Global Complexity

GLOBAL COMPLEXITY

JOHN URRY

polity

[,verything flows' Heraciitus Time is not absolutelY defined Albert Einstein CopyrightO JohnUrry 2003 The right of JohnUrry to be identifiedas authorof this work has beenasserted with the UK Copyright,Designsand in accordance Patents Act 1988. First publishedin 2003by Polity Pressin association with BlackwellPublishing Ltd. Reprinted2004,2005

Elements are elements only for the system that employs them as units and they are such only through this system.

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All rightsreserved.Exceptfor the quotationof shortpassages for the purposes of criticismandreview,no partof thispublication may be reproduced, storedin a retrievalsystem,or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, photocopying, mechanical, recordingor otherwise, withoutthepriorpermission of thepublisher. A CIP cataloguerecordfor this book is availablefrom the BritishLibrary. Libraryof Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Urry,John. Globalcomplexity/ JohnUny. p. cm. Includesbibliographical references andindex. ISBN 0-7456-28t7'6(hbk.)- ISBN 0-7456-2818-4 (pbk.) l. Globalization. 2. International relations.3. Socialsystems.I. Title.

tzt249 .u172003 327.l'01'1851 -dc2l

We are observing the birth of a science that is no longer limited to idealized and simplified situations but reflects the complexity of the real world, a science that views us and our creativity as part of the fundamental trend present at all levels of nature. Ilya Prigogine

20020'72082

Typesetin I I on 13pt Berling by SNPBest-set Typesetter Ltd.,HongKong Printedandboundin GreatBritainby MPG DigitalSolutions, Bodmin,Cornwall For furtherinformation on Polity,visit our website:http://www.polity.co.uk

If you want to humble an empire it makes senseto maim its cathedrals. They are symbols of its faith, and when they crumple and burn, it tells us we are not so powerful and we can't be safe. Time Magazine, 12 September 2001

Contents

Preface

vl11

1

'Societies'and the Global

2

The Complexity Turn

t)

3

Limits of 'Global' Analyses

39

4

Networks and Fluids

50

5

Global Emergence

76

6

Social Ordering and Power

104

7

Global Complexities

t20

References Index

t4l 155

Preface

Preface

During the 1990s,like many others, I became fascinatedby the idea that social relations are in some senseincreasinglyglobal. [n The Tounst Gaze in 1990 I briefly considered how many different places had to compete on a more global stagein order to attract tourists from all sorts of other places fUrry 1990, 2001J. Later works, such as ConsumingPlaces[Urry ]995), brought out how people across the world's stage are global consumers of other placesand that this very importantly changeswhat placesare like. They are on the world's stage. More generally,Scott Lash and I ar-ralysed such global transformations through the 'end of organizedcapitalism' thesis.Capitalism, we argued, is shifting from an organized national, societal pattern, to global 'disorganization'flash and Urry i987, 1994). In Economiesof Signsand Space[Lash and Urry 1994) we showed that moving rapidly in and across the world are complex and mobile economies,both of signsand of people working in, escaping from or seduced by various signs.These signs and people increasinglyflow along various 'scapes',resulting in further 'disorganization'of once organizedcapitalistsocieties.It was claimed that there is a move from the 'social' to the informational and communicational,from national government to global disorganization. Such a mobile economy of signs produces complex redrawingsof the boundariesof what is global and what is local.We tried to elaboratesome of the time and spacechangesinvolved in what Roland Robertson had termed 'elocalization'.

ix

l.ater in the decade Phil Macnaghten and I maintained that there is no such simple cntity as'nature'[Macnaghtenand Urry l'qqSl. There is nothing'natural', we showed,about nature.There could be ,r" u'variety of ContestedNatures and one of these what Ulrich t".-"a 'globalnature'.We explored the emergenceof 'global describing especially risk society', as a g".k hrt described of the story sad of the in detall the international ramifications British cow roast beef BSE and new variant CJD. This led me in Soaologt beyond Societies[Urry 2000bJ to try to rethink the very basesof sociology. I showed there, following Manuel Castells'strilogy on The Int'ormationAge (1996, )'997, 1998),that the emergenceof giobal networks transformsthe very nature of social life. It can no longer be seen as bounded within national societies.The concept of society is revealedto be deeply problematic, once the scale,range and depth of various mobile and global processesare examined. I suggestedthat such transformations lead us to rethink the nature of sociology,which had been mostly based upon attempts to understand the properties and reproduction of 'societies'.I elaboratedsome 'new rules of sociologicalmethod' to deal with disorganization,global flows and the declining powers of the 'social'. However, in all these works, I, like most other commentators, did not sufficiently examine the nature of the 'global' that was supposedlymaking great changesto social life and undermining 'societies'.The global was almost left as a 'black box', a deus ex machina that in and of itself was seen to have powerful properties.What was not analysedI think by anyonemuch was just what sort of 'system' the global is. Thus there was a rather weak understanding of how the systemic properties of the global interact with the propertiesof other entities such asthose of 'society'.The global is often taken to be both the 'cause' of immense changes and the 'effect' of those changes. As I was completing SociologtbeyondSocietiesI became increasingly aware of the growth within certain of the social sciencesof some conceptsand theories from the complexity sciences.This is over and beyond economics,where complexity was initially developed [see Arthur 1994b). I tried to develop some elements of complexity in SociologtbeyondSocieties,especially in relationship to thinking through how time and space are transformed in a

Preface

Preface

globalizing world. But more recently this small stream of complexity thinking in the social scienceshas been turning into a flood. In this current book I have tried to draw on some elemenrs in a more systematic way, although I am well aware of the dangers of crass simplification and misunderstanding as disciplinary boundariesget crossed.My formulations are qualitative,with no attempts to apply the mathematics of chaos and complexity. The social scienceof globalizationhad taken the global system for granted and then shown how localities, regions, nation states, environments and cultures are transformed in linear fashion by this all-powerful 'glob alizatton'. Thus globalization (or global capitalism) has come to be viewed as the new 'structure', with nations,localities,regions and so on, the new 'agent', employing the normal social science distinctions but given a kind of global twist. But complexity would suggest that such a system would be diverse,historical, fractured and uncertain. It would be necessary to examine how emergent properties develop at the global level that are neither well ordered and moving towards equilibrium nor in a state of perpetual anarchy.Complexity would lead one to see the global as neither omnipotent nor subject to control by society. Indeed, it is not a single centre of power. It is an astonishingly complex system, or rather a series of dynamic complex systems, a huge array of islands of order within a sea of disorder, as Ilya Prigoginemore generallypostulates.There would be no presumption of moving towards a state of equilibrium. And, as I was finishing this book, the tragic events of both l l September and its bloody aftermath showed the profound hmitations of any linear view of the global. These events demonstrate that globalization is never complete. It is disordered, full of paradox and the unexpected.Racingacrossthe world are complex mobile connections that are more or less intense, more or less social,more or less 'networked' and more or less occurring'at a distance'.There is a complex world, unpredictableyet irreversible, fearful and violent, disorderly but not simply anarchic. Small events in such systemsare not forgotten but can reappear at different and highly unexpected points in time and space.I suggest that the way to think these notions through is via the concept of global complexity.

And in thinking through what might be meant by 'global complexity', I have been helped by various colleagues,especially Lrirjof Capra, Biilent Diken, Mick Dillon, Andy Hoskins, Bob Jessop,Scott Lash, John Law, Will Medd, Mimi Sheller, Jackie Stacey,Nigel Thrift and Sylvia Walby.

x

xi

John Urry Lancaster

'societies'and the Global

Introducing the Global It increasinglyseemsthat we are living through some extraordinary times involving massivechangesto the very fabric of normal economic,political and sociallife.Analogieshave been drawn with a century or more ago,when a somewhat similar restructuring of the dimensionsof time and spacetook pl.ace.New technological and organizationalinnovations 'compressed'the time taken to communicate and travel across large distances.Some of these momentous innovations that changed time-space a century ago included the telegram, the telephone, steamship travel, the bicycle,cars and lorries,skyscrapers, aircraft,the massproduction factory, X-ray machines and Greenwich Mean Time fsee Kern 1983). Together these technological and social innovations dramatically reorganized and compressed the very dimensions of time and spacebetween people and places. Today some rather similar changesseem to be occurring.The 1990s saw the growth of the Internet with a take-up faster than any previoustechnology.There will soon be I billion usersworldwide. The dealingsof foreign exchangethat occur each day are w-orth$1.4 trillion, which is sixty times greaterthan the amount ol world trade. Communications 'on the move' are being transformed, with new mobile phonesnow more common in the world than conventionalland-line phones.There are 700 million international journeys made each year, a figure predicted to pass i

'societies'and the Global

'Societies'and the Global

billion very soon. Microsoft pointedly asks:'where do you want to go today?' and there are many ways of getting 'there'. At the same time tens of millions of refugees and asylumseekersroam the globe, with three billion people acrossthe world receiving the same total income as the richest 300. Globally branded companies employing staff from scoresof different courltries have budgets that are greater than those of individual countries. Images of the blue earth from space or the golden arches of McDonald's are ubiquitous across the world and especiallyupon the blllion or so TV sets.A huge array of public and private organizations has arisen seeking to produce, govern, surveil, terrorize and entertain this 'spaceshipearth', including some 17,000 trans-bordercivic associations. Thus new technologiesare producing 'global times' in which the distancesbetween places and peoples again seem to be dramatically reducing.Some writers even suggestthat time and space are 'de-materializing', as people, machines, images, information, powet money, ideas and dangers are all, we might say, 'on the move', travelling at bewildering speed in unexpected directions from place to place,from time to time. Various commentators have tried to understand these exceptional changes.Anthony Giddens [1990) has described modern sociallife asbeing like a massiveout-of-control 'juggernaut'lurching onwards but with no driver at the wheel. The journalist FrancesCairncross (1995) describesin detail the 'death of distance' that these various technologiesseem to produce.Zygrnunt Bauman (2000) talks of the speeded-up'liquid modernity' as opposed to the fixed and given shapes that the modern world had earlier taken. Manuel Castells(2001) has elaboratedthe growth of an 'lnternet galaxy' that has ushered the world into a wholly different informational structure. Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) have provocativelysuggestedthat notions of nationstate sovereigntyhave been replacedby a singlesystem of power, what they call'empire', while many writers,indeed more than 100 a year, have described and elaboratedthe so-calledglobalization of economic,social and political hfe. In this book I show how various 'global' processesraise major implications for most of the categoriesby which sociologyand the other social scienceshave examined the character of social life.

