Armies of the Ancient Near East, 3000 B. C. To 539 B. C. : Organisation, Tactics, Dress and Equipment

Armies of the Ancient Near East 3,000 BC to 539 BC Organisation, tactics, dress and equipment. 210 illustrations and 9 maps

by Nigel Stil Nigel Ta is

and Sum.,......

Egypllan Old KlnQdOm. Mlddl. Kingdom. N_ Klngclom. Salle, Ubyan, NublWl , Kushlt., Akk.r;llan , fbi"" , "motile, H_urap!c BabyIonIM, Old Allyrl ...., HurNn. MiltlMlM. KauUI, Mlddl. AHyMn. Neo Assyrl.", Nee 8f1bylonian, ChllkleWl, Gut l.... MannaHI'!, IrWllwo, ClmmerlIn, H~, c.tIaMIt., Syrian, Ugarltic, Hetnw, PhlllltiM, MIdI....lt. Arab. Cyprioc, Phoenk:l8n, HanlM, HIIII,.. ANtoll.", SN Peoples, Nee HIIII,. , ArMIMMI, Ptuyglan. Lydian. UrartlWl, Elamll., Minoan, Mycen_. H~ .

A WARGAMES RESEARCH GROUP PUBLICATION

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FRONT COYER: COMMAND CHARIOT OF KING ASHURBANlPAL OP ASSYRIA 1J8.121 BC

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Politically, Sumer was divided into several small, competing city-stAtes, cons.isting Ordle capital city rin ged by oUllying lawns and villages and surrounded by wluablc irrigated farm land and uncultivated steppe used for pasture. The cities were generally large and their populations numerous, the walts ofUruk (ltPditionally fim built by the famous Gilgamesh) were: 10 kilometres in circumference, so human resources we rt considerable:. However, Su.mcr was com· plettly lacking in Slone, good-qualilY timber and metal ore and the city-states vied with each othcr [0 gain control of either the trade: routes or sources of supply of {hest vilal raw ma terials - a simation compounded by endemic disputes over Wllterways and border land . The Sumerians envisaged each city·slile as belonging to its patron god and his 'family' of minor deities, and early Sumerian rulers reguded themselves only as EN, ' lord', or ENS!, 'governor', of the god's eanhly estates, their office combining both religious and $«Ular functions. The prttise definition of the differences between the titles EN and ENS! is unciear, however a third title, LUGAL ('grtat man', or 'king') is less ambiguo us, and seems 10 have ~ adopted by I ru ler wbo had gained hegemony over sevellil city-states. An even more prestigioU$ title, and one thai remained so long after the Early Dynastic period, was ' King of Kish', which, because of the early dominance of that city, became synonymoU$ with Sumerian overlordship. A Sumerian ruler who could gain conuol of Kish and the holy city of Nip pur (t he 'borne' ofEnlil, the suprtme god of the Sumerian pantheon) would therefore be universally recognised as overlord of Sumer. Whether EN, ENS!, or LUGAL rival the city's temples.

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Sumer ian ruler WllS an autocrat whose palace and household (E. GAL) came to

A Sumerian city-state was a temple, and to I lesser atent, a palace economy. The state's temples functioned as the mater administrative and economic units in Sumer, organising trade and employing lhousands of workers in temple workshops and 00 the land. The bulk of the population consisted of landless tenants and labourers who worked on the csteosive royal and temple estates (which together attOUnted for at least two-thirds of a city-state'! J6

land). In times of peace these men were organised into specialised group5 according to thei r profession, under the supervision of UGULA, 'commanden', NU. BANDA, 'C3ptains', and ce rtainly in the cue of a temple's tenants, AGRIG, 'superintendents', and SANGA, or 'slew:ards' . Private landownen did exist but these were family, or 'dan' holdings resembling, on a smaller scale, the estates of the noble and royal 'clans'. In time of wat a city'. ruler could conseri!" both royal and temple tenann for military service, the extent and condi· tions of which Ire not fully known. Both labouren and soldiers were called ERIN a word which or iginally meant I yoke or necQu)(k and succinctly implies the nature of their employment! Two, mort ezplicitly military, titles wert SHUB.LUGAL, meaning 'king's mainer', and AGA.USH, 'follower'. The SHUB.LUGAL pfObably formed part of the rOY11 household and performed regular military and para. military duties. The AGA.USH, by analogy with the later use ofthiJ term, Ippear to have been ERIN who regularly served IS soldiers, rather than IS labourers., when fulfilling their obligat ions IS royal or temple clients. A general term for a soldier was ER IN.SUMMA, or 'spearman'. Military uniu seem to have had filled sizes, although the size of similarly orga nised work·gangs varied according to the nanue oflhe work. It is prob:r.ble that the same officers could be detailed to command both military and civil units. A NU.BANDA probably commanded between 60 to 100 men (since: the Sumerians used both a deci mal and a sell' agcsimal number system - which is why we have six ty minutes in an hour). Officers of higher or lowe r rank were te rmed UGULA, with the actu al sile of Ihe command being indica ted by a numeral SU ffIX , as in, for example, UGULA.NAM.IO('commande r of 10'). P resumably thert were six 10 ten UGULA.NAM.IO under a NU.BANDA. La rge r units we re probably formed by brigading logether several oflhese NUBANDA companics. The largest uniu mentioned occur in texts from the small city,sllte ofShu rrupak, were 67().680 men strong, and are descri bed as 'going into battlc'. Troops conscripted from temple ellltcs appear 10 have retained thei r own commanders and command 5tructur~. In one documented insta nce a SANGA of the Nimar temple at Lagasb led troops levied from its eslales 10 overtake

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In Iddition to the contcTipt militia each cily... tlle would seem to IUlVe posscucd II lffilll, r~lUlar forct bncd on lhe ruler', househole!. Tan of~.2600 B.C . from Sh utrupak. al lhal Ilm~ aub}a:1 10 th" kin. orlh~ pow~rfW . 111" of Kish, describe. lurprilingly large royal household of SOfDC 600 men, which includes 144 cupbearers, 113 muli· d.ns and 65 cooks (I), together with various cnfismen . Aside from most oftbc: crafismc.n these titles W~.ft probably only honorary, reflecting both the ItIIW of their bolders IS royal retainers and tbe common usage of the eztcnded ' household' U In Idministntive unit in the Near East (the famous Sargon of Akbd began his Clreer u a cupbearer ofth~ king of Kish Ind gove rnor of Aglde). Another lext SI.les lhatlhe 'chief· mason' ofKish was having his banle· Clr repaired in ShurrupU's p.l~ workshop, which suggesu that. proportion at least of the fOyal household usually fought from battlc-can. Certlinly one ruler of the state of Umma had an elite unit of si:ll:ly vehides. There is little indication oflhe total number ofbanle-ars that could be mustered by Iny one dIY-5tlte, Iside from Umma. However, even if no individual cily could afford 10 maint.in more than 60, this would suggest that a power· ful LUGAL, such as lugllugesi who controlled all southern Sumer, could conceivably field over 600 battle-ars. Tenants and soldiers, including the household troops, rcc:e:ived month ly rations of food and oil IS wages from tem· pic and pal.ce granaries. Important temple and palace officials liso held grants ofllnd from royal and temple esUtCl, generally fOf life. The Dynasty of AkUd (e. 2334· 2154 B .C.) The rtign of Sargon (Sharru·kin, 'true, legitirMle king') of Akbd was I momentous turning·poinl in the history of Mesopotamia. He, Ind his dynasty, introduced I new conctpt of kingship and set a mark lhat succttding gen~ra­ tions of rulers wou ld Ittempt to emulate. For lhe ftrst time Akbdia.n bccsme the langulge for olTkial inscriptions, and the Semitic-speaking northernen achieved genull political domina nce. To sutxlue the stronpy independent traditions of the conquered city·statCl, Sargon replaced their rulers with his own governors., or JhaUanaiJlJtl. In order to ensurt tbeir loyalty they were IlwlYS Akkadians, Ind oflen members ofhis own family or clan. Those nativt rulen who retained their posilion5 ,,"'ere closely walchtd by rOYl1 appointen

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and officials. Similarly, the religious establishment of Sumer "'{as carefully connolled by SarGon'. installation of his daughter, Enheduanna, as hiGh'priesteM of Nannar (the moon·god) at Ur. Akkadian tats relating to sp«:ifically military affairs arc rare, though much more extensive thin for the preceeding Early Cynntic period. Sargon's household consisted of 5400 men, who in Akkadian were termedguruslt, in Sumerian, ERIN. They were stationed in Sargon's p,alace It Agade, where they 'ate bread daily before lhe king' .nd undoubllibly formed the profwional core of his army. High officials were the SAGI./;'fAH, or 'chief cupbearc.r', and SAGI, o r 'cupbearer', as in tbe previous period. The royal cupbearers probably formed an inne r bodyguard for the king.

As in the Early Dynastic period bolh work.gangs and military units had a similar, if nO( identical, command struc· Nre. The genersllum for both IOldiers and labourers was either ",rusll, or ERIN, though it would sccm thatgurusll may hive hid a more precise meaning of an adult male who was capable of I full-days work. Royal and temple tenants sccm, as before, to have provided the main pan of Akkadian Irmits, sometimes being described as /u·uru, or 'city men', which suggests that their employment and recruitment was sti1llocal and based on their home city. The levying ofthesc men wn probabl y the responsibility of the city's GIR.NITAhllakJtanaJuun. They were issued with rations of grain and beer every 4/5 days. However, an Akkadian innovation was the nlJitum, a class of soldier probably to be ident ified with the aga.us" lugal, or 'royal soldier'. The nirltwrn held plots of land, almost certainly from the king, in addition to recei"ing rations of fi sh and sail every three months. This land·gram marks a considerable change from ea rlier practice and was probably int roduced to strengthen the soldiers' loyalty 10 the kin g IS an individual (a ro yal te nant always remained 10, no maHer who the .ctual ruler was) while reducing the burden on the palacc's economy, since the nisltwm had in pan to maintain himself. The system would also provide greater numbers ofscmi·professional soldiers for the army and ensure thlt roY11 forCC5 would be on hand 10 supprw any revolts loally. Officers and men could be termed miltum . Other, ra ther comprehensive, terms for soldiers .....ere: LU. TUKULLA , literally: 'he who lics on the weapon', lind LU Gl$1I GlD. DA or 'spearmen'. Tats from Umm. show that bmd rations for workmen and soldiers were issued in lots of 30, 60, 90,120,180, 240 and 600 lones, which would seem to indicate the theOretical stre ngths of Ihe units presenl. Aplin from the suggested unit strengths of30 and 90 men these figures accord quite ..... ell with Early DynllSlicunilS of60 and ~700 Strong, and are in any caSt ttraightforw.rd multiplcs of 60. From this evidence it may be posNllled Ibtt the king's hOUKhold troops comprised nine 'battalions' of6OO men, each probably commanded by. GIR.NITA, or 'coIont.!'. Other ranks of officer included the PA.PA/sM !Utattim, literally: 'he of two ttaffs (of office)', The title indicata lhat this officer commanded t.....o or more units of6O, since below this rank WIIS the NU-BANDA and the UGULA; the laner .lso remaining in use as a general term for 'officer' (n in UGULA-NU·BANDA) together with the Akka· dian rabi $lJbl~ 'trOOP commander'. The nnk of NU. BANDA remained unchanged as 'capllin' , or 'company com· mander'. UGULA, when used with precision, still meant, 'commander', or ' n.c.o.'. Light trOOPS or skirmishers we re known as NIM--soldiers, or 'flics', no doubt because of their lack of formation and speed ofmovernent! In the Aklr.adian period these soldien could also be foreign mercenaries, from the Zagros mount ains and the west, as well as native troops - probably the younger, less experienced conscri pts.

It is difficu lt due to the scardty of material to judge the different proponions of troops available to an Akkadian commander. However, a list of soldiers guarding the walls at Umma has a body of 107 niJItu and 469 LU.URU 'sleeping on the wall'. l flhis proponion is at all representative it would suggat lru.tlhc.rc were four times as many militiamen to semi.regular nisitu. This does nOI mean of course that Aklr.adian Innics would mainlain these proportions in the fie ld, as the nisltu were regularly moved about the empire, one leiter stales: ' his nilitu have indeed gone away 10 Uruk', while the l.U. URU do nOl appear to have usually campaigned far from home. The military usc of both banie-c:ars and straddle-c:ars seems [0 have declined rapidly following the Early Dynastic period. One suspects that the fu. rcacbing and strenuous campaigns of the Akbdian kings, often directed against lightly armed tribesmen in rou gh lerrain, quickly highlighted the deficiencies of vehicles designed for shon-range warfare belween nearby city-states. Both platform and Slraddlc-cars seem Slilllo have been employed as fut mounts for couriers however, special 'chlriO! roads' being mentioned in some texIS. Other textS list numbers of equid! and their fodder. 18

Army sizes Ire rarely mentioned, though taking III evidence into account, AJr.kadian armies probably numbered over 20,000 men.

