Agents of Moscow: The Hungarian Communist Party and the Origins of Socialist Patriotism 1941-1953 (Oxford Historical Monographs)

OXFORD HISTORICAL MONOGRAPHS EDITORS R. R. DAVIES R. J. W. EVANS J. HARRIS B. WARD-PERKINS J. ROBERTSON R. SERVICE...

Author: Martin Mevius

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OXFORD HISTORICAL MONOGRAPHS EDITORS R. R. DAVIES

R. J. W. EVANS

J. HARRIS

B. WARD-PERKINS

J. ROBERTSON

R. SERVICE P. A. SLACK

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Agents of Moscow The Hungarian Communist Party and the Origins of Socialist Patriotism –

MARTIN MEVIUS

CLARENDON PRESS • OXFORD

3

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford ox2 6dp Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education by publishing worldwide in Oxford New York Auckland Bangkok Buenos Aires Cape Town Chennai Dar es Salaam Delhi Hong Kong Istanbul Karachi Kolkata Kuala Lumpur Madrid Melbourne Mexico City Mumbai Nairobi São Paulo Shanghai Taipei Tokyo Toronto Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries Published in the United States by Oxford University Press Inc., New York © Martin Mevius  The moral rights of the author have been asserted Database right Oxford University Press (maker) First published  All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted by law, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the address above You must not circulate this book in any other binding or cover and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data Data available Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Data available ISBN ––– 1 3 5 7 9 10 8 6 4 2 Typeset by Hope Services (Abingdon) Ltd. Printed in Great Britain on acid-free paper by Biddles Ltd., Kings Lynn, Norfolk

This book is dedicated to the memory of my grandparents


PREFACE This research was generously supported by funding from various sources. The contributions of the Reiman de Basfonds, the Prins Bernhardfonds, and Genootschap Noorthey in the Netherlands were essential in deciding to embark on the project. In Oxford, the Arts and Humanities Research Board, Oxford University, the Modern History Faculty, St Antony’s College, and the Arnold Bryce and Read Fund all helped in bringing it to a conclusion. Special mention needs to be made of the agencies that supported this work on the Master’s level, some of which has been integrated into this thesis: Dr Hendrik Muller’s Vaderlandsch Fonds, the Fundatie Vrijvrouwe van Renswoude, and the British Council. Prior research in the Comintern archives in Moscow used in this thesis was funded by a grant from the Foundation Internationale Informatie en Communicatie (IIC). I also voice my gratitude to the archives visited in completing this work: in Budapest, the archivists and staff at the Institute of Political History (PIL), the Hungarian National Archives (MOL), and the Smallholder Party Archive (TIKL) provided me with all necessary aid and advice. Personnel at the Manuscript Collection of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences was similarly cooperative. In brief visits to the Baranya County archive, the Békés County Archive, and the Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Archive I found the archival staff welcoming and helpful. Thanks also goes out to Katalin Jalsovszky of the Historical Photograph Collection at the National Museum, Dr Tibor Kovács, director of the National Museum, who provided advice in the selection of posters, and the staff at the Kerepesi Cemetery in Budapest who unlocked the crypt of the ‘Pantheon of the Workers’ Movement’ one cold January morning. I am indebted to the historians, political scientists and regional specialists, who commented on my work in progress. I am grateful specifically to my supervisor, Professor Robert Evans, for his criticism and encouragement throughout the production of this work. I thank the Hungarian National Museum, the Széchényi Library, and the Magyar Távirati Iroda for their kind permission to reproduce illustrations from their collections. I must thank all those in Britain, the Netherlands, and Hungary whose friendship ensured this was not only an intellectually satisfying period but provided a warm and pleasant atmosphere for the work to come to fruition. My deepest thanks is reserved for Judith en Heleen Boerma, who ensured this project could start in the first place, and most of all for Kati,

viii

Preface

without whom the present thesis would have been on the KPD rather than the Hungarian party. Certain editorial measures have been taken for more convenient reading. In the text the usual Hungarian practice of putting surname before Christian name has been reversed. Thus, Révai József becomes József Révai. For communist party bodies, English equivalents have been used rather than the literal translation of the Hungarian name. So, instead of translating Központi Vezetőség by Central Leadership, the corresponding ‘Central Committee’ is employed, Politburo is used instead of ‘Political Committee’, and ‘Secretariat’ instead of the Hungarian ‘Chief Secretariat’.

CONTENTS List of Illustrations

xi

Notes on Hungarian Pronunciation

xii

Abbreviations

xiii

Introduction: The Heroes’ Gate . Communism and Nationalism (–)

 

. Agents of Moscow (–)



3. The Policy of National Unity and the Soviet Factor (Autumn –Spring )



. The Legacy of  and Left-Wing Radicalism (Autumn –Spring )



. The Heirs of Kossuth, Petőfi and Táncsics (December –January )



. The Only True Party of Hungarian National Interests (March–November )



. Conflicting National Policies (–)



. Salami Tactics and National Unity (–)



. The Cult of the Martyrs (–)



. The Cominform and the Nationalist Errors of The MKP (–)



. Socialist Patriotism (–)



Conclusion



Bibliography Index

 


LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS . The first mass meeting of the MKP in Budapest in the Sports Hall on  February . Huge red, white, and green flags break with pre-war tradition. The party’s rank and file preferred the red banner. The slogans read from left to right: ‘Down with the reaction,’ ‘Land, bread, freedom!’, and ‘Long live independent and democratic Hungary.’ (Nemzeti Múzeum Történelmi Fényképtára, NMTF). p.  . ‘The heir of Rákóczi, Kossuth, Petőfi—the Hungarian Communist Party.’ This poster appeared on the smouldering walls of Budapest even before the war was over. Prince Ferenc Rákóczi, leader of the th century anti-Austrian rebellion, was later replaced by  peasant radical Mihály Táncsics. (NMTF). p.  . Communist anti-Semitic propaganda. Smallholder leader Ferenc Nagy is portrayed as a Jew in Ludas Matyi, a satirical magazine printed by the MKP’s party press Szikra. (Széchenyi Library). p.  . The MKP’s propaganda during the  campaign is the most national yet. ‘The Hungarian Communist Party protects the independence of our homeland in the spirit of Rákóczi, Kossuth and Petőfi’. (NMTF). p.  . Architect of the national policy József Révai had carefully supervised the celebration of the  centenary. Here, the local party organization in Sopron has decorated its headquarters to underline the party’s national character. (NMTF). p.  . Official celebration of  March by the Trade Unions’ Youth Council at the Budapest Petőfi statue. After  the theory of a ‘national road to communism’ was abandoned and the ‘national deviation’ condemned in the wake of the Yugoslav–Soviet split. National propaganda remains the key to attempts at persuading the masses, though national imagery is now blended with Socialist symbols. The national holiday of  March was still commemorated, but downgraded to a youth holiday. (MTI, Magyar Távirati Iroda). p. 

NOTES ON HUNGARIAN PRONUNCIATION In Hungarian the stress is always on the first syllable. The pronunciation of the following letters differs from English. A Á E É Gy Ly Ny O Ö Ő Ó S Sz Ty U Ü Ű Ú Zs

O as in on Aa as in aunt E as in ten A as in lane D as in duke Y as in you N as in new O as in boss A as in about Similar to ö, but lengthened oa as in oar Sh as in shop S as in set T as in tune Oo as in book Ou as in you Similar, but lengthened Oo as in ooze G as in rouge

ABBREVIATIONS

ÁVH ÁVO CC Comintern CPSU CPUSA CRC DISz

Államvédelmi Hatóság (State Defence Authority) Államvédelmi Osztály (State Defence Department) Central Committee Communist International Communist Party of the Soviet Union Communist Party of the United States of America Czechoslovak Resettlement Committee Demokraták Ifjúsági Szövetsége (Alliance of Democratic Youth) DNP Demokrata Néppárt (Democratic People’s Party) ECCI Executive Committee of the Communist International FKGP Független Kisgazda Párt (Independent Smallholder Party) FMDP Független Magyar Demokrata Párt (Independent Hungarian Democratic Party, Balogh Party) GDR German Democratic Republic Glavlit Glavnoe upravlenie po delam literatury i izdatel’stv (Main Administration for Literary and Publishing Affairs) GLAVPURKKA Glavnoe Politicheskoe Upravlenie RabocheKrestyanskoi Krasnoy Armii (Political Administration of the Workers’ and Peasants’ Red Army) KALOT Katolikus Agrárifjúsági Legénységegyletek Országos Tanácsa (National Council of Catholic Agricultural Youth Young Men’s Organizations) KAPD Kommunistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands KB Külügyi Bizottság (Foreign Affairs Committee) KMP Kommunisták Magyarországi Pártja (Communists’ Hungarian Party) KPD Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands KPJ Communist Party of Yugoslavia KPSS Kommunisticheskaya Partiya Sovetskogo Soyuza (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) KRN National Council for the Homeland

xiv KSČ KV MADISz Mafirt MDP MFP MGB MINSz MKP MNDSz MNFF MNSz MSzMP MSzMT MVD Narkomindel Narkomnats NÉKOSZ NKFD NKVD NPP NSDAP OFT

Abbreviations Communist Party of Czechoslovakia Központi Vezetőség (Central Leadership [Central Committee]) Magyar Demokratikus Ifjúsági Szövetség Magyar Filmipari Részvénytársaság (Hungarian Film Industry Ltd.) Magyar Dolgozók Pártja (Hungarian Working People’s Party) Magyar Függetlenségi Párt (Hungarian Independence Party) Ministerstvo Gosudarstvennoi Bezopastnosti (Ministry of State Security) Magyar Ifjúság Népi Szövetsége (People’s Alliance of Hungarian Youth) Magyar Kommunista Párt (Hungarian Communist Party) Magyar Nők Demokratikus Szövetsége (Democratic Alliance of Hungarian Women) Magyar Nemzeti Függetlenségi Front (Hungarian National Independence Front) Magyar Népi Szövetség (Hungarian Popular Alliance) Magyar–Szovjet Munkáspárt (Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party) Magyar–Szovjet Művelődési Társaság (HungarianSoviet Cultural Society) Ministerstvo Vnutrennykh D’el (Ministry of Internal Affairs) Narodnyi Komissariat Inostranytch D’el (People’s Commissariat for Foreign Affairs) Narodnyi Kommissariat po Delam Natsional’nostei (People’s Commissariat for Nationalities’ Affairs) Népi Kollégiumok Szövetsége (Alliance of People’s Colleges) Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland Narodnyi Kommissariat Vnutrennikh D’el (People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs) Nemzeti Paraszt Párt (National Peasant Party) Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei Országos Földbirtokrendezo Tanács (National Landholding Organizing Council)

Abbreviations PCF PCI PCR PDP PKN PPR PPS SPD SS SzDP SzIT TASS USSR VKP(b) ZPP

xv

Parti Communiste Français Partito Communista Italiano Romanian Communist Party Polgári Demokrata Párt (Civic Democratic Party) Polish National Committee Polish Workers’ Party Polish Socialist Party Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands Schutzstaffel Szociáldemokrata Párt (Social Democratic Party) Szakszervezeti Ifjúsági- és Tanoncmozgalom (Trade Union Youth and Apprentice Movement) Telegrafnoe Agentstvo Sovetskogo Soiuza (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Vsesoyuznaya Kommunisticheskaya Partiya (bolsevikov) (All Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) Union of Polish Patriots


Introduction: The Heroes’ Gate Szeged is a medium-sized town in the south-east of Hungary, near the Yugoslav border, well known for its large university, the sausages produced in the Pick factories at the outskirts of town, the Szegedi Szabadtéri Játékok, musical performances held annually in front of the cathedral on Dom Square, and for the Virág Cukrászda, probably one of the best cake shops in Hungary. The main road into town from the railway station is the Boulevard of the Good Lady, known before  as the ‘Road of  April’, the communist celebration of the ‘liberation’ of Hungary in . As the road enters town, it is spanned by a huge arch, flanked on either side by a -metre-high statue of soldiers of the Great War, dressed in greatcoat and stahlhelm. The arch, known as the Heroes’ Gate, was erected in  to commemorate the dead of the First World War, the victims of the communist Republic of Councils of , and the loss of Hungarian territory to Romania. The statues that guard the gate, made by sculptor Eva Lőte, are called ‘live soldier, dead soldier’. The arch was decorated with frescoes by the artist Vilmos Aba-Novak, many of them religious in nature. One of these depicted Admiral Miklós Horthy, charging forward on a white horse, heroically leading his troops. His ‘departure from Szeged’ in  marked the destruction of the Republic of Councils and the beginning of his own rise to power as regent of Hungary. The Hungarian Communist Party (MKP) and its successor parties, the MDP and MSzMP, attached great value to symbols, statues, and monuments. The blowing up of the statue of statesman Gyula Gömbös in  was afterward remembered, without any sense of irony, as one of the great acts of wartime resistance. After the war the party dismantled statues that were not to its liking, and filled the country with communist heroes. One might wonder why the Heroes’ Gate, with its anti-communist and irredentist background, was not replaced by a more Socialist alternative. Aba-Novak’s murals were covered up in , which in effect reduced the Gate to a war memorial, but a more thorough treatment of a monument that had celebrated the destruction of the communist revolution and the death of party comrades could have been expected. The Heroes’ Gate opens the eye to the many other national statues, monuments, and street names that were retained during communist rule. A short walk through Szeged shows a large number of references to national heroes and historical events. The live soldier and his ghoulish companion overlook the Square of the Arad Martyrs, named after the



Introduction

generals of the  revolution executed by the Austrians, and the equestrian statue of Prince Ferenc Rákóczi, leader of the eighteenth-century anti-Habsburg rebellion. Standing in front of the nearby library facing the fountain, the Sándor Petőfi Boulevard, after the nationalist poet of the  revolution, joins the former Lenin Boulevard, now named after Count Lajos Tisza. To the right, the main promenade leads past Hungary’s first statue of the leader of the  revolution, Lajos Kossuth, erected in . The street ends in the vast Széchenyi Square, which bears the name of the famous national reformer. All the national streets and statues mentioned had been established prior to the Second World War, and remained unchanged up to the present date. Not only are there a large number of them, in Szeged they have pride of place in the town. Despite the fact that the party systematically changed street names and destroyed statues it disliked, under communism often the most important streets and public spaces were named after national heroes. This is not true only of Szeged, but of the great majority of Hungarian towns. More than any other regime in Hungarian history the party had the power to change these at will, but refrained from this for a reason: it had to demonstrate that it was patriotic, and had the best interests of the Hungarian people at heart. At the same time, it had to show that it was a Socialist party, that the People’s Republic was the state of the Hungarian ‘working people’ (dolgozó nép), and an ally of the Soviet Union and the other Eastern European countries. The identity of the People’s Republic of Hungary was both national and Socialist in content. The allegiance to this state, as propagated by the party, was known as Socialist Patriotism, a phrase implying that it was possible to be both a communist and a good Hungarian patriot at the same time. What is true for Hungary is true for all People’s Republics in Eastern Europe. All espoused a form of Socialist Patriotism in which national symbols figured prominently. Ceaușescu’s Romania provides the example of a very virulent communist form of nationalism. But the Czechoslovak party also laid claim to national precursors of communism, in this case presenting the religious reformer Jan Hus as a predecessor. The East German SED constructed for its state a sense of nationhood, one which embraced Goethe but omitted Hitler. In the s the Hungarian Communist Party abhorred the national flag, and denounced patriotism as a sham, but after the war a patriotic stance became an essential part of the MKP’s selfimage. The same is the case for all Eastern European communist parties. The question is how these parties changed from scathing critics of national imagery to the progenitors of national cults of their own.

Introduction



      There is a tradition of examining statues and street names like those in Szeged, as expressions of national identity,1 the study of what Raoul Girardet called the ‘cult of the Fatherland’ (‘culte de la Patrie’), ‘with its dogmas, heroes, saints, mythology, liturgy, mysteries and rites’,2 their connection to political ideas, movements, and social groups, and their importance in public life. One of the key questions in the study of national identity is whether the development of the national image was a spontaneous development, or a conscious, deliberate policy. Ernest Gellner stresses the mythical character of national self-image. In his view, nationalism ‘suffers from a pervasive false consciousness. Its myths invert reality: it claims to defend folk culture while in fact it is forging high culture; it claims to protect an old folk society while in fact helping to build an anonymous mass society.’3 In Imagined Communities Benedict Anderson contrasts ‘genuine, popular nationalist enthusiasm’ with the ‘systematic, even Machiavellian, instilling of nationalist ideology through the mass media’ by the state.4 The latter he calls ‘a conscious, self-protective policy, intimately linked to the preservation of imperial-dynastic interests’.5 The idea of fabrication of nationalist ideology is explicitly put forward in a collection of articles edited by Eric Hobsbawm, Invention of Tradition.6 The authors describe how certain traditions, which seemingly date back to time immemorial, are in reality quite recent, nineteenth-century, inventions. They point at the pageantry surrounding the British monarchy, the writing of new ‘ancient’ folk songs in the nineteenth century, and the creation of national flags and anthems as examples of such invented traditions, which were established especially in the years between  and .7 Hobsbawm discerns three main goals of the invention of traditions: establishing social cohesion, legitimization of authority, and the inculcation of beliefs. While the artifice of these constructed traditions is demonstrated beyond doubt, it is not clear to what extent these goals were deliberately

1 See for instance Nipperdey, ‘Nationalidee und Nationaldenkmal’; Agulhon, Marianne au combat; Agulhon, Marianne au pouvoir; Tacke, Denkmal im sozialen Raum; Nora, Les Lieux de mémoire; Samuel, Patriotism; Freifeld, Nationalism and the Crowd in Liberal Hungary. 2 3 Girardet, Nationalisme français. Gellner, Nations and Nationalism. 4 5 Anderson, Imagined Communities,  (original emphasis). Ibid. . 6 Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds.), Invention of Tradition. 7 Hugh Trevor Roper, ‘Highland Tradition’, ibid. –.



Introduction

kept in mind. Here, there is a problem with the sources employed. In the research on national identity symbols such as statues and festivals themselves tend to be taken as evidence not just of the invention of tradition, but also of the reasons behind the construction of identity. Statues themselves are silent. Though contemporary published sources such as speeches and articles can provide some proof of the purpose of, for instance, a festival, they rarely reveal a double agenda. The deliberations of politicians and government agencies, where such intentions could most obviously be found explicitly, are rarely taken into account.    Compared to the production of works on nationalism, there has been relatively little interest in national identity under communism. There are several influential works on the relationship between communism and nationalism, but these mainly study theoretical debates.8 Historical works on nationalism under communism tend to focus on the attitude towards national minorities.9 When historians have taken note of the communist exploitation of national sentiments they have done so mostly in passing while studying broader themes, such as the history of the Russian Revolution, Soviet Russia, the Comintern, or German communism.10 Hobsbawm, for instance, notes the popularity of the use of national symbols by the communist movement in the s and s, but concludes there has been too little research to decide whether there was a ‘genuine upsurge of national sentiment’ on the left.11 In contrast to western historiography, Hungarian historians started to take an interest in national imagery under communism already in the s. There consequently is now a large body of Hungarian work on topics such as statues under communism, political propaganda and historical commemorations, the celebration of the national holiday of  March, and

8 Bloom, World of Nations; Carr, ‘Bolshevik Doctrine’; Nimni, Marxism and Nationalism; Szporluk, Communism and Nationalism. See also Ernest Gellner’s criticism of this book: Gellner, Encounters with Nationalism, –. 9 Connor, National Question; Conquest, Formation of the Soviet Union; Conquest, Nation Killers. 10 Pipes, Russian Revolution; Pipes, Russia under the Bolshevik Regime; Borkenau, Europäische Kommunismus; Braunthal, Geschichte der Internationale; Weingartner, Stalin und der Aufstieg Hitlers. 11 Hobsbawm, Nations and Nationalism, –.

Introduction



the anniversary of the  revolution in .12 Though authors are conscious of the link between symbolism and political developments, this is rarely the subject of analysis, research or explanation. The same can be said of the handful of western works published on communist patriotic propaganda prior to .13 Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, however, a number of studies have appeared on the role of national symbols in communist regimes. In National Ideology under Socialism Katherine Verdery presents an anthropological view of national identity in Ceaușescu’s Romania.14 Walter Kemp, a political scientist, offers a broad overview of communist attempts from Marx to Gorbachev to come to terms with popular nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe.15 Historians too have started to analyse the national propaganda of communist parties. David Brandenberger’s book National Bolshevism explores the construction of a national, Soviet patriotism from the s.16 Árpád von Klimó looks into the contrasting interpretations of national history between the Catholic Church and the communist party in Hungary.17 Bradley Abrams examines changing views of the nation among communist intellectuals in Czechoslovakia.18 Carol S. Lilly investigates the propaganda of the Yugoslav communist party.19 Ben Frommer researches Czech communist attitudes towards collaborators 20 and Lauri Koloski looks at culture and art and the party in post-war Poland.21 What unites these works is the understanding of the importance of popular legitimacy to communist parties, and the significance they ascribed to being accepted as national, patriotic parties. There is another similarity: apart from Abrams, all make use of primary government and party sources. The result is that, more than is the case in traditional research on national identity, they also show the debates and motives behind the exploitation of nationalism.

12 Pótó, Emlékművek; Szabó, ‘Politikai Propaganda—Történelmi ünnepek’; Gyarmati, Március hatalma; Gerő, Államosított forradalom. 13 Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism; Janos, ‘Nationalism and Communism in Hungary’; Oberländer, Sowjetpatriotismus. 14 Verdery, National Ideology under Socialism. 15 16 Kemp, Nationalism and Communism. Brandenberger, National Bolshevism 17 Klimó, ‘A nemzet Szent Jobbja’; Klimó, ‘Die gespaltene Vergangenheit’. 18 Abrams, ‘Struggle for the Soul of the Nation’. 19 Lilly, Power and Persuasion. 20 Frommer, ‘Retribution against Nazi Collaborators’. 21 Koloski, ‘Painting Krakow Red’.



Introduction

With regard to the communist attitude to national identity one crucial aspect is still missing, however, and that is a view of the one truly binding factor shared by all parties: the relationship with Moscow. For it was no accident that all parties constructed a similar blend of national and socialist patriotism. The post-war national propaganda of all European communist parties had the same origin, in what was known among communists as the ‘national line’ or ‘national policy’ of the Communist International (Comintern). Seldom have historians of national identity had the luxury of an exact date to pinpoint the beginning of the construction of a national self-image. In the case of the Hungarian Communist Party this date was  July . On the morning of the German attack on the USSR, Stalin ordered the Comintern and its member parties to fly the national flag. Not just the Hungarian Communist Party, but all ‘sections’ of the Comintern were obliged to follow the same course, including the German Communist Party, the Polish Communist Party, and the parties of Hungary’s neighbours Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. Prior to the war these parties had derided national imagery as a tool of the bourgeoisie designed to mislead the proletariat. The same national symbols soon would form the centrepiece of party propaganda. The national policy of the Comintern had antecedents in communist theory and practice dating back to Marx, who applauded national revolutionary movements, and was convinced the working class would one day form the ‘national class’ of the nation. Lenin in  contrasted treason by the bourgeoisie with the true patriotism of Russia’s working class. Still, Stalin was the overwhelming influence on the national line. As Commissar for the Nationalities he had overseen the policy of korenezatsiya in the s, in which national symbols were used to sell Socialism to the nationalities of Soviet Russia. In the s, he commenced the construction of a Soviet patriotism, based heavily on Russian pre-revolutionary national figures. The communist parties of Eastern Europe followed a similar policy after the war, replacing Russian national heroes with their own. After the communist parties took power in , the goal became the construction of a Socialist Patriotism, a communist sense of self-identity both national and Socialist in content, in which internationalism and loyalty to the Soviet Union were squared with national pride. Even after the Soviet–Yugoslav split and subsequent Stalinization of party propaganda, national themes were prominent in party propaganda. A ban was issued on ‘bourgeois nationalism’ and ‘national deviationism’. But these terms described Tito’s crime of pursuing a line independent from Moscow. The use of national propaganda was never at issue.

Introduction



This book portrays the national image of the Hungarian Communist Party (MKP), and shows the communist appeal to the nation was a deliberate, centrally organized, and utilitarian policy. It is not in the first place a history of statues or street names. To the Hungarian communists these were a means to an end. What seems in first instance a cultural historical issue is in fact exceedingly political in nature. Politics and national identity were linked almost on a daily basis. This is reflected in the choice of sources. The origins and execution of the MKP’s national policy are reconstructed from memoranda, reports, plans and correspondence from the files of the party’s Politburo, Central Committee, Propaganda Department, International Department, and personal files of party leaders. Documents from the national Parliament, Foreign Ministry, and the office of the Prime Minister provide valuable additional information. The symbols do take their rightful place in this research: primary sources such as brochures, pamphlets, posters, photographs, and school books make it clear plans were not only conceived, but also carried out. Despite any leeway local communists may have had the Soviet party remained the ultimate arbiter and decision maker. Mainly published Soviet sources provide the evidence that the MKP’s national policy was, in the end, a Soviet product. This fact was at the same time one of the more interesting contradictions of the communist national propaganda. Although the Soviet Union provided the example and even the literal instructions for the national policy, the link with Moscow also impeded its successful execution. This is shown especially by one of the central themes in this book: the charge levied against communists of being agents of Moscow. The desire to rid communists of the brand of ‘Soviet stooges’ was a key motive for embarking on the national line in the first place, and it was an important reason for dissolving the Comintern in May . Yet despite such far-reaching steps and the intensity of the MKP’s national propaganda, the Hungarian communists never truly managed to rid themselves of the accusation of being agents of Moscow.



Communism and Nationalism (–) At first sight, looking solely at Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels’s publications, communism and nationalism seem utterly incompatible. First, to Marx, history was a progression of class struggles, the most recent being those between the feudal order and the bourgeoisie, and the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. The struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat would culminate in Socialism, a classless society in which the means of production were shared. Classes, not nations, were the primary actors in this process. Second, this theory was economically deterministic. Class was defined by the ownership of the means of production, class struggle was the clash between those who controlled them, and those who were exploited by these possessing classes. All else followed from this basic premiss: philosophy, politics, and culture were all determined by class. As the nation was mainly a cultural phenomenon, this too was in the final instance a product of class relations. Marx and Engels disputed the existence of ‘national interests’, which in their view were a way for the bourgeoisie to claim that its own goals were identical to those of the entire nation. Marx accused the bourgeoisie of playing on ‘patriotism and national prejudices in piratical wars’.1 According to Horace B. Davis, Marx and Engels did not believe ‘the nation’ had an objective existence.2 Instead, it was a matter of national identity, which depended on social background. Marx discerned several different images of the nation in France, deriving from class. The petty bourgeoisie conceived of itself as ‘the people’ and ‘the nation’. The bourgeoisie on the other hand saw the nation as ‘the whole of institutions, customs, laws and ideas which sanctified private property’. But the ruling class, the remnants of the old feudal order, saw wealth and glory as the attributes of the nation.3 As the nation was a function of class struggle, national differences would cease to be important once Socialism had been attained. 1 3

Cited in Bloom, World of Nations, –. Bloom, World of Nations, –.

2

Davis, Nationalism and Socialism, .

Communism and Nationalism



Finally, because material relations and class determined developments, communism was in its very nature international. The workers of a country had more in common with their brethren across the border than with their national bourgeois masters. A true proletarian revolution would therefore necessarily have to be international to be successful. In theory, therefore, nationalism and communism are, ultimately, mutually exclusive. The Communist Manifesto itself famously stated: ‘the working men have no country.’4 Yet this truism does not explain why communists from Marx onward have allied themselves with nationalists, supported national liberation movements, stimulated the national culture of some minorities while oppressing that of others, and, once communist states had been created, established a strongly national-coloured Socialist Patriotism as the official identity of the country. Even in theory there were opportunities to include nationalism in the communist programme. Precisely because communism was a theory of development, there was a role for the nation in communism: as long as Socialism did not exist, nations and nationalists could still play a part in bringing it about. Exactly because Marx and Engels believed class determined nationalism, there was little to fear from nationalism as such. It could be embraced and discarded as necessary, and alliances with nationalists could be concluded, as the ultimate victory of Socialism and demise of nationalism was assured anyway. It was because Marx and Engels saw national identity as class related that they implicitly acknowledged the national sentiments of the working class. Indeed, the famous phrase ‘the working men have no country’ was not included in the Communist Manifesto to argue that the proletariat was internationalist and without a Fatherland, but rather as a defence against the accusation that the communists were not national: The working men have no country. We cannot take from them what they have not got. Since the proletariat must first of all acquire political supremacy, must rise to be the leading class of the nation, must constitute itself the nation, it is so far itself national, though not in the bourgeois sense of the word.5

As the bourgeoisie equated its own interests with those of the nation, so Marx and Engels argued that working class and nation could one day be the same. More important than dwelling on theory is to note that Marx and Engels were not merely theoreticians, but politicians and journalists. 4

MECW vi., –.

5

Ibid. Original emphasis.




Though they presented what, in their own eyes, was a scientific analysis of historical change with an irrevocable and unchangeable outcome, they also believed Socialism could only be achieved through conscious political action. This point is made by Erica Benner, who argues in Really Existing Nationalisms that Karl Marx’s view on nationalism cannot be properly understood by merely looking at his ideas on class struggle, laws of historical development, and economic determinism. In practice, Marx and Engels treated nationalism as a form of politics. They saw nationalist movements as being defined and influenced by class struggles, but when writing on nationalist movements, showed special interest in the voluntary motives of individual nationalist politicians, rather than anonymous historical forces.6 Doctrinal openness and astute political instincts allowed Marx and Engels a great deal of strategic and tactical flexibility. Marx believed that a communist revolution would be the result of the struggle between bourgeoisie and proletariat. It was therefore in theory necessary that in a feudal state like Prussia, the bourgeoisie should take power first. Marx saw it as the task of the proletariat and the communist movement first to aid the bourgeoisie against the aristocracy. Once the bourgeoisie was a force to be reckoned with, the guns would be turned on the former allies.7 Not only was this doctrinally sound, it also made political sense to attack a common opponent first. To forge the alliance, it was politically necessary for Marx and Engels to downplay their communism and instead present themselves as bourgeois democrats. When they set up the Neue Rheinische Zeitung, they deliberately intended it to be a democratic, bourgeois newspaper in appearance. According to Engels, the paper could ‘emphasise its specifically proletarian character in details only’, otherwise the communist party would risk becoming ‘a small sect instead of a great party of action.’ Engels did not want to be a ‘preacher in the wilderness’: ‘we have not drafted our programme [the Communist Manifesto] for that.’8 If it was possible to support bourgeois democrats to further the goals of the movement, then there were no objections to supporting bourgeois nationalists either. This came forward especially in articles in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung published during the revolutionary years  and , when Marx and Engels supported various national liberation movements. They primarily judged national movements by the extent to which they ultimately contributed towards Socialism. Aristocratic national 6 7

Benner, Really Existing Nationalisms, , . Nicolaievsky and Maenchen-Helfen, Karl Marx, .

8

Quoted ibid. .




uprisings were therefore condemned. The anti-Russian Polish insurrection of  was rejected by Marx because of its feudal leadership: ‘replace the Russian autocrats by Polish autocrats and you will have given despotism nationalisation papers.’ But as soon the bourgeoisie rose up against feudal lords, the revolts were worthy of support, such as the Cracow uprising of .9 Cummins notes that size and historical development were also criteria for deciding between praise and damnation. Marx and Engels were aware that nationalism could play a key role in creating integrated modern states, with viable economies, led by a developed bourgeoisie, with a growing revolutionary proletariat, providing they were large enough. For this reason, Marx and Engels lauded the national aspirations of Germans, Poles, and Hungarians, but ridiculed those of smaller nations.10 Engels extolled the leader of the Hungarian revolution of , Lajos Kossuth, as ‘the incarnation of Danton and Carnot in one person’.11 Kossuth had refused to grant national minorities in Hungary such as the Slovaks, Serbs, and Croats national rights of their own. As a result, the Croats sided with the Austrians against the Hungarians. To Engels, this was a betrayal of the more important anti-feudal, anti-Habsburg revolution, and he chided the small Slav peoples of Hungary for not having produced a democratic movement of their own. He considered them ‘residual fragments of peoples’, whose whole existence was ‘a protest against a great historical revolution’. Similar irrelevant peoples were the ‘Gaels’ in Scotland, the Bretons in France, and the Basques in Spain, who had always proven themselves ‘fanatical standard-bearers of the counterrevolution’.12 Despite their support for national movements, Marx and Engels themselves were not nationalists, in the sense that they supported national aspirations as a goal in their own right. Their sole yardstick for backing national movements was whether they would ultimately contribute to Socialism or not. Once the Hungarian revolution had failed, Marx was withering about Kossuth, and called him the representative of an ‘obscure and semibarbarous people, still stuck in the semi-civilisation of the sixteenth century’.13 Marx and Engels were conscious of the fact that Socialism had not yet been reached, and that, for the time being, the nation was a reality. True internationalism was only possible after the establishment of Socialism.14 Until then, realities had to be recognized. Both considered the International Labour movement more effectively organized on a 9 11 13

MECW vii. –, . MECW viii. –. Ibid.

10 12 14

Cummins, Marx, Engels, . Ibid. Davis, Nationalism and Socialism, .




national basis, and Marx rejected any notion of multi-national organization.15 Strategic flexibility did not mean Marx and Engels had abandoned the basic theoretical tenets of their communism. In contrast to ordinary politicians, pragmatism was not a concession to beliefs, but fully sanctioned by theory through the mechanism of dialectics. Support for the bourgeoisie in  was not merely seen as necessary momentary opportunism, but as a historically necessary step to create the preconditions for Socialism. A similar attitude can be perceived in Lenin. In Robert Service’s biography, Lenin appears as the ultimate political practitioner, a revolutionary leader capable of setting aside theoretical beliefs to achieve his goals. Like Marx, he could understate the Socialist nature of his intentions,16 and was willing to accept concessions to theory in order to achieve the ultimate goal of all: the revolution. Lenin summarized his view on nationalism in the sentence: ‘Marxism is incompatible with nationalism, even the most “just”, “pure”, refined and civilised nationalism.’17 Like Marx and Engels, however, his attitude towards national movements in practice was defined by political necessity. His first great problem arose from Austrian Marxists Otto Bauer and Karl Renner’s concept of extra-territorial nationhood, according to which a nation was not necessarily attached to a geographical area.18 It was a solution to the complicated realities of the nationalities question in the Austrian empire, where it was impossible to grant regional autonomy to all the hopelessly intertwined minorities. For Lenin, however, the thesis posed a direct threat to the Russian Social Democratic Party. The Jewish Bund, a member organisation of the Social Democratic Party, took up the idea and demanded the sole right to represent Russia’s Jewish proletariat. Lenin rejected it, as it threatened to create a horrifying precedent: all the other nationalities in the Russian party might demand the same, splitting the Russian Labour movement.19 According to Charles C. Herod it was in response to this threat that Lenin commissioned Stalin to counter Bauer and Renner’s arguments in an article (‘The National Question and Social Democracy’).20 There, Stalin presented a description of the nation as a community of language, territory, economic life, and psychological makeup. Stalin’s definition has since become famous, but it had not been devised for scholarly reasons in the first place. He specifically added that 15 17 19

Connor, National Question, . Connor, National Question, . Carr, ‘Bolshevik Doctrine’, .

16 18 20

Service, Lenin, . Herod, Nation, . Herod, Nation, .




one could only speak of ‘a nation’ when all characteristics were present, thereby explicitly tying nationhood to territory.21 Stalin’s definition was a political weapon against Bauer, Renner, and the Bund, as it denied both the concept of extra-territorial autonomy and the Jewish claim to nationhood. The rest of the article was a frontal attack against the AustroMarxists and the Bund, in which Stalin rejected extra-territorial autonomy in favour of regional autonomy, and dismissed the Bund’s proposal to reorganize the party along national lines. This, he believed, would only lead to the disintegration of the party.22 Such instrumental use of theory can also be perceived in Lenin’s confrontation with radicals on the left such as Rosa Luxemburg, Karl Radek, and Bucharin.23 Luxemburg, for instance, rejected the importance of national self-determination movements, which she saw as a transitory phenomenon. She opposed Polish independence, on the grounds that the Polish proletariat would have more to gain if Poland remained part of Russia. Lenin, on the other hand, disagreed. He saw national liberation movements and demands for national self-determination as a normal stage in ‘bourgeois-democratic revolutions’, and consequently supported the Polish right to secede.24 But Lenin’s support for Polish independence was also motivated by a great deal of pragmatism. By encouraging Polish national aspirations, the Russian Social Democratic Party propped up a permanent irritant to the common enemy, the Tsar. Lenin warned Rosa Luxemburg: If, in our political agitation, we fail to advance and advocate the slogan of the right to secession, we shall play into the hands, not only of the bourgeoisie, but also of the feudal landlords and the absolutism of the oppressor nation. . . . When, in her anxiety not to ‘assist’ the nationalist bourgeoisie of Poland, Rosa Luxemburg rejects the right to secession in the programme of the Marxists in Russia, she is in fact assisting the Great-Russian Black Hundreds.25

Lenin was a cunning political operator, whose views on the national question were largely formed in response to theoretical challenges from other Marxist politicians and theorists. Besides this willingness to adapt theory to political expedience Lenin, more explicitly than Marx, judged national movements by their place in the development towards Socialism. The historian E. H. Carr has reconstructed Lenin’s views on national selfdetermination and nationalism on the basis of two articles. In ‘On the 21 23 25

22 Stalin, ‘Marxism and the National Question’, . Ibid. 24 Pipes, Nationalism and Communism, , . Connor, National Question, . Lenin, ‘On the Right of Nations to Self-Determination’.




Right of Nations to Self-Determination’ (April–June ), Lenin noticed two different stages of revolution which could exist simultaneously in different geographical areas. The United States and Western Europe had developed furthest, and bourgeois nationalist movements no longer played a progressive role. In Eastern Europe, however, national movements led by the bourgeoisie still helped to advance the revolutionary struggle, and should be supported. In ‘Imperialism as the Highest Stage of Capitalism’ (April ), Lenin added a third group, the European colonies. For those he similarly argued that colonial national independence movements should be supported because they exacerbated the revolutionary situation.26 Lenin’s willingness to back national movements as long as they supported the revolution had the consequence that the party line towards national independence could suddenly change with the circumstances. In , when Lenin needed all the support he could get, the Bolsheviks promised the nationalities of Russia the right to secede. During the civil war, nevertheless, they attempted to bring under control as much of tsarist Russia as possible. Soviet republics such as Ukraine later only received the theoretical right to secede. Once the Tsar was gone, Polish independence was no longer relevant, and in  the Red Army invaded Poland, in the hope that this would precipitate revolutionary insurrections on the rest of the continent. Like Marx, Lenin had concentrated on national independence movements and national minorities, but unlike him, he also commented on national sentiments of the workers. In the Communist Manifesto, Marx had called the proletariat the ‘national class’ and implied that it would one day become identical to the nation. Lenin, similarly, argued that there were ‘two nations within all modern nations’.27 Within the nation, exploiting and exploited class each had their own distinct ‘national’ culture. Lenin dismissed the national sentiments of the bourgeoisie as ‘bourgeois nationalism’, ‘chauvinism’, or by placing the word ‘patriotism’ between quotation marks.28 The national feelings of the proletariat, on the other hand, he considered legitimate. After the outbreak of the First World War, the Russian Social Democrats that opposed the war were tarnished as traitors. In response to this accusation, Lenin wrote ‘On the National Pride of the Great Russians’, in which he asked himself: ‘Is a sense of national pride alien to us, Great-Russian class-conscious proletarians?’, and responded, 26 28

27 Carr, ‘Bolshevik Doctrine’, . Gerns, Nationalitätenpolitik, . See for example Lenin, ‘Bellicose Militarism’, –.




‘Certainly not! We love our language and our country.’ The Russian proletariat was ‘full of national pride’ because it had produced a ‘great revolutionary class’ and had not just submitted to oppression. Lenin turned the tables on his accusers: it was not the revolutionaries who were traitors, but the rulers of Russia. The Romanovs were a ‘disgrace to our Great-Russian national dignity’, and there was no better way of ‘defending the Fatherland’ than by fighting the monarchy, landowners, and capitalism, the ‘worst enemies of our country’. Lenin argued that the best way of defending the Fatherland was to hope for defeat in the war, because this was the ‘lesser evil’ to  per cent of its population. Lenin accused not only the aristocracy of treason, but also Socialist opponents, who supported the war. These ‘home grown socialist-chauvinists’ were traitors ‘not only to their own country’, but also to Socialism. As usual, Lenin had formulated his beliefs on nationalism in response to a direct political threat. It was not the last time Lenin would support a sense of national pride for the workers either. During the civil war Lenin, when it became necessary to cultivate allegiance to the Bolshevik regime, claimed it was a ‘socialist duty’ to defend the country, and argued that this kind of patriotism differed from ‘bourgeois nationalism’ due to its class character.29      In  and , radical European Social Democrats who had rejected war credits in , and continued to oppose the mainstream parties as traitors, formed communist parties in their own countries and established the Communist International (Comintern) in . From the very start, the Russian Bolsheviks dominated the Comintern. As the only party to have successfully carried out a revolution, the Bolsheviks had immense prestige in the international communist movement, and were naturally regarded as an example and looked to for advice and leadership. The Russian party also exercised influence in other ways. At the founding congress of the Comintern, in March , Moscow was chosen as the seat of the Executive Committee of the Communist International (ECCI), making the organization of the Comintern dependent on the Russian party. The only party in control of a state, the Bolsheviks were also in the position to provide sister parties with ample funds—in return for obedience. At the Second Conference of the Comintern held in , Soviet 29

Lenin, ‘Renegade Kautsky’, .




mastery of the Comintern was formalized. According to the ‘twenty-one conditions for admission to the Comintern’ member parties had to organize themselves on the basis of the same ‘democratic centralism’ as the Bolsheviks, and two-thirds of the Central Committees of these parties had to consist of communists loyal to the Comintern. Point  declared all decisions of the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI) binding, and the ECCI had the right to send representatives with far-reaching powers to the parties. Additionally, every party was unconditionally expected to aid ‘any Soviet republic’ that requested help. Though in theory this could also apply to other Soviet republics, such as those in Bavaria and Hungary, their swift downfall meant that it applied in practice only to Soviet Russia.30 The Russian party was dominant. Paragraph  of the statutes declared that the brunt of the work of ECCI would rest on the party where the ECCI had its seat. This party provided five representatives to the ECCI with the right to vote, the other ‘important parties’ only one. Because the Russian party was the only one that could provide a secure territory for the Comintern to reside in, this meant that, in fact, the Soviet party controlled the Comintern from the very beginning. On this, historians are generally in agreement, though there is debate on the extent of Soviet control and the exact time when Soviet supremacy turned into all-out control. According to Julius Braunthal, the Fourth Congress of the Comintern, held in December , made an end to even the last theoretical freedoms of the ‘sections’ of the International. But according to Fritz Borkenau there was still a measure of debate and freedom of manoeuvre at that point.31 In any case, by  the Comintern and its sections had become fully Stalinized, which could not have been achieved had the member parties not been loyal to the USSR to begin with. By that time, to communists, ‘proletarian internationalism’ was thoroughly identified with the interests of the Soviet Union. The Soviet link, however, caused the communists great problems. In every European country, they were presented as traitors, as tools of a foreign state, as ‘agents of Moscow’. As a rule, the communist parties did not hide their affiliation but presented it with pride, so for instance the leader of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ), Klement Gottwald, in Parliament on  December : You say finally, that we are under the command of Moscow and that we go there to get our savvy. Well! It’s like this: you are under the command of the Živnobank 30 31

Braunthal, Geschichte der Internationale, –. Borkenau, Europäische Kommunismus, –.




[the Živnostenská Bank] . . . And we, we are the Party of the Czechoslovak proletariat, and our highest revolutionary headquarters really is Moscow. And we go to Moscow to learn, you know what? We go to Moscow to learn from the Russian Bolsheviks how to wring your necks (Shouts). And you know the Russian Bolsheviks are masters in that (Shouts).32

In some senses, the communist parties were agents of Moscow. Communists critical of Soviet dominance had, by , been purged from most parties. Parties received substantial funds from Moscow, which obviously influenced the party line. The Russian-dominated Comintern was accepted as the ultimate arbiter in case of conflicts. During the quarrels in the leadership of the German Communist Party between  and , all parties submitted their disputes to the Comintern, which made the final judgement. It was impossible to function for long without Soviet consent. On the other hand, local communists were not mindless puppets simply waiting for instructions from above. Even though the Soviet word was final, communists took their own initiative, and the ECCI could be responsive. Communists saw themselves as internationalists. All parties bore the legend ‘Section of the Communist International’. The Comintern itself was regarded as the ‘general staff of the world revolution’, and communists did not consider themselves Russian, or even Soviet agents, but the disciplined foot soldiers of the communist revolution. Support for the USSR was seen as completely identical to support for proletarian internationalism, and the interests of the revolution and those of the USSR were held to be one and the same.

    This doctrinal internationalism did not mean that the communist parties on principle rejected all kinds of nationalism. As in Soviet Russia, their relationship towards nation and nationalism was dictated by political necessity. Béla Kun’s Hungarian Republic of Councils, which briefly existed in , could initially count on broad support in the country because it demanded a revolutionary war against the Entente powers. The ambivalent relationship between nationalists and communists came forward particularly in Germany. The right-wing self-styled ‘National Bolsheviks’ expected national salvation through cooperation with the 32

Quoted in Sayer, Coasts of Bohemia, .




communists and the Russians.33 Others, such as ultra-conservative author Ernst Jünger, thought the experience of revolution would bring spiritual salvation.34 Though some of these nationalists later ended up in the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD),35 on the whole their outlook was national rather than Marxist. The party’s attitude towards these nationalists and the national uproar caused, later, by the Versailles Treaty was defined by tactical necessity. Lenin urged the communist leadership to stop advocating a revolutionary war against the entente, because he believed the unpopular peace would hasten the downfall of the German bourgeoisie. He turned against the leftwing German communists Lauffenberg and Wolfheim who called for war, and accused them of forming a bloc with the bourgeoisie while a revolutionary situation existed in the whole of Europe, dubbing them ‘petty bourgeois nationalist’. Lauffenberg and Wolfheim then formed their own party, the Kommunistische Arbeiterpartei Deutschlands (KAPD), which attracted over half the membership of the KPD and almost all the party members in Berlin. The KAPD demanded a ‘revolutionary people’s war’ against the Entente, in which the revolutionary working class and the conservative Freikorps were natural allies.36 By , the Bolsheviks had learnt from their mistakes, and Zinoviev gave the order to the KPD to establish contacts with national bolshevik groups. According to historian Conan Fischer, there was by now no significant difference between the line of the KPD and the KAPD.37 The best known early tactical cooperation between communists and nationalists in Germany occurred after the French occupation of the Ruhr in . On the local level, the KPD leadership permitted cooperation between communists and nationalists against the French. Within the Comintern, the political use of supporting resistance against the French was appreciated by Karl Radek. In May , a German nationalist, Leo Schlageter, had been executed by the French for sabotage, and had immediately become a nationalist martyr. In a speech before the Enlarged Executive of the Comintern, Karl Radek praised Schlageter as a ‘martyr of German nationalism’ and a ‘courageous soldier of the Counterrevolution’, who deserved to be ‘honestly and manly praised’ by communists. He also named him a ‘wanderer into nothingness’ because, he argued, 33 34 35 36 37

Sontheimer, Antidemokratisches Denken, –. Schüddekopf, Nationalbolschewismus, . Laqueur, Die deutsche Jugendbewegung, . Schüddekopf, Nationalbolschewismus, . Fischer, German Communism and the Rise of Nazism, .




only by choosing communism could German liberation truly be achieved.38 The speech was praised by German nationalists. The völkisch publicist Count Ernst von Reventlow published articles in the KPD party paper Rote Fahne, and Radek published a brochure together with the conservative author Möller van den Bruck, entitled Das Dritte Reich.39 In the s, the KPD was again confronted by the success of the extreme right and the appeal of nationalism among the working class, this time in the shape of Hitler’s National Socialist German Workers Party (NSDAP). In the  election campaign, the KPD responded to the challenge posed by the Nazis with a declaration titled ‘Programme Declaration on the National and Social Liberation of the German People’. In it, the KPD contrasted the ‘national-socialist demagoguery’ of the Nazis with its own plans for a Soviet Germany. The Versailles Treaty would be torn up, and with the permission of ‘revolutionary workers’ in France, Poland, Italy, and Czechoslovakia, German-speaking territories would be allowed to attach themselves to Soviet Germany. The programme declaration was, as its title implied, a conscious attempt to take the wind out of the sails of the National Socialists. Significantly, it had not been drafted by the German party itself. It had been devised on orders of the Political Secretariat of the ECCI40 by the Central-European Ländersekretariat of the Comintern.41 Though text was added to the final version in Germany, one of the KPD’s most important programmatical documents of the s had been devised by the Comintern.  ,   Like the Bolsheviks, the German Communist Party exploited national sentiments when necessary. This was true of other sections of the Comintern as well. The Hungarian party, the Kommunisták Magyarországi Pártja (KMP), was virulently opposed to the despised Trianon Treaty and called for the protection of Hungarian minorities abroad. The communist parties in Slovakia and Romania were filled with Hungarians, who looked to the communist party for national liberation. But this national agitation was mostly Socialist in outlook. In its propaganda, the KPD did not hide its internationalism or its relationship with the VKP(b). In Europe, commu38 39 40

Radek, ‘Schlageter’, –. Radek et al., Kommunismus und nationale Bewegung. 41 RTsKhIDNI, ./, –. RTsKhIDNI, ./, –.




nists regarded national symbols such as flags, celebrations, and anthems as bourgeois instruments of oppression. As Terry Martin points out, the Bolsheviks saw nationalism as ‘masking ideology’. The national flag was, in Stalin’s words, used to deceive the masses, as a ‘convenience for covering up the counterrevolutionary plans of the national bourgeoisie’.42 Yet while the European communist parties viciously attacked such symbols as tools of the bourgeoisie, the Bolsheviks were promoting them in Soviet Russia. Having inherited a multi-national empire, the Bolsheviks had to assure themselves of the support of the many nationalities. To this end, they established the People’s Commissariat for the Nationalities (Narkomnats) in October , with Stalin at its head as Commissar. Narkomnats attempted to appeal to native populations by co-opting minorities into the party and appropriating national culture. While allowing nations to flourish was not an end in itself, neither was it the intention merely to appease the nationalities. Instead, a grander plan was kept in mind: national culture was used as a means to spread Socialism. There were no theoretical obstacles to the utilization of national culture to this end. Lenin’s notion of ‘two nations’ implied that there was such a thing as a specific proletarian national culture. Stalin himself argued that there was no ‘irreconcilable contradiction’ between proletarian and national culture: ‘The culture that is common to all humanity, and toward which Socialism moves, is proletarian in content and national in form. Proletarian culture does not abolish national culture; one is contained within the other. And, conversely, national culture does not abolish proletarian culture, but gives it form.’43 With the final victory of Socialism, the nation would not be destroyed as such, but instead transformed into a ‘Socialist nation’.44 The slogan ‘national in form, socialist in content’ was put into practice from , with the introduction by Narkomnats of the policy of korenezatsiya or ‘indigenization.’ First, the Bolsheviks co-opted nationalities by heavily recruiting new cadres from the native population. Secondly, they stimulated national language and culture. Not only existing national languages such as Ukrainian were promoted, but also those of regions such as Byelorussia, where only the national elite considered itself distinct from the Russians. Besides languages Narkomnats also encouraged national culture by advancing art, theatre, opera, film, and literature.45 In the end, the Bolsheviks stimulated national culture for tactical 42 43 45

Cited in Martin, ‘Affirmative Action Empire’, . 44 Carrére d’Encausse, Great Challenge, . Gerns, Nationalitätenpolitik, . Martin, ‘Affirmative Action Empire’.


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reasons. As Stephen Blank points out, for Stalin, national autonomy existed only to build Socialism.46 Stalin also used the national question as a political instrument against comrades such as Trotsky who were sceptical about the importance of nationalism.47 When local nationalist leaders got too big for their boots, they were accused of a ‘nationalist deviation’ such as the Tatars in . And if nations could be constructed out of political necessity, they could destroyed for the same reason: after , Volga-Germans, Chechens, Crimean Tatars, and Kalmyks were deported from their homelands and virtually ceased to exist as national units.48 While smaller nations were permitted to cherish pre-revolutionary national heroes, the Bolsheviks made one significant exception: Russia. As Martin notes, Lenin and Stalin saw Russian nationalism as a much larger threat than that of the national minorities.49 In the s, the state ideology of the USSR as a whole was mainly communist in content. The concept of ‘Socialism in one country’ was the first step towards a development of a Soviet patriotism. Stalin’s ‘Socialism in one country’ was heretical to traditional Marxism in two ways. First, it implied it was possible to have a Socialist revolution in a feudal society like Russia without the intermediate phase of a bourgeois revolution. Second, it entailed the claim that a revolution could succeed in one country, without similar revolutions in other countries. Lenin had long believed the Bolshevik revolution would fail without similar revolutions in the industrial countries of Western Europe. But too much can be made of the nature of ‘Socialism in one country’ as antithetical to Marx and Lenin. After Hitler’s failed Munich putsch in , it was clear that the revolutionary threat in Western Europe had passed, and that Soviet power had consolidated itself in Russia. ‘Socialism in one country’ may have been a heresy, but it was supremely Leninist in the sense that it was a tactical concession to reality. The international dimension was not lost. Stalin wrote that, rather than being contradictory to world revolution, ‘Socialism in one country’ was ‘the beginning and premise of world revolution’.50 While initially an unimportant point, it rapidly gained momentum according to E. H. Carr, as it offered doctrinal support for the New Economic Policy as a means of progress towards Socialism in a peasant country, and fitted in well with the ‘stabilisation of capitalism’ that had been perceived to have started after . As Carr writes, it had another consequence: ‘By giving a national colour to the revolution, it had helped to reconcile to it many of 46 48 50

Blank, Sorcerer as Apprentice. Conquest, Nation Killers, . Carr, Socialism in One Country, .

47 49

Ibid. . Suny and Martin, A State of Nations.

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those Russians, both at home and abroad, who had originally rejected it as non-Russian and anti-national . . . it reawakened a vague sense of national pride or patriotism which had been temporarily silenced.’51 Indeed, from the s, a sense of ‘Soviet Patriotism’, based in part on Russian national symbols and heroes, was cultivated from above.52 This patriotism remained vague. ‘Socialism in one country’ was not a rallying cry sufficient to create a sense of loyalty towards the Union as a whole. With the largest part of the population prevented from benefiting from korenezatsiya, that policy did not succeed in creating a sense of patriotism either. On the contrary, it could easily have the opposite effect by strengthening local nationalism. Despite supporting national minorities, the Bolsheviks were wary of the nationalities. Stalin feared his own nationalities policy would backfire by turning Bolsheviks into nationalists rather than the other way round. When Ukrainian communists protested against grain requisitions, this was seen as a symptom of independent-minded national communism, which prompted Stalin to change the policy towards the nationalities.53 In the s, the ban on Russian nationalism was withdrawn and reversed. Russian pre-revolutionary national heroes such as Alexandr Nevsky regained their prominence. But despite Stalin’s mistrust of ‘national communists’, korenezatsiya was not actually abolished: the Bolsheviks still selected their cadres from native elites and continued to promote national identity through literature and culture. The difference was that the policy was implemented quietly, and that Russian history and culture now became the focus of Soviet patriotism.54 The goals were very similar to those of korenezatsiya: to make Socialism palatable to the Russians and, beyond that, to establish a sense of Soviet patriotism based on Russian national sentiment. With that, themes were set which would also become prevalent in Hungary after the Second World War: the construction of Socialist Patriotism based on Hungarian national feeling, coupled with a fear of ‘national communists’ who operated independently from Moscow.

Carr, Socialism in One Country, . Barghoorn, Soviet Russian Nationalism, . See also Brandenberger and Dubrovsky, ‘The People Need a Tsar’. 53 54 Martin, ‘Affirmative Action Empire’, . Ibid.  51 52




  Around the same time as Stalin’s reappraisal of Russian nationalism, the communist parties of Europe did an about-turn on the appraisal of the national past. This was not connected to Soviet nationalities policy, but rather to a change in strategy towards Fascism and Social Democracy. Between  and , Stalin believed the consolidation of the revolution at home to have top priority. There are signs that Stalin had believed a right-wing victory in Germany would be beneficial to the Soviet Union. Revision of Versailles would, after all, mostly have been directed against the West, against France and Britain. In consequence the Comintern did not declare the Nazis, but the Social Democrats, to be its main enemies, and denounced them as ‘traitors’ and ‘Social Fascists’. The communist parties were only permitted to cooperate with Social Democrats in a ‘United Front from below’, directed at undermining the Social Democratic leadership. By the end of , however, Stalin reversed course, and commenced a search for collective security through Europe.55 In consequence, the strategic line of the Comintern changed between  and . Now Fascism was proclaimed the main enemy, and a ‘United Front from above’ with the Social Democratic leadership, and even progressive bourgeois parties, was proposed to stem the rising tide of the radical right. One of the main ideological weapons in the struggle against Fascism was to be the appropriation by communist parties of national symbols. At the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in , at which the change was announced, the secretary-general of the Comintern, Georgi Dimitrov, argued that the ‘Fascists’ presented themselves as ‘heirs and continuators of all that was heroic in [the nation’s] past’, whereas enemies were smeared with ‘all that was degrading or offensive’ to national sentiments. In Germany, he stated, the ‘Fascists’ had appropriated national history by presenting ‘the greatest people of the German past’ as ‘Fascists’, and the ‘great peasant movements’ as the ‘direct precursors of the Fascist movement’. In Italy, Mussolini referred to Garibaldi, and ‘the French Fascists’ promoted Joan of Arc as a heroine. In response, Dimitrov proposed to do exactly the same: to claim national historical figures for the party. Communists who failed to understand the importance of this ‘voluntarily hand over to the Fascist falsifiers all that is valuable in the historical past 55

Haslam, Struggle for Collective Security, .

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of the nation’. Communists, Dimitrov continued, were ‘irreconcilable opponents, on principle of bourgeois nationalism in all its forms’, but at the same time should not support ‘national nihilism’. The principle of proletarian internationalism was fundamental, but ‘anyone who thinks that this permits him, or even compels him, to sneer at all the national sentiments of the wide masses of the working people is far from being a genuine Bolshevik, and has understood nothing of the teaching of Lenin and Stalin on the national question’. To give an example of the ‘correct approach’, Dimitrov quoted extensively from Lenin’s ‘On the National Pride of the Great Russians’.56 The strategy against Fascism consisted of two basic prongs. On the one hand, the party had to ‘expose’ the ‘Fascist bourgeoisie’, and prove that it pretended to defend national interests as a pretext for oppression at home and abroad. At the same time, the communist parties had to show that ‘the proletariat is rising against every manner of bondage and oppression, is the only true fighter for national freedom and independence of the people’.57 The French Communist Party (PCF) had already conducted a similar policy for over a year. Although it had previously ridiculed national imagery, the PCF had the advantage that many of the national symbols of the right had had their origins in France’s revolutions. The anniversary of the French Revolution had been a right-wing celebration since the First World War, but was celebrated by the left at the first great demonstration of the Popular Front on  July . The PCF party chairman, Maurice Thorez, wore a tricolour sash in public, and the PCF adopted the ‘Marseillaise’ besides the ‘Internationale’.58 At the Seventh Congress, Thorez echoed Dimitrov in his own address: ‘The reactionary press has fulminated against the presence of the tricolour beside the red flag at the head of the demonstration of  July. . . . We do not want to abandon to the Fascists the flag of the great revolution, nor the “Marseillaise” of the soldiers of the Convention.’59 The PCF, previously opposed to any expenditure on armaments, now called for increases in spending to defend the Fatherland. The strategical nature of the Popular Front can be illustrated by the revision of the line of the Comintern after the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact of August  and the outbreak of war in September. Fascism and Democracy were once again equated as one and the same, and the war between Germany and France and Britain was officially presented as a war 56 57 59

Dimitrov, ‘The Fascist Offensive’, –, original emphasis. 58 Ibid., original emphasis. Jackson, Popular Front, –. Cachin and Thorez, Du front unique au Front Populaire, .




between two groups of imperialists. The French and British communist parties were instructed not to support their governments, and even when France was invaded by Germany on  May , the PCF attacked the French bourgeoisie rather than the Germans. National-tinged propaganda did not altogether disappear: after the Fall of France, the PCF was permitted to protest against ‘the enslavement of our people by a foreign conqueror’. The party, however, continued to aim itself against the French ‘reaction’ as well, which it accused of ‘preparing the enslavement of the French people by foreigners’.60 From Marx onwards, doctrine had permitted the support of nationalists and national sentiments by communists if it supported the revolution and Socialism. By , the question had been reduced to whether a national line was in the interests of the Soviet Union. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union on  June , this was once again the case, and the Comintern again viewed the nation in a favourable light. 60

Dallin and Firsov (eds.), Dimitrov and Stalin, –.

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Agents of Moscow (–)       On the day of the German attack on the Soviet Union, Commissar for Foreign Affairs Vyacheslav Molotov gave a rousing speech in which he referred to the defeat of Napoleon at the hand of the tsars almost a century earlier, consciously mixing tsarist and Soviet history. The war became the ‘Great Patriotic War’, and Russian national heroes such as Alexandr Nevsky were used to rally the troops. Simultaneously the parties connected to the Comintern conducted national propaganda of their own, in a centrally organized ‘national line’ carried out on orders by Stalin. Immediately after the German invasion, the political line of the Comintern changed. First condemned as an ‘imperialist’ war, the war had now become a ‘patriotic’ one in defence of the Soviet Union. All national sections were called upon to organize support for the Soviet war effort in their respective countries, and were expected to take part in broad, national, anti-Fascist alliances. To facilitate this, the communists had to drop Socialist agitation and instead call for a war of national liberation. This change in line was ordered by Stalin himself, and then centrally implemented through the Comintern. At  o’clock in the morning of  June , Dimitrov was summoned to a cabinet meeting in the Kremlin, where Stalin announced the news of the German attack on the Soviet Union earlier that day. Stalin instructed Dimitrov that ‘the Comintern was not to manoeuvre openly’, and the communist parties were to ‘desist from pursuing Socialist revolution’.1 After this conversation, Dimitrov called a meeting of the Executive Committee of the Comintern, and presented the change in policy. Up to the German invasion, Dimitrov still defined the war as an ‘imperialist war’, with the sole purpose of the repartitioning of the world between capitalist states, where in both camps the communists sided with the suffering population and struggled against the war. The German attack on the Soviet Union had, however, decisively changed its character: the Soviet Union was fighting a 1

Dimitrov, Dnevnik, .

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Agents of Moscow

‘patriotic, just war’, which made the destruction of German Fascism the interest of all peoples and, consequently, placed completely new tasks before the communists. In the Allied countries, the communist parties would have to develop a broad campaign for support of the Soviet Union against Germany. In occupied countries, they had to organize national liberation movements, and in neutral countries, advocate entry into the war against Germany. In Axis countries and their allies, it was necessary to oppose the Nazis and agitate in favour of ending the war.2 So in Britain, the communist party now had to support Churchill rather than call for his removal; the campaign of the CPUSA against American involvement in the war was judged ‘no longer topical’, and the party should support participation in the war against Germany instead. In domestic politics, allies and opponents changed places. ‘In Czechoslovakia, we earlier classified Benes as an agent of English imperialism. Now the fire has to be directed against traitors such as Hacha . . .’ ‘Anything’, Dimitrov summarized, ‘that aids the defeat of Fascism is the correct tactic and useful.’3 The key to the change in policy was the temporary rejection of Socialist revolution and the embracing of national liberation: ‘At this stage we cannot call either for the overthrow of Capitalism in individual countries, or for world revolution. The discourse in individual countries now is on the struggle against national oppression, against the enslaving occupying regimes, about national liberation.’4 The all-out support for patriotism became known as the ‘national line’ of the Comintern. It is unclear to what extent Stalin influenced the text of his speech, but it is unlikely Dimitrov would have delivered it without his express consent. Whatever initiatives the Comintern may have been able to take itself, the final decision was made by Soviet authorities. Mátyás Rákosi, the later leader of the Hungarian Communist Party, had only recently been released from Horthy’s jails in return for flags of the  revolution captured by the tsarist armies. The power relations in the Comintern were, nevertheless, no mystery to him: ‘to me it was no secret, that, to a certain degree, the International could not make important decisions without the preliminary approval of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and Stalin.’5 Rákosi later commented on the working relationship between Stalin and Dimitrov: ‘for me it was not a question that in this Stalin was the leader. I had no doubts about this.’ After the meeting of the Secretariat, Rákosi had asked Dimitrov whether he had consulted Stalin 2 5

Nairinski and Lebedeva (eds.), Komintern, –. Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, i. .

3

Ibid.

4

Ibid.

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Agents of Moscow

before the change in policy. ‘Dimitrov looked at me with a little amazement, and answered: of course. He was right to be surprised: I should have realized something like that.’6 The central direction of this change in policy is further illustrated by the decision of the Secretariat, that same day, to inform the other communist parties ‘in the spirit of Comrade Dimitrov’s report’.7 Corresponding instructions were immediately sent out to the national sections. The British Communist Party was ordered to teach that at present, the question was about the defence of the people against ‘Fascist enslavement’ rather than Socialist revolution.8 Dimitrov instructed the German party to stress that the USSR had faithfully kept to the non-aggression treaty and had never done anything against the national interests of the German people.9 He commanded the French party to contact the Gaullist movement on the basis of a ‘joint struggle for national liberation’, and demanded in strong terms that they should desist from Socialist agitation: ‘Yet again we insist on the absolute necessity to avoid in your agitation the presentation of the war between Germany and the Soviet Union as a war between the Capitalist system and the Socialist system. For the Soviet Union this is a patriotic war of defence against Fascist barbarism.’ The instructions to the French show this tactical change was not merely made to facilitate the struggle of the communists in their own countries. Relations with the other Allies had also been kept in mind. ‘Chatter about world revolution causes the strengthening of Hitler and hampers international unification of all anti-Hitlerite forces.’10 The change in propaganda, from socialist revolution to national liberation, was intended to underscore the very factual change from a revolutionary to a national front strategy. The communist parties were expected to look beyond the working class, to forge and lead alliances with other classes against the common enemy: ‘we must not push aside sections of the middle bourgeoisie, intelligentsia, and peasantry who honestly take a stand for national liberation movements. By contrast, we must try to win them as allies.’11 Dimitrov expanded on this particular point nearly two weeks later in a letter to Molotov. In every occupied country, the communist party had immediately to set about organizing united national front movements. Relations had to be established with anti-German forces such as de Gaulle, Benes, partisans, and the London governments-in-exile. The goal of the 6 7 9

Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, i. . Nairinski and Lebedeva (eds.), Komintern, –. 10 Ibid. –. Ibid. –.

8 11

Ibid. –. Ibid. –.

Agents of Moscow



fronts was to increase the resistance against the Germans. The purpose of this strategy was to organize ‘active support in the capitalist countries for the Patriotic War of the USSR against Germany’.12 The establishment of the national front movements had to be conducted under the general slogan of the defence of democracy and national independence. For tactical purposes, the presence of communists in the national front movement had to be downplayed. They were not permitted to ‘pose the question of their hegemony in the National Front’. Molotov and Dimitrov discussed the latter’s proposal on  July. Molotov approved, and a similarly worded text was sent out as a directive by the ECCI the next day.13      Not only was the initiative a Soviet one, the Comintern’s national propaganda was centrally directed and controlled. The final word lay with the All-Union Communist Party (VKP(b) ), as the source of the correct ‘line’, and as censor. Higher Comintern authorities usually gave direct instructions. At the same time, the national sections were expected to show a degree of initiative. While the new line was centrally ordained, the national parties were left to themselves to sort out the details. ‘Everyone hurried to organize their own line,’ Rákosi later wrote in his memoirs.14 Not all propaganda material was simply translated out of Russian. A large part had to be produced by foreign communists working in Comintern offices, who therefore had to decide themselves what was orthodox and what not. Moreover, leading Comintern officials were dependent on the national sections when interpreting events at home. Still, in the end, Comintern and Soviet officials had the last word. This structure was reflected in the organization of propaganda. The Hungarian party had already been broadcasting to Hungary since . Broadcasts were suspended with the crushing of the Hungarian party during the purges, but recommenced from  through Inoradio, the radio service of the Comintern.15 Not the Comintern, but the Central Committee of the VKP(b) appointed the editors, such as for example Imre Nagy.16 With every text first having to pass through the central Soviet censor, Glavlit, the service was tighly controlled by Soviet authorities. 12 15

13 Ibid. –. Ibid. –. Petrák, Magyarok a Szovjetunióban, 

14

Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, i. . 16 Rainer, Nagy Imre, .

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Agents of Moscow

The transmissions closely followed changes in Soviet foreign policy: after the conclusion of the Molotov–Ribbentrop pact, great care had to be taken not to mention anything that could be construed as meddling in the internal affairs of other countries. From the day of the German attack, propaganda became a preoccupation of the Comintern. The manager of the Press Department of the ECCI, Friedrich, was required to offer information and proposals for propaganda to the troika consisting of Dimitrov, Manuilski, and Togliatti that had just been set up to run the ECCI. The Press Department further provided the Secretariat, representatives of the party, Inoradio, TASS, and the Comintern’s foreign press with articles and other propaganda materials, and was required to maintain continuous contact with the management of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the VKP(b). To improve the service of Inoradio, national party leaders were made responsible for the provision of material for foreign broadcasts. In anything regarding Inoradio, for example the texts of broadcasts, they were obliged to turn for approval to a working commission of the ECCI Secretariat.17 To optimize the propaganda effort, Dimitrov proposed a direct link between the newly established Soviet Information Bureau (Sovinform) and the Press Department of the ECCI. The leadership of the radio sections would provide general instructions on a day-to-day basis. Within this framework, the individual editorial offices were required to show initiative and independence. In the case of special events, Sovinform would immediately issue directives to Inoradio on the content of broadcasts.18 The services of Inoradio were, however, seen to be inadequate. The Hungarian party leadership in Moscow felt the need for a communist transmitter in order to bring the new line across at home, and put such a request to Dimitrov. On  July, Dimitrov asked Beria and Molotov to decide on a secret radio station ‘which would speak in the name of free Germany’ and could also be used for broadcasts in Romanian, Finnish, and Hungarian.19 Dimitrov’s proposal was accepted on  July. The Hungarian party leadership also found that the obvious Moscow origins of Inoradio hampered the propaganda effort, as it made it impossible to present the communists as patriots. According to Rákosi, even ‘broadcasts presenting the point of view of the simple, non-communist Hungarian patriot or non-partisan peasant lost in efficacy, because they 17 19

Nairinski and Lebedeva (eds.), Komintern, –. Ibid. –.

18

Ibid. –.

