Earth on Fire : Climate Change from a Philosophical and Ethical Perspective

Earth on fire

Climate change from a philosophical and ethical perspective

Mickey Gjerris, Christian Gamborg, Jørgen E. Olesen Jakob Wolf (Eds.)

Earth on fire Climate change from a philosophical and ethical perspective

Earth on Fire – climate change from a philosophical and ethical perspective is an electronic open access version of the book Jorden brænder – klimaforandringerne i videnskabsteoretisk og etisk perspektiv published by ALFA 2009. ALFA has kindly given their permission to this translation under the conditions that the English text is in no way used for commercial purposes. The printed Danish version of the book can be bought in book stores or at the publisher’s web-site: http://www.forlagetalfa.dk/alfa_detail.asp?ID=2859 The English translation has been published with economic support from Theme Cluster 1 and The Institute of Food and Resource Economics, both from the University of Copenhagen and from the University of Aarhus.

Earth on fire Climate change from a philosophical and ethical perspective

Edited by Mickey Gjerris, Christian Gamborg, Jørgen E. Olesen & Jakob Wolf

2009

Earth on fire Climate change from a philosophical and ethical perspective Edited by Mickey Gjerris, Christian Gamborg, Jørgen E. Olesen, Jakob Wolf © The authors and The Institute of Food and Resource Economics, The Faculty of Life Sciences, University of Copenhagen Cover: @ Arne Naevra (Norway); Polar meltdown Translation: Oversætterhuset A/S Layout and typesetting: Narayana Press Cover: Religionspædagogisk Center, Bjarne Jensen Printed by: Narayana Press ISBN: 978-87-993282-0-8 The publishers have been unable to contact the legal copyright holders of some of the pictures in this book. Any violation of their copyrights etc. has been unintentional. Legal obligations arising will, of course, be honoured as if permission had been granted in advance. The Danish edition was published with funding from ‘Torben & Alice Frimodts Fond’, ‘Direktør Einar Hansen og hustru fru Vera Hansens Fond’, the Institute of Food and Resource Economics at the University of Copenhagen, the Faculty of Life Sciences at the University of Copenhagen and the Faculty of Agricultural Sciences at Aarhus University.

Content Foreword to the English edition Mickey Gjerris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Introduction Mickey Gjerris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

The climate is changing – but why? Jørgen E. Olesen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

What will happen? Scenarios of the future Jørgen E. Olesen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37

Climate science – how did it come about? Matthias Heymann . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

What is climate science all about? Philosophical perspectives Matthias Heymann, Peter Sandøe & Hanne Andersen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

The price of responsibility – ethical perspectives Christian Gamborg & Mickey Gjerris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89

A religious perspective on climate change Jakob Wolf . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

The climate debate’s debating climate Polarisation of the public debate on climate change Gitte Meyer and Anker Brink Lund . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135

Case 1  ∏  Biofuels Biofuels – Crops for food and energy Claus Felby . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163

Content

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Biofuels: Hunger, subsidies and lack of effect on CO2 emissions Christian Friis Bach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 Study questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 173

Case 2  ∏  Genetically modified organisms GMOs: A solution to changed climate conditions Preben Bach Holm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175

GMOs: The right way of taking responsibility? Rikke Bagger Jørgensen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182 Study questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

Case 3  ∏  Trading in CO2 quotas CO2 trading. A cost-efficient tool to achieve political goals? Alex Dubgaard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191

CO2 trading. Should you be able to buy your way out of the problems? Peder Agger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200 Study questions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207 Further reading . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 209 About the authors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219

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content

Foreword to the English edition Mick e y Gjer r is

This book is about climate change and what it does to us and our planet. But even more it is about the philosophical and ethical challenges that arise from the changing weathers. The book was originally written for Danish students by Danish researchers, but just as global warming is a global phenomenon so is the questions that are put forth here. The book has therefore been translated into English so as to make it available for a wider audience The English online version is free for all to use. All we ask you is that you share the existence of the book with your colleagues and fellow students so that as many as possible might benefit from it. Should you have any comments or ideas for improvements to the next edition, please mail Mickey Gjerris at [email protected]. The editors would like to thank Forlaget ALFA and our editor Jeanne Dalgaard for their generous permission to translate the original text and their good cooperation throughout the process. Furthermore we would like to thank Oversætterhuset A/S for their efficient work with the translation and Annette Larsen for her help. Finally we would like to thank Theme Cluster 1 and The Institute of Food and Resource Economics from the University of Copenhagen and the University of Aarhus for their economic support to this translation.

Foreword to the English edition

9

Introduction Mick e y Gjer r is

The Earth is on fire. Our world is getting warmer, and the climate is changing. There is a lot to suggest that this is due to how we are using the Earth’s resources. Also, it is a matter of urgency if we want to be able to exercise just a modicum of control over what the future will bring. So, in a manner of speaking, the Earth is getting too hot under our feet. We need to find out what is behind the climate change, but we also need to find a solution – fast. At least that is how things stand at the moment. Just a few years ago, however, many scientists, politicians and laymen still questioned whether the climate was in fact changing, let alone whether human activities had any role to play. How could it be that all this doubt evaporated, and that everyone suddenly started talking about the climate and marketing themselves on low CO2 emissions? A significant shift has occurred. Today, very few people question that climate change is happening and that it is largely due to human activity. Have we arrived at a new scientific certainty, or is it the result of a less transparent process where ethical values and political considerations have come to influence the scientific agenda? How definite actually are the climate models on which we are basing our actions, and how much of the discussion about them is science and how much relates to the ethical and philosophical considerations which have shaped them? It is not absolutely clear what will happen with the climate in the coming years, but there is general agreement that the world will change. And man has started to prepare for these changes. This gives rise to important ethical questions. What must we do, who must we consider, and what does the natural world mean in an ethical sense? Should we save endangered species for their own sakes or for ours? Should we help the people who will benefit most from our help or those that most need the help – and do we in fact have a duty to help anybody apart from ourselves? Major changes threaten – and the solutions risk being rushed through without careful consideration. That’s what happens when the Earth suddenly gets too hot under one’s feet. This book is about climate change, one which will contribute to our understanding of what is happening and why it is happening. The objective is to show how climate change raises not only a number of questions to do with natural science, but also many questions of a more universal nature

Introduction

11

that are based on philosophical, political, ethical and religious assumptions about how the world is and how it should be. We hope that this book will encourage critical reflection and ethical consideration of what is happening, why it is happening and what we ought to do. Because something is happening: James A. Hansen, as head of NASA’s Goddard Institute for Space Studies and one of the world’s leading climate researchers, is one of those who repeatedly points out that the situation is far more serious than we are willing to acknowledge. According to him, the targets for CO2 reductions which have been set in the international agreements which applied for 2008 already exceed what is necessary to stabilise the situation. According to Hansen we must act far more effectively and radically – and we must take action now. In a speech given to The National Press Club in Washington DC on 23 June 2008, he said: Changes needed to preserve creation, the planet on which civilisation developed, are clear. But the changes have been blocked by special interests, focused on short-term profits, who hold sway in Washington and other capitals. I argue that a path yielding energy independence and a healthier environment is, barely, still possible. It requires a transformative change of direction in Washington in the next year.  (Hansen, 2008)

Research published in winter 2008 by the Canadian geophysicist David Barber suggests that, by 2015, the Arctic will be ice-free during the summer. Whether this happens in 2015, 2025 or 2035 is, in this context, fairly irrelevant. What is important is that the temperature increases on the planet seem to be having quite an impact and that things are developing at a pace which, time and again, takes the scientists by surprise. The climate and the factors which have a bearing on it are complex. Often, individual scientists only see part of the picture, but when the various factors start reinforcing each other, the whole picture suddenly changes. In the past eight to ten years, the possible climate changes have led to worried minds and international agreements which have not really put the big players under any sort of obligation and to the setting of national targets which have basically been ignored in practical politics. The general consensus is that we can no longer afford such procrastination. Things are hotting up now – really hotting up. So we need to both act fast and think carefully about what we are doing. This book is primarily intended as a textbook in ethics and science theory at university level, where it can be used on all study programmes to provide

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Mickey Gjerris

recurrent case material. The more technical chapters can be used depending on the field of study. The book can also be used as a source of background information for upper-secondary school teachers and other teachers in the educational system and as a study book by reading groups, or simply by readers who want to understand what the climate debate is all about. The book is the result of scientists from many different fields and institutions collaborating together, which is evident from the author presentations at the back of the book. The breadth of expertise clearly reflects the radical significance of climate change for the future. Climate change literally cuts across all boundaries. It is the hope of the editors that this broad approach will contribute to understanding the complexity of the problems and a healthy level of scepticism towards any over-simplified messages in the climate debate. The book consists of seven chapters which show how the climate changes are rooted in our scientific, philosophical, political, ethical and religious understanding of the world. Chapters 1 and 2 are written by the climate scientist and member of the UN climate panel Professor Jørgen E. Olesen from Aarhus University. The first chapter describes the changes which the climate is undergoing, which physical, chemical and biological mechanisms are interacting to cause climate change, and what is driving the changes. The second chapter looks at the consequences of climate change for life on Earth both generally and specifically for a number of areas such as agriculture, infrastructure and urban planning. The book’s third chapter is written by the science historian Matthias Heymann from Aarhus University. This chapter puts the present discussion about climate research into a historical perspective and shows how climate research has always been embedded in philosophical and political discussions. Matthias Heymann has also been involved in Chapter 4, this time with the philosopher Peter Sandøe from the University of Copenhagen and the science theorist Hanne Andersen from Aarhus University. Together they describe the science-theoretical challenges raised by the use of computer models in climate research, and seek to show how scientific uncertainty also becomes a political issue. Chapter 5 is written by the ethicist Mickey Gjerris and the natural resource ethics researcher Christian Gamborg, both from the University of Copenhagen. The chapter focuses on the ethical dilemmas presented by climate change as far as mankind is concerned as well as in relation to the natural world in general. In Chapter 6, the theologian Jakob Wolf, also from the University of Copenhagen, looks at climate change from a religious perspective, and offers his views on how religion, broadly speaking, can help to fight climate change. Finally, in Chapter 7, senior lecturer

Introduction

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and journalist Gitte Meyer from the University of Copenhagen and professor in media management Anker Brink Lund from Copenhagen Business School write about the political discussion about the climate which has dominated the media over the past twenty years, and put this discussion into a broader context concerning the role of science in the current debate. The seven chapters can be read independently of each other, but as they each have something to offer, reading them all will provide a solid foundation from which to relate to climate change. The chapters are written as textbook chapters, and thus provide a general introduction to the issues from what is hopefully a neutral perspective. Nonetheless, it is important to note that the chapters are written by different researchers, each of whom possesses expertise within their particular field. The various chapters are therefore, unavoidably, coloured by their respective views. This basic condition for all communication should make the reader take a critical approach to the chapters and not be seduced by what is presented as obvious conclusions. These chapters are not the final answer to anything, but invite the reader to participate in a broader discussion about climate change. At the end of the book, three actual cases from the climate debate are discussed: CO2 trading, GM crops and biofuels. These cases are addressed by experts who have played a prominent role in the public debate of these topics. What all three cases have in common is that they describe controversial solutions to problems resulting from climate change. The purpose of these cases is partly to present some of the more controversial strategies for countering climate change to the reader, and partly to show how the ethical and philosophical issues on which the seven main chapters centre can be used as ‘keys’ to understanding the disagreements that arise when discussing some of the most important issues currently faced by mankind. Each case is preceded by various working questions which can be used as a starting point for a discussion of the case and as a way of focusing on the ordinary problems that lie behind the specific differences of opinion. Each chapter is followed by a list of the references which have been used as background material. These can be used as inspiration for further reading. There is also a list at the back of the book of commented suggestions for further reading, organised by chapter. The intention is that students and others will easily be able to find further literature for project work, studies etc. The editors would like to thank all the contributors for their time, Jeanne Dalgaard from the publishers Alfa for her good and thorough editing, and a number of Danish financial contributors who have made the publication of this book possible: 1: Torben & Alice Frimodts Fond 2: Direktør Einar

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Mickey Gjerris

Hansen og hustru fru Vera Hansens Fond 3: Institute of Food and Resource Economics, University of Copenhagen 4: Faculty of Life Sciences, University of Copenhagen 5: Faculty of Agricultural Sciences, Aarhus University. The changes we face are both alarming and far-reaching. They will have a major impact on our lives. In order to meet this challenge, it is necessary that we understand both the scientific details and the broader contexts of the different problems. Technical solutions detached from the social reality into which they must be incorporated cannot solve these problems, just as theoretical musings on background, causes and values are of no use in the present situation. However, if we gather the threads and endeavour to tackle the task based on a high level of expertise and sound knowledge about the context of the problems, we believe there is every possibility that the huge challenges we face can be resolved. We hope that this book will make a small contribution to this task. References Hansen JA: Global Warming Twenty Years Later: Tipping Points Near (2008).http://www. columbia.edu/~jeh1/2008/TwentyYearsLater_20080623.pdf

Introduction

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The climate is changing – but why? Jørgen E . Olesen

1. Introduction The mean temperature at the Earth’s surface is increasing, and at the same time the patterns of precipitation are changing towards more intense rainfall and longer periods of drought. These changes are controlled by physical as well as biological processes. Even though there are natural processes which can lead to global temperature increases, research shows that human (anthropogenic) activities – especially CO2 emissions – are most likely to be the main reason for the increasing temperatures on Earth over the past 30 years. Model calculations show that global temperatures will probably increase by 1.8‑4.0 °C during the twenty-first century depending on emissions of greenhouse gases. Following the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and Al Gore’s documentary ‘An Inconvenient Truth’ as well as the Nobel Peace Prize which was awarded to the IPCC and Al Gore in 2007, there has been an unparalleled level of attention on man-made climate change. This is largely due to the fact that the IPCC now concludes that: “Most of the observed increase in global average temperatures since the mid-20th century is very likely due to the observed increase in anthropogenic GHG concentrations.” However, in the media this is still being debated although most researchers support this conclusion.

The climate is changing – but why?

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IPCC – the UN’s climate panel

Box 1

The UN’s climate panel is called the IPCC, which stands for ‘Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’. It was set up in 1988 as a follow-up to the Brundtland Report  – ‘Our Common Future’. Based on its reviews of scientific literature, about every five years the panel publishes a summary and an assessment of research and knowledge on climate change and the effects of these changes. The scientific reviews are conducted by recognised scientists within the various fields. The scientists are appointed by the UN’s member countries. The assessment consists of a report from each of the three main working groups: ππ Working group I: Describes the scientific aspects of the climate system and climate changes. ππ Working group II: Describes vulnerabilities in the socio-economic and natural systems in the face of climate change, impacts as well as the possibilities for adaptation. ππ Working group III: Describes how to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases and other ways of preventing climate change. In addition to these assessment reports, the IPCC also publishes a number of special reports on specific subjects, for example emission scenarios, technologies for reducing emissions or methods for calculating greenhouse gas emissions. The latest assessment report (the fourth) was published in 2007. The IPCC does not conduct independent research itself on climate changes or their impacts, but is charged with drawing conclusions from the available scientific literature on the subject.

2. Climate changes – what’s happening? Worldwide, the temperature has increased by 0.7‑0.8 °C since the end of the nineteenth century. By far the largest share of this increase (0.55 °C) has occurred within the past 30 years. However, it is not just the temperature which has increased. Other aspects of the climate systems have also changed: ππ Sea levels worldwide have risen, and the rate of increase is growing, such that sea levels are now rising by 3‑4 mm per year. ππ In many places, ice caps and glaciers are melting, contributing to rising sea levels. ππ Snow cover in the northern hemisphere has decreased by about 5 per cent since 1966. ππ The area covered by permafrost has decreased by 10 per cent in the northern hemisphere. ππ The extent of Arctic sea ice has decreased by 20 per cent since 1978.

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Jørgen E. Olesen

ππ Precipitation has increased at high latitudes in both the northern and southern hemispheres. ππ There are more periods of drought. This increase in droughts has mostly been observed in the already dry areas of the world, i.e. the dry tropics and subtropics. ππ The frequency of heavy precipitation has increased, even in areas with reductions in total rainfall. ππ There is no change in the number of tropical hurricanes, but they tend to be stronger and to last longer. Over a longer time-scale, climate on Earth has varied considerably more than what we have seen in recent decades. However, we only have reliable measurements of temperature and precipitation for the past 150 years or so. To look at the climate over longer periods of time, we must resort to indirect measurements. Here, measurements of e.g. oxygen isotopes in ice cores and sediment layers play an important role in describing the climate (Box 2). However, there are considerable uncertainties associated with translating these observations into a global average temperature. Using such measurements, the IPCC assesses that the global average temperature during the past 50 years has not been as high for the past 1,300 years.

3. The Earth’s radiation balance As mentioned above, in the course of the Earth’s long history the climate has varied considerably more than what has been observed within the past 100 years. Basically, the climate is determined by the balance between the energy which is supplied by sunlight, and the energy which is lost through longwave heat radiation from Earth (Figure 1). Two factors in particular affect the radiation balance: 1) The amount of sunlight intercepted by Earth, and 2) the strength of the greenhouse effect. Incoming solar radiation corresponds to an average of about 342 W/m2 on the entire Earth’s surface, day and night, 365 days a year. However, 31 per cent of this radiation is reflected by clouds, atmospheric particles and the Earth’s surface. This is called the planetary albedo. It is the remaining 69 per cent (or 236 W/m2) which heats the Earth and the atmosphere. Earth loses heat by emitting longwave infrared radiation. The amount of longwave radiation is proportional to the absolute temperature to the fourth power (Stefan-Boltzman’s law). Over a long period of time, the outgoing radiation will be the same as the incoming radiation (236 W/m2). Using Stefan-Boltzman’s law, this gives a mean temperature for the globe

The climate is changing – but why?

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Measuring temperature

Box 2

Traditionally, air temperature is measured by placing a thermometer in what is termed a Stevenson screen, which provides shade and ventilation, ensuring that it is the air temperature that is measured and not the effect of solar radi­ ation on the thermometer. Such measurements have been conducted worldwide since the mid-nineteenth century. Temperature measurements are affected locally by urban development (the urbanisation effect), and it is being discussed whether such effects have affected the global temperature series so they show excessive temperature increases. It is well known that the climate in large cities is significantly warmer than beyond the city limits, but by far the most weather stations are situated in the countryside, far away from urbanised areas. Moreover, temperature measurements from towns and cities are corrected to take account of the urbanisation effect. A number of recent studies show that, at most, urbanisation produces a small uncertainty (0.06 °C over 100 years), which is far less than the observed increases in temperature. In recent decades, measurements using satellites have provided new ways of measuring the Earth’s temperature. However, such measurements provide information in particular about changes in temperature distribution at various heights in the atmosphere. Here, observations show that the temperature in the uppermost part of the atmosphere has been falling, which ties in with the greater greenhouse effect leading to reduced outgoing radiation from the lowest part of the atmosphere. Reconstructing the temperature over longer time-scales calls for other – indirect – methods. Geological deposits provide information about the fauna and flora in the past, and the composition of these organisms provides information about climatic and temperature conditions at the time when these organisms were living. Similar information can be obtained by studying the thickness of tree rings. Studies of longer time-scales are concentrated on ice cores in Greenland and on the Antarctic as it is possible to indirectly read the variations in temperature several hundred thousand years ago. One of the most important methods of reconstructing the temperature back in time is to measure the amount of different forms of oxygen (oxygen isotopes), both the ordinary oxygen isotope 16O and the heavier and rarer 18O. Oxygen is the heaviest constituent of a water molecule (H2O), and as it is easier for the lighter 16O to evaporate than the heavier 18O, in colder periods there will be less 18O present in the atmosphere than in warmer periods. The relative content of the two isotopes in the ice caps can therefore tell us about the temperature of the atmosphere at the time when the snow fell. In cold periods there will be less 18O present in the atmosphere than in warmer periods. The relative content of the two isotopes in the ice caps therefore tell us about the atmosphere’s temperature at the time when the snow fell.

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Figure 1:  The Earth’s radiation balance consists of the balance between incoming solar radiation (shortwave radiation) and solar radiation reflected by clouds and the surface of the sea and the Earth as well as longwave heat radiation from the surface, sea, clouds and atmosphere (Taken with permission from H Meltofte (ed.) (2008): Klimaændringerne: Menneskehedens hidtil største udfordring. The Environmetal Library. Hovedland Publishers)

of 254 °Kelvin (approx. -19 °C). This is about 34 °C lower than the mean temperature of 15 °C which has been measured. Another mechanism (the greenhouse effect) must therefore be influencing climate on Earth. A number of gases in the atmosphere (for example water vapour, carbon dioxide and methane) are, like the clouds, able to absorb some of the outgoing longwave infrared radiation. The absorbed radiation warms the air and is emitted again as longwave radiation, just at a lower temperature than at the Earth’s surface as the atmospheric temperature declines with height. Seen from space, the heat is not emitted from the Earth’s surface but from greenhouse gases and clouds some way up in the atmosphere. On average, it is at the level where the effective outgoing radiation temperature is 254 °Kelvin (at a height of just over 5 km). With a greater concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, the radiation effectively takes place higher up in the atmosphere and for a period at a lower temperature, so that heat builds up in the climatic system until

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Box 3: Feedback mechanisms The Earth’s climate system consists of a closely interconnected system involving the atmosphere, land, ice, soil and vegetation. If the temperature changes, it will lead to changes in the other components, which in turn may affect the temperature. These feedback mechanisms can both enhance and weaken temperature changes. Here are a few examples of feedback mechanisms: Water vapour Water vapour is a greenhouse gas, but the maximum amount of water vapour that the atmosphere can contain greatly depends on temperature (almost 7 per cent increase for every 1 °C increase in temperature). The warmer it is, the more water vapour the atmosphere can hold, and the greater the warming effect from the water vapour (positive feedback). Snow and ice Warming leads to a melting of snow and ice on the Earth’s surface and consequently a reduction in snow cover and sea ice. This minimises the amount of reflected sunlight to space and leads to additional warming (positive feedback). This is the main reason why global warming leads to the greatest temperature increases at high latitudes. Clouds Clouds affect the climate system in varying ways depending on how high they are in the atmosphere. This is because clouds have an insulating effect while also reflecting sunlight. High clouds generally have a warming effect while low clouds are cooling. The overall effect of clouds is thought to be cooling, corresponding to about 20 W/m2. This should be seen in relation to the fact that man-made changes in the radiation balance so far are only approximately 1.6 W/m2 (Table 2).

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CO2 Man-made climate changes are particularly due to emissions of CO2 from using fossil energy and from deforestation. Over longer periods of time, however, CO2 also plays a role in feedback systems. For example, the solubility of CO2 in sea water falls with increasing temperature, which reinforces the role of CO2 as a greenhouse gas. Warming also increases the temperature in areas with permafrost where very large quantities of carbon are fixed in the soil, which is released at higher temperatures. This too amounts to a positive feedback. Temperature profile in the atmosphere The temperature change will be greater at the effective level of outgoing radi­ation higher up the atmosphere than at the Earth’s surface. On the surface there will therefore be smaller temperature changes (negative feedback). Heat transport Large volumes of energy are transported in the atmosphere and in the oceans. In a changed climate, these flow patterns can become altered, which can lead to both positive and negative feedback. Vegetation The Earth’s vegetation influences how much sunlight is reflected and how much water evaporates. As vegetation is also influenced by changes in temperature and precipitation, there is the possibility of many different feedbacks which can be very hard to predict.

Jørgen E. Olesen

the Earth’s temperature again corresponds to the loss through outgoing heat radiation. This leads to warming in the lowest part of the atmosphere.

4. Greenhouse gases The most important greenhouse gases are water vapour (H2O), carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), CFC (chlorofluorocarbons) and tropospheric ozone (O3) (Table 1). It is not possible to rank with any certainty the effect of the individual gases with respect to the total greenhouse effect. This is, among other things, due to a number of feedback mechanisms between the greenhouse gases (Box 3). Basically, the ratio between the most important greenhouse gases – water vapour, clouds and carbon dioxide – is estimated at 2‑1‑1. Table 1.  Estimates of the radiation contributed by a number of factors which influence the overall radiation effect of the greenhouse gases (W/m2) for 2005 compared with pre-industrial levels (Solomon et al. 2007). Cause

Type

Man-made

Long-lived greenhouse gases

Ozone

Factor Carbon dioxide (CO2)

1.66

(1.49‑1.83)

Methane (CH4)

0.48

(0.43‑0.53)

Nitrous oxide (N2O)

0.16

(0.14‑0.18)

CFC

0.34

(0.31‑0.37)

Stratospheric

-0.05

(-0.15‑0.05)

Tropospheric

0.35

(0.25‑0.65)

0.07

(0.02‑0.12)

-0.20

(-0.4‑0.0)

0.10

(0.0‑0.2)

Direct effect

-0.50

(-0.9‑ -0.1)

Cloud albedo

-0.70

(-1.8‑ -0.3)

0.01

(0.003‑0.03)

0.12

(0.06‑0.30)

1.60

(0.6‑2.4)

Stratospheric water from CH4 Surface albedo

Land use Black dust on snow

Aerosols (particles)

Contrails (vapour trails from aircraft) Natural

Solar radiation

Total man-made

Radiation effect (W/m2)

Direct

The man-made sources of CO2 are the burning of fossil fuels (coal, oil and natural gas) as well as changes in land use, particularly deforestation. Emissions of CO2 have increased greatly since 1960 (see Figure 2), and the atmospheric content of CO2 now exceeds by far the natural level seen over the past 650,000 years (140 to 300 ppm). The concentration of methane and

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nitrous oxide has also increased sharply during the past 50 years. Methane is produced anaerobically, i.e. through the transformation of organic matter under oxygen-free conditions, for example in the rumens of ruminant animals, from livestock waste, landfills and in paddy rice fields. Methane has a global warming potential which is 23 times greater than for CO2. The methane content of the atmosphere has, compared to pre-industrial levels, risen by 160 per cent, which is largely due to rapidly increasing numbers of livestock and growing volumes of waste. Nitrous oxide is an even more potent greenhouse gas than methane with a global warming potential which is 298 times greater than for CO2. The concentration in the atmosphere has increased by 17 per cent compared to pre-industrial levels; it is also a very long-lasting greenhouse gas with a lifetime in the atmosphere of 120 years. Nitrous oxide stems in particular from the microbial transformation of nitrogen in the soil, and the rapidly growing volumes of nitrogen which are added through agricultural activities are the main cause of increased emissions of nitrous oxide to the atmosphere. Emissions of CFC gases from refrigerators, freezers, airconditioning systems, fire-extinguishing agents etc. also contribute to the greenhouse effect, which is being further intensified by ozone in the lower part of the atmosphere – the troposphere. Ozone is formed when sunlight decomposes mono-nitrogen oxides (NOx) and carbon monoxide (CO), for example from car and truck exhaust gases. Thus, a large number of different sources of pollution contribute to boosting the atmospheric content of greenhouse gases. The combustion of coal and oil in particular also results in the emission of many small particles to the atmosphere, which generally have a cooling effect, because they increase the amount of sunlight which is reflected (the albedo). Changes in land use have also increased the albedo, but there is considerable uncertainty regarding both these effects (See Table 1). In addition to man-made factors influencing radiation, there have been very large but relatively brief cooling contributions in connection with volcanic eruptions when many small particles are emitted, increasing the albedo. Finally, variations in solar radiation have also resulted in a slight increase in radiation effects in the first half of the twentieth century (Table 1). A handful of scientists claim that these factors together with other natural causes can be the main reasons for the observed climate changes rather than the emission of greenhouse gases (see subsequent chapter on the sun’s indirect influence on the climate).

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CO Content of CO2 (PPM) 2-concentration (ppm)

Years before now present day Years before Figure 2.  Development in the atmospheric concentration of carbon dioxide (CO2) following the end of the last ice age measured in air bubbles trapped in ice cores taken from Antarctic ice. The enlarged section shows the concentration for the period 1750‑2005. The full-draw line shows direct measurements in the atmosphere (Solomon et al. 2007).

5. Climate sensitivity Warming as a result of an increase in the atmospheric content of greenhouse gases (or of the other parameters in Table 1) is described using the concept of climate sensitivity. Climate sensitivity states how much the global temperature will rise through a change in additional energy of 1 W/m2. Such a change in added energy can be due to an increase in the atmospheric content of greenhouse gases or a change in solar radiation. The climate sensitivity makes it possible to calculate the temperature increase from different forcings of the climate system which, directly or indirectly, influence the energy addition. If we know the change in energy addition, it is then possible, using climate sensitivity, to immediately estimate the temperature change. Unfortunately, we do not know a lot about climate sensitivity. If, for example, we only look at what a change in energy addition should result in based on how dependent the longwave outgoing radiation is on temperature, we arrive at a sensitivity of 0.269 K/(W/m2).

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This produces far too small a climate sensitivity. In reality, a number of feedback mechanisms reinforce the temperature change (Box 3). One of the most important feedback mechanisms is the effect of temperature on the atmospheric content of water vapour. Water vapour is a greenhouse gas, and as a warm atmosphere can contain more water vapour than a cold atmosphere, warming will lead to an enhanced greenhouse effect due to the presence of more water vapour in the atmosphere. There are many of these feedback mechanisms, and the climate sensitivity is influenced by the combined effect of these. To calculate the overall effect, comprehensive climate models are used which represent all the physical processes in the atmosphere, the oceans and on land. At the same time, observations over the past 150 years have been used, as well as reconstructions of climate changes over the past 500,000 years, to determine the climate sensitivity. Using these methods, a value of approx. 0.75 K/(W/m2) has been arrived at. Feedback mechanisms therefore result in almost a tripling of the sensitivity compared to the effect without feedbacks. This means that the warming effect of CO2 will be tripled due to feedback mechanisms in the climate system. However, there is still considerable uncertainty associated with establishing the climate sensitivity, and the estimates range from approx. 0.5K/(Wm2) to more than 2K/(Wm2). Table 1 shows an overall estimated radiative forcing of man-made climate changes of approx. 1.6 W/m2. A climate sensitivity of 0.75 K/(W/m2) leads to a temperature increase of 1.2 °C. This is considerably more than the stated temperature increase of approx. 0.75 °C, which is due to inertia in the climate system and which leads to the climate changes continuing for a period after the radiative forcing has increased. This inertia is particularly related to the slow warming of the oceans.

6. The sun’s indirect impact on the climate In addition to the direct effect of solar radiation on the Earth’s climate (solar forcing), two specific indirect effects of the sun’s influence on the climate have attracted attention in the climate debate. The first effect is due to the absorption (warming) from ultraviolet radiation in the stratosphere’s ozone layer, which is in the uppermost part of the atmosphere (at a height of 15‑30 km). The amount of UV radiation depends on sunspots, producing greater warming in periods of maximum sunspots. The number of sunspots varies over an eleven-year cycle. Some studies indicate that the warming can be transmitted to the lower part of the atmosphere and lead to changes in the climate system’s circulation patterns.

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The second effect has been suggested by Henrik Svensmark, where the variation in solar activity through changes in the amount of cosmic radiation can affect the formation of ions in the atmosphere and thereby affect the formation of the small particles which function as cloud condensation nuclei for ice and water, and thereby affect cloud formation. Because lowlying clouds in particular have a cooling effect, a change in solar activity can thereby perhaps indirectly affect the climate. Laboratory experiments have shown that this type of radiation can promote the formation of cloud condensation nuclei, but it is unknown whether this mechanism will also work in the atmosphere. However, there is nothing to suggest that either of these two indirect solar effects have been significant for the global warming of the atmosphere over the past 50 years when there has been no change in the volume of cosmic radiation hitting Earth. On the other hand, it is possible that changes in the cosmic radiation and in UV radiation may have been significant for the warming which occurred in the 1910‑1940 period.

7. Ice ages There has for some time been general consensus among scientists that the basic cause of the coming and going of the ice ages is due to changes in the Earth’s orbit around the sun (see Box 4). This is called the Milankovitch theory, and states that the ice ages are caused by small, cyclical variations in the Earth’s orbit (eccentricity) and axial tilt (obliquity) around the sun. These variations lead to a complex pattern of changes in the amount and distribution of solar radiation reaching the Earth, influencing global energy balances and heat transport and thereby climate. During the ice ages, large volumes of water are accumulated in glaciers, causing the sea level to fall. The temperature at the Earth’s surface is also lower, resulting in less evaporation of water from the oceans, which in turn leads to less precipitation. Moreover, as much of the precipitation falls as snow, the ice ages are often accompanied by marked periods of drought in ice-free areas. This leads to a global climate which is far less favourable for life on Earth than the present climate. During the ice ages, the climate is not constantly cold, but there are often considerable global and regional variations in the temperature which result in the ice sheets advancing and retreating. The cause of these variations is still poorly understood. Even though there is general agreement that the Milankovitch theory is the predominant cause for initiating ice ages, it appears that more is required to trigger a new ice age. Here, the amounts of dust and greenhouse gases

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Milankovitch and the ice ages

Box 4

The shape of the Earth’s orbit around the sun is not constant but varies according to the attractive force of the other planets. Moreover, the Earth’s axial tilt (obliquity) and its precession (axial rotation) in space also vary. These variations affect the amount of total solar radiation reaching Earth and its distribution, otherwise known as solar forcing. The Serbian geophysicist Milutin Milankovitch (1879‑1958) was the first person to calculate (by hand) these effects over the past one million years and thereby demonstrate that these variations are the primary cause of the switch between ice age and interglacial periods. Eccentricity The Earth’s orbit around the sun changes from being almost circular to slightly elliptical and back again over a period of approx. 100,000 years. This change in eccentricity means that the distance between the Earth and the sun changes, resulting in minor changes in the overall solar radiation reaching the Earth. Axial tilt The angle of axis of the Earth’s rotation in relation to an axis perpendicular to the Earth’s orbit around the sun varies between 21° and 24° over a period of approx. 41,000 years. Changes in the Earth’s axial tilt affect the distribution of solar radiation, but not total solar radiation. When the axial tilt is large, the difference between summer and winter at high latitudes will be greater. Cooler summers with a low axial tilt are suspected of encouraging the start of a new ice age. Precession The direction of the Earth’s axis of rotation in space changes over a period of about 21,000 years. At the moment it is summer in the northern hemisphere when the Earth is closest to the sun. In about 10,500 years, summer will be in the southern hemisphere when the Earth is closest to the sun. This does not affect the total amount of solar radiation reaching Earth but rather the seasonal variation in temperature.

in the atmosphere are likely to play a significant role. The geography of the Earth is another factor. Only when the position of the continents hinders an efficient exchange between cold water at the poles and warm water at the equator will new ice ages occur. This is actually the case with the Earth’s present geography, where there is relatively little exchange between water in the Arctic ocean and the other oceans. At the same time, the continents are currently placed so close to the poles that long-lasting ice caps can be formed. An ice age typically lasts about 100,000 years, while an interglacial period lasts 10,000‑15,000 years. We are now in an interglacial period which has

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lasted 11,700 years. However, this does not mean we are on the threshold of a new ice age. Thus, the IPCC states that it is very unlikely that the Earth will enter a new ice age within the next 30,000 years as a result of natural causes. This is because the next major fall in summer radiation to the northern hemisphere will not happen for 30,000 years (see Box 4).

Climate models

Box 5

Climate models describe the atmosphere as a physical system based on physical laws which can be expressed mathematically. As the oceans are also an important factor for the climate, climate models often include models of the heat transport and heat exchange taking place within the oceans. In the global climate models (GCM), the atmosphere is described using a number of boxes distributed in a spatial network across the entire globe. There are about 200 km between the grid points, with 30‑40 vertical layers in the atmospheric models and 20‑30 layers in the ocean models. The most important physical laws used in the climate models are: ππ ππ ππ ππ

Equations of motion based on Newton’s laws Mass and energy conservation Equation of state for ideal gases Radiation equations, which describe how solar and thermal radiation are transmitted and deposited in the atmosphere.

Moreover, the models include a number of empirical relations based on observations. These empirical relations do not necessarily have a reliable theoretical basis but are necessary to describe processes which occur at temporal and spatial scales which are not sufficiently resolved in the models. Such empirical relations often contain a number of parameters which have to be tuned by comparing model simulations with observations. One example of this is cloud formation, which often takes place on a much smaller scale than what is represented in the models. The empirical relations are necessary, but they also reduce the degree of precision in the model calculations. This can to some extent be remedied by increasing the models’ spatial and temporal resolution, but this leads to vastly greater requirements for computer processing power when running the models. Often calculations are therefore performed with an increased resolution for a smaller geographical area with the help of regional climate models (RCM), where a GCM supplies the boundary conditions for the regional model, i.e. temperature, air pressure, water vapour at the edge of the geographical extent of the regional model.

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8. Models of the climate system As described above, the climate is the result of a complex interplay between many different physical, chemical and biological processes which are simultaneously influenced by the geographical distribution of the oceans, land masses, ice caps, lakes and rivers. In order to better understand this complex system, several mathematical models of the climate system have been developed (Box 5). These are complex models which demand some of the world’s fastest computers to simulate the Earth’s climate. The most important criterion for assessing whether a climate model is reliable consists of comparing the model simulations of the present climate with observations. The climate models are continually being improved, and at the moment there are about twenty models worldwide which are capable of producing satisfactory simulations of the climate system. The deviations between the calculated and the observed temperature distribution on Earth are in most cases just a few degrees, with the biggest deviations being seen in areas with snow and ice. Generally speaking, the climate models can be regarded as providing a solid basis for calculating future climate change.

9. Scenario calculations of climate changes An important question when assessing future climate changes is how society will develop over the next century and how this will affect the emission of greenhouse gases to the atmosphere. To assess the uncertainty in this area and the effect of different social developments, including environmental awareness and new environmentally friendly technologies, the IPCC has developed a number of scenarios for the future (Box 6). These scenarios range from sustainable societies based on the widespread use of renewable energy and resources to an even more resource-hungry society than that we know today. The global increase in temperature up until 2100 is shown in Figure 3 for three of these scenarios. In about 2100, the temperature globally will have increased by 3‑4 °C if the world develops as shown in the A2 scenario, but only by 1.3‑2.4 °C according to the B1 scenario. Most of the other scenarios show temperature increases which fall within this interval (see Table 2). It is worth noting that the differences between the scenarios first become really apparent during the second half of the twenty-first century. This is partly due to the fact that it takes a long time to make the very resource-consuming technologies more sustainable and partly because of inertia in the climate system.

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The IPCC’s emissions scenarios

Box 6

Future population developments and economic and technological developments will cause additional anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases and thereby lead to a greater atmospheric concentration and a continued forcing of the greenhouse effect. At the moment it is difficult to predict how the factors which determine emissions will develop because different international trends have an important bearing, including issues such as the development of the global economy versus a regionalisation of the markets as well as potential changes in people’s lifestyles. These changes can either lead to less consumption and thereby relatively small greenhouse gas emissions, or greater consumption of energy and resources and thereby higher emissions. Another important factor is the future of the developing countries where high rates of economic growth and energy consumption on a par with that in the industrialised countries can become a major source of greenhouse gas emissions. The climate issue is thus closely integrated with general development issues. To assess the necessity/effect of possible measures to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases, it is necessary to make a number of assumptions about the future. As mentioned, such assumptions are subject to considerable uncertainty, and therefore so-called scenarios are presented which describe possible future global social and technological developments. In 2000, the IPCC carried out extensive scenario work that shows a number of possible alternative development perspectives which are gathered in four groups labelled A1, A2, B1 and B2. A1.  A future world with very fast economic growth. The world population peaks in the middle of the century, and new and more efficient technologies are quickly introduced. The A1 family comprises three sub-families where fossil fuels are primarily used (A1FI) or non-fossil energy sources (A1T) as well as a mix of all energy types (A1B). A2. A more heterogeneous world with continued population growth and a slower pace of technological development. B1. A world which is similar in some respects to A1, but which focuses more on a service and information-based economy as well as sustainable technologies. B2. A world which still sees population growth, although at slower rates than in A2, as well as slower and more diversified technological developments than in A1 and B1. Together, the scenarios cover the many combinations of world population growth (approx. 7‑15 billion), growth in GDP (approx. 11‑26 times), distribution of energy production on fossil and non-fossil energy sources etc. Even though some optimistic scenarios predict a reduction in CO2, most show an increase in CO2 concentration from the present level of 370 ppm to – including a level of uncertainty – from under 500 ppm to more than 1000 ppm up until 2100.

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Table 2.  Model-calculated projections of global warming and rising sea levels during the twentyfirst century (Solomon et al. 2007). Temperature increase (°C)

Sea level rise (m)

Scenario

Best estimate

Likely interval

Without accelerated increase in melting rate of ice

Constant year 2000 concentration

0.6

0.3‑0.9

B1

1.8

1.1‑2.9

0.18‑0.38

A1T

2.4

1.4‑3.8

0.20‑0.45

B2

2.4

1.4‑3.8

0.20‑0.43

A1B

2.8

1.7‑4.4

0.21‑0.48

A2

3.4

2.0‑5.4

0.23‑0.51

A1FI

4.0

2.4‑6.4

0.26‑0.59

The climate system’s inertia is illustrated by the lower curve in Figure 2, which shows the temperature development if the concentration of greenhouse gases is maintained at the year 2000 level. Calculations based on the climate models show that the temperature will increase by 0.4‑0.8 °C in any case. This is because the Earth’s climate – and especially the temperature in the oceans – is still out of balance with the present level of greenhouse gases. The climate will therefore continue to warm, regardless of how the world and our emissions develop.

10. Regional climate changes However, what is crucial for the effects of climate changes is not how the global average temperature develops but how temperature and precipitation develop regionally. Calculations based on the climate models show large regional changes occurring basically everywhere around the world. Warming above land will be higher than above water, and consequently higher than the global average. The temperature increase over land is usually 50 per cent greater than the global mean value. Moreover, the increase in temperature is much greater during winter in the Arctic, usually twice the global mean, which is largely due to the fact that the warming reduces the amount of ice and snow (see Box 3). Significant changes will also occur in the distribution of precipitation. The general picture is that it will become drier in areas which are dry at present and even wetter where it already rains a lot. In addition, the dry areas will spread, with increased risk of drought in many places. This is particularly true in the dry tropics and subtropics, while increases in rainfall

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will be seen at higher latitudes in cooler climates. Where rainfall increases, there will be a greater risk of flooding. The changes in the atmosphere’s circulation will mean that the storm paths in the middle latitudes will move slightly further towards the poles. At the same time, calculations suggest that the maximum wind speeds in storms above the sea will increase, leading to a greater frequency of very intense and destructive hurricanes. More extreme weather

An enhanced greenhouse effect will not just lead to a generally warmer climate, it will also result in changes in the frequency, intensity and duration of extreme weather events. Model calculations show that there will be more and longer-lasting heat waves, but also heavier precipitation. The model calculations show increasing precipitation intensity across most of the Earth, but also that the number of dry days increases. This accords with observations of climate changes over the past 50 years, and is linked to the intensification of the hydrological cycle which stems especially from the fact that higher temperatures enhance evaporation and the maximum water vapour content in the atmosphere before clouds form. When evaporation is limited (e.g. due to dry soils), this leads to less rainfall, whereas it leads to higher rainfall where evaporation is not limited by water availability. All in all, this increases the risk of both flooding and drought in many places worldwide. Again, this is in line with what has been observed over the past 50 years, where the frequency of flooding has increased throughout almost all of Europe, while periods of drought have become more extensive, particularly in southern Europe. Similar changes are seen across the globe. Rising sea levels

When the temperature increases as a result of anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases, two factors can contribute to rising sea levels worldwide. On the one hand the water expands as a result of being warmed, and on the other glaciers and ice caps melt in a warmer climate. The likely range for the increases in sea levels worldwide during the twenty-first century is reported by IPCC as 15‑59 cm depending on the chosen emissions scenario (see Table 2). The thermal expansion of water is responsible for 70‑75 per cent of this increase. Recent studies suggest that the ice, especially on Greenland, will melt at a faster rate. However, these studies are still regarded as being very uncertain and are therefore not included in the IPCC’s estimates in Table 2. Sea levels worldwide during the previous interglacial period (the Eemian

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Interglacial) 125,000 years ago were probably four to six metres higher than during the twentieth century, probably due to the polar ice caps melting. It is therefore likely that the melting of the ice caps on Greenland will contribute significantly to rising sea levels in the coming centuries. However, thousands of years may pass before the Greenland ice sheet has melted away completely. Once so, sea levels would have risen by 7 metres. Uncertainties

There is no doubt that the Earth’s climate is changing towards a warmer and more extreme climate. There is also no doubt that at least the majority of the observed climate change is due to anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases. However, considerable uncertainty remains on how climate will change in future. This is not so much due to the obviously chaotic nature of the weather systems or the natural fluctuations in the climate caused by changes in solar radiation or volcanic eruptions. Rather, the uncertainty is largely attributable to our current lack of understanding of the feedback mechanisms

Figure 3.  Model calculations of the global rise in temperature from 1900 to 2100 for three emission scenarios (see Box 3) as well as for the hypothetical situation where the atmospheric content of greenhouses gases remains constant at 2000 levels. All temperatures are shown relative to the mean temperature for 1980‑1999 (Solomon et al. 2007).