,Globalization'debatestransform many existirrgsociologicalcontroversies,such as the relative significanceof social structure, on the one hand, and human agency,on the other. Investigating the slobal also dissolvesstrong dichotomies between human subjects and physical objects,as well as that between the physical sciences The study of the global disruptsmany conand the socialsciences. and debates should not be viewed as merely an extra ventional level or domain that can be 'added' to existing sociologicalanalysesthat can carry on regardless.'Sociology'willnot be able to sustainitself as a specificand coherent discoursefocusedupon the study of given, bounded or'organized' capitalistsocieties.It is irreversiblychanged. So faq, howevel globalization studies are at an early stage of recording,mapping, classifyingand monitoring the 'global' and its effects[see Castells1996, 1997,7998; Held et al. 1999; Scholte 2000). A new social scienceparadigm, of globalization,is developing and extending worldwide, but so far it remains somewhat 'pre-scientific'.[t concentrates upon the nature of the global 'region' that is seen as competing with, and dominating, the societal or nation-state'region'. Globalization studies pose a kind of inter-regionalcompetition between the global and each society, the global on such a view being regarded as an overwhelming, singularcausalforce. Whether writers are critics of, or enthusiastsfor, the global, globalizationgetsattributed exceptionalpower to determine a massive rangeof outcomes.Furthermore,'globalization' is often taken to referboth to certain processes[from the verb, to globalize)and to certainoutcomes (from the noun, the globe). Both get designated asglobalization, as both'cause'and'effect' (Rosenberg20001. In order to develop the analysishere I suggestthere are five major globalizationdebatesand claims that should be clearly distinguishedfrom each other. There is no single and agreed-upon Slobalizationthesis. These five theori., u." based respectivelv upon the concepts of structure, flow, ideology,performanc" ,r,i complexity. Each recurs at different points in this book - but I especiallvdeveloo the implications of the last.This book setsout ard defendsa complerity approach to globalization,an approach that elaborates the systemic and dynamic character of what I previouslycalled'disorganized'capitalism.

2

'societies'and the Global The structural notion of the globaL Chase-Dunn,Kawano,and Brewer [2000: 78) maintain that giobalization is defined as the increaseddensity of international and global interactions,compared with such interactionsat the local or national levels fsee Castells 1996; Held et al. 1999; Scholte 2000). There has been an increasein structural globalizationwith the greatly heightened density of such global interactions, although this is not simply a new phenomenon. This increased density of interactions is seen to result from a number of causes. There is the'liberalization of world trade and the internationalizing of th6 organization of much capitalist production. There is the globalizing of the consumption of many commodities and the declining costs of transportation and communications.Interregional organizationsare more significantwith the internationalizing of investment and the general development of a 'world system'. These together produce a revised structural relationship between the heightened density of the global and the relatively less networked, less dense,local/national levels.Globalization is not the property of individual actors or territorial units. It is an emergent feature of the capitalist economy as a whole, developing from the interconnections between different agents,especially through new forms of time-space 'distanciation'acrossthe globe and of the compression of time-space relations (Jessop2000: 356). This produces the 'ecological dominance' of globalizing capitalism. Relatedly it is argued that this dominance both stems from, and reflects,the growth of a 'transnationalcapitalist class'that is centred within transnationalcorporationsthat are 'more or lessin control of the processes of globalization'(Sklair Z00l: 5). US presidential candidate Ralph Nader summarized this thesis through the concept of 'corporateglobalization'. The global as flows and mobilities These flows are seen as moving along various global 'scapes', including the system of transportation of people by air, sea,rail, motorways and other roads.There is the transportationof objects

'Societies'and the Global .,;qnostal and other systems.Wire, coaxial and fibre-optic cables television pictures and computer informessages, .nrry ,"t"pttone There are microwave channelsthat are used images' .-''r,ion and /n'. nlobll" phone communications.And there are satellitesused receiving phone, radio and television signals for transmitting and and Urry 1994; Castells1996; Held et al. Lash 1990; fApprdurai that, once such physical and organizational argued igbgt It is scape structures are established,then individuals, companies, olacesand even societiestry to become nodeswithin such scapes. Various potential flows occur along these scapes.Thus people travel along transportation scapesfbr work, education and holidays.Objecrsthat are sent and received by companies and individuals move along postal and other freight systems.lnt'ormation, and imagesflow along various cables and between satelmessages lites.Messagestravel along microwave channels from one mobile ohone to another. What Thesescapesand flows createnew inequalitiesof access. becomessignificantis the 'relative', as opposed to the 'absolute', location of a particular social group er town or society in relationship to these multiple scapes.They passby some areaswhile connecting others along information and transportation rich 'tunnels'.These can compress the distancesof time and space between some places while enlarging those between others [Brunn and Leinbach 1991; Graham and Marvin 2001). Globalization as ideologt This neo-liberalview is articulated by transnationalcorporations and their representativesand by variouspoliticians and journalists lseeFukuyama1992;Ohmae 1992).Suchcorporationsoperateon a rvorldwide basis and often lack any long-term commitment to particularplaces,labour forces or even societies.Thus those with economicinterestsin promoting capitalismacrossthe globe maintain that globalization is both inevitable and natural and that nationalstatesor nationallyorganizedtrade unions should not regulateor direct the inevitabie of the globalmarketplace.What ls viewed as crucial is 'shareholder -arch value', so that labour markets should be made more flexible and caoital should be able to invest or disinvestin industriesor countries at will.

'Societies'and the Global

'Societies'and the Global

In this account, globalization is seen as forming a new epoch, a golden age of cosmopolitan'borderlessness'. National statesand societiesare thought unable to control the global flows of information. Such a borderlessworld is seen as offering huge new opportunities to overcome the limitations and restrictions that societiesand especiallynational stateshave historically exercised on the freedom of the 44,000 trans-border corporations to treat the world as 'their oyster'. There were incidentally only 7,000 such corporations in the 1960s [Scholte 2000: 86). The World Tiade Organization both symbolizes this neo-liberal notion of globalization as ideology and represents such an interest, often spreading such notions through closed seminars for business leaders, academics and free-market politicians (see account and critique in Monbiot 2000).

on\,ironmentswhich are often markers of global threats,dramatic Inr.iron-"tttal protests,scientific papers on climate change,the of the cold war, NGO campaigns,records of extreme "nding events,pronouncementsby global public figures,global weather conferencessuch as Rio and Kyoto, and so on. Together these practicesare performing a 'global nature', a nature that appearsto be undergoingchange that needs to be vigorously and systematically resistedand indeed reversed.

6

Glob alization as p erformance Drawing on ideas about the analysisof gender as involving enactment, processand performance,Franklin et al. (2000: 1-17) argue that the global is not so much a 'cause' of other effects but an effect. It is enacted, as aspiration rather than achievement, as effect rather than condition, and as a project to be achieved rather than something that is pre-given.The global is seen as coming to constitute its own domains. It is continuously reconstituted through various material and semiotic processes. Law and Hetherington maintain that 'global space,is a material semiotic effect. It is something that is made' []999). And to perform the global implies that many individuals and organizationsmobilize around and orchestratephenomena that possessand demonstrate a global character.A good example of this involves how the idea of a separateand massivelythreatened 'global nature' has been produced and performed. What were once many apparently separate activities are now regarded as interconnected components of a single global crisis of the natural world [see Wynne i994). This global nature has resulted from fusing various social practices that are remaking space.These include imagesof the earth from spaceand especiallythe Apollo 17 photograph of the 'whole earth' taken in 1972, transportpolicies, deforestation, energy use, media images of threatened iconic

Global complexity This conceptionis nowhere developedin detail, but Rifkin [2000: l9l-3) analysesthe implicationsof what he callsthe'new physics' for the study of property relations in the emerging capitalist world (see also Capra 2O0Z). Rifkin notes that contemporary 'science' no longer sees anything 'as static, fixed and given'. The observer changesthat which is observed,apparent hard-and-fastentities are always comprised of rapid movement, and there is no structure that is separatefrom process.In particular, time and space are not to be regardedas containersof phenomena,but rather all physical and social entities are constituted through time and through space.These ideasfrom the 'new physics' will be elaboratedbelow, so as to explore better the extraordinary transformations of timespacethat'globalization' debatesboth signify and enhance. Complexity does not, of course,solve all the problems of the socialsciences.Nor is globalization only and exhaustively comprehensiblethrough complexity. And most of all I am not suggestingthat the 'social' implications of complexity are clear-cut. But I do suggestthat, since the systemic features of globalization are not well understood, the complexity sciences may provide concepts and methods that begin to illuminate the global as a systemor seriesof systems [for a similar formulation from within complexity', see Capra 20OZ). 'global' and'complexity', the aim is to . In coupling together the show that the former comprises a set of emergent systems possessingproperties and patterns that are often far from equilibrium. Complexity emphasizes that there are diverse networked timespace paths, that there are often massive disproportionalities between causes and effects, and that unpredictable and yet

'Societies'and the Global

'Societies'and the Global

irreversiblepatterns seem to characterizeall social and physical systems. Some of this 'new physics' is also present in the so far most significant examination of the new global order, Manuel Castells'sThe Int'ormationAge fl996, 1997, 1998). His argument restsupon a 'complexity' conception of the global, although thls is somewhat buried in the astonishingmass of material he presents.I now set out aspectsof his argument,especiallyrelating to the concept of 'network', before noting its 'complexity' components. His focus on networks will also be central to the analysis that follows below.

/evelopment of new scapes,with the instantaneousflows of inforI,'r,ion being the preconditionfor the growth of globalrelations. This new informational paradigm is characterized by the ,,etrlork enterprise(see Castells 1996, 2000, 2001). This is a made from either firms or segmentsof firms, and/or from ""i*orn segmentation of firms. Large corporations are internally internal decentralizedas networks.Small and medium businessesare connected in networks. These networks connect among themselves on specificbusinessprojects,and switch to another network when the project is finished. Major corporations work in a strategyof changing alliances and partnerships, specific to a given product, process,time and space. Furthermore, these cooperations are increasinglybased on the sharing of information. These are information networks, which, in the limit, link up suppliers and customers through one firm, with this firm being essentially an intermediary of supply and demand. The unit of this production processis the businessproject. What are important, therefore,are not'structures',which imply a centre,a concentrationof powe4 vertical hierarchy and a formal or informal constitution. Rather, networks 'constitute the new social morphology of our societies,and the diffusion of networking logic substantially modifies the operation and outcomes in processesof production, experience, power and culture . . . the netr,vorksociety,characterizedby the pre-eminenceof socialmorphology over social action' [Castells 1996: 469). A network is a set of interconnectednodes.the distancebetween social oositions being shorter where such positions constitute nodes within a network asopposedto those lying outsidethat particular network. Netlvorks are dynamic open structures so long as they continue to effect communication with new nodes (Castells 1996: 470-I; seealsoCastells2000). Networks decentreperformanceand share decision making. What is in the network is useful and necessary lor its existence. What is not in the network will be either ignored if it is not reievantto the network's task, or eliminated if it is competing in goalsor in performance.If a node in the network ceasesto perform a useful function, it is phased out from the network, and the t-te.tworkrearrangesitselfl Some nodes are more important than others,but they all need each other as long as they remain within

