit in accord w i t h its essence, the concept of freedom. This is he fundamental object and thus also the driving principle of d e ^ opment. Such an object is that f r o m w h i c h development derives K . m e a n n and significance; so for example i n R o m a n history Rome is the

whkh is the bagmen, 'C. C ^ T j ^ S J , ^ ^ °" ' " "» > ° of the fit,] J ^ ^ ^ T ^ >•,

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In connection w i t h the n o t i o n of a state of nature in which freedom and justice are, or were, supposedly present in perfect f o r m , we have already remarked i n general terms h o w the beginning of the history o spirit must be comprehended i n terms of the concept. However, the historical ex.stence of a state o f nature was only an assumption made in the feeble light of hypothesizing reflection. | A pretension of a quite different s o r t - t h a n s , an assumpt i o n put f o r w a r d on the basis not of thought but rather of a historical fact, and indeed one based on a higher a t t e s t a t i o n - i s made by another nonon that is prevalent today i n certain circles. I t is that of an original paradis ac human c o n d i t i o n , a notion that earlier was elaborate^by theologian,un the r o w n fashion ( f o r example, that God conversed w i t h A d a m i n Hebrew and that ,s taken up aga.n but adapted to suit other « * » « ™ f j « authority t o w h i c h appeal is initially made is that of the biblical a n a m ^ But this narrarive presents the primitive condition only m its ^ w e l l - k n o w n parameters, i n part, however, w i t h various adaptations m regard t o the

n f i

" »^ P .° ^J. l .^t v , w h i c h e

- 4 . h , s ^ « ^ ^ dynam* by refernng especially to Aristotle, Metaphysics H i m l

n

0

pp. 7 6 Í - 6 1 . "5. This heading is editorial. „f ,he divine origin of language. Set, "6. Hegel apparently » alluding here to ** *>£™ „ 3 dTerste Splche éren , m o n oihers, johann Peter S u t l e r , ^ ^ ^ ^ u T h a b e ^ , 176*1. Hegel Ursprungnid* vonMenscben, * ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ * « f r W Herder, Abhandlung would have been famihar w,th dus * " ' ° " ^^^dutTwerke, ed. Ikmhard Suphan, v uber den Vrsprung der Iprache iBerl.n. 17721 ^ ^ ' . ^ V a n d especial I v C a b b a l a • Berlm, 1 8 9 * 1-155». Hegel ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ i-Hebnw. speculations about Adam's possession of complete knowledge an g

C

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stages are the fundamore precisely w i t h i n

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c. The Beginning of W o r l d H i s t o r y

manuscript reads 'b\

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111

INTRODUCTION,

MANUSCRIPTS OF T H E I N T R O D U C T I O N

human being as such (taking i t as universal human nature), or, insofar as Adam is taken as a single individual, as t w o in this one i n d i v i d u a l — o r as only present and complete in a single human couple. T h e biblical account does not justify our imagining that a people a n d its historical c o n d i t i o n actuallyexisted i n that primitive shape, still less that i t had developed a pure k n o w l edge of God and nature. Nature, so the fiction runs, 'originally lay open and transparent like a bright mirror of God's creation before the clear eye of humans', and the divine t r u t h was equally open t o t h e m . I t is also hinted, although in an indefinite and obscure fashion, that i n this primitive condition humanity was in possession of a specific | and already extensive knowledge of religious truths, which indeed were directly revealed by G o d . A l l religions had their historical origin i n this c o n d i t i o n , b u t at the same time they adulterated and concealed the original t r u t h w i t h products o l error and depravity. In all o f the erroneous mythologies, however, traces o f t h a t origin and o f the first teachings of religious t r u t h are present and discernible. Thus the study of the history of ancient peoples gains its essential interest f r o m tallowing back to the point where such fragments o f the o r i g i n a l revealed knowledge can soil be encountered in their greater p u r i t y . * We owe very 77

1830-1

much that is valuable t o the interest | [that has produced] this research, but ie» the latter directly belies itself because i t sets out to prove by historical methods w h a t i t has presupposed to exist historically. Neither that [advanced] state o f the knowledge o f G o d , or of other scientific, for example, astronomical, i n f o r m a t i o n , such as astronomers themselves, including Baillv,* have fancifully attributed t o the Indians, nor the assumption that such'a state prevailed at the beginning o f I w o r l d history or that the reh- 1 » gions o f the peoples were derived f r o m it by tradition and subsequently developed b y a process o f degeneration and deterioration, as is claimed by the crudely conceived so-called system of emanation—none of these 0

7 8

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pra.seworthy invesagaDons into Chinese and thence into Mongolian literature, could, into Tibetan literature. And Baron von Eckstein, in his own fashion _ wrtb the he p ol superficial nouons and mannerisms borrowed from German natural p h - l ^ T Frlednch von Schlegel, which, although more ingenious than those of Schiegd, ™ve«h« it ^ - e n corwruss.oned ^ « » £ Onen, , o discover at las. sttll hidden treasures with the hope of ohta.ning further regardmg more profonnd doctrines and espec.ally on ^ « ^ " ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ 5 1 " F ^ h i s m - t h e r e b y furthering the cause of Catholicism by tlus circuitous but for scholars f

^ 77. In the margin urth an asterisk: Friedrich von Schlegels Philosophie der Qeschichte, vol. 1.

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INTRODUCTION.

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tribes that scarcely f o r m a sociery, much less a state, but that have Jong been k n o w n t o exist; and w i t h others, although i t is primarily their advanced condition that interests us, their traditions extend back before the history

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of the f o u n d i n g o f their state, and they underwent numerous changes prior

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