A Rhetoric of Motives

OTHER BOOKS BY

KENNETH BURKE Counter-Statement Revised Edition Revised Paperback Edition Towards a Better Life, A Series of Epistles, or Declamations Revised Edition Permanence and Change, An Anatomy o£ Purpose Revised Edition Paperback Edition Attitudes Toward History Revised Edition Paperback Edition Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action Paperback Edition (Abridged) Revised Edition A Grammar of Motives Paperback Edition A Rhetoric of Motives Paperback Edition Book o£ Moments, Poems 1915-1954 The Rhetoric of Religion: Studies in Logology Language as Symbolic Action: Essays on Life, Literature, and Method Collected Poems, 1915-1967 The Complete White Oxen: Collected Short Fiction First Version Augmented Version Perspectives by Incongruity, Edited by S. E. Hyman and B. Karmiller Terms fw Order, Edited by S. E. Hyman and B. Karmiller

A RHETORIC OF MOTIVES

KENNETH BURKE

UNIVERSITY O F CALIFORNIA PRESS Berkeley and Los Angeles 1969

TO W.C. BLUM

University o£ California Press Berkeley and Los Angeles, California University o£ California Press, Ltd. London, England Copyright 1950 by Prentice-Hall, Inc. First paperback edition copyright O 1962 by The World Publishing Company

California edition @ Kenneth Burke, 1969 Library o£ Congress Catalog Card Number: 69-16742 Manulactured in the United States o£ Arnerica

appeared in T h e Nation. Otherwise, to my recollection, no portions of the work have been previously published. 1 wish to thank the members of my classes at Bennington College, who with charming patience participated in the working-out of the ideas here presented. And 1 wish to thank Dr. J. Robert Oppenheimer for the opportunity to spend some very helpful months at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, while making a final revision of the manuscript. Also, during this time, 1 was fortunate in being able to discuss many of these theories and analyses at the Princeton Seminars in Literary Criticism, then in process of formation. 1 regret that 1 did not have an opportunity to incorporate additions suggested by a six-month sojourn at the University of Chicago where, under the auspices of the College, 1 presented some of this material. Many authors of the past and present have contributed to the notions herein considered, in this project for "carving out a rhetoric," often from materials not generally thought to fa11 under the head. And 1 wish to make special acknowledgment for permission to quote from the following works still in copyright: Harcourt, Brace and Company, Inc., Collected Poems and Four Quartets by T . S. Eliot, and T h e Meaning of Meaning by C. K. Ogden and 1. A. Richards; Charles Scribner's Sons, George Santayana's Realms of Being, and T h e Prefaces of Henry James, edited by Richard Blackmur; Dr. Clyde Kluckhohn, Director of the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, for permission to quote from his pamphlet, Navaho Witchcraft; Harvard University Press, the Loeb Classical Library translation (by H. Rackham) of Cicero's De Oratore; Princeton University Press, Walter Lowrie's translation of Kierkegaard's Fear and Trembling; The University of Chicago Press, Austin Warren's Rage for Order; Modern Philology, Richard McKeon's essay, "Poetry and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century," which appeared in the May 1946 issue. And to The Mediaeval Academy of America for permission to quote from an essay by the same author, "Rhetoric in the Middle Ages," published in the January 1942 issue of Specdum; Longmans, Green and Co., T h e Varieties of Religious Experience, by William James; Schocken Books, Inc., Franz Kafka's T h e Castle, copyright 1946, and Max Brod's Kafka: A Biography, copyright 1947; the Oxford University Press, a poem by Gerard Manley Hopkins; The Viking Press, Thorstein Veblen's T h e Theory of the Leisure Class; The Macmillan Company, W. B. Yeats' "Byzantium" in Winding Stair, copyright 1933. K. B.