Agents of Moscow



were sent by Moscow’. The need was felt for a radio service that ‘operated in the name of all anti-Nazi Hungarians and communists’. Other parties were experiencing the same problem.20 While in this case a national section had, in demanding a broadcasting service of its own, taken some initiative, it followed the example of already existing stations such as the Bulgarian transmitter Khristo Botev. As usual, Soviet authorities made the final decisions. At first, the Hungarians had desired a purely communist illegal radio service. According to Rákosi, it was Stalin himself who demanded they target a wider audience. Only after his intervention did the Hungarian party leadership choose a service that was more attuned to the ‘general line of the Communist International’, one that would be aimed at ‘not just the Communists, but all the anti-Nazi Hungarians’.21 An agreement on Hungarian ‘illegal’ broadcasts was reached at the end of September .22 The Hungarian service was christened ‘Radio Kossuth’, a name chosen consciously for its patriotic meaning: ‘In this situation, the name itself was a programme in its own right: opposed to the Germans, for the unity of all the democratic forces.’23 The broadcasts concentrated on war news, but also touched on patriotic themes.24 The other sections of the Comintern set up similar radio stations. Besides Kossuth, a number of these stations were named after national heroes, such as the Polish ‘Radio Kosciuszko’, and the Bulgarian ‘Khristo Botev’. Some referred to national freedom, such as the Czech ‘For National Liberation’, ‘Free Radio Finland’, ‘Romania Libera’, ‘Free Yugoslavia’, ‘For a Free Slovakia’, and ‘Free Norway’. Others were given names referring to popular struggle: the Bulgarian ‘Naroden Glas’ or the ‘Deutsche Volkssender’. While broadcasting from Moscow, the pretence was made that these were national, illegal communist radio stations, broadcasting from behind the front lines: ‘How did (Radio Kossuth) acquire its news? It was done as if it had been made in Hungary. That is how they wanted to mislead the Hungarian authorities.’25 Dimitrov requested of Molotov that, for ‘conspiratorial’ purposes, the transmissions should not be conducted from the TASS radio studio, but special studios should be set up located in the Press Department of ECCI.26 The leadership of the foreign parties participated in the organization of radio broadcasts. The national radio stations thus became bases of party leadership and a training ground for the post-war generation of party 20 23 24 25

21 22 Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, i. . Ibid. Dimitrov, Dnevnik, . Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, i. . For a selection of broadcasts on national themes from –, see: PIL .. 26 Nairinski and Lebedeva (eds.), Komintern,  n. . PIL /, .

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Agents of Moscow

leaders. This was also the case for Radio Kossuth, where Rákosi bore final responsibility, and party ideologue József Révai was editor-in-chief. Other party members who gained post-war prominence were employed as editors, broadcasters, and writers. Among them were Mihály Farkas, the former leader of the Communist Youth International, the journalist Zoltán Vas who had been released together with Rákosi, Czechoslovak Hungarian Sándor Nógrádi, the lawyer and journalist Rezs ő Szántó and his brother Zoltán, the economist István Friss, agricultural specialist Imre Nagy, the economist László Hay, and Spanish Civil War veteran Ferenc Münnich. Leadership conflicts were battled out in the radio studios. Ideological bickering and Soviet intervention typified such struggles. The example of the Szántó affair shows the relative importance of national propaganda at this stage. Zoltán Szántó aspired to a leadership position, and in February  was for a short while one of the leading editors of the radio broadcasts. Other leading communists, such as Rákosi, Farkas, and Comintern apparatchik Ernő Gerő, desired his removal.27 A suitable pretext was offered when Szántó proposed a change in the programming. Szántó took the national line seriously. He apparently winced at the Soviet propaganda idealizing Socialism and the Red Army that was fed through the radio. Constructed by Soviet propagandists, it was not only irksome but contained many factual errors, for instance in Hungarian history.28 Szántó was in favour of a programme that was of interest and understandable to Hungarian listeners, and at the same time anti-Fascist. Soviet leaders, however, demanded glorification of the Soviet Union and enthusiastic political and military propaganda. This was used to trip Szántó up. In a little conspiracy involving Farkas and Rákosi, Farkas urged Szántó to put forward the impossible request that only Hungarians should provide materials for broadcasts. The other editors stuck to Soviet orthodoxy, and accused Szántó of anti-Soviet viewpoints. Szántó was duly transferred to duties as a propagandist among prisoners of war.29 Despite the national line, Soviet propaganda was still preponderant. The Szántó affair demonstrates the utilitarian character of national propaganda. Rákosi and others were quite willing to sacrifice it when it suited their purposes. Nationalism was both a weapon to be used against foreign enemies, and an accusation to be levied against internal opponents.

27 29

Korom, ‘Magyar kommunista emigráció’, . Korom, ‘Magyar kommunista emigráció’, .

28

Rainer, Nagy Imre, i. .

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After the German attack, enemy soldiers and prisoners of war became an immediate target for propaganda. The Central Committee of the VKP(b) established the Bureau for War Political Propaganda and the Political Administration of the Red Army, GLAVPURKKA, formed a wartime subdivision for special propaganda. Both of these dealt with propaganda for prisoners.30 The Comintern provided special instructors, with knowledge of national languages, cultures, and traditions, to send into the prisoner of war camps. In August , the ECCI set up a Prisoner of War Committee, chaired by German party leader Walter Ulbricht and including Rezső Szántó.31 From that month onward, ECCI secretary Manuilski directed a movement for prisoners of war to sign a declaration against the ‘aggressive politics of Fascist Germany’. In January , Mihály Farkas and Ern ő Gerő commenced propaganda work among thousands of Hungarian prisoners of war, and published a patriotic ‘Declaration to the Hungarian People and Hungarian Army’ in February . From  June  the Hungarians disseminated the newspaper Tábori Ujság (Camp News) among prisoners. In , the propagandists organized a total of  conferences,  meetings, and  rallies, along with , political information meetings, , group and , individual discussions,  evening question and answer sessions,  evening artistic performances,  conferences with ‘active anti-fascists’, held  talks and  lectures, and screened  films.32 Anti-Fascist schools, where émigré communists re-educated prisoners of war, were established in April . Erzsébet Andics, who after the war would be one of the party’s main propagandists, led the Hungarian school in Kusnarenko. Prisoners were also used as a source of news from the home front, of information on troop morale and similar topics, and national party leaders such as Rákosi frequently visited prisoners and reported back to Dimitrov. Despite the effort, no significant results were achieved until after the defeat of the th German Army at Stalingrad, and the nd Hungarian Army at Voronezh, both in January . Hitler was perceived as having betrayed his army at Stalingrad and the ultimate defeat of Germany now seemed certain. With , dead and tens of thousands wounded, Voronezh was a disaster for the Hungarians, which sapped troop morale, and made prisoners more receptive to propaganda.

30 32

Palitskiy, ‘Gitlerovtsi’, . Palitskiy, ‘Gitlerovtsi’, .

31

Adibekov, ‘Formal’novo rospuska’, –.

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Propaganda among the soldiers was even more strongly national in character than the Comintern line in general. Again, the main initiative for the national content of the propaganda was taken from the Soviet side, though the implementation was left to the émigré communists. Their activities were as usual corrected from above. From  onward, the main tool of propaganda among prisoners became the several national prisoner of war committees. One of the most important of these was the Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland (NKFD, National Committee of Free Germany). But besides being used to re-educate prisoners, they also had an important function in foreign propaganda. According to East German historiography, the National Committee had been an idea of leading German communist Wilhelm Pieck. But recent research points out that, in reality, Manuilski had taken the initiative for its creation in May . It was the Politburo of the VKP(b) that decided on  May on the establishment of a German anti-Hitler committee consisting of prisoners of war, writers, artists, and politicians,33 and a committee including Manuilski, Viden, Akkerman, and Ernő Gerő that edited the NKFD manifesto.34 As was the case with the national propaganda line in general, the creation of a committee movement was not limited to one country but extended to others as well. On  May, Manuilski informed Dimitrov of plans to create anti-Fascist committees consisting of ‘German, Italian, and other’ prisoners of war.35 The national character of the propaganda of the NKFD had been pushed through from the Soviet side. Phrases such as ‘imperialist robber policy’ and ‘Prussian militarism’ preferred by the German communists had to be abandoned in favour of a more neutral tone. The German émigrés had proposed to use the black-red-gold flag of German liberalism, but this was replaced on Russian orders by the red-white-black Prussian flag (and the flag of Wilhelmine Germany), in order to avoid unfavourable comparisons with the hated Weimar republic.36 Heike Bungert has made an inventory of the motives for the creation of the NKFD. According to East German historians, it was part of a consistent strategy that led directly to the establishment of the GDR. Some western historians consider propaganda and re-education of prisoners of war to have been the main aims. According to another point of view, Stalin set up the NKFD as a negotiating chip. As a potential government of Germany, it formed a warning to the Americans and British to hurry up with the 33 36

Bungert, Nationalkomitee. Bungert, Nationalkomitee, –.

34

Dimitrov, Dnevnik, .

35

Ibid. .

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forming of a second front in Europe, and the programme a basis for negotiating a separate peace with Germany. Most historians do not consider that the NKFD was intended as a future German government, but it was at the very least seen as a basis for recruitment.37 Adequate documentary evidence is lacking, so most of this remains speculation. Quite likely, the NKFD was brought into existence for several of the above-mentioned reasons. Another possible motive, unmentioned so far, but which becomes obvious when considering the Comintern’s policy of national propaganda, is that the NKFD was in part intended as a propaganda tool to extend beyond the front and into Germany: its existence showed that patriots could be found fighting against Hitler. The same could be said of other national committees. Thus, it reinforced the national line of the communist parties, and ultimately aided the Soviet war effort. The establishment of a similar Hungarian committee failed. The Hungarian communist émigrés had already started a movement for the establishment of a Hungarian National Committee for Prisoners of War at the end of April . In July  the captured Hungarian generals Stomm and Deseő agreed in principle to its creation. While radical proposals were left out of its programme, some social and economic demands were included, and by the beginning of August, a thirty-eight-member founding committee had been established. Problems arose, however, regarding its opening declaration. The two generals were only prepared to speak out against Hitler, but refused to attack Horthy. A declaration in this sense was drawn up with the aid of Zoltán Vas, and approved by Rákosi. A debate then broke out among the Hungarian émigrés, with Gerő and Farkas insisting on including an attack on Horthy in the declaration. The matter had to be decided from the Soviet side. Rákosi explained to Manuilski that Horthy could still be turned against Hitler. Manuilski, however, adopted Gerő’s position. To most officers and enlisted men, the proposal was unacceptable, and the plans for the committee were shelved. Its official founding on St Stephen’s day ( August)  was cancelled.38 The intransigence of the Hungarian generals was later considered to be the reason for the failure to create a national Hungarian brigade, the Magyar Légió, that would fight alongside the Red Army against the Germans, similar to other token national armies fighting on the Soviet side, with suitably patriotic names such as the Romanian Tudor 37 38

See for this overview ibid. –. Korom, ‘Magyar kommunista emigráció’, –.

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Vladimirescu brigade. But, as Mihály Korom points out, in truth it was blocked because it was not desired by the Soviet Union. The national legions of other nations, such as the Czechs, were led by officers of no higher rank than captain, so the participation of the generals was not absolutely necessary, and some lower-ranking officers could be found among the Hungarians as well. Rákosi himself had repeatedly insisted on the creation of a Hungarian legion, but such requests were met with silence.39 Zoltán Vas later poured out his frustrations in his memoirs. According to Vas, the Hungarian party leadership had ‘pleaded in vain’ for the creation of a Hungarian division, but had been ‘betrayed’ by Stalin. The Czechoslovak government-in-exile had protested against a Hungarian legion, and Stalin had heeded its wishes. In addition, Stalin had allegedly made a secret agreement with the Romanian leadership to respect their territorial demands at the expense of the Hungarian ones. For these reasons, according to Vas, the formation of Hungarian armed forces in the Soviet Union was stopped.40 From the moment Germany invaded the Soviet Union, the tactics and propaganda of the Comintern changed. Rather than protest against the war, the sections of the Comintern were now expected to sabotage the German war effort, and proclaim a struggle for national independence. Socialist revolution was to be abandoned, and the parties now had to forge alliances with other parties and social strata in national front movements. Paradoxically, this policy of national liberation was not initiated by the national parties, but originated in the Soviet Union and was orchestrated internationally. It was Stalin himself who had ordered the change, and Dimitrov ensured the Comintern adopted it. The central executive body of the Comintern then informed the individual national sections about the new policy. The émigré members of the national communist parties were employed in the implementation of the national propaganda among prisoners of war and in the radio stations, and there could exercise a small degree of independence and initiative. Yet on the whole, this work was supervised by the Comintern, which in turn had to answer to relevant Soviet bodies, such as Narkomindel, the Central Committee of the Soviet Union and GLAVPURKKA. The exact nature of Soviet intervention varied: in the Szántó affair, they had disposed of a too ‘nationally’ minded editor, but in the case of the NKFD they had pushed for a more national propaganda against a reluctant German party leadership. There was not 39

Korom, ‘Magyar kommunista emigráció’, .

40

Vas, Betiltott könyvem, , .

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necessarily a blueprint for what was correct ‘national’ propaganda, but the Soviet word was in any case final. Nationalism was used as a tool against foreign enemies, but the accusation of being a nationalist could also be used against internal enemies. The fate of the Hungarian Legion illustrates the problems inherent in a national policy that was international in character and ultimately Soviet controlled: it was impossible to satisfy all national demands without causing conflicts between national communist parties.      The logical consequence of the national policy was the dissolution of the Comintern, formally proposed by ECCI on  May and carried out on  June . According to Milovan Djilas, the dissolution of the Comintern was already on the agenda in . It had become clear that the Soviet Union was the main centre of Communism, and now all forces had to rally around it. It was only postponed as it would seem too much like a concession to the Germans.41 In , the Communist Party of the USA had withdrawn from the Comintern, when under the Vhooris Act it became obliged to offer information about its finances and activities. To Stalin, this did not matter. After a concert at the Bolshoi Theatre on  April , he toasted Dimitrov and argued in favour of nominally independent communist parties: ‘the communist parties should be made into completely independent parties rather than sections of the CI. They must become national communist parties under various names—Workers’ Party, Marxist Party, and so on. The name is not important. What is important, is that they take root among their own people and concentrate on their own specific tasks.’ Stalin did not actually desire to relinquish Soviet control, and made clear dissolution was a tactical measure: ‘When the communist parties have been strengthened in this way, then you can re-establish their international organizations.’42 The move nevertheless came suddenly. On  May , Molotov summoned Dimitrov and Manuilski, who agreed to draft a resolution on dissolving the Comintern. This was sent to Stalin on the eleventh. On the fourteenth, Stalin proposed the ECCI Presidium would submit the draft to the sections, and publish it after their consent. However, he quickly 41

Djilas, Gesprekken met Stalin, .

42

Dimitrov, Tagebücher, .

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changed his mind. On the next day he pushed for immediate publication of the resolution. The timing coincided with the visit of American emissary Joseph Davies. Most western historians believe that Davies came to seek the dissolution of the Comintern, and his visit is cited as evidence that the Comintern was dissolved by Stalin mainly to appease his British and American allies.43 Yet in reality, Davies was instructed to discuss one issue only: scheduling a meeting between Roosevelt and Stalin. There is no evidence that Davies requested Comintern dissolution himself.44 The strengthening of the Allied camp did play a role. In an interview with Reuters on  May , Stalin declared the dissolution would ‘facilitate the work of patriots of all countries for uniting all freedom loving peoples into a single international camp’ against ‘Hitlerism’. Mainly, Stalin hoped for a further strengthening of the ‘United Front of the Allies’.45 But while it may explain the timing, Stalin’s rushed intervention is not adequate to explain the motive. The official reason for dissolution given in the resolution of the Presidium of the ECCI was that the Comintern had outlived its purpose as a revolutionary centre, a phrase that Stalin had insisted on including in the text.46 Using an argument that Molotov had given to Dimitrov and Manuilski,47 the ECCI Presidium explained that the main reason for the dissolution of the Comintern was the differences in national development: ‘The deep differences in the historic paths of development of various countries, the differences in their character and even contradictions in their social orders, the differences in the level and tempo in their economic and political development, the differences, finally, in the degree of consciousness and organisations of the workers conditioned the different problems facing the working class of the various countries.’48 The war had further sharpened these differences, which meant the Comintern had become superfluous as an organization. In fact, the central direction of the international communist movement did not come to an end. The ECCI resolution reminded its supporters that ‘the founders of Marxism-Leninism, communists, have never been supporters of the conservation of organizational forms that have outlived themselves’, and referred to Marx’s abandoning of the First

43 44 45 47

McDermott and Agnew, Comintern, –. Dallin and Firsov (eds.), Dimitrov and Stalin, . 46 Dimitrov, Dnevnik, . Degras, Communist International, –. 48 Degras, Communist International, –. Ibid. .

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International.49 What occurred was a change in form. In a meeting on  May, the Presidium discussed organizational issues arising from dissolution: what to do with the national radio stations, the press agency SUPRESS, the archive and library, how to organize relations with national communist parties, and what to do with the Comintern staff. Most proposals were forwarded to the Central Committee of the VKP(b). On the evening of  June, Dimitrov and Manuilski met in the Kremlin with Molotov, Voroshilov, Scherbakov, Mikoyan, and Beria, where the decision was announced to create a Department of International Information at the Central Committee of the VKP(b). Formally, it would be led by Scherbakov, with Dimitrov and Manuilski as deputies. In reality Dimitrov would be its true head, a masquerade intended to prevent opponents from claiming that the Comintern was continuing in another form.50 Which, in fact, it did. A newly created committee for the formal disbanding of the Comintern recommended what to do with the various departments. The national radio stations were now organized under a consciously vaguely named ‘Institute ’. Out of the  staff members of Institute ,  had previously worked at the Press and Broadcasting Department of ECCI. Leading émigré communists formed the political leadership of the national radio broadcasts and gave political instructions. Broadcasts were, however, checked by the Soviet management of Institute , for which purpose Hungarian, Romanian, and other texts were translated into German.51 The ECCI Committee for Work with Prisoners of War was renamed Institute , under which name it continued to direct the activities of the Nationalkomitee Freies Deutschland. But for the fact that it was hidden, the new structure was a more accurate reflection of the real distribution of power. The old Comintern departments were now also formally answerable directly to the Central Committee of the VKP(b). The Comintern was dissolved, but the basic command structure remained. ‘In every important question I turned invariably to Dimitrov,’52 said Rákosi. The meetings took place less frequently and were informal and more intimate, but it was clear where the decisions were made. Even ideologically little changed in reality. As in the s and s, Internationalism continued to be defined as loyalty to the Soviet cause and the USSR. As Marti put it, ‘Several comrades are disturbed that the dissolution of the Comintern will lower the sense of internationalism. This is a groundless fear. The international authority of 49 51

Ibid. Ibid. .

50

Adibekov, ‘Formal’novo rospuska’, . 52 Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, i. .

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the USSR is enormous. The battles and victories of the Red Army—that is the authentic basis of this internationalism.’ Romanian party leader Anna Pauker used the same argument.53 As the Soviet Union remained firmly in control of the foreign communist parties, concerns about national differences in development did not weigh heavily among the motives for dissolution. The appearance of national independence, however, did. In his Reuters interview, Stalin said about the dissolution: It exposes the lie of the Hitlerites to the effect that ‘Moscow’ allegedly intends to intervene in the life of other nations and to ‘Bolshevise’ them. An end is now being put to this lie . . . it exposes the calumny of the adversaries of Communism within the Labour Movement to the effect that Communist Parties in various countries are allegedly acting not in the interests of their people but on orders from outside. An end is being put to this calumny too.54

This argument was echoed in the deliberations of the Presidium of the ECCI. At the meeting on  May, Vlasov stated that the dissolution of the Comintern ‘facilitates the position of the Yugoslav insurgents, who now have a response to those who say they are “agents of Moscow” ’.55 It was repeated at length in a letter from the German party leaders to Dimitrov sent on  May: ‘In no other country of the world has the lie of communists as “agents of Moscow” been utilized to unleash bloody terror against the vanguard of the workers’ movement, for ideological fooling of wide strata of the working population, so shamelessly as in Hitlerite Germany . . . The dissolution of the Comintern removes the basis of this dark manoeuvre, exposes the lie of the Hitlerite Fascists that “Moscow” wants to meddle in the internal affairs of other states and “Bolshevize” them.’56 This particular complaint ran for almost three pages, and was reiterated in the final statement made by the Presidium of the ECCI.57 This was a rather defensive rationale, but it backed up a more positive line of reasoning: the disbanding of the Comintern supported the national credentials of the parties, transformation of illegal parties into mass parties, and the formation of national front movements. The post-war perspective was already being kept in mind. According to Stalin, dissolution ‘facilitates the work of patriots of all countries for uniting the progressive Nairinski and Lebedeva (eds.), Komintern, –. Degras, ‘Communist International,’ –. 55 Nairinski and Lebedeva (eds.), Komintern, –. 57 Degras, Communist International, –. 53 54

56

Ibid. –.

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forces of their respective countries, regardless of party or religious faith, into a single camp of national liberation—for unfolding the struggle against Fascism’.58 Thorez voiced similar sentiments. In France, a foundation had already been established for a broad ‘National Front’. ‘This movement is wider than the organizational framework of the Communist International . . . As a French communist, I salute this step, because it will assist the broadening of the national anti-Hitlerite front in France.’59 According to Sverma, of the Czech party, dissolution ‘establishes in Czechoslovakia the foundation for a united [single] mass party, where communists can have decisive influence.’60 These opinions were expressed in the ECCI resolution of  May. This stressed the need for armed struggle and wars of national liberation against Germany. The ‘general national upsurge and mobilization of the people’ against the enemy could best be achieved by the national working-class movement ‘working within the framework of its own countries’.61 The Spanish Central Committee welcomed dissolution, as it would ‘still further reinforce the national character of the Spanish Communist Party and facilitate the unification of all Spanish patriots.’62 But why this was the case, why dissolving the Comintern would make establishing national front movements easier, was not made explicitly clear. Usually an oblique reference was made to organizational issues. According to the Hungarian resolution, membership of the Comintern formed an obstacle for potential allies.63 It was the expected liberation from the charge of being agents of Moscow that lay at the basis of this hope. Stalin pointed this out in a meeting of the Politburo, when discussing the resolution of the ECCI Presidium on dissolution: ‘the communist parties that are members of the CI have been libellously accused of being agents of a foreign state, and this obstructs their work among the broad masses. With the dissolution of the CI, this trump card will be beaten out of the hands of the enemies. The undertaken measure will doubtlessly strengthen the communist parties as national worker parties’64 The German émigré leaders wrote this explicitly: ‘[dissolution] ends any kind of slander and pretext. It considerably facilitates the implementation of the very vital and urgent task of the German opponents of Hitler: creating a united movement of struggle of

58 60 63

59 Nairinski and Lebedeva (eds.), Komintern, –. Ibid. . 61 Degras, Communist International, –. 62 Ibid. –. Ibid. 64 Dimitrov, Tagebücher, . Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, i. .

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German workers and all other honest Germans who come forward against Hitler and the continuation of his criminal war!’65 Accommodation to the Soviet Union’s wartime allies certainly played a part in the disbanding of the Comintern. But this was not an overriding concern. Stalin had earlier not been willing to please Hitler with its dissolution. As far as can be discerned from Dimitrov’s diary and recently published Comintern documents, concern for the Allies did not play a large part in discussions, whether in the Comintern or elsewhere. When the Comintern’s ‘national line’ is taken as a background, the dissolution becomes easier to explain. One of the main arguments for dissolving the Comintern was to remove the onus of being ‘agents of Moscow’ from the communist parties in belligerent countries, in order to strengthen their national credentials and ease their participation in national front movements. As the Comintern was only dissolved in form, this was not done primarily to aid the national communist parties, but mainly for Soviet raison d’état. It supported the war effort against Germany. In Allied countries, the communists supported the war governments; in Axis and occupied countries, they aligned with the rest of the resistance against the Nazis. In states allied to the Axis, they joined national front movements against the Germans. All this was completely in line with Comintern policy as laid down almost two years earlier. While the war effort was the most important, the post-war situation was already being taken into account, although thought on this subject was not very detailed yet. Rákosi, for instance, considered that the motive for dissolving the Comintern, the differences in development in countries, was not provisional, but would also remain topical after the war, and was worried that complete dissolution would block the reunification of the international working movement in some form or other after the war. Dimitrov soothed his fears: it was hardly likely that the need for a centralizing organization such as the Comintern would arise. If it turned out to be necessary, one would be created that took the separate conditions into account.66 The exchange between Rákosi and Dimitrov shows that ‘national line’ was also considered as the main post-war policy.

65

Nairinski and Lebedeva (eds.), Komintern, –.

66

Ibid. –.

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     While Radio Kossuth proclaimed opposition to the Germans in the cause of national independence, the actual introduction of this policy in Hungary itself had to be arranged by the local organization of the KMP, headed by the illegal Central Committee. The party in Hungary had to implement the new line by forging alliances and disseminating national propaganda. It also had to popularize the national line among the existing party cadres. Both these tasks proved too daunting for the KMP in the early years of the war. The party was too small and had too radical a past to be unconditionally accepted as an ally by former opponents such as the Smallholder Party and the Social Democrats. Moreover, the communists had to operate under increasingly difficult circumstances of illegality, which crippled their possibilities for action. Finally, the party was virtually cut off from Moscow, almost solely reliant on Radio Kossuth for news on the correct line. This made it difficult for the leadership to interpret what was desired by the Comintern, and even more problematic to convince the sceptical party cadres to unite around the national banner. The bombardment of Kassa (Kosice) by unknown aircraft on  June  was used as a pretext by the Bárdossy government to join Hitler on  June in his invasion of the Soviet Union. The Central Committee of the KMP met the next day, and demanded a separate peace. In September , it issued a circular to the other political parties, calling for a struggle against Germany, the common enemy, for the realization of ‘common national goals’.67 Despite the infrequent contact with Moscow, the party in Hungary followed the line promulgated on Inoradio, and later Radio Kossuth, and pursued a ‘national line’ and a national front policy. On the commemoration of the execution of the Martyrs of Arad,  October, a demonstration of several hundred workers was held at the statue of Count Batthyány. This was followed by another demonstration at the graves of Kossuth and Táncsics on  November.68 Attempts were made to cooperate not only with the Social Democrats, but also with other political groups. The Christmas issue of the Social Democrat party paper Népszava contained articles celebrating St Stephen, Petőfi, and the thousand-year constitution of Hungary.69 Among the contributors were the social democrat Árpád 67 69

68 Kovrig, Communism in Hungary, . Ibid. Pölöskei and Gergely, Magyar történelem, .

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Szakasits, the communists Gyula Kállai and Aladár Mód, the Smallholder Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, and the conservative historian Gyula Szekf ű. Szekfű also became president of the Hungarian Historical Memorial Committee (Magyar Történelmi Emlékbizottság), established in February  with the ostensible goal of preparing for the  March celebrations. When its real function as a united front organization under communist control became clear, it was abandoned again by Szekfű and other noncommunist participants. The Committee organized a demonstration on  March. Again only several hundred demonstrators took part, who were quickly dispersed by the police. This was followed in April by a crackdown on the party and a wave of arrests. János Kádár later estimated that around  members had been arrested or had abandoned the party: ‘At the end of August , the party had  members left, including the members of the secretariat.’70 This practically paralysed the KMP. A call from Radio Kossuth on  December  for the creation of the Hungarian National Independence Front was not followed by the Central Committee until April , when it came with a programme of its own. Moscow sent emissaries, but they could not all complete their missions. Zoltán Schönherz for instance was captured, and executed on  October . The Moscow leadership therefore mainly relied on Radio Kossuth and the discipline of their ‘home’ comrades. While this could be expected among the members of the Central Committee, many older party members refused to join the calls for national liberation, and instead insisted on the demand for a dictatorship of the proletariat. A large left-wing faction led by Pál Demény operated independently of the Central Committee. Some of this seeped through to Moscow, probably through interviews with prisoners of war. When the Comintern was dissolved, Rákosi requested the inclusion of ‘proletarian solidarity’ among the motives for disbanding the Comintern ‘in order to create clarity for our people in the country’.71 Lack of communication also led to the overenthusiastic interpretation of Moscow’s word. After the dissolution of the Comintern, the Hungarian leadership decided to dissolve the KMP itself as well, and re-establish it as the Peace Party. In the early s, János Kádár attempted to blame fellow Central Committee member Ferenc Donáth, who had told Kádár that the peasants ‘feared’ and ‘did not even like’ the communist party due to their ‘reactionary upbringing’. Donáth’s contacts among the peasantry 70

MOL ./, –.

71

Nairinski and Lebedeva (eds.), Komintern, –.

Agents of Moscow



had told him that ‘if the same pamphlets were published not by the Communist Party, but by someone else, it would be a lot easier to distribute them, and the peasants themselves would pass them hand to hand.’72 Kádár’s accusation may have been false, but the argument he put into Donáth’s mouth was almost certainly used. The MKP was experiencing increasing difficulties in establishing alliances, whether with other parties or other social groups. Gyula Kállai later stated that one of the main motives for disbanding the KMP was the belief that it would ease the establishment of national unity between the opposition parties.73 The Central Committee also believed the formal liquidation would ease the pressure from the authorities on the communists. But according to László Reti, the key reason was the lack of contact between Moscow and Budapest. The local leadership simply had not understood the line properly. After the dissolution of the Comintern, they thought this meant the national party had to be disbanded as well.74 The news did not reach Moscow until almost a year later. The Hungarian communists in Moscow refused to believe the news when they first heard it from prisoners of war. Only when two party members, Ferenc Hont and András Tömpe, were taken prisoner was the news accepted as true—in May . Even then many communists remained uninformed. Even in the summer of  Farkas wrote in a letter: ‘As you probably already know our party’s central committee disbanded the Communist Party after the dissolution of the Comintern. From Hont’s account it turned out that our party now works as the Peace Party.’75 Dimitrov could not understand how a party could simply dissolve itself, demanded to see the Radio Kossuth broadcasts to ascertain whether the order had been given by the ‘Moscow’ communists, and then turned wrathfully on Rákosi: ‘Dimitrov did not easily lose his temper, and he usually picked his words carefully, but in this issue he let his anger flow freely, and I also had to share in his disfavour when he cursed “your Hungarian comrades”.’76 * * * By the time the war was drawing to a close, the Hungarian Communist Party had failed to establish a national front policy. Disconnected from their ‘Muscovite’ leadership, the ‘home’ party leaders had to rely on their 72 74 76

73 MOL ./, –. MOL ./, –. Ibid. 75 PIL //, –. Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, i. .



Agents of Moscow

instincts the best they could to interpret the correct line, and failed spectacularly when they established the Peace Party. But even though the move was not appreciated in Moscow, the reasoning behind dissolving the KMP and creating the Peace Party was wholly in tune with the tactical logic of the national front, demonstrating that the ‘home’ party leaders had been listening to Radio Kossuth and attempting to implement the ‘national line’ as they thought best. Even so, the Peace Party ploy had been in vain. The party failed to become a leading force in a broad national front, and did not succeed in playing a dominant role in national politics. This would only change with the liberation of Hungary from the Germans by the Red Army, with Moscow-trained propagandists following in its wake. Again it would be the Soviet party that stimulated the ‘national line’, with the Hungarian communists trotting behind. But simultaneously, the connection to the Soviet Union proved an almost insurmountable impediment to a patriotic image.



The Policy of National Unity and the Soviet Factor (Autumn –Spring ) In the autumn of , Germany’s Eastern European allies collapsed one after the other. In Romania, King Michael deposed Marshal Antonescu and declared war on Germany on  August, the Red Army occupied Bulgaria on  September, and Finland signed a ceasefire with the Soviet Union on  September. The wartime national front policy could now be put into practice. In Bulgaria, a coup d’état supported by the Red Army put the communist-dominated ‘Fatherland Front’ into power, and in Romania communists took part in the new Provisional Government and formed the ‘National Democratic Front’ in October .1 The situation in all three countries was different: in Bulgaria, the communist party was strong, immediately in control, and commenced with large-scale arrests of political opponents. In Romania, the party was weaker but fomented popular unrest to put the Radescu government under pressure. In Finland, the party was weak and without influence. What they did have in common were the continued appeals to national unity and the nation. The Hungarian Communist Party was not able to go as far as its colleagues in neighbouring countries. In agreements with its wartime allies, the USSR did not push for influence in Hungary. Churchill visited Stalin in Moscow in September , where they carved out spheres of influence in Eastern Europe in the infamous ‘percentage deal’, allocating  per cent influence for the Soviet Union in Greece,  per cent in Romania,  per cent in Bulgaria, and  per cent in Yugoslavia and Hungary. Unlike Poland, control over Hungary was not seen as a major prerequisite to Soviet security, so pushing too hard in Hungary would only alienate the Allies without serving any purpose. Furthermore, a more moderate approach in Hungary could serve to gloss over growing Soviet interference in other countries occupied by the Red Army. According to Charles 1

King, Romanian Communist Party, .



The Policy of National Unity

Gati, Stalin had told the Hungarian party leadership they would have to wait at least ten to fifteen years for the establishment of Socialism in Hungary, in order to divert attention from the rapid Sovietization of Poland.2 The Moscow party leadership was left with no choice but to prepare for a long stand in the wings. József Révai wrote an extremely cautious draft party programme, which went little beyond demanding the destruction of the Horthy regime and the introduction of limited social and economic reforms. Before a committee meeting of émigré Hungarian activists on  September , Révai used the position of the Soviet Union as a justification for caution, reminding them that the Anglo-American–Soviet alliance had to be taken into account, and somewhat vaguely suggested that ‘certain options had to be left open’.3 Rezs ő Szántó made success of the gradual approach dependent on the international situation: if ‘England, America renounce intervention in the affairs of European countries, if there is no external pressure, then the peaceful development towards Socialism is feasible. Red Terror is not by all means necessary.’ As the main argument, however, Révai presented the unfavourable domestic situation in Hungary, where he considered the ‘internal forces’ to be ‘a lot weaker’ than in Bulgaria.4 At a second meeting on  October, Gerő further explained the necessity of caution. Compared to , the party had to start from a disadvantaged position, and was forced to move forward ‘on a wider front.’ In , military defeat had left the reactionaries isolated, and ‘democracy’ had fallen into the people’s lap. Such an occurrence could not now be counted on, as the ruling classes had learnt from the past and their main ambition was to preserve parts of their system for the future. Other ceasefire agreements (with Romania and Finland) had shown that ‘democracy’ did not occur automatically.5 While underlining the need for carefulness, the party leadership reassured the committee that the pursuit of a Socialist Hungary would not be abandoned, and that the need for a gradual approach was mainly tactical. Révai acknowledged the party would not ‘go as far with arrests’ as in Bulgaria, but implied that more was to come and that even a few detentions would have wider resonance: ‘This does not yet mean the elimination of the class of big landowners. It only Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc, . PIL /, –. These are notes of three Moscow programme meetings held in September and October , another copy of which can be found in PIL ./. The latter have been published in Hungarian (Korom, ‘Magyar kommunista emigráció’). The versions differ slightly. 4 5 PIL /, –. Ibid. 2 3




strikes against the treasonous part of the ruling class, but of course it will scare the entire class [my emphasis].’ On  September, Gerő told the assembled émigrés that a gradual approach did not mean the end of the march to Socialism. Gerő summarized the thoughts of some communists: ‘with the end of the Horthy system, the other parties will be democratic, there will be temporary cooperation, end to the class struggle. That is a dangerous position. Class struggle will continue in a different form.’ The removal of ‘Horthy and several thousand people’ would not be enough; the radical cleansing of society was necessary.6 Révai tried to assure his comrades that his programme was more radical than it actually looked: ‘In the event of the realisation of our Action Programme, it would not be far removed from what a democratic revolution would establish, but it is not the programme of a democratic revolution, it leads there.’ Rezs ő Szántó came to the conclusion that the democratic state was a step towards Socialism, as it destroyed feudalism and the rule of monopoly capital, for which cooperation with certain segments of the bourgeoisie was possible.7 The party leaders did not specify when the communist party would be able to gain power in Hungary and when Socialism would be introduced. While there is no documentary evidence to show that Stalin at this stage planned to honour his promise to the Hungarian communists to establish communism in Hungary, Stalin did exhort the Hungarians to push at open doors wherever possible and exploit opportunities whenever available. When referring to the purge of the administration, he suggested to Gerő: ‘Do not be sparing with words, there is no need to work up a scare. But when you get stronger, full steam ahead.’8 The key to the gradual strategy was the continuation of the Comintern’s national line. In order to be acceptable, the communist party had to be presented as a national one. The national front policy took shape as the war drew to a close. In occupied Poland, Gomulka founded the National Council of the Homeland,9 paralleled by the creation of the Union of Polish Patriots (ZPP) and the Polish National Committee (PKN) in the Soviet Union in .10 Typically, the name of the ZPP had been suggested by Stalin.11 But as the war went on, it was hard to predict how 7 Ibid. 8 Pünkösti, A hatalomért, . Ibid. 10 Ibid. . Bogacki, Polish Paradox, . 11 According to Wanda Wakilewska. See Kersten, Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, . 6 9




the national propaganda of the communist parties would be accepted after liberation. The Hungarian communists’ first confrontation with practice was the propaganda at the front. Throughout the war, special propaganda units had operated along the front lines, with the duty to entice enemy soldiers to defect. The work was considered important: in one month alone, the Fourth Ukrainian Front bombarded the Hungarian Army with thirty-five different pamphlets in  million copies.12 This, often dangerous, work was carried out with the aid of foreign communists, who shouted messages through loudspeakers or were attached as advisers to local units of the Seventh Department of the Political Administration of the Red Army (GLAVPURKKA), which took care of propaganda. The direct contact with the prisoners of war, and, as the war progressed, the population, underlined the usefulness of the Comintern’s propaganda for the national independence struggle. Ernő Gerő supervised propaganda work at the Seventh Department, and while he had previously attacked Zoltán Szántó for anti-Soviet behaviour, he now argued in favour of a national image. As chief goals of propaganda, he presented to Rákosi: ‘To smash the antibolshevik agitation, defeat the fear of Russian captivity, appeal to Hungarian patriotic feelings and Hungarian interests’.13 Mihály Farkas, who worked as Gerő’s lieutenant, became responsible for propaganda after Gerő’s departure from the front in July . Like Gerő, Farkas quickly came to the conclusion that national propaganda was essential: ‘Briefly and to the point: we should manage our propaganda in red, white, and green . . . We have to explain to the Hungarian army here that the freedom struggle of the Hungarian people will fail, if we do not create the fighting unity between army and nation against German oppression. We should explain to the Hungarian army fighting here, that they will only then be fighting for the Hungarian cause, if they fight under the banner of the Hungarian National Independence Front.’ 14         After years of national propaganda on Radio Kossuth, among prisoners of war, and the experience of propaganda at the front, there were no doubts among the Muscovite party leadership about the post-war presentation of 12 14

Puskás, ‘Háborús propaganda’, –. PIL ./, –.

13

PIL ./, –.




the party. The party’s first political programme was consciously national in outlook. Révai presented the first chapter of his draft Action Programme on  September , and explained it would be ‘national in its starting point’.15 The national character of this first chapter was chiefly expressed in its attack against Horthy, the Germans, and their Hungarian collaborators. The proposal called for the deposition of Horthy, the dissolution of Parliament, the removal of all officials who were ‘the support of the Horthy system’s anti-people and anti-nation war policy’, and the establishment of ‘National Committees’ to take control in their place. ‘Reactionary and Fascist elements’ were to be purged from army and police, the hated gendarmerie (csendőrség) dissolved completely and replaced by a national guard. The draft chapter announced a similar cleansing of the judiciary, the establishment of special courts ‘for the sentencing of traitors and war criminals’, the dissolution of the Arrow Cross and the Volksbund as ‘Fascist treasonous organizations in German pay’, and the disenfranchisement of their members. Furthermore, the draft programme demanded the elimination of the ‘Fascist and anti-popular spirit’ from education and school books, which would be transformed in keeping with a ‘progressive, democratic, national spirit’. Apart from these national, anti-German points, the proposal contained more general democratic demands, such as free and secret elections, freedom of the press, the right of assembly, and the freedom of religion.16 Whether domestic weakness or the ‘Polish trade-off’ clinched the strategy of the Hungarian Communist Party, the final decisions were not made in these Moscow discussions among Hungarian communists. Responsible instead were Soviet politicians, Dimitrov and, ultimately, Stalin. The Moscow émigrés had been presented with a pre-constructed line and, for the most part, followed it, their influence being limited to fleshing out the proposals. Once the entire programme was completed, it was submitted for approval to Dimitrov, who considered the initial Hungarian effort ‘unrealistic’, and made Révai rewrite his proposal.17 Most likely, Dimitrov had found fault with the draft programme’s attack on Horthy, as at the time Molotov was negotiating with emissaries from Horthy on a ceasefire, a fact which was kept concealed from the Muscovite party leadership.18 New versions of the programme contained no further assaults on Horthy’s regency, which not only illustrates the subservience of the Hungarian Communist Party to Soviet interests, but also that Stalin and Molotov 15 18

16 17 PIL /, –. PIL ./, –. Dimitrov, Dnevnik, . Korom, Magyarország ideiglenes nemzeti kormánya, .




were even more cautious and ‘nationally’ minded than the Hungarian communists. By the middle of October , the party had abandoned the Peace Party strategy and reconstituted itself. As part of the national policy, the party dropped its old internationalist name, Communists’ Hungarian Party (Kommunisták Magyarországi Pártja—KMP), in favour of the more national-sounding Hungarian Communist Party, (Magyar Kommunista Párt—MKP). After having forwarded it to Stalin and Molotov, Dimitrov finally approved the Action Programme of the MKP at the end of October.19 As Révai had indicated, the nation took centre stage in the final version, and its introduction was voiced in great national pathos. The programme commenced by describing the current situation as ‘the worst in the history of the country’. Horthy’s attempts to extricate Hungary from the war failed when he was interned in Germany by Hitler, and the Germans put a government under Arrow Cross leader Ferenc Szálasi into the saddle on  October , which promptly initiated a reign of terror against political opponents and Jews. Révai used the coup to create a new stab in the back legend, this time in favour of the communists: just as the nation had been preparing to shake off the Germans, it had been stabbed in the back by the Arrow Cross. The situation had not been so deplorable since the Battle of Mohács in , when the Turks occupied most of Hungary, but the communists believed in the rebirth of the country, called for the ‘fighting unity of all patriots’ and the ‘democratic reconstruction and uprising of Hungary,’ and urged all Hungarians to join the Hungarian National Independence Front (Magyar Nemzeti Függetlenségi Front—MNFF), in order to realize the slogan ‘Hungary has not been, but shall be!’ The programme was divided into six chapters, which contained a mixture of national and social demands, still mainly focusing on the war. Hungary had to abandon Germany and ‘aid in the destruction of German barbarism’. The MKP promised to lock up traitors and war criminals, confiscate their property and hand them over to People’s Courts, dissolve Fascist organizations, and purge members of the Arrow Cross, traitors, and ‘other anti-popular’ elements from the government, judiciary, and army. The party repeated the demand for the establishment of National Committees containing representatives of democratic parties and ‘tested anti-Hitler patriots’. Besides including national demands and phrases, the 19

Korom, Magyarország ideiglenes nemzeti kormánya, .




programme also put forward generally acceptable social and democratic claims, such as a three-year plan for reconstruction, land reform, an eighthour working day, freedom of the press, freedom of religion, and free and secret elections. By way of conclusion the party appealed to ‘all patriots’ to support this ‘programme of national unity’ (nemzeti összefogás): ‘We call the nation to battle for the realization of this programme!’20 Gerő, Farkas, and Imre Nagy arrived in Szeged at the beginning of November, where Gerő presented the national line for the first time on Hungarian soil at a mass meeting celebrating the October Revolution. Issuing the slogan ‘there will be a Hungarian rebirth!’, Gerő called for the gathering of all national and progressive forces, and emphatically stated that the MKP did not desire the monopoly of power: alone it could not fulfil the national goals; the wider the national unity was in the country, the quicker the country would be back on its feet.21 The MKP first published its programme in the Néplap on  November. The national and moderate tone was clearly the right one: it was accepted with minor alterations by representatives of the Smallholder Party (FKGP), Social Democratic Party (SzDP), National Peasant Party (NPP), and Civic Democratic Party (PDP) as the programme of the Hungarian National Independence Front (MNFF) on  December. The gradual, national route of the MKP had become the programme for Hungarian reconstruction. The extent of Soviet control over not only the MKP but the rest of Hungary’s political life becomes apparent with the establishment of the Provisional Government, whose composition and statements reflected Stalin’s overall caution in regard to Hungary. From the outset, the government could only operate with the consent of the Soviet Union. Molotov made it clear to the Hungarian negotiators Faragho and SzentIványi that, as long as a state of war existed in Hungary, the Provisional Government would work under the direction of the Red Army. Moreover, the composition of the government had to be agreed on in advance, ‘so that the government can implement our intentions’.22 The Soviets were determined to create the government that suited their purpose, and rejected proposals that excluded émigré communists,23 but, at the same time, wanted government composition to reflect the national front strategy, which meant the MKP must not be seen to dominate. The strategy was implemented exceedingly carefully. Three Horthy generals, Béla Dálnoki Miklós, János Vörös, and Gábor Faragho, took up positions as Prime 20 21 23

PIL ./, –. Korom, Magyarország ideiglenes nemzeti kormánya, . Vida, ‘Orosz levéltári források’, .

22

Ibid. –.




Minister, Minister of Defence, and Minister for Public Supply. Count Géza Teleki, son of Prime Minister Pál Teleki who had committed suicide because he had failed to halt Hungarian participation in the war, became Minister for Religion and Education. At a meeting with the Hungarian communist leaders, Stalin said he had even been prepared to accept Horthy as a regent, but the latter had ‘politically shot himself through the head’, had become ‘morally a corpse’ by accepting Szálasi as a Prime Minister and was now no longer acceptable.24 The Social Democrats supplied two ministers, as did the Smallholders. With only two communist ministers, with innocuous portfolios, Imre Nagy on Agriculture, and József Gábor as Minister for Trade and Transport, the cabinet seemed to reflect Soviet guarantees against the Bolshevization of Hungary. In reality, the communist party was already commencing the tug of war for power behind the scenes, as the government contained two more secret communists. The Smallholders and the generals would have objected to a communist as Minister of the Interior, so this post was given to National Peasant Party leader Ferenc Erdei. It was always known that he was a communist sympathizer, but new archival evidence shows Erdei requested of Ernő Gerő that he should be made a member of the MKP. Gerő assented: ‘Our decision is to admit him, but we will keep the affair secret.’25 Besides Erdei, the officially independent Erik Molnár, Minister for Public Welfare, was a secret member of the MKP.  : , ‘ ’,   While the origins of the national policy lay in the Soviet Union, the link with the USSR was also one of the greatest obstacles to the MKP’s national image. The Hungarian party leaders did not perceive it as problematic to introduce the national policy on the national holiday of a foreign state. In Hungary, however, it very soon became clear that the Comintern’s policy of national liberation had done little to weaken the perceived link with the Soviet Union and the general view of the MKP as agents of Moscow. The link was all the more a problem as in Hungary historical opposition to Russia was stronger than in many of its neighbours. While Hungarian nationalism had traditionally been aimed against Austrian rule and Germanification, the aid the Russian Tsar had given the 24

Korom, Magyarország ideiglenes nemzeti kormánya, .

25

PIL ./, –.




Habsburgs in suppressing the Hungarian revolution of  had not been forgotten.26 With Czechs, Romanians, and Poles, the mostly Catholic and Protestant Hungarians shared a suspicion of Orthodox Russia, and, like the Romanians, they were apprehensive of the Slav threat. In countries like Czechoslovakia and Bulgaria on the other hand, the concept of Slav brotherhood mitigated negative views of Russia. More important in perceptions were recent events. As Germany and Hungary had both been defeated by the Soviet Union, it was unlikely that its representatives at home would easily be considered patriots, certainly when considering the virulently anti-Bolshevik propaganda emitted by the wartime authorities. Romania and Bulgaria had also fought against Russia, but, unlike Hungary, had succeeded in changing sides at the end of the war. As part of the anti-German coalition they would be eligible for indemnities, which made the claim of Soviet friendship more plausible. The advance of the Red Army was greeted with great apprehension. ‘The fear of Bolshevization is great’, wrote Farkas from the front. ‘In our propaganda we state that the Red Army will not intervene in Hungarian internal affairs. This is simply not believed.’ This was especially the case while the Hungarian propagandists were doing their work as Red Army officers, serving the Seventh Department of GLAVPURKKA. As Farkas noted, ‘They would believe it more readily if the Hungarian patriotic organization explained to them the Independence Front programme.’ Appeals to national sentiments could not be done ‘in the name of the Red Army’. For this, an independent Hungarian organization was necessary.27 On its initial advance, the Red Army had no intention of allowing the Hungarian communists to operate independently. Upon reaching Lvov, the Seventh Department refused permission to print a Hungarianlanguage newspaper for the benefit of the inhabitants of liberated Hungary. The only permitted newspapers were the official Red Army Hungarian publications, Magyar Újság and Új Szó. In the immediate aftermath of the fighting, the Seventh Department administered the conquered territories as it saw fit, with little regard for the political line of the Hungarian Communist Party. Zoltán Vas travelled with the Red Army, and his distraught letters testify to both the scope of the problem and the difficulties this caused the Hungarians:

26 27

Bárány, ‘Aristocratic to Proletarian Nationalism’ –, . PIL ./, –.




And oh my God, a particular curse here is that damned Seventh Department, that completely self-contained body, that institution of empty time-wasting and stupid tripping-up, irresponsibility, terror, and everything bad that causes a thousand hassles. They are foolish, foolish, and again foolish! They have forbidden the red, white, and green flag. They are handing it over as a symbol to Fascism, to the Reaction, and I beg them, weeping, don’t do that, it’s madness. But they are as obstinate as petrified Buddhas.28

Obstruction by Red Army authorities of the activities of the MKP occurred frequently. In Békéscsaba, the Seventh Department had forbidden the publication of a Smallholder Party paper, permitting only communist newspapers to appear. In the village of Oroszháza, close to Szeged near the Yugoslav border, communist papers had been banned after the Seventh Department judged they contained political errors. This endangered the MKP’s new policy, and caused Vas to protest: ‘Of course there are larger or smaller errors in them, but if there is no Communist standpoint on the issue of broad national cooperation, what is the point in bringing it about?’ The Seventh Department showed little concern for the needs of the Hungarian communists or the subtleties of the national line. ‘It is disheartening,’ continued Vas. ‘And when one attempts to explain something, they say that’s not the line of the Red Army, but of the Hungarian Communists, the Comintern line. We should turn straight to Stalin, because only his word is capable of changing things.’29 While the Seventh Department obstructed the execution of the national line, the actions of the Red Army alienated the population even further. As areas were liberated from the Germans, Soviet military authorities put men between  and  to work, for days and sometimes weeks at a time, building and repairing roads, bridges, entrenchments, train stations, and airfields.30 Men picked up by the Red Army were sometimes never heard of again.31 Men of military age were often simply deported to prisoner of war camps, regardless of any military past.32 Certainly initially, no special regard was given to MKP members. ‘[T]he Communists have until today not re-surfaced. Life has been paralysed up till now. Whoever appears on the street, they drive off to work,’33 reported Vas from Szeged. In March , Rákosi informed Dimitrov that raids in the streets of Budapest had increased: ‘the result is that hundreds of comrades disappear in this 28 31 33

29 Ibid. PIL ./, –. MOL XIX-A--j-, XIX-A--J-. PIL ./, –.

30

Miklós Füzes, Modern rabszolgaság, . 32 PIL ./, .




manner.’34 Rákosi himself interceded on behalf of communists who suddenly found themselves in captivity.35 The disappearances and forced war labour deeply affected the population. The local party organization in Dorog described how the men returned home sick and exhausted. As they would be needed for work in the fields, it asked the Central Committee to aid in the speedy return of the villagers.36 It was damaging to the party, and local party leaders pointed out the propaganda value of returning their men in the hope their pleas would be successful.37 Rákosi complained how the disappearances affected the mood of the Budapest workers, and the Central Committee building in Budapest was ‘beleaguered by relatives on a daily basis’.38 The pidgin Russian phrase ‘malenkiy robot’ (translated as ‘a little work’) soon became a byword for being pulled off the street to an unknown destination.39 As a group, the German minority was singled out for ‘public work of reparation’ in the Soviet Union. On  December , the Soviet State Defence Committtee issued a decree on the internment and dispatch to the USSR of all Germans capable of labour in Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia. All men between the age of  and  and women between  and  were to be detained.40 These orders were carried out by local Red Army and NKVD commanders. Aided by the Hungarian authorities, Swabian men and women were deported to the Soviet Union for forced labour. Exact figures are unknown, but estimates approach ,, of whom  per cent never returned home.41 In January , Beria reported to Stalin and Molotov that , Germans had been interned in Hungary.42 The State Defence Committee decree, and subsequent decrees issued by local commanders, did not define who was considered German. In practice this led to anyone with a German-sounding name being in danger of arrest, including Jews returning from concentration camps, even if they spoke no German whatsoever. This was worsened by the quota system used: Gerő reported to Rákosi that many Hungarians were carted off to the Soviet Union merely to fulfil the quota of ‘Germans’.43 Vas reported to Gerő from the front: ‘New 35 36 PIL ./, –. PIL ./, . PIL .., . 38 PIL ./, . PIL ./, –. 39 Though usually used in Hungarian texts, malenkiy robot literally means ‘a little robot’. The correct translation of ‘a little work’ is malenkaya rabota. Besides being simply pidgin Russian, ‘malenkiy robot’ could also conceivably refer to the Hungarian word robot, the obligatory labour of peasants on the estate of the landlord. 40 Volokitina et al. (eds.), Sovetskiy faktor, –. 41 Füzes, Modern rabszolgaság, , . 42 43 Volokitina et al. (eds.), Sovietskiy faktor, . PIL ./, –. 34 37




problem! They are taking away the Germans, probably to the USSR! Let them take them! But they are taking German-speaking Hungarians as well! Completely fantastic excesses are occurring.’ 44 On the other hand, Germans with Hungarian names were being left alone. According to Vas ‘they are leaving out all kinds of Fascist, even Germans if they have Hungarian names.’45 The communist party card was no guarantee against deportation. ‘I could only barely drag out [from Soviet captivity] some really great new cadres,’ wrote Vas,46 who also reported how three people, among whom was one party member, had chosen suicide to elude the Russians.47 Rákosi complained to Dimitrov that ‘With the evacuation of Hungarian Swabians to the Soviet Union, many good comrades were in this manner deported as Germans, and could only occasionally be liberated. The various authorities have hundreds of names of such comrades.’48 Special identity cards had to be introduced for party workers so that ‘the Red Soldiers will not take them away’.49 In addition to forced labour, haphazard arrests, and deportations, the Russian advance was characterized by widespread looting, executions, murder, and rape. After the conquest of Budapest, Marshal Malinovski permitted his victorious soldiers three days of unpunished looting.50 Looting was comprehensive but not systematic, and absolutely anything was considered loot: especially food, clothing, furniture, gold, jewellery, and other valuables. The Budapest MKP reported that the ‘plush curtains’ of the Magyar Művelődési Ház (Hungarian Educational House) had been stolen.51 Another report complained about Russian soldiers stealing food and horses.52 Russian soldiers looted indiscriminately: on  January , Russian soldiers entered the house of Imre Kardos, and stole four curtains, six pairs of ladies’ shoes, six or seven car inner tubes, and one ‘sleeping baby doll’.53 Red Army soldiers had a special fondness for watches and clocks, a partiality which became notorious. When in a newsreel on the Yalta Conference Roosevelt’s watch was seen clearly glimmering on his arm stretched out in an explanatory gesture towards Stalin, voices from the audience shouted: ‘Look out! Ura! Ura! [a Red Army battle cry].’54

44 47 50 52 54

45 PIL ./, . PIL ./, . 48 PIL ./, . PIL ./, –. Ungváry, Budapest ostroma, . PIL ./, . Ungváry, Budapest ostroma, .

46 49 51 53

PIL ./, . PIL ./, . PIL ./, . PIL ./, .




In Pécs, in December , Russian soldiers were reported as cutting down trees and selling the wood as firewood or timber to civilians.55 The district MKP organization in Nagykanisza, a town in south-west Zala county, asked the Organization Department for help against Russian soldiers who were stealing from the poor peasantry: ‘By the way, the excesses, robbery, and theft are the order of the day . . . We turned to the town Commander in vain.’56 József Dyengeli wrote to the Prime Minister that he had found Russian soldiers squatting in his house. All movable property had disappeared, they had set fire to the furniture, and pulled out the fence.57 In Hódmezővásárhely near Szeged, Russian soldiers worked in collusion with black marketeers.58 In Makó on the Romanian border, the Hungarian border guard complained to the local Red Army command about the smuggling of salt from Romania by Red Army soldiers. The guards had confiscated the salt, but the soldiers returned and recaptured it at gunpoint. The soldiers escaped punishment. In response to questions from the Prime Minister, then acting head of the Allied Control Commission General Vladimir Petrovich Sviridov simply stated that the criminals had not been soldiers, but ‘individuals living on Romanian territory’. He did not indicate how this gang of Romanian smugglers had captured Red Army uniforms and machine guns.59 No property was safe from marauding soldiers. During a propaganda trip to the countryside in the  election campaign, three Russian officers stopped Central Committee member Köböl’s red Opel, an unheard-of luxury in Hungary’s post-war conditions, fired in the air several times, and drove off in the car. They also stole , pengő of party cash, party badges worth , pengő, and  copies of the party magazine Pártmunka.60 Central Committee member István Kossa reported on the misbehaviour of ‘members of groups wearing Russian uniform’ who had beaten up communist party members and stolen the trade union secretary’s bicycle.61 For the Hungarian Jews, the arrival of the Red Army meant salvation from certain death at the hands of the Arrow Cross, yet even for Jews, it was not an unequivocal liberation. One Budapest Jew sped from his hiding place and embraced the first Russian soldier he met, who replied: ‘Well, Jew, give me your leather jacket.’62 On his first 55 56 57 58 60 62

BML XVII [State Forestry Office, Pécs, to Pécs National Committee, n.d.]. PIL ./, . MOL XIX-A--J- [József Dyengeli to Prime Minister,  Jan. ]. 59 MOL XIX-A--J-. PIL ./, . 61 PIL ./, . PIL ./ [report,  Oct. ]. Ungváry, Budapest ostroma, .




meeting with a Russian soldier, the rabbi of Leányfalu solemnly stood before him, and greeted him with the exclamation that he was a Jew. The Russian smiled, kissed the rabbi on both cheeks, and stated that he was a Jew as well. Then he lined the family up against the wall, had the house thoroughly searched, and robbed it of every item of value.63 Beside the pillaging by individual soldiers, the Red Army dismantled large parts of the Hungarian infrastructure and economy for transport to the USSR under the ceasefire agreement of  January , in which the Hungarian government agreed to a sum of $ million in reparations, of which $ was to go to the Soviet Union. In addition, the Allied (Soviet) Commander in Chief expected Hungary to provide for the sustenance of the Red Army. As the fighting ended, Soviet authorities immediately occupied banks, factories, granaries, schools, and hospitals and confiscated currency reserves. Soviet units considered works of art legitimate spoils of war, and untold numbers of paintings and statues, whole public and private collections, disappeared to the Soviet Union.64 In particular the Red Army’s need for food was a burden on the population. Rakósi informed Dimitrov on the catastrophic situation in the country. Means of transport had either been hauled off by the Germans or confiscated by the Red Army, and as a result food was rotting away in the countryside while Budapest was beginning to starve.65 The bad economic situation continued to bother Rákosi. ‘Our food supplies are at their end, and at the same time we need to supply large quantities for the provision of the Red Army. It concerns , tonnes of grain and similar quantities of cattle, fat, etc. This number has been reduced, but it provides us with incredible difficulties.’66 The bread ration in Budapest was  grams per person and the workers were starving. The problems were exacerbated by the confiscation of granaries by the Red Army.67 For June and July  alone, Sviridov demanded , tonnes of meat, , eggs,  tonnes of dairy produce,  tonnes of herbs, , tonnes of hay, , tonnes of fresh fruit, and  tonnes of butter or dairy products.68 This had catastrophic consequences for the country. Hungarian authorities pointed out that they could only provide , head of cattle rather than the , demanded by the Red Army. Lack of cattle also influenced milk production and the harvest. Before the war, Budapest’s daily intake of tejföl (sour cream) was , litres. Now, 63 65 68

64 Balogh and Földesi, Magyar jóvátétel. Ungváry, Budapest ostroma, . 66 PIL ./, –. 67 Ibid. PIL ./, –. Balogh and Földesi, Magyar jóvátétel, .




it was only ,.69 The interests of the MKP were not necessarily taken into account. The trains that Gerő as Minister of Economic Affairs had designated for the reconstruction of Hungary’s railways were frequently painted over in Soviet markings and moved to the Soviet Union instead.70   :     More shocking than the forced labour, looting, and war reparations were the executions and murders that accompanied liberation. Surrendering soldiers were frequently simply mowed down; of the prisoners and the wounded, soldiers of the SS, Vlasov Army, and the Hungarian Arrow Cross were as a rule shot upon discovery.71 After the cessation of hostilities, civilians were not spared. Executions were often arbitrary. Shootings took place when people resisted looting soldiers, or unintentionally, when the uniforms of train conductors and postmen were mistaken for those of the Arrow Cross.72 Drunken soldiers were known to shoot people for no apparent reason,73 and mass executions ‘by way of warning’ also occurred. In February , after an Arrow Cross sniper shot a Russian officer in the Budapest Halmi Street, all the men in the street were rounded up and shot in a nearby park. After the capture of Buda similar executions took place.74 Figures of such deaths are not widely available. Vas wrote from Szeged about a ‘significant number’ of executions.75 The Budapest XIVth district police station reported on  June  four people shot by Russian soldiers, one of them accidentally.76 According to the mayor of Kecskemét in central Hungary,  inhabitants (out of a population of ,) were killed with a shot through the head by drunken Russian soldiers even after the fighting had ended.77 By far the worst atrocity committed was that of rape. Not only was it perpetrated on an unheard-of scale, it also caused the greatest shock to the population. Norman Naimark has extensively discussed the extent of rape by Red Army soldiers in Germany and the impression this left on the civilian population, and Antony Beevor has further added to the image of catastrophic suffering during the Soviet advance.78 Though Soviet troops 69 71 74 76 77 78

70 PIL ./, –. Ibid: Magyar jóvátétel, –. 72 Ibid. 73 BMKT //, –. Ungváry, Budapest ostroma, . 75 PIL ./, –. Ungváry, Budapest ostroma, . PIL ./, . MOL XIX-A--J- [Mayor of Kecskemét to Ferenc Nagy,  Dec. ]. Naimark, Russians in Germany; Beevor, Berlin.




were known to have raped civilians of Allied countries, their full malice was reserved for the enemy. As an ally of Germany, the distress caused in Hungary was second only to that of the Germans. Again, figures are not readily accessible. In areas briefly retaken by German and Hungarian units, numbers were quickly prepared: out of , women in Lajoskomárom in Veszprém county,  reported to a doctor. Fifteen hundred women in Székesfehérvár, a city close to the Balaton lake, reported being raped, but the full figure was estimated at ,–, or  to  per cent of the population.79 With proper statistics lacking, estimates for Hungary vary between , and , individuals.80 On the basis of increased abortion figures and occurrences of venereal disease, Andrea Pető considers the usually assumed number of  per cent too high.81 But for contemporaries, the shock of openly committed gang rapes, with groups of sometimes fifteen to twenty soldiers raping women of all ages, could not be expressed in numbers, and figures were often considered to be much higher. A Swiss diplomat, for instance, wrote in a report: ‘the rapes of women cause the greatest suffering to the Hungarian population. These rapes are so common—including women from ten to seventy years of age—that hardly a woman in Hungary escapes this fate.’82 Rapes continued well after military clashes had ended. The alarm caused by the rapes becomes apparent from an anonymous report to a Soviet commander: The Red Army has encamped in our city for four weeks already, the front has already moved approx.  to  km away from us, but the initial looting still occurs. It still occurs, that at night drunken soldiers raid peaceful families, smash their furniture, steal clothing, and rape women. Especially on the women question, the situation is horrible. Sober, the soldiers behave themselves passably, but if they have the smallest quantity of drink inside them, even the best of them goes wild. Respectable family girls, elderly women from  to , -to--year-old still undeveloped children, not to mention respectable girls of the normal age, are raped, with as many as  to  individuals going over a woman, which breaks them not just mentally, but in the literal sense also physically, indeed rape almost in every case introduces serious venereal disease into the family.83

The Soviet soldiers had no regard for social status or party card. The working-class women of Kőbánya were victimized just as much as the middle-class girls of central Budapest. ‘Several comrades paid with their lives for coming to the aid of their wives and daughters,’ wrote one 79 81

80 Ungváry, Budapest ostroma, . Pető, ‘Átvonuló hadsereg’, . 82 83 Ibid. Ungváry, Budapest ostroma, . PIL ./, –.




disillusioned Kőbánya communist.84 In the village of Konyár, north-east of Budapest, two communist Hungarian policemen were condemned to death by a Red Army military court after they had killed two Russian soldiers in an exchange of fire following the rape of two Hungarian women.85 The violence and disregard for the country’s population brought home the fact that Hungary had been liberated by its enemy. The Red Army issued two types of commemorative medals for the capture of cities: either for their liberation, such as Prague, or for their conquest, such as Berlin. Budapest fell in the latter category. Retribution for German and Hungarian atrocities against civilians in the Soviet Union was one motive for the maltreatment of the Hungarian population.86 The prevalence of rape by Red Army soldiers is often explained by the psychological desire for vengeance, for humiliation not only of the woman in question, but also the men who are unable to defend her, rather than by sexual motives.87 While rapes occurred in Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Romania, and Poland as well, the number was far higher in enemy Hungary, and even worse in Germany. Not only Soviet propaganda, but Soviet soldiers considered the civilian population of Hungary not as friendly, but as the enemy. These sentiments were reciprocated by the Hungarian population. Liberation was a national disaster, even for those groups whose lives had been saved, who had gained their freedom, or who could now look forward to social change thanks to the arrival of the Red Army. Social background, Jewish origins, or party card offered no protection against Soviet soldiers on the rampage. Many Social Democrats and communists greeted the longawaited liberation with disillusionment, and the Jewish community of Hungary, while grateful, perceived liberation as a national tragedy and would on the whole have preferred liberation by Anglo-American forces.88 Police reports list complaints about the Russians as an ‘army of locusts’ that had run rampant over the country, stealing, murdering, and dragging off women on its way.89 Politicians and journalists compared the liberation to the Mongol invasion in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries.90 At Ungváry, Budapest ostroma, . PIL ./ [Konyár MKP members to Voroshilov,  June ]. 86 Ungváry, Budapest ostroma, . 87 Ibid. , Pető, ‘Átvonuló hadsereg’, –. Naimark, Russians in Germany, –. 88 Szabó, Kommunista Párt és a zsidóság, . 89 MOL XIX-B--j- [Magyar Államrendőrség Budapesti Főkapitányságának Politikai Rendészeti Osztálya Tanúvallomási Jegyzőkönyv (Hungarian State Police to the Political Department of the Budapest Chief of Police, Witness Report)],  May . 90 Nagy, Struggle behind the Iron Curtain, . 84 85




low-key local political rallies speakers denounced the Red Army as a foreign occupier, for instance at a Smallholder meeting in Békéscsaba in south-east Hungary: ‘We Hungarians have a great historical past, and that is why we cannot tolerate that the Russian hordes occupy us.’91 Enmity took violent forms, often in response to Red Army atrocities, well after the end of the war. In Sásd, a village near Pécs in the south-west, two alleged Arrow Cross members beat up the local Soviet commander. In response, the Russians took  prisoners.92 This sort of violence continued well after the fighting had ended, all over Hungary. In the locality of Besenyszög, a village close to Szolnok in central Hungary, two soldiers were murdered in ‘beastly fashion’ in December ,93 and in Kiskunfélegyháza, between Kecskemét and Szeged, five Red Army soldiers were killed in the space of two weeks.94 On the national holiday of  March in  in Tata in northern Hungary, unknown persons laid mines which blew apart a soldier.95 On  June , one officer and a private were shot, and four other officers and an NCO were wounded in a single attack in Budapest, and earlier, in Gyöngyös, north-east of Budapest, ten soldiers had been killed.96 Even though, especially on the left, the Soviet invasion was perceived as a liberation from war and the Germans, and the Red Army was met with official ceremonies of gratitude, the spontaneous popular joy that had greeted liberation in Western Europe was thoroughly absent in Hungary.       From the very start of the Soviet advance, the communist party was conscious of the hostility towards the Red Army caused by the atrocities. Vas informed Rákosi that ‘the excesses are truly grave’.97 Vas feared the atrocities seriously risked turning the Hungarian population against the Red Army and the MKP, and pleaded emotionally for direct intervention by Stalin: ‘only his word is capable of changing things . . . Shortly and directly, the question is whether the Hungarian people will be friend or foe. Friend, only friend, but everything is turning out that they will be foe. 91 92 93 94 95 96 97

BMKT, //, –. BML, XVII- [National Committee, minutes, ]. MOL XIX-B--J- [Guard Captain Miridov to Ferenc Erdei,  Apr. ]. PIL ./, –. MOL XIX-A--j- [Sviridov to Ferenc Nagy,  Apr. ]. MOL XIX-A--j- [Sviridov to Ferenc Nagy,  June ]. PIL ./, –.




The situation is horrible.’98 Years of wartime national propaganda had done little to change the perception of the MKP as a foreign, Russian party, and now, unsurprisingly, the party was held responsible for the behaviour of the Red Army. In the s, Gerő remembered that Vas ‘was in a true state of panic because in some cases Red Soldiers had raped women and had been looting’.99 But when he himself arrived in Hungary, he voiced similar concerns to Rákosi. The fact that the Russians had taken away all the livestock could cause hunger and would force delay in the land reform, for which the communists would get the blame.100 Rákosi later wrote to Dimitrov: ‘our situation is further complicated by the fact that the excesses of the Red Army are written on the party’s slate. In this regard there is doubtlessly a certain improvement, but the cases of mass rape, looting, etc. are renewed with the liberation of a given territory.’101 The communists were often told by ‘well-meaning outsiders’ that the Red Army atrocities endangered the position of the party.102 Rákosi complained that ‘reactionary village notables’ greeted the soldiers with drink and women, and so managed to influence them against the communists. In many places, forced labourers were not paid anything or were paid in useless , pengő notes. ‘All this is laid at the party’s door, and our influence among the masses suffers in such a degree that we renew our request to direct ourselves straight to comrade Stalin for the solution of this problem.’103 Stalin was unsympathetic. When Milovan Djilas complained about Red Army rapes in Yugoslavia, Stalin responded: ‘can’t he understand it if a soldier who has crossed thousands of kilometres through blood and fire and death has fun with a woman or takes some trifle?’104 Very little changed, and Rákosi still mentioned the problem to Dimitrov personally in June .105 The communists attempted to use what influence they had. Vas held an ‘entire series of meetings’ on the issue. At all sections of the front, he gave a report to the officers’ corps at division level, and made them understand ‘how the excesses make our work impossible’.106 These protests may have had some results. In January , Marshal Malinovski officially forbade the maltreatment of civilians and prisoners of war.107 As the atrocities continued until , this did not go far enough, and, in any 98 100 102 104 105 107

99 Rainer, Nagy Imre, i. . Ibid. 101 PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –. 103 PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –. Quoted in Naimark, Russians in Germany, . 106 Volokitina et al. (eds.), Sovetskiy Faktor, –. PIL ./, –. Ungváry, Budapest ostroma, .




case, the damage had already been done. The impact of Red Army behaviour on the image of the party remained a cause of concern, and was discussed at the Central Committee meeting of  August . In Győr in north-west Hungary, communist representatives pointed out to local Red Army commanders the negative effects of atrocities on the image of the Red Army and that of the MKP. To gain the trust of the local population, the Red Army now participated in important public works, it gave concerts in the city, took part in political mass meetings, and planned a Hungarian–Russian sport festival, with the aid of the local political parties. That such measures had a deep impact is unlikely, and Zoltán Szántó was only mildly optimistic: ‘Even if we do not achieve a lot in this area, it is sure that it has some result.’108 Keresztes worried about the effect of atrocities on public opinion, but blamed the ‘reaction’ for blowing them up out of all proportion: ‘The Hungarian peasant can still bear it, that they take away his ham, bread, and sausage, but he cannot bear it if they harm his wife and daughter. The reaction is more and more hugely exerting itself to blow up these events.’109 The MKP was also held responsible for the disastrous economic situation caused by the war and the Red Army.110 Budapest was starving: by the end of March the city authorities were only capable of distributing , calories per person (, is the daily minimum required for an adult).111 To stave off total catastrophe, the Red Army regularly released food, a step which Rákosi hoped would improve the image of both the party and the Red Army.112 While such measures were also made to alleviate immediate suffering, their propaganda value was paramount. In September  Nagy had sent a request to the Inter-allied Control Commission in which he had asked for ‘substantial amounts’ of food from the Red Army. Rákosi chastised Nagy, and considered Russian indignation at the initiative justified, as they had not yet attempted to get what they needed out of the harvest.113 With elections looming, in which Soviet food deliveries would be useful, Rákosi was probably mainly irritated by the fact that Nagy had acted on his own initiative. Indeed, during the November elections, both the MKP and the National Peasant Party utilized the Soviet aid in their propaganda.114 Nevertheless, Rákosi’s line of reasoning shows that he did not consider the needs of the Hungarian population more important than those of the Red Army. The character of food handouts as propaganda is demonstrated by the Red Army request for the return of the food it had provided to the starv108 111 113

109 110 PIL ./, –. Ibid. PIL ./, –. 112 Ungváry, Budapest ostroma, . PIL ./, –. 114 PIL ./, –. Iszák and Kun, Moszkvának jelentjük, –.




ing city. In June , Sviridov demanded the Hungarian government return , tonnes of meat out of the , which the Red Army had provided ‘on loan’ for the feeding of Budapest in .115 The Red Army was not able or willing to rein in its soldiers too much, and it is debatable whether the Hungarian population was truly grateful for receiving its own produce in the form of aid. To minimize the damage caused by the Red Army, the party had to turn to propaganda. But it could not depart from the eulogies of praise and thanks to the glorious Red Army that had been delivered since , and had to present the Red Army as Hungary’s liberator and protector. The party’s tactic in dealing with the issue of rape was therefore to discuss it in small groups, and to diffuse the situation by shifting the blame onto the Germans and their Hungarian collaborators. Rákosi was especially concerned about the female vote, which could be very influential since so many men were still absent as prisoners of war and made it impossible to avoid the topic altogether. In print, the behaviour of the Red Army could not be questioned, because the Soviet authorities denied rapes had occurred. But it could not be avoided either because, as Rákosi stated, ‘otherwise they will believe the communists are dishonest’. One of Rákosi’s main guidelines for election propaganda was to blame the old regime and the Germans for the misery in the country. In this manner Rákosi directed the party instructors to downplay the responsibility of the Russians: ‘Here we have, for instance, the Russian question. It cannot be talked about at large mass rallies, but in smaller groups, in private, it must be talked about. One must say that the largest part are not Russians, but hooligans.’ For this, the Germans were responsible, as they had released all the thieves and murderers on their retreat, as a consequence of which , criminals were now roaming freely in Budapest. Some Russians had committed excesses, but these were a reaction to German and Hungarian atrocities in the USSR: ‘A part of the Russian soldiers lost their families, everything, horrible things happened in German and Hungarian prisoner of war camps, and they cannot control themselves.’116 Rákosi followed his own advice in several smaller speeches in the north-eastern towns of Nyíregyháza, Mátészalka, and Nyírbátor. ‘If somewhere a drunken Russian soldier is doing mischief, at that very moment they saddle the communist party with it and hold our party responsible.’ But, explained Rákosi, such excesses invariably accompanied war. He then claimed that in Paris it was inadvisable to be on the streets after . p.m., with drunken American soldiers on the rampage, forcing themselves on 115

Balogh and Földesi, Magyar jóvátétel, .