Global temperature increase A2 A1B B1 Year 2000 constant concentrations 20th century

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in the climate system. This can make the climate change both larger and smaller than the present projections. In terms of how society adapts to climate changes, reliable projections of temperature and precipitation distribution play a key role at regional level. In many cases, it is also important to have detailed information about changes in the frequency of extreme weather events such as storms, heavy rainfall and drought. Here, the climate models have improved markedly in recent years, but improvements are still badly needed. For projections towards the end of the twenty-first century, the uncertainties regarding the future emissions of greenhouse gases are far more important than the uncertainty about the climate sensitivity. This shows that at we now have a reliable climatic basis for deciding whether we as a society must take steps to avoid the climate changes. It also shows that mankind will be forced to adapt to changes in climate – some warming is unavoidable. References Dawson AG (1992): Ice Age Earth. Routledge. Houghton J (2004): Global warming. The complete briefing. Cambridge University Press. Marsh N & Svensmark H (2003): Solar influence on Earth’s climate. Space Science Reviews. 107, pp. 317‑325. Nakicenovic N, Alcamo J, Davis G, DeVries B, Fenhann J, Gaffin S, Gregory K, Gruebler A, Jung TY, Kram T, La Rovere EL, Michaelis L, Mori S, Morita T, Pepper W, Pitcher H, Price L, Riahi K, Roehrl A, Rogner HH, Sankovski A, Schlesinger M, Shukla P, Smith S, Swart R, VanRooijen S, Victor N & Dadi Z (2000): Special Report on Emissions Scenarios: A Special Report of Working Group III of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Philander SG (2008): Encyclopedia of global warming and climate change. SAGE. Silver J (2008): Global warming & climate change – demystified. A self-teaching guide. McGraw Hill. Solomon S, Qin D, Manning M, Chen Z, Marquis M, Averyt KB, Tignor M & Miller HL (eds.) (2007): Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. Svensmark H & Friis-Christensen E (1997): Variation in cosmic ray flux and global cloud coverage – a missing link in solar-climate relationships. Journal of Atmospheric and Solar-Terrestrial Physics. 59, pp. 1225‑1232.

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What will happen? Scenarios of the future Jørgen E . Olesen

1. Introduction Climate change is nothing new. In the history of Earth there have been considerable climate changes – from very warm periods to an almost complete freezing of the planet (‘snowball Earth’). Over the past half a million years, the biggest climate changes have happened in connection with the coming and going of the ice ages. Nevertheless, life on Earth has survived even though many species have become extinct, especially at the onset of the ice ages. So, history also shows that life on Earth – generally speaking – is pretty robust. However, we should remember that the climate change we currently face is expected to lead to a warmer climate than the Earth has experienced for several million years – and this will take place over just 100 years! We are therefore on the threshold of a new type of climate change which will take place at a speed that surpasses what has previously been seen. Climate change is undoubtedly one of the biggest challenges faced by mankind. This is not least because of the huge consequences that climate change will have for the world’s ecosystems and for our living conditions. At the same time, climate change poses a colossal political problem where democracies around the world risk failing to make the right decisions in time. The political and democratic problem stems from the fact that people experience only to a very small degree any connection between lifestyle, greenhouse gas emissions, climate change and the effect of the climate change on the living standards of individual citizens. This is because there is both a spatial and a temporal separation between emissions and effects. The world’s industrial countries, which emit the largest volumes of greenhouse gases, are generally less vulnerable to the effects of climate change. This is because industrial countries have a higher adaptive capacity than

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Box 1. Key terms In connection with adapting to climate change, a number of terms are used which unfortunately do not always have the same meaning within different scientific disciplines. The IPCC has therefore chosen to define some of these terms. These will be used in this chapter. Climate describes the ‘expected’ weather (temperature, precipitation, air humidity etc.). As such, the climate has often been stated as the mean weather over a longer period of time, usually 30 years. With anthropogenic climate change, where the climate changes relatively quickly, it is necessary to use other methods (for example model calculations) to describe both the present and future climate. Climate change, in the definition of IPCC, refers to a change in the state of the climate over time, regardless of whether this is due to natural variability or the result of human activity. This definition comes from the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Adaptive capacity is the ability of a system to adjust to climate change (including climate variability and extremes) to moderate potential damage, to take advantage of opportunities, or to cope with the consequences. Vulnerability is the degree to which a system is susceptible to, or unable to cope with, adverse effects of climate change, including climate variability and extremes. Vulnerability is a function of the character, magnitude, and rate of climate change and the variation to which a system is exposed, its sensitivity and its adaptive capacity. There have, especially in the study of the relationship between social and environmentally dependent systems (e.g. agriculture and forestry) been different interpretations of the term vulnerability. In such contexts vulnerability can be looked at from different angles: 1) risk or danger, where the angle is the climate impacts and their consequences, 2) a political/economic angle, which looks in particular at how people and society adapt to the changes, and 3) an ecological angle, where the term resilience is often used as an antonym to vulnerability. When assessing vulnerability studies, it is important to be aware of the angle from which vulnerability is defined and interpreted.

many developing countries (see Box 1). Moreover, serious effects will make themselves felt far later (decades to centuries) than the emissions. Therefore it can be very difficult to foster support among the general population (and voters) for the timely adoption of effective measures that are needed to curb greenhouse gas emissions. The political will to act against climate change will probably only emerge once both politicians and the general population acknowledge that climate

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change results from greenhouse gas emissions and that these are harmful. Likewise, the will to act assumes that future harmful effects are deemed relevant for decisions being made now. It is therefore important to be able to establish the effects of climate change and their economic consequences. As climate change in one form or another must be regarded as unavoidable, it is crucial that society adapts in the most appropriate way.

2. The effects are already evident The effects of climate change do not just belong to the future. Climate change is already happening  – as are the effects. The global mean temperature has increased by 0.55 °C over the past 30 years. This has led to documented changes in biological and physical systems across all continents. Examples include: ππ Increased instability of the ground in areas with permafrost and more rock slides in alpine areas. ππ Changes in some Arctic and Antarctic ecosystems, for example for the polar bears (Box 4). ππ Increased run-off and earlier spring floods in many rivers which are fed by glaciers and snow. ππ Warming of many rivers and lakes with consequences for the food chains and water quality. ππ Earlier occurrence of springtime events such as leaf unfolding and bird migration. ππ Shift towards the poles in the spread of flora and fauna. ππ Change in the distribution area of algae, plankton and fish in the oceans at high latitudes. ππ Increased occurrence of algae and zooplankton in lakes at high latitudes (Box 5). ππ Incipient bleaching of many coral reefs as a result of rising sea temperatures. A number of changes have been documented in both natural and human systems, even though it can be difficult to distinguish climate effects from adaptations to other non-climatic trends: ππ In northern areas changes are taking place in agricultural and forestry systems involving earlier sowing and growth in the crops as well as changes in the occurrence of windfalls, forest fires and pest infestation.

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ππ Changes in health-related risks, for example the occurrence of heatrelated deaths in Europe (see Box 2) and a greater incidence of allergenic pollens at the mid and high latitudes in the northern hemisphere. ππ Certain human activities in the Arctic (e.g. hunting and moving across snow and ice) as well as winter sports in low-lying alpine areas. There are also indications that climate change is affecting other natural and human systems. Even though these changes are described in the literature, they are still not documented trends which can be ascribed to anthropogenic climate change. ππ Buildings in mountain areas are subject to an increased risk of flooding from melting glaciers. Governments and other authorities have in several places initiated the construction of dams and ducts to mitigate the risk. Heatwave over Europe in 2003

Box 2

From June to August 2003, many parts of Europe suffered a serious heatwave with summer temperatures 3‑5 °C above normal over much of southern and central Europe. The highest temperatures were recorded at the beginning of August when the maximum temperature for several days running was 35‑40 °C. The average summer temperature was way above normal, which shows that it was an extremely unusual phenomenon under normal climate conditions. However, the phenomenon is consistent with the combined increase in both mean temperature and temperature variability that is expected as a result of climate change. As such, the 2003 heatwave simply represents what can be expected to be normal for central and southern Europe towards the end of the twenty-first century. Consequently, the heatwave in 2003 has been taken by many as a sign of what is to come. The heatwave was accompanied by a significant shortfall in precipitation, and the resulting drought led to a loss of productivity of 30 per cent for agricultural and forestry production in large parts of Europe. This obviously reduced agricultural production and increased costs. It has been estimated that total losses amounted to EUR 11 billion within agriculture and forestry. The warm and dry conditions also resulted in many very large forest fires, especially in Portugal. Several large rivers (e.g., the Po, Rhine, Donau and Loire) had record low streamflows, affecting river navigation and the use of the river water for cooling and irrigation. The Alpine glaciers melted at extremely high rates, which helped to prevent even lower rates of flow in the Rhine and Donau. In large towns and cities, the heatwave from June to August led to excessive mortality of more than 35,000 people, especially among senior citizens. Many of these large towns and cities have now introduced emergency plans to prevent a repeat of this in future.

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ππ In the Sahel in Africa, warmer and drier conditions have led to a shorter growing season with devastating consequences for the crops. In southern Africa, a longer dry season and more uncertain rainfall has led to changes in patterns of crop cultivation. ππ Rising sea levels, increased settlement and urban development have led to a loss of wetlands and mangroves as well as increased damage from flooding along the coasts in many areas. Effects depend on the extent of the warming

It probably does not come as any surprise to learn that the greater the extent of the global warming, the greater the consequences. However, it is only since the publication of the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment Report that an overall picture has been presented of the consequences across various sectors and across the world’s continents. Examples of this are given in Figure 1 where the expected effects are shown for a number of areas which are deemed to be relevant for people and the environment. Figure 1 shows the effects in relation to a rise in the global mean temperature. However, only a few of the most serious consequences of global warming can solely and directly be ascribed to temperature changes. Most of the effects are associated with changes in patterns of rainfall or the increased frequency of extreme weather phenomena such as storms, heatwaves, droughts and torrential rain. In coastal areas, the rising sea levels also play a big role. Figure 1 illustrates what could happen during the present century. Far more serious effects are likely in the following centuries. These effects will, in particular, be associated with significant rises in the sea level, leading to the large-scale displacement of people, economic activities and infrastructure away from the present coastlines. This will both be extremely expensive and will pose social, cultural and political challenges of as yet unseen dimensions. It is expected that parts at least of the Greenland ice sheet and possibly the ice cap in West Antarctica will melt in the coming centuries with temperature increases of 1‑4 °C, leading to sea level rises of 4‑6 metres or more. This is on top of the sea level rises resulting from the fact that water expands when warmed.

3. Water resources The availability of clean and ample drinking water is regarded as a human right. At the same time, water is fundamental to agricultural production. Of total agricultural production, 40 per cent comes from irrigated farming, but

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Figure 1.  Illustration of how different degrees of global warming during the twenty-first century will affect various resources, ecosystems and human health. The solid lines show where the effects are calculated to take place, and the dashed lines show that the effects continue and are reinforced by increasing temperatures. Adaptation to climate change is not included in these estimates (Parry et al. 2007).

worldwide agriculture accounts for 80 per cent of total freshwater consumption. In addition, water plays a role in many different contexts which will be affected by climate change, for example river navigation, hydroelectric power, cooling of thermal power plants and private and industrial uses. More than a sixth of the world’s population live on floodplains where much of the water comes from melting glaciers and snow. Here, global warming will initially lead to increased streamflow in rivers and thereby greater possibilities for agricultural irrigation. In the long term, the consequences will be smaller volumes of water stored in the glaciers and snow, resulting in bigger differences between summer and winter streamflow in the rivers with an increased risk of both flooding and drought. By the middle of the twenty-first century, the annual run-off in the rivers and the availability of water is expected to have increased by 10‑40 per cent in the high latitudes and in certain tropical regions. The run-off will cor-

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respondingly fall by 10‑30 per cent in certain dry areas at medium latitudes (e.g. southern Europe, South Africa and Australia) as well as in the dry tropics, which are at present among the most water-stressed areas. Increased drought will often be linked to greatly increased summer temperatures, and the effect of this can be illustrated by the heatwave over Europe in 2003 (see Box 2). The size of the drought-struck area is also likely to grow. At the same time, the risk of very heavy rainfall increases, increasing the risk of flooding. The effect of more extensive flooding can be illustrated with the widespread flooding along the River Elbe in 2002 (see Box 3). There are a number of options available for adapting to changes to a river’s water flow, the frequency of flooding and to more frequent drought. As human society is so dependent on water, most of these methods are already known by the authorities and private organisations handling water Major flooding along the River Elbe in 2002

Box 3

On 10 August 2002, a large low-pressure system moved slowly in across central and eastern Europe. The storm had started several days earlier above the British Isles and then swung south where it gathered large volumes of humid air from the warm Mediterranean. While gradually making its way over the central part of the continent, it released its humidity in the form of sustained and heavy rain. In some places, almost 250 millimetres of rain fell over a four-day period. The flooding started in the Czech Republic, where the Vltava River, one of the main tributaries of the Elbe, caused flooding in the medieval towns of Cesky Krumlov and Ceske Budejovice. The next victim further downstream was the low-lying districts in Prague. The flood wave continued into the Elbe and, on 15 August, caused widespread flooding in Dresden. While the flood wave moved further down the Elbe, the river burst its banks in Wittenberg, Dessau and other towns in Saxony. The high water levels finally reached the mouth of the Elbe on 24 August. Even though most flooding was seen along the Elbe, the streamflow increased considerably in the Danube, which led to flooding in many towns in Austria and Slovakia. When the Elbe and the Danube burst their banks, fertile farmland was flooded along the rivers, destroying crops which were about to be harvested. The muddy flood water which swept across low-lying areas forced many businesses along the river to stop production and trade, and bridges, roads and other infrastructure was extensively damaged or destroyed. Private homes and other property were also to a large extent lost in the flooding waters. If the damage from all the floods in central and eastern Europe is put together, the financial losses from the floods in August 2002 amount to approximately EUR 15 billion.

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resources in many countries around the world. The possibilities open to us for managing changes in water supplies basically fall under the following points: ππ Political instruments such as ‘regional strategic water plans’, which consolidate and document the initiatives which the authorities and other players can implement to adapt to climate change. ππ Technological and structural instruments such as new water reservoirs and implementing programmes designed to ensure the renewal of groundwater to safeguard water supplies in the long term as a way of countering the increasing frequency of droughts. ππ Risk sharing and spreading in the form of insurance policies against extreme climate events and which are made available to poor and vulnerable societies. ππ Changes in use, activity and place covers measures for overcoming climate change, e.g. special zones along rivers to protect the population from the risk of flooding. This also includes a large number of initiatives to boost the efficient use of water (especially in farming) and water-saving methods (in industry and in private and public housing).

Figure 2.  Illustration of how the effects of climate change on freshwater resources affect the possibility for sustainable development in various regions (Parry et al. 2007). The background map shows the estimated difference in annual run-off (in per cent) between the present (1981‑2000) and future (2081‑2100) climate for the SRES A1B emissions scenario. The blue colours show increasing run-off, the red declining run-off.

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4. Ecosystems Climate change will have serious consequences for the world’s ecosystems. However, it is important to remember that, globally, ecosystems already have to contend with considerable impacts of human activities. In the areas which are at the moment bearing the brunt of deforestation, agricultural expansion and pollution, it is expected that these effects and not climate change will be largely responsible for the loss of biodiversity over the next 50 years. However, climate change will exacerbate the situation and lead to further species loss. On the other hand, climate change will be the dominant driving force for changes in places which are not affected to the same extent by human activities. This applies, for example, to areas with tundra and polar ice (see Box 4), coniferous forests at high latitudes, certain areas with Mediterranean vegetation, deserts, savannahs and tropical rainforests. Natural world in the Arctic is the loser

Box 4

For thousands of years, the fauna and flora in the Arctic region have adapted to the extreme living conditions, and many species are directly dependent on ice and snow. Polar bears live almost exclusively from hunting seals on the sea ice, and when this disappears during the summer, the bears are unable to find anything to eat. This is already happening, with hundreds of polar bears becoming stranded on Svalbard because the ice melts too rapidly. On land the polar bears are unable to find sufficient food, and this means that the polar bear population will shrink considerably with climate change. There will be similar problems on land as the tundra gradually becomes overgrown with trees and bushes. This will obviously benefit the species which can spread northwards. However, it will threaten the Arctic species, which will likewise move north. But they are far more restricted because the animals and plants can migrate no further than to the edge of the Arctic Ocean, and the species which depend on the ice have nowhere to go once it disappears during the summer. It will be particularly hard on the high Arctic zone. Here the plants will seldom grow more than 5‑10 centimetres tall. The high Arctic constitutes a relatively narrow border between the low Arctic to the south and the Arctic Ocean to the north. Many of the species from the high Arctic tundra will thus become extinct or decline significantly in number and extent. The warmer winter climate will mean periods of thawing during the winter. This will form crusts of ice in the snow, which will make it hard or impossible for musk and other herbivores to feed on the vegetation. There is therefore considerable risk that they will disappear from large areas.

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During climate change, the northern coniferous forests with a naturally low biodiversity will slowly develop into deciduous forest areas with a potentially higher biodiversity. The tropical rainforests, which are home to much of the world’s biodiversity, will, on the other hand, be particularly sensitive to changes in rainfall volumes. If the rainforests become drier, as some climate models predict, many species will not be able to survive, which will lead to huge species loss. The temperature of the world’s oceans is expected to increase, affecting the distribution of sea ice. In addition, the sensitivity to nutrient loading will increase in many places, which can lead to an increased risk of hypoxia in coastal areas (see Box 5). The tropical coral reefs are particularly vulnerable, and these are enormously significant for the oceans’ biodiversity and for fishing by local populations. Predictions based on the climate models show that the majority of the coral reefs will be in the danger zone by 2050. Increasing temperatures are not alone in affecting life in the oceans. The increased CO2 concentration in the atmosphere also impacts the oceans directly, because they absorb large volumes of atmospheric CO2. This leads to ocean acidification, and during the twenty-first century, the pH could fall by 0.3 to 0.4 units. This may not sound like very much, but it represents an increase in the hydrogen ion concentration of between 100 and 250 per cent. This can have major consequences for the marine fauna and flora, including the coral reefs, but these effects are still poorly understood. Several attempts have been made to calculate how many species risk becoming extinct as a result of climate change. The calculations are based on models which are still subject to considerable uncertainty, and the results vary greatly. According to the most pessimistic predictions, between 15 and 37 per cent of all the world’s species risk becoming extinct as a result of global warming.

5. Agriculture, forestry and food security Climate change comes on top of the major challenge which agriculture has in the twenty-first century of securing food for an ever growing and more prosperous global population at the same time as having to preserve the available soil and water resources. Projections of present developments show that global food production must be doubled over the next 50 years in order to meet demand. Doubts are now being raised about whether this will be possible. Climate change exacerbates this challenge by reducing the quality of the soil and the availability of water in many of the world’s agricultural regions and by increasing temperature and rainfall variability.

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Climate change has already affected agriculture and food production worldwide. At the same time, the patterns of precipitation have changed. Worldwide there is more extensive drought, especially in the subtropics. In Europe it is most evident around the Mediterranean, where the growing incidence of drought has led to growing pressure on irrigation systems. In parts of southern France and Italy, this has resulted in a reduction in the size of irrigated areas and in changes in crop rotation in favour of less water-consuming crops. Northern Europe on the other hand has seen an increase in precipitation. This has also had consequences for the aquatic environment (see Box 5). Warmer climate leads to more oxygen depletion

Box 5

Oxygen depletion, or hypoxia, is unfortunately a recurring phenomenon in many lakes, inlets and coastal waters worldwide. In Europe, oxygen depletion in the Baltic Sea in particular has spurred extensive EU regulation with the aim of reducing the leaching of nutrients into the aquatic environment. Billions of euros have been invested in reducing emissions of nitrogen and phosphorus, but it has not yet been sufficiently well implemented to ensure a healthy aquatic environment. Oxygen depletion occurs when oxygen consumption on the sea or lake bed exceeds supply. When the water column is stratified or characterised by pycnoclines, the water at the bottom is separated from the water above and is not supplied with oxygen from the atmosphere. This results in limited amounts of oxygen at the bottom of the water column available for organisms during summer. Most oxygen is consumed on the sea bed during the decomposition of algae and other organic materials which sink down from above. Nutrients and light stimulate the production of algae, but it is the weather which determines the extent of the oxygen depletion. Oxygen depletion has serious consequences and, in addition to high fish mortality, causes long-term damage to vegetation and all marine life. The regulations which have been implemented in the EU have led to large reductions in the release of nutrients to the marine environment, but climate change is unfortunately having the opposite effect. Warmer sea water can contain less oxygen, and higher temperatures lead to higher oxygen consumption on the sea bed. In inlets and coastal waters in particular, this means that the oxygen is used faster during periods with clear stratification or well-defined pycnoclines. Climate change may also result in increased precipitation and consequently more run-off, especially during the winter. This in turn results in more leaching of nutrients and stronger stratification in coastal waters. In combination, this exacerbates the hypoxia, and it may therefore be necessary to impose more regulations via the aquatic environment plans.

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Climate change is expected to lead to increasing productivity of agricultural crops at medium high and high latitudes with temperature increases of up to 1‑3 °C. Temperature increases above this level will probably result in reduced yields. At low latitudes, especially the dry tropics and subtropics, crop yields will fall with even small increases in temperature (1‑2 °C), which will increase the risk of famine in many places. Globally, calculations indicate that food production will increase with temperature increases of 1‑3 °C, but that above this level food production will fall. However, most of these calculations do not take account of many of the negative effects which increasing climate variability and more flooding and drought have for agricultural production. The consequences therefore might well be declining food supplies and food availability, especially in developing countries at low latitudes (see Box 8). At the global level it is expected that commercial timber production will increase slightly with climate change in the short and medium term. However, there will be considerable regional variations to this general trend. Around the Mediterranean, the big challenge will be a far higher incidence of forest fires in future. In northern Europe, forestry is dominated by long production times of, depending on the tree species, between 50 and 180 years. In this context, climate change poses a significant challenge because the trees and forests we are planting today must be able to grow and remain stable in the climate of the next many decades. One example is the Norway spruce which will see a decline in southern Scandinavia as high winter temperatures result in forest die-back in Norway spruce plantations. A higher incidence of heavy storms poses a particular threat to forests. Monocultural conifer plantations are particularly liable to storm damage. Many countries are therefore in the process of converting their forestry operations to ‘multispecies plantings’, where several species of trees of different ages are grown together. This results in greater stability in the face of changes in climatic conditions while also increasing the richness and diversity of life in the forests. Climate change will lead to considerable regional changes in the distribution and production of fish species, and in many places it is expected to have negative consequences for aquaculture and fisheries. Fish populations depend on a complex interplay between various parts of the marine food chain, and biological production will be affected by the climate at all levels. It is therefore hard to predict exactly what the consequences will be for the fisheries. European fishery areas will see the widespread influx of species from southern areas, whereas some of the native species will move further north.

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6. Agriculture The cool temperate areas (e.g. Scandinavia) will be favoured by the expected effects of climate change on agricultural production potential. However, exploiting this potential assumes that cultivation methods are properly adapted. It is especially in terms of agriculture’s environmental impact that this adaptation will need to be planned and managed. This is because intensive farming in these areas discharges significant volumes of fertilisers and pesticides to the surrounding environment. Sea level rise will, in certain places, lead to flooding or to so high groundwater levels that farming will become impossible. This is likely to be the case along some inlets as well as rivers with a very small height of fall. In some places, the problem can be solved through building dykes, although this may have a negative impact on the natural world. Alternatively, these areas must be abandoned for agricultural purposes. In some regions, in particular along estuaries, salt water intrusion will threaten groundwater quality for both drinking water and irrigation purposes. Worldwide, approx. 40 per cent of food production comes from irrigated farmland, and about 80 per cent of the world’s freshwater consumption is used for irrigation. Climate change is accompanied by more drought in many places during the summer, increasing the need for irrigation. This will have serious implications for groundwater levels and the streamflow in rivers and streams. More efficient irrigation methods and better water consumption regulation is therefore required. The changes in crop growing conditions and the more extreme rainfall resulting from climate change are expected to lead to greater discharges of phosphorus and nitrogen to the aquatic environment. However, considerable uncertainty still surrounds the size of these changes, but the consequences are probably a higher risk of algae blooms in the aquatic environment (see Box 5). At the same time, rising temperatures are expected to lead to more crop protection problems and thus to greater pesticide use (see Box 6).

7. Coasts Life along the costs will never be the same. The patterns of winds and storms will change, and in many cases it will lead to more intense storms and hurricanes. Sea levels in the oceans will rise, and a walk along the beach will often include sights of ruins of old buildings, shipyards and quays surrounded by rising water. Along other coasts, which are now dominated by

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Greater pesticide use in agriculture

Box 6.

Most problems with crop infestation are closely related to the host crop and the climate. The extent and nature of the disease and pest problems will therefore change once climate change means that new crops have to be cultivated. Higher temperatures will reduce the generation times of both diseases and pests, and milder winters may also increase survival rates for both pests and their natural predators. Higher temperatures will also see the emergence of new weed species in northern Europe, for example Redroot amaranth, which is a serious weed in the maize fields of Central America. It is likely that warmer temperatures will aggravate plant protection problems for the agricultural sector, and increase the need for pesticides. This may lead to an increase in the spreading of pesticides beyond the fields and contribute to the increased biodiversity loss.

marshes or mangroves, only remnants of these ecosystems will be found. This will particularly be the case where the coast prevents these ecosystems from retreating or where they will be robbed of the necessary sediment. Towards the end of the twenty-first century, land on which many millions of people depend worldwide is expected to be flooded as a result of rising sea levels. The greatest risk affects the densely populated and low-lying areas with little space for adaptation and which are already now threatened by tropical storms. The threat is particularly great for the populations in the mega-deltas in Asia and Africa and for the small Pacific islands. By 2050, the sea level is expected to have risen by about 45 centimetres, leading to the loss of 15,000 square kilometres of land in Bangladesh which will affect 11 per cent of the country’s population. In Europe, many large cities have grown up along the coast or along rivers which will be affected by sea level rises, and a lot of tourism is dependent on the coastal zone. Many densely populated and low-lying areas in the world are protected by dykes. This is true, for example, of the Netherlands, where much of the country already lies below sea level. Elsewhere, coastlines are protected against erosion by other means (for example beach nourishment by pumping up sand). These measures will have to become more widespread in future to protect coastlines, while in many areas it will probably be relevant to allow the coastline to move back. Throughout much of the world, sandy beaches along many coastlines have been pushed back during the twentieth century. There are complex reasons for this, but climate change is likely to be partially responsible, and there is no doubt that this will be a growing trend in future.

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8. Infrastructure under pressure In town and cities, climate change will bring about both benefits and disadvantages. In some places, temperature increases will reduce the need for heating, while in others it will increase the need for air-conditioning. It will therefore be necessary to insulate buildings more effectively against both heat and cold. It may also be necessary to decide new building standards so that buildings can better withstand violent storms and higher wind speeds. Generally, the disadvantages are expected to outweigh the benefits. Roads, bridges, tunnels and railways will be vulnerable to heavier precipitation, higher groundwater levels, higher temperatures and falling trees. The infrastructure will be affected very differently by climate change, but the life-spans of such investments are often 50 to 100 years. It is therefore necessary to take climate change into account in the case of renovation and new construction work. Increasingly heavy rainfall also results in more frequent and more extensive flooding of land and basements. This is exacerbated in towns and cities by increasing built-up areas so that larger volumes of rainwater have to be carried away via the sewer systems. Drain and sewer dimensions therefore need to be enlarged during renovation and construction work, while new urban layouts are also required to accommodate reservoirs where rain water can be stored before being carried away in the sewers and streams.

9. Health Climate change is expected to affect the health and well-being of millions of people worldwide, and for populations with low adaptive capacity the effects will generally be negative: ππ Higher incidence of malnourishment, affecting children’s growth and development. ππ Increased mortality, illness and injury from heatwaves, flooding, storms, fires and droughts. ππ Higher incidence of diarrhoea. ππ Increasing frequency of cardiovascular disease as a result of higher levels of ozone in the air in towns and cities. ππ Changed distribution of certain infectious diseases (e.g. malaria) due to changed living conditions for the disease vectors. However, climate change will also have positive effects, for example fewer cold-related deaths. Generally, the favourable effects are again overshad-

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More allergies in northern Europe

Box 7

The effects of climate change on health in northern Europe will probably be indirect. Already, significantly larger amounts of pollen have been observed, and the pollen season now starts several weeks earlier. This may partly explain the increase in the prevalence and incidence of allergies. Climate change means that new plant species will thrive in northern Europe, and here ambrosia artemisiifolia poses a particular risk for people with pollen allergies. Ambrosia artemisiifolia is a plant which originally comes from North America where it is called common ragweed. It is thus an invasive species which has spread to many European countries. It is also found in northern Europe but is not yet common here as it flowers too late in the year to be able to produce viable seed. However, a warmer climate will mean that the plant can produce viable seeds resulting in the propagation of Ambrosia artemisiifolia in northern Europe, causing a new weed problem. Ambrosia artemisiifolia poses serious problems for people suffering from pollen allergies as the pollen season is very long (six to eight weeks); in areas where the plant grows, it is responsible for about half of all asthma attacks.

owed by the harmful effects at a global level. Moreover, there will be a number of additional side effects from climate change which also affect health, for example changes in the composition and timing of allergenic pollen (see Box 7).

10. More expensive insurance Climate change will increase the insurance burden as a result of more frequent and stronger storms, more intense rainfall and more flooding. This is one of the reasons why new buildings should not be constructed on lowlying areas near rivers, lakes and inlets. It may well become more expensive and possibly even impossible to insure such properties in future. And the insurance premiums will not solely depend on developments in the individual countries. If the large international reinsurance companies become liable for claims elsewhere in the world, it can affect the local insurance company’s ability to reinsure climate-sensitive risks.

11. Economic consequences A number of estimates of the net economic costs of global damage caused by anthropogenic climate change are now available. It is expressed as the current value of future net benefits minus costs. Estimates show that the

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costs of climate change for 2005 amounted to approx. USD 12 per tonne of CO2 emitted. However, the estimates vary considerably in the various studies, and it is likely that the harmful effects globally are underestimated. Generally, the studies indicate that the net costs of climate change are significant and increasing with time. Every country will be affected by climate change. The most vulnerable, i.e. the poorest countries and populations, will suffer most, even though they have contributed least to the causes of climate change (see Box 8). The costs of extreme weather events (flooding, drought and storms) are already increasing, even in rich countries. It is no longer possible to imagine that climate change can be avoided for the next 50 years, but it is still possible to minimise the negative economic consequences of the changes – for example by providing better information, improving planning and investing The poorest are the hardest hit

Box 8

Climate change is affecting the world’s population as a whole, but its effects are particularly significant for livelihoods in the world’s poorest countries. Vulnerability to climate change depends on the available resources, information and technologies as well as on the stability and effectiveness of national and local institutions. This means that the possibility of achieving sustainable development will be more negatively affected in developing countries and among indigenous peoples than in the developed world. Climate change can make it harder for these populations to meet their basic needs, both in the short and long term. It will therefore become even harder for developing countries to lift themselves out of situations with high levels of poverty and low economic growth and to move towards eradicating poverty and ensuring sustainable development. In this way, climate change increases the difference between rich and poor, and inequality worldwide. Some of the most serious consequences of climate change are expected in Africa. This continent is also most vulnerable to climate change, and adaptive capacity is often low because of a combination of underdevelopment, poverty and scarce resources. A quarter of Africa’s population – approximately 200 million people, primarily in eastern and southern Africa – are already experiencing water shortages. This figure is expected to rise by 75‑200 million people by 2020, and by as many as 350‑600 million people by 2050. This will obviously affect farming and consequently food security and incomes in rural areas. When water becomes an ever scarcer resource, it can lead to conflict, for example between people who need water for their households and those who need water for irrigation purposes and industrial production. In many cases there will also be conflicts between countries and regions about the right to water, which can potentially lead to armed conflict and war.

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in more climate-resistant crops and infrastructure. Making the necessary adaptations will cost billions of dollars each year just in the developing countries, and climate change will consequently increase the pressure on the world’s sparse resources. References Bates B, Kundzewicz ZW, Wu S & Palutikof J (2008): Climate change and water. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Caldeira K & Wickett M (2003): Anthropogenic carbon and ocean pH. Nature 425, p. 365. Cassman KG, Dobermann A, Walters DT & Yang H (2003): Meeting cereal demand while maintaining natural resources and improving environmental quality. Annual Review of Environment and Resources 28, pp. 315‑358. Gilland B (2002): World population and food supply. Food Policy 27, pp. 47‑63. Eakin H & Luers AL (2006): Assessing the vulnerability of social-environmental systems. Annual Review of Environmental Resources 31, pp. 365‑394. Fink AH, Brücher T, Krüger A, Leckebusch GC, Pinto JG & Ulbrich U (2004): The 2003 European summer heat waves and drought – Synoptic diagnosis and impact. Weather 59, pp. 209‑216. Mueller M (2003): Damages of the Elbe flood 2002 in Germany – a review. Geophysical Research Abstracts 5, p. 12992. Parry ML, Canziani OF, Palutikof JP, van der Linden PJ & Hanson CE (2007): Climate change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Philander, SG (2008). Encyclopedia of global warming and climate change. SAGE. Petrie G (2002): Flooding in Middle Europe observed from space. Geoinformatics 5(7), pp. 6‑9. Schär C, Vidale PL, Lüthi D, Frei C, Häberli C, Liniger MA & Appenzeller C (2004): The role of increasing temperature variability in European summer heatwaves. Nature 427, pp. 332‑336. Schär C & Jendritzky G (2004): Climate change: Hot news from summer 2003. Nature 432, pp. 559‑560. Stern N (2007): The economics of climate change: The Stern review. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. p. 602. Tubiello FN, Soussana JF, Howden SM (2007): Crop and pasture response to climate change. Proceedings of the National Academy of Science 104, pp. 19686‑19690.

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Climate science – how did it come about? Mat t hia s He y mann

1. Intro The greenhouse effect and rising global temperatures have been predicted since the late nineteenth century, by which time it was evident that the exponential growth in coal burning was releasing enormous amounts of carbon dioxide into the atmosphere. At that time, however, hardly anybody was interested in the matter. Even 40 years later, when climatologists observed a significant rise in temperatures between 1920 and 1940, climate change was not of interest to scientists, politicians or the general public. It took around another 40 years or more before carbon dioxide emissions began to be considered a threat and started causing concern. Surprisingly, this change of perception occurred at a time when global temperatures had stagnated. So, what made scientists believe in climate change, and why and when? And how come that climate science suddenly became a field of high political priority in the late 1980s, but not in the 1930s? This chapter sets out to provide some answers. When the famous Swedish physicist Svante Arrhenius predicted rising temperatures due to growing carbon dioxide emissions in 1897, little attention was paid to his result. Four decades later, the engineer Guy Callendar faced similar reservations. Callendar was puzzled by rising carbon dioxide emissions and expected an unavoidable change of climate. Based on meticulous calculations he came up with a prediction of climate warming caused by the greenhouse effect. Well aware of a significant rise in temperature, which had been observed since about 1920 in northern Europe, Callendar was convinced he had the proper explanation. To his surprise, climatologists were not convinced. Climatologists, instead, considered Callendar’s theory highly unlikely and preferred an alternative explanation. They believed that accidental and temporary shifts of meteorological circulation systems (shifts of the pathways of high and low pressure systems), which had been experienced in the past, explained the regional and local shifts in temperature (or precipitation). Callendar’s theory could only explain global

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Figure 1:  Published records of surface temperature change over large regions. (Source: IPCCReport 2007, p. 101).

temperature changes, as carbon dioxide emissions uniformly mixed in the atmosphere and caused a greenhouse effect everywhere on earth. Which left the question of why the arctic region should be especially affected by increasing temperatures? Climatologists appeared to have the empirical evidence on their side. The warming tendency in Europe and in the arctic regions came to a halt in the 1940s. Stagnating temperatures for the next three decades – at a time of strong economic growth and rapidly rising energy use and carbon dioxide emissions – did not provide much proof of climate change. Were Arrhenius and Callendar and their theories mistaken? In 1965, a conference at the newly founded National Center for Atmospheric Research in Boulder, Colorado in the USA showed that scientific perceptions and perspectives had suddenly turned. The conference was entitled “Causes of Climate Change”. Climate change, the scientists now believed, was a real threat, and its causes were believed to be: carbon dioxide and the greenhouse gas theory! This conference represented a turning point after which scientists began to investigate climate change and to communicate its risk to politicians and the public. Obviously, there is no simple relationship between temperature observations and a belief in climate change. So, what had happened between the 1890s and the 1960s? How could the idea of climate change be dismissed for so

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long despite significant evidence, and then become accepted during a time of stagnating temperatures? Apparently, no simple historical logic framed the emergence of climate change science. Scientific findings certainly played a significant role in the shaping of this field of science, but perhaps equally important were the technological innovations, military and economic interests and social demands that characterised the period.

2. Features of classical climatology Interest in climate had a long tradition. Greek philosophers like Parmenides, Eratosthenes and Aristotle reflected on climate and its effects. The term “climate” originates from the ancient Greek word “κλινειν” (‘klinein’), which means “incline”. Climate was directly associated with the inclination of the sun on the earth’s surface: the bigger the inclination, the weaker the sunlight and the colder the climate. This, however, was not the full truth, as the Greek philosophers admitted. Features of landscape and weather, oceans and mountains, wind regimes and seasons obviously also played their role. Systematic research on climate began much later. Alexander von Humboldt is regarded as one of the pioneers in the field. He was the first to clearly outline the prerequisites for a science of climate in the first half of the nineteenth century. Crucial for the emerging field of climatology was Humboldt’s definition of climate. Climate meant “in the most general sense all changes in the atmosphere which noticeably affect the human organs”, such as temperature, humidity, barometric pressure or wind (Humboldt 1845, Bd. I, p. 340). Humboldt’s understanding of climate proved important in three respects. First, climate was always associated with a specific location. Geographical locations had a certain climate and in different places like Copenhagen or Rome the climate differed in specific ways. From Humboldt’s perspective the term climate did not make sense without reference to a specific location. Second, the concept of climate was directly linked to the experience of humans. Only those atmospheric phenomena which had an effect on the human senses were regarded as elements of climate by Humboldt. Other atmospheric phenomena (like cosmic radiation or wind velocities at a height of three kilometres or more) did not represent elements of climate, because they had no impact on the human senses. Third, Humboldt formed a holistic concept of climate. Climate could not be reduced to single parameters (like temperature), but involved all atmospheric phenomena affecting the human senses. Climate was seen as stable over time, but changing from place to place. Humboldt, thus, shaped a geographical understanding of climate. In the

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second half of the nineteenth century, climatologists like the Austrian Julius von Hann and the Russian Wladimir Köppen adopted Humboldt’s conception of climate and made it the basis of a rigorous science. Climatology in their vein was an effort of systematic collection and evaluation of meteorological data and of analysing their broader relationships in order to identify the specificities of local and regional climates. Von Hann invented the foundations of a quantitative description of climates by averaging longterm time series of meteorological data such as temperature, precipitation, etc. from a particular location. His climatology, therefore, was called an “averaging climatology”. Köppen followed von Hann’s climatology. He collected systematically large amounts of climatologic and geographical data and subsequently brought the climates of the earth into systematic order. In the early twentieth century, Köppen constructed climate maps representing different climate zones on the earth. These climate zones were based on his definition of classes of climate like “tropical climate”, “subtropical climate”, “polar climate” etc., concepts which still are in use today. The climatology founded by Hann and Köppen represented the core of what could be called “classical climatology”. It defined the standard programme of climatologic research in the first half of the twentieth century. This climatology saw its task as the collection and evaluation of climatologic data in order to produce, complete and refine the quantitative description of the climates on earth and provide proper data bases for the investigation of the effects of local climates on vegetation, agriculture and human health. Subsequent editions of the handbook of climatology, which von Hann first published in 1883, reflected the progress in climatology. The description of climates of specific regions on earth increased from half a volume in 1983 to four full volumes in the 1930s. Classical climatology maintained a conception of climate which emphasized its stability over time and variability with respect to geographical location. This kind of climatological research formed a backdrop for the physicist Svante Arrhenius in the 1890s and the engineer Guy Callendar in the 1930s to come up with their versions of a greenhouse gas theory based on rising concentrations of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. At that time, their concepts of climate change did not fit at all well with the contemporary climatologic methodologies and beliefs. Not rooted themselves in the tradition of climatologic research, Arrhenius and Callendar went their own original ways. Climatologists, however, didn’t want to follow. Arrhenius’ and Callendar’s main methodological tool – calculations based on physical laws – was foreign to climatologic methodology. Finally, both Arrhenius and Callendar were not part of the scientific community of climatologists.

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Even though they studied climatologic thinking, methodology and language to a considerable extent, they remained foreigners to the community of climatologists. These factors may have contributed to the reluctance with which their theories were received.

3. Technological change and conceptual shift It remained a long way to go from classical climatology to the climate change science of today, a way which was not paved with logic or linear progress, but owed much to historical coincidence. While classical climatology focused on data collection close to the surface of the earth, von Hann and Köppen also supported the taking of measurements at higher layers in the atmosphere. Such measurements were provided by a few mountain stations and with the help of kites or balloons that transported the instruments to great heights. But the extent of such measurements remained extremely limited throughout the nineteenth century. Climatologic data and, consequently, climatologic knowledge, perceptions and understanding largely extended over the two dimensions of the surface of the earth. In the first half of the twentieth century, this limitation slowly dissolved when a rapid expansion of knowledge about the higher atmosphere occurred – the “discovery”, as one could paraphrase it, of the third dimension of the atmosphere. And this discovery enriched meteorological knowledge enormously. Coherent wind regimes at great heights, the so-called jet streams, were discovered, for example. The “discovery” of the third dimension of the atmosphere had a very practical background. In 1903 the brothers Orville and Wilbur Wright succeeded in making the first powered flight in a small motorized aircraft. At about the same time Count Ferdinand Zeppelin started to construct huge airships. The dream of flying was about to become reality. With the onset of World War I aircrafts and airships exhilarated the public and the military alike. The advances in flying technology had a knock-on effect on meteorology. Aircrafts and airships were highly sensitive devices, and as such strongly dependant on weather. Very soon there was a demand for weather data from the higher atmosphere, and with this demand a new climatologic discipline began to develop, which Köppen in 1906 named “aerology”. The war accelerated the course of developments. Flight technology as well as aerology thrived, pushed by military and, after the war, commercial interest. After 1937, and the introduction of radiosondes (which could send measurement results back to earth by radiowaves), there was an explosion of data from the higher atmosphere. While in 1930 weather services provided data

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from about 3,000 balloon or kite launches a year, this number skyrocketed to about 180,000 twenty years later. Technological demand combined with military and commercial interest was only one part of a complex combination of events that helped to shape climatologic development. Also, of tremendous importance was the development of dynamical meteorology. Von Hann had made a clear distinction between climatology and meteorology. While climatology was a descriptive and holistic geographical science, which aimed to provide comprehensive descriptions of regional climates, meteorology was a reductionist physical science interested in the mathematical description of meteorological parameters so that predictions about the weather could be made using the laws of physics. At the end of the nineteenth century, geographical climatology had established its methodological foundations, while physical meteorology still struggled to master the complexity of meteorological phenomena. The number and causal relationships between the atmospheric parameters proved difficult to describe mathematically. As a consequence, meteorology was limited to data collection and evaluation without coming any closer to weather prediction based on scientific laws. Scientifically-minded meteorologists suffered from failure and disregard, while meteorology was not even considered a science by many physicists. In 1903, the Norwegian physicist Vilhelm Bjerknes described a new framework for dynamical meteorology. Bjerknes sought to make meteorology a true physical science able to calculate and predict the weather. He claimed that all meteorological processes in the atmosphere could be described by seven parameters and six differential equations describing the mathematical relation of these parameters. In principle, what Bjerknes’ scheme achieved was a complete description of the physical processes in the atmosphere. But solution of these highly non-linear differential equations proved impossible. Bjerknes and his group of students at the University of Bergen, the so-called Bergen school of meteorology, developed graphical methods that could be used to gain approximate solutions of the differential equations. But, weather prediction still proved impossible because much more data on the current state of the atmosphere was needed in order to predict future states. Not long after, the British scientist Lewis Fry Richardson approached the same problem using a very different strategy. Richardson attempted an approximate so-called numerical solution of the differential equations. Though this strategy was feasible, it proved far too laborious and time-consuming. Richardson engaged in the cumbersome calculations for a period of many months before being able to predict the weather for one single day at two

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locations. Such long calculation times meant meaningful predictions were impossible, because the weather being predicted would have been and gone by the time the result was achieved. If such predictions were to be of use, they would have to be carried out within few hours. According to Richardson’s estimates the realization of such an ambition would have needed the combined force of 64,000 human calculators. Bjerknes’ graphical and Richardson’s numerical solutions proved difficult and never reached the status of routine application in weather prediction. But Bjerknes did go on to describe weather phenomena that changed meteorological understanding fundamentally. He and his students described larger patterns of air flow and discovered the importance of air masses, cyclones (very large rotating air flow systems) and polar fronts. Weather could not simply be conceived as a state of the atmosphere at specific locations (on or above ground). The development of weather, in contrast, was a geographically extended phenomenon reaching across continents. The exploration of the higher atmosphere and the description of extended weather systems also left their mark on climatology and gave rise to a broadened view of climate. First, a climatology of the higher atmosphere emerged, which was founded on the availability of a growing body of meteorological data from higher layers of the atmosphere. Second, it had become clear that an understanding of the causes of climate required a departure from the strict focus on locality and instead demanded consideration of the wider geographical extension of weather systems, which could be in the range of thousands of kilometres. The concept of climate slowly shifted from being a predominantly geographical concept linked to specific locations to a more dynamical concept linked to typical weather systems and extending over considerable distances. The Swedish meteorologist Tor Bergeron, a member of Bjerknes’ Bergen school, consequently demanded a “dynamic climatology” in 1930. The dynamic aspects of climate did not only concern the causes of climate produced by a dynamic atmosphere. This also opened up the possibility of thinking about longer-term and more fundamental changes of climate – a possibility, which the “average-climatology” of von Hann with its emphasis on the stability of climate did not account for. In the 1930s the International Meteorological Organisation (a predecessor of the World Meteorological Organisation) adapted the official definition of the term “climate” in accordance with this new thinking. This new definition described “the average state of the atmosphere above specific locations within a specific period of time”. The expression “specific period of time” was recommended to be taken as a period of thirty years. A change of climate within a few decades now became an acknowledged climatologic

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possibility, and a legitimate scientific consideration. The German climatologist Hermann Flohn attempted to integrate the features of classical and dynamic climatology around 1950 and suggested the term “modern climatology”. This attempt, however, failed in the long term, since it soon became apparent that conceptions of climate in classical climatology and in dynamic climatology did not match. The physical and dynamic conception of “climate” proved incompatible with classical climatology’s geographical interpretation. So, this led to the situation where there were two rather different definitions of climate in circulation, a geographical one, interpreting climate as a set of characteristics of a geographical location, and a meteorological one focused on the physical characteristics of extended weather systems.