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CONTENTS 1. T H E 'RANGE OF RHETORIC T h e "Use" of Milton's Samson. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Qualifying the SEUcidd Motive. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Self-Immolation in Matthew Arnold. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Quality of Arnold's Imagery.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . T h e Imaging of Transformation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Dramatic and Philosophic Terms for Essenm. .................. "Tragic" T w m s for Personality Types. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Recapitulatim.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Imagery at Fate Value. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Identification.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i/ Identification and "Consubstantiality" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . \i' T h e Identifying Nature of Property . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i/ Identification and the "Autonomous" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . \/' T h e "Autonomy" of Science. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ''1"Redemption" i n Post-Christian Science . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D u d Possibilities of Science. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . lngenuous and Cunning Identifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rhetoric of "Address" (to the Individual Soul). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 'i/ ,.Rhetoric and Primitive Magic. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . / Realistic Function of Rhetoric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Persuasion.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Identification.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Other Variants of the Rhetorical Motive. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Formal Appeal.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Rhetoricd Form i n the Large. ................................ ix

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. . Imagtnatzon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

Image and Idea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84 Rhetoricd Analysis in Bentham . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 Marx on "Mystification" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 Terministic Reservations (in View of Cromwell's Motives) ...... 110 Carlyle on "Mystery" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114 Empson on "Pastoral" Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123 T h e "Invidiozd' as Imitation, in Veblen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127 Priority of the "Idea" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132 A Metaphorical View of Hierarchy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137 Diderot on "Pantomime" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142 Generic, Specific, and Individual Motives in Rochefoucauld ...... 145 De Gourmont on Dissociation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149 Pascal on "Directing the Intention" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154 "Administrative" Rhetoric in Machiauelli . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158 Dante's De Vulgari Eloquentia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167 Rhetoric in the Middle Ages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169 'Infancy," Mystery, and Persuasion ............................ 174

111. ORDER Positive. Dialectical. and Ultimate Terms...................... 183 Ultimate Elements in the Marxist Persuasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189 "Sociology of Knowledge" vs Platonic "Mytli" .................. 197 "Mythic" Ground and "Context of SittcationJJ.................. 203 Courtship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208 "Socioanagogid' Interpretation of Venus and Adonis . . . . . . . . . . . . 212 T h e Paradigm of Courtship: Castiglione . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221 T h e Caricature of Courtship: Kafka (The Castle) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233 A "Didectical Lyric" (Kierkegaurd's Fear and Trembling) . . . . . . 244 T h e Kilt and the Absurd . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 252 Order, the Secret, and the Kill . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 260 Pure Perswsion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 267 Rhetorical Radiancc of the "DivinE ........................... 294

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1 HENRY JAMES ON THE DEITY OF "THINGS" ................. 2. "SOCIAL RATING" OF IMAGES IN JAMES .................... 3 RI-IETORICAL NAMES FOR GOD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4. THE "RANGE OF MOUNTINGS". . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. ELATION AND ACCIDIE IN HOPKINS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. YEATS: "BYZANTIUM" AND THE LAST POEMS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 ELIOT: EARLY POEMS AND "Quartets" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 PRINCIPLE OP THE OXYMORON. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 ULTIMATE IDENTIFICATION .............................

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INTRODUCTION THEONLY diñicult portion of this book happens, unfortunately, to be at the start. There, selecting texts that are usually treated as pure poetry, we try to show why rhetorical and dialectical considerations are also called for. Since these texts involve an imagery of killing (as a typical text for today should) we note how, behind the surface, lies a quite different realm that has little to do with such motives. An imagery of killing is but one of many terrninologies by which writers can represent the process of change. And while recognizing the sinister implications of a preferente for homicida1 and suicida1 terms, we indicate that the principles of development or transformation ("rebirth") which they stand for are not strictly of such a nature at all. We emerge from the analysis with the key term, "Identification." Hence, readers who would prefer to begin with it, rather than to worry a text until it is gradually extricated, might go lightly through the opening pages, with the intention of not taking hold in earnest until they come to the general topic of Identification, on page 19. Thereafter, with this term as instrument, we seek to mark ofl the areas of rhetoric, by showing how a rhetorical motive is often present where it is not usually recognized, or thought to belong. In part, we would but rediscover rhetorical elements that had become obscured when rhetoric as a term fe11 into disuse, and other specialized disciplines such as esthetics, anthropology, psychoanalysis, and sociology came to the fore (so that esthetics sought to outlaw rhetoric, while the other sciences we have mentioned took over, each in its own terms, the rich rhetorical elements that esthetics would ban). But besides this job o£ reclamation, we also seek to develop our subject beyond the traditional bounds of rhetoric. There is an intermediate area of expression that is not wholly deliberate, yet not wholly unconscious. It lies midway between aimless utterance and speech directly purposive. For instance, a man who identifies his private ambitions with the good of the community may be partly justified, partly unjustified. He may be using a mere pretext to gain individual advantage at the public expense; yet he may be quite sincere, or even xiii