116

PIL /, –.




women and stealing.117 Finally, the MKP was not above using the bad image of the Red Army to its own advantage. In southern Hungary, the MKP went around claiming that should the Smallholder Party win in a certain district, the Red Army would be stationed there. The Red Army did not necessarily cooperate with the MKP propagandists: it ceremoniously abandoned the area just before the elections.118 * * * To improve its position in liberated Hungary, the MKP embarked on a policy of cautious manoeuvre, and while the party did not attempt to gain power immediately, it used any available opportunity to strengthen its position. The key to the strategy of becoming an acceptable party was the continuation of the ‘national line’ of the Comintern. It was not the MKP, but rather Soviet authorities such as Dimitrov, and ultimately Molotov and Stalin, who decided on the ‘gradual route’ to Socialism and the necessity of presenting a national face, and in this, for instance in the change in policy towards Horthy, they at times adjusted the programme of the MKP to be even more gradual or national than the MKP leadership originally intended. From a perspective of Soviet security there were several reasons for prudence. First, Hungary was not seen as particularly important compared to Germany and Poland, and a quick grasp of power would divert resources and energy from those more important objectives. Second, this was worsened by the domestic situation in Hungary, which was not as favourable to an immediate communist takeover as in, for instance, Bulgaria. Third, as the so-called ‘Polish trade-off ’, Soviet caution in Hungary could be used to counter Anglo-American worries about the swift Sovietization of Poland. That Hungary was not a priority also became apparent from Soviet behaviour in Hungary during and after liberation. The Seventh Department of GLAVPURKKA initially attached little importance to the opinion of Hungarian communists and obstructed them in implementing the party line. Lootings and atrocities committed by the Red Army, and the rapid dismantling of Hungary’s economy for reparations, ensured the hostility of the population to the occupying forces, which refused to take tough measures against soldiers or halt the exploitation of the economy. While the behaviour of the Soviet occupying forces was fully in line with the Soviet perception of Hungary’s strategic importance, it was counterproductive to the MKP’s policy of national unity. The MKP continued to be seen as a foreign, Russian party, and was held accountable for the actions of the Red Army. While the ‘national line’ was Soviet in origin, these Soviet origins were also one of the main obstacles to the national policy. 117

PIL /, –.

118

PIL ./, –.



The Legacy of  and Left-Wing Radicalism (Autumn –Spring ) Not just the link with Moscow was detrimental to the national image of the MKP, but the attitude of the communists in Hungary as well. In theory, the Hungarian Revolution of Councils of  could have been presented as a great Hungarian revolutionary achievement, a national contribution to international communism. In the s this line was indeed put forward, but in  the memory of the  republic was harmful to the desired national and democratic presentation of the party. The Republic of Councils was hated for its radicalism. It had swiftly alienated the peasantry through the immediate collectivization of land, and because of the reign of terror of Tibor Szamuely’s Lenin Boys was remembered as a vicious phase in Hungarian history. Initially the republic could count on mass support as it propagated the national liberation of the Hungarians against the Entente powers. This was done, however, with reference to the doctrine of national liberation. The revolutionaries themselves promulgated proletarian internationalism, attacked traditional Hungarian nationalism, and commenced an assault against popular national symbols such as St Stephen. Events like the covering up of the Millennium Monument on Heroes’ Square in red boarding stuck strongly in people’s minds. As the republic failed to defend Hungary against Entente troops, it soon lost the support of the middle classes and conservatives. In , the Republic of Councils was remembered in Hungary with bitterness. Its radical and anti-national nature made it an impediment to the image of the party. The Moscow leadership had another reason to downplay it: many of the leaders of the Republic of Councils, among them Béla Kun, had perished in the purges, accused of ‘left-wing sectarianism’. Many veterans of the Republic of Councils and the party’s illegal struggle under Horthy were oblivious to the tactical considerations of the Moscow party leadership. They had suffered bitterly during the destruction of the Republic by Horthy and the repression by the regime in the inter-war years. They greeted the arrival of the Red Army as an opportunity



The Legacy of 

to recreate the Dictatorship of the proletariat, and to unleash red terror against its enemies. For them, the revolution and proletarian internationalism were more than mere slogans, and the red banner too powerful a symbol to be replaced instantly by the national tricolour, which to them had been an object of disdain and ridicule under the previous regime. The veterans of Hungary’s communist revolution were proud of their achievements, and counted on being able to re-establish the republic that had been crushed twenty-five years ago, and for whose return they had struggled and suffered all that time. This hope for a return to  was mainly held by the party rank and file. The ‘home’ leadership prepared for liberation in keeping with the line that emanated from Moscow. At the same time as the émigré party leadership was debating the party programme, ‘home’ communist leaders László Rajk and Gyula Kállai drafted a policy statement which was to be presented to the leaders of the other parties of the Hungarian Front. According to Mihály Korom, Rajk and Kállai’s ‘What do the Hungarian people desire after the end of the war?’ of  October  was ‘surprisingly similar’ to Révai’s draft ‘Action Programme’ of the same period.1 Korom was perhaps trying too hard to demonstrate the singularity of purpose of the two leaderships. Similarities should not come as a surprise, since the illegal Central Committee had been able to follow the Moscow line since September  on Radio Kossuth. The thrust of the programme was certainly in keeping with the Moscow draft: Rajk and Kállai’s Hungarian Front programme did not call for proletarian revolution, dictatorship of the proletariat, or the establishment of Socialism, but instead for a People’s Republic, in which limited political and social reforms would be realized. But at the same time, the general slant and language of the ‘home’ draft was far to the left of what Révai was proposing in Moscow. The term ‘People’s Republic’ did not figure largely in the Moscow proposal, while it was the centrepiece of Rajk and Kállai’s draft programme. Even though Rajk and Kállai, like Révai, did not yet demand the expropriation of the large landowners, they had written their programme in the language of social struggle, quite unlike the more measured Muscovite version. By describing the People’s Republic as the ‘democratic state’ of the workers, in the first place founded on the working class and the peasantry, who formed the ‘great majority’ of the Hungarian people, they sidelined the middle classes the Muscovites intended to appeal to. Most importantly, 1

Korom, Magyarország ideiglenes nemzeti kormánya, .




they did not make the nation the ‘point of departure’, as Révai had insisted upon in Moscow. Rajk and Kállai did call for struggle against the German imperialists for an independent Hungary, but focused on the creation of a workers’ and peasant state. The ‘home’ approach completely missed the incessant appeals to the nation that characterized Révai’s draft,2 a fact that once again illustrates the Soviet origin of the national policy. Differences should not be attributed to the radicalism of Rajk and Kállai, but rather to the complete breakdown in communications with Moscow, which made it practically impossible to request counsel or receive instructions, while the swift turn of events still demanded day-today policy-making. On some occasions, the decisions of the ‘home’ leadership were more to the right than those of the Muscovites: while Révai initially put the removal of Horthy as first point in his draft Action Programme, the illegal Central Committee in Budapest was taking a much more careful approach, as it considered it feasible that Horthy would abandon the Germans. The ‘home’ programme proposal contained no references to Horthy at all. The most obvious example of ‘home’ communists taking the Moscow line too far was the earlier overenthusiastic dissolution of the KMP and establishment of the Peace Party discussed in the previous chapter. In the end, ‘home’ communist leaders like Rajk, Kádár, and most Central Committee members were disciplined communists in the service of the party, ready to lay aside doctrine if necessary. Overall, the line of the ‘home’ leadership was to the left of the Muscovites. They could not witness at first hand Stalin and Dimitrov’s approval of the ‘national line’, and may have decided to err on the side of caution and choose more traditional slogans and policies. More importantly, unlike the Muscovite communists, they were subject to pressure from the radical rank and file. The ideological split that emerged after the war within the party was not between the Muscovite and ‘home’ leadership, but between the new party line and the pre-war local party members and activists. These had witnessed hardships, risked imprisonment and mistreatment by authorities, and were now about to be cheated out of the dictatorship of the proletariat they had been striving for all those years. In the immediate post-war power vacuum that followed the Soviet advance, these communists took to the streets and grasped power locally, not the strategically minded Muscovites or the cautious ‘home’ leadership. Local communists installed Soviets and proclaimed the dictatorship of the proletariat and the implementation of 2

Ibid. –.




red terror. While insignificant in themselves, total lack of communication and transport meant in practice that localized communist dictatorships were popping up, which acted ruthlessly against enemies and fulfilled the population’s worst fears about Bolshevization. Many local party members greeted the new programme with scepticism, even dubbing it ‘opportunist’—the stock Stalinist phrase to describe a right-wing deviation from the party line.3 An anonymous internal party report later remembered: ‘our party’s democratic and national policy, the aspirations to national unity, were accepted as alien in the beginning within the party organizations, indeed in several party organizations part of the membership qualified our party’s policy as “right-wing”.’4 Apart from selling its Action Programme to its allies in the Hungarian National Independence Front, one of the first tasks the party leadership set for itself was to convince its own members of the correctness of its new line. On  November , Révai, Farkas, and Vas presented the Action Programme to the communists of southern Hungary in Szeged. It was the second discussion of the programme; a similar event several days earlier had descended into a long-drawn-out and apparently heated debate. The meeting was explicitly intended as no more than a ‘making known’ (ismertetés) of the Action Programme. There was no question that any true discussion would take place or amendments were possible. The first speaker, Katona, requested the assembly to listen carefully and save passions for another time.5        József Révai, the main speaker, observed that ‘many old and new communists have listened with some amazement to this action programme’.6 Révai focused especially on the need to get rid of the Germans, to atone for Hungary’s alliance with the Nazis, and to ensure that Hungary would not only be liberated by the Red Army, but also by Hungarian soldiers. Revolution and dictatorship of the proletariat would only complicate this struggle. The mood in the room was more radical. While he was greeted with shouts of ‘that’s correct’, another participant misinterpreted Révai’s call to battle by calling out, ‘Let’s create the Hungarian Red Army!’ Révai 3 6

PIL ./, –. Ibid.

4

PIL ./, –.

5

PIL ./, –.




was quick to dispel the revolutionary atmosphere: ‘If we create a Hungarian Red Army now, then we will not be launching a war of national independence, but a civil war. This will be grist to the mill of the Germans.’ The Red Army, Révai said, had not come to bring Socialism, and its presence could not be exploited to enforce a communist dictatorship. Farkas spoke on the need to mobilize the entire nation, and the necessity to liberate patriotic and national forces besides ‘democratic’ ones. The MKP could not possibly fulfil the tasks of liberation and reconstruction by itself, and therefore had to aid in setting up the other parties. Révai also pointed to the international context: a communist dictatorship would not be acceptable to the Soviet Union’s Anglo-Saxon allies, and would so weaken the war effort against Germany. The national content of the Action Programme was especially shocking to the ers, and Révai had to deal explicitly with the communists’ fear of the nation: ‘It sounds strange to the ears of many communists that we must fight for the Fatherland . . . We have become used to considering ourselves as exclusively a workers’ party. “Patriotic” and “Nation”, we greeted these slogans with suspicion.’ But, argued Révai, the communist parties of Western Europe had become national parties during the war, and had done their communist duty by standing at the head of their nation. This was also possible in Hungary: ‘What these French communists could do, we can do too. We have to fight our way up to become the leading party of the Hungarian nation.’ Révai noted some had accepted the new line ‘with a shrug of the shoulders’, and attempted to instil some passion into the crowd. A ‘whole row’ of martyrs had fallen for Hungarian freedom. It was a goal worth fighting for in itself, even if it was not the party’s ‘final goal’. The communists of southern Hungary were assured that the new policy was of a tactical nature, and that the end goal was still a Socialist Hungary. Katona explained that it was necessary to pursue Realpolitik, as twenty-five years of reaction had weakened the party. Yet the communist ‘Idea’ would not be abandoned for even a second. ‘We have to flatten the road to communism to reach our goal.’ As if to convince themselves, all the local communist speakers repeated out loud the tactical nature of the Action Programme. Vas was the only Muscovite to stress it explicitly, and also made it clear that the gradual course was not only endorsed by Moscow, but had originated there: ‘Moscow is the representative of Socialism, the road that on our behalf marks the programme, the road towards Socialism. Is it possible to propose that our leader, Mátyás Rákosi, who has dedicated his whole life to Socialism, is not Communist enough,




or Comrades Révai, Farkas, Ger ő, Nagy, and finally myself, have become bourgeois? We are Socialists, we remain Socialists, we will create a Socialist Hungary. But the Action Programme is the road leading to Socialism.’ The radicals were not convinced by arguments or reassurances, and the party leadership used a whole battery of threats and slogans to put them under pressure. Katona played to the feelings of insecurity of the often uneducated party rank and file, and invoked the tremendous authority the Muscovites commanded. ‘The Central Committee’s Action Programme must be accepted, because currently it is the most feasible road. Those who put this together have been about in the big world for twenty-five years, they are very experienced in matters of which we have not got the faintest clue.’ Farkas’s tone was more threatening. He deplored the lack of enthusiasm of the Szeged comrades, and opened the attack: ‘There have been those who said the Muscovites have become bourgeois . . . These comrades do not know what has happened in the world in the last twentyfive years. Dubious elements have wriggled into the party, Trotskyite elements, radical elements.’ Not taking the balance of forces into account would lead to ‘adventurist policy’. Révai flatly accused anyone pursuing Socialism at this point of engaging in ‘provocateural’ politics, and bluntly stated that party members not accepting the outstretched hand of the Horthy generals did not deserve the designation ‘communist’. Though they purported to agree with the programme, the local party activists were not convinced by the threats, slogans, and appeals to common sense. According to a Comrade Strack, the new line was clearly due to the cooperation with the Anglo-Saxon powers, and called for ‘accommodation to this tactical consideration’. Yet at the same time, he hoped the party would create People’s Courts ‘by dictatorial means’, and received applause when he made it clear that he considered the programme a temporary measure: ‘We accept the Action Programme, but there isn’t a definite programme yet. It is about the time that we are living in now.’ The leadership reacted forcefully. Vas ridiculed Strack: ‘Please, comrades, I would not have applauded the comrade that spoke before me, I am not applauding. We will sort out our opponents somehow, but our friends are our worst opponents.’ According to Vas, Strack had pretended to support the cautious approach, but ‘then he unsheathed his penknife, and wanted to go for dictatorship’. Vas’s scathing words were not enough to silence criticism. A speaker named Andorka delivered the most open attack on the programme at the meeting. He noted a split between the Central Committee and old




communists, and rebuked Farkas for attacking the old comrades, who did not understand why the programme for which they had fought in  was not retained. Andorka said he believed the Muscovites might have known why they had to ‘give up principles’, but the party members in Hungary had not been present at the deliberations on the programme. This was the main reason they did not understand the new line. The solution was to be as democratic as possible and discuss the programme with the entire membership. As both groups in the end desired the victory of the workers, Andorka expected them to come to the same conclusion. Andorka deplored the underestimation of the workers and party members by the Muscovites. While most did not yet understand why the communist party had to become a national party, given time and a proper discussion, they would be able to, and they should not be terrorized by the party leadership. Vas immediately responded to Andorka’s criticism: ‘one should not underestimate the Hungarian working class, one should not say that they do not understand the programme. If that were true, that would be a big problem . . . we live and die for the dictatorship of the proletariat . . . but today we must build up Hungary and we can’t build with phrases and demagoguery.’ Andorka’s one man rebellion was swiftly quashed by Révai: ‘since nine o’clock this morning the debate has been going on, and now Comrade Andorka comes and says, it’s not correct, we should debate it. Well, what have we been doing?’ Discussion or not, Révai made it clear that the programme could not be contested and would have to be accepted as it was: ‘Andorka wants to brush away twenty-five years of development and explain that we should build a democratic Hungary . . . Only those who desire to divert the party from work can say such things . . . Those who support this programme, support world communism. Comrade Andorka did not dare to say openly that he did not agree with the programme either. We are hard men, we defend the party against all attacks. We are not scared that Comrade Andorka accuses us and brands us as terrorists. Comrade Andorka’s opinion undermines the party.’7       The strong opposition came as a surprise. Shortly after arriving in Hungary, Révai had optimistically told Rákosi that they had mostly solved the problem of making the cadres understand the new line. Rákosi wrily 7

PIL ./, –.




remarked to Gerő that this was not apparent from the minutes of the meeting in Szeged.8 Indeed, the struggle to implement the party line had only just begun. In the aftermath of the fighting, the Muscovites could not make threatening speeches before every town and district party organization to convince the local firebrands, and radicalism continued to be a major problem. The first indication of the extent of the discrepancy between the Muscovite approach and the radicalism of the local communists was the elections for the Provisional Parliament in December . The MKP’s Action Programme and the programme of the MNFF both called for the establishment of National Committees to fill the power vacuum created after the Horthy regime collapsed. Many local Hungarian villages and towns did not even need this prompting, and set up their own ‘village committees’ or ‘town councils’ to take control of civil administration, and soon National Committees popped up everywhere. The notes of the Moscow autumn meetings show that the Muscovite leadership saw the National Committees as instruments of class struggle: they could more easily be filled with ‘progressive’ representatives, and could thus counterbalance a right-wing government.9 Yet at the same time, the leadership feared that the spontaneous and open character of the Committees made their infiltration by ‘undemocratic’ politicians possible. The party leaders acknowledged they did not know in advance what power the Committees would wield. For this reason alone, caution was thrown to the winds, and the party pressed to dominate the Committees. Backed by the presence of the Red Army, the communists could demand parity in seats with the other parties, though this was widely out of proportion to the preliberation division of power.10 The Preparatory Committee for the Provisional Parliament, which issued the call for elections and distributed votes to regions, was dominated by the MKP, which had five seats, while the Smallholders and Social Democrats each had three, the National Peasant Party and the Civic Democratic Party (PDP) one each, with the remaining four seats being distributed to independents. The elections themselves were conducted indirectly: National Committees usually put forward candidates, who were then confirmed at popular assemblies by the population. The result was an overwhelming communist victory: out of  seats,  were taken by the MKP,  by the Smallholders,  by the Social Democrats,  by the National Peasant Party, and  by the PDP.11 From an insignificant political force, the MKP had suddenly become the 8 10 11

9 PIL ./, –. PIL /, –. Nagy, Struggle behind the Iron Curtain, . Korom, Magyarország ideiglenes nemzeti kormánya, .




dominant party in the country, a result clearly at odds with the great care the USSR and the Muscovites were taking at the same time with the composition of the Provisional Government. In correspondence with Rákosi, Ernő Gerő considered the result exaggerated, and blamed it partially on the enthusiasm of the local communists: ‘we have certainly overdone it. But the cause was partially the rush, partially the over-zealousness of the local comrades.’12 Gerő was not very satisfied with the communist representatives either and complained to Rákosi that there was not a single serious leader among the ‘home’ communists. According to Gerő, the members of the communist fraction reflected the radicalism on the ground: numerous speakers had ‘in practice’ argued in the first meeting in favour of the introduction of kolkhozes, opposed the land reform, or stood up in favour of the nationalization of industry. In Gerő’s opinion, most of these ‘ultra left-wing speakers’ came from newly liberated territories, which explained why they had not been able to ‘make the party’s political programme their own’ yet. Gerő reassured Rákosi that at fraction meetings the Muscovites sharply attacked anything that would ‘turn the party from the successes achieved.’13        The actions of the local communists remained a point of concern, and émigrés travelling behind the front informed Rákosi about their behaviour. Captain Miklós Steinmetz, who became one of the most prominent communist martyrs when he was gunned down by the Germans negotiating the surrender of the Buda castle, considered them communists in name only, not actually party members, but usually former supporters of the Republic of Councils. With distaste he noted slogans such as ‘Fight for communist power!’ appearing on the walls of Gyömrő, to the south-east of Budapest. Gyömrő was also the scene of one of the most extreme localized post-war ‘dictatorships of the proletariat’ in Hungary.14 Under the rule of a radical ‘directorate’ at least eighteen former officials of the Horthy regime were murdered, shot, beaten, or tortured to death between February and May . The murders were particularly brutal: men were forced to dig their own graves, one man was buried to his waist and then trampled to death by horses, the local priest’s eyes were gouged out and 12

PIL ./, –.

13

Ibid.

14

PIL /, .




his tongue pulled out before he was killed. The backgound of the killings was a political struggle between the self-proclaimed dictatorship of the proletariat in Gyömrő, led by a direktorium of veterans of , and the newly established National Committee, whose use of national colours had been especially shocking to the directorate.15 To Rákosi, the confrontation with the ‘home’ communists had been a disappointment: ‘the old comrades from illegality are adjusting themselves badly to the new situation. There is a lot of sectarianism and lack of experience in mass work . . . The mass of the party consists in its majority of communists of feeling [Gefühlskommunisten], who of course have to be kneaded through thoroughly first.’16 The leading positions in cities and towns were in the hands of the older generation, and their attitude endangered the position of the party. ‘With few exceptions, they stick to the ideology of  and don’t understand our current line at all. They spend a significant amount of their time recounting their old heroics and are disdainful about the current generation. They are a serious danger to the party, as they stick together and replace their lack of flexibility with dictatorial pretensions. The small communist village dictator threatens to become a real plague.’17 Complaints about the ‘home’ communists were a recurring feature in Rákosi’s letters to Dimitrov: ‘both the new members and the comrades from illegality and  have hardly a clue about discipline and proper party behaviour. We have daily surprising cases of lack of discipline, which are rarely even noticed by those concerned and even less often admitted to. We are educating comrades how to implement the party line, but it will be a hard job.’18 Rákosi also objected to the Budapest party leadership, which consisted entirely of older comrades, who could not make the adjustment from illegal work to working among the masses, and moreover ‘cannot get accustomed to the fact that the party has changed into the leading party of the nation’.19 The local communists were not only radical but they lacked the discipline and schooling in Marxism-Leninism that was the hallmark of the steeled cadres of the modern Stalinist communist party. Instead, they were unguided projectiles, social revolutionaries eager for change, without a definite ideology but with a strong emotional attachment to the dictatorship of the proletariat and the Soviet Union. This is exemplified by a farcical situation at a dance organized by the communist party in Kisujszállás, 15 17

Palasik, ‘Gyömrői gyilkosságok’, –. 18 PIL ./, –. Ibid.

16 19

PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –.




a village in the east of Hungary. There, a leaflet addressed to ‘Hungarian Revolutionaries! Reds! Communists!’, which purported to be a political programme issued by Béla Dalnoki Miklós, was read out to the partygoers. The leaflet was a forgery. It presented Dalnoki Miklós as ‘Prime Minister of the Hungarian Soviet Government’, and in its twelve points issued demands certain to offend the national sensibilities of most Hungarians. The programme demanded immediate Hungarian membership of the Soviet Union and ‘dissolution among its states’, the devaluation of the pengő and its replacement by the rouble, and the elimination of all land ownership in favour of collective farms ‘similar to the Soviet Union’ where ‘peasants, spoiled by Fascists and the Arrow Cross’ would be ‘taught how to work’. Pensions were abolished forthwith, ‘because who does not work, shall not eat’. Dalnoki Miklós’s impostor then ordered the NKVD to take over the Hungarian police, entrusted the Trade Union Council of the Soviet Union with the organization of Hungarian labour, and played into anti-Semitism by promising ‘restitution of the Jews plundered by Fascists and Arrow Cross from the property of the lords and peasants’, and the establishment of a Jewish university in Munkács ‘for our enlightenment’. He also allowed the immigration of other nationalities in Hungary’s less populated areas. All men between  and  were to be drafted in the Red Army, and, ‘in keeping with Soviet tradition’, all women between  and  as well.20 The forgery was extremely crude, but it was considered genuine by the dancing communists. According to the local police captain ‘the party members failed to notice the Fascist provocation, and they agreed to publicize the content of the leaflet. Indeed, they were delighted that Béla Dalnoki Miklós had finally given up the construction of Democratic Hungary and had taken the road to dictatorship.’ The police captain blamed the affair on the narrow-mindedness of the party members, who ‘certainly want to be more communist than Mátyás Rákosi’.21 Many of the ers were truly confounded by the new situation and the new policy, and could not adjust to the fact that they were not appreciated by their fellow revolutionary veteran Rákosi. A group that called itself the ‘old guard’ petitioned Rákosi for ‘work and bread’, and bitterly complained about the treatment of veterans of , who were being systematically bypassed when reporting for party duties. Political past and prison suffering did not seem to count for anything; apparently it was more important that ‘someone in the recent past pasted posters in secret’. 20

PIL ./, .

21

PIL ./, .




The ‘old guard’ prided themselves on being ‘the first fighters’ of the Republic of Councils and the ‘pioneers of the collective spirit in Hungary’, who had waited ‘with fanatical faith’ for twenty-five years for the victory of that struggle. Now, they found ‘some young comrades’ believed they were ‘from yesterday, fallen out of the rising new world’. Yet all the ‘old guard’ asked for in return for its past contribution was work and bread.22   - Such pleas were only likely to confirm Rákosi in his abrasive views of the  generation. He considered the threat it posed to be one of the most significant problems facing the MKP’s new line. Rákosi told the Central

F. . The first mass meeting of the MKP in Budapest in the Sports Hall on  February . Huge red, white, and green flags break with pre-war tradition. The party’s rank and file preferred the red banner. The slogans read from left to right: ‘Down with the reaction,’ ‘Land, bread, freedom’, and ‘Long live independent and democratic Hungary.’ 22

PIL ./ [‘old guard’ to Rákosi, n.d.].




Committee that left-wing radicalism was even more destructive to the image of the party than the behaviour of the Red Army.23 When writing to Dimitrov, he did not go as far, but stated the two were of equal gravity.24 Either way, the problem demanded a solution, and combating the left-wing spirit became one of the highest priorities. The most dangerous opponents of the party line were purged and even arrested. Pál Demény had led a faction of several hundred party workers which had issued proclamations in the name of the KMP demanding a Soviet Hungary. In his private correspondence, Demény accused the party leadership of ‘representing the reaction’.25 Demény was arrested and incarcerated on trumped-up charges of being a police spy. It was impossible to do this on a large scale, however. One of the largest problems that faced the rapidly growing Communist party was the lack of experienced cadres. While previously party membership had been a secretive affair, it was now to be a mass party, and the gates were opened to anyone who wanted to join. In Hungary, political parties were traditionally instruments of local paternalism (protekció), and many new members expected the communist party card to be the most effective remedy against malenkiy robot or pillaging Russian soldiers, to give the best chances for a choice piece of land at the land reform, to help in finding employment, or to offer similar benefits. In December , the MKP already had over , members; by July  this had grown to , and Rákosi had to consider a halt to membership intake. The party had to build up an entire apparatus from scratch to shape this huge mass of members, and needed new recruits to fill the positions in police and administration it was bringing under its control. It proved an almost unworkable task to find politically and technically reliable personnel to fulfil these functions. According to Rákosi, after twenty-five years of illegality it was impossible to find ‘educated Marxists’ who had ‘followed the Lenin-Stalin school’, and the party was forced to work ‘with elements which would make the hair stand on end of the Cadre Department over there [i.e. in Moscow]’.26 Rákosi claimed in March  that the party already controlled almost all the leading positions in the secret police 27 but at the same time complained about the quality of its staff: ‘I cannot characterize the situation better than by the fact that I had to instruct the leaders of the political police in the basic principles of examination and interrogation.’28 23 25 27

PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –.

24 26 28

PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –.




The same was the case with newspapers, which were run by inexperienced editors and lacked the staff to check for errors: ‘we open the paper the following day with fear of death, because we never know what kind of stupidities may have remained.’29 At the same time, the party faced enormous difficulty in transporting émigré communists back to Hungary. Soviet authorities simply did not allow their return, and in almost every single letter to Dimitrov, Rákosi had to plead for their release from duties in the USSR, and their return home where they were needed. Even then, the result was not always satisfactory. Rákosi found to his frustration that communists who functioned perfectly in the Soviet Union had lost touch with Hungary and flopped around ‘like fish on dry land’ at home.30 Children of Hungarian émigrés were often unacceptable, because they either spoke Hungarian with a Russian accent, or not at all. For the time being, while the party was forced to rely on its pre-war membership, the only approach open to the party leadership to counter radicalism was strongly to reiterate its position, and to attempt to convince the party members of the correctness of the new line. Wartime conditions made it difficult to implement this on a national level. Lack of proper transportation and communication made it impossible to implement the party line everywhere.31 As early as February , the party planned to combat radicalism among communists active in two of the main communist front organizations, the Democratic Youth Alliance (DISz) and the Hungarian Women’s Democratic Alliance (MNDSz), where ‘sectarianism still shows in their ranks’. The women and youth activists still implemented the new line ‘only in words and formally’, while the broad basis of party work should manifest itself in precisely these ‘democratic mass organizations’.32 In the same period, the newly created Propaganda Department planned to take measures to ensure the party members would make the political line of the party their own, and ‘to completely eliminate the lack of understanding and their opposition to the democratic political line’.33 Just how it was going to achieve this, the Propaganda Department did not mention. Rákosi thought it disheartening to keep referring to the relative weakness of the party, and requested omission of further reference to the wartime alliance, as this allegedly distracted from the more important reasons for caution.34 At a first significant meeting of party activists in 29 32

30 PIL ./, –. Ibid. 33 PIL /, –. PIL /, –.

31 34

PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –.




March , Gerő attacked the ‘left-wing danger’ in the party, and repeated that ‘some comrades’ had not understood the party’s policy. They did not recognize the balance of forces, were impatient, and attempted to solve all the problems at once, rather than one at a time. In itself it was not bad for a Bolshevik to be impatient, but it was if it isolated the party, brought it into opposition to its allies, and ruined the chance to attack the reaction on a wide front. The cause of this left-wing danger was, according to Gerő, the lack of political education of the party members, who did not comprehend that the party was fighting for a free and democratic Hungary rather than the dictatorship of the proletariat. Gerő nevertheless was convinced that the party members would comprehend the policy better from day to day, make it their own, indeed, it would become ‘their flesh and blood’.35 In May , an offensive against the inner party radicalism got off the ground. At a meeting of Budapest party activists, Rákosi attacked the party cadres for suffering from a ‘left-wing children’s disease’, and expecting that something similar to the Republic of Councils would be set up. They had ‘overslept’ the whole intervening period, had woken up and now expected to continue where they had left off in , refused truly to accept the new party line of cooperating with democratic parties in the national interest, and so aided the reaction in isolating the party. The ers also blocked new members and the new generation from entering the party. Rákosi hoped that part of the problem would be resolved once lines of communication were restored, for at the moment every town was a republic in itself, and the local party organizations lived independent political lives.36 The ‘left-wing excesses’ were also a main point on the agenda at the First MKP National Party Council of high party functionaries on  and  May . The occasion was used by Rákosi to reaffirm the MKP’s policy of National Unity. Rákosi now claimed that the policy of National Unity had in fact been the party’s policy for the last ten years, and the events of the last few months had proven its correctness. Therefore, he called upon the Party Council to emphasize that National Unity would remain the party’s policy for the future. There were now no more references to the weakness of the party and the need to keep an eye on the balance of power. Instead, Rákosi defended National Unity as a policy that had solved the age-old problem of land reform and would be able to tackle reconstruction, something which none of the parties would be able to do 35

PIL ./, –.

36

PIL ./, –.




by themselves. It was necessary to make the members understand the party line, otherwise it would not be possible to implement the policy. Rákosi still referred to the need for tactical caution, but rather than pointing to the final goal of Socialism, he treated National Unity as an end in its own right. If the party was too forceful, then this would alienate the population. According to Rákosi, many ers did not even want to implement the party line, ‘or what they think is the party line’, and intended to force their will on the other parties, instead of using powers of conviction. The result was ‘where even one of these comrades works, the National Unity falls to pieces’.37 In the routine condemnations fired off at the Council, not just the doctrinal stubbornness of the  generation was attacked, but also the forcefulness of the local party bosses. Zoltán Vas roundly condemned the ‘little kings’ and ‘dictators’ who were ‘dizzy with power’ and ruining it for the party.38 Gerő sneered at ‘left-wing phrase-heroes’ who were compromising and isolating the party. As a prominent ‘home’ and known left-wing communist, László Rajk’s opinion on inner-party ‘sectarianism’ was particularly relevant, and Rajk wholly supported the policy of National Unity and attacks against the radicals. In Rajk’s view, the party would have a real problem if the ‘sectarians’ were not ejected from the party soon. They had described the demands for a war of liberation as ‘opportunist’ and a policy of compromise, and had been harping on differences of opinion between the returning Muscovites and the ‘home’ leadership. Rajk assured the Council that there were no such differences, but that the ‘home’ leaders had awaited the return of the Muscovites with the greatest ‘impatience, happiness, and love’.39 Rajk also emphasized the Central Committee’s role in preparing the National Party Council’s resolution, which was mainly an attack on the left-wing excesses in the party.40 But Szobek, the representative from Békés, remained pessimistic about the chances to get the correct line through to the party members on the ground while wartime destruction made communication impossible,41 and the Party Council did not prove adequate to suppress radicalism. At a meeting of the Area Committee in Debrecen, district representatives spoke about fears that the party would fall apart under the strain of the new line, or worries held by local activists that the ‘final goals’ would not be met after all.42 A party instructor in the Győr area related how, at a demonstration in Tarkony, ‘worked-up left-wingers’ had promised to 37 40

PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –.

38 41

PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –.

39 42

PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –.




‘break some heads’, and beaten up several people who had refused to join their procession. When he attempted to explain the new line to the gathered ers, this provoked a ‘sharp discussion’, during which several party members left the room. Similar attacks on the party line occurred in the village of Mosonmagyaróvár, in north-east Hungary near the Slovak border.43 In June Rákosi wrote to Dimitrov that the party membership had taken well to the criticism, but there had as yet been few practical results.44 When Rákosi met Dimitrov in Moscow later that month, he listed as one of the party’s chief difficulties ‘left-wing communists, village dictators, and people who work in the police and commit stupidities in the name of the communist party’.45 In his speech before the Central Committee of  August , Rákosi claimed the complaints against ‘left-wing excesses and little village kings’ were as bad as ever. According to Central Committee member Ferenc Dónáth, the local party members were simply ignoring instructions from above.46 Rákosi’s words seemed to have little effect. At the next Central Committee meeting, on  November, he once again put forward the problem of ‘left-wing excesses’ by local party secretaries. Significant results had still not been achieved: in many places the party was not only isolated from the population as a whole but even from the ‘democratic’ elements among them. In ‘a whole series’ of National Committees the MKP found itself in direct opposition to the other three parties. Again Rákosi called for urgent change in the situation; the goal was that the party was not only to be respected but also loved, ‘otherwise the party’s influence will not grow as our struggle demands’.47 In December , László Rajk was charged with quashing a rebellion of former Demény supporters in Csepel, near Budapest. Besides accusing Demény of being a police spy and agent provocateur, Rajk staunchly supported the policy of National Unity, and attempted to convince the Csepel workers by pointing to similar policies in the surrounding countries and stressing its tactical nature: ‘We know very well that the tactic of the MKP, all that is happening in Hungary today, is not an isolated incident. In the whole of Europe such a political situation has been created, which gives Leninism’s new tactic success, and new strategic possibilities for the attainment of Socialism.’ Neither in Yugoslavia, nor in Bulgaria, had the communists unleashed revolution. ‘Has Dimitrov, the legendary hero of the nation and the working class, denied Lenin and Stalin in Bulgaria? We 43 45 46

44 PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –. Volokitina et al. (eds.), Sovietskiy faktor, –, . 47 PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –.




have not heard that he called the workers to revolution. We have not heard that this was the goal of the Bulgarian Communist Party.’48 * * * That the ‘national line’ was a Soviet, rather than a domestic Hungarian invention was made abundantly clear by its reception in Hungary after the Second World War. ‘Home’ leaders Rajk and Kállai did not put the nation centre stage, as Révai had done. The policy was thoroughly objected to and only grudgingly carried out by many of the ‘home’ communists. The real dividing line, however, did not run between ‘home’ communists and Muscovites, but between the party leadership and the rank and file, especially the veterans of  and illegality. ‘Home’ leaders such as Rajk not only followed, but implemented the party line. At the same time, some Muscovite leaders complained that the MKP’s line went too far. Rezső Szántó, as the VKP(b)’s official representative at the MKP, disapprovingly noted that the party’s line meant ‘wiping out the traditions of proletarian dictatorship’,49 and in a report to the VKP(b) noted the shame for the revolution of  was ‘laughable’.50 Complaints about local party radicalism persisted until the end of the coalition years,51 but became less of a headache for the party leadership. With the re-establishment of transport and communications, through a system of party schools and courses in Marxism and the employment of a network of party instructors, it became easier to coordinate the party line centrally. Most importantly, the ers were swamped by the huge growth in membership: in , only  out of , functionaries, or  per cent, had been party members before , and tended to serve in middle-ranking posts in the counties. In the districts, the pre- generation had been almost entirely replaced: it took up only . per cent of leading positions.52 The eclipse of the pre-war generation made it easier for the MKP to present itself as a national party. 49 PIL /, –. 50 PIL /, . PIL ./, –. BMKT //, –; PIL / [nov .-i propaganda értekezlet (Propaganda Committee of  November), Nov. ]. 52 MOL ./, –. 48 51



The Heirs of Kossuth, Petőfi, and Táncsics (December –March ) To be credible as a national party, it was not adequate to deflect attacks on the MKP’s national reputation, but also necessary to present a positive national image. Reminiscent of the VKP(b)’s exploitation of Russian national figures, the MKP used Hungarian national symbols, such as the national flag, national heroes, and national celebrations, to underline its national character, depicted Hungarian history as an age-long struggle for national and social liberation, and pronounced itself the only heir to all of Hungary’s progressive national traditions, especially the anti-Habsburg revolution of . In contrast with this positive ‘patriotism’, it formally denounced ‘reactionary’ Hungarian nationalism of the Horthy years, which it dubbed ‘chauvinist’. This did not stop the MKP from appropriating some of the heroes of Horthy Hungary, such as St Stephen, the founder of the Hungarian state. In day-to-day politics, the party portrayed itself as the only party that could truly represent the interest of the Hungarian people, claimed to be the main binding force of the Hungarian National Independence Front (MNFF), the engine behind reconstruction, supported policies with evident national connotations such as the ruthless punishment of ‘traitors’, and presented less obviously patriotic measures in a ‘national’ light. Besides aiming at presenting the MKP in favourable, national colours, a second goal came to the surface, which was the establishment of a ‘new’ or ‘true’ patriotism to counter the nationalist propaganda of the Horthy years. Before the party could realize this ambition, the party’s propaganda was limited to the strictly utilitarian purpose of giving the MKP a sympathetic, and therefore national, image. This proved a difficult task as party radicals still refused to carry out the national line, despite detailed instructions by the party leadership and assurances about its ultimately tactical nature. The ‘national line’ had originated in the Soviet Union, and during the war the MKP’s national propaganda had often been subjected word for word



The Heirs of Kossuth, Petőfi, and Táncsics

F. . ‘The heir of Rákóczi, Kossuth, Peto˝fi—the Hungarian Communist Party.’ This poster appeared on the smouldering walls of Budapest even before the war was over. Prince Ferenc Rákóczi, leader of the 18th-century anti-Austrian rebellion, was later replaced by  peasant radical Mihály Táncsics.




to Soviet censors in Glavlit or the Comintern bureaucracy. At the end of , Soviet authorities decisively influenced the literal text of major party documents. After liberation, however, such constant supervision became unworkable. The MKP leadership was left to fill in the content of its national policy on its own, within the margins set by the Soviets. From Hungarian archives, recent literature,1 and publication of Soviet documents a clearer image emerged of the nature of Soviet control over the MKP. In Hungary itself, most contacts ran through local Soviet authorities: Ambassador Pushkin at the Soviet embassy, Voroshilov and later Sviridov at the Allied Control Commission, and NKVD officials such as Fyodor Belkin. The party also had formal contacts with the All Union Communist Party through the Hungarian desk at the International Department of the Central Committee of the VKP(b). In Moscow itself the MKP had a permanent representative at the Central Committee of the Soviet Party in Rezs ő Szántó, who simultaneously acted as an informant on internal MKP affairs to the Soviet comrades. As far as can be told, no formal competences for these various lines of communication were established, though one principle was clear: the Soviet party made the ultimate decisions. This did not mean the Hungarian communists were helpless puppets jiggled by Soviet masters. They took initiatives of their own and were consulted on major issues. They considered themselves better judges of the Hungarian situation, were known occasionally to obstruct Soviet wishes, and were certainly not always pleased with Soviet intervention in MKP policy. Révai once threw aside a Soviet ideological instruction with the derisive remark ‘we know Moscow, we know what kind of stuff usually comes from there’ and on another occasion berated Pushkin behind his back: ‘why is he interfering in the matter?’2 High-level contacts were very rare. Even Rákosi only occasionally met or spoke to Stalin directly, and usually had to deal with him through Voroshilov, Molotov, and Dimitrov, who often derisively treated him as a subordinate. Rather than using the comradely German ‘Du’ or Russian ‘Ty’, Rákosi addressed them in writing with the formal ‘Sie’ or ‘Vas’. Voroshilov considered Rákosi a politician ‘of medium stature’,3 and Dimitrov harshly censured him when necessary. In Moscow, for instance, the following exchange took place when discussing trials of war criminals: Rákosi: ‘. . . A number of important Fascists were caught by the English and Americans, but the Americans and English will not let us see them.’ 1 2

See especially Baráth, ‘Pártközi kapcsolatok’ and Földesi, Szövetséges ellenőrző bizottság. 3 PIL /, –. Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. –.




Dimitrov: ‘That the Americans and English won’t let you is understandable, but that you do not put this on the agenda in your press and speeches is incomprehensible.’4

Rákosi briefed Dimitrov in long letters about the situation in Hungary, but there are no indications that Dimitrov answered or even read just one of Rákosi’s letters, though officials at the Department for International Information, such as Baranov, did.5 Several times, Rákosi asked Dimitrov for a response to his letters. Rákosi’s relationship with Stalin was even worse. When requesting help with the Slovak issue, he addressed Stalin so submissively that he seemed little more than a provincial party apparatchik: ‘I know how busy you are, but an important question has arisen here that cannot be solved without your assistance.’6 Consequently, the party leadership was often in the dark about Soviet intentions. For Rákosi, this was intolerable. At the dissolution of the Comintern in , the first step he had taken before he took up a position was to assure himself that Stalin agreed with the measure.7 Similarly, Rákosi did not desire to make any mistakes now, and endeavoured to gauge Moscow’s will as early as possible: ‘It would be a great support for us if we could hear your opinion and advice. I have to admit that we are a bit embarrassed by the fact that we do not hear anything about whether our policies are correct or not. We see it as a sign of trust; still, it would be better if we could hear your opinion anyway.’8 That Rákosi was anxious to please illustrates the nature of Soviet control over the MKP. While Soviet authorities frequently intervened in Hungarian political life and the policies of the MKP, gave instructions, and called the party leaders to Moscow for consultation, Soviet command frequently left the party to work out what was required of it by itself. It was normal for national parties to guess at Soviet intentions and pre-empt them on their own initiative. For instance, when asked by Ágnes Ságvári why the MKP decided to create National Committees if they intended to do away with them later, Gerő replied: ‘Listen here. Stalin invited me over, and when I was waiting in the anteroom, de Gaulle stepped out of his office, and I knew that they had established the French coalition under de Gaulle’s leadership. I did not even have to ask Stalin. After they established [national] committees of that nature in Czechoslovakia as well, I knew we would have to make a coalition too.’9 4 6 9

Volokitina et al. (eds.), Sovetskiy faktor, –. 7 Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, –. Ibid. i. . Ságvári, Mert nem hallgathatok, .

5 8

Ibid. –. PIL ./, .




There were clear similarities between the content of the national propaganda of the Czechoslovak and Hungarian parties. The Czechoslovak communists also presented themselves as both the heir to national traditions and the true representative of the interests of Czechoslovakia. It is likely explicit guidelines had been established in discussions with Dimitrov, Pushkin, Voroshilov, and others. But to a large degree, the MKP constructed its national policy on its own, in line with what it thought would be acceptable to Moscow and was compatible with doctrine. The one guiding factor was that, no matter how disadvantageous to the party’s national policy, it could not contradict the interests of the Soviet Union.      According to the MKP Propaganda Department, party propaganda was not merely aimed at winning support, but at establishing ‘the freedom of the peoples and of peace between the peoples’, and ‘awakening the consciousness of the working class’.10 In other words, the party strove to win not just votes, but also converts to communism. As long as the party was still struggling to attain even basic popularity, this broader ambition was lost in the practice of day-to-day propaganda, which was above all directed at making the MKP as palatable as possible, by minimizing the communist character of the party and asserting that it served the interests of the Hungarian people as a whole. This meant the party tailored propaganda to its audience. The party press, Révai emphasized, was ‘written for the people, and not for communists’, and should therefore be relatively mild in nature.11 He told propagandists to refrain from a threatening and violent attitude. The door-to-door ‘house agitation’ was deliberately intended to mobilize the apolitical and ‘indifferent, backward masses’ to vote, and this could not be done by discussing grand political issues, but only by concentrating on everyday questions. Workers should be approached by other workers rather than members of the intelligentsia, and vice versa. If possible, propaganda among women should be conducted by ‘women comrades’, who better understood the daily problems of Budapest housewives.12 In the countryside, propagandists had to address local issues besides national ones, speak in understandable 10 12

PIL ./, –. PIL /, –.

11

MTAKK, MS ., –.




language with the peasants, listen to their problems, and not ‘simply answer their questions with the usually constructed and often trite propaganda slogans’.13 Besides Révai, Rákosi urged his propagandists to appear ‘sympathetic’, and adjust their propaganda to rural conditions. As a model, he referred to American election campaigns, where politicians showed an interest in daily life and were popularly called ‘baby kissers’. Small things needed to be taken into account: for instance, in the countryside female propagandists should not wear glasses or smoke, as this made a bad impression. The word ‘reaction’ had to be avoided in the villages, as it was not understood there.14 MKP leaders made it clear that, for tactical purposes, the content of propaganda did not always have to be in line with the party’s true goals. At a preparatory meeting for the October  Budapest elections, Révai told the campaign agitators: ‘we communists should not fear—I say it within quotation marks—being “right-wingers”.’15 The MKP and Social Democratic Party were on a single list during these elections, but Révai stressed that the alliance with the Social Democrats was of a purely tactical nature: ‘It is not the word that is important, but the result. We will not be able to cause the destruction of the right-wing Social Democrats if we attack them loudly . . . the best way is seriously to carry out the election struggle with Social Democratic workers, functionaries, and organizations. This way we will undermine the right-wing influence and “kick them out”.’16 Similarly, Révai urged propagandists to take the utmost care with the clergy: ‘attack is the best defence, but in the question of the Church we can only defend.’ He forbade them from attacking Christ, the Church, or religion in general, but demanded they should make it clear the party would not bother the Church, whilst adding the threat: ‘we will act against those who attack us.’17 The communists should not stress their materialism and atheism, but instead underline that there was much in ancient Christianity that resembled communism. ‘A communist never lies, but can leave out certain things if necessary.’18 Rákosi claimed the party was most successful where it could prevent hostility from the local priest and teacher, and it was necessary to cultivate good relations to prove to the priest that the communists were not so bad after all. ‘[W]e can

13 15 17

MTAKK, MS ., –. PIL ./, –. MTAKK, MS ., –.

14 16 18

PIL /, –. PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –.




easily (nyugodtan) say that the communist party will not lay a hand on the Church.’19 The content of the party’s propaganda was dictated by the desired end result. In difficult issues, such as repressive measures against peasants to feed the starving cities, the propagandists should speak the truth and explain these were necessary measures in difficult times. Révai told the agitators nevertheless to ‘wrap these bitter truths in a wafer, because if they are too bitter, the people won’t swallow them’.20 Révai warned against ‘crude demagoguery’ and the giving of exaggerated, untenable promises, but concluded: ‘elections are elections. Now we have to give promises more vigorously. And that is not really demagoguery, because if the people are behind us, regardless of what we promise, it will become reality.’21 When discussing the ‘front press’, nominally MMNF, but de facto communist newspapers, Révai advocated their deployment in the election struggle, even if it did risk compromising their multi-party façade. ‘Main line: to win this election struggle and resort to any means in this interest, that is more important, than protecting [their] appearance.’22 The same all-or-nothing utilitarian view was true of the election campaign as a whole. While stating there would be no corruption, Révai promised the party would fully exploit any lead it had: ‘We have more cars than others, we are the leading party of Hungarian democracy and will not be ashamed to utilize our political and technical advantages. Let them cry later that they were clean in the elections.’23 Party propaganda went beyond merely adjusting the tone of the message to the audience, but also involved the spreading of half-truths and blatantly non-communist ideas to gain support. To make this digestible to the party activists, the party leaders created a conspiratorial atmosphere where deception and cunning were lauded as virtues. This came especially to the fore in front organizations such as the MNDSz which attempted to hide their communist character, in order to gain support from the other parties of the National Front. At a meeting of MNDSz activists in August , Rákosi praised the ‘wiliness’ of one communist MNDSz organizer, who, when locally setting up a meeting, had ignored the communists, and instead first approached the Social Democrats and the priest, in order to hide the communist character of the MNDSz. Deception was made into a virtue by claiming it was not really deception at all. ‘We have heard of comparable cunning, which is not really cunning but clever political 19 22

PIL /, –. Ibid.

20 23

MTAKK, MS .. Ibid.

21

PIL ./, –.




reflection,’ explained Rákosi. Half-truths and manipulation rather than outright lies characterized this approach. Rákosi emphasized that the women should under no circumstances deny being communists, when asked directly, because ‘sooner or later it will come to light anyway, and then we will lose our political credibility’, but at the same time they should not ‘make a show’ of their party membership. The communist party badge was for wearing among party members; at MNDSz meetings the women should wear ‘the, by the way, pretty and fitting badge of the MNDSz’.24 Such tactical elasticity or, as Rákosi phrased it, ‘everyday dialectics’ was not just a means to an end, but the basis of MKP propaganda, which made it possible for party activists and propagandists to adjust to the party line regardless of their own opinions. Rákosi was especially keen to stress the tactical nature of propaganda, and told his propagandists to ‘learn from the enemy’, which he illustrated with his own experiences in the Szeged Csillag prison. ‘When I was inside together with the Fascists, I questioned them in detail about what they had learned from Goebbels’ people.’ He explained how local Nazi agitation groups of three or four good friends targeted individuals. They first talk about general subjects, and then adjust their propaganda to their audience. ‘If he wasn’t anti-Semitic, they would even praise the Jews. If he was an alcoholic, they would drink together.’25 : -  The lengths to which the MKP was prepared to go are best illustrated by its response to post-war anti-Semitism. The communists were frequently portrayed not only as a ‘Russian’ party, but also as a Jewish one. In a country with a strong undercurrent of anti-Semitism, the MKP was adamant to counter its Jewish image, by taking measures against Jews in the party and by itself using anti-Semitic propaganda against opponents. Already before the end of the war, the Muscovite party leadership was apprehensive about its Jewish image, and made attempts to reduce it by keeping Jews away from public view. In April , Dezs ő Nemes was forbidden to do illegal party work in Hungary on grounds of his Jewish appearance.26 While the possibility of his arrest might still have played a role here, this was no longer the case in August, when Farkas informed 24 26

25 PIL /, –. PIL /, –. Korom, ‘Magyar kommunista emigráció’, .




Rákosi of the establishment of the Fourth Ukrainian Front: ‘The target of the new Front is Hungary. Gather all capable Christian Hungarians and Jews of non-Jewish appearance—these we will need in the first place.’27 At a meeting on  November , Molotov reassured the negotiating Hungarian generals that there would be no question of Jews out of the Hungarian émigré communists becoming members of the government,28 an order which according to Rákosi had come direct from Stalin.29 Care was taken with the returning communist party leadership as well: the Jewish Zoltán Vas was informed that he would not be made a member of the top party leadership, the ‘Christian’ Imre Nagy would take this place instead,30 as there already was a majority of Jews in the returning leadership.31 Besides attempting to adjust the party’s Jewish image by keeping Jews out of public view, the party ignored the Jews altogether in its political programme. During the October discussions in Moscow, Rezső Szántó complained that Révai’s draft Action Programme did not contain any reference to the punishment of crimes against the Jews.32 His comment was quietly ignored. General pledges to arrest war criminals were made, but no specific mention was made of the Jews. The post-war Jewish perception of the MKP was mostly influenced by the visibility of Jews in the party leadership. Most important party functions remained in the hands of the pre-liberation generation, which meant that the composition of the Politburo, Central Committee, editorial boards, and County and District Committees reflected the larger pre-war proportion of Jews. Out of the five Muscovite leaders, Rákosi, Gerő, Farkas, and Révai were all Jews, while only Imre Nagy was of Hungarian peasant stock. The post-war Jewish members tended to be active, and ended up in functions where they were very visible and bound to be unpopular, such as the communist-dominated police and the communistcontrolled state security organization, which were attractive to Jews because they offered opportunities for justice, revenge, or simply an easy route to the regaining of stolen property. Some Jews joined out of the idealistic motive of saving the Hungarian people by purging it of its Fascist remnants; for others entering the police force was a contribution to the creation of a new Jewish identity: not weak and persecuted, but strong and vengeful.33 As Jews were considered inherently reliable for the task of rooting out Arrow Cross supporters, ‘Fascists’, and war criminals, they 27 29 31 33

28 Ibid. . Rainer, Nagy Imre, i. . 30 Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, i. . Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc, . 32 Korom, ‘Magyar kommunista emigráció’, . PIL /, –. Szabó, Kommunista Párt és a zsidóság, .




were gratefully accepted by the new regime. There are no reliable estimates for the number of Jews in the secret police, but the usual figure presented is that  to  per cent of top ÁVO positions were taken up by Jews, which was originally presented in an intelligence report by a defector to the United States.34 Correct or not, the high figure at least reflects the contemporary perception of the ‘Jewish’ character of the ÁVO. Rákosi later quite strongly criticized the party’s enlistment of Jews: ‘At this time there was a general view that the Jew that had survived the horrors of Nazism was, if not a communist, then definitely a democrat . . . I remember that in –, in those issues, when the question was on the taking of some petit bourgeois Jew into the party, it was enough to say that he had been in Auschwitz, that the Nazis had killed three of his relatives, and that was enough reason to take him into the party.’35 Rákosi soon reported to Dimitrov on the effect the returning Jews were having on the image of the party: ‘A new danger is the appearance of returning Jews, who used to be in the labour battalions and are now returning home. They present themselves as born anti-Fascists and become members of our party . . . In north-west Hungary—as in Budapest itself—the party is perceived as strongly Judaized . . . a significant number of these former forced labourers have proven to be corrupt careerists and they cause great damage to the image of the party.’36 One month later, at a meeting of Budapest party activists, Rákosi addressed the ‘exceedingly difficult question’ of the ‘Jewish forced labourers that infiltrated the party’. Rákosi accused the returning Jews of believing themselves to be ‘born communists’ or at the very least ‘born anti-Fascists’, who were accepted into the party with compassion due to their past suffering, but in most cases turned out to be enriching themselves. In the villages the party consisted of simple workers and peasants, and there ‘one such forced labourer’ could cause ‘colossal damage’.37 On the meeting of party activists of  March, Gerő launched an attack against Jews. While formally denouncing anti-Semitism, he promised the party would ‘most decisively’ take position against ‘various Jewish municipal councils’ who, in Gerő’s words ‘desire that Hungarian Jewry lives in a state within the state, and who endeavour to turn Hungarian Jewry not against Hungarian reaction and German Fascism, but against the Hungarian people’.38 Gerő wanted to rid the party of its Jewish image by showing the party was tough against Jews. This was done with such 34 36

Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc, . 37 PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –.

35

MOL ./, –. 38 PIL ./, –.




efficacy that Rákosi wrote to Dimitrov on the issue: ‘We are fighting this danger, and as a result in many towns we count almost as anti-Semites,’39 and pointed out to the Budapest party activists that the MKP was now known both as a Jewish and an anti- Semitic party: ‘I have to say, that I am afraid there is some truth in both.’40 Both Gerő and Rákosi declined to specify exactly what methods were used in the attempt to rid the MKP of its Jewish image. Besides publicly attacking returning Jews, the MKP conducted a covert anti-Semitic propaganda campaign, in which it exploited the general hatred of the black market, and attempted to depict the FKGP as a Jewish party. Under the Horthy regime, years of propaganda had depicted black marketeers as Jews,41 and by  the two had become synonymous.42 According to János Pelle, the MKP printed pamphlets and posters against black market ‘parasites’, where the Semitic features of the caricatures of black marketeers left no doubt as to the origins of the persecuted profiteers.43 The satirical weekly Ludas Matyi was printed on the MKP party press Szikra, and at the time seen as a communist paper;44 anti-Semitic cartoons appeared occasionally.45 Before the national elections of  November , Rákosi gave a speech before a group of instructors who were to implement the party’s line in the countryside. He told them that antiSemitism played an important role in the villages, and that it should be addressed. Rákosi urged the instructors to blame the failed Budapest elections of  October on Jewish black marketeers. The propagandists should claim ‘that we struggle against black marketeers, and in Budapest a large part of the Jews, who occupy themselves with black marketeering, with money, voted for the Smallholders, because the Communist party pursues them’.46 Like Gerő, Rákosi also exhorted the instructors to denounce antiSemitism, as ‘the Germans and Arrow Cross had started with that and then robbed the entire nation’. Rákosi, however, did not want this to compromise the party, and warned that anti-Semitism could only be attacked in small circles, as at mass meetings it would provoke unanswerable calls from the floor.47 The MKP leadership was intent on presenting a party that was acceptable to most Hungarians, and instructed its propagandists to use whatever 40 PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –. 42 Varga, ‘Miskolci népítélet’, . Braham, Politics of Genocide, –. 43 Pelle, ‘A miskolci konstruált vérvád’, . 44 According to LM caricaturist Tibor Kaján: www.myv.hu/musorok/ szazadunk/20011027. 45 46 47 See p. 98. PIL /, –. Ibid. 39 41




F. . Communist anti-Semitic propaganda. Smallholder leader Ferenc Nagy is portrayed as a Jew in Ludas Matyi, a satirical magazine printed by the MKP’s party press Szikra.




means were necessary to accomplish this. By lauding tactical flexibility and praising deception and the presentation of half-truths for political purposes, the leadership created a political culture in which it was possible for activists to put forward whatever line was appropriate. The overall image the party hoped to convey was that of being acceptable and sympathetic, illustrated by the ‘baby kissing’ and the ‘if possible pretty, friendly girls’ who could be found leafleting on election day, ‘so that the last impression the voter going towards the polling station gets of our party will be pleasant’.48       The key to appearing sympathetic was to appear national. The Propaganda Department received that particular name, rather than the more traditional ‘Agitprop Department’, because the latter was not considered ‘Hungarian sounding’ (magyaros) enough, whereas the word ‘propaganda’ had ‘already struck roots in the Hungarian language’.49 Like the goals of communist propaganda in general, the stated aims of communist national propaganda were not simply to make the party appear national, but also to spread the party’s views on patriotism and nationalism through the population. The Propaganda Department claimed the ‘fostering of true love of the Fatherland’ as one of the main aims of communist propaganda,50 and Révai himself wanted to ‘build modesty into Hungarian self-consciousness’, in contrast to the national ‘megalomania’ of the Horthy period, and in fact already perceived a ‘new national consciousness’ and a ‘new national pride’ developing in Hungary which would eliminate ‘chauvinism and national arrogance’.51 As long as the MKP was still in general considered an unpatriotic party, such goals were overly ambitious, and it had to concentrate on establishing its national image. Shortly after the liberation of Budapest, a poster appeared on the still smouldering walls of the city with the text ‘The heir of Rákóczi, Kossuth, Petőfi—the Hungarian Communist Party’.52 With this slogan, the MKP presented itself as the natural successor to Hungary’s national freedom struggles. It concentrated on the national and social revolution of  and laid claim to the anti-Habsburg wars of Prince Ferenc Rákóczi. To emphasize the contemporary parallels, however, the MKP presented the Germans rather than the Austrians as Hungary’s historical enemies. 48 51

49 PIL /, –. PIL /, –. MTAKK, /, b, –.

50 52

PIL ./, –. SKPA, A/.




For the celebration of  March, the MKP Propaganda Department issued a guideline (vezérfonal), in which it laid down the party’s official view on the revolution of . According to the guideline,  March commemorated the rising of the people of Budapest against ‘the foreign and domestic enemies of Hungary’s freedom and independence, the Germans and their Hungarian accomplices’.53 Now, the masses had to get to their feet for the same reason as in March , namely ‘to gain national independence against the Germans and democracy against the reaction’. As in , all issues were interconnected: those who desired land reform, democracy, and the destruction of the ‘Fascist and feudal reaction’ also had to preach and fight for national liberation, and those who longed for national independence also had to aspire to a ‘new emancipation of serfs’, the ‘extermination’ of Arrow Cross traitors, and the ‘victory of democracy’. As in , traitors had to be punished and the land reform had to be implemented. The ‘twelve points’ of the March Youth now were summarized in three words: ‘Land! Bread! Freedom!’ However, in contrast to , when Hungary had fought at the spearhead of the free nations of the world, Hungary had now borne arms against them, and had to wash off the shame of fighting on the side of the ‘German Fascists’. While the revolution of  had failed, the chances of success had now improved. In  Hungary had stood alone; today it sided with all the free nations of the world, and ‘the best army in the World, the Red Army’ was ‘our comrade in arms’. Then, ‘the German oppressor was strong and powerful’, now it was about to be destroyed. At the time, it was doubtful whether the Hungarian freedom struggle could be victorious, but in the changed circumstances, victory was inevitable.54 The Propaganda Department gave instructions to use quotes from Petőfi, such as ‘Destroy the scoundrels at home!’ and ‘On your feet, Hungarians, the Fatherland calls!’ and issued slogans referring to the antiHabsburg uprising and war of independence: ‘In the spirit of Kossuth— democratic people’s army!’, ‘The heir of Kossuth, Petőfi, Táncsics—the Hungarian Communist Party!’, ‘Long live the new Hungarian struggle for independence!’, ‘We will crush the reaction in the spirit of  March,’55 ‘On your feet Hungarians, down with the reaction!’, and ‘Long live the leader of the new Hungarian freedom struggle, Mátyás Rákosi!’56 This was a reversal of pre-war KMP policy. Before the policies of the Seventh Congress took shape in Hungary in the form of the  ‘March Front’, the party had still ridiculed any relevance of the  revolution to 53

PIL ./, –.

54

Ibid.

55

Ibid.

56

PIL /, –.




the contemporary struggle of the labour movement. Even though it started to celebrate  March from  onward, the KMP did not go as far as claiming to be the heir of Hungary’s national traditions. Nevertheless, the MKP’s assertions were not entirely outlandish. As a revolutionary party, it made sense to appropriate national revolutionary traditions, and even if the party had not always celebrated national heroes, the international communist movement had always called for national liberation. Révai did not deny the change in policy, but instead argued that ‘true patriots’ should be glad that parts of the population which had previously rejected the national colours now no longer saw a contradiction between the red of class struggle and the ‘three colours of the homeland’.57 To convince non-communists that it was possible to be patriots and communists simultaneously, and depict competing images of the nation as unpatriotic, Révai presented the opposing notions of ‘patriotism’ and ‘chauvinism’ in a speech at Budapest’s Technical University.58 Patriots loved their land of birth, culture, and people, and did not contrast this with that of other nations, but understood that they too loved their own country. Chauvinists, on the other hand, scorned other peoples. ‘True patriotism’, according to Révai, did not entail the opposing of the democratic aspirations of other peoples, but meant the solidarity between peoples and democracies. The workers’ movement therefore supported, besides ‘love of the Hungarian Fatherland’, the brotherhood of nations, solidarity of democracies, and the ‘interdependence of workers’, without regard to nations or national borders. The Polish General Bem’s support for the Hungarians in the – war of independence showed, according to Révai, that this international solidarity was part of Hungarian national traditions.59 Révai did not portray this point of view as a communist one, but instead quoted Ady to illustrate it: ‘nationalism is enraged patriotism, not even that.’ With this statement, Révai noted, Ady was merely continuing the ‘traditions of the great Hungarian humanists and thinkers.’ But in preparing the speech, Révai had more likely looked to Lenin, rather than Ady, for inspiration. Among his preparatory notes are several paragraphs copied in longhand from Lenin’s ‘On the National Pride of the Great Russians’—to which there was further no explicit reference in the text of the speech.60 Révai stated, ‘to love the homeland is to love human progress’, then paraphrased Ady and cited Kölcsey (‘we choose as slogan 57 60

MTAKK, MS ./, a. MTAKK, MS ./, c.

58

Ibid.

59

Ibid.




country and progress’) to illustrate this was a continuation of the ‘traditions of the great Hungarian humanists and patriots’.61 But in his preparatory notes, patriotism, humanity, and progress were instead linked to the exclamation ‘Lenin!!’62 Employing this sense of patriotism meant Révai did not place the workers’ movement within all national traditions. He denounced the ‘chauvinist’ tradition, the ‘megalomania of greater Hungary’, ensconced in the ‘idea of St Stephen’, the notion that Hungary’s modern borders should coincide with the borders of medieval Hungary, which proclaimed that Hungary alone had a right to rule in the Carpathian basin. This was unpatriotic, Révai argued, because Hungary’s hegemony over the minorities historically had only been ‘kept afloat with German aid’. To be hegemonic, Hungary had always had to hand over part or all of its independence to the Germans. The ideal of St Stephen’s Hungary had led directly to the current catastrophe. This did not mean the party rejected St Stephen himself. Révai himself called St Stephen ‘a truly great Hungarian king’.63 The MKP claimed that it had played a major role in reestablishing the Hungarian state on the ruins of the ‘destroyed semi-feudal reactionary state’ and, in doing so, had ‘literally’ done ‘St Stephen’s work’.64 The MKP constructed this elaborate national self-image for utilitarian purposes, and took part in national celebrations in the first place to enhance its national image. It decided that  March was to be the ‘colossal mustering of democratic, independent Hungary’.65 The lower organizations of the MKP were instructed to take part in the celebrations ‘with all their strength’, to turn them into an ‘imposing mass demonstration of gigantic proportions’. As was the case with party propaganda in general, the communist participation in the  March celebrations served a conscious political goal: it was designed to demonstrate that the MKP was the ‘cementing force of national unity’, and the ‘main force’ of the MNFF.66 The combined celebration with the coalition parties was described as ‘a weapon in the struggle against the reaction’, from which the claims to national leadership were to appear: ‘from the joint demonstration must appear, that the our party is the leading force of the national independence front.’ For this reason, the propaganda could not be only purely national in character, but had also to stress the party’s own character, ‘both 61 63 65

MTAKK, MS ./, a. MTAKK, MS ., –. PIL ./, –.

62 64 66

MTAKK, MS ./, c. MTAKK, MS ./, –. Ibid.




outwardly, and in the speeches of speakers’. The marchers therefore had to carry ‘not solely national, but also red coloured flags’.67 A main concern for the propaganda department was not only the national appearance of the MKP externally, but also its acceptance by the party activists. The fact that the Propaganda Department had to send out detailed instructions shows that the MKP’s national image was far from taken for granted. The Propaganda Department concluded that ‘the success of the celebrations depends on the extent to which the importance of the celebration will successfully be drummed into our party membership’. With the convincing of its own members in mind, the Propaganda Department organized a special Party Day, with as sole goal the ‘appreciation of  March’.68 The party members were instructed already to start wearing a specially designed Petőfi badge, and to prepare and popularize national-coloured cockades embellished with the MKP slogan ‘Land! Bread! Freedom!’ The party headquarter was to be decorated with images of Kossuth, Petőfi, and Táncsics.69 The party leadership used the same tactical arguments as it used in the rest of its propaganda. Party activists were told that they disagreed with the renaming of a mine from ‘St Stephen mine’ to ‘Rákosi mine’: ‘There should certainly be a different mine that could be given that name. If we change the name of St Stephen, that will have a really bad effect.’70 Rákosi explained to the women activists in MNDSz that the communists now should also sing the national anthem and carry national flags besides the red ones. The ‘suspicious masses’ would sooner enter the MNDSz if it displayed a national image, and it would be a ‘big problem’ if the communist women failed to understand the importance of emphasizing the party’s national character. Even more so than the party itself, the MNDSz should present a ‘healthy, democratic, national spirit’, which to Rákosi meant ‘that there the national flag should dominate and there should, as far as possible, not even be red banners’. But to reassure his audience, he immediately added, to large applause: ‘those whose heart aches a lot because of this, can look at just the red out of the red, white, and green.’ 71 Fears that the party members would not take to the sudden celebration of previously ignored or derided figures later proved justified. According to Farkas, a ‘left-wing bloc’ within the Pécs party organization saw the MNFF as a ‘forced marriage’ and had obstructed the celebrations. When they ‘aligned the party members in marching columns, several members of the party stated that they 67 70

PIL /, –. PIL ./, –.

68

Ibid.