4. The rise of climate change research It still took some time before the concept “climate change” was recognised widely. But technological progress, military interest and scientific ambition all helped the process. During war time rapid progress was made in the development of new calculation machines. The US Army needed such machines for the calculation of ballistic tables. John von Neumann, an outstanding mathematician, was involved in these developments. Early on he recognized the potential of these machines, soon to be called “computers”. They were capable of performing up to 5,000 operations per second, and it was not long before von Neumann began to ask what these machines could be used for outside the existing military application? One answer was weather prediction. In 1946 von Neumann assembled a team of brilliant young scientists. Four years later the first promising weather calculations had been performed. Von Neumann’s team had set off with Bjerknes’ differential equations (as did Richardson 30 years earlier), introduced drastic simplifications and transformed the mathematical operations for the numerical solution of the equations into computer code. Thus, the first meteorological computer model was based on physical theory and used to simulate the development of weather on the computer. Computer simulation for weather forecasting made quick progress in the following years. Weather services adopted and extended early computer models. In the early 1960s computer-based forecasts had reached the same performance as traditional methods of weather prediction. But, meteorological models did not only revolutionize weather prediction. Their impact on climate research was more far reaching. It started in 1956 with a bold computer experiment. Norman Phillips, a young member of von Neumann’s

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John von Neumann in front of one of the early computers that were part of the breakthrough in climate change prediction.

modelling team, attempted to use the meteorological model to simulate the development of the weather, not for single days, but for a longer period of time in order to investigate longer-term processes of weather and climate. Due to limited computer capacity, Phillips had to introduce further simplifications into the model. He neglected vertical air movements and the distinction of land mass and ocean. He also started his simulation with the unrealistic initial condition of equal temperature and a static atmosphere with no air movements over the whole globe. This idealization meant that he did not need to begin with a large initial data set. In the simulation run air masses were set in motion solely by solar radiation and the earth’s rotation. After several simulated days a pattern of cyclones emerged – very similar to the cyclones in the real atmosphere. Phillips’ computer experiment was ground breaking. His model represented the first version of a model type which soon came to be called the General Circulation Model (GCM). GCMs are global simplified versions of weather models that can be used for simulation runs over a long period of time in order to study the development of climate. GCMs can also be used as experimental instruments. Model parameters or input data can hypothetically be changed (such as solar radiation or the carbon dioxide concentration

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in the atmosphere) and the impact of these changes on (model-) climate can then be investigated. The prospect of so-called “computer experiments” was met with a mixture of enthusiasm, and curiosity, among scientists. And it soon became apparent that it was now possible to simulate experiments that would be impossible in the real world (such as doubling the carbon dioxide concentration in the atmosphere). After Phillips’ pioneering experiment several research groups engaged in GCM development for climate simulation. These included a group at the US Weather Bureau (which was later moved to the Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory at Princeton University) and further groups at the University of California in Los Angeles, the Laurence Livermore National Laboratory at Livermore, California, and the National Centre of Atmospheric Research at Boulder, Colorado. The first climate models outside the USA emerged about ten years later in the early 1970s. By the end of the 1960s GCMs were already widely acknowledged as a central tool in climate science. Climate models created new opportunities, which increasingly shaped scientific efforts and interests. This kind of model, for example, provided an excellent means to investigate the impact of changes in carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere by way of simulation. One common new strategy was the simulation of the global climate for double the existing concentration of carbon dioxide. While such experiment could not be performed in nature, the computer proved a perfect playground for investigating the effects of such global change. A series of simulation experiments in the 1960s and early 1970s suggested that a doubling of carbon dioxide concentration would increase the global average temperature by 1 to 6°C. Arrhenius’ and Callendar’s calculations, thus, were confirmed. But this time, the interest in these results was much greater in the scientific community than in Arrhenius’ or Callendar’s time. The historian Paul Edwards has suggested that the prediction of climate change by computer simulation benefitted greatly from the enormous prestige of the computer. But it is also possible that the newly emerged and persistent interest in climate change owed as much simply to the availability of a fascinating versatile new research instrument (the computer), which was ideally suited for the investigation of climate change. Arrhenius and Callendar did not possess such an instrument. The situation of researchers using climate simulation models in the 1960s or 1970s was very different to the situation of Callendar 40 years earlier or Arrhenius at the end of the nineteenth century. These late twentieth-century researchers were not working totally on their own; and they did not have to stand their ground in a foreign scientific community. Climate simulation based on computer models formed the core of a new and thriving research

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community. Computer power increased at a rapid pace, and these ever more powerful computers enabled scientists to enlarge their models and include even more detail in ever more comprehensive simulation runs. The philosopher Paul Humphreys suggested, that scientific progress today is strongly dependent on progress in computer technology. Similarly, we can conclude, that progress in computer technology strongly and continuously fuelled scientific research. While climate models in the 1970s were limited to processes in the atmosphere, by the close of the twentieth century, oceans and other areas of water (hydrosphere), biological processes (biosphere), ice and snow (cryosphere) and soils and the earth’s crust (pedosphere and lithosphere) were all be included in the models. Climate models became “earth-system models”, which included the exchange processes between the atmosphere and other components of the “earth system”. At the same time, increased computer power facilitated an increased resolution of the models. In 1990 the models were based on grids with a grid cell length of about 500 km, by 1995 this length was reduced to about 250 km, by 2001 to about 180 km and in 2007 to about 110 km. Likewise, the number of researchers involved in climate modelling increased from some 20 in the early 1960s to several thousand at the end of the millennium. In summary we may conclude that the analysis of 150 years of research on climate reveals fundamental shifts and changes. Research interests shifted from a geographically oriented classical climatology to a physically oriented climate change science. This shift was associated with a dramatic change in the meaning of the term “climate”. Until well into the twentieth century “climate” represented a geographical term, describing the collective effect of local atmospheric phenomena on human senses. The term “climate” only made sense in relation to specific locations. Climates differed in different locations, but remained stable over time. At the end of the twentieth century the term climate had lost its association with specific locations and had become a global category. The understanding of the scientific term “climate” now did not only involve large-scale weather systems, but the whole earth system. While geographical interest in climate faded almost completely (or was not visible anymore), interest in climate change dominated research efforts in the second half of the twentieth century. This shift in interest can not simply be explained by stronger evidence for climate change. Knowledge about the effect of increased carbon dioxide emissions existed in the late nineteenth century. And evidence supporting predictions of rising temperatures was as strong around 1940 as it was in the year 2000. In fact, it was a number of scientific, technological and social factors that helped make climate change of interest, and of import, to the

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scientific community, politicians and public alike. Such, factors included the conquest of the higher layers of the atmosphere (by flight technology and meteorological measurements) and the advent of the computer, which turned out to be a tremendously powerful research machine. References Agrawala S (1998): Context and Early Origins of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in: Climatic Change 39, 605‑620. (a) Agrawala S (1998): Structural and process history of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in: Climatic Change 39, 621‑642. (b) Armatte M & Dahan-Dalmedico A (2004): Modèles et modélisations, 1950‑2000: Nouvelles pratiques, nouveaux enjeux, in: Revue des Histoire des Science 57, 245‑305. Dahan-Dalmedico A (2008): Climate expertise: between scientific credibility and geopolitical imperatives, in: Interdisciplinary Science Reviews 33, (in press). Dahan-Dalmedico A (2007): Le regime climatique, entre science, expertise et politique. In: Dahan-Dalmedico A (ed.): Les modèles du futur. Changement climatique et scénarios économiques: enjeux scientifiques et politiques. Paris, 113‑138. Edwards P (2000): A Brief History of Atmospheric General Circulation Modeling. In: Randall DA (ed.): General Circulation Development, Past Present and Future: The Proceedings of a Symposium in Honor of Akio Arakawa. New York: Academic Press, 67‑90. (Siehe auch: http://www.si.umich.edu/~pne/PDF/gcm_history.pdf ). Elzinga A (1996): Shaping Worldwide Consensus: The Orchestration of Global Climate Change Research. In: Elzinga A & Landström C (ed.): Internationalism and Science, Taylor Graham, London, 233‑253. Fleming JR (ed.) (2002): Global Changes: History, Climate & Culture. Oxford. Oxford University Press. Fleming JR (ed.) (1998): Historical Perspectives on Climate Change, Oxford. Oxford University Press. Fleming JR (2007): The Callendar Effect. The Life and Work of Guy Stewart Callendar (1898‑1964), Boston. American Meteorological Society. Hart DM & David GV (1993): Scientific Elites and the Making of US Policy for Climate Change Research 1957‑75, Social Studies of Science 23. Heymann, M (2008): Zur Geschichte der Klimakonstruktionen von der klassischen Klimatologie zur modernen Klimaforschung. Submitted to NTM August 2008. Huntington E. (1924): Civilization and climate, New Haven. Yale University Press IPCC (1990): Climate Change, The IPCC scientific assessment, Cambridge. Cambridge University Press IPCC (1996): Climate Change 1995, The Science of Climate Change, Cambridge. Cambridge University Press IPCC (2001): Climate Change 2001, The scientific basis. Cambridge. Cambridge University Press IPCC (2007): Climate Change 2007, The physical science basis, Cambridge. Cambridge University Press Kellogg WK (1987): Mankinds Impact on Climate: The Evolution of Awareness, Climatic Change 10: 113‑136.

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McGuffie K & Henderson-Sellers A (2001): Forty years of numerical climate modelling, in: International Journal of Climatology 21, 1067‑1109. Oppenheimer M & Petsonk A (2005): Article 2 of the UNFCCC: Historical Origins, Recent Interpretations, in: Climatic Change 73, 195‑226. Trumbo C (1996): Constructing Climate Change: Claims and Frames in Us News Coverage of an Environmental Issue, in: Public Understanding of Science 5, 269‑83. Ungar S (1992): The Rise and (Relative) Decline of Global Warming as a Social Problem, in: Sociological Quarterly 33, 483‑501. Weart S (1997): Global Warming, Cold War, and the Evolution of Research Plans, Hist. Stud. Phys. Sci 27: 319‑356. Weart S (2003): The Discovery of Global Warming. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Pres. Weart S (2007): The public and climate change. In: http://www.aip.org/history/ climate/public2.htm#M_100_ (2007). See particularly: http://www.aip.org/ history/climate/public2.htm#S1988.

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What is climate science all about? Philosophical perspectives Mat t hia s He y mann , Pe t er Sand øe & Hanne Ander sen

1. Intro Today, climate science is mainly the science of climate change. Chapter 3 described how the scientific study of climate has shifted from an interest in the description of the geographical diversity of climate to trying to understand climate change. Perhaps surprisingly, it was not observed changes in climate that triggered this shift in interest, but a variety of non-scientific factors such as technological innovations and political interest. In this chapter we shall analyze what constitutes climate science today. A process that will address questions such as: What do the scientists know about climate change? How was this understanding gained? How confident are the scientists in their results and claims? And, how does climate science feed into politics? In order to answer such questions we must first look at the key tool of climate science – the computer model. As described in chapter 3, climate simulations based on computer models are the core component of studies carried out by the rapidly expanding climate science research community. These climate models represent a large number of processes and can model oceans and water, biological processes, ice and snow, and even soils at the earth’s crust. We shall begin by attempting to define the nature of scientific models in general and how to characterize the computer models that are used in climate science. We shall also discuss how models are constructed and tested, and how they are used. Throughout we aim to address some of the inherently philosophical questions associated with this approach to science including: how computer models relate to the real world, and the role that different kinds of values play in choosing between models.

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2. Models and model construction Models form an important part of science. A model represents a selected part of the world. This representation is not, however, an exact replica of the system that the model represents instead the model represents only certain aspects of the system while ignoring others. Many representational models are analogue models which are based on certain similarities or analogies between aspects of the represented and the representing systems. For example, the billiard ball model of a gas represents the molecules of a gas as a collection of billiard balls that are randomly moving and hitting each other. However, molecules in a gas and randomly moving billiard balls are far from identical, and while the billiard ball model may successfully represent some aspects of gaseous behaviour, there are many other aspects that it does not represent. Another example is a ball-and-stick model of a molecule. This model is a representation of the molecule in which the spatial structure of the molecule is rendered by the bond angles and the relation between the bond lengths, but there are many other aspects of the molecule that it does not represent. Other models are abstract and reflect how scientists imagine that different things or processes may work. Many abstract models, such as those used in climate science, are mathematical and provide a numerical representation of specific features of the world, for example selected features of the climate system. All scientific models are produced by humans, who investigate phenomena, make observations, create abstract descriptions and construct models that can represent the investigated phenomena. But, as noted above, many processes in nature are far too complex to be fully represented in a model or even in a series of combined models so instead a model represents only certain aspects of the system while ignoring others. Thus, when creating a model of a phenomenon those who construct the model select what they want to represent and what they want to ignore. The deliberate focus on single, specific features of these phenomena makes it easier, for example, to establish mathematical relations between these features. In the case of meteorology, in 1903 Vilhelm Bjerknes managed to describe some meteorological phenomena by focusing on the relation of parameters like temperature, wind velocity and pressure in the form of complex mathematical equations. As meteorological phenomena are extremely complex, he was only able to accomplish such a description by being selective  – by reducing his interest to the limited number of physical properties outlined above and neglecting many others (such as atmospheric electricity, solar

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radiation, chemical processes or the colour of clouds). This selection process means that there is no single way to construct a model, and therefore no single model for addressing a particular question. However, as we shall see later, this does not mean that models can be constructed arbitrarily, or that all models are equally good for all purposes.

3. Computer models in climate science Computer models are usually very complex constructions based on many sub-models that model different features. A modern climate model, to take an example, consists of sub-models for meteorology, solar radiation, atmospheric chemistry, carbon exchange processes, oceans and many other phenomena. Thus, climate models build on a multitude of elements from hydrodynamics, aerodynamics, thermodynamics, chemistry etc. At first sight, it may seem preferable to have a complex computer model that represents many aspects of the climate instead of simpler models. But, when working with complex models, there is a level of uncertainty associated with each process, which when added together increases the uncertainty of the overall model, at the same time as being hard to isolate. This issue of uncertainty in models is worth further discussion. In general there are two major factors that mean a model has a level of uncertainty, 1) limitations of mathematical techniques and 2) limitations of computer capacity. Lewis Fry Richardson, who attempted to calculate the weather (see the preceding chapter), experienced the mathematical problems involved in solving complex differential equations. Since he could not reach a solution analytically he had to resort to cumbersome numerical solution strategies. Numerical solutions are approximations, however. These solutions do not work in all cases, and they may cause so-called instabilities in simulation runs (which is the production of very strange results due to the approximations). Numerical techniques, therefore, add to the uncertainty of simulation output, even though these uncertainties are usually well understood and can be investigated and minimized. The limitation of computer power causes more significant problems. The weather models created by von Neumann’s group and the first attempt at climate modelling by Norman Phillips (see the preceding chapter) both represented typical examples of model construction for the use on computers with limited power. The mathematical theories upon which these models were based had to be simplified drastically to enable the construction of modules, which could be executed by the computer power available, and which did not have extraordinary long (and expensive) runtimes. The build-

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ers of the first weather model intentionally ignored any vertical movement of air, fully aware of the fact that this simplification was far from realistic. Such simplifications in complex computer models are typical of this kind of model construction. Since there is no clear answer to the question of which processes and modules the model builder should include and on which theories the modules should be based, there is a certain amount of freedom and flexibility in the model construction process. Models, in this sense, are “plastic”. They can be moulded and designed. It is the model builders who decide on the model’s features and choose the forms and extent of simplification, and the level of detail they wish to consider. Their decisions will depend on the problem to be tackled and the questions that need to be solved by the model, and the knowledge and data available. Usually, a lot of guess-work and trial-and-error is involved in model construction. In climate modelling there was a tendency to keep on increasing the detail of the models until the mid-1990s. Though this tendency continues to the present day, it is now complemented by a second, more recent strategy, which is the use of much smaller models for the treatment of specific problems (so-called EMICs – Earth Models of Intermediate Complexity). Smaller models have several advantages: they need less run time, less input data and they are easier to comprehend. This also means that unavoidable mistakes and programming errors can be found more easily and quickly. The range of freedom in module design and model construction is one of the reasons why there is not only one accepted model for a certain domain, but usually many models. However, scientists often appreciate a multitude of computer models for single domains, because models and model simulations can then be compared. It has become an important strategy in recent years to perform so-called ensemble-simulations. Ensemble-simulations are simulations of one specific case with identical boundary conditions and input data using many different models. So what does this mean for uncertainty? It is, perhaps, paradoxical that the uncertainty in climate models becomes apparent because this uncertainty is not visible. Simulation results can usually not be given with any uncertainty margins from which the reliability of the result could be assessed. Computer simulations only produce exact numbers, which may even give the deceptive impression of precision. This is a knotty problem. While climate modellers know about uncertainties, it is difficult for them to assess the level of uncertainty, whether it is 10 percent, 50 percent or 200 percent. While uncertainty in climate simulation certainly is a significant problem, climate modellers appear to have considerable confidence in what they do.

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Investigations by social scientists have shown that scientists get used to uncertainties and the insurmountable limitations of computer model use. They have learned to live in a computer model world, got to know the behaviour of their models after many years of experience and over time developed familiarity and trust. In everyday language in the simulation laboratories scientists talk about clouds, radiation, aerosols and the like referring to computer model clouds, radiation and aerosols. Computer models take on a life of their own. They allow climate scientists to get a feeling for violent storms, pouring rain or heat waves without ever leaving the lab. Over all, most model builders are aware of the specific problems in computer model building, computer simulation and the uncertainties that are related to these techniques, and they have invented a number of specific practices and procedures to handle many of the problems involved.

4. The art of climate model building I: resolution and parameterization Climate models can calculate meteorological parameters such as temperature, humidity or precipitation over a long period of time based on relevant conditions and processes in the atmosphere. But, herein lays a fundamental problem. A parameter like temperature can in principle be assigned to virtually every point in the atmosphere and every point in time. This infinity of potential points of measurement has to be reduced to something more manageable. Climate models are therefore based on a grid consisting of grid elements with defined length and breadth. A common size for grid elements in 1990 was a length and width of 500 km, by 2000 it was 250 km and in 2007 the grids had a length and width of 110 km. Since climate models are always based on a grid they, therefore, always have a limited spatial resolution. Similarly, climate models differ in vertical resolution. Very simple models do not distinguish between different heights in the atmosphere, at all, while complex models divide the atmosphere into many layers. The same kind of strategy applies with respect to time. While parameters like temperature change continuously and can be measured for every point in time, computer models can only consider a limited temporal resolution. For simulation runs fixed time steps (e. g. one hour) are defined to calculate the progression of weather or climate. Computer models never calculate point values; they are always spatially and temporally averaged values. A particular climate simulation means that on a specific predefined grid (for which the model is designed) all climate variables are calculated for every grid element and every time step. All cal-

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Figure 1:  Schematic outline of a climate model. The surface of the Earth is divided into a grid with approximately 110 km between each point and a series of vertical layers. Atmospheric models typically contain 30‑40 layers and oceanic models contain 20‑30. On the right side the physical processes that are simulated in the model are shown (Source: Wikipedia)

culated climate variables represent spatial averages for the grid element and temporal averages for the length of the time step. Obviously, computer run time increases enormously if the spatial resolution (that is, the number of grid elements) or the temporal resolution is increased. The selection of spatial and temporal resolution usually is a compromise between detail and available computer power and run time. Limited resolution in climate modelling has significant implications. All processes or phenomena with a smaller spatial extension than the size of a grid element (so-called sub-grid phenomena), cannot be considered explicitly in the model. Instead, the scientists try to consider sub-grid phenomena by using simplifications and generalizations, which are referred to as parameterization. Clouds are a case in point. Clouds play an important part in climate processes, but they are usually much smaller than the size of a grid element and so need to be treated in this simplified and generalized way. Parametrizations may also be applied for other phenomena, which can for different reasons not explicitly be considered in the climate model, e. g. because of the lack of computer power. Since both the amount of available computer power and our knowledge of the various phenomena may change

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over the time, some phenomena that were first parametrized may later become explicitly modelled. The oceans and aerosols are relevant examples. In the 1980s, oceans were usually not considered explicitly in climate models. The effect of oceans could be parameterized, for example by assuming a certain uptake of carbon dioxide by the oceans. Ten years later, however, ocean models had been developed and were included in climate models. Over all parameterizations add a great deal of uncertainty to models and are constantly a matter of debate. Clearly, parameterizations do not reflect real physical processes, but a much simplified and generalized description. There is no generally agreed upon method for creating good parameterizations, in fact there is not even agreement on what makes a good parameterization. Some parameterizations appear to work well for specific applications, but fail in other applications. Scientists, therefore, strive to reduce the number of parameterizations by explicitly modelling the respective phenomena.

5. The art of climate model building II: testing the models Single parameterizations and modules are tested before they are integrated into the model. Ideally the calculated data from the model can be tested against measured data, but this is not always possible if, for example, measured data does not exist for your model or the existing measured data is incomplete. Therefore, scientists sometimes test submodules and parameterizations with the help of other, more detailed models. Then if the calculated data of a sub-model do not match measured data or are not consistent with calculated data from existing and tested models, modules may be changed and adapted. Simplification schemes may be revised, parameterizations adjusted or single parameters tuned, until model tests bring better results. Parameter tuning is a common practice in model building. As many uncertain assumptions flow into model construction, tuning provides a strategy for improving model performance by trial and error. Ideally, tuning and testing are limited to the process of model construction and stop once model construction is complete. But in many instances model development is an ongoing process, which benefits from knowledge gained through use and simulation experience, so a clear separation of model construction and model use is often not possible. In several cases it has been found, for example, that less complex models with more simplifications and neglected effects have given better results than complex models, which may not have been what the model developers

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would have predicted. The problem of model assessment also makes it difficult for the model developer to decide how best to improve her/his model. Identifying the source of errors within a model is difficult and consequently it is hard to say which part of a model should be improved first. Many model developers start by ensuring that their models reflect the most up-to-date scientific understanding. Including a recently understood effect is generally considered a good way to raise confidence in a model, even though an improved performance may be impossible to prove Climate model construction is thus a complicated process which involves a large diversity of data, experimental outcomes, theories, models, parameterizations, assumptions, simplifications and technical tricks as well as repeated processes of fitting, testing and tuning. Climate models, in this sense, can be compared with complex technical machines like airplanes, for which many different parts are needed and often have to be optimized according to trial and error testing. As in complex machines, the different modules must be designed so as to fit well together in a comprehensive computer model.

6. Uses of climate models and features of climate simulation Above we described the main challenges involved in constructing climate models. We shall now look at the challenges that are involved in the climate researchers’ use of climate models. Some of these challenges are primarily related to the collection and interpretation of data, while others are related to the different kinds of predictions that can be made from the models. When a climate model has been constructed, it is not a simple and straightforward task to run simulations. The model cannot simply be switched on like a machine. Climate models need an enormous amount of input data, which first have to be provided. Meteorological data sets, data on solar radiation, data on the composition of the atmosphere, data on carbon cycles, data on ocean processes and many more data have to be collected and prepared for a simulation. These data are needed for every single grid cell and every single time-step (e. g. every hour) for the whole period of calculation. Here a fundamental problem arises. A full set of input data is usually not available. Data, therefore, are produced from many different sources and through a variety of routines. Input data may comprise measured data sets, calculated data, interpolated data, extrapolated data, estimated data and invented data. These data sets also comprise predictions, e. g. of future greenhouse gas emissions. In many projects (e.g. in the framework of simulations produced for the Intergovernmental Panel

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on Climate Change (IPCC)) these predictive data are predefined and based on standardized socio-economic scenarios. Simulation runs do not only require large sets of data, they also produce very large sets of data. Never before in the history of science have such large amounts of data been created within such short periods of time as with computer modelling. While in traditional experimentation data production usually is cumbersome, expensive and slow, computer models can very quickly produce gigabytes of data. Masses of data have to be managed, checked, condensed, represented and interpreted, which is not a trivial task. Many routines and tools have been developed to handle these floods of data and wring out information from them. While computer modelling is usually more visible to the outside world than the processing and management of data, data management in many cases requires a much larger amount of work.

7. Prediction, experimentation and control Once the data requirements have been met and the problems of data processing and management overcome, climate models can prove to be enormously versatile tools which are widely applicable. The most visible application of a climate model is for prognostic purposes as a forecast tool. If a model manages to simulate past climates in such a way that many of the predictions come close to what we can measure, scientists feel encouraged to use it for climate predictions. As most climate models come to very similar conclusions with regard to climate warming these predictions, or at least their general tendency, are almost universally accepted, today. So, while it is still regarded an open question as to whether the average temperatures in the 21st century will increase by 2 or 5°C, or even more, the idea that it is very likely that there will be increasing temperatures is not seriously questioned anymore. It is interesting to note that this almost universal agreement has been accomplished with the help of computer models and would otherwise probably not have been achieved. Computer modelling is not, however, only a tool for making predictions of this sort. A second application, which is at least as important, is the use of models to predict hypothetical developments. In such cases the model is used to calculate what will happen, given specific conditions. A computer climate model, for example, can be developed to provide answers to questions like the following: What happens if we reduce carbon dioxide emissions by 50 percent? What happens if ice melting occurs twice as fast in future decades? Or what would be the impact on climate, if deforesta-

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tion in the tropics accelerates? Also unrealistic assumptions can be tested for scientific reasons or just for the sake of curiosity, such as: What would happen in an atmosphere without clouds? Or what impact would it have, if huge sails in outer space shielded the earth from certain kinds of solar radiation? In this way climate models provide the opportunity to perform virtual experiments, where the researchers vary some variables to see how that affects other variables. This form of experimentation is generally called “numerical experimentation”, to distinguish it from experiments in which we study aspects of the world by interacting with it. Scientists in many fields have embraced enthusiastically the use of computer models for virtual experiments, because it enlarges the reach for “experimental” investigation enormously. Computer “experiments” are mainly performed in fields where scientists do not have the option to make traditional experiments, either because it is impossible (such as investigating what will happen to the world economy given dramatic changes in interest rates), too expensive (such as making real tests of nuclear fusion) or because it is ethically problematical (such as making epidemiologic experiments by circulating certain bacteria), or a mixture of these reasons (such as testing an intervention like spreading aerosols in the atmosphere to lower temperatures in the Earth’s climate system which at this time would be practically impossible, very expensive, and ethically problematic since it could have very severe and unwanted effects). It has to be kept in mind that computer “experiments” are a form of playing with theories– and thus are a theoretical and not an empirical exercise. In fields, which are investigated by computer simulation, concepts like “experiment” and “theory” have to some extent lost their original meanings. Finally, a third application of computer models is as a mutual control for other computer models. As described in the section “The art of climate model building II”, scientists test submodules and parameterizations with the help of other, more detailed models. In this mode of application the output of computer simulations is compared with data obtained from other models in order to answer questions like the following: Are the emission estimates that have been put into the simulation realistic? Is this new parameterization good enough? Is the spatial resolution chosen for a certain model application appropriate? Usually, new models or new modules are tested extensively with the help of other well-known and accepted models that serve as control devices. In some cases, computer models may also be used to control the quality of empirical data and answer questions like: Can these historical climate data obtained from unreliable historical sources be correct?

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Most scientists agree that computer models and computer simulations such as those used in climate modelling have enhanced scientific knowledge considerably. In fact computer simulation appears to have become a fundamental scientific methodology in its own right, similar to theoretical reasoning and real-world experimentation. Climate models, for example, can neither be considered as empirical nor theoretical constructions, instead they represent hybrid entities that involve both theoretical (e.g. laws of atmospheric physics) and empirical data (measured data), and use elements of both experimentation and theory building. For this reason, some scholars have pronounced computer simulation as a “third way in science”. Although their opponents argue that hybrid forms of scientific practice have always been common, noting that even empirical data, like measurements, are not pure empirical entities since theory is applied during their interpretation. But, even if not all scientists see computer simulation as the “third way”, most agree that computer models and computer simulation represent a new, powerful and increasingly influential scientific strategy.

8. Models and the real world So far we have spoken about how the predictions of a model correspond with measurements without going deeper into the philosophical question of how models relate to the real world. An important issue when dealing with models is how well the model fits the world, that is, whether the predictions made by the model are similar  – within a certain degree of accuracy  – to the data that can be obtained by studying those parts of the world that the model is assumed to represent. If the observational data are far from the predicted results, then we know that something is wrong with our model. However, we may not know exactly what is wrong with our model, only that something is wrong. On the other hand, if the observational data are close to the predicted results, we may be tempted to think that the model truly represents the world. However, there may be other models that provide equally good predictions. We may not be familiar with such competing models, but still they may be possible. These other models may provide equally good predictions, and therefore there would be no empirical way to choose between them. Instead, we may make a choice based on values such as simplicity, coherence with other parts of science, or internal consistency. Some of these values many scientists consider fundamental. Most scientists expect their models to be consistent, and inconsistencies will count

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heavily against accepting a model. Likewise, new models are expected to be coherent with known theories from other areas of science. Climate models have to be based on physical laws and are not allowed to contradict such laws. A case in point is mass balance. If atmospheric gases flow into a certain grid element and are subject to chemical transformation and deposition processes, the total amount of the mass of chemical compounds must not change at different points in time. Mass simply does not get lost. In choosing between models we may also be influenced by social, political or ethical values. We may choose a model, for example, because it focuses on aspects of the world that we are especially interested in, it is more economical to use, or it produces results quickly. One model, for instance, may provide good data on oceanic transport and possible changes in the direction of ocean currents such as the Gulf Stream, while another is better at providing information about atmospheric phenomena and relations between green house gasses and temperature changes.

9. Comparing prediction and observation: validation The most important part of the model assessment process is “validation”. The term “validation” simply refers to the process used to see whether the model models what it is supposed to model. A climate model, for example, firstly has to be able to simulate past climates for which measured data exist. A climate model that is able to simulate the differences in climate observed during different seasons or in different geographical regions is considered more valid than a model that is not able to reproduce such observations. All modern climate models pass such validation tests, but there are large differences as to how well a model reproduces observational data. All models do so in many cases of comparison. But all models also fail in other cases, sometimes even miserably. A good model should be successful in most cases of comparison and only fail in a few instances. But even successful validation tests do not allow the conclusion that the model is correct and will provide correct results in the future. Validation projects suffer from many problems. Firstly, validation is limited by a general lack of measured data. While climate models can quickly process a large amount of data, the measurement of comparable data is much more expensive and takes much more time. For that reason, the amount of measured data usually is much smaller than the amount of calculated data. As a consequence, validation opportunities are limited from the outset. Secondly, data bases of measured data are not equally good for all parameters involved in climate modelling. While good data

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bases may exist for temperature over the surface of the earth, much less measured data are available for the concentration, type and size of aerosols in higher layers of the atmosphere. Thirdly, measured data are usually measurements at a specific point. Simulated data, in contrast, represent a whole grid element, which even in the best models has a size of a tenth of a kilometer. In that sense, measured and simulated data are not comparable, at all. Scientists have to assume that point measurements (or the average of several point measurements) may be regarded as representative of the whole grid element, in which the measurements were taken. And finally, predictions for future periods of time can of course not be validated. Based on a large amount of experience with computer models, scientists have to assess whether such predictions can be considered reliable. If future conditions of the atmosphere, upon which the simulations have been based, are similar to past conditions, confidence in the model predictions may be warranted. More problematic are simulation cases, in which the atmosphere or other systems of the earth like the oceans, the biosphere etc. enter a new state, e.g. noticeably higher greenhouse gas concentrations than in the 20th century, or higher ocean temperatures than experienced previously. Major sources of uncertainty in climate model predictions are the socalled secondary effects. Such effects are caused by climate change, but also may have an impact on future climate development, which is unknown. Examples of such secondary effects are increasing cloud formation (which would cause a negative feedback due to increased reflection of solar radiation, that is a slowing of climate warming) or the melting of arctic ice (which would cause a positive feedback due to decreased albedo, that is an acceleration of climate warming). Climate scientists, however, do not have any measured data for states of the atmosphere with increased cloud formation or with decreased arctic ice volumes. For that reason, it is not possible to tell, whether current climate models are able to provide realistic predictions of such future states and their impact on climate warming. In spite of the manifold problems of climate model validation there is agreement among climate modellers that climate models can be  – and have to be – validated and applied as useful tools. In order to increase the confidence in model simulations, several additional practices have become important, such as sensitivity studies, model comparisons and ensemble predictions. Sensitivity studies serve to provide information on the sensitivity of the climate model with regard to a specific parameter. In sensitivity studies a particular parameter is varied over a certain range of values and for all these variations simulation results are calculated. If the simulation

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results do not differ very much in spite of parameter variation, the model is considered a little sensitive with regard to that parameter. Such information is extremely valuable, because a parameter included in the simulation might be very uncertain or even not known at all. Such a situation is not so problematic, if the model is not very sensitive with regard to that parameter. In the opposite case, however, if the model reacts sensitively to parameter variation, simulation results have to be considered as very uncertain and unreliable. The use of ensemble simulations is one approach that is gaining credibility as a means of increasing the reliability of climate models. Since the 1990s, a growing number of projects have set out with the goal of performing climate simulations with many models which use standardized conditions and data sets, such as those defined by IPCC working groups. Such model comparisons originally were devised to compare the behaviour of different models and provide insights into the reasons why models behaved differently. In recent years, the use of several models for climate simulations has also become a standardized practice to increase the reliability of simulations. This practice is called ensemble simulation. The rationale behind it is the belief, that averaged simulation results from many, very different models would be more reliable, and the probability of gross errors smaller.

10. Climate models and politics A special feature of climate science is that this form of science has become closely linked with politics. There is a panel of scientists under the auspices of the United Nations, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) that has been given the role of assessing “the scientific basis of risk of human-induced climate change”. The testing of models and model results are a priority of the relevant IPCC working groups. Here, the consensus of a large number of the most prestigious scientists provides the basis for confidence in models and simulation results. On the other hand, the need for these IPCC working groups and their standardized procedures reflects the fact that comprehensive and effective scientific criteria to assess and rank models are not yet available. In addition to politically driven initiatives there are also a whole host of individual scientists and research institutions which are trying to develop and present their ideas and findings in open competition with other scientists and research institutions. In this instance, the scientists rely on

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getting their papers published in esteemed international journals as a way to get their ideas into the public domain. To get a paper into such a journal a scientist or – more typically – a group of scientists will submit their written summary of ideas and findings, known as a manuscript, to a specific journal. The editor of the journal then sends the paper to one or more eminent scientists who are familiar with the field that the manuscript addresses. These experts, or referees, then provide an anonymous assessment of the paper and recommend whether the manuscript should be accepted, should be accepted but only if certain revisions are made, or should be rejected. This process of so-called peer review is the backbone of science. The aim of the system is to ensure that only papers which in the eyes of eminent scientists are up to the highest standards will be published. So, in this system, it should not be possible to have your ideas or results published just because you are an influential person or because your ideas or results fit into what is considered politically desirable. A consequence of this system is that often conflicting and competing ideas and hypotheses will get published side by side. For example within climate science some scientists have managed to publish papers which argue that climate change is not mainly the effect of human activities but rather the effect of naturally occurring fluctuations, e.g. in the sun. At the same time other scientists, and the majority of them, have presented results that they take to indicate that climate change is mainly the effect of human activities. Such disagreement and openings for discussion are considered good for the process of science by, among others, academics interested in the philosophy of science who generally believe that science and scientists should not be aiming for consensus. Robert Merton, a British sociologist of science, is one proponent of this way of thinking. According to Merton the essence of science is to be objective. Scientists should not band together and aim for consensus. Quite to the contrary, they should constantly aim to put each other’s results under critical scrutiny. In his opinion, science can only make progress towards an objective truth through constant and organised scepticism. However, this situation is not very convenient in a political context, where politicians seem to need unanimous advice from the scientific community rather than conflicting pieces of advice that are likely to be taken up and used by other political parties with different political agendas. An example of this kind of use of science is the selective highlighting of scientific publications which argue that climate change is not mainly man-made by those groups

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and political parties that have a vested interest in the economy being driven by the unhindered consumption of coal and oil. It was against this background that the IPCC was established in 1988. The IPCC was set up by the World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), which both come under the United Nations. This new organization built on earlier international collaborations set up to gather and share meteorological data, but its establishment also reflected a growing political awareness of the potential negative effect of human activities on the climate. The role of the IPCC is to assess the scientific information relevant to understanding the risk of human-induced climate change, its potential impacts and options for adaptation and mitigation. Review is an essential part of the IPCC process. Since the IPCC is an intergovernmental body review of IPCC document involves both peer review by experts and review by governments. Since its establishment the IPCC has published four main reports, the first in 1990 and the fourth in 2007. The main parts of these reports are reviews made by prominent scientists in various branches of climate research. And these reviews are again carefully scrutinized through peer review processes very much like the peer review processes used by scientific journals. To write a report is a huge undertaking involving a lot of scientists. The 2007 IPCC Fourth Assessment Report, for example, involved people from over 130 countries making contributions over a period of 6 years. These people included more than 2500 scientific expert reviewers, more than 800 contributing authors, and more than 450 lead authors. Besides all the individual reviews an IPCC main report also contains a summary report, called Summary for Policymakers. This summary undergoes review by participating governments in addition to scientific review, and it is this summary that usually gets all the media attention. But even though the IPCC uses some of the procedures followed by non-associated climate scientists, there are some features that are specific to the IPCC. Firstly, scientists are selected to participate; and there is no way that a scientist with views opposing the mainstream is going to be able to make a contribution to the report. Secondly, the main aim is to achieve some form of consensus  – a feature which clearly serves to modify the norm of organized scepticism. Thirdly and finally even though it is said in the remit of IPCC that the panel should be neutral with respect to policy there is a clear link to policy, not least via the role governments play in reviewing the report. The political role of the IPCC is also underlined by the fact that the organization’s panel shared the 2007 Nobel Peace Prize

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with former vice-president of the USA, Al Gore. This prize is given for actions that make a positive political difference in relation to creation of peace in the world. It is, therefore, not surprising that there have been controversies surrounding the IPCC. One example is that in January 2005 the prominent climate scientist Christopher Landsea resigned from his work with the organization, saying that he viewed the process “as both being motivated by pre-conceived agendas and being scientifically unsound”. He made his decision following the highly publicized claims of one of the leaders of the IPCC that global warming was contributing to recent hurricane activity. Other critics have argued in the opposite direction, claiming that the IPCC reports tend to underestimate dangers, understate risks, and report only the “lowest common denominator” findings. According to these critics the IPCC actually serves to legitimate governments withholding necessary action in the light of alleged scientific uncertainty. Some puritans would like to have an iron curtain between science and society. However, in reality science and politics have to interact. It is the role of science to give advice in many politically sensitive areas besides climate science. For example, when it comes to the safety of products, including the food we eat, it is the role of scientists working for governments to do risk assessments which are then used by regulators and ultimately politicians to make decisions about what to allow and what not to allow. Many scientists involved in assessing risks will claim that they are not mingling with politics at all – they are just presenting the facts and then leaving it to regulators and politicians to decide what to do. However this view does not really stand up to closer scrutiny. Firstly, often it is the role of scientists, as is the case in climate science, to identify what things we ought to be worried about, and this, if anything is, is a value-laden decision. Secondly, scientists are partly being selected because they are considered “reasonable” and work in committees which aim at consensus rather than organised scepticism. The only solution to the problem seems to be transparency, a value that is also written into the remit of the IPCC. Climate scientists should be open about the uncertainties and limitations relating to their scientific efforts, they should allow different voices to be heard, and when they engage in work for organizations like the IPCC, they should be open about their political role.

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References Edwards PN (2001): Representing the Global Atmosphere: Computer Models, Data, and Knowledge about Climate Change, in: Miller CA & Edwards PN (eds.): ­Changing the Atmosphere. Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance. Cambridge, MA,: MIT Press, 31‑65. Fox Keller E (2003): Models, simulation, and ‘computer experiments’, in: Hans ­Radder (ed.): The philosophy of scientific experimentation, Pittsburgh, 198‑235. Green M (2006): Looking for a general for some modern major models, in: Endeavour 30, 55‑59. Heymann M (2006): Modeling reality. Practice, knowledge, and uncertainty in atmospheric transport simulation. In: Historical Studies of the Physical and Biological Sciences 37, No. 1, 49‑85. Humphreys P: Extending ourselves: Computational science, empiricism, and scientific method, Oxford, Oxford University Press. IPCC (1990): Climate Change, The IPCC scientific assessment, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. IPCC (1996): Climate Change 1995, The Science of Climate Change, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. IPCC (2001): Climate Change 2001, The scientific basis. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. IPCC (2007): Climate Change 2007, The physical science basis, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. Kaufmann W & Smarr LL (1994): Simulierte Welten. Moleküle und Gewitter aus dem Computer, Heidelberg,. Lahsen M (2005): Seductive simulations? Uncertainty distribution around climate models. In: Social Studies of Science 35, 895‑922. Oreskes N, Conway EM & Shindell M (2008): From Chicken Little to Dr. Pangloss: William Nierenberg, Global Warming, and the Social Deconstruction of Scientific Knowledge, Historical Studies in the Natural Sciences 38, No. 1, 109‑152. Petersen A (2006): Simulating Nature: A philosophical study of computer simulation uncertainties and their role in climate science and policy advice, Antwerpen. Shackley S, Risbye J, Stone P & Wynne B (1999): Adjusting to policy expectations in climate change modelling, in: Climatic Change 43, 413‑454. Shackley S, P. Young P, Parkinson S & Wynne B (1998): Uncertainty, complexity and concepts of good science in climate change modelling: Are GCMs the best tools? In: Climatic Change 38, 159‑205. Shackley S & Wynne B (1996): Representing uncertainty in global climate change ­science and policy: Boundary-ordering devices and authority, in: Science, Technology & Human Values 21, 275‑302). Stehr N & von Storch H (1995): The social construct of climate and climate change, Climate Research 5, 99‑105. Van der Sluijs Jeroen P (1997): Anchoring amid uncertainty. On the management of uncertainties in risk assessment of anthropogenic climate change, Ph-D. thesis, University of Utrecht.

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Weingart P (ed.) (1999): Climate coalitions: The science and politics of climate change. Minerva 37 No. 2, Special issue on the relation of climate science and climate politics (results from the CIRCITER project), pp. 103‑181. Weingart, Peter, et al.: Risks of Communication: Discourses on Climate Change in Science, Politics, and the Mass Media, in: Public Understanding of Science 9l (2000), 261‑283. Weingart P, Engels A & Pansegrau P (2002): Von der Hypothese zur Katastrophe. Der anthropogene Klimawandel im Diskurs zwischen Wissenschaft, Politik und Massenmedien, Opladen.

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The price of responsibility – ethical perspectives Chr is t ian G amborg & Mick e y Gjer r is

Flash 1: Somewhere in the Arctic, a polar bear is looking puzzled. Where before there was sea ice from which it could hunt for seals, now there is only sea. The habitats and living conditions of the polar bear are changing. Global warming is forcing it to either adapt to the new conditions by living more on land and finding other sources of food or face extinction. So the polar bear is standing with its paws in the salty water, facing a gigantic challenge. A challenge which has become one of the symbols of the climate change which is now becoming a reality in the public space. A space which we all share, where pop stars, 9/11, reality TV, football and now CO2 emissions are our joint frame of reference. For most of us, the puzzled look of the polar bear spurs a feeling that something must be done. That it is wrong that the polar bear should vanish because we humans have acted in a way which has dire consequences. Something which we have been very long in acknowledging. Flash 2: The Carteret Islands is a small group of islands off the Papua New Guinea coast in the Pacific Ocean. These islands are being swallowed by the sea, and the approx. 1,500 islanders are being evacuated (2008). Known as the world’s first climate refugees, these people must create a new life for themselves as their world is literally going under. The story has made headlines in newspapers worldwide, and the rising sea levels resulting from climate change have been identified as the main culprit. Others are saying that tectonic activity and normal erosion are to blame for making these islands uninhabitable. However, this does not change the fact that the islands and the islanders – in much the same way as the polar bear – have become symbols of the climate change which is currently sweeping the globe. Symbols that we are changing the Earth on which we live, and symbols that the poor and the disadvantaged will be the ones paying the highest price. Flash 3: Monday morning on a sunny autumn day in 2008. The media are full of the story that CO2 emissions are increasing rapidly, and despite the considerable political attention devoted to the issue, the growth in emissions is still escalating. Industrial developments in countries such as India and China and the continued growth in the transport sector get the blame.