8

The Network Society Castells (2000) argues that there are various technological paradigms, a cluster of interrelated technical, organizational and managerial innovations. Their advantageslie in their superior productivity in accomplishlng assignedgoals through synergy between their components.Each paradigm is constituted around a fundamental set of technologies,specific to the paradigm, and whose coming-together into a synergistic set establishes the paradigm. Castells views information/communication technologies [including genetic engineering) as the basis of the new paradigm that developedwithin especiallyNorth America during the 1970s and 1980s. The main properties of this new informational paradigm are that the building blocks are bits of electronically transmitted information. Such technologiesare pervasive,since information has become integral to almost all forms of human practice.complex and temporally unpredictablepatterns of informational development occur in a distributed fashion in very specific localities.Technologiesare organized through loosely based and flexibly changing networks. These different technologies gradually converge into integrated informational systems, especially the once-separatebiological and microelectronic technologies.Such systemspermit organizationsto work in real time 'on a planetary scale'. These instantaneous electronic impulses produce a 'timeless time' and provide material support for the

l0

'societies'and the Global

the network. Nodes increasetheir importance by absorbingm information and processingit more efficiently.If they decline i their performance,other nodestake over their tasks.Thus, the relevanceand relative weight of nodes come not from their speci Features,but from their ability to be trusted by the rest of network. In this sense,the main nodes are not centres,but switch ers that follow a networking logic rather than a command logic in their function vis-a-vis the overall structure. Networks generate complex and enduring connections stretch ing acrosstime and space between peoples and things (M 1995: 745). Networks spread across time and space,whlch ; advantageous,because 'left to their own devices human acti and words do not spread uery t'ar at all' [Law 1994: 24; see also Rycroft and Kash 1999). Different networks possessdifferent abilities to bring home to certain nodes distant events, places or people, to overcome the friction of space within appropriate periods of time. According to Castells,there are now many very varied phenomena organized through networks, including network enterprises (such as the criminal economy), networked states [such as the European Union) and many networks within civil society [such as NGOs resistingglobalizationor international terrorists). Castells'snetwork analysisis of major importance, becauseit breaks with the idea that the global is a finished and completed totality. And he uses various ideas that prefigure a complexity approachto global phenomena [for a brief comment, see Cast 1996: 64-5). The analysisof networks emphasizescontingency, opennessand unpredictability,suggestinganalogieswith how the 'web of life', accordingto Capra Q996;35), consistsof 'networks within networks'. Castells also emohasizes how networks power produce networks of resistance.Many social practicesare drawn to what could be called in complexity terms the 'powerresistanceattractor' [Castells \997: 362). He also arguesthat the strength of networks results from their self-organizing and often short-term character and not from centralizedhierarchicaldirection, as with older style rational-legalbureaucraciesof the sort famously examined by Weber [see Rycroft and Kash 1999; Rifkin 2000: 2B). Specifically,Castellsshows the'chaotically' subversive effects of the development of the personalcomputer in the 1980s

'societies'and the Global

11

-- rhe workingsoI the sfafebureaucracyin the Soviet Union. lp":l'W;i"rian bureaucracyhad historically controlled all inforflous, including even accessto the humble photocopier. ;;;"" 'jl,r'i *", completely outflanked by the informational effects of global spread of the PC [Castells 1996: 36-7; Itl'u,",p."dlctable 1998:ch' 1J.' b"st"l1, also notes how attempts to regulatethe Internet seem judges have written: loomed to failure, since,as three American Internet is chaos, so the strength of our of the strength i"r, n, the of the unfettered chaos and cacophony the lib"rt' dependsupon .,-,"".h the First Amendment protects' [Castells 1997: 259)' The ,.,J"rkr"r, of hierarchical nation states can be seen in the growth of the 'global criminal economy' and the exceptional mobihty of illeeal money and its transmutation [money laundering) as it .u.""r, around global scapes,often evading detection [Castells l99B: 201-3; this money movement being partly created by different nation-state regimes). This global criminal economy, or indeed global terrorism, takes the global order far from equilibrium, as nation statesrespond to such mobilities with attackson civil libertiesespeciallyof mobile immigrant groups,and as global crime corrupts democratic politics in many societies.Castells fl998: 162) also talks of the 'black holes' of informational capitalism,placesof time-space warping where peoplesand placesare drawn into a downwards and irreversible spiral or vortex from which there is no escape.He argues,similarly, as we will see, to Prigogine,that the global world is characterized not by a single time but by what he calls multiple times.There is clock time of the massproduction factory, the timeless time of the computer and the glacial time of the environment [Castells 1996: ch.7; 1997:125; Urry 2000b: ch. 51. However, Castells's *ogni* opus lacks a set of interrelated conceptsthat would enable these very diverse phenomena to be systemailcallyunderstood. The global remains rather taken for grantedand there is not the range of theoretical terms necessary to analyse the emergentproperti;s of the networked'global'levei. tn particular, the term 'network' is exoected to do too much theoreticalwork in the argument.Almost all phenomenaare seen through the single and undifferentiated prism of 'network'. This concept glosses-o,r". ,r".y different networked phenomena. They

'societies'and the Global

'Societies'and the Global

can rangefrom hierarchicalnetworks such as McDonald's to heterarchic extremely inchoate'road protest movements', from spatially contiguous networks meeting every day to those organized around imagined'cultures at a distance',from those based upon strong ties to those based on very important and extensive'weak ties', and from those that are pretty well purely 'social' to those that are fundamentally 'materially' structured. These are all networks, but they are exceptionally different in their functioning one from the other. Moreoveq,the concept of network does not bring out the enormously complex notions of power implicated in the diverse mobilities of global capitalism, such as those of the Internet [but see Castells 2001). Movement and power are now inextricably intertwined, and the concept of network minimizes the astonishing paradox, uncertainty and irreversibility of the patterns of global emergence. It is the materials, concepts and arguments within the science of complexity that remain undeveloped in Castells's otherwise brilliant examination of intersecting global networks.

ratherinsteadconceivingof nature as active and creative',to make Ithe la*s of nature compatible with the idea of events,of novelty, ond of creativity' (Wallerstein1996: 61, 63). The Commission how scientific analysis 'based on the dynamics of l".o--"nds non-equilibria,with its emphasison multiple futures, bifurcation and choice, historical dependence, and . . . intrinsic and inherent uncertainty',should be the model for the social sciencesand this would undermine clear-cut divisions between humans and nature, and between social and natural science.However, most surprisingly this Commission is silent on the study of globalization, although the global is surely characterized by emergent and irreversible complexity and by processesthat are simultaneously socialand natural. I show in various chaptershow conceptsand theories in chaos andcomplexity theory bear directly upon the nature of the global. In particular, complexity examines how components of a system can through their dynamic interaction 'spontaneously'develop collective properties or patterns, such as colour, that do not seem implicit, or at least not implicit in the same way, within individual components. Complexity investigatesemergent properties, certain regularities of behaviour that somehow transcend the ingredientsthat make them up. Complexity arguesagainstreductionism, against reducing the whole to the parts. And in so doing it transforms scientific understanding of far-from-equilibrium structures,of irreversible times and of non-Euclidean mobile spaces. It emphasizeshow positive feedbackloops can exacerbate initial stressesin the system and render it unable to absorb shocks to re-establishthe original equilibrium. Positive feedback occurs when a change tendency is reinforced rather than dampened clown.Very strong interactions occur between the parts of such systems,with the absenceof a central hierarchical structure that unambiguously'governs'and producesoutcomes.Theseoutcomes are to be seen as both uncertarn and irreversible. Another way of expressingthis is to argue that complexity can .,, lilumine how social life is always a significant mixture of achievernent and failure. Much social science is premised upon the successfulachievementof an agent'sor system'sgoalsand objectives. Sociologyis'imbued with a commitment to and confidenie in the possibility of increasedsuccessin social life'; the social world to

12

The Challenge of Complexity Thus, although hundreds of boola and articles have been written on the'global', it has been insufficiently theorized. In this book I turn to the complexity theory that is now emerging more generally as a potential new paradigm for the social sciences,having transformed much of the physical and biological sciences. Thus 'non-linear' scientistsworking at one of the leading scientific complexity centres,the Santa Fe Institute in New Mexico, have developed some implications of complex adaptive systems for theorizing the nature of the global,especiallythe idea of global sustainability[Waldrop 1994: 348-53). Moreover, the US-based Gulbenkian Commission on the Restructuring of the Social Sciences,chaired by Immanuel Wallerstein and including non-linear scientist Ilya Prigogine,has advocated breaking down the division between'natural' and'social' sciencethrough seeingboth domains as characterizedby'complexity' (Wallerstein 1996). Complexity, they say,involves not 'conceivingof humanity as mechanical,but

l3

'societies'and the Global

'Societies' and the Global

which it directs our attention 'is one conceptualised,for the most part, in terms of practices,projects and processesthat operaterelattvely unproblematically' [Malpas and Wickham 1995: 38). On this account, failure is 'an aberration, a temporary breakdown within the system', the exception rather than the rule fMalpas and Wickham 1995: 38J.Thus there are the svstemsinvestisat by sociology (or the social sciencesmore generally) and there is failure or breakdown. There is thought to be either one or other. It is a duality. And yet, of course,social life is full of what we may term 'relative failure', both at the level of individual goals and especially at the level of social systems.Failure is a 'necessaryconsequence of incompleteness'and of the inability to establish and sustain complete control of the complex assemblages involved in any such system [Malpas and Wickham 1995: 39-40). This is well known but tends to be viewed in the social sciencesthrough the concept of unintended consequences. What is intended is seenas having a range of unintended side effects that may take the system away from what seemsto have been intended.However,this is a limited and often individualistic way of formulating relative failure that does not explicate just how these so-calledside effects may be systemicfeaturesof the system in question.The use of complexity should enable us to break with such dualistic thinkins. system and its failures. Chaos and order are always interconnected within anv such svstem. It is in the light of these argumentsthat the emergent level of the global is examined below. Such a system clearly seems to combine in curious and unexpected ways,both chaos and order. It is not simply another region like that of society,nor is it the product of, or to be reduced to, a pre-existingdifference or some governingelement. Global systemscan be viewed as interdependent, as self-organizingand as possessingemergent properties.I suggestthat we can examine a range of non-linear,mobile and unpredictable'global hybrids' alwayson the 'edgeof chaos'.These should constitute the subject matter of sociology and of its 'theory' into the twenty-first century. Examples of such global hybrids include informational systems,automobility,global media, world money, the Internet, climate change, the oceans,health hazards,worldrvide social protest and so on. Sociologyhas known

with an open system.But the proliferation of inter"l"ar ir deals I-..na"ntly fluid global hybrids operating at immensely varied scalesproduces a quantum leap in the opennessand I.I.-ror." of the systemsbeing analysed,systemsalways com."rpf"l,o.lo. .':::[: li5;1"ryil*],*m : lil:n:''ntv' empire' ""'societies' All they imply is Sion deployedby Hardt andNegridoes l'r'llij:";iil;

s1-^'",n:.::.?",

"1'"-pire'

#;:ru'.;il:':^.T*i:::;'":::T::Tlin';*:1'

iott"Ti'ij':i;":;; be characterizedas'a sovereignpower that .Tetonty rrr H"' " /1000. p. xi).Although Hardt and Negri conl.rerns the worta. le

Sili;+;::::^ri::::::"S.:x1fr :::':tulf#i,iHiu:i iheirclaimthat'thereis worldorder' matize

Empires and Multitudes

@rillliu"\'{rr,

In Empire, Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000 the conceptof ,empire,o.,imo"Ji:;:^-^,_-,,

#flfi'r"Jo"lUi"

ttll.J'i:ffi IIJ*: rj; o :l ra ; dynamican t*j.,1.; : :"f:"' d n ; i ;'ff" :i;1" "",:bi"' tally across the globe, i,ffi ,sovorroh-6 TTJ,lt; a kind Nrrq ut of r^,:!L_ .

that sweeps ,"*J,6",

'

Sovernance without gover

Q0003)' the concept of 'empire' is a useful one' Rather,I suggesttnat of ch"ura.terizeoverall global relations. My analysis b";;;;; be to said that all societiescould be il;;i-;"-Olexity.suggests ,empires'. contemporary societies possess libe [ecoming more power such as buildr" t*r"""tf.gly visible ."nt.", with icons of there is a i.gr, f""at.Jp", ur-tdbrands, while beyond the centre of ,pi."aing of effects outwards with a relative weakness borders' Within such'empires'there are emergentinequalitiesrather than, as in at least welfare societies,an attempt to create citizenship rights that are common throughout the territory. In particular, ,oii.ti", are on the world's stage, showing off their trophies, competingwith each other for the best skyline,palaces,galleries, stadia,infrastructures and so on, and seeking to avoid scandal and risk. Societiesare endlesslydrawn into the glocal attractor and it is thisthat remakesthem as'empires',the USA being the most powerful and dominant of such societalempires currently strutting the world'sstage.The USA possesses a number of exceptionalcentres (NY LA,Washington),many iconsof power (Pentagon,WallStreet, Hollywood,Ivy ieague Universities,Texan oil wells,SiliconValley, MOMAI, a porosity of borders (on the USAs Latinization, see Davis2d00bj r"d hug"'imperial' economic and socialinequalities. It is the purojig- ..s" of 'societyasempire'.Thus,rather than there beinga single'empire',globalcomplexity suggeststhat eachsociety is drawn into ttLe attractor of glocalization and is remade, so developingsome characteristicsof 'empire'.

