Contemporary Shi'ism as Political Ideology: the views of Sharî'atmadârî, Ṭâliqâni, and Khumaynî

Contemporary Shi'ism as Political Ideology: The Views of Sharî'atmadârî, Tâliqânî, and Khumaynî by Kenrick Abbott Institute of Islamic Studies McGill University, Montréal Canada

May 1990

A Thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research in Partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

(c)

Kenrick Abbott, 1990

ABSTRACf

(

Islam was drastically altered in Iran as a result of the 1978/79 Revolution. This thesis looks at the political aspects of contcmporary Imâm; Shi'ism by comparing the ideas of three leading mujtahids of the day: Âyatullâh Sharî'atmadârî, Âyatullâh Khumaynî, and Âyatullâh Tâliqânî. This study points out the wide divergences of ideas present within the religious c1ass, ranging in the political spectrum, from conservative

[0

radical. A comparison of these three figures highlights the differences

between "Tradilionalist" Islam, as put forlh by Sharî'atmadârî, and "Fundamentalist" Islam, as proposed by Khumaynî and Tâliqânî. Further differences within the fundamentalist "camp" are demonstrated through Tâliqânî's progressive ali-inclusive "Liberation Theology" and Khumaynî's equally aIIencompassing "religion of militant individuals".

RESUME L'Islam fut dramatiquement modifié en Iran suite à la révolution de 1978/79. Cette thése porte sur les aspects politiques du Shi'isme Imâmî contemporain et compare les idées des trois principaux mujtahide d'aujourd'hui: Âyalullâh Sharî'atmadârî, Âyatullâh Khumaynî, et Âyatullâh Tâliqânî.

L'étude fait note du grand degré de divergence des idées présentes au sein de la classe

religieuse, qu'il nous est possible de ranger à l'intérieur du spectre politique, de conservateur à radical. La comparaison de ces trois personnages souligne les différences entre l'islam "traditionnaliste" mis l'avant par Sharî'atmadârÎ, et l'islam "fondamentaliste" proposé par Khumaynî et Tâliqânî. D'autres différences parmi le "camp" des fondamentalistes sont démontrées à partir de la progressive et trés inclusive "théologie de libération" de Tâliqânî ainsi que par la "religion des militants individuels" toute aussi absorbante de Khumaynî.

t

Table of Contents

Preface

page ÎÎ-iii

Chapter 1) Introduction: The Increasing Political Role of the Imâmî omc knowledge of the law. Khumaynî held that the ruler will have the sa me right!o. to authority and loyalty as the Prophet and the bnâms. "If a worthy individual pmsessing the!>e two qualities arises and establishes a government, he will posses!o. the sa me authority as the Most Noble Messenger ... and it will be the dut Yof aIl people to ohey him." (Khumaynî, "Islamic Government," 62). This view means that the

po~!>ihility

exi!o.t!o. -

indeed, it is the preferred circumstance - of one specially qualified leader emcrging and creating an Islamic government. This idea breaks entirely with the cJa!>!o.ÎCal tradition by rejecting the idea of the ilIegitimacy of ail government other than that of the Imâm.

Instead it proposes the selection of the leader from among the

mujtalzids. 31

The fuqahâ', then, are the heirs of the Imâms, with the exception of the Imâms' infallibility; just as the Imâms were the heirs of the prophet with the

30

Khumaynî, "Islamic Government", 60.

S. Akhavi, "Islam, Politics and Society in the Thought of Ayatullah Khomeini, Ayatullah Taliqani and Ali Shariati," Middle Eastern Studies, 24 #4 (19HO), 414. 31

80 exception of the bringing of revelation. When we say that after the Occultation, the just faqih has the same authority that the most noble messenger and the Imams had, do not imagine that the status of the faqih is identical with that of the Imams and the Prophet. For here we are not speaking of status but rather of function. By authority we mean government, the administration of the country, and the implementation of the sacred laws of the shari'a. (Khumaynî, "Islamic Governrnent," 62). Since the beginning of the Lesser Occultation the jurist, who has the special qualities needed, has had the right to rule?2 Thus, a single member of the fuqahâ' • who are collectively the heirs of the lmâms - has the task of implementing the government, administering it, and executing the Law. However, the fuqahâ' do not hold aIl of the authority of the lmâms. For although: The authority that the Prophet and the Imam had in establishing a government, executing laws, and administering affairs exists also for the faqih. But the fuqaha do not have absolute authority over aIl other fuqaha of their own time... There is no hierarchy ranking one faqih higher th an another and endowing one with more authority than another. (Khumaynî, "Islamic Government." 64). Thus, while, politicalleadership of the people is the prerogative of the fuqahâ', they are to have no authority over one another; an idea that is not elaborated bl' which contradicts the idea pf a supreme leader. The prerogative of government, Khumaynî makes a point of stating, is an onerous duty and nothing but "pain and trouble" for the just FaqÜ1. 33 Furthermore, to ensure honest rule the political authority must be

H. Enayat, "Iran: Khumayni's Concept of the Guardianship of the Jurist," in Islam and the Political Process, ed. J. P. Piscatori (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs; Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 32

165. 33

Khumaynî, "Islamic Government," 66.