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Known as one of the world’s first climate refugees, this woman is seeing how her island is slowly disappearing beneath the waves. The Carteret islanders are facing an uncertain future.

A Dane speaking on the radio news says that of course he would like to do something about it, but when nobody else is cutting down on their driving, then why should he? And so, in less than a minute one gets a sense of how climate change and the reasons for the changes are both to do with global structural conditions and with individual people’s unwillingness to assume responsibility. But what does it mean? What will happen and when? You get the feeling that the climate has become the new threat which we can use to deposit our fear of the future. And you sense that there are plenty of reasons to be fearful.

1. Intro These are just three stories in the almost endless stream of accounts of the consequences of climate change reported by the media every day. What is down to climate change and what should be attributed to other factors can be hard to discern. And to what extent climate change is actually caused by human activity or triggered by other factors is not easy to decide, neither for those of us who are not experts in this field, nor for the experts themselves. However, these questions are addressed in other sections of this book. Here, we assume that the climate is changing, and that this is largely attributable to human activities. Against this background, we discuss the ethical questions raised by this development.

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Many people, if not most, believe that it is wrong that the polar bear should face extinction and that poor people should become poorer because other people in more affluent parts of the world will not change their ways. But do we have a responsibility towards other people, animals, plants or the entire globe? And how should we divide the burdens which must be borne in the coming years to mitigate the consequences of the changes which are under way? These are all ethical questions. And these questions are part and parcel of the challenges posed by climate change. The purpose of this chapter is not to provide hard and fast answers to the ethical questions, but to put the most important questions into words and to show the values which may help the individual person find an answer. In other words, the idea is not to dictate what the right attitude might be, but to help the reader clarify his or her own views. Views spring from values, and ethics is precisely to do with systematic and critical reflection on views and values. Ethics is an invaluable tool if you want to understand both your own views and those of others to the whole climate change issue, and if you want to contribute to it in a qualified way. We therefore start the chapter by presenting a number of ethical key concepts and relating them to the issue of climate change. Subsequently, we delve into the climate change debate to extract a number of examples with a view to pinpointing the ethical issues on which they touch.

2. Ethics as a fundamental premise It is easy enough to fail. Not to do what one should. Most people know this. Part of being human is experiencing that you fail in your relations with other people and do not treat them properly. We may fail our friend by being late or by losing touch because we simply do not have the energy for all her problems. We may fail the lady at the check-out by not telling her that she has given us too much change back, or the starving children staring at us from the TV screen while we drink our coffee and eat our cake. Not that we can’t explain it all. Humans have a unique ability to tell their lives like a story in which they themselves appear just and good. A story which we often need to hear because our conscience tells us that what we are doing is not the right thing. One could call it a form of ethical self-defence. If we disregard what would, in the specific situations mentioned above, be ‘the right thing’ to do, it is characteristic of us as humans that we like to be seen to be doing ‘the right thing’. We have an ingrained need to be ethical. This need may stem from a variety of sources: Everything from evolutionary advantages to religious influences has been mentioned. In this

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context, what is important is that ethics is an everyday phenomenon which involves assessing our own actions and those of others as being right or wrong. An assessment which we make all the time, and one which depends on the values that help us navigate among the many choices thrown at us by life. Ethics is thus an integrated part of life. There is good, and there is evil, and very few people are indifferent to whether their ways of life and their actions are deemed to belong in one category or the other. However, ethics is also omnipresent in another way. As shown in the examples above, ethics is not just something that comes to the fore when tackling complex and technical problems, as if ethical reflection was reserved for genetically modified animals, climate change and organ donation. A situation is ethical as soon as a responsibility comes into it, as soon as one’s actions start affecting other creatures which one feels should be included in the ethical deliberations. A situation is ethical as soon as you have a responsibility. But when is that? The short answer is that you have a responsibility in any situation involving two individuals. One person’s actions may contribute to making the other person’s life better or worse – on a big scale and on a small scale. So the answer is that you are always ethically responsible, that all situations contain an ethical element. However, we are often not aware of this responsibility as we simply adhere to the norms which apply in the society of which we are part. We hold the door, say thank-you for supper, help blind people cross the road, take casualties to hospital, see lost children home, behave in a way so that other people do not mind being with us and also think of others, and not just ourselves. Through our childhoods and upbringing – our socialisation – we have many unwritten rules about how to handle the responsibility which we have all the time. And these rules make it possible for us to act every time without having to think everything through from scratch in terms of what we should do in a particular situation. We know already, because the situation resembles other situations in which we have found ourselves or which we have heard about, and we have a clear idea of what we should do in such a situation. But sometimes we become doubtful. We may find ourselves in a situation where doing the right thing has major personal implications, or where we do not recognise the elements in the situation and are therefore uncertain about what exactly is the right thing. In the first case, we basically know what is right. What we should do. But as it requires a sacrifice on our part which we cannot bear, we typically start thinking about the ethics to find out whether we are really obliged

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to make the sacrifice which the situation seems to demand from us. We know that it is wrong that children should be dying from starvation a few thousand kilometres away while we are rolling in food. But are we really ethically obliged to change our lives to the extent required to help these children? In the other case we are genuinely in doubt because we are facing new challenges or opportunities and find it difficult to decide what is the best course of action. Biotechnology is a powerful tool, but how can we best use it for the benefit of us all? This is where the ethical thinking kicks in to help us clarify our objectives and ideals and the possible paths to fulfilling them. Climate change represents a mixture of both scenarios. On the one hand, climate change raises a number of scarily familiar issues concerning whether and how those who have the most should help those who have the least to a better life. In this context, our lifestyle and our willingness to help are challenged even it means that we must change our lives. On the other hand, we are faced with whole nations sinking into the sea, with the extinction of species on a hitherto unknown scale, changed living conditions for six billion people and even more animals, and with the natural sciences battling to understand both the causes of climate change and the possible consequences. What is the right thing to do in this situation? The answers are by no means clear. The ethical question is basically: What should I do out of everything which I could do. The fundamental ethical experience is thus that there is a difference between actions. Some are right, and some are wrong. However, to answer the question, you have to ask some more questions. First and foremost, what the objective actually is. Simply answering doing ‘the right thing’ or ‘what is good’ is not enough. Most people would agree that this is what we should do. But what is ‘the right thing’ and ‘what is good’? In other words, we are forced to put our values and objectives into words so that we have an idea of where the actions should take us and others. In the face of climate change and the ensuing changes in living conditions on an unprecedented scale, most people can probably accept an ethical objective of upholding or improving quality of life. However, there is very little agreement on what constitutes quality in human life. Is it when you do not feel pain and all your wishes are fulfilled? Is it when you are challenged to apply your abilities to the utmost and are able to experience the whole gamut of emotions, from the deepest sorrow to soaring happiness? Is it a question of finding technological solutions to climate change which ensure that we can carry on the growth and consumerism which characterises our present society? Or is it a question of changing

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our attitude so that we shift our focus from material goods and transport and start leading far more local and simple lives. Another question is the question of equality. Most people agree that, ethically speaking, it should be possible to treat people differently if there are relevant reasons for doing so. If only some citizens in a country should be given the chance to vote on who should govern, then there should be a good reason for excluding the rest. Otherwise, it amounts to discrimination: Unfair treatment based not on factual grounds. However, sometimes disagreement arises as to what grounds of fact are. In a situation where resources are scarce, the resource distribution can give rise to considerable discussion. Just think of the discussions about what our priorities should be within the health care system. Which diseases should be treated, and what are we prepared to pay for the treatment methods? Such questions are virtually piling up in connection with the climate change discussion: How should we divide the burdens? Looking at the various countries’ carbon footprints, it is clear that a number of poor countries which emit very little CO2 per capita will be harder hit by climate change and the changing conditions for food production than countries with a very high level of per capita emissions. Is that fair? Should the rich countries pay for the poor countries? Or is it up to each individual country to solve its own problems? Should we help the areas plagued by drought, or should we help the populations on the islands which are drowning? Should we help the Dutch before helping the Indians, or are we equally obliged to help other people, no matter where they live? And how far should we go for others? How much of our wealth should we spend on helping others? Should we help other people to an acceptable minimum, or should we aim for a situation in which everybody is equally well off – or equally badly off ? Finally, there is the question of who it would be relevant to include in the ethical deliberations? To whom do I owe something – who am I responsible for? This is also a question which must be answered in this situation. Should all people be included or only some? Do I have more obligations towards people I know than those who live far away? And what about animals and plants, species and ecosystems? Am I directly ethically obliged to them, or should I only care about them to the extent that they are of any significance to people? We will return to this question in the next section. All these deliberations are not new to ethics. They are questions on which people have been pondering for centuries, if not millennia. But climate change is lending a certain urgency to these problems and adding a new twist. That is simply the way it is. Each new era has had its challenges – and there are many signs that these are the challenges of our time. The question

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of where our knowledge of ethics comes from is also relevant in this context. For if we are to discuss which strategies are right in the current situation, and if we are to discuss what objectives to lay down, then it is necessary to have an understanding of where our own basic values and those of other people stem from. Are they culturally determined, and thereby dependent on time and place, or do they stem from a universal human sensibility and are thus available to anybody who thinks about it? Have they been invented by mankind for ensure the survival of the species in an evolutionary perspective? Has some Creator incorporated them into our lives or revealed them in a book? Or are they simply part of the human condition, like death and hunger? Whether the answer is one or the other, we must know our own answers and those of others if dialogue is to lead anywhere. Otherwise we will end in a situation where we each feel that we are right and that the others either have not been listening or have not understood a thing. One of the big questions within ethical thinking is whether the end justifies the means. Within the ethical tradition in the Western world, this is one of the questions which divide two of the most fundamental positions: Utilitarianism and deontology, often represented by the English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748‑1832) and the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (1724‑1804), respectively. According to utilitarianism there are no limits to what we can allow ourselves to do as long as the overall result leads to the highest possible quality of life. If the best results would be achieved by leaving the poorest countries to their destiny and helping those that are almost on a par with ourselves, then that is the right course to set. If, on the other hand, we get most quality of life for our money by helping the poorest people, then that is what we should do. Every action must be measured in terms of its consequences. Deontological theories, on the other hand, maintains that there are actions which, notwithstanding the fact that their combined consequences can be said to be good, are not ethically acceptable. For example, the killing of an innocent person can never be justified. The end does not always justify the means. In the face of the challenges presented by climate change, there is no doubt that we will, time and again, find ourselves in situations where choosing what to do is not simple. Situations in which there is no clearly right or clear wrong course of action, but where the choice is between two evils. Should we protect human life or endangered animal species when the animals’ habitats are disappearing and they start making their way towards our towns, as has for example been observed in the case of the polar bears in Greenland? Are there actions which can never be ethical, or can we do anything we want as long as we aim for the best consequences? Climate

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change and the global scale of the ethical conflicts highlight the fact that sometimes our ‘solutions’ to various problems are highly ethically debatable. All these questions and challenges must be addressed in the coming years. Whether we like it or not. We cannot check out of society and pretend that the choice is not ours. Not choosing is also a choice. The ethical responsibility is unavoidable. As mentioned earlier, throughout this section we will attempt to show how the above questions come up specifically in the climate change discussion. But before we get to that, we will focus in particular on one of the questions raised in this section: For whom are we responsible? Is it only people who have any ethical significance, or do other creatures also have a claim to be protected for their own sake?

3. Who and what are we responsible for? The global consequences of climate change are unpredictable, but will undoubtedly lead to major social unrest and extensive consequences for animals, plants and ecosystems. Some plant and animal species will be threatened with extinction, and their distribution area will change materially. To what extent we should seek to prevent this depends, to a large extent, on who and what we feel has an ethical value in itself. This question has been discussed within ethics for a long time, but the discussion has become particularly intense since the 1960s with the increasing awareness of the damage inflicted on the natural world by industrialisation and intensified farming. To gain an overview of this discussion, we first divide everything into three ethical categories: ethical agents, ethical subjects and ethical objects. Ethical agents are creatures to which we can ascribe a responsibility for their actions. One can, of course, imagine non-human intelligences (animals, aliens or artificial intelligence) which could be regarded as ethical agents, but today we know only of humans. Generally speaking, ethical agents are those who can be held legally responsible for their choices. The term agent has been chosen to emphasise that focus is on the entity acting actively (having agency, taking action) in a particular situation. This makes it clear that not all humans belong in the group of ethical agents. To be an ethical agent (somebody who can act ethically), you must live up to certain requirements: Self-awareness; you must know that you have wishes, goals and instincts and that you can act to fulfil them or decline to do so for ethical reasons. Freedom; it must be possible to make your choices without external influence. Rationality; you must be able to assess the consequences of your actions in so far as it is possible and to choose

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between alternatives based on this knowledge. Only some people meet these requirements. Children up to a certain age, people with dementia, the mentally ill, people in a coma etc. are not ethical agents. But even though you are not an ethical agent, it does not necessarily mean that you are ethically irrelevant. The second category of creatures in the ethical landscape is the ethical subjects. Here we find all the creatures that are ethically significant in themselves without being ethical agents. Ethical agents are also ethical subjects. You are both obliged in relation to others, and other ethical agents are obliged in relation to you. However, you are not only obliged to other ethical agents. You are also obliged to the ethical subjects. The term subject has been chosen to emphasise that in the ethical action, the subject needing the agent’s help is the focus for the action – not the agent. The task of the ethical agent is to focus on the ethical subject and to act as though he himself was the ethical subject (see the Golden rule: Do unto others as you would have them do unto you). Ethical subjects can be regarded as creatures which have an ethical significance in themselves, an ethical value which means that the ethical agents are ethically responsible for them. It means something in an ethical sense whether the actions of the ethical agents harm or help the ethical subjects. Being an ethical subject is being a valid member of the ethical community. And if you belong to the ethical community, there are limits to what other people can do to you. Thus it makes a big difference whether you think that older people suffering from serious dementia and who have no relatives are members of the ethical community. If they are, they are entitled to our consideration. If not, you could ask whether, for financial reasons, we might just as well kill them. The last category in the ethical landscape is the ethical objects. This is the residual group – everything that can neither act ethically nor put others under ethical obligations. This does not mean that ethical objects are of no interest to ethics. A knife, for example, is not an ethical agent or an ethical subject. But it can be used by ethical agents to either harm or help ethical subjects. So, indirectly, the knife is incredibly important. But on its own the knife has no ethical significance. As far as the knife is concerned, it is not wrong to destroy it. On the other hand, it may be wrong in relation to the person who owns it or the people for whom food could be cooked using the knife. Thus, the ethical community consists of a judicious mix of ethical agents and ethical subjects. Outside this community we find the ethical objects which are only indirectly of any ethical significance. The big and very important discussion looks at who and what can be said to belong to the group of

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Ethical subjects Ethical objects

Ethical agents

Figure 1:  For whom or what are we responsible? This depends on where we place the various creatures. It is a question of being in the right circle.

ethical subjects. Because being part of this group is belonging to the ethical community and having a claim on the ethical agents’ consideration. If we return again to the discussion on climate change, it becomes clear how important it is where we draw the boundaries for who or what we regard as ethical subjects. One of the reasons why the special branch of ethics which is called environmental ethics or nature ethics has sprung up over the past 40‑50 years is that a more and more pressing need has arisen for explaining our ideas about what is morally right and wrong in how we treat the natural world or the environment. Environmental ethical considerations can help us to understand the complexity of the issue. There is no single answer to this question, no one truth, but several competing environmentally ethical views which offer widely differing ideas on the limits for our use, protection and restoration of the natural world and the environment, and in particular on who is entitled to our consideration in this respect. For the sake of clarity, here too we will draw a picture of the ethical landscape. However, it is important to note that this systematisation necessarily omits many distinctions and considerations which the individual philosophical directions and philosophers use. The following should therefore be seen as an outline of possible positions rather than a detailed account. The various positions within environmental and nature ethics can be divided into four fundamental categories: anthropocentrism, sentientism, biocentrism and ecocentrism. An attitude which is prevalent throughout much of the West and which, among other things, has been predominant within the Christian philosophy of nature, and which has largely helped to shape the Western civilisation’s

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view of the natural world, is anthropocentrism (from the Greek antropos: man). According to this view, people are the only ethical subjects. This approach does not preclude taking nature and the environment into consideration, but assumes that the consideration is indirect, i.e. all use and protection of the natural world happens out of consideration for human needs and interests. An extended version of this view is found in the UN’s Brundtland Report ‘Our Common Future’ from 1987 in which the consideration for the needs of future generations is emphasised. In the past ten to fifteen years this approach has had a clear impact on environmental and nature management, for example in connection with energy consumption, waste policies and protecting animal and plant species. For example, in relation to this view, the growing of genetically modified crops does not in itself pose an ethical problem, but must be assessed according to the advantages and disadvantages for people. The problem with the anthropocentric perspective is that it can be hard to explain why it is only people who are ethically significant. To assert this solely on the grounds of a biological affiliation to the species Homo sapiens gives little meaning outside a narrow religious understanding of human beings being specially selected by God. If we adhere to the philosophical reasoning, the question is: What quality do human beings possess which means that they – and only they – have ethical value in themselves? In the history of philosophy, many different qualities have been proposed such as reason, logical thinking, language, the ability to use tools etc. However, not all people possess these abilities. Since the 1960s, and as more and more attention has been given to mankind’s relationship with nature, increasing criticism has been levelled at the anthropocentric viewpoint. The criticism which has had the most impact has come from the sentient (meaning having the power of sense perception or sensation) perspective. This point of view is closely related to the utilitarian perspective where, as previously mentioned, you focus on the consequences of your actions. The aim is to ensure as high an overall quality of life as possible. According to utilitarianism, the criterion for being part of the ethical community is therefore only that a being is able to feel comfort or pain. If so, your experiences are contributing either positively or negatively to the combined quality of life and must therefore be taken into account. This way of thinking has, among other things, resulted in a growing focus on animal welfare in both commercial livestock production and vivisection, while, generally speaking, animal welfare is also higher on the public agenda today than at any time previously. Not many people today will claim that the ability to feel pain is not ethi-

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cally relevant. You can discuss the extent to which different creatures should be part of the ethical considerations, and you might claim that human beings basically take precedence over animals. However, few people will (or can) argue that the suffering of animals is ethically irrelevant. However, the question is whether the ability to feel pain is the only relevant factor to be considered when deciding whether something belongs to the group of ethical subjects. Biocentric or life-centred ethical theories would have nothing to do with such an ethical distinction. All living organisms – whatever their level of consciousness  – should be seen as ethical subjects and included in any ethical reflections. Anthropocentrism draws the line at capabilities which are deemed special for humans or at a purely biological affiliation with the species Homo sapiens. Sentientism draws the line at being capable of feeling pain. Biocentrism draws the line between what is and what isn’t living. In 1986, the American environmental ethicist Paul W. Taylor published the book Respect for Nature. A Theory of Environmental Ethics, in which he argues in favour of a biocentric perspective based on the idea of a good of its own. Everything of which you can say that actions can be good or bad for it has a good of its own. Taylor then made having a good of its own a condition for having an ethical value irrespective of everything else, which can here be understood as being an ethical subject. For Taylor, all living beings – fauna and flora – belong to the ethical community. Other biocentric positions argue on the basis of our human experiences that the ability of humans to identify with ‘the other’ must be what defines the boundary for the ethical community. It is then claimed that the limit of the ability of humans to identify with another goes hand in hand with the living as, thanks to shared existential basic conditions such as vulnerability and mortality, we can perceive the surrendering of the living to us as an ethical cry for help, whereas inanimate objects such as rocks, rivers, mountains etc. do not share the basic conditions with us in the same way and thus only have indirect ethical significance (are ethical objects). However, supporters of a holistic approach do not regard the above as being sufficiently far-reaching. Only once everything in the natural world – living or dead  – and not just individual organisms are included in the considerations are the ethics perfect. Key for the so-called deep ecologists is to point out that current problems such as air pollution and the ruthless exploitation of the natural world require a rethinking of our role in the natural world and the environment. Humans are part of the natural world and are so closely associated with the rest of it that, ethically speaking, it makes no sense to distinguish between us and that. The limit for the individual is not

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determined by the skin, but by the relationships which the individual enters into. The Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss (1912‑2009) thus talks about the difference between the individual self and the ecological self, where the latter, in the extreme sense, may be understood as the ecosphere as such. Therefore it is not only individual organisms but also magnitudes such as species and ecosystems which have direct ethical significance. The goal is as far as possible to preserve a level of diversity and genuine nature and achieve a state of harmony between the natural world and humans, where humans are part of the Earth’s cycles and on an equal footing with other creatures and – in so far as is possible – avoid influencing the ecosystems. From a philosophical point of view, we have a number of competing views of nature which range from anthropocentrism, where only people have ethical value, via sentientism and biocentrism to ecocentrism, which includes all living matter in the ethical community. Which of these you take as your viewpoint is very significant when discussing global warming. If, for example, your starting point is non-anthropocentric, you cannot only argue on the basis of a given action’s possible consequences for people and their rights or welfare – the consequences of global warming for the rest of the natural world also become directly ethically relevant. A small example can be used to illustrate the different ethical approaches in relation to climate change. Recently, Australian researchers discovered that an increased level of CO2 in the atmosphere reduces the nutrient content in the leaves of the eucalyptus tree while also increasing the number of naturally occurring toxins. With fewer nutrients, the value of the leaves as food is reduced. This has implications for the koala bear, which is the only mammal that uses eucalyptus leaves as a source of food and water. Fewer nutrients is obviously not a problem for humans, who cultivate eucalyptus trees as a source of paper pulp, as only the wood quality and tree size are of interest. In other words you could – very simplistically – from an anthropocentric viewpoint argue that as long as the trees can be used for our benefit, this development presents no ethical problem for people now or in future, other things being equal. Here, the natural world is regarded as an instrument. The question of whether it serves our human interests or not defines whether or not there is an ethical issue. However, it does not mean that, from an anthropocentric point of view, you can necessarily justify the consequences of global warming for eucalyptus trees and koala bears. In addition to our need for food, water and shelter, people have needs which mean that we can take an interest in or care for plants and animals. You can also talk about a broader concept of

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(human) behaviour which includes animals and plants as well as experiences of these. With this enlarged welfare concept, it would thus become an ethical problem that the value of the eucalyptus tree as food for the koala declined as something which we humans appreciate – koala bears in Australia – would otherwise be lost. Therefore we should show consideration for the koala out of regard for other people. On the other hand, the koala, from the anthropocentric point of view, cannot expect consideration itself. From a sentient viewpoint, certain koala bears would be entitled to consideration, as higher animals, which are capable of feeling pain or happiness, are covered by ethical considerations. More far-reaching ethical viewpoints such as biocentrism would also be concerned about other organisms which may be harmed through the effects of changed CO2 levels on the leaves, maintaining that they were entitled to moral considerations, like people, regardless of whether they were directly or indirectly of benefit to us. Finally, from an ecocentric perspective, you would also relate to how the changes in the nutritional values of the leaves would affect the overall ecosystem and the species within it.

4. Ethical challenges of climate change Climate change raises a number of practical issues: Can we produce cars with lower petrol consumption? Can we build better embankments to protect against flooding? Can we develop solar cell technology? And so on. However, climate change also raises issues which cannot be answered solely from a scientific or practical point of view. It is not only about what we ought to do to check or halt climate change and its consequences, but also why. How many resources should we invest in developing vaccines for people in the third world who are threatened, for example by changed areas of distribution for a number of pathogenic insects, how should we prioritise the efforts in relation to combating and preventing disease, and are we ethically obliged to help these people? Climate change thus raises several critical ethical issues. Another question is whether it is reasonable that, in the West, we use fossil fuel-consuming cars for transportation as well as abundant heating and power while people in other parts of the world, especially in the non-industrialised countries, have to pay the price, for example in the form of flooding which forces hundreds of thousands to leave their native areas, or extreme drought which causes harvests to fail, when millions risk dying of starvation and thirst. We are not alone – literally. We are not and will not be the only people

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inhabiting the Earth. This means that we have to address key questions such as: Who or what do we need to take into consideration? And what is a fair or proper distribution of the benefits and the burdens? As previously mentioned, our ethical perspective helps to shape our answers to these questions in light of the changed living conditions for other people, future generations, fauna and flora and the natural world as a whole. We have described various ethical views about the natural world above and different fundamental ethical concepts and issues. In the following we will use these considerations as a basis for discussing the ethical aspects of a number of issues raised by climate change: Rising sea levels, changed habitats for animals, the implications of climate change for insects and plants and the consequences of climate change for species and ecosystems. We will do so by focusing on a number of cases which will also serve to demarcate the boundaries in the basic discussion about who and what is part of the ethical community. Consideration for other people: Climate refugees

One consequence of climate change is rising sea levels in the world’s oceans. This is the result of ice melting at the poles and the general warming of the sea water. The melting ice will mean that low-lying countries will disappear, or that it will no longer be possible to farm land which is currently used for agricultural purposes, which in turn will lead to increased competition for ever scarcer resources such as crops and water. Such changes will be seen in particular in areas with poor populations who are either unable or who cannot afford to adapt (for example through irrigation or controlling the advancing sea water). The small Pacific atoll Carteret, which was mentioned at the start of the chapter, is a case in point. The atoll, which lies off Papua New Guinea, is one of the most densely populated areas in the world. On the Carteret Islands, which rise just above the surface of the sea, the sea level has risen 10 cm in twenty years, and it is estimated that the islands may well be completely submerged by 2015. About 1,500 people live on the atoll itself, and they are now being called the world’s first climate refugees. Their fields and coconut and banana plantations are being destroyed by the salty sea water. However, it should be emphasised that there are strong indications that it is not due to climate change that the islands are being consumed by the sea. Geological activity and ordinary erosion are thought to be the worst culprits. Nonetheless, Carteret has become synonymous with the development we will see with climate change. The fact that the Carteret islanders probably cannot claim to be the world’s first climate refugees does not change the

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fact that Carteret is just the first of many places where low-lying areas will over the next many years be vacated by the inhabitants because of a drastic change in living conditions. At the moment the island’s population mostly lives off rice which is sent from the mainland, but it will be hard to maintain this arrangement in the long term, among other things because of a shortage of resources. A rehousing project has been launched – but this too lacks funding. The Carteret Islands are just one of many atolls which look set to become uninhabitable as a result of rising sea levels. On the neighbouring Tuvalu Islands, which have been inhabited for 2,000 years and where 12,000 people currently live, sea water bubbles up from the ground and the people look at what is happening on Carteret with concern. When the Maldives, a group of islands in the Indian Ocean, elected a new president in 2008 (Mohamed Nasheed), one of the first things which he implemented was to use a proportion of the income from the islands’ extensive tourism to acquire land elsewhere in the world to which the population can relocate once the rising sea levels make the islands uninhabitable. Generally, it is expected that the number of people who will flee as a result of climate change will rise dramatically. Some estimate as many as 200 million climate refugees in the coming decades. At the moment (2008), the Red Cross estimates the number of so-called environmental refugees to be about 25 million people worldwide. In a country such as Bangladesh, where one in four people live along the coastline, the problem is particularly pressing. Who is responsible for these changes and what does this responsibility entail? What are we expected to do? Ethically, it is not just a question of the responsibility of present generations in relation to other people living at the moment but also about our responsibility in relation to coming generations. How these questions are answered is very significant for the solution models which will be chosen in connection with, for example, the Carteret Islands. Is it the local population living on the islands, but who are not behind the climate change, which must bear the burden and the responsibility? Is it the regional authorities who are failing to allocate sufficient resources to rehousing the people or who are not investing enough in preventive measures? Or should responsibility rather be apportioned according to guilt? Yes, is the response from a local pressure group on Carteret which points to the industrialised countries collectively as being responsible, through the burning of fossil fuels, for impacting the climate and thereby – presumably – causing the sea level to rise. In their view, the countries which are believed to have contributed most to climate change should pay most.

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Finally, responsibility can be allocated according to ability, such that it is the rich countries which can afford to help others that, irrespective of the guilt issue, must lend a hand. The question can also be seen in light of the classic conflict between utilitarianism and deontology, and one could ask whether, other things being equal, we would not get more for our money by helping others and – literally – leaving the inhabitants of the Carteret Islands and other environmental refugees to their own devices. Closer analysis would perhaps show that – again other things being equal – more quality of life can be bought by using the money to prevent climate change in other, less exposed places. Or is this an indecent and unethical approach, as deontological theories would assert? Do we have a duty to help those in need – even though it is not the most efficient thing to do? Consideration for animals: Emperor penguins and polar bears

The emperor penguin (Aptenodytes forsteri), which lives on Antarctica, is the biggest of all the penguin species, and it is already badly affected by global climate change. It is estimated that the population of emperor penguins has been halved in certain areas as increasing sea temperatures have reduced the amount of food, primarily small fish and the special shrimp, krill, which is disappearing as the ice around Antarctica melts. As much as 40 per cent of the sea ice is estimated to have melted compared to 25 years ago. The problem with increasing air and sea temperatures also poses problems on the other side of the world, in the Arctic, where polar bears need the sea ice in order to hunt seals and to get to the Arctic coastal areas where they hibernate. In Canada, the polar bear population has already fallen by 20 per cent, and according to analyses from the US Geological Survey, about two-thirds of the more than 25,000 polar bears in the Arctic areas will disappear by 2050 if the ice continues to melt at the present rate. Do we have an ethical obligation to try and save these animals, both as individuals and as species? And if we do, where does this sense of obligation stem from? According to the anthropocentric view, climate change is only an ethical problem if it directly or indirectly impacts other people negatively – for example by causing the sea level to rise so people are either forced from their homes or are unable to farm their land. The problem is that we do not necessarily experience the harmful climate effects of a given activity (for example burning fossil fuels) at the same time that we perform the activity, but that it might take several generations before the effects become apparent. It raises the question of whether we are ethically obliged to future generations or only to those living now. This discussion has preoccupied

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Emperor penguins occupy a kingdom which is melting away. Antarctica is affected by global warming, and the emperor penguin’s habitat is rapidly changing. Do we have a duty to help them – and if so, why?

ethicists for a long time, but it is now thought that the discussion is being left behind by developments. Because now our actions are not just going to be affecting the lives of far-off generations but actually the lives of our children and grandchildren. The ethical approach implied by, for example, the Brundtland Report’s ideas on sustainability, is to expand the group we need to include in our ethical considerations to also comprise future generations in order to protect their interests. You can then distinguish between different degrees of interest or need. Several people draw a dividing line between basic (e.g. life, food, water, clothing, freedom from intense pain etc.) and peripheral interests (air-conditioning, theatre, expensive food etc.). One of the difficulties, of course, is that we do not agree about the interests which future generations will deem important. But if we assume that they are similar to ours, one interest might be to live in a world where emperor penguins and polar bears are found. It is then possible to argue that future generations would be entitled to live in a world with polar bears and emperor penguins. And that we are therefore indirectly ethically obliged to try and save them.

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If we reject anthropocentrism and look at the sentient perspective, the indirect obligation becomes a direct obligation. If there is insufficient food as a result of climate change, we have a responsibility to step in and rectify the situation. Even if nobody now or in future takes or is going to take an interest in emperor penguins and polar bears. It is worth emphasising that this is about our obligation to individual creatures of a given species, but not the species as such. You could say that a polar bear is interested in not drowning because of the melting ice, and consequently it has a right to not being killed, but the polar bear as a species has no corresponding claim to such consideration. A species has no quality of life or needs. It is only the individual animal which counts in an ethical sense. By enlarging the ethical community from only including humans to also including animals, countless possibilities for conflict arise between different creatures and their interests or needs. How, for example, do we balance a human being’s need for heating or power (and thereby a potential contribution to CO2 emissions) with a given penguin’s need for food? And how do we weigh up whether the polar bear is suffering more than the penguin, or which of two polar bears needs attending to? If we imagine that a penguin is the last member of an endangered species, do we have a greater ethical obligation to that penguin than to the polar bear, which is one of many? And if we distinguish between the two, are we doing so out of consideration for the individual animal, the species as a whole or so that human beings can experience a world in which penguins exist? One final ethical issue which will be mentioned here is that many people hold the view that we should refrain from interfering with the wild natural world. The natural world must be able to develop without human interference. This ideal has now been rendered impossible by the global climate change which will affect all living creatures on the planet. The question is what we should think about this. Should we let the natural world continue to unfold under the new conditions without interfering in any way apart from trying to stabilise the situation, or should we play a far more active role in working to save animals and endangered species, for example through capturing animals and keeping them in zoos, feeding wild animals etc? Again, there are no obvious answers to such questions. The answers depend on our views of the natural world and the values which we bring into the discussion.

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Consideration for other living organisms: Insects and plants

Alpine Blue-sow-thistle (Cicerbita alpina), a tall perennial plant with distinctive blue flowers which grows in alpine meadows above the tree line, has almost disappeared from the British Isles. The plant is found in four places in Scotland where it cannot be reached by grazing animals, but probably too far apart for the individual plants to cross-fertilise. In continental Europe the plant is not endangered – yet. If the current predictions about climate change hold true, this plant will find it even harder to survive. In other words, it is not only people and higher animals that will experience changing conditions. Insects, flowers and trees risk seeing their geographical ranges being significantly limited or changed, and those which cannot adapt to the climate change will die out. A large joint European study has looked at how 1,350 European plant species will manage under seven different climate scenarios. Even in the more moderate scenarios and taking the uncertainty of the models into account, there is the prospect of very significant changes, especially in mountain areas where up to 60 per cent of the species will become extinct before 2080. In low-lying areas, far fewer species will become extinct, but the vegetation will change due to the changing conditions which in turn will lead to a rise in the number of invasive species. There are strong indications that increasing temperatures will result in a dramatic increase in the number of invasive species in, for example, Denmark in the coming years. Insects from the south will expand their territories and, in addition to the problems this may pose for humans in the form of new diseases (malaria etc.), this development will also threaten the insects and plants which already live in our countryside. Thus the habitats of both the Lyme disease-carrying wood tick and the horse chestnut leaf miner have spread because of increasing temperatures. But is this something that affects us ethically? Why can we not just allow plants and insect life to change and then make do with taking the necessary precautions and measures vis-à-vis the new diseases which are coming to our part of the world? This was the answer offered by anthropocentric ethics in connection with the emperor penguins and polar bears – that they mean something to us humans, and that therefore we must try to save them or prevent them from becoming extinct. In other words, we should only concern ourselves with the changed habitats of plants and insects in so far as the changes affect us. As these are animals which are incapable of feeling pain (as far as we know) and plants, sentient ethics will give the same answer – with the postscript that it may also be necessary for the sake of higher animals. However, the biocentric or life-centred ethical theories will have nothing

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to do with such an ethical distinction. Whatever their level of consciousness, all living organisms should be taken into consideration. The philosopher Paul Taylor has been mentioned earlier as an example of a biocentric. Another example is the philosopher and doctor Albert Schweitzer (1875‑1965) who, with his principle of ‘veneration for life’, helped to formulate an ethical perspective where interests are an expression of any type of need which helps to ensure survival and the ability to function, while proponents of sentient ethics define interests more narrowly as needs which, if they remain unfulfilled, are associated with pain or suffering. You can ask whether, from a biocentric perspective, you can defend combating the malarial mosquito or HIV virus if everything living is ethically significant in itself and part of the ethical community. Only a few biocentrics (if any) draw these conclusions, but think that eradicating other forms of life should happen after assessing whether it can be regarded as part of protecting other creatures’ basic needs. The task then is to define what it actually means to respect a plant and when basic needs are at stake. Should all species in principle have an equal right to be here? Yes, believes the Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss (1912‑2009), who is most well known for his work in helping to found the branch of environmental ethics called deep ecology. (Photo: Per Løchen/Scanpix)

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Consideration for the whole: Ecosystems and endangered species

For many people, the focus is not the single individual or a collection of individuals, a population, but the species itself. In May 2008, the US declared, for the first time, a species – the polar bear – threatened due to anthropogenic global warming. And for several species the writing is already on the wall. The golden frog (Bufo periglenes) – a relatively unknown, small brightly shining orange frog only 5 centimetres long – lived in the tropical rainforest in the misty mountains near Monteverde, Costa Rica. In the book In Search of the Golden Frog, an American biologist describes how she was lucky enough to catch sight of the frog which was engaged in a mating ritual: “One of the most incredible sights I have ever seen … they [the frogs] resembled gleaming jewels on the forest floor.” The golden frog was first described as a species only in 1966, but since 2004 the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) has considered it extinct, probably because of global warming. From an ecocentric perspective, it makes no sense to use individual-based ethics to regulate the conditions between human beings and animals and plants. The argument is both practical and theoretical. Practically speaking, you can say that ethics which seeks to benefit or protect the individual instead of communities of individuals, such as ecosystems, at the end of the day does not benefit the individual as the individual is always dependent on the relations in which it lives. Theoretically speaking, you can argue that what is ethically valuable is not the isolated individuals but the contexts and systems which ensure the basis of life for the individuals. In slightly the same way that we intuitively feel that a person has more ethical meaning than his or her finger or arm. There are many versions of ecocentric ethics which each argue that species, landscapes and ecosystems should be included in the ethical community. This can either happen as described above, through a naturalistic

Definition of ‘species’

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The “species” is a fundamental systematic unit within biology and for our daily understanding of the world. Nonetheless, it is not easy to provide an unambiguous definition of the notion. According to the biological species concept, a species is defined by its individuals not normally exchanging genes, i.e. being able to produce fertile offspring, with individuals of other species. However, this definition can be difficult to apply in practice, which is why a number of more genetically defined species concepts exist. Here a species is defined as a genetic relationship.

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understanding of the individual’s relations to and dependence on the bigger contexts, through a religious understanding of nature as being created and coherent (see the chapter by Jakob Wolf ) or through the more psychologically oriented deep ecology introduced earlier in this chapter. What is most interesting in this context is that even though the ecocentric positions are often seen as extreme positions on the periphery of the nature ethics landscape, their approach to the ethical significance of also non-individual magnitudes in nature is met with a degree of sympathy by most people. This sympathy is, among other things, reflected in the broad public support for saving endangered species and threatened ecosystems. This can be observed, in particular, when the possible consequences of climate change are discussed. When, for example, researchers say that the polar bear can adapt to new conditions by eating another type of seal or hunt land animals, it is not a specific individual being referred to but the polar bear species. It is also this species concept which is used in discussions about loss of biodiversity  – i.e. the variation in species  – such as when researchers call attention to the fact that the Mount Graham red squirrel is facing extinction. Likewise, when there is talk of climate change driving plants up the mountainsides, what is being said is that a given species of plants is adapting to its new area of distribution. According to sentientism, species are not entitled to being considered from an ethical point of view as species are not conscious beings. For proponents of a more holistic and ecocentric approach, the ethics are only perfect once the entire natural world  – living and dead  – and not just individual organisms are included in the considerations. A practical point for them is that a complex mix of problems such as global warming calls for a reassessment of our role in the natural world and the environment. What is important is not individual organisms but entities such as species and ecosystems.

5. Responsibility We are now in a situation where our behaviour is suspected of threatening our basis of existence globally. The key to understanding why we have arrived here and to developing sustainable technologies does not just lie in solid scientific and technological research and skills. Prior to and concurrently with conducting the research and developing technologies that can enable us to meet the challenges, it is necessary to clarify the values which have brought us into this situation and which lie behind the various proposals for dealing with it.

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In relation to the questions about values, there are significant controversies and lures beneath the surface. If we are to reverse the current development, it is necessary to formulate these values. It must be clear which value-based considerations lie behind a given decision or practice. The solutions needed must not just be sustainable from an ecological point of view but also in a social sense. Climate change will not be solved simply through quarrelling without knowing exactly what it is we disagree about, and then relying on politicians at various levels to find the solutions. The only way is to make citizens responsible over a broad field so the solutions become joint property and the individual is prepared to follow them as part of a common project and not out of a sense of duty or hardship. Along with the discussions about climate change, there has been a clear trend to cloud the value-based assumptions by subscribing to buzz words such as sustainability, biodiversity and nature preservation. On the face of it these words sound right, and it is hard to imagine anyone thinking that these would be a bad idea. As we have tried to show in this chapter however, such notions are not unambiguous. Agreement about the general concepts often conceals disagreement which only comes to light when you need to decide which is right in practice. In our view, the earlier in the process that these disagreements are submitted for discussion, the more qualified and democratically rooted the decisions. Of greatest importance is that all parties in the debate acknowledge that the range of attitudes is as broad as outlined here. Even though contradictory ethical attitudes are found in our culture, it is not impossible that solutions exist which will be broadly accepted. However, a precondition is that a discussion takes place where all parties feel that their positions and interests will be taken seriously. Not everyone can get their way, but in a democracy it is important that everyone is able to speak. We can discuss who is responsible for the situation we are in, where anthropogenic global change threatens our existence. We can discuss which views of nature and which values should underpin our decisions in the coming years where together we must seek to solve one of the biggest challenges which mankind has faced. But we cannot discuss whether we, as which in this article are called ethical agents, have a responsibility to contribute to solving this situation in one way or another. We cannot avoid committing ourselves, and to acting in ways which at the end of the day reflect our ethical values. From an ethical point of view, this is the price of responsibility.

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References Adger WN, Paavola J, Huq S & Mace MJ (2005): Fairness in Adaptation to Climate Change. MIT Press. Crump M (1998): In search of the golden frog. University of Chicago Press. Garvey J (2008): The ethics of climate change. Right and wrong in a warming world. Continuum. Jardin J Des (2000): An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy. Wadsworth Publishing. Løgstrup KE (1997): The Ethical Demand. University of Notre Dame Press. Northcott MS (2007): A moral climate. The ethics of global warming. Darton, Longman and Todd. Næss A (1989): Ecology, Community and Life-style: Outline of an Ecosophy. Cambridge University Press. Stern N (2006): The Economics of Climate Change. The Stern Review. Cambridge University Press. Taylor PW (1986): Respect for Nature. A Theory of Environmental Ethics. Princeton University Press. Thuiller W, Lavorel S, Araújo MB, Sykes MT & Prentice IC (2005): Climate change threats to plant diversity in Europe. PNAS, Vol. 102, no. 23 8245‑8250. World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED) 1987. Our common future. Oxford University Press, New York.

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A religious perspective on climate change Jakob Wolf

1. Intro The link between religion and climate change was spectacularly introduced in the Danish debate when a Danish Lutheran Church bishop declared that he saw a link between climate change and the Day of Judgement. Climate change could be a sign of the impending End of the World. Melting glaciers and floods out of control are vivid images of disintegration and disaster. According to the New Testament, the Day of Judgement will be preceded by heavy storms and floods. The bishop was immediately rebuked by a number of theologians who pointed out that the climate change which we see today is, at least partially, triggered by human activity, while the Day of Judgement is an act of God. Moreover, you cannot simply translate the Biblical world picture to our context. In the New Testament, the Day of Judgement and the signs of it are mythological descriptions which require demythologisation to become relevant to our lives today. The bishop replied to such criticism by saying that of course neither he nor anybody else knows the day and time, but that he was simply using climate change to draw attention to the significance of the Day of Judgement to the Christian faith. We cannot prove that climate change is a sign that the Day of Judgement is near, but on the other hand, we cannot disprove it, just in the same way that many other natural disasters may also be signs. In the USA, conservative Christian movements have been advocating the same message – that climate change is a sign that the Day of Judgment is imminent. The significance of such an ecological disaster is that one must spread the Christian message even faster than before as time is scarce. However, this view is by no means shared by all Christian movements, nor by all conservative circles. Of course, what is most worrying about this view is that it encourages us to take no action to mitigate climate change, which is what we should be doing if climate change is indeed anthropogenic. Some people refer to the fact that according to the Bible, the Earth is only on loan from God, which means that Man is obliged to look after it as

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God’s creation and treat it responsibly. And they refer to the commandment of charity “You shall love your neighbour as yourself ”, which is found in the Bible in various versions. If we take no action in the face of the climate problem, we increase the harm done to our global neighbours. The world’s poor will suffer as they do not have the means to ward off the consequences. At the same time, they are the least to blame for the problem. It is the rich nations, such as the USA and Western Europe, which have a special moral obligation to act. This discussion shows that the religious perspective on climate change is by no means straightforward. There are lots of religious perspectives on climate change, just as there are many faiths and many different views within the various faiths. This article will focus on the question of whether there is a religious perspective which could contribute to combating climate change, and what form such a contribution may take. What the article offers is thus only one of many possible perspectives. This perspective is inspired by the European Christian tradition, but is fundamentally inter-religious and not specifically Christian. It is interesting to note that the UN has addressed the ethical dimensions of climate change and has published a ‘White Paper on the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change’. And perhaps even more interestingly the UN has also launched an initiative involving the faiths in the fight against climate change. Excepting the collaboration which has always existed between UNICEF and the faiths, this is the first time that this is happening on a larger scale. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) and the Alliance of Religions and Conservation (ARC), which is a secular institution helping the big world religions to develop their own environmental programmes based on their creeds, core doctrines and practices, will be heading the initiative, which will be presenting a seven-year plan of action at the beginning of 2009. The programme involves major traditions within eleven of the big world religions: Baha’ism, Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Islam, Jainism, Judaism, Shinto, Sikhism and Taoism. It would appear that the global community is realising that working together on political, economic and technological problems is not enough; more fundamental problems such as a common human ethical set of values must be addressed if more sustainable solutions are to be devised. In explaining its reasons for collaborating with the religious faiths, the UN cites a number of both practical and more theoretical reasons. One of the practical reasons is that the faiths are major land owners. They own more than 7 per cent of the habitable land surface of the planet. The faiths together make up one of the largest investing groups in the world. They

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are major providers of education and health care worldwide. They have vast media networks. The great faiths have astonishing outreach. However, even more interesting are the theoretical, philosophical reasons why the UNDP attaches importance to collaborating with the faiths. Under the heading: ‘Myth, metaphor and memory’, it is stated in item 5: The emphasis on consumption, economics and policy usually fails to engage people at any deep level because it does not address the narrative, the mythological, the metaphorical or the existence of memories of past disasters and the ways out. The faiths are the holders of these areas and without them, policies will have very few real roots. People need to understand why certain archetypes, myths and stories work and others do not. The “climate change activist” world and indeed the environmental world has all too often sought refuge in random use of apocalyptical imagery without seeking to harness the power of narrative. Without narrative, few people are ever moved to change or adapt. The faiths have been masters of this for centuries.  (ARC, 2007)

So according to this statement, the faiths are – by virtue of their stories, myths, metaphors and images – able to engage people at a far deeper level than politics and economics. Under another heading, ‘Celebration’, it is stated: Climate change and environment issues are often presented as scary, or at least doom-ridden and gloomy. Yet human psychology does not work well when only told how bad we are. The need to celebrate in order to appreciate better why we need to care for our planet, is something the faiths understand well and can help the often over-earnest secular groups to appreciate. Understanding the cyclical nature of festivals and lives also assists in helping build a profound environmental awareness into yearly rituals. We can want to protect the world because it is beautiful, not simply because it is useful – and with that as our value, we might perhaps protect it better.  (ARC, 2007)

So, the secular environmental activists usually only manage to appeal to our bad conscience, threatening the End of the World if we do not act. The faiths, with their ritual celebrations of the beauty and generosity of Creation, on the other hand, are able to contribute a much more positive reason for looking after our planet. Reference is generally made to the fact that the faiths often advocate simple and sustainable living and

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thousand-year-old values which go hand in hand with environmentally friendly and pro-ethical lifestyles.