.^dry";;"tdd :;'j:;il 1._"; .1 :1,"_: Ji:i,il.,|1 ^ . *ior. l'#l';llifrffi'",I:'"or'ur"'h";;;;;;)"?il'"."'I?3r'J is deterritoriatir"a u"a with a rneroin_ al."]., wor ld" t he .s i n o l . l n o i ^ f ,,,1 .,

,tinterdependentfluid globaihybridsthat both

u€rergnpow e4,a' r

g*'iil.TT'Jf,it'itt;"'il"fi,{il1{ii*$',i:;:l ^-.,,o,u,"r"r,qnty

boundaries __r r s qr r L r u ,aso oir b"..i".r. u a rrre rs .,l h e ,a g e nf The _ . .r o f g l obal i zati on i s,t. -l^t-^I,-^.,

l

r* . oi r r r g, r r ", .. rr Z.ffi U Ui: U : IrJ3 O6 J). A A nn dd, , e m_ p i fp , Lrary 1;i < ;,,.""*:iy i".iits .j oppos.itg, l:, d,;; iry generates ";;, whaIHa.dt " ei.., N"gri +;#;r,

desires r,' ".a tude,t :::::i,T:,],'fl,li',": _:nd :I r "-i - ouir"1murti*:' . '

iiooo, [r]11l'r;'61" T::f:Tj[;"j?:t "-pi." parallelsmy argument as to the

tra Iitvor thea :':1"i,fff iiloil:it"'r'tri ",".'iioi"i, Ji'is*;' little ,p"cifi."tion

tralitv of tL- ,^.^-:lliie' global system.Howr

Negri Nesriof rhe o,"r_*..^=lll l.h*" of th esv stemi' ."ru.i o,',*i ;i;; :

U, H".ji *a

#:l:: ilnrtJ"lilit T;

rt operatesin co'dirion, fbl ft"; ;;;,1]0.,,r,',, Theirs is a remark ably undynamicaccount of serf-repilJ,r.ir,ggrobal rerations. They say,for example,thr

supp orts,r, 'il:fiJ:il?,:il**l.mt :Hi "'*i.u"iTffi ; ;;.'""; ;i il;";'^iii-' ""t5#"t"t$ lf] .?y"ehere un.dtuiJft ";;;:;ii,;H:,i'"""rrl;f:'r:,#*".,.;#;i::

130

GIobaIComPlexities

.,,,:alComplexities

And each society qui:npire produces its opposite,its its rebellious multitude ird the globalizing of capitalistm has generated some str.,i-:.g new zones from which ,multi emerge to challengeen:.:es. The events of l l September to have emerged unprec.,:rbly from one of the very poorest c tries in the world, and :: are said to have irreversiblv ch many parametersstruct;l]g economic,socraland political life.-l I September demonstrat* :re c-omplexity of 'asymmetric threats,i that 'wars' are increasL::ry fought between formally .rn.qual powerswith the appare'-r weakable to inflict massiveUlo*, oi the apparently powerfu. : is almost the secular equivalent of ,thu first shall be last, and t-,,.astshall be first,. The mightie, i, ihe power of society as eL-::e, the greater the harm ihat can be inflicted. _ Global complexity ca:*rusbe seen in the power of the powerless to inflict the utrn;i: harm upon the institutions of imperial powet especially::rsebuildings, institutions and people that symbolize the inte:it condensationof imperial power. The USA is the paradigm casi'i'societyas empire'. And it is the New York skyline that most gi:hically symbolizes its imperial power. Moreovel, huge trans;.:mationsare taking place in the very production of 'empire a:imultitude' across the elobe. This can be seen as a specificexa::leof the glocalizine atlactor. Bhabha summarizeshow: 'The g ,:eshrinksior those*ho o*n it; for the displaced or the disposs*;ed, the migrant or refugee,no distance is more awesome than'-:. few feet across borders or frontiers' []992:88). Indeed one effect of ;'lal markets is to generate ,wild zones' of the increasinglydispos,ossed. In parts of the former USSR,subSaharanAfrica, the Balkii. central America and central Asia are zones that are places c'.bsence,of gaps, of lack. Such zones possessweak states witL rry limlted infrastructures, no monopoly of the means of coer.r.n, barelv functionine economiesoften dependent upon comrnurfiringlilegal materlls, an imploded social structure and a re.;:rtelylimited set of connections to the global order. In the 'West' socio-spi:.rlinequalities have remained largely invisible.There is a 'splir,:::ing urbanism', with the invisibihty of the 'other' taken to extre': lengths in the 'gated, cities of North

131

and Marvin 2001)' There are gatedcommuniamerica[Graham theme parks' workplaces' 'l^- .nndominiums, shopping centres' gatesseparate ttt:;;;, ;irpo.,t, fi,tut'tiul districts and so on'The within the t'Tl# .lf" ,'on"r'fro- th" wild and dangerous.z:ne's

thepoorand s"t' 'o""' of the""gou"'n"ble' w",J :il"5tTi: across the are found in many cities especially

the dispossesseo ut*r,, of these safe and the increasingly, the time-space-edges new juxtapositions .omingli"to strange and dangerous *iiJt" from the wild flows the Wesi' The .'an or oerhaps --^r CvLrr' .^r i increasingly "rp".iully,"in on nsrs, substances'images and so zonesof people, chaotiiftt""gft tft" tuf" gates'suddenly and slip under, over and that had kept the zones apart' cally eliminating the invisibilities urbancrime'asvlum

;ffi;h

;o.'"1i t"""J;ti;;, the drugtrade'

the tlave tradlng and urban terrorism' seeking,people t-"ggfl"g, safe are chaoticallv juxtaposed' wild ;ithZ r"L"t%i,fte zones have "" of glo$al co;nplexitv' wild and safe I; ,;,;;s

ii' "#:l becomehighly tO,S,1ai'ilri' *-t'tto.t ffiIl

o" "

1:;: ist world the capi:lt al Ther e is' time-sp a."f-pt""io'i" zones are now only a telebut also of the'a"..o'i* i"o'ld''Wild plane.ride away' Capitalphone call, an Internet connection or a 'whole world' closer and this is ist markets ft"t" U.""gltt the its violent pu.udox"ically true. of those bent on especially "nd destroving the dominance of ; destruction and ;;i;lt' 'Americans' within th" glotd order' 1l September^demonstrates th" few feet were drathis new curvature oi'i"t" "lttJ- and time' "' ittuitibility was no more' Suddenly matically t.".tr."ndli the tot" f'o- ihut zone and struck at those from th" *ill-Jo""' The wild and safe vertical city that had previously beeninvisible' manner no one in a in New York zones collid"a in tt ,ky "Uou" " also collide in the safezoneshrd ;.;J1;ed' of course'the zones cheap petrol for Saudi Arabia, whele ,f.r" Uint obsessionwith unholy alliance one-third of the world,s cars has generated the between American power and Saudi oil wealth' the most dramatic Moreover, the events of 1l September are or 'netwar' involvro iu. of a non-territorial network war "*"-fi" taken by the 'multitude'' And hierarchies i"; J;" tou"l f**,

h"?;-g.;ut aifn."ii'"nghti',g i.,.h networks.Indeed,networks are best

"t

fightirrg tL,o-'"

"""g"ged

in netwars [see Arquilla and

ij

132

Global Complexities

Ronfeldt z00l: r 7). Al-eaida hasbeen likened.tl a self-3rqanizing system 'on the edge of ihuor'. The 'amorphousness of a-l-rgaida not only makes it difficult to hunt down its members and pin blame on individuals: it also means it does --6,^prAeek "o, ""."..".ijy h.uu the same form from day to day,a clear beginning or 200IJ. Indeed, 'what they receivefrom Bi;Lade; hr, associ""d ates is less specific orders and training than a crea4, rimple ideorogy, which they are expected to go out into the *o.tj pua into practice on their own' "na 200.1). This emergeni fMeek global fluid of international terroriim is hard i" d"f""f ;;?;;re it is made up of very diffuent self-organizingelements.They regurarry change their shape, form and ,Jtiuities] Such cTpacity renders them 'invisible' if on occasionsawesomely -;,;;ilp..r".* castells (2001) describesthe nature of ,non-line"., ,"".r".. ,rr",

;';'Hr"ffi li",,[1nil,r"'f i.].T"i*'$kftT':*.lL ,ftaiiff

small autonomous units posserrr"g higl, fi.. po*.f ,ie.y rapid mobility, robust communications, reai-time information' and a capacity to 'sense'the enemy.This 'non-linear warfare represents a high-tech version of the old tradition of guerrilr" rt.rggi"r. rhi, "network-centric" warfare . . . is entirely de-penden,,roJi .ourrrt. secure communication, able to maintain constant connection between the nodes of an all-channel network' fcastells z00r: 16l-2; Duffield 2001: t4J. thus suggestedthat, rarher than there beingan,Empire, .l.h.l": with 'its' multitude, there is what we might hypoth"'rJ" ,r-" rr"* attractor.This could be designatedas 'societiesas emoires,. societies acrossthe world are being drawn into developing ,empire,. as And, as they are drawn into iuch an attracto{, so new unsiable and unpredictable multitudes arise,seekingto topple those empires and their icons. societies as empires=u." d"u"loping some strange new practices as systems develop to deal with the non_ linear multitudes that are increasinglyin their very midst.