Hl separated from economic power as this linkage is at the root of corruption. Any member of the 'ulamâ' who wishes ta accurnulate wealth is corrupted and cannot, therefore, be a trustee of the Prophet. 34 Moreover, anyone who wishes to "assume such a weighty responsibility" as just rulership must be an ascetic

a~:

... sU\ch a person must be totally disinterested in the world and devoid ofwnrldlyambition. Anyone whose efforts are oriented to this world even in matters that are inherently legitimate - cannot be the trustee of God and is not worthy of our trust. (Khumaynî, "Islamic Government," 143.) The just Faqflz who mIes must, according to this point of view, live humbly, piously, and austerely. In this chapter, Khumaynî included a criticism of his own c1ass. He enjoined them to be active in the defense of religion and denied any excuse for not taking action. The meaning of the statement of the Imam that the fllqalw are the fortresses of Islam is that they have a duty to prote ct Islam and that they must do whatever is necessary to fulfill that duty. It is one of their most important duties and, moreover, an absolu te dut y not a conditional one. (Khumaynî, "Islamic Government," 74). The fa ct that the fuqahâ' "must do whatever" is necessary is a theme tl1at will be returned to later in the work, but it must

obviou~ly

include direct action; and it

specifically excludes inaction, and, worse, collaboration with the nOIl-blamic forces.

As an extension of the need for leaders who are Khumaynî held that they must

SUbOl

nate themselves and

per~onally

other~,

just,

possihly even

whole groups, to the greater good of the Ml'slim community. Based on the cxample of the Prophet's treatment of the Jewish Bani Qurayza, at Madîna, Khumaynî .f"

34

Ibid., 78.

~ays:

82 Anyone who rules over the Muslims, or over human society in general, must always take into consideration the public welfare and interest, and ignore personal feelings and interests. For this reason, Islam is prepared to subordinate individuals to the collective interests of society and has rooted out numerous groups that were a source of corruption and harm to human society. (Khumaynî, "lslamic Government," 89).

ft is the needs of the 'umrna as a whole that are of primary importance; ail else is subordinate to these needs. After Khumaynî has proved the mujtalzid's right to authority. he says that: "The traditions are perfectly clear... No one can doubt that the Imam ... designated the fuqaha 10 exercise the functions of both government and judgeship." (Khumaynî, "Islamic Government," 96). He says this despite candid admissions as to the weakness of the isnâds in the traditions cited; however these traditions, his view of Islam and his reason are enough to create, and sustain, his arguments.

35

Having demonstrated the authority of the /utfahâ', Khumaynî then moves on to describe their role in "true" Islamic society. Theirs are the tasks of "establishing belief in the face of external opposition"; promoting the rights of the oppressed; fighting the oppre!:l!:lors; ensuring correct distribution of public wealth; and ensuring correct collection and expenditure of religious taxes. 36 In addition, their dut Y encompasses: ... the expression of opposition and the expounding of God's teachings and ordinanccs that stand in contradiction to innovatior, oppression, and sin are also useful in themselves for they make the masses aware of the corruption of society and the wrong doing of the treacherous, sinful, and irreligious rulers. The people will then fise up in revoIt and refuse to cooperate any longer with the tyrants or to ohey corrupt and

35

Fischer, "Imam Khomeini," 157.

36

Khumaynî, "lslamic Government," 109.

HJ treacherous ruling powers. (Khumaynî, "Islamic Govcrnment," 114). To achieve the se goals. the religious class must create a means to cOllnteract government propaganda against them, organize a coherent alternative program, and develop a means to disseminate it. 37 By speaking out the fuqahâ' can mise public awareness and lead the people to resist tyrants and corrupt governments which impose anti-Islamic laws. It is then incumbent on the unjust ruler to hced the wi!o>hcs of this popular opposition and return ta the straight path. If the ruler faib to reform himself, and attempts to control the people by force, the people may wage dcfen!o>ive

jihâd against the government as it will have become an active enemy of Islam. 1!! There is no systematic plan given for the removal of illegitimatc tyrannical government, but there are hints that this change, whcn it abrupt and violent. 39 Khumaynî came to this conclu~ion ha!o>cd ~usayn.

COI11CS,

011

will he

a tradition of

Khumaynî inferred that: "... the fuqaha, by means of jihad and enjoining

the good and forbidding the evil, must expose and overthrow tyrannical

and

can

establi~h

Islamic government..." (Khumaynî, "Islamic Government," 108·109). This

lIpri~ing,

rouse the people so that the universal movement of ail alert

Muslim~

ruler~

whell it cornes, is ta be one of mass proportions instigated by those who have the right, and the ability, to rule justly.

37

Ibid., 115.

38

Ibid., 114-115.

39 J. Ismael and Y. L. Ismael, Government and PoUlies in I.\/anz (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1985), 90.

84

Khumaynî places great faith in the ordinances of Shî'î Islam to provide aIl the solutions to Iran's problems. If only Islam was properly implemented by the appropriately qualified class, ail of Iran's problems would be solved. The failings of modern Iran are, therefore, laid squarely at the feet of the non-lslamic government. Islam has solved the problem of poverty and inscribed it at the very top of the program: "Sadaqat is for the poor," Islam is aware that first, the conditions of the pOOf must be remedied, the conditions of the deprived must be remedied. But they do not allow the plans of Islam to be implemented. (Khumaynî, "ls1amic Government," 120).