2. Ethics and religion There is hardly any doubt that if the religions are to play a positive and productive role in the fight against anthropogenic climate change, the UNDP is on the right track. Incidentally, in this article it is assumed that the UN is right in saying that climate change is man-made even though the technical discussion of this has not been concluded. In continuation of the points made by the UNDP, this article is trying to suggest specific contributions which the faiths may, on more philosophical grounds, be able to make to the fight against global warming. Again, this is only one suggestion; there are undoubtedly many others. It is, of course, also a problem talking about the faiths as if they were all the same. The faiths are undeniably very different. However, the aim of this article is to try to answer the question of what religion could contribute to the fight against the fateful climate change. Here, a number of religious metaphors are brought to life which are common to many, perhaps even all faiths. Because even though the faiths are different, they also contain a number of common elements. It makes sense to talk about universal religious beliefs. The idea is not to smooth out the differences between the faiths, but to point out something commonly religious which relates to something universally human. It is noteworthy that religious groupings which for centuries have disagreed on central faith-related questions are now agreeing on the climate issue and sending out joint declarations. For example, the Pope and the Patriarch of Constantinople are currently speaking out in considerable agreement on the climate issue despite the fact that the Roman-Catholic Church and the Greek-Orthodox Church have for more than 800 years brought about division and disagreement within the Christian faith. There are many other perspectives and aspects to the faiths than the ones mentioned here, but they are not of immediate relevance to this article. Generally speaking, the contribution which the faiths can make is about the motivation to do something about climate change. The faiths cannot contribute technical, economic or specifically political solutions. But the question of motivation is also important as there is general agreement that the only thing we need to do something about climate change is the will to do it. We do not need more technical inventions, and we do not need to wait for more innovation. We have all the tools we need, what we need now is the will.

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Perhaps the solution to climate change is not primarily to be found in the belief in technological development. (Drawing by Nicholson from The Australian, www.nicholsoncartoons.com.au)

The specific contribution from the faiths could follow from the ethical implications of anthropogenic climate change. If climate change is manmade, then we are ethically responsible. If our emissions of greenhouse gases, and especially CO2, constitute the main factor behind the current global warming, we also have the power to decide how much warming should be tolerated, and thereby we are the ones who decide which human communities and animal species should live and which should perish. It is also our responsibility to divide the right to emit CO2 into our shared atmosphere. Should we maintain the blatantly unjust distribution of rights which we see today, where the rich industrialised countries emit relatively more CO2 per capita than the poor countries, which  – and this is welldocumented – suffer most of the damage from global warming? Richness is accumulated in the rich countries while the damage and the risk grow in the poor countries and in the vulnerable natural world. The ethical dimensions of climate change are addressed elsewhere and will not be repeated here. The question which one should ask oneself in this context is: What is the relationship between ethics and religion? What is the relationship between moral norms and obligations and the faiths’ talk of divinity and holiness? It is clear that religion involves ethics. The faiths include considerations and discussions about the basis of ethics in the form of practical ethical

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instruction. Some of the most fundamental ethical principles stem from the faiths. For example, the golden rule ‘Do unto others as you would have them do unto you’ and the commandment of charity ‘You shall love your neighbour as yourself ’ are found in several faiths. The following five commandments are found in all the big world religions: 1) You shall not kill. 2) You shall not lie. 3) You shall not steal. 4) You shall not act immorally. 5) You shall honour parents and love children. The faiths also share a number of other ethical norms, so they can to a great extent contribute to the discussion of the ethical dimension of climate change. The religious perspective and the ethical perspective overlap. Often contributions from the faiths are perceived as ethical contributions. Religious leaders from all the big faiths, from the Patriarch of Constantinople to the Dalai Lama and the Pope, have already impressed upon us our responsibility for the planet in the face of global warming. The religious leaders first and foremost appeal to our ethical sense of responsibility, and so in this respect their rhetoric does not differ much from that of secular political leaders. The faiths are seen as a moral resource which can contribute to stressing our responsibilities and to ethical and moral rearmament. They can both awaken our ethical consciousness and identify specific moral obligations. They can, with some weight, for example based on the commandment of charity, which is common to all faiths, claim that it is our duty to look after the planet and its diversity of life because the planet has now become our neighbour as our power over the natural world is now such that the fate of the planet is in our hands. Figuratively speaking, the planet has a temperature and is suffering, and it is in our power to cure this illness. This function is, of course, extremely important, but here we want to focus on the fact that religion is about much more than ethics. What specifically can the religious perspective contribute over and above the ethical? It is actually important that what the faiths contribute is

Inter-religious focus on the Arctic regions

Box 1

In September 2007, the symposium The Arctic: Mirror of Life was held at the fastmelting Sermeq Kujalleq glacier near Ilulissat in Greenland. It was a meeting of religious leaders from all over the world which attracted representatives of Islam, Judaism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Sikhism as well as Inuits and Sami. Patron of the symposium was the head of the Greek-Orthodox church, the Patriarch of Constantinople, and the Pope sent his greetings and promised to support the initiative.

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not reduced to a proclamation about our ethical responsibilities as we will soon get enough of such moral admonishings. Religion can do something which ethics cannot. Ethics can point out what is our duty. From a particular ethical perspective it is, for example, our duty to act responsibly in the face of climate change because it is our duty not to harm other people or the natural world, but to look after them in so far as it is in our power to do so. However, ethics has difficulties presenting the reasons why we must do our duty. Why should we be good and think of others and not be selfish and think only of ourselves? Some people would say that we must act ethically because that is most expedient. However, on the face of it, it is not most expedient for the rich countries to show consideration for the poor. The rich countries can amass even greater riches by exploiting the poor which must bear the brunt of all the consequences of climate change. One could say then that it is most expedient for us all if the rich countries show consideration for the poor, but this simply raises the question once again: Why should we act in a manner which is most expedient for us all? If something is ethical because it is expedient, is one not in the end saying that it is ethical because it is for one’s own benefit? That is, it is ethical because it is selfish, and is that not self-contradictory? Is what is truly ethical about an ethical deed not the fact that one does not act out of self-interest, but out of consideration for another human being? In brief, based on a particular understanding of ethics, it is a very big question whether ethics can be explained rationally. Our ethical deliberations seem to assume that we must be good rather than explaining why this is so. That we must be good seems, in an unfounded way, to be part and parcel of our existence in the same way that other people, animals and birds and trees and flowers are part of our existence. The question is whether the Polish-English sociologist Zygmunt Bauman is not right when claiming that it is a mystery how we can be plagued by the thought that we do not care about others even though we list to ourselves plenty of grounds why we quite rightly do not need to care about others. Ethics is a pre-rational fact, which is something other than an irrational fact. This is where religious reflection can go further than ethics and provide a pre-rational explanation. Some religions answer that love is the reason. The reason why we must love each other is that God loves us. The world has been created so that it is full of love, and therefore we must love each other. The created love in which we live and which embraces us is the basis of ethics. It is generally important to point out that there are other reasons for doing what is good than the duty suggested by ethics. As the Danish

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theologian K.E. Løgstrup pointed out, love does what is good without being bound by duty to do so. There is a spontaneous goodness within us which has many faces. When parents look after their children, they do so not out of duty, but freely and easily. When good friends help each other, they do not do so out of duty, but willingly. And it must be added that in love you often do much more than one could ever be expected to out of duty. Parents can sacrifice everything for their children, and friends can be unreasonably generous to each other. According to religious reflection, the good deed is the deed done out of love. If a deed is done out of duty, then it is not done out of consideration for another person, but out of duty, which is not optimal from an ethical point of view as ethics demands that we act out of consideration for the other person. Only in love do we act exclusively out of consideration for the other person. The deed done out of duty is in reality a replacement deed for the deed done freely and out of love. If we all lived in love for one another, like children and parents, lovers and friends, then there would be no need for the duty of ethics because then we would all be looking after each other freely and happily and fulfilling the ethical requirement of being good without being bound by duty to be so. The problem is that we often do not fulfil the ethical requirements, and then duty must be brought into play as a replacement for love. Duty must make up for the lack of love. Duty is inferior to love, but better than indifference. As a society, we have to institutionalise duty to maintain an acceptable level of ethics. The health service and the tax system are examples of the institutionalisation of duty. The institutions make us help those who are ill and weak, even though we might not care about them. Duty is necessary to contain selfishness and curb cynicism. Ethics is restricted to pointing out our responsibilities and duties. That is, it can only motivate us to act through moral coercion and moral threats. Its point of departure is that we are lacking in will to do what is good; ethics must force out the good in us. This is, of course, also necessary, but this is where ethics is restricted. As a perspective, it is blind to the fact that, potentially and actually, we also contain an unforced will to do what is good in the form of potential and actual love. In the religious perspective, Man’s lack of will to do what is good is interpreted as sin. The lack of will to do what is good arises because Man does not realise that the world is created by love and for love. Man believes that the world is simply a means to fulfilling his own needs. According to the religious interpretation, ethics are necessary because of sin, i.e. from this angle the ethical view of human nature is that humans are sinners. The religious view of human nature is much wider.

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Man is not only a sinner, he is first and foremost created in God’s image, and that means created by and for love. Religion is thereby not limited to using moral coercion and moral threats when motivating us to do what is good. It can also appeal to our love resources. Human beings are not simply selfish beings, but also beings who are or can be ruled by a need to care. This is not an idyllic description or a description of how it should be. This is a description of how life actually unfolds. I think most people will recognise a description of humans as beings who can also be seized by a will to do what is good. Religion can help nurture this side of our potential as humans, which ethics cannot. Religion nurtures it through its view of human nature and the world. Religion sees humans as being created in God’s image and the world and its creatures as having been created to be loved and looked after. This fundamental vision in itself contributes to coaxing out our love potential because our fundamental views of something deeply influence our attitudes. What determines our actions is to a much larger extent our fundamental vision of ourselves and the world than our subjective choices which are controlled by the vision. If we fundamentally see the natural world as being made up of accidental, impersonal material which exists basically as a means to fulfilling our needs, then we will treat the natural world as such. We must be careful how we interpret the world, because that is how it will become, given all the power which we as human beings possess today. The faiths consolidate their visions in people by means of myths and rituals and metaphors, images and dogmas and confessions. For example, religious services to a very large extent consist in songs of praise. We sing the praises of God and thereby also the praises of all creatures created by God. The songs of praise and the eulogy emphasise that the universe and the natural world and its creatures are valuable in themselves. Not only do they have the value which we assign to them; they are valuable in themselves because they have value by virtue of God. Many faiths never tire of praising what is, from the biggest to the smallest, from the smallest blade of grass to the elements themselves, everything is magnificent and worthy of praise in itself, regardless of its utility value. The faiths are incredibly insistent in their songs of praise. In the psalms and rituals, the variations of the praise seem endless. The Great Spirit loves variety, as it is said in Indian religions. The natural world is multitudinous, filled with individual variation. There is not just one species of boll weevils, there is the leaf weevil, the apple blossom weevil, the pine weevil, the figwort weevil etc. For the faiths, the diversity of life is proof that the power of being’s relationship with what is is love, because love is always love of the

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individual, of letting the other unfold in its individual variation, of living and letting live. The religious interpretation can thus contribute a deeper and more far-reaching motivation to fighting climate change than ethics because it can motivate via elated, positive feelings such as love, respect, affection and experiences of beauty. Motivation and commitment based on positive, elated feelings are far more effective than involvement based on negative feelings. The motivation of parents to look after their children is infinitely deeper than their motivation to pay tax. We are happy to forgo and make sacrifices for our children, but we become embittered and self-righteous if the tax authorities make us pay too much. We pay our taxes out of duty. The more we love the earth, the more deeply we appreciate its wonders and glories, the readier we will be to sacrifice for it. One cares for what one loves … One does not need majestic mountains to gain this appreciation – a mundane occurrence such as learning that there are over eight hundred species of tarantulas will evoke awe in most of us!  (McFague, 2008: 116)

Religion can – at best – inspire love of the planet and its inhabitants as a reason for fighting harmful climate change. Love is a far deeper motivating force than duty because it focuses on the giving, while duty is focused on deprivation and sacrifice. Psychologically, it is much easier to make people do something if you focus on the giving and not on the deprivation. If duty stands alone, it not only becomes a laborious toil, we simply drown in it. It drains our mental reserves. In the long run, we are enervated by duty and become loveless and burnt-out. There is something scary about people who are governed purely by a strong sense of duty. Duty must be supplemented with love or the other way around, otherwise it overwhelms us. If we only encounter ethical threats, then we choke on them and perhaps finally give up completely in the face of the unbearable demands of duty. The problem with ethics is also that they give rise to feelings of guilt, but that they cannot deal with this guilt. When people in the rich world are faced with their obligations in relation to the poor world and the future of the planet, they will not be able to fulfil these obligations, and they must invariably feel guilty. No ethical person can live in the rich world without feeling guilty, but ethics have nothing to offer when it comes to dealing with such guilt. They can only instil it and make it grow. The consistent accumulation of feelings of guilt is psychologically very unhealthy. We can end up breaking down under such pressure. One way of surviving is to reject the

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whole ethical project as hysterical. We give up on ethics and become cold and cynical. It won’t help anyway! Here too, ethics can be supplemented with religion because the religious vision offers metaphors for forgiveness, atonement and restoration of the suffering of the victims. Religion offers a possibility for upholding the entire – perhaps insurmountable – ethical project without being destroyed by it. Ethics do not fundamentally change people. Love does, and it comes with deep, unremitting and generous commitment. In so far as cosmic love is the central theme for the faiths, they can commit people more deeply and more unremittingly to caring for the planet than ethics can. The faiths offer a supplement to ethics, whereby they provide the potential for reflection on the two huge problems thrown up by ethics, i.e. the explanation problem and the guilt problem. Ethics is placed in a larger framework, where it is seen as love’s servant. Duty cannot do without love as its basis, but it should also be added that love cannot do without duty. Some faiths take a double view of humans, containing both aspects, as they do not simply see humans as being created in God’s image, but also as sinners. The faiths can contribute a religious vision which embraces and supports ethics. The faiths generally put us into a much greater context, both temporally and cosmically, than the political debate, which often does not see beyond the next election. They offer a hope of restoration which makes it possible to bear disappointments and setbacks without giving up. In this account of the relationship between ethics and religion, it is important to stress that religion is not a necessary prerequisite for ethics. It is not an indisputably deduced conclusion based on given premises like a mathematical proof, but only one possible interpretation of given experiences. The religious interpretation is only a possible solution to the problems relating to ethics. There may be other solutions. And finally, one could, of course, choose to leave the problems raised by ethics unresolved. There are no demonstrable solutions to them. The religious interpretation is therefore simply just a reasoned interpretation, which one can choose or not, and not proof. Taking the religious interpretation as being true partly involves a personal choice. On the other hand, the religious interpretation does not simply reflect an arbitrary, subjective choice. There are many universal human experiences to which reference can be made when arguing in favour of the truth of the religious interpretation. It is a reasoned interpretation.

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3. Religion and view of the world The religious perspective can also contribute to the fight against global warming by providing an ethical view of the world. In our modern, secularised world, the relationship between world view and ethics is a problematic one. The trouble is that natural science has been elevated to the status of world view. The scientific description of the natural world and the universe virtually has a monopoly on telling us what the natural world and the universe basically are. Natural science is not simply seen as a particular method for investigating the phenomena of the natural world and the universe. It is seen as a view of the world or ontology, i.e. a doctrine about the real world. Natural science is not simply seen as one perspective among others, but as the only true perspective which one can and should apply to the world. This is what is called scientism, and it exercises a very strong ideological power in the modern world (Stenmark 2001). The problem with scientism in relation to ethics is that a scientific view of the world works against ethics. If we adopt natural science as our view of the world, ethics loses its basis in reality; in fact, the question is whether the scientistic view of the world does not, in reality, cancel out ethics, turning ethics into an illusion. Ethics becomes homeless in the world. According to the natural scientific world picture, the universe and the natural world are basically made up of random, nonconscious, dead material which is controlled by mechanical, nonconscious laws and accidental occurrences. But we have no ethical obligations towards random, nonconscious, impersonal material. We can do with it exactly what we want. In this view, the Earth with its multitudinous forms of life cannot be seen as our neighbour for whom we are responsible. Ethical reasoning is a problem for such a world view. The question is which world view can be used as a basis for ethics? As mentioned before, the religious world view can, for example, as it is a characteristic of the religious world view that all living things are seen as being part of the cosmic community. All things are seen as being related to each other and mutually dependent. The Buddhist Thich Nhat Hahn writes: When we look at a chair, we see the wood, but we fail to observe the tree, the forest, the carpenter, or our own mind. When we meditate on it, we can see the entire universe in all its interwoven and interdependent relations in the chair. The presence of the wood reveals the presence of the tree. The presence of the leaf reveals the presence of the sun. The presence of the apple

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blossoms reveals the presence of the apple… The chair is not separate. It exists only in its interdependent relations with everything in the universe. It is because all other things are.  (Quoted from McFague, 2008: 51)

According to the religious world view we are all members of a community and related to one another. We are all created and bound together by Creation, as expressed by the big creational religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam. We live vulnerably in the hands of each other. Children are handed to their parents, parents are handed to other people, people are handed to the natural world and the planet, which in return is handed to people. Everything is handed to everything and thereby bound in a common destiny. Everything affects everything and everyone who can have a responsibility therefore have one. Some may ask whether this interdependence of which the faiths are speaking is not described in the natural scientific discipline, ecology. Today, we have an exact natural scientific discipline which much better and much more accurately and rationally describes what the faiths are talking about The connectedness of everything is an important religious theme. From sun to life to apple blossom to apple to sensing and taste. We are closely connected with the world of which we are a part.

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in a more vague and imprecise way. Natural science must replace religion. But if we replace the religious ecological world view with the natural scientific ecological world view, then we again run into problems with ethics. The natural scientific ecology describes the natural world as made up of mechanical, impersonal systems. The ecological aspects of the natural world are described in terms such as ‘food chains’, ‘biomass’, ‘energy flows’ etc., phenomena with which we cannot relate ethically. When the religious ecological world view sees life as a woven blanket and humans as a thread in it, then it is not an interrelated system of impersonal material, but the beauty of life which evokes wonder, admiration, awe and love of our common destiny and its individual members. When, today, there is general agreement that we must take an ecological approach to the world, the question is whether this ecological world view is not, in effect, a modern universal religious world view as it amounts to a comprehensive ethical view, which is exactly what characterises a religious interpretation of the world. The religious interpretation is determined by being an interpretation of the world which sees the world as a whole, and by being an interpretation which contains some element of action orientation. We cannot proceed from the natural scientific ecology to what we understand by taking an ecological approach to the world. Natural science involves no action orientation. Natural science only says how something is, and not how it ought be. The ecological approach has a universal religious foundation, whether we perceive ourselves as religious or not. Our natural scientific ecology can, at best, contribute to our ecological knowledge; it cannot create an ecological attitude. The universal religious world view is rooted in our pre-scientific experience. Before taking a natural scientific view of humans and animals and plants, we see them as living, vulnerable creatures which are valuable in themselves, and good reasons must be given if we are to interfere with them. Nobody must destroy humans or animal and plant species without good reason. This view is articulated in the common natural languages and in art based on immediate sensations and experience. Thus, the religious interpretation  – that the natural world and its creatures are created  – is not without a basis of experience. Since the early twentieth century, the phenomenological philosophy has delivered an in-depth defence of the validity of pre-scientific cognition. Here, wide-ranging arguments are found in favour of pre-scientific cognitions being cognitions in their own right. They are neither precursors of a more precise natural scientific cognition or illusions. The pre-scientific cognition is a comprehensive cognition which is more fundamental for our cognition of the world than

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the particular regional perspective of natural science. It is possible that the religious interpretation can contribute a world view which, at the same time, consolidates ethics in an ontology and leaves room for natural science so that it can be a servant to ethics and not its opponent. The natural scientific knowledge and the natural scientific technologies can be a servant to ethics if they are not elevated to being a world view. As stated earlier, the way in which we fundamentally see the world is of decisive importance because our world view determines our attitude to what we see. If we see something as worthless and if we are convinced that it is basically of a random nature, then we will, of course, end up treating it as worthless. The natural scientific view of the world cannot explain the ethical project, and it cannot provide us with the meaning of life. It is a void which the religious interpretation of life may contribute to filling. The natural scientific world picture almost automatically assumes the role of world view because there is no alternative even though it looks as if the natural scientific world picture falls short of being able to play the role of world view and provide a philosophy of life. But surely modern, democratic societies cannot adopt a religious world view? No, we cannot elevate a specific faith to providing the horizon for society’s world view, but the question is whether a universal religious philosophy of creation which builds on universally human experience and not a specific belief in particular revelations, cannot provide a horizon for society’s world view? For example, it may be worth discussing whether the UN’s Declaration of Human Rights, which is based on the assumption that every human being has unconditional value in itself, is not based on a creational philosophy. Some would say that unconditional value is something we confer on ourselves, and it is, of course, right that it is something which we as a society decide. But the question is whether it is a random decision. Could we just as well decide that only white males have unconditional value? If it is not a random decision, then the question is what is forcing us, and that is a question which is open to interpretation based on a philosophy of creation. The same applies to the UN’s ‘Earth Charter’ from the year 2000, the first principle of which is: ‘Respect Earth and life in all its diversity.’ How does one explain such a principle? There can be no doubt that a universally religious explanation is one possibility. But is a world view not something individual, private? A society does not have and should not have a world view. However, the question is whether all social orders and all political ideologies do not imply a world view which is open to discussion. No society can exist without common laws. But do common laws not imply a minimum of common ethics, and do ethics not

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imply a minimum of common world view? Claiming that rights are simply something which we confer on ourselves and the natural world also amounts to a world view, i.e. the world view that humans alone can confer value. Does a humanistic liberal ideology, a socialist ideology, a Nazi or communist ideology not actually contain a philosophy about humans and the world? It is obvious that the social order of some near-Eastern countries implies an Islamic philosophy of humans and the world. If it is true that human rights (and nature’s rights) are open to interpretation based on creational philosophy, then perhaps all social orders based on human rights imply a philosophy of creation world view. You can, of course, elect not to explicate this implicit philosophy, but that will not make it go away. Fundamental questions do not disappear by not addressing them, as some people seem to think. Again, all this does not mean that we must necessarily adopt the philosophy of creation interpretation. It is only one possibility. We can, for example, stop at observing that human rights (and nature’s rights) are random, and leave it at that. There is no proof that this means that their unconditional significance stems from a power of being. Some may object that you cannot use religious arguments in a modern, secular society. That depends what you mean by religious arguments. You cannot argue using arguments based on belief and special revelations, but you can argue using universal religious arguments based on universal human experience and reflections as they are of a philosophical nature. Regardless of beliefs and convictions, everybody can take a stand because they cite universal experience which everybody can judge. It is debatable whether a universal religious world view is better than a scientistic, a secularist, a Nazi, a humanistic etc. world view. It is not all elements from the historical religions as such which can contribute to a modern, democratic society’s fight against global warming. Religious elements which are suppressive to women, which do not respect human rights, which are against freedom of speech and the freedom of the press, which go against democratic principles of law etc. are useless. The contribution from the faiths requires a non-fundamentalist, non-dogmatic understanding of religion. It assumes that you must understand the faiths as interpretations of the holy, the untouchable, sacrosanct, the divine. These interpretations are not bound to the world picture or social order which was prevalent at the time at which the faith was formulated in writing. At the core of religious faith is not a belief in a particular world picture or a particular historical social order, but a belief in that which must not be outraged, the holy and the divine. What is at the core of religion can and must therefore be expressed on different historical and social terms than the original. The

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core content of the faiths can and must today be formulated on the terms of our modern, democratic society. The religious interpretation can, if adopted, explain ethics and endow our lives with meaning and meaningful goals for our actions. Deep convictions about meaning and meaningfulness are the best and most durable motivation for ethical commitment there are. Politics, economics and the state’s regulations of the market and the curbing of individual and group interests are necessary means to creating the fabric of an ethically sound society and to protecting the diversity of life on the planet, but they are only means and can never be ends in themselves.

4. Religion and politics Many would probably say that the fight against climate change is a political issue we should not mix up with religion. This is both right and wrong. There are two levels to politics. One level concerns the political strategies which we need to solve society’s problems. Should top-rate tax be abolished or not, should Denmark launch itself into another huge bridge-building project or not? In this context, politics divides us. We disagree wildly on the question of which political ideologies and strategies would create the best society for all. At that level, politics and religions should not be mixed up. A specific political solution can only be explained pragmatically and never religiously. For example, it is hugely unacceptable calling the Iraq war a ‘crusade against evil’, as President Bush did, instead of explaining it as an act of self-defence. If we mix politics and religion at this level, the religious contribution invariably becomes fanatical and self-righteous. Religion should not monopolise solutions to problems. It should not divide us in the face of a shared problem. The other level is the level which concerns society’s common core values and objectives. Here, politics is about what we have in common. The abolition of slavery, the fights against poverty and disease etc. are fundamental political objectives which unite us, and to which the fight against climate change has now been added. There are no serious political parties which, in their political programme, call for the reintroduction of slavery or an end to the fight for social justice and welfare and the battle against disease. Often this level of politics is forgotten, the level which does not divide us, but which unites us, because we are hypnotised by the daily political dogfight and the entertaining mudslinging, but it is very important to pay attention to it. No society can survive without a minimum of core values and objectives. At this level, mixing religion and politics does not create

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such huge problems because here religion and politics are about what we have in common. However, the risk is that religion is reduced to simplified messages, which are what politics is largely made up of, and thereby the religious contribution to the debate becomes banal and uninteresting. The strongest cohesiveness in a society stems from the fact that, behind all differences, common objectives exist with which everybody can identify and feel a sense of solidarity. One can say that the common objective which for the past few centuries, and despite all disagreements, has united the political endeavours of the developed countries is the fight against hunger and poverty. This objective has now largely been fulfilled, at least in the western world. We therefore need a new overall objective behind which to unite. Perhaps we should have even more consumer goods and even more luxury? Luxury is not a sustainable objective for society. It is not worthy. Particularly not when you give thought to the fact that the luxury is achieved at the expense of the poor countries, the natural world and the elements. The ethical failing is obvious. We cannot identify with a society whose objectives are consumerism and luxury; it would simply disintegrate. Where a shared worthy objective should be, there is only a void. Here, the ethical-religious vision can provide a worthy overall objective which could unite our joint endeavours, i.e. the objective of working to protect the diversity and beauty of the planet. Religion can contribute the vision which is necessary to lay down and explain such a new, sustainable objective which could give, in particular, the rich countries back their dignity. But can we ever agree on a common objective? It is not completely out of the question. For example, it looks as if we could agree on fighting hunger and poverty, so why should we not be able to agree on a new elementary objective: Not to ruin the admirable planet on which we live. We cannot agree on objectives which we ourselves make up and choose, but perhaps we can agree on objectives which are so elementary that we do not choose them, but they choose us. They are presenting themselves of their own accord and in such a pressing manner that it is hard not to identify with them. References Alliance of Religion and Conservation (ARC) (2007): UN and ARC launch programme with faiths on climate change. Alliance of Religion and Conservation (ARC). http:// www.arcworld.org/news.asp?pageID=207 Brown D, Tuana N, Averill M, Baer P, Brandão R, Frodeman R, Hogenhuis C, Heyd T, Lemons J, McKinstry R, Müller M, Miguez J, Munasinghe M, de Araujo M, Nobre C, Ott K, Paavola J, de Campos C, Rosales L, Rose A, Wells E & Westra L (2004):

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White Paper on the Ethical Dimensions of Climate Change. Rock Ethics Institute. Penn State University. Garvey J (2008): The Ethics of Climate Change. Right and Wrong in a Warming World. Continuum. Jensen O (1986): Unter dem Zwang des Wachstums: Ökologie und Religion. Chr. Kaiser. Løgstrup KE (2007): Beyond the Ethical Demand. Introduction by Kees Van Kooten Niekerk. University of Notre Dame Press. McFague S (2008): A New Climate for Theology: God, the World, and Global Warming. Fortress Press. Stenmark M (2001): Scientism: Science, Ethics, and Religion. Aldershot.

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The climate debate’s debating climate Polarisation of the public debate on climate change Git t e Me y er & Ank er Br ink Lund

1. Intro “Imagine if a scientist won the Nobel Prize in 25 years’ time, proving that CO2 does not affect the climate at all. Would that in any way imply that our efforts to reduce fossil fuel consumption and our battle against pollution then had been a waste of time? Why can’t we just behave properly?” This was one of the final comments made by a member of the scientific panel at a public meeting in Copenhagen in spring 2008. The meeting was about anthropogenic climate change. The comment was a response to a question about the uncertainty of climate models, and it was expanded with calls to drink tap water instead of bottled water and to drink soft drinks out of recyclable bottles rather than from plastic cups. It was followed by applause from the hundred-strong audience in the hall. And it raises a number of big and difficult questions: Is the climate debate a scientific or a political debate? Or is it a moral debate? Why have scientific data and models been so central in the debate if they are not central to the substance of the issue? And what is actually the substance of the issue? In this chapter we will take a look at the public climate debate – and not least the discussion about the debate – as an example of a societal discussion or discourse where science plays an important and very complex role. We will scrutinize a small selection of texts from the vast debate, texts that in different ways are suitable for illustrating problems in the debate. The purpose is to provide food for thought on how professionals – scientific researchers or administrators with a background in the natural sciences – can act appropriately in such debates and participate in them in a sensible way. There are no definite answers as to what it means to act appropriately or sensibly. And there are no recipes for how to do it. It requires ongoing

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judgement depending on the situation. What we must do is think. This may be facilitated by the use of real-life examples, by drawing on insights from the history of ideas and by the formulation of thought-provoking questions. We will endeavour to do this in the following pages.

2. A fragile model Amongst the members of the Danish public who attended the above meeting in Copenhagen, there seemed to be general support for the view that the climate debate is actually not about science. Put bluntly, this view can be worded as follows: Science or not – doing the right thing can’t do any harm. And we know what the right thing is; we are well aware of our moral obligations vis-à-vis the environment, and we know that bad things will happen if we are not careful. We know that our patterns of production and consumption – of energy and generally speaking – must change, and that this goes for society in general as well as for us as individuals. So, according to this view, the ‘issue’ is not a scientific question of whether human activities have caused the climate change seen so far and will cause similar climate change in future, and it is not a question of how and to which extent this can be documented scientifically. No, the ‘issue’ is a moral and political one. It is about behaving ourselves. It is about the way in which we use resources, and how we as a society should organise ourselves with regard to our patterns of production and consumption. This view is not the only possible one. The public climate debate – and the debate about the debate – seems largely to have taken place and been judged on the assumption that the issue is scientific and should be discussed scientifically before becoming political. This has been the most widespread view, regardless of the stance that people have taken, and it is to some extent in line with the very popular model for the relationship between science and politics which dictates that first science establishes the truth about reality, and then it can be discussed and decided politically what should be done within the framework of these scientific facts. According to this model, science should confine itself to describing what ‘is’, while politics should confine itself to prescribing what ‘should’ be done. It may be that the political ‘should’ cannot be deduced directly and unequivocally from the scientific ‘is’, but ‘should’ must follow ‘is’, politics must follow science, the prescribing of action must obey the scientific description of reality. All along the way in the public climate debate, this model has been creaking and groaning. It has not been possible to maintain the radical separation of ‘is’ and ‘should’, of science and politics. Rather there have

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been signs that it has become difficult to distinguish at all between science and politics. We will take as our starting point the view that it is valuable to maintain the ability to distinguish between science and politics and that society needs both.

Discussion, discourse, dialogue and reason

Box 1

Debate, discussion, dialogue, discourse are all words used to describe conversations and the exchange of opinions: The words have come from Latin or Greek, and whether one word or the other is used in a particular context will depend, among other things, on the specialist field to which the text pertains. Some specialists tend to use the word ‘discourse’ all the time, whereas ‘dialogue’ dominates in other contexts – and in this chapter on the public climate debate, we have decided to talk about ‘discussion’ and ‘debate’. So is this of any significance? Both yes and no. All the words can be used to refer to conversations, and they are frequently used interchangeably. On closer study their etymologies and meanings are different, but these words – like words in general – are not unambiguous, but can be interpreted in various ways. This is most obvious in the word ‘dialogue’ or ‘dia-logue’. The last syllable comes from the Greek word for reason: logos – which can also mean both ‘word’ and ‘figure’. So ‘dialogue’ can be used to refer to reason as both ambiguous (word and speech) and unambiguous (figure).

3. Old story with a new career It is a new phenomenon – at the most a couple of decades old – that the climate is discussed as something requiring political action. But it is nothing new that scientists occupy themselves with the impact of human activities on climatic conditions. Nor is it anything new that scientific attempts at predicting long-term climate change have been taken to the public sphere. In the polarised discussion that has been going on in recent decades of climate change as man-made or not, representatives of both camps have presented historical information to support their arguments. The different ways of making use of history for argumentative purposes may, in turn, serve the purpose of understanding what has changed. More than 100 years ago, in the 1890s, the Swedish physicist and chemist Svante Arrhenius, who was, by the way, awarded the Nobel Prize in chemistry in 1903, studied how CO2 emissions could contribute to increases in

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Public, politics and freedom

Box 2

Many misunderstandings arise because words such as ‘public’ and ‘politics’ are used without any thought being given to the fact that others may understand the words differently. For example, ‘public’ will make some people think about the state and the power of the state, and politics may be seen as synonymous with state control. This perception connects ‘public’ and ‘politics’ with a lack of freedom and coercion. Public affairs come to refer to situations in which the state must intervene. In this context, it may be demanded that the state’s policies be based on science, i.e. on precise, accurate and, in so far as is possible, unambiguous scientific knowledge about objects and their working mechanisms. In connection with discussions about technology, such demands are often made – i.e. demands for ‘science-based policy’. On the other hand, ‘public’ can also be associated with what is shared and common to all – society rather than just the state – and ‘politics’ can similarly be associated with conflicts between different perspectives, principles and interests. The second version is more in line with the classical views which associated the public and political life in the Greek city state with freedom. Here, public affairs come to refer to questions which should be debated in public. Similarly, what is public and shared can be thought of as that which everybody agrees on and which is not open to discussion. Or, on the other hand, it may be thought of as relating to all which is uncertain and unpredictable and therefore calling for many different points of view and perspectives: discussion. These examples of interpretations are rarely found in their pure form in real life. They can to a certain extent be combined, but at the same time, they are very different, and they reflect a lack of agreement which has characterised the entire history of the Western civilisation. The difference is related to the difference mentioned in the box on ‘Discussion, discourse, dialogue and reason’, focusing on the question of whether reason should be associated with words and speech (ambiguous) or figures (unambiguous).

temperature. In the 1930s, the British engineer G.S. Callendar, who was also into meteorology, collected temperature measurements from various parts of the world and concluded that increases in temperature were caused by emissions from industry of what we now term greenhouse gases. Similar conclusions were drawn by a small number of other scientists around 1950. However, these scientists were clearly working on their own, as traditional and specialised scientists keen to increase the knowledge about the natural world through their empirical testing of hypotheses about natural mechanisms. Every now and then, conclusions from such research were presented to the public in the form of questions about natural phenomena which people could then ponder a bit. ‘Is the World Getting Warmer?’ was such

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a headline in the British Saturday Evening Post in 1950. ‘Are Men Changing the Earth’s Weather?’ asked the US Christian Science Monitor in 1957. In 1966 and 1977 global temperature increases and human activities were seen as interrelated in reports from the United States National Academy of Sciences (see also Chapter 3). This information has been gathered by advocates of the view that humans are to a considerable extent to blame for the climate change which may lead to dramatic changes to the living conditions on the planet, and that mankind should therefore also act decisively to counter such change. Such information provides the greenhouse theory with a history and lends a certain venerableness to it; this is not some modern whim, but based on age-old insight. History is also used the other way around, i.e. in support of criticism of the greenhouse theory and related predictions as being untrustworthy and unsuitable as a basis of political action. This is done with reference to the changing waves of climate science as they have been reported by the US media in the course of the twentieth century. The point is that warnings of global warming have alternated with warnings about a new ice age. In 1895 and in 1912, The New York Times carried articles warning that a new ice age might be on its way. In 1923, on the other hand, Chicago Tribune printed an article warning of global warming: ‘Scientist Says Arctic Ice Will Wipe Out Canada’. In the following decades, a number of articles were published on the impending global warming, but in 1974 The New York Times published an article headlined ‘Climate Changes Endanger World’s Food Output’, warning of a possible new ice age. The following year Time Magazine published an article with a similar message. Scientists were quoted as saying that unpredictable climate patterns in recent years could be a sign of global climate change. It could take the form of a new ice age. So history has been used to emphasise that it has been known for a long time that emissions of CO2 could affect the climate and lead to global warming, and on the other hand to stress that scientists have never been able to agree on how the climate was developing and have changed from one extreme position to the other. And what is new then? The possibility of climate change can no longer be presented, depending on the temperament and the horizon of the individual speaker, simply as either curious and entertaining or as fateful and threatening. Rather, climate change has become an issue which requires deliberation and decisions. The old climate research has embarked on a new career as a societal issue. When reporting historical information like the above, one must be careful to make it clear which side the information comes from. This is because the information

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has been gathered and published as ammunition in a conflict between two camps that disagree on how energy should be produced and consumed, how society should be organised, how we ought to act politically. The background to this strife – which has been particularly polarised and taken the form of a war between left and right in the USA – seems to be a fundamental agreement that the real question is a scientific one; once we know the truth, we will know what to do. Unfortunately, ‘the others’ are forging the truth. They are ‘politicising’ science. They are allowing science to be directed by politics whereas it ought to be the other way around. It is a widespread regret – which is not only voiced within the framework of the climate discussion – that science is becoming politicised. Underlying this regret seems to be an assumption that politics is dirty by definition. This is certainly not a helpful starting point for scientists wishing to make reasonable contributions to political discussions of topics belonging to their field of knowledge. A more fruitful starting point could be to regard modern environmental research as a field which has always been ethically and politically motivated, and which thus has not only been informed by a pure curiosity concerning natural mechanisms, but also to a large extent by a concern about how production and consumption affect the natural world. Environmental research has not been about pure description, but about description which was to move other people and prompt them to action. Moreover, it has been less about understanding specific individual mechanisms in order to be able to imitate or control them than it has been about understanding large complex systems and interrelations. Thereby uncertainty  – a basic condition for human action which modern science to a large extent was developed to reduce – has become more visible as a basic condition that also applies within science. One groundbreaking book in the history of modern environmental research was Silent Spring, written by the US biologist and geneticist Rachel Carson in 1962. When the book was reprinted in London in 1964, the text on the cover started as follows: For as long as man has dwelt on this planet, spring has been the season of rebirth, and the singing of birds. Now, in some parts of America, and throughout the world, spring is strangely silent, for many of the birds are dead – incidental victims of our reckless attempt to control our environment by the use of chemicals that poison not only the insects against which they are directed but the birds in the air, the fish in the rivers, the earth which supplies our food, and, inevitably, (to what degree is still unknown), man himself. Rachel Carson became so concerned with this situation that she

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spent over four years gathering data from all over the world on the effects of pesticides now in general use.  (Carson, 1964)

Both up until and after the Second World War, the natural sciences have played a decisive role in the development of industrial production processes, including the development of chemicals for eradicating insects and killing weeds on farmland. Through modern environmental research the natural sciences also came to play a key role with regard to shedding light on the dark sides of such production processes. None of these efforts can be described as amounting to pure, curiosity-driven research. From the outset, environmental research and environmental politics have thus been inextricably related. It is not an infection of which science can be freed. It is a condition for environmental research and for the environmental scientists’ contributions to the public debate that they address big, complex questions which are accompanied by many and considerable uncertainties, and that ethical and political aspects are always present. Since the 1960s, the environmental discussion has refused to die down. It has been an international discussion with regional and national variations. Especially in the USA, more than in Europe, it seems to have remained a sticking point dividing society into two warring factions, rather than having become a unifying issue around which everybody could unite and see themselves as good people supporting a good cause. The climate discussion can be seen as a preliminary culmination of half a century of environmental debate. Unlike the 1970s’ warnings of forest deaths, warnings which proved too radical, and unlike the warnings of increasing human infertility as a result of the widespread use of chemicals, the greenhouse theory and the accompanying models and predictions have found support both among scientists within the field and among other citizens, and references being made to ‘the scientific consensus’ on man-made climate change are now common. The UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), set up in 1988, has undoubtedly played a major role in this development. The IPCC, which published its fourth report in two parts in 2007, has developed into a gigantic body with several thousand affiliated experts who are operating in a borderland between science and politics. This fourth report seems to a large extent to represent and/or to have brought about the turning point which has changed the climate debate from being a war between two opposing factions and into a unifying cause for everybody who would like to be a good force and to be perceived as such. Why? In July 2007, Mojib Latif,

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a German professor of climate research, wondered about this development: “The results now being discussed are already almost twenty years old. The last UN report from 2001 said more or less the same thing,” he declared (NDR fernsehen, 2007). A Danish study is concluding that journalists are asking fewer critical questions about the topic than they did before the report. It also points out that this may have to do with the fact that the conclusions in the report are presented as more certain than is usually the case in scientific reports (Asbjørn & Bakalus, 2007). The widespread consensus that could be observed in summer 2008 concerned the issue as a scientific question, the answer to which should be followed by political consequences. Now it is generally regarded as a fact – and is therefore discussed less than before as an open question – that human activities are making a considerable contribution to climate change. All sorts of products can be marketed as climate-friendly or criticised for not being so. All sorts of questions can be raised and proposals made with reference to their impact on the climate. Newspapers set up climate blogs. Universities appoint climate panels. Scientists join forces to submit applications for funding of climate-related research – and to write textbooks concerning the climate. However, there is no reason to believe that this means that the discussion is over and that there is no need to learn from the process so far with a view to being able to improve in future. Actually, from another perspective it seems doubtful whether greater consensus has been achieved. From this perspective the issue is taken to be a political issue – with scientific elements – about how we should organise our societies with regard to production and consumption. Admittedly, the cue ‘climate’ – like a cue such as ‘sustainability’ – can now attract people with widely differing views on continued economic growth and market mechanisms, and money can be made by emphasising climate care. However, the lack of consensus about growth and market mechanisms remains an undercurrent in the environmental debate. And drawing the line between politics and science remains the big challenge.