69 71

PIL ./, –. PIL /, –.




were not prepared to march under the national flag’.72 Very likely, the party activists had taken the command not to forget the party’s own character to heart. Some of the instructions were simply confusing: in Esztergom, the youth organization MADISz had denounced St Stephen as a ‘cut-throat scoundrel German hireling’. Révai spurned this ‘historical nonsense’, produced by either a ‘madman’ or a ‘provocateur’. Yet it was very likely his own condemnation of the ‘idea of St Stephen’ as an instrument of Teutonic enslavement that had made the MADISz attack St Stephen as a German agent.73    ’   It was not enough to deck out the party in national symbols, but it had also to be seen to represent Hungarian national interests: ‘The national policy must be proven with facts as well.’74 Since the publication of the party’s Action Programme in November , the party had presented itself as the leader of Hungary’s ‘National Unity’ (nemzeti összefogás) for the cause of national liberation. At the party’s mass meeting in Békéscsaba on  March , Rákosi claimed communists had fought and died under this slogan for the previous ten years.75 While ‘national unity’ was the key political concept used to underline the MKP’s national pretensions, the party also used a wide range of topical issues. In the eyes of the MKP leadership anything was a legitimate national subject: it supported obvious nationally coloured demands such as the expulsion of Hungary’s German minority, and presented other policies that were less immediately national in content, such as reconstruction, as patriotic affairs. Where border revision and the treatment of Hungarians abroad were concerned, the MKP found itself limited by Soviet foreign policy, yet even there delivered a national line. Though at times the party played down the importance of the Russians, in the end it could not deny the link and turned vice into virtue: the party presented the USSR as liberator of Hungary and guardian of Hungary’s interests and independence. As was the case with the celebrations of  March, the claim to be the party representing the national interests of the Hungarian people did not come naturally to most party activists, and required detailed instructions 72 74

PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –.

73

MTAKK, MS ./, –. 75 PIL ./, –.




from above. In his speech ‘What did the MKP do for the Hungarian people?’, József Révai described extensively to party propagandists how the MKP had served the nation’s interests.76 Révai stressed the MKP’s claim to be the most significant force in the national front by arguing that the communists had already been pursuing a policy of National Unity since the s, and portrayed the party as the most significant fighter for national independence, by underlining the party’s struggle for ‘Hungarian independence in the shadow of Hitlerite Germany’. Hungarian communists had fought against Fascism in Spain and France, and the KMP had been the only party to organize armed partisan struggle. Mainly the MKP, Révai claimed, had helped the ruined country to its feet after the war; the party had selflessly ‘breathed life’ into the other parties while they were still foundering in the wartime destruction. The communists had organized local government and the police ‘where others did not want to do this’. The ‘nation-saving role’ of the MKP was further proven by the establishment of the Provisional Government and Parliament in Debrecen, which Révai also ascribed to the MKP. ‘We saved Hungary’s independence,’ said Révai; ‘it is in our interest that there is an independent Hungary and an independent national government for Hungary.’ Révai had a broad comprehension of what constituted national interests. He declared that Zoltán Vas, as commissioner for Budapest, had saved the city from starvation when the other parties had shirked the responsibility, and that Imre Nagy and the party had brought the land reform to a successful conclusion in several weeks. According to Révai, the MKP had fed the workers because it had guaranteed the delivery of agricultural products to the state and was leading the reconstruction of the country, which proved that ‘the nation, the country, can calmly trust the communists with the completion of the most difficult tasks’. At the end of his speech, Révai called upon the propagandists: ‘we have to understand that . . . we explain to the people that the victory of the communist party is in the national interest, and it would be national calamity if the right wing in the democratic parties allied to us achieved serious results.’77 Révai’s understanding of what constituted a national topic meant that the MKP attempted to exploit all possible political questions for their national content. One of the ‘national’ domestic issues that the MKP pursued energetically was the punishment of collaborators. The MKP had already 76

MTAKK, MS ./, –.

77

Ibid.




demanded the expropriation and bringing to justice of ‘traitors to the Fatherland’ in its Action Programme, and it made the punishment of collaborators, especially members of the Arrow Cross, a chief concern, even as the fighting continued. Under the heading ‘fighting democracy’, Révai demanded a ‘relentless’ struggle against the Arrow Cross, and attacked those who showed leniency towards its members for legal or moral reasons. The claim that the communists had betrayed the nation in  and had been responsible for the dismemberment of Hungary at Trianon had cost them dearly during the inter-war years. Révai now constructed a stab in the back legend around the Arrow Cross. According to Révai, the ‘people’s masses’ had to be convinced of the guilt of the Arrow Cross for the national catastrophe and, hence, their everyday problems. Without the Arrow Cross, the country would not be in such a state of destruction, and the ‘Hitlerite dogs’ were responsible for the failing of an armistice in October , which ‘compelled’ the Russians to ‘treat Hungary even today as an enemy country’, so that the ‘German war’ was still destroying the land. Révai wanted to use the punishment of traitors as a means for political mobilization. If the people saw those responsible for their problems suffer, then they would ‘help themselves and the country’; the struggle against the Arrow Cross was a necessity for the establishment of a ‘healthy, national public opinion’.78 The argument was vague; a more obvious motive for Révai was to place all ultimate blame for wartime destruction on the Arrow Cross rather than the advancing Red Army. The first People’s Courts appeared in February , and proceeded with their task immediately. From February  to April , they investigated , people, of whom , ended up in a proceeding, and , were convicted. Of the  death sentences pronounced,  were actually carried out.79 Besides administering justice, the People’s Courts performed a political function, in condemning the old order and underlining its blame for Hungary’s situation. Some contemporaries censured the MKP for stimulating ‘theatrics’ at the trials.80 Executions started before the fighting in the country had yet come to an end, and were carried out in public. In the first week of February , three murderers responsible for the death of  people were condemned to death and hanged several days later from lamp-posts, to an audience of thousands of people on Budapest’s Oktogon square, where the corpses remained on display for three days.81 The MKP loudly supported the executions, handed 78 80 81

79 ‘Magyar’, –. Kiszely, ÁVH, . Kovács, Im Schatten der Soviets, . Pór and Vásárhelyi (eds.), Magyar, –.




out leaflets announcing them, and in public put forward a populist line, showing dissatisfaction with slow-working People’s Courts and demanding the immediate execution of death sentences. At a mass meeting in Békéscsaba, Rákosi complained about the slow sentencing, and the delays in executions caused by needing confirmation from the Ministry of Justice. The People’s Courts should not wait for a response, but carry out the sentence immediately. Rákosi forcefully demanded the carrying out of death penalties: ‘those who have committed serious crimes against the nation, we hand over to the People’s Courts, and if found guilty, they should string them up!’ Smaller fry had to be locked up in labour camps and put to work ‘for the nation,’ as the Hungarian people had a bone to pick with them.82 Propaganda in favour of People’s Courts was one of the favoured topics of the party. ‘Traitors before the People’s Courts’ was one of the main slogans of its  March celebrations.’83 Rákosi was concerned about the lack of major war criminals being tried. In June he complained to Dimitrov that they had as yet not been able to capture any ‘Fascist ministers’, so that only people of ‘tertiary’ importance were being judged. The courts were not always favourable to the party’s national image; Rákosi especially perceived the prosecution of war crimes against Jews as problematic: ‘mostly it concerns people who have done something against Jews, and that is of course not the right thing.’ Most importantly, three-quarters of the suspects were industrial labourers, ‘so that we have now started to release them’.84 The people, Rákosi feared, were in danger of forgetting the crimes of ‘the Fascists’. Dimitrov sharply rebuked Rákosi for not paying enough attention to trials, but Rákosi retorted that the MKP was doing its utmost, repeating that the main obstacle was the lack of arrested Arrow Cross leaders. The arrest of one high-calibre suspect gave some perspective: ‘we have only one general, an adjutant of Horthy, through him we can presently attempt to organize a large trial.’85 But for the time being, the MKP would have to be satisfied with less prominent figures. Following the Potsdam Conference, and the agreement that war criminals were to be tried in the country where they had committed their crimes, Hungary received the prominent suspects Rákosi had been waiting for in the autumn of . The trial of former Prime Minister László Bárdossy was to commence on  October, and Rákosi proposed to use this and other trials to enhance the party’s national image: ‘The party’s national character must be absolutely insisted upon. 82 85

83 PIL /, –. 84 PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –. Volokitina et al. (eds.), Sovetsky faktor, –. It is not clear who Rákosi is referring to.




This will be possible, because they will be holding the Fascist trials and a lot of things will be cleared up.’86 The national character of the prosecution of war criminals was further enhanced by tying it to the post-war land reform. Land reform was one of the key demands of the MKP and the other parties of the MNFF, and, with the majority of the Hungarian population consisting of peasants, a popular move. Dimitrov joked that the MKP was fortunate in having land to divide.87 Land reform had national implications. Not for nothing was it seen by Révai as the central post-war issue.88 It could be said to be in the interest of a large, if not dominant section of the population, would finally bring an end to Hungary’s large landowners, and so was dubbed by the Szabad Magyarország the ‘historically most significant moment of the Hungarian people’.89 The Soviet occupying forces actively intervened in the timetable for implementing the land reform. Initially, the MKP wanted the Provisional Parliament to vote on the land reform in April, upon which the actual redistribution of land would commence after the harvest, on  October.90 The reform was brought forward by the chairman of the Allied Control Commision, Klement Voroshilov, acting with Stalin’s approval, due to the effect it might have on the morale of Hungarian troops still fighting the Red Army.91 This had the advantage that the land reform could now coincide with Hungary’s national holiday,  March. Minister for Agriculture Imre Nagy was, however, unable to present the draft of the decree (no. /) before the meeting of Council of Ministers on  March, where it was accepted unanimously and came into force the next day with its publication in the government’s official journal, the Magyar Közlöny. Nevertheless, the myth was upheld that the land reform commenced on  March: in the deeds handed over to the new landowners, the date of the land reform decree no. / was falsely stated to be  March.92 The communist party not only advocated the land reform in social terms, but also shrouded it with national imagery. Imre Nagy presented it at the Council of Ministers as the ‘century-old dream’ of the ‘Hungarian soil-tilling people’. Nagy personally underlined the national importance of the land reform by commencing the official distribution on  March in 86 88 90 91 92

87 PIL ./, –. Korom, Magyarország ideiglenes nemzeti kormánya, . 89 János, Nagy Imre, i. . ‘Magyar’, –. PIL ./, –; Nagy, ‘As -ös földreforban’, –. Rainer, Nagy Imre, i. , Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, i. . Rainer, Nagy Imre, i. .




Ópusztaszer. 93 This was the legendary site of the Hungarian ‘land-taking’ (honfoglalás), where chieftains of the Hungarian tribes had pledged allegiance to their leader Árpád in  before taking possession of the Carpathian basin. As the legend presumed the Hungarians had been the first to arrive in the area, it had been used in the past by nationalists to justify Hungarian rule over other peoples. It was a central point in the ideology of a ‘thousand-year Hungary’, and had been celebrated with the creation of the Millennium Monument in . Though Nagy did not draw the link explicitly, describing Ópusztaszer rather as ‘one of the old centres of feudalism, the holding of Count Pallavicini’, he framed the land reform in a national context, referring to the revolution of , the landtaking, and the age-old dream of the Hungarian peasantry. ‘Now, almost  years after our Father Kossuth unfurled the flag of the freedom struggle, the hard-working people of the Hungarian soil embark on a new landtaking (új honfoglalás), to take possession of their ancient rights.’ 94 At the Moscow meetings in September , Rákosi had already referred to the land reform as a ‘new land-taking’, and this same phrase was also employed in MNFF newspaper Délmagyarország.95 The MKP appropriated the land reform, and fully exploited the popularity of Imre Nagy as ‘land-distributing ( földosztó) minister’.96 Besides emphasizing the symbolical meaning of the land reform, the MKP also underlined the practical benefits land reform had brought the Hungarian peasants, for which it claimed sole responsibility. The fact that almost all of the committees responsible for dividing up the land were run by communists had initially caused some concern among the MKP leadership, but now Révai claimed that without the Budapest communists aiding the reform, it would have been impossible to complete the land reform in a short number of weeks.97 ‘The Hungarian people can thank us that the land reform could be completed, through communist shock labour and the mobilisation of the other parties through this shock labour.’98 * * * The ambitions of MKP propaganda were grand. It was not good enough simply to gain electoral support, but beyond that the party aimed at awakening the class-consciousness of the workers and imbuing the population with a ‘true’ sense of patriotism. Yet, the immediate necessity of gaining popularity meant that, for the time being, such imposing goals 93 95 97

Ibid. . Pór and Vásárhelyi (eds.), Magyar, . Ibid.

94 96 98

Dér, Nagy Imre vonal, –. MTAKK, MS ./, –. Ibid.




were dropped and all energy was devoted to presenting the MKP in as sympathetic a light as possible. For this, a national image was an absolute prerequisite. The party constructed an elaborate national self-image, drawing especially heavily on the national revolution and revolutionary war of –, and presented itself as the heir to Hungary’s most important national traditions. Through the opposition of ‘patriotism’ or ‘true patriotism’ with ‘chauvinism’, an explanation was given why the communist party could espouse national values. It meant the rejection of other national traditions as unpatriotic, especially the revanchism of the Horthy years and the idea of the ‘Holy Crown of St Stephen’. While the distinction between patriotism and chauvinism had been made by such figures as the poet Ady as well, Révai drew his true inspiration from Lenin’s ‘The National Pride of the Great Russians’. While discarding the ‘chauvinism’ of the s and s, heroes of the Horthy period, such as St Stephen, were maintained by the party. Besides stressing the party’s national character through the appropriation of national symbols and heroes, it presented itself as the main defender of Hungary’s national interests, which it defined as broadly as possible: everything from the feeding of Budapest to the land reform counted as a ‘national’ and patriotic policy. That the MKP’s national image was clearly a deliberate, artificial, consciously created policy can be seen from the many instructions that the party leadership emitted. There was extensive opposition to the national propaganda amongst radical party activists and ordinary party members, who had to be convinced through tactical arguments. Like the radicals, the Soviet connection continued to be problematic. Though extremely important, to the MKP the land reform was a surrogate for a national issue of truly great significance to Hungary: that of the post-war borders. At the autumn meetings in Moscow in August , Révai consciously presented the land reform as a counterbalance to territorial revision. By not giving territory too much attention, but instead putting forward land reform and the construction of a democratic state, he hoped ‘the reaction’ would not be able to gain much through revisionism. Rudas also hoped that the land reform could be used to counter the consequences of Hungary’s loss of territory.99 In this area, the link with the Soviet Union again proved an impediment. Though the MKP leadership had wanted to propose peaceful border revision, it had to remain silent to avoid conflicts with Soviet policy. In the end, the Soviet link determined the success or failure of the MKP’s national policy. 99

PIL /, –; PIL ./, –.



The Only True Party of Hungarian National Interests (March–November ) By the middle of , the MKP’s ‘national policy’ consisted of two main dimensions. On one level, it appropriated national symbols and presented itself as heir to national historical traditions. On another level, it put itself forward as the only true party of Hungarian national interests. Support for People’s Courts and the land reform were two important examples of this. The key to success was, however, the extent of Soviet support. When this was forthcoming, as in the case of the expulsion of the German Swabian minority, the MKP could press its case without inhibitions. If it was not, for instance, when Czechoslovakia threatened to deport its Hungarians, the MKP had serious trouble in presenting a national image. Ideologically, the MKP attempted to address the matter by presenting the USSR as an ally of Hungary. Anti-communist propaganda used during municipal elections in Budapest in October and parliamentary elections in November, however, demonstrated that the MKP continued to be accused of being in league with Moscow. Defeat in both elections convinced the MKP leadership that the ‘national line’ had not been successful.    Soviet support for the MKP was deeply lacking in the border issue, one of the most important post-war national issues. Between  and , Horthy Hungary benefited from its alliance with Nazi Germany through the piecemeal revision of Trianon, and regained territory at the expense of Slovakia, Romania, and Yugoslavia. Itself annexing Bessarabia from Romania, the Soviet Union initially supported Hungary’s acquisition of Northern Transylvania in April , only changing its mind with Hungary’s declaration of war two months later. Of the three allies, the Soviet Union now favoured the reinstatement of the Trianon borders, and



The Only True Party of National Interests

the return of all of Transylvania to Romania.1 At the same time, the United Kingdom and the United States saw a basis for a partial revision of the borders in Hungary’s favour on grounds of ethnicity, so that at the Yalta Conference (February ), the question of the borders, especially Transylvania, was still left partially open.2 As the Soviet position was subject to change, this meant that the Hungarian communists would have some room for manoeuvre. During the discussions on the party programme in August , Révai noted that while other communist parties could claim to ‘realize national aspirations’, the MKP, by contrast, would be saddled with the legacy of Trianon and have to ‘take responsibility for dismemberment [of Hungary]’.3 This, according to Révai, was unacceptable. As one solution, Révai proposed to point the blame elsewhere: ‘Will we blame Horthy for everything? Yes!’ But that was in itself not adequate. While proposing a national line elsewhere, Révai now advocated not using national propaganda, saying that ‘swimming along with the national current’ in this case boiled down to supporting ‘imperialism’. Révai also rejected a ‘nationalist Bolshevik’ line, a repeat of , when the communists had called for a Hungarian war of liberation against the Entente and neighbouring countries. All the party could do was to take a defensive position. The key arguments to be used were that Hungary would drop out of the war too late to have any influence at the peace negotiations, and had to suffer the consequences for its wartime role as an ally of Germany. This did not mean the MKP would reject border changes if they were possible. ‘So [does that mean] peaceful revision [?],’ asked Zoltán Rákosi after Révai had finished speaking—‘Yes’, replied Révai. The party would, however, not sponsor it very persistently. The main motive for this policy of silence was fear of confronting the Soviet Union and the neighbouring countries. Révai thought stressing revision might mean a ‘suicidal’ collision with the Soviet Union and the surrounding countries. Besides Révai, Rudas emphasized that the party could not ‘deviate from the interests of the SU’, and Dezs ő Nemes warned that a ‘national Bolshevik’ line, supporting Hungary’s minorities and demanding border revision, would amount to an ‘objective provocation’ because it would ‘subvert the relation of the SU with its allies’.4 For the time being, the MKP chose silence on the border issue. It would become topical with the start of peace negotiations early in . Then it would prove an example of how Soviet patronage of the MKP worked to the detriment of the party’s national image. 1 3

Fülöp, Revizió vagy autonómia?, . PIL /, –; PIL ./, –.

2

Kertész, Magyar békeillúziók, . 4 Ibid.




     Supporting other national issues, for which there was more Soviet backing, could compensate for the party’s feeble stance on the borders. The presentation of the MKP as true patriots and enemies of collaborators was further enhanced by its attack on Hungary’s ethnic German Swabian minority, which in all but name was accused of being collectively guilty of treason. The expulsion also points again to the Soviet inspiration for the national line: not only the MKP, but other communist parties supported it as well. Between  and  over . million Germans were expelled or removed to Germany from former German land in Poland,5 and Czechoslovakia expelled a further . million Germans from the Sudetenland,6 policies supported by the Polish and Czechoslovak communist parties, and which served a Soviet interest. The deportation of Germans from Poland was necessary to make way for the Poles expelled from former Polish territories occupied by the Soviet Union, and both expulsions justified the USSR’s own mass deportations from Polish territories annexed in . In Poland, loyalty towards Soviet policies was detrimental to the party’s national image. It had to accept the loss of the Polish eastern territories, and already in  accepted the Oder–Neisse line as a border. It compensated for this support by pressing for ‘national’ demands elsewhere. By , the Polish Workers’ (communist) Party (PPR) claimed Poland had a ‘historical right’ to Breslau, Stettin, and Danzig.7 That the Germans were to be removed from these areas was clear from the outset. In January  the communist-dominated KRN (National Council for the Homeland) wanted, with the support of ‘the powerful organism of the USSR’, to ‘remove the Germans from our territories and secure a peace for eternity’. In August , the chairman of the Polish Committee of National Liberation, the Polish government-in-exile set up in the USSR, stated there could be ‘no German minority’ in Poland.8 The question of borders was not as important in Czechoslovakia as in Poland. The London government-in-exile and the communist party both agreed on the restitution of pre-Munich borders. Loyal to Moscow, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia defended the annexation of Transcarpathian Ukraine by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, but 5 8

6 Ibid. Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam, p. xxv. Vierheller, Polen und die Deutschlandfrage, –.

7

Urban, Deutsche in Polen, .




compensated for this by demanding the deportation of the Germans from the Sudetenland.9 An ally of the Germans, the situation in Hungary was completely different. Yet even during the alliance with Hitler, there was growing support among the political right for an ethnically pure Hungary, achieved by deporting rather than assimilating the German minority.10 The German occupation of the country and ensuing chaos fuelled animosity towards the Swabians, who en masse entered the Nazi Volksbund, even if this did not reach the same levels of hatred felt towards the Germans in Poland and Czechoslovakia. During the war, the communist party emitted virulently anti-German propaganda, which was aimed against both Nazi Germany and the Hungarian Swabian minority. Already in June , Rákosi promised the liberation from ‘Germanization’ of the country.11 By the end of the war, the MKP attempted recruitment for the new ‘National Liberation Army’ with the slogan ‘We shall not be a German colony any longer.’12 Post-war MKP support for the expulsion of the Germans was, therefore, not unexpected. Yet there is little evidence that the issue of expulsions was very important to the Hungarian communists. It was not brought up during the debates in Moscow, and the ‘Action Programme’ only envisaged the expropriation of the Volksbund members, not their deportation. It is not clear whether the party ever received an instruction to call for the deportation of Hungary’s Swabians. At the very least, the party leaders probably realized that the MKP had no choice in the matter because the expulsion of the Hungarian German minority was on the Soviet agenda, but deportations were also very conveniently in line with the party’s national policy. The MKP’s anti-Swabian propaganda was very similar to that of the Czechoslovak and Polish communist parties, which condemned the Germans as fifth columnists, and used historical and ethnic arguments to support the deportations, usually the exclusive terrain of nationalists of the right. In Poland, already during the war the Polonization of the German territories to be annexed was represented as the fulfilment of an ancient Polish dream. The lands were not annexed, but ‘regained’, even though they had never been Polish and few Poles had ever lived on them. Gomulka openly dreamt of an ‘ethnically homogeneous socialist Nation’.13 9 10 12

Zayas, Nemesis at Potsdam, . 11 Schieder, Fate of the Germans in Hungary, . PIL /, –. 13 PIL Rgy., IV///. Urban, Deutsche in Polen, –.




Also in Czechoslovakia, expelling the Germans and Hungarians was represented by the communists as liberation from the ancient German yoke, and a class element was added by contrasting German nobles with Czech peasants. Gottwald, for instance, cited the defeat of Czechs at the hand of Germans at the Battle of the White Mountain (): ‘You must prepare for the final retribution of White Mountain . . . We will expel for good all descendants of the alien nobility.’14 The Czechs also demanded ethnic homogeneity. Minister for Information Václav Kopecky stated at the Eighth Conference of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia that the party was ‘realizing the dream of generations of our nation’ by ‘building a Czechoslovak state without Germans or Hungarians, as a national state of Czechs and Slovaks’.15 Added to historical and ethnic grievances were the experiences of the more recent past. In Czechoslovakia, Germans and Hungarians were considered a potential fifth column and collectively responsible for disasters such as Munich. ‘The Germans and Hungarians who have sinned so gravely against our republic, will be deprived of their citizenship and will be severely punished,’ announced Gottwald.16 The categories of German, Hungarian, and traitor were usually considered similar, as appeared from a military journal: ‘We must clear Slovakia of all intruders and traitors . . . the cleansing of the Republic of all Germans, Hungarians, traitors has begun.’17 While formally the government stuck to the fiction that the deportations would be conducted on the grounds of individual responsibility, in practice the Germans were deported almost without regard to political past. On  May  Gottwald presented the policy towards seven categories of Germans. Only those who could prove they had been active members of the resistance were exempted from discriminatory measures.18 The Germans had already been accused of having formed a fifth column during the invasion of September , and this theme was picked up after the war as a reason for expelling them.19 As in Czechoslovakia and Poland, the Hungarian communists attacked the Swabians for their collective behaviour during the war and used historical arguments against them. The campaign against the Hungarian Swabians commenced with the National Peasant Party’s statement of  April, ‘Out 14 15 16 18 19

Janics, Czechoslovak Policy and the Hungarian Minority, . Kemp, Nationalism and Communism, . Janics, Czechoslovak Policy and the Hungarian Minority, . Hrabrovec, ‘Neue Aspekte’, . Kersten, Establishment of Communist Rule in Poland, .

17

Ibid. .




with the Swabian traitors of the country,’ in which NPP party leader Imre Kovács declared: ‘Hungary has finally reached the point at which it can clear up its relations with Germany and the Swabians. The Swabians came here with a stick, and will leave with a stick. The Swabians cut themselves off from the body of the country, and with all their actions proved that they felt one and the same with Hitlerite Germany. Now they can share in Germany’s fate.’20 While the NPP was the most radical supporter of the Swabian deportations, the MKP did not lag far behind, and had, according to Rákosi, purposely left the leadership of the anti-Swabian campaign to the NPP. 21 The MKP was probably content with playing a secondary role, because the German question was especially important in the countryside, which gave the NPP the opportunity to win support from the peasantry at the cost of the Smallholder Party. In any case, Rákosi was satisfied with the way in which they had initiated the campaign. At the meeting of the Budapest National Committee of  April, the representatives of the NPP and the communist party both openly propagated the doctrine of collective responsibility. Imre Kovács bluntly stated that ‘every Swabian is a Volksbundist’. When the Civic Democratic Party representative argued against punishing Germans for the sole reason that they were Swabians, this provoked a venomous reaction from Ernő Gerő, who proposed to do exactly that: ‘Not only Hitler is guilty for what has happened now, but all the Germans must share in his fate.’22 The MKP did not only insinuate that the Swabians had been a fifth column during the war, but, like the Czechs, also presented long-standing historical conflicts with the Germans. So, on  April, the Szabad Nép declared that the NPP had spoken ‘from the heart of the Hungarian people’ when denouncing the ‘Swabian traitors’, and argued that the Germans for centuries had benefited from the rich ‘black Hungarian soil’, but had always stabbed the Hungarians in the back when they struggled for freedom. There was no place for these ‘Swabian traitors’ in the country, and it would be a ‘national stupidity’ if even one tear was shed when ‘we finally and forever say our goodbyes’.23 Unlike the Poles, the MKP did not openly advocate ideals of ethnic purity, but its support for the deportation of , Swabians amounted in practice to demanding the deportation of the entire Swabian minority— there were probably only , Swabians in the country.24 Rákosi added 20 22 23 24

21 PIL ./, –. Fehér, Utolsó percben. Gáspár and Halasi (eds.), Budapest Nemzeti Bizottság, i. –. Szabad Nép,  Apr. , in Zielbauer, Magyarországi németek elhurcolása, . Tilkovsky, Nemzetiségi politika Magyarországon, ; Fehér, Utolsó percben, .




an element of ethnic conflict when he urged the Central Committee to exploit the Swabian expulsions by linking them explicitly to the land reform. The total amount of land finally appropriated from Germans, , hold ( hold =. acres), was about an eighth of the total . million hold of land distributed among the Hungarian peasantry.25 In predominantly Swabian areas, the proportions were of course different. In south-east Transdanubia (the counties Baranya, Somogy, and Tolna) . per cent of the land used for the land reform belonged to former Volksbund members.26 The national character of these expropriations was further underlined by the new owners of the holdings. Not only small or landless peasants received land, but also Hungarian refugees from Transylvania, from ethnic Hungarian minorities such as the Székely and Csangó, Hungarians from Croatia and Serbia, and, later, from Slovakia. The , hold of Swabian land was divided up among , families (, individuals), of whom , (, individuals) came from Slovakia.27 Again, in Swabian areas the impact was higher. One example: in the heavily German-populated area of south-east Transdanubia, the National Landholding Organizing Council (Országos Földbirtokrendező Tanács, OFT) planned the settlement of , Székely families (, individuals) into the German townships in the district of Völgység.28 Rákosi pointed out to the Central Committee that the promise of Swabian land could aid the MKP. ‘In the Hungarian countryside, the Swabian question, of Swabian land, has absolutely to be referred to frequently, especially as others are not doing it.’ Anti-Swabian propaganda should be used to depict the Smallholders as a pro-German party. As it would not work in German areas, it should not be made in public, only in door-to-door propaganda, and only in Hungarian areas. ‘It is good therefore, if in the small agitation we explain that there is enough land, but it is still with the Swabians, and the Smallholder Party defends them and only the communist party defends the interest of the Hungarian tiller of the soil. We should speak about this question not in the German, but in the Hungarian countryside.’29 Expelling the Germans was very well suited to enhance the party’s national image. It was compatible with Soviet foreign policy, so the Soviet connection did not need to be an obstacle, but could be portrayed as an advantage. Though obscured by the emphasis on ‘treason’, MKP support for the deportation of the Germans added a very definite ethnic element to the party’s self-constructed national image. 25 27

PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –.

26 28

Füzes, Forgószél, . Füzes, Forgószél, .

29

PIL ./, –.




       Critics of the deportation of the Germans, such as Cardinal Mindszenty, and NPP politician and intellectual István Bíbó, realized that supporting the deportations left Hungary with no moral arguments against the deportation of Hungarians from Slovakia. To the Czechs and Slovaks, their Hungarian compatriots were a fifth column, who had supported the destruction of the Czechoslovak state just as much as the Sudeten Germans had done, and should suffer the same fate. Like the Hungarian party, the Czechoslovak Communist Party continued its wartime ‘national line’. This was to a large degree identical to the MKP’s national propaganda. Like the MKP, the Czech party presented itself as ‘the logical inheritor of the best values of the nation’.30 Révai’s Czech counterpart, party ideologue Zdeněk Nejedly, explained in Communists, Heir to the Great Traditions of the Czech Nation exactly as the MKP was doing in Hungary: that the Czech Communist Party was the successor of great national heroes such as Jan Hus.31 As in Hungary, the Czechoslovak party did not limit itself to symbols: the party also presented itself as the defender of national interests, which meant the party supported the deportation of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia. The Czech communists were the more fortunate. First, the communist party and the Soviet Union were genuinely popular in Czechoslovakia, in large part thanks to their sacrifices in the war. Secondly, the Czech party was assured of Soviet support for the expulsion of the Hungarians. Consistent with the national policy of the Comintern, the Czechoslovak Communist Party in its Moscow exile had already during the war demanded the deportation of the Hungarians from Slovakia. This clearly enhanced the national image of the Czechoslovak party, but put that of the MKP under pressure. Beneš negotiated with leaders of the Czechoslovak party in December . In principle they agreed on treating the Hungarians in Slovakia the same as Germans, and put the exchange of Hungarians with Slovaks living in Hungary on the agenda.32 Initially, however, the Czechoslovak communists had been apprehensive about the expulsions, especially as they had a large base of support among Hungarians in Slovakia, which is why Gottwald proposed a population exchange rather than outright 30 31 32

Abrams, ‘Struggle for the Soul of the Nation’. Kemp, Nationalism and Communism, . Janics, Czechoslovak Policy and the Hungarian Minority, .




expulsion.33 As the war progressed, the Czech communist émigrés became more comfortable with the idea of deportations. Gottwald demanded an ethnically pure Czechoslovak state in a speech on  May , and by August  both the London and the Moscow exiles were united in demanding a democratic, Slav national state.34 In September , the Slovak Communist Party insisted that ‘the Germans and the Hungarians’ would be driven out of Slovak territory ‘with the help of the Red Army’.35 The Slovak revolt of September  was anti-Hungarian from the beginning. Spontaneously set up Hungarian National Committees were disbanded as soon as an area was put under Slovak control and Hungarian schools were closed. The revolt was national and not class based, as Hungarian workers were considered enemies rather than allies.36 The overriding necessity for loyalty towards the USSR dictated the MKP’s position. The Czechoslovak plans for resettlement of Hungarians were only discussed in passing at the autumn  meetings, at which Ernő Gerő had stated that it could not be opposed, because it would ‘conflict with the SU’. As an alternative, it was argued that the party should stress the rights of the Hungarians rather than territory, because it was impossible to draw ethnic borders anyway. The MKP would also call for solidarity for the freedom of the neighbouring peoples. Béla Fogarasi demanded the creation of a ‘principled line’ to counter the hatred created by Horthy, aimed at cooperation with the Slovaks.37 He was wildly optimistic if he thought the Slovaks would reciprocate any goodwill. The atmosphere in Slovakia was violently anti-Hungarian, and newly established Slovak authorities had already started deporting Hungarians over the border, even before the government had firmly established a policy.38 In its Kosice Programme of May , the Czech government announced that only Hungarians who had been Czechoslovak citizens before  could keep their citizenship, Hungarians who had moved there after Munich would be deported immediately. In the land reform, ‘Czech and Slovak land will be torn forever from the hands of the alien German-Hungarian aristocracy, and from the German traitors as well.’ The government programme promised a cultural purge to rid the country of German and Hungarian influence, to give Czechoslovakia a Slav orientation.39 A start was made with the immediate forcible deportation of 33 35 36 37 38

34 Ibid. Vadkerty, Kitelepítésétől a reszlovakizációig, . Ibid. ; Janics, Czechoslovak Policy and the Hungarian Minority, . Janics, Czechoslovak Policy and the Hungarian Minority, . PIL /, –; PIL ./, – 39 Vadkerty, Kitelepítésétől a reszlovakizációig, . Ibid. –.




Hungarians who had immigrated to Slovakia after Munich, which was carried out so relentlessly that it provoked cries of outrage across the border. The indignation was increased by Benes and Fierlinger’s continued demands for the deportation not just of the post- immigrants, but of all Hungarians from Slovakia. Hungarian public opinion was further inflamed by the harsh treatment of the Hungarians by the Slovaks. The head of the Seventh Department, Burtsev, reported that Hungarians did not speak their own language out of fear of losing their jobs, in some places had been compelled to wear the letter ‘M’ (for Magyar) on their arms, Hungarian schools were closed, and the tone of both the Czech and Slovak press was aggressively anti-Hungarian, including the central party newspaper of the Slovak Communist Party, Pravda.40 By contrast, there was no Hungarian press available, and all public manifestations of Hungarian cultural life were stifled. Even speaking Hungarian in the streets could lead to censure by Slovak soldiers. The Hungarians lost political rights, and even those who retained their Czechoslovak citizenship were discriminated against. Hungarians were, for instance, not allowed to become members of the National Committees in Slovakia. Where such committees had been set up by Hungarians in Hungarian areas, they were later dissolved.41 Burtsev noted the ‘activization of chauvinist elements’: in Levice, the Czechoslovak garrison commander ordered the posting of anti-Hungarian slogans such as ‘Slovaks, speak loudly’ and ‘We are in our home, we are master.’42 Similarly to the MKP’s attitude towards the Swabians, the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia (KSČ) considered the Hungarians collectively responsible for the destruction caused by the war. While a large majority of the Slovak Communist Party before  had been Hungarian, the KSČ now concluded that 95 per cent of the Hungarian minority was ‘reactionary and nationalist.’43 The large pre-war Hungarian membership of the Slovak Communist Party almost precluded a believable Slovak national character for the party, which made the communist attack on the Hungarians all the more ferocious. The KSČ halted the intake of new Hungarian members. In theory the Central Committee checked the old party members’ past on an individual basis,44 but in public the KSČ dubbed Hungarians ‘Fascists’ who would all have to be expelled from the party. For instance, at the Slovak party’s conference of - May  the party concluded that in 40 42 43 44

Volokitina et al. (eds.), Sovetskiy faktor, –. Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. –. Vadkerty, Kitelepítésétől a reszlovakizációig, . Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. –.

41

PIL ./, –.




Hungarian areas ‘the enemy has ended up in the party, but these Fascists have to be transported to Hungary’.45 In Slovakia, the party underwent a similar transformation into a mass party to the MKP in Hungary, so that the intake of Slovak members further diluted the Hungarian membership. The debatable wartime activities of many new Slovak members only strengthened the anti-Hungarian character of the Slovak Communist Party. According to a report by the MKP, in Dunajska Stredá (Dunaszerdahely) the party leadership was mostly middle class in background, and in Rimavská Subota (Rimaszombat),  per cent of the members of the Slovak Communist Party had a past in the extreme nationalist Hlinka guard.46 A prominent leader of the Slovak communists, Husak, was known for his hatred of Hungarians, and the communist chairman of the Slovak National Council, Smidke, used to declare at meetings that he was first a Slovak, and only then a communist.47 Hungarian activists who remained in the party were gradually removed from their posts, despite having suffered years of persecution at the hands of the Hungarian authorities. József Fabry, for instance, had been a member of the communist party since  and party secretary since , he had been imprisoned in jail and concentration camp for thirty-three months, and after that was decorated for his contribution to the Slovak partisan struggle. He was sacked regardless. Comparable events occurred in the labour movement.48 Within the parties and the unions, the use of the Hungarian language was prohibited, even when the majority of the members were Hungarians who did not understand Slovak at all, because, according to the communist president of the Kosice district National Committee, it endangered the ‘Slovakness’ of the Slovak Communist Party.49 At a local conference in the Galanta district, twenty-five out of the forty delegates were not able to understand Slovak, but were nevertheless forbidden to use Hungarian, and in the township of Šeliska the president of the Party Committee had forbidden the use of Hungarian despite the majority of the delegates being Hungarian.50 Sometimes, the Hungarians were ignored even if they did speak Slovak: at a regional conference in Bratislava none of the eighty Hungarian delegates had been allowed to speak at all.51 Hungarian communists were not permitted to turn their eyes to Hungary: Rákosi protested to Dimitrov that the local party secretary of 45 47 49 51

Vadkerty, Kitelepítésétől a reszlovakizációig, . MOL ./, –. Vadkerty, Kitelepítésétől a reszlovakizációig, . Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. –.

46 48 50

MOL ./, –. PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –.




Lučenec had forbidden Hungarian party members to attend a speech by Rákosi in Salgótarján on the Slovak border.52 Hungarian communist grievances went unheard in Slovakia, so they complained to Rákosi that ‘certainly the fate of us Hungarians, whether communists or not, is terrible, our oppression is greater than in the old Czechoslovak Republic’.53 The situation was so bad that Rákosi was having trouble restraining Hungarian communists in Slovakia, who were producing Hungarian pamphlets and desired the publication of an illegal party newspaper to put forward their case.54 While the Comintern’s ‘national policy’ had originally been devised to improve the national credentials of the individual sections, it now provoked a damaging conflict between two communist parties. The Slovak party explained its attitude towards the Hungarian communists by the fact that it ‘otherwise could not operate as a national party’.55 The Slovak communist national image was improved by its attacks on the Hungarians, but the fact that communists participated in the poor treatment of Hungarians reflected badly on the MKP. It made a mockery of the Hungarian party’s own entreaties for solidarity with neighbouring peoples, and showed the MKP was not capable of defending Hungarian interests with the most obvious means it had at its disposal: by negotiating with its sister party abroad, or asking for the help of Moscow. The latter’s conspicuous withholding of support for the Hungarian position called into doubt the MKP claim that the Soviet Union backed Hungarian national interests. According to Rákosi, public opinion could agree with the deportation of Hungarians who had moved to Slovakia after , but the deportation of ‘original inhabitant Hungarian peasants’ would be ‘grist to the mill’ of the reaction. 56 In practice, even the merciless repatriation of the immigrants proved too much after it commenced. Rákosi informed Dimitrov that it created ‘a lot of bad blood here and causes us a lot of damage’.57 Rákosi’s complaints to Dimitrov point to the role of arbiter in conflicts that the Soviet party retained even after the dissolution of the Comintern. Rákosi had informed Dimitrov already in March  about the ‘ “incorrect policy” of the Slovak communists’, protested about the lack of Hungarian-language newspapers for the Hungarian communists and the oppression felt by the Hungarians, and asked Dimitrov to discuss the 52 55

PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –.

53 56

PIL ./, . PIL ./, –.

54 57

PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –.




matter with visiting Slovak communists.58 Some note was taken of Rákosi’s letters, as Dimitrov saw to it that he was also informed by Soviet authorities on the situation in Slovakia.59 However, very little changed in practice, and the MKP remained confronted with Smallholder propaganda on the persecution of Hungarians in Slovakia. The relative lack of maltreatment of Hungarians in Romania and Yugoslavia, countries that had suffered no less under Hungarian occupation, made the situation worse, as it proved that an alternative policy was available. All in all, it made ‘remaining silent for us ever more difficult’.60 Rákosi urgently appealed to Dimitrov for intervention and counsel, and said the MKP leaders wished to travel to Bratislava or Prague, ‘but not before we know that you have already intervened in this issue, as otherwise we will not be certain of success’.61 Rákosi was presumptuous if he counted on Dimitrov’s support. He met Dimitrov in Moscow on  June, where he most likely received little information on the Soviet position towards the deportations.62 Despite the talks, he was surprised by a declaration by the Czech Prime Minister Fierlinger, ‘in which he alleges that Comrades Stalin and Molotov agreed with the expelling of the Hungarians from Czechoslovakia’.63 Stalin had even allegedly added, ‘give them a sound beating’.64 In fact, Molotov had already qualified the limits of Soviet support explicitly to Fierlinger, but this was clearly not known to Rákosi.65 The MKP leadership had initially wanted to avoid a conflict with Moscow or Prague, but the beginning of the deportation of Hungarians made it impossible for the sake of its own national policy to ignore them altogether, so that by mid-July the party decided to ‘take up a somewhat muted position, as it was impossible for us to remain silent any longer’.66 At the end of June, Rákosi and other MKP leaders met the Presidium of the Czech Communist Party in Prague, for talks that ended up in a fruitless heated debate, because both parties entrenched themselves in their respective ‘national policies’. Hungarian protests against the deportations were dismissed by the Czechoslovaks. Gottwald underlined that the policy against the Hungarians had already gone so far ‘that an essential change would boil down to a great political defeat and would not be 59 Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. –. PIL ./, –. 61 Ibid. PIL ./, –. 62 Volokitina et al. (eds.), Sovetskiy faktor, – n. . The Slovak issue was discussed, but is not reproduced in this document. 63 64 PIL ./, –. Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, –. 65 Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. –. 66 PIL ./, –. 58 60




comprehended in Czechoslovakia.’ While Siroky appeared to be understanding of the MKP’s position, Rákosi complained that Siroky was later ‘worked upon by the Czech comrades’ and so brought to heel. Clearly, the Czechoslovak party leadership was planning to remain steadfast. According to Rákosi, Kopecky in particular put forward a hard line: ‘In the Presidium Comrade Kopecky was very aggressive against us and alleged that our request in fact was the continuation of Hungarian chauvinist revisionist propaganda and the theory of the holy crown of St Stephen.’ During the deliberations, the ‘national line’ of the Comintern was referred to explicitly by the Czechoslovaks. Gottwald justified the hard line of the Czech party by claiming that the Comintern had been dissolved because ‘the national aspirations of the individual sections were no longer compatible with each other.’ He then, according to Rákosi, made a proposal that was a logically consistent solution to the clashing national policies of two communist parties: ‘To bridge our difficulties, Comrade Gottwald proposed that we should calmly attack Czechoslovakia and even the Communist Party because of this policy.’67 Rákosi later alleged the same before the Central Committee of the MKP: ‘they calmly gave us the tip that we could attack the Czech Communist Party, and they would attack the Hungarian Communist Party.’68 Rákosi told Dimitrov he had declined the proposal. With no possibility of an agreement, both parties attempted to court Moscow’s favour. According to Rákosi, the Czechoslovaks admitted they had been told by Molotov and Vishinsky to carry through ‘certain changes’ in their policy towards the Hungarians, but on the whole still invoked Stalin’s support for the deportations, and even claimed that ‘their plans and even laws against the Hungarians had been elaborated in Moscow and approved by comrades Stalin and Molotov’.69 The KSČ did consult with Soviet authorities,70 and indeed Rákosi probably took it for granted that they did so, as the MKP had done the same. By reporting their claims to Dimitrov he either hoped to catch them in a lie or was fishing for more information on Moscow’s position, with which Rákosi was completely out of touch. This was demonstrated by his protest to Dimitrov that all Hungarians, including communists, had to reapply for their Czechoslovak citizenship. He did not realize that Soviet authorities had advised the Czechs to request applications on an individual basis, rather than exempting certain categories of ‘democrats’.71 67 70

68 69 PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –. 71 See for example Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. –. Ibid.




Rákosi hoped for protection from Dimitrov, whom he told that the MKP would ‘flatly reject’ a forthcoming Czechoslovak proposal for a population transfer between Hungary and Slovakia, ‘as there is not a corresponding number of Slovaks in Hungary’. He stressed again ‘what a heavy blow the realization of the Czech plans would be for Hungarian democracy’, and pulled the ultimate card by stating, ‘I have told the Czechoslovak comrades that in this question . . . I will turn directly to Comrade Stalin.’72 At the Potsdam Conference the Czechoslovak request to equate the Hungarians with the Sudeten Germans and deport the entire minority was rejected. Instead both governments were instructed to cooperate on a proposal for a population transfer. Rákosi still thought the Czechs were ignoring the conference by ‘forcing the expulsion of the Slovak Hungarians’. He carried out his threat and complained to Stalin. He could not do this as directly as he might have liked, however. His letter to Stalin was handed over by Voroshilov.73 The complaints were similar to those put forward to Dimitrov, though Rákosi now also indicated that lack of Soviet support would lead to increased anti-Soviet sentiment in Hungary. The expulsions were sure to be ‘damaging to Soviet–Hungarian friendship’ and would ‘increase the influence of the English’ in the country.74 As far as is known, Rákosi did not receive a reply to the letter, and it did not bring about any obvious immediate changes in the policy of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. The problem of the Hungarian minority in Slovakia showed what happened when the ‘national policy’ of two communist parties clashed. Each party hoped to increase its national standing, but could only do so at the expense of the other. As the national policy had always been more about national propaganda than actual independence of the sections of the Comintern, Gottwald’s suggestion that both parties simply attack each other in their own party press was a logical consequence of the national line. The source of each party’s national policy was, in the final instance, Moscow, so it was to be expected that disputes would be brought before Soviet authorities, in the form of the Department of International Information, Dimitrov, and, ultimately, Stalin. The Soviet link was now again detrimental to the Hungarians. Rákosi’s pleas probably only had very minor effects—the reports from the Seventh Department suggest 72 PIL .., –. In place of the ellipses the original reads ‘if necessary’, this has however been crossed out. 73 74 PIL ./ [Rákosi to Gerő, n.d.]. Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, i. –.




that they at least prompted Dimitrov to make some investigations of his own—but on the whole the Soviet Union supported the Czechoslovak Communist Party. Yet it was not unequivocally positive to them either, as they were compelled to support the annexation of Transcarpathian Ukraine, and local Red Army commanders were known to intervene in too extreme displays of Slovak anti-Hungarian ‘chauvinism’.75    While in the Slovak issue the link with Moscow was detrimental to the MKP, other questions could be used in its favour. After the cessation of hostilities, the MKP became the target for families seeking news of captured sons, brothers, and fathers. Local MKP organizations requested the liberation of desperately needed comrades, and pointed to the propaganda value of early release.76 Rákosi was not enthusiastic about the return of prisoners of war, as he considered a ‘significant part’ of the prisoners ‘Fascists’, whose quick release would mean the ‘strengthening of Fascism’ in Hungary. To explain delays, Rákosi urged the women activists in the MNDSz to say that the prisoners of war would not be sent home until a peace agreement had been arrived at, and ‘demonstrations and impatience’ would not be able to change this. Not just the Hungarian, but also the German, Italian, and even former Russian prisoners of war were not returning to their homes yet. Despite his reservations, Rákosi recognized the propaganda value of release of prisoners of war, and the fact that the prisoners of war were at Russian disposal meant, for once, that the Soviet link could be turned into an advantage. To the women activists, Rákosi intimated that several tens of thousands of prisoners would be released prior to the Budapest elections, which would be presented as the work of the communist party.77 Such releases, he said, were to continue, but not to the extent that the ‘reaction’ could exploit them. ‘That is a very clever weapon of the reaction. They do not want the democratic prisoners of war, but those , Arrow Cross members.’ Rákosi said all this could not be openly discussed, instead it was necessary ‘to say everywhere that we are truly helping, we will see to it that we obtain the earliest possible release of prisoners of war, what we can do, we will’. Further to take the wind out of the sails of the ‘underground reaction’, the women had to welcome returning prisoners at the train stations.78 75 77

PIL ./, –. PIL /, –.

76 78

PIL ./, , ; PIL ./, –. Ibid.




The USSR was prepared to help the MKP by releasing prisoners of war. Voroshilov proposed to Beria to release Hungarian officers in connection with the elections, providing they had not served in the SS, SA, or committed war crimes against Soviet citizens.79 In his memoirs, Rákosi claimed that he managed to convince a sceptical Stalin, who feared most would oppose the communists, that most prisoners of war would be positive towards the MKP. Stalin’s agreement was used to the full propagandistically: Rákosi’s request was printed as a letter in the Szabad Nép, as was Stalin’s positive response.80 On the eve of the elections, the advantages of release outweighed the disadvantages: not only would it demonstrate that the MKP fought for Hungarian interests, it also showed that Rákosi had significant influence in Moscow, and shone a positive light on the Soviet Union. The prisoners were indeed released, Rákosi requested the Budapest propagandists to propagate the ‘decisive role’ of the party in the prisoner of war question,81 and the MKP organized demonstrations of ‘grateful’ prisoners of war.82 In the run-up to the elections, Rákosi concluded to Dimitrov that liberation of the prisoners of war had made a favourable impression, which the party was now ‘making a heavy use of’.83 Whether as heir to national traditions or guardian of national interests, the Soviet element was crucial to the MKP’s national policy, as whatever line the party put forward, it could not oppose the Soviet Union, and had to make a positive view of the Soviet Union part of its national image. Soviet policies did not always conflict with Hungarian national interests: there was significant support for the expulsion of the Swabians. Measures such as the early release of prisoners of war could be used to increase support for the Russians. The MKP underpinned this ideologically by proclaiming the USSR as Hungary’s liberator and protector. Rákosi expected already in August  that, with the end of the war in Japan, tensions between the USA and USSR would increase.84 With the Cold War slowly unfolding, there were opportunities to present the USSR as a friendly power, and the United States and Great Britain as hostile. According to Révai, in a speech held in October , fears that the Soviet Union would threaten Hungary’s independence were baseless. It was after all the Red Army that had liberated Hungary from the Germans and ‘Arrow Cross hirelings’. The leaders of the Soviet Union, Révai argued, 79 80 82 84

Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. –. Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, i. –. PIL ./ [Secretariat, minutes,  Aug. ]. PIL ./, –.

81 83

PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –.




knew very well that, unlike Estonia and Latvia, Hungary had never been part of the Russian empire, and incorporating it would only weaken the USSR. Révai noted that a polarization had clearly taken place in the last several months and weeks between an ‘English’ and ‘Russian’ camp in Hungary. Révai claimed he wanted friendly relations with the AngloSaxon countries, listed Hungary’s traditionally strong cultural relations with the United Kingdom and the USA, and stated that it would be ‘childish, stupidity, and a fantasy’ to ‘erase’ that from ‘Hungarian national consciousness’. However, in its foreign policy, Hungary should ‘strongly and unwaveringly’ demand an alliance with the Soviet Union, and make this into a ‘national programme’, national, because Hungary ‘lies at the foot of the Carpathians and not at the English Channel’. Opposed to this ‘Danube-Valley policy, this Kossuth policy’ were the attempts of ‘unfortunately not insignificant circles’ to use the link with the Anglo-Saxons to pre-empt Hungarian–Soviet friendship, according to Révai an ‘adventurist’ aspiration, as Hungary’s position in the Danubian basin clearly made an alliance with the USSR more obvious.85 Révai did not say so specifically, but clearly insinuated that more favourable solutions to Hungary’s international problems could be expected in an alliance with the Soviet Union, and left open the threat that a different policy would have the opposite effect. Another implication was that opponents of the Soviet alliance were unpatriotic. Rákosi made a similar point to the party propagandists, though he put it much more bluntly: ‘We should not be ashamed of being patriots, because we are the true patriots, not those Smallholders, who sell the country for a dollar to the Americans.’86     Despite the continuing problem of the party’s national image, by the end of the summer the mood in the party was optimistic. A mass demonstration on  May, the biggest Hungary had yet seen, promised a bright future for the workers’ movement. With the influx of hundreds of thousands of members, the MKP seemed successful in its transition from an illegal to a mass party. The MKP dominated the police and had presided over the land reform, and between May and July provoked a swing to the left in the composition of the government that seemed permanent. This perceived position of strength emboldened the party to call for elections that 85

MTAKK, MS ./, b, –.

86

PIL /, –.




autumn.87 The aim was, according to Gerő, to find a date which was ‘most advantageous and most favourable’ to the communist party.88 National elections were finally called for  November, but were to be preceded by municipal elections in Budapest on  October, mainly because the party leadership expected to do well in Budapest and hoped the effect would rub off nationally.89 Foreign policy considerations, however, also played a role. Elections had taken place in surrounding countries, and Hungary could not keep on postponing them. Rákosi predicted that increasing conflicts between the Soviet Union and the western Allies would strengthen the political right—it was therefore best to hold elections sooner rather than later when things would come to a head.90 In its national election platform, published on  September, the MKP presented a programme of practical demands. It proposed a three-year plan for reconstruction, control of inflation, central control of bank credit, and a partial nationalization of industry.91 For the Budapest elections, it also presented the solution to a number of burning issues.92 Permeating the whole campaign was the emphasis on the party’s national image. The MKP brought up national topics such as the return of Hungarian gold confiscated by the Germans, promised the expulsion of the Swabians, and, despite Rákosi’s rejection of Gottwald’s proposal, complained about the persecution of Hungarians in Slovakia. At the meeting of the Central Committee on  August, the general propaganda line Rákosi presented for the election was based on Révai’s speech ‘What did our party do for the Hungarian people?’ and consisted of listing the MKP’s achievements in the past six months. ‘Was there any other party that in this respect did so much?’ Rákosi asked himself.93 Révai’s lecture became study material at eight-day training courses for election propagandists.94 Attention was paid to national symbols as well. During the campaign for the Budapest elections, the propagandists were explicitly instructed to use national colours: ‘Every vehicle, car, carriage, truck, bicycle must be decorated (not only with red, but also with national colours), to advertise and popularize our party and the list of workers’ unity.’ 95 The party could not risk opposing the Soviet Union, but simply had ‘unquestionably’ to proclaim solidarity with the Soviet Union and the Red Army. This was so obvious, that Rákosi said, ‘we do not have to speak about this separately’.96 87 89 91 92 94 96

88 PIL ./, –. Iszák and Kun, Moszkvának jelentjük, –. 90 Kovrig, Communism in Hungary, . PIL ./, –. Kovrig, Communism in Hungary, . 93 Teleki (ed.), Magyar munkásmozgalom, –. PIL ./, –. 95 PIL ./, –. PIL ., –. PIL ./, –.




The MKP was fully expectant of victory in the Budapest elections: Rákosi confidently predicted a  per cent majority for the joint Social Democrat/communist list before the Central Committee,97 and on the eve of the elections already toasted the expected victory. The result, however, was a disaster: they had to settle for . per cent of the votes, while the Smallholder Party took . per cent. Voroshilov was reportedly so furious that he slapped Rákosi in the face.98 The continued radical image and lack of national character of the party was seen as one of the main reasons for defeat. According to Rákosi, the elections demonstrated that ‘petit bourgeois circles’ feared the MKP even more than had been foreseen. The alliance with the Social Democrats had not helped—the ‘left-wing phraseology’ of the Social Democrats, slogans such as ‘Red Budapest’ and ‘First Democracy, then Socialism’, presented ‘a break with the spirit of National Unity’ and had, according to Rákosi, pushed voters towards the Smallholders.99 But the lower communist party organizations had also been guilty of presenting too ‘red’ a propaganda line, and had not heeded instructions to fly the national colours. The Propaganda Department later concluded that ‘there was too little national colour, which was completely forced into the background by the red’.100 Rákosi raised the same point: ‘I emphasized that there should be as many national-coloured banners as possible on  September, but the comrades are imbued with the old revolutionary spirit. The next day, the Kis Újság and other newspapers wrote that Budapest was swimming in red.’101 The most significant opponent of the MKP during the elections had been the Smallholder Party, which presented itself as the main alternative to a communist Hungary, as the defender of the faith and the nation. While at large meetings and in the national press the Smallholder Party leadership praised the Red Army as Hungary’s liberator, at smaller, local meetings it denounced the Soviet Union as a foreign oppressor and the MKP as its domestic agent. In the Budapest elections, Rákosi accused the Smallholder Party of having two different political lines, one official and one under the surface, the latter consisting of ‘illegal’ anti-Russian and anti-Semitic whispering propaganda. Rákosi complained to Tildy about a leaflet reading ‘if you want the Red Army to remain in our Fatherland for long, vote for the Communist Party.’ The Smallholder Party propagandists had allegedly also spread the rumour that the MKP wanted Hungary to become a member of the Soviet Union.102 97 99 102

PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –.

98 100

Kovrig, Communism in Hungary, . 101 PIL /, –. PIL /, –.




The conclusion drawn from the failed election campaign was that the party would have to put forward its national image even more strongly than before: ‘At the Budapest party conference, one of the comrades protested that we bring our national policy too much into the foreground. We say that we have to emphasize our party’s national character much more strongly. We must show who really represents the national interest . . . from issue to issue we will prove that we represent the interests of the nation the best; that way we will wrest this weapon from the Smallholders’ hands.’103 Rákosi kept stressing the need for a national appearance: ‘The Soviet army and the local little kings do not make the party sympathetic. The comrades have to be patriots. They must wear the party badge together with the national ribbon, and emphasize constantly that we do not want to be a Russian state, we love our country, we are simple working people and exceedingly stress our patriotism.’104 Gone was Rákosi’s ‘unquestionable’ demand for solidarity with the Red Army: ‘now, when the enemy constantly plays around in national colours against us, we should not always start every speech with the Glorious Red Army. It should always be emphasized that the communist party is a patriotic, national party. And refer to the spirit of Kossuth, Petőfi, Táncsics.’105 The national elections now became a contest between two opposing views of the nation. Rákosi told the provincial instructors to contrast the leadership of the Smallholder Party with the ‘Hungarianness’ of the MKP. Rákosi claimed the MKP was more national as it represented the ‘most precious social strata of the nation’, the ‘workers, peasants, and progressive intelligentsia’, and attacked the Smallholder leadership for its un-national character: ‘Let us look at the Smallholder candidates in Budapest. The only smallholder is Ferenc Nagy, the rest are lawyers, bankers, industrialists, etc.’ As precisely these professions had been under attack by anti-Semites for their Jewish character, it is possible Rákosi was insinuating the same. Explicitly, he only claimed the Smallholder leaders wanted to bring back the old system and were socially incapable of representing the peasantry.106 The Budapest defeat did not diminish optimism about the national election results in November, but there were early signs that communist confidence would suffer a second severe dent. Voroshilov was scathing about the MKP’s election campaign. Leading party workers, especially 103 106

PIL /, –. PIL /, –.

104

PIL /, –.

105

PIL ./, –.




Rákosi, lacked the experience to run a mass party, got ‘carried away’ by mass meetings, and ‘paid too little attention to door-to-door propaganda.’ Voroshilov thought Rákosi had been generally regarded as a ‘national hero’ during the Debrecen period, but had since then lost a great deal of authority, due to his involvement in ‘petty inter-party squabbles’. In consequence he was more and more viewed as a leader just of one party. In addition, the fact that Rákosi was not of ‘Hungarian nationality’ provoked anti-Semitic propaganda which proved ‘very damaging’ to the party.107 Now running on a single list, the scale of the MKP’s defeat became visible: it only managed to gather . per cent of the votes. The party had not succeeded in convincing the population of its national credentials. In Pécs, graffiti appeared contrasting the communist star with the national colours. The centrally conceived national policy did not always translate into realities locally. One leading member of the Pécs National Committee thought the graffiti were an attack against the Soviet Union. He had to be told they were directed against the MKP. The local activists had not implemented the national propaganda with enthusiasm. Not all party members were pleased with the new style of electioneering. A report from Békés county suggested that the ‘American’ campaign of  had alienated even those close to the party.108 The party leadership blamed local party organizations for badly executing central directives. Local propagandists had not always followed the national lead and still issued leaflets headed ‘Proletarians of the world, unite.’109 In his analysis, Rákosi considered the lack of national image one of the important reasons for the defeat, and especially blamed the party activists for not being able to carry it out: it became clear that a great many organizations and comrades in the course of their agitation could not implement the party’s national line. In many places they went about it ashamedly, as if they had to represent it as an alien notion . . . they could not present our party either as the heir and continuator to the Hungarian democracy’s historical traditions, or as the party that currently represents the interests of the Hungarians most successfully; neither outwardly with the use of national banners, nor with phraseology, nor, more importantly, with their arguments, were they capable of stressing the national character of the communist party. This is in part the reason for the success of the Smallholder Party.110

Also the Smallholder Party’s ‘strong emphasizing of the so-called national character’ was seen by Rákosi as a reason for their victory. In contrast to 107 109

Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya, i. –. PIL ./, –.

108 110

BMKT //, –. PIL ./, –.




the communist party, the Smallholders had not presented a programme with specific demands, but instead presented themselves as the most significant national and religious party. As with the MKP, there were differences between its national propaganda and local, small-scale agitation. Its national propaganda was conducted in general national and religious terms, but basically in keeping with the goals of the National Independence Front. Locally, however, the Smallholders, according to Rákosi, had shown an ‘essentially anti-Russian tendency. The smaller the village or the less controlled the meeting where they spoke, the more the national character transformed.’111 The Seventh Department of GLAVPURKKA noted the same, and reported that the Smallholder Party’s propaganda was ‘very nationalistic’, and aimed against both the communist party and the Red Army, though not necessarily openly. At a meeting in Nagykanizsa, Smallholder leader Béla Varga said: ‘We have always fought for our Hungarian national flag, that is also why we won in Budapest. And under this banner [we will win the national elections too] . . . We will not allow further that they besmirch the Hungarian national flag. We do not need the interference of other countries. Hungary was an independent nation state, and will stay one.’ Géza Turóczi, the Smallholder Party secretary in Nagyatád district, had said: ‘we work under the tricolour national flag, the communists by contrast under the alien red flag. Do not vote for the communists.’112 Once again, Rákosi stressed the need to be a national party. But although since November  the party leadership had used mainly tactical arguments to convince the party propagandists of the need for national propaganda, now Rákosi argued that the MKP was in actual fact a national party: ‘the comrades must understand that when the communist party represents Hungary’s national interests it is not wearing borrowed plumes or some strange costume, but presents what is its essence.’113 According to Rákosi, the party should not stress its national character ‘almost only with words or historical references’, but by underlining ‘the present burning questions of the Hungarians’, such as the issue of Hungarians abroad or Hungarian property in Germany. Even after the election had been concluded, competition with the Smallholders for the label of ‘national party’ was essential. ‘We have to go much further in stressing the Hungarian Communist Party’s national character than we have done so far. It cannot be allowed that the Smallholder Party will, once 111 113

PIL ./, . PIL ./, –.

112

Iszák and Kun, Moszkvának jelentjük, –.




again, virtually appropriate for itself alone all that national feeling, which does not necessarily have to be anti-Russian and chauvinist, and whose significant part the Communist Party can demand for itself with much more right than other parties.’114 * * * In the second half of , the MKP leadership continued to press the claim that the MKP was heir to national traditions and defender of national interests. It was doing so with little apparent success. The radicalism, or simply ineptitude, of local party activists remained an impediment to the full development of the party’s national line. Party leaders such as Révai and Rákosi attempted to convince their party audience by using tactical arguments. The party activists were nevertheless difficult to convince of the need for national propaganda, and as Rákosi’s repeated exhortations before the Central Committee show, perhaps a significant part of the party leadership was not enthusiastic either. By the end of , Rákosi was not only using tactical arguments, but also within the party presented the MKP as the only true national party. Besides radicalism, the link with the USSR continued to pose tremendous difficulties. The similarities between the Czechoslovak ‘national line’ and that of the MKP are significant. Like the MKP, the KSČ also stressed the party’s position as both heir to the nation and defender of national interests. Though it cannot be substantiated with documentary evidence, this clear parallel makes it likely that the Soviet party had suggested this particular approach. The Soviet origins of the ‘national policy’ still obstructed the national image of both the MKP and the KSČ. Both parties attempted to gain national credit at the expense of the other, while the link between both parties obstructed their national image at home. In Hungary, the MKP attempted to turn vice into virtue and claimed the Soviet Union as ally and liberator. With the beginning of tensions with the West, it was already depicting ‘western’ connections as unpatriotic. The release of Soviet prisoners of war in time for the elections was meant to bolster claims of Soviet friendship. Yet, during the elections, the ‘Soviet’ image of the party remained a cause for concern for both the MKP leadership and Soviet authorities. The need for national propaganda increased as the initial optimism of the MKP gave way to despair. One of the most significant new challenges posed to the MKP’s national image was formed by the Smallholder Party, 114

PIL ./, –.




which had presented a credible alternative national programme to the MKP, both anti-communist and anti-Soviet in content, a programme which had very likely won it the elections. Immediately after the defeat, the MKP began planning the destruction of the Smallholder Party, a struggle in which national propaganda would play a significant role. The development of the MKP’s national policy during the coalition years is detailed in the next three chapters, which, broadly defined, cover foreign policy, domestic affairs, and the use of national symbols.



Conflicting National Policies (–) One of the most important lessons the MKP learnt from its election defeat in  was the necessity of presenting the party’s national image. The party’s national line continued unabated, and many of the same problems that characterized the national policy in  and  continued to obstruct the party during  and . The ‘national lines’ of the Romanian and Czechoslovak communist parties were damaging to the national image of the MKP. The expulsion of the Hungarians from Slovakia was still written on the party’s slate, and contacts between the MKP and KSČ remained appalling. The situation in Romania was better, but only slightly so. Though not threatened with expulsion, the Hungarian minority was mistreated and discriminated against, and while there were friendly contacts with the Romanian communists, the PCR was just as protective of its own ‘national line’ as the KSČ was. In both cases, the MKP was forced to hold back its national propaganda. Decisive in each case was not so much solidarity with its neighbouring communist parties, but the position of the Soviet Union. When in April  it briefly seemed as if Moscow would support limited Hungarian claims on Romania, the MKP immediately publicly demanded Romanian territorial concessions in favour of Hungary. The Swabian question was the only ‘international’ issue that the MKP could pursue because it had the necessary Soviet support, and it did so relentlessly. Not only because of its propagandistic value, but also because it was a means of reckoning with the support of its main domestic opponent, the Smallholder Party. The national line became inextricably linked to the MKP’s struggle for power.

:     While the relations with Romania and Czechoslovakia remained unresolved, the Swabian expulsions were seemingly the perfect national issue

Conflicting National Policies



to pursue for the MKP. There was open Soviet patronage for a policy that promoted the interest of ethnic Hungarians over ethnic Germans. Hungarians would be receiving the land of the German settlers who had been forced to abandon their homesteads. In addition, Hungarian settlers needed protection from angry German settlers whose property had been expropriated, but who had not yet been deported. Having found a ‘national policy’ supported by the Soviet Union, the MKP continued to be a ruthless advocate of expulsions. During  and  the emphasis in the expulsions shifted from accusations of collective responsibility to the destruction of the social and political base of the Smallholder Party in Swabian areas. As expropriations had started already early in , long before the first deportations in December , the Swabians continued to live in their old villages, where, lacking employment, they were forced to live from charity and theft. Ethnic conflicts worsened as the destitute Swabians offered themselves as day labourers at half the wage of their Hungarian neighbours.1 As the expulsions commenced the new settlers often arrived before the previous, Swabian, owners had left, which sometimes meant they had to share their new houses with the former proprietors. In other cases, Volksbund members interned in concentration camps fled home and requested residence in their old homes from the new owners.2 To the indignation of the latter, proud Swabians refused to work on their former property. Their presence was demoralizing to the new settlers, who, with the old owners still present, did not get used to seeing themselves as the legitimate owners of the property, and feared they might one day lose their new land. Conflicts between the old and new owners quickly followed. In Baranya county, Swabians were reported as dubbing the immigrants ‘gypsies’ and sometimes physically assaulting them in broad daylight.3 In Pécs, settlers refused to till the fields until their position had been legalized. Settlers who did work grew resentful from providing for the remaining Swabians. According to János Horváth, communist representative to the Pécs National Committee, the patience of the settlers was at an end, and neither the MKP nor the National Committees would be able to contain them for very much longer.4 A lynch mob mentality was not only reported in Pécs. Further to the east, in Vaskút near Baja, during a dance where everyone, including the local MKP party secretary, was much the worse for wear, a 1 4

2 Füzes, Forgószél, . 3 PIL ./, –. PIL ./, . BML XVII [minutes, National Committee,  Apr. ].




woman claimed ‘the Swabians’ were breaking into her home. A mob then left, and beat up and killed one of the Swabians. The background to the murder was listed in the police report as the resentment of the immigrants who felt they had been short-changed and blamed the Swabians for their misfortune.5 The MKP came to the defence of the new settlers and continued its aggressive backing of the expulsions. At the Central Committee meeting of  October , Rákosi stressed the importance of reassuring the settlers, and underlined the legal security of their new property.6 Upon becoming Minister of the Interior in November , Nagy put forward the ‘expulsion of Volksbundists and Swabians’ as one of his priorities.7 The slogan ‘land we shall not return!’ (Földet vissza nem adunk!),8 issued in February , to attack the Smallholder Party, was also perfectly suited to the Swabian situation. The problem worsened in July  when the Americans suspended the deportations of Swabians to Germany into their zone of occupation, and officially ended them in December of the same year. The end to deportations became even more threatening considering the Slovak–Hungarian population exchange, which started in April . With government decree / of  March , Swabian families were forced to move in together to make room for Hungarians from Slovakia.9 Acting chairman of the Allied Control Commission Sviridov noted the situation was ‘very embarrassing’ for the Hungarian government, and ‘a lot of friction’ was developing between Hungarians and Swabians.10 The party’s role as defender of Hungarian settlers also became apparent at the local level. According to county propagandist reports, in the Baranya township of Lánycsók, the party consisted mainly of ‘settlers and left-wing deviationists’, who organized ‘demonstrations, with bloody fights’ against the Swabians.11 In Vaskút, the party had been swamped by settlers, and most party meetings were spent with the members inciting each other against the Germans.12 In Ivándárda, a small village near the Villány wine district, the ‘remaining Swabians agitate against the new owners and our party’, and in slightly larger Bábarc near Mohács, the village requested ‘a communist village notary who represents the Hungarian’s interests, because in the parish hall and everywhere else, only the Swabians play a role’.13 5 7 8 9 11

6 PIL ./, . PIL ./, –. Dér, Nagy Imre vonal, –. For the slogan as an attack on the Smallholders see Chapter . 10 Füzes, Forgószél, . Bendegűz, Allied Control Commission, –. 12 13 PIL ./, –. PIL ./, . PIL ./, –.