Tbe Third DYD.tty of Ur (c, 2112·2004 B.C.) After nearly I century of anarchy in Sumer, following the collapse of the Dynuty of Akbd's authori ty, when tbe barbarous Guti were the arbiten of power in the land, one UN-Hegal, the king of Uruk, ' returned the ltinphip to Sumer'. What battles this king fought, what allies he had, we do not know in any detlili Ilthough it would seem that most of biJ shon, seven-year reign was spent in driving the Guti out of Sumer and establishing his conuol oftbe country. HOwrlOCf, Utu-Hegal's dynasty was nOl: destined to lut - the king was swept IWIY Ind drowned while supervising the construction ofa new canal. It was his governor ofUr, I man named Ur-Nammu, who was to found a dynasty and an empire that would sec the fmal flowering of Sumerian culture. By his founh year UrNammu, by force oflrms Ind diplomacy, had so enended his rule as to declare himself: 'King ofSumer Ind Allid'. The ltings of the T hird Dynasty ofUr, unlike tbe imperialistic kings of Allid, did not unduly mCl, their military achievements. Instead their surviving inscriptions concentrate OD tbe digging of canlls, the rebuilding of temples and the restoution of order to the land. Individull cities and their surrounding districts were administered by governors, ENSI, appointed by, and directly responsible to, the king. The ENSIs were frequ ently moved from city to city (for example, the ENSI of Ashur was transferred to Susa) either to prevent strong local tics developing as a threat to the king, or perhaps to use the tale nll of In able ma n to the full in troublesome areas. Many of these imponant positions, villi to the cohesion of the empire, were filled by clOSt rdalion! of the king. There a rc several instances ofgovemors marricd 10 royal princc.s.scs, and in one case a king's uncle was an ENSI. The duties of an ENSI we re to maintain order in his city, to );eep the local canals and road, in good repair, to «IlIecl and organise the district's tribute, and to kee p tbe king informed of events in the area. Communications wtre maintained by the use of the numerous royal mcssengcn travelling the well-kept roads from city to city in the empire. In order to pre>n.nt tbe frequent re\'olts of the Dynasty of Akkad the military responsibilities of the governor were «Inttntrated in a new POSt, sJraUana, of equal lIatus to the ENS/. The tWO types of official, tbe one military, the OI:her civilian aist side by side in some districts, although they were. somelimes combined in one person. This is more commonly the cue in oudying provinces, whose security depended on the military. Thul the governor of Mari was always a sllakAaruJ, IS wu Ihe governor of Elam, while in Zariqum and Ashur it varied according to tbe military situation. Ouring the reign of Shulgi the sJraltlt.aruJ of Uruk wu his younger son, Sbu-Suen. & ...ocU as commanding hi. district's soldiers, the shaJrAanaJruJ were responsible for the consc:ription of labourers for agricultural and constructional work.

Collectively, the men employed on civilian and military tasks were called eitber ERIN, sabuffI, or Ufflfflannum, and they appea r to have been «Insc:ripted from tenants on royal and temple land holdi ngs. It would seem that only the besl, finest conscripts were pickcd for regular military service since soldiel1 were sometimes termed SAG. ERIN or ER IN.SAG.GA, 'chosen men'. However, soldiers could still be employed on civilian duties, such IS traruporting CUt reeds and digging and cleari ng canals. The pool of available civilian labour also functioned .. a 'reserve' (DAMU.DIRI. TAl used to IIlcngthen the ERIN.SAG.GA in emerge ncies. The ERIN were di vided inlO companies, commanded by the familiar NU.BANDA, ideally comprising 100 men in IOSCetions of 10 men each unde r an UGULA orSHESH.GAL.NAM.10(litenlly: 'big brother of 10'!). However, companies were sometimes as much u 60% undersnength. The majority of each company were vetet1lns termed ERIN. GAL GAL, or 'strong men', with a .maIl proponion of company sltength made up of ERIN. TUR. TUR, 'youths' or 'recruits'. All ERIN rccc:ived regular payments of barley, oil and beer, tho ugh one leller from a military commander teporu that hi. soldiers would mutiny if their 'wlgcs' were not quickly paid! Household $Oldim wr:re ailed ERIN.LUGAL or LU. TUKUL

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BOlh soldiers and workmen 5C1:m 10 have be1:n moved aOOUi the empire as required. and though army sizes are nOI recorded. one body of workmen on canal maintenance was 21,799 strong. It is probable that higher unit organisation remainea unchanged from the Akkadia n period.

Isin, Lana a Dd the Am a n te leule me nt. Following the collapse of the: Third Dynasty of Ur, a successor kingdom, ccnlerea on the city of Isin, managed to maintain peace and stability in Sumer. The kings of th e First Dynasty or hin deliberately strove to mainlain the traditions of the kings of U r, even to the extenl of ret aining Sumerian as the official language of inscriptions, though the majority or the population now spoke Akkadian. During this period, in the early years orthe second miUeniu m, many Amorite tribes ceased to be nomadic. Instead, in large numbers, they settled around, and in some cases inside, the old urban centres throughout Mesopotamia and Syria. This process of gradual urbanisation created numerous small Amorite kingdoms, ofwhkh the most signifi· cant wen Aleppo (Yamkhad). Qatna, Mari and Ashur. The Amoriles in southern M esopotamia were quickly assimilated culturally and by the end orme Old Babylonian period they had been totally absorbed by the nati\'e, Akk..adian-speaking. population. In Assyria, howe\"Cr, the Arnorite dynuty or Shamshi·Adad I was later regarded as an unwelcome int rusion of roreigners ' not or Assyrian blood'. or lhe many Amorite kingdoms established in Mesopotamia tWO in panicular achieved considerable power and importance. The first of thC$C was the kingdom of Larsa, founded by Gungunum, c. 1932 B.C. a 'Sheikh of the Amorites' whose tribe settled about ursa in the last days of the Third Dynasty kings of Ur. Gungunum seized Ur rrom Lipit-bhtar of Isin and gained conuol of the lucrative trade between Ur and Dilmun (modern Bahnin) in copper, gold, ivory and precious stones rrom their sources of supply in Iran, Oman, and, possibly, India. Both bin and Larsa roughl ror dominance amongst t.he multitude of Amorite kingdoms, the kings or both cities claiming 10 be 'King ofSumer and Akkad'. However, by 1860 B.C., Irra·immiti, the king orlsin, ruled linle more th~n the capital. and Amorite sheikhs had eSI ~bli5hed kingdoms around Kish, Uruk, Mal"llld, Sippar, and a small lown called Bab-ilim, or Babylon. Irra·imi tti must have been an exceedingly unlucky man. When an omen roretold the dealh of the king, Irra·imini followed the standa rd procedure and proclaimed a 'substitute king', his gardener Enlil·hani. Afler a shon time such 'substitutes' were usuall y put to death, thereby the omen being fulfilled. Unfor· tunately Im ·imiui ale a precipitate bowl of broth, and died, leaving the gardener as king. The hurriedly deified Enlil·b:mi ruled the steadily eroding Sllle of Isin for over 20 years!

THE O LD BABYLONIA N AND O LD ASS YRIAN KIN GDO MS 1894· 1595 BC When Hammul"lllpi (1792·1750 Bq ascended the throne or Babylon, the mosl powe rful Slate in M esopotamia was Assyria. (known then as Ashur or Subinu,) ruled by Shamshi·Acbd I (1813· 1781 BC). M ost orthe area to the south of Babylon was controlled by Rimsin (1822·1763 Bq of Eshnunna. The city-state of Mari, situated on the middle stretch of the Euphrates, at the iunction ofimponant trade routes, was within Shamshi·Adad's sphere of influence and administered by his ratber elTete son Yasmakh·Adad, (we know this from the letten sent to him by his father, which make excellent reading!). Assyria n power began to d ecline witb th e death orShamshi·Adad I. Even his com· pelent eldest son and successor, hhme·Dagan. could not prevent Yasnukh·Adad losing Ihe throne orMari to Zimri· Lim, or the rise of H ammurapi 10 supremacy in Mesopotam ia. Hammurapi defeated Assyria, fuhnun D. and Larsa, and remained frien dly with Mari until that city was itselr annexed by him. It is from the enormous palace archive which has survivcd al M Ilri, that the political, diplomatic and military situ:Jlion existing II this time can be reconstructed in remarkable detai l. Military Organ isati on

Mililary organisation in the Amorite Slates or M esopotamia and Syria (or which Babylon, Assyria and Yamkhad, or Aleppo, we re tbe. mOIl powuful) appears to have been very similar. A common Indition of Amorite tribal organiS:ltion was combined wilh elements of Sumerian tradition. T exIS make it clear that there were two basic types of soldie r; the (proper) soldier, or (qaqad) rtdim , and his reserve, or IQIt.Mlnasnu. They were required to serve either on wllr-Krvice, police-dUlies or labou ring (such as d.igging canals and building ronifications). this obligation of service bein,g ICrmed illt.um. In return for this service the soldier and

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his family were granted I house Ind lind by the king, and it appears Ihlt ail the male m~Clbers of the family shared the ilkum duties in tum, perhlps on In annUliI basis. These plou of land, generally minimum of one bur or 65 hectares. were apparently divided between tbe udum aod his reserve in the proportion of2:1, and remained the property of the king. This land could neither be leased nor sold, and could be recllimed by the king al any time. The lCtuallength of service involved in j/bm is nOI clear. The ruler was usually accompanied on ampaign by his household retinue, known at Mati and Ashur either as the girslilum~ the kiJi, IMrrim , or jusl the:: kisrum. AI Babylon the king's retinue was always called the JtUi, IMrri, and seems 10 have comprised 500 to 1000 men. From tbe rtdu. were selected elite troops known as bdlrntm or hrt'nlm (derived from the: word meaning 'to choose'). Only "willi (free citizens) could b«ome bdhntm.

Unit Organbadon An anny or 'expediLion' ("'amlltim), could number as many as 20,000, 30,000 or even 60,000 men, but smaller forces of 100, 1000, 2000 and 10,000 are also recorded. The commander·in-chiefof an army was known IS an aliJt pdni. The GAL.MAR . TU. or rDbi Amurrnm, meaning 'Commandu of Amo rites', was an administrative rank II Mari, liaising belwun the army and the coun . In Yamkhad, Eshnunna and Babylon (where the rank was UGALA.MA R · TU or _ft.il Amurrnm), he was an active military commander over large bodies of troops, numbering up to 3000. The DUB.SAR.AiAR. TU o r lupsar Amurntm, meaning 'scribe of the Amoriles', could lead forces in the field. He wu s«ond in command 10 Ihe rDbi A murrnm, in charge of t he ccnsusand consc:ript IislS. The GALKUD or rabi pinjm, a 'aptain', (known It Babylon 'company', known as a KUD or pirs;m, of 200 men.

IS

a PA . PA or _/til sliD IIlwttim), commanded the

The NU.BANDA or lopuuam, commanded units less than 200 strong but grtaler than 10, probably 100 men, IS this number WlIS required to guard I 1wlsiJu:J (district) and a NUBANDA luJisu, was responsible for a vi113ge. He could command a baztJft.AD/Jim (suongpoint) and btJtJr'ntm (elite troops). The tlJMatum, or squad nflO men wucommanded by an UGAU.(IO) LU or r»a1til (10) aw;/um, a SOrt of'decurion'. At Babylon he was called an UGALA . NAM.(10) nr rcoJtil ul/llmim. The ordinary ,oldiers ..llere known as UKU. USH or rtdum, 10 which the epithet SI.SA or iSMntm, meaning 'regular' could be added. Small numbers could let as bodyguards alongside Prltqll, in bodies around 500 strong. M ilitlry reserves were known as LU. DIRIG.GA o r I/Xlt/antm at Mati, and DAKH or raJtUAllm It Blbylon. Small detachments of soldiers used for escon or guard duties were

refer~ 10

as an Dlift./um.

Troop Typel The grealer pan of the army at Ihis time consisted of infantry, of whic h there were several different typc5. The main diviJion was between ,obum ft.ibitum, or 'heavily-Irmed troops' and sob" m fDllor" m, or 'light troops'. Sources indicate lhat the sobum /tibi/um required tn operate from I base, or tue up holding positions, while the Ulbum qaltatum, were C'lpable nf mounting ambushes or wrmishing, and could include guides and look-outs. Troops could also be defined as sobum emuqo /um. or 'veterans', and as sabum doltnum or sab,,1I'I' dtJmqam, referring to panicularly good or effective troops. An interesting trOOp-type. which appears to have been considered essentia l to take on campaign (Shamsl·Adad once reprimanded Yasmakh·Adad for neglecting 10 mobilise them), were the ba'l·ntm. The tenn is de rived from the word meaning 'to hunl ' (like Ihe Napoleonic 'chuseur' and 'jaeger'), and their principle weapon WI! an ue. Chariotry consisted of two types oflw()owheeled datiOl, the 1UJrMbsum Ind the nalHJlum. Some chariots were fu rther defined as 'fISt'. ChariotS are known from Syrian and Anatoliln Kals Ind models from Blbylonia at this lime. Their design was a development of the earlier Sumerian 'piliform-car', but were equipped with spoked wheels. They were drawn by twO or four mules. donkeys or horses, which were now making their appc.ranee in the Near EaSt . Le;ther coven for chariot, and animals Ire l iso hinted :It. A limited amounl of tiding 1110 took place, and a leller from "uri, advises the king lhat it was nOI fitting fo r a sove.reign 10 ride I hnrse:. 21

D efe nee The countrysjde was guarded against marauders by means offon ified outposts or strongpoints called bazaJrhatum, and guard troops who included spears among their equipment. These ou tpostS reponed movements ofpcoplc, pursued fugitives and were capable of resisting serious attacks. Fire'signals were used to give warning of impending anack and to mobilise the armed forces in defence. A letter from the eldest son of Shams hi· Ad ad I, hhme-Dogan, to his rather incompetent brother, Yasmakh·Adad at Mari, tdls us that when a large raiding part y entered his ter· ritory, Yasmakh seems to ha\'C panicked and lit two fire-signals at night, which resu lted in complete national mobilisation. His brother advised him to send out m~ngers to repon that it was only a false alarm and hall the process.