It would seem, based on this quote, that the solutiol1 tù vwerty is seen

a~;

charity and

the redistribution of wealth rather than the creation of work and other social programs. If the 'ulama, who are the trustees of God's decrees concerning what is permitted and what is forbidden and who possess the two characteristics of knowledge and justice ... were to implement Gad's ordinances, ta execute the penal provisions of the law, and generally to conduct and administer the affairs of the Muslims, the people would no longer be hungry and wretched ... (Khumaynî, "lslamic Government,"

123). The final chapter of Vilâyat-i Faqfh, entitled "Program for the Establishment of an Islamic Government", contains a plea to the other members of the religiolls c1ass ta join Khumaynî's campaign for the establishment of Islamic Government. He charges that: We must propagate our cause to the people, instruct them in it, and convince them of its validity. We must generate a wave of intellectual awakening, to emerge as a current throughout society, and gradually, ta take shape as an organised Islamic movement made up of the awakened, committed and religious masses who will rise up and establish an Islamic government. (Khumaynî, "Islamic Government,"

127).

..

-

----------------------------------85

Popular rebeIIion, though possible. needs the leadership that only the 'li/lImâ' can provide.40 Just as there are no detailed specifies for revolutionary activity, neithcr does Khumaynî lay down a time-table for the overthrow of corrupt govcrnment. Indeed, he says that the ove raIl plan will take time and may not come to fruition for several generations.41 What is made clear is that Khumaynî desired a re-ncwcd and renovdted infrastructure for Imâmf Shi'ism that would allow the propagation of his revolutionary brand of Tl:\lam. As far as he was concerned, Islam had a structure that was designed for political involvement and that could be llsed to :-.pread Islamic revolution. 42 It was necessary that religious ceremonies take on political ovcrtonc~ to inùuet the people into revolutionary Islam.43

Foreign influcnce had to hc

eradicated, and the "court affiliated aklzunds" had to be purged from the

religiou~

class and reIigious teaehing institutions to meet Khumaynî's nccd~.44

Abo to he

purged were the foreign influenced members of the 'u/alllâ' who were

accll~ed

of

removing Islam from the political sphere as a result of their acccptanee of the imperialist's propaganda. Khumaynî follows with a Iist of four specific actions for the overthrow of the monarehy.

These were: "(1) severing aIl relations with governmental

40

Ibid., 90.

41

Khumaynî, "Islamic Government," 128.

42

Ibid., 130.

43

Ismael and Ismael, 90.

44

Khumaynî, "Islamie Government," 136.

86 institutions; (2) refusing to cooperate with them; (3) refraining from any action that might be construed as aiding them; and (4) creating new judicial, financial, economic, cultural and political institutions." (Khumaynî, "lsIamic Government," 146). While in keeping with the Traditions cited regarding the forbidding of cooperation with iIIegitimate government, there is no real plan for the overthrow of illegitimate government other th an the creation of parallel structures. There follows a short discourse on the revolutionary activities of the Imâms and the threat they have always posed to the ruling power. These four lectures ended with an appeal to God for assistance in the struggle against the oppressors. During the revolutionary upheavals in Iran Khumaynî, as the consummate politician, soft pedalled his opinions as put forth in Vilâyat-i FaqÎlI and instead attacked the régime at its weak points. He did this by focusing on popular issues, avoiding mention of rule exclusively by the 'ulamâ', and talking publicly in general terms. He spoke in favour of the eviction of the irnperialists and ushering in a period of Islamic Justice. Furthermore, he was consistent in his uncompromising attacks on the Shâh and his supporters; while others among the upper echelons of the religious hierarchy, su ch as Âyatullâh Sharî'atmadârî, approved of negotiations with the authorities, Khumaynî remained dogmatic in his opposition. This hardline stance only added to his popularity during the extremism of t/Je revolutionary period. 45

He further raised his appeal by borrowing from the platforms und

rhetorical terminology of other populistS. 46

.'

45

Bashiriyeh, 114.

46

Abrahamian, 428-429.

j

87 However, in an interview granted to S. A. Arjomand, on January 2 nd 1979, shortly before Khumaynî's return to Iran, he did expand on the role of temporal officiaIs in post-revolutionary Iran. To the question of the administration of the country Khumaynî said, much to the surprise of the Iranian civilian politician present: "... There are certain matters which are executive affairs sllch as urhan planning and traffic legislations. These are not related to [sacred] law, and it is beneath the dignity of Islam to concern itself with them .. .'t47. Only those details of national administration as trivial as the se, which are beneath the 'ulamâ', fall to the laymen in the government. Khumaynî did not falter in his conviction of the necessity of Islamic government, nor did he hesitate to orchestrate the implementation of his ideas in Iran as quickly as possible. Khumaynî's concept of Islamic government was stamped onto Iran following the Revolution by its inclusion in the Constitution. This document not only incorporates the extended notion of Vilâyat-i Faqîh but also mentions Khumaynî himself, by name or titIe, no less than nine times as leader of the revolutionary movement. Seven of these references are in the "Introduction"; the other two are in the body of the constitution itself.48 The Constitution recognises that: Jne plan of Islamic government, based upon the governance of the S. A. Arjomand, "The State and Khomeini's Islamic Order," lraniall Studies. 13 (1980), 156. Khumaynî, and other fundamentdlbts, fall into a hole in their own argumenb on issues such as these. This statement, is in fact, in contradiction to the ide a that Islâm has laws for every aspect of life from conception to the grave. 47

48

H. Algar (trans.), Constitutiofl of the Is{amic Repuhlic of Iran (Berkeley: Mizan

Press, 1980) see: "Introduction" pages U (three times), 15, 16 (twice), and 18; Chapter 1, Article 1 page 26; and Chapter 8, Article 107, page 66. aIl further reference to the Constitution are taken from this source.