Cosmopolitanism But there is something else going on here within the emergent system of global complexity. Let me return briefly to when there

Global Complexities

133

.^,rsa 'sirnple'systemof hierarchicalnation states.When the world of nation states,the 'other' society was almost always -,.]-'.irr.'d .,]r"thing to fear, to attack, to colonize, to dominate and to keep on the move, ut bny The other was dangerous,especially others travellers who might migrants, traders, vagrants, armies, as such came to of rights attributable to tightly consist xa.v.Crtizenship within and specifiedcategoriesof those who were unambiguouly 'society'. of national societies involved This system the of oart rnassiveantagonism towards the other, with relationships normally being'nasty, brutish and short' (see Diken 1998). But we should consider here whether a 'cosmopolitan' global fluid is uncertainly and contingently emerging [D. Harvey 2000). Is a set of 'global' values and dispositionsbecoming an emergent and irreversibleimplication of global complexity? Are 'societies' increasinglyforming themselveswithin such an evolving complex and will they be subject to scandalizeddisapprovalif they do not display cosmopolitanismupon the global screenTIs the 'enemy' fbr each society as empire the global risk that have few borders or boundaries and that can be as much within the society as terrorists, diseases withoutT These risks include asylum-seekers, and viruses,environmental and health risks (seeVan Loon 2002). Such a cosmopolitan fluid involves various characteristics[see Waldron 1995; Tomlinson 1999; Beck 2000; Cwerner 2000; Franklinet al. 2000;Walby 2001). There is extensive mobility where people have the right to 'travel' corporeally, imaginatively and virtually and, for significant numbers of workers, students, tourists, asylum-seekers and so on, the meansto travel and to consumeplaces,peoples, rights and environmentsen route. There is a cunosity about places, peoples and cultures and a rudimentary capacity to 'map' one's own society and its culture in terms of history and geography.There is a stance of opennessto other peoples and cultures and a willingness/ability to value elements of the language/culture/history of multiple, contested and fragmented 'others' to one's own culture, provided that they meet certain global standards. There is a willingness to take nsks by virtue of encountering various'others',combined with a semioticskill to interpret and

134

4

Global Complexities

evaluate images of other natures,pracesand societies,to see what they are meant to represent,and to know *h",, th.v r." ironic. There are some global standards by which other places, cultures and people are positioned and can be judged Many international organizationsfollowing the founding -of th" uN advocateand promulgate such stanJards.

Two writers that articulated the notion of the cosmopolitan are Salman Rushdie and c. L. R. James.Rushdie wrote i,, tggo, ,tr The Satanic Wrses is-anything, it is a migrant,s_eyeview of the world. It is written from the very experilnce of uprooting, dis_ juncture and metamorphosis. . . that is the migrant condition, and from which, I believe, can be derived a metafhor for all humanity' (cited in waldron 1995: 93). And c. L. R. James once wrote: 'The relation of classeshad to.h"r,g" before i discovereJlhu, ia', not quality of goods and utility that matter; but movement, not where you are or what you are, but where you come from, where you glg going and the rate.at which you are getting th"r"; [cited in Clifford 1992: 96; see also Clifforj 1997.). Such an global fluid stems from the intensively -emergent mediated relations now swarming the world. This is even true in mainland china where the massivegrowth of diverse media is generating a recosmopolitanism (Ong and Nonini 1997; yang 1997)' The UN commission on Grobal Governance (1995J, sei up to report on the first fifty years of the u\ talks of 'our Grobal Neighbourhood', arguing that a mediated, enforced global pro"i_ is-generatingcosmopolitanism ltity fsee alsoTomhnin 1999: ch. 6; Beck Nelson Mandela ofien refers to 'the p"opre of -2000). South Africa and the world who are watching' o,, th"i. tV ri."",r, IUN Commission on Global Governance l9-95: lO7). The ,we, in M^andela'sspeechesalmost always evokes those beyond south Africa that view South Africa upon the global and have collectively. participated in the country;s rebirth -"di"through an enforced televisualproximity. when Ma,rd"la statesthat '#" ur. one people', he is pointing both to south Africa and to the rest of the world that is witnessing.Likewise the pointing f.o* th" TV commentators to the collective 'we' at princeis Diana's funeral was to the astonishing2.5 bilhon people witnessing and

Global Complexittes

r35

sharing on the global screen, as the iconic 'global healer' sanctifiedby the whole world [Richards et al. 1999: 3). Indeed,sincethe fallof the BerlinWall in 1989,there have been various 'global events' when The Whole World is Watching fGitlin 1980). On 11 September2001, the whole world watched the surreal and stranger-than-Hollywoodmoment when live planes with live passengersflew into and demoiished two of the largest buildings in the world. The World Thade Cente4 with up to 150,000 workers and visitors,a city in the ai4,was at two strokes bombed out of existencewith the whole world agog.The hugely unlikely forming of a 'global coalition against terrorism' both depended upon such collective watching and helped to promote further the cosmopolitan fluid. Collective global disastersare the key to the forming of such cosmopolitan global fluids, perhaps beginning with the founding moment of the Nuremberg trials in the immediate post-SecondWorld War period. Moreover, various visual representations of the earth or globe increasingly challenge the importance of 'national' flags fsee Ingold 1993; Cosgrove 1994). The iconic blue globe involves seeingthe earth in dark space,as a whole defined againstthreatening emptiness,with no lines or political colouring, freezing a moment in time. The globe functions as a symbol of authority, organization,and coverageof global infbrmation, particularly in news programmes. More generally,imagesof spaceare often used to connote the endlesspossibilitiesof travel and the potential 'cosmopolitan'consumption of other places and cultured from all acrossthe globe [Urry 2000b: ch. 7). Hebdige concludes that a 'mundane cosmopolitanism' is part of many people's everyday experience,as they are world travellers,both corporeally and through the TV in their living room: 'lt is part of being "taken for a ride" in and through late-2Oth century consumer culture. In the 1990s everybody [at least in the West] is more or less cosmopolitan'

[1990:2 0) .

A powerful 'televisual flow' throws viewers into the flowing visual world lying beyond the domestic regime.There is an instantaneousmirror reflectingthe cultures of the rest of the world that are mirrored into people's homes (Williams 1974; Al|an 1997; Hoskins 2001). Arundhati Roy evocatively describesan elderly

13 6

Global Complexities

Global Complexities

woman whose life is transformed by the instantaneousand often 'live' visual perception of multiple'global others'.Roy writes:'She presided over the World in her drawing room on satellite ry. . . . It happenedovernight.Blor-rdes, wars,famines,footbaii,sex,music, coups d'etat - they all arrived on the same train. They unpacked together. They stayed at the same hotel . . . whole wars, famines, picturesque massacresand Bill Clinton could be summoned up hke servants'[1997: 27). There is thus a hugely diverse and changingarray of 'referencegroups' that is disclosedand exposed especiallythrough TV and now the Internet. The 'cosmooolitan traveller' may derive ideas, values,norms and sensesof iustice from an incredible array of such sources[Waldron 1995; Walby

2001).

Such sensationsof other placescan create an awarenessof cosmopolitan interdependenceand a 'panhumanity' [Franklin et al. 2000). The flows of information, knowledge, money, commodities, people and images 'have intensified to the extent that the sense of spatial distance which separatedand insulated people -which from the need to take into account all the other people make up what has become known as humanity has become eroded' [Featherstone1993: 169). By participating in the practice of consumingin and through the media, people experiencethemselvesas part of a dispersed,global civicness,sharingsimilar experiences and united by the senseat least that they are witnessing the world and its mosaic of cultures with millions of disperseJ others [Gitlin 1980; Dayan and Katz L99Z) Acording to the U\ this global civicnessis generatingsome senseof the universalstandardsby which human development is to be judged [see UNDP 2000). One paradoxicalconsequenceof global complexity is to provide the context in which universal rights, a panhumanity, relating not only to humans but also to animals and environments, comes to constitute a framing for collective action. Illustrations of such panhumanity are the wide range of what we can call'global gift giving', the giving to distant [unknown) others of money, time, objects, software and information [via mega events like Liveaid, via local events or via the Internet). Cosmopolitanism should be seen as produced by, and further elaborating, the glocalization attractor through transforming rela-

)a

ji 6

fi C

t37

Uonsbetweenthe global and the iocal (Tomiinson i 999 194-207). The drawing of many 'localities' into the attractor of 'glocality' provides preconditions for emergence: 'changes in our actual physicai environments,the routine factoring in of distant political-economic processesinto life-plans, the penetration of our homes by new media and communicationstechnology,multiculturalism as increasinglythe norm, increasedmobihty and foreign travel, even the effects of "cosmopolitanizing" of food culture' [Tomlinson 1999: 199-200; see also Rotblat 1997b; Beck 2000). Thus the apparently local and the apparently cosmopolitan should not necessarilybe counterposed.Powerful sets of dispositions in the contemporary world are neither localist and proxirnate nor global and universal.As Zygmunt Bauman argues in Liquid Modernity via a discussionof Derrida's to 'think travel': 'the trick is to be at home in many homes, but to be in each inside and outside at the same time, to combine intimacy with the critical look of an outsider, involvement with detachment' [2000: 207). Cosmopolitan fluidity thus involves the capacity to live simultaneouslyin both the global and the local, in the distant and proximate, in the universal and the particular. Such cosmopolitanism involves comprehending the specificity of one's local context, to connect to other locally specific contexts and to be responsiveto the complex threats and opportunities of a globalizing world. We can thus talk of a 'glocalizedcosmopolitanism'in rvhich 'in the everydaylifestyle choicesthey make, cosmopolitans need routinely to experiencethe wider world as touching their local lifeworld, and vice versa' fTomlinson 1999: 198J. Such cosmopolitanism as a global fluid appears increasingly widespreadthrough the 'shrinking world' of various intersecting global fluids that were outlined in chapter 4. Its increasingscale and complex impact will irreversiblytransform each civil society, altering the conditions under which 'social actors assemble,organize, and mobilize' [Cohen and Arato 1992: 151). And, as they assemble,organizeand mobilize differently,so new unpredictable and emergent cosmopolitan identities, practices and cognitive praxeswill emerge fEyerman and Jamison 1991J.Out of TV and jet travel, the mobile and the modem, there is an emergent global fluid of cosmopolitanism.This transformswhat it is that appears to be co-present and what is mediated, what is embodied and

7

138

Global Complexities

Global ComPlexities

what is distant, what is local and what is global [D. Harvey 2000:

8s-6).

of the cosmopolitanglobal fluid thus showsthe T(e "m"rgence irreversible, ,rnp."di.table and chaotic workings of global complexity. And complexity theory seems to provide the means to !*"-ir-r" how cosmopolitanism has come to develop as a new emergent fluid of global ordering.