Auxiliary T roo p s Great reliance was placed on assistance from v:usa.1 or allied states. Contingents supplied by foreign allies were known as sam.1I1 tilJatu1l1 , while native rei nforcements were referred to as sahum ruddum. Allied contingents could be very large; one contingent sent to Mllfi from Yamkhad, numbe red 10,000 men, another, from Hammurapi, numbered 10,500. Allies could prove unreliable as Shamshi-Adad I found out. In one letter he refers 10 a cen2in Yashub-Addu, who had altered his allegiance several times in the previous three years and in the space of only two months would swear an 02th of allegiance to one lting and then swear an 02 th to another, thereby becoming an enemy of the first king. Another source records that 15 minor ltings followed Hammurapi, with similar numbers allied 10 ursa, Eshnunna and Yamkhad. Nomadic tribes were often allied or subjCClto the Amorile ltingdoms, and could be levied for military service. This may have been imposed as a condition of settlement within the te rr itory of the state. M ilitary scribes were sent into their encam pments to list those eligible for service. Tribesmen were sometimes reluctant to be levied, and in order to encourage them the bead of an executed criminal would be ca rried arou nd thei r encampments. In one leller Shamshi-Adad states that if the king goes on campaign, every membe r of the tribe should be made aVlli lable by the tribal chief. To hold anyone back would be 'sacrilege against the lting'. The tribes rKOrded at Mari were the H ana (who were of particular milita ry imponance), Sutu, Banu·yamin (Benjaminitcs) and Bani-Sim'a1. The Banu· yamin we re panicularly unreliable and unconuollable. Habi ru, or 'Apiru' tribesmen arc mentioned, and apparently lived in the app roaches to Syria. Composition of Armlcs A letter from Shamshi-Adad I to Yasmakh·Adad consists ofinsl ruClions 1510 the mUSler of trOOpS for I campaign, and may provide an example ofa typical army. Yasmakh-Adad has already gOt 3000 men, levied for their military service. 2000 men arc to be levied from among the tribal encampmen ts, for which purpose military scribes have already entered the camps and made lists. 1000 of these men should be Hana, 600 should be levied from the Uprapu, Yarikhu Ind Amanu sub-t ribes, and 200 and 300 can be obtained 'here and there' until sufficient n um be r have been collected. Only 1000 personal retaine rs will be required, an d the total of troops will be 6000. To these will be added 10,000 men sent by Shamshi-Adad, probably native Assyrian s, described as a strong and well-equippcd continge nt . A funher 6000 allied troops are expected to come from Eshnunna. The entirt force is described as '20,000; a strong army', (i n fact it tota ls 22,000). Supply Apart from soldiers, an army would require sup plies and transport . This consisted of pack-donkeys, fou r·wheeled wagons (mqllum ) and boats. The laner would be especially important when it is considered that the Euphrates was a major military route. In one case 200 ships were requ ired to tnnsport 3000 men. Although this suggests sma ll ships carrying only 15 men eac h, they may have been larger with some devoted to supplies. Mari was 8 ce ntre for weapon manufacture, and armouries were probably att ached to the palace . Shamshi-Adad I scnt orders to Mari for shields, arrowheads and siege equipment, and the palace supplied Hana tribesmen with some weapons. Military Law The famous law,

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MIDIAN

War between c itY-Slltes was commonplace, as were the ravages of nomadic Bedouin and 'Apiru (Jlabiruj. The great powers of Egypt. Mitllnni and Hani made use of these local conflicts to exlend their spheres orinfluence. Canaanite rulers would also anempt to play-ofTthe greal powers against each other to funher their own ambitions. Aziru of Amurru was adept at this during the reign of Akhenllten (1379- 1362 Be). Canaanite armies relied mai nly on high-quality chariotty. provided by a ~ial elite of noble char iot warriors. the maryanna. This term is ultimately derived from 1m 'lndG-European' word meaning youlh or hero. Mar)'Qnna evolved in Canaanite society following the introduction of ChariOI warfare at the beginning of this period. The origin of this institution is probably to be found among the Hurrians of .\titanni. Mitannian military practice had considerable influence on Canaanite warfare and there WllS a strong Human element in the population. especially llmong maryanna.

34

The mal'}"lnnll was I profe"ional chariot war rior who possessed sufficienl wellth to mlintain I two-horse c hariot and the a$SOCilted armour and equipment . T he source of this weallh was a Land holding carrying an obligation to scrw: the king. A ntal'}"lnnll would also pos$CS5 such retlineB 15 I driver, grooms and a small numbe r offOCMsoldiers or 'runners'. Mal'}"lnllll status was generally hereditary, initially being conferred by the king. It is possible that maryallllQ could be provided by merchants and craftsmen u well as landed nobility. Rulers possessed I personal re!lnue of elite maryall"". The term nt'anll IXCUrs in Ugaritic tats, in Egyptian tats u a reference to Ca· naani te enemies and later as a Hebrew term for elite soldiers. A force of nt'an'lI who rescued R2.mcsscs 11 at Kadesh could have been allies from Amurru. This term probably refers to elite mal)l2nllO , Most of the ordinlry infantry were conscripted from the peasantry, or IIl1psllu. They we re free citizens who owned land but we re liable for conscription for work or war. In the Amarna letters infantry arc referred to by the Akk2dian terms saM *P~ sabt bitari Pictorial evidence suggc:su that infantry ....'Cre usually lightly equipped archers or spearmen. They took second place to c hariotry Ind acted in suppon of them, in contrast to Egyptian tlctical thinking. Elite units of infantry acted as royal guilds, like the ' Royal Archers' of Piryawaza of Damascus. Canaanite princes could supplemenl their forces with Shaasu or Sutu Bedouin, and 'Apir'll, or garrison troops pro\·ided by their imperial overlords. 'Apir'll, or Habiru, was a term long used for I clln of fl'CCbooten Ind outcasts including outlaws, fugitives, desen nomads and even some settled people. The similarity of the name to that of the Hebrews has uoused much debate. The term may well have been applied to them by the Canaanites and gave rise to the name Hebrew. These bands we re also known as IIabbarll (bandits) Ind 'Dusty-Ones'. They were undoubl:edly rugged and fierce but also unreliable and treachcroU5. 'Apiru were olien employed as merccnuics, Piryawaza of Damascus could count frie ndly Sutu mnd 'Apinl amongst his forces, but non-aligned 'Apirw posed a considerable threat to the Canaanite cities. 'Apirll bands could be qui te weil-cquippcd and might even include chariotry. One of the main occupations for the forces of Canaanite city-states would be curbing the activi ties of 'Apr'ru and desc n nomads. Some of then bands could be quite llrge and dange rous. A b:md of SUIU recorded in archive! from Alalakh contained 1436 men, 80 ofthesc were CbariO(etTS Ind 1006 were 1111111OIIU, probably I type of u cher. T he city of Alalakh iuelf could only mUSler 31 mal)'lJfIlll oUI of a male popuialion of around 1200 and the surrounding 22 villages with populations varying from II to 500. One \'i1lage fell to a SUIU force of 17 infantry, 7 chariotecn and 4 IIIaIUinu·troops, while 2000 IIIIbiru captured lallul, on the Euphrates nonh of Car chern ish. An 'Apiru chief posed such I tbrot to the old adversaries, Shuwudata of Hebron and' Abdu· Heha of Jerusalem, that they united Ind even rcccl\-cd SO chariots to a"ist them from Accho and Achshaph. Milkilu of Gcze r asked the Pharaoh to provide clwiots to protect his bnd against 'Apiru. Perhaps c hariots werc particularly dTectivc: at pursuing Ind roodng out 'ApirN raiders. Such bands provided I refuge and potential supponers fo r political fugitives like Labaya (who made himself ruler ofScchem with their aid) and Idrimi (who fled to them with only his chariot Ind I groom and ended up IS ruler of ALaIakh).

SMrdanu mercenaries arc mentioned at Byblos and Ugarit. The Egypdan Empire In Ca naa o a nd S yria By the reign of Amunhotep III Egyptian control had been firmly established in Canaan and Southern Syria. Unlike Nubia which was admi nistered as I Southern extension of Egypt, the Egyptians did not interfere wi th the long established arra ngements of the Canaanites. Their main concern was to cnsure a regular now of tribute and the exclusion of any rival power from the region. To achievc: this end, garrisons wcte set up at Ullaza, Sharuhen, SumeTll and Irqata, and administrative centres at Gna and JOPpl. The ITCli was gove rned by an Egyptian 'Oversecr of All Foreign Count ries' (the coun terpart of the Viceroy of Kush). Each city-state was supervised by an Egyptian fMpury, a sort of political officer or 'resident', called a 1O"i"l1 by the Canaanites. Imperial protocol demanded that Canaanite kings be referred to as /tlla:anll, 'headman' or JUSt aw/l/, ' man', of such· and·such city (use of the word IIIt/i! 110'11 considered impeninent by the Egyptians). Local rulers were allowed much freedom of action to defend themselves and indulge in warfare with each other, as lonlll they acted out of loyalty to Pharaoh. They lII'ere nOl slow to usc this acust to obtain mate rial assistance from Emt. Egyptian garrison ltoopS in Canaan consisted of infantry, usually Egyptian or Nubian archers, and chariO(ry. Garrison forces were $IIlIn; Megiddo and Oezer required only 100 men, other cities as few as SO. Bybl05 once requested IS many all 600 men and 30 chariots while Piryawua required 200. Loca.l rulers were corutlntly requesting the EgyptianJ to send more trOOPS to assist against riwl cities Ind 'Apiru. The Egyptians may sometimes have taken a cynical view of these requests. 35

Garrison uoops seem to have been allocated on an annual basis; vassals often complain that if the Pharaoh doet not send 'archers' this year, he would lose territory to his enemies. Egyptian garrisons were onen I menace in themselves to their hosts. OfficeI'! indulged in corruption and troops became drunk and disorderly. They might even pillage the palace of the local prince if Iheir rations were not fonhcoming. Ugarh This information derives from the palace archives of Ugnit (modem Ras Shamra) situated on the Syrian coast. Many of the temu appearing in these texts are related to AJUr.:Klian, Egyptian and Hurrian military terminology, and demonstrate the great interchange of military ideas in this region. The organisation they portray is probably relevanl to most of the stales of Syria during this period. Upn! was an important mercantile stale deriving ils wealth from ~ and land commerce. Untillhe mid-14th cen· tury BC it feU within the Egyptian sphere of influence, but later became an ally of the Hiltites. Forces comprised an army and navy. The navy was imponantlo a COlIstal state like Ugarit, and was probably welldeveloped. It could be used to suppon land operation. and also fighl battles al~. Ug'ltit was sometimes subjected to seaborne raids by pirates like the Lukka. The Ugarilic flt1:1 may have been enli5led by the Hittites when they required naval forces. T he army was under the command of the prince who constituted a rtsuti, 'subordinate ally' when forming pan of the army of a major power. Fully~uipped troops, sabu natib, consisted ofinfantcy and choriotry. Units were commanded by officen called mur-u, but unit sizes are not known. Mur-u seem to have been connected with land holdings. Some mur-u belonged to special units such as the 'Officers of the Crown Prince'. The chariolry were commanded by the okil narAabt~ 'Chief ofChariouy'. The main strength of the chariolry were mO~lfna, 'noble chariot warrion'. A son of 'household chariOtty' was provided by the 'Maryo.znna of the King'. The term ne'orim occun at Ugarit, probably referring, IS elsewhere. to elite chariotry. The maryo.znnu was Ihe commander of the chariot. Another chariOtry soldier was the kUy, 'groom' who may have ridden in the chariot and was responsible for three hones (presumably [wo for harnessing to the vehicle and one spare). The tjtnntlf may have been another crewman, possibly an archer. It is possible that Ugarit used three-man chariOIS on the Hillile model. Ugaril wu a wealthy Slale and could muster a large cbariot force numbering 1000 chariots. Infanlty included palace guards, troops who patrolled the counlryside, and troops recruited from Ihe peasantry, known IS ItMpttj (a venion of huprhu), or awilu Mm/.!. Among troops who cannol be clearly defined are the mtdnfem, possibly archen. and tJTDtli imjlll~ probably spearmen, (tbe imirrll-spear is known from the Old Baby lonian period). Some troops may have worn corslets or tiryana (related to the Akkadiln term Ulriam). Uprit was destroyed al the time of the Sea-Peoples' disturbances. Official correspondence between Upril and Aluhiya (Cyprus) (dating to shonly before this happened) Slate thai Ihe Uga ritic forces had all been despatcbed to help the Hittites and that seaborne raiders had appeared 01T the COllSt.