.------------------------------------------------88

faqih, as set forth by Imam Khomeini ... created a new, distinct, and consistent motive for the people, opening up before them the authentic path of Islamic ideological struggle. ("Introduction", Constitution of tlze Islamie Republie of Jran, page 16.) He is, furthermore, promoted to the rank of Marja'-i Taqlîd by this document, an advancement that guaranteed his ascendancy in post-Revolutionary politics. Article 5 of the Constitution directIy borrows from Vilâyat·j Faqflz and paraphrases Khumaynî's qualification for the leader. It states, in part: ... the governance and leadership of the nation devolve upon the just and pious faqih who is acquainted with the circumstances of his age; courageous, resourceful, and possessed of administrative ability; and recognized and accepted as leader by the majority of the people. (Constitution oftlze Islamie Republic of Jran, Article 5, page 29) This is also a good description of Khumaynî, making his position as Leader assured as the Constitution was, evidentially, written to enshrine it. There is a further reference to the mIe of one faqîh in Article 107. This reference actually specifies that Khumaynî is to be the first such ruler of the Islamic Republic. It states that: Whenever one of the fuqalza possessing the qualifications specified in Article 5 of the Constitution is Recognized and accepted as marja' and leader by a decisive majority of the people - as has been the case with... (Khumaynî)... - he is to exercise governance and ail the responsibilities arising therefrom. (Constitution of the IslanlÏe Republic of Iran, Article 107, page 6(,.) There follows the provision for the Council of Experts to select either a leader or a leadership council, consisting of three or five mujtahids, in the event that a charismatic leader of undoubted qualifications and mas,; appeal cannot be found. The final article of the Constitution of interest helc is number 110. This is the section that specifies the duties of the leader. These duties are extensive

89 and in effect give The Faqih control over aIl aspects of government; either through direct involvement or, more usuaIly, through the right of appointment to various areas of the governmental apparatus. He is charged with appointing six of the twelve members of the Council of Guardians which has veto power over a11 legislation; he also appoints the !mpreme judicial authority in Iran. Moreover, he must initially approve aIl presidential candidates and then sign a decree making the election results formaI. Further, he has the right to dismiss the president following a decision of the Supreme Court or a vote of the National Consultative Assembly that such an action is in the national interest. He may also grant pardons and reduce sentences in accordance with Slzan"'a and on the recommendation of the Supreme Court. 49

As supreme commander of the Armed Forces the Faqîll has the duties of appointing the Chief of the General Staff and of appointing the Commander-inChief of the Revolutionary Guards. He is responsible for the formation of the seven-man National Defense Council which includes the President, the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, the Chief of General Staff, the Commander-inChief of the Revolutionary Guards, and two others appointed by the leader; thus, four of the seven are his direct appointments. He has the dut y to appoint the

head~

of each of the threr- branches of the Armed Forces, based on the recommendation of the National Defense Couneil. Finally, again based on the recommendation of the National Defense Couneil, he has the right to dec1are bath war and peace, and

49 Constitution o/the Islamic Republic of Iran, Article 110, clauses a, b, d, e, and f; 67-68.

...

90 to mobilise the Armed Forces.so Âyatullâh Khumayni in the course of his political career rose to the position of absolute theocratic leader of Iran.

His criticism of the government

started in 1943 when he was among the first to see the cumulative threat to Islam from numerous small changes imposed by the government.51

He grew more

politically significant from 1963 onward, wh en he again attacked the government's policies; but on this occasion his tirade was directly aimed at the Shâh. Âyatullâh Khumayni came to dominate Iranian poli tics by using his charisma and political acumen to !'Ipread his ideas. Together these two factors elevated him !o the position of spokesman for the poor and down trodden with whom he aligned himself.52 Khurnaynî's success can be explained by five factors, given by Fischer. When taken together these factors add up to explain Khumaynî's charismatic aura. First, he combined the tensions between Iranian nationalism and

Islamic

internationalism in his ideas and resolved these in the favour of universal (albeit Shrî) Islam. Second, there is a legend of distress and suffering surrounding his

personal history; this includes the murder of his father shortly after Khumaynî's birth, the death of his mother and aunt when he was 16, his exile, the death of his infant daughter and eldest son (rumoured to have been killed by SAVAK). His constant pursuit of justice in the face of these personal tragedies only added to the

50

Ibid., Article 110, clause c; 67-68.

A. Najmabadi, "Iran's Turn to Islam: From Modernization to Moral Order," Middle East Journal, 41 (1987),210. SI

52

Akhavi, Religion and Polities, 101.

91 legend.

Third, his involvement in mysticism, an area shunned by the orthodox.