Conclusion John Gray [2001) describesthe current state of the globe as ,an intract"bly diro.dered world'. I have tried to show that 'complexity' provides a wide array of metaphors, concepts and for examining such intractable disorderliness. theoiies "rr"ntl"l that world are complex, rich and non-linear, Relations across involving multiple negative and, more significantly, positive feedback loops. There are ineluctable patterns of increasingreturns and long-term path dependencies.Such global systems,or re-gions, GINs and GFs, are characterizedby unpredictability and irreversibility;they lack any finalized 'equilibrium' or 'order'' They do not exhibit and sustain unchanging structural stability. Complexity elaborateshow there is order and disorder within all physical and social systems. Following Gray we can see how there is a complex world, unpredictable and irreversible, disorderly but not simply anarchic. Suih complexity derives from what I have described as the dialectic of mooring s and mobilities. If, to express this far too simply, the social world were to be entirely moored or _entirely then systemswould not be dynamic and complex' But -obii", social life seems to be increasingly constituted through material worlds that involve new and distinct moorings that enable, Pfoduce and presuppose extensive new mobilities. So many more systemsare complex, strangely ordered, with new shapesmoving in and through time-space. In such ,yrt"-, the various components are irreversibly drawn towards uuiio,r, 'attractors' that exercise a gravity effect. Such components within any system operate under conditions that are 'local' fu. i.o,,' equilibrium, partly because each responds to

it ir li

ri

1 fl

I39

sources of information. But components at one location have substantial time-space effects elsewhere through multiple connections and awesometrajectories.Such systemspossessa history that irreversiblyevolvesand where past eventsare not'forgotten'. Points of bifurcation are reached when the system branches,since 'causes'and 'effects' are disproportionate.There are non-linear relationshipsbetween them, with the consequencethat systems can move quickly and dramatically from one state to another. Systems'tip' or'turn', especiallythose that are organizedthrough 'networked' relationships that usher in some surprising and distinct effects. Finally, let me consider briefly here how this connects to the theory of 'reflexive modernization'.It has been arguedthat'social structures,national in scope,are being displacedby such global information and communication fl and C) structures' flash and Urry 1994: 6). These emergent systemsof information and communication are the bases for increased reflexivity. Through the increasingly structural power of information and communications the 'structure' of 'societies'has progressivelylesspurchase. And there is heightened reflexivity produced by and through these new 'l and C' structures. Reflexive modernization characterizes social life in which individuals and systems reflexively monitor especially the side effects of modernity. Such reflexivity moreover gives rise to many new structures, especially of various expert systems.Such reflexivity is, however, cultural aswell ascognitive [see Lash and Urry 1994; Waldron 1995). It is not only a matter of scientific or expert systemsthat enable the side effects of the modern to be monitored, organized around and in cases rectified. Rathel, reflexive modernization involves aestheticexpressive systems that result in huge new cultural industries, a veritable economy of signs. I want though to suggestthat these processesof reflexive modernizationstem from what I have describedasthe emergentglobal fluid of the cosmopolitan.Cosmopolitanismprovides dispositions of an appropriate cultural reflexivity within emergent global complexities. The form now taken by reflexive modernization is the global fluid of cosmopolitanism.Such a cosmopolitan fluid involves redrawing the speed of the global and the slownessof the ontologically grounded. It irreversibly transforms the conditions

14 0

Global Comolexities

under which other networks and fluids operate as well as have been historically ry understood urrusr)LUULT ds as 'societies'. suLt.crra, This nts connects ..,.,.I

.r, the shift that Lashdescribesasthe move from the .irk roll.*

examined by Beck,to the moresenerd;;k;i;"-.;bll[iBri

to;

,-

1998; Lash 2000). Such a risk culture has to deal wiih risks that unambiguously run across borders. These.include post-industrial risks, especially involved in informational flows [biotechnolog; cybersurveillance, epidemics, waste products, GM foods, .ybur, crime, international terrorism), as well as with the risk taklnj that is part of the very processesof innovation zooz)."ano, ,[van .L9o1 corresponding to this shift is a corresponding shift from national society to the increasing power of a cosmopolitan global fluid from modernity to reflexive modernization, as others have exoressedthis. And we might further see complexity theories as deriving from and in turn enhancing cosmopolitanism. This global fluid, with many convergent, overlapping and irreversible interdependencies with other networks and fluids, serves to remake social relations across the world, but not in a linear, closed and finalized form. Complexity is the theory that cosmopolitanism produces and generalizes, that captures and reflects the qystenic features of powerful material worlds. Thus cosmopolitanism involves an emergent global fluid that will in part reconfigurehow the social sciencesdevelop in a postsocietal era of global complexity. It will lead to the spread of theories of global complexity as one of the major meansof capturing, representing and performing the new world ordering that remains balancing'on the edge of chaos'.Complexity theoriesthemselves seem irreducibly part of the emergent systems o/ global complexity. Thus we are going with the flow, so to speak, if we develop, as I have tried to here, the implications of the complexity sciencesfor the many global systems currently haunting the world's population.

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75 Socierv, -i::il jffi:; i I )6ool

governme nt' , Econonrytand

*uiesor ct

?- "i|il

?b i^Y"i:l ! K:,^:,! !,i,"in !J. Rotblat [ed'), oli']'llr:j p'"face' Executt'" ^, iggz" ft:ilT'i - 'iilii;L,i'll"'i;';r,ni'i;;;;ii:'^""gL"l$:::Y:'T"li J

worldetuzensnrP'"u%'*rii'ciit";iip:AllegiattcetoHumaniry'

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r.i:l:"1

:f::* "2000;

Tl:::^.11 if,S;i*::

versus associationar

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Index

122 A . 73, 74'94' 96' A bbott, r;absence,and P res enc e access' frec 62 i nequal i ti es nf .? .'normal ^J) D ecci Jcrrts, l /l ^ c. t(rr-net\vork the()rY

l; : ; : ' ;

r " ,z o ' ; 6 - f i i o '7 o

' r. 5 A d r m s ,J . 3 of 88 Parodies ,r.t"".,ir"-"rttt, -^*.n.r relations ree structure-agency 8 2 . 4 3 ' M . Albrow. l-: a l i _h, , r n n c ln e tw ( ) r ks) A1lan,S. 135 AmericanPatriots88' 89 with African anacmia,Dutch compared 57 4l-Z' treatrrlents anarchism7l William 81-2 Anclers, An.lcrson,A. S)8 33 ,^t..i-, ,,nnt"unistii feeding 88 movement anti-sweat.shoPs of 33 ,"itSt"".t ineffectiveness 92 65' 59' 5, ;\pPadurai,A' A r a t o ,A . 1 3 7 Archer, M 4ti architcctures30--1 -^ , " A r u u i l l a ,J . 5 1 , d 5 ' 7 Z' 1 3 1 I2 l , l r l t '" ] . n t'.," i x, I7 ' 5 3 ' 5 5 ' 133 l 3 l ' 2 ,6 1 ' .tti"-.""ft*s

83 'centriPherY' -1 93' ^^ ,, 94- 5 98' 86 ni*t n. . t i'nt lnn "' 1367 io: , t ot , 123,129' 90 of 88' ooeration

10 por,l'er-resistance 'see ako 'strangeattractofs audit societY 109 Auee,M. 61 AuL ShinrlkYo 88 automobilitY68-Sl ^ .^, 9:l-tu t autoPoiesis28-9'

It

il

Bachelard'G 59 Baker,P 30, 50' 83-4 ; / 'haker translirrmatlL)n"" l l I 6 1 , K. Ba l e s,

I

ll8 nrii.]",r ll5' l16' I l7' barbarism 92 Ba r b e rB , 9l-2 ot x: barriers,Jissolution 5 8 Ba u tJr i l l a r d ,J ) ^ ,^ a !r Ltm u n t j '.l u /' Ba u m a n ZYg ,

r?7 '- '

""i",ili)Mo'Jentiry lle 124'137 BBC 8 I

"uli,'jt".n ix,7o'96-7't33'137 t40 becoming 20, 22 b ci n g 2 2 ri l l 4 7 , 8 5 . 9 {' otc tr BerlinWall, eftccts 135 Tim 86 Berners-Lce,

r38-e t s,I 23'132' :iii;il';;; t a--',

7

15 6

Index

Indsx

Bh ab ha ,H. 1 30 bifurcationpoint 26-7, 28, 29, 47, 1 7 3 , 13 9 'Big Ba ng ' 2l - 2 Biggs,M. 30, 120 Billig ,M. 1 07 biodiversity 70 biological systems,chaotic propertiesof 32-3 biopower,performative I 15-16 patentsand 70 bioprospecting, Blair,Tony 87 blu e e arth 81- 2, 135 Boden,D. ti5, 90 body, informational 64 socialanalogousto human 104 Bogard,W. 74 Boh m, D. 20 , 25, 50 borders, policedof nation states43 p oro sityo f 6, 41, l2! ) boundaries, blurring of 74 dissolutionof 85-(j bounded systems 26-7 bourgeoisie78, 79 brain 5l bra nchin g4 7, 79- 80 Bran d,S. 63 , 64, 70, 85 b ran ds 8 2, 87, 99, 107 cultural power o[ 67-8 global 57, 67-8, 87 and identity of oppositionll organizations58 and nationality87 public shamingof I l7 Braudel,F. 36 Brenner,N. 44-5, 125 ISrewer,B. 4 8i British Empire,hegen-rony Brunn,S. 5 Budiansky,Stephen,Nature's Keepers 3 l-3 Wcbcrirn l0-l I bureaucracies, Burt, R. 52 business, competition 63

ncrv places of face-to-face interaction

90-1 projects !) Butler,J. 99 butterfly effect 23,27 , 47 Byrne,D. 24, 25, 26-7, 30, 47, 83, 120 Cairncross,Irrances2, 85 capital, lack of border controlson 66 transnational88 see,.tlsosyrnboliccapital capitalism, 'blackholcs' of informational l1 'casino'65 crlsesor /v disorganizedviii,3 ecologicaldominanceof globalizing 4 pmpropnt

f-'-,rtrrrec

4

end of organized viii global see globalization ' ideal col l ecti ve i nterests' of 78 rcsistance tcl 88-9 systemi c and dynami c character 3 ' turbo-' 45 ca p ital i st mode of producti on, contradi cti ons of 78-80 Ca pra, Fri tj of 7, 10, 19,20,21,23,25,

26-7, 78, 29, 30, 37, 51, 77, 100, l0t The Hidden Connections 120 The Web of Lit'e l8 cars 68-9, 131 and carbongasemission68, 80 use of petroleum-bascd34, 55-6, I26 c as c a d e f f e c t 7 1 , 1 1 6 Manuel 2, 3, 4 , 5, 15, 43, 54, Castells, 56, 59, 62, 63, 64, 65, 79, 85, 86, 88-9, 110,132 The lnformation Age ix,8-12 Casti,J. 19, 22, 23, 51 catastrophe34-5,98 causality, circular 27 cause-effect3, 6, 7-8, 20,23-4,77-8, 96, l2l,123 lack ofproportionality 34-5, 139 centring 83-4

t57

shrinkage 8!) Central and EastcrnEuroPe 85 transnational98 centriphery 83-4 C l a r k,N . 3 3 ,7 0 ,1 2 2 certainty,the end of 22 classdomination 95-6 chain networks 51-2 classreproduction 78 22 and chance,dcterminism Clifford, J. 62, 134 change, cl i m a tech a n g e8 1 , l l 0 constantecological32 C l i n to n ,Bi l l Il 5 , l l 6 53 switches with dramatic cloning 67 individual or collective 46 clusters,and regions 40-1,43 and stasis22, 45 cNN 8r,85-6 27-8 tendencies co - e vo l u ti o n4 6 ,9 2 t h r o u g h 'l o ck- i n 5 5 - d , 6 9 co - p r e se n ce\1 2 , ) 2 1 c h a o s 1 3 , 2 2 ,3 0 , 5 9 , !) 8 coercion 104 o n t h e e d g eo f 1 4 - 1 5 , 1 6 ,2 2 ,3 2 ,8 6 ' C o h e n ,J.2 4 ,2 5 ,7 6 ,1 3 7 t O l , 1 3 2 ,1 4 0 Cohen,R. 62, 107 a n d o r d e r 14 ,2 1 - 2 ,2 9 , t0 6 Cohen,S. 98 c h a o st h e o r y 1 7 ,2 3 Colborn, T. 69 Chase-Dunn,C. 4, 43 and individual levels collective, China, 76-7 automobile culture 68 collective action, framing of universal history 36 standardsfor 136-7 m e d i ai n 13 4 commodification, C h i n e s e , 'o ve r se a6s'2 , 9 8 , 1 0 7 of financialmarkets 90 92 Christianity,'born-again' of the future 65-6, 72 chrono-biology Z0 commodities,rvith moorings or points Cilliers,P. 18, 24, 25, 3(),80, 84 of insertion49 circulating entities I 22-3 communicatiotr, cities, computer-mediatedB9 as complex dynamic open systems horizontal of the Internet 63 33 communications4, 57, 97, 100 'gated'of north America 130-l metaphor of fire 73-4 as interchangesbetween intersecting 'on the move' l-2 flows 36-7 communism, nonlinear readingof 33-5 co l l a p seo f 8 1 ,8 5 36-7 self-organization world /:l seeako 'host cities' 97-8, communities,transnationalized citizen,and state,mutual visibility 108 1l 2 - 1 3 community of tate 109 citizenship43, l33 politics competition, identity consumerismor local and cooperation36 92 inter-regional43-4 and settlement I 12 systemslZ, 18,29-37 complex global 98 women and complexity 3, 7' 8, 17, 79-80, 96, 100, world 97-8 r 38-40 city states 95 th e ch a l l e n g c,r f | 2 - l 5 civic associations2 ideas98 civil society, methods 124 networks llj