THE HEBREWS

Initially Ihe basic divisions were those of tribe or clan. These rallied to the call of the acknowledged leader. Within these divisions smaller units were formed according to the decimal system, with leaders of 100's and 1000's. All males over 20 yean old were considered Ihe fighting strength. Leaden had to select the troops n~ed for certain tasks from among the generll musler of tribesmen. Forces were divided shortly before the bailie, according to the requirements of the situation. When Joshua was Ittempting 10 oustlhe Belhelites from the ruins of Ai, his scouts estimated Ibat 3000 men would be enough. When the fintlllack. failed. Joshua was forced to use the whole tribal hosl in a feigned flight with a small group of picted men to move in behind the enemy. In the face ofa large raid by Midianite and Amalekile nomads, Gideon mustered tribesmen from Asher. Zcbulun, Naptali and Manesseh. Gideon planned a night attack and needed to separate a force of stealthy warrion. He observed how the tribesmen wenlto drink at a water-hole and picked those IMtiay down 10 drink. These men knew tbalthey were most vulnerable al such times lind were clearly uperienced in nomadic-style warfare. Gideon obtained 300 such men whom he subdivided inlO three panies. They were 10 approach the enemy camp from three sides while the rest of the tribesmen were 10 block the enemy's escape route. Funher evidence of the improvised nllturt of tribal warfare comes from the same action in which Gideon had to alen the tribes of Ephraim to block the escape of the enemy across the fords of the Jordan. However, they were not impressed at being warned at such a late stage.

Not III the tribesmen rushed 10 the call oflheir leaden with the same enlhuiasm. In order 10 musler enough men 10 relieve Jabesh..Qilead from the AIDIlekites. Saul threatened 10 kililhe oxen of Inyone who did nOI turn up. As the Dew king, Saul wu e5tablishi ng his authority to call out the tribal levy. As the Hebrews became uniu:d and organised under a single king I more pe rmanent military organisation developed. Saul created a fo rce of 3000 lill hGllwr, 'cbosc::n men', with whom he seiud Gibeah from the Philistines. On this occasion 1000 men were dcuched under the command of Saul's son, Jonathan. Da vld'i Military OrsaointJoD David inherited I system blsed on the musler ofuiballevies in time of war common to many Near·EiJlem states, although most, unlike Israd, supplemented and strengthened these levies with e:hariouy and regular soldiers.

urnlS

Israel'l militil wu orglnised intO Iccording to a decimal system under elected 'valiant men' , iJ IIQyil, whn as commanders, .car, led uniu of 1000 (Q'kJplrimJ. 100 (mt'tllrJ. SO and 10. The militia were recrui ted II musters by the tribal chief, or MJ~ and assigned to their individual mt'ttll in peacetime, and ponibly received lOme rudimenlaty training. There were vlrious tribal specialities with cenlin weapons and styles of fighting. The Benjaminiu:s for eumple were co nsidered good at archery and slinging. The Benjaminites of Gibeah could mUlter 700 isll hGltwr, or 'picked men', who 'were left·handed; every onc could sling a stone It a hare and not mill'. The Gldi tes were swift and fierce, the Judeans used spear and buckler, and the tribesmen ofZebulun were competent with all weapons and able to keep rank. The pressures of conslant warfare made il necessary to appoiot overall leaders and ultimately led to the establish· ment of a monarchy. King Saul came 10 maintain a pe~na l semi·regu l ar army of 3 Q'itJpllim of isll hGllwr in his household, and David, when he Iled from Saul's service, acqu ired a personal follow ing of his own . This band was perhaps typical ofwhatlhe Canaanites would call 'tJpirw or IIQbiru, consisting of' . . . everyone that was in distress and everyone thai was in debt and every man that wu discontented'. David'. retinue eventually numbered 600 men or 6 mt 'ttll~ and 10 escape from Saul he entered the service of the Philistine prince; Aehish ofGath, who placed his contingent in a border outPUll 10 suppress nomadic raiders such as the AmalekitCi. When Saul mel his death in battle with the PhilistinC$ at Gilboa, David seized Ihe opportunily to make himse:lf King of Israel. David UlCd his band of followers, known as ,iblxm'm, or 'mighty mm', as a core Iround which 10 build rus military organisation. From tbcsc were selC'Cled an inner elite of officers called 'The Thiny'. The tribal levy wu organised into 12 divisions totalling 24,000 men. Each division wu to $land in readintsll for one month in rotalion. The com· manders oflbe divisions were appoinled from among tbe Tbiny. This meant that part oflhe tribal levy was always under the direct control of the king and Ivailable immcdiltdy 10 face any national threat. David formed a foreign bodyguard of'Cherethiles' and 'Pc:lethites' probably recruited from Philistines and Cretans settled on Ihe coaSt of Soulhern Canaan. Israelite fortts were mainly infantry untillbe reign of Solomon. Consequenlly Hebrew commanders had always been wary oflhe Canaanite and Philistine chariotry. They usually attempted to fight in terrain that wu unsuitable for charlO( tactics. When David defeated Hadadc:ur orZobeh and his allies from Danwcus, he: captured 1000 chariots but ordered the horses to be ' houghed' except for 100 spans. Obviously David only had need of, or means of supponing, a small force of chariotry. Solomon'a C hariotry Solomon had sufficient wealth to organise and maintain a chariot corps. Horses (at 150 shekels each) were purchlsed from Egypt, the Nto· Hi uile lIales and the Aramacan slates of Syria; chariots (at 6000 shekels) were bought from Egypt. In this way a force of 1,400 chariOls and 12,000 chllriotry pe rsonnel (referred to as ' horsemen' ) was eslablished. They wtre stalioned in special chariOt cities and a reserve was kept at Jtruulem. The figure: of 12,000 scc:ms large compared 10 the number of verucles. There would have been twO, possibly thrc:e, crewmen 10 each vehicle and the figure probably also includes runners and grooms. Tbere may even have bc:cn replattmC:OI crews and tbe chariotry may have been accompanitd by cavalry. Perhaps some of the runners were mounted (the mounts could then double as spare chariOl horses). Developments such as these were taking place lmong the Nco-Hittites Ind Aramaeans and in Assyria, leading to the devc:lopment of true cavalry. Solomon built stables in the chariot cities wllh I totaJ number of staUs to bouse 40,000 (probably 4,(00) horses. Stables dating to the reign of Ahab have: bc:cn c:xcavated at Me,iddo. They contained space for 450 barxs. Assuming that each vehicle required t .....o horses plus one spare, we arri\~ II a figure of 150 chariots stllioned al Megiddo. This could represc:nl I rhrc:csquadron formation, each squadron comp rising 50 \·c:hiclcs.

37

In order to supply the coun and the chariot cities (which were also 'store' cities), Solomon divided his kingdom inlO 12 provinces of equal productive capacity, ~ch controlled by a "uib official. Each province supplied the king ~nd the stables for one month of each r~r in rotation. It seems that this system did not extend to Judah or that region provided some other scrvice which is nO( known. The ch~riot cities ..... ere probably chosen for their strategic impon:mce ~nd would be located on borders or major military routes. Apan from the king's central reserve at Jerusalem the ehariot cities protr..bly included: Megiddo, Hazor, Gezer, Tadmoor (later known as Palmyra), Hamalh·Zobeh, Beth·horon, Baalath and Tell Qedah. At Karkar in 853 BC Ah~b led a contingent of 2000 ch:ariots and 10,000 infantry (his was the largest chariot con· tingent). It is possible that Solomon's org~nisation continued into Ahab's reign, or was developed by him, as 12 chariot Cilies with st~bles of the same size as those: at Megiddo would give a total of 1,800 chariots. The funher 200 could be provided by the king's central rescrve, the nl'(;Irin.

THE PIDUSTINES The name Philistine, and ultim3tely Palestine, derives from the Pelesct, one of the 'Sca.Peoples'. Wnpon finds suggest that some Sea.Peoples were al ready established in Canaan as garrison troops under the Ramenide Phanohs. The origin of the Philistincs probably datet to the rtpulse of the greal I~nd onslaught against Egypt in the time of Ramesscs Ill. With the Egyptian fromier barred 10 them, the inwden Clrved out a territory for thcms.clves around the five citics of Ashdod, Askelon, Ekron, Gath and Gaza. The Tiiller settled on Ihe coast to their nonh and possibly a small group of Cretans 10 their south. The Philistine cities were each ruled by a prince, but they usually acted in concert and met in a council called the SQrnty. They gradually began to assimilate Canaanite culture: lind methods of warfare. Their allempts to exen aUlhority over most of Canaan natu rally brought them inlO confliC! wi th the Hebrews. The Philistines seem to have adopted chariotry on the Canaanite model; at Mount Gilboa the Israelitcs were shot down by arrow! from the pursuing Philistines. For campaigns into enemy turitory the prin~ mustered their forccs at Aphek. Advance posilions might be set up from which the surrounding area could be ravaged. At Michmash the Philistint1 divided their forces into three columns for this purpose and placed a rearguard to cover their escape route through the narrow pass. Like the Hebrews, the Philistines were also menaced by nomadic raiders. In order to suppress them and watch the frontie rs, they established sclliements of auxiliaries such as David's ,ibborim, at Ziklag.

PHOENICIA AND CYPRUS 1200-539 BC The Phoenician pons recovered from the Sea- Peoples' IIllack, but the population now included large endaves of Sea·Peoples. The Egyptian ' Repon of Wen am un' describes this states of affairs and mentions that Dar, for example, was ruled by a prince called Tjcld:er·Ba'~I, and that Tjekker fleet! from these enclaves we re still interfe ring wilh trade in these waters in the 11th century BC. Sea·Peoples had also scllied in Cyprus, and it is interesting fO nOle that on an ivory plaque: from Enkomi, runners dresscd exactly like Pele:sct are shown following the: chariot of a Near·Eastern style m(;lryannll. The city-states of Phoenicia did not have the same military strength on land as thei r powerful Nee-Hittite:, Anmaean and Israelite neighbours, bUllheir real strength I~y in their fleets. A Neo-Hillite relief from Kautepe, Assyrian reliefs of Scnnacherib and the Til.Barsip paintings all depict warships that are dearly equipped with nffiS. The Auyrian sources show biremts which have rowers on the lower deck and soldiers on the upper deck, which is prottcted by a gunwhale on which round shields are mounted. The ram in the T il· Barsip example is clearly shod in bronu. Thc:sc: sour~ probably show Phoenician ships which would have been available to the powers which could control the Phoenician pons, and indicate the level of naval developme:nt reached by the 8th century BC. The first land power to make use of such fo rces WloIS Solomon, who formed an alliance with Hiram of Tyre, enabling him to keep a nawl force at Ezion Ge:ber where it could dominate the Red Sea, commanding nOl only imporlant trade rOUlet but Egypt's CIStern flank. Ashurtr..nipal was later to use the fleets of22 ofhis Phoenician vassals to approach Egypt from her weak nonhern flank. The Phoenician contingents recorded at the battle of Karkar may illustrate the weakness in land for~. They contain few or no chario[5 and moslly small numbers of infantry. Unable to compete: with strong inland states, Phoenician Slates narurally employed their navics to expand wcstwardJ into the Mediterranean. The control ofthc:sc: states, which included Aradu!, Byblos, Sidon, Tyre, Accho, Irkate, Arvad, Usanata and Shian, was of great stralegic ad va ntage and also great economic value. Lacking slrong land forces, thc:sc: cities rtlied on wi thstanding sieges in order to survive, perhaps coullting on supply by 5c:a. Some cities were actually situated on islands separated from the coast, such as Arvad. The Assyrians had to reduce these by construction of siege moles. AI the time of the Assyrian Empire, Cyprus, or Iadnana as it was known in Assyria, was divided into several city· states. T hese were Edi'il, KilnlSi, Pappa, Silli, Kuri, Tamesi, Nuria, Sillu'ua, Qani.hadasti and Lidir. Cyprus fell

3.

under the control of Assyria following tbe conquest of the Phoenician stalts beg\ln by Tiglath·P ilese r III and com· pleted by his successors, becoming tributary under Ashurbanipal. Later, Cyprus was to fa ll for a time within the sphere of influence of the Saite kings of Egypt.