Fourth, Khumaynî's refusai to submit to material concerns, his simple lifestyle, and his rejection of humour in his attacks on the régime combined to show his uncompromising differences with the government and their corruption. FinaIly, Khumaynî, unlike other mujtahids, used the language of the ordinary people to make his appeal more direct; added to this he placed his trust in the people.53 There are, also, many other components in Khumaynî's suc\:ess. One main factor that contributed to his triumph was the continuous efforts of his exstudents who were, as a whole, loyal to him throughout the period. This factor was added to by the entire system of religious networks which were made aIl the more important as a political force by the Shâh's destruction of the secular opposition. Even more significant, however, must have been the willingness of the lranians to hear and accept his message; or rather what they felt his messa~e to be. Khumaynî's ideas appealed to a widespread sense of "alienation, frustration and rage" among the populace which resulted from rapid soCÎo-economic change during the 1970s as weil as imperialist aggressions.54 This popular discontent with the régime was heightened by economic slow downs in the mid-1970s. Thus in 1978 the people were willing to follow Khumaynî, while they had not been willing to go to such lengths in 1963. The situation had ripened since the formulation of his concept of the mandate of the Jurist.

S3

[,

Fischer, "Imam Khomeini," 160-162.

54 M. Zonis and D. Brumberg, "Shi'ism as Interpreted by Khomeini: an Ideology of Revolutionary Violence," in Shnsm, Resistance and Revolution, ed. M. Kramer (Boulder: Westview Press; London: Mansell Publishing Ltd. 1987),48.

1

-

92

. .."

The political theory and religiously inspired populist strategy of Khumaynî made him into one of the major innovators in Shî'î thought.55 Yet his message was in numerous ways similar to that of many other fundamentalists; the main differenee between Khumaynî and these thinkers was in the former's political success. While Vilâyat-i Faqîh did not put forward any specifies for the structure of Islamic Government, it did extend the idea of the mandate of the jurists; indeed, the work even states that this is aIl it was intended to do. It does, however, deal with the fuuction of the just government, which belongs to the mujtalzids, and is the formation of a just society in which aIl individuals can grow to their full (spiritual) potential. The government of the Jurists is to act as the trustee of society anù, as such, prevent eruelty, oppression, and the violation of the rights of aH people in society; guide men to true Islam (a task that in itself perfects men); and en!lures economic justice through the implementation of the provisions of Islam for the redistribution of wealth. In short, Khumaynî wanted an Islamic government; which is, by definition, perfeet; under which "... aIl will live under the protection of the law, and no ruler will have the right to take any step contrary to the provisions anù laws of the immaculate slzari'a."S6 Another clear change from previous ShN thinkers resuIts from Khumaynî's rejection of taqîya when Islam itself is threatened, as by the imperialists and the Shâh. Rather, he attempted to make action obligatory for ail members of the religious class, though taqîya was to be permitted for those who are muqallid.

-

55

Abrahamian, 429.

S6

Khumaynî, "Islamic Government," 80.

93 This factor, according to Bayat, has put an end to Ja'farî Shi'ism which had used

taqîya as a central part of its beHef system to allow accommodation with the temporal state.57 While this idea may be an overstatement, Khumaynî has certainly added a new dimension to the question of taqîya and its use in essential political matters. What is beyond doubt is that while a "doctrine of potential resistance is not a doctrine of revolution,,58; Khumaynî has been largely, if not solely, responsible for making the potential resistance of the /mâmî Shî'a into a very militant and popular revoJutionary doctrine.

While the concept of Shi'ism as

revolutionary doctrine has precedents, most notably in Dr. 'Alî Sharî'atî's and Âyatullâh Tâliqânî's works, its widespread acceptance is unprecedcnted. These ideas have changed Shî'î Islam for aB time.

M. Bayat, "The Iranian Revolution of 1978-79: Fundamentalist or Modern?" Middle East Journal, 37 (1983), 41. 57

{

.. f,

58 N. Calder, "Accommodation and Revolution in Imami Shi'i Jurisprudence: Khumayni and the Classical tradition," Middle Eastern Studies, 18 #1 (1982), 3.

94 Chapter Five Conclusion: The Diversity of the Fuqahâ'

The above chapters have, in part, demonstrated that "[i]n religion, as in poli tics, aU men are a party of one."t This statement is doubly true when the two spheres overlap. The political ideas of the three members of the fuqahâ' considered within c1early show, even in such a limited study, the widely varied notions prevalent among their class during the period in question. These men lived at the same time, being born with in ten years of one another and dying over a like period; yet, despite they came to radically different conclusions. While there is sorne common ground among them there are many more differences. It is their work as theorbts that b of the greatest interest for comparison for they did not deal with the actual structure of government. Even Khumaynî's ideas on the structure of the state can he seen only in their institutionalization in the wake of the revolution; Tâliqânî and Sharî'atmadârî never broached the topie.

Rather, ail three of

the~e

men were

interested in the nature and function of government.

1

1989.

C.1. Adams, in lecture for "Islamic Religious Tradition," McGiII University,

95

(

Their political theorizing is interrelated with, and may be said to have sprung from, their views of the nature of Islam. Islam for Sharî'atmadârî, as a traditionalist, was a personal thing through which the individual could reach salvation.

He felt that men could be helped towarès this goal through the

implementation of an Islamic order built on the traditional values by the use of

ijtihâd. Alternately, true to the fundamentalist mold, both Tâliqânî and Khumaynî saw Islam as an aIl encompassing system of beliefs and practices which contained ail of the solutions for man's and society's problems . if only man would impIe ment its solutions.