L

158

i59

complexity cor?t. an dp or v er lt l- 13 of scandal I I 3-l I sciencesix-x and socialtheory 120_4 without telos 86 complexitytheory 36, 45_6, 140 as new socialscienccparadigm l2 -15 complexitythinking 3g+0, 106_7 complexityturn l7_J8 'compulsionto proximity, 90 'computime' B5 computing, pervasive l0_l l 62, 73, ,

8s,89

Comte, Auguste ) 20 conccpts, branding and 67 as collective representations 59 parallel 102-3 c o n n e c t i o n s 1 2 2 , lZ 7 conscience 98 c o n s e n s u s 10 4 c o n s p i r a c y ,glo b a l 1 0 2 consumerism 80, 135 citizenship and !12 ' M c W o r l d ' 9 t- 2 Cutsuming Placas (tJrry) viii c o n s u m p t l o n, c o s m o p o l ita n ch a r a cte r 7 9 global viii, 4 c o n t a g i o n 6 2 , 7 l, l2 B m a c r o e c o no m ic 6 6 Contested Natures (lvlacnaghten and

UrryJ ix co ntin ge ncy10, 42, 56, l0l contradictions73, 7g_g0,g4 cttoperativity25, 36 corporations2, 9 bid for world domination 95 creatingopposition88 globalseetran-snational corporatlons useof globalimagery 82 Cosgrove,D. 82, 135 cosmopolitanism132-8, l3g-40 characteristics I 33-4 glcrcalized137-40 In u l to 3 n e

l - i5

Coveney,p. lg,Zl,22 cn m l n a l e c o n o m v l 0 l l Critical Mrss bike ,ia", gg aulturo,.tusion rvith nature gg culture industries139 culturesat a distance 12, 16 curiosity 133 Cwerner,S. 133 cybernetics27, 30_1, 105 c y b e r s p a c e7 4 , 9 9 , l Z 7 cyborg /4 Davies,Paul 2l-2 How to _ ,Buil.d a Time Machine 19 Davis,Mike, EcoLogtof Fear 33_5 MagicaL Urbanism lOg Dayan,D. 136 De Landa,Manuel 33, 77 A Thousand years of Non_Iinear History 36_7 decisionmaking, shared 9 deep robotics 70 Delanty, G. 87 Deleuze,G. 59-60, 108-9 dematerialization84-5 democracy43, 89 democraticpolitics, corruption by crime ll Derrida,Jacques137 determinism,and free will 18, 22, 106, I 1l _ 1 2 deterritorialization44, 58, 60, 87, 125 Diana,Princess, funeralof 134-5 diaspora,fluid 107-8 Dicken,P. 122 differentiation 28, 104 digitization63, 64-5, 85, ll5, lZ7 Diken, B. 133 Dillon, M. l 22 Dion n e ,E . I l 7 di.sasters, collectiveglobal 135 in ecologicalsystems32,34-6 discourses,complexity in 30 disembedding90-l dis o r d e r v t i i ,2 1, 2 7 an d o r d e r 2 2 , 1 3 8

rrPletr l,-Z 107-l) r:.nla."l Pe

tl"ill'j, ' '' ii,po'.t't' 2r,28, jl|i:,;:.::,'iitures -1 6 di s tantc ' - .- r 7d l collap\e '_"_ ' " :r , r el ati v e I a1 JZ r 'tr l ogl c al ,l i v er s i tY, tr l l r s t en t l e n re l l - '.',,,* , Ulv'"

,l^flinati('n

r i,

in/ rUa'

of

I8

ltt r r I

ltt8 inm;nt..tt RePublic , r - , ot r a l t l 3 I 8 6 ,9 4 , 9 6 , l u 8 , l l 0 ' O " m . 'U , M . 3 0 , t32 D u r k h e i mE , mile 59 17 24 J y n r t '. P r t r P t 'r ti e3s , ' 54, 64 e-comnrerce of 81-2, earth,visualrepresentations 135 EasternEuroPe 92-3 o f c o m m u n i sm 8 1 ,8 5 collapse J. 66 Eatrvell, Eco,LI. 58 ecoiogicalsYStems, complcxityof 32 dominanceby globalizingcapitalism 4 c c o n o m i c s3 1 , 53 economies of scale 53 Econotit:sof Signsand Space[Lash and Urry) viii ecosystems, and lire intensity 34-5 Eddington,A. S. 22 Einstein,Albert 19, 83 electricpower 126 e l i t e ,g l o b a l l l 2 Elliott,E. 30 Elstcr,J. 78 emergence74-5, 29, 38, 54 and collcctives 77 prcconditionsfbr 137 seeako global emergen.:e cmergenteffects99, 139-40 a n d t h e l o c a l 7 6 - 8 2 ,9 4 c m c r g e n tp r o Pe r ti e sx, t l , l 3 - 1 5 , 1 8 , 2 3 - 6 , 3 9 - 40 , 4 7, 4 9 ,5 l , 7 7 - tl

emergentsystems7-8, l6 Emirbayer,M. 73, 122 e m p i r e s9 5 , 1 2 9 and nrultitudes 128-32 cnergy 28, 83 flows 36-7, 48-!) turning waste into 92-3 Engels,Friedrich 78, 79 enterprises,global 57 e n tr o p y 2 1 ,4 6 ,8 3 enviroliment,as laboratorY97 cnvironmentalhazards69-70, 110, 133 environmentalissues,women and 98 environmentalmovement, global 92-3 environmentalNGOs 88 equilibrium 27, 44,55-6 Ethernet network 53 Ettrope,feudal 95 EuropeanCourt of Justice 1 10 EuropeanUnion (EU) 10, ll0 Eve,R. 30 events, localizationof global 82-3, 135 mediation of global 85-ii seealso extremc events;mega-events evolution 22 expert systems139 explanation,Western-tYPe23-4 exposure,the Power of I I5-18 externalities,acrossnetworks 53-5 extremeevents 34-5 Eye r m a n R , . 137 interaction52, 90-l face-to-face failure, accidentsand sYstem35-6 a n d a ch i e ve m e n t1 3 - 1 5 1 ll falseconscic'rusness far from equilibrium 7-8, 1 l, 13, 21, 3 2 , 5 4 ,8 0 ,9 4 - 6 , 1 0 6 , 1 1 8 - l e , 1 2 3 , 1 2 8 , 1 3 8 - :l pocketsof t>rderl0l-3 M. ti3, 64, l3tt Ireatherstone, lecdbackmechanisms27, 29, 3O-I ' 34, 1 0 0 ,1 0 2 see ako negativefeedback;positive feedback emcrgingstructurcsof 29, 5!) f-eelir-rg,

Index

16 0 feminization

90 f e u d a l i s m a n a lo g y 9 5

FIFA B1 financialcrises,globaland national 66 financial markets, interdependence of 66 on-linereal-timetrading 86 financialsystems,global 90 fire, intensityand ecosystems34-5 metaphor 73-4 use in primitive agriculture 32 flows 3,2 1, 40- 2, 80 from wild zones 13l the globalas 4-5, l4t) power of 59-60 seealso global fluids IGFsJ fluidity,cosmopolitan137 fluids 40-2, 59-74,124 3nd networks 5U-/5 seealso global fluids (GFs) food culture, cosmopolitanizationof t37 r(rrolsm Zf) Fo ucau ltM , ic hel 113 Fox Keller,E. 23-4,71 fractals74,98, 102-3 Francis,R. 30 Franklin,S. 6, 38, 44, 64, 67, 6g, 99, 99 , 1 33, 136 free rvill, and determinism 18, 22, 106, I I t-l 2 Friedman,Thomas 86 The Lexus and the Oliue Tree 9l frontiers,permeable 85-7 Fu ku ya rna, F. 5, 43 fu nction alis ml0l, 102, l2l, 122 normative I04-5 fundamentalism,religious 8tl fu ture 1 9, 22, 45 commodificationof the 65-6,72 futures trading 65 Came,A. 45 Care (Hungary) 92-3 Gates,Bill 54 ga ze I l6 gcnder 6

generationsnot yet born 69 genes36-7 timekeeping20 genetic engineering8 geneticallymodified food 5g, 69 GFs seeglobal fluids G i d d e n sA , nthony 2,39, 45,46_7, l2l gift giving,global 136 Cilbert, N. 80, 8t Gille, Z. 92, 93 GINs saeglobally integratednetworks G i t l i n ,T . 1 1 6 , 1 3 5 , 1 3 6 Gladwell,Malcolm 53, 66 Cleick,J. 47 global,the ix, l-8 as flows and mobilities 4-5 'intimate' 99 and the national 44, 85 as processand outcome 44 a sa r e g i o n 4 3 - 4 , 4 9 societiesand l-16 structural notion of 4 globalanalyses, limits of 38, 39-49 global capitalismseeglobalization global complexity 120-40 the conceptof x, 7-8, 95, 102 and socialorder 104-l l globalemergence93-l0l globallluids (cF 42-9, 56, 59-75, 94, t24, 138 characteristics72-4 cosmopoliran135, 137-40 examples60-72 CIobaLNature, GLobaLCulture fFranklin et al.J 98, t00 global networks seeglobally integrated networks [GINs) global order, emergent 81 far from equilibrium I I resistanceto 88-9 social relationsin the new 9l Global PositioningSystem[GPS) 91, 1t3 globalregions42-9 Global Resistancemovement 88 global scepticism 44 globalscreen87, 89, 135

svsrcms ' el ol ti rl ., ,nrtl t'si strl tz t 99-101.. l , n,,t,'P u't' ti t 1,,'..ti u,' charac ter of ' 16 95. ,',.l nt"ud.l i tm prophecies in social s"li-tittnft,ng science's 3 8 profes s i onal s 98 ,l ,rbrl vi l l agc , and l 0l 34' w armi ng l i .bal