ANATOUA AND THE HITTITE EMPIRE Ea r ly Anatolia Little can be said of the military organisation of this area before the H ittite Empire. The rich tombs found at Dorak, AIDctI Huyuk and the Pontic region demonstrate the existence of several principalities. From around 2300 BC the mine ral wealth of this area had attraded the attention of Akkadian and Assyrian merchants. Assyrian kings sponsored the establishment ofl.rading colonies, called karum, among the city-statts of ccntnlll Anatolia. There we re about ten small principalities in this area including Dukhumid, Wakhshushana, K.hurum and most imponantly Kanes h, where the chief karum was sit uated. T hese states may have been ruled by a single 'Prince of Princes'. Relations with the Assyrians were friendly and the natives profited greatly from their tnllde. No doubt military ideas from Mc.sopoumia filteT(d into Anatolia along the same trade roUt es. The natives were known as the Hatti, but there was alT(ady an intrusive dement in the population who were later to emerge as the H ittites. The Hittites traced their origin to a King of Kus5anll, Pithanas, who conquered Kanesh, and his son Anni tas who made it his capital around j 750 BC. The Hittite language was descended from the tongue spoken in Kanesh and the name of the older inhabitants was adopted as the name of the Hinile state, The founder oflhc H ittite slale was considered to be a king of Kussara, Labarnas, who extended his rule to the sea. It was during this period that knowledge of the two-horsed chariot fi ltered imo Anatolia. A text from the reign of Aninas mentions a body of 1, 400 men and a unit of 40 chariots. Tbe Old Hittile Kingd o m Labarnas's son, Hanusilis, campaigned against the Amorite states of Syria. reaching the Euphnlltes before being killed in [he war against Yamkhad (Aleppo). M UT'Silis I completed his conquesl5 and ..... ent on down the Euphrates to sack mighty Babylon, an e\'ent which shook the Near East. This empire was lost under successive weak kings and had to be re-established by Suppiluliumas I. Little is known about mili tary organisation in this period tllCCpl that a change was taki ng place in Hittite society with the development of a son of ' feud2-I' aristocracy perhaps connected with the introduction of chariot warfare on the Milannian model. Previously the king was served by a body of fight ing men and officials called the pankhus. Chief offici2-1s were often kinsmen of the king and held military commands as in later times. There was 2- body of high'ranking officers known as the ItJianuui}W and a royal bodygua rd called the Intshtdi

THE HITTITE EMPIRE In his ' 1st Syrian war', Suppiluliumu I (1380-1346 BC) conquered the Slates of Khaleb (Aleppo), Alalakh, Tunip and Nukhuhshe in Nonhern Syria, which brought him into conOid with the Mitannian Empire. In his ' 2nd Syrian war', Suppiluliumas marched through M itanoi, plundered the capit2-1 and crossed the Euphrates south ofCarchemish, to arrive in Egyptian territory. The M.itannian state began to collapse. This was followed by the 'Hurrian war', lasting six years, in which Carchemish fell, an Egyptian attack was defea ted and l\.titanni was fmally destroyed (par. titioned between Hatti and Auyria). Suppiluliumas died of a plague brought back by his soldiers from Syria. H e had established H ani as a foremost wor ld power, which she remained until her collapse during the Sea-People disturbances around 1200 Be. The Hittites were great imperialists. They were also highly competent in the ans of war and in ternational dip lomacy. War was imerpreted in legal terms. A form al ultimatum was issued before force was applied. Vassal states were bound by trea ties which usually contained the following provisions; The ally was required to suppo n the Hittite king on campaign, never give away information to an enemy, rush to the aid of t he H atti-Iand in time of attack or revolt, (and in return could request H illite usinancc in similar circumstances), accom modate and supply Hittite garrisons and trea t them as friends, an d had 10 extradite any fugitives (or dissidents) neeing from H atti. The friends of the H ittites were to be: considered Ihe friends of tbe ally state, and similarly, Hittite enemies WeT( their enemics. An an nual tribute in gold or silver had to be paid to the Hitt ite king. Soldiers were sworn in to the army by an oath and the army had to be ritually cleansed before setting oul on ctlm· paign. This was achieved by marching between twO posts, wi th one half of II human sacrifice tied to each post. It wu assumed that no evil could pass through such a barrier. Perhaps this was an archaic ritual restrided [0 an early period of H ittite hiS[ory.

39

The supreme commander was the king, but command could be delegated to other members of the royal family. Beneath the king were governors of conquered territories, including royal princes set up as kings in front ier regions, and vassal rulers who led thei r own contingents. Commanders of smaller divisions were provided by the lesser nobility. Unit organisation followed the decimal system, with commanders of Tens, Hundreds and Thousands. T he chariotry were probably the most formidable part of the Hittite army. The Hittites learned the art of training horses to the yoke from the Hurrians. A Hittite version of a Hurrian training manual has actually been found, writteo by an expert called Kikkuli. A military aristocncy, maimained by land grants, formed the chariotry and are probably comparable to the maryanna of Syria and Mitanni. Maryanna were cenainly included in the allied contingems supplied by Syrian \"1Issal states. The Kadesh inscriptions mention maryanna ofNaharin (the Egyptian name for the region of Mitanni), Carchemish, Keshkc:sh (Kaska?) and Dardany, (so the Egyptians clearly classed some Anatolian chariotry as equivalent to maryanna). Milim y service was connected with land ownership. Estates were held from the king with an obligation to serve. Lesser classes of land ownen we re the 'Weapon.men', or 'Tool-men', who were probably craftsmen rather than soldie rs. Terms of service fo r Ihis class we re called sakhkhan, and the term for obligation (a concept pervading Hittite society from vassal princes downwards) was iskhuil, or ilkum. Such obligations were taken very seriously by the Hittites and their allies, and were expected to be upheld to the full. The Kadesh inscriptions and other Egyptian sources mention troops called tth" or ruhuytnl, possibly a Mitannian term. They formed an important part of the Hittite fo rces and the allied Syrian contingents. A king ofTunip once employed 329 of these soldiers. At Kadesh the two large bodies of infantry numbering several thousands arc called 'fighting ruhuytnl', which might imply that it was a designation of status rather than a completely military term. There were also 'ruhuytnl of chariots' and ruhuytnl sh.ie1d·bearers at Kades h, so they we re not exclusively infantry. A 'Leader of ruhuytnl' is found among the slain Hittite notables listed by the Egyptians. O rde r of Ba ttle of the Hittite Empire at Xadesh , 1300 BC

It is possible to reconStruct the Hiuite order ofbaule at Kadesh from Ihe Egyptian recorcb. It mus t be: an example of one of the largest armies ever raised by the Hittites. T he ChariOlry and infantry of the Ki ng of HaUl. These ..... ere supported by Allied Contingen ts including infantry and chariotry from: Naharin - mainly comprising the former kingdom of Mitanni but including territory west of the Euphrates. Anawa - located in Central Anatolia. Nahari n and Arzawa were kuiroxlna states, enjoying preferred status in the Empi re. Dardany - located in North-Western Anatolia, included maryalllla. Possibly associated with the Dardanoi of Homer. Keskesh - probably the Kaska of Northern Analolia, included maryallna. Masa - 10000ted in Western Ana tolia. Pitassa - located in Central Anatolia. Arwen - or Arawa nna, in Analolia, (possibly 'Ilion', the Egyptians rendered 'I' with the sign for 'r'). Karkisha - localed in South·Western Anatolia. Lukka - situated along the southern coast of Anatolia. Kiuuwatna - located in South-Easl Anatolia (Cilicia) providing maryanlla. Kedy - located north of Syria. Mushanet - location unknown. lnesa - locat ion unknown. lnenes - location unknown. Carchemish - located on the Euphrates in Syria. Ugaril - located on the Syrian coaSt. Nukhashshe - located in Northern Syria. Khaleb - Aleppo (modern Arabic ' Halb') in Syria. Kadesh - the land of Kinza, on the Orontes. T he dose-order spearmen, called 'fighting ruhuytnl', formed two large formations of 18,000 and 19,000 men. The hieroglyph for '10,000' was missed on early tI'll nslations, leading 10 some sources quoting 8,000 and 9,000.

40

2,500 c.hadOls, organised intO four bodies, formed the first wave of chariotry, consisting of contingents from Haui, Anawa, Mau, and Pitassa, and included chariOl runners. A reserve or second wave of 1,000 chariots wall formed from the contingents of Arzawa, Mau, Arwen, Lukka, Dardany, Carchemish, Karkisha, and Khaleb, each led by their own commander, and Hittites led by brothers of Muwatallis. In addition to these: the re were troops manning the battlements of Kadesh, and lOme Anatolian infantry posit ioned betwtcn the city and the meam that surrounded it (now Ihe EI Mubdiya brook).

Sea Power For naval operations the Hinies probably called upon the f1tcts of Ugaril, Alashiya or the Lukka. A naval battle is rcalrded in the reign ofSuppiluliumas II at the end of Ihe 13th. t%ntury BC. The Hiuile f1tcl engaged the ships of Alashiya at sea and destroyed them with fire. Either Alashiya was attempting to break away from Hiuiu: control, or other enemies were operating from Alashiya, possibly Sca·Peoples.

THE HITTITES and Neighbours

Hayas a

Azz i Aishe

CllVlllry began to become effective as mobile missile troops and, to a limited extent, close-combat troops, the number of the crew, the amount of proteaion and the size of th e chariot were increased to the detriment of manoeuvrability, and li mited further the terrain on which it could be used. The chariot units would form up on the wings of the Assyrian battle-line, su pported by cavalry to guard the vulnenble flanks and rea r. They wou ld then rumble toward the enemy, the shield·bearers holdin g their shields high ovtr the heads of their companions to guard against enemy arrows descending al long ranges. The sight of tb ese ve:hicles thundering across a plain might well have been enough to cause any untrained enemy le vies to flee. Those that stood firm would have little hope:, unless they had sufficient volume of missiles to b reak the Assyrian charge by killing the vulne rable chariot hor5t$ (often well protected enough to make this ineffeaive). If they failed to bait the charge, yet thei r nerve held until the shock, the resultant clash might ruin them as " fight ing unit.

To be fu ll y ~fTective, howev~r, chanolS wer~ limited to open baule on fairly nat plains or gentle slopes, as at tbe battles of the U lai, Halule and du ring Ashurbanipal's Arab wars wh~r~ th~ speed ofth~ ~nemy cam~Js prov~d insufficient to escapc a rombined for~ of Ass yrian chariots and cavalry. When campaigning in diffiC\l ltterrain, such as the mountainous regions to the north and cast of Assyria, the chariotry left behind, or only a small force of chariou was taken. Sometimes only one chariot, that of the king him:iClf, wou ld proceed, accompanied by guard eavalry, probably as a command vehicle. Even then, it might need to be hauled up the mountainsides with ropes.

w~re oft~n

Cavalry Horsemen, used as scouts or messeng~rs, had long b«n known in the Nur EaSt, but by the 10th century B.C. tttle cavalry make thei r appearance in sev~ ral r~gion! of the Near East, such as th~ Aramoean and Neo- Hittite states, Iran and possibly Egypt. Th~ first usc of cavalry in Assyria occurs during th~ 9th century B.C. At first cavalry operated in pairs ronsis!ing of an archer and a shield·bearer, the laner holding the reins of the other's horse and screening him with the shield while he shoots. This gives the impression of a cha riot crew and horses operating as a unit while t he vehicle itsclfha! been dispensed with. By the lime ofTiglath· Pileser JII the cavalry still operate in pairs but cormol their own ho rses. By the 7th ~ntury B.C., howeve r, cavalry equipped with both spear and bow, armou red, and ridiog armoured horses were in usc, although the shield had been d.iscarded by AS5yrian cavalry during this prot"ess of develop men t. The cavalry team of archer and shield-bearer would have the advantage of being able to operate in le rrain that would have rutricted or prevented the usc: of chanotry and were able to carry out the funclion of mobile m issile troops. \Vi th the introduction of armour and the cavalry spear, some degree of shocK-charge abi lity was added, making eavalry a reall y viable replacement for chariotry in any but the most fa\'ourable terrain fo r chariotry, and against any but the most heavily-armed and densely formed enemies. Apan from the general trend in Ihis dircttion in the Ncar East, and the possible «
crewmen. Some crewmen might dismounlto despatch fallen opponenls, or engage t hem on foot . The melee: would bc:come confused and there would be ch3nces for a wamor 10 win renown by seeking OUI and slaying a notable enemy. The undisciplined mighl wasle time dismounting 10 1001 or take captives. If either formation was baded up by a $«Ond wave of chatiotry or infantry, their a"ival al this time could be decisive. finally the remnants of the worsted formation would retire pursued by those: who have not stopped to loot or rescue friends. tfthey should reach the prolection of their own infantry the pursuers could be: repulsed by volleys of missiles or dele"ed by a mass of spears. A change in chariot tactics probably took place: towa rds the end of the 13th century B.C. when chariOl design ahuc:d and a less robust vehiclc called the 'rail-th3lf of his overlord in Heraklcopolis, the Nomarch, Ankhtify,led the Nomes of Hic.rakonpolis and Edfu against Thebes, which wn allied wi th Koptos. Ankhtify rc.scued the town of Hermonthis which was unde r threat from the Thebans and invaded the Theban Nome on both banks of the Nile. Ankhtify desnoyed che town orVushenshen, a few miles north of Thebes. The Thebans, under Menthuhotep II, fought back and conquered the Nome of Asyut. They advanced nonh,through the Hare Nome where there was much fighting, and the Oryx Nome where there was lillie resistantt, to r~ch Hentkltopolis which fe ll in 2040 B.C. The last outposts of resista nce were suppressed in the Delta and the Oam, while the frontiers were secured (the South as far as Nubia was alrady p:1rI of the Theban coalition du.ring the war against Hentk.lcopolis). Mcnthuhotep II took the title 'Smalawy', meaning 'Unite! of the Two Lands', and bcC2me Pharaoh of all Egypt and founder of the Middle Kingdom. The southcrn Nomarchs were abolished. The Nomarchs of middle Egypt were left alone for the lime being, to be suppreucd by later kings. 'DAY OF SHEDYETSHA' e. 2046 B.C. During the civil wa rs between Thebes and Heraklcopoiis there was great diSlrcss in Egypt due to famine and the uvagcs of the opposing armies. When Menthuhotep [J marched into the Hare Nome (KI","m), the royal forces marched in to oppose him. The local Nomarch was Ncheri, who was chief-of-slafl" to Heukleopolis and commander of one of the lWO divisions of ber army. He resolved to save his Nome from the deprcdacions of both sides. Neheri's son, Kay, mobilised the young me n to fight in companies and formed II 'rearguard' in ShedyelSha con· sisting only of his followers. Here they foughl successfully againsl the forces or Uppcr and Lower Egypt, which included Medjay Nubians and Asiatic alUiliaries. Kay's young troops prOl:cctcd Ihe people ofche Nome who had ned into Ihe swamps, while che older men would not take the field againsl the royal forces. Kay opened his own house co refugees from the figh ting. M~nwhile, Neheri's other son, Thutnakhte, held Slt:ldy in a fierce battle witb the kin g'5 troops. These actions were remembered in the Nome as the 'Day of Shedyetsh3'.