4. Why everybody wants science to be on their side It has been a characteristic of the discussion so far that everybody has wanted to appear scientific: They have science on their side, while their opponents are unscientific. This has given rise to quite a lot of linguistic dodging. Let us again take a look at examples from both camps. Among the most active advocates of the view that human activities are

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having a substantial impact on the climate, it is not unusual to refer to studies which are concluding otherwise as ‘so-called scientific’ Likewise, scientists from the other camp are often not referred to as scientists but as extreme and peripheral persons, such as “a fringe group of dissenting figures”. Or they are described as “a tiny minority of the scientific community”. Or they are called “the Scientific Fringe” or “enemies of crucial research” or “contrarian scientists” – as opposed to “mainstream scientists”. Or they are simply referred to as “these dissenters”. The above examples have been taken from the USA and the UK where the debates have been most polarised and where polarisation trends are most clearly visible. These trends have been less pronounced and less obvious in other countries, for example in Denmark, although present beneath the surface. The choice of words is interesting. It is worth noticing that they are characterised by a different tenor to the one which dominates today’s discussions about democracy in English-speaking countries. In discussions on democracy it is normal to emphasise ‘local’ as something positive, as opposed to ‘central’, which is seen as something negative. In the climate discussion, on the other hand, ‘the fringe’ has negative connotations, as compared with ‘mainstream’, which has positive connotations. The expression ‘dissenter’ refers to religious strife and is used quite frequently. The term was originally used about Protestants and others who did not belong to the Roman-Catholic Church, and today ‘dissent’ means having or expressing views which are contrary to normal or official views or to official religious doctrine. A ‘Dissenter’– with a capital D – is a Protestant who does not accept the doctrine on which the Church of England is built, or a person who refuses to conform to the established church. The term ‘dissident’ does not refer to religion in the same way, but first and foremost to politics – it is, however, difficult to use the term about one’s opponents as it has chiefly been used about critics of totalitarian regimes, especially in the former Eastern European bloc, and therefore has positive connotations. The religious undertones have been picked up and used as a starting point for critique. Thereby science moves to the other side: It is argued that the commitment to countering man-made climate change is not scientific, but religious. Again, the ‘so-called’ science rears its head, for example with a reference to ‘some of the doomsday scenarios currently being brought to market’ and which others ‘seem to regard as scientific’. There is talk of “scientists sceptical of climate alarmism”, and warnings about serious consequences of the large-scale emissions of greenhouse gases are no longer associated with science, but with the “media and entertainment industries”, the “Hollywood

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elites”, the “hysterical left” and to “the eco-doomsayers” as well as “grant seeking climate modelers”. The roles of “pop culture” and “computer models” are emphasized as a contrast to “leading scientists”. Modellers desperate for funding are contrasted with “the many skeptical scientists” and “the serious scientists out there today debunking the latest scaremongering on climate change”, based on “scientifically unfounded fears”. There is a clear trend that both camps in the polarised debate want to have science on their side and see ‘the others’ as being caught up in politics and/or religion and/or the media distorting the issue. The groups with which one agrees ‘find’, while the others ‘fabricate’. ‘The others’ are in the pockets of special financial or political interests, while one’s own side is pure and above interests. Everything that can be seen as open to criticism is, so to speak, shifted away from science and blamed on religion or politics or the media. Again, what we see is an underlying agreement. It would appear that there is widespread consensus that the ‘issue’ should primarily be seen as a scientific one. There is agreement also on what can be regarded as reprehensible, i.e. views and attitudes and social interests. First and foremost there is also agreement on what must be seen as most trustworthy: science as the true description of reality, elevated above views, attitudes and social interests. The warring factions seem to agree that what is good and true must be found in or come from science, while what is bad and untrue originates outside science. The agreement has links to the model on the division of labour between science and politics which takes all questions about how things really ‘are’ to be scientific, while questions about what ‘should’ be done are related to politics only. In this model, science stands for the truth about reality. In practice, politics easily comes to be seen as the opposite, i.e. as untruth.

5. Conditions for politics In the course of the history of the West, political and public life has been regarded as representing the quintessence of human freedom, but it has also been seen as a mere free-for-all. Democracy has been seen as an organisation of public decision-making allowing everybody to contribute to decisionmaking processes about public affairs. On the other hand, democracy has also been seen as an organisation of societies, facilitating first and foremost that all citizens may represent and speak on behalf of themselves. Public debate has been seen as a fruitful struggle between many different views and interests. But disagreement has also been seen as threatening, perhaps even as a possible precursor of civil war. The model which says ‘science

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first, then politics’ is not related to any particular understanding of politics. Rather, one could see the model – which is as old as modern science – as an attempt to avoid or bypass the fundamental conditions for politics and for human action in general: the existence of uncertainty, different social interests and disagreement. As natural scientific enquiry and approaches have spread to ever more, ever larger and ever more complex issues, these political conditions have become increasingly prominent also in discussions on science-related issues. The climate discussion can be seen as an example of the difficulties of dealing with uncertainty, social interests and disagreement by means of frameworks of thought which have been designed with a view to circumventing these conditions in so far as possible. Uncertainty and doubt as ammunition

‘Warming sceptics’ is one of many terms of abuse having been coined in the climate debate. Somewhat peculiarly, it has been used against critics of scientific climate theories and models. Why is this peculiar? Because scepticism is normally seen as a virtue in scientific contexts, not as a vice. How can it be that the connotations of scepticism suddenly change from positive to negative? Scepticism is an important concept in modern natural science; ‘organised scepticism’ has even been described as a part of the ethos of science – the set of norms of behaviour binding scientists together (Merton, 1968). Being sceptical means being inclined to doubting or to having reservations, for example about established assumptions. It can also mean being doubtful about the usefulness of trying to interfere actively with aspects of life. And being doubtful about the possibilities of achieving true knowledge. In English – impacting on today’s international discussions because of its status as a lingua franca – there is a religious meaning to the term. A sceptic can be a person who does not believe in religious doctrine, an unbeliever. ‘Sceptic’ is not a neutral term, but may be used to signify honour or dishonour depending on the circumstances. Because of the uncertainty unavoidably surrounding climate models, the climate discussion is rich in examples of both uses of the term. There is a clear connection between scepticism and doubt on the one hand, and uncertainty on the other. The sceptic is raising doubts about claims which are presented as certain. The sceptic will immediately ask whether something is, in fact, certain. This can give rise to renewed investigations and testing. A principle involving such processes of continuously raising doubts and conducting more tests is central to scientific observa-

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tion and description and constitutes, for example, the basis for the editing of scientific journals. The aim is to achieve the greatest possible degree of certainty – or the least possible degree of uncertainty – but there are no hard and fast rules as to when such a process driven by scepticism must and should stop. In principle, it can carry on indefinitely. That in itself is uncertain. One may decide, but cannot prove, when it is reasonable to stop doubting. Scepticism – doubts about what is certain – is used in natural science in an attempt to achieve the greatest possible degree of certainty. There is ambiguity here, a double relationship with scepticism. There is a confession to doubt which is voiced by scientists during the scientific process. But it is not uncommon for the signs to change, from plus to minus, when doubts are voiced by other citizens, including politicians, and when they concern the results – such as climate models – of scientific processes. Where scientific discussions and issues are confined to being considered in isolation in the scientific community, this ambiguity is not necessarily very evident. In such cases, scepticism and doubt can be encapsulated in the scientific world, i.e. can be reserved for internal use. Subsequently society at large can then be presented with the findings: the largest possible degree of certainty or the least possible degree of uncertainty – the appearance of certainty, for non-scientists to rely on. However, in connection with the climate discussion, this has not been the case. It has not been possible to confine the uncertainty to internal scientific exchanges. The scepticism has also entered the public domain. Thus, the uncertainty of the climate models has been a regular topic in the public debate. Those who are sceptical about the impact of human activities on climate change have, in this respect, had an easy time. For quite a long way they have been able to refer without ambiguity to the need for and the value of scepticism, using the uncertainty of the climate models as their ammunition. Uncertainty has, so to speak, been on their side. Nor has the uncertainty been difficult to deal with for the probably large group of people in between the camps, who do not contest that human activities contribute to climate change, but who do not see climate change as the most important of issues and who tend not to be convinced of the factual value of accurate predictions of future events. From this point of view, the uncertainty surrounding the models is only a problem in so far as it is not acknowledged. However, the most active of the proponents have had a difficult time. The uncertainty has not been on their side, and they have not been able to contain it.

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On the one hand, scepticism has been presented as ‘our’ virtue: Accusations have been made against ‘the others’ to the effect that they demanded absolute certainty and therefore would not or could not accept the fact that science is always subject to uncertainty. The recognition that science is characterised by uncertainty – and by an ability among scientists to express themselves in a guarded and nuanced manner – has been described as a scientific virtue. This virtue has been seen as being in opposition to the demands made by ‘the others’. It has been argued that ‘the others’, and especially the politicians, do not understand that science involves uncertainty, and therefore demand absolute certainty about future climate change and about mankind’s contribution to such change before they are prepared to act. Scepticism has thus been presented as a mistake on the part of ‘the others’: Those ‘others’ have been accused of being sceptics – of being incurable doubters who would not acknowledge that now something had been sufficiently substantiated and demonstrated: “Doubt is being produced and thereby an argument for politicians to abstain from action. This supports the oil companies in getting their way” (Fog, 2007). Debates have been framed to make room, at the same time, for criticising politicians and others for not being able to appreciate the uncertainty inherent in science and for contemptuous references to ‘the sceptics’. Scepticism has been described as a practice which historically has been good and sound in and for science, but which has been abused in the public climate discussion. Journalists in particular have been ticked off in a big way. They have been told that they should be extremely sceptical about the scepticism of scientists outside the mainstream precisely because the conclusions behind which the majority of scientists within a particular field end up rallying are the results of longstanding, stringent, professional, critical and sceptical processes. Doubt and scepticism in the public with regard to climate change, its causes and likely future development has been described as a problem created by the media. The ambiguity of science with regard to certainty has been pointed out: Science has been developed, it is said, among other things, to minimise uncertainty. At the same time there is uncertainty in science. However, the argument continues: “The manufacture of doubt and uncertainty regarding the science of climate change was a deliberate, well-financed tactic by oil and coal companies and conservative politicians in an attempt to undermine public confidence in science and thereby defer action against global warming.”  (Corbett & Durfee, 2004)

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It has also been said that although journalists have to critically investigate the interests of various sources, critical journalism should not become ‘too critical as it can otherwise and unintentionally undermine the actual scientific message’ (Asbjørn & Bakalus, 2007). Regardless of whether one looks at the climate discussion as primarily a scientific discussion or primarily a political discussion, it is problematic when scepticism is used both to signify own virtues and the vices of others. This is a challenge for the scientist or administrator who – with a background in the natural sciences – is to contribute to the climate debate or to other major public debates about the environment and health: scepticism and doubt cannot be isolated (any longer) within the scientific community and cannot be kept from or admitted to the public discussion at will. The sceptical traditions of science spring from real uncertainty which will not go away. There are plenty of reasons why public debates involving sciencerelated questions are accompanied by scepticism. Therefore, openness about uncertainty is a prerequisite of trustworthiness, regardless of convictions about causes as good causes in need of immediate action. Social interests always belong to the other camp

Independence of (special) interests is, like scepticism, part of the ethos of science, and the climate discussion has been strongly dominated by mutual accusations about not living up to this norm. As regards this topic, the most active advocates of the view that climate change is to a considerable extent caused by human activities have had the easiest time. From the outset, the oil industry has had an obvious financial interest in ensuring that serious restrictions were not imposed on the use of its products, and it has supported the critics. The latter have, on the other hand, been referred to as the Carbon Club and the foot soldiers of the producers of fossil fuels. There has been talk of “a small cadre of dissenting scientists (of whom some are funded, in part, by industry)” and of “the industrial/sceptical contrarian view”, of “self-appointed climate experts, funded by the producers of fossil fuels” and of “sowers of uncertainty … such as the oil and coal industry” and of ‘direct or indirect support’ from ‘the oil giant Exxonmobil’ and other representatives of the oil industry. Reference has first and foremost been made to close relations with major financial interests. To a lesser extent, reference has been made to more or less clearly defined political groupings. There has, for example, been talk of ‘status quo interests’, of ‘the climate sceptic in the White House’ and directly of supporting the former US President George W. Bush. The foundation for sending similar accusations in the opposite direction

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has been less obvious. Reducing emissions of greenhouse gases has only recently become a cause which could attract financial interests to any large extent. Instead, criticism has highlighted political connections, mentioning for instance “a global warming propaganda blog reportedly set up with the help of an environmental group”. Along this line, suggestions have been made about dubious connections to left-wing politicians and foundations and to partisan left-wing environmental groups, supposed to have a vested financial interest in hyping alarmism. It is no coincidence that these examples are taken from an American text (Inhofe, 2006). In a Danish context, for example, pointing out the opponents’ links with environmental organisations would probably not have served to make anybody appear suspicious. Financial interests and political views cannot simply be put on the same footing. That would imply that politics could be reduced to no more than the safeguarding of financial interests. However, financial and political connections also have something in common. Both may signal a certain influence on people’s power of judgement. The criticism about a lack of independence has generally been presented so as to imply that this was a particular problem which affected only ‘the others’. Thus, those wielding the criticism appeared to be free from that sort of thing. They simply represented the clear voice of good sense and good morals: ‘We’ glide across the surface of the waters, ‘the others’ have chosen to move along in the mud – an assumption which is probably not the best starting point for any self-critical reflection on the part of ‘we’. This is where the challenge currently lies. Mistrust of special interests as something which can easily get in the way of the common good is part of the mental luggage in the West. This mistrust, accompanied by a wish to harness special interests, is also at the bottom of scientific norms and ideals about science as being completely independent and impersonal. In the past, the efforts have to a great extent been focused, firstly, on isolating science from special interests within the walls of protected research institutions and, secondly, on the development of methods to ensure that scientific results were uninfluenced by the persons who conducted the research. Such scientific methods are still being applied and developed further. However, at the same time, the Western world has embraced an official policy that scientists must maintain close ties with financial interests and government authorities, that as many patents as possible must be taken out, and that universities and other research institutions should conduct themselves more like private enterprises. Also, it is pointed out increasingly often that it is unrealistic to imagine science as being detached from social interests – including scientists’ own

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The Great Global Warming Swindle by Martin Durkin (2007) shows that in 2007 it was still feasible to question in public whether global warming is attributable to human activities – even though the scientific evidence presented in the film came in for strong criticism.

interests in promoting themselves as part of the competition for research funding. This, in turn, may result in the overselling of science-based messages  – about imminent disasters or cures. In short: it is obvious today that the scientific community as a whole is not above the sphere of social interests. The idea that floating in space is a possible working position for science is likely to hamper reflection and deliberation about how to maintain integrity while dealing with and containing connections with various social interests. Social interests have come to play an increasingly prominent role in science. At the same time, expert opinions are increasingly being sought as opinions from independent bodies which are completely detached from social interests. This is a dilemma of some urgency, regardless of whether an ‘issue’ is seen as being first and foremost of a scientific or of a political nature. This is a challenge for the scientist or administrator who – with a background in the natural sciences – is to contribute to the climate debate or to other major public debates about the environment and health: social interests (own interests and those of others) must be dealt with openly, critically and self-critically. There are no self-evident solutions or answers to this challenge, but the question can rarely be ignored. More often than not, science cannot be said to be free from affiliation with various social interests, but that does not imply that such affiliation should not be accounted for. Nor does it mean that it is unnecessary to document efforts to delimit the influences of those social interests on research questions and conclusions.

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Disagreement as a threat to truth

In the climate debate, the most obvious clash between ideals about science and ideals about politics has taken the form of a demand that a political ideal about many-sidedness as a basis for the formation of opinion must give way to a scientific truth ideal. According to the political ideal, which is also a journalistic ideal, a public debate gains through contributions being made from as many perspectives and angles as possible. More voices encourage the well-founded formation of opinion. The scientific ideal is about uncovering the truth, of which there are not several, but only one. This scientific ideal can be interpreted and specified in many different ways, and some of these go quite well with a political ideal about balance or many-sidedness, However, the climate debate has been marked by a veritable clash between the scientific and the political ideal. Proponents of the current mainstream have argued that many-sidedness or balance may hamper the recognition of truth, and that journalists and others are indeed hampering such recognition by presenting the viewpoints of non-mainstream scientists. “Balance as bias” is the English-spoken version of this critique, while a Danish (or Continental European) version focuses on ‘many-sidedness’ rather than ‘balance’. Many-sidedness and balance can be said to represent different ideals and understandings of politics. Many-sidedness is about many different viewpoints and assessments. Balance, on the other hand, usually refers to just two parties, pro and con. There is a significant difference, but here we will concentrate on what the two statements have in common, i.e. the viewpoint that while ‘balance’ or ‘many-sidedness’ may be good and necessary in discussions about political and social issues, other rules apply when it comes to scientific questions. This argument – which is based on the view of the climate debate as first and foremost a scientific discussion – is probably the most widespread argument of all in the discussion about the climate debate. It is cited again and again, either directly as the central argument in the discussion, or clearly appearing as an unspoken assumption. In spring 2007, a BBC report concluded that the weight of evidence that climate change is predominantly caused by human activity no longer justifies equal space being given to the “opponents of the consensus”. Admittedly, the report also stated that it was not the BBC’s role to close down the debate and that the dissenters (or sceptics) would still be heard as long as their views were presented coherently and honestly. Nevertheless, the principle of ‘balance’ was toned down in favour of a principle of giving more space to mainstream science. Almost at the same time, the British Channel 4 – not

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part of the BBC – broadcast the controversial documentary The Great Global Warming Swindle, which was also broadcast by the Danish public service DR2 channel in summer 2007, and which accuses climate researchers of seducing the global public and of having turned a scientific theory about natural mechanisms into a religion and ideology. This resulted in the same discussion flaring up, also in Denmark. The Danish DR2 channel broadcast the documentary as part of a theme on the sweating planet (‘Kloden sveder’) together with a number of other broadcasts about climate change. Afterwards on the DR blog, Jacob Mollerup, the Danish Broadcasting Corporation’s Listeners and Viewers Editor, criticised the fact that the documentary had been presented as a ‘science programme’. Mollerup described the programme as very categorical in style and as representing the opponents’ views in a very caricatured form. He argued that ‘broadcasting it could be justified if it was part of a debate’, and that viewers would then probably be able to make up their own minds, but that it was problematic that DR2 should have ‘provided it with a qualitystamp by broadcasting it as a science programme’ (Mollerup, 2007). Other bloggers disagreed that there could be any justification at all for broadcasting the documentary. It was argued that: ‘It is certainly not the media which should decide what is scientifically true or false. Science should. If the media want to do a theme about the scientific statements made by science in certain areas, then they must try to do so based on scientific criteria. The media have no competence to decide what is scientifically true or false’. And: ‘Science is not democratic’ (Rasmussen, 2007). The idea that people could make up their own minds was also attacked: ‘After all, if Mr and Mrs Smith in their semi out in the suburbs could decide for themselves what is true and what is false, trustworthy and untrustworthy, then science would be superfluous!’ (Fog, 2007). Mollerup specified his views further: ‘The media should not play the role of superscientists. It is, of course, not for the media to decide what is good science. But the media must, for example, report on relevant debates about scientific results.’ Debates such as this generate questions of use to considerations on what constitutes proper argumentation in the climate discussion – and in discussions on other issues which have been subjected to scientific enquiry: Should journalism and participants in the public debate simply passively report and receive the statements of scientists, or do we need scepticism and criticism from parties other than the specialists? Should others remain silent – or be silenced for that matter – when the scientists within a (more or less clearly defined) field have formed a clear consensus on a (more or less clearly defined) question? Are science and debate contrary in nature? If

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so, how does this fit in with the widespread understanding of free and open discussion as one of the hallmarks of modern science? And what would be the consequences for political life in general if the argument that manysidedness or balance hampers the recognition of truth was applied within all the other areas where scientific answers are on offer? Should all debate about the actual state of affairs be closed down once the scientists within a particular field had reached a consensus? How often can questions which are subjected to scientific study be clearly defined as non-political and nonsocial? And vice versa: How often can political and social questions be clearly defined as questions which cannot to some extent be studied scientifically? This is a challenge for the scientist or administrator who – with a background in the natural sciences – is to contribute to the climate debate or to other major public debates about the environment and health: room must be made for the existence of disagreement proper on science-related political issues so that a free and open, public discussion and opinion formation is encouraged. It is no easy task. It has even been quite diffusely defined in the above. We may, however, advance a step further in our understanding by taking a look at the notion of opinion formation and at frameworks of thought on the relationship between majorities and minorities.

6. The formation of opinion in politics and science Both in the climate discussion and in the discussion about the discussion, reference is incessantly made to scientific consensus. This is not a very aptly chosen expression. Consensus signifies agreement. In the climate debate, it is used to refer to the views of a large majority. The view that journalists should toe the line of such consensus among scientists, no matter which side it supports, has long been widely held among, for example media researchers. Ten years ago only a minority of scientists argued that global warming was caused by human activities. It was therefore argued that the journalists should make sure that doubts were voiced and uncertainty highlighted (McComas & Shanahan, 1999). Since then, the minority has become the majority, and the expression of doubt in the public debate and in journalism has come to be described as a problem (Corbett & Durfee, 2004). References to the majority or mainstream have actually been imbued with such a positive ring in science communication that other words, such as “orthodoxy” must be introduced to express criticism of a majority view. The relationship between the many and the few, and concerns about the possible tyranny of the majority are age-old themes. Linked to the latter

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concern is the view that might and right should not be confused, and that a system which automatically gives the right to the many may end up turning right into might – and might into right. Such concerns have had a significant impact on the gradual shaping of today’s democratic societies. They have also informed a couple of centuries of debate about the controversial concept, the public opinion. Are they also relevant to the issue of opinion formation within the framework of the scientific community? Or is the formation of scientific opinion fundamentally different from the formation of public opinion? It is a widespread assumption that such a fundamental difference exists. References are made to “rational consensus” and “the accumulation of collective opinion in support of an accepted interpretation of the available evidence”. Consensus does not mean that there is absolute agreement or certainty, it is emphasised, but it is based on “a large body of evidence” and “many thousands of scientific papers”, almost none of which  – in fact far less than a fraction of one per cent of the total – has diverged from the consensus (Ward, 2008). There is talk of “sufficient consensus over data and models” (Boykoff & Rajan, 2007). And it is stated that “scientific theories and interpretations survive or perish depending upon whether they’re published in highly competitive journals that practice strict quality control, whether the results upon which they’re based can be replicated by other scientists, and ultimately whether they win over scientific peers. When consensus builds, it is based on repeated testing and retesting of an idea” (Mooney, 2004). The underlying claim is that results of scientific methods and procedures should not be regarded as opinion, but as knowledge. What takes place is not the formation of opinion, but the production of knowledge. Does this hold? Is it that simple? Science does not necessarily fall apart if we allow the thought that the production of knowledge might take place concurrently with the formation of opinion, and that opinion and knowledge are not opposites, but different and overlapping phenomena. The above-mentioned references to “collective opinion”, “accepted interpretation”, “sufficient consensus” and “to win over scientific peers” indicate that it has not been possible to rid science completely of opinion formation. This does not have to be a problem, provided that the element of opinion is properly acknowledged and that the process of opinion formation is regarded with respect. On the other hand, it can be seen as problematic when references to the majority opinion are often supplemented with references to prestige and status – the “leading”, the “largest”, the “prominent”, “top scientists” etc. This could be a sign that the formation of opinion is connected exclusively

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to status concerns and not surrounded with respect as an intellectual endeavour. Opinions can be understood simply as more or less sophisticated expressions of special interests  – as purely calculated. Opinions can also be understood in a straightforward way as rash and ill-considered results of gut feelings  – as purely emotional. However, these are not the only possible ways of understanding opinions and the formation of opinion. Moreover, those understandings are likely to prepare the ground for contempt of public and political life as a seat of expressions and formation of opinion. Another option is to understand opinions – if founded on a solid process of opinion formation – as results of reflection based on observations, experience and the weighing-up of various principles and concerns. In this sense, opinions and the formation of opinion are indispensable in both science and politics as outcomes of the art of reasoning. Two points from the critique of the complicated concept of public opinion are relevant here. One point is: Those who have the means can – not least by means of emotional appeals – manipulate public opinion to promote their own interests. This is a point of criticism which can easily become self-fulfilling. Rather than trying to counter such manipulation, it can develop into a view that the public formation of opinion must necessarily be manipulation. Public and political life then ends up representing no more than the safeguarding of vested interests and emotional appeal – as opposed to scientific facts, neutrality and thoroughness. In a much-cited statement from 1989, the American biologist and climate researcher Stephen Schneider, a veteran on the IPCC, expressed his frustration at finding himself in a dilemma where he had to choose between “being effective” or “being honest” (­Schneider, 1996). He associated honesty with science and with the open expression of doubt and uncertainty. Effectiveness he associated with public life and politics. Scientists, like everybody else, wanted to make the world a better place, he argued. To that end, they needed broadly based support. To achieve this, they needed a strong presence in the media. And so they had to supply alarming forecasts and dramatic statements, and say as little as possible about doubt. This assumption about the necessary conduct in the public and political life – which is, precisely, an assumption and not a law of

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nature – may have influenced many scientists participating in the public climate debate. Thereby, it may have contributed to dramatisation, polarisation and the toning-down of uncertainty. Another point of critique which has been raised against the concept of ‘the public opinion’ concerns the fact that people are different and thus cannot have just one opinion. There will always be people with other opinions. Even though they do not agree with ‘the public opinion’ – which in reality is not shared by all, but is the opinion of the many – they may be right, but they may not dare or have access to voicing their opinion. This point of critique is relevant not only to the public debate, but also to the internal debate in the scientific community itself. A German duo, consisting of the meteorologist Hans von Storch and the sociologist Nico Stehr, have made frequent contributions to the scientific and the public climate debate, and have raised the issue. They do not contest that human activities contribute to climate change, but they are concerned about the alarmism which, they believe, originates in the scientific community itself. Alarmism aims to generate action by instilling fear, but this may prove counter-productive, they argue. Fear only creates a shift in the short term. The fear must be renewed and increased all the time. This produces an endless spiral of exaggerations and, in the end, may develop into a crisis for science. The constant alarmist hype eats into a scarce resource – the credibility of science (Storch & Stehr, 2005). Unfortunately, Storch and Stehr continue, the traditional scientific routines to secure quality and correct error do not seem to work. The public utterance of doubt by scientists is not welcomed by the scientific community, and may be referred to as the products of conservative thinktanks, as disinformation from the oil and coal industry and as detrimental to the good cause. Researchers tend to keep quiet about doubt in public, pretending to have accumulated solid knowledge, which simply needs the finishing touches around the edges. According to Storch and Stehr, scientists practise a kind of self-censorship which may easily erode their ability to recognise new and surprising insights competing or breaking with the acknowledged patterns of thought. Thereby, there is a risk of science becoming sterile, the argumentation continues, but differences of scientific opinion are not embarrassing family affairs to be concealed from the public eye. In science, as in all other areas of life, development is driven by differences of opinion. In other words: Storch and Stehr clearly do not see science and disagreement as being incompatible, and do not consider the formation of public and scientific opinion as being essentially different in kind. From this per-

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spective ‘the scientific consensus’ can be seen as ‘the public opinion’ in the scientific community. The advantage of that perspective is that it facilitates the practical utilisation, also in relation to science and to internal science communication, of centuries of thought about the complicated concept of ‘the public opinion’.

7. Improving the climate of discussion In the introduction, we cited a scientist who appealingly asked: Why can’t we just behave properly? The short answer is: Because we – the citizens of Denmark, of Europe and all over the world  – do not agree on what proper behaviour should be taken to mean. The marked trend which could be observed in summer 2008 of people uniting around the good cause of fighting against man-made climate change – so marked that environmental organisations were concerned that other important environmental issues were ignored – should not lead anyone to believe that disagreement has evaporated. The basic, political disagreement about the use of resources and the mores and means of production and consumption is still in place. Like uncertainty and the presence of a variety of social interests, the existence of disagreement is a fundamental condition for political life. The acknowledgement of those conditions should not prevent, but rather encourage us to agree on guidelines on the proper conduct of discussions between different points of view. For example, people may hold different views on when and how it is reasonable to use science in a discussion – and at the same time agree that this is a topic for discussion in itself. The climate debate can be seen as an example of a discussion where this has rarely been debated. The dominant ideal has been based on the model providing science with the primary task of identifying the truth about reality while political life is presented with the secondary task of deliberating and deciding on action. The climate debate can also be taken to illustrate that this old model may somehow be flawed. In practice, it has not served to facilitate distinctions being made between science and politics. Rather, they have been allowed to become blurred. Every time the basic political disagreement about production and consumption raises its head in a new shape, in the form of a new cause, science is called in. This may well happen too often. In the long term it may undermine the ability, firstly to acknowledge the limitations of science, secondly, to maintain the borders of science. If political aspects are not acknowledged as such, they cannot be dealt with. Thus, there is a need for the model to be revised so as to make room for acknowledging – and for attempting to

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deal with – the fact that science also contains political elements: There are social interests and commitment, opinions and disagreement, uncertainty and more uncertainty. It is not possible to radically separate questions about how things are and what should be done. Awareness of the continual interplay between these questions is a challenge for everybody who – with a background in the natural sciences – contributes to the climate debate and to other public debates about the environment and health. It is important for the sake of the debating climate which – incontestably – is man-made and which it is, at least to some extent, possible to do something about. What it takes is acknowledgement of the facts: ππ that reasonable argumentation and the reasonable formation of opinion are not the preserves exclusively of science, but are also possible and necessary in public and political life; ππ that the difficulties with respect to acknowledging and dealing with uncertainty and with conflicts of interest are not confined to politics, but are also present in science; ππ that science and politics are indeed different, but they are not opposites and do not constitute a dichotomy – rather, politics and science condition each other’s existence; ππ and that room for criticism is of vital importance for both science and politics in any democratic society. References Anderson RW & Gainor D (2006): Fire and Ice. Special Report. Business & Media Institute. Asbjørn M & Bakalus S (2007):[In Danish] Fra klimakoma til klimastress – da FN satte gang i klimadebatten anno 2007. En analyse af syv danske mediers dækning af FN’sklimarapport i forhold til rapportens videnskabelige indhold. Specialeafhandling i Journalistik, Roskilde universitetscenter. [From climate coma to climate stress – when the UN started the climate debate of 2007. An analysis of the coverage of the UN climate report and its scientific content in seven Danish media] www.ruc. dk/jour/Forskning/Specialer/Silla_Mette.pdf [accessed July 2009] BBC Trust (2007): From Seesaw to Wagon Wheel. Safeguarding Impartiality in the 21st Century. www.bbc.co.uk/bbctrust/assets/files/pdf/review_report_research/ impartiality_21century/report.pdf [accessed July 2009] Boykoff J & Boykoff M (2004): Journalistic Balance as Global Warming Bias. Creating controversy where science finds consensus. FAIR – Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting. www.fair.org/index.php?page=1978 [accessed July 2009] Boykoff MT & Rajan SR (2007): Signals and noise. Mass-media coverage of climate change in the US and the UK. EMBO Report Vol. 8, No.3, pp. 207‑211 Carson R (1964): Silent Spring. London: Readers Union Hamish Hamilton.

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Corbett JB & Durfee JL (2004): Testing Public (Un)Certainty of Science: Media Representations of Global Warming. Science Communication Vol. 26, No. 2, pp. 129‑151 Fog K (2007): [In Danish] Kommentar DR blogs. [Commentary to Mollerup] http:// blogs.dr.dk/blogs/jacobmollerup/archive/2007/08/06/l-gne-om-klimaet.aspx [accessed July 2009] Haas J (2007): Die Wahrheit, die Medien, und die Angst. Klima der Gerechtigkeit. www. klima-der-gerechtigkeit.de/die-wahrheit-die-medien-und-die-angst [accessed July 2009] Inhofe J (2006): Hot & Cold Media Spin Cycle. A Challenge to Journalists Who Cover Global Warming. Senate Floor Speech Delivered Monday September 25, 2006. United States Senate. http://epw.senate.gov/repwhitepapers/HOT %20AND %20 COLD %20MEDIA %20SPIN %20CYCLE.pdf [accessed July 2009] McComas K & Shanahan J (1999): Telling Stories About Global Climate Change: Measuring the Impact of Narratives on Issue Cycles, Communication Research Vol. 26, No. 1, pp. 30‑57 Merton RK (1968): Science and Democratic Social Structure, in Social Theory and Social Structure, The Free Press & Collier-Macmillan Limited, pp. 604‑616 Mollerup J (2007): [In Danish] Løgne om klimaet? DR blogs. [Lies about the climate?] http://blogs.dr.dk/blogs/jacobmollerup/archive/2007/08/06/l-gne-om-klimaet. aspx [accessed July 2009] Mooney C (2004): Blinded by Science. How ‘Balanced’ Coverage Lets the Scientific Fringe Hijack Reality. Colombia Journalism Review Vol 43, Issue 4 NDR fernsehen (2007): Aufgeheizt und ausgereizt – Klima-Debatte in den Medien. http://www3.ndr.de/ndrtv_pages_std/0,3147,OID3762074,00.html [accessed July 2009] Pötter B (2007): Die Kluft zwischen Wissenschaft und Medien ist tief beim Thema Klimawandel. Sturm über dem Elfenbeinturm. taz.de. www.taz.de/index.php?id= debatte&art=4717&id=kommentar-artikel&src=ST&cHash=1137d774a0 [accessed July 2009] Rasmussen S (2007) [In Danish]. Kommentar DR blogs. [Commentary to Mollerup] http://blogs.dr.dk/blogs/jacobmollerup/archive/2007/08/06/l-gne-om-klimaet. aspx [accessed July 2009] Schneider S (1996). Don’t Bet All Environmental Changes Will Be Beneficial. APS News Online. http://home.att.net/~rpuchalsky/sci_env/sch_quote.html#quote [accessed July 2009] Schwentker B (2008): Schlammschlacht ums Klima. Zeit Online. http://www.zeit.de/ online/2007/44/klima-schlammschlacht-rahmstorf [accessed July 2009] Storch H von & Stehr N (2005): Klima inszenierter Angst. Der Spiegel. www.spiegel.de/ spiegel/0,1518,338080,00.html [accessed July 2009] Ward B (2008): Reporters feel the heat over climate change. The Independent. www.independent.co.uk/news/media/reporters-feel-the-heat-over-climatechange-793586.html [accessed July 2009] Weingart P (2002): Kassandarufe und Klimawandel. gegenworte.org www.gegenworte. org/heft-10/weingart-probe.html [accessed July 2009]

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Case 1  ∏  Biofuels

Biofuels – Crops for food and energy Cl aus Felby

The Earth is covered by plants. Plants act as natural solar collectors, and by means of photosynthesis they are capable of converting CO2 and water into biomass. Wherever there is water, there are plants. They are the very foundation of our entire ecosystem and a source of nutrition for animals, bacteria and fungi. But we also use plants for purposes other than just food. Plant biomass is used for materials and energy, e.g. paper and timber from wood, electricity and heating from wood and straw, and now also liquid fuels for cars and aircraft from oil and grain crops.

The total annual biomass production from land plants is five times the world’s total energy consumption. Plants first and foremost produce sugars, which make up more than 75 per cent of the entire biosphere. By far the largest quantity of biomass (80 per cent) consists of wood. Globally, biomass meets 10 per cent of the world’s total energy consumption, primarily for cooking, heating and electricity. Biomass is also a major contributor to renewable energy, i.e. types of energy that do not increase the level of CO2 in the atmosphere and which, in principle, are inexhaustible as long as there is a sun. In Denmark, for example, biomass accounts for 65 per cent of the renewable energy generated. According to the International Energy Agency (IEA), biomass for energy, including biofuels, is one of the required key technologies if we are to meet the UN climate targets. In an expansive, but conservative, sustainability perspective, we can probably triple our use of biomass for energy production to cover 30 per cent of the world’s total energy supply (Berndes et al. 2003). But how should we utilise biomass for energy, and how do we at the same time ensure that it does not have a negative impact on food production? That is the challenge we are facing if bioenergy is to contribute to a more sustainable world. Bioenergy is unique. It is the only type of energy which can be used both for transport, heating and electricity. Biofuels can reduce CO2 emissions from transport by 30‑50 per cent compared to fossil fuels. According to the IEA, biofuels will initially replace petrol and diesel for cars, but will in the longer term mainly be used as fuel for aircraft and ships.

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Sustainability – challenges and opportunities

But can we replace petrol with biofuels extracted from plants without negatively impacting our food production, resulting in less food and higher prices? The answer is yes, but we must take into account the required technological development, and we must take the concept of sustainability seriously – a feelgood purchase of three litres of organic milk is simply not enough. It takes a different lifestyle, and it takes technology. We are facing a technical and economic transformation of unparalleled dimensions. To prevent the climate change from getting out of control, the entire world must reduce its CO2 emissions by 50 per cent. According to the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), the West must cut its CO2 emissions by 80 per cent. At the same time, by 2050 the planet must feed 35 per cent more people than today. This requires new technology as well as an entirely new way of including agriculture and forestry in a sustainable cycle which produces both food and energy.

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Sustainability and bioenergy are a challenge which must be incorporated from the very beginning. The objective is to strike a balance between food, energy and the environment. Sustainability means utilising the Earth’s resources in the best way possible for humans and the environment without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs. This means that we can certainly manipulate the natural world and our surroundings as long as we maintain a balance. Bioenergy in the form of biofuels can be used both to manufacture animal feed and highly efficient energy carriers, and both must

When annual and perennial plants are grown in the same field system, higher biomass yields can be obtained and, at the same time, higher biodiversity and very limited leaching of nutrients are achieved. CFE culturing systems can be used both in tropical and temperate areas. (Photo: Claus Feldby)

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be incorporated in a holistic approach. The objective is, in particular, to pull global agriculture in a far more sustainable and balanced direction.

How much biomass can land plants produce for energy? Generally speaking, what limits the use of biomass for energy production is the land area available. Forests contribute most to the biomass which we use for energy, but wood is less easily converted into liquid biofuels than grasses and herbs. Some 10 per cent of Earth’s land area is today used for agricultural crops, and just over 30 per cent is used for livestock grassing. In the West and some parts of South-East Asia and South America, the agricultural sector is highly efficient, whereas many regions in Africa still rely on Iron Age agricultural technology. We could, of course, just choose to increase the farmed area to meet the need for biomass, but this may, in many cases, have a number of negative environmental impacts, and it is thus often not a sustainable solution.

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The solution to this apparent paradox is a more balanced and intelligent use of our biomass resources. We can utilise existing crops better, grow new crops and change agricultural and forestry practices. Over the past 10,000 years, agriculture has been optimised to produce food for humans and livestock. Energy from biomass has not been a part of this equation, and there is a huge potential for processing which does not necessarily compete with food production. We have, for example, bred short-straw grain varieties because it was more efficient, and we had little use for the straw. However, a Stone Age rye variety such as svedjerug has straws of up to two metres. By employing a combination of technology and agricultural development, it is possible to meet the existing targets that biofuels should be developed to cover 5‑10 per cent of the total need for transport fuels based on the existing agricultural area. But it requires clear political control of the market and the technology. By far the highest biomass potential is found in the tropics, and biofuels are an opportunity for farmers in developing countries to create more agricultural value. But a well-developed infrastructure must first be established. In areas which are hardly self-sufficient in food, it would be risky to start producing crops for biofuels. Here, the first step would be massive investments in establishing the area’s own food production.

Different types of biofuels Biofuels are not just biofuels (Tolleson, 2008 and The Royal Society, 2008). Their effect on CO2 emissions and the potential synergies with food production depend to a large extent on whether the biofuel is first or second-generation bioethanol to replace petrol or biodiesel from oil crops. First-generation bio­ fuels utilise, with the exception of sugar cane and sugar beets, food and fodder crops such as wheat, corn or rape, while second-generation biofuels are based on the parts of the crops which neither humans nor animals eat.

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The process of manufacturing bioethanol from corn or wheat grains involves the simple fermentation of starch and has been known for thousands of years. Almost 90 per cent of the original energy in the starch is retained in ethanol. The residual product from the process corresponds, in terms of quantity, to ethanol, and it contains high-quality protein which is used for animal feed. One hectare of farmland with wheat used for bioethanol yields almost as much protein as one hectare with soya beans. This does not mean that firstgeneration bioethanol does not have any impact on the food supply, but there is a level at which the agricultural area used for first-generation bioethanol is offset by the freeing-up of an area elsewhere which should otherwise have been used for growing protein crops (Bentsen et al. 2009).

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Oil crops such as soya, rape, oil palm and Jatropha may be used for biodiesel. The process is simple: The oil is pressed from seeds and is then purified and filtered. Plants produce less oil than glucose, and a larger area is required to produce the same amount of liquid fuel than for bioethanol production. Increased production of both soya and oil palms also poses a large risk of deforestation in the tropics. A crop like Jatropha may be relevant in dry tropical areas, but, from a sustainability perspective, it presupposes that the area in question already has its own agricultural production supplying the local community with food. The existing biodiesel production based on soya, rape and oil palms must be considered a dead end both from an environmental sustainability perspective and from a wider perspective which also includes the supply of food. Second-generation biofuels are made from the part of the biomass that does not form part of the human and animal food chains. Examples of this include straw, grass, deciduous trees, household waste etc. Using biotechnology, the structural carbohydrates in the plants are converted into bioethanol. An advantage of the process is that the plants bring extra energy in the form of lignin which can supply the electricity and vapour required to convert the biomass. The challenge for second-generation bioethanol is to establish a supply of biomass based on existing agriculture and forestry, so that it does not end up competing with food production. This is possible, and, at the same time, new crops can be developed which produce feed and energy, e.g. perennial grasses, which make it possible to create high-yielding and very robust agricultural systems with very limited nutrient leaching. If we look further ahead in terms of technological development, we will see algae and new energy carriers such as butanol. As the technological development of biofuels progresses, not only will the technology become more efficient, it will to a larger extent also become more and more disconnected from food production. It is a development where the technologies build on each other and depend on whether there is an industry and a market to drive the development (Tolleson, 2008).

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Food crisis and biofuels From autumn 2007 to summer 2008, the price of rice and wheat in particular saw a sharp increase which was followed by a corresponding drop, so that in autumn 2008 the prices had fallen back to more or less the same level as before they skyrocketed (Institute of Food and Resource Economics, 2008). The debate on the reason for the increases singled out biofuels, and especially the use of corn for bioethanol, as the cause of the shortages and higher food prices. During the past ten years, US farmers have increased their corn production corresponding to the demand from ethanol production, and, at the same time, US exports of corn and wheat for food have seen an upward trend. All other things being equal, the absence of bioethanol would have resulted in lower corn production and probably did not have much of an impact on food production in 2007‑2008. The US bioethanol also produces protein animal feed, which reduces the actual load on the land. If the production of protein feed is included, the total net global area used for biofuels in 2008 was estimated to be below 10 million hectares or approx. 0.5 per cent of the total agricultural area (Taheripour et al. 2008). As is the case with all other types of goods in demand, biofuels from agricultural crops will increase prices, but 0.5 per cent of the agricultural area will only have a limited effect on pricing.

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There is obviously a limit to how much corn can be used for bioethanol, and the Americans have probably reached the ceiling in relation to a balanced agricultural production. However, there is every reason to believe that the high food prices in 2007‑2008 were mainly attributable to poor harvests in Australia and Europe as well as heavy speculation in agricultural products, and as such not related to the production of corn. The big problem in relation to the food supply is, however, not biofuels but the absence of strategic stocks which can make up for poor harvest years. The question is: How come we have central banks spending huge amounts on stabilising the financial market, when at the same time we have abolished the intervention grain stocks that stabilised food prices? Another factor influencing price development is the increasing amount of meat consumed in the West. More than 70 per cent of global agricultural production is used for animal feed. Approx. 300 million hectares, for example, are used for growing protein feed for livestock, while the gross area used for biofuels amounts to approx. 15 million hectares (FAO, 2008). The largest climate impact from agricultural production today is attributable to cattle breeding as the production involves deforestation to establish grazing areas and large emissions of methane, a greenhouse gas that is 25 times stronger than CO2 (put differently, ruminants fart). The more meat we eat, the higher the prices of basic foods and the larger the climate impact from our food production. In 2008, the FAO published a report recommending that international consensus be reached on the development of sustainable biofuels, taking into account both food supply and greenhouse gas emissions. The objectives of the

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current research activities tie in nicely with the targets and guidelines issued by the FAO. It is thus a political decision to ensure the right development of sustainable biofuels and at the same time develop a balanced food supply. The technologies are available, but focusing on technology only does not solve the fundamental problems we are facing. First and foremost, we must change the way we behave. It does not mean an end to eating meat, but we must eat less and better-quality meat. We need to reduce our energy consumption considerably, travelling to Thailand on holiday by plane is a luxury we can no longer permit ourselves, and then we will have to develop an economy where growth not only equals bigger and more but also includes stability and sustainability. Quite simply we must learn to value the future highly.

References

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Bentsen NS, Thorsen BJ, Felby C (2009): Energy feed and land use balances of refining winter wheat to ethanol. Biofuels, Bioproducts and Biorefining, in press Berndes G, Hoogwijk M & Broek R (2003): The contribution of biomass in the future global energy supply: a review of 17 studies. Biomass and Bioenergy 25, pp. 1‑28. Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) (2007): Livestock’s Long Shadow. Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations. http:// www.fao.org/docrep/010/a0701e/a0701e00.htm Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) (2008): Bioenergy, food security and sustainability – Towards an International Framework. Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations. http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/ user_upload/foodclimate/HLCdocs/HLC08‑inf-3‑E.pdf Institute of Food and Resource Economics (2008): A note on the causes and consequences of the rapidly increasing international food prices. Institute of Food and Resource Economics. http://www.foi.life.ku.dk/Nyheder/Nyheder %202008/~/media/Foi/ docs/Publikationer/Udredninger/2008/International_food_prices.ashx Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007): Climate Change 2007. Synthesis Report. Fourth Assessment Report. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4‑syr.htm Taheripour F, Hertel TW, Tyner WE & Beckman JF (2008): Biofuels and their ByProducts: Global Economic and Environmental Implications. American Agricultural Economics Association 2008 Annual Meeting. http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/ bitstream/6452/2/467314.pdf The International Energy Agency (IEA) (2008): Energy Technology Perspectives. The International Energy Agency. http://www.iea.org/g8/2008/ETP_2008_Exec_Sum_ English.pdf The Royal Society (2008): Sustainable Biofuels: Prospects and Challenges. The Royal Society. http://royalsociety.org/document.asp?latest=1&id=7366 Tolleson J (2008): Not your Father’s Biofuels. Nature, 451 pp. 880‑883.