However, the similarity diminishes with deeper consideration.

For

Tâliqânî Islam holds aIl of the answers for the entire world; and its function is to

~ !

Iiberate the oppressed, by providing a middle road between capitalism and communism. Comparably, Khumaynî's conception of Islam was, again, that of an aIl inclusive system; furthermore, this system is to liberate the oppressed of the world. Yet, when Khumaynî launched a polemic against the Non·Islamic political systems and the imperialists - wh Dm he held responsible for aIl problems in the modern Middle East - he ignored the apologetics of other fundamentalists and - instead of comparing Islam to western ideas . portrayed Islamic society as something distinct and perfect. In order to understand more fully the nature of the po1itical systems proposed by the Âyatullâhs in question it is necessary to look first at their ideas on the nature of man. This then leads to the method by which man can (must) live in civil society so as to perfect himself - as much as possible in the absence of the

(

Imâm. While the Imâmî Shî'î belicf has historically been that man is weak and in

,

)

J

96 need of divine guidance, various adaptations of this theme are evident in the idem, of Sharî'atmadârî, Tâliqânî, and Khumaynî. The traditionalist view was most closely held by Sharî'atmadârî; just as religion is a personal matter so too is man's effort tn improve himself. For Tâliqânî the human will is weak and easily coerced, and only Islam can allow man to strive for perfection. Yet Tâliqânî concerned himself with economic systems as, he argued, they are responsible for the corruption and enslavement of man. Khumaynî, however, saw man as entirely self-interested that he will place his own interests above those of ail others.

~uch

Khumaynî displays

the "optimistic" belief that men are, nonetheless, capable of being perfected through Islam by following the true 'ulamâ' who, as a result of their learning, are ju~t.2 However, men will remain in a state of moral poverty without this external guidance.

If, as shawn, man is imperfect then the concern is, natm ally, with how to bring him to his best possible state. Here, too, there is disagreement. Tâliqânî held that men must be brought to truth and justice in arder for wciety tn change. Furthermore, Tâliqânî said, it is faulty economic systems which have corrupted and enslaved man. Islam, then, provides an alternative to these defective man made economic systems. Th" order of these changes is reversed for Khumaynî. Kllll maynî argued that for men to be brought to perfection and to hlam their society must first be perfected. He felt that men had to be pushed to goodness by the 'ulamâ's creation of a just society which would then allow men to attain perfection. The resolution to the problem of man's need ta improve himself, for Sharî'atmadârî, was

2 F. Rajaee, Islamie Values and World View, Vol. 8, Khomeyni on Mail, the State and International Polities (Lanham, New York, London: University of America Press, 1983), 37-42.

97

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l

a free democratic political system with just, Islamic, laws. Oniy in such a system, with the guidance of the lulamâ', can man develop himself to his full potential. There was also common ground in the political aspirations of Sharî'atmadârî, Khumaynî, and Tâliqânî. They, as well as aIl other members of the

lulamâ', he Id that alllaw pclSsed from God to man. This role as supreme lawmaker gave AlIâh ultimate authority; furthermore, the fuqahâ', as legal experts, retained a position as supreme and final earthly interpreters of divine legislation. They, Iike an others involved in the revolution, also opposed the monarchy.

Although

Sharî'atmadârî initially wanted the enforcement of the 1906 Constitution - and, therefore, of constitutional monarchY - he came to adopt a stance favouring republican democracy once the former stance became untenable. Khumaynî and Tâliqânî had opposed the monarchy as an institution for many years prior to the revolution. They ail agreed that astate was needed for men to live in civil society.

It is their conception of this state that truly sets them apart from one another for the purposes of this paper. Here again Tâliqânî and Khumaynî held positions that were more c10sely related to the views each other th an to those of Sharî'atmadârî. The two fundamentalists, while differing on many points, held that Islam was cIosely intertwined with aIl aspects of life. One of Tâliqânî's goals had becn to provide for the religious, political, and social needs of people. For Khumaynî there could be no division between religious and political authority. Islam was, to him, a perfeet system for ail aspects of. However, Sharî'atmadârî was disinterested in politics, and opposed r 1

political involvement by the lulamâ', which was an activity that he considered to be

98 .1

beneath the dignity and rank of the religious cIass. Government was a necessary evil that was, therefore, better left to the professional statesmen. Another are:! in which Tâliqânî and Khumaynî were in sorne respects in agreement was their view on the influence of the West. Both ultimately turned their backs on things western but they did so in different manners. Tâliqânî saw things from an economic perspective; based on this viewpoint he rejected both communism and capitalism as each leads to the enslavement of man; due to the contradictions inherent with in them. Instead Tâliqânî proposed the middle way of Islam; yet, democracy and socialism were both seen as acceptable plths toward the ultimate goal of divine unity. Islam was for TâIiqânî a superior economic system due to its clear regulations for ownership.

Man is permitted to own what he can use,

cultivate, and dispose of; so long as aH members of society are provided for. While Tâliqânî engages in apologetics in order to portray Islam as the

he~t

option,

Khumaynî does not debate this issue; he simply rejected ail things western as inferior to the solutions of Islam. Politically, Khumaynî rejected communism and western democracy for the entirely separate path of Islam. Sharî'atmadârî accepted western political developments as the surest path to Divine Unity, concurring with Tâliqânî that democracy and socialism are merely means to an end. The most glaring difference in the ideas of these revolutionary 1S

lcadcr~

seen in their concept of how the state is to be governed and by whom.