Shortly afterwa rds Neheri decided to join the: Theban side. 71

THE FALL OF UR c. 2004 B .C. The exertions of Shu·Suen ensured that Ihe Sumerian empire of the Third Dynasty of Ur remained more or less imact. Ebla, Mari, TUllul and Abarnum in th e north·west, and Shubur 'on the shores of the Upper Lakes', tOgether with Magan, seem to have remained loyal, these areas being the extreme limits of the Empire at the best of times. However, shortly ancr the accession of Shu-Sucn's son, Ibbi-Sin, large areas of the empire began to break away, Eshnunna in his second year, Susa in his third, Umma in year five. Also, in year five, the Amorites, or MAR. TV, broke through the 'Rampan of the West' and its fortresses, penetnlting to the hean of the Empire (as the defection of Umma at this lime shows). The Amorite incursions cut Ihe roads and broke down the vi tal chain ofcommunicalion in the Empire, removing the supervision of the king from his ENS/s. As Ibbi·Sin proved unable 10 help the ENSIs were thrown on their own resources and, one by one, declared their independence. From his sixth 10 his eighth years, Ibbi·Sin built 'great walls' about Nippur an d Ur, the two most prestigious cities of his collapsing empire, whilst Lagash and even the administ rative cemfe of Puzrish·Dagan broke away. Elamite raide rs cont ributed to the confusion in the country which resulted in a $evere famine. In order 10 secure ample supplies of gnltn for U r, Ibbi-Sin sent an expedition under one of his generals, Isbbi·Erra, to Isin. Ishbi·Erra was successful in buying enough grain to feed thc population ofUr for fifteen years (though at a price some sixty times that of normal) however he then wrote to Ibbi-Sin 10 say that the Amorites com rolled the roads to Ur and prevented his return, unless it were by boat along the canals. T o ensure the safe return of the gnlin Ishbi·Erra asked for 600 large boats and the governorship of Isin and Nippur. Ibbi·Sin was not in a position to refuse, though by the eleventh year of his reign the wily Is hbi-Ernl had proclaimed himself king of Isin and controlled much of the nonh of the country. Ibbi·Sin stubbornly resisted the growing pressure from Isin and Elam and achieved some successes against the Amorilesj and, through Ihen enlisting thei r support, launched counter-auacks on Elam and Anshan in years eleven and twelve. In fact U r, the capital and finally the only city of Ibbi·Sin's empire, continued the struggle fo r another rv..e1ve years before eventually being captured and sacked by an Elamite army, with ibbi·Sin himselfled captive to Elam. Within a few years Ishbi·Ernl managed to recapture Ur and was thcrefore able to assume the prestigious title: 'King of Ur, King of Sumer and Akkad'. SEKMEM Reign of Senusret III This battle was fought during a campaign of Sen us ret 1Il (1818-1841 B.C.) in Retjennu. The enemy were engaged al Sc:kmem. The Egyptian deployment included a vanguard led by the king and a rearguard under Sc:bek-khu, a commander of the royal retainers. The course of the battle is not recorded exactly but the rearguard was eventually brought into action.

ASHUR c. 1808 B.C. The city of Ashur was ruled by a native dynasty following the fall of the Third Dynasty of Ur unt il the throne was seized by Ilukabhbu, the sheikh of an Amorite tribe that had settled in the }azirah. On his dealh the throne passed to his elder son, Aminu, while Shamshi.Adad, his other son, fled to Babylon, gathered a following of merttnaries, and captured Ekallati, a town on the T igis north of Ashur ,hat was part of the kingdom of Eshnunna. Shamshi-Adad reigned there for three years before he succC(:ded in capturing Ashur.

ARRAPHA, QABRA AND ARBELA Moving against the small kingdoms to the north-east and east of Ashur, Shamshi-Adad I (1813-178 1 B.C.) allacked and reduced the fonresses of Arrapha in spring. Afler celebnlting the 'Festival of Heat' in Arrapha itSClfthe Assyrian army moved north, crossing the river Zab, and ravaged the harvest of the la nd of Qabra before macking tbe land of Arbela in late summer. Shamshi-Adad I reorganised Arrapha and Arbela as Assyrian provincts and established his own governors. 72

THE SEALAND c. 1739 B.C. Hammurapi's son and successor, Samsu·iluna (1749.1712 B.C.), faced a maior revolt in Sumer in c. 1740 B.C. in· stigated by I1uma·ilu who claimed descent from the last king of bin. This ' Dynasty of the Sealand' probably ruled from Uruku, near Lagash, and controlled the trade routes from Babylon to [he Arab Gulf. A Kassite invasion prevented Samsu·iluna from reacting to this threat from the south until c. 1739 when he sacked Ur, Uruk and Kish. The Se:aland Dynasty survived safe in the swamps of southern SUIDe! where the kings of Babylon were unable to reach them. In a vain elTon to trap Iluma·ilu, Abi~buh (1711 .1684 B.C.) dammed tbe Tigris to dry OUt the swamps! The Sealand maintained itself as a thre1llt to Babylon, with varying degrees of success, and was only finally con· quered by the Kusile king U1amburiash c. 1460 B.C.

THE SIEGE OF URSHU c. 1623 B.C. The H iuite king, Hattusilis I (c. 1650-1621 B.C.), was campaigning in Nonhern Syria attempting to defeat the Amoritc state ofYamldUld (centered on Aleppo). During these operations he was forced to conduct a long and bitter siege of tbe ciry of Urshu on the Euphnlles. The forces ofCarcbemish (possibly allies of Urshu) were occupying high land nearby. The siege operations were conducted by a general, Sanw, and supervised by the king. These were alre1lldy going badly when the battering ram broke, whereupon Hmusilis ordered. new balledng ram, 'in the Hunian fuhion ', to be made from timber in the mountains of Hassu, and a siege ramp to be constructed. However, the battering ram, and also a siege tower, were unfonunately delivered 10 the wrong place! Eight attacks were mounted against the city without success, the delays involved resulting in unnecessary lou of life. It was found that the city was able to main tain contact with allies oUlside so the king ordered it to be more closely invested. In order 10 do this eight separate forces and eighty chario(S were positiooed around the city. However, a fugitive from Unhu revealed that this was still not isolating t he city. The fmal outcome of the siege is not clear, but tbe conquest of Yamkhad and Carchemish was finally achieved by Hallwilis's adopted son, Mursilis I, following Hattusilis's death in banle against Yamkhad.

BABYLON c. 1595 B.C. After the capture of Carche:mish, Munilis I led a Hiuite army 5OU1h-ea5I, following the coursc of the Euphrates, on a raid deep intO foreign territory. The small kingdoms on Ihe Euphrates seem to have submilled 10 Munilis I withoul a struggle, allowing the Hi ttites 10 arrive unexpectedly at Babyloo. Samsu..wtana, the King of Babylon, was take n completely by surprise by the Hittite attack.. Babylon was captured and $licked, and the statues of the national god, Marduk, and his conson, the goddess Sarpanitum, were taken away as hocMy by the Hittites. Having gained great prestige from his taking of Babylon, though not having the milimy rcsour~ to keep his con· quest, Mursilis retreated back up the Euphrates le1IIving tbe statue of Marduk at the city of Hana 00 tbe middle Euphrates. Following the withdrawal of the H ittites, the throne of Babylon was seized fint by Gulkishar, the king of the Sealand, and theo by the Kassite kiog, Agum 11 (kakrime), in c. 1570 B.C. It is possible thatlhe Kauites helped Mursilis I in his attack on Babylon, thougb once established in Babylon Agum II made clear his intention to rule as a good Mesopotamian monarch by bringing back the smue of Muduk. and restoring the shrines of the gods destroyed by the Hitlites.

KAMOSE'S CAMPAIGN AGAINST THE HYKSOS c. 1576 B.C. Against the advice of his nobles, who were quite cootenl with the status quo, the Theban Pharaoh, Kamose, was delermined to re-unite Egypt and break the power of the Hyksos ruler, Apophis. 73

Kamos sailed nonh with a fleet, wbile his army marched on the banks of the Nile, pre~ed by an advance guard of scouting Medjay Nubians. Teti, an Egyptian noble, and one of the many that su pponed the Hytuos, was besieged in his stronghold of Nefruisi. The Mediay were sent ahead to hold ofT any Hyksos reinforcements that might be sent. Nefruisi was taken by a dawn attack and its walls were destroyed. Kamose proceeded to Per·Shak, which was in panic (unfortunately pan of the account is lost and it is not known exactly what took place there). Kamose con· tinued his advance to Per·Djedken and the 'depot of going South', which was apparenlly a Hyksos naval base. To mack this position, Kamose formed his fleet in tine u tern, 'arrayed one aner anmber'. The bodyguard was on the river and Kamose was at the head of the line in a 'ship of gold'. A mtk·ship was despatched to probe the desen edge, followed by a dftlr·ship, (these presumably being special types of warship). The Hyksos fleet was found to be in the base, the ships being l~ded with produce from Retjennu. It was here that Kamose is recorded as boasting that he would ' take over the cllariotry'. The entire nett was seized and Kamose. advanced into the Nile Delta. Here he desolated the lands of the nobles who had coliaboT1llted with or supponed the Hyksos. At this point Apophis sent a message to the King of Ku sh, an aUy of the Hyksos, requt:$ting him to attack Egypt from the south. Ramose intercepted this message and had it relurned to Apophis. Turning south, Kamose ravaged the Nome of Cynopolis because it was the personal propeny of Apophis. While there, he took up a position at Sako to protect his rur from rebels (Egyptians serving the Hyksos), and sent a strong foret: overland 10 lay waste the 8ahariyeh Oasis, west of Cynopolis. Following this Kamose continued south, crushing every rebel he found until he reached Thebes amid gmlt jubilation. THE FINAL DEFEAT OF THE HYKSOS c. 1567 B.C.