The expulsion of the Swabians was not only of interest because it was a national issue, but also because it could be linked to the MKP’s struggle for power: the Smallholder Party found many Swabians among its adherents. By attacking wealthy Swabians, the MKP deprived the Smallholder Party of a social and political basis of support. Within the coalition, the MKP and NPP in particular demanded the continued expulsion of the Swabians, and pressed through modifications to change the social nature of the deportations. The initial stage of expulsions, which commenced in December , had especially demanded the removal of Volksbund and SS members. It soon turned out that, in general, the poorer Swabians had flocked to these organisations, while the wealthy Swabians had kept their distance. In May and August , the decrees governing the expulsions were modified. Those who had been forcibly pressed into service of the SS or the Volksbund were now exempted. Formally, this measure was taken to limit the excesses of the first stage of the deportations.14 In reality, as it defended the social base of the MKP the move reflected the power struggle in the country. Government directive ,/ went further, and exempted industrial workers and miners, agricultural day labourers, indispensable craftsmen, and small tradesmen from deportation, unless they were voluntary members of the SS or Volksbund. As former SS soldiers could now expect to remain in Hungary while innocent, but well-to-do Swabians were deported, the last sense of individual responsibility in the expulsions disappeared, replaced by social gerrymandering that favoured the natural supporters of the MKP. A ministerial report written after the deportations justified it by claiming that the initial criteria had been ‘without a doubt directed against the Swabian proletarian’. Their ‘defencelessness’ made their forced servitude in the Volksbund or SS more likely, and so they were deported, whereas the ‘careful kulaks’, who had ‘not openly sided with the Volksbund’ and ‘endeavoured not to carry out their service in the SS’, had escaped.15 Dodging the SS draft now seemed more of a crime than fighting with the SS. The concern was not so much to redress the balance caused by the ‘detrimental measures’ of the first wave of deportations, but, as the report put it, to ‘break the economic power of the Swabians’ by deporting ‘part of the Swabian kulaks’ and limiting their property to a maximum of  hold. Besides using legal measures, the party also employed its control of the Ministry of the Interior to exploit the deportations in its favour. After 14

Tilkovsky, Nemzetiségi politika Magyarországon, .

15

PIL ./, –.




Nagy acquired the Ministry of the Interior in November , the implementation of the expulsions fell almost entirely under the aegis of the MKP. While the deportations formally were part of the jurisdiction of the Prime Minister as well, by July , all aspects of the expulsions were, in practice, under communist control.16 This gave the party the crucial say in the appointment of local committees in charge of expulsions and exemptions. The result was, in the words of one ministerial counsellor, that the expulsions of  went even further in lawlessness than those of .17 The exemption committees were known to ignore government decree no. ./. ME, which released ‘former members of democratic parties’ from deportation, and did not accept the affidavits issued by the Smallholder Party as evidence of membership of a ‘democratic party’. Furthermore, the committees not only singled out for expulsion the members of former Fascist organizations, but now also members of German cultural organizations, for which there was no legal obligation at all.18 Other decrees were ignored when it suited the committees. Whereas Swabian background had been defined by mother tongue, it now regularly occurred that native Hungarian speakers and ‘true-born Hungarians’ were threatened with expulsion. In some cases, expellees were so magyarized that they could not even speak German.19 The decree that exempted press-ganged SS soldiers, introduced to protect Swabian ‘proletarians’, was ignored when it did not favour the MKP.20 The chairman of the Smallholder Party in Pustavám in Baranya county had been threatened with deportation, despite his protests that he had always been opposed to the Volksbund because of his ‘Hungarianness’. He protested that he did not know why he was lumped together with members of the SS and the Volksbund.21 One letter writer called on the intervention of Ferenc Nagy for twenty-five Swabian families from the Harta district near Budapest, who were being deported under alleged false pretences. Boldizsár Gillich, for instance, had been put on the list of deportees for taking in two German children as refugees for four days. Because he had refused payment for provideding shelter, he was accused of ‘materially supporting the Volksbund’. János Gottschall should have been exempted because he had been an inmate in a German concentration camp, and the widow of a Swabian soldier was singled out for deportation, even though her husband

16 17 18 20

MOL XIX-A--J: d [unknown author to Prime Minister,  July ]. MOL XIX-A--J-d [Pro Memoria,  Aug. ]. 19 TIKL, /, –. MOL XIX-A--J- [Pro Memoria]. 21 BML XVII-, Jegyzőkönyv /,  May . TIKL /, .




had been killed fighting as a soldier in the Hungarian army, which he had joined in order to avoid service in the SS.22 The expulsion of the Swabians took place to the background of the post-war power struggle. Indeed, the MKP accused other parties of using the same tactics, by saving ‘their’ Swabians from deportation.23 Another indication of the party’s utilitarian attitude towards the Swabian expulsions was that the MKP simultaneously vilified and courted the German minority. Despite its anti-Swabian line, the MKP attempted to gain its support where possible. At a national conference of county secretaries and propagandists, one speaker urged that potential Swabian supporters in the German districts near Budapest should not be frightened. ‘The counties of Esztergom-Komárom are made up of a significant number of Swabian townships. The communist party continually puts on the agenda that they have to be expelled, and the old democratic strata take up a reserved position, as they fear that they will be expelled as well. There are Swabian districts where  per cent of the inhabitants voted for us. I ask the leadership to take these townships into consideration and not to judge them similarly to districts that were part of the Fascist organizations.’24 Such criticism was taken to heart. Rákosi emphasized that linking land reform to Swabian expulsions should only be done in areas with a Hungarian majority, but should be avoided in Swabian districts.25 In whispering propaganda, the party propagandists implied that if the Swabians behaved well, they would not be deported. For instance, Central Committee member Ferenc Keleti described how they had approached the Swabians: We did not scare them, by saying ‘you will be deported because that is our programme’, instead I said, for instance in Elek: ‘the Swabian conduct in the past has been wrong. Now we want to convince ourselves whether you want to amend your past mistakes. Who will you be voting for: the reaction, which we will take to mean that you do not want to be a part of the new Hungarian framework, or us’ . . . the result: we became the strongest party in Elek.26

Nevertheless, the party could not be seen to be supporting the Swabians. This kind of propaganda was conducted covertly. In regard to the expulsions in the Budapest area, Central Committee member Köböl told Budapest propagandists that ‘considering only a small part will be deported’ they should agitate in favour of Swabians, but ‘naturally’, this

22 24

MOL XIX-A--J-. PIL ./, –.

23 25

PIL ./, –.

26

PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –.




could not be done in writing.27 In response to this carrot-and-stick approach, many Swabians attempted to join the MKP and other left-wing organizations. In Baranya county, National Committee member József Csett claimed –, Swabians had ‘infiltrated’ the unions in order to escape expulsion.28 In Farkasgyepű, near Veszprém, a ‘large number’ of Swabians joined the MKP. Much further south in the Baranya county village of Bátaszék, the local party organization took up a ‘Swabian comrade’ in the central leadership, and the central district secretary there was also German.29 Elsewhere, the party was less successful. From Tolna, instructors reported the party was having ‘serious problems’ in winning over Swabians remaining after expulsions.30 The MKP continued to support deportations for reasons of its national policy, but also as an instrument in its conflict with the Smallholder Party. As wealthy Swabians were selected for deportations and ‘proletarian’ Swabians saved, the expropriations and deportations were given the nature of a social conflict. The language of the expulsions, nevertheless, did not change, and the call to deport ‘treasonous’ Swabians remained even though working-class Volksbund and SS members were exempted from deportation. Mirroring the fate of the right-wing Smallholders, the wealthy Swabians were branded traitors even if they had had nothing at all to do with the Volksbund.  As soon as the interests of neighbouring communist parties, especially the Soviet party, had to be taken into account, the MKP was a lot less successful in defending national interests. With regard to Romania, the mistreatment of Hungarians and the, as yet, unresolved border issue formed two major problems. The official Romanian attitude to the Hungarian minority was tolerant compared to that of the Slovak communists. There was no official demand for expulsions, and the Groza government sounded conciliatory and voiced at least a formal commitment to minority rights. In practice, though, similar abuses of Hungarians by Romanian authorities and extremists occurred to those in Czechoslovakia. The situation the Romanian Communist Party found itself in was comparable to that of the Czechoslovak and Hungarian parties. The single 27 28 29

PIL / [Greater Budapest Propaganda Committee Meeting,  Aug. ]. PIL ./, –; BML, XVII– [minutes no. /,  May ]. 30 PIL ./, –. PIL ./, .




largest problem of the Romanian Communist Party (PCR) after the war was that it was perceived as an ‘agent of Moscow’. Its image as a ‘foreign’ party was, as in Slovakia, enhanced by the large number of the party’s prewar ethnic Hungarian members, many of whom had joined because the PCR had opposed the Trianon Treaty. As in Hungary, the view of the party as ‘alien’ was strengthened by the significant number of Jewish activists.31 The PCR compensated for its un-national image by taking a tough stance on the Hungarian minority. The fact that Vasile Luca, the party’s expert on the national question, was Hungarian in origin—his true name was László Lukács—only worsened matters. More than any other PCR leader he had to prove his loyalty to Romania.32 The tough stance of the PCR, however, alienated its traditional Hungarian following, and ensured that in Hungary, the MKP was resented for the trespasses of the PCR. Two young Hungarian communists, Géza Losonczy and the later dissident Sándor Haraszti, visited Transylvania in August , and reported to the MKP leadership on anti-Hungarian demonstrations by supporters of the former Fascist Iron Guard and Iuliu Maniu’s National Peasant Party. These had provoked a ‘chauvinist mood’ among the ‘Hungarian working and village masses’. Before the war the defender of the minority, the PCR now suppressed dissent. According to Losonczy and Haraszti, PCR party instructors sent down from Bucharest forbade even the discussion within the party of the ‘reactionary chauvinist attacks’. Local Transylvanian party leaders concluded that, as a result, the PCR was losing support among the Hungarian minority. Losonczy and Haraszti condemned the Hungarian ‘chauvinists’ that were springing up in the party, but concluded that they were very popular, to the point of threatening a split in the PCR. At the other extreme, Losonczy and Haraszti noted the oppression had caused ‘left-wing exaggerations’ in northern Transylvania. Rather than living under the Romanians, the Hungarian communists demanded to join the Soviet Union, which, in turn, only ‘strengthened Romanian chauvinism’.33 Besides the oppression of the Hungarian minority, the border issue troubled the MKP. According to Tatiana Volokitna and Tofik Islamov, the fate of Transylvania was sealed on  March , a reward to Romania for the installation of the pro-Soviet Petru Groza government on that day.34 But though northern Transylvania was returned to Romanian 31 32 34

King, Romanian Communist Party, . 33 PIL ./, –. Fülöp, Revízió vagy autonómia?, –. Islamov and Volokitna, Transil’vanskiy vopros, .




administration pending a peace treaty, an element of ambiguity remained thanks to article  of the ceasefire agreement between the Allies and Romania. This stipulated that ‘Transylvania (or its greater part) will return to Romania.’35 The bracketed words were enough to give the Hungarians hope of gaining at least some territory at the negotiating table. To the Romanians, the clause was a constant reminder that Transylvania could still be taken away from them. Even though at the September  meeting of the Conference of Foreign Ministers the Soviet government again announced that it supported the Romanian claim on Transylvania, the threat remained that this position could suddenly change. The MKP, conscious of Soviet opposition, remained as silent as it could on the border issue, and hoped instead to gain national credentials from the land reform. But on  December , Révai broke silence and denounced territorial claims on Romania based on ethnographic principles in Szabad Nép.36 Révai’s article was a reaction to Smallholder evaluations of the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers in Moscow from  to  December. There, the United States and Britain agreed to recognize the National Democratic Front government led by Groza, providing one member each of the National Liberal Party and the National Peasant Party was added to the government. It was a victory for the Soviet Union: candidates for posts supported by the United States and Britain put forward by party leaders Maniu and Bratianu were rejected in favour of Soviet-sponsored politicians. Romania now stood on the eve of a new political struggle within the Groza government. The uncertainty caused by article  ensured that Transylvania could be used as both a carrot and a stick by the Soviet Union to ensure compliance from Romanian politicians. On the other hand, the Romanian tail may also have been wagging the Soviet dog. A friendly Romania was crucial to the Soviet Union, and this could only be bought at the price of a Romanian Transylvania. In any case, Soviet support for Transylvania played a part in Romania’s domestic affairs. Gheorghe Tatarescu was Minister of Foreign Affairs, and leader of the Royalist faction in the National Liberal Party, with a record of support for the Iron Guard in the past. He emerged as one of the most prominent right-wing fellow-travellers in Romania. Judging from a meeting with Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Andrej Vyshinsky, one of the reasons for his alliance with the communists was Soviet support in reckoning with 35 36

Kertész, Magyar békeillúziók, . József Révai, ‘Nemzetrontó sovinizmus’, Szabad Nép,  Dec. .




enemies within his own party. The Soviet position on Transylvania emerged as another strong motive. On  January , Tatarescu met Vyshinsky specifically in order to discuss the Transylvanian question. Vyshinsky confirmed Soviet support for the return of Transylvania to Romania, and stressed that the USA and Britain were more inclined towards Hungary. Following this exchange, Tatarescu thanked Vyshinsky profusely for his aid in removing opponents Bebe Bratianu and Gheorge Fotino from the National Liberal Party list of ministerial candidates for the new Groza government. He declared solidarity with the communist party and stated that there was a ‘common language’ and a ‘common platform’ for cooperation with the communists.37 With the support of Tatarescu now bought, Vyshinsky instructed Gheorghiu-Dej on current tactics. With regard to the National Liberal Party, the goal was to isolate the group around Bratianu. Vyshinsky ordered Gheorghiu-Dej not to hamper Tatarescu ‘but aid him in the disintegration of the National Liberal Party’.38 From the episode, it seems clear that Tatarescu’s support was not unconditional, and that he had at least wanted to assure himself of the Soviet position on Transylvania before dedicating himself to an alliance with the PCR. It is not certain whether the MKP denounced border revision on explicit Soviet instructions, after a formal request from the PCR, or decided to do so on its own initiative. The timing of the move, however, suggests that the need to support Soviet policy in Romania was a main motive at this point. The rejection of border revision by the MKP could be interpreted by politicians such as Tatarescu as further evidence of Soviet backing for Romania, and could also bolster the national credentials of the PCR. For the MKP, the line was less beneficial. Révai’s article led to condemnations from the Smallholder newspaper Kis Újság, which accused the MKP of being ‘un-national’.39 In January , NPP leader Imre Kovács accused all those who did not explicitly demand border revision of being ‘unpatriotic.’ This produced also a domestic need for the MKP to formulate its stance on border revision more precisely. To compensate for the party’s position on the border issue, Révai decided to defend the Transylvanian Hungarians against persecution by the Romanian ‘reaction’. In the Szabad Nép of  January Révai argued that, as a defeated nation, Hungary had very little to demand, and should rather concentrate 37 39

Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. –. Balogh, Magyarország külpolitikája, .

38

Ibid. –.




on defending the Hungarian minority.40 Both this trade-off for borders against minority rights and the fact that rejection of border change was a conscious effort to support the PCR become apparent in a letter from József Révai to Vasile Luca. Révai reminded Luca of the support the MKP was giving the PCR by attacking its own ‘chauvinists’, but was deeply critical of the lack of aid the MKP received in return. While the Romanians had published an article by Révai in the PCR party organ Scinteia, the MKP’s Politburo refused to print PCR statements in the party press: I send you my lead article in Sunday’s issue of Szabad Nép, from which you can see that we are strongly continuing our struggle against Hungarian chauvinism . . . In our struggle against Hungarian chauvinism we are—as you can imagine— swimming against the stream as it is. Our position on this question is pretty difficult. This, of course, in no way means that we will make the smallest concession on matters of principle on this issue, but tactical viewpoints force us not to push our luck. In this case specifically, that means we cannot be silent about certain complaints of the Transylvanian Hungarians. Unfortunately, from your statements it somehow appears as if such complaints do not exist, or at least are insignificant. In my opinion, this on the one hand does not wholly correspond to the truth and on the other hand it would unnecessarily provoke the already sensitive Hungarian public opinion and so make our struggle against Hungarian chauvinism more difficult. As we understand your situation, understand ours as well.41

Révai’s letter to Luka again demonstrates, as in the case of MKP–KSČ relations, that it was impossible to satisfy the ‘national policy’ of two national communist parties with conflicting national interests. His call for understanding, more a gibe than a request, echoes Gottwald’s proposal for a mutual attack. Révai was at least hoping for a deal with the PCR. But as was the case with the Czechoslovaks, Soviet patronage for the neighbour ensured that the MKP would have to suffer the effects of the national policy of the PCR.  ’    ’    The Soviet position on Romania’s borders remained, in the meantime, unchanged. During discussions in London on  March , the Soviet representatives proposed that Romania retain ‘the whole of 40 41

József Révai, ‘A magyarkodók ellen’, Szabad Nép,  Jan. . PIL ./, . Révai refers to ‘A magyarkodók ellen’.




Transylvania’.42 By the end of March , the situation regarding the Romanian–Hungarian border seemed straightforward. In the Soviet drafts for a Hungarian peace treaty presented to the deputies of the Foreign Ministers on  March, the Soviet position on the border issue was still full support for the transfer of the whole of Transylvania to Romania.43 Following agreements between the Great Powers, the former allies of Nazi Germany would be allowed to present their own requests at the Conference of Foreign Ministers in Paris starting on  April. As yet, the Hungarian government was not aware of the Soviet attitude on the border question. At a multi-party conference on  March in the Foreign Ministry, Foreign Minister János Gyöngyösi considered the USSR ‘indifferent’ to Hungarian territorial claims, but noted that, at least, such proposals had not been met ‘with indignation’.44 Though in his articles Révai had rejected ‘chauvinist’ territorial claims and a redrawing of the map along ethnic principles, he had stopped short of explicitly opposing the possibility of any border changes. This principle was adhered to at the all-party conference. As far as can be gleaned from an incomplete report on the meeting, communist representatives Károly Kis and István Kovács did not argue against border revision, though they did point to possible problems: the Hungarians should be realistic as a defeated power, the reaction of the Great Powers was unknown, and claims could provoke counter-claims.45 Gyöngyösi later claimed that the Social Democrats and MKP had argued at this meeting to keep the Trianon status quo intact, but to this both parties reacted with indignation. Anna Kethly argued for the SzDP that her party had never supported merely the preservation of the Trianon frontier.46 Révai hotly and repeatedly denied Gyöngyösi’s accusation.47 Kis and Kovács also both claimed they had ‘most decisively’ supported the notion that the Soviet–Romanian ceasefire agreement gave Hungary the chance of the return of territory.48 Their protests of innocence probably had a basis in fact. Though outwardly keeping a low profile, the MKP was not from the outset opposed to all territorial claims. According to Ferenc Nagy, Rákosi proposed that Hungary should claim no more than , to , square kilometres of Transylvanian land, for Fülöp, Revízió vagy autonómia?, . Fülöp, ‘The Failure of the Hungarian–Rumanian Negotiations’, –. 44 Ibid. . 45 MOL XIX-J--A, [‘Feljegyzés a Magyar Külügyminisztériumban . március .án tartott békeelőkészítő közi értékezletről’]. 46 47 48 Stark, ‘Út a békeszerződéshez,’ –. Ibid. PIL ./, . 42 43




which he hinted there would be Soviet support.49 Smallholder plans were more ambitious than this, however. Prime Minister Nagy and Foreign Minister Gyöngyösi settled for two schemes: one added , square kilometres and one and a half million inhabitants to Trianon Hungary, and the fallback position limited the claim to , square kilometres and , people. In April, in preparation for the Conference of Foreign Ministers, Hungarian and Romanian delegations visited Moscow for discussion with the Soviet leadership. These were preceded by preparatory trips by representatives of the communist party. Rákosi left for Moscow at the end of March, where he met Stalin for a rare -minute meeting on  April. It is not clear what was discussed, but the border issue was a likely topic. The next day, Molotov met Gheorghiu-Dej and asked, out of the blue: ‘Is it true that Petru Groza expressed his agreement with the transfer of part of north Transylvania to Hungary?’50 Gheorghiu-Dej said he did not know, but that Groza had, following a visit from a cultural delegation from Hungary, told him that northern Transylvania could possibly be granted regional autonomy.51 What prompted Molotov to ask this question is unclear, but it is the first indication that the USSR might support bilateral negotiations between Hungary and Romania. At the  March meetings, Gyöngyösi had still argued against bilateral negotiations, on the grounds that ‘no call has come from the Great Powers to start such talks’.52 But now, for the first time the notion appeared that Romania and Hungary should discuss the border question themselves. On  April, Molotov whisked Gyöngyösi straight from his aircraft to prepare the discussions with Stalin, and asked him whether the Hungarians had engaged in any official or non-official talks with the Romanians on the border issue. Gyöngyösi replied there had not been any.53 The next day, the entire delegation, including Hungarian ambassador Gyula Szekfű, held talks with Stalin, which lasted more than two hours. Ferenc Nagy argued for limited border revision, which would ‘set the Hungarian people at ease’. Stalin did not, as would have been consistent with Soviet support for Romania, reject the Hungarian request out of hand. Instead, he argued that article  of the ceasefire agreement with Romania gave Hungary a basis for territorial claims: ‘The ceasefire agreement . . . states that all or the greater part of Transylvania must be 49 50 52 53

Nagy, Struggle Behind the Iron Curtain, . 51 Ibid. Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. –. Fülöp, ‘The Failure of the Hungarian–Rumanian Negotiations’, . Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. –.




transferred to Romania. This clause gives Hungary the possibility to receive part of Transylvania.’ The issue, Stalin said, would be discussed at the Council of Foreign Ministers. Nagy thanked Stalin and said his response gave hope for a ‘peace that will soothe the Hungarian people’, in other words, that rewarded Hungarian territorial claims. This was rather optimistic, even considering the record of the talks. When Gyöngyösi unfolded the map with the Hungarian claims on Transylvania, Stalin toughened and said Romania would not be able to accept all Hungarian demands, and no Romanian government that accepted them could expect to stay in power. Gyöngyösi could only retort that the Hungarian government could not stay in power either if it did not make any demands.54 Stalin merely offered to investigate the Hungarian claims in Paris; nevertheless, the Hungarian delegation considered the Soviet leadership now supportive. In reality, no change had taken place in the Soviet position. Even the offer to consider the Hungarian wishes at the Conference of Foreign Ministers went beyond true Soviet intentions. After the meeting with the Hungarians, Molotov and Deputy Foreign Minister Dekazanov met representatives of the Romanian government, and promised them unwavering support on the border issue, thus making negotiations between Hungary and Romania unnecessary.55 All the same, in discussions with Hungary Molotov returned to the subject of bilateral negotiations on  April, telling Ferenc Nagy that it would be preferable if the Hungarians and Romanians could come to an agreement, and that the Soviet Union expected the Hungarian government to initiate negotiations.56 Ferenc Nagy was surprised, and replied that Groza would probably not be prepared to make any concessions to Hungary before elections in Romania, expected no earlier than the summer, had taken place. Nevertheless, Molotov insisted: ‘the Romanians either accept or decline, but you have done your duty.’57 Molotov must have realized such negotiations were futile if the Romanians felt themselves assured of Soviet backing, which he had delivered in person. He probably insisted upon them nonetheless, as Mihály Fülöp argues, to abide by an agreement with the other two Great Powers of  April. This stated that states should attempt to resolve their differences before tabling them before the Council of Foreign Ministers.58 By leaving some room for ambiguity, Stalin and Molotov ensured the 54 55 56 58

Ibid. –. Fülöp, ‘The Failure of the Hungarian–Rumanian Negotiations’, . 57 Nagy, Struggle behind the Iron Curtain, . Ibid. Fülöp, ‘The Failure of the Hungarian–Rumanian Negotiations’, .




Hungarians would press their claims in Paris. The outright rejection in line with true Soviet intentions could have deterred the Hungarian government from making an application, which would have led to a conflict between the Soviet Union and the western Allies. Additionally, if the Hungarian proposal had been summarily opposed in Moscow, the Soviet Union would have carried all the blame. By insisting on negotiations and stimulating the Hungarians to put forward a territorial claim at the Council of Foreign Ministers, the responsibility for denying Hungary’s border changes would be spread out between the Romanians and the Great Powers. The Hungarian delegation was impressed by the friendly reception in Moscow. Though Stalin had offered no absolute promises, his comments were nevertheless seen as supportive of Hungarian peace aims, and the delegates left Moscow on  April optimistically.59 Upon return home, the high expectations were immediately shared with the Hungarian public. The Smallholder Party declared it could count on Soviet support in all issues of foreign policy.60 The MKP shared in the hopefulness that now engulfed the country. At a speech in Békéscsaba on  April, Rákosi declared that the delegation had won Soviet benevolence towards Hungary’s peace goals.61 The Moscow visit was debated in the Foreign Affairs Committee in Parliament on  April, where the parties, on the basis of the favourable reports, decided that Hungary would press its claim on parts of Transylvania at the meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers. During the discussions Révai objected to territorial demands on Slovakia, but supported those on Romania. Indeed, it was Révai who tabled the motion to accept Gyöngyösi’s plans. Optimism abounded in the country, and in the press the impression was given that success was assured.62 The MKP now, for the first time, openly spoke out in favour of territorial demands on Romania. On  April, Révai gave a speech ‘on the Hungarian Peace’ in the Music Academy, with the entire diplomatic community present, and argued explicitly in favour of limited revision.63 60 Kertész, Magyar békeillúziók, . Romsics, Magyarország története, . 62 Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, ii. . Balogh, Magyarország külpolitikája, . 63 The quotes here are reconstructed on the basis of the testimony of István Kertész, who was present, a draft of the speech, and a transcript of the speech. The transcript was censored, and does not contain the explicit references to cities which are mentioned by Kertész and in Révai’s handwritten notes. See MTAKK, MS ./, ‘A magyar béke’ (handwritten notes), and MTAKK MS /, ‘A magyar békéről. Révai József előadása.’ A bowdlerized version of the speech appeared in Szabad Nép,  Apr. . See also Kertész, Magyar békeillúziók, . 59 61




‘There is here—if not a Hungarian bloc—a strip with a Hungarian majority: the line Szatmárnémeti—Nagybánya—Nagyvárad—Nagyszalonta— Arad [Satu Mare—Baia Mare—Oradea—Salonta—Arad]. We are striving for this. In direct negotiations.’64 ‘We have to try to strive for this smaller or larger border strip at the peace talks. We have reason to believe that the Soviet Union will not oppose our desires, on the contrary, on the basis of the atmosphere at the Moscow talks we have reason to believe that it will support us.’65 Rezs ő Szántó was the MKP’s representative in Moscow. He also furnished the International Department of the VKP(b) with information on the activities of the MKP leadership. The speech, Rezs ő Szántó reported, ‘left a deep impression, and everybody thought Révai’s speech was based on serious promises’.66 Révai’s oration had a huge impact, as the MKP demand for territory lent credence to the belief that the USSR would support Hungarian claims. It did not just cause a stir outside the party. In the meeting of the Secretariat following the speech, Révai came under attack for not clearing the speech with the Politburo first. Révai claimed, however, that he had shown the speech in advance to the Soviet ambassador, Pushkin.67 Indeed, it seems inconceivable that Révai would have made territorial demands without prior Soviet consent. István Kertész even had the impression that the MKP was operating under direct Soviet instructions.68 Yet on the basis of Szántó’s reports and recent published sources, it is more likely that Révai himself was responsible for the blunder. Rákosi claimed in his memoirs that, following the speech, he was criticized by both Stalin and the ‘Romanian comrades’ for having ‘nationalist tendencies’.69 Soviet criticism would not have occurred had the speech been approved beforehand. Besides the fact that it was probably Voroshilov or Pushkin, and not Stalin personally, who had delivered the criticism, Rákosi was probably telling the truth. At the Central Committee meeting of  May , Rákosi distanced himself from the MKP’s overoptimistic expectations following the Moscow visit, and it is unlikely that he would have practised such self-criticism had it not been for Russian censure. It is possible that Révai wrote the speech on his own initiative, without informing the rest of the Politburo. The main party bodies were completely dominated by the Moscow ‘foursome’ Rákosi, Révai, Farkas, and 64 67 69

65 66 MTAKK, MS ./. MTAKK, MS /. PIL /, –. 68 PIL /, –, –. Kertész, Magyar békeillúziók, . Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, i. .




Gerő, and more junior members rarely spoke out in the Secretariat or Politburo. Moreover, Szántó, not one to pull punches, was often greatly critical of Révai, but relieved him of responsibility by reporting to Moscow that the speech had been written ‘obviously on the basis of wrong information’. Szántó blamed primarily Rákosi, who had been responsible for leaving a false impression of Soviet support for peace claims. The day after Révai’s speech, on  April, the Hungarian plenipotentiary envoy Pál Sebestyén arrived in Bucharest with the task of persuading Gheorghe Tatarescu and Petru Groza to open bilateral discussions on the border question. The Romanians predictably declined, despite Sebestyén’s insistence that Hungary had support from ‘our joint great neighbour, the Soviet Union’.70 Shortly after the the speech, Imre Nagy and Ernő Gerő travelled to Timi șoara where they met Gheorghiu-Dej, Vasile Luca, and Lucretiu Patrascanu to discuss the now opposing lines of the Romanian and Hungarian communist parties, and to ‘come to an agreement on this issue’.71 This was not a reference to Révai’s speech: the Secretariat had already planned the meeting on  April, in order to ‘clarify matters for the Peace conference’.72 Most likely it was a last-ditch attempt by the MKP to reach an agreement on the border issue. Whatever the case, Szántó noted the deliberations remained ‘without result’.73 It was a mistake to send Nagy. From Szántó’s notes, it appears that it was Nagy who furnished him with the information on which he based his report. László Orbán and István Kovács complained to Nagy about having to learn party policy from the newspaper. Nagy, a recent addition to the party’s Secretariat, had not known about the speech either. Gerő dismissed the three of them with the words: ‘That’s not party leadership!’ It was from the sidelined Nagy that Szántó learnt about discrepancies in Rákosi’s and Gerő’s account of the Moscow trip that emerged during the Timișoara visit. Szántó furiously scribbled in his notes. ‘It turned out, that Rák[osi’s] and Gerő’s inform[ation] about the M[oscow] trip did not correspond to the truth. They took the party into an anti-Soviet line.’ ‘Why was this necessary?’, asked Szántó. ‘G and M clearly said how far it was possible to go. A completely incorrect line was established.’74 It is not clear from Szántó’s notes how exactly Rákosi had misrepresented the Moscow talks. Most likely, Rákosi had given, like Ferenc Nagy, the impression of Soviet support for border changes. That becomes 71 Fülop, Revízió vagy autonómia?, –. PIL –, –. 73 Ibid.; PIL –, –. PIL ./ [Secretariat, minutes,  Apr. ]. 74 PIL /, –, –. The identity of G and M in this quotation cannot be established. 70 72




apparent from his self-criticism before the Central Committee: ‘I have to say that our people took the notion that Hungary has the right to take up certain territorial claims . . . a little further and presented it as if the rightfulness of taking up these claims at the same time means that the Soviet Union supports these claims with all its might. Without a doubt there occurred from the returning delegation a certain exaggeration.’75 Szántó blamed Rákosi’s ‘personal ambitions and illusions’ for his false representation of the Moscow discussions.76 Rákosi’s ‘illusions’ probably referred to the same kind of wishful thinking that had taken hold of Ferenc Nagy, the belief that Stalin really might support a favourable settlement. Stalin and Molotov had in all probability not informed Rákosi of their true intentions, as it is extremely unlikely that Rákosi would have opposed Stalin behind his back. What Rákosi’s ‘ambitions’ might have been is less obvious. Since  March, the MKP had supported the idea of bilateral negotiations. Rákosi might have hoped to win the day by clinching a limited territorial deal with the Romanian communists. Rákosi may have even promoted the idea of negotiations in Moscow. This, at least, offers an explanation of how Szántó learned about Rákosi’s ‘ambitions’: they had been fed back to the Romanian communists, who presented them to Nagy and Gerő in Timi șoara. At the very least, however, Rákosi would have aspired for the MKP to take the lead on this important national issue. The reconstruction of events and motives before and after the Music Academy speech is, due to the lack of documentary evidence, guesswork to a degree, and, on the basis of Szántó’s notes, alternative interpretations are possible. The main underlying cause of the mistake was, in any case, the party’s national policy. Révai’s speech has been seen as a -degree turn from an official party policy of condemnation of border revisionism as chauvinism.77 But it was compatible with the party’s national policy since the end of the war, according to which the party could put forward a national face, providing it did not conflict with Moscow. Révai had already argued in favour of peaceful border revision at the autumn  meetings, but had been unable to propagate this openly as it would have brought the party in opposition to the USSR. While the MKP had publicly warned against ‘chauvinism’, had called for a ‘realistic’ approach to the peace talks, and had opposed the principle of revision along ethnic lines, the party did not conduct a fully fledged campaign against border changes in general. Révai had taken great care not to denounce explicitly all possible changes 75 77

76 PIL ./, –. PIL /, –, –. Kertész, Magyar békeillúziók, .




in the border. This was, as Szántó stated in his report, as far as the Russians had allowed the MKP to go. After the Moscow visit, the obstacle of Soviet objections had been seemingly removed, and thus it followed that territorial demands could be pressed. Indeed, with apparent Soviet support, it would have been folly not to demand territorial changes, and risk leaving all the glory to the Smallholders in case of success. That it was possible for Révai to make such a stunning error can be explained from the MKP’s relation to the Soviet party. Soviet mistrust backfired on the MKP. In the end, the speech proved to be damaging rather than helping the party’s national image. Szántó reported that it started a ‘contest’ in the press between the other parties, who did not want to stay behind the MKP. On  May, Ferenc Nagy not only learnt that Transylvania would be transferred to Romania in its entirety, but that it was especially Molotov who had insisted on this at the conference, without giving any regard to article  of the ceasefire agreement. The MKP suffered an enormous backlash, though it attempted to blame the Americans, who had chaired the meeting.78 In his notes, Szántó groaned ‘the events proved that an exaggerated and incorrect line was established . . . We expected a lot from the Russians, and when the groundlessness for this became clear, an anti-Soviet atmosphere was established.’79 In his report, he noted the speech was seen as the cause of this: ‘According to several comrades, if Révai’s speech had not happened and the standpoint of the communist party had been different, the other parties and the Hungarian government would not have supported such far-reaching demands, there would not have been such a sharp contrast between the lines of the Hungarian and Soviet governments.’ This was probably exaggerated. The Smallholders were not dependent on Révai for wishful thinking. Even Gyöngyösi had to admit that Ferenc Nagy had overestimated the Moscow meetings to the general public.80  ‒   Despite differences of opinion, the Hungarian and Romanian governments at least adopted conciliatory tones. The relationship with Czechoslovakia was worse still, both between the states and the parties. As before, the national policies of the MKP and the KSČ became hopelessly 78 80

Nagy, Struggle behind the Iron Curtain, . Stark, ‘Út a békeszerződéshez’, –.

79

PIL /, –, –.




entangled. Forced to come to an agreement, Slovak and Hungarian delegations met several times during the winter of  to discuss the population transfer.81 Gerő, Révai, and Antal Apró met with delegates of the Slovak Communist Party in January , only to be confronted with the same unflinching attitude as in the summer of .82 The two governments finally came to an agreement on  February , which allowed Czechoslovakia to deport as many Hungarians as it could entice Slovaks to emigrate voluntarily from Hungary to Slovakia. The solution was especially unsatisfactory to the Slovaks. As only , Slovaks lived in Hungary compared to the , Hungarians in Slovakia, they would never be able to create the pure Slovak state they desired. Consequently, they kept pushing with the Allies for the deportation of all Hungarians. The bilateral agreement with Hungary gave the Czechoslovaks the right to recruit volunteers for resettlement in Slovakia. Under the auspices of the Czechoslovak Resettlement Committee (CRC), the first Slovak propaganda committees started to do their work in Hungary in March . Complaints about the Slovaks soon piled in. In Bükkszentkereszt they apparently depicted Slovakia as such a ‘land of milk and honey’ that even non-Slovak Hungarians signed up for voluntary emigration to Slovakia. The author of a letter to Rákosi estimated that out of the , people in the district,  per cent of them MKP members,  per cent would leave the country. The propaganda committees were also accused of threatening the Slovaks that if they did not leave voluntarily now, they would later be forcibly deported with  kg of luggage.83 The activities of the CRC immediately reflected badly on the MKP. The CRC employed the mainly communist members of the left-wing Slovak Antifascist Committee, which made communists seem the main instigators of the population transfer.84 On top of this, commencing with Viliam Siroky at a mass meeting in Békés, prominent Slovak communists came to Hungary to agitate in favour of the population exchange, which in Rákosi’s words ‘the reaction obviously noticed and was not ashamed to exploit’.85 Rumours that MKP party members aided the work of the CRC and had carried the Czechoslovak flag had proven untrue, even though some ‘Slovak elements’ within the party had volunteered.86 The problem was serious enough for Rákosi to put it before Stalin. In the spring of , possibly during his meeting with Stalin on  April, 81 82 84 85

Lázár, Csehszlovák-magyar tárgyalások, –. 83 Kovrig, Communism in Hungary, –. PIL ./, –. Vadkerty, Kítelépítésto˝l a reszlovakizációig, ii. . 86 Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, i. . PIL ./, –.




Rákosi complained about the population exchange, and warned that the expulsion of all Hungarians from Slovakia, as advocated by Benes, would turn out to be a great burden on the young democracy and cause a ‘chauvinist wave’, with the communists ending up being held responsible. While Rákosi’s entreaties to Dimitrov had been met with silence, Stalin now apparently gave permission to the MKP to pursue a harder line against the Czechoslovaks. According to Rákosi, Stalin told him, ‘you should correctly carry out the population exchange, but otherwise take a strong line, of course in a communist manner, against the persecution of the Slovak Hungarians. The communist party is the party of Hungarian patriots, and naturally cannot keep silent when they are persecuting the Hungarians next door.’87 Whether Rákosi was telling the truth is a different matter. His memoirs are notoriously mendacious, and at the time both parties claimed the support of Stalin against each other. Yet at the time the memoirs were drawn up the population exchange was no longer a key issue for Rákosi, compared to for instance the Rajk trial or . It is telling in itself of the national policy that Rákosi thought it was believable to attribute such a statement to Stalin. Even if Stalin stimulated Rákosi to take a ‘national’ line, the transfer issue was still not resolved, and the possibility of unilateral Slovak deportations was left open. During the talks between Ferenc Nagy and Stalin in the middle of April , Stalin also held up the examples of the Ukrainian–Polish and Latvian–Polish population transfers to Ferenc Nagy, and declared that parity did not necessarily have to play a role in exchanges. However, he stated that the demand for minority rights for the Hungarians in Slovakia was a just one, and promised to support it.88 As the talks were being held, Rákosi attempted to influence Stalin further by forwarding a request for help by Hungarian communists from Slovakia to Stalin, who complained specifically about persecution at the hand of Slovak communists.89 Rákosi also showed he had followed Stalin’s advice. On  May, Rákosi strongly criticized the Czechoslovak government in his Békéscsaba speech. He denounced Benes’s description of the population transfer as a ‘victory’ and condemned the Czechoslovak treatment of Hungarians, the lack of Hungarian newspapers, education, and political organizations, as ‘in no way compatible with a democratic state’.90

87 88 89

Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, i. . Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. –. 90 Cited in Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, i. . PIL ./, –.




Besides using the population exchange, the Czechoslovak government employed other means to solve its Hungarian problem which caused resentment in Hungary. From the autumn of , it started with the forced labour of Hungarian men from Slovakia to repair war damage in the Bohemian lands. In sometimes violent actions Hungarian men were arrested and transported to Bohemia.91 From the summer of , the voluntary labour of Hungarians in Bohemia and Moravia commenced, but the Czechoslovak authorities failed to recruit significant numbers of Hungarian workers. Following a secret decree in November , Hungarians from the southern districts of Slovakia could be forcibly employed in Bohemia and Moravia. Between November  and February , , families (or , persons) were transported to the Czech lands.92 At the same time, a movement was started to colonize land left by Hungarians in the Slovak border districts with Czechs and Slovaks from around the country. The Czechoslovak communist Minister of the Interior, Václav Nosek, boasted the resettlement of the former Hungarian land was ‘ per cent the work of the communists’ and ‘a truly revolutionary feat’.93 To facilitate the creation of an ethnically pure Slav state, the Czechoslovak government commenced a policy of ‘reslovakization’. Czechs and Slovaks, assimilated in the past by Germans and Hungarians, now had to be led back to their Slavic origins. The communist party strongly supported the ‘bringing to the surface of those of Slavic origin from the Hungarian masses’.94 The Slovak ideologues of Slovakization went even further, and condemned the ethnic policies of the s and s as too liberal, for not propagating the Slovakization of the borderland. The reslovakization was treated confidentially and as a purely domestic affair, to avoid condemnation from abroad. 95 The concept of Slovak was ethnic in character, as the government specifically stated, ‘there can be Slovaks, who do not know the Slovak language’.96 Magyarized Slovaks were invited to report to Reslovakization Committees where their claims to Slovak origins were checked. As propaganda promised Czechoslovak citizenship and exemption from the population transfer there were strong incentives to claim Slovak origins,97 but a mere statistical reslovakization was not deemed adequate. The , individuals who asked to be reslovakized were also expected to be re-educated in Slovak language and culture.98 91 93 97

Vadkerty, Kitelépítéstől a reszlóvakizációig, –. 94 95 Cited ibid. . Ibid. . Ibid. 98 Ibid. . Ibid. , –.

92 96

Ibid. –. Ibid. .




In his correspondence with the International Department, Rákosi’s urgent tone on the Slovak issue remained unchanged: ‘In international questions our Czechoslovak comrades are giving us a hard time. They could not cause us more damage than they are doing now if they were acting on the orders of American imperialists. They persecute the Hungarians in a way that in Hungary causes indignation even in communist circles.’99 Rákosi pointed out that ‘anti-communist elements’ were exploiting the situation, by claiming that the MKP had sold the Slovak Hungarians to the Czechoslovaks. Relations between the MKP and the KSČ were frozen. ‘The Czech comrades boycott us. They did not invite us to their party Congress. We did not let that deter us and invited them to our Congress in the autumn of last year. They did not come and did not send any written greetings either.’100 In the run-up to the  elections, Rákosi would once again ask for Soviet intervention.101 * * * Population exchange, forced labour, and reslovakization kept putting the MKP under pressure throughout  and . Additional problems were caused because the citizenship of Hungarians in Czechoslovakia had been revoked in , creating a large stateless minority in the country. Likewise, minority rights were not respected. Hungarians were forbidden education in their own language, Hungarian publications were not permitted, and frequently vigilantes acted violently against people speaking Hungarian in the street. Resentment built up in the MKP itself against the Slovaks. A party secretary in Maglód had been overheard calling the Hungarian Slovaks ‘traitorous scoundrels and a rabble’.102 Rákosi noted to the Central Committee that the Hungarians in Slovakia were growing increasingly right wing as a result of Czechoslovak oppression and the influence of the reaction. ‘We had to establish this with our own comrades as well, who with the greatest effort we can only hold back occasionally from chauvinist measures or chauvinist expressions. And if our comrades have shifted so far to the right, it can be imagined what happened with those people who from the start were Fascist or reactionary.’103 The relationship with the Czechoslovaks, whether communist or not, remained appalling. The MKP’s Foreign Affairs Committee (Külügyi Bizottság, KB) concluded on  February : ‘With regard to Czechoslovakia we have to establish that our policy so far has been without result. We have to think about its possible revision.’104 99 102

PTI ./, –. PIL ./, .

103

100 Ibid. PIL ./, –.

101 104

See Chapter . PIL ./, .




The Paris peace treaty negotiations started in earnest on  July , and were concluded on  February . At the conference, the Hungarian demand on Transylvania was dropped from an original , square kilometres to , square kilometres, but Romania retained its hold on the whole of Transylvania. Hungarian successes at the conference were defined by preventing the worst: while the bilateral population transfer agreement remained in force, Czechoslovakia’s demand for a unilateral transfer of Hungarians from Slovakia was rejected by the conference. Czechoslovakia furthermore only received three out of the five border villages it demanded. Hungary was burdened with a $ million bill in reparations, of which $ million was to go to the USSR, $ million to Yugoslavia, and $ million to Czechoslovakia, a severe blow to the economy. The only ray of light for the opposition, and a threat to the MKP, was the agreement that Soviet occupying forces would leave the country following an agreement. A clause stipulating that Soviet forces could remain present as long as necessary to guard the communication routes to Austria provided a pretext for the Soviet troops to remain. The Comintern origins of the national policy continued to obstruct the MKP’s own national line. All neighbouring parties continued to follow the national line, and to all parties this meant support for national interests wherever possible. This was most obviously the case with Czechoslovakia, where between February  and June  the contact between the MKP and the Czechoslovak Communist Party was strictly one way. Even the relatively mild attitude of the Romanian Communist Party was damaging to the MKP. The PCR similarly refused to change its policies towards the Hungarian minority or the border issue to favour the MKP. As before, the position of the Soviet Union was detrimental to the party. From Szántó’s report on Révai’s Music Academy speech, it can be inferred that the Soviet party had given the MKP very explicit instructions on the line to take: rejection of some, but not all border changes, but no public demands by the party itself. A degree of initiative nevertheless remained. Révai’s speech also shows that the party took steps of its own within what it held to be the permitted margins. That these had become blurred was largely the result of the Soviet party’s mistrust of the MKP, its refusal to brief it fully on true Soviet intentions. The implied support by Stalin and Molotov for border revision given to Ferenc Nagy, while the decision had already been made to grant the whole of Transylvania to Romania, served Soviet purposes, but worked out negatively for the MKP as soon as it turned out the expectations were based on false hope.




Soviet influence was also damaging indirectly. Both the Czechoslovak and Romanian communists confidently pursued their own ‘national’ line because they felt certain of Soviet support. The MKP, for the lack of it, had to keep a low profile. The only international issue in which the MKP could and did claim success was the expulsion of the Swabians. Here, the party was assured of Soviet assistance, and hence ruthlessly supported the expulsions and claimed credit for it in national terms. The MKP, for instance, attributed to itself a key role in preventing the transfer of the partially German-speaking city of Sopron to Austria following a plebiscite. When the police picked up ‘an organization of reactionary Swabians and chauvinist Austrians’ who had been campaigning for secession to Austria, a communist instructor reported: ‘as a result of our party’s initiative, almost two-thirds of the Swabian population was expelled, the attempt of this movement for the plebiscite was in vain.’105 The persecution of the Swabians was not merely intended for its propagandistic effect. By using social background rather than connection to the Volksbund as a criterion for deportation, the MKP used the deportations to rid the country of a base of support for its main enemy, the Smallholder Party. A direct parallel between the domestic power struggle and the party’s national policy could also be seen in other dominant domestic political issues. 105

PIL ./, –.



Salami Tactics and National Unity (–) After the election defeat of , it was clear that the MKP would not gain power through the ballot box. The Smallholder Party would have to be defeated through extra-parliamentary pressure and the control over the police and security services. By allying itself with the National Peasant Party, the Social Democrats, and left-wing Smallholders, the MKP managed to have its right-wing enemies expelled from the party, and bring about the disintegration of the party in . The MKP’s ‘national policy’ was inextricably linked to its rise to power. The party continued to present itself as both the heir to the traditions of the nation and guardian of Hungary’s national interests. The main concept of ‘National Unity’ (nemzeti összefogás) was still used, though this was narrowed down to exclude the new-found enemies in the Smallholder Party, who were instead heaped on the pile of ‘reactionaries’, ‘Fascists’, and ‘traitors’ derided in  and . Even as the power of the communist party increased, the party’s national policy continued unabated: the election campaign for August  was more national in content than the one of . Immediately after the elections, on  November  Révai presented the party’s new tactics in ‘The politics of National Unity/Bread, Good Money, Order!’, a rambling speech on the changed situation. The speech was delivered to a party audience, and a chastened version was later published for the benefit of the party education system.1 The Smallholder Party had previously been an ally within the Hungarian National Independence Front. At his Békéscsaba speech of  March , Rákosi had still counted the Smallholder Party and the Civic Democratic Party as being among the ‘healthy, patriotic forces’ with which the communist party could cooperate within the framework of ‘National Unity.’2 With the Smallholders now the MKP’s main domestic 1

PIL ./, –.

2

PIL ./, –.



Salami Tactics and National Unity

opponent, the MKP could no longer describe the FKGP as ‘healthy’ and ‘patriotic’. An explanation had to be given why the Smallholders had previously been an ally within the MNFF, but now had become an opponent. Révai argued that circumstances had changed since . According to Révai, the goal of the party during liberation had been the rallying of all forces for the ‘freedom and liberation struggle’. Even though the Horthy generals could not be called ‘champions of Hungarian democracy’, the policy had been correct at the time, as the ‘main thing’ had been the mobilization of the country’s forces against Hitler. In this first phase of ‘National Unity’, the workers, the peasantry, important parts of the bourgeoisie, and the greater part of the intelligentsia had united in the National Independence Front against the ‘treacherous pro-German (németbarát) part of the Great Bourgeoisie’. In this era, the MKP had been the hegemonic party. A second phase in the development of ‘National Unity’ and the MNFF had started after the German defeat in May , when the freedom struggle was replaced by reconstruction, which could not be managed by one single class or party on its own either. This had turned the MKP into a mass party, ‘the party of the people, the party of the nation’. The same broad policy of National Unity was still necessary, as otherwise the MKP would have remained ‘a small sect’, isolated from the other parties and ‘the great majority of the nation.’ But, explained Révai, in this period the other parties had caught up with the MKP, and fractures started to appear in the Independence Front. The Civic Democratic Party had moved to the right and was already standing, as Révai said, ‘with one foot outside the united front’, the right wing in the country was on the rise, and along with it ‘increase in sabotage’ and ‘speculation on chaos’. According to Révai, a right wing was forming within the national front, with the goal of isolating the communist party from the ‘unity of democratic forces’. At the same time, a left wing was emerging led by the communist party, which had to prevent this isolation from occurring. Révai saw the right wing of the Smallholder Party as the chief danger to the MKP, and argued that the MKP had to attack the FKGP. The struggle for the masses was the key: the MKP would have to ‘build bridges’ to the ‘progressive masses’ behind the Smallholder Party, in order to wean them from its right wing. Besides wooing the mass base of the Smallholder Party, the MKP was also to aim directly against the party itself. Révai presented it as the main task of the MKP to split the left wing from the Smallholder Party, and have that left ‘join the left wing of Hungarian democracy.’ Victory was by no means assured. The MKP, argued Révai, had to stimulate divisions within the Smallholder Party faster than they




could arise between the MKP and the Smallholders or the MKP and the Social Democrats. It should strengthen the left wing of ‘Hungarian democracy’ and ‘take the democratic left wing of the Smallholder’s Party into battle against its right wing’.3 Its very nature as a coalition, a rallying party against communism, made the Smallholder Party vulnerable to this approach. The very different social and political groupings that constituted the party could be played against each other. Confronted with this tactic Smallholder deputy Zoltán Pfeiffer soon dubbed the FKGP the ‘salami party’, from which the communists removed one slice at a time, giving birth to the concept of ‘salami tactics’.4 The MKP’s ‘salami tactics’ amounted to a constant reappraisal of the content of ‘National Unity’ and its organizational expression, the Hungarian National Independence Front, from which the opponents of the MKP were gradually removed. It seems paradoxical to limit the participants in a national front, a concept which in itself implies unity. But because ‘National Unity’ had been defined initially in both anti-German and social terms, against domestic traitors, the ‘reactionary’ landholding nobility and their helpers, this was not the case. The Horthy generals had been ejected from the national front as reactionaries in the summer of , and the right-wing Smallholders were about to suffer the same fate. Révai limited ‘National Unity’ to ‘patriotic’ political and social forces. This was classical Marxism. Marx had dubbed the proletariat the ‘national class’, Lenin had spoken of ‘two nations’, and Stalin perceived the existence of a proletarian national culture. If it was possible for them to envisage a concept of nationhood that consisted of the proletariat alone, then it was no problem for Révai to perceive a ‘National Unity’ that was limited to the political left, even if that did not comprise the majority of the nation. For the moment, Révai still included left-wing Smallholders in Hungarian ‘National Unity’, but he already noted with approval the existence of even more restricted left-wing ‘National Unity’ in Romania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia. It was a small step from placing an opponent outside ‘National Unity’ to depicting him as unpatriotic. This was facilitated by the post-war search for collaborators, traitors, and war criminals, which created an atmosphere of suspicion of domestic enemies. Propaganda against the Germans and their Hungarian allies continued unabated after liberation; in particular the war crimes trials before the 3

PIL ./, –.

4

Gati, Hungary and the Soviet Bloc, .




many People’s Courts ensured a constant attack against enemies of the nation. This was enforced by the major Hungarian war crimes trials that took place from October . While the suspects were mainly indicted for war crimes, they were also presented as unpatriotic and treasonous. Public prosecutor Ferenc Fenesy labelled former Prime Minister László Bárdossy in his summing up a ‘German hireling’.5 Former Prime Minister Béla Imrédy was not only served an indictment for war crimes but for treason as well.6 The second prosecutor at the Imrédy trial, the communist sympathizer and editor of the Népszava Zoltán Horváth, repeatedly called Imrédy a traitor, stating that he ‘sold the country by the metre’ and was a ‘traitor to the nation and the people’.7 Leaders of the Arrow Cross such as Szálasi and Jenő Szőlősi were tried in February  and accused of treason besides war crimes and crimes against the people.8 Besides fulfilling a judicial role, the trials also met a political need. Through the prosecution of Horthy’s prime ministers, the blame for Hungary’s alliance with Hitler was laid on the old regime. It was a message intended for consumption both at home and abroad. In domestic politics, this underlined the responsibility of the Horthy system for the country’s desperate economic plight. In foreign policy, the energetic reckoning with war criminals and traitors demonstrated that the new Hungary had broken with the revisionist past, and therefore deserved consideration at the negotiation table. Not just the communists, but politicians across the coalition sought to bring across the same political message in the trials. The prominent right-wing and anti-communist Smallholder Dezső Sulyok was one of the chief prosecutors at the trial of Béla Imrédy, and concentrated on proving Imrédy’s responsibility for Hungary’s participation in the war. To Sulyok, Imrédy was a traitor as well: he stressed in his summing up that Germany had been aided by ‘fifth columnists’ such as Laval and Quisling in the whole of Europe. Sulyok had a political motive of his own: he later explained he had only accepted the position of prosecutor in order to exonerate the Hungarian people by holding the guilty politicians responsible for their actions.9 The heavily politicized war crimes trials set the background for the persecution of the Smallholder Party. Similar to the Horthy politicians, the right-wing Smallholders would soon be accused of being both ‘treasonous’ and ‘reactionary’. The power of the

5 6 8 9

Ábraham and Kussinszky, Bárdossy per, . 7 Ibid. Ábraham and Kussinszky, Imrédy per, –. Ábraham and Kussinszky, Szálasi per, . Ábraham and Kussinszky, Imrédy per, –. See also Sulyok, Zwei Nächte, –.




Smallholder Party would finally be broken in a series of show trials, in which the accused stood trial for conspiracy and treason.  -  Lacking the necessary strength in parliament, the MKP leadership chose to attack the Smallholder Party by organizing mass protest on the street. The strategy employed closely followed Révai’s speech ‘The Politics of National Unity’: the party appealed to the mass following of the Smallholder Party over the head of the party leadership, and directed it against the right wing of the FKGP. Opportunities for whipping up popular dissent against the Smallholders arose early in the new year, when the MKP once again put itself forward as champion of the land reform. Among new landowners, fears abounded that the land reform would one day be reversed, that the old landowners would return and avenge themselves on the new proprietors. Already at the Central Committee meeting of  October , Rákosi stressed the importance of reassuring the settlers of the legal security of their new property.10 The insecurity of the new landowners had only increased after the Smallholder victory. The land reform, hastily executed by the communist-dominated committees, had frequently produced injustices, so that the Smallholder Party committed itself after the elections to reverse some of the appropriations. In response, the MKP organized a mass movement to defend the land reform under the slogan ‘Land we shall not give back!’ (Földet vissza nem adunk!).11 The fear of a return to the old system was further played on by the demand of cleansing the state apparatus from ‘reactionaries’ and increased nationalization of industry. The party took to the streets, organizing mass demonstrations against the ‘reaction’. The whole campaign was aimed at invisible enemies, enemies of the people, who were allegedly scheming to reverse the reforms of . The communist agitation played into wide-ranging popular dissatisfaction, caused by economic hardship and inflation. The attack on reactionaries was given a patriotic slant by the MKP’s support for the proclamation of Hungary as a republic on  January . Though some politicians thought there were more urgent issues at hand, there were few topics that elicited such unanimous support in Hungary. 10

PIL ./, –.

11

See also Chapter .




The MKP immediately proclaimed itself the staunchest supporter of the republic, and it phrased its backing fully in national terms. On  January , the Secretariat decided that the party would issue ‘an enthusiasticsounding poster greeting the republic, in a red-white-green border, possibly furnished with the ’ coat of arms’. The text would be provided by Révai,12 who used it again to stress the MKP’s national credentials. Framed in national colours, but lacking the Kossuth crest of , the MKP greeted the proclamation of the republic with the words ‘the alien Habsburg monarchy is finished’. It treated it as the formal end to ‘the bloody rule of Miklós Horthy’, and invoked the full pantheon of communist and other national heroes by calling the republic the ‘Victory of the cause of Ferenc Rákóczi, Lajos Kossuth, Sándor Petőfi, Mihály Táncsics, Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinsky, Endre Ságvári.’13 Révai immediately exploited the proclamation of the republic in the MKP’s campaign for protection of the land reform and purge of ‘reactionary’ civil servants. The poster continued: ‘Do you want the victory of the Hungarian people to be permanent? Then destroy the enemies of the republic!’ These he defined as ‘big landowners and their assistants, who want to diddle the new owners of their land’, ‘former magistrates, sub-prefects, reactionary officers who wish to once again control the people with gendarmes’ bayonets!’, and ‘plutocrats living off the people’s suffering and the state’. In this attack, Révai transformed reactionaries and social enemies of the MKP into enemies of the republic, and as he also claimed the republic had been a national cause for centuries, he made them anti-national by implication. Révai propped this up by presenting the reactionaries as opponents of ‘National Unity’: ‘The Hungarian republic builds National Unity! Down with the reaction, which wants to demolish National Unity! Down with enemies of Hungarian Unity, of Hungarian democracy!’14 By defining the ‘reactionaries’ as opponents of National Unity, Révai reinforced the limited social concept of nemzeti összefogás put forward in ‘The politics of National Unity’. The ‘reactionaries’ Révai referred to were mostly remnants of the administration of the Horthy regime, whose support in  and  had still been needed and who, at the time, escaped the charge of collaboration. Now, they also were charged with being unpatriotic. In keeping with Révai’s speech, Rákosi warned the parliamentary fraction not to attack the FKGP in its entirety. Rákosi referred to the Budapest 12 14

13 Ibid. Föglein, Államforma, . ‘Magyarország Köztársaság!’ ibid. .




elections, where in his view this mistake had been made, which had awakened ‘party chauvinism’ and forged unity within the Smallholder Party.15 Révai put forward the answer: the MKP had to ‘increase the differentiation’ within the FKGP.16 The pressure from the streets had effect. On  February, after weeks of demonstrations, the Minister for Agriculture, leading Smallholder Béla Kovács, was replaced by the more left-wing István Dobi. The frontal attack came on  March, when Rákosi declared that the MKP would not be prepared to cooperate with the coalition unless the right-wing Smallholders were ejected from the party. To strengthen its position and isolate the Smallholder right wing, the MKP and its allies, the Social Democrats and the NPP, formed the Left-Wing Bloc on  March . In its declaration, the Bloc repeated the demand for expelling the right-wing Smallholders, but underlined its preparedness to work with the ‘democratic elements’ in the Smallholder Party.17 The Bloc organized a mass demonstration of , people in Budapest on  March under the slogan ‘Out with the enemies of the people from the coalition!’ Besides the land reform, purge, and nationalization, the leftwing press now also demanded the expulsion of seventy right-wing Smallholders from Parliament. The Bloc succeeded in gaining support among Smallholders not only for political measures, but also for the removal of thirty-six members of Parliament. The Smallholder leadership crumbled under the pressure and, as the Bloc’s ultimatum expired on  March, expelled twenty of its right-wing members from its parliamentary faction, among them Dezső Sulyok. Under his leadership, the banished deputies formed the Freedom Party. The MKP had achieved two of its objectives: it had split the Smallholders politically and reduced their parliamentary majority. The legal means for persecuting opponents of the party was delivered by the ‘law defending the democratic order and the criminal law of the republic’.18 Prominent Smallholders initially strongly criticized the law, but it was accepted along with the removal of Sulyok after the pressure from the streets by the Left-Wing Bloc, and passed in Parliament on  March.19 The law was very broad. It not only applied to ‘crimes against the democratic republic’, or conspiracies against ‘democratic state order’, but also to the ‘incitement of hatred’ against ‘individuals or groups because of their democratic convictions’, and even to the spreading of rumours that could 15 17 19

16 Palasik, ‘Szalámi taktika első szakasza’, –. Ibid. 18 Vida, Koalíció és pártharcok, . Kiszely, ÁVH, . Föglein, Államforma, .




endanger the republic. Because neither ‘incitement to hatred’ nor ‘democratic convictions’ was defined, the law was open to abuse. Moreover, the People’s Courts, which were already criticized for their weak legal basis and abuse by the MKP, were given the jurisdiction to prosecute on the basis of the law. Punishments, including the death penalty, were harsh.20 Sulyok himself dubbed it the ‘executioner’s law’ for its severity, a title by which the law became more commonly known. Throughout the summer of , the position of the MKP was strengthened. Rajk continued to purge the administration and police and fill them with loyal officials. The campaign was so ruthless that it led to a government crisis: on  May, Ferenc Nagy demanded speedy local elections and the dividing up of administrative posts by party, in particular, the transferral of half the police posts to the FKGP.21 When these demands were dismissed, Nagy threatened to step down. Soviet Ambassador Pushkin urged both Nagy and Rákosi to a compromise. The Smallholders were promised the appointment of  Smallholder police officers, amongst whom would be six county police chiefs, and at least one district police chief in each county.22 That Rákosi had to back down is indicative of the speed with which the communist infiltration of public life occurred. Following the compromise, the struggle for control continued unabated. During the summer of , citing the law on defence of the republic and the threat of ‘reactionary organizations’, Rajk initiated a campaign against Catholic organizations, instigating searches for weapons in churches and monasteries, and exploited opportunities as they arose. On  June , a young girl, a Soviet officer, and a soldier were killed and several others were wounded in a shooting incident in Budapest. Voroshilov’s successor as head of the Allied Control Commission, Sviridov, protested to Ferenc Nagy that the incident was connected to the ‘political mood’ in the country, and demanded the dissolution of catholic youth movements such as the organization of Catholic young peasants (KALOT). Rajk immediately took Sviridov’s lead and dissolved these and around ,-, other ‘reactionary’ youth organizations.23 Illustrative of the atmosphere of the summer of  is Rezső Szántó’s claim that the party leadership had been plotting a military coup d’état in the summer of : 20 ‘: VII. Törvénycikk a demokratikus államrend és köztársaság büntetőjogi védelméről (kihírdetett az . évi március hó . napján).’ Ibid. –. 21 Vida, Koalíció és pártharcok, . 22 Ibid. . 23 Vida, Független Kisgazdapárt, –.




some leading comrades in the month of June of this year seriously considered the question of an armed coup. But this matter was neither discussed in the Politburo nor in the Secretariat of the CC. Comrade [Imre] Nagy, who gave me this information, found out about this through his son-in-law, Ferenc Jánosi, a political worker in the army. Comrade Mihály Farkas . . . in the month of June in this year spoke to the communists in the army, whom he told that in the near future an armed coup was intended, and that the soldiers had to prepare for this. Ferenc Jánosi would have had to go to the army base near Pápa. But the question of the armed coup was purportedly postponed to September.24

With no documentation available to corroborate this claim, the question remains open whether Farkas, and presumably Rákosi, had really been planning a coup. Szántó was acrid in his report about his comrades, and there was little love between them. Yet it is not likely he had simply made the story up. Szántó took a risk by mentioning Nagy, who could deny the claim. The alleged coup plans fits in the heightened radicalism of the summer of . In , Rákosi bemoaned the gradual tactics of the MKP and noted that ‘hardness would have been better’.25 It seems unlikely Rákosi would have dared even to consider a putsch without consulting Soviet authorities such as Pushkin and Sviridov. With elections due in Romania in the autumn, a military coup was not in the Soviet interest. Of course, it is always possible that Nagy had lied to Szántó to begin with. But as is often true in such cases, the fact that this claim was considered believable is significant in itself. It was apparently a credible accusation that the ‘Muscovite’ leadership was radicalized enough to plot a coup d’état. ’    ’   The MKP was now on the offensive, and this needed a doctrinal basis. Up to the summer of , the politics of the MKP had been characterized by the vague and defensive slogan of ‘National Unity’. Though it was understood that the ultimate goal of the party was Socialism, this was rarely spoken aloud. The party activists were told that this coalition period was transitional, yet what this meant exactly was not clear. According to Marxist-Leninist doctrine, violent overthrow followed by a dictatorship of the proletariat, according to the Soviet model, provided the transition to Socialism. If that was the case, how could the careful tactics of the party be explained? In Germany, the KPD had already in 24

PIL ., –.

25

PIL ./, –.




December  spoken of an alternative, non-violent route, a ‘German way’ to Socialism, and Dimitrov had mentioned a peaceful ‘Bulgarian road.’ In the summer of , the Daily Herald reported a conversation between Stalin and a delegation of the British Labour Party, in which Stalin mentioned the possibility of two routes routes to Socialism, ‘one Russian and one British’. The Russian road he described as ‘less easy and brings bloodshed with it’, and the parliamentary route as peaceful but ‘a longer march’.26 Now, Rákosi embraced the concept of the national road to Socialism as well.27 The gradual route to power had been the strategy since , and as such the ‘national route’ offered nothing new. The real novelty lay in the fact that now Socialism was, once again, publicly proclaimed as the ultimate goal. It was probably for this reason that the ‘national road’ never played an extensive part in the MKP’s mass propaganda. The party preferred referring to a transitional phase as the more immediate goal. The particular phrase used to describe this transition was that of ‘People’s Democracy’, which Rákosi favoured over ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ as the latter would be too problematic in domestic and foreign politics. To some, it seemed to lack commitment to Socialism, but Rákosi ridiculed them as being ‘politically illiterate’.28 Though the term ‘People’s Democracy’ had been used already during the war, it was presented at the Third Congress of the MKP, held from  September , as the main goal of the party. It was significant that the party had chosen to stress the continuity with the KMP by dubbing it the ‘Third Congress’ of the MKP, rather than starting numbering anew. The party was now more confident and open about its ultimate, Socialist goals. Nevertheless, the national self-image continued to figure strongly. Rákosi opened his speech with a dedication to the party’s martyrs, fallen for the liberation of Hungary. He praised the Soviet Union, but took care to do so in a national manner, by thanking the USSR for ‘removing the shackles from the hand of our nation’ and referring to Stalin as the ‘great, wise, Hungarian-loving leader’. In his address to the foreign guests at the conference he summarized the mixture of national and Socialist elements that was becoming the party’s national self-image: ‘we Hungarian communists proudly proclaim ourselves trustees and continuators of Hungary’s national and revolutionary traditions. . . . we are a true-born Hungarian party, the struggling, unified and determined party of the Hungarian workers and progressive intelligentsia. But at the same time we 26 27 28

Abrams, ‘Struggle for the Soul of the Nation’. Murashko et al., ‘Nationalen Wege zum Sozialismus’, –; Vas, Betiltott könyvem, . Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, i. .




are an international party, the party of democracy and socialism that embraces all humanity and recognizes no borders.’29 The concept of People’s Democracy was established as a national ideal. Imre Nagy noted that it was a ‘national affair’.30 In its closing declaration, the MKP described the People’s Democracy as the road to ‘the flowering of our Fatherland, to the happiness of our nation’. People’s Democracy enforced the interests of ‘the national community’. But similar to Révai’s limited sense of ‘National Unity’, this was an exclusionary national community that comprised only the social base of the MKP: the workers, peasants, and progressive intelligentsia. They were promised the deciding vote in the People’s Democracy, while its social enemies were to be excluded.31 Though the MKP was clearly on the offensive, if Rezső Szántó’s reports are to be believed, the party leadership was still holding back. According to a report by Szántó, leading circles within the party did not comprehend the tasks before them in the current transitional stage, and with radical slogans were pushing the MKP’s masses to the left and alienating those outside the party.32 At a mass meeting, for instance, Rákosi had toasted ‘to the health of the workers’ and peasants’ governments’, and when Szántó queried him, Rákosi responded: ‘In Yugoslavia, we have, in essence, Soviet power.’ At the conference gossip had circulated about a soon-to-be-formed ‘Government of the Left Democratic Bloc’ of MKP, SzDP, NPP, and left-wing Smallholders. Szántó reported that ‘sober comrades’ did not believe such a government would find wide-scale support. Rákosi, however, had told Szántó that this government would institute an electoral reform and reduce the maximum landholdings to  hold. Szántó’s report is remarkable, because it is a first indication that the party was already at this time consciously aiming at doing away with the coalition. Still, no change in government occurred. The full-scale attack on the Smallholder Party began at the end of the year in a more circumspect way. In December , the ÁVO arrested several members of the Magyar Testvéri Közösség, the Hungarian Fraternal Society, a group that planned to fight communist influence after the anticipated withdrawal of the Red Army. Some of the members had connections to the Smallholder Party. On  January , Rajk presented the ‘conspiracy against the republic’ to the press. The MKP was determined to use it to the full: the Politburo decided the Left-Wing Bloc would demand the ‘thorough cleansing’ of 29 31

30 PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –. 32 Habuda, Rákosi, et al. (eds.), határozatai, –. PIL ., –.




the Smallholder Party.33 Before the Central Committee meeting on  January, Rákosi insisted on the ‘unmasking of the interaction between reaction and the right-wing Smallholder Party’. The ‘conspiracy’ was of such great importance that it ‘strongly influences the entire course of our strategy for ’, even if the consequences were not completely clear yet: ‘this is such a heavy stone still flying now that we do not know where it will stop . . . We will make sure that the effect will be maximum . . . and that it will cause the reaction the greatest defeat.’34 The MKP exploited the situation as much as it possibly could, by demanding the Smallholder Party distance itself from the conspiracy and sack more right-wing deputies from the party. Soon Béla Kovács was implicated by the confession of an arrested Smallholder, which led Ferenc Nagy after continued communist pressure to send Kovács on vacation and dismiss a number of right-wing parliamentary deputies.35 On  March, Ferenc Nagy and Rákosi reached an agreement. Nagy reshuffled his cabinet and dismissed several other Smallholder members of Parliament six weeks later. Besides using the ‘conspiracy’ further to carve up the Smallholder Party, the MKP also prepared a series of show trials. The two years of monopolizing all significant positions of power in the Interior Ministry and the ÁVO, and the law on defence of the republic, now came into their own. By the spring of , secret police chief Gábor Péter reported that  per cent of the political police was communist.36 Soviet aid in building the new police force, Péter told G. Ya. Korotkevich, had been essential: ‘We have learnt much from Soviet comrades. Great help was rendered by [NKVD] General Belkin.’37 Through its control of the Ministry of the Interior and the secret police, arrests and interrogations were managed by the communist party. Rákosi especially praised Rajk for suppressing the conspiracy,38 but Gábor Péter also played a prominent role. The MKP controlled the trials themselves. On  January, the Politburo decided that ‘the trials of the conspirators have to be prepared well’. This meant not only that the audience would be pre-selected and ‘acceptable judges’ would have to be considered, but also that the record of the trial would have to reflect the goals of the MKP: ‘the definitive record has to be drawn up in the presence of the prosecutor with utmost care.’ Farkas, Rajk, and Révai were charged with the implementation,39 though later a committee 33 34 35 36 38

Csicsery-Rónay and Cserenyey, Koncepciós per, . PIL ./ [Central Committee, Rákosi’s report,  Jan. ]. Vida, Független Kisgazdapárt, . 37 Ibid. Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. –. 39 Csicsery-Rónay and Cserenyey, Koncepciós per, . PIL ./, –.




consisting of Farkas, Rajk, and Imre Nagy was charged with preparing the trial.40 People’s Judge István Tímár received instructions directly from Gábor Péter and László Rajk, who directed the investigation during the whole of .41 Soviet authorities were deeply involved. The MKP continued to clamour for Kovács’s dismissal and the suspension of his parliamentary immunity. When this did not occur swiftly enough, he was arrested by Soviet troops on  February , suspected of espionage against the Red Army.42 Besides Kovács, Soviet interrogators questioned Smallholders Jáckó Pál, László Gyula, and Bálint Arany, and the minutes of these interrogations were handed over to Rákosi.43 The first trial was that of György Donáth and several ‘coconspirators’.The Donáth trial was the first real show trial of the coalition era, in that the accused were not just innocent but the crimes themselves were imaginary. The war crime trials had, thanks to their strong political and propagandistic aspects, helped to create an atmosphere in which such trials could be held. Similar to the previous trials, the trials against the Smallholders took place under heavy public attention, part of which was stimulated from above. Like the war crimes trials, the conspiracy trials were accompanied by a virulent communist press campaign demanding ‘death to the Fascist conspirators’. Though never formally charged with treachery, the defendants were accused of ‘treason to the Fatherland’ in the press, and crowds at mass meetings demanded ‘death to the traitors’.44 The prosecution took place under the law on defence of the republic. As the republic was proclaimed a fundamentally national institution by the MKP, this added another national element to the proceedings. The communist party used the trials to bolster its own national image and attack that of its opponents.45 At the party’s National County Conference on  and  April , Rákosi once again argued the necessity to present the MKP as a national party.46 Lajos Bencze, county secretary from Sárospatak near the Slovak border, repeated Rákosi’s demand: ‘We should not oppose the healthy patriotic feelings of the peasantry, but enlist them as an engine for the realization of the economic demands of the party . . . it should be demonstrated what is true national policy. In connection with the Sulyok party and the conspirators, we should stress their treasonable nature.’47 The Szabad Nép also stressed their anti-national character: ‘the

40 42 44 46

41 PIL ./ [Politburo, minutes,  Jan. ]. Kiszely, ÁVH, . 43 Nagy, Struggle behind the Iron Curtain, . Kiszely, ÁVH,  n . 45 Csicsery-Rónay and Cserenyey, Koncepciós per, . Ibid. 47 PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –.




conspirators and their accomplices did everything to break up National Unity.’48 Though rarely mentioned explicitly, it was always implied that the conspirators had betrayed their country to the West, especially to Britain and the United States. This was reinforced by the increasing antagonism between the Soviet Union and the West. On  March , United States President Truman promulgated his ‘Truman Doctrine’, in which he promised to aid any country threatened by a communist takeover. An angry exchange of American–Soviet notes on the arrest of Béla Kovács in the same period gave the MKP ‘evidence’ to point at the ‘foreign connection’ of the conspiracy. Rákosi explained to the Central Committee: ‘The comrades know from the materials of the proceedings the role played in the conspiracy by couriers going to the western zone, and aid coming from there.’ According to Rákosi, the United States and Great Britain had, by protecting Béla Kovács in the exchange of notes, attempted to save the ‘conspiracy’.49 While during the war crime trials the defendants had been accused of betraying their country to Germany, as relations between the erstwhile Allies worsened, the German role was gradually taken over by the West. The trial ended on  April, with Donáth receiving the death penalty and the other ‘conspirators’ severe prison sentences. During  and , a total of  defendants would be prosecuted in connection with the conspiracy. Besides Donáth one more death penalty was meted out.50 The theme of the betrayal of the nation to the West ran through the proceedings, as treachery for Germany had defined the war crime trials.          The national image of the party continued to be a major preoccupation for the MKP. Despite the continued successes against the Smallholder Party in the rolling up of the conspiracy, ultimate victory was by no means certain. In Rákosi’s estimation, the left-wing masses that deserted the Smallholder Party were not joining the MKP, but instead flocked to the NPP and SzDP. Right-wing Smallholders fled to Sulyok’s Freedom Party.51 Rákosi now requested Soviet support for several major nationally tinged issues, in order to improve the position of the MKP. In a letter to 48 49 51

Kövér, Losonczy Géza,. Csicsery-Rónay and Cserenyey, Koncepciós per, –. Iszák and Kun, Moszkvának jelentjük, –.