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Case 1  ∏  Biofuels

Biofuels: Hunger, subsidies and lack of effect on CO2 emissions Chr is t ian Fr iis Bach

“Something bad is happening to our corn.” This is how strongly an elderly woman states it in a documentary on food and biofuels from Guatemala. Corn tortillas are the most important ingredient of all meals. In just a couple of months in 2008, the price of corn increased dramatically, creating a very serious situation for poor families and people living on a few dollars a day. Many organisations in Central America are already reporting that some families only light their stove every other day because they cannot afford to buy food. There are also reports of desperation and riots provoked by the high prices.

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Central America is one of the places where the footprint of biofuel can be seen most clearly. It is particularly North America which has seen an explosion in the use of corn for the production of bioethanol, and it has been an important factor in the price increases. Globally, opinions are divided as to the impact of biofuels on the exploding food prices – the US Administration has argued that the impact only amounts to a few per cent, but most researchers believe that the impact is far greater. The International Monetary Fund estimates that up to 60 per cent of the price increases are attributable to biofuels (IMF, 2007). In an internal analysis, the World Bank’s leading agricultural economist, Don Mitchell, states that biofuels, together with the derived effect on food stocks, export restrictions and speculation, may be responsible for up to 75 per cent of the price increases (The Guardian, 2008). Even though less than 0.5 per cent of total grain production is used for biofuels, the production of biofuels accounts for 50‑75 per cent of the total increase in the demand for grain in recent years. This has had an impact on the food market which is under pressure from increasing grain and meat consumption, not least in Asia, and clear signs of climate change. High food prices have dramatic consequences for the more than 800 million people already affected by hunger and malnutrition. The amount of grain required to fill the fuel tank of a large four-wheel drive car (240 kg of corn for a 100‑litre ethanol tank) could feed one person for an entire year (The World Bank, 2008). The financial crisis and good harvest conditions resulted in falling food prices in autumn 2008, but practically all forecasts indicate higher

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food prices in the coming years. There is thus reason to be sceptical about producing biofuels for the transport sector. However, producing biofuels from the agricultural sector can certainly also have positive effects in poor countries, because agriculture is crucial for employment, growth and for combating poverty. Around two-thirds of the world’s poor live and work in rural areas. If the income in the agricultural sector in a poor country goes up by one dollar, the income in society as a whole typically increases by 2 to 2.5 dollars. This is because the farmer will buy a new hoe from the local smith, invest in a new tin roof for his or her house or buy new clothes for the children. This kick-starts the economy and creates new jobs. Industrialisation and agricultural development are closely related. Here, biofuels may play a positive role, both directly and through higher food prices. There are also positive examples of poor farmers who have generated both energy and an income from, e.g., Jatropha for biodiesel.

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Such examples are, however, rare. Firstly, biofuels are often produced in large plantations without strong links to poor farmers, because the production process requires economies of scale and mechanisation. This excludes small farmers. At the same time, there are more and more reports – from Uganda, Malawi, Burma  – about enterprising businesspeople who, using more or less unsavoury methods, try to gain access to large areas for growing crops for biofuel production without thinking about the poor who otherwise use and live from the land. Like oil and other valuable energy sources, biofuels typically contribute to reinforcing the political power struggles, rarely for the benefit of the poorest parts of the population. And in many poor countries, not least in Latin America, the distribution of land is extremely inequitable. The poorest farmers do not have enough land to produce sufficient food for the entire year and are thus affected by the higher food prices, while a small wealthy elite, which owns most of the land, profits from the higher food prices and the production of biofuels. You certainly cannot blame biofuels for the world’s unequal distribution of land, but the type of production and market which characterises biofuels can maintain and further add to the unequal distribution of land because the production of biofuels leads to high politics and economies of scale. This applies both to sugar production in Brazil, oil palms in Indonesia and the attempts at starting up large-scale production of Jatropha in, among other places, Africa. Secondly, biofuels are rarely processed in the world’s poor countries, which reduces the beneficial effect on the economy. Finally, felling forests to make way for biofuel production and then employing intensive cultivation methods without regard for the land’s productive capacity can have a negative impact on the environment. Growing biofuels in rich countries is typically not a good idea either, in particular for economic reasons. Practically all rich countries still maintain high agricultural subsidies, and combined with the direct and indirect subsidies available to the transport sector, the growing of biofuels will lead to subsidies

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on top of subsidies. It is simply not good for the economy. The subsidies paid to biofuel production in OECD countries total USD 13‑15 billion, and around USD 1 billion in Brazil. The subsidies can amount to up to 50 per cent of the total production costs (OECD, 2007). New calculations show that only ethanol production based on sugar cane in Brazil can compete with petrol and diesel. All other biofuels are considerably more expensive to produce than the oilbased alternative (FAO/OECD, 2008).In light of the major challenges we face due to climate change, biofuels could still be a useful strategy if it really did translate into significant CO2 reductions, but that is not even the case. This is, among other things, because of the conversion of organic material in the ground resulting from the intensive growing of crops for biomass production. Cultivating new land can result in CO2 emissions which are 200‑900 per cent more than can be saved over 30 years by substituting fossil fuels with energy crops (Righelato and Spracklen, 2007). Even if we do change to the much-talked-about, and reportedly promising, second-generation biofuels, this can result in less organic material being applied to the farmland, and this will reduce the positive effect on CO2 emissions.

Figure 1.  The effect of a number of interventions on CO2 emissions (Righelato and Spracklen, 2007‑ Photo Credit: World Land Trust)

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In addition, there are better alternatives to energy production, for example wind power, solar collectors and solar cells, which require less space and resources. Last, but not least, the energy efficiency obtained by converting biomass into bioethanol and then using it in a car engine is low, as low as 10 to 20 per cent. If we want to use biomass for energy purposes, it would be more efficient to burn it directly for power and heat production (Nielsen and Wenzel, 2005) where efficiency rates of 50‑80 per cent can be obtained, and instead focus on electric cars which also results in increased energy efficiency (Wenzel, 2007). In addition, the demand for biomass for chemicals and plastics production will increase, and here biomass will be a more direct replacement for the increasingly scarcer oil and natural gas. This will, at the same time, lead to higher CO2 reductions than producing bioethanol and biodiesel for the transport sector. Overall, there are very few arguments for producing biofuels such as bioethanol and biodiesel. Food prices will increase to the detriment of the world’s poor. The effects on poverty and growth are often limited, and we risk unfortunate social and environmental consequences in the world’s poor countries. We accumulate subsidies that damage the economy. And the effect on CO2 emissions is very low, and we could achieve far greater effects from alternative applications of biomass or other alternative energy sources.

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Compared to focusing on energy savings, the use of biomass for heat production and biogas and other types of renewable energy, producing bioethanol and biodiesel for the transport sector is thus a bad idea.

References Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (FAO) / Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2007): Agricultural Outlook 2008‑2017, FAO/OECD. International Monetary Fund (IMF) (2007): World Economic Outlook – Globalization and Inequality. IMF. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2007): Biofuels for Transport: Policies and Possibilities. OECD. Righelato R & Spracklen DV (2007): Carbon Mitigation by Biofuels or by Saving and Restoring Forests? Science 317 (5840): p. 902. The World Bank (2008): World Development Report 2008: Agriculture for Development. The World Bank. Nielsen P & Wenzel H (2005): Environmental Assessment of Ethanol Produced from Corn Starch and used as an Alternative to Conventional Gasoline for Car Driving. The Institute for Product Development, Technical University of Denmark. Wenzel, H (2007): Bio-ethanol: is the World on the wrong track? Analysis of Energy Issues (T3 3a). European Congress of Chemical Engineering.

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Case 1  ∏  Biofuels

Study questions 1 In the opinion of the two authors, what consequences does the current (2008) production of biofuels have on, e.g., food prices, CO2 emissions, social justice etc.? 2 In the opinion of the two authors, what does the concept of sustainability cover in connection with biofuels? 3 What are the two authors’ main arguments for and against biofuels, and on what assumptions are they based? 4 Is the disagreement between the two authors about biofuels as a tool for controlling climate change primarily the result of different views of the scientific knowledge in the area or is it value-based? 5 Are you able to find out whether new knowledge has surfaced since the two articles were written (autumn 2008) which could alter the conclusions made in the articles?

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6 Discuss how disagreements of this kind form part of the overall social and political discussion on climate change.

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Case 2  ∏  Genetically modified organisms

GMOs: A solution to changed climate conditions Pr eben Bach Holm

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Can the genetic modification (GM) of crop plants help to solve some of the problems we will be facing due to climate change? In my opinion the answer is clearly yes. Genetic modification offers a range of opportunities which ordinary plant breeding does not, and with the problems that we are facing, it would be inexcusable not to use this technology. In the ongoing debate on climate change and food production, one of the arguments voiced more and more often is also that the development of new crops using GM technologies will be critical to meeting future challenges. Here, I will try to shed light on which problems the predicted climate change will cause as well as the other challenges which global food production is facing. This will be compared to what we know about genetic modification and its potential today. Plant breeding is as old as agriculture. We can imagine that the Stone Age farmer while cultivating his land with the first crops occasionally came across a variant with larger, and maybe even better-tasting, seeds or tubers. He would then store some of these variants as seed grain for the next year. In this way, our crops have been improved – or bred – into what we know today. In some cases, the breeding is so comprehensive that we do not fully know where the plants came from. Within the past century, this breeding process has become much more focused. Variants with useful properties have been cross-bred, and in other cases new variants have been created through irradiation or treatment with chemicals that change the properties of the plant genes. The main limiting factor in traditional breeding is, however, that only closely related species can be cross-bred, thus considerably limiting which properties can be combined. Besides, irradiation/chemical treatment affects the plant genes at random, and most new variants are inferior to the parent species. Genetic modification does not have these limitations. In reality, you can transfer any gene from any organism, and you can predict which property the gene will give the plant. This is, of course, why the expectations for this technology are so great. Box 1 briefly describes the terminology and techniques used today for the genetic modification of plants.

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Population growth Global plant production has previously faced major challenges in terms of ensuring adequate food supplies. So far, it has succeeded in keeping pace with the population growth through the development of new plant varieties by means of plant breeding as well as improved cultivation methods such as the use of irrigation, fertilisation and pesticides. In the developing countries, particularly in Asia, this development is called the ‘Green Revolution’, where the 1960s and 1970s saw a doubling in the yields of main crops like rice and wheat. Approx. 50 per cent of the productivity increases are ascribed to varieties with shorter growing periods and more compact growth, better nitrogen utilization, improved disease resistance and adaptation to different climate conditions. A good description of the Green Revolution can be found in Wikipedia.

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We are now facing far bigger challenges. In 2050, the Earth’s population will total nine billion people, livestock production is expected to see a sharp increase due to strong economic growth in a number of developing countries, and an ever larger share of plant production, especially corn, is used for bioethanol. Combined with poor harvests in a number of countries, very limited stocks as well as historically high oil prices, these factors led to dramatic increases in food prices in 2007‑2008 (von Braun, 2008). At the same time, the industrialised countries in particular have expressed a desire for larger areas of undisturbed countryside and reduced environmental impacts from nutrients and pesticides used in agriculture. Energy and grain prices fell again during 2008, but the big question is whether the days of low energy and food prices will not become a thing of the past. To illustrate the scope of the problem, I have chosen to briefly refer to the FAO report ‘World Agriculture: towards 2015‑2030’, which was published in 2003.

Definition: Genetic modification

Box 1

The terms ‘genetic engineering’ and ‘gene splicing’ are used synonymously with ‘genetic modification’ and ‘genetic manipulation’, and genetically engineered organisms are called ‘GMOs’. The term ‘gene splicing’ comes from the fact that you can cut and paste genes and gene sequences, using different enzymes, into new combinations which are subsequently inserted into another organism. The actual insertion is often referred to as ‘genetic transformation’. The first genetically engineered plants were made in 1983. Two methods are primarily used today: a method whereby the genes are injected into the plant tissue using a so-called gene gun or by means of a soil bacterium (Agrobacterium) which is capable of transferring genetic material to plant cells. Techniques have gradually been developed for genetically engineering all our cultivated plants.

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This means that it was published before the full brunt of the food and energy crisis was felt, but it provides a detailed assessment of the challenges which the global agricultural sector is facing: Producing food for eight billion people by 2030, without taking into account climate change, biofuels and increasing energy prices. The FAO emphasises that they are not presenting a strategy but a projection and an assessment of how global agriculture will develop to meet the increasing demands on food production.

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According to the report, annual grain production is expected to increase from the current 2 billion tonnes to 3 billion tonnes by 2030, of which approx. 60 per cent will be used as feed. The developing countries will increase their imports of grain from 110 to 265 million tonnes by 2030. The FAO expects that plant production will increase by 67 per cent from the start of the millennium and up until 2030. In the developing countries, the use of irrigation will increase from about 40 per cent to 50 per cent of the agricultural production, resulting in a 14 per cent increase in water consumption. In some areas, this does not pose a problem, whereas other areas, e.g. North Africa and the Middle East, already have a negative water balance, i.e. consumption is higher than the water supplied. The use of fertilisers is expected to see an increase from 138 million tonnes at the start of the millennium to 188 million tonnes by 2030. Approx. 120 million hectares of new farmland are expected to be added (an increase of 13 per cent in the total agricultural area), primarily in South America. According to the FAO, 1.8 billion hectares in the developing countries can potentially be used for cultivating plants of some kind with acceptable minimum yields. Ninety per cent of this area is located in Latin America and sub-Saharan Africa. The FAO report laconically states that some people believe that mankind has already cultivated too many areas at the expense of the natural world, while others are of the opinion that there are large areas which should be included for agricultural purposes. Overall, the recipe is thus an increased use of existing methods: intensive farming and greater use of irrigation and fertilisers. To strike a balance, major productivity increases are required, primarily in the developing countries. Many people thus believe that we need a new Green Revolution – a Biorevolution – which both ensures higher productivity and, at the same time, less environmental impact.

Climate change The comedian and actor Peter Sellers has been quoted as saying that the problem with predicting the future is that it is like scratching yourself before you start to itch. As for climate change, the itch seems to be well-defined, even though the extent is still uncertain. As for plant production, the latest report from the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) from 2007 projects that, in addition to getting warmer, the climate will also become less stable. Major agricultural areas, in particular the large river deltas in Asia, will be threatened by the rising sea levels. It is predicted that the temperature

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increases will result in higher plant productivity in upland areas, while lowlying areas will see a decrease, particularly in tropical and subtropical regions. Globally, higher productivity is expected at temperature increases of up to 3 °C, while higher temperature increases will result in lower productivity. The speed of the climate change will be a very important factor. Slow changes will allow plant breeders and producers to gradually adjust plant production to the new growing conditions where existing varieties from other climate areas can be introduced and new varieties can be developed. Climate stability will be another important parameter. Higher and more fluctuating temperatures and precipitation will stress the plants and result in lower yields. The environmental impact is also expected to change, taking the form of new plant diseases and pests. These effects are currently being assessed worldwide in experiments and by designing models, and a complex picture is painted for the various combinations of crops and diseases/pests with both positive and negative effects on crop productivity and yields.

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A third parameter of major importance is the atmospheric content of carbon dioxide (CO2). CO2 is the raw material for the photosynthesis of plants, and it is well-documented that for most plants higher CO2 levels will lead to higher productivity and yields. A doubling of CO2 levels will thus increase yields by 10‑25 per cent. At higher CO2 concentrations, plants will also consume less water as the leaves’ stomata can remain closed for a longer period as there is sufficient CO2. Some researchers actually believe that the most frequent type of photosynthesis, the so-called C3, was developed for an atmosphere with considerably higher CO2 levels than those seen today. There is, however, a downside to higher productivity. The increase will primarily be in the form of carbohydrates, while the content of minerals, some vitamins and proteins will be relatively lower. This will affect the quality of the products, for example the baking quality of wheat, and result in lower nutritional values, a problem which will in particular affect poor populations in the developing countries whose basic diet consists of wheat, rice, corn, cassava and potatoes (Easterling et al., 2007). How are we then prepared for a Biorevolution? Our understanding of the genetic basis for the properties of our crop plants is rapidly developing. Today, we know the complete structure – sequence – of all genes in rice, corn and alfalfa, and for barley and wheat steps have been taken to sequence parts of these plants’ chromosomes. A complete sequence is also available for a number of so-called model plants, i.e. plants that are simple to use in experiments. It is now possible to test how thousands of plant genes respond to external factors such as drought, cold, salt stress and disease attacks and which genetic mechanisms determine the plant’s constituents and development, including flowering, fructification and seed production. At the same time, today’s very detailed genetic tools can quickly generate detailed genetic maps and identify so-called genetic markers for a number of properties.

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This knowledge provides us with a number of opportunities to improve plant properties. In some cases, it will be possible to introduce these properties from wild relatives by cross-breeding or by inducing changes of the genes’ properties by irradiation or chemical treatment. In other cases, genetic engineering will be required. Different researchers can have different preferences regarding their choice of technology. I personally believe that genetic modification provides us with far more opportunities and a much quicker and more efficient breeding process than cross-breeding and mutagenesis.

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Growing genetically engineered plants is today well-established in all parts of the world with the exception of Europe where only Spain uses a significant proportion of its agricultural area (approx. 50,000 hectares) for growing genetically modified corn (James, 2007). In 2007, 114 million hectares were used for cultivating GM crops globally, an increase of 12 per cent on 2006. The crops were cultivated in 23 countries by more than ten million farmers, 90 per cent of whom live in developing countries. The crops include almost exclusively herbicide-resistant (HR) soya, insect-resistant (IR) and/or HR corn and cotton as well as HR rape. In addition, smaller areas are used for cultivating virus-resistant papaya and HR squash. The insect resistance is based on the production of the so-called Bt toxin in the above-ground parts of the plant or in the roots, and the herbicide resistance is against glyphosate (Roundup) or glufosinate (Basta), the glyphosate resistance being the dominant technology. A significant increase is being seen in the number of corn and cotton varieties with both insect and herbicide resistance. According to Brookes and Barfoot (2006), GM crops have increased the net income of GM growers by USD 27 billion in the 1996‑2005 period (USD 5 billion in 2005). Their calculations also show that the introduction of HR and IR crops over a ten-year period has led to a reduction in the pesticide consumption of 224,000 tonnes of active substance as well as a 15 per cent reduction in the so-called Environmental Impact Quotient (EIQ), which is calculated on the basis of the amount of active substance used, the toxicity and degradation rate of the pesticide as well as discharge to the surroundings. In a climate context, it is very interesting to note that the cultivation of GM crops has resulted in a reduction of CO2 emissions of around 1 million tonnes due to less driving in the fields. HR crops make it possible to dispense with soil preparation altogether, which has resulted in the binding of an additional 8 million tonnes of CO2 in the ground. The implementation of particularly Bt cotton has reduced insecticide spraying considerably, especially in the developing countries, with measurable positive health effects for farm workers. We thus have a technology at our disposal which in a very short time has had a significant impact on global plant production and benefited both the economy and the environment. So far, only four species have the HR and/or IR resistance properties. A large number of other plant species with other properties have been subjected to field tests, but so far only those mentioned above have proved commercially viable. Today, new genetically engineered varieties are developed in the private sector by multinationals (with China and India as

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The discussion on the use of gene technology in food production has been characterised by considerable public scepticism about the technology. Here, a group of Spanish demonstrators are protesting against genetically modified plants at a conference for plant biotechnologists held on Tenerife in 2007. (Photo: Preben Bach Holm)

potential exceptions). It is thus difficult to predict which new crops are in the pipeline for commercialisation, but according to the companies, their main focus is on crops with better nutritional properties and varieties with high drought tolerance (Monsanto, 2008). So how can we use genetic modification of our cultivated plants today as a tool for adapting to future climate change? We have come far in terms of technology and knowledge, but far more comprehensive and focused research and development initiatives are required to handle the necessary complex changes. In this context, the public sector must play a much larger role to promote the development of new varieties based on the long-term needs of society and not leave the technology to a small handful of breeding companies which, for obvious reasons, have to focus on earnings and their short-term bottom line. The EU area needs, in particular, a much speedier approvals procedure for genetically modified plants as the existing regulations are very comprehensive and make it a very slow and costly process for applicants wanting to market new varieties. It goes without saying that new genetically modified varieties should be subjected to a risk assessment, but as the extremely comprehensive risk assessments still have not revealed any significant problems regarding the health and environmental effects of genetically modified plants, the caution exercised today seems to overshoot the mark (Sanvido et al., 2006 and European Food Safety Agency, 2008).

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The debate over the past ten years has shown that for some people genetically modified plants pose a number of ethical and attitudinal dilemmas where genetic modification is seen as part of undesirable industrialised agriculture where the natural world is manipulated. Others conclude that there is no need to take any risk, irrespective of how hypothetical it may be, with these crops if there are no benefits. A lot suggests that the latter group, which probably includes most citizens, is starting to take a more positive view in light of the future scenarios involving climate change and increasing food and energy prices. In this discussion, it is crucial that the population is given a free choice and that you respect that there are different opinions on future plant production and solution models. This choice is not possible without information on the pros and cons based on facts and science.

References

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Brookes G & Barfoot P (2006): Global impact of biotech crops: Socio-economic and environmental effect in the first ten years of commercial use. AgbioForum 9, pp. 139‑151. James C (2007): Global status of commercialized biotech/GM crops: 2007. ISAAA Briefs 37‑2007. www. isaaa.org. Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations (2002): World Agriculture: towards 2015‑2030. Food and Agricultural Organisation of the United Nations. http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/y3557e/y3557e00.htm Easterling WE, Aggarwal PK, Batima P, Brander KM, Erda L, Howden SM, Kirilenko A, Morton J, Soussana JF, Schmidhuber J & Tubiello FN (2007): Food, fibre and forest products. Climate Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, in Cambridge University Press, pp. 273‑313. http://www.ipcc.ch/ pdf/assessment-report/ar4/wg2/ar4‑wg2‑chapter5.pdf European Food Safety Agency GMO Panel Working Group on Animal Feeding Trials (2008): Safety and nutritional assessment of GM plants and derived food and feed: The role of animal feeding trials. Food Chem. Tox. 46, 2‑70. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Green_Revolution Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (2007): Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar4/syr/ar4_syr.pdf Monsanto (2008): Monsanto R&D Pipeline 2008. http://www.monsanto.com/pdf/ products/2008_monsanto_pipeline.pdf Sanvido O, Stark M, Romeis J, Bigler F (2006): Ecological impact of genetically modified crops – Experiences from ten years of experimental field research and commercial cultivation. Federal Department of Economic Affairs DEA, ART-Schriftenreihe 1, p. 85. http:// www.art.admin.ch/dms_files/03017_de.pdf von Braun J, Ahmed A, Asenso-Okyere K, Fan S, Gulati A, Hoddinott J, Panday-Lorch R, Rosegrant M, Ruel M, Torero M, van Rheenen T & von Grebner K (2008): High food prices; the what, who and how of proposed policy actions. IFPRI Policy Brief 1A. Washington DC. http://www.ifpri.org/PUBS/ib/FoodPricesPolicyAction.pdf

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GMOs: The right way of taking responsibility? R ik k e Bagger Jørgensen

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Global climate change is caused by the industrialised countries’ energy consumption and pollution, but it is the developing countries that will face by far the biggest problems with the future climate (IPCC, 2007). The developing countries are where extreme climate events and natural disasters will most frequently occur, where the cultivated area will be reduced most owing to higher temperatures and where biodiversity will be most threatened due to increased deforestation and the invasion of new species (Abate et al., 2008 and IPCC, 2007). We, in the rich part of the world, are the environmental sinners and the developing countries are the victims, so we thus have a major responsibility to fight hunger and increase the living standards in the poor parts of the world. We can do so by contributing to fair, environmentally correct and socially sustainable development in the developing countries. If we do not take action on this injustice here and now, the result will be increased political tension between the developing countries and the developed world. How do we prevent food shortages when agricultural production is under pressure due to extreme climatic conditions? Are genetically modified organisms (GMOs) adapted to the changed environment the solution to the problems of global hunger? Promoting GMOs as a panacea to the challenges which global food production is facing has not lacked backing. In the industrialised world, both Danish politicians and opinion-makers (e.g. the Danish Minister for Food, Agriculture and Fisheries Eva Kjer Hansen), international politicians (former US President George Bush) and the agrochemical industry (Monsanto, 2008) have been advocating the message that GMOs should save future agricultural production.

Multinational biotech companies have accelerated their production of GMOs But are GMOs the answer to the challenges resulting from climate change? Today, it is possible to produce genetically modified, climate-tolerant crops which can resist drought and high temperatures and which can grow on land with a high salt content (Hitesh et al., 2007). Intensive research is being

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conducted in this area, and major agrochemical companies such as BASF, Syngenta and Monsanto have apparently already started patenting genes which make plants tolerant to environmental stress. Several hundred patent applications have been submitted to cover the use of climate-related gene families. Spokespersons for the agrochemical companies state that it is necessary to patent the genes to effectively meet the world’s hunger problems (Washington Post, 2008). So are these companies on a philanthropic mission with the purpose of feeding hungry people in the developing countries? There is no doubt that the large agrochemical companies would like to sell their stress-tolerant varieties to Africa, South America and Asia, because, as we know, genetically modified varieties cannot be sold to the Europeans who are frightened of GMOs! According to Eurobarometer, approx. 75 per cent of European consumers are negative towards GMO technology, and the food crisis has not altered this picture much; for example, in France and the UK the opposition is actually growing (Block, 2008).

Locally adapted varieties are flexible to climate change

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If genetically modified varieties of the cultivated plants are part of the solution to the food crisis in the developing countries, the GM varieties should be developed from locally adapted plant material (Cohen, 2005). The local genotypes have been selected over centuries and are thus particularly well adapted to the local environment. The majority of these will be far more genetically diverse than the modern varieties which we can supply. This diversity serves as a buffer against local stress factors, and the diversity cannot be replaced by a limited number of inserted GM traits (transgenes), coding for, e.g., drought, salt and temperature tolerance. The local needs are thus best met through public research and development of crops from local material and in local conditions. This means that the patented genes must be made available free of charge or at a low cost to countries which want to produce their own GM crops, so that the genes can be inserted or crossed into locally adapted material. Dare we believe that the multinational patent holders will make the genes available free of charge? This means that the patent holders will also have to waive their patent rights to farm-saved seeds. Taking out seed from the harvest as seed for the next crop is common practice for farmers, especially in developing countries. The Monsanto vs. Percy Schmeiser case shows that farm-saved seed is not accepted in industrialised countries. In the light of this case, it is difficult to imagine that companies like Monsanto would allow farm-saved seed in the potentially large markets in Africa, South America and Asia as this would undermine their market potential.

Do GM varieties give better yields for developing countries? Conventional types of biotechnology like Marker-Assisted Selection (MAS) in breeding, in vitro culture, fermentation etc. are widely accepted and used in developing countries and have increased the yields for many crops (Abate,

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Monsanto vs Schmeiser

Box 1

In 1998, Monsanto filed a lawsuit against Percy Schmeiser, a farmer from Saskatchewan in Canada, because the company believed that he had deliberately taken seeds from their GM Roundup-resistant variety for seeding his field the following year. As the genes inserted into the GM varieties are patented, you waive your right to use farm-saved seed when you buy a batch of seeds from a GM variety. However, Percy Schmeiser claimed that the GM seeds were dispersed by wind to his field from neighbouring fields and that he was thus entitled to harvest the plants sprouting from the seed and use them for seeding; he was, after all, under no obligations to Monsanto.

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Schmeiser became an international symbol for the groups and movements working against GMOs in food production. The public debate focused to a large extent on the problems related to GM plants from neighbouring fields polluting non-genetically modified crops. The Canadian Supreme Court did not deal with this issue, but in 2004 found Schmeiser guilty of deliberately infringing Monsanto’s patent rights by collecting seeds from the genetically modified plants. The court decided, however, at the same time that Schmeiser should not pay any damages to Monsanto as it could not be proved that he had made any extra profit by using Monsanto’s plants.

Percy Schmeiser. In an out-of-court settlement, Schmeiser settled his lawsuit with Monsanto in 2008 as Monsanto agreed to pay all clean-up costs of removing GM plants from   Schmeiser’s field.

2008). Whether GM crops result in increased yields is, however, far from certain. Data show, for example, that the yields for some GM crops in a given year may be 10‑33 per cent higher in one location and lower in other locations (Abate,

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2008). Figures from the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications show that it is mainly the growing of Bt cotton in China and India and the growing of herbicide-resistant soya beans in South America which have been successful (Brookes & Barfoot, 2006)  – it is profitable business to cut down the rainforest to grow GM soya beans for bioethanol, which, among other things, is exported to the USA and Europe. The low yields for many GM crops are, among other things, due to the very limited selection of GM crop varieties. The poor variety selection is blamed on patent rights, know-how and the high production costs for a new GM variety. Only the large multinational biotech companies have the patents, knowledge and financial resources required to develop the varieties and have them approved, and they have no direct interest in producing several different varieties. The developing countries which choose to cultivate the West’s highly bred GM varieties will typically cultivate them under low-input conditions, which will often result in low yields: “You get fantastic yields if you are able to apply fertilizer and water at the right times and herbicides to go along with that. Unfortunately most African farmers cannot afford these inputs” (N. Zerbe, 2004).

Risk assessment and legislation – developing countries lagging behind

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Even though most GM crops produced in developed countries have been subjected to thorough risk assessment, this risk assessment will probably have to be repeated if the crop is to be cultivated elsewhere in a different environment. Interactions between the GM crop and ecosystems with totally different organisms imply that new scenarios have to be evaluated. Legislation is in place in both the USA and the EU which prescribes how the risk assessment should be performed (see, e.g., EU directive 2001/18/EC). In many developing countries, such regulation is, however, not yet in place (Nelkin et al., 1999). Without a scientifically based risk assessment and a regulated approvals procedure, ensuring environmentally secure cultivation will be a problem (Cohen, 2005). Thus, we have a moral obligation to contribute to providing the developing countries with the know-how required to guarantee a sensible assessment of the GM crops. For GM crops cultivated in areas where non-GM crops are also cultivated, it is important to establish co-existence legislation to prevent GM and non-GM crops from being mixed which will entail quality and financial risks – or maybe even lawsuits, like the Schmeiser case, from biotech companies if genes are spread naturally in the surroundings. GM cultivation may potentially undermine local cultivation strategies which ensure food safety and economic sustainability.

GMO food aid to Africa – politics as a co-player The US offer of food aid to southern Africa in 2002 is one example of how the West’s exports of GM varieties to developing countries are not just an unproblematic helping hand. Noah Zerbe, Professor at Humbolt State University,

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has reviewed the details of the food offer, and he believes there is reason to conclude that famine relief in southern Africa was not the real purpose of the generous US offer (Zerbe, 2004). The primary reason for the offer was to promote GM crops, increase their market distribution and, at the same time, ensure multinational agrochemical companies’ control of the market and last, but not least, to outmanoeuvre and isolate GMO-sceptical Europe. Southern Africa rejected the US food offer despite the imminent famine. According to Zerbe, the reason for this was not so much environmental and health concerns in connection with the GM crops but rather a question of the domestic and international political economy, in particular a fear of being excluded from the European market and the potential opportunity of obtaining an extra high price for crops certified as non-GM crops. If developing countries reject the West’s generous offers of GM crops, it may also be related to the history of the developing countries. Many developing countries are former colonies, and the resulting dependence on multinational agrochemical companies is too reminiscent of colonial times and may make it difficult to accept the varieties.

If GMOs are not the solution to the climate crisis, what is?

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There are many reasons why GM crops are not the solution to the developing countries’ climate problems. To name but a few: ππ Patented transgenes and the associated limitations in breeding and cultivation strategies ππ Lack of locally adapted varieties for low-input farming ππ Lack of both technology and technology assessment know-how (risk assessment and co-existence rules) The main reasons for the food crisis affecting the developing countries today are the lack of investment in their agricultural sectors over the past 30 years and an unequal distribution of the world’s food due to trade restrictions (Abate, 2008). What the developing countries need are investments which can stimulate the production of high-value crops and crops with unexploited potential, trade barriers between developing and developed countries must be removed, the local markets with their multifunctional activities must be stimulated, and the local communities must be assured a guaranteed food supply and quality. Forget all the talk about GM crops being the only hope – focusing on GM crops deflects the attention from the larger picture and the fact that it is first and foremost the more basic and conventional areas of the developing countries’ agricultural sectors which need resources. You cannot rule out that GM crops in some cases may be the solution to specific cultivation problems, but GM crops are and will only be one of many small elements in the solution which will prepare the developing countries for the future climate change.

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GM crops and the developed world But global climate change will also affect the developed countries. So will GMOs play a role in our farming? Not that we will suffer much from climate change – on the contrary actually. The thing is that the higher temperatures will most likely increase agricultural production in at least northern Europe (IPCC, 2007). The argument for using GMOs here in Scandinavia has also been that we must produce more so we can export food to countries which cannot feed themselves. But the fact that we must profit from their hunger clearly does not help solve the problems in the developing countries. The developing countries will become even more dependent on imported food than is the case today, and unless they have other products which we demand, their economies will come under even more pressure.

References

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Abate T, Albergel J, Armbrecht I, Avato P, Bajaj S, Beintema N, ben Zid R, Brown R, Butler LM, Dreyfus F, Ebi KL, Feldman S, Gana A, Gonzales T, Gurib-Fakim A, Heinemann J, Herrmann T, Hilbeck A, Hurni H, Huyer S, Jiggins J, Kagwanja J, Kairo M, Kingamkono RR, Kranjac-Berisavljevic G, Latiri K, Leakey R, Lefort M, Lock K, Herrmann T, Mekonnen Y, Murray D, Nathan D, Ndlovu L, OsmanElasha B, Perfecto J, Plencovich C, Raina R, Robinson E, Roling N, Rosegrant M, Rosenthal E, Shah WP, Stone JMR, Suleri A, Yang H (2008): Report from an Intergovernmental Plenary Session in Johannesburg, South Africa, April 2008. International Assessment of Agricultural Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD). http://www.agassessment.org/index.cfm?Page=About_ IAASTD&ItemID=2 Block B (2008): British GMO Protests Highlight Global Divide. Worldwatch. http://www. worldwatch.org/node/5838 Brookes G & Barfoot P (2006): GM Crops: The First Ten Years – Global SocioEconomic and Environmental Impacts. ISAAA Brief No. 36. The International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-biotech Applications. Cohen JI (2005): Poorer nations turn to publicly developed GM crops. Nature Biotechnology 23, pp. 27‑33. EU directive 2001/18 EC. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32001L0018:DA:HTML Kathuria H, Giri J, Tyagi H & Tyagi AK (2007): Advances in Transgenic Rice Biotechnology. Critical Reviews in Plant Sciences 26, pp. 65‑103 http://www. informaworld.com/smpp/title~content=t713400911~db=all~tab=issueslist~br anches=26 – v26 Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) (2007): Climate Change 2007. Synthesis Report. Fourth Assessment Report. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. http://www.ipcc.ch/ipccreports/ar4‑syr.htm Monsanto (2008): Agriculture Can Help Keep Carbon in Balance. Monsanto. http://www. monsanto.com/responsibility/our_pledge/healthier_environment/carbon_ sequestration.asp Nelkin D, Sands P & Stewart RB (1999): The International Challenge of Genetically Modified Organism Regulation. ASIL Insights Vol.8, 3, The American Society of International Law. http://www1.law.nyu.edu/journals/envtllaw/issues/vol8/3/ v8n3a1.pdf

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Philips L (2008): Brussels approves GMO bean despite public fears. EUobserver. http:// euobserver.com/9/26710 Webinfrance (2008): Consumers in France reject genetically modified crops ahead of French parliament vote. Web in France Magazine. http://www.webinfrance.com/consumers-in-france-reject-genetically-modified-cropsahead-of-french-parliament-vote-205.html Weiss R (2008): Firms Seek Patents on ‘Climate Ready’ Altered Crops. Washington Post, 13 May http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/12/ AR2008051202919.html Zerbe N (2004): Feeding the famine? American food aid and the GMO debate in Southern Africa. Food Policy 29, pp. 593‑608.

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Case 2  ∏  Genetically modified organisms

Study questions 1 According to the two authors, which role can GMOs play in connection with the changes in food production which appear to be caused by climate change? 2 On which arguments do they base their assumptions? 3 How do the two authors assess the risk of developing and using GMOs? 4 How do the two authors regard public scepticism about GMOs and the significance of this scepticism for future development? 5 Which ethical problems do the two authors highlight in connection with GMOs? 6 Discuss whether the two authors’ disagreement is primarily due to different interpretations of the natural scientific knowledge in the area or to different values?

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Case 3  ∏  Trading in CO2 quotas

CO2 trading. A cost-efficient tool to achieve political goals? Ale x Dubg a ar d

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Let there be no doubt: Trading in CO2 reduction commitments does not in itself solve the greenhouse effect problems. The anthropogenic greenhouse effect can only be limited through physical changes in the form of reduced fossil fuel consumption, biological carbon sequestration and other measures that limit greenhouse gas build-up in the atmosphere. In other words, you cannot globally buy your way out of the problems. The purpose of CO2 trading is to realise the politically agreed reductions as cost-effectively as possible for society/the world in general. The overall objective is thus politically determined, while the market is used to allocate the agreed reduction between countries, producers and consumers. Not until then does it make sense to talk about ‘buying your way out of the problems.’ By trading in CO2 reduction commitments, individual countries and individual emitters can pay someone else to take over (some of ) their commitments, in much the same way as the normal division of labour between countries and producers in connection with the production of goods and services. The reasoning is also the same: Through a division of labour between countries and producers, considerable cost savings may be achieved – and thus potentially more welfare gained for all.

Cost-effectiveness Thus, the purpose of CO2 trading is rather limited. It is not about giving priority to controlling the greenhouse effect over other national or global problems. This prioritisation takes place politically through the acceptance of reduction commitments before CO2 trading is implemented. Nor is it about how we get the best pollution control for a given sum of money. The justification for CO2 trading is not that there is a specific sum of money available for controlling the greenhouse effect. As mentioned above, it is a political decision how much greenhouse gas emissions should be reduced – not how much it should cost. The economic rationale for CO2 trading is to realise the politically determined reduction target as cost-effectively as possible for society. It is thus a question of employing cost-effective economic regulation instruments to realise an already adopted political objective.

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Kyoto Protocol

Box 1

Under the Kyoto Protocol, which was adopted in 1997, a number of industrialised countries and transition economies have committed themselves to reducing their greenhouse gas emissions in the 2008‑2012 period. Less developed participating countries have undertaken no quantitative reduction commitments. The Kyoto Protocol allows the participating countries to apply three flexible mechanisms to facilitate a cost-effective realisation of the reduction commitments:

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1. Emissions trading (ETS). The ETS means that industrialised countries reducing their emissions more than their commitment level can sell emission rights to other industrialised countries which want to emit more than permitted. Trade is conducted in terms of Assigned Amount Units (AAUs). One AAU represents the tradable right to emit one metric ton of CO2‑equivalent. Quota trading is described in more detail in Box 2. 2. Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The CDM allows the industrialised participating countries to fund projects which reduce the emission of greenhouse gases in other countries – primarily less developed participating countries without reduction commitments. For each project, an independent commission must confirm that the reductions in question are additional reductions in relation to a realistic base line. The commission then issues Certified Emission Rights (CER) which are credited to the balance for emission reductions in the country funding the project. 3.  Joint Implementation (JI). JI allows the industrialised participating countries to fund emission-reducing projects in other countries with reduction commitments and subsequently have the reduction credited to their own reduction obligations. If the host country meets a number of specific requirements, it may issue Emission Reduction Units (ERU) itself. If not, as is the case with the CDM, the reduction must be confirmed by an independent commission. A network of national registers keeps track of the holdings of AAUs, CERs and ERUs which all represent one tonne of CO2 equivalents per unit. These units are called Kyoto units and together make up the individual country’s Kyoto account. Under the so-called supplementary principle set out in the Kyoto Protocol, national emission reductions must constitute a significant element of the effort. How much a ‘significant element’ is in practice has not been specified in detail, but the EU argues that it should be at least 50 per cent of the total reduction commitment. In the Danish allocation plan for 2008‑2012, an upper limit of 19 per cent of the quota allocation (32.5 per cent for electricity production) has been set for the use of JI/CDM credits. Sources: United Nations (1998) and United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change

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The regulation instruments cannot help define what the overall reduction target should comprise. To this end, economic analysis instruments such as cost-benefit and cost-effectiveness analysis may be used. The purpose of a cost-benefit analysis is – in short – to identify the scope of socially optimal pollution reductions, whereas as a cost-effectiveness analysis is used to answer questions such as: How do we get the best environment/pollution control for a given sum of money (Pearce et al., 2006)? Economic analysis instruments will not be described in further detail here, as they are of no relevance in themselves to the issue of the pros and cons of CO2 trading.

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One may ask why it should be cheaper to realise a given reduction target by letting the market determine the allocation of the reduction commitments. Here, it will be useful to first take a closer look at the Kyoto Protocol, which is described in Box 1. Under the Kyoto Protocol, the industrialised countries have committed themselves to individually agreed reductions in their greenhouse gas emissions. The industrialised countries must together reduce their emissions by 5.2 per cent relative to their 1990 levels, whereas no quantitative reduction commitments are imposed on less developed countries. The EU has committed itself to a total reduction of 8 per cent, distributed among the member states in accordance with the EU’s Burden-Sharing Agreement from 1998. Denmark and Germany agreed to reduce their emissions by 21 per cent, which, in the case of Germany, however should be seen in the light of the already implemented and expected closure of obsolete heavy industries. By comparison, the Netherlands must reduce its emissions by 6 per cent, France by 0 per cent, whereas Sweden has been granted permission to increase its emissions by 4 per cent. The background for the high emission reduction targets in Denmark and Germany is that both countries have relatively high emissions of greenhouse gases per inhabitant, among other things because a considerable share of their power generation is coal-fired. France and Sweden, on the other hand, have based a large proportion of their power generation on non-CO2‑emitting nuclear power and hydropower. The differences in reduction costs have to some extent been taken into consideration when establishing the individual countries’ reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. However, considerable variations in the marginal reduction costs from country to country should be expected. In this context, marginal reduction costs means the reduction costs per tonne of CO2 equivalents in connection with successive reductions until the overall reduction target has been reached. At the beginning, it will generally be possible to obtain energy savings and technology improvements at low reduction costs, but once the low-hanging fruit has been picked, the marginal reduction costs will increase. Differences in marginal reduction costs are what provides the rationale for CO2 trading. If the marginal reduction costs are higher in country A than in country B, it will be advantageous for the two countries to reallocate their reduction commitments, so that country A pays country B for assuming (a part) of country A’s reduction commitments. The same applies to companies with different marginal reduction costs. In a competitive CO2 market, reallocation

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through trading transactions will continue until the marginal reduction costs have been equalised between countries and businesses. Equal marginal reduction costs for all polluters is the basic condition in environmental economics for social cost-effectiveness of pollution control (Perman et al., 2003). If this condition is met, no additional savings can be achieved by trading in reduction commitments. CO2 trading enables flexible adjustment to the reduction requirements set out in the Kyoto Protocol under the conditions described in Box 1 and Box 2. Countries and companies with high marginal reduction costs will only reduce their emissions by a relatively small proportion and will instead buy CO2 emis-

The EU quota system for greenhouse gas emissions Box 2

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The EU has adopted a directive establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community. The scheme covers a significant part of the energy sector and the energy-intensive industries. The purpose of the scheme is to contribute to a more costeffective reduction of the emission of greenhouse gases. Enterprises in the sectors covered by the quota system are allocated rights to emit a certain amount of greenhouse gases in the form of CO2 emission allowances or quotas. The rights can be purchased and sold in the quota market. Enterprises which believe that they can profit from reducing their greenhouse gas emissions by more than is required according to their quota allocation are allowed to sell their quotas. Similarly, if an enterprise expects that it can profit from emitting more CO2 than its own emission allowances, it can buy quotas. In other words, enterprises can only exceed their emission allowance by paying other to keep their CO2 emissions correspondingly below their emission allowances. The total amount of emission allowances thus make up an EU ceiling on the CO2 emissions in the sectors covered by the scheme. Under the existing system, at least 90 per cent of the emission allowances are free, whereas the rest are auctioned off. The European Commission has, however, presented a proposal for a climate and energy package for the 2012‑20 period in which the allocation of free emission allowances will gradually be replaced by the auctioning-off of quotas. In future, enterprises covered by the emission allowance trading system will have to pay for their entire emission of greenhouse gases. This cost will (to a greater or lesser extent) be transferred to consumers in the form of higher prices of electricity and other energy-intensive products. This will give consumers even stronger economic incentives to save energy and to reduce their consumption of energy-intensive products. Source: The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (2003).

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sion quotas. These quotas will be offered by countries and companies with relatively low marginal reduction costs, which, in turn, will have to reduce their physical emissions correspondingly. As neither party may emit more than their respective quota, the overall reduction target will be realised as a result of this arrangement – and, what is more, at lower costs than without a reallocation of reduction commitments. The fact that the level of reduction varies geographically is irrelevant to the climate. The greenhouse effect of one CO2 equivalent is the same regardless of where it is emitted.