II was len to Kamose 's brother, Ahmose, to complete the expUlsion of the Hyksos. Kamosc had retann most of Egypt and Ahmose commenced the siege of Avaris, the Hyksos capital. During the investment of the city. amphibious operations took place in the canal called Pa.Djedku and in the area to the south of Avaris. Following these evenu.. Avaris was captured. Ahmose advanced into Palestine and besieged the Hyksos monghold ofSh:Jruhen for three years before it fell, leaving the way clear for future Egyptian advance into Asia. Ahmose then turned againsl his southern enemies, defeating the Nubians at Khenthennefer and the forces of Aala,

an enemy from further south, at Tint·IO-Amun. On returning nonh, Ahmose defeated the last of the: Egyptian rebels, Tety·an. Ahmose may have penetrated as far as Fenkhu (Phoenicia?) during the course of his reign. MEGnmO 1481 B.C. A coalition of Canaanite and Syrian princes, led by the king ofKadesh, rebelled against Egyptian rule. They prepa~ to block the advanet: of the Egyptian army, led by Thutmose III, al Megiddo in the plain of Esdradon. The rebels were deployed read y to repel an entry into the plain from north or south. The Egyptians held a council of war at Yehem. Against the advice of his generals, Thutmose decided to approach through the narrow pass of Arona, which crossed the hills between the non hem and southern roultS to M egiddo. AdVancing on foot al the head of his troops, Thutmose led his forces th rough the pus. Fortunately for the Egyptians, the rebels had nOI prepared an ambush. The only action was a skirmish fought by the rearguard of the column at Aruna. The rebel coalition was completely unprepared to meet an advance from this direction and the Egyptians were able to get their entire force into the plain, and even make camp for the night, while the rebels were altering their deployment. Early next morning the Egyptian army advanced. The southern wing was on a hill south of 'the b rook of Kina', Ihe northern wing was in position north·west of Megiddo, the Pharaoh was in the cenlre. The rebels were swe pt away by the onslaught and ned towards Megiddo. The inhabitants had closed the gates of the city and had to tie their clothes together to make ropes in ord er to haul the routers up the walls to safety. The Egyptian soldiers were more concerned with looting the enemy amp than taking advantage of their vu lnerability. 74

After the bailie Thutmosc rebuked the soldiers for Ihis breakdown in discipline. Mcgiddo was surrounded by a timber palisade and the crops wert harvested by Ihe Egyptians. Faced with starvation the cit)' surrendered.

ALALAKH c. 1480 B. C. While in his yo uth, Idrimi and his family were fo rced to nee Khlliba (Aleppo) and kek refuge with his uncles at Emar (Meskene) on the Euphrates nellir Carchemish. Finding lilltc honour in Ii\'ing on the charit y of his mother's fami ly, Idrimi lefl to seck his fonune with only his horses, his chariot and his groom. After a journey lhat took him through the lands of Ihe SUIU ui besmen Idrimi arrived in Canaan, where natives of Khalba and nellirby territories nocked to join the son of their old rute r, forming a band of habiTlI. Idrimi lived with his habim for seven years before deciding 10 rcturn home, building ships to carry his men to the land of Mukish by sea. On landing in his homeland Idrimi gained the submission of his people, though had to fight for seven years against Ihe forces of Pn:lIarna, Ihe King of M ilanni and overlord of ldrimi's lands of Mukish, Niy and Ama'u. Eventually, Paratama accepted Idrimi as his vassal and gave him charge of the city of Alalakh. As a vassal of Mitanni Idrimi fought against the Hinites, dest roying seven towns, and forced the Sutu within his borders to senle in villages. NAHARIN 1470 B.C. After an engagement on the ' heights of Wan', west of Aleppo, Thutmose HI reached the 'great bend of Naharin' (the EuphratCi south of Carchemish). T hutmosc was determined to cross the river as his grandfather, Thutmosc I, had done, but this time in greater foret, to anack the kingdom of Nahari n (Mitanni). Many of the Syrian stales that had hitherto opposed Thutmosc ....'Cre Mitannian vasuls. Thutmose ordered the tran!ponalion of ships overland by ox-cart from the coast, in order to make his crossing. The Egyptian army crossed over and engaged the forces of Naharin at Senur, whe re the Egyptians were victorious. This established the limits of the Egyptian Empire on the Euphrates and earned its recognition by the other great powers of the Ncar East. Thutmosc remrned through the wilderness ofNiy where he was able to hunt Etephan ts (later bunted by Assyrian kin ~ in this region). He was rescued from an angry beast by the commander of Ihe Iltnyt ('braves'), Amenemhab. NUZI c. 1450 B.C. Border raids and skirmishcs were common between the kingdoms of Assyria and Arrapha even thoug h both slates owed allegiance to Ihe king of Mitanni . One Assyria n ra id on the Arraphan province of Nuzi rcsuhed in seven dimali, or manors, being anacked, Iheir sheep and oxtn seiud and the unharvested barley being burnt in the fiel ds. The Assyri~n! took away 42 prisoners for ransom or s!:lvery, having kill ~d Ihree men in the mack. IRRITA e. 134 8 B.C. Tushra113, King of Mitllnni, had bc1::n murdered by Shunarna who had Ihen usurped Ihe th rone. The dead lUng's son, Ma n iwal.a, IIppealed 10 the Hin ite king, SuppiJuliumas, for hdp. The Hittites seil:Cd the opportunily to inslal a vassal regime in Milanni and supplied Maniwaza with equipment. The Hinile prince, Piyassilis, was placed in charge of the expcdilion. The IWO leaders met al Carchemish, on the front ier wilh Mitanni, and anempled 10 con· tact the town of Irrila. This town had been bribed 10 remain 10y.Jl to Shunama and would not allow Maniwaza to re-cnler the country. The combined forces of Mattiwlza and the Hillile$ then crossed the Euphrates and defeated the infantry and chariotry of Irrita which opposed them. This encouraged other cities in Milanni to acknowledge Maniwaza, except for the capital, Washshuganni, which had to be re·taken by force . .KARDUNIASH c. 1340 B.C. Kadeshman·Kharbe, the King of Babylon (al this time known as Kar·Duniash) and the grandson of the Assyrian king, Ashur·u ballit I, fought and defeated the SUleans on the fringes of the Arabian Desert as well as strengthening the fortresses in the area during the early part of his reign. However, the Kassite! rebelled agai nst him and killed him, placing the Kass ite, Shuzigash, on the throne. Ange red by the murder of his daughter's son, Ashur·ubaltit mustered his army lind marched soulh, defeating the Kani te army and killing Shuzigash. Following his victory, Ashur-uballit placed Kurigalzu, K:lIdeshman·Kharbe's son, on the throne of Kardu niash.

75

ASTARPA 133& B.C. Mursilis II moumed a major campaign to conquer Anawa. The Hiuite: forces wefe mustered at Sallapa. where they were joined by the comingenl of the King of Care he m ish, a brothe r of Mursilis. The army croued. the river Schiriya (sangarius) and marched on Arz.:awa. At this point tbe troops witnessed a meteorite pass OV( T them, convinc· ing them dUll the slonn·god approved of thei r cause (tbis anC(:dote is probably H ittite propaganda). They were lhen joined by th e King of Min, who luId r«'emly be:uen ofT an Arz.:awan attack. He informed Mursilis that the Arzawan king, Ukha-zitish, lay in his palace at Apsus (Ephesusn, having been injured when the meteorite landed, and that the Arzawan anny under his son, Piy:Hn:a·ndus, ....-:15 forming up at the river Astarpa on the frontier of Aruwa. Further elated, the Hittite forces engaged those of Anawa on the Ast:lrpa and defe:ued them _ During the pursuit and mopping up following the bailie, Ukha·zitish and somc fugitives Oed o ... ersellS, while OIhers fled into the moun· tains of Arinnanda. Here they had to be su rroundcd and starved OUI as Ihe terr.ain was impassable for horses. 15,000 were deported to Hani as forced labour. Some refugees Oed into the highlands of Puranda, ruled by a son of Ukha-litish, Tapala·zu naulis. He led his forces OUI to attack the: H ittites but was defealed and pur.;ued back into the hills. Puranda was besieged and its water supply cut ofT. Tapala-lunaulis attempled to escape by night but was o\'ertaken by pur.;uing Hinile chariolry.

PIGGAINA.R ESSA 1330 B .C. Intending to Ic:ad a camp;!ign into the land of Aui·Hayasa, Mursilis II was mel atlhe city of T egar.ama by officers, including gcncnl Nuwanus. Being advised by them tha t it WII~ tOO late in the yeu 10 anack this region, the king decided 10 make a punith'e expedilion inlo the land of Pigianllreua which had been raiding Hittilt ICTritOry. The army mustered at Harnna, and by forced marching al night Ihe infllnl ry and char iotry entered steah hily into enemy lerritory. Scver.altowns we re allacked and razed. The inhabitants surrendered and become allies of the Hittites, supplying troops as infantry and chariot·warriors.

HUTUPIYANZAS' DEFENCE OF PALA 1324 B.C. Prince HmupiYlln..:as had been given command of the region of Pal a b)' the father of Mursilis n, Arnuwan das II . lt was an undeveloped region without fortified tOWn5, and the prince did nOI luI ... e an anny at his disposal. Despite this, Hutupiyan..:as held Pala against de\'asuting Kukac:an allacits wilh only a small group of relainers operating from hide-outs in the mountains. Every attack was defutcd, ..... hile fortifications were gradUlllly established. Next spring Mursilis II marched in with the H ittite army. Making a baggage depot ncar the Kaskaean frontier, he advanced 10 capture the city of Tum manna which guarded a pass into Kaskac:an terrilory. The: enemy adv:mct; guards were surprised by a feigned retrtat and night ma rch, allowing their forces to be defc:atcd and pursued to Mount Kassu.

MT KASSU 1324 B.C. The Hillite army of Munilis II (c. 1346·1320 B.C.) was cam paigning in the Kaska·lands, which lay 10 the north of the Haui- Iand. The Kaskaeans hlId been pursued to the foot of M t Kassu ..... here they took up a defensive position on the SICCP slopes knowing that the (ernin was im passable to the Hi ttite chariot ry. Mursilis personally led an assault by his infantry up the mounlain, and the position was laken with hc:avy loss inflicted on the Kl5beans. After the ba ul e, the enemy livestock in Ihe area was plundered, and the Hittites returned to their ma rching camp whic h had been set up nearby.

SUGAGA Reign of ED UI-Duari Assyrian and Babylonian sources dirrer as to the date and outcome of the battle of Sugaga, near the city of Sugaga on the Tig ris. H owever, it seems mosllikeiy that Enlil·nar.ari (1329-1320 B.C.), son of Ashu r-uballit I and the King of Assyria, campaigned in the south aga inst Kurigailu II, King ofKarduniash. Kurigalzu marched no nh to prevent (his and fought the Assyrians at Sugaga, inflicting a hcavy defeat on Enlil·narari who 1051 large numbers of soldiers killed and many officers caplUred. h appear.; thai later in Enlil·narari's reign the Assyrians defeated Kurigalzu in tWO battles.

76

SAPPIDUWA Reign of MUf'l ilis II , c. 1346· 1320 B .C. The Anatolian prince, Pitaggatalis, with 9000 men, anempted to prevent the Hinite army of Mu rsilis II from enter· ing the city of Sappiduwa. Leaving his baggage behind, Munilis advanced in battle formation intending to iUrTOUnd the enemy. He found that he was being obscrved by enemy outposts who wouJd warn PitaggataJis, allowing him to escape from envelopment. Mursilis pretended to march away but returned during the night by means of a forced march, arriving outside the city at daybrnk. His opponent \Io1l5 taken by surprise: ~nd defeated.

ARNUNA Re iga of Arik·den-il! Arik-din·ili, the King of Assyria (1319-1308 B.C.). bad a large battering-ram constructed before going on campaign against the land of Nigimhi in thc Zagros foothills to the east of Assyria. The .'\ ssyrian army met the forces of Nigimhi while they were apparently carrying off their harvest, howcvcr thc Assyrians were victorious, ca pturing 33 chariots - Arilt-dln-ili leading his chariots in person during the banle. Esini, the commander of the forces ofNigimhi, fled to the nearby city of Amuna, which the Assyri:lns then besieged, destroying itS gate with the battering-tam buil! specially beforehand. The city appears to have surrendered at this point, the nobility of Amuna taking an oath to Arik-din-ili as their new ~rlord, thOU&h Esini had somchow managed to escape.

KAR-1SHTAR Reign of Adad·na rari I Adad·narari I, King of Assyria (1307-1275 B.C.), established hiJ rule ovcr mOlt of Mitanni (known to the Assyrians as HanigaJbat) as far as Carchcmish and completed the conquest of Nigimhi. Moving south against Karduniash, Adad·nafllri fought the Kassite king, Nuimuruttash, near the city ofKar-lshtar. The Kassites were defeated, the Assyrians ca pturing their baggage camp and their divine·standuds. After this victory the boundary-line bc:tween Assyria and Kardunilsh was fiXed further south.

KAD ESH 1300 B.C. Rames~ II, leading fOUf Egyptian armies, invadtd Hittite tcrritory intending to take the city of Kadesh on the Orontes. The H ittite king, Muwatallis, prepared to SlOP him with a large army. incl ud ing allied contingents drawn from throughout the empire.

To approach the city the Egyptians had to cross the Orontes II the ford of Shabtuna. The wood of Rebawy was probably situated on high ground 10 the south of this ford father than 10 the north of it. The Egyptian marching columns were sufficiently long for an army to be crossing the ford and partly in the wood at the same time. Ramcsses detached Lht leading units of his army to form a ' battle-line' protecting the rest of his forces as they croutd the river. This force was the nt'arvn 'from the land of Amor'. Thcy hive been variously tllplained as elite allies from Amurru (the Hitti tes reglrded the b~ltle as a defcl t for both Egypt and their ally Amurru). or a tuk-force scnl along the COISI of Amurru to appear north·west ofK adesh. However, the Orontes may ha~ formed the border bc:t ....-cc:n Amurru and Kinu (Kad es h) althis poi nt and the reference in the Egyptian text to the ·shores of Amurru' could refer to t.he rh'er bank, 15 the Egypt.ian word wu used for both 'bank' and 'shore'.