50

Ibid. .




Stalin and Molotov, sent via the International Department of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), Rákosi asked for the return of Hungarian prisoners of war, Soviet aid in producing an agreement with the Czechoslovaks, and help in the further expulsion of the Swabians. Rákosi seemed to be in two minds about the prisoner of war issue. After the Budapest election disaster of October , Rákosi argued that the return of prisoners, done explicitly to aid the MKP in the elections, had backfired. He claimed before the Central Committee that many of the returned prisoners of war remained under ‘Fascist influence’ and had turned the ‘generosity’ and ‘liberalism’ of democracy against democracy, by voting Smallholder.52 Rákosi was, however, mainly looking for a scapegoat. Despite his misgivings about the prisoners themselves, he continued to believe in the propagandistic necessity of support for the liberation of prisoners of war. At the Central Committee following the November  election defeat, Rákosi concluded that the party had to espouse the prisoner of war issue ‘much more consistently’.53 Besides using the prisoners of war in electoral propaganda, the MKP also took up the organization of the prisoners themselves, in the words of Dezső Nemes, because ‘it would be a shame if the prisoner of war movement, which was in our hands over there, fell out of our hands’.54 Yet despite some apparent successes, the MKP continued to be blamed for delays in the return of further prisoners of war. In , , Hungarians, including prisoners of war, had been returned to Hungary by the Soviet authorities. But on  April , , Hungarian prisoners of war were still held in Soviet Ministry of the Interior camps,55 and no further mass releases followed. Rákosi wrote to Stalin that ‘it would be truly desirable, if, at the initiative of the communist party, every prisoner of war or part of them could return home as soon as possible’.56 Rákosi met with Molotov on  April  and again brought up the topic there: ‘the next question that we would like to discuss is the prisoner of war question. The reactionaries very strongly exploit it against us.’ Molotov brusquely retorted: ‘And what is your concern with that?’ Rákosi responded: ‘The reactionaries spread the news that the communists explicitly advise the Soviet Union not to release the prisoners of war, because it can be used as a means for applying pressure. For us it would be very desirable if the prisoners of war in 52 54 55 56

53 PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –, –. PIL ./ [Secretariat, minutes,  Sept ]. Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. –. Iszák and Kun, Moszkvának jelentjük,–.




the Soviet Union could be released as soon as possible, better still on initiative of the communist party.’ Molotov seemed sceptical: ‘And what would you win with that?’ Rákosi explained that the Americans were promising the release of their Hungarian prisoners, which ‘the reactionaries’ used against the MKP, while ‘the communists, on the other hand, have nothing to promise to the masses’. Molotov was, however, concerned that many of the POWs would be unsympathetic to the MKP, as Rákosi himself had argued in . Rákosi now considered that one-half of the approximately , prisoners would ally themselves with the communists, while the other half was ‘reactionary’. Release of all prisoners would, nevertheless, create a good general impression in the country. ‘Every day crying women come to me in droves and ask for the release of their husbands and sons. We want to do something serious, which would show to the masses the results of the work of the party, and increase its prestige.’57 Molotov refrained from making any promises. Besides the prisoner of war issue, Rákosi asked for Soviet aid in the conflict with Czechoslovakia. The ground had been laid in an earlier letter to Baranov at the International Department,58 and Rákosi could now in person point out how help against the KSČ could improve the position of the MKP: ‘It would be a great success for the communist party, if at our initiative we could come to an agreement on this topic.’59 At the meeting, Rákosi complained that the relationship with Czechoslovakia was ‘truly bad’, that during the population transfer ‘the Czechoslovaks take proletarians from us but send us rich peasants’. The Slovaks were persecuting Hungarian communists. While the Church was allowed to print Hungarian-language prayer books, Rákosi stated, Hungarian communists were not allowed their own press. ‘As we see it, our Czechoslovak comrades have gone mad.’ Rákosi also complained to Molotov about the abominable relationship with the Czech communists: ‘At the time, we invited them to our party congress, but they did not even honour us with an answer . . . It is our impression, that the Czechoslovak communists will do anything against us. The Yugoslav comrades have the same impression.’ The attitude of the Czechoslovak communists, Rákosi stated, was being exploited by the Smallholders: ‘Our impression is that only the Czechoslovak communists persecute the Hungarian communists. The Smallholder Party uses this in its agitation work, and endeavours to prove that the entire problem is caused by the communists. But we at this time have no relationship 57 59

Iszák and Kun, Moszkvának jelentjük, –. Ibid.

58

See page .




with the Czechoslovak Communist Party.’ Molotov asked, rather superfluously: ‘does this mean you do not have a good relationship with the Czechoslovak comrades?’ Rákosi replied: ‘not only do we not have a good relationship, but we have no relationship at all.’ A communist women’s delegation sent to Czechoslovakia was greeted by bourgeois representatives, but ignored by communists. The Czech communists, Rákosi concluded, ‘cause us serious problems’. Molotov seemed more forthcoming on the Czechoslovak issue than had previously been the case. To set Rákosi at ease he himself now attacked the Czechs: ‘I also, I must admit, want to tell you my own complaints regarding the Czechs.’ Neither Slánsky nor Gottwald had responded to Soviet letters on Czechoslovak–Polish agreements. ‘At this time’, Molotov continued, ‘it is truly difficult to talk with Czechoslovakia; perhaps it is only a temporary phenomenon, but for the time being the Czechs very rarely listen to sense.’ Rákosi also hoped for Soviet help on the Swabian question. He briefly sketched the problem for Molotov: only a third of all Swabians had been expelled, because the Americans had refused them entry into their zone of occupation. Soviet forces had, in turn, denied access into Austria. According to Rákosi, the importance of the halt in deportations could not be dismissed, and it was causing the MKP ‘serious problems’. Rákosi now asked Molotov for a solution: ‘Could we not agree to deport the Hungarian Swabians to Germany’s Soviet zone?’ Molotov initially was dismissive: ‘But I believe Hungary has no common border with Germany’s Soviet zone of occupation.’ Rákosi argued that they could be deported through Slovakia. In any case, the news in itself would be enough: ‘If we tell this to the Swabians, they will be so scared that they will flee into the American zone of their own accord.’ Molotov thought this unlikely. ‘If we act like this, the Soviet zone of Germany will turn into a kind of scarecrow.’ Rákosi, however, thought this mattered little: ‘No. The Swabians simply in no way love the Soviet Union.’ A final nationally coloured topic that Rákosi discussed with Molotov was that of the expropriation of the property of German nationals. According to the peace agreement settled in February , German businesses in Hungary were to be transferred to the Soviet Union as a means of reparations. But because the Hungarians were to pay the USSR in foreign currency for the value of the companies, it was an added burden on the Hungarian economy in addition to the war reparations. In practice, the Hungarians were buying up the now Soviet German properties and paying with valuable hard currency. The arrangement had been insisted upon




by Soviet authorities in Hungary. Rákosi rarely defended Hungarian interests against Soviet ones. Zoltán Vas later compared Rákosi with Tito. ‘Tito always endeavoured to defend the interests of his Fatherland with great decisiveness. He bravely put this into words even in contradiction to Stalin. Rákosi now [], and later as well, tried this several times. But he did not dare to do this with the same decisiveness as Tito.’60 The question of the German businesses was one of the few issues in which Rákosi knowingly contradicted the Soviet authorities in Hungary. Here, he used the argument that it would be damaging to the MKP. ‘If the people knew that besides the reparations we have to pay another two hundred thousand dollars to the Soviet Union for the German businesses, the thing will go against us and the Americans will exploit it.’ The most pressing issues, concluded Rákosi, were those of the behaviour of the Czechs and Slovaks and the return of the prisoners of war.61 Molotov did not answer any of Rákosi’s requests in this meeting, though apparently the Hungarians were soon promised that the Soviet zone would be able to receive , Swabians.62 At the meeting with Molotov Rákosi also prepared the next step in the reckoning with the Smallholder Party. Rákosi had claimed already on  April that ‘it has been proven that Ferenc Nagy has taken part in the conspiracy’,63 but he did not, as yet, take any steps. In his discussion with Molotov on  April he presented his desire to ‘unmask’ Ferenc Nagy on the basis of a compromising confession by Béla Kovács, who however was in Soviet hands. ‘We would like it if you could give him to us for a day or even only - hours, so that he can step forward as a witness before the Hungarian people, and make a confession. For that however, we, need your permission.’64 This was granted by Molotov. The MKP waited in taking further steps until Nagy left for a holiday in Switzerland, where his resignation was extracted on  May in exchange for his infant son. Simultaneously, Gyula Kállai courted the left-wing Smallholders in an open letter by referring to the ‘national opposition’ during the war and expressing the hope that a similar cooperation between Smallholders and MKP could be established.65 The Smallholder Party, and other political parties, had in the meantime been infiltrated by the ÁVO. Chief of the political police Gábor Péter 60 62 63 65

61 Vas, Betiltott könyvem, . ‘Moszkvának jelentjük,’ –. Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, –. 64 ‘Moszkvának jelentjük,’ –. Ibid.,–. Vida, Független Kisgazdapárt, .




boasted to Korotkevich about the ÁVO’s growing network of informers among churchgoers, in the ministries, and in political parties: ‘In all political parties we have our own people. We succeed in recruiting political figures from other parties. Recruiting proceeds thanks to compromising material in our possession. Fearing exposure, people collaborate with us.’ This placed the MKP at a distinct advantage: ‘Before multi-party conferences we succeed in learning the intentions of our political opponents; consequently we can inform our political leadership in good time about them.’ The ÁVO was an MKP fiefdom, from which not even the Prime Minister was safe: ‘We organize the tapping of telephone conversations. Now we eavesdrop on all important phone calls of the Prime Minister and leaders of the [Smallholder] party, and the most important we announce to Comrade Rákosi.’ Personal changes in government and within the Smallholder Party now followed swiftly. Ferenc Nagy was replaced as party chairman by the peasant radical István Dobi and as Prime Minister by the more pliable Lajos Dinnyés. Gyöngyösi was replaced as Foreign Minister by Ernő Mihályfi. Right-wing Smallholders such as Béla Varga, Németh Hajdu, and Bálint Czupi abandoned the party, which was now left in the control of procommunist figures such as Gyula Ortutay, and left-wingers such as Dobi. In the background to the unfolding drama of the smashing of the Smallholder Party, the Mistéth trial served as a reminder of the treason of the ‘conspirators.’ The indictment against Endre Mistéth and forty-three others was served on  April, in which they were accused of participation in the conspiracy. Particularly, they were accused of having ‘endeavoured to attack and prevent a Russian foreign political orientation’ and standing in ‘close contact with traitorous former diplomats that had fled to the West’.66 Five more trials took place after the Mistéth trial. But as their chief goal, the disintegration of the Smallholder Party, was by then more or less achieved, they took place under much less publicity. Shortly after Nagy’s resignation, international developments presented new opportunities to the MKP to damn the USA as a meddling foreign power and underline its own role as protector of Hungary’s freedom and independence. On  June , American Secretary of State George Marshall announced the offer of cheap credits to any country in Europe in order to speed up recovery. The Soviet reaction was initially suspicious. Pravda denounced it, as it had the Truman Doctrine, as an attempt to interfere in the domestic affairs of other states.67 For months, the coalition 66 67

Csicsery-Rónay and Cserenyey, Koncepiós per, –. McCauley, Origins of the Cold War, .




had been preparing legislation for a Three-Year Plan for the reconstruction of Hungary. The plan itself was expected to prove that the MKP was, on the one hand, a party of construction, and ‘on the other hand, that our party is the party of the nation, does not just represent the narrow interests of workers, but in the first place the interests of the little man’.68 The Smallholder Party had called for western loans to finance the Three-Year Plan. By rejecting these the MKP could further emphasize the national nature of the plan and, thus, the party. In May , Révai had argued that the MKP ‘defended our independence and freedom with regard to the foreign loan’ at a speech before a peasant assembly.69 Such loans were presented as a means for unnamed foreign powers to interfere in the internal affairs of Hungary. The same line was taken with the Marshall Plan. In contrast to the other Eastern European countries, Hungary decided already on  June, after Soviet pressure, not to participate in the Marshall Plan, formally on the basis that the government did not expect an agreement anyway.70 But the Soviet Union did not immediately reject the Marshall Plan, either for itself or for Poland, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Molotov travelled with a large negotiating team to Paris to discuss the Plan at a conference beginning on  June, and encouraged the Eastern European countries to do likewise. On  June, however, Molotov received an intelligence report leaking discussions between the British and Americans, in which the Plan was described as a defence of Western Europe against a Soviet threat.71 After this, Molotov ended negotiations and left Paris, now opposed to the Plan. Moscow initially allowed the Eastern European countries to join the next conference, in order to prevent unanimous acceptance of the plan, but on  July forbade them to take part in it altogether.72 In July , the Propaganda Department passed instructions to party speakers on how to discuss the rejection of the Marshall Plan. The speakers were told to argue that the MKP, in the first place, counted on Hungary’s own strength in realizing the Three-Year Plan. Nevertheless, Hungary was also ‘doing everything’ to secure foreign aid, ‘but we can’t accept the kind of foreign aid which would mean interference in the domestic affairs of the country and giving up the country’s independence’. At the same time the speakers were expected to stress that the MKP was not in favour of an unfriendly policy towards the West and America, and 68 69 71

PIL /,  [Propaganda Committee,  Jan. ]. 70 PIL ./, –. Pölöskei et al., Magyar történelem, –. 72 Mastny, Cold War and Soviet Insecurity, –. Ibid.




desired ‘strong friendship and cultural exchanges’ with the West. However, ‘the arranging of domestic affairs, the selection of responsible politicians and their placement in certain positions is our affair alone and this can only be decided in Budapest and not the capitals of foreign states. Who is Foreign Minister of Hungary is not decided in London, Moscow, or Paris but by the democratic parties in Hungary.’ 73 It was a reference to the American protests at the changes in government following Nagy’s resignation.    In the meantime, the MKP planned new elections to consolidate its victory over the Smallholder Party. Rákosi reported triumphantly to Moscow on the May crisis and Nagy’s removal, and announced the intention of holding parliamentary elections in August.74 Soviet pressure now dictated the running of the elections. Molotov had heavily condemned the MKP for its defeat in , and blamed it on the MKP’s inability to form an electoral bloc rather than individual lists: ‘If you had gone forward as a joint bloc, the situation would not have arisen that one party received a majority. In my opinion, that was your mistake.’ Rákosi reluctantly agreed.75 Nevertheless, the coalition parties did not establish a true, single list electoral bloc. Parliament was dissolved on  June. On  June , the MKP, the remnants of the Smallholder Party, the SzDP, and the NPP established the ‘Hungarian National Independence Front Electoral Alliance’. Outside the Independence Front the MKP was confronted by the new opposition parties emerging from the debris of the Smallholder Party. Of these Zoltán Pfeiffer’s Hungarian Independence Party (MFP), the selfproclaimed true successor to the Smallholder Party, István Barankovics’s Democratic People’s Party (DNP), and István Balogh’s Independent Hungarian Democratic Party (FMDP) were the most significant. In preparation for the elections, Rákosi intended to create an as favourable situation as possible. On  August bread and fat rations would be doubled, and  million kilos of sugar,  million metres of textiles, and , pairs of boots would be released. Rákosi had initially rejected changing the electoral law to place further restrictions on certain categories 73 75

PIL ./, –. Ibid. –.

74

Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. –.




of voters because he feared this would be used by the opposition as ammunition.76 However, on  July , a week before the elections, a new electoral law was pushed through Parliament that withdrew the right to vote from members of Horthy-era right-wing parties, B-listed civil servants, Swabians marked for expulsion, and Hungarians deported from Czechoslovakia. Not only were these categories likely to be hostile to the MKP, the party’s approach to the revoking of voting rights illustrated how the MKP was interested in reducing a set number of opponents rather than specific ‘Fascists’. Rákosi reported to Moscow that ‘on the basis of the new electoral law we want to exclude from the lists  to  per cent of the voters as reactionaries and fascists.’ The other parties felt threatened because the persons authorized to make the exclusions were mostly communists. This would be solved, wrote Rákosi, by enlisting the aid of the Social Democrats in the operation, though ‘this will weaken the efficacy of this measure’.77 István Kovács told the party’s Organizing committee: ‘The Comrades should not be exaggerated law-abiders . . . we have to exclude from those eligible to vote ,-, people.’78 Besides excluding opponents from the votes, the MKP attempted to influence the composition of the lists of its opponents. On  June, the Organizing Committee ordered a Comrade Olt to ‘confidentially occupy himself with the composition of the list of candidates of other parties and take the necessary steps and proposals in the interest of people cooperating with us being in electable positions on the lists of other parties’.79 Rákosi furthermore counted on Soviet support. On  June he appealed again to Moscow for help with the same national issues that he had tabled in the April meeting with Molotov: ‘If in the month of August more than , prisoners of war were returned to Hungary, this would yield a great advantage . . . We endeavour to achieve Czechoslovak–Hungarian rapprochement on the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, to make a large impression on the intelligentsia. For us it would be also essential help if the Soviet Union would admit at this time to the Soviet zone of occupation of Germany , Swabians, as was promised (or more).’80 Indeed, the USSR was amenable to helping Rákosi. Already in the first week of June, a first batch of prisoners of war left for Hungary. The timing with Ferenc Nagy’s defeat was probably not coincidental. The deportation of Swabians to the Soviet zone also commenced. Moreover, between  and  June, Mátyás Rákosi and Mihály Farkas travelled to Czechoslovakia for 76 78 80

77 Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. –. Ibid. –. 79 Cited in Kiszely, ÁVH, . PIL ./, –. Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. –.




a meeting with Eduard Bene š and the leaders of the Czechoslovak Communist Party. It is unlikely the meeting would have taken place without Soviet pressure. The USSR had supported the MKP in three key national issues prior to the elections. Only Rákosi’s protest against the currency payments to the USSR for German property had been ignored. The MKP’s election campaign for the elections of  August was thoroughly national in content. The  campaign was very similar to that of , in that it stressed both the party’s national character, and the party as defender of the interests of the Hungarian people, as in ‘What did the MKP do for the Hungarian people?’ The Propaganda Department’s plan divided the campaign into three periods. The central slogan of the first period of campaigning was to be ‘Good Life, Order, Independence’. The central themes would be ‘the bringing out of our party’s national character, defence of private property, and the popularizing of the Three-Year Plan’. These three themes would be stressed during the entire campaign. In this kick-off period, only centrally distributed materials were to be used. Local party organizations were expected to develop their own ‘individual agitation.’ During the second phase the party would ‘exploit the results of the party’. The basic thought now was ‘vote for the party that gave you land, good money, gave you the Three-Year Plan [launched on  August], brought home the POWs’. In this period, the MKP would target a more differentiated audience and pay specific attention to the problems of local villages and factories. In the third and final phase, the party intended to benefit from the release of consumer goods by using as background thought: ‘more communist votes equal more clothes, more shoes, more foodstuffs, more bread.’ The propaganda from the first and second period would now be combined by arranging for some of the demands at a local level to be met, such as the arranging of industrial goods for the village or the partitioning of new land.81 The emphasis on the party’s national character found its way into the party’s propaganda posters and other election material. An early incarnation of the plan called for the ‘large-scale popularizing of our party’s national emblem’.82 One of the party’s chief propaganda posters, aimed at the countryside, depicted the national colours and a healthy worker protecting a typical Hungarian farm, with the slogan ‘The Hungarian Communist Party defends the private property of the little man.’ It was 81

PIL ./, –.

82

PIL ./, –.




printed in , copies. A poster with images of Rákóczi, Kossuth, and Petőfi with the text ‘The Hungarian Communist Party protects the independence of our homeland in the spirit of Rákóczi, Kossuth, and Petőfi’ was printed in , copies. Another poster (, copies) merely showed an image of the new, nationally coloured party badge, without any words. A copy of the same poster with the text ‘Good Life, Order, Independence, Hungarian Communist Party’ was printed in , copies. An even larger print run for the ‘first period’ of campaigning planned was, however, for a poster promising that more communist votes would mean more consumer goods (,). Party leaders, especially Rákosi, were also popularized. An image of Imre Nagy handing out land was placed within a national-coloured frame, under the slogan ‘Vote for the party that gave you land.’ This was printed in , copies.83 Appeals to the nation and patriotism were also evident in the slogans designed for the election. These often expressed the MKP’s claim to be the heir to national traditions, such as ‘Rákosi leads Rákóczi’s people to a happy future’ or: With Dózsa for the Land, With Petőfi for Freedom With Kossuth for Independence With Rákosi for a happy Fatherland on free Hungarian soil! Other national slogans stressed Hungary’s independence: ‘More communist votes defend our Fatherland’s independence.’ Many slogans referred to the improvement of economic conditions; there were only very few ‘Socialist’ slogans issued, and even they had a ‘Hungarian’ theme: ‘Strong communist party—strong workers’ unity, strong workers’ unity—happy Hungary!’ 84 The party leadership still had to urge the party activists to use national symbols. Rákosi called on the party speakers not to be ashamed of the national colours: ‘We still have a problem with our patriotic character. A lot of comrades are afraid that we are deviating from the Marxist track. It has to be underlined demonstratively that we chose the red banner and the national flag, because with the national flag we commemorate Kossuth and Petőfi’s heritage the best. One has to say that the national flag is the flag of Hungarian democracy. The red star and the national banner represent that we are the party of the people and the democracy.’85 A different group of speakers was given a similar explanation of the use of the national colours: 83

PIL ./, –.

84

PIL ./, –.

85

PIL ./, –.




F. . The MKP’s propaganda during the  campaign is the most national yet. ‘The Hungarian Communist Party protects the independence of our homeland in the spirit of Rákóczi, Kossuth, and Petőfi’.

We have to say that we are indeed Hungarians. Our party is the party of the Hungarian people, and we proudly claim for ourselves the red-white-green colours. This is in the first place our banner, under which the Hungarian people fought for centuries against the lords, for freedom. The bravest fighters for Hungarian freedom shed their blood for the red, white, and green banner. We proudly take these colours for ourselves, because we are flesh from the flesh of the Hungarian people and blood from Hungarian blood. We want to make the Hungarian nation happy and free. He who is ashamed of the national colours




cannot be Hungarian. We are not ashamed, but proudly claim for ourselves the red, white, and green.86

As in , the party leadership had to exhort its activists, propagandists, and speakers to use the national line, though more than in the previous elections the tone Rákosi used on an inner party platform was the same as to an outside audience. In his election speech of  August, Rákosi praised the national colours in almost the same terms as he had done before the party speakers.87 The MKP thoroughly exploited the aid it had been given by the USSR in deporting the Swabians. In one of its leaflets, it detailed the party’s efforts in removing the Swabians from Hungary.88 The expulsion of the Swabians was again explicitly linked to the land reform, and now offered a ‘second land reform’ for those who had not received any land in the first round. The Propaganda Department instructed the county and district propagandists to claim during elections that land confiscated from ‘conspirators’ and ‘Swabians’ would go to those without land.89 Rákosi instructed the communist speakers in the campaign: ‘The decisive thing is to say that the land reform is the direct consequence of the expulsion of the Swabians.’ The MKP did not want to deport factory workers, but Swabians with - hold of land.90 To speakers going out to the countryside Rákosi said the same: ‘The expulsion of the Swabians means a new land reform.’ Rákosi was keen on exploiting American opposition to the deportations. ‘We will deport , Swabians into the Soviet zone. The Americans do not want to implement the duties that the Potsdam agreement put upon them. They obstructed the taking over of the Swabians. This has to be emphasized specifically in Hungarian areas, one has to say that they [Americans] are relying on the Swabians being one of the supports for the reaction here, and will use them against the Hungarians.’ In contrast to the American obstruction Rákosi now could pick the fruits from Soviet cooperation. On the initiative of the MKP, stated Rákosi, the Hungarian government had requested the Soviet government to accept , Swabians in the Soviet zone of occupation, which had been accepted. Rákosi then proceeded to outline the benefits to normal Hungarians: ‘We will expel the richest Swabians, who have the most land. There is a quarter of a million hold of land in the hands of the Swabians, which is why the expulsion of the Swabians is a new land reform. However, our work will only show results if we can expel above

86 88

PIL ./, –. PIL Rgy. IV///.

87

Földesi and Szerencsés, Halványkék választás, –. 89 PIL ./, –. 90 Ibid.




those , even more Swabians. That will only be possible if the Hungarian Communist Party is victorious at the elections.’91 The party also used the return of the prisoners of war in its election propaganda. The first draft for the campaign stated: ‘we must exploit the return of the prisoners of war during the entire campaign.’92 In public pronouncements, slogans, and speeches the MKP was presented as the party that had brought home the prisoners of war. The party furthermore directed its propaganda specifically at the returned prisoners themselves and attempted to recruit them for the MKP. In Budapest, almost all the local party’s reports during the elections were concerned specifically with prisoners of war. In the Budapest Ist district, the police were used to get hold of their addresses so they could be targeted individually.93 The VIIth district party organization divided the district into zones, and sent three to six propagandists per zone to approach prisoners of war. Out of  former prisoners,  joined the MKP and others promised to join with their families.94 In the provinces, successes in recruiting prisoners of war were also reported.95 The party placed an even stronger emphasis on ‘whispering propaganda’ during this campaign than in . The propaganda department described the one-on-one ‘individual agitation’ as the ‘decisive method’ of the campaign.96 On  June, the Organization Committee ordered the coordination of the ‘party’s whispering apparatus’.97 At a meeting of the MKP’s Organization Committee on the elections, István Kovács exclaimed: ‘We have to endeavour that we dominate as well in whispering propaganda. It is very important that we explode every mine in the last weeks of the elections.’98 The first draft of the party’s campaign plan mentioned that through ‘whispering propaganda’ the rumour had to be spread that prisoners of war would return home sooner in places with a communist majority.99 Rákosi himself instructed the party’s speakers to say that in areas where the elections went well, the Russians would speed up the return of the prisoners of war.100 Kovács put it more bluntly. He instructed the Organizing Committee to spread the message at provincial meetings: ‘If the communist party is victorious, the prisoners of war can 91 PIL ./, –. These particular sentences were crossed out in pencil, but in the margin the word ‘Stays!’ was written (‘Marad!’). 92 PIL ./, –. 93 PIL /a, . 94 PIL /b [Az MKP VII. kerületi szervezetének  július havi agitációs jelentése (July  report on agitation for the MKP VIIth district organization)]. 95 PIL ./, –. 96 PIL ./, –. 97 PIL ./, –. 98 Földesi and Szerencsés, Halványkék választás, –. 99 PIL ./, –. 100 PIL ./, –.




come home by Christmas, but if it does not win, the return of the prisoners of war is cast in doubt.’101 As far as the relations with Czechoslovakia were concerned, there was little to boast about despite the visit to Prague. The MKP did not issue detailed instructions to discuss the population transfers in the party propaganda, and the question was absent from Rákosi’s election speech on  August.102 In other speeches, the Prague meeting was used to underscore the party’s national character: ‘Finally, Comrade Rákosi made a speech in defence of the national line . . . Up to now the MKP has done most for the Hungarian minorities living abroad. Here Comrade Rákosi referred to the struggle taken upon himself, by which he achieved in Prague that further persecution of the Slovakian Hungarians would come to an end.’103 As far as the party’s national character was concerned, the election campaigns of  and  were similar. Now, as well, the party presented itself as heir to Hungary’s national traditions. If anything, the national propaganda of the party during the  campaign was far more intense than in . The ‘national line’ of the party had been made the central theme in the plans of the Propaganda Department. The party’s  electoral programme had still emphasized Socialist themes, but the  programme was predominantly national. Its very title, ‘Ne bántsd a magyart’ (Do not hurt the Hungarians), was taken from the ‘Szózat’, often regarded as Hungary’s second national anthem besides the ‘Himnusz’. The programme demanded an independent Fatherland, increased standards of living, peace, and a Hungarian resurrection. It lashed out at the Americans: ‘Thousand-year Hungary is not for sale! We arrange our own internal affairs, and no one else!’104 The MKP had created favourable circumstances for itself. It had been able to revoke the voting rights of opponents, though not necessarily the  per cent envisaged: one ÁVO report mentioned that , persons had been struck off the electoral roll. As  million votes were cast, this was about . per cent of the electorate.105 The party manipulated the electoral lists of its opponents. It arranged for the deliberate release of consumer goods to coincide with the party’s campaign message that it would bring more of everything. Its national propaganda was bolstered by Soviet support on the three ‘national’ issues Rákosi had debated in April with 101 103 104 105

102 Kiszely, ÁVH, . Földesi and Szerencsés, Halványkék választás, –. PIL ./ [n. d., ]. Iszák, ‘A parlementarizmus vesztett csatája’, . Földesi and Szerencsés, Halványkék választás .




Molotov: the expulsion of the Swabians, the relations with Czechoslovakia, and the return of the prisoners of war. During the election itself on  August, the MKP managed to secure a large number of votes through fraud. A special ‘blue form’ enabled people to vote outside their own constituency. Using fake duplicates of this form, the party arranged a nation-wide operation in which it plotted the casting of , additional votes.106 How successful it was is unclear, but head of the ÁVO, Gábor Péter reported that , votes were cast in this way; estimates of other contemporary witnesses run between , and ,.107 The expectations were, therefore, again high. Rákosi reported to Moscow that he expected the communist party to win more than  per cent of the votes.108 The actual result of the elections was mixed. A success for the communists was the unexpected final defeat of the Smallholder Party. With only . per cent of the vote, it had been completely smashed. It came as a complete surprise. But the MKP, despite fraud and manipulation, managed only a  per cent increase and received . per cent of the vote. The Social Democrats lost votes and received . per cent, and the NPP stayed the same (.).109 There had been no marked shift since  in forces between the MKP and its direct allies NPP and SzDP, and the oppositional position taken by the Smallholder Party. The latter was by now a shell of its former self and little more than a communist front. Its supporters moved to Pfeiffer’s MFP (.), Barankovics’s DNP (.), and Balogh’s FMDP (. per cent). The parties of the Left-Wing Bloc were still as far from a parliamentary majority as they had been in . There were two factors that stopped the elections from being another catastrophic defeat and instead made them into a victory: the MKP was now the largest party, and the Smallholder Party had utterly disintegrated. The MKP’s salami tactics had finally succeeded. * * * After , the party’s national line continued as it had done previously. The MKP continued to represent itself as guardian of the interests of the nation, and presented issues such as the land reform, prisoners of war, the 107 Ibid. Iszák, ‘A parlementarizmus vesztett csatája’, . Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. –. 109 An American agent with access to high level intelligence claimed , blue cards had been printed by the ÁVO, , of which were handed over to the NPP. One of his contacts in the ÁVO claimed that the actual number of communist votes on  August  was %. See Felix, Spy and his Masters. 106 108




relationship with Czechoslovakia, and the expulsion of the Swabians in national terms. The MKP, in any case, remained loyal to the USSR, and only rarely protested against measures that were detrimental to Hungary, such as the transfer of German businesses to the Soviet Union. In its relations with Hungary, the interests of the Soviet Union always prevailed over those of the MKP. When there was no conflict of interest, the USSR could take steps to boost the national image of the party, such as releasing prisoners or putting pressure on the KSČ. In domestic politics, a clear link was established between the party’s national propaganda and its salami tactics. Since  the concept of National Unity (nemzeti összefogás) had been central in the party’s propaganda. From the beginning this term was subject to erosion. At first it had comprised any patriot prepared to fight Hitler and the Arrow Cross, but by the summer of  the Horthy generals, initially hailed as allies, were pushed out of the Provisional Government as reactionaries. After the election defeat of November , the right-wing Smallholders were similarly abused as ‘reactionaries’. The groundwork for this was laid down in Révai’s speech ‘On the politics of National Unity’, in which he made it clear that the participants in National Unity could be limited to the left wing alone. In practice, the process can be seen at work by comparing the war crime trials of  and  with the  conspiracy trials. In the first trials Horthy politicians responsible for the war and Arrow Cross leaders who had been held accountable for numerous atrocities were attacked in the press as traitors working for a foreign state. A year later Smallholder politicians were put to trial for imaginary crimes, but similarly accused of treachery. With that, they were shoved on the same pile of ‘reactionaries’ and ‘Fascists’ as the Arrow Cross. Despite the increase in communist power during  and , the need for national propaganda was undiminished. The MKP’s  election campaign was the longest single sustained national-coloured propaganda campaign since , in which the central theme was the national character of the MKP. During the coalition years, the MKP continued to present itself not only as the champion of national interests, but as heirs to the tradition of the nation. In this period, the use of national symbols changed from a defensive measure to the confident portrayal of a communist self-image that was both national and Socialist in content.



The Cult of the Martyrs (–) As presented in Chapter , the basic content of the MKP’s national policy was established in . There were two chief aspects to the national line. First, the MKP presented itself as the party of Hungarian national interests. The previous chapters make it clear that the MKP continued this line throughout the coalition years. It supported national policies in domestic and foreign affairs whenever possible, that is, when they did not conflict with Soviet interests, and used national rhetoric to attack political opponents. Secondly, the party presented itself as heir to Hungary’s national traditions, and appropriated national Hungarian symbols. This part of the party’s national policy also continued after . Between  and  it developed a self-image that was both national and Socialist in content: the MKP not only celebrated national figures to stress its national character, but also presented its own, communist, heroes as national champions. It did so in the party’s ‘cult of the martyrs’, a consciously crafted cult of the dead, established deliberately to bolster the party’s national image. The same development can be seen in the celebrating of commemorations and festivals: the MKP not only appropriated national holidays such as  March and  October, but also ‘nationalized’ such typically Socialist and communist festivities as  May and  November. Because the martyr cult and these national and Socialist holidays were celebrated within the party itself, the national image the party had created was not just disseminated outwardly, but also within the party itself. As argued in Chapters  and , one of the hallmarks of the party’s representation as champion of national interests during the coalition period, as the struggles within the coalition increased, was the exclusion of ever larger numbers of ‘treasonous’ reactionaries from the concept of National Unity, and its gradual reduction to encompass the radical left only. A similar development can be seen in the use of national symbols. Initially, the party’s approach to national symbols fitted well within the framework of the coalition. There was a post-war consensus on the need to rid the country of references to the ‘reactionary’ and irredentist Horthy period by removing offending statues and street names. The disproportionate power of the MKP was reflected in an early growth of ‘Soviet’ and ‘communist’ symbols in public places, and such



The Cult of the Martyrs

references expanded as the party’s hold on the country increased. As the MKP’s hold on the country grew, its own sense of patriotism was spread through the public sphere. Rather than simply exploiting nationalism, the MKP developed its own national self-image, in which Socialist symbols were as prominent as national ones. The first step towards the establishment of such a ‘cult of the Fatherland’ was the creation of the MKP’s ‘martyr cult’. The MKP not only appropriated national heroes like Kossuth and Petőfi, it also ‘nationalized’ the heroes of the class struggle: the victims of white terror in  and the Horthy regime, the Hungarian casualties in the Spanish Civil War, and the communist dead of the Second World War were not simply presented as communist heroes, but also as national ones. Already in March  proposals were aired to name a Budapest street after communist war hero Endre Ságvári as a ‘martyr of the Hungarian freedom struggle’.1 Rákosi opened the MKP’s First National Council of – May  with a speech dedicated to the party’s martyrs, who had fallen for the nation: ‘My first words are directed to those martyrs who gave their lives for Hungarian freedom, for the cause of the workers and that of the entire nation. Without their self-sacrifice, we could not today rebuild our great party, the party that plays such an important role in the reconstruction of our Fatherland.’2 The party leadership ascribed great importance to keeping alive the memory of the party’s heroes. Unknown fallen party workers were reburied with full honours, with delegates from the Central Committee such as Rajk laying wreaths.3 After the election defeat of , when it became clear the national image of the party was to be enhanced still further, the party took a more systematic approach towards the commemoration of its heroic dead, and commenced with the construction of a cult of the dead in which the party celebrated its fallen heroes with the conscious intention of improving the MKP’s national image. Under the heading ‘fostering the cult of our martyrs’ the Propaganda Department wrote: ‘We must put together a complete list of the martyrs of our -year-long struggle. In the party centre we must put up a memorial tablet and unveil it ceremoniously. Lower party and union organizations should ensure that they worthily tend to the memory of the martyrs that worked in their midst.’ 4 This proposal for the creation of a cult of the dead was put into practice. On 1 3

Pór and Vásárhelyi (eds.), Magyar, –. PIL ./, , .

4

2 PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –.




 May , the Secretariat discussed a plan put forward by the head of the Propaganda Department, László Orbán, on the ‘fostering of the cult of our martyrs and emphasizing of our role in the independence movement’. Five prominent martyrs would be buried in Budapest’s Kerepesi Cemetery on the anniversary of Endre Ságvári’s death, accompanied by the publication of commemorative booklets on Ságvári and the five other martyrs. Gyula Kállai was to complete a book on the independence movement, and Lajos Fehér on the partisan movement. A marble plaque commemorating the party’s heroes would be unveiled in the party’s central building.5 The unions, countryside, and Budapest’s district party organizations were instructed to ‘tend to the memory of the comrades in their organization that died a martyr’s death, by for instance organizing celebrations of commemoration/immortalization on the anniversary of their death and tending to their graves, popularizing their names’. The plan was approved by the Secretariat, which then instructed the Propaganda Department to put together, within two months, a ‘complete list of all our martyrs’, including those killed after the fall of the Republic of Councils and in the Spanish Civil War.6 The MKP’s Cadre Department subsequently ordered local party organizations to send names, biographical information, and circumstances of death of ‘comrades that died a martyr’s death’.7 The emphasis of the cult of the martyrs lay on those who had died in the Second World War: a ‘martyr album’ commissioned by the Secretariat paid attention to the victims of Horthy and Hungarians killed in the Spanish Civil War, but the largest section was devoted to those who had died during the Second World War.8 The primary goal of this consciously created cult of the dead was the improvement of the party’s image. The Propaganda Department hoped that the equation of the party’s heroic dead with the greats of Hungarian history would improve the MKP’s national standing. For instance, it planned the publication of a series of brochures on national leaders such as Kossuth and Petőfi, leaders of social movements such as Mihály Táncsics and the peasant leader György Dózsa, including its own martyr, Endre Ságvári. This would document ‘that the Hungarian Communist Party truly represents national traditions’ and would so win over the ‘village masses’. The Propaganda Department further advocated the ‘emphasizing of the cult to a greater degree, [to show that] our party most consistently represents the interests of the Hungarian people’.9 Orbán proposed 5 7 9

PIL ./, –, . B-A-Z.m.LT.XXXIII-/ ..V/. PIL ./, –.

6

PIL ./, –. PIL ./, .

8




that the burial of three communist martyrs on  August  was to be given national importance by printing obituary posters and decorating the houses of Budapest with flags.10 Rákosi was initially to give the funeral address, but, significantly, he was replaced by Rajk, possibly because of Rákosi’s Jewish background.11 Despite these utilitarian goals, the martyr cult, nevertheless, went beyond the mere exploitation of national symbols that characterized the  election campaign. The MKP honoured its martyrs both as champions of the workers’ movement and as national heroes, and put forward their victimhood as evidence of the national credentials of the MKP, not only to the outside world, but also on party platforms. Rákosi, for instance, opened the Third Congress of the MKP, in August , with the words ‘the Hungarian Communist Party proudly establishes that it has given more martyrs in the struggle for the liberation of the workers and Hungarians on its own, than all the other parties put together’.12 As the martyrs were not just fêted outside the party, but also within the party itself, as communist and national heroes, the establishment of the martyr cult was a step beyond tactical propaganda towards the creation of a national self-image for the party. The appropriation of national symbols, and the presenting of communist symbols as national ones, extended beyond the cult of the martyrs into the celebration of public holidays and other national and Socialist festivals. During the coalition period, the communist party continued to participate in national holidays. As had been the case with the  March celebrations in , the main goal was to improve the national image of the party. On  February , the Békés county agitprop secretary warned the local party organizations that in the past the ‘reaction’ had appropriated the holiday for itself. To prevent this from recurring, the party organizations had to start preparing for  March, and bring a ‘massive mobilization’ of supporters. It was important, according to the secretary, that ‘young people, girls in national garb, take part in the celebrations’. The entire celebration had to be made to appear as ‘truly the national holiday of freedom’. The goal of participating in this national celebration remained instrumental: ‘The comrades should take care of the following point: at the celebrations they should use the national flag without fail, because only in that manner can we emphasize the party’s standpoint on the issue that we are the true national party.’13 10 13

PIL ./, . BMKT //, .

11

PIL ./, –.

12

PIL ./, –.




The party also celebrated non-official national holidays. The holiday of St Stephen on  August traditionally celebrated the foundation of the Hungarian state. As the ‘state of St Stephen’ had in the past referred to the pre-Trianon border, had been exploited to justify the domination of Slav and Romanian minorities by Hungarians, and was the basis for historical claims on lost territories, celebrating St Stephen was potentially problematic. In , there were no official state celebrations dedicated to St Stephen; instead the parties organized celebrations of their own. The theme of St Stephen was combined with that of the harvest festival. The MKP participated in the ‘New Bread’ festivities in the middle of August, culminating in a mass meeting on St Stephen’s day. Most of the meetings the MKP organized were little more than party meetings, dedicated to peasant issues and other political questions.14 The high point of the celebrations on Peasants’ Day on  August  was a mass meeting on Heroes’ Square with all four coalition parties. In  St Stephen continued to receive attention from the MKP, who dubbed him the ‘the defender of true national independence’ and the ‘greatest opponent of German imperialism’.15 The party did not only commemorate  August, but also  October, the Day of the Arad Martyrs, commemorating the execution of thirteen generals of the Hungarian freedom struggle by the Austrians on  October . The principal reason for participating was to show the continuity between the  freedom struggle and the MKP. The Budapest Area Committee Propaganda Department instructed the district party leaders as follows: ‘We must call our comrades’ attention to the memorial service organized by the National Committee on  October in the town theatre. As many comrades as possible from the districts should come in order to express that we are the true trustees of the cause of national independence.’16 The commemoration of  October was not merely used to claim national heroes for the communist party, but also to present communist heroes as national ones, by connecting the day of the Thirteen of Arad to the communist martyr cult. In , the Budapest Propaganda Department urged the district propagandists to mobilize the party for the celebration: ‘This year, the nation does not merely celebrate the martyrs of the – freedom struggle, but also the martyrs of the struggle against Fascism and reaction. On Saturday, during lunchtime, short, - to -minute commemorations will be held in individual factories and offices 14 15

PIL ./, –. Szabó, ‘Politikai Propaganda—Történelmi ünnepek,’ .

16

PIL /, .




to the memory of the martyrs of the freedom struggles of  October and the time elapsed since then. We must put in the foreground that our martyrs are the direct heirs and continuators of the Thirteen of Arad. We must strive . . . to pay homage on  October to the martyrs of Hungarian freedom in the framework of minor-scale memorial services.’17 In , Propaganda Department leader László Orbán saw two goals for the commemoration of  October: to display gratitude towards those who had given their lives in the cause of freedom, and to use the example of the past as a guide to the future. The chief lesson to learn for the communists was the importance of defending national independence, which the communists had proven by demonstrating on  October  against German oppression. As in , Orbán connected the Arad Martyrs to the MKP, who in twenty-five years had given the most martyrs to the Hungarian freedom struggle. Orbán’s speech, given before a party audience, was confrontational and reflected the domestic and foreign political situation, the reckoning with the last remaining enemies of the party, and the budding Cold War. According to Orbán, another conclusion to be drawn from the sacrifice of the Thirteen of Arad was the importance of fighting the ‘enemies of the people’. Orbán warned against ‘foreign and domestic enemies’ who were preparing a ‘new  October’, but promised that there would be no recurrence. Orbán demanded a ‘merciless’ struggle against the followers of the right-wing Social Democrat Pfeiffer, ‘enemies of the people’, and the ‘spies of foreign powers’, and now also connected  October to the international situation and the founding of the Cominform: the establishment of the international Soviet-led ‘Peace Front’ would also prevent a repetition of .18 The intention to prevent a ‘new  October’, the link between the Arad Martyrs and the dead of the MKP, the struggle against foreign and domestic enemies, and the aid given by the Soviet Union were key elements that also appeared a year later.19 As was the case with the commemoration of the communist dead, the MKP not only celebrated national holidays, but also ‘nationalized’ purely Socialist and communist festivals.  May was an opportunity to get the red banner out without the necessity of excuses, though in  the local Budapest party organization demanded darker coloured red flags, as their own pale banners had contrasted unfavourably with the blood-red flags of the Social Democrats.20 Yet even this typically workers’ holiday was used 17 19 20

18 PIL /, –. PIL /, . Október  (Diósgyőri Munkás,  Oct. ), in: Gerő, Államosított forradalom, . PIL ./, –.




to promote the MKP’s national image. According to László Orbán, , people had turned up to the May Day demonstration in  in Budapest alone. To Orbán, this was a ‘gigantic plebiscite’ in favour of the victory of the workers and ‘Democratic Hungary’. While it demonstrated in the first place workers’ unity, it also proved to Orbán that the isolation of the workers’ movement had come to an end, and that the leading role of the workers was now acknowledged. ‘That the holiday of the working class has also become the holiday of the entire nation shows that the whole nation sees the force that leads the country towards progress.’21 The celebrations ended in a mass meeting on Kossuth Square, where the national anthem was sung. The ‘nationalization’ of May Day by the MKP continued throughout the coalition years. In , the Secretariat decided that the MNDSz would take part in the May Day parade in a separate group of - women, bearing national flags, and portraits of Kossuth and Petőfi were carried along in the main parade.22 In May , the MKP was in practice responsible for the organization of the festivities. A report on the  May Day celebrations concluded that, despite the existence of joint preparatory committees, the MKP had not succeeded in activating the other parties and had done most of the work preparing for the celebrations. The party had done its best to ‘nationalize’ this Socialist celebration. The Budapest Propaganda Committee decided that national flags would have to be used during the celebrations, and the new party badge with a red star and tricolour instead of red banner was to be popularised.23 Though all the meetings ended in the singing of the ‘Internationale’, they were opened with the national anthem. Attempts were made to broaden the social base of the festivities and attract the ‘petit bourgeois layers’, who shied away from political meetings but were lured by light entertainment offered at ‘people’s celebrations’.24 The conscious attempt to turn the holiday into a national celebration is shown by the specific attention the report paid to the national character of May Day: ‘The national character of the festival in the whole country was brought forward among other ways, by the bearing of national flags in the parades.’25 A second report also shows the significance attached to the national image of May Day. All speakers specifically reported on how effectively both workers’ unity and ‘national character’ had been expressed, a clear 21 23 25

PIL /, –. PIL / [Propaganda Committee,  April ]. Ibid.

22 24

PIL ./, –. PIL ./, –.




indication that they had been asked to do so, and that the ‘national character’ of May Day was regarded as of great importance. In Tatabánya the decorations had been bad, and workers’ unity and national character had been weakly expressed during the day. In Nyíregyháza the decorations were not good, but at least both had ‘generally’ come forward in the parade. In Sopron both aspects had been ‘well emphasized’. In Szeged the ‘national character’ had been prevalent to an acceptable level. The MKP in Csanád had given the celebrations a popular, national look, with communist party members giving a presentation as horse riders in traditional costume and girls dressed in Hungarian folk costumes. Red flags had flown in Tolna, and in Szabolcs the party meeting had been decked out in red and national flags.26 May Day was a traditionally Socialist celebration. Specifically communist commemorations were celebrated, for the time being, in party circles. A low profile was kept on  March, the day of the Republic of Councils. Lenin’s death on  January was commemorated by the party, and here national flags were also present. The Nagykanizsa party organization reported, for instance, that the meeting had started with the singing of the ‘Himnusz’ and that the decorations had been ‘unimpeachable’: besides black banners (for mourning) and huge portraits of Lenin the ‘national flag also brought to the surface our party’s national essence’.27 The commemoration of the October Revolution on  November was given more attention, and the precedence it took in the minds of communists over the other national and Socialist festivals can be gleaned from the description of October  in  as ‘the most important date in human history’.28 Nevertheless, while it was celebrated, it was not done more lavishly than  March, and even this quintessentially communist celebration, the national holiday of a foreign state, was presented in Hungarian national terms. The use of national colours on  November was justified by the claim that the ‘state of ’ had liberated Hungary in  from  years of slavery.29 That the Socialist and national image portrayed in the cult of the martyrs and the celebration of festivals was disseminated within the party can be seen in the party’s children’s movement, the pioneers, where up to  national themes were strongly emphasized and Socialist themes were almost non-existent. Again, the  revolution was predominant. The 26 28

27 PIL ./, –. PIL ./, . Szabó, ‘Politikai Propaganda—Történelmi ünnepek’, –.

29

Ibid.




name ‘pioneer’ itself was said to be taken from the revolution, and so was the greeting Előre! (Forwards!). The new pioneer at his initiation swore to ‘study, work, and strive for the happiness of my people and my Fatherland’.30 The pioneer promised to adhere to twelve points, which themselves were instituted in remembrance of the twelve points put forward by the ‘March Youth’ in . The first two were distinctly patriotic: ‘the pioneer wants to live in a free Fatherland, among free people, as a free person,’ and ‘the pioneer loves his Fatherland and his people, works and fights for them.’31 Pioneer ‘groups’ and ‘patrols’ carried names of fortyeighters such as Petőfi, Kossuth, and József Bem, and ‘anyone else who struggled for freedom’, like Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky. Children were taught to work in the spirit of great Hungarian cultural figures such as Endre Ady, János Arany, Béla Bartók, and Attila József. Apart from Hungarian folk songs, Petőfi’s ‘National Song’ was taught, as well as others bringing to mind the  revolution. Among the holidays celebrated by the pioneers were Petőfi’s birthday ( January),  March, and  October. The national aspects of the  revolution, like the fight against the Austrians, received the lion’s share of attention. Communist symbolism was kept at a minimum. In the Soviet Union the red necktie had become a cult in itself, and had become an object of adoration. Children’s stories recounted exciting acts of heroism through the use of the red necktie—for instance, using it to flag down a train and so preventing a terrible accident. The Hungarian úttörő, however, wore a less spectacular blue necktie.32 That did not mean there were no references to Socialism and communism at all: the necktie was supposed to symbolizse ‘workers, working men, and peasants’ and was tied together by a red ring—possibly a reference to the party. In addition, one of the twelve points was: ‘the pioneer sees every worker as his brother.’ Nevertheless, such Socialist symbolism was drowned in the references to the  revolution. Even in the pioneers, the actively conveyed patriotism was national, rather than Socialist in content. In part this was because the pioneers were just another mass organization which had to appear attractive to the non-party masses. But as the party was educating its future, such a minimal explanation does not suffice. It was deliberately instilling into its children a sense of patriotism that consisted of both national and Socialist themes.

30

Úttörő vezetők kézikönyve, .

31

I. próba és fogadalomtétel, .

32

Ibid. .




    There was a distinct link between the MKP’s struggle for power, and the development of the MKP’s national self-image. As the party’s position improved and its confidence grew, it became more confident in expressing the Socialist aspects of its identity. While the defensive goal of needing to present a national image was still important, the party now also attempted to spread its notion of true patriotism outside the organization. With that, the party’s self-image gradually started to spill over into Hungarian public life, as expressed in changes in street names, statues, and school books. Reflection on street name changes started while the fighting continued. On  January , a crowd organized by the MADISz removed the name plates from ‘Hitler Square’ and the ‘Mussolini Square’.33 In February  the newly formed Propaganda Department of the MKP proposed the replacement of ‘Fascist’ and ‘reactionary’ street names by ‘the names of democratic thought and progressive struggle’.34 It suggested that the Oktogon, a large square on the Budapest outer boulevard, christened ‘Mussolini Square’ under Horthy, be renamed ‘Red Army Square’ as a sign of the ‘gratitude and love’ of the population towards its liberators.35 This plan never saw the light of day, but in early March the coalition newspaper Szabadság demanded streets for the Smallholder martyr Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, the communist martyr Endre Ságvári, and the poet Attila József.36 Responsibility for the renaming of streets lay with local authorities. In Budapest, the body in charge was the capital city’s Council of Communal Works. In Pécs, street-naming committees were established to prepare suggestions for town councils to decide on. In Békéscsaba, the district representative body decided on street names.37 In the renaming of public buildings, the National Committees could play a role. In Pécs, the National Committee dealt with a request for the changing of names of army barracks in the town, by mediating with army authorities.38 During , there were no apparent national directives for the changing of street names, certainly in the beginning when there was no functioning centralized authority. The initiative was left to local authorities and political parties. This is important to note, because it meant that changes in street names were a reflection of the distribution of power. Though the MKP 33 35 37

34 Pór and Vásárhelyi (eds.), Magyar, . PIL /. –. 36 PIL /, –. Pór and Vásárhelyi (eds.), Magyar, –. 38 BMKT //, . BML XVII, .




had an influence disproportionate to its pre-war size and true support, the national image established by the Hungarian authorities was a creation of the coalition. There was consensus between the parties on the need for a reckoning with the Horthy and Arrow Cross past, and the necessity to get rid of streets named after politicians representing the period. In Budapest in April , the (King) Károly Boulevard was given the name of the Social Democrat Béla Somogyi, murdered in , Emperor William Street was renamed Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Street, Berlin Square was changed into Marx Square and the long Arena Street leading from the Western (Nyugati) train station received the name of the leader of the  peasant uprising, György Dózsa.39 In June  a second wave followed, when about thirty street names were formally altered, especially those referring to the Horthy era. Mussolini Square was now formally changed back into the Oktogon, Hitler Square back into the Körönd, Gömbös Street back into Alkotás Street, István Horthy Street (after the regent’s son) into Vámház Boulevard, and Nyilas Street (after Nyilas Kereszt, the Arrow Cross) into Kalapács (Hammer) Street. Names referring to nobility were changed, like Margit Boulevard and the street named after the nineteenth-century conservative politician Count Tisza. The same happened in the rest of the country. In Szeged, Hitler Square, Mussolini Square, and Franz-Joseph Quay were among the first names to be altered,40 in Szentendre MariaTheresa Street was one of the few in .41 Changes in public places extended to statues. The blowing up of the Gömbös statue on  October , one of the most significant acts of Hungarian armed resistance, testifies both to the weakness of Hungary’s partisans and the importance attached to such symbols. Removal of undesired statues commenced immediately after fighting had ended. This iconoclasm took place at the local level, often spontaneously. On  May , youths from the People’s College movement toppled the statue of István Werbőczy on Apponyi Square.42 The changing of statues reflected the desire of all of the coalition parties to break with the past. János Pótó describes the destruction of the former national memory in favour of a new one in his book Emlékművek, politika, közgondolkodás. A large number of important statues had been seriously damaged in the siege, but only those deemed worthy of the use of scarce raw materials were rebuilt. Statues and memorials considered ‘reactionary’, such as the irredentist sailor’s memorial, and the statue to the Horthy-era politician Count Kuno Klebelsberg, 39 41

Pór and Vásárhelyi (eds.), Magyar, –. Pethő Zsoltné Németh, Szentendre utcanevei.

40 42

Péter, Szeged utcanevei. Pótó, Emlékművek, .




were left in ruins. Undamaged statues that were considered unacceptable were removed, such as that of the ‘feudal oppressor’ Werbőczy, and, especially, the irredentist statues of the Horthy period. State nationalism in the inter-war years had been deeply irredentist, a conscious effort to keep the nation in perpetual state of shock at the dismemberment of the country and to keep alive the vow to ‘no, no never!’ accept the Trianon Treaty. This was expressed in the public arena with a plethora of statues and memorials dedicated to the lost territories and the injustice of Trianon. Streets received names to commemorate lost territories (Transylvania Street) or cities (Arad Street, Brassó Street). These were not usually the most important streets in town, so they were not changed at an early stage. The half-mast ‘National Flag’ representing the Trianon Treaty erected in  in the centre of Freedom Square, standing on a mound of earth from all over ‘St István’s Hungary’, was replaced by a Soviet war memorial in May .43 In November , Zoltán Vas ordered the taking down of the allegorical figures North, East, South, and West, each representing territories lost to Hungary’s neighbours. Other monuments were simply changed in function. A bronze statue of a woman titled The Statue of Hungarian Suffering was erected on Freedom Square in . Only the lettering could remind anyone that it represented ‘the pain of Hungary weeping for the fate of its children stolen away under the Trianon arrangement’. The entire statue was removed in  for restoration, and replaced in , without its plinth, in front of the Palatinus baths on Margit island. As Pótó rightly puts it, it had turned from an irredentist monument to one symbolizing the cult of the body. With the inscription removed, the irredentist Well of Hungarian Justice was innocuous enough and left in its place on Freedom Square.44 Besides these irredentist symbols, statues representing Hungary’s feudal past were destroyed. The Werbőczy statue was put in that category. Statues bringing in mind the repression of the Republic of Councils were removed, such as the monument of the ‘national martyrs’ dedicated to the ‘bourgeois victims of proletarian power’. In a period characterized by iconoclasm, it is just as important to note which statues were retained. Statues of national historical figures were usually kept, especially the ones connected to struggles for national liberation, most importantly the revolution of , such as the Petőfi statue in Budapest. But statues with potentially controversial connotations were also kept in place. The partially damaged Millennium Monument was 43

Sinkó, ‘Political Rituals’, .

44

Pótó, Emlékművek, .




rebuilt, despite its obvious references to a ‘thousand-year Hungary’. The statue of the nobleman Prince Ferenc Rákóczi was restored to keep alive the memory of his leadership of the wars of independence against the Austrians. War memorials to the dead of the First and Second World Wars were usually left alone, though any references to the Horthy regime and irredentism were removed. Streets named after national heroes, especially of the  revolution, were retained. These streets had usually received their names during times of great political conservatism and heightened national sentiments: during the Tisza regime at the end of the nineteenth century, and the Horthy period. Thus in Szombathely, close to the Austrian border, Kossuth Street had received its name in , and was retained. So was Széchenyi Square (), and the streets named after Petőfi () and Ferenc Deák ().45 In Szeged, among others, the Square of the Arad Martyrs (), Sándor Petőfi Avenue (), Lajos Kossuth Avenue (), and Szécheny Square () remained the same. National symbols which were less easy to explain as a reference to revolution were also retained. In Szolnok, in central Hungary, for instance, the street which was explicitly named after Arad in remembrance of the Trianon Treaty kept its name until the present.46 Likewise, in Szeged, Temesvár (Timi șoara) Boulevard also remained unchanged (until ). Names referring to the Árpáds, the mythical founders of Hungary, were removed sometimes, but were kept for example in Szolnok, where they had been given these names in the second half of the s.47 In some cases, national names were added. Both Szeged and Szentendre received a Mihály Táncsics Square. Szentendre also gained a Petőfi Square. In Szombathely, Hitler Square became  March Square. In Budapest, in the Second district several unacceptable street names were changed into Honfoglalás (Land-Taking) Street, Pusztaszer Street and Mihály Táncsics Street, and in the important Vth district, a  March Square was established.48 After  a new national self-image was being created, as a rejection of the Horthy years. Symbols that stood for its political repression, irredentism, and the feudal system were removed. They were not replaced by a monolithic, simplistic national image. Though the freedom struggle of  figured prominently among the new street names, so did more conciliatory national figures such as Széchenyi. References that propped up the notion of a thousand-year Hungary were 45

Feiszt, Szombathely utcanevei. 47 Cseh, Szolnok város utcanevei helytörténeti adattár, . Ibid. 48 BFL, XV. [] [Budapest City Council Executive Committee. Subject: changes of street names in Greater Budapest –]. 46




also included. The cleansing of the nation’s self-image was a common objective supported by all the coalition parties. In Budapest, for instance, the Smallholder Party alerted mayor Zoltán Vas to the existence of the monument to the ‘national martyrs’ that commemorated the victims of the red terror of , and urged its removal.49        The positive image the coalition parties wanted to convey was that of a new and democratic Hungary. Common ground was found in the  revolution, though there were differences in emphasis. The MKP favoured the radicals Petőfi and Táncsics, whilst the NPP and Smallholders preferred Kossuth. Outside the  revolution, each party had its own pantheon of national heroes. St Stephen was popular among the Smallholders, but not in the MKP. The peasant leader György Dózsa was especially celebrated in the NPP and MKP. In a ruined country, changing street names and statues was not the first priority, so changes were not immediate, but were slowly under way during  and . The steady growth of communist influence can be seen from the increase in names with a ‘Socialist’ or revolutionary connotation. Even at a very early stage, names inspired by social revolution or the communist party appeared, reflecting the political realities in Hungary: the Soviet occupation and the disproportionate power of the MKP. Soviet monuments to the Red Army and the Soviet war dead appeared already during . For these, the Hungarian communists and the coalition parties were not ultimately responsible. As part of the ceasefire agreement with the Allies, the Hungarian government was expected to tend war graves of fallen Allied soldiers. Memorials to Soviet soldiers were frequently built at the initiative of Soviet commanders, but at the cost of the Hungarian state. In August  in Pusztaszabolcs, a town close to Székesfehérvár, local authorities contacted the Prime Minister’s office for materials for a memorial to Soviet soldiers.50 In October , the mayor of Kecskemét complained to the Prime Minister’s office that the local Soviet commander had been pressing for a Soviet war memorial for two weeks. The city had already built two, and did not have the – million pengő required, and now requested funds from the Prime Minister.51 For 49 51

50 Pótó, Emlékművek, . MOL XIX-A--j--VIII-. MOL XIX-A-I-j- [Kecskemét Mayor to Prime Minister,  Oct. ].




the construction of the first two monuments, stone had been requisitioned from two local companies, who were now demanding compensation.52 Though the Soviet liberation monuments and memorials had not necessarily been established at the initiative of Hungarian authorities, they nevertheless influenced the national image portrayed in the public space. A distortion in favour of the communist view on nation and history took place from the beginning. This was evident as well in the changes in street names, for which not Soviet but Hungarian authorities were responsible, and which therefore mirrored coalition relations. For instance, in Budapest in  an Attila József Street appeared, named in honour of the social revolutionary poet. This name would also have been popular in the NPP and SzDP. The same is true of the Győrgy Dózsa Street mentioned earlier. But this is less certain of outright communist names like Red Flag, Soviet Heroes, and Duclos which appeared in Szombathely,53 or the Moscow Boulevard in place of Berlin Boulevard, Marx instead of Mars Square, and Stalin Promenade rather than Stéfania Boulevard in Szeged.54 The same could probably be said about the honouring of the communist dead. So in Budapest Margit Boulevard was changed into Street of the Martyrs, while the Square of the Martyrs dedicated to the victims of the Republic of Councils was renamed in favour of the communist martyr Endre Ságvári.55 The cult of the martyrs was an attempt to transform communist heroes into national heroes and so improve the national standing of the party. Its pouring over into the public space is significant, because it was a first step in making the party’s martyrs cult part of the national collective memory. Communist street names were not the only ones to appear. So did neutral ones and clearly non-communist examples such as Roosevelt Square in Szeged, and Endre Bajcsy-Zsilinszky Street and Montgomery Street in Budapest. In  renaming of streets had still been left to municipal authorities, but in  the government made a nationwide request to alter street names in order to ‘strengthen the new democratic spirit’.56 Names that had escaped the first wave of changes were now replaced. The kind of names that were removed were still the same, but now even outright Soviet names appeared frequently, as happened in Budapest in May , when Erzsébet Square became Stalin Square, Vigadó Square became Molotov Square, Stefánia Road became Voroshilov Road, Italian Avenue 52 54 56

53 MOL XIX-A--J-. Feiszt, Szombathely utcanevei. 55 Péter, Szeged utcanevei. BFL, XV., street name file []. Pethő Zsoltné Németh, Szentendre utcanevei.




became Malinovski Avenue (after the Marshal), and Hidegkúti Road Street of the Red Army.57 In Szentendre, Marx Square replaced Erzsébet Square, and György Dózsa Road the Buda Road.58 The small town of Makó received a Stalin Street in , and a Lenin Square in ,59 and Szombathely a Square of the Martyrs and a Voroshilov Street.60 By , a significant number of streets had received distinctly communist names. As the dissemination of national propaganda within the pioneers offers evidence of the creation of a national self-image within the communist party, so general education gives a view of the developments in the country as a whole. One of the demands in the MKP’s  Action Programme had been ‘the elimination of the Fascist and anti-people spirit from education. The transformation of teaching and school books in progressive, democratic, and national spirit’.61 Immediately after the war, practical problems like paper shortages made immediate, radical change impossible. New school books could not yet be published, so those of the Horthy period were still used, though they were censored on their irredentist nationalism. School books came under complete control by the state in . Those for state schools were published by the Religion and Education Ministry run by communist sympathizer Gyula Ortutay, and those for private schools were subject to its approval. Nationalism did not disappear from the new school books, although it took a different form. A directive of the Ministry of Religion and Education in  demanded the removal from schools of all irredentist, counter-revolutionary, and chauvinist pictures and maps, all pictures referring to politicians of the old regime and the connection between Hungary and the Habsburgs.62 The references to ‘Rump Hungary’ and the holy crown of St István were removed, as were pejorative references to neighbouring peoples (Romanians had usually been referred to as olah—Wlachs).63 But a sense of the nation was conveyed no less than in the Horthy period. The revolution of  and its leaders were given a lot of attention, as were other national historical figures. Already in the first class of primary schools children covered subjects like ‘the celebration of freedom’ on  March. Their school book included a story about a grandmother crying tears of happiness on  March, an uncle singing the ‘Himnusz’, and the first stanza of Petőfi’s ‘Nemzeti Dal’ (National Song).64 Both had religious 57 59 61 63

58 Pethő Zsoltné Németh, Szentendre utcanevei. BFL, XV. []. 60 Feiszt, Szombathely utcanevei. Buzás and Tóth, Makó utcanevei. 62 Sinkó, ‘Political Rituals’, . ./, –. 64 Borst and Dantó, Első könyvünk, . Pinter, Magyar nemzet története, .




connotations. The first class only had one book dedicated to all subjects. The fact that  figured so prominently in it shows it was to be the centre of the national self-image. According to Révai,  belonged to ‘those historical periods which should stand in the centre of democratic historical, national education’.65 Révai was keen to dispel the idea that the MKP only desired the teaching of Petőfi, the ‘nurturing of the love of Endre Ady’, and the ‘popularizing of Attila József’, and emphasized that Hungarian history was more than revolution and popular history alone. The whole of national history from the ‘great Árpád dynasty’ via the Hunyadis and Rákóczi would have to be taught, and that included the role of the great landlords in national progress.66 In history books, a wider range of subjects was covered than  alone, including a whole chapter dedicated to the land-taking (Honfoglalás), underlining the thousand-year history of Hungary.67 As was the case with statues and street names, the number of (often very oblique) references to communism grew as the party gained control, though references to nationalism continued greatly to outnumber them. Books published in  (and which were intended for the academic year /) contained conspicuously more references to agrarian labour, tractors, and May Day, but otherwise differed only slightly from their predecessors.68 They still contained the same references to  March, and to the ‘Himnusz’ and ‘Szózat’, and other national poems like ‘Nemzeti Dal’.69 Compared to the changes in statues and street names, Socialist symbolism had made little headway in schools by mid. As the party was by then firmly in power, it shows it saw as yet no great need to discard national symbols.  :     The increase of Socialist symbols in the public sphere was not a coincidence, but a result of the MKP’s intention to convince the population of its own view on nation and nationalism. This can be seen from the MKP’s preparations for the  centenary. Early in January , the Propaganda Department noted the need to start preparing for the centenary and decided to produce a proposal for the MKP’s line.70 In its first proposal for the celebrations, the Propaganda Department warned that the 65 67 68 70

MTAKK MS ./, b, –. Elekes and Tóth, Történelem. A VII. osztály, . Újvári and Stelly, Marci a másodikban, . PIL ./, –.

66

Ibid.

69

Tóth, Második könyvünk, .