Khumaynî's ideal state - in the absence of the Imâm - is one in which the fuqaluî' hold ail authority and preferably one in which a single faqîlz assumes rulership.

Thi~

type of government, he argued, was necessary as the fuqahâ' are, by Khumaynî's

99 definition of the cJass, just and Iegally knowledgable - or they are not true members of the 'u/amâ'. They are, therefore, the only ones who can effectively proteet and propagate Islamic society. Since the revolution, the role of the class has expanded until it has permeated aIl aspects of life in modern Iran. Within Khumaynî's system it was said to be preferable that one faqih assame the supreme positiun in the state and exercise Khumaynî's expanded notion of Vilâyat-i Faqih. Furthermore, it was specified that the Faqîh must be an ascetic; in the Platonic tradition, it was held that in order for government to be good the leader(s) must be separated from the wealth in society.

He (they) must, aIso, see the task of rulership as a burden and a

necessary duty; otherwis(' the position may be abused. At the

opposite end

of the spectrum from

Khumaynî was

Sharî'atmadârî. As a traditionalist Sharî'atmadârî saw the primary role of the

'u/amâ' as protecting Islam, its Iaws, and the community. The religious class was to become politically involved only when Islam itself was threatened; hcnce, he urged disengagement and a return to the mosques after the removal of the anti-Islamic Pahlavî régime. Another reason that Sharî'atmadârî opposed politieal control by the

'u/amâ' was that their failure would, possibly, damage Islam in the eyes of the people, perhaps irreparably.

When the time came for political involvement

Sharî'atmadârî opposed dictatorship and worked for the revolution; however he later opposed what he saw as a dictatorship by his own class - and Khumaynî - in the guise of Vi/âyat-i Faqîh. The political structure favoured by Sharî'atmadârî was, consistently, sorne form of democracy, be it constitution al monarchy or republican, so long as it was based on popular sovereignty. The 1906 Constitution with its

100

civilian democratic government guided by the 'ulamâ' was the model he cited; even after the flight of the Shâh he pressed for this system with the deletion of ail clauses referring to the monarchy. What Sharî'atmadârî wanted then was the closest of the~e

three to a western style democracy, with participation for aIl. There were two

significant additions, however; the recognition of Allâh as supreme

I~lwmaker,

and

the acceptance of guidance from the 'u/amâ' who are the ultimate earthly interpreters of the laws. In effect this system would be a guided democracy, and not dissimilar from the western style democracy in whirh laws must be in accordance with a constitution or be struck down by the courts. The middle ground was occupied by Tâliqânî. Under his preferred system, earthly government was said to reside with both the just 'ulamâ' and the believers. Actual political sovereignty was to be exercised by those mehlbers of these groups who were elected the from society at large. It was Tâliqânî's opinion that, in the absence of the Imâm, aIl men form the executive of the government. This government must, moreover, represent aIl individu aIs in the society not just a single class. It is rule by a single class, or in the name of a single c1ass, that is the failing of aIl Western governmental systems. Ultimately, in capitalism the government despite egalitarian beginnings - has come to represent the vested interests of the owners of the means of production; whereas, in communist systems the group that leads in the name of the proletariat naturally exclu des members of ail other groups. Furthermore, in Tâliqânî's system, unlike Khumaynî's, the government has no right to deprive individuals - much Jess whole groups - of their rights in the name of the

-

good of society. Before he died Tâliqânî formed a loose alliance with Sharî'atmadârî

101 and called for the 'ulamâ' to return to their mosques and seminaries. He did this as a result of what he perceived to be the failure of the religious c1ass in the poJitics of government. The traditionalist Shall'atmadârî and the fundamentalist Tâliqânî were also doser to one another's positions regarding the rights of men in society. Man, for Tâliqânî, has natural inalienable rights grar.ted by Gad, which the è)overnment has no right to denv. Sharî'atmadârî showf'c! his eoncern with men's rights in the wake of the revolution when he opposed the erosion of popular sovereignty, defended the freedom of the press, and demanded fair and open trials. Antagonistic to both of these positions was Khumaynî's belief that man has no natural or inalienable rights as he is entirely dependent God for his existence and any rights he Id by man would "infringe" on God's omnipotence.3 Furthermore, in Khumaynî's state the individual is wholly subjugated to the needs of society. There were, however, sorne fundamentalist are as in whieh Tâliqânî and Khumaynî agreed with one another. One of these areas of mutual agreement was in their regard for MadÎna as the model of a perfeet society and the need to st rive towards the duplication of this society. Notwithstanding their agreement on the perfection of Madîna, they seem to have had very different notions of what the early Muslim society at Madîna entailed. For Tâliqânî it was a society of perfect equality in ail areas except administration which was carried out by the Prophet. In this society ail were involved in the affairs of the state and goods were equitably distributed. On the other hand, Khumayni's model of Madîna while still held to be

( 3

Ibid., 43.