Objections to CO2 trading The economic justification for CO2 trading is based on the ethical position that minimising the costs of achieving a social (e.g. environmental) objective is a good thing, all other things being equal. Cost minimisation means that there will be more resources (in the form of labour, capital etc.) available for other social purposes, such as the production of goods and services, additional environmental improvements or other things desired by society. Based on this assumption, CO2 trading contributes to increasing social welfare. It is based on this assumption that most economists recommend CO2 trading. The incorporation of the various flexible mechanisms in the Kyoto Protocol demonstrates that there is also political backing for this view.

Cases

But there are (of course) different opinions on CO2 trading. Some of the objections are economic by nature as they do not reject the ethical assumptions behind CO2 trading but question whether the assumptions regarding costeffectiveness/economic welfare gain will in fact be realised. It’s a frequent argument against CO2 trading that the money would be better spent on reducing greenhouse gas emissions at home rather than spending it abroad to buy CO2 quotas. Another objection made is that CO2 trading will enable Eastern European countries to sell emission allowances which they do not utilise today, thus eroding the reduction target set out in the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, some of the flexible mechanisms are criticised, as it is claimed that it is difficult to control whether there are real reductions behind the transactions. Some critics also dismiss, however, that cost savings can be seen as an ethically acceptable reason for allowing CO2 trading. The underlying ethical position is typically that we, as a society, have an obligation to take care of the pollution problems we create ourselves – and not pay our way out of it. We will start by taking a closer look at the economic points of criticism.

Is it (always) best to spend the money domestically? As mentioned above, one of the arguments often put forward is that it must be best for society if the money is spent on greenhouse gas reductions at home instead of paying other countries to do so. This claim is typically based on two arguments: 1) If investments are made in domestic reduction measures, it will generate economic activity and employment in the country and thus

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more welfare; 2) Supporting alternative energy and energy savings domestically will promote technological development and create first-mover benefits. Major objections may be raised in both cases. It is, of course, correct that investments in local energy-saving measures will typically have an effect on employment. However, this is only a relevant economic argument if the labour (and capital) involved does not have alternative employment opportunities. In a situation characterised by labour shortages, the employment argument is of no relevance to society in general (but could be in fringe areas with permanent employment problems). Even if unemployment goes up, it is doubtful whether energy investments are a suitable instrument for reducing cyclical fluctuations, as climate policy should rest on long-term objectives and measures.

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As for the development of new technologies, it is often overlooked that CO2 trading per se will generate incentives for developing new technologies, as CO2 trading increases the costs of emitting greenhouse gases for producers and consumers. This in turn makes it economically more attractive to develop and implement energy-saving and renewable energy technologies. On the other hand, this does not mean that all technological development should be left to market forces alone. There are still reasons for supporting what is called learning-by-doing industries where a new technology must be applied to generate the improvements that may gradually render it competitive. That may justify subsidies for renewable energy technologies such as solar cells and wave energy. But it is important that these subsidies are phased out when the technology has reached a development stage where it can – or should be able to – compete under market conditions.

‘Hot air’ Due to a major economic decline since the collapse of communism, the greenhouse gas emissions of Russia and the Ukraine have dropped more than their national reduction commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. The two countries have the option of selling their emission allowances in the quota market. Critics claim that trading in these surplus emission rights, also named hot air, will undermine the overall efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. The criticism is, however, based on questionable (economic) assumptions. As the economy grows in Russia and the Ukraine, the emission of greenhouse gases will increase. The possibility of selling CO2 quotas to other countries means that, for society, there is a positive shadow price of increasing greenhouse gas emissions. The shadow price equals the price of CO2 emission allowances. In other words, CO2 trading will provide the same economic incentives for limiting greenhouse gas emissions, irrespective of whether a country has an emission allowance surplus or deficit. Without CO2 trading, the incentives for limiting the emission of greenhouse gases would be considerably smaller in countries with emissions below their emission allowance under the Kyoto Protocol.

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Control problems Control problems in connection with CO2 trading are associated, in particular, with the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation instruments, which are described in detail in Box 1. In both instances, industrialised countries have the option of meeting some of their reduction commitments by funding projects which reduce greenhouse gas emissions in other (less developed) countries. An example of this is Denmark’s funding, under the Clean Development One of the most debated issues in connection with the Kyoto Protocol is the US aversion to mandatory greenhouse gas emission targets. Here, the environmental organisation Greenpeace offers its views on the possible outcome of non-US participation.

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Mechanism, of a power plant in Malaysia fired with biomass instead of diesel oil. Under the Joint Implementation scheme, Denmark is, among other projects, funding a geothermal project in Romania to replace lignite-based energy production. It may, of course, be difficult to decide whether the reductions in greenhouse gases would not have occurred anyway, i.e. to which extent the reductions are additional reductions. Still, the parties are not free to decide themselves how large a reduction a project will give. As explained in Box 1, independent bodies must approve the Certified Emission Rights and Emission Reduction Units issued under the two schemes. Finally, the supplementarity principle limits the extent to which CO2 trading can be used to meet the individual countries’ mitigation obligations – such as described in more detail in Box 1.

Ethical aspects

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In the absence of CO2 trading, each country will have to reduce its own greenhouse gas emissions to the extent specified by the Kyoto Protocol. It is probably a widely held opinion that this is the most reasonable approach – even though it may not be the least-cost solution for the participating countries. Most economists find it difficult to see the point of rejecting taxes on pollution or trading in pollution permits if it does not affect anyone negatively but only means that pollution control takes place at lower costs. In a climate context, it is irrelevant which countries reduce the emission of green house gases. The emission of greenhouse gases is a so-called uniform global pollution which has the same effect on the climate irrespective of where the emissions occur. Therefore, it does not matter which countries are reducing their emissions as long as total global emissions are reduced sufficiently. Optimal or cost-effective use of society’s scarce resources play a central role in economic theory. The economic paradigm is based on consequentialist ethics where the ‘good’ which society should seek to achieve is the satisfaction of the desires and needs of its citizens to the highest extent possible (Hausman & McPherson, 1996). The needs of citizens are assumed to include goods and services in a wider sense, including the services delivered by the environment. Cost minimisation in connection with pollution control makes it possible to generate more of what citizens want. CO2 trading contributes to cutting the costs of controlling the greenhouse effect globally. It is therefore regarded as an economic control instrument which can promote the ‘good’.

Final observations – the market vs command and control The market is not the only resource allocation instrument available to society. Resource allocation may also take place through command and control where polluters are given more or less detailed instructions as to what they should produce and how – or how much and by means of what technology they should reduce their pollution. But achieving cost-effectiveness in centrally controlled production activities requires huge amounts of information about production opportunities and technology. Historical experiences with centrally planned

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economies have been conspicuously poor, and the political discussion about centrally planned economies vs market economies has practically ceased when it comes to the production of ordinary consumer and capital goods. Gradually, the notion of the advantages of the market has also had an impact on our views on how to organise pollution control. This has led to an increase in the use of incentive-based environmental control instruments – primarily in the form of green taxes and transferable pollution permits. It is important to note that the use of economic instruments does not imply that the definition of environmental objectives is left to the market. The extent to which pollution should be reduced is decided politically. It is then left to the market mechanism to allocate the reduction commitments among the polluters and, in connection with the Kyoto Protocol, also among the participating countries.

References

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Hausman DM & McPherson MS (1996): Economic analysis and moral philosophy, Cambridge University Press. Pearce D., Atkinson, G. and Mourato S. (2006): Cost-benefit analysis and the environment: Recent developments, OECD. Perman R, Common M, McGilvray J & Ma Y (2003): Natural Resource and Environmental Economics, Pearson Education. United Nations (1998): Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change: The Mechanisms under the Kyoto Protocol: Emissions Trading, the Clean Development Mechanism and Joint Implementation http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/items/1673.php The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union (2003): DIRECTIVE 2003/87/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 13 October 2003 establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and amending Council Directive 96/61/EC Official Journal of the European Union 25.10.2003 http://www.environ.ie/en/Legislation/ Environment/Atmosphere/FileDownLoad,20488,en.pdf

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Case 3  ∏  Trading in CO2 quotas

CO2 trading. Should you be able to buy your way out of the problems? Peder Agger

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In a market-dominated society, it is obvious to think that the problems with greenhouse gases are best solved by leaving them to the ‘market’. It is thus a question of, one way or the other, converting the relevant parts of the problems into commodities for which a price can be fixed and which can then be sold in the usual manner. Supply and demand will subsequently see to it that the costs are minimised and that the level and localisation of the production and consumption will be based on an overall consideration of what is most appropriate. As we live in a market-dominated society, I also believe that it is only natural that the market should contribute to at least some of the necessary regulation. But it is still a far cry from ‘buying your way out of the problems’. Below, I will try to explain why. I will restrict myself to focusing on one type of commodity: the CO2 quotas, i.e. the right to emit specific quantities of carbon dioxide or quantities of other gases having a similar effect that the countries which have ratified the Kyoto Protocol are allowed to emit and thus also sell in the market. If the total quantity of emissions allowed is set just below what is required, a demand for permits, and thus a market for these, is created. If a country wants to emit more CO2 than the quota allocated, it can either buy surplus quotas from another party or a documented reduction of a similar size must occur elsewhere, either as a result of reduced emissions or by binding extra CO2. The quota trading will typically take place between more or less developed industrialised countries, or when an industrialised country pays a developing country for increasing the use of renewable energy, increasing energy efficiency or by binding CO2 through flue gas purification, or in forests, in the soil or underground. The market is regulated by the so-called Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). The arrangement may be in the form of so-called Joint Implementation where one country meets its reduction target by investing in a project in another country which can then achieve its reductions with less costs. This solution model is, however, characterised by significant drawbacks.

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The critical perspective: The Indian environmental activist Vandana Shiva has said the following about the Kyoto Protocol: »… Kyoto introduced a system of emissions trading which in effect rewards the polluters by assigning them rights to degrade the atmosphere and allowing trading in these rights … Today, the emissions trading market totals USD 30 billion and is expected to reach USD 1 trillion. Meanwhile carbon dioxide emissions continue to increase, as do emissions from polluting industrial activities« (Information 2008).

Firstly, it is a drawback that even an ideally friction-free market will only be able to distribute the agreed total quantity of quotas in accordance with the laws of the market. The market cannot reduce the total quantity of quotas to the level where it should be. This can only be fixed politically, which is attempted on the international political scene when discussions are held to decide which nations should reduce their emissions to a given percentage of their 1990 level and by when. In addition, the quotas allocated were initially so generous (and free of charge) that it will take years before the quota system will have any serious impact on total emissions. Another drawback is when a country’s CO2 reductions are only achieved by buying quotas abroad, which means that, as long as this situation applies, there will be no immediate incentive to develop technological or organisational solutions in the country in question to reduce local CO2 emissions. Quota trading may thus further delay the necessary long-term changes of infrastructure and building layout which should preferably start today and not tomorrow. What

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is at stake is, in other words, not only the economy but also the consequences for technological development and the acquisition of knowledge. Thirdly, there are also political problems: For ethical reasons, many citizens do not want us to shirk our responsibilities by trying to buy our way out of the problems in this way. It may even resemble an attempt at absolution – a sale of indulgences that relieves us from doing anything ourselves. We distance ourselves from the problem. We can lean back, make a few adjustments to our development aid and otherwise carry on as before. If no changes take place at home, the entire effort will be seen as ‘hot air’. This is where ethics comes into the picture. Economic rationality is not enough. To make an impact – or to be accepted, at least – the policy must come from below: From the citizens, or rather from the citizens of the world who realise the necessity of this and who show solidarity with current and future generations. This realisation and solidarity will come and grow much more easily if the responsibility can also manifest itself in everyday life and through personal actions instead of through abstract appeals and complicated explanations. It is difficult for climate consciousness to manifest itself because greenhouse gases are invisible, there is a long way in terms of both time and space between cause and effect, and it may be difficult to see if our own minor contribution makes any difference at all.

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Finally, there is the question of verifying whether words equate to action in this market: What was the emission level before? How much CO2 is actually bound? Can we be sure that it does not just result in increased emissions elsewhere or later? The problems of establishing reliable control systems are manifold. In addition to the problems mentioned, i.e. establishing the total quantity of CO2, ensuring the technological development and build-up of knowledge, as well as the conscience and control aspects, there is the overall problem: That the emissions of greenhouse gases and the resulting change is not a simple, isolated problem which is easy to rank along with other, equally complex problems such as decreasing biodiversity, food shortages, poverty and health problems. The CO2 problem is, so to speak, just another element in the complex of problems resulting from society’s techno structure and our way of life as it has developed historically and geographically and which is difficult to think of as a commodity. “We have to prioritise,” is, however, the message from Bjørn Lomborg’s Copenhagen Consensus Conference which believes that fighting AIDS and ensuring clean drinking water should be given higher priority than controlling climate change, because “we cannot afford everything.” As if we have not been prioritising so far. It is actually the only thing politics is about. And as if we have a choice, e.g. as if we can afford to do nothing about AIDS, drinking water or the climate. But if we cannot afford to do what is required, we still have to find the funds because there is no alternative. The necessary path has got a name. It is called sustainable development.

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Sustainable development is a form of development that meets the needs of the present without compromising the possibility of future generations to meet their own (United Nations, 1988). Since it first appeared, this concept has been incorporated as an objective in many contexts (amongst others in the Amsterdam Treaty), but has also been the subject of so many interpretations that the concept has been accused of being void and ripe for condemnation. It has, however, proved so persistent that it has created a framework for a discussion that differs from what we have been used to, because the concept contains a number of ethical requirements which, maybe not individually, but together contain important new elements. Today’s society must: ππ ππ ππ ππ

Take into account the needs of future generations Ensure a fair distribution of resources among the world’s populations Respect the limits imposed by the natural world Contribute to bringing about a revitalisation of the economy: ‘Producing more with less.’

Cases

By linking environmental protection and development and by insisting on globality and the long-term perspective and equality, sustainable development is a normative concept, which may be growth-oriented, but only within the framework dictated by the planet and the natural world. You can say that sustainable development is a way of organising complex political discussions where natural scientific rationality and normative arguments may contribute to a more coherent understanding. Relying on the market to ensure sustainable development would, as we will see, be even more far-fetched than thinking that it can solve the CO2 problems. The normative part of the sustainability concept is simply out of reach of the economy. Where ethics is about values, politics is about how the value are distributed between the individual and the community, between existing and future generations, between humans and the natural world. Some of these values can be expressed in money terms. This means that the economy and the market still come into the picture as elements which, within certain political and temporal limits, may contribute to an appropriate distribution. In addition to distributing commodities such as CO2 quotas, the market may also distribute the cash flows so that they move in the most profitable direction. This makes it possible to subject activities and projects to cost-benefit analyses (CBA) where the total costs and profits may be compared. Here, it is assumed that the different commodities or services can be substituted with others. In this way, the loss of rainforest in Brazil, for example, may be worthwhile and indicate growth if the forest felled provides space for more profitable farming. For some of nature’s vital functions, there is, however, a critical limit for how much can be substituted. Many biologists and economists, for example, see eye to eye on this. But there is major disagreement as to what functions and how much is involved. Put simply, the economists believe, and with some justification, that it is up to natural science to say what is so important that it should be left out of the ‘substitution accounts’. But natural science is very

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reluctant to do so, among other things referring to the considerable uncertainty and lack of knowledge associated with this (Howarth, 2003). CBA is an analysis tool which can help identify economically sound solutions and is, as such, neutral. Its application does, however, have some limitations which may serve to illustrate some of the innate weaknesses of the environmental economy and thus also provide arguments for why CO2 trading is hardly able to solve all problems. The shortfalls may be summarised thus: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Lack of data and knowledge Unclear or inadequate welfare goal Methodological problems Lack of long-term perspective

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Re 1) When embarking on a calculation of economic sustainability, the lack of data is often significant. For example, when the Danish Economic Councils in 1998 set out to calculate whether Denmark was experiencing sustainable development, they had to confine their investigation to only looking at changes in the natural capital within the extraction of oil and natural gas, emissions of greenhouse gases and certain air pollutants, i.e. they restricted themselves to only looking at some of the most centralised and thoroughly controlled and, thus, well-documented elements of Danish production and emission. In addition, no data exist on some very important areas, i.e. not only data but an actual understanding of how things work. Re 2) Cost-benefit analyses (CBA) are based on a welfare-economic theory which believes that it can provide the most effective prioritisation of the benefits of society based on the normative perception that the goal is the fulfilment of the population’s preferences. CBA cannot, however, decide which preferences are ‘good’ because one benefit may substitute the other. When the same formula is applied to all values, the political debate on value-relational issues, which is otherwise the essence of politics, is, so to speak, closed down. It is a problem, because in a liberal democracy each person is not only a consumer but also a citizen, and we want both to satisfy our own preferences and to discuss goals and visions on how society should be organised, ideas which make sense in our lives and which define our identity. CBA does not have any visions and is unable to set an upper limit for the total production. The economist Herman Daly has described it as follows: If you see economics as a ship that is being loaded, the market mechanism is likely to help place the cargo so that the ship does not capsize. But it cannot prevent the loading from continuing until the water is above the railings and the ship sinks. Re 3) CBA requires perfect competition in all markets, which means that a market price exists for all commodities, or that it, at least, can be estimated with some degree of certainty. Willingness-to-pay analyses will get you some of the way. Some of the criticism voiced against the economists’ work in this field may be based on a criticism of the gross domestic product (GDP) as an expression of welfare. GDP is, for example, not capable of including income distribution, unpaid labour, the black economy, health, education, freedom,

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security, peace, pollution, depletion of resources, cancer and crime. The economic sustainability concept is, to some extent, able to take into account many of these elements. An example of the problems which willingness-to-pay analyses are facing is that some population groups do not answer questions about the value of nature based on a CBA-based prioritisation, but carry out a value-rational weighing instead, perhaps because they confer rights on nature that we must respect. The balance between these different sets of values exists in the political process – not in the market. It is simply not possible to fix a price for several of the amenities that we want to pass on to future generations. The things in question are phenomena such as burial mounds and natural forests as well as the intangible value related to these, e.g. memories, sense of identity and aesthetic experiences.

Cases

Re 4) Climate change and biodiversity are processes that evolve over decades and centuries whereas the perspective of markets and economies is usually weeks, months and years. This timescale discrepancy is yet another source of limitation of CBA. Who dares, for example, predict the price of oil 50 years from now? This we need to know for a CBA to be taken seriously in the long term. Future expectations can be expressed in the so-called discount rate, which is the percentage rate of growth that one Danish krone, euro or dollar must be given in the next period to correspond to one Danish krone, euro or dollar today. If a high capitalisation rate is set, the expectations of the annual yield are high, and if a low rate is set, they are low. Calculations of long-term environmental and energy investments are thus extremely sensitive to the capitalisation rate used. In most countries, it is set lower (2‑3 per cent) than in Denmark, where the number crunchers at the Ministry of Finance set it high (6‑7 per cent). The future does not seem to be of much value to them. Could one imagine an ethical cost-benefit analysis? An analysis where the good things are weighed against the bad? This requires that all the good and bad thing can be substituted, i.e. included in the same formula. I will not deny that this is possible to some extent. But the nature of such an analysis means that it cannot be left to computers and number crunchers. It must be based on a political dialogue on the many new dilemmas brought about by international developments and which, ultimately, is about how we want to live on this planet. As part of a sustainable development, climate change must be something we both try to counter and adapt to. But CO2 trading neither can nor should be the main way to solve the climate problem. For market-dependent shortsighted business interests, a market solution is attractive. But for the long-term interests of the community, it can only be a temporary and limited means in a long-term strategy based on scientifically acknowledged conditions of existence and on all values, also those which the economy cannot grasp but which are crucial for the individual and for the political process.

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References

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Howarth RB (ed.) (2003): Ecological Economics, vol. 44. Elsevier. Information (2008): A cure that worsens the disease. Newspaper commentary. 13.02.2008, Information. http://www.information.dk/154677 United Nations (1988): Report of the World Commission on Environment and Development: Our Common Future. United Nations. http://www.un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm

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Case 3  ∏  Trading in CO2 quotas Study questions 1 What are the main arguments for and against CO2 trading according to the two authors? 2 Do they mainly disagree on scientific or value-based issues? 3 In which way do the two authors’ descriptions of the Kyoto Protocol mechanisms differ? 4 Which role may cost-benefit analysis play in connection with CO2 trading according to the two authors – and what are their arguments? 5 Which consequences will CO2 trading have for the development of technologies according to the two authors? 7 What ethical questions does CO2 trading raise according to the two authors?

Cases

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Further reading

Jørgen E. Olesen: The climate is changing – but why? Solomon S, Qin D, Manning M, Chen Z, Marquis M, Averyt KB, Tignor M & Miller HL (eds.) (2007): Climate Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK. The IPCC’s authoritative review of the causes of climate change, historical climate change and global as well as regional climate change projections. The report summarises the research conducted within the area in recent years. It is a comprehensive report but an executive summary briefly describes the main trends. The report can be downloaded from http://www. ipcc.ch. Houghton J (2004): Global warming. The complete briefing. Cambridge University Press. John Houghton has previously chaired the IPCC’s Working Group I. He has also headed one of the world’s leading climate research centres (the Hadley Centre in the UK). In this book, he provides a relatively simple yet wide-ranging description of climate change, its causes, consequences and what can be done to counter it.

Jørgen E. Olesen: What will happen? Scenarios for the future Parry ML, Canziani OF, Palutikof JP, van der Linden PJ & Hanson CE (2007): Climate change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. The IPCC’s authoritative review of observed consequences of climate change, vulnerability to these, effects of climate change on ecosystems and society as well as the opportunities for adaptation to climate change. The report summarises the research conducted within the area in recent years. It is a

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comprehensive report but an executive summary briefly describes the main trends. The report can be downloaded from www.ipcc.ch. Fink AH, Brücher T, Krüger A, Leckebusch GC, Pinto JG & Ulbrich U (2004): The 2003 European summer heatwaves and drought – Synoptic diagnosis and impact. Weather 59, pp. 209‑216. This article provides an insight into the future by looking at an event in the past. There is every reason to believe that the heatwave in 2003 was an early warning of what we can expect. The article describes the meteorological conditions for the heatwave as well as its many negative consequences. Stern N (2007): The economics of climate change: The Stern review. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. p. 602. Sir Nicholas Stern is Head of the UK Government Economic Service. His review of the economic consequences of climate change compared to what it will cost to counter the climate change was the first serious attempt to assess the economic consequences of climate change.

Matthias Heymann: How did climate research begin? Randall DA (ed.) (2000): General Circulation Development, Past Present and Future: The Proceedings of a Symposium in Honor of Akio Arakawa. Academic Press. This book contains a number of detailed contributions on the history of climate modelling written by the scientists involved as well as a very useful overview written by the science historian Paul Edwards. Fleming JR (1998): Historical Perspectives on Climate Change, Oxford University Press. JR Fleming is one of the leading experts within the history of climate sciences. This book traces the idea of climate change back to the beginning of the nineteenth century in contributions from Tyndall, Arrhenius, Callender and many others.

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Heymann M (2009): Zur Geschichte der Klimakonstruktionen von der klassischen Klimatologie zur modernen Klimaforschung. NTM. Zeitschrift für Geschichte der Wissenschaften, Technik und Medizin. This is a summary article analysing how understanding the climate has changed from being a static and local concept within climatology to being a dynamic and global concept within climate science. Weart S (2003): The Discovery of Global Warming. Harvard University Press. Spencer Weart is the leading science historian within the development of climate sciences since World War II. In this book, he reconstructs in detail the many discoveries and debates that have led to the current knowledge of climate change. A more detailed account of the history of climate science can be found at http://www.aip.org/history/climate/, which is regularly updated.

Matthias Heymann, Peter Sandøe & Hanne Andersen: What is climate science all about? Philosophical perspectives Giere RN, Bickle J & Mauldin R (2006): Understanding Scientific Reasoning, 5th edition, Cengage Learning. This textbook provides a detailed account of how to understand and assess scientific models. The book contains a large number of cases and also has some exercises. Humphreys P (2004): Extending ourselves: Computational science, empiricism, and scientific method, Oxford. This book provides a detailed account of philosophical questions related to the use of computer simulations within different scientific fields. Lahsen M (2005): Seductive simulations? Uncertainty distribution around climate models. In: Social Studies of Science 35, pp. 895‑922. This article is an account of how researchers handle the uncertainty related to climate modelling, how they assess it and how they become accustomed to it. Miller CA & Edwards PN (ed. (2001): Changing the Atmosphere. Expert Knowledge and Environmental Governance. MIT Press. This anthology contains quality contributions on different aspects of climate research and climate modelling aspects. Paul Edwards provides a useful overview of how climate modelling is actually performed.

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Petersen A (2006): Simulating Nature: A philosophical study of computer simulation uncertainties and their role in climate science and policy advice, Antwerpen. This book is a detailed account of uncertainties related to climate modelling, how these uncertainties are handled and their importance in connection with policy advice. Shackley S, Young P, Parkinson S & Wynne B (1998): Uncertainty, complexity and concepts of good science in climate change modelling: Are GCMs the best tools? In: Climatic Change 38, 159‑205. This article is a critical account of climate modelling and the problems related to this. The article gave rise to a controversial discussion on the use of climate models.

Mickey Gjerris & Christian Gamborg: The price of responsibility – ethical perspectives Blackburn S (2001): Being Good. A Short Introduction to Ethics. Oxford University Press. The book starts out by answering the question of why it makes sense at all to talk about ethics in our time and then relates the most used ethical theories and concepts to a number of basic experiences such as life, death, happiness, sorrow, selfishness etc. Garvey J (2008): The ethics of climate change. Right and wrong in a warming world. Continuum. The book provides an overview of climate change  – not as a scientific problem but as a moral challenge. The book is about how you can consider climate change from an ethical point of view and about choices and responsibility. Des Jardin J (2000): An Introduction to Environmental Philosophy. Wadsworth Publishing. Now in its third edition, this book is one of many which provide an introduction to environmental ethics. In addition to describing the basic ethical concepts, it also gives an introduction to central positions within environmental ethics. The strength of the book is that it relates theory to a number of practical environmental examples and examples from the natural world, including the climate.

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McIntosh A (2008): Hell and High Water. Climate Change, Hope and the Human Condition. Birlinn The book contains a straightforward account of the development in the past 15‑20 years and a comprehensive discussion of the relationship between political and personal responsibility. Its conclusion is that the crisis is so overwhelming that only deep spiritual changes will give us the courage to change our lifestyle as fundamentally as is required to prevent climate change from threatening our existence.

Jakob Wolf: A religious perspective on climate change McFague S (2008): A New Climate for Theology: God, the World and Global Warming. Fortress Press. As a criticism of a market system with excessive growth, McFague’s book presents her alternative idea of a fair and sustainable economy. She argues that the background for such an alternative economic order is that human identity is a relational identity as part of a universe which develops while expressing divine love and human freedom. Primavesi A (2008): Gaia and Climate Change. A Theology of Gift Events. Routledge. Based on James Lovelock’s Gaia theory, which perceives the Earth and its life as one big ecosystem, and the preaching of Jesus as a gift theology which sees God as the forgiving and generous God, Primavesi reflects on how we should address the challenge of climate change.

Gitte Meyer & Anker Brink Lund: The climate debate’s climate debate: Polarisation in the public debate on climate change Arendt, Hannah: The Human Condition. The German-Jewish thinker, Hannah Arendt, was concerned with the conditions for human action and, thus, for political life. The chapter on the debating climate of the climate debate has to a large extent been inspired by her writings. The Human Condition, originally published in 1958 is one of her crucial works. Published for instance by The University of Chicago Press.

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Crick, Bernard: In Defence of Politics Reprinted over and over, since it was published for the first time in 1962, this is an easily read defence of politics, discussing the relationship of politics with ideology, democracy, nationalism and technology. Crick advised the British Home Office for many years on issues of education for citizenship. Published most recently by Continuum. Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Reason in the Age of Science; Praise of Theory: Speeches and Essays. These two collections of brief and rather easily read essays by the German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer discuss what form reasoning about life and society can take in a culture permeated by scientific and technical modes of thought and how to delimit the use of science in reasonable ways. Published for instance by MIT Press and Yale University Press. Habermas, Jürgen: The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere. An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society. A modern classic on conditions and possibilities for public discussion and on the history of the public sphere. Originally published in 1962 in German, it was only translated into English in 1989. An important book, but not easily read. Its history of interpretation has suffered by difficulties with respect to the translation of concepts from German to English. Pulished for instance by MIT Press. Mill, John Stuart: On Liberty. A modern classic, this essay was first published in 1859. In the essay the British philosopher John Stuart Mill concerned himself with the dangers relating to a tyranny of the majority. Published for instance in Gray, John: On Liberty and Other Essays (pp. 1-128) Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998.

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About the authors

ππ Peder Agger: MSc in Biology from University of Copenhagen in 1966. Has worked at the Danish Institute for Fisheries Research as a fisheries biologist, as Associate Professor and later Professor in Environmental Planning at Roskilde University and for seven years as Head of the Nature Division of the Danish Forest and Nature Agency. Over the years, he has chaired the Danish Nature Conservation Council, the Danish Ecological Council and is now Chairman of the Danish Council of Ethics. His main interests are nature management and nature politics. ππ Hanne Andersen: Associate Professor in History of Science and Theory of Science at the Steno Department for Studies of Science and Science Education, Aarhus University. MSc in Physics (major) and Comparative Literature (minor) from University of Copenhagen in 1992 and PhD from Roskilde University in 1998. Her research area is science theory with special focus on issues relating to the development of science. Historical case studies of modern natural science are thus also an important part of her research activities. ππ Christian Friis Bach: International Director of DanChurchAid. He has previously worked as Associate Professor in International Economics, been Chairman of MS Danish Association for International Co-operation and worked as a journalist at Danmarks Radio. In addition, he has worked as a consultant for, amongst others, the World Bank, the EU and Danida. In his spare time, Christian Friis Bach has been an active member of a number of organisations, ranging from the WWF to Amnesty International. He was one of the driving forces behind the establishment of Max Havelaar and the Danish Ethical Trading Initiative. ππ Alex Dubgaard: Associate Professor in Environmental Economics at the Institute of Food and Resource Economics and Head of the Environmental Economics and Rural Development Division, University of Copenhagen. Alex Dubgaard’s work focuses in particular on economic regulation instruments and cost-benefit analysis within the aquatic environment and climate area. He has, among other things, carried out environmental economic analyses for Danish public authorities and EU institutions, including con-

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sequence analyses of the proposal for an EU soil framework directive as well as the EU’s proposal for a climate and energy package. ππ Claus Felby: Professor in Wood and Biomass Technology at the Faculty of Life Sciences, University of Copenhagen. His research activities centre on the use of biomass for energy, feed and materials. He has focused in particular on the connection between the chemical and physical structure of various crops and their applicability in the production of sugar and subsequent conversion into biofuels and feed. He has previously been employed in the biotech industry in Denmark and the USA. Claus Felby heads the Faculty’s ‘Fuel for Life’ research initiative within the development of sustainable bioenergy. ππ Christian Gamborg: PhD, Senior Researcher at the Centre for Forestry, Landscape and Planning, Faculty of Life Sciences, University of Copenhagen, and is permanently affiliated with the Danish Centre for Bioethics and Risk Assessment (CeBRA). Since 1998, he has mainly conducted research – of which a large part is funded by the EU – into ethics, science theory and stakeholder analysis in relation to forestry and agriculture, landscape architecture, nature management and modern biotechnology. He teaches a number of courses at BSc and MSc level within these subjects and is a frequently used guest lecturer. ππ Mickey Gjerris: PhD, Theologian. Associate Professor at the Institute of Food and Resource Economics, Faculty of Life Sciences, University of Copenhagen, and is permanently affiliated with the Danish Centre for Bioethics and Risk Assessment. His research interests include nature ethics, bioethics, ethics, nanotechnology and animal ethics. He has previously edited the following books (in Danish) ‘Naturens sande betydning’ (2001), ‘Spor i sandet’ (2002) and ‘Hvad er meningen?’ (2008). He teaches ethical and science theory subjects and gives many lectures outside the safe walls of the university. ππ Matthias Heymann: Associate Professor in Technology History at the Department of Science Studies, Aarhus University. He works with the history of environmental science and technology history and has published books on the use of wind power in the twentieth century, liquid natural gas and engineering design in a historical perspective. He is about to publish a book on the historical aspects of hydrogen as an energy carrier. He is currently conducting research into the history behind the use of computer

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models in environmental science and in the production of and change in our knowledge of the environment. ππ Preben Bach Holm: Biologist, PhD and DSc from University of Copenhagen. From 1973 to 1988, he worked at the Carlsberg Research Center conducting basic studies of sex cell formation in plants and animals, but switched to plant biotechnology and genetic engineering of barley in 1988. In 1996, he moved to the Danish Institute of Agricultural Sciences with the task of establishing a plant biotechnology team at Flakkebjerg Research Centre. Today, he is Professor and Head of Research at the Faculty of Agricultural Sciences, Aarhus University, and is heading a team working with plant genetics and biotechnology in grasses, barley and wheat. The main purpose of these research activities is to improve the nutritional value of these crops as feed and food for humans. ππ Rikke Bagger Jørgensen: Senior Researcher, PhD in plant genetics and biotaxonomy. She is working on projects within the following areas: The effects of climate change on biodiversity and plant production, the effects of genetically engineered organisms on the environment, risk assessment, gene dissemination and the co-existence of GM farming and non-GM production. A member of, e.g., the Danish Council of Ethics and the Nordic Committee on Bioethics. ππ Anker Brink Lund: Has a background in political science and has in particular focused on political communication, the media and journalism. He is D.phil. in Strategic Communication from Roskilde University and Professor in Media Management at the International Center for Business and Politics, Copenhagen Business School. ππ Gitte Meyer: Worked as a journalist specialising in the debate on science and technology-related topics for more than 25 years. In 2004, she defended her PhD thesis titled: Offentlig fornuft? Videnskab, journalistik og samfundsmæssig praksis. She is an Associate Professor and affiliated with the Danish Centre for Bioethics and Risk Assessment. ππ Jørgen E. Olesen: Research Professor at the Department of Agroecology and Environment, Faculty of Agricultural Sciences, Aarhus University. He conducts research into the interplay between climate and agriculture focusing on both the emissions of greenhouse gases from agriculture and on how agriculture best adapts to climate change. Thanks to his participation in

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217

research projects, committees and commissions, he has many international contacts. He is a member of the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), which earned him a share in the Nobel Peace Prize in 2007. He is also a member of the Danish Commission on Climate Change Policy, the Board of Representatives of the Danish Board of Technology and the Coordination Forum for Climate Change Adaptation Research. ππ Peter Sandøe: Holds an MA in Philosophy. Has since 1997 worked as Professor in Bioethics at the Faculty of Life Sciences, University of Copenhagen (formerly the Royal Veterinary and Agricultural University). Also heads the interdisciplinary Danish Centre for Bioethics and Risk Assessment. Has published a large number of articles and books on ethical issues in relation to animals, agriculture and food. ππ Jakob Wolf: MA in Theology in 1978, PhD in 1984, Doctor of Theology in 1990. Parish parson in Lumsås/Højby from 1983‑95. Has since 1995, worked as an Associate Professor in Ethics and the Philosophy of Religion at the Department for Systematic Theology, University of Copenhagen. His research activities have in particular focused on the relationship between nature and ethics and religion. In addition to a large number of articles on these themes, he has also published the doctoral thesis: Den farvede verden – Om Goethes farvelære, Hans Lipps’ fænomenologi og K.E. Løgstrups religionsfilosofi (1990), Etikken og universet (1997), Den skjulte Gud – Om naturlig teologi (2001), Rosens råb  – Intelligent design i naturen. Opgør med darwinismen (2004) and Naturlig kærlighed – Kritik af pligtetik og nytteetik (2007).

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Index

Affluent  91 Agriculture  13, 38, 40, 42, 46, 47, 49, 50, 58, 164, 165, 166, 170, 175, 176, 177, 181, 216, 217, 218 Antarctica  41, 105, 106 Anthropocentrism  98, 99, 101, 107 Anthropogenic  17, 31, 33, 34, 38, 40, 52, 86, 110, 112, 115, 118, 119, 135, 191 Arctic  12, 18, 28, 32, 39, 40, 45, 89, 105, 120, 139 Atmosphere  19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 33, 46, 47, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 73, 76, 78, 81, 101, 119, 163, 178, 191, 201 Biocentrism  98, 101, 102 Biodiversity  45, 46, 50, 111, 112, 164, 182, 202, 205, 217 Bioethanol  165, 166, 167, 169, 172, 176, 185 Biofuel  14, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 177, 216 Biomass  128, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168, 171, 172, 198, 216 Breeding  167, 175, 176, 179, 180, 183, 186 Brundtland Report, the  18, 99, 106 Carbon dioxide  21, 23, 25, 55, 56, 58, 63, 64, 65, 75, 77, 178, 200, 201

index

Carteret Islands, the  89, 103, 104, 105 Charity  116, 120 Climate debate  13, 14, 26, 135, 136, 137, 142, 145, 148, 151, 153, 156, 157, 158, 213 Climate model  11, 26, 29, 30, 32, 35, 46, 64, 65, 69, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 86, 135, 146, 147, 211, 212 Climate refugees  89, 90, 103, 104 Climate research  13, 62, 84, 140, 142, 209, 210, 211 Climate simulation  64, 72, 73, 76 Climate system  18, 22, 25, 26, 30, 32, 35, 70, 78 Climatology  57, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 65, 211 CO2 trading  14, 191, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 200, 204, 205, 207 Computer model  13, 62, 64, 69, 71, 72, 73, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 144, 216 Consensus  12, 27, 82, 83, 84, 85, 141, 142, 144, 152, 153, 154, 155, 157, 159, 167 Creation  12, 84, 116, 129, 130 Critical  12, 14, 83, 91, 102, 142, 147, 148, 149, 175, 201, 203, 212 Crops  14, 39, 41, 43, 47, 48, 50, 54, 99, 103, 163, 165, 166, 167, 170, 171, 175,

176, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 216, 217 Data  58, 59, 60, 61, 63, 72, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 81, 82, 84, 135, 141, 154, 204 Day of Judgement, the  115 Democracy  37, 112, 143, 145, 204 Deontology  95, 105 Dialogue  95, 137, 138, 205 Doubt  11, 34, 46, 50, 93, 95, 118, 129, 145, 146, 148, 154, 156, 183, 191 Drought  17, 19, 27, 32, 33, 35, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 47, 48, 49, 51, 53, 54, 94, 102, 178, 180, 182, 183, 210 Duty  11, 105, 106, 112, 120, 121, 122, 124, 125 Ecocentrism  98, 101 Economy  31, 78, 83, 168, 170, 171, 172, 179, 186, 187, 192, 196, 199, 202, 203, 204, 205, 213 Ecosystem  37, 39, 42, 45, 50, 94, 96, 101, 102, 103, 110, 111, 163, 185, 209, 213 empirical  29, 56, 78, 79, 139 Empirical ...  56, 78, 79, 139 Energy  163, 165, 168, 172, 176 Environmental ethical considerations  98 Environmental ethicist  100 Environmental research  140, 141

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Ethical subject  96, 97, 98, 99, 100 Ethics  91, 92, 100, 113, 118, 121, 122, 125, 126, 133, 212, 215, 217, 218 Extinct  37, 45, 46, 108, 110 Extinction  89, 91, 93, 96, 111 Fauna  20, 39, 45, 46, 100, 103 Flooding  33, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 48, 49, 51, 52, 53, 102 Food  39, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 53, 54, 85, 89, 93, 94, 97, 101, 102, 105, 106, 107, 128, 135, 141, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 173, 175, 176, 177, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 202, 217, 218 Food production  46, 47, 48, 49, 94, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 175, 177, 180, 182, 184, 189 Forestry  39 Fossil fuel  23, 31, 102, 104, 105, 135, 149, 163, 171, 191 Genetic engineering  179, 217 GM crop  14, 179, 181, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187 Greenhouse effect  19, 20, 21, 23, 24, 26, 31, 33, 55, 56, 191, 195, 198 Greenhouse gas  17, 18, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 56, 58, 76, 81, 119, 138, 144, 149, 167, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196,

220

197, 198, 199, 200, 202, 204, 217 Guilt  104, 105, 124, 125 Health  40, 42, 51, 52, 58, 94, 117, 122, 148, 151, 153, 158, 179, 180, 186, 202, 204 Holistic  57, 60, 100, 111, 165 Ice age  25, 27, 28, 29, 139 Invasive species  52, 108 IPCC  17, 18, 19, 29, 30, 31, 33, 38, 41, 56, 66, 67, 77, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 141, 142, 155, 164, 177, 182, 187, 209, 218 Justice  131, 173 Kyoto Protocol, the  192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 207 Love  116, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 128, 213 Mean temperature  17, 19, 21, 34, 39, 40, 41 Measurement  19, 20, 25, 59, 66, 73, 79, 80, 81, 138 Meteorology  59, 60, 70, 71, 138 Moral  102, 113, 116, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 135, 136, 185, 199, 212 Motivation  118, 124, 131 Nature  11, 34, 50, 64, 69, 70, 98, 99, 101, 111, 112, 117, 122, 123, 129, 130, 150, 153, 156, 195, 203, 205, 215, 216, 218 Nature preservation  112 Objective  11, 83, 93, 95, 131, 132, 164, 165, 167, 191, 195, 196, 199, 203 Peer review  83, 84 Philosophy of science  83

Plant production  176, 177, 178, 179, 181, 217 Plant species  52, 99, 108, 128, 179 Politics  12, 69, 82, 85, 86, 117, 131, 132, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 149, 151, 153, 155, 156, 158, 170, 185, 202, 203, 204, 215 Pollution  24, 45, 100, 135, 182, 191, 193, 194, 195, 198, 199, 205 Poor, the  44, 53, 89, 91, 94, 103, 116, 119, 121, 124, 132, 167, 169, 170, 172, 176, 178, 182, 185, 199 Population growth  31, 176 Precipitation  17, 19, 22, 27, 32, 33, 35, 38, 40, 47, 51, 55, 58, 73, 178 Prioritisation  191, 204, 205 Quota  191, 192, 194, 195, 196, 200, 201, 203, 207 Radiation balance  19, 21, 22 Reduction cost  193, 194, 195 Religion  13, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 125, 128, 130, 131, 132, 143, 144, 152, 218 Religious  12, 13, 91, 99, 111, 115, 116, 118, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 143, 144, 146, 213 Resource  11, 13, 30, 31, 41, 42, 44, 46, 53, 54, 94, 102, 103, 104, 120, 123, 136, 156, 157, 164, 165, 172, 185, 186, 195, 198, 203, 205 Responsibility  89, 90, 91, 92, 96, 104, 105, 107, 112,

index

119, 120, 121, 122, 127, 182, 187, 202, 212, 213 Rhetoric  120 Risk  11, 32, 33, 37, 38, 40, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 48, 49, 50, 52, 56, 82, 84, 85, 86, 102, 108, 119, 132, 157, 166, 172, 180, 181, 185, 186, 189, 217 Risk assessment  85, 86, 180, 185, 186, 217 Scepticism  13, 83, 84, 85, 145, 146, 147, 148, 153, 180, 189 Science  11, 12, 13, 14, 55, 57, 58, 59, 60, 64, 65, 66, 67, 69, 70, 71, 77, 79, 82, 83, 85, 86, 126, 128, 129, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 181, 203, 210, 211, 212, 215, 216, 217 Scientism  126 Sentientism  98, 101, 111 Species  11, 37, 45, 46, 48, 50, 52, 93, 94, 95, 96, 99, 100, 101, 102, 103, 105, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 119, 123, 124, 128, 175, 179, 182 Sunspots  26 Sustainability  106, 112, 142, 163, 164, 166, 168, 173, 185, 203, 204, 205 Sustainable development  44, 53, 182, 202, 203, 204, 205 Technological development  31, 119, 164, 166, 196, 202

index

Technology  18, 30, 31, 53, 59, 65, 66, 102, 111, 129, 138, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168, 175, 179, 180, 183, 186, 193, 196, 198, 207, 216, 217 Temperature  12, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 63, 64, 65, 70, 73, 77, 78, 80, 81, 105, 108, 120, 138, 139, 177, 178, 182, 183, 187 Temperature change  22, 25, 26, 41, 56, 73, 80 Temperature increase  12, 17, 20, 22, 25, 26, 30, 32, 33, 41, 48, 51, 139, 177, 178 Theory  12, 27, 55, 56, 58, 59, 62, 71, 72, 76, 78, 79, 95, 100, 105, 108, 139, 141, 145, 152, 154, 198, 204, 212, 213, 215, 216 Theory of Science  215 Truth  17 Uncertainty  13, 19, 20, 24, 26, 30, 31, 34, 35, 46, 49, 71, 72, 73, 75, 81, 85, 86, 108, 135, 140, 141, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 154, 156, 157, 158, 204, 211, 212 UN, the  13, 17, 18, 99, 116, 118, 129, 132, 141, 142, 158, 159, 163, 177, 218 Utilitarianism  95 Validation  80, 81 Value  11, 15, 26, 32, 52, 69, 73, 79, 80, 81, 85, 91, 92, 93, 95, 96, 97, 99, 100, 101, 102, 107, 111, 112,

116, 117, 118, 123, 129, 130, 131, 146, 147, 165, 168, 173, 178, 186, 189, 203, 204, 205, 207, 217 Vulnerability  38, 54, 100, 209 Warming  9, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 32, 35, 41, 42, 46, 54, 55, 56, 77, 81, 85, 89, 101, 103, 106, 110, 111, 113, 118, 119, 120, 126, 130, 139, 148, 149, 150, 153, 209, 212 Water level  43 World view  126, 127, 128, 129, 130

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