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mag willingly make sacrifices in behalf of such identification. Here is a rhetorical area not analyzable either as sheer design or as sheer simplicity. And we would treat of it here. Traditionally, the key term for rhetoric is not "identification," but

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oric, a persuasion, which in turn is grounded in a dialectic. The rhetoric is words; the dialectic, being concerned with the non-verbal order of motives, could be equated with "science." And an art in keeping would be grounded in "science" (or "dialectic") insofar as it took its start from the experiences of natural reality, while being rhetorical in proportion as its persuasiveness helped form judgments, choices, attitudes deemed favorable to Communist purposes. Al1 this seems obvious enough; but rhetoric having become identified with non-Marxist rhetoric, the Marxist persuasion is usually advanced in the name of 11 1 11;

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no-rhetoric. In his Book of Fallacies, Bentham had recognized both factional and universal interests. Factionally, he treated parliamentary wrangles in terms of the ins vs. the outs. And since, "whatsoever tlie ins have in possession, the outs have in expectancy," to this extent he saw no difference in their "sinister interests," nor in the fallacies by which they sought to protect or further these interests. But in addition to such factional splits, he observed, "these rivals have their share in the universal interest which belongs to them in their quality of members of the community at large. In this quality, they are sometimes occupied in such measures as in their eyes are necessary for the maintenance of the universal interest." For a comprehensive statement o£ human motives, this distinction o£ Bentham's seems very necessary. An ideal of cooperation, for instance, can certainly be applied for sinister factional advantage, as when conspirators cooperate against a common victim. Yet cooperation is also an ideal serving the interest of manrjind in general. It might be said that the Marxist analysis of rhetoric is primarily designed to throw new light on Bentham's "Fallacy of Vague Generalities." Otherwise put: As a critique of capitalist rhetoric, it is designed to disclose (unmask) sinister factional interests concealed in the bourgeois terms for benign universal interests. Though Marx twitted Bentham for his stress upon "interests," Marxism gives grand lineaments to the Benthamite notion of "interest-begotten prejudice." In its analysis of property, it puts an almost architecturally firm foundation beneath Bentham's somewhat flimsy d,istinction between ins and outs (indeed, as Bentham himself would probably have agreed, Marxism shows that often the shifts between ins and outs is but the

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most trivial of palace revolutions, where an apparently cleansing change of agents has left the morbidities of the scene itself substantially unchanged). And where Bentham had looked into extraverbal. . - situational factor~behind rhetorical expressions, recognizing "the influence of time and place in matters of legislation," and holding that a law good for one situation was not thereby to be considered cate. .. gorically good, Marx imposingly formalized such "conditional" thinking by linking it with his revisions of the Hegelian dialectic. Al1 told, Marx thus forged a formidable machine; and he could a ~ ~ itl to v A L shatter, as deceptive "ideology," traditions which had been the pride of mankind, but which in being upheld by economic and social classes . that got special advantage from them, a i d in being put forward as universally valid, thus protected factional interests in the wider, more general name of universal interests. To expose the workings of such "ideologies," it was necessary to give an exhaustive analysis of the "objective situation" in which they figured. Insofar as the terms describing this extraverbal situation were correct, they would apparently be a "dialectic" (in the sense that equates "dialectic" with "science"-i.e., with a subject matter of nonverbal things and relationships). They could be called a rhetoric, however, in severa1 important senses: (1) The account o£ extralinguistic factors in a rhetorical expression (as when disclosing how economic interests influence modes of expression that, considered "in themselves," seem wholly to transcend the economic) is itself an aspect o£ rhetorica docens, though perhaps on the outer edges; (2) insofar as the Marxist vocabulary itself is partial, or partisan, it is rhetorical, and we could not have a dialectic in the fullest sense unless we gave equally sympathetic expreuion to competing principles (though we shall later see that this objection must be modified) ; (3) it is concerned with advantage, not only in analyzing the hidden advantage in other terminologies (or "ideologies"), but also in itself inducing to advantages of a special sort. (Here it becomes a kind of rhetorica utens.) The main principles of Marxism, as a theory of rhetoric, are most directly stated, perhaps, in an early work by Marx and Engels, T h e German Ideology. But though Marxist writings probably contributed much to the current prestige of the word, "ideology," it is seldom used in exactly the sense that Marx gave it. So we might begin by noting /