102

perfect - because

Mu~ammad

ruled - was very different.

example of the destruction of the Bani

Qura~a

Khumaynî used the

to show that the needs of the many,

indeed the dictates of true religion, outweigh the desires of the few; there was no room for such ideas in Tâliqânî's version. Conversely, Sharî'atmadârî eoneeded that Madîna was a good example of a perfeet community but thought it not tntally relevant to the modern world. He argued that modern developments required the use of ijtihâd to reconeile Islam and these developments. The Muslim community cannot, therefore, return to Madîna; rather the paradigm of Madîna must be adapted to modern developments. Another area in which Khumaynî and Tâliqânî agreed \Vas in the way in whic'\ change could be attajned. While Sharî'atmadârî shied away from arme(! struggle, reserving it for a last option, the other two supported armed struggle. Eve.n in late 1973 Sharî'atmadârî was calling for negotiations with the régime. After the Revolution, he would not let those who opposed Khumaynî coalesce around him, again in an attempt to avoid violence.

Both Tâliqânî and Khumaynî had also

reserved armed struggle for a last option, a path to be taken if ail el se failed; the difference lies in where they drew the Hne. Khumaynî called for violent revolution which coulè only occur with the leadership of the 'ulamâ' - after the régime

w~s

give a chance to repent, a condition that had been met as early as 1963. Tâliqânî, too, called for armed struggle from an early period. In faet Tâliqânî argued that the duty of stopping tâghûtfs was a fourth form of jihâd to be engaged in, fi saMl A/Wh, if the ~âghûtî could not be urged baek within his limits. This stance in effeet made militancy into a religious duty for his followers. It is interesting to note that Tâliqânî

103

and Khumaynî used different methods to justify a jillâd against the régime; for Khumayni this was defensive jihâd against an enemy of Islam while for Tâliqânî it was jihâd to restrain a tâghûtî.

AlI of these thinkers betray a certain amount of utopianism in their thoughts. This fact is, perhaps, to be expected as their first principles are drawn from religion which stresses the possibility of man's salvation and therefore, to sorne extent, his ability to improve his condition.

Neither is it unexpected, as most

philosophers have an essentially unrealistic faith in uncorrupted man and are concerned with theories and perfect systems rather than realpolitiks. Tâliqânî's argument for the improvement of man through the improvement of society was based on the belief that in a perfect society aIl class tensions and other sources of eonfliet between groups will vanish. While in his ideal system this may be true, it requires an acceptance of ail his ideas for one to accept this notion and to ignore the c1ass differences between the mujtahid and muqallid. For bis part, Sharî'atrnadârî failed to recognise the socio-political developrnents of Iran. It is unlikely that his concept of a perfeet democracy eould be instituted in a society that has never known anything but autoeracy. Moreover, his expectation that his class would turn their back on poli tics after leading the move to topple the monarehy, and discovering the amount of power they could exert, is nothing short of naive.

The faHure of

Khumaynî's ideas in practiee can be seen in the current state of Iran, the problems of which cannot be entirely blamed on the war with Iraq or the years of the Pahlavî dynasty. Enforcing "right" religion has failed tü produee a perfected men in a perfeet

l

society.

104 The first, and most general, observation that one can draw from the above discussion relates to the view that ImâmÎ SIzî'î thought sees ail worldly government as illegitimate and therefore something to be resisted. Obviously this cannot be the case. Even Sharî'atmadârî, who rejected involvement in government, regarded it as necessary. The other two discussed ways to perfect government in the absence of the Imâm; obviously then they accepted both the need for government and the possibility of good government during the Occultation. The differences among these three are extensive; this is seen in Sharî'atmadârî's opposition to Khumaynî after the latter came to power.

Tâliqânî also moved into direct

confrontation with Khumaynî before he died; their dispute is reflected in the belief among Tâliqânî's followers that their Marja' was killed by Khumaynî's government. Alliances among these three thinkers were based on political necessity rather than common belief. Despite aIl of their differences there is a common thread that ultimately ties these thinkers together. This link, however tenuous it may seem, ties aIl SIzî'î religious thinkers together.

Ali, including Tâliqânî, Khumaynî, and

Sharî'atmadârî, aim at the protection of true religion, the purity of the faith, and

Shan.....a. These concerns have consistently been the motivator of the c1ass since the time of the Occultation. They are separated by their dcfinition of the scope of the solution to this problem. Among the three considered herein Khumaynî regarded the resolution as being extended to the farthest possible limits. Sharî'atmadârî fclt the traditional extent of the solution was sufficient.

105 1 0,

Though it is recognised that fundamentalist movement are shaped by national considerations and are, therefore, different;4 a comparison of Khumaynî and Tâliqânî shows the possibility of difference between fundamentalists of the same nation who live at the same time. Both Khumaynî and Tâliqânî fit the mold of fundamentalisrn, but the differences between them were, by 1979, so great that the fundamentalist Tâliqâni was politically doser to the traditionalist Sharî'atmadârî than he was to the fundamentalist Khumayni. Tâliqânî strikes one as a liberal and,

l

at the same time, a fundamentalist. This combination identifies him as what might be called an Islamic Liberation Theologian, based on the example of Latin American, Christian, Liberation Theology. This marriage of convenience, between Sharî'atmadârî and Tâliqânî, also points to a close relationship among sorne of the more moderate fundamentalists and the traditionalists.

1 !

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4 H. Enayat, Modem Islamic Political Thought (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1982), 83.

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