r6l

gr avit y83, 92,94, 123,l3u Gra;',John 138

greenhouscgases70 Gr e e n p e a ce5 8 ,8 l greens,global seeenvironmental rnovement GreenwichMean Time 8l Guattari, F. 59-60, 108-9 89 guerrillas,'informational' Commissionon the Gulbenkian 1023' l) 3' 94' 84 l i ,,i ..l tu.rt r clat ions Restructuringof the Social r27, 136-7 Sci e n ce s1 2 - 1 3 ol,rbalization, Gulf War 86 ' 4 !trrPtlrate debates3-4 Habermas,Jiirgen 108, I09 Giddens'sde{inition39 habits,new social 57 Habermason 109 Hardt, Michael 2 as ideologY 5-6 EmPire 128-9 43-4 state end the nation H "r u e y,D . 2 0 ,2 8 ,3 0 ,7 8 ,7 9 , 1 3 3 , 1 3 8 x structLrre new the ils Harvey,P. 87 outcomcsof 93-l0l Havel, Vaclav 97-8 39 of paradigm Hawken, P. 69 n, pe.fc,rm"nce6-7, 38, 96-103 Hawking, StePhcn,A Brief HktorY of 96 problemsof definition Time 70,22 of relationshiPsI Zl H a yl e s,N . K. 2 2 , 2 7,2 9 ,3 0 , 6 4 rtsistanceto 44, 58, i;2, 87-9 environmentaland health hazards, 44 theory globalization theory of and 6 9 7 0, 110,133 vs.localization88-9 marine envtronment projects, healing globally integratednetworks [GlNs) 70 and 12-9, 56-9, 7 4-5, 94' l0l ' lz4 ' health hazards69-70, tl0, 133 138 HebdigeD , . 135 sclflorganizing106 hegemonY, 58-!) weak-nesses British EmPire 8l globe,as syrnbol of authoritY [35 usA 43,45,85 137 glocal,the 84, M. 84 Heidegger, g l o c a l i z a t io nvi i i , 1 5 , 8 2 - 3 ,8 4 - 5 W. 37' 77 Heisenberg, 1 0 3 , 9 8 , a t t r a c t o ro f 8 6 - 9 3 ,9 4 - 5 , D . 3 ,4 ,5 ,4 0 ' 4 3 , 4 4 , 6 5 , 8 1 ' 9 4 ' H e l tJ, 1 3 6 7 r o 7 , 1 2 3 ,1 2 9 , r29 Goerner,S. 39 Helmrcich,S. 70 Goldman,P. 67 Hetherington,K. 6 Goldthorpe,J. 77 h i e r a r ch y3 6 - 7 ,1 3 1 governance, of values 105 134 global 95-6, attemptsat H i g h l i e l d ,R . 1 9 , 2 1 , 2 2 without government 128 Hinduism 92 governments, H i r st, P. 4 4 , l l 0 brands 87-8 h i sto r y 2 l - 2 , 5 4 , I2 3 , 1 3 9 role in globalization 43 Chinese36 1 2 5 6 G r a h a m ,S. 5 ,6 0 , hologram 50-l Granovetter,M. 52

t62

Index

I loskins,A. 86, l l5, 135 'host cities' 82-3, 86-7 h ub net wor k s 5l- 2, 82 human dcvelopmcnt l3ti humanity, an d nat ur e ll_lJ and science97 humans,netrvorkedwith machines56 Hungary,post-CommunistSl2-3 Hutron, Will, On the Edge 45, 46 hybrids 63-4,74, t02 gl obal l4- 15, 59, 129 of physicaland socialrelations I 7_lg hypercomplexity30 hyperglobalist position 43, 44 hypertext 63 icon, religiousto computer 64 identities, tt

D ra n o s a n d h /- u c o s m o p o ttta n lJ / a n cl flu id ity 4 2 m u ltip le 1 0 8 resistance 88 identity politics, and new global order

91_2 ideology3, 132 g l o b a liza tio n a s 5 - 6 Ignatieff M. 65 images, co-present media 97 IIOW

J

g lobal 8l- 2, 96- 7 organizations and 82 (]ra spacc rI^J) imaginedcommunity,global 12,gl_2 Imken, O. 65 immobilities,relationshipwith m ohllt t les 1l) - b rmpressionmanagementI I3 increasingrcturns 53-4, 74, )23, l3g of brands 68 ftrr economicpopulations l7 exponentialof networks 53+, 5g individual, and collective levels 76-7 orvnershipand mobility 68-9 and statisticallevelsof analysis24_5

lndex

i n e q u r l i t i e sl 0 l , i 2 g , 1 3 0 _ l of access5 incrtia,pattcrnsof 55 i n f o r m a r i o n6 4 - 5 , 8 3 , l 1 3 , l 2 7 t.

or gttl z ed

bJ

localized60, 80, 84, 123 irrfbrmationagc ix, 8-12, 43, 50_1,72,

8s

information and communication (l and C) structures8, 139 informarionflows 5, 84-5, 99 co-evolutionof 86 internationalized43, 109 post-industrialrisks 140 information networks 9-l 2 infcrrmationsharing9, I l3 Ingold,T. 72, 135 i n n o v a t i o n sl , 8 , 6 2 , 1 4 0 product and process3l instability 24, 27 rnstantaneity50, 72 institutions, global 8l and systemdcvelopment55-6 intellectuals,wandering 95 In(er-Governmental Committeeon Climate Change 8l inter-regional organizations,l interaction effects 25-6, 123 interconnectedness 36, 48, tjg, 94,97, t0l interdependence l4-15, 18,39, 79, gl, 94, 97_8,\02, t04, t24 cosmopolitan136 ,'f financialmarkcts 6ti interests, economic 5 'real' I I l InternationalAir TiansportAssociation 8l intcrnational non-gtlvernmental organizations (NGO{ 45 internationalorganizations45, 108, t34 InternationalRcd Cross 8l internationaltreaties45, ll0 internationalization of production 4, 83-4

l n t o r n e t l , 1 2 ,5 4 , tr 2 - 3 ,7 3 ,8 0 , 1 2 7 ,

r3 6 attemptsto regulate I l, ti3 of and informationalization knowledge 64 use by oppositionmovements89 intimacy',public I I6 of 4 investment,internationalization Ireland 9 I irreducibility 77, 7B irreversibility13, 45, 83, 95, 99, I 16, 138 o f t i m e Z l - 2 ,2 9 , 4 6 - 7, 4 9 ,6 0 Islam 92 i t e r a t i o n \ 6 ,2 7 , 4 6 - 7 ,4 9 , 6 3 , 8 3 , 9 9 , 103 Jarnes,C. L. R. 134 Jamison,A. 137 J. 7l Jasper, J e r v i sR , . 24 - 5 ,3 2 ,3 5 J e s s o p1, 3 .4 ,8 ,9 6 Jihad 9l Jordan,J. 7l Kaplan,C. 98 K a s h ,D o n 1 0 ,5 1 ,5 4 ,5 9 The Complexity Challenge 30-l K a t z ,E . 1 3 6 Kauffman, S. 22 Karvano,Y. 4 Keck,M. 98 Keil, L. 30 K t 'i l , R . 4 0, 1 1 0 K c l l y ,K . 5 1 , 5 2 - 3 , 5 4 , 6 0 , 7 6 - 7 Kern, S. I keyboards54-5 Keynesianism79 K l e i n ,N . 5 7 , 5 8 , 6 7 , 8 8 , 9 5 , 1 I 7 Knorr-Cetina,K. 18, 56, 106 knoivledge,informationalizationof 64 Krugman, P. 29 Krva, C. 86 Kyoto Protocol on climate change I I0 Langton,Chris 39-40 languages, flows of 36-7 lascrtheorv non-linear29

163

L a sh ,Sco tt vi i i , 5 ,9 1 , 1 3 9 , 1 4 0 Latinos,in USA 108 Latour,B. 46, 56, 106, 122-3 law, Europeanand national ll0 L a r v,Jo h n 6 , 1 0 , 3 6 , 4 O- 2 ,4 3 ,4 8 ,5 6 , 5 7 ,6 0 ,7 3 , 1 0 6 , t2 2 Lcfebvre,Henri 125 The Productionof Space 4B-9 Leinbach,R. 5 lensmetaphor 50 Levitt, P 108 L e ysh o nA. , 6 5 , 8 6 ,9 1 liberalizationof trade 4, 89 life, as nctwork or web 51, 70 lifestyle choices 67, 137 line networks 51 2 linearity 25-6, 93-4, 127-3 local, the, emerpenleffectsand 60, 7tj-82' importancc of 86-7 local-globalrelations84-93, 94, 102-3, 1 2 7 , t3 6 ,7 localization,vs. globalization 88-90 'lock.in' 55-6, 69 Lodge, David 52 logos,global 67-8 London, City of 90 looselycoupled systems35-6 Lorenz,K. 23, 27 Los Angeles34-5 L u h m a n n ,N . 2 9 ,3 0 , 1 0 0 - l Luke, T. 63 Lukes, Steven, Power:A Radical Vieut ill l-ury, C. 99 M a a se nS. , 23, 30 McCarthy, A. tt2 McCrone,D. 87, 108 McDonaldization57-8 m a ch i n e s5 6 , l 2 4 - S changingnatureof 126 f-amiliall2ii humans networked with 56 mobile 125 McKay,G. 7l Macnaghten,Phil ix, 18, 45 Macy Conferenceson cybernetics27

a 164

Mahoney,J. 28, 54, 55 Maier, C. [i7 Majone,G. I l0 Makimoto,T. til, 127 Ma libu 34 -5 Malp as,.l.l4 Man de la,Ne ls on 81, 94, 134 Manifesto of the Communist Party, The 79 Ma nn , M. 44 Ma nn ers,D. 61, \ 27 marineenvironment,exploitationof 70 market,globaland 'u,ild zones' 130 Marshall,l. 20, 47-8 Martin, H.-P 43, 66 Marvin, S. 5, 60, 125-6 Marx, Karl 78-80, 84, 104 Marxism I I l materialworlds 16, 31, 46, 56, 64, 106, 1 21 -2, 124, 138 mediationby 52 systcmicfeaturesof 140 unpredictabilityof 33 practices99 material-semiotic Maturana,H. 28, 99 measurement19, 37 Mcdd ,W.30 , 100, 120 media, g lob al 86 - 7, 97, 113, 114- 17 migratory 65 scaleand rangeof 84-5 mediation, by materialworlds 52, 90 of globalevents 85-6 med iatizati on110- 11, i 15- l6 medicalization33 medicine, fluidity of treatment 4 I -2 risk culturesand 33 Mee k,J. 13 2 gkrh:rlS2, 8ti-7, l()7 mega-cvents, Melu cci,A. 7l Men on ,M. 8 2, 97 'meshworks'36 messages, flo w 5,6 3 protestors 72

165

Index

lndex metaphors16,42-3, 50-l , 59, 64,74-5,91,I05, 122,3,t34, r38 scienceand I 2l method,significance of ix, 37 methodologicalholism 40 methodologicalindividualism40, 78, 106 Mexico 108 Meyer,J. I l0 Meyerowitz,J. I 13, I l5 micro-habitats32 Microsoft 8l migrantcondition 95, 131 migrationpatterr)s6l-2 Mingers,J. 30, 100 Mische,A. 73 mixtures 42, 63 mobilities 6l-2, 74-5, 78, 94, 101, 1 1 0 ,i l 3 , 1 3 3 cnmnlew