the severa1 meanings it now seems to have, meanings wbich, while not necessarily antagonistic to one another, are quite diffeient in insight 1 and emphasis : 1. The audy, development, criticism of ideas, considered in themselves. (As in a Socratic dialogue.) 2. A system of ideas, aiming at social or political action. (Pareto's sociology, or Hitler's Mein Kampf.) 3. Any set of interrelated terms, having practica1 civic consequences, directly or indirectly. (A business men's code of fair practica might be a good instance.) 4. "Myth" designed for purposes of governmental coatrol. ("Ideology" would here be an exact synonym for "myth of the state.") 5. A partial, hence to a degree deceptive, view of reality, particularly when the limitations can be attributed to "interest-begotten prejudice." (For instance, a white Southern intellectual's "ironic resignation" to a stattrs quo built on "white supremacy.") 6. Purposefully manipulated overemphasis or underemphasis in the discussion of controversia1 political and social issues. (For instance, the kind of verbalizing done by a statesman, home from a discordant conference with foreign diplomats. In a "confidential" radio talk he gives the people a "frank and simple report of the facts." But the report is scrupulously designed to allow them no inkling of how the matter looks from the other side.) 7. An inverted genealogy of culture, that makes for "illusion" and "mystification" by treating ideas as pimnry where they should have been treated as derivative. This last meaning is the most difKcult. But because Marxism is a materialist revision of Hegel's idealism, not only do the authors of T h e German ldeology take their start from this seventh definition, they continually circle back to it. If we understand this special usage, we can see why a Marxist might legitimately object when, after he has attacked his political opponents as "ideologists," they retort by calling Marxism an "ideology" too. In the special sense of the word, as used in The German ldeology, it is quite true that the schools and movements there selected for attack are "ideologies," while Marxism is not. Of course, in the War of Words, there is nothing to prevent contestants from hitting one another with anything they can lay hands

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on. So you could be sure that, once the Marxists had given the word a strong dyslogistic weighting, they too would be resoundingly dyslogized by it (as, having zealously helped make "fascism" a dyslogistic word, they end by being called "Red Fascists"). But for our yresent purposes, we should try to see the word exactly as Marx used it. For only by trying to get the matter straight can we understand the Marxist contribution to rhetoric, and thereby isolate a principle which can even be applied beyond the purposes of Marxism. We consider it a sign of flimsy thinking, indeed, to let anti-Communist hysteria bulldoze one into neglect of Marx. (We say "bulldoze," but we are aware that the typical pedagogue today is not "bulldozed" into such speculative crudity; he welcomes it, and even feels positively edified by it. If he cannot grace his country with any bright thoughts of his own, he can at least persuade himself that he is being a patriot in closing his mind to the bright thoughts of his opponents. No wonder the tendency is so widespread. It is a negative kind of accomplishment for which many can qualify.) With the division of labor, Marx says, and the corresponding cleavage of society into different social and economic classes, there arises a ruling class; likewise, from the distinction between manual and intellectual work, there arise specialists in words (or "ideas"), such as priests, philosophers, theoreticians, jurists, in general, "ideologists," who see things too exclusively in terms of their specialty, and thereby misinterpret the role played by "consciousness," "spirit," "idea," Ui human history. The whole relationship between "matter" and "spirit" thus seems to be exactly the reverse of what it really is. Property and the division of labor give rise to a ruling class with its peculiar set of ideas; each economic change calls forth a corresponding change in the nature of the ruling class (or at moments of revolutionary crisis a new ruling class takes over)-and each such alteration in the conditions of the-ruling class is riflected as a corresponding change of "ideas." The "ideologists" of the ruling class, in keeping with the nature o£ their specialty, perfect and systematize the ideas of the ruling class. And, since the ruling class controls the main channels of expression, the ideas of the ruling class become the "ruling ideas." But, such is the nature o£ documents, after the economic basis o£ society has changed, and the class structure has changed accordingly,