Smallholder Party was attempting to control the commemorations through the Ministry of Information. In order to prevent this, the Propaganda Department advised that the celebrations should be organized through the National Committees. The Propaganda Department now saw a use for exploiting national celebrations beyond simply improving the image of the party. ‘The centenary must be put to use for the mobilization of democratic forces. This mobilization would buttress the struggle against the reaction.’ Rather than presenting a national and social image to improve the MKP’s national standing, the centenary would be used for the ‘re-education’ of the masses, to instil the MKP’s self-image in the population through the ‘cultivating and animating of historical traditions’ and ‘the making known of our view of history’. To this end, the MKP would have to ‘increasingly work upon the youth, especially the university youth’, would need the ‘broad cooperation of teachers’, and would have to produce ‘new Hungarian history books and other school books’. The Propaganda Department expected results: ‘on this basis, we can carry into the masses the combative character of  and exploit this as the ideological basis for our political struggle against the right-wing.’71 The MKP succeeded in wresting away the control over the centenary celebrations from the Smallholders through the establishment of a coalition-based ‘Historical Memorial Committee’ on  February , presented as a continuation of the anti-German committee of the same name established on  March . Even before the defeat of Ferenc Nagy, the Committee was dominated by the MKP. Its presiding committee contained, besides Rákosi and Ferenc Nagy, Árpád Szakasits and, for the NPP, the communist sympathizer Péter Veres.72 After Nagy’s resignation, the membership of the Historical Memorial Committee was entirely dominated by the MKP and its sympathizers.73 Of the thirty-five members, usually only a minority showed up at formal meetings. Serious opposition figures such as Smallholder István Barankovics were present, but did not contribute to the meetings. At a meeting of the memorial committee of  June , József Révai took the initiative to establish ideological guidelines for the  celebrations. He considered it necessary that ‘the ideology of the festivities and the centenary year in general will be worked out in an acceptable way, as it has great importance indeed’. Zoltán Tildy then proposed the establishPIL ./, –. Original italics. MOL XIX-A--, – [Historical Memorial Committee, minutes,  Apr. ] 73 MOL XIX-A--, – [A Történelmi Emlékbizottság tagjainak névsora (List of names of members of the Historical Memorial Committee)]. 71 72




ment of a subcommittee to ‘work out the ideology of the ’ centenary.’ The coalition relations within this new committee of four were again skewed in favour of the MKP. The Social Democrat member of Parliament Pál Justus, secret MKP member Ferenc Erdei for the NPP, and the fellow-traveller Gyula Ortutay for the Smallholder Party were all ideologically well disposed towards the MKP. These relatively minor and weak politicians were in any case overshadowed by the domineering figure of József Révai, the MKP member of the subcommittee.74 The centenary would be celebrated in the way the MKP desired. This was guaranteed by the fact that Révai personally drafted the ideological guiding principles of the festival.75 The ‘political guidelines’ expressed the party’s desire to use the national celebrations to mobilize the population, as the Propaganda Department had wished in February: ‘We have to recall the great historical past of the Hungarian nation, but in such a way that with the calling to life of traditions we mobilize the population for the solving of current great tasks of no lesser importance.’ The increase in Socialist imagery reflected in the increase of ‘communist’ street names and the content of school books was mirrored in the ‘political guidelines’. As before, the  revolution was classified as a struggle for both national and social liberation. Significantly, the revolution of  was mentioned as an attempt to ‘return’ to , where two years earlier the Republic of Councils had been ignored. A class-based analysis of the freedom struggle was given, as class antagonism was used to explain the defeat of . Because social reform had not gone far enough after the revolution, and especially the peasantry had been left without land, the ‘basic needs of the masses’ had not been met and the social base of the revolution had been too narrow. The main reason for the defeat was, however, the ‘high treason’ (nemzetárulás) of the large landowning aristocracy, who, almost without exception, had ‘denied their Hungarianness’ by taking sides with the enemy. Despite the emphasis on class, a concession was made to national feeling by placing Lajos Kossuth in the centre of national celebrations rather than radicals such as Petőfi and Táncsics, the March Youth and  March. Kossuth was to be presented as the towering figure of . Despite the fact that Kossuth had not always agreed with the radicals, workers, and peasants, he had managed to create an alliance between the landed gentry and the people, and could be thanked for the fact that the nation had not MOL XIX-A-- [Historical Memorial Committee, minutes,  June )]. MTAKK MS / [A centenárium megünneplésének politikai irányelvei (Political guidelines for the celebration of the centenary—undated handwritten draft)]. 74 75




capitulated, but had risen in arms. Kossuth ‘was more than the leader of the progressive gentry; he was the leader of the entire nation.’ The need for good relations with Hungary’s neighbours had been the MKP’s party line since  and was reflected in the evaluation of . The national liberation struggle had also been defeated because of the conflicts between the Hungarians and other peoples. The ‘feudal counterrevolution’ had successfully exploited the differences between the nationalities in Hungary. The increasing tensions between Russia and the West were also evident in the guidelines, where it was underlined that ‘progressive peoples’ and their leaders had shown solidarity with Hungary in , but that the ‘western European bourgeois classes and their leaders’ had promoted intervention by the reaction. Russian intervention by the Tsar was explained away by claiming that the ‘best of the Russian people’ had supported the Hungarians rather than the Tsar. That the historical evaluation of  was made with present political objectives in mind became clear from the paragraph on ‘the topical lessons of ’. As in , the nation would have to accompany national liberation with social reform, this time by driving back the ‘plutocrats’ through the nationalization of banks and industry. One of the lessons of  was that ‘national unity’ was a precondition for victory, this time between the ‘workers, peasants, and the intelligentsia’. After the ‘conspiracy’ trials, Révai put emphasis on the destruction of ‘domestic enemies’. The Historical Memorial Committee attacked the treason of the ‘reaction’ in , and, in addition, praised Kossuth’s ‘unceasing’ opposition to figures such as Széchenyi, Deák, and Lajos Batthyány, who had favoured compromise with the Austrians over conflict. This was needed to prove that ‘it is only possible to take up the battle against foreign opponents if we and our allies mercilessly and consistently settle accounts with the “domestic scoundrels” ’. In sentiment this did not differ from what had been stated in , though the category of ‘scoundrels’ had now considerably widened. The stress on the conflicts between the nationalities as a cause of defeat of the war of independence served to bolster the lesson that ‘the cause of Hungarian independence has to be defended and secured in alliance with the democratic peoples of the world’. Not all ‘topical lessons’ put forward in the guidelines followed logically from the historical analysis presented. The memorial committee, for instance, concluded that  proved independence could only be guaranteed by removing ‘all colonial dependence’ on ‘foreign capitalists’. At present, that would be served by the fulfilment of the Three-Year Plan. How that was related to  was not made clear at all.




F. . Architect of the national policy József Révai had carefully supervised the celebration of the  centenary. Here, the local party organization in Sopron has decorated its headquarters to underline the party’s national character.

The ideological basis for the centenary was exactly as the MKP, in the person of Révai, had wished it. The guidelines made the  revolution completely subservient to the political needs of the MKP. They presented the working class and MKP as heir to , and supported the party in its political needs of the day, such as attacking foreign and domestic enemies of the Three-Year Plan. * * * The MKP’s increase in power could be seen from the confident pushing of more ‘Socialist’ themes, such as a class-based analysis of  and the unashamed references to  as a continuation of the ideals of . The exploitation of nationalism by the MKP had changed in nature since . Rather than being simply defensive in nature, it was on the way to becoming the party’s self-image. In addition, the ambition voiced by the Propaganda Department early in  not just to win votes but in fact to spread ‘new’ or ‘true’ patriotism was now being put into practice. The Propaganda Department had in February  already proposed not merely to ‘emphasize the party’s national character’ but also to spread the




communist view on history. The ‘political guidelines’ to the centenary show this was being realized. Yet at the same time, the ‘guidelines’ also showed the MKP was still not firmly in power. The emphasis on personalities rather than the power of the people, the stress on Kossuth rather than Petőfi and Táncsics, and especially the positive appraisal of the role of the landed gentry showed that the centenary was still not a communist celebration. Concessions had been made to enable broader support for the festivities. Essential changes in the content of the party’s national propaganda would only slowly be introduced in  and , after which the party’s propaganda became thoroughly Stalinized. Even then, the nation still took centre stage.



The Cominform and the Nationalist Errors of the MKP (–) The ‘national line’ of the Hungarian and other Eastern European communist parties had been established in  by the Comintern, on Stalin’s instructions, to aid the parties in their struggle against the Germans. Partially to facilitate this policy, the Comintern was abolished in , which, it was hoped, would help the defence against the charge of being ‘agents of Moscow’. The ‘national line’ continued to be applied after the war, when it was a necessary accompaniment to the gradual, parliamentary route to power. After the introduction of the Marshall Plan in June , changes started to take place in the national policy of the MKP. With the onset of the Cold War, it became more and more important to demonstrate the ideological cohesion within the ‘People’s Democracies’, even more so after the Yugoslav–Soviet split in June . The dissolution of the Comintern had deliberately obscured the dominance of the VKP(b) over the other communist parties. While the Soviet Union had been referred to by the MKP as an example and a guarantor of Hungary’s independence, fear of being dubbed agents of a foreign power made the MKP insist on its independence in public. Now, the leadership of the VKP(b) was once again to be acknowledged openly, and the Soviet Union was to be popularized in the People’s Democracies. Any show of independence from Moscow, by contrast, could not be tolerated. The notion of a peaceful, parliamentary ‘national road to communism’, in vogue since , was dropped and branded as heretical. ‘Nationalism’, ‘bourgeois nationalism’, and ‘national deviationism’ now became the greatest political aberrations a communist could be guilty of, and propaganda campaigns and purges were launched to purify the party of real and imaginary ‘nationalists’. This did not mean the national line came to an end. If purely defined as the exploitation of national sentiments for political purposes, no change took place in the ‘national policy’. After  the exploitation of national sentiments, again on Soviet orders, served new goals: to incite hatred against western ‘imperialists’ and Tito’s Yugoslavia, to promote patriotic



The Nationalist Errors of the MKP

feeling towards the People’s Republic, and love of the ‘Peace Camp’, the Soviet Union, and its leader, Joseph Stalin. The MKP had presented itself as heir to Hungary’s national traditions, and defender of the country’s national interests. This the party continued to do. The trial of László Rajk was used, for instance, to whip up a frenzy against ‘foreign imperialists’, and to prove that the party and the Soviet Union defended Hungary’s independence. The party, renamed Hungarian Workers’ Party (Magyar Dolgozók Pártja, MDP) in June , continued to present itself as the heir to national revolutionary traditions. Though from  onward national symbols became dominated by red banners, Lenin, and Stalin, the MDP never abandoned the national colours, and Socialist and national references were welded into one state ideology: Socialist Patriotism. From  to  September , the Soviet, Eastern European, French, and Italian communist parties met in the Warsaw suburb Szklarska Poreba, for the founding meeting of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform), the first international communist platform since the disbanding of the Comintern in  and, in practice, its successor. The main theme at this First Conference of the Cominform was the reappraisal of the international political situation following the introduction of the Marshall Plan. In his address, Soviet representative Andrej Zhdanov condemned the Plan as an instrument of US global domination, and divided the world into two camps: an ‘imperialist’ and ‘anti-democratic’ camp led by the United States and Great Britain, and an ‘anti-imperialist’ and ‘democratic’ camp led by the USSR. It was the first public Soviet admission that the Grand Alliance of the Second World War was irrevocably broken. While the timing of the creation of the Cominform and the subject matter of the First Conference was linked to the Marshall Plan, its establishment itself was not. Even as the Comintern was being dissolved in , there were signs that, one day, a new international would be established, although it would be more loosely organized. On  May , VKP(b) Politburo member Georgi Malenkov and Dimitrov had been instructed by Stalin to come up with ideas about the form in which the Comintern could be continued. Stalin mused that ‘experience has taught us that one cannot have an international leading centre for all states. That became clear in the times of Marx, Lenin, and at the present time as well. Perhaps one has to change over to regional organizations—for instance for South America, the United States and Canada, several European states, etc.—but even




these should not be overburdened.’1 After the war, in April , the formation of a new, European, communist organization was discussed by Stalin and Tito.2 Following his visit to Moscow in April , Rákosi reported to the Central Committee at its meeting of  May in detail about the international situation and the establishment of a ‘new communist international’.3 The arguments Rákosi used for the dissolution of the Comintern and the as yet vague designs for the new International were similar to those employed by Stalin in . The Comintern had been dissolved, Rákosi maintained, because it ‘hindered rather than aided the growth of the communist parties’. It had been intended as a ‘centralized, strong International with executive powers’. This, however, had proved to be ‘the catastrophe’ of the Third International, because, instead of looking for the preconditions for revolution in every single country, it ‘directed from the Centre’. The new proposed International was therefore to be different in nature: So, we cannot establish an International like that again. On the contrary, the International should be such that it does not inhibit the development of individual parties, it should make it possible for individual parties to complete the work which leads to the liberation of the proletariat, adjusted to the local situation. I have to say immediately that the new International, accordingly, cannot be similar to the other Internationals. This will not be a directing organization, its task will be . . . to help in dealing with complaints, the conveyance of the good or bad experiences of one country to the communist party of another country, so that they can learn from the neighbours’ experiences and losses.4

It was as if Stalin was speaking through Rákosi’s lips. Rákosi’s description of a decentralized, coordinating body fitted closely with Stalin’s observations in  on the nature of a possible successor organization for the Comintern. During meetings in Moscow with Tito and Dimitrov in June , Stalin continued to object to a centralized organization, and already at this stage had started to consider the establishment of an ‘Information Bureau’ which would have no decision-making powers of its own. As Soviet dominance over the Eastern European communist parties ensured that power relations remained centralized and all parties still followed the same basic strategy, the need for greater flexibility for the national sections had not been the main reason behind the disbanding of the Comintern. As argued in Chapter , the goals had been to placate western fears of communist revolutionary intentions, and to prevent the 1 3

Dimitrov, Tagebücher, . PIL ./, –.

2

Adibekov, First Conference, . 4 Ibid.




European communists from being feared as agents of Moscow. This would aid the national communist parties both during the war as they searched for allies against Hitler, and after the war, as they vied for power in their respective countries. Both these reasons for dissolving the Comintern had now become redundant. With the open break between the Allies a fact, there was no more need to befriend the West, and now communists were close to holding political power in most of Eastern Europe, neither was it as necessary to hide their alliance with the Soviet Union. The chief goal of the establishment of the Cominform was, therefore, not to coordinate policy. That was done by Moscow anyway. As was the case with the dissolution of the Comintern, the main intention was to send a strong political message. Even now, full Soviet control over Eastern Europe was not yet assured. Czechoslovakia was still ruled by a coalition government, and with the signing of the Paris Peace Treaty, Soviet troops were supposed to leave Hungary in September . The removal from government of communists in Italy and France could form a dangerous precedent in both countries. To the Soviet Union it was now necessary to rally the People’s Democracies to its side before any of them could slip out of its sphere of influence.       For the communist parties the consequence was that they now, once again, had to advocate ideological conformity and openly accept Soviet leadership. The notion of the ‘national road’ to communism, which had only really been in fashion for a year, was dropped. The idea that there could be a road to Socialism distinct from the Soviet one was no longer acceptable. At the First Conference of the Cominform, the representatives of the Yugoslav Communist Party, Milovan Djilas and Edvard Kardelj, were given the task of criticizing the old line. The French and Italian communist parties in particular came under severe attack. At the Conference the phrase ‘national road to communism’ was not mentioned literally, though in the Soviet preparatory dossier Basis of the Zhdanov Report, the PCF was censured for wanting to find ‘one’s own distinct road to Socialism, different from the Russian road’.5 Even if the phrase itself was not used, the concept, a peaceful transition to Socialism in contrast to the violent revolution in the Soviet Union, was 5

Quoted in di Biago, ‘Establishment of the Cominform’, .




condemned at the conference. Duclos practised self-criticism for the PCF: ‘There were obviously opportunist tendencies in the Party and excessive respect for legalism and parliamentarism. Here lie the roots of our mistakes.’6 For the MKP, Mihály Farkas reprimanded the ‘parliamentary cretinism’ of the PCI.7 The rejection of parliamentary and gradual tactics resulted in a reappraisal of the events of the past few years. Though, like any other communist party, the PCF’s wartime policy had been implemented on Soviet instructions, Djilas now scolded the PCF for having favoured coalition politics ‘on the basis of some kind of vague national solidarity’. Djilas reprimanded the PCF for not having gone into open revolt, but having instead waited until ‘the whole nation, including the communists’ bourgeois allies as well, were ready to rise’. As a consequence, the ‘hated bourgeois politicians’ had been able to ‘appear once more before the masses behind the mask of patriotism’.8 The communist parties were still expected to present themselves as national ones, but this could no longer be done by advocating parliamentary tactics; instead, the communist parties would have to prove their national credentials by stressing their allegiance to the Soviet Union. The USSR was presented as the champion of the independence of small nations against aggressive ‘imperialists’ led by the United States; support for the Soviet Union was therefore by default patriotic, whereas allegiance to the West amounted to treason. Malenkov gave the first speech as a Soviet representative, in which he accused the United States of making ‘new plans for war’ and plotting ‘the enslavement of weakened capitalist countries’.9 In his key report delivered at the meeting, Zhdanov accused the United States of striving for world domination, and following an ‘expansionary’ and ‘reactionary’ course aimed specifically against the USSR and the ‘new democracies’ of Eastern Europe. In the United States, Zhdanov argued, ‘expansionist circles’ were ‘dreaming of the preparation of a new, a third world war’.10 Economic aid such as the Marshall Plan, according to Zhdanov, was put forward by the Americans as salvation of a country from famine and ruination, but in reality was used by ‘American monopolies’ to ‘deprive [a country] of all independence’. The essence of the Marshall Plan was, in Zhdanov’s view, to ‘grant American credits as payment for the renunciation by the European states of their economic and later political independence as well’. He dubbed the Marshall Plan ‘the plan for the enslavement of Europe’. 6 8

Procacci (ed.), Cominform, –, . 9 Ibid. –, . Ibid. –.

7 10

Ibid. . Ibid. –, .




Zhdanov accused the United States of waging an ‘ideological campaign’ to ‘accompany the plan for enslaving Europe’. American support of the United Nations and the then still frequently floated idea of a ‘world government’ was invented to ‘attack the principle of national sovereignty’. Because the USSR was ‘untiringly and consistently defending the principles of genuine equality and the sovereign rights of all peoples, great and small’, this ‘campaign against national sovereignty’ was directed specifically against the Soviet Union.11 In response to the Marshall Plan, the USA was presented as the enemy of the freedom of European nations and the principle of national sovereignty itself. The Soviet Union, by contrast, was fêted as the guarantor of national independence and the defender of the freedom of small nations. The result for the political line of the other communist parties was clear. Despite the rejection of the ‘national road to communism’, they would have to put forward their parties as the champions of national independence more than ever. The PCF had initially supported the Marshall Plan by citing national interests, and now the French party was expected to reject the Plan, again by using patriotic, national arguments. The party was criticized for having acted out of fear of being seen as unpatriotic, but at the same time it was still portrayed as the only ‘true’ patriotic party. Zhdanov condemned the PCF for allowing itself to be ‘intimidated’ by ‘arguments about the national interests of France’, when it accepted the Plan. ‘In this the communists let themselves be blackmailed by means of accusations that they were not sufficiently patriotic, whereas the only patriotic force in France would have been the CP, had it exposed the real significance of American credit.’12 A similar argument was used in József Révai’s draft of Farkas’s speech: The reaction presented the communist party as an anti-national party, denounced us as ‘agents of Moscow’ who do not follow their policy according to Hungarian interests, but according to Soviet interests . . . We, however, turned the tables on them. We proved to the people that our policy of self-help, the refusal of foreign credits insofar as they are bound to political conditions, to the interference in our domestic affairs, is the true national policy.13

The future line against the Marshall Plan was expected to be the defence of national sovereignty against American infringements. The communist parties, Zhdanov said, were to ‘head the resistance to the American plan 11

Procacci (ed.), Cominform.

12

Ibid. .

13

PIL ./, –.




for enslavement of Europe’, to ‘support all patriotic elements who do not want their country dishonoured and who want to fight against the enslavement of their motherland by foreign capital, and for its national sovereignty’.14 The fear of being considered agents of Moscow, which had been one of Stalin’s main reasons for disbanding the Comintern, was now, again at Soviet behest, formally considered exaggerated. Zhdanov reflected that the dissolution of the Comintern had ‘forever put an end to the slanders of the enemies of communism and the labour movement to the effect that Moscow allegedly interferes in the internal life of other states and that the Communist Parties of the varied countries allegedly act not in the interests of their own peoples, but on orders from abroad’.15 The concern of being branded ‘agents of Moscow’, Zhdanov now argued, should not deter communist parties from working together. He observed the emergence of ‘a rather strange picture’. Socialists, ‘who went all out to prove that the Comintern allegedly dictated Moscow’s orders to the Communists of all countries’, had re-established their International, while communists had ‘refrained even from meeting each other, let alone consulting together’, precisely because of the ‘fear of their enemies’ slanders regarding the “hand of Moscow” ’.16 The parties were still expected to put forward a national self-image: not by stressing independence from Moscow, but now by openly supporting the USSR. Duclos, for instance, stated: ‘Campaigns are often launched against us on this pretext that we are supposed to be dependent on Moscow. But we must frankly declare that if our people want to be free, they must support the democratic foreign policy of the USSR.’17 Even though officially the anxiety of being dubbed ‘agents of Moscow’ could no longer be used to hide the link with the Soviet Union, in practice Soviet influence over the Eastern European communist parties was still disguised. At the Conference, the Polish Workers’ Party (PPR) was given the task of formally proposing the creation of the Communist Information Bureau. Compared to the former ‘general staff of the world revolution’ it was a modest affair. The bureau was to consist of two representatives of each party, who would meet every few months to discuss policy, and publish a journal (For a Durable Peace, for a People’s Democracy). Even so, Gomulka was adamant that accusations about Soviet control should be prevented. Rather than Moscow, Belgrade would be the permanent seat 14 16

Procacci (ed.), Cominform, . Ibid.

17

15 Ibid. . Ibid. –, –.




of the bureau, ‘so as to make less easy slanders about pressure from Moscow’.18      Upon their return to Budapest, Révai and Farkas reported to the Politburo on the results of the Cominform meeting. Though the hard line established at the conference was, of course, hailed, the immediate effect on the party’s national policy was negligible. Even so, Soviet authorities were now on the lookout for anything that presented a possible deviation from loyalty to the USSR. That becomes apparent from a report by Korotkevich, the official at the Hungarian desk of the International Department of the Central Committee. Korotkevich praised the MKP for its stand against ‘Anglo-American intrigues and provocations’ in the form of the Marshall Plan, but also noted that ‘the leadership of the Hungarian communist party, even if generally Soviet-oriented, and approving of Soviet foreign policy, at times errs into narrow nationalist points of view’. What Korotkevich understood by ‘narrow nationalism’ was, basically, any form of opposition to Soviet interests. He specifically complained about Rákosi’s resistance to the Hungarian payments to the Soviet Union for former German assets, and the desire to avoid paying reparation payments to the Soviet Union. As the main motive for the behaviour of the Hungarian party leaders, Korotkevich saw the party’s national policy: ‘The leaders of the communist party would like to show that the MKP is a national party and that is why they occasionally tolerate facts that damage Soviet interests.’ Korotkevich also noted the lack of attention given to the Soviet Union. The leadership of the MKP did not warmly support the Hungarian–Soviet Cultural Society (Magyar–Szovjet Művelődési Társaság).19 There was little material on the USSR in Hungarian newspapers, and the cinemas of Budapest, mostly owned by the MKPcontrolled company Mafirt (Magyar Filmipari Részvénytársaság, Hungarian Film Industry Ltd.), preferred American films and refused to show Soviet ones, using a ‘variety of pretexts’. The main reason for this lack of interest in the Soviet Union Korotkevich considered to be the fear of being dubbed ‘agents of Moscow’: ‘The Hungarian Communist Party’s Procacci (ed.), Cominform, –, . This was perhaps not surprising, since it was run by Rezső Szántó, whose rancorous reports to Moscow had not been forgiven. 18 19




leaders have up to today not been able to bring themselves to propagate the Soviet Union, out of the false fear caused by the accusation of the reactionaries, according to which the communists are merely “Russian agents”.’20 Korotkevich’s criticism at this stage had very little obvious effect on the propaganda of the MKP; indeed, the document had probably been for internal use and the MKP had in all likelihood not yet been informed of its content. The centenary celebrations of the  revolution went ahead as planned. The centenary year was opened by President Tildy in Petőfi’s birthplace on the anniversary of his birthday,  January . The focus of the year-long celebrations was, however,  March, which was celebrated by drowning the country in national colours. National banners, the portraits of Peto˝fi, Kossuth, and Táncsics, and slogans presenting the MKP as their heir decorated every MKP party building in the country.21 The ideological ‘guidelines’ for the anniversary drafted by Révai were followed as planned, with the celebrations strongly tied to contemporary political developments. The ‘guidelines’ had already proposed a positive presentation of Russia, difficult considering the tsarist intervention of , and the propagating of friendly relations with the neighbours in the Danubian basin, which became even more necessary after the establishment of the Cominform. In his speech in Parliament on  March, Révai pointed to parallels between  and  in order to attack the West and praise the Soviet Union. Révai reminded his audience that in , Britain and France had declined to aid the Hungarian revolution. By currently disparaging ‘our democracy’, Révai argued, they were doing the same as when at the time ‘they showed the door to the revolutionary circles of Hungary that requested aid.’ The Holy Alliance between the emperors of Austria and Russia and the King of Prussia that had defeated the European revolutions of  now took the form of the ‘imperialist plutocracy’ of Great Britain and the United States. Though Russia had fought the Hungarian revolution, that had been tsarist Russia. Since , however, ‘the country of Lenin and Stalin had taken the place of the country of Tsar Nicholas’. Where a hundred years earlier Field Marshal Paskevich had allied with ‘our ancient enemy’ to beat down the Hungarian freedom struggle, the Red Army had ‘defeated our ancient enemy and returned our independence’ only three years ago.22 The friendship with the Soviet 20 22

See Iszák and Kun, Moszkvának jelentjük. Ger˝o, Államosított forradalom, –.

21

See p. .




Union was further brought forward by including  April in the centenary celebrations. In , the Soviet Union had presented Horthy Hungary with fifty captured Hungarian banners of the war of independence, a gift for which they received the imprisoned Rákosi in return. In  these had been looted by the retreating Wehrmacht, and so again fell into Soviet possession after the German surrender. These flags were now festively presented on  April as a gift to the Hungarian people.23 The suppression of the Romanian and Slovak minorities by Kossuth during the  revolution caused problems when stressing Hungary’s desire for friendly relations with neighbouring countries. Late on  March panic ensued at the Prime Minister’s office when the Czechoslovak delegation announced it was only prepared to lay wreaths at the Petőfi statue, and planned to boycott the ceremony at the Kossuth statue.24 In Parliament, Révai mourned the ‘tragic fratricidal struggle’ of – and said it was time to ‘openly acknowledge’ the mistakes of the past, now that this struggle had ended.25 The need for the People’s Democracies to draw together and to abandon the national road to communism became even more of a necessity due to the split between the Soviet and Yugoslav parties. After several months of tensions, the Soviet Union announced on  March the withdrawal of its civilian and military advisers from Yugoslavia.26 The ideological case against the Yugoslavs was now being prepared in Moscow. In a report drawn up on  March in the Foreign Affairs Department of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), the independent stance of the KPJ was utterly condemned. The KPJ was described as having an ‘incorrect, malevolent’ attitude towards the Soviet Union and VKP(b) as the ‘recognized leader of the anti-imperialist forces of the world.’ It had ‘ignored’ the Soviet Union as the ‘deciding force in the camp of Peace and Democracy’ and was guilty of ‘adventurism and aspiring to a leading role in the Balkans.’ Quotes by Tito, made before the First Conference of the Cominform, that it was not necessary for all countries to follow the path of the ‘great October revolution’ were presented as evidence of the deviationism of the Yugoslav party.27

23

XIX-A--J-. XIX-A--- [‘Március ’ protocole IV Váltózas Jelentés SŰRGŐS (15 March ‘protocol IV’ change report. URGENT,  Mar. ]. 25 26 Ger˝o, Államosított forradalom, –. Gibianskii ‘Soviet–Yugoslav Split’, . 27 Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. –. 24




In this particular document, the Yugoslavs were not yet specifically accused of ‘nationalism’. However, the Yugoslav party was not the only party to be criticized. It would not be enough merely to reprimand the Yugoslav communists, but a stern warning would have to be given to the other parties as well. For most of the other Central and Eastern European communist parties, long reports listing their ‘nationalist’ mistakes were drafted. In a second report, the ‘anti-Marxist mistakes’ of the Polish Workers’ Party (PPR) were analysed. Chief among the errors found were the ‘nationalist tendencies’ of the PPR, which revealed themselves in ‘unfriendly’ relations with the USSR. In line with the discussions at the first meeting of the Cominform, the leadership of the PPR was criticized for acting out of the fear of being seen as Soviet agents. Gottwald was quoted as noting that the ‘distrust’ between the PPR and the Polish people had not yet disappeared, largely due to ‘so-called problems of independence and Sovietization of Poland’. The result was that, according to the report, the PPR was guilty of ‘nationalism’ in theory and practice. Under ‘nationalism’ was also understood the insistence on parliamentary politics and an evolutionary road to Socialism, the ‘underestimation’ of the role of the Red Army in liberating Poland or lack of attention to the ‘successes of Socialist construction in the USSR’, and finally, the acting against Soviet interests, for which in the Polish case was cited ‘the dismissal of communist Soviet officers from the Polish armed forces’.28 Like the other parties, the Czechoslovaks were accused of advocating a ‘specific road to Socialism’ and harbouring ‘parliamentary illusions’. The Czechoslovak party was charged with ‘bourgeois-nationalist tendencies’, which did not so much refer to their attitude to the Soviet Union as to the way they treated the Hungarian minority and conducted relations with the MKP. The KSČ was accused of scorning Leninist-Stalinist principles for the sake of its national image, and of ‘adapting its position in the national question to the mood of the backward nationalist elements of the Czech population’.29 Regardless of censure of the ‘national’, parliamentary road to communism at the First Conference of Cominform, the communist parties had still been expected to promote themselves as national parties serving national interests. The same was true in the case of the Yugoslav–Soviet conflict: despite criticism of independent policies and lack of adequate interest in the USSR, the national communist parties were still required to use national symbols and images to promote themselves. This is best 28

Ibid. –.

29

Ibid. –.




illustrated by Korotkevich’s report on the MKP. Barely a week after Révai had been speaking on the importance of  before Parliament, Korotkevich compiled a report ‘On the nationalist errors of the leadership of the Hungarian communist party and the bourgeois influence in the Hungarian communist press’, which he forwarded to Mikhail Suslov, party ideologue and member of the VKP(b) Secretariat.30 Korotkevich started out by sketching the development of the party’s national policy, though he avoided mentioning its Soviet origins. Rising from illegality, the MKP had propagated its goals: a free, independent Hungary, or ‘struggle for the national interests of the Hungarian people’. Following liberation, the MKP ‘appeared before the Hungarian people as a Hungarian national party’, but the relationship with the Soviet Union made this difficult: ‘At the same time, the reactionaries operated in their propaganda with the slanderous accusation that the Hungarian communists are not a national party, but agents of Moscow. In response to this enemy agitation the Hungarian communists became even stronger in underlining the national character of their party.’ Korotkevich reported how Kossuth and Petőfi and other national heroes appeared more and more on MKP posters, how communist posters were usually presented in a national-coloured frame, and how the party badge now had a red, white, and green coloured banner rather than a red one. Korotkevich emphasized that all this was perfectly in order: ‘The leadership of the Hungarian Communist Party is absolutely correct, when it underlines that the Hungarian communists are the best fighters for an independent Hungary, for the national interests of the Hungarian people, and are the best in continuing the traditions of Kossuth, Petőfi, and other revolutionary democrats of the past.’ However, in their efforts to appear as a national party, the MKP leadership had not ‘infrequently moved away from the correct line and slipped into nationalist positions’. While Rákosi, Révai, and others underlined the necessity of friendship with the Soviet Union, they were silent about the historical mission of the Soviet state and the role of Stalin. In the ‘daily work’ of the party the leaders kept quiet about the USSR, ignored it, and had endeavoured to ‘ensure that the USSR would take the stand of a disinterested spectator’. The reason for this, Korotkevich repeated, was ‘probably their fear of the accusation that they are “agents of Moscow” ’. As examples of nationalist errors, Korotkevich again mentioned the attempts by the party leadership to lessen the burden of reparations and 30

Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. –.




the obstruction of the transfer of former German businesses. On one occasion, a Hungarian engineer who had informed Soviet authorities that his factory was once German property, and therefore should now fall into Soviet hands, was arrested by the Hungarian communist-controlled police. Rákosi and other leaders tolerated this kind of behaviour. Korotkevich also complained about certain ‘anti-Soviet’ publications. A book on the siege of Budapest, entitled Games of the Underground World, was criticized because ‘Red Army soldiers appear in the book as savages and rapists. This foul libel against the Soviet people was published with a laudatory preface.’ Korotkevich again criticized the Hungarian–Soviet Cultural Society which operated ‘weakly’, because it was not aided by the MKP’s Central Committee, and reproached the communist press: ‘In the central organ of the communist party, Szabad Nép, no material whatsoever focuses on life in the Soviet Union and of the Soviet people or on the VKP(b). The same also ought to be said about other newspapers, publications of the communist party.’ While Korotkevich concluded that ‘without a doubt’ the MKP party leadership was guilty of ‘nationalist errors’, it is clear that the use of national propaganda itself was not at issue. Korotkevich’s remarks follow the argument established in Szklarska Poreba and used against the Yugoslavs: what was meant by ‘nationalism’ was opposition to the Soviet Union. The MKP dealt with most of its right-wing opponents following the September  elections and turned to a new goal: the expulsion of the right-wing, Anglophile Social Democrats from the Social Democratic Party, and its unification with the communist party in a single, united mass labour party. That the Soviet party was not only unconcerned by the ‘national’ content of propaganda of the Hungarian party, but continued to stimulate it, can be seen from the discussion around the name of the new, unified party. The Politburo of the MKP had initially not been able to agree on a name. In his memoirs, Rákosi claimed the MKP leadership had submitted the dispute to Stalin for arbitration, who decided on the name of the party. In reality, Rákosi sent information on the dispute to Baranov at the Foreign Affairs Department, the new name of the International Department, of the Central Committee of the VKP(b). As Baranov forwarded the question to Suslov, the query may have reached Stalin via this route, and considering Stalin’s previous interest in the naming of Eastern European communist parties—for instance the PPR in —it is likely he did have the final word.




The choice the Hungarian Politburo presented at first had been between ‘Hungarian Worker and Peasant Party’ (Magyar Munkás és Paraszt Párt), favoured by Rákosi, and ‘Hungarian Workers’ Party’ (Magyar Munkás Párt).31 By  March, the latter was replaced by ‘Hungarian Socialist Party’ (Magyar Szocialista Párt), suggested by Ernő Gerő.32 According to Rákosi, Révai considered ‘Worker’ and Peasant Party’ not ‘Leninist’ enough, and Gerő thought it diluted the importance of the working class. The name ‘Socialist Party’, however, Rákosi pointed out, had been the name of the unified party in  and carried many bad memories in the country. In Moscow, Rákosi’s comments were received by Baranov, who forwarded his own remarks to Suslov, diplomatically rejecting all proposals. Baranov considered Rákosi’s suggestion unacceptable for the same reasons as Révai and Gerő: it did not show the ‘hegemony of the working class’. Baranov also rejected a reference to the peasantry without making any social distinction between poor peasants, middle peasants, and kulaks, against whom the new party was expected to unleash a class war. Baranov did not accept Gerő’s alternative either, also because it would be a reminder of , but not out of the concern held in  that it would frighten the population. Now that the peaceful road to Socialism had to be abandoned, scaring potential bourgeois allies was no longer important. According to Baranov, the name ‘Socialist Party’ was unacceptable because it would constantly remind the workers of the ‘treacherous’ and ‘compromising’ policy of the Social Democrats in . More convincingly, he argued that this name would be regarded as a compromise with the Social Democrats, and was too reminiscent of the Social Democratic parties of the West, which would endanger the national image of the party: ‘when almost every European Socialist Party betrays the interests of the working class of its country, this name cannot be popularized under the working masses of Hungary.’ Baranov insisted that the new name of the Hungarian Communist Party should reveal the national nature of the party. He wrote his report under the—false—impression that Gerő had advocated the name ‘Socialist Party’ without the national qualifier ‘Hungarian’. This, Baranov protested, ‘does not underline the national character of the party’. Once again a Soviet official showed himself concerned with the national credentials of the Hungarian Communist Party. Baranov himself preferred the option ‘Hungarian Workers’ Party’ (Vengerskaya Rabochaya Partiya) to the Magyar Munkás Párt mentioned in Rákosi’s earlier letter, 31

PIL ./, .

32

PIL ./, –.




as this would not only demonstrate the working-class nature of the party, but ‘also emphasizes the national character of the party’.33 In the end, Baranov’s proposal was accepted in slightly amended form. The new party would be called Magyar Dolgozók Pártja (Hungarian Working People’s Party, MDP), using the more general dolgozó instead of munkás, which, like the Russian rabochaya and German Arbeiter, refers specifically to the industrial working class. Dolgozó is broader, more like the Russian trudyashiesya, the German Werktätige, or the English ‘toiler’, and would therefore also encompass the social allies of the MDP, the poor peasantry and the ‘progressive intelligentsia’.34 Whether Stalin ultimately decided in person on the name of the MDP or not, it is important to note that the Soviet superiors of the MKP still considered it essential that the party present itself as a national one: this despite the conflict unfolding with the Yugoslav Communist Party and the accusations of ‘national errors’ levelled against the MKP leadership. The message was taken seriously. In the preparations for the programme of the new party, Révai told the Politburo on  April that it would have to occupy itself deeply with the question of why the MDP was a national party.35 On  March , the Yugoslav communists were informed of the charges against them. Rather than bending to Stalin’s will, the Yugoslav Politburo chose to defend itself.36 In May, two prominent pro-Soviet members of the KPJ were arrested, provoking Soviet demands for their release. The Yugoslav case would be dealt with at the Second Conference of the Cominform, held in Bucharest from  June . Prior to the conference, the lessons to be drawn from the Yugoslav case for each party were drafted by the Foreign Policy Department of the Central Committee of the VKP(b), based on the reports on the errors of each party drafted in March.37 In the lessons for the Hungarian party, the use of national symbols was not referred to this time, and the leadership even received some praise for its relationship with the USSR. It was lauded for considering Soviet advice and submitting regular reports on the political situation to the Central Committee of the VKP(b). It continued to be admonished for acting against Soviet interests on the reparations issue and the question of former German property. The lack of pro-Soviet propaganda was criticized, and 33 34 36 37

Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa, i. –. 35 PIL ./, . Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, i. . Gibianskii, ‘Soviet–Yugoslav Split’, . See Volokitina et al. (eds.), Sovetskiy faktor, –.




again this flaw was ascribed to the fear of the Hungarian communists of being depicted as ‘a Russian party’ or ‘agents of Moscow’.38 The Second Conference of the Cominform, held in Bucharest from  to  June , was entirely dedicated to the Yugoslav affair. The KPJ did not send any representatives. Zhdanov’s assessment of the errors of the Yugoslavs, delivered in his report, was similar to that prepared in the many documents of the previous months. He accused the KPJ of taking up ‘anti-Soviet’ positions, incompatible with Marxism-Leninism, which were ‘fitting only for nationalists’. The ideas of the KPJ leaders he held more appropriate to ‘petty bourgeois nationalists’ than Marxist-Leninists. This most of all concerned Yugoslavia’s opposition to Soviet interests. In Zhdanov’s view, Yugoslav concessions to the western powers originated in the ‘bourgeois nationalist’ thesis that the capitalist states presented less danger than the USSR to its independence. Zhdanov predicted that Yugoslavia would soon ‘degenerate into an ordinary bourgeois republic’, lose its independence, and become a ‘colony’ of the West. The parties present unanimously condemned the deviations of the KPJ and practised the required self-criticism, along the same lines of the documents that had been circulating since March. Rákosi announced that the MDP ‘could be endangered by Hungarian nationalism’ and stated, ‘we must tirelessly remind the Hungarian people of the services rendered by the Soviet Union in the creation of a People’s Democracy in Hungary’. The MDP would fight ‘all manifestations of bourgeois nationalism’ and try to eliminate ‘underestimation of the role of the Soviet Union’.39 The representatives of other parties expressed themselves in similar fashion. Berman, for the Polish party, mentioned that ‘basic petty-bourgeois nationalist sentiments’ were strong within the Polish Socialist Party (PPS) but had ‘also penetrated the Polish Communist Party’, and announced the convening of a party plenum where a political offensive against ‘opportunist and nationalist elements’ would be presented.40 Though these deliberations were not published at the time, the resolution that concluded the Second Conference of the Cominform was. It had been drafted by Zhdanov, and in it the Yugoslav party was publicly condemned for its errors, including ‘bourgeois-nationalism’.41 Following the establishment of the Cominform and the expulsion of the Yugoslav Communist Party, the parties of the People’s Democracies were 38 39

See Volokitina et al. (eds.), Sovetskiy faktor, –. 40 Procacci (ed.), Cominform, . Ibid. .

41

Ibid. .




expected to shelve their differences and unite against the common enemy. At the First Conference of the Cominform, the Czechoslovak and Hungarian communist parties were permitted to put their case. Although both sides formally declared their conviction that in the future an agreement could be reached, this was immediately followed by an acrimonious exchange of arguments. Slánsky defended the Czechoslovak demand for the resettlement of Hungarians and the deprivation of their citizenship with the contention that in ‘almost a thousand years of Hungarian rule’ the Slovak nation had been brought to the ‘brink of destruction’ through an unprecedented process of enforced Magyarization. In response, Révai pointed out that disputes between People’s Democracies could be ‘used by the Anglo-American imperialism to set these countries against each other’, and suggested out that the MKP was willing to ‘subordinate this matter in dispute in the interests of the common struggle of our peoples against imperialism’. This sounded conciliatory, but was in fact as much a demand to the Czechoslovak Communist Party, who were taking by far the harder line, to back down. In the rest of his speech he showed little sign of relenting. He flatly rejected Slánsky’s historical arguments, and blamed the Czechoslovak party for not conducting relations ‘in the spirit of internationalism’. In his draft of the speech he had been even harsher, accusing the ‘Czechoslovak comrades’ of ‘fanning hatred’ against the Hungarian minority in order to compete with Slovak nationalists. A trifle hypocritically he added: ‘We believe that a competition between communists and nationalists can only be won by the nationalists.’42 Révai concluded that the dispute had to be settled ‘as quickly as possible, in the interests of the common struggle against AngloAmerican imperialism’, and was prepared to understand it if ‘The Czechoslovak comrades are, for internal political reasons, not going to make a turn in their policy on this question all at once.’ Still, he demanded, ‘this turn has to be made.’ ‒  For years the Hungarian party had been forced to compromise on the Slovak Hungarian issue because the USSR favoured the Czechoslovak 42 Ibid. , n. . The English translation of the Russian here reads that a competition would only ‘benefit’ nationalists. The original Russian uses the rather stronger ‘to win’ (vyigrat’), as does a Hungarian copy of the text with handwritten corrections by Révai. PIL ./, –, –.




party. Now it was the latter’s turn to submit to Moscow’s will. Zhdanov told the conference: ‘Some comrades understood the dissolution of the Comintern as meaning the liquidation of all links, all contacts between fraternal communist parties’, and made it understood the Czechoslovak party would have to change its policy: ‘such disconnection between communist parties is incorrect, harmful, and essentially unnatural.’ But despite this Soviet disapproval, relations between the two parties remained tense. The MKP leadership hoped that the Prague coup of February , which brought the communist party into power, would lead to rapid improvements in the situation of the Hungarian minority, but this was not the case. On  April , for instance, the Foreign Committee of the MKP noted that since the coup ‘the situation of the Hungarian population [in Slovakia] has worsened’, and proposed to the Politburo that it demand an end to the population exchange.43 In July , it voiced its irritation about Czechoslovak obstruction in the delimitation of the Czechoslovak– Hungarian borders. Slovak Hungarians continued to complain to the party about the mistreatment of the Hungarian minority, and, despite the expulsion of the Yugoslavs, favourably compared the situation in Yugoslavia to that in Slovakia.44 On  July , the most conciliatory meeting to date took place between representatives of the MDP and the Czechoslovak Communist ˇ Party. Sirok´ y announced that, with the communists in power, it was now possible to solve the Hungarian question. From September, discrimination on grounds of nationality, forced labour, and forced migration would be ended, the Hungarian language would be permitted again, Hungarians could again become members of the communist party, and Hungarianlanguage schools and press could be set up. Révai, in turn, promised that the MDP would do ‘everything to help the KSČ overcome these difficulties’. He expected the Slovak party to ‘explain’ their measures to their own population; in exchange, the MDP would ‘combat Hungarian nationalism’ at home.45 Rákosi was greatly satisfied with the agreement, especially because it would enhance the national image of the party. He called it a ‘truly important victory’ and thought it would have ‘deep effect especially on those intellectual layers that, how shall I put it, perceive us as traitors or at least neutral in national issues, and these layers will now, through this question, see that Hungarian Democracy in every respect can defend the true interests of the Hungarians’.46 43 45

PIL ./, –. MOL ./, –.

44

MOL ./, –. 46 MOL ./, .




Formal improvements were indeed introduced, and with the possibility of regaining citizenship in October , one of the most grievous Hungarian complaints had been met. Yet all in all, the position of the Hungarians in Slovakia continued to be problematic, with Slovak Hungarian communists complaining to the MDP that changes were not actually implemented. According to an internal MDP report from October , the Slovak Communist Party was conducting an ‘antiHungarian campaign’. Despite formally permitting the use of the Hungarian language, traders in several towns had been instructed not to serve customers who spoke Hungarian. Široký was accused of passing an instruction to local parties to limit Hungarian education by only announcing the possibility several days before the beginning of the academic year. Hungarian youth organizations and Hungarian newspapers were to be established, but they would stand fully under Slovak control. No independent Hungarian organizations were to be permitted, and in any remaining deportations the intelligentsia was to be deported first.47 Though Révai had shown willingness to ‘understand’ the national policies of the Czechoslovak communist parties, Rákosi sent a long list of complaints to Gottwald in December . He deplored the lack of progress in education and availability of Hungarian literature, and was especially dissatisfied with the new citizenship law, which, he said, ‘took with one hand what it gave with the other’: though technically Hungarians had been granted Czechoslovak citizenship, this was still withheld from all Slovak Hungarians who had at one point been singled out for deportation, that is, , people.48 Later that month the population transfer came to an end, eliminating one source of friction, and Gottwald’s reply to Rákosi was at least written in Hungarian, a conciliatory gesture. Nevertheless he considered Rakosi’s letter ‘incorrect, or based on incomplete information’, and rejected his complaints about Hungarian-language education and the citizenship law.49 Despite these frictions, this level of contact had been unthinkable even a year earlier, and relations slowly improved, also due to the economic cooperation in Comecon, established in February . In April  Hungary finally signed a Treaty on Mutual Friendship and Cooperation with Czechoslovakia, the only People’s Democracy with which it had not yet concluded such an agreement. But still, the position of the Hungarian minority and the relationship with Hungary remained tenuous. In March 47 49

MOL ./, –. MOL ./, –.

48

MOL ./, –.




 the authorities permitted the distribution of only  copies of Hungarian communist newspapers Szabad Nép, Világosság, and Népszava in the whole of Slovakia. Slánsky did not consider the publication of Hungarian newspapers ‘timely’ yet. Hungarian papers, he complained, ‘educate the Hungarian people in Hungarian patriotism’, which would lead to ‘misunderstandings’. A Slovak Hungarian paper, Új Szó, would be used to ‘educate the Czechoslovak Hungarians in Czechoslovak patriotism’, and Hungarian newspapers could ‘perhaps’ appear in a couple of years’ time.50 ‒  The relationship between Hungary and Romania, between the PCR and the MKP, had been relatively friendly. Despite abuses, Romania treated its Hungarian minority better than the Slovaks did. The major outstanding cause of tension in the immediate post-war years, the border issue, had been resolved in favour of Romania and was off the agenda. Not surprisingly, Romania was one of the first countries with which Hungary signed a Treaty of Mutual Friendship and Cooperation following the establishment of the Cominform. In spite of such a formal milestone, the relationship deteriorated markedly. As in Czechoslovakia, one of the key causes of friction was whether the Hungarian minority would be permitted an orientation on Budapest. The first sign that the Cominform had not brought overnight improvements was a report from October  on statements by the leaders of the Hungarian section of the PCR, Vasile Luca and József Bogdán. Luca and Bogdán attacked the MKP’s interest in the Hungarian minority in Romania, mainly because they feared that the MKP could form an alternative source of authority to the PCR. Because the MKP maintained relationships with Transylvanian communists, Luca complained, ‘a part of the Romanian Hungarian communists expects instructions from Budapest and not from Bucharest’. The report found that these opinions were ‘so mechanically repeated by individual comrades that it is not possible to free oneself from the notion that this is the general opinion in the highest circles of the Romanian party’. As was the case in Czechoslovakia, Hungarian communist literature, even books by Révai and Rákosi, was not permitted to be spread in Romania. Relations, the report concluded, were ‘quite 50

MOL ./, –.




bad’, and ‘even Comrade Luca agrees that a truly serious meeting is necessary between the two parties’.51 This report sets the tone for Hungarian–Romanian relations until the early s. Almost exactly a year later, in October , negotiations took place on a Romanian–Hungarian Cultural Agreement, where the main obstacle was the level of contact permitted between the Hungarian minority and Budapest. While the Hungarians had proposed a complete reappraisal of Romanian–Hungarian relations, the Romanians were only prepared to discuss a small exchange programme of individuals. While the MDP representatives requested that independent contacts between mass organizations such as trade unions should be permitted, the RCP insisted all contacts should be handled through the Foreign Ministry. The Hungarian representative, Nógrádi, described the Romanian proposals as ‘bunkum’. The Romanian stance on literature proved the greatest obstacle to an agreement. According to Nógrádi, Szabad Nép was barely available in Transylvania, copies ran out between one and two hours after sales began, and assurances by the RCP that as many copies as necessary were ordered therefore did ‘not correspond to the truth’. Nógrádi noted a Romanian tendency to ‘shut off the Transylvanian Hungarians from Hungary’s cultural influence’, and complained that party officials at the ministry spoke of ‘Hungarian-speaking Romanians’ rather than ‘Transylvanian Hungarians’.52 The MDP wanted to provide both ‘classical’ and ‘presentday’ Marxist literature, and demanded the ‘widespread diffusion’ of newspapers and magazines. The Romanians, by contrast, wanted both countries to consult with each other on the titles of the works to be disseminated, and agree beforehand on the number of copies, thus ensuring control of the amount of Hungarian literature entering the country.’53 During the coalition years, Romania had been commended for permitting the functioning of an organization of Transylvanian Hungarians, the Hungarian People’s Alliance (MNSz). The organization was now purged, the leadership replaced by pliable men loyal to the PCR, and used to cut the relationship with Budapest and forge allegiance to Bucharest. The Hungarian ambassador to Romania, Jenő Széll, was invited to the Fourth Conference of the MNSz, held in Cluj on  and  December . Although he was festively welcomed at the train station, from then on things went downhill. He was greeted at the opening session of the conference as ‘a foreign diplomat’—a warning for what was to follow: ‘During the further course of the congress they completely succeeded in ignoring 51

PIL ./, .

52

MOL ./, –.

53

Ibid.




me: I was present at every cultural event, where the ministers attending were greeted individually by name, myself, however, they consistently forgot.’ Not only was Széll ignored, so was the People’s Democracy of Hungary. While images of Petőfi, Attila József, and Ady decorated the chamber, there were no references to present-day Hungary. The congress established a honorary presidency, consisting of prominent international communists such as Mao Zedong, Dolores Ibárruri, and Eugene Cotton. ‘It was conspicuous, at least it was conspicuous to me, that specifically Mátyás Rákosi was not mentioned’, reported Széll.54 At the conference, Vasile Luca defended the official policy of not permitting Hungarian communist literature into the country. He declared that he was not opposed to the Hungarians in Romania ‘getting to know the new Hungary’ but added: ‘we cannot allow that the Hungarian reaction under this veil smuggles into our country the old Hungary, the literature of the Hungarian reaction.’ Széll considered Luca’s speech a ‘hideous attack on us’. Besides blocking cultural contacts, literature, and newspapers, Romania also distanced itself from Hungary by closing the borders. There was as yet no visa arrangement between Hungary and Romania, and only a very limited amount of local cross border traffic was permitted. The Romanians were adamant to keep the border closed both ways, to keep contacts between Hungary and Romania to a minimum, which was obviously directed against the Hungarian minority. According to a Hungarian report, Romanian Minister of the Interior Gheorghescu ‘most decisively opposes social-type passenger (personal) traffic’ between Hungary and Romania. The Romanian government wanted to ensure full control over the border: it proposed that along the entire border a -metre strip should be raked up, and beyond that there should be a -metre zone containing no high plant growth. The ideological justification for this demand was insulting to the MDP: Romania was the ‘forward bastion’ of the USSR, and therefore needed to secure its border with great care. This, a Hungarian report noted bitterly, was ‘not in accordance with the relationship between two People’s Democracies’.55 According to a second report of  December , the Romanians wanted to punish illegal border crossings ‘with draconian measures’ and their attitude had ‘on several occasions given rise to armed Romanian border violations’.56 Following these reports, Rákosi reproached Gheorghiu-Dej in January  for Luca’s speech, and complained about the lack of mention in the 54 56

MOL ./, –. MOL ./, –.

55

MOL ./, –.




resolution of the MNSz Congress of the ‘Hungarian People’s Democracy’, and the absence of ‘Hungarian communist leaders’ from the honorary presidency. All these, according to Rákosi, were ‘smaller or larger manifestations of the tendency that we have experienced of Romania isolating itself from Hungary’. Rákosi further reproached Dej for the lack of availability of Hungarian literature and newspapers in Romania.57 Dej replied that Rákosi’s letter contained ‘serious political errors’ and was based on ‘incorrect information’, which could only be corrected by meeting in person, on  and  February.58 At this meeting Dej repeated his accusations, and the Hungarians defended themselves. Despite the accusations and counter-accusations, according to the Hungarian report of the meeting, the Romanian communists agreed to promote Hungarian ‘Marxist and progressive’ literary press products.59 Relations seemed to improve shortly afterward. Though at the Bucharest May Day procession of May  there were ‘truly few’ slogans referring to the other People’s Democracies, at least a -metre tall portrait of Rákosi was now carried along in the parade.60 Népszava editor Zoltán Horváth perceived a ‘decisive change’ in the RCP’s treatment of the Hungarian minority, and cited as a positive example the publication of a Hungarian-language newspaper in a print run of , copies. In actual fact, the Romanian party continued to isolate the Hungarians from Budapest. Horváth also noted that the new Hungarian papers were translations of Romanian newspapers, and that there was ‘no material referring to Hungary in them’ at all. The difference was that the MDP was now more understanding of the Romanian position. Horváth at least judged that the Romanians wanted to ensure that ‘Romanian Hungarians will turn to Bucharest’ rather than Budapest, a goal which Horváth regarded as ‘understandable and correct’. The replacement of Ambassador Széll, who was frequently sceptical of the Romanians, by the more doctrinary Kiáltó, underlines the changing Hungarian attitude, yet even Kiáltó expressed concern about the fate of the Transylvanian Hungarians. During a visit to Transylvania in September , he was mobbed by Hungarians, who ‘stroked’ the Hungarian national flag on the embassy car and asked him when it would be possible to travel to Hungary again. Kiáltó was embarrassed by what he dubbed ‘chauvinism’, but all the same

57 59

MOL ./, –. MOL ./, –.

60

58 MOL ./, . MOL ./ , –.




concluded that the situation of the Transylvanian Hungarians was not ‘very rosy’.61 * * * After the establishment of the Cominform in September , relations between the People’s Democracies did not immediately improve, but on the contrary worsened. This was not despite the new line, but because of it. Each party now warned the other that its attitude displayed signs of nationalism—Révai warned the Czechs against being ‘bourgeois nationalist’, and Vasile Luca criticized the MKP for ‘making concessions to the nationalist, chauvinist tendency’. Proletarian internationalism did not mean solidarity with the other People’s Democracies, but in the first place with the Soviet Union. To Širok y´ for instance, it was unimportant that both Hungary and Czechoslovakia were building Socialism. As each country approached questions such as collectivization differently, he argued, the Hungarian minority would only become ‘confused’ if it was permitted to read the Hungarian press.62 The Romanian party justified its isolationism by claiming that contacts with the People’s Democracies distracted from its relationship with the USSR.63 After , the MDP’s support for the Hungarian minorities in Czechoslovakia and Romania waned, though the treatment of the minorities was still dutifully reported by embassies abroad. This, however, did not mean a complete end to the ‘national policy’. First, though the MDP took a weaker stance, the Czechoslovak and, especially, Romanian communist parties continued to take a tough line against the Hungarian minorities in their countries. The continuity with their national policies was seamless; what had changed was that they were now conducted, paradoxically, under the banner of combating ‘nationalism’. Secondly, the relationship with the neighbours had been the weakest spot in the MKP’s national policy since . The MDP’s use of nationalism, however, continued unabated. The party still presented itself as the defender of the interests of the Hungarian people and the heir to national traditions, albeit now with a much stronger Socialist, even Soviet content. 61 63

MOL ./, –. MOL ./, –.

62

MOL ./, –.



Socialist Patriotism (–) During the coalition period, the MKP had rarely used the term ‘nationalism’, preferring instead the word ‘chauvinism’ to define forms of patriotism it disagreed with. Now, the designations ‘nationalist’ and ‘bourgeois nationalist’ became potentially lethal labels to attach to political opponents and scapegoats. Nevertheless, with Soviet consent and encouragement, the MDP continued its national propaganda. As in the coalition period, it put itself forward as the heir to Hungarian national traditions, and as a party that represented Hungarian national interests. Enemies, real or fictitious, were depicted as unpatriotic, anti-Hungarian turncoats, in the service of foreign paymasters, usually connected to the American secret service. Between  and , the MKP had used war crimes trials and the show trials against the Smallholders to label its opponents as traitors and itself as a guardian of national interests. After , the same trend continued in the major Stalinist show trials, notably those against József Mindszenty and László Rajk.   :    The change in line following the establishment of the Cominform and the expulsion of the Yugoslavs was not limited to affirmations of loyalty to the Soviet Union; the communist parties were now expected to pursue more radical policies across the board. With the abandoning of the national road to Socialism, and the decreasing need of appeasing hostile sections of the population, the way was now open for Soviet-style collectivization of agriculture. The MDP had also been accused of ignoring ‘class differentiation’ among the peasantry, and was now prompted to start a class struggle against the relatively well-to-do peasants, branded with the Russian word ‘kulak’.1 Another result of the changed line was the assault on the church and its leader in Hungary, the fiercely anti-communist Primate of Esztergom, 1

Volokitina et al. (eds.), Sovetskiy Faktor, –.



Socialist Patriotism

Jósef Minoszenty. Prior to the employment of the euphemistically dubbed ‘administrative measures’ against Mindszenty, a propaganda campaign was organized against him. As in previous trials, conscious national propaganda played a key role, and the Church was to be accused of being antiHungarian. At the meeting of the Propaganda and Agitation Committee of the MDP on  November , Révai proposed to ‘utilize every manifestation in Hungarian history from which appears the pro-German and reactionary nature of the Church’. This would now be linked to the Cold War: as the Church was currently pro-American rather than pro-German, party propaganda would have to ‘point out the anti-national nature’ of the pro-American orientation of the Church. Of course, there was little in Hungarian history that could be used to achieve this, Révai admitted. The way around it was to ‘prove that being pro-German and pro-American is one and the same thing’.2 Mindszenty would be shown to be an enemy of the Hungarian people by presenting him as a warmonger, a saboteur, and the ‘agent of foreign adversaries’, and, like the ‘conspirators against the republic of ’, he would be accused of planning the reversal of the land reform and other social changes achieved since .3 The goals and methods to be used against the Church were drawn up on  November  in a document entitled ‘the struggle against the clerical reaction’, which was discussed and accepted with some revisions in the meeting of the party’s Propaganda Committee the next day. One of the main tasks of the party was ‘to unmask Mindszenty’s treacherous imperialist connections, anti-land reform, anti-harvest, pro-war politics’. The plan was conceived to set up a movement of opponents of Mindszenty from the Catholic clergy, who were expected to protest against the ‘reactionary policies of the Church’, and to object that the Church did not ‘represent the interests of the Hungarian people but those of American imperialism and warmongers’.4 The campaign against Mindszenty was, therefore, national in content. The MDP accused Mindszenty of selling Hungary to foreign foes, and of betraying the interests of the Hungarian people, by plotting war and the reversal of the land reform. That these key themes were put into practice can be seen in the MDP Propaganda Department’s work schedule for  December  to  March , which again demanded the ‘unmasking of Mindszenty and his supporters as warmongers, enemies of the people and the land reform, and agents of foreign imperialists’.5 2 5

MOL ./, –. MOL ./, –.

3

Ibid.

4

MOL ./, –.




Mindszenty was arrested on  December , and on  December formally charged with treason, espionage, crimes directed at the subversion of the republic, and the ‘traffic in foreign currency’.6 Beaten and possibly drugged, Mindszenty finally confessed to the charges brought against him.7 Rákosi, however, almost exploded with dissatisfaction at the first draft of the report of Mindszenty’s interrogation, which, he noted, ‘glorifies the work of Mindszenty’, and in places was ‘a very successful Fascist propaganda document’8 and ‘the work of people who have absolutely no inkling of politics, not the faintest clue of state security’. Rákosi then personally interfered with the text of Mindszenty’s confession to ensure that this would reflect the planned propaganda campaign. From Rákosi’s detailed intervention, his desire that the right political message would come across, it is again clear that the attack against Mindszenty was consciously national in nature. During the war, the Holy Crown of St Stephen had been looted by retreating Germans and was then captured by the Americans, who refused to hand it back to Hungary. Rákosi wanted Mindszenty to admit that he had desired to prevent the return of the Crown to ‘democratic Hungary’. Mindszenty was to confess to his master plan: the establishment of a ‘Federal Central European Kingdom’ comprised of Hungary, Austria and Bavaria, with Otto von Habsburg as its king, in which Mindszenty would play ‘first fiddle’ after having placed the Crown of St Stephen on Otto von Habsburg’s head. As if this was not treasonous enough, Mindszenty was ‘in every respect . . . at the disposal of the Americans’, as only with their aid could the Hungarian Republic be destroyed. Besides such traditional treason against the state, it had to be established that Mindszenty’s actions were directed against the Hungarian people. To this end, Rákosi required Mindszenty’s admission that he planned to turn Hungary into a war zone: ‘In this respect he should say as well that the prerequisite of all their plans was that Hungarian Democracy would suffer a defeat in an approaching Third World War and that the country once again would be turned into a battlefield.’ Rákosi placed special emphasis on the accusation of spying. He wanted the record to mention that Mindszenty organized ‘monumental espionage’ in preparation for his plot, and as evidence the court was to produce Mindszenty’s correspondence with German bishops: ‘On page  and elsewhere, the word “espionage” has to be used. Here he himself points out that it was clear to him that his reports and supplying of information 6 7 8

Gergely, Mindszenty per, . See Mindszenty, Emlékirataim; Kahler, Főcsapás; and Kiszely, ÁVH, –. MOL ./, –.




[to the bishops] in essence constituted wide-ranging espionage, and the spying did not just serve the hastening the outbreak of the Third World War, but was also a service to the Americans for dollars and their support . . . Let him mention that he endeavoured to report exaggerated, false news in his reports, because he hoped this would speed up foreign interference.’9 The trial of Mindszenty took place between  and  February . In the indictment, the prosecutor’s speech, and the cross-examination the political line designed by the Propaganda Committee and inserted into the confession through Rákosi’s personal intervention was put forward. The prosecutor outlined Mindszenty’s foreign connections and espionage for the United States, and used the alleged connection with Otto von Habsburg to brand Mindszenty a traitor. He announced that to the ‘Hungarian person that loves his Fatherland’ there could ‘hardly be a more hated name than that of Habsburg’. Bethlen, Rákóczi, Kossuth, and Ady, he claimed, had all ‘passionately hated’ Habsburg rule, and ‘Mindszenty wanted to seat a successor of the Habsburgs on the neck of the Hungarian people, to have the national independence attained after so much suffering stolen away once again.’ The prosecutor placed special emphasis on the Crown of St Stephen, and asserted that Mindszenty ‘wanted to deprive our state of this relic’ so that he himself could crown Otto von Habsburg with it.10 Mindszenty was sentenced to life imprisonment. Mindszenty’s trial was thoroughly national in content. Accusations such as the plan to reverse the land reform and reinstate capitalism not only had a social meaning, but in the sense that they were directed ‘against the interests of the Hungarian people’ a national one as well. As in the war crimes trials and the trial against the conspirators, charges of betrayal and espionage served to undermine the national credentials of political enemies of the communist party. The plans of the Propaganda Department and Rákosi’s personal involvement in amending Mindszenty’s confession are evidence of the conscious intent behind this national propaganda. From the Rajk trial, the Soviet involvement in the party’s propaganda becomes apparent. The condemning of ‘nationalism’ and ‘bourgeois nationalists’ had an unexpected result: it was believed in the West. Following the Second Conference of the Cominform in June , articles appeared in the west9 10

MOL ./, –. Mindszenty József a Népbíróság előtt, –.




ern press speculating on conflicts within the MDP, in which László Rajk, János Kádár, and István Kossa were considered ‘national communists’ similar to Tito, who desired to represent Hungarian national interests, as opposed to the ‘Muscovite’ quislings Rákosi, Gerő, and Farkas. According to Zoltán Vas, Farkas took these reports seriously and presented his opinion to Rákosi and Gerő that all three were ‘nationalist deviationists’ of the Yugoslav variety.11 There were certainly tensions between ‘home’ communists and ‘Muscovites’. Rezső Szántó noted in  that the ‘home communists’ quickly complained ‘that they are not in on things’, that there were signs that ‘the home communists’ were ‘coming together’, and that Rajk was playing a role in this.12 But there is no conclusive evidence of fundamental political disagreements, let alone any based on national sentiments: as argued in Chapter , the ‘home’ leaders had, if anything, been cautious about adopting the ‘national line’, preferring instead the safety of an orthodox line. Left-wing Social Democrat Pál Justus later claimed he was the last person to see Rajk alive in prison; Rajk had apparently told Justus that he disagreed on some points with Rákosi, had not believed Tito was a traitor, and had wanted to call a special party conference to discuss the Yugoslav affair, so that the MDP could offer services as a mediator between the Soviet Union and the Yugoslav Communist Party.13 There is, however, no indication that Rajk had ever seriously attempted to oppose Rákosi on the Yugoslav issue. Vladimir Farkas, Mihály Farkas’s son, and a notoriously sadistic secret police interrogator, considered Justus’s reflections untrue.14 According to Zoltán Vas, neither Rajk nor Kádárn or Kossa would have dreamt of lifting a finger against Rákosi, and they did not hold diverging opinions on basic issues.15 Even Rákosi wrote in his memoirs: ‘Rajk did not have a separate line.’16 Rákosi did, however, admit that there was deep-seated strife between the two groups, when he noted: ‘there was a smouldering dissatisfaction between those from Moscow, as they said, between the Muscovites and the home communists.’17 Though the ‘home’ communists did not form an ideological opposition to the top MDP leadership and the dominance of the Soviet Union, their resentment and discontent with their own lack of power made them Vas, Betiltott könyvem, . See also Shawcross, Crime and Compromise, . PIL /, –. 13 ‘Utolsó őszinte beszélgetés Rajk Lászlóval’, Szabad Nép,  Oct. . Published in Paizs, A Rajk per, –. 14 Farkas, Nincs mentség, . 15 Vas, Betiltott könyvem, . 16 Pünkösdi, Rákosi. A csúcson, . 17 Ibid. 11 12




a potential threat to the established Muscovites. Vladimir Farkas thought that even without the Tito–Stalin case, eventually a sharp power struggle would have broken out between Rajk and the Muscovites.18 The personal aspirations of ambitious ‘home’ party leaders such as Rajk and Kádár meant that they frequently clashed with Muscovites, who drew all power to themselves. Rajk, as Minister of the Interior, often quarrelled on issues of competence with the head of the ÁVO, Gábor Péter, and Mihály Farkas, responsible within the party for state security. Both grew to hate and resent Rajk. Gábor Péter had already reported Rajk’s ‘anti-party’ behaviour in , as yet without result, but following the accusations of ‘national deviationism’ in, ironically, the western press, Rajk and Kádár were both soon demoted. Rajk was unexpectedly appointed Foreign Minister in the autumn of , a function which left him without significant power, and Kádár was moved from leading the Budapest party organization to the Ministry of the Interior, an equally ceremonial function now that the ÁVO had been placed under direct control of Gábor Péter under its new name, the State Defence Authority (Államvédelmi Hatóság, ÁVH). From the summer of  outside pressure on the party leadership for a purge increased. In September , Gomulka was accused of nationalist deviationism and replaced as secretary-general of the Polish Workers’ Party; in December  he was ejected from the Politburo, and in January  from the government. In September  Rákosi was told in Moscow that the MDP was not paying enough attention to the ‘Trotskyites’ in the party, and to his anger, and no doubt grave concern, Rákosi found out that the ÁVH had been passing on information concerning possible Trotskyites directly to the Soviet foreign security service, the MGB, without consulting him first.19 The Soviet ambassador to Hungary, Pushkin, further strongly criticized Rákosi for his lack of vigilance towards Trotskyites.20 It is clear that Soviet pressure prompted the search for enemies within the party, but it is not certain when the idea of holding a Hungarian show trial was first conceived, or when and by whom Rajk was selected to be the main suspect. In any case, by May , when the first arrests began, the basic goal of the trial was established: it was not only to be an indictment of the ‘western imperialists’, but also of the ‘traitor’ Tito, who would be depicted as an agent of the West. The connection with the western 18 20

19 Farkas, Nincs mentség, . Pünkösdi, Rákosi. A csúcson, . Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa ii. –.




intelligence agencies was provided by the arrest and kidnapping in Prague on  May  of Noel Field, an American fellow-traveller accused of spying for the Office of Strategic Services. Beaten by ÁVH interrogators, the journalist Sándor Cseresznyés, an assistant of Rajk, confessed to having spied for Yugoslavia, but it was Tibor Szőnyi, head of the Cadre Department, who finally implicated Rajk. Whether Rajk had been selected by the Hungarians or the Russians is not completely certain. It is possible Rákosi himself jumped into action and singled out Rajk, before Soviet leaders made up their own mind about a useful scapegoat. There is no reason to suppose Moscow would unswervingly prop up Rákosi, and the failure to find Trotskyites could easily lead to the condemnation of the present party leadership. Another motive for Rákosi could have been to rid him of a popular leader who plausibly could pose a threat in the future. It is also likely, however, that Moscow selected Rajk because he fitted the ideological case the best: that of a national deviationist stooge of Tito and the West. Hungarian historians are still in disagreement whether the initiative lay in Budapest or Moscow. Szőnyi was personally interrogated by Gábor Péter and Mihály Farkas, who asked him leading questions on Rajk’s role as master spy. On  April, Farkas met Lieutenant-General Fyodor Belkin, head of the MGB in Central Europe, in Prague where, in Tibor Hajdu’s opinion, Farkas informed Belkin of the confession and received permission to arrest Rajk.21 But according to László Varga, Rákosi had already received evidence from Moscow against Rajk prior to this meeting, in which case Rajk’s fate had been sealed in Moscow.22 In any case, it is clear that Soviet consent was necessary for the arrest, and the very same day, Rákosi, Gerő, and Farkas decided in favour of detaining Rajk, which occurred on  May. According to Soviet Ambassador Pushkin, the ÁVH was ‘inexperienced, young, makes many mistakes, but most importantly—it is loyal to the Soviet Union’.23 Its inexperience showed in the initial investigation. The Hungarian expression for show trial is koncepciós per, or ‘concept trial’. Though the ÁVH managed to produce confessions of espionage and treason, they were incapable of swiftly constructing the required koncepció, the stage-managed ‘concept’ of conspiracy and deceit on which the trial would be based. Rákosi wrote to Stalin for help, and received in 21 23

22 Varga, Kádár János, –. Hajdu, ‘Rajk per’, . Volokitina et al. (eds.), Vostochnaya Evropa ii. –.




response ‘a lieutenant-general with a staff’, namely, Fyodor Belkin.24 According to Gyula Decsi, one of Rajk’s interrogators, ‘Belkin arrived for the clarification of the case and to help to disentangle this scrambled, complicated case.’25 The MGB specialists immediately took control of the investigation, and left the Hungarian ÁVH staff the task of translating at the interrogations. The Soviet presence was crucial: according to Gábor Péter, Rajk only started confessing to the crimes of espionage and treason after the Russians arrived. ‘On Mihály Farkas’s instruction they beat him one night. They told him, confess that you are an American spy. Rajk did not confess. Three or four days after the arrival of Belkin this changed. Then these coarse things started to come out.’26 Immediately after his arrival, Belkin called a meeting of all the key interrogators on the Rajk case, and produced a summary of the confessions which, according to interrogator Gyula Decsi, was at this stage not yet ‘worked out to such global political levels’.27 Belkin added new crimes to the list of accusations against Rajk, and only now did the grand scheme of international intrigue and espionage start to be formed. This did not mean that he was solely responsible for the emerging koncepció: Belkin himself claimed that Rákosi had presented him with a list of charges that he wanted Rajk to confess to, one of them being a plot to murder Rákosi, Gerő, and Farkas,28 and Farkas had probably added the claim that Rajk had been preparing a military coup to tear Hungary away from the ‘Peace Camp’.29 According to Belkin, Rákosi had been argumentative, had ‘always wanted more and more’, telling Belkin ‘you do not know the circumstances over here’ whenever he disagreed.30 In the end, neither Belkin nor Rákosi had the final word on the content of the indictment, the confessions, and the verdict; that was Stalin’s prerogative. Out of the nine times that Rákosi met Stalin between  and , on five occasions the ‘enemy within the Party’ was discussed, and the Rajk affair was treated twice.31 On  July  Rákosi flew to Moscow for talks, and on  August sent the indictment to Stalin. According to Rákosi, Stalin personally corrected the indictment and discussed the changes with him.32 25 Pünkösdi, Rákosi. A csúcson, . MOL ./, –. MOL ./, –. One of the other interrogators on the Rajk case was questioned on the affair. From his testimony it also appears that Rajk did not confess until after Belkin’s arrival. MOL ./, –. 27 28 MOL ./, –. Pünkösdi, Rákosi. A csúcson, . 29 30 Hajdu, Rajk per, . Pünkösdi, Rákosi. A csúcson, . 31 32 Varga, Kádár Jánòs, . Rákosi, Visszaemlékezések, ii. . 24 26




   ‘ ’ The main goals of the Rajk trial were to provide a condemnation of American ‘imperialism’ and, especially, the Yugoslav communists, and a pretext for a purge of the party of ‘nationalists’ and other deviationists. Within the party itself, the absolute need for ideological conformity and loyalty towards the Soviet Union was presented as the main consequence of the discovery of the ‘spy gang’, and propaganda was chiefly communist in content. To the county, Budapest, and factory party secretaries, Farkas emphasized Rajk’s hatred of workers, and claimed that there was ‘not one worker, not one working peasant man’ among the members of the ‘spy band’. The conspirators were an ‘imperialist fifth column’ within the party, and Rajk an ‘anti-Soviet, Trotskyite gangster, the head of the American secret service in Hungary’. The use of the term ‘Trotskyite’ especially shows the stronger communist content of the Rajk affair compared to the Mindszenty case: outside the party a meaningless phrase, within the party it signified the blackest treason. Besides ‘Trotskyism’ Farkas listed ‘nationalism’ and ‘an anti-Soviet attitude’ as the political crimes of the conspirators. Farkas demanded a struggle against ‘all deviations’ from the party line and pronounced ‘Marxism-Leninism’ as the party’s chief weapon against spies. The ‘spirit of international solidarity’ was to be kept alive and ‘nationalism and chauvinism’ to be expunged from the ranks of the party. Farkas further called for the ‘strengthening and development of burning hatred in hundreds of thousands of communists and our people against the imperialist warmongers and the Trotskyites and Titoists’. Hatred of the enemy was offset by love for the Soviet Union: ‘we have to keep alive and strengthen in our party and people the unparalleled love and loyalty towards our teacher, Comrade Stalin . . . He, comrades, who wavers a millimetre, a tenth of a millimetre from the Soviet Union, or Comrade Stalin, ceases to be a communist.’33 The emphasis on the working class, proletarian internationalism, the Soviet Union, and Stalin, and the denunciation of Trotskyism and nationalism, made the case against Rajk Socialist in nature, but this did not mean it lacked national content. Even before this party audience, Farkas denounced Rajk as the ‘agent of a foreign power’. The definition of nationalism employed by Farkas was very limited: anything that was anti-Soviet 33

MOL ./, –.




was nationalist. Rákosi also noted that ‘coarse chauvinism is usually supplemented with hostility towards the Soviet Union (Szovjetellenesség)’.34 The Central Committee draft resolution of  June likewise called for ‘consistent and tenacious struggle’ against ‘every deviation’ and ‘any manifestation of nationalism’, and by ‘nationalism’ mainly understood an antiSoviet position.35 The national element was provided by equating support for the USSR with patriotism, and opposition to the Soviet Union with treason, or, as Farkas put it: ‘He who is anti-Soviet, is also antiHungarian.’ Outside the party, the propaganda was less hysterically pro-Soviet. As was the case in the trials of the ‘conspirators’ and Mindszenty, charges of undermining the republic and nullifying the achievements of ‘Hungarian Democracy’ were combined with accusations of espionage. On the day the trial began,  September , the party Agitation and Propaganda College, a new centralized committee that coordinated the work of the Propaganda Department led by József Révai, set as one of the main goals of the campaign to prove that ‘what Rajk, Tito and the others do on American orders essentially is aimed at re-establishing the old order’.36 The Propaganda College consciously intended to exploit national sentiments in order to discredit Tito. For this meeting of the College a memorandum was prepared entitled ‘Note on the press and radio propaganda of the case of the spy gang’ on which Révai had written in the margin ‘Against Titoism: put the national cause.’37 At the meeting itself, the College decided: ‘We have to show that the murder attempt that they organized against the party and its leaders was directed against the entire Hungarian people. So their punishment is a national cause, the cause of the people.’38 A proposal on ‘Propaganda related to the trial of the spy gang’ accepted by the MDP’s Secretariat on  September listed several main viewpoints. First of all, the international importance of the ‘unmasking of the spy gang’ was to be underlined. Not only had the ‘most important centre of the imperialists in the People’s Democracies’ been destroyed, but ‘conclusive evidence’ had been presented that ‘unmasked Tito and his gang as the shock troops of imperialism’. A second key point was national in content: ‘Rajk and his gang, as the agents of the imperialists, wanted to reinstate the capitalist system and betray our national freedom and independence.’ The instructions of the Party College were followed by describing ‘Rajk 34 36 38

MOL ./, –. MOL ./, –. MOL ./, –.