AI the ford, Hittite Igents, pretending to be dtstrting Shauu·bc:douin, misled RamcS$CS intO thinking that the H ittitcs were far lway It Aleppo, whe n they were really hidden bc:hind the great 'ttl' of Kadesh. This encouraged Ramesses to mm haste to reach Kadesh and take it before the H inites urived. The Pharaoh had arrived at Kadesh aDd the army of Amun was making camp when captured Hittite scouts revealed the true position ofthcir army. Meanwhile the army of P'Tt (liteflllly 'The Rt'). was crossing the ford wilh its rear, and the Plait column still in the wood of Rebawy. Couriers, including the vizie r, were sent to hastCD these armies. P'rt was a distance of I iur (lO.S Km). from Ramcsscs. MuwataJlis now despatched 2,500 chariots in four bodies across the Orontes by. ford south ofKadesh. They burst th rough the Arm y of P'rt and broke inlo the uncompleted camp of Amun. Ramesses was now CUt orr from the rest of his army. 17

How the H iuite chariotry managed to conceal !.heir approach and surprise the army of P'rt so completely must remain a mystery, but as they were apparently carrying chariot runners mounted 15 third crewmen, they lI1lIy have been able to penetl'3te between the hastily deploying Egyptian units, isolating !.hem with infantry and chariotry and destroying them pi~mea1. Routing troops from the anny of P'r~ I'3n through the camp of Amun, spreading panic there also, while the pursuing Hittite chariotry surrounded Ramesses and a remnant of his troops who were attempting to break out. Some Hittites, however, seem to have StOpped to plunder the Egyptian camp. Fonunately for Ramesses, the Hittites were suddenly attacked in the rear by the nt'ani/!. This caused Muwatallis send in a funher 1,000 chariots which he was holding in reserve, perhaps expecting the approach of another Egyptian army. Despite this the nt'onm broke through to join Ramesses. The combined for« charged into the Hittites six times before finally routing them IcrOSS the Orontes, assisted by the newly-arrived army of Prolr. The Hittites suffered heavy losses from drowning while struggling to crou the river.

10

It was now dusk and hostilities c~d. Many dispersed Egyptians returned unde r cover of darkness. MuwatalJis remained on the east side oftbe Orontes throughout tbe battle with two massive bodies of infantry, one of 18,000 men, the other of 19,000 men. These figures, rather than the 8,000 I nd 9,000 often quoted, are suggested by the presen« of the hieroglypb for' 10,000' in the options to the rtIiefs. The following day it seems that sporadic fighting resumed, but Muwatallis offered Rame5$tS a tru« (possibly inspired by the arrival of the intact army of SuuJtlr, whicb is not mentioned as taki ng pan in the battle, being still ' upon the road'). This allowed Ramesses to withdraw rapidly to Egypt. Altbougb tbe Egyptian army recovered on the baulefield, (wbich says something for their professionalism), the Hittites won the ompaign and were able to seize some Egyptian territory.

This baule must rank among the best docume nted baules of antiquity. It is recorded in the Egyptian sources in great detail, and Hittite sources for the battle also survive.

SEVEN AGAINST THEBES, 13TH CENTURY B.C. Many legends recorded by the later Greelts are now considered to be based on actual events that took pla« during the M yce naean period. One such concerns a siegt of Thebes, in Boeotia, shonly before the Trojan War. After the death of Oedipus, Eteocles and Polynices contended for the throne of Thebes. Eleodes seized it and Polynices fled to AdraslUs of Argos, whe re he was joined by another exile, Tydeus. These ' beroes' were joined by four more Ilf!d advanced to attack Thebes. The for~ presumably consisted of their personal followings and the Argive anny. Mycenae declined to take pan in Iht eDlerprise. After a long siegt a fina l asuult was mounted in which both contenders killed each other. The rest oftht besieging forces then withdrew without taking Thebes. Thebes was later sacked by the Epigoni (t he subjtcl of another lost epic) and of Ships' recorded in the Iliad.

50

does not figu re in the 'Catalogue

HANIGALBAT Reign of SbalmaDuu I Shalmaneser I (Sirulmanll-Q.Slrortdu), King of Assyria (1274-1245 B.C.), decided to strikt westwards against H anigalbat and its Hittites allies, possibly because the Hittite suc«sses in Syria we re seen to threaten Assyrian possessions in the Jazirah . Moving through difficult paths IlDd passes in Hanigalbat, the Assyrians found that the passes and fresh-water springs in their path had been seized by the anny of Shattuara, King of Hanigalbat, in combination with a H ittite army and Ahlamu (Aramaean) mercenaries. Tired and without water the Assyrians were suddenly attacked in force by Shattuara, however, the uhausted Assyriam counter-allacked, defeating the allies and inflicting severe losses, pursuing Shattuara wutwards. 14,400 prisonen were taken and blinded in the right eye before being led [0 Assyria. This Assyrian success seems to have forced the rapprochement between Egypt and Haiti.

78

TIWARA Reign of T udba liyaJ IV, a,c, 1255 B,C, Tudhaliyas IV was in Assuwa, having recemly PUt down the rebellion of Kullulis, who had incited the Assuwan anny consisting of 10,000 infantry and 600 'Lords of the Bridle' (Chariotry ) to revolt. While he was there the KaWeans had taken the opponunilY to raid the Han i·lIInds. Tudhaliyas rushed back and punued the Kaska into their own country. He encountered the full forces of the Kaska draw n up for bailie al Tiwara. The enemy rear was protected by a wood and their front by a river. Undaunted the H illites advane«l and defeated them. The victory was followed up by the t2ltin g of many strongholds described as 'difficult of approach'.

DALA WA E nd of reign of T udbaliyas rv The western Anatolian prince, Madduwattas, was a serious cause for co ncern to the H ittites. This incident is recorded in a document known as the 'Madduwauas Indictment '. Madduwatlu sent a message to the local Hillite gene ral, Kisnapilis, proposing a combined allack on the cities ofOalawa and Hinduwa in the Lukka lands. Following his pan ofthe plan, Kisnapilis marched on Hinduwa while the treacherous Madduwaltas informed the people ofOalawa of the Hillite position and incited them to mount an ambush. The troops of Dalawa attacked the H illites, killing Kisnapilis and another commander, Partuhallu. In this way Madduwatt3s won ove r the people of Dalawa into allegiance with him.

KARDUNIASH 1235 B.C. Seeing thai Babylonia was weak following an Elamite victory, Tukulti·Ninum I provoked a war with Kashtiliash IV and fought him near Karduniash (Babylon).

Kashtiliash was captured during the battle and his army defea ted. Babylon was then taken by th e Assyrians, its walls destroyed and the city sacked. 8mh the statue of M arduk and the unfortunale Kuhtiliash wen:: sent to Assyria, and Assyria n governors established in Ka rduniDsh. Assyrian control of Babylon lasted seven yean until 'the Akkadian officen of Karduniash n::belled'. Tukulti-Ninuna I, who had aroused hostility 10 his rule in Assyria, was shut up in a room of his new capital of Kar·Tukulti·Ninuna and killed by one of his sons in 1208 B.C.

THE FIELDS O F PER·YER 1231 B.C. Libyan tribes under their chief, Meryey, together with con tingents of Sea·Peoples, invaded the Western frontier of Egypt. Repeated incunions even pe.netra.ted as far as the Nile. Phanoh Merenptah prepared to hal! II major invasion attempt in the district of Per-Ye r in the Western Delta. Meryey approached the Egyptians at dawn, bul found them deployed with th eir archen 10 th~ fore, 5upponed by c1ose-combat troops and chariotry. The archen shot down the advancing enemy for six houn before halting and finally rOUling them. The Libyans fled. abandoning their pOSSdSions, closely pursued by Egyptian chariotry. Over 9,000 were killed or captured. The other Libyan chi~fs in the coalition were so disgusted with the fiasco that they deposed Meryey and soon fe ll into fighting among themselves.

lUO N c. 1200 B.C. The Ancient Gn::cks regarded the T rojan War as a hislorical event which marked the end ofthe 'Heroic Age'. Modem research favoun a date of around 1200 B.C. for this event and there is archaeological evidence lhat Troy VU was besieged and saded. Archaeology and th~ Linear B tablels help to demonstrate thllthe background to the Homeric legends is largely correct. Tbe lists of Achaean and Trojan allies correspond to what is known about Myce naean and Anatolia n political geography at this time but is un like that ~isting later on. I f the Ahhiyawa of the Hi ttite archives is really a reference to Achaeans, then the activities of Allaniyas were an earlier attempt al ~Iending Acru.ean influe nce into Western Anatolia. Ananiyas \1,'1$ chased off by the forces of the Hillite Empire, but II generation later this empire was weakening and a confederation of West Anatolian states may have been established. The ca use ofthe war was traditionally the abduct ion of an Achaean royal lady by a Trojan prince. This may indicate something of the relations between the Achaeans and Anatolia; the linea r B tablels mention slave women from 79

EaSI Aegean islands and Milelos, possibl y indicating Ihar M ycenae:m eolonies indulged in slave Inding or nids inlo Analolia (which had bcf:n a causc of friclion berv.'ttn the Hiltilcs and Ahhiyawa) and we may note the concern for coastal defence al Pylos. A massh-e seaborne expedition was organised by Ag:amc:mnon of M yttIllle who:s«:1IlS to Iu~ been the acknowledged overlord of the Achaelln statts II this time. Etch state supplied a cont ingen t unde r its own leader. The armada totalled 11 76 ships with crews \'arying between 120 to >0 men, As chariotry and non·comballnts would also hlYe bcf:n taken the full siu of the forces was probably small by Near·Eastern standards. Unlike th e catalogue of ships in the lIil1d, the list of Trojan allies provides no figu res and much more sketctJy infor· m:llion. Whal is clear is th:u contingents came from many regions of AIllItolia, some being remote and little known to Ihe Achaeans, reinforcing the impression of an Anatolian confederation. Although the legends imply tlul the war was di rected specifically al Troy, this may simply have bttn the point chosen for the landings as it WIS positioned on the Dardendles. a location of strategic imponance controlling the stnits and the entry into Anllolia from Eu rope. It would thus become the point at which the Anatolian Slates ""ould anempt 10 h:alt the in~sion. This city would fmd itsclf in I vital position like tlut of K.3desh, Carchemish and Megiddo in Glhe r Witt. Troy was SlIcked more than once on this accoun t. M ilitary opt:nlions in the area around Troy cont inued for le n years. The defendett fought the Achaeans in open battles before the city. At one poim some of the Ach3ean contingents would nOl co-operate and Agamemnon's authority WllS questioned . This caused a te mporary setback and the Achaeans were contained for a time within a defended beachead. Troy fin ally fell to deception and a device known as the 'Wooden Horse'; (siege machi nes we re ofien named after animals and sometimes decorated to look like them, a practice for which there is ample evidence from the Near East). Many legeneb concerning he roic fou nders of dynasties traCt their wanderings to the sad: of Troy, and some of the returning Achaeans encountering trouble II home. It is tempting to speculate tlutl long period of warfare between the Aclucan and Analolian SUtts led to their collapse and contributed to the phenomenon of the 'Sa Peoples'. The destruction of I powerful stile in the European approaches 10 Anatolia could luve gnve implications for all the peoples of this region. HATSHO 1192 B.C. The Libyan Iribet of the M eshwah, Tjemehu and Seped.,led by the chief, Ma hesher, intendin g to sellie.

ad~nc:cd

lowards Egypt

They were met II the rronlier fOnfess of H arsho by the Egyptian army ofRamesses III. Linear formations of closeorder archers followed by lines of c1ose-order spearmen adVllncctlucd IJld edged with coloured trim.

~ a

A

~ .•.•~. .

c

b

90

f;t d

e

89 89 shows the variety of armour worn by the majority of Hurri·Mitannian mariyomla, or militia-cha riotttrs as opposed 10 mariYOIIM of the royal, or noble, households. He ....'ears

I

shon lamellar or scale tunic with shon sleeva of ICluhcr lamellae. Suil5 of armou r, being of COUrK

indhoidually made by specialist cnfumm, \'afkd considtrably in materials and cmrall design. 1bey could be slet\"tless, or wilhom. back. with or without a collar; ofleathcr or bronze $Cales or lamellae, ofiuther with slcc\'cs ofbronzc, or even leather wilh I bronze back. This aqn tw; large ItalAlI, pu::ruges. or nips suspended from the wlisl btll 10 protect the lower body. Ka/ltu could be used to CO\'cr the front or back only or bOlh. Under a shoner rob(: than 87's or 88's this man wears clostAiuing trouscn. At Nuzi, all armour was issued in scts from the paJ:a~ ancnal and wu mlde in the pala~ workshops there. Arter usc the armour WilS returned for store if nOI needed, though mOlt men seem to have retained their issues of armour, sloring il ready for use at their homes. Each wurior seems to have betn obliged to It