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the ideas that had prevailed seem to remain unchanged. That is, once the verbal or esthetic expressions are recorded, they retain substantially the form that they had when they arose. Ima~ine.now, an "ideologist" who, with the documents o£ -many. centuries to work from, inspects a whole developmental series ot such successive "ruling" ideas, and who, considering these ideas "in themselves," attempts to work out an explanation for their development. If he proceeds in accordance with the Hegelian dialectic, he will get the kind of reversed genealogy which Marxism is attacking. .. He . ,can treat these particular sets o£ ideas in terms o£ some over-al1 titie, a word for ideas in !general, such as Spirit, or Consciousness, or die Idee. Hence he can look upon the succession of "ruling" ideas (like "honor," "lovaltv." "libertv") , . as though each were an expression of the one I I' Universal Idea (his title for &e lot, which he uses not just as a summarizine word, but as a "sub-ject" in the strict philosophic sense, that is, an underlying basis, a sub-stance, o£ which any step along the entire series can be considered as a property, or expression). He can next assign some direction to the entire series, such as the gradual increase of freedom or self-consciousness. Then he can treat this ultimate direction as the essence o£ the whole series, the end towards which the entire series strives, whereby it can be considered latent in even the first step o£ the series. Then this Purpose, or Universal Idea, can be viewed as the creative principie operating within the entire series. Each step along the way would be a limited expression o£ this universal principle; its nature would be determined by its particular place in the series; yet within the limitations of its nature, each stage would represent the principle o£ the total development (as bud, flower, and seed could each, at different stages in a plant's growth, be called successive momentary expressions of a single biologic continuity). "The Idea" thus becomes a universal self-developing organism. Its successive stages make a dialectical series, as shifts in the nature o£ nronertv. oroduction, and rule make for shifts in the ruling ideas; but r 1 these ruling ideas are considered "purely" (as manifestations, not ot oarticular ruling., classes, but of the "Absolute Idea"). 'I'he Absolute L Idea thus becomes the creator o£ nature and history, which are but concrete expressions of ít. Hence, al1 the material relations in history are interpreted as the products o£ this Universal Spirit, manifesting itself in the empirical world. The study o£ this empirical world, o£ '

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course, would include such matters as conflicts over property. But instead of considering ideas as weapons shaped by their use in such conflicts, the kind of "ideologist" Marx is attacking would treat the conficts as themselves but "moments" in the expression of the Universal Idea underlying al1 historical development. In this strictly Hegelian form, Marx may here seem to be attacking a doctrine to which few practical-minded persons would subscribe. Quite true, yet once you begin to follow the logic o£ Marx's critique, you see that most people ditfer from Hegel, not in being immune to such thinking, but in being immune to its thoroughness. Marx shows how this position generates a whole set of belieh. And what you usually encounter, in the piecemeal thinking of the non-philosophic mind, is a view comprising various detached fragments o£ such "ideology." Since these fragments prevail on important issues, such as our views o£ nationalism, a rhetorical critique o£ such patterns, as they lurk in our thinking, is of tremendous importance. The authors list three telltale tricks of such "theodicy," whereby the "hegemony" or "hierarchy" of spirit in history is "proved": (1) The thinker separates the ruling ideas from the ruling class, and by thus dealing with the ideas in their "pure" form, concludes that the ruling force of history is "ideas" or "illusions"; (2) the ideas are arranged in a developmental series, with a "mystical" connection among them (this is done by treating the successive ideas as though they were "acts o£ self-determination" on the part of the divine, absolute, or pure Idea) ; (3) the "mystical appearance" can be removed by putting progressively increasing "self-consciousness" in place of "the self-determining concept"; or it can be made to lo04 thoroughly materialistic (despite its underlying principle of "mystification") if it is transformed into a developmental series of persons, thinkers, philosophers, "ideologists," who are said to be the historical representatives of the concept." S