35

MOL ./, –. MOL ./, –.

37




and his gang’ as ‘the enemies of the working people’, because they had plotted to assassinate Rákosi, Gerő, and Farkas. Not only was the propaganda concerning the Rajk trial given a national content, its goal was to incite the population into a patriotic frenzy: ‘The material of the trial has to be utilized in decisive measures for the awakening and intensification of patriotic hatred of the imperialists and their spies in the widest masses of the people.’39 This proposal also put forward the necessity of popularizing the Soviet Union as the guardian of Hungary’s independence. The ‘spy gang’ was to be presented as the ‘deadly enemy’ of the Soviet Union, because it knew the USSR was the strongest supporter of the ‘People’s Democratic Orders progressing towards Socialism’, the defender of Hungary’s independence and ‘the main safeguard that our people will not be handed over to the imperialists’.40

  The proceedings against Rajk started on  September . The formal indictment brought against him was reminiscent of the accusations in all major post-war trials: Rajk was charged with ‘leading an organization for the downfall of the democratic order’, ironically under the same ‘executioner’s law’ that he himself had used to break up the Smallholder Party.41 At the trial, Rajk confessed to having been a police spy as a student, a provocateur during the Spanish Civil War, and a spy for the French Deuxième Bureau, the Gestapo, and the American Office of Strategic Services (OSS). He was supposed to have become an agent for the Yugoslavs in , and had met the Yugoslav Minister of the Interior Ranković on three occasions to discuss the liquidation of ‘Hungarian Democracy’. Through Rajk Tito was put on trial: his master plan had been to organize a coup d’état in Hungary, murder Rákosi, Gerő, and Farkas, and tear Hungary away from the ‘Peace Camp’. That the trial was a propaganda set-piece, designed with the sole purpose of getting across a political message, becomes clear from the prosecutor’s summing up. This speech reads like a summary of the discussions in the party Propaganda College, and in places it almost literally follows the proposals that had been made earlier by the College and the MDP’s Secretariat. The key elements of party propaganda demanded by the 39

MOL ./, –.

40

Ibid.

41

László Rajk und Komplicen, –.




College were all present in the speech. The prosecutor, for instance, underlined that Rajk had planned the restoration of capitalism and the return of the great landlords, to erect a Fascist regime and bring the country under foreign domination. As the College had proposed, a strong national line was put forward, stressing the threat that had been posed to Hungarian independence: It is clear, honourable People’s Court, that the conspiracy of Rajk’s people set itself the goal of the abandoning of Hungarian national independence and the liquidation of national sovereignty. This gang swore to bring Hungary under a foreign yoke, to turn our country into a foreign colony, compose its government out of foreign spies and agents, and erect in place of an independent Hungary a system that dances to the tune of foreign agents and betrays Hungarian national interests.

The prosecutor ridiculed the western press for presenting the view that a man who had ‘sold his Fatherland to foreign imperialists and spymasters’ could have ever been the representative of a ‘national line’. As Révai had demanded in his scribbled marginalia, Tito was contrasted with the ‘national cause’. According to the prosecutor, Tito had demanded full control over the Hungarian army and police, and Hungarian industry would be made fully subservient to the fulfilling of the Yugoslav FiveYear Plan. ‘I am not surprised that the fist of every self-conscious working Hungarian tightens when he hears of this treasonous, dishonourable plan that puts down our entire nation.’ He attacked Tito’s ‘chauvinist hubris’, and denounced him for believing that ‘the Hungarian people hold their independence of so little worth that they mock the national honour of the Hungarian people’. When the prosecutor came to the role of the Soviet Union, it was almost as if he had a copy of ‘Propaganda related to the trial of the spy gang’ in front of him. Because Rajk had intended to betray Hungary’s national independence, he argued, Rajk had automatically wanted to tear Hungary from the ‘Peace Camp’ and oppose the Soviet Union. ‘These’, continued the prosecutor, ‘are two sides of the same coin.’ Rajk was an enemy of the Soviet Union, because the USSR was the ‘highest defender of our peace and Hungarian independence’, and he who was an enemy of the Soviet Union was automatically an ‘enemy of the power of the working Hungarians and the independence of the country’.42 Rajk was tried, and eventually executed, having been found guilty of wholly imaginary crimes. He was even innocent of the political aberration 42

László Rajk und Komplicen, –.




that lay at the heart of them. Though there may at times have been objections to Soviet interference, there were within the MDP no real ‘nationalist deviationists’ such as Tito who were ultimately prepared to break with Moscow. Party leaders of other parties, like Gomulka in Poland and Traïcho Kostov in Bulgaria, though also ultimately loyal, would have been much more suitable to fulfil this role. Precisely the loyalty of Rajk and the Hungarian party in general illustrates the nature of the Rajk trial as a propaganda set-piece with a political message. Here, the Soviet influence on the propaganda line was overwhelming. The Soviet party had insisted on a search for ‘Trotskyites’ to begin with, and, through Stalin and Belkin, had intervened directly in the text of the indictment. As the party’s propaganda was identical to the indictment, Soviet authorities were in this way ultimately responsible for the party’s line.   The propaganda directed specifically at the trial coincided with a much broader campaign that promoted a strict interpretation of MarxistLeninism, and opposed the slightest deviation from the party line. It was not deemed enough merely to attack ‘bourgeois nationalism’, but it was also necessary to promote patriotism against the West and Tito’s Yugoslavia. On the day after Rajk’s arrest, on  May , Rákosi announced to the Central Committee the importance of stimulating patriotism in the workers, in order to oppose American plans for world domination: ‘We, the representatives of the working people, especially now when we have become lords in our own country, when the Fatherland is the Fatherland of the working people, have to oppose this with the feeling of patriotism. We must nurture progressive patriotism.’ This type of patriotism, Rákosi argued, ‘is not opposed to the principle of Leninist-Stalinist proletarian internationalism’ but ran ‘parallel’ to it.43 In the Soviet Union, the term ‘Socialist Patriotism’ had been introduced and widely employed in the s, but it had not yet been used extensively in Hungary, where the MKP had preferred phrases such as ‘new’ or ‘true patriotism’. The phrase ‘Socialist Patriotism’ came into vogue after –, but it did not mean exactly the same thing. In promoting ‘true patriotism’ Révai had argued that friendship with neighbouring peoples and an alliance with the Soviet Union was in Hungary’s 43

MOL ./, –, –.




interest and, therefore, patriotic. Socialist Patriotism went a step further: it simply equated Hungarian patriotism with proletarian internationalism, loyalty to the Soviet Union, and worship of Stalin. Despite its overriding Socialist content the expression was also given a national meaning. The MDP’s Education Department, for instance, described Socialist Patriotism as ‘communist pride in the nation.’44 Within the party, the broad campaign was defined as ‘the increased struggle against left- and right-wing deviations’, and a struggle against ‘cosmopolitanism’, ‘bourgeois nationalism and remnants of anti-Semitism’.45 On domestic issues, this meant propagating the leading role of the working class and its ownership of the state, announcing the ‘sharpening of the class struggle’, and supporting collectivization and measures against ‘kulaks’. The notion of People’s Democracy, presented at the MKP’s Third Conference as the means of peaceful transition to Socialism, was now described as ‘one of the forms of dictatorship of the proletariat’. The idea of a distinct national road to Socialism was to be ‘unmasked’, The Five-Year Plan, the collectivization of agriculture, the basics of ‘Socialist Culture’ all had to be taught to the people. On international issues, the party would promote the Soviet Union’s ‘role in the defence of the peace’, unmask the ‘imperialist preparations for war’, ‘strengthen the spirit of proletarian internationalism in our party membership and develop it in the extra-party masses’, and ‘propagate the principle of Leninist-Stalinist friendship between the peoples’. At the same time, it followed Rákosi’s call for a boost to patriotism, by demanding ‘the development of the fighting patriotic spirit in the party membership and the masses outside the party’.46 As a catchphrase, Socialist Patriotism encompassed several of the key propaganda ingredients that had come out of the Rajk trial: loyalty to the Soviet Union, hatred of the ‘imperialist’ West, and love for the Hungarian homeland. The campaign to win party and population for Socialism obviously did not end with the execution of Rajk: it was a continuous campaign. The Central Committee decided on  February  to educate ‘the party members, working class and the entire working people’ in the spirit of ‘the struggle against any type of nationalism’, ‘workers’ internationalism’, ‘the international solidarity of the workers’, as well as ‘democratic and Socialist patriotism’. The slogan of national independence added a national element to the concept of Socialist Patriotism. The Central Committee wanted to ‘awaken the patriotic feelings of our people even more’, and thought it 44

MOL ./, –.

45

MOL ./, –.

46

Ibid.




even more important ‘that we make it known to them that the imperialist warmongers endeavour to bring down our national independence and democratic achievements’. But national and Socialist elements were completely intertwined, as the Central Committee also thought it more important to ‘deepen within [the people] the brotherhood of free peoples, the solidarity of the working classes, gratefulness and loyalty towards the liberating Soviet Union and the leader of the international Peace front: the great Stalin’. In practice, the Committee considered these not just compatible, but identical to Hungarian national interests and part and parcel of ‘Socialist Patriotism’.47 The conscious stimulating of ‘Socialist Patriotism’ remained a priority throughout the Stalinist years. The  book-publishing plan was intended to ‘strengthen the patriotic spirit’ of the worker. The youth books it proposed to publish to this end were Russian adventure stories on partisan warfare, novels set against the background of the Indian struggle for independence, accounts of life in the Komsomol, the ‘Great Patriotic War’, and the activities of the Czech Resistance. The only Hungarian book put forward was one by Zsigmond Móricz on the anti-Austrian Rákóczi uprising of .48 Not only literature, but Socialist construction was to be exploited in the kindling of patriotic feelings. The propaganda for the Five-Year Plan was to be entirely subordinated to the ‘Peace Struggle’, or the conflict with the West. The Five-Year Plan would be presented as the ‘Peace Plan’, with industrial and agricultural development providing a response to ‘the imperialist warmongers and their domestic agents’. To this end, economy and heavy industry would have to be strengthened, the ‘unity of the working people’ and the army built up: ‘The development of our army ensures the victory of our plan and the inviolability of the hallowed borders of our Fatherland.’ To support the Five-Year Plan, the Agitation and Propaganda Department proposed the kindling of patriotic sentiments. Every worker, peasant, and member of the intelligentsia would have to view ‘with national pride’ the vast industrial, agricultural, and cultural projects that the Party was promising to construct: the Duna Iron Works, the new Budapest underground, the power station at Inota, the state agricultural holdings of Hortobágy, the Agricultural Institute at Gödöllő, and the new National Theatre in Budapest. Pride in ‘the building and strengthening of “our” homeland’ in general was also to be promoted by the rousing of 47

MOL ./, –.

48

MOL ./.I, –.




‘healthy local patriotism’, by awakening pride in local achievement in counties, towns, villages, and factories. The Propaganda Department favoured the promotion of a broad definition of patriotism: ‘we must instil the widest and deepest interpretation of patriotism into the general consciousness of our people.’ On the one hand, this meant, besides celebrating the past, the presenting of an image of a glorious future. The MDP should stress that ‘love of the Fatherland’ went beyond ‘historical traditions’, and should also encompass ‘the Homeland, the people that our country, our people will become’. The final goal was the ‘most important task’ of Hungary’s history: ‘that a happy people deciding its own fate will live in a blooming, independent Hungarian Homeland.’49 Of course, this broad sense of patriotism would also have an international angle. ‘Not only should the hatred of the past and present base deeds of the domestic and foreign enemy be stoked up, but the knowledge [taught] of the kind of future they want to deprive us of.’ Besides attacking the West, it would also have to be demonstrated that there was a direct link between the realization of the plan and the ‘success of the Peace Struggle’. The importance of Soviet support in everything had to be emphasized everywhere. The final goal was ‘to mobilize even the most backward worker into enthusiastic participation in the strengthening of the Fatherland’. Socialist Patriotism—hatred of the West, devotion to the Soviet Union and proletarian internationalism, and loyalty to the new Hungary of workers, peasants, and the progressive intelligentsia—found its outward expression in the use of symbols by the party. In a conscious and centrally implemented policy, the presence of Socialist and Soviet symbols increased following the Rajk trial, and eventually came to dominate public life. Nevertheless, this did not mean national symbols were abandoned. National symbols may have been swamped by Socialist imagery, but they were not replaced. Instead, they were given a Socialist meaning and, as had been the case during the coalition years, Socialist and Soviet symbols in turn were given a national meaning. From  the MKP’s martyr cult had been illustrative of the party’s ‘true patriotism’: it had ‘nationalized’ its own heroes and ‘Bolshevized’ national ones. After  the party continued to honour its dead. In the summer of , a proposal was made for a large burial site on Budapest’s Fiume Street Cemetery (currently the Kerepesi Cemetery) to augment the 49

MOL ./, –.




existing grave of the five communist martyrs Ságvári, Sallai, Fürst, Rózsa, and Schönherz with a massive memorial dedicated to communist heroes. Some thought had gone into the necessary national connotations of the monument. It was to be a centrally located vault, between the crypts of national heroes Batthyány and Kossuth, where the martyrs of the workers’ movement would be buried ‘together with the other great figures of the national freedom struggle in a, as it were, “national Pantheon” ’.50 A special committee was supposed to work out a plan before the end of September. A more detailed plan appeared in January ,51 but no significant progress would be made on a large monument until well after the  uprising.52 In the meantime, the communist martyrs Endre Ságvári, Imre Sallai, and Endre Fürst were commemorated on  and  July . A similar programme was followed to that in previous years, though with a marked difference: where previously both the ‘Internationale’ and the ‘Himnusz’ would have been sung, the national anthem was now not part of the programme.53 Despite the grand schemes for a large ‘national pantheon’ there are signs that the martyr cult slackened under Stalinism. Géza Kassai complained in  about the lack of flowers on the graves of the five martyrs, noted that the wooden sign above the grave was barely legible, and demanded a decent monument.54     Such carelessness was not displayed in the Sovietization of public space. After , the revision of street names that had started in  was accelerated, in a centrally organized initiative. As Minister of the Interior Rajk sent an instruction to town councils in the spring of  in which he argued that the ‘democratic changes’ were not yet adequately reflected in changes in street names, as there were still many streets named after people who did not fit into ‘today’s democratic spirit.’ Rajk did not expect incidental corrections but a thorough reform, a ‘contemporary transformation of the townscape.’ Rajk did not go into detail about which names were acceptable,55 which means he expected local authorities by and large to know themselves what names were undemocratic and by what they should be replaced. 50 53 55

MOL ./, –. MOL ./, –. Nagy, Gyula utcanevei.

51 54

52 Serényi, Ismertető. Ibid. MOL ./, –.




As many nationalized businesses still carried the names of their former owners, these would have to be renamed, according to a proposal of the Agitation Department dated  February , in order to ‘liquidate these capitalist remnants’. The political message behind the name changes was to ‘strengthen the knowledge among the workers’ that the factories had become the property of the Hungarian people, and would never be sold again. The suggested names were both national and Socialist in content. Factories were to be given names of ‘great historical figures and figures of the workers’ movement’, ‘great historical events and events of the workers’ movement’, ‘outstanding Hungarian literary and artistic leaders’, and, more neutrally, the geographical location of the factory. Although it is clear from the very existence of this document that this process of renaming was conducted from the top down, every endeavour was made to make it appear as a spontaneous process: ‘We want to accomplish the name changes through well-prepared initiatives from below, and the Ministry of Industry will approve the proposal by the factory workers.’56 As had been the case with street names, only broad outlines were given regarding acceptable names, but in important cases the MDP intervened directly: in June  it decided on a suggestion by the party’s Foreign Department to rename Budapest’s Fővám Square Dimitrov Square.57 For the time being, the MDP still exercised restraint in spreading outright Socialist or Soviet names. In February , the Agitation Department objected to giving factories the names of living people, even ‘international leaders of the workers’ movement’, though the names of Marx, Engels, Lenin, Stalin, and Rákosi were ‘subject to consideration’.58 Immediately after the Rajk trial, after more than a year of criticism from the Soviet party that the USSR was being ignored in party propaganda, the Secretariat still decided on  October that ‘it is not yet necessary to name a street after Comrade Lenin’ in Budapest.59 This restraint was rapidly dropped. Andrássy Road became Stalin Road in , and Montgomery Road Belioannis Quay. The Oktogon was called  November Square in , the Erzsébet and Teréz Boulevards together were renamed Lenin Boulevard in the same year. In Szeged the Lajos Tisza Boulevard became the Stalin Boulevard (), the Street of the Good Lady Street of  April (), and Kárász Street was changed to Lenin Street ().60 By , explicit Soviet and 56 58 60

MOL ./, –. MOL ./, –. Péter, Szeged utcanevei.

57 59

MOL ./, –. MOL ./, –.




Socialist names were commonplace, with most towns in Hungary having important streets and public spaces named after the Red Army, Stalin and other Soviet political figures, and international communist personalities such as Dimitrov and the Greek party leader Belioannis. Many lesser streets received the names of communist martyrs, often so unknown that many of them went unnoticed in the post- reversal of the process. This did not mean that national street names were discarded. The streets they had replaced were mostly religious in content, or referred to now unacceptable ‘reactionary’, Smallholder, and Social Democrat politicians. Prominent squares named after Kossuth and Petőfi were retained and new nationally named streets were added. With the creation of the Greater Budapest metropolitan area in , the city swallowed up several villages, and the many duplicate names formed a practical necessity for large-scale renaming of streets. The Budapest Council requested ‘proper Hungarian, easily pronounceable old place names’ and ‘less well-known personal names from the  revolution’. The obvious ones, like Petőfi and Kossuth, could not be used as they existed already in duplicate.61 Changes in public and party festivals also reflected the promotion of Socialist Patriotism. Compared to the period before , national holidays were given an even greater Socialist content than before, and in practice were subordinated to Socialist holidays. The distinction is not easy to draw, however, as the latter were given a strong national character. In , the anniversary celebrations of the – revolution continued into their second year, and now even more than in  were utilized to attack the West and promote the People’s Democracies. This demand for a greater Socialist content was expressed by the instructions of the Propaganda Department, which proposed as the main political viewpoints behind the celebrations ‘firmly standing ground against the western imperialists and foreign expansionists’, the ‘unwavering’ struggle for the country’s independence, the popularization of the new People’s Army, and ‘the new Socialist Patriotism’ in general.62 The  celebration of the October Revolution was mainly draped in Socialist symbols, but a national perspective was not forgotten:  had created the Soviet State, which in turn had liberated Hungary from Fascism and made it possible to build Socialism in ‘our Fatherland’.63 Concerns about the party’s national image were still rampant. On  June , the Politburo decided that the 61 62

BFL, XV. [City Council to Budapest Capital Archive,  Feb. ]. 63 MOL ./, –. MOL ./, .




centenary of Petőfi’s death was to be celebrated to demonstrate that ‘the party tends to national traditions and true patriotism.’64 The immediate goal of the celebration was, however, explicitly a Socialist one, namely to ‘deepen relations with the Soviet Union and the People’s Democracies’. In February , the establishment of the republic in  was commemorated. At the time the republic had been presented by the MKP in a national light, and linked to the agitation surrounding the Left-Wing Bloc. Now its celebration was also exploited with day-to-day politics in mind. The Propaganda Department proposed to use the commemoration to attack ‘Mindszentyism’, and to defend ‘our Fatherland’s Independence’ from the ‘American Imperialists’. The point was to be made that the People’s Democracy, and the republic, had only come into existence thanks to the help and support of the Soviet Union.65 An important Socialist element was contributed to the commemoration of the republic by the legitimization of the Republic of Councils. In  Rezső Szántó had complained that the new republic had been referred to by the MKP as the ‘Third Republic’, thus ignoring the communist revolution of . Now, the time had come once again to openly honour , and the republic of  was officially designated the ‘Fourth Republic’, obviously without mentioning that any change in attitude had taken place.66 The celebration of Stalin’s seventieth birthday on  December  offers a prime example of the fusion of national and Soviet symbols into Socialist Patriotism, and also shows that the VKP(b) was still directly involved in the MDP’s decision-making on propaganda. Even with the arrest of Rajk and the Soviet demand to popularize the Soviet Union, the decision to what extent Stalin’s birthday was to be celebrated was far from a given fact. Rákosi preferred to ask for Soviet advice, and on  September, two days after the Rajk trial commenced, wrote to Suslov: Dear Comrade Suslov! We would very much like to know whether there will be any decision on the celebration of the th birthday of Comrade Stalin, especially in relation to how far the foreign parties can go, that is, the parties of the Peoples’ Democracies. I would be very much obliged to you, if you could communicate whether there will be such a decision and whether there will be a definite line which we can adhere to.67

Rákosi was clearly anxious to avoid any potentially very harmful mistakes, but whether he feared it would be an error to overplay or undervalue the celebration of Stalin’s birthday is not apparent. This does make clear, 64 67

MOL ./, –. MOL ./, .

65

MOL ./, –.

66

Ibid.




however, that ultimate decision-making on the propaganda line of the MDP remained in Soviet hands. It is not known whether Rákosi received any replies to his letter, but preparations were started in November. In contrast to the practice in the coalition years, Stalin’s birthday was now elevated from a party celebration to a platform for conveying a message to the entire people. The Agitation and Propaganda Department declared that the goal of the celebration would be ‘to develop and at the same time deepen the love that lives in our entire people for Comrade Stalin’.68 A report on the celebration itself listed that the goal had been to ‘strengthen in the working masses the love of Comrade Stalin’.69 To achieve this goal, the propaganda was at least partially national in nature. The party’s Propaganda College decided that the press would have to thank Stalin for bringing liberation, national existence, and independence, and to endeavour that ‘Stalin’s birthday will truly be made the holiday of the entire Hungarian people’.70 The Propaganda Department proposed that Hungary would express gratitude to Stalin for giving it its independence,71 and Rákosi did so in his birthday telegram to the Soviet leader.72 A speech by Géza Kassai, entitled ‘The great friend of the Hungarian People’, proclaimed that ‘every Hungarian that loves his Fatherland’ desired to celebrate Stalin’s birthday and that ‘every true Hungarian desires to swear his allegiance to the programme of peace, national independence, and socialism’ personified by Stalin.73 The Propaganda Department reported later that the slogan ‘Stalin: the great friend of the Hungarian People’ had ‘penetrated’ into the masses.74 In   March was still an official day off, but downgraded by being given the specific function of a youth holiday. The youth movement was ‘socialized’, which is apparent from the very name of the new ‘unified’ youth organization, the People’s Alliance of Hungarian Youth, or a Magyar Ifjúság Népi Szövetsége, MINSz, emphasizing the social rather than the national. Nevertheless, the Youth Council of the Unions (SzIT) still used lavish national decorations on  March .75 Changing  March into a youth holiday enhanced the national image of the youth movement despite its Socialist character. The Secretariat of the MKP instructed the meetings to take place at the National Museum in Budapest and Petőfi statues throughout the country, and the MINSz was to be 68 70 72 74

MOL ./, –. MOL ./, –. MOL ./, . MOL ./, –.

69 71 73 75

MOL ./, –. MOL ./, –. MOL ./, –. See p. .




F. . Official celebration of  March by the Trade Unions’ Youth Council at the Budapest Petőfi statue. After  the theory of a ‘national road to communism’ was abandoned and the ‘national deviation’ condemned in the wake of the Yugoslav–Soviet split. National propaganda remains the key to attempts at persuading the masses, though national imagery is now blended with Socialist symbols. The national holiday of  March was still commemorated, but downgraded to a youth holiday.

represented as the direct successor of the revolutionary youth of . At the same time,  March was given a strong Socialist content. Images of Lenin and Stalin were now added to those of Kossuth, Petőfi and Rákosi. Even in these communist images the national element was given second place: while in  Stalin and Lenin had flanked the picture of Rákosi, now the picture of Rákosi, the leader of a national communist party, was slightly lowered between these portraits of foreign leaders.76 The MDP still had clear political goals in mind for the celebration. The Propaganda Department proposed for the celebrations of March  to ‘utilize the meetings and demonstrations of  March’ to popularize the MINSz.77 The celebration of  March was not only subordinated to, but consciously used to prepare the ground for that of  April: ‘we will use the preparations of the youth for the celebration of the liberation of our 76

See illustrations.

77

MOL ./, –.




Fatherland.’78 Several days later, on  March, the Revolution of Councils was commemorated. As an indigenous communist revolution it was particularly well suited to be celebrated as a national and Socialist holiday. Nevertheless, it did not gain ascendancy over  March, and like  March, its main function was to prepare the ground for  April.79 In , the anniversary of the liberation was to be celebrated more strongly than any other holiday, including  May.80 While  March had become Stalinized,  April was given a national content, by claiming that the failed dreams of  had become reality with the liberation of Hungary in . This made  April Hungary’s most ‘glorious’ holiday.81 Though essentially a communist celebration, it was couched in national terms: ‘ April is our greatest national holiday because the Hungarian nation now for the first time is the proprietor of its freedom. If  March is the day of the glorious, but still defeated struggle,  April is—thanks to the liberating Soviet Union—the holiday of the reality of Hungarian national and popular freedom.’ Besides being a national holiday,  April was also the ‘holiday of our gratitude and devotion to the Soviet Union’, because the Soviet Union had finally liberated Hungary from  years of oppression and currently protected Hungary from ‘imperialist adventurers’.82 Within a month of  April, Labour Day was celebrated on  May, and, as in the coalition years, it was consciously given a national besides a communist content. The Propaganda Department specifically proposed that, while in Budapest red flags were to dominate, in the countryside half the flags flying should be national ones.83 In contrast to the period before , there was now no significant difference between the outward image of the party and its self-image. Socialist Patriotism was both presented to the population as an ideal, and taught in party schools and special seminars to new cadres and rank-and-file party members.84 Socialist Patriotism was also to be instilled into the pioneers, which had now in practice expanded from being the party’s youth movement to a comprehensive one. The goal of the pioneer movement was described to the Politburo as: ‘to raise boundless devotion to our Fatherland, our party, and Comrade Rákosi, love for the Soviet Union and Comrade Stalin, international solidarity, and hatred of the domestic enemy and the imperialists.’85 Besides Hungarian folk songs, the pioneers 78 81 83 85

79 MOL ./, . Ibid. MOL ./, –. MOL ./, –. MOL ./, –.

80 82 84

MOL ./, –. MOL ./, –. MOL ./, –.




now sang Komsomol songs, and ones dedicated to Lenin and Voroshilov.86 References to the nation abounded, especially to the  revolution, but were firmly embedded in a communist context. Rather than naming pioneer patrols only after national figures, they were named after celebrations, like ‘May Day’, ‘ April’, historical events, such as ‘’ and ‘Freedom Struggle ’, and more abstract concepts, like ‘peace’, ‘labour’, ‘knowledge’, ‘love of the Fatherland’, or were given names with social and national historical connotations, such as ‘György Dózsa’s cousins’, ‘little soldiers’, ‘little drummers’, and ‘red whistlers’, the last two also references to . In , the red necktie was introduced as a special distinction for the most deserving of the pajtások (buddies, chums, comrades), the red, white, and green flag was still dubbed ‘our greatest treasure’, and the ‘twelve points’ were still the same.87 By , after the example of the Komsomol, the red necktie had been introduced comprehensively, and was now referred to as ‘our greatest treasure’. The references to ‘freedom’ were removed from the pioneers’ ‘twelve points’, making the declaration of love for the Fatherland the first one. In addition, the personality cults of Lenin, Stalin, and ‘our great teacher: that friendly smiling, tireless pajtás Rákosi’ were introduced.88 As the pioneers were now no longer merely a party organization, but compulsory for every schoolchild, there was by  no great difference between the self-image of the party, and the image projected outward. * * * The attack on ‘nationalists’ and ‘national deviationists’ within the party following the Rajk trial did not compromise the ‘national line’ the party had employed since . Though Aladár Mód, one of the party propagandists associated with the national line, came under assault for not paying enough attention to the Soviet Union in his  Years of Struggle for Independent Hungary,89 others such as Erzsébet Andics remained above reproach. Révai, the architect of the party’s national line, was untouchable. His status weakened perceptibly after , partially due to his heart condition, and partially because his power base in the party propaganda machine was inherently weaker than the positions of Rákosi, Farkas, and Gerő. Considering Révai’s role in the party’s national propaganda he was the ideal candidate to purge on charges of a ‘nationalist deviation’, and it would not have been hard to produce evidence against him. Indeed, when 86 89

A mi ünnepeink a köztársaságra, . Mód,  év küzdelem.

87

I.próba, .

88

Ibid.




Tibor Szőnyi realized his ÁVH tormentors were fishing after Politburo members, he named Révai as his Hungarian spymaster.90 On  November , Géza Kassai sent the party Politburo a long document listing ideological errors within the party, specifically aimed against József Révai, which was simply ignored.91 Not national propaganda, but opposition to the Soviet Union was the yardstick by which nationalism was measured. In Bulgaria, party leader Traïcho Kostov had questioned the subservience of the Bulgarian to the Soviet economy and paid for it with his arrest in June , and his subsequent trial and execution. In Poland, Gomulka had suffered the consequences for taking too independent a position. Neither Kostov nor Gomulka would have opposed Stalin in the way Tito had done, but anything less than unquestioning obedience now met with heavy sanctions. In Hungary, Rajk was accused of a similar type of nationalism, though there is no reason to believe he would have ever been in opposition to the Soviet Union. In several essential respects the ‘national policy’ did not change: first, the communist party continued consciously to exploit national sentiments with political ends in mind. This appears from almost every single Propaganda Department document cited here, which proposed to utilize ‘national’ commemorations such as the celebration of the republic to spread communist views on day-to-day political events such as the Mindszenty case, and beyond that, to use national sentiments to promote ‘Socialist’ ideals such as the veneration of Stalin and the Soviet Union. Secondly, the changes in MKP/MDP propaganda were brought about at Soviet instigation. The Soviet party was responsible for the abandonment of the ‘national road’ to communism at the First Conference of the Cominform. Through the contribution of Fyodor Belkin and Stalin in drawing up the indictment against Rajk, Soviet authorities were responsible for the—national—propaganda around the Rajk trial. Rákosi’s request for instructions on the celebrations of Stalin’s seventieth birthday shows that the USSR remained the ultimate source of authority on propaganda. Third, the basic elements of Socialist Patriotism were also present in the coalition years: the presentation of the MKP as heir to national traditions and guardian of national interests, of the Soviet Union as liberator of Hungary and guardian of its independence, of the West and its ‘domestic agents’ as the enemy of Hungarian sovereignty. The changes were just as significant, however. While before  the MKP presented itself as a national party, after  it went a step further 90

Pünkösti, Rákosi. A csúcson, .

91

MOL ./, –.




and promoted a new form of allegiance to the state: Socialist Patriotism. The Propaganda Department deliberately intended to instil civic pride into the population for the achievements of Socialist construction and whip up ‘hatred’ against the ‘imperialists’ and ‘love’ for the Soviet Union. Socialist Patriotism was both national and Socialist in content. In practice, the word ‘nation’ was almost equated with the ‘working people’ (dolgozó nép), the presumed social base of the MDP. Soviet and Socialist symbols became predominant, though national symbols were retained in a Stalinized form, and the omnipresent Stalinist imagery was given national connotations. National symbols were nevertheless subservient to Socialist ones: they were consciously employed to promote Stalinism. It is difficult to say exactly when Socialist symbols overtook national ones, but this did not truly gather momentum until after the Rajk trial, in the early s. The personality cult of Stalin was the prime example of how Socialist Patriotism worked in practice, an example of how ‘internationalist’ (i.e. Soviet) themes were reconciled with Hungarian patriotism. Révai explained the concept of Socialist Patriotism to a group of army officers : ‘Only he who deeply loves the Soviet Union, the great protector of the world’s peoples, the powerful and invincible vanguard of progress, is a good Hungarian patriot. Only he is a good Hungarian patriot, who reveres and loves our great teacher, Generalissimus Stalin.’92 On  December , Révai unveiled the new Stalin statue in Budapest. He scolded the Horthy regime for filling the country with statues of national ‘midgets’, promised the communists would set things right by remembering the true greats of the nation, and announced that in , new statues of Kossuth and Hunyadi would appear. However, Révai said, the party had consciously chosen to start the series of unveilings with a statue of Stalin, as the national struggles of Kossuth and Hunyadi had been to no avail until he had brought freedom to the country. Stalin, Révai said, was the leader of the Soviet Union and the whole of ‘progressive humanity’, but ‘every people, great or small, has taken him to their hearts and made him their own’. In constructing Socialism, Révai argued, every people contributed something of its own national distinctiveness to the common work, and every people ‘perceived the Stalin of common humanity with national spectacles’. The heart of every people struggling for freedom beats for Stalin, and ‘our people’s heart beats for him in Hungarian’. The Stalin statue, Révai stated, ‘has come from the soul of our nation’. ‘This statue’, he grandly asserted, ‘is a Hungarian statue.’93 92 93

Szász, Volunteers,  (my emphasis). MTAKK, MS /, a, –. Original emphasis.

Conclusion Returning to Szeged and once again marvelling at the Heroes’ Gate, it is now possible to answer some of the questions it raised. Demolishing the monument would not have done anything to improve the reputation of the MKP. Its destruction would have been interpreted as an act of revenge against the crushing of the revolution, and therefore would have pointed at the continuity with  that the party was trying to downplay. Better then to render the ghosts of the past harmless by covering up the offensive murals and leaving the Gate as a memorial to the dead of the First World War. The attitude of the party leadership to national propaganda was utilitarian. Révai and other propagandists constantly stressed the tactical importance of the party’s national image: Rákosi told his propagandists to tailor the message to its audience and, following this logic, the MKP on occasion even used anti-Semitic propaganda. To a believing communist, such pragmatism would not necessarily have seemed cynical. There was a long tradition in Marxist theory and communist practice of supporting nationalism for strategic purposes. Marx supported the national revolutions of , Lenin backed Russia’s nationalities, and the German KPD courted the Nazi voter. Communist revolutionaries from Marx onward were not content to be utopian dreamers, but adamant to achieve their goals through political means, and therefore ready to make concessions to theory. This combination of dialectics and political activism spawned a particularly cold-blooded strategic and tactical flexibility. All Eastern European parties followed a national line after , and all constructed a nationally coloured Socialist Patriotism for their People’s Republics. In Czechoslovakia, the KSČ became, according to Bradley Francis Abrams, ‘super patriotic’.1 Like the MKP, it at first strenuously avoided the word ‘Socialism’ in its propaganda,2 preferring instead the phrase ‘national democratic revolution’. As in Hungary, the KSČ presented itself as both an heir to national traditions and a party of national interests. The MKP underlined the anti-German character of the struggles of St Stephen, Rákóczi, and Kossuth. The KSČ likewise ascribed hostility towards Germans to Jan Hus. Similar to the MKP, the 1

Abrams, ‘Struggle for the Soul of the Nation’, .

2

Ibid. .



Conclusion

KSČ found itself confronted with radicals who rejected the peaceful, ‘national road’ to Socialism. The KSČ constructed a martyr cult of its own around its , communist dead, and hailed the Soviet Union as Czechoslovakia’s liberator and ally. As in Hungary, the KSČ commenced the construction of Socialist Patriotism after , and proclaimed internationalism and patriotism to be two sides of the same coin. There were, inevitably, differences too. In Czechoslovakia, more emphasis was put on the concept of the ‘national road to Socialism’ than in Hungary. Most political parties and the majority of the population truly perceived the Soviet Union as a liberator and an ally. The KSČ was popular; it received  per cent of the votes in the  elections, which were by all accounts free and fair. The KSČ was more fortunate in the sense that many of its national policies were in line with Soviet interests.3 In Czechoslovakia the advocates of a ‘national road’ to Socialism ended up as victims in the show trials. In Hungary there was no such link. In Korotkevich’s reports in  the MKP was the only party whose national propaganda was specifically mentioned; this suggests the MKP’s level of public patriotism was remarkable when compared with its sister parties. This should not be surprising as the MKP’s position was probably the least enviable of all Central European parties and its need for a national face thus all the greater. Nevertheless, all parties conducted national policies and developed Socialist Patriotism. The chief explanation for the similarities in national propaganda is the Soviet origins of and antecedents to the national policy. The notion of using nationalism to sell Socialism had first been put in practice with the policy of korenezatsiya in the s. In the s, the Soviet Union constructed a ‘Soviet’ Patriotism in order to foster an all-union patriotism based on a fusion of Russian and Socialist elements. The influence of the Soviet example was especially clear once the satellite parties had become masters of their own states. Despite the adoration of all things Russian, the introduction of the Stalin cult, and compulsory Russian-language lessons, sovietization did not mean all-out Russification. Instead it was characterized by the introduction of a Socialist Patriotism based on the Soviet model, but centred around the own nation and state. The ‘People’s Democracy’ formed the key reference point: the USSR was hailed above all as a friend and example.

3

Ibid. .

Conclusion



Stalin emerges as the dominating influence in the post-war national propaganda of the Eastern European communist parties, not only because he had given Dimitrov the direct order for the Comintern to pursue a national line, but also because his own experience in dealing with national sentiments in the s and s provided the direct example for the national policy. Stalin was aware that communist parties needed to become national in form in order to succeed. He followed this logic for parties outside the USSR in , with the establishment of the Popular Front, and reintroduced it for all sections of the Comintern in . The dissolution of the Comintern in , an idea Stalin had been toying with since , formed an early high point of the national policy. Open Soviet supremacy was never again re-established. The Cominform, as a more informal body, conformed more to Stalin’s thoughts about how internationalism and nationalism could be reconciled. Despite what Soviet orders and antecedents may suggest, the ‘Muscovite’ leadership and main party cadres were not mindless tools. Hungarian party leaders did not immediately embrace the national line. Soviet authorities such as Dimitrov occasionally showed themselves more nationally minded than the émigré Hungarian leadership. It cannot be proven conclusively that Stalin from the outset planned to Bolshevize Hungary, but the MKP leadership took his promises at face value and certainly behaved that way. Soviet authorities frequently had to rein in the MKP leadership. Nagy’s claim of the abortive coup attempt in  is probably one of the most spectacular examples of this heightened radicalism. Interestingly, Hungary was not the only country where the tail occasionally attempted to wag the dog. In his Ph.D. thesis Vesselin Dimitrov argues that the Soviet Union was drawn into Bulgaria more than it had intended to thanks to the extremism of the Bulgarian communists.4 It is clear that the Soviet party was responsible for the grand shifts in strategy. Aside from introducing the national line in , it dictated the end of the ‘national road’ to communism in , and from  it enforced the idolization of the Soviet Union and Stalin in the Soviet satellites. It is less clear to what extent Soviet authorities interfered with the exact content of the national line. Radek’s Schlageter course and the KPD’s Programme of National and Social Liberation show that the Comintern had involved itself in detail with previous national programmes. During the Second World War, all Hungarian party 4

Dimitrov, ‘The Failure of Democracy in Eastern Europe’.



Conclusion

propaganda was directly subject to Soviet supervision. There is very little documentation to prove direct Soviet involvement in the MKP’s national propaganda for the post-war period, but some aspects of it were so similar to the policies of neighbouring communist parties that a strong element of central direction almost certainly existed. If proof is lacking for the MKP, there is documentary evidence available for East Germany, where Soviet occupation authorities discussed the ‘national line’ of the SED with German communist leaders, suggesting that comparable conversations also took place in Hungary.5 In any case, within margins set by the VKP(b) and Soviet authorities such as the Allied Control Commission and Ambassador Pushkin, the MKP developed its own line. Révai’s blunder at the Music Academy in April  is a good illustration of the extent of Soviet control over party policy. Because Stalin did not inform the MKP leadership of his true intentions, it was possible for Rákosi and Révai to believe that he supported border revisions. The Music Academy speech also points to the greatest problem inherent in the national line of the Comintern: though Soviet in origin, the Soviet link was also one of the greatest obstacles to the national policy. Soviet authorities treated the MKP as an irksome, incompetent junior partner and were not always open about their true intentions. With the MKP stumbling around in the dark, errors like the Music Academy speech could easily occur. The Red Army initially did not permit the Hungarian communists to implement the policy, and its pillaging of Hungary was written on the party’s slate. The origins of the national line as a Soviet-instigated Comintern policy caused problems as soon as conflicts occurred between national parties. In keeping with the line of the Comintern, the Czechoslovak and Romanian communist parties followed a national line of their own, which in both cases was contradictory to that of the Hungarian party. The Czech and Slovak parties enthusiastically participated in the expulsion of the Hungarians from Slovakia, the Romanian party ignored the treatment of Hungarians in Transylvania and was not prepared to compromise on the border issue. In Hungary, the MKP was blamed for the policies of its sister parties, which in turn were compromised by the verbal resistance offered by the Hungarian party. There were some attempts to come to an arrangement. Gottwald’s proposal that both parties simply should attack each other was one, and Révai’s letter to Gheorghe Luca, in which he 5 ‘Besprechung mit Semjonov vom ..,  Uhr’, in Badstubner and Loth (eds.), Wilhelm Pieck, .

Conclusion



asked for understanding for the difficulties of the MKP, was another. But there was no all-out coordination of the national line; the irritations between the MKP and KSČ were very real. The Soviet origins of the national line also formed the greatest impediment to its success. This conclusion can mostly be reached from the evaluations of communists themselves of their own national reputation (or lack thereof), in which the charge of being Soviet spies figured frequently as cause for frustration. The true opinion of the population is more difficult to determine, and an investigation into the popular mood has not been the subject of this book. Nevertheless, a few brief points can be made. The MKP’s national line had its greatest chance of success during the coalition years. To many noncommunists, there was little wrong with promoting the heritage of . The land reform was a popular move. Even conservatives like Gyula Szekfu˝ conceded that Hungary’s future lay in the shadow of the USSR. During the  elections the Smallholders presented themselves as the national rallying party against the communists and won a spectacular victory. Still, a significant minority that voted for the workers’ parties decided that the nation, or at least the Smallholder version of it, was not the key issue. The Stalinization of the national line dealt a death blow to any chances of success it may have had. Praising Stalin as a Hungarian leader could perhaps be explained dialectically, but seriously conflicted with common sense. Thanking the Red Army for liberation was painful enough, but calling  April the most significant date in Hungary’s history and promoting it to Hungary’s most important national holiday was an affront to national feeling. Events during the  uprising showed the lack of success of the party’s national propaganda. As in Russia in the s, stimulating national feeling may have been counter-productive. Hungary’s youth had been fed for years on the heroic national freedom struggle of  and on romanticized Soviet films on partisan warfare against the foreign oppressor. Instead of fighting the ‘imperialists’ in , working-class youths in Budapest attacked the only really obvious foreign oppressor in the country: the Red Army. Sovietization of national symbols did not sell Socialism but was regarded instead by many as an insult. The communist coat of arms was cut out of the national flag during demonstrations in the  uprising, and students tore out the pages in history books that described Peto˝fi as a great friend of the Russians.6 For all their national propaganda, 6

Tábor, ‘The Youth’, .



Conclusion

the Hungarian communists were unconvincing patriots. They never became national communists: unlike the Yugoslavs they did not take an independent, national position. Bluntly put, the national policy of the Hungarian communists failed because they, in the end, remained ‘agents of Moscow’.

BIBLIOGRAPHY Short citations have been used throughout the notes. Full details will be found in the Bibliography. Abbreviations have been used for the most commonly employed locations or works of reference.   BFL Budapest Fővárosi Levéltár (Budapest Capital City Archive) B-A-Z.m.LT Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén Megyei Levéltár (Borsod-AbaújZemplén County Archive) BMKT Békés Megye Képviselő-Testülete Megyei Levéltára (Archive of the Békés County Representative Body) BML Baranya Megyei Levéltár (Baranya County Archive) MECW Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, Collected Works (London, ) MOL Magyar Országos Levéltár (Hungarian National Archive) MTAKK Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Könyvtára, kézirattár (manuscript collection of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences) PIL Politikatörténeti Intézet Levéltára (Archive of the Institute of Political History) PTI Politikatörténeti Intézet (Institute for Political History) Rgy. Röpiratgyűjtemény (brochure and pamphlet collection (of the PIL) ) RTsKhIDNI Rossiiskiy Tsentr Khraneniya i Izucheniya Dokumentov Noveishei Istorii (Russian Centre for the Preservation and Study of Documents of Most Recent History) TIKL Független Kisgazda és Polgári Párt Tudománypolitikai Intézet Kisgazda Levéltára (Archive of the Institute of Political Science of the Independent Smallholder and Citizens’ Party) .   Baranya Megyei Levéltár (BML, Baranya County Archive). XVII National Committee, minutes –. Békés Megye Képviselő-Testülete Megyei Levéltára (BMKT, Archive of the Békés County Representative Body). Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén Megyei Levéltár (B-A-Z.m.LT, Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén County Archive). XXXIII /v cadre department.

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INDEX  January (anniversary of Lenin’s death): and singing of Himnusz   March (commemoration of the  revolution): attack by Révai on Britain and USA ()  demonstrations in   downgraded to youth holiday – and land reform  MKP guidelines on celebration () – streets named after  underlines national character of the MKP ,   March (commemoration of Republic of Councils): low profile of celebration   April (liberation of Hungary by Red Army): national content of   May (Labour Day): nationalization of –  October (Martyrs of Arad): appropriated by MKP – demonstrations in   explosion of Gömbös statue   November (Russian October Revolution): and nationalization by MKP ,   December (Stalin’s birthday): national elements in celebration – Action Programme, see MKP, Action Programme Ady, Endre , ,  Allied Control Commission  Imre Nagy demands food from  as instrument of Soviet control  Andics, Erzsébet ,  Antonescu, Ion  Apró, Antal  Arany, Bálint  Arany, János  Arrow Cross: in MKP Action Programme – People’s Courts – Rákosi’s ambivalence about prisoners of war  replacing streets named after 

and stab-in-the back legend  summary execution of Arrow Cross soldiers  trials against leaders  ÁVH: and Rajk trial –,  ÁVO:  election fraud ,  n  infiltration of Smallholder Party – NKVD influence on  perceived Jewish character  Bajcsy-Zsilinszky, Endre: celebrated by MKP as martyr ,  cooperation with KMP  Balogh, István ,  Balogh Party, see FMDP Barankovics, István ,  Baranov, L. S.: as intermediary between Rákosi and Dimitrov  as intermediary between Rákosi and Soviet leadership ,  and renaming MKP to MDP – Bárdossy, László: labelled as traitor  trial underlines national character of MKP – Bartók, Béla  Batthyány, Count László ,  Belkin, Fyodor , – aids building Hungarian political police  and Rajk trial – and Soviet control over MKP  Bem, Józef Zachariasz ,  Bencze, Lajos  Beneš, Eduard , , ,  Beria, Lavrenty Pavlovich: arrests of Germans in Hungary  Comintern radio propaganda  and department of International Information  release of Hungarian officers  Berman, Jakub  Bethlen, Gábor  Bibo, István  Bogdán, József 

 Bratianu, Bebe – Bucharin, Nicolai  Bulgaria: and attitude towards Soviet Union  Bulgarian road to Communism  and Fatherland Front  occupation by Red Army  radio transmitters Khristo Botev and Naroden Glas  trial of Traïcho Kostov  Burtsev, Vladimir Lvovich  Churchill, Winston  Civic Democratic Party, see PDP Comecon  Cominform: attack on fear of being ‘agents of Moscow’ – censure of Marshall Plan as form of patriotism  disguise of Soviet control over – First Conference of –,  For a Durable Peace, for a People’s Democracy  and KSČ–MKP relations  Second Conference of – Comintern: continuation of Soviet control after dissolution –,  dissolved to mask Soviet control over communist parties, – early proposals by Stalin on dissolution  ECCI, , , , ,  influence on national policy of KPD  national line implemented on orders by Stalin – national line as post-war policy  national line, continuation despite Rajk trial  national line, implementation in Hungary – national line, Soviet origins as obstacle ,  national line, source of conflict between MKP and KSČ , ,  national line, source of conflict between MKP and PCR  and Popular Front  and prisoners of war – and radio propaganda – Seventh Congress – Soviet dominance over 

Index Communist Manifesto  CPGB ,  CPUSA  CRC  Cseresznyés, Sándor  Cult of the martyrs, see MKP Czechoslovakia: and attitude towards Soviet Union  expelling of Germans from Sudetenland  Hungarians as Fifth Columnists  Kosice Programme  popularity of Communist Party  reslovakization – Rákosi criticizes treatment of Hungarians  Rákosi requests Soviet aid in conflict  role of Hungarian–Czechoslovak relations in  Hungarian elections  Slovak–Hungarian population exchange  Treaty on Mutual Friendship and Cooperation with Hungary  Czupi, Bálint  Dalnoki Miklós, Béla ,  Davies, Josef  Deák, Ferenc  Deák, István  Decsi, Gyula  Dekazanov, V. G.  Demény, Pál , – Democratic People’s Party, see DNP Deseő, László  Deuxième Bureau  Dimitrov, Georgi: and Action Programme of the MKP  and Bulgarian road to Socialism  claims national heroes for communism – and Comintern radio propaganda – condemns KMP’s Peace Party ploy  and dissolution of the Comintern , – as head of the Department for International Information  implements national line of the Comintern – land reform in Hungary  and Rákosi’s appeals on Slovak issue –

Index Rákosi’s letters to , , , , , , , , –, ,  relationship with Rákosi ,  speculates on a successor for Comintern  street named after  subservience to Stalin  and war crimes trials in Hungary  Dinnyés, Lajos  DISz  Djilas, Milovan , , – DNP – Dobi, István – Donáth, Ferenc –,  Dózsa, György  celebrated by NPP  and MDP pioneer movement  MKP plans brochures on  street named after , ,  Duclos, Jacques 



ECCI, see Comintern Engels, Friedrich – Erdei, Ferenc: and  centenary  as secret member of the MKP 

and land reform  and MNFF  presented as ‘German’ party by MKP  presented as ‘Jewish’ party by MKP ,  presented as unpatriotic by MKP  and Programme of National Unity ,  and Provisional Parliament  and Provisional Government  and Red Army as foreign conqueror  and St Stephen  and salami tactics against –,  and Soviet atrocities  Swabian expulsion as attack on Smallholders –,  and Transylvanian Question –,  whispering propaganda against MKP ,  FMDP ,  Fogarasi, Béla  Fotino, Gheorghe  Freedom Party ,  Friss, István  Fürst, Sándor 

Fabry, József  Faragho, Gábor  Farkas, Mihály: and abortive coup claim  and Action Programme of the MKP  anti-Semitic propaganda ,  and Cominform – conducts propaganda among Prisoners of War  identifies need for patriotic propaganda  and Rajk affair – Farkas, Vladimir  Fehér, Lajos  Field, Noel  Fierlinger, Zdenek ,  FKGP: and Budapest elections () – as competing ‘national’ party to MKP in elections of   and ‘conspiracy against the Republic’ –, – and elections of  ,  exploit Slovak issue against MKP  expulsion of Sulyok  and KMP 

Gábor, József  Georghiu-Dej, Gheorghe , , ,  Gerő, Ernő: and Action Programme of the MKP –,  and anti-Semitic Propaganda  and deportation of Germans  and expulsion of Hungarians from Slovakia ,  and Ferenc Erdei’s secret MKP membership  and Hungarian Legion  meeting with Georghiu-Dej on Transylvania  and prisoners of war –,  and provisional parliament  and radicalism ,  and Red Army atrocities  and relationship with Romania  and renaming MKP to MDP  and Stalin  and Swabian expulsions ,  GLAVPURKKA, Seventh Department of , , , , ,  Goebbels, Josef 



Index

Gomulka, Wladyslaw , ,  Gottwald, Klement ,  and communists as ‘agents of Moscow’  and expulsion of Germans from Czechoslovakia ,  invites Rákosi to attack KSČ –,  and MKP–KSČ relations ,  Great Britain  Groza, Petru –,  Gyöngyösi, János –, ,  Gyula, László  Habsburg, Otto von  Haraszti, Sándor  Hay, László  Historical Memorial Committee ,  Hitler, Adolf , –, , , ,  Hont, Ferenc  Horthy, István  Horthy, Miklós: attacked in draft MKP action programme  blamed for Transylvanian border issue by MKP  Comintern debate on attacking Horthy  departure from Szeged  Stalin’s attitude towards  Horváth, Zoltán ,  Hungarian Independence Party, see MFP Hungarian Legion, see Magyar Légió Hungarian National Independence Front, see MNFF Hungarian–Soviet Cultural Society, see MSzMT Hus, Jan  Imrédy, Béla  Independent Hungarian Democratic Party, see FMDP Inoradio –,  Iron Guard  Jánosi, Ferenc  József, Attila: decorations at MNSz conference  and MKP pioneers  street names ,  and József Révai  Jünger, Ernst  Justus, Pál , 

Kádár, János: as home communist  and Peace Party  and Rajk affair ,  Kállai, Gyula –, –, ,  KALOT  KAPD  Kardelj, Edvard  Kassai, Géza , ,  Keleti, Ferenc  Kertész, István  Kéthly, Anna  Kis, Károly , ,  KMP: Central Committee –,  name change to MKP  and national line of the Comintern –, – Peace Party – Köböl, József ,  Kölcsey, Ferenc  Kopecky, Václav ,  korenezatsiya , ,  Korotkevich, G. Ya. , –, –,  Kossa, István ,  Kossuth, Lajos: Budapest statue of  at centre of  centenary  Czechoslovak boycott laying wreaths at statue  Karl Marx’s appreciation of  MKP as heir of – portrait decorates MKP buildings  smallholder attitude towards  streets named after ,  Kostov, Traïcho ,  Kovács, Béla , , ,  Kovács, Imre  Kovács, István , ,  KPD: dissolution of Comintern  and NSDAP  and Schlageter course  KPJ: as ‘agents of Moscow’  and Cominform – KSČ: as ‘agents of Moscow’  Central Committee  Eighth Conference of  and expulsion of Hungarians  and national line , –

Index and relationship with MKP , –, ,  Kun, Béla ,  land reform , – Lauffenberg, Heinrich  Laval, Pierre  Left-wing Bloc –,  Lenin, V. I.: factories named after  and nationalism – On the National Pride of the Great Russians , ,  streets named after  and Versailles Treaty  Losonczy, Géza  Luca, Vasile , , – Luxemburg, Rosa  MADISz  Mafirt  Magyar Légió – Magyar Történelmi Emlékbizottság , – Magyar Újság  Malenkov, Georgi Maximilianovich ,  Malinovski, Rodion ,  Maniu, Iuliu – Manuilski, Dmitri Zacharovich , , ,  March Youth  Marshall, George  Marshall Plan –, , – Marx, Karl: and nationalism – as street name – and names of factories  MDP:  centenary –  March –  April   May   centenary – Agitation and Propaganda College ,  attacks Church as unpatriotic – changes in national line of MDP  deteriorating relationship with PCR – Education Department  fight against bourgeois nationalism  Five Year Plan 



Foreign Department  home communists vs. Muscovites – martyr cult  pioneer movement – Propaganda (and Agitation) Department , –,  and Second Conference of the Cominform  strained relationship with KSČ – MFP ,  Michael of Romania  Mihályfi, Ernő  Mikoyan, Ansastas Ivanovich  Millennium Monument , ,  Mindszenty, József: and Swabian issue  trial of – Mistéth, Endre  MKP: and  centenary –, – Action Programme –, –, , –,  as ‘agents of Moscow’ , ,  anti-Semitic propaganda – attitude towards Church  Cadre Department  celebration of  March –, , – celebration of  March  celebration of  May –,  celebration of  October – celebration of  November  ‘conspiracy against the republic’ –, – elections, Budapest municipal () , – elections () – elections () – First Party Council –,  Foreign Affairs Committee ,  as heir of Kossuth, Petőfi and Táncsics – home communists vs. Muscovites –,  land reform – and land-taking (honfoglalás)  and left wing opposition to national line –,  and malenkiy robot  n ,  martyrs, cult of – membership intake 



Index

MKP (cont.): and MMNF ,  name change from KMP  name change to MDP – National Committees  national propaganda of – pioneer movement –, – (Programme of) National Unity , ,  prisoners of war –, ,  Proclamation of the Republic  Propaganda Department –, , –, , , , , – propaganda tactics – Provisional Parliament  Red Army atrocities – relationship with KSČ , – , –, , ,  relationship with PCR , – salami tactics – school books – singing of himnusz ,  Slovakia, expulsion of Hungarians from –, –,  Soviet control over , –,  Swabians, expulsion of, –, –,  and SzDP – Third Congress of  and Thousand Year Hungary , ,  Three Year Plan , – MINSZ  MNDSz , –, ,  MNFF , , , , ,  MNSz  Mód, Aladár ,  Möller van den Bruck, Arthur  Molnár, Erik  Molotov, Vyacheslav: dissolution of the Comintern – elections of   and Jews in MKP  and MKP–KSČ relations – Moscow meetings on Transylvania – national line of the Comintern , ,  negotiates on ceasefire with Hungary ,  and prisoners of war –,  Rejects Marshall Plan  Slovakia, expulsion of Hungarians from –

street names after  Swabians, expulsions of – urges award of Transylvania to Romania  Móricz, Zsigmond  MSZMT  Münnich, Ferenc  Mussolini, Benito , ,  Nagy, Ferenc: demands police posts for FKGP  dismisses Béla Kovács  resignation of  Swabians, expulsion of ,  and Transylvanian question –, ,  Nagy, Imre: and abortive coup claim  and ‘conspiracy against the republic’  and land reform , –,  as Minister of Agriculture  as Minister of the Interior  and People’s Democracy  replaces ‘Jewish’ Zoltán Vas  requests food from Allied Control Commission  and Révai’s music academy speech – Swabians, expulsion of  wartime activities of ,  Narkomindel  Narkomnats – ‘national road to communism’ ,  Nejedly, Zdeněk  Nemes, Dezső , ,  Néplap  Népszava , ,  Neue Rheinische Zeitung  NKFD – Nógrádi, Sándor ,  Nosek, Václav  NPP: and Dózsa György  election () ,  and Historical Memorial Committee  and Kossuth  and Left-wing Bloc (Baloldali Blokk)  Programme of National Unity  Provisional Parliament  Swabians, expulsion of – Ópusztaszer ,  Orbán, László , , – Ortutay, Gyula , 

Index Pál, Jáckó  Paris Peace Treaty ,  Paskevich, Ivan Feodorovich  Patrascanu, Lucretiu  Pauker, Ana  PCF: and First Conference of the Cominform – national line of the Comintern  use of national symbols – PCI  PCR: as ‘agents of Moscow’  deteriorating relationship with MKP – Révai’s criticism of  PDP , , ,  People’s Courts , –, , ,  Péter, Gábor , , , – Petőfi, Sándor:  centenarry , ,   elections  celebrated by Népszava  celebrated by PCR  claimed as predecessor by MKP – MDP commemorates death to underline national character  MKP celebration of  March   and MKP martyr cult  and pioneers  portrait used in May Day parade  proclamation of the republic  Rákosi insists on references to  references to retained during Stalinism –,  school books  Soviet support for use as national symbol by MKP  statue  streets named after  Pfeiffer, Zoltán , , ,  Pieck, Wilhelm  Poland: National Council of the Homeland (KRN) ,  PKN, Polish National Committee ,  ZPP, Union of Polish Patriots  Potsdam Conference ,  PPR , ,  Pushkin, Georgi Maksimovich , , , , 



Quisling, Vidkun  Radek, Karl ,  Radescu, Nicolae  Radio Kosciuszko  Radio Kossuth , – Rajk, László: and changing of street names – conspiracy against the republic –,  and home communists  and left wing radicalism – and MKP martyr cult ,  repressive measures in the summer of   trial of , , –, –,  and wartime KMP programme – Rákóczi, Ferenc –, , , ,  Rákosi, Mátyás: abortive coup attempt  anti-Semitism –,  conspiracy vs. the republic ,  dissolution of Comintern ,  elections  –,  establishment of Cominform  Hungarian Legion  land reform  left wing radicals and veterans of  –, –, – martyr cult  MDP change of name from MKP  Mindszenty affair – national propaganda –, – national unity ,  party cadres – People’s Courts – and propaganda tactics – and radio  Rajk affair – Red Army atrocities –, , ,  relations with PCR – relationship with Soviet leaders , , –, ,  relationship with KSČ –, , – Socialist Patriotism – Stalin, th birthday  and Transylvanian question , – Red Army: atrocities –, – attitude towards Hungarian communists – forced labour – Hungarian reactions towards –

 Red Army (cont.): as liberator  looting – MKP attitude towards –,  Streets, monuments dedicated to , ,  used against MKP in propaganda ,  withdrawal from Hungary  Republic of Councils , ,  veterans of –, –, –, – Reti, László  Révai, József: Action Programme –, – Cominform ,  MDP (name change) – music academy speech – national propaganda – national interests, defence of –, – national unity –,  patriotism vs. chauvinism  The Politics of National Unity/Bread, Good Money, Order  prepares  centenary –, – proclamation of the republic  propaganda tactics – Rajk affair – relationship with KPČ – St Stephen ,  Slovakia, expulsion of Hungarians from  Socialist Patriotism  Transylvanian question , ,  wartime activities of  What did the MKP do for the Hungarian people?  Yugoslav–Soviet split – Reventlow, Count Ernst von  Romania: border violations with Hungary  Iron Guard  National Democratic Front  Transylvanian question –, –, – Tudor Vladimirescu brigade  Roosevelt, F. D ,  Ságvári, Ágnes ,  Ságvári, Endre , ,  St Stephen: celebration by MKP – FKGP attitude towards 

Index KSČ criticizes ideal of  removal of references after  ,  used in Mindszenty trial  Sallai, Imre  Scherbakov, A. S.  Schlageter, Leo – Schönherz, Zoltán  Scinteia  Sebestyén, Pál  Seventh Department, see GLAVPURRKA Siroky, Viliam , ,  Slánsky, Rudolf , ,  Slovak Communist Party , – Slovakia: Slovak–Hungarian population exchange , –,  Slovak Revolt  Smallholder Party, see FKGP Smidke, Karol  Social Democratic Party, see SzDP Socialism in one country – Soviet Patriotism  Soviet Union, see USSR Spanish Civil War –, – SS , , ,  Stalin, J. V.: th birthday  and Action Programme of the MKP  and Cominform – definition of nationalism – dissolves the Comintern – and expulsion of Hungarians from Slovakia – and Hungarian Legion  instigates national line of the Comintern  intervenes in Radio Kossuth editorial policy  and naming of MDP – and naming of ZPP  ‘national in form, socialist in content’  opinion on national flags  and percentage deal  policy of korenezatsiya  praised as friend of Hungary  prepared to accept Horthy as regent  and prisoners of war  Rajk affair ,  reaction to rape by Red Army soldiers 

Index relationship with Dimitrov  and Slovak-Hungarian population transfer  ‘Socialism in one country’  and Soviet power in Hungary – statue in Budapest  street named after , – and Transylvanian question – Steinmetz, Miklós  street name changes – Stomm, Marcel  Sulyok, Dezső ,  Suslov, Mikhail Alexandrovich – Sviridov, Vladimir Petrovich: demands return of food given to Budapest  deportation of Swabians  dissolves catholic youth organisations  and Red Army looting  Szabad Nép , ,  Donáth trial  expulsion of Swabians  prisoners of war  Transylvanian question – Szabadság  Szakasits, Árpád ,  Szálasi, Ferenc  Szamuely, Tibor  Szántó, Rezső: and abortive coup claim – and Action Programme –,  and home communists vs. Muscovites  and proclamation of the republic  and Révai’s music academy speech – and Third Congress of the MKP  wartime activities  Szántó, Zoltán –,  SzDP , , , ,  and elections () ,  and Left-wing Bloc  Szécheny, István ,  Szekfű, Gyula ,  Széll, Jenő  SZIT  Szőlősi, Jenő  Szőnyi, Tibor , – Táncsics, Mihály , , , ,  TASS 



Tatarescu, Gheorghe ,  Teleki, Géza  Teleki, Pál  Thorez, Maurice ,  Tildy, Zoltán –,  Timár, István  Tito, Josip Broz ,  and Rajk affair – Togliatti, Palmiro  Tömpe, András  Trianon, treaty of , , , ,  Truman, Harry S.  Turóczi, Géza  Új Szó ,  Ulbricht, Walter  USA  USSR: annexation of Bessarabia and Northern Transylvania  annexation of Transcarpathian Ukraine  expulsion of Germans  Hungarian reparations to  influences  elections – presented as liberator and protector of Hungary – Varga, Béla ,  Varga, László  Vas, Zoltán: activities in Moscow exile , – concerned about Red Army atrocities , – criticism of Seventh Department – as mayor of Budapest  and relationship MKP/VKP(b)  and Swabian expulsions  and veterans of  and radical communists  Világosság  VKP(b): Bureau of War Political Propaganda  Department of International Information ,  Foreign Affairs Department  International Department , , ,  Vlasov army  Volksbund , , , ,  Vörös, János 

 Voroshilov, Klement: and Budapest elections () – dissolution of the Comintern  expulsion of Hungarians from Slovakia , ,  prisoners of war  Vyshinsky, Andrej – Wolfheim, Fritz 

Index Yalta, Conference of ,  Yugoslavia: Hungarian reparations to  Korotkevich’s criticism of  Soviet–Yugoslav split  Zhdanov, Andrej , –